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MEMORY AS A TOOL TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN THE POST 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

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Memory as a tool to national reconciliation in post 1994 genocide in Rwanda

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Memory as a tool to national reconciliation in post 1994 genocide in Rwanda

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University of California Los Angeles, 2015

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The 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed close to a million lives leaving behind thousands of orphans, widows and a traumatized population. Families that once lived, worked, and prayed together turned against each, using machetes, hoes, and sometimes guns. Places of worship easily turned into slaughter houses and up to date, some churches and different places of worship are genocide museums. Tutsi families were particularly targeted although Hutu-Tutsi sympathizers were also killed. Rwanda's challenge today is rebuilding the nation and reuniting people once again. The government of Rwanda has focused on allowing Rwandese to tell their stories of survival and of betrayal. Through testimony sharing, both perpetrators and victims have re-united and have become neighbors again. This thesis therefore will attempt to discuss the role of memory in uniting the once divided Rwandese.

The Thesis of Benjamin Mushuhukye is approved.

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INTRODUCTION

After the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi[1], the government of Rwanda as well as civil society has promulgated an official narrative of the events. The role of memory thus become a primary consideration in government, religious society, civil society and in the general social fabric of the Rwandan people. The Aegis Trust[2], in collaboration with the Government of Rwanda, the Kigali Genocide memorial Center (KGMC) was built with the cardinal goal of preserving stories of those who died as well as those who survived. Officially opened in 2004, the Kigali Genocide Memorial Center houses over 200,000 remains of those who were killed in April- July 1994 and well as thousands of testimonies of those who survived[3]. In all 30 districts of Rwanda, a memorial center has been built and every year during the first week of April, all districts hold a collective memorial in honor of those who were killed.

This Thesis assesses the role of memory in guiding the current narrative of Rwandan society, institutions, and reconciliation while addressing the friction caused in collective remembrance, identity and social fabric. Ultimately, this thesis will address potential processes of engaging with memory in the present about the past that could include wider truth-telling and grappling with the historical record in order to shift a population towards deeper understanding of their realities, and potentially reconciliation.

[1] The phrase, 'genocide against Tutsi is contentious. Reports suggest that a good number of Hutu were targeted and killed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, 'genocide against Tutsi' is the official government position.
[2] Aegis Trust is a UK based Non Governmental Organization with a mandate to prevent acts of genocide by documenting stories/testimonies of survivors.
[3] www.aegistrust.org

Chapter One: Historical Overview

Memory exists at the core of history, dictating how events are recorded, how stories are told, and what is remembered or silenced. An inherent difficulty exists in attempting to give a historic overview of the Rwandan genocide without only capturing what is remembered and recorded by historians and the media. It is difficult to know what is omitted and whether the omission is a purposeful burying of history or simply details that were lost along the way. However, an account of the important moments and factors that led to the genocide, what occurred during the genocide, and what have transpired since helps to set the stage for an analysis of the role of memory within the Rwandan society. This chapter outlines relevant pieces of Rwanda's history. The first section explores events that predate the 1994 genocide, including the effects of colonization, conflicts in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the civil war that began in 1990. The following section includes the events of the genocide. The final section gives an overview of the violence in the years following the genocide.

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is the best known violent episode in the history of Rwanda and the fastest and bloodiest in the 21st century. Yet, when historical events are looked at, one realized that the Rwandan genocide is only one period of concentrated violence within decades of tension and periods of violence[4] However, themes emerge in comparing different time periods, from 1959 through current day Rwanda, creating foci for the analysis of the role of memory. Throughout the historical overview, the role of ethnicity, power, violence, and the regional implications of the conflicts serve as threads tying together the events.

[4] Hinton and O'Neill, Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation. (Duke University, London, 209) Pg.81.

Colonization and its discontents

Scholars have tried so hard to trace the advent of ethnic division and animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi groups to its roots, revealing a number of hypotheses. Views on whether there is a real difference between Hutus and Tutsis vary from "no difference" to "distinct differences." Mahmood Mamdani notes four hypotheses of how the division between the groups initially formed. Firstly, he looks to the phenotype, or physical differences between groups. Secondly, he notes theorists that focus on genotype, including blood analysis, the existence of the sickle cell trait, and the ability to digest lactose. Thirdly, he considers cultural anthropology which focuses on the memory of peoples as the method for understanding the making of culture. Finally, he notes theorists that piece together past narratives through assessing archeological and linguistic evidence[5]. An analysis of language shifts the parameters beyond simply Rwanda, as the community of Kinyarwanda speakers is much larger than the state[6] Beyond the above mentioned possible "divisions," Mamdani notes that Hutus and Tutsis both recognize patrilineal kin groups, including lineage and clan systems, which play a role in the fabric of society[7]

In pre-colonial central Africa, Hutus and Tutsi shared a common history, language, and culture. The groups intermarried and intermingled[8] . The Kinyarwanda speaking people also live in eastern Congo, southern Uganda, and western Tanzania[9]. Migrations of these populations between what are now states occurred over centuries. Due to the mixing of the two groups, which may have not been viewed as separate at the time, ethnographers and historians have also

[5] Mamdani, Mahmood. When victims Become Killers. (Princeton University Press, Oxford, 2001), pg. 56
[6] Ibid, pg. 51
[7] Ibid, pg. 54
[8] Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our Families. (New York, 1998) pg.47
[9] Ibid, 8-9

concluded that the groups are not completely separate in their origin[10]. The overwhelming evidence shows that Hutus and Tutsis had created different types of communities, including economic, cultural, and political within the same geographical spaces. Additionally, the commonly held notions that Hutus served as the agriculturalists and Tutsis the pastoralists was not substantiated in hard evidence[11]. As a demonstration of the geographical and social inter-mixing of the groups, Mamdani notes that the tradition of cohabitation and marriage between the two groups spans decades[12]

Many historians point to Belgian colonialism as a marker in creating an official division between the tribes. The division became a "cornerstone of their colonial policy"[13]. Thus the advent of colonialism shifted the understanding of identity, causing it to take on a political, economic, and cultural form. From this point the meaning of being Hutu or Tutsi would shift in relation to power shifts[14.] In this context, power was held through community governance institutions designed by colonizing forces. In 1863 John Speke introduced what is now known as the Hamitic myth, which claimed that Tutsis belonged to a "higher order of humanity," given their assumed Ethiopian origin and physical appearance[15]. Mamdani notes that the content of the Hamitic myth dates back to Judaic and Christian myths[16] The infamous hypothesis was part of "race science" which developed throughout Europe in parallel with colonization in Africa and other parts of the world. The colonists constructed a Tutsi hegemony where they served as the "perfect intermediaries" shuffling between the colonists and the population[17] Additionally, the

[10] Gouvrevitch, 48
[11] Mamdani, 51

[12] Ibid, 53

[13] Gouvrevitch, 54
[14] Mamdani, 50
[15] Lemarchand, Rene. The Dynamics of Violence in Central African. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) pg. 54
[16] Mamdani, 80
[17] Lemarchand, 88

Belgians sought to re-make the social structure by re-drawing maps and altering the social fabric of the states[18]. Lemarchand in his book, points to the Hamitic myth as the single most devastating impact on Tutsi-Hutu relations[19]

Over the years, ideas ascribed to these myths re-emerged, usually as political tools, used by both sides as an attempt to understand the perceived differences between the two groups. During colonization, Rwandan society perpetuated discrimination, including schools and work forces that were comprised of Hutu laborers and Tutsi managers[20] Racism was both enforced by colonizing forces and then adopted as a way of life within society[21]. Additionally, Rwanda underwent "race education" where Tutsis were portrayed as a civilizing race, and were given a superior education. In the same vein, the "superiority" of Tutsis within society was enhanced by colonists who appointed Tutsis to High levels of leadership within the local population[22]. The most devastating impact of colonialism on the population was the process of official classification that took place between 1933 and 1934. During this time, every Rwandan was identified as either Hutu or Tutsi, making social levels less fluid and making one's identity fixed to the history of a certain ethnic background. Implicit in creating ethnic divisions was power which became an effective tool of the divide and rule technique that led to polarization of people based on these identities[23]. As is evident in the Hamitic myth, etc., Lemarchand refers to ethnicity as being "invented, imagined, and mythologized."[24] Thus, elements of the ethnic divisions created by the Belgians became re-imagined by the communities themselves[25]. Catalyzed by the colonial obsession with ethnic identification, Rwandan society became further

[18] Lemarchand, 59
[19] Ibid, 57
[20] Gouvevitch, 57
[21] Mamdani, 89
[22] Ibid, 91
[23] Ibid, 100
[24] Lemarchand, 7
[25] Ibid, 50

stratified. The Tutsi minority held power over the Hutu population, mainly made up of "peasants." As the next section will cover, the 1959 – 1962 Hutu rebellions sought to flip the power structure.

1950s – 1960s: Rebellion and Independence

The late 1950s and early 1960s mark a shift in the dynamic between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and the eastern part of the DRC. In the years leading up to Rwanda's independence in 1961, the Tutsi population came to be seen as "the other," viewed in opposition to the native Congolese or Rwandan populations. Leading up to the 1959 tumult, the Hutu elites seized an opportunity to exploit the Hamitic myth to their benefit by demonstrating the foreign nature of the Tutsis[26]. Additionally, the rapid increase in the Tutsi population in the eastern DRC, caused a shortage of land and added kindling to the mounting tensions between the populations[27]. In 1959, the tension turned into violence.

Between 1959 and 1962 the Hutu rebellion, also known as the Rwandan revolution, forced over 200,000 Tutsis into exile and many (up to 20,000, although numbers vary) were killed[28] The violence began after the beating of a Hutu politician by Tutsi forces. The attack spurred counterattacks by Hutus against Tutsis. The situation during the uprisings is described by Philip Gourevitch as "roving bands of Hutus attacked Tutsi authorities and burned Tutsi homes." He calls this rebellion as an attempt "to undo the wrongs of colonialism"[29] Also Mamdani notes that decolonization was the product of the empowerment of the social majority[30]. This majority, the Hutu population, began to assert its power though violence.

[26] Gouvrevitch, 57
[27] Lemarchand, 14
[28] There is a disagreement on the number of Tutsi who were killed during this period. Numbers vary between 750-20,000. The number of Tutsis who were forced into exile is also debatable.
[29] Gouvrevitch, 59
[30] Mamdani, 104

This was the first instance in which violence "demarcated Hutu from Tutsi"[31]. However, the period of violence "triggered broader constitutional and political developments" that gave power to Hutu elites[32]. Finally, the rebellions brought an end to Tutsi rule, including dissolving the monarchy (or mwami)[33]. Throughout this period, Tutsis fled to neighboring Countries, including Uganda and DRC, where they took shelter and built their lives in settlements. Later, these communities would serve as the breeding grounds for Tutsi rebel movements, as many of these communities felt ostracized from their homeland and resented the inability to return home. This time period also saw the end of "formal" colonization, as both Hutus and Tutsis push Rwanda towards independence. In 1962, Rwanda was officially separated from neighboring Burundi, making the country fully independent.

Civil War

In 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Tutsi soldiers who trained in Uganda, entered Rwanda and started a civil war that would last four years under the leadership of Major General Fred Gisa Rwigema[34]. At the time, the government was controlled by Juvénal Habyarimana, who took control of the country in 1973. Under his leadership, discrimination against the Tutsi population continued, yet the amount of violence had reduced. Much attention has been based on the role of Habyarimana's wife, Agathe Habyarimana, who had strong familial ties to Hutu power and was said to "run the throne" during President Habyarimana's term in office[35]. She had a more radical stance than her husband. Leading up to the 1990 RPF invasion, the idea that Tutsi could gain power through political invasion was faded[36].

[31] Ibid, 105
[32] Ibis, 104
[33] Lemarchand, 31. Note: The monarchy was dissolved in 1962 through the Belgium referendum
[34] Fred Gisa Rwigema was killed on October 2, 1990 a day after the civil war had started. He was replaced by Major General Paul Kagame who was undergoing a military course in USA.
[35] Gouvrevitch, 78
[36] Mamdani, 189

Additionally, in 1990, the Hutu "10 commandments" – which later become infamous for their call to Tutsi exclusion and violence – were published[37]

The conflict lasted from October 1990 until August 1993, when the Arusha Accords were signed in Tanzania. The peace agreement created a power-sharing government between the RPF and the Habyarimana regime. During the war, the RPF fought a guerilla style war, led by Paul Kagame. The RPF was financially backed by the Tutsi diasporas, many of whom had been exiled for over thirty years. The RPF sought to facilitate the return of refugees (from the exoduses of the 1950/60s) to Rwanda by displacing enough of the Hutu population that the regime would be pressured into concessions[38] Additionally, the RPF sought to free the country from President Habyarimana's dictatorship, calling for an end to the exclusion and tyranny[39]. However, Habyarimana's regime was influenced by Hutu Power, a political group with extremist tendencies[40] To instill fear in the Tutsi population, the Hutu Power massacred ordinary Tutsi citizens to put pressure on the RPF to stop advances. Although, external to the fighting, an economic slump causing food shortages increased tensions in the early 1990s[41]. In the three years of the war, neither side decisively won, yet the RPF successfully weakened the regime, forcing Habyarimana into negotiations.

The civil war and peace negotiations shifted the power dynamics within the country. Mirroring the shifting power dynamic was a shift in the RPF as a fighting force. Over the course of the war, the group shifted from a rebel group or liberation army to an occupying force with real political influence. On the one hand, the Habyarimana regime, which had focused on reconciliation before the war, began to lean towards the Hutu Power movement[42].

[u] Gouvrevitch, 82
[38] Mamdani, 192
[39] Hilton & O' Neill, 81
[40] Mamdani, 193
[41] Lemarchand, 116
[42] Mamdani, 185

The Arusha Accords planned an end to the fighting, authorized a neutral military observer force under the Organization for African Unity, a cease-fire, and a schedule for political talks[43]. However, during the negotiations, fighting continued. In 1992, Hutu Power, organized into youth groups, massacred Tutsi civilians in northern and western Rwanda. During the same time frame, the RPF undertook offensive military moves. Both political parties had more moderate representatives at the Arusha negotiations and, thus, the full nature of radicalized politics may not have been discussed at the negotiating table. Following the signing of the agreement, the presidential plane was shot down over Kigali[44]. Although it is unknown who ultimately shot down the plane, the moment in which the President was killed triggered the beginning of the genocide[45]

1994: The Genocide

Much has been written about the Rwandan genocide in an attempt to understand how widespread violence could take place. This section seeks to outline the main events, but does not delve into the extensive detail of the numerous difficult and often unanswered questions about how and why the genocide occurred. The genocide began on April 7th, 1994 when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down over Kigali[46]. Although the genocide had been planned in advance, the crash set off mass killings through the capital city and country. Over the course of the next hundred days, approximately one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed[47]. The majority of the victims were killed with machetes or beaten to death; only a few were killed with bullets. Not until 2000 would the United Nations reflect on the Rwandan genocide, officially declaring it "a failure" in terms of the international community's reaction[48].

