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Are We the 99%? Student Attitudes Toward the Occupy Movements

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*Articles*



**ARE WE THE 99%?  
STUDENT ATTITUDES  
TOWARD THE OCCUPY  
MOVEMENTS**

*Tiffany Neman*

The recession of 2009 brought about great turmoil throughout the globe: unemployment rates rose, housing prices fell, income disparities grew, and countless homes were foreclosed upon. Europe appeared to be in absolute disarray while violent protests popped up all throughout the Arab states, claiming independence from the Western world. Initially, the public sat idly by, awaiting an adequate response from various governmental bodies. Within two years, however, a collective voice emerged from all of the tumult demanding swift action to correct the state of political and economic injustice; collectively, it proclaimed, “We are the 99%.”

After the first Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement developed in New York City’s Zuccotti Park on September 17, 2011, the public was exposed to what appeared to be a leaderless resistance movement with seemingly ambiguous policy goals and a mixed demographic of supporters. Despite much of the ambiguity, one of the movement’s complaints was quite clear: the enormously wealthy and well-connected among us had made dire financial mistakes, and the vast remainder of the nation was paying for the consequences. Six-hundred additional demonstrations and two years later, the social movements continue to lack any organizational backbone and receive an assortment of coverage; largely, however, they have been dismissed as negligible and radicalized by many in the media and elected officials alike.<sup>1</sup>

Despite such claims, OWS has remained consensus-based since its inception, borrowing a framework of participatory democracy from the Students for a Democratic Society’s (SDS) 1962 Port Huron statement, and the limitations that come with it (Polletta 2004). Owing to these limitations, the various international OWS movements have never explicitly supported a particular political ideology; on the contrary, all public statements released have emphasized the movements’ political heterogeneity and anti-establishment nature. Throughout the movements’ continuing lifespan, it has instead upheld populist themes; the iconic chant, for which the Occupy movements first gained ubiquity, told the public that the corporatist, top 1% of income earners had subverted any previous semblances of democracy through

their increasing concentration of wealth. This is an assertion that data from the Congressional Budget Office<sup>2</sup> buttresses: between 1979 and 2007, the incomes of the top 1% of households grew by 275%, while only growing around 40% for the remaining 99% of household incomes. Accordingly, the movements cried out an increasingly relevant narrative: the current state of social and economic injustice in the US is in desperate need of reform, beginning with the ever-growing income disparity. On the movements’ official website, distrust of political officials also enters the picture.<sup>3</sup>

As much documentation has evidenced, the movements can indeed be studied and contextualized through an academic lens. Nevertheless, studying the internal dimensions of a social movement without any formal organization does have its limitations, leading to an important question that has yet to be raised: how, then, have the Occupy Wall Street movements fared in the public eye?

### Hypothesis and Theory

In October 2011, 1,026 Americans’ attitudes toward the goals of the Occupy Wall Street movement were gauged by Gallup.<sup>4</sup> 22% of Americans reported they approved of the movement’s goals, 15% disapproved of the movement’s goals, and an entire 63% claimed to have not known “enough to say.” One month later, however, the public grew increasingly familiarized with the movements and a December Pew Research Center poll<sup>5</sup> of 1,521 Americans garnered new results: 48% of Americans reported agreeing with the movement’s concerns, 30% reported disagreeing, and 22% presumed to not know or refused to answer. (See Table 1 in the Appendix for a clearer comparison). One year later, in a survey of 806 college students by the Panetta Institute for Public Policy, it was determined that 28% of college students identified with Occupy (Panetta Institute for Public Policy 2012). Among members of the media and elected officials, however, the collective movements received much more unfavorable attention and were instead painted as radical, extremist, or communist—some even ventured to label the movements as advocates of Nazism.<sup>6</sup> Coverage often painted proponents

of the movements as extremists who were waging class warfare that was both dangerous and unpatriotic.

In contrast, it is clear to many who have experienced the movements firsthand that OWS protesters seem to come from all political stripes, as many researchers have duly noted (Harcourt 2012). In *Changing the Subject: A Bottom-Up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City* (2013), researchers Milkman, Luce, and Lewis document the political party orientations of 656 protesters at the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York City (and thus not entirely representative of all Occupy protesters). As Table 2 in the Appendix displays (Milkman et al. 2013), while there is a notable disparity between Democrat and Republican protesters (33.8% versus 0.5%, respectively), only a small margin of protesters are ‘Third party/Other affiliation,’ a category under which Communists would self-report (13.1%), rendering much of the media accusations Occupy received rather inaccurate. A much larger portion of protesters indicated that they ‘Do not identify with any party’ (20.6%). The accumulated percentage of all Independent protesters (regardless of leaning) is 43.9%, making it the most popular political orientation among Occupy protesters.

