Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instablity: The case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa

By

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Abstract

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Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instability: the case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa seeks to unravel a conundrum in African politics. Since the 1980s, we have witnessed two contradictory trends: on the one hand, coups, which have become rare events world-wide, have continued to proliferate in the region; concurrently, several African countries – such as Ghana, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Benin – have managed to escape from seemingly insurmountable coup-traps. What explains this divergence? To address these contradictory trends, I focus initially on Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, neighboring states, with comparable populations, topographies, and economies that have experienced contrasting trajectories. While Ghana suffered five consecutive coups from the 1966 to 1981, Cote d'Ivoire was an oasis of stability and prosperity. However, by the end of the 20th century, Ghana had emerged as one of the few stable two-party democracies on the continent, as Cote d'Ivoire slid into civil war. Why was Cote d'Ivoire so much more stable and prosperous than Ghana in the '60s and '70s? And what explains their dramatic reversal of fortunes?

I answer these puzzles by examining the political strategies of regimes in both countries, with a particular focus on rural alliances. I find that the leaders who followed a *rural political strategy* were better able to preserve stability, while those who followed an *urban political strategy* were more likely to suffer coups. In contrast to the prevalent urban-bias thesis, I contend that traditional elites and producers in rural areas – not the organized urban sectors – are most critical to political stability. To show the wider applicability of my thesis, I extend my argument beyond these two countries. In a systematic review of fifty-eight regimes over eighteen sub-Saharan countries, I demonstrate that the rural/urban dichotomy is pervasive and predictive of the success/failure of regimes. Using formal modeling, I show a strong and robust correlation between supporting rural areas and the likelihood of being ousted in a coup as well as longevity in power

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Barbara Cowen, without whose continual support and love it would not have been realized.

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INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, neighboring states with similar populations, economies and geographies, represented opposite poles among the newly independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Côte d'Ivoire's rapid development was singular – so singular that it was dubbed the 'Ivorian miracle'. In contrast, Ghana, once the most prosperous territory in Colonial West Africa, had become one of the poorest nations in the region and was spiraling into a seemingly unending succession of coups. However, fast-forward three more decades and the two countries had exchanged places. By the turn of the 21st century the Ivorian miracle had come to a violent and unexpected end, the country suffering its first coup after forty years of political stability. Ghana, on the other hand, had become the poster-child for democratic governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Why did these two countries reverse their fates?

The reversal of fortunes of these two countries is, in fact, emblematic of wider trends on the continent. Therefore, a study of the Côte d'Ivoire's slide from stability to instability and Ghana's successful climb out of instability can help shed light on how states more broadly achieve political stability in Africa. Speaking in the broadest terms, Africanists have developed fruitful schemas for analyzing the failures of post-independence Africa, but have been less successful in critically assessing its successes. For example, great strides have been made in explaining how dysfunctional governance systems are perpetuated in sub-Saharan Africa. Bates (2008) examines how inherited colonial institutions have enabled African leaders' to create 'control regimes' that undermine the productive capacity of the state, enabling leaders to privilege the few at the expense of the many. Leonard and Strauss (2003) analyze how the region's high dependence upon geographically circumscribed resources ('enclave economies') and/or international aid undermines governments' responsiveness and states' productivity. A variant of this line of reasoning is provided by Riddell who argues that it is not the ease of receiving aid but rather the inadequate and irrational distribution of aid on the part of international donors that has undermined the ability of governments to develop their own capacity and stabilize their economies. Perhaps, the most prevalent generalization made about African politics is that the region suffers from patrimonial systems of rule which legitimize the use of public resources for patronage, undermining the institutional order and economic development (Jackson & Rosberg 1984, 1985; Bayart 1989; Chabal & Daloz 1999; van de Walle 2001).

The problem is that none of these analyses help us understand why some states (such as Ghana), though they share all of these afflictions, have been able stabilize after prolonged periods of political volatility, while others, like Côte d'Ivoire, spiral out of control despite having been stable for decades. Yet these types of dramatic changes occur frequently. Mali alone is emblematic of the dissonant trends on the continent. From 1960 to 1991, Mali experienced two coups and was subject to military rule. In 1991, its military rule finally ended as Mali's first democratically elected President took office. But in 2012, Mali's thirty-year democracy was violently ended with a military coup. Ever since, Mali has been on a path towards increasing political instability. Unfortunately, the dominant paradigms in African politics are too static to explain such transformations. What is missing, therefore, is a more nuanced account of the incentive structures that might lead a head of state to develop better or worse state-building strategies.

Today, however, we have a unique opportunity. Since the 1980s, there have been a handful of states that have rebuilt out of the ashes of failed regimes: Uganda, Ghana, Benin and

Burkina Faso. Moreover, they have done so in a similar way. All of these countries have extricated themselves from what is termed a 'coup-trap'. Prior to 1980, Ghana experienced a succession of five coups over a fifteen-year period, Uganda seven, Benin six and Burkina Faso seven. Studying their transitions may offer a new window into African politics.

There are, of course, many analyses of coups and political risk. But none have been able to bridge both macro and micro explanations of the phenomena. Econometric studies have identified several conditions associated with coups and political risk, such as instability of export earnings, regime type, leadership duration, past coups, economic decline and underdevelopment. However, such correlations leave the mechanisms that bring about change opaque, only suggesting "the societal background that might encourage military upheavals" (Decalo 1986:42). Scholars have also analyzed the relationship of coup risk to the institutional structure of the military, such as the high levels of ethnic fractionalization within sub-Saharan militaries (Horowitz 1986). Yet, given the structural similarities of African militaries, these studies generally do not provide a means to analyze which regimes will more likely trigger such events. In contrast, studies that offer insight into what typically triggers coups, such as intra-military rivalries, or threats to an aggrieved faction or soldier (Kandeh 2004; Decalo 1986; Baynham 1986; First 1970), do not help explain how such trigger mechanisms relate to the broader structural conditions associated with coup risk. The gap in the scholarship is best exemplified by the literature on coup-traps. The most consistent finding has been that countries that suffer from the combination of low GDP and the experience of a past coup are far more likely to undergo subsequent coups (Londregan & Poole 1990; Collier & Hoeffler 2005). However, this presents a perplexing puzzle – if having had a coup and low GDP sends one into a coup-trap, what enabled these countries to end their coup-traps?

The argument put forth here is that because most sub-Saharan states have similar structural vulnerabilities, e.g. low GDP, high dependence on commodity exports, poor insertion in the global economy, under institutionalized political systems, high levels of ethnic fractionalization, etc. (Belkin & Schofer 2003; Decalo 1986), the likelihood of a leader being deposed is largely determined by his/her political strategy. In a region dominated by patrimonial regimes, where economic and state power are fused in the office of the president, the choices a given leader makes has far ranging consequences (Jackson & Rosberg 1984; van de Walle 2001). Moreover, given the zero-sum nature of politics in sub-Saharan Africa, both in terms of access to resources and higher levels of risk in losing power, policy choices are often derivative of immediate political imperatives (Jackson & Rosberg 1984; A. Goldsmith 2001). As a result, the strategic choices leaders in sub-Saharan Africa make are more critical to political outcomes than in more institutionalized states.

I further posit that there are two dominant political strategies used: an *urban political strategy* that yields instability; and a *rural political strategy* that yields stability. I define an urban strategy as one in which leaders appease urban groups, enacting policies favorable to urban dwellers but harmful to peasants and local/regional elites. I define a rural strategy as a one in which heads of state suppress urban groups rather than accede to their demands and pursue policies favorable to agricultural producers and traditional elites. The logic behind my thesis is that a regime that can mobilize a strong rural power base and repress organized urban sectors, will be able to enact policies that keep traditional rural elites in check, undermine the organizational capacity of urban opposition and promote agricultural growth, thereby fostering stability and minimizing politicization of the military. The reverse is also true, i.e. a regime that cannot suppress its urban political base and has a weak rural political base will use policies to

promote urban interests, leaving the rural areas disaffected, undermining economic growth and, thus, over time, fracturing the military and destabilizing the regime.

Understanding the different positions that have been taken vis-à-vis the urban and agricultural sectors may therefore be the key to unlocking the coup-trap conundrum. If my contention is right, the ability of a new leader to forge alliances with important rural elites and develop cross-regional rural support may be the critical factor that allowed these countries to end their coup-traps.

CHAPTER 1

URBAN-BIAS AND THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

For decades, conventional Africanist wisdom has held that in order to maintain power, African leaders, easily imperiled by urban populations and ever fearful of food-riots, have been forced to implement policies favorable to urban consumers but detrimental to the majority rural population. Ever since Bates (1981) applied Lipton's (1977) concept of 'urban-bias' to Africa, the term has become as integral to the study of African politics as ethnic fractionalization and neo-patrimonialism. This line of reasoning is encapsulated by Bienen and Herbst:

> "African countries exhibit a profound urban bias because the state is based almost entirely in the capital city. Although the majority of Africans still lives in the countryside, the pricing of many goods and the delivery of social services have been heavily biased in favor of the relatively small urban population. Successive nondemocratic African governments have also viewed the urban population as their main constituency because, although votes were not important, the fear of destabilizing urban riots was very real. Regimes that did not have to pay attention to rural voters did not favor agricultural interests and rural majorities." [1996:33]

Even though some scholars have criticized the simplest formulation of the 'urban-bias' thesis (van de Walle 2001; Varshney 1993; Widner 1993), it is still widely held that, except in rare instances or when there are multi-party elections, rural constituents are politically inconsequential and therefore easily neglected. Indeed, the idea that rural dwellers might be politically significant in sub-Saharan Africa is in many ways counter-intuitive. The rural areas have rarely been politically mobilized. Therefore, it seems implausible that they would be strategically vital to the central government. Because Africanists, by and large, have taken the urban-bias thesis for granted, few have systematically investigated the implications of holding different kinds of policy.[1]

However, the persistence of this interpretation is puzzling when one looks at the empirical evidence. In fact, one finds a much wider variety of policy choices have been enacted by regimes. Though many leaders have supported urban constituents by paying extremely low farmgate prices to farmers to keep the price of food low, we can find several examples of regimes that did the opposite. African leaders such as Houphouët-Boigny, J.J. Rawlings, Yoweri Museveni and Ahmadou Ahidjo all chose to focus on agriculture and offered relatively favorable prices to producer. They, moreover, were willing to deal with the type of urban consumer militancy that emerged with far more repression and less concession than the Bates-model would predict. Indeed, the canonical examples of politically stable regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those of Jomo Kenyatta, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere and Hastings Banda, all had strong rural support bases. On the other hand, many failed leaders, like Milton Obote, Kwame Nkrumah, Hubert Maga in Benin, Maurice Yaméogo in Burkina Faso and Modibo Keita in Mali, neglected rural constituents and promoted urban interests.

One of the reasons that the urban bias thesis has remained so prevalent is that the political leverage of urban groups in the region is often overestimated. In point of fact,

[1] Catherine Boone (2003A, 2003B) offers an important exception. Boone systematically compares how regimes institutionalize core-periphery relationships and develops a rigorous typology.

however, urban interest groups in sub-Saharan Africa on the whole have tended to be weak. "African governments have typically outlawed, emasculated, or coopted economic interest groups such as unions, business associations and farmer associations" (van de Walle 2001:29-30). This is because the private sector has remained relatively small while the industrial sector and most formal employment has been controlled by the state. The state has therefore had greater leverage over organized interest groups than in other parts of the world. Perhaps most significantly, a number of studies have found that the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) unfavorable to urbanites did not bring about serious political instability or regime change (Auvinen 1996; Bienen & Herbst 1996; Snider 1990; Bienen 1993; Bienen & Gersovitz 1986; Bienen and Gersovitz 1985).

By the same token, the importance of establishing ties to the periphery has been underestimated, as has the desire and capacity of regimes to do so. Because of the weakness of bureaucratic structures, particularly in the rural areas, the presumption has been that there are no or few effective ways for the center to penetrate the periphery (Hyden 1980; Herbst 2000). However, there are many ways in which the center has been able to penetrate the rural areas and conversely rural elites have been able to exert pressure on the center (Boone 2003A; 2003B). The focus on the 'informality' of traditional socio-political structures belies the extent to which the 'informal' sector is regularized and formalized. In fact, in the rural areas there are entrenched hierarchical divisions regulating the flow of resources and most exchanges among people (Mamdani 1996). As such, "Informal power relations, communal divisions or solidarities and underlying economic arrangements can constitute real parameters of institutional change and choice" (Boone 2003A:4-5).

Moreover, these communal divisions, solidarities and economic arrangements are not geographically circumscribed; they span the state – connecting urban dwellers to their natal or ancestral villages. Many urbanites maintain a family home in their ancestral village, which they visit annually; many others sustain farms to supplement their income (Berry 1989). Urban elites often sustain clientelist relationships with people in their natal villages.[2] Perhaps most importantly, the distinction between rural and urban elites is a blurry one at best. Privileged rural families are able to send their children to the best universities and therefore make-up a significant portion of the urban elite; in some cases wealthy chiefs are themselves urban elites.[3] Therefore, the ability of urban of elites to mobilize rural areas is ever-present; and conversely a sense of injustice against a particular region can have a significant impact on urban constituents. For all these reasons, rural areas play a more potent political role than is generally assumed.

Therefore, though I do not question that urban constituencies pose a great potential threat to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, I am contesting the entrenched idea that the way regimes have kept that threat in check is by sustaining policies favorable to urban consumers. In fact, I am going further and claiming that those regimes that have been most successful have actually pursued the opposite strategy, what I term a rural political strategy. In this study, I will argue that the reverse of the dominant assumption is true: even without elections, the stability of a regime

[2] For example, in a survey undertaken in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s, of the 354 Abidjan residents surveyed, 22 percent belonged to "hometown associations, which the majority stated they supported as a way to promote economic development in their native villages" (Woods 1994:471). According to Woods, "the spread of hometown associations is linked with a broader process of socio-economic upward mobility on the part of an urban elite…Many bureaucrats and party officials see the formation of local and regional associations as a means of building up for themselves a clientele base" (1994:472).

[3] For example, at independence in both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, the professional classes were individuals that had had privileged educations because they were from or related to noble families.

and the ability of a leader to sustain himself in power have been actively won by promoting political and economic policies that support regional elites and regional populations and by curtailing the demands of urban constituencies. My central argument is that the political leaders with the political acumen to politically incorporate rural areas have been the best able to sustain control of the state.

Rural versus Urban Political Strategy

Another way to put things is that the dominant theories in African politics present an overly simplistic account of political coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the urban-bias literature ignores the central role played by traditional elites and focuses too much attention on urban interest groups. On the other hand, the patrimonialist literature, though it focuses on the importance of coopting ethnic and regional representatives, ignores *which* elites are being coopted. Yet, coopting lesser chiefs and putting them in power in the place of long-standing paramount chiefs has different implications from coopting existing power brokers. For this reason, simply adding to the cabinet[4] or co-opting regional representatives, in and of itself, may not be sufficient to explain divergent outcomes.[5]

In this study, I differentiate between regimes that build coalitions through urban political strategies from those that use rural political strategies. The regimes that have fostered rural coalitions – by taking measures such as, favoring export-agriculture, devolving power to local governments, investing in rural infrastructural/development projects and incorporating powerful regional elites in the governing coalition – have been the most stable. Contrastively, the regimes that have been the most unstable are the ones that have catered to their urban constituencies by choosing extreme pricing policies to favor urban consumers, restricting political participation of established local elites and neglecting the rural areas.

To be clear, it is important to underscore that it is not my contention that regimes that follow 'rural political strategies' do not have urban-bias. Rather my claim is that there are significant and discernible differences between a rural approach and an urban one. In sub-Saharan Africa, rural resources remain critical to urban and national development. Therefore, by necessity, almost all regimes in Africa have policies that are biased towards the urban areas. Yet, not all do so in the same way. Just as neo-patrimonialism is not sufficient to explain divergent outcomes, neither is 'urban-bias.' The social forces I believe to be most consequential are on the one hand, unemployed urban 'youth' and school-leavers[6] in the capital and on the other, competing regional and local powerbrokers (particularly chiefs). An urban strategy gives primacy to the former, while the rural strategy to the latter.

As understood here then, a rural strategy has both political and economic dimensions. It is not simply the promotion of one agricultural export commodity, but rather a systemic approach to development and governance: one which focuses on fostering the cooperation of rural populations as a means to both maintain the periphery and expand the productive capacity

[4] For a discussion of political stability and cabinet-building strategies see Arriola 2009.

[5] The Bédié government in Cote d'Ivoire underscores this point. Bédié increased the size of his cabinet two times, the last time only one year before the coup d'état. In addition, in the last cabinet he included Francis Wodié, the leader of the only party which had contested the Presidential election in 1995. Yet, Wodié had negligible support, while Bédié continued to exclude the one political leader that had mobilized the most opposition: Alassane Ouattara.

[6] The term 'youth' in Africa is a broad category, having little to do with age. It generally refers to men who are of lower social-status. School-leavers are those with primary or secondary school education.

of the state. In contrast, an urban strategy is a defensive posture: one in which the regime tries to sustain control by forestalling urban discontent through the creation of state industries (to supply jobs to urban youth and 'school-leavers') and by implementing pricing policies aimed at keeping urban food costs down (primarily through farmgate pricing and currency policies that keep imports accessible to urbanites). In the simplest terms, a rural political strategy consists of policies that benefit farmers and chiefs, while an urban strategy benefits urban youth and urban consumers.

To determine if a policy is 'rural' or 'urban' I have three measures:1) Devolution of Power to Power to Established Traditional Elites; 2) Concentration of Agriculture; and 3) Development Priorities (See Tables 1, 2 below).[7]

Table 1: Measures of Ideal-typical Rural Strategy

Devolution of Power to Established Traditional Elites
- Permission of chiefs to participate in local political administration; and local elite access to state funds
- Administrative incorporation = traditional elites are free to run localities according to their precepts (or)
- Decentralization = open local elections enabling local notables to be popularly chosen for representation
- Laws protecting chieftaincy
- Inclusion of important regional traditional elites/notables in central government

Deconcentration of Agriculture:
- Promotion of export agriculture that empowers individual farmers:
  - Favorable producer prices
  - Access to inputs and credit

Development Focus:
- Government promotion of farming and rural (re)settlement

Table 2: Measures of Ideal-typical Urban Strategy

Centralization of Government Administration
- Prohibition of chiefs from participation in local political administration – replacement with state agents (courts, policing, resource distribution)
- Laws usurping chieftaincy
- Exclusion of regional powerbrokers in central government
- Incorporation of less-established regional elites in party and government

Centralization of Agriculture:
- Promotion of export agriculture exclusively through state owned/operated agents
- Unfavorable producer prices
- Inaccessibility or low accessibility of farming inputs and credits

Developmental Focus:
- Job creation for urban youth and school-leavers

[7] This typology is similar to that used by Boone (2003A, 2003B).

There are, admittedly, potential problems with lumping 'rural policies' together. In particular, Boone (1993, 1998, 2003A, 2003B) has demonstrated that rural societies in Africa are not homogeneous and further that, because of variations in regional/tribal organization, as well as regions' command over resources, states develop heterogeneous links to the periphery. Therefore, a regimes capacity to penetrate different regions and reciprocally of regional power brokers to pressure the center, differs across time and space. Nevertheless, I believe that focusing on the larger 'rural vs. urban' dichotomy still provides important analytic leverage. This is because, in the first place, the type of strategy chosen – even if implemented differently in different regions – has similar impacts across regions.

It is true that policies focusing exclusively on a particular export crop might only benefit one area. Generally, however, where leaders have been focused on building up a rural base of support, they have implemented policies that have positively impacted rural areas across the state. Building up a rural base of support requires the buy-in of rural elites – chiefs – which leads to the promulgation of laws and the creation of local government structures that benefit chiefs in all areas. Similarly, policies that promote agricultural production require investment in rural infrastructure, which can potentially aid rural dwellers involved in a wide spectrum of activities. Conversely, policies that try to suppress regional control of resources (as a means to control agricultural exports and lower urban food costs) adversely impact chiefs and producers across regions, alienating populations throughout the territory.

Secondly, by a 'rural' strategy, I am not strictly referring to developmental policies. There is also an important strategic political element. Even decentralization policies are often driven more by political imperatives than economic ones (Crook 2003:84). My focus is on how well leaders develop local alliances aimed at sustaining control of the periphery. Consequently, in determining if a regime has followed a rural or urban strategy, I look at how effectively a regime has created alliances with established local and regional power brokers.

My third rationale for using the categories of 'rural' versus 'urban' is that, in sub-Saharan Africa, urban living is disproportionately centered in the commercial capital. Indeed, with few exceptions, secondary cities tend to function more as regional extensions than as competing metropolises (Yacoob & Kelly 1999). For all these reasons, juxtaposing regional areas against the urban center is analytically coherent. In short, I use the term 'urban' to refer to commercial capital cities and 'rural' to refer to 'regional' areas. Accordingly, another way to characterize the strategies I am outlining would be to label them as 'capital vs. cross-regional political strategies.' By rural political strategy, then, I am referring to policies that seek to incorporate elites and populations across different regions through a combination of economic and political policies.

Put simply, rural political strategies are the best way to conduct successful domestic ethnic and geopolitics in sub-Saharan Africa. By taxing producers without squeezing them, regimes are better able to expand the productive capacity of the state, thereby increasing state revenue and food production. By coopting existing powerbrokers, regimes can potentially diminish regional disaffection, thereby curbing ethnic-mobilization. In turn, bolstering the productive base of the economy and reducing ethnic-mobilization helps contain urban discontent and the politicization of the armed-forces, improving a regime's chance of survival.

The Study

This theoretical discussion is supported by research conducted at two different levels of analysis: an in-depth analysis of my two emblematic countries, and a larger survey of resource-

poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding that every historical period presents political leaders with particular constraints and opportunities, both the in-depth analysis and the larger survey is divided into two epochs: the independence period, from 1960-1980; and the Structural Adjustment period (SAP), from 1980-2000.

In Part I, I present a comparative analysis of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire at two different time periods (See Table 3).[8] Chapters Two and Three examine the independence leaders of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, respectively; Chapters Four and Five, the Structural Adjustment leaders in both countries. In Part II, Chapter Six, I test how widely applicable this typology is by surveying fifty-eight regimes in eighteen agriculturally-based sub-Saharan countries, from 1960-2000.

Table 3: The Case Comparison

	Ghana	*Cote d'Ivoire*
Independence Regimes	Nkrumah (1957-1966) *Instability*	Houphouët (1960-1993) *Stability*
SAP Regimes	J.J. Rawlings (1981-2000) *Stability*	Bédié (1994-1999) *Instability*

For the in-depth analyses, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were chosen because of their relative similarities. These neighboring states have comparable population sizes, levels of ethnic fractionalization, economies, climates and terrains. Both countries have economies based on primary exports: cocoa in Ghana; cocoa and coffee in Côte d'Ivoire. Topographically, they are divided in half between a fertile forest-belt in the South and dry, savannah in the North. The roughly twenty-million inhabitants in both countries are divided between the less privileged, predominately Muslim tribes in the North and the wealthier, predominately Christian, Akan peoples in the South (see Table 4**).** As a result of all these similarities, there is a long history of scholarly comparison between these two states **(**Foster & Zolberg 1971, Woronoff 1972, Zartman 1997, Boone 2003, MacClean 2010)**.**

The in-depth case studies demonstrate how a leaders' capacity to sustain a rural policy can help the regime overcome problems endemic to patrimonial rule. It has generally been observed that, "personalistic rulers who are overly sensitive to threats to their authority set about weakening all independent centers of power beyond their control" (Bratton & van de Walle 1997:84). The studies will illustrate that the leaders who were able to mitigate the power of competing elites through cooptation rather than repression were more successful. Another central problem for patrimonial rulers is that they lack institutional ties to corporate groups in society. They therefore have a tendency to lose touch with popular perceptions (Bratton & van de Walle:1997:84). Accordingly, the capacity of leaders to appoint and listen to good advisors and

[8] The following analysis is based on data collected during my fieldwork in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire between 2009 and 2010, from diverse sources including government reports and documents, contemporary newspaper articles and interviews with former Ministers, academics, journalists, civil servants and community leaders.

particularly to trust and recruit technocrats is critical. As critical is a leader's ability to be flexible enough to change course when popular opinion jeopardizes their support in a given region. The case studies will show that the leaders who were unable to seek good council and be flexible lost support of powerful regional elites and farmers. As a result, they were to lose the support of important ethnic groups and undermine the economy, ultimately losing control over their own militaries.[9]

Table 4: Ethnic Fractionalization in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

Côte d'Ivoire	*Ghana*
Akan 42.1%, Voltaiques or Gur 17.6%, Northern Mandes 16.5% Krous 11%, Southern Mandes 10%, other 2.8%	**Akan 45.3%,** Mole-Dagbon 15.2%, Ewe 11.7% Ga-Dangme 7.3% Guan 4% Gurma 3.6%, Grusi 2.6% Mande-Busanga 1%, other tribes 1.4% other 7.8%

Source: CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/html (accessed 2/11/2012)

In Part II, I demonstrate the wider applicability of my rural/urban model and provide evidence for my probabilistic claims about coups. I offer both a statistical model, as well as a survey-narrative of the fifty-eight cases examined. The larger quantitative study provides statistical support for these claims and the accompanying narrative illustrates the broader patterns.

The quantitative study is limited to agriculturally-dependent countries. Though there may be implications for countries with resource-wealth, it has been repeatedly shown that mineral and oil-rich countries have different political dynamics.[10] The final sample size is fifty-eight regimes from eighteen countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Madagascar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe.[11] This case selection has the benefit of including countries of different sizes, regions and colonial backgrounds.

[9] Widner has encapsulated this in the following passage: "How leaders perceive the constraints rules and organizations create and the costs, benefits and risks attached to alternative courses of action affects outcomes...This repertoire of skills, styles and preferences enables some decision makers to learn from their mistakes while others repeat the errors of the past and it prompts some to try to change the rules of the game by re-designing institutions instead of respecting the limits set by existing structures. In short, character matters in the way leaders incorporate the features of the political landscape social scientists so often take as given into their decision making." [Widner 1994:152]

[10] See Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Benjamin Smith 2004; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2002; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004.

[11] I have excluded regimes in power for less than nine months, provisional/transitional governments and one Comorian leader that died in office after only three years in power.

Throughout this study, political instability is defined as the likelihood of being forcibly removed from power within ten years.[12] I have chosen to focus on forcible removals, in part, because they are discrete events that are easier to identify, but more importantly because this type of quick military intervention has commonly been the cause of instability in sub-Saharan Africa. Though military interventions have become relatively rare events globally, they continue to be pervasive in Africa. Thirty out of forty-eight sub-Saharan states have experienced at least one successful coup. All told, the number of coups in the region is staggering – it is estimated that between 1956 and 2001, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed eighty successful coups, 108 failed coups and 138 coup-plots (McGowan 2003). Nor have these numbers abated with increasing trends towards democratization. In the 21st century alone, thirteen coups have been successfully staged in Africa, thus far.[13] This of course does not include the many failed coups and coup plots that have occurred. Coups also are important because they often undermine the political order, order, which can lead to long-term economic and political decline.

I have added years in office to differentiate between regimes that survive decades before being ousted, from those ousted within a short period of time. A regime that survived for thirty years is not comparable to one that lasted less than a decade. The ten-year cut-off was chosen because multiple studies have shown a regime's risk of being deposed greatly decreases after its first decade in office (Schofield & Gallego, 2011:401, Sanhueza 1999:337, Bienen & van de Walle, 1992). In addition, I found within my own sample that the likelihood of being forced out of power dramatically decreases after the first ten years (See Table 6). Focusing on the first ten years also makes the coding of each regime more consistent and helps militate against the possibility that what is being measured is the effect of time in office, rather than the efficacy of the policies themselves.

TABLE 6: Likelihood of Forcible Removal within First Ten Years in Office
Pearson's Chi-squared test: Likelihood of forcible removal in regimes with 10 yrs. or less in office compared to regimes with 11 yrs. or more in office p-value = 001** N = 58

In Chapter Seven, I make a final case for the importance of rural alliances. First, I address the question of foreign involvement in African politics and put forth my argument for why domestic politic strategies ultimately decided the fates of the leaders in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. I then present schematically what the mechanisms may be to account for the importance of rural alliances. Finally, in my conclusion, I explore the larger implications of this study.

Ultimately, the ideal-typical typology offered here is an attempt to develop a different model for state-society relationships in Africa; one that take into account long-standing social

[12] I define a forced removal as: 'the sudden overthrow of an existing government, enforced by a militarized group with the threat or actual use of violence'. I use the term 'forcible to include both coup d'etats and being forced out of power by popular forces with military backing. My definition is close to that of a *cuartelazo* because coups in sub-Saharan Africa have been almost exclusively conducted by military or police units.

[13] Guinea-Bissau (2012, 2009, 2003), Central African Republic (2012, 2003), Mali (2012), Niger (2010) Madagascar (2009), Guinea (2009, 2008), Mauritania (2008), Comoros (2001), Democratic Republic of Congo (2001).

structures and modernization at the same time. It is my hope that this schema may serve as a way to help distinguish among forms of rule in sub-Saharan Africa and aid in our attempts to explain why some leaders become predatory, while others create functioning patrimonial regimes.

PART I

REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: GHANA AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE COMPARED

Both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire emerged from colonialism onto the world stage with high expectations. While Ghana was the most advanced of all the former West African colonies, Côte d'Ivoire was the most promising of the French West African territories. Both countries also had independence leaders that were larger than life. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was the first man to lead any sub-Saharan African country to independence in 1957. In Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny had become a heroic figure after helping bring about the abolition of forced labor in French West Africa.

Soon, the different political approaches of the two men made Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana the perfect litmus test for political development in Africa.[14] Nkrumah was committed to the revolutionary restructuring of Ghana. He chose a path of development modeled after the great industrial successes of the Soviet Union and China. On the other hand, Houphouët-Boigny, a conservative chief and one of the wealthiest cocoa farmers in Côte d'Ivoire, chose to remain close to France and courted western investment and political support. With Félix Houphouët-Boigny's commitment to a market economy in Côte d'Ivoire and Kwame Nkrumah's socialist venture in Ghana, these two countries offered something akin to a natural experiment for social scientists. Moreover, within a decade, there appeared to be a clear winner: Houphouët had developed a stable state and turned Côte d'Ivoire into the economic powerhouse of West Africa, whereas Nkrumah had been ousted in a coup and Ghana was spiraling down into bedlam.

Indeed, even at the time, both men recognized an important rival in the other. The two leaders had even made a wager about who would be the more successful by the end of the decade. For some, Houphouët's wager might have been regarded as a sucker's bet. Ghana was substantially ahead of Côte d'Ivoire. It had a civil service generally recognized as one of the best in Africa, the most advanced roadway and transportation system and one of the highest per capita incomes on the continent. Nevertheless, shortly after independence, Ghana alone began its precipitous fall. Nkrumah was ousted in a coup in February 1966, sending Ghana into a fifteen-year period of political instability and economic decline. By the end of 1981, the country had been through a succession of five coups and was facing a full-scale economic crisis that was destroying the very fabric of society.

In contrast, Houphouët's strategy for economic growth and development appeared to have been remarkably successful. Surrounded by neighboring states embroiled in coups – Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo – Côte d'Ivoire was an oasis of peace and prosperity in West Africa. By the end of the first decade of independence, Houphouët had begun to build up what was coined the 'Ivoirian Miracle'. Reaping the benefits of high world prices for coffee and cocoa and prudently diversifying the economy, the state had been able to use commodity revenues to build roadway systems and ports, improve communications, develop industrial centers and raise the educational level of its work force. The strength of the Ivoirian economy made it a playground for the wealthy and a Mecca for migrant workers from neighboring countries. Abidjan, the capital, was regarded as the 'Paris of West Africa' with its impressive skyscrapers, intricate freeway system and exclusive European shops. By the 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire had even overtaken Ghana as the primary exporter of cocoa.

Fast-forward three more decades and Côte d'Ivoire's miraculous success was unraveling

into civil war, while Ghana had moved into the miracle business, going from being one of the least stable African nations to having a stable democratic government. In December 1981, a thirty-four year old Flight Lieutenant, Jerry John Rawlings, toppled the Ghanaian government for the second time in as many years. Rawlings' "Second Coming" proved to be the decisive turning point for Ghana. In two decades, Ghana metamorphosed from one of the greatest tragedies of post-colonial Africa to its shining star. The new regime was able to rebuild the state's infrastructure, revamp the health care and educational systems and create a stable political environment. From 1984-1988, Ghana's GDP grew annually at a rate of 6 percent or more and continued growing on an average of about 5 percent till 2004. In 1992, Rawlings reintroduced electoral politics and finally ended military rule and in 2000, he left office in a peaceful transfer of power through open elections. By 2008, Ghana had the distinction of being one of only three countries on the continent to have successfully passed Huntington's 'two-turn over test.' Today, Ghana remains one of the most promising economies in sub-Saharan Africa.

Sadly, after decades of political stability Côte d'Ivoire began its descent into political chaos. In December of 1993 the country's independence leader and President of thirty-three years, Houphouët-Boigny, died of cancer. His successor introduced xenophobic policies that alienated Muslims and Northerners throughout the country. Côte d'Ivoire was soon rocked by unabated student riots and opposition protests. After five years, Bédié was ousted in the country's first coup. The coup was followed by an unsuccessful coup attempt in 2002, which morphed into a full-scale civil war – cutting off the predominately Muslim, Mandé populations in the North from the wealthier and majority Akan, Christian regions in the South. The civil war lasted two years but hostilities continued until an unsteady truce was worked out in 2006 and a power-sharing government formed in 2007. Again, after a decade of economic deterioration and in the wake of the elections of November 2010, the situation began to unravel. Côte d'Ivoire tragically seemed to be once again on the precipice of civil war. Today, there is an unsteady peace.

What led Côte d'Ivoire from political stability into instability? And, what has allowed Ghana to achieve political stability after five successive coups? Over the next four chapters, these four leaders' will be used to illustrate why and how rural strategies are the key to answering this question. I will examine each leader in terms of four central themes:

a) How regional opposition emerged and what steps were taken to address it;

b) What kind of urban opposition was faced and how it was managed;

c) What the policy implications were with respect to center-periphery institutions and economic development as a result of their choices in managing their urban and rural opposition;

d) How all of these factors ultimately impacted the security forces and the political fate of each.

It will be argued that the two successful cases, Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire and J.J. Rawlings in Ghana, followed rural political strategies. Both incorporated powerful regional elites at all levels of the administration and expanded agricultural production by incentivizing farmers. Consequently, both were able to sustain power for decades despite being subject to numerous urban demonstrations. In contrast, the two unsuccessful leaders, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Henri Konan Bédié in Côte d'Ivoire, suppressed powerful regional elites, alienating the rural areas. As a result, once they lost urban support, they could no longer hold onto power.

CHAPTER 2

KWAME NKRUMAH: AN URBAN STRATEGY UNRAVELS

Kwame Nkrumah is perhaps one of the most complex and difficult political leaders to encapsulate. He was a man of great vision who almost single handedly led an entire continent to independence. He was also a weak leader who was very poor at state building. He might be, as Apter prophesied in the 1950's, a quintessential example of the problems that emerge when a charismatic leader is not amenable to bureaucratization. Though in recent years, Nkrumah has been increasingly lionized, his political failures bequeathed to Ghana several decades of political and economic turmoil. This study will accordingly be focused more on Nkrumah's failures as the president of Ghana than his successes in inspiring a content towards freedom. My aim is not to belittle Nkrumah's legacy but to illustrate what kinds of political strategies can lead to political instability.

It is generally argued that Nkrumah's downfall was due to a number of structural conditions, such as the drastic drop in prices for cocoa in the mid-1960s; the institutional system he inherited which bequeathed to him strong rival centers of power supported by a British civil service; the punishing economic conditions imposed on Ghana by western powers, particularly with respect to the Volta River Project; and CIA's machinations against him. While all of these were important factors, it will be argued here that what was ultimately decisive was Nkrumah's failures as a leader. In particular, I will show that Nkrumah's removal from local realities and entrenched ideological positions prohibited him from forging necessary alliances with rural, conservative elements and led him to neglect traditional agriculture. As a result of these poor leadership choices, Nkrumah brought upon his own demise.

I. The Origin of Nkrumah's Opposition

Nkrumah's beginnings

From the beginning, Nkrumah's central support came from urban workers, youth and school-leavers. His natural antagonists were the protectors of the traditional order – Chiefs and intellectuals. Nkrumah himself had risen from obscurity having been born in a poor fishing village in the West of Ghana, a member of the small Akan tribe, the Nzima. Nonetheless, his unique intelligence was recognized early on. Promoted by missionary teachers and supported by extended family members, he was able to go to the US study to study at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania in 1935. He soon became involved with pan-African politics and in 1944, he went to London, where he befriended the great pan-Africanist leader, George Padmore. There Nkrumah became a consummate political organizer (Rooney 1989).

While Nkrumah was abroad, politics were moving steadily forward in the Gold Coast. At the time, the intelligentsia, advocating for more political involvement, was trying to displace the power of traditional chiefs. In 1947, the intelligentsia decided to launch a political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC).[15] However, the leaders of the UGCC had few ties to the masses. They were all 'men of substance and social position'. They knew they needed someone to help them reach 'ordinary folk' so that they could develop a national party. A friend

[15] The leaders of the UGCC, later referred to as the 'Big Six' were: JB Danquah, Eric Akufo Addo, William Afori Atta, Ako Adjei, Obetsebi Lamptey and Kwame Nkrumah

of Nkrumah's from Lincoln University suggested Nkrumah was the man to organize the party. After a short deliberation, Nkrumah accepted. In 1948, he left London to begin his political career in Gold Coast (Basil Davidson 1989:52).

With great alacrity, Nkrumah organized a mass party, traveling to every village and town and capitalizing on the many young-men's organizations that had already sprung up around the county. But the odd association between this young socialist and these conservative intellectuals was short lived. In 1949, Nkrumah departed from the UGCC to form his own national party, the Congress People's Party (CPP).

Meanwhile events were running away with themselves in the territory. Boycotts, strikes and arrests were becoming common place. The British sent a Commission to determine how to proceed. The Coussey Commission's recommendations were quite conservative. They tried to maintain the status quo as much as possible, by slowly transitioning power away from the British to the chiefs and intelligentsia. They advised that a Gold Coast National Assembly be created, with seventy-five African members – thirty-seven to be appointed, thirty-three elected indirectly and only five members to stand for direct election by popular vote. In addition, of the seventy-five African members only eight would be eligible to be Ministers on the Governor's Executive (Basil Davidson 1989:72).

In response, Nkrumah organized a vast gathering in Accra and issued a call for 'Immediate Self-Government'(Basil Davidson 1989:73). Soon after, Union leaders called for a General Strike and Nkrumah launched his 'Positive Action', a non-violent resistance movement modeled after Gandhi's. On January 11th 1950, the Governor-General declared a state of emergency and began wide-spread arrests. Nkrumah and several CPP activists were arrested. Despite the unrest, the colonial administration went ahead with the general election for the new legislature. In prison, Nkrumah decided to stand for the most prominent seat in Greater Accra, the Accra Central seat.

The election held on January 8th , 1951was a massive CPP triumph. In the rural areas, as well as the towns, the CPP won by a landslide. In Accra Central alone, Nkrumah won 22,780 of the 23,122 votes cast (Basil Davidson 1989:80). The CPP had, moreover, won a majority of sixteen seats in the Assembly, which entitled them, as the Majority party, to form the new government. Nothing like this outcome had been remotely considered. Even the prominent chief, Nana Sir Tsibu Darku IX, "a veritable monument of the 'political class'", was defeated by the railway union leader, Pobee Biney, only recently released from prison for helping initiate the General Strike (Basil Davidson 1989:79). Other prominent elites were also defeated, including a number of UGCC leaders and their supporters.[16]

No preparation had been made for such an eventuality. It was assumed that a coalition of chiefs and conservative intellectuals would be elected by the rural constituencies. The CPP was expected to be supported by its urban 'Verandah Boys'[17] and win a few seats, but to constitute nothing more than "a vocal minority" (Bing

[16] Cobina Kessie in Kumais East, A.A.Y. Kyerematen in Mampong North, J.W.de Graft Johnson in Saltpond failed to get any votes at all in the rural electoral colleges. Even Dr. Busia, of the UGCC, was defeated in his own area, where his brother ruled as chief. There were, however, some successes for the UGCC. Dr. J.B. Danquah and his son William Ofori Atta won seats in the Akim districts in Ashanti, though by the smallest of majorities.See Austin 1964, pp. 145.

[17] Nkrumah's followers were contemptuously so-named for being too poor to own a bed and having to sleep on the verandah. See Basil Davidson 1989, pp. 57.

1968:143). The success of Nkrumah's followers marked a radical shift in power relations. Five days after the election, Governor Arden-Clarke released the CPP men from prison and, with that, a new era began in the Gold Coast.

The Emergence of Opposition Movements - The Early Years - 1951-1956:

Nkrumah's beginnings in government seemed promising. He was able to incorporate opposition leaders in his cabinet and implement policies supportive of cocoa farmers. But the more power he was given, the more dogmatic and rigid he was to become. He increasingly alienated his own supporters and suppressed the opposition. By the end of his reign, there was virtually no evidence of the pragmatism and political savvy of his earlier years.

Following his resounding electoral victory, Nkrumah was released from prison and summoned to the Castle to meet with the Governor-General, Arden Clarke. Clarke offered Nkrumah shared rule and the promise of independence 'soon' if he would be 'sensible and moderate' and abandon his call for immediate independence. There would still be a colonial government and the Governor-General would retain his powers, but it would be a step towards independence (Davidson 1989:81-82). This was undoubtedly a difficult choice for Nkrumah. His party's galvanizing slogan had been 'Self-Government Now' which had forced the opposition to adopt the far less stirring phrase: 'Self-Government at the Soonest Possible Moment'. By accepting these terms and joining the colonial government, he risked looking as if he had capitulated to the British and was no better than the conservatives he opposed. But Nkrumah realized that this was still a triumph for the nationalist cause and that if he were working within the government he would be better able to set the pace of change. He therefore accepted this distasteful compromise, understanding the potential dangers it presented to him.

Nkrumah's first government was balanced among different interests. Particularly important was the choice to include J. A. Braimah in the executive Council. Braimah was one of the most respected members of the northern representatives. Bramiah's inclusion signaled to the north that their interests would be protected. Of equal importance was the appointment of E. C. Quist as speaker. Quist was the first African to be on the Crown Counsel in 1914 and had been appointed the President of Legislative Council in 1949. His appointment allied the fears of the British about the nationalists' agenda. Part of the impetus behind these choices may have been the effect having a split executive which gave the British Governor-General important influence over Nkrumah. However, Nkrumah himself has to be credited with understanding the need to be tactical (Nkrumah 1957:138).[18]

Another manifestation of the careful policy initiatives of this period was in the management of swollen shoot, a plant pathogenic virus that infects cacao trees. The disease had been spreading quickly and the colonial government had introduced an aggressive policy of

[18] This is also reflected in Geoffrey Bing's, Nkrumah's legal advisor, observations of Nkrumah at the time:
"I was struck then and it was an impression which was fortified with the years, by Dr. Nkrumah's preoccupation with the need of continuity. No one knew better than he the reactionary nature of chieftaincy but he wished to reform it and not to destroy it. The aloof intellectuals of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society were needed to provide professional and technical skill and he must therefore win them over. He deeply distrusted the economic conceptions of the British Civil Servants but he had come to realize that it would be impossible immediately to replace them. He must devise a policy under which they and the CPP could work together. Above all he wanted to begin the struggle for independence from the basis of a Constitution which was agreed by all groups of the existing Gold Coast society. To him law and order ultimately depended, not on the control of the military or police forces, but upon the existence of the system of Government which was freely accepted." [Bing 1968, pp. 114-115]

cutting-out infected trees to stave off the infection. But this enraged and alienated farmers who saw the British chopping down their seemingly healthy trees. Given that cocoa trees take five to seven years to mature, the farmers' resistance to having trees cut-out is understandable. This all presented a difficult situation for Nkrumah, a potential flashpoint. Promises had been made by many CPP representatives and during the 1951 election campaign that if elected they would ensure an immediate suspension of the cutting-out of infected trees for a one-month trial period.

Shortly after the election, however, Nkrumah's government set up an investigative committee to look into the matter. Much to the CPP's chagrin, the committee's report showed that it would be necessary to continue with the policy of cutting-out infected trees but also that if that were done there was a high potential for violence and resistance. The Government took careful steps. First, they introduced a new propaganda campaign, the 'New Deal for Cocoa,' and stepped up involvement with local farmers through local development groups. The campaign carefully explained to farmers the need for cooperation. They also increased the amount paid to farmers for trees cut out and gave a three-year stipend towards replanting and increased the producer price of cocoa, offering farmers an unprecedented 80s per load from 1951-52. So successful was the new campaign, that when in October 1952 compulsory cutting-out was reintroduced, there was no serious protest (Austin 1964:160-161).

Despite these positive choices, there were also clear signs that Nkrumah's leadership style would lead to problems in later years. The first indication was Nkrumah's inability or refusal to work with opposition leaders. This is best exemplified by the statements he made to his CPP Assemblymen upon their formation of a new majority government in 1951. Nkrumah made an opening speech to his assemblymen, to inform them of "the policy of the Party and of the dangers and difficulties that lay ahead of them when they took their seats in the Assembly" (Nkrumah 139), Nkrumah underscored that,

> "Our party was the only one in the country that had [the aim of "Self-Government Now"] and therefore it would be impracticable for it to work with those who held different views...As far as we were concerned there should be no compromise on this point. Coalition with the other political groups in the country, as we knew them, would be dangerous," [1957:139]

As the first speech outlining the policy of the party, Nkrumah lay a framework that would be antithetical to compromise and cooptation.

In addition to his resistance to compromise, Nkrumah was unable to deal tactically with critical elements within his own coalition. Instead, any form of dissent was taken as a sign of personal disloyalty to Nkrumah and the party. Nkrumah's response was often swift and harsh. As a result, a large number of formerly close associates became virulently opposed to him. Part of the reasons for this were circumstantial. Because of Nkrumah's acceptance of Clarke's deal, a rift emerged between the CPP leaders and radical leftists within the party that were angered by the slow pace of change. Especially with the former members of the League of Ghana Patriots, an organization originally sponsored by Nkrumah to be the party avant-garde and to provide a groundwork for the development of the party's socialist organization.[19] These youth leaders were

[19] The League was planned as "an elite formation, communist in type, organized on a cell basis and having para-

angered by what they saw as Nkrumah's capitulation to the colonial order. The first to resign in protest over the compromise government was Kwesi Lamptey in August 1951. Lamptey, a science teacher from Sekondi, had ran as the CPP representative for Sekondi-Takoradi in the 1951 election and had also held the position of National Acting Deputy Chairman of the CPP.

This was not a good sign for the CPP but it was far from ruinous. Though young and idealistic, none of these youth leaders held central positions in the government. There may therefore have been a way to offer them a greater role in the new government or the party and thereby assuage them. These are the types of tactics that Houphouët-Boigny used repeatedly with great success. Instead, the CPP chose to handle the situation quite severely. In January 1952, an emergency meeting of the National Executive was convened to discuss the 'disruptive attitude' of several members of the National Secretariat: Dzenkle Dzewu, Mate Kole, H.P Nyemetri, as and E.S. Nartey. It was found that their 'demeanour and activities' were 'detrimental to the Party' (Austin 1964:167-169). Soon after, Party leaders voted to expel them from the CPP. A short time later, Ashie Nikoe, J.G. Swaniker, K.G. Kyem, Kojo Nkrumah and Saki Scheck were also expelled. Almost all of these men had had high standing in the early organization of the party. Dzenkle Dwenku and Saki Scheck were leaders of the Committee on Youth Organization (CYO),[20] the youth group started by Nkrumah that had splintered off from the UGCC to form the CPP. H.P. Nyemitei had been the acting General-Secretary of the CPP during the period of 'Positive Action' and E.S. Nartey was the Eastern Regional Secretary.

This was a fateful turn of events. By May 1952, an opposition party, the Ghana Congress Party, was launched in Accra with Dr. K.A. Busia at its helm. Now the usual suspects of conservative lawyers and intellectuals were joined by ex-CPP militants. Thus, the former UGCC leaders: J.B. Danquah, Obetsebi Lamptey, Akuffo Addo, N.A. Ollennu and Dr. Busia united with former CPP youth leaders and trader-farmers: Dzenkle Dzewu, Ashie Nikoi, Mate Kole, H.P. Nyemitei, Saki Scheck, B.F. Kusi and Kwesi Lamptey. The opposition was not as yet a coherent force. "There were numerous quarrels among this ill-assorted group" (Austin 1964:181; Apter 1955, 1966). Yet the writing was on the wall. These same ex-CPP leaders were to emerge again and again among the opposition.

The loss of Ashie Nikoi and others tied to large cocoa interests like B.F. Kusi and N. Mate Kole, who had lent Nkrumah some credibility within the cocoa growing regions, was to have serious implications. In 1949, the CPP had shallow roots in the rural areas. Most of their organizing had been done through youth associations, unions, professional associations and among those in the petty trades and clerical workers. As a result, "the rural masses - the farmers, the farm-laborers, the small-village traders and craftsmen - were only marginally engaged in the organised nationalist movement" (Beckman 1976:52). Thus, the CPP needed to bring farmers on board. They did so by coopting existing farmers' institutions.

The early support of large numbers of cocoa growers came about in considerable part due to the capable skills of the farmer Ashie Nikoi. Nikoi was a wealthy cocoa farmer who in the 1930s had helped unite the farmers in the Colony into the Farmers' Union of the British West African Growers. Eventually, Nikoi developed a strong following, particularly among migrant

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military 'strong-boys'" (Apter 209). During the early movement, they were the tacticians in the party. They controlled the apparatus of the party and generally accompanied Nkrumah on rallies and public appearances. Later, many of them were members on the first CPP Central Committee.

[20] The executive of the CYO included Kolma Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, Krobo Edusei, Atta Mensah and Bediako Poku of the AYA in Kumasi; Dzenkle Dwenku and Mrs. Hannah Cudjoe; Kofi Baako, Saki Scheck and Kwesi Plange of the 'Ghana League of Patriots'; and R.S. Iddrisu and Eben Adam in Tamal. See Austin 1964:81.

farmers in Akim Abuakwa.[21] A long-time anti-colonialist, Nikoi had met Nkrumah at the 5th Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945. A couple of months later, Nikoi joined Nkrumah and four others to create the West African National Secretariat (WANS).[22] When they returned to Ghana, Nikoi joined the CPP.[23] He was among the 'Prison Graduates' that suffered imprisonment from protesting British rule,[24] and had even spent time in jail with Nkrumah. According to Nkrumah's own testimony, while in prison they discussed the need to create a national farmers' union and, upon their release, Nikoi was given free rein to develop one.[25] By 1949, he had become a member of the CPP central committee and in mid-December 1949 he and John Ayew formed the national Ghana Farmers' Congress out of the Farmers' Committee, the Sika Mpoano Akuafo Fekew Ltd and the Asante Farmers' Union.[26]

Along with Ashie Nokoi, other CPP leaders who had also helped rally farmers to vote for CPP candidates were expelled: Dzenkle Dzewu, Mate Kole and the large trader from Ashanti, B.F Kusi. These men had exploited the fact that cocoa farmers were already fractured among themselves, as well as the numerous grievances cocoa farmers had developed against the colonial government. In the late 1940s, a wealthy merchant-cocoa farming class emerged which was unrelated to the traditional elite. These merchants had been active in organizing cooperatives to increase their market share. The CPP leaders recognized that an undercurrent of hostility had developed between smaller cocoa farmers and the entrepreneurs of the cooperative movement and built on the schism between these entrepreneurs, the small cocoa farmers and chiefs to penetrate the cocoa sector (Young 1981:183). In addition, cocoa farmers were angered by the colonial government's handling of the swollen shoot disease and their establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) in 1949, which was used to peg cocoa prices. One of the central reasons the CPP was able to win the vote of substantial number of cocoa co-operative members was the farmers' anger over the existence of the Cocoa Marketing Board was somewhat allayed when Nikoi was himself appointed to the Board.[27]

Not only were these men crucial to getting out the cocoa farmers vote in the 1951 election, they had also been central to the highly successful policy approach the CPP had adopted to deal with the Swollen Shoot problem immediately after the election. Nikoi was a particularly important influence over the Commission of Enquiry organized to address the problem in 1951 and its subsequent report, whose recommendations were largely followed. The report had warned the CPP that if they were to implement cutting-out, it would lead to violent protests and general

[21] Later, in 1951, he and J.E. Turkson ran as the CPP candidates for the two constituency seats against Danquah and William Ofori Atta and his popularity had made that two-member race quite close . See Austin 1967, pp. 145.
[22] The founders of the WANS were Nkrumah, Nikoi, Kojo Botsio, Bankole Awoonor-Renner, Wallace-Johnson, Bankole Akpata. See Marika Sherwood, 'Pan-African Conferences, 1900-1953:What Did 'Pan-Africanism' Mean?' *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.4, no.10, January 2012.
[23] According to one account, Nikoi helped fund Nkrumah early on and was even the one who had first proposed the CPP symbol of the red rooster. See 'The Tragic End of GÃ politicians' by Nikoi Kotey, 3 March 2005 *Modern Ghana*, accessed on 4/24/2013.
[24] Throughout 1950 there was a procession of victims in and out of the Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi prisons: as the Postive Action leaders came out after serving their three- or six- month terms, others went in on convictions for libel and sedition. See Austin 1964, pp. 114.
[25] See Jibowu Report - 29. 95
[26] The Ghana Farmers' Council launched in July1951 A. Casely Hayford, Kojo Mercer (chairman of the Cocoa Marketing Board), A.Y.K. Djin (managing director of the CPC), R.R. Amponsah, B.E. Dwira and D.E. Asafu Adjaye.
[27] See 'Government statement on the Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Local Purchasing of Cocoa.' Accra : Ministry of Information, 1967, pp. 2 (8).

unrest. The Commission therefore suggested that the government proceed cautiously and include the farmers' unions and the chief farmers more directly. After the election, still mindful of their campaign promises to the cocoa farmers, the CPP initially suspended cutting-out entirely. But understanding that it was a necessary evil, they later reintroduced it with care. Not only did the government *increase* the producer price to the unprecedented 80*s.* a load, they also paid farmers 4*s.* compensation for every live tree cut down and a further 2*s.* for three years to help offset the cost of replanting. This, combined with an extensive propaganda campaign, proved to be very effective (Austin 1964:161). Later, when similar warnings and policy suggestions were made with respect to cocoa prices after the 1954 elections, there were no cocoa farmer advocates in the governing council. The absence of their representation in the new coalition led to one of the most destructive decisions made by the CPP.

The fallout with Ashie Nikoi came about because he wanted to create a purchasing monopoly which he would head. Given that Nikoi had a strong following among the farmers and that his goal was to strengthen the farmers' bargaining power vis-à-vis the center, it is not surprising that Nkrumah was reluctant to give him so much authority. Nikoi resigned in protest. Soon after, Nkrumah created the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC). However, the CPC was very different from what Nikoi had envisioned. Instead of supporting farmers, it was primarily used to extract as much wealth from cocoa growers as possible and to support the CPP faithful. Within a few years, the CPC "was bankrupt, riddled with scandal and a major source of resentment in Ashanti Cocoa areas" (Young 1981:184). By 1956, the CPC was liquidated.

The expulsions of the Youth leaders and CPP cocoa farmers were followed by a second series of expulsions that targeted the workers' base of the radical left-wing of the party. The expulsions were brought about by the fact that the unionists had been accusing the CPP leadership of abandoning the populist revolution simply to get their hands in the 'honeypot' (Davidson 1989:127). [28] They themselves were more committed to socialist goals. In contrast to the increasing venality of the Ministers, "There [was] little graft or corruption among the militant left wing, whose members, emulating Nkrumah, live in comparative simplicity, some of them in the slum areas in Usshertown in Accra" (Apter 1955:210). The radical left were also concerned about Nkrumah's increasing centralism and the growing deification Nkrumah himself. These fears were not without justification. Already, Nkrumah was being described in the papers as "Kwame Nkrumah, Man of Destiny, Star of Africa, Hope of Millions of down-trodden blacks, Deliverer of Ghana, Iron Boy, Great Leader of Street Boys, personable and handsome Boy from Nzima" (Austin 1964:281-282).

Among these men were the trade unionists Anthony Woode, Turkson Ocran and Pobee Biney.[29] The former had founded and headed the largest union in the Gold Coast, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the latter headed the Railway Workers Union and had been responsible for the General Strike in 1950 (he was also the man that defeated Busia in the 1951 election). Therefore, these men may have presented some genuine threat to Nkrumah. By August 1952, the

[28] Kurankyi Taylor, a lawyer, de Graft Johnson, a tutor in the University College, Cecil Forde, later editor of the *Ghanaian Times*, Eric Heymann, later editor of the *Evening News*, Anthony Woode, president of the Ghana TUC and Turkson Ocran, the TUC general secretary. It was also the TUC that called the general strike in 1950, even when Nkrumah had back tracked and tried to recall his 'Positive Action', which ultimately provoked the British to grant shared rule. See Austin 1964, pp.168, 89.

[29] Pobee Biney had been the chairman of the "Ghana People's Representative Assembly' called by Nkrumah where the delegates adopted the statues of the CPP. He also successfully defeated most influential chief of the Colony, Nana Sir Tsibu Darku IX, in the 1951 election. The chief was subsequently destooled by his subjects for abuse of power. See Padmore 1953, pp. 85.

leftist critics had grown in number and were joined by other prominent CPP men, including the lawyer Kurankyi Taylor and two journalists, Eric Heymann and Cecil Forde. They all charged that "the compromise had gone too far, the chance of movement towards self-government too slow" (Davidson 1989:128).

Table 7: Nkrumah's Supporters Turned Opposition

Ex-CPP Militants	Region/ Ethnicity	Occupation	CPP Affiliation	Prison Graduate	Expelled	New Party Affiliations
Kwesi Lamptey	Sekondi	Science Teacher, Mfantisipim School	National Acting Deputy Chairman		√	GPC/NLM/UP
Dzenkle Dzewu	Gã	General President of the Ex-Servicemen's Union	Manchester Pan African Congress/ Ghana League of Patriots/ CYO/ Ghana Farmers Congress		√	GPC/NLM/Gã Shifimo Kpee/UP
Ashie Nikoi	Gã	Wealthy Cocoa Farmer	Manchester Pan African Congress/ Founder Ghana Farmers' Congress	√	√	GPC/NLM/Gã Shifimo Kpee/UP
Saki Scheck	Takoradi	Editor of Takoradi Times	Ghana League of Patriots/ CYO / National Secretariat/Private Secretary of Nkrumah	√	√	General Secretary of GPC/NLM
B.F. Kusi	Ashanti	Large Trader	National Assembly Representative		√	GPC/NLM/ UP
H.P. Nyemitei	Ashanti	First President of the Meteorological Workers' Union	Former acting General-Secretary of CPP/ National Secretariat, Secretary	√	√	GPC
Nuh Abubekr	Ashanti	n/a	National Assembly Representative		√	NLM
N. Mate Kole	n/a	n/a	National Secretariat, Treasurer/ Ghana Farmers Congress/ Personnel Officer of the Cocoa Marketing Board		√	GPC/NLM
E.S. Nartey	n/a	n/a	Eastern Secretary/ National Secretariat		√	
Kurankyi Taylor	Ashanti	Lawyer	Manchester Pan African Congress, West African Students Union (WASU)	√	√	NLM/UP
Anthony Woode		President of the Ghana TUC		√	√	Restored to CPP
Turkson Ocran	Sekondi	General-Secretary TUC		√	Suspended and forced to resign	Restored to CPP
Pobee Biney	Sekondi	Locomotive Driver	Vice-chairman of Gold Coast TUC	√	Forced to resign	Restored to CPP
Bankole Awoonor-Renner	Gã (Muslim)		West African Student Union	√	√	Founder MAL/UP
Kofi Bour	Ashanti	Farmer	Chief farmer in the United Ghana Farmers' Council		√	NLM

R.R. Amponsah	Ashanti		Education Officer/ Liaison Officer for CMB in West Germany			NLM/ General Secretary UP
Victor Owusu	Ashanti	Lawyer				NLM/UP
Joe Appiah	Ashanti	Lawyer	Manchester Pan African Congress/President WASU/Prime Minister's Rep in London			NLM/UP
Ansah Koi	n/a	n/a	Minister 1951-1952		Forced to resign	GCP/Ghana Action Party
Kolma A. Gbedemah	Gã	Secondary School Teacher	National Secretariat/ Minister 1951-1961	√	Forced to resign	exile

Sources: Austin, Dennis. 1964. *Politics in Ghana, 1947-1960*. London: Oxford University Press; Padmore, George. 1953. *The Gold Coast Revolution; the Struggle of an African People from Slavery to freedom*. London: D. Dobson; Adzakey, N.K. (ed.-in-chief). 1972-3. *Ghana who's who*. Accra: Bartels Publications (Ghana) Ltd.; McFarland, Daniel Miles. 1985. *Historical dictionary of Ghana*. Metuchen, N.J. : Scarecrow Press; Davidson, Basil. 1989. *Black star : a view of the life and times of Kwame Nkrumah*. Boulder: Westview Press; Allman, Jean Marie. 1993. *The Quills of the Porcupine : Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; Bing, Geoffrey. 1968. *Reap the Whirlwind: An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966*. London: MacGibbon & Kee, Ltd.

Though there may have been justification for perceiving a threat, Nkrumah had a lot of wiggle room to counter these critical elements. He and his core associates, K.A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, were still extremely popular and had the legitimacy having led the successful struggle towards independence. Additionally, once the National Assembly passed Nkrumah's motion that the British Government introduce an Act of Independence 'as soon as the necessary administrative arrangements' were made, his leftist critics were effectively silenced (Austin 1964:169-170). Despite these advantages, Nkrumah decided to expel these disgruntled elements in October 1952. Davidson conjectures that Nkrumah made this choice out of fear the British would turn against the nationalists if they suspected the CPP was being infiltrated by communists (Davidson 1989:127-128). In contrast, Austin argues that the critics did not pose much of a threat to the CPP leadership, as they were "small in number" and "had little weight behind them" (1964:169). The most interesting claim is made by Apter, who contends that Nkrumah purged the radical left-wing of the party because they had developed loyalties to K.A. Gbedemah when he organized the party while Nkrumah was in jail. Therefore, eliminating the 'back benchers' wiped out any possibility of Gbedemah sustaining an independent following (Apter 1955:230). Whatever the truth may be, the fact was that Nkrumah choose to punish those that resisted him or critiqued his government, rather than finding a way to coax them back into the fold. And this came back to haunt him.

In some respects, Nkrumah's inability to contain the extreme left-wing of his party mirrors the experiences of both Houphouët and Rawlings. They too had to suppress radical leftist ideologues in their coalition immediately after achieving political power. This therefore partially underscores how much more vulnerable Nkrumah was to his leftist detractors. Once the radicals were expelled, they were able to join with conservative forces to fight the CPP. This was not so for either Houphouët or Rawlings. However, the difficulty Nkrumah had in controlling his party was also due to his own failure to negotiate with dissenters. Unlike Houphouët, who under similar circumstances almost always figured out a power sharing scheme to placate all but the most hardened opposition, Nkrumah was unable or unwilling to do so. He had neither Houphouët's disposition nor wisdom when it came to managing people who held competing

political visions. As Apter explains, "disloyalty or psychological betrayal offended him most...He could accept the idea of having enemies, but he could not accept opponents. A Ghanaian was either with him or against him" (Apter 1968:775). As a result, Nkrumah was to develop a pattern of dealing with internal controversy by expulsion, which brought with it very serious ramifications.

Such was the case with another important leftist militant that parted ways with Nkrumah at this time, Bankole Awoonor-Renner. Awoonor-Renner was one of the few 'Bolshevists' of his time and possibly the first Black African to study in Moscow during the 1920s (Weiss 2006; Davidson 1989). In London in 1946, he had published a pamphlet, *The West African Soviet Union*, in which he proposed creating a federation of West African socialist states to lead the fight for African unity. In 1948, he met Nkrumah in London, where he likely influenced Nkrumah's views on Socialism and African Unity (Davidson 1989). The two men even collaborated on writing a political treatise entitled *The New Africa*. Renner was also among the six founders of the West African National Secretariat, whose grandiose aims mirrored the aims Renner had first espoused in his pamphlet. Upon returning to the Gold Coast in 1948, Renner threw his support behind Nkrumah, working with Gã activists to bring Muslims into the CPP. Renner was also imprisoned in 1950 during Positive Action and, while there, Renner's wife was elected to the Accra Council on the CPP ticket (Mcfarland 1985:43).

But by mid-1951, Renner had become disenchanted with Nkrumah. Among the reasons for Renner's disaffection was his unhappiness with Nkrumah's concessions to the British. In addition, the Muslim community in Accra had become aggrieved with Nkrumah, who they contended had promised them land for a Mosque in return for their support, but instead had given the land over to the YWCA after the election (Hanretta 2011). Thus, in 1952, even this hard-core pan-African leftist "abandoned his radical aims and joined forces with the conservative opposition, becoming leader of the splinter party called the Moslem Association" (Davidson 1989:127).[30]

As serious as the expulsion/resignation of these important CPP leaders was, they might have been managed later if it had not been for several more critical decisions made by the CPP that further alienated regional groups. There were four different critical policy decisions; they were, in order, the CPPs: 1) neglect of the Northern chiefs; 2) attempt to control the 1954 elections; 3) freezing of cocoa producer prices; and 4) failure to address concerns voiced by the Gã.

Loss of the North

The first important loss of regional support came from the North. The Northern Territories were, at the time, still under a treaty with Britain and had a separate protectorate status. The North, which was also far less developed than the South feared that if the Gold Coast was granted independence, they would become subject to a government in Accra run by southerners that would further neglect their region. What they most wanted was some guarantees that the North would be given equal representation and resources. But those reassurances were never really made. In preparation for adopting a new constitution, Nkrumah toured the country from April to June of 1953. While touring, he accepted an invitation from Northern chiefs to go

[30] According to Apter, the Muslim Association Party tried to cooperate with the CPP for the 1951 elections, offering to support CPP candidates and to make joint nominations of candidates for both general and by-elections but the offer was refused by the CPP. See David Apter 1966.

to a meeting in Tamale. But at the time, Nkrumah was far more focused on increasing 'party discipline' in the area. His primary goal was to meet his own delegates at the Annual Delegates' Conference in Tamale held later that summer (Nkrumah 1957:204).

By the end of 1953 the Northern Chiefs had grown even more fearful of Nkrumah's government. The precipitating event occurred on November 25th, 1953, when the Minister of Works and Communications, J.A. Braimah, was forced to resign in the face of corruption charges.[31] At the time, Braimah was the only northern representative in the Government. To make matters worse, in the official enquiry, Braimah was found guilty of corruption but no one else was despite the fact that there were widespread allegations of corruption throughout the party. Yet, the commission found no evidence of misconduct on the part of any of the other government officials. Altogether, this was the last straw for the North which had never received sufficient reassurances from Nkrumah to allay their fears. As Apter observed at the time, "considerable resentment must have been felt in the north that Braimah was forced to resign and left holding the bag for sins which they felt all the cabinet ministers were guilty of on a larger scale" (1955:299)

A few months after Bramiah's resignation, at a meeting of Northern leaders in Tamale, the Northern People's Party (NPP) was launched.[32] Under the circumstances, the sense of repudiation on the party of the Northern chiefs was completely predictable. It is therefore surprising that Nkrumah had not taken it upon himself to have negotiated with the Northern chiefs about how to best handle the situation with Bramiah and allay their fears. Particularly with the upcoming elections. But Nkrumah apparently neglected to address the situation until it was already a *fait accompli*. As Nkrumah himself wrote,

> "By the time I arrived back in Accra I learnt that a new party had been formed in the Northern Territories called the Northern People's Party. I at once dashed to the North, but this time it was too late to do very much. Candidates - one of whom was my late Minister of Communications and Works [Braimah] - had been found to oppose one of the twenty-one constituencies in the North." [Nkrumah 1957:207]

This was one of many lost opportunities for Nkrumah. The loss seems to have been all the more avoidable because the Northern chiefs were not particularly opposed to the CPP's platform, so long as they had reassurances that their concerns would be addressed. "On the contrary, what they wanted was its application in their area as a priority" (Bing 1968:157). A more sensitive politician might have seen the potential rift and understood the importance of the northern representatives to his overall strategy.

The loss of the Northern Chiefs proved to be a pivotal moment. Because of the cohesiveness of the north, "the Chiefs of the North were able to organize a Party of a sort to

[31] It also appears that Braimah was under some pressure as non-CPP member of the government. The Commission of Enquiry into his resignation found that he had felt he was under attack. He claimed that there was a 'long-standing grievance' against his being a member of the government because he was "not a member of the party in power" and the CPP feared that "there was a certain conflict between his duty to the Northern Territories which he represented and the policy of the Convention People's Party." (15). One advisor to Nkrumah had even warned the Prime Minister not to trust Braimah because he "was not a party member." See, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr. Braimah's Resignation and allegations arising therefrom. Ministry of Interior, Accra, 1954, pp. 14, also see Braimah's testimony, pp. 10.

[32] The Northern People's Party was inaugurated at a public rally in the regional capital during the week-end 10-11 April 1954. See Austin 1964, pp. 184.

safeguard their interests and their nominees won twelve of the twenty-one seats in the Northern Territories" (Bing 1968:157). It was the northern chiefs, therefore and not the intellectuals, that became the CPP's official Opposition in the Assembly.

Election of 1954

Ultimately, his failure to conduct negotiations with the Northern Chiefs and to better handle the Braimah scandal was because Nkrumah neither anticipated the political rift, nor appreciated its import. This fault was to come about in spades in the lead up to the 1954 elections. Unlike the 1951 election, this was to be the first election with universal suffrage. It was a moment of great opportunity for the CPP, which still had wide-spread popular support. And though it did vindicate the CPP's position, it also proved to be a strong indication of problems to come.

The central mistake was in the handling of local candidacies. The CPP Central Committee decided to control the choice of local representatives. This was the strategy they had used in the 1951 election, but that election had been much smaller and the party was much less diverse. To make matters worse, Gbedemah instructed the constituent secretaries to send as many names as the local officers thought necessary to the National Executive. This opened up the Central Committee to a flood of applicants, for which there was "no effective machinery to cope" (Austin 1964:221). Having limited knowledge of the grassroots, the Committee made several blunders along the way and became subject to an onslaught of protests and counter protests.[33] Instead of ensuring that they would have loyal candidates at the local level, they alienated some supporters and made enemies of others.

As a result of the disappointment at not being nominated by the CPP, several CPP members decided to run as independents. Nkrumah tried to heal the rift by personally visiting two-thirds of the 104 constituencies and inviting all the rival candidates to come to a meeting with him in Accra. "Nevertheless, by April 1954 the party began to divide into obstinate, local groups which remained unmoved by appeals for discipline and unity" (Austin 1965:216). To these were added several of the 'expelled' CPP members that now also ran as independents, particularly in Ashanti, among them Kwesi Lamptey, Nuh Abubekr, BF Kusi, Ohene Djan, Atta Mensah, as well as Dr. Ansah Koi, a former CPP Minister. In the North, all of the seats were contested by 'rebel' candidates, as well as by former Minister Braimah. All-told, eighty-one CPP members decided to run against the official CPP candidates.

Nkrumah was enraged but what he saw as these betrayals. His response was swift and extreme. The Central Committee decided to hold a mass rally in Kumasi, at which all the rebels were publicly expelled from the Party. Nkrumah even described himself "an executioner" who

[33] Austin gives an illustrative example of how this occurred in a remote area in the North: "The C.P.P. National Executive members, meeting in Accra, decided that Abavana was the obvious candidate for Kassena-Nankanni South; but they were less sure of what to do in the north constituency and had neither the time...nor the detailed knowledge to assess the situation in so remote an area as Kassena-Nankanni North... they offered their support to J. E. Seyire, a local store-keeper. Seyire had been one of the handful of early C.P.P. supporters in the Navrongo district, who in I95I felt that loyalty and service should now have their reward. But the reward he wanted was the party's nomination in his own area-Kassena-Nankanni South, in place of Abavana. The National Executive continued to support Abavana and told Seyire that they would support him only in Kassena-Nankanni North. He refused, being quite certain that he would lose there; and like a great many other party members throughout the country in I954 he filed his nomination papers as an Independent. The result of the election in Kassena-Nankanni South was L. R. Abavana, C.P.P. 5,796; J. E. Seyire, Ind. 3,344.' (Austin 1961:4-5).

had "turned a deaf ear to pleas and excuses" because "they lacked team spirit and they should be made an example of" (Nkrumah 1957:207). The ramifications of Nkrumah's choice to expel party members was particularly felt in Ashanti, after so many of its members had been publicly expelled in Kumasi (Austin 1964:218). As Davidson explained, in the subsequent election, "More than a fifth of all the votes [in Ashanti] had gone to CPP rebels, expelled by Nkrumah from the CPP, who had persisted in their candidatures" (Davidson 1989:141).[34]

Most of all, the problems that emerged with the rebel candidacies revealed the inability of the Nkrumah government to deal with the realities of local politics. Unlike Houphouët whose loosely federated party allowed for the adherence of incompatible local interests, Nkrumah's party became increasingly dogmatic and unaccommodating.[35] Thus, where Houphouët's party continued to expand and coopt competing elites, the Nkrumah government began to alienate large numbers of people as he transformed his party into "a movement, monopolistic, demanding total loyalty and defining its friends and its enemies in terms of that loyalty" which exhibited "a militancy with a strong quality of coercion about it" (Apter 1966:285).