[43] Hinton & O' Neill, 81
[44] "The Arusha Accords," http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf
[45] Lemarchand, 122. Note: it is still unknown who actually shot the president's plane.
[46] Ibid, 123
[47] Human Rights Watch believes that 500, 000 people died. Actual numbers of the death is debatable
[48] BBC News, April 2000 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa.

It is alleged that a powerful section of Hutus who occupied key roles in government (Akazu), planned and coordinated the genocide. The planning and execution was coordinated with local level officials and media, especially radio stations which propagated hate speech against the Tutsis. In preparation, Hutu Power supporters were organized into the Interahamwe, or local level militias that carried out the majority of the killings. Hutu Power set out to murder all Rwandan Tutsis, regardless of age or gender. Moderate Hutus were also targeted by these groups. Hutus within the population were placed in an impossible position of participating in the killings or losing their own life. Once the killings began, they spread quickly throughout the country. Lemarchand notes that "the slaughter rapidly gained a momentum of its own, drawing participants from a wide cross section of the population that included government officials, town mayors and councilors, members of the clergy, teachers, and nurses."[49] In many locations, such as Gisenyi (a town on the border with the DRC), mayors organized killings and distributed arms to militias. In these locations, the Interahamwe searched for Tutsi victims, many of whom were killed while hiding in churches, schools, and other community buildings.

Throughout the genocide, women were particularly targeted and rape became a common weapon of war intended to further exhaust and destroy the Tutsi population. In a 1996 report, Human Rights Watch notes;

> Rape in conflict is also used as a weapon to terrorize and degrade a particular community and to achieve a specific political end. In these situations, gender intersects with other aspects of a woman's identity such as ethnicity, religion, social class or political affiliation. The humiliation, pain and terror inflicted by the rapist is meant to degrade not just the individual woman but also to strip the humanity from the larger group of which she is a part[50].

During this period, hundreds of thousands of women and girls were raped[51]. In the aftermath of

[49] Lemarchand, 88

[50] "Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Genocide and its Aftermath," Report by Human Rights Watch (1996). Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/rwanda

[51] De Brouwer, Anne-Marie (2005), *Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence*, Intersentia, pg.11

the genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) prosecuted the widespread rape as an element of the crime of genocide. In this unprecedented decision in international law, the Trial Chamber held that ". . . .the rapes were systematic and perpetrated against Tutsi women only. . .sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group."[52]

Leading up to the genocide, Lieutenant General Dallaire of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the UN mission stationed in Rwanda after the Arusha Accords, sent information to UN headquarters alerting the Security Council of arms caches, the UN mission was continually downsized. The UNSC did not act on information Dallaire obtained from an informant to seize weapons, because the action was perceived to be outside of UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate.[53] Thus, General Dallaire was left on the ground without the appropriate troops or mandate to act. As the killers gained more ground, they did everything possible to scare and intimidate the western powers so as not to send any intervention force to stop their acts. Consequently, ten Belgian soldiers were killed, causing the Belgian contingent to withdraw, significantly decreasing the size of the overall force. In response, UNAMIR was officially withdrawn on April 14th, 1994[54]. The situation quickly became too risky for the scaled down UN mission to act, even when the UNSC voted to restore UNAMIR's strength to 500 troops on May 13th, 1994[55].

In June, the United Nations Security Council authorized French troops to bring a more aggressive force, *Operation Turquoise*, into the country. However, at this point, the massacres of the Tutsis had begun to slow, as the majority had already been killed[56]. In mid-July, the RPF captured Kigali, officially "winning" the war. Pasteur Bizimungu was sworn in as the first

[52] Fourth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the General Assembly (Sept. 1999).
[53] United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 (October 1993.
[54] Gouvrevitch, 154
[55] Ibid, 155
[56] Ibid, 157

president of the new regime. For fear Tutsi retaliation killings by the RPF, thus a safe zone for Hutus was established known as the *zone turquoise.* Critics claim that the zone in southern Rwanda served as a cover for Hutu refugees who were fleeing the RPF. The French openly regarded the RPF as their enemy, and the ongoing slaughter of Tutsis took place within the safe zone[57]. As the RPF began to gain the military upper-hand and the French softened their response and eventually withdrew. The French force represents the only intervention by an international force during the genocide.

Scholars look to a variety of reasons to explain how and why the level of violence occurred and to understand the moments that catalyzed it. Mamdani considers a mix of particular elements of culture and economics as leading to the genocide. In the early 1990s, Rwanda suffered a land crisis, mixed with a growing population and diminishing food production[58]. He additionally looks to Rwandan culture, where racism is deeply ingrained and people tend to conform to power[59]. Gerard Prunier speaks of Rwandan political tradition as "one of systematic, centralized and unconditional obedience to authority"[60] Similarly to Mamdani, Lemarchand points to a wide array of possible underlying causes of the genocide that range from the invasion of the RPF, to the shooting down of the presidential plane, to structural violence within Rwanda[61]. Most likely, the genocide occurred because of a number of factors that influenced different segments of the population. However, what is clear is that the genocide was not a sudden eruption of long- simmering hatreds; rather, it was planned and part of a cycle of violence that the country had been spiraling in for decades.

Post-Genocide years

The post-genocide years mark a major transition in governance, economic development,

[57] Ibid, 158
[58] Mamdani, 197
[59] Ibid, 199
[60] Prunier, 76
[61] Lemarchand, 93

and attempts at moving beyond the genocide, including legal action and movements towards reconciliation and coexistence. In the nearly two decades since the genocide, Rwanda has been the site of major transitions. The post-genocide period is characterized by the control the RPF exerts over the country through governance structures, beginning with changes that were made to the constitution when the RPF first took power[62]. Under the new constitution, the presidency gained strength and the composition of parliament was altered, allowing the RPF to gain more power[63].

Four month after the genocide began, Kigali fell to the RPF. During this same time period the French established safe zones in Southern Rwanda. As was previously mentioned, thousands of people were killed within the safe zone[64]. As the RPF gained power, the Hutu Power feared reprisals from and fled into the *zone turquoise* or towards the DRC border into Goma.[72] The Hutu Power and over one-third of the Hutus in the country fled the across the border, taking any portable property with them. In the process of fleeing they destroyed government offices, factories, and schools.

In the wake of the mass movement of the population, a humanitarian disaster ensued. The international community jumped at the opportunity to assist the refugees, setting up camps for internally displaced people (IDP) within the safe zone in southern Rwanda and refugee camps in Goma (and other locations in Tanzania, DRC, and Uganda) for the population fleeing across the border. Within these camps, the Interahamwe re-establish a presence[65]. Hutu Power remained Mobilized and militarized[66]. The newly installed government in Kigali attempted to close the camps, and return the population to their homes. One of the most noted examples occurred in southern Rwanda in the Kibeho camp. The camp existed within the *zone turquoise* and was home

[62] Reytjens, Fillip. Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship. (African Affairs (2004), 177-210
[63] Reytjens, 179
[64] Reytjens, 181
[65] Gourevitch, 166
[66] Ibid, 188

to a large contingent of genocidaires[67]. In December of 1994, the RPF ran a joint operation with UNAMIR with the intention of sweeping the genocidaires out of the camp. In a rather chaotic process, the RPF attempted to close the camp, during which fighting broke out that left between 2,000 and 4,000 people dead[68]

After the genocide, the new government was left with a devastated country, humanitarian crisis, and a call for justice. In assessing the current human rights situation, critics often cite the prison situation. By April of 1995, over 33,000 "men, women, and children had been arrested for alleged participation in the genocide." The number reached 125,000 by the end of 1997. Lemarchand notes that little is said about this population, many of whom are still imprisoned. Prosecutions have been slow. The legal system is stratified between the international mechanism, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, domestic prosecutions, and a local level justice system known as Gacaca. The Gacaca courts, which began in 2001, consisted of the revival of a traditional legal mechanism that attempted to alleviate some of the strain on the court system[69].These community courts sought to promote healing and reconciliation through the creation of a platform for community dialogue. However, the legal mechanisms fail to include all of the crimes that took place during the time period for lack of clear evidence against the perpetrators. Some genocidaires have been set free for lack of substantive evidence.

In 1999, the Rwandan government created the National Unity of Reconciliation Commission (NURC) through Article 178 of the Rwandan Constitution, which the goal of "ending discrimination and to erase the negative consequences of the genocide on the Rwandan people"[70] The genocide left an impact on Rwandan society that is pervasive in everyday life, even as the population continues to live side by side. Recently the government through a

[67] Gourevitch, 190
[68] Ibid, 193 (a commission was set up to investigate what happened at the camp).
[69] Lemarchand, 79
[70] Zorbas, Eugenia. Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda. (African Journal of Legal Studies 29, 2004-2005).pg.36

program entitled, “ndumunyarwanda-I am a Rwandese” has embarked on a national dialogue where all citizens are challenged to face the historical realities of Rwanda as the beginning point in asserting their identities as Rwandese. Consequently, after embracing their history, they shall live harmoniously with each other. Ultimately, this has created/is creating a positive environment for memory in order to allow healing and eventually reconciliation to be.

Chapter Two: A Review of the Literature on Memory

This literature review addresses the role of memory in the re-creation of the state and re-structuring of society after conflict, taking into account the impacts of memory on identity, politics, and governance within a broader theoretical basis as well as in specific relation to Rwanda. The inquiry will more specifically look at the memory through Richard Werber's Memory and the Postcolony, Pierre Nora's *Les Lieux de Memory*, and Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer's Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present. These texts serve as a framework for the role of memory, which will then be applied to the case of Rwanda through the consideration of *The Politics of Memory* by René Lemarchand, which appears in The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa and *Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda* by Susanne Buckly- Zistel. The latter two articles illustrate how memory is manifested in Rwandan society. Through the lens of the literature, memory will be addressed through its current crisis, its private and public nature, and its individual and collective correlation to identity.

On Memory

Three foundational works on the role of memory frame the discourse on the importance of memory in present-day Rwanda. The texts include: Memory and the Post-colony: African anthropology and the critique of power by Richard Werbner; *Les Lieux de Memoire* by Pierre Nora; and Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present by Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer. The critical theories of each are further outlined and analyzed through the three threads present in Werbner's piece. He describes memory as in "crisis" based on society's ability to contest and fully engage with its memory and complex narrative. He also highlights the tensions in the public and private nature of memory, taking into consideration the role of

forgetting and counter-memory. Finally, he highlights the relationship between collective memory, the social fabric of a community, and the formation of identity.

Memory and the Post-colony by Richard Werbner

Richard Werbner compiles studies that frame the role of memory, crisscrossing the African continent in the wake of colonialism. His approach centers on the way in which memory manifests itself in current-day society, "…we put our emphasis on the discovery of ongoing processes of memory work – these are the processes by which memory lives, gets realized or ruptured, is textualized, becomes buried, repressed or avoided, has its effects, and is itself more or less transformed"[71] Werbner views memory as "in crisis within the public space," and thus he looks to the public and private nature of memory as well as the community and social fabric in which it exists.

Werbner places importance on the individual and collective understanding of memory. He views the individual as a "being," connected to a sense of memory, taking into consideration how memory affects the individual's body and concepts of home. He draws a link between individuals and their relations with others – thus the formation of a community and the web that creates social fabric[72] Furthering both the individual and community sense of "memory" as actionable, he notes the right of "recountability," or understanding of the past, including the knowledge of what took place during specific events. Recountability is discussed in cases of government oppression or violence where individuals' narratives are suppressed – noting that the individual's memories should be acknowledge in the public space[73] This notion parallels the "right to know," which has since become a norm in international law. Drawing on collective

[71] Werbner, Richard. Memory and the Postcolonial: African Anthology and the critique of power (Zed Books, New York, 1998), 2

[72] Ibid, 3
[73] Ibid, 11

memory, the demand for memory is linked to a quest for identity: "memory work seeks to keep traces of the past and present alive for the future"[74]

Acts of Memory by Bal, Crewe, and Spitzer

Mirroring the compilation style of *Memory and the Postcolony*, Bal et. al. create an anthology of case studies centered on what they refer to as cultural memory. Each of the chapters is written by a specialist within the field of memory studies, and it spans post-holocaust Germany to the contemporary United States. The book is divided between types of memories: helpful memories, disperse memories, and memories for the present. The categories serve as a framework for the various roles memory plays in the life of the individual and the collective. The authors define cultural memory as memory which is understood as a cultural phenomenon. Memorization also occurs in the present by considering memory's role in shaping the future. Memory is active, i.e. it is not "a psychic or historical accident, it is something you perform."[75] Bal et al. highlights the role of memories in creating narratives. "Narrative memories, even of unimportant events, differ from routine or habitual memories in that they are affectively colored, surrounded by an emotional aura that, precisely, makes them memorable."[76] Narratives are how collective memories are understood in the public space.

Through case studies that consider their designated types of memories, Bal et al. illustrate their three-part theory. Firstly, they focus on the incorporation of the past into the present – memory becomes the vehicle making this possible. Secondly, they describe an important element between the specific memory and the individual. Thirdly, they discuss witnessing and facilitating memory as active choices, thus "…the acts of memory become an exchange between the first

[74] Bal, Mieke, Crewe, Jonathan, and Spitzer, Leo: Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present. (University Press of New England, London, 1999), vii

[75] Baal, viii
[76] Baal, ix

and second person that sets in motion the emergence of a narrative."[77] The relationship between individual's memories and their social context is visible through the creation of a narrative, placing important emphasis on understanding each of the pieces; the individual memory, the collective memory, the social or communal context, and the process by which narratives emerge.

Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire by Pierre Nora

In the context of French history and memorialization, Pierre Nora writing focus on memory in present-day France. While he focuses on sites of memory, the theories behind these sites speak to the larger societal forces influencing memory. He claims that in present-day society, people attempt to memorialize the past, because "there is so little of it [memory] left."[78] He states that there are no longer "real environments for memory," which refers to open spaces for discourse about the past.[79] Nora's methodology assesses where "memory crystallizes and secrets itself," he claims that this creates a point where there is a break with the past, which he describes as "the sense that memory has been torn."[80] This place becomes the moment in which the public conversation stops or is fractured in some way. Nora delineates between the individual's memory and the social or "dictatorial" in some cases in his discussion of the divergences between history and memory. "…Memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual."[81] In his view, history is a fixed narrative, and memory "is life…remaining in evolution." He places more importance on memory as a tool for understanding the past, creating a framework for the future.

Nora focuses on the importance of memory as he discusses the "end of the tradition of memory" and the "push and pull" between actors in society that creates space for memory[82] This public discourse also lays the foundation for identity. He focuses on marginalized

[77] Baal, et., x
[78] Nora, Pierre. Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire. (University of California Press, Representation, No, 26. Special Issue: Memory and Counter Memory, Spring 1989), 7
[79] Ibid, 8
[80] Ibid, 8-9
[81] Ibid, 9
[82] Nora, 12

populations, "those who have long been marginalized in traditional history are not the only ones haunted by the need to rediscover their buried pasts."[83] Through memory, groups search for their origins and identity. Nora makes two vital points that further the discussion on memory. She argues that, there must be a will to remember on the part of individuals as well as society[84]. Also she says that certain moments can re-establish a new historical memory, thus affecting present memory, social relations, and group identity.

Memory: In Crisis

Werbner situates memory as a public practice that is "in crisis" in postcolonial Africa[85] The notion of a memory crisis is rooted in the lack of public space for memory practice, the lack of freedom for individuals to engage with memory practice, and the possibility of buried memory. While Werbner looks specifically at postcolonial Africa, Nora looks at the state of memory in France in the mid-1980s, and Bal et al. take a more global approach – pulling in case studies from a variety of regions. Each work reflects a specific context and, thus, the assessment of the role and nature of the memory crisis varies; however, this analysis seeks to understand what elements, regardless of time and context, make up the memory crisis, in order to theorize the elements of a healthy memory environment.

In Werbner's assessment, the memory crisis refers to the depletion of public space that is accessible for memory, including public occasions, elements of every-day life, as well as the ability of the population to freely engage with memory. The crisis becomes visible in moments when the "means and modes of remembrance are disrupted"[86] This could occur through the lack of safety in public remembrance, pressure to not remember publicly or keep certain memories quiet, or a process of forgetting or repression occurring within a society. The lack of public space for memory may signal a decrease in freedom for society to engage with "unsettled memory,"

[83] Ibid, 15
[84] Ibid, 21
[85] Werbner, 1
[86] Werbner, 1

thus limiting open discourse[87] Embedded within the memory crisis, is the lack of "contested memory"; the tension between what is remembered or forgotten. Contestation is part of a healthy memory environment as it signals ongoing discourse, ostensibly with public structures and institutions to guide it. Drawing on possible results of contested memory, Werbner separates the efforts of "state memorialism" and the notion of counter-memory[88], forces which occur from different realms of society that may clash or potentially complement each other.

As a point of intersection between memory and history, Nora looks at memorials as a public display of both notions. Yet, he criticizes these spaces as creating a specific and static history that is not necessarily able to contain memory in its evolving forms. Nora differentiates between history and memory in that history is more fixed, whereas memory is "life. . . remaining in evolution."[89] He considers memorials as closed off from the ongoing process of memory, which shifts and grows. Nora pinpoints the "memory crisis" within the "realization of the difference between real memory…and history."[90] Thus, there is a break between what is remembered in the public space through memorials and the memory of the past that individual and society hold. Werbner refers to this as a crisis, where the public space for discussion, debate, and practice is not available to consider the divergence between history and memory. Thus, memory is stunted or constrained, unable to affect how history is remembered or portrayed. For Nora, the crisis is encapsulated in the end of the tradition of memory, which he states, is born out On the other hand, the anthology put forth by Bal et al. does not speak directly to the notion of a crisis within memory. However, implicit in the authors' understanding of memory is its importance and role in creating a narrative. The claim that the disintegration of the narrative could occur when the memories do not provide continuity (for the individual or society), thus becoming a "memory crisis." Bal et al. on the other hand asserts that the "narrative frameworks

[87] Ibid, 3
[88] In the context of memory, counter- memory may re-enforce elements of the dominant narrative or it may challenge it outright
[89] Nora, 9
[90] Bal et al, 35

allow for an experience of (life) histories as continuous unities."[91] This quotation draws on an assessment of continuous narratives for survivors of concentration camps during the Holocaust, who compare the broken narrative to a kind of death. Narratives allow people to make sense out of experiences, thus, potentially, allowing for the individual and society to move forward. While their writing touches on the memory experience of the individual, elements of these shared narratives bring people together, as a community. Thus, the breakdown of the memory or the narrative within a given society could constitute a crisis.

Nora, Werbner, and Bal et al. focus on the importance of memory – thus making a "memory crisis" relevant. A consideration of how power affects the analysis sheds light on the actors, their motivations, and how/why memory is used at different moments in history. Some argue that memory affects the present, which Bal et al. refers to as the "polemic use of the past to reshape the future."[92] Thus, those [political elites, etc.] who control power in the present gain the ability to shape how the past is remembered, potentially a position that can shift social relations and identities. Werbner looks to the depletion of public space, which through the lens of power relations begs questions such as why and how the disruption of public space occurs. Bal et al. touch on the potential disruption caused by elements in the continuity of memory/narrative, the power imbalances of elites, political actors, communal level – stratification based on socio-economic differences – all of which are rooted in power. Thus, it constitutes a lens to view memory, even in understanding the nature of the "memory crisis," which considers which forces hold power over memory.

The reason a "memory crisis" exists depends on the context and the "moment" within the context in which memory is considered. The crisis could signal state oppression, the lack of public space, desired political gains, marginalized populations, cleavages between local and national stories, or the desire of any segment of the population to stop remembering in a certain

[91] Bal et al, 36
[92] Ibid, 36

way. The power imbalance affects what is remembered or silenced, which in turn affects the freedom individuals and certain populations, especially those marginalized by the process to openly engage with memory. Additionally, as Werbner alludes to and will be further considered, the nature of the public space must be considered. Within the notion of "contested memory," the public space must allow a way for average citizens to engage with the public discourse. Thus, efforts may include a decentralization of power over memory, allowing citizens control over their individual memory and narrative in a way that allows for an open consideration of the past and present.

Memory: public and private

The notions of public and private as well as individual and collective overlap as memory exists in each of these competing realities.

In the private space, each individual holds memories about the past, however, influenced by trauma, repression, etc[93]. These memories encompass the individual's life, social connections, and the life of the community and society, are held, discussed, cherished, or simply put - exist, within this space. The private space consists of individuals and their close relations/community. Individuals experience memory differently within the private space; however, this analysis focuses on the importance of the ability for individuals to experience memory.

Werbner sees public space as a critical element of memory. He sees a link between the "interpersonal power" of remembering and forgetting as a public practice and identity formation, which becomes a part of a state through institutions and civil society. "My present discussion regards memory as public practice which – being at once moral, political and, often also, painfully subjective – is a product of open and unfinished realities."[94] His framework further defines counter-memory movements as playing a vital role in demanding recognition to "make a

[93] Werbner, 15
[94] Werbner, 99

citizen's memory known and acknowledged in the public sphere."[95] Thus, citizens attempt to carve out public space for memory. He looks to public commissions that are "demanding recognition as a right of recountability . . . to make a citizen's memory known and acknowledged in the public sphere- no longer to remain a private matter." The opposite of public memory, is private, or buried memories, which "produce what elsewhere I call unfinished narratives: popular history in which the past is perceived to be unfinished, festering in the present – these are narratives which motivate people to call again and again for a public resolution to their predicament."

Memorials are an inherently public display of memory, yet they have public and private dimensions of the meaning and effect of memory. In Nora's theory, memorials exist at the place where memory (in a public sense) has become history, i.e. a moment that is "frozen" in time. Thus, elements of memory may be "frozen" in the public sphere. Nora's work focuses on memorials as an expression of public memory that, similarly to Werbner, draws a connection between memory and the formation of identity. The formation of identity based on memory (and memorial) takes place in the public sphere, "the passage of memory to history has required every social group to redefine its identity through the revitalization of its own history."[96] He continues by stating that in the absence of collective memory (or memorials that harness the public understanding of memory), individuals will be tasked more with the process of remembrance[97]

Bal et al. view "cultural memory" as individual and social, and, thus, by extension private and public[98] In the first paragraph of their text, they introduce the duality in memory: the public and the private. Through incorporating the past into the present, Bal et al. include "witnessing" in their theory[99]. Thus, their theory moves the memory beyond the individual.

[95] Ibid, 102

[96] Nora, 15

[97] Nora, 16

[98] Bal el al., vii

[99] Ibid, xi

This act diminishes the privacy of the memory. While a witness could be a single person, this idea could be incorporated into the public process of memory, i.e. considering and combining individual's memories to build a national narrative.

Public and private spaces hold their own power in terms of what is remembered and forgotten. As with the notion of the "memory crisis," an analysis of public and private spaces inherently includes a power analysis of the means by which these spaces are controlled. What allows individuals to engage with memory in public spaces? Often times the safety, security, and trusted tie between the individuals, community leaders, and state actors who support public remembrance, discourse, and even contestation is part of creating a viable space. While Werbner touches on identity formation through memory, Nora and Bal et al.'s theories are lacking in so far as they fail to explain the individual's understanding of self and a community's understanding of its own identity are related to the public display of memory. What happens to the individual when the private display and public display radically differ? A form of cleavage between the individual, community, and state narrative may occur. Additionally, more emphasis on how memory becomes public could shed light on the process by which elements of the past are remembered or forgotten, who controls the process, and how the public version of memory is maintained or shifts.

Theme 3: Memory and social fabric; individual and collective memory

As theories discussed through the lenses of public and private memory in the previous section demonstrated, the authors additionally view memory as having individual and collective iterations. While the compilation of individual memories is the force behind the collective memory, this analysis focuses on the role and significance of the collective memory through social relations, referred to as the social fabric that makes up families, communities, and societies. Collective memory looks to shared memory, or cultural memory as Bal et al. remark, which is a bond that unites or divides people, causing the creation or disintegration of social

fabric. Both Werbner and Nora link the formation of collective memory to the creation of group identity. Imbedded in Werbner's approach to the study of memory in post-colonial states is the notion that it "touches" individuals as well as the collective or social fabric.

> "…instead our approach to memory takes it as problematic that intractable traces of the past are felt on people's bodies, known in their landscapes, landmarks and souvenirs, and perceived as the tough moral fabric of their social relations….sometimes the stifling, utterly unwelcome fabric."[100]

De Boeck, in his work entitled *Beyond the Grave: History, Memory, and Death in Postcolonial Congo/Zaire*, views memory as a thread that is part of "people's ability to continue to construct. . . meaningful reality out of the social, political, and economic paradoxes."[101] He ties the reality that stems from these memories to the creation of social relations. These can break down through conflict and the loss of a communal memory, which he refers to as "a sense of personal and communal crisis."[102] Yet, in the conclusion of his analysis, he returns to the notion that the memories of the collective cannot exist without the memories of the individual. De Boeck further highlights the "intrinsic link between memory and identity" which requires an element of social cohesiveness.[103] He further asserts that, "the dismembering of collective remembering, the fragmentation of a collective consensus concerning the representations of historical "truth," is itself a symptom of the breaking up of the social interweave as a harmonious memory environment."[104] As the collective memory splinters, social unity may shift. As the collective memory is intertwined with group/social identity, this could potentially be altered by changes in the collective memory. However the link can be drawn from the individual to the collective, or vice versa. The understanding of collective memory, the "reshaping of identity" requires an "analysis of individual memories."[105] Thus, the individual memories lead to the collective memory and understanding of identity— links which can also be made in the opposite direction.

[100] Werbner, 3
[101] Ibid, 39
[102] Ibid, 40
[103] Ibid, 30
[104] Ibid, 33
[105] Ibid, 41

In *Acts of Memory*, Bal et al also shed light on the importance of individual and collective *Personal and Public Fantasy*, she describes memory "as not something we have, but something we produce as individuals sharing a culture." She goes on to say that "memory is…the mutually constitutive interaction between the past and present, shared as culture but acted out by each of us as an individual."[106] The word "culture" replaces "society" or "community" in Werbner's text. Additionally, in a chapter by Jonathan Crewe, memory is viewed as a "collective, social phenomenon" rather than an individual one."[107] He draws the link between the individual and the collective, stating that the memory of the individual is a product of social memory. In a further chapter by Carol Bardenstein on memory within the Israeli and Palestinian contexts, she looks to Nora's work and the importance of highlighting the place of rupture in memory. Collective memory is understood as both a response to and a symptom of rupture, a lack, an absence, and "a substitute, surrogate or consolation for something that is missing."[108] Thus, collective memory takes on a different form than Werbner and Nora's descriptions, as it allows the collective to overcome what is missing in their day-to-day life, as opposed to signaling the break down in social fabric. Additionally, the chapter introduces the idea of the present community, which is described as "the construction of collective memory [that] is inextricably linked with the construction of collective identity and imagined community in the present"[109] A link is drawn between collective memory and identity formation.

In describing the nature of memory, Nora writes that it is "by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual."[110] Like the previous anthologies, Nora places importance on the existence of the individual and the collective memory. Additionally, in the same vein as the previous authors, he ties memory to identity, "…the passage of memory to history has required every social group to redefine its identity through the revitalization of its

[106] Bal et al, 37
[107] Ibid, 75
[108] Ibid, 148
[109] Bal et al, 149
[110] Nora, 9

own history."[111] He goes on to state that all groups search for their origins and identity, thus the collective memory is important in allowing the process of identity formation. However, he notes that memories are also held within the individuals, especially in situations in which the collective memory is not freely experienced.[112] This may occur in societies in which narratives of segments of the population are repressed and are only shared in private or safe communal spaces, but where the narrative is not acknowledged on the state level.