To what degree does this sample reflect the political party orientations of Americans? In a 2012 Gallup poll measuring party identification, 40% of Americans identified as Independent, 31% identified as Democrat, and 28% of Americans identified as Republican (Jones 2012). Putting such statistics into perspective, it can be extrapolated that the political party orientations of Occupy Wall Street protesters are not necessarily representative of the American population at large (particularly when comparing percentages of Republicans). Is such a disparity indicative, however, of the Occupy movements’ accuracy in reflecting the demands and concerns of Americans at large, independent of political orientation?

Although notably disorganized in its early beginnings in Zuccotti Park, the collective Occupy Wall Street movements have since substantiated relatively clear concerns and policy goals. The movements’ official website

has released<sup>7</sup> eight core issues that serve as central demands:

1. The reduction of corporate influence on elected officials and the political process
2. Upheaval of the 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling
3. Student loan reform so as to decrease student debt costs
4. Lending structure reform so as to lower the number of wrongfully foreclosed homes and end fraudulent mortgage practices
5. Increased regulation of large banks
6. Health care profiteering regulation
7. Increased minimum wage so as to institute a ‘living wage’
8. Halting budget cuts to education and public services

While these values are fairly representative of OWS activists, understanding how, and to what extent, the American public prioritizes each one is a much more difficult task. Many public policy polls have succeeded in measuring attitudes toward several of these policy demands, all of which have tested as fairly popular. For example, regulating Wall Street banks received 50% approval (as opposed to 36% opposition) according to a 2010 Gallup poll.<sup>8</sup> Preferring government action to prevent foreclosures garnered 58% approval in a 2012 Gallup poll<sup>9</sup> and increasing the minimum wage garnered 71% approval in a 2013 Gallup poll.<sup>10</sup> According to a 2010 ABC News<sup>11</sup> poll, a whopping 80% of Americans opposed what they were told was the ruling that enables corporations and unions to “spend as much money as they want to help political candidates win elections,” alluding to the Citizens United ruling. Attitudes toward other Occupy policy demands, however, have yet to be assessed. Furthermore, while previous research has gauged public opinion on the Occupy movements by explicitly asking respondents if they support or oppose the movements, no research—thus far—has sought to define public opinion toward the Occupy movements by measuring American sup-

port for the policies advocated by the movements.

I therefore hypothesize that the majority of Americans do indeed support the demands of the Occupy movements; specifically, a greater majority than presented by the various public polls directly measuring support and opposition toward the movements. While researchers have studied attitudes toward each of these issues to some extent, none have studied a single sample of respondents' attitudes toward all eight issues at one point in time. Based on popular descriptions of the movements, it is clear that much misinformation has been disseminated, all of which has presumably led to opposition toward the movements. Outrageous claims have been made about the nature of the movements (its alignment with Nazism and Communism is but one example). During the practice surveys I conducted on attitudes toward the Occupy movements, for instance, one student claimed to oppose the movements because its protesters want to jail rich people "just because they're rich." The October 2011 Gallup poll referenced earlier<sup>12</sup> further buttresses such claims; as Table 3 in the Appendix demonstrates, Americans paying attention to news covering the movements are more inclined to approve of the movements' goals.

The reasons underlying this dissemination of misinformation are unknown, although a 2012 study by researchers Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and Cook aids in clarifying the process by highlighting the origins of misinformation, ranging from fictitious rumors to vested corporate interests. Many notable researchers have furthermore studied the precise effects of misinformation on voting behavior and political orientation. For example, Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis (2004) illustrate the significant correlation between misperceptions about the Iraq war and support for Bush; as misperception increases, so does support for former President George W. Bush. Slemrod's study (2006) similarly tells us that misinformation about a flat or sales tax leads respondents to support more regressive reforms; correcting such misinformation consequently reverses the trend.