The Cocoa Duty Ordinance

As bad as the expulsions of CPP members and the loss of the North was, Nkrumah's most serious political blunder came one month after the 1954 election. The tipping point was the announcement of the passage of a Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill. The new ordinance froze the price of cocoa at 72 shillings for the next four years, despite increasing world prices. Such an announcement could not have been popular at any time, but it was guaranteed to be especially inflammatory at that moment. As Rooney explains, "because the world price of cocoa had increased to £450 per ton, it was confidently expected that, after the election of 1954, the CPP government would announce a substantial increase on the 1953 price of 72 shillings a load. No figure had been quoted but some CPP candidates had spoken in terms of five pounds a load" (Rooney 1982:156-7). Therefore, to make such an announcement "immediately following an election, when hopes had been raised, was folly" (Austin 1964:254). Austin observes, "The Ordinance was a sensible attempt to check an inflationary situation as the world price climbed to £450 a ton (or £121*s*. a load), but ill timed" (Austin 1964:254). The poor choice of timing was all the more given that three months before the announcement, the Chief Regional Officer of Ashanti, A.J. Loveridge had warned the government "that any provocation could easily stir up Ashanti nationalism and unite the various opposition groups into a powerful and dangerous movement" (Rooney 1982:157). The general manager of the United Africa Company, Sir Patrick Fitzgerald, also advised the government to offer an immediate slight increase in the price and then continue to maintain prices so as to reconcile farmers to having a ceiling. But this advice was rejected and Sir Patrick Fitzgerald was attacked in the *Evening News* for his interference (Austin 1964:254).

Gbedemah himself was aware of the potentially explosive effect of this policy and had purposefully timed the announcement of the pegging of the cocoa price in August, after the

[34] Nkrumah later claims that he had considered the potential fall-out of this action, "I was aware of the probable outcome of this, namely that with so little feeling of loyalty towards the CPP most of the 'rebels' would support any party that offered them the chance to stand" (Nkrumah 1957:207).

[35] For example, Apter describes how after 1954, the party began to lose support of Youth groups because of the harsher party discipline imposed by Nkrumah: "Youth groups were not disposed to take order from the Nkrumah government or from the party. Thus the bitterly anti-Nkrumah Ghana Youth Federation, which collaborated closely with the NLM, was formed in the coastal area in 1954" (1966:278).

elections were over. He defended the decision on the grounds that: "the Government is justified and is right in basing its policy on the major crop which this country produces in order to stabilise its economy and in doing so to use the accumulated funds to the benefit of every section of the community"(GC, LA Deb., 13 Aug. 1954).

Part of the reason for this foolhardy choice was undoubtedly that the new government was chaffing under British control and eager to introduce its own, more expansive, development agenda. The suppressed producer price would allow the government, it hoped, to increase its revenue and thereby increase its autonomy. In addition, the new Finance Minister Gbedemah's primary concern was not supporting the farmers, but protecting the interests of urban consumers. An official statement from the Cocoa Marketing Board explained, "Increase cocoa prices abnormally today and tomorrow prices in the stores will be sky-rocketed" (Austin 1964:254). Gbedemah over a decade later explained that "the cocoa price was the main factor in Ghana's inflation and it was deliberately kept low in order to prevent inflation" (Rooney 1982:157). Nevertheless, the policy showed that neither Nkrumah, nor his advisers had the political sensibility that would have allowed them to gage the immense costs such a move would engender.

The indignation over the cocoa price was made all the more intense because the corruption of the CPC, which had come under increasing attack. But Nkrumah repeatedly resisted any serious investigation into the charges. When the NLM and the Asanteman Council later issued a statement against the government they cited the reasons for their discontent as including "the Government's unyielding attitude to the nationwide protest against its cocoa price policy, its partisan and often misguided appointments to public boards and corporations and its refusal to have the disbursement of public funds by the CMB and the CPC investigated" (quoting Rathbone, Rooney 1982:166-167). With this as a background, it was easy to whip up anti-Nkrumah sentiment among cocoa farmers who felt that they "who laid the golden egg [were] being fleeced for the benefit of party officials and high ranking ministers" (Appiah 1990:237).

Thus, as much as the protests against the cocoa duty were driven by economic considerations, they were easily merged with other brewing discontents. The choice to pass the Cocoa Duty and Development Amendment and keep price of cocoa pegged, with the growing indignation over the corruption of the CPC and on the heels of the political expulsion of so many party members in Ashanti, was therefore explosive. And it finally gave the chiefs the opportunity to rally a populist movement around them. "So it came about, at this most critical time in the nation's birth, that the 'traditional opposition' of the chiefs and men of substance and other local separatists, was combined with the opposition of commoners" (Basil Davidson 1989:142)

The immediate response was for a number of aggrieved farmers to come together to create a new coalition. In fact, the activists that led the charge were all former CPP adherents. The first important development came on August 22nd, when Kofi Bour, formerly a loyal member of the Supreme Council of the United Ghana Farmers' Council, led disgruntled farmers that had come to Asawase in a series of meetings to address the new Ordinance. The farmers elected Kofi Buor the chairman of their new association: 'The Council for Higher Cocoa Prices'. The formation of this new organization proved to be a lightening-rod for others in Ashanti and the cocoa growing regions that were unhappy with the CPP.

Three days later, the farmers were joined by members of the Asante Youth Association (AYA) at a meeting in the Kumasi State Council Hall to discuss the cocoa price, as well as other grievances. Krobo Edusei, who had up until then had a strong following in the region and other government representatives present at the meeting were 'roughly handled and forced to leave'.

Soon after, the opportunity was seized upon by the CPP 'rebels' who had been expelled in June. On Friday, August 27th, another meeting was held, this time led by a group of CPP 'rebels', Kusi Ampofo, Osei Assibey and E.Y. Baffoe. The next day, the Council was joined by M.K. Apaloo, a long time opposition leader, as well as two other expelled CPP members: Kwesi Lamptey and Ashie Nikoi (Austin 1964:258-259). Other ex-CPP who were in the National Assembly, BF Kusi and Nuh Abubekr, were invited to join as well (Allman 1993:45).[36]

For the first time, radical leftists and youth leaders had joined forces with conservative Ashanti elements. "The separate threads of support for a new party were now drawn swiftly together" (Austin 1964:260). A predominately Ashanti political movement was born, the National Liberation Movement (NLM). Bafour Akoto, the Asantehene's chief linguist, widely known and respected in Ashanti, was chosen to head the party. On Sunday 19th September in the Prince of Wales Park in Kegetia Bafour Osei Akoto as chairman of the NLM, ritually slaughtered a sheep and swore the Great Oath of Ashanti to a large cheering crowd and the party was launched. Others continued to join. "The NLM gathered up an enormous variety of subsidiary discontents as it spread through Ashanti...based on the belief that Ashanti as a whole - as a people in history - were being 'smothered'...by a rival nationalist movement whose principal leaders were non-Ashanti" (Austin 1964:267). By October, fifty-three chiefs of the Ashanti State Council had sworn a solemn pledge to support the NLM. The Asantehene also publicly came in support of the new 'movement', donating £20,000 to the cause (Davidson 1989; Austin 1964;).

Not only were the traditional elite easy to bring on board. Prominent CPP leaders from Ashanti also defected to the NLM. The most important of these were Kurankyi Taylor, Victor Owusu, R.R. Amponsah and Joe Appiah (Bing 1968:153; Austin 1964:267-8; Appiah 1990:240).[37] At a joint press conference held by the four defecting Ashanti leaders in Kumasi on February 23, 1955, they explained their primary reasons for resigning from the party were: the low-peg of cocoa, the refusal of the government to investigate the activities of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the choice of giving 'jobs to the boys' regardless of qualifications and the pernicious attacks on the institution of Chieftaincy (Appiah 1990:240-241).

Appiah's defection was particularly hurtful to Nkrumah because he had been a close companion of Nkrumah's in England. Appiah was a delegate to the fifth pan-African conference in Manchester, President of the West African Students' Union and even acted as the Prime Minister's representative in London. According to Appiah, Nkrumah was even supposed to be the best man at his wedding.[38] But the addition of the other two CPP members was equally shocking: Amponsah was a former education officer and liaison officer for the Cocoa Marketing Board in Western Germany; Victor Owusu, a respected lawyer, had been 'an outspoken defender of the CPP' (Austin 1964:268). To add insult to injury, the NLM not only copied the organization of the CPP and many of its techniques for mass mobilization, but incorporated many of its local and executive members, in effect transferring "the pattern of organization from one to the other" (Austin 1964:269).

[36] BF Kusi had been elected to the assembly as a CPP representative but had 'crossed the carpet' after 1951 in protest against the CPPs slow advancement towards self-government (Allman 1993:110).

[37] In the 1956 Legislative Assembly, four of the thirteen NLM representatives were former CPP men: Kurankyi-Taylor, R.R. Amponsah, Victor Owusu and Joe Appiah (Allman 1993:152-3).

[38] Appiah offers a very graphic depiction of the closeness between these two men: "Nkrumah and I had stood in the same bath and used the same water and one towel; I had inserted into his rectum native suppositories from his dear mother and held his legs against the all for a minute, as instructed, before releasing him to go to the lavatory. He had become a friend in the fullest and truest sense: but when he saw what was wrong and refused to put it right, he ceased to be a moral being and a friend" (1990:243).

With the poor organization of the 1954 elections and the combustible cocoa duty ordinance, Nkrumah had brought together the AYA, CPP rebels, the Chiefs and former Ghana Farmers' Council leaders – all of whom now sought revenge on Nkrumah and his People's Party (Austin 1964:265).

This political blunder is all the more stark when compared to the very careful attention given to farmers' concerns over Swollen Shoot after the 1951 elections. Nkrumah's 'New Deal' was a very carefully thought out and politically astute policy. In fact, it has been argued that the CPP's ability to handle this potential crisis was central to the first CPP success (Adamafio 1982; Rooney 1982). But somehow, by 1954, that political sense had been lost. It is here that the influence of Nikoi and the other important farmers that had been expelled in 1952 is evident. The difference in approach in 1954 is quite stark. Again, in 1954, just as in 1951, there were warnings of potential for violent eruption if campaign promises were ignored. In September 1954, Loveridge expressed his growing fear that the situation was becoming dangerous in Ashanti. In a personal communiqué to Arden-Clarke he warned him of the potential dangers but suggested there was still time to rectify things: "I think the whole movement depends upon cocoa...if it removed the reason for the movement's existence the 'victory' would be shortlived and I think it would be worthwhile suffering it" (Rooney 1989:158). No one in the CPP heeded his warning. Instead of trying to allay fears of cocoa farmers, Krobo Edusei speaking to the Legislative Assembly in 1954 proudly proclaimed that, "The Cocoa Purchasing Company is the product of a master brain, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and it is the atomic bomb of the Convention People's Party" (Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, (1956:26) At a time when cocoa farmers were fearful that the CPP was in fact trying to eradicate them, such a proclamation was far from reassuring.

As a result of the poor management of the situation, by the end of November 1954, "Roaming bands of young men wielding every kind of dangerous weapon and shouting *"Ya ti"* (short for "we have torn ourselves from the rest of the country") were all over [Kumasi]" (Appiah 1990:237). As the divisions deepened and violence began to spread across the territory, the Asahnti Ex-Servicemen's Organization, another central pillar to the CPP, "repented for their action against the Golden Stool" and were welcomed back to by the Asanthene (Rooney 182). The NLM was to become one of the most violent and vociferous opposition groups Nkrumah was to face.

Nkrumah had lost support in the North over failure to assuage Northern fears, anticipate a backlash in the face of the Braimah scandal and in his inability to better assess local candidacies in the 1954 elections. He was now alienating support of his Southern constituencies. This was particularly foolhardy given the fact that, despite the strong showing in the 1954 elections, in terms of seats, there had been a substantial anti-CPP vote. It is true that the CPP won 69 seats whereas the non-CPP cumulatively won only 32; however the popular vote was much closer than the number of seats won indicated: the CPP had 391,817 votes, as compared to the non-CPP 314,903 (Austin 1964:243). Thus, though the win was significant, there was also sufficient evidence that the party needed to bolster its support rather than diminish it.

It is true that Nkrumah was taking over a relatively decentralized state with autonomous power brokers, the most powerful of whom were the cocoa growers. But cocoa farmers were not a homogenous group. There were small peasant farmers, large-cocoa farmers many of whom were traditional elites and a new class of cocoa-entrepreneurs who had emerged during the interwar period. It was the competing interests of these cooperative 'big-men,' small-holder farmers and traditional elites that Nkrumah was able to exploit in 1951. The successes in 1951

had shown that it was possible for the CPP to balance the need for government centralization with cocoa farmers' interests. And the government already had the Cocoa Marketing Board in place, enabling it to control cocoa revenue. Though there would clearly be discontent, Nkrumah still had enough carrots to keep a significant number of farmers on his side: the ability to provide loans, extension services, inputs and raise producer prices.[39] These were the means that Houphouët used to keep farmers committed to his regime while continuing to extract sufficient revenue from the sale of exports. Indeed, Nkrumah's all or nothing approach was arguably that much more imprudent given the fact that the cocoa farmers *did* have a level of autonomy.

One reason the CPP was unable to keep farmers incorporated was that the Farmers Council continued to have shallow roots among farmers. The CPC itself was not run by farmers. After the loss of major cocoa interests like Nikoi and B.F. Kusi, the CPP appointed people from within its own base. Their interests were in expanding job opportunities, not in guaranteeing fair prices for farmers (Beckman 1976:64). The urban bias of the Nkrumah administration therefore infected its capacity to deal effectively with this central and sensitive issue. This was intensified by the fact that Nkrumah's government was anxious to implement its own development agenda. He and his advisers were more concerned with gaining complete control over cocoa exports than in finessing political support among the farmers. This lack of understanding of the strategic importance of keeping farmers and chiefs on board, therefore, was critical to how events unfolded.

Given the fact that the CPP central committee was out of touch with grassroots conditions in the regions, it is perhaps not surprising that the sudden creation of the NLM, according to Austin, took the new government "completely by surprise" (1964:281). Moreover, once the NLM had been launched, the government was slow to respond. Nkrumah remained on holiday in the hills at Amedzofe in the hills of Togoland (Austin 1964:283). Instead of concerning himself with the developments in Ashanti, Nkrumah, who had just won the election and saw himself as having a large mandate, was anxious to focus on Pan-African issues. To help launch a Pan-African Movement, the CPP began to push forward its ideological wing, opening branches of the National Association of Socialist Students organization (NASSO) in the main towns. Plans were also being made for a conference of delegates from organizations all over Africa to be held in August 1955 (Austin 1964:284). It also appears that Nkrumah was loathe to publicly address the increasing violence in Ashanti. To do so would expose to the world the fact that there was political instability in the Gold Coast at a time that Nkrumah was hoping to gain international credibility (Austin 1964; Appiah 1990). However, by the end of December 1954, Nkrumah's hand was forced. By then the violence had escalated to such a point that "the rival movements were facing each other in Ashanti as opposed armies" (Austin 1964:285).

Other events were also intensifying the face-off between the opposing camps. In general, Nkrumah opted to enforce his strength rather than attempt to work with the opposition. It is true that the opposition was extremely intransigent. But it is also true that Nkrumah had never given

[39] Bjorn Borg describes some of the political muscle of the CPC: "the Purchasing company [was] able to pay substantial commissions to ordinary farmers...[another] formidable resource of the Cocoa Purchasing Company was the Loans Scheme. In this case, neither firms nor cooperatives were able to compete. It was a powerful instrument for expanding the market share of the Company by reserving the loans for its customers. It also served as a vehicle of political patronage. It could be used to win important farmers for the CPP and to reward those who were prepared to come out in open support of the party in the current political struggle. The ceiling for individual loans was £1,500 a very substantial sum by local standards. The primary official purpose was to relive indebtedness but the scheme lent itself to a much wider range of purposes....almost £2million were released in the first year of operations. By the end of the 1954/55 season some 15,000 farmers had received loans" (1976:62).

the opposition any reason to believe that he would deal favorably with them. At the same time as violence was breaking out over the Cocoa Duty Ordinance, there was a fight in the Assembly over the possibility of creating a federal system and a Second Chamber, conceived as something akin to the House of Lords in which chiefs would be representatives. The CPP put together a Select Committee to make recommendations, but stacked the deck in favor of the CPP. After stringent objections, Nkrumah increased the number of opposition members on the Select Committee from two to five members, against the seven appointed from the "Government benches." This, of course, was hardly enough to appease the opposition. When Nkrumah invited leaders of the NLM to a round-table conference, his overtures were "turned down flat" (Nkrumah 1957:237). Instead, the Opposition refused to participate in the Assembly debate, stating that it was their "duty in the highest interest of the country to refrain from participating in the farcical drama about to be enacted" (Nkrumah 1957:238-239).

With chieftaincy and the traditional classes under attack, the NLM was able to bring together a number of parties to create a more unified opposition. Almost all of these parties had the character of 'chiefs' or conservative parties, among them, the Northern People's Party (NAP) led by the Tolon Na and the Muslim Association Party (MAP) led by the paramount chief of the *zongo*, Muslim 'stranger' community in Kumasi. They also joined forces with the Togoland Congress, which represented the interests of the Volta Region. The opposition now began to press the British government for new elections and a federal constitution to prevent the 'abuse of power' and the 'growth of dictatorship' (Austin 1964:276-277).

The NLM also began to marshal resources afforded them by the support of the most powerful paramount chiefs in Ghana, the Asantehene and the Akim Abuakwa in the Eastern Region. They levied fines of sub-chiefs and used stool revenues to fund the efforts of the NLM and the 'Action Troopers' who were battling the CPP government throughout Ashanti and the Eastern Region (Nkrumah 1957:271-272). Things came to a head when the Asantehene destooled a number of 'rebellious' Brong chiefs under his dominion[40] who supported Nkrumah and had been organizing for the CPP in the northwestern most part of the Ashanti region.[41]

Nkrumah immediately responded by using the power of the state now vested in him. In November, 1955, Nkrumah introduced an amendment to the State Council (Ashanti) Ordinance to permit destooled chiefs the right of appeal to the Governor (Nkrumah 1957:217). With this amendment, the CPP government was fundamentally undermining the prerogative of the most powerful chief in the territory. "As intended, this amendment had the effect of immediately strengthening the CPP within the northwest Ashanti cocoa belt and of diluting the economic and political power of the NLM" (Mikell 1989:174).

Though Nkrumah's actions against the Asantehene are understandable, as was his desire to take a strong and decisive stand, one has to question the wisdom of the timing. So serious was passage of the amendment that it precipitated the first violent attack on Nkrumah personally. On

[40] The Brong were conquered by the Ashanti in the 18th century. The Asantehene installed several chiefs in the region. Thus, by independence the area was divided between chiefs loyal to the Asantehene and those that wanted to end his suzerainty of the area. A similar pattern emerged in the area south of the Brong, among the Ahafo chiefs. The 'rebellious' chiefs of both areas joined forces with Nkrumah in 1955. Nkrumah promised these chiefs that if they supported him, he would grant them independence from Ashanti. In 1959 Nkrumah made good on his promise by creating the Brong-Ahafo region. Rathbone 2000, and *Brong Kyempim: Essays on the Society, History and Politics of the Brong People*. Edited by, Kwame Arhin. Accra: Afram Publications (Ghana) Limited, 1973.

[41] The Asantehene destooled the Bechemhene, the Juasohene, the Jabenhemaa, the Nimafahene of Kumasi and the Bamuhene of Kumasi.

November 10th 1955, at eight o'clock in the evening Nkrumah's home in Accra was bombed.[42] To make matters worse, whether or not justified, these policy choices alienated the British, putting Nkrumah's hard-fought plans for independence in jeopardy. The States Council Bill came into effect just before a British mission was being sent to the Gold Coast to try to work out a compromise between the increasingly entrenched factions. Therefore, the "badly timed action of the CPP government made it certain that the NLM would boycott the Bourne Mission and created another major constitutional crisis" (Rooney 1982:177).

As Nkrumah had feared, by the end of 1955, with the continual flow of protests, the lobbying of NLM leaders like Busia and the unfavorable British press coverage of events unfolding in the Gold Coast,[43] the British Parliament became ever more supportive of the NLM. Though the British civil service and a strong core within the British government had always been fearful of Nkrumah and sympathetic to the chiefs, the Governor-General of the Gold Coast, Sir Arden-Clarke, was an important advocate of Nkrumah's. At the same time, the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, felt that it was critical that the Gold Coast be kept a unified state. With Arden-Clarke's increasing support of Nkrumah and Britain's new determination to finally go through with the 'experiment' and allow the Gold Coast independence, the concern over stability would have given the British government more reason to support Nkrumah's call for unification than the oppositions untenable federalist and separatist claims. But the NLM's ability to exploit the States Council Bill and stir up fears of Nkrumah's leftist, dictatorial tendencies, the tide began to turn in favor of the NLM. Arden-Clarke himself came under attack in the British press and was painted as a stooge of the CPP. Where before, the unfeasibility of federalist solution had been rejected by the Colonial administration, now the British government became more sympathetic to putting in checks against Nkrumah's centralization of power and creating strong regional governments within the Gold Coast. This in turn lent power to the opposition and their growing intransigence. By the end of 1955, "the NLM had gained sufficient support in the country and in London to make [independence in 1956] impossible" (Rooney 1982:179).

The CPP was forced to hold a new round of general elections in 1956. In the end, NLM leadership proved to be unrealistically over confident. "Despite the NLM's blatant appeal to class interests and Ashanti ethnicity in the 1956 elections, as well as its campaign slogan, "Vote Cocoa," it failed to defeat the CPP either in the rural areas or in urban centers" (Mikell 1989:163). Nonetheless, the CPP had to pay for its loss of support with the postponement of independence. Even worse, once granted the terms of the independence constitution imposed by the British showed how far the opposition had been able to influence events. The new government was forced to accept strong regional governments and protections for chiefs.

Loss of the Gã

[42] Nkrumah describes the bombing: "We were still sitting in our chairs when a bright orange glow suddenly lit up the whole of the back of the house and there was a violent explosion, followed within seconds by another. The house trembled, windows were blown in and we could hear the screams of women and children. I went downstairs to find my mother whose room was very near the explosion. The poor woman was speechless and there were tears in her eyes as she clutched hold of my arm....I went into her room. There were no windows anymore and the shattered glass was all over the place, even in her bed" (Nkrumah 1957: 218).

[43] According to Nkrumah, "One letter, which was published in a London newspaper about this time, forecast widespread bloodshed and accused me of possessing a private army! As a result of this and similar publications, thousands of readers in Britain and elsewhere were given an entirely false picture of domestic trouble in the Gold Coast. It is little wonder that I was forced to the conclusion that at the eleventh hour imperialist enemies were still trying to defeat my efforts towards independence" (1957:217).

It seems clear that, with respect to the creation of the NLM and the showdown in Ashanti, Nkrumah's policy choices at a sensitive moment tipped the scales. Only a couple of months before in the 1954 elections, the intellectuals had little support and even the southern chiefs had done poorly (Bing 1968; Appiah 1992. Joe Appiah explains, "Ashanti, before [the Cocoa Duty Ordinance], was so enamored with the CPP that she had given all but one of her twenty-one parliamentary seats to that Party" (1990:243). Austin also recounted that "In June and July 1954 there was hardly a sign of the conflict that was soon to break out. At the national level, all was quiet" (Austin 1964:251).

Just as the problems that emerged in Ashanti can be clearly traced to poor policy and political strategies undertaken by the CPP, so too can the emergence of another regional/ethnic movement: the Gã Shifimo Kpee. During the early anti-colonial movement, Nkrumah had managed to align with 'commoners' and sub-chiefs in the region and was in fact himself the representative of a Gã constituency in Accra. Yet, by 1956 even the CPP Gã were beginning to feel that their interests were not being looked after. In 1956, the Accra regional executive of the CPP members submitted to the central committee a memorandum signed by forty-nine members, among them leading figures in the Accra region.[44] The memorandum stated a number of their concerns 'affecting the welfare' of Gã Municipal and Rural Constituencies (Austin 1964:373). Central among them was that the Gã had not been given any Ministerial or Secretarial positions and that the Estate Building project, which had ostensibly been initiated to address long-standing housing problems in Gã areas in Accra, was being used to house CPP Ministers, not the Gã themselves. The Resolution ominously advised Nkrumah that these issues were engendering "a ferment for an eruption likely to blow up any time" and that the group had chosen to send the resolution so that 'the Hon. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah' "be made known of it before it is too late if he seems not to know it or does not know it" (Austin 1964:374).

Despite the warnings, the CPP never sufficiently addressed these concerns. A few months later, a new association was created 'to protect the interests of the Gã people.' Taxi drivers were enlisted to spread the word, which was quickly picked up among Nkrumah's own constituency: unemployed elementary-school-leavers. This association also brought in Gã members of the Ex-Servicemen, an organization which had originally been indispensible to the rise of the CPP, who were also angered by the government's handling of the allocation of Estate housing (Austin 1964:374-375). These "anti-CPP elements had fanned the discontent of the Gã areas and had successfully organised strong support for the Gã Shifimo Kpee, Gã Standfast Association" (Amonoo 1981:67). Thus, just as with the NLM , this anti-CPP Gã party was launched by formerly staunch CPP adherents (Austin 1964:964; Apter 1966).

By the time of independence, three of the five serious opposition groups were headed by former CPP leaders: the NLM (Appiah, Owusu); the Gã Shifimo Kpee (Ashie Nikoi, Dwenzle Dzewu) and the MAL (Awoonor Bankole-Renner). It is not surprising that subsequently, when regional/ethnic based parties were banned in 1957 and the opposition parties came together under the umbrella of the United Party (UP), four of the twelve members of the executive's Working Committee had been prominent CPP figures.[45] In fact, one of the first people tried for

[44] Such as E.C. Quaye, C.T. Nylander, R. A. Hammond and E.W. Note Dowuona. See Austin 1964:373.

[45] The executive of the United Party was drawn from the NLM, NPP, MAP, the Togoland Congress, the Anlo Youth Organization and the Gã Shifimo Kpee. The officers were: National Chairmen, Dr. J. Hutton-Mills, Deputy Chairman, J.A. Braimah [former Minister]; National Treasurer, Mrs. Nancy Tsiboe [from Ashanti Pioneer]; Working Committee: Dr. Busia, S.D. Dombo, E. O. Obetsibi Lamptey, M.K. Apaloo, Joe Appiah [ex-CPP], Attoh Okine, Bankole Awoonor Renner [ex-CPP], K.Y. Attoh, Ashie Nikoe [ex-CPP], Kwesi Lamptey [ex-CPP], Dr I.B. Asafu Adjaye and Dr. Danquah. See Austin 1964, pp. 384).

an attempted assassination of the Life Chairman of the CPP was R.R. Amponsah, the former Education Office of the CPP.

The early choices perhaps most clearly demonstrate that there was nothing fated about the nature of Nkrumah's opposition. The fact that so many opposition leaders had once been staunch CPP supporters reveals that the opposition was determined neither by strong ideological rifts, nor by regional/ethnic divisions. The enmity that these individuals developed toward Nkrumah was in response to his policies and his poor handling of local and regional concerns. As a result, radical leftists came into partnership with the most conservative elements in Ghanaian politics. Even with respect to the rise of the NLM, the central catalysts had been the CPP's poorly chosen cocoa policy abetted by the expulsion of local CPP leaders that had already undermined regional and local CPP organizations.

Nkrumah was a visionary leader with political charisma who was a master at political mobilization. But he was a poor statesman. Neither a negotiator, nor a compromiser, Nkrumah was intolerant of dissent and unable to allow for any form of decentralized power. Though there were a handful of expelled CPP leaders that were brought back into the fold,[46] for the most part, Nkrumah was unwilling to allow for any departure from the party line which he invariably perceived to be disloyalty to him personally. In the end, the critical factor in the rise of opposition movement in the early years was Nkrumah's mishandling of local politics born from his inability to stomach dissent and his uncompromising vision. Over the years, Nkrumah was not to learn from his mistakes. The same kinds of choices were to be made later, more virulently and with more serious repercussions.

II. Consolidation of Power

Overwhelming Regional and Local Authorities - 1957-1959

Independence was granted to the Gold Coast on March 6th, 1957. Though it was a great triumph for Nkrumah, it was not an unmitigated success. Independence came with strings. Nkrumah's government had been forced to accept a constitution that was completely antithetical to its own principles and aspirations. As Nkrumah had expected, the British Government had "concede[d] the shadow of independence in order to avoid granting its substance" (Bing 1968:188).

The British enforced what they saw as a 'compromise' constitution. Though they had stopped short of creating a federal system, it was stipulated that there were to be five Regions in the new country: Ashanti, Eastern, Northern, Trans-volta and Western Regions, each with its own Regional Assembly. The Regional Assemblies were to be given broad powers and chieftaincy was to be protected as was the independence of the civil service. None of this was acceptable to Nkrumah. In addition, the British had tried to make it virtually impossible for Nkrumah to amend the new constitution. Instead of the usual practice, wherein a constitution can be altered by a two-thirds vote of in the Parliament, any an amendment to the constitution would first have to be approved by two-thirds of the Regional Assemblies before being brought before the National Assembly. This meant that four out of the five regional assemblies would have to sign on. Given that Nkrumah had the support of only three of the regions, the British had made it close to impossible for Nkrumah to transform the quasi-federal system (Bing 1968:191).

With the constitution so constructed, Nkrumah took over a government that he could not

[46] In particular, the expelled TUC leaders: Anthony Woode, Turscan Ocran and Pobee Biney.

control and which greatly limited his powers. The first three years of independence, therefore, should not be regarded as characteristic of the CPP government. It was rather an interim period in which the CPP maneuvered to gain full control over the state. Most of the government's policy initiatives were geared towards the critical by-election in 1958 when the Regional Assemblies would be chosen. Only if the CPP government could gain control of the Regional Assemblies, would it be able to implement its own constitution. With this in mind, it is understandable that the first key decision of the government should be focused on ways to break the power of the opposition.

The fight against the opposition began as soon as the legislative session began. The Nkrumah government appears to have started its attack by plucking off the lowest-hanging fruit. The government passed a series of Acts that would allow it to begin deportations of Muslim 'strangers' within the opposition, many of whom had been living for more than a generation in the Gold Coast. In its first legislative sessions, it passed the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act and Immigration Act and by July it had put into place a Deportation Act. Immediately after, deportation orders were issued for two longstanding conservative opposition Muslim leaders, Imam Abbas of Accra and Alhaji Amadu Baba, the *Zerikin Zongo* in Kumasi.[47] In addition to having formed their own party to organize Muslim 'stranger' or *zongo* communities in the major cities, the Muslim Association Party (MAP), these traditional leaders were seen to be 'clients' of the Asantehene. A series of expulsions of other prominent Muslim leaders and traders ensued (Mikell 1989; Bing 1968; Austin 1964:19). According to the CPP's own estimates, between 1957 and 1960, 359 people were deported (Bing 1968:217). The Government alleged that these expulsions were necessary "to restore law and order in Kumasi", where these Nigerian 'strangers' who "owed allegiance not to the Government of Ghana but to religious or tribal representatives of their own community" had been the principle agents behind the violence in Kumasi.[48] With the existing Muslim leaders deported, the CPP was able to install its own Hausa supporters as the head of the 'stranger' communities (Mikell 1989).

Measures were then taken to undermine the opposition leaders in the regions. To prevent the Regional Assemblies from dominating the regional administrative machinery, on June 3rd, 1957, the government announced to the National Assembly that Regional Commissioners (RCs) who were to administer the new regions, would be appointed by the central government. The RCs were to be 'personally and directly responsible to the Government for the administration of their regions and for seeing that this policy is carried out'(*Ghana Gazette*, 16 Oct. 1957). This also undermined the British attempt to depoliticize the position, by keeping the Regional Commissioners within the purview of the civil service. Four months later, five RCs assumed office in the regional capitals (Amonoo 1981:66-69).

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[47] In fairness to Nkrumah, the Muslim leaders did work against the CPP. Appiah gives an example of one such leader who was deported: "The next case involved an old Moslem leader of about seventy who was very highly respected by the Moslems of Wenchi town. During Nkrumah's campaign for the setting-up of a "Republican government" in Ghana, the Moslem community sought the advice of an old man on what 'Republicanism' meant. Briefly, the old man replied: "As far as I know, if this form of government ever comes into being Nkrumah will be called president; he will be able to take wives, lands and any property he wants without any trouble." Among the group was a police informant who immediately after the meeting reported to his bosses. The old Moslem was arrested and put before court on a charge of spreading false news. I traveled a distance of eighty miles to a crowded court at Sunyani to defend the old boy" (1990:249).

[48] See "Statement by the Government on the Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Matters Disclosed at the Trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey Before a Court-Martial and the Surrounding Circumstances." White Paper No. 10/59. Printed by the Government Printer: Accra. (Accra Archives GDP/NRA 1562/10,000/6/58-59).

Soon after, the government began to hit the most powerful chieftaincies directly. Early in 1958 a number of pro-NLM Ashanti chiefs were 'downgraded' from the position of a paramount chief and pro-CPP chiefs were 'upgraded'. "By such means, every pro-NLM chief in Ashanti was removed from office with the exception of the Asantehene who was spared only after he had made a public declaration of support for 'the government of the day'" (Austin 1964:377-78). This was followed on June 23rd, 1958 with the passage of the 'The Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act', which put the control of all the chief's revenues under the central government. The Act instituted the office of the 'Receiver of the Stool' in the department in the Ministry of Local Government who had the sole right to receive and recover "all rents, dues, royalties, revenues and other payments" from Stool lands controlled by the Akim Abuakwa State. At the Assembly's next sessions, the government went after the revenue of the Asantehene, chiefs in the Northern Territories and the Volta. On the 9th of September, the Assembly passed 'The Ashanti Stool Lands Act', which established that, "All such property, rights and interests as the Asantehene possesses" be transferred to and vested in the Governor-General where it would be held 'in trust' for the Golden Stool and the Kumasi State.

This was quickly followed two days later with 'The Councils (Northern Territories and Trans-Volta/Togoland) Dissolution Act' that mandated that Traditional Councils in these regions "shall cease to exist and the assets of the Councils shall vest in the Public Trustee as trust property within the meaning of the Public Trustee Ordinance, 1952." In addition to directly taking over the control of the properties and revenues of the most powerful paramount chieftaincies, the Nkrumah government undermined other sources of local control and revenue. 'The Local Courts Act' established that new local courts were to be created to replace Native Courts that would be presided over by magistrates appointed by the Minister. The Local Courts Act thereby denied traditional leaders political control over the courts, as well as the fines and fees traditionally assessed by Native Courts.

But the most important Executive Act passed in 1958 was 'The Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act 1958' that finally removed restrictions governing constitutional change. The repeal was made possible by the careful restructuring of the Regional Assemblies. In April, the Regional Constitutional Commission formed by the CPP recommend that the interim regional assemblies appointed in 1957 be replaced by elected assemblies for which elections would be held in October. This would enable the government to place supportive elements within the regional assemblies before a vote on repealing the restrictions in the constitution. In addition, the plan stipulated that the range of powers formerly granted to the Regional Assemblies be severely restricted. Angered by these moves, the Opposition decided to boycott the election and refused to nominate any candidates. By September, the CPP therefore had a majority on every Regional Assembly. When the Repeal of Restrictions Bill was sent to the CPP-dominated regional assemblies and houses of chiefs, it was quickly passed. One month later, the Bill sailed through the National Assembly and by December 1958, the 1957 Constitution had been effectively nullified (Bing 1968:192; Austin 1964:380). In spring of the following year the Regional Assemblies were abolished.

With the Repeal Act of 1958, the government could put the final nail in the coffin against resistant paramount chiefs and any form of local autonomy. March 25th 1959 was a particularly important date. On that day, the government passed a succession of Acts that further undermined chieftaincy and local authority, starting with 'The Chiefs (Recognition) Act, No. 11', which established that, "no enstoolment or destoolment of a Chief" would "have any effect unless recognized by the Governor-General by Order." This gave the government the possibility

replace chiefs at will and made any resistance to the Governor-General's order punishable by imprisonment or fine. The Chiefs (Recognition) Act was followed by The Local Courts (Amendment) Act, No. 13, which increased penalties for resisting new Local Courts; and by The Local Government (Amendment) Act, No. 14 and The Municipal Councils (Abolition of Traditional Members) Act, No. 15, which removed all traditional members from the local government. Finally, the government passed 'The Brong-Ahafo Region Act, No. 18', which established 'Western Ashanti as a separate Region and established 'The House of Brong-Ahafo Chiefs Act' that the Brong-Ahafo chiefs would no longer be subject to the Ashanti House of Chiefs.

At the same time that Nkrumah was undermining the political and economic resources of his opposition, he had also started to build up his repressive powers. Nkrumah's government had started to take more repressive measures after the break out of riots in Alanyo, in the Togoland immediately following independence. The Emergency Powers Act of December 1957 gave the Governor-General expanded powers to detain, imprison, fine and modify or extend any laws he saw 'necessary or expedient for securing the safety, the defence of Ghana, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community'.[49] One year later, in November 1958, after those charged with being behind the Avalyano riots were acquitted by the courts on technicalities, the CPP government passed the notorious Preventive Detention Act (PDA) (Austin 1964:381; Bing 1968:270). [50] The PDA gave the government the power to arrest and detain anyone for up to five years without trial. It was used almost immediately to imprison nearly all the Gã leaders in opposition who were suspected to be involved with the Gã Shifimo Kpee, including Ashie Nikoi and Dzenkle Dzewu (Bing 1968:248). In 1961, when the opposition came out in support of a large railway workers' strike in Sekondi-Takoradi, almost all the opposition leaders were detained under the PDA, along with hundreds of workers. Most were released after six months to a year, when Nkrumah declared a general political amnesty in 1962. But by the time of the coup, detention without trial had been extended to up to ten years and it was alleged that Nkrumah had imprisoned 1,300 political prisoners under the Act (Bing1968:273). Though Bing claimed that there were only 400 political prisoners out of 788 that were released, the PDA had certainly become an instrument of terror and had created fear and distrust of the regime throughout the country.[51]

Thus by late 1958, the CPP government had considerably consolidated itself. In many

[49] *Emergency Powers Act, 1957 (30th December 1957), No. 28, Section 5(1), (2).*

[50] See also: 'Statement by the Government on the Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Matters Disclosed at the Trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey Before a Court-Martial and the Surrounding Circumstances.' W.P No. 10/59. Printed by the Government Printer: Accra.

[51] Other legislation also followed in the summer of 1959. In July, 'The Offences Against the State (False Reports) Act' added to the Criminal Code that it would be punishable for up to fifteen years imprisonment to communicate "whether by word of mouth or in writing or by any other means," any false statement or report that could injure "the credit or reputation of Ghana or the Government of Ghana". It was further stipulated that this was a punishable crime whether the accused knew or did not know that the injurious statement was false and that statements made outside Ghana would be equally treated "as if it had been committed within [her] jurisdiction." The Act was clearly aimed at clamping down on Busia, who, much to the government's chagrin, had held a press conference in London on 29th April 1959, in which he charged that "The present state of affairs offers no good prospects either for investment for Ghana from abroad or for a parliamentary government which requires respectable standards of honesty of its public officers" (WP 10/59). Another act, 'The National Assembly (Disqualification), No. 16 1959, made it possible to eliminate representatives to the National Assembly accused of a crime. The False Reports Act was followed in November with' The Sedition Act' and in December, The Treason Act.

respects, it has to be acknowledged that Nkrumah's draconian laws enacted between 1957 and 1959 were successful. By the end of 1959 it appeared that the opposition had been completely beaten. Their finances had been greatly impacted, most opposition leaders were in exile or imprisoned (including the Asantehene's linguist and titular head of the NLM) and chiefs' powers had been all but eliminated. As a result, by the end of 1959 "The United Party practically vanished" (Adamafio 1982:46-47). Returning to Ghana in 1960, Austin wrote:

> How different is the Ghana scene today! The Ashanti movement has been crushed, the State has not merely held together but is in process of extending its boundaries in a wider union, Accra has become an important centre in pan- African affairs, a single party holds the country in its grip and Nkrumah rules over a radical party-controlled republic defined as 'socialist at home, neutralist abroad'. Indeed, those who entertain fears for the new republic are uneasy not that the Government may be unable to govern, but that its rulers will rule only too well." [Austin 1960:424].

These policies had moreover brought about two important co-optations for Nkrumah. First, the threat of destoolment, which had forced the exile of the prominent Mamprusi Paramount Chief in the North, had made an impact on the Ya Na in Dagomba, one of the most centralized chieftaincies in the Northern Territory. It was the Ya-Na's sub-chief, the Tolon-Na, who was in fact a founding member of the Northern People's Party, the central opposition party based in the North. But the looming threat of destoolment had been sufficient to force a change. The Ya Na instructed all his sub-chiefs to end their opposition to the CPP government.[52] Accordingly, they crossed the carpet *en masse* in 1959.[53] Nkrumah's second victory was winning the allegiance of Brong-Ahafo. By dividing the Ashanti Region in two and creating the Brong-Ahafo Region, Nkrumah was able to reward Brongs and Ahafos who had supported him in the 1956 election, weaken the Asantehene and win the continued fidelity of the region.

Thus, upon the dawning of the new decade, it appeared that Nkrumah was there to stay. Nkrumah's electoral victories in 1959 allowed him to finally change the terms of constitution and introduce a new Republican Constitution in 1960 which placed him unquestionably at the helm. The position of governor-general was finally abolished and all authority was vested in the newly created Office of the President. As a result, by the end of 1960 "of the thirty-two Opposition Members elected to the Ghana Parliament in 1956, seventeen [had] joined the Government" (Bing 1968:284).

With the opposition thus chastened by its clear losses, there now appeared a brief possibility of étente. It is true that there still existed a core of politico-elites that would never be swayed to Nkrumah's side. Many opposition leaders "had a deep, instinctive dislike of everything that Nkrumah and the CPP stood for" (Austin 1964:369). But the strength of this group was questionable. The intelligentsia and chiefs had not been able to launch much popular support for themselves between 1951-3. In 1951, the CPP had won "a resounding victory,"

[52] Nkrumah had almost destooled the Ya Na himself. Allasani, Nkrumah's Dagomba Minister, advocated for the destoolment of the Ya Na. Fortunately for all concerned, Nkrumah had other advisors that made him understand the dangers of such a course. It appears that for once, Nkrumah had made an important assessment of the kind of advice he was receiving. In the end, Nkrumah decided not to destool the Ya Na.

[53] The Ya Na's Abudulai clan was rewarded. The Tolon Na was given the ambassador post in Nigeria. At the same time, Nkrumah did not abandon his Adani supporters. In 1960, passed the LI 59, which stipulated that the stool would alternate between families and that the the next to hold the stool would be an Andani. Overall, Nkrumah skillfully managed the complex Dagomba political situation. See Ladouceur 1972: 103-106.

winning 29 out of the 33 possible rural seats in Ashanti and the South and all but five of the municipal seats (Rooney 1989:116). It was only when Youth leaders, Ex-Servicemen and CPP rebels joined the conservatives and traditional elites that they had become formidable. Once Nkrumah had gained independence, the dramatic success of the CPP's accomplishment and the allure of its power had taken all the air out of the opposition. It was therefore a moment of potential. For these reasons, Austin opined that,

> "given the growing awareness of the power of the Accra government...it was not unreasonable to argue that ...if the CPP were to make no other move against the opposition alliance than to offer its members inducements to join the government party, the uneasy coalition of regional local parties would quickly fall victim to its own internal differences." [Austin 1964:368-369]

Yet, the CPP government continued to deeply distrust the old regime and anyone connected to it. There is no indication that Nkrumah ever intended to work through compromises or develop any kind of power sharing scheme. He and his advisers did not seem to see the importance of keeping their enemies in his camp. More than that, they seem to have been eager to exercise unrestrained power – to finally show the defeat of the old regime and have the freedom to redraw the political contours of the country and society.

In many ways, Nkrumah's independent rule did not begin until 1960. When he first assumed power, he was under the constraints of the 1957 Lennox-Boyd Constitution that was antithetical to his own agenda and vision and which greatly limited his control of the state. Ironically, therefore, the independence constitution had had the positive effect of slowing down Nkrumah's centralization of power and it may, as a result, also have been responsible for Nkrumah's ability to hold onto power longer. Only once he had restructured the state and eliminated any possible checks on his control were the deep flaws in his character revealed. His incapacity to assess political situations and respond appropriately led to his quick and decisive fall. In less than six years Nkrumah – who had every advantage and was at the apex of power and who had defeated almost every conceivable opposition force in Ghana and appeared to be invincible – was quickly and dramatically removed from power with virtually no popular support left.

Free Reign and Poor Politics: Move toward the radical left, 1960-1962

On 1 July, 1960, Ghana became a Republic in the commonwealth. In his swearing-in ceremony as Ghana's first president, Nkrumah incorporated all the symbols of Ashanti kingship, including the special Kente cloth, a Golden Stool and a Golden Staff. He even assumed the official title of *Osagyefo*, an Ashanti warrior title meaning the 'Redeemer' or 'Conqueror'. Nkrumah's symbolic assumption of Ashanti royal command was matched by the increasing centralization of power in the Office of the Presidency.

Over the next five years, as he steadily eliminated any remaining vestiges of opposition, he was free to follow his own course. Nkrumah began to focus more attention on African Unity and transforming Ghana into a socialist state. According to one source, Nkrumah's intent to be the President of the unified Africa was so strong that he married an Egyptian women in order to fulfill a prophecy that the son of a black African man and a white African woman would rule all of Africa (Mahoney 1983:158). Where Nkrumah had started with his political sojourn with some

amount of pragmatism, impatience and distrust became the hallmarks of the CPP regime. His one-time close associate, Tawia Adamafio describes how:

> "Nkrumah could be aptly described as 'Africa's Man in a Hurry'. He always said: 'Tawia, Ghana must run all the way. We cannot afford to walk at ease. There is too much to be accomplished and we are only just starting.' This made him rather impatient and always eager to adopt unorthodox methods and short cuts of solving problems." [Adamafio 1982:68]

But these 'unorthodox methods' ultimately undermined the economy and transformed Ghana into a proto-police state modeled after the Soviet Union. A number of things seem to have contributed to these outcomes.

Prior to independence, Nkrumah had not been much of an ideologue. He believed in state-led growth and pan-Africanism, but he was not a communist and had genuine reservations about the Soviets.[54] The first significant event that turned him away from the West and towards the Eastern bloc came in 1960 when the Congo erupted in war. Despite their bitter battle to resist independence, by 1960 the Belgians had been forced to accept the inevitable and allow for elections. A young, charismatic intellectual leader, Patrice Lumumba, became Prime Minister. However, with the such a vast territory made up of formerly independent states and the large Belgian settler population protected by an all-Belgian security force, tensions continued. Within months of independence, the two wealthiest, mineral-rich regions of the Congo, Kasai and Katanga, declared themselves independent states. The secessionists were supported by Belgian mining interests and backed by Belgian troops. The country was at war.

Nkrumah immediately went to the aid of the fledgling republic and its newly elected leader, Lumumba. Already committed to freeing the African continent of all remnants of colonialism, Nkrumah became deeply committed to the Congolese cause. But the freedom-fight in the Congo came to an abrupt and tragic end in January 1961 when Lumumba was captured, brutally tortured and then mysteriously murdered. Lumumba's death had a profound impact on Nkrumah. It radicalized his positions and fueled what was to become his consuming fear of Western powers. In a speech given a few months after Lumumba's death, Nkrumah pronounced, "The revival of colonialism in the Congo is sufficient evidence and warning of the treacherous character of imperialism and its menace even to independent states and of the danger of the new colonialism which is more subtle but equally vicious."[55]

With this growing distrust of the West, Nkrumah made his first visit to the Eastern Bloc in early 1961. He spent several months travelling through the Soviet states and China. He returned deeply impressed by their successes (Killick 1978:45; Packham 2004). For their part, the Soviet's treated Nkrumah as a hero, awarding him the Lenin Peace Prize, and offered him financial, technical and military support (Mahoney 1983:158). All of this influenced Nkrumah's

[54] When in October 1953, Nkrumah suspended the CPP unionist Anthony Woode, who had gone to the Soviet Union and returned agitating along more ideological lines Nkrumah asserted, "There can never be any question of exchanging British masters for Russian masters. It is not in the best interests of our country for any nationalist....to allow himself to be used by a Communist organization" (Packham 2004:124). Even in the late 1950's, Dennis Austin was writing that 'there is very little ideological commitment to the party (CPP) among its rank and file" (quoted in Packham 2004:152).

[55] "A Message from Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana On the Third Anniversary of Africa Freedom Day, April 15th 1961," in *Selected Speeches of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, First President of the Republic of Ghana. Vol. 2.* Compiled by Samuel Obeng. Accra: Afram Publications (Ghana) Ltd. (1961), pp. 78.

choice to build a 'vanguard socialist party' and attempt to rapidly industrialize Ghana.

At the same time, Nkrumah was coming increasingly under the sway of radical leftist elements within his party. Two people in particular were extremely powerful: the British lawyer and architect of Ghana's Republican Constitution, Geoffrey Bing and the student leader, Tawia Adamafio. The latter had an especially pernicious effect on Nkrumah. Early on, Adamafio was something of a CPP spin-doctor. In the 1950s, he authored a popular column in the Accra *Evening News*, 'Tawia's Daily Notes', in which he railed "against the imperialists, the reactionaries and the saboteurs who were bent upon halting the successes of the CPP by all the means at their disposal" (Adamafio 1982:6). In 1956, Adamafio went to the London to study law. There he became Chairman of the National Association Of Socialist Students Organization (NASSO). Through NASSO, Adamafio was slowly able to take over the already existent Ghana Students Union (GSU) that had formerly been strongly affiliated with the NLM.

With his increasing power over organized youth and his ability to spin purist rhetoric, Adamafio quickly ascended the political ladder. By 1959, Nkrumah had appointed Adamafio, General Party Secretary of the CPP. In that role, Adamafio pressed Nkrumah to widen his attack on 'neo-colonialist forces'. He relentlessly pushed Nkrumah to purify the party, rid itself of 'petty-bourgeoisie, national opportunists' and to expel any British remnants of the colonial order still in the Armed Forces, the Police, the Civil Service and the University. Under his sway, Nkrumah began to reshuffle his cabinet and intensify ideological education of the party and administration as a means "to build a Vanguard Party for the work of socialist reconstruction" (Adamafio 1982:31). In short-order, Adamafio's socialist study groups and youth party gained ascendency over the CPP Ministers, who were warned in no uncertain terms, 'to tow the party line or get out'(Adamafio 1982:35).

Altogether, Adamafio's influence began to fracture Nkrumah's party even further. In January 1960, Nkrumah removed Kojo Botsio from his position as secretary of the CPP central committee. By July 1960, Adamafio had begun to turn against K.A. Gbedemah, the Minister of Finance and the second most important leader of the CPP. Their falling out began with a dispute over the civil service. Adamafio insisted that the civil service suffered from "archaic snail-pace methods of work" which was obstructing "expeditious progress" (Packham 2004:159). His solution was to begin "an intensive socialist education" of the civil service, so as to "eliminate the bourgeois and petty bourgeois mentality" and "redeem them from the colonial mentality which negated their usefulness to the African revolution" (Adamafio 1982:76). Gbedemah objected to this politicization of the Service which he saw as a dangerous threat to the efficacy and efficiency of the administration. When Adamafio put "the case of the party" over the civil service to Nkrumah, he reminded Nkrumah - speaking as the General Secretary of the Party - that "the party was the foundation of all his power. If at any election in future, the party failed, he and all his glorified civil servant ministers would pack up" (1982:52). Soon after, Nkrumah came to Adamafio's side in the dispute. [56]

Like Adamafio, the leftist lawyer Bing also believed that Gbedemah was too conservative. Both men saw Gbedemah's concern with balancing budgets and his desire to work with Western capitalists so as to gain financial backing (especially for the massive Volta Dam project), as indicative of his being "orthodox in the extreme" and following "almost the same

[56] Adamafio's increasing control was due to his ability to manipulate Nkrumah. In addition to his effective scare-tactics, Adamafio knew how to pander to Nkrumah's weakness for sycophancy. It was he that helped develop the myth of Nkrumah as the unassailable 'Osagyefo'. For example, after the bombing at Kulungu, Adamafio controlled the press coverage ...convinced Nkrumah that...

policy as that of his ex-officio British predecessor" (Bing 1968:152). In April, 1961, Nkrumah made his famous Dawn Speech, in which he warned his Ministers that they had to end their venal ways. Many believe that Adamafio was the speech-writer. One month later, Adamafio replaced Gbedemah as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. That September, charges of dereliction of duty and corruption were brought against several of the old-guard, including Gbedemah, Bostio, Krobo Edusei and Inkumsah (the Minister of the Interior).[57] The following October, all four were removed from the Government, leaving the CPP "bereft of its early leaders" (Austin 1964:407). The political coup was complete when the old guard was replaced by Adamafio's faction: Adamafio took over the position of Minister of Establishment, his protégés Coffee Crabbe was named Minister of Information, Ako Adjei became Minister of Foreign Affairs and other close associate Kwaku Boateng became executive secretary of the party, later to be Minister of the Interior.

The loss of Gbedemah had a number of serious consequences for the future course of events. First, Gbedemah went into exile and joined the subversive forces working against Nkrumah. He worked secretly with the CIA on assassination plots (Mahoney 1983) and eventually joined forces with Dr. Busia and the exile community in Lomé (Bing 1968:153). But more decisively, his leaving seriously impacted the economic planning of the CPP government. "Under the strong but conservative hand of Minister of Finance Gbedemah, fiscal policy was used as an orthodox tool of economic stabilization" (Killick 1978:154). With his departure in 1961, any restraint on Nkrumah's spending ambitions was removed. "Nkrumah was able to shift the whole emphasis of fiscal policy from a pursuit of domestic and external equilibrium to nothing much more than a search for resources to match the government's expenditure plans" (Killick 1978:154).

This became apparent almost immediately as the government began to undertake the drafting of a new seven-year plan. In October 1961, the existing Development Commissions were dissolved and replaced by a State Planning Committee, now directly responsible to the president. With Gbedemah and the former economic advisor, Arthur Lewis, out of favor, the government hired a team of three Hungarian experts, headed by Professor Jozef Bognar, to draw up the broad lines of the plan (Ewusi 1973:9). The new Seven-year Plan was far more 'ambitious' than any that preceded it. In presenting the it to the National Assembly, Nkrumah explained:

> "The main tasks of the Plan are: firstly, to speed up the rate of growth of our national economy. Secondly, it is to enable us to embark upon the socialist transformation of our economy through the rapid development of the State and co-operative sectors. Thirdly, it is our aim, by this Plan, to eradicate completely the colonial structure of our economy" [Second Seven-Year Development Plan, 1964, pp. ix]

In accordance with these new objectives, expenditures were more than quadrupled. Whereas in the previous Development Plan guided by Gbedemah and Lewis total expected investment in Agriculture and Industry were £24.6 and £25.3 million, respectively, they had grown to £176.6 and £206.4 million in the Seven-Year Plan. In addition, loans and grants were to account for one-half of public investment, making the government heavily reliant on expensive forms of foreign capital. Projections for private investment were just as out of scale. The private

[57] Some of these men had indeed been guilty of embezzling large amounts of money, Inkumsah in particular who infamously bought his wife a gold bed.

sector was expected to invest £540 million, despite the fact that in the years immediately prior to the plan the private sector had invested an average of £45 million per annum. These fantastic figures were regarded as possible because the anticipated rate of growth was projected at 5.5 per cent with a capital output ration of 3.5, thus the plan's architects expected capital formation to increase by 19.25 percent. For outside observers, these plans were nothing more than wishful thinking (Ewusi 1973:42-43).

The outlandish budget was justified by equally fantastic expectations of rates of industrialization. The authors of the plan explained: "the further Growth of Ghana's economy and the achievement of stability demand that Ghana be transformed eventually into an industrial country" (7-Year Plan 1964:54). This transformation was expected to take place within a very short period of time. The plan's architects projected that over the next seven years, there would be a need to fill 500,000 new jobs *a year* in industry and modernized agriculture. They anticipated further that the acquisition of higher skills would be "particularly urgent" since they estimated that "the requirements of economic growth under this plan will not be satisfied unless unemployment in both high level and middle level occupations increases by more than 60 per cent in the course of the next seven years" (7-Year Plan 1964:143). There would even be a need to shorten elementary education from ten years to eight years to keep pace with the need to speedily absorb laborers into the vast industrial schema.

A central part of the scheme was to move rapidly towards industrialized agriculture to increase productivity and ratchet up food production. Estimating that new mechanized farms would require the "services of approximately 20,000 farm equipment maintenance mechanics and thousands of other agricultural workers," they foresaw the need to train and recruit 300,000 new employees in this sector alone over the seven-year period. Accordingly, the planners argued that, with 60 percent of the workforce in agriculture, nearly two-thirds of the labor force would have to undergo a "revolutionary change" (7-Year Plan 1964:150). Through these means the government believed it could eradicate unemployment. In its party publication *Programme of the Convention People's Party for Work and Happiness* that came out a few years earlier, it was explained that "large pockets of unemployment in the urban areas and "hidden" or "underemployment" of the rural work force was a result of the "agrarian character of the economy" so that with the "diversification and mechanisation of agriculture" a "substantial force of surplus labor" would be "released from the rural areas and transformed into industry". Thereby, over the "Seven-Year Plan Period unemployment will have been abolished in Ghana" (1961:32).

From exile, Gbedemah published a pamphlet, entitled: "It will not be "*Work and happiness for all"!:An open letter :being also an appeal to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and comment on and criticism of the proposed new 7 year Ghana Development Plan*". Gbedemah stridently critiqued the 7-Year Plan for "the vastness of the proposals", arguing that the plans was "overambitious, not only for a 7 year period, but wrong in concept for even a 14 year plan". In addition, he took issue with the government's "obvious intention to regiment and state-control everything", warning that no investor would be attracted to Ghana as a good investment field. He concluded with a direct appeal to Nkrumah:

> "If I may say so, I don't think it is fair for a small country such as Ghana, unlike some other big countries with hundreds of millions of population, also to try to make a 'great leap forward'. We can be original in our ideas and try to learn from the mistakes others have made before us, can't we Mr. President?" (1962:14).

Gbedemah was to be proven right. Over the next five years, as the Nkrumah government became increasingly centralized and radicalized, the economy began to unravel. The dismissal of his closest associates had sent a message never to cross Nkrumah. Nkrumah therefore became increasingly removed from reality, surrounded by 'yes-men' and sycophants.

III. Policy Implications

Eventually, Adamafio was made Minister for Establishments in charge of the Civil Service. In that position, he tried to end the bureaucratic 'red-tapism' by adopting 'revolutionary methods'. Under his direction, the CPP government stepped up its attempts to impose ideological education on the party and government administrators. All party leaders and public servants were required to attend seminars at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute. The transformation of the administrative apparatus of the state was also made possible by the emasculation of the Civil Service Commission which had begun in 1959. In that year, the government passed 'The Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 7 of 1959', empowering the then Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General on appointments to 'special posts' without necessarily consulting the Public Services Commission (Amonoo 1981). In practice the amendment allowed the President to simply side-step the Public Services Commission and create parallel organs under his direct control. Through these means he was able to completely by-pass the Ministries.

One of the mechanisms the President used to sideline the Ministries was to create a number of 'secretariats' responsible wholly to himself. There was a Labour Secretariat that ran parallel to the Ministry of Labour, a Chieftaincy Secretariat that managed chieftaincy affairs, a Publicity Secretariat that took over the functions of the Ministry of information, an Establishment Secretariat that monitored the Civil Service, an Organizational and Methods Secretariat, a Planning Secretariat, etc. These secretariats were not subject to any official control mechanisms. Eventually, the Office of the President controlled virtually every aspect of the central administration (Amonoo 1981).

The creation of a dual administrative apparatus was initiated to allow the CPP more quickly implement its policies without having to suffer the intransigence of the civil service. Nor would the CPP be subject to the 'outmoded planning models' of overseas advisors. These institutional reforms enabled Ghana's rapid rate of Africanization and the weakening of foreign interests (Amonoo 1981:32). While both laudable goals in theory, the effects of the policy choices were disastrous. Nothing was properly vetted, no checks were put on spending. Every part of the Ghanaian economy suffered from poor policy planning and inadequate funding.

Industrialization

One of the most important of the President's 'secretariats' was the State Enterprise Secretariat. Its mission was "to ensure that the growth rate of the public cooperative sectors of the economy exceeded that of the private sector" (Amonoo 1981:53). In 1961, Nkrumah by Executive Act instituted the Statutory Corporation Act of 1961, enabling the State Enterprises Secretariat to take over or create government enterprises. From 1961 to 1962, the public sector took over virtually every part of the economic sphere. There was a Ghana Tyers Corporation, Ghana Laundry Corporation, Ghana Brick and Tile Corporation, Star Bakery Corporation, as well as larger enterprises like the Black Star Shipping Corporation, Ghana Airways Corporation,

the Ghana States Farms Corporation and the Ghana National Construction Corporation that took over the functions of the Divisions of Public Construction. Formerly the ministerial and departmental divisions followed civil service procedures, conducting feasibility studies and assessing the credit-worthiness of contractors before embarking on any major development project. Now all such procedures could be disbanded. With the Osagyefo able to draw from his own pool of consolidated and development funds he was able authorize whatever expenditure he though politically desirable.

As a result, projects were no longer audited. State Corporations and State Farms became schemes to increase employment and reward political fidelity without any regard to productivity. In the absence of proper oversight, "New projects appeared which had never been envisaged in the Plan but were now being pushed by contractors willing to pay commissions to the persons who accepted them....New enterprises were distributed among party functionaries as private fiefs, enabling them to give patronage to relatives, friends and supporters" (Rimmer quoted in Killick 1978:140). In addition, appointments to senior administrative positions were made almost entirely on the basis of party affiliation rather than educational qualifications. In 1964, the Ministry of Finance found within the State Corporations that even "The Managements of these corporations are themselves sometimes quite ignorant of development affecting their enterprises or ill-informed about them" (State Enterprises Report, 1964:2).

Nkrumah and his colleagues, freed of the constraints of 'orthodoxy' were able to experiment and implement things as they saw fit. They therefore adopted a strategy of accelerated industrialization. But the strategy was poorly suited to the conditions of the country. Part of the problem was that they made little to no distinction between industrialization and development. As a result, the traditional sector, which still represented over 60 percent of the labor force, was largely ignored. Instead, the government focused on advanced technologies. Factories were 'imported wholesale" that were ill-suited to the conditions in Ghana (Killick 1978:178).[58] Over the next five years, the central budget expenditure on new machinery, virtually all of which was made abroad, increased 34 percent (Esseks 1975: 1976, 40).

The situation was made worse by the CPP's terrible import licensing policies. Allocating import licenses for raw materials, spare parts and capital equipment was undertaken to protect state enterprises. But instead, the policies created disastrous shortages (Killick 1978, Esseks 1975, Afrifa 1967:90). The shortages that hit both urban consumers and export manufacturers had reached serious proportions by 1964: "Scarcities of sugar, drugs, tyres and vehicle spare parts were reported and by the following year, milk, flour and fabrics began to disappear from the shops for prolonged periods. Municipal water systems ran out of water-purifying chemicals; hospitals reported shortages of X-ray fluid, vaccines and other vital supplies" (Esseks 1975:38).

Another central problem was the government's irrational choice of capital projects. As

[58] To illustrate of how ill-suited mechanized farming was to Ghana at the time, here is a passage from a 1961 study of the predecessor to the State Farms, the Agricultural Development C... (ADC). The study adumbrated the problems the scheme had encountered. Among them was problems with mechanization: "Anthills, steep slopes, stumps, roots and rocks caused damage to machines. Cleared land tended to erode when exposed to the heavy rains. Improper operation of machinery and frequent breakage led to increased costs for spare parts and made it necessary to set up local workshops and servicing units. Lack of scheduled maintenance programs and lack of skilled fitters aggravated the problems" A second series of problems related to the farmers' level of education: "Skilled labor was scarce. Most employees had no education. The laborers worked in groups under the supervision of a headman who possessed seniority, although he frequently lacked adequate skills. Even estate factory men were semi-literate and learned their skills on the mob. The director of the former Holland estate had been on the job 15 years and remained the only man there who could run the modern rubber-pressing machinery. At Prestea, only the fitter was literate" (Miracle & Seidman 1968A:11-12).

Esseks explains: "Through the inexperience and venality of Ghanaian officials, as well as the greed, bribery and political machinations of project salesmen from both East and West, the Government contracted for many overpriced, poorly designed enterprises" (1975:41). A number of 'prestige' projects, chosen on the basis of their grandeur rather than their utility, were embarked upon. Killick offers the example of the government rejecting a modest proposal for the construction of a pharmaceutical factory opting instead for one nearly ten-times as costly, which included "a handsomely outfitted administration block, a large cafeteria with one of the biggest and most modern kitchens in Ghana" (1978:229). Another example was the choice to build a lavish Conference Building in Accra at a cost of £7-8 million, to be used for a single meeting of the Organization of African Unity (Packham 2004:157).

Problems also emerged from the choice of where projects were sited. Several enterprises were located in areas as a political reward for constituents, with little regard for the practicality of doing so. Thus, a glass factory was located in an area where the Krobo reside, long-time CPP adherents. But this put it miles away from the main points of consumption, greatly increasing the already high transportation costs endemic to the industry. In an effort to promote cross-regional development, a footwear factory in Kumasi received hides from a tannery in the North, which meant the leather had to be hauled over 500 miles and then the final product had to be transported an additional 200 miles to the center of the foot-ware market in Accra (Killick 1978:231). Nor was there much thought given to how the factories were to be fed their necessary raw materials. A corned beef factory was constructed in Bolgatanga, for which no provision had been made to supply beef and its machines lay idle. Two sugar factories were erected in Komenda and Sutsuare where no cane-sugar was grown and little planning was made for how the cane would be transported to feed the machines (Afrifa 1967:91). As a result of these types of locational choices, the viability of several industries was undermined.

A central impetus behind this drive towards industrialization was the desire to create jobs and address unemployment in the urban areas. As Dadson explains "the entire socialist sector of the economy [was] established as a device to solve the unemployment problem" and to attract "the rural educated youth into the industry" (1970:214). But instead redundant labor was kept on. The state enterprises kept "on average, at least twice as many clerical workers as other firms of the same size and type" (Killick 1978:259). Overstaffing of State Enterprises further undermined their viability. Moreover, dysfunctional educational policies led to a rural exodus to the urban centers which only increased the rising rates of urban unemployment. By the 1962, "Massive urbanization was underway as educated Ghanaian youth left rural areas for opportunities in the city" (Mikell 1989:183).

Overseas capital investment did not amount to anything near the economic planners' projections. At the same time, the economy was suffering from a balance of payment deficit. The situation became serious when world cocoa prices began to fall in 1960. The balance of payments deficit was worsened as overseas companies began repatriating large portions of their profits (Packham 2004:160). The means of financing these under-producing enterprises also added to the country's economic woes. The government became dependent upon financing its deficits with suppliers' credit which had high rates of interest. With decreasing supplies of imports and rising amounts of money being pumped into the economy by the government, inflation began to soar (Esseks 1975: 1974:40).

All of this resulted in industrial failure on a colossal scale. A report prepared for Parliament in 1964 by the Ministry of Finance's on the financial situation of the State Corporations found that almost all of the thirty-two State-Owned Corporations it was able to

receive accounts from, were working at deficits (see Table 8). The Ministry found that several of the large enterprises run by the government, such as the Ghana National Construction Corporation, responsible for building and road construction; the Ghana Boatyards Corporation, for building big and small wooden vessels; the Ghana Furniture and Joinery Corporation responsible for the manufactures of household, office and school furnishings; and the Ghana Fishing Corporation, not only paid exorbitant salaries to workers and administrator, but also kept on 'redundant labor' "as a result of Government policy to reduce unemployment" (1964:15). Other Corporations failed because they had almost no market share and exceedingly low sales, like the Ghana Marble Works, the Star Bakery, the Ghana Brick and Tile Corporation and the Workers and Farmers Company, the latter consistently operating with less cash than it needed to meet day-to-day expenses. Still other industries were operating far below their capacity, such as the Vegetable Oil Mills Corporation and the Cannery Corporation. For some, the losses were compounded by the fact that the government had taken them over with severe debts.

Table 8: CPP Government Investment in 32 State-Owned Corporations	
Government direct investment in the form of capital	25,545,571
Government loans	12,104,414
Total	*39,649,985*
Accumulated losses	15,120,391
Accumulated profits	1,244,137
Net Accumulated losses	*13,876,284*

Source: *The Financial Position of State Corporations*, Ministry of Finance: Accra, 1964

Agriculture

As bad as the government's industrial policies were, the agricultural policies were possibly worse. In 1962, the decision was made to operate State Farms which would introduce mechanized farming to Ghana on a large-scale. These State Farms Corporation were expected "to produce food-stuffs and agricultural raw materials for industry at competitive prices by using modern and most economic methods of farming."[59] At the same time, the Division of Agriculture was dissolved and its staff divided among the United Ghana Farmers' Cooperatives, the State Farms, the Agricultural Wing of the Workers' Brigade and the Ghana Fishing Corporation.[60] By 1965, the government was operating 105 farms all over the country, many of which were mechanized.

The emphasis on industrial farming was made in part because Nkrumah believed that Ghana had to make a 'total break' from traditional agriculture. He saw subsistence farming as an inferior form of activity that promoted 'conservatism and acquisitiveness' rather than socialist values (Killick 1978:46).[61] Unlike Houphouët who chose to build his export industry by expanding small-holder production, Nkrumah "had little faith in the modernizing capabilities of Ghana's millions of small-scale peasant farmers" (Killick 1978:46). Even the aims of the State Farm Corporation reflected the government's fundamental urban bias. In an address to Parliament in October, 1962, Nkrumah declared: "We must produce food so cheaply that even

[59] 'The Financial Position of State Corporations,' *The Budget 1965* Ministry of Finance: Accra, 1964, pp. 22.

[60] Report and financial Statements by the Accountant-General and Report Thereon by the Auditor-General For the Year Ended 30th September, 1962. Accra: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ghana Statistics Bureau., Prepared by N. W. Sabine, Auditor-General (1964).

[61] It is important to note that Nkrumah's line of thinking was parallel to both the modernization theorists that Nkrumah had followed prior to 1961, like Arthur Lewis and Gbedemah, as well as his new Eastern advisors.

the worker earning the minimum wage of 6s. 6d. a day can be fully fed for not more than 2d. s day" (Dadson 1970:26).

Over time, as an increasingly higher portion of the agricultural expenditure went to government farms, support for peasant farmers began to decline (Miracle & Seidman 1968:35; Killick 1978:205). Nkrumah began to dismantle the system that had been built up. The provision of extension services was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the UGFCC. But the UGFCC lacked the expertise and administrative capacity, as well as the motivation, to handle its expanded responsibilities. Their running of extension services was soon hampered by serious shortages – in part due to the reduction of imported supplies like machetes, fertilizers and seed, but also because of incompetence of the venality of the UGFCC officers.[62]

As world cocoa prices fell, the government also eliminated subsidies paid to farmers for spraying against disease and cutting out trees affected by swollen shoot. By 1965, subsidies for motorized spraying machines were completely removed. Farmers were asked to pay an inflated price for the only spraying machines then available.[63] In addition, land was requisitioned by the state that had been prepared or previously held by private farmers. Farmers were no longer able to obtain permits themselves to initiate or expand private agricultural business (Mikell 1989:184).

Not only did state farms siphon, land and supplies away from peasant farmers, but their performance was quite dismal. In September1963, investment in the Ghana State Farms Corporation amounted to £G4,033,043, while the net assets were worth only £G1,631,800.[64] By 1965, There was little to show for the 19.8 million cedes in subventions the government had sunk into the state farms. Though they were liberally equipped with tractors and other imported machinery, they had only succeeded in planting 104,000 acres of their available one million. Food crop harvests were for the most part negligible (except for rice and maize). The only modicum of success was found among some rubber and oil palm plantations, particularly those in the Western Region (Mikell 1989, Killick 1978, Esseks 1975, Dadson 1970).

There were several reasons for the failure of the State Farms, first among them was the Congress People's Party's fear of educated technocrats. From its inception, "The members of party branches had been fed on venom against persons of the well-educated class" (Adamafio 57). In the 1960s, the CPP still harbored a general "distrust of white-collar agriculturalists" (Dadson 1970:131). CPP leaders attacked extension workers, claiming that they "'lived in an Ivory tower' at the experiment stations and 'lorded it over the farmers' without helping them devise methods applicable to their situation" (Miracle & Seidman 1968A:31). The refusal to deal with educated agricultural officers was most extreme in the agricultural division of the Workers' Brigade. They refused to recruit any graduates beyond that of secondary school. The UGFCC took in some technocrats, but they placed them in ineffectual positions "removed from decision making or direct contact with farmers" (Dadson 1970:131). In general, political considerations were given over-riding importance in the selection of trainees. Only the State Farms Corporation had a few Agricultural Officers with graduate level education or equivalent experience. As a

[62] When the UGFCC took over the distribution of insecticide, a severe shortage of the insecticide gammalin was reported from all over the cocoa growing areas during 1963-64 even though the national factory continued to produce as much as in previous years. An extensive "black market" developed for cutlasses which farmers alleged was being facilitated by the employees of the UGFCC. It was also alleged that "some officers of the erstwhile UGFCC diverted cutlasses to their wives, relatives and traders for sale at exorbitant prices." Part II. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. 1956.pp. 51.

