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Assessing Taiwan's Semi-presidentialism: A Within-case Comparison through the Lens of
State Capacity

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by

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State Capacity

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by

Chih-Yung Ho

DEDICATION

In dedication to my beloved late grandparents, Chung Ho and Ling-Ti Chang.

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It has been a long journey that started six years and nine months ago to reach this moment. Along with my doctorate, my wife and I were also blessed with the birth of our adorable first son, Yun-Che, in Santa Barbara; he was named after the city's warm sunshine and clear ocean water. I thank my wife, Yu-Xiu, for being not only the best mom to our son but also so supportive throughout my years of doctoral studies whether in the States or later in Taiwan. The road to my doctorate was not straight. I did not pass my qualifying exam at UC Santa Barbara until the third time being a charm. Thank you, Professor Bruhn, for believing in me and holding my hand through my difficult time, as we both understand that "failure is not an option." I could not have made it without you. Thank you, Professor Weatherford, for always being thoughtful, inspiring, and committed to driving my progress over a year with writing a field paper on state capacity that contributes significantly to my later dissertation research. Thank you, Professor Lien, for granting me admission to UC Santa Barbara in the first place and having cared so much for my family and me. I also want to take this opportunity to extend my heartfelt appreciation to everyone who showed their support in so many ways during my doctoral journey, including Chia-Chien Chang, Tian Wu, Jaedong Choi, and Francisco Brandao, Jr., all of whom were the most dedicated members of our study group; Professor Li-Hsien Sun of Taiwan's National Central University, my statistical consultant and baseball teammate; Uncle Ben and Auntie Suhlan with the devoted care of us whether I was on the east or west coast, not to mention their personal delivery of my Honda CR-V cross country upon our arrival in Santa Barbara; and Auntie Josie Cheng, Auntie Chia-Yu Huang, Chien Sun, Elisa Hsiao, Carol Conley, and Leihua Ye for always

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ABSTRACT

Assessing Taiwan's Semi-presidentialism: A Within-case Comparison through the Lens of
State Capacity

by

Chih-Yung Ho

The Republic of China (ROC) government was transformed into a semi-presidential (SP) system after the 1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments. This constitutional framework has been subject to criticisms for creating a powerful but unaccountable presidency in president-parliamentary congruence (SP majority regime), a political stalemate between the executive and legislative branches in president-parliamentary incongruence (SP minority regime), and an incapable government regardless which political party is in power. My research examines the validity of these criticisms by empirically studying the Presidential (executive)-legislative relationship of variations in ROC's semi-presidentialism (independent variable), namely, SP majority and minority regimes, and its impact on the nation's governance, specifically through the lens of state capacity (dependent variable), from mid-1997 to early 2018. My research methods include hypothesis testing and a power-law analysis. I also build linear regression models to explore if there is a correspondence between trends in approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet in Taiwan and variations in state capacity in the ROC SP regimes over the past twenty-odd years, respectively. Four salient, alternative dimensions of state capacity are examined in this study: extractive/fiscal capacity,

(domestic) coercive/(external) military capacity, administrative/bureaucratic capacity (with a focus on policy coherence/continuity), and legal capacity (with a focus on legislative productivity).

This study uses Taiwan's over two decades of SP experience to test (i.e., confirm or falsify) the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence. The research findings show that the SP majority/minority government division may not be associated with overall state capacity (detected by chi-squared tests). Whereas it makes some differences in several dimensions of state capacity, the KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily affect state capacity, or have effects limited to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity. More specifically, the SP majority regime outperforms its minority counterpart, as hypothetically expected and unexpected, respectively, in fiscal capacity (when measured with changes made by the Legislature to annual general budgets, either in revenue or expenditure) and military capacity (when measured with the natural log of defense budgets in expenditure per capita), amidst long-standing Communist Chinese threats to Taiwan. By contrast, both institutional and party divisions affect legal capacity, but not in the direction expected. Similarly, high frequencies, or power-law distributions of Cabinet official changes (reflective of administrative/bureaucratic capacity) are found in both SP majority and minority regimes (even after the party factor was accounted for), although the latter more evidently followed a self-organized criticality behavior. The institutional factor affects coercive capacity only when it is measured by its performance (violent crime rates per 100,000 population), rather than its capacity per se. The findings also reveal that variations in state capacity in the ROC SP regimes were barely reflected, if

at all, in job approval ratings of the President and the Premier and not reflected for the Cabinet in Taiwan.

These statistical results are synthetically interpreted with two different perspectives, namely of leadership and political culture, based on inputs from my semi-structured interviews with a few leading politicians and senior political journalists in Taiwan. Between my statistical analysis and the interviews, this study tries to build up a complicated but convincing picture of twenty years of governance under the new constitutional arrangements. It seems, for the time being, Taiwan's experience has cast doubt on, if not falsified, the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is better than that in president-parliamentary incongruence.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, a.k.a. KMT) under then-President Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) leadership suffered a stunning defeat in Taiwan's 2016 combined Presidential and Legislative elections on January 16, garnering only 31% of the Presidential popular vote and securing barely 35 seats in the 113-seat Legislature, clearly reflective of the public's disapproval of outgoing Ma's eight-year Presidency. The sound defeat to the pro-Taiwan independent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led by Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) was a sharp reversal of the sweeping 2008 election victories of Ma and his party. Under eight years of KMT rule (2008-2016), the party retained a substantial legislative majority, unlike its DPP predecessor Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) Presidency, which never enjoyed a legislative majority. Conventionally, and perhaps theoretically, the KMT/Ma administration which was given a mandate to govern and enact laws would have had been deemed capable of doing more work with less effort than its DPP/Chen counterpart.

Although Tsai's victory gave the DPP control of the Legislature for the first time in history, her honeymoon with the Taiwanese public ended much sooner than she had hoped. Voters in Taiwan delivered a sharp rebuke to the ruling DPP in the November 2018 midterm (local) elections, repeating the pattern of the KMT's disaster in the 2014 midterm elections and thus signaling that the DPP will be hard-pressed to retain the Presidency in the 2020 election. In 2018, the KMT won 15 out of 22 jurisdictions and the DPP only six. The results were almost an exact reversal of the numbers from the 2014 midterm elections, in which the DPP won 13 jurisdictions and the KMT won only 6. One might wonder how it was possible for the two debacles of Taiwan's ruling parties in "total governance" (完全執政), with a

single party controlling the Presidency and Legislature, in the 2016 general and 2018 local elections to happen. Nevertheless, this study will focus on the national level.

Within the “third wave,” the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan began its democratic transition in the late 1980s, and the ROC government was transformed into a semi-presidential (a.k.a. dual executive) system—a popularly elected presidency with considerable power alongside a premier and cabinet responsible to the parliament, in accordance with the Duvergerian definition (see Chapter 2)—after the 1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments from the spirit of parliamentarism enshrined in a five-branch constitutional framework,¹ as shown in Figure 1.² Semi-presidentialism (hereafter referred to as SP, so is semi-presidential) is a common choice in many third-wave nascent democracies. According to a variety of sources, SP is applied in dozens of countries worldwide, ranging from 20 or so up to approximately one-third of all countries, due to a controversy over its definition (Elgie, