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### Title

Understanding Democratic Congruence: A Demand-Supply Perspective

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Ever since Aristotle's typology of political systems, theorists speculated that the question of which political system prevails in a society is linked in predictable ways with the orientations prevailing among the people. Charles de Montesquieu (1989 [1748]), for instance, argued in *De L'Esprit des Lois* that whether a nation is governed by despotism or whether it is a monarchy or a republic depends on the prevalence of servile orientations (which lead to despotism), orientations emphasizing honesty (leading to monarchy) or egalitarian orientations (leading to a republic). Likewise, Alexis de Tocqueville (1994 [1837]) reasoned in *De la Démocratie en Amérique* that the flourishing of democracy in the United States reflects the liberal, egalitarian, and participatory orientations among the American people.

In modern times, the most flagrant illustration of the fact that people's orientations influence a regime's chances to survive was the failure of democracy in Weimar Germany. Because this failure had such catastrophic consequences as the Holocaust and World War II, it troubled social scientists, psychologists, and public opinion researchers alike. Much of the research inspired by this break in civilization shared the premise that democracy is fragile when it is a "democracy without democrats" (Bracher 1971). In this vein, Lasswell (1951) claimed that the existence of democratic regimes depends on the proportion of a public that actually prefers democracy. Similarly, when Lipset (1959:85-89) reasoned why economic modernization is conducive to democracy he concluded that this is so because modernization changes mass preferences in ways that increase support for democracy. Most explicit on this topic, Almond and Verba (1963) and Eckstein (1966) introduced the term "congruence," claiming that in order to be stable democratic institutions must be supplied at a level that is congruent with people's desire for democracy.<sup>1</sup> In short, the assumption that the level at which democracy is supplied reflects how strongly the masses demand democracy has a long tradition. The congruence assumption is constitutive for the entire political culture approach as it reflects the most fundamental claim for the political relevance of mass orientations.

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<sup>1</sup> Outlining their understanding of congruence Almond and Verba use the terms "structure" and "culture." We prefer the terms "supply" instead of structure and "demand" instead of culture in order to express congruence as a producer-consumer relation with regard to power rules. In this relation the power rules that the political producers (i.e., elites) provide constitute the supply side while the power rules that the political consumers (i.e., masses) desire constitute the demand side.

Until recently, congruence theory could not be directly tested because comparable survey data have been available only for a dozen established Western democracies. Since these countries show very little variation in their levels of democracy and because the publics of these countries all show widespread support for democracy (Dalton 2004), the claim that stronger mass demands for democracy are reflected in higher supply-levels of democracy, could not be analyzed. This situation changed only recently as a consequence of the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington 1991). In its wake survey researchers widened their field to an almost global scope. Comparative survey projects such as the International Social Survey Program, the regional barometers in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and the World Values Surveys make it possible now to compare mass demands for democracy across countries covering the full range of political regimes from overtly authoritarian systems to fully fledged democracies.

At the same time, measuring supply-levels of democracy has made considerable progress as well (Bollen and Paxton 2000). Attempts to measure the level of democracy for countries around the world started in the 1970s. Today two projects, the Freedom House freedom surveys and the Polity project, continue to rate each year all countries around the world in terms of their level of democracy (Freedom House 2005; Marshall and Jaggers 2004). Still, the Freedom House surveys have established themselves as the most widely used measures of levels of democracy around the world (Casper and Tufis 2002).

The parallel progress in the fields of comparative survey research and comparative democracy rating make it possible for the first time to analyze whether stronger mass demands for democracy are reflected in higher supply-levels of democracy. But in contradiction to congruence theory, Inglehart (2003) has shown that standard indicators of supply-levels of democracy and of mass demands for democracy show a surprisingly weak relationship (Shin & Wells 2005). This finding raises a fundamental question: Does the link between supply-levels of democracy and mass demands for democracy not show up strongly because the link is *indeed* weak? If this were the case, it had the crucial implication that for democracy to exist and to flourish, mass demands do not really matter. But before accepting such a far-reaching conclusion, we probe into another possibility: The supposed link between supply-levels of democracy and mass demands for democracy does not show up in its real strength because existing measurements miss central aspects of a society's democratic reality.

The article addresses this question in the following steps. We start with an update of Inglehart's finding showing across some 80 societies that there is indeed a stunningly weak link between standard indicators of supply-levels of democracy, on one hand, and mass demands for democracy, on the other hand. In the following steps we show that this finding is inconclusive because standard measures of the institutional supply of democracy and of mass demands for democracy are insufficiently indicative of the extent to which democracy is *really* supplied and demanded in societies. On the supply side, routine measures such as those from Freedom House rely mostly on the enactment of democratic *standards*, neglecting antidemocratic institutional *practices* that devalue these standards in reality. Using information on such practices to qualify

indicators of democratic supplies shows that institutional practices of democracy fall in many societies far short of enacted standards. Thus, qualified measures fail to distinguish effective and corrupted democratic standards. Our adjusted supply-measure, by contrast, yields “*effective*” democratic standards, revealing the extent to which democracy is *factually supplied* in societies. On the demand-side, routine measures rely exclusively on outspoken mass support for democracy, ignoring how much such outspoken support is detached from genuine democratic values. Using information on democratic values to qualify measures of democratic mass demands shows that real commitments to democracy fall in many societies far short of the outspoken support for democracy. Thus, unqualified demand measures fail to distinguish genuine and spurious commitments to democracy. Our adjusted demand-measure, by contrast, yields “*genuine*” commitments to democracy, revealing how much democracy is *factually demanded* in societies.

Using factual measures of democratic supplies and demands changes the picture drastically. We observe a stunningly strong congruence between effective institutional supplies of democracy and genuine mass demands for democracy, pointing to an  $r = .89$  correlation across 80 societies. This underlines how important it is to look closer at the factual qualities of democratic institutions and democratic commitments if one wants to see democratic congruence in its real strength. Finally we address two possible causes of congruence: Does the endurance of democracy by itself make democratic supplies more effective and democratic demands more genuine? Or is it economic development that does so? Available evidence suggests that democratic congruence is a development-driven rather than institutionally inherited phenomenon. At the end we discuss this finding within a typology of democratization processes.