[63] Part II. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. 1956.pp. 50.

[64] *The Financial Position of State Corporations*, Ministry of Finance: Accra, 1964

result, farm production programs had few competent mangers. Farms suffered from the absence of overall planning objectives. In general, "decisions on what to grow were greatly confused" (Dadson 1970:131). Dadson observed, "Much of the high rates of break-down, deterioration and destruction of the cultivating equipment that the sector suffered can be explained by this factor (Dadson 1970:131).

The lack of technical input was reflected in many of the dysfunctions of the organization. To begin with, the production policy of the State Farms was incoherent. State Farms were ostensibly introduced to mechanize farming. But with very high rates of expenditure on both labor and imports, it had become both labor-intensive and machine-intensive, resulting in overstaffing and underused machinery.[65] Large numbers of 'redundant laborers' were hired in an effort to uphold the objectives of the Seven-Year Plan and end unemployment (Miracle & Seidman 1968B:44-45). Even with this high number of workers, the output of State Farm workers was quite underwhelming. The workers on state farms proved to be one-fourth as productive as ordinary peasants (Mikell 1989:184). And though the express reason behind the Farms was to lower food costs, in actuality, far greater emphasis was placed on producing raw materials for Ghanaian industries. Crops like rubber, jute and oil seed were promoted above others (Dadson 1970:72-73). This was reflecting in the choice of siting of the Farms. The SFC had its greatest expansion in the Western Region, where its oil and rubber plantations there were among the most successful of the whole scheme. Yet, the Northern and Upper Regions were relatively neglected, despite the fact that these areas had the greatest possibility of producing high caloric food (Dadson 1970:152-3). This went against the stated objectives of the Seven-Year Plan, whose authors had intended that there be an increase of agricultural production in the North because of its potential to increase food supply. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the large successful oil-palm plantations were sited near Half Assini and Dix Cove, from where Nkrumah's ethnic group, the Nzima, hail.

All in all, Nkrumah's agriculture policy hinged on the success of the State Farms – and they were a dismal failure. Farms were established with little planning; managers were political appointees; there were acute shortages of trained personnel and supplies; and a high proportion of machines was usually out of service. The Corporation's actual results were far below its projected targets. The low productivity impacted industry and urban consumers. Low levels of food production led to soaring food costs and wide-spread discontent (Killick 1978:206). Miracle and Siedman, in their study of State Farms concluded that "If the Government of Ghana had used the same amount of money and organizational talent that were expended on the state farm programs, to develop techniques and provide incentives for small famers, there would probably have been a far greater increase in domestic food production (1968B:46). Overall, Nkrumah's irrational approach to economic development with his disdain for technocratic advice brought about the degeneration of the economy.

Hollowing out of rural and urban support

Thus, with the increased focus on state planned economy and industrialization, the CPP's urban bias became more pronounced. This had the unfortunate effect of impoverishing the rural areas while increasing urban costs of living.

The Nkrumah government had made several attempts to incorporate rural areas. Between 1957 and 1962, numerous development projects were undertaken by the government. The

[65] Ibid, pp. 22-23.

government's chief success was in the spread of education, particularly primary and secondary education facilities, with great emphasis placed on increasing literacy. Important improvements were also made in health, water, roads and communications. In addition, the replacement of the government institutions with party institutions played an important part in enabling the regime to penetrate the rural areas. Regional Commissioners (RCs) and District Commissioners (DCs) replaced old Government Agents. They were appointed on the basis of party involvement and had generally been party organizers in their communities. Existing Local Village Development Committee, established in 1949 to promote community involvement in development, were incorporated into the party. All of these party institutions acted as the eyes and ears of the central government.

However, these same institutions alienated village communities. RCs became satraps in their own areas, holding the strings for development funds, contracts and promotions (Woronoff 1972). DCs appointed their favorites to local councils against the wishes of the communities. Far from encouraging local self-determination, local development committees became the means for advancement of the party faithful at the expense of the community at large (Amonoo 1981). The exclusion of traditional authorities from local government also undermined rural support. Chiefs became rival centers of power and loyalty. In many communities, traditional elites became hostile to the local authorities. These hostilities were fueled by the fact that in chiefs were forced to raise contributions for local 'development' funds, without being able to exercise authority over them. In many places, the DCs and Village Development Committees came into direct conflict with traditional authorities, particularly in areas that had been UP strongholds (Amonoo 1981:160-161).

Similarly, the UGFCC was to some degree successful in rooting the CPP government in the rural areas. When, after 1962, the UGFCC assumed control over the distribution of all inputs, services, loans and development assistance, the government was able to move large numbers of rural farmers in its orbit. The UGFCC's structures also were more efficient which allowed for a more thorough extraction of cocoa profits (Mikell 1989:179). But these successes were not without costs. A post-coup enquiry into its operations found that the UGFCC had had a 'sinister' effect on farmers. The world 'co-operative' had become associated with the exploitation of farmers by petty party officials (Killick 1978:191). Farmers complained that the UGFCC was imposing high interest rates on loans. Corruption was alleged to be widespread. "Scales were reportedly moved into dark corners so that farmers could not check the weights. Sometimes, whole bags of cocoa would be declared subgrade and simply confiscated; the farmers would receive nothing for it" (Miracle & Seidman 1968A:35-36). By the time of the coup the UGFCC was seen, "in the popular mind, as the CPP's weapon to reduce the farmers of Ghana into a submissive docile rural mass" (Dadson 1970: 284)

The cocoa growing regions were particularly affected. In his dawn broadcast on April 8th 1961, Nkrumah had announced that the UGFCC would be the sole Licensed Buying Agent for the Cocoa marketing Board. In so doing, the government eliminated existing cocoa cooperatives from the purchasing scene. Prior to this, there had been three separate cooperative organizations marketing cocoa as licensed buyers: the United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council and the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Sefwi Co-operative Organization (ABASCO) and the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association (De Graft 1974? 358-9). All of them were liquidated and their assets absorbed into the UGFCC. The takeover was designed to undermine the autonomy of cocoa growers and vest greater power in officials in Accra. This created a backlash. As Nkrumah pushed forward his monopoly plan, riots broke out in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo. The political

backlash overtime became less overt, yet it persisted. Old cooperative members remained embittered. Even local CPP members involved in the trade cooled toward the CPP (Mikell 1989:177).

Despite the worsening conditions and rising food prices, the government imposed higher taxes on cocoa growers. Though the gross producer price was maintained until 1965, despite declining world prices, the government extracted 'voluntary contributions' from farmers. The first Compulsory Savings Scheme was introduced in 1961, with which 6 shillings was deducted on every load of 60 lbs.[66] Again in 1964, another mandatory 'contribution scheme' was forced upon cocoa farmers. Consequently, when the government was forced to lower the price of cocoa paid to farmers in 1965, producers' real income fell to 70 percent of the former record low level during the Great Depression.

The effects of these policies on the cocoa industry snowballed. Rising food costs drove up the cost of labor and several farmers were forced to cut back on their hired hands. Migrant laborers who had worked in the cocoa industry left Ghana for neighboring Côte d'Ivoire where wages and living costs were better.[67] By the end of the regime, "Relations between the share-croppers and hired laborers and the farmers were reported to have become so bitter as producer prices fell and payments were held up that in one instance the sharecroppers are reported to have burned a farmer to death" (Miracle & Seidman 1968:12). The increased labor employed in the government sector further depleted the agricultural labor force in the private sector. Farmers' lost their incentive to invest in new cocoa plantings. As the cocoa industry became more depressed, there was little to attract the youth to the industry who left the farms for the possibilities of urban jobs. The whole industry began to contract (Mikell 1989).

Thus, although the CPP did in many ways extend its control in the periphery, for the most part it failed to win over the rural population. Farmers began defecting from cooperatives as it became clear that they were not benefiting from the scheme and it was only taking them away from critical time on their own farms. State Farms displaced peasants and spread fear among the population that the state planned to take over all the farming areas (Dadson 1970). Too many dysfunctions led to wasted crops and opportunities for middlemen to profit off of the system. General productivity in foodstuffs went down and consumer prices steadily rose. In the end, the UGFCC and the Brigade terrorized the population, forced farmers to become card carrying members but did not really win their loyalties.

Just as in 1953, the regime continued to impose its own order on localities without enough sensitivity to the local conditions. These actions increased the sense of alienation from the party and the central government. Added to this was the increasing demands for sacrifice on the part of producers. "As the CPP struggled to salvage the national economy, it neglected to safeguard the standard of living of rural folk" (Mikell 1989:187). Thus, though the UP affiliates had been roundly beaten and any opposition had all but become extinct by 1960, smoldering resentment against the CPP government continued. By 1965, the early achievements of the regime in the rural areas had been overshadowed by its oppressive nature and declining living standards. "It was only a question of time before both rural and urban reactions...demanded some form of change" (Mikell 1989:187-188).

IV. Nkrumah and the Military

[66] Economic Survey 1962 pp. 34, paragraph 71

[67] Part II. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. 1956.pp. 41. See also Mikell 1989.

Interfering with Security Apparatus - the straw that broke the camel's back

On August 1, 1962, the President and his retinue were returning from a visit with the President of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). There had been a scheduled stop along the route in a small village in the Northern Region, Kulungu, where the President was to be greeted by a group of admirers. As he stepped out of his car, a hand-grenade exploded, just missing him but killing two people and wounding several others. One of those killed was a small boy who was about to present the *Osagyefo* with a bouquet of flowers.

This was the closest call Nkrumah had had and he was deeply shaken. Nkrumah's response to the Kulungu incident dangerously eroded his support base. In response to the security threats he faced, Nkrumah tried to protect himself and his regime. But the more he tried to control real and perceived enemies, the more enemies he made. First, he undermined the judicial system, then he dealt harshly with 'suspected' opposition leaders. At the same time, he increased surveillance around the country on ordinary citizens. And most serious of all, he built up a paramilitary force that put in jeopardy Ghana's traditional military.

Almost immediately, after the Kulungu explosion, suspicion fell on Adamafio. Those angered by Tawia Adamafio's thirst for power were finally able to strike back. It was said that Adamafio and his associates had suspiciously and uncharacteristically placed themselves several cars back in the motorcade, as if they were privy to the assassination attempt ahead of time. On August 29th, Adamafio and two of his close associates and fellow Gã's, Coffie Crabbe and Ako Adjei were arrested under Preventive Detention Orders. Then, on September 2nd, yet another attempt was made on Nkrumah's life. A bomb exploded outside the Osagyefo's residence killing three children and wounding many others. Two more explosions followed. In all 15 people were killed and 256 injured. A State of Emergency was declared in the Greater Accra area and the Tema township and 5:30 pm curfew imposed. Police and the army began to conduct house-to-house searches. Armored cars were positioned around the city.[68] The blockade in the capital lasted almost until 1964 and over 500 people were imprisoned under Preventative Detention Orders (Baynham 1988). Several of the usual suspects were rounded up. Though Danquah was released from prison in 1962 after having spent only six months in prison, he was put back in 1963, this time in very poor health. Danquah died in prison a year later and his family was allowed to bury him only under the condition that his funeral be 'as plebian as possible' (Appiah 1990:271). Appiah was also released within a year and then re-imprisoned on charges that he had been part of a conspiracy in June 1965 to overthrow the government.

Nkrumah's treatment of the opposition further alienated him from Ghanaians. Unlike Houphouët, Nkrumah never restored his enemies. Therefore the enmity only increased despite his periodic offers and amnesty and he began to develop a reputation for cruelty. In an open letter, Gbedemah wrote, "Your assurances of protection and immunity from molestation are too watery for me not to see through their shallowness" (1962:10). After Danquah's second arrest and ignoble burial, Appiah proclaimed that "My hatred for the regime grew to such proportions that I was prepared now to risk everything I possessed in this world, including life itself, for the total destruction of this abominable Frankenstein monster that my poor country had created in all sweet innocence" (1990:271). This reputation for cruelty was further solidified when Nkrumah decided to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court with respect to the case of Adamafio, Crabbe and Adjei. The Court found insufficient evidence against them and all three were acquitted. But Nkrumah was infuriated by this verdict. He dismissed the Justice and then signed

[68] *Daily Graphic*, Mon Sept 24 1962, No. 3,730, pp. 1

into law an executive order allowing him to reverse the Supreme Court's decision. During the re-trial the three were found guilty and sentenced to death.

To many, by 1963 it began to look like Ghana was under one-man rule. As Bing explained, Sir Arku Korsah was the government's central link to the old ruling families (Bing 1968:310). As a result of his dismissal, Nkrumah lost support of many within the old establishment like Sir Tsibu Darku, Chairman of the Cocoa Marketing Board, Sir Charles Tachie-Menson, former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Sir Emmanuel Quist, former Speaker of the National Assembly. Justice Van Lare who had been on the court resigned and the other Justice, Akuffo Addo, was dismissed (Packham 2004:167). Even Geoffrey Bing, one of Nkrumah's steadfast supporters, considered by many his legal henchman, admitted that this "was the one moment when I seriously considered resignation" (Bing 1968:311).

With the radical leftists out of favor, Nkrumah once again changed tack. Most of the old guard that had been dismissed regained their standing: Kojo Botsio and Krobo Edusei, were restored the former to the positions, Foreign Minister and Minister of Agriculture, respectively. Nevertheless, Nkrumah's erratic behavior had undermined the confidence of his own associates. Nkrumah himself became increasingly isolated and paranoid. Suspicious of virtually everyone around him, he made infrequent visits to his own ministries. After July 1962, a strong security cordon was built around the Osagyefo in Flagstaff House. According to Packham, Nkrumah even had sealed water brought to him out of fear of being poisoned (Packham 2004:173). A US State Department memo dated February 24th, 1963, relays that "Nkrumah had not been out of his castle since January 2."[69] Cabinet ministers no longer had regular contact with the Osagyefo. Though they were allowed to meet with the President if he was given prior notice, in practice they only went to Flagstaff House on invitation.

Distrust led to Nkrumah's intensifying control and a further break down in the administering of government. He became increasingly reliant on his special departments and secretariats. Despite his isolation, no decision could be made without his approval. This created serious delays in the execution of policy and added to the financial problems the state was already experiencing (Amonoo 1981:58; Packham 2004:174). By 1965, Nkrumah appears to have been suffering from a nervous breakdown. In a telegram sent in April of that year by the United States Ambassador to Ghana, the Ambassador reports that during the course of a conversation with Nkrumah, the President broke down into tears:

> "At this point Nkrumah, who had been holding face in hands, looked up and I saw he was crying. With difficulty he said I could not understand ordeal he had been through during last month. Recalled that there had been seven attempts on his life. Also that he wasnupset with problem executions. ("You know why I commuted the sentences?" I replied I assumed it for humanitarian reasons. "It was for Africa, for Africa.") Asserted he would not have made the speech had it not been for what he had been going through."[70]

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[69]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 238, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m. [Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, February 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved in M on February 24, in S on February 27, and by the White House on February 24. The meeting took place at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VI."]

[70] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State [Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GHANA–US. Confidential. Accra, April 2, 1965, 6 p.m.]

As his trust eroded, Nkrumah turned to his small ethnic group, the Nzima. He appointed Ambrose Yankey, an Nzima, as his personal advisor to replace Adamafio. In early 1963, Yankey helped Nkrumah establish a Special Intelligence Unit. According to one source, Yankey put particularly emphasis on recruiting Nzimas (Packham 2004:167). Soviet agents, Nicholai Gladkiy and Robert Akhmerov, were hired to train the recruits in undercover surveillance techniques. Spies, both men and women –stationed everywhere, including factories, offices, shops, public transport, political rallies and drinking establishments – were instructed to check on political activities of civilians and uncover any indications of dissension against the CPP. The Special Intelligence Unit also monitored other Intelligence and security organizations. At the same time, Nkrumah rapidly promoted another Nzima, M.M. Hassan, who was eventually made the first Director of Military Intelligence (Baynham 1988:136). According to Baynham, "Very little was known about his background, except that like Nkrumah he was an Nzima from the western coastal region of Ghana" (Baynham 1988:136). Thus, by 1964 the intelligence services of the state were under the control of Nzimas, who make up approximately one percent of the population. At the same time, civilian youth organizations of the CPP, the Ghana Young Pioneers and the Workers' Brigade, were all militarized (Baynham 1988:135; Packham 2004:167).

Despite all his security measures, Nkrumah failed to prevent another serious attempt on his life. A month after the trial of Adamifio, on January 2nd, 1964, a Police Constable on duty at Flagstaff House fired five successive shots at Nkrumah, missing him but killing his personal bodyguard and the head of the special police guard, Assistant Superintendent Salifu Dagarti, who had shielded Nkrumah after the first shot was fired. The Police Constable, Seth Ametwee, was overpowered by Nkrumah's bodyguard and arrested. Later he was tried and hanged for the crime (Packham 2004:173; Baynham 1988:133-134). According to Baynham, there is evidence that Constable Ametwee had been hired by senior police officers who posted him to Flagstaff House to assassinate Nkrumah, promising Ametwee £2,000 and overseas education if he completed the mission (Baynham 1988:134). Around the same time, the press reported another unsuccessful police plot, this one led by the bandleader of the police band, who allegedly planned to have members of the band shoot Nkrumah with revolvers when the President congratulated the musicians after their performance (Baynham 1988:134).

The response to these police conspiracies was almost immediate. Within a week, the entire police force was reorganized. The Police Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Superintendent and seven other senior officers were dismissed. Many of them including the Commissioner and the Superintendent were imprisoned at Nsawam Prison under Preventive Detention Orders. The Police Commissioner was replaced by J.W.K. Harlley, head of the Criminal Investigation Department. In addition, the police force was disarmed, its special guard at Flagstaff House was dissolved and responsibility for Nkrumah's personal security was transferred to the Presidential Detail Department (PDD) (Baynham 1988:135).

At this time, Nkrumah decided he needed a more powerful alternative security force. This process had already begun immediately following Kulungu. In 1962, Nkrumah ordered that his Presidential Guard, originally a ceremonial regimen of older soldiers established in 1960, be expanded to battalion strength and renamed the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR) . Everything required for the Regiment was given top priority. They received a number of shipments of Soviet equipment, including armored cars, field artillery, high velocity AK-47 rifles, special uniforms. They were also given special training in the USSR (Baynham 1988, Ocran 1977). By 1963, the battalion was well-equipped. At the end of 1964, Nkrumah instructed

the Ministry of Defence to establish a second POGR battalion and in July 1965, the POGR was officially detached from army command.

The operations of the Regiment were kept secret from the Regular Army Forces. Not even Nkrumah's Chief of Defence Staff, General Otu, was appraised of their activities. Instead, the special forces were put under the direction of the only two Northerners to have been commissioned in the military before 1957: Major General Barwah, a Dagomba, and Lieutenant-Colonel David Gbon Zanlerigu, a Fra-Fra from the extreme north of Ghana. Zanlerigu was appointed the Commander of the POGR and Major-General Barwah the liaison officer between the Guard and the Regular Forces. Against normal army protocol, Nkrumah consulted with Barwah rather than his General Chief of Defence Staff and it was Barwah who was in charge of any arrangements concerning Nkrumah's security. Barwah was assigned sole responsibility for assisting and training of personnel in the Guard Regiment. He was also responsible for all the equipment received from the USSR and China and the only officer in close contact with all the Russian and Chinese officers operating in Ghana, who took orders from him directly. He also knew about the secret training camps that had been set up by Eastern advisors and was responsible for the distribution of arms inside and outside of Ghana along with the Director of Military Intelligence, Hassan (Ocran 1977).

Thus, Nkrumah created a dual security apparatus that mirrored the dual structure he had created in his government administration. Just as fear of his civil servants had driven him to create Secretariats under the Office of the President, he now had begun to create a second army, answerable to him alone and with no ties to the British. To make matters worse for the military, the majority of resources were diverted away from the regular armed forces to support the Guard Regiment. Where the Guard Regiment was outfitted with new weaponry and equipment, the Regular Armed Forces were languishing with broken down radios and vehicles, and extreme supply shortages. Rumors of Nkrumah's plans to transform the Guard into a President's Own Field Regiment with three to five battalions, rankled the officers in the regular army even further (Baynham 1988:138).

Thus, as threats proliferated, Nkrumah took a series of measures to shore up his control of the state. But the more he tried to control the unfolding history, the more enemies he made. The proliferation of surveillance in Ghana, with the Special Intelligence Unit, Ghana Young Pioneers (GYP) and Workers' Brigade had a chilling effect on the population. Afrifa describes how.

> "Between 1961 and 1966 the old regime of Kwame Nkrumah had instilled fear into every Ghanaian. There were security men and women everywhere and no one trusted his friend. Fathers did not trust their sons who had been indoctrinated with the young Pioneer ideas, neither did husbands trust their wives. It was a reign of terror. [1967:37]

By 1965, Nkrumah's popularity had plummeted:

> "Local opposition continued to rise. This was either ignored in the higher reaches of the party or identified as subversion with punitive results. Hardly a family did not have friends or relatives in Preventive Detention. In such a small country, with its extraordinarily high degree of intimacy and family solidarity, this factor could not be considered negligible." [Austin 1968:785-6]

At the same time, the morale of the police force had been lowered by the series of dismissals and

arrests among their ranks and the traditional armed forces felt threatened by the increasing amounts of resources allocated to the POGR, the militarization of other wings of the CPP, and the undermining of the traditional command structure.

As a result, several subversive plots were hatched within the security forces between 1964 and 1966, though all abortive. In 1964, Colonel Afrifa approached Lt. Colonel Crabbe with a plot to use their two battalions to arrest Nkrumah and topple the regime. But Hassan's intelligence got wind of the plot and Crabbe was brought in for extensive questioning (Afrifa 1967; Baynham 1988). In July 1965, Nkrumah's two highest generals, his Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Otu and Otu's deputy, Major-General Ankrah were discovered to be conspiring against the regime. Nkrumah abruptly dismissed both men. According to Baynham's sources, the two Generals had plotted to arrest Nkrumah in April 1965 and charge him with crimes against the state but had not carried the arrest out because each man feared the other would betray him (Baynham 1988:143). There is even State Department evidence that the CIA had reached out to Ankrah as early as 1964.[71] According to sources, Harlley, who was the architect of the 1966 coup, had also begun to plot against the regime in 1964 and with Kotoka had twice approached Ankrah and Otu with plans to oust Nkrumah (Baynham 1988:156,143).[72]

Despite the worsening morale of his offers and the impoverished condition of his troops, on November 25th, Nkrumah asked the parliament for authorization to send troops to Rhodesia. This exceedingly unpopular proposal made an imminent coup almost a certainty. For the next few months, soldiers discussed the likelihood of a military takeover. According to Appiah, "by the first week of January 1966, the impending doom was being whispered between trusted friends, including even some ministers of state, regional commissioners and party activists" (Appiah 1990:271). Even Michael Dei-Anang, Nkrumah's Director of the African Affairs Secretariat, principal Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of his closest collaborators told Davidson: "Everyone had an eerie sense of things not being right somehow and I was personally unhappy about something being "in the air" without being able to identify it

[71] According to a CIA memorandum, dated February 11, 1964, "[CIA Agent] McCone and Rusk had reviewed the Ghana situation on February 6. According to McCone's memorandum for the record, Rusk "raised the question of the ability of General Ankrah to take over the government." McCone replied that "the General, in our opinion, was well respected in Ghana, but not inclined to accept responsibility." Rusk asked McCone to explore this prospect fully and report to him." See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 236, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, February 11, 1964, 3 p.m. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 01 Jan.–15 Apr. 64. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.]

[72] Also see US State Dept. Memorandum 251 of March 11, 1965, in which the CIA briefs the State Department of the coup plot one year before it occurred: "While Ambassador Mahoney felt that popular opinion was running strongly against Nkrumah and the economy of the country was in a precarious state he was not convinced that the coup d'etat, now being planned by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley and Generals Otu and Ankrah, would necessarily take place. He did feel, however, that one way or another Nkrumah would be out within a year. [*3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] referred to a recent report which mentioned that the top coup conspirators were scheduled to meet on 10 March at which time they would determine the timing of the coup; however, because of a tendency to procrastinate, any specific date they set should be accepted with reservations. In response to the Director's queries as to who would most likely succeed Nkrumah in the event of a coup, Ambassador Mahoney stated that initially, at least, a military junta would take over, headed perhaps by Acting Police Commissioner Harlley" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 251, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 11, 1965, 3–3:30 p.m.) . [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memo for the Record, 01 Mar.–28 Apr. 65. Secret. Drafted on March 12 by [text not declassified] Deputy Chief of the Africa Division in the CIA Directorate of Plans. Filed with a covering memorandum from Africa Division Chief [text not declassified] to McCone. The time is taken from a CIA transcript of the conversation. (Ibid.) The meeting took place in McCone's office.]

specifically" (202). When the Nigerian was ousted...only a fortnight before Nkrumah's planned trip to Viet Nam on a mission to..., "an atmosphere of restlessness and impending drama began to prevail" within the rank-and-file, as soldiers began "waiting impatiently for 'our coup'" (Baynham 1988:154). The week before his departure, there were reports of military plots. His aides urged him not to leave the country, but Nkrumah ignored their warnings (Mahoney 1983:158).

The coup

Nkrumah was in Peking, en route to Hanoi on February 24, 1966, when Major A. A. Afrifa, Colonel E. K. Kotoka and Mr. J. W. Harlley, Inspector-General of Police, proclaimed over Ghanaian radio that Nkrumah's government was over. 'Operation Cold Chop',[73] the code name for the coup-plot, had begun in the early morning hours. Colonel Kotokola and Major Afrifa had taken advantage of already scheduled tactical maneuvers in preparation for the possible intervention in Rhodesia to bring their battalion to Accra. At the same time, the police had organized the arrest of all of the major CPP leaders and politicians around the country.

All in all, the coup was relatively bloodless and over quickly. Armed resistance to the insurgents was restricted to the environs of Flagstaff House. The only officer who tried to alert the Guard of what was transpiring was General Zanlerigu, after he had jumped out his window barefoot and in his pajamas when they came to arrest him. Members of the POGRs First Battalion, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Zanlerigu, fought for several hours, but surrendered by noon. During the firefight, one of the Guard Regiment and seven soldiers were killed. General Barwah was the only ranking officer to die, allegedly while resisting arrest. Part of the reason for its success was that almost 60 percent of officers of major and above serving at home at the time were either active participants or passive supporters of the coup (Baynham 1988:189).

Though the country's general economic decline was a contributing factor, the central impetus behind the coup was the fact that Nkrumah had begun to undermine the command structure of the military and threaten its very existence. Part of the threat came from the fact that Nkrumah had turned to the Eastern bloc. Just as with the civil service, Nkrumah had increasingly subject to the military to socialist indoctrination. He even set up a branch of the CPP at Teshie Military Academy. One of the greatest breaches came in 1961, when Nkrumah began sending recruits for training to Eastern Europe and, as well as receiving his military supplies from the Eastern bloc. Working outside of the Commonwealth was not only a radical departure from longstanding tradition, but it was perceived as a threat to the cohesiveness of the military as an institution. The Ghanaian officer corps, who had been trained at the British officer training academies of Sandhurst and Eaton Hall, found Nkrumah's increasing politicization of the armed services intolerable (Price 1971A:402). In fact, the decision to send Ghanaian military cadets to the Soviet Union for training in 1961, provoked senior Ghanaian officers to conspire again against Nkrumah. The plan collapsed after the chief conspirator, Brigadier General Joseph M. Michel, was killed in a plane crash in Ghana on September 3rd 1961 (Mahoney 1983:171).

Ethnicity also played a role. Baynham underscores the fact that the officer corps under Nkrumah was largely Ewe and Gã. As Nkrumah began to crackdown on Gã politicians and pass-over Ewe and Gã officers for promotion, these officers felt their positions were in jeopardy. Kraus expresses reservation about Baynham's heavy emphasis on ethnicity as a factor in the

[73] The coup plot was so named because 'chop' was the slang term for food, and 'cold chop' could be had with relatively little work. See Baynham 1988.

coup. He points out that Nkrumah had made several appointments of Ewe and Gã's in his party and government (Kraus 1990:581). Indeed, with the reshuffling of the police department in 1964, Harlley, an Ewe and the architect of the Operation Cold Chop, was promoted to Police Superintendent and Afrifa's paternal uncle, Owusu Sekyere, was the head of the Special Branch.[74] Nonetheless, it seems clear that Nkrumah had indeed begun practicing ethnic favoritism. By 1965 the president no longer had any Ewes in his cabinet despite the fact that they make up almost 13% of the Ghanaian population, whereas he had appointed *three* Nzimas who make up only 1.2% of the population (Asante & E. Gyimah-Boadi 2004). A similar pattern was also evident within the command of the armed forces. Despite the fact that the Ewe made up a disproportionate majority of his officer corps, all four of the alternative security forces Nkrumah had built up to protect himself – The Guard Regiment, Military Intelligence, the Workers' Brigade and Special Intelligence – were directed by Nzimas or northerners who had received training from the Soviets (Baynham 1988:146).

Table 10: Ethnic Breakdown of Nkrumah's Cabinet

Year	Akan		Ewe		Ga-Adangbe		Guan		Northern		Total
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No
1952	3	37.5%	1	12.5	2	25	1	12.5	1	12.5	8
1954	6	54.5	1	9	1	9	1	9	2	18	11
1956	8	61.5	1	7.6	1	7.6	1	7.6	2	15.3	13
1965	13	68.4	0	0	1	5	2	10.5	3	15.7	19

Source: Asante & E.Gyimah-Boadi, 2004

Furthermore, most of the conspirators came from backgrounds that would have made them more sympathetic to the opposition than to the CPP. Of those who were involved in the planning of 'Operation Cold Chop', nine were Ewes from the most politically disenfranchised and anti-CPP region in southern Volta: Anlo (see Table 10B). Anlo is also the region that was home to the head of the Togoland Congress, M.K. Apaloo, arrested for the first conspiracy plot against Nkrumah, as well as the ex-CPP Minister in exile, Kolma Gbedemah. Several other plotters were from conservative backgrounds. Lieutenant-Colonel John Addy was from a privileged Gã family, as were two prominent Gã officers, who were privy to the plans though not participants Colonel Crabbe and General Ankrah. Okai was from a wealthy Akim background from the cocoa-growing Eastern Region. Similarly, Major Afrifa came from a long line of chiefs who served in positions of command in the Ashanti Army. Though Ocran's father was not wealthy, he was a cocoa trader from the Western Region.

It is difficult to gauge how much these men identified with regional opposition movements. Nkrumah himself suspected that his officer corps were sympathetic to the opposition. He was later to write that he had been forced to contend with "an African officer corps which contained a high proportion of individuals who were either actively hostile to the CPP and myself and who were anti-socialist in outlook" (1966:38). At least one of the central conspirators, Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse Kattah, a close friend of Kotokola, had been involved in several conspiracies against Nkrumah, including the first major subversive plot against

[74] And although Kraus contests the idea that Nkrumah had few choices but to promote Ewe and Ga officer, the truth is that they made up the majority of the senior policie and army staff. See Baynham 1988.

Nkrumah in which leaders of the Gã Shifimo Kpee and the Togoland Congress recruited a handful of Ewe officers to help assassinate Nkrumah (Baynham 1988:157). Kotokola was himself known to hold Nkrumah and the CPP in disdain (Afrifa 1967).

Table 10B - Ethnicity of Anti-Nkrumah Conspirators		
Conspirator	***Conspiracy***	***Ethnicity***
Captain Awhaitey	Awahitey Affair	Ewe
Modesto K. Apaloo	Awahaitey Affair	Ewe (Anlo)
Reginald Reynolds Amponsah	Awahaitey Affair	Gã
Brigadier General Joseph M. Michel	Alleged plot	Ewe
Lt. Colonel Crabbe	Alleged plot	Gã
Obetsebi Lamptey	Kulungu	Gã
Police Constable Seth Ametwee	1964 shooting	Ewe
General Joseph A. Ankrah	Alleged plot	Gã
General Stephan J. Otu	Alleged plot	Akwapim
Commissioner of Police John Kofi Harlley,	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Deputy Commissioner of Policie Anthony Deku	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Captain Francis Kwashie	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant Colonel Kotoka	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse le Sage Kattah	Awhaitey Affair, Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant-Colonel Clement Tevie	Awhaitey Affair, Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Major Dedjoe	Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Captain Avevor	Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Captian (acting Major) Akawsi Amankwa Afrifa	Operation Cold Chop	Ashanti
Major I.A. Ashitey	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Lieutenant-Colonel John Addy	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Captain AM Tetteh	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Major Victor Coker-Appiah	Operation Cold Chop	Fanti
Source: Simon Baynham, *The military and politics in Nkrumah's Ghana.* London: Westview Press, 1988		

We also have the direct testimony of two of the participants in Operation Cold Chop, Colonel Afrifa and Major-General Ocran, who wrote accounts of the coup within two years of the event.[75] In both of their narratives, the two conspirators make statements that strongly suggest they were indeed sympathetic to the opposition. Afrifa charges that Nkrumah had marshaled "the 80 per cent illiterate citizens around himself" against "the rightful authors of Ghana's Independence - men who were his hosts" (1967:54). He also expresses anger over how Nkrumah, the "upstart", "trampled underfoot" Ashanti honors by abrogating to himself the paraphernalia and titles reserved for Ashanti Kings (1967:115). Similarly, Ocran asserts that "Right-thinking Ghanaians did not like [Nkrumah's] communist affiliation and regimentation" and that Nkrumah had to be overthrown to prevent Ghana from becoming "a base for communists" (1968:25, 26). He also speaks disparagingly of Nkrumah's "so-called African

[75] Col. A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (London, 1967) and Major-General A. K.; Ocran, A Myth Is Broken (London, 1968).

Unity" which only fattened up disgruntled refugees "being trained to cause confusion in their own states" (Ocran 1968:25). Perhaps, most revealing is a passage where Ocran states explicitly that the main fear of the "Army authorities" was that the cadets trained in the Soviet Union, would be used "*to replace us, the so-called 'bourgeois and colonialist-oriented officers'*" in "a communist-inspired take-over of the Government" (Ocran 14:1968 emphasis mine).

In explaining why they were motivated to topple the regime, both Ocran and Afrifa explain that after the rigged 1964 referendum for the continuation of one-party rule, it had become clear that there could be no constitutional means of taking Nkrumah out of power. Yet, for both the central irritation was the empowerment of the PORG and, with it, the undermining of army command structure. Both men describe at length how the armed forces were reduced to wearing tattered uniforms and forced to make due with extreme supply shortages and deteriorating equipment. In contrast, the Guard Regiment received "kingly treatment" (Afrifa 1967:100), "receiving the best of everything! The best of equipment, the best of rations, the best of morale" (Ocran 1968:34). Ocran refers to Nkrumah's interference in the military administration and operations as a "deliberate tactic" to "liquidate the Regular forces" (Ocran 1968:80) and claims that Nkrumah's "second Army" was designed to "gradually strangle the Regular Army to death" (Ocran 1968:37). Afrifa adds that the arbitrary dismissal of General Otu and Ankrah "was one of the major factors that led to the coup of 24th February" (1967:101-102).

It is true that there is clear evidence of US involvement in early coup attempts. In recently released CIA documents, there is mention of possibility of Ankrah taking over the Ghanaian government in February 1964 – two years before the actual coup. Also, the US Ambassador was clearly aware of coup plot of Ankrah, Otu and Harlley, informed by an agent whose name was blocked out and who was in contact with the military leaders, as well as police chief Harlley. Other documents acknowledge that Nkrumah's dismissal of Otu and Ankrah helped forestall a coup.[76] But, by then, the stage had already been set.[77] As Davidson argues:

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[76] See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 257; and The Socialist Forum of Ghana, *The Great Deception, Second Edition.* Accra, 2007.

[77] Excerpts from CIA cables summarized in a Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Helms, dated February 25, 1966, further support this view:

> "1. [*2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] The embassy also has reported periodic build-ups of coup rumors, especially at times of economic tension. On 10 February 1965, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] noted "plotting is actively underway to oust Nkrumah in the very near future. Plans are incomplete, and this, like previous plots, may collapse before execution." The CIB of 26 February 1965 commented that "any move to oust Nkrumah would require the support of the army, one of the few power groups not yet under party control."
>
> 2. During the spring and early summer of 1965 a group of senior military and police officers continued to develop coup plots, to discuss tentative dates and occasions for overthrowing Nkrumah, and to vacillate about carrying out their plans. Younger, middle-grade officers were chafing over the failure of top military leaders to act. OCI reporting followed the ups and downs of the conspiracy, as indicated in the following examples.[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] 1 May 1965 noted "some of the steam appears to have gone out of the group of senior military and police officers plotting Nkrumah's overthrow. They are now said to have only vague plans to act sometime in June or July. Public resentment against Nkrumah's domestic policies remains high, however." The CIWR of 4 June 1965 indicated that "anti-regime elements of the military and police might try to take advantage of any outburst of discontent to try to oust Nkrumah. Last month some younger officers were reported chafing over the failure of top military leaders to move against him." The CIB of 19 June 1965 stated "Disaffected military and police leaders could well move against the regime soon, possibly during Nkrumah's current trip abroad (for the Commonwealth Conference) …. Many military leaders have long been unhappy over Nkrumah's leadership. A conviction that their personal interests are now at stake could finally overcome their reluctance to move . …The Otus (two brothers who held high military posts) have also recently been in

> One would have to be very naïve to imagine that no such influences were upon the scene, though the actual manner and degree of their involvement remain obscure....But the crucial fact about the *coup* was that the vast majority of people appear to have made absolutely no objection to it. And this must be traced not to any great enthusiasm for the *coup*-makers, except in the ranks of the traditional opposition, but to the decay of the CPP as a party of the people. [Davidson 1989:208]

In the end, Nkrumah's increasingly repressive measures designed to suppress his opposition created the gathering storm that ultimately destroyed him. The centralization of power in the Office of the President, the creation of the POGR to displace the military and the police, the surveillance of the Young Pioneers; the spread of undercover spies; the unpredictable dismissal of judges, police and army officers; the increasingly irrational government spending; and his own increasing withdrawal from daily Ghanaian life – all conspired to create a situation in which a coup, whether in February of 1966 or soon after, had become inevitable.

I. Conclusion

There are so many tragedies of Nkrumah. The greatest may be that his analysis of neo-imperialism and his prognosis for the African continent was extraordinarily insightful. Nkrumah rightly understood that only a unified Africa could develop the kind of leverage that would be necessary to compete on the world stage. In addition, in many ways Nkrumah's disdain for orthodoxy is understandable. He was a man who had achieved the impossible, launching the emancipation of an entire subjugated continent in less than a decade. During the same timeframe, he himself had gone from being a penniless student in London, to a world leader.

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close touch with pro-Western Police Commissioner Harlley, who is said to be thoroughly fed up with the regime and to have aligned himself with them."

3. As the plotters continued to delay putting their plans into operation, Nkrumah took countermeasures in July which apparently put a stop to the plotting for the time being.[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] 28 July 1965 said "Nkrumah's sudden move today in retiring Ghana's defense chief (Otu) and his deputy (Ankrah) effectively neutralizes the two as potential coup leaders. Both had been involved in coup plotting for several months but vacillated too long and gave Nkrumah the chance to act first."

4. The series of recent successful military coups elsewhere in West Africa apparently gave new encouragement to the Ghanaian plotters. This development was reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on 15 January 1966, which noted that "The rash of army coups in western Africa has sparked new plotting against Nkrumah. Last spring and summer, restless military officers were reportedly set to move, but they procrastinated too long and Nkrumah was able to defuse the plot." On 17 February 1966, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] stated that "There is another plot afoot to kill Nkrumah and take over the government. A clandestine source [*less than 1 line source text not declassified*] reports that a number of important military and police officers were involved." The latest report, which tied the coup plans to Nkrumah's trip abroad, was printed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on 23 February 1966."

See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 257[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64–2/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. The source text is filed with an undated handwritten note from Helms to Bundy, apparently sent on February 28, noting that Bundy had expressed an interest in the subject when they talked on Friday (February 25) and adding, "I am particularly pleased to send you a favorable report on your last day."]

It seems that his brilliance outstripped his time and his own capabilities. He was a visionary with no understanding of how to implement pragmatic plans. This was Apter's conclusion at the time:

> "Nkrumah lacked the imagination and skill to develop a country. He was a revolutionary without a plan - a visionary, but not a builder. The combination was a disaster - not only politically, but economically as well" (Apter 1968:788).

The tragedy of Nkrumah is so palpable that even one of the participants of the coup, Colonel Afrifa, expresses similar sentiments:

> Kwame Nkrumah could have been a great man...At the beginning of his political career Nkrumah represented the hopes and aspiration of black people all over the world...and a beacon to the millions of black people who inhabit the African continent...One cannot underrate his impact on African politics and his contribution to the emancipation movement of the black people in their quest for dignity and a place in history...It is sad that a Ghanaian becomes a stateless vagabond in a strange land, among people whose language he does not understand and whose ways are strange to him...But like Napoleon he will die in exile and we Ghanaians will mourn his better part. [Afrifa 1967:121-123]

It is undeniable that Nkrumah had several serious obstacles to overcome. First, he had many internal enemies from the beginning of his reign. But so too did Houphouët. It is hard to imagine that the enmity that the conservatives felt for Nkrumah surpassed the enmity that the *colons* felt for Houphouët. It is true that the *colons* did not control as much wealth as the cocoa chiefs. But it is also true that by 1957 there was a moment when the cocoa chiefs' strength had been sorely tested and it was clear that Nkrumah had the upper hand. Had Nkrumah been a different kind of leader he might have been able to work out a power-sharing scheme. He also had a strong possibility of winning British support. But he did not. There were never speeches about reaching across party lines or working together for the greater good. He chose instead to attack Muslims, Chiefs and technocrats. Nor can Nkrumah's failure be understood only in terms of his choice to move to the East. Other contemporary leaders like Fidel Castro and Sekou Touré had successfully had done so, with just as much desire on the part of the CIA to assassinate them.

In the end, despite the enormous challenges Nkrumah faced, the fall of the regime was due to his own feeble leadership: his poor choice of people in which to place his trust; the fury with which he dealt with 'traitors' in his own party; his inability to incorporate opposition; his obsession with African unity and neglect of the domestic problems facing Ghana; and his drive to industrialize Ghana. Ultimately, Nkrumah did not have the leadership skills he needed to keep powerful elites on his side, nor did he appreciate the importance of supporting traditional agriculture and rural areas more broadly. As a result, Nkrumah "wanted a revolution; instead he got a shambles" (Killick 1978:41, 195).

CHAPTER 3

FELIX HOUPHOUËT-BOIGNY: A RURAL STRATEGY BUILDS A NATION

For decades, Houphouët's remarkable success has been contrasted with Nkrumah's 'socialist' failure. Houphouët is credited with presiding over a politically stable country for thirty years, during which time he turned Côte d'Ivoire into the wealthiest and most influential of the former French colonies.

There were certainly a number of structural features that favored Houphouët. First, Houphouët had a far less-educated and less-politicized population to contend with than Nkrumah. Therefore, Houphouët's initial opposition was more easily overcome. His opposition was further diluted by the territory's slow rate of enfranchisement and the French electoral system, which, based on party lists rather than competitive local and district elections, was more conducive to power sharing. Secondly, Houphouët's traditional opposition was much weaker than the traditional opposition that existed in the Gold Coast. Like Nkrumah, Houphouët's early political opponents were those who were most closely affiliated with the traditional colonial power structures: Canton Chiefs, Civil Servants and white settlers. But in Côte d'Ivoire, the Canton Chiefs had far less support and prestige than the Paramount Chiefs Nkrumah faced in Ghana. In the Lower Côte, traditional chiefs often hid their stature from the whites and allowed the regime to promote or place others as Canton Chiefs in their stead. Most Canton Chiefs were appointed from the ranks of colonial administrative workers. They were not of royal lineage, nor did they have traditional followings. With their power derived from the regime, they soon won the enmity of the population they 'served' by aiding the Colonial administration enforce its hated head-taxes and conscript forced labor.

Furthermore, in Ghana, to gain control over his economy, Nkrumah had to subdue the powerful centralized Ashanti kingdom, which controlled the cocoa trade and most of the wealth in the territory. In the Lower Côte, though there were centralized Agni kingdoms in the southeast, they were not nearly as large, or populace, or wealthy, and their control over cocoa production was much easier to challenge (Boone 2003A, 2003B). Therefore, the center that Houphouët inherited was much stronger vis-à-vis the regions, than that in Ghana. Indeed, it was in the areas where the state challenged local control over resources through the promotion of settlement farming, that opposition remained most strident in the Ivory Coast.[78]

Nonetheless, there were several institutional factors that might have greatly benefitted Nkrumah and disfavored Houphouët. Samir Amin summed up Côte d'Ivoire's position relative to Ghana: "Le Ghana disposé en realité encore d'une dizaine d'années sur la Côte d'Ivoire" (quoted in Ewusi 1973:34). Nkrumah inherited a far more developed state with an extensive roadway system that out surpassed that of Côte d'Ivoire many-fold. Ghana was also the world's largest producer of cocoa and had one of the highest per capital incomes in sub-Saharan Africa (Price 1984:163). As Bill Mahoney, US ambassador to Ghana 1962-1965, recalled, "Ghana was singular in the sense that it had everything. It had educated people, it had considerable infrastructure, three universities, schools, lawyers, doctors – it had everything going for it."

Therefore, as important as the inherited institutional factors were, it will be argued here that Houphouët's success was fundamentally related to his state-building strategies.[79] Houphouët's initial base of support was rural and throughout his tenure he made sure to sustain

[78] In the Southeast (the Agni) and in the Center West (the Bété).
[79] Interview, History Nkrumah Part III, UCTV History (accessed on www.youtube.com, 1/4/2011).

that support-base. He carefully incorporated regional elites from around the territory, deconcentrated his political administration, supported chieftaincy and expanded traditional agriculture. In so doing Houphouët was able to able to subdue most ethno-regional politicization in the country, as well as in his military. Without fear of ethnic entrepreneurs, Houphouët was, ultimately, better able to develop the economy and the state.

I. The rise of the One-party State

The Early Years: Houphouët's assent and his regional opponents

The early years illustrate Houphouët's strategic approach to politics and coalition building. From the beginning, he made continual attempts to create a unified front and to coax his opposition to join him. Like Nkrumah, in the early 1950s, he was challenged by ethno-regional parties – conglomerations of the intelligentsia, professional classes and established chiefs. And as in the Gold Coast, lacking popular support, these parties were propped up by the colonial administration. In addition to ethno-regional parties, Houphouët faced a small, racist settler population violently opposed to African nationalism and later an anti-foreigner movement, the *Ligue des Originaires de la Cote d'Ivoire* (LOCI), as well as an internationally-supported, communist party opposed to Houphouët's relations with France. But whereas Nkrumah intensified political divisions both within and without his own party, Houphouët skillfully minimized them. Thus, despite this assemblage of forces, by 1959 Houphouët had cajoled almost all of the opposition leaders, including the racist colons, to join his party-ticket. He did so by creating "a culture of dialogue, compromise, rewards, punishment, forgiveness and reintegration" (Langer 2004:20).

Houphouët's political career and the politicization of the Cote d'Ivoire began with the end of WWII. Arguably, the second World War had much more devastating effects on Cote d'Ivoire than Ghana, as the territory see-sawed between right-and left-wing French governments. The leftist interwar Popular Front government in France (a coalition of socialist and communist parties) presented new opportunities for African subjects. They allowed Africans to form trade-unions and even supported their participation in Marxist study-groups (Zolberg 1964:65).[80] With this political opening, Houphouët was able to help create a mixed planters' union of European and African export producers, the *Syndicate agricole de la CI* (SACI). But the Popular Front government was short lived. In 1939, Germany occupied France and installed the right-wing, German-sympathetic, Vichy government. The Vichy government implemented the most rapacious racist policies that had ever been instituted in the territory, undermining what progress the African elite had made. It strengthened the white settlers of Côte d'Ivoire, the *colons*, giving them preferential treatment over Africans in every sector. Wealthy African planters were even

[80] Literate Africans were first allowed to organize trade-unions in 1938. These unions included every white-collar occupational group. In addition to various government clerks' unions, there was the *Syndicat des Instituteurs*, *Syndicat des Trasnporteurs, and* the *Synmedvetpharsa* an association of auxiliary doctors, pharmacists, nurses, mid-wives and veterinarians. Attempts to organize coffee and cocoa growers began during the 1930s under the leadership of southeasterners, who were also involved in the establishment of the *Association pour la Defense des Interets des Autochtones de la Cote d'Ivoire* (ADIACI). They tried to create a cooperative that could secure loans from the government-controlled agricultural credit fund but little progress was made. One of the major failures was that ethnic antagonism between the Agni and other farmers elsewhere undermined their ability to effectively collaborate. See Zolberg 1964, pp. 65-66.

exploited as laborers on the white farms (Woronoff 1972).

Taking away the rights that had been hard won among the African elite politicized them in new ways. Prior to the Vichy regime, elite African planters saw their interests as more closely aligned with white planters than with poor Africans. As Houphouët himself explained: 'the African planters had placed their confidence in these metropolitan planters who had more experience and they were charged with the defence of their interests."[81] Indeed, Houphouët's family had always been closely aligned with the French colonial government. His uncle, who was Canton chief in Yamoussoukro, had even been killed because of his support of the Europeans.[82] Houphouët himself had been sent by the administration to the elite *École William Ponty* secondary school in 1919 and then to the prestigious *École de Médecine (Jules Carde) de l'Afrique Occidentale Française* in 1921, where he earned his qualifications as a medical assistant. The administration had wanted to appoint him Canton Chief in 1932, but he chose instead to pursue a career as a *medicin Africaine.* However, after the unexpected death of his brother four years later, Houphouët was forced to assume the title of Canton Chief, giving him responsibility for the administration of Akouè, a canton of thirty-six villages. At the same time, Houphouët inherited his family cocoa plantations, making him one of the wealthiest African farmers in Côte d'Ivoire.

The more involved Houphouët became with cocoa farming, the more politicized he became. The administration was unresponsive to the needs of the African planters. Despite the fact that African planters already outnumbered their European counterparts and were producing far more cocoa and coffee, the African planters interests were not served by the syndicate. As Houphouët explains:

> "we thought that this society was going to be able to defend us against large wholesalers. But alas!...No action was taken in favor of the planters, neither to defend against forced recruitment, nor in the weighing of their products, nor in the placement of their products" [Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965: 4]

Conditions deteriorated once France was occupied by the Germans. Under the Vichy government all Africans were subject to harsh treatment, especially forced labor practices. They were compelled to produce quotas of commodities needed by the metropole without adequate compensation. As the international economy worsened and the market for cocoa and coffee bottomed out, it was the African planters that suffered the brunt of the losses. The Vichy regime paid planters to destroy their crops but the Africans were paid far less than the Europeans. By 1944, there was an acute drop in production, yet the 9,000 *colons* involved in cocoa were able to sustain their production levels because of the administration's support. "In contrast, the indigenes who produced 45,000 tons [of cocoa] saw their production tumble to 4,000" (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:6). As Houphouët explains, "For these reasons we decided, in 1944, to take the defense of our interests into our own hands ...we could not allow for the ruin of agriculture upon which the whole population of our territory was dependent" (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:6).

Thus, the upsurge in racist policies and repression under the Vichy administration had the

[81] Audition du M. Houphouët-Boigny, Sceance du mercerdi 31 mai 1950. In (ed.) M. Damas, *Rapport No 11348 Sur Les Incidents Survenus En Côte d'Ivoire, Tome I,* Abidjan: Assembly Nationale, March 1965, pp. 4. [Abidjan Archives B-217].
[82] Ibid, pp. 11.

effect of creating common cause between the *évolués* and the African peasantry (Zolberg 1964:61). This was to have important consequences for Houphouët's later ability to create a political organization that coalesced rural populations across class and territorial divides. For a decade to come, Houphouët was able to evoke the memory of the harshness of the period, so deeply engrained in the population, during elections campaigns.[83]

With the defeat of the Germans in 1944, France briefly returned to an interim leftist-government, headed by the leader of the Free French Forces, General Charles de Gaulle. In Côte d'Ivoire, de Gaulle's interim government installed the first post-Vichy Governor André Latrille, a leader of the French resistance in April 1945. This appointment proved to be crucial to Houphouët's political fortunes. With Latrille's appointment, for the first time, the colonial administration's traditional support-base – white settlers (*colons*) and traders – turned against it. The conservative settlers, nostalgic for the golden days of the Vichy regime, despised Latrille. For his part, Latrille realized he had to find a support base in the territory for the Free French side. To do so, he would have to undermine the power of the pro-Vichy *colons* by breaking their control of economy. Accordingly, Latrille began to cultivate relationships with the Ivorian capitalists, among them Houphouët-Boigny (Rapley 1993:44). In August 1944, Latrille approved the formation of the *Syndicat agricole africain* (SAA), the first all-African planters' union.[84] This ruptured the *Syndicat agricole de la Cote d'Ivoire*, which had until then been the colony's most powerful association and signaled "the beginning of the end for settler/trader dominance" (Rapley 1993:44).

At the same time, de Gaulle's government introduced elections in its overseas territories. Each territory was to have elections in which both citizens and subjects would be allowed to select representatives for the French Constituent National Assembly on a unified slate. The first election to include all the African territories was held in October 1945 and were structured as a two-tiered process, such that citizens, as well as subjects voted for separate representatives on a common roll with a slate of nine subjects and nine citizens (Zolberg 1964 68-69). Houphouët quickly realized that the subjects, who were a majority of the electorate, could win representatives if they formed a unified voting bloc and supported a single ticket. Houphouët therefore made the radical choice to exclude whites from his ticket and formed an all-African slate, the *Bloc African*.[85]

Fearing Houphouët's political power and his campaign to reform the cocoa industry, the governor who preceded Latrille, Henri de Mauduit - himself a long-time supporter of the colons - recruited a number of chiefs and *évolués* to run against Houphouët (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 7 juin 1950, 1965:24). They put together thirteen additional candidates to contest the election in the Lower Côte, five among them were from the Lower Côte. [86] Four of these men were to continue to represent opposition parties during the anti-colonial period and

[83] Even during interviews in 2009, poor farmers and chiefs in the environs of Korhogo expressed their support of the PDCI because of Houphouët's end of forced labor.

[84] "The founding fathers of the union were: Felix Houphouët, doctor and farmer; Joseph Anoma, instructor converted to businessman and then farmer; Fulgence Brou a large planter; Gabriel Dadie, a former clerk for the PTT become large farmer, polyglot and a great supporter of unions; Djibril Diaby, businessman and large farmer; George Kassi, large farmer; Kouame N'guessan, instructor become farmer; Amadou Lamine Toure, large farmer. Felix Houphouët-Boigny was elected president because he was the youngest and most dynamic" (Loucou 1992:41).

[85] His slate comprised 8 Ivorians, including only 1 Baoulé beside himself, 6 Senegalese, 2 Dahomeyans and 2 Guineans. See Zolberg 1964.

[86] There were also 6 Upper Volta candidates, headed by Tenga Ouedraogo, Chief Page in the Mossi Empire. Three Europeans and 1 Senegalese brought the total to 14. The one from Lower Côte that did not become a major opposition figure was Sanoussi Ouattara, *chef de canton* of Ferkessédougou.

came to form, collectively, Houphouët's regional opposition. They include Alphonse Boni and Kinzeme Binzème, two Agni's from the wealthy southeastern, region who had studied law in France; Adrien Dignan Bailly, a Bété from Gagnoa who had spent many years abroad and had even been active in French Socialist politics at the municipal level in Paris; and from the north, Tiadiane Dem, a businessman and the son of one of Samory's lieutenants (Zolberg 1964:70). Like Houphouët, these candidates were all among the educated, privileged elite. But unlike Houphouët, most of these men had spent more time in the metropole than in Côte d'Ivoire.[87] They were therefore less sensitive than Houphouët to issues that concerned the general public.

With so little time to prepare and without any party institutions, all the political candidates had to develop voting blocs quickly out of pre-existing organizations. Houphouët mobilized the SAA to support his candidacy. The other *évolués* formed their parties primarily out of existing ethnic associations. Thus, Boni and Binzème founded the *Parti Progressive*, which derived most of its support the *Association pour la Defense des Interets des Autochtones de la Cote d'Ivoire* (ADIACI) founded in 1934 by the leaders of the Agni and other Akan groups of the southeast. The lagune intellectuals all rallied behind Binzème as did Agni planters and the royal elite of the South and the East, including the King of the Indenie, Essey Bonzou, the King of the Sanwi, Amaon N'douffou II. The party base was very limited – primarily restricted to the branches created in Abidjan, Grand-Bassam, Bongouanou, Abengourou, Bondoukou, with one exception (Loucou 1992:63). Tidiane Dem, a successful northern business man with a degree from an accounting degree from the *École Premiere Superieure* of Bingerville, set up an affiliate branch of the *Progressistes* in the North, in Korhogo.

In Gagona in the Central West, Adrien Dignan Bailly organized the Bété population under the banner of the French Socialist Party (*Parti socialist, section Française de l'International Ouvriere*, SFIO). The SFIO was a party with a following in all of the French African territories and led by the Senegalese socialist, Lamine Gueye. In the Lower Côte, it's primary support came from functionaries, farmers, journalists, European employees, as well as African French citizens. Before Dignan Bailly, the SFIO's central activists were the "*petits Blancs*," who did not want the end of colonialism and who looked negatively upon the emancipation of the indigenous. Dignan Bailly brought to the SFIO his own support base. Out of the Bété organization, the *Originaries de l'Ouest,* Bailly built the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain* as an affiliate of the SFIO. Thus, with Dignan Bailly's adherence, the SFIO developed a strong following in Bété country. In the Central West, the party controlled about 250 villages in the Gagnoa cercle and 500 in the Issia and Daloa cercles. By 1951, the SFIO claimed 34,327 members of which 10,549 were Bété from the Daloa and Gagnoa *cercles* (Loucou 1992:29-32; Dozon 2008:342).

In the North, Sékou Sanogo established the *L'Entente des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire* (EIDCI). They developed their support base out of the ethnic association, the *Odienné Ideal*, which incorporated Malinké Moslems from Odienné, Séguéla and elsewhere. The leaders of the party were almost all civil servants. Sekou Sanogo, the President, was a civil servant and native of Séguéla who became Counselor General in 1946, Grand Counsilor of the AOF and finally deputé in 1951. Other important leaders of the EIDCI were Vamé Doumouya, the secretary of the organization, also a civil servant and Capri Djédjé, a doctor who was elected with the support of the colonial administration, president of the Conseil General de la Cote d'Ivoire in 1949. In the Sènoufo areas, the Canton Chief, Bema Coulibaly, presided over the

[87] Before 1945, only four men had been able to study abroad, sent by their families: Binzème, Boni (who was in 1950 the attaché to M. Aujoulat), Dignan Bailly and Williams Jacob (Houphouët Testimony 1950, pp. 24).

Korhogo branch of the EIDCI (Loucou 1992:75-77).

Later, in December 1948, Etienne Djaument, who broke with Houphouët after he lost an election and was charged with fraud, would form the *Bloc Democratique Eburnéen*. Like the other parties, this *Bloc* was created out of the pre-existing ethnic association formed in 1944, the *Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de l'Ouest* (UOCOCI)), which included most Kru ethnic groups in the Southwest. This was the weakest parties of all the opposition parties, with only two local branches were created in Duekoue and Sassandra (Loucou 1994:72).

Though for the most part these opposition parties had but one or two branches outside of their regions and though they lacked the extensive village organization of the PDCI, there were adherents to the *Indépendants*, the *Socialistes* and the *Progressistes* in almost every community in the country *(*Zolberg 1964:129-131). Many of these adherents were tied to the colonial administration as Canton chiefs and civil servants. They supported the opposition because their interests were tied to the continuation of the system and/or because they were more susceptible to the administration's punitive threats. Still others hid their support of Houphouët's party. For example, in Daloa, the one chief that supported the administration resided in Abidjan and worked as a civil servant. The others, fearful that their lands would be left fallow if the French refused to send workers to their plantations, claimed to be *Socialists*, though in fact they supported Houphouët.[88] Additionally, as in Ghana, local power struggles had made it possible to divide populations with competing loyalties. Thus, there was even an opposition Baoulé party, the *Union des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire* (UICI), opposed to Houphouët, though he himself was a Baoulé. All in all, these ethnic entrepreneurs were able to establish significant, though limited, pockets of opposition.

Table 11: Political Parties in Lower Côte 1945-1956

Region	*Leaders*	*Party*	*Ethnic Group*
Southeast (Abiosso, Abengourou)	Koucou Aoulou, Alphonse Boni, Kinzeme Binzème	*Parti Progressiste*	Agni, Attie
North (Odiénné, Korhogo, Séguéla)	Tidiane Dem, Sékou Sanogo, Vamé Doumouya, Capri Djédjé, Bema Coulibaly	*Entente des Indépendants de Côte d'Ivoire*	Malinké, Sènoufo
West (Gagnoa, Daloa)	Dignan Bailly	*Section Française de l'International ouvriere (French Socialist Party)*	Bété
Southwest (Sassandra)	Etienne Djaument	*Bloc Democratique Eburnéen*	Kru
Center (Bouaké, Toumodi)	Blaise N'dia Koffi	*Union des Indépendants de la Cote d'Ivoire*	Baoulé

Like Nkrumah, Houphouët's being the only candidate whose platform opposed the hated colonial power structure almost guaranteed his political success. In 1945, Houphouët's campaign focused on expanding educational opportunities and developing infrastructure, but the centerpiece of his campaign was the abolition of forced labor (Zolberg 1964:72). Ending forced labor had become a fundamental goal of Houphouët's during the Vichy regime. The SAA's first statute proclaimed the union's renunciation of free labor and its commitment to create a

[88] Interview with three important chiefs in Daloa, August 2009.

sharecropper system akin to that which existed in the Gold Coast, which would entitle agricultural laborers to a stipulated percentage of the crop (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:24, 1965:8). Houphouët's campaign therefore received the enthusiastic support of the peasantry around the territory.

The campaign against forced labor also allowed Houphouët to forge critical relationships with powerful chieftaincies in the North, from where the majority of forced labor was recruited. In 1945, Houphouët travelled first to Korhogo to meet with the chief of the most populace group in the northern part of the Lower Côte, Gbon Coulibaly and then to Ouagadougou to meet with the powerful Moro Naba of the Mossi. These two traditional potentates provided the colonial administration annually with 6,500 and 30,000 laborers, respectively (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:8). During this historic trip, Houphouët successfully won the chiefs over to his side. He was able to bring back 1,500 voluntary workers from Korhogo and 3,5000 from Upper Volta after this trip - the first voluntary agricultural workers ever recruited in Côte d'Ivoire. According to Houphouët, it was because of this success that he was chosen to be a candidate for the National Assembly: "as I came to create the *syndicat agricole*, which for the first time was able --before the vote on the law to end forced labor-- to make exemptions of forced labor for 20,000 Africans and their families...my brothers estimated that I should come here and present myself as a candidate" (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:13).

The first election occurred only months after the SAA had been formed. 30,000 electors were registered (one-third of the number in Ghana), of which only 14,000 were from lower cote and 16,000 were from the Upper Cote (12,000 from the Mossi and 4,000 from the non-Mossi: Bobo, Lobi). Houphouët described the process,

> "We had participated in an electoral campaign of many paradoxes. The Baloum Naba, close to 80 years old, married to 42 women, illiterate, unable to express himself in French, was the official candidate of the colons and of the administration. The 12 stooges of the lower cote were there simply to diminish my chances in Lower Cote where I was known and where Baloum Naba is unknown. So the 14,000 votes of the Lower Cote were split between 13 candidates and the Mossi bloc voted in favor of Baloum Naba. We were obliged to accept this fight." [Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:13]

Though Houphouët won, the vote was split among the fourteen candidates such that the administration was able to manipulate the results of one constituency and claim that there had been a tie. They were forced to run the election again. During the lead-up to the second election there was far more intimidation than during the first round. Many SAA supporters were arrested, bridges were sabotaged and one man was even killed. Despite these machinations on the part of the administration, Houphouët's ticket won the second round of elections with an even larger percentage (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:13).

The following year, Houphouët ran again for the French National Assembly. By this time, he had established his political dominance in the field. This was because of a monumental victory he had achieved in the First National Constituent Assembly. On March1st, 1946, Houphouët along with other members of the African coalition in the Assembly introduced a bill proposing the abolition of all forms of forced labor in France's Overseas territories. Having been an integral part of his campaign promises and part of his central drive to form the SAA, the

introduction and passage of this bill came to be seen as Houphouët's triumph. "Overnight, Felix Houphouët-Boigny became a mythical hero who had imposed his will upon the French" (Zolberg 1964:74). "From then on, no one could stand up to Houphouët as a popular leader" (Woronoff 1972:36). When one month later, Houphouët launched the *Parti democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), he had no trouble finding people interested in becoming members. "Thousands of Africans offered him their devoted support and not least among them the northerners who had served as labor....Within the year there were 85,000 paid-up adherents and by 1950, ten times that number" (Woronoff 1972:36-37).

The PDCI developed in part out of the electoral coalition that had been forged for the Assembly elections. The SAA furnished the PDCI with a mass of supporters, material resources and its organizational structure. It was the rural basis of the party – its 'traditional sprit' and 'agrarian core' (Loucou 1992:42). But the PDCI also had to develop an urban component that was more modern and revolutionary. The rural movement, thus, joined forces with organizations of salaried urban workers and other important unions, as well as some ethnic or regional associations, Marxist study groups and cultural associations.[89] However, not all of the ethnic associations joined with the SAA. The leaders of the *Parti Progressiste* who were two of Houphouët's major opponents in the first election, K. Binzème and Tidiane Dem, decided to contest the election. Earlier, the two men had created an agricultural association, the *Syndicat des Planteurs et des Eleveurs Africains,* intending to supplant the SAA in the southeast and in the North. They now formed a coalition party under the name of the *Parti Progressiste de Cote d'Ivoire* hoping to secure substantial support among the Malinké and Sènoufo in the North who were not part of the plantation economy, as well as to guarantee a seat for the southeastern *Parti Progressiste* whose following was too circumscribed to win a seat on its own (Loucou 1992:63-65; Zolberg 1964:75-76). Ultimately, the oppositions attempts were futile. By then, the PDCI candidate had become "invincible" (Zolberg 1964:76). Houphouët won 98 percent of the votes in the Lower Côte and faced no opposition in the Upper Volta where the leading candidate had withdrawn his candidacy.

Despite his overarching stature in Ivorian politics, as soon as Houphouët achieved victory, he began to push for unification of all the opposing parties. As he was to do time and again, Houphouët tried to convince all the opposing leaders that creating a unified list would be a win-win for all. Houphouët even invited the racist *colons* to join his party-ticket. Houphouët describes the overture he made 1947,

> "Some days after my arrival, elections were held for the Assembly of the French Union. We offered to the colons the occasion for collaboration with us on the General Council. There were five posts of power. We had proposed to the colons to make one list composed of three RDA and two representatives from the colons, chosen by themselves. This proposition was refused. The colons thought that the RDA was in fear of their strength. They created one list opposed to the RDA, composed of dissidents from our

[89] Houphouët brought on board *l'Union des originares six cercles de l'Ouest* (UOCOCI), established in July 1944 whose members from the Daloa, Gagnoa, Grand-Lahou, Man, Sassandra, Tabou *cercles.* They carried for the PDCI the populations from the west: Bété, Dida, Godie, Guere, Wobie, Yacouba, Neyo and Kroumen. There was also an Akan organization, *L'Union fraternelle des originaires de la Cote d'Ivoire* which furnished the PDCI with supporters for the most part from the East; and the *Odiénné Ideal* that grouped together natives from Odiénné, Korhogo and Séguéla the three most important population centers in the North. Houphouët was also able to bring on board the Senegalese, who were the majority of African citizens in the territory, because of his marriage to a women whose father was Senegalese . See Zolberg 1964, pp. 71.

> movement. We were forced to accept this battle: the dissidents were beaten and the three candidates of the RDA were elected." [Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 28 juin 1950, 1965: 33]

Thus, Houphouët's shrewdness as a leader was manifest early on. His genius lay in his understanding of how to build coalitions of disparate interests and groups. As Houphouët himself said in an interview with Aristede Zolberg, "If unity had not been in our heart, we should have discovered it in our head" (Zolberg 1964:74).

Though rebuffed by the *colons*, the PDCI-RDA did successfully conclude an alliance with the PPCI, whose representative, Kacou Aoulou, was included on the communal list for the December 1946 elections of the Counsel General. Kacou Aoulou was also one of the Ivorian delegates sent to the Constituent Congress of the RDA that year. But this fragile coalition fell apart within a year. The reason for this was yet another change in the political climate in France.

One Step Back: Alliance with the Communist Party

As great as these victories were in 1945 and 1946, the battle had not yet begun. The *colons'* attempts to curb the activities of the PDCI had been thwarted by the intervention of Latrille. However, new developments finally allowed the full wrath of the *colons* to be felt. This was precipitated by the attempt on Houphouët's part to make a strategic alliance in the French National Assembly.

The new French colonial structure established by de Gaulle had four political levels: local councils, territorial assemblies, the Grand Conseil to look after affairs of the two federations (the West African Federation (the AOF) and the Central African Federation (the ACF) and representation in the French National Assembly. But it was only in the latter that any real political decisions were to be effected. Therefore, alliances became crucial. With this in mind, three months after the founding of the PDCI, in mid-October, Houphouët helped organize an historic meeting in Bamako, at which almost all of the African deputies were gathered. As he had led the formation of the *bloc africaine* in CI, Houphouët now helped engineer the creation of an African voting bloc for the French National Assembly. The aim was to increase African influence over political debates and particularly over the parameters of the new French constitution to be adopted. Out of this historic conference, the pan-African organization, the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) was formed.[90]

However, even with this unity, the RDA's influence in the National Assembly was nugatory. Africans were grossly underrepresented, holding a mere 13 out of 627 seats. They therefore had to ally themselves with a larger metropolitan party (Woronoff 1972:38). At that time in post-war France, the *Parti Communiste de France* (PCF) was the strongest party, holding 182 seats, the largest number in the Assembly. Moreover, the communists were the only party sympathetic to the struggle of France's colonial subjects. They had already been involved in organizing and funding African labor movements. Communist study groups had been established throughout West Africa and several of the largest unions in the overseas territories were subsidiaries of the French trade unions, themselves closely affiliated with the communist party.

[90] Though the RDA was focused on ending colonial abuses and strengthening territorial control, under Houphouët's leadership the organization continued to support union with France rather than independence. Houphouët later explained, "The RDA was not a political party; it was a movement that included the diversity of our territories in their evolution" (Houphouët Testimony 1950, pp. 21).

Indeed, once the SAA joined forces with the urban syndicalists, union leaders became the majority on the political bureau of the PDCI, almost all of whom were strong supporters of the communist party.

For Houphouët, the political alliance of the RDA with the PCF was a purely strategic one. With the support of the Communists, the RDA was able to put forward a draft constitution that included the immediate enfranchisement of all African's to full citizenship status, the end of the two-tiered electoral system and the legalization of union activism. For their part, the PCF needed to bolster themselves against the conservatives, as well as the less progressive liberal wing of their own coalition. Unlike Nkrumah, therefore, Houphouët-Boigny never shared the ideology of the communist party or its radical desire to end the oppression and economic exploitation of the metropole. As Houphouët-Boigny himself once remarked: "I, a bourgeois landowner, I would preach the class struggle? That is why we aligned ourselves with the Communist Party, without joining it."[91]

Though there is no reason to believe that Houphouët-Boigny ever embraced communist ideology, his union with the PCF undoubtedly strengthened his partnership with the leftist colonial administration. Latrille was a member of the progressive left and his chief of staff was closely associated with the communists. When the PDCI was founded, Latrille helped Houphouët secure a large American car for his campaign trips, as well as the petrol (Widner 1994:167). The Free French administration went farther than beneficent support. Latrille appears to have actually blocked the efforts of those opposed to the SAA. In one incident, it was alleged that the Governor ordered one of his Commandants to register any SAA member to vote, regardless of their legal eligibility (Zolberg 1964:72). Conservatives who had tried to launch their own rival agricultural union, the *Syndicat des planteurs et eleveurs afrcains de la Cote d'Ivoire* (SPEACI), accused Latrille of having actively blocked their efforts to recruit members (Loucou 1992:63). Latrille even went so far as to depose the Indénié King in Abengourou who supported the *Progressistes* and install a PDCI-RDA supporter in his stead, a man who also happened to be Houphouët-Boigny's brother-in-law, Amouakon Dihye.[92]

Thus, benefits initially accrued to the PDCI-RDA as a result of its affiliation with the communists. However, soon, so too did very serious negative repercussions. First, it created divisions within the RDA. Several elected RDA representatives broke ranks with the party and formed their own parliamentary group of "Overseas Independents" (IOM) in 1948 (Loucou 1992:96). In the Lower Côte, the PDCI-RDA experienced its own internal dissention. Conservative elements within the coalition were deeply troubled by Houphouët's affiliation with communists. The first to leave the alliance were the Agni and northern affiliates. Later, Etienne Djaument repudiated the PDCI-RDA, ostensibly for its support of communism.[93] The affiliation also alienated the syndicate of chiefs which Houphouët himself had helped to found (Zolberg 1964:62).

