Connectivity and Global Studies

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Connectivity and Global Studies

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Connectivity and Global Studies

palgrave
macmillan

Jan Nederveen Pieterse
Global Studies
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-59597-5 ISBN 978-3-030-59598-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2

Cover illustration: Zia Liu & eStudioCalamar

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

A few chapters in this book are revisions of papers that appeared earlier. Part of Chap. 2 appeared as a journal article ('What Is Global Studies?' *Globalizations* 10, 4, 2013: 499–514). Nine scholars wrote responses and two responses I wrote are worked into the chapter. Chapter 5 draws on a journal article ('Periodizing Globalization', *New Global Studies* 6, 2, 2012: 1–25). A revised version is the concluding chapter of the *Routledge Handbook of Archeology and Globalization*, edited by Tamar Hodos (2017). An early version of Chap. 6 is a book chapter (in Pitts and Versluys, eds., 2015a: 225–239). A section of Chap. 8 is a revision of a paper in *Third World Quarterly* (33, 10, 2012: 1909–1924). I thank the publishers of these journals and books for their permission to reuse the material in this book.

I tried out some chapters in lectures and thank participants for comments (at University of Essex; Moscow University; San Marcos University, Lima; Middlebury College, Vermont; the California School of Arts, West Hollywood; the Czech Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Prague; Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine; International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Transnational Institute, Amsterdam). Regional studies also underlie this work (such as co-edited books on the Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia, Brazil, Russia, China and Southeast Asia).

I owe many friends for inspiring conversations. I am indebted to Bhikhu Parekh, Fazal Rizvi, Nubar Hovsepian, Don Lehman, Peter Bloom, Surichai Wungaeo, Boike Rehbein, Anirudh Krishna, Markus Schulz, Sérgio Costa, Alena Ledeneva, N.C. Narayan and Jongtae Kim. For insights in archeology, I owe Miguel John Versluys; in East Asian religion (and many references), Bill Powell; in global political economy, Jeffrey Henderson, Kees van der Pijl; in technology, Geert Lovink, Brett Aho, Ravindran Mahalingam and Amy Mowl; in art, Florian Stoll and Ron Wigginton; for China, Mayfair Yang, Changgang Guo and Wen Tiejun. I am also grateful to Peter Bloom and Brett Aho for commenting on several chapters. Mistakes are mine.

My cordial thanks go to the Global Studies Department, University of California Santa Barbara, and graduate and undergraduate students for sharing a new field, among others Brett Aho, Mariah Miller, Daniel Zorub, Sarp Kurgan, Roberta Duffield, Daniel Palm and visiting scholars Taras Tsymbal, Andrew Kam, Ratna Nepal and Justin Malbon. Many thanks to Onur Kapdan and Brett Aho for their

research assistance. My cordial thanks to all and to Chris Rojek for prompting me to write this book.

At the request of a PhD student (how did you go into academia), I add a brief bio note. I grew up in Amsterdam in postwar times as part of a mixed postcolonial family. My family and ancestors had lived since the late 1700s in Sumatra, Makassar and Java. I saw the country becoming increasingly multicultural over time—not just people from Indonesia but also people from the Dutch Antilles and Suriname, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and African countries. I dipped into literature and philosophy. At University of Amsterdam I studied anthropology and sociology (1966–72). One of the university institutes I worked at was located in the seventeenth-century building of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). I later learned one of my ancestors was chief treasurer of the VOC in Batavia around 1800.

I spent time in Italy (my sister had married an Italian and lived in Rome and Sardinia), did student research in Tunisia and the Netherlands, and taught sociology for three turbulent years at University of Cape Coast in Ghana (1978–81 and four governments). In Ghana I became friends with the leader of a military coup from the lower ranks and went on to research coups from the lower ranks in Liberia and Suriname. When Jerry Rawlings went to Libya, I went to Liberia, spent time with soldiers and did interviews, and later we compared notes. The year after I went to Paramaribo, Suriname, to study the military coup from the lower ranks. I went on to study development studies and world-system thinking in the US with Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi and James Petras (1981–84). In State University of New York Binghamton I set up a Latin American solidarity committee. We organized talks by trade union leaders, organizers and researchers from Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and friends such as Phil Wheaton of EPICA and Louis Wolf from Washington, DC. After three years at Binghamton I found world-system theory too limited and wrote a critique (in Nederveen Pieterse 1989). Back in the Netherlands, I resumed my friendship with Gerrit Huizer, director of the Third World Center at Nijmegen University, and with my teacher and friend Wim Wertheim, a leading scholar of Indonesia, Southeast Asia and China, then retired from the University of Amsterdam. I resumed my affinity with Wertheim's emancipation perspective. My PhD dissertation (1988) turned into a book, *Empire and Emancipation* (1989). In Amsterdam I also resumed contact with El Salvador, Palestinian solidarity and anti-apartheid groups and squatters.

For 11 years I worked at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, ISS, Europe's largest graduate school of development studies, which exposed me to wide-ranging experiences and marvelous students from all over the world (1990–2001). Development studies interested me ever since my time in Tunisia and Ghana and became my focus during the years at ISS. At ISS I was elected as Director of Research and organized several major international conferences. I was invited to do a lecture tour of seven universities across India and often traveled to Pakistan at the invitation of Durre Ahmed at the National College of Arts, for lectures in Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar. I taught a course at a development studies institute in Tokyo. For a semester I was visiting professor at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Java. Several times I was visiting professor for three months at the

Global Studies program at Freiburg University. I made several visits to South Africa and held visiting professorships in several countries.

I moved to the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), a distinguished university, to take up a professorship, chairing the specialization of transnational sociology (2001–08). Our flight was delayed by 9/11 and we arrived days after in a very tense atmosphere. At UIUC we organized an inspiring interdepartmental seminar series on transnationalism. Bill Cope, a colleague at UIUC, asked me to co-organize annual international global studies conferences (so named because the theme was 'globalization and'—the US, the Persian Gulf, East Asia, Brazil, Russia, India, China). This inspired regional cooperation and several co-edited books came out of this collaboration.

Invited to apply for an endowed chair at the University of California Santa Barbara I was appointed in global studies and sociology (2009–present). At the time I was also appointed as a quarter time professor in Globalization and Culture at Maastricht University for three years (and another three years of honorary professorship). I was invited to be an endowed research professor in international studies at National University of Malaysia, or UKM, to conduct a research project, a position I held for two years (2015–17). Living and working in many places—Italy, Tunisia, Ghana, South Africa, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Germany, Sweden, China, South Korea, Malaysia—exposed me to many networks of activists and scholars, and experiences that typically cannot be captured briefly.

My early work was concerned with cultural studies, analyzing Eurocentric views of culture and multiculturalism (in books such as *Christianity and Hegemony*, *The Decolonization of Imagination* and *White on Black*). Part of this was anthropology and ethnicity. Work since the mid-1990s dealt with globalization and development studies. History always holds my interest and is part of my first book, *Empire and Emancipation*. I was asked to join the editorial board of *Review of International Political Economy*, a leading journal, and doing this for seven years familiarized me with global political economy (1997–2004). Thus, skipping details, my journey includes history, anthropology, cultural studies, development studies, globalization, global political economy, regional studies and global studies.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Introduction

> The world is not like a platoon advancing at the pace of a single commander. It's a network of events affecting each other. (Carlo Rovelli 2018)

Connectivity has long been discussed under many headings. One of the oldest notions, the Buddhist idea of *interbeing* goes back to the fourth century BCE. Logistics and supply lines are fundamental in military thinking. Trade routes and exchange are basic in economics as well as in history and archeology. Networks play a part in information, communication and computer science and sociology; flows and circulation in anthropology, cultural and media studies; intersubjectivity in philosophy and psychology, interdependence in international relations, and intertextuality in literature studies. Connectivity is a recent term, influenced by cyber technologies and social media. Are you connected, can you connect?

Connectivity is so omnipresent that it escapes generalization and even escapes attention. Connectivity is the prerequisite of nearly all action. Marshall McLuhan's 'the medium is the message' refers to one period, but actually the subtext of *every* message is 'we connect'; connectivity underlies all messages.

Connections also refer to social relations. Humans are social animals (ants, locusts, bees are super-social). Social cooperation provides an evolutionary advantage. Social cooperation is also a wide category. Connections, networks and social capital can be rooted in culture and tradition, such as *guanxi* in China, or carry an ambiguous meaning, such as *blat* in Russia, a term that originated in the underworld (Yang 1994; Ledeneva 2008). Social capital is diverse and stratified from weak links to strong ties.

Our life is a story of connectivity. We are born connected and grow up connected to family and friends, and gradually our connections expand to neighborhood, school, town, country and region. Connections shape periods of our life. Books, music, movies, hobbies, newspapers and media connect us. Networks inform our work life. Friends and acquaintances are associated with places we feel attached to. Just as connectivity is a profound part of our life story, it runs deep through human history. Routes of migration, trade and conquest, knowledge and pilgrimage criss-cross the world map. Modes and circuits of connectivity define historical epochs. Economic history and the history of globalization are histories of connectivity.

Connectivity is so ordinary we barely think about it, until it breaks down. Connectivity is fundamental, necessary and at times fraught and contentious. Path

dependence, a term in institutional economics, derives from routes of connectivity. In feudal times trade routes came with tolls and war levies. International trade involves conditions and tariffs. Shipping lanes may come with pirates. Eurasian overland trade brought the black plague via the Crimea (McNeill 1977). With the exploration of the 'new world' came the decimation of Native American peoples. Energy powers our machines and fossil fuels also bring pollution.

Circuits of connectivity provide basics and opportunities and exact a price. Now digital entrapment is commonplace. The transaction cost of changing connectivity circuits may be such that we have little choice but to take corporate data capture in stride. Connectivity is never seamless or entirely smooth and is always interrupted, often in unnoticed ways. Also digital connectivity passes through many nodes and its passage involves many micro-decisions along the way (Sprenger 2015). Connectivity means expanding digital services as well as surveillance, it means 5G as well as Covid-19. As we switch to digital connectivity and electricity, the cost of connectivity changes too. Edward Snowden notes that 'the electricity usage by data centers is enormous… threatening to produce roughly five times the CO_2 emissions of all current global air travel… To achieve sustainability we will need to treat technological change and environmental change as symbiotic'.[1]

In discussions of globalization the issue is not globalization as such (globalization 'per se' doesn't actually exist) but how globalization is organized. Likewise, with connectivity the issue is how connectivity is organized. In classic information network theory, patterns in the organization of networks are centrist (one central node), multicentric (several key nodes) and distributed (equal data load in each node; Baran 1964: 79). Which type of network organization is most vulnerable to external attack? In a centrist network an attack on the central node may disable the network; a multicentric network requires attacks on multiple nodes but is still vulnerable; the distributed type of network is the most secure (see Fig. 1).

In a broad and allegorical sense, this patterning corresponds with types of political-economic organization—centrist concentration of power (as in absolute monarchy, divine right, authoritarianism), multicentric (with giant companies as data centers, as in liberal democracy) and distributed (roundtable governance and data distribution, as in social democracy). Each mode of organization involves tradeoffs. Organizational patterns operate at multiple scales, from households to world scale. In most social formations all organizational modes usually play a part, with a different rank order in diverse settings. Examining this also requires reflection on fundamentals: what are centers, and how are centers understood, constituted and embedded in worldviews? How do centers differ? What are different views on different kinds of centrism? Luxor, Delphi, Sarnath, Jerusalem, Zion, Rome and Mecca are all 'centers of the world' and are also different kinds of centers.

Traditionally much history has been viewed from centrist and unitary perspectives, such as history centered on states. Empire, religion, civilization, science, progress and capitalism have been part of centrist logics. These views live on in different guises, although major changes have taken place. Until the late nineteenth century most history was state-centric, followed by nation-centric history,



Fig. 1 Network diagrams (Source: Baran 1964: 79)

civilizational history, social history, working-class history and histories of a wide range of units and variety of social forces.

In our personal lives we experience diversity and plurality. In our personal growth, everyday experiences, work, travel, learning and media, we experience worlds that are diverse and connected, different compared to the past and different in diverse settings and cultures. Our ordinary experience includes parallel development as well as difference. In the words of Hazel Henderson, we are now 'a 7.5 billion-member global human family—all thrown into new relationships in today's 24/7 technological connectivity' (2019: 148).

Ours is a world of increasingly widely distributed consciousness, interspersed with legacies of centrist consciousness and agency. A time of diverse information flows from many sources that feature multiple layered publics. The growing role of emerging societies and developing countries has expanded information flows. With the spread of Covid-19, everyone with a smartphone has comparative data on how countries handle the public health situation at their fingertips. Everybody is doing global studies.

The knowledge economy, information age, attention economy and digital and big data turn all refer to information processing. It follows that a premium is on perspectives that guide information processing and enable the integration of information. How is information organized? How, according to what criteria and for what purpose do we determine the rank order of types of information? Information analysis and pattern analysis are skills of our time.

The point of connectivity as a theme is to shift gear from conventional categories to a level that enables a greater integration of information. The point of global studies as framework is to step back from globalization, the debates it is associated with and the luggage it carries. Global studies faces wider databases and demands a wider and deeper integration of information. A field of our times, global studies faces the widest database of social science and humanities and therefore encounters the deepest problems. Its rationale is that it is an integrative field; its mandate is the integration of diverse databases and its risk is superficiality and taking shortcuts.

The theme of the book, connectivity is deliberately wide. The approach is pattern analysis, which is again a deliberately a wide arc. Pattern recognition is fundamental to biological functioning and to human cognition (see Chap. 4). Pattern analysis is a bandwidth in-between macro theory and micro knowledge (Nederveen Pieterse 2018). Two meridians in the book are consciousness and agency, a bridging thematic, and varieties of market economies, a bridging analytic.

Consciousness and agency, awareness and choice rely on pattern recognition. Consciousness and agency is a perennial theme, as in classic conversations between philosophers and kings, sages and rulers (Rustow 1970; Giri 2009). In the *Bhagavad Gita*, Krishna and Arjuna represent, in a fashion, peak consciousness and peak agency. Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king refers to wide consciousness and wide agency. There are many different kinds of consciousness and different kinds of agency. The Grand Vizier and the Sultan, Machiavelli and the Prince, the Pope and the Emperor, the consigliere and the don come to mind. Many combinations are possible, such as narrow consciousness and broad agency, broad consciousness and narrow agency, narrow consciousness and narrow agency, and disconnect of consciousness and agency. Philosophers and kings are not necessarily on speaking terms. An Ethiopian proverb has it, when the great lord passes, the peasant bows and silently farts. Wide consciousness and little agency in the street and narrow consciousness and broad agency in government offices have been common and, at times, preludes to rebellion. When Hegel cast the state as the embodiment of 'ethical life', subsuming family and civil society, as the peak of the objective spirit, the embodiment of the spirit of world history, he did so at a time when states possessed the widest database. 'Statistics' is named after the data collection of states. After Germany's unification, Prussia became a model for many rising countries from Russia to Japan. Consciousness and agency is a theme with a wide alert function; as a theme it also links with conversations in philosophy.

Growing connectivity brings widening and deepening consciousness but not necessarily widening agency. The gap between consciousness and agency is a perennial quandary, more so in times of hyperconnectivity. According to the Arab Human Development Report, the Middle East is the region with the widest gap between university graduates and jobs (UNDP 2013). Such 'unhappy development' leads to 'eruptions of popular anger' (Ianchovichina 2018). Mobilizations and protests in many countries usually concern not just social inequality but also inequality of agency. People are increasingly aware, yet feel powerless and under-resourced to deal with challenges they face.

Participating in globalization we encounter diverse experiences and quandaries. Worldliness is an experience of foxes, rather than hedgehogs. We seek deep understanding, but we are not specialists nor are we walking world encyclopedias. In balancing width and depth we exercise judgment. In acupuncture style, the issue is identifying meridians, nodes and patterns of probabilities. We face fragments and try to make a whole out of parts. Encountering diverse places and times, facing commonalities and differences, we come up with tools that make plausible combinations possible.

Varieties of market economies is one such organizing tool—an analytic that *grounds* global studies in development studies and global political economy. Varieties of market economies represent a different balance of society, state and market, the big three in social science. A classic distinction runs between liberal, state-led and coordinated market economies (Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). In brief, in liberal market economies, corporations lead; in state-led societies, the state leads in organizing economic behavior; coordinated market economies are roundtable societies in which government, social and market forces sit at the table. State-led market economies can be differentiated in developmental, conservative and extractive states. All state-led market economies have authoritarian features but authority serves different purposes—to achieve overall national development, to uphold a conservative social vision or to serve strategic elites. Of course, several variables run across market economies (such as are states capable, trust in government, surplus or deficit economies).

Varieties of market economies broadly correlate with distribution patterns of consciousness and agency. Schematically, in liberal market economies, consciousness and agency are concentrated in market forces (the market rules okay). In state-led market economies, consciousness and agency are concentrated in state institutions. In coordinated market economies, consciousness and agency are distributed across government agencies, social (labor, communities, consumers) and market forces (business councils, employers' associations, corporations). Arguably, similar equations of network resilience may apply as in information network theory. Elsewhere I find that varieties of market economies are a pertinent tool in analyzing patterns of inequality, institutions and populism (Nederveen Pieterse 2017, 2018a, b). In this book, it plays a part in perspectives on technology, art, borders and populism (Chaps. 8, 9, 10 and 11). How societies deal with Covid-19 is also a test of institutional capacity.

Themes in the book, history, DNA, technology, art, borders and populism, all showcase dimensions and layers of connectivity in different ways. Not every theme arrives or must arrive at a 'last word'. The awareness of diverse and layered connectivity itself is a relevant step along the way of global awareness. Global consciousness takes shape in the process of articulation. Globalization is a collective learning experience, which includes how to integrate diverse flows in a wider confluence. A précis of chapters follows.

The first four chapters discuss globalization and global studies. Chapter 1 reviews twentieth-century global data gathering, narratives that represent and organize global connectivity, and a host of global initiatives. Global data collection has been

a basic step in navigating global connectivity. Chapter 2 reviews globalization research and existing global studies and undertakes spring cleaning to clear the way for global studies as a wider arc. Themes of spring cleaning are capitalism, hegemony and postcolonial studies. Chapter 3 gives an overview of key concerns of globalization in the form of propositions on historical and contemporary trends and alternative views in relation to conventional perspectives.

Chapter 4 takes up global studies problems and is the most sensitive, tightrope chapter. How do we integrate knowledge in a multicentric, multilevel, entangled world? We face problems of fragmentation, how to balance width and depth, how to engage the whole. Aggregation and generalization are cognitive hurdles and disaggregation and pattern analysis are remedies. Cognitive biases are in our way and tools of pattern analysis are counterpoints.

While historical depth plays a part in all chapters, three chapters focus on history. Chapter 5 reviews approach to world history over time—such as universal history, history of civilizations, world-system studies and archeology—and how they understand what is now called globalization. The chapter seeks to provide an X-ray of global history thinking over time. Chapter 6 considers Greco-Roman history in light of globalization. I was asked to take part in a workshop in Exeter of historians and archeologists of the Greco-Roman world who want to take up globalization because they are weary of the old paradigm of Romanization and I would do the globalization part. It took place around the corner from Roman baths. Replace Romanization with globalization and the upshot is situating Rome in wider streams of history, decentering Rome, which includes viewing the Greco-Roman world as a westward extension of Eurasian Bronze Age culture.

Transport and communication are basics of connectivity but the tools are not connectivity itself. Consider the human genome and connectivity appears in another light. Human genome and consumer DNA analysis situate us in deep time and thus hold implications for how we understand identity. Chapter 7 straddles the history chapters and the chapters on technology, art, borders and populism, which showcase different ways of navigating connectivity and patterns of consciousness and agency.

Technology is the tissue of connectivity. Chapter 8 takes up hyperconnectivity such as smartphones and social media and politics of truth. WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden episodes are part of asymmetric transparency, from above (governments and corporations) and from below (social forces, whistleblowers). Understanding the role of technology requires understanding the regulatory institutions in different market economies. Tech connectivity is a terrain of contestation; there are as many kinds of connectivity conflicts as there are stakeholders. States, corporations, citizens all seek to harness data access to their advantage. Silicon Valley tech giants raise questions of monopolistic capture, data privacy and control. American government agencies promote the 'freedom to connect' and seek control of information links and data flows. Technologies of connectivity and control are frontiers in the 'clash of capitalisms' between American capitalism and market economies such as the European Union (EU) and China and their approaches to data protection. Surveillance capitalism is a keynote of American approaches; the surveillance state

leads in China while EU approaches to data privacy have given rise to General Data Protection Regulation.

Globalization involves growing connectivity and the awareness of growing connectivity. This awareness involves synchronization, the experience of contemporaneity. Aesthetics, art and architecture, music, design and fashion are sensory and cognitive conductors of synchronization. Art patronage showcases power and profiles peak consciousness and agency. Mesopotamian mathematics, Persian gardens, Greco-Roman legacies, Islamic civilization, modern syntheses, postmodern turns and contemporary art shape and reshape global experience and the world stage. Art sheds a distinctive light on connectivity.

Borders and populism offer complex, meandering takes on connectivity (see Chaps. 10 and 11). Borders have been ordinary decision points in organizing connectivity and cooperation. 'Strong fences make good neighbors'. The meanings of connectivity and borders change constantly as part of larger processes. Making sense of snapshots is to consider the process they are part of. The twentieth-century hegemon experienced a sequence of borders (containment), debordering (rollback Soviet influence), debordering (the Washington consensus, unipolarity and wars) and borders (immigration walls, travel bans, tariffs). The journey from 'Tear down this wall' to 'We will build the wall' is an itinerary from expansive hegemony to retreating hegemony. The new borders the US faces in ending up on the world's Covid-19 travel red list (2020) are a history lesson.

Chapter 11 asks can a multipolar world be squeezed back into a bipolar order. Can rightwing populism and authoritarian governments turn the clock back on international order, standards of legitimacy and growing global connectivity? Can oligarchs and billionaires capture media, weaponize differences and inflame rightwing populism? Can conservative nationalism replace globalization? Is monoculturalism the future of multiculturalism? Are the premises and operations of conservative nationalism self-limiting? Are the 'barricades of nostalgia' conservative utopias that replace the erstwhile utopia of 'free markets'? Can the pot call the kettle black when the US accuses China of 'drowning countries in a sea of debt' and coercive conduct? Is the world in a tailspin of collective regression and deterioration? Which contemporary developments are short term, which are of medium-term significance and which represent long-term structural developments? Different types of market economies yield different kinds of populism. In each setting, the 'barricades of nostalgia' serve different purposes, such as shelter pluto-populism (US, UK), crony capitalism (Hungary, Czech Republic) or culture wars that consolidate conservative elites (India, Poland).

Is this an era of deglobalization or reorganization of globalization? The diverse responses to Covid-19 provide some of the answers. The overall momentum of connectivity and globalization leans toward widening cooperation, but this is not a linear forward process. Collective learning gradually shifts from territorial learning to encompass translocal learning, but this is not a linear forward motion. The quandary of global problems and national institutions is familiar. The problems of dealing with Covid-19 are an installment in a series.

To avoid each treatment turning into a world encyclopedia, the discussions of many themes in the book must be pointed, without being flippant or lightweight. It would not be difficult to multiply minutiae and references on each subject, but I exercise restraint; at times I refer to my own work also because it includes detailed discussion and references. Many themes in the book are live-wire problematics that are in flux. News sources and websites are in endnotes and books and journal articles in references at the end. To the Acknowledgments, I add, at the request of a PhD student, a brief bio note.

Note

[1] Edward Snowden, The year 2030, ***New York Times***, December 29, 2019.

Global Why

1

Overview

- How has globalization become a salient theme?
- While manifestations and expressions of globalization vary widely, underlying trends are world population growth, growing population density and growing connectivity.
- Trade and migration, conquest and pilgrimage produced geographical and cultural knowledge. Collecting global data is as old as the first charts of sea and land routes and world maps.
- What is the demand and what is the supply of global knowledge?
- Globalization involves long-term transformations as well as recent accelerations.
- Globalization gifts of art, technology and knowledge have long sprawled across regions and more recently, fashion, style, film and media worlds.
- Demands of globalization move up the ladder of attention, from foreign affairs to global problems.

How has globalization become such a salient theme? While manifestations of globalization vary widely, underlying trends that have long been in motion are world population growth, growing population density and growing connectivity. Connectivity has been growing since time immemorial. Trade and migration, conquest and pilgrimage required and generated geographical and cultural knowledge. Collecting global data is as old as the first charts of sea and land routes and world maps. This chapter gives an overview of global turns, considers premises of global thinking and establishes links between connectivity and globalization.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_1

Global Gifts, Global Demands

Global cultural interplay and mixing are as old as the hills and are ongoing and unstoppable. Fashion has long adopted styles and fabrics from across continents and regions, well beyond the ethnic chic and tribal turn of past decades. Multicentric couture goes back as far as the Roman Empire (assimilating Greek and Phoenician, Persian and Egyptian styles), the Middle Ages and colonial times. European football is huge in Asia and rising fast in China. The widening range of products available on supermarket shelves and the variety of culinary styles sprawls and follows people's travel habits. Medicine, healing and spiritual practices have long crossed civilizational boundaries. Apothecaries in medieval Europe carried a Moor's head as signboard to profile the oriental origins of medicinal herbs.

In art, biennales have proliferated across regions; new art markets, museums and galleries are mushrooming; fluctuating art prices reflect regional trends. Architects from across the world build iconic structures of a postnational character. Western architects design new mosques in Arab countries. New art venues give rise to new criteria of art (see Chap. 7).

Newsreel was multi-sited early on. Movies have increasingly become multi-sited, filmed in different countries with local actors, language, cultures (such as the Jason Bourne series and *The International*). Global movies have become a regular fixture. Multi-country filming started in spy and James Bond movies, spread to action movies, then moved across film genres and has become ordinary, also in TV production and Netflix (such as *Sense8* and *Money Heist*).

Media worlds have long sprawled across regions, not just BBC world radio, also film and TV with the popularity of Bollywood and Hong Kong martial arts movies in Africa, Turkish soaps in Saudi Arabia, Brazilian telenovelas in Latin America and Lusophone Africa and the Korean wave in East Asia. The K wave, Hallyu, in pop, soap operas, movies, TV shows, design and cosmetics is unstoppable. Bollywood and Hollywood have strengthened their cooperation. Hollywood now needs China for blockbuster box office numbers. Dalian Wanda has bought into Hollywood studios. The downstream production of books, film and media is increasingly decentered too.

While Amazon, Disney and HBO stream mainly American movie content, Netflix is a 'global platform'. Netflix's 'goal is to appeal to an increasingly global audience with an increasingly global slate'. Its shows are seen in more than 190 countries around the world. Netflix has production hubs in London, Madrid and Toronto and content teams on the ground in many other countries such as Mexico. According to the head of Netflix's non-English language original programming: 'when we go into a country, it really is about the storytelling—a creator with a vision from that country' (Lev-Ram 2018: 82). Netflix's programs have stirred local debates, in Argentina (a docu-drama about the death of attorney general Nisman), Brazil and India. A global platform that produces local stories with global production techniques and a global appeal is a novel kind of format and a harbinger of a new level of global consciousness.

Global production and value networks have proliferated since the 1980s as have global supply chains for retailers and supermarket chains (Carrefour, Tesco, Walmart). Digital tech facilitates long-distance communication, containerization lowers transport cost and jet air travel continues to expand. The salience of the global and the growth of global mixing is not just trendy; it is structurally embedded in the world economy.

Major structural changes have been at work at the same time, in particular population growth, urbanization (see Table 1.1) and technological change. Together these add up to a confluence that often goes under the heading of globalization, though much more is taking place. Globalization, then, is a stand-in for wider changes, an umbrella under which many changes are provisionally parked. These changes appear to be in overdrive especially since the mid-twentieth century. This is how people often view globalization.

Among major changes over recent decades, James Rosenau counts urbanization, greater mobility (travel, tourism, migration), education and environmental change. According to Rosenau, these changes give rise to a 'capacities revolution'. On account of increased information processing due to microelectronics, education, media, the growing complexity of large urban communities and growing mobility, a skills revolution is taking place. Dealing with greater urban and environmental complexity enhances intellectual functioning and induces 'a greater capacity to focus emotions' and a freeing up of the imagination. In his view, 'the skill revolution is world-wide in the sense that even as the analytically, emotionally, and imaginatively rich get richer, so do those who are poor in these respects get richer'. Part of this is

Table 1.1 World population growth, share of urban population and population density over time

Year	World population (millions)	Urban population (% of total)	World population density (inhabitants/km^2)[a]
1000	295[b]		1.98
1500	461[b]		3
1800	989[b]	2[c]	6.6
1900	1654[b]	15[d]	11.1
1970	3700[e]	36.5[f]	24.8
1980	4458[e]	39.2[f]	29.9
2000	6145[e]	46.5[f]	41.2
2017	7550[e]	54.2[f]	50.6

Sources:
[a]Calculations based on land area of the world, 148.94 million square km
[b]Goldewijk, K. K., A. Beusen and P. Janssen 2010 Long-term dynamic modeling of global population and built-up area in a spatially explicit way: HYDE 3.1, *The Holocene* 20: 565–573
[c]UN 2001 *Istanbul+5: Habitat Agenda*. New York, June 6–8. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/Istanbul+5/booklet4.pdf
[d]Spence et al. (2008)
[e]UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017 *World Population Prospects: the 2017 Revision* Vol 1. Available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf
[f]Figure is for 2016, World Bank

an 'organization explosion'—'the global stage has become ever more dense with actors' (Rosenau 1990: 61, 1011–1014).

Globalization, then, is a matter of long-term transformations as well as recent accelerations. Considering we talk about globalization on two wavelengths, short term and long term, we should probably call this a skills evolution. Population growth, urbanization and technological change have accompanied human evolution throughout history, though not in a linear fashion. Bronze Age technological evolution (the plow and animal traction) enabled a surge in agricultural productivity, which spurred population growth, trade and an urban revolution (Goody 2006). Thus, we can fine-tune the assessment as follows: (a) major structural changes go back at least 5000 years; (b) they have been marked by periods of acceleration, slowdown and breakdown; (c) they have been accompanied all along by skills evolution; (d) the past two centuries have been periods of major acceleration as well as the period since the 1970s, the time that Rosenau and many others talk about.

It is a truism that the twenty-first century is more saliently global than the preceding century, which is noticeable in virtually any sphere—in economics, finance, advertising, media as well as in culture, politics and social movements. The global isn't new in any of these domains and in some areas goes back for thousands of years, but its salience is new. Global awareness is more widespread than before, including awareness of global problems (climate change, epidemics such as HIV Aids, bird flu, coronavirus, crime syndicates, terrorism, marine piracy, multinational corporations and economic crises). Migration and emancipation movements of women, minorities and migrant workers shape new publics and make new demands on the public sphere under headings such as multiculturalism and diversity. While these concerns constitute the demand side of global knowledge, global studies is on the supply side.

According to Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook manifesto, Building Global Community, 'Our greatest challenges also need global responses—like ending terrorism, fighting climate change, and preventing pandemics. Progress now requires humanity coming together not just as cities or nations, but also as a global community' (Zuckerberg 2017). These are examples of the demands that the acceleration and growing density of global interdependence pose. Inequality, poverty, migration, surveillance, technologies such as 5G and drones, epidemics and Covid-19 are others.

In the old days, foreign affairs and diplomacy was an affair of gentlemen, often of aristocratic background. In medieval Europe, aristocracies intermarried across borders, dynastic marriages sealed the fate of kingdoms, aristocratic orders such as the Golden Fleece and the Order of the Garter glued aristocratic bonds and alliances. The Church clergy was 'transnational' and so were humanist scholars such as Erasmus and Renaissance artists such as Dürer. Trade alliances such as the Hanseatic League established commercial bonds.

The nineteenth-century rise of nation-states gave rise to 'foreign affairs'. In the course of the twentieth-century international affairs followed foreign affairs and was in turn succeeded by 'global affairs' and 'global issues'. Contemporary terminology has moved on to 'global problems'. The demands of the global keep moving up the ladder of attention. As we face global problems and challenges we do so mostly with national institutions. International institutions are underfunded and are

viewed as rivals by hegemonic powers. The chronic disparagement of the United Nations in American media and government is an example. Many problems are global, but media and public spheres are mostly national or provincial in outlook. We often face global problems with national or provincial attitudes.

Global Data

Social sciences and humanities fulfill service functions. They would not exist unless they meet social demand and provide interested parties with relevant information, perspectives and skills. This includes analytical functions and critique—which discuss which types of data are relevant, which categories, concepts and classifications matter, examine structures and institutions, and question epistemological premises and cultural assumptions. Global studies, likewise, meets a social demand. Adopting a sociology of knowledge approach, a sociology of global knowledge can start out by identifying the social demand that global knowledge seeks to meet.

The rise of global studies reflects the growing presence of the global. Simply count how often the adjective 'global' appears in news headlines and reports. Global studies reflect the growing pace, scope and intensity of global relations and effects. Global studies have been growing because of the exponential growth of global dynamics; it is a response to ramifying, intensifying and deepening processes of globalization. Global studies has been spreading because global relations and problems require a global approach, a need that is felt by governments, social forces, international organizations and corporations the world over.

In relation to this social demand, global knowledge represents the supply. We can distinguish three levels of global knowledge. The first level is global data and information per se; the wide array of diverse and sprawling data collected by all actors and institutions that have an interest in global information of some kind, such as international institutions, governments, corporations, social movements, media and foundations. Many data are collected to meet specific demand and are systematically organized according to limited purposes. Familiar sources of global data are the UN agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the CIA Fact Book, the Economist Intelligence Unit, regional development banks, university research centers, professional associations and so on. Other organizations and corporations seek global information of more specific types, such as the Peace research center in Oslo on conflicts and Oxfam International on inequality. In addition, media and literature supply data that are diverse and may be impressionistic and anecdotal. This basic level of global data is constantly growing, wide in scope and fragmented.

The second level consists of globalization research, which has mostly been organized according to social science and humanities disciplines' legacies and theories. The third level is global studies as the integration of these bodies of knowledge. In sum, the three levels of global knowledge are global data—wide, yet fragmented; globalization research—influenced by discipline demarcations and theories; and global studies—the integration of the above and an approach in its own right.

Table 1.2 gives a sketch of global data—indicative, not exhaustive. The first column lists the agency of social demand and the relevant type of data; the second

Table 1.2 Global data

Social demand	Global data supply
Governments	
Internationalization, geoeconomics, geopolitics, cross-border movements, cultural flows, refugees	Comparative politics; regulatory and legal regimes; security, conflict flash points; crime, terrorism, human trafficking; demographics, studies of religion; surveillance systems
International institutions	
Environment; resource use; international development; demography, migration, urbanization; international law, ICC, Interpol; disease, public health	Sustainability and climate studies; development data, statistics such as literacy rates, Human Development Index; migration studies; nodal cities, infrastructure, cartels, money laundering
Organizations	
Professional associations, think tanks, educational institutions	Specialist knowledge networks, international conferences, for example, physicians, epidemiologists, lawyers, security analysts, accountants, travel; higher education policies
Trade unions, ILO	Labor standards and regulations, labor rights regimes. Minimum wage, social protection floor
Media, ICT	
Markets, investments, cooperation, events	ICT hardware and use, satellites, fiber optic cables, regulatory regimes; media production networks, centers, flows
Sports	
International sports, Olympic Games, World cups, tournaments, sponsors, clubs	Global markets in soccer, golf, tennis, cricket; global talent searches
Art	
Auction houses, museums, dealers, collectors, artists, academies	Art markets, fairs, biennales, galleries, regional and transnational aesthetics, price trends and fluctuations
NGOs, social movements, foundations	
International NGOs. World Council of Churches, ecumenical organizations, World Social Forum	Aid policies and social demand; transnational activism, global reform from below, pressure points of social change; interfaith dialogue
Corporations	
Commodities, logistics, shipping, insurance. Global market share, joint ventures, global brands, advertising; offshoring, outsourcing, institutional arbitrage; technology, innovation, intellectual property, laws, piracy. Banks, hedge funds, institutional investors, credit rating agencies. World Economic Forum, Davos. Tourism, events management. Luxury goods markets, fashion, cosmetics	Transportation networks; financial fluctuations, currencies; price movements, regulatory regimes, business cultures; interlocking boards; patent regimes and enforcement; stock exchanges, credit ratings. Global culture, 'cool hunters', style; beauty pageants, contests. Luxury studies, global fashion.

column indicates the knowledge supply that seeks to meet this demand. Each of these could be detailed in many subsets but this only seeks to give an impression of the sprawl and diversity of global data. What is listed is a sample (being exhaustive would serve little purpose).

Global Narratives

Stories such as *A 1001 Nights* traverse worlds of space and imagination. Agatha Christie's classic thriller, *Murder on the Orient Express* and the movie versions owe much of their appeal to their traversing vast ancient lands. They are journeys that take us back to our subliminal memory and ancestral knowledge.

Among the 2500 books in Richard Wagner's library in Wahnfried, his house in Bayreuth, Bavaria, many are plays, comedies, literary classics, myths and legends. Wagner revived the idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art) and transformed opera from light entertainment to powerful cosmic battles of good and evil, against a backdrop of ancient myths and legends (Young 2014). Wagner's operas such as *Der Ring des Nibelungen* (1874) are preludes to Tolkien's *Lord of the Ring*, to *Star Wars*, the Harry Potter series, *Game of Thrones* and science fiction novels and movies that unfold at the edge of the abyss, the precipice of apocalypse. Thus, legendary tales of Manichean struggles between good and evil continue to shape fantasy and media worlds.

According to an advertisement page in *Fortune* magazine, 'With more data than ever before, what we need is intelligence'. 'Reveal the hidden patterns that will change your business' promises the ad of a research firm that uses a streaming infrastructure.

The issue in contemporary globalization is not data and knowledge. Data are plenty, facts abound and big data join world encyclopedias of information. Google, Wikipedia and encyclopedias are a click away. Data on global trade, investment, poverty, migration, disease and so forth are reported on a daily basis and in reports of international institutions and agencies such as the IMF, Oxfam International and WHO. The weak link in contemporary globalization is narratives that organize data and index information in meaningful ways. Without stories that integrate them in coherent wholes, facts are merely *faits divers* (a classic newspaper heading for assorted news tidbits). In his play *Six Actors in Search of an Author* (1921), Luigi Pirandello observes that facts by themselves are just empty sacks; they only stand up if they are filled with meaning.

Why narratives and not analyses? Because stories speak to emotion and imagination. Narratives focus on the mind. Stories form the psychosocial tissue that drives and enables social cooperation. All social cooperation needs stories that focus attention, motivate and organize social interaction. Stories function at all levels, family, local, national, regional and global.

As Ben Anderson observed, nations are 'imagined communities' that have been cobbled together by means of transport and print media, education and the invention of traditions (1983). Nations are narrations (Bhabha 1990). Likewise, globalization is an assemblage of stories. At times we experience globalization directly, as in travel, fast fashion and fast food on high streets, but we often experience globalization through representations of various kinds, media, movies, reports and metrics. As was the case with nations and other imagined communities, globalization comes to us in the form of crisscrossing stories. Our global coexistence is a salad bar of stories.

Take finance. Because finance relies on credit (belief) which is a function of reputation, it is fundamentally a matter of representations, such as analysts' reports, market data, newspaper reports, corporate gossip as well as the equations of quantitative investors. Securities and stock values, futures and derivatives largely unfold through stories and in the imagination (Cameron and Palan 2004).

Stories experience four seasons. They are sown, germinate, rise, peak, unravel and decline. There are always stories coming and going and crisscrossing on the way. Most conversations in the public sphere are the jostling of stories. Newspaper headlines launch storylines and pinprick storylines. Stories work cognitively, emotionally and imaginatively. For stories to motivate and carry social cooperation they must be repeated often (as in advertising), generate familiarity (a shared story) and be backed up by delivery (some kind of material record). Delivery and its assessment hinge on representations. Stories come in many guises, myths, fables, scriptures, fairy tales, folklore, rituals, ceremonies, traditions, ideologies, paintings, architecture, national anthems and symbols. 'Every picture tells a story'. No social gathering occurs without a storyline (a birthday, wedding, celebration, funeral), which also applies on wider scales. Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto, Gandhi's Salt March, the Muslim hajj, Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream', Nkrumah's pan Africanism and at an international level, the Cold War and domino theory are examples of collective narratives.

Stories also represent collective learning, from the invention of fire and Homer's tales onward. Growing connectivity means a growing demand for narratives that organize and give meaning to connectivity. 'All the world's a stage' has been true all along. Now more than before, it is a global stage.

What we now call globalization went under earlier headings such as 'internationalization' and 'interdependence'. The 1970s was an era of international reform proposals such as the New International Economic Order initiated by the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen (1976) and the New International Information Order endorsed by UNESCO. The pro-market turn of the 1980s sidelined these perspectives and gave rise to new global narratives. Keynesianism had replaced neoclassical economics, and efficient market theory replaced Keynesianism. The 'free market and democracy' and Washington consensus narratives gave cohesion to IMF (conditionalities) and World Bank programs (structural adjustment). The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the triumph of liberal democracy. For consumers this was to usher in an era of a 'borderless world' and 'the world as a global duty free store' (Ohmae 1992). These narratives inspired trade pacts such as the World Trade Organization and regional cooperation such as NAFTA and ASEAN. The Club of Rome brought ecological concerns and Limits of Growth to the foreground. Global narratives inspire institutions and organizations of cooperation. In the 2000s, the language of globalization became digital and metamorphosed as interconnectedness and connectivity.

A sample of collective stories is Table 1.3. The stories are broadly familiar. To each there are background stories and subplots as well as specific organizational initiatives and changes over time. It goes too far to discuss this in detail. The point is to illustrate the collective importance of stories in focusing and organizing

Table 1.3 Collective narratives—sample

Scale	Institutions	Narratives
Global	United Nations	Bretton Woods system, 1944 UN Charter, Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 New International Economic Order, 1974 UN Millennium Goals; Sustainable Development Goals, 2015 Paris Climate Accord, 2016
	International law	Nuremberg trial, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, War Crimes Tribunals
	GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1948–1995
	WTO	World Trade Organization, 1995
	Non-Aligned Movement	Bandung 1955, South-South cooperation
	Club of Rome	Limits to Growth, 1972
	NIEO	New International Economic Order, 1974
	G20	Global systemic crisis, 2008. Seoul consensus, 2011
	BRICS	South-South cooperation, 2001. New Development Bank
	Investment banks	Emerging market investment memes
	World Economic Forum	'As America retreats, China advances', Davos, 2017
	China, BRI	Belt and Road Initiative, 2013
Hegemonic	US (IMF, World Bank, GATT, WTO)	Cold War, domino theory, containment, rollback NATO, Marshall Plan, Alliance for Progress Free market and democracy. Efficient market theory Washington consensus, 1990s 'The end of history', liberal democracy triumphs, 1989 Clash of civilizations, 1993 America First, 2016
Regional	Regional integration	European Union, ASEAN, Gulf Cooperation Council, Mercosur, etc.
	Developmental states	Asian tigers, the East Asian miracle, 1993. Pacific century
	Asian values	Neo-Confucian ethic
	21C socialism	Cuba, Venezuela, Kerala
From below	Social movements, NGOs	Abolitionism, women's movements, working-class struggles, national struggles—19C Decolonization, Third World solidarity, 1968, peace movements, Via Campesina, battle of Seattle—20C Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, environmental justice, Extinction Rebellion, animal rights, Black Lives Matter—21C

attention, also on the global stage. National, regional and global cooperation all refer to 'imagined communities'. The overview omits local and national narratives, of which there are many.

While several of these stories claim global sway, they are mostly *regional stories* that seek to organize world order from the viewpoint of a zone or center of influence. Abundant knowledge of connectivity is available, but to access its meaning

often means to subscribe to one or other hegemonic narrative. Through the nineteenth century, the British Empire and Europe were major global storytellers—the Enlightenment, stages theories, progress, the civilizing mission, national sovereignty, modernity and so on. In the twentieth century, the 'American Century', the US was a major global storyteller, ranging from Washington to Hollywood and popular culture. Familiar storylines are modernization, Fordism, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Walt Disney, Barbie and CNN.

There were counter narratives to the Cold War (such as the Bandung conference of 1955, the Movement of Nonaligned Countries and the Tricontinental Movement, based in Havana). Counter narratives to globalization also emerged. Globalization was cast as neocolonialism, Americanization, Coca-colonization, McDonaldization, west-toxification (in Iranian views) and neoliberal globalization. Asian values, the neo-Confucian ethic, Islamic values and Latin American cosmovisions (such as the Zapatistas' Alliance of Hope and *buen vivir*) served as counterpoints.

In the twenty-first century, the tables have turned. Emerging societies and the global South *welcome* globalization and free trade while in the US and part of Europe globalization is often viewed with discomfort. Emerging societies provide new narratives such as the Seoul consensus (2011) and China's grand Belt and Road Initiative (2013), a new Silk Road. International institutions advance Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals and international cooperation advances accords such as the Paris Climate Accord. In the US, economic nationalism and 'America First', anti-immigration and demographic chauvinism are counter narratives to 'globalism'. Trade tariffs, securitization measures and border walls also emerge in parts of Europe (Chaps. 10 and 11).

Globalization, then, is a salad bar of stories that are different in different parts of the world, with different meanings and different time cycles. Each form of connectivity such as trade, finance, migration, military reach and big tech comes with winners and losers (the distribution of which changes over time) and is contentious. The assessment of gains and losses is itself a function of representations. Global narratives are not just descriptions but also prescriptions and arenas of contention. The social construction of reality also takes place on a world scale.

According to the Polish philosopher Henrik Skolimowski, for the 'participatory mind' evolution is taking a reflexive turn: 'we are evolution conscious of itself' (1994: 92). Our growing engagement with global trends and concerns, with global inequality, with not just national and regional but also global development, with climate change and species' futures signals 'evolution conscious of itself'. The notion of the Anthropocene marks a recognition of sapiens' impact on other species and the planet.

Cornerstones of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* are consciousness (Geist, spirit) and agency (the ability to act upon consciousness). Consciousness, awareness of what is going on in the world and agency are keynotes of what Hegel called the awakening of the spirit of history (Hegel 1840/2001). In this perspective, the difference between being an object of history and a subject of history is consciousness and agency. Observed Marx in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please… but under

circumstances existing already'. Claude Lévi-Strauss paraphrased: 'Men make their own history but they do not know they are doing it' (cited in Loyer 2018).

Are stories, also global stories, just-so stories or do they also represent collective learning? In a book on development theory I redefine development, not as improvement of living standards, enlargement of choices or enhancement of capabilities, but as a process of *collective learning*, socially distributed and shared trial and error processes (Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 191). Globalization, too, can be viewed as a process of collective learning and global narratives and global studies articulate this learning. One of the social demands that globalization makes is awareness of achievements and challenges of global coexistence, its historical depth and evolutionary momentum. Facing our global rendezvous consciously, part of reflexivity is recognizing the role of narratives of globalization, intellectually and emotionally. There is a narrative character and a collective imagination to our collective coexistence. Global awareness, of course, is also a story about stories. It features humanity as a subject of history, 'evolution conscious of itself'. A challenge of global consciousness is to examine global stories that meaningfully organize our collective experience. The chapters that follow explore this challenge.

Overview

- Many problems are global but media and public spheres are mostly national in outlook.
- Movements of women, minorities and migrant workers shape new publics and make new demands on the public sphere under headings such as multiculturalism and diversity.
- Global awareness is growing, including awareness of global problems.
- Levels of global knowledge are global data—fragmented; globalization research—demarcated by discipline outlooks; and global studies—the integration of the above.
- Global studies is a response to ramifying and deepening processes of globalization.
- The weak link in globalization is narratives that organize information in meaningful ways.
- We mostly experience globalization through media representations, reports and metrics.
- Globalization comes to us in the form of crisscrossing stories.
- Global narratives are often regional stories that portray the world from the viewpoint of a center of influence.
- Each form of connectivity comes with winners and losers and is contentious.
- Globalization is an assemblage of stories in different parts of the world with different meanings and time cycles. Global narratives are not just descriptions but also prescriptions and arenas of contention. Stories also represent collective learning.

Global How

2

Overview

- How to engage globalization? Research on globalization has been underway since the 1980s. Social sciences and humanities have developed global repertoires. Disciplines differ in emphasis, scope, definition and understandings of globalization. They differ in how they define globalization, the unit of analysis, key features and the timing of globalization. There is no consensus on the definition of globalization, its effects and timeline.
- Perspectives dominant in the 1990s have structured globalization discussions.
- In globalization studies social sciences and western scholars dominate, especially from the UK and the US.
- What is the case for global studies as a level beyond research on globalization?
- In global studies the global is the central focus, not the disciplines and their agendas.
- Global data are Global 1.0, globalization research is Global 2.0, global studies is Global 3.0.

Why engaging the global is necessary and welcome is easy to agree on; the salience of global trends is widely experienced. But *how* to engage the global is more difficult. It revisits intellectual terrains in which many have a stake. The elephant in the room is globalization. Research on globalization has been underway since the 1980s. Global studies builds on globalization research and the added value of global studies isn't always clear, even to its practitioners, and some question the rationale

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_2

of global studies. Don't social science, humanities and area studies study globalization already?

This chapter examines the case for global studies as a level beyond research on globalization. What sets global studies apart is that the global is the central focus, not the disciplines and their concerns. The first section addresses studies of globalization. The second section gives an overview of global studies, which is of recent vintage and uneven. Section "Spring Cleaning" undertakes spring cleaning to facilitate the step from globalization to global studies. The line of thinking is that global data are Global 1.0, globalization research is Global 2.0 and global studies is Global 3.0, level three of global awareness.

Globalization

Globalization emerged as a theme in the 1980s and rose steeply from the 1990s onward. Globalization literature now ranges well over 40 years. Social sciences and humanities have developed their global repertoires and profiles (as in global sociology, global history, global political economy, global economics, global finance, global anthropology, global geography, global media and communication studies, global art, global linguistics, etc.), which often means brushing up existing international or comparative study programs. Research on globalization is sprawling and extensive. It is uneven with paths well-trodden and roads less traveled. Research has been mostly anchored in social science and humanities disciplines. Another feature of globalization research is the theoretical overhang of the 1990s; perspectives and paradigms that were dominant in the 1990s have structured globalization discussions.

The disciplinary moorings of globalization research mean that economics of globalization is markedly different from sociology of globalization, cultural studies are quite different in their approach than international relations, and so forth. The disciplines tend to be different in how they define globalization, how they view the unit of analysis, what they view as key features, the timing of globalization and so on. There is overlap and crossover but discipline boundaries remain salient.

Compare approaches to globalization in different disciplines and glaring discrepancies are apparent. Books on and introductions to globalization written from the perspective of different disciplines differ markedly in emphasis, scope, definition and understandings of globalization, reminiscent of the situation of the blind men and the elephant. Thus, starting out from an international relations background, Jan-Aart Scholte defines globalization as the growth of *supraterritorial* relations, fundamentally different from Westphalian territorial sovereignty (2005). This is in stark contrast to geographers and anthropologists who view globalization in terms of global-local interactions.

Economists often define globalization as the *convergence* of economic conditions across borders. According to Gray, globalization is 'the similarity of economic conditions and policies across national boundaries' (Gray 1993: 38). This doesn't quite make sense because much cross-border economic interaction is prompted by

differences in conditions across zones, such as in wages, taxes, environmental and labor standards. Global value chains and corporate institutional arbitrage exist precisely because of such differences, so institutional and price *divergence* across economies is an important variable in global dynamics. Also in migration the divergence of conditions across borders is often a key variable.

These examples illustrate the unevenness of globalization studies and the extent to which they have been organized according to disciplinary conventions. In four decades of globalization literature, areas of consensus on globalization across disciplines have grown but controversies remain and new ones arise; overarching frameworks emerge but discrepancies between how disciplines view globalization remain distinct and sometimes glaring. There is no consensus on the definition of globalization, its effects and periodization (Nederveen Pieterse 2019).

Table 2.1 gives an overview of work on globalization in social science and humanities disciplines. Glaring differences in perspectives are visible at a glance. The first column lists the disciplines; the second column indicates the time according to which (the dimension of) globalization that is relevant for the discipline has started; additional periods refer to the emergence of subsequent themes. The disciplines are listed in the order of when they typically mark the start time of globalization. The third column

Table 2.1 Globalization according to disciplines

Disciplines	Time	Agency, domain	Keywords
Political science, international relations	1980	Internationalization of the state, international NGOs	Competitor states, postinternational politics, global civil society
Development studies		IMF, World Bank	Debt crisis, structural adjustment
Geography		Space, place, global and nodal cities	Glocalization, local-global interaction, migration
Economics	1970	MNCs, technologies, banks, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds	Global corporation, global value chains, world product
Cultural studies, comparative lit		Representations, stereotypes, aesthetics	Orientalism, McDonaldization, hybridization
Media studies		Media, ICT, film, advertising	Global village, Disneyfication
Philosophy	1950	Ethics, worldviews	Global ethics
Sociology	1800	Modernity	Capitalism, industrialism, nation-states, urbanization
Political economy	1500	Modern capitalism	'Conquest of the world market'
History, historical anthropology, archeology	3000 BCE	Population movements, trade, spread of technology, world religions	Bronze Age, scale of social cooperation, global flows, ecumene
Biology, ecology	Time	Integration of ecosystems	Evolution, global ecology, Gaia

Source: Adapted from Nederveen Pieterse (2019)

indicates the agency of globalization or the domain in which it unfolds; the fourth column gives keywords for typical areas of interest. The overview is indicative, not exhaustive. The bottom row of ecology, biology and geology situates processes in wider species, ecological, planetary and cosmic circumstances.

In some cases, there are multiple perspectives on and timelines of globalization *within* disciplines. In sociology, the periodization of globalization ranges from 1500 (world market), 1800 (modernity) to postwar times. In history, time frames range from 3000 BCE, 1000 BCE, 500 CE to 1500 (Chap. 5).

Table 2.2 gives an overview of how disciplines have contributed to globalization research according to lose criteria 'have written books with globalization in the title' or influenced globalization thinking in distinctive ways. The list is an overview to give a sense of how the field has developed and how interdisciplinary it is; it is not exhaustive. If our unit is 'world' rather than 'globalization' and we add

Table 2.2 Disciplines and scholars of globalization

Disciplines	Scholars
Sociology	R Robertson, I Wallerstein, A Giddens, U Beck, G Arrighi, J Mittelman, P Berger, W Bello, Z Bauman, A Dirlik, S Sassen, P Hirst, G Thompson, B Turner, R Holton, G Ritzer, J Henderson, C Enloe, B Axford, H Khondker, V Roudometov World: N Elias
Anthropology	M Sahlins, G Childe, J Goody, U Hannerz, A Appadurai, R Rosaldo, A Ong, J Ferguson
Political science	B Barber, F Fukuyama, M Juergensmeyer, J Frieden, M Steger, T Teivanen, S Huntington, M Mohanty
Economics	A Sen, J Tinbergen, J Stiglitz, J Bhagwati, M Wolf, P Krugman, L Summers, W Hutton, R Brenner, R Wade, G Soros, G Palma, B Milanovic, S Roach, R Sharma
Development studies	AG Frank, FH Cardoso, B Hettne, S Amin, D Rodrik, HJ Chang, D Nayyar, R Kaplinsky, J Friedmann, S Haggard
International relations	R Falk, D Held, M Kaldor, JA Scholte, J Ikenberry, J Hobson, P Khanna
History	AG Hopkins, B Mazlish, K Pomeranz, S Subrahmanyam, D Sachsenmaier, F Cooper, D Hoerder, AR Chaudhuri, J Abu-Lughod, M Middell, A Bailey, F Spier World: J Needham, A Toynbee, P Curtin, H Honour, W McNeill, M Hodgson
Geography	D Harvey, P Dicken, D Massey, J Peck
Archeology	J Jennings, N Purcell, MJ Versluys, M Pitts, T Hodos
Cultural studies, comp lit	EW Said, G Spivak, M Featherstone, R Gagnier
Art	H Belting, G Adam, C Duncan. World: R Wittkower
Finance, business, management	K Ohmae, J O'Neill, R Sharma, CK Prahalad, MA Witt, G Redding, M Pettis, Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey, Allianz
Journalism	T Friedman, F Zakaria, N Klein, R Kaplan
Institutions, social movements	D Della Porta, R Soborski, Forum on Globalization, World Economic Forum, World Social Forum, Oxfam International, Focus on the Global South, Transnational Institute, Third World Network

comparative studies from before the term 'globalization' was used we can add scholars such as Joseph Needham, Norbert Elias, Marshall Hodgson and Hugh Honour.

Several points stand out. Social sciences dominate, especially sociology; which is no surprise because sociology is the most interdisciplinary among social sciences. Western scholars dominate, especially from the UK and the US. As hegemons for 200 years their demand for global knowledge has been large and the global horizon of their institutions and media has been politically embedded. Non-western scholars are few; many have been preoccupied with national or regional questions, their immediate horizon of social demand for knowledge and detailed knowledge, which includes decolonization, neocolonialism and hegemonic ideologies. Interdisciplinarity in globalization research is high and references across disciplines are common.

Global Studies

Since the turn of the millennium, centers, programs and courses of global studies have been mushrooming across the world. They build on existing international relations and development studies programs and combine globalization studies in diverse disciplines. Conferences, associations and journals that are explicitly devoted to global studies—not just to globalization—have been growing in number as well.[1] Database searches with *global studies* as keyword give relatively few entries in 2018 (1140 in Google Scholar) rising to 6,170,000 in 2020, while the keyword *globalization* gives 2,470,000 entries in 2020.[2] Books with global studies in the title are few and are mostly introductory textbooks or readers (e.g. O'Byrne and Hensby 2011; McCarty 2012). This suggests that the intellectual profile of global studies is at a scaffolding stage and global studies programs, conferences and journals exist as scaffolding without a roof. Global studies as a synthesis with added value beyond globalization literature is work in progress.

At this stage, we can distinguish two accounts of global studies: an empirical account, that is a description of actual existing global studies, and an analytical or programmatic account, which refers to what global studies can or should be for analytical or other reasons.

Is global studies different from the earlier wave of research on globalization? Accounts of global studies often treat it as equivalent to studies of globalization (e.g. Roudometov 2012; Robertson 2012), which makes sense in that what is taught in global studies programs usually isn't different from studies of globalization. Yet, research on globalization is anchored in disciplines and global studies is conceived on a different footing. In global studies the global comes into its own; the world as a field of inquiry leads.

Global studies are different from globalization research just as *global sociology* differs from *sociology of globalization* and *global history* differs from history of globalization. In each case, 'global' refers to perspectives that incorporate a larger database and a wider angle of vision. Most sociology is national in scope and global sociology refers to broader premises and questions (Cohen and Kennedy 2007).

Most history has been national, regional or civilizational and global history represents a more comprehensive perspective, as do evolutionary and Big History (Hopkins 2002; Mazlish 2006; Spier 2010).

In part this is a matter of a wider database. The study of global social movements obviously covers a wider terrain and a different object of research than social movement studies. The global turn also involves analytical considerations. The study of global social movements involves different objects and perspectives than globalization *and* social movements (Cohen and Rai 2001; Hamel et al. 2001). Global studies, then, differs from studies of globalization just as sociology of economics (which applies standard sociological approaches to economics) differs from economic sociology (which incorporates economic analytics to develop a more refined approach). Another element is going beyond the international to the global level. International finance (finance in different nations interacting) differs from global finance (transnational financial interactions).

Because globalization is multidimensional, global studies is interdisciplinary. Global studies is kaleidoscopic, combines diverse disciplinary angles and seeks to offer panoramic views. Disciplinary perspectives on globalization are driven by each discipline's legacies. They concern political science *and* globalization, sociology *and* globalization, and so forth. Global studies aspires to be more comprehensive; the whole is more than the sum of the parts. By combining perspectives new understandings arise; by pooling disciplinary domains new knowledge platforms take shape. Global studies seeks to address dynamics of the Gestalt of the global, the global not just in its specifics but also in its overall shape.

Placing the global at the center of attention is a fundamental shift of perspective. In other approaches the global is at the margins; what leads are the disciplines and their conventions. Since the disciplines took shape in the nineteenth century, national preoccupations are in the forefront. History has long been national history, a history of statesmen and battles; history of regions (such as the Mediterranean world) and civilizations appeared much later (see Chap. 5).

For most of its career sociology has served national preoccupations with 'society' as stand-in for the nation-state as the framework of analysis (Wallerstein 2001). When the global leads it is the other way round: nations, regions, cities are stepping stones and nodes in unfolding global dynamics. Global studies is a recentering of social sciences—from the national to the macro-regional and the global; centers become peripheries. We find this transition in Ibn Khaldun's oeuvre, Marx's work on the world market, in studies of imperialism and decolonization, dependency and world-system studies. Going beyond methodological nationalism and the decentering of the state is common to all global approaches.

The nineteenth century was avowedly national in scope; the nation-state was the political form of nineteenth-century globalization (Robertson 1992; Harris 1990). The national market, national firms, national history, national politics, demography and culture were strategic and so was national knowledge. Nations held stereotypes of each other (Leerssen 2005). Note the work on 'national character' from the nineteenth century into the Second World War (such as Ludwig Klages' work and Ruth Benedict's book on Japan), approaches that now appear quaint and static. The

successor notion, 'national identity', is a frail category. Nowadays, the 'container' view of nation-states belongs to a bygone era.

Several themes transcended the nation all along—such as trade routes, religions, ethnicity, language, migration, conquest, empire, imperialism, slavery and race. 'Race' transcended the nation and served to rationalize plantation labor, colonialism and imperialism (Nederveen Pieterse 1989, 1992). The high tide of race thinking and 'race science' ranges from the 1840s to the 1940s with a longer career in the Americas and South Africa. Class and social struggles likewise point beyond national horizons.

Twentieth-century concerns gradually inched to the foreground—such as ideology and the bipolar conflict of the Cold War; development gradients of 'advanced' and developing countries; and regionalism as a new architecture of globalization (such as the European Union). Along with migration flows came cultural difference and multiculturalism. If from a national perspective, migration flows are phenomena at the margins, which may help or hinder national projects, from a global viewpoint they are central to shaping world relations; hence, the significance of diaspora studies. If from a national perspective, multinational and transnational corporations are sideshows, from a global point of view they are forces that drive global production networks. If from a national viewpoint, international law, international treaties and covenants are add-ons to national sovereignty and legislation, from a global viewpoint strengthening international law is central to the making of world order. 'World order' itself is a wider category than international order. The logic of expanding scale can be extended to virtually any domain, such as social movements, NGOs and art.

Macro approaches such as world-system studies represent intermediate stages in-between national and global perspectives. Another intermediary perspective is the network approach, as in Michael Mann who defines societies as densities in social networks, Castells' network society, peer-to-peer networks and Internet and communication studies (Mann 1986; Castells 1996; Benkler 2006; Lovink 2012). Migration, diaspora and border studies are at the margins of national approaches. Transnationalism, a perspective developed in international migration studies, refers to domains that overlap with the global (Vertovec 1999; Khagram and Levitt 2008).

In many spheres such as art, architecture, music and fashion, national knowledge has gradually folded into international and transnational domains. While modern art holds national connotations it is a transnational phenomenon, as a stroll through any modern art museum shows. The postmodern turn in architecture, art, style and philosophy is postnational in character. Major art fairs, biennales and auctions have become global markers. In film and video, international festivals (such as Cannes, Berlin, Venice and Amsterdam) have likewise become markers. In art, interest has shifted over time from sacred, court and classical art to national art and to modern and contemporary art, which are transnational in character (see Chap. 9).

A potential keynote of global 3.0 is concern with dynamics that are difficult or impossible to map or understand *other than* through global studies, a stronger claim than simply meeting the demand for addressing new global tropes. Examples are studies of risk and complexity (Beck 1999; Urry 2003). Examples of complex

entanglement in global political economy are the Pacific economies and formations such as 'Chamerica'; in global finance, the vast ecosystem of central banks, investment banks, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, offshore finance, tax havens, trading floors, brokerages, stock and commodities exchanges; in climate change, the intersections of economic growth, consumerism (rising in emerging economies), technologies of sustainability (renewable resources, energy efficiency, recycling), regulation and inequality (Pansters 2008); with regard to global reform, institutions and actors operate at multiple levels.

Development studies is problem-oriented (responsive to social and political demand) and policy-oriented (don't just criticize, propose alternatives) and implies comparative studies. Global studies is problem-centered as it is driven by social demand for addressing pressing global issues. Policy-oriented strands are articulated in adjacent terrains such as macroeconomic policy, global public goods and global governance (e.g. Stiglitz 2006; Kaul et al. 2003). Further extensions are global futures and shaping globalization (Nederveen Pieterse 2000). Specialist terrains such as environmental studies, human genome research, disease, demography and security studies intersperse with global studies.

Occasionally one hears that 'one should never study something with the word "studies" in it'. The reasoning is that 'studies' lack the structure, depth and craft of the disciplines. Consider the wide array of studies (international studies, development studies, area studies, urban studies, peasant studies, border studies, world-system studies, cultural studies, media, film, communication studies, gender studies, feminist studies, ethnic studies, black studies, Native American studies, Chicano studies, postcolonial studies, diaspora studies, transnational studies and so forth) and they all concern *new objects of study*, domains or subjects and sensibilities that did not exist or were not recognized at the time when the disciplines took shape, largely in the nineteenth century.

A discipline is a field of study (with a community of scholars, a distinctive terrain and principles and methods of research), so disciplines and studies are actually broadly synonymous. The distinction runs essentially between early and latecomers, a matter of seniority. The early comers claim to be foundational while the latecomers claim new objects of study. The studies often exist in an uneven (sometimes fraught) relationship with the disciplines because the new domains are *also* studied in the disciplines (e.g. sociology of culture) where they broaden and rejuvenate the disciplines, while studies often breakdown according to disciplines (such as development economics, development sociology, urban anthropology). The rationale of the studies is that the disciplines fall short because the field of study requires an interdisciplinary approach and involves agency and subjectivity that is marginalized in established academe, as in the case of women, gender, minorities and migrants.

Unlike the disciplines, studies lack a canon, or there is unevenness in what is recognized as expert knowledge if only because of the newness of the field. The studies lack a recognized place in academia where the disciplines occupy the main arena and act as gatekeepers for newcomers. Hence, studies are often introduced first at young or newcomer universities that cannot compete with the established universities in the disciplines but can attract faculty and students in new terrains. At American

university campuses studies are often housed in annexes off the main quad (just as in supermarkets 'ethnic foods' have often been located in add-on aisles).

The studies have often been innovative and have introduced new theories and methodologies earlier than the disciplines precisely because they are unconstrained by the disciplinary canon; operating from the margins they carry less burden and are more mobile. Thus, feminist studies embraced and contributed to postmodern approaches earlier than many disciplines and introduced alternative epistemologies such as standpoint theory. In knowledge as in society, revolutions and paradigm shifts take place more often from the margins than from the center (Kuhn 1962). The major rationale of the studies is that they represent a more advanced level of integration of knowledge than the disciplines: they proliferate at the same time and by the same logic as the disciplines fracture into multiple subfields.

Global studies shares features with other studies—global studies is new, interdisciplinary, innovative and uneven. Its object of study is also researched in the disciplines, under the heading of globalization, a field that, arguably, has been colonized by the disciplines. If we examine actual global studies as it is researched and taught at universities across the world it mostly consists of a bricolage of globalization and international studies, in which disciplines dominate according to how the program has come about and which group of faculty initiates the global studies program. Global studies programs usually refurbish existing international programs and cluster existing transnational studies to partake of the momentum of the global heading. They are usually pragmatic local improvisations rather than theoretically honed projects. To the extent that globalization research is Eurocentric, presentist and stuck in disciplinary grooves, global studies is apt to reproduce these features; however, an analytical and programmatic account of global studies may point to further directions.

Spring Cleaning

What should be kept from four decades of globalization research, what should be left behind? This is stepping into a minefield, like removing statues from public squares or redecorating palaces. What are the criteria? Learning is a cooperative exercise, part of collective reflexivity, particularly if we accept that 'globalization is evolution conscious of itself'. This exercise involves essentials of global consciousness and is part of the step from social theory to global theory.

Isaiah Berlin divided thinkers in two categories: hedgehogs and foxes. Hedgehogs typically know one thing deeply, a field of specialization, a paradigm, a defining idea, while foxes draw on a wide variety of experiences and know many things (Berlin 1953).[3] Global studies is typically a field of foxes. When scanning geographical horizons, probing ideas and perspectives across diverse settings and historical periods, what paradigms survive? In the face of comparative studies and historical and geographical variation, single defining ideas fall by the wayside. Paradigms give way to metaphors. Hence, to clear the way for global studies the disputes are typically with hedgehog favorites, the major paradigms. The whale in the ocean of globalization research is global capitalism, which is part of the shadow

of the 1990s, along with hegemony and postcolonial studies. These perspectives must be taken up for a discussion of how to engage the global to proceed.

Nine scholars commented on my paper 'What Is Global Studies?' and global capitalism was the most salient theme and counterpoint. Several colleagues argue that global studies is not and does not need to be distinctive from globalization research (Habib Khondker, James Mittelman, Kevin Archer, Manfred Steger) and refer to global capitalism and world-system theory (Khondker 2013; Mittelman 2013; Archer 2013; Steger 2013; Axford 2013b).

Habib Khondker takes the rise of global studies back to Marx, Marxist economists and Wallerstein. In his view, 'the logic of economic system has been world-systemic since the birth of capitalism'. I disagree on several points. Starting the rise of the global with the birth of capitalism is a Eurocentric fallacy and a classic, narrow version of Global 2.0. Studies of conquest (Herodotus, Thucydides, Plutarch), empire (Tacitus, Gibbon), trade routes (Pirenne, Braudel), civilization, knowledge, religion (Jaspers, Toynbee, Weber, Tawney, Needham, Sahlins, McNeill, Goody), migrations and diasporas (Curtin, Hoerder) take us deeper back in time, are arguably just as relevant and have deep research lineages. As an aside, it is interesting to note how many medieval Arab scholars are known as the founders of fields (al-Zahrawi, the 'father of modern surgery', Alhazen, the 'father of modern optics', Averroes, the 'father of rationalism', Ibn Khaldun, the father of sociology, etc.). In other words, there probably is life before capitalism.

According to Khondker, 'theories of globalization were built on the macro-theories of social change. "Globalization can best be understood as a reaction to and elaboration of two main sociological approaches: the world systems and the modernization approaches (Nas 1998: 182)"'. To the extent that this is true for sociology it is, in my view, part of the problem and exemplifies the fallacies of globalization studies: sociological perspectives are taken as yardsticks of the global; second, the approach is theory-led; third, it introduces two ruptures, the sixteenth-century 'birth of capitalism' and modernization with Enlightenment antecedents. This illustrates how disciplinary perspectives mortgage globalization thinking.

James Mittelman takes the same point of departure: 'global and globalization studies concern the dynamics of capitalism in all its varieties and in sundry domains'. The same criticism applies: this perspective is narrow in principle and Eurocentric and presentist in application. The general rule is the later the timing of globalization, the more Eurocentric the perspective. Capitalism and modernity are cornerstones of Eurocentric history; they place two caesuras in history, 1500 and 1800, which both cast Europe as the lead actor of 'modern history'.

According to Mittelman, 'Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin's *The Making of Global Capitalism* (2012) skillfully explains the intricate connections between capitalism and the US state, which, they maintain, serves as an informal empire and superintends the restructuring of other states'. This reiterates the focus on capitalism, elevates it to global capitalism and twins it with the trope of American hegemony. This short circuits the entire discussion. In a single sweep, globalization = capitalism = global capitalism = American hegemony. This is both thoroughly conventional (40 years of, by now, clichés passing as frontier knowledge) and

counterproductive. Instead of problematizing the global, we get it wrapped and delivered in an all-in-one package. Viewing globalization as driven by American hegemony works for the second half of the twentieth century, but not for contemporary trends such as the rise of East Asia, China and the BRICS. If American hegemony were sufficient as an analytic, why do we now have the G20? Mittelman pleads for globalization studies that are critical, reflexive, historicist, decentered and engage strategic transformations (2004: 224–225). In my view, this should include problematizing capitalism as a category and include epochs prior to the sixteenth century.

If, according to Kevin Archer, globalization research is superior to global studies because it is theorized, it probably matters what kind of theory. World-system analysis is an amalgam of Marxism, dependency theory and Braudel, which represent different theoretical outlooks. Which then is the superior perspective? If 'the logic of capitalism' is central (according to Harvey, Dirlik and others), what is it? Of course, globalization is often equated with economic globalization and capitalism, no wonder this is a hot potato. Since the 'logic of capitalism' leads in many perspectives it is worth spelling out the questions this poses.

First, why privilege capitalism? As mentioned earlier, long-distance trade and trade routes long predate capitalism; migrations and diffusion of knowledge, technology, culture and religion range wider and without them 'modern capitalism' could not exist or function. Thus, singling out capitalism as take-off point of the global implies a contradiction because it presupposes infrastructures that are prerequisites for the rise of capitalism.

Second, if capitalism is taken as the takeoff of the global, *when* did capitalism begin, in the 1500s, following Marx and Wallerstein, in the 1100s, following Braudel and Abu-Lughod, or earlier still (following Frank, Gills and Hobson)? As Abu-Lughod, Chaudhury and others show, the Levant trade was an extension of other trade circuits of the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Straits and beyond to the China Seas.

Third, this refers to capitalism in which sense? Braudel viewed capitalism as the domain of monopolies and rent seeking, perched above the market economy, a view that differs markedly from mainstream economics (1980). Braudel disagreed with Wallerstein's preoccupation with the 'long sixteenth century'. In later work, Andre Gunder Frank proposed abandoning the category capitalism altogether and rather focus on trade routes, shifting centers of accumulation and hegemony (1996).

Fourth, is capitalism a singular construct, or should we rather speak of capitalisms plural? If we assume the singular it means in effect to marginalize the contestations between and within capitalisms. Mittelman mentions capitalism and its varieties, but what is the status of the varieties? Recent work deals with 'variegated capitalism' and uneven neoliberalization (Peck and Theodore 2007; Brenner et al. 2010), which are nuanced perspectives but still take neoliberalization as the overriding logic, with unevenness in the margins and specifics. Is there then a single overriding logic of capitalism with varieties on the side? The upshot is that many accounts capture neither the diversity of capitalisms nor the frictions between capitalisms. Thus, according to several scholars (Harvey 2005; Dirlik 2000), contemporary China is a franchise of neoliberalism, but this is widely disputed (Arrighi 2007; Redding and Witt 2010; Brink 2013).

A related thesis is 'neoliberalism everywhere' (Peck and Tickell 2002). How then can we analyze differentiation? Take the European Union. One of the problems of the EU, besides uneven development, is that it includes different capitalisms—liberal (the UK, until Brexit), coordinated market economies (Germany, Nordic Europe, France), Mediterranean and East European market economies, and difficult balancing acts for Brussels and the European Central Bank. Which, then, is 'the logic of capitalism'? In the austerity-stimulus debates (Blyth 2013), which is 'the logic of capitalism'? Using the plural, *logics* of capitalisms is the smarter option.

Fifth, is global capitalism a valid category? If we assume the singular and add the global (the modern world-system, global capitalism, the capitalist system, etc.), the implication is convergence theory. The category global capitalism by its nature focuses the attention on *dominant* capitalism. If we vehemently reject convergence theory in modernization theory, in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative' and in the Washington consensus, why should we welcome it back at a conceptual level in categories such as global capitalism? If we reject convergence theory as a hegemonic cliché on the right, why should we applaud and embrace it on the left? Global capitalism assumes a view from the center with convergence built-in. But what if the momentum and center of hegemony is shifting, as they have since the late twentieth century and the 2008 crisis? If capitalism is a single global system, the dominant form of capitalism, neoliberalism, is the global standard, economies converge on this model and therefore a crisis in the dominant zone is a global crisis. If, however, the 1997–98 crisis in East Asia was deemed an 'Asian crisis', why should we treat crisis in the US and Europe as a global crisis, rather than as a *regional crisis* with global spillover? If the 2008 crisis is a global crisis, a view such as Wallerstein, 'the world economy won't recover, now or ever' follows (Wallerstein 2011). Capitalism-apocalypse has been a dominant leftwing mood since Marx and Engels in 1848. Capitalism in the singular, reified and elevated as global capitalism, shuts out the possibility of alternative capitalisms. In emerging economies and developing countries the talk is of state capitalism, entrepreneurial states, developmental state capitalism and contender state-societies (Bremmer 2010; van der Pijl 2012), but if the premise is convergence thinking, does this matter? Much work on capitalism explores varieties and byways, but more conventional work takes shortcuts.

Global studies has arrived at the introduction, textbook, encyclopedia and handbook stage and has become a fixture in the social science landscape. The proliferation of global studies centers is part of this momentum. To firmly anchor itself in academe global studies needs a shared matrix of definition, periodization, methodology and approach, a catechism. According to the Global Studies Consortium, the global studies subject matter is transnational, contemporary and historical; the approach is interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, critical, multicultural and globally responsible (Juergensmeyer 2012).

This is basic scaffolding and several dimensions require more work. One issue is the shadow of the 1990s. Many textbooks on globalization have a 1990s feel and sensibility. They exhibit a 1990s outlook, a world in which neoliberal globalization and American hegemony are defining parameters and criticizing the IMF and World Bank opens doors. Dislocations of the 1990s such as post-Fordism, informatization,

the digital turn, the opening up of the Soviet bloc, China and India, which added three billion workers to the workforce of transnational capitalism were major (Rosenberg 2000; Prestowitz 2005; Axford 2013a: 17–18). Absent or underrepresented in these accounts are emerging economies as twenty-first-century drivers of the world economy, the rise of South-South relations and momentous shifts in global problematics (Nederveen Pieterse 2011, 2018a).

Alongside American capitalism, *American hegemony* is part of twentieth-century legacies. Hegemony has lost weight since the Washington consensus, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the 2008 crisis and the Trump administration. It experiences an afterlife in legacies of liberalism and *'liberal world order'*. While the post-American world has become a familiar trope, the 'liberal world order' may be one of the last vestiges of hegemony. Liberal order is the language of the Council of Foreign Affairs and Chatham House in London, an elective affinity that goes back to the 1890s (Nederveen Pieterse 1989). It matches the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights, with a twist—in that notions of liberalism and liberal order are also a ground zero of hegemony.

The political underpinning of these notions is liberal democracy, based on the rule of law and individual rights. With it come distinctions such as liberal versus illiberal and authoritarianism versus democracy. This terminology is common fare in the UK and the US, but not in continental Europe. Leading political formations in Europe are social or Christen democracy and green parties, and liberal parties are typically right of center pro-business parties that favor low taxes. Also rightwing parties often flag freedom or liberal in their name. Here the undertone of 'liberal' is curb government. In Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, the term liberal rarely comes up, besides occasionally in Commonwealth countries. Ideas of a rules-based international order, based on international law and international institutions, are shared worldwide. International order framed as liberal order has narrower currency, is a language of journals such as *Foreign Affairs* and in NATO and Atlanticism (in Europe, pro-NATO and pro-American politicians are often referred to as 'Atlanticist'). An issue of *Review of International Political Economy* is devoted to 'China's rise in a liberal order in transition' (Graaff et al. 2020). This framing, especially when it concerns China's rise, carries a mortgage. Like other vestiges of American hegemony, liberal order is due for spring cleaning.

American hegemony is layered. The American 'empire of bases' includes about 700 bases in 130 countries, 6000 bases in the US and its territories, extensive security and intelligence networks (such as the Five Eyes of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), NATO and other allies (Johnson 2004; McCoy 2017). Elsewhere I discuss liberalism and hegemony (Nederveen Pieterse 2004b, 2015b, 2017, 2019); here a few points are relevant.

National security states, established with US military support during the Cold War as bulwarks against the communist danger, have been typically illiberal, repressive (see Chap. 11). One of the bloodiest episodes was the 1965 military coup in Indonesia in which about a million civilians were massacred. Other Cold War allies, conservative governments such as Saudi Arabia and security allies such as Israel have not been liberal either.

The liberal international order is perched on top of these foundations. International institutions that the US helped to build it has in later times sidestepped or treated instrumentally (we support them if they go our way, Nederveen Pieterse 2008). Since the 1980s American liberal democracy has turned into, in shorthand, neoliberal democracy. The Washington consensus was an international expression of this dispensation; and government rollback also meant rollback state power: recruit states into the American orbit, or weaken them. Intelligence agencies across the world are familiar with the dark side of American hegemony, but American media are mostly familiar with the cheerleading side of American leadership. Corporate media and Hollywood are part of this framework. American universities may often be part of this order, wittingly or unwittingly, part of the military-corporate-tech-universities-media constellation (see Chap. 8). In Vincent Bevins' words, 'The "liberal world order" was built with blood'.[4] Against this backdrop the liberal order is a diversion, a smoke screen. Recognizing this is part of 'global literacy' and global awareness.

This also matters in relation to *postcolonial studies*. The world has not left the colonial era behind; its political vestiges and cultural ghosts linger on. We inhabit postcolonial times in a formal sense (independent nations) but not necessarily in an informal sense. Cultural shadows of colonial times remain. Britain is steeped in imperial nostalgia. The US is 'addicted to primacy' along with the hubris according to which this is necessary and a good idea. Even though book knowledge has long found 'race' and similar categories dead, emotional and street knowledge straggle behind. 'Internal colonialism' in postcolonial nations, the oppression and harassment of minorities and subalterns continues on, hence, there is a pressing need for postcolonial and subaltern studies.

Postcolonial studies is also part of a global crossroads. Global hegemony is crumbling, yet colonial nostalgia and the collective sleepwalking of hegemony linger on. Also in a multicentric world, a hegemon in retreat can inflict great damage. In postcolonial studies, ongoing developments and developments of past decades are often understood as extrapolations of colonialism, imperialism and hegemony and are viewed through the lens of dependency theory. Core preoccupations of postcolonial studies—orientalism, colonial tropes, race, Eurocentrism, modernism—refer to earlier cycles of globalization. Postcolonial studies is a cleanup of colonial vestiges, a necessary rearguard cleanup, yet also stuck in a groove. Postcolonial studies is often long on theory and normative in tone. Missing in Edward Said's work is political economy, as in his book *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), as a recent study observes (Abu-Manneh 2020). Guiding themes and sensibilities of postcolonial studies belong to earlier cycles of globalization (Slater 2004; McLennan 2013; Dabashi 2015). Postcolonial studies targets North-South relations at a time when East-South relations have in several respects taken over and occupy the foreground. According to critics in the 1980s and 1990s (such as Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia), globalization is neocolonialism and recolonization by another name, a polemical simplification. The Cold War left a legacy of security states and concentration of power in the military and intelligence in many regions (Central America, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Middle East). Security states in league with old and new elites are often a more pressing problem than North-South relations (see Chap. 11).

Some limitations of postcolonial studies parallel limitations of global consciousness.

Multiple cycles lie behind us. Colonialism was followed by decolonization, the Cold War, neocolonialism and dependency thinking, and next by the rise of New Industrializing Economies (NIEs), global value chains and the Washington consensus. The 1990s Tiger economies profiled the rise of Asia that went further in the 2000s with emerging societies, the rise of China and the BRICS. Arguably, postcolonial studies is several cycles behind. According to critics now, the role of China, India and other emerging societies in developing countries is neocolonialism or recolonization by another name—in the form of land grabs, debt-infrastructure traps and new geographies of dependence that are geared to Chinese or Indian interests. The burdens of past colonialism remain meaningful but are no longer cutting edge. A forward perspective is analysis of practices of emerging societies, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative and India's ventures in Africa.

These considerations clear some of the way forward for global studies. Chapter 3 is an overview and Chap. 4 takes up problems, old and new, that global thinking encounters and discusses further ways forward.

Overview

- Globalization is multidimensional, therefore global studies is interdisciplinary.
- Placing the world at the center of attention is a major shift of perspective.
- Going beyond methodological nationalism and decentering the state is common to all global approaches.
- The studies compared to the disciplines concern new objects of study, domains or subjects that did not exist or were not recognized at the time when the disciplines took shape. Studies have often been innovative and introduced new theories and methodologies.
- Studies represent a more advanced level of integration of knowledge than the disciplines.
- Like other studies global studies is interdisciplinary and innovative.
- Global studies has become a fixture in the social science landscape. Actual global studies programs are often a bricolage of globalization and international studies.
- Spring cleaning: from four decades of globalization research what should go?
- Spring cleaning: global capitalism, American hegemony and postcolonial studies.
- Starting globalization with the birth of capitalism is a Eurocentric fallacy. Unitary notions of capitalism are limiting. Limitations of postcolonial studies are lack of political economy and focus on North-South relations in an increasingly East-South world.

Notes

1. Conferences include the Global Studies Association, based in the UK and North America, the Global Studies Consortium of global studies graduate schools and the annual Global Studies conference (disclosure: I am on the board of GSA North America, have attended meetings of the Global Studies Consortium and have been lead organizer of seven annual Global Studies conferences).
2. Globalisation: 49,000 (March 2018). A Melvyl database search gives 759 entries for global studies (2012) and 3855 (2018) and for globalization 63,681 (2012) and 140,333 plus 49,378 for globalisation (2018). Google Trends shows the relationship between globalization and global studies over time, with global studies emerging and remaining at a constant low level since 2004 http://www.google.com/trends/?q=global+studies,+globalization&ctab=0&geo=all&date=all&sort=0.
3. Quoting Wikipedia: 'Hedgehogs view the world through the lens of a single defining idea examples given include Plato, Lucretius, Dante Alighieri, Blaise Pascal, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henrik Ibsen, Marcel Proust and Fernand Braudel), while foxes draw on a wide variety of experiences and the world cannot be boiled down to a single idea examples given include Herodotus, Aristotle, Desiderius Erasmus, William Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, Molière, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Aleksandr Pushkin, Honoré de Balzac, and James Joyce)'.
4. Vincent Bevins, 'The "liberal world order" was built with blood', *New York Times*, May 31, 2020.

Forty-Four Theses on Globalization

3

These propositions give an overview of key concerns. They are summary statements of issues raised earlier, alternative views in relation to conventional perspectives and set the stage for subsequent discussions. They are propositions for the sake of clarification, concern questions of perspective and method and are not comprehensive. A section deals with historical and contemporary trends.

1. Globalization is the trend of greater worldwide connectivity of people over time and the awareness of this happening.
2. Globalization is a process, not a condition or outcome (which is globality).
3. Since it is an ongoing process, globalization is open-ended.
4. Since connectivity takes myriad forms, so does globalization.
5. Globalization involves the widening scale of social organization over time, though not as a linear forward process.
6. Globalization enables widening cooperation as well as widening competition.
7. Globalization is an objective, empirical (growing connectivity) and subjective process (the awareness of greater connectivity). Objective dimensions include migration, transport, navigation, trade, communication and information and communication technology (ICT). Subjective elements include attitudes, norms, institutions, worldviews and world religions.
8. Connectivity doesn't function without accompanying changes in culture and subjectivities, the more so when connectivity becomes increasingly dense and complex.
9. Connectivity involves synchronization, the material and subjective experience of contemporaneity. The *how* of connectivity—by migration, trade, conquest, pilgrimage or emulation—shapes the *how* of synchronization. For instance, trade religions such as Buddhism and Islam functioned differently than Christianity. Roman Catholicism inherited empire, undertook crusades and was an extension of conquest (the Reconquista of Spain) so it often operated as a

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_3

conquest religion (such as the Catholic Church in Latin America and Jesuits in sixteenth-century Japan).
10. Globalization is multidimensional and unfolds simultaneously in technology, economics, culture, social life, politics, art and design, philosophy and ethics.
11. Dimensions of globalization include a *process*; an *ideology*, globalism; a *discourse*, global babble; a *condition,* globality; and *projects* that seek to shape directions of globalization.
12. There are as many globalization projects as there are conscious agents, such as empires, hegemons, states, transnational corporations, international institutions, interest groups, transnational NGOs and social movements.
13. Globalization is layered with changes unfolding in different spheres that move at different speeds and in different bandwidths. One-dimensional and linear accounts of globalization are inadequate.
14. *Objects* play a significant part in connectivity; they enable connectivity (such as navigation instruments, telegraph, radio, radar and GPS), motivate connectivity (such as jade, tin, amber, salt, sugar, spice, silk, fossil fuels and cobalt) and give shape to globalization. Without the tea imports of the British Empire there would be no 'cup of tea' in Britain (Mackenzie 1986).
15. The pace and rhythms of globalization are affected by communication and transport technologies, trade routes, security conditions, centers of hegemony, economic conditions and cultural subjectivities.
16. Globalization is not a linear forward process; there are phases of acceleration as well as deceleration of globalization.

Examples of phases of *acceleration* are the Greco-Roman world, the Middle East caravan trade, the Mongol Empire, Zheng He's maritime voyages, the Levant trade, the spice trade, Europe's journeys of reconnaissance, the triangular trade, colonialism, the Pax Britannica and technological advances such as the steamship, containerization, integrated circuits in production that enabled global value chains. *Slowdowns* of globalization occur due to breakdowns of security (such as the fall of the Roman Empire), war, depression (such as the 1930s Great Depression) or disease. The black plague arose from increasing trade between Asia and Europe via the Crimea and halted East-West connections for some time (McNeill 1977). Covid-19, another slowdown of connectivity, involves restrictions on travel and reviewing supply lines.

17. Globalization is a multidimensional and dialectical process. Slowdown in one sphere can be accompanied by acceleration in another. Nativism and nationalism can resist connectivity in one sphere (such as immigration) while it is being pursued in other spheres (such as trade, finance, corporate mergers and acquisitions).
18. Different stakeholders hold diverse perspectives on globalization. Different social sciences and humanities shed light on different dimensions of globalization according to disciplinary concerns.

19. Areas of consensus and controversy in studies of globalization depend on stakeholder perspectives, disciplines, ideological leanings and worldviews.
20. Globalization includes processes of borders bending and borders hardening, borders dissolving and new ones emerging.
21. Taking one strand or level of globalization and assuming that what pertains there applies to all of globalization is scale inflation. Actual globalization is layered and comes in mega, large, medium and small. Just looking at peak globalization, such as mega corporations, as stand-in for the whole is a caricature of globalization.
22. Ulrich Beck distinguished between c*osmopolitanization* as an empirical, factual process of greater cross-border connectivity and *cosmopolitanism* as a normative outlook (2004).
23. Phrases such as 'the impact of globalization on' are usually misrepresentations because they cast globalization as a force *external* to circumstances that are already part of globalization.
24. Globalization, a concept, is not an agent. Globalization is a summary description of wide processes in the context of which agents act and dynamics unfold.
25. Cultural changes usually unfold at a slower pace (except in popular culture) than technological and economic changes while the pace of political changes varies (politics and policies can change rapidly, institutions change slowly).
26. Media accounts of globalization are often patchy approximations based on aggregates, attempts at mapping that scratch the surface and represent vortices by means of schemas.
27. Perspectives on globalization have often been *centrist*—understood in terms of a leading center (such as Eurocentrism and America-centrism). Yet through history, periods of multiple centers and powers coexisting have been more frequent and lasted longer than periods of hegemony.
28. Actual globalization is made up of many intersecting, overlapping circles or spheres of influence, each with different centers, organizing logics, worldviews and balancing acts.

History

29. Globalization as lasting and wide-ranging connectivity goes back to the world's first extensive sustained trade links, which date from the Bronze Age, 3000 BCE. In the Stone Age there was long-distance trade in obsidian, centered on Catalhöyuk, Anatolia (5000 BCE), but while this trade was extensive it only concerned a single commodity.
30. A rapid expansion of trade networks, a 'commercial revolution' took place from 1000 BCE, stretched across Afro-Eurasia and was followed by the 'Axial age' (800–200 BCE), a period of widespread cultural efflorescence.
31. Oriental globalization preceded occidental globalization by many centuries. Phases of oriental globalization include the west-east movement of trade from the Middle East to Asia (500–1100 CE), east-west movements from Asia to the

Mediterranean known as the Silk Roads (1200–1800 CE) and from Asia to the world, 2000–present, the East-South turn (Nederveen Pieterse 2018).

32. The later the start time of globalization, the more Eurocentric the perspective. Eurocentric views of globalization typically begin globalization with the Renaissance and the sixteenth century.
33. There are as many histories of globalization as there are strands and dimensions of globalization.
34. Long-term *trends* of globalization differ from the *forms* that globalization takes during particular periods (Robertson 1992).
35. During the nineteenth century the leading *political* form of globalization was the formation of nation-states across continents. The high tide of nation-state formation, 1840–1960, includes the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations.
36. From the mid-twentieth century onward the peak period of nation-state formation gradually gave way to regionalism. Regionalization became the leading political form of globalization. The 1956 Treaty of Rome established the European Common Market (now European Union) and has been followed by many regional formations across the world.
37. The period from 1970 can be called contemporary accelerated globalization (there have been previous periods of acceleration). It is characterized by the role of multinational and transnational corporations, American and Trilateral hegemony, the (end of) Cold War, information and communication technologies and global value networks.
38. Contemporary accelerated globalization unfolds simultaneously in technology, economics, finance, international institutions, culture and politics, along with migration, travel, social and everyday life changes. It is more dramatic than previous eras of accelerated globalization because it unfolds with greater speed in view of ICT and digital technologies; involves wider scope and geographical spread (jet travel, containerization); greater intensity and depth in view of economic interweaving (technology, global value chains); unfolds with communication via satellite and Internet and involves greater global consciousness, which is still filtered through stereotypes. At times it appears and operates (during the 1990s Washington consensus) as a package deal.
39. Contemporary globalization is a fluid network of intersecting nationalisms, regionalisms, international institutions and interest groups. Each nationalism has inward-looking (provincialism) and outward-looking dimensions (cosmopolitanism). To each nationalism there are centers and peripheries. In many countries there is a government center, commercial center and cultural center, such as in Brazil, Brasilia, Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro; in Pakistan, Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore.
40. Twenty-first-century globalization is markedly different from twentieth-century globalization with the rise of East Asia, China, emerging societies, global East-South trade and investment, aid and security arrangements, new international institutions and sovereign wealth funds. A megaproject is China's Belt and Road Initiative (2013).

41. In view of rapid changes, contemporary globalization is replete with short-term opinionating. Given its media-sensitive character, globalization is swarmed by soundbites, instant analysis and confetti thinking.
42. As a concept globalization does overwork, is riddled with shortcuts and weighed down by hegemony. Globalization research is tilted toward economics, geopolitics and states, then culture, and society comes last.
43. The interplay of worlds that makes up globalization makes for a spaghetti bowl of crisscrossing networks. It cannot be modeled but we have recourse to shorthand approximations.
44. Global studies is not about promoting but about proportioning the global.

Pattern Analysis

4

Overview

- Engaging the whole follows from worldwide connectivity is part of global awareness and is not possible to achieve in a literal sense.
- Engaging the whole involves identifying meridians and nodal points, which requires analytics; which analytics matter depends on the question asked.
- Because the whole appears differently from whichever point it is perceived, the whole is contingent on positioning.
- There is no Archimedean point outside the whole from which to describe the whole.
- Since we are part of the whole our knowledge of the whole is partial knowledge.
- A global studies paradox is we are part of the whole we seek to understand.
- Options are unicentric, multicentric and omnicentric approaches to the whole.
- Human cognition is pattern recognition.
- Narratives, ideologies and paradigms offer shortcuts that enable pattern recognition.
- Content requires context. Global consciousness needs context. If context exists in different circles, at different levels, holds different meanings for different participants, context is not a given. Context is limitless, bounded only by fine-grained inference.
- In striking a balance between width and depth, expanse and meaning, global studies shares problems of all scholarship. We need a wide view of depth and a deep view of width.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_4

Global studies is a new field that is open to a wide variety of approaches. Thus, global studies exists on diverse bandwidths, the same heading, different meanings. Global studies can be a large parking lot for diverse vehicles that share a need for parking space. In global studies lite, because the global is in the local, nearly everything is 'global'. Add mixed methods and global studies research is just around the corner. Put 'global' in front of a noun—global race, global migration, global discourse, global knowledge—and join the use of the global tag in marketing (global product, global brand), business (global bank, global database), media (global trending, global appeal) and scholarship (global modernity, global culture, global capitalism, global crisis, global policing). Or, recycle globalization research, world-system thinking and other 1990s perspectives. Global studies is a bricolage, an improvised combination of elements.

Global studies provides shelter, an umbrella that shelters diverse agendas, a do-over of international studies, or a fold for civil society activism. When borrowing a global umbrella, fuzziness works better than precision. Vague definitions, fuzzy demarcations and a bland endorsement of mixed methods blur distinctions. Axford cautions that doing interdisciplinary research on globalization has the 'dangers of intellectual sloppiness of a "pick-and-mix" approach to knowledge production' (2013a: 68). How do we establish a rank order of importance—what in the local-global spectrum is important to address, what are meridians, nodal points, what is strategic to examine? What are key problems in relation to which global studies can be a response?

A preliminary step is reflection on the global. Every tool is also a trap, including the global. Often the global is understood as part of dynamics and narratives of globalization, and a pattern is already built-in. In effect, then, the discussion deals not with globalization per se but with a specific form of globalization. Roland Robertson cautions that we shouldn't mix up the *form* that globalization takes during a particular period with the *trend* of globalization (1992).

With the thematization of globalization has come a shift from the world to the globe and the global. The 'global' itself is in question. French discussions since Derrida often opt for '*mondialisation*', 'worldwide-ization' as more grounded and less abstract than globalization (Derrida 1978; Li 2007). Every day we see the world, not the globe. For Edward Said, worldliness is a matter of understanding literature in the socio-political conditions of its production and reception (Said 1984). It implies openness to and engagement with the world. Replace globalization with 'mondialisation' as many French discussions do and we exit Anglophone globalization narratives and adopt a Latin-French perspective with an emphasis on mundus, world, which is deeply geographical and historical.

Fig. 4.1 René Magritte, 1929

The heading globalization invokes the world as a whole, yet also homogenizes the world, unlike mondialisation or worldliness. A wider perspective is connectivity. The bone marrow of globalization is connectivity, which is layered, multidimensional and multi-purpose and sprawls in all directions. We don't argue about connectivity because it is basic to everything. We argue about globalization, but as we do the actual problem isn't globalization per se but the organization of globalization according to certain powers and narratives.

Next is a reflection on world relations and entanglements of situations wide apart. Entanglements may be part of a matrix—political, economic, cultural or cognitive, which is stable. Or part of a confluence—variables intertwine and it is difficult to assess the relative influence of any particular one. Or, part of a vortex of whirling currents with unpredictable ramifications. Hegemony is a matrix, trade war is a vortex. Authoritarianism is a matrix, populism is a vortex.

Economics has gone through classical political economy, neoclassical economics, Keynesianism, the Chicago school, new institutional economics, information economics, behavioral economics, nudge economics, narrative economics, Big Data and identity economics. Other social sciences and humanities have experienced similar transformations. Frontiers of change now include cognitive science, neuroscience and the digital turn (Digital Humanities). Global studies is another frontier and is work in progress.

This chapter deals with patterns as basics of cognition. The first section discusses cognitive shortcuts that enable a degree or illusion of control; the next section reviews social science remedies to bias; the third section moves on to global studies perspectives and tools.

Shortcuts

If you have a hammer, every problem is a nail. To make tools relevant or appear relevant, narrow the problem, limit the database. Limitation is a key to science and social sciences, a key to getting grants and paying the bills. Limitation enables quantification and modeling. Narrow premises provide limitations that enable order and classification. Meanwhile, the black swan points to the boundary of models (Taleb 2007).

Global studies per definition pushes boundaries, operates at margins where premises unravel and models don't apply. Pilgrims travel worlds of imagination, travel to Sarnath, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Rome, Santiago de Compostela, Lourdes, Qom, Karbala, Konia and Mecca. Major parts of the world lie well outside the domains of classification. Global studies straddles both domains, the world of classification and the uncategorized worlds of imagination.

Pattern reductionism crosscuts fields and times: the inclination to turn complexity into simplicity, chaos into order, according to clear enough principles to instill a degree of control, or illusion of control. Divine kingship, the mandate of heaven, the holy emperor, papal infallibility, divine right and absolutism, dynastic rule, totalitarianism are instances along these lines. Monotheism, theocracy and teleological history supply pattern reductionism. Aids in pattern management are many; they

range from sacred architecture, sacred scripts and symbols to organizing principles, modeling and algorithms.

It is inherent to the human mind to forge a whole picture based on partial information, a disposition to fashion fragments into a whole. *Pars pro toto* (the part stands for the whole) is how the mind works. Stereotypes and shortcuts enable fast thinking, fast pattern recognition, assessments made in the blink of the eye (Kahneman 2011).

Questions of representation and reality are as old as philosophy. Awareness of frictions between knowledge and reality goes back to the Greek philosophers. According to the caption of René Magritte's painting of a pipe 'This is not a pipe'. Jorge Borges' distinction between the map and the territory comes back in Alan Greenspan's book about the 2008 crisis, *The Map and the Territory* (2013).

Panoramic views come with temptations that are familiar in geopolitics, international relations, macroeconomics, development studies and comparative studies. Comparisons across space and time are impossible without meta-concepts, which turn into shortcuts. Global thinking may privilege macro perspectives, which emphasize structure rather than agency (such as modernization theory and world-system theory). Thinking global is near impossible without thinking in terms of large-scale structures, broad abstractions and all-encompassing concepts, which easily slip into a structuralist strain. Global thinking is steeped in problems of aggregation.

The 'dismal science', the dominant discipline in the twentieth century, has been riddled with conceptual shortcuts and reductionist models. Chicago school economics, monetarism, rational choice, public choice and mathematical models used in quantitative investment, no matter their technical smarts and econometric finesse, rely on limited premises, aggregation and generalization. New institutional economics seeks to disaggregate generalizing models. Global studies is prone to the simplistic assumptions, reductionist reasoning and sweeping generalizations that have beset all structuralist and comparative approaches. This cognitive minefield breaks down in several crisscrossing strands. The following is a recap of recurrent problems.

Aggregation may be valid at a narrow and thin level of discourse but poses problems when applied at finer scales of interaction. Lumping concepts such as capitalism, modernity and 'the state' may work up to a point but lack granularity. Lumping concepts such as 'Asians', 'Latinos', 'Americans', 'Muslims' are superficial banners that fall short when it comes to, for instance, intercultural marketing, business cultures and management.

Pattern recycling provides familiarity and is emotionally and cognitively comforting. Repetition, tradition, ceremony, liturgy and ritual are pervasive in all domains of life, private and public, domestic and international. Repetition provides structure. Daily life and collective life depends on routines and habits because having to invent everything along the way is time and energy consuming. In fashion, styles return every 10 or 15 years, with tweaks. Vintage builds on retro taste. Retro matters in design, art and literature such as revisiting Dante's Divine Comedy or quoting Shakespeare. Music repeats motifs, poetry and song come with refrains.

Repetitive patterns are basic to algorithms, mathematical models, computation, AI and robotics.

Series cater to pattern nostalgia. Movies offer sequels. Pattern familiarity sustains brand loyalty and pattern nostalgia is part of the appeal of Disney, Marvel Comics and K pop. Series with tweaks are comforting, such as Marx, Marxism, western Marxism, neo-Marxism and post-Marxism, modernization theory and postmodernism. Hegemony also inspires pattern recycling. The first question after any lecture I give about China is will China be the next hegemon?

In the British Commonwealth, Queen Victoria parks and avenues are pervasive in Hong Kong, Cape Town, Cape Coast and Britain, along with King's Road, King's Cross. Bismarck allées and hotels are pervasive in Germany. Repetition instills order and routine in military drills and exercises. States erect monuments and invent traditions and ceremonies to establish continuity (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Institutions reproduce patterns, such as the limited liability company and the quarterly report. Jurisprudence documents precedent and establishes patterns.

Repetition represents a kind of timelessness that provides belonging, is a source of comfort and an organizing principle. Repetition is an organizing motif in armies and monasteries, schools and universities. Propaganda, rhetoric and advertising hinge on repetition. In scholarship, paradigms rely on the appeal of repetition and continuity (Kuhn 1962). Intellectual schools rely on the repetition of organizing Leitmotifs.

As there is need for the integration of information there is a need for generalists in a world of specialization, but that doesn't mean generalization. 'Generalization is the enemy of common sense'.[1] Holding that which is partly true in some context as generally or widely true is taking a shortcut. Holding that which is partly true at a macro level as valid at meso or micro levels is miscasting the unit of analysis. Homogenization and essentialism overlook that any category we use breaks down further. Go down to the level of community and find that it too is fractured in terms of class, gender, age.

Positivism and empiricism involve a tendency to view metrics and data as reality and use models and macro-judgments to map reality while overlooking that measurements of reality need to be twinned with people's understandings of reality. Measuring and interpreting, quantitative and qualitative understandings must go together. In Jerry Muller's words, 'measurement is not an alternative to judgment: measurement demands judgment: judgment about whether to measure, what to measure, how to evaluate the significance of what's been measured, whether rewards or penalties will be attached to the results, and to whom to make the measurements available' (Muller 2018).

Models such as the macroeconomic models carried from country to country by IMF and World Bank officials, the criteria applied by credit rating agencies and the mathematical models used by quantitative investors and traders, are schematic approximations that pose the problem of mistaking the map for the territory. Freak events can squash models. Assumptions embedded in models and algorithms (real estate always increases in value) at odds with market dynamics (speculation in subprime mortgages) triggered the 2008 financial crisis (Taleb 2007; Lewis 2010;

Roubini and Mihm 2010). Models are crucial to risk analysis and forecasting of banks, traders, investors, insurance and security analysts. Pitfalls in geopolitics have been the CIA overestimating USSR military capabilities and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) fiction that led to the Iraq war.

The objectification of models fosters systems thinking, which ranges from nineteenth-century German philosophy to the 'esprit de système' that permeates Marxism and world-system theory (Nederveen Pieterse 1989).

Reification and objectification when concepts get to lead a life of their own are common when it comes to globalization and globalization is cast as an agent.

Linear thinking and forward extrapolation has played a part in demography, early future studies and early studies of climate change. Path dependency is built into cognition, institutions and policy; the transaction cost of changing course increases with time. It is part of the 'retarding lead': early investors in gas lighting were latecomers to electric lighting. *Continuity bias* is one of the pitfalls of strategic thinking; people tend to think things will generally stay the same particularly when they are heavily invested in those circumstances. *Plan continuity bias* is ignoring signs of mishap just to stay the course.

The view from the center, metropolitan fictions, the illusions and hubris of being at the center is as old as the ancient empires. Imperialism studies have been beset by top-down perspectives that attribute undue influence to metropolitan centers. A criticism of world-system theory has been its underestimating the role of local struggles in shaping outcomes.

The ***view from above***, the 30,000-mile perspective on worldly concerns, held by the world's jet set merges elite perspectives and generalization. The interest of billionaires in space travel adds elevation to these perspectives. Using fly-over terminology or ***globish concepts*** stretches concepts to transnational status with little regard for diverse contexts and meanings. This kind of global overstretch is often an exercise in hegemony that reifies a center and implies convergence thinking.

Part of the view from above is the politics of ***representation***, or who speaks for whom and how. How people are represented is how they are treated. The ethnographic gaze, stereotypes of minorities, migrants, the poor, the stigmatized and outcasts, and other countries are examples.

The use of the ***global trope***—global culture, global modernity, global capitalism, global crisis, global society, global policing, global change, global discourse—organizes the world in stereotypes. Global tropes are common in media, advertising, policy and scholarship, generally to give the nouns more heft. It is an air-miles take on global concerns. Global is also a marketing tag. In specific cases, the global adjective makes sense (such as global brands, global marketing, global value chains), though it isn't literally true and is usually a matter of aspiration. Or it refers to an agenda, such as global governance, global challenges. It follows that a problem of global studies is not simply methodological nationalism but also *methodological globalism*.

Simplistic categories need to be handled with caution. The distinction between 'globalization from above' and 'globalization from below' (Falk 1997) overlooks globalization 'from the middle' (Waterman 2001).

Two extremes in understanding the world are to echo hegemonic and centrist thinking, views from above, whether as follower or critic, and at another extreme, thinking in snippets and tidbits. Sound-bites and ***confetti thinking*** (such as 'the world is flat') are prevalent because globalization is a media-genic theme. People seek to 'domesticate' globalization, make it part of their mental furniture, available for fast thinking, which is a way of feeling at home in the global. However, quick-fix slogans provincialize globalization and need to be cross-validated by wider views.

There are plenty of examples of ***fragmented, patchy accounts*** of globalization. Aren't all our assessments of globalization partial and fragmented? Protectionism is rising, global trade is down—therefore globalization is in retreat. Geopolitical instability increases, security risks rise—therefore globalization goes in reverse. Headlines like these are common in newspapers and magazines. The assumption is globalization = economic integration = trade. Meanwhile, communication, cultural flows, travel, migration continue on as strands of connectivity. Reductionist assumptions such as globalization = economic globalization echo the bias of an epoch.

The constraints of global thinking are intertwined with institutional matrices so they pose twin problems of cognitive *and* institutional bias. International financial institutions and credit rating agencies (CRAs) are based in the US. American companies own the CRAs. Emerging markets and the global South make up close to 40 percent of global GDP but are underrepresented in international institutions (with a 6 percent vote quota in the IMF). Major commodities exchanges are based in metropolitan centers, notably London and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Accounting standards and legal systems diverge. Indexes of globalization reflect American or western bias. 'Good governance' in development policy also refers to donor policy preferences. Aid donors are largely based in the West, which affects the agendas of governments, international and local NGOs. Human rights discourses carry western baggage and media amplify these biases. In global studies, the risk of misrecognition is acute since it often deals with macro dynamics in settings where ideologies are rife and there is no radio silence.

How to deal with these problems? First, let's consider general social science diagnoses and remedies by way of a basic analytical plateau and go from there. Core problems of global consciousness are the problem of the whole and how to balance width and depth.

Comparing himself to Hegel, Wittgenstein remarked, 'my interest is always in showing that things which look alike are really different' while Hegel was 'always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same' (quoted in Rée 2019). Hegel, then, is at an extreme of aggregation and Wittgenstein pursues disaggregation. Both perspectives have things going for them. The problem with disaggregation, when applied at a global level, is it yields fragmentation and scatter; the problem with aggregation is generalization and often also systems thinking.

Aggregation poses the problem of the whole—how do the widely diverse aggregated parts fit together? Global studies per definition poses the problem of the whole. Large ocean swells south of New Zealand can create giant surfs in Southern California. An American president's tweet can cause market fluctuations in China and East Asia. Arguably, the problem of the whole is not the actual, empirical whole

but the problem of *narratives of the whole*, which have often been hegemonic narratives—from the viewpoint of empires, systems thinking or nodal points. The balancing act of global studies lies between the extremes of aggregation and disaggregation.

The question of the whole and how parts relate the whole has been posed by Herodotus (total history), Plato, Kant, Hegel (philosophy of totality). Jan Smuts' holism 'defines "parts" and "wholes" in such a way that the parts in a whole obtain their meaning from their contextualization in the whole and are altered, in all aspects, by their relationship with the other parts. The context in which a part appears changes its meaning, significance, and character… and a whole is characterized by structure' (Ziporyn 2000: 28; Smuts 1926).

But what kind of structure? According to Brook Ziporyn, there is always a center, but there is a major difference between unicentric and omnicentric wholes (34–35). A sixth-century Buddhist monk, Zhiyi (538–597), the founder of Tiantai Buddhism, speaks of omnicentric holism which 'holds that we may in fact take the part for the whole, since any part, simply considered in itself, in its own characteristics already implies the whole of which it is a part' (37). Since in this view 'every point is a center', the whole appears differently from the point from which it is perceived, so the whole is contingent on positioning, such as in the role of location in using GPS and standpoint theory in feminism. There are fundamentally different views on how parts fit together and make up an ensemble, how fragments fit into patterns, how they form assemblages and are connected through correlation, cause and effect, affinity or meaning. It is a matter of seeing and understanding wholes from diverse points of view. The problem of the whole and the nature of what constitutes a center exists in every field and with a vengeance when it comes to globalization which is, short of cosmology, so to speak the mother of all wholes.

Grand narratives serve to plaster over the problem of the whole and establish a center as the *locus of value arbitration*. Traditionally, religions supplied overarching narratives. Dharma in Hinduism, detachment in Buddhism, the way in Taoism, filial piety in Confucianism, redemption in Christianity, surrender in Islam, all offer ways to strike a balance with the whole. Mandalas and yantras represent the whole by means of geometry, squares and circles that indicate depth and multiple dimensions of the whole.

Hegel posed this problem in the philosophy of history. Hegel distinguished between peoples with and without history. The latter did not face the problem of the whole, a widely criticized view (Wolf 1982; Habib 2017). Hegel's answer was the spirit or consciousness of history (Geist) and the state as the embodiment of this consciousness. Marx's response was to posit the primacy of material conditions and class struggle as the motor of history. Darwin offered the survival of the fittest as an evolutionary principle.

Narratives of science—Enlightenment, reason, progress—followed and often emulated and secularized the pattern of religious narratives. Narratives of emancipation followed, the emancipation of peoples, women, slaves, serfs and minorities. With nationalism also came chauvinism, war and fascism. Fukuyama posed the triumph of liberal democracy as the end of history. Narratives, ideologies and

paradigms offer shortcuts that enable pattern recognition and 'fast thinking' to deal with the whole. Everywhere the search is on for leaders of government, CEOs, decision makers who all have to address the difficult whole, that is, exercise judgment and strike a balance amid multiple variables and contending claims. Extensive literatures exist to address these questions in public administration, economics, development studies and management. Courses are offered, university degrees are available. In economics, a key concern is trade-offs. In business and administration, cost-benefit analysis. Many approaches are highly technical, assume a narrow range of problems and propose algorithms to address them. Meanwhile, social forces from below that articulate social demand and press for change are major balancing forces.

It is not possible to deal with the global whole in a literal sense. Attempts to do so gave rise to grand theories such as those of Kant, Hegel and Marx with epistemologies that are outdated. Nietzsche debunked grand theories and systems thinking as 'the Egyptianism of philosophers'. Wallerstein's world-system theory attracts adherents but is also viewed as Eurocentric, centrist and schematic (see Chap. 5).

There is no Archimedean point *outside the whole* from which to describe the whole and map how parts relate to the whole, which is viewed differently from each part. Since we are part of the whole, our knowledge of the whole is per definition partial knowledge. Awareness of the observer effect goes back to the new physics—measurement of a particle may change a particle (as in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, or quantum uncertainty, 1928). In social science, in view of reflexivity, once a pattern is described it may no longer unfold as it did before. These are part of a fundamental global studies paradox: we are part of the whole we seek to understand. In sum, engaging the whole is (a) a function of worldwide connectivity and of globalization as a concept, (b) part of global consciousness, (c) not practical or possible to achieve in a literal sense, (d) involves identifying meridians and nodal points, (e) which requires analytics and (f) which analytics matter depends on the question asked.

How to balance width and depth? The challenge of global consciousness is not spatial width, which is already implied and often problematized, but depth. This problem is familiar in art history: 'Content is nothing without context'. Philip Dodd notes, 'As the art world becomes broader and increasingly global, it needs to go deeper too'.[2] Context is a key concern in archeology; we know the form of objects but without knowing the social setting and how objects were used, how can we understand what they mean? Context is a familiar question in literary theory too. According to Jonathan Culler, 'meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless' (cited in Versluys 2017: 85). It is boundless because each text, object or phenomenon can be used by different users in interminably different settings—interminable because of intertextuality and global entanglements.

To avoid misrepresentations or recycling clichés, global consciousness needs context. Yet, if context exists in different circles, at different levels, holds different meanings for different participants, context is not a given. Context is limitless, bounded only by fine-grained inference. Width and depth is not a simple equation. We need a wide view of depth—because context is boundless, and a deep view of width—because connectivity varies in scope and intensity and comes with local

ramifications. Balancing width and depth, then, is a foursome, not a tango. This is the double balancing act of global studies.

In many sciences, truth is a matter of striking a balance (take into account the problematic, the nature of evidence, the variety of sources, and the quality of arguments), an exercise of judgment rather than adding up evidence. The nature of this balance, where the balance lies, changes over time and is contextual. In striking a balance between width and depth, expanse and meaning, global studies shares problems of all scholarship, all comparative studies, international studies and development studies. Hence, in facing problems of the whole and balancing width and depth, global studies need not reinvent the wheel. In working toward global studies tools, the first step is to consult basics of social science, humanities and philosophy which have long taken up core problems. This includes a reflection on first principles.

One direction for this kind of work is thematic studies—that is map global entanglements in relation to a single theme such as an object (a history of sugar, salt, indigo), a location (ports, straits, regions), a problematic (civilization, monarchy, nation building) and so on. A second direction is macro theory (such as world-system theory, postcolonial theory). A limitation of thematic studies is that because connectivity involves many crisscrossing themes, global studies must combine and intertwine thematic studies, which requires meta-level cognition. The limitation of macro theories is that they are implicitly or explicitly linked to a particular epoch or center (such as the 'long sixteenth century' in world-system theory, the Enlightenment in modernization thinking) while connectivity ranges across epochs and centers. Systems approaches, a third direction, are limited because they typically focus on that which can be mapped, quantified and modeled and sideline other domains. Generally, a classic response to knowledge paradoxes (such as Zeno's paradox) is meta-language, yet going further along this line runs the risk of stratospheric abstraction (as Axford 2013a cautions).

Tools

Should the emphasis be on methods? Methods belong to the domain of *how*, rather than why, what for or what. Max Weber distinguished between instrumental rationality and value rationality (1978); methods belong to instrumental or goal-rationality. All social science relies on methods, but empiricist social science *focuses* on methods. The remit of global studies is wider. Because methods are tools, questions and the perspectives that generate questions come before methods. This discussion takes up perspectives in the sense of ways of seeing. Another reason not to foreground methods in this discussion is that global studies methods are not distinctive; they are an amalgam of methods in several disciplines, under headings such as mixed methods.

Foundations of global studies are comparative studies and history. Next, in response to the multiplication of publics and emancipation movements, structural diversification and the emergence of new forces worldwide (see Chap. 1), multi approaches take shape. Multi approaches (multicentric, multilevel, multiscalar,

multi-sectoral, multidimensional, multivariate, multi-temporal) avoid centrist and lumping views, which matters at a time when the center doesn't hold.

Decentering and nonlinearity are part of these perspectives. Next, we move on to relational patterns—confluence, entanglements and vortices. The closing section deals with pattern analysis, the kind of refinements that enable us to deal with global questions—refinements of language, plural thinking, narrative analysis, layered analysis, transformation analysis and redundancy logic.

Comparative studies. Comparison is fundamental to life. Cellular organisms decide whether to interact with one or another set of molecules based on what is best for nourishment and whether to open or close based on their level of nourishment. This happens down to the level of amoebae, one-cell organisms. Life is a comparative experience in which recognition and memory determine survival. Life is comparative studies and cognition is based on comparison. Hot and cold, dry and wet, big and small, dead or alive, tall and short, male and female, young and old, raw and cooked, mountain and valley, rural and urban, before and after, safe and unsafe and so forth. All basic parameters turn on comparisons of size, duration, distance, temperature, air quality. The attribution of causality is based on comparisons of size: the larger unit is the cause, the smaller is an effect. An exception is the butterfly effect, but this builds up size by means of cumulative effects.

Human cognition relies on pattern recognition. Combinations of elements make up patterns. Pattern recognition enables and drives decision making. Images, icons, idiom, expressions and proverbs in every language serve as memory aides that index patterns. Indices such as per capita income, low-, middle- and high-income countries, population, literacy rates and urbanization, currencies and trade data involve comparisons. Scenarios and probabilities hinge on comparisons as the basis of trend assessments. All sciences, social science and humanities are comparative. Comparative study is a basic working method in all disciplines. A basic principle in religious studies is that studying one religion is studying none; study two and one begins to understand one. Comparative study counters availability bias (this information is true because it is available). Going outside one's comfort zone is the first step of consciousness, from baby steps onward. Ibn Battuta, Marco Polo, Montaigne, Montesquieu, Humboldt, Darwin and Marx all did comparative studies. Humboldt's work *Kosmos* sought to unify branches of scientific knowledge and culture and provide a holistic perception of the universe as one interacting entity (1845). Based on observations during his travels, Humboldt was the first to describe human-induced climate change, in 1800 and 1831.

In social science comparative studies is the nearest equivalent to experiments in physics as methods of validation. Social science and humanities mostly consist of comparisons of various kinds. Development studies is fundamentally comparative, as in notions of 'catching up', early and late industrializing countries, center and periphery, developed and developing, backward and advanced. Dependency and autonomy are comparative judgments. A book on *How big should our government be?* does not refer to laboratory experiments but to relative judgments (Bakija et al. 2016). Global studies is comparative studies writ large. The keynote of global

studies is robust comparative studies, familiarity with different conditions, sensibilities and narratives in diverse settings and times.

There are many ways of doing comparative studies. A classic approach is multi-sited ethnography (Burawoy et al. 2000). A second approach is breaking down a big question into smaller questions and testing them, using control groups in different locations (e.g. Krishna 2004, 2006) or subjecting them to randomized trials, as in the work of Banerjee and Duflo (2011, which received a Nobel award). A third approach is to bring big questions of macro theory down to mid-level questions of institutions. Comparative political science, institutional economics, development sociology and global political economy have long been concerned with comparing institutions (Rodrik 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Ezrow et al. 2016; Nederveen Pieterse 2018a).

Each approach involves tradeoffs. The quality of multi-sited ethnography depends on the caliber of the guiding perspectives and the quality of the questions asked. A limitation of using control groups and randomized trials is that big questions slip out of view; the approach is piecemeal and downstream, rather than upstream. The emphasis shifts to questions of *how* rather than why or what for. Start small and scale up is often important, so testing what plumbing works matters. Translating big questions into small questions is fine, but how do we get the big questions back? A limitation of comparing institutions is that it involves many variables, some of which may escape detection or attention, or are imponderable. A comparative approach is never better than the ideas that guide it. The paper, 'Omission and commission in the development economics of Daron Acemoglu and Esther Duflo' is a pointed critique of their premises (Chernomas and Hudson 2019).

History. History is the counterpoint to snapshot thinking. History widens the database of comparison. History enables us to assess what is a blip and what is a trend, what is an event and what is a turning point, what is ephemeral and what is structural. Global studies must be historical; the alternative, presentism, risks misreading contemporary trends as novel though some are ancient. Shallow time frames lead to mixing up that which is old and which is new, what is recurrent and what is fluctuating and produce failures of pattern recognition. History is comparative studies in time, comparing different periods and settings.

Comparative-historical approaches. According to Norbert Elias, social science must combine 'Langsicht und Breitsicht', a long view and broad view (1994). Comparative history combines comparisons in time and space, a double comparison, as in Skocpol's study of revolutions (1984). According to Skocpol and Somers, comparative history can serve several purposes—the parallel demonstration of theory, the contrast of contexts, and macro-causal analysis (1980). Comparative-historical work usually involves a multicentric approach.

Multicentrism. Many people are so used to hegemony, the British Empire and American hegemony, that they overlook that periods of unrivaled world leadership have been relatively rare and multiple centers of power coexisting has been the historical normal. Ancient Egypt, the Middle Kingdom, the Persian Empire, the Pax Romana, the Aztec and Inca empires were regional powers. In times of world-spanning connectivity, Wallerstein identified just three periods of unrivaled

hegemony (unmatched leadership in economic, financial and military domains), the United Provinces, 1620–1670, the British Empire, 1820–1860, and American hegemony, 1945–1970, or longer by some accounts (Wallerstein 1984). Multiple centers of power, influence and civilization have existed more often and lasted longer than periods of hegemony. The lead of single centers of power has been a historical outlier, yet monocentric thinking has been common.

Recognizing multiple centers of power and influence is ordinary. It is as old as Sumer and Mohenjo-Daro; Athens, Sparta and Troy; Macedonia and Persepolis; Rome and Carthage; the Habsburgs, the Vatican, Protestant princes and the Ottomans, and so forth. Alignments or alliances of centers have been familiar as well, such as Egypt and Mesopotamia, the Ottomans and Protestant princes. The tribute paying mode of power involved a hierarchy of multiple centers of power (Amin 1976). In eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, multicentrism was known as balance of power and diplomacy was understood as 'manipulating the antagonisms'. Civilizational history in the tradition of Toynbee, Spengler, Sorokin and Tiryakian is multicentric. Thus, multicentrism is a common perspective with a long lineage.

Ethnocentrism has been the species' historical norm. Provincialism has characterized most of the species' existence. Over time units of social cooperation have changed and expanded—the extended family, clan, tribe, federation of tribes, kingdom, empire, faith, nation, language, civilization, race and so forth, while a general principle of groupthink remains. Until fairly recently, local or national perspectives have held the foreground and the international sphere, too, was understood in self-serving terms—in categories such as empire, the church, the white man's burden, civilizing mission, domino theory, American exceptionalism. Ethnocentrism and multicentrism have coexisted throughout history. Globalization as growing interconnectedness inevitably entails clashes of ethnocentrism. Examples are Bernard Lewis' work on the Middle East's failure to modernize (2002) and Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations (1993), while Samman's 'clash of modernities' offers a smarter angle (2011).

Engaging globalization means understanding human conditions in global terms. This isn't new, witness the long legacy of cosmopolitan thinking from the Stoics, Muslim thinkers and Renaissance humanists to Kant, but the scope and intensity of global awareness is new.

Cognitive retooling is easier said than done for after some 200 years of European and American hegemony many perspectives and data are west-centric, also because these periods of hegemony have coincided with major leaps in connectivity technologies. The predominance of Atlantic institutions, publishers, journals, citation indexes, associations, conferences, media and measurements is such that 'international' has often meant trans-Atlantic, with Japan as add-on in the era of the Trilateral Commission. The predominance of English poses problems of translation. In economics, the Washington consensus has been a glaring case of American bias. Similar considerations apply to indexes such as the Competitiveness Index and the Economic Freedom Index. Most business schools are located in the West. In psychology, most data on the human mind and behavior are derived from research on

American undergraduate psychology students, a minuscule outlier subset of humanity: 'in the top international journals in six fields of psychology from 2003 to 2007, 68 percent of subjects came from the United States and a whopping 96 percent from Western, industrialized countries'. The predilection for selecting 'people from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic societies—WEIRD, for short', earns psychology the status of 'weird science' (Keating 2011).

In political science and political philosophy, liberalism takes up large space and terms such as liberal democracy and civil society carry Atlantic overtones (Parekh 1993; Mehta 1997; Nederveen Pieterse 2017). In sociology, nineteenth-century legacies include macro concepts such as modernity and capitalism that reflect specific phases of evolution and hegemony; extrapolated in categories such as 'global capitalism' and the 'modern world-system' they pose problems of unreflexive aggregation.

Eurocentric perspectives have been subjected to extensive criticism (Hobson 2004). Yet replacing them with Indocentrism, Sinocentrism or Afrocentrism is not an option. It would bring us back to the turn of the nineteenth-century 'Pan' movements, Pan Arabism, Pan Slavism, Pan Turkism and so on. It would mean relying on regional hegemony as a corrective of global hegemony.

Global studies follows the critiques of Eurocentrism and Orientalism, the decolonization of imagination, the 'deconstruction of the West' and the problematization of modernity (Nederveen Pieterse and Parekh 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2014). If the object of study is worldwide, the study too should be global in its premises. As communities of interpretation multiply and widen so must the vantage points from which they are comprehended. In the global South 'globalization' is often viewed as a North American preoccupation, so there is a need to 'globalize global studies' (Riggs 2004). Global studies includes viewing global concerns not just from New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, but also from the viewpoint of Beijing, New Delhi, São Paulo, Nairobi and Teheran, which is common sense in a multicentric world. Multicentrism assumes each center has a different worldview.

While Axford poses the problem of 'telling a story without a center', what about telling stories from the point of view of multiple centers? General trends such as globalization and tech change have diverse meanings and impact in different regions and countries depending on different initial conditions. This is a basic starting point in chaos theory (Eve et al. 1997). In relation to general dynamics (such as tech change, migration, economic crisis, inequality or climate change), what is required is a multicentric approach that takes into account diverse histories, cultures and political economies (Nederveen Pieterse 2018a). Multicentric thinking is a challenge because most thinking has been from the viewpoint of nations, regions, religions, civilizations or other conventional units, but for traders, seafarers and warriors, pirates, pilgrims and nomads, multicentric knowledge has been survival knowledge all along.

Even as polycentrism is a correction of Eurocentrism, it also replicates centrism. Multiplying centers—Sinocentrism and so on—doesn't fix centrism. Centrism is a real problem as soon as one travels outside the radius of capital cities. What about regions and peoples within the radius of these centers? What about Adivasis and

dalits in India, Hui, Uyghur, Yi and other minorities in China, Moluccans, Bataks, Chinese and Christians in Indonesia, Muslims in southern Thailand, Copts in Egypt, Alevites and Kurds in Turkey, Druze in Lebanon, Yazidis in Iraq, indigenes and cholos in Latin America, Roma in central Europe and the Balkans? Domestic and regional hierarchies pose problems of internal colonialism and regional hegemony (Hechter 1975). Thus, multicentrism as a corrective of Eurocentrism must be supplemented by decentering and multilevel thinking as fine tuning of understanding.

To multicentrism we can adopt three approaches. First, a monocentric approach—view diverse zones through the lens of one zone. For example, the news aggregator Google News provides reports on the world but shows mostly American sources on a world viewed through American lenses. Second, a multicentric approach—understand each center in its own terms. However, what 'its own terms' are is contentious and also leaves the question by what criteria then to conduct comparative studies. Third, an omnicentric approach—factor in and address diversity (and instability) within each zone. The first is a low, the second medium, the third a high resolution approach. The low-resolution approach yields the least information and what info it yields is biased, tilted toward one zone. Thus, multicentrism requires further refinements.

Multilevel. Multicentric and multilevel thinking go against the grain of much cognition. Multilevel thinking is a challenge for most thinking has been from the viewpoint of privileged strata.

Upstairs and downstairs, master and slave are multilevel relations. Dostoevsky's novel *Notes from the Underground* (1864) was a prelude to Freud, Jung and existentialism. The basement carries connotations of class as well as of the subconscious, the id and that which is hidden. The Korean film *The Parasite* (2019) plays on both these themes, a multilevel treatment of multilevel situations.

Cognition is layered, as in Gramsci's 'pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will'. People can chew gum and walk at the same time. In environments of constant propaganda, state propaganda or nonstop corporate marketing, epistemologies of cynicism and heuristics of suspicion become routine tools.

A classic distinction runs between frontstage and backstage. Social science devotes much analysis to frontstage performances for public consumption; backstage goings on are usually more important but receive less attention because less information is available (unless whistleblowers step forward). Real issues are hammered out backstage, such as 'Green Room' discussions at WTO meetings. Clandestine and covert operations of American hegemony take place at the back of the backstage, some of which Ed Snowden leaked (Chap. 8; McCoy 2017, 2018).

Significant social change comes from below. In short, views *from below* give information on social demand and social pressure for change, views *from above* provide information on hurdles of change and views *from the middle* provide information on practicalities of transformation. Multilevel approaches raise questions—in which direction, study up or study down? We often lack investigative detail, forensic knowledge of the kind that insiders, whistleblowers and leaked documents provide. Forensic knowledge is why journalists are killed, whistleblowers are harassed and governments fall—as in Russia, Malta, Mexico, Peru (Odebrecht),

Iceland (banks). Hence, the importance of the Pentagon and Afghanistan papers, the Panama and Paradise papers. Follow the money is a basic global studies tool.

Multilevel approaches view global relations across the spectrum of class and status, from the world's poorest to the richest. The global class spectrum ranges from indigenous peoples to hedge fund billionaires, from pygmies to PIMCO (which used to be the world's largest hedge fund; now Blackrock is the largest). Some of these actors are transnationally organized, such as in the Indigenous Peoples Working Group in the United Nations, the World Economic Forum in Davos and the Bank of International Settlements in Basel; they are also profoundly local, from locally-grounded indigenous ways to fast traders positioning servers to gain advantages of nanoseconds.

Multilevel analysis is intersectional; class and status intersect with ethnicity, religion, gender and other cultural markers. Intersections extend infinitesimally, intertwining with another and another without end, across dimensions.

Multiscalar. Globalization implies a double movement: the global includes but does not override the local; global-local interplay is a recurrent motif. Sociology, geography, political science and history function at multiple social scales and view social relations at macro, meso and micro scales of interaction, down to the level of households. Global studies straddles the range from the macro (as in global political economy), the meso (as in regional studies) to micro levels (as in ethnography, business studies, household studies). It includes globalization from above and from below, on the part of those who do the legwork of globalization, seafarers and dockworkers, migrant workers, social movements and grassroots communities. And globalization from the middle, the cadres who manage and staff international institutions and transnational NGOs, who see to the logistics of global value chains, manage media and film production and staff giant corporations as well as small enterprises.

The reliance on macro theories at times makes globalization research predictable and hostage to functionalist or teleological reasoning. Because anthropology and geography are concerned with local-global interplay in which fieldwork and comparative studies play a large part, they can be closer to the ground, suppler and less driven by macro theories than sociology, political science and political economy. History, art history, sociology and cultural studies deal with global-local relations as well (Massey 1993a; Wilson and Dissanayake 1996; Tsing 2005; Inda and Rosaldo 2008).

In her fine-grained work on Mexican immigrants in the American Midwest, Faranak Miraftab combines ethnography and political economy and twins 'the worm's-eye view and the bird's-eye view' (2016: 210). Covid-19 hit America's meatpacking industry in the Midwest where migrant workers often face poor work conditions. *Glocalization* seeks to address this conceptually (Roudometov 2016). Multi-sited ethnography seeks to address this as methodology. Local diversity is a familiar theme in development studies (Oxfam 1996). Human rights thinking can be decentered by starting out from below, from diverse understandings of human rights in different cultural settings (Santos 1999). In other fields, these sensibilities are often patchy and uneven. There is plenty scholarship about these problems, but many of these problems are not generally acknowledged.

Multidimensional. The stock exchange symbols, the bull and the bear, display collective emotions. As J.M. Keynes noted, animal spirits drive the economy, which behavioral economists have taken up. Economies combine quarterly reports and analyst reports and the emotional realm of animal spirits, speaking to the limbic brain.

Multidimensionality is all around us. While engaging the neocortex with functionality, the design of luxury products and sumptuous architecture subliminally speak to the reptilian brain. At issue is not just 'base-superstructure' but also everything in-between. At issue are also imagination, style, aesthetics, that which is conscious and intentional as well as that which is liminal and subliminal. While there are differences between style and substance there is also substance to style. In the words of Oscar Wilde, 'It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible' (1890).

All institutions and organizations lead a double life, formal and informal. As material and other odds rise so does the chance that the informal stretches to comprise the three variants of ethical, unethical and illegal informality at the same time (Ledeneva 2008).

Multi-temporal. 'He won the battle but lost the war' is a common saying. In everyday life we distinguish between decisions that affect us for an hour, a day, a year, or all our life. Celebrations take place in the present and often refer to the past, such as anniversaries, jubilees, or celebrate origins, such as Christmas and Easter. Familiarity with Greek and Roman classics, with the Bible, the Mahabharata and stories and literature from across the world give us reference points from different time frames. In ancient cities, we turn a corner and face buildings thousands years old. Notions such as 'medieval modernity' and neo-medievalism are multi-temporal (AlSayyad and Roy 2006).

Multiple time frames also apply in global dynamics. Authoritarianism is often long lasting while rightwing populism is unstable and short term (see Chap. 11). Temporalities can clash too. A trope in Latin America is the coexistence of premodern, modern and postmodern times. On roads in India, cows and occasional elephants stroll on thoroughfares amid cars, trucks and motorbikes against a backdrop of temples and occasional postmodern architecture. The sustainability turn toward energy and resource conservation comes with different perspectives on history and past resources, in recovery, retrieval and reuse, vintage and pre-love apparel and a new appeal of antiques that has become in vogue in construction and design.[3]

Multi-sectoral. Some sectors of manufacturing flourish while others flunk. Some economic sectors and domains are more susceptible to elite capture than others. Sectors with a long history of government regulation—such as railways in India or health care in Malaysia—can better withstand elite capture than, for instance, mining, palm oil plantations, construction (Odebrecht in Latin America), energy companies (Petrobras in Brazil) and new technologies where regulation lags behind, such as fracking. Each sector and domain has different features. Illegal mining in Ghana is possible due to weak law enforcement. Wealth is a different category than income, as Thomas Piketty points out (2013). In development studies, inequality can be measured in human development, gender, literacy, education, health care, pollution and

shows different features and curves in each domain (Yanguas 2017; Horner and Hulme 2019). Rather than blanket assessments, we need fine-tuned research that differentiates between domains. Besides, as thick business studies show, there is differentiation *within* sectors. The big five, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft and Netflix, are all big tech, yet are quite different too. Then, of course, there is the so-called informal sector, which is vast and under-researched.[4]

Multivariate. Dealing with multiple variables is ordinary in social science and humanities. An equivalent in mathematics is multivariable calculus. But multivariate analysis in engineering, architecture or design is based on the working premise is that the *units* of analysis don't change. This does not apply in social science. Human behavior is fluid and reflexive and cannot be contained in boxes, as Bauman's *Liquid Modernity* (2000) finds, which poses limitations on quantitative approaches in social science.

Multidirectional. Business consulting agencies are taken to be agents of modernization and probity, yet episodes such as McKinsey in South Africa (and the Gupta brothers) and PWC in Angola (and the ruling dos Santos family) show that they play other tunes as well. So modernization comes in different varieties.

Decentering. To understand the center, go outside the center. Decentering is a basic sensibility; understand the capital from the provinces, understand the metropole from the outposts has been basic to all revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. Understand the center from the peripheries has been a methodological premise ever since Ibn Khaldun's work contrasting nomadic and sedentary peoples. China's dynastic cycle started from outlying regions, as in the classic sixteenth-century novel *Water Margin, the Outlaws of the Marsh* that inspired Mao.

Decentering, viewing the center from outlying regions comes up in the work of Gandhi, Senghor, Cabral, Fanon, Memmi, Sartre, Deleuze, Bourdieu and Thiong'o. In decolonization struggles, liberated zones are far from the centers of power, such as Chiapas and Lacandon forest for the Zapatistas in Mexico. Decentering plays a part in Marx and is basic to social history and Subaltern Studies. Decentering in history is viewing the Crusades through Arab eyes (Maalouf 1984). In anthropology, it inspires reverse engineering, such as anthropologists from India scrutinizing Denmark and France, pericentric analyses of empire in which peripheries play a central role, decolonizing knowledge and imagination (Fieldhouse 1973; Thiong'o 1986; Nederveen Pieterse and Parekh 1995). 'Provincializing' Europe and the West from the perspective of Indian history has become a familiar theme (Chakrabarty 2000; Lal 2003). Is it useful to heed advice from Singapore and China on financial crisis in the United States? To apply microcredit methods of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank in Britain and the US, and Mexican and Brazilian welfare programs such as Oportunidades in New York and Michigan?

Nonlinearity. In *The History of the Idea of Progress*, Robert Nisbet contrasts cyclical and linear perspectives on history (1980). The Abrahamic faiths introduced a linear script of redemption and salvation, a script of history verging toward fulfillment. Centuries later, ideas of progress resumed and secularized this teleology, now with applied science as a force of redemption. Enlightenment era stages theories

followed a logic of unilinear evolution, which also influenced Marx. Modernization, economic growth and development thinking are further installments along this route.

The work of Hieronymus Bosch (1450–1516) prefigures Salvador Dali and surrealism.[5] The court jesters of the Middle Ages and harlequins and commedia dell'arte are preludes of Dada. Art isn't linear. Influences zigzag and crisscross, at times centuries apart. Albert Elsen describes the making of Rembrandt's painting of Bathsheba (1654) as follows: 'take a Protestant Dutch housewife and pose her in the manner of a Roman goddess to re-create the character of a tragic Hebrew woman' (Elsen 1981: 192). Much art is nonlinear, multi-temporal, cross-cultural and defies classification. Imagination knows no boundaries. Linearity is a knowledge fiction. In the words of the physicist Carlo Rovelli, 'The world is not like a platoon advancing at the pace of a single commander. It's a network of events affecting each other' (2018).

Flashpoints. A whole whether it is a city, country, continent or the world is not even tempered. Networks involve nodal points. There are peaks and valleys, hotspots and flashpoints, elegantly lit promenades and dark smuggling routes. Observes Richard Florida, ours is not a flat world but a spiked world with spikes of innovation, excellence and wealth (2008, 2017). Migration is a flashpoint of global inequality, a point where inequality between zones of different levels of development becomes visible and visceral. Flashpoints play a key role in security analyses; strategic world atlases show maps with flashpoints of conflict and violence (Smith 2012). Flashpoint is the name of a business risk intelligence group in New York. Atlases of world health conditions show epidemics hotspots and their radius of influence. Flashpoints are sites where contradictions pile up and conflicts erupt, such as checkpoints and borders in conflict zones.

Crises. What flashpoints are in space and geography, crises are in time. Crises are turning points. Flashpoints are places and crises are times where truth boils over and transformation sets in. Kairos is the moment of truth and decision in Paul Tillich's Christian theology. Also Wallerstein refers to crisis as Kairos (2004). After the 2008 crash mathematical models had to be redone, American economists went back to the drawing board and eventually IMF economists conceded that neoliberalism had been oversold (Ostry et al. 2016).

World situations are relational. Types of relations include entanglements, confluence and vortices.

Entanglements. Centers, levels, scales, sectors and time cycles—the 'multi' discussed above—are different but are not separate. At issue are not just different units and levels but also the entanglements and flows between them (Therborn 2003). Flows may be patterned and institutionalized (as in credit ratings), conjunctural (as in fluctuating currencies and energy prices), or occasional, improvised, unintended. Some are orchestrated from above, some emerge from below, or from the interstices, the cracks within regimes and institutions. A classic sociology finding is that patronage and clientelism in India and in all hierarchical societies *crisscross* class, caste and status.

Global entanglements are a salient theme in global history (Sachsenmaier 2018). From this follows the problem of the whole, or how to integrate diverse threads of

connectivity, according to what criteria of understanding. Just as we can distinguish different capitalisms and modernities, we can also recognize the interaction between them. Examples are the 'creeping liberalization' of European social market economies (Streeck 2013) and neoliberal strands in China's state-led economy (Xin 2003). Corporate social responsibility also operates in liberal market economies, such as benefit corporations, impact investment and funds that focus on green and socially responsible investment (e.g. the Calvert Fund in the US).

Confluence. In physics, relations between more than two units cannot be captured in an equation because there are too many possible combinations, too many moving parts. Social science usually deals with confluences, variables operating together such that we cannot unravel their specific influence. These are situations of 'causal opacity' where 'it is hard to see the arrow from cause to consequence' (Taleb 2014: 57). The 'invisibility of causes' and 'causal opacity' is an ordinary circumstance. 'We are built to be dupes for theories' but 'explanations change all the time' (Taleb 350).

Vortices. A narrowing energy field generates a vortex. Compression generates heat that can melt the component elements, which physics describes as turbulence. Chaos can revert to order but turbulence changes the character of the components, which become liquid. Situations at a boiling point—conflict, armed struggle, war and revolution—create turbulence and an entanglement can change into a vortex. Turbulence is a familiar trope in financial markets. Catholic missions in an African country can exist side by side with merchants and armed forces, but when war breaks out missions may have to take sides and a confluence changes into a vortex with unpredictable ramifications. A political impasse can lead to populism as a way out, but the solution can produce turbulence, as in the case of Brexit. The Hong Kong government's adoption of the extradition law to China in May 2019 led to protest and government failure to deal with the protesters led to turbulence. In regional and world scale situations a host of variables interact, demonstration effects, trade flows, currency fluctuations, logistics, media, intelligence agencies. The American turnaround from viewing China as a partner to a strategic competitor has ramifications in technology (5G, Huawei), global value networks, alliances (security arrangements) and intelligence (US agencies provide negative intel about China to Australian agencies, which filters down to Australian media and policy, leading to a downturn in Australia-China relations).

Pattern Analysis

Dealing with such variables requires fine-tuning analytical tools. The following is an overview under several headings. Human cognition is pattern recognition; social science is pattern analysis or pattern deconstruction. Typologies, categories, theories, all refer to patterns. World Bank categories such as high-, middle- and low-income countries refer to patterns with quantitative thresholds. Weber's Protestant ethic as the spirit of modern capitalism, the routinization of charisma and the iron cage of bureaucracy refer to patterns. Social science concepts and theories refer to patterns, such as the 'iron law of oligarchy' (Michels), possessive individualism

(McPherson), pattern variables (Parsons), national systems of innovation (Porter), risk society (Beck), post-democracy (Crouch), the petro state, illiberal capitalism, varieties of capitalism, BRICS (O'Neill) and so forth. The patterns are ideal types, schemas that enable a degree of social navigation. The patterns are not fixed boxes and pushing them too far can mislead.

Comparative studies is pattern analysis. The alternative is that we fall back on geography, lists of countries, the units of area studies, or civilizational clusters. Social science contributes patterns. Patterns and their boundaries of similarity and difference are tools of diagnosis and explanation. Pattern analysis matters to global studies; worldliness enables identifying similarities and differences, which offer 'control groups' of explanation and interpretation. Global studies is the opposite of putting 'global' in front of everything ('global x'); on the contrary, it indicates that similar phenomena carry different forms and meanings in different settings. The contribution of global studies is not to promote the global but to *deconstruct the global*, to deconstruct that which is claimed to be global.

A paper by economists asks, 'Is Employment Globalizing?' They examine the familiar idea that workers across the world are now competing with other workers and human resource policies should factor this in. Processing vast data, they find that this actually only applies to a few countries and to specific sectors. They explain why and conclude, 'Scalpels may be preferred to brooms' (Chen et al. 2018: 29). Scalpels don't work in every field but the principle of disaggregation applies widely.

Pattern analysis is the master analytical framework. In social science it is called 'theory'. Fine-tuning calibrates strands of pattern analysis—such as layers, narratives, language and thresholds of volume. Analytics are heuristic tools and which type of pattern analysis is useful depends on the problem one is looking at. We need theories, but macro theories carry luggage that can lead astray. Middle-range theories are more adaptable than grand theories. I find varieties of market economies a useful pattern in relation to inequality, institutions, global political economy, technology, art and populism (Nederveen Pieterse 2018a; this volume, Chaps. 8, 9 and 11).

Layered analysis. Reality is a layer cake. Layered analysis is ordinary in international relations which obviously unfold simultaneously in political, security, economic and cultural domains. Layered analysis differentiates between scales (what is happening at local, urban, provincial, national, macro-regional, international and global scales) and dimensions of interaction. There are familiar differences between politics (which changes rapidly), policies (the crystallization of politics) and institutions (rules and parameters in the context of which policies are implemented, which change slowly). Different layers are not necessarily aligned. Politics can clash with policies. Policies for growth may be in place but with institutions absent or poorly designed, their efficacy is limited, which is the 'governance-policy gap' (Rodrik et al. 2004).

Events make up history, history includes not just events but also long-term changes and is embedded in evolution, the time of living organisms; evolutionary time is embedded in geological time, geological time is part of cosmic time, which is part of a multi-verse of atomic and quantum realms.

Coming across remains of mammoths in Siberia, of dinosaurs in Los Angeles or New Jersey confronts people with multiple times, historical and evolutionary. Inhabiting multiple levels of time is ordinary. Fossil fuels, carbon remains of evolutionary time embedded in geological time, enable our phase of historical time. Any time we inhabit all times of planetary existence. The celebrations of the equinoxes, Christmas (the Saturnalia in Roman times) and Carnival, spring festivals and harvest feasts land us back in evolutionary time. Like all religious ceremonies and feasts, they land us in multiple dimensions, revisiting historical encrustations along the way. In Mediterranean cities, we can turn a corner and stroll by ruins of thousands years old. We inhabit a multi-temporal world.

Layered analysis is common in art history. Art touches on wealth (patrons, market), power and politics (whose portrait), culture (symbolism, style), aesthetics and science (geometry, perspective). Layered analysis is de rigueur in studies of capitalism, which exists at multiple tiers of size (small to mega), scope (local to transnational), sectors and rules and institutions. What pertains in one tier cannot be generalized across tiers or settings. Layered analysis is a remedy against scale inflation or generalizing across levels. That which is valid at one layer of experience or analysis doesn't necessarily apply at other levels or dimensions.

Narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is basic in humanities and literature studies. Social science experienced the linguistic turn, structuralism and poststructuralism, the cultural turn and discourse turn, and narrative analysis is another step along the way. Stories shape the social construction of reality; we experience social reality through narratives or clashes of narratives, such as capitalism and communism during the Cold War. Progress, stages theories, modernization, the disenchantment of the world (Weber), the stages of growth (Rostow) are narratives. Hindutva, redefining Indian history and culture through Hindu lenses, is a narrative.

Narratives are not all equal (as in a postmodern narrative of anything goes). Stories are big or small. Small stories enable small-scale cooperation, such as family gatherings. Big stories enable large-scale, expansive social cooperation, whether at a local or global range. Narratives differ in the scope of reality they encompass, the quality and range of information they include and the quality and range of social cooperation they inspire. Narratives are good or bad in terms of the quality and veracity of information they hold and the nature and quality of social cooperation they inspire. Nelson Mandela's and Jacob Zuma's stories are of a different caliber. Examining stories means taking into account diverse data streams, quantitative and qualitative.

Language. In diplomacy, face-to-face meetings matter to get a sense of the tone, attitude, body language and meaning of words. In business, face-to-face meetings are necessary to know what parties mean by their use of words. This also holds for intercultural understanding. Hence, the turn to anthropology in development policy and behavioral economics. Thick description in the tradition of Clifford Geertz is a remedy. The World Bank hiring anthropologists in the 1990s led to books such as *Voices of the Poor* (Narayan et al. 2000).

A multicentric world involves epistemological decentralization and the 'decolonization of imagination', or else we would view different centers through the lens of one particular center (as in convergence thinking). Multilingualism is a fundamental

approach (Rehbein 2015: 100–103). A multicentric approach implies a refined use of language; avoiding globish concepts is basic to global studies. Through some 200 years of colonialism and hegemony our language and concepts have carried the weight of power. Human rights has different meanings in different settings (in much of Asia the conversation is rather about human security). Liberal democracy, liberalism and freedom are concepts that don't travel well (Mehta 1999). Or the same term has different meanings in different settings. We say 'state' but the state in Morocco carries a different meaning than in France (Badie 1989). In Pakistan, it includes autonomous regions such as Waziristan. In stretching the use of concepts transnationally much is lost in translation. In Latin America, populism holds a socially progressive meaning, in the footsteps of Juan Perón in Argentina (Kirchner, Chavez, Lula, Correa, Morales) while in the US and Europe populism holds rightwing connotations (Laclau 2005; Nederveen Pieterse 2018b). 'Race' is a fighting word in the Americas, South Africa and Europe, but in many other settings it is a limp word. In Africa a fault line is ethnicity, in India caste and communalism, in the Middle East religion and ethnicity.

Language also involves different kinds of knowledge, not just expert knowledge and its technical repertoires but also registers such as practical knowledge, tacit knowledge and indigenous knowledge (Wainwright 2018).

Plural language. The singular often carries a mortgage. It may be hegemonic, such as modernity, or burdened by a conceptual legacy of reductionism, such as capitalism, or it may just be simplistic, such as 'the future' rather than futures. A basic precaution is to use concepts in the plural—such as futures rather than the future, modernities rather than modernity—because the singular has convergence thinking built in (Nederveen Pieterse 2018a).

How much. Expressions such as the straw that broke the camel's back, critical mass and tipping point all refer to thresholds of mass or magnitude. How much, how big. A quantum leap is when more means different, quantitative increase triggers qualitative change. Mass is crucial in physics (at what volume do particles coalesce as molecules), chemistry and molecular biology. Size is a key criterion to distinguish cause and effect; causes are 'larger'. The usual recourse to assess relative magnitude is quantitative analysis. Yet, indispensable as numbers are, notions such as quantum leaps and qualitative transformation indicate that quantity and quality are interdependent. Chaos theory and the 'butterfly effect' make the same point.

Transformation analysis. Part of understanding the whole is understanding the process that it is part of. For Hegel, the 'whole truth' is that the tree became a table and will become ashes. Becoming, not being, is the nature of reality.

Point counterpoint is basic to music. In body movements one movement balances another; different muscle groups push and pull. This flow is part of music, dance, theater and gymnastics. The Tai Chi symbol, yin within yang, yang within yin represents ongoing movement. To every thesis is an antithesis. The underlying flow to everything also applies to the global. All is relational across dimensions, scales, levels, world regions and countries. That there is a counterpoint to everything is fundamental to cognition. To avoid assuming that situations are static, which Norbert Elias calls 'Zustandsreduktion', it is essential to build in flow. Part of transformation is emergence—at a tipping point of critical mass, new emergent

properties take shape that may be unanticipated. Emergence is a key element in Artificial Intelligence. 'Interstitial emergence' matters in sociology—newness arises not simply from dominant institutions but often from cracks and crevices in-between institutions (Mann 1986). Jeffrey Henderson applies transformation analysis in development studies (2012), which poses the problem of how to identify time boundaries when transformation begins and ends.

Redundancy logic. To appraise people and situations, humans use all senses and take into account setting, timing, bearing, dress, language, body language and so forth. In science, redundancy logic is seeking validation from multiple sources, deductive and inductive, qualitative and quantitative, from a variety of disciplines and databases. Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of information is multivariate (Shannon and Weaver 1949; Lehman 2018). Ashby, a British pioneer of cybernetics applies the principle of 'requisite variety'. Cross validation from diverse data streams and perspectives, including experiential and anecdotal information shields against partial or patchy assessments of global trends. Anthropologists in the World Bank, neuroscientists in finance, gender analysis on trading floors (how does testosterone affect risk taking), the use of MRI in art evaluation take on board diverse data streams. In movies, alternating close-ups and panoramic views, and flashbacks and forwards, combine data streams. Redundancy, combining a network of diverse sources is a tool for getting a sense of the whole picture.

Table 4.1 sums up global studies tools; pardon a long stilted list. The point of spelling them out is not that they are novel (of course they aren't) but to make them explicit and make that which is marginal or occasional, central and methodical. Showing them in combination matters with a view to their interplay and cumulative

Table 4.1 Global studies perspectives

Tools	Global studies
Multicentric	Diverse viewpoints yield diverse patterns
Multilevel	Levels of class and status; upstairs, downstairs
Multiscalar	Scales of interaction from local to supra-national
Multi-temporal	Multiple time frames interact
Multi-sectoral	Sectors are diverse
Decentering	Understand centers also from the peripheries
Flashpoints	Hotspots where conflicts flare up
Crises	Turning points in time
Entanglement	Differences interact across space
Confluence	Diverse variables act together
Vortices	Rapid currents produce turbulence
Emotion and reason	Layered cognition
Pattern analysis	
Layered analysis	Awareness of strata of analysis
Narrative analysis	Unpack storylines and plots
Language	Multilingualism, tacit knowledge
Thinking plural	Plural language foregrounds diversity
How much	Thresholds of volume and magnitude
Transformation analysis	Make emergence and turning points visible
Redundancy logic	Cross validate using diverse data streams

effect and helps to make complexity ordinary. To avoid a lengthy overview I leave out some approaches.

This is no master key, but these tools in combination may add up to a helpful sensibility and level of awareness. A general principle is disaggregation, breaking down aggregate generalizations; because globalization is replete with sweeping generalizations unbundling them is vital. Meanwhile, at issue is not just deconstruction but also reconstruction—synthesis of discipline perspectives, data streams, pattern understandings at multiple levels, of which 'global' is just one.

Go deeply into, say, ethnicity (or religion, art, the Internet) and we find class, status, boundaries, geography, stereotypes. Zoom out and place ethnicity in a wider context and we find: political economy, demography, space, population density, technology, labor markets, uneven development and so forth. Ethnicity sheds light on globalization and the global scene illuminates ethnicity. The global figures on each side of the equation. In global consciousness each theme is a two-way portal.

Understanding the whole may be a problem but the reverse is equally true. Seeing the whole may be difficult but *not* seeing the whole is even more difficult. When we see the whole picture, the component parts make sense, as in a puzzle. *Not* connecting patterns and seeing the whole is a handicap, which is a fundamental rationale of global studies. For centuries philosophy was the queen of the sciences as it was held to synthesize the widest array of knowledge; economics was the leading social science through the twentieth century in response to political demand and arguably with limited tools. Global studies is a threshold of growing global consciousness. If it meets the growing demand for global understanding it can be a leading twenty-first-century field.

Overview

- Centers, levels, scales, sectors and time cycles are different but not separate.
- Not just different units and levels matter but also flows among them.
- Chaos can revert to order but turbulence changes the character of the component parts.
- Patterns are schemas that enable a degree of social navigation.
- Pattern analysis is called theory in social sciences.
- The role of global studies is not to promote but to proportion globalization.
- Pattern analysis includes layers, narratives, language and thresholds of quantity.
- Middle-range theories are more adaptable than grand theories.
- Events make up history, history is embedded in evolution; evolution is embedded in geological time, which is part of cosmic time, which is part of a multi-verse of atomic and quantum realms.
- Layered analysis is a remedy against scale inflation and generalizing across levels.

- Narratives are big or small, differ in the reality they encompass, the quality and range of information they include, and the quality of social cooperation they inspire. Narratives are good or bad in terms of the quality and veracity of information they hold and the nature and quality of social cooperation they inspire.
- A multicentric world involves epistemological decentralization, or else we view different centers through the lens of one particular center.
- Approaches to multicentrism can be monocentric, multicentric or omnicentric.
- Using plural language avoids the convergence thinking that is built into the singular.
- Quantity and quality are interdependent.
- Part of understanding a whole is understanding the process that it is part of.
- Redundancy logic seeks validation from multiple sources and viewpoints, from a variety of disciplines and databases.
- In global consciousness each theme is a two-way portal.
- Seeing the whole is difficult but not seeing the whole is even more difficult.

Notes

1. F. Fedeli, Pandemic tells us that EM countries have grown worlds apart, Financial Times, June 9, 2020.
2. Philip Dodd, Content is nothing without context, Financial Times January 9, 2014: 11.
3. H. Barrett, Recovery room, Financial Times November 23–24, 2019 (about a London salvage company).
4. A valuable resource is the informality project ('The Global Informality Project, www.informality.com, concerns the open secrets, unwritten rules and informal practices from all over the globe'). Some of its findings are: 'Informality is fringy but central. The more developed societies are, the less visible (and hidden behind the facades of formal institutions) are their informal norms. It is not that informality does not exist in developed societies, rather that the norms developing in these societies have pushed it out of sight'.
5. See the Bosch Research and Conservation Project, www.boschproject.org.

Histories of Globalization

5

Overview

- How old is globalization, when did it begin?
- What is the significance of global history?
- The disadvantage of taking postwar times as start time of globalization is presentism.
- The disadvantage of modernity as cutoff in globalization is Eurocentrism.
- The disadvantage of 1500 as cutoff in globalization is Eurocentrism.
- Presentism narrows the database; Eurocentric views aren't global.
- If we look further back than occidental globalization, how far back do we go?
- If oriental globalization (OG) is relevant, what about its antecedents?
- What do archeologists bring to globalization?
- How do ancient migrations, trade routes and empires relate to globalization?
- 'Time-space compression' is an often quoted description of globalization but more pertinent is arbitrage of time and space.
- Global history is a delta of universal history, history of civilizations, imperial and colonial history, thematic histories and social history.
- The modern world-system approach is Eurocentric and centrist.
- Parallel and connected history approaches recognize multiple civilizational zones, tracks interconnections across them and finds they are not reducible to one another.

How old is globalization or when did it begin? In view of the contemporary feel of many globalization effects, the question seems moot. A common understanding in media and many scholarly accounts is to view globalization as a trend of recent decades. According to a familiar account, 'The usual timescale in which

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_5

"globalization" is considered is at minimum post-Cold War, at maximum post-Second World War' (Wilkinson 2006: 69). In economics, cultural studies, communication, media and film studies, studies of marketing, international relations and much political science, the effective database of globalization runs from the 1970s or 1980s onward, as the relevant timeframe for the accelerating density of global connectivity.

What then is the significance of global history, of world-system studies and those who date global trends from earlier times? Are these mere antecedents of globalization? Does it make sense that a process as momentous as globalization would just be a few decades old? Understandings of globalization such as 'complex connectivity' situate globalization in recent decades (Tomlinson 1999: 2), but perspectives on globalization such as material and cultural exchange, economic and social flows take us much further back in time.

Several issues are at stake in periodizing globalization. First, because of its presentist leanings much research treats globalization unreflexively, narrows the database, may overlook structural patterns, present as novel what are older features, misread contemporary trends and make wider analysis impossible. Second, a presentist view implies a Eurocentric view and recycles the massive cliché that world history begins with the 'rise of the West'. Conventional cutoff points in globalization history, 1500 and 1800, echo old-fashioned Eurocentric history. Third, this view of globalization isn't global. It ignores nonwestern contributions to globalization, which doesn't match historical records and makes no sense in multipolar times when multicentric readings of history are pertinent. Fourth, it is out of step with current globalization research, including research in archeology. Fifth, the periodization of globalization is controversial in globalization research.

Periodizing globalization raises several problems. The aim of this discussion is to make the analytics and criteria that inform periodizing globalization *explicit*; the treatment is organized around key questions. The first section discusses the problems of presentism and Eurocentrism. The second section scans approaches that inform world history—such as universal, civilizational and comparative history, the Annales School and world-system analysis and thematic history—and their implications for historicizing globalization. The third question, what is the unit of analysis, is a key variable in timing globalization. The fourth question looks beyond Eurocentrism: if occidental globalization is inadequate and we look further back, then how far back do we go? The alternative thesis of oriental globalization (from approximately 500 CE) raises a further question: if oriental globalization is pertinent, what about its antecedents and infrastructure? This brings us to archeology—they may be 'latecomers to the party' (Pitts 2017: 508), but what do archeologists bring to globalization? How does the history of ancient empires relate to globalization? The concluding section incorporates various historical streams and perspectives in a framework of phases of globalization. This exercise of combining history and globalization seeks to provide X-rays of globalization thinking.

Presentism and Eurocentrism

The term globalization emerged first in business studies in the 1970s and then sprawled widely and rose steeply in the 1990s. Its rise followed the development of multinational corporations and spurts in information and communication technology, global value chains, global advertising, global finance and jet travel.

Because globalization as a theme took off in the 1990s and key texts on globalization were written in this period, much of the discussion is marked by 1990s sensibilities. Then reigning perspectives were superimposed on globalization, even though they weren't particularly global. Themes prevalent in 1990s sociology were transposed to globalization, such as Giddens who defined globalization as an 'extension of modernity' (Giddens 1990). Modernity, of course, is a western project.

'Time-space compression' became an often quoted description of globalization. It rephrases Martin Heidegger's 'abolition of distance', an account of improvements in transport and communication (Harvey 1989; Heidegger 1950/1971). Yet the idea of 'annihilation of distance' is mechanical and inappropriate. Yes, communication and travel across the planet have become easier and faster, yet time and distance still matter, in some respects more so because *access* to communication and mobility is differentiated by class, as anthropology and geography show. What is at issue is the reorganization and re-signification of time, space and distance, rather than their compression or annihilation.

In classical sociology the time frame widens with modernity as keynote, which is assumed to unfold from circa 1800 with the French Revolution and industrialization. In political economy and Marxist views the time frame widens again and the threshold is 1500, following Marx's dictum 'the conquest of the world market marks the birth of modern capitalism'. Here globalization is equivalent to 'modern capitalism'. Thus, capstone moments of globalization are 1500 and 1800. Each links back to the Renaissance: the 1500 view via the journeys of reconnaissance and Columbus and the 1800 view via the Renaissance humanists, the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment philosophes, setting the stage for modern times. By implication each also links back to antiquity, so these views on globalization incorporate the classical world, but do so via a conventional historical lens. Clearly, this is an occidental story of globalization, not a global account.

The young Marx wrote about alienation as part of the human condition; the alienation of workers from the product of their labor because of the conditions of industrial work and the appropriation of surplus value. An astute reflection on a particular historical transition. In the twentieth century, alienation was revisited as the alienation of individuals in the crowd of 'mass society'. Yet another form of alienation is alienation from history because the present is absorbing and alienation from the global because the local and the national are compelling or mesmerizing.

The disadvantage of taking postwar times (1970s) as start time of globalization is presentism or ignoring history. The disadvantage of modernity (1800) as cutoff in globalization thinking is Eurocentrism, an 'intellectual apartheid regime', a 'great wall' that cuts Europe off from global history and gives us a biased and shallow perspective on both history and modernity (Hobson 2004: 283; Jennings 2011). The

Table 5.1 Major perspectives on start of globalization

Time frame		Dynamics of globalization	Disciplines
Short	1970	Production technologies, form of enterprises, value chains, marketing, cultural flows	Economics, political science, cultural and media studies
Medium	1800	Modernity	Sociology
	1500	World market, modern capitalism	Political economy
Long	3000 BCE	Growing connectivity, urbanization, forms of social cooperation	History, anthropology, archeology

disadvantage of using 'modern capitalism' (from 1500) as cutoff is ignoring earlier forms and infrastructures of capitalism. As Fernand Braudel asked, why not the thirteenth century?

An overview of disciplines and perspectives on globalization and their timelines is in Chap. 2 (see Table 2.1). We can cluster perspectives on globalization according to three main time frames that involve different assumptions (see Table 5.1).

Applying Norbert Elias' recommendation that social science adopts a broad view and a long view (*Breitsicht und Langsicht*) to globalization research yields wide-angle and historically deep perspectives on globalization. First, the deep view breaks the spell of Eurocentrism, which is essentially the nineteenth-century view when Europe was triumphant. Second, the long view helps us to understand that the contemporary rise of emerging societies in Asia is not just a rise but a comeback, which gives us a clearer perspective on ongoing trends. Third, the long view syncs with the broad definition of globalization as growing connectivity over time, the growing density of connections between distant locations. Fourth, it breaks with representations of the past as immobile, segmented, which is refuted by research on material exchange, technology, migration and the movement of knowledge and religion (McNeill 1982, Hoerder 2002, Versluys 2015). Fifth, the long view embeds globalization in evolutionary time. Taken in this sense, globalization becomes a human species feature, part of its ecological adaptability that enables humans to inhabit all of planetary space. It becomes part of Big History, which situates planetary evolutionary processes within cosmic evolution (Spier 2010). The disadvantage of the long view is that globalization becomes an all-encompassing framework. The counterpoint is to identify phases and shifting centers of connectivity and globalization, which the closing section takes up.

World Histories

Global history is a delta of multiple streams. The widest stream is *universal history*. The origins of universal history as a genre can be traced to Greek historiography around the fifth century BCE 'in the effort to encompass the notable happenings of all the poleis and their neighbors' (Mazlish 1993: 3). Universal history 'acknowledges the totality of history' and 'can be understood as the total temporal, spatial and structural process of human development' (Kossok 1993: 93 96–7). Its lineages

include eighteenth-century encyclopedic history, von Humboldt, Laplace, d'Holbach, Kant and Hegel (Humboldt 1845; Spier 2010). Kindred views are Barraclough's 'general history' (1955) and Braudel's 'total history', 'the study of time in all its manifestations' (1980: 69).

Some approaches to universal history situate human evolution in a wider setting. The *Columbia History of the World* opens with chapters on The Earth and the Universe, The Geological Evolution of the Earth and The Evolution of Life (Garraty and Gay 1985). The Big History approach goes back to the Big Bang 13.7 billion years ago, adopts a perspective of cosmic evolution, situates human evolution in the 'galactic habitable zone' and notes that humanity represents no more than 0.005 percent of planetary biomass (Spier 2010: 27, 31). A recent speculation is that the Big Bang may be a black hole in another universe.

The history of *civilizations*, as in Gibbon, Burckhardt, Spengler and Sorokin is an early multicentric approach to history that became widely influential since Toynbee's classic *Study of History* (1934).

World history is a confluence of several currents. Among the oldest strands is the empirical history of trade routes and nodes (as in Pirenne, Curtin). The Annales School (Braudel) combines the history of trade networks with structural transformations in the longue durée. The Chicago school (McNeill, Hodgson) combines civilizational and anthropological history and archeology. McNeill's *Rise of the West* (1963) was followed by *A World History* (1967). The *Journal of World History* was founded in 1990.

Old-school state-centric *national history* widened to *regional history* (as in Reid, Gunn) and gave rise to *comparative studies* (as in Bayly, Pomeranz) and to parallel and connected history (Lieberman). Imperial and colonial history and the broad palette of thematic history (economic, social, military, cultural, art history, history of science, technology, ideas, language, mentalities, smell, etc.) all feed into global history. Histories of commodities (such as sugar, salt, cotton, indigo, amber) make wider trade links visible while histories of migration and diasporas show expanding social networks. To each of these approaches there are narrow and broad, Eurocentric and non-Eurocentric versions.

Globalization is a latecomer to this delta and figures in accounts from the 1990s onward (Mazlish and Buultjens 1993; Hopkins 2002, 2006). Initiators of *global history* such as Bruce Mazlish define it in contrast to world history as 'history in the age of globalization', which is taken to be the postwar and recent period, a common view in the 1990s (1993). The irony then is that global historians adopt a presentist view of globalization.

The timeline of conventional western history curricula is the premodern (pre-1500), early modern (1500–1850), modern (1850–1945) and contemporary era, a timeline that echoes in many accounts of globalization (Held et al. 1999, Robertson 2003, Marks 2007). In Hopkins's volume *Globalization and History*, 'archaic globalization' (preindustrial, before 1500) is followed by 'proto-globalization' (1600–1800), 'modern globalization' (from 1800) and 'contemporary globalization' (from 1950; Bayly 2004). The volume's chapters mostly deal with developments post-1600. In other words, in this account 'real globalization' refers

to 'modern globalization', which is European, western and what comes before are preludes to globalization. This caesura restates Eurocentrism—'modern history' and modern globalization start with Europe. Informed by comparative studies and acknowledging sprawling contributions to Europe's take-off, this narrative opens wide to the past and then shutters it by means of the conventional rupture of modernity (a critique is Nederveen Pieterse 2005). While this approach makes nonwestern infrastructures more visible, the 'product' remains European. This global history approach rectifies presentism with one hand and recycles Eurocentrism with the other.

Is this is a semantic issue? Many historians have traced wide and deep infrastructures of global connectivity without using the term globalization. Yet terminology matters and periodizing globalization is representing global history. The essential issue is whether or not a caesura that privileges Europe (read: modernity, modern capitalism, modern world-system, modern globalization) is appropriate. Several contributors to world history question this rupture. McNeill and Hodgson are concerned with broad civilizational lineages, drawing on archeology and anthropology of Childe, Renfrew and others (McNeill 1979, Hodgson 1974, 1993). 'Globalization' doesn't figure in these accounts but neither does a rupture of 'modernity'. Many historians reject this caesura (such as Blaut 1993, Stavrianos 1998, Frank 1998, Goody 2006).

Another approach to global history is *world-system studies*. Wallerstein's approach combines classical Marx, dependency theory and Annales school history. Wallerstein's focus on the 'long sixteenth century' (1480–1620) follows Marx. Fernand Braudel rather argued that the onset of modern capitalism in Europe took place in the thirteenth century with centers of the Levant trade such as Venice and Genoa (1979). Janet Abu-Lughod pushed not only the timeline back but also changed the geographical focus to Egypt and the Middle East (1989). Their arguments are complementary: while Braudel focuses on the northern Mediterranean, Abu-Lughod looks at the southern Mediterranean—twin sides of the Levant trade. The Mediterranean circuit was the infrastructure of the Atlantic journeys of reconnaissance, undertaken by Spain and Portugal in league with the Genoese and informed by Arab navigators (Parry 1973). The Mediterranean economy set the stage for the Atlantic economy, the focus of Marx and Wallerstein. Wallerstein is also concerned with the Low Countries and the Baltic trade (1974). Recent accounts treat the Low Countries as an extension of the Mediterranean economy (Morris 2005). Wallerstein's modern world-system over time incorporated peripheral areas, and continues to do so, which is a strong version of Eurocentrism.

Subsequent studies criticize Wallerstein's Eurocentrism, his preoccupation with the 'long sixteenth century' and the Baltic-Atlantic economies, and go further back in time (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; Frank and Gills 1993; Denemark 2000; Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005; Friedman 2008). Because it is mostly undertaken by social scientists rather than historians this approach is better known in social science and anthropology than in history. World-system studies focus on system features as units of analysis: core and periphery, the incorporation of outlying regions, and trends, cycles and crises. Arrighi added the role of semi-peripheries. Much effort

has gone into measuring cycles of expansion and contraction, A and B phases of long waves, via changes in city size and variables such as climate change (Frank 1993, Chew 2006). Core and periphery are now measured in terms of population densities (Gills and Thompson 2006: 11).

Wallerstein's modern world-system is not just Eurocentric; it is also *centrist* in claiming a *single* central world system. Centrism (and its kin universalism) is a trope that is as old as the first empires, civilizations and religions that claimed a dominant status. In nineteenth-century anthropology, diffusionism traced cultural traits to centers of diffusion, in which Egypt held the center stage. New archeological findings in the 1930s pointed to Sumer and Mesopotamia as older civilizations that influenced ancient Egypt. David Wilkinson went further and argued that from the confluence of Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations around 1500 BCE a 'central civilization' emerged along with a political-military network; a restatement of diffusionism that expands the classic focus on Egypt with Mesopotamia (1987).

Frank and Gills expand on Wilkinson's argument. They argue that 'interpenetrating accumulation' or 'interdependence between structures of accumulation and between political entities' ranged wider, extending to the Levant and to the Indus valley civilization, and occurred earlier, around 2700–2400 BCE (Frank and Gills 1993: 84; 2000). Thus, they trace the history of the world-system back from 500 to 5000 years. According to Frank, given 'the evidence for the existence of *one* immense Afro-Eurasian world system in the early Bronze Age', 'there is an unbroken historical continuity between the central civilization and world system of the Bronze Age and our contemporary modern capitalist world system'; 'the present world system was born some 5,000 years ago or earlier in West Asia, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean' (1993: 392, 387, 390).

While historical world-system studies breaks with Eurocentrism, it doesn't necessarily break with centrism. The notion of a *single center* lives on in some world-system approaches to globalization. According to Gills and Thompson, 'systemic expansion is very much akin to globalization' (2006: 10). Cioffi-Revilla distinguishes two dynamics of globalization, *endogenous* ('a process of growth or expansion that takes place within a given world region') and *exogenous* (which 'occurs between or among geographically distant world systems that had previously been disconnected from each other') (2006: 87). If we apply this to the Atlantic system, from a European viewpoint its development is endogenous whereas from the viewpoint of Africa and the Americas it is exogenous globalization, so the distinction is tenuous. Centrist world-system thinkers privilege globalization as system expansion (endogenous globalization) over exogenous globalization. Of course, 'incorporation' is a major recurrent process (Hall 2006), but it is only part of the wider story.

The significance of multiple *civilizations* is a widely shared premise. Centrist approaches have been outliers ever since Toynbee's world history. Regional and comparative history has gradually sidelined the once dominant focus on Europe and the West. Eurocentrism, a mainstay of hegemonic history, has been refuted many times over. Wallerstein's modern world-system has been overtaken by comparative world-system studies; it lives on in approaches that adopt a totalizing take on contemporary global capitalism (such as Harvey 2005 and the transnational capitalist

class approach) but has negligible influence in global history. The centrist approach in world-system studies extrapolates dependency theory's center-periphery structure to the point of reification; its weakness is that it is too one-directional. Classic world-system theory resembles structural functionalism in overemphasizing structure and has been criticized for downplaying the role of local forces in shaping world systems. Fine-grained studies of imperialism correct centrist metropolitan approaches with pericentric and web approaches (Fieldhouse 1973; Nederveen Pieterse 1989).

Frank's thesis of a single world system raises several problems: the archeological evidence is thin and sparse and the argument is loose (see comments appended to Frank 1993). Asserting a *continuous world system* doesn't make much sense and at any rate must be combined with multiple dynamics and changes of centers and routes. Its heuristic value is minor for the discontinuities are as important as the continuities and its metaphoric value is counterproductive.

Chase-Dunn contrasts views that assert a single continuous world system and comparative world-system studies. Comparative world-system studies recognize multiple civilizations (also in the Americas), avoid centrism and don't claim continuity between past world systems and the contemporary world system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

Parallel and connected history approaches recognize multiple civilizational zones, track parallel developments across them and find they have been interconnected but are not reducible to one another (Subrahmanyam 1997; Lieberman 1999, 2003). The comparative world-system approach concurs but differs in terms of the unit and methods of analysis by focusing on system features, rather than civilizations. The evolutionary world politics approach concurs as well but emphasizes transformations of political organization over time. Scanning the delta of global history there are several currents such as anthropocentric and evolutionary accounts and centric and multicentric perspectives. Table 5.2 gives a schematic overview.

In recent work, the distinction between the history of world-systems and the history of globalization fades into the background (Gills and Thompson 2006). According to Jerry Bentley, the study of 'historical globalization…maintains that the world has never been the site of discrete, unconnected communities, that cross-cultural interactions and exchanges have taken place since the earliest days of human existence on planet earth, that Europe has not always been a unique or privileged site of dynamism and progress, that identities have always been multiple and malleable' (2006a: 29).

Units of Analysis

Units of analysis in approaches to world history include empire (Gibbon), civilization (Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin), ecumene or the interplay of multiple zones (McNeill, Hodgson), world economy (Braudel), world-system (Wallerstein), networks (Mann, Castells, Chase-Dunn), cities (Jennings), innovations (Korotayev)

Table 5.2 Approaches to global history

Approaches	*Keywords and variants*	*Sources*
Eurocentric history	World history ruptures 1500, 1800	Mainstream, Bayly, Hopkins
World history	Multiple civilizations	Toynbee, Barraclough, McNeill, etc.
	Parallel and connected history	Subrahmanyam, Lieberman
Global history	Successor to world history	Mazlish, Buultjens, Bentley
World-system studies	Modern world-system, from 1500	Wallerstein, Cioffi-Revilla
	A single world system 5000 years	Frank and Gills
	Comparative world-system studies	Chase-Dunn, Anderson, Friedman
Archeology	Material and cultural exchange, networks, cities	Labianca/Scham, Jennings, Versluys
Evolutionary world politics	Transformation of political institutions	Thompson, Modelski
Evolutionary history, Big History	Embedded in planetary evolution	Garrathy and Gay, Spier

and material and cultural exchange (archeology). World history has a long lineage, but history of globalization is a recent preoccupation. How does globalization enter the conversation?

Economists prefer hard, quantifiable definitions of globalization. O'Rourke and Williamson take as the criterion for globalization the convergence of commodity prices across continents, which they time in the 1820s (2002, 2004). Flynn and Giraldez ask, 'At what point does the integration of world regions become "globalization"?' (2006: 234). In their view, globalization means 'the permanent existence of global trade' when all major zones of the world 'exchange products continuously…and on a scale that generated deep and lasting impacts on all trading partners'. They conclude that 'the birth of globalization occurred in 1571, the year that Manila was founded as a Spanish entrepôt connecting Asia and the Americas' (2006: 244).

The emergence of a *world economy* is a familiar threshold of globalization. In Braudel's terms, it refers to the merger of economic worlds into a world economy, or 'the "compression" of human history into a worldwide system of reciprocal communication…penetrations, influences, and dependencies' (Kossok 1993: 7). This is often timed to occur around 1500. Braudel and Abu-Lughod date this in the 1200s, which follows the cultural efflorescence in the Muslim world and Al-Andalus; and research on Asia broadly concurs (Frank 1998, Gunn 2003). John Hobson times this much earlier. In his view, while global connections run as far back as 3500 BCE, 'the big expansion of global trade occurred during the post-600 period'. Hobson takes 500 CE as start time of globalization, under the heading of oriental globalization, spurred by 'the revival of camel transport between 300 and 500' (2004: 35, 34). A different perspective holds that a '*commercial revolution*' unfolded from 1000 BCE:

> a web of direct commercial ties that linked a very large portion of the world, with active points in the eastern Mediterranean, south China, and India, and with connections to Europe, West Africa, East Africa, Indonesia, Central Asia, the north Pacific and the western Pacific. The main elements of this new system of commerce and its changes from earlier systems of exchange included: an expanded set of commodities; the use of widely recognized systems of money; the development of new technology of shipping, accounting, and merchandising; the establishment of well-traveled commercial routes, with ports and caravanserai; the creation of social institutions of commerce such as trade diasporas; and the development of ideas and philosophies to address the problems of commerce. (Manning 2005: 87; cf. Ehret 1998)

'The era of the commercial revolution was also a time in which major new traditions developed in religion and ethical philosophy. Zoroaster and the Buddha, Confucius, Laotse, the Hebrew prophets, the Greek philosophers, Jesus and others preached about the fundamental issues of life, death, community, and destiny' (Manning 89). This era matches Karl Jaspers' axial age (800–200 BCE), which stands out as a major acceleration in growing global consciousness.

If we adopt a wider criterion and take the development of *trade links between distant regions* as a minimal threshold of globalization, it leads further back to the Bronze Age. Early trade in Eurasia is mixed in with tribute and booty. Besides silk and cotton from China, early trade includes lapis lazuli, turquoise, agate and beads. The Jade Road from China to Central Asia dates back to 3000 BCE and the early Silk Road, from Xian to the Mediterranean, goes back to 800 BCE (Mair 1998: 64, 258, 555). This coincides with the timing of early technologies of commerce, such as charging interest on loans, which dates back to 3000 BCE in Sumer (Mieroop 2009).

Archeologists such as Jennings take the formation of cities as threshold of globalization in the sense of nodal points in connectivity and in the emergence of 'global culture' loosely defined (Jennings 2011). The Uruk period (4200–3100 BCE) ranks 'as a critical period of rapid urbanization and social change in the wider Mesopotamian world' with Uruk Warka as the major urban center, which at its peak was three times the size of Athens (Jennings 2011: 58). In sum, we have the following thresholds for globalization, from early to recent (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Thresholds of globalization

Time	*Criteria*	*Sources*
4200 BCE	Development of cities	Jennings
3000 BCE	Trade linking multiple regions	Mair, Goody
	Innovations, diffusion of technology and information	Korotayev
1000 BCE	Trade linking a large part of the world	Manning, Ehret
500 CE	Emergence of a world economy	Hobson
1200		Braudel, Abu-Lughod
1500		Marx, Wallerstein
1571	Trade linking all major zones of the world	Flynn/Giraldez
1820s	Convergence of commodity prices across continents	O'Rourke/Williamson
1960s	Multinational corporations	General
1980s	ICT, containerization, end of Cold War, post-Fordism	

However, what most of these thresholds (from 500 CE) have in common is that they are measures not of globalization but of *globality*. They assume that for globalization to occur there must first be globality, so they take the outcome as a precondition for the *process* through which it comes about. This is part of a recurrent confusion between globalization as process and as condition or outcome, between globalization and globalness. Should globalization be *global* in a literal sense and encompass the world? Should it refer to conditions that are 'sufficiently global' according to a minimum threshold? Rejoinders to this view are, first, globalization refers to a process, not a condition. According to dictionary definitions, global means worldwide; globalization then refers to *becoming worldwide*. Second, as Abu-Lughod notes, global connections are never *entirely* global: 'No world system is *global*, in the sense that all parts articulate evenly with one another' (1989: 8). Third, recent history of antiquity suggests a shift to less structuralist and more processual understandings of globalization, a turn to processes, trade routes and nodes, migrations and interconnections. Here globalization functions as a heuristic, 'a shift in attention paid to questions of knowledge, communication flows, actor-network relations, interconnections, spatiality, mediality, agency, etc.' (Holban 2012; cf. Frank 1996). An example is focusing on the diffusion of innovations and technologies as a driver of globalization (Korotayev 2005).

If we include *thematic histories*, the units of analysis of world history widen further and in diverse directions. In fact, there are as many histories of globalization as there are dimensions of globalization. A sample is the following.

- Histories of civilization—such as Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Tiryakian.
- Histories of religion—such as Weber, Jaspers, Tawney.
- Histories of empire and military histories.
- Histories of science and technology—such as Needham, Bernal, McNeill, Goonatilake, Goody, Korotayev. Technologies of transport (horse, chariot, lateen sail, steamship, refrigeration), navigation (compass, sextant) and communication (fiber optic cables, satellites, Internet) impact globalization directly.
- Histories of irrigation—such as Roman aqueducts, Wittfogel's hydraulic civilization.
- Histories of architecture and engineering—such as Persian gardens.
- Histories of art—such as Wittkower, Honour.
- Histories of commodities—such as salt, tin, sugar, cotton, spices, indigo, paprika, cashew nuts, wine, jade, silk, porcelain, amber, diamonds, tea, coffee, cocoa.
- Culinary histories—such as cuisine of the Middle East and the Ottoman world, work on imperial taste buds and the journal *Food and Foodways* (Tapper and Zubaida 1994, Collingham 2017).
- Histories of linguistics; histories of costumes and fashion and so on (Racinet 2016).

Thematic histories are typically multicentric. The unit of analysis is the object or theme; they are histories in the plural because they diversify according to national and regional viewpoints and databases. They concern geographical mobility and spread and overlap with adjacent terrains. They involve intercultural

communication and osmosis. They affect the shapes and profiles of cultures, mentalities and Zeitgeist.

I define globalization as the trend of growing worldwide connectivity (Nederveen Pieterse 2015a: 19). Connectivity is a better yardstick than integration, which is too strong a term. Growing worldwide connectivity is the keynote of many recent accounts of globalization. This definition is general, matter of fact and processual. It implies a long view for obviously growing connectivity is not a recent trend. It doesn't require a specific beginning or threshold. In this view, globalization is spurred by transport and communication technologies, institutions of commerce and security conditions. The rhythms of globalization follow the vicissitudes of connectivity, which aren't always in forward motion; there are accelerations as well as decelerations of connectivity. These dynamics then frame the phases of globalization (discussed below).

Oriental Globalization[1]

The sixteenth-century Portuguese writer Tomé Pires observed, 'Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hands on the throat of Venice' (quoted in Abu-Lughod 1989: 291). 'Venice survived because Egypt survived, sustained by the persistence of the southern route to Asia', according to Abu-Lughod (215). Abu-Lughod views the thirteenth-century world system of Egypt and the Levant as part of eight interlinked subsystems which 'can be grouped into three larger circuits—the western European, the Middle Eastern and the Far Eastern' (33–34). This perspective matches Frank's *ReOrient* and historians of Asia and the Indian Ocean. This places the beginnings of a world economy in Song China and India from 1000 or 1100 CE. Asia remained the driving force of the world economy until 1800 (Pomeranz 2000 and others concur). A shorthand account of this phase of globalization is the later Silk Routes.

Much Silk Roads history, in view of its heading, focuses on the east-west movement of trade and culture. This downplays that the east-west movement was preceded and accompanied by west-east movements, from the Middle East to Asia, as part of a long history of osmosis in both directions. An essential part of this history is Muslim traders going east, as far as China and Korea. Muslim traders reconnected China and East Asia with the world economy, which was centered at the time in the Middle East; reconnected because there were earlier trade links between East Asia and the Greco-Roman world, but the overland silk routes declined after the fall of the Roman Empire (Teggart 1939, Abu-Lughod 1989, Sherrat 2006). Ninth-century postmasters in Persia and the Arab world kept detailed records of Asian routes as far as Korea (Hoerder 2002). According to Jack Goody, 'In the ninth century there were said to be over 100,000 Muslim merchants in Canton' (2010: 254). Muslim Afro-Eurasia was a vast intercultural expanse in which merchants and scholars traveled; the world of Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides, a world in which Chinese, Indian, Persian, Turkic, Central Asian, Muslim, Arabic, Mongol, Jewish and Berber cultures were interconnected. The *Dâr al-Islâm*, the 'abode of Islam' was not the world's earliest cosmopolitanism but one that stretched further and

endured longer than any other (Hodgson 1974, Nederveen Pieterse 2007). This gave rise to the encounter of the trading religions Buddhism and Islam (Elverskog 2010). Zheng He, the great Chinese mariner and predecessor of Columbus, was a Hui-Muslim, also known as Ma Sanbao and Hajji Mahmud Shamsuddin. Surely the '*Pax Islamica* that stretched from Morocco to Mataram' (Hopkins 2002: 33) is a major part of globalization history.

Abu-Lughod adopts a world-system approach while being critical of the definition of world systems (1989: 9), so hers is crossover work that opens to wider horizons. While her focus is the 1250–1350 period as a 'world system' she discusses earlier trade and prosperity. She notes that among the routes between Asia and the Levant, by comparison to the northern overland route via Armenia, and the southern Red Sea route via Egypt, the 'middle route' via the Persian Gulf was the older and most convenient link; Baghdad declined after the reign of Harun al-Rashid and the Abbasids (Abu-Lughod 1989; Kazim 2000, Hoerder 2002). This suggests a timeline similar to Hobson's. Hobson places the origins of a world economy around 500 CE with the resumption of the caravan trade, centered on Baghdad and Mecca: 'oriental globalisation was the midwife, if not the mother, of the medieval and modern West' (Hobson 2004: 36).

In later work, Hobson distinguishes four historical phases, marked by varying relative strengths of Oriental and Occidental influences. In the first phase (500–1450), the extensity, intensity, velocity and impact of Afro-Eurasian interactions qualify as 'proto-globalization'. In this phase, Orientalization was dominant in the sense that the 'proto-global network was crucial for delivering Eastern resource portfolios into Europe'. The second phase, 'early globalization' (1450–1830), was a period characterized as 'Orientalization dominant and Occidentalization emergent'. The third phase, 'modern globalization' (1830–2000), witnessed 'Occidentalization in the ascendance, with the West being the dominant civilization,' which was achieved by colonization and neocolonial globalization, that is, Western capitalism. The current phase, 'postmodern globalization' sees 'the return of China to the center of the global economy' (Hobson 2012).

In short, we have multiple phases of oriental globalization: (a) Eurasian globalization of early Silk Roads; (b) Middle East and West Asian globalization with caravan trade moving to East Asia, west to east; (c) East Asia-driven globalization of the later Silk Roads from the Song era onward, east to west; (d) the twenty-first-century comeback of East Asia and the rise of China, and (e) China's Belt and Road Initiative.

This view differs markedly from Eurocentric accounts, provides nuances of relative influence and credits oriental influences, past and present. I find this perspective meaningful with provisos. First, it should be viewed as part of long ongoing processes of east-west osmosis further back in time: 'globalization is braided' (Nederveen Pieterse 2019). Second, the terminology of modernity (and variants premodern, postmodern) carries Eurocentric luggage and is best avoided in periodizing globalization. Third, considering that mapping and timing globalization are codependent it makes sense to combine geographical and temporal markers to identify phases of globalization.

Historians of antiquity used to view globalization as a 'modern' or contemporary phenomenon and kept their distance from it. Hopkins's volume *Globalization and History* (2002) prompted historians of antiquity to ask whether the Greco-Roman world is part of globalization history (Pitts 2011, Pitts and Versluys 2015a). Archeologists joined the globalization discussion adopting material exchange and networks approaches and focusing on the formation of cities (Labianca and Scham 2006, Jennings 2011).

In archeology, the focus is on material exchange and connectivity, which overlaps with cultural networks (as in the adoption of ceramic styles across regions and, for example, the spread of Olmec style in Mexico and Guatemala in the second millennium BCE). Social hierarchy and stratification also matter (as in status distinctions in funerary styles, as in Hallstatt styles during the Iron Age in Europe). Material connectivity includes obsidian in the Stone Age, copper and tin in the Bronze Age, as well as ceramics, gemstones, metals, weapons, cattle, food and cloth. Transcultural material exchange includes knowledge and techniques and sheds light on interregional networks of interaction.

With their insights in connectivity and comparative data across multiple regions, archeologists push the timelines of connectivity back. Thus, long-distance trade in obsidian during the Stone Age, centered in Catalhöyuk, Anatolia, goes back to 5000 BCE (Rice 1997). Finds in Uruk Warka, Mesopotamia push urbanization back to the late fifth millennium BCE. In Southeast Asia, the 'globalization of food' is traced to the fourth millennium BCE and extensive seafaring to the second millennium BCE. Persia is part of interregional networks during the first millennium BCE, and so forth. How these findings and understandings of connectivity affect globalization discussions depends on analytics of globalization that archeologists use—which among archeologists is as diverse as it is in social sciences and humanities (see Hodos 2017).

Retiming Globalization

As discussed, assessments of the timing of globalization range widely, from globalization as part of planetary evolution, as long-term processes going back to 3000 BCE and possibly a millennium earlier, as a commercial revolution unfolding 1000 BCE; as a world economy taking shape 500 CE, 1100, 1200 or 1500; as modernity, 1800; and as a recent trend from the 1970s.

So when did globalization begin? How we identify the start time of globalization depends on how we define globalization and what we take to be the unit of analysis. If globalization is defined as a condition of *global connectedness* a start time after 1500 would make sense. The problem is that this makes the outcome (being globally connected) a precondition of the process through which it comes about (*becoming* globally connected); it places the cart before the horse. For instance, according to Leslie Sklair globalization requires the simultaneous occurrence of eight trends (time-space compression, deterritorialization, standardization, unevenness, homogenization, heterogeneity, re-embedding of local culture, and vulnerability), which

are a mishmash. In archeology to assess what was and was not a period of prior globalization, Jennings applies the same eight thresholds of complex connectivity as yardsticks (Sklair 2006, Jennings 2017). These yardsticks put the cart before the horse and the same reservations apply as discussed above (see Chap. 2).

If globalization is defined as the process of *becoming globally connected* and the awareness of this happening, we can distinguish several layers and levels of connectivity with different start times. At one level, if the unit of analysis of globalization is *growing connectivity*, connections are as old as human history, as old as when people dispersed and wandered across the planet (Gamble 1993). Connectivity became substantial and sustained once production surplus was generated as a basis for exchange and trade, which points to agriculture, particularly plow agriculture, and urbanization—conditions that first became widely available during the Bronze Age. This enabled interregional trade which received a boost around 1000 BCE and was accompanied by a surge in global consciousness—the axial age.

Many globalization studies are steeped in presentism and Eurocentrism. The general principle is the later the timing of globalization the greater Europe's role and the more Eurocentric the perspective (Nederveen Pieterse 2019). The long view gives us deeper insight into the depth of human interconnectedness and matches recent human genome research (see Chap. 7). While the advantage of taking the long view is that it embeds globalization in the longue durée and in evolutionary time, the disadvantage is that globalization becomes too wide and sprawling a category. Remedying this requires identifying phases and zones of global history, which then poses problems of demarcating and labeling periods.

The general idea of *phases of globalization* that sync with advances in transport, communication, travel and awareness is well-established. Robertson notes accelerations of globalization in 1500, the 1800s, the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1992). If globalization is defined as growing connectivity, the rhythms of globalization are a function of connectivity conditions, which are spurred by technologies of transport and communication and conditions of security (such as the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica). Reviewing the literature, 3000 BCE is a relevant time range with the additional stipulation of the commercial revolution of 1000 BCE as a major acceleration and deepening of connectivity and cross-border awareness, which matches many findings.

On the basis of this discussion, we can revisit the timing of globalization and fill in lacunae by showing early and intermediate phases of globalization (see Table 5.4). Considerations that inform this periodization are the following. Globalization in the sense of sustained interregional trade unfolds with the Bronze Age in Eurasia. Interregional trade underwent a boost from 1000 BCE and linked Afro-Eurasia. Antiquity and the Greco-Roman world are intermediary phases between the Bronze Age and oriental globalization. In the first phase of oriental globalization (OG1), trade flows are primarily eastward, from West Asia (Middle East) toward East Asia. In OG2, the balance is westward, from East Asia toward West Asia (Middle East), resuming the early Silk Routes and with additional maritime Spice Routes. Distinctive for the period from 1500 is the growing role of Europe and the Americas, the triangular trade and the Atlantic exchange while the role of Asia is ongoing.

Table 5.4 Phases of globalization

Phases	*Start time*	*Central nodes*	*Dynamics*
Bronze Age	3000 BCE	Eurasia, Mesopotamia, Egypt	Agricultural and urban revolutions, trade, ancient empires
Afro-Eurasian	1000 BCE	West Asia, Greco-Roman world, Africa	Commercial revolution, growing cross-cultural awareness
OG1	500 CE	Middle East, West Asia	Emergence of a world economy, caravan trade
OG2	1100	East and South Asia and multicentric	Productivity, technology, urbanization; Silk Routes
Multicentric	1500	Atlantic expansion	Triangular trade; spice trade
Euro-Atlantic	1800	Euro-Atlantic economy	Industrialization, colonial division of labor
20C globalization	1950	US, Europe, Japan: Trilateral	Multinational corporations, (end of) Cold War, global value chains
21C globalization	2000	East Asia, China, emerging economies	New geography of trade; global rebalancing

Characteristic of the phase from 1800 is industrialization along with colonialism and imperialism. Twentieth-century globalization includes the world wars, the rise of multinational corporations and the Cold War. The period from 2000 ushers in new patterns of twenty-first-century globalization, which is work in progress. Obviously, this is only a shorthand overview.

Another question is centrism or multicentrism. Multicentrism is based on the premise of 'multiple origins of social complexity, not on a single origin from which social complexity radiated' (Cioffi-Revilla 89). This premise is widely shared. That multicentrism can go together or be interspersed with periods of hegemony does not undermine the premise itself. Rather it sheds light on the diversity of practices of empire and hegemony, particularly at the frontiers, whether during the Roman Empire (Wells 1999: 122f; Woolf 1997), the British Empire or American hegemony. This is important not merely in historical terms but also conceptually. The premise of multicentrism rectifies the proclivity toward the *singular* that is widespread in social science and the humanities—as in capitalism, modernity, rather than capitalisms, modernities (Nederveen Pieterse 2018). Bentley rightly criticizes 'modernocentrism' as a deeper problematic than Eurocentrism (2006).

Reviewing histories of globalization shows that globalization has been multicentric all along, which is relevant also for contemporary trends. In light of the ancient globalizations (Mesopotamian, Afro-Eurasian, oriental), western hegemony is a latecomer. Twenty-first-century globalization breaks the 200-year pattern of dominant North-South relations with an East-South turn, so western hegemony emerges as a historical interlude (approximately 1800–2000) and present times indicate a return to a historical normal in which Asian dynamics have been the driving force of the world economy through most of the career of globalization.

This chapter has outlined analytics and criteria that inform periodizing globalization. It criticizes presentist and Eurocentric views on globalization—the view

according to which globalization is recent and contemporary; the modernity view (1800 plus) or the capitalism view (1500 plus). It discusses approaches to world history and how globalization fits in. Understandings of globalization and of units of analysis inform the timelines of globalization. Archeology contributes insights in transcultural material exchange to globalization studies and pushes the timelines of globalization back. The chapter concludes by outlining phases of globalization in the very longue durée. Taking global history back to oriental globalization and the Bronze Age requires including the Greco-Roman world as part of global history, which the next chapter takes up.

Overview

- Units of analysis in world history approaches include empire, civilization, world economy, world-system, networks, cities, innovations and material and cultural exchange.
- Thresholds for globalization include the development of cities, trade linking multiple regions, innovations, diffusion of technology, the emergence of a world economy, trade linking all major zones of the world, convergence of commodity prices, multinational corporations and the end of the Cold War.
- The 'commercial revolution' of 1000 BCE is a prelude to the axial age (800–200 BCE).
- Economists offer quantifiable definitions of globalization (such as global trade involving all major zones of the world, 1571, or the convergence of commodity prices across continents, the 1820s).
- Histories of globalization are as many as there are dimensions of globalization such as civilization, religion, science and technology, irrigation, cities, architecture and engineering, art, costumes and fashion, commodities, linguistics, cuisines.
- Thematic histories refer to diverse databases and viewpoints and are multicentric.
- Phases of Oriental globalization include (a) early Eurasian Silk Roads, (b) Middle East caravan trade to East Asia, (c) East Asia-driven Silk Roads and (d) the twenty-first-century comeback of East Asia.
- Archeologists push timelines of connectivity back: urbanization and long-distance trade to 5000 BCE, the globalization of food to 4000 BCE, extensive seafaring to 2000 BCE, and interregional networks to 1000 BCE.
- The start time of globalization depends on the definition and the unit of analysis of globalization.
- Defining globalization as global connectedness makes the outcome a precondition of the process through which it comes about.

- Defining globalization as the process of becoming globally connected and the awareness of this happening means distinguishing levels of connectivity with different start times.
- If the unit of analysis is growing connectivity, connections are as old as human history.
- Substantial and sustained connectivity involved surplus, which became available during the Bronze Age.
- Identifying phases of global history poses problems of demarcating periods.
- Globalization in the sense of sustained interregional trade unfolds with the Bronze Age in Eurasia. Interregional trade underwent a boost from 1000 BCE and linked Afro-Eurasia. Antiquity and the Greco-Roman world are intermediary phases between the Bronze Age and oriental globalization.
- This chapter outlines criteria that inform periodizing globalization and criticizes presentist and Eurocentric views. It outlines phases of globalization in the very longue durée.

Note

1. Elsewhere I devote a chapter to Oriental globalization (Nederveen Pieterse 2018); this section takes a more historical approach.

Decentering Rome

6

Overview

- Romanization, the classic approach in ancient Roman history, follows the state-centric approach in history and places Rome at the center.
- Historians and archeologists of ancient Roman have turned to globalization as an alternative approach.
- Globalization perspectives situate the Roman world in wider streams of history and connectivity and decenter Rome.
- Rome is globalized, on the receiving end of influences, and globalizing, passing on many influences.

Ten minutes' walk from the Colosseum in Rome is the twelfth-century Basilica di San Clemente. At a level below the basilica is a fourth-century Christian church. At a deeper level below is a second-century temple to Mithras with an altar of the god slaying a bull, and a first-century Roman house. Further below rushes the Cloaca Maxima, the sewer system built in the sixth century BCE. In one building are two churches dedicated to Christ and a temple for the Persian god Mithras, worshipped by Roman legionnaires. The depths of ancient Rome combine imports from Persia, the Middle East and Byzantium with Roman engineering skills.

Yet the paradigm that has long guided ancient Roman history is Romanization. In the words of Haverfield, 'Greece taught men to be human and Rome made mankind civilized…the form it took was Romanization' (2012). The Romanization paradigm is now an old and weary narrative in history of ancient Roman (Mattingly 2004; Pitts and Versluys 2015a; Hingley 2012). It places Rome at the center and as standard bearer without much reflection on how this center has come about. Obviously, Romanization is just half the story. It echoes the state-centric approach that has long dominated history. Historians and archeologists of ancient Roman

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_6

have turned to globalization as an alternative approach, which has sparked wide discussion (Hingley 2005; Naerebout 2006–2007). At issue is which approach to globalization and which approach to the Greco-Roman world. Does globalization apply to antiquity when global conditions or conditions of complex connectivity did not yet exist? In contrast to Romanization, globalization perspectives on the Roman world situate Rome in the wider stream of history. They decenter Rome and in doing so, place Rome in wider fields of connectivity. In these views, Rome is globalized, on the receiving end of many influences, and globalizing, synthesizing and passing on diverse legacies and influences.

The first section of this chapter discusses approaches in archeology and history of ancient Rome. The second section asks not what globalization can do for Rome but what Rome can do for globalization. What is the contribution of Greco-Roman history to globalization studies? The third section elaborates the two-way perspective of Rome being globalized and globalizing.

Greco-Roman History

In recent archeological studies of the Greco-Roman world, mobility and connectivity loom large. According to Morris, a new model is taking shape in Mediterranean history: 'Where the old model emphasized static cells, rigid structures, and powerful institutions, the new one sees fluidity and connectedness' (2005: 31). In its strongest form the new model links up 'the whole period from later prehistory to the eighteenth, nineteenth, or even twentieth century'. 'The three concepts of mobility, connectivity and decentering are at the heart of recent historical/anthropological treatments of the Mediterranean', which 'sets it apart from many 1970s and 1980s accounts of ancient Mediterranean history' (Morris 2005: 31, 37). Principles of materiality, mobility and contact inform a new archeology and history of the Mediterranean; material connections and 'processes such as long-distance and prolonged migrations, hybrid practices and object diasporas' as part of the 'social biography of objects' take center stage (Knapp and van Dommelen 2010: 1, 6; van Dommelen 2006).

We find similar sensibilities in material and cultural studies of Greco-Roman history. Hybrid Rome and the 'inherent pluralism' of the Roman world are well-established; related themes are syncretism, creolization and multicultural antiquity (Versluys 2010; Hingley 2005; Webster 2001). The Roman world is an assemblage of diverse influences in every sphere—economic, political, cultural and symbolic. The entire Greco-Roman world may be viewed as a sphere of 'continuous circularity' from the Iron Age and possibly from the Bronze Age onward (Versluys 2015: 164). Etruscans, Greece and Egypt are prominent influences along with Persia, Phoenicians and the influence of colonized lands and peoples. Egyptian influence, notes Versluys, includes casting the Roman emperor in the image of the pharaoh (2015: 149).

Both archeological and cultural studies of ancient Rome accept globalization as a productive approach to Roman history, or at any rate, share sensibilities such as an

emphasis on mobility and mélange. In contrast, state-centric accounts of Roman history tend to adopt views that center on Rome and the evolution of state institutions. In Hitchner's view, the Roman super-state unified the fragmented world of the ancient empires and with Caracalla's institution of Roman citizenship in 212 CE, this process of unification evolved at a further level, and a gradual process of decline set in from the third century (Hitchner 2008). While Hitchner recognizes pushback from Rome's peripheries in the first century CE, his account is generally Rome-centric and a restatement of the Romanization paradigm, in which the empire is the globalizing force (alternative perspectives are Witcher 2000; Geraghty 2007). Romanization, of course, matters and new archeological and cultural accounts emphasize that they don't seek to marginalize the significance of institutions and empire, but place the emphasis differently. In state-centric accounts it is structures and institutions that unify the Mediterranean world while in globalization perspectives connectivity, mobility and knowledge networks do.

These strands of ancient Roman history are crisscrossed by macro-historical views, in which Greco-Roman history is more often a bystander than a protagonist. Most historians of ancient Rome who adopt a globalization perspective follow Hopkins's periodization of globalization (Pitts and Versluys 2015a; discussed in Chap. 5), although a wider periodization would be far more relevant to understanding the Greco-Roman world.