In the 2009 article, "The Undeserving Rich: 'Moral Values' and the

White Working Class," Dr. Prasad and her research team conduct a study in which they provide white, working-class Republicans with data on the direct beneficiaries of the Bush tax cuts. They write:

When we presented those who did not know the correct distribution with information on the distribution of the tax cuts... one-half decided that they disapproved of the tax cuts... However, none of these respondents changed their vote choice because of the information presented to them; those who disapproved of the tax cuts prioritized other issues or other reasons to vote for Bush. (P. 7)

In other words, despite the fact that respondents acknowledged their opposition toward Bush's policy, they continued supporting him for other, unidentifiable reasons. Therein lies the complex nature of political partisanship and the loyalties we harbor. By hiding the fact that my primary focus is measuring attitudes toward the Occupy movements in my survey, I hope to eliminate such factors from biasing the opinions of respondents and skewing my measurements.

To reiterate, I have outlined two hypotheses:

1. That a greater percentage of Americans support the Occupy movements than self-reported in various public polls.
2. It is precisely misinformation and, less importantly, misperception—the former being the dissemination of inaccurate information, and the latter the misunderstanding of existing accurate information—that has led to opposition toward the Occupy movements, and that were opposing members provided with accurate information regarding the movements and its various policy demands, their support for the movements would increase.

Nevertheless, identifying attitudes toward the Occupy movements through a more indirect process serves a significant purpose. By doing so, I can filter out the role political partisanship and loyalties play in influencing the public's attitudes toward social and political movements.

## Methodology

Because the Occupy movements are fairly recent, little data has been recorded on the phenomena. As a result, there is reason to believe that collecting original data would provide for more interesting insight into attitudes toward the movements than the very limited existing data. Thus, in order to assess the validity of my hypotheses, survey questionnaires were used to gauge attitudes toward the demands of the Occupy movements outlined above. Students residing at the politically-oriented University of California Washington Center (UCDC) in Washington, DC comprised the population sample for this paper, with respondents surveyed at random. If respondents supported a clear majority of the seven demands of the Occupy movements outlined above,<sup>13</sup> they were categorized as supporters of the movements for the purposes of this research.

The survey initially asks respondents to identify their political orientation, with five options provided (Very Liberal, Liberal, Independent, Conservative, and Very Conservative), and additionally measures respondents' self-reported awareness of political and current events, with four options provided (Very Informed, Informed, Somewhat Informed, and Not Informed). While the standard approach to evaluating political knowledge is summing a respondent's correct answers on a host of factual items (Monak 1999), the validity of measuring political knowledge has been the topic of contentious political behavior research over the past few decades (Fiske et al. 1990; Delli Carpini 1993). Dedicating a major part of my survey to evaluating respondents' political awareness would have been extensively time-consuming for the purposes of my research, particularly because such an evaluation is not the focus of this study. Respondents' self-reported gender is also measured in the survey, with three options provided (Male, Female, and Transgendered). Much research has evidenced that gender plays a discernable role in influencing voting behavior and political affiliations (Inglehart and Norris 2000).

In addition to such questions, the survey also directly asks respon-

dents to report both their attitudes toward the Occupy movements and the recent Tea Party movements (the latter to further obfuscate research intentions). Furthermore, by measuring self-reported attitudes toward the Occupy movements, the survey tests whether such responses are reflective of attitudes toward the policies advocated by the movements. As a result, it can be determined if misinformation and misperception are indeed the cause of opposition. Lastly, the survey gauges respondents' assessments of whether particular demands are key issues of the Democratic or Republican Party, or are bipartisan; such a measure assesses perceptions of the political leanings of the eight core Occupy movement demands. Furthermore, it allows me to measure respondents' perceptions of the political leanings of the Occupy movements (once again, indirectly).

Before finalizing my questionnaire for this proposal, I succeeded in surveying seven students.<sup>14</sup> Those seven practice surveys were incredibly helpful in shaping my final survey; of the eight Occupy movement demands, seven of them were extremely unpopular among conservative respondents (overturning Citizens United garnered bipartisan support, however). Since then, I have modified the wording of those questions so as to make them appear more politically neutral. Additionally, during the pilot survey process, I decided upon omitting the demand for healthcare reform from the survey as a result of its obscurity.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, only seven of the original eight demands were used in the final version of questionnaire.

During the actual surveying procedure, I sat in the UCDC center's lobby and informally requested that students who pass through take my survey. This method was selected in order to have a relatively randomized data sample. I surveyed each weekday evening for three consecutive weeks, and provided selective incentives (snacks) for participants.