More seriously, by the end of 1946, the RDA found their communist benefactors had

[91] Kenneth B. Noble, "Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Ivory Coast's Leader Since Freedom in 1960, Is Dead." NY Times, December 8, 1993

[92] Latrille was able to remove the King because of a technicality: it was possible to dethrone a siting king if he were found to be 'incompetent.' Bonzou was accused of being incompetent as a manager of business affairs and accused of having embezzled state funds through a land scheme. Through this technicality, Latrille and Houphouët were able to dethrone Kouassi Bonzou and replace him with Houphouët's brother-in-law, Amouakon Dihye. See Houphouët's Testimony 1950, pp. 25-26.

[93] Prior, Djaument was removed from the PDCI list because of a scandal. Only after his removal, did he renounce the PDCI for its communist affiliations.

turned into a serious liability. In the emerging Cold-War climate, anti-communist fears coupled with the humiliating and bloody rebellions in Algeria in 1945 and Madagascar in 1947, helped to feed a right-wing backlash in France. The right stirred up anger over the destruction of the Empire and, with that, fears of the left-wing coalition government and its progressive draft constitution. By June, the leftist government had collapsed. Communist members of the cabinet were dismissed and the PCF went into open opposition. In Africa, the new right-wing regime removed all communist and progressive leaders in the colonies. Latrille, Houphouët-Boigny's benefactor, was recalled in January 1947 and an interim-governor was sent to replace him, Georges-Louis-Joseph Orselli. But Orselli proved to be too soft on the African 'communists.' After he refused to persecute the RDA and sided with the Africans in condemning traders' attempts to underpay African farmers, he was recalled (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 28 juin 1950,1965:37-39).[94] Finally, Orseilli was replace by Governor Péchoux, who arrived in November 1948 "to restore the colonial power's prestige" (Woronoff 1972:39).

Now, with the arch conservative Péchoux in the office of Governor, the war with the *colons* began in earnest. From January 1949 to January 1950, Cote d'Ivoire witnessed a string of colonial atrocities carried out against the RDA. The right-wing government had begun to illicitly arm the white settlers as soon as Latrille was recalled. Arms were even distributed to European patients in the hospital (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 7 juin 1950,1965:31). The first violent incidents took place in January and February1949 in Bondoukou. Abengourou, Dabou, Agboville and Bouaké (Loucou 1992:85).

Part of the active and violent campaign launched against the RDA was assisted by the regional opposition elites that had emerged earlier and who were now strengthened by Péchoux's support: Kacou Aoulou, Dignan Bailly, Etienne Djaument and Tidiane Dem. Kacou Aoulou, the central leader of the southeastern Agni, revived the *Progressiste Parti*, supported mostly by people from Abengourou and Aboisso. The teacher Etienne Djaument, who had originally brought the support of the *l'Union des originares six cercles de l'Ouest* (UOCOCI)[95] (which carried for the populations from the west) to Houphouët's candidacy in 1945 and had become a deputy the following year, withdrew from the PDCI in 1948 over a scandal. He then created the *Bloc Democratique Eburnéen* supported by people of Kru origin in areas around Sassandra in the West. Dignan Bailly, the Bété *évolué* from Gagnoa, revived the French Socialist Party (*Section Française de l'International ouvriere* (SFIO) with Capri Djédjé who had been elected President of the Territorial Assembly against the PDCI leader August Denise in 1949. Tidiane Dem, the Muslim leader from the North, along with long-time opposition leader Sékou Sanogo, another Ivorian representative to the Grand Council, expanded the ethnic association, the *Idéal d'Odiénné,* into a Northern political party, the *Entente des Indépendants de Côte d'Ivoire*. In Abengourou, Houphouët's brother-in-law, Amoakon Dihye, was revoked and Kouassi Bonzou put back on the throne (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 7 juin 1950,1965:25-27).

Table 12: Agni-N'Denie Kings	
1943-1945	Nanan Koassi Bonzou I (1st time)

[94] According to Houphouët, Orseilli met with him and said "'I received orders to lead the fight. The officials wanted to proceed by repressing the population. I tried to dissuade them. The colons came to demand that I leave.' M. Orselli told me as well, during the course of an interview, that M. Lagarosse had demanded the destruction of the RDA, adding that he must not hesitate if it was necessary to shed the blood of Africans" (Houphouët Testimony 1950, pp. 38).

[95] Established in July 1944 whose members from the Daloa, Gagnoa, Grand-Lahou, Man, Sassandra, Tabou *cercles.*

1945-1947	Nanan Amoakon Dihye III (Houphouët's brother-in-law)
1947-1950	Nanan Koassi Bonzou I (2nd time)
1950-1995	Nanan Bonzou II (Amoakon Dihye's son)

All of this came to a head in Abidjan-Treichville on Sunday, the 6th of February 1949. Violence broke out between RDA supporters and activists of the other Ivorian parties. Shooting erupted and riots ensued. It appears that the opposition party leaders, especially Djaument, had been used by Péchoux to incite the PDCI to a violent confrontation. One person was killed, several injured and a lot of property was damaged (Amondji 1986:51). The colonial administration was able to use the incident to persecute members of the PDIC-RDA, hoping to "so weaken the party that it would wither away" (Loucou 1992:86-87). Only four people of the opposition were charged with any infraction, all of whom had their cases dismissed – most notably Kacou Aoulou, the secretary-general of the *Parti Progressiste,* who was not prosecuted despite having been caught in possession of a firearm at the meeting. In contrast, 30,000 supporters of the PDCI-RDA were arrested and imprisoned on flimsy evidence, among them eight of the party leaders (Loucou 1992:86-87). The only reason the administration did not arrest Houphouët was that, as a French parliamentarian, he was protected by diplomatic immunity.

By the spring of 1950, things had reached a fever pitch and violence had spread around the territory; thousands had been imprisoned, hundreds were wounded and over fifty Africans had been killed. The month of January 1950 was particularly gory. Every day of the month witnessed a new bloody event. One of the worst incidents took place in Dimbokro, a predominately Baoulé city, not far from Houphouët-Boigny's natal village. On the 29th and 30th of January 1950, unarmed protestors were attacked by the colonial administration while on the way to the home of resident administrator to protest the arrest of their local leaders. Thirteen people were killed – shot in the back – dozens of others were injured and close to five thousand were detained (Amondji 1986:46). Paris reluctantly was forced to address the situation. In February 1950 the French sent a commission to investigate the events in Dimbokro. The commission's findings placed the blame on the communist PDCI-RDA.

Two Steps Forward: Houphouët's repli-tactique

Before the violence had reached such a pitch, Houphouët-Boigny had decided his strategic alliance with the PCF was too great a hindrance and that it would be necessary to work with the administration (Loucou 1992:94-95). As early as May 1948, Houphouët-Boigny had begun strategic talks with the Governor of the French West African Territories (AOF), Paul Béchard, negotiating terms that might allow him to sever ties with the communists and strengthen his relations with the metropole. At a meeting between the two men in Houphouët's home in Yamoussokro, Governor Béchard reportedly promised Houphouët that if he were to severe his ties with the French Communists, he would ensure that Lamine Gueye would end his support of the SFIO and back the PDCI (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 28 juin 1950, 1965:34; Loucou 1992:93-96).

Conducting talks with Béchard could not have been easy for Houphouët. Béchard had been largely responsible for much of the repression perpetrated against the RDA, as the Upper Commissioner of the AOF. Houphouët's followers were deeply skeptical of any of Béchard's promises (Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 28 juin 1950,1965:36). Nevertheless, Houphouët was determined to follow this course. Ultimately, the talks proved to be pivotal. They

led to meetings carried out between Houphouët-Boigny and the then Minister of Overseas Territories, Françios Mitterrand. Eventual a deal was struck: The French government would end its repression of the RDA, all political prisoners would be released and the oppressive colonial administrators would be dismissed. In return, the RDA would renounce communism and support the French regime.

By 1950, Houphouët openly introduced his new policy, initiating what came to be referred to as his "*repli-tactique*". First, the PDCI communists were scapegoated. In June 1950, the most militant communist in the PDCI-RDA, the union leader Gabriel d'Arboussier, was pressured to resign (Schmit 2007:105). With d'Arboussier forced out, Houphouët-Boigny was able to carry out his new agenda: gaining French support of economic development in exchange for, what many at the time saw as, 'un véritable «immobilisme politique»'(Vingaud 1956:572). On October 18th 1950, the RDA publically announced it had severed all ties to the PCF. Houphouët then began to forge an alliance with the ruling French coalition (Loucou 1992:96).

At the same time, Houphouët had begun to prepare a new politics of national union. Even before the official announcement of the split with the communists had been made, party members were being advised to avoid frictions with adversarial parties and to "practice a politics of reaching across party lines" (Loucou 1992:102). As he had done in 1947, overtures were made to the leaders of the main opposition parties that the colonial administration still openly supported. At first, Houphouët's calls for unification fell on deaf ears. The colonial administration, supported by the ruling French party, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF), pushed for an alliance of the *Progressiste*s, the *Indépendants* and the association of the customary chiefs headed by the prince Kouame Andingra. Under their guidance, Sekou Sanogo and Kacou Aoulou created the *Parti de l'Union Française de Côte d'Ivoire* (PUFCI) to run against the PDCI in the upcoming June 1951 elections (Loucou 1992:105). Not to be outdone, Dignan Bailly and E. Djaument also created North-South coalition parties to contest the election. As before, the administration aided the opposition by suppressing votes.[96] In the Baoulé *cercles*, where the PDCI had its heaviest support, nearly half of the voters were struck from the rolls, while in the two areas that the opposition commanded a following, the Agni-dominated *cercle* of Abengourou and the Malinké area of Odiénné, the electorate was multiplied tenfold (Zolberg 1964:137-138). Despite this vote tampering, the PDCI secured 61percent of the votes cast[97] and Houphouët won the first seat (Zolberg 1964:139).[98]

Table 13: 1951 June Elections

Party	*Candidates*	*# Votes*
PDCI	Houphouët-Boigny + Ouezzin Coulibaly	67,200
Union Française	Sekou Sanogo + Kacou Aoulou	35,336
Union Républicaine	Dignan Bailly + Vamé Doumouya[99]	5,881

[96] Houphouët also presented a North-South coalition, with himself as a Baoulé from the Lower Côte and Ouezzin Coulibaly representing the non-Mossi populations in the Upper Côte.

[97] Of the 12 subdivisions it failed to carry were 6 predominantly Agni, 2 Bété, 3 Sènoufo and Malinké districts in the north and 1 in the extreme west (Odiénné). See Zolberg 1964, pp. 139.

[98] The voting fraud was however successful at eliminating Houphouët's running-mate, Ouezzin Coulibaly. Instead, Sekou Sanogo 'won' the second seat on the ticket with 32% of the vote.

[99] A Dioula from Bouaflé.

Entente Ethnique Eburnéenne	E. Djaument + Kassoum Coulibaly[100]	1,341
Union Démocratique		1

Source: Zolberg 1964:139.

With yet another decisive election behind him, Houphouët again made a call for national unity. Fearing that internal conflict would harm the country's chances of recovery, the PDCI announced that rather than go it alone, it preferred joining together with the Europeans and Africans in a union for the economic development of the territory (Woronoff 1972:80). Thus, as before, overtures were made to all the competing African leaders, as well as the important members of the European *colons,* even some whose actions had hurt the PDCI before. On the 6th of October 1951 in the Géo André stadium in Abidjan, Houphouët publicly launched his call for the union of all the political parties. In his historic speech, Houphouët proclaimed that "union for a constructive politics is a vital necessity" and that "hatred and anger, even if legitimate" would have to be set aside "for the realization of a common program of economic and social progress." He then called upon "all men and all women...regardless of color" to join together to form a "union of all men of good will, regardless of our respective politics and in the higher interest of Cote d'Ivoire and the Republic of the French Union."[101]

To make the affiliation more palatable to their opponents, the more moderate members of the PDCI were put-forward. Three of the thirteen Assemblymen most closely associated with the communist party, Mockey, Gadeau and Paraiso, were excluded from the proposed slate. In essence, the party returned to its original roots. "The new recruits were mostly SAA officials, more business-minded than most members of the PDCI executive and party leaders who had not been into the forefront of the battle" (Zolberg 1964:154).[102] By the end of the year, the PDCI had reached an agreement with Dignan Bailly of the *Socialistes,* as well as the *Indépendants* and even some leading members of the French RPF and Socialists (Loucou 1992:103).[103] This electoral coalition, which united the RDA, the *Socialists,* the *Indépendants* and one-fourth of the French, was christened the '*Union pour le development economique de la Côte d'Ivoire*' (UDECI) and concretized with the creation of a common list for the March 1952 elections. Accounting for 62 percent of the votes cast, the UDECI effectively increased the PDCI's seats in the Cote d'Ivoire Territorial Assembly from 28 to 50 (Woronoff 1972:80) and captured all but 4 of the 32 seats in the second section of the new Assembly (Zolberg 1964:155). None of the competing parties had any success. Sekou Sanogo, E. Djaument, Kacou Aoulou and Capri Djédjé were all defeated in their own home constituencies (Loucou 1992:105; Zolberg 1964:155).

[100] A Sènoufo.

[101] Félix Houphouët-Boigny, "Solennelle Déclaration Publique au Stade Géo André à Abidjan," 6 octobre 1951. *Anthologie des Discours 1946-1978 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Tome I,* Abidjan: CEDA, 1978, pp. 88. Also see Loucou 104It is worth underscoring that this speech for unity was made about six months after Nkrumah's speech to his party-members in the first government he presided over, when Nkrumah asserted that it "would be impracticable" to work with "those who held different views" and that therefore "Coalition with the other political groups in the country" would be "dangerous."

[102] In addition, Houphouët negotiated the freeing of all those imprisoned (Zolberg 1964:151). This may be why the radicals accepted their temporary purge.

[103] Such as the Commandant Ply, director of the journal *La Cote d'Ivoire,* the farmer Olivier Reinach, former president of the Chamber of Agriculture and the leader of the society, Pierre Chiché head of the *Compaigne de Constructions Generales en Afrique Francaise* (CCGA)

The final fusion of all the political parties was made possible with the introduction of a new French over-seas governmental system, the *Loi-Cadre* (Loucou 1992:107). The Loi-Cadre dismantled the Federations of West and Equatorial French Africa (the AOF and ACF), transferring powers that had been centralized in the capitals at Dakar and Brazzaville to the respective territories (Welch 1987:178). With this territorial devolution, competing political leaders interested in accessing the limited political positions now available were more amenable to putting aside their differences and joining the ranks of the PDCI.[104]

Echoing the event for unity held five years earlier, Houphouët once again convened a large rally in the Géo André Stadium in Abidjan to announce the union of political parties. Representatives from all of the major parties took turns to speak, including E. Djaument and Kacou Aoulou. The central difference between the 1951 and 1956 rallies was that this time the opposition parties were formally dissolved: the *Parti Progressiste*, the *Block Democratique Eburnéen*, the *Entente des Indépendants* and the *Party de l'Union Française* "disappeared from Ivorian political life" (Loucou 1992:108). Only the SFIO refused to disband itself, though they too rallied to the new political course.

The success of the strategy of union was reflected in the PDCI's electoral victories that year. In the 1956 Abidjan Municipal elections, those elected on the PDCI-sponsored list included the *Progressistes*, Kacou Aoulou, Lucien Yapobi, the Socialist, Amadou Diop and the *Indépendant*, Fama Toure. In other cities, the inclusion of competing party leaders on the PDCI list was also significant. In Bouaké, a municipal seat was won by the *Indépendant* Niangoran Eyemon and in Agboville and Abengourou, the *Progressistes* Jean-Baptiste and Boa Amoakon won seats (Loucou 1992:118). All in all, the elections were a resounding victory for the PDCI, exceeding all expectations including those of the party leaders themselves. The PDCI took 86.8 percent of the votes cast. In contrast, Sekou Sanogo-Kakou Aoulou list, which came in second, won only 6.7 percent (Vignaud 1956:580).

Remarkably by 1959, almost *all* of the regional opposition leaders had been coopted by the PDCI. With the exception of Kinzeme Binzème and Sankou Sanogo, "the followers of the former opposition parties had become the activist base of the PDI-RDA, such that their principle leaders obtained seats on the municipal councils and as deputes" (Loucou 1992, 109). Among those elected deputies to the Legislative Assembly that year were: Dignan Bailly, Etienne Djaument, Alphonse Boni, Blaise N'dia Koffi, Vamé Doumouya, Tidiane Dem, Kacou Aoulou, Guirandou N'diaye and Amadou Diop. Moreover, two of Houphouët's most intractable opponents were promoted to the government on April 30th, 1959: Alphonse Boni was named Minister of Justice and Tidiane Dem was named Secretary of State of Farming (Loucou 1992:118-119).

It is true that the opposition parties in the Lower Côte were hollow for the most part. But in reality the same was true of the opposition parties in the Gold Coast in 1951. The chiefs and the intellectuals had little more support and had experienced equally crushing electoral defeats. Moreover, it was not necessary for Houphouët to try to incorporate these failed opposition leaders in his ticket. Even without their support, his party would have easily won the majority of seats and could have controlled the political environment. But Houphouët went a step further. He

[104] This is reflected in the explanation the socialist leader, Adrien Dignan Bailly, gave to his followers for his reversal: "Activists in different political formations who had followed different wings had come to the same goal: France had given us the major part of the management of the our own affairs. ..the hour of reconciliation and of political truce had come. It is why my dear compatriots and friends, who have always followed me, I ask of you to rally as I have to the great cause of the RDA to share tomorrow, all together, the responsibility of power and work in union and peace for the progress of our dear country: Cote d'Ivoire" (quoted in Loucou 1992, pp. 118).

was not content to simply defeat the enemy. He understood the danger of having disgruntled *colons* and regional elites operating outside his political edifice. It is truly striking that every victory Houphouët had he used as an olive branch to coopt his opposition. The wisdom of this choice is attested to by the fact that, overwhelmingly, those who were coopted by Houphouët were to stay with him. Thus, the *Progressistes*, Tidiane Dem, Kacou Aoulou, and Alphonse Boni, were still in Houphouët's government a decade later. Though it is not possible to prove a counter-factual, it is certainly true that Houphouët's decision to keep regional leaders in his party-government who might otherwise have been able to build an independent base of support was an important piece of the political stability Houphouët was able to foster.

There was, however, one major setback in this triumphal-march towards unity. The small Agni kingdom of Sanwi in the Southeast made a bid for succession in 1959. The Sanwi kingdom, as the other Agni kingdoms of Indénié and Mourou, had had a unique status under the French colonial administration, with whom they had signed treaties early on. As a result, their pre-colonial political structures were left largely intact. Unlike other areas where the administration appointed chiefs with no traditional authority, the Agni kings were allowed to sustain control in their areas. In addition, because Sanwi was one of the first areas that cocoa farming had been introduced, the Agni quickly became among of the largest and wealthiest plantation owners. Nor were they subject to the onerous forced labor practices, as were most of the population in the Lower and Upper Côte (Zolberg 1964; Boone 1995). It was in these areas, where the kings had stronger ties to the French administration, that Houphouët had had some of his lowest levels of support. The PDCI had little traction in the region also because, with the promotion of cocoa production in the region, anger had been brewing since the early 1950s over the increasing settlement into the region of Baoulé and other peoples from the savannah areas (Zolberg 1964:291). Zolberg explains that by 1953, the Sanwi State saw itself as threatened. The final straw came in January 1959, when conflict broke out between the Sanwi and the Ehotilé, the traditional 'vassals' of the Sanwi state. When Houphouët sent in police detachments to subdue the area, the Sanwi seized upon the situation. They rallied around their King, Amon N'Doffou III, who claimed his kingdom was distinct from that of the colony of the Cote d'Ivoire and should be recognized as an autonomous region (Zolberg 1964:292-293).

Houphouët responded immediately. On the 19th of May, 1959, he had the king and his ministers in Krindjabo arrested. He then had the king's emissaries in Paris arrested and transported to civil prison in Abidjan. Twenty-nine people were prosecuted, though two prominent Sanwi leaders, Éhounoud Biley and Fattoh Elleigand, were able to escape to Ghana where they set up a government in exile. Those arrested for the 'Sanwi Affair', including the king, were condemned to 10 years in prison on March 2nd 1960 (Diarra 1997:50-54). In addition, the king was banished for twenty years, the *chefferie superieure* of Aboisso was discontinued and all the *chefs de canton* who had supported the king were replaced by politically reliable appointees (Zolberg 1964:292).

Thus, Houphouët's strategy alone does not explain his early successes and his ability to conquer all his opposition. The fact that most rural interests were aligned with his was also critical. In Sanwi, where Houphouët was unable to coopt the traditional elite, he used the same tactics as Nkrumah – arrests, detentions and the replacement of prominent chiefs with his own political allies. It would take a long time for him to regain the ground that was lost in the region. Thus it is clear that structural factors were of considerably importance to the outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire. In the long run, however, even these favorable structural conditions could not have ensured the continued stability of Houphouët's regime. This is where Houphouët's dogged

determination to incorporate his opposition stands in relief to Nkrumah's repeated expulsions of his own supporters. As does his willingness to work with France and align himself with the *évolués* and traditional elites that had opposed him. It is true that Houphouët was able to benefit from French support, but that was only after he himself had made the dangerous choice to turn against the strongest faction in his own coalition, as well as his urban support network and negotiate with oppressive colonial administrators. In fact, this was to bring about the first and only significant schism within his own party.

The emergence of the radical left

The anti-colonial struggle that had begun in 1947 was largely waged by union leaders, most of whom were urban intellectuals trained in Marxism. In contrast, the *Syndicate agricole africain* had been established by the planter elite. Their primary focus was on gaining economic parity with the white planters. These wealthy planters, for the most part, stayed away from political affairs and especially radical politics. It was therefore an odd 'federation' of the traditional and modern organizations in Côte d'Ivoire. This necessary alliance of strange bedfellows was to have serious ramifications after the heated battle with the *colons* had ended. With Houphouët's new tactical direction, the autonomy of the unions and their hard-core, anti-colonial positions presented a serious obstacle to Houphouët's determination to win French support. "Their suppression was made necessary" (Amondji 1986:70).

For the opposition parties dependent upon the colonial administration's backing for their continued success, the new compromise of 1950 was effectively their death-knell. By 1951, Houphouët's new alignment had begun to bear fruit. The port of Abidjan was inaugurated in February 1951. Shortly after, Governor Péchoux was transferred out the Côte, along with many of the colonial officials who had been anti-PDCI (Woronoff 1972:43). In addition, Houphouët, who was reelected to French Parliament, soon announced the RDA's affiliation with the ruling French party, *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* (UDSR). Houphouët subsequently served as a member of several French cabinets.

However, at the same time that Houphouët's close affinity with the metropolitan government was pacifying his regional opponents, it was engendering a schism within the PDCI-RDA. This time opposition emerged from the urban left. During the anti-colonial fight, labor union leaders had supplanted the planter-elite in the governing bodies of the RDA and the PDCI. But Houphouët's *repli-tactique,* based upon an open partnership with colonial power, put the party at odds with its urban base. Before this, workers' unions were central to the PDCI-RDA and many union leaders were among the most eminent members of the its political bureau.

The most important of the unions that had joined forces with the SAA to create the PDCI were two: *le Comité d'études franco-africains* (CEFA) and of the *Groupe d'Études Communists* (GEC) (Amondji 1986:41). Indeed, excluding Houphouët and Ouezzin Coulibaly, from 1946 to 1950 none the founders of the SAA played important roles in the leadership of the PDCI. On the other hand, the influence of activists from the GEC and CEFA and other syndicates were key. Their members were also the core of the constituent congress of the RDA (Amondji 1986, 41). Four of the first eighteen-member board of the PDCI came from Abidjan office of CEFACI: Jean Delafosse, Germain Coffi Gadeau and Fily Sissoko (Loucou 1992:44:47). In like manner, the GEC was the training ground for many who were to become top leaders of the PDCI-RDA, including, Germain Coffi Gadeau, J.B. Mockey, Albert Paraiso and Ekra Mathieu (Loucou

1992:45).[105] In the urban areas, union leaders were also among the most often elected of the party's candidates. "In fact, only about one-third of the party's estimated 80,000 members and supporters in 1946 belonged to the SAA; the remainder were affiliated to the party through the auspices of the other groups" (Zolberg 1964:76).

There now developed a cleavage between the intellectual hard-line Marxist unionists from the GEC and the CGT and the moderate and reformers that supported Houphouët (Loucou 1992:49). The urban union leaders were outraged by what they saw as Houphouët-Boigny's traitorous abandonment of the anti-colonial struggle and his complicity with administration. The leader of the powerful Railway Workers' Union in Cote d'Ivoire, Gabriel d'Arboussier, published two open letters, vehemently attacking the RDA's political break with the communists. His followers including Sery Kore, Coffi Gadeau and Jean-Baptiste Mockey rallied behind him.

In response, Houphouët's supporters, Ouezzin Coulibaly, Mamdou Coulibaly and Auguste Denise organized a campaign to explain the RDA's decision to PDCI branches around the territory. Despite these efforts and the organization of a rally on the 22nd of January, 1952, internal opposition persisted. When d'Arboussier was expelled from the territory, Jean-Baptiste Mockey took up the struggle. Mockey was the leader of the radical wing of the PDCI in 1948. He was greatly respected and his prestige had increased after for being one of the PDCI-RDA 'martyrs' imprisoned during the 'time of troubles.' With Mockey's leadership, several secretaries of the PDCI sub-sections began to demand that there be a re-examination of the foundations of the party (Loucou 1992:97-99).

Thus Houphouët was facing circumstances similar to those Nkrumah had in 1951, when trade unionists and student radicals criticized his rate of reform. But where Nkrumah chose to expel all those that opposed his policies, Houphouët did the opposite. In August 1952, Houphouët personally met with the leaders of the leftist opposition. After days of deliberation and despite Houphouët 's handicap in suffering from an illness, the two parties came to an agreement. On August 21st, Mockey and six of his followers published a communiqué in the August issue of *Afrique noir* proclaiming their fidelity to the party and its president. That same day, Mockey distanced himself from d'Arboussier with an official letter (Loucou 1992:99). From then on, Mockey was one of Houphouët's foremost lieutenants. In 1957, Mockey was made Minster of the Interior in the Conseil de Governement de la Loi-cadre and was subsequently appointed Vice-Prime Minister and then Minister of the Interior in Houphouët's first government (Amondji 1986:32).

But the cooptation of Mockey and his six affiliates did not bring the matter to a close. There were still several urban and intellectual groups that were angered by Houphouët's capitulation to France and his refusal to embrace independence. This was particularly so of Ivorians affiliated with pan-Africanist labor and student movements that had developed in French West Africa. These associations were opposed to the Loi-cadre which they considered a ploy to balkanize and weaken Africa. They supported the creation of a federation of West African states completely independent from France and were highly critical of Houphouêt-

[105] The influence of the GEC was especially strong in the syndicate movement and particularly within the most important unions of which there were four: the *Confederation Generale des Travailleurs* (CGT) – created in September 1944 and composed of seven syndicates of the private sector and three unions from the public sector, with more than 6,000 members whose principal leader, Camille Gris, would also become among the central leaders of the PDCI. the *Union of African Railway workers*, directed by Gaston Fianken and Rapheal Konan; the *Sydicat du personnel ensiegnant African de la Cote d'Ivoire*, directed by Dijbo Sounkalo, Kouassi Kouadio, Bernard Sangaret, Niangoran Eyemon; and by the *Syndicat professionnnel des medicins, veterinaires, pharmaciens et sages-femmes Africans* (SYNMEDVETPHARSA) directed by Hubert Varlet and Tanon Magoua. See Loucou 1992, pp. 45.

Boigny and his politics of collaboration.

Table 14: Coopted Urban Opposition Leaders, 1959	
Organization	*Leader*
CGT *Comité Intersyndical du Secteur Privé*	Camille Gris
Railroad Workers' Union	Gaston Fiankan
Teachers' Union	Amoah Tanoh
Student Leaders	Charles Donwahi Jean Konan Banny Amadou Koné Aoussou Koffi, Camille Alliali Alicide Kacou Augustin Djessou Loubo Joachim Bony

Between 1956 and 1958 urban unrest mounted. Several events precipitated the growing unrest. First, in November 1956, serious clashes broke out in Abidjan after the *Comité Intersyndical du Secteur Privé*, a union of private sector employees, called for an a election boycott and a three-day strike because of the inclusion of the unpopular *colons* on the UDECI's coalition slate for metropolitan elections (Woronoff 1972:81). The party leadership immediately tried to broker a peace. After protracted negotiations, the party promised to take labor's needs into account. This was made manifest when two prominent labor leaders were soon after sponsored by the PDCI to run as for territorial councilors, Gaston Fiankan and Amoah Tanoh (Amondji 1984:171). As with the radical wing of the RDA, Houphouët now managed to coopt the central leaders of the union movement.

Nevertheless, civil servants went on strike again in March. They were unhappy with the Houphouët's choice of labor representatives and with the PDCI position on the core issues of independence and Ivorianization (Zolberg 1964). External events in the region were also politicizing Ivorian workers. On January 16, 1957, the Railway Workers' Union, with chapters in several west African territories, called for the unification of all African trade unionists. Unhappy with the RDA's politics of reconciliation and its rejection of independence, they held a conference in Cotonu where they created the first African union to be independent from French Unions: the *Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire* (UGTAN). One month later, Kwame Nkrumah won independence for Ghana. This was the first successful independence movement in Africa, spurring the nationalist aspirations of many. Even in the face of all this fervor, Houphouët remained undeterred in his rejection of independence and his support of a Franco-African federal community. Soon urban intellectuals, workers and youth began to call for the purging of the RDA leadership.

The growing politicization was heightened by the fact the first wave of African intellectuals trained in France were now returning to Côte d'Ivoire. Having studied in the Parisian milieu of Marxist student movements, many were associated with the pan-African student federation, *La Fédération des étudiants d'Afrique noire en France* (FEANF) created in 1950. Yet, there was little room for these young, aspiring intellectuals in the PDCI to which they returned. When a number of young, returning intellectuals tried to establish a special party unit to address political and economic problems, their efforts were thwarted by the less-educated, older elite who saw them as a threat. They thus began to form 'cultural' and professional

organizations to further their own interests and agenda (Zolberg 1964:207). [106]

Houphouët was not unmindful of this potential threat. The returning intellectuals became "the object of special attention" (Diarra 1997:57). He was successful in coopting some of the more moderate students: Ernest Boka entered the office of the governor of the territory in Lamy. Usher Assouan and Henri Konan Bédié sequentially held the position of undersecretary of the *Caisse de Compensation and Prestations Sociales* (Diarra 1997:57). Houphouët also tried to appease the more radical student leaders, such as Charles Donwahi, who had strong ties to the student unions and had also helped found the *Cercle Culturel et Folklorique de la Côte d'Ivoire (*CCFCI), a 'cultural' organization that was active in organizing the southern educated elite. Donwahi was designated in 1955-1956 to take part in the Cote d'Ivoire delegation sent to Indochina. Another radical student leader, Camille Adam, was nominated as a judge in Grand Lahou and a third, Gabriel Kouadio Tiacoh, was given credit to open a private clinic in Bouaké (Diarra 1997:58). Despite these efforts, the returning students joined forces in July 1956 to form the more powerful *Union Generale des Étudiants de Côte d'Ivoire* (UGECI). They were to become key players in this new coalition movement developing against Houphouët's conciliatory politics.

The final catalyst for the left came with the referendum vote held in September 1958 over the continuation of the Community of the French Union. In response, the FEANF and UGTAN began to call for immediate independence. Houphouët campaigned vigorously for a vote of "Yes" to sustain the French Union "and called upon his countrymen to reject "nominal independence" (Woronoff 1972:46). His leftist counterpart, Sékou Touré, the leader of the UGTAN (soon to be head of state of Guinea) proclaimed "we prefer poverty with liberty to riches with slavery," and delivered a fervent speech, in which he declared: "We do not renounce, we will never renounce our right to independence" (Woronoff 1972:45-46). The aopogee of urban discontent was reached on September 28th 1958, during the celebration of the 'Yes' vote for the continuation of the Franco-African Community, when a bomb exploded in Abidjan (Diarra 1997:49). This was the only successful bombing in Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët.

Despite the ultimate success of the 'Yes' vote for the Community, the PDCI's position led to a parting of the ways between the PDCI-RDA and the Ivorian section of the UGTAN, *Union de Travailleurs de Côte d'Ivoire* (UTCI). Gradually, the UTCI followed its parent body's broader demands for trade union rights and independence. Problems with the unions were further fueled by the fact that the economy was worsening. Several strikes were held during the course of 1958 (Woronoff 1972: 88).

The failure of the PDCI to address the mounting resentment and anger led to tragedy in October 1958. A xenophobic association based in Abidjan was established by two disgruntled returning students from Paris, Christian Groghuet and Paul Pépé, the "*Ligue des Originaires de la Cote d'Ivoire*" (LOCI). The LOCI channeled the anger of unemployed workers, returning students and Ivorian youth against foreign African residents, especially those from Togo and Dahomey (Benin) and Nigeria (Yoruba). These 'foreigners', formed the better-educated classes in the French West African Territories, had monopolized the civil service and administrative jobs

[106] One of the first of such groups established was the *Cercle Culturel et Folklorique de la Côte d'Ivoire (*CCFCI). Several of the young, predominately southern, educated elite joined including Charles Donwahi and Djessou-Loubo who also had strong ties to the more radical student groups. In addition, Kacou Aoulou was a member of the executive committee and J.B. Mockey attended meetings. Other important associations, such as the *Africain d'Etudes et de Recherches Economiques et Sociales* and the *Association des Ingenieurs et Techniciens Africains*. See Zolberg 1964:206 -209.

in Côte d'Ivoire since the colonial period. On the night of October 24, "the hunt of the Daho-Togolese transformed the Treichville neighborhood into a field of battle" (Diarra 1997:55). Home-made bombs exploded, homes and shops were raided and refugees fled to the old port of Abidjan (Notes of the Month 1961:517). By October 26th, there were a reported 20,000 victims (Diarra 1997:55).

Eventually, calm was restored and Houphouët made a hasty return from Paris to Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët's response was, as always, to try to find a means to curb the influence of these returning students by coopting them. According to Diarra, upon his return Houphouët met with the imprisoned leaders of the LOCI and told them:

> "I understand very well your frustrations and your revolt; they are legitimate….But in my position, I cannot declare this publicly…there is a serious problem with the social and political incorporation of the youth in our country. This is why, I am going to create a youth movement of the PDCI, of which the role will be to make known the concerns of the youth. It will be your movement."[Diarra 1997:65]

True to these words, soon after Houphouët established a youth wing of the PDCI-RDA, the *Jeunesse-RDA de la Côte d'Ivoire* (JRDACI). Its first Congress was held from March 14th to March 16th 1959. Though the students began by demanding autonomy, eventually a compromise was reached and the JRDACI became a parallel body within the PDCI (Woronoff 1972:90).

By the end of the conference, the domestication of the student movement was effectively achieved. Houphouët had been able to steer the choice of directors of the JRDACI and to bifurcate its leadership. Amadou Koné and Ahoussou Koffi were to both be secretary-generals while M'Bahia Ble and Issa Bamba were both secretaries for international relations. In addition, Jean Konan Banny, Amadou Thiam and Amon Tanoh Lambert were given positions on the executive committee. This meant that the more radical factions of the youth organizations, the LOCI and the UJCI-UGTAN, were not represented in the JRDACI leadership (Diarra 1997:66).[107] The final move was made one week later, when the PDCI held its own Congress. Houphouët-Boigny then appointed three members of the executive committee of the JRDACI to the political bureau of the PDCI: Amadou Koné, Aoussou Koffi and Issa Bamba (Diarra 1997:70). Other prominent student leaders were also coopted into the PDCI, including Aoussou Koffi, Camille Alliali, Alicide Kacou, Augustin Djessou Loubo, Joachim Bony, Charles Donwahi and Jean Konan Banny (Diarra 1997:59). Later, Amon Tonah and Charles Donwahi would be made consecutive Ministers of Education.

With the students temporarily contained, Houphouët still had to contend with the workers' unions. Over the first half of 1959, Houphouët had tried to force the unions to disaffiliate from UGTAN. But worker disaffection with Houphouët's policies only increased. In October 1959, Yao N'Go Blaise, Secretary General of *l'Union Generale des Travilleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN) was arrested and banished to Guinea. Following his arrest, workers from the public sector held a general strike in his support. The army responded immediately: many were arrested including almost all of the union leaders, 230 civil servants were fired and 319 were suspended (Dagbo 2002:47; Woronoff 1972:88). The strike collapsed within a week.

Therefore, as with Houphouët's regional opposition, by 1959 most of the radical leftist

[107] The LOCI faction was represented by Christian Groghuet and Paul Pépé, and *the Union de la Jeunesse de Cote d'Ivoire-Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noi*r (UJCI-UGTAN) was led by Blaise Yao N'Go. The latter was later expelled to Guinea . See Diarra 1997:66.

leaders had been incorporated into the new government. Camille Gris, the leader of the UL-CGT resisted the longest but finally succumbed. Gris had been a founding member of the *Confederation Generale des Travailleurs* (CGT); with more than 6,000 members it was created in September 1944 and composed of seven syndicates of the private sector and three unions from the public sector. He was nevertheless finally brought on board by Houphouët in 1959 when he was given a Ministerial position (Amondji 1986:71; Loucou 1992:118-119). Other union activists were also given political satisfaction. Gaston Fiankan, Secretary-General of the union of railway workers, became Minister of Work and Lambert Amon Tonah was appointed Minister of Education.

On August 7, 1960, the Ivory Coast became an independent state. Remarkably, out of the fourteen Ministers in Houphouët's first government, six had formerly been in open opposition to Houphouët. By 1961, the number had risen to seven. Three who had been bitter regional opponents were in the cabinet: the principal leaders of the *Parti Progressiste*, Kacou Aoulou and Alphonse Boni from the southeast and Tidiane Dem from the North. Kacou Aoulou was named Minister of Construction and Urbanism; Tidiane Dem, the Minister of Animal Husbandry; and Alphonse Boni, Minister of Justice. The cabinet also included former leaders of the leftist opposition: Charles Donwahi was made Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives; Joachim Bony, Minister of National Education; Amadou Koné, Minister of Public Health and Population; Jean Banny, Minister of Defence and the Civil Service; Alcide Kacou, Minister of Public Works, Transportation, Post and Telecommunications; and Camille Gris, Minister of Work and Social Affairs.[108] Several others were made members of the Assembly, including the Bété leader from Gagnoa, Dignan Bailly. Djaument Etienne, the leader of the BDE was named ambassador in Lagos. Jean-Baptiste Mockey represented the Counsel of Entente in Tel-Aviv.

Thus, between 1951 and 1959, while Nkrumah progressively fragmented his party, turning stalwart supporters into virulent opposition leaders and alienating most of the conservatives in the country, Houphouët cajoled or forced nearly every opposition leader to join him in his party-government. There were several reasons for Houphouët's initial success. First, there was Houphouët's strategic calculus. Not only was he able to accommodate people of divergent backgrounds, but he also understood that it was safer to keep the enemy nearby than to alienate him. Never incensed by disloyalty, Houphouët understood how to capitalize on mutual interests and minimize conflicts. Mamadou Coulibaly later admitted that Houphouët's appeal for union had been a tactical move to disorganize his adversaries (Zolberg 1964:152). In addition, throughout the period, the PDCI maintained and strengthened its rural network. This helped them achieve their repeatedly high majority votes even in the face of difficult intimidation and after rumors had been spread that the party was disintegrating (Vingaud 1956:572, 580).

Another reason for Houphouët's victory was his own personal achievements. One of the first Baoulé to reach the apex of the educational system, he had status among the educated strata. But unlike Binzème, Boni, Bailly and a handful of others who had studied abroad, he had not removed himself from the mainstream of Ivorian life. In addition, he was a Canton Chief. This gave him the "double quality of being a man of letters and of being a chief which permitted him to be accepted by the new elite, as well as by traditional elites" (Loucou:1992:41). Houphouët was also a master of developing cross-ethnic ties. In his role as *Médecin*, he had been posted in many different regions and had gained the trust of people from different ethnic groups. By taking the lead in organizing the *Association des Chefs Coutimiers* he had further extended his influence among traditional leaders outside his own ethnic groups (Zolberg 1964:73). With this

[108] "Le Ministere, 1961," *Fraternité Matin*, 6 Janvier 1961, No. 89, pp. 1.

background, Houphouët's assent had begun in the first three years of his presidency of the SAA, when "he established the syndicate in all of the regions and catalyzed the revolt of all the people against the colonial regime" (Loucou 1992:41).

Even in his personal life, he was a 'master of ethnic calculus'. His first marriage strategically linked him to both the royal Agni lineage through his wife's mother's line and the Senegalese 'citizen' community through her father. In addition, "at the time of his emergence as leader of the SAA, he was one of the richest African farmers in the entire country" and had the "personal means to finance a political campaign" (Zolberg 1964:73-74). As Houphouët himself explained:

> "I was not an African businessman, I did not come from a royal Baoulé family. My family was only a small vassal of the king. It was because of the diverse functions that I have occupied that, at the moment when the *syndicat agricole Africain* was created, it was to me that people turned to preside over it. I was in some ways the union between different social circles." [Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965:12]

In addition, Houphouët built his party to be a unique amalgam of heterogeneous elements. As Stryker puts it, at the local level the PDCI "was a highly flexible organizational weapon" (Stryker 1971:87). This was because, "The PDCI emerged as an organization for the masses rather than as a mass organization" (Zolberg 1964:185). The members were remarkably disparate, including normally antagonistic elements such as wealthy planter-chiefs and leftist young men.[109] At the territorial level, there was little or no structural congruence between local and national party arenas. In many areas, the PDCI was little more than a clan or faction of an ethnic group (Stryker 1971:88). As Zolberg explains, "No attempts were made to integrate chiefs and young men, or Bété and Dioula, at the local level" (Zolberg 1964:76-77). Part of the reason for this fluid party structure was it had been born from expediency. For the early elections, the ethnic associations in the cities were the most efficient means to mobilize votes. PDCI militants transformed existing associations into party subcommittees and even began to create ethnic associations where they had not existed before, knowing that through these ethnic associations they would be able to penetrate the villages and establish themselves more widely. As a result, the party was constructed as a sort of 'federation of tribes', with the territorial *sous-section* acting as an indirect 'caucus' of villages and towns, rather than part of a structured hierarchy. This set-up was facilitated by the fact that, "the PDCI was not intended to be a vanguard organization with restricted membership, but rather an all-encompassing mass organization" (Zolberg 1964:114, 116). This party structure was reinforced overtime. In the end, Houphouët's ability to keep disparate groups under one umbrella was central to his success. And this was achieved because he never demanded that local loyalties be supplanted. Rather, he focused on creating and maintaining effective coalitions.

Finally, Houphouët benefitted from the fact that his opposition was not naturally rural. Though Canton chiefs opposed him, they were only seen as legitimate in a few areas where

[109] Among the 34 participants at the Constituent Congress of the PDCI were:22 Ivorians, 3 Senegalese, 2 French, 2 Lebanese, 2 Dahomeyans, 2 Sudanese and one Voltaique. In terms of the professions, there were 13 civil servants – (almost all copyist clerks); six railway workers; three doctors; one industrialist; one businessman; one accountant; one instructor; one farmer; one court clerk; one pharmacy employee; one mechanic; and one driver. See Loucou 1992, pp. 46 footnote 59.

actual kings or traditional leaders had been appointed to the position. The majority of the Canton chiefs, however, were appointed from non-royal classes and were hated by the populations for enabling the colonial regime's extractive practices. Additionally, Houphouët's political agenda supported rural areas across classes. More than the urban intellectuals, Houphouët's interests aligned with the large planters and cocoa farmers. Above all, his focus on ending forced labor helped him win the support of rich and poor Ivorians alike.

The State's Repressive Power

Houphouët used draconian tactics similar to those Nkrumah implemented to consolidate state power. But unlike the *Osagyefo*, whose repressive apparatus was primarily targeted against powerful chiefs and tradition, Houphouët's first period of state consolidation was focused on containing urban interests. The process began with the suppression of labor and student unions in 1959, reached its apotheosis with a series of purges that occurred between 1963 and 1964 and culminated with mass arrests of union and student protesters at the end of the decade.

In 1959, Houphouët, concerned with controlling labor union activists, instituted restrictive laws that gave the regime greater authoritarian control. In August, the government added a series of extremely repressive articles to the penal code. Article 1 stipulated that anyone found guilty of actions deemed to compromise public security or 'throw discredit on political institutions' could be imprisoned for up to five years, made to pay a fine of up to 2,500,000 francs and have their movements restricted for more than five years. Article 2 made it illegal to subsidize any 'subversive' activities and Article 4 made it illegal for anyone to publish, diffuse, divulge or reproduce false or misleading information about the government. "These measures permitted the government to put into effect without delay…the arrest of student leaders and the banishment of union activists notably after the strike of civil servants of October 1959" (Loucou 1992:120).

The process of subduing urban agitators continued with the further domestication of the student unions. Though several student leaders had been successfully coopted by the time of independence, there was still a significant faction among the leftist youth who disapproved of the bourgeois, capitalist policies of Houphouët's government (Woronoff 1972:91). Additionally, as a result of Houphouët's repressive reaction to the UGEECI congress, the student union leadership had fallen to the most radical elements within the student movement. To finally contain the radicals, in January 1960 the government began to cut off financial support to the student unions. One month later, the government created a new student association, the *Union Nationale des Étudiants et des Éleves de Côte d'Ivoire* (UNECI).[110] From then on, the UNEECI alone received access to government hostels and funds (Woronoff 1972: 91). By April 1962, the JRDACI was practically forbidden to hold public activities and its acronym was no longer mentioned in any radio or press communiqué (Amondji 1984:182).

But the real offensive came a year later, when the government embarked on a series of purges within the party and government. The primary targets were PDCI elements associated with student and labor movements that opposed Houphouët's policies. The purges were essentially aimed at the intellectual elite who had opposed Houphouët's politics of 'repli-tactique' (Loucou 1992:139; Amondji 1984:186). From 1963 to 1964 several ministers and members of the JRDACI were arrested.

Though the genesis of these purges remains unclear, what is striking is that they were

[110] *Fraternité Matin*, 26th February 1960; See also Cohen 1974, pp. 78.

launched one day after the assassination of the Togolese President Olympio. Just as significantly, the first mass pardons for those who were incarcerated in 1963 occurred a few months after Nkrumah's ouster from power in 1966.

It would appear that, however trumped up the charges were in these years of 'complots', they were related to the clandestine fight between Nkrumah and Houphouët. Relations between the two major independence leaders began to cool in 1957. Nkrumah had allied himself with Sékou Touré who was advocating full independence for French West Africa. Nkrumah even publicly accused Houphouët of being the victim of French neo-colonial machinations (Shepard 1963:36). Tensions increased between the two leaders as a result of the Sanwi Rebellion. The Sanwi's straddle the Ghana-Ivory Coast border. After the crackdown and arrests of their leaders, several hundred left Côte d'Ivoire and established a government in exile on the border in Ghana. Soon after, a number of dissident Ghanaians from the Western region fled into the Ivory Coast. Though "refugees from both sides were well received by the other" (George Shepherd 1963:36), they were particularly welcomed in Ghana. Nkrumah was an Nzima, a group closely related to the Sanwi Agni. He was not only receptive of the Sanwi rebels, but publicly supported their aspirations to join with Ghana. By 1962, events had taken a more menacing form. In June of that year, Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs organized a conference of 'freedom fighters' from around the continent (Thompson 1969:222). This was seen by many as a means to give succor to subversive elements in neighboring states. Houphouët and other leaders "grew alarmed at [Nkrumah's] willingness to use subversion and communist aid in pursuit of his ambition" (Mahoney 1983:158). A few months later, in August of 1962, a grenade was tossed at Nkrumah in Kulungu. Thus, by the end of 1962, fears had undoubtedly heated up on both sides. [111]

Whatever the real reasons for the accusations of conspiracy launched in 1963 and 1964, the administration clearly was seeking to eliminate any elements that might be susceptible to the influence of external communist forces. According to the official story, in mid-1962 Yacé and other party officials became privy to a plot "being worked out by a group of 'Young Turks'" who planned, with the support of some ethnic opponents of the regime and military officers sympathetic to their cause "to surround the President and other leaders at one of the councils he held at his home in Yamoussoukro" (Woronoff 1972:91). The 'plot' was imputed to Amadou Koné, the former JRDACI leader. The most prominent members of those arrested were the Ministers that Houphouët had coopted from the student unions in 1959: Amadou Koné (Health), Joachim Bony (Education), Charles Donwahi (Agriculture). Eventually, one-third of the members of the political bureau of the PDCI was arrested and thrown into prison (Amondji 184:1984). A newly established Security Court, presided over by J.B. Mockey, met from the 5th to the 9th of April 1963. "126 people accused of conspiracy and imprisoned in Yamoussoukro. 40 people were dismissed for lack of evidence, 22 were acquitted and 64 were condemned" (Loucou 1992:139).

The purges did not end with the January arrests. A second series of purges were made in 1964. Again the government claimed it had discovered a conspiracy against the regime. It was charged that this second conspiracy had been hatched during Houphouët's absence from April to August 1963 (Loucou 1992: 139-140). This time, Jean-Batiste Mockey was charged with being the architect of the plot. The head of the Security Court was now arrested. Soon after, Ernest Boka, who had been forced to resign from the Supreme Court in February 1963 after protesting

[111] Both Amondji and Loucou also underscore the relationship between the timing of the arrests and the assassination of Olympio, though take this fact as a strong indication that the plots were engineered by France. See Loucou 140; Amondji 189.

the unlawfulness of the January arrests, was also arrested. More than ninety accused were brought before the Security Court in December 1964. In the end, twenty-seven were condemned; six received death sentences, two life sentences and nineteen sentences of hard labor (Dagbo 2002:48). As with the previous trials, the executions were stayed (Lamb 1988:128).

According to Diarra several of the accused in the second round of purges had strong links to the French Masons, the preponderance of whom were southeastern intellectuals. Two men in particular were targeted: Kacou Aoulou, Houphouët's longtime foe from the southeast and J.B. Mockey, his Minister of the Interior. Mockey, an Nzima like Nkrumah, was first stripped of his titles and forced to resign in July 1959, two months after the Sanwi arrests (Dagbo 2002:47).[112] He was charged with having placed in Houphouët's home in Yamoussoukro the severed head of a black cat with a cow's horn clutched in its jaws as a *fetish* to bring about Houphouët's death. Mockey was reinstated by independence, but as Houphouët's fear of Nkrumah mounted, Mockey was once again arrested in 1964. Diarra claims that Houphouët "had seen in the Masonic fraternity between Aoulou and Mockey an 'unnatural alliance' established against him, on behalf of a necessary reorganization of the N'Zima and Agni in Cote d'Ivoire, activated by N'Krumah" (Diarra 1992:77). It was also noted by contemporaries that the second round of purges enabled the regime to PDCI leaders, such as Mockey and Boka, who might have agitated to have the first group of prisoners removed (Amondji 1984:187).

The arrest of Boka led to one of the more chilling incidents in Houphouët's rein. The former Supreme Court Justice was found dead in his prison cell on April 6th 1964. According to some, Boka's death was the unintentional result of injuries inflicted by over-zealous guards (Toungara 1990:31). The official report stated that Boka had committed suicide – Houphouët himself read Boka's suicide letter to the nation – but most of the population did not find the official story credible. Even the Catholic Archbishop, Houphouët's own faith, publicly refuted the official version (Loucou 1992:140). This was one of the low points of Houphouët's career, though "Houphouët's personal charisma, in addition to his past achievements - notably the ending of forced labour and French oppression - guaranteed little loss of popular support through this period of internal dissension, confusion and uncertainty" (Toungara 1990:31). At the same time, the death of Boka had sent a clear message and may have helped secure the regime against further incidents.

Just as Nkrumah used the Analyo bombings to introduce repressive laws, so did Houphouët after the discovery of these alleged plots. On January 17th, 1963, a law was passed that enabled the government to remove agitators from urban centers. "*L'utilisation des Personnes"* legally allowed the government to assign a new residence or job to any persons whose actions could be deemed 'prejudicial to the economic and social promotion of the nation' (*Journal Officiel*, January 17, Loi no. 63-4). At the same time, students were placed under increasing surveillance (Cohen 1974:78). By 1964, the student union headquarters had been moved to Abidjan, the UGEECI had been banned by decree and only UNEECI students were able to find work in public or private sector (Woronoff 1972:96).

Houphouët, like Nkrumah, also decided to take greater control of the military. In 1963, he instituted by decree a new Ministry of the Armed Forces, Youth and National Service, headed by M'Bahia Ble Kouadio from his Intelligence services. The following month, a General Secretariat for Defense was created which was put under the direct control of the President. "From that moment forth, the management of national defense and security became the business of a

[112] It was also four months after Mockey had won the party leadership at the PDCI convention in March 1959, only to have the election overturned. Mockey was replaced as head of the party by Philippe Yacé.

triumvirate, consisting of the President of the Republic, the Minister of the Armed Forces and of National Service and of the Defense General Secretary" (Kadet 2012:271).

At the end of the 1960s, the government's will to use the repressive apparatus it had built up was put to the test, when student agitation in France and Senegal spilled over into Côte d'Ivoire. The regime responded with extreme crackdowns. First, in January 1967, university students at Abidjan University led a strike in support of the anti-French student movement in Madagascar. The government arrested 315 people, many of whom were subsequently drafted into the army.[113] Again in May, 1969, about 150 students in Abidjan held a strike, this time to protest the administration's attempt to set up a new, centrally-controlled student organization, the *Mouvement des étudiants et élèves de Côte d'Ivoire* (MEECI). After one day, soldiers and the police occupied the university. All of the Ivorian students were arrested and all of the foreign students were expelled. The Ivorian detainees were sent to the Akouédo military camp outside Abidjan where they spent a week before being released - only after they had publicized a formal apology to the government. For two more weeks, the university was closed and all were exams canceled. When students in other towns, such as Bouaké, launched a series of supportive strikes, they were attacked by soldiers with tear gas and three hundred students were arrested (Cohen 1974:78-81; Michel Delaborde 1969:250; Wodié 2010:73).

As quick and severe as the treatment of the students was during this period, the government's response to union strikes in the summer of 1969 was an astonishing example of the capacity and willingness of the state to use extreme force to subdue urban protest. Unemployed workers in Abidjan, particularly in Treichville and Adjamé were becoming increasingly discontent. By late September, the devaluation of the franc further stoked their fears and anger. Unemployed workers' representatives from Treichville and Adjamé attempted to meet with the Minister of the Interior to press for greater "Ivorianization" of lower-level jobs, but they were rebuffed. On September 30th, they took to the streets: "groups of unemployed in all *quartiers* of the city...were running through the markets upsetting stalls in protest against mass unemployment" (Cohen 1974:105). The administration's response to the *sans-travail* demonstrations was swift and harsh. The crowd was surrounded by soldiers. 1,600 prisoners were taken away in army trucks to Akouédo military camp. The detainees were held for more than three months, after which they were sent to 'agricultural training camps' in the interior (Cohen 1974:105).

The government did make some concessions to disaffected urban elements. The following year, civil servants' salaries were raised by 10 percent and a nominal Ivorianization of the government had begun. But for the most part, the government's willingness to use force proved to be decisive. In its first decade, urban unrest therefore did not present a serious threat to the regime, despite the fact that this was where most of Houphouët's opposition crystallized. As Cohen observes, "Government response to urban protest was largely successful for the first decade of independence...the administration was able to either co-opt it by the politically profitable distribution of urban resources or to suppress it by closing off all non-violent means of expression" (Cohen 1974:94-95).

[113] Francis Wodié was among those arrested during that protest. He recounts how he was sent to Akouédo military camp and then transferred to Bouaké where he was forced to undergo five to six months of military training before finally being flown to an audience with President Houphouët who that they had been given clemency and were free - after which the ritual expressions of thanks were made for Houphouët's 'magnanimité habituelle'. See Wodié 2010:66-68.

II. The Success of '*houphouetisme*'

Unlike in Nkrumah's Ghana, where most political agitation came from the leaders of former ethnic/regional parties, under Houphouët, most political unrest was related to urban discontent: riots against foreign laborers; student protest at the university; and unemployment demonstrations. Though there were periodic local conflicts over land expropriation, with the exception of short violent incidents restricted to the prefectures of Gagnoa and Aboisso, there was relatively little ethnic politicization. Nor was Houphouët subject to frequent bombings or assassination attempts. The containment of regional discontent was arguably due to in large part to Houphouët's success in coopting rival regional elites. This was achieved through several political strategies. First, Houphouët created a politico-elite or state-bourgeoisie to sustain control over the periphery. Secondly he devised a territorial administration to further undermine ethnic politicization. Thirdly, he developed novel institutional solutions to address political and ethnic discontent. Fourthly, he was flexible to emerging situations. Lastly, when problems did emerge he did not hesitate to use extreme force.

Through these means, Houphouët's system hollowed out the possibility of the formation of competing powerbase. The most influential, educated and politicized ethnic leaders were coopted to the center. This had the dual purpose of offering power and riches to potential adversaries, at the same time that they were removed from their home constituencies. Thus, while access to patronage was determined, in part, by an individual's links to his ethnic community, he was also physically removed from his place of origin, undermining his ability to develop an independent support base, or incite discontent in the periphery. Therefore, with the most important regional elites and young intellectuals increasingly coopted, the chances of the emergence of any would-be ethnic entrepreneur was almost entirely eliminated.

Pacification of Rural Elites

The regime made a conscious effort to include representatives from all regions in the centers of power. Houphouët's government was able to incorporate potential regional competitors and control intra-elite factionalism through the proliferation of state development corporations (*societies d'état),* state enterprises, governing Councils and Ministries. For example, in 1962 concerns were raised that the North and Center West were not sufficiently represented at the highest levels of the state. It was feared that this could lead to frustrations and political agitation. To prevent any such eventuality, Houphouët "gave firm instructions in April 1962 for the promotion of these two national regions" (Diarra 1997:96). Soon after, Maurice Sery Gnoleba, from the Central West, was appointed to the post of Treasure Payer General and Mamadou Coulibaly from the North was named President of the Economic and Social Council. Again, in 1970 after the difficult period of agitation that had been felt around the country, careful consideration was given to ethnicity. Among his new ministers, Houphouët chose a popular Bété from Daloa, a leading Agni from Aboisso, two men from the forest peoples and three more from coastal groups (Cohen 1993:149).

At the same time, under the PDCI government, politics became a highly profitable activity. Party and government leaders were given valuable urban land concessions, large plantations and positions on the boards of most powerful corporations and enterprises.[114]

[114] In the 1970s, a study of the Ivorian membership on the boards of eighty-eight enterprises and economic associations found that only 129 individuals held all of the 287 seats. Deputies from the National Assembly had the

Through these means, Houphouët developed an elite political class, whose wealth and prestige were completely tied to their political fortunes and loyalty to the state (Woods 1988:109; Cohen 1974; Rapley 1993). Moreover, as a result of Houphouët's careful distribution of government and party positions, "virtually all the country's ethnic groups [were] represented in the bourgeoisie, none of them being significantly overrepresented" (Rapley 1993:121).

Cross-ethnic ties among the elite were further solidified through business partnerships and intermarriage. Large Ivorian companies typically drew their shareholders and directors from a variety of ethnic groups. At the same time, the country's most powerful families often married their sons and daughters, ensuring that families involved in a wide range of industrial concerns were related to one another. As Rapley explains,

> "The ruling capitalist cement their hold on power not only by trying to attain political office, but by linking themselves with others who do. In this way they can leave office but still keep an ear in the state or the party. More importantly, this seals the bonds that keep the class together" (Rapley 1993:109).

Thus, Houphouët-Boigny was related by marriage to several other powerful Ivorians, including Philippe Yacé, Lambert Amon Tonah, Marcel Laubhouet, Lambert Aka, Amadou Thiam, the Zinzou family and Mathieu Ekra. In turn, the Ekras, Amethiers, Niamké families were all intermarried and shared family ties with Alicide Kacou and Gabriel Dadie. Alicide Kacou was also linked to the Delafosses by marriage who were linked to the Mockey's and the Houphouët's. These men additionally shared the administration of the most powerful *societies d'état*, as well as private business concerns. In this way, Ivorian society came to be made up of interlinking webs of politico-elite, forming one large political and economic network that linked the pinnacle of economic and political power through a series of other pyramids to all the other members of the business classes (Rapley 1993:111-115).

As importantly, Houphouët was also able to incorporate young, educated technocrats who might otherwise have attempted to undermine the old bourgeoisie's political organization. In the government of 1970 and again of 1980, the cabinet was expanded to include a number of young technocrats, proudly heralded as 'new blood' in the government press. Yet, at the same time Houphouët remained faithful to his core political supporters. Almost no one was dropped from his administration once in power, though some were shifted around (Crook 1989:216). The first generation of Ivorian leaders, including the wealthy planters of the original SAA, such as Joseph Anoma, Gabriel Dadie and Alphonse Assamoi, and the first leaders of the RDA, like Germain Coffi Gadeau, Camille Gris, and Ekra Mathieu, continued to command huge amounts of power and wealth throughout Houphouët's tenure and even beyond.

Even at the local level, Houphouët created a "virtual political oligarchy" that was beholden to him (Jeffries 1972:250). The government held no local competitive elections, nor was there recruitment of new representatives for the first decade. Thus, the same individuals who had assumed prominence during the early struggles were allowed to monopolize positions of power. In addition, after the fear of the plots of 1963-1964, Houphouët tried to bolster his support in localities by making the PDCI Secretary General a paid government position. No longer dependent upon local funds, the regime could more effectively co-opt potential representatives of local interests (Cohen 1973:234).

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highest number of positions, with 70 percent of them holding two or more seats, followed by the members of the Economic and Social Council. See Rapley 1993, pp. 50, Cohen 1974, pp. 62.

Ethnic containment was furthered by the fact that this national elite became the central means for channeling funds to the rural areas (Cohen, 1974:62, Vidal, 1991, Woods 1994, Chauveau 2000). National Assembly deputies, PDCI militants and Ministers, almost all of whom resided in Abidjan, created "hometown associations" or *mutuelles. Mutuelles* were essential in attracting development projects to villages and in mobilizing communities to support them. In general, 'home-town associations' raised funds and oversaw the development of a wide array of basic services to local communities, including the construction of health clinics, hospitals, water-pumps, utility poles, roads, postal services and public meeting halls (Woods 1994:474). The greater the number of prominent elites in Abidjan, generally, the greater the success of the association.

The channeling of funds through the state via the national elite was made express government policy at the 1965 PDCI Congress, when Houphouêt instructed his party members to maintain ties to their rural communities and even made it "a necessary condition of entry into the political bureau of the party" (Woods 1994:469). As Woods explains "The President's object was to rely on urban elites under his influence to channel ethnic demands" (1994:469). Urban elites from the same village mobilized members from their native communities to join the associations in return for the promise of economic benefits (Woods 1994:469). Support for the government or any of its key figures was rewarded with the granting of public resources. For example, when the Minister of Construction and Town-Planning, Kacou Aoulou, was to choose one hundred villages for urban improvements, he reviewed a list drawn up by deputes from all over the country "in an effort to reward loyal politicians and encourage support from opposition groups" (Cohen 1974:90). Furthermore, most of these associations functioned at the sub-prefectural level. Thus, regional identities were fractured along these sub-regional lines and sub-regional demands were managed as much as possible within the institutional structure of the state. In this way, political power and patronage was used to strengthen ties between the center and the periphery.

Therefore, Cohen is partially right when he maintains that "The history of the PDCI, from its agricultural origins to an urban political base, reflects the transfer of political power from rural to urban areas" (Cohen 1974:23). However, this is also somewhat misleading. As Rapley underscores, virtually all of the country's political oligarchs, though based at one time or another in Abidjan, continued to maintain regional power bases. This was true of "the Coulibaly's in Korhogo and Boundiali, the Konés in Kouto, Leon Amon in Dimbokro, the Ekra-Ametheir-Niamke network in Bonouwa, the Houphouët-Boignys in Yamoussoukro; the list goes on" (Rapley 1993:121). The strategy was one of cooptation of potential competing elites from around the territory as a means of pacifying the rural areas. They, in turn, were given charge of resources to be dispensed to the areas connecting the periphery to the center in a series of concentric circles.

Territorial Administration

The elimination of ethnic politicization was also made possible by the fact that Houphouët allowed the PDCI-RDA machine to wither away. As Amondji argues, the rise of Houphouët "is inseparable from the degradation of the organization of the PDCI" (1986:99). This is particularly true at the regional level, which, by the 1970s, had become fragmented or non-existent and was the weakest link in the PDCI (Jeffries 1972:219). In general, Houphouët's approach to territorial control was diametrically opposite to that of Nkrumah. Where Nkrumah

allowed the administrative apparatus to shrink and weaken, replacing it with his party machine, Houphouët built up the technocratic capacity of the state and tried as much as possible to depoliticize the countryside. Even in the beginning, Houphouët chose to focus attention on economic issues and ignore questions of social and political organization (Stryker 1971:86). In this way "the emphasis on select socioeconomic issues, at the expense of efforts to restructure local public life so as to develop participant local and national communities has been an enduring feature of the Houphouët-Boigny regime" (Stryker 1971:86). Philippe Yacé encapsulated this when he described Ivorian political participation as "active acquiescence in the policies of government" (quoted in Rapley 1993:56).

Over the course of the 1960s, the party operated less and less as a distinctive territorial organization. It ceased to be a central link between localities and the capital. Nor was it used as a means for the elite to control villages or to supervise rural administration. Its primary relevance was restricted to the upper reaches of government in Abidjan, where it remained an important channel for access to the center. But as a territorial vehicle for mobilizing support for the regime or its development policies, it was simply allowed to atrophy. In its stead, the public and semi-public administration were elevated to the dominant position (Cohen 1973:234; Stryker 1971:91; Jeffries 1972:244-245).

In the early 1960s, Houphouët launched a new prefectural system, a highly centralized bureaucratic apparatus which allowed the center to penetrate its hinterland. This was achieved through the deconcentration of administrative and technical field-agents from the capital to the countryside. These agents were beholden to decision makers in Abidjan but allowed to implement technical and administrative decisions in the localities. Prefects had the power to decide about the siting and allocation of all kinds of services, from hospitals to schools, to electricity.[115] At the same time, an increasing number of para-public development corporations, or *societies d'état,* were established. They too had technocrats and field-agents at virtually every level of the administration. Without devolving power to localities – either through local statutory powers or local elections – the state was able to increase its efficiency, widen its scope and extend its influence throughout the territory (Jeffries 1972:155; Stryker 1971:92). Addressing the Party Congress in September 1965, Philippe Yacé stated unequivocally that within the territorial administration, it would not be the PDCI secretary-general but "the sub-prefect in his sub-prefecture [who] commands and leads" (Jeffries 1972:220). In this manner, Houphouët allowed his new prefectural system and *societes d'état* to "exercise enormous administrative power and appropriate much of the local political responsibility, thus retarding the development of sub-national politics and allowing only superficial participation of the rural masses in the political process "(Jeffries 1972:245).

Though *prefets* and *sous-prefets* had a lot of power, their influence was attenuated so that they were unable to develop their own independent powerbases. Houphouët generally appointed *prefets* either from 'stranger' populations, especially the Dioula, or from young men of lesser stature. The same was true for the *sous-prefet.* Stryker described how "the subprefect is always a stranger in his assigned district," as dependent upon interpreters as was his colonial predecessor and who was with respect to education and lifestyle "nearly as differentiated from the local population as the white administrator" (Stryker 1971:95). Additionally, the positions were rotated, with prefets and sous-prefets frequently transferred to address local conflicts and avoid nepotism. Without community ties, prefets and sous-prefets were made beholden on Houphouët for their political survival. This at once helped create greater fidelity of his territorial staff and

[115] Interview with three chiefs in Daloa, August 2009.

undermined established elites, further decreasing the possibility of any official being able to develop a regional or local following.

At the same time, financial control remained centralized. In the late 1960s, Stryker found that though prefets and sous-prefets were there to coordinate and supervise local administration and development, "neither official possesses sufficient resources to carry out these responsibilities" (1971:93). He described the sub prefecture as often consisting of little more than "a single clerk frequently lacking even a typewriter" (1971:93). Further limiting their fiscal control, the other arms of territorial administration, the *societies d'état* and regional agents of the Ministries, were "relatively free from the financial control of the prefectoral officers" (Jeffries 1972:159).

Chieftaincy was of critical importance at the most local level. Unlike Nkrumah, chiefs were given recognition from the beginning of the regime. Before independence, Houphouët even helped establish a chief's union, the *Syndicat des Chefs*, which became a major vehicle for the expression of chief's grievances. In the early years, the *Syndicat* was able to successfully advocate for better salary scales, more favorable recruitment and promotion, additional clerical help, guarantees of tenure and retirement pay. Although they were given no formal representation in the National Assembly, there were important chiefs elected to the *Conseils Generaux* in various regions. After independence, Houphouët even summoned the chiefs to Abidjan to reassure them that no measures would be taken to abolish the *chefferie*, though they were warned that there would be sanctions against any chief who 'attempted to hamper progress" (Zolberg 1964:288-289).

Houphouët did allow the hated institution of the canton *chefferie* to die off. At independence, they ceased to be paid servants of the state and after 1960 Canton chiefs were no longer replaced. However, Canton chiefs were not forcefully removed from office, nor were they formally attacked by the regime as were the powerful paramount chiefs in Ghana. Informally, communities sanctioned many Canton chiefs that had been supportive of the colonial administration. Activists who were *Indépendants* and *Progressistes* were ostracized and even required to pay heavy fines to the PDCI general-secretary. Almost everywhere, they were prevented from buying and selling in local markets. In Séguéla, the *Indépendants* were not allowed to be buried in the cemetery and in Man there were punitive expeditions taken against former 'traitors' of 1948-1951. Yet these actions were publicly deplored by the central government, though the regime understood that it was a way for PDCI militants to make up for the economic and political deprivations they had suffered during the 'times of trouble' (Zolberg 1964:187). One of the only regions in which Canton chiefs were subject to state sanctions was in Aboisso after the Sanwi revolt. There, the *chefferie superieure* of Aboisso was discontinued and all *chefs de canton* who had supported the king were replaced by politically reliable appointees.

Though Canton chiefs were allowed to die off, village chiefs and urban '*chefs des quartiers'* were actively recruited to local administrations. Now, however, villages were allowed to select their own leaders according to traditional rules of succession and then formally invested in the office by the prefet (Stryker 1971:94-95; Handloff & Roberts 1991:155). This symbolically invested in the local administration the legitimacy of chieftaincy. Given the difficulties of maintaining regular contact with the so many villages in a district, the *sous-prefets* became very dependent upon the village chiefs. As a result, in general, traditional authorities held positions of authority at the most local level. Village chiefs played a central role in coordinating and supervising surrounding villages and *campements* and assumed a number of important administrative functions (Jeffries 1972; Cohen 1974; Handloff & Roberts 1991:155;

Chauveau 2000:211). They dispensed justice at the most local level and mediated local disputes (Cohen 1971:243; Jeffries 1974:168). Thus, the *chef du quartier* in Yamoussoukro was responsible for overseeing the local courts and the gendarmerie, as well as public health services.[116] Jeffries describes how:

> The traditional sector of sub-national politics is centered on village life...The focal point is the village chief who has both traditional and modern political and administrative responsibility although it is usually shared with his council of elders. The differentiation of functions is often blurred with the chief as party head, administrator and the most important planter. In many cases he is also the village developer, acting as an *animateur rural* or a *chef de sector Agricole.* [Jeffries 1972 177]

As a result of these policies, chiefs and traditional councils were given a certain amount of autonomy within their own communities. In the 1970s, Jeffries found in the cluster of villages surrounding subprefecture of Niable that, "Neither the administrative structure represented by the sub-prefect nor the political structure represented by the PDCI secretary-general has as much influence as the village chief who plays both an administrative and political role, in addition to his traditional responsibilities (1974:179-180). Stryker also described how the roughly 8,600 villages below the subprefecture were "as yet untouched by any administrative presence" (Stryker 94).

For poor regions, this lack of state penetration often amounted to what might be termed 'benign neglect'. But for areas of some wealth, both chiefs and their communities were able to benefit from this autonomy. For example, when the government initiated a matching community development fund, *Les Fonds Regional d'Amangement Rural* (FRAR), traditional authorities were allowed to identify desired development projects and organize village support for it.[117] In surprising contradistinction to Nkrumah, village chiefs in the traditional cocoa growing regions of the Southeast were able to thrive, even in Abengourou. By the 1970s, while the institution of canton chiefs and the Kingship were stagnating due to 'absentee leadership', village chiefs were displaying increased viability because of their crucial involvement with the coffee-cocoa complex (Jeffries 1972:142). Their power was augmented because they were responsible for resolving disputes over land, wages and the performance of the labor force, as well as recruiting labor for the village. Thus, Jeffries found that "it is the village chief who is the catalyst in this emerging cash crop political culture. He wields considerable power largely because of his control and responsibility over the village land" (1972:191).[118]

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[116] Interview with Chief and former Deputy of Yamoussoukro, Abidjan September 2009.

[117] Ibid, also see Jeffries 184.

[118] In her study of the same region forty years later, Lauren MacClean found that chiefs had less respect and less autonomy than in Ghana. The incorporation of chiefs into the central administration had, over time, been more effective in Côte d'Ivoire. As a result chiefs were seen to have less power and prestige than in Ghana. But a central reason for this difference was the fact that the Ivorian state had been more successful at providing and directing services from the center down to localities, whereas in Ghana – particularly through the difficult period in the seventies and early eighties – the state had so withered away that local communities had been forced into being more self-sufficient. In addition, local communities were asked to make direct contributions for social services in Ghana as early as the 1970s, whereas in Côte d'Ivoire, villagers were required to pay for 'party' membership. These funds the state than allocated from the center. Another reason for this difference was that Rawlings' introduction of communal representation and participation had led to a more genuine decentralization of the state than in Côte d'Ivoire which remained 'deconcentrated' but highly directed by the center for the delivery of services and community development. See Maclean 2010.

More generally, Houphouët officially rehabilitated traditional customs. National personalities were often sent to participate in traditional ceremonies. Traditional themes were evoked as a means to settle political differences. Philippe Yacé, like Houphouët, was made chief of his native village (Cohen 1971:243). At important functions chiefs were included and given places of prominence. They were also frequently asked to perform a libation and benediction before an important proceedings, as in traditional ceremonies.[119] In return, the PDCI regime expected, and generally were given, traditional support. Many of the traditional authorities had become PDCI members during the struggle against the Canton Chiefs and colonial authorities and remained so after independence.

The strengthening of local chiefs in tandem with the weakening of regional institutions through the promotion of absenteeism allowed for a narrowing of ethnic loyalties. With these policies therefore Houphouët was able to practice a form of domestic 'divide and rule.' Thus, the separatist aspirations of the Agni in Aboisso, did not as greatly infect other Agni-dominated areas such as Abengourou or Bongounanou (Jeffries 1972:224). Similarly, the brutal repression of the Bété in Gagnoa was not seen as an attack on the Bété in Daloa. Even after the terrible massacre in Gagona in 1970, the Bété in Daloa did not side with the victims in Gagnoa.[120] Instead, with the development of the cash crop culture, "the chief focus of political concern [was] coffee and cocoa prices. All other concerns [were] secondary including Pan-Africanism and neo-colonialism, as well as the rivalry between Bété aspirations and Baoulé power" (Jeffries 1972:224).

Institutional Ingenuity

In addition to the successful co-optation of potential rivals and the effective transformation of territorial administrative apparatus, Houphouët used several concrete measures to contain ethno-regional discontent. A central strategy implemented by Houphouët in the rural areas was use of visible forms of largesse. In 1964, Houphouêt began to rotate the Ivoirian Independence Day celebration, or *fête nationale*, as a mechanism to build up peripheral support in politically sensitive areas. Every year a different city was chosen to 'host' the national celebration. In anticipation of the upcoming event, funds were poured into the regional capital for all kinds of urban renewal projects: road construction, water and sanitation improvements, electrification projects, the building of hotels and government buildings, etc. According to Cohen "The choice of the site for the Fête reflects careful political judgments, is usually a guarded secret of the President himself and is supposed to demonstrate concern in Abidjan for 'balanced national development'" (1973:239). In particularly sensitive areas, the *fête* was also an opportunity for the state to display its own repressive power. In addition to dignitaries and troops of traditional dancers, the army marched through the center of the town in full regalia, with all its weaponry.

These events were well-publicized and in many cases the development undertaken was

[119] Interview with Chief and former Deputy of Yamoussoukro, Abidjan September 2009.

[120] Interview with three major Bété chiefs in Daloa, Daloa, September 2009. The Chiefs described how Houphouët blamed the deaths of Bété from Daloa on the radicals from Gagnoa. As a result, the people in Daloa did not see this as a war against the Bété and did not want to be involved in it. In general, the chiefs described Houphouët's tactics to divide the Bété population. Thus, again in early 1992, when Laurent Gbagbo, the political opposition leader from Gagnoa, organized a march in Abidjan, Houphouët claimed that Gbagbo was responsible for the burning down of buildings in the Plateau and for creating general disorder as a means to keep the Bété divided. Also see Jeffries 1972, pp. 224.

quite extensive. In preparation for the 1968 *fête* in Abengourou, roads were paved, construction was begun on a new airport, as well as a new water tower, Post and Telecommunications station and Regional Television station. The government also built several administrative buildings, including the Office of the Prefecture, the Office of the Departmental Directorate of Agriculture, the Office of the Inspector of Departmental Work and a residence for the Head of State. The town was additionally provisioned the town with new tourist facilities, including several restaurants and a modern, air-conditioned hotel. The construction in Gagnoa two years later was just as extensive. The state built a triumphal road way, public gardens and two artificial lakes. Principal roads were asphalted and lit, secondary roads were paved, the telephone and water systems were improved. A residence was built for the president, another for the prefet and a third for the General Secretary. New amenities were constructed, such as a modern hotel with air-condition and a swimming pool and a new sports stadium named after a prominent independence leader from Gagnoa, 'Biaka Boda'. They even constructed a new neighborhood of forty houses.[121]

In most cases the renewal of the major regional city only addressed the tip of the iceberg in terms of rural development needs. Tremendous regional disparities continued to be felt between the relatively impoverished north and far west and the wealthy southern areas clustered around Abidjan. Nevertheless, the development often sparked an economic resurgence of the city (Cohen 1973:239) and these highly visible forms of largesse helped build a positive image of the state and its 'fatherly' leader.

Table 15: Fêtes nationale held outside of Abidjan		
1964	Bouaké	
1965	Korhogo	
1967	Daloa	Construction of a hotel with forty rooms; asphalt on the principal roads; repaving of secondary roads; 'adduction' of water; restoration of the municipal stadium; construction of group of villas with three rooms each; the amelioration and construction of new street lamps 1968 - Abengourou
1969	Man	a new stadium, several public buildings, the Television study, radio station, the hotel 'Les Cascades" and a telephone connection between Man and Abidjan
1970	Gagnoa	repaved roads - 700 thousand to reinforce the paved arteries that have degraded and 300,3000 for new paved roads - there will be 40 kilometers of roads paved along the 5 axes of roadways which start in Gagnoa - also a factory of SERIC is in construction in Gagnoa - Mayor also called for the reopening of the airport
1971	Bondouku	
1972	Odienné	close to 3 million invested in infrastructural projects - electrification, water, construction of homes, hotels
1975	Dimbokro	restored the old rail town formerly prosperous which had fallen into disrepair - with paved roads, a covered market, new public buildings and divers kinds of housing.
1978	Séguéla	
1979	Katiola	last *fête nationale* - a hospital was inaugurated

Sources: Côte d'Ivoire An XI - Les Relais du Developpement (Archives Abidjan: P 124/xi/7/ R7); Indépendance An - Man, 7 Aout 1969; *Indépendance An 10 - Gagnoa, 7 Aout 1970*; *Programme Officiel des Fêtes, 19eme Anniversaire de L'indépendance - Katiola,* Minister of the Interior, Abidjan Archives.

But not all of Houphouët's strategy was to use carrots. Some sticks were used as well.

[121] *Côte d'Ivoire An XI - Les Relais du Developpement*, pp. 14-15 (Archives Abidjan: P124 /xi/7/ R7).

For example, Abengourou before 1968 suffered the central government's purposeful neglect. It did not receive electrification until the mid-sixties, whereas other regional centers, like Agboville, Daloa, Gagnoa, Dimbokro, Korhogo, Adzopé and Man had all been electrified in the fifties. In fact, an electrical grid planned for Abengorou in 1955, was instead directed to Dimbokro after the representatives from Abengourou refused to join the UDECI (Jeffries 1972:139; Zolberg 1964:194). It was not until the seventies that the region was 'reintegrated' back into the political system.

A second means Houphouët utilized for keeping elites within the fold was the use of pardons. Periodic political pardons were to become a staple of Houphouët's rule. In the government press, these pardons were always trumpeted as demonstrations of the magnanimity of the Head of State. In several instances, the strategy appears to have been successful. The first pardons were issued in 1961 when all of those arrested in 1959 during the 'Sanwi Affair' were released from prison. Pardons were made again in 1962 of the majority Attie students arrested in France and extradited to Côte d'Ivoire in 1961 under suspicion of supporting the Sanwi movement.[122] The first mass pardon took place in 1966 for those held for the *complots* of 1963 and 1964. On the occasion of the 6th Independence Day celebration (and six months after Kwame Nkrumah's fall), ninety-six prisoners who had been found guilty of participating in the conspiracies were set free. The international press reported that the newly released prisoners were brought before the Head of State in the National Assembly hall, where members of the *Conseil National* of the PDCI, the deputies, as well as representatives of the women's union, the workers' union and the national student's union were present. President Houphouët-Boigny then addressed 'the stupefied prisoners':

> "Gentlemen, you are free. The party, speaking for the country, grants you its pardon, whatever faults you may have committed. From now onwards it is up to you to act in such a way that this pardon will enable you in your turn to contribute to building up the country. The Ivory Coast is not a country in which people kill each other. It is not with tomfoolery, plots and poisonings that we will arrive at the give and take which is necessary for the country's wellbeing. We thought that on the occasion of this sixth anniversary of independence and by giving you a pardon like this, you would have cause to reflect, for it is never too late to do the right thing. Gentlemen, I wish you good night and may you have God's blessing." [Philippe Scipion 1966:376].

These pronouncements were followed by 'thunderous cheers' in the Hall. One year later, on the occasion of his aunt's funeral, Houphouët declared amnesty for all those remaining political prisoners (Lamb 1988:128).

By 1970, not only had all the alleged conspirators been released, most had been given valuable land grants and/or sinecures. Several were even resuscitated politically (Michael A. Cohen 1974:45). By using the "principles of pardon, negotiation and reconciliation" (Toungara 1990:31), Houphouët was actually able to bring men who should have become his hardened enemies back into the political fold. Toungara describes how, the return to power of disgraced party dissidents, "has always been marked by a quiet determination to prove their loyalty to the PDCI and their devotion to Houphouët, as if the oath of allegiance had been renewed" (Toungara 1990:31). As late as 1978, some of the most prominent men imprisoned during the period of the

[122] *Fraternité Matin* 12 January 1962 "Apres la nouvelle mesure de clemence du Chef de l'Etat: Il n'y a plus de detenus politiques en Côte d'Ivoire" pp. 3.

'complots' were still members of the PDCI Political Bureau, among them Alphonse Boni, Alcide Kacou, Laminé Diabaté, J.B. Mockey and Jean Banny. Still others were on the Committee of Directors, such as Gaston Fiankan and Camille Gris. In addition, these men all held important positions in the government: J.B. Mockey was Minister of Health; Alphonse Boni, the President of the Supreme Court; and Vamé Doumouya, the Vice-President of the Commission of General and Constitutional Affairs. Lamine Diabaté and Étienne Tapé were appointed President and Vice-President of the Commission for Economic and Financial Affairs, respectively.[123] It also appears that when Houphouët was not confident that he could be assured 'reconciliation', he opted to post former adversaries overseas. Thus, Etienne Djaument was named Ambassador to Nigeria and the first time Mockey was brought back after charges in 1959, he was named Ambassador to Israel for two years before he was brought back into the Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture.

Houphouët's final strategy for keeping ethnic areas contained was his use of foreigners for political support and economic development. His dependence upon 'stranger' populations, like the Dioula, had begun with the anti-colonial fight. During that struggle, it was often wealthy Dioula traders that funded and transported the PDCI-RDA's operations. They became secretary-generals in many localities and later were appointed as prefets and sous-prefets throughout the territory (Zolberg 1964). In addition, Houphouët used migrant populations as a means to expand the production of cocoa. Particularly in the Central West and Southwest regions which were sparsely populated, but also in the established cocoa growing regions in the Southeast. In the early 1960s, at the Houphouët-Boigny Cinema in Daloa, in front of an assembly of people from the whole Central West Region,[124] Houphouët famously pronounced: "*la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur*" (the land belongs to those who develop) (Chauveau & Collin 2011:90). This dictum became akin to a legal proclamation. Houphouët's promotion of settler farming brought waves of migrations of Baoulé, Dioula, Burkinabe, Malians and Guineans, mostly from the Savannah regions, to settle in the fertile forest belt.

By the late 1970s, so much of the land in the Southwest had been alienated to immigrants, that local lineages no longer exercised effective control over its allocation. The net result was that indigenous groups became fragmented as migrant settlers, wholly dependent upon the regime for their livelihood and safety, began to outnumber them (Hecht 1983, Boone 2003A). Houphouët also relied upon these stranger populations to control local administrations and implement development policies. Through these various strategies, Houphouët undermined the political cohesiveness indigenes and their effectiveness at challenging the State. This helped him regulate and control regions crucial to export agriculture (Boone 1995, 2003A). Later, foreign populations were even central to his electoral success.

Houphouët's Flexibility

In general *flexibility* was a central ingredient to Houphouët's political system. If Nkrumah could be categorized as rigid and dogmatic, Houphouët was adaptable and pragmatic. There are several examples of Houphouët replacing his local PDCI militants with former opposition leaders as a means to win back the support of local populations who had become

[123] *Les Elites Ivoiriennes*, EDIAFRIC-LA Documentation Africain 1978.

[124] Interview with Daloa Chiefs, August 2009. The chiefs describe how the one man who publicly objected to Houphouët's pronouncement, Christian Groguhet - the Bété student leader who had also been the head of the xenophobic movement the LOCI – was forced out of the public meeting.

alienated by his own administrative representatives.[125] This was a move unimaginable for Nkrumah, who positioned loyal party members at every level and turned a blind eye to the effects of their behavior on local populations.

Houphouët's revamping of the local party machine began in 1965. By 1968, he had begun to introduce party elections to enable him to remove unpopular local representatives and gain the support of the most influential regional factions at the time (Jeffries 143; Cohen 1971:243). Delegations of ministers were sent to localities to oversee the elections, as well as to decorate 'ancien militants' for loyalty and past services. By 1970, in several regional capitals, such as Gagnoa, Daloa, Abengourou and Korhogo, unpopular prefets had been transferred.

This tactic is best exemplified in Korhogo. The region of Korhogo has always been political important in Côte d'Ivoire because it is the most populace in the North. During the period of liberation, Houphouët developed strong support among the local Sènoufo, with the passage of the end of forced labor. Equally important was the alliance Houphouët developed with the reigning monarch in the area, Gbon Coulibaly who "commanded almost mystical respect" among the Sènoufo and was "venerated by all the peasants and influential among Muslims of the North" (Boone 2003A:258). The alliance was first made in 1945, when Houphouët traveled to the area to seek the old patriarch's support for his new labor policies. Gbon remained supportive of Houphouët until his death in 1962. But Gbon's sons were not as easily won over. Having several wives, his sons were many and competed against one another for power. As a result, they were split in their support of Houphouët. On one side was Bema and Gon Coulibaly. Both were Canton Chiefs who had had close associations with the colonial administration and had been central figures in the campaign against the PDCI-RDA in the North. By the late 1950s, Bema and Gon were still opposing the regime, now as members of the JRDACI. On the other side was Gbon's younger son, Dramane Coulibaly, who was a member of the railroad workers union and progressive. Dramane developed alliances with the Dioula in the cities and together they became the central militants for the PDCI-RDA in the region. During the colonial struggle, it was the Dioula who used their resources to counter the power of the canton chiefs.

But after independence, the coalition that had been so effective began to fray. When Gbon Coulibaly died, Bema assumed the mantle of the head of the Coulibaly family and the position of *Chef de Canton* of Korhogo. Yet, it was Dramane who was rewarded for his loyal support of the PDCI and put in charge of the PDCI chapter of Korhogo. As a result, Dramane became the political boss of Korhogo. He used his power to dispense patronage to his allies and 'wage war' on his brother's, the canton chiefs. Overall, the PDCI administration in Korhogo undermined the established political hierarchy, replacing the traditional leaders with 'commoners' and 'outsiders'. Dioula PDCI militants were appointed village administrators throughout the region, sidelining the Sènoufo chiefly hierarchy. Dramane's central collaborator was another non-Sènoufo northerner and prominent member of the PDCI, Pierre Koblan Huberson, who Houphouët appointed the *prefet* of Korhogo. As a result, the administration

[125] In Daloa, for example, within the two-man constituency, a Dioula had been chosen to represent the migrant urban population. But by 1960, the administration heeded the native Bété population's growing discontent with this 'stranger' representative and replaced both representatives with Bété students returning from France, neither of whom had been involved in past community controversies. Houphouët then traveled to Daloa during the campaign to consecrate the two and even elected one as Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Similarly, in Bouake, the PDCI representative was replaced in 1960 by a former unsuccessful opposition candidate, Gabriel Tiacoh Djibo; in Abidjan a PDCI representative of the Ebrié was replaced by a different Ebrié leader, Pierre Gadje in 1959 (Zolberg 1964).

alienated many village elders and Sènoufo notables (Boone 2003A:261).

Houphouët tried to placate the non-PDCI side of the family by incorporating Gon into the national government. In 1959, Gon was made a deputy to the National Assembly. A few years later, during the *complot* of 1963, Gon and Bema, as members of the JRDACI, were harassed. Gon was even arrested and charged with subversive activities. Yet he was released almost immediately. Houphouët's granting of liberty to Gon was to signal to the North that the President was not interested in repressing the son of Gbon Coulibaly (Diarra 1997:127). Despite these efforts, overtime Sènoufo resentment grew against the repressive and 'alien' administration of Dramane, Huberson and their Dioula administrators. The population saw the PDCI leaders as out for their own gain and the protection of the Dioula communities. The expansion of cotton cultivation was particularly put into jeopardy. When the administration tried to introduce a new 'cotton program' in 1960, the peasants were not cooperative. Without the direction of their elders and chiefs, the peasantry was unwilling to cooperate with the alien power structure. In response, the administration resorted to various forms of coercion to try to get the compliance of the population but this backfired on them, ending with appreciably lower output. By 1964, the administration had changed its tactics and started to introduce pricing incentives and peasant support instead (Boone 2003B:264). Nevertheless, discontent on the part of the Sènoufo continued.

Houphouët understood that he needed to work through the traditional social institutions to expand commodity production in the region and was fearful that he would lose the area's support if he continued to sideline the traditional elite. At the same time, the student dissent that was developing in the capital was threatening to destabilize the north. By 1969, the North became a center of student unrest. The popular tied had moved against the local administration, making it a moment ripe for the mobilization of a larger coalition against the regime in the North. Therefore, in 1970 Houphouët took decisive action. In a radical reversal, Houphouët overturned the existing PDCI power structure in the region. Dramane Coulibaly's political machine was dismantled: all his administrators − even at the village levels − were removed from their positions. Huberson was transferred to a different prefecture and all his sub-prefets were changed as well (Boone 2003:269; Jeffries 1972). Dramane himself was imprisoned and disgraced (Lanciné Gon Coulibaly 2005). This put the local chiefs back in control of the region. As before, Houphouët attempted to keep both sides in the family in the fold though the two sides remained embattled. Dramane was never restored to his former position, but his closest adherent, Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, the youngest son of the old patriarch Gbon Coulibaly, took his place as the representative of the urban/Dioula faction in Korhogo. Lanciné was later appointed to the Conseil Economique et Sociale and made deputy mayor of Korhogo in 1981, as well as Vice-President of the National Assembly in 1984. Nonetheless, from then on Houphouët's primary allegiance was with Gon/Bema faction of the family, the Sènoufo elite closest to the peasantry. By the 1980s, the Coulibaly family was one of the wealthiest and most powerful in the country.[126]

[126] Rapley describes how: "Perhaps the one family in Côte d'Ivoire which can rival the Houphouët-Boignys in the extent of their political-economic power base is the Coulibaly... [Gbon Coulibaly's] children have gone on to acquire in at least a dozen different firms in all the subsectors of the tertiary and secondary economy, not to mention the plethora of more moderate business interests to which they lay claim. Many members of this family also hold leading positions in both the party and the state. In addition, they are related to other leading Ivorian political figures such as Bella Keita, Laurent Dona-Fologo and Sekou Diaby...Through Seydou Coulibaly, the Coulibalys are also related to Issa Diakité, prefect of the department of Bouaflé and to the family of the late Adjo Coulibaly, who was himself at one time a prefect. The family is also closely related to the Koné family, which holds both business

The political choices made in Korhogo are a clear example of the masterful way in which Houphouët understood the importance of maintaining cooperation in the peripheral areas and his willingness to change. Far from being circumscribed either by his original political base or a commitment to party, Houphouët was able to continually adapt to changing circumstances. As time progressed, Houphouët increasingly decentralized his administration. In the 1980s, he increased the number of mayoralties from 38 to 136 to give smaller towns more autonomy and introduced regional and local elections. In 1990, as the 'new wave of democracy' began to spread through the continent, Houphouët held a verisimilitude of multi-party national elections in 1990. Though never willing to release the reins of power, Houphouët understood the importance of maintaining some level of popular legitimacy and was able to devise institutional solutions to allow him to do so.

A quintessential example of Houphouët's institutional ingenuity and ability to respond to political circumstances is his introduction of the National Days of Dialogue in 1969. These were a series of direct and open meetings scheduled between the president and representatives of virtually every social and political organization in the country. The 'Days of Dialogue' were Houphouët's most successful solution to the problem of not having a viable safety-valve for popular discontent.

During the first decade of PDCI rule, most forms of political participation had been closed off. But the increasing tensions in the urban areas had impressed upon the government the need to devise some kind of political solution that would go beyond the increasing use of force. By September 1969, the political atmosphere in Côte d'Ivoire had become very tense. Increasing discontent over the economic situation, anger over the government's high level of dependence on foreign labor and capital and the growing demand for greater political participation was widespread (Cohen 1974:119-120). The government knew it had to act. Houphouët himself had said in an interview in 1966, "if the people are unhappy, their leaders are forced to become oppressors to silence them. When the leaders become too oppressive, the people are forced to revolt against them" (J.F. Médard 1982:72). The National Dialogues were designed to provide a political catharsis to the country, as well as an opportunity for the Head of State to take the 'pulse' of the nation by "listening to the grievances, unhappiness's and proposals of all social and professional classes represented by their associations" (Loucou 1992:146).

Conceived by Philippe Yacé as a new form of political action to address these destabilizing conditions, it was Houphouët's ability to dominate and direct the proceedings personally that made it such a success (Cohen 1994:120). Houphouët genuinely understood the importance of expression and that this was an opportunity for him to gain information that was otherwise difficult to ascertain. This is reflected in his explanation for the first such meeting he had agitated students: "We must listen to the young, let them express themselves freely; but they must understand when we show them realties" (Cohen 1974:117). His determination to make these meetings open fora and his capacity for personal persuasion proved to be exceedingly successful.

The President opened the first session of the National 'Days of Dialogue' on the last day of September, 1969. Originally expected to take six weeks, they ended up lasting through December as Houphouët accommodated more and more groups. All-told, thirty-three mass meetings were held. Among those scheduled were teachers, students, the executive committee of

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interests and some senior political positions; and through Kassam Coulibaly, it is tied to Sounkalo Djibo, one of the country's senior capitalists, who holds central positions of political power , Djibo, in turn, shares interests in CNA, an insurance company, with Leon Amon and in Prepal with Lamine Fadiga" (1993:114).

the trade union, employers, the Lebanese community, tenants, construction entrepreneurs, transporters, pharmacists, doctors, bookstore owners and sports clubs. Additional meetings were scheduled for women, the native community of Abidjan (the Ebrié), high-ranking government officials and the army (Cohen 1994:120). Houphouët himself set the tone for the procedures. For example, at one of his first sessions, he pronounced, "The meeting this morning must be held under the sign of frankness and confidence; total confidence of one another, absolute frankness and without any restrictions" and closed his remarks saying simply, "I am listening to you" (Cohen 1994:122). Over the course of the following months, all kinds of issues were raised, including open criticisms of the political structure, the government's foreign relations, nepotism in the public services, Baoulé domination of positions of power, the dearth of affordable public housing, the continuation of one-party rule and the slow pace of Ivorianization. Direct attacks were even made against individual ministers.

The dialogues were successful on many levels. On the most immediate level, the dialogues provided some institutional expression of discontent that the one-party system had precluded. In addition, Houphouët was able to use the fora as an opportunity to personally present the rationale behind the government's positions to each group individually. He reasserted the importance of the one-party system to political unity and stability and made it clear that Ivorianization in the public sector could not be rapidly increased. At the same time, he managed to distance himself from unpopular elements in the government and was able to use the dialogues as a way to underscore his own indispensability and legitimacy. Therefore, the dialogues greatly restored Houphouët's popularity. In 1990, an editorial described the dialogues as the essence of *houphouetisme*.[127]

Nor was this simply an exercise in faux-democracy. Though it is true that the 'Days of Dialogue' "gave [only] the illusion of direct democracy," they also "resulted in some of the most spectacular decisions" (Loucou 1992:74). The most unpopular Ministers were removed from office and replaced with a number of younger, educated technocrats. At the local level, unpopular prefets and sous-prefets were transferred, local administrations were revamped and party elections were held. New associational groups were formed that continued to have influence on government policy, including a number of home-town associations and regional development associations (Cohen 1974; Widner 1994; Woods 1994). Houphouët also carried through a number of direct promises he had made to constituent groups. A new salary-scale was introduced for civil servants and indemnities were paid to the Ebrié, the indigenous population in Abidjan which had been disadvantaged by the rapid urbanization of the area (Cohen 1974:163-4).

One of the most concrete outcomes of the dialogues was the government's increased focus on regional disparities. In response to the concerns raised in the dialogues, from March to April, 1974, the head of state and his entourage made a tour of the North, visiting multiple towns from Odienné to Dikodougou. On his tour, Houphouet-Boigny met with farmers and peasants in the least developed sub-prefectures and listened to their complaints. He also made a point to consult with the northern educated cadre, the group that had represented northern concerns during the national dialogues in 1970-71 as spokesmen for their ethnic communities. Houphouët described how the North was to be the granary of the country and that it was his intention to

[127] "la philosophie houphouetiste: le dialogue, encore le dialogue, toujours le dialogue pour entrainer le consensus. Car le consensus est le system de base de notre politique. Il est le pilier de la construction nationale. Il est l'armagure qui, sans heurt majeur, a sous-tendu jusque a present notre avancee sociale..." See "Dialogue et Consensus," *Fraternité Matin*, March 6th 1990, pp. 1.

promote all kinds of agro-industries in the region, announcing that several major developmental projects were to be launched, including large rice, sugar and cotton plants (Woods 1994). An impromptu development program, the *Programme du Nord*, was drawn up following the President's visits. The program led to the allocation of over CFAF20 billion for development schemes in the northern and central regions. Local officials and entrepreneurs were allowed to exercise greater control over the direction of the projects. In this way a higher percentage of the investment remained in the region (den Tuinder 1978:75).

The dialogues continued to be used as a political institution. They were 'decentralized', i.e. held in regions, as a way to encourage Ministers to pay greater attention to the concerns of their constituents. Several more national dialogues were held in the 1970s and the 1980s. In addition to providing a safety-valve for popular discontent, the dialogues continued to be a means for the government to rid itself of Ministers whose corruption was becoming a liability. The dialogues also provided the party-state with the means to assimilate the young and educated into their ranks, as the *jeunes cadres dynamiques* ("JCDs") (Toungara 1995:21). This further diminished the likelihood that young competing intellectuals would seek other avenues for political expression.

Thus, unlike Nkrumah who became more and more rigid, Houphouët was able to adapt to circumstances. He did a much better job of keeping abreast of popular concerns. This he mastered with the dialogues, but also in his willingness to make important administrative and institutional changes to address discontent. Moreover, he understood the importance of symbolically including constituents in the process – something the *Osagyefo* completely failed to do. The difference between Houphouët and Nkrumah is perhaps best illustrated by the way these two men dealt with the discontent of indigenous groups in the capital city. In both countries, the indigenes were deeply disadvantaged as property values escalated and each new government expropriated land in the capital for both national development and patronage purposes. In 1956, Nkrumah was sent a letter by his Gã constituents informing him of their anger over the government's neglect. In particular, they complained that no housing had been provided for them and that they had little representation in the upper strata of the party-state. But Nkrumah ignored their concerns. As a result, one of the most violent political groups emerged, the Gã Shifimo Kpee. Many of Nkrumah's would-be assassins were, at least tangentially, connected to the Gã Shifimo Kpee and the group was likely responsible for several of the bombings in Accra. In Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët had also ignored the plight of the Ebrié. But once informed of their discontents, the government paid out 361.8 million F.CFA to 916 individuals, for the expropriation of their land (Cohen 1974:150-151). As a result, Ebrié discontent was never formally organized and never presented any kind of threat to the state.

Regional failures: Aboisso and Gagnoa

Houphouët's system of regional incorporation was least successful in two areas: Aboisso and Gagnoa. It was in these two prefectures that forces of order came closest to failing. In 1969 and 1970, small rebellions were launched in both these areas, respectively. In both cases Houphouët did not hesitate to use extreme force, far more brutal than his repression of urban unrest.

Both Aboisso and Gagnoa were among the areas most adversely affected by Houphouët's policy of 'pioneer farming'. In both areas cocoa growing was introduced quite early and tensions between indigenes and migrant workers, particularly Baoulé and Dioula who had

been settled to work in the industry, had existed for a long time. But otherwise, they were quite different with respect to their pre-colonial institutions and the relative wealth and power commanded by each region before 1948. While Aboisso was a wealth region, Gagnoa was not. Nor was there a strong centralized chieftaincy in Gagnoa as there was in Aboisso. They were, however, both areas where local leaders had been most heavily targeted.

It was in Abiosso that the Sanwi King had been imprisoned and his whole *chefferie* had been replaced. The first pardons for those involved in the 'Sanwi Affair' were made in 1961. During the purges of the 1960s, suspicion immediately fell on the Agni, who still had a government in exile in Ghana. The majority of the victims accused of conspiring against the government in 1964 were the educated elite from the region, including J.B. Mockey and Kacou Aoulou. This second wave of Agni political prisoners was pardoned in 1966, after Nkrumah was toppled. Yet, the separatist movement was sparked once again in 1969, likely inspired by the events in Biafra.[128] The Sanwi king called a second time for succession and new a revolt was sparked. This time the revolt was crushed with extreme force.

Like the Sanwi, a key part of the political ill-will that formed in Gagnoa was born from the fact that several leading political members of the area had been persecuted by the administration. The opposition from Gagnoa had been quite vociferous in the early years. The worst incident occurred in the lead up to the 1956 municipal elections when violent clashes broke out between the PDCI activists and resident *Socialistes.* Several Bété *Socialistes,* including Dignan Bailly were brought before the court and found guilty of orchestrating the confrontation (Camille Alliali 2008:25; Dozon 2008:342).[129] However, it appears that the mysterious death of Biaka Boda, a populist PDCI Bété leader, had as much if not more of an impact on people of the area.[130] Biaka Boda, who was the RDA representative to the *Conseil de la Republique*, disappeared at the age of thirty-seven, in January 1950 – just at the time of Houphouët's *repli-tactique.* Many in Gagnoa believed that the PDCI had had him 'removed' because of his anti-French stance. This sense of injustice increased in 1963, when Bété leaders from the area were once again targeted. Several of those arrested in the '*complot'* of 1963 were from Gagnoa, including Dignan Bailly, Capri Djédjé, Zadi Nicodeme. According to Diarra almost all of the political and traditional leaders of the region were imprisoned (Diarra 1997:48; Dagbo 2002:48; D. Biaka 1993:67).

Though ill-will had been breeding in the area, the 1970 anti-government maneuver in

[128] See Brayton 1979, pp. 243 and "Le Sanwi revendique son traite de protectorat," *Fraternité Matin,* Mardi 3 aout 2010, pp. 5.

[129] Part of the reason the Bété in Gagnoa were so supportive of Dignan Bailly, was that he advocated for the regulation of migration and land sales in the region. Bailly was therefore seen as the one who would protect the interests of small, Bété farmers, while Houphouët was believed to be the representative of wealthy Baoulé and Dioula planters (Dozon 2008:343).

[130] Thus, for example, the man that began the anti-government rebellion in Gagnoa in 1970, Kragbé Gnagbé, began his call to action, "La proclamation aux tribus d'Éburnié" by referring to Boda: "Consider Biaka Boda, Boka Ernest and several other who died under mysterious conditions at Yamoussoukro, the cemetery of our elites and you will find that the major preoccupation of Houphouët is murder. Should this continue with impunity?" (Dagbo 2002: 63). In his study of the incident, Joseph Gadji Dagbo found in 1992, when he interviewed people in the area, that the memory of Boda, Dignan Bailly and Gnagbé were still cited as reasons for the distrust of the government. He records one interview with an old man who told him: "You know my son, you are young and you do not know the politics of President Houphouët; but I am going to tell you that he did not like the Bété and Gagnoa in particular. It all started with Biaka Boda, then he kills the small fire of Dignan Bailly. In 1970, he killed Kragbé Gnagbé, without cause; moreover, he put in place a Senegalese as the Mayor of Gagnoa" (Dagbo 2002:166).

Gagnoa was relatively circumscribed. Essentially three villages were involved.[131] The rebellion consisted of a rag-tag band of young men and peasants armed with hunting rifles and led by a recently returned student from France, Kragbé Gnagbé. Gnagbé, whose studies in France focused on politics, was determined to create an opposition political party in Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët had tried to use his regular tactic of cooptation to silence Gnagbé, offering the young man a position in the administration, but Gnagbé refused. Instead, he went into hiding in the woods, where he wrote a political manifesto, proclaiming himself Chancellor of the new state of Ébrurnie and Commander and Chief of the National Popular Army. The proclamation was tantamount to a call for the succession of the western forest region (Dagbo 2002; Dozon 1985:347).

At midnight of October 26th, 1970, Gnagbé led several dozen poorly trained men in taking over the local Gendarmerie and removing the Ivorian flag from the Police precinct and the Office of the sub-prefecture and replacing it with their own Eburnéen flag (Dagbo 2002).The next day, a fire-fight ensued with the local police and gendarmes resulting in seven casualties. Despite the relatively small size of the rebellion, the military were ordered to surround the area to put down the uprising. The ensuing carnage was completely out of scale with the threat Gnagbé and his rag-tag 'army' posed. The number of causalities has never been satisfactorily established but even the lowest estimates are quite high, with reports ranging from 1,000 to as high as 4,000.

Whatever amount of alienation existed among the Bété in Gagnoa before the massacre, it appears to have multiplied afterwards. A relative of Biaka Boda wrote of these events in the 1990s:

> "the massacres in Gagona are comparable to those perpetuated in Europe by Adolf Hitler against the Jews... the Gnagbé affair served as a pretext for Houphouët to put into execution a sort of 'final solution', a decision made to end Bété liberty. It was therefore a premeditated genocide and not accidental political repression" (D. Biaka 1993:68).

The harsh repression, thus, seems to have confirmed for at least some among the local population that Houphouët was "motivated by a visceral tribalism" and "harbored a "fierce desire to harm to the Bété at all levels, particularly the Bété from Gagnoa" (D. Biaka 1993:63). As Marshall-Fratani observes, "the "Guébié genocide," has remained fundamental in Bété collective memory" (2009:21; B. K. Kouadio 2009). Opposition to the regime remained strong in Gagnoa. In 1980, the most important opposition leader to emerge under Houphouët, Laurent Gbagbo, was from Gagnoa. His party, the *Front populaire ivoirien* (FPI) rallied the Bété throughout the 1990s.

All in all, the rebellions in both regions underscore the seriousness of Houphouët's failure to contain local elites. Houphouët's choice to use repression and force only solidified those sentiments. In a different light, however, the fact that the Sanwi rebellion was not joined by other Agni groups and that the Bété of Daloa did not identify with the extreme repression in Gagnoa, can be seen as a testament to Houphouët's success in stemming ethnic politicization.

III. Policy Implications

[131] The chiefs in Daloa recalled that Gnagbé's manifesto was disseminated but not widely read. Few in Daloa and even in Gagnoa were invested in the rebellion, though it was generally know that Gnagbé had been denied the right to form an opposition party. Interviews in Daloa, August 2009.

The 'Ivorian Miracle'

Houphouët's ability to keep regional elites and intellectuals in the fold was in large part due to his own development agenda. Houphouët's central priority was to develop the county's export sector by expanding the existing agricultural system. As Houphouët explained in 1960,

> "...it is a fact that Ivory Coast is poorer than a number of African States, such as Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria or Congo (Kinshasa), on account of the lack of mineral and hydraulic resources. This explains why Ivory Coast has had to look things in the face and has found that there is only one way out: calling upon its peasants to put forward the maximum effort in the national exploitation of its soil, which has fortunately shown itself bounteous in the extreme" [Philippe Scipion 1966:377]

PDCI official discourse situated the peasantry at the center of the government's priorities. To symbolize the importance of the peasantry, Houphouët referred to himself as "The Nation's number one peasant," (Lamb 1988:118; A. Toure 1982:232). In one of his first speeches as President, Houphouët promised to "grant particular and loving attention to the rural masses" (A. Touré 1982:233). At party congresses, in the official press and in speeches, government representatives made repeated references to "our brave and hardworking peasant population to whom we owe the general prosperity of our dear Côte d'Ivoire."[132]

In concrete terms, these objectives were pursued by encouraging foreign investment in larger plantation schemes and infrastructure, while promoting and incentivizing as many individual farmers as possible. The state's emphasis on expanding agricultural production through both traditional and industrial farming had a number of important policy implications. First, given that almost all of the country's elite were tied to agro-business concerns and/or owned large plantations, the powerful political elite shared interests with small-holder farmers. Thus a "tripartite political alliance" developed in which the Ivorian politico-elite was dependent on "the Ivorian peasantry for internal support and foreign capital for external support" (Rapley 1993:133). As a result, the marketing board was careful not to extract so much from farmers that it would threaten the country's economic or political stability. Unlike in Ghana, therefore, the peasants were never 'squeezed' so much that they were forced to retreat from cash crop production or smuggle crops over the border. As Rapley explains:

> "While skimming off immense amounts of export agricultural revenue, the Ivoirien regime has ensured that the Ivorian peasantry has been probably West Africa's most prosperous. During most of the postcolonial period, consistent increases in producer prices have given farmers the impression of a generous marketing board, even if these price increases were only marginally better than the rate of inflation. ...peasantries, when overexploited, are likely to retract from production or resort to smuggling their output...On the contrary, Ivorian peasants have continually expanded production throughout most of the postcolonial period." [1993:132-133]

In general, for the first two decades of his rule, Houphouët regularly increased producer prices, expanded extension programs and supplied farmers with an array of necessary inputs such

[132] Houphouët-Boigny, "Discours pronounce a Adzopé," 24 May, 1959, *Anthologie de Discours.* Abidjan: CEDA, 1978, pp. 281; A. Touré 236-237

as fertilizer, insecticides, disease resistant seeds and trees and machetes. Thus, from 1960 to 1975, there were only upward trends in cocoa and coffee producer prices. By the late 1970s, Ivorian farmers were receiving higher than average remuneration, averaging 50 percent of the f.o.b (den Tuinder 1978:81). Cocoa production in particular remained overwhelmingly in the hands of smallholder producers. In 1974, there were nearly 225,000 cocoa farms, one-fifth of which were around ten hectares. It was estimated that one out of five people were directly involved in cocoa farming (Gbetibouo & Delgado 1984:123). With these agriculturally favorable policies, the country's initial successes were astounding.

During Houphouët's first two decades, GDP grew on average more than 7 percent a year, with a GDP per capita only second on the continent to petrol producing countries such as Algeria, Libya and Gabon. In its first fifteen years, production of coffee and bananas almost doubled, while cocoa production increased six-fold. These production-increases greatly surpassed the government's own expectations. Where it had been projected that by 1973, 600,000 hectares of cocoa and 700,000 hectares of coffee would be under cultivation, in actuality, by 1973-74 there were 920,000 hectares of cocoa and 1,235,000 hectares of coffee (den Tuinder 1978:39). By 1977-78, Cote d'Ivoire had overtaken Ghana as world's first supplier of cocoa. The country also became the world's largest producer of coconuts and largest exporter of tinned pineapple (Rapley 1993:79, Fauré 1982).

One of the most remarkable achievements of Ivorian agriculture was the growth in food production. The annual growth rate in food crops went from 3 percent a year in 1965-70 to 4 percent in 1970-75. Increased food production was so successful that by the mid-seventies, despite increasing urbanization, the country's dependence on imports had actually dropped (den Tuinder 1978:43-44). From 1970-1975, Côte d'Ivoire was self-sufficient in rice.[133] Though prosperity was not shared equally the standard of living in Côte d'Ivoire was much higher than its neighbors. Fauré notes that despite the disparities in wealth, the general populace fared better in Côte d'Ivoire than in most of West Africa, for otherwise, "only masochism and ignorance could explain why two million non-Ivoirien Africans (25 percent of the population) come to settle in the country!" (Fauré 1982:45).

Table 16: Changes in the Value of Production (in millions of F.CFA)

	1960	*1965*	*1970*
Food Crops	36,295	43,263	48,054
Husbandry and Hunting	3,586	3,937	5,565
Industrial Agriculture and Agricultural Exports	22,357	33,262	49,063
Logging	7,253	16,709	23,500
Fishing	2,218	2,974	3,700
Total	**71,709**	**100,145**	**129,882**

Source: Deuxieme Esquisse du Plan quinquennal de Development 1971-1975 (Tableua No. 1, pp. 87), Abidjan Archives 3.33/58.

There were other aspects of Houphouët's policy choices that led to this impressive economic growth. Houphouët's commitment to pioneer farming, as a means to accelerate production, hugely contributed to the substantial increases in cocoa and coffee production from small-holder farms. To ensure its continuation, Houphouët worked hard to contain the xenophobia in the country. Despite periodic tensions he tried to keep the country focused on the prosperity that foreign labor had helped the country attain. By the 1970s, hundreds of thousands

[133] Interview Professor of Geography, November 2009, Abidjan.

of families were involved in cocoa and coffee cultivation alone (den Tuinder 1978:39). Immigrants also provided the majority of labor on large-scale plantations, like oil, coconut and palm plantations (den Tuinder 1978:43).

Houphouët's policies encouraged the employment of highly trained personnel (though many were foreign) and encouraged research and development (den Tuinder 1978:43). Even members of Houphouët's government were 68.4 percent university graduates, a large number of which were scientists (Bakary 1984:38-39). Therefore Houphouët was able to build an effective bureaucratic system, unlike Nkrumah who distrusted the educated elite and kept them out of important decision making tracks (Crook 1989). Projects were overseen by experienced technocrats and carried out by qualified personnel operating under clearly delineated objectives (den Tuinder 26). Most development projects were carried out by the para-public agencies, *Sociétiés de Développement* (SODE), under the supervision of the technical ministries. Each *sociétié* was devoted to the development of a particular product. Thus, there was SATMACI for coffee and cocoa, SODEPALM for oil and coconut, palm, SOCATCI for rubber, SODESUCRE for sugar, SODEFE for fruit and vegetables, SODERIZ for rice, CIDT for cotton and SODEPRA for livestock. In addition, three regional development agencies were established: one to oversee the resettlement of villagers displaced by the Kousou Dam project; another for the development of the Southwest and a final one for the North (den Tuinder 1978:41).

Table 17: Tri-Annual Budget 1977 - 1978 - 1979 (in Thousands of F. CFA)

	State (Budget, Subventions)			Para-public Sector			
	1976	1977	1978	1976	1977	1978	Total
Agricultural Development	**28, 340**	**26,221**	**18,956**	**40,384**	**56,550**	**56,096**	**226,547**
Mining & Industry	1,992	990	670	435	480	405	4.972
Extra-Ad Territory	2,101	235	--	674	324	--	3,334
Transportation	29,997	27,057	15,116	--	--	--	72,170
Post and Telecom.	444	420	--	5,311	7,452	6,823	20,450
Energy	2,127	3,119	1,677	20,190	23,930	25,506	76,549
Urbanization and Housing	25,469	17,332	10,067	3,295	3,279	950	60,392
Sanitation	3,419	687	144	--	--	--	4,250
FRAR	600	700	1,000	500	700	1,000	4,500
Cultural Development	11,593	5,785	1,145	2,698	2,023	14	23,258
Research	869	840	550	--	--	--	2,259
General Administration	7,507	2,651	15	--	--	--	10,173
Defense	2,563	1,149	--	--	--	--	3,712
Internal Security	120	25	--	--	--	--	145
TOTAL GENERAL	**125,120**	**97,130**	**57,265**	**89,903**	**111,430**	**104,314**	**584,162**

Source: Extraits de la Loi-programme des investissements publics 1976-1977-1978, Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, Fevrier 1976, (adopted December 26th, 1975). Abidjan Archives, 3.33/73

As a result, Houphouët avoided some the most glaring inefficiencies that developed under the Nkrumah government. For example, the siting of plants and industries was much more

rational. Consideration was made of the proximity of a proposed project to railways, or ports, or raw materials. Different poles of industry were planned in the North, Center and Southwest. Agro-industrial centers were designed as '*Grand Blocs'* with plantations, factory complexes and housing for all the personnel and laborers. The *societies* even built schools and clinics for the staff.[134] Thus, in the North there were five central zones of sugar production: Borouto Koro, Ferké I, Ferké II, Mara Badiasa, Zueoula. [135] Palm, oil and rubber plantations were situated in forest regions of Aboisso, Divo and Sassandra. Textile factories were built in Bouaké, Dimbokro and Agboville. In 1969, the government built the San Pedro Port to provide access for Western products. The development of the port was expensive but it enabled exportation of about 1 million cubic meters of logs in its first year of operation (den Tuinder 1978:189).

In addition, Houphouët was far more successful at diversifying the economy than Nkrumah. Ghana's dependence upon cocoa actually increased during Nkrumah's rein. In 1960, cocoa accounted for 59 percent of Ghana's exports. By 1967 that percentage had increased to 65 percent. During the same time-frame, Côte d'Ivoire's coffee exports decreased as a percentage of total exports from 48 percent to 38 percent in 1967 and cocoa exports declined from 22 percent of total exports to 18 percent. Because Ghana remained heavily dependent on cocoa exports, she faced serious foreign exchange shortages and suffered from negative trade imbalances. In contrast, Côte d'Ivoire by the 1970s had a balance-of-trade surplus (Due 1969: 640).

Houphouët's government also took more concrete steps to stem urban drift and promote rural settlement. Houphouët understood that it would be critical both politically and economically, in an almost wholly agrarian society, to keep the population as immersed in agriculture as possible. In the 1970s the government introduced its first campaign to encourage youth to resettle in the rural areas and take up farming. The *Programme le Retour a la Terre* were primarily addressed to the youth. In speeches during the National Days of Dialogues Houphouët implored Ivorians to go back to their villages and farm. Speeches were accompanied by media campaigns in which youth were exhorted to help increase national prosperity by returning to their family farms and cultivating. The government also introduced targeted programs. Youth were required to work on cooperatives and in return were given free fertilizer.[136] In 1973, the *Office National de Promotion Rurale* (ONPR) was created, under the joint supervision of the Ministries of Planning and Agriculture. Its objective was to design training programs aimed at motivating rural inhabitants, especially the youth (den Tuinder 1978:42).

Another way the government attempted to minimize urban drift was by slowing down the expansion of primary education. Here again, the regime's strategy was markedly different from Nkrumah's. As the writers of the 1963 report for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development remark, this choice was "a difficult undertaking in view of the strong popular support and enthusiasm for primary education."[137] The government's justification of their policy was an implicit critique of Nkrumah's populist promotion of basic education:

> "...in developing countries education policy too often proves to be an expensive and ineffective myth. Inherited or imitative of developed countries, the systems of education

[134] Interview with Professor of Geography, November 2009, Abidjan.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Interview with Professor of Urban Studies, Cocody University, Abidjan 2009.
[137] "The Economy of the Ivory Coast," International Bank For Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, Report No AF-6a, April 30, 1963, pp. 6.

> are indeed badly adapted to the possibilities and needs of economies in the process of development ...The choice made here is thus that of an education policy, which promotes resolutely selective training....It may be disappointing in comparison with education policies whose objectives are more ambitious, but unrealistic. However, this policy has the virtue of taking into account the possible without forgetting the desirable."[138]

Where primary education was intentionally limited, a great amount of resources was dedicated to higher education. In 1973, education accounted for 32.6 percent of the government's budget, which was deemed the highest portion spent on education in the world (den Tuinder 1978:75). But that figure primarily reflected the high amounts of investment the government was making in secondary and tertiary education – particularly in supporting studies abroad of engineering and the hard sciences.

Though the promotion of rural farming was not wholly successful,[139] it did help stay the rate of urban drift over the first two decades. Thus, in the late 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire had a 2 percent lower rate of urbanization than the African average (Brayton 1979:237). Altogether the country's rapid growth, and increased standard of living were due to Houphouët's choice to focus on traditional agriculture, trust in technocrats and minimize urban drift as much as possible. His rural policies therefore helped build the Ivorian miracle.

Houphouët and the Military

Houphouët's success was also reflected in his ability to keep the loyalty of his armed forces. In general, his approach to the risks of being ousted by the Ivorian military was relatively unique and grew out of his broader objectives and tactics.

Before Independence, there was no Ivorian military force to speak of. In January 1960, the security forces in Côte d'Ivoire were primarily colonial troops run by French Officers, with some indigenous African Guards. The forces, moreover, were under a dual chain of command: the Republican Guard, was placed under the Prime Minister's cabinet, while the French Gendarmeres (paramilitary police) took orders from the French military command. The new republic therefore had no autonomous defence system. Rather, the security of the state fell mainly within the jurisdiction of France, under article 78 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of France and African States. As a result, upon independence Houphouët signed several defense agreements with France (Kadet 2012:271; Welch 1987:179-180).

But Houphouët actually saw this as an advantage. Nkrumah's ideological and political positions had forced him to rapidly Africanize the army (according to Baynham against his better judgment). Particularly after problems emerged between white officers and Ghanaian and Congolese troops during Congo Crisis (Baynham 1988). Houphouët had no such commitment to independence. He had always believed the development of Côte d'Ivoire would only be possible

[138] "Deuxieme Esquisse du Plan quinquennal de Developpement 1971-1975," Abidjan: Ministere du Plan, June 1970, pp. 327. [Abidjan Archives 3.33/58].

[139] For the most part, however, these programs were not very successful. The youth did not stay long on the farms. In general, the programs did not encourage settlement beyond three years. For those with some education, the incentives were still too low to dissuade them from pursuing greater opportunities in the urban centers. In addition, some of the programs were not well managed. For example, in one of the rice program, Ministers appropriated for themselves 100 hectares of land and monopolized the threshing machines, leaving little for the youth that the program had been aimed at servicing. Anonymous interview with Professor of Urban Studies, Cocody University, Abidjan 2009.

with the close political, economic and military cooperation of France. Using French military forces would be key to insulating the government from its own military command and lowering the economic burden of the country (Brayton 1979:243).[140] In a speech made to the Ivorian public at the Géo André Stadium on September 7th 1958, Houphouët lampooned Nkrumah's rush to develop an independent military force:

> "For defense, one says to us:" look at Ghana which had a national defense separate from the British". Okay. But do you believe, my brothers, that at the hour we speak, Ghana's four battalions – which were established by cutting millions to our great friend Kwame Nkrumah – these millions that our great friend Kwame Nkrumah has engaged in one military organization are going to serve any purpose, but false prestige? With these battalions, can Kwame Nkrumah really attack a territory that he would like to? I do not believe so. With these four battalions, can Kwame Nkrumah truly defend himself against an attack coming from the exterior? No. But that is satisfactory, for one will be able to marshal these four battalions and that is good." [Houphouët-Boigny, *Anthologie des Discours, Tome 1*, 1978:203-204]

Houphouët, thus, choose to keep a significant French military presence. In 1961, he concluded a defense agreement with France that allowed for the stationing of hundreds of French marines in Port-Bouët, adjacent to the Abidjan airport. The location was chosen to enable French forces to quickly occupy the landing strips and bring in additional forces to Abidjan within a few hours if necessary. At the same time, there were as many as 111 French military advisors in the country and France continued to be the major supplier of equipment and training and even conducted periodic joint exercises with Ivorian soldiers to test the efficacy of French rapid deployment. By late 1962, Houphouët had a 5,000 man army, a 3,000 man gendarmerie and a small navy and air force (Welch 1987:181; Africa Confidential 1973:6).

Scholars of Côte d'Ivoire often attribute Houphouët's longevity and ability to maintain political security as largely due to the deterrent of France's military presence. But this, in and of itself, is not a complete explanation. As Welch points out, "such ties have not prevented other African militaries from seizing control" (Welch 1987:174). In fact, French troops were stationed at Port Bouët on the day that Bédié was ousted. Moreover, to whatever extent the French military presence was a deterrent against internal insurgencies, it did not assure Houphouët of his own safety.

That "Governmental control over the armed forces has rested not only on the "dissuasive effects" of the French presence" (Welch 1987:182) is best exemplified by the way Houphouët managed his own security threats. The first security threat emerged in 1963, at the time of the *complots.* It was then that Houphouët began to shore up his control of his security forces. As discussed above, he centralized the military command structure. He also founded a 'Baoulé' militia. The *Garde Presidentielle et Milice* (Presidential Guard and Militia), later renamed the Republican Guard, was originally a 600-man independent battalion of select troops, chosen from the president's own tribal group, which was put directly under his command. In addition, Houphouët created a 300-man party Militia to protect other government officials. As in Ghana,

[140] According to Brayton, the military expenditure per GNP and ratio of armed forces strength were among the smallest in Africa, with Côte d'Ivoire expending 1.5 percent of its GNP on military spending per capita, as compared to the African average of 3.02; and having a strength of 1.43 armed personnel forever 1,000 persons in comparison with the African average of 2.79 per thousand. See Brayton 1979, pp. 243.

the militia was at first mostly occupied with "parades and the accessorizing of the protection of the party chief." Overtime the militia and guard became a formidable weapon used for special assignments to protect the regime (Brayton 1979:243; Loucou 1992: 129).

Houphouët strengthened the Guard by dispersing the other security forces around the territory while allowing the Guard to be concentrated in the capital (Welch 1987:182). Nonetheless, Houphouët did not privilege the militia in such a way as to undercut the command structure of his armed forces. He allowed the French upper brass to continue to direct the security forces; he did not interfere with any of the established training regiments; nor did he undermine military morale by underpaying his regular forces. Therefore, the militias did not present a threat to the traditional forces as they had in Ghana.

> "Houphouët also took care not to upset the conservative values of the military establishment by insisting on its direct subordination to the PDCI - although in practice political reliability was the dominant criterion in promotion. Nkrumah openly espoused CPP dominance over the officer corps, a policy that...resulted in deep unrest among supposedly apolitical officers" (Welch 1987:182).

More importantly, after the first alleged coup in 1973, Houphouët began to restructure the military. In a brilliant stroke, Houphouët used the deconcentration of the administration as a means to coopt the military itself. The first step in this direction was taken in November 1974. Ten of the brightest young officers were assigned as *sous-prefets* throughout the territory. Houphouët explained that he did not want a 'conquering' army but rather an 'army for National development.' Accordingly, the new sous-prefets were given special uniforms with the insignia of a bee to signify their new role as productive builders of society. They were later promoted to prefets and stationed around the territory. Among the most prominent of these men was Lieutenant-Colonel Émile Constant Bombet who later became Minister of the Interior and Decentralization under Bédié. [141] The inclusion of bright, junior military officers was an effective strategy in many ways: it dispersed capable young officers, making it more difficult for them to collude; it removed them from the urban centers; and at the same time, it increased the state's capacity to monitor the periphery. As Fauré and Médard explain, "by this policy [the Ivorian government] wishes not only to introduce more discipline into the administration but also to disincline...soldiers who would risk languishing in their barracks" (Fauré & Médard 1982:137).

But Houphouët did not stop there. He also incorporated the upper brass into the National Administration and the economy. In other words, he used the same strategic approach as he had with other elites. First, in 1974, Houphouët replaced the expatriate head of the armed forces and the French commandant of the military academy at Bingerville them with Ivorian officers. A month later, he brought military officers into the cabinet for the first time, appointing the Commander of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Lamine Fadiga and the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Commander Ousenan, as Secretary for Maritime Affairs and Secretary of the Interior, respectively. Other military officers were appointed Chief Administrative Officers in the civil services, such as the Health Services and National Airlines. Military men were also placed on boards as Chief Executive Officers of public enterprises.

Through these means, the military were made part of the politico-elite class, ensuring that they would share the same privileges and outlook as the state bourgeoisie. As a result, "What

[141] Anonymous interview with one of the military men assigned as prefet under Houphouët, Abidjan 2010. Also see, *Fraternité Matin*, 10eme annee, numero 29, Mardi 5 novembre 1974, page 2.

might best be described as a convergence of views...emerged in Côte d'Ivoire" (Welch 1987:182). In late 1985, again, several senior military officers were appointed to leadership posts in the PDCI, furthering the process of co-optation that had begun in the 1970s. Houphouët also devised institutions, such as the Military Fire Fighters (1974) and Army Rural Corps of Engineers (1976), so as to foster "public spiritedness" in the military and reinforce "solidarity between the military and the Nation" (Bertin G. Kadet 2012:272; Brayton 1979:242; T.D. Robert et al, 1991:204).

Last but not least, Houphouët was careful to use ethnic quota to ensure that his army was not dominated by a single ethnic group. "By the end of 1974, a new ethnic balance had emerged among the security forces" (T.D. Roberts 1991:204). Houphouët's Minister of Defense, Mbahia Ble Kouadio was a Baoulé, but several of his senior officers were from different ethnic groups. Thus, General Ouattara Dakin was a Taguana from Katiola (North), General Guéï, a Yacuba from Biankouma (West), General Zeze Barouan, a Bété from Issia (West), General Palenfo, a Lobi from Bouna (Northeast), General Coulibaly, a Sènoufo from Korhogo (North) and Admiral Lamine Fadiga, a Mahoka from Touba (West) (B. K. Kouadio 2009:127). There was also a balance among the various arms of the security forces: Northerners controlled higher positions in the army; the Baoulé dominated the National Security Police; and southerners formed a plurality in the police and National Gendarmerie (T.D. Roberts 1991:204).

For all these reasons, Bakary in 1991, projected that a coup in Côte d'Ivoire was relatively unlikely. Even in the 1990s, the army was, for the most part, loyal to the regime. The gradual integration of the military in the political and administrative institutions, the various material benefits they received, as well as the fact that "the ethno-regional or social divisions in the army (especially the officers or NCOs) are the same as those shape society as a whole" (1991:45-46) all created a loyal force.

Houphouët's ability to keep his armed forces contained was also related to his larger success in staving off ethno-regional mobilization. This is best demonstrated by the two areas in which Houphouët's system of regional incorporation was least successful, Aboisso and Gagnoa. The suppression of the Agni in Aboisso did not spark an insurrection within the security forces. It is likely that this is because few Agni were in the armed forces and even fewer were in the officer corps. The Agni was not subject to compulsory labor as were the other tribes. Nor were they seen as 'bellicose'. Under the French, most conscripts came from the 'warrior' tribes in the North. This is attested to by Houphouët in his testimony of 1950 when he spoke derisively of the Agni:

> "I assisted as a doctor in three military recruitments. My brother Agni's, since I am of the same race...never liked military service. They paid foreigners from other regions to do their military service in their place. Very few of them were recruited...of all the former soldiers, decorated with medals to attest to their military valeur...it is very difficult to find someone in the Agni country with more than five medals. In contrast, in the Baoulé, in my proper region, you find legionnaires that gained the Legion of Honor in their battles. You find equally in many other regions: Man, Daloa, etc., those decorated with the Military Cross...In Abengourou, if you find one sergeant, it will be, I believe the maximum" [Séance du mercredi 7 juin 1950,1965:29]

Given that compulsory service in the military had for all intents and purposes ended after 1962 (with the exception of union strikers and student protestors who had been on occasion forcibly

conscripted), by the early 1970s, most of the professionals in the armed services were still from the North (Handloff 1991:192; T.D. Roberts, et al 1973:412-416; Kieffer 2000:34). Thus, anti-government mobilization of the Sanwi did not greatly impact the armed services.

The situation was different in Gagnoa. Bété officers were far more prominent in the armed service. In early 1999, 40 percent of officers and NCOs were Bété (Kieffer 2000:36). In fact, there is circumstantial evidence that Bété military officers presented a threat to the regime. First, there are several factors that suggest that the first coup attempt in Côte d'Ivoire might have been related to Bété discontent, particularly after the Gagnoa massacre. In 1973 the government discovered its first military conspiracy. A small group of captains and lieutenants had planned to assassinate the country's military and political leadership. The twelve junior officers – five captains and seven lieutenants – were all Bété or Goru from the areas surrounding Gagnoa (Chappell 1988:689; Africa Confidential, 1973 (14):6). According to the official statement, the 'ringleaders' had begun plotting against the regime in 1970, the same year the massacre took place. Several plans had been aborted between 1970 and 1973 because the planners had difficulty recruiting co-conspirators within the armed forces (Africa Dairy 1973 (13):6538, 6589-6590; Africa Confidential 1973 (14):5-6; Africa Year Book and Who's Who, 1977:478; David A. Chappell 1989:689).

In addition, according to one source, the officers confessed that their primary target was to assassinate their immediate commanders. This would appear to speak more to a desire for revenge than political conspiracy (Africa Confidential 1973 (14):5-6). The plot also seemed to be less strategic and more about revenge because the conspiracy was markedly amateurish. Official sources claimed that the plot was discovered after Captain Sio[142] admitted to ritually sacrificing five fishermen, whom he had discovered fishing illegally in Lake Koussou where he was stationed. It was said that Captain Sio had killed the fishermen to ensure the safe outcome of the coup.[143] But beyond these actions, there was little evidence of any serious strategizing. Upon searching Captain Sio's home, nothing was found beyond two lists of names: one of the intended targets – Houphouët, Yacé, the army commander General Ouattara and a whole group of colonels; the other recording the names of the members of the new government, with Captain Sio at the helm. The official report underscored that there was no evidence of any military-strategic plan – no operational plans for movements, or list of those expected to support the coup, nor was there any delineation of strategic targets. The plotters did not even have a definitive date, the plan having been put off so frequently, though there was a vague expectation that it would occur on August 7th 1974, the next Independence Day forces (Africa Dairy 1973 (13):6538, 6589-6590; Africa Confidential 1973 (14):5-6; Africa Year Book and Who's Who, 1977:478; David A. Chappell 1989:689).

There is also further evidence of a connection between the 1973 coup leaders and Kragbé Gnagbé. Francis Wodié, the socialist party leader, was introduced to Kragbé Gnagbé in 1969 in Abidjan by a mutual friend (who was from the same village as Gnagbé, Guébié, the central village involved in the Kragbé insurrection and subsequent massacre). The two men discussed the necessity of changing the political system. Wodié claims that he lost touch with Gnagbé who returned home to evaluate what would be the best means to create the desired changes and he only later learned about Gnagbé's demise. However, during that same period, 1968-1969, Wodié was also introduced to a young Lieutenant, Boni Bi Golé. At the time, Boni Bi and Wodié also

[142] Captain Sio was later to head a small battalion for Gabgo's FPI in the fight against the Northern Rebels in 2003.

[143] "Ivory Coast death sentences on officers." *The Times* (London, England), Thursday, Aug 02, 1973; pg. 7.

discussed the need to change the political system (Wodié 2010:108-111, 166). It was Lt. Boni Bi Golé who had begun to plot the conspiracy with the junior Bété officers in 1970. However, Boni ultimately gave up the project when he was unable to recruit a sufficient number of conspirators in the armed forces. He then left the country to pursue studies in France (Africa Diary, 13:6538; Africa Research Bulletin 1973:2887). Apparently these difficulties did not deter Captain Sio, who went forward with the plan to take action against the regime. Like Captain Sio, Lt. Boni was to become a strong supporter of Gbagbo in the 1990s. Interestingly, though Wodié was not a Bété, he was an Nzima born in Gagnoa.

Thus, the 'Captain Sio Affair' seems to be indicative of the fact that the Bété, unlike the Agni, did present a threat in the military, particularly after of the tragic events in Gagnoa in 1970. The potential threat of Bété officers also appears to have been monitored by the regime. When the government labeled student and university strikes of 1982 a "conspiracy of Bété teachers," Bété officers, including the then Chief of Staff, Major-General Bertin Zeze Baroan, issued a statement denouncing the strikers and asserting their support of the regime (Chapelle 1989:691). Nonetheless, five years later, the Bété General, Major-General Baroan was replaced as chief of staff by Major General Felix Ory. Baroan was promptly sent overseas to act as the Ivorian Ambassador to Brazil (Handloff 1991:187; B. K. Kouadio 2009:16).

Finally, the only other planned insurrection under Houphouët also appears to have been related to a Bété political movement. On July 30th, 1991, the Army Chief of Staff General Guëi reported to the press that "mutinous soldiers" had been caught "red-handed" planning to overthrow the President. A group of seventeen to twenty enlisted men, the highest-ranking a sergeant, were arrested for plotting a coup. Later, the FPI paper, *la Voie*, linked the coup attempt to the May army raid on the university dormitories in Yopougon, where four students were killed and several others were raped or assaulted (Grebalé 2001:18-19). The paper reported that those arrested had been eyewitnesses to the raid, insinuating either that the soldiers were arrested because they were potentially dangerous to the regime or that they had staged a revolt in response to those events.[144] The students had been targeted at Yopougon because the FPI's student organization *Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI) had been demonstrating there and both FESCI and the FPI were headquartered in Yopougon. General Guëi also made a link between the plot and the FPI. He intimated to the press that the coup was orchestrated by disaffected civilians, which was interpreted at the time to be "an oblique and desperate attempt to discredit Laurent Gbagbo."[145]

It is noteworthy therefore that the second coup attempt in Côte d'Ivoire was linked to the Bété. Moreover, aside from these events, no other military manifestation against Houphouët's government appears to have been political in nature.

Conclusion: 'Miracle' or 'Trompe-l'œil'?

By 1980, strains in the system had become evident as financial hardships began to set in. The effects of declining world prices and the global recession were compounded by the fact that the regime had committed itself to costly sugar complexes in the North.[146] On top of these

[144] Gerald Bourke, "Coup in Ivory Coast quashed," The Independent (London), July 31, 1991, pp. 9.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Houphouët's drive to push through the industry became a huge drain on the economy. The project, which was overly ambitious to begin with, was thwarted by Western sugar concerns that did not want the competition. Houphouët was denied funding by the major International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and forced to borrow from private banks with high interest rates. The project was also plagued with corruption and mismanagement. Four top

economic woes, Houphouët had developed a penchant for large prestige projects, particularly in Yamoussoukro, his natal village. The city was made the country's capital and modernized with eight-lane boulevards, three training institutes and the Houphouët-Boigny Foundation center as large as the U.S. Capitol building. The most ambitious project was Houphouët's Roman Catholic basilica, Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro. When finished, it rivaled St Peters basilica in Rome, standing 525 feet tall, with 36 massive stain glass windows and seating for 7,000 with standing room for an additional 10,000 (*LA Times*, Jan 28, 1989:36). To undertake such a massive project at a time when the general population was experiencing hardship – even if Houphouët paid for it out of his personal funds as he claimed – was, at best, politically unwise. It seems that by the 1980s, some of Houphouët's pragmatism had been lost.

More broadly, the country was plagued with a number of problems typical of developing countries. Industry was still heavily concentrated in Abidjan and the sector suffered from its high dependence upon expensive, semi-finished imports and underutilization (den Tuinder 1978:50). Most trade was still controlled by foreigners, as was the ownership of the top industrial firms (Boone 1993:72; Rapley 1993:83). Though urban drift had not been as severe as in other countries, it was still a serious issue. An increasing number of Ivorians were migrating to the urban centers. The government's various *retour a la terre* programs had generally failed. Not enough support was given to the youth exhorted to return to the fields.

However, the darkest side of Houphouët's governance was the country's growing xenophobia. Houphouët's promotion of settlement farming had left rural areas on a slow-burn. Land exhaustion was resulting in increased competition over land tenure. By 1988, foreigners accounted for nearly one fourth of the total population and had become the focus of bitter attacks (Crook 1997). Nonetheless, Houphouët remained deeply committed to the foreign population. This came to the fore during the first Presidential election in 1990, when the regime flagrantly disregarded popular opinion by allowing non-citizens to vote. This disregard is illustrated by an editorial that appeared in the special presidential election issue of *Fraternité Matin*:

> Since the eve of our independence, non-Ivoirien Africans have always participated in our national elections. This is because they have aided us since independence in the growth of our economy, they have shared in our pains and joys. It is therefore natural that these African brothers who have made this country their second homeland should participate in presidential elections this coming Sunday.[147]

Houphouët's inability to address the growing anger over the increased numbers of migrants and their position in society was to have serious consequences for the country in the following decade.

As a result of all of this, the careful machinery that Houphouët had built over three decades began to crumble. The first signs of decay came in 1980, when several strikes engulfed the country, particularly in Abidjan. Houphouët shut them down with his typical mixture of suppression, followed by some concessions. But by the end of the decade, as cocoa prices continued to fall, Houphouët could no longer sustain the spending programs that had sheltered

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ministers, including Henri Konan Bédié, the then Minister of Finance, were dismissed from the government. All of this exacerbated the debt already incurred and added to the country's steady economic decline. For more on the sugar projects see Woods...dissertation...

[147] Lambert Kouassi, Du vote des etrangers," *Fraternité Matin*, special presidential election issue, 22nd October 1990, pp. 11.

the population from the severest effects of the crisis. He was finally forced to drastically cut the price paid to coffee and cocoa producers (Rapley 1993:57). When the Minister of Finance announced that he would cut the salaries of all civil servants in accordance with the IMF's structural adjustment program, virtually every major group took to the streets, including nurses, doctors, traders, train workers, bus drivers, hospital workers, the police, the firefighters and the security forces (S. Samba Koné 1991).

Still, even in this fragile political situation, Houphouët was able to hold onto power and win an election that same year. Houphouët finally allowed for the first contested presidential election in 1990. The election reinvigorated Houphouët's position by exposing the limits of his opposition and winning him back regional elites who had defected to other parties. Though there was fraud, it was clear that Houphouët had won the majority – particularly in the rural areas which remained his stronghold (Crook 1997).

Moreover, even during this difficult period, Houphouët's military forces remained, by and large, loyal to him. Their fidelity was put to the test on several occasions. Between 1990 and 1993, there were three separate army mutinies, but none had political overtones and none led to serious problems. The mutiny in 1990 was the most spectacular. Between 500 and 1,0000 air force and army conscripts commandeered a convoy of taxis and army lorries to take over the Abidjan airport. France refused to send in its 1,000 troops stationed nearby at Port Bouët. It was Houphouët's loyal Presidential Guard that rescued the situation. Within hours they had surrounded the airport with armored cars and had taken control. The next day, Houphouët met with the mutineers to address their concerns. The soldiers' demands were simple. They were conscripts who wanted their two-year service extended out of fear of not being able to find a work in the difficult economy. After Houphouët promised to lengthen their service and doled out some money, the mutiny was over.[148] Similarly, in 1993, forty-five Corporals in the Presidential Guard mutinied in Abidjan. Houphouët promised them higher pay and the mutiny was over. A few days later, 250 of their counterparts in Yamoussoukro took over the Presidential palace demanding the same pay as that which had been promised to the Guard in Abidjan. Houphouët quickly flew to Yamoussoukro to meet with the mutineers, promised them a pay raise within reason and the whole event was over (Bayle 2007:29-30). On all three occasions, Houphouët was able to end the mutiny within a day with a promise of higher pay.

Therefore, though by 1990 Houphouët's tightly controlled system had outlived its viability, it was ultimately Houphouët's clever political calculus – his understanding of the importance of incorporating potential regional opponents, his genuine commitment to negotiation, and his prioritization of agriculture – that was central to his long-term survival.

[148] Mark Huband, "Ivory Coast leaders meets for crisis talks," UP International, May 17, 1990; Paul Webster, "Ivory Coast mutineers seize airport," *The Guardian* (London), May 17, 1990. Also from anonymous interview with former army Colonel, Abidjan, November 2011.

CHAPTER 4

JOHN JERRY RAWLINGS: HOW ENDING URBAN-BIAS REVIVED THE STATE

Conventional wisdom holds that Rawlings' success was due, in the main, to the large amounts of aid Ghana received after implementing Structural Adjustment reforms in the 1980s. For the most part, it is argued that the Rawlings' success was largely circumstantial. [149] First, his assumption to power came when international donors had a renewed interest in Africa. At the same time, the economy was in a shambles and Ghana had little means of going lower. The implementation of SAPs therefore was potentially not as difficult as in Côte d'Ivoire where there was a long history of state development and prosperity and the restructuring of the economy would likely be far more destabilizing. Furthermore, Rawlings did not have a substantial or organized political opposition (Chazan 1983). As a result of all of these factors, Rawlings had little choice but to follow the IMF and the World Bank and was able to do so.

However, there are several problems with this general narrative. As Herbst points out, "there is no clear relationship between an African country's economic condition and its willingness to undertaken reform measure" (Herbst 1993:30). In fact, Ghanaian leaders had repeatedly 'hit rock bottom' and then 'done nothing to reverse the slide'. This has been even truer of other African regimes, such as Mobutu's, which continued to follow 'counterproductive economic policies even though the experts were saying the economic situation could not get any worse'. In truth, "The economy could have become worse in Ghana and the government could have limped by" (Herbst 1993:30). Secondly, the aid Ghana received, contrary to popular perception, was not greater than that received in several other African states. Actually, Ghana's receipt of '$27.5 of aid per person [was] substantially below the $35.0 that African countries other than Nigeria averaged' (Herbst 1993:132). In addition, the larger grants of aid that Ghana did receive were not granted to it in until after the regime had gone through its most difficult and destabilizing period. If Ghana was successful because of donor funding, why haven't many other regimes had equal success?

Finally, there were more reasons for the Rawlings regime to fail rather than succeed. That is certainly what most scholars believed at the time. A staff report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of 1983 described Ghana as "a textbook example of the overwhelming challenges to political stability and economic development now facing many African states."[150] In the same vein, in 1982, Chazan saw primarily "the fragility of state power and the limitations placed on its wielders in the midst of the breakdown of the state" (Chazan 1982:483). All in all, the odds of success were decidedly not in Rawlings' favor. The argument that Rawlings had no choice but to follow the dictates of the IMF and the World Bank is, therefore, simply 'too deterministic an explanation' (Herbst1991:31).