Ask What Rome Can Do for Globalization

Historians of ancient Rome look to globalization as an alternative perspective to overcome the limitations of Romanization while scholars of globalization rather ask, how can we learn from ancient and Roman history and archeology to deepen and refine understandings of globalization? Keynotes that emerge from Greco-Roman history concern the timeline of globalization, the analytics and unit of analysis of globalization, questions of mobility and lineages of cosmopolitanism.

First, Roman history matters with regard to the timeline of globalization. If we accept that the Arab-Muslim world was the epicenter of early oriental globalization (see Chap. 5), we cannot properly understand it without taking into account its building on Greco-Roman legacies. The Islamic world carried a Hellenic character (with classical knowledge and translations of classical Greek texts) and Roman technologies. Many towns in Al-Andalus were built on ancient Roman settlements and used Roman construction techniques. The Alhambra in Granada (Elvira) and the Alcazar in Seville used Roman irrigation technologies and aqueducts. Roman aquaculture influenced the style of Islamic gardens. Thus, starting globalization in 500 CE is inadequate; as the onset of a world economy, this too had its precursors. This includes the contributions of the Greco-Roman world as a nexus between globalization phases and as a major accelerator of globalization.

With regard to analytics, ancient history and archeology confront us with the recurrent confusion between globalization as process and as condition, between globalization and globalness (Pitts and Versluys 2015a; Morley 2015; this volume,

Chaps. 2 and 5). Should globalization be 'global'? Should globalization be literally global and encompass the world; or should it refer to conditions that are 'sufficiently global'?

A familiar form of this question is the idea of the *world economy* as the threshold of globalization, in the sense of a trans-regional division of labor that is necessary for social reproduction (as in Wallerstein's world-system approach). A world economy in this sense does not apply to all ancient empires but does apply to the Roman world, which established and sustained an interregional division of labor that comprised olive-grape agriculture (Gaul, Spain), grain (Egypt, North Africa) and Mediterranean trades (Woolf 1997). The map of Roman value chains matches the 'greater Mediterranean' argued in recent accounts, extending from Sumer to the Danube (and in the sixteenth century to Antwerp) (Morris 2005: 36, 45; Horden and Purcell 2000).

Current ancient history and archeology makes an analytical shift to processual understandings of globalization as trade routes and nodes, migrations and interconnections. This included significant relations with Persia, India and China (wine, silk, muslin). Trade with India was direct; traces such as Roman coins and amphorae have been found in Cochin (Kerala). Also important was India in Roman representations, going back to Alexander and Greek antecedents, as a place of 'naked philosophers' and as an outer parameter of Roman reach (Parker 2008).

Trade with China was indirect via Persia, Syria and Damascus. Chinese traders reached the Roman world, known as 'Da Qin', probably mainly as far as Damascus and Syria. Chinese records of 166 CE allege that a Chinese envoy reached Da Qin in 130 BCE and a Roman envoy visited the Chinese emperor (Sitwell 1986: 130, 146–147), but no Roman or other records confirm this. Second-century CE Chinese records discuss routes to Da Qin. The main overland route led via the 'Jade Gate' through central Asia, but sea routes were also used. First-century Chinese records of Da Qin note: 'they regularly make a profit by obtaining Chinese silk, unraveling it, and making *hu* ("Western") silk damasks. That is why this country trades with Anxi (Parthia) across the middle of the sea'.[1] Chinese descriptions of Da Qin products show detailed knowledge: 'Gold-threaded embroidery, polychrome (warp twill) fine silk or chiffon, woven gold cloth, purple handkerchiefs, *falu* cloth, purple *chiqu* cloth, asbestos cloth, fine silk gauze cloth, shot silk, "clinging cloth" or "cloth with swirling patterns", *dudai* cloth, Wensu cloth, multi-colored *tao* cloth, crimson curtains woven with gold, and small, round multi-colored mosquito nets'. This research also brings the silk routes further back in time (Hill 2011a, b). Silk was part of Roman culture and of Rome's foreign trade (Cohen 2000: 12), but was a luxury good, not a product that was necessary for social reproduction.

Third, with regard to mobility, it breaks with stereotypical representations of the past as immobile, fragmented segmented, sheltered, closed off, which is belied by extensive research on mobility in the ancient world, on migrations in the first millennium, and on the spread of religion and the travel of knowledge and technology (McNeill 1982; Hoerder 2002; Isayev 2015).

Empires are per definition multiethnic. They are early multiculturalism, in a matter of fact sense and usually in an institutional sense with rules and provisions for

nomads, pilgrims, foreigners and minority populations. It is difficult to talk about multiethnicity or multiculturalism in ancient times or across history because the meanings of ethnicity, cultural difference or whatever concepts we use, are fluid and change radically over time. There was xenophobia but no 'racism' in the ancient Mediterranean world, even if we consider the role and treatment of corsairs, slaves and prisoners of war.

The Mediterranean world as a multicultural world is addressed in 'cosmopolitan archeology' (Meskell 2009; cf. Witcher 2015). Muslim cosmopolitanism, for instance, in the Caliphate of Córdoba continued the multiculturalism of the Mediterranean world. The Ottoman Millet system continued Mediterranean and Muslim multiculturalism. This doesn't carry the normative sense of twentieth-century multiculturalism because ideas about cultural difference and boundaries have changed.

Fourth, the Greco-Roman world is significant in relation to globalization as subjectivity, the evolution of cosmopolitanism and global consciousness (Edwards and Woolf 2003). The Stoics often figure as an early cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum 2006). Polybius's *Histories* is often mentioned as a precursor of global sociology, centuries before Ibn Khaldun (Inglis and Robertson 2006; Isayev 2015). After the Punic wars between 160 and 120 BCE, Polybius wrote,

> Now in earlier times the world's history had consisted, so to speak, of a series of unrelated episodes, the origins and results of each being as widely separated as their localities, but from this point onwards [after the Second Punic war] history becomes an organic whole: the affairs of Italy and Africa are connected with those of Asia and of Greece, and all events bear a relationship and contribute to a single end. (*Histories* 1.3, quoted in Pitts and Versluys 2015b: 18)

'Orbis terrarum' is an early global consciousness. The major ancient cosmopolitanisms, the Greco-Roman world with Latin and Indic civilization with Sanskrit, overlap in time (Pollock 1996). After the Latin and Sanskrit worlds unraveled and gave way to local vernaculars, Islamic civilization and Arabic emerged as the next major cosmopolitan world, bridging East and West. At its widest expanse it stretched from Muslim Iberia to Muslim traders in China. As subjectivity it carried Hellenic legacies. The Ottoman Millet system continued the legacy of Mediterranean, Hellenic and Muslim cosmopolitanism.

If we explore how ancient Roman history can work with globalization, the key point is to decenter Rome. Decentering Rome means viewing Roman history from the outside, as a regional subset of wider history. In other words, it concerns the difference between inward- and outward-looking perspectives on the unit of analysis. In several ways, this is already part of archeology and history of the Greco-Roman world—Rome as inheritor civilization of Etruscan, Greek, Persian, Phoenician and Egyptian influences. Long before the Romans the Etruscans engaged in long-distance trade as far as Asia Minor. Second, the perspective of Mediterraneanization decenters Rome as part of the Mediterranean world. Third, the Bronze Age is an important link. Helle Vandkilde uses the term Bronzization rather than globalization (2017). Jack Goody's work takes us back to the Bronze Age, ranges widely across

Eurasia and offers articulate criticisms of Eurocentric views. In his view, there is not one but there are 'many Renaissances' and the miracle is not Europe but Eurasia (Goody 2010a, b; Nederveen Pieterse 2011). Stretching across Eurasia, Bronze Age culture brought plow agriculture, the use of animal traction, an urban revolution and the ongoing existence of urban culture. This is profoundly relevant to ancient Roman history. From this viewpoint, the Greco-Roman world was a western extension of Bronze Age culture, contemporaneous with the expansion of Han China in the east (McNeill 1963, 1979). As part of Eurasian trade, material and cultural networks, the Hellenic-Roman world is linked to the east, part of East-West osmosis and an East-West hybrid.

The Greco-Roman world, then, emerges as a nexus and bridge in-between the Bronze Age phase of globalization (from 3000 BCE) and the phase of early oriental globalization (from 500 CE). The Eurasian perspective sheds light on the world of interconnected knowledge, religions and technologies; the world of Mesopotamia, Mohenjo-Daro, Sumer, Egypt, India, Persia, Phoenicia; the world of Karl Jaspers' Axial age, Bernal's Black Athena and McNeill's pursuit of power. The Hellenic-Roman Stoics are part of a wider cultural lineage. The Roman world, then, emerges as a western extension of Eurasian urban culture.

The decline of the Roman Empire meant that Europe's urban culture slipped away and relapsed into rural culture, with a long spell of feudalism and the castle system. After Rome's decline most of Europe reverted to forest and made a gradual comeback only from the eleventh century onward. The decline and fall of Rome meant Europe gradually losing urban culture unlike in the rest of Eurasia where it persisted. The castle system ended in the late middle ages with the introduction of Chinese gunpowder and cannon.

Rome Is Globalized and Globalizing

Rome is globalized, witness Rome as an eclectic 'successor culture' and as 'an aggregate cultural praxis' (Versluys 2010: 17, 2015: 144). Multiple identities and 'multiple sources of the self' that are often viewed as characteristic of postmodern times (Taylor 1989), we find in antiquity as well. For instance, 'King Herod who was appointed king of Judea by the Romans was "by birth an Idumean (i.e. Edomite), by profession a Jew, by necessity a Roman, by culture and by choice a Greek"' (quoted in Nederveen Pieterse 2007: 9; cf. Pitts 2007; Versluys 2013; Wallace-Hadrill 2008). Multiple and intersecting cultural layers and overlapping jurisdictions, then as now, generate multiple identities.

Conversely, Rome is globalizing, as a successor to and westward extension of Egypt, Persia, the Hittites, Macedonia, Greece, the Phoenicians, Cartage, enabled by precursors and building on their infrastructures—in crisscrossing the Mediterranean, wiring east and west and as a westward extension of Eurasian culture. Part of Rome's western expansion was that it brought aqua and grape/wine culture to northwest Europe as well as levels of olive oil consumption not seen again until the late twentieth century. In colloquial German views, Cologne as a northern

boundary of Roman expansion marks Germany's wine/beer, oil/butter frontier. Rome had 'civilized' Europe as the Roman Catholic Church did in later times, in monasteries upholding scholarship and Cistercian abbeys modernizing agriculture (and with extensive cultural vandalism and destruction of classical and pagan legacies) (Heer 1974; Nixey 2017).

Of course, Romanization matters, but what does it mean? And how Roman is Rome? If we accept that Rome was globalized, it follows that *Romanization is a form of globalization*. Peripheries define the center as much as the center shapes the peripheries. The peripheries are many and there is also travel between peripheries, before, during and after Roman times. The Romans globalized their peripheries by bringing in their own influence and elements of *other peripheries*. Rome's peripheries are polycentric (Laurence and Trifilò 2015: 80). A battalion of Mesopotamians from Iraq guarded Hadrian's Wall (Tolia-Kelly 2011). A Gaul entered the Roman Senate in 70 CE. The Theban Legion with legionaries from Africa served on the German frontier. Maurice, a black African commander of the Theban legion who died as a Christian martyr later became the patron saint of the crusade to convert the Slavs. He is commemorated in the town Saint Maurice in Switzerland and in a statue in the cathedral of Magdeburg, then the center of the Slav crusade in 1107 (Nederveen Pieterse 1992).

The Romans brought eating seafood to Britain and brought garum, fermented fish sauce, possibly from a recombination of Asian recipes.

> … in early Roman London, an emergent 'taste' for seafood accompanied religious reverence for seafood within British-Roman culture. … In perhaps one of the earliest demonstrations of the relationship between power, social formation and 'taste' within the British Isles, revered sea fauna became seafood. … Liquamen and garum, similar in many respects to fermented fish sauces used in contemporary Thai and Vietnamese cooking, and in a coincidental continuity, one of the most widely available, and used flavorings in east London today. (Rhys-Taylor 2010: 165; cf. Kurlansky 2002)

As the empire gobbles up peripheries, the peripheries reshape the center; such are the dialectics of empire and emancipation (Nederveen Pieterse 1989). In the endgame, the frontiers often take over the center (Wells 1999). Christianity became the religion of the empire, barbarian mercenaries guarding the imperial frontiers took over the empire, and centuries later Seljuk Turks took Constantinople. Part of fine-grain imperial history and the network approach to empire is the recognition that the peripheries polemicize with the center.

At the same time, the center polemicizes with the periphery. Tacitus' *Germania* blamed the decline of Rome on its absorption of foreign, alien elements. The German tribes are stronger because they are pure. This trope was taken up in Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776), a perspective that influenced European elites, reared in the classics, and their thinking about decay and decadence, as in Comte de Gobineau's thesis that mixture produces decay. Purity (of 'blue blood' and of 'race') became a key sensibility of Europe's declining aristocracy and exercised a profound influence on Nazism (Krebs 2010; Nederveen Pieterse 1989).

Part of the nexus Romanization as globalization is that Greco-Roman Europe was linked to the east—a westward extension of the Eurasian Bronze Age with Greece, Persia and Hittites as stepping stones. Over time Latin Christianity, driving the Crusades, weakened Byzantium, the 'second Rome' and contributed to the west-east split. Latin cosmopolitanism lingered on in the Roman Catholic Church (the 'oldest international') and in Renaissance humanism. The Renaissance meant Europe resuming urban culture and *also* its links to the east, via Venice, the Levant trade, the Silk Routes (Goody 2010a; Nederveen Pieterse 2011). The infrastructure of the Greco-Roman world became part of the foundations of Europe's trade networks. While modern Europe is explicitly neoclassical Greco-Roman in style and outlook, the subtext of the Renaissance is also that Europe rejoined Eurasia.

In aesthetics and symbolism, the Roman Empire framed the character of imperial power in the West—in the Carolingians, the Habsburgs, Napoleon's empire style and the Napoleonic code, the British Empire's notions of law, citizenship and infrastructure modeled on Roman examples; in Italian fascism, Nazism and in the classical evocations of American superpower (Bondanella 1987; Raskin 1973; Hingley 2000; Murphy 2008). To the east, the Ottomans (adopting Italian imperial style architecture in the Topkapi palace) and the Russian tsars echoed the Roman Empire. The tsars and the Habsburg's double-headed eagle claimed to rule east and west. The American and French Revolutions, led by elites reared in the classics, were steeped in Greco-Roman imagery, which is on display in the design and architecture of Washington, its Capitol and its monuments as well as in Albert Speer's architecture in Nazi Germany.

In this context, is empire a productive theme? Then, which imperialism? Relevant approaches are the pericentric theory of empire in which peripheries play a central, not just a marginal role and multicentric and network understandings of empire (Fieldhouse 1973). This generates multiple and layered understandings of the Roman world including the diversity, polyphony and dynamics of Romanness: unfolding across nine centuries, multicentric Rome involves many actors, many different Romanizations and Roman identities.

While Roman history and archeology involve accomplished methodology, large databases and impressive case studies, monuments, artifacts and texts define the case. To the extent that archeological data lead the argument because the data are monumental (as traditionally studied in classical archeology) arguments take on a monumental bend. The monumental bias in Roman history drives state-centric approaches. This framework may mistake the stage (monumental remnants of which remain) for the performance, which was more polyphonic than the monumental remains suggest. Recent archeological and cultural studies of the Greco-Roman world are backstage inquiries and have shifted the focus from the center to the peripheries. Postmodernism has entered the classics with an emphasis on discourse and representation, cultural exchange and code switching.

Second, there is a West-bias in Roman history. Part of the 'the spell of Rome' and the Rome of Hollywood and Cecil B. de Mille is a whitewash of Rome, broadly along similar lines as Martin Bernal discussed in relation to ancient Greece (1987). While the eastward extension of Hellenism is well on record in the Gandhara

civilization, Rome's eastward extension is little explored. Rome's links with the east, with Parthia, Bactria, Persia and Asia are understated and remain relatively under-researched, including links with China and East Asia (Parker 2008; on China, see Hill 2011a, b).

The importance of Greco-Roman history for global studies involves several strands. First, it makes the sway from prehistory to the present intelligible. It establishes a link between Bronze Age cultures and later developments into modern times. Second, it sheds light on Oriental globalization taking shape in the Middle East that carried Greco-Roman legacies. Third, the plural, creole, multicultural Mediterranean of recent historical and archeological research debunks Eurocentric myths, the myths of antiquity along with misguided narratives of an East-West split, a narrative lineage that ranges all the way from the battle of Troy to Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations.

Resuming the wider historical discussion, the sequence of early globalization is that Bronze Age Eurasia set the stage for the ancient empires, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Greece, Ashok India and Han China. Their common features include developed agriculture and urban culture. Hellenism, in turn, enabled the Roman Empire, Greco-Roman Hellenism contributed to oriental globalization, which in turn set the stage for the Renaissance.

To conclude on a general note, scholars often expect too much from paradigms, as if they could be an all-purpose elixir to serve their wishes. Change the paradigm, say from Romanization to globalization and problems don't disappear, they just relocate. The question then becomes *which* globalization, according to which approach. A further question is agency. Globalization is often reified and treated as an agent—as if 'globalization' overwhelms other agents, the agency of sovereignty, the state, the nation, the local. Globalization used in this sense is disabling, not enabling. Using paradigms involves reworking them in the process.

Overview

- Rome is globalized (influences from Egypt, Persia, the Hittites, Macedonia, Greece, the Phoenicians, a westward extension of Eurasian culture) and Rome is globalizing.
- Romanization is a form of globalization.
- As the empire incorporates peripheries, the peripheries reshape the center. The peripheries polemicize with the center while the center polemicizes with the periphery.

Note

1. From a translation of the Chronicle on the 'Western Regions' from the *Hou Hanshu* composed in 107–125 CE, compiled by Fan Ye 398–446 CE.

DNA and Connectivity

7

Overview

- The Human Genome Project started in 1988 and mapping the human genome was complete in 2003.
- Developments in DNA sequencing technology, in deciphering ancient DNA material and African DNA research have added major data to human genome analysis.
- The cost of human genome sequencing dropped from $14 million in 2006 to $1000 in 2016.
- The price drop of individual DNA tests from $1000 in 2007 to $100 in 2017 enabled the commercialization and growing popularity of consumer DNA analysis.
- In view of links to health diagnostics, genome data firms partnered with medical and pharmaceutical firms.
- Population genetics provides evidence of human connectivity at a planetary scale.
- We are planetary beings in an evolutionary sense and in a historical sense.
- Population movements between continents have left traces in population genetics.
- Population genetics is multicentric, multilevel, multi-temporal and multilayered.
- Human ancestry is not a simple tree but a 'matted web'.

The Human Genome Project started in 1988. By 2003 the mapping of the human genome—listing the roughly 3 billion 'letters' that make up a person's DNA—was complete. Since then there have been significant developments in the technology of DNA sequencing. A major development in population genetics has been strides in uncovering and deciphering ancient DNA material, in labs in the US, Germany and the UK (Reich 2018). Developments in African DNA research are adding major

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_7

data to human genome understanding. Considering that about 99 percent of our evolutionary history occurred in Africa, Africa holds the vast majority of our genetic diversity, which African researchers are now mapping.[1]

The cost of human genome sequencing dropped from $14 million in 2006 to about $1000 in 2016.[2] The price of individual DNA tests dropped likewise, from $1000 in 2007 to about $100 in 2017, which enabled the commercialization and growing popularity of consumer DNA analysis. In view of links to health diagnostics, genome data firms have partnered with medical and pharmaceutical firms. Preventive surgeries are now undertaken on the basis of DNA analyses, not always with success. An example is preventive surgery for breast and ovarian cancer on the basis of a mutation of a BRCA gene, but when more people were tested the lab changed its classification from high risk to no risk (from 'pathogenic' to 'unknown significance') while the life-changing side effects of surgeries had already taken hold.[3] False starts such as these show the field is in its early stages.

About 8 percent of the human genome is made up of viruses that are now inactive. Genes, the part of DNA that codes for proteins, comprise only 2 percent of our genome; thus, we have four times more viral genetic material in our genome than our own genes. Some viruses have been repurposed and have provided evolutionary advantage (Shubin 2020).

Population genetics gives compelling evidence of wide-ranging connectivity at a planetary scale. The ancient population movements from outside Africa onward and between continents have left their traces in population genetics. Humans are a worldly species. Worldliness is not merely for fancy globetrotters but is in-bred in all of us. Faced with DNA analyses, the conventional boxes of identity (nationality, ethnicity, religion, region and civilization) unravel and fade. Conventional identity packages don't hold up to the longue durée. The implications for understanding our place in globalization have barely been spelled out.

Population genetics is multicentric—of course, our ancestry hails from many diverse backgrounds. Population genetics is multi-temporal—of course, it adds centuries to our self-understanding. When we add a thousand years or more multiple identities apply. Population genetics is multilayered—we can assume we're just scratching the surface. Population genetics is multilevel—our ancestors have all been hunters, cultivators and pastoralists. Besides, in Adam Rutherford's words, 'You are of royal descent, because everyone is' (2017: 165, discussed below).

This chapter first takes up the implications of population genetics for connectivity and our relation to the world or, so to speak, globalization. Next I discuss retail genomics and the questions it raises and go over DNA analysis of three companies of my own background. Then I consider wider question of identity and time.

Coming Home to Globalization

I contain multitudes. Walt Whitman, 1855

Home is the local, the village, our hometown, our home country. The rest is mostly alien, whether we see it as threatening or appealing. Along these lines many

accounts treat globalization as 'outside', an alien intrusion, invasion or worse, a steamrolling juggernaut. A world of elites, Davos, mega corporations, international banks and security barriers.

Yet, of course, we ourselves are globalizing forces too. Our village and our hometown are also part of globalization. Globalization is not 'external', outside. We all take part in global operations, as in the Internet, media, technology, consumption, travel. Global production networks have put together most products we use. Look closer and many of our favorite home foods turn out to have come from faraway places, such as potatoes, tomatoes, chilies (leaf through anthropology journals such as *Food and Foodways*). Besides, actual globalization is layered and comes in mega, large, medium and small. Just looking at peak globalization, such as mega corporations, as stand-in for the whole is a caricature of globalization.

In an evolutionary sense we are global all along; we are planetary beings. This isn't an abstract idea or a normative plea for global citizenship. It simply follows from human genome analysis. We all share common ancestors. Tremendous accelerations of worldwide connectivity of the past century have led to the idea that globalization is a recent trend; many accounts extrapolate recent forms of globalization backward to serve as yardsticks for when global connectivity began. Yet, of course, connectivity has been with us all along. Connectivity is part of our original collective DNA. Acknowledging this is coming home to globalization.

We are planetary beings in an evolutionary sense. Our species is the only one that can adapt to any ecological habitat, the only planetary mammal. Because the species is not fully specialized it is able to adapt to diverse habitats. Humans are an unfinished animal (Roszak 1976). Language, communication and technology extend our range further, as far as the arctic poles, the deep sea and outer space. We are planetary beings also in a historical sense. Our ancestors have been hunters and gatherers, pastoralists, cultivators, seafarers, warriors and artisans, town dwellers and merchants. Over time our ancestors have been part of clans, tribes, empires, monarchies, city-states and republics. They have been conquerors and conquered, nomads and settlers, landlords and refugees. Our ancestors have experienced many social formations, which have all been stations along the journey. The planet is our home and our journey is coming home to the global. Navigating globalization may feel like driving in a fog so we must be circumspect; yet, part of the fog is lack of self-knowledge and our failure to recognize our self in others. Growing in self-knowledge is recognizing the world as familiar and coming home to globalization. To know thyself, Socrates' admonition, is to know the world.

Population genetics shows our common ancestry in Africa 250,000 years ago. While DNA analysis is a field is in its early stages, it sheds light on fundamental features of human history. Human genome research shows that 'mass migrations occurred repeatedly, overwhelming natives while absorbing some of their genes'. '"Major upheavals" of human population have been "overwriting" the genetic history of the past 50,000 years, thus "present-day inhabitants of many places in the world are rarely related in a simple manner to the more ancient peoples of the same region." In short, we are none of us natives or pure-bred'. 'In the prehistory of our species, almost all of us were invaders and usurpers and miscegenators'.[4] According

to Adam Rutherford, human ancestry is not a simple tree, but a 'matted web' and 'there is no group of people on Earth that can be identified by their DNA in a scientifically satisfactory way' (2017).[5]

Human genome analysis overturns many common assumptions. More than 150 years of research along various lines has shown that differences *within* clusters of identification such as 'race' are larger than *between* them. Race is a fictional category. Genome research takes this further. Thus, '"whites" represent a mixture of our ancient populations that lived 10,000 years ago and were each as different from one another as Europeans and East Asians are today'.[6] For instance, farmers in Europe did not simply evolve from hunters and gatherers in the same region; nomadic herders from the Asian steppes contributed about half the genes of North European and British skeletons beginning around 5000 years ago. Sheep and cattle herders who fanned out from the steppes northeast of the Black Sea and Ukraine into Europe is also the likely explanation for the common origin of languages from Irish to Sanskrit: 'Indo-European languages probably originated in the steppes just two millennia before the Christian era'.[7]

DNA Analysis

The rise of individual DNA analysis and its spurt since 2017 raises many questions. The development of retail genomics follows advances in DNA sequencing since the Human Genome Project. The Silicon Valley firm 23andMe, based in Sunnyvale, California, pioneered individual DNA tests in 2007 with a saliva test that promised to reveal genetic information at a $999 price tag. The company is named after the 23 pairs of chromosomes in a human cell. 'It included ancestry and information about medical and other genetic information, including consumers' risk for age-related macular degeneration, Parkinson's disease and Type 2 diabetes, as well as genes that block the bitter taste in vegetables and influence weight gain' (Padawer 2018). Early investors were Google ($3.9 million in 2007), Genentech and New Enterprise Associates. In 2018, the pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline invested $300 million in 23andMe the company partnered with GlaxoSmithKline, allowing the company to use the test results of five million customers to design new drugs.

> Much of the jump in DNA-test sales this past year or two has been a result of deeply discounted prices (they now cost about $99) and aggressive marketing, as companies try to lure evermore people to give up their personal genetic code. … In 2017, in a consumer guide to DNA ancestry testing, the Council for Responsible Genetics wrote, "These comeons promise more than they can deliver, ignoring problems with accuracy while obscuring a business model in which customers pay for the privilege of giving away valuable information to venture capitalists who expect it will make them very, very rich." (Padawer 2018: 9)

By 2017, 23andMe had some two million customers and by 2018 more than five million. AncestryDNA's customer base doubled to about six million in 2017 alone and by 2018 had grown to more than 10 million. Add to that the customers of

MyHeritage, FamilyTreeDNA, Helix, National Geographic's DNA test and dozens of others (Padawer 2018).

Concerns that emerged in retail genomics are the accuracy of data, the interpretation of data and data protection. As to data accuracy, the reference populations are limited and regions such as Africa and the Middle East are underrepresented. The 'confidence level' of ancestry estimates of 23andMe ranges from 50 percent (fifty-fifty) to 90 percent and when it is raised to higher levels (which one can now do with a click), ancestry estimates can drop significantly. Companies such as 23andMe provide updates of estimates as reference population databases expand. A general assessment is that DNA analysis companies provide breadth, not depth, and are unreliable when it comes to assessments of health.

The company pairs with other companies to examine causes of Parkinson's disease, inflammatory bowel disease, psychiatric disorders such as bipolar disorder and major depression; a crowdsourced treatment rating website provides data on over 600 medical conditions. About corporate access to data Ruth Padawer notes,

> The data haul is a potential gold mine for biotech firms, insurance companies, marketers, data brokers, law enforcement and, most of all, pharmaceutical companies. Drug companies have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into at-home-DNA-test companies worldwide, banking on all that genetic data, linked to vast crowdsourcing on individuals' physical and psychological disorders, to slash the time and cost of developing new treatments and drugs, including ones tailored to an individual's unique genetic makeup. Scientists have already made incredible progress, building on the advances by the Human Genome Project. Data from 23andMe customers has revealed spots on the genome that are linked to depression, Parkinson's, lupus, inflammatory-bowel disease, allergies and some cancers, prompting Fast Company to name the business the second Most Innovative Health Company this year. (Padawer 2018: 9)

As to the interpretation of genetic data, conventional categories and narratives of identity don't line up with the wide swaths of information of genome analysis, which are deep in time and global in sway. DNA analysis shows that identity is layered and plural and the options are many; which option then does one identify with? Instead of a destiny, a box with a label, identity turns into a Russian doll with options of affiliation or identity in the order of 30, 15, 5 or 0.21 percent. It turns out that all our categories are unstable, provisional, concepts such as race, ethnicity, nationality and religious affiliation, as well as geographical categories, such as 'Europe' or 'India'.

I have done DNA analyses with three genome analysis firms. In parentheses, my interest is in having a sense of how this works and its implications for understanding globalization; my interest is in breadth, not in depth or detail; in ancestry, not in health information. I want to verify whether different firms produce similar findings and whether their findings match family genealogies. I am concerned about companies' data sharing but I take it in stride as long as the alternative is doing no DNA analysis at all. Striking is the extent to which the findings of different firms concur. Their analyses broadly concur with some variation in terminology and details.

Table 7.1 Ancestry genome composition, Jan Nederveen Pieterse

MyHeritage DNA	23andMe	Genographic Project
North and West Europe 65.3%	European: French, German, Netherlands 14.2% British and Irish 11 Scandinavian: Denmark 2.7 Broadly NW European 16	Northwest Europe 32% Northeastern Europe 9
East Europe: Balkan 7.4	Eastern Europe: Poland 2.9	Eastern Europe 12
Ashkenazi Jewish 10.9	Ashkenazi Jewish 14.5	Jewish diaspora 7
	Iberian 0.4	West Mediterranean 8
	Broadly Southern European 7.1	Southwestern Europe 3
East Asia: Filipino, Indonesian and Malaysian 13.3 Chinese, Vietnamese 0.9 Inuit 0.8	East Asian and Native American: 21.4% Indonesian, Thai, Khmer, Myanmar 8 Filipino and Austronesian 6.9 Broadly Chinese and Southeast Asian 5.8 Broadly Northern Asian 0.1 Broadly East Asian and Native American 0.6 [Manchurian and Mongolian 0.9]	South China Sea 19 Asia Minor 7
South Asian 0.6	Central Asian, Northern Indian and Pakistani 1.8 Bengali and Northeast Indian 0.8 Central Asian 0.4 Broadly central and South Asian 0.3	Southern India 2
	Broadly Melanesian 0.2	
West Africa: Nigerian 1.4	Unassigned 1	Neanderthal 1.4
	Maternal haplogroup M7c3c Paternal haplogroup I-M253	M7 East Asia L3, M42 East Africa P305 Africa M89, P143, M578 Southwest Asia

An overview is in Table 7.1. The terminology is taken directly from the genome firms; the numbers are percentages. In 23andMe data, 'broadly' refers to genome elements that can be attributed by region but not specifically.

23andMe explains its approach as follows:

> To determine your ancestral breakdown, we use an algorithm that individually looks at short pieces of DNA across your genome. We compare each piece to DNA sequences from 31 ancestral reference populations from around the world, which include over 10,000 individuals with known ancestry. When a piece of your DNA resembles the DNA from a specific reference population with a high degree of certainty, it is assigned to that population. Sometimes a piece of DNA resembles reference DNA from several populations, in which case it is assigned to a 'broad' ancestry…

> To determine your recent ancestor locations, we look for identical pieces of DNA that you have in common with individuals of known ancestry from over 120 countries and territories in Europe, Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania. If you share identical DNA segments with five or more individuals from a specific location (excluding your close relatives), that location is assigned to you. The strength of that assignment … is determined by how much of your DNA you share with people from that location, adjusting for the number of people that we compared you with.

When I raise the confidence level of 23andMe data from 50 to 90 percent, the ancestry estimates numbers do not change significantly. 23andMe notes, 'Country borders have changed a lot even within the past 100 years, which can sometimes produce counter-intuitive results'. The geographical categories used by gene mapping firms don't quite line up. Thus, one uses East Asia, another Southeast Asia, yet another the South China Sea (which is short for wet rice cultivation lands bordering the South China Sea). Twice after providing its original analysis, 23andMe researchers added new ancestral regions and 23andMe updated its report with new figures; figures in Table 7.1 reflect an updated analysis (per September 2019).

Types of human DNA analysis are mitochondrial and autosomal. Mitochondrial analysis goes further back in time and shows deeper strata as far back as Neanderthal and ancient Africa. 23andMe uses both autosomal and mitochondrial data. MyHeritage uses autosomal analysis. The

Genographic Project, which is affiliated with National Geographic, uses mitochondrial analysis. In my case, according to 23andMe,

> You descend from a long line of women that can be traced back to eastern Africa over 150,000 years ago… your maternal haplogroup is M7c3c. You descend from a long line of men that can be traced back to eastern Africa over 275,000 years ago… your paternal haplogroup is I-M253.

'How many generations ago was your most recent ancestor for each population?' 23andMe provides a timeline of *when* ancestry components come in (Table 7.2; the numbers are percentages of ancestry composition). In this breakdown of my recent ancestry, the widest stretch of regions and mix of peoples is during 1890–1830 and 1830–1740.

Table 7.2 Ancestry composition with timeline, Jan Nederveen Pieterse

1890–1830	1830–1740	1800–1710	1800–1680+
French, German, Netherlands 14.6%	Eastern European 2.8	Manchurian and Mongolian 0.9	Scandinavian 1.2
Ashkenazi Jewish 14.3	South Asian 1.2		Melanesian 0.5
Southeast Asian 19	Indonesian, Thai, Khmer, Myanmar		Iberian 2.7
British and Irish 12.1			South Asian

Source: 23andMe, 2018

The upshot is my ancestors are from nearly everywhere. The analyses broadly match a 23andMe analysis of my youngest daughter. The findings also match family genealogies according to records that go back to the 1700s. My immediate ancestors spent nearly two hundred years in Java, Makassar and Sumatra, then the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia). Family records of ancestors in the region include Padang, Sumatra, 1773, Makassar, Sulawesi, 1777, and many locations in Java.

My ancestors were traders, civil servants in the salt administration, worked in plantations, and served in the navy (a great grandfather, Vaillant, was a rear admiral) and the Netherlands colonial army, the KNIL. A maternal ancestor was chief treasurer of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in Batavia around 1800. Two paternal ancestors received the Military Order of William for KNIL service in Sumatra. One of them, a retired artillery captain who had received the Order of William (1870), ran a plantation estate in Sumatra, Rudolphsburg, and was accused of killing a plantation worker, a conduct that the assistant-resident investigated. The community of planters in Deli admitted to having been guilty of similar behavior (1876). Ann Stoler refers to this episode specifically and by name to document the violent character of the Dutch plantation economy in Deli, Sumatra (1992: 155).

My maternal grandfather was an architect and civil engineer who built houses and bridges throughout Java. He was friends with a notorious rightwing journalist, an advocate of the Aceh war, as well as with the sultan of Yogyakarta, who became a key figure in the anti-colonial struggle. My mother and her sister ran a beauty salon in Bandung. My father, like many Dutch and Indo Dutch of his generation in the Dutch East Indies, spent three years of internment in a Japanese concentration camp during the Japanese occupation. He was released immediately after Japan's capitulation following the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, 1945).

The East Indies was a colonial cocktail in which many peoples intermingled, Javanese, Bugis, Chinese, Arabs, Dutch, Portuguese, Germans, French, British, Armenians and many others. Family genealogy records concubinages and marriages in the East Indies by name, place and year, going back to the 1700s. The family genealogy includes German ancestors who, allegedly, left Germany for the Indies to avoid the consequences of duels. Family records in the Netherlands go back to the eleventh century (Nederveen and Nederveen 2006: 221–224). According to family records, our ancestors were also in Galle, Ceylon; Decima, Japan and Paramaribo, Suriname. For many generations back I am the first in the family *not* born in Java or Sumatra, but in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

The firm MyHeritage provides an 'Ethnicity estimate', which in my case indicates an ethnic composition of ethnicities of 42 regions. No wonder I have been writing about hybridity, ethnicity and multiculturalism (Nederveen Pieterse 1992, 2007, 2019). A friend remarks, it shows I'm not 'a nowhere man' as in the Beatles song, but an 'everywhere man'. According to his DNA analysis, his ancestors hail 80 percent from South Asia and 20 percent from Iran and Central Asia.

Yet, what is the meaning of geography in these analyses? If an analysis says Central Asia and Iran, what is the time frame? Of course, these are also places of mixture. Persia and Central Asia in particular have been major civilizational

crossroads, as far back as the Stone Age (Frankopan 2016). For instance, silk found in early medieval Viking boat graves in Scandinavia shows the words Allah and Ali in Kufic Arabic script. The materials, weaving techniques and design indicate a combination of Persian and Central Asian origins. Viking settlements in Sweden were western outposts of the Silk Road, part of a trade that went on for 150 years starting in the first half of the ninth century. DNA analysis of the skeletons will probably indicate that some have a Central Asian heritage.[8] In other words, geography is destiny only within a limited time frame.

Ethnicity is a fluid phenomenon; it refers to claims to affinity or kinship based on region, language or religion. In an article 'Deconstructing/Reconstructing Ethnicity', I analyze modalities of ethnicity (latent, enclosure, domination, competition and symbolic ethnicity) and the dynamics according to which one modality morphs into another (Nederveen Pieterse 2007).

My DNA analysis with origins in 42 ethnic regions refers to mixture and sprawl during the past few hundred years (1680–1890). These kinds of findings don't do much for identity politics or tribal belonging. Identity politics takes a presentist approach to identity. Genome research shows there is no stable relationship between geography, ethnicity, religion and ancestry. All these relations and boundaries are temporary. Go deeper back in time and wide-ranging mixture applies to everyone. In the words of Adam Rutherford,

> You are of royal descent, because everyone is. You are of Viking descent, because everyone is. You are of Saracen, Roman, Goth, Hun, Jewish descent, because, well, you get the idea. All Europeans are descended from exactly the same people, and not that long ago… If you're a human being on Earth, you almost certainly have Nefertiti, Confucius, or anyone we can actually name from ancient history in your tree, if they left children. The further back we go, the more the certainty of ancestry increases, though the knowledge of our ancestors decreases. (2017: 165)

For mathematical reasons—everyone's ancestors double every generation and the population size on earth gets smaller as we go back in time—we all share a small number of common ancestors.

> The truth is that our pedigrees fold in on themselves, the branches loop back and become nets, and all of us who have ever lived have done so enmeshed in a web of ancestry. We only have to go back a few dozen centuries to see that most of the 7 billion of us alive today are descended from a tiny handful of people, the population of a village. (Rutherford 2017: 2)

Thus, also if DNA analysis yields a concentration in two or three regions, ancestors' ancestors hail from a wide radius. Contemporary DNA analyses follow a limited database (which together comprises 25 million), shallow timeframes and geographical categories that are of limited purchase. In the case of 23andMe, the database includes just over 10,000 individuals, 31 ancestral reference populations and 120 or so countries. According to my DNA analyses, I am 40 to 65 percent of European descent—but who are 'Europeans' and where do they come from? As noted above, the ancestry of about half hail from the steppes between the Black Sea and the Ural Mountains.

Identity and Time

Avec le temps
Avec le temps va tout s'en va
On oublie le visage et l'on oublie la voix
Le cœur quand ça bat plus
C'est pas la peine d'aller chercher plus loin
Faut laisser faire et c'est très bien
Léo Ferré, Avec le temps, 1969

Tangled identity has loomed large in literature and history. Multiple identities are of all times. Hebrew, Greek and Roman, Moorish and Spanish, native and mixed, Franco-Algerian, French Egyptian, Peranakan Chinese, Chinese Malaysian, Sino-Singaporean, Afro-American, Afro-European, Caribbean-American, Asian-American, on and on. DNA analysis adds threads and pieces to identity puzzles.

In *The Lost Family: How DNA Testing Is Upending Who We Are*, Libby Copeland asks, 'How much of your sense of yourself should scientists and algorhythms be allowed to dictate', and 'What makes us who we are?' (2020). Examining American reactions to DNA analyses Ruth Padawer asks a similar question: 'underlying all these reactions is the question of identity: What do these results mean about who I am? How do these results fit with the stories I've long clung to that connected my past, my present and my future?' (2018: 8).

Genome research overturns many idées fixes and carries major ramifications. Humans have been on the move throughout history. Walt Whitman's 'I contain multitudes' applies to all of us. Some mixtures are recent, others go further back, yet everyone is mixed. With generous simplification, our collective story can be summed up as: sameness in origins, differences along the way, and sameness (of a different, layered kind) now and on the horizon.

How does identity come in? Identity is a noun but should rather be a verb, identifying. Identifying is social and existential nest building in time and place and involves agency and choice. Yet, to paraphrase a saying, people make their history and exercise their agency in conditions not of their own choosing but in which they find themselves.

In caste and hierarchical societies, identities are ascribed—know your place. Purity and danger are at stake. In pillarized societies, identities are ascribed—stay in your lane. In societies in conflict, nest building is a matter of struggle, an existential struggle for meaning, even survival. Tattoos and other markers signal identification. In some Los Angeles neighborhoods, how women wear lipstick signals what gang they belong to. In conflict societies, demarcations matter, boundaries can harden and get inflamed. 'Safe spaces' are carefully policed. Ethnicity is a matter of authenticity and territory and 'cultural appropriation' is trespassing. Identity bunkers mark territory, are containers of meaning and tools of struggle.

In these kinds of settings, DNA tests are dangerous instruments. People in Japan have been upset about the findings of widespread Korean ancestry, people in India have been upset because genome findings bring into question the 'Indianness' of Indic civilization. In more fluid settings, ethnic identification can be entrepreneurial.

Chicano in the morning, Native American in the afternoon (selling beads), Mexican by night. Or identifying can be cultural play, as in the Netherlands—Muslim by day, disco at night.

DNA tests can be challenging for purveyors of purity and can provide tools for ethnic entrepreneurs. Members of the far-right Stormfront, the oldest white supremacy group in the US, took DNA tests to find confirmation of their 'whiteness' and then struggled with their findings. Rather than changing their racial purity worldview, they sought recourse in cranky conspiracy theories such as that DNA tests are a tool of the 'Zionist Occupied Government' (Ebner 2020).

> Many blacks and whites whose families have long claimed that some of their forebears were Native American dismiss DNA reports that say otherwise. And Asians, like whites, often rebuff results that indicate that their heritage isn't pure… White nationalists who use DNA tests to prove their racial purity adamantly reject any non-European results. A professor at the University of California at Los Angeles and another researcher studied comments on the online white-supremacist forum Stormfront. They found that some posters who had taken DNA tests and were upset with their results argued that they were "rigged" to "spread multiculturalism" or that the non-European findings were merely "noise DNA." (Ebner 2020; Padawer 2018: 8)

The terminology of population 'replacement' used by rightwing groups and white supremacists in the US and Germany is derived from population genetics. Books such as David Reich, *Who We Are and How We Got Here* (2018) discuss how gene pools have been 'overwritten' by migrating peoples over time.

DNA tests enter a prevailing ambience of stratification and cultural boundaries. A stable hierarchy of dominant ethnicity (ethnocracy), ongoing struggles (competition ethnicity) or actual pluralism (symbolic ethnicity) (a typology is in Nederveen Pieterse 2007). In the US and multicultural societies where competition ethnicity prevails, DNA tests serve to validate claims. A sociology of DNA test knowledge, then, matches the prevailing sociology of interethnic rivalry or multicultural entente and coexistence. The latter includes acknowledgment of multiple 'sources of the self', according to the Canadian philosopher of culture Charles Taylor (1989).

In contexts of ethnic competition, retail genomics leads to questions such as 'How much ancestry is enough to give someone the authority to claim that identity?' (Padawer 2018: 5). Who would need such authority and on what criteria would authority be based? Where identity is ascribed, rather than a matter of choice or preference, ancestry genetics may be a way to contest identity ascription or to re-anchor identity and belonging.

What puzzles some American users of DNA analysis is dealing with percentages. A blog post that went viral is 'I celebrated Black History Month … by Finding out I Was White'.[9] Racism as well as some forms of anti-racism are based on categories as boxes and DNA analysis subverts boxes. Real life involves crisscrossing links and affinities that don't belong in boxes. Realities are a global mélange; we all contain multitudes. A paper I wrote was called 'We Are All Migrants' (Nederveen Pieterse 2019).

In Norbert Elias' figuration analysis, social interdependence increases over time with growing population density and social organization. As clusters of close social interaction, court societies were centers of civilizational and cultural synchronization. Likewise, armies and monasteries were centers of social organization and discipline, as Michel Foucault pointed out. In Elias' view, growing social interdependence is a 'civilizing process' that involves etiquette rules and growing social restraints. Elias studied etiquette books and documented these processes as a forward motion in time (1994). Yet, taking into account common ancestry doesn't interdependence also apply backward in time? Interdependence in a broad sense is woven into our DNA, considering that DNA trees are 'matted' as we go back in time.

Our collective history, then, involves both commonality in origins and compartmentalizations of identity over time. Ethnic and national antagonisms are both fateful and temporary. 'Japanese may not like hearing that they share 80 percent of their DNA with Koreans', yet archeological findings show the diverse origins of Japan's population from Southeast Asia, southern China, Northeast Asia, Siberia and Mongol backgrounds (Diamond 2018; Reich 2018; Nederveen Pieterse 2007). Ethnic, religious and national demarcations germinate, rise, peak, change and then fade over time. In deep history, compartmentalizations of our collective life are of all times; they are *both* fateful attunements to specific space-time configurations and relative provisional arrangements. For instance, we have all been rulers and ruled. Self-other and master-slave relationships—that loom so large in our awareness, past and present—no matter their temporary sway, are of limited duration. Nest building and belonging are context bound; they belong to specific time-space configurations. Stretch the context, in space, as travel and migration do, and identity transforms and widens. Stretch the context in time and space, as DNA analysis does, and identity widens and becomes more fluid and porous. Widen the context in consciousness, as dreams, meditation and psychedelic experiences do, and the sense of self softens and transforms.

Multiculturalism in conjunction with online dating sites such as Match.com and Tinder subsume spatial distance; colonialism that was once distant is now around the corner ('we are here because you were there'). Mixture enters another phase; research shows that 'inter-racial marriages have increased since the introduction of online dating sites'.[10]

We all bring to this world personal and social knowledge we have learned at home, in our hometown, home country and region and through media, movies and cyberspace. We bring education and book knowledge to global understanding. Yet, if book knowledge would be sufficient to navigate globalization, we would be walking world encyclopedias. We experience globalization at many levels, not just cerebrally but also physically, viscerally and emotionally, imaginatively and morally. Genome research enables us to navigate globalization and tap our ancestral knowledge—which is a subtle knowledge of feeling, not a cerebral knowledge. It is a knowledge we know or sense, as the saying goes, 'in our bones'. According to a Ute song, 'In our bones is the rock itself; in our blood is the river; our skin contains the shadow of every living thing we ever came across. This is what we brought with us

long ago' (quoted in Halifax 1993: 28). In the words of Joan Halifax, 'We are the sum of our ancestors. Our roots stretch back to blue-green algae; they stretch to the stars. They ultimately reach the void' (1993: 28).

If we cannot access ancestral knowledge we can at minimum assume it, for reasons indicated above. What is the relationship between ancestry and consciousness? Traditionally, it is viewed as strong two or three generations backward. The further back in time, the more memory fades. Yet in view of genome analysis, ancestral knowledge is also part of us.

We come home to globalization in an unsentimental, matter of fact way. First, as we recognize or acknowledge the planet as our common home, the deficits of global public goods become more glaring still. Second, the premise of interconnectedness enables a holistic approach so we view global concerns as shared and interlinked. Third, the underlying feeling and awareness many of us have that actually there is no 'outside', no other to blame or to be compartmentalized away (as in NIMBY) gradually inches to the foreground. DNA's vast record of connectivity shows that world history is part of us, is part of our existential makeup. Global history, then, is not remote or abstract, but is within us as part of our ancestral legacy and makeup. Perhaps this is part of what Carl Jung called the collective unconscious. Perhaps it is what accounts for the subliminal appeal of representations and stories of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, sagas such as *1001 Nights*, Tolkien and *Game of Thrones*. Traces of connectivity from time immemorial are part of us.

Overview

- In light of DNA analyses, conventional ideas of identity lose standing.
- Implications for understanding our place in globalization have barely been spelled out.
- Tangled identity looms large in history, literature and fiction.
- Multiple identities have been of all times.
- Identity is a noun but should be a verb, identifying, which involves agency.
- In societies in conflict, agency and identification involve struggle.
- Geographical categories and categories such as race, ethnicity, nationality and religious affiliation are unstable and provisional.

Notes

1. N. Munshi, How African DNA could change the world, Financial Times, March 7–8, 2020: 18–19.
2. J. Thornhill, Three tech trends to shape the decade, Financial Times, January 7, 2020.
3. A. M. Marcus, Gene tests led to surgery, then the odds changed, Wall Street Journal December 21–22, 2019: A1–A12.
4. M. Ridley, The prehistory of us, Wall Street Journal May 2–3, 2015: C1–2.

5. C. C. Mann, A family portrait for all humanity, Wall Street Journal, November 4–5, 2017: C7–8.
6. David Reich, 'Race' in the age of modern genetics, New York Times, March 25, 2018: 1–2. *National Geographic*, April 2018 devoted a special issue to the temporary nature of the demarcations of ethnicity, religion, nationality, in which 'race' looms large in articles such as E. Kolbert, Skin deep (29–45).
7. Mann (2017: C8).
8. C. Anderson, 'Allah' is found on Viking costumes, New York Times, October 15, 2017: 9.
9. A. Krueger, Like Facebook, but based on DNA, New York Times, June 17, 2018: 1–2.
10. J. Thornhill, Swipe right for a more diverse society, Financial Times, October 17, 2017: 9. See Hergovich and Ortega (2017).

Technology and Connectivity

8

Overview

- Technology is omnipresent, touching everyone's life.
- How technology is organized and functions is a mirror of how society is organized.
- Ownership and uses of technology are embedded in institutional settings.
- There are as many kinds of connectivity conflicts as there are stakeholders.
- Citizens, states and corporations seek to harness data to their advantage.
- Technologies are tools of control as well as emancipation.
- Technologies are frontiers in the clash of American capitalism and regulated market economies such as the EU and China.
- The public sphere in each setting involves a different balance of society, state and market.
- Instrumentalism and techno-optimism lead Silicon Valley narratives of innovation.
- Tech optimism has given way to tech skepticism and tech lash.
- WikiLeaks and Snowden's disclosures are counterpoints to American hegemonic organization of connectivity. At issue are transparency from above and from below.
- WikiLeaks exposures reveal politics of transparency—good if it exposes targets of hegemony, bad if it reveals hegemonic mischief. Edward Snowden revealed digital mass surveillance of tech firms in tandem with the NSA.
- Connectivity and technology provide X-rays of institutions and values.
- Digital connectivity widens consciousness but not necessarily agency.
- Links between industrial production and national security are an international pattern.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_8

- Links between the Pentagon and universities go back to the Second World War. After the 'Sputnik moment', government funding flooded universities and private companies. The pro-market stance was part of the American ideological posture.
- ICT start as military technologies, are honed by companies, and then come available for individual use.
- Big tech joined big oil, big pharma, big agribusiness and in each sector competitiveness shrunk.
- Silicon Valley firms are wired to Wall Street, Washington and the military-industrial complex.
- Since 2010, seven out of the ten leading companies in the stock exchange are tech companies.

Technology is basic to connectivity. Transport and communication are arteries of globalization. Chariots and caravans, ships and navigation instruments, Internet and 5G are part of the chronology. Throughout history communication tools have exercised profound influence, from writing, paper and the printing press onward. Printing spread the thought of humanists, made vernacular translations of the bible available and enabled the rise of Protestantism. Nineteenth-century newspapers were crucial in the process of nation building. Twentieth-century radio and television shaped the public sphere in countries across the world.

Tool making has been basic to human development since the invention of fire. The development of capabilities has marked turning points in history. Chariots enabled Hittites to expand from Anatolia to Egypt. Horse riding techniques made the Mongol Empire possible. Gunpowder from China and cannons ended Europe's castle system and feudalism. The machine gun changed the balance of power between colonizers and native peoples; in Kipling's words: 'We have got the Gatling gun, and they have not'. Industrial warfare ended the role of the cavalry. The nuclear bomb changed the nature of warfare; war between the major powers became obsolete, only proxy wars and small wars remain (Mandelbaum 2010).

The digital turn is another watershed. Discussions often focus on technologies and their ramifications while in a fundamental sense the issue is not the capabilities, the tools, but *how* capabilities are used. As a theme technology is in a league of its own, basic and omnipresent, sprawling and unavoidable, touching everyone's life. Technology is the tissue of connectivity. Because technology is connectivity it is unavoidable; it is impossible to work and be a functioning citizen and be off the grid. Transport, phone, media, communication, credit card, gas, electricity rely on tech. With the digital turn tech has become even more pervasive and 5G is a further step. Follow contemporary dynamics and the technology files are probably the largest files. How technology is organized and functions is a mirror of how society is organized.

In development studies, the UNDP began to publish the annual Human Development Report in 1990, an alternative to World Bank and IMF reports. An early idea was to view development as the enlargement of people's choices; under

Amartya Sen's influence, the emphasis changed to the enlargement of people's capabilities. Capacity building became a keynote—don't give people fish but teach them how to fish. Other prominent themes during the 1980s were grassroots development, bottom-up development and empowerment. John Friedmann, however, argued that what developing countries need is a strong civil society to check state power and a strong state to check the power of large and multinational corporations (1992).

With satellites, fiber optic cables, smartphones, 4G and 5G, connectivity is key to global consciousness. The Internet comes with profound influence on social life and giant tech firms. As basic capabilities, technologies are tools of control as well as emancipation. Tech connectivity is a terrain of contestation with conflicts under headings such as information war and cyberwar. There are about as many kinds of connectivity conflicts as there are stakeholders. Citizens, states and corporations—society, state and market, the big three of social science—all seek to harness or shield information flows and data to their advantage in local, national or transnational arenas. Technologies of connectivity and control are frontiers in the 'clash of capitalisms', between American capitalism and its pro-corporate approach and regulated market economies such as the EU and China. This clash is referred to as 'the real cyberwar' (Powers and Jablonski 2015).

Tech discussions range widely. Tech optimism has given way to tech skepticism and tech lash, particularly since the role of Facebook in Brexit and the election of Trump. The monopolistic role of Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Google is a growing concern. With 5G and the Internet of Things come new digital combinations such as fintech, biotech, gentech, food tech, delivery tech, smart cars and smart homes. Smart cities may improve public services, or maybe another spoke in the wheel of surveillance. Smart lampposts in Hong Kong come with face recognition tech and Bluetooth. Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and robotics are changing the world of work. Electric cars dramatically change markets; to survive competition car makers, also in Germany, must become tech companies. Quantum computing adds further ramifications. Also at issue are intellectual property, trade disputes, Huawei, security and geopolitics. Higher taxes on American tech companies that are on the table in Europe prompt threats of US tariffs on European exports. US government restrictions on Huawei, TikTok and Chinese high tech prompt China to seek greater high tech autonomy with major ripple effects.

The first theme in this chapter is instrumentalism and techno-optimism that inform Silicon Valley narratives of innovation and hyperconnectivity boosterism. The second theme is American hegemony as an organizer of connectivity, in relation to which WikiLeaks and Snowden's disclosures are counterpoints. At issue is the juxtaposition of transparency from above and from below. The third theme is digital connectivity and the public sphere; beyond headings such as post truth and information war, the politics of truth has a long lineage. This is a multicentric discussion because truth is a cultural category and the public sphere in different settings involves a different balance of society, state and market. Technology functions in institutional settings that are embedded in history and worldviews. The closing section focuses on institutional settings in which tech is used. The balance of society, state and market is the key concern. How is tech connectivity deployed and

regulated in different institutional settings? Three main varieties are market-led societies, state-led societies and roundtable societies in which stakeholders are represented. Technology and connectivity provide X-rays of institutions and underlying values. These shape the implications of tech changes for consciousness and agency. No doubt, digital connectivity widens consciousness but does it enhance agency?

In relation to technology, each type of society features characteristic narratives and institutional patterns. In market-led societies, the typical narrative is innovation—technology leads society forward and market forces are most capable to lead this march. In state-led societies, the state protects people from dangers and uses technology to perform this role. Roundtable societies view technology as a public good, society and citizens are the central value and the state regulates market forces accordingly. Thus, capabilities and technologies have dramatically different development itineraries and outcomes in different cultural and institutional settings. In the US, the keynote is corporate-led surveillance capitalism. In authoritarian societies, state surveillance leads. In roundtable societies, data privacy and connectivity as a public good are leading concerns.

Cultural efflorescence typically occurs in societies at geographic and civilizational crossroads. Transport and communication tech enable connectivity which enhances awareness and consciousness. Historical instances are Karl Jaspers' Axial Age, the Sanskrit world, the Greco-Roman era and Islamic cosmopolitanism (see Chaps. 5 and 6). James Billington provides a captivating historical overview of revolutionary consciousness (1980). The degree to which connectivity contributes to agency and to what kind of agency depends on cultural settings and institutions. Tools enhance consciousness and agency. The plow increased agricultural productivity and enabled population growth and trade. Space travel expands cosmic consciousness. Tools can focus consciousness with scalpel finesse or laser precision. Tools can narrow consciousness to instrumental rationality, efficiency in achieving a goal. As mentioned earlier, Max Weber distinguished instrumental rationality and value rationality, which concerns ends that for ethical or religious reasons hold value in themselves (1978).

Instrumentalism, Tech Optimism

According to Thomas Friedman, writing in 2011, with 'cloud computing, robotics, 3G wireless connectivity, Skype, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, the iPad, and cheap Internet-enabled smartphones, the world has gone from connected to hyper-connected'. Hyperconnectivity and the fusion of globalization and IT enable productivity gains as well as social activism from the Arab spring to the Israeli tent movement, flash mobs in London and the 'globalization of anger'. 'This globalization/IT revolution is also "super-empowering" individuals, enabling them to challenge hierarchies and traditional authority figures—from business to science to government'.[1] Since then, the big four, Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Google have become the world's leading tech companies. How did we get there? The spectacular rise of Silicon Valley big tech arises from a confluence of circumstances.

Links between the US military and universities go back to the Second World War. University of California campuses, especially Berkeley, ran major labs of military research, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia. Robert Oppenheimer who led the Manhattan Project that led to the atomic bomb was a physics professor at UC Berkeley and so was Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. For decades federal research and development funds have comprised 70 percent of American universities' research funds, much of which was defense related (Aby 2007: 293). The University of California plays a prominent role in this constellation along with many other universities (Turse 2008, Pavelec 2010).

Margaret O'Mara singles out the 'Sputnik moment' as a turning point (2019). When the US realized the Soviet spurt in space technology in 1957 what followed was a flood of government funding to technology firms and universities. Funding, driven by security considerations, went to private companies, not government agencies; this pro-market stance was part of the American ideological posture, a counterpoint to Soviet economic planning. In the late 1970s, this grew into a free market frenzy and in the 1980s the Reagan administration institutionalized it in rounds of privatization and deregulation. The gates opened wide to money in politics. Campaign financing and interest group lobbies consolidated corporate influence on legislation. Fast forward and the outcome is the proliferation of corporate monopolies in nearly every sector of the American economy, including giant monopolies in technology. American tech leadership stems from superpower competition of the military-industrial complex that was funneled through the private sector. Big tech joined big oil, big pharma and big agribusiness and in each sector competitiveness shrank. While the US is the proclaimed leader of free-market economics, it is now an ordinary observation that competitive markets are more common in Europe than in the US (Philippon 2019).

'Big data is watching you', according to Internet skeptics such as Evgeny Morozov, Geert Lovink and Jaron Lanier (Morozov 2011, Lovink 2012, Lanier 2017). 'Beware the unholy alliance of state and internet', cautions Morozov. 'Intelligence services have access to more data than ever before—it just happens to be gathered by the private sector'.[2]

Big tech cooperation with US government is not just an 'unholy alliance' but is part of their DNA. Info and communication tech have been part of the military-industrial-university complex all along. Military industries have led info technologies, developed at universities with federal funding; the telegraph, telephone, Internet, the world wide web, email and GPS all originate as military technologies. Security objectives and surveillance are embedded in ICT. They start out as military-government technologies, are deployed and honed by companies and banks and then come available for use in individuals' social networks. In Justin Schlosberg's words, this is the 'media–technology–military industrial complex' (2017).

Tech companies led US stock markets in the 1990s until the dotcom bubble burst in 2000. Since 2010 stocks have again gone up massively, mostly American large cap and seven out of the top ten companies have been tech companies, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, and two Chinese companies, Tencent and Alibaba. The 2010s has been the decade of the tech turn. The tech decade in

financial returns is also, in the words of a headline, 'The Decade That Tech Lost Its Way'.[3] Big tech companies achieved trillion-dollar status through aggressive expansion. They mastered nudge economics (if you want people to do things, make it easy) so well that we have become captives, hostages of their connectivity and control platforms.

'Data is the new oil' and the big four have been collecting oil fields with zest. The trillion-dollar companies now function as platform gatekeepers with monopoly status and expand as conglomerates. According to 2018 data, together the big four have a market capitalization of $2.8 trillion and a 24 percent share of the S&P 500 top 50. Amazon's share of the worldwide cloud business is 34 percent; its share of US online commerce is 44 percent; US households with Amazon Prime are 64 percent; Amazon's share of in-home voice devices is 71 percent. Google has a 92 percent share of the Internet search market (Galloway 2018: 131). Google has 88 percent of search advertising, Facebook owns 77 percent of mobile social traffic and Amazon has a 74 percent market share in the eBook market (Foroohar 2017). All that startups can nowadays aspire to is to be bought by one of the big players (Siegele 2014).

Google hired Wall Street quants to control and monetize its vast extraction of user data (Foer 2017). Google pioneered the method of using data surplus for targeted advertising, which then migrated to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter (Zuboff 2019). Google acquired DeepMind, a builder of neural networks that teach themselves as part of the Google Brain project.

Amazon operates in ecommerce, cloud computing, logistics, search engines, social networks, food production and retail, interactive media, warehousing and freight. In its spectacular expansion Amazon also managed to create an exploitative workplace (Marvit 2014). Heike Geissler provides an insider view (2018). The Facebook problems are familiar—a platform without curation, fake news, trolls, and data scraped for psychographics, which enable targeted commercial and political messaging. Notes Elizabeth Denham, then UK Information Commissioner, 'Methods such as emotional targeting, cross-device tracking and detailed audience segmentation can influence consumers in a commercial context'.[4] Tracking cyber behavior, algorithms micro target advertisements. Given people's profiles and 'likes', Facebook and Twitter enable political agencies to use the same tools to identify swing voters and pinprick where to target political messages, down to neighborhoods and households. Gradually then the public sphere changes into a semi-public sphere in which information tunnels, filtered by algorithms, organizes perceptions. Facebook's influence extends to insurance, retail and finance. Facebook photos are scraped for face recognition by law enforcement and private security firms.[5] The face recognition market is estimated at $96 billion by 2022. As Stiglitz notes, we know that unregulated markets for goods don't work, why would they work in relation to information?[6] Investigations into Facebook (such as McNamee 2019) signal wider problems of the big four.

Allegedly dark money also plays a role in the mega expansion of the big four. As several sources report, Amazon sold expensive phony books, a matter of money laundering.[7] Allegations of dark money also apply to Facebook (data sharing with

Cambridge Analytica) and Google (data sharing with corporations). Apple engaged in tax deals with Ireland. Apple is so confident of its brand status that it slows down the operating speed of older iPhone models.

Silicon Valley firms are wired to the military-industrial complex, Wall Street and Washington. Links between high tech and security planning are an international pattern and are as common as the links between industry and the military were during the nineteenth century. The utopia of the tech titans is no government, no lifespans, no checks on capitalism, and replacing bum politicians with engineers (Foer 2017). This is a scenario without a moral compass. In this setting, tech skepticism has made a place for tech lash.

Tech and Hegemony, WikiLeaks and Snowden

The US state department and Pentagon engage in defensive and offensive cyberwar efforts, which sync with the record of American agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy in support of human rights and Voice of America radio broadcasts.

The state department dedicated diplomacy efforts to Internet freedom, 'the freedom to connect'. During the G.W. Bush administration, secretary of state Condoleezza Rice introduced Internet techies in outreach and diplomacy in the Middle East. Internet freedom was part of the Bush administration's Freedom Agenda.[8] The state department promoted connectivity in support of the 'color revolutions' in the Caucasus, Balkans, Iran and the Middle East. It supported and trained Internet and social media activists in the Arab world, Iran and China.[9] According to President Obama in a speech in Shanghai in 2009, 'I think that the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable'. In 2010, secretary of state Hillary Clinton gave a speech on Internet Freedom praising how 'the spread of information networks is forming a new nervous system for our planet'.[10]

In 2011, the US designated cyberspace the fifth military domain, along with land, sea, air and space. The US deployment of the Stuxnet virus targeting Natanz, Iran's uranium enrichment facility, has been as ominous as the Flame malware virus that wreaked havoc in the Middle East.[11]

In response to controls on info flows in Iran, North Korea, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and other countries, the state department financed stealth wireless networks that would enable activists to communicate outside the reach of governments. By the end of 2011, it spent some $70 million on circumvention efforts and related technologies, including 'shadow' Internet and mobile phone systems that dissidents can use to undermine repressive governments; use of 'mesh network' technology that can transform devices like cellphones or personal computers to create an invisible wireless web without a centralized hub; the 'Internet in a suitcase' project of the Open Technology Initiative at the New America Foundation;[12] use of Bluetooth to beam info directly from one cellphone to another; the Palisades project, a $50 million collaboration of the Pentagon and state department to build a

'shadow' cellphone system in Afghanistan where repressive forces (read: Taliban) exert control over the official network, relying in part on cell towers placed on American bases, with Kandahar airbase as data collection hub; and burying Chinese cellphones 'on hillsides for people to dig up at night' in Dandong, Jilin Province, China as 'natural gathering points for cross-border cellphone communication and for meeting sources', for use in North Korea and able to pick up signals from towers in China. This involves technology that the US is developing as well as tools 'created by hackers in a so-called liberation-technology movement sweeping the globe'.[13]

WikiLeaks was part of the era of enthusiasm about the democratic potential of hyperconnectivity and digital transparency. Official reactions to WikiLeaks exposures, however, reveal the politics of transparency—good if it exposes targets of hegemony, bad when it reveals hegemonic mischief. Google and other big tech companies eavesdrop for the NSA, as Snowden showed. Ed Snowden revealed a regime of digital mass surveillance, surveillance capitalism of NSA in tandem with Silicon Valley firms. Given different rules for transparency from above and from below, digital enthusiasm gave way to digital dystopia.

In 2010, WikiLeaks began publishing leaked US embassy cables totaling 251,287 documents dating from 1966 to 2010 and containing confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the state department in Washington, DC. Over 15,000 were classified secret and over 100,000 were confidential. In WikiLeaks' words, they represent 'the largest set of confidential documents ever released into the public domain'.[14] Major newspapers in five countries (*The Guardian*, *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *El Pais* in Spain and *Der Spiegel* in Germany) as well as media in countries outside the West, cooperated by releasing selected and redacted documents from the WikiLeaks cables.

Washington's initial official response to the disclosures was that they are a major breach of security and classified information. The rules of openness don't apply in this case, according to the secretary of state, because the information was 'stolen'. Once the material circulated widely in major newspapers, the response in official and establishment circles was to poo-pooh and trivialize the disclosures as minor and unimportant, nothing new. They show, according to commentators, that American diplomats hold realistic assessments of conditions abroad and they write well. Many American responses, also in some left-leaning media, were hostile or dismissive. According to Christian Caryl in the *New York Review of Books*, the disclosures seem 'to boil down to a policy of disclosure for disclosure's sake. … I don't see coherently articulated morality, or immorality, at work here at all; what I see is an amoral, technocratic void' (Caryl 2011). Slavoj Žižek dismissed the disclosures in a similar vein.[15] In American mainstream media responses to the WikiLeaks disclosures ranged from trivialization to indignation, decrying them as vandalism or as cyber terrorism. The responses reveal deeper contradictions. For Alan Rusbridger, editor of *The Guardian*, 'It was astonishing to sit in London reading of reasonably mainstream American figures calling for the assassination of Assange for what he had unleashed. It was surprising to see the widespread reluctance among American journalists to support the general ideal and work of WikiLeaks' (in Leigh and

Harding 2011). There is an astonishing hiatus between cyber boosterism and enthusiasm about social media (as in notions of a 'Facebook revolution') and lack of enthusiasm when such media target the US. Exposing politically correct targets—such as Iran, China, Syria, Russia and North Korea—is held to an entirely different standard than exposing hegemonic behavior. US agencies routinely tap Internet and cellphone networks across the world for intelligence gathering, stealthily obtain biometric information of UN diplomats and steal information. The difference is that WikiLeaks is a nonstate actor and info is released into the public domain; the former is deemed statecraft and the latter vandalism.

Part of hyperconnectivity is the desegregation of audiences (cartoons satirizing Islam for a Danish public prompt consternation in Amman and Istanbul; radio conversations in Berlin echo in Islamabad). After the intelligence failures of 9/11, the US government desegregated information circuits and merged diplomatic, defense and intelligence info pools, which enabled defense personnel to access embassy cables—and also pass them on to WikiLeaks. US government actions made WikiLeaks disclosures possible. The root tension between hyperconnectivity and hegemony is that hegemony is centrist while hyperconnectivity is multidirectional and cannot be centrally dictated or controlled.

At issue are whistleblowing and civil disobedience (Sifry 2011). Viewing WikiLeaks disclosures and whistleblowing by Chelsea Manning and Ed Snowden as acts of civil disobedience is appropriate, but does it also raise the problem of obedience, the culture of conformity that is deeply ingrained in mainstream media? 'Journalism these days amounts to little more than outsourced PR remixing', notes Geert Lovink (2012). Commentators on WikiLeaks gloss over the message and fall over the messenger. This presents several options: American war crimes (killings of civilians and their cover-up in Iraq and Afghanistan) are taken for granted—hence, disclosing them is trivial. Or, the disclosures are inopportune—which implies that the public is assumed to be complicit with impunity. Or, they are taken as a breach of trust—which implies that impunity is the standard and its breach is more important than the actual disclosed information.

By any account, the mainstream media responses pose the problem of a political culture and politics of impunity. This double standard may be termed hegemonic populism (Nederveen Pieterse 2018).[16] The idea that the cables contain 'no surprises' is beside the point; the point is they confirm and document hegemonic operations, political complicity and war crimes, so their status changes from hearsay to actionable offenses or, at minimum, information that carries political consequences. It stands to reason that the political ripple effects are greater in the target zones of hegemony than at the home front where corporate media act as buffers and a jaded public is inured to impunity.

Outside the West, the WikiLeaks disclosures democratize access to information, undermine the legitimacy of rulers and hold significant political ramifications, such as in Tunisia, Libya, Pakistan, India, Haiti, Thailand, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. This has been barely touched on in western media. In the Arab world, the cables expose the complicity of governments in American schemes to a degree that, Philip Stephens notes, is 'startling'.[17] Prior to the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, 'the airing

of Cablegate material on the mainstream media, revealing just how rotten Ben Ali's crony-capitalist system was, played a significant role in politically engaging the youth of the country'.[18]

In Libya, Khadafy blamed the Tunisian uprising on WikiLeaks: 'Qaddafi claims cables leaked by WikiLeaks detailing the spending habits of Ben Ali and his family were planted by ambassadors to push along the Tunisian uprising'.[19] There are clear connections between WikiLeaks and Tunisia's 'Dignity Revolution' that sparked the Arab spring, which in turn influenced Indignados in Europe and Occupy Wall Street. WikiLeaks is a significant link in the chain of events that sparked a 'new culture of popular resistance'[20] and turned 2011 into a year of popular uprisings worldwide.

The country most discussed in the cables is Iraq. WikiLeaks information on US armed forces killing civilians in Iraq and seeking to cover up the deaths undermined the legitimacy of the US military presence; it was a contributing factor in the Iraqi government's decision not to allow an extended stay of the US military at the end of 2011.

In Pakistan, the government time and again condemned US military incursions in the autonomous regions (called 'tribal areas' in western media) in pursuit of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban and drone attacks killing civilians—just as the Karzai government in Afghanistan condemned US bombings and night raids killing civilians. In Pakistan, many tacitly assumed the government condemnations of US incursions are perfunctory and the attacks are in fact carried out with government sanction—which cannot be conceded publicly. WikiLeaks disclosures confirmed this complicity. This played into the hand of pro-Islamist forces and reinforced their anti-government campaigns—if you hit us in the autonomous regions we will hit you in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. While it reinforced anti-American sentiment in Pakistan it also strengthened Pakistan's democratic forces that seek futures that are neither dominated by overseas superpower nor by Islamist extremists.

'The government of Yemen is happy to see Washington use its drones to bomb al-Qaeda insurgents in the country. On the other hand, the US must hold firmly to the public fiction that the attacks are carried out by Yemeni forces'.[21] Here the disclosures added to the hold of the Saleh government slipping. In India, the newspaper The Hindu accessed over 5000 diplomatic cables through an arrangement with WikiLeaks and their disclosure created major uproar. The cables showed that the ruling Congress party had access to over a million dollars to bribe MPs in order to survive the confidence vote over the US-India nuclear deal in 2008.[22] They show that Indians have the largest amount of black money in Swiss banks, which confirms the momentous size of India's underground economy (Kumar 2002).

In Thailand, the disclosures unveiled the views of US ambassadors who were not constrained by the *lèse majesté* law that keeps Thailand's 'network monarchy' outside accountability; the main power center sheltered by an antiquarian law stood suddenly exposed. In Zimbabwe, the cables revealed not only widespread disaffection with the rule of Robert Mugabe but also major rifts within the ruling Zanu-PF party and government. In Suriname, diplomatic cables of 2006 detailed the close involvement of Desi Bouterse in Latin American cocaine trade. Released in 2011,

the cables caused embarrassment in Paramaribo where Bouterse was president. In Haiti, disclosed cables covered seven years from 2003 to 2010, and show 'Washington's obsession with keeping Aristide out of Haiti and the hemisphere; the microscope it trained on rebellious neighborhoods like Bel Air and Cité Soleil; and its tight supervision of Haiti's police and of the United Nations' 9000-person military occupation … What emerges is an extraordinary portrait of Washington's aggressive management of Latin America's first sovereign nation'.[23] Developing countries are part of the arena in which WikiLeaks operates but most western reactions only consider their ramifications in the West.

Transparency from Above, from Below

Chelsea Manning leaked footage of American war crimes in Iraq and spent years in prison. WikiLeaks leaked American diplomatic cables and underwent widespread vilification and a bank payments blockade. In 2012, Julian Assange was given asylum at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. In 2018, Ecuador granted him asylum, but the British government refused to grant him free passage. Assange is now in a British prison. Ed Snowden released massive NSA surveillance of US citizens and foreign leaders and remains in exile in Moscow. Reality Winner was convicted to five years in prison (2018) for disclosing NSA information on Russian interference in the 2016 US elections.

How then do we read the frontiers of asymmetric information war? The WikiLeaks disclosures, even if they trespass on the traffic rules of liberal democracy, without a doubt contribute to democratization. The reception of WikiLeaks' disclosures casts light on the character of dominant institutions in liberal democracy. Under the etiquette of liberal democracy cyber connectivity is supposed to serve social interaction, personal expression and entertainment needs. By using it to expose elite machinations WikiLeaks invigorates democratization of the public sphere and upsets the traffic rules of liberal democracy.

Does whistleblowing and radical transparency unwittingly expose third parties to danger? Across a wide spectrum the main argument against unauthorized disclosures is the possibility of harm (to named sources or informants). After a batch of unredacted disclosures in September 2011, newspaper headlines stated that 'deaths are feared because of WikiLeaks disclosures'. Yet no significant case of such harm has been put forward.[24] Yet, while the disclosures are deemed reckless and dangerous, the danger and recklessness of the actions of US government and allies and the death toll and collateral damage of military operations remain out of view. The former is regarded as a major, possibly treasonous breach while the latter is taken as a routine byproduct of war. In American wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the 'war on terror' in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Niger and other arenas, tens of thousands have been killed or assassinated, millions displaced and countries, cities and industries ravaged, but this is not part of polite conversation. The wars are barely in question; 'classified information' prevents them from being adequately discussed in the public sphere. American agencies promoting democracy overseas involve

clandestine operations that undermine the institutions of democracy in the US (Miller 2020).

Diplomacy and foreign affairs have traditionally been a preserve of elites. For decades this monopoly has been broken by the entry of nonstate actors such as international NGOs, trade unions and people-to-people networks. Social media and WikiLeaks are part of this cross-border field along with Doctors without Borders/MSF, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace. Complaints of NGO interference by incumbent monopoly holders have gradually died down; similarly, WikiLeaks may become part of the landscape. In time the complaints of incumbent information monopolists become routine and boring. In the wider terrain, international service-delivery NGOs usually refrain from political criticism and engagement; transnational advocacy NGOs may refrain from criticizing donor countries. WikiLeaks differs from international NGOs in its counter-hegemonic approach.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks a new American security regime took shape with Homeland Security and the Patriot Act. At the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, John Poindexter introduced an ambitious project of Total Information Awareness (est. 2002), housed in the Information Awareness Office. Snowden's disclosures reveal that the NSA collected data on a massive number of US citizens, tapped into EU and UN offices in New York and Washington as well as phone records of 35 world leaders, including Angela Merkel.[25] American intelligence Internet and phone surveillance connect the world into an 'espionage empire'.[26] The NSA PRISM program collected five zettabytes (1 zettabyte equals 250 billion DVDs) from users of Google, Facebook, Apple and other tech giants (Bamford 2012).[27] What these exercises share is transparency, with a difference. Transparency from above through government surveillance and corporate data gathering and transparency from below, through whistleblowers and data leaking.

Empires, medieval bureaucracies and monarchies have collected data on subjects and crops with a view to taxes, trade and security. Nineteenth-century government data collection expanded with new methods and new objectives such as conscription, infrastructure and public services. AI and big data are installments in this series.

Jeremy Bentham's innovations such as the panopticon for surveillance of prisons were part of a vision of society as a glass house, in which the actions of the governed *and* the actions of government would be equally visible (Sánchez Estop 2014: 140). This was an era of utopian thinkers such as Condorcet, Proudhon, Saint-Simon and Owen. Comte envisioned a rational society, shaped by the application of science to society. Two-way transparency plays a growing role in administrative decentralization and public participation in decision making. Interactive decision making has become significant in urban governance (as in Porto Alegre, Rotterdam, Barcelona) and development projects, while in many other domains it is an exception rather than the rule.

Contemporary surveillance technologies go further. Corporations and banks collect consumer and credit data for marketing and risk management. These surveillance techniques, as David Lyon points out, are reductionist, control-oriented, undemocratic, one-way, not relational and without reciprocity. They produce digital

discrimination that may operate in advance so surveillance leads to social sorting (Lyon 1994, 2002). The use of big data for social sorting or 'automating inequality' is a growing concern (Eubanks 2017, Noble 2017, Murray 2010).

Combatting corruption became a keynote of international development policies in the 1990s; transparency and accountability became part of 'good governance' and a yardstick of aid conditionality upheld by western and UN institutions. Crony capitalism is supposed to be practiced overseas. Does this make sense in view of the Enron series of corporate scandals, bank frauds, Libor, subprime mortgages, Boeing and other scandals in the US and Europe? Oversight in developing countries doesn't mix well together with deregulation of American companies that also operate in developing countries (such as banks, construction, arms trade, security firms). Hegemonic transparency has double standards built in.

WikiLeaks and Snowden expose the tensions between hegemonic and democratic transparency. Hegemonic transparency is top-down, like George Orwell's Big Brother. 'In the networked age, when the watched can also be watchers, nothing less than the credibility of authority itself is at stake… In this changed environment, the people formerly known as authorities can re-earn that trust only by being more transparent, and by eliminating the contradictions between what they say and what they do' (Sifry 2011: 18).

One problem is policy incoherence—such as colluding with autocratic governments in one sphere while undercutting them in another. Thus, 'the United States could expose itself to charges of hypocrisy if the State Department maintained its support, tacit or otherwise, for autocratic governments running countries like Saudi Arabia or Bahrain while deploying technology that was likely to undermine them'.[28] States are complex institutions; multi-channel politics is as common as hedging one's bets, just as major political campaign donors fund both the incumbent and the opposition. While this is generally a deliberate incoherence, implementing it requires discretion. WikiLeaks poses the problem not of back channels (which are always available) but of trespassing on the fine arts of double dealing.

According to Julian Assange, 'It is not our goal to achieve a more transparent society; it's our goal to achieve a more just society'.[29] Assange's approach is based on the view that 'authoritarian power is maintained by conspiracy', according to his essays on 'Conspiracy as governance' (Assange 2006). Forcing authoritarian institutions to greater secrecy renders them more opaque to themselves and less effective in dealing with changing environments. 'An authoritarian conspiracy that cannot think efficiently, cannot act to preserve itself against the opponents it induces' (Assange 2006: 5).

This sounds like Karl Popper's open society (that inspires the Open Society Foundation) and parallels arguments in favor of information circulation (as in knowledge economy and management literature), but also suggests a simplistic account of government institutions. First, it doesn't take into account divisions within government; for instance, the state department's endorsement of partial openness isn't shared by the Pentagon and intelligence agencies. The classification levels of government info (confidential, classified, secret, top secret) indicate compartmentalized information circuits. Second, when it comes to covert operations

and war theaters, outer government circles don't necessarily know the agenda of inner circles (the deep state), as during the Iraq war (McCoy 2017). Third, secrecy as a mode of operation of authoritarian institutions may be operationally effective but doesn't meet standards of legitimacy. While the state department promoted openness of information in the 'color revolutions' in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the CIA and Pentagon engaged in secret renditions, sending terrorism suspects to Eastern Europe and the Arab world for interrogation and torture.

This discussion leaves aside the question of transparency in WikiLeaks itself. WikiLeaks as an organization and Julian Assange as a key figure have been criticized for various reasons. Some criticisms may reflect disinformation and a smear campaign against Assange; some reflect faulty judgment on the part of an organization under pressure, a small organization that handles large concerns and data flows (Brooke 2012, Lovink 2012). According to Geert Lovink, WikiLeaks is an organization shaped by 1980s hacker culture and by the political values of 1990s techno-libertarianism. It has been criticized for being 'a typical SPO (Single Person Organization)', for lack of transparency in its funding and for 'secrecy in this way of making-things-public'. Organizational problems have given rise to alternative channels (such as OpenLeaks, founded by a WikiLeaks dissident). In this discussion the issue isn't WikiLeaks as an organization per se but WikiLeaks as part of contemporary techno-politics that enables new levels of public awareness. It belongs alongside websites and listserves such as MoveOn, TruthOut, AlterNet, Open Democracy, Huffington Post, The Intercept, Tuenti (Spain), QQ (China) and Naver (Korea), but with the specific function of enabling leaking. WikiLeaks is an Internet project that operates from Europe, led by an Australian. It belongs to a different category from hacker websites such as Anonymous, LulzSec and the Chaos Computer Club. WikiLeaks represents the shift from hacking to leaking, or facilitating 'insiders from large organizations to copy sensitive, confidential data and pass it on to the public domain while remaining anonymous' (Shirky 2011: 41; Lovink 2012).[30]

Disclosure of information matters—the Pentagon papers, the Church Report on the CIA, the Iran-Contra hearings, the Freedom of Information Act, the Panama and Paradise papers and the Afghanistan papers have ramifications throughout the world. Yet disclosure may also serve purposes of power; how information works depends on the context, the timing and source. Sánchez Estop observes,

> in modern power, transparency and secrecy are much more complementary than contradictory, all the more so when power is conceived of—as Assange himself does—as a reticular structure, a network, or a web. When transparency is not opposed to secrecy anymore, it can become the most refined form of secrecy. In such a regime of truth, whoever tries to get rid of secrecy and promotes transparency, instead of being freed of a "totalitarian regime," gets entirely entangled in the dialectics of modern power. (2014: 40)

This entanglement applies to Julian Assange. Cooped up in a small embassy in London, with no friends in establishment parties in the US and the UK, Assange became a disrupter, even teaming up with disrupters such as Trump and Nigel Farage. A possible motto is 'Let them eat chaos'. When WikiLeaks released emails of the National Democratic Committee, the timing and lack of curation of the leaks

were viewed as 'political sabotage, not whistleblowing'.[31] The leaks were accompanied by Russian interventions in American social media in favor of Donald Trump.

What Is Truth?

Rumor, slander, triggering moral panics have served political entrepreneurs from time immemorial; new is that it is amplified through social media. In ancient Greece, instructors of rhetoric, sophists, were accused of sophistry, word games in place of understanding. In Rome, rhetoric and poetry were tools of settling political disputes. Octavian accused Mark Anthony who was close to Cleopatra, of Egyptian leanings, using gossip and allegations of foreign influence (Versluys 2015).

Truth has been contested all along. The nineteenth century was a time of 'physics envy'. Laws like the laws of nature should also apply to society; it is a matter of uncovering the 'iron laws of history', as Marx claimed he did. This changed with the new physics of the 1910s. Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky probing different levels of consciousness inspired Freud and led to the notion of the subconscious (Hughes 1958). With Dada and surrealism this entered public awareness. In two world wars, the collective unconscious seemed to lead the way. Fast forward and the linguistic turn, the cultural turn and discourse analysis entered collective awareness and positivist tenets of rationality gradually unraveled. Truth as in physics and the 'laws of nature' look different with the onset of quantum theory and the new physics. According to Nietzsche, the one person who made sense in the New Testament was Pontius Pilate when he asked, facing the Sanhedrin accusers of Jesus, 'what is truth?' (Nietzsche 1888/1976: 67–68). Pilate implied there are multiple points of view.

Nietzsche was a vanguard of postmodernism. Postmodernism dethroned nineteenth-century reason (Lyotard 1979). As Walter Anderson observed, 'reality isn't what it used to be' (1990). Postmodern sensibilities outflank Enlightenment notions of truth. They enter collective awareness in the setting of the knowledge economy and the digital turn. With population growth, growing population density and urbanization across the world come more information, more stakeholders and more diverse perspectives. The rise of emerging societies multiplies the diversity of information and perspectives.

The Oxford Dictionary word of the year 2016 was 'post-truth', 'a condition where facts are less influential in shaping opinion than emotion and personal belief'.[32] A public sphere in which expert knowledge and facts matter less than partisan affiliation. Expert knowledge—in relation to climate change, economic and financial policy, or evolution—is discredited for various reasons, a gradual erosion. Policy makers and experts have lost public trust because of economic and social disarray. Who thought it was a good idea to give globalization over to big corporations and call it free trade? Who foresaw the 2008 crash?

Fake news is disseminated for disinformation, noise and distraction, or to make money from ads.[33] Brazen lies can work in a polarized environment where partisan loyalties prevail over analysis; refuting the lies takes up so much oxygen that the

public sphere itself changes. Examples are Obama's birth certificate and Boris Johnson's claim that Brexit would free up £350 million a week for the British National Health Service. The aim is not to persuade but rather to change the subject: 'distraction is the goal'.[34]

'In Mr Bannon's view, the imperative is to dominate the conversation rather than contest a battle of ideas. "The Democrats don't matter… The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to *flood the zone with shit*"' (Italics added).[35] When post-truth is organized, objectives are concealment of what matters, noise so public conversation cannot focus, and framing so developments are viewed through certain narratives.

Lineages of 'the manufacture of consent' include early 1900s yellow press magnates such as William Randolph Hearst. In the 1920s Edward Bernays, the 'father of public relations', the 'father of spin', and a distant nephew of Sigmund Freud, wrote about crowd psychology and influencing public opinion. In the 1950s, Vance Packard observed that 'hidden persuaders' tailored after motivational research were long used in advertising, marketing and store design (Packard 1957). Nudge is a key principle in economics and marketing; Richard Thaler received a Nobel memorial prize for economics for his work on nudge economics (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). In applications of behavioral economics and neuromarketing we are being tracked and conditioned in our consumer behavior in malls, supermarkets, department stores, websites and ecommerce.

Dan Schiller's book *Digital Capitalism* documents how deregulation of telecoms in the 1980s enabled corporate fortunes and media tycoons with major influence on the public sphere (1999). Telecom millionaires shaped or continue to shape public communication (such as Robert Maxwell, Rupert Murdoch, Conrad Black, Michael Bloomberg, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Carlos Slim Helú in Mexico, Mukesh Ambani in India, Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, Hameed Haroon in Pakistan). Film and TV stars made it into high office, such as Reagan, Trump and Joseph Estrada in the Philippines. The Reagan administration's deregulation of media opened the way for hate speech radio and shock jocks entered the American public sphere (such as Rush Limbaugh, Don Imus, Michael Savage), normalizing extremist polarization. The coarsening of discourse and degeneration of public life paved the way for the Tea Party (O'Connor and Cutler 2008). With Donald Trump, hate speech entered the White House. Exasperation about Trump's style overlooks that it has been in the making for decades; it is the background becoming foreground.

Contemporary big tech and social media are a sequel to media casino capitalism. The Murdoch group controls a large swath of the Australian press (70 percent) and a TV channel, major papers in the UK and the US, and Fox News. Telecoms wealth has moved into cyberspace. As before, quantity trumps quality; what counts is ratings and market share. Scale is a key variable, the 'curse of bigness'—'Big data tilts the playing field decisively in favour of the largest digital players themselves'.[36] Quantity means data and 'data are power' (Nilekani 2018). The normalization of extremes and partisan polarization are part of the social media business model. They are not bugs, they are features. Deregulation also enabled the comeback of financialization; hedge fund billionaires also intervene in the public sphere. The Koch

brothers funded the Tea Party and Robert and Rebekah Mercer funded Breitbart News and bought Cambridge Analytica.

Thus what is now called post-truth and information war has a long lineage. Information war is techniques of information processing that seek to gain advantage over adversaries (Libicki 1995). Propaganda, disinformation and psyops are ordinary statecraft modes of operation in arenas of conflict. As Michel Foucault observed, truth claims are power claims (1980).

Information war is a subset of a wide digital spectrum. A general backdrop is data smog (Shenk 1997). In the digital economy 'we are the product'. Credit cards, banks and retailers share customer data with other firms. It is possible to block some data sharing but doing so takes us through a labyrinth. Noise, redundant information differs from intentionally produced data overload where the objective is to undermine credibility or change the rank order of information types.

Most people have opinions before they have analyses, have attitudes before they have opinions and have feelings before they have attitudes. Emotions and moral intuitions are usually more important than facts or arguments. Hence, the everlasting influence of family and kinship, also in the form of symbolic kinship such as ethnicity, religion or nationalism. A strong public sphere is a counterweight to attitudes, but this isn't available in the US. Corporate media produce theater to sell advertising (fast paced, Breaking News, visual), not information. Public broadcasting is dramatically underfunded. Add to this a weak educational system. This is the setting that social media enter into. Extensive research shows that bots supply 40 to 60 percent of social media traffic in America and across the world, posting and reposting false and divisive narratives, notably during the Covid-19 pandemic (Blackbird.AI 2020).

Tech and Institutions

Scott Galloway writing for an American magazine, *Esquire*, notes: 'We also have a gag reflex when it comes to regulation'. Since he started suggesting that Amazon should be broken up, Fox News began to introduce him on-air as a socialist (Galloway 2018: 147). Kara Swisher writing in the *New York Times* calls Europe's attitude to big tech 'punitive and suspicious'. In her opinion article under the title 'I'm not going to take it anymore. None of us should', she quotes a Silicon Valley tech entrepreneur who claims, 'You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it!' Referring to China 'stalking its citizens', she finds that 'we need to ensure that the version of the internet that was invented in the United States—one based on a principle of openness—is the one that should prevail'. As to problems in big tech, she quotes the same tech entrepreneur who is 'not a fan of government regulation': 'There's nothing to be done about it but consumer choice'.[37] An article on the next page talks about 'the horrors of China's information-age totalitarianism'.[38]

These quotes display several elements. First, American pro-market views are culturally embedded (we have a gag reflex). Second, in spite of big tech malfunction, the attitude remains one of corporate self-regulation. Third, the competitive

market fantasy (the one solution is consumer choice—while the article finds there is no choice). Fourth, lightheaded thinking—declare opposition (won't take it anymore), yet genuflect before market views and praise American Internet 'based on openness'. Fifth, seek Internet hegemony (we must ensure). These are perspectives on the part of savvy tech writers. Tech writers are Janus faced, one face looks at consumers and the other at corporations. The American big tech antitrust agenda leads headlines, but may not be as strong as it seems.

When people gawk at tech giants such as Google (omnipresent), Apple (design) and Amazon (size), they overlook that American taxpayers have provided basic funding which congress funneled to corporations, which with the aid of congress legislation have turned into quasi-monopoly enterprises. They overlook it is all just mass production.

Digitalization and big data AI can yield big improvements in public services, or alternatively, tech dystopia. One observation is 'Smart cities are only as clever as their designers'.[39] It's not simply tech, but how to combine components and balance options. Where lies the line between public service, private greed, state intrusion, and creepy innovation? The question that digital and AI tech pose is the *balance between society, state and market*, the institutions that frame and guide connectivity and innovation. Tech dystopia includes home gadgets that collect data (Nest) or listen in (Alexa, Siri), phones that record locations, reckless scaling of disruptive innovations (Uber, WeWork), AI face recognition (Clearview), hacking in the service of authoritarian governments and oligarchs (Pegasus, ONS), scraping social media data for commercial or political purposes (Cambridge Analytica) and other Black Mirror scenarios.

Tech innovations may be 'disruptive' in business processes and consumer habits but tech per se is not transformative; instrumentalism and tools of power reflect and reinforce existing power relations. In liberal market economies, corporations lead and digital tech provides corporations with more data and power. In state-led market economies where authoritarian governments lead, government gains surveillance leverage. The digital turn poses core questions of values and governance. Digital tools and big data provide major opportunities to improve public services such as mass transit, infrastructure, utilities, education and the organization of the labor market. Digital coordination of the labor market is what youngsters in Europe are enthusiastic about. Digital coordination of the labor market, education and re-education can provide jobs. To realize these opportunities requires capable administration and roundtable governance in which stakeholders are represented.

Yet where power and governance are concentrated, whether in corporate hands or in authoritarian government hands, digital tools can hold the majority back. To understand the role of tech is to understand the setting in which tech functions; focusing on tech itself is just an engineering shortcut. Connectivity is embedded in the institutional and cultural mesh of societies. Institutions mediate the development and uses of technology. To what ends, from what mindset connectivity is developed and organized depends on cultural frameworks and institutions, which vary widely across societies. What is the relationship between society, state and market? Does government regulate market forces on behalf of the public interest, on behalf of

oligarchs, or to shelter conservative elites? Are the relations between state and society cooperative, patronizing or adversarial?

Liberation tech, transparency from below and new connectivity hold democratic potential with hackers and whistleblowers, leaking and clicktivism. Fax and copy machines (Russian dissidents' samizdat), phone trees (people power in the Philippines, Tiananmen Square), Blackberries (protesters in Brixton), cell phones (Tahrir Square, the Jasmine Revolution), smartphones (Occupy Wall Street, the umbrella movement in Hong Kong). Social movements from the Arab spring to frustrated voters in Russia show diverse faces of the digital turn. In Russia, phone cameras and YouTube videos revealed ballot box stuffing in elections and sparked riots and demonstrations (2011). In China, Sina Weibo, the largest microblog platform (launched 2009, with 462 million monthly active users in 2018) and the social media of the search engine Baidu expose corrupt local bosses. According to the *China Daily,* 'public opinion pressure conveyed by *weibo* is helpful in cracking down on corruption and supervising the administration of local governments'.[40] Activists in Hong Kong and China teach activists to 'jump firewalls' and staying a step ahead of government censorship by continually upgrading software and becoming clicktivists.

Yet digital tech tends to benefit incumbents more than insurgents. As Internet controls are etched in countries telecoms law, to breach or go around them becomes illegal and one can go to jail over it. Governments control virtual borders and instrumentalize connectivity in cyber statecraft. Authoritarian Internet governance includes Internet surveillance and censorship, cyberattacks on websites (as in Saudi Arabia, Belorussia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Thailand), slowing down Internet connectivity, blocking access to social media or jamming airwaves (Egypt, Iran, Russia), using trolls in elections (the Philippines), paying microbloggers or recruiting volunteers to spread positive information about the government (China) and interfering in foreign social media (Russia).

A classic distinction in varieties of market economies runs between liberal, state-led and coordinated market economies. All are mixed economies and the headings refer to the *dominant* character of governance, the mode of governance that frames the articulation of strands and sets the terms of interaction. In brief, in market-led societies, corporations control the uses of technology and how tech can be monetized is what matters. In state-led societies, the state determines the uses of tech and corporations work together with the state. In roundtable societies, standards of public service inform and regulate the uses of tech. State-led market economies can be differentiated in developmental states (such as Singapore, China, Vietnam, Rwanda, Ethiopia), conservative states (India, Saudi, UAE, Iran, Morocco) and kleptocratic states (e.g. Russia, Egypt, DRC, Cambodia, Myanmar, Zimbabwe). All societies are a mix that includes strands from across the spectrum. The typology is shorthand in that while each governance includes all strands, the dominant strand heads the typology. State-led market economies all have authoritarian features but authority serves different purposes—to achieve overall development for the nation and the majority of people, to uphold a conservative social vision, or to serve an elite.

Table 8.1 Regulation of tech connectivity in diverse market economies

Market economies		Regulation	Beneficiaries	Examples
Liberal ME		Deregulation	Corporations	US, UK
Coordinated ME		Regulation	Stakeholders	EU, Japan, NE Asia
State-led ME	Developmental	Regulation	State, legitimacy	China, Singapore, Rwanda
	Conservative	Regulation	State, supporters	Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey
	Extractive	Regulation	Regime cronies	Russia, Egypt, Indonesia

Another variable across market economies is whether or not the state is a capable state.

Table 8.1 is a schematic overview of how big tech connectivity is organized in different market economies. The terms regulation and deregulation are shorthand; deregulation is a form of regulation too (but this isn't the place to develop this argument).

In the US, given the structural partnership of big business, lobbies and congress, big business plays an overweening role and the public sphere is commercialized (Kornbluh 2018). Tech solutionism and hyperconnectivity enthusiasm alternates with dystopia and apocalyptic paranoia (in science fiction and movies) as part of a bipolar public sphere. *Wall Street Journal* opinion pages consistently favor deregulation of corporations, banks, environmental policy, media, the Internet—except when it comes to security, law and order, women's rights and immigration. Corporate self-regulation is doctrine in Chicago school economics and is an established American pattern that extends to big tech and data privacy. The US functions in three capacities, as a liberal market economy, committed to market fundamentalism; as a global hegemon with a strong military-tech-media complex; and as diverse state governance in a federal state.

Jen Schradie's research of class frictions in South Carolina shows that 'while hashtag activism captures headlines, conservative digital activism is proving more effective on the ground. Large hierarchical political organizations with professional staff can amplify their digital impact, while horizontally organized volunteer groups tend to be less effective at translating online goodwill into meaningful action. Not only does technology fail to level the playing field, it tilts it further, so that only the most sophisticated and well-funded players can compete' (Schradie 2019).

Silicon Valley tech libertarians match Washington, Wall Street and their aptitude for deregulation; code words are innovation and competition. Firms such as Google broadly share Washington views on terrorism and security.[41] Silicon Valley is enmeshed in the deregulated market economy of consumerism as well as in the ethos and apparatus of hegemony. In finance, a common observation is that 'tech titans behave like big banks'.[42] An insider notes, 'It makes San Francisco and Silicon Valley not too dissimilar to Wall Street… but it wraps itself in this moral high ground'.[43] With tech companies as seven of the ten largest companies on the stock exchange, how could it be different? To expect utopia from big tech is as absurd as it would be from big oil, big banks or big pharma.

The European Union is a completely different cultural and institutional setting. Brussels has been at the forefront of regulating American companies and big tech. For years the EU Commission in Brussels has put hurdles in the way of Silicon Valley firms with restrictions on Microsoft, fines for Google and Apple.[44] The fines are just a tiny drop of the big tech bucket; more important is that the EU places restrictions on big tech in relation to privacy, monopolistic capture and tax avoidance that are absent in the US. Fake news and hate speech are off-limits in social media, with robust fines for trespassing in Germany. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) sets a world standard (Dixon 2018). It has been followed by data privacy legislation in California (the California Consumer Privacy Act, 2020), but this legislation has been neutered after last minute intervention. In Europe there is less money in politics, digital services are faster and cheaper and competition is greater than in the deregulated American market (Philippon 2019).

In Russia, the secret police of tsarist rule, Okhrana used covert operations, set up police-run trade unions and fabricated provocations. The USSR expanded state surveillance, striving toward a society that would be transparent and legible for the sake of economic planning, social engineering, security and party control. Transparency became an obsession as well as a fiction to the point that governance became opaque to itself—with dark humor such as 'you pretend to pay us, we pretend to work'. The fiction of top-down transparency has been criticized from Arthur Koestler (1941) to Ernesto Laclau (1990). Under the Putin government, the FSB, successor of the KGB, and the GRU, defense intelligence, have turned to info war as part of 'hybrid warfare'. Info war is a declared policy instrument and part of a dedicated propaganda division of the Defense Ministry. According to the defense minister, 'propaganda needs to be clever, smart and efficient'.[45] Russia deployed info war during clashes in Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the staged insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Hybrid warfare plays a growing role in special operations (Pukhov and March 2017). In response to backlash against its annexation of Crimea, Russia unleashed info war further afield, interfering in elections via social media and befriending rightwing political forces in Europe and the US. While Russian info war has a notoriously wide footprint, info manipulation within Russia has been losing points; by one account, 'The top-down model of "political technology", the method of managing political life in Russia, is exhausted'.[46] While Russia's info war is aimed at weakening the 'western alliance', an unintended consequence of its cross-border intrusions is that they strengthen the case for regulation of Facebook and other tech titans, not just in Europe but even in the US.

China, an advanced high tech producer and consumer, is ahead of OECD countries in fintech, cashless payments, ecommerce, research and development and 5G and is well ahead of the curve when it comes to a digital organized economy.[47] State-society relations in China have historically been different than in many regions of the world. Going back to ancient times, 'through the system of mutual responsibility (the so-called *pao-chia* system), individuals were responsible for each other's actions within each household, and families were responsible for one another within a community' (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960: 58). In Confucian thinking this went up all the way to the emperor, but as the saying goes 'the emperor is far away'. The

digital turn has vastly increased the party's surveillance capacity by monitoring WeChat and other social media. Tencent may keep consumer data for government access.[48] China has become a high-tech surveillance state. Its experimental Social Credit System rewards good citizen behavior and penalizes social misconduct with a point system (with criteria such as traffic behavior, fines, repayment of loans). Sophisticated surveillance methods are particularly aimed at Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, China's poorest province that borders Central Asia.[49]

Comparing the US and China, 'the difference can be summed up in two words: industrial policy. China has one. The US doesn't'.[50] This is a key difference but it's just one of many differences. In China, consciousness and agency are concentrated in the party and its central authority, a concentration of power that comes with risk. Full power also means full responsibility. Another risk is hubris and the illusion of transparency. The power of the party is performance legitimacy (Nederveen Pieterse 2015). Wuhan and Covid-19 could have been China's 'Chernobyl moment', but it was contained with great determination. Local government was aware of the risks but required central authority authorization to declare emergency and take measures. Because a month passed for central authority to act, several million people could leave Wuhan unchecked, which contributed to a global health emergency. The party has conceded its failure and has been in overdrive to remedy the health emergency.

According to a report, 'China's sophisticated censorship machine could provide a playbook for how to control information'. It includes content bans (such as the 'three T's', Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen), the Great Firewall that in effect creates an intranet, the Great Cannon (ways to intercept and redirect massive amounts of web traffic to specific websites so they crash), real-name registration (provide identity card and mobile phone number to service providers), data sovereignty (China's cybersecurity law requires Internet companies operating in China to store user data on local servers and allow inspections when authorities deem necessary), human content moderators (Internet companies employ armies of human censors to police content), screen time limits for kids (video games impose time limits for underage users), and threats, harassment, arrests.[51]

In India, basic Internet infrastructure has been funded by the government as part of the data aggregator India Stack, which combines the personal identification system Aadhaar, a Unified Payments Interface and WhatsApp. The idea is to bring the majority of people into the formal economy with a digital identity, bank account and access to credit, which poses several concerns. India Stack is also a surveillance tool of the ruling BJP party and is used to promote its Hindutva agenda. It raises issues such as blocking Internet service in Jammu and Kashmir and social media monitoring of opposition to the Citizens Amendment Act and in Assam. The company that has set up the data system, Infosys has privileged access to the data and can accumulate fortunes, despite official claims that data privacy is built-in (Nilekani 2018). India is exporting India Stack technology to African countries.

Northeast Asia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are broadly similar to the EU in following coordinated regulation with regard for stakeholder interests. Differences

are that bureaucracy plays a larger role, particularly in Japan, and chaebols such as Samsung play a large role in Korea.

Meanwhile, market economies are not just different; they are also entangled. Connectivity conflicts are also globalization conflicts. The American case is familiar—Washington consensus policies sought to turn developing countries into mirror images of Anglo-American economies; the Pentagon and NSA maintain monitoring posts across the world; American soft power includes Microsoft, Facebook and Google. The US government backed Apple in its protests against Brussels taxation. The Cambridge Analytica episode revealed the extent of third party data sharing; profiles of 87 million Facebook users were captured and used for political purposes. Cambridge Analytica operated in 68 countries (Briant 2020, Kaiser 2019). Silicon Valley survived the NSA disclosures but did not survive the Cambridge Analytica debacle. Data privacy has emerged on the agenda even of American legislatures.[52] As Brussels seeks to impose taxes on American digital tech companies, the Trump administration threatens to retaliate with tariffs on European exports. The US has made Huawei and 5G part of trade disputes with China, seeking to undercut China's technological rise.

Digital capitalism, surveillance capitalism and big tech data harvesting slide into the next phase, AI capitalism which relies on big data inputs. An emerging arena of global competition is which society and which methodology is better able to collect and harness big data in automation systems—corporate self-regulation, state-led regulation or stakeholder regulation? At issue is not just technical capability but also the quality of institutions and the public sphere: which approach is qualitatively better? The EU typically exercises its role via international law and international institutions and its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has worldwide ramifications. It presents a stark example of the difference between stakeholder and shareholder principles of economic coordination.

In response to global tech entanglement, several countries opt for localization of the Internet under headings of 'internet sovereignty' and data sovereignty (Segal 2018). Countries are taking control of the Internet.[53]

A growing number of countries adopt measures of data sovereignty such as Singapore, Russia and India. These measures pose a host of technical and administrative problems: how do we rhyme Internet walls with transnational connectivity for citizens (how to reach booking.com?), corporations and banks. Mastercard, the world's largest credit card provider warns against countries nationalizing payment networks: 'The cost of building siloed systems in a world where citizens travel globally is really stupid, and where crime travels globally is even more stupid, and where technology is global is even three times stupid'.[54]

Overview

- Digital enthusiasm has given way to digital dystopia.
- Corporations collecting consumer data may produce digital discrimination.
- Telecom millionaires have shaped and continue to shape public communication.
- Quantity trumps quality; ratings and market share is what counts. 'Data are power'.
- Normalizing extremist polarization is part of the social media business model.
- Steve Bannon: 'The Democrats don't matter… The real opposition is the media. And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit'.
- Post-truth includes fake stories that conceal what matters, noise so public conversation cannot focus, and framing so developments are viewed through certain lenses.
- Most people have opinions before they have analyses, attitudes before they have opinions and feelings before they have attitudes.
- Tech writers are Janus faced, one face looks at consumers, the other at corporations.
- Where lies the line between public service, private greed, state intrusion, and creepy innovation?
- At issue in digital tech and AI is the institutions that guide connectivity and innovation.
- To understand the role of tech is to understand the setting in which it functions; focusing on tech itself is just an engineering shortcut.
- Tech innovations may be 'disruptive' in business processes and consumer habits but are not transformative. Tech tools reflect and reinforce existing power relations.
- Where corporations lead, digital tech provides corporations with more data and power. Where authoritarian governments lead, they gain surveillance leverage.
- Digital tools provide major opportunities to improve public services such as mass transit, infrastructure, education and the organization of the labor market.
- Does government regulate market forces on behalf of the public interest, on behalf of oligarchs or on behalf of conservative elites?
- Are relations between state and society cooperative, patronizing or adversarial?
- Digital tech benefits incumbents more than insurgents. Governments control virtual borders and instrumentalize connectivity in cyber statecraft.
- In the US, tech solutionism and enthusiasm alternate with dystopia and apocalyptic paranoia as part of a bipolar public sphere.

- Silicon Valley is part of digital consumerism as well as the apparatus of hegemony.
- To expect utopia from big tech is as absurd as it would be from big oil, big banks or big pharma.
- China is ahead of the OECD curve in fintech, cashless payments, ecommerce, research and development, 5G and a digital organized economy.
- India's Internet infrastructure is part of the data aggregator India Stack, which combines the personal identification system Aadhaar, a Unified Payments Interface and WhatsApp.
- Digital surveillance capitalism and big data slide into the next phase of AI capitalism.
- Which methodology is better able to harness big data in automation systems? At issue is not just technical capability but also the quality of the public sphere.
- Connectivity conflicts are also globalization conflicts. In response to global tech entanglement, several countries opt for localization of the Internet under headings of 'internet sovereignty' and data sovereignty.

Notes

1. T. Friedman, A theory of everything (sort of), New York Times August 13, 2011.
2. E. Morozov, Beware the unholy alliance of state and internet, Financial Times April 4, 2012.
3. New York Times, Business special issue December 22, 2019.
4. E. Denham, Stop political campaigns exploiting personal data, Financial Times August 17, 2018: 9.
5. K. Hill, Face scan app inches toward end of privacy: using 3 billion photos to identify anyone, New York Times January 19, 2020
6. J. Stiglitz, Facebook does not understand the marketplace of ideas, Financial Times January 18–19, 2020
7. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/02/money-laundering-via-author-impersonation-on-amazon/comment-page-1/#comment-462109; https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16428671; https://fortune.com/2018/02/22/money-laundering-books-amazon/; https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/27/fake-books-sold-amazon-money-laundering
8. J. Harkin, Cyber-con, *London Review of Books* December 2, 2010: 19–21.
9. S. Coll, The Internet: for better or for worse, *New York Review of Books* April 7, 2011: 20–24.
10. M. L. Sifry, In the age of WikiLeaks, the end of secrecy, *The Nation* March 21, 2011: 17.
11. M. Glenny, We will rue the cavalier deployment of Stuxnet, Financial Times June 7, 2012: 9.
12. This draws on J. Glanz and J. Markoff, U.S. underwrites internet detour around censors, New York Times June 12, 2011.
13. Glanz and Markoff 2011.
14. The cables can be browsed according to various search criteria (by country, date, tag, etc.) at http://www.cablegatesearch.net. See also http://www.cabledrum.net/.

15. S. Žižek, Good manners in the age of WikiLeaks, *London Review of Books* 33, 2, January 20, 2011: 9–10. Fouad Ajami similarly dismissed the WikiLeaks cables (2011).
16. T. Wright, America has double standards in fighting cyberwar, Financial Times June 27, 2011: 7.
17. P. Stephens, A history of the present in 250,000 cables, Financial Times November 30, 2010: 3.
18. P. Noel and S. Carrion, A new culture of resistance: from WikiLeaks to the squares, *RoarMag.org*, November 11, 2011.
19. M. Vilensky, Libyan Leader Blames Tunisian Uprising on WikiLeaks, Daily Intel January 16, 2011.
20. Noel and Carrion 2011.
21. Stephens, Financial Times 2010 (above).
22. Cable 162458, according to D. Sahni, India—U.S. WikiLeaks: the highlights so far, Wall Street Journal March 17, 2011. According to The Guardian, the four MPs who were the target of bribery voted against the government (J. Burke, Indian government tried to buy votes, says WikiLeaks cable, The Guardian March 17, 2011). See imgur.com, newsofdelhi.com.
23. Comment, The Nation June 20, 2011: 4.
24. Also in relation to national security, for according to the lawyer representing US Army Private Chelsea Manning in a court filing, the information in question did not do 'any real damage to national security'. L Shaughnessy, Lawyer: WikiLeaks cables did little harm, CNN.com Blogs November 29, 2011.
25. L. Poitras, M. Rosenbach and H. Stark, Codename "Apalachee": How America spies on Europe and the UN, Spiegel Online, August 26, 2013.
26. B. Gellman and G. Miller, 'Black Budget' summary details U.S. spy network's successes, failures and objectives, Washington Post August 29, 2013.
27. H. Berkes, Amid Data Controversy, NSA Builds Its Biggest Data Farm, NPR 6/10/2013. G. Greenwald and E. MacAskill, NSA Prism Program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others, The Guardian June 7, 2013.
28. In Glanz and Markoff 2011.
29. Quoted in L. G. Crovitz, Julian Assange, information anarchist, Wall Street Journal December 6, 2010: A17.
30. J. Menn, The scary face of hacktivism, Financial Times September 24-25 2011: 1-2. B. Wasik, Crowd control, *Wired* January 2012: 76-–83.
31. Z. Tufekci, WikiLeaks isn't whistleblowing, New York Times November 5, 2016.
32. M. Hayden, The end of intelligence, New York Times April 29, 2018: 1–6.
33. During the 2016 US elections thousands of fake news items were posted from Veles, a small Macedonian town to make money from ads on Facebook (Robb 2017).
34. T. Hartford, The fatal attraction of cynical falsehoods, Financial Times September 23–24, 2017: 9.
35. J. Thornhill, How to fix Facebook, Financial Times August 6, 2018: 9. Discussions of politics of truth in the US are often America-centric (e.g. Andersen 2017).
36. R. Foroohar, Big tech makes vast gains at our expense, Financial Times September 16, 2017: 9.
37. K. Swisher, 'I'm not going to take it anymore. None of us should', New York Times April 14, 2019.
38. R. Douthat, 'The only solution is less internet', New York Times April 14, 2019.
39. J. Thornhill, Smart cities are only as clever as their designers, Financial Times, August 6, 2019.
40. C. Longxiang, China's *weibo* fever needs to be checked, China Daily June 25–26, 2011: 6.
41. J. Assange, The banality of "Don't be evil", New York Times June 2, 2013: 4.
42. R. Foroohar, Tech titans behave like big banks, Financial Times February 12, 2018: 9.
43. C. Palihapitiya, Time Magazine, July 30, 2018: 12–13.
44. R. Waters and R. Toplensky, Taking on Big Tech, Financial Times July 1–2, 2017: 7.

45. A. Lockie, Russia acknowledges propaganda force meant to wage information warfare against the West, *Business Insider* October 26, 2017.
46. C. Clover, The humbling of a tsar, Financial Times December 10–11, 2011: 7.
47. Sarah Hsu, China's digital economy's growth will soon see it outpace the traditional economy, *Forbes* November 24, 2017.
48. Y. Yang and X. Liu, Tencent denies storing WeChat logs, Financial Times January 3, 2018: 12.
49. For example, E. Feng, Security clampdown bites in western China, Financial Times November 15, 2017: 4. J. A. Millward, What it's like to live in a surveillance state, New York Times February 4, 2018: 7. Particularly damning is E. Dou et al., China detains Uighurs on a vast scale, Wall Street Journal August 18–19, 2018: A7.
50. R. Foroohar, Globalised business is a security issue, Financial Times 16 July 2018: 9.
51. Zheping Huang, 8 ways China controls the internet, *Inkstone newsletter*, 18 April 2019, https://www.inkstonenews.com/tech/what-china-can-teach-world-about-controlling-internet/article/3006687
52. N. Confessore, Big Tech's war on privacy, New York Times Magazine, 19 August 2018: 28–33.
53. E. C. Economy, The great firewall: China's internet shutdown, The Guardian, 29 June 2018: 9–11. W. Hall, The internet risks fracturing into quarters, Financial Times 12 December 2018. R. Foroohar, Nations in push to avoid global 'splinternet', Financial Times 25 January 2019.
54. R. Armstrong, 'Chief backs Mastercard to stay ahead of the pack', Financial Times 3 February 2020.

Art and Connectivity

9

Overview

- Globalization involves synchronization, the experience of contemporaneity.
- Aesthetics, design and marketing are conductors of synchronization.
- A world saturated by marketing is also a world immersed in art.
- Aesthetics is a basic form of cognition.
- Art is multicentric, anchored in multiple cultures; multilevel, speaks to diverse strata; layered, emotive and cognitive; nonlinear and multidirectional.
- Many designs combine geometric and organic forms. Rectangular borders and organic forms within is the layout of gardens, oriental carpets, buildings, temples and palaces.
- Mathematics of Sumer and Babylon informed the design of Persian gardens, which were models of Islamic gardens, which influenced Renaissance Italy and France.
- Art at all times showcases or counterpoints dominant trends of globalization.
- Art is part of the sign language of globalization. Art is a world platform in its own right.
- Civilizations and power centers are collages of past legacies.
- Throughout history power deploys prestige building and art to demonstrate triumph, organize public drama and educate and propagate. Leaders aspire to represent the sense of order that organizes the collectivity. Statecraft as stagecraft is of all times.
- Currents in art history are the autonomy of art and understanding art as an expression of social context. Meanwhile, form and social context intertwine.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_9

- Order is an ancient organizing aestheticizing force.
- The overall sequence of art patronage is temple and court patronage, followed by merchants, industrialists, banks, hedge funds and emerging society elites.
- Lisbon was the first city to adopt the grid design, which became a standard of urban planning.
- Grids are the fastest way to set up military camps.
- Modern art arose alongside the crumbling *ancien régime*, the machine age, and imports of orientalism, Japonisme, African and Islamic art and Russian influences.
- Modern art accelerated the succession of aesthetic styles and the spread of styles across countries.
- If modernity was the 'disenchantment of the world', modern art was a re-enchantment.
- Modernism in culture was a counterpoint to modernity in society. Modernism shows subconscious undercurrents of the modern era.
- American agencies promoted abstract expressionism as counterpoint to Soviet socialist realism, as part of the cultural Cold War.

Why talk about art? Isn't globalization largely a matter of trade, geoeconomics and geopolitics? This is what it looks like in accounts of globalization with metrics of global trade, foreign trade as share of GDP and global production networks. These metrics dominate reports of the IMF, World Bank and UN agencies, but they are not part of ordinary social experience. Most people's experience of globalization is through the Internet, media, movies, music, fashion, sports, travel and 'world events' such as the Olympics, World Cups and tournaments.

A growing literature deals with 'experiential globalization', from the ground up ethnographies of local globalization, and at another end of the experience spectrum, the collective psychodynamics of 'world events'. 'All you need is love', the first global live broadcast (1967), which became a global anthem is an instance of experiential globalization.

How talk about art? If we talk about the art market and art prices, as many conversations do, we may end up echoing the usual market narratives. If we talk about contemporary art and globalization, much discussion turns to how the art market has expanded and now includes Asia, China and other emerging economies, which matters, but other considerations come in as well. This chapter poses two questions. What light does art shed on connectivity as part of globalization? If we shift the emphasis to art and connectivity, immediately we face themes of a different order, such as art as a conduit of sensibilities and aesthetics that are embedded in worldviews. Second, how does looking at globalization through art contribute to our understanding of patterns and trends?

Art displays many meridians of global connectivity. Art is multicentric, anchored in multiple cultures and civilizations that have become increasingly interconnected. Art is multilevel and speaks to diverse strata, from court art to street craft, from billionaire art to activist art. Art is layered, from surface forms to underlying fundamentals. Art is sensory and contemplative, emotive and cognitive, a meeting place of beauty and power, science and technology. Art is transcendent and grounded, shallow and enigmatic, at the intersection of dimensions. Life worlds are sensory ambiences of sound and color, shape and texture, smell and sensation. Art is multidirectional. The boundaries of art, more than of other domains, are blurry. Art sprawls in all directions, in architecture, urban design, craft, furniture, decoration, theater and literature, music and film, beauty standards, fashion, glamor, marketing, luxury industries, kitsch and philanthropy, past and future. Art is multi-temporal and nonlinear. In art multiple times mingle, and globalization, too, is multi-temporal.

During World War Two, the allies and the Axis powers were also set apart by aesthetic markers. The Glenn Miller Band at one radio frequency and Prussian march music at another. During Iron Curtain times, crossing into the East bloc was entering a different sensory world. Traveling in Cold War Yugoslavia, the design and lettering of shops gave me an instant sense of where I was. West Berlin was abuzz with neon lights, advertising and traffic, while East Berlin was tranquil, no ads at 'Unter den Linden', dads strolling with children, almost rustic.

Globalization is heavy metal bands in the Middle East, basketball in Beirut, Indian gurus in Romania, graffiti on Tahrir Square and Banksy on the walls that separate the West Bank. It is the same fashion stores in high streets and malls from middle-income societies on up, along with McDonald's and Starbucks popping up in places wide apart. Marketing and politics are drenched in aesthetics. A world saturated by marketing is also a world immersed in art (Baisya and Das 2008). The staging and design of political campaigns have become similar in many countries.

Globalization involves synchronization, the experience of contemporaneity and aesthetics, design and marketing are major conductors of synchronization. Nowadays across the world, designers and photographers report growing style synchronization in the design of upmarket cafés and restaurants, hotels and resorts. Instagram is a conduit of rapid synchronization.

Aesthetics is a basic form of cognition. In Avicenna's words, 'Know that access to that by which our soul becomes knowing begins by way of the senses' (Erzen 2007: 71). In John Berger's words, 'Seeing comes before words. It is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain the world with words' (1972). Ways of seeing are ways of knowing and where you are shapes what you see.

Turning to fundamentals, there are widely diverse views about the foundations of art. Recurrent motifs in sacred architecture are temples as mountains (pyramids), vertical axes (obelisk, totem pole, pagoda, church spires) and cosmic diagrams that seek to model the cosmos, such as mandalas (Humphrey and Vitebsky 1997). A recurrent contrast and at times friction runs between geometry and biology, between metric and organic, linear and nonlinear forms, such as the arabesque. Geometry goes back to Egypt ('measure the earth' to recover land property boundaries after

the flood of the Nile water has receded) and Mesopotamia. Cuneiform records of mathematics and geometry in Sumer and Babylon were more extensive than Egyptian records and informed the design of Persian gardens of the Achaemenid dynasty (sixth century BCE). Persian gardens were the most influential gardens of the east and were the models of Islamic gardens in Mughal India, Al-Andalus and Renaissance Italy, from where geometric designs traveled to castles of the Loire valley and seventeenth-century Versailles (Hejazi 2004; Alexander 2019).

Basics of geometry are the square, circle and triangle. 'Squaring the circle' is an ancient theme (Lawlor 1982). The mandala, a circle within a square, is the structural layout of the Borobudur in Java, Angkor Wat and many Asian temples. Yantras combine squares, circles and triangles. The role of geometry in architecture and art matches the idea that 'the universe speaks in numbers', in the lineage of Plato (Farmelo 2019).

Rectangular outside borders and organic forms within (water, flowers, plants) is the basic layout of gardens, a design structure that echoes in oriental carpets as well as in buildings, temples, palaces. Rectangular buildings house rectangular rooms with rectangular tables and rectangular frames that hang on rectangular walls. The rectangular frame is the basic form of visual arts as well as of the buildings in which they are housed, museums, halls and galleries. Rectangular frames are the format of print media (posters, newspapers, books), visual media (television), computers (monitors) and laptops, so *all* information is conveyed within rectangles. Clocks are among the few exceptions. Rectangles make efficient use of space; round and oval shapes are more difficult to construct.

Other approaches, however, trace architecture and art back to biological roots as part of evolutionary development (Hersey 2001). Omar Calabrese contrasts the classical and the baroque as categories of form, in which the classical maintains stability and certainty and the baroque introduces instability and uncertainty (1992: 13–19). James Scott's *Seeing like a state* contrasts winding footpaths and straight roads, wild forests and scientific forestry, the winding alleys of old Paris and the rectilinear boulevards of George-Eugène Haussmann's renovation of Paris (1998). On a wider canvas, this comes back in the tensions between premodern and modern forms and again between modern and postmodern sensibilities.

Yet, equally prominent is how many designs *combine* geometric and organic forms such as Islamic gardens, floral motifs in Art Deco and Art Nouveau and the arboreal style in architecture (Gaudi, Barcelona). Oriental carpets imitate gardens with rectangular borders surrounding flowers and plants. Stephen Wolfram's work on the principle that simple programs can generate complex forms is another example of combining geometric and organic forms (2002). Geometry and biology combine in art and architecture and their relative influence alternates over time.

Art is part of the sign language of globalization, a marker and driver of globalization, as in mass cultural tourism (Taj Mahal, Alhambra, the Louvre, Uffizi, Bilbao Guggenheim). Art is a lens on globalization, of how cultures and sensibilities interact, how not just goods and technologies but also styles and sensibilities travel, and yields fluid maps of humanity's sensory flows. This has been true for art and aesthetics through time. In the words of Ezra Pound, 'All ages are contemporaneous'

(1910). According to a similar view, this is the 'Forever Now'.[1] In a broad sense, all art is contemporary art that reveals contemporary globalization. Art at all times showcases or counterpoints dominant trends of globalization.

The world is a recurrent art theme. The first biennale was in Venice in 1895. The first World Arts Forum took place in Venice in 1991 (and has since become part of the World Economic Forum). Art is a world platform in its own right along with the World Music Festival, the World Social Forum and couture fashion shows. Okwui Enwezor, the first African curator of the Venice Biennale (2015) chose as the exhibition theme 'All the world's futures'.[2]

This chapter first takes up how art and architecture spread over time and patterns of art patronage over time; in pointed format, or else this would be a world history in itself. The section on modern syntheses discusses the speed-up of changes in art forms, their growing international radius during times of accelerating connectivity and the layered character of modernity. Sections on contemporary art and contemporary globalization go into more detail. Since contemporary art is a salient part of contemporary times, what does it tell us about contemporary globalization? Features that contemporary art and globalization share are the role of scale, wealth, finance and technology, and how they work out in diverse institutional settings. The world in which a few billionaires own as much as half the world population manifests in the art world with billionaire art.

Civilizations and Osmosis

Art and aesthetics travel along with the spread of civilizations, alongside trade, language, knowledge, technology, religion. Civilizational osmosis between east and west goes back to Bronze Age trade routes and has gone through many phases, with influences from Mesopotamia, Egypt, Persia, Phoenicia and China.

A leading scholar on the travel of art and civilization is Rudolf Wittkower and his work on 'the impact of non-European civilizations on the art of the West' (1989). Hosts of specific studies go into detail on episodes such as the Gandhara civilization, Indic and Sinic civilizations, Persia and Al-Andalus. Hindu culture spread to the Himalayas, Southeast Asia, the Khmer and Champa kingdoms and Java, Bali and Lombok. Buddhism is on display in the stupas of Tibet and Nepal, Burma's golden pagodas, and the Kamakura Buddha in Yokohama. Buddhism spread to Ceylon, Southeast Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Korea and Japan, and beyond. Sinic civilization and Confucianism extended through East Asia and shaped a cultural sphere, particularly from the Song dynasty onward (Katzenstein 2012). The center was the Middle Kingdom, the system was tributary and the heading was Tian Xia, All under heaven.

Civilizational osmosis involves inward absorption and outward radius. The Greco-Roman world carried legacies of Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, Phoenicia and Hebrews (see Chap. 6). Alexander's conquests reached the shores of the Indus and left a legacy of Hellenic culture in Gandhara (in Peshawar valley in Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan). Gandhara culture passed on Hellenic styles of representation

that influenced representations of the Buddha far into Asia (Honour and Fleming 1995: 200–206). The Roman Empire engaged in extensive trade with Persia, India and the Far East, including China (Wittkower 1989; Frankopan 2016).

Ancient cosmopolitanisms include the world of Sanskrit and the Latin world that were broadly contemporaneous (Pollock 1996). When after the fall of the Roman Empire the Latin world shrunk and the Sanskrit world gave way to vernacular languages, a new cosmopolitanism arose, the world of Arabic and Islam. Islamic cosmopolitanism lasted longer and expanded wider, from Muslim Iberia to China, than prior cosmopolitans (Hodgson 1974). After China's links with the Mediterranean world declined with the fall of the Roman Empire, Muslim traders from Baghdad and Basra reconnected China with world trade (Hobson 2004). China's oldest mosque, in the old quarter of Guangzhou (Canton), dates from 627 and is one of the world's oldest mosques. Further episodes of osmosis include the Muslim expansion in the Mediterranean and France, the Indian Ocean trade, Arab traders expanding into East Asia and East Africa, the Levant trade growing in the wake of the Crusades, and the spice trade when the Portuguese, Dutch, English and French established strongholds in Southeast Asia. The amber trade connected the Baltic and the Black Sea.

Byzantium was a bridge between east and west and influenced Venice. During the time of Charlemagne, the Mediterranean was a 'Muslim lake' (Pirenne 1939). In the late-Middle Ages, the eastern Mediterranean became 'a Turkish lake' with Venice at its shores. Venice became the *oculus orientis*, the eye through which Europe sees the east. To the west, a cultural bridge was Al-Andalus and the *convivencia* of Muslims, Jews and Christians in Córdoba, Toledo and Granada. These bridges and the Levant trade set the stage for Europe's Renaissance.

Although the Renaissance is usually portrayed as an Italian phenomenon (classic is Burckhardt 1878), it was rather a Mediterranean phenomenon. The Islamic world carried Hellenic legacies. The architecture of forts and mosques in Al-Andalus borrowed Roman construction techniques (Inglis and Robertson 2006). In Al-Andalus, classical Greek texts were translated into Hebrew and Latin. The eleventh-century flourishing of Muslim culture was an inspiration to Europe (Boase 1977, 1978). Influences traveled back and forth. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II admired the Roman imperial style and hired Italian architects to build Topkapi palace. His library included humanist Renaissance works. 'Artists such as Gentile Bellini and Constanza de Ferrara were loaned by Venice and Naples, respectively, to Mehmet II after his conquest of Constantinople. Both subsequently returned to the West, bringing with them imagery and iconography that they encountered in the Near East. Motifs imported by artists like these appeared frequently in European artworks' (Carroll 2007: 137). In Russia, Tsar Ivan the Terrible hired Italian architects such as Filarete to build the Kremlin. Thus the Renaissance included the Ottoman and Orthodox worlds. Jack Goody widens our perspective further by showcasing renaissances in many civilizations (Goody 2010a, Nederveen Pieterse 2011).

Ongoing east-west osmosis includes many episodes of Europe absorbing outside influences such as Ethiopianism (fifteenth century), Turquoiserie (seventeenth–eighteenth century), Chinoiserie (eighteenth–nineteenth century), Indophilia

(Germany) and Egyptomania, Orientalism and Japonisme in France (nineteenth century). Confucianism influenced Europe's Enlightenment. Chinoiserie in France and Britain influenced the Physiocrats, agricultural methods and science and technology (Needham 1956; Marshall and Williams 1982; Goonatilake 1984; Goody 1996; Clarke 1997; Pomeranz 2000; Hobson 2004).

During the ancient empires, civilizational osmosis unfolded over hundreds of years at a glacial pace. Hindu styles go back to Vedic times and their influence extended wide, to the Champa kingdom (192 CE–1832), the Khmer empire (802–1431 CE), Angkor Wat and Bali. In twentieth-century Bali, government buildings were still designed in the style of classical Hindu temples.

Art and culture travel as part of civilizational influences. Civilizations and power centers are collages of past legacies. As power centers wane, cultural legacies linger. Cultural osmosis occurs widely and intensifies when civilizational circles overlap, such as Gandhara culture and Southeast Asia as contact zones of civilizations. 'Indochina' is a familiar term. Migrants and bridging peoples—such as Arab seafarers, Parsees, Mongols and Vikings—enabled civilizational interplay. The influence of Buddhism and Islam as trading religions extended far and wide. Waning hegemons make room for the rise of others, such as the expansion of Arabs in Chinese seas during the later Ming dynasty, and Portuguese and other Europeans entering the Indian Ocean after the Mongols sacked Baghdad (1258). Early civilizational osmosis was mostly regional. It widened during the Axial Age, the Greco-Roman era, widened again with the spread of Islam, the Mongol conquests, Zheng He's voyages, and Manilla port (1571) as a meeting place of Atlantic and Pacific exchanges.

Power and Patronage

The origins of art go back to cave art and standing stones. Shamanic art gave way to temples. Temples in South Asia, China, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece and Rome were state sanctioned. Rulers erected temples in the name of deities or divine kings such as pharaohs, Hadrian and the Pantheon in Rome, Justinian and the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, and Suryavarman II who dedicated Angkor Wat to Vishnu. The oldest forms of art are sacral.

States and rulers have erected iconic architectures from ancient times onward. What remains of the ancient civilizations after the passage of time is mostly architecture and sculpture; shrines, woodwork, paint and paintings vanish with time.

Prestige building, 'the edifice complex' has been an expression of power throughout history (Tinniswood 1998; Sudjic 2005). According to Eric Hobsbawm, power makes three demands on art. First, demonstrate the triumph and glory of power—such as triumphal arches to celebrate victory, from the Roman Empire to Napoleon; re-planned capital cities such as Akhenaton's Amarna, or reshaping entire countries. Second, organize public drama—wide rectilinear processional avenues serve political display such as the Avenue of the Dead in Teotihuacan, the Champs-Elysées, the Mall in London, Washington, DC, and their echoes in colonial and postcolonial

architecture such as the Mall in Lahore and India Gate. Third, educate and propagate—as in monumental public statuary in Europe during 1870–1914, giant plazas designed for public gatherings and huge stadiums, such as the Zeppelin Field in Nuremberg along with elaborate mass choreography (Hobsbawm 1995: 12).

Art also plays a deeper role. Leaders embody and represent (or are supposed to represent) the sense of order that organizes the collectivity; by profiling a form or style they instill or impose a sense of order. Imperial palaces in China were designed as microcosms of the empire. In leading ritual performances, repeated in the same form in provinces throughout the empire, the emperor affirmed the imperial sense of order, a choreography that was firmly established from Ming times onward (Schafer 1967; Chang 1983; Meyer 1991).

Peter Bürger offers a classification of the evolution of art patronage in Europe from the middle ages onward (see Table 9.1). The individualization of art production and reception developed from the Renaissance onward. Over time not just artistic consciousness but also artists' agency developed and gradually came to the foreground.

A classic divide in art history runs between those who insist on the autonomy of art, which is to be evaluated by formal aesthetic criteria (such as Ernst Gombrich and Clement Greenberg) and those who understand art as an expression of its social context (such as Peter Bürger, John Berger, Pierre Bourdieu and the art-in-society approach). Yet, look patiently and actually form and social context intertwine. Gombrich's study *The Sense of Order* holds that path breaking art and architecture transform people's sense of order. Establishing a different style changes logics and manners of perception and thus reorganizes experience. The upward spires of the Gothic style changed the character of the public sphere of late medieval Europe (van den Berg 1961, 1970).

Traditional art is deeply embedded in ceremonial life and social structure. Form and ceremony were deeply in harmony. Form *is* social context. Order is an ancient organizing aestheticizing force. In Asia, the shape of mandalas organized temples and palaces and combined square (representing earth) and round (representing heaven) forms, as in the Borobudur in Java and Angkor Wat in Cambodia. Interior structures repeat the square outside walls of Angkor Wat, while the Vishnu temple at the center is round. Sacred geography has structured empires, palaces, landscapes and urban designs all along. The organization of experience may be spectacular or understated. Halls of state in Renaissance Siena, Mantua and Florence show subtle as well as marked style differences (Starn and Partridge 1992).

Table 9.1 Art patronage in Europe

	Sacral art	Courtly art	Bourgeois art
Purpose or function	Cult object	Representational object	Bourgeois self-understanding
Production	Collective craft	Individual	Individual
Reception	Collective (sacral)	Collective (sociable)	Individual

Adapted from Bürger (1984: 48)

Statecraft as stagecraft, high politics as art, and cultural politics of power are recurrent themes. Casting Louis XIV as *roi soleil* in the image of a pharaoh, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* was part of a state-making project that was meticulously choreographed and stage-managed with Colbert, the senior minister of finance, in charge (Burke 1992; Duncan 1993).

Artisans are part of temple and palace economies. Workshops of artisans working for the court surrounded the Kraton, the palace in Yogyakarta and Solo, royal towns in Java. At markets on the outer ring of this neighborhood, artisans sell their wares to the public. Likewise in the old center of Kathmandu, Nepal artisan workshops and markets surround the temple area. So did workshops in the hutongs around the Forbidden City in Beijing and in Kasbahs in the Middle East.

The adoption of a new style of art, architecture, fashion, furniture and design means a rupture with existing styles. This is often by design, the aesthetic articulation of a different regime—such as the austere art of the Reformation, the baroque Counter Reformation, Louis XIV's Versailles, Napoleon's Empire style, Soviet socialist realism, fascism and futurism, Nazism's neoclassical bombast and postwar American abstract expressionism. Style and aesthetics carry a political imprint and a signaling role. Shortly after coming into office President Donald Trump redecorated the White House:

> The modern art favored by the Obama family is mostly gone, replaced with classic oils, including portraits of Trump's favorite predecessors, like Andrew Jackson and Teddy Roosevelt. Gold curtains have replaced the maroon ones in the Oval Office, and military-service flag stands have been added around the room, topped by battle ribbons and held in place by heavy brass bases that Trump praises to visitors.[3]

Alongside art sponsored by the state and the church, merchants sponsored art. From medieval times, the halls of leading guilds stood at the central square side by side with the city hall and the cathedral, as in Bologna and Freiburg. In port cities such as Livorno, Pisa and Lepanto, Levant trade merchants sponsored buildings with Islamic designs, with arched gates and windows inspired by oriental styles. In Al-Andalus and the grand mosque of Córdoba, frames painted in alternating red and white bands intend to suggest infinity. Over time they became part of the 'Spanish colonial style', whose influence extends as far as California.

Regents of the United Provinces (the Dutch Republic) commissioned work such as Rembrandt's painting of the civic militia (The Night Watch 1642) and the governing board of the drapers' guild, the wool trade (The Syndics 1662). In the world's first bourgeois republic, state and bourgeois patronage overlapped (Schama 1987).

Rice merchants in eighteenth-century Osaka were avid buyers of woodblock prints of the Ukiyo-e school, such as work of Hiroshige and Hokusai. This art depicted the ephemeral world of everyday life, affordable art bought by the wider public, outside the Shogun castles. When the prints were shown in Paris, their design (flat surface, elevated viewpoint, cropped format, intense color) made a great impression on painters such as Seurat, Manet, Monet, Van Gogh and Whistler. *Japonisme* inspired European modern styles and sensibilities (and European elements had influenced some Japanese techniques too).

When the French Revolution ended the rule of the monarchy, the aristocracy and the Church, an art patronage system also collapsed. The breakdown of patronage and the art market set the stage for the bohemian lifestyle, Puccini's *La Bohème* and the romantic artist. In France, the rupture with old ways was radical and artists experienced downward mobility and went from rubbing shoulders with courts and clergy to the demi-monde. *The Banquet Years* of early twentieth-century artists in Paris were lean years (Shattuck 1967). Gradually, art achieved greater autonomy and new forms of patronage emerged, such as the tycoons of the gaudy belle époque (as in Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*).

A general sequence of art patronage over time is temple and court patronage, followed by merchants, industrialists, corporations, banks and hedge fund managers. Corporations stepped up as art sponsors to supplement state support for the arts and museums.[4] The shift in patronage from states to corporations and banks ushered in the 'modern art bank'. Deutsche Bank supports the Frieze art fair in London and owns a large private art collection. DB acquired a reputation for an aggressive Anglo-American pursuit of growth and became the world's largest bank in 2007, but did not navigate the 2008 crash well (Erich 2020).[5] UBS, Union Bank of Switzerland, a multinational investment bank, is the main sponsor of the Art Basel and Miami and Hong Kong Basel fairs. In South Africa, the First National Bank sponsors the Johannesburg art fair (FNB Joburg Art).

Modern Syntheses

The earthquake of 1755 in Lisbon devastated the entire city center, the Baixa. The king assigned Marquês de Pombal with rebuilding the center city. Military engineers drafted plans for redesign and Pombal selected a clean slate option of rectilinear roads and a grid design (Mullin 1992). In fact, this was the design of army camps. Lisbon was the first city to adopt this design, which over time has become a standard of modern urban planning, implemented in modern Manhattan (with numbered streets and avenues) and in many towns and cities.

The oldest recorded grid designs are army encampments in the Hittite kingdom in Anatolia, 1300 BCE (Derks 1986). Straight roads are the fastest way to move an army and grids are the fastest way to set up military encampments. Armies have adopted the space-time relations of speed and efficiency from the Hittites, the Romans and Napoleon onward. Thus, some of the fundamentals of modernity (as in Bauhaus, Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier, Robert Moses) go back to ancient mathematics and military efficiencies. James Scott's book *Seeing like a state* discusses the modern rectilinear approach in scientific forestry, Haussmann's boulevards in Paris and Soviet collective agriculture. These principles of order don't just refer to Enlightenment-era applied science but also to much older principles of organization. Modern urban design, then, features grids of ancient military order in combination with neoclassical buildings (libraries,

banks, government offices) and postmodern designs, in nested time-space configurations. Straight lines and grids also figure in office design. Piet Mondrian's work is a playful angle on these deep patterns (combined with jazz motifs during his New York period).

Islamic cultural efflorescence, Al-Andalus and the Levant trade accelerated east-west cultural exchanges and set the stage for the Renaissance that spread from the Mediterranean to the Low Countries. Fast forward and another major acceleration in the spread of aesthetics is modern art from the late nineteenth century onward. Modern art arose against the backdrop of the slow crumbling *ancien régime,* the slow-motion crisis of aristocracy, the onset of the machine age and the colonial imports of orientalism, Japonisme, African art, and Islamic art as a precursor of abstract art.

Modern times were times of expanding and accelerating connectivity. The spread of aesthetic styles accelerated, from painting to furniture, urban design, theater, dance, architecture, fashion, advertising; the spread of aesthetic styles across countries and continents accelerated; and the succession of styles accelerated—impressionism, expressionism, fauve, art nouveau, cubism, Dada, surrealism, constructivism, futurism, socialist realism and abstract expressionism.

Real-existing modernity is quite different from the representations of modernity, which is apparent when we look at domains such as modern art. If modernity was the triumph of science, industrialism and European culture, modern art arose rather at the confluence of many currents from outside Europe—influences of Japan, Africa, orientalism, Russia and colonized countries. At times these strands have been grouped together under the heading of 'primitivism' (Goldwater 1938; Rubin 1984), an odd way of acknowledging the role of nonwestern culture. The Magiciens de la Terre exhibition in Paris (1989) struck a similar exoticizing, shamanic tone, which was probably the point.

If modernity was the 'disenchantment of the world', modern art was a re-enchantment of the world. Modernism in culture was a counterpoint to modernity in society. Although Paris was the center of the art world, many makers of modern art were migrants, outsiders in Paris. Chagall was an émigré from Belarus, Léon Bakhst and Kandinsky came from Russia, Picasso from Spain, Modigliani from Italy, van Gogh and Mondrian from the Netherlands. Modern art also carried spiritual and mystic influences from across the world (Weisberger 1986). Islamic art was influential because it was the major non-representational tradition of art; and it had a strong influence on Kandinsky. Modern art shows that many grand theories of modernity and modernization are partial theories, such as rationalization (Weber), the shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Tönnies), and from particularism to universalism (Parsons). Modernism and modern art as counterpoints to modernity showed the subconscious undercurrents of the modern era, the world of Nietzsche, Wagner, Dostoevsky, Freud, Jung, Rilke and surrealism, currents that would contribute to outbursts of nationalism and two world wars, the 'dark side of reason' (Hughes 1958; Cuddihy 1974).

Modernism was profoundly international, rippling in concentric circles from Paris outward. Stroll through modern art museums in Helsinki, St Petersburg, Ankara or Istanbul and they broadly follow the succession of art styles and methods in France, with a time lag. The ripples extended to postcolonial countries. 'Modernism was, and is, an international phenomenon, happening in different ways, on different timetables, for different reasons in Africa, Asia, Australia and South America' (Cotter 2014).

The cultural internationalism of the prewar period was grouped around a center and came with universalistic claims (Iriye 1997). Over time the center shifted from Paris to postwar New York, as described by Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art* (1983). Postwar American political and cultural agencies promoted abstract expressionism as a counterpoint to East bloc socialist realism. 'Nonfigurative and politically silent it was the very antithesis of socialist realism' (Saunders 1998: 254). As part of the cultural Cold War, as 'cultural NATO', the CIA sponsored literary journals (such as Encounter) and congresses that declared 'the end of ideology' in the name of cultural freedom. Edward Said called it a 'sham pluralism' (1999: 54).

Multinational corporations of the 1960s combined operations in multiple countries under the direction of national headquarters. Transnational corporations of the 1970s decentralized headquarters and decision making in different regions. The art world of the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin wall and the opening up of the East bloc and China parallels these organizational trends. The art world became multicentric.

How does art relate to consciousness and agency? Builders, artisans and artists' consciousness and agency usually function within the parameters set by patrons who commission the work. Artists' imagination and craft largely operate within these parameters. The consciousness and agency of designers and builders of temples, pyramids and gardens and their use of advanced mathematics widened parameters in ways that still influence civilization, as in the Alhambra and Taj Mahal. The masonic guilds of medieval cathedral builders laid the groundwork for the Freemasons and their reverence for Hiram Abiff, the allegorical Master Builder of King Solomon's Temple. The consciousness and agency of Renaissance artists such as Leonardo, Michelangelo, Rafael, Botticelli and Dürer broadened parameters in ways that continue to inspire.

Modern art emerged in the wake of the collapse of patronage of the church, the monarchy and the aristocracy. The romantic artist and the bohemian lifestyle emerged alongside the long crisis of aristocracy (Mayer 1981). Artists began to claim the status of *avant garde*, the military term of the vanguard in battle, that is leadership in cultural transformation. Artists' consciousness and agency became autonomous. Artistic production increasingly individualized, artistic agency became autonomous and instead of patrons, buyers and collectors stepped in, and did so *after* the work was completed (cf. Table 9.1). This process takes several turns and continues in contemporary art: art becomes increasingly multicentric, multilevel and plural along many curves.

Contemporary Art/Contemporary Globalization

> Over the course of the past 15 years, the art of the moment has become the dominant cultural force in much of the western world. Institutional behemoths such as the Tate and Guggenheim museums fill their spaces with the dream demographic: young people with money to spend. Auction prices spiral to lunatic realms. Art fairs combine the brashness of the supermarket with a conceptual trickiness that used to be the sole province of intellectuals with too much time on their hands. (Peter Aspden 2013)[6]

Modernism peaked in minimalism with an air of austerity and seriousness. The postmodern turn in architecture and philosophy also affected art. Pop art signaled the transition to postmodern times. Postmodern techniques—bricolage, quotation, pastiche, fragmentation, self-referentiality—are all around us. The distinction between high culture and popular culture faded, a demystification that began with Dada and Marcel Duchamp. 'You can't imagine contemporary art without postmodernism', according to curators of the London Victoria and Albert Museum. 'The vocabulary of popular culture—the mash-up, the remix, the pop-up—is deeply influenced by postmodernism's promiscuous cultural plundering'.[7] The backdrop of postmodernism in advanced economies are the conditions of postmodernity, the 1970s shift in jobs from manufacturing to services and the adoption of flexible production methods (Harvey 1989).

Contemporary art is art by living artists and often refers to artists born after 1945. Contemporary art genres include pop art, conceptual art, installation, performance art, photography, film, video art and street art. In Andy Warhol's words, 'art is what you can get away with'. Andy Warhol emerged at a time when America's postwar generation became accustomed to high mass consumption, intensive marketing, brands and mass media. Warhol turned commercial icons such as Campbell's soup and Brillo cleaning pads into art, with skillful attention for detail and business acumen. His work echoed the fascination with icons and celebrity that mass media displayed (Graw 2009). The studious depthlessness of Warhol's work transformed the banal into art and in the process demystified art. It was code switching on a mass scale.

Since much contemporary art turns on 'the visualization of an idea', distinguishing quality is more difficult than with painting and sculpture, so the conversation often turns back to craft and applied arts. There are no longer generally accepted criteria of quality. By one assessment, 'The old assumption that "art should be exhibited" has been reversed to read "if it is exhibited, it is art"'.[8] It also means an end of art history, at least in the narrow sense of a history of art forms since the Renaissance.

Contemporary art ranges across a wide spectrum from inspired innovation to pranks and gimmicks, a 'Zeitgeist of no Zeitgeist', 'between a joke and a hard place'. A frequent assessment is that contemporary art is too diffuse to be categorized. Contemporary art comes with uncertainty over what to expect and how to evaluate it. Because of its expressive and public character, art reveals globalization. What then does contemporary art convey about contemporary globalization? How do developments in the art world parallel or deviate from developments in

globalization? If contemporary art profiles global consciousness, what does it reveal and reflect?

There are many strands to contemporary art—the influx of new buyers, art prices go through the roof, the art world goes mega, big bucks art squeezes museums and the art world decenters radically, while a 'transnational republic of art' is also emerging. The global turn is a plural turn. Yet, beyond impressionistic accounts of diversity, what are key patterns?

Most talk now is more about the *art market* than about the actual art, more about the price than about the art. Just as with globalization, most talk is about market forces, trade and global value chains rather than about the actual depth, content and ramifications of connectivity. In the art world, 'globalization' refers to the era after the fall of the Berlin wall with a vast expansion of the art market, going global with new wealth. In the late 1980s, Japanese buyers joined the market and in the early 1990s Russians, Qataris, Middle Eastern and Chinese buyers joined as well as American hedge fund billionaires and currency traders. Notes Georgina Adam, 'A key factor in the art market boom is the growth of global wealth. In 2013 there were a record 2170 billionaires in the world… and many have founded private museums or art spaces'. The Internet is another variable; now 'everyone wants the same few things'. 'Almost all the huge prices are… being made as a growing pool of ultra-rich buyers battles for a small number of brand name works'.[9]

Supply and demand is part of the picture. The supply of Old Masters is limited. 'If you have unlimited money, you can no longer buy the best Old Masters collection in the world. But you can buy the best collection of living artists. For that reason contemporary art will be the most significant market for the next 20 years… In China, every new [top-end] real estate complex being built has an art museum. All these spaces need to be filled and that will keep demand high', according to a plug of Simon de Pury, who heads a contemporary art auction house.[10]

Between 2004 and 2012, the contemporary art market rose 564 percent in value (Adam 2014: 10). Art prices went through the roof. A Rothko sold for $86.9 million in 2012. Jeff Koons' orange *Balloon Dog* sold for $58.4 million in 2013. Another bumper year was 2015. One of the highest prices was $300 million for *When Will You Marry?* by Paul Gauguin. The sale of *Untitled*, a painting by Jean-Michel Basquiat for $110.5 million in 2017 was a milestone, the highest price for work by an American artist and the first artwork created since 1980 to sell for more than $100 million.[11] In 2017, Leonardo da Vinci's *Salvator Mundi* sold for $400 million ($450.3 million with fees) at Christie's New York. Jan Dalley wonders 'whether the jackpot figure was not an outlier but a sign of a market gone mad': 'Had the art world gone completely insane? Lost all connection with reason, with reality?'[12]

As the art market became a world market it underwent major changes. An art-industrial complex emerged with the transformation of auction houses into international art businesses, the emergence of mega galleries, an explosion of art fairs (250 in 2017), a 100 or so biennales, and private museums proliferating. Mega galleries such as Gagosian, Pace and White Cube outflanked the 'global cooperative gallery model' in which galleries in different countries show the same artist. Gagosian gallery has branches in Hong Kong, Paris, Athens, Rome, Geneva,

London, Beverly Hills, New York and San Francisco. The Global Guggenheim, their term, operates locations in New York, Venice, Bilbao, Berlin and Las Vegas. Christie's and Sotheby's account for 80 percent of auction sales at the top end of the market. The top art fairs are Art Basel (and Miami Basel), the Frieze in London and the European Fine Arts Fair, TEFAF in Maastricht.

In a world market, scale matters. Consolidation in big oil, agribusiness and pharma goes decades back but in other sectors it is of recent vintage. Scale is a key to global market share, hence, waves of mergers and acquisitions especially since the 1990s. Besides economies of scale, in some sectors complexity is a variable. To make complex products requires large companies. In aircraft a few companies dominate; on some high-tech frontiers, size matters. Consolidation in telecoms dates from the 1990s and consolidation in retail (Carrefour, Walmart, Tesco), fast fashion (Zara/Inditex, H&M), luxury goods (LVMH, Richemont, Kering), advertising (WPP, Publicis, Omnicom), big tech and Silicon Valley date from the 1990s and the 2000s. High fashion changed from small, family-owned businesses to vast global luxury empires. Big Art consolidation parallels trends in luxury goods, fashion and related sectors. In sports, football, film and music winner-takes-all markets took shape (Frank and Cook 1995) and similar trends affect art and architecture with keynotes of scale, brands, celebrity and media.

The wealth of the 1990s ushered in the 'age of the starchitect': 'Across the world starchitecture has given branding to blockbuster buildings'. Architects such as Frank Gehry (Bilbao Guggenheim), Zaha Hadid (Olympic aquatics), Rem Koolhaas (Seattle Public Library) and Norman Foster (Gherkin) are part of 'an arms race of the spectacular'. Their epigones produce 'perfume bottle skylines'.[13] Some museums are now better known for their architects than for their contents.

Scale, of course, has a predatory side—as in 'too big to fail' banks, American big pharma jacking up prices, monopolies in Silicon Valley, Korean chaebol squeezing competitors. In any sector the temptation of scale is rent seeking. How scale works out depends on regulations and oversight that allow or constrain rent seeking. The European Union places restrictions on big tech companies in relation to monopolistic capture, privacy and tax avoidance that are mostly missing in the corporation-friendly US (Chap. 8).

Regulation in the art world is difficult to address (see Fig. 9.1). Collusion between collectors, dealers and auction houses jacks up prices, protects the value of work bought through intricate methods (guaranteed prices in auctions, collectors acting as insiders, donors sitting on museum boards). Insider trading in art is pervasive (Adam 2014, 2017). Generally, collusive corruption (cooperation of high-placed actors in governance and business) is the most difficult form of corruption to detect (Pei 2016).

François Pinault, founder of Kering, the company that owns Gucci, Stella McCartney, Alexander McQueen and Yves Saint Laurent, owns the auction house Christie's, is a collector and the founder of two private museums in Venice (Adam 2014). Bernard Arnault, CEO of LVMH is a major contemporary art collector.[14] The art world is part of a sprawling ecosystem, a fraternity of luxury brands, designers, celebrities. Much high art buying is not purely business or financial investment but

Fig. 9.1 Jeff Koons, *Balloon Dog*, 2013

is token and prestige buying, like luxury yachts. Its logic is peer emulation. Even so a vast business network surrounds big art with investment advisers, art price indexes and Freeports for art—giant armored warehouses in tax-free zones in Geneva, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai where art can be stored (and viewed) free of duties.

In the words of Holland Cotter, 'The art industry is the nexus of high-price galleries, auction houses and collectors who control an art market renowned for its funny-money practices… a substantial portion of the art world is content to serve as the support staff to a global ruling class'.[15] This is a world of shady finance, money laundering and tax evasion. Given the culture of confidentiality, the collusion of collectors, auction houses and dealers, the opacity of value, oversight is near impossible. Georgina Adam's book on excesses at the top of the art market and Jake Bernstein's study of the Panama papers, *The secrecy world* converge in the same findings: the art world overlaps with the world of tax havens and figures extensively in the Panama and Paradise papers (Adam 2017; Bernstein 2017: 103–115).

Whether collecting art as investment makes sense is in question. Media report when art prices go up and beat records; art that is sold for less than it was bought years earlier isn't worth reporting. 'Relentlessly good news is de rigueur in a world where opinion and reputation are paramount'.[16] 'The price of art is entirely determined by a moment in time when two people are interested in it'.[17] A key principle is 'the art of the deal' (Hook 2017). Struck by the focus on acquisition in the art scene, the composer Brian Eno observes, 'It is not so different from bitcoin. Art is the ultimate cryptocurrency. What the art world is doing is engineering the

consensual value of something, very quickly. It only needs two people, a buyer and a seller'.[18]

'The price levels of art do not reflect its fundamental characteristics, rather the fortunes of its buyers'. Yet, 'Participation in today's art market offers an unparalleled presence in the experiential economy: how else could a hedge fund trader find himself sitting next to a film star at an exclusive dinner in a Miami Beach hotel?'[19]

Billionaire art, playground of the 0.01 percent, oligarchs, magnates, the superrich, is about big names. It draws the biggest headlines but is not the most interesting or where the frontiers of art are at. Jeff Koons designing bags for Louis Vuitton with facsimiles of the Mona Lisa, of Titian and Van Gogh (and prices in the order of £2,240) follows Takashi Murakami and others.[20] It is like David Beckham modeling underwear in Germany or cologne in Japan and about as interesting. Don Thompson spoofs big art in *The $12 Million Stuffed Shark* (2008). 'With Mr Hirst's open-mouthed shark and glittery-banal skull and bull its emblems, art history of the past 20 years is distinguished not by a dominant movement or style—that is impossible with the new global pluralism—but by the unprecedented, unstoppable, absurd, obscene rise of the art market itself'.[21]

At issue now is not just the commodification of art—the mechanical reproduction that gave Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno headaches—but art that is *made* as commodity, as luxury product, along with producing series, multiples, mechanical copies, outsourcing production to China and the risk of overproduction. Back in 1990 Robert Hughes observed, 'We have come to take it for granted that art should be alienatingly expensive; it seems normal that its price should violate our sense of decency…. The art market boom has been an unmitigated disaster for the public life of art' (1990). According to an assessment in 2007, 'Today, the reigning values of the art world are money, prestige and power. Scholarship and education take second place to nonstop fund-raising, big-name architects, blockbuster shows, attendance figures, gift shops, restaurants and branding. In the process, museums have become part of a globalized creative industry'.[22]

An air of exasperation permeates the art world. The flipside of mega art is a sprawling crisis that affects museums and galleries. Museums cannot afford to compete with the superrich and magnum art prices. In the US, 30 percent of large museums are in stress (2009). Galleries can no longer afford the rising rent of hyper-gentrification. Austerity in Europe cut support for art and museums and new museums in the Gulf Emirates benefitted. The first year when Europe was a net exporter of art was 2011. When the drop in oil prices from over $100 to below $50 per barrel (2012) affected the Middle East, even the Emirates adopted austerity policies and trimmed their art and museum projects.

A growing trend is private museums and collectors' galleries, also in emerging economies such as Thailand, Indonesia, China and Mexico. 'The private museum, bearing the name of the collector but open to the public, has become the latest accessory of the super-rich'.[23] Following in David Getty's footsteps, they are often tax deductible. In Malaysia Daim Zainuddin, for many years finance minister under Prime Minister Mahathir, funds the Ilham Gallery in Kuala Lumpur that exhibits protest art from the Mahathir era to the present without reservation.[24]

'After analyzing 600 art exhibitions in the United States, the publication [The Art Newspaper] issued a report that found that nearly a third of all solo museum shows in the country centered on artists represented by five of the world's biggest galleries'. The president of the Art Dealers Association of America concurs: 'we live in an era when much of what you read about are mega-monster galleries that are very rich and powerful, with tons of money and satellites… But that's really only 5 percent of the market. The vast majority of galleries are small single- or double-venue operations'.[25]

Citing high art prices, Siri Hustvedt comments the art world 'is capitalism in its fullest form. It's the smell of American culture'.[26] However, there is capitalism mega, medium and small and for each different rules prevail, rules that are not all economic. This also applies in the art world. Besides, capitalism varies by region with a different mix of society, state and market and different regimes of regulation. Since 2014, more than half of galleries in London have been failing and losing money.[27] A gallerist in Zürich, Jean-Claude Freymond-Guth, when abruptly closing the gallery he founded in 2008, sent an email to his mailing list in September 2017:

> The consequences for art in an increasingly polarizing society ultimately built on power, finance and exclusion are clear. What I would like to address though nevertheless is a sentiment closest described as alienation. Alienation in all relationships between all participants. Alienation in a climate where space and time for reflection, discussion and personal identification with form and content of contemporary art have become incompatible with the ever growing demand in constant, global participation, production and competition.[28]

According to a New York gallerist, Stefania Bortolami, 'There are six or seven galleries that just eat up everything. … You can't just have 10 multinational galleries controlling everything. It's just not healthy. That's the way it's going, but there's still space for the boutique, "farm-to-table" galleries' (Neuendorf 2017). Small galleries may survive by creating new exhibition methods such as displaying in industrial spaces, big box warehouses, repurposed dumpsters, pop-up galleries, 'shoebox' galleries (in Hong Kong), or by combining in new forms of cooperation. The pressure is greater on midsize galleries that are less flexible in their operations. Cooperation of small and midsize galleries is a growing trend.[29]

What then does contemporary art tell us about contemporary globalization? Parallels that are on blatant display are scale, the role of banks and hedge funds, the effect of economic cycles (such as the 2008 crash), the salience of brands and big names, and the rise of Asia, emerging societies and multicentrism. Profound but less visible is the inequality squeeze. By dominating the art world, the mega rich jack up prices and squeeze museums, and private museums and venues take over from public venues. The world of the 1–0.01 percent is not simply a separate world of private jets, private islands, yachts, concierge chefs and doctors, Richistan, deftly concealed from public view, but arrangements that cater to billionaires squeeze the public sphere. They squeeze real estate prices in London, Manhattan, Malta, Cyprus and Hong Kong. They corrupt the sphere of public art, just as tax havens drain societies' fiscal health the world over. In effect, tax avoidance and evasion are privatization via the back door (see Chap. 10).

The power balance in the art world has shifted: 'during the 1950s, critics were influential, while in the 1960s and 1970s it was the curators, and the galleries during the 1980s… in the last few years collectors have been at the helm' (Tan 2009: 387). In effect, this means art advisors because collectors—who are first- or second-generation wealthy—don't have time to cruise the art world and meander from biennale to biennale. Big money may have a loud voice in shaping aesthetic criteria, yet art advisers are an uncontrolled occupation. The contemporary art world is one of constant conflict, between critics, dealers, artists, curators (Morishita 2009: 317). Private funding also means the privatization of art curation. In the words of the financier J. Tomlinson Hill about the Hill Art Foundation and its collection, 'This is personal. It's about what I like'.[30]

Why do such brutal trends manifest in visual arts and architecture, but not in music, theater or film? The answer is simply that these fields do not allow exclusive private ownership. Exclusive ownership is a condition for trophy property and speculative investment. In a world where 8 billionaires own as much as half the world population (Oxfam International 2016), the 1–0.01 percent must have something to hold on to.

Aesthetics and connectivity take us also outside the art world. Kansai Yamamoto, Japan's top fashion designer and super show producer had wide-ranging influence. Showcased in a Victoria and Albert Museum exhibition in 1971, his work was featured on the cover of *Harpers & Queen* under the cover line 'Explosion from Tokyo', which drew David Bowie's attention. He became costume designer for Bowie's Ziggy Stardust tour (1972) and went on to dress Elton John and Lady Gaga. He also influenced fashion designers Alexander McQueen, Valentino and Marc Jacobs. Kansai's approach was inspired by the Japanese aesthetic of *basara*, 'dress freely with stylish extravagance', by Kabuki theater costumes and Japanese imperial court robes. Thus Kabuki theater made its way to contemporary rock music grand stadium shows.

Contemporary art is multidirectional; it proliferates in so many directions that labels and generalizations fail. Art frontiers are in galleries, biennales, street art or art schools, rather than in big name art. Alternative exhibition models, street art and public art outflank some of the pressure of mega galleries. Commercial street art galleries are expanding while many midsize galleries are closing.[31] The decentering of the art world has unexpected consequences with path following (borrowing brands and genres) as well as path ruptures. Multidirectionality is a fundamental characteristic of contemporary art as well as contemporary globalization. Table 9.2 is a schematic overview of features of contemporary globalization and contemporary art.

Distributed Consciousness

It is impossible to tell a story from a single center. Ángel Kalenberg (2009: 287)

Table 9.2 Contemporary globalization/contemporary art

Dimensions	Contemporary globalization	Contemporary art
Scale	World market fashion $2.5 trillion	World art market, $65 billion
	Brands, media	Big bucks art
	Big tech, pharma, telecoms, retail, fashion, oil, agribusiness	Mega galleries, global museums
	World economic Forum, Davos	World Art Forum, Davos
	Global supply networks	Outsourcing production (China)
Finance	Hegemony of finance capital (comeback since the 1980s)	Billionaire collectors, hedge fund managers (1990s)
Technology	Digital turn	e-auctions, digital representations, holograms
Structures	Multicentric	Multicentric
	Multilevel, stratification	Mega, medium, small, street art
	Omnichannel	Multidirectional
	China rising	China biggest art market (2011)
	Free trade zones	Freeports for art
Institutions	Transnational corporations, banks	Mega galleries, global museums, fairs
	Biased regulation in liberal market economies	Weak oversight
Collusive corruption	Tax havens, tax avoidance	Tax evasion, money laundering
	Finance, accounting firms, arms, diamonds	Collectors, dealers, auction houses
Inequality squeeze	8 billionaires own as much as half the world population, 2017	Pressure on museums, galleries, real estate
	'Private opulence, public squalor'	Private patronage overtakes public patronage
	Luxury sector	Art as an exclusive luxury good
Decentering	New wealth, 'new champions' and sovereign wealth funds in emerging economies	New art hubs in emerging societies, diversification and decentering of evaluation

Until the 1980s the art world was mostly Europe and US centric. Exhibitions traveled along the Paris-London-New York axis along with second-tier cities. Long-time efforts to bring immigrant and minority artists into mainstream venues, such as Rasheed Araeen's efforts in Britain and journals such as *Third Text*, had limited effect. Now art markets have emerged in Asia, China, the Middle East, Russia and other emerging societies. Art hubs taking shape in emerging societies decenter the art world. Now museums in western countries pursue diversity in hiring curators and museums such as MOMA reorganize their exhibitions to include diversity and minority and female artists.

Multicentric globalization means multicentric art. Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Doha have become art hubs. The Istanbul Modern opened in 2005. UNESCO declared Seoul City of Design in 2010. In each of these hubs, temporalities, genres, categories and meanings come with different GPS coordinates.

Does the decentering of the art world counterbalance western influence? Does the rise of emerging societies make a significant difference? In a previous book I examined this in global political economy (Nederveen Pieterse 2018a). There is no clear-cut answer; the art world is multi-stream and layered. There are strands of transnational commonality, but commonality easily combines with difference (as in 'western technology, Asian values'). There is convergence in biennales and large-scale international exhibitions, star architects and art Freeports. There are entrenched conventions and deep-seated differences as well as unstable, fleeting differences.

Both art and globalization face the problem of scale. Will mega take over? This is not likely; when mega-galleries and auction houses establish outposts in emerging economies, they can do so only if they take on board local aesthetic preferences. Diverse trends and strands do not just coexist; they mingle and intertwine.

Outside Europe and North America, art often consists of three streams: traditional art, modern art influenced by western styles, and contemporary art. In Japan these are *Nihon-Ga*, traditional Japanese painting, eastern in materials and methods, *Yo-Ga*, painting that has adopted some European painting styles, and the less known *Gendai-Bijutsu*, contemporary art (Muroi n.d.). Museums broadly reflect this framework. Museums in Bali or Cambodia show traditional art (fine arts). Museums in larger, wealthier countries also show modern art and contemporary art. In the Emirates, new museum zones combine cultural heritage (Islamic art museum), western and modern art (the Louvre or Guggenheim branches) and contemporary art in galleries. The UAE instead of contemporary art uses the term global art, as in the Dubai Global Art Forum (2007). Hong Kong does not have a museum tradition, avoids the terms modern and contemporary art and instead uses twentieth- and twenty-first-century art (Ho Hing-kay 2009: 270).

The sense of time is different too. In Japan contemporary art dates from the 1960s and 1970s (MoNo-ha movement), in Korea from the 1970s, in Latin America and China from the 1980s (Cho 2010a, b; Chiba 2010). Where contemporary art is housed also differs. Latin American museums may place it side by side with modern art and pre-Columbian art. In Turkey, it may be housed in anthropological museums. Ethnological museums, which are underemployed, often host contemporary art, such as the Musée Branly in Paris. The Amsterdam ethnological museum (Tropenmuseum) hosts special exhibitions on Lifestyles (as marketing categories) and Urban Islam.

Aesthetics goes plural as it goes global. It was plural all along, but in a $65 billion world art market it pays to pay attention. Multicentric trends in the arts have been in motion for decades. Plurality comes with gradients. Different preferences in Sharjah or Azerbaijan don't matter as much as different tastes in China.

Prices for work by Chinese artists jumped ten-fold and emerged as top sellers in 2006. China became the world's number one art market in 2011 with 30 percent of the world market (Adam 2014: 138). A scholar at Sotheby notes, 'Someday soon a Chinese ink painting is going to outsell Picasso… that's where we're headed'.[32] Chinese collectors bidding on their cultural heritage setting new records nearly every week raises new questions. China houses 355 auction houses and 3589 museums, 535 of which are private museums. 'More museums are being opened in

Shanghai than Starbucks cafés' (Ho Hing-kay 2009: 266). Most sales are for Chinese artists for Chinese buyers and much goes to traditional goods, jades, scrolls and porcelain. Clearly, a different sense of order prevails. Western art galleries establishing outposts in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong take into account different evaluation criteria.[33]

Art in China proliferates also in second-tier cities and includes, for instance, Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang province. Urumqi now hosts a Xinjiang Contemporary Art Museum, which is dedicated not just to the revitalization of the Silk Road, sponsored by the culture ministry of Xinjiang but also features diverse approaches of local Uighur artists (Byler 2017).

Museums are sites of contestation for a variety of reasons. Because they have diverse functions and mixed political effects, such as the Tate Modern in London; because they seek to mix publics, such as museums in Turkey (Muslim and secular, middle and upper class); because metropolitan art has marginalized their art, as in Latin America; because they are contact zones between local and global, as in Japan; because they feel small next to a big neighbor, as in Hong Kong; because they navigate state bureaucracies that treat art as a tool of economic development, a stepping stone toward the creative economy or toward mass cultural tourism, as in Singapore (Belting and Buddensieg 2009).

One level is Big Bucks—big name architects, prestige affiliations (the Louvre, Abu Dhabi); another is highlighting cultural heritage (the Zayed National Museum in Abu Dhabi, designed by Norman Foster); and conservative exhibits under the canopy of royal patronage (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait), while galleries in the margins show local transgressive and protest art. It is true that soft power follows economic power, but that does not say *how* it follows. Soft power trailing economic power may just add to big bucks art. At one level, decentering art is just geographical, a transnational cosmopolitanism that actually celebrates the old hegemony.

> Will the United Arab Emirates make its artistic mark on the world by borrowing second-tier Picassos and Matisses from the basements of the Louvre? It is impossible to discuss the globalisation of culture without also addressing its westernisation. The west may be beginning its decline as a political and economic force, yet its culture continues to stand triumphant.[34]

The booming art market outside Europe and North America does not necessarily refer to interest in western contemporary art. It does not play a part in China where buyers mostly buy Chinese art and traditional goods. The Emirates do not necessarily buy art; they buy brands (Louvre, Guggenheim) and iconic architecture as an investment toward cultural glamor and future mass cultural tourism. Cultural infrastructure investment supplements their earlier investments in hardware infrastructure (ports, airports, fiber optic cables, satellites), both with a view to their geostrategic location in-between time zones and rising regions (Nederveen Pieterse and Khondker 2010).

In many countries to gain acceptance in the home country an artist must first find recognition in international art circles. A young artist in Japan first had to make it in New York or Cologne; now Seoul, Hong Kong or Taipei will do. In Southeast Asia, artists who had lived and worked abroad introduced modern art. Graduates of European and American art schools bring 'subversive art' back to their home countries. Because art education is international, methods and rules crisscross.

An exhibit in Kuwait closed down. A director of the Biennial in Sharjah is sacked. A video on 'art as a subversive act' banned in Sharjah is shown at a film festival in Austin, Texas. The artist explains, 'In a place where there is no freedom of speech, you cannot say there is no freedom of speech'.[35] Work banned in Kuwait may be on display in Dubai. Frontiers of censorship are difficult to manage. Diverse initiatives often occur side by side. The aesthetics of the multipolar world are multicentric and multilevel and reflect sensibilities of different strata and generations. On display in galleries, museums and biennales in virtually every region is a cacophony of voices with clashing narratives, clashing views on the role of art and aesthetics. In art, as in political economy, American or European standards no longer dominate.

A frequent question in relation to biennales and international exhibitions is 'Where is the painting and the sculpture? The shows tend to be dominated by video, film, photography, installation pieces (often multimedia in nature), conceptual art, and performance art (often recorded by means of some moving picture medium)'. Thus, argues Noël Carroll, what is emerging is 'something like a single, integrated cosmopolitan institution of art, organized transnationally in such a way that the participants, from wherever they hail, share converging or overlapping traditions and practices'.

> The popularity of photography, film, video, and increasingly, computer, digital and Internet art is itself *emblematic* of the emerging cosmopolitan artworld insofar as these media are themselves cosmopolitan. …Today… when the artworks that derive from nominally different cultures stand by side, they are not necessarily artworlds apart. The works at large-scale international exhibitions generally are playing the same or related language games and share, to a great extent, the same tradition… a unified artworld with shared language games and traditions appears to be emerging across the globe. (Carroll 2007: 136, 139, 138, 141)

This is true at one level. Yet, art fairs mushrooming across the world also come with local logics of reception. For instance, calligraphy ranks high in China and the Arab world. Protest art has a long lineage in South Africa (Williamson 1989). Is *global art*, as in the preferred language in the UAE, a possible successor to contemporary art? According to Hans Belting, art on a global scale loses context.

> Rather than representing a new context, it indicates the loss of context or focus, and includes its own contradiction by implying the counter movement of regionalism and tribalization, whether national, cultural or religious. It clearly differs from modernity whose self-appointed universalism was based on a hegemonial notion of art. In short, new art today is global, much the same way the World Wide Web is global. The Internet is global in the sense that it is used everywhere, but this does not mean that it is universal in content or message. (Belting 2009: 40)

Notes Belting, 'The local requires new meaning in a global era. In the end art becomes a local idea' (2009: 6). Yet this is a *new* local, a local engaged with and retuned by the global. Doreen Massey noted that each place comes with its own take on the global and the local is constituted by its relationship to the global (1993a).

The cacophony of contemporary art is an ordinary cacophony, the kind one expects from the confluence of diverse voices and crosscurrents, as well as a profound cacophony. To art insiders it is not a cacophony but an array of patterns, though this insider view may shun dissonants. Likewise, the cacophony of contemporary globalization is not a cacophony of which one expects a quick fix—by means of experts (here comes science), social science (here come economists) or a master paradigm (postmodernism, neomedievalism) because perplexity is sprawling and comes with newness. At the roundtable of art, the humanities sit next to political economy. Edward Said noted, 'No one now can confidently say where the humanities begin and end, and where interest-created fields of knowledge pick them up or overlap with them' (1999: 56).

Contemporary art/contemporary globalization are part of a data-gorged time-poor world in which everything competes for attention. In competing in the attention economy, *form* plays a signal role. Galleries take the shape of vast white cubes, plagiarizing museums, borrowing the aura of museum-quality work (Adam 2014: 56). Globalization processes take the form of trade pacts, the World Economic Forum, spectacular marketing (iPhone, Samsung, Huawei), mergers and acquisitions, mega brands (Amazon Prime) and mega projects (Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). 'Global' itself is a signal marker, hence, 'global everything'. Brands are globalization for beginners. Brands function as shortcuts, like instant coffee. Newcomers to globalization, like nouveau riche, don't know the side streets and back alleys of sophisticated production, and brands signal at least some level of quality. Hence, Louis Vuitton, Prada, Hermes, Rolex, Patek Philippe.

Art is power and an expression of power. Because of art, architecture and design we often face or inhabit imaginations of power. Some imaginations are passé, some are fundamental to social life, such as the military camp as an arch design of modern cities, and some are absurd.

Alice Walton, the daughter of Walmart founder Sam Walton, one of the country's wealthiest women, founded the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art in downtown Bentonville, Arkansas. It opened in 2011. Public access is free. Its construction involved large tax exemptions from the city and the state. Walmart operates its stores with tax incentives, militantly opposes unions and wages are so low that many workers need food stamps to get by. Jeff Bezos earns $260 million a day, is interested in space travel while work conditions at Amazon are notorious and wages are below subsistence level. Whether billionaires crave space travel, superyachts, extravagant jewelry, sports clubs or trophy art is not of major significance.

The corporate and billionaire stranglehold of art fairs and mega galleries, museums and trustees faces growing protest (Evans 2015). In recent years 'museums have become a new site of protest'. For big oil, big pharma and the arms industry, sponsorship of the arts is 'a strategic expenditure', 'a way to establish an air of social legitimacy', a way of creating leverage.[36] Museums in Europe, the Tate in Britain, Van Gogh in Amsterdam, the Mauritshuis in The Hague have all divested from fossil fuel sponsors. The Sackler family with wealth derived from opioid drugs is no longer welcome sponsoring halls in the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. Warren Kanders whose firms sell weapons and teargas, faces public demonstrations and artists withdrawing their work and is no longer vice-chair of the Whitney Museum.[37] The art of protest is on the rise and is a frequent target of authoritarian governments such as the work of Ai Weiwei.[38]

A convergence amid diverse art worlds and marked cultural differences is that we find many superrich together in the Panama papers. Circles of art trade, arms trade, drug trade, crime cartels, tax havens and money laundering intersect. In 2014, 73 percent of art sales were for investment purposes, most of which is hoarded in Freeports to accrue value, withdrawn from public view. The shift from public museums to private museums operating with tax rebates is part of an ongoing privatization of public assets and the public sphere, particularly in liberal market economies. JK Galbraith described American society as 'an atmosphere of private opulence and public squalor' (1958). Fast forward decades and this is in overdrive. When Richistan encroaches on the public sphere it lowers standards all around. It does in the art world what it does in policy. Billionaires on the board of think tanks discreetly commission policy papers that make their way to congress and trickle down to media and legislation. A short story of contemporary art is billionaire art alongside billionaire press, billionaire think tanks, billionaire tech, billionaire populism and billionaire policies. Is art hoarded for investment and withdrawn from public view still art? Does billionaire art—such as 'The $12 million stuffed shark'—show an inverse relationship between price and value?

Yet, there is also a surge in activist art of a wide variety. A sublime counterpoint to the acquisitiveness in the contemporary art world occurred when a canvas of Banksy's work *Girl with Balloon* sold for $1.4 million at a Sotheby auction in London, a record price for Banksy, and self-destructed moments after, an operation that had been long in the making. Banksy noted in an Instagram video, 'A few years ago I secretly built a shredder into a painting in case it was ever put up for auction'.[39] Contemporary art illustrates that contemporary globalization is a theater of the absurd.

Overview

- Contemporary art genres include pop art, conceptual art, installation, performance art, photography, film, video art and street art.
- Andy Warhol's 'art is what you can get away with' was code switching on a mass scale.
- In the art world, globalization refers to the period after the fall of the Berlin wall with a vast expansion of the art market, going global with new wealth, art prices going through the roof, big bucks art squeezes museums and the art world decenters radically.
- Between 2004 and 2012, the contemporary art market rose 564 percent in value. The art market became a world market with an art-industrial complex, auction houses as international art businesses, mega galleries, art fairs, biennales and private museums exploding. Big Art parallels trends in luxury goods, fashion and related sectors.
- The art world is unregulated with pervasive collusion, insider trading and shady finance.
- The art world is part of an ecosystem of luxury brands, designers, celebrities. Much high art buying is not purely business but is token and prestige buying. Its logic is peer emulation.
- Billionaire art draws the biggest headlines but is not where the frontiers of art are.
- The flipside of mega art is a crisis of museums and galleries.
- Parallels of contemporary art and globalization are scale, the role of banks, hedge funds, brands, big names, the rise of emerging economies, multicentrism and inequality squeeze.
- Exclusive ownership is a condition for trophy property and investment.
- Decentering in the art world includes path following and path ruptures.
- Aesthetics goes plural as it goes global. Multicentric globalization means multicentric art.
- Museums reorganize exhibitions to include diversity and pursue diversity in hiring curators.
- In biennales and large-scale international exhibitions, star architects and art Freeports, there is convergence as well as unstable, fleeting differences.
- Both globalization and art face the problem of scale.
- Plurality also comes with gradients.
- The cacophony of contemporary art is an ordinary as well as a profound cacophony.
- Contemporary art is part of a time-poor world in which everything competes for attention.
- Brands are globalization for beginners.

- Because of art, architecture and design we often face imaginations of power.
- A convergence amid diverse art worlds is that many superrich are in the Panama papers.
- Contemporary art is billionaire art alongside billionaire media, billionaire think tanks, billionaire tech, billionaire populism and billionaire policies.
- Contemporary art illustrates contemporary globalization as a theater of the absurd.

Notes

1. A 1982 album by the English rock band the Psychedelic Furs.
2. M. M. Lane, Venice's curator breaks the mold, Wall Street Journal May 1, 2015: D5.
3. M. Scherer and Z. J. Miller, Trump after hours, Time May 22, 2017: 28–37 (p. 30).
4. According to an Arts & Business report, of American FTSE 100 companies 30 percent are involved in the arts in a significant way (2011). J. Dalley, Sponsors you can bank on, Financial Times October 12, 2011: 7.
5. P. Jenkins and L. Noonan, Deutsche's big bet, Financial Times November 11–12, 2017: 20. DB has been a key financier of Donald Trump's real estate operations since the 1990s, allegedly channeling Russian funds. B. McLannahan et al., The president's debt to Deutsche, Financial Times August 31, 2017: 7.
6. P. Aspden, 10 tips for dealing with (or in) contemporary art, Financial Times October 5–6, 2013: 1–2.
7. P. Aspden, You can't be serious, Financial Times September 3–4, 2011: 1.
8. G. Norman and E. Lucie-Smith, Craft supplants minimalism, The Independent, September 1, 1990: 44.
9. Adam, Financial Times 2014.
10. D. Brewster, Off the wall? Financial Times June 28–29, 2008.
11. R. Davies, What $110 million for a Basquiat painting tells us about the art market, The Guardian, May 19, 2017.
12. J. Dalley, The $400m question, Financial Times December 9–10, 2017: 18.
13. E. Heathcote, Age of the starchitect, Financial Times January 28–29, 2017: 1–10.
14. LVMH, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy in France also comprises Fendi, Bulgari, Loro Piana, Emilio Pucci, Acqua di Parma, Donna Karan, Loewe, Marc Jacobs, TAG Heuer, Benefit Cosmetics (8.7 percent of global sales in FY 2011–2013). Richemont, Switzerland comprises A. Lange, Azzedine Alaïa, Baume & Mercier, Cartier, Chloé, Dunhill, IWC Schaffhausen, Giampiero Bodino, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Lancel, Montblanc, Panerai, Piaget, Peter Millar, Purdey, Roger Dubuis, Shanghai Tang, Vacheron Constantin, and Van Cleef & Arpels (8.9 percent of sales). Estée Lauder, US comprises M.A.C., Aramis, Clinique, Aveda, Jo Malone, Licensed fragrance brands (6.3 percent of sales). Deloitte (2015).
15. H. Cotter, Lost in the gallery-industrial complex, New York Times January 19, 2014: 1–22.
16. Dalley 2017, above.
17. C. O'Murchu, A market laid bare, Financial Times April 8, 2015: 5.
18. P. Aspden, Discreet music, Financial Times April 28–29, 2018: 12.
19. M. Gerlis, Is collecting art as profitable as it is painted? Financial Times January 14, 2014: 9. Gerlis (2014).

20. Jo Ellison, A bunny thing happened…, Financial Times April 15–16, 2017: 4.
21. J. Wullschlager, The Midas touch that turns the art world literally cold, Financial Times September 13–14, 2008: 7.
22. A. Riding, The industry of art goes global, New York Times March 28, 2007: H2.
23. E. Heathcote, Money meets art, FT.com/wealth March 24, 2011.
24. Chen May Yee, A strong-arm era's art, back for public encore, New York Times October 9, 2016: 8.
25. A. Feuer, When smaller is better, New York Times October 30, 2016: 12.
26. In J. C. Gabel, The art world invades fiction, Wall Street Journal May 30, 2014: D1–D6.
27. L. Muñoz-Alonso, More Than Half of London's Galleries Are Failing, Art News September 7, 2017. 'I pulled out all the public records for results in 2014 of London galleries, and I presented [the data] anonymously. It was really interesting because more than half of the galleries were in red'.
28. Art News September 3, 2017.
29. G. Harris, Better together, Financial Times November 30–12, 2019.
30. J. Belcove, 'It's about what I like', Financial Times December 1–2, 2018.
31. G. Harris, Millionaires get street, Financial Times January 6–7, 2018: 15.
32. K. Crow, The China Factor, Wall Street Journal October 7, 2011: D1.
33. N. Degen, Great for the walls of China, Financial Times August 30–31, 2008: 12.
34. P. Aspden, Does China need Puccini? Financial Times March 26–27, 2011: 11.
35. G. Adam, Dollars and censors, Financial Times March 17–18, 2012.
36. G. Grindon, Art brought to you by guns and big oil, New York Times May 31, 2020.
37. R. Spence, Corporate funding's golden grip chokes the art world, Financial Times August 2, 2019. R. Pogrebin, E. Harris, G. Bowley, Wealth fuels art showcases, and activism, New York Times October 8, 2019.
38. R. Spence, The art of protest, Financial Times April 6–7, 2019.
39. S. Reyburn, Banksy Painting Self-Destructs after fetching $1.4 million at Sotheby's, New York Times October 6, 2018.

Borders and Connectivity, Enlargement-and-Containment

10

Overview

- 'Annihilation of distance' as a definition of globalization marks an epoch in which borderlessness is an upbeat cliché.
- Borderlessness is an empirical description in some sectors and a kitsch and glamor account in others.
- The American government motto changed from 'Tear down this wall!' to 'We will build the wall!' In the Covid-19 period many countries ban American travelers.
- In social theory, three fundamentally different paradigms of globalization coexist.
- American-led borderlessness came with national security states, authoritarianism and structural inequality.
- In social policy social exclusion emerged as a new terminology. Inclusive development became the policy beacon in the UN Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals.
- Globalization is a process of hierarchical integration in which integration refers to growing borderlessness and hierarchy to managing borders.
- Rebordering concerns conflict, security and policing, uneven development and migration, technology, trade and economic competition.
- What analytics can come to grips with the alternation of borders and borderlessness? Enlargement-and-containment includes the enlargement of the scope of multinational capital and hegemony and the containment of risks and pushback generated in the process.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_10

- Does this also apply in domains of culture and religious and ethnic strife?
- Borders are political and legal terminology. Boundaries refer to intangibles. Fronts refer to military and security boundaries, and frontiers have wider connotations.
- Boundaries and borders are ordinary. No social cooperation is limitless. 'Good fences make good neighbors'.
- Why do borders become hostile? The general heading is competition for resources, be it power, land, water, mineral resources, trade routes, sea-lanes, strategic positions, or zones of influence.
- Is erasing borders always liberating? Borders also offer protection, enable social compacts and functioning state institutions.
- Borders are the institutionalization of differentials of power. It is not borders as such that matter but power relations that uphold, defy or renegotiate them.
- Borders do not block connectivity but are expressions of the terms and conditions of connectivity.
- Security expansion and market expansion occur in tandem. American geopolitics and geo-economics intertwine.

Ronald Reagan's 1987 speech in Berlin—'Tear down this wall!'—was the opening salvo of an epoch that celebrated borderlessness. Media and advertising from the 1980s on have been replete with images of cross-cultural encounters, accounts of unprecedented migration and travel, footloose business and placeless finance. Advertising tells us there are 'no frontiers'. Information and communication technologies annihilate distance. According to Marshall McLuhan, media lead the way to a 'global village' (1964; McLuhan and Powers 1992). Globalization was the buzzword of fin-de-millennium media and scholarship. According to a commonplace description, globalization is the 'annihilation of distance'. But distance, of course, is annihilated only by those who can afford to do so. Many others suffer the 'tyranny of distance'. The annihilation of distance is a half-truth. That it is often cited as a definition of globalization typifies an epoch in which borderlessness is an upbeat cliché.

Technical and geopolitical changes accompanied these shifts. The use of microchips in production enabled the transition from mass production to flexible production and ushered in global value networks. Transnational marketing campaigns launched global brands. Walk in the wet mud of slums of Monrovia, Liberia, and look up to giant billboards of Colgate and Nestlé.

IMF conditionalities and World Bank structural adjustment programs sought to align developing countries with Anglo-American capitalism. The Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex made the world safe for American capitalism and finance.

Global supply chains, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and global marketing boosted the aura of a borderless world. Jet travel and tourism proliferated. Americanization held sway in the guise of Coca-colonization, McDonaldization, Disneyfication, Barbiefication and CNN-ization. The IMF and World Bank converging with the WTO seemed to be harbingers of a borderless world. By the end of the Cold War, the East bloc, China and India joined the world market. The bipolar world turned unipolar and the US graduated from superpower to hyperpower. Americanization was on a winning streak. Liberal democracy was 'the end of history'. Globalization, according to Kenichi Ohmae, is a borderless world, a worldwide duty-free store in the making (1992).

On the business pages we read of fast new technologies, mega financial transactions, transborder mergers and acquisitions, and growing international trade. Yet, leaf back to the front pages and most headlines concern border conflicts of one kind or other. How then do we rhyme the talk of borderlessness with the continuing or growing salience of borders and border conflicts? Could it be that the worlds of economics and politics operate according to different principles, in parallel universes, intersecting erratically?

Seek advice from social theory and we find a similar disarray in that three fundamentally different paradigms of globalization coexist. First, a theory of the gradual inevitable erasure of borders because of modernization, which recycles the convergence theory of 1960s modernization thinking. Second, a strong discourse of borders, as in Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations ('Islam has bloody borders') and Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld*. Third, a perspective that sees neither uniformization nor strong borders, but instead ongoing mixing and hybridization, reworking borders and generating new differences in the process (Nederveen Pieterse 2019). The coexistence of these three paradigms of globalization and culture—each familiar, yet each contradicts the others—shows the peculiar vortex we are in.

One option is 'all of the above'. All these trends unfold, to different degrees and with undecided outcomes. History is work in progress. A second option is spatial: different tendencies apply in different parts of the world. Alternatively, they apply to different time periods—a view this chapter develops. The first paradigm goes with hegemonic universalizing worldviews, the second with embattled hegemony and conflict zones (from the Middle East to Asia), and the third is compatible with many circumstances.

Yet, the contemporary shift from globalization to deglobalization (in trade), from trade liberalization to protectionism (in advanced countries), from the world wide web to a series of intranets (in the making), from global inclusion to exclusion (courtesy rightwing populism), from global to national narratives is a dramatic turn. It is not as complete or global a turnaround as snapshot views suggest but it is momentous enough to examine. In the twenty-first century, borders and walls have made a spectacular comeback. The American government motto changed from 'Tear down this wall!' to 'We will build the wall!' Erstwhile leaders of free trade,

the US and the UK, turned into opponents of trade liberalization. Brexit and the election of Trump as president mark a turn-around. The Trump administration withdrew from international pacts and started trade disputes. Populist governments reject migration and build fences to block refugees and asylum seekers. The turnaround has been momentous to the point that globalization itself has been deemed to be in retreat, or in grave danger (King 2017).

This epochal transformation raises many questions. Is the claim that globalization comes with increasing border crossing tenable? Do epochs of borders and borderlessness alternate, or are both features of all times? Is contemporary globalization not a simple trend toward borderlessness but rather a trend of reworking borders? Are growing borderlessness and new borders interrelated? Is there a pattern to the contemporary reworking of borders? A firsthand impression is that borderlessness is an empirical description in relation to certain sectors (information and communication, big tech, finance, luxury goods, some sectors of capital) while it is a kitsch and glamor account in others (advertising, travel, consumption, Instagram). The relationship between borders and borderlessness, then, varies across domains. We find uneven combinations of borders and borderlessness in finance, capital, labor, politics, technology, security and culture. Does borderlessness prevail in some sectors and borders in others, or do borderlessness and borders interact in each domain?

America-led borderlessness came with growing inequality. While media and marketing celebrated borderlessness, in social policy and development studies *social exclusion* emerged as a new terminology for social inequality, highlighting the dark side of borderlessness. In the 2000s *inclusion* became a leading policy target; inclusive development became the beacon of development policy in the UN Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals; which extend to thinking about education, urban planning and so on. How do we rhyme these crisscrossing trends? Consider in what contexts borders made a comeback in the twenty-first century, or were never away but took on new salience:

- Ongoing wars and spillover—refugees, asylum seekers, militants, weapons
- Securitization of borders—terrorism, crime and migration
- Digital boundaries—cybersecurity, encryption, paywalls, surveillance tech, Internet sovereignty
- Trade policies—tariff and non-tariff barriers; coercive diplomacy
- Uneven development—economic migrants, environmental refugees
- Migration—legal status, citizenship and multiculturalism rules
- Wealth and status—gated communities, gentrification, VIP perks, Richistan

Thus, rebordering concerns security and conflict, boundaries arising from uneven development and migration and differences arising from technological and institutional changes and from trade and economic competition. The general question this chapter poses is what analytics can come to grips with the alternation of borders and borderlessness? How do borders relate to connectivity? The discussion first gives bird's eye overviews of analytical viewpoints on borders and boundaries and their changing meaning in historical perspective, and then turns to the question of

debordering and rebordering. Part of the discussion is also the dramatic changes that come with the Covid-19 crisis.

One option is to discuss borders from a historical point of view, as in Manlio Graziano's book *What Is a Border?* A general historical approach provides necessary basics but is not precise enough to bring the conversation further. Another option is to take capitalism as the central problem, from the enclosure of the commons onward, as in Patrick Brantlinger's *Barbed Wire*. This approach gives historical insights from centuries back, but then it draws on examples from especially the contemporary US. This kind of discussion needs perspective on the specifics of American capitalism because without it American capitalism—which is a historical outlier—is cast as the general template of capitalism. A third option is to view states as builders of borders and walls, as in James Scott's work. Thus, one account is economic (capitalism) and the other political (states). Ethnographic accounts of walls and border zones often show that situations on the ground are radically different from official and media accounts. Further resources are studies of conflict, ethnic, religious or criminal. All these studies are invaluable but they need to be combined with and cross-validated by wider data streams (Graziano 2018; Brantlinger 2018; Scott 1998; Cintio 2013; Frye 2018).

Another dimension is American hegemony. Several studies examine how America's military role boomerangs *within* the US and at US borders, in the militarization of policing, and quasi-military responses to protest and immigration. Hardening borders overseas is matched by hardening boundaries domestically and generates coarsening, brutality and anxiety in the US (Hall and Coyne 2018; Balko 2013; Wood 2014; Miller 2020; Gibson 2020). George Floyd's murder by police in Minnesota (I can't breathe) is part of this pattern and is part of everyday American authoritarianism.

Social exclusion does not factor in that people generally have become *more included* in government policies and international regimes. People have become more included than before in IMF and World Bank financial regimes, WTO trade rules, the reach of major corporations and marketing campaigns. But they are asymmetrically included, affected by the consequences and spillover but not included in the design or the benefits. Thus, these are times of *asymmetric inclusion* rather than simply social exclusion (Krishna and Nederveen Pieterse 2008). Since people are included already, inclusion targets should rather focus on the terms and conditions of inclusion. In this discussion, the wider argument is that contemporary globalization is a process of asymmetric inclusion or hierarchical integration in which *integration* refers to growing borderlessness and *hierarchy* to management of borders.

A framework that is relevant for a wide range of processes is *enlargement-and-containment* in economic, political and military domains. Borderlessness has all along been partial, segmented and part of exercises of enlargement-and-containment. Conquest, empire and colonialism are classic instances of enlargement-and-containment—enlarge territorial control and contain resistance, as during the British Empire and American Manifest Destiny, followed by American hegemonic expansion from the Cold War onward and the expansion of

Anglo-American capitalism particularly after the waning of the Cold War. These are combined and uneven processes of enlargement-and-containment: the enlargement of the influence of multinational capital and transnational regimes (US, NATO, IMF, G8) and the containment of risks and pushback generated in the process. Enlargement implies the prior existence of boundaries or borders, which expansion moves further out. Enlargement has borders built-in and new borders take shape in response to pushback.

Does enlargement-and-containment also apply in domains of culture and religious and ethnic strife? Dominant ethnic groups have pushed boundaries and pursued power for millennia. They have established ethnocracies and relegated minorities to second-class citizens. Buddhism rules in Thailand, Myanmar and Sri Lanka; Sunni Islam rules in the Arab world, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. Everywhere minorities are pushed to the sidelines. Enlarging the influence of Hindutva in India, the program of the ruling BJP, comes with containment measures—such as cow vigilantism, intimidation and disenfranchisement of Muslims in Assam, occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and the Citizenship Amendment Act. In Malaysia, 60 years of UMNO rule institutionalized Malay supremacy in political, economic and cultural ways and Chinese, Indian, Arab and indigenous Malaysians have had to adjust, or emigrate. Israel, Erdogan's Turkey and Bahrain also come to mind. However, the difference in cultural domains is that there is *no claim* to borderlessness; debordering only pushes the boundaries of ethnic domination further out. Cultural categories of religion and ethnicity per definition do not claim universal currency the way modernization, democracy, liberalism, free trade or finance do. (Conversion religions such as evangelical Christianity and the Mormon Church are partial exceptions.)

Debordering and rebordering occur in other domains too. Developing countries borrowed Eurodollars at low rates in the 1970s and when in the late 1970s American interest rates rose the Third World debt crisis ensued. A general terminology is 'disaster capitalism'. In the 1990s, the IMF stipulated lifting capital controls as part of its lending conditionalities. The inflow and outflow of short-term funds contributed to the Asian crisis of 1997–1998. When the crisis triggered massive defaults in several countries, the IMF decreed cuts in government spending, which missed the point that private corporate spending had brought about the crisis and cutting government spending worsened the effects of crisis. This earned the IMF the nickname of the 'master of disaster'. In phase two it enabled American corporations to buy East Asian assets at fire-sale prices. Countries that had not borrowed extensively or had maintained capital controls (such as China, Taiwan and Malaysia) came away unscathed.

Boundaries and Borders

The oldest demarcations between social formations were physical boundaries such as deserts, forests, mountains, rivers or oceans. Differences between hunters, pastoralists and cultivators emerged later. Boundaries emerged between hunter-gatherers and cultivators and between pastoralists and cultivators. A key theme in Ibn Khaldun's work is differences in social organization and outlook between nomadic and sedentary peoples. Empires constructed boundary fortifications such as China's Great Wall and the Limes Germanicus, Limes Danube and Hadrian's Wall of the Roman Empire. Later still, town walls separated towns from the countryside.

Borders in the sense of legally established, internationally recognized borders only emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that established the principle of territorial sovereignty. Many actual borders were fought over in battles and wars and were established later. The requirement of legal documents to cross borders and the invention of the passport dates from the late nineteenth century (Torpey 2000). Demarcations and criteria of citizenship have changed over time. Understandings of the meaning of sovereignty have been dynamic over time as well.

Boundaries and borders first take shape as fixtures of the imagination. Imagined boundaries separated cultural zones, known and unknown lands, the kind of boundaries that Homer described in Odysseus' voyages. They include language boundaries such as Greek and non-Greek speakers; civilizational boundaries such as the legendary East-West, Persia-Greece boundary; religious boundaries between believers and nonbelievers such as between Christians and heathens, Muslims and kaffir.

Another kind of imagined boundary is temporal—such as the Renaissance boundary between the ancients (the classical era) and the moderns with the Middle Ages in-between. Nineteenth-century stages theories placed boundaries between archaic, premodern and modern eras. With the notion of Progress came backwardness as its flipside, the stagnation or decay of once glorious civilizations. In the late nineteenth century, late industrializing countries were 'catching up' with early-industrialized countries. During the Cold War, ideological boundaries separated East and West and overlapped with superpower spheres of influence. Development gradients ran between developed countries in the North and developing countries in the global South. According to modernization thinking, these boundaries are temporary; in time, laggards will catch up and industrialized countries will converge.

Borders separating zones of development, between high and middle or low-income countries (such as between the US and Mexico, the EU and North Africa and the Middle East, between South Africa and its neighbors) carry a high charge. Also charged are borders between countries or in regions in conflict such as Israel-Palestine, Syria, Kurdish areas and Nagorno-Karabaj.

Boundaries often refer to demarcations of intangibles such as status, class, etiquette, culture, style, language, religion and ethnicity. *Borders* are political and legal terminology. *Fronts* refer to military and security boundaries and *frontiers* have wider connotations.

Boundaries and borders are ordinary. No social cooperation is limitless. 'Good fences make good neighbors'. Borders don't clash with connectivity. The actual

question is not borders but why, under which conditions boundaries or borders generate frictions and become problematic or hostile boundaries. A general heading is *competition for resources*, be it power, land, water, mineral resources, trade routes, sea-lanes, strategic positions, or zones of influence. Borders become hostile borders when survival, livelihood or power are at stake. Belonging and identity are resources too, especially if one believes becoming a minority, or a majority that is at risk of losing status. Boundary and border conflicts are forms of competition for resources that are held to be strategic.

Is erasing borders always liberating or emancipatory? A tacit assumption in many accounts is that crossing and, further, erasing borders is a good thing. Deterritorialization in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) refers to cultural politics: deterritorialization, moving across space means parting with fixed identities while reterritorialization means reclaiming identities. However, borders also offer protection, enable social compacts and functioning state institutions, and the cost and benefits of increasing border crossing are never equally distributed. Yes, technologies, communications, finance, production, consumption and travel swirl across the world, yet borders remain as prominent as border crossing.

'Flexible citizenship' for those who can afford it is an option (Ong 1999). 'Astronaut families' doing international commutes is another. The erasure of borders and boundaries brings boon or bane to different classes and interests. The reach of transnational corporations, mining, pipelines and loggers and the expansion of financial regimes often squeeze the livelihoods of local peoples. NAFTA benefited segments of Mexican business but peasants in Chiapas and Tabasco lost their commons. The privatization of communally owned land, competition in agricultural produce, local manufactures and retail with the US were among downstream problems in Mexico. The erasure of borders can mean the dismantling of protection that endangers livelihoods and existence, as in ecological politics, Amazon forests burning and loggers killing ecological protectors in Mexico. A thoroughly examined case of overbearing development projects is the Narmada Valley Dam in India (Dwivedi 2001; Kala 2001).

Mobility is a function of power and so is control of mobility. Actual borders and boundaries are the institutionalization of differentials of power. The differences that matter are relations of power, so it is not borders as such that matter but the power relations and rapports de force that uphold, defy or renegotiate them. That mobility is a function of power is well established in geography; Doreen Massey referred to 'power-geometry' (1993b). A related line of inquiry is 'geographies of resistance' (Pile and Keith 1997).

Avatars of transnationalism are the chartered companies of colonial times such as the Dutch East Indies and West Indies Companies and the British East India Company. The oil majors of the interwar period belong here as well. The postwar multinational corporation is a successor. When multinational corporations decentralized their headquarters, they became transnational corporations, which ushered in another cycle. Michael Storper distinguishes four tiers of globalization, referring to sectors of capital as well as labor, each involving different effects (2001: 96–99). The top tier of labor (such as CEOs, hedge fund managers, sports celebrities) is highly mobile while the top stratum of capital (such as aerospace and machine

tools) is often localized. Large enterprises usually offshore more easily than small ones and multicultural enterprise more easily than monocultural business.

The US-Mexican border, one of the world's notorious borders, generates border talk as well as border crossing talk. In Gloria Anzaldúa's borderlands, mixed and in-between Chicana identities and experiences rhyme the conflicting worlds on both sides of the border. Their 'migratory space', mixing Latino and Anglo speech, music, writing and art, is a site of transnational culture that includes insurgent identities (Anzaldúa 1987; Canclini 1995; Saldívar 1997; Kearney 1998). Intercultural engagement exists cheek by jowl with the harsh realities of the border zone. But not all the intercultural mix of the border zone is 'counterhegemonic' (Michaelsen and Johnson 1997). Critical border anthropology examines the mortal dangers of crossing the world's most militarized high-tech surveillance border zone with the greatest intensity of border inspections and the dire realities of work in the maquiladoras (Lugo 2000). The US-Mexico border extends well into the US with 'Migra' and ICE controls of migrant workers.

In the wake of protests against neoliberal globalization in Seattle (1999), Washington (2000) and Prague, subsequent WTO and other meetings in Québec, Gothenburg, Davos, Genoa and Qatar have been surrounded by heightened security measures. A report about the 2001 WTO meeting in Doha noted,

> Also casting a pall over the meeting in this Persian Gulf emirate were the extraordinary procedures aimed at ensuring the personal safety of the attendees… A perimeter guarded by machine-gun-toting Qatari police and military personnel protected miles of roads surrounding the conference center, ensuring that anyone without credentials issued in advance was denied entry. In hotels, Qatari security officials wearing traditional white robes and headdresses manned metal detectors and patrolled the halls.[1]

Thus, new borders emerge at the site where growing borderlessness is supposed to be the topic of international decision making. Ever since the mass protests, the preference is for remote locations for WTO and other summit meetings, that is a physical, spatial separation between 'globalization from above' and 'from below', a trend of securitization that has been reinforced by security concerns in the wake of the September 11 episode. The Doha meeting initiated the 'Doha round' of agriculture and development and the WTO has been in impasse ever since. The conjunction of enlargement-and-containment comes back at every junction. While Free Trade Zones rank as leading instances of border-crossing capitalism, security measures heavily guard the FTZs and their production facilities, which are under stringent labor discipline (Klein 2000).

The Doha exercise and summits afterward create, as it were, an elite bunker, shutting out protest. Heterogeneous societies can host identity bunkers in which identity turns into a cult, such as Hasidim in Williamsburg and Jerusalem (no electricity on Sabbath), Amish in Pennsylvania (no industrial tools), Hindutva in India (cow vigilantism) and white supremacy (keep out immigrants) (see Chap. 7).