The transition from individual to collective memory requires a movement or mechanism for the individual memories to become part of the collective. Implicit in how this occurs, I suggest, is a driver, an occurrence that binds people together, a process that decides which voices are heard, which memories become emblematic of the collective, what elements of the memory are interpreted, what cultural or spiritual lenses guide the process, and ultimately which voices are lost. Power balances exist throughout the process of forming a collective identity. The reverse of the described situation is that the collective memory could be imposed from an outside force; however, can control over the individual's memory occur? The lack of the collective, or freedom to engage with the collective, means that the memories remain with the individuals. As Nora says, "it is important for the individual to remain as memory-individuals." The authors fail to engage with the critical analysis of power, which guides the process of collective memory formation (leading to identity formation). This sheds light on who is empowered or disempowered in the process. The elements of memory discussed throughout this section frame the following discussion on the role of memory in Rwanda.

The Role of Memory in Rwanda

The Politics of Memory, in The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa by René Lemarchand and *Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence*

[111] Nora, 15
[112] Ibid, 16

in Post-Genocide Rwanda by Susanne Buckly-Zistel give adequate information in understanding the role of memory in Rwanda. These sources assess elements of memory, including the notion of the memory crisis, public versus private tensions, and the importance of individual versus collective memory in relationship to identity formation.

***The Politics of Memory* in** The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa **by René Lemarchand**

Through Lemarchand's study of the Great Lakes region, he assesses various domestic and international influences that led to the Rwandan genocide. He looks at the "politics of memory" in an assessment of current-day Rwanda and the role of memory in constructing it. He begins by contextualizing his assessment of memory within the government-imposed public ban on ethnicities, which legislated against maintaining separate Hutu and Tutsi identities[113] He later offers an understanding of memory as "official or ethnic, collective, or individual – [it] is a preeminently subjective phenomenon."[114] The phenomenon includes blind spots, blurry lines between fact and fiction, ethnic amnesia, and denials of historical evidence. Lemarchand states that legislating against ethnicity will not make it disappear, based on the role of "ethnic and individual memories [that] alter perceptions of the past, and by implication, the writing of history."[115] Hutus and Tutsi remember and forget the past, including divergences of memory within each separate ethnicity.

Lemarchand divides memory into three categories; thwarted memory, manipulated memory, and enforced memory. Firstly, thwarted memory draws a connection between memory and recognition, thus addressing elements of Rwanda's past that are missing from the official memory. He refers to the ban on the memory of atrocities committed against and suffering endured by Hutus. He links recognition to reconciliation, and refers to it as "highly problematic,"

[113] Lemarchand, 99
[114] Ibid, 100
[115] Ibid, 101-102

due to the fact that a sense of healing comes with reckoning with the past[116] Secondly, in the manipulation of memory, which he refers to occurring at the hands of the ruling elite, does not allow for discussions of culpability of this elite – thus the national-level memory does not address the beginning of the civil war in 1990 or the crimes committed by the RPF post-genocide in Rwanda and DRC.[117] Thirdly, the notion of enforced memory furthers the idea of manipulated memory, creating a history or national narrative, enforced in this case by the state. Within this national narrative, Hutus cannot achieve victim status, only that of culpability. Amnesia surrounds elements of the past, begging the question of why and/or how a collective memory can be used to form a group's identity[118] What is remembered and forgotten plays a vital role in the efforts of Rwandans, today, in their own identity and their ability to live side by side; however, the "amnesia" allows details of the past that still affect individuals and communities to slip between the cracks. This may serve as an obstacle to reconciliation.

***Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda* by Susanne Buckly-Zistel**

Susanne Buckly-Zistel looks at the role of memory in the ability of Hutus and Tutsis to live side by side in post-genocide Rwanda through local level research. Through interviews, she attempts to understand what is forgotten and remembered. Her research demonstrates the subjective reconstruction or manipulation of ethnic realities coupled with diverse memory experiences of Hutus and Tutsis (as well as diverging experiences within these categories). Like Nora and Werbner, she draws a link between the formation of collective identity and memory discourses.[119] "…the social, economic and political cleavages still prevail, and are frequently

[116] Lemarchand, 106
[117] Ibid, 103-104
[118] Ibid, 107
[119] Buckly- Zistel. *Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide* Rwanda. (Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol.76, No.2 2006), 132

invoked in order to determine one's group identity as Hutu or Tutsi."[120] Within memory, she refers to "chosen amnesia," reflecting elements of the past that are no longer a part of present-day discourse.[121] Interviewees revealed that they hide their true feelings, and they "cautioned her not to trust the peaceful coexistence."[122] Thus, interviewees insinuated that the coexistence only truly existed on the surface level. Her research yielded many important results in understanding the nature of ethnicity in present day Rwanda, including the fact that ethnic belonging may be even more important today, since a portion of the population was killed based on this division. Memory plays a vital role in remembering and transmitting the past not only in the public space, but the private as well. However, the notion of chosen amnesia overrides public cleavages to allow for local coexistence.

In the various interviews conducted, Rwandans portrayed the past as harmonious, describing the genocide as a "sudden rupture."[123] She describes this as "social amnesia" or "a mode of forgetting by which a whole society separates itself from its discreditable past record, which could happen at an organized, official and conscious level."[124] Additionally, she describes memory as particularly important in Rwanda; "… a society which relied on oral tradition until the arrival of colonialism and which even today does not have a strong infrastructure of Knowledge transmission, including education about its history, individual and collective memory constitute the basis of reasoning"[125]

Memory has historically been used to transmit individual and collective memories, and thus Rwanda as a society relies on this mechanism to form collective memory, and potentially collective identity. The people of Rwanda, Susanne discovered, "depend on each other in their day to day lives, which requires cohesion….thus, the past is distorted to

[120] Ibid, 135
[121] Ibid, 131
[122] Ibid, 134
[123] Ibid, 132
[124] Ibid, 133
[125] Ibid, 136

establish group coherence."[126] She explains coexistence as the outcome of government coercion, fear of the other, and basic pragmatism [127] Additionally, she touches on remembrance, which interviewees spoke of as important, yet mention that only Tutsis are remembered. One interviewee responded, "Many have lost loved ones – at the hands of the RPA, in refugee camps or in prisons under poor conditions."[128] Much of this pain and suffering has not been recognized. A divide exists between the individual and collective memory, based on the lack of a healthy memory environment, causing friction in the ability of Rwandese to truly live peacefully post-genocide.

Memory Crisis: The Rwandan context

While the word "crisis" is not directly used by Lemarchand and Buckly-Zistel, the notion of a crisis, as defined by Werbner and Nora, is implied through the diminished public space for memory as well as its static nature. Lemarchand describes three categories of memory (thwarted, manipulated, and enforced), which indicate crisis. Each category speaks to the lack of open, public memory, and its manipulation to serve a specific end. In her assessment, Buckly-Zistel speaks to the ever-present nature of the genocide;

> "More than a decade after the event, the horror of the 1994 genocide is omnipresent in Rwanda. It serves as a foundation for private arguments and public policies; the individual and collective raison d'être of the nation and its people is built around the genocide. Yet the presence of the genocide reaches beyond what words can capture."[129]

The quotation notes the importance of considering the way in which memories of the genocide manifest in present day society to understand how Rwanda can move forward. Both Lemarchand and Buckly-Zistel describe the public ban on ethnicities moving the state towards "one Rwanda," which in itself attempts to limit the memory of the existence of ethnicities. The limit on public memory fits within Werbner's definition of the memory crisis. Another byproduct

[126] Ibid, 134
[127] Ibid, 138
[128] Ibid, 319
[129] Buckly-Zistel, 137

of the ban on ethnicities is that it has driven the divergence of memory into the private space. Thus, ethnic differences are not discussed in public, which does not mean they do not exist (or are not discussed in the private space). However, more research is required to understand the true division of memory within private spaces. In terms of maintaining peace and moving towards "reconciliation," there is an inherent difficulty in not allowing ethnicity to be remembered openly as it is a central element of past conflicts. The ban silences the experiences of some Rwandan citizens, including victimized Hutus. Bal et al.'s notion of "memory crisis" looks to the places where memory is silenced. The "chosen amnesia," as Buckly-Zistel refers to it, is both top-down and bottom-up, while a sense of amnesia about ethnicity and memories that diverge from the official state narrative exists. Bucky- Zistel also points to the desire to "forget publicly" so that coexistence on a daily basis is possible. However, chosen amnesia may eclipse certain cleavages, which, in a cynical assessment, could someday rupture again.

The breakdown of the narrative framework constitutes the crisis in *Acts of Memory*. While there is an element of shared culture, i.e. everyone has the same memory of the past within the "new Rwanda". In Buckly-Zistel's interviews, people commented that "they did not want to recall specific aspects of their past" or "could not remember how the genocide started."[130] It appears that they have either let go of their individual past or are not comfortable discussing it. The official national narrative is enforced via legislation, known as the divisionism laws, which were added to the penal code to punish those who speak about "other versions of the genocide."[131] Thus, as Lemarchand notes, memory is "enforced."

The memory crisis signals the lack of a healthy memory environment, which may be a prerequisite for mourning, healing, coexistence, and reconciliation. The crisis denotes the divide between the individual and public spaces which underscores different versions of history. Individuals' understanding of history, which impacts their day-to-day life, actions, and view of

[130] Buckly-Zistel, 134
[131] Lemarchand, 99

their neighbors, is not recognized. Their experience is not legitimated within discourse, potentially leading to further divides between groups. Thus, the notion of moving forward is not based on starting from the same understanding of the past or present-day Rwanda, making the process of discourse and healing more difficult.

The nexus between individual and collective memories: Identity formation

Lemarchand and Buckly-Zistel's articles parallel the previous articles in their discussion of individual and collective memory and the relationship between memory and identity formation. Lemarchand notes that "conflict has individual and collective memories – based on the simple fact that it affected everyone."[132] In a country in which identity, along ethnic lines, was a reason to be killed or kill in the past and in present-day Rwanda where the government has legislated against ethnic identities, the understanding of identity still exists. Buckly-Zistel clearly states in relation to her aim that she focuses on "the stories people tell to refer to their past and ask whether they facilitate or obstruct group cohesion between the former parties to the conflict."[133] Thus, understanding how individual and collective memory lead to the formation of identity is vital in creating a common ground to assess the conflict and move forward.

The collective memory emerges from the national discourse as well as the social nature of memory, or how a group remembers its past. The publicly discussed memories as well as the omissions become part of the social cohesion. As was previously mentioned, Rwandans note "buying" into the official collective memory to preserve social fabric. However, collective memories are not by definition "public," and thus other collective memories may exist in private spaces. Again, this is a topic that requires more field research to gage how memories are understood and practiced within this space. Werbner states that the collective cannot exist without the memories of the individual, which implies a "bottom up" approach to the creation of the collective.[134] However, collective memory in Rwanda comes from both directions: on one

[132] Lemarchand, 103
[133] Buckly-Zistel, 132
[134] Werbner, 39

side, the state encourages a memory and, on the other side, communities maintain memories out of fear of the other, as Buckly-Zistel suggests or as part of the social memory of the collective as Bal et al. notes[135]. Thus, the individual memories of Rwandans are influenced by both factors, combined with their own experience before, during, and after the genocide. Lemarchand contends that Rwandans' recollections of the past depend on their role at the time and their situation today. Additionally, "Rwanda's society is highly diverse, reflecting various experiences of the genocide as victim or participant, bystander, absentee or savior."[136] There is no one understanding of the individual's memory in Rwanda, yet, it is important to note that it exists. It has not been swallowed by the official narrative.

Both individual and collective memory are linked to the creation of identity, which is a notion carried throughout the texts, based on the manner in which identity has been galvanized for evil in Rwanda. Lemarchand quotes Nora in his piece: "Remembrance has a coercive force, for it creates identity and a sense of belonging."[137] In Buckly-Zistel's theory of chosen amnesia, she discusses the potential use of memory to create a "particular we-group," thus defining "who is inside and who is outside."[138] By altering the identity of Hutus and Tutsis, the Rwandan government is attempting to create a collective identity which stems from a cohesive collective memory of the conflict. However, the collective identity may not be a reality and, beneath the public surface, it is splintering, which could open society up to conflict. As has been noted, more research is necessary to understand how deep the divide is between the individual and collective memory and whether or not it carries inherently dangerous tensions.

Looking Forward

From the literature reviewed so far, there is tension in the memory environment in

[135] Bal et al., 75

[136] Lemarchand, 132
[137] Lemarchand, 133
[138] Buckly-Zistel, 134

Rwanda, highlighting the important use of memory for coping and the existence of divergent memories. Moving forward, this thesis attempts to outline potential elements of a healthy memory environment and consider ways to open Rwanda's public and private spaces. Thus, considering memory based on the assumption that only through altering how people relate to each other in present-day Rwanda can future ethnicity-related violence be prevented[139] In order to fully assess the relationships between individuals, more research based on local analysis is needed that gives an honest assessment. Given considerations of the power dynamics, macro level policies must be informed by micro-level assessments.

[139] Buckly-Zistel, 148

Chapter Three: Memory Frameworks

> "Our **memory** is our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our action. Without it, we are nothing." – Luis Buñuel

A review of the literature uncovered numerous challenges in understanding and addressing memory. In order to understand the current status of memory within the post-genocide Rwandan context, a framework is needed from which to assess a healthy or unhealthy memory environment. This chapter seeks to define memory and the elements of a healthy memory environment. In doing so, the underlying assumption, which is addressed, is that within a healthy memory environment, there is a greater possibility for healing on the individual, community, and societal level.

What is memory?

> "**Memory** is an action: essentially it is the action of telling a story." Pierre Janet

Memory plays a particularly central role in how post-conflict societies understand their identities and how individuals within these contexts heal and move forward[140]. Although memory is researched across fields, including natural science and psychology, it is relevant within the post-conflict field "due to its pivotal role in the re-constitution and negotiation of the present by addressing past events."[141]

The University of Cambridge Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Research and Discussion Group defines memory in the specific post-conflict context; Memory is a label for a diverse set of cognitive capacities with which human being retain information about and reconstruct the past in (and for) the present. It is related but distinct to perception, imagination, or knowledge, as well as significantly connected to emotion, trauma, reasoning and morality. **Memory** also plays an

[140] The assumption is that healing is possible. This moves beyond the framework that healing is an acceptable

[141] Memory", University of Cambridge Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Research Group. Available at: http://www.post conflict group.cam.ac.uk/glossary-memory.html

important part in the constitution of individual as well as collective identities by sharing, constructing, and transmitting memories within a society or group[142]. Memory, as an action, has individual, collective, and cultural dimensions. It is the force by which the past interacts with the present. Lemarchand refers to it as understanding multiple sides to a story so as to narrate the past. They are subjective – blurring the line between "factual truth and interpretive truth."[158] Additionally, he describes a central "place" for claims of memory, where they can exist immune from manipulation and appropriation. Memories become something to be protected and shared.