### **Unqualified Measures of Democratic Supplies and Demands**

Cross-national survey programs have experimented with various questions, trying to sort out the best indicators of mass preferences for democracy. Following the support concept of Easton (1965), a consensus has emerged that the most direct way to tap mass preferences for democracy is to ask people directly about how strongly they agree with the idea of “having a democratic system” and with a variation of Churchill’s statement that “democracy may have its problems but is still the best system of governance.” However, Klingemann (1999), Shin and Wells (2005) and others emphasize that outspoken democratic preferences are meaningless unless they go together with a rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy. Thus, it is practice to measure people’s democratic preferences by combining their outspoken support for democracy itself with their rejection of authoritarian alternatives, especially the idea of “having the army rule” and of having “strong leaders who do not have to bother with parliaments and elections.” Accordingly, only those respondents who agree to have a democratic system and see democracy as the best system and who at the same time disagree with the army rule and strong leaders, are considered as respondents with a consistent preference for democracy.

As the World Values Surveys provide data on mass preferences for the widest array of countries, we will use these data for our analysis.<sup>2</sup> Depending on whether respondents agree strongly or fairly with both of the two pro-democracy items, and depending on whether they disagree strongly or fairly with the two authoritarian items (army rule, strong leaders), their commitment to democracy is measured in an ordinal scale of eighth-steps from 0 over 12.5, 25, 37.5, 50, 62.5, 75, 87.5 to 100 where 100 indicates a strong agreement with both democratic items and a strong disagreement with both authoritarian items.<sup>3</sup> Respondents who agree with any of the authoritarian items or disagree with any of the democratic items are coded 0. Because this measurement includes no further qualification in regard to how strongly people hold the values underlying democracy, one cannot take this measure to indicate people's genuine demand for democracy. Without further qualification, one can only take it to indicate just what it measures: people's "outspoken" demand for democracy, no matter what people define as democracy (Schedler 2005).

We calculate the strength of an entire society's outspoken demand for democracy using the population mean on the above described scale. Population means are not tied to the eighth-steps but can instead have any value between 0 and 100. According to congruence theory, cross-country variation in these mass demands for democracy should be strongly related with variation in supply-levels of democracy, such that countries with stronger mass demands for democracy have higher supply-levels of democracy.

The most widely used indicators to measure the level at which countries supply democracy are the Freedom House ratings of civil and political rights, which are usually combined so as to measure degrees of liberal democracy (Freedom House 2005).<sup>4</sup> Even though Freedom House intends to recognize violations of democratic rights, it is unclear how much weight is given to institutional practices of an inherently rights-violating nature. Uncorrupt and law-abiding institutional practices appear in only two points of the organization's 28-point check list. And no evidence is given that information on such practices is included in systematic ways using available data on corrupt and unlawful institutional practices. These limitations make it likely that the Freedom House ratings do not sufficiently recognize factual institutional practices that undermine democratic standards (Rose 2001). Until further clarification of this point one should not consider the Freedom House ratings as taken-for-granted indications of the factual

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<sup>2</sup> For information on the World Values Surveys, such as questionnaire and fieldwork visit the website: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>. We use data from the second to fourth waves (1989-1999) of the World Values Surveys. For countries for which more than one measurement point is available we averaged the available measures.


<sup>3</sup> See Appendix for details on index construction.

<sup>4</sup> We reversed the 1-7 Freedom House scales for civil and political liberties such that higher numbers indicate more freedom. Then we added the two 1-7 scales, yielding a 2-14 point index from which we subtracted the constant 2 to obtain a 0-12 point scale. Finally all values on this scale are divided by the maximum 12 and then multiplied by 100, yielding a percentage scale with maximum 100 and minimum 0.

supply of democracy. More cautiously one should consider them just as an indication of the “procedural” supply of democracy, leaving it open for further qualifications in how far this supply is made effective by proper institutional practices.

Despite considerable criticism from a conceptual point of view (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Schedler 2005), standard measures of democratic supplies and demands continue to be used just as they are. In most empirical studies they are still treated as if they measure an effective institutional supply of democracy and genuine mass demands for democracy. Using these problematic measures, the claim that democratic institutions are supplied at a level that is congruent with mass demands for democracy has found only weak support (Inglehart 2004).

Figure 1. Unqualified Measures of Democratic Supplies and Demands



Visualizing Inglehart's findings, Figure 1 shows a statistically significant link between outspoken mass demands for democracy in a country and the level at which democracy is supplied in that country. But even though this link is significant, its most striking property is its weakness. Most of the variation in institutional supplies of democracy (70 percent to be precise) remains *unexplained* by mass demands for democracy. Many countries show mass demands for democracy above the 50th percentile, yet this does not necessarily raise them to high supply-levels of democracy. Instead, even societies whose mass demands for democracy are close to the 70th percentile can achieve almost any supply-level of democracy: from a low of 5 percent in Iraq to a high of 100 percent in Finland. Obviously, merely outspoken mass demands for democracy do not seriously constrain power holders in their choice of the level at which they supply democracy, even if these demands are widespread.

The apparent weakness of congruence is not a methodological artifact of the Freedom House ratings. Using instead the democracy-autocracy scores from the Polity project for the same countries (Marshall and Jaggers 2004), the correlation between mass demands for democracy and institutional supplies of democracy drops to  $r = .33$  (compared to  $r = .55$  when Freedom House is used). Using a combination of the Freedom House and Polity scores does not do a better job in depicting congruence either. Different indicators point to the same conclusion: there is no evidence for a strong formulation of congruence theory.

There are two possibilities to explain this finding. Either the link between democratic supplies and demands is indeed as weak as we have just seen, in which case a basic theorem of political culture were called into question. Or the measures are too imprecise to show the actual strength of the link. We argue that institutional supplies of democracy as well as mass demands for democracy are often seriously overestimated and that cross-country variation in this inflationary tendency is a major source of measurement distortion. To demonstrate this point we introduce important specifications of the actual quality of democratic supplies and demands. We use these qualifications as weights to transform unqualified measures of democratic supplies and demands into realistic measures, yielding *factual* democratic supplies and demands. For many but not all countries, factual democratic demands and supplies are drastically lower than one would suggest relying on unqualified measures.

### **Measuring the Factual Supply of Democracy**

Following the debate about deficient democracies (Ottaway 2003; Merkel 2004) we suppose that measures of the procedural supply of democracy often overestimate the real supply of democracy. More precisely, this overestimation is present to the extent to which antidemocratic institutional practices that undermine and circumvent democratic standards are neglected. In line with Rose (2001), Warren (2006), and Welzel and Inglehart (2006), we argue that institutional practices corrupting the rule-of-law are plainly antidemocratic, rendering democratic procedures ineffective.