To freeze time, recapture and sustain a 'before', it is necessary to keep everything out that would break the spell. Thus, freezing time means protecting space, hardening boundaries or erecting borders. These situations are common in conflict societies that experience ethnic cleavage and competition. This can take the form of

enclave ethnicity, maintaining a safe space (Amish, Hasidim, cultural integrism, no outside marriages) or an expansionist *competition ethnicity*. Rebuild the Ram temple in Ayodhya, keep Muslims and Dalits down, deny Muslim rights in Kashmir and Assam. Parade the Orange banner through Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast. Uphold the symbols and statues of the Confederacy in white supremacy America. Often identity cults maintain a fantasy island or redemption fantasy. All Jews will become Zionists and all Zionists will become Orthodox. All Hindus will go back to worshipping Ram. All Americans will pass as white and support the values of the Confederacy. Because only one group is freezing time and others don't, such redemption narratives can easily turn into their opposite. America First becomes America Alone (including countries banning American travelers because of Covid-19); MAGA turns into MAIA, Make America Irrelevant Again (see Chap. 11).

In conflict societies, boundaries do not merely exist but are often inflamed. Anxiety undergirds a siege mentality. Boundaries mark spaces, boundaries of dress, accessories, language, which signal inside or outside. Tribal markings in Africa, tattoos in parts of Los Angeles mark boundaries, gang territories. Political correctness, accusations of cultural appropriation in the US are boundary management. Mishap can turn deadly. In a Turkish bar in Ankara, don't ask for Kurdish music (I've tried). Israeli checkpoints in Palestinian Occupied Territory are not the best place for cracking jokes. Caste and communalism are no joking matter in India.

Enlargement-and-Containment, Debordering and Rebordering

Key points that emerge from a history review are the following. Borders are the institutionalization of relations of power. Borders do not block connectivity but are expressions of connectivity, of the terms and conditions of connectivity. Borders are ordinary. 'Good fences make good neighbors' refers to the stability of power relations. Frictions and hostile borders refer to the instability of power relations.

Thus, the key problematic is power and the central twentieth-century arena of globalization is American hegemony and capitalism. Hegemony stands for military-security and geopolitical dimensions; capitalism stands for corporations, finance and geo-economics; dimensions that follow distinct paths and also intertwine. Security expansion occurs in tandem with market expansion. In this light, we can revisit the shift from debordering (Tear down this wall 1987) to rebordering (Build the wall 2016), from pushing borders outward to fortifying or erecting new borders, as part of phases of expansion and contraction. I review this briefly in several stages—Cold War containment, 1980s rollback, 1990s Washington consensus, 2000s crises, 2016 election of Trump. The episodes are familiar, the literature is vast, but the point is not retelling the familiar but accounting for the itinerary from borders to enlargement back to borders.

1. Following the US rise to globalism, the Cold War came with containment, domino theory, counterinsurgency operations, border conflicts and processes of enlargement and debordering. The superpower contest involved efforts to influ-

ence political and economic landscapes across the world. The Marshall Plan (reconstruction of postwar Europe), the Alliance of Progress (cooperation with Latin America) and foreign aid in developing countries unfolded against the backdrop of the postwar boom, the 'golden years of capitalism'. This took place under aegis of the Keynesian consensus (the state coordinates economic behavior), which unraveled upon the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (the Nixon shock 1971–1973).

The hegemonic expansion of the Cold War established security states and allied elites in many countries across the world, a legacy of national security states in which the military and intelligence play a key role. In many countries, the security apparatus has over time been able to transform their security role into political and economic capital. American Cold War alliances established 'deep states' that have often been nearly unassailable by elections, or elections have been manipulated to consolidate the power of core elites (as in the Philippines and Central America). American hegemony empowered and entrenched elites the world over, often of an extractive nature. Several are mini versions of the military-industrial complex in the US that collaborate with corporations and private military contractors. Trade in arms, contraband and drugs (the Golden Triangle), money laundering and cooperation with mafias to establish slush funds for covert operations are part of extensive underground links between security forces, mafias, financial circuits and businesses, military industries, construction and logistics, concealed from public scrutiny because of 'classified information'.

2. Phase two, the Reagan administration's *rollback* of the Soviet sphere of influence ranged widely with entanglements in Angola, Mozambique, the Middle East, low-intensity conflict in Central America, the Iran-Contra episode and support for the Mujahedeen battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Reagan lauded the Mujahedeen as 'the moral equivalent of our founding fathers'. Fast forward two decades and they also spawned the Taliban, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, 9/11, and in its wake, America's longest ever war in Afghanistan.

On the capitalism axis, in response to stagflation in the late 1970s, government policy took a radical turn toward deregulation, liberalization and privatization, in short, neoliberalism, in the UK under Thatcher and in the US under Reagan, under the heading 'get government off our backs'. Multinational corporations shifted basic industrial production to low-wage countries, initiating the so-called new international division of labor. Fast forward two decades and many low-wage countries turn into new industrialized economies, emerging markets, darlings of finance capital and, for a while, drivers of the world economy (Nederveen Pieterse 2018a).

Geopolitical rollback coincides with rollback of the state on the capitalism axis, domestically and then internationally. With deregulation and opening up of economies from the 1980s onward, corporations and banks join the fray. Susan Strange's casino capitalism is often literally true (1986). These dynamics went into the making of financial and economic fortunes and crises in the 1990s and the 2000s, an expansive phase that culminated in the clarion call 'Tear down this wall!'

3. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the bipolar world morphed into a 'new world order' of unipolarity. The Washington consensus took over from the Keynesian consensus—not governments but markets lead. In this phase, rollback of the USSR morphed into *rollback of government* as a global project. The Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs sought the alignment of developing countries with American traffic rules.

In the Middle East, the US along with Israel and Saudi Arabia had cultivated Islamic forces as a 'Green Belt' against the red danger from Pakistan to Morocco during the Cold War. In the 1990s, the erstwhile allies were recast as enemies under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism and the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993). Upon the victory of liberal democracy (aka the end of history), Muslim allies had to become, not just anti-communist, but also liberal democrats, falling in line with the liberalization of Middle East economies.

The reach of American transnational companies and banks seemed limitless. The 'roaring nineties' were a high tide of American power and success (Stiglitz 2003). In 'cool Britannia' and by adopting the Third Way, perhaps growth *and* redistribution are possible. Perhaps global integration under a 'benign hegemon' is possible. American capitalism seemed dynamic, innovative, solvent and able to create jobs. Was it a time of optimism, or is collective schizophrenia more accurate? Growth, but no redistribution. Productivity growth, but no rising wages. Growth, but rising inequality. Growth, but 'lost decades' in Africa and Latin America. Growth, but crisis in Mexico, Asia, Brazil and Russia along with IMF discipline.

The wider pattern of enlargement recalls Manifest Destiny. The Monroe doctrine brought a long-lasting American military security presence in Latin America. The Carter doctrine brought American bases to Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, aircraft carriers to the Gulf and troops to Saudi Arabia. NATO took part in the Afghanistan war and expanded its role in Eastern Europe: 'the globalization of NATO' (Nazemroaya 2012). Support for 'color revolutions' in the Caucasus and Balkans extended American influence.

Expansion was hegemony and market driven. We train and equip your military and you take our side. We lend you money and you follow our rules (get government out of the way) and let in our corporations (liberalization) and banks (lift capital controls). We let you into our borderless world and you accept our worldview (the market rules okay). The economic script was deregulation (government rollback) and the security script was weakening states (pushing back state power) on a global scale, an American hegemony utopia. According to *The Pentagon's New Map*, the world's 'integrated core' is to integrate the unruly peripheries in an orderly fashion under American leadership (Barnett 2004).

IMF medicine was invariably cut government spending, which usually means cut social spending (subsidies, social benefits), which produced the so-called IMF bread riots and 'IMF homeless'. Thus, in order to implement IMF programs, governments must increase law and order spending, and in effect, overall government size and spending tend to remain the same, just the composition changes. This is the same logic as what has happened in the US since the 1980s: cut social spending,

therefore increase police and prison spending, along with 'war on drugs' and 'tough on crime'. The American model since the 1980s is the plantation economy of the South, high-exploitation capitalism, resold as innovation, growth, jobs, freedom, liberalism (Dixie capitalism, Nederveen Pieterse 2004a). 'Get government off our backs' means we welcome corporations and militarized policing on our backs.

A slogan is not a policy, but 'defund the police' (2020) hits the nail on the head because it zeros in on reversing the decades' long shift from social spending to law and order spending. A perverse spending pattern also applies *within* police forces: limited spending on training (12–14 weeks in the US, compared to two years in Germany, four years in Japan), most of which goes to weapons training and coercive tactics, and greater spending on equipment and weapons.

4. The diagnosis of a 'clash of civilizations' reflected a reshuffling of priorities and alliances in the Middle East. Recasting Muslim Cold War allies as enemies boomeranged in the retaliatory attack of 9/11 in New York, which, in turn, inspired wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and war on terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11 we enter a world of heightened security in airports and at borders across the world. The unipolar moment was squandered in a display of imperial overstretch in three new wars. Wars without end, waged without tax increases, and in the American tradition of losing ground wars.

From the turn of the millennium, hegemonic, corporate and financial excess ground to a halt in a cascade of crises in the US: the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (1998), the dotcom bubble burst (2000), the Enron series of corporate crises, bank scandals (Libor, Madoff) and financialization unraveling. Credit was the comfort cushion that buffered inequality. In 2007 subprime mortgages collapsed, the housing bubble burst, securities went under and by 2008 major financial institutions went bankrupt or were on the verge. In 2009, the G20 was called into action to stave off a world 'systemic crisis'; a unipolar government invited multipolarity back in.

5. Financial and economic crisis led to political crisis in the election of Trump in 2016. What was needed was a New Deal; what emerged was plutocratic populism (Chap. 11). The Koch brothers funded the Tea Party, Sheldon Adelson, a casino magnate of Las Vegas and Macao, funded Trump, hedge fund billionaire Robert Mercer funded Breitbart News and bought Cambridge Analytica (Mayer 2016). Financialization enabled rogue finance and rogue finance promoted rogue politics. With Donald Trump the dark side of New York, the murky world of real estate developers and casino capitalism occupies the White House, a government that resembles the banana republics that American security policies have been supporting for decades in the periphery. From 'Tear down this wall!' we come full circle to 'We will build the wall!' This is a chronicle of power—expansive and contracting, ascendant America and America retreating to white supremacy and ethnic nationalism.

Table 10.1 American hegemony, capitalism and borders

	Hegemony	Capital	Borders
1950–1970	Containment, domino theory	Postwar boom, Keynesian consensus, Marshall Plan	Debordering: counterinsurgency, Vietnam War, foreign aid
1970s	Containment	MNCs, offshoring production	Debordering: new international division of labor
1980s	Rollback USSR	Neoliberalism, TNCs	Debordering: Afghanistan, low-intensity conflict
1990s	Unipolarity	Washington consensus IMF, World Bank, WTO	Debordering: New World Order, rollout neoliberalism, Gulf War
2000s	Multipolarity	Emerging economies, BRICS, big tech, 2008 crisis	Debordering: Afghanistan, Iraq war. G20 as crisis buffer
2016	US retreat Clash US-China	'As America retreats, China advances', Huawei, 5G	Rebordering: build wall, block immigration, trade war
2020		Review global supply lines	Rebordering: Covid-19 boundaries, borders

While borderlessness gives way to borders and walls, America's overseas border operations boomerang within America by hardening and militarizing boundaries. Militarism comes back home. The militarization of American policing ranges from police forces reusing military equipment and weapons and undergoing the training that goes with them (Turse 2008; Rios 2011; Balko 2013; Hall and Coyne 2018). This extends to 'the militarization of protest policing' (Wood 2014). Protest police brutality ('I can't breathe') and the response is more police brutality.

6. Covid-19 brings new boundaries (social distance, mask, avoid crowds) and borders (contain spread). Air bridges connect countries that have implemented effective controls (Scandinavia minus Sweden), the EU and several countries, a ban on travelers from the US, Brazil and Russia (2020). Liberal market economies that have weakened and underfunded government agencies for decades, particularly the US and the UK, now face weak public health systems, lack of government coordination, lack of trust in government ('get government off our backs') and a chaotic, dysfunctional response to crisis. With 4 percent of the world population the US has over 25 percent of world Covid-19 deaths.

The fly in the ointment of the story is borderlessness. The 1990s description of globalization as borders breaking down is an ideological posture, a marketing tool rather than an empirical account. When Kenichi Ohmae launched the term borderless world he was director of McKinsey Japan in Tokyo and his view was an extreme notion of 'hyper globalization'. If the world is global duty-free store in the making, what about taxes? For public services, do we call on corporations? In business, global competition is part of business risk analysis. An example is the Boston Consulting Group's diagnosis of *Globality: Competing with everyone from everywhere for everything,* which is far from a rosy promise (Sirkin et al. 2008). James Rosenau referred to dynamics of globalization more realistically as

'fragmegration', a combination of integration and fragmentation (1997). Table 10.1 is an overview of borders and enlargement over time.

We inhabit a world in which eight billionaires own as much as half the world population. How we got there is usually attributed to tech innovations, global operations that open governance gaps and enable new fortunes, but does enlargement-and-containment also play a part? Power and money, hegemony and capital work in tandem. Concentration of power is a general enabler. Concentration of wealth is also concentration of power, and is usually enabled by concentration of power to begin with. How does concentration of power come about? Major avenues—in short, they change over time—are the military and intelligence, government, governance gaps and financialization. Conditions under which the military and intelligence come to play a pivotal role are hegemony and superpower; conflict and war, whether civil or interstate war; regions in conflict (such as the Middle East and Central and West Asia); ethnic or civil strife and insurgency and counterinsurgency (such as Southeast Asia, the Balkans, Central America, and parts of Latin America and Africa).

American military and security agencies spend in the order of $1 trillion a year while breaking records in losing wars and fudging numbers, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, as documented in the Pentagon and Afghanistan papers.[2] According to the public script, the US is fighting for democracy, while the reality in many countries is a Mafia world. Washington circles regard the Putin government as outcast, but many American allied governments, as mentioned above, are hardly different.

Going back to the question raised earlier, what kind of analytics can come to grips with the oscillation of borders, borderlessness and borders? First, the extreme privatization of liberal market economies is also on display in the kind of security states that the US has supported and state-led market economies of self-serving extractive elites. Strategic and elective affinities are at play; the refrain is 'cronies everywhere' (Dervis 2019). Hegemonic wars and conflict zones come with spillover of polarization, borders and securitization. The aggressive expansion of neoliberal globalization made a comeback of borders a necessary sequel. Part of this are the gradients of development. Per capita GDP in Ceuta, Melilla and Spain is eight times higher than in Morocco and North Africa. Along with deepening stratification, the brittle boundaries of status, religion and ethnicity are part of the landscape.

In retrospect, the 1990s episode of borderlessness was a specific conjuncture with technological changes, a vast expansion of American-led capitalism into new zones of influence, a high tide of American confidence in its economic model and an aggressive posture in several regions. Now several features remain—tech change, the digital turn, hyperconnectivity, the rise of Asia, China and emerging economies, and companies' global reach, but the American lead is no more. Environmental refugees number 65.6 million in 2017. With the spillover of conflict and war, including civil wars and ethnic strife come refugees and asylum seekers.[3] This world of border crossing is starkly different from the marketing and travel accounts. The burden of collateral damage is not borne by hegemonic power which is at a far remove, but mostly by neighboring countries and Europe.

The US' global engagement takes place through its 'empire of bases', American banks and corporations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO and international efforts at deregulation and the Internet. Since the 1980s the US approach to

international institutions has often been instrumental, taking part in international institutions only to the extent that they serve 'American interests'. The Trump administration withdrawing from the WHO during a global pandemic, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris climate accord, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Iran denuclearization agreement and the nuclear and arms treaties with Russia matches a long-standing approach of Senate Republicans of non-participation in mainstream global covenants and treaties (Nederveen Pieterse 2008, 2015b, 2018a). The Trump administration bars judges of the International Criminal Court entry to the US if their investigation targets Americans or Israel for alleged crimes, and penalizes states that assist the ICC, which takes noncooperation to the level of international vandalism.

Meanwhile, another card on the table changes many equations. In 2003, 'the OECD demanded that tax havens eliminate low tax rates and provide international access to secret banking and corporate information'. The EU issued a 'savings directive' to EU member states along similar lines. In the words of Jake Bernstein in *Secrecy World*,

> The tax havens had powerful allies in Washington. Congressional Republicans and the Bush administration attacked the savings directive and refused to cooperate with the OECD. While the United States was happy to promote international cooperation to pursue terrorists, the administration didn't like forcing people to pay taxes. Well-funded think tanks lobbied Congress to eliminate the U.S. contribution to the OECD—about 25 percent of its budget. The pressure forced the OECD to all but abandon its blacklist and tax reform efforts. (2017: 75–76)

Upholding tax havens gives the superrich a way out, which in effect means a tax squeeze passed on to economies the world over. Thus, in winner-takes-all economies, winners also get a way around taxation, which lowers the tax revenues of governments the world over. To compete with tax havens, states give their super wealthy tax relief (e.g. France), which again lowers tax revenues. States and localities offer corporations tax incentives to attract investments, which again lowers tax intake. Corporations, banks, celebrities, drug lords and mafias populate the Panama papers. Their tax evasion adds to the burden of middle and low-income earners the world over. If one's objective is to promote deregulation by weakening states and their oversight, upholding tax havens, courtesy of the US Senate, is the way to go.

Corporations avoid taxes by setting up shell companies that shelter in tax havens. Swiss banks can hide deposits in offshore shell banks in low-tax zones (Panama, Luxembourg, Delaware, Lichtenstein, Virgin Islands, Monaco, etc.) well out of the reach of tax authorities. The world of big art inhabits the twilight zone of legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. The Mafia world that is draining resources from the world is the real giant vampire squid. Information war from Russia promotes rightwing nationalism in Europe and the US as part of efforts to weaken NATO countries. By blocking efforts to curb tax havens, American Republicans drain the tax base of economies the world over. Facing diminishing tax revenues, European governments impose spending restrictions and rightwing parties argue that immigrants and the EU drain resources. The Brexit argument was by leaving the EU we save £350 million a week to fund the National Health Service. Rightwing parties in Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Austria and Poland make similar arguments.

To the toolkit of global studies research we can add the old adage: follow the money. There is a multipronged squeeze on social market economies—allow offshore tax havens, drain the tax base, refugees seek shelter in social market societies, the tax floor weakens, public services are under pressure, immigrants add pressure, rightwing parties see openings, info war supports attacks, and rightwing populism finds a home. In this fashion, the borderless world actually is achieved; it is the borderless world of tax evasion, a mafia world that is achieved underground while its ramifications are on display above ground.

Overview

- Debordering, pushing borders out (Tear down this wall 1987) and rebordering, erecting new borders (Build the wall 2016) show expansion and contraction.
- Hegemony moved from borders (containment) to enlargement (rollback, Washington consensus) back to borders (Trump).
- We equip your military, you take our side. We lend you money, you follow our rules. We let you into our borderless world, you accept our worldview.
- The economic script was deregulation (government rollback); the security script was weaken state power (state rollback).
- Deregulation enabled rogue finance; rogue finance promoted rogue politics.
- With Trump a government that resembles the banana republics that American security policies have been supporting for decades in the periphery occupied the White House.
- The description of globalization as borders breaking down is a marketing tool rather than an empirical account, part of a project of weakening state power.
- Tech change, hyperconnectivity, the rise of Asia, China and emerging economies, companies' global reach remain, but the American lead is no more.
- If the objective is to promote deregulation by weakening states, upholding tax havens works.
- The global studies research toolkit includes follow the money.
- Squeeze social market economies—allow tax havens, drain the tax base, refugees seek shelter, public services are under pressure, rightwing parties see openings, info war supports attacks, rightwing populism finds a home.
- The borderless world is achieved in a borderless world of tax evasion, which is achieved underground while its ramifications are on display above ground.
- The public health crisis of Covid-19 requires capable states. In corporate-led societies infection and deaths per million are high, hence they face travel bans.

Notes

1. P. Blustein, WTO leader cautions against 'protectionism', Washington Post November 9, 2001.
2. For example, R. Nordland et al., How the U.S. government misleads the public on Afghanistan, New York Times September 9, 2018: 12.
3. An overview of the world's 20 largest refugee streams is below, per December 2016:

From		In
Syria	2,823,987 1,005,503 648,836 375,122 230,836 116,013	Turkey Lebanon Jordan Germany Iraq Syria
Afghanistan	1,352,160 951,142	Pakistan Iran
South Sudan	639,007 338,774 297,168	Uganda Ethiopia Sudan
Somalia	324,448 255,121 241,014	Kenya Yemen Ethiopia
Vietnam	317,098	China
Sudan	312,468 241,510	Chad South Sudan
Central African Republic	283,602	Cameroon
Myanmar	276,198 102,633	Bangladesh Thailand
Rwanda	245,052	DR Congo
Burundi	230,850	Tanzania
Ukraine	226,232	Russia
DR Congo	205,363	Uganda
Colombia	171,920	Venezuela
Eritrea	165,548 103,176	Ethiopia Sudan
China	110,098	India
Nigeria	105,501	Niger

Sources are UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf and Eurostat 2016 Asylum, first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, Annual aggregated data (rounded)

Paradoxes of Populism

11

Overview

- What are the similarities and differences between authoritarianism and rightwing populism?
- Similarities are weak institutions, concentration of power and wealth, inequality, propaganda.
- Differences are authoritarianism is a governance system that is long-term and rightwing populism in power is a governance crisis that is unstable.
- Types of authoritarian states are conservative, national security, post-communist, developmental and new authoritarian governments.
- Market authoritarianism can generate political authoritarianism; political authoritarianism can blend with market authoritarianism.
- In the US and the UK, rightwing populism is an outcome and variant of neoliberalism.
- Decades of permissive capitalism have produced vast concentrations of wealth and power. This new power bloc is largely responsible for the ideological and political turn.
- Financial-economic crisis (2008) led to political crisis (2016) and governance crisis (2020).
- What explains the shift from multiculturalism to ethnic supremacy in several countries? If economic policies don't deliver, wage culture war.
- Paradoxes of populism are attack institutions that are necessary to exercise power; campaign but don't govern; divide but don't rule; seek longevity with a short-term approach.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2_11

Analyses often place authoritarianism in the same box as rightwing populism. Their features overlap and they may cooperate, yet differences between authoritarianism and rightwing populism are equally important. Another feature of populism discussions is presentism. Because populism looms large in media and news, it draws us into the present. Because it comes with political polarization and culture war, we are drawn to take sides, which again draws us into the present. Discussions of rightwing populism are often west-centric and generalize from a few instances. Zooming out and considering a larger database may offer insights. How do rightwing populism and nativist nationalism relate to connectivity and to long waves of social change? Do nativist nationalism, protectionism and withdrawing from multilateralism signal a trend toward deglobalization or does it indicate a reorganization of globalization?

This chapter discusses similarities of authoritarianism and rightwing populism, then turns to how they differ and identifies different types of authoritarianism and populism. The second section considers paradoxes of populism. Rightwing populism rises to power by attacking institutions, including agencies that are necessary to exercise power. Propaganda works in campaigning but not in governing. Rightwing populism is a short-term approach that seeks longevity. Closing questions are how does rightwing populism relate to long waves of change and does it represent deglobalization or a reorganization of globalization?

Authoritarianism and Rightwing Populism

Weak institutions (weak in terms of legitimacy), weak rule of law and limits on rights define authoritarianism and are trending in rightwing populism. Rightwing populists view institutions as obstacles and limitations on power. Weakening institutions is an everyday struggle of rightwing populism to enable free reign of power opportunism.

The main parallel of rightwing populism and authoritarianism is the concentration of wealth and power which follows from the weakening or dismantling of institutions. Concentration of wealth and power usually isn't new; new is that the background becomes foreground. A growing concentration of wealth and power is also a feature of neoliberalism. In authoritarian and rightwing populism settings, crony capitalism is a de facto expression of power while in neoliberalism deregulation is also an ideological idée fixe, according to the idea that the market knows best and therefore rules okay. Meanwhile, the net outcome is similar.

Rightwing populists in power want the executive to control the judiciary so they can neutralize parliament and exercise 'full power' (Trump in the US, Johnson in Britain, Orban in Hungary, Law and Justice Party in Poland, Duterte in the Philippines). Most authoritarian governments have long achieved this, some try to achieve it and they have generally greater staying power than rightwing populists. Propaganda and control of media is another common feature.

In the US and Britain, we can view rightwing populism as an outcome or variant of neoliberalism. In Britain, the backdrop is an enduring class hierarchy that labor struggles have only partially overcome. In the US, the backdrop is Dixie capitalism, the plantation economy of the American South that combined a punitive state with

low taxes, low wages, low services and labor without rights (Nederveen Pieterse 2004a). In the US under Reagan and in Britain under Thatcher, attacks on trade unions ushered in privatization, liberalization and deregulation. In Chile, military dictatorship implemented neoliberal policies.

The successor combination is 'progressive neoliberalism' (Fraser 2017): neoliberalism combined with inclusive policies in relation to gender, minorities and immigrants, without system change. The American terminology is diversity, the British version was 'cool Britannia' and a general heading is the Third Way. When permissive capitalism yielded bubbles and crises, corporate and bank scandals, the cumulative outcome was the 2008 crisis. Financial and economic crisis followed by political crisis yielded the third combination, neoliberalism plus rightwing populism and nativist nationalism. Exit minorities, immigrants, gender rights; enter white supremacy, misogyny, Make America Great Again. In effect, this a return to the original combination, Dixie capitalism, capitalism without frills, which in the American setting also serves as the 'revenge of the Confederacy'. In economic terms, it is neoliberalism in its contraction phase; from a social point of view it is capitalism without benefits.

From combination two back to combination one is a difficult transition. Is it possible to get the genie back into the bottle? Progressive neoliberalism during Clinton and Obama administrations (diversity, women's rights, pro-choice, minorities, LGBTQ rights, while tough on crime and immigration) giving way to Trump's nativist neoliberalism and pluto-populism produces an acute sense of loss for urban and suburban middle classes, women and minorities and a downward spiral of legitimacy. Their emancipations are economically anchored in changes in the labor market, the knowledge economy and the 'creative class' (Florida 2008) and culturally anchored in social expectations and media.

One form of authoritarianism breeds another. Corporate authoritarianism includes CEOs earning over 300 times average worker pay, managerial authoritarianism, banks acting as vulture funds, private equity funds, mergers and acquisitions that outmaneuver competition, lobbies in congress tweaking legislation to serve corporate interests, using regulation to outflank competitors (Derber 2007). Employee nondisclosure agreements institutionalize impunity. Creative accounting and white-collar mischief (Enron, Libor, Barclays, Madoff, subprime mortgages, securities and bank fraud) join in. The bubble economy of financialization—steep growth in Wall Street stocks but little investment and productivity growth—has inequity built-in.[1]

Market authoritarianism that breeds billionaires and giant monopolies pave the way for political authoritarianism (dark money in think tanks and media, such as the Koch brothers). The transactionalism that is bemoaned in rightwing populism and Trump is already part of permissive capitalism. Market authoritarianism, opportunism and fraud blend with political authoritarianism and take the stage as rightwing populism. This blend was in operation already below the radar in congress (regulations benefitting interest groups and corporations) but not in the White House. When market authoritarianism and political authoritarianism merge, economic squeeze is accompanied by law and order bullying minorities and migrants, peripheries and border zones.

Crony capitalism is versatile: the concentration of power and wealth can branch out from the power side or from the wealth side. Political authoritarianism can also blend in with market authoritarianism. The BJP in India cooperates with Ambani, Reliance and assorted magnates. In Russia, East Europe, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, the rapid transition to market economies placed well connected apparatchiks center stage as oligarchs. Oligarchs in Hungary, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Bulgaria and Kazakhstan control banks, airlines, media and economic sectors. To stay clear of the vampire squid, newcomers to the labor market opt for new niches such as software and programming. Also conservative religious authoritarianism (such as in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Thailand) can blend with market authoritarianism.

A signal parallel of authoritarianism and rightwing populism is inequality as an outcome of the concentration of wealth and power; steady inequality in the case of authoritarianism and rising precarity in corporate authoritarianism and rightwing populism. Health care, housing, education, transport and other cost rise while wages remain stagnant.

How do we interpret the shift from multiculturalism to ethnic supremacy, from outward-looking to inward-looking nationalism in countries such as the US (white supremacy), Britain (Brexit), Italy (anti-immigrant policies), Israel (Jewish citizenship law, annexation of Golan Heights), India (Hindutva, Citizenship Amendment Act, cow vigilantism, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam) and China (Xinjiang)? If market performance doesn't deliver, wage culture war. Sideline minorities and keep immigrants out and the pie looks marginally bigger. Scapegoating minorities and migrants diverts attention from declining living standards. In India when Modi's promised economic miracles don't materialize targeting Muslims and Dalits offers symbolic gratification. White supremacy, Sunni or Salafi supremacy, Buddhist supremacy, Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism, Jewish and Catholic supremacy share family features.

Propaganda is another common feature of authoritarianism and rightwing populism. Telecoms have been the origins of oligarchs in many settings (such as Berlusconi, Slim, Shinawatra, Rupert Murdoch, Conrad Black). Oligarchs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia buy and own media. Digital tech and social media extend this pattern (see Chap. 8). Secrecy, the flipside of propaganda, the reverse of accountability also accompanies authoritarianism and rightwing populism. Hedge fund billionaires supply dark money. Oligarchs, celebrities, magnates, drug cartels and mafias are side by side in the Panama papers. Secret payments, money laundering, clandestine operations, secret services, arms traders, mercenaries and organized crime are often close by (Johnson 2004; Glenny 2009). In the US, Project Veritas recruited ex-spies to infiltrate trade unions and liberal groups that oppose the Trump administration.[2] The cooperation of the Catholic Church, political parties and Mafia was well known in prewar Chicago and Italy. Mafia muscle is often a backup for authoritarian governments. Gangs assisted the ruling party, UMNO in 1990s Malaysia (Lemière 2014). Mafia thugs and triads in Hong Kong roam the back alleys of the casino world and can be called upon when the going gets tough. The youth wing of rightwing movements such as RSS in India, the backbone of the BJP, provides street power. Trump calls on law and order forces, customs and border

Table 11.1 Authoritarianism and rightwing populism

Themes	Keywords	Sample
Weak institutions of accountability	Definition of authoritarianism, ambition of rightwing populism	'Full power', Salvini 'Absolute right', Trump
Crony capitalism	Oligarchs, tycoons	Russia, East Europe, Central Asia
Media, social media	Media polarization industry 'If it roars, it scores'	Fox, Murdoch, Maxwell, Berlusconi Target media, journalists
Narrative control	Noise drowns signal 'Anti-corruption'	Culture war Manufacture of dissent
Re/set nationalism	Ethnic nationalism	Hindutva; Jewish citizenship
	Harden cultural boundaries Ethnicity entrepreneurs	White supremacy, Catholicism, Sunni Islam, Wahhabi
	Aggrieved nativism	Trump, Brexit
Target dissidents, minorities	Mobilize base, demobilize society	Rohingya, Uighurs, Kurds, Kashoggi, Soros; Muslims, Dalits
Law and order	Justice system, crime, policing	Duterte, Bolsonaro, Trump
Repress peripheral zones	Zones of exception	Rakhine; Xinjiang; Kashmir, Assam; Gaza, settlements; Kurdish areas; US-Mexico border
Harden sovereignty	'Take back control'	UK as 'Singapore-on-the-Thames'
Neo-mercantilism	Tariffs	US trade policies
Weaponize networks	Walls, sanctions Balkanize technology, 5G	Japan-South Korea; US-China Huawei; Gulf; Qatar; China rare earths
Cherry pick globalization	Transnational divide and rule	Criticize the EU, welcome China
Brutalism	Environment, crime Foreign countries, leaders	Bolsonaro, Duterte, Trump ICE, EPA. Orban: Soros, CEU
Secrecy	Dark money, tax havens, organized crime	Panama, Paradise Papers Russia, Cyprus, Malta
Street clout	Gangs, thugs, mobs	Casino back alleys

patrol and ICE, veterans and bikers and condones white supremacy violence. Table 11.1 is an overview of overlapping strands in authoritarianism and rightwing populism. Each strand would deserve wider discussion, but at this stage the overview matters.

The next step is unbundling authoritarianism and rightwing populism, which involves distinguishing different types, trajectories and patterns of authoritarianism. Types of authoritarian governments include the following.

(1) The oldest cluster is *conservative governments* based on religious or ethnic elites, in combination with dynastic monarchy (Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Brunei, Morocco) or a military-monarchy alliance (Thailand, Jordan). This includes late-oil rentier societies (Saudi, Emirates, Brunei). Iran, a more recent conservative formation (1979) has also implemented significant reforms in women's education and women's role in politics.

(2) The largest cluster in number are *national security states* that go back to the Cold War era. American hegemony established or strengthened authoritarian

constellations in many countries (Iran, Guatemala, Guyana, El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Zaire/DRC, Sudan). Security forces form the deep state and rule in alliance with traditional (landlords and religious leaders) or modern elites (bureaucracy). Over time the concentration of political power translates into economic power in banks (Guatemala), land (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia). Crony capitalism is part of the normal of national security states and may be institutionalized as kleptocracy (Egypt, Myanmar, Honduras, Afghanistan). North Korea and Syria, too, are national security states. Likud in Israel builds on a deep national security state history. In several countries, the national security state has not endured (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Iran, Panama, Paraguay) but may continue under a different guise (Nicaragua, Brazil) or exercise power in the background (Indonesia).

(3) The third cluster is *post-communist countries*. In Russia, the security state made a comeback after market shock. In East Europe and the Balkans, Catholic conservatism and frustrated nationalism combine (Poland, Hungary). Post-Soviet (Belarus, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), post-communist (Albania, North Korea), post-socialist (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia) and post-national liberation states (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Palestine, Cambodia) belong to different categories.

(4) Authoritarian *developmental states* are based on long-term development pacts (China, Singapore and more recently, Rwanda, Ethiopia). In these countries, state capability has greater performance legitimacy than in other forms of authoritarianism; crony capitalism is officially frowned upon. Also Cuba and the post-communist states Vietnam and Laos are developmental states.

(5) In *new authoritarian governments* without a deep history, institutions (norms, expectations, judiciary, civil service, military) are not aligned with governments, such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, Duterte in the Philippines and BJP in India. These governments are more fragile; the coalition they are based on is not deeply anchored. They may be salient but their longevity is in question. Erdogan and AKP outmaneuvered Turkey's secularist military legacy and Gulen cadres took their place in administration, and then Gulen cadres were replaced by AKP loyalists.

The key difference between authoritarian governance and rightwing populism is that populists arise from a *rift* in power blocs (Laclau 2005) whereas authoritarian regimes *are* the main power bloc. Populists rise *outside* the established channels and institutions whereas authoritarian regimes *are* the established channels. Authoritarianism is a governance system while rightwing populism is a governance crisis. Authoritarian regimes are often based on long-term institutional structures while rightwing populism is unstable and seeks to establish a new balance. Authoritarian regimes don't just control the institutions, they *are* the institutions; they have written the rules and appointed allies as officials.

Populist outreach to build a support base activates other circles of influence. Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2019) is backed by the 'three B's', bible, bulls and bullets: evangelicals with a social conservative agenda, cattle owners in southern Brazil, a middle class that fears crime and supports coercive policing, with support from

Amazon planters, military circles (some with a pragmatic, moderate agenda) and a radical rightwing.

Similar equations apply to Egypt, Thailand and the Philippines. In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra broke off from the monarchy-military power bloc, started a new party, Thais Love Thais, won by a landslide and was prime minister from 2001 to 2006. Struggles ensued between his supporters, the red shirts, rice growers and also middle class from the poor Northeast, and yellow shirts, supporters of the monarchy in metropolitan Bangkok. The military intervened and eventually the monarchy-military-elite power bloc took power back (2014). Prayut Chan-o-cha matches the general-becomes-head of state pattern of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt. In Thailand, it is part of a hundred years of monarchy-military rule; in Egypt it is part of a national security state that goes back to the 1950s.

The time cycle of authoritarian regimes differs case by case. Generally, long term are those based on traditional religious and landholding elites and on national security states. The terminology is regimes, rather than governments. When authoritarian regimes have staying power they adopt long-term perspectives and develop agility in adapting to changing conditions. They may be able to tune in to long waves of change while the horizon of rightwing populist governments often extends no longer than the next election cycle.

The strength of authoritarian governance, concentration of power, often also means a structural efficiency gap; the concentration of consciousness and agency yields weak institutions. With poorly designed institutions, policies even if they make sense, have limited sway because of the governance-policy gap (Rodrik et al. 2004).

Developmental states may be authoritarian and top-down but are in a different league. Countries such as Singapore, China and Rwanda strive to be intelligent states and invest in education, research and development, science and innovation. China combines several features: the world's oldest continuous state, a vast state of almost a fifth (18.47 percent) of the world population, outlying regions with different cultures (Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong), a contender state, a society that combines different capitalisms and a high-tech surveillance security state (van der Pijl 2012; Nederveen Pieterse 2015b).

Authoritarian regimes have staying power but their rule is not indefinite. After 61 years rule in Malaysia, the UMNO party was abruptly voted out in 2018 (yet made a comeback in 2020). Ultimately, all forms of government are performance legitimate. The Al Saud family founded and ruled Saudi Arabia and now also Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its economy. Table 11.2 is an overview of different stripes of authoritarian regimes and a basic estimate of their longevity.

All these types mix strands. Thus, authoritarian governments are of different types (dynastic monarchies, national security states, post-communist states, state-led market economies, new authoritarian governments) and differ from rightwing populist governments, which are based on unstable coalitions. Several refer to long-lasting conditions—deeply entrenched elites such as the enduring influence of traditional elites—landholding and religious elites; the security apparatus in national security states. Others refer to specific conjunctions and whether they are long

Table 11.2 Types of authoritarian regimes

Types	Bases	Sample	Time
Conservative	Religious/ethnic elites	Saudi, Emirates, Brunei, Iran, Pakistan	Long
	Military-monarchy	Thailand, Morocco, Jordan	Long
National security states	Deep state	Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, Guatemala, Indonesia (Philippines)	Long
	Add kleptocracy	Egypt, Syria, Myanmar, Honduras	
	Post-Soviet	Belarus, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan	
Developmental state	State-led economies	China, Singapore, Rwanda, Ethiopia	Long
	Post-communist	Vietnam, Laos	
Extractivist-oligarchic	Kleptocracy	Russia, DRC, Angola, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria	Medium
	Post-socialist	Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia	Unstable
New authoritarianism		Turkey, AKP; India, BJP; Brazil, Bolsonaro	Unstable

lasting depends on other variables. While many authoritarian regimes are institutionally anchored and long lasting, rightwing populism may be a blip, unless they gain control of the courts, media and the military.

Paradoxes of Populism

Casualties of rightwing populism, truth and institutions, are both essential for governance. The paradox of populism is that its battle against institutions is a battle against agencies and mechanisms that are needed to govern and implement policies. Propaganda and lies may work in campaigning and gaining power but don't work as tools of governance. Rightwing populists campaign rather than govern. As long as the objective is attacking opponents this can be productive but the agenda of dividing doesn't include ruling.

In the US, rightwing populism is an outgrowth of institutional erosion since 1980s deregulation, privatization and liberalization. Institutional decadence has affected corporate and financial sectors along with interest groups and lobbies in congress, but not the judiciary and parts of the legislative branches of government. The Trump administration is an extension of anti-government government. In the Trump administration posts were not filled, only acting heads of agencies were appointed that don't require congress approval, those that are appointed are opponents of the agency they head (energy, environmental protection, education, intelligence services, postal service) so institutions are neutered or deactivated. The 'deconstruction of the administrative state' (Steve Bannon's agenda) is the deconstruction of a major lever of power. Giving this up means it is hard to get anything done. This makes sense if policy ambitions are zero—besides sowing division, cut taxes, help cronies, build walls, chase immigrants, and seek revenge on progressives

and sanctuary cities. The Trump White House relies on a narrow basis (Fox News, the attorney general, the Supreme Court, the police force, border guards, ICE and Senate republicans, conspiracy bots in social media).

Rightwing populism shares the efficiency gap of authoritarianism. With cronies rather than experts in positions of power, how to implement policy? The outcome is a governance-policy gap; even if policies make sense, the agencies run by loyalists don't support them. If the objective is staying in power, all else is secondary. Moments of truth for authoritarian governance emerge in arenas that lie outside the ambit of power as an end in itself. The crunch comes when a crisis erupts, a natural disaster (Hurricane Katrina), economic crisis (subprime mortgages) or a public health crisis (Covid-19). Suddenly it turns out that to provide essential services one depends on agencies that have been gutted. For corporations and the financial sector, conservative nationalism and trade war are not ways forward either. Also for the security complex (the deep state) and diplomatic service, the shift from strategic stability to strategic instability is a net loss. Eventually media tire of rightwing government when it has little to show for itself besides 'the deconstruction of the administrative state'. The Johnson government in the UK reshuffles the civil service (Dominic Cummings' agenda) but when the gap that opens up isn't filled by consistent leadership, the administration is adrift.[3]

Populism is a style, a short wave, not a proposition. But its consequences may be lasting, such as Brexit, the Amazon burning, and the breakdown of American alliances. Rightwing populism in the US and Britain is an installment in a long trend. For Americans Cold War ideology meant no industrial policy (hence, no national economic strategy either); government bad, market good (hence, institutional decay). The government that implemented the New Deal, the Tennessee Valley Authority, won world war two, provided public works, the national highway system, the GI Bill, was sidelined. Neoliberal deregulation put corporate authoritarianism and transactionalism in its place; the rest is history.

Discussions of rightwing populism are often west-centric and generalize from a few instances, usually the US and Britain and a sprinkle of rightwing parties in Europe. Single-issue interpretations of the rise of rightwing populism are prevalent. According to Steve Bannon, the rise of Trump is a product of the 2008 crisis. Alternatively, the rise of the far right in the US is viewed as almost entirely driven by 'cultural backlash', a combo of xenophobia, racism and misogyny (Mudde 2019). In other words, an economic view and a cultural view. Michael Lind's perspective is wider: drivers of the rise of Trump are a backlash against oligarchy combined with the loss of economic prospects (2020). According to Adam Schiff, contemporary working-class Americans face a combination of globalization, automation and social media with an existing reservoir of xenophobia and racism. It makes sense to understand populism as arising from a *confluence* of factors, with different combinations in different settings. Manifestations of rightwing populism may look the same but how variables intersect differs. Populism supporters range from a core base to bystanders who piggyback. Reductionist accounts narrow the database. To assess the time cycle of rightwing populist parties and governments we

must examine the setting in which they operate, their base, the coalition they attract, their narratives and methods of mobilization.

In the US, deindustrialization without a safety net has eaten away white privilege. For white working class in rural and small-town America, the postwar boom years were a time of rising expectations, but deindustrialization, offshoring, shift to services brought a long downward spiral. White working-class privilege is not what it used to be because of economic changes (automation, offshoring), demographic changes and changes in gender balance (more female participation in the labor force). The service economy requires different skills and attitudes than manufacturing work. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 removed credit as a consolation cushion. White supremacy provides symbolic compensation. Other variables converged—smartphones, social media and billionaires funding the alt-right (Robert Mercer and Cambridge Analytica in the US and the UK, using Facebook data to tip the vote balance). 'As opportunities declined and wages stagnated, smartphone ownership, giving users access to whole online worlds, may have offered some compensation' (Seymour 2019). Hence, in a context of media polarization and narrative displacement, the vote for Trump. The 2016 Trump campaign relied on Facebook posting; the 2020 Trump campaign shifted to phone data, collected at mass campaign rallies, and text messaging.[4]

Note the difference between the US and the UK with support for populist positions in the order of 40 percent and Nordic Europe where support fluctuates between 10 and 25 percent. The US and the UK face globalization (offshoring, outsourcing) and deindustrialization without a safety net, financialization without a safety net (American interest rates on student debt are 7 percent; consumer protection against bank malfeasance is low). The lead of corporations is structurally embedded in liberal democracy. Liberalism is individualistic in outlook and social rights take a backseat.

Hong Kong citizens experienced major setbacks (China changed the two systems agreement, imposed a national security law, suppresses dissidents and sides with the Hong Kong government and billionaires that impose high housing cost). Hong Kong has a tradition of laissez-faire as well as social activism. China's actions undermine its soft power and rapprochement with Taiwan.

In the Arab world, Arab winter followed Arab spring, skipping summer. Yet, expectations are low, national security states and regional hostility have long been the overall reality, as in Egypt. In Eastern Europe, authoritarian government has been the experience of the Soviet era. The double transition—to democracy and the market economy—raised expectations but oligarchs have implemented market authoritarianism. Table 11.3 offers a brief profile of rightwing populist agendas in different settings.

Table 11.3 Agendas of populist forces

Market economies	Sample	Agendas
Liberal market economies	US, UK	Broad: economic, social, jobs The UK, 'take back control' from the EU
Coordinated ME	EU	Narrow: immigration, Islam
State-led market economies	Russia, China	Extreme nationalism
	Turkey, AKP; India, BJP	From secular to religious nationalism
Hybrids	Eastern Europe	Nationalism, immigration; EU
	Mediterranean Europe	EU, immigration, transformation
	Latin America	Social progressive (Peron, Kirchner, Chavez, Lula, Correa, Morales)
	Philippines, Duterte	Strengthen security forces

Source: Adapted from Nederveen Pieterse (2018b)

Long Waves

Media report in snippets and immerse us in the present. The populist battle against institutions and culture war draw us into present. Polarization politics tempt us to take sides. The theater of absurdity is grotesque and it is difficult to turn away our gaze, which again immerses us in the present. Zooming out to long waves, the longue durée, adopting a multi-temporal perspective helps to get a sense of the time cycles of rightwing populist governments.

Is it still valid to view globalization as a way forward? With nativist nationalism on the rise, is global mélange still a global horizon? To assess the time cycle of authoritarian and rightwing populist governance, key variables are the J curve and the legitimacy curve. The J curve, coined by political scientist James Davies, has been a classic explanation of when revolutions occur: 'Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary' (Davies 1962: 5). Setbacks following a period of improvement give rise to relative deprivation and trigger loss aversion (Wertheim 1974). Comparison with other groups motivates the perceived discrepancy between what 'is' and what 'should be' (Gurr 1970). Thus, the legitimacy curve comes in. The legitimacy of authoritarian governments rises when expectations are met and government coercion can be relaxed. When expectations are not met, social unrest increases along with coercion to contain unrest, legitimacy shrinks, which produces further unrest, in a downward spiral. These are classic equations in political science and political risk consultancy.

In societies where traditional elites are well entrenched, expectations are low. How the legitimacy curve works out in developing countries depends on initial conditions. In China, nationalism and the development bargain are the basis of support for the party. Nationalism is the successor ideology to Maoist communism.

Development is performance legitimacy: as long as living standards improve we support the party.

Curves of expectations and legitimacy are not nationwide but are segmented by vectors (urban-rural, high-low education, gender, minorities, ethnicity, region, etc.) and function as part of narratives that highlight or distort them. Authoritarian governance and populist campaigning deploy narrative displacement such as scapegoating, creating momentum. Convert class frustration into culture war. Nativism is a misdirection ever since chauvinism—blame foreign countries, blame globalization rather than deregulation that enabled corporations to offshore, blame 'cosmopolitan elites' rather than neoliberalism. In Britain, blame the EU and cast Brexit as redemption. External enemies unite divided brothers.

Why do readings of long-term trends diverge, even widely? General reasons are limited data, short termism, centrism (not taking into account how other regions fare), ideology and mistaking forms (current manifestations) for trends. Nevertheless, what are long-term trends? Long-term trends are those that have been long term all along. Growing connectivity (transport, communication, the spread of knowledge, technology and trade) and migration have been in motion through all of history and will likely continue. Globalization and global mélange are long-term trends as well, which authoritarianism and rightwing populism can slow but cannot stop. As archeologists show, urban centers have been nodal points of trade and economic growth since 4000 BCE (see Chap. 5).

Communication, travel, mobility and migration, global value networks, supply chains and tech interweaving will continue to increase overall, despite hurdles and setbacks. Technological advancement is an evolutionary trend that will continue and will increasingly interact with climate change. Globalization, tech change, climate change, the rise of China, Asia and emerging economies, multicentric globalization and the need for wide-ranging cooperation are long waves that are part of *any* future scenario. How they interact with other processes depends on medium and short-term variables, so long waves are not purely long. The rise of Asia is a long wave. Asia makes up 60 percent of the world population and its rise resumes oriental globalization (see Chap. 5). The rise of China is a long wave. China has been expanding on a historically unprecedented scale in trade, investment, finance and technology, notably in the Belt and Road Initiative. China is a new balancing force worldwide.

One pattern break in long waves is that long-term continuous population growth and the twentieth-century population boom have made place for demographic decline and aging societies, with Africa as the major exception.[5] Table 11.4 recaps long waves.

Table 11.4 Long waves of change

Historical, perennial	Migration, growing connectivity, tech advancement, urban growth poles
19C>	Climate change
20C>	Shift from Atlantic to Pacific world economy, rise of Asia, emerging economies

All social forces—governments, parties, corporations, movements—position themselves in relation to these changes and seek to affect the form they take. Forms change and trends last. The Atlantic powers, Britain and the US, long ruled the world and have since experienced a shrinking share of world GDP and structural loss of power and influence in international affairs. The Pacific turn, the rise of Asia and emerging economies usher in a post-American world (Zakaria 2008; Nederveen Pieterse 2018a; Khanna 2019). Rather than focusing on structural trends, in the US and Britain many blame globalization, China, the EU or immigrants. Rather than reflecting on the role their countries have played (imperialism, double standards, indulgent capitalism) they blame others for unfair trade, state-managed economies, currency manipulation or intellectual property theft. American circles cling to the idea that to cooperate one must follow American ways, as if the American Dream still lasts. American advantages in market size, technology, corporations, finance and military might are considerable, yet without a purpose, a storyline of connectivity and soft power, they are of limited purchase.

Rightwing populism is crude in consciousness and agency. China's responses to Trump's trade tariffs are calibrated, target sectors of American exports that affect Trump's reelection prospects (agriculture, soybeans) and are balanced by tariff cuts for Canada, Japan and Europe. A developmental state is capable of balanced policies as part of long-term strategy; a rightwing populist government relies on deal making, short-term election cycles, and slogans and attitude rather than expertise. Rightwing populists can achieve temporary gains, but can they go against long-term structural trends? China's horizon is 50 years, Trump's horizon is three months.

Is nativist nationalism a global trend? Many countries continue to view multiculturalism as part of national identity and uphold institutions of multiculturalism. In most countries (Nordic and Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, Canada, New Zealand) only a fringe supports ethnic nationalism. 'Democratic recession' is not a global trend either. First, in many cases, it is not a recession but a continuation of long-established patterns. The US, the proponent of 'free markets and democracy' has been the long-time supporter of authoritarian security states and reactionary governments and has itself succumbed to authoritarianism. Second, in many countries there is sustained commitment to democracy and multiculturalism (northwest Europe, Northeast Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). Democracy is on the rise in many African countries. Third, in several countries rightwing populism is over its peak. Cities lead dissent such as in Turkey (11 of 13 major cities turned against AKP), Hungary (Budapest voted against a Fidesz appointee), the Czech Republic (Prague leads protests against prime minister Andrej Babis, a pharmaceuticals oligarch), Italy (Emilia Romagna voted against the League), India (New Delhi defeated BJP), the US (sanctuary cities), Russia (rising protest, falling living standards, rise of pension age), Belarus (protests in Minsk). In the US, the major cities are the mainstays of growth and are Democrat in outlook. In the UK, a backlash against cold water Brexit may be in the cards and Scotland may leave the union. Mass protests are coming and going in Russia, Hong Kong, Prague, France, Britain, the US, Chile, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and many other places.

Table 11.5 Limits to rightwing populism and authoritarianism

Rightwing populist positions	Countertrends	Specifics
Block connectivity	Connectivity keeps growing	Tech, supply lines
Anti-immigration	Population bust, aging populations	Need for immigrant labor
Trade war	New trade combinations emerge	China, ASEAN +6, Russia, EU, Latin America, Africa
US-China rivalry	Multicentric connectivity	China, Russia, EU, Asia, Latin America, Africa
Technology hegemony	Technology Balkanization	Intranets
Atlantic retreat	Pacific expansion	Asia, Eurasia rise
Conservative nationalism	Cities and states go different ways	Global municipalism
Institutional erosion	New institutions	SCO, BRI, NDB, CRA Business Council US Sanctuary cities
Less legitimacy—more coercion	Growing resistance, growing coercion—downward spiral	Hong Kong, Chile, Czech Republic, Russia, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt

Table 11.5 is a provisional sketch of limits of rightwing populism and authoritarianism in view of long-term trends.

Deglobalization or Reorganization of Globalization?

> The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots. (Donald Trump, UN speech, September 24, 2019)

How do authoritarianism, rightwing populism and nativist nationalism relate to connectivity and globalization? Can a multipolar world be squeezed back into a bipolar order? Can combinations of rightwing populist and authoritarian governments turn the clock back on international order, standards of legitimacy and global connectivity? Can billionaires capture media and keep the torch of rightwing populism going? Can conservative nationalism replace globalization? Is the future of multiculturalism monoculturalism? Are the operations of conservative nationalism self-limiting? Can 'facts on the ground' limit horizons? Are 'barricades of nostalgia', walls and trade wars neoconservative utopias that replace the utopia of 'free markets'? Can the pot call the kettle black when the US accuses China of 'drowning countries in a sea of debt' and coercive policies? Is the world in a tailspin of collective regression? If great powers revert to rogue behavior, can middle powers cooperate to support international standards, or are they transfixed in the habit of following hegemons even when they have lost their moral compass? Can international institutions make a difference? Are these developments temporary twists, or harbingers of a new order?

A paradox of global futures is that we must look at futures through rising forces, not declining forces (which are the rearview mirror). But emerging societies rise in an international order that is shaped by declining forces. Emerging economies and middle powers construct new principles of international order in a context of declining hegemony and sabotage.

In many societies, battle lines of polarization are drawn. Authoritarian politicians often occupy the front row and play narrow ethnic nationalism as a trump card. On public stages a contrast is drawn between 'globalists' and 'nationalists'. Since Goldilocks globalization has changed place from Atlantic economies to Pacific economies, attacks on globalization have become part of the new normal from Hungary to the US. These questions are part of wider discussions. Many analyses adopt a segmented or short-term perspective on globalization and therefore on deglobalization.

- Globalization is occidental globalization, from the sixteenth or eighteenth century onward—which ignores oriental globalization, past and present (see Chap. 5).
- Globalization refers to the postwar international order, is an expression of American hegemony and as hegemony shrinks, so does globalization—which implies a regional, not a global perspective on globalization.
- Globalization is liberal globalization, the liberal international order; therefore, deglobalization refers to the declining influence of 'western values' and, according to Stephen King, 'the end of globalization' (2017). Europe and the EU attach great value to international law and international institutions, which the US views as obstacles to its leadership. What then are 'western values'?
- Globalization is liberal globalization and the rise of 'illiberal' forces and 'illiberal capitalism' marks the end of globalization. What lies ahead is 'authoritarian deglobalization' led by nativist nationalism (Spurk 2020). This view treats current surges of nativist nationalism—which don't have much of a future, as discussed above—as an end station.
- Globalization refers to the end of the Cold War and is linked to American ideologies of liberal democracy and free trade. What then about the later American theme of 'clash of civilizations' and the turn toward protectionism and tariffs?
- Globalization is neoliberal globalization, dominant since the 1980s, undergoing system shock in the 2008 crisis and is now in terminal decline; therefore, deglobalization is taking place and is welcome (Bello 2013). This view revisits dependency theory, a political economy of decolonization, updated as Asian dependency theory, an approach that also criticizes East Asian emerging economies. This implies a unitary, convergence perspective on capitalism and a narrow angle on globalization.
- Globalization refers to growing world trade and global economic integration, which is a common view in business media (*Financial Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Businessweek*, *Forbes*). A downturn in global trade, then, is globalization going in reverse.[6] Does this mean that globalization is only a linear forward movement

or a one-dimensional trend that comes and goes in spurts? It is fairly easy to point to countertrends.

- Globalization is for globalists and 'the future belongs to patriots'. Deglobalization, then, is a return to nationalism. However, the idea of going back to the national economy of 70 or 100 years ago is Norman Rockwell economics. Amid accelerating connectivity, weaponizing sovereignty may score political points but is economically counterproductive.
- 'Will Covid-19 sink globalization?' Supply-chain disruption provides lessons: 'With goods trade in freefall, governments and companies have many lessons to learn'.[7] Reorganizing global value chains is widely discussed in manufacturing and retail, commuting, international students and higher education, in travel and tourism, in art, in resources. But 'back to before' is not a viable option.[8]

Most of these views are snapshots of long and winding roads of connectivity that capture just a segment or episode. Several views equate the retreat of Atlantic powers with the retreat of globalization. Understand globalization not just as a particular form and organization of globalization but as growing connectivity and there is no deglobalization. Winding roads are part of the process. What is taking place is another reorganization of globalization. Rightwing populism in the US is part of that reorganization. The American retreat from trade liberalization, multilateralism and international pacts has been in motion for decades. The US has long taken an instrumentalist approach to international law and international institutions to safeguard its hegemony (Nederveen Pieterse 2008). In recent years, this rejection has gone into overdrive under the (implicit) motto, if we don't control the game, we break the game. Brexit implies a similar take on the EU.

Amid accelerating leaps in connectivity, weaponizing sovereignty is economically and politically counterproductive—in trade, resources, technology, strategic cooperation, soft power, tourism, immigration, climate change and, not least, global public goods. The US federal government may opt for walls and tariffs, but cities, states and corporations may not follow. Cosmopolitanism may be a fashionable target in some circles but actual cosmopolitanization continues, under the radar without slogans. Steve Bannon's Movement seeks to conglomerate rightwing parties in Europe and beyond, and stumbles because inward-looking nativism doesn't mix well with transnational cooperation. Protest is not a compass. The internationalist international is more robust than the nationalist international because it syncs with long waves of history.

The outcome of 40 years of permissive capitalism and 70 years of American hegemony is vast concentrations of wealth and power and steeply growing inequality and anger. This new power bloc is to a large extent responsible for the ideological and political turn, including a shift from establishment corporate capital to speculative chaos capital.[9] Shades of dark money roam across media, think tanks, social media, software and technology (Mayer 2016). Market and corporate authoritarianism means large-scale social demobilization. In the US, workers without unions, students riddled with debt, unaffordable health care, stagnant wages and

rising cost of living, a condition that 'progressive neoliberalism' combines with lifestyle diversity and identity politics.

Corporate rule generates concentrations of wealth and power that create a breeding ground for rightwing populism. In response to rightwing populism bringing back liberalism and diversity is to restore the conditions that bring about rightwing populism, in a vicious circle. It is a mistake that undoing populism, back to old is an option (Eichengreen 2018). Tweaking the conjuncture doesn't fix the trends. A course correction 'back to before' means going back to the problems that gave rise to populism. Combine 40 years of deindustrialization, tech change, erosion of the social safety net, corporate media and debasing the public sphere with rising inequality: Trump is a sequel to established American patterns. The neoconservatives ('simplify, then exaggerate'), the Tea Party, Fox News paved the way—'if it roars, it scores'.

Neoliberalism cannot address the challenge of advanced economies: how to manage industrial decline. Industrial decline without a safety net yields collective anxiety. Rightwing populism offers nostalgia nationalism and angry unilateralism, but does not change the conditions. The economic sectors that are Trump favorites, mining and manufacturing, are the weakest. Is rightwing, populism in the Atlantic world a byproduct of the reorganization of globalization (never let a crisis go to waste) and multicentric globalization? It is difficult to see a way forward for the US. The master narratives no longer hold. Both the decline of American hegemony and the unsustainability of neoliberalism are long-term trends. Deregulation is not an economic strategy; mounting inequality doesn't work for prosperity and stability. Neoliberalism is crisis prone (Ostry et al. 2016).

The US left the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran nuclear agreement, the WHO, and all continue without the US. The US sanctions bypassing the embargo on Iran, and France, Germany and the UK use a new tool, Instics, to bypass the sanctions. The US sanctions allies that adopt Huawei 5G (while the US lags behind, its alternatives are of lower quality, more expensive and American farmers object). So far only Canada, Australia and the UK join the ban. PM Mahathir in Malaysia advises, 'Use Huawei as much as possible'.[10] Angry unilateralism has the side effect of generating new alignments—of which there are many.[11] America First is America Alone. Is it a post-multilateral world? It is rather a multilateral world without the US. Trump praises Erdogan and Turkey opts for Russian defense purchases. While Atlantic cooperation unravels, China, Russia, Iran and other countries form Eurasian combinations (Nazemroaya 2012; Dutkiewicz et al. 2018).

China is a new balancing force worldwide, which includes growing relations with Europe 16+1, Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy and the Balkans), Turkey, the Gulf and the Middle East. China defends the Belt and Road Initiative to the EU by pointing out that with a view to migration, development in sub-Saharan Africa is in the interest of Europe, so the BRI in Africa means greater stability for the EU. Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the US were 179 in 2000 and 121 in 2016 while Fortune 500 companies headquartered in China rose from 10 to 119.[12] Growth is expected in Asia, also after Covid-19.

Major poles are China, the European Union, Northeast Asia and Eurasia. Europe's enlargement-and-containment takes the form of the European Union. Europe's global engagement is strengthening international order through international law and international institutions. This global approach parallels the way Europe's market economies are organized, according to stakeholder principles. The EU also undertakes moves to contain American big tech companies and corporate tax evasion (see Chap. 8).

Like the EU, China supports the Paris climate accord, UN SDG and other international agreements. China's global engagement is through worldwide economic outreach, cooperation in the BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative and strategic and thoughtful participation in international institutions such as UN agencies and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China takes part in cooperation institutions in Asia. China's firewalls block American tech giants. Chinese brands Huawei, Oppo, Vivo, Xiaomi and Realme account for 47 percent of global smartphone sales. China's Belt and Road Initiative includes enlargement in infrastructure investment, loans and markets, and containment in the terms and conditions of investment contracts, infrastructure debt and security measures, which increasingly generates pushback from receiving countries. Sri Lanka lost control of a port because it could not repay the construction debt to China. Malaysia canceled major BRI projects and resumed them after renegotiating the terms (2019). Pakistan is renegotiating BRI contracts; African countries increase their vigilance and demands in relation to Chinese investments.

Northeast Asia, the Gulf, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, like the EU, navigate their course in between the Atlantic and Eurasian combinations, 'crossing the river by feeling the stones'. These are just working notes to indicate there is much more going on than rightwing populism and authoritarianism. It is by no means, of course, a complete discussion, which would require another book.

Afterword

Connectivity is the mainstream of human evolution and history. Every significant development involves connectivity. Globalization (no matter the start time) refers to widening and deepening connectivity and thus a wider socially accessible database. In taking a front-row seat global studies can see perplexities up close.

For obvious reasons, this outlook meets resistance. Keep things small, keep them manageable. Stick to known parameters is practical, the rest is distraction or useless theory. In social science, break big questions down to small questions, operationalize them in testable hypotheses, gather data, chisel to precision, obtain a PhD, teach others the same, and repeat. Methods is the master key. In policy studies, stay away from 'academic theories' because they aren't useful (a guiding principle of Gideon Rose, long-time editor of *Foreign Affairs*; 2020: 8). In finance, quant investment and risk analysis, establish parameters, calculate probabilities, convert into algorithms, apply and reap rewards. Probabilities are the master key in every field.

The counterpoint to reductionist comfort zones is simply that widening connectivity requires widening approaches. Conventional approaches overlook black swans, freak events: here comes the 2008 crisis. Reductionism to manageable formats and premises produces fragile outcomes; one shortcut and there goes a house of cards: here come WMD and the Iraq war. Neoliberal market economies are based on the principle that markets know best and government should get out of the way: here comes Covid-19. Facing a public health crisis, corporations maximize profits (Amazon, Gilead), are missing in action and seek bailouts. Populist leaders keen on applause miss the boat: here comes the likely end of rightwing populists.[13] Covid-19 shatters risk analyses, collapses entire economic sectors, disrupts supply lines, and upends electoral strategies. It turns out that capable states, trust in government and quality leadership are crucial in confronting Covid-19 (Fukuyama 2020).

Viruses of past decades, HIV, Ebola, SARS, MERS and Zika arose from human contact with wild animals, which has been common in human evolution. The human genome holds four times as many viruses as actual genes (see Chap. 7). The surge of viruses (a resurgence in evolutionary terms) is a byproduct of world population growth encroaching on nature and wild life. Holistic approaches such as deep ecology and global studies can factor this in.

Global studies means a wide database of historical depth, comparative studies and wide-angle perspectives. Wide pattern analysis learns from freak events to develop flexibility of response. Several approaches show this kind of sensibility. Contrarian investors take into account a wider range of options than conventional investors. Intelligence services widen the database and the estimates of the range of probabilities. Art breaks boundaries and widens parameters of perception and understanding. Quantum theory upends the rules of physics. Social science advances through paradigm shifts, breakthrough leaps in understanding shatter textbook knowledge. Chaos theory reckons with the possible effects of small changes even in remote settings. Wide-angle, hardnosed and flexible military approaches often come closer to realities than bunkering in boxes. Philosophers can handle paradoxes that torpedo conventional premises.

Keep it small enables depth and predictable outcomes, and also shelters conformity and provincialism. According to conventional thinking, racism, caste, patriarchy, ethnocentrism, inequality and prejudice are of all times. Time and again emancipation and anti-colonial movements stretch possibilities and change societal parameters.

A wide database is not a matter of choice or preference; it is an existential given, a part of our collective rendezvous, which global studies accepts. The key question global studies poses is how to integrate information. Considerations are avoid centrism, presentism, circumnavigate biases. Analytics include pattern analysis, a varied set of tools; consciousness and agency, a wide hermeneutics; and for purposes of grounding, varieties of market economies. How, according to what criteria to integrate information depends on the question asked—and since there's no limit to questions that can be asked is there a limit to ways of integrating information? This open-endedness is a strength, not a weakness. The learning process of global studies is not just to be robust (mistakes don't topple it) but to become anti-fragile in that

learning from mistakes makes it stronger (Taleb 2014). There is no master key, no closure other than in taking shortcuts. All of history is also a history of shortcuts. Handling shortcuts with care is part of the learning process of global studies.

Overview

- How does rightwing populism relate to connectivity and long-term social change?
- Can conservative nationalism replace globalization? With nativist nationalism on the rise, is global mélange still a global horizon? Can a multipolar world be squeezed back into a bipolar order?
- Zooming out to long waves helps to get a sense of time cycles of rightwing populism.
- Variables to assess time cycles of authoritarianism and rightwing populism are the J curve and the legitimacy curve.
- Most countries show a sustained commitment to democracy and multiculturalism.
- Rightwing populism is over its peak; cities lead dissent.
- Since Goldilocks globalization has changed place, attacks on globalization have become part of the new normal from the US to Hungary.
- A similar license that is claimed in the domestic sphere often extends to the international sphere: cherry-picking connectivity and globalization.
- Are walls and trade tariffs neoconservative utopias that replace the utopia of free markets?
- Amid accelerating connectivity, weaponizing sovereignty is counterproductive.
- The internationalist international is stronger than the nationalist international because it syncs with long waves.
- The retreat of Atlantic powers to aggressive unilateralism generates new alignments.
- Emerging markets and middle powers construct international order in a context of fading hegemony and sabotage.
- The issue is not globalization but how globalization is organized.
- Is nativist nationalism deglobalization or reorganization of globalization?
- Rightwing populism is part of the reorganization of globalization. The US retreats from multilateralism under the motto if we don't control the game, we break the game.

Notes

1. Jomo K. S., Stock market bubble no basis for shared prosperity, IPS, March 10, 2020.
2. M. Mazzetti and A. Goldman, Ex-spies recruited in push to attack liberal groups, New York Times, March 8, 2020.
3. P. Stephens, Johnson loses all semblance of control, Financial Times, August 7, 2020.
4. R. Draper, Can the Trump campaign rewrite the story of Trump? New York Times Magazine, April 28, 2020. K. Stacey, Democrats search for digital edge, Financial Times, February 11, 2020: 7. G. Tett, It's the data, stupid, Financial Times, January 11–12, 2020.
5. P. Morland, The new demography, Financial Times, August 24–25, 2019.
6. R. Foroohar, The age of deglobalization is here, Financial Times, July 22, 2019.
7. A. Beattie, Will Covid-19 sink globalization? Financial Times, May 28, 2020.
8. M. Wolf, The dangerous war on supply chains, Financial Times, June 24, 2020.
9. G. Monbiot, From Trump to Johnson, nationalists are on the rise, backed by billionaire oligarchs, The Guardian, July 26, 2019.
10. M. Jacobides, Trump's Huawei ban risks backfiring spectacularly, Financial Times, June 10, 2019.
11. Note just one day's sample of headlines: Trade war favours Asian emerging markets. Trade war boosts Korea domestic supply chain. Russian farms reap benefit of US-China trade battle—all in Financial Times, September 26, 2019.
12. R. Foroohar, The 'doomsday dollar' scenario, Financial Times, September 30, 2019.
13. G. Rachman, Coronavirus could kill off populism, *Financial Times*, June 30, 2020.

References

Abromeit, J., Y. Norman, G. Marotta, and B.M. Chesterton, eds. 2017. *Transformations of populism in Europe and the Americas*. London: IB Tauris.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. *Before European hegemony: The world-system A.D. 1250–1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abu-Manneh, Bashir, ed. 2020. *After said: Postcolonial literary studies in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty*. New York: Crown.

Adam, Georgina. 2014. *Big bucks: The explosion of the art market in the twenty-first century*. Farnham, Surrey: Lund Humphries.

———. 2017. *Dark side of the boom: The excesses of the art market in the twenty-first century*. Farnham, Surrey: Lund Humphries.

Ainley, Rosa, ed. 1998. *New frontiers in space, bodies and gender*. London: Routledge.

Ajami, Fouad. 2011. Nothing to see here. *Foreign Policy*, March–April: 103–104.

Alexander, A. 2019. *Proof! New York*. Straus & Giroux: Scientific American/Farrar.

AlSayyad, Nezar, and Ananya Roy. 2006. Medieval modernity: On citizenship and urbanism in a global era. *Space and Polity* 10 (1): 1–20.

Amable, Bruno. 2003. *The diversity of modern capitalism*. Oxford University Press.

Amar, Paul. 2012. Global South to the rescue: Emerging humanitarian superpowers and globalizing rescue industries. *Globalizations* 9 (1): 1–13.

———. 2013. *The security archipelago: Human-security states, sexuality politics, and the end of neoliberalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ambrose, Stephen E. 1983. *Rise to globalism: American foreign policy since 1938*. 3rd rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Pelican.

Amin, A. 2000. Spatialities of globalisation. Global conference on Economic Geography, Singapore, unpublished paper.

Amin, Samir. 1976. *Unequal development*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.

Amorim, Celso. 2017. *Acting globally: Memoirs of Brazil's assertive foreign policy*. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books.

Andersen, Kurt. 2017. How America lost its mind. *The Atlantic*, September 28.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Walter Truett. 1990. *Reality isn't what it used to be*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

———. 1997. *The future of the self: Inventing the postmodern person*. New York: Tarcher/Putnam.

———. 1999. Communities in a world of open systems. *Futures* 31 (5): 457–463.

———. 2001. *All connected now: Life in the first global civilization*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Anzaldúa, G. 1987. *Borderland/La Frontera*. San Francisco: Spinsters/Ann Lute.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2

Apffel-Marglin, F., and S. Marglin, eds. 1996. *Decolonizing knowledge: From development to dialogue*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Appadurai, Arjun, ed. 1986. *The social life of things*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———, ed. 2001. *Globalization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
———. 2010. How histories make geographies: Circulation and context in a global perspective. *Transcultural Studies* 1: 4–13.
Archer, Kevin. 2013. Searching for the global in global studies. *Globalizations* 10 (4): 521–525.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 2007. *Adam Smith in Beijing*. London: Verso.
Asma, Stephen T. 2017. *The evolution of imagination*. University of Chicago Press.
Assange, J. 2006. Conspiracy as governance and state and terrorist conspiracies. http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf
Axford, Barrie. 2013a. *Theories of globalization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 2013b. You had me on 'Global' and 'Studies' too, I think. *Globalizations* 10 (6): 779–784.
———, ed. 2016. Borders of global theory, special issue *ProtoSociology* 33.
Badie, B. 1989. Comparative analysis in political science: Requiem or resurrection? *Political Studies* 373: 340–352.
Baisya, Rajat K., and G. Ganesh Das. 2008. *Aesthetics in marketing*. New Delhi: Sage.
Bakija, J., L. Kenworthy, P. Lindert, and J. Madrick. 2016. *How big should our government be?* Berkeley: University of California Press.
Balko, Radley. 2013. *Rise of the warrior cop: The militarization of America's police forces*. New York: Public Affairs.
Bamford, James. 2012. The black box. *Wired*, April: 79–85.
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2008. What is middle class about the middle classes around the world? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22 (2): 3–28.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. 2011. *Poor economics*. New York: Public Affairs.
Baran, Paul. 1964. On distributed communications networks. *IEEE Transactions* CS12 (1): 1–9.
Barnett, Thomas P.M. 2004. *The Pentagon's new map: War and peace in the twenty-first century*. New York: Putnam's.
Barraclough, Geoffrey. 1955. *History in a changing world*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bayly, Christopher A. 2004. *The birth of the modern world, 1780–1914*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Beck, Ulrich. 1999. *World risk society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2004. Cosmopolitical realism: On the distinction between cosmopolitanism in philosophy and the social sciences. *Global Networks* 4 (2): 131–156.
Bello, Walden. 2013. *Capitalism's last stand? Deglobalization in the age of austerity*. London: Zed Books.
Belting, Hans. 2009. Contemporary art as global art: A critical estimate. In Belting and Buddensieg, eds., 38–73.
Belting, Hans, and Andrea Buddensieg, eds. 2009. *The global art world: Audiences, markets and museums*. Ostfildern: Hatje-Cantz.
Benkler, Y. 2006. *The wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bentley, Jerry H. 2006a. Beyond modernocentrism: Toward fresh visions of the global past. In Mair, ed., 17–29.
———. 2006b. Globalization history and historicizing globalization. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 18–32.
Berger, John. 1972. *Ways of seeing*. London: Penguin.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1953. *The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Bernal, Martin. 1987. *Black Athena: Afro-asiatic roots of classical civilization: The fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785–1985*. London: Free Association Press.
Bernstein, Jake. 2017. *Secrecy world: Inside the Panama Papers*. New York: Henry Holt.
Bhabha, H.K., ed. 1990. *Nation and narration*. London: Routledge.
Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2014. *Connected sociologies*. London: IB Tauris.

Bhattacharya, P., and A.R. Chaudhuri. 2000. *Globalization and India: A multidimensional perspective*. New Delhi: Lancers Books.
Bijker, W.E. 2009. Vulnerability in technological cultures. Maastricht University Dies Natalis 1/8.
Billington, James H. 1980. *Fire in the minds of men: The origins of the revolutionary faith*. New York: Basic Books.
Blackbird.AI. 2020. Covid-19 Disinformation Report, 3.0. https://blackbird.ai
Blaut, J.M. 1993. *The colonizer's model of the world*. New York: Guilford.
Blyth, Mark. 2013. *Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Boase, R. 1977. *The origin and meaning of courtly love*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
———. 1978. *The troubadour revival*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Bondanella, P. 1987. *The eternal city: Roman images in the modern world*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Brantlinger, Patrick. 2018. *Barbed wire: Capitalism and the enclosure of the commons*. New York: Routledge.
Braudel, Fernand. 1979. *Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th centuries*. English translated by S. Reynolds. 3 vols.
———. 1980. *On history*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson (orig. edn. 1969).
Bremmer, Ian. 2010. *The end of the free market: who wins the war between states and corporations?* New York: Viking.
Brenner, Neil. 1999. Globalisation as reterritorialisation: The re-scaling of urban governance in the European Union. *Urban Studies* 36 (3): 431–451.
Brenner, N., J. Peck, and N. Theodore. 2010. Variegated neoliberalization: Geographies, modalities, pathways. *Global Networks* 10 (2): 182–222.
Briant, Emma Louise. 2020. *Propaganda machine: The hidden story of Cambridge Analytica and the digital influence industry*.
Brink, Tobias ten. 2013. Paradoxes of prosperity in China's new capitalism. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 42 (4): 17–44.
Brinks, J.H., E. Timms, and S. Rock, eds. 2012. *Nationalist myths and modern media*. London: IB Tauris.
Brooke, Heather. 2012. *The revolution will be digitised: Dispatches from the information war*. London: Heinemann.
Burawoy, Michael, et al. 2000. *Global ethnography: Forces, connections and imaginations in a postmodern world*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Burckhardt, Jacob. 1878. *The civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. London: Penguin Classics 1990 (German original, 1860).
Burckhardt, Titus. 1977. *Sacred art in east and west*. Pates Manor, Bedford, orig. 1967.
Bürger, Peter. 1984. *Theory of the avant-garde*. Translated by M. Shaw. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Burke, Peter. 1992. *The fabrication of Louis XIV*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Byler, Darren. 2017. New Silk Road art worlds: The art of the hybrid and the marginal at the Xinjiang Contemporary Art Museum. *Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art* 4 (1): 27–43.
Calabrese, Omar. 1992. *Neo-Baroque: A sign of the times*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Cameron, A., and R. Palan. 2004. *The imagined economies of globalization*. London: Sage.
Canclini, N.G. 1995. *Hybrid cultures*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Carroll, Noël. 2007. Art and globalization: Then and now. In Feagin, ed., 131–143.
Caryl, C. 2011. Why WikiLeaks changes everything. *New York Review of Books*, January 13: 27–28.
Castells, M. 1996. *The information age, Vol*, 1. Oxford, Blackwell: The rise of the network society.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. *Kicking away the ladder*. London: Anthem.
Chang, K.C. 1983. *Art, myth and ritual: The path to political authority in ancient China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chase-Dunn, C., and E.N. Anderson, eds. 2005. *The historical evolution of world-systems*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chase-Dunn, C., and T.D. Hall, eds. 1991. *Core and periphery relations in the precapitalist worlds*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Chen, Liming, Jesus Felipe, Andrew J.Y. Kam, and Aashish Mehta. 2018. *Is Employment Globalizing?* Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series No. 556, Manila.
Chen, Xiangming. 2005. *As borders bend: Transnational spaces on the Pacific Rim*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
Cheney-Lippold, John. 2017. *We are data: Algorithms and the making of our digital selves*. New York: NYU Press.
Chernomas, R., and I. Hudson. 2019. Omission and commission in the development economics of Daron Acemoglu and Esther Duflo. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 40 (4): 447–463.
Chew, Sing C. 2006. Dark ages. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 163–202.
Chiba, Sigeo. 2010. Drawings from the culture hub: Contemporary art of China and Japan. In Cho, ed., 31–40.
Cho, Eunchung. 2010a. Curation of contemporary art of China and Japan. In Cho, ed., 13–16.
Cho, Ilsang, ed. 2010b *Contemporary art of China and Japan*. Busan Museum of Art.
Chomsky, N., and E. Herman. 1979. *The political economy of human rights*. Vol. 1. *The Washington connection and Third World fascism*. Vol. 2. *After the cataclysm*. Montreal: Black Rose.
Cintio, Marcello di. 2013. *Walls: Travels along the barricades*. Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press.
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 2006. The big collapse. In Gills and Thompson, 79–95.
Clarke, J.J. 1997. *Oriental Enlightenment: The encounter between Asian and Western thought*. London: Routledge.
Clarke, Richard A., and Robert Knake. 2011. *Cyber War: The next threat to national security and what to do about it*. New York: Ecco.
Clegg, S. 1989. *Frameworks of power*. London: Sage.
Cohen, Robin, and Paul Kennedy. 2007. *Global sociology*. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave.
Cohen, Robin, and Shirin M. Rai, eds. 2001. *Global Social Movements*. London: Athlone.
Cohen, Warren I. 2000. *East Asia at the center: Four thousand years of engagement with the world*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Collingham, Lizzie. 2017. *The taste of Empire: How Britain's quest for food shaped the modern world*. New York: Basic Books.
Connors, M. 1997. *The race to the intelligent state: Charting the global information economy in the 21st century*. Oxford: Capstone.
Copeland, Libby. 2020. *The lost family: How DNA testing is upending who we are*. New York: Abrams.
Cotter, Holland 2014 *Lost in the gallery-industrial complex*, New York Times Magazine, January 17
Crouch, Colin. 2004. *Post-democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
Cuddihy, John M. 1974. *The ordeal of civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss, and the Jewish struggle with modernity*. New York: Delta.
Cullather, Nick. 2006. *Secret history: The CIA's classified account of its operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Curtin, Philip D. 1984. *Cross-cultural trade in world history*. Cambridge University Press.
Dabashi, Hamid. 2015. *Can non-Europeans think?* London: Zed Books.
Darian-Smith, Eve, and Philip C. McCarty. 2017. *The global turn: Theories, research designs, and methods for global studies*. Oakland: University of California Press.
Davies, James. 1962. Toward a theory of revolution. *American Sociological Review* 27 (1): 5–20.
Davis, Peter. 2005. At the edges of empire: Letter from El Salvador. *The Nation* 7 (11): 16–20.
Delanty, Gerard, ed. 2006. *Europe and Asia beyond East and West: Towards a new cosmopolitanism*. London: Routledge.
Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari. 1994. *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deloitte. 2015. Global powers of luxury goods: Engaging the future luxury consumer.
Denemark, Robert A., Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills, and George Modelski, eds. 2000. *World system history: The social science of long-term change*. London: Routledge.

Derber, Charles. 2007. *The wilding of America*. 4th ed. New York: Worth.
Derks, Hans. 1986. *Stad en land, markt en oikos*. Diss., Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Ellipsis. In *Writing and difference*, 294–300. London: Routledge.
Dervis, Kemal. 2019. Cronies everywhere. *Project Syndicate*, December 13.
Diamond, Patrick. 2018. *The crisis of globalization democracy, capitalism and inequality in the twenty-first century*. London: IB Tauris.
Dickinson, Eliot. 2017. *Globalization and migration: A world in motion*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Dikec, M. 2018. *Urban rage: The revolt of the excluded*. Yale.
Dirlik, Arif. 2000. Reversals, ironies, hegemonies: Notes on the contemporary historiography of modern China. In *History after the three worlds: Post Eurocentric historiographies*, ed. A. Dirlik, V. Bahl, and P. Gran, 125–156. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
Dixon, Helen. 2018. Regulate to liberate: Can Europe save the internet? *Foreign Affairs* 97 (5): 28–32.
Dreisinger, Baz. 2016. *Incarceration nations*. New York: Other Press.
Duncan, Carol. 1993. *The aesthetics of power: Essays in critical art history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dutkiewicz, Piotr, R. Sakwa, and F. Lukyanov, eds. 2018. *Eurasia on the edge: Managing complexity*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Dwivedi, Ranjit. 2001. *Resource conflict and collective action: The Sardar Sarovar project in India*. Maastricht: Shaker.
Ebner, Julia. 2020. *Going dark: The secret social lives of extremists*. London: Bloomsbury.
Edwards, Catharine, and Greg Woolf, eds. 2003. *Rome the cosmopolis*. Cambridge University Press.
Ehret, Christopher. 1998. *An African classical age: Eastern and Southern Africa in world history, 1000 BC to 400 AD*. London: James Currey.
Eichengreen, B. 2018. Populism, ideology and materialism. *New Global Studies* 12 (3): 367–375.
Elias, Norbert. 1982. *Power and civility: The civilizing process*. Vol. 2. New York: Pantheon (orig. 1939).
———. 1983. *The court society*. New York: Pantheon (orig. 1969).
———. 1994. *The civilising process*. Translated by E. Jephcott. Oxford: Blackwell.
Elsen, Albert E. 1981. *Purposes of art*. 4th ed. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.
Elverskog, Johan. 2010. *Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Erich, D. 2020. *Dark towers: Deutsche Bank, Donald Trump*. New York: Custom House.
Erzen, Jale Nejdet. 2007. Islamic aesthetics: An alternative way to knowledge. In Feagin, ed., 69–75.
Eubanks, Virginia. 2017. *Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor*. New York: St Martin's Press.
Evans, Mel. 2015. *Artwash: Big Oil and the arts*. London: Pluto Press.
Eve, R.A., S. Horsfall, and M.E. Lee, eds. 1997. *Chaos, complexity and sociology*. London: Sage.
Ezrow, Natasha, Erica Frantz, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. 2016. *Development and the state in the 21st century*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Falk, Richard. 1997. Resisting 'globalisation-from-above' through 'globalisation-from-below'. *New Political Economy* 2 (1): 17–24.
Farmelo, Graham. 2019. *The universe speaks in numbers*. London: Faber.
Feagin, Susan L. 2007a. Introduction. In idem, ed., 1–9.
———., ed. 2007b. *Global theories of the arts and aesthetics*. London: Blackwell.
Fieldhouse, David K. 1973. *Economics and empire 1830–1914*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Florida, Richard. 2008. *Who's your city?* New York: Basic Books.
———. 2017. *The new urbanism*. Toronto: Ingram.
Flynn, Dennis Owen, and Arturo Giraldez. 2006. Globalization began in 1571. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 232–247.
Foer, Franklin. 2017. *World without mind: The existential threat of big tech*. London: Penguin.
Foroohar, R., 2017. *Silicon Valley has too much power, Financial Times*, May 15

Foucault, M. 1980. *Power/knowledge*. Edited by C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon.
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1993. Bronze age world system cycles. *Current Anthropology* 34 (4): 383–429.
———. 1996. The underdevelopment of development. In *The underdevelopment of development*, ed. Sing Chew and Robert Denemark, 17–55. London: Sage.
———. 1998. *ReOrient: Global economy in the Asian age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Frank, Andre Gunder, and Barry K. Gills, eds. 1993. *The world system: From five hundred years to five thousand*. London: Routledge.
———. 2000. The five thousand year world system in theory and praxis. In Denemark et al., eds., 3–23.
Frank, Robert H. 1999. *Luxury fever: Why money fails to satisfy in an era of excess*. New York: Free Press.
———. 2006. *Richistan: A journey through the American wealth boom and the lives of the new rich*. New York: Crown.
Frank, Robert H., and P.J. Cook. 1995. *The winner-take-all society*. New York: Free Press.
Frankopan, Peter. 2016. *The Silk Roads: A new history of the world*. New York: Knopf.
Fraser, Nancy. 2017. From progressive neoliberalism to Trump—and beyond. *American Affairs I* 4: 46–64.
Freeland, Chrystia. 2012. *Plutocrats: The rise of the new global superrich*. London: Allen Lane.
Friedman, Alexander. 2019. Dystopia is arriving in stages. *Project Syndicate*, December 31.
Friedman, Thomas. 2016. *Thank you for being late: An optimist's guide to thriving in the age of accelerations*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Friedmann, John. 1992. *Empowerment: The politics of alternative development*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frye, David. 2018. *Wall: A history of civilization in blood and brick*. London: Faber.
Fuchs, Christian. 2008. *Internet and society: Social theory in the information age*. London: Routledge.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2020. The pandemic and political order: It takes a state. *Foreign Affairs* 99 (4): 26–32.
Gagnier, Regenia. 2000. *The insatiability of human wants: Economics and aesthetics in market society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Galbraith, J.K. 1958. *The affluent society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Galloway, Scott. 2018. Silicon Valley's tax-avoiding, job-killing, soul-sucking machine. *Esquire*, March: 124–131, 147–148.
Galtung, J. 1980. *The true worlds: A transnational perspective*. New York: Free Press.
———. 1981. Structure, culture and intellectual style. *Social Science Information* 206 (6): 816–856.
Gamble, Clive. 1993. *Timewalkers: The prehistory of global colonization*. London: Penguin.
Ganster, Paul, and David E. Lorey, eds. 2005. *Borders and border politics in a globalizing world*. Lanham, MD: SR Books.
Garraty, John A., and Peter Gay, eds. 1985. *The university history of the world*. Poole: New Orchard, 1972.
Geissler, Heike. 2018. *Seasonal associate*. New York: Semiotext(e).
Geraghty, Ryan M. 2007. The impact of globalization in the Roman empire, 200 BC–AD 100. *Journal of Economic History* 67: 1036–1061.
Gerlis, Melanie. 2014. *Art as an investment? A survey of comparative assets*. London: Lund Humphries.
Gibson, D.W. 2020. *14 miles: Building the border wall*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The consequences of modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gills, Barry K. 2010. The return of crisis in the era of globalization: One crisis, or many? *Globalizations* 7 (1–2): 3–8.
Gills, Barry K., and William R. Thompson. 2006a. Globalizations, global histories and historical globalities. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 1–17.
———, eds. 2006b. *Globalization and global history*. London: Routledge.
Giri, Ananta K., ed. 2009. *The modern prince and the modern sage*. New Delhi and London: Sage.

Gledhill, John. 2017. *World anthropologies in practice: Situated perspectives, global knowledge*. London: IB Tauris.
Glenny, Misha. 2009. *McMafia: A journey through the global criminal underworld*. New York: Vintage.
Going, C.J. 1992. Economic 'long waves' in the Roman period? A reconnaissance of the Romano-British ceramic evidence. *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 11: 93–117.
Goldwater, R. 1938. *Primitivism in modern art*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press (enlarged ed. 1986).
Gombrich, E.H. 1961 *Art and illusion: A study in the psychology of pictorial representation*. rev. ed. Princeton University Press.
———. 1984. *The sense of order: A study in the psychology of decorative art*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Goody, Jack. 1996. *The East in the West*. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2006. *The theft of history*. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010a. *Renaissances: The one or the many?* Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010b. *The Eurasian miracle*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Goonatilake, Susantha. 1984. *Aborted discovery: Science and creativity in the Third World*. London: Zed Books.
———. 1999. *Toward a global science*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Goudsblom, J., and S. Mennell, eds. 1998. *The Norbert Elias reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Graaff, N. de, T. ten Brink, and I. Parmar, eds. 2020. China's rise in a liberal order in transition. *Review of International Political Economy* special issue, 27, 2.
Graça da Silva, Sara, and Jamshid J. Tehrani. 2016. Comparative phylogenetic analyses uncover the ancient roots of Indo-European folktales. *Royal Society Open Science* 3: 1.
Graw, Isabelle. 2009. *High price: Art between the market and celebrity culture*. Berlin: Sternberg Press.
Gray, H.P. 1993. Globalization versus nationhood: Is economic integration a useful compromise? *Development & International Cooperation* 9 (16): 35–49.
Graziano, Manlio. 2018. *What is a border?* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Greenspan, Alan. 2013. *The map and the territory*. New York: Penguin.
Grotenhuis, Elizabeth ten. 2002a. Introduction: The Silk Road, ancient and contemporary. In Grotenhuis, ed., 15–25.
———. 2002b. *Along the Silk Road*. Washington, DC: Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution.
Guilbaut, Serge. 1983. *How New York stole the idea of modern art: Abstract expressionism, freedom, and the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gunn, G.C. 2003. *First globalization: The Eurasian exchange, 1500–1800*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson, eds. 1999. *Culture, power, place*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why men rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Habib, M.A.R. 2017. *Hegel and empire: From postcolonialism to globalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon.
Halifax, Joan. 1993. *The fruitful darkness*. San Francisco: HarperCollins.
Hall, Abigail R., and Christopher Coyne. 2018. *Tyranny comes home: The domestic fate of U.S. militarism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. 2001. *Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Thomas D. 2006. [Re] peripherialization, [re] incorporation, frontiers and non-state societies. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 96–113.
Hamel, P., H. Lustiger-Thaler, J. Nederveen Pieterse, and S. Roseneil, eds. 2001. *Globalization and social movements*. London: Palgrave.

Handley, Paul M. 2006. *The king never smiles: A biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Harris, N. 1990. *National liberation*. London: IB Tauris.
Hart-Landsberg, M., and P. Burkett. 2010. *China and socialism, market reforms and class struggle*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Harvey, David. 1989. *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2005. *A brief history of neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haustein, Lydia. 2008. *Global icons: Globale Bildinszenierung und kulturelle Identität*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
Haverfield, F. 1912. *The Romanization of Roman Britain*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hayden, Michael V. 2018. *The assault on intelligence: American national security in an age of lies*. New York: Random House.
Hechter, M. 1975. *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536–1966*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Heer, F. 1974. *The medieval world: Europe from 1100 to 1350*. London: Sphere, 1962.
Hegel, G.W.F. 2001. *The philosophy of history*. Kitchener, ON (orig. German 1840).
Heidegger, M. 1950/1971. *Poetry, language, thought*. New York, Harper Perennial (German orig. 1950)
Hejazi, M. 2004. Sacred geometry in nature and Persian architecture. *Design and Nature* II: 25–34.
Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. 1999. *Global transformations*. Cambridge: Polity.
Henderson, Hazel. 2019. The politics of connectivity. *Cadmus* 3 (6): 148–154.
Henderson, Jeffrey. 2012. *East Asian transformation*. London: Routledge.
Hergovich, P., and J. Ortega. 2017. The strength of absent ties: Social integration via online dating. *Physics and Society*, 1–40. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.10478.
Herman, Edward S., and Frank Brodhead. 1984. *Demonstration elections: U.S.-staged elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El Salvador*. Boston: South End Press.
Hersey, G. 2001. *The monumental impulse: Architecture's biological roots*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heryanto, Ariel. 1993. *Discourse and state terrorism: A case study of political trials in New Order Indonesia 1989–1990*. Anthropology diss., Monash University.
Hill, John E. 2011a. *Through the jade gate to Rome: A study of the Silk Routes during the later Han dynasty*. BookSurge.
———. 2011b. *The 'Peoples of the West' according to the Weilüe, by Yu Huan*. English translated by J.E. Hill.
Hingley, R. 2000. *Roman officers and English gentlemen*. London: Routledge.
———. 2005. *Globalizing Roman culture: Unity, diversity and empire*. London: Routledge.
———. 2012. *Hadrian's Wall: A Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirschfield Davis, J., and M.D. Shear. 2019. *Border wars: Inside Donald Trump's assault on immigration*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hitchner, R.B. 2008. Globalization avant la lettre: Globalization and the history of the Roman Empire. *New Global Studies* 2: 1–12.
Ho Hing-kay, Oscar. 2009. Government, business and people: Museum development in Asia. In Belting and Buddensieg, eds., 266–277.
Hobsbawm, E.J. 1995. Foreword. In *Art and power: Europe under the dictators 1930–45*, ed. D. Britt, 11–15. London: Thames and Hudson.
Hobsbawm, E.J., and T. Ranger, eds. 1983. *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobson, John M. 2004. *The Eastern origins of Western civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2012. Orientalization in globalization: A sociology of the promiscuous architecture of globalization, c.500–2010. In *Globalization and development in East Asia*, ed. J. Nederveen Pieterse and J. Kim. New York: Routledge.
Hodgson, Marshall G.S. 1974. *The venture of Islam: Conscience and history in a world civilization*. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1993. *Rethinking world history*. Cambridge University Press.
Hodos, Tamar, ed. 2017. *The Routledge handbook of archaeology and globalization*. London: Routledge.
Hoerder, Dirk. 2002. *Cultures in contact: World migrations in the second millennium*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Holban, Mihaela. 2012. Globalization and religion in the Roman world: Notes from a borderland. Paper at Essex conference on Globalization and the Greco-Roman world.
Honour, Hugh, and John Fleming. 1995. *A world history of art*. 4th ed. London: Laurence King.
Hook, Philip. 2017. *Rogues' gallery: A history of art and its dealers*. London: Profile.
Hopkins, Anthony G., ed. 2002. *Globalization in world history*. New York: Norton.
———., ed. 2006. *Global history: Interactions between the universal and the local*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Horden, Peregrine, and Nicholas Purcell. 2000. *The corrupting sea: A study of Mediterranean history*. London: Blackwell.
Horner, Rory, and David Hulme. 2019. From international to global development: New geographies of 21st century development. *Development and Change*, forthcoming.
Hughes, H.S. 1958. *Consciousness and society: The reorientation of European social thought 1890–1913*. New York: Vintage.
Hughes, Robert. 1990. The decline of the city of mahogany. *The New Republic*, June 25: 27–38.
Humboldt, Alexander von 1845 *Kosmos*. Stuttgart
Humphrey, Caroline, and Piers Vitebsky. 1997. *Sacred architecture*. Boston: Little Brown.
Huntington, S.P. 1993. The clash of civilizations. *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22–49.
Ianchovichina, Elena. 2018. *Eruptions of popular anger: The economics of the Arab spring and its aftermath*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
Inda, Jonathan Xavier, and Renato Rosaldo, eds. 2008. *The anthropology of globalization: A reader*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
Inglis, David, and Roland Robertson. 2006. Discovering the world: Cosmopolitanism and globality in the 'Eurasian' renaissance. In *Europe and Asia beyond East and West: Towards a new cosmopolitanism*, ed. G. Delanty, 92–106. London: Routledge.
Institut du monde Arabe. 2006. *Venise et l'Orient, 828–1797*. Paris: Gallimard/Institut du monde Arabe.
Iriye, Akira. 1997. *Cultural internationalism and world order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Isayev, Elena. 2015. Polybius's global moment and human mobility through ancient Italy. In Pitts and Versluys, eds., 123–140.
Jennings, Justin. 2011. *Globalizations and the ancient world*. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2017. Distinguishing past globalizations. In Hodos, ed., 12–28.
Johnson, Chalmers. 2004. *The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy and the end of the Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Jones, Caroline A. 2017. *The global work of art: World's Fairs, Biennials, and the aesthetics of experience*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2012. Global studies. In *Encyclopedia of Global Studies*, ed. M. Juergensmeyer and H. Anheier. London: Sage.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. *Thinking, fast and slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kaiser, Brittany. 2019. *Targeted: The Cambridge Analytica whistleblower's inside story of how big data, Trump, and Facebook broke democracy and how it can happen again*. New York: HarperCollins.
Kala, Pablo. 2001. In the spaces of erasure: Globalisation, resistance and Narmada River. *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 2.
Kalenberg, Angel 2009. *Museum sceneries in Latin America*, in Belting and Buddensieg, eds., 278–291
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 2010. *Civilizations in world politics: Plural and pluralist perspectives*. London: Routledge.
———., ed. 2012. *Sinicization and the rise of China*. New York: Routledge.

Kaul, I., P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven, and R. Mendoza, eds. 2003. *Providing global public goods: Managing globalization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kazim, Aqil. 2000. *The United Arab Emirates AD 600 to the present: A socio-discursive transformation in the Arabian Gulf*. Dubai: Gulf Book Centre.
Kearney, M. 1998. Transnationalism in California and Mexico at the end of empire. In *Border identities: Nation and state at international frontiers*, ed. T.N. Wilson and H. Donnan, 117–141. Cambridge University Press.
Keating, J.E. 2011. Weird science. *Foreign Policy*, January/February: 36.
Kennedy, Hugh. 2002. *Mongols, huns and vikings: Nomads at war*. London: Cassell.
Kennedy, Paul. 2010. *Local lives and global transformations: Towards world society*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Khagram, Sanjeev, and Peggy Levitt, eds. 2008. *The transnational studies reader: Intersections and innovations*. New York: Routledge.
Khanna, Parag. 2019. *The future is Asian: Commerce, conflict, and culture in the 21st century*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Khondker, Habibul Haque. 2013. Globalization, glocalization, or global studies: What's in a name? *Globalizations* 10 (4): 527–531.
King, Stephen D. 2017. *Grave new world: The end of globalization, the return of history*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Klein, Naomi. 2000. *No logo, no space, no choice, no jobs*. London: Flamingo.
Knapp, A.B., and P. van Dommelen. 2010. Introduction. In *Material connections in the ancient Mediterranean: Mobility, materiality and Mediterranean identities*, ed. P. van Dommelen and A.B. Knapp, 1–19. London: Routledge.
Kneale, Matthew. 2018. *Rome: A history in seven sackings*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Kobrin, S.J. 1998. Back to the future: Neomedievalism and the postmodern digital world economy. *Journal of International Affairs* 51 (2): 361–386.
Kornbluh, Karen. 2018. The internet's lost promise and how America can restore it. *Foreign Affairs* 97 (5): 33–39.
Korotayev, Andrey V. 2005. A compact macromodel of world system evolution. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 11 (1): 79–93.
Kossok, M. 1993. From universal history to global history. In Mazlish and Buultjens, eds., 93–112.
Krebs, C.B. 2010. *A most dangerous book: Tacitus's 'Germania' from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich*. New York: Norton.
Krishna, Anirudh. 2004. Escaping poverty and becoming poor: Who gains, who loses, and why? People's assessments of stability and change in 35 North Indian villages. *World Development* 32 (1): 121–136.
———. 2006. Escaping poverty and becoming poor in 36 villages of Central and Western Uganda. *Journal of Development Studies* 42 (2): 346–370.
Krishna, Anirudh, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse. 2008. Hierarchical integration: The dollar economy and the rupee economy. *Development and Change* 39 (2): 219–237.
Kuhn, T.S. 1962. *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kumar, Arun. 2002. *The Black economy in India*. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
Kurlansky, Mark. 2002. *Salt: A world history*. London: Jonathan Cape.
LaBianca, Oystein S., and Sandra A. Scham, eds. 2006. *Connectivity in antiquity: Globalization as a long term historical process*. Sheffield: Equinox.
Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. *New reflections on the revolution of our time*. London: Verso.
———. 2005. *On populist reason*. London: Verso.
Lal, Vinay. 2003. Provincializing the West: World history from the perspective of Indian history. In *Writing world history 1800–2000*, ed. B. Stuchtey and E. Fuchs, 271–290. Oxford University Press.
Lane, G. 2017. *The Mongols*. London: IB Tauris.
Lanier, J. 2017. *Dawn of the new everything: A journey through virtual reality*. Random House.
Laurence, Ray, and Francesco Trifilò. 2015. The global and the local in the Roman empire: Connectivity and mobility from an urban perspective. In Pitts and Versluys, eds., 99–122.

Lawlor, R. 1982. *Sacred geometry: Philosophy and practice*. London: Thames and Hudson.
Ledeneva, Alena. 2008. Blat and Guanxi: Informal practices in Russia and China. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50 (1): 118–144.
Leerssen, Joep. 2005. The cultivation of culture: Towards a definition of romantic nationalism in Europe. Working Papers European Studies 2, University of Amsterdam.
Lehman Jr, Don. 2018. Information theory and redundancy logic. http://theinformationdynamics.com/Attention%20Theory/General/G03%20Redundancy%20Logic.html
Leigh, David, and Luke Harding. 2011. *WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange's war on secrecy*. London: Guardian Books.
Lemière, Sophie. 2014. Gangsta and politics in Malaysia. In *Misplaced democracy: Malaysian politics and people*, ed. idem, 91–108. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre.
Lev-Ram, Michael. 2018. Once upon a time at Netflix. *Fortune*, October: 74–82.
Lewis, Bernard. 2002. *What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East*. New York: Perennial.
Lewis, Michael. 2010. *The big short: Inside the doomsday machine*. London: Allen Lane.
Li, Victor. 2007. Elliptical interruptions: Or, why Derrida prefers mondialisation to globalization. *The New Centennial Review* 7 (2): 141–154.
Libicki, Martin C. 1995. *What is information warfare?* National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies.
Lieberman, Victor, ed. 1999. *Beyond binary histories: Re-imagining Eurasia to c.1830*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
———. 2003. *Strange parallels: Southeast Asia in global context, c. 800–1830*. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
Lind, Michael. 2020. *The new class war: Saving democracy from the managerial elite*. New York: Penguin.
Lovink, Geert. 2012. *Networks without a cause: A critique of social media*. Cambridge: Polity.
Loyer, Emanuelle. 2018. *Lévi-Strauss: A biography*. Cambridge: Polity.
Lugo, Alejandro. 2000. Theorizing border inspections. *Cultural Dynamics* 12 (3): 353–373.
Lyon, David. 1994. *Electronic eye: The rise of surveillance society*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———, ed. 2002. *Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk and automated discrimination*. London: Routledge.
Lyotard, J.-F. 1979. *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*. Paris: Minuit.
Maalouf, A. 1984. *The Crusades through Arab eyes*. London: Al Saqi.
Mackenzie, J.M., ed. 1986. *Imperialism and popular culture*. Manchester University Press.
Maffesoli, M. 1988. *Le temps des tribus*. Paris: Klincksieck.
Mair, Victor H., ed. 1998. *The bronze age and early iron age peoples of Eastern Central Asia*. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Man.
———., ed. 2006. *Contact and exchange in the ancient world*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Mallaby, Sebastian. 2010. *More money than god: Hedge funds and the making of the new elite*. London: Bloomsbury.
Mandelbaum, M. 2010. *The frugal superpower: America's global leadership in a cash-strapped era*. New York: Public Affairs.
Mann, C. C. 2017. A family portrait for all humanity, Wall Street Journal, November 4-5, 2017
Mann, M. 1986. *The sources of social power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Manning, Patrick. 2005. *Migration in world history*. London: Routledge.
Marks, Robert B. 2007. *The origins of the modern world*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Marshall, P.J., and G. Williams. 1982. *The great map of mankind: British perceptions of the world in the age of Enlightenment*. London: Dent.
Marvit, M. 2014 The wages of Crowdwork: How Amazon created the most exploited workforce you've never seen, *The Nation*, February 24

Massey, Doreen. 1993a. A global sense of place. In *Studying culture*, ed. A. Gray and J. McGuigan, 232–240. London: Edward Arnold.
———. 1993b. Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place. In *Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change*, ed. J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, and L. Tickner, 59–69. London: Routledge.
Mattingly, D. 2004. Being Roman. *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 17 (1): 5–25.
Mayer, Arno. 1981. *The persistence of the old regime*. New York: Pantheon.
Mayer, Jane. 2016. *Dark money: The hidden history of the billionaires behind the rise of the radical right*. New York: Doubleday.
Mazlish, Bruce. 1993. An introduction to global history. In Mazlish and Buultjens, eds., 1–26.
Mazlish, Bruce. 2006. Global history. *Theory Culture & Society* 23 (2-3): 406–408.
Mazlish, Bruce, and Ralph Buultjens, eds. 1993. *Conceptualizing global history*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
McCarty, P., ed. 2012. *Integrated perspectives in global studies*. Cognella, CA: San Diego.
McCoy, Alfred W. 2017. *In the shadows of the American century: The rise and decline of US global power*. Haymarket Books.
———. 2018. The world according to Trump. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 17.
McLennan, Gregor. 2013. Postcolonial critique: The necessity of sociology. *Political Power and Social Theory* 24: 119–144.
McLuhan, Marshall. 1964. *Understanding media: The extensions of man*. London: Routledge.
McLuhan, M., and B.R. Powers. 1992. *The global village: Transformations in world life and media in the 21st century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
McNamee, R. 2019. *Zucked: Waking up to the Facebook catastrophe*. Penguin.
McNeill, William H. 1963. *The rise of the West*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1967. *A world history*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
———. 1977. *Plagues and peoples*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1979. *A world history*. 3rd ed. UK: Oxford University Press.
———. 1982. *The pursuit of power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mehta, Uday S. 1997. Liberal strategies of exclusion. In *Tensions of empire: Colonial cultures in a bourgeois world*, ed. F. Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, 59–86. Berkeley: University of California Press.
———. 1999. *Liberalism and empire: A study in nineteenth century British thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meskell, Lynn, ed. 2009. *Cosmopolitan archaeologies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Meyer, Jeffrey. 1991. *The dragons of Tiananmen*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Michaelsen, S., and D.E. Johnson, eds. 1997. *Border theory: The limits of cultural politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Mieroop, Marc van de. 2009. The invention of interest: Sumerian loans. In *The origins of value: The financial innovations that created modern capital markets*, ed. W.A. Goetzman and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, 17–30. Oxford University Press.
Migdal, J.S. 1988. *Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Miles, S. 1986. The real war: Low intensity conflict in Central America. *NACLA*, 20, 2.
Miller, Todd. 2020. *Empire of borders: Expansion of US borders around the world*. London: Verso.
Miraftab, Faranak. 2016. *Global heartland: Displaced labor, transnational lives, and local placemaking*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mittelman, James H. 2013. What's in a name? Global, international, and regional studies. *Globalizations* 10 (4): 515–519.
Morgner, Christian. 2017. Diversity and (in) equality in the global art world: Global development and structure of field-configuring events. *New Global Studies* 11: 3. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2016-0015.
Morishita, Masaaki. 2009. *Museums as contact zones: Struggles between curators and local artists in Japan*, in Belting and Buddensieg, eds., 316–327

Morozov, Evgeny. 2011. *The net delusion: The dark side of internet freedom*. New York: Public Affairs.
Morris, Ian. 2005. Mediterraneanization. In *Mediterranean paradigms and classical antiquity*, ed. I. Malkin, 30–55. London: Routledge.
Mudde, Cas. 2019. *The far right today*. Cambridge: Polity.
Mulgan, Geoff. 1998. *Connexity*. rev. ed. London: Vintage.
Muller, Jerry Z. 2018. *The tyranny of metrics*. Princeton University Press.
Mullin, John R. 1992. The reconstruction of Lisbon following the earthquake of 1755: A study in despotic planning. *The Journal of the International History of City Planning Association*, 45.
Muroi, Hisashi. n.d. Toward art as an alternative technology. Yokohama National University.
Murphy, Cullen. 2008. *Are we Rome? The fall of an empire and the fate of America*. New York: Mariner Books.
Murray, Nancy. 2010. Profiling in the age of total information awareness. *Race & Class* 52 (2): 3–24.
Naerebout, F.G. 2006–2007. Global Romans? Is globalisation a concept that is going to help us understand the Roman Empire? *Talanta* 38–39: 149–170.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1992. Elliptical sense. In *Derrida: A critical reader*, ed. D. Wood, 36–51. Oxford: Blackwell.
Narayan, D., R. Chambers, M. Kaul Shah, and P. Petesch. 2000. *Voices of the poor: Crying out for change*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
Nayyar, Deepak. 2006. Globalisation, history and development: A tale of two centuries. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 30: 137–159.
Nazemroaya, Mahdi D. 2012. *The globalization of NATO*. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press.
Needham, J. 1956. *Science and civilization in China*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 1988. Slavery and the triangle of emancipation. *Race & Class* 30 (2): 1–22.
———. 1989. *Empire and emancipation: Power and liberation on a world scale*. New York: Praeger.
———. 1992. *White on black: Images of Africa and blacks in Western popular culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
———. 1998. Sociology of humanitarian intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia compared. In *World orders in the making: Humanitarian intervention and beyond*, ed. idem, 230–265. London and New York: Macmillan and St Martin's.
———., ed. 2000. *Global futures: Shaping globalization*. London: Zed Books.
———. 2004a. *Globalization or Empire?* New York: Routledge.
———. 2004b. The trouble with hegemony: Hegemonic destabilization theory. *Asian Review*, special issue *Globalization and Hegemony* 16: 69–89.
———. 2005. The long nineteenth century is too short. *Victorian Studies* autumn: 113–125.
———. 2007. *Ethnicities and global multiculture: Pants for an octopus*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
———. 2008. *Is there hope for Uncle Sam? Beyond the American bubble*. London: Zed Books.
———. 2009. Multipolarity means thinking plural: Modernities. *Protosociology* 26: 19–35.
———. 2010. *Development theory: Deconstructions/reconstructions*. 2nd ed. London: Sage.
———. 2011. Many Renaissances, many modernities? *Theory Culture and Society* 28 (3): 149–161.
———. 2012. Leaking superpower: WikiLeaks and the contradictions of democracy. *Third World Quarterly* 33 (10): 1909–1924.
———. 2014. Rethinking modernity and capitalism: Add context and stir. *Sociopedia Colloquium* (e-journal).
———. 2015a. China's contingencies and globalization. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (11): 1985–2001. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1067860.

———. 2015b. History and hegemony: The United States and twenty-first century globalization. In *The Routledge international handbook of globalization studies*, ed. Bryan S. Turner and R.J. Holton, 2nd rev. ed., 96–113. London: Routledge.
———. 2017. The Atlantic twin tunnel vision. *Global-e* 10, 71, October 31.
———. 2018a. *Multipolar globalization: Emerging economies and development*. London: Routledge.
———. 2018b. Populism is a distraction. *New Global Studies* 6–9. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2018-0020
———. 2019. What do people want? Unscrambling populism. *Soundings* 102 (2–3): 112–127. https://doi.org/10.5325/soundings.102.2-3.0111.
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan, and Bhikhu Parekh, eds. 1995. *The decolonization of imagination*. London: Zed Books.
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan, and Habibul H. Khondker, eds. 2010. *Twenty-first century globalization: Perspectives from the Gulf*. Abu Dhabi: Zayed University Press.
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan, Abdul Rahman Embong, and Tham Siew Yean, eds. 2017. *Changing constellations of Southeast Asia: From Northeast Asia to China*. London: Routledge.
Nederveen, F.B.M., and C.J. Nederveen. 2006. *De geneaologieën van Nederveen*. Geertruidenberg: Stichting van Nederveen.
Neuendorf, H. 2017. How smaller galleries can innovate to survive the age of the mega-gallery. *Art World*, 7/6.
Nietzsche, F. W. 1888/1976. *The Antichrist,* no. 46, in *The portable Nietzsche*, ed. by W. Kaufman. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 626–627 (orig. 1888)
Nilekani, Nandan. 2018. Data to the people: India's inclusive internet. *Foreign Affairs* 97 (5): 19–27.
Nisbet, R.A. 1980. *History of the idea of progress*. New York: Basic Books.
Nixey, Catherine. 2017. *The darkening age: The Christian destruction of the classical world*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Noble, Safiya Umoja. 2017. *Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism*. New York University Press.
Nugent, Stephen, and Cris Shore, eds. 1997. *Anthropology and cultural studies*. London: Pluto Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. *Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
O'Byrne, D.J., and A. Hensby. 2011. *Theorizing global studies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
O'Connor, Rory, and Aaron Cutler. 2008. *Shock Jocks: Hate speech and talk radio*. San Francisco: AlterNet Books.
Ohmae, K. 1992. *The borderless world: Power and strategy in the global marketplace*. London: HarperCollins.
———. 1995. *The end of the nation state: The rise of regional economies*. New York: Free Press.
O'Mara, M. 2019. *The code: Silicon Valley and the remaking of America*. London: Penguin.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2002. When did globalisation begin? *European Review of Economic History* 6: 23–50.
Ostry, J., P. Loungani, and D. Furceri. 2016. Neoliberalism: Oversold? *Finance & Development* 53: 2.
Oxfam. 1996. *Development and social diversity—Development in practice readers*. Oxford: Oxfam.
Oxfam International. 2016. *An economy for the 1%*. Oxfam Briefing Paper 210.
Packard, Vance. 1957. *The hidden persuaders*. New York: David.
Padawer, R. 2018. Decoding the story of yourself. *New York Times Magazine* 11 (18): 2–11.
Pansters, Wil G., ed. 2008. *The troubled triangle: Unravelling the linkages between inequality, pluralism and environment*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg.
Parekh, Bhikhu. 1993. The cultural particularity of liberal democracy. In *Prospects for democracy: North South East West*, ed. D. Held, 156–175. Cambridge: Polity.
Parker, Grant. 2008. *The making of Roman India: Greek culture in the Roman world*. Cambridge University Press.

Parry, J.H. 1973. *The age of reconnaissance*. London: Sphere.
Pavelec, S. Mike. 2010. *The military-industrial complex and American society*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. 2002. Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode* 34 (3): 380–404.
Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2007. Variegated capitalism. *Progress in Human Geography* 31: 731–772.
Pei, Minxin. 2016. *China's crony capitalism: The dynamics of regime decay*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Perkins, John. 2004. *Confessions of an economic hit man*. New York: Penguin.
Philippon, Thomas. 2019. *The great reversal: How America gave up on free markets*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Phillips, Kevin P. 1994. *Arrogant capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the frustration of American politics*. Boston: Little Brown.
Piketty, Thomas. 2013. *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pile, S., and M. Keith, eds. 1997. *Geographies of resistance*. New York: Routledge.
Pirenne, H. 1939. *Mohammed and Charlemagne*. New York: Norton, orig. 1923.
Pitts, Martin. 2007. The Emperor's New Clothes? The utility of identity in Roman archaeology. *American Journal of Archaeology* 111 (4): 693–713.
———. 2011. Globalization. In *The encyclopedia of ancient history*, ed. R. Bagnall, K. Broderson, C. Champion, A. Erskine, and S. Huebner. London: Blackwell.
———. 2017. Deep histories of globalization and Europe: Beyond Eurocentrism. In Hodos, ed., 505–508.
Pitts, Martin, and Miguel John Versluys, eds. 2015a. *Globalisation and the Roman world: World history, connectivity and material culture*. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2015b. Globalisation and the Roman world. In idem, eds., 3–31.
Pollock, Sheldon. 1996. The Sanskrit cosmopolis, 300–1300 CE: Transculturalization, vernacularization, and the question of ideology. In *Ideology and status of Sanskrit*, ed. Jan E.M. Houben, 197–248. Leiden: Brill.
Pomerantsev, Peter. 2020. *This is not propaganda: Adventures in the war against reality*. New York: Public Affairs.
Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. *The great divergence: China, Europe and the making of the modern world economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Porter, Michael E. 1990. *The competitive advantage of nations*. New York: Free Press.
Portes, A., L.-E. Guarnizo, and P. Landolt. 1999. The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (2): 217–237.
Pound, Ezra. 1910. *The spirit of romance*. London: J. M. Dent.
Powers, Shawn M., and Michael Jablonski. 2015. *The real cyber war: The political economy of internet freedom*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Prestowitz, Clyde. 2005. *Three billion new capitalists: The great shift of wealth and power to the East*. New York: Basic Books.
Pukhov, R., and C. March, eds. 2017. *Elite warriors: Special operations forces from around the world*. Minneapolis: East View Press.
Rachman, Gideon. 2016. *Easternization: Asia's rise and America's decline*. New York: Other Press.
Racinet, Auguste. 1888/2016. *The costume history*. Köln: Taschen (orig. edn. 1888).
Raskin, J. 1973. *The mythology of imperialism*. Cary, NY: Delta.
Redding, G. 2005. The thick description and comparison of societal systems of capitalism. *Journal of International Business Studies* 36: 123–155.
Redding, G., and M.A. Witt. 2010. *The future of Chinese capitalism: Choices and chances*. Oxford University Press.
Rée, Jonathan. 2019. *Witcraft*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rehbein, B. 2015. *Critical theory after the rise of the Global South*. London: Routledge.

Reich, David. 2018. *Who we are and how we got here: Ancient DNA and the new science of the human past*. New York: Pantheon.
Reischauer, E.O., and J.K. Fairbank. 1960. *East Asia: The great tradition*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rennstich, Joachim Karl. 2006. Three steps in globalization. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 203–231.
Rhys-Taylor, Alex. 2010. *Coming to our senses: A multi-sensory ethnography of class and multiculture in East London*. PhD thesis, Goldsmiths, London.
Rice, Michael. 1997. *The power of the bull*. London: Routledge.
Riggs, Fred W. 2004. Global studies manifesto 1. *Globalizations* 1 (2): 344–350.
Rios, Victor M. 2011. *Punished: Policing the lives of Black and Latino boys*. New York: NYU Press.
Robb, Amanda. 2017. Anatomy of a fake-news scandal. *Rolling Stone* 11 (30): 28–33.
Robertson, Robbie. 2003. *The three waves of globalization: A history of a developing global consciousness*. London: Zed.
Robertson, Roland. 1992. *Globalization: Social theory and global culture*. London: Sage.
———. 1994a. Globalisation or glocalisation? *Journal of International Communication* 1 (1): 33–52.
———. 1994b. Glocalization: Space, time and social theory. *Journal of International Communication* 1: 1.
———. 2012. Early approaches to global studies. In *Encyclopedia of global studies*, ed. H.K. Anheier and M. Juergensmeyer, 728–737. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Rodrik, Dani. 2001. Institutions for high-quality growth: What they are and how to acquire them. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35 (3): 3–31.
Rodrik, Dani, A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi. 2004. Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. *Journal of Economic Growth* 9 (2): 131–165.
Rose, Gideon. 2020. The world after the pandemic. *Foreign Affairs* 99, 4, July/August: 8.
Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in world politics*. Brighton: Harvester.
———. 1997. *Along the domestic-foreign frontier: Exploring governance in a turbulent world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenberg, Justin. 2000. *The follies of globalisation theory*. London: Verso.
Roszak, T. 1976. *The unfinished animal*. London: Faber and Faber.
Roubini, Nouriel, and Stephen Mihm. 2010. *Crisis economics: A crash course in the future of finance*. New York: Penguin.
Roudometov, Victor. 2012. Current academic approaches to global studies. In *Encyclopedia of Global Studies*.
———. 2016. *Glocalization: A critical introduction*. London: Routledge.
Rovelli, Carlo. 2018. *The order of time*. NY, Riverhead: Long Island.
Rubin, W. 1984. *'Primitivism' in twentieth century art: Affinity of the tribal and the modern*. 2 vols. New York: Museum of Modern Art.
Rustow, D.A., ed. 1970. *Philosophers and kings*. New York: Braziller.
Rutherford, Adam. 2017. *A brief history of everyone who ever lived*. New York: The Experiment.
Sachsenmaier, Dominic. 2018. *Global entanglements of a man who never traveled: A 17th century Chinese Christian and his conflicted worlds*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Said, Edward W. 1984. *The world, the text, and the critic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Said, Edward. 1999. *Hey, Mister, you want dirty book?* London Review of Books, 21, 19, September 30
Saldívar, J.D. 1997. *Border matters: Remapping American cultural studies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Salter, Mark B. 2015. Borders, passports, and global mobility. In *The Routledge international handbook of globalization studies*, ed. B.S. Turner and R.J. Holton, 2nd ed., 491–506. London: Routledge.
Samman, Khaldoun. 2011. *The clash of modernities: The Islamist challenge to Arab, Jewish, Arab, and Turkish nationalism*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Sánchez Estop, Juan D. 2014. WikiLeaks: From Abbé Barruel to Jeremy Bentham and beyond (A short introduction to the new theories of conspiracy and transparency). *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 14 (1): 40–49.

Santos, B. de Sousa. 1999. Towards a multicultural conception of human rights. In *Spaces of culture: City—Nation—World*, ed. M. Featherstone and S. Lash, 214–222. London: Sage.

———. 2006. Globalizations. *Theory Culture & Society*, special issue, *Problematizing Global Knowledge* 23 (2–3): 393–399.

Sassen, Saskia. 2014. *Expulsions: Brutality and complexity in the global economy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Saunders, Frances S. 1998. *Who paid the piper: The CIA and the cultural Cold War*. London: Granta Books.

Schafer, Edward. 1967. *Ancient China*. New York: Time-Life Books.

Schama, Simon. 1987. *The embarrassment of riches: An interpretation of Dutch culture in the Golden Age*. London: Fontana.

Schiller, Dan. 1999. *Digital capitalism: Networking the global market system*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Schiller, Dan, and Vincent Mosco, eds. 2001. *Continental order? Integrating North America for cyber-capitalism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Schlosberg, Justin. 2017. The media–technology–military industrial complex. In *State of Power 2017*, ed. N. Buxton and D. Eade. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Scholte, J.A. 2000. *Globalization: A critical introduction*. London: Macmillan.

Schradie, Jen. 2019. *The revolution that wasn't*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scott, J.C. 1998. *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Segal, Adam. 2018. When China rules the web: Technology in service of the state. *Foreign Affairs* 97 (5): 10–18.

Seymour, Richard. 2019. *The twittering machine*. London: Indigo Press.

Shannon, Claude E., and W. Weaver. 1949. *The mathematical theory of communication*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Shattuck, Roger. 1967. *The banquet years: The origins of the avant-garde in France*. rev. ed. New York: Vintage.

Sheller, M., and J. Urry. 2006. The new mobilities paradigm. *Environment and Planning* 38: 207–226.

Shenk, David. 1997. *Data smog*. New York: HarperCollins.

Sherrat, A. 2006. The Trans-Eurasian exchange: The prehistory of Chinese relations with the West. In Mair, ed. 30–61.

Shirky, Clay. 2008. *Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations*. New York: Penguin.

———. 2011. The political power of social media. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (1): 28–41.

Shubin, Neil. 2020. *Some assembly required: Decoding 4 billion years of life using ancient fossils and DNA*. New York: Pantheon.

Siegele, Ludwig. 2014. A Cambrian moment: Tech startups. *The Economist Special Report* 1 (8): 1–16.

Sifry, Micah L. 2011. *WikiLeaks and the age of transparency*. New York: OR Books.

Sirkin, Harold L., James W. Hemerling, and A.K. Bhattacharya. 2008. *Globality: Competing with everyone from everywhere for everything*. New York: Business Plus.

Sitwell, N.H.H. 1986. *Outside the empire: The world the Romans knew*. London: Paladin.

Sklair, Leslie. 2006. Competing conceptions of globalization. In *Global social change: Historical and comparative perspectives*, ed. C. Chase-Dunn and S.J. Babones, 59–78. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Skocpol, Theda, ed. 1984. *Vision and method in historical sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda, and Margaret Somers. 1980. The uses of comparative history in macrosocial theory. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (2): 174–197.

Skolimowski, Henrik. 1994. *The participatory mind*. London: Penguin/Arkana.
Slater, David. 2004. *Geopolitics and the post-colonial: Rethinking North-South relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Slater, David, and Peter J. Taylor. 1999. *The American century: Consensus and coercion in the projection of American power*. London: Wiley.
Smith, Dan. 2012. *Penguin state of the world atlas*. 7th ed. London: Penguin.
Smith, M.P., and L.E. Guarnizo, eds. 1998. *Transnationalism from below*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Smuts, Jan C. 1926. *Holism and evolution*. London: Macmillan.
Spence, M., P. Clarke Annez, and R.M. Buckley, eds. 2008. *Urbanization and growth*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Spier, Fred. 2010. *Big history and the future of humanity*. Oxford University Press.
Spivak, Gayatri. 1999. *A critique of postcolonial reason: Toward a history of the vanishing present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sprenger, Florian. 2015. *The politics of micro-decisions: Edward Snowden, net neutrality, and the architectures of the internet*. Leuphana University of Lüneburg: Meson Press.
Spurk, Jan. 2020. The world before and after the corona crisis. *Global-e*, 13, 36, June 9.
Stäheli, Urs. 2003. The outside of the global. *New Centennial Review* 3 (2): 1–22.
Standing, Guy. 2011. *The precariat: The new dangerous class*. London: Bloomsbury.
Starn, Randolph, and Loren Partridge. 1992. *Arts of power: Three halls of state in Italy, 1300–1600*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Stavrianos, L. Stavros. 1998. *A global history: From prehistory to the 21st century*. 7th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Steger, Manfred B. 2013. It's about globalization, after all. *Globalizations* 10 (6): 771–777.
Steger, Manfred B., and A. Wahlrab. 2016. *What is global studies? Theory & practice*. New York: Routledge.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2003. *The roaring nineties: A new history of the world's most prosperous decade*. New York: Norton.
———. 2006. *Making globalization work*. New York: Norton.
Stoler, Ann L. 1992. 'In Cold Blood': Hierarchies of credibility and the politics of colonial narratives. *Representations* 37: 151–189.
Storper, Michael. 2001. Lived effects of the contemporary economy: Globalization, inequality and consumer society. In *Millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism*, ed. J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff, 88–124. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Strange, Susan. 1986. *Casino capitalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Streeck, Wolfgang. 2013. *Re-forming capitalism: Institutional change in the German political economy*. London: Oxford University Press.
Studwell, Joe. 2007. *Asian Godfathers: Money and power in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia*. London: Profile Books.
———. 2013. *How Asia works*. London: Profile.
Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 1997. Connected histories: Notes towards a reconfiguration of early modern Eurasia. *Modern Asian Studies* 31 (3): 735–762.
Sudjic, Deyan. 2005. *The edifice complex: How the rich and powerful shape the world*. London: Penguin.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2007. *The Black Swan: The impact of the highly improbable*. New York: Penguin.
———. 2014. *Antifragile: Things that gain from disorder*. New York: Penguin.
Tambunan, A.S.S. 1995. *Socio-political functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces*. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan.
Tan, Eugene. 2009. *Museum politics and nationalism in Singapore*, in Belting and Buddensieg, eds., 386–393
Tapper, Richard, and Sami Zubaida, eds. 1994. *Culinary cultures of the Middle East*. London: IB Tauris.

Tarschys, Daniel. 1987. Symbols, rituals, and political legitimation: Some concluding remarks. In *Symbols of power: The esthetics of political legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, ed. C. Arvidsson and L.E. Blomqvist, 173–177. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Teggart, Frederick J. 1939. *Rome and China: A study of correlations in historical events*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Thaler, Richard R., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. *Nudge*. New York: Penguin.

Tharoor, Kanishk. 2015. The sandstorm. *Even* 2: 74–100.

Therborn, Göran. 2003. Entangled modernities. *European Journal of Social Theory* 6: 293–305.

Thiong'o, Ngugi wa. 1986. *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature*. London and Nairobi: James Currey/Heinemann.

Thompson, Denise P. 1999. *Skin deep: Citizenship, inclusion and entitlements for the 'dark'-skinned woman in Jamaica*. Institute of Social Studies MA thesis, The Hague.

Thompson, Don. 2008. *The $12 million stuffed shark*. New York: St Martin's.

Thornton, Robert. 2000. Ethnicity and the geometry of power: The aesthetics of ethnicity in the imagination of the polity. *Critical Arts* 14: 1.

Tinniswood, Adrian. 1998. *Visions of power: Ambition and architecture from ancient Rome to Paris*. London: Mitchell Beazley.

Tolia-Kelly, Divya P. 2011. Narrating the postcolonial landscape: Archaeologies of race at Hadrian's Wall. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36 (1): 71–88.

Tomlinson, John. 1999. *Globalization and culture*. University of Chicago Press.

Torpey, John. 2000. *The invention of the passport: Surveillance, citizenship and the state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Toynbee, Arnold. 1972. *A study of history*. rev. abridged ed. London: Thames and Hudson.

Tsing, Anna L. 2005. *Friction: An ethnography of global connection*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Tucker, Vincent. 1996. *Critical holism: Towards a new health model*. Cork: Cork University College.

Turner, Bryan S., and R.J. Holton. 2015. Theories of globalization: Issues and origins. In *The Routledge international handbook of globalization studies*, ed. idem, 2nd ed., 3–23. London: Routledge.

Turse, Nick. 2008. *The complex: How the military invades our everyday lives*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

UNDP. 2013. *Human Development Report 2013: The rise of the South*. New York: UNDP.

Urry, John. 2003. *Global complexity*. Cambridge: Polity.

———. 2011. *Climate change and society*. Cambridge: Polity.

Uvin, Peter. 1999. Ethnicity and power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different paths to mass violence. *Comparative Politics* 31 (3): 253–272.

Vale, L. 2008. *Architecture, power and national identity*. New York: Routledge.

Van den Berg, Jan H. 1961. *The changing nature of man: Introduction to a historical psychology, Metabletica*. New York: Norton (trans., 1957).

———. 1970. *Things: Four metabletic reflections*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Van der Pijl, Kees. 2012. Is the East still red? The contender state and class struggles in China. *Globalizations* 9 (4): 503–516.

Van Dommelen, P. 2006. The orientalizing phenomenon: Hybridity and material culture in the western Mediterranean. In *Debating orientalization: Multidisciplinary approaches to change in the ancient Mediterranean*, ed. C. Riva and N.C. Vella, Monographs in Mediterranean Archaeology 10: 135–152. London.

Vandkilde, Helle. 2017. Small, medium and large: Globalization perspectives on the Afro-Eurasian Bronze Age. In Hodos, ed., 509–522.

Vasile, E. 1997. Re-turning home: Transnational movements and the transformation of landscape and culture in the marginal communities of Tunis. *Antipode* 29 (2): 177–196.

Versluys, Miguel John. 2008. Exploring identities in the Phoenician, Hellenistic and Roman East. *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 65: 342–356.
———. 2010. Understanding Egypt in Egypt and beyond. In *Isis on the Nile: Egyptian Gods in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, ed. L. Bricault and M.J. Versluys, 7–37. Brill: Leiden.
———. 2013. Material culture and identity in the late Roman Republic (C. 200–C. 20). In *A Companion to the Archaeology of the Roman Republic*, ed. J. DeRose Evans, 427–440. London: Blackwell.
———. 2015. Roman visual material culture as globalising *koine*. In *Globalisation and the Roman world: World history, connectivity and material culture*, ed. M. Pitts and M.J. Versluys, 141–174. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2017. Exploring Aegyptiaca and their material agency throughout global history. In Hodos, ed., 74–89.
Vertovec, S. 1999. Conceiving and researching transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (2): 447–462.
Vivekanandan, B. 2016. *Global visions of Olof Palme, Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt: International peace and security, co-operation, and development*. Berlin: Springer.
Volkmer, Ingrid, ed. 2015. *The handbook of global media research*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wainwright, Hilary. 2018. *A new politics from the left*. Cambridge: Polity.
Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. 2008. *Rome's cultural revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel M. 1974. *The modern world-system*. New York: Academic Press.
———. 1984. The three instances of hegemony in the history of the capitalist world-economy. In *The politics of the world economy*, 37–46. Cambridge University Press.
———. 2001. *Unthinking social science: The limits of nineteenth-century paradigms*. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
———. 2004. *The uncertainties of knowledge*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
———. 2011 The world economy won't recover, now or ever, *Foreign Policy*, 184, January/ February
Wang Hui. 2003. The 1989 movement and the historical origins of neo-liberalism in China. *Asian Exchange: China Reflected*, 18, 2 and 19, 1: 211–223.
Waterman, Peter. 2001. *Globalization, social movements, and the new internationalism*. London: IB Tauris.
Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Webster, J. 2001. Creolizing the Roman provinces. *American Journal of Archaeology* 105: 209–225.
Weinberger, Sharon. 2017. *The imagineers of war: The untold history of DARPA*. New York: Penguin.
Weisberger, E., ed. 1986. *The spiritual in art: Abstract painting 1890–1985*. Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum of Art and Abbeville.
Wells, Peter S. 1999. *The barbarians speak: How the conquered peoples shaped Roman Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Welsch, W. 1997. *Undoing aesthetics*. London: Sage.
Wertheim, W.F. 1974. *Evolution and revolution: The rising waves of emancipation*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Wilde, Oscar. 1890. *The picture of Dorian Gray*. London: Lippincott's Monthly Magazine.
Wilkinson, David. 1987. Central civilization. *Comparative Civilizations Review* 17: 51–87.
———. 2006. Globalizations. In Gills and Thompson, eds., 68–78.
Williamson, S. 1989. *Resistance art in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip.
Wilson, Rob, and Wimal Dissanayake, eds. 1996. *Global/local: Cultural production and the transnational imaginary*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Witcher, R. 2000. Globalisation and Roman imperialism. In *The emergence of state identities in Italy in the first millennium BC*, ed. E. Herring and K. Lomas, 213–225. London: Accordia Research Institute.
———. 2015. Globalization and Roman cultural heritage. In Pitts and Versluys, eds., 198–222.

Wittkower, Rudolf 1989 *The impact of non-European civilizations on the art of the West*. Edited by D.M. Reynolds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wodak, R., M. KhosraviNik, and B. Mral, eds. 2013. *Right-wing populism in Europe*. London: IB Tauris.
Wolf, E.R. 1982. *Europe and the people without history*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wolfram, Stephen. 2002. *A new kind of science*. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media.
Wood, Lesley J. 2014. *Crisis and control: The militarization of protest policing*. Pluto Press.
Woolf, Greg. 1997. Beyond Romans and natives. *World Archaeology* 28: 339–350.
———. 1998. Becoming Roman: The origins of provincial civilization in Gaul: Romano-British ceramic evidence. *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 11: 93–117.
Woolridge, Adrian. 2016. The rise of the superstars. *The Economist Special Report*, September 17: 1–16.
Wright, Tom, and Bradley Hope. 2018. *Billion dollar whale*. New York: Hachette.
Wu, Tim. 2011. *The master switch: The rise and fall of information empires*. New York: Knopf.
Xin, Chen. 2003. New development of consumerism in Chinese society in the late 1990s. In *Asian exchange: China reflected*, ed. Lau Kin Chi and Huang Ping, 18, 2 and 19, 1: 162–175.
Yan, Yunxiang. 2008. Managing cultural conflicts: State power and alternative globalization in China. *Art Today* 15: 131–144.
Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui. 1994. *Gifts, favors, and banquets: The art of social relationships in China*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Yanguas, Pablo. 2017. Making states more effective and development inclusive. In *Addressing global inequalities*, 38–39. Manchester University, Global Development Institute.
Yu Huan 429. *The 'Peoples of the West' according to the Weilüe*. English translated by John E. Hill. Booksurge Publishing.
Young, Julian. 2014. *The philosophies of Richard Wagner*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Yo-Yo Ma and Theodore Levin. 2002. A conversation with Yo-Yo Ma. In Grotenhuis, ed., 25–38.
Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. *The post-American world*. New York: Norton.
Zarobell, John. 2017. *Art and the global economy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Zevin, Alexander. 2019. *Liberalism at large: The world according to the Economist*. London: Verso.
Ziporyn, Brook. 2000. *Evil and/or/as the Good: Omnicentrism, intersubjectivity, and value paradox in Tiantai Buddhist thought*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Zuboff, S. 2019. *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. New York: Public Affairs.Zuckerberg, Mark. 2017. Building global community. Facebook manifesto.

Index[1]

[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

J. Nederveen Pieterse, *Connectivity and Global Studies*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59598-2