## Results

In total, 119 surveys were collected. When assessing student attitudes toward the Occupy movements, and across the political spectrum, the largest percentage of students—31%—indicated that they were unsure about how

they felt about Occupy; 29% supported the movements, and 21% opposed them (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). When aggregating the responses, however, the largest percentage of respondents supported the movements, with 38% reporting Strongly Support and Support (29% of respondents indicated Strongly Oppose and Oppose).

Such findings—particularly the percentage of students that are unsure about their sentiments toward the movements—are somewhat alarming as the public has grown seemingly more familiarized with the Occupy movements over the years. Also disconcerting is the fact that the Occupy movements were primarily comprised of student protesters. In addition to reporting their attitudes toward the movements, respondents were asked to indicate which political party seemed to be most aligned with the Occupy movements, the results of which are displayed in Figure 2 in the Appendix. The majority of students (69%) perceived the movements as most likely to be supported by Democrats, suggesting that although much uncertainty seems to surround perceptions of the movement, its political leanings are well-identified and may even play a role in influencing attitudes toward the movements.

As for how attitudes toward Occupy and attitudes toward Occupy goals are connected, Table 4 and 5 in the Appendix illustrate this relationship. Support for the movements and support for the movements' goals are noticeably positively correlated; unsurprisingly, as support for Occupy increases, so does support for Occupy demands. Relatively speaking, respondents who claimed to oppose the movements were less enthusiastic about Occupy goals than self-reported supporters of the movements. Nonetheless, this trend does not negate the fact that the large majority of all five cohorts (Strongly Support, Support, Unsure, Oppose, Strongly Oppose) still supported the goals of the movements—with the exception of overturning the Citizens United ruling, which 51% of *all* respondents indicated they were unsure about.

When focusing on only the responses of those who opposed the

movements, it is evident that the vast majority of respondents within the cohort look favorably upon Occupy demands (once again, with the exception of overturning Citizens United). From regulating the big banks to reforming the lending structure, well over 50% of those who purportedly 'Oppose' Occupy support its goals, thereby reinforcing the hypothesis that many are misinformed about Occupy goals and oppose the movements as a result of misinformation. Nevertheless, with the Strongly Oppose cohort this phenomenon is less apparent; there is only one Occupy demand that is supported by a majority of respondents from this cohort, thereby not necessarily buttressing my hypothesis.

#### *Limitations*

There are indeed many limitations hindering the validity of my research, the most evident of which is my data sample. Because I only surveyed UCDC students—a group of which 47% identify politically as liberal; see Figure 4 in the Appendix—it is safe to say that such a cohort does not represent the national population by any means (the entire data sample has, after all, received some form of college education). Nevertheless, this limitation may also serve as a potential tool for more insightful results. Because the UCDC students are more politically aware than the general US population, they may have a more thorough understanding of their stance on various public policies (specifically, the eight demands of the Occupy movements), and might even be less apt to have their opinions skewed by misinformation. In regards to measuring the political awareness of respondents, an additional limitation presents itself. Self-reports of knowledge are susceptible to a social desirability bias, which often results in respondents overstating their political awareness (Zaller 1992). My survey results are thus susceptible to this bias as well, a bias which limits the full validity of this study.

Demographically, the age range and gender distribution of my data sample also imposes limitations on the generalizability of my findings. The majority of UCDC students are between the ages of 18 and 25 and, thus, are likely to prioritize issues differently than most Americans. This limitation is



most notable when considering student debt reduction, one of the eight Occupy demands. It is unsurprising that a sample of university students would be supportive of lowering student debt; as a result, their attitudes on this core demand are negligible at best. Furthermore, 61% of respondents identified as female and 39% as male; considering the national male to female ratio, it can be extrapolated that the disproportionate number of females in the data sample can further tamper with the results.

Another more convoluted—but equally troubling—limitation is the degree to which the eight core demands of the Occupy movements objectively represent the majority of supporters of the movements. The eight demands never underwent a democratic voting process, but were instead decided upon by many high-ranking members of the movements (another consequence of the movement’s lack of formal organization)—presumably members who had a great deal of insight into the commonalities among all protesters; this is an assumption that must be made for the purposes of this study.