Instead, it will be argued here that Rawlings' ability to restore political stability and grow the economy was due to four factors : 1) his willingness to redirect the revolution towards liberal economic policies; 2) his ability to forge critical alliances with traditional elites and keep the North from splitting against him; 3) his steadfast determination to rehabilitate agriculture

[149] There are some exceptions. For example, see Jeffrey Herbst, *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, where the author puts forth the argument that the Rawlings' regime's strategy was the key to its economic success.

[150] *Liberia and Ghana - Policy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* US Government Printing Office: Washington, June 1982. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1982, Introduction, p. III.

and develop underprivileged areas; and 4) his willingness to risk his political capital and use more repression than concession in the urban areas. Ultimately, his success came from his ability to reorient the state, away from its long-standing urban bias to a rural emphasis. The elements that allowed him to achieve his aims were his charismatic example, his pragmatism, his adaptability and his constructing ideas.

I. The Early Years: 1979-1983

In the early years of the revolution, the Rawlings' regime had to overcome factionalism within its own ruling junta and re-direct its economic policies. Given the power of the radical left, Rawlings' choice to move towards the IMF was potentially life-threatening. Far from being circumstantial, it will be shown that this decisions had its roots in the regime's own priorities and evaluation of the situation. Later, Rawlings' ability forge new alliances with rural and conservative leaders, coupled with his rapid and strategic response to disaffected elements from the North, prevented the military from fracturing against him and allowed him to withstand the dangers of his most uncertain years.

i. Birth of the Revolution

Rawlings originally emerged from relative obscurity to become a national figure. He was catapulted onto the national stage on the 15th of May 1979. On that day, Rawlings, accompanied by fifteen Air Force officers and airmen, held a group of Generals captive. The group claimed that they had taken the Generals hostage to impress upon them the looming dangers the military government faced from it rank and file, if they did not immediately punish the most corrupt members of the military brass.

Rawlings' unconventional act had its roots in Ghana's tenuous political situation. For almost a decade, Ghana had been under corrupt military rule. Colonel I.K. Acheampong had conducted a coup in 1972, against Ghana's Second Republic headed by Dr. Kofi Busia. Acheampong then promoted himself as General and head of state. His military junta, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), ruled from 1972-1978. Because of the extreme corruption and dysfunctions of the state, General Akuffo, one of Acheampong's deputies, led a palace coup in 1978 and formed a new military junta, the SMC II. Akuffo began to restructure the economy and prepare for the return to civilian rule, scheduling elections for the following year. But in Rawlings' estimation, Akuffo did little to alleviate the immediate situation – top officials had gone unpunished and the economy was continuing to plummet. Despite the fact that the Akuffo was in the process of implementing elections, Rawlings decided to act.

Rawlings' forced 'talk' with the Generals was seen by the authorities as a mutiny and Rawlings was duly imprisoned and sentenced to execution. However, his subsequent trial gave Rawlings a national platform upon which to pronounce the reasons for his actions. Rawlings railed against the SMC II for not rectifying the 'tarnished image' of the Armed Forces and asserted that the only way to wipe out the widespread corruption and reverse the 'nasty state of affairs' was by 'going the Ethiopian way' – by which he meant using 'bloodshed to clean up the country,' starting with the armed forces (Yeebo 1991:25).

Rawlings' claims were not without justification. During the lost-decade of the 1970s, the decay of the state had caused the social fabric of Ghana to unravel. Acheampong's failed economic policies – in particular his choice to keep the cedi artificially inflated, impose price

controls and dole out import licenses to the political faithful – had decimated the economy. People of all walks of life had to scrounge daily just for basic amenities. Even produce grown in the interior was difficult to come by because the roads had so decayed, automobile parts were so scarce and fuel was under such limited supply that goods could not be brought to larger markets. Because of the regime's rigid price controls, a complicated underground system had developed with clandestine signals (like the pinning of cloth to a door) to indicate that the goods were available for sale. This had rendered simple imports like soap and cloth so difficult to come by and so steeply priced that everyone had begun to engage in hoarding of some kind. As one person described it, 'Toilet paper was worth more than gold.'[151] Thus, 'By 1975 corruption permeated every sphere of life and its prevalence had made bribery, embezzlement and larceny an everyday occurrence' (Chazen 1982:6).[152]

During his trial, the justness of Rawlings' charge and his personal charisma 'provided the tinder that led to the socialist explosion' which came soon after.[153] On the 4th of June, 1979, a group of young officers freed Rawlings from prison, toppled the SMC II government and placed Rawlings at the helm. True to Rawlings' words, once in power his new military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), began a bloody 'house cleaning' campaign to rid the country of corruption. Several of the top leadership, including Acheampong and Akuffo were executed by a firing squad. The bent-up rage was so great that citizens spontaneously marched in the streets chanting 'Let the Blood Flow'.

Throughout the country, soldiers went on a rampage as they tried to force prices down and retrieve items that had been hoarded. Civilians were also glad to have access to goods they had long been denied and cheerfully supported the seizure of goods. Many traders were maimed or killed by soldiers (*National Reconci[li]ation Commission* 2004(2):48). But, remarkably, within three months the AFRC, under Rawlings' leadership, had restored some measure of order. Pillaging and rampaging soldiers had been reined in and the first national elections in a decade were held. Rawlings gained even greater credibility when, in September 1979, he ceded office to the newly elected Third Republic, headed by Hilla Limann.

Thus, when Rawlings staged a second coup less than two years later, despite the fact that he was now unseating a democratically elected government, he was still widely popular. Under Limann, few visible changes had been made. The infrastructure was continuing to deteriorate, black marketeering was flourishing and commodities were still scarce. In his first speech to the nation, Rawlings asserted that this was not a coup but a 'Holy War' aimed at the complete reconstruction of Ghanaian society, to finally cleanse it of its ills.[154] The force of his convictions

[151] Interview with Valerie A. Sackey, former Director of the Castle Information Bureau, Tema: Nov 8, 2010.

[152] The timing of the coup may also have been influenced by other factors. At the time, it was believed that the Supreme Court Justices were about to repeal the immunity given to the 1979 coup leaders in the 1979 Constitution, so as to prosecute those responsible for the human rights abuses of the June 4th 1979 coup. Already, the court had ruled that people had been wrongfully imprisoned by the AFRC, in disregard to that constitution's Transitional Provisions section 15(2) which had stipulated that courts had no jurisdiction over matters relating to the execution, legislation or judicial acts of the AFRC (*National Reconcilation Commission*, Vol. 2: 2004). This also seems plausible given the fact that the Limann Government had first forcibly removed Rawlings from the armed forces and then become increasingly distrustful of Rawlings, putting both he and Captain (Ret.) Kojo Tsikata, one of his key allies, under constant surveillance (Yeebo 36-37). For most of the Limann regime, Rawlings was effectively in hiding, though he was also actively promoting the development of radical youth groups around the country. In fact, the student organization which he was most involved with, the June Fourth Movement (JFM), was to be an important constituent element in the ruling coalition formed on January 1, 1983.

[153] *National Reconcilation Commission*, Volume 2, Accra, October 2004, p. 46.

[154] All kinds of biblical terms came to be associated with Rawlings and the coup. He was referred to as 'Junior

and the sincerity of his presentation galvanized people.[155]

From the outset, the new revolutionary military junta, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), had a number of radical socialist goals. The most visible and immediate was to reverse class privilege by restructuring the economy to benefit the 'common man'. To do so, the government set out to reverse the wild price inflation on commodities that Ghanaians had been suffering from for a decade. Soldiers and police searched homes and confiscated hoarded goods. PNDC youth set up 'People's Shops' in which these confiscated goods were sold to the public at ridiculously low prices. Many people who were found hoarding goods were publicly humiliated, stripped and beaten.

The wealthy and elite were vilified. The government conducted an all-out campaign to recover revenue from privileged Ghanaians. On February 2nd, Rawlings signed into a law the 'Citizens Vetting Committee Law', which established a Committee 'to investigate, among other things, persons whose life styles and expenditures substantially exceed their known or declared incomes and persons whose bank balances, being in credit, are in excess of such sum or sums as the council may specify.'[156] Anyone could now be brought before the committee and investigated for tax evasion. Hundreds of people were imprisoned, their property confiscated. Soon after, 'People's Tribunals' were created to abrogate the power of the corrupt legal system to the people. Each community was empowered with the creation of its own tribunal. In the first year, hundreds of cases were brought before the tribunals and harsh sentences were imposed. Under the new tribunal system, not only alleged subversive plots, but smuggling and in some cases even stealing were made capital crimes (Ray 1986:103).

Another central concern was to recuperate export earnings. The Rawlings regime saw it as particularly critical that Ghana rejuvenate its moribund cocoa industry. Because of the complete disrepair of the roads and railroads and the scarcity of trucks and auto-parts, there had been no means to bring thousands of tons of cocoa to the ports in the South. The PNDC immediately began to free tons of cocoa that had been simply left rotting in silos and warehouses in the hinterland. They launched an all-out 'cocoa evacuation' campaign.[157] All universities and technical schools in the country were closed for the semester and students were required to join the national Student Task Force, whose primary focus would be to carry bags of cocoa to the harbor. The regime also summoned technical experts, civil servants and related industry leaders to the Castle to develop a cohesive strategy. Several State Owned Industries, like the Cocoa Services Division of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, donated labor and vehicles and other forms of support to help in the cocoa removal drive.[158] By January 22nd, the students had already carried fifty-three railway van loads of cocoa to the Tema Harbor.[159]

In 1982, the revolution also had as its central aim 'to demystify governance and to bring the act of government to the doorstep of the people'.[160] This was based upon the strong belief that the demise of the state had been due to the high-concentration of control at the top. Influenced by the revolutions in Cuba, Korea and Libya, as well as by Nyerere's *ujumaa*, the PNDC leadership saw decentralization as central to building up a revolutionary, socialist state.

Jesus', alluding to his first initials 'J.J.' and the 1981 coup was referred to as his 'Second Coming'.

[155] Even Joe Abbey maintained that he personally found Rawlings to be sincere in his pronouncements and that he was moved by him because he believed him to be speaking truthfully.

[156] Ghanaian Times, Wednesday Feb 3, 1982, No 7501, p. 1.

[157] *Ghanaian Times*, Saturday Jan 16, 1982, No 7486 p. 3

[158] *Ghanaian Times*, Fri Jan 22, 1982, p. 3

[159] *Ghanaian Times*, Fri Jan 22, 1982, 7491 , p.1.

[160] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra: Oct 19, 2010.

They believed that a Leninist party structure would enable the 'people' to govern themselves and end the politics-elite's monopoly on decision making. They also believed that returning power to the people would help spawn a 'green revolution' that would enable the country finally become self-sufficient in food.

The government's intention to 'return the power to the people,' was made known on January 5th, during Rawlings' first major broadcast to the nation. Rawlings called upon Ghanaians to form 'local Defence Committees at all levels of our national life - in the towns, in the villages, in all our factories, offices and work places and in the barracks' (quoted in Oquaye 2004:97). Though the mandate for these Defence Committees was vague, it was understood that Peoples' Defence Committees (PDCs) would address local development needs and establish community farms to help fight against the food shortages, while Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) would protect workers' rights, as well as help feed workers by creating co-operative farms at the workplace. Almost immediately, the national press was filled with announcements of communities and factories which had formed their own Defence Committees. In the first months of 1982, the PDCs and WDCs had a number of successes. PDCs were pictured cleaning up blocked sewage drains, repairing pot holes and establishing communal farms. J.J. Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC, was himself depicted in the government media with his sleeves rolled up, helping in the cleanup and farming efforts.

The revolution also had a dark side. Youth had been turned loose and were using their new-found power to lord it over 'the parasites' that had degraded them and flaunted their wealth. Soon the excesses of the revolution were felt around the country. Fear on the part of professionals and people of means was so great that even the well-to-do went out in ragged clothing and poor sandals to avoid being targets of the soldiers and youth rampaging through the streets.[161] In short, the revolution was creating a rift within society: chiefs were being publicly humiliated; the professional classes were being persecuted; and businessmen and traders were fearful for their lives.

ii. The Unlikely Road to Reform - Overcoming Internal Divisions

In the first quarter of 1982, the Rawlings regime appeared to be a radical leftist government intent upon revolutionarily restructuring society. Indeed, one of the first actions Rawlings undertook was to re-open political relations with Libya.[162] The PNDC's revolutionary rhetoric was rabidly anti-imperialist and anti-western. That such a 'radical' regime would move within six months to work with the IMF and implement liberal reforms was hard to imagine.

Moreover, it was clear at the time that to do so would be rife with danger for the Chairman of the PNDC. During the Limann period, new parties, such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana (PRLG), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) and the Pan African Youth Movement (PANYMO), had been established around the country. In early 1982, the JFM was the most powerful of these groups. Named in honor of the first Rawlings coup, the JFM espoused a purest Marxist agenda, with plans to 'quickly build a Bolshevik-style revolutionary party'. They were intent upon 'attacking the rich and breaking ties with imperialism, namely the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the governments and multinational companies of North America, Western Europe and Japan' (Ray 1986:41). Rawlings himself had helped build the June Fourth Movement in the

[161] Interview with JSL Abbey, Accra: Sept 20, 2010
[162] *Daily Graphic*, January 2nd, pp. 1.

hopes of creating a revolutionary political base; and its leaders were critical in mobilizing popular forces to support the coup after it had occurred (Yeebo 1991:52).[163] In fact, it had been the leftists in the military and not Rawlings, who had launched the June 4th coup. Furthermore, without their support, Rawlings would not have been able to execute the second coup either (Yeebo 1991:51).

Thus, in 1982, Rawlings' military junta was predominately in the hands of these idealistic youth leaders. Four of the seven original members of the Provisional National Defence Council - the primary governing body - were founding members of the JFM: Rawlings, Sergeant Allolga Akata-Pore, Chris Bukari Atim and Zaya Yeebo. Another two, Joachim Amartey Kwei and Adjei Boadi, had a strong affinity to the JFM and several other JFM members were in the upper levels of the National Defence Committee - the second highest governing body (Ray 1986:47; Yeebo 1991:55). Of these, there were two leaders who were potentially formidable because each had his own political base. The first was Chris Atim. He was a founder of the JFM and as the effective representative of students and youth on the PNDC, Atim had been critically instrumental in mobilizing student support for the regime. The second was Sergeant Akata-Pore, who was the representative of the lower military ranks on the PNDC. He provided the PNDC with its link to the leftists in the military. To cross either would prove to be very dangerous to Rawlings.

However, there was another faction which had also been vital to Rawlings' 'second coming'. This faction was mainly made up of 'moderate' leftist academics and professionals, many of whom were members of the New Democratic Movement (NDM). They included among their ranks: Captain (Ret.) Kojo Tsikata and his brother Tsatu Tsikata, P.V. Obeng, Justice Apaloo, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey and the brothers Kwamena and Atu Ahwoi. The NDM were also proponents of socialism, but they believed that socialism could only be achieved in steps, based on an understanding of Ghanaian society, rather than by forcing through a Marxist-Leninist agenda. Though they were not in the PNDC cabinet, the members of the NDM were highly represented on the PNDC's advisory councils (Ray 1986).

There were also important social differences between these two factions. The JFM leadership was mainly composed of young students and ex-students from the Upper and Northern Regions. They accordingly had a large following in the Upper Region, particularly among the youth and northerners in the military (Ray 1986:41). In contrast, the NDM leadership was largely made up of older professionals; many were university teachers. And, where the JFM was seen as a 'northern' organization, the NDM was perceived to be a southern one and more specifically Ewe dominated.[164] Given the very different backgrounds, orientations and expectations of these two factions, it is not surprising that they soon came into conflict with one another (Ray 1986:27-50).

In February and March, it appeared that the radical forces were in the ascendency. Chris Atim had established a central committee, the Interim National Coordinating Committee (INCC), to direct the actions of the new People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) and was himself named as the Committee's Chairman. Though Kojo Tsikata, Rawlings' closest adviser and the security adviser for the PNDC, tried to weaken Atim's

[163] During January, JFM chapters staged marches in most cities and towns, in support of the 31st December coup and the new PNDC government.

[164] This NDM clique is often referred to as the 'Dzulekofe mafia'- Dzulekofe being the town in the Volta region where the Tsikata family, as well as Rawlings' mother and several other Ewe intellections in the PNDC, were from (Yeebo 1991:52, Oquaye 2004:121). This was not entirely accurate. For example the Ahwoi brothers were Sefwi from the Western Region and P.V. Obeng is an Ashanti.

power by putting stumbling blocks in his way, the INCC was allowed to take over the Afienya Youth Training Centre and use it as a Cadre Training Centre, which would later produce ultra-leftist revolutionaries. Even more troubling for the 'Rawlings faction' was the fact that the INCC had operations which extended to the military and the police (Oquaye 153-154).

Atim was also the leader of delegations to Libya, Cuba and Eastern Bloc countries. In March, he signed agreements with several socialist countries. All and all, the aid that was agreed to was negligible. Bulgaria pledged a grant of US $300,000; Hungary three-million forints; and the German Democratic Republic 200,000 marks for the supply of drugs and hospital equipment. The USSR and the Czechs agreed to revive some of the projects that had been abandoned after the fall of Nkrumah.[165] However, the technocrats on the PNDC advisory councils saw things very differently. At the same time that Atim was touring the Eastern Bloc countries, Rawlings had appointed the National Economic Review Committee (NERC), to assess the economic situation. Each member had been summoned individually by Rawlings because of his credentials as a top academic or professional in his field. The two leading men on the Committee were Dr. Joe S.L. Abbey and Dr. Kwesi Botchwey. Joe Abbey, the Committee's leading economic advisor and professor at the University of Ghana, Legon, had served as the Chief Statistician and Assistant Economic Advisor for the Acheampong regime and Chief Economic Advisor under Akuffo. Kwesi Botchwey was a distinguished leftist Law Professor at the University of Ghana who had organized the NDM at Legon. He was appointed Chair of the Committee, in large part, because of his leftist credentials.[166]

In early 1982, Abbey had accompanied Rawlings on his tours around the country. From the helicopter, both men had seen the ravages drought and bush fires had reaped upon cocoa trees and other crops, as well as the tragic state of the once impressive road system. Abbey had also been a member of the early delegations sent to Libya and was involved in subsequent negotiations there. Abbey found that the Libyan's were offering far too little and asking for far too much. For example, in discussions about the possibility of establishing joint ventures in food production, the Libyan's were demanding they receive predetermined quotas of the output. Abbey argued that the food situation in Ghana was too dire and that the country needed time before food could be exported anywhere. Similar problems emerged when negotiating terms for goldmines.[167]

As a result of these disappointing negotiations with Libya and other socialist states, Abbey began to press Rawlings to open negotiations with the World Bank. According Abbey, he had already gathered evidence of the dire straits Ghana was in at Rawlings' behest. He presented his evidence to Rawlings, impressing upon him that nothing the Western institutions could put on the table would be unacceptable given the extreme situation the country faced. Moreover, his own assessment of what would be required to resuscitate the economy was not far removed from the orthodoxy that was being propounded in Washington. As he saw it, the entrenched problems in the Ghanaian economy had to be faced realistically and head on. It would require the resuscitation of cocoa, adjustment of cedi and retrenchment of public sector.[168]

Rawlings, for his part, recognized that the technocrats were presenting reasonable facts and figures while the radicals were simply repeating tired socialist slogans.[169] He saw clearly that

[165] Ghanaian Times, Fri. April 23, 1982, No. 7,568, p.1.
[166] Interview with Joe Abbey, Accra: Sept 20, 2010.
[167] Ibid
[168] Ibid.
[169] Interviews with Abbey and P.V. Obeng, 2009.

the socialist states could not provide the capital required to regenerate the economy. He therefore gave Abbey the okay to develop a budget proposal, designed to set the terms to start negotiations with donor institutions.[170] Abbey drew up what he named the 'Economic Recovery Programme', which he later submitted to the IMF and negotiations began in secret.[171]

Nonetheless, Rawlings faced serious risks in moving towards the West. His credentials as the leader of the 'true Ghanaian revolution' were in part built on his criticism of former regimes and their complicity with the West. In several of his speeches during the course of the first half of 1982, Rawlings had attacked the Limann government for claiming that foreign investment was necessary to ensure development. He referred to previous foreign agreements as examples of 'exploitation' and promised to 'ensure that this exploitation should cease' (Yeebo 1991:48). For the man who had executed Acheampong and Akuffo for forsaking the Ghanaian people and who had proclaimed upon taking power that if he failed the revolution he would willingly face a firing squad, his seemingly abrupt *volte face* was clearly a very dangerous proposition. As a result, Rawlings kept the negotiations and the Abbey proposals under wraps.[172]

Indeed, it was not long after that the radicals began to make moves against him. In June, the progressives joined forces to strengthen their position. The June Fourth Movement (JFM) merged with another leftist group, the People's Revolutionary Guard (PLRG), to form the United Front (UF). On June 18th 1982, the first abortive coup was made against Rawlings. To make matters worse for Rawlings, an untoward event dramatically challenged the legitimacy of his regime. On the 30th of June,1982, the media exploded with news of the abduction of three Supreme Court Justices. Three days later, the Justices' bodies and that of a retired Army Officer were found gruesomely burned on the side of the road. Suspicion immediately fell on Rawlings and his advisors, particularly because the Justices that were murdered had 'sat on AFRC cases and took unpopular decisions in cases affecting AFRC convicts after the return to civilian administration.'[173] Persistent rumors abounded that Kojo Tsikata had been responsible for the abduction of the Justices and that the keys to the truck used to transport the victims had been found lying on J.J. Rawlings' desk. This was the nadir for Rawlings' faction. The murder of the Justices gave strength to the beleaguered professional classes, as well as the estranged leftists.

By August the ruling Council, which had never been a coherent body, was completely fractured. The final showdown occurred a week after an IMF delegation had been to Ghana and rumors were circulating that the National Economic Review Committee (NERC) was conducting negotiations without the approval or consultation of the PNDC. On the 27th of August, Rawlings called an emergency meeting of a Joint Committee comprising all PNDC secretaries, members of the NDC, the NERC and the PNDC. At that meeting, Abbey for the first time, publicly admitted that the government had been in contact with the IMF and informed the meeting that Dr. Botchwey was already in Washington and that an immediate decision had to be made about whether Ghana would accept the Funds' terms (Yeebo 1991:118). The meeting quickly erupted, as the leftists assailed Abbey's proposals. They argued that mere fiscal adjustments, which had

[170] The degree to which the final agreement with the IMF was dictated by the IMF is not entirely clear. However, there is evidence that Abbey's plan served as an important basis for the final accord. Martin found that in1983 and 1986-7 , the Fund only got about 70-75 percent of what it demanded, as compared to the norm in sub- Saharan programs which was 90-95 percent. Martin further underscores that this does not include the ground given by the Fund in preparation for the negotiations (1991:239).

[171] Ibid.

[172] In Jon Kraus' estimation, Rawlings delayed response was due more to the fact that he was 'highly emotional' and slow to make changes. Notes from Kraus received in November 2012.

[173] *Ghanaian Times*, Mon. July 5, 1982 7,629 , p.1

been tried unsuccessfully by previous regimes, would not address Ghana's deep-rooted problem of neo-colonial dependence. Yeebo charged that Abbey was a 'nation wrecker' who was consciously trying to undermine the revolution. The Joint Committee was then asked to take a vote. According to Yeebo, the Abbey package lost overwhelmingly.

The next day, an Economic and Political Committee was formed to replace the National Recovery Economic Committee that had been headed by Botchwey and Abbey, now regarded as traitors to the revolution. The new committee included members of the NDM and UF, as well as some august radical leftist economists who had been invited as consultants, such as Samir Amin from Egypt and Eskor Toyo from Nigeria (Hansen 1991:112). The Committee's programme, presented on 10 September, 1982, kept the radical revolutionary framework intact. It 'identified imperialism as Ghana's main enemy' and had as its center piece the 'building of a peoples' economy' which would be developed out of popular participation. (Yeebo 1991:120-126).

At the same time, the Leftists, who still controlled the media, launched an anti-IMF, anti-devaluation campaign. Articles appeared regularly in the *Daily Graphic*, the central newspaper, with headlines like, 'The Revolution or the IMF' and 'Devaluation Not the Answer'. In the latter article, the author (an official of the NDC and a UF cadre) charged:

> "Devaluation is an imperialist ploy to destabilize the 31st Revolution - it is a tool used to tie developing countries forever. It has never worked anywhere in the developing world before and it will not work here either..." [Hansen 1991:118-9]

The most vituperative attack came from the JFM's paper, the *Workers' Banner* (though it had very low readership), in which an editorial ran claiming that:

> "...the IMF – this financial monster, the mercenary headquarters of imperialist monopoly companies – has been laying 'time bombs' under the 31st December IMF – to squeeze our finances, sabotage the economy, destroy the revolution and thus ensure the continued exploitation and oppression of our people." [Hansen 1991:119]

Despite the inflammatory rhetoric and the radicals' attempts to mobilize the regimes' support base against the PNDC Chairman, Rawlings was unwavering. He trusted in the technocrats and was determined to transform the economy. He also understood that even the most renowned leftist economists were not providing viable solutions. Nevertheless, he and his faction were coming under increasing pressure – not least because the accusations about Tsikata's involvement in the murder of the judges had turned a number of important PNDC members against Rawlings and had lowered his popular support (Yeebo 1991:150).[174]

Given the enormous political pressure Rawlings found himself under, he could easily have retreated from his commitment to the Fund. In fact, western officials had already begun to wonder whether the government would be able to sustain its agreements (Hansen 1991:121). Instead, Rawlings and his faction chose to stay the course with the Abbey proposal and work with the IMF. It was a decision that had very serious consequences for Rawlings. Botchwey, upon his return from successful negotiations with the fund, openly rejected the Economic and

[174] The scandal had led to the resignation of a number of key PNDC members in November 1982, including the moderate PNDC leader, Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah as well as some NDC secretaries, such as the respected lawyer, Johnny Hansen whose investigative committee into the murders had been abruptly terminated by Rawlings. See Ray 1986.

Political Committee's new economic plan. This infuriated the majority-PNDC. Not only was Rawlings selling out to the neo-colonial imperialists, but his people were moving forward with the IMF, despite the fact that two Joint Committees had voted against the Abbey proposals.

Fearing that Rawlings' faction was taking over, the war now began in earnest. From October 1982 to January 1985, seven separate coup attempts were launched against Rawlings. Almost all of these were led by northerners and members of the JFM who had been radicalized against the regime during the period in which IMF reforms were adopted (Ray 1986:106-111). In the end, the radicals could not stand up to Rawlings' popular power and his control of the state. By the end of the first year, they had been crushed: in December 1982, Chris Atim resigned and then fled the country; Akata-Pore was charged with mutiny and Amartey Kwei was sentenced to death for the murder of the judges. Many others in the United Front had been arrested or dismissed. Thus, on the first anniversary of the 'revolution', Rawlings had regained the upper hand and seemed to have contained the radical threat. All the same, when he chose to stay the course with the IMF, the risks had been quite real and the outcome unsure.

In the final analysis, Rawlings choice to move towards the IMF and introduce reforms was borne from his own assessment of the situation. Though there must have been pressures from the donor institutions, many of Rawlings' basic premises had not changed at all. And it was these convictions that enabled him to make the difficult political choices he made. From the start, Rawlings had believed that decentralization, the downsizing of government and greater compensation for producers were critical elements of the country's needed reform. As P.V. Obeng underscores, 'We chose decentralization to respond to the quest to our own promise to devolve authority...it was part of our agenda from day one.'[175] Thus, though the IMF had undoubtedly pressed the PNDC leadership to make painful changes they may not have undertaken as quickly as they did, the PNDCs re-direction has to be understood as driven as much by internal developments, as external ones.

What stands out as the most exceptional part of this story is the commitment and faith that Rawlings sustained in his advisors and the quality of their advice. Nothing could be farther from Nkrumah who surrounded himself with sycophantic 'yes-men' and avoided the advice of educated and trained experts. Rawlings had a better capacity to size-up men and distinguish practical advice from political posturing. It was these abilities that enabled him to make pragmatic decisions that were to be the hallmark of his regime. These attributes were to continue to play an essential role in Rawlings' development as a leader and in the direction that the PNDC would take over the next decade.

iii. The Nigerian Expulsions

The way in which the PNDC managed the expulsion of 1.2 million Ghanaians from Nigeria best illustrates these points. In January 1983, Nigeria announced that it had begun to expel all Ghanaian residents in Nigeria. Nugent has been argued that the timing of the expulsions were actually fortunate for the PNDC. According to this line of reasoning, the humanitarian crisis enabled the regime to implement its economic reforms with less opposition than it would have otherwise faced, while also giving the PNDC good reasons to slow the rate of implementation prescribed by the IMF (Nugent 1995:113-115). However, though there are many reasons to see the event as having been fortuitous for the regime, from another vantage point it could not have come at a more disastrous moment.

[175] Ibid

In January 1983, the regime's popularity around the country had plummeted, the international community was extremely hostile to it and the economy was still in shambles: '[R]eturning Ghanaians were faced with massive food and goods shortages, a crippled transport system and an economic infrastructure in a state of total disrepair (Brydon 1985:585). Worst of all, the countryside was scourged with fires and famine. In 1983, the country faced its most critical drought in recent history. Hunger had become so widespread that people had come to refer to the protruding collar bones on the emaciated sufferers as 'Rawlings' Chains'.[176] With the extreme food shortages and deteriorating farming conditions, the appearance of millions of new mouths to feed could have been extremely explosive. In fact, members of the PNDC government at the time believed that the expulsions had been orchestrated by the Nigerians at the behest of the Western powers, as a way to destabilize the regime and bring about its downfall.[177] Instead, the event put a new, charitable face on the regime.

What turned this potentially devastating event into a windfall was the quick and brilliant way the regime's strategists addressed the tragedy. Thus, the fact that it does appear to have been in some respects well-timed has to be understood as a result of the very careful and clever use made of the event by the regime; it could easily have spelled the end for the PNDC.

As soon as the government received word of the expulsions, the PNDC formed a National Emergency Relief Committee to direct the resettlement process. The Committee decided that the deportations and resettlement of the returnees would have to be dealt with in military fashion. First, it was decided that the deported Ghanaians would be transported back to Ghana from Nigeria in an orderly manner. Mini-busses, *tatas*, trucks and ships were dispatched to Nigeria to pick up the refugees and bring them back to Tema harbor in Ghana.[178] Secondly, the Committee determined that rather than follow the general practice of building refugee camps - which would present problems of sanitation, disease and crime - all of the refugees would be reintegrated into their original communities. As P.V. Obeng explained, 'our thinking was such that in Ghana everybody has roots...Our principle was [therefore] that we should encourage them to go to that place rather than stay in a camp and our management strategy was fashioned around this principle.'[179] First, reception centers were set up at the Tema Trade Fair Centre. There, returnees received medical attention, small parcels of food and money and some amenities like blankets. Then, the returnees were sorted out geographically and transported in articulated trucks back to their regional capital, after being provided with enough money to ensure that they could make it home to their villages.

The government also attempted to use the humanitarian crisis as a unifying event. Rawlings called upon churches, chiefs and individuals to aid in the efforts. He made direct appeals to people to behave charitably towards the returnees and not to harbor anger or resentment against them.[180] He urged chiefs to allocate land to the returning people and saying, "This gesture will enable them to contribute their quota to the development of the country."[181]

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[176] Interview JSL Abbey, Accra: Sept 20, 2010.

[177] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra: Oct 19, 2010. Also see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Rawlings on Nigeria's "Conspiracy": Obeng's Talks with African Envoys," February 16, 1983, Wednesday, Text of report (accessed at LexisNexis Academic, June 5, 2013).

[178] James Lemoyne, Ray Wilkinson In Lagos And Patricia J. Sethi, "Nigeria's Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus", Newsweek, Feb. 14, 1983, pp. 32; "The Refugees Returning to Ghana," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 1, 1983, Tuesday. Text of report (accessed at LexisNexis *Academic*, June 5, 2013).

[179] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra: Oct 19, 2010

[180] *Ghanaian Times*, Saturday, Jan 29, 1983, p.1.

[181] "Ghana Admits Its People From Nigeria," *NYT*, Jan. 30, 1983, Sunday, Late City Final Edition, section 1, pp.

According to P.V. Obeng, "It was one thing that enabled us to mobilize society together, including people who were otherwise against us...Because of the efficiency with which we did things, because we made it obvious that this was an exercise in humanity, people began to see the humanity in us."[182] The capable handling of the tragedy also helped earn the PNDC some international credibility. The BBC reported,

> "It is commendable that the PNDC Government has decided to meet the challenge posed by the Nigerian decision by taking measures to transport Ghanaians back home and to rehabilitate them. The Government also deserves commendation for not allowing itself to be provoked into taking measures that will fuel any anti-Nigerian sentiments in the country."[183]

Valerie Sackey, Rawlings' propaganda spokesperson, observed,

> "That was just about the tipping point. Before that just about any respectable government in the world thought that we were just a bunch of raving loonies and it was after that they began to talk sense. After they had sent all their press men to say 'Where are the refugee camps?' and [to their surprise] they were told that [the returnees] had been sent home."[184]

As critical to the success of the operation was the fact that the Committee further recognized the need to help organize the reintegration of the returnees back into society. P.V. Obeng recalled the thinking of the Committee at the time: "[These Ghanaians] went [to Nigeria] as economic refugees and they came back. What is going to keep them busy? That is when we built a National Mobilization Programme."[185] The PNDC created 'mobisquads' in towns and villages in which returnees were organized to run community development projects. The creation of the Mobisquads was important on a number of levels. First, it productively channeled the energies of this mass of unemployed returnees. Secondly, it created some strong allies for the regime in the rural areas (Mikell 1989). Indeed, it was understood that the creation of the mobisquads would enable the PNDC "to trap their energy, their desire, their thankfulness for bringing them home."[186] Thirdly, the mobisquads were used to further the PNDC's agenda to rehabilitate the countryside and to reverse rural-urban drift. Though Mobisquads were originally launched to deal with the returnees, they were quickly expanded to incorporate any underemployed youth who wanted to join. Throughout the 1980s, the mobisquads were the cornerstone of several of the rural development projects the government pursued. In the early years, they were central to the campaign to resuscitate the cocoa industry. Subsequently, they were involved a host of activities, including sanitation work, well drilling, block farming projects, food relief programs and non-formal education programs (Mikell 1989; PAMSCAD Report, May 1987) .

The ability of the PNDC to avert disaster was due to the success with which the technocrats organized the returnees, their foresight in placing them in Mobisquads and the rhetorical choices made by Rawlings. These were all indicative of the competence of Rawlings' advisors. Rawlings's ability to find capable people and trust in their expertise was at the heart of

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[182] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra, Oct 19, 2010

[183] "Ghana and Nigeria's Expulsion of Illegal Aliens" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 27, 1983, Thursday. Text of report (accessed at LexisNexis *Academic*, June 5, 2013).

this success. Thus, in the final analysis it was the strategic choices made by the regime, not the timing of events, which was most consequential to the success with which the humanitarian crisis was managed.

II. Political Survival: Forging Critical Alliances 1983-1985

i. Populist Nonsense Gives Way to Popular Sense

Though J.J. had survived the first coup attempts, his position by the end of his first year in power was still extremely precarious. Indeed, 'support for Rawlings' second revolution lessened throughout 1982 as he failed to 'deliver the goods' (Rhoda Howard 1983:474). By 1983, 'The common slogan of the general public after 1983, the year of the most severe drought in the country's history, could be summed up with a common saying of the Akan people of Ghana, *obiara ba, saa na obeye*, meaning that 'whoever comes to power, will do the same' (Anaman 2006:11). In short, the tide could easily have turned for Rawlings.

A number of critical choices were made to contain the situation. First, the PNDC began to forge new alliances with alienated segments of the population. P.V. Obeng explains the transformation in the following way:

> "A lot of us started as very leftist, idealistic - we were very hot - and all institutions that were colonial and feudal and whatever were looked upon with suspicion. But then, when we started stabilizing we knew that we needed to get allies to partner with us in our programs...So we had a conscious program to coopt middle class people and traditional and some social forces...we realized that we needed to engage a strong force to be able to overcome the opposition against our moves and among the social forces we wanted to mobilize were the chiefs who had a lot of influence among their people...We also tried to find ways of winning the professional class...*so it was a conscious political strategy that we crafted and used*...We had to assess how to get to their hearts. We had to assess how to demonstrate that we were not monsters. We had to demonstrate how we shared common objectives of seeking the welfare of the ordinary people. We had to find things that would bring us together and [ways] of managing the things that would divide us."[187] [italics mine]

Rawlings began to indicate the new direction of the PNDC in national addresses. In his 1983 Independence Day speech, Rawlings first accused the PDCs and WDCs of 'exercising power without authority'. He then invited 'the professionals, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a push,' proclaiming that 'the character and commitment of the individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes' (Oquaye 2004:166; Yeebo1991:180). In August 1983, Rawlings declared that it was imperative that Ghanaians go beyond empty ideology and examine the truth of their circumstances, emphasizing that, 'Populist nonsense

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[184] Ibid.
[185] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra: Oct 19, 2010
[186] Ibid.
[187] Interview with P.V. Obeng, former Co-coordinating Secretary of the PNDC, Accra: Oct 19, 2010.

must give way to popular sense. Many of us have spent too much time worrying about who owns what, but there can be no ownership without production first.'[188]

Speeches were accompanied by actions. The first critical realignment was made immediately after the coup attempts in October and November, 1982. On 28th December 1982, Rawlings appointed the Nandom-Naa, a powerful chief in the Upper Region to the cabinet. Hansen observed:

> 'A few months earlier, this appointment of what one would call a feudalist to such a high office would have been inconceivable...Ideologically it signaled the period of the renunciation of class war and the beginning of class peace, a theme which was to come up more frequently in the further pronouncements of Rawlings.'[Hansen 1991:127]

In early 1984, the PNDC dissolved the PDCs/WDCs and replaced them with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). For the first time, membership in local Defence Committees, 'was open to all persons or citizens of Ghana who were prepared to abide by and defend the basic objectives of the revolution and who had ample record of patriotism, integrity and democratic practice' (Oquaye 2004:167). Significantly, the symbols for the CDR reflected the new tenor of the regime. Where the motto of the PDCs/WCDs had been 'Power to the People' and its symbol was an upraised fist, the motto for the CDRs was 'Mobilise, Defend and Produce' and its symbol was a soaring eagle (Oquaye 2004:173).

These dramatic changes were also reflected in Rawlings' Cabinet. By the end of 1985, the radicals had all been replaced by moderates. The new Vice-President of the PNDC was Justice D.F. Ananan, a retired Court of Appeal Judge, who was highly respected within the legal profession and among the middle classes. The radical trade unionist Amartey Kwei was replaced by the more moderate trade unionist, Ebo Tawiah. After the departure of Akata-Pore and Adjei-Boadi, no other NCOs or lower ranks of the military were included in the PNDC. In addition, two of the NDM advisors that had not been on the PNDC were now made members: Captain Kojo Tsikata was made responsible for Foreign Affairs and National Security and P.V. Obeng was appointed as the PNDC Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries. The position of Kwesi Botchwey was also formalized. He was appointed Secretary for Economic and Financial Planning.

Thus, the regime radically recreated itself. It made a concerted effort to bring on board the 'traditional' and established classes that had been alienated by the early zeal of the revolution. The rhetorical shifts and new strategic alliances Rawlings made were part of a deliberate plan to move the country past the heightened tensions that had come to dominate the second of half of 1982, as well as to help move forward the PNDCs new development agenda. This was the first of what were to be many times in which the PNDC and its charismatic Chairman would recreate themselves.

ii. The Northern Factor: Coup-proofing

As important to his success was Rawlings' rapid and strategic response to disaffected groups in the North. Even after the radical leftists had been purged from the government, a serious threat still loomed: youth and members of the Armed Forces from the northern part of Ghana. As Yeebo explains,

[188] J.J. Rawlings, radio and television broadcast on 28 August 1983, quoted in Nugent 1995, pg. 113.

> There were...a number of serving soldiers, mainly from the North, who had important links with the military intelligence unit of the armed forces and the special branch of the police force. This group was most vital for the success of any coup against the Limann administration because of that government's increasing reliance on what it perceived as 'Northern loyalties'. What Limann did not realize was that radical soldiers from the north, having been exposed to the radical politics of the 1970s, were more likely to be swayed by political rather than ethnic consideration. Their Northern origins gave them certain advantages which soldiers from other ethnic groups did not have in that period. [Yeebo 1991:51]

Managing the 'Northern factor' was therefore critical to Rawlings' ability to sustain power.

This was all the more so because the purges of the radical leftists had been perceived as ethnically motivated (National Reconcil[i]ation Commission, Vol.2 2004:115). All of the junior officers accused of being involved in the murder of the judges were from the North.[189] Yet, Kojo Tsikata, an Ewe from the same town as Rawlings who had also been implicated in the plot, was left unscathed. In addition, the purged PNDC and NDC members were mostly from the Upper Region; the area from which a significant portion of the Armed Forces hailed.

The Upper Region was also the area that Limann was from and, as a result, it had been the only area that launched protests against the 31st December coup; even worse, it had been the JFM that had been able to restore order and support for Rawlings in the area in 1982 and it was now the same JFM whose members had been ousted and humiliated (Yeebo 1991:48-49). The seriousness of this is attested to by the fact that in 1983, the worst coup that Rawlings experienced was one in which the conservative northerner military officers from Limann's government joined forces with the radicals that had been imprisoned by Rawlings in 1982 and early 1983.

To address the potential northern threat, Rawlings made a number of tactical moves. The first came two weeks after news of Atim's resignation and the capture of two of the 'rebels'. On December 17th, Rawlings announced that, as part of his general decentralization plan, he would be creating two regions out of the Upper Region.[190] This was a long-held wish on the part of the chiefs and people in the western part of the Upper Region who had for decades been forced to travel over three hundred kilometers to Bolgatanga, in the East of the region, for most of their resources. Having a regional capital in the Upper West was therefore a real coup for the area. In turn, winning over the traditional leaders in the region was immensely important for the regime; particularly in the northern areas, where the chiefs wielded enormous influence over their people.

Rawlings made his second move just before the end of the year. On Dec 28th Rawlings announced that the Nandom-Naa, one of the most important chiefs in the Upper West, would be a new member of the PNDC Council. As expected, the promise of a separate region and the appointment of the Nandom-Naa had an immediate effect. On December 30th, the Nandom-Naa organized a durbar for the chiefs and people of Wa and Bozing 'to express their gratitude to the government in its intention to create a separate region for the area.' At the durbar, the Nandom-Naa 'called on the people of the Upper West to justify the creation of the region by working harder than before... [and to] embrace the government agricultural program and intensify food

[189] They were: Amartey Kwei, Lance Corporal Amedeka Lance Corporal Senya, Johnny Dzandu and Tonny Tekpo (*Ghanaian Times*, Tuesday December 21, 1982, p. 1).
[190] *Ghanaian Times*, Friday Dec 17, 1982, No 7771, p.1.

production'.[191] A couple of weeks later, a delegation of chiefs, PDC Youth and Student Task Force members and progressive youth organizations called on the PNDC Chairman at the Castle 'to reaffirm their support for the PNDC and to express their appreciation to it for the creation of the Upper-West Region.'[192] As Hansen argues, it is clear that these two political maneuvers were designed 'to blunt the edge of any ethnic response which might arise as a result of the conflict with the UF as many of its leading members, as well as some of the most active cadres of the NDC came from the Northern and Upper Regions. The same could be said of the 'Left' soldiers in the armed forces' (Hansen 1991:127).

When the Nandom-Naa died in August 1984, Rawlings accompanied the body in a procession in Accra and attended the funeral in Wa. He then replaced the Nandom-Naa on the PNDC with another northerner, Alhaji Mahama Iddrissu, 'to placate non-radical elements within the country, the northerners and Muslim community' (Oquaye 2004:133). The succeeding Nandom-Naa, Naa Puoure Puobe Chiir VII, also developed a close relationship to Rawlings and the regime. A few months after his enskinment, he met with the Chairman of the PNDC and other PNDC representatives. Soon after, he began to advocate on their behalf in Western Europe for development funding.[193]

There were other means that the PNDC used to build up support in the North. For example, the regime was able to gain further footing in the Upper East with the introduction of native language radio. In the Region, there is a small tribe, the Builsa, who are distinct from all the other ethnic groups in the region. They have their own customs and speak a language unrelated to neighboring tribes. The Builsa traditional area also happens to have a large percentage of its young men in the security forces. The PNDC began a program of native language broadcasts to the region. The radio programs in the Builsa language quite dramatically impacted the traditional area. For the first time, the Builsa were made to feel like they were being integrated into the body-politic; as one former PNDC official described it, the native language broadcasts 'really knocked their socks off'.[194]

The PNDC began visible aid programs in the Upper regions. Thus, for the celebration of the 27th Anniversary of Ghana's Independence in March 1984, the PNDC resumed an anti-yellow fever program in the Upper West, which had been discontinued in 1981 and immunized 3,200 people.[195] Finally, the regime worked in general to include Muslims and Muslim religious leaders. During the lead up to the 1984 Independence day celebration, the national press presented a front page article highlighting the fact that the starting program would include special prayers for the nation led by Muslim leaders around the country.[196]

In the following years, Rawlings increasingly focused on the underprivileged North. Many development and infrastructural projects were launched in these areas. For example, in 1987, the Food-for Infants and Mothers program was mostly channeled in the Northern region. Rawlings also launched a Non-Formal Education and Development Programme, designed to promote basic literacy skills, particularly in deprived rural communities. Rawlings himself

[191] *Ghanaian Times*, Dec 31, 1982, No. 7781, p.1.
[192] In 1984, he advanced 'negotiations with private investors in Western Europe to help implement a three-year medium term Economic Recovery Programme in the Nandom Traditional Area in particular and in Ghana in general'. A year later, he was instrumental in getting Italy to donate tractors for one of the PNDCs new development schemes in the Upper West (*People's Daily Graphic*, Friday, Jan 14, 1983, No. 7792, p.1).
[193] *People's Daily Graphic*, Jan 31, 1986, p. 5.
[194] Interview with Valerie Sackey, Tema: Nov 8, 2010.
[195] *People's Daily Graphic*, Saturday March 17, 1984 p. 1.
[196] *People's Daily Graphic*, March 1,1984, p.1; March 3, 1984, p.8.

explained that the program was created 'to reduce substantially adult illiteracy, especially in the Northern and Upper East and Upper West Regions, as well as other deprived and depressed local communities.' In addition, the government introduced a scheme to establish petroleum storage depots in every region, beginning with Tamale and Buipe in the Northern region, to enable the North to more easily access both kerosene and LPG-gas.[197]

The government committed itself to launching a 'major project for supplying electricity to the northern parts of Ghana from the national transmission grid' as a way 'to ensure regional balance' (9). In keeping with this goal, in 1988 and 1989, Rawlings toured the country, inaugurating the National Electrification Scheme which was planned to bring electricity to every rural capital in the country. In his speech at the inauguration of the first electrical power grid in the Upper East Region, not only did the Rawlings emphasize his government's past record and commitment to the northerner areas, but also the historic reversal that his regime had made by choosing to serve these neglected regions:

> "...since the 1960s the benefits of this great accomplishment have concentrated in the southern part of the nation, covering hardly more than a quarter of Ghana's land area...the PNDC's determination to extend to all Ghanaians not merely access to basic needs but to conditions which will enable the fulfillment of our vast human potential, led us to plan together with the Volta River Authority, to extend reliable electricity supplies to every part of this nation. I am sure that the year 1989 will be long remembered by the people of Wa, Sunyani, Kete Krachi and Tamale as the year when the vitalizing spark of electricity lit up their homes and hopes. And now we have reached Bolgatanga. I would like to reaffirm the government's commitment to ensure that every district capital will have reliable electricity by the end of 1992."[198]

Rawlings remained good to his word. In 1992, the extensive work had begun to bring electricity to the Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions. Once in place, the PNDC set up a separate utility, which charged discounted electric rates to the North.

The Rawlings regime faced a series of coup attempts, mainly led by northern leftists. Yet, the coup-plotters were never able to develop sufficient support either within the armed forces or the general population. Rawlings' ability to quickly respond to political threats by building up important alliances and putting into effect preventative measures kept his detractors at bay and enabled him to stay in power for another decade.

III. Policy Implications - Development from 1984-1990

I have argued that Rawlings' early success was due to his political willingness to move towards the IMF. This was made possible because of Rawlings' pragmatism, his ability to adapt to changing political circumstances and his trust in technocrats. Moreover, Rawlings was able to survive the early crisis this move engendered by forging critical alliances, particularly with

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[197] J.J. Rawlings, *Unity is Strength: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1989*, Vol. 8. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1990, p. 106.

[198] J.J. Rawlings, 'The vitalizing spark of electricity' - inauguration of the national grid in the Upper East Region at Bolgatanga, on Tues, 10th April, 1990, in *Towards a Greater Tomorrow: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1988*, Vol 7. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1989, p. 48.

chiefs and the northern regions. In subsequent years, Rawlings was able to consolidate his control of the state. In large part, the capacity to do so was related to his critical decision to redirect the state's energies towards the rural areas. The PNDC's policies channeled resources towards rural, underprivileged areas, which bolstered his ability to resuscitate the economy and stabilize the state - despite growing urban discontent.

i. Rural Development

The period from 1984-1988, was the period in which the Rawlings regime began to 'institutionalize its relationship with rural people' (Ninsin 1991:58). Rhetorically and symbolically, Rawlings intensified his support of the peasantry, while the urban populations were increasingly vilified (Chazen 1993:36, Nugent 1995:137; Ninsin 1991:60). This position was expressly stated in the Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives new *Rural Manifesto*:

> The organized urban workers, because they are articulate - owing to their educational background - claim to speak for the working classes. That claim is grossly erroneous since the majority of the working classes who happen to live in the rural areas have little or no say in the cities where negotiations for salaries, wages, prices of commodities and other social benefits are carried out between government, management and the organised urban working classes. As a group, the urban rich and poor have exploited the majority in the rural areas for a long time...[199]

Rawlings' own rhetoric echoed these sentiments: "Our fellow citizens in the rural areas create the wealth to sustain the urban areas under conditions which increasingly threaten their own existence."[200]

The Chairman of the PNDC also became more visible in the rural areas. "[D]uring the post 1985 period [Rawlings] developed a strong inclination to interact more with rural populations. In more dramatic instances he camped by villages, worked with them on community projects and held durbars with them" (Ninsin 1991:62). He also worked to further his alignment with traditional rural elites. This strategic choice "became more obvious towards the close of the decade when Rawlings and his entourage made a special point of attending chiefly durbars throughout the country. At these events, Rawlings identified publicly with the concerns of the chiefs" (Nugent 205).

By 1985, the PNDC had already begun to make gains with cocoa farmers. Not least because the government had continued to raise the price paid to cocoa farmers in accordance with its objective to increase producers' share of the world price. Also, up to that point, most of the infrastructural rehabilitation projects had been centered in the cocoa growing regions, especially road repair and the construction of storage silos. Another element that ingratiated the regime to the cocoa farmers was the Akuafo Cheque system. Begun in August 1982 as a way to

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[199] *The Rural Manifesto (Policies, Plans and Strategies of the Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operatives to Effect Accelerated Rural Development in Ghana* (Accra: Ministry of rural Development and Cooperatives, 1984), p. 1, quoted in Nugent 1995:138.

[200] *Unity is Strength: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1989*, Vol. 8. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1990, p. 41

help curb cocoa smuggling, the system paid farmers directly by check for the cocoa they sold to an official marketing agency. It was 'a major success' because it "reduce[d] the practice whereby cocoa purchasing clerks cheated farmers of considerable amounts of money" (Ninsin 1991:60). As important was the fact that negotiations that Rawlings had begun in 1982 with the Dutch company, Reshiga Limited, to buy waste cocoa for pharmaceutical and cosmetic products had been settled at the end of March 1984 and cocoa farmers were finally able to sell their rotten cocoa, rather than throwing it away at a loss.[201]

Nevertheless, the regime took concrete steps to further its rural development agenda. After the major fires had been put out (both literally and figuratively), development priorities turned to increasing food production, rehabilitating rural infrastructure and addressing underdevelopment in the poorest regions, particularly in the North. Though food producers were no longer to receive subsidized inputs, they were now given greater price incentives. The government also established a guaranteed lowest price for food growers. Additionally, the regime continued its policy of giving cocoa growers a greater share of the producer price, with regular producer price increases. And to renew its support of farmers, a National Farmers' Day was introduced in 1985, designed to be a day to award productive farmers.[202]

Rawlings himself underscored his commitment to rural development on several occasions. Such was the case in his speech on March 4th, 1988, for the inauguration of the Afram Plains Agricultural Project:

> To give you some idea of the importance which we attach to agriculture, let me inform you that under the 1988 development budget, an amount of over C11 billion cedis has been devoted for the Agricultural Sector. This is 16.6% of the total national development budget and is second only to Roads and Highways, which has nearly C19billin, or 28% of the total and which, by making transport of inputs and produce easier also helps our farmers. In addition, the government has obtained a loan of $25 million from the African Development Fund, to ensure an adequate supply of inputs such as fertilizers, fishing nets, raw materials for the manufacture of agriculture tools, etc. A West German financial institution, KFW, has also provided a loan of $8.5 million for veterinary drugs, vaccines and livestock equipment.[203]

The allocation of expenditures on economic services from 1983 to 1991 clearly reflects the regime's stated priorities (See Table 18). In 1983, nearly one-half of the expenditures went to agriculture and thereafter, it stayed fairly consistently at one-quarter. The rehabilitation of roads

[201] *People's Daily Graphic*, March 29, 1984 p.1.

[202] Valerie Sackey, who was there when the idea came to Rawlings and was subsequently on the committee set up to codify the idea, gives this account: 'The idea came to then Chairman Rawlings during a visit to East Africa, which coincided with the first anniversary celebrations in Uganda of Yoweri Museveni's takeover...At the anniversary parade, those agricultural 'mobisquads' which had excelled during the past year were honoured and presented with prizes. The best received tractors. Chairman Rawlings remarked that the PNDC should do something similar to encourage Ghanaian farmers. On our return to Accra, a committee was set up. As well as representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers' and fishermen's associations, the members included the late Albin Korem, a Slovakian agriculturist and myself. We decided on the date (a period when farmers are not too busy) and the form (rotating venues for the national event, with simultaneous events in every region and district). Owing to the economic constraints at that time, the prizes were modest at first.' [Sackey 2011]

[203] *Towards a Greater Tomorrow: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan - 31st Dec 1988*, Vol. 7. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1989, p. 7.

and ports consumed one-third of the budget in the first ERP and went to almost fully half of the government's expenditures from 1987 until 1991.

Table 18: Composition of Government Expenditure on Economic Services, 1983-1991 (Percentages)									
	1983	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**	**1989**	**1990**	**1991**
Fuel & Energy	00.8	00.9	00.8	00.7	.0.0	00.3	00.04	00.7	00.0
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	848.2	626.1	424.4	828.8	323.8	919.4	727.6	727.3	222.6
Mining, Manufacturing and Construction	99.9	113.1	07.7	09.9	09.5	66.3	06.6	09.9	05.8
Roads and Waterways	828.8	737.4	232.1	424.0	343.5	848.3	444.9	242.0	151.4
Transport and Communication	07.7	010.2	222.8	424.4	313.9	09.8	07.1	08.5	07.9
Other	06.6	111.2	111.2	212.2	06.3	114.9	313.7	212.6	010.3

Source: State of the Ghanaian Economy in 1992, Accra: The Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana, Legon, 1993.

A central part of the PNDCs renewed rural commitment was embodied in the launching of the *Programme to Mitigate Against the Social Costs Of Structural Adjustment* (PAMSCAD), on June 9th, 1987, by P.V. Obeng. The program's stated objectives were to direct development expenditures 'at redressing the deprivations endured by the productive rural majority.'[204] To these ends, PAMSCAD encompassed a number of projects aimed at alleviating rural poverty, including a program for the distribution of food to lactating mothers and infants, in partnership with the World Food Organization and a 'Communities Initiative Programme', which focused on funding and promoting community organized development projects, such as building schools, digging wells, constructing latrines and rehabilitating feeder roads. PAMSCAD also took under its umbrella the placement of retrenched civil servants into agriculture and other semi-skilled jobs. The Mobisquads were charged with administering services to them, as well as helping with their training and placement.

Another key initiative undertaken at this time was the introduction of a new system of local government, the District Assemblies in 1988. The first significant innovation was an increase in the number of districts from 65 to 110, augmenting the power of localities to control their own destinies. Secondly, unlike the preceding systems, the new local government structures were mandated to include chiefs. The members of the new assemblies would now be one-third popularly elected, one-third chiefs and one-third government appointees. Finally, the District Assemblies would be the first local government structure to have funds ceded directly to it from the central government. The PNDC created the District Assembly Community Fund (DACF) to which it was mandated that the government dispense at least 5 percent of its expenditure annually.

Though the creation of district assemblies is often described cynically as having been implemented to increase state control at the local level, this interpretation appears to be an over-

[204] *A Program of Structural Adjustment*, Report prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris, May 1987, p. 10, 18-19.

simplification. The charge is usually based upon the fact that one-third of the district assemblies were to be state appointees. Yet, according to Nugent, of those appointed by the PNDC, a significant number were chosen from the professional classes or unions which were quite opposed to the PNDC. For example, the PNDC appointed prominent trade unionists as members of the councils, like Mr. Ahiable of the Teachers and Educational Workers Union and Mr. Yalley of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. They even appointed an outspoken Ashanti nationalist, Baafour Osei Akoto, to the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. As Nugent concludes, "On the whole these were not the sort of people who could be counted on to agree meekly with every policy of central government" (177). And it would appear that, at least at first, the choice to appoint professionals was a good one. As Nugent found, "the astute manner in which the PNDC filled the quota helped to place a greater range of skills at the disposal of the DAs and (contrary to expectations) helped to confer a considerable measure of popular legitimacy on these bodies. The result was that the Rawlings regime emerged with some credit from the District Assembly exercise" (178).

In the end, the District Assemblies proved far less successful at local development than the reformers had hoped. They were almost immediately plagued by dysfunctions, corruption and inefficiencies. Politically, however, the creation of this new local government apparatus helped to solidify the rural base the Rawlings regime had already begun to develop. The DAs provided a new means for the PNDC to coopt members of the professional classes, the trades unions and chiefs. As a result, the new institutions allowed the PNDC to forge important alliances "with the most influential power brokers at the community level" (Nugent 205). Kraus observed at the time that the District Assembly elections of 1988 had 'given it a new capacity to tap and mobilize rural support' (Kraus 1991:149). Thus, with the implementation of the new District Assemblies (DAs), the regime's long-standing and genuine desire to increase local participation in development was now being pursued with greater political astuteness.

This was demonstrated in the subsequent elections held for the District Assembly seats in three phases between 1988 and 1989. In the majority of rural areas there were record levels of participation, with over 60 percent turnout. On the other hand, in the urban areas the turnout was quite low. In Greater Accra only 44 percent and in Kumasi, the second largest metropolis, the participation rate was only 44.3%. The lowest was in the district of the University of Ghana, Legon where there was only an 11% turn out (Chazen 1991). As Chazen observes, "This distribution was indicative of the relative strength of the PNDC in the countryside and its waning credibility in the cities"(Chazen 1991:37)

Furthermore, those who were not coopted in the DAs could now channel their discontent through local elections and away from the national stage. Though the record levels of rural participation in the DA elections is often taken as testament to the higher levels of support the regime had developed in the rural areas, Herbst cautions that these high numbers should not be seen as reflecting unqualified support for the regime. In many races, the turnout was also due to the local opposition's ability to 'get-out-the-vote' in the hopes of undermining the power of the PNDC in their localities (Herbst 1991:89). But even this represents part of the political success of the decentralization: for these local elections allowed political dissatisfaction with the PNDC to be channeled towards local contests, relieving some of the pressure that was building up against the regime nationally.

Thus, through the 1980s, the Rawlings regime made a concerted effort to address the long-standing regional inequities in Ghana, woo traditional leaders and resuscitate agricultural productivity around the territory. As a result, he was able to build wide levels of grassroots

support in the countryside, particularly in the formerly neglected northern areas and the Volta Region, but also more generally among a large portion of the rural population.[205] His focus on rural development had allowed the PNDC to increase food production and stabilize the economy. This, in turn, had enabled Rawlings to solidify his hold on the state and prevent the military from splitting against him.

ii. Urban Discontent

While Rawlings was building up a faithful following in the rural areas, the urban areas were a different matter altogether. It was in the urban areas that Rawlings faced his greatest opposition. During his first ten years in office, there were continuous union and student strikes. Whereas ERP II had increased allocations for rural infrastructural development, it also placed a greater burden on urban consumers. Subsidies on goods and services were ended. By the end of the 1980s, only a handful of price controls were still in place. According to Herbst, Rawlings even went out of his way to underscore that the choice to remove price controls was necessary to reverse the favorable terms of trade that urbanites had over their rural counterparts (Herbst 1993:62-63). In addition,' after 1985 everyone except the destitute had to pay for hospital services and for drugs' (Nugent 1995:168). The PNDC also began to remove subsides for secondary school and university student housing and food.

Perhaps most significantly, the government undertook a serious retrenchment and redeployment program. By December 1992, 60,937 employees had been re-deployed, among them messengers, typists, clerks, charwomen, watchmen, cleaners, artisans, drivers, etc. The government encouraged as many retrenched workers as they could to 'redeploy' to the rural areas. Many were enrolled in the new, rural 'Food-for-Work' programme under PAMSCAD, of which approximately "30,000 opted and registered to undertake farming as their alternative source of employment and livelihood."[206] Nevertheless, many were left in the urban areas with few employment prospects and decreasing living standards.

Thus, normally perceived as the 'third-rail' in African politics, the PNDC was willing to weather the inevitable storm that this rise in urban living costs would engender. And weather it they did. Throughout the 1980s the PNDC was confronted with a series of workers' strikes and student demonstrations:

> ...between 1985 and 1988 the government had to contend with demands from almost all the key political groups in the country, including labor and students, manufacturers and professional politicians. Workers backed their demand for a living wage and improved working conditions with severe criticisms of the government's economic and social policies and a demand for constitutional rule as well as protection for civil liberties. Students of the country's three universities criticized the government's education and economic reform policies and demanded a return to constitutional rule. Neither was the business community, especially manufacturers happy with the government's open trade regime, which

[205] The two areas that remained hostile to the PNDC were the Ashanti and the Eastern Regions, despite the fact that cocoa growers in those regions were some of the greater beneficiaries of the PNDC policies. This is not surprising, given the fact that these two regions had historically been more closely linked to conservative political parties. In addition, the Ashanti and Akim have continued to make up a larger percentage of the intelligentsia which was under attack by the PNDC. Nevertheless, even in these areas the PNDCs favorable rural policies made some inroads.

[206] *PAMSCAD REPORT AS AT 31ST DECEMBER*, Accra: PAMSCAD Secretariat, May 1994, p. 14.

hurt local industry (Ninsin 1991:56-57).

Although, on occasion the government gave some concessions to students and unionists,[207] for the most part, it cracked down on them. After 1985, the government "relentlessly ferreted out and detained or intimidated critics and organized opposition" (Ninsin 1991:55). When, in June 1987 strikes and student protests broke out, the government closed down all three universities in Accra and dismissed and arrested prominent student leaders (Nugent 179). The government also "embarked on a deliberate policy of de-unionizing" (Ninsin 56). Some workers who had formerly had unions were now denied the right to organize.[208] Other workers unions were "systematically depleted through retrenchment [and] privatization of state enterprises"(Ninsin 56). For example, in September 1988, the government sold the Ghana Textile Printing Company (GTP) and dismissed all the workers who were forced to reapply for jobs. "A number of workers were eased out in this fashion" (Nugent 1995:172).

The PNDC also cracked down on Union leaders. The General-Secretary of the TUC, L.G.K. Ocloo, who resisted the PNDC for the longest time, was hounded by security forces and threatened with trumped up corruption charges. Eventually, Ocloo went into exile and was replaced with the more tractable A.K. Yankey who even defended the government's unpopular minimum wage legislation arguing that the country could not afford anything more generous (Nugent 181-182).

In short, by 1987 the government had alienated almost all of the organized urban constituents and lost "decisive support among urban-based classes" (Ninsin 1991:57). Though there were some concessions made, for the most part, the government used harsh tactics. The PNDC did try to coopt and incorporate the middle classes, but they met with little success - especially among the members of the professional classes. For the most part, Rawlings' political and economic strategies of the 1980s were geared away from the urban areas and towards developing rural infrastructure, expanding services and credit to farmers, increasing services to rural areas, expanding food production and establishing ties with traditional elites.

Though strikes and demonstrations spiked during this period, the regime's stability was never seriously threatened. Even the worst of the coup attempts was put down relatively quickly. All the coups were led by small, disorganized elements. By carefully building up rural support and remaining populist, the population remained supportive of Rawlings. Unlike Nkrumah, major portions of the military never turned against him and Rawlings was able to stay in power for two decades.

iii. Assessing the Political Effects of Rawlings' Rural Strategy

By 1990, most scholars agree that the terms of rural-urban trade had been reversed. Chazen sums up the transformation:

> ...the more notable outcome of the structural Adjustment Program [was] the reversal of the terms of trade between the rural and urban areas. Hikes in producer prices and infrastructural rehabilitation meant that the lot of many rural

[207] An example Herbst provides is when, in 1987, the government reversed its decision to eliminate leave allowances for employees after there was a huge outcry against the proposal (Herbst 1993:70).

[208] This happened, for example to the workers of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS) and the Ghana Board Corporation (GBC), ostensibly because it would endanger national security.

> communities improved, while residents of the cities carried the burden of the reform program. Statistics showed that the exodus from the rural areas had been halted and that people were returning to the countryside. The socioeconomic processes that had supported the urban bias of the past had been replaced by a more dispersed pattern of resource allocation (Chazen 1991:34).

Similarly, Jaeger noted that "significant reverse migration is occurring from non-agricultural to agricultural occupations since the introduction of Ghana's reform program" (Jaeger, March 1991:vi).

That said, it is important to acknowledge that not all of Rawlings actions benefitted the rural areas and some took time to take effect. Many of the development projects were plagued with inefficiencies. And though the PNDC sought to increase its alliances with traditional elites, some chiefs were also removed by the PNDC.[209] There is therefore a debate within the scholarship about whether the rural areas actually benefited much from the regimes' initiatives.

Herbst noted in 1991 that, "people in the rural areas are still absolutely poorer than they were in the mid-1970s" and that the gains to cocoa farmers would not be significant until the new trees the government helped farmers plant began to crop, which takes seven years (1991:83). Several scholars at the time emphasized the fact that even though some cocoa farmers did gain from the government's rehabilitation efforts, it was by and large only a small number of wealthy cocoa farmers that saw any kind of change in their income (Herbst 1991; Kraus 1991; Ninsin 1991). And while Kraus found that the terms of trade after 1983 steadily favored food producers, Ninsin argued that decentralization measures shifted a considerable tax burden onto the rural areas, as did education reforms which reintroduced school fees (Kraus 1991; Ninsin 1991). The government itself acknowledged some of these problems in 1987:

> The recovery of food production in 1984 and 1985 has improved the situation compared with 1983, but we recognize that serious nutritional deficiencies persist among these groups. Moreover, living standards have been further eroded by the past decline in quality and levels of service in the health, education, water and sanitation sectors.[210]

Though it remains difficult to gauge how much improvement actually reached the rural majority, most of the major indicators seem to support the observation that "the change in economic conditions since the extraordinary depressed years of 1982-1983 is palpable to anyone who has been in Ghana" (Kraus 1991:129). From 1982 to 1990, life expectancy increased from an average of 52 years of age to 58, while infant mortality and birth rates decreased.

Graph 1: Life Expectancy at Birth, Ghana 1977-2000

[209] Particularly after the promulgation of the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Law, 1993 (PNDCL 307), 'which prohibited the conferment or recognition on any person enstooled or enskinned who had a previous conviction for an offense involving 'fraud, dishonesty or moral turpitude'... [and thus] legitimized the de-recognition of many chiefs that had been affected since that period' (National Reconcilation Commission, Vol.2 2004 (2):54).

[210] *A Program of Structural Adjustment,* Report prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris, May 1987, p. 17.



Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011.

Graph 2: Mortality Rate, Ghana 1975-2000



Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011

Graph 3: Crude Birth Rate, Ghana 1975-2000



Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011

In addition, the rural areas made some clear gains. For example, according to a PAMSCAD report, the Food-for-Work program in the North assisted 222 rural Communities in the cultivation of 2,357.5 acres of arable land under agroforestry and afforestation. And approximately 8,000 peasant farmers and their 32,000 dependents were the beneficiaries of the program.[211] Several other studies have shown that these programs allowed for an appreciable

[211] *PAMSCAD REPORT AS AT 31ST DECEMBER*, Accra: PAMSCAD Secretariat, May 1994, p. 13.

growth in agricultural production. For example, in the Hohoe District of the Volta Region, between 1984 and 1986 Mobisquads rehabilitated 4,000 hectares of abandoned cocoa farms. 'Another 36 hectares were also rehabilitated and given to old and incapacitated farmers who could not maintain the farms on their own because of combined effect of swollen shoot infection and high cost of labor that had rendered several aged farmers helpless' (Oquaye 2004:456). Kraus found that the 'PNDCs open encouragement of cocoa and food farmers and much higher price for cocoa, plus road and vehicle repair, have induced many farmers to support PNDC policies' (1991:149). Jaeger saw Ghana as "a striking example of both how deleterious the effects of bad economic policies can be and how changing those poor policies can have a dramatic effect for agriculture and for the economy overall," in part because agricultural exports had rebounded after real producer prices had been nearly doubled (Jaeger March 1991:39). Among the reasons he sites for Ghana's economic success was the additional labor brought to the agricultural sector by the incorporation of expelled workers from Nigeria.

Graph 4: Immunization of DPT & Measles, Ghana 1981-1995



Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011

But perhaps the most important gains cannot be gauged by econometric figures. Though living costs appear to have increased for many rural dwellers, the government's investment in infrastructure and social services had an enormous psychological impact on the rural areas. Indeed, as Nugent observed, 'It is hard to exaggerate the political impact [of new roads] in areas where poor roads had long been a source of grievance' (Nugent 1995:206). And it was not just roads. The PNDC had for the first time started to provide underserved rural areas with pipe-borne water, schools, immunization campaigns and electricity. Even the introduction of television and radio helped people in isolated villages feel more like they were a part of the national community.

While the benefits to the rural areas are debated, the same is not true for the urban areas. There seems little question that the organized urban groups in particular fared the worst under the PNDC. And despite this fact, the regime was able to stay in power, stabilize the polity and develop the economy. In conclusion, it was precisely Rawlings' success in reversing the long-standing urban-bias in government policy and his choice to promote rural areas - by decentralizing government, empowering local rural elites, offering favorable terms to producers, offering incentives for rural re-settlement and expanding rural infrastructure - that were the keys to his achievements.

The greatest proof of the positive impact of Rawlings' rural policies may be said to lay in electoral success his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), had among the rural population after the introduction of multi-party elections. Indeed, the areas where Rawlings focused the most attention - the Volta; the new cocoa growing areas of the Western Region, such as Sefwi-Aowin and parts of Brong-Ahafo; and the neglected areas in the North, particularly in the Upper East, Upper West and Northern Brong-Ahafo - all became solidly supportive of Rawlings' government throughout the 1990s; and, in most of these regions, is still manifest today. Thus, even in the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana, Rawlings' NDC party had large majorities in the Upper West, Upper East and Volta Regions, as well as the North of Brong-Ahafo and the northern part of the Western Region.

Focusing on the rural areas and the neglected North had thus enabled Rawlings to bring onboard the rural chiefs and their followers. Initially, this was strategically critical to making sure that the Northern constituencies and particularly those in the security forces, did not turn against the PNDC after the 'revolutionary' leftist faction had been purged. It was therefore central to Rawlings' ability to sustain the political stability. The concentration on rural areas and the promotion of traditional leaders had also enabled Rawlings to resuscitate the export economy and increase food production during the critical years of the 1980s. Again, it was these policies that allowed Rawlings to consolidate his power and prevent the military from fracturing against him.

In its first decade then, the Rawlings regime had done what is conventionally thought not to be done by African governments: it had developed a rural base of support and spurned its urban constituents - and in the absence of multiparty elections! And though there were some bumpy moments, the regime was never really put into jeopardy. The realignments begun in 1983 and continued through to 1990 had enabled the government to sustain political stability and make progress in its mission to reverse the years of economic degradation. The ability of the PNDC strategists to respond to changing circumstances and adopt new tactics had been critical in both these regards.

Conclusion

I have argued above that Rawlings' success cannot be simply construed as due to his being forced by circumstances to follow the dictates of the IMF and World Bank. First of all, it was never a foregone conclusion that the PNDC would adopt the reforms. Rawlings' counterpart in Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara, had conducted a revolution very much similar to that of Rawlings, yet Sankara was unwilling to work with the 'imperialists' and stayed dogmatically against the Mossi traditional elite. Even Limann, Rawlings' conservative predecessor, had been very slow in moving towards IMF reforms, though faced with the same structural problems as Rawlings. Despite continual pressure from the IMF and World Bank, the Limann government's fear of the destabilizing effects of devaluation had kept it from reaching any agreement with the Fund.[212] And Limann did not have radical revolutionaries in his cabinet to whom he was indebted.