Corrupt institutional practices involve financial misappropriation, bribery, patronage, clientelism and nepotism. These mechanisms disable democratic controls over the two essential areas of politics: finance and personnel (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). Bribery diminishes democratic controls over public spending; patronage diminishes democratic controls over personnel recruitment. Undermining democratic controls means to disempower the people. And because people empowerment is what democracy is all about, the disempowering effect of corrupted institutions is of direct relevance to the extent to which democracy is really set into effect. To use Warren's words (2006:803): "Corruption breaks the link between collective decision making and peoples' power to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very acts that define democracy." Thus, absence of corrupt practices is a first-rate qualification of the extent to which the procedural supply of democracy translates into a factual supply of democracy.

Corrupt practices violate the rule of law, which is yet another reason why corruption undermines democracy (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). Because democracy is about due formal process, involving predictable, transparent, and enforceable rules, democratic procedures simply cannot be practiced without the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996). To the extent of its absence, rule of law disables democratic standards. In order to set given democratic standards really into effect, the practice of these standards must be uncorrupt and law-abiding.

To avoid misunderstandings, uncorrupt and lawful institutional practices do not *by themselves* make a country democratic. A country's elite might follow uncorrupt and law-abiding practices, yet democratic standards might nevertheless be lacking. Singapore's rather uncorrupt and law-abiding institutional practices do not make this country a democracy as it lacks basic democratic standards. Thus, proper institutional practices can affect democracy *only* within the range of given democratic standards. Within this range, however, one should give these practices full weight in measuring actually practiced standards instead of the standards themselves only.

Following these rationales we combine information of a country's procedural supply of democracy with its level of proper institutional practices, deflating procedural standards by corrupt and unlawful practices. In other words, we devalue given democratic standards *to the extent* to which these standards are mismatched by proper institutional practices. Technically, we use the Freedom House ratings of institutionalized democratic standards, measured in percentages from 0 to 100, and weight these percentages by fractions from 0 to 1.0 indicating the absence of corrupt and unlawful practices (1.0 representing a complete absence of these practices). The source of the latter data are the World Bank's "control of corruption" and "rule of law" indices, which we average into a combined index of "proper institutional practice" as the two scores correlate anyway at  $r=.95$  (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005).<sup>5</sup> Note that our

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<sup>5</sup> To create its control of corruption and rule of law scores, the World Bank gathers data from some fifty different sources. We transformed the data available for 2000, 2002, and 2004 into normalized scales with minimum 0 (the lowest empirical control of corruption and rule of law



weighting procedure does not allow proper practices to compensate for lacking democratic standards because fractions from 0 to 1.0 can only *downgrade* but never upgrade a given democratic standard. We interpret the resulting index as measuring the “effective” supply of democracy. The logic of this index is that effective institutions emanate from the *interaction* of institutional standards and institutional practices or the interplay between formal and informal aspects of institutions.

*Effective Supply of Democracy*

<p>Supply of Democratic <i>Standards</i></p> <p>Percentages from 0 to 100</p> <p>Combined Political and Civil Rights Ratings by Freedom House</p>	*	<p>Proper Institutional <i>Practices</i></p> <p>Fractions from 0 to 1.0</p> <p>Combined “Control of Corruption” and “Rule of law” Scores by World Bank</p>
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A country’s effective supply of democracy can be low for two different reasons. Either a country’s democratic standard is low in which case not even the most proper practice can raise it. Or the democratic standard is high but corrupt and unlawful practices render it ineffective. For exactly which of the two reasons a society’s effective supply of democracy is low does not matter from the viewpoint of empowerment. For people are disempowered in both cases. Whether they are disempowered because democratic standards are not institutionalized in the first place, or whether they are disempowered because these standards are corrupted and violated, does not make a difference to the fact of disempowerment itself.


Some might argue, following Freedom House’s self-declared intentions, that the organization sufficiently recognizes proper practices of democratic standards. In this case, an additional grading of Freedom House data by proper practices could not create much additional variance. Accordingly, effective supplies of democracy would produce more or less the same cross-country differences as procedural supplies. If this were so, the concept of effective democracy would be unnecessary. Whether this is indeed the case or not is an empirical question. It can be investigated by looking at the ratios at which effective supplies match procedural supplies of democracy and at how much these match ratios vary across countries.<sup>6</sup>

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levels) and maximum 1.0 (the highest empirical levels). Then we averaged the two scores, keeping the resulting index within the 0-1 range.

<sup>6</sup> To calculate the match ratio we divide for each country the percentage value for the effective supply of democracy by the percentage value for the formal supply of democracy. As the effective supply can never exceed but only fall short of (or in the best case just match) the formal supply, the match ratio is necessarily bound between 0 and 1.0.

Figure 2. Ratio at which Effective Supplies Match Procedural Supplies of Democracy



As Figure 2 illustrates, the effective supply of democracy matches the procedural supply at a ratio of .51 only. Moreover the match ratio varies enormously, with effective supplies of democracy matching procedural supplies at a much higher rate in some countries than in others. Apparently, the best matches are found in countries on a high level of economic development and with a long democratic tradition. This is plausible in both an institutional learning perspective and a modernization perspective. Defining and enacting democratic standards is a rather easy task compared to the exercise of uncorrupt practices, which is something that has to be learned. Because such learning processes can only advance under enduring democratic standards, it is plausible that practices match standards more closely as democracy endures (Sung 2004). On the other hand, uncorrupt practices are more easily adopted when higher income levels reduce the incentive that elites abuse public power for private benefit (Montinola and Jackman 2002). Thus, it is plausible, too, that practices match democratic standards more closely at higher levels of economic development.

Table 1. Explaining the Ratio at Which Effective Supplies Match Procedural Supplies of Democracy

Dependent Variable: Match of Effective to Procedural Supplies of Democracy (0-1.0 scale)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Democratic Tradition until 1995	.78*** (10.76)		.12 (1.30)
Per Capita GDP in PPP 1995		.91*** (18.29)	.81*** (8.94)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.61	.82	.83
N	75	75	71

*Note:* Entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas) with T-ratios in parentheses. Significance levels: \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\*p<.005.

The validity of these suppositions becomes evident in Table 1 where the match ratios are regressed on the temporal length of a country's democratic tradition<sup>7</sup> and its level of economic development.<sup>8</sup> In separate regressions both factors seem to increase the ratio at which institutional practices match democratic standards. Yet, as one controls the two effects against each other, the democratic tradition turns out to be insignificant and only economic development shows a significant effect. Thus, the democratic tradition helps institutional practices to match democratic standards insofar—and only insofar—as it goes together with economic development. Conversely, economic development helps institutional practices to match democratic standards even in absence of a long democratic tradition. This means that poor countries face greater difficulties to establish institutional practices that meet given democratic standards. Not the enactment of democratic *standards as such* is less easily achieved in poor countries. The adoption of *practices* that meet these standards is the problem. This finding underlines the need to look at effective democratic standards.

<sup>7</sup> We measure democratic tradition by the number of years a country spent under democracy using the -10 to +10 Autocracy-Democracy scale by Gurr and Jagers (1995). This is an additive index of dummy indicators for constitutional provisions guaranteeing limitations of executive power, competitiveness of political recruitment, and openness of political participation. This index is available on an annual basis for all independent countries of more than 1 million people at a given time as far back as 1850. For each country we counted backwards from 1995 the number of years since the country has been democratic (scoring at least +6 on the -10 to +10 scale) in an uninterrupted series, back until 1850 or until the year of the country's national independence (in case independence came later than 1850).

<sup>8</sup> We measure economic development by per capita GDP in purchasing power parities in 1995. Data are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators online databank.

## Measuring the Factual Demand for Democracy

Following the debate about how to best measure support for democracy (Shin and Wells 2005) we suppose that outspoken mass demands for democracy often overestimate a society's genuine demand for democracy. More precisely, such an overestimation is present to the extent to which people's outspoken preferences for democracy are detached from the values that are inherent to the idea of democracy.

Democracy is essentially an emancipative achievement because it is designed to empower people (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Thus, values that share an emancipative thrust in emphasizing people empowerment constitute core democratic values. To the extent to which outspoken demands for democracy are detached from these values, they are dissociated from the very idea of democracy. Mass demands for democracy are solidified only insofar as they are rooted in democratic values. Thus, a society's real demand for democracy becomes manifest in the extent to which its people's outspoken demand for democracy is tied to democratic values (Schedler 2005).

Welzel and Inglehart (2006) characterize a syndrome of "emancipative values" as a democratic type of values because its various components overlap in an emphasis on people empowerment. The emancipative impetus of democratic values is rooted in an ideal of man that considers ordinary people as to-be-empowered, to-be-tolerated, to-be-trusted, autonomous and participating persons. This democratic type of values covers five components that—insofar as they overlap—reflect different aspects of a common focus on human empowerment. The components include: (1) an *emphasis on people power* measured by rank-ordered priorities on "giving people more say in important government decisions," "giving people more say in how things are done at their jobs and in their communities," and "protecting freedom of speech;" (2) *participation in people actions* measured by self-reported participation in "signing petitions"; (3) *tolerance of non-conform people* measured by an acceptance of homosexuality; (4) a *sense of human autonomy* measured by people's feeling of having "choice and control over how their lives turn out"; (5) *trust in people* measured by a question asking directly of whether one "can trust other people."<sup>9</sup>

Not each of these five components is by itself a direct indicator of a democratic emphasis on people power. But insofar as they *overlap*, each of these components reflects this emphasis. Consider, for instance, participation in people actions. This might not be considered as a democratic value at all but as a behavior that might have or might not have a democratic impetus. Yet, *in connection* with an emphasis on people power, tolerance of non-conform people, and trust in people, such participation is a behavioral manifestation of democratic values. Likewise, trust in people might not by itself indicate a democratic value, yet *in connection* with an emphasis on people power, participation in people actions, and tolerance of non-conform people it does indicate a democratic value, implying a generally high valuation of ordinary people.

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<sup>9</sup> For the measurement of these components see the Appendix.

For this reason it is important to extract the overlapping variance of these five components. This is done by averaging the components using their factor loadings as weights in a one-dimensional combination. As a principal components analysis reveals, these five components do indeed significantly overlap on a common dimension accounting for 33 percent of the total variation over all components. We interpret this dimension as representing the core democratic value of people empowerment. To extract the intersection that constitutes this democratic value, we standardize each component on a scale from 0 to 1.0, then weight the components by their factor loadings, add the weighted components and eventually divide the sum by the sum of the factor weights for each individual.<sup>10</sup> This procedure yields an overall scale of democratic values with minimum 0 (in case a respondent scores 0 in all components) and maximum 1.0 (in case s/he scores 1.0 in all of them).

How genuine a person’s outspoken demand for democracy is, depends on this person’s adherence to the values inspiring the concept of democracy (Klingemann et al. 2006). Thus, we weight a person’s outspoken demand—measured in eight-steps from 0 to 100—by this person’s adherence to democratic values, measured in fractions from 0 to 1.0. This produces weighted scores from 0 to 100, assuming that people’s outspoken demand for democracy interacts with their democratic values in producing “genuine” demands for democracy. To have a strong genuine demand for democracy a person must show both a strong outspoken demand for democracy and strong democratic values, while for a genuine demand for democracy to be absent it suffices that either there is no outspoken demand for democracy or the democratic values are absent. How a society on average scores on the index of genuine democratic demands indicates the strength of its real demand for democracy. The logic of this index is that genuine demands for an object emanate from the interaction of the outspoken demand for this object and the valuation of this object’s intrinsic values.

### *Genuine Demand for Democracy*

<i>Outspoken Demand for Democracy</i>		<i>Adherence to Democratic Values</i>
Percentiles from 0 to 100	*	Fractions from 0 to 1.0


It is perfectly possible that genuine mass demands for democracy do not significantly fall short of outspoken mass demands. And even if they fall short, the shortfall might not vary much between countries. In this case our measure of genuine mass demands for democracy would be unnecessary. However, neither of these possibilities turns out to be true as Figure 3 illustrates. On average, a society’s genuine demands for democracy match its outspoken demands at a ratio of .44 only. And as was already true for our supply-measure, the match ratios vary greatly across countries. Obviously, democratic values match outspoken demands for democracy the most in countries on high levels of economic development and with long democratic traditions. Again

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<sup>10</sup> For details of scale construction see Appendix.

this is plausible from both an institutional learning point of view and a modernization point of view. For one, the endurance of democracy makes it likelier that people learn to appreciate democracy and internalize its core values. On the other hand, economic development enhances ordinary people’s participatory resources, making the democratic ideal of people empowerment a more realistic and hence more easily internalized value.

Figure 3. Ratio at which Genuine Demands Match Outspoken Demands for Democracy



Looking at the separate regressions in Table 2, it seems that both the democratic tradition and economic development increase the extent to which a public's democratic values match its outspoken demands for democracy.<sup>11</sup> But again, under mutual controls only economic development shows a significant matching effect. Apparently, poor societies are less likely to generate the values that make democratic demands genuine. The problem of poor societies is not that their people are less likely to speak out demands for democracy. They are less likely to do so on the ground of genuinely democratic values. Like effective supplies of democracy, genuine demands for democracy seem to be a developmental phenomenon. We come back to this point below.

Table 2. Explaining the Ratio at Which Genuine Demands Match Outspoken Demands for Democracy


Dependent Variable: Match of Genuine to Outspoken Demands for Democracy (0-1.0 scale)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Democratic Tradition until 1995	.77*** (10.20)		.15 (1.53)
Per Capita GDP in PPP 1995		.87*** (14.93)	.77*** (7.86)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.58	.75	.80
N	75	74	70

*Note:* Entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas) with T-ratios in parentheses. Significance levels: \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\*p<.005.

Pairing effective institutional supplies of democracy with genuine mass demands for democracy, democratic congruence becomes strikingly apparent, reaching an  $r = .88$  correlation across 80 nations. Figure 4 documents this remarkably close relationship. A strong formulation of congruence theory seems now justified as most of the variation in supply-levels of democracy, namely 78 percent, can be explained by variation in mass demands for democracy.

<sup>11</sup> To calculate the match ratio, we divide for each country the percent value of the genuine demand for democracy by the respective value of the outspoken demand for democracy. As the genuine demand can never exceed but only fall short of the outspoken demand, the match ratio is bound between 0 and 1.0.

Figure 4. Qualified Measures of Democratic Supplies and Demands





Comparing Figures 1 and 4 two things become obvious. First, quite a number of countries do not fit into a congruence corridor in Figure 1 because their *procedural* supply of democracy appears to be too high, placing them far above a congruent distribution. But the same countries do fit into a congruence corridor in Figure 4 because their *effective* supply of democracy is much lower, placing them far below their position in Figure 1. Examples of this pattern are Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico, or The Philippines. Second, a number of countries do not fit into a congruence corridor in Figure 1 because their *outspoken* democratic demands appear to be too strong, placing them far to the right of a congruent distribution. Yet the same countries do fit into a congruence corridor in Figure 4 because their *genuine* democratic demands are much weaker, placing them far left of their location in Figure 1. Examples of this pattern include Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

In any case, the qualified measures of democratic supply and demand are strikingly more congruent with each other than are the unqualified measures, even though the ways in which we did qualify these measures are entirely different in terms of the information used. These qualifications coincide only insofar as both use information relevant to a society's factual state of democracy. Such qualifications become increasingly important in a world in which more people demand democracy in a sort of lip service without having an idea what democracy means and in a world in which more power holders adopt democratic standards in an opportunistic strategy to please international donors.

### **Some Hints on Causality**

We have seen that measurement adjustments for reality make more visible the demand-supply nexus underlying democracy. This finding is important in itself as it confirms congruence theory, which emphasizes in a most fundamental way the relation between political culture and political institutions. Our interpretation of this relation is that elites make democratic institutions effective at a level that satisfies the masses' genuine demands for democracy. An alternative interpretation is that mass demands for democracy are a function of elite behavior, becoming genuine to the extent to which the elites make democracy effective. This is the institutional learning argument proposed by Rustow (1970) some time ago.

If the institutional learning argument is correct, the strength of a society's genuine demand for democracy should be a function of the time a country had spent under democracy. For the endurance of democracy in the past reflects the amount of time that people have had to recognize and internalize the benefits of democracy and to pass on these experiences as values to subsequent generations. To test this possibility we use the number of years a country was democratic since its existence until 1995, assuming that the more years of democracy a country has accumulated the deeper is democracy ingrained in people's values.

But other factors might be similarly important. As Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) argue, democratic values are strongly shaped by economic development. If this is true, the societal strength of genuine democratic demands must be influenced by economic development as well. To test this possibility we use the 1995 per capita GDP in purchasing power parities as an indicator of economic development.

Table 3. Partitioning the Explained Variance in Genuine Demands for Democracy

	DV: Genuine Mass Demands for Democracy	DV: Residual in Genuine Demands for Democracy <sup>a)</sup>	DV: Residual in Genuine Demands for Democracy <sup>b)</sup>
Democratic Tradition until 1995	.17 (1.97)		
Per Capita GDP in PPP 1995	.77*** (9.33)		
Residuals in Democratic Tradition <sup>a)</sup>		.21 (1.98)	
Residuals in per capita GDP <sup>b)</sup>			.74*** (9.39)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.82	.04	.53
N	78	78	78

*Note:* Entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas) with T-ratios in parentheses. Significance levels: \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\*p<.005.

*Variance Components:* - total explained variance  
82%  
- variance explained by democratic tradition alone:  
04%  
- variance explained by per capita GDP alone:  
53%  
- variance explained by overlap between per capita GDP and democratic tradition: 82%-04%-53%= 25%

<sup>a)</sup> Residuals unexplained by per capita GDP.  
<sup>b)</sup> Residuals unexplained by democratic tradition.

The first model in Table 3 shows that economic development and the democratic tradition jointly explain 82 percent of the societal strength of genuine democratic demands. But the relative effect of the democratic tradition is weak and insignificant. Partitioning the contributions to the explained variance clarifies this point. The second model documents the partial effect of the democratic tradition on genuine mass demands under control of economic development, showing that--in isolation from economic development--the democratic tradition contributes an insignificant 4 percent to explain genuine mass demands for democracy. The part

of economic development that is independent of the democratic tradition, however, contributes fully 53 percent to explain genuine mass demands for democracy. Adding up the 53 percent contributed by economic development and the 4 percent contributed by the democratic tradition, there still remains a 25 percent contribution to the total explained variance of 82 percent. These remaining 25 percent can only derive from the inseparable overlap between economic development and the democratic tradition.

These findings indicate that the democratic tradition is relevant to the emergence of genuine democratic mass demands insofar—and only insofar—as it is linked with economic development. By contrast, economic development shows a truly independent effect, helping to give rise to genuine democratic demands irrespective of the democratic tradition. The two partial plots in Figure 5 visualize these findings.

The important point is that the democratic tradition does neither have the sole nor even the major effect on genuine mass demands for democracy. This is important because some scholars argued that genuine mass demands for democracy can *only* emerge through institutional learning (Rustow 1970; Jackman and Miller 1998). This does not seem to be the case. Economic development is a stronger force in generating genuine mass demands for democracy than an institutional legacy of democracy. A genuine mass demand for democracy can also emerge in the absence of democracy. This finding is of critical importance for our claim that effective supplies of democracy are most likely to be achieved in a process of “responsive democratization” in which elites react to genuine mass demands for democracy. For this to happen, genuine mass demands for democracy must not depend too heavily on the prior existence of democracy, so that they can emerge even in absence of democracy—in response to other forces, such as economic development. This is exactly what our findings show.

Our findings help to better understand *why* economic development has been found to have a positive effect on democracy in so many studies since Lipset’s (1959) first treatment of the topic (more recently see Boix 2003). Lipset (1959:85-89) himself argued that economic development is conducive to high levels of democracy *because* it shapes mass demands in favor of democracy. Analyzing effective supplies of democracy as the dependent variable Table 4 demonstrates that this is indeed true.

Seen in isolation, economic development seems to explain fully 81 percent of the variation in effective supplies of democracy. But this effect is largely confounded by the overlap between economic development and genuine mass demands for democracy. Taking this into account it turns out that the sole effect of economic development drops to an explained variance of 24 percent. Another 28 percent of variance in effective supplies of democracy is explained by genuine mass demands for democracy alone. Still another 34 percent of the variance in effective supplies of democracy is explained by the inseparable overlap between economic development and genuine mass demands for democracy. Hence, for its most part the pro-democratic effect of economic development results from its contribution to generate genuine mass demands for democracy. By the same token, genuine mass demands for democracy impact on effective supplies of democracy mostly insofar as these demands are generated by economic development.

Figure 5. Genuine Mass Demands for Democracy as a Function of Economic Development and Democratic Traditions





Table 4. Partitioning the Explained Variance in Effective Supplies of Democracy

	DV: Effective Supply of Democracy 2000-04	DV: Residuals in Effective Democracy <sup>a)</sup>	DV: Residuals in Effective Democracy <sup>b)</sup>	DV: Residuals in Effective Democracy <sup>c)</sup>
Democratic Tradition until 1995	.07 (1.01)			
Per Capita GDP in 1995 PPP	.45*** (4.88)			
Genuine Demands for Democracy 1995-99	.46*** (5.40)			
Residuals in Democratic Tradition <sup>a)</sup>		.12 (1.02)		
Residuals in Per Capita GDP <sup>b)</sup>			.50*** (4.95)	
Residuals in Genuine Demands for Democracy <sup>c)</sup>				.53*** (5.47)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.87	.00	.24	.28
N	77	77	77	77

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas) with T-ratios in parentheses. Significance levels: \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\*p<.005.

*Variance Components:*

- total explained variance  
87%
- variance explained by democratic tradition alone:  
0%
- variance explained by per capita GDP alone:  
24%
- variance explained by genuine demands for democracy alone:  
28%
- variance explained by overlap between per capita GDP and genuine demands: 87%-0%-24%-28%= 35%

a) Residuals unexplained by per capita GDP and genuine demands for democracy.

b) Residuals unexplained by democratic tradition and genuine demands for democracy.

c) Residuals unexplained by democratic tradition and per capita GDP.

Still, in addition to their joint effect there remain considerable independent effects of both economic development and genuine demands for democracy. This is logical because in order to exert democratizing pressures people need both the *means* and the *will* to do so. Economic development gives them the means and genuine demands give them the will to do this, so both are relevant-- independent from each other as well as in connection with each other.

The role of economic development in generating genuine demands for democracy can also be traced at the individual level. For that matter we decompose genuine demands for

democracy into its two components, merely outspoken demands for democracy and democratic values. This allows us to look at how a society's economic development impacts on the individual-level effect of democratic values on outspoken demands for democracy. Looking at such cross-level interactions helps understand what makes outspoken demands for democracy more genuine in tying them more closely to democratic values. This is shown in the multi-level model in Table 5.

Table 5. Multi-Level Model Analyzing How Societal-Level Factors Tie Outspoken Democratic Demands to Democratic Values

Dependent Variable: Outspoken Democratic Demands, 1995-99		
Intercept ( <i>Fixed Effect</i> )	56.297721***	(24.552)
<i>Individual-level Effect</i> (general slope):		
Democratic Values, 1995-99	13.971597***	(6.772)
<i>Societal-level Effects</i> (intercept variance):		
Per Capita GDP in 1995 PPP	0.000369	(1.298)
Democratic Tradition until 1995	-0.031851	(-0.517)
<i>Cross-level Interaction Effects</i> (slope variance):		
Per Capita GDP * Democratic Values	0.000684**	(2.755)
Democratic Tradition * Democratic Values	-0.023870	(-0.622)
<i>Notes:</i> Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. Level-1 N=132,829 individuals; level-2 N=70 nations. Model calculated with HLM 6.03.		
Reduction of Error related to Base Model:	Level-1: 8%	
	Level-2: 12%	
<i>Data source:</i> World Values Surveys II-IV (1989-1999).		

The coefficient for the general slope in Table 5 shows that an individual's democratic values have in general a positive effect on its outspoken demand for democracy. This general individual-level effect is significantly positive irrespective of a society's level of economic development and democratic tradition. Yet, as is obvious from the coefficients for the slope variation, economic development strengthens the individual-level effect of democratic values on outspoken democratic demands. This means that the more developed a society is, the more are people's outspoken demands for democracy explained by their democratic values. In other words, higher levels of economic development make it more likely that people speak out demands for democracy *because* they hold democratic values. Hence, economic development makes demands for democracy more genuine by tying them more closely to democratic values. A society's democratic tradition, by contrast, does not have such an effect. By itself it does not make demands for democracy more genuine. In plain contradiction to the institutional learning model, genuine mass demands for democracy are not at all endogenous to existing democratic institutions. They constitute a largely developmental phenomenon.

## Discussion: A Typology of Democratization

Our findings suggest that the most typical way in which societies achieve an effective institutional supply of democracy is that genuine mass demands for democracy push for this supply and that political actors react on these pressures responsively at some point. This way of achieving an effective supply of democracy is a mass-driven process, which we characterize as *responsive democratization*. But this is certainly not the only type of democratization and the question is how it relates to other types.

Since democracy means to empower ordinary people, each additional degree of democracy means a degree more power to the masses and a degree less power to the elites. Given this simple fact, power maximizing actors should have a vested interest to supply as little democracy as possible (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). If this interest does not face constraints, a dictatorial monopoly of power should be the default case. Yet there can be various constraints leading power holders to give up their natural preference for dictatorship and to supply democracy at least procedurally. These constraints can take the form of (1) learning pressures resulting from failed dictatorial experiments, leading to *enlightened democratization*; (2) the dependence of power holders on the will of foreign democratic countries leading to *imposed democratization*; (3) monetary and symbolic incentives of the international system that lead power holders to an *opportunistic democratization*, and (4) societal demands for democracy that put power holders under mass pressures leading to *responsive democratization*. Table 6 summarizes these types of democratization.

One of the reasons why power holders might overcome their natural tendency to maximize power and why they supply democracy is when negative historical experiences have discredited alternative forms of government. The adoption of democracy in post World War II Germany, Italy, and Japan might partly fall into this category. This type of enlightened democratization is the only type in which elites effectively supply democracy even in absence of genuine mass demands for democracy. But this model is very rare in history as it is at odds with power holders' natural tendency to limit democracy. Thus, effective supplies of democracy in the absence of genuine mass demands for democracy are exceptional. This is well reflected in Figure 4: there are few countries reaching highly effective supplies of democracy when genuine mass demands for democracy are weak.

Another reason why elites supply democracy even if genuine mass demands for democracy are weak is when these elites depend on the will of external powers and when these powers are pushing for democracy. This case of imposed democratization is again typical of post-war democracies such as West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after World War II. The U.S.-led attempts to install democracy in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq fall into the same category of externally imposed democratization, though it is far from being clear whether the latter cases will be successful.

Table 6. Types of Democratization

<i>Type of democratization</i>	<i>Constraints on elites' power maximizing interests</i>	<i>Regime result</i>	<i>Demand-Supply Congruence</i>
<b>No</b> democratization	Unconstrained	No democracy	Absent genuine demand for democracy <b>congruent</b> with absent effective supply of democracy
<b>Enlightened</b> democratization	Constrained by learning effects resulting from failed experiments	Effective (uncorrupted) democracy	Weak genuine demand for democracy <b>incongruent</b> with strong effective supply of democracy
<b>Imposed</b> democratization	Constrained by dependence on external democratic powers	Ineffective (corrupted) democracy	Weak genuine demand for democracy <b>congruent</b> with weak effective supply of democracy
<b>Opportunistic</b> democratization	Constrained by external monetary and symbolic incentives	Ineffective (corrupted) democracy	Weak genuine demand for democracy <b>congruent</b> with weak effective supply of democracy
<b>Responsive</b> democratization	Constrained by genuine mass demands for democracy	Effective (uncorrupted) democracy	Strong genuine demand for democracy <b>congruent</b> with strong effective supply of democracy



Still another and increasingly widespread case in which elites supply democracy in absence of genuine mass demands for democracy is when they believe they can easily corrupt democratic standards in practice and when the pretense of democracy is perceived as a useful means to open the doors to the international community, especially donor organizations. This case of opportunistic democratization has become more likely since the Washington Consensus, as a result of which Western credits have been tied to conditions of “good governance.”

Imposed democratization and opportunistic democratization are cases of democratization in which the elites supply democracy even though they are not pressed to do so by genuine mass demands. But in both cases domestic elites have it easy to corrupt democratic procedures, precisely because there is no genuine mass demand for democracy. For in the absence of genuine demands the public is unlikely to put elites under democratizing pressures. Corrupting democratic procedures is a strategy for elites to realize their power maximizing interests under the cloak of democratic procedures. This strategy can disempower the people just as much as open dictatorship. Thus, in the absence of genuine mass demands for democracy, the most likely outcome is either the absence of democracy or corrupted democracy.

If there is a genuine mass demand for democracy, the power maximizing interests of elites face opposing mass expectations. Elites must react to or anticipate societal pressures emerging from mass demands to supply democracy in such a case. Elites might not be willing to give in to such pressures, yet they cannot ignore them. In an undemocratic regime that lacks legitimacy because the masses genuinely demand democracy, elites must mobilize extra resources in order to sustain repressive capacities strong enough to keep opposition under control. This will further erode the elites’ legitimacy, forcing them to squeeze out even more resources for repression. Against a population with opposing demands, this strategy is self-defeating: when the elites need more repressive resources because of lacking legitimacy, the very lack of legitimacy diminishes the resources they can mobilize. At some point, this leads to a situation in which the elites run out of the means to keep opposition silent. Then dissidents show up and rally mass support around a pro-democracy movement, confronting the elites with the alternatives of negotiating a transition to democracy or to opt for repression with the risk of having the regime swept away by a democratic revolution (Thompson 2004; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). In conclusion, elites are not always willing to give in to mass demands, but if these demands grow strong enough, at some point the elites have to give in and supply democracy at a level that satisfies mass demands, provided these demands are genuine.

Let’s sum this up. If genuine mass demands for democracy are absent or weak, elite tendencies to monopolize power are so unconstrained that either open dictatorship or corrupted democracy is the most likely result. In any event, an effective supply of democracy is in short supply in such a case. If, by contrast, genuine mass demands for democracy are growing strong, the elites become subject to societal pressures on which they must react. In the short run they might be able to resist these pressures. But in the long run fading legitimacy depletes them of the resources needed to keep opposition under control. Thus, democracy is most likely to come at some point in such a situation, leading to responsive democratization.

## Conclusion

We have shown that standard measures of democratic institutions and democratic preferences greatly overestimate the “real” institutional supply of democracy and the “real” mass demand for democracy. This has been shown using additional criteria that are highly indicative of the quality of democratic institutions and democratic preferences. In particular we qualified given democratic standards by measures of proper institutional practices, namely rule of law and uncorrupt government, yielding effective institutional supplies of democracy. Likewise, we qualified merely outspoken demands of democracy by measures of internalized democratic values, yielding genuine mass demands for democracy. Using these qualified measures of democratic institutions and democratic preferences, it appears that the levels at which societies supply democracy effectively and that the extent to which their people demand democracy genuinely are much lower than standard measures of democratic institutions and preferences suggest.

The strong association that congruence theory predicts to exist between a society’s institutional supply of democracy and its mass demand for democracy becomes evident if—and only if-- one focuses on measures of effective democratic supplies and genuine democratic demands. This finding gives congruence theory new meaning in a realistic perspective that focuses on the factual state of democracy at both the supply-side and the demand-side.

Addressing the causal mechanism underlying the congruence between the institutional supply of democracy and the societal demand for democracy we found little evidence supporting a democratic learning model according to which one would expect genuine democratic mass demands to emerge in response to the endurance of democratic institutions. Instead, available evidence suggests that economic development helps giving rise to genuine democratic mass demands, irrespective of a society’s democratic tradition, and that this is one of the reasons *why* economic development is conducive to democracy. This insight is important showing that democratic congruence, accurately measured, is more a development-driven than institutionally inherited phenomenon.

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## Appendix

### Measuring Outspoken Demands for Democracy with World Values Survey Data

A question in the World Values Surveys reads: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?” V164 reads: “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments and elections. V165 reads: “Having the army rule.” V166 reads: “Having a democratic political system.” Another introduction reads: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? V172 then reads: “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” To create the 0-100 index for outspoken democratic demands, the following SPSS-procedure is run: If (v164=1) or (v164=2) nostrglead=0. If (v164=3) nostrglead=50. If (v164=4) nostrglead=100. If (v166=1) or (v166=2) noarmyrul=0. If (v166=3) noarmyrul=50. If (v166=4) noarmyrul=100. If (v167=3) or (v167=4) yesdemsys=0. If (v167=2) yesdemsys=50. If (v167=1) yesdemsys=100. If (v172=3) or (v172=4) yesdembest=0. If (v172=2) yesdembest=50. If (v172=1) yesdembest=100. Compute  $yesdem\_nodict=(nostrglead+noarmyrul+yesdemsys+yesdembest)/4$ .

### Measuring Democratic Values

#### *Emphasis on People Power (POWER):*

Ordinal preference scale measuring priorities on three goals related to civil and political freedoms, taken from the materialism/postmaterialism item batteries: “seeing that people have more say about things are done at their jobs and in their communities,” (V120, V121) “giving people more say in important government decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” (both in V122, V123). For each item, no priority is coded 0, second priority is coded 1 and first priority is coded 2. Priorities for each item are then added to a 0-5 scale. The following table describes this index:

#### Emphasis on People Power Index

Code	Meaning	Label
0	Absent	No item on 1st or 2nd rank
1	Weak	One item on 2nd rank
2	Moderate	One item 1st or two items 2nd
3	Moderate-to-strong	One item 1st and one 2nd
4	Strong	One item 1st and two items 2nd
5	Maximum	Two items 1st and one 2nd

We transformed this 0-5 point index into a normalized scale with minimum 0 and maximum 1.0.

#### *Participate in People Actions (ACTIONS):*

Question wording (V134): “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have

actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.” We coded “would never do” as 0, “might do” as 0.5, and “have done” as 1.0, yielding a 0-5 point normalized scale.

*Tolerance of Non-Conform People (TOLERATE):*

Question wording (V208): “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card” (on which 1 means “never justifiable” and 10 means “always justifiable”). One of the behaviors people are asked to rate is “homosexuality” (V208). We recoded this 1-10 point scale into a normalized scale with minimum 0 and maximum 1.0.

*Trust in People (TRUST):*

Question wording (V25): “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The response options are “most people can be trusted” and “need to be very careful.” We recoded answers as 1.0 for “most people can be trusted” and 0 otherwise.

*Sense of Human Autonomy (AUTON):*

Question wording (V82): “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” We transformed this 1-10 point scale into a normalized scale with minimum 0 and maximum 1.0.

*Index of Democratic Values (DEMOVAL):*

Based on the pooled individual-level dataset of the World Values Surveys I-IV, a principal component analysis reveals the following factor loadings:

ACTION	.598
TOLERATE	.575
POWER	.566
AUTON	.566
TRUST	.366

We use these factor loadings as weights to calculate the combined index of democratic values from its normalized five components. This is done with the following SPSS-procedure (-99 defined as missing values):

*Calculating democratic values when data for none of the five components are missing:*

if ((AUTON ne -99) and (ACTION ne -99) and (TOLERATE ne -99) and (POWER ne -99) and (TRUST ne -99)) DEMOVAL=(.566\*AUTON+.598\*ACTION+.575\*TOLERATE+.566\*POWER+.366\*TRUST)/2.671. [Note: 2.671 is the sum of the factor weights. Dividing by it keeps the composite index in a range between 0 and 1.0.]

*Calculating democratic values when data for AUTON are missing:*

if ((AUTON=-99) and (ACTION ne -99) and (TOLERATE ne -99) and (POWER ne -99) and (TRUST ne -99)) DEMOVAL= (.598\*ACTION+.575\*TOLERATE+.566\*POWER+.366\*TRUST)/2.105.

*Calculating democratic values when data for ACTION are missing:*

if ((AUTON ne -99) and (ACTION=-99) and (TOLERATE ne -99) and (POWER ne -99) and (TRUST ne -99)) DEMOVAL= (.566 \* AUTON + .575 \* TOLERATE + .566 \* POWER + .366 \* TRUST) / 2.073.

*Calculating democratic values when data for TOLERATE are missing:*

if ((AUTON ne -99) and (ACTION ne -99) and (TOLERATE=-99) and (POWER ne -99) and (TRUST ne -99)) DEMOVAL=(.566 \* AUTON + .598 \* ACTION + .566 \* POWER + .366 \* TRUST) / 2.096.

*Calculating democratic values when data for POWER are missing:*

if ((AUTON ne -99) and (ACTION ne -99) and (TOLERATE ne -99) and (POWER=-99) and (TRUST ne -99)) DEMOVAL=(.566 \* AUTON + .598 \* ACTION + .575 \* TOLERATE + .366 \* TRUST) / 2.105.

*Calculating democratic values when data for TRUST are missing:*

if ((AUTON ne -99) and (ACTION ne -99) and (TOLERATE ne -99) and (POWER ne -99) and (TRUST=-99)) DEMOVAL=(.566 \* AUTON + .598 \* ACTION + .575 \* TOLERATE + .566 \* POWER) / 2.305.