Lastly, despite the decisive nature of responses on the Occupy demands, one in particular stood out as receiving noticeable uncertainty. 51% of all respondents indicated that they were unsure about overturning the Citizens United ruling, with nearly equal numbers supporting and opposing the initiative. The ruling was decided upon in 2010; understandably, the public is still in the process of adjusting to and comprehending the extent to which more lax campaign financing laws affect society at large. Nonetheless, the ABC poll referenced earlier garnered fascinating results: approximately 80% of Americans opposed the ruling, while only 2% of participants were not able to provide an opinion. Why is there such a large disparity between public opinion and UCDC student attitudes on the subject of the Citizens United ruling? The answer is most likely embedded in the way in which the questions were worded; unlike my survey, which simply asked students to report their attitudes toward the Citizens United ruling, the ABC Poll provided participants with a brief, one-sentence explanation of what the ruling

actually accomplished. In retrospect, had my survey provided such an explanation, it is quite likely that it would have garnered radically different results.

#### *Other Findings*

The least popular issue on the survey was support for 2009 Tea Party movements. Only 6% of students indicated any level of support for the movements. In the 2012 report by The Panetta Institute for Public Policy referenced earlier, researchers found that Republican students (23%) are more likely to support the Tea Party movements than independents or Democrats, at (8%). Considering the fact that—accumulatively—15% of UCDC respondents identified as some form of conservative politically, it is therefore logical that Occupy would receive low-levels of support among a notably left-leaning student group.

#### **Conclusions**

In summation, this paper explores the role misinformation and misperception play in influencing student opinion, particularly on the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movements. Despite 21% of respondents claiming to oppose the movements, their survey data shows otherwise. Unbeknownst to them, the majority of respondents looked favorably upon the policy demands that best represent the Occupy movements.

Although the data supports my original hypothesis, the ultimate purpose of this research is not to suggest that the public is wildly misinformed about the Occupy movements, or even that the Occupy movements necessarily reflect the concerns of the majority of Americans; on the contrary, the phenomenon documented here illuminates the potency of both misinformation and misperception, and the ease with which they can tarnish public opinion. What has been observed among UCDC students who claim to oppose the movements instead raises two enormously important questions about the nature of public opinion and voting behavior. First, if misinformation and misperception are indeed key factors in inducing opposition, is the media or the citizen to blame—in other words, are consumers being



misinformed, or are they misperceiving the information being disseminated? While much evidence has been laid out of the media and politicians' role in distorting OWS to the public, there is also much evidence to suggest that Americans who take an active role in learning more about the social movements are more likely to be supportive of OWS. Political psychologists would largely argue that the former is to blame, pointing to the fact that most Americans don't hold a single opinion on a given issue; instead, it is often argued, public opinion is driven by elite discourse, or political information in the mass media (Zaller 1992). Despite the fact that many OWS goals are indeed quite popular among the general public, the movement as a whole has yet to be labeled as such. It thus remains an important possibility that had OWS been branded as a more populist social movement, public support for the movements would have increased.

Second, if not misinformation and misperception, which factors could induce an individual to oppose a movement with which he or she shares common goals? Scholars have long been studying party identification, and how partisanship impacts individuals' policy preferences. Colloquially known as 'changing sides or changing minds,' (Carsey and Layman 2006), this phenomenon occurs when new political information either compels someone to change minds—adopt their party's attitude toward a given policy—or, more rarely, change sides—change their political party. In most cases, particularly when it involves abstract, technical policies, people will simply align their ideology with that of their political party of choice. However, if the issue is salient, changing political parties does occur. In this study, OWS demands were supported across partisan lines; despite this, left-leaning respondents were much more likely to report supporting the movements than their right-leaning counterparts. This suggests that the party loyalties we harbor are quite influential in swaying OWS support and are potentially causing would-be supporters to simply 'change minds.' Like the Bush supporters who remained steadfast in their loyalties even after learning the undesirable truth about regressive taxes, supporters of OWS

demands are unlikely to change their orientation toward OWS regardless of the political information they are exposed to, unless that information fails to prime partisanship cues. Public opinion researchers have long noted the quintessential paradox in American political behavior: while, as a whole, we are symbolically conservative, we are operationally liberal (Free and Cantril 1967). In this same vein, as long as the Occupy Wall Street movements are tainted as radically liberal social movements, no matter how far from the truth, a public committed to conservatism will continue treating them as such.

Appendix

Tables, Charts, and Graphs

**Table 1.** Attitudes toward Occupy Wall Street Goals by Public Poll and Time, 2011

Public Poll	% Support OWS	% Oppose OWS	% Unsure
Gallup (Oct 2011)	22	15	63
Pew (Dec 2011)	48	30	22

Population in 1000s. Source: Gallup and Pew Research Center.