Moreover, the reason the World Bank and IMF were willing to ratchet up their support for Ghana in the mid-1980s was because of the successes the Ghanaian government was reaping.

[212] *Liberia and Ghana - Policy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* US Government Printing Office: Washington, June 1982. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1982, p. 15-16.

Neither the plans for decentralization, retrenchment of the civil service, nor focus on export agriculture had come wholly from the IMF. They emerged, in part, out of the PNDCs commitment to end corruption by down-sizing and decentralizing government; its conviction that independence rested first and foremost on self-sufficiency in food; and its recognition of the need to rehabilitate the productive base of the economy. P.V. Obeng surmises that, "so well done was [the economists'] technical work that the World Bank did not have to have to impose conditions that we had not thought were necessary ourselves...The respect that the world bank and the IMF had for Ghana, I believe started from that engagement."[213]

Thus, even if it is conceded that at the time Rawlings was left with little choice, the extent to which Rawlings was able to restructure the economy and restore stability to the state has to be understood as, in large part, due to the regime's willingness to undertake such measures in the first place. To explain Rawlings' success, therefore, either in terms of funding or timing is simply insufficient.

Nor can Rawlings be understood to have implemented rurally-oriented policies solely as an attempt to build up rural support for elections. It is true that he did step up his rural infrastructural projects in the run-up to the elections in 1992. But the infrastructural projects undertaken had been planned long before and were consistent with the regime's policy objectives from its inception: the very purposeful effort to build up local control, address regional inequities and his missionary zeal to eliminate corruption. Moreover, the push for elections had forced the regime to make greater concessions in the *urban* areas. For example, in 1992 Joe Abbey had strongly advocated that the regime capitulate to labor's demands for increased wages because he feared that, if there were too many anti-regime demonstrations and Rawlings felt his back was against the wall, he might suspend elections, which would have grave implications for the continued donor support.[214] And Oelbaum underscores the fact that after 1992 the government's relations with business substantively improved (Oelbaum 2002:307).

Perhaps, the most important element in Ghana's success was the 'Rawlings Factor': Rawlings as a figure himself. Though he transformed over the years, he didn't fundamentally sway from his core objectives. As Chazen observed, 'Rawlings displayed a combination of astuteness and self-preservation on the one hand and consistency in the pursuit of his transforming mission on the other' (1993:35). Throughout his time in office, he continued to deliver the message to the Ghanaian people of the need for sacrifice and hard work; and he continued to be regarded as incorruptible - even by his detractors (though that became less and less so for his Ministers). Yet, at the same time, Rawlings was able to adapt to changing circumstances, read the impact of his policies on the Ghanaian people and respond accordingly

In the end, J .J. Rawlings successfully presided over a stable polity for two decades. He took over a state which had all but collapsed and left one in its stead with real institutions and political stability. What is more, he left power after being openly defeated in the polls in 2000, setting the stage for Ghana's future democratic success. Overall, Rawlings' success has to be understood as due to his leadership and more specifically to his political willingness and capacity to carry through the crucial resuscitation of his country's failed productive base by risking his own political gains in the urban areas in the process.

[213] Interview with P.V. Obeng, Accra: Oct 19, 2010
[214] Interview with Abbey, September 2011.

CHAPTER 5

HENRI KONAN BÉDIÉ: IVOIRITÉ AND THE LOSS OF THE RURAL PERIPHERY

At face value, the case of Bédié appears at odds with the general thesis of this paper. Bédié's productive policies favored the rural areas and he was the first to decentralize government administration. Nevertheless, Bédié's cumulative policies served to alienate rural areas and mobilize ethnic political leaders in the capital. In an attempt to impede his long-time adversary, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), Bédié introduced a series of inflammatory, jingoistic policies and exclusionary citizenship laws. These fostered ethnic conflict in the rural areas, alienating large parts of the countryside and mobilizing ethnic counterparts in the urban areas, as well as within the military. In the end, the coup against Bédié was led by Generals who were affiliated with the ethno-regional movements that supported Ouattara, the very opponent Bédié had tried to suppress. In the case of Bédié, once again, the President's attempt to undermine his opposition only increased its strength and alienated the military, ultimately leading to his being ousted in a coup.

I. Origin of the Opposition

An inauspicious beginning

From the beginning Bédié's career was steered by Houphouët. Despite some ups and downs, by 1990 Houphouët had placed Bédié in line for the succession as the head of state. He was accordingly referred to as the 'dauphin,' the prince in waiting for the throne. But despite Houphouët's best efforts, Bédié's political trajectory was to come under threat, as dramatic changes were implemented in Côte d'Ivoire in response to the state's economic crisis.

Bédié's career began in the 1950s. He quickly rose in the government to a position of prominence. By 1966 he had been named Economic and Finance Minister, a position which he held for eleven years. In that capacity, Bédié was credited with being the architect of the 'Ivorian Miracle.' His success won him international regard. As a result, Bédié was appointed the first Chairman of the IMF and World Bank's joint Development Committee, a position which he held from 1974 to 1976. However, in 1977, Bédié and three other top Ministers became embroiled in a scandal over contracts for large sugar complexes in the North. All four ministers were dismissed from government.

Nonetheless, three years later, Houphouët summoned Bédié back to Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët had determined that Bédié would become the President of the National Assembly. To make this happen, he first set Bédié up to run as the representative of Daoukro unopposed. Then, during the 1980 PDCI Congress, Houphouët summarily dismissed Philippe Yacé, his long-time second in command, who had acted as both Secretary General of the party and President of the National Assembly since 1959. In fact, no one was more stunned by this political maneuver than Yacé, who had not been informed of the decision ahead of time and only learned of it while seated below Houphouët on the dais as the announcement was made (David Lamb 1988:125). It has been conjectured that the reason for this summary dismissal was that Yacé had "prematurely" begun overtly running the presidency which was not yet vacant (Loucou 1992:148). With Yacé removed, Houphouët appointed Bédié as President of the National Assembly.

It is not clear why Houphouët put so much stock in Bédié. It may have been that with Bédié as the number two man, Houphouët did not feel threatened. Bédié had little charisma, being more of a technocrat than a political leader and was therefore less likely to develop an independent following.[215] Some believe the choice was made because Bédié was Houphouët's illegitimate son. Other's emphasize the fact that Bédié was Baoulé, which allowed Houphouët to keep things in the clan. Whatever reasons Houphouët had for promoting Bédié, Bédié's fortunes were soon to be put in jeopardy.

Bédié's assured political future first became threatened ten years later, with the arrival on the Ivorian political stage of Alassane Dramane Ouattara. 1990 marked a watershed for both Bédié and the country as a whole. Everything changed. First, on March 2nd 1990, the largest pro-democracy demonstration was held. Thousands took to the streets in Abidjan and Bingerville. Pro-democracy demonstrations continued throughout the month. At the same time, on March 15th, the Economic and Finance Minister, Koumoué Koffi, released a communiqué announcing that, as a result of negotiations with the IMF, the government would be initiating austerity measures that would include reductions in Civil Service salaries. From then on the capital was engulfed in demonstrations. Virtually every sector took to the streets in protest (S. Samba Koné 1991).

Facing the possibility of an ignoble ouster, Houphouët was forced to make drastic changes. His Economic and Finance Minister was sacked and the IMF sent in its own man to fix the situation: Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO). Alassane Ouattara, who at the time was serving as the Governor of the Central Bank of West African States, was given the task of turning around the country's moribund economy without precipitating a full scale revolt. He quickly formed an 'Inter-ministerial Committee on Economic and Financial Questions.' By May 23rd, the government announced that it would be annulling the salary cuts and initiating the new 'Ouattara Plan' to address the economic crisis (S. Samba Koné 1991:84). In November, Alassane Ouattara was promoted to Prime Minister, which placed him at the head of the government (though Houphouët remained its titular head). It was generally believed that Houphouët had been forced to appoint Ouattara head of the government to reassure the donor community that the necessary policies would be initiated as efficiently and swiftly as possible.

Ouattara's appointment as Prime Minister was immediately controversial. Though Ouattara had been born in Côte d'Ivoire, he had spent the majority of his life living elsewhere. He left Côte d'Ivoire as a teenager to attend secondary school in Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso). He then went to pursue advanced degrees in the United States. In 1968, he was appointed as an economist in the International Monetary Fund, where he remained until late 1973. Afterward, he served in several capacities for the IMF and Central Bank of West African States in Paris. In late 1984, he returned to the IMF as Director of the African Department and in October 1988, he was named Governor of the BCEAO.[216] With this biography, Ouattara had had very little to do with the Ivorian political elite or even the Ivorian culture. He had not lived in Côte d'Ivoire since his childhood, was married to a French woman and had adopted manners and a lifestyle that were far more European than African. He was therefore seen by most as an outsider. Moreover, he was a conservative economist which put him at odds with many of the established political elite, as well as leftist intellectuals.

In the meantime, Houphouët's health was deteriorating. In 1990, he was already 85 years

[215] He is often referred to as the 'Sphinx,' in part because he is not much of a public speaker.

[216] See Alassane Ouattara's biography on his own official site http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/ado.htm, as well as on the IMF site, http://www.ado.ci/rubrique.php?lg=en.

old. Speculations about the succession had occupied the nation for over a decade, but Houphouët always resisted making any clear statement about who he intended to have follow him or when he expected to step down. With the new appointment of Ouattara, Houphouët was finally forced to name his successor. On November 6th, the National Assembly passed Loi N˚ 90-1529, introducing articles 11, 12 and 24 to the constitution. Article 12 added the position of Prime Minister to the Government allowing Houphouët to nominate Ouattara as head of government. Article 24 stated that the President could delegate authority to the Prime Minister during his absence. But the article that most consumed the Ivoirian public was Article 11. Article 11 established that it would be the President of the National Assembly – not the Prime Minister, nor the Secretary General of the PDCI – who would be his constitutional successor. It stipulated that in the event of death, resignation or incapacity of the President, the President of the National Assembly would become the head of the state after having been confirmed by the Supreme Court, until new elections could be scheduled within the next year.[217]

With ADO, the Prime Minister and Bédié, the President of the National Assembly and heir apparent, the two men were naturally pitted against one another. It is likely that their competing positions as the country's leading economists – Bédié being architect of the country's historical economic plan and Ouattara the new economic reformer – did not help matters. The PDCI, a relatively coherent party for decades, began to break into factions. There were now the Bédiéstes, the Alassanistes, and later even the Yaciestes, a faction that followed the former Secretary-General of the PDCI, Philippe Yacé.[218] For the most part, the Alassanistes were the 'new' men of the party – the technocrats who had benefitted or would potentially benefit from the reformist agenda, while the Bédiéstes were of the old guard, men like Dona-Fologo, the Secretary General of the PDCI. In addition to the old guard, Bédié had the support of many of the new generation PDCI members who had been recruited in 1990 and did not want to put their career prospects in jeopardy by denying Bédié the Presidency (Crook 1997:224). The technocrats were organized by the reformer Djéni Kobina who sought to revitalize the party. He and Ouattara were seen by the younger, more progressive members of the party as offering a bulwark against the corrupt system and the inner decay of the party (Fofana 2009)

At the same time, multipartism was officially introduced in Côte d'Ivoire on April 30th, 1990. Several opposition parties had been formed, most of which were quite small, headed by urban, socialist intellectuals.[219] But one party, the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), made greater inroads. Its leader had been the most important opposition leader to emerge in the 1980s, Laurent Gbagbo, a leftist history lecturer at Legon University. Gbagbo had been at the forefront of university protests throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s, he built up a clandestine party-movement that had been joined by other disaffected intellectuals.[220] Thus, by 1990 he had a significant – though not quite national – following. Most of his supporters were urban intellectuals, students, unionists and leftists. He also had a strong following among the Bété populations, particularly in Gagnoa where Gbagbo was from, as well as smaller pockets of

[217] *Journal Official,* 'Numero Special', N˚43, Mercredi 7, Novembre 1990, Loi N˚ 90-1529 du 6 Novembre 1990 portant modification des articles 11,12 et 24 de la Constitution.

[218] *Le Nouvel Horizon*, No 169 10 december 1993, pp. 5

[219] *Le Parti Ivoirien de Travailleurs (PTI), l'Union des Socio-democrates (USD), le Parti Socialiste Ivoirien (PSI).*

[220] Among the new leaders of the movement was Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, youngest son of Gbon Coulibaly who had been alienated by Houphouët in 1980 when he won the first open election in Korhogo for Mayor but was forced to resign and was replaced by a different representative of the Coulibaly family. Houphouët had tried to win Lanciné back, even placing him as Vice-President of the National Assembly, but Lanciné Gon now eagerly joined the with Gbagbo. Interviews with Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, Korhogo and Abidjan 2009.

support in the North and Southeast. Jailed several times, he was finally allowed to contest the Presidential elections in November 1990.

With this opening, a new vitality was also sparked in the PDCI-RDA. The movement was led by Djéni Kobina, a former student union leader who had helped found the *Syndicat National des Enseignants du Second Degre de Côte d'Ivoire* (SYNESCI)[221] and was later was coopted by the PDCI. Despite his cooptation, Kobina had kept his penchant for political mobilization. He now founded the *Coordination pour la Renovation du PDCI* in May 1990. The movement was basically an opposition party at the heart of the party. Kobina attracted to his 'renovation movement', young technocrats in the party. They positioned themselves against the old corrupt party leadership, advocating for more transparency and responsiveness within the PDCI. At the 8th party Congress in July 1990, Kobina's faction was able to push forward much of their agenda, including their promotion of Ouattara's economic program (Fofana 2009).

Along with the legalization of parties came the legalization of the press. Several newspapers with alternative views emerged, among them *le Nouvel Horizon*, *le Voie* and *La Nouvelle Presse*, the first two politically aligned with Gbagbo's FPI. The alternative press began to attack both Bédié and Ouattara. At first, Ouattara was primarily attacked for being a stooge of the IMF and France. He was accused of selling off Ivorian assets to benefit a few wealthy cronies. It was suggested that Ouattara's expensive home was a 'gift' from the President, revealing that all his talk of breaking with the corrupt practices of the PDCI-RDA was no more than posturing.[222] But as time progressed, the attacks against Ouattara became more insidious. He was accused of being a Burkinabé (i.e. from Burkina Faso) not an Ivorian citizen and therefore not entitled to be in line for political succession. He was also charged with being a '*nordiste*'. As early as February 1991, the opposition published an article which lampooned Ouattara for having traded in his position as "Oudi Naba," e.g. the equivalent of the Prime Minister to the Moro Naba (the most important Chieftaincy in Burkina Faso), for the position of Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire.[223] More directly, in April 1992 a series of articles ran in *le Nouvel Horizon*, which scrutinized 'The Political Men' behind Ouattara.[224] It was charged that 'Ouattara's lobby' had a "strong tribal or regionalist" complexion. They were said to be, with few exceptions, from Odienné, Guinea, Mali, Burkina, or other Northern parts. It was also claimed that they all adhered to Islam and shared a "disproportionate ambition."[225]

As Ouattara was being accused of being a '*nordiste*' and essentially plotting an Islamic take-over of the state, both the opposition and the reformist factions within the PDCI had begun to attack the legality of Article 11. Bédié's opponents charged that the amendment was tantamount to the promulgation of 'hereditary succession', creating a 'neo-pharaonique,' 'monarchical republic,' designed to keep the Baoulé in power. Calls were made for the courts to review the constitutionality of the amendment. But the Supreme Court at the time was crippled. Its President, Lanzeni Coulibaly, had left his post and had not been replaced. It was reported that the government removed Coulibaly from office fearing that he would align with Ouattara (presumably because he was a northerner) in collusion against Bédié and would strike down the amendment.[226]

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[221] Francis Wodié was the first Secretary General of SYNESCI in 1969 before he left the country after Kobina and Gbagbo were arrested. Kobina became Secretary General in 1970. See Wodié 2010:72-75.

[222] *Le Nouvel Horizon* no 26 - 18 mars 1991, pp. 13 - "Un Chateau pour Alassane Ouattara. Deja!"

[223] *Le Nouvel Horizon* no 21 - 11 fevrier 1991, pp. 3 "M. Alassane Ouattara: L "mouton" du sacrifice"

[224] See also Lemassou Fofana 2009.

[225] "Les Hommes Politique," *Le Nouvel Horizon* No 81, April 3 1992, pp. 4, 5, 6.

[226] *Le Nouvel Horizon*, no 162 22 October 1993 - pp. 8-9; *Le Nouvel Horizon*, No 169 10 decembre 1993, pp 5

Thus, in 1993, the PDCI began to fracture even further over the issue of succession, particularly as Houphouët's health deteriorated. Approaching his 88th year, Houphouët was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Throughout the year he spent several months abroad in France receiving treatment. His absence added to concerns over the imminent succession. On November 29th, 1993, the FPI held a convention calling for the leadership of all the political parties to initiate discussions towards forming a transitional government.[227] Shortly after, on December 1st, Yacé echoed the sentiments of the FPI. In a speech before "PDCI sages," he also proposed initiating talks with the opposition to find a political solution to the problem of succession. In angry response, Dona-Fologo, the Secretary General of the PDCI, held his own party conference, condemning Yacé as a traitor and reasserting the party's support of Article 11.[228] Later that week, Alassane Ouattara weighed in on the matter, publically supporting a negotiated solution.

None of the opposing sides realized how soon the succession would be upon them. On December 7th 1994, the Ivorian public learned that its longtime president had died. Within hours of Houphouët's death, Bédié, escorted by several dozen soldiers, forced his way into the state television station and announced to the nation that Houphouët was deceased and that he had assumed the Office of the Presidency. Given the assemblage of forces opposed to Article 11, it is understandable that Bédié acted quickly. But at the same time, making an such an overt power grab had started him off on the wrong footing. His unseemly choice to muscle his way into the television station had shocked many.[229] Moreover, though the constitution clearly stated that he was supposed to take over the government, it was also stipulated that the Supreme Court had to first confirm the succession. Yet, Bédié had not waited for the Supreme Court or a third party to make the public announcement, instead choosing to announce his succession himself.

Part of the reason for Bédié's decision appears to be his fear of an impending coup on the part of Ouattara's supporters. According to one source, at 3 am on the night of 7th, Bédié had convened a meeting with military leaders, General Tany and General Guëi and the Minister of Defense Leon Konan Koffi, asking them to be at his disposal and not to respond to any summons from the Prime Minister. Though Guëi and Tany did not oppose Bédié, Leon Konan Koffi, the Defense Minister, reportedly condemned Bédié's 'self-proclamation'. The following day, December 8th, Ouattara met with military leaders, including General Coulibaly and Colonel Palenfo (both of whom were to take part in the 1999 coup). Soon after, the Defense Minister, the chiefs of the army, the air force and the police all pledged their loyalty to Ouattara.[230]

Though the Ivorian military establishment had largely sided with Ouattara, France had not.[231] It was reported that thirty-five highly trained French commandos, "Spooks", were prepared to arrest Ouattara.[232] It was also reported that Bédié had sent a superior officer in the French army accompanied by Ivorian officers to arrest the Prime Minister.[233] Not wanting to force a constitutional crisis, Ouattara chose to resign and leave the country. On December 9th,

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[227] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 30, 1993, Tuesday, "FPI convention reaffirms opposition to Article 11 on hereditary succession," SOURCE: Television Ivoirienne, Abidjan, 28 Nov 93.

[228] *la Voie* no 662 du 2 decembre 1993, pp. 2, 3; *Le Nouvel Horizon* No 168 3 decembre 1993, pp. 3 .

[229] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 10, 1993, Friday, "AFP reports controversy over succession following death of Houphouet-Boigny"; *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), December 10, 1993, pp. A9; Cindy Shiner, "Ivorian Crisis Ends," *The Washington Post*, December 10, 1993, pp. A52.

[230] "Le film de la demission d'Alassane Ouattara", *Nouvel Horizon*, N° 171, 24 decembre 1993, pp. 4. "Power Struggle Is Simmering in Ivory Coast," *NYT*, December 9, 1993. "PM of Ivory Coast loses power struggle; Speaker succeeds Houphouet-Boigny," *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), December 10, 1993.

[231] *Le Nouvel Horizon* No 169, 10 December 1993, "Apres la mort d'Houphouët la France installe Bédié"

[232] *la Voie*, no 668, 11 and 12 December 1993, pp. 4 'L'insulte de la France aux Ivoiriens'

[233] "Le film de la demission d'Alassane Ouattara," *Nouvel Horizon*, 24 decembre 1993, pp. 4.

Ouattara publicly announced his resignation.[234] Soon after, he accepted the post of Deputy Director-General of the IMF in Washington, in charge of a portfolio of ninety countries (Crook 1997:225).

Thus, in a manner of speaking, the first Ivorian coup had both been prevented and conducted in 1993. Ironically, though it is often argued that Bédié lost his presidency because he did not have French backing, truth is that, at the beginning, Bédié did have French support - it was, therefore, his to lose.

II. The Possibilities: The Economy Resurgent

Though Bédié's political beginnings were inauspicious, his economic beginnings were arguably propitious. For his last decade, Houphouët had resisted the devaluation of his currency - which he saw as a mark of failure.[235] It was therefore not until January 1, 1994 that the Franc CFA was devalued. The devaluation immediately buoyed the Ivorian economy. Inflation soared briefly to 32.2 percent, but quickly began to drop off and stabilized to an average of 2 percent per annum. As a result, domestic demand recovered, rising from about 8 percent share of nominal GDP in 1993 to 16 percent in 1998.[236]

The positive effects of the devaluation were further boosted by resurgent concessional aid flows between 1994 and 1998. Foreign assistance was doubled in U.S. dollar terms between 1993 and 1995 (see Graph 4). The international community also helped reduce the country's external debt burden. Between 1994 and 1997, the government signed three debt agreements: the 1994 Paris Club debt rescheduling, the 1996 London Club agreement and the 1997 G-7 decision to include Côte d'Ivoire in the IMF-World Bank debt forgiveness initiative for heavily indebted poor countries.[237]

At the same time, cocoa prices that had long been in decline began to revive. The rebound started in September 1993 and prices remained on an upward trajectory until 1997. The government passed on these increases to producers. Producer prices were increased from 44 percent of export prices (CFAF 316 per kilo) at the beginning of 1994/95 agricultural season, to about 63 percent of export prices (CFAF 575 per kilo) during the first half of the 1998/99 agricultural season. Resurgent prices were accompanied by unprecedented levels of production. In 1995, the country had achieved 1.2 million tons of cocoa output, an historic level. That output was maintained until 1999. The expansion was due to the fact that improved tree varietals that had been planted in the late 1980s and early 1990s had gone into production in 1995. Increased output was also aided by the expansion in the total acreage planted in the early 1990s (IMF 2000:9, 35). Bédié's cotton programs in the North were also proving to be quite successful. Cotton production increased almost 9 percent annually over this period (IMF 2000:9).

Cumulatively, these factors all contributed to an impressive recovery. Economic growth skyrocketed from 0.7 percent to an average of 5 percent per-annum. Starting in 1995, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first sustained improvement in per capita GDP since the late 1970s. With the sizeable reduction in its debt burden, the overall fiscal deficit was also reduced, from 11.9 percent of GDP in 1993 to 2.3 percent in 1996. As a result, activity in almost all sectors of the economy picked up. Trade and commerce increased so considerably that the volume of traffic at

[234] Ibid.

[235] Anonymous interview with former Minister in Houphouët's government, Abidjan, November 2010.

[236] IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/107, "Côte d'Ivoire :Selected Issues and Statistical ," August 2000.

[237] (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm, accessed 3/10/2011).

the port of Abidjan rose by 21 percent, making Côte d'Ivoire the third-largest in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of volume (IMF 2000:10). Thus, by 1995, the economic situation had improved "dramatically" and "a consumer boom was under way in both the rural and urban areas" (Crook 1997:230).

Bédié also implemented policies favorable to both urban and rural populations. One of his first policy announcements was that his government would be increasing salaries for most civil servants by 15% and the army would also be receiving pay increases.[238] Priority was placed on the health and education sectors. The government increased its spending on health and education by roughly 20 percent annually. Between 1995 and 1997, the state constructed about 700 new classrooms and 50 new clinics (IMF 2000:21).

At the same time, the government sought to revive the country's infrastructure, which had gone into decline. In 1996, the World Bank approved funding for twelve large infrastructural projects as part of the government's larger economic stimulus policy. These included the development of two toll highways, three toll bridges, the construction of a long distance bus station and an Olympic Stadium in Abidjan.[239] But the centerpiece of Bédié's infrastructural development was his large road projects. Work was begun on a major road to connect Korhogo with Odienné and another to connect Angré with Abobo.[240] The most important project, however, was the construction of a major artery to connect the East to the West of the country, from Abidjan to San Pedro, named the coastal route (la 'Côtière').

Bédié's infrastructural development also benefited rural areas. Several secondary and tertiary roads around the country were repaired and paved. Between 1995 and1997, electricity was brought to 408 villages for the first time. The government also built 1,382 housing units in rural areas around the country (in the Region des Lac, Region des Lagune, Region des Savannah, Region de N'zi Comoe, Region de l'Agneby and Region des Montagnes.[241]

Thus, Bédié began with a number of things going in his favor. He benefited from the positive effects of the devaluation and an upturn in world prices. In addition he had the support of France and the international donor community. And even though the opposition had made some headway, the country was not familiar with the new parties. The PDCI was still the most recognized and respected party country-wide – particularly among the older generation. Bédié therefore might have pulled through. Ultimately Bédié's own policies were his undoing.

III. The Reality: Politics Unravels

It was quite clear that the succession was going to be bitterly contested. Bédié's 'self-proclamation,' as it was derisively labeled, was sure to incite massive criticism, raise doubts about the legitimacy of his status and exacerbate existing tensions – all of which came to pass.[242] Though it is arguable that Bédié had little choice at the time and was forced to make a quick move to ensure his hold on power, his subsequent decisions less equivocally demonstrate his poor political judgment.

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[238] Surprisingly the policy almost backfired on him because he had not given the lower ranks in the army a comparable increase to the lower ranks in the Civil Service and junior officers and troops almost mutinied (*La Voie* no 1115, mercredi 14 Juin 1995:2).
[239] *Fraternité Matin*, 21 February 1996; *Fraternité Matin* 12 Mars 1996.
[240] *Fraternité Matin*, 25 Oct 1994.
[241] *Fraternité Matin*, Jeudi 28 Mai 1998, pp. 10; *Fraternité Matin,* Samedi 16- Dimanche 17 Mai 1998, pp. 4.
[242] *la Voie* 11 and 12 December 1993, pp. 4; *Le Nouvel Horizon*, no 171 24 decembre 1993., pp. 10.

Two days after his 'self-proclamation' Bédié purged all the members of the government believed to be associates of ADO. Among those dismissed were Patrice Kouamé, Henriette Dagri Diabeté, Jacqueline Oblé, Adama Coulibaly, Nibi Zana and Grah Claire. Also dismissed was Colonel Lassano Palenefo, Ouattara's Security Minister. At the same time, those that had been most strongly opposed to Ouattara were promoted. Laurent Dona-Fologo, Pierre Kipré and Faustin Kouamé all gained cabinet positions (Fofana 2009:26). Bédié also purged Ouattara loyalists in the civil service, party and government media. Among the northerners sacked were Ali Coulibaly, the head of Ivorian TV1, Koné Moussa, the editor of *Ivoir Soir*, and Yacouba Kebé, the managing director of *Fraternité Matin* (Crook 1997:226). As a result, Bédié lost important potential political allies, further divided the government and weakened his hold on his own party. [243] He had not learned from Houphouët the importance of keeping the enemy within his own ranks. And he certainly had not developed the political skills that would have enabled him to do so. Thus, "In some respects it could be said that the PDCI engaged in a self-fulfilling prophecy; in acting as if the RDR were a Muslim conspiracy, it produced the very kind of reaction which it most feared" (Crook 1997:226).

Bédié did try to negotiate with other opposition leaders. In the best Houphouët tradition, he met with all the opposition leaders, including Gbagbo and Wodié, offering them positions in the government. Yet only one opposition leader agreed to join his cabinet, Zadi Zaourou, from *l'Union des Socio-democrates* (USD).[244] Bédié also, at first, maintained Houphouët's system of ethnic quotas in the cabinet, choosing representatives from most regions.[245] And, in Bédié's first declaration to the nation, he promised: "The country will be governed for all, Ivorians and foreigners living on our soil."[246] In accordance with these sentiments, Bédié quickly sent delegations around the country – particularly to the North – to seek out goodwill.[247]

Despite these positive gestures, Bédié was not a true negotiator nor a facilitator. The first serious indication of his poor political calculus was made on November 23rd 1994, when Bédié introduced a new Electoral Code. Trying to correct the problems attendant to the 1990 election by drafting a clear election code was not in itself unreasonable. However, the new Code included Article 49, a controversial requirement that any presidential candidate provide proof that both his/her parents were born in Côte d'Ivoire. This made the citizenship requirements for presidential candidates stiffer than those for ordinary citizens and even for potential candidates for the National Assembly who were only required to have *either* their mother or father born in the country. In addition, the code stipulated that Presidential candidates had to have been living in the country continuously for five years before the election.[248] The exclusionary citizenship criterion was immediately seen as designed to block ADO from contesting the presidency, whose citizenship had already been brought into question by the opposition press. It was, therefore, seen, by extension, as an attack on Northerners as a whole.

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[243] From anonymous interview with former Cabinet member (Abidjan, November 2010).
[244] *la Voie* no 668 des 11 et 12 decembre 1993, pp. 2; *la Voie* no 672 du 16 decembre, 1993, pp. 2.
[245] His first cabinet included: Lancine Gbon Coulibaly, former FPI Dona-Fologo, Gaston Ouassenan and Fadika Lamine Kone (northerners); Achi Atsain and Ezan Akele (from South East) and Maurice Kakou Guikahue, Bernard Zadi Zaoucou and Pierre Kipre (Central West). See *la Voie* no 672 du 16 decembre, 1993, pp. 2, 3, 5.
[246] *la Voie*, no 666, 9 decembre, pp. 4, from text of Bédié's proclamation to the nation on December 7th.
[247] Tours were planned to tours to Oumé, Vavoua Daloa Férké, Korhogo, Bouna, Bondoukou. See *la Voie* no 672 du 16 decembre, 1993, pp. 3.
[248] "Projet de loi portant Code electoral' *Fraternité Matin,* 9 decembre 1994, pp. 3. For all other citizens, the laws required then (and still require) that only one parent be born in Côte d'Ivoire

Table 18: % Non-Ivorians in Côte d'Ivoire by Sub-prefecture - from 1988 Census									
Abidjan	36.4	Bouaflé	24.8	Divo	40.9	Man	17.7	Sinfra	32.6
Abengourou	47	Bouaké	27.5	Duékoué	28.6	Manokono	5	Soubré	40.2
Aboisso	48.8	Bouna	8.1	Ferkéssedougou	15.2	M'Bahiakro	16	Tabou	31.3
Adzopé	22.9	Boundiali	9.2	Gagnoa	29.2	Odienné	6.6	Tanda	12.8
Agnibilékrou	50	Dabakala	4.6	Grand-Lahou	43.6	Oumé	33.7	Tengrela	24.1
Bangolo	9.4	Daloa	30.7	Issia	28.3	Sakassou	4.8	Touba	6.9
Béoumi	4.2	Daoukro	28.3	Katiola	10.8	San Pedro	38.9	Toumodi	14.9
Biankouma	6.4	Danané	13.8	Korhogo	14.9	Sassandra	44.8	Yamousoukro	22.6
Bondoukou	7.5	Dimbokro	11.9	Lakota	27.1	Séguela	22.9	Zuénoula	15.5
National Total: 25.8%									

Source: Le Nouvel Horizon No 57 du 18 ocotobre 1991, pp. 5.

The Code became an immediate lightening rod. Tensions over the citizenship status of northerners had been developing for over a decade, particularly as economic conditions worsened. With Houphouët's open-door policy, by 1988 one-quarter of the population of Côte d'Ivoire were foreign, the majority of whom were Muslims from Burkina Faso and settled in the South and West where pioneer cocoa plantations had been established (See Table 18). In the countryside, land disputes had been increasing; in the cities, foreigners were accused of controlling trade and a large portion of the economy. Houphouët's encouragement of the foreign vote in the 1990 Presidential elections had only added to the xenophobic climate.

Ironically, one of Ouattara's own policies had contributed to the increasing friction. In 1990, ADO's government introduced a new '*carte du sejour'* requiring that foreign residents purchase a resident alien card. The introduction of the card created several problems. Petty authorities used the mandate to indiscriminately extort money from anyone without documentation who appeared to be a northerner or Muslim, regardless of their actual citizenship status. Even the FPI journal, *la Voie*, published a sympathetic article in 1991 describing how "Operation Carte de Sejour" had "overtones of surgical removal" which had increased insecurity, resulting in the tragic death of student in Adama Soro, and its authors suggested that the central impetus behind its implementation was not, as the government claimed, to promote security, but rather to raise government revenue.[249]

Soon after the introduction of the *carte du sejour*, an anonymous tract allegedly appeared calling for the unification of the North, the '*Charte du Nord'*. This Charter infamously championed the creation of a' Great North'. According to the document subsequently printed in *Fraternité Matin* in 2010, the Charter's stated goal was to strengthen the underprivileged north by politically unifying its peoples so as to create greater equity in Côte d'Ivoire.[250] It also called for people of the Great North to support Alassane Ouattara.

[249] Olivier Guei Konan, Carte de sejour, insecurite, les etrangers et nous," *Le Nouvel Horizon* No 57 du 18 ocotobre 1991, pp. 5.
[250] "La première charte du Nord," *Fraternité Matin* Thursday, August 5th, 2010, pp 4-5.

Despite the fact that the Charter promoted multipartism and a unified Côte d'Ivoire, and despite the fact that its authors equally endorsed Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Dona-Fologo as rightful candidates for succession,[251] it was labeled a racist, xenophobic document that had originated with Ouattara's followers.[252] Thus, Sandlar uses the following passage to demonstrate how the authors of the *Charte* "display a desire for absolute power for the citizens of the Grand North":

> "To play second fiddle forever has absolutely no honor for [the sons of the North]. To lend oneself always to serve as support for others, to achieve their ends, can only undermine our self-esteem and an awareness of each other and bring about a sense of guilt at our inability to unify and create a association among ourselves" [Sandlar 2005:300, translation mine]

And Vivane Gnakalé evokes a different extract as emblematic of the racist and xenophobic sentiments espoused in the *charte*:

> "Renew the sense of mutual attachment which is at the bottom of our traditional affinities, revive the notion of ethnic solidarity among communities united by a similar fate, spread the virtue of self-sacrifice to forge a bright ideal, redefine a common position with respect to a model of society where equality is the rule, this is what constitutes our pretentious ambition, but not an impossible one. Drum up in the Great North concerted action, resolutely turned towards a movement whose guiding principle is: "Neither right nor left, but in the center." This milieu will represent the driving force that is sure to embody the advent of a Northern renewal, giving rise to a third force midway between the PDCI and FPI, even to establish itself as the arbiter of the next electoral consultations. This is the calling that is appropriate henceforth for the Great North, a calling to which all the sons of the North should contribute." [Vivane Gnakalé 2006:106-107, translation mine][253]

The Charter does expressly call for political mobilization of all northern peoples along ethnic lines, so as to try to address the inequities that have been at the base of Ivorian society from the

[251] Ibid.

[252] In *le Nouvel Horizon*, in November 1992, it was asserted that "The prime minister, until proven otherwise, has the support of financial institutions, as well as of the charter of the North, which is being openly distributed and he has not opposed." Subsequently, Sandlar asserts that several sources agree that Lamine Diabate, the leader of the RDR and husband of Henriette Diabate, the then Minister of Justice and General Security was the author, or at least the inspiration for this charter (Sandlar 2005 297).

[253] Gnagkalé includes another passage as evidence as well: "Thenceforth, it is important to situate the North at a distance from the PDCI and very far from the FPI and the opposition, because this region must pursue its own path. The difference in zones renders, ipso facto, a difference of understanding and behavior and a difference of interests, which can be complementary, but never the same. Accordingly, the North must take new steps, with respect to its own specific quest in which it must be engaged. There is a need for an ardent identity to conquer and to display this legitimate aspiration by affirming a strong independent, regional identity at the national level. Such a position is necessary thenceforth as the path to salvation ...The Great North does not intend to be anew the victim of a National Assembly and government run by the opposition. One time was enough. The Great North intends to organize itself according to its own proper interests. Our initiative reaches out to the masses, with arguments and language appropriate for this purpose. Finally, the last motivation, is to always be behind the authors of political currents, authors foreign to our area, who do not demonstrate any spirit of entrepreneurship or creativity and that do not at all honor the sons of the North." [Vivane Gnakalé 2006:109, translation mine]

beginning. Yet there is little beyond that. Though there is an express ethnic appeal, even in these passages, there is little evidence of a desire to impose dominance of the North over the South, or to proclaim the superiority of northern peoples over southern peoples. Nevertheless, both claims are still made about the Charter. The fear these lines engendered is made manifest in the following commentary:

> The question we are posing at the outset is: which communities, are explicitly being addressed ...? Is this addressed to compatriot communities in Côte d'Ivoire, or to communities in neighboring countries in the North, with which our brothers and sisters share more than just our northern borders? [Vivane Gnakalé 2006:107]

Whatever the truth may be behind the intent and authorship of the '*Charte du Nord,*' it did make manifest the sense of disenfranchisement that was felt by peoples of northern origin at the time. The Charter states expressly that it was initiated in response to the poisonous political situation being created by Ouattara's detractors who denied his rightful citizenship and whose pernicious discourse was turning all northerners into 'second-class citizens.'[254]

Another testament to the fragile political climate came soon after. In 1992, a second tract was circulated, this one entitled, "*La Republique des Peuples du Nord de la Côte d'Ivoire*". Unlike the notorious *Charte de Nord*, this tract in no uncertain terms called for the people of the North – "Les Malinké, Les Sènoufo, Les Tagbana, Les Djimini, Les Lobi, Les Mahouka, Les Koyaka, Les Dioula, Les Koulango, etc." – to secede from Côte d'Ivoire (M Le Pape & C Vidal 2002:301-302). Its author is also undisputed. Alpha Blondy, the venerated Reggae artist from the North, wrote the tract in protest after having been denied an Ivorian passport. In a later interview with *Notre Voie*, Blondy admitted that, infuriated with being treated thusly, he had personally distributed leaflets at the Bassam station in Abidjan, as well as at "mosques, churches, to the sick, the police, the students." He explained that he had printed the leaflet as "a kind of warning" and chose to call for succession because people of northern origin were being treated as foreigners.[255]

Neither the Ouattara government nor Bédié's government took any real steps to pacify this growing sense of alienation. Instead, in July 1994, Bédié's government tripled the cost of the residence permits (*carte du sejour*) for non-citizens, while greatly reducing the cost of national identification cards for citizen.[256] Thus, though by November 1994, when the Electoral Code was promulgated, Blondy's treatise was no longer in circulation, it was clear that excluding ADO from the electoral process on the grounds of citizenship would fan the flames of a highly combustible situation.

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[254] "[After 1989, there was a] general outcry orchestrated by supporters of the regime and other Ivorians in the forest zone, challenging Alassane Ouattara's status as an Ivorian. For them he is a Burkinabé. Every son of the North is generally outraged and shocked by the conduct of the Ivorian forest zone. For them, the bearer of a name that sounds Dioula or Sènoufo is, ipso facto, a foreigner, an Ivorian by circumstance. Do you not hear all day long, "You Dioula this, you Dioula that"? This view leads to behavior that poisons our ability to live together. Our initiative is ...[a] reaction to this state of affairs without creating a rupture. ["La première charte du Nord," Fraternité Matin, August 5th 2010:5 translation mine]

[255] "Alpha Blondy interviewé par Notre Voie (partie 1)," *Notre Voie*, no, 2217 du 19 octobre 2005 (accessed at alphablondy.info, November 20th, 2010).

[256] United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Côte d'Ivoire, 26 February 1999, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa5f4.html [accessed 4 January 2010].

Moreover, there seems to have been little reason for Bédié to have done so. Even if Bédié believed ADO to be a Burkinabé,[257] a savvier tactician would have understood that such actions would only increase ADO's strength. In 1994, ADO was not particularly popular in the urban areas (Rapley 1995:119-121). He was *the* figure most closely associated with externally enforced SAPs – in particular the deeply contested privatization of Ivorian industries and the rollback of pensions that were seen as a betrayal of the Ivorian system. He was reviled by many urban leftists who saw his economic policies as 'ultraliberal' and 'anti-social' (Wodié 2010:155). Even in the North, the ruling party still maintained high levels of support. As late as 2009, northern villages surrounding Korhogo were divided, with the elders citing the PDCI's end of forced labor and the introduction of roads and health care as reason to support Bédié against the unknown Ouattara.[258] In addition, the Bété areas in the Central West were being galvanized for Laurent Gbagbo. Under such circumstances it was highly unlikely that ADO had the requisite levels of support that would have enabled him to win an election.[259]

This conjecture is further supported by the results of the December National Assembly elections. Ouattara's party (*Rassemblement des républicains*, RDR) won only 19 seats, Gbagbo's (FPI) only 13, whereas the PDCI took 155 seats. Even in the North, the RDR carried less than half of the constituencies: three of the six districts in Ferkessédougou; five of the eleven in Korhogo, one of six in Mankono; four of twelve in Odienné; three of eight in Séguéla (the FPI took two). The FPI was relatively strong in the West taking all three of the districts in the department of Gagnoa, one of two in Issia, one of four in Guiglo, one of three in Danane, as well as three out of five in the southeastern district Adzopé. On the other hand, all the seats in Divo and Daloa went to the PDCI. Even in Abidjan, where the opposition had some of its highest levels of support, the two parties combined only took two out of the nineteen seats. [260]

Thus, if Bédié had allowed ADO to run, it would, in all likelihood, have slowed down the opposition movement. With such small numbers favoring the opposition, it would have been difficult for Bédié's opponents to claim the election had been stolen. It might even have been possible for Bédié to find a way to include ADO and Gbagbo in the government -- once defeated. Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that if Bédié had rescinded Article 49 of the electoral code, the situation could have been salvaged. Particularly after the positive effects of 1994 devaluation of the CFA had begun to be felt throughout the economy. But instead, every step of the way, Bédié made choices that strengthened his opposition, divided the Ivorian population and undermined the political capital he could have gained from the country's economy recovery.

With the new electoral code, the opposition now had a rallying cry. Alassane became a symbol of the disenfranchisement of the Muslim, northern community. He, like them, was

[257] This was suggested in an anonymous interviews with former members of Houphouët's Cabinet (Abidjan, November 2010).

[258] From a series of interviews conducted with villagers and chiefs in six villages surrounding Korhogo, July 2009.

[259] Chirot argues the reverse. According to him: "Ouattara, backed by the Rally of Republicans (RDR), would probably have won the 1995 presidential race had he and many of his supporters not been disqualified on ethnic grounds. Instead, both Ouattara and Gbagbo asked their followers to boycott the polls, thereby teaming up against President Bédié and the Akan-dominated PDCI. As a result, Bédié was reelected with 96 percent of the vote in a patently unfair election" (Chirot 2006, 69). But there seems little evidence to support his position. My interview with two different former Ministers that were serving at the time also believed that ADO would not have been likely to have won in an election at that point in time. Rapley also wrote at the time: "ADO remains deeply unpopular among many Ivoiriens for the economic reforms he introduced during his tenure. Moreover, his opponents have effectively, though perhaps not fairly, tarred his movement with a particularist brush, identifying it as a northern and Muslim coalition."

[260] *Fraternité Matin*, No 9400, Mardi 13 fevrier, 1996, pp. 1, 12-19.

considered a 'false' citizen pitted against the 'true' Ivorians who were understood to be Christians from the South. As Akindès explains, before this, there were few in the Ivory Coast that identified with Alassane Ouattara:

> Between 1992 and 1995, in both the North and the South, ADO was perceived as a technocrat, whose lifestyle set him at a distance from ordinary people. He was also perceived as a symbol of modernity...His professional career abroad made him a 'man of the world'...ADO's matrimonial alliance... [added] to his cultural distance. But, as from 1995, political mobilization gradually developed around the person of Alassane Dramane Ouattara. This mobilization has to be linked to the political effects of Ivorianness, which encouraged the populations in the North to organize politically in order to resist what they considered as being a spiral of a process of exclusion. [Akindès 2004:35]

Right before the promulgation of the new electoral code, Djéni Kobina had transformed his PDCI splinter group into an autonomous party *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR).[261] In response to the new code, on Nov 25th 1994, the RDR formed a parliamentary group to oppose it.[262] By April, the RDR had joined forces with Gbagbo's FPI party and smaller opposition parties to form the *Front républicain.* This coalition party was organized expressly to contest the Electoral Code. Throughout the spring and summer of 1995, the *Front* organized marches to demand its repeal. By July, the RDR had nominated Alassane Ouattara as the party's presidential candidate.

In what was to become his typical fashion, Bédié's reaction to these developments was to dig his heels in further. His government refused to negotiate or change its position. With the government's intransigence, the *Front*'s demonstrations became larger and increasingly violent. The opposition promised to make the country 'ungovernable' until the law was changed (Crook 1997:230). Massive demonstrations were held in Abidjan in June, July and August. By September 14th the opposition press reported sit-ins, marches and all kinds of demonstrations occurring around the county: Bondoukou, Logouale, Biankouma, Man, Akoupe, Aboisso, Korhogo, Agboville, Duekue. The next day the opposition called for "All of Côte d'Ivoire in the Street Against the Electoral Code", to join a *grand marche* beginning at Yopougon.[263]

Still the government remained unflappable, insisting that the laws of the state could not be abrogated in the streets (Crook 1997:230). The government adopted a tough stance. The Minister of Security, Marcel Dibonan Koné, stated at a press conference that anyone found to be a member of the student group associated with Gbagbo's FPI, the *Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI), would be considered an "outlaw." Brutal police raids were conducted against FESCI and hundreds of its members were arrested and held 'incommunicado'.[264] PDCI officials tried to besmirch the RDR. They accused them of endangering the nation with their anti-republicanism and undermining the country's social

[261] On October 5th 1994, he announced the formation of the *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR) and on the 24th they held their first meeting naming Djéni Kobina the party secretary.

[262] The RDR Parliamentary group was presided by Adama Coulibay (Korhogo) with M. Bosset Dallet (Sassandra) as the Secretary General, M. Fanny Ibrahima (Bouake) as 'raporteur' - other members of the group include Hyacinthe Sarassoro (Sinematialli), Broueka Nabo Clement, Doumbia Mory, Lohouess Essoh Vincent (Dabou), Seydou Yeo, Coulibaly Souleymane Sakrou.

[263] *la Voie,* no 1191, p. 1

[264] *"The Best School": Student Violence, Impunity and the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.* New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2008.

cohesion.[265]

By mid-September, with the government still refusing to hold negotiations with the opposition, Djéni Kobina called for an 'active boycott' of the elections. As Crook explains, "This was a euphemism for a concerted attempt to actively sabotage the elections, that is, physically prevent them from happening" (Crook 1997:233). The *Front républicain* encouraged its followers to use any means to prevent the course of the elections. In a television interview on the 17th of September, Kobina reportedly did not "hide his wish to promote violence as a means to fight the government and force them to retract the Code electorale".[266] By the eve of the election, opposition actions "had escalated into what can only be described as an attempt to foment a state insurrection" (Crook 1997:233).

Throughout October violence escalated, as the death toll of both police and civilians mounted. In Abobo (the Abidjan district heavily populated by people of northern origin) there were several serious incidents. On October 4th, three were killed during demonstrations. Later, the city hall was burnt down. In Yopougon, a predominately Bété neighborhood that had become the FPI's stronghold, the PDCI headquarters was burnt down. The violence was not restricted to the capital. Around the country there were serious skirmishes. In Daloa, in the Central West of the country, the court house and city hall were sacked. From about October 17th, the main opposition strongholds in Gagnoa, the southwest and prefectures of Odienné and Korhogo were cut off by road blocks. Government and PDCI offices were burnt to the ground by mobs and the prefects chased away. On the 17th of October two people were killed during opposition demonstrations in Korhogo. On the 20th, at least ten people, the majority of whom were children, were massacred on a plantation in Kramoyaokro, 300 km northwest of Abidjan. The worst occurred right before the election. In a series of attacks made by indigenous Bété on Baoulé settlers, about 18 people were killed in villages around Gagnoa, the FPI's stronghold. The attacks left 4,000 Baoulé refugees in the regional capital (Crook 1997:234-235; Bayle 2007:48-50).[267]

Perhaps the most significant event occurred on the eve of the election. General Robert Guëi, the head of the armed forces and the man whom Houphouët had brought in from Korhogo to deal harshly with urban protests in 1990 (and later promoted to Chief of Staff), refused to obey the government's orders to dismantle the 'active boycott' (Kadet 2012:273). It is difficult to explain why this man turned overtly against Bédié, if not because of Bédié's anti-Muslim, anti-Northern policies. Guëi himself, though not a Muslim, was a Yacouba, a minority group from the West of Côte d'Ivoire. Before the succession, there had been speculation about where Guëi's loyalties would lie and whether he would support Ouattara.[268] But unlike other military officers, Guëi remained silent. He did not enthusiastically endorse Bédié's assumption of the Presidency, nor did he oppose it. Days before the succession it was reported that Guëi had met with his benefactor, Houphouët, and afterwards pledged his and the army's support of Article 11.[269] Later Guëi even claimed that he had dissuaded Colonel Lassana Palenfo (then security minister in Ouattara's government), from undertaking a coup against Bédié.[270]

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[265] "Le Code electoral", *Fraternité Matin* Samedi 24-Dimanche 24 decembre 1994, pp. 6.

[266] United States Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - Côte d'Ivoire, 26 February 1999, available at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa5f4.html [accessed 4 January 2010].

[267] Also see *la Voie* No 1275, mardi 26 decembre 1995 -pp. 2

[268] *La Nouvel Horizon*, no 83, du 13 avril 1992, pp. 4

[269] *la Voie* no 665 - 4,5,6, 7 decembre 1993

[270] Tom Kamara, "Côte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'état," UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000, pp 5.

Nonetheless, during the anti-government protests of 1995, Guëi became increasingly resistant to aiding the government crackdown. In an interview in early September 1995, Guëi made the extraordinary statement that "it was not the place of the army to settle the problems of public order."[271] Coming from the man whose forces in May 1991 had conducted raids on students in their dormitories at Yopougon– smashing windows and breaking down doors – during which time one student was killed, several were raped and several more were injured, Guëi's statements were tantamount to insurrection. Immediately after the election Guëi was dismissed as the Army Chief of Staff and appointed the Minister of Sports. After only a year, in January 1997, a decree was issued for the dismissal of Brigadier-General Robert Guëi from government; he was accused of an attempting to foment a coup with officers from the West (Guerés and Bété) (Kieffer 2000:32). Guëi was sacked and eighteen other officers were accused of plotting a coup against the government.

Despite the violence, the elections were held as scheduled on October 22nd. Because the main opposition leaders had either been banned or had chosen to boycott the Presidential elections, Bédié won the presidency with a landslide of 96 percent (even higher than Houphouët's 86 percent in 1990).[272] Now, with the presidential election concluded, the boycott was ended. All the opposition parties participated in the National Elections the following December.

Introduction of 'Ivoirité'

Perhaps as a consequence of his easy victory, Bédié's strategic choices did not improve in subsequent years. In 1996, a study was published by a group of PDCI ideologues and Bédié supporters to help orient the government's future policies. The group gave itself the cumbersome name, "University Research Cell and Dissemination of Ideas and Policy Actions of President Henri Konan Bédié" (*Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Ides et Actions Politiques du President Henri Konan Bédié*," or CURDIPHE). These academics had taken (or been given) as their task to develop a framing ideology for Bédié's presidency that would replace '*houphouetisme*'. The new political doctrine, '*ivoirité*,' was, in its simplest terms, a proclamation that Côte d'Ivoire was to be a country for *'ivoiriens'* and '*ivoiriennes*'.[273] It was presented[274] as a radical departure from '*houphouetisme*,' which had become associated with Houphouët's open-door immigration policy, his inclusion of non-citizens in elections, as well as his close association with France.[275]

The origins of the term, *ivoirité,* according to one of its supporters, are to be found with the cultural essayist Pierre Niava, who first coined the term in 1974. According to this interpretation, *ivoirité* grew out of "the cultural effervescence of Marxism and the Pan-African atmosphere," which had given rise to identity movements with similar terms, such as

[271] *la Voie* no 1187 des 9 et 10 septembre 1995

[272] Only Francis Wodié, the leader of the PIT, who had a very small following, contested the election. When asked to join Bédié's government after the election he refused a second time. It was not until 1997 that Wodié came on board. See Wodié 2010.

[273] For more on *ivoriete* see "The War of "Who Is Who": Autochthony, Nationalism and Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis" Ruth Marshall-Fratani African Studies Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Sep., 2006), pp. 9-43

[274] CURDIPHE published a book in 1996, which had issued from a series of conferences the group had held between 1995 and 1996.

[275] At this point, *houphouetisme* had been so discredited that its positive aspects - promotion of co-existence, tolerance, dialogue and the importance of the national good above parochial interests - had been lost.

"Negritude," Senghor's philosophy of "blackness," Mobutu's "authenticity" and the US slogan "Black is Beautiful" (Boa 2009:75-76). Nevertheless, given the long history of xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire, it is also possible that this term always had a tinge of exclusion and even racism. It was not until August 1995, during the presidential campaign, that candidate Bédié first used the term to describe his new policy and political philosophy (Saliou Touré 1996:preface; Boa 2009:77). In his speech delivered on August 26th during the PDCI-RDA Convention in Yamoussoukro, Bédié introduced the concept:

> "It is through the unity of the nation and its essential conditions...that we continue to assert our cultural personality, the development of the Ivorian man in his specificity, that which we can call his *ivoirité*. What we aspire to achieve is an original synthesis, fertilized by tradition and modernity. This synthesis, it goes without saying, is not enabled by political power in and of itself; it is realized by the unity of all citizens." [quoted in Loucou 1996:22-23, translation mine]

His supporters contend that Bédié meant this to be a call for the political participation of all Ivorian citizens in the building of a modern nation-state, even as a utopic vision of the future (Boa 2009:77). Yet, given the context in which it was chosen to be introduced – i.e. during the campaign of 1995, when protest marches were taking place around the country about exclusionary citizenship requirements – it is difficult to see its use in such innocuous, let alone glorious, terms. Indeed, in such a combustible situation, it was evident that this policy re-orientation would only encourage more anti-foreigner and anti-Muslim sentiment. As early as 1993, anti-foreigner sentiment had already reached such a pitch that at least 23 Ghanaians were killed in anti-Ghanaian violence after a soccer match in Abidjan (Amnesty International Report 1995; Bayle 2007:27-29).

The relationship between *ivoirité* and increasing anti-Muslim/northern sentiment was made transparent in the first of the group of essays CURDIPHE published in 1996. The essay was written by the respected historian Jean-Noël Loucou, who was serving then as the Director of the Office of the President. Loucou's explanation for why *ivoirité* had become "an anxiety, a necessity and a project" was, among others, because an increasing number of migrants from "neighboring African countries" with "higher birth-rates," had produced a "massive foreign presence" that was threatening "to destroy the socio-economic balance of the country." Loucou even justified the electoral code, arguing that "it excludes no one" given that citizens are not "eligible to the same degree in almost all countries, as is demonstrated by the example of the U.S., the greatest and oldest democracy" (Loucou 1996:19-21). The connection between *ivoirité* and fear of Muslims was made even more explicit in a report issued in October 1998 by the *Conseil Economique et Social*, which found, "the inflow" of Muslim immigrants had "considerably modified the pre-existing religious balance," and that "An upset in the balance of this sort, in such a sensitive sphere, could lead some people to endeavor to exploit religious affiliation for political ends, which is a disservice to national harmony and unity and a threat to the social peace so dear to our country" (Akindès 2004:29).

Certainly, for many northerners, '*ivoirité*' amounted to little more than '*akan-ité*', e.g. the assertion that Côte d'Ivoire was for the Akan people, most of whom are Christian and from the east and center of the country (Contamin & Losch, 2000:121). The xenophobic basis of the government's ideology assumed tangible form soon after. In December 1997, Bédié introduced a new land ownership law that led to the expulsion of long-time settlers from their farms. The

Reforme fonciere, or Reformed Land Use Law, established that land-title would no longer be transferred from traditional owners to 'users' simply by virtue of their working the land. This officially reversed the de facto government policy, based upon Houphouët's dictum that "the land belonged to those who tilled it" (see above). With this new law, long time settlers were put in serious jeopardy. Farmers who had owned and cultivated trees and crops on the land for decades had no legal rights to their plantations. Even those who had legitimately bought orchards from indigenous owners were now accused of illegally occupying Akan or Kru land. A mass expropriation of settlers' farms were conducted with a vengeance. Northern settlers were expelled from Baoulé and Kru lands; Baoulé settlers were expelled from Kru lands. By the late 1990s, opposition newspapers were filled with reports of northerners being attacked and discriminated against, particularly in the Southwest and in Abidjan (J.P. Azam:2007:219; Woods 652; State Department Report 1998). In 1999, conflicts with Kru landowners and settled 'Burkinabé' resulted in an estimated 20 deaths. By November an approximately 12,000 Burkinabé had returned home. As Toungara explains, "The nearly two million Burkinabé who had made Côte d'Ivoire their home and been allowed to vote under Houphouët now found themselves disenfranchised" (Toungara 2001:67-68).

Opposition Resurgent

In addition to fanning ethnic conflict, Bédié stonewalled the growing opposition movement. Even worse, in 1998 Bédié tried to sure up his hold of the state. But the steps he took to guarantee the impregnability of his position further undermined his domestic support and even alienated his international supporters.

In the early spring, Bédié introduced a law that would make several amendments to the constitution. The proposed law included the extension of presidential term limits from five to seven years, the creation of a new senate whose members would be nominated by the president and presidential powers to suspend elections for reasons of national security. The proposed law renewed the passions of the period of the 1995 presidential election. Over the objections of the *Front républicain* members of the Assembly, the PDCI super-majority passed the law in June. In protest, parliamentary members of the FPI walked out and the RDR parliamentary group registered its opposition with a block vote against the passage of this law and particularly against the fact that the Assembly had voted to uphold Article 49 of the Electoral Code.[276] Soon after, the president of the FPI called for national protests against these constitutional reforms.

In an attempt to head off the opposition, Bédié made new additions to his cabinet. He increased the number of Ministerial positions from 32 to 36. With this he was finally able to incorporate two opposition leaders into the government. In March, the number two man of the RDA and Mayor of Korhogo, Adama Coulibaly, joined the government as Minister of Transportation. Five months later, in August, with another cabinet shuffle, Francis Wodié finally agreed to join the cabinet after having refused in 1993 and again 1995.[277] With this final cabinet reshuffle, seven ministers were dropped and twelve were added (most of whom were Baoulé).[278]

[276] *Fraternité Matin*, mercredi, juillet 1, 1998 pp. 2-3

[277] See Fafona 2009:87. "Ivory Coast; Bedie Drops Seven In A Cabinet Reshuffle," Africa News, Panafrican News Agency, August 11, 1998. Melvis Dzisa, "Ivory Coast:Hard Road To Travel For Ivorian Cabinet," Africa News, Panafrican News Agency, August 14, 1998.

[278] The other new members of the August 1998 Cabinet: Presidential Affairs & Government Spokesman - Paul Akoto Yao; Promotion of Internal Trade - Adou Kouadio; Planning & Development Programmes - Tidjane Thiam; Family & Women's Development - Leopoldine Coffie; Environment & Forestry - Jean-Claude Kouass; Tourism &

The addition of Adama Coulibaly was intended to be particularly strategic. Korhogo and Odienné had become centers of the RDR opposition since the 1994 uprising. They were also central to Ouattara's political machine. But the gain for Bédié would prove to be minimal. Coulibaly had not consulted within anyone before defecting to the PDCI and was regarded by many as a sell-out. Djéni Kobina expelled him from the party. As a result, Bédié's attempt to neutralize the opposition in Korhogo came to naught.

In response to Gbagbo's call for renewed protests against the constitutional amendment, between the 11th of August and the 18th of September 1998, representatives of the *Front républicain* crisscrossed the country, holding meetings to explain why it was important to oppose the constitutional reforms. Marches and events were held around the country, the largest of which was a demonstration in Abidjan on the 7th of September attended by an estimated two hundred thousand people. With the threat of disorder and increasing international pressure, Bédié was finally forced to enter into negotiations with his opponents.

In a tactically smart move, Bédié held separate negotiations with the leaders of the FPI and the RDR. In doing so, he was able to split the movement. The negotiations with the FPI concluded with an agreement on December 18th, 1998. The FPI agreed to rescind its demands for the repeal of Article 49 of the electoral code, for a guarantee of transparency in the electoral process and the repeal of the other proposed constitutional reforms. The government conceded also to grant amnesty to all persons arrested in connection with the active boycott of the 1995. Thirty-three people who were serving terms ranging from 3 years' to life imprisonment were released on December 24th. The RDA refused to make any pact or to concede anything to the President if he insisted on upholding the citizenship clause in the constitution. They criticized Gbagbo and the FPI for selling them out to the government (Fafona 87-8; US State Department Report 1998).[279]

At the same time, Bédié's poor governance had begun to take a toll on the economy. Between 1998 and 1999, GDP growth decelerated in Côte d'Ivoire, falling below 3 percent in 1999. A major contributor to the economic decline was the 40 percent drop in world cocoa prices (IMF 2000:8). However, government policies also added greatly to the country's economic woes. Fiscal fraud, large tax exemptions and weak tax enforcement had all hastened the economic slowdown. Special tax exemptions (mainly for investment,[280] petroleum and mining, as well as special exemptions for ministries and foreign embassies) multiplied five-times, rising from CFAF 17.8 billion in 1996 to CFAF 80.8 billion in 1999. By 1997, there were also serious arrears resulting from unrecorded off-budget spending and *depenses engages non ordonnacees*, or DENOs (spending committed for which payment orders have not been issued). DENOs doubled from 3.8 percent of GDP at the end of 1998 and to over 7 percent of GDP by the end 1999 (IMF 2000:17-19).

Because of the government dysfunction and the misallocation of resources, most of the large development projects Bédié initiated were undermined. By 1998, a huge chunk of the great 'Côtière' route had fallen off into the river, rendering the road impassable. The Northern route

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Craft Works - Norbet Anet Kablan; Deputy Ministers Foreign Affairs in charge of International Cooperation - Youssouf Bamba; Interior in Charge of Territorial Groups - Marcel Aka Zirimba; Agriculture in Charge of Animal Resources - Youan Kolou; Economy & Finance in Charge of Budget - Jean-Baptiste Ayaye Aman. See "Ivory Coast; Bedie Drops Seven In A Cabinet Reshuffle," Africa News, Panafrican News Agency, August 11, 1998.

[279] According to Fofana, in this context, the subsequent death of Djéni Kobina on the 19th of October 1998 was interpreted by many in the RDR as the direct consequence of Gbagbo's betrayal.

[280] Ironically, the exemptions granted under the investment code for twelve major public works projects Bédié had launched in 1996 accounted for more than 70 percent of the total revenue loss (IMF 2000:19).

never really got underway. Worse still, because of the political turmoil in the country and the scandals, Bédié lost the support of the international donor community.

By June 1999, the international donor community had caught wind of the regime's poor governance structure. That month, the EU released an audit report in which it found the equivalent of US$34.5 million of the Community's funds had been defrauded by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization. To make matters worse, the monies had been earmarked for poverty relief and were supposed to be used for the provision of health services and local development. Soon after, the IMF found that the cocoa and coffee industry had similar levels of fraud. US $220 million could not be accounted for in the records of the state's cocoa and coffee monopsony, CAISTAB.

The effects of these scandals were quite grave for Bédié's government. The World Bank, which had been pressing Bédié to liberalize the cocoa market, used the CAISTAB scandal to finally liquidate it in January 1999. It was replaced by a new body, the Nouvelle CAISTAB, a mixed public-private company in which the state now held only a minor stake. It also ended price protections for cocoa and coffee farmers. In November 1999, farmers took to the streets in the first cocoa protest the country had ever experienced. Even more seriously, by September 1999, all donor funds had been suspended. This meant that over US$700 million of combined IMF and World Bank credit facilities would not be dispersed.[281]

In response to the country's increasing economic woes, Bédié accused Ouattara of influencing the IMF and tarnishing his reputation.[282] To whatever extent Ouattara might have been lobbying against Bédié from within the IMF, it was clear that Bédié's government's failures had brought about the distrust of the donor and international community. Thus altogether, by 1999, whatever gains the government made were undermined by its failure to manage itself and the increasing ethnic tensions its policies were engendering within the country. All of this would contribute to Bédié's final fail

IV. The Beginning of the End

In 1999, a new course of violent protest was initiated when Bédié tried to prevent Ouattara from running in the upcoming 2000 Presidential election. On August 1st, 1999, Ouattara, who had been serving for five years as the Deputy Director General of the IMF, formally announced his intention to run for the presidency. Still intent on keeping his hold on power, on September 5th, Bédié once again denied ADO the right to run in the upcoming presidential race because of his questionable citizenship. Ten days later, on September 14th, police security forces arrested about 400 people who were protesting the government's decision in front of Ouattara's residence.[283] Bédié did try to reach an accord with Ouattara. On the 18th of September, Ouattara met the President, at Bédié's request. Allegedly Bédié offered Ouattara the Prime Ministership if he would agree to abandon his presidential bid. If true, clearly Ouattara did not take the bait (Cornwell 2000:89). With the failure to come to an agreement, Bédié renewed his efforts to block Ouattara's bid for the presidency. On September 22nd, the government began

[281] CDD, London, 26 December 1999; Africa Confidential, January 23, 1998, 39(2):8; Global Witness, June 2007:47.

[282] Tom Kamara, "Côte D'ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup D'etat," UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000, pp. 9.

[283] Africa Research Bulletin, September 1st–30th 1999:13687; Terence Neilan, "Ivory Coast: Opposition Seized," The New York Times, September 16, 1999, pp. 12

an official investigation into the status of Ouattara's identity papers – alleging they had been forged.

From then on, protests escalated. They reached an apex on October 27th, after it was announced that a court in northern Dimbokro, Ouattara's place of birth, had annulled his Ivorian nationality certificate because of irregularities. Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in protest. Riot police arrested opposition leaders and used tear gas, rubber bullets and stun grenades to disperse the crowds.[284] Twenty leaders of the RDR were rounded up, including ten senior party officials (among them the Secretary General of the RDR, Henriette Diabaté, along with the president of RDR's parliamentary group, N'Golo Coulibaly and Deputy Secretary General Amadou Gon Coulibaly).[285] A high court on Nov. 11 convicted the RDR leaders for fomenting violence. Seven were sentenced to two-years in prison, including the RDR members of the National Assembly (Wodié 2010:180). Despite the rising tensions, Bédié had an arrest warrant issued for Ouattara on 29 November, on the grounds that Ouattara had used forged birth documents to support his eligibility to run in the elections in October 2000.[286] Bédié then banned weekday public demonstrations for six months.

By mid-December, Bédié appears to have wanted to scale things back. He allowed some 15,000 Ouattara supporters to gather in Abidjan at a 'freedom' rally. Then, on December 22nd, in a radio address to the nation, Bédié intimated that he would be willing to release the RDR political prisoners and pardon the seven party leaders, if Alassane Ouattara, respected a "minimum code of good behavior."[287] But these concessions were not enough to stem the tide. On December 23rd, soldiers begin a mutiny in the streets of Abidjan and by Christmas day, the government had fallen with General Robert Guëi's military junta in control.

The Coup

The mutiny had begun on the night of December 22nd, when six NCOs of the Para-Commando Rapid Deployment Force (FIRPAC) seized control of the arsenal at the military camp at Akouédo in Abidjan. The six were veterans of the United Nations mission to the Central African Republic (MINURCA). Subsequently, the mutineers explained they taken these actions because their pay was in arrears, but also to protest their poor living conditions and the fact that ethnicity had become a factor in determining promotions. The contagion of the mutiny spread quickly through the camp.

Surprisingly, despite the urgency of the situation, Bédié did not take the matter very seriously. Instead of addressing the mutineers, he chose to fly home to Daoukro to celebrate Christmas with his family. As events unfolded, his advisors pressed him to return to Abidjan. Bédié reluctantly returned to the capital, but, even as soldiers continued to rampage through the streets of Abidjan – shooting into the air, commandeering people's cars, looting and spreading fear and mayhem – Bédié refused to meet with them. He choose instead to delegate negotiations to his senior ministers (Cornwell 2000:80-82)

By 3 am on Christmas morning, the mutineers had taken over the airport and set up road

[284] Glenn Mckenzie, Associated Press, October 27, 1999

[285] Stephane Orjollet, "Cote d'Ivoire police arrest 10 senior opposition officials," Agence France Presse, October 27, 1999 17.

[286] IRN West Africa news update, December 10, 1999.

[287] Fabienne Pompey, "Ivorian president tells opposition to behave if leaders want amnesty," Agence France Presse, December 22, 1999.

blocks across the two bridges linking the northern and southern parts of Abidjan. Soon after, they took over the government television and radio station.[288] At 5 am, Bédié reportedly received a phone call from General Robert Guëi, the former Chief of Staff of the Army who had been dismissed from government in 1997 after being accused of plotting a coup. According to Cornwell, Guëi claimed that the mutineers had taken his wife hostage and that he was asked to represent their demands. He also urged Bédié to take their demands seriously. When Bédié finally agreed to meet with representatives of the mutineers, he was presented with four soldiers, one of whom had belonged to ADO's guard when he was prime minister. The meeting was fairly brief and the soldiers left after Bédié promised to review their demands. However, by then, General Guëi had already joined the soldiers at the television station and begun to broadcast that Bédié's regime was over (Cornwell 2000:80-82). Almost immediately afterward soldiers went to 'the MACA', the prison where the seven RDR political prisoners were incarcerated, to release them.[289]

There are several things that suggest that this mutiny may not have been quite so 'spontaneous'. It is true that most of the mutineers had been assigned to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (Minurca) and that the mutineers said they had begun the mutiny because they had not been adequately paid (Kieffer 200:36-39). Yet, the mutiny had actually begun at 3 am on the 23rd, when the six original mutineers went to the home of Cote d'Ivoire's military commander General Maurice Tauthuis and were fired upon by the General's personal guards. After one of the mutineers was shot, the remaining five retreated back to Akouedo camp where they began distributing weapons to other soldiers. According to Cornwell, the group had gone to General Tauthuis' home as 'representatives' to 'present their grievances' to him (2000). But if their honest intention had been to demand higher pay, it is odd that they should choose to go to the home of the chief of ground troops in Abidjan in the middle of the night and engage in a fire fight with him.

Moreover, this original six mutineers were all members of FIRPAC, the special unit that General Guëi had commanded. According to Francis Wodié, five months earlier, on August 4th, 1999, the Assistant Secretary General of the Council of Ministers had announced to the government that General Guëi was organizing a movement within the army, the Movement for National Health (*le Mouvement de salut national*, Mosana), which was aiming at bringing about a coup d'état (Wodié 2010:180). There was also an intriguing comment made by J.J. Rawlings when asked about the coup a few days afterwards. Reportedly, Rawlings replied that he was not surprised about the events in Côte d'Ivoire because, in his words, "We picked up information from sources in that country which suggested an uncertain situation. We therefore made efforts at the last ECOWAS Summit in Lomé to prevent the potential danger by advising President Bedie, but he assured us that those issues were purely legal and not political which could be solved internally."[290]

Whether the coup was planned or spontaneous, it is certain that those that ended up leading it were, for the most part, affiliated with the opposition. All nine officers in the new junta were from ethnic groups that had been under attack during the Bédié regime and many had been personally connected with Ouattara. There was General Guëi who was from the minority Yacouba from the West; General Lassana Palenfo, a Lobi from Odienné; General Aboudoulaye Coulibaly a Sènoufo from Korhogo; Soumahila Diabakate from Man whose father was a Dioula

[288] "Military uprising in Cote d'Ivoire president," Agence France Presse, December 23, 1999.
[289] Ibid.
[290] "ECOWAS Condemns Coup in Côte d'Ivoire," Xinhua General News Service, December 29, 1999.

from the north-east and Mattias Doué, a Bété. Both Doué and Naval Captain Djikalou Saint-Cyr had been military prefets that were removed from their positions with the change in administration and named military attaches overseas, in Tokyo and Germany respectively (Kieffer 2000:32).[291] Several of these men also had had close ties to Ouattara. As Cornwell observes, "The association of the senior members of the [junta] with Alassane Ouattara was lost on nobody" (Cornwell 2000:82). For example, General Lassana Palenfo had served as Ouattara's Security Minister; General Abdoulaye Coulibaly, who had been Houphouët-Boigny's personal pilot, was in command of the Air Force under Ouattara (African Security Review, 2000 9(1); Ellenbogen 2002:118-122). In fact, soon after their assumption to power, Laurent Gbagbo accused the junta of favoring Ouattara and supporting the RDR – especially Lassana Palenefo, a known Ouattara ally, who was number two within the junta (Kamara 2000:17).

Even the leaders of the mutineers had some political connections with the opposition. Most of them had been participants in the student protests of the 1990s. Three had even been protest leaders at their respective high schools (Kieffer 2000:36). And one had been a member of Ouattara's guard. According to Kieffer, they also believed that their career prospects had been compromised by the shift in political discourse. Especially the non-commissioned and middle ranking officers, the preponderance of whom were from the West, Northwest and North. As Kieffer explains, "Examples of shelved General Guëi, Palenfo, or Coulibaly...and even biased recruitment of the Ivorian army, reinforced this sense of accelerated exclusion" (Kieffer 2000:36).