Why Healthy memory environment?

In the aftermath of conflict, individuals and societies re-create narratives of their past. Memory is a central component in the re-creation of the narrative or history. The process is complex and may involve multiple understandings of the truth that do not overlap. Individual's memories make up the collective memory, and are woven together to form a narrative. Memory becomes the prism through which individuals and societies experience their environment, which is a vital consideration at the center of peace-building efforts. Thus, the study of memory spans from the psychology of the individual to the field of transitional justice with the attempt to understand how healing can take place that allows for people to coexist or reconcile.

Memory and the creation of a narrative may be a pre-requisite for healing, which will subsequently support processes of coexistence, and reconciliation. One of the foundational pillars of transitional justice is the notion of "moving forward" or, in other words, finding a way for a population to move forward, whether through legal, political, psychological, etc. The ability to move forward is tied to healing. Healing is a cross-cutting theme, spanning the political, legal, and psychological realms. Healing is important for individuals, communities, and nations as a whole. Staub defines healing as a form of "psychological recovery."[143] Additionally, he notes

[142] Memory-University of Cambridge Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis

that only from a place of psychological recovery can reconciliation begin. Thus, healing for individuals is intermixed with the ability for reconciliation. Additionally, Staub notes;

> After group violence healing will ideally be a group process. First, huge numbers of people have been affected—in Rwanda the whole population. Second, the violence was a group process. Third, Rwanda in particular is a collectivist, community-oriented society.[144]

Underlying the theory of a healthy memory environment is the assumption that healing is a way for post-conflict societies to move forward. Central to this process is the establishment of the truth, which will be covered in subsequent chapters. Throughout this analysis, healing will be referred to on the individual, community, and state level; each of which is intertwined and vital in creating an overarching healthy memory environment[145]

The consideration of a healthy memory environment is crucial in creating the space for individuals and society to heal[146]. Memory initiatives may involve the competing goals of a search for the truth, a means of producing information/accountability, and support for court hearings. The process of narrative creation ascribes ownership to the survivor in re-gaining a sense of self and view of the world. Research on traumatic memories "has focused on the need for traumatic memories to be legitimized and narratively integrated in order to lose their hold over the subject who suffered the traumatizing event in the past."[147] Trauma can cause a drastic disruption of memory, which severs the past from the present. These memories require a different type of consideration as they may be harder to reintegrate into a narrative – a notion which can be understood for the individual or the society as a whole. For example, the conflict

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[143] Staub, Ervin. Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps toward a General Theory. (International Association of Psychology, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 2006). Pg. 868.

[144] Staub, 784

[145] Note: Staub delineates elements of healing, including: "Their basic needs for security, for feelings of effectiveness and control over important events in one's life, for positive identity, for positive connections to other people and communities, and for a comprehension of reality and of one's own place in the world have all been deeply frustrated." (This quote was taken from pg. 867)

[146] Note: The word, "may" is used here refer to the fact that there are more than one elements required for healing.

[147] Bal et al, vii

between ethnic groups in Rwanda, specifically the genocide, is more difficult to integrate into the understood narrative of the country than other periods. Bal et al note that the "fact that narratives contribute to recovery is currently accepted as uncontroversial in the field of the psychology of trauma"[148]. On a community or societal level, the process would restore an element of ownership to the affected population in understanding their history and creating a narrative.

What makes a health memory environment?

While there are a variety of definitions and strategies within post-conflict societies that address the issue of memory, there is no common understanding of the elements of memory or how it is used that make a "healthy environment." A healthy memory environment is one where healing is possible on the individual and societal level. This chapter seeks to tease out what the important elements are of a healthy memory environment. Many more definitions, theories, and cases exist explaining the elements and effects of a challenging memory environment, which will undoubtedly be important in the case of Rwanda. However, this does not mean that the reverse or absence of the unhealthy elements will set guidelines for elements of a healthy memory environment. While memory, itself, ranges from the nostalgic, to the everyday, to traumatic, this assessment primarily assesses in the context of healing on the individual and social levels.
Reviewing pertinent literature in the field of memory studies revealed the following elements of a memory environment:

Understanding: Falling within the new universally recognized norm of the "right to the truth," the literature refers to the ability of individuals and society to access memory and to understand history. This category manifests itself in understanding crimes that were committed, participating in dialogues that further understanding, visiting important locations, etc. *The International Center for Transitional Justice* focuses its work on truth seeking as a central element to memory, and thus memory initiatives play a role in "public understanding of past

[148] Bal et al, 40

abuses."[149]

Contestation: The literature demonstrated the importance of the ability of individuals and society to contest memory, in essence, to freely tell their story.

Levels and spaces of memory: While memory inherently exists at all levels, including the individual, collective, and national, this category speaks to the recognition of the levels and potential divergences of narratives that may exist. Memory is both a public and private phenomenon. The literature speaks to the freedom to engage with it in both spaces, thus the individual and society can both heal within their own space and this is understood and recognized in the public space.

Identity: How individuals and societies engage with memory is ultimately a part of the individual or group's identity. Thus, memory is intrinsic to the formation of community and identity.[150] Adding to the elements of the memory environment described in the literature, an analysis of power and agency will describe how the memory environment is formed – asking the questions who is in control? Who has ownership? Who benefits? Memory exists within the nexus of politics and power, at times silencing sections of a population. In a similar vein, Lemarchand describes memory as "thwarted, manipulated, and enforced."[151] Thus, memory environments are guided by power: whose memory is remembered? Who is silenced? Why? Additionally, in the analysis published by Bal et al, memory is described as something performed, even if not consciously[152] Thus, a sense of agency or ownership is implied in how the individual or society engages with their memory environment.

[149] "Truth & Memory", International Center for Transitional Justice. Available at http://www.ictj.org/our work/ transitional-justice-issues/truth and memory

[150] Lemarchand, 107
[151] Ibid, 108
[152] Bal et al, vii

Chapter Four: Understanding the Past: Memory and Truth

This chapter explores the individual's right to the truth, the relationship between memory and truth, and takes a closer look at the role of truth in Rwanda. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, various efforts to engage with truth were undertaken, including, prosecution efforts by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the national court system within Rwanda, and the community justice and reconciliation mechanism, Gacaca. This section will focus on the role of Gacaca to explore the role of memory, public dialogue, and efforts towards justice /reconciliation – all of which contribute the challenges that Rwandese face as a nation almost 20 years after the genocide happened.

The Right to the Truth

Similar to memory, justice, healing, and many of the other words discussed throughout this analysis, truth has a multiplicity of definitions. Without diverging into a philosophical conversation, the following quotation from Naqvi's article will serve as a guide;

> "Truth is a concept that is notoriously hard to pin down. It implies objective credibility but also requires subjective understanding. It suggests agreement about factual reality but also space for differing interpretations. It takes on value in the public sphere while remaining an intensely private matter for the individual and it is honed on the past but may change our perception of the present and teach lessons about what to do with the future."[153]

Transitional justice literature outlines the many benefits of "truth." It is considered to be a vital part of the healing process, enabling a sense of closure. The acknowledgement of harm done re-creates a sense of dignity for survivors. Additionally, truth-seeking mechanisms are key for understanding past atrocities and are intended to be restorative in nature, generally as part of a reconciliation process.[154] They acknowledge the harm done to victims. Additionally, Naqvi points to the benefit to society "collective catharsis" and "collective conscience" against the

[153] Naqvi, Yasmin. The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction. (International Journal of the Red Cross Volume 88 Number 862 June 2006). Pg. 272.
[154] Naqvi, 263

repetition of acts[155]

The right to the truth for the individual victim has been acknowledged by international organs and courts at the national and international level, and has been written into the guiding principles of truth and reconciliation commissions and national legislation, and is considered to be a customary right. A resolution put forth by the Human Rights Council to the UN General Assembly drew on the body of law acknowledging the right to the truth and noted, the right to the truth "recognizes the importance of respecting and ensuring the right to the truth so as to contribute to ending impunity and to promote and protect human rights."[156] Additionally, an article published by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted, "The right to the truth has emerged as a legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights"[157] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has led the field in codifying the individual and collective right to the truth. The Inter-American Convention, via Article 9(1) demonstrates that "ensuring rights for the future requires a society to learn from the abuses of the past"[158] . The court decided the landmark case in the codification of the right to the truth. In 1988 the court ruled in the Velásquez Rodríguez decision that the state was obligated to provide the victims' families with the truth about the disappeared individuals[159] This landmark case led the way to developing the individual's right to the truth, which belongs to any person who has suffered atrocities or the family members of someone who has been disappeared. The individual has the

[155] Ibid, 264

[156] Right to the Truth, Human Rights Council, Resolution 9/11.

at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_9_11.pdf (The Resolution draws on the Geneva Conventions and the International Convention for All Persons Against Enforced Disappearances, Article 24(2)). Also, it should be noted that the "right for a society" to understand its past is not yet codified in international law.

[157] Naqvi, 257

[158] Naqvi, 261

[159] Park, Gloria. Truth as Justice (Harvard International Review, 2010) Available at: http://hir.harvard.edu/bigideas/Truth-as-justice

right to "discover their fate and whereabouts."[160] Additionally, the right to the truth extends to society in general, and thus, creates an obligation for states to "disclose information about the circumstances and reasons that led to massive or systematic violations."[161] The ICTJ phrases societies' right to the truth as "the right to learn their [individuals or families] history without lies or denial."[162]

Memory and Truth

Memory and truth are overlapping forces, yet, they are not interchangeable and one does not necessarily lead to the other. Memory is not inherently truth, and truth does not inevitably lead to an environment that is safe for a multiplicity of memories. ICTJ frames the overlap between the two as, "…truth and memory are not just a matter of state policy . . .they are also the responsibilities of any society striving for security, equality, and peace."[163] In the case of Rwanda, efforts to understand the truth have been undertaken by the current government as well as international actors, including the national court system, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and to some extent the Gacaca system. These systems deal with "forensic truths," referring to those which can be proven. On the other hand, memory initiatives have the possibility of addressing "social truths," which refers the overlap between truth and memory, as there may be multiple versions of memory and truths within a population. Few efforts to access and understand memory have taken place, including memorialization and Gacaca, the latter of which will be discussed in this section. In other post-conflict contexts, truth and memory have both been products of historical inquiry, community dialogue, and other reconciliation efforts. However, for sections of the Rwandan population, both truth and memory remain suppressed.

The process of engaging with memory and searching for elements of truth can be extremely difficult for individuals and societies. Efforts focus on certain elements of truth (for

[160] "Right to the Truth," International Center for Transitional Justice. Available at: http.//ictj.org/gallery-items/right-truth
[161] Naqvi, 257
[162] Right to the Truth
[163] Right to the Truth

example, national versus local level) and thus putting parameters around truth is a process in which it should be acknowledged that "memory and truth-seeking is political."[164] Inherent in the types of truths that are discovered and the nature in which they are used is the notion of power. Michael Foucault referred to truth in the assertion, "truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: . . .truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint".[165] Naqvi continues through the lens of Foucault to note that "truth" is a "construct of the political and economic forces that command the majority of power within the societal web."[166] While each of the reconciliation and justice processes that have taken place in post-genocide Rwanda weave together power and the type of truth displayed, Gacaca creates a particularly open, yet controlled, space for understanding what took place during the genocide.

Phil Clark in his book, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda, introduces three types of truth, which created a helpful framework to analyze Gacaca (and other memory initiatives). He points to the legal truth, the personal/therapeutic/emotional truth, and finally, the restorative truth. In the nexus between truth and memory, these prescribed categories of truth may overlap with memories or the space between memory and truth may diverge. In a general sense the notion of truth telling is that it may provide a sense of healing on the individual and community level through regaining a "sense of belonging."[167] This "sense of belonging" concerns how the truth is expressed and thus, shaped, to aid in the rebuilding of the social fabric of a society, thus it points to the communal aspects of truth as opposed to the individual[168]

Gacaca: Broad Participation in Memory and Truth

In 2001, Rwanda officially began a community level dialogue and legal process that built

[164] Memorization Expert, 4
[165] Naqvi, 257
[166] Naqvi, 258
[167] Clark, Phil. The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 192. Note: Many studies exist showing the danger of truth telling, including, but not limited to, re-traumatization of the victim
[168] Ibid, 187

on traditional community legal systems. From 2001 to 2012, Gacaca engaged much of the population in a post-genocide rebuilding process. Across the country, nearly every adult has participated[169]. The meetings, which take place at the community level with judges and, often, government officials, were designed to allow victim and eye-witness and preparatory testimony to be heard and ultimately to decide on a punishment for the perpetrator. Philip Clark notes that one commentator called Gacaca "a face-to-face confrontation with truth."[170] Ultimately, the outcome of Gacaca relies on people's participation, engagement, and trust in the process[171] The government of Rwanda claims that Gacaca is a mechanism by which the country can rebuild a sense of national unity. National unity appears to be a cornerstone of the reconciliation process and thus community dialogue falls within this effort.

Gacaca opened the possibility of dialogue on the community level, thus allowing the possibility of truth and memory sharing in public, structured setting. This level of discussion about past atrocities had not yet occurred in Rwanda. The mass participation signals the engagement of the population in understanding the events of the genocide. Additionally, based on the structure of Gacaca, the population owns the process, creating a sense of ownership over justice, understanding, and, potentially, healing. Through his research, Clark views Gacaca as a "central element in moving towards reconciliation."[172] He cites the space for public discourse that is open and fair to be the driving factor. Thus, genuine engagement with the truth, including the memories of individuals, is required[173] One of the primary intentions behind Gacaca was to air truths about the events of the genocide. The process targeted the community level, since high level perpetrators were tried at the ICTR or through the national court system. The individuals Clark interviews report that "much truth has come out and participation is generally high."[174] One government official once commented that "at Gacaca, the truth ultimately comes from the

[169] Clark, vii
[170] Ibid, 201
[171] Ibid, 151
[172] Clark, 152
[173] Clark, 166
[174] Clark, 138

population."[175] Overall, Clark cites that there is a sense of agreement on "the population" owning the process. Gacaca is one of few spaces for communication and, for some, it is a way to overcome what Clark refers to as "a conspiracy of silence."[176] Through participating in the proceedings, members of communities that are often disenfranchised, including women, have the ability to participate not only in discussion, but also in the process of rebuilding the social fabric of the community. Commentators argue that Gacaca is "vital for the reconstruction of facts," which in a sense is a "reconstruction of memory."