**Table 2.** Political Party Orientation of Respondents Eligible to Vote in the US, 2012

Political Party Orientation	% All Respondents
Democrat	33.8
Disillusioned Democrat	8.4
Independent, Leans Democrat	15.1
Republican	0.5
Independent, Leans Republican	0.3
Independent, Does not lean	7.9
Third party/Other Affiliation	13.1
Does not identify with any party	20.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: The 656 respondents eligible to vote are all OWS supporters.


Source: Milkman et al. 2013.

**Table 3.** Opinions of Occupy Wall Street Movement’s Goals, by Attention Paid to News about Occupy Wall Street Movement, 2011


Attention Paid to OWS	% Approve	% Disapprove	% Don’t know enough to say
Following very/somewhat closely	35	22	44
Following very closely	45	29	27

Population in 1000s. Source: Gallup.

**Figure 1.** UCDC Student Attitudes toward Occupy Movements (n=119)



**Figure 2.** Political Party Perceived to be Aligned with Occupy Movements (n=119)




**Table 4 Attitudes toward Occupy Demands by Support for Occupy Movement** (Percentage of Student Support Shown)

Attitude toward OWS	Regulate Big Banks	Increase Minimum Wage	Decrease Corporate Influence	Continue Funding Public Services
Strongly Support OWS	81.8	100	90.9	90.9
Support OWS	52.9	82.4	88.2	82.4
Unsure	68	81	78	76
Oppose OWS	<b>56</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>60</b>
Strongly Oppose OWS	50	40	50	10

**Table 5. Attitudes toward Occupy Demands by Support for Occupy Movement, Cont'd.** (Percentage of Student Support Shown)

Attitude toward OWS	Reform Student Debt	Overturn Citizens United	Reform Lending Structure
Strongly Support OWS	81.8	54.5	72.7
Support OWS	85.3	47	73.5
Unsure	84	24	65
Oppose OWS	<b>92</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>64</b>
Strongly Oppose OWS	60	20	40

Figure 3. Self-reported political affiliations of UCDC students (n=119)



**Notes**

1 There are countless examples of this. See Occupy Wall Street: The Communist Movement Reborn by Perazzo and Horowitz (2012); for politicians’ reactions to the movements, see <[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/occupy-wall-street-politician-reactions\\_n\\_1014273.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/occupy-wall-street-politician-reactions_n_1014273.html)>; and on Fox and Friends, the same connection with the Communist Party was made, see <<http://mediamatters.org/video/2011/10/19/foxsbolling-occupy-wall-street-protesters-are/182836>>.

2 See <<http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42729>>.

3 “...We can no longer trust our elected officials to represent anyone other than their wealthiest donors, we need real people to create real change from the bottom up,” See <<http://www.occupytogether.org/aboutoccupy/>>.

4 See <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/150164/Americans-Uncertain-Occupy-Wall-Street-Goals.aspx>>.

5 See p. 37; <<http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-questionnaires/12-13-11%20NII%20Topline%20for%20release.pdf>>.

6 There are countless examples of this. See Occupy Wall Street: The Communist Movement Reborn by Perazzo and Horowitz (2012); for politicians’ reactions to the movements, see <[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/occupy-wall-street-politician-reactions\\_n\\_1014273.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/occupy-wall-street-politician-reactions_n_1014273.html)>; and on Fox and Friends, the same connection with the Communist Party was made, see <<http://mediamatters.org/video/2011/10/19/foxsbolling-occupy-wall-street-protesters-are/182836>>.

7 See <<http://www.occupytogether.org/aboutoccupy/#issues>>.

- 8 See <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/127448/Banking-Reform-Sells-Better-Wall-Street-Mentioned.aspx#1>>.
- 9 See <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/152213/Majority-Americans-Gov-Help-Stop-Foreclosures.aspx>>.
- 10 See <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/160913/back-raising-minimum-wage.aspx>>.
- 11 See <<http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1102a6Trend.pdf>>.
- 12 See <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/150164/Americans-Uncertain-Occupy-Wall-Street-Goals.aspx>>.
- 13 No other sources have succeeded in outlining the core demands of the Occupy movements.
- 14 Of the 7 UCDC students I surveyed, 4 were liberal, 2 were conservative, and 1 was independent.
- 15 I have since attempted to contact spokespeople for the movement but to no avail.

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