Perhaps most significantly, there appears to have been no one interested in defending Bédié's presidency. Houphouët's loyal Presidential Guard had quickly come to his defense during the large 1990 mutiny. Even Nkrumah had had loyal Guards, some of whom gave their lives to defend his presidency. But for Bédié, not *one* military regimen came to his defense. During the course of the mutiny, Bedie was able to hold an interview with *Radio France Interationale*. During the interview, he tried to rally support. On the air he called upon the nation: "I invite all active forces in Cote d'Ivoire, military, civilian and traditional, to resist and do everything to oppose and rapidly defeat this grotesque and backward attempt at a military coup." [292] But not one of his 13,900-strong armed forces responded. The mutineers claimed to have the support of the Marines, the Police, the Republican Guard, the Armed Battalion, the First Infantry, as well as the troops stationed in the provinces.[293]

Thus Bédié was ousted from power, not because France did not step in to support him, but because his own security forces failed to do so. We know from Houphouët's example that mutiny's can be quelled. The economic situation had clearly worsened by 1999, but it had not become as dire as it was in 1990. In the end, Bédié's own policies led to his loss of domestic support, loss of international support and, finally, his loss of military support.

Conclusion:

In fairness to Bédié, he was thrust into a difficult position, following one of the most competent and popular African presidents at a time of economic and political uncertainty.

[291] The other junta members were Colonel Mathias Doué; Naval Captain Djikalou St Cyr; Naval Lieutenant Sama Henri Cesar; Chief Petty Officer Zohin Honore; Staff-Sergeant Boka Yapi Laurent; and Major Mouassi Grena

[292] "Mutineers in Cote d'Ivoire seize control of Abidjan, announce coup," Agence France Presse, December 24, 1999.

[293] Ibid.

Nevertheless, Bédié's own failings as a leader and his incapacity to understand the broader ramifications of his actions were what led to his forcible removal from power. Sadly, the political legacy Bédié bequeathed to Côte d'Ivoire led to an explosion of violence that has yet to fully abate

PART II

TESTING THE MODEL: THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY

There has long been a recognition that in sub-Saharan Africa that there are different patterns of rule. Even within the general rubric of 'patrimonial rule, "rulers have used a variety of mechanisms to maintain national cohesion" (Bratton and Van de Walle 75). But which of these mechanisms have been more successful? As Jackson and Rosberg observed three decades we still need to develop models to help "distinguish the more orderly and civil rule of a Senghor, a Nyerere, or a Kenyatta from the more abusive rule of a Mobutu or a Bokassa-to say nothing of a Macias or an Amin," (Jackson & Rosberg 1984:428). But what types of policies and strategies allow for more orderly and civil rule?

This study contends that regimes that focus most of their resources and political capital on urban constituents will end up facing greater political risks and becoming less 'orderly', while those that are able to incorporate rural competitors will ultimately be more effective in office. Though the in-depth case comparisons are not definitive, they strongly suggest that rural political strategies do bolster a regime's stability.

To further test these assertions, I have undertaken a survey of fifty-eight regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey has two parts. In the first, I present a narrative survey of agriculturally dependent states to show that the same patterns observed in the in-depth case analysis are generalizable. The narrative is followed by a quantitative analysis, in which I code each of my fifty-eight cases to establish to what extent it followed a 'rural political strategy' (see Appendix I). I then develop regression models to test whether following such policies does in fact correlate with the reduction of a regime's political risks.

CHAPTER 6

SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL REGIMES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

i. The Patterns - Medium-N Case Narrative

Where the in-depth case analyses examine in detail the kinds of rural strategies used and their effects, the larger narrative survey illustrates broad patterns of rule. I find that those leaders that were supportive of farmers were more successful than those that chose to centralize and/or industrialize agriculture and secondly, those regimes that politically incorporated rural areas by devolving power to local traditional elites or decentralizing were more successful than those that centralized government administration or tried to curtail powerful regional elites.

This broader survey has been limited to agriculturally-dependent countries.[294] To determine if a state is agriculturally-dependent, I use two criteria: at least 10 percent of GDP must be derived from agriculture;[295] and fuel, minerals and metals must account for less than 50 percent of merchandise exports.[296] From the remaining countries, I further eliminate those that were in a protracted civil war[297] between 1960-2000.[298] This decision was made because it appears that the mechanisms that bring about coups differ from those that bring about civil wars and ethnic conflict. This is attested to by the fact that coups are rarely bloody affairs (See Table 5). In fact, the few coups that have resulted in mass-deaths occurred either as a precursor to, or an outgrowth of civil war, (many of which were ethnic conflicts as well).[299]

The final sample size is fifty-eight regimes from eighteen countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Madagascar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe.[300] This case selection has the benefit of including a broad diversity of countries: different types – small island countries, coastal countries and in-land countries; different regions – countries from West, East, Central and Southern Africa; and different colonial histories – former British, French and Portuguese colonies.

[294] This is because it has been repeatedly shown that mineral and oil-rich countries have different political dynamics. See Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Benjamin Smith 2004; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2002; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004.

[295] These figures were derived from CIA World Factbook, accessed June 2011.

[296] I have used Jensen and Wantchekon's (2004) scoring of regimes.

[297] By civil war, I understand a conflict where opposition forces control a major portion of the state for a protracted period of time. The conflicts in northern Mali, Casamance in Senegal and northern Uganda have never undermined the center's control of the majority of its territory.

[298] Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan

[299] The bloodiest coups recorded by the Center of Systematic Peace are: Burundi 1993, 150,000 deaths; Burundi 1972, 10,000; Burundi 1996, 6,000; Chad 1990, 5,000; Sudan 1976, 1,000; Liberia1985, 750, Gambia 1981, 650, Burundi 1965, 500, Ethiopia 1989, 400. In each case (except Gambia), the country was on the precipice or embroiled in civil war. The Gambian coup attempt was unique in that an external force from Senegal fought the Gambian military to put down the coup.

[300] I have excluded regimes in power for less than nine months, provisional/transitional governments and one Comorian leader that died in office after only three years in power.

Table 5: Coup Deaths



Source: Monty M. Marshall, "Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004: A Macro-Comparative Perspective," Data Annex 2b. Center for Systemic Peace, George Mason University, Arlington VA, (Oct 14, 2005).

In addition to outlining patterns, the survey demonstrates that the choice to build either an urban or rural support base is in many ways a function of what kind of development model a leader has in mind. For example, many of the leftist leaders of the independence era strove to make their economies more autarkic and hoped to industrialize as soon as possible. Emerging from middle-class, urban-led anti-colonial movements, they also had as their initial base of support urban leftist groups. Their central focus was, therefore, on creating employment for urban youth and keeping down urban costs vis-à-vis low farmgate prices. As a result, these independence leftist leaders provide the clearest illustration of an urban-based strategy. Unique among them, however, were Ahidjo and Julius Nyerere, who were more influenced by Sino development model than the Soviets. Rather than pushing for rapid industrialization, they sought to create a stronger peasant-based economy and focused on food-security through a Green Revolution. As a result, both Ahidjo and Nyerere were able to sustain a strong rural base of support and to minimize the power of urban consumers. Thus, I find each man's success was shaped more by his overall state-building strategy than by his choice to align with Western or Eastern powers and - more to the point - by his choice to build either an urban or rural support base.

Understanding that every historical period presents political leaders with particular constraints and opportunities, the survey-narrative is divided into two epochs: the independence period, roughly from 1960-1980; and the Structural Adjustment period (SAP), from 1980-2000. For each epoch, there is a brief discussion of the context in which these leaders were operating. Successful and unsuccessful cases for each epoch are discussed as a group. Cases are also addressed that appear to challenge this typology.

Introduction

II. Independence Regimes

At independence, newly emergent African leaders faced a number of imminent

challenges. They had inherited incomplete and extremely variable colonial administrative systems that made it difficult to consolidate power across their territories (Herbst 2000). To make matters worse, they had a new government bureaucracy to staff with few citizens sufficiently educated to do so. The majority of the population was rural and illiterate, while the urban areas were only marginally developed. In addition, the independence leaders had almost insurmountable economic challenges. Their economies were based on mono-export crops and highly dependent on former colonial powers. There was almost no industrial base, leaving the new states heavily dependent upon expensive imports for all their capital goods. And, they had growing populations with low-levels of food production.

How individual leaders dealt with these common challenges was largely influenced by their own backgrounds. The ideological orientations of these new leaders and their own political skills structured the types of domestic institutions they would erect and the constituencies with whom they would align. These factors, in turn, would shape each man's political success.

Table I: Independence Leaders Rural Score (from 0 to 5)* and Survival in Office

	Rural Support = Predict Stability **Rural Score: ≥ 3**	**Mixed Support = Unstable Equilibrium** **Rural Score: 2.5 - 1.5**	**Rural Neglect = Predict Instability** **Rural Score: ≤ 1**
No coup ≥ 10 years ***Stability***	Leopold Senghor Houphouët-Boigny Robert Mugabe Ahmadou Ahidjo Hastings Banda Jomo Kenyatta	Julius Nyerere	†***Manuel Pinto da Costa***
Coup ≥ 10 years	Dawda Jawara	Philibert Tsiranana Moussa Traore	Jean-Bedel Bokassa
No Coup < 10 years			
Coup < 10 years ***Instability***		Saye Zerbo Ali Soilihi	Christophe Soglo Hubert Maga Sangoulé Lamizana David Dacko I Acheampong Modibo Keita Sourou-Migan Apithy Émile Zinsou Kwame Nkrumah Gabriel Ramanantsoa Milton Obote I Maurice Yameogo Luiz Cabral

			Dr. K.A. Busia Idi Amin
†Unpredicted Outcomes		**N = 29**	*** See Appendix I, II, III**

Successful Cases

Within this universe of cases, are those countries that have never experienced a successful coup: Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Not surprisingly, these countries had some of the most lauded independence leaders, who sustained power and stability for decades. They include Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Léopold Senghor in Senegal, Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Dr. Hastings Banda in Malawi and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.[301] To this list, I add Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the independence leader in Côte d'Ivoire, who died in office after holding power for thirty-three years.

What is most striking about this group of leaders is that, despite the fact that they came from different ends of the political spectrum, they all came to power with strong rural bases of support, which they maintained throughout their tenure. Conservative leaders like Banda, Kenyatta and Houphouët believed that expanding agricultural exports was essential to the growth of their national economies and key to building a strong state. Their policies exhibited 'less urban-bias' than most (Widner 1993:25).[302] Kenyatta and Houphouët were singular in their pro-farmer policies (Bates 1981). Both men paid relatively high farmgate prices and provided inputs and credit to farmers. Houphouët also famously encouraged pioneer-farming as a means to rapidly expand cocoa production and introduced a campaign to promote a '*retour a la terre'* in a conscious effort to reverse urban-drift.

The socialists within this group, Nyerere and Ahidjo, also viewed agricultural expansion as critical to achieving their ends. However, they were influenced by the Sino-model of agriculturally-led development. In 1972, Ahidjo launched his 'Green Revolution' as a means to bolster food production − he supplied farmers with inputs and extension services and even paid rice farmers prices *above* the world price (van de Walle 1989). Surprisingly, after oil revenues had begun to flow into Cameroon, Ahidjo used oil profits to further stimulate food and agriculture production by increasing farmgate prices. Ahidjo also introduced a '*retour a la terre'* campaign in an attempt to stem urban-drift. Nyerere similarly sought to develop Tanzania through a Green Revolution (Verbilt 1971). Though he implemented very destructive agricultural policies,[303] rural development was the pillar of his national self-reliance campaign (*ujamaa)* and the basis of his socialist state (Huizer 1973:188). Indeed, Nyerere's "*Ujamaa* ideology stressed that the nation's primary activity was agriculture and implied that cities themselves, particularly Dar es Salaam, were parasites on the nation's agricultural sweat" (Brenan 2006:400). Thus, in a different manner from their conservative counterparts, agricultural development was central to Ahidjo and Nyerere.

Independence leaders like Mugabe and Senghor fell somewhere in the middle of the

[301] Though Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, I include Mugabe with the independence regimes because as an independence leader and inheritor of a settler-controlled economy, he faced similar advantages and constraints.
[302] Banda prioritized export agriculture, although his policies were unfavorable to smallholders.
[303] Nyerere's policy of 'villagization' was particularly damaging. Farmers were forced off productive farms and relocated in communal villages, creating massive food shortages.

ideological spectrum. Both espoused socialist goals but pursued more liberal policies. Yet, both focused on the agrarian sector. Mugabe ascended to power in Zimbabwe with a very strong rural support base.[304] He consciously sustained it by providing farmers with favorable farmgate prices, services, inputs and credit (Bratton & Masunungure 2011). Similarly, though Senghor was rhetorically anti-capitalism, he cemented the backing of the major plantation owning *marabouts* by increasing producer prices (Bates 1981:126, Boone 2003).

In addition to prioritizing agriculture, almost all of these independence leaders incorporated established traditional elites into local and regional administrations. Ahidjo, Houphouët and Senghor were particularly adept at incorporating competing elites into the central government. Ahidjo coopted regional elites from each province and major ethnic group (Krieger, 1994:608-609). Houphouët-Boigny practiced a de facto consociationalism, using "the spoils of a booming export crop economy to link local elites to a powerful state through the mediation of a dominant party" (Crook 1997:216). The same can be said for Senghor, who used "the *sufi* orders as critical anchors of state legitimacy in society" (Ndegwa & Levy 2003:297). Banda and Kenyatta supported chiefs and local/regional elites as well. Banda rhetorically aligned himself with chiefs, "stress[ing] the subordination of the young to the old and urg[ing] that parents, elders and chiefs be respected" (Peter G. Foster 1994:490). He also strengthened 'traditional' courts. Under Kenyatta's government, chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed local government administrators and made up almost one-third of the *harambee* representatives, as well as members of Community Development Committees, both of which directed local development (Ngau 1989:529).

Ahidjo and Mugabe had more complicated relationships with traditional elites. Ahidjo's record with chiefs was checkered. Chiefs were made 'go-betweens' between state and society, yet they were given little autonomy. He did, however, co-opt several chiefs by giving them sinecures in central government or parastatals (Jua 1995; Chem-Langhee 1983; P. Geschiere 1993). Mugabe paid chiefs stipends and nominally protected chieftaincy in the constitution (conditioned upon state recognition). But he also reduced their role in local administration. Only after the mid-1990s, when he had begun to loose significant rural support, did he increase their responsibilities. Nevertheless, Mugabe had a strong rural base of support. Nyerere, similarly, emerged with a strong rural base. Though he excluded chiefs, he built up a solid base of support among the peasantry, in part by incorporating respected elders and community representatives (Huizer 1973:186). Moreover, in his first decade in power, he let freely-elected Village Development Committees administer their own localities (Tidemand et al. 2010). In this way, Nyerere politically incorporated the rural areas.

Unsuccessful Cases

By contrast, all the independence leaders ousted in their first decade in power followed classic urban-biased policies: they kept urban food prices low by paying out low farmgate prices, focused on creating jobs for urban 'school-leavers,' and generally neglected the rural areas. They include independence leaders in Benin, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the

[304] "Throughout the liberation struggle, [Mugabe's party] ZANU – unlike ZAPU – drew its support base from the rural areas. ZAPU emerged as a worker-based party and drew its fighting forces from this class mainly whereas ZANU imbibed Maoist mobilisation strategies of the 'fish and water' type...Throughout the liberation struggle ZANLA used night vigils ... to politicise the peasantry and to win them over to ZANU...The legacy of the liberation struggle has left a deep memory in rural areas...this makes it hard for the MDC to break into ZANU's rural base" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008:2).

Comoros, Central African Republic and Uganda. In fact, the first *four* leaders in Burkina Faso and the first *five* leaders in Benin − all of whom were ousted within ten years − neglected the rural areas. [305] What has been written of Benin's fourth President, Sangoulé Lamizana might have been written of any of these regimes:

> Under Lamizana the rural areas, where approximately 95 per cent of the six million population live, were largely forgotten. The villages have a medieval atmosphere, untouched by modern life... Education was so neglected that even now it is conservatively estimated that 95 per cent of the population is illiterate. Health care provisions were equally shameful.... No infrastructural investment was made. [Brittain 1985:41]

In some cases, the failure of the independence regime was due to the circumstances under which the leader came to power. Both Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic (CAR) had the misfortune of losing their charismatic independence leaders, thus bequeathing to those countries founding-Presidents bereft of a political vision. In Guinea-Bissau, the independence leader, Amilcar Cabral was a man with great fore-sight and enormous capability who had placed absolute priority on rural development. According to Chabal, Amilcar Cabral's revolutionary success was due to his "experience in and understanding of the countryside," which is why he placed "extreme emphasis on the importance of political mobilisation and on the cadres' ability to live with and relate to the villagers" (1981:88). However, after his untimely assassination one year before independence, his successor and brother, Luiz Cabral, had neither the political judgment nor skill to continue Amilcar's legacy. Instead, "the new state leadership found it difficult to resist the appeal and ideology of urban life and development" (Chabal 1983:198; Forrest 1987).

Similarly, in Central Afrique (CAR) David Dacko was foisted into the presidency after his cousin and leader of the independence struggle, Barthélemy Boganda, died in a plane crash. Like Amilcar, Boganda "had highly developed political and organizational skills and built [his party] into a machine of over-whelming strength and organizational depth" (Le Vine 1968:13). Sadly, Dacko came to power with no popular support. He was wholly dependent upon the metro-pole for his survival. Under his rule, "Central African political life centered entirely around [a] privileged caste, who seemed to be entirely indifferent to the low standard of living of the thousands in the villages" (Kalck 1971:117).

In other cases, independence leaders' failures came from the fact that they chose to emulate the Soviet Union and rapidly industrialize. This was true of leaders in Ghana, São Tomé e Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau, all of whom established centralized Soviet-styled party-states: investing heavily in unneeded capital goods, implementing faulty import licensing policies and squeezing farmers to finance large-scale industries. In São Tomé, Pinto da Costa (1975-1991) nationalized all plantations and industries, including all export/import trade; he had plans to develop large-scale agriculture. As a result, São Tomé , once a leading exporter of cocoa, found its export revenues had dropped from $27 million in 1979, to $9 million in 1981 (Seibart 2006:169). The same was true of Luiz Cabral in Guinea-Bissau. His ruling party became committed to "a socialist transformation of society: economic development based on rapid urban

[305] One exception is the Béninois President Christophe Soglo, who focused on agricultural rehabilitation but had shallow rural support.

and industrial development" (Chabal 1983:203).[306] With the resulting neglect of the rural areas, by 1980 "food shortages revealed the depth of the government's failure to sustain agricultural development and focused discontent on the Luiz Cabral regime" (Chabal 1983:201). That year, Luiz Cabral was ousted in a coup.

Lastly, for some, the choice to squeeze export producers also helped undermine powerful, centralized kingdoms that had historically controlled the export trade. This was so in Ghana and Uganda. In both cases, the president's choice to keep producer prices low helped them undermine powerful, centralized chieftaincies that had historically controlled the country's export trade. Nkrumah had to neutralize the rival power base of the Ashanti Kingdom - which controlled the most productive cocoa belt in Ghana, while Obote had to face off against the Ganda Kingdom - which controlled Uganda's coffee export trade. In both cases, the fight against these powerful kingdoms played a central role in their choice to implement policies that hurt the rural areas and traditional elites, ultimately contributing to both men's ouster from power.

In summary, though the independence leaders faced similar constraints, they chose divergent paths. While ideology alone cannot account for the success or failure of each regime, the leaders that had ideologies compatible with a rural political strategy proved to be successful; those that did not were ousted in coups – most within their first decade in office.

II. SAP Regimes

During the SAP period (post-1980), African leaders faced new challenges. Many were inheriting failing states with radically dysfunctional economies. Almost all had mounting external debt, caused by the international liquidity problems of the 1960s and 1970s and exacerbated by the oil crisis and global recession of the 1970s. In addition, a new orthodoxy had taken hold in Washington and the multi-lateral lending institutions. Donor aid was now conditional. Highly-indebted countries would only be eligible to receive assistance if they restructured their bloated public sectors, re-invigorated agriculture through price incentives and eliminated popular, but dysfunctional, protectionist policies. On the political front, the global order had also changed. Soviet funding had begun to dry up and Cuba and Libya (and to a lesser extent North Korea) had emerged as the new influential leftist regimes. These circumstances created new opportunities and constraints for emerging leaders.

As with the independence leaders, how each leader addressed these new circumstances was related, first and foremost, to his political acumen and ideological dispositions. Ultimately, the choice to cooperate with lending institutions and/or to focus on rural areas − or not − was directly tied to each leaders' state-building priorities and strategies for bolstering his own power base.

[306] As Chabal explains: 'The failure of the government's agrarian programme despite large receipts of foreign aid, the investment in projects which so far have been of little benefit to the countryside and the continuous massive financial drain involved in the maintenance of the bureaucracy and the urban population, must mean that (until 1980 at least) the balance of political forces within the PAIGC was shifting slowly but inexorably against those whom Amilcar Cabral had defined as the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and towards the consolidation of a political alliance between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the proponents of more rapid industrial development' (Chabal 1983:204).

Table II: SAP Leaders' Rural Scores (0 to 5)* and Survival

	Rural Support = Predict Stability **Rural Score:≥ 3**	**Mixed Support = Unstable Equilibrium** **Rural Score: 2.5 - 1.5**	**Rural Neglect = Predict Instability** **Rural Score:≤ 1**
No coup ≥ 10 years ***Stability***	Yoweri Museveni J.J. Rawlings Abdou Diouf Mathieu Kerekou II Alpha Konare Bakili Muluzi Benjamin Mkapa Ali Mwinyi Joao B. Vieira Paul Biya	Daniel arap Moi Blaise Campaore	***†Miguel Trovoada***
Coup ≥ 10 years	Didier Ratsiraka I	Mathieu Kerekou I Yahya Jammeh Andre Kolingba	Ange-Felix Patasse
No Coup < 10 years	Nicéphore Soglo		
Coup < 10 years ***Instability***	***†Henri Konan Bedie*** ***†Didier Ratsiraka II***	Thomas Sankara Hilla Liman Ahmed Abdallah II Said M. Djohar	Albert Zafy Milton Obote II Gérard K. Ouédraogo David Dacko II

†Unpredicted Outcomes N = 29 * See Appendix I, II, III

Almost all the successor regimes in the 'non-coup' countries, Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya, Senegal and Cameroon, continued the independence government's commitment to agriculture and local devolution. In Malawi, Bakili Muluzi "saw decentralization as critical to [his regime's] expansion of legitimacy" (Levy & Kpundeh 2003:312). Similarly, Paul Biya in Cameroon saw local elections as a way to coopt chiefs and their supporters (Jua 1993:44). For others, liberal economic reforms were in concert with their own ideologies. In Senegal, Senghor's successor Abdou Diouf's "main goal was to return the financial management of the country to orthodox norms" (Mbodj 1993:104). Similarly, in Tanzania where Nyerere had reluctantly begun IMF reforms, his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, embraced them as the necessary means of improving the economy.

Unlike these successful cases, in many other countries, SAPs were undertaken half-heartedly with minimal success. For example, in the Comoros, despite signing successive agreements, regimes in the 1980s and 1990s neglected the rural areas, neglected food production and kept government centralized. As a result, the country was put under World Bank sanctions

from 1993 to 2008.[307] By 1999, the Comoros had suffered eight coups and a series of secessionist movements. In the Central African Republic, during the same period André Kolingba was forced to sign agreements as well. But he never invested significantly in the rural areas, or tried to resuscitate the productive base of the economy. Nor did his successor, Ange-Félix Patassé. CAR remained unstable throughout the 1990s and experienced another coup in 2003.

By the same token, countries that finally extricated themselves from 'coup-traps'— Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Uganda — did so because radical reformist governments came to power that oriented the state away from its entrenched urban-bias and towards the rural areas. These reformers include, Mathieu Kérékou in Benin, Thomas Sankara/Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, J.J. Rawlings in Ghana, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Alpha Konaré in Mali. Rawlings, Sankara, Museveni and to a lesser extent Kérékou all sought to 'empower the people,' by ending the despotism of the wealthy that had corrupted their societies. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, Qaddafi's *Little Green Book and* Nyerere's *ujamaa*, they introduced revolutionary governments built up from grassroots socialist cells in every locality and workplace. These 'Revolutionary Committees' (RCs) were made responsible for community development, local policing and community farming and later became the basis of the new, decentralized system. Though Alpha Konaré in Mali was not a Cuban-styled leftist, he too implemented Mali's first decentralization (Seely 2001).[308] And like so many of the other 'rurally-oriented' leaders, such as Houphouët, Nyerere and J.J. Rawlings, Konaré was very effective at cultivating a rural following (Vengroff 1992:558).

Part of the success of these reformist governments came from the fact that they were as concerned with decentralizing and supporting rural communities as the Bretton Woods Institutions. Museveni and Rawlings were particularly successful in fusing the rhetorical and institutional forms of their 'revolutions' with IMF and World Bank strictures. Yet, these leaders' achievements cannot be solely attributed to the fact that they implemented IMF reforms. In Mali, ten years before Konaré, General Moussa Traoré implemented SAPs. He increased producer prices and nominally deconcentrated government. But Traoré's reforms were not a genuine part of his own agenda.[309] Though there were some moderate gains for rural consumers, the new programs largely failed (Staatz et al 1989). Traoré was ousted in 1990. Similarly, Milton Obote was the first to introduce adjustment in Uganda. Obote's second government, in the wake of the Amin year and starved for revenue, signed an IMF agreement in 1981with stringent adjustment conditions. Nevertheless, Obote was not focused on developing the productive base of the economy, nor on helping the rural poor. By 1984, dependent upon aid and unable to pay his debts, Obote promoted Langi military officers ahead of others to buttress himself in power. Instead, he prompted his second ouster (Bunker 1987).

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[307] African Development Bank/ African Development Fund, 'Union of The Comoros Appraisal Report: Economic Reform Support and Financial Governance Programme (PAREGF) 2009-2010,' Michel Malberg Osge, Lead Analyst, pp. 7.

[308] There have been several critiques of Konaré's decentralization program as well as others discussed here. For a cogent discussion of the shortcomings of decentralization in Africa, see Ribot & Oyono 2005. However, this study is not focused on how effective decentralization is in promoting better representative government or more efficiently distributing resources, but rather on whether it enables leaders to incorporate competing local and regional elites. Accordingly, the critiques of decentralization generally underscore the efficacy of the strategies I emphasize.

[309] To give an example of how little Traoré concerned himself with rural areas, in 1987 "Over half of the health personnel, as well as drugs and supplies [were] in the capital, Bamako and serve[d] 8 percent of the total national population" (Imperato 1989:103).

In short, the successful SAP reformers were successful because IMF and World Bank reforms were commensurate with their own policy agendas. These cases therefore demonstrate that what Ndegwe and Levy argue of decentralization is true for SAP reforms more broadly: "It is ultimately propelled by events, priorities and individuals within the political realm making very deliberate calculations" (2001:311). In summary, the SAP regimes, like the independence rulers before them, faced similar structural opportunities and constraints. And like their predecessors, their success was tied to the degree to which their own conception of state-craft and nation-building promoted rural areas. The leaders that implemented reforms which promoted agricultural development and political decentralization proved to be the most successful, while those that did not suffered the consequences.

III. Exceptions that Stay Within the Rule

There are of course exceptions. Several cases only partially supported rural areas. Yet even in these mixed-cases a pattern emerges: leaders that implemented terrible economic policies but politically incorporated local and regional elites outlasted their counterparts. Such was the case in Benin in the 1970s, where the 'reformer,' Mathieu Kérékou, created revolutionary grassroots cells with freely elected representatives. Nonetheless, Kérékou's agricultural policies were disastrous. Farmers remained highly taxed and the economy deteriorated as peasants increasingly sold their products across the border. As Heilbrunn argues, "in an important regard, Kérékou survived [two decades] because he decentralized rule. A core within the regime never seriously threatened the centers of traditional authority in the country's three regions" (1997:50).

Similarly, in The Gambia the independence leader, Dawda Jawara, was in power thirty years before being ousted. Jawara heavily taxed the farmers and rapidly expanded the government sector, running the economy into the ground (Parfitt 1995). However, he also allowed for a more thorough political decentralization than most of his contemporaries. From the early 1960s, The Gambia had elected local councils and until the coup of 1994, it had the distinction of being the longest continuous democracy in Africa (Wiseman 1996, Diene-Njie 1996). Arguably, it was Jawara's political openness that helped him sustain power, despite his neglect of the productive base of the economy.

Pinto da Costa, in São Tomé, also bankrupted the state but he wisely began to restructure his party-government before it was too late (Seibart 2006:184). In 1984, he reached out to his political opposition, made overtures to the West and started implementing economic reforms: cocoa was privatized, producer prices increased. Within seven years, São Tomé was one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to hold multiparty elections. Additionally, in many ways he had a longer grace period than most African leaders. Because of São Tomé's unique history, the country had no pre-colonial rural institutions, nor a landed-elite. Thus, in many ways São Tomé is an agriculturally-based economy without strong agricultural interests. This is arguably why Pinto da Costa's successor, Miguel Trovoada, also remained in power despite having weak rural policies.

On the other hand, regimes that introduced pro-rural policies but alienated traditional and regional elites were far less successful. For example, Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso sought to radically restructure society by redistributing wealth away from privileged urban elites to the neglected rural poor. He created revolutionary cells in every village, invested in rural infrastructure and increased producer prices. Yet, Sankara was ideologically unyielding. He remained fiercely anti-feudal, alienating powerful Mossi chiefs and their followings at the same

time that he was attacking urban workers (Speirs 1991:110; Englebert 1996). While Compaoré's coup against Sankara was unpopular, Campaoré quickly restored the Mossi chiefs and nominally sustained Sankara's rural institutions. He was therefore able to cobble together a coalition in his first decade in power that preserved his presidency.

In conclusion, the majority of cases examined here fit within the general schema I have proposed. There are admittedly exceptions this schema cannot explain easily, such as the longevity of Jean-Bedel Bokassa or Andre Kolingba. However most cases can be accounted for by looking at the coalitions these leaders formed, or failed to form and who they supported in the rural areas.

IV. Conclusion

From this survey a number of patterns emerge. The most successful leftist regimes emulated Chinese, Cuban or Libyan models of socialist development, based on self-directed local cells and some sort of 'Green Revolution.' On the other hand, the least successful followed the Soviet model and attempted to industrialize and radically centralize, with disastrous effects. Similarly, almost all the pro-Western regimes that promoted smallholder agriculture and were willing to grant some autonomy to local/regional elites, were successful. While regimes allied with former colonial powers, but which lacked political vision or a development strategy, tended to opt for defensive policies aimed at paying off their urban populations. They all neglected the rural areas and were ousted from office. Finally, among regimes that straddle these categories, the ones that permitted local elites to direct their communities were more successful than those that tried to improve agriculture but lost traditional elite support.

ii. Testing the Thesis: the Regression Models

Though the survey narrative shows that the patterns established in the in-depth case analyses are broadly applicable, statistical models are better able to test my probabilistic claims about the relationship between regime survival and political strategy. To develop models, I code each of the fifty-eight regimes and establish a Rural Political Score (RPS) for each. I then test how Rural Political Scores correlate with the likelihood of a forced removal, as well as duration in office.

The Coding

To determine if a regime followed a 'rural political strategy,' I code each regime on six measures (see Appendix II). The coding is based primarily upon secondary sources and international reports, though some primary sources were also used (see Bibliography). To better triangulate information, reference was made to an average of six sources, with a minimum of four per regime. A cumulative 'Rural Political Score' was then created (See Appendix I, III).

Because I am measuring political stability as the likelihood of being forcibly removed from power within ten years, all of my regimes are coded based on their first ten years in power or the duration of their tenure, depending upon which came first. Focusing on the first ten years makes the coding of each regime more consistent and allows for greater parity among regimes with widely different time-frames. It is also a better means to test the policies themselves as opposed to the added effects of long-duration in office.

Whereas most of the existent literature focuses almost exclusively on producer prices as an indicator of rural support or neglect, I place greater emphasis on political policies. Therefore

my six proxies were chosen to measure how much a regime incorporated local traditional powerbrokers. I have chosen my proxies in accordance with three dimensions (See Appendix II):

> Political Support Base: My assumption is that those that begin with a rural base of support will generally be more supportive of traditional elites and traditional agriculture than those that begin with an urban base of support and are beholden primarily to union and student activists. I therefore code regimes on whether they had a predominately rural or urban base of support upon assumption of power.
>
> Political Decentralization: I have used three separate measures to establish the degree to which a regime decentralized power. The first is administrative deconcentration, e.g. giving local/regional state functionaries greater discretion over the allocation of resources and development rather than keeping decisions centralized. The second is fiscal decentralization, when a regime designates funds that are to be used by local administrations at their own discretion. The last is whether the state allows for freely elected councils to administer localities.
>
> Support of Chieftaincy: I have derived two further measures to determine if a regime has been supportive of chieftaincy. For the first, I code each regime on whether they offer constitutional protections of chieftaincy. For the second, I code each regime on whether it allowed chiefs to hold important offices in village and local administrations (such as on local courts or development councils).

The choice of a cumulative score was made because my hypothesis is that the closer a regime comes to following an ideal-typical rural strategy, the greater the probability it will survive over a decade in office. An ideal-typical rural strategy would be one in which a regime scored highly for each of the six measures. Therefore, the higher a regime's rural score, the closer it comes to following an ideal-typical rural strategy. Thus, as a regime's Rural Political Score increases, I predict the regime's likelihood of surviving the first decade in office should also increase and, correlatively, its likelihood of being ousted in a coup should decrease.

I have also tested the effects of six competing explanatory factors against RPS. The explanatory factors are: 1) the period in which the regime came to power; 2) the type of regime; 3) the country's former colonial power; 4) changes in urban population; 5) levels of ethnic and religious differentiation; and 6) changes in GDP per capita.

> Epoch: Because the end of the cold war and increased aid after 1980 changed the political climate on the continent, I code regimes by epoch to test the if the effects were related to whether a regime was in power from 1960-1980 or from 1980-2000 (Independence vs. SAP period).
>
> Regime Type: To see if longevity or the proclivity for coups might be more likely under a particular type of regime I used a dummy coded for each: Military Regime, Autocracy, or Democracy.
>
> Colonial Power: I tested to see if the colonial history was relevant to outcomes, by using a dummy code for each country. Within my sample there are three possibilities: former

British, French and Portugese colonies.

Changes in Population of the Largest City: One hypothesis is that upsurges in urban population and particularly in the largest city, can intensify urban competition and discontent and thereby increase the likelihood that a regime will destabilize. Therefore, I have included percent changes in the population of the largest city as a partial test of this thesis.[310]

Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious Polarization*:* Ethnic fractionalization and religious polarization have often been correlated with higher levels of instability. I therefore coded each regime for both measures.[311]

Changes in GDP per capita: Level of economic prosperity has long been associated with both political stability and political risk. Therefore, I have included this measure to see how it correlates in my sample with both longevity in office and the probability of forced removal.[312]

After coding each regime, I ran two different types of models to test the effects of rural scores on the likelihood of regime remaining in power for over ten years. First, I ran a standard linear regression of all the coefficients on years in office.[313] Secondly, I used a logit model to test the likelihood of a regime being forced out of power.

The Findings

The findings are in fact in accord with the predictions. In a simple crosstab, I find that regimes with low rural scores are much more likely to be forcibly removed from power within the first ten years in office. Only 26 percent of the regimes with high rural scores were forcibly removed from power, whereas 91 percent of those with very low rural scores. In addition, regimes with high rural scores averaged seventeen years in office, those with a very low rural score averaged only six years in office. Finally, as predicted, regimes with mid-level scores, which proxy for a mixed-strategy, fall in the middle range. Two-thirds were forcibly removed from power and they averaged fourteen years in office (See Table G).

[310]Data was taken from the World Bank dataBank, African Development Indicators (ADI) http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 (Accessed March 2012).

[311] Data from Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic diversity and economic development," *Journal of Development Economics* 76 (2005) 319-322. The drawback is that these measures do not take into account changes over time. Only one measure is used for each country over several decades. Therefore, there may be effects that these numbers do not measure.

[312] This is a measure of percentage increase over the time of the regime. The data is from the World Bank dataBank, African Development Indicators (ADI) http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 (Accessed March 2012).

[313] Because ten of my cases dropped out due to missing population, GDP, ethnic and religious data, I ran models in which I imputed the mean values of these measures where they wre missing. The substitution of the mean values, however, did not substantially affect either the coefficients or the significance in the second model.

Table G: Rural Scores and Outcomes				
Rural Score	**# of Cases**	**# of Coups**	**% with Coups**	**Av. Years in Office**
High RLS ≥ 3	19	5	26%	17.3
Mid-RLS 5.5 – 3.5	16	10	62%	14.4
Low RLS ≤ 3	23	21	91%	5.8

To further test these possible correlations, I use a linear regression model to estimate the effect of rural score on years and a logit regression model to estimate the effect of rural score on the likelihood of forced removal. The regression results show Rural Political Scores (RPS) to be extremely highly correlated to increased years in office, with less than a million percent chance that the correlation is random. A one-point increase in Rural Political Score increases the likelihood a regime will stay in power by 3.5 years. It also significantly decreases the likelihood of forced removal, though the correlation is not as strong (with a 10% chance of being a random correlation) (See Table J, Table K and Scatterplot 1).

Table J: Effects of Rural Political Score (RPS) on Years in Office)

Coefficients:	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Rural Political Score	3.3888	0.7171	2.11e-05 ***
Epoch	2.8982	2.1700	0.18812
France	-1.4842	3.7088	0.69085
England 3	-0.2919	3.7346	0.93803
Autocracy	15.0098	2.6595	9.27e-07 ***
Military Regime	5.9927	2.0936	0.00626 **
% Change Pop. of Largest City˚	5.0535	3.5223	0.15799
Ethnic Fractionalization[i]	3.2012	5.2662	0.54620
Religious Polarization[i]	3.5915	3.8625	0.35720
% Change GDP per capita˚	0.5773	1.2688	0.65120

Multiple R-squared: 0.6337, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5557

Notes: Significant at: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'

˚**Source***:* World Bank dataBank, African Development Indicators (ADI) http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 (Accessed March 2012).
[i]**Source:** Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic diversity and economic development," *Journal of Development Economics* 76 (2005) 319-322.



Not surprisingly, autocratic regimes were also highly correlated with a larger number of years in office, as compared to democracies. Interestingly, though, civilian autocracies show a higher probability of remaining in office over time than military autocracies. However, only RPS was significantly correlated with the likelihood of forced removal. None of the traditional explanatory factors for political instability were correlated with either outcome: neither changes in GDP per capita, nor levels of ethnic fractionalization or religious polarization, nor increases in the population of the largest urban center had significant effects. Nor was there a significant correlation between the former colonial power and the longevity of a regime or its ability to avoid forced removal. Perhaps most surprisingly, there appears to be no significant difference between regimes that came to power between 1960 and 1980 during the Cold War period, and those that came to power after 1980 during the SAP period.

Table K: Effects of Rural Political Score (RPS) on Coup Probability

Coefficients:	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Rural Political Score	-0.8386	0.3328	0.0117 *
Epoch	-1.9331	1.6116	0.2303
France	0.6902	1.4385	0.6314
England	1.2337	1.4444	0.3930
Autocracy	-2.5164	1.7221	0.1440
Military Regime	1.0846	0.9644	0.2607
% Change Pop. of Largest City[°]	0.2005	1.8987	0.9159
Ethic Fractionalization[i]	-2.1979	2.2901	0.3372
Religious Polarization[i]	-2.8521	2.4196	0.2385
% Change GDP per capita[°]	0.6399	1.1258	0.5697

Notes: Significant at: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'

[°]**Source***:* World Bank dataBank, African Development Indicators (ADI) http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 (Accessed March 2012).

[i]**Source:** Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic diversity and economic development," *Journal of Development Economics* 76 (2005) 319-322.

I have also broken down the rural score to see which measures have a greater effect (See Table L and M). Unexpectedly, for both outcomes, the highest correlation is with my weakest proxy for political decentralization: administrative deconcentration. The second most significant measure is a leader's political base upon assuming power. Additionally, the legal protection of chieftaincy was correlated with years in office, although not with coups. However, my central measures for political decentralization, locally elected councils and fiscal decentralization, were not correlated with either increased years in power or the probability of a coup. Nonetheless, I subtracted administrative deconcentration from RPS and ran the models again and found it did not significantly change either the coefficients or the significance values..

Thus, overall, the regression models strongly support the thesis of this study. As such, this survey suggests that rural areas are central to regime longevity and secondly to regime stability. By analyzing how the center institutionalizes its connection to the periphery, I have sought to show that one can better account for different political outcomes.

Table L: Years ~ Rural Measures

Coefficients	p-value
Political Base	3.03e-05 ***
Administrative Deconcentration	0.000703 ***
Fiscal Deconcentration	-0.679923
Elected Local Councils	-0.014693 *
Legal Protection of Chieftaincy	0.038053 *
Chiefs in Village Administration	0.152116

Notes: Significant values at, 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Table M: Coups ~ Rural Measures

Coefficients:	p-value
Political Base	-0.01015 *
Administrative Deconcentration	-0.00448 **
Fiscal Decentralization	-0.24483
Elected Local Councils	0.26939
Legal Protection of Chieftaincy	-0.14045
Chiefs in Village Administration	0.43875

Notes: Significant values at, 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

CHAPTER 7

WHY RURAL STRATEGIES?

In this study, I have sought to explain why a country like Cote d'Ivoire might suffer a coup after forty years of stability, despite having a relatively resurgent economy, while Ghana, a country which had weathered five successive coups and whose economy was decimated, was able to extricate itself from its coup-trap. I have argued that most African regimes share similar structural vulnerabilities. Consequently, a regime's capacity to stay in power is contingent upon its ability to forge strategic rural alliances. This is because, to survive, a regime has to be able to ride out persistent disturbances in the capital, minimize the power of ethnic entrepreneurs and grow the economy. I have argued that all of these goals can be best achieved by sustaining a rural base of support.

The in-depth case comparisons are used to elaborate the mechanisms behind the success and failure of each regime. The choice of cases was also made to address many of the confounding factors that might account for political instability (e.g. changes in world prices for primary commodities and ethnic fractionalization). However, there is one confounding factor that warrants particular attention: the impact of foreign governments on each regime's fate. Although it would be foolhardy to deny foreign involvement, the question is whether such involvement is decisive. Strong arguments have been made to support the view that they are.

With respect to Ghana, it is often argued that Nkrumah was undermined by western powers, whereas Rawlings received massive amounts of western aid. Indeed, Nkrumah's anti-imperialist rhetoric, relations with Eastern-bloc countries and support of anti-colonial struggles made him easy fodder for Cold-War fear-mongers. He was denied crucial financing and there is clear evidence that the CIA supported anti-Nkrumah plots throughout the 1960s and that they were even in contact with the 1966-coup leaders (See Chapter 2).

Nevertheless, Rawlings situation in the early 1980s was not so dissimilar. Like Nkrumah, Rawlings' relations with Libya and Cuba raised ire of the Reagan administration. At the time, his government alleged numerous CIA plots had been carried out against it. First, it was claimed that the sudden Nigerian expulsion of 1.2 million Ghanaians in 1983 was directed by the United States, with the hopes of destabilizing the regime. Two years later, a number of CIA agents were arrested in Accra, among them a former commander of the most important military barracks in Accra who was in command from 1982-1983, a period when several coup attempts were launched against Rawlings. Again, in 1986, eight US mercenaries were seized off the coast of Brazil with six-tons of weaponry. The mercenaries reportedly admitted that they were headed for Ghana to join a coup funded by a Ghanaian dissident with CIA ties.

To protect himself from these various conspiracies, Rawlings built a formidable security-apparatus (with Cuban and Libyan support, not western aid). But so had Nkrumah, whose Stalinist-police state penetrated most of the country. Given all these similarities, it is quite plausible that, without the loyalty of his own armed-forces, Rawlings might have succumbed to a (CIA-backed?) coup, as Nkrumah before him.

Furthermore, although International Financial Institutions (IFIs) eventually financed Rawlings, they were cautious at first. As late as August 1986, the U.S. government, angered by Ghana's rhetoric and 'Castro-style foreign policy,' threatened to cut off all aid to Ghana. Moreover, even after aid had begun pouring into Ghana in 1986, the aid received was "substantially below" the average aid-per-person given to other African countries (Herbst 1993:132). Therefore, there seems little evidence to support the pervasive idea that Rawlings was

kept in power by western aid; rather, what was critical was Rawlings' tactical use of that aid. In point of fact, in the early 1990s, the lion's share of aid was also going not to Ghana – but to Côte d'Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire's aid doubled as soon as Bédié took power. In 1994, the country received more than triple the amount Ghana was receiving at the time. In fact, it was after Rawlings left power in 2000 that aid for Ghana really took off (See Graph 1). If aid was responsible for anyone's stability it should have been Bédié's.



With respect to Côte d'Ivoire, it is frequently argued that Houphouët's presidency was secured by French military support, whereas Bédié's was not. However, this is slightly misleading. The fact is the French initially supported both leaders, and, moreover, withdrew their support for both Houphouët and Bédié before they left office. During Houphouët's last years, the French no longer could be counted upon. When in 1990, over 500 conscripts mutinied, taking control of Abidjan airport, Mitterrand refused to send in the 1,0000 French troops stationed right nearby at Port Bouët – despite a personal request from Houphouët. According to French sources, "Mr Mitterrand's response could be summarised by a polite reminder that interference in a former colony belonged to another age."[314] Nonetheless, Houphouët's Presidential Guard was able to quickly quell the revolt.

In contrast, in 1999, when France again refused to intercede in Abidjan as soldiers mutinied in the streets, no security forces came to Bédié's aid – not even after Bédié issued a direct radio plea, "to all active forces in Cote d'Ivoire, military, civilian

[314] Paul Webster, "Ivory Coast calls crisis meeting as French refuse to intervene." *The Guardian* (London), May 18, 1990.

and traditional, to resist and do everything to oppose and rapidly defeat this grotesque and backward attempt at a military coup."[315] Rather, "the country's paratroopers, marines, infantry and armoured units had abandoned Bédié. Even his presidential guard let him down."[316] These parallel events, therefore, lend credence to the idea that the success of the 1999-coup was due to the absence of Bédié's domestic military support, rather than France's actions.

Thus, though foreign actors clearly aided regimes and abetted coup-plotters, there is reason to doubt that their machinations could have been decisive had each leader not strengthened/weakened his position vis-à-vis the State and society at large. Ultimately, Nkrumah and Bédié failed because they hollowed out their political bases, which caused them to lose support of their militaries. Houphouët and Rawlings survived because they worked diligently to prevent such an outcome, by making tactical choices and fostering regional alliances.

In conclusion, there was nothing pre-ordained in the existing circumstances, which determined the outcomes that came to pass. In fact, in each of these cases contemporary commentators predicted the reverse outcome. Though no one predicted either the success or failure of Côte d'Ivoire at the time of independence, many viewed Ghana as the obvious frontrunner. Apter in 1955 described the Gold Coast as "the most hopeful spot on the map of Africa, if one is concerned with African freedom and self-government" (Apter 1955:120). The same sentiment was echoed by the U.S. Ambassador to Ghana from 1962 to 1965, Bill Mahoney, who reminisced how, "Everyone was hopeful. Those were absolutely optimistic times for hope. Ghana was singular in the sense that it had everything."[317]

The reverse was true of the prognostications for both countries in the post-SAP period. In 1984, Robert Price described Ghana as being in a "crisis is so severe that it might accurately be termed a crisis of economic, if not political, survival" (1984:165). In the same vein, in 1982, Chazan held that "The second populist experiment in Ghanaian politics merely reaffirms, at this juncture, the fragility of state power and the limitations placed on its wielders in the midst of the breakdown of the state" (1982:483). Another long-time scholar of Ghanaian politics, Richard Jeffries, projected in 1982 that the most likely scenario would be that the Rawlings government would "muddle through" implementing "minor" and "ineffective" economic policies, which would be "the politically most safe course of action" but would "almost certainly also result in the further disintegration of Ghana as an effective nation-state" (1982:317).

In contrast, few, if any, scholars imagined that Côte d'Ivoire's would experience such rapid political disintegration. By 1995, Rapley found that in small ways things were improving in Abidjan and wrote that for the time being "Houphouet-Boigny leaves behind a stable polity," in which Henri Konan Bédié "appears secure in the presidency" and "the political dominance of the Ivoirian industrial bourgeoisie, the central feature of the country's politics, appears unlikely to weaken" (1995:119-121). And as late as 1997, Tesse Bakary asserted that, "Côte d'Ivoire has been and will long continue to be governed in its ways of managing conflict by coherent values and a normative set of codes, as well as by a self-reproducing and cohesive ruling class" (1997:93).

Thus, many contemporaries still believed in the solidity of the Ivoirian state and the precariousness of Ghana's. Certainly it is undeniable that by the 1990s Houphouët's system of

[315] "Mutineers in Cote d'Ivoire seize control of Abidjan, announce coup," Agence France Presse -English, December 24, 1999, Friday.
[316] "Guëi , Cote d'Ivoire's new leader, longtime foe of Bédié," Agence France Presse - English, December 27, 1999, Monday.
[317] Interview, *History Nkrumah Part III*, UCTV History (accessed on www.youtube.com, 1/4/2011).

political checks and balances had begun to fray. Likely, Côte d'Ivoire was headed for difficult times no matter who led the country. But that it would suffer a coup d'état and slide into civil war was not a foregone conclusion. Likewise, it was clear in the 1980s that Ghana had nowhere to go but up and that Rawlings was left with little choice but to work with the IMF and World Bank. Nonetheless, that Ghana would become one of the highest growing economies on the continent and eventually the paragon of political stability and democratic governance was far from conceivable in the 1980s. The level of success and failure that each regime achieved, therefore, is best ascribed to the political stewarding of each leader.

Moreover, the case comparisons suggest several possible ways rural strategies can reduce political hazards. First, as has often been argued, political hazards increase when widespread discontent leads to escalating urban protest (Londregran & Poole 1990, O'Kane 1987). The question is *how best to manage this risk*. It is possible that with a rural support base, a government can use more repression and less concession to contain urban protest, thereby better insulating it from its urban threat. As Huntington theorized: "If the government can build a bridge to the countryside, if it can mobilize support from the rural areas, it can contain and ride out the instabilities of the city;" Otherwise, it will be "caught in an urban prison of instability and function at the whim of the city mob, the capital garrison and the central university's students" (1968:209). These observations are borne out by the case studies. Once both Nkrumah and Bédié had begun to lose control over their urban constituents they had no other support base to sustain themselves in power. In contrast, both Houphouët and Rawlings were able to weather several periods of urban unrest without serious risk to their presidencies.

Secondly, rural strategies can potentially help strengthen the economy. Catering to urban demands tends to siphon funds away from productive investments. Furthermore, squeezing farmers raises the likelihood farmers will choose 'exit strategies' – cutting-out export crops to grow food staples and selling-off products on the black market – which undercuts the state's productive base and capacity to generate revenue (Bates 1981). Mukonoweshuro's description of Madagascar in the 1980s provides a typical example:

> "the government favoured the urban population by maintaining low prices for staple foods to the detriment of the rural producers...The reaction of the peasants was to concentrate on food crop production such as sweet potatoes and cassava, while reducing to a minimum unprofitable cash crops which the government wanted. Sometimes peasants retaliated by smuggling cash crops to neighbouring islands. For instance, almost seventy-five percent of the 1982 peasant vanilla harvest was smuggled to the Comoro Islands (1990:383)

As this example also illustrates, reducing costs for farmers promotes their ability to get food crops to market. In tandem with this, when farmers receive fair wages, they can hire extra laborers (particularly from less productive regions). All of these factors help food markets thrive.[318] Thus, following rural strategies can allow the state to expand productivity and in so doing tax agriculture more efficiently, increasing state revenues.

However, the central argument of this study is that focusing on local autonomy can

[318] In a report on agriculture in SSA, agronomists emphasized the importance of these 'non-price' factors in increasing food supply. See Kherallah et al 2000, pp.15.

reduce the strength of ethnic appeals, a critical driver of political hazard (Horowitz 1985). Generally, it is urban ethnic entrepreneurs that mobilize populations to secure political followings (Mamdani 1996). Promoting rural self-administration can diminish the power of the ethnic entrepreneurs, by fracturing political mobilization along local lines and diffusing other forms of political engagement. As a result, devolving power to localities potentially strengthens the central government against its regional competitors. Additionally, supporting traditional elites and devolving power locally, can give communities a greater sense of autonomy and may therefore help diminish ethno-regional discontent.

In fact, this line of reasoning is found repeatedly in Africanist literature. In analyzing the dynamics that allowed for Museveni's success in stabilizing Uganda after the devastating years of Idi Amin, Mamdani concludes more broadly that, "localized reform in favor of the peasantry...consolidates the social base of the regime and monopoly of power at the top, neutralizes middle-class contenders for leadership from within civil society" (1996:214). Similarly, Chinsinga observes in Malawi that, "What therefore might look like decentralization from the centre may actually turn out to be a centralizing force" (271). In her study of politics in Mali under Konaré, Seely finds that part of Konaré's success was due to his decentralization policies. She also concludes that, "Decentralisation preserves the top of the hierarchy and prevents further undermining of the structure by a trouble-making or separatist group" (2001:505). Similarly, Widner attributes Kenyatta's success largely to his ability "to focus the attention of politicians on local issues and on the formation of alliances across communities, while limiting their power to force agendas on one another" (1993:73).

This mechanism is most clearly illustrated in the case of Houphouët. Houphouët's ability to incorporate political elites from most regions helped dampen ethnic mobilization in the countryside. He was also able to divide ethnic loyalties by developing an administrative system that favored local elites and relocated regional elites in the capital. The difference between the way Houphouët and Nkrumah handled the indigenous groups in the capital most clearly underscores the effects of Houphouët's policies. Both groups were disadvantaged by the quick development of the capital city. But where Nkrumah continued to neglect the Gã even after they explicitly warned him of the ramifications of not taking action, Houphouët made sure to send sufficient compensation to the community and its elites. As a result, the Gã in Ghana organized into a terrorist group that plagued Nkrumah until his ouster. Radical Gã leaders were part of most of the conspiracies and coup attempts launched against Nkrumah and were suspected of conducting many of the bombings in Accra. Houphouët faced no such manifestation. The one and only time Houphouët was bombed was after the urban opposition was angered over the 'Yes' vote to continue union with France. There is no reason to think the indigenous groups in Abidjan had anything to do with any violence against the regime.

As a result, rural strategies may enable a regime to better insulate itself from the military. Because sub-Saharan militaries are ethnically factionalized, officers can be easily politicized (Horowitz 1985; Ocran 1977). Such politicization frequently occurs when a regime, fearful of ethno-regional powerbrokers, tries to protect itself from ethnic counterparts in the military – by denying promotions, initiating dismissals and arrests and creating 'ethnically-friendly' paramilitary forces – the very actions that typically bring about coups (Horowitz 1985:467-469). Such actions triggered coups in Uganda in 1977 and 1985; Guinea-Bissau in 1980; CAR in 1966; Ghana in 1966 and 1972; Sierra Leone in 1967; and Liberia in 1980 (Kandah 2004; Horowitz 1986). This mechanism is also demonstrated by the case studies. Nkrumah and Bédié reorganized their military by dismissing important Generals associated with ethnic groups that

were hostile to the regime. Nkrumah went so far as to undermine the entire command structure of the established military. In both cases, the dismissed officers organized the coup that ousted the government.

Therefore, by incorporating established rural elites, a regime is less likely to fear ethnic groups in the military and strike out against members of that ethnic group in the armed-forces. This tactic was expressly used by Rawlings, who was able to keep his majority-northern troops on his side even after key military leaders from the North turned against him. His ability to incorporate the Nandom Naa and other powerful chiefs coupled with his choice to bring electricity and aid to the North were critical to his gaining the support of the Upper North; a region in which most of his troops had been recruited from. As a result, despite the fact that a handful of northern junior and senior officers made repeated coup attempts against him, Rawlings maintained the support of the region and most of his armed forces. In fact, three decades later, his party still maintains strong electoral support in the region. Similarly, Houphouët was able to keep the military on his side in part by dispensing patronage across regions in a veritable quota system and by incorporating military elites into the political and economic institutions of the country.

By the same token, rural neglect can increase the likelihood of aggrieving the rank-and-file and middle and junior ranks of the armed forces. Whereas the top military-brass can generally insulate itself from economic recession as part of the ruling elite, the lower and middle ranks – who command battalions that can be efficiently mobilized against a regime – are disproportionately affected by declining living standards and military cut-backs. Therefore, strategies that reduce the probability of food shortages and productive decline will be less likely to bring about disaffection of these ranks. Such grievances precipitated the 1979 Ghanaian coup and the 1990s coups in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Kandah 2004). Forrest's description of the lead-up to the 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau illustrates how the two mechanisms can converge:

> ...between 1977 and 1979, when the impact of the Sahelian drought resulted in a severely depleted food-crop harvest and the Government was able to obtain internationally supplied rice, much of this was distributed within the urban sector rather than to the peasants who had until then been providing the Government with their surplus produce. With 80 per cent of the rice normally being grown by the Balanta, their discontent was directly transmitted to the soldiers, the vast majority of whom continued to retain direct ties with their rural homes, so that these economic and ethnic variables merged to further prepare the political stage for military intervention. [1987: 102]

In summary, for a regime to survive it has to withstand incessant urban unrest, curb ethno-regional competitors, grow the economy and prevent military politicization. These aims are arguably best achieved by fostering rural support.

CONCLUSION

In this study I have sought to develop a systematic way to understand why some regimes in sub-Saharan Africa fail and others succeed. Given that most of the countries on the continent share so many of the same economic, institutional and historical challenges, why have some regimes been able to foster political stability – even out of the wreckage of decades of political and economic turmoil, while others have brought about state collapse after years of stability? To answer this question, I have looked in-depth at two countries that reversed their fates: Ghana, which democratized after decades of coups and economic decay; and Côte d'Ivoire, once the most promising country in West Africa that experienced its first coup after forty years and was subsequently riven in two by civil war.

In analyzing these cases, I have made the argument that what is critical to a regime's success is not its institutional inheritance or even international political support, but rather how a political leader navigates the given political situation. More specifically, I have argued that African regimes share similar structural vulnerabilities, consequently, a regime's capacity to stay in power is contingent upon its ability to forge strategic rural alliances. This is because to survive a regime has to be able to ride-out persistent disturbances in the capital, minimize the power of ethnic-entrepreneurs, develop the economy and keep the support of its armed-forces. These goals are arguably best achieved by developing the support of rural areas.

I therefore developed two ideal-typical strategies and argued that implementing one, a rural political strategy, promotes political stability, while implementing the other, an urban political strategy, leads to political instability. To test these claims I have conducted a quantitative study of most of the resource-poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2000. The quantitative study bears out the theoretical argument. I have found that regimes that politically incorporate rural areas and support chieftaincy are able to survive in office for over a decade. The in-depth cases studies also bear out the argument by showing that the regimes that implemented rural political strategies were able to overcome continued urban protest and repeated coup attempts. In contrast, the regimes that lost critical support in the rural areas weakened their hold on the capital and ultimately on their armed forces. It is possible, as sub-Saharan states become increasingly urbanized that the critical distinctions outlined here will become less significant. But so long as chieftaincy and ethno-regional identities continue to play a central role in African politics, the observations in this study will likely remain relevant.

This study provides important implications for theories of decentralization. The types of successful decentralization examined here all kept sub-regional authorities intact, while weakening regional autonomy. This suggests that federalism may not be the best approach in sub-Saharan Africa, where empowering (rather than coopting) competing regional actors is more likely to destabilize a political regime than strengthen it. On the other hand, though empowering localities appears to be critical for state security and development, this study also suggests that decentralization does not necessarily lead to social empowerment or more equitable distribution of resources. Where traditional power structures are still dominant, decentralization often allows powerful elites to strengthen their positions within local community and capitalize on resources made available. This may, therefore, help strengthen the center vis-à-vis the regions but will not necessarily strengthen local communities.

In the broadest terms, the study suggests that it might be valuable to resuscitate rural/urban analyses in the great tradition of Barrington Moore and Samuel S. Huntington. Such analyses, by and large, went by the wayside after interest in the dramatic peasant revolutions of

the early 20th century ebbed. But patterns of political organization around the globe suggest the continued importance of studying political life in terms of these social configurations. In countries as disparate as Iran, Thailand and Venezuela, the breakdown in political support along urban/rural lines has steered important political outcomes.

The question then is not why sub-Saharan regimes neglect the rural areas, but when do they choose not to. My answer is the rural/urban story is part of the larger story of how elites address their opposition. Leaders that have been able to overcome their fear of competing regional powerbases have been able to pursue more beneficial state-building policies.[319] This study, thus, supports the claim that "Leaders need a minimal degree of protection in office to undertake development" (A.A. Goldsmith 2001:96). As a result, it gives credence to the idea that if sub-Saharan leaders are given sufficient political protections, "rulers and other leading politicians might begin to value the limited security of official tenure more highly than the uncertain possession of personal power and, beyond this, the greater stability and order attainable only under institutional government" (Jackson & Rosberg 1984:439).

[319] Dunning (2005) makes a similar observation.

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Appendix I: List of Regimes by Rural Political Score*

Country	Leader	Epoch	Period	Leaves office	Coup	Years	RPS
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	2	1986-	still in power	**0**	**26**	**5**
Ghana	J.J. Rawlings	2	1983-2000	voted out	**0**	**17**	**4.5**
Senegal	Abdou Diouf	2	1981-2000	voted out	**0**	**19**	**4**
Tanzania	Benjamin Mkapa	2	1995-2005	voted out	**0**	**10**	**4**
Malawi	Bakili Muluzi	2	1994-2004	voted out	**0**	**10**	**4**
Senegal	Leopold Senghor	1	1964-1981	voted out	**0**	**17**	**3.5**
Cote	Houphouët-Boigny	1	1960-1993	dies	**0**	**33**	**3.5**
Mali	Alpha Konare	2	1992-2002	voted out	**0**	**10**	**3.5**
Benin	Mathieu Kerekou II	2	1996-2006	voted out	**0**	**10**	**3.5**
Cote	Henri Konan Bedie	2	1994-2000	coup	**1**	**5**	**3.5**
Tanzania	Ali Mwinyi	2	1985-1995	voted out	**0**	**10**	**3.5**
Madagas	Didier Ratsiraka I	2	1975-1993	forced out	**0.5**	**18**	**3.5**
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1	1980-	still in power	**0**	**32**	**3**
Gambia	Dawda Jawara	1	1965-1994	coup	**1**	**29**	**3**
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	1	1960-1982	turns over	**0**	**22**	**3**
G-Bissau	Joao B. Vieira	2	1980-1999	coup	**1**	**19**	**3**
Cameroon	Paul Biya	2	1982-	still in power	**0**	**30**	**3**
Madagas	Didier Ratsiraka II	2	1997-2002	forced out	**0.5**	**6**	**3**
Benin	Nicéphore Soglo	2	1991-1996	voted out	**0**	**5**	**3**
Malawi	Hastings Banda	1	1964-1994	dies in office	**0**	**30**	**2.5**
Kenya	Jomo Kenyatta	1	1963-1978	dies in office	**0**	**15**	**2.5**
Gambia	Yahya Jammeh	2	1994-2012	coup	**1**	**18**	**2.5**
Burkina	Thomas Sankara	2	1983-1987	coup	**1**	**4**	**2.5**
Benin	Mathieu Kerekou I	2	1972-1990	forced out	**0.5**	**18**	**2.5**
Tanzania	Julius Nyerere	1	1961-1985	voted out	**0**	**24**	**2**
Comoros	Ali Soilihi	1	1976-1978	coup	**1**	**2**	**2**
Burkina	Saye Zerbo	1	1974-1980	coup	**1**	**6**	**2**
Kenya	Daniel arap Moi	2	1978-2002	voted out	**0**	**24**	**2**
Madagas	Philibert Tsiranana	1	1960-1972	forced out	**0.5**	**12**	**1.5**
Mali	Moussa Traore	1	1968-1991	coup	**1**	**23**	**1.5**
Ghana	Hilla Liman	2	1979-1981	coup	**1**	**2**	**1.5**
Comoros	Ahmed Abdallah II	2	1978-1989	dies in coup	**1**	**11**	**1.5**
Comoros	Said M. Djohar	2	1990-1995	coup	**1**	**5**	**1.5**
CAR	Andre Kolingba	2	1981-1993	voted out	**0**	**12**	**1.5**
Burkina	Blaise Campaore	2	1987-	still in power	**0**	**25**	**1.5**
Mali	Modibo Keita	1	1960-1968	coup	**1**	**8**	**1**
CAR	Jean-Bedel Bokassa	1	1966-1979	coup	**1**	**13**	**1**
CAR	David Dacko	1	1960-1965	coup	**1**	**5**	**1**
Burkina	Sangoulé Lamizana	1	1970-1974	coup	**1**	**4**	**1**
Benin	Hubert Maga	1	1960-1963	coup	**1**	**3**	**1**
CAR	David Dacko II	2	1979-1981	coup	**1**	**2**	**1**
CAR	Ange-Felix Patasse	2	1993-2003	coup	**1**	**10**	**1**
Benin	Christophe Soglo	1	1965-1967	coup	**1**	**2**	**0.5**
Ghana	Acheampong	1	1972-1978	coup	**1**	**6**	**0.5**

Country	Leader	Epoch	Period	Leaves office	Coup	Years	RPS
Uganda	Milton Obote I	1	1962-1971	coup	**1**	**9**	**0.5**
Madagas	Gabriel Ramanantsoa	1	1972-1975	coup	**1**	**3**	**0.5**
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	1	1958-1966	coup	**1**	**9**	**0.5**
Benin	Sourou-Migan Apithy	1	1964-1965	coup	**1**	**1**	**0.5**
Benin	Émile Zinsou	1	1968-1969	coup	**1**	**1**	**0.5**
Burkina	Gérard K. Ouédraogo	2	1980-1982	coup	**1**	**2**	**0.5**
Uganda	Idi Amin	1	1971-1979	coup	**1**	**8**	**0**
Sao Tome	M. Pinto da Costa	1	1975-1991	voted out	**0**	**16**	**0**
Ghana	Dr. K.A. Busia	1	1969-1971	coup	**1**	**2**	**0**
G-Bissau	Luiz Cabral	1	1974-1980	coup	**1**	**6**	**0**
Burkina	Maurice Yameogo	1	1960-1966	forced out	**0.5**	**6**	**0**
Uganda	Milton Obote II	2	1980-1985	coup	**1**	**5**	**0**
Sao Tome	Miguel Trovoada	2	1991-2001	voted out	**0**	**10**	**0**
Madagas	Albert Zafy	2	1993-1997	impeached	**0.5**	**4**	**0**

*Rural Support = Rural Political Score of ≥ 3 (Predict Regime Survival)
Partial Support = Rural Score of 2.5 - 1.5 (Predict Unstable Equilibrium)
Rural Neglect = Rural Score of ≤ 1 (Predict High Hazard)

Appendix 1I: Key to Coding (For sources see Bibliography)

I. Political Factors

i. Political Support

1. Support-base upon assuming power [Base]

1= Predominately rural
0.5 = Populist with an appeal to segments in both urban and rural areas
0 = Predominately urban and restricted in the rural areas to home region, or military-backed

ii. Devolution

2. Local Councils [LclCncl]

1 = Free elections for local councils
0.5 = Councils made up of elected and appointed members
0 = Appointed members or Party/Government-controlled electoral lists

3. Fiscal Decentralization [FDcn]

1 = Devolution of funds provided to local administrations
0.5 = Central funds made available for locally initiated development projects
0 = Centralized funding - only government directed investment in local development

4. Administrative Deconcentration [ADcn]

1 = Deconcentrated districts or regional administrations made responsible for planning, implementing and managing rural development.
0.5 = Nominally Deconcentration - reforms initiated to begin deconcentration but not really put into practice
0 = Centralized no regional autonomy allowed, all aspects of governance and administration directed from the center

iii. Chieftaincy

5. Constitutional Protection of Chieftaincy [LglChf]

1 = Chieftaincy explicitly recognized and safeguarded in the constitution
0.5 = Chiefs given official recognition but subject to the central government
0 = Nothing expressly written in the constitution regarding the status of chieftaincy

6. Chiefs in Village Administration [ChfVAd]

1 = Established chiefs appointed or elected to local administrative posts
0.5 = Chiefs in charge of rural areas by default; no real administrative penetration into the rural areas
0 = Established chiefs replaced by the central government with lesser chiefs, government/party members, or civil servants

II. **Dummy Variables**

1. Epoch [Epoch]

1 = Independence (1960-1980) [exception Zimbabwe]
2 = SAP (1980-2000)

2. Colony [Cny]

1 = Portugal
2 = France
3 = England

3. Regime Type [Regm]

1 = Democracy
2 = Autocracy
3 = Military

III: Regimes Coded

Leader	Base	ADcn	FDcn	LclCncl	LglChfs	VAdm	Epoch	Cny	Regm	City	Ethic	Reli	GDP
Abdallah II	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	1	3	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.00
Acheampong	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	3	3	0.01	0.73	0.88	0.51
Ahidjo	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	0.05	0.82	0.89	0.48
Amin	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	-0.07	0.93	0.85	0.39
Apithy	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	1	0.04	0.87	0.82	0.05
Banda	1	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	3	2	0.96	0.68	0.82	0.32
Bédié	0	1	0.5	1	0	1	2	2	1	0.01	0.87	0.89	0.08
Biya	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	3	2	-0.06	0.82	0.89	-0.14
Bokassa	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	1	2	3	0.23	0.79	0.90	2.39
Busia	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	0.03	0.73	0.88	0.07
Cabral	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0.18	0.65	0.84	-0.10
Campaore	0	0.5	0	0	0	1	2	2	3	0.01	0.69	0.92	-0.12
da Costa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0.03	0.69	0.79	0.21
Dacko I	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	1	2	2	0.13	0.79	0.90	0.13
Dacko II	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	2	2	3	-0.01	0.79	0.90	-0.15
Diouf	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	0.01	0.81	0.32	0.32
Djohar	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	1	2	1.00	0.06	0.01	0.00
Houphouët	1	1	0.5	0	0	1	1	2	2	0.33	0.87	0.89	0.70
Jammeh	0	0	0	0.5	1	1	2	3	3	-0.14	0.73	0.49	-0.04
Jawara	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	2	0.05	0.73	0.49	0.11
Keita	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	0.02	0.86	0.62	0.21
Kenyatta	1	0	0.5	0	0	1	1	3	2	-0.21	0.89	0.83	0.01
Kerekou I	1	0	0	1	0	0.5	2	2	3	-0.03	0.87	0.82	0.57
Kerekou II	1	1	0	1	0	0.5	2	2	1	-0.08	0.87	0.82	-0.09
Kolingba	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	2	3	-0.06	0.79	0.90	0.32
Konaré	1	0.5	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	-0.05	0.86	0.62	-0.32
Lamizana	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	3	0.09	0.69	0.92	0.52
Liman	1	0	0	0	0	0.5	2	3	1	-0.01	0.73	0.88	0.00
Maga	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	3	0.03	0.87	0.82	0.05
Mkapa	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	3	1	0.02	0.96	0.88	0.59
Moi	0.5	1	0	0	0	0.5	2	3	2	-0.11	0.89	0.83	0.01
Mugabe	1	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	1	3	2	-0.12	0.53	0.96	-0.08
Muluzi	0.5	0	1	1	0.5	1	2	3	1	0.10	0.68	0.82	0.28
Museveni	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	3	3	-0.15	0.93	0.85	-3.54
Mwinyi	0	1	0.5	1	0	1	2	3	1	-0.05	0.96	0.88	-0.22
N. Soglo	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	-0.10	0.87	0.82	-0.08
Nkrumah	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	-0.01	0.73	0.88	0.41
Nyerere	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	0.04	0.96	0.88	0.21
Obote I	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	0.14	0.93	0.85	1.12
Obote II	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	2	-0.13	0.93	0.85	1.42
Ouédraogo	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	2	2	3	0.02	0.69	0.92	-0.03
Patasse	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	2	2	1	-0.02	0.79	0.90	-0.01
Ramanantsoa	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	3	-0.90	0.05	0.98	0.31
Ratsiraka I	0.5	1	0	1	0	1	2	2	3	-0.03	0.05	0.98	0.15
Ratsiraka II	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	2	1	-0.04	0.05	0.98	0.00
Rawlings	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	2	3	3	-0.15	0.73	0.88	0.18
Sankara	1	0	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	2	2	3	0.03	0.69	0.92	0.34
Senghor	1	0.5	0	1	0	1	1	2	2	-0.03	0.81	0.32	-0.07
Soglo	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	3	-0.01	0.87	0.82	-0.01

Soilihi	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	0.03	0.06	0.01	1.00
Traoré	0	0.5	0	0	0	1	1	2	3	0.49	0.86	0.62	1.97
Trovoada	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0.03	0.69	0.79	0.21
Tsiranana	1	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	2	-0.17	0.05	0.98	0.33
Vieira	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	3	0.21	0.65	0.84	0.01
Yameogo	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	0.06	0.69	0.92	0.12
Zafy	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	-0.04	0.05	0.98	0.08
Zerbo	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	0.11	0.69	0.92	0.83
Zinsou	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	3	0.01	0.87	0.82	-0.01