Gacaca has drawn widespread criticism. Not everyone shares the optimistic view of "truth" being shared during the proceedings. Critics point to an inherent problem in having a traumatized population making legal decisions, in a situation where few checks exist on the proceedings[177] The proceedings are not absent of the power structures that exist within society. Individuals that Clark interviewed claim that Gacaca became another mechanism for elites to control the population. Some believe it serves as another mechanism through which the state can impose legal and historical truths on the population. Additionally, Clark cites concerns about due process and the protection of rights of genocide suspects and that it encourages punishment of Hutus. The process reinforced the Tutsi monopolization on victimhood by creating an open space to air grievances against Hutus[178] Finally, commentators note that the culture of silence in Rwanda has created a cultural preference and "requirement" not to discuss the genocide or the truths of what occurred in public. This makes it very difficult for individuals to tell their story.

In 2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a study which looked at the limitations of fair trial procedures in the Gacaca process. While the study does take into consideration the reason for the government's selection of Gacaca, to find a quick and informal mechanism to deal

[175] Clark, 138 and 189; Clark translates the Gacaca manual to say: "Don't forget it is from the population that the truth will emerge."

[176] Clark, 142
[177] Clark, 151
[178] Clark, 204

with the high volume of cases to which HRW is critical. "The government made a number of substantial compromises, particularly in relation to the rights of the accused, judges' qualifications, and applicable legal standards"[179] Amnesty International has also levied the same criticisms stating that the trials lack international standards. Also the government took to making participation mandatory and fining individuals who did not attend. The report also found that both Hutus and Tutsis feared speaking against false accusations for fear of retaliation, community shunning, or out of fear of the "poorly defined laws of divisionism and genocide ideology"[180] The benefits, and traumas, caused by Gacaca are still unclear. Clark openly states that it is contested as to whether Gacaca leads to truth. The original intention of Gacaca was to create a space where parties could interact, interpret, and share personal testimony, thus fulfilling Clark's category of "truth-shaping."[181] While Gacaca has provided a space of dialogue, it did not fulfill the realm of "truth shaping," meaning a sense of communal understanding of what occurred during the genocide. According to Clark, the population remains deeply divided about whether Gacaca has assisted in the peace process.

In June 2012, Gacaca officially ended, closing the 11,000+ community courts[182] As was Previously noted, Gacaca has unearthed many truths, some in the form of legal facts, about the events of the genocide. While, Gacaca in itself may play a role in the healing process, the next steps for the creation of a more complete narrative are unclear. "Gacaca's compilation of testimony form 11,000 communities now provides a rich, diverse reservoir of historical material regarding genocide crimes"[183]. The opportunity exists for the creation of a historical record, further dialogue, and engagement in the process. The critiques that memory is "neither plural, nor openly contested" carry over into the Gacaca process[184] . Gacaca is bound by the time period

[179] Reports of the Human Rights Watch, 34; Zorbas, 36

[180] Clark, 91
[181] Clark, 188
[182] Clark, 227
[183] Clark, 228
[184] Ibrek, Rachel. The Politics of mourning: Survivor Contributions to memorials in Post-Genocide Rwanda. (2010 3:300

of crimes (i.e. only 1994) that are discussed and the crimes within the time frame (i.e. only crimes against Tutsis).

Divisionism and Genocide Ideology

"To speak of shared responsibility for the genocide, or of Tutsi violence against Hutu – indeed, to criticize the present-day government of Rwanda at all – is to risk the accusation of sympathizing with the killers." – Rene Lemarchand[185]

In an effort to move past the painful divide between Hutus and Tutsis, which is believed to be the root of the past conflicts in Rwandan, "divisionism" and "genocide ideology" the constitution of Rwanda enacted a few additions. Between 2003 and 2008, Rwanda held a series of parliamentary commissions to investigate the crimes, which included public denunciations of hundreds of Rwandans and international organizations. The idea of divisionism and genocide ideology is to prohibit hate speech, which Amnesty International claims is a legitimate aim. The problematic issue with the laws, Amnesty asserts, is the "vague and sweeping" language that in reality criminalizes speech that is protected under international and domestic laws. Amnesty International takes the argument a step further and claims that the vague wording is deliberate and allows for human rights to be violated"[186]. Counter arguments to Amnesty International's claims indicate that it is ignorant of Rwanda's history and the reality on the ground thus the reason for making uninformed claims.

Genocide ideology was not officially defined until 2008, although it had been a part of the Rwandan Constitution since 2003. The definitions are found in Articles 2 and 3 of Law Number 18/2008:

Article 2: Definition of "genocide ideology"

"The genocide ideology is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing

Memory Studies) Pg.2
[185] Lemarchand, 107
[186] Safer to remain silent, 8

on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war." *Article 3: Characteristics of the crime of genocide ideology*

The crime of genocide ideology is characterized in any behavior manifested by acts aimed at dehumanizing (sic) a person or a group of persons with the same characteristics in the following manner:

1. Threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory (sic) speeches, documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or inciting hatred;

2. Marginalising, laughing at one's misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, despising, degrading creating (sic) confusion aiming at negating the genocide which occurred, stirring (sic) up ill feelings, taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred;

3. Killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of furthering genocide ideology.[187]

The laws have been widely criticized, as they are used to impose the victor's version of history and justice on a population through fear and the suppression of dissent. "Laws on divisionism and genocide ideology allowed the elimination of dissenting voices and the imposition of the RPF reading of the truth and history."[188] In August 2009, Reyntjens reports that approximately 900 people were in prison based on genocide ideology accusations. The laws grant the current government a "monopoly on truth". Lemarchand states that "it provides the government with a convenient weapon to ban almost any type of organized opposition. . . control over ethnic identities and memory does little more than suppress them."

Conclusions

Rwanda is still experiencing a period of political transition and as caution must be made while making any statements because it is still a young country, emerging from the ruins of the

[187] Safer to Stay Silent, 11
[188] Lemarchand, 57

genocide. Hearts of survivors as well as perpetrators who through the amazing work of reconciliation live alongside each other are in the process of total healing. As the regime continues to seek ways of rebuilding nation of Rwanda, different things are being done to ensure that the peace and order seen on the streets of Rwanda also reigns in people's hearts. One of the ways to do this is opening allowing people to talk about their past in various forums that the government has set in place.

Chapter Five: Levels and Spaces for Memory

"Remembrance is essential in stopping the cycle of violence."[189]

This chapter addresses two fundamental pieces of the memory environment. Firstly, the levels in which memory exists will be explored, from the individual to the collective and national. Between these levels, memory may play a different role, adding to the potentially diverging nature of narratives. Secondly, this chapter will address the public and private nature of memory, as it exists in both realms. The literature on memory speaks to the importance of the individual's and community's freedom to engage with memory in both spaces. Thus, the personal and public are intertwined, both forming important elements of a healthy memory environment. As an example of the levels of memory and the nexus between the public and private, this chapter will focus on memorials in the case of Rwanda.

While field research on the topic of this thesis is particularly difficult due to the sensitive nature of the topic, I only glimpsed at the surface of this challenging. The authors of the sources I draw from in this section also note the difficulties. Susanna Buckley-Zistel notes this in her article, which focuses on "chosen amnesia." She describes her experience in the following excerpt;

> "While conducting research in Rwanda it became apparent that, although memory about the genocide was considered to be very important, some aspects of the past were eclipsed from the discourse. Interviewees frequently made their omissions explicit, stating that, despite their public attitude and occasionally even their participation in reconciliation projects, in their hearts it looked different . . . This inability, however, does not point to a new or different interpretation of the past or a fading memory, but rather implies that the memory is still stored in the mind, even though the group does not (choose to) have access to it at present"[190]

In some cases, research remains difficult because of this sense of chosen amnesia, and in others it becomes impossible due to the fear that is pervasive within society. From my personal observations, albeit limited, individuals and communities remain stalled by the potential

[189] Ibrek, 11
[190] Buckly-Zinkel, 133

consequences of charting their own course in how they contend with or experience their memories of the conflict. Thus, within the context of memorialization there are opportunities for further research to truly understand the effects these efforts are having on the population.

Split Memory

Central to the understanding of memory in the Rwandan context is the post-conflict make-up of the country where individuals from both ethnic groups continue to live side by side. Although the memories and memory processes that are prioritized and categorized at the individual, communal, and national level vary, the need to continue to live and work together transcends these levels. Buckley-Zistel believes that "the past is eclipsed because maintaining daily life takes priority."[191] This section will look at how individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole express and engage with memory.

Although the levels of memory diverge, the levels are interrelated and to some extent interdependent. The influence of memory flows in both directions in Rwanda. Firstly, the national level version of the narrative of the conflict influences the communal and individual memories, altering people's memories and experiences. Secondly, individual's memories add to the communal understanding of the conflict, which in turn influences the national-level understanding. In a healthy memory society, these patterns would freely flow in both directions; however, for reasons covered in the previous chapter, this pathway is more difficult in present day Rwanda. Drawing on the literature review in the first chapter of this thesis, memory, in De Boeck's writing, is a thread that is "part of people's ability to to construct. . . meaningful reality of the social, political, and economic paradoxes."[192] Thus, it connects t h e Individual's understanding of the world, to their community and social relations, which on a large scale become the country's experience and memory.

[191] Ibid, 135
[192] Buckley-Zickel, 133

Werbner describes the memory crisis as a breakdown in the freedom to express memory at the previously described levels. The loss of these practices, or in some case beliefs, can constitute a personal or communal crisis. Central to understanding the role of memory are power and agency, the latter of which plays out at the national level. In Rwanda, the government plays a strong role in dictating how memory and memorialization are to happen, when they will happen, and who will be involved. Firstly, beginning of April 7th, each year, to commemorate the beginning of the genocide, Rwanda enters into 100 days of mourning. The words "Never Forget" are written on purple banners and spread throughout the country[193] The 100 days are full of speeches, visits to memorials, a certain type of music, and a general somberness in the whole country. The process is very structured, and Hinton and O'Neill, note that "the national genocide memorial ceremonies are extremely dense sites for social production and nation-building."[194] Thus, they note the government's use of the mourning period to continue to memorialize a certain narrative of the genocide as well as to further instill a sense of "one Rwanda" onto the population. Buckly-Zistel notes that "ethnic identity is suppressed in the public discourse." [195]Additionally, the national level commemoration ceremonies place the memory of the genocide into the context of current political issues. The current situation in Rwanda is directly affected by what happened in 1994 and greatly influences national priorities. How can the country forget to 'remember' when thousands in exile claim the genocide did not take place?

Collective memory also exists on the community level. On this level, collective memory looks to shared memory, or cultural memory, as the literature review noted. However, on the community level, the collective and individual senses of memory are much closer, in that, space may exist for dialogue, such as the Gacaca courts where the memory of individuals becomes part

[193] Lemarchand, preface xii. Note: "The watchword in Rwanda today symbolized by the moving memorial to Tutsi victims is "Never forget"

[194] Hinton and O'Neill, 95
[195] Buckly-Zintel, 143

of the community narrative. Additionally, survivors' associations and other community groups may provide a sort of outlet for memories; however these groups are often influenced by the umbrella organization or political ties at the national level. Additionally, there is a tendency to model local level ceremonies after the national commemoration ceremonies. Thus, Vidal notes, "... Rwandan citizens have little public space left to mourn in the fashion that best suits their needs."[196]

On the other hand, in some communities the church has played a role, "community-level ceremonies, first conducted in early 1994 under the direction of local Catholic parishes, better served the needs of psychological healing and social reconciliation than the national ceremonies."[197]

In a healthy memory environment, the methods by which people engage with memory provide the opportunity for healing. At the core of this is the notion that it should be a free process, thus individuals can chose how they engage with it. This does not mean that there are no structures, but rather that, individuals and chose or not to engage with those that exist. This includes activities such as the Gacaca courts, commemoration ceremonies, visits to memorials, or participation in other community or national level activities. For many individuals the trauma is still vivid. It cannot be avoided in daily life. Structured mourning may not fit the process which the individual seeks. Individuals and family units may have their own practices for mourning and/or commemorating the dead. Along these lines, there is a gap in the literature. Among other clinical mental health diagnoses, post-traumatic stress disorder, is still prevalent in high numbers. Therapy is beginning to become more common practice[198].

Spaces: Private and Public

The previous part of the chapter highlighted the split between the levels in which Rwandan's feel that they can express their memories, or at least versions of their memories. This

[196] Hinton and O' Neill, 100

[197] Ibid, 102

[198] Personal Observation, NURC conference, June 2012

split parallels what is discussed openly in public and private spaces, thus defining what is remembered and forgotten. This section will examine the tricky space that memorials inhabit, tying together the public and private spaces as well as the personal and the political.

Memory exists in public and private spaces, as manifestations of the individual and collective conscience. The following section discusses the nexus between public and private memory, looking at the nature of human beings as individuals, yet having social relations and interactions within society. The notions of public and private as well as individual and collective overlap as memory exists in each of these competing realities. In private spaces, individuals have the opportunity to remember, believe, and mourn in ways they chose. For many individuals, how they chose to engage with these memories is influenced by the trauma of the violence and, potentially, repression or PTSD associated with the events. This description of the private space includes the individual as well as their close relations. On the other hand, individuals may feel free to act in the public space if they experience a sense of safety and security in doing so. Activities such as remembrance, discourse, and even, contestation are all possible actions in creating a public space. The actions taken in these two spaces may diverge, as the stories told and the sense of collective identity may limit what takes place in the public space. Additionally, private spaces may also be limited. While the home creates a space that is, in essence, private, Rwandans may be socialized to remember or address memories in a specific way that limits their engagement with the vivid stories of their past. Werbner refers to these as "buried memories," which produce what he calls "unfinished narratives: popular history in which the past is perceived to be unfinished and festering in the present."[199] Outside of Gacaca and other forms of community dialogue it is unclear what forums exist.

[199] Werber, 9.

Memorials

"My present discussion regards memory as public practice which – being at once moral, political and often also, painful subjective-is a product of open and unfinished realities"[200]

This section will discuss public spaces through the use of memorials in Rwanda. Memorials are an inherently public display of memory, yet they have public and private dimensions of the meaning and effect of memory. In Nora's theory, memorials exist at the place where memory (in a public sense) has become history, i.e. a moment that is "frozen" in time. Thus, elements of memory may be "frozen" in the public sphere. Over 500 official memorials exist throughout the country; some created by the government, others by community associations, and still others by individuals[201] At some sites, skeletons are left intact in the position the person died, others display the bones of victims neatly arranged in rows, and still others consist of modest crosses at sites of mass burials. Memorialization has been positioned as a central part of the healing process of Rwandan communities and society as a whole. However, inextricably linked to the memorialization process is the power it implies to choose how history is remembered through, at times, static narrative of the genocide. While the majority of the more than 500 memorials are "part of a state-led endeavor to promote a collective identity," they are also shaped by the concerns and efforts of genocide survivors[202] In fact, Ibreck claims that the survivors constitute the largest group of "active contributors" to the creation of the memorials. Thus, they sit squarely at the intersection between the personal and the political, at times serving both ends.

The Role of Memorialization

This section will focus on the role, purpose, and actors in memorialization.

> 'memorialisation' is used to denote only deliberate action to preserve the memory of a violent past, rather than ad hoc, spontaneous acts of memorialisation that emerge after violence. . .the Principles put forth in this Policy Brief are intended to inform decision making by policymakers and practitioners on memorialisation as a planned action. Additionally, memorialization is now viewed as a tool of transitional justice, one which,

[200] Werber, 19
[201] Ibreck, 334
[202] Policy brief: Guiding Principles of Memorization, Impunity Watch, (Perspectives Series, January 2013), Pg. 3

> can be mutually reinforcing through other transitional justice mechanisms[203] It is part of the broader tool set that aims to create an environment for coexistence or reconciliation through memory, as well as the other transitional justice processes, such as justice, peace, and healing. According to the ICTJ, the central goal of memorialization is to preserve the memory of crimes[204]

However, the act of memorialization should be placed alongside other initiatives that "contribute to a more holistic tackling of violence."[205] In that sense, memorialization activities seek long term change, and thus the process must be designed allowing for shifts in memory and interactions between individuals or society with the memorial.

Memorialization can, potentially, create a space for the acknowledgement of different narratives. However, timing and context are crucial in navigating varying histories between groups.349

It is important to note the following;

> "But while multiple narratives are constructive and should be encouraged, it does not follow that reconciliation or relinquishing demands for justice are an inevitable or indeed necessary consequence. This distinction should be clear. Multiple narratives and mutual recognition of suffering do not provide a justification for the crimes that were committed, and providing space for the multiplicity of discourse should not be equated with an attempt to reconcile narratives or groups."[206]

The transitional justice aims of coexistence or reconciliation may not directly stem from the creation of a memorial, but rather from the memorialization process that surrounds the memorial that brings groups together and develops a new space for understanding. The organization Sites of Consciousness views the purpose of memorials as taking the space created for understanding a step further, and states that they should play a civic role in the life of the community.[207]

It should be noted that memorialization is not always constructive and the creation of a memorial is not always the right choice, especially in the recent aftermath of violence. It is

[203] Policy Brief: Guiding Principles of Memorialization, 8.
[204] Ibid, 10
[205] Ibid, 11. Note: It may still be too soon to attempt this goal of "multiple narratives" in Rwanda, even though it is part of healthy (or healthier) memory environment.
[206] Ibid, 14
[207] Hamber, ˇSevˇcenko, and Naidu, Utopian Dreams or Practical Possibilities? The Challenges of Evaluating the Impact of Memorialization in Societies in Transition, (The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 4, 2010, 397–420).

possible that efforts can further divide communities[208] Also, in a more sinister outlook, "memorial sites can be used to force a specific ideology onto society." The previously mentioned article on the possibility of evaluating memorial efforts notes the possible role of memorials as a political resource, they could "glorify" as opposed to memorialize, focus on only one point of view (one-sided victimhood), and close the space for debates of alternative narratives[209] Community interactions with memorials in Rwanda suffer from many elements of the previous list. Additionally, the creators of memorials often imagine them serving various roles, which may create a blurry purpose and competing goals[210]

The purposes of memorials, outside of memory and remembrance, should also be mentioned, including preservation and restoration of human and structural remains and documentation and research on the events[211] Cook notes that preservation or restoration may have an education component, thus educating visitors on the events using the actual physical remains. This effort is not always separate from memorialization, in that preservation efforts may show what happened in the past by leaving sites unchanged[212] In the wake of mass killing, research and documentation takes place to establish "an authoritative account of particular events based on primary sources," which may be later used in legal cases[213]. At many of the sites, these goals overlap.

Actors

Memorials, or broader memorialization processes, may involve various actors in society as well as be designed for varying segments of the population. *The Guiding Principles on Memorialization* note that local, national and international actors are more often involved in the development and implementation of these initiatives. Additionally, ICTJ notes the role of civil

[208] Policy Brief: Guiding Principles of Memorialization, 13.
[209] Hamber, ˇSevˇcenko, and Naidu , 23.
[210] Mass Atrocities," Course taught by Bridget Conley-Zilkic, March 2013, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
[211] Cook, Susan. The Politics of Preservation in Rwanda, (2005), Pg. 4.
[212] Ibid, 5
[213] Ibid, 6

society: "In many cases, by launching commemoration activities, civil society has been the Catalyst for states to assume their duties."[214] It is important to note that states often do not have the choice of whether or not to engage in memorialization activities, as they may be a public response to a tragedy or pushing of a certain political platform[215] Thus, the efforts are started by the population and/or the state in response to tragedy. Additionally, these processes may be supported by outside actors. In the case of Rwanda, the international community, in the case of Rwanda, is invested in the process via the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and visitors who want to understand the horror that took place.

While first and foremost, memorials should be created (or at least create space for) for the survivors of violence, to acknowledge what happened, there are other competing interests in the process. One such interest is the role of outsiders visiting the location. Cook reflects on this reality in Rwanda, "Although people shy away from the idea that genocide sites might represent some opportunity to generate income from foreign visitors (tourists), the desire to expose the world to the gruesome reality of what took place in Rwanda in 1994 is also evident."[216] As was previously mentioned, memorials may serve more than one purpose, thus blurring their purpose and effectiveness.

Methods

Although memorialization is not a new phenomenon, little evaluation has been done in terms of generating best practices in the field. However, in a report published after the *Meeting of Memorialization Experts* in 2012, Guiding Principles were put forth to inform practitioners and policymakers. "The eight final [agreed upon] principles are: context; critical self-reflection; participation; complementarity; process; multiple narratives; youth; and politicization."

[217]Additionally, the importance of local ownership over each step of the process is highlighted

[214] Truth and Memory, 42
[215] Hamber, ˇSevˇcenko, and Naidu, 2
[216] Cook, 16
[217] Policy Brief: Guiding Principles of Memorialization, 7

– from planning to ongoing engagement with the site/act – is vital. *The Guiding Principles on Memorialization* note that participation may open space for local narratives and thus further engagement of the population with the memorial. Ibrek notes that memory work is a response to loss, an expression of grief, and a practice of mourning. She vividly portrays these three purposes through interviews;

> "An architect explained how creating a memorial brought him close to the members of his family killed there: 'When you work with memory you meet the victims.' With so many dead and so few left to mourn them, private bereavement necessarily became a public matter. Survivors united around a shared experience and as a practical necessity, because the normal social arrangements surrounding bereavement had collapsed"[218]

Most importantly, the actors involved must assess and understand the space that exists for memorialization, which highlights the "character of the ongoing discourse about the past violence. . . which influences the parameters of acceptable narratives."[219] An article that discusses evaluations of memorial efforts notes that "memorials and memory sites are often treated as finite objects or goods." Thus, there is a lack of understanding about how this space shifts and how people, varying groups of people, experience the site over time. The literal mechanics of memorialization may include, "burying victims together in a common cemetery, building some kind of monument, or by leaving the pits, schools, churches, etc. untouched as visual reminders of the killing . . ."[220] Memorialization may also happen through commemoration days, moments of silence, and countless other practices that societies have developed in response to tragedy. Although the previous examples have highlighted the communal aspects of memorialization, it also may be a private act, such as families visiting graves on a certain day or remembering the dead through a certain practice. Memorialization processes are malleable, flexible, and should be designed to meet the needs of those who are mourning and those who seek to remember.

[218] Ibrek, 8
[219] Policy Brief: Guiding Principles of Memorialization, 1
[220] Cook, 16

National and Public

Memorials play an important role on the national (and public) stage in Rwanda. At the over 500 memorials throughout the country, many of them display bones, blood stains still visible on walls, the belongings of those who died, and other graphic reminders of the horror that took place. "The predominant strategy of memorializing Rwanda's 1994 genocide has entailed Leaving massacre sites intact and displaying the bones of the dead – or, in the case of one memorial, preserving thousands of corpses in powdered lime."[221] Guyer vividly describes the memorials through the following reflection;

> "Far from being sanitized spaces of worked-through mourning or barren sites without clear traces of the violence that occurred there, Rwanda's genocide memorials are raw and macabre. They are uncomfortable—physically, emotionally, and intellectually. The response that they occasion is due not only to what they commemorate—the one-hundred-day genocide of the Tutsis and Hutu moderates in April 1994 and the absent testimonies of those murdered—but how they commemorate it—with "shelves and shelves of skulls and bones."[222]

Although Rwanda does not display bones in open space, they are displaced at the Museum but generally the Rwandan practice is to bury them honorably. Vidal notes that, ". . .the displaying of bones could be understood to reflect the enduring absence of mourning and working through, it may be rather that the bones continue to prevent mourning from taking place."[223] Some argue that the memorials may be part of ongoing trauma[224] Also, Ibrek notes that survivors often complain and rally against slow government policy surrounding memory work and memorialization. Survivors felt that their views were not taken into account and that memory was not "given sufficient priority."[225]

Community

Between the national narrative and memorialization process and that of the individual or family is the community level. In many communities survivors' organizations developed in the

[221] Guyer, Sara. "Rwanda's Bones" (Duke University Press, *boundary 2* 36:2 (2009), Pg. 3.
[222] Guyer, 3
[223] Guyer, 5
[224] Ibid, 5
[225] Ibrek, 7

wake of the genocide. These committees were formed to create memorials or to organize commemorations. Although not all survivors chose to join these groups, "preferring to keep memories and mourning private," Ibrek notes that many do join. Many of these survivors associations on the community level exist under the umbrella of IBUKA (to remember), a national level non-profit that "gathers genocide survivors associations."[226] Much of the funding comes from government and private source, and only a few sites actually have national oversight. Ibrek notes the tensions that exist between the national level and local organizations[227] However, these groups play a critical role in the memorialization process through gathering and preserving remains as well as organizing ceremonies.

Many of the memorials on the community level are "created out of a sense of grief and community."[228] Hinton and O'Neill note that community level commemoration activities take on a different tone than those on the national level in that they are more focused on mourning "loved ones lost in the violence and on fulfilling traditional and imported religious obligations towards the dead."[229] Memorials are viewed as part of the healing process. Ibrek notes that "survivor commitment persists [in Rwanda, specifically] because of the extent of human losses – more mass graves have been found each year requiring more reburials – and because of the extreme violence of the atrocities, which prolongs efforts to restore dignity and seek consolation."[230] She also notes that "survivors are tenacious and dedicated participants in memory production," and this effort sometimes coincides with state efforts or diverges.

Personal and/or Private:

"The intensity of mourning in Rwanda is a consequence of the scale and horror of

[226] "Ibuka: Bringing Together Genocide Survivors" Available at: http://www.ibuka.rw/.

[227] Ibrek, 6

[228] Ibrek, 9

[229] Hinton and O'Neill, 100

[230] Ibrek, 13

survivors' bereavement."[231] Cook notes that there is a "widespread desire to remember and honor the dead;" however this does not mean that individuals and families want this to be done publicly or as a communal activity. Firstly, as can be expected, there is no single opinion on how to treat the dead. In some cases Rwandans did not bury the dead until their suffering was recognized[232]. In other cases, families could not bury the dead due to a government law stating that bodies had to be buried in public cemeteries[233] robbing individuals (who had located the bodies of victims) the opportunity to decide where to bury the dead. Secondly, public memorials may re-traumatize individuals. A Rwanda psychiatrist noted in Ibrek's study, "it is important that there is a time to remember, but it must be organized so that we don't distress people. Even within families there are no agreements about this. There are some people who say that is the past and we need to look to the future. Thirdly, there are groups of Rwandans who are not considered "survivors" and thus they cannot mourn in the public space. Central to this group of people are Hutu survivors whose suffering is not recognized[234]

Additionally, some individuals and families want to mourn privately without interference from the state. Although it can be assumed that individuals and families mourn and practice types of memorialization in private spaces, there is a gap in the literature on what exactly this looks like. On the other hand, perhaps individuals cannot engage with the current processes of memorialization. Guyer notes the impersonal nature of the memorials, in that no effort has been made to identify the individual skeletons or bones nor are the names of the dead displayed. "Yet, by refusing to return names, identities, or individualities to the dead. . ..the persons are recognized only as members of a population."[235] Furthermore, the memorials often display bone types, not even full skeletons, further breaking apart a sense of identity of the individual. Thus,

[231] Ibid, 12
[232] Hamber, ˇSevˇcenko, and Naidu, 1
[233] Ibrek, 6
[234] Ibrek, 3
[235] Guyer, 9

the memorials memorialize death, or genocide, in general, as opposed to the lives and deaths of individuals.

Conclusion

"How can people live together when the remains of the dead, the abhorrent evidence of what stands between them, makes such a violent—and also incoherent—claim on the living, or, in other words when the living still haven't figured out how to place—comprehend or bury—the dead? When bones take the place of stories?"[236] In a healthy memory environment, individuals will be able to freely engage with memory on each of these levels. In Rwanda, the public space is still limited by government influences. In order to heal and take important steps towards coexistence and reconciliation, I posit that the individual must have a sense of agency in the process. Their memories and experiences must be acknowledged and woven into the narratives of the communities and the potentially multi-narratives of the country. Although narratives diverge, the dialogue and ability to mourn and heal may further the objective of national unity. The state has put several strategies that have opened space to allow various narratives to be told. As the next chapter will explore, intricately tied to the process of memory is the shifting nature of identity as they are interdependent.

[236] Ibid, 7

Chapter Six: Memory and Identity

"Memory has a coercive force, for it creates identity and a sense of belonging."[237]

Violence stemming from differences in identity is one of the most cited reasons behind the ability to divide a population, such as the division that occurred leading to the Rwandan genocide. In this context, the word "identity" is usually prefaced with the word "ethnic." Both words are socially constructed ways of understanding oneself and the relationship between self and community and nation. Both were built and specifically influenced in the lead up to the genocide, and to a large extent remain influential in Rwandan society today. This chapter will look at the formation of identity and the relationship between identity and memory. Then, the analysis will be applied to the Rwandan case study of the formation of national unity through the notion of "One Rwanda."

Identity

"Narrated life stories are distortions, not descriptions, of life as lived."[238]

Individuals' memories, in their subjective natures, play a large role in the understanding of identity. Memory, in essence, is the narrated version of each individual's past, which as a force, affects their day to day decisions. Ricoer notes that this effort to narrate one's life is a sustained effort to "integrate life events and actions into a unified whole," thus giving a sustained coherence to one's life[239] The vast body of theory on the creation of identity considers the question of how narration and lived life are related and how they influence each other. Implicit in the notion of influence is the direction in which it occurs. From this notion, stem the following questions: Do individuals live their lives in a certain way based on a certain narrative, thus imposing a structure on life? Or, does the way individuals live their lives create this structure? Is

[237] Buckly-Zistel, 132
[238] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler. Changing Conceptions of Psychological Life (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, 2004). Pg. 33
[239] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler, 28

there a natural coherence between the two?[240] While, the questions are unresolved in the field of psychology, the elements of the questions point to the various influences on the individual that are both internal and external in nature.

In his essay *Ricoeur, Narrative, and Personal Identity*, Polkinghorne highlights elements of the formation of individual identity. The first element of an individual's personality is "the felt sense we have of who we are that underlies the articulated narrative composition we tell about ourselves."[241] Thus, he first notes the internal component of our identity. Complementary to the internal, is the section, which refers to the created self-story. This element of identity is a narrative that configures actions into "meaningful wholes and thereby unveil an order and coherence that was not previously experienced."[242] Individuals have the ability to retrospectively attribute meaning to actions, thus combining the internal and external influences. Memory is the mechanism through which individuals reconstruct or reinterpret the past. In this same vein, Polkinghorne notes;

> "Memory is not a container of taped replays of life events. Recollection is a partial reconstruction of the past that attends to and connects memory traces according to the press of present needs and interpretations."[243]

Memory thus becomes the tool by which the narrative can shift, thus altering one's perceptions of how events shape one's identity. While some of the effort to create an individual's identity is internal, much of it is influenced by the context, including the social, historical, and cultural influences. Identities are formed through the interactions between individuals and larger groups within society (such as religious, tribal, community, etc.) Thus, identities are multi-faceted. Individuals maintain various elements of their identity, including, professional, religious, family, personal, etc at the same time Moshman notes that the "ideal atmosphere for identity formation,

[240] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler, 35
[241] Ibid, 35
[242] Ibid, 41
[243] Ibid, 43

is one in which individuals are politically and socially free to construct diverse interpretations, ideologies, and commitments."[244]

While in a healthy memory environment, individuals and groups within a society would be free to develop identities, these same freedoms can be manipulated to control the process. While the government of Rwanda strives to rebuild a national identity in the aftermath of the genocide, references to multiple narratives (thus, multiple identities) are viewed as threats to this process. The freedom to develop these narratives (and in some senses, actually reflect on the past) may seem "to threaten the macro goals of some transitional justice processes."[245] In Rwanda, the story of ideology and identity mix, as over time individuals became strongly influenced by external forces that led them to intensely identify with their "ethnic" identity, above other identity markers. Rwandans Learned over time to categorize themselves as Hutu or Tutsi, beginning, as was described, with the advent of colonization. However, in the lead up to the genocide, these labels took on more sinister meanings. Thus, they divided the population along a specific line, without room for all of the ethnic complexities.

In the aftermath of the violence, with the attempts to rid the country of ethnic categories, new and additional categories have sprung up for both Hutus and Tutsis (although under different names)[246] The new categories are largely based on experiences during the conflict, such as where individuals spent time as refugees and at what point they returned to Rwanda. Rwanda's future will, firstly, depend on how the past is reflected upon and incorporated into the national narrative. Secondly the future will depend on how individuals are permitted to engage with this narrative and create their own narrative and fluid identity that once again mixes internal and external influences in a more balanced manner. Finally, Moshman notes that "such a

[244] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler, 202

[245] Hamber, ˇSevˇcenko, and Naidu, 22.

[246] Hamber, 23

dichotomization of history fosters a continuing dichotomization of identities."[247] This quotation paints a picture of a country that, if no precautionary measures are taken could again experience division based on identity.

The power of ethnicity

In Rwanda, ethnicity became the strongest factor in an individual's identity. In the lead up to the genocide, multi-faceted identities ceased to exist as the Hutu Power called for a "cleansing of the country" along ethnic lines. While the roots of Hamitic Myth and the increasing level of importance placed on ethnicity were previously discussed, it is important to note that in the post-genocide years ethnic identity still plays a role in Rwanda. All individuals must carry ID cards, which note that they are "Rwandan," but serve as a mechanism for the government to check if they re-registered in the country after the genocide[248]

Based on the ethnic nature of the conflict, ethnicity is still a central factor in Rwanda today. However, after the 1994 genocide, discussions about ethnicity were restricted since they seemed to fuel ethnic tension. Bert Ingelaere claims that these factors also played a role in the genocide, citing the micro and macro level political and social formations connected/attached to ethnic identities[249] Additionally, "the genocidal violence reflected both the goals of the supra-local forces and factors mainly the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage mobilized by political actors for political purposes – and their local shadows – struggles for power, fear, coercion, and the quest for economic resources and personal gain, vendettas, and the settling of old scores."[250] Polkinghorne notes the indirect references to ethnicity saying they are visible "in many spheres of social life,

[247] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler, 192

[248] Hinton and O'Neill, 85

[249] Ingelaere, Bert. "Peasants, Power and Ethnicity: A Bottom-Up Perspective on Rwanda's Political Transition."

[250] Bert, 250

such as identity politics, memorialization, and transitional justice[251]

One Rwanda: the re-creation of a state "without" ethnic identities

In the aftermath of devastating violence, the Rwandan government has embarked on a national plan to re-create national unity as an effort towards reconciliation. The message of national unity began at the first genocide commemoration, which took place in 1995, one year after the beginning of the genocide.[252] At this speech, no mention was made of ethnic identities. Rwandan officials point out "that the aim of the state at this critical juncture is to build a nation, and the first step towards this daunting task is to do away with ethnic labels once and for all.[253] Lemarchand notes that the above mentioned crimes, "offer the new nation builders a unique opportunity to legislate ethnic identities out of existence."[254]

Although, there is pressure from the government and society at large, individuals are in some ways re-writing their narratives with different frameworks for identity. From these narratives emerge the new labels. These are more "experiential," referencing time spent as a refugee in Tanzania or the Democratic Republic of Congo, in some cases signaling ethnic identity and in other cases, remaining vague.

The government remains convinced of their strategy to eradicate ethnicity. Through the publication of the "Reconciliation Barometer" the government of Rwanda is now able to track the penetration of the notion of "One Rwanda," as national unity and reconciliation are inextricably linked in the eyes of the government. Conducted in 2010, the study notes that

Seventy-two percent of the population strongly agreed that they are proud to be citizens of

[251] Dona, Giorgia. Interconnected Modernities, Ethnic Relations and Violence (2013 61: 226 originally published online 25 September 2012 *Current Sociology). Pg.* 15.
[252] Hinton and O'Neill, 88
[253] Lemarchand, The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1.
[254] Ibid, 13

Rwanda and forty-six percent strongly agreed that all citizens share common values[255]. Additionally, nearly 100% of Rwandans were reported to believe that "most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority" and that "the everyday actions and behavior of most Rwandese promote reconciliation."[256] Over seventy percent of Rwandans reported that they want their children to think of themselves as Rwandan, above other identities[257] Thus, at first glance, based on reporting by the government, it appears as if the efforts towards national unity are shifting the way individuals configure their identity, and that the trumping of national identity over ethnic identity appears to be creating a more peaceful nation. However, the study also revealed that between 30 – 45% of the population, depending on age group, believed that "although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favorable."[258] Although it is unclear who respondents were referring to, when answering this question, it does speak to underlying tensions and the belief that violence is still possible. The government's target is to (and adaptation to the plan by society) elevate national identity over ethnic identity. While, identity as a Rwandan may be a part of an individual's identity, it should not be outwardly forced as the "trump card" to other elements of identity. Lightfoot, Lalonde and Chandler note that "choosing to be Rwandan is a collective act of solidarity." However, it should be one taken freely and not at the expense of other identifying factors. Thus, the government should continue to encourage discussion and memory around the genocide, allowing the population to seek to understand it, rather than "explain it away." Moshman believes that ". . . there should be processes of reflection, such that "we might foster identities, and selves, capable of resisting the call to genocide."[259]

[255] Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2012), Pg. 59.
[256] Ibid, 53
[257] Ibid, 54
[258] Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, 55.
[259] Lightfoot, Lalonde, and Chandler, 204

Conclusion: Steps Forward

The creation of a healthy memory environment underscores the ability of the individual and society to engage in conflict resolution, and peace-building activities. Memory forms the prism through which all actors engage with their society and is, thus, a vital consideration. The process is complex as individual's memories, communal memories, and those that exist within the national history do not overlap. However, a healthy memory environment welcomes cleavages as points of discussion and engagement for individuals, civil society and the state. Memory should be understood as separate from truth and history, even though the three categories may overlap in their content.

The previous chapters demonstrated the elements of a healthy memory environment through case studies of where Rwandan society currently is. The case studies highlighted the following points; the relationship between memory and understanding, the levels and spaces that exist for memory, and the important tie between memory and identity. Each of the chapters assesses a certain element of Rwandan society, such as Gacaca or the freedom of speech, and considers it in the context of a healthy memory environment. Not all actors have control over their own memory process or how they are able to engage with memory in communal and public spaces. The following recommendations, set within the framework for a healthy memory environment, view Rwanda as a country needing to create more open memory processes in order to shift a sense of agency to the population.

Memory and Understanding

The Right to the Truth: Based on the right to understand the past and to have access to this information, Rwanda should move towards taking a wider look into crimes that were committed before, during, and after the genocide. What should be done to the Interahamwe and former genocidaires who are in foreign countries but are also present in the forests of Congo?

Historical Inquiry: As other societies have done in the wake of violence, Rwanda, pushed by the international community, should consider the creation of a commission for historical inquiry. The commission should be a mix of internal and external actors to find a balance between Rwandans and the international community perceiving it as unbiased but also creating mechanisms for ownership within the country.

Education: Public education should allow for deviations from a solitary narrative of the violence. Students should be able to engage with a wide variety of facts and understanding in relation to the genocide, and thus move towards building conflict resolution skills and understanding of conflict. There ought to be a broader understanding of the conflict in school curriculum as well as skill building seminars on conflict resolution and identity focused on the individual as multi-faceted. Additionally, NGOs and civil society organizations can establish extra-curricular activities that focus on non-violent conflict resolution, community organizing, and peaceful leadership. Education should also occur outside of the school setting, such as through television and radio programming.

Levels and Spaces for memory

The government of Rwanda ought to continue encouraging diverging narratives of a conflict are not the same between individuals and communities. As a country, Rwanda must acknowledge these divisions, while noting that it is not reason for further division or conflict but rather a strategy for co-existence. The model should be open to including more people and more opinions, in a situation that does not carry legal weight, as the Gacaca Courts did. Nora notes that there is a "push and pull" between actors that create this space. It includes more memory practices, such as memorials or discussion forums, or simply, a change in perception that would allow individuals and communities the freedom to engage with memory as they would like to, without fear of repercussions.

More inclusive memorials: Memorials should tell more than a static narrative of a complex and changing conflict and post-conflict situation. As Werbner suggests, they should be open to a multitude of versions of grief and, thus, the freedom for individuals to engage with memory as they want to. There should be space for individuals to create memorials, or preserve memories. These efforts should be supported and celebrated by communities, civil society, the government, and the international community.

Identity and Memory

Shifting identity: Rwanda should envision itself as a nation where identity is fluid. It is neither statically "Hutu or "Tutsi". "Rwandan." Individuals should be allowed to develop a variety of identities and exist within all of them. Thus, national pride should be celebrated, but not at the expense of other forms of identification. Open and secure dialogue, as opposed to the burying of differences, will foster healing between groups. Thus, there should be space for individuals to engage with memory and be open to the impact it has on their identity. This is a process that can be structured by civil society and government institutions.

Continuous individual and community narratives: All of the above categories seek to create a situation where individuals and communities can write inclusive and healing narratives of their past experiences. More information about the past, mixed with the ability for open public dialogue, will allow individuals and communities to overcome the gaps in the past created by traumatic events and the ongoing imposition of an official memory. Bal et al note the importance of the experience of the narrative frameworks of lives as continuous unities.

The structural changes outlined in the previous sections stem from the overarching need for a more open society in which civil society and strong democratic institutions are developed to guide the process. Rwanda has already started implementing many of the recommended changes. Through opening society up to addressing the past, Rwanda will be able to grapple with the

violence that occurred and the ongoing challenges. Whether the "end result" is continued coexistence or deeper reconciliation, this is a vital process for Rwanda to continue. In the past, unexamined tensions that existed under the surface, made it possible for neighbors and friends to pick up arms against each other. Although it will take generations to heal, it is a necessary direction to move in to protect future generations from the same fate that took hold of the country in 1994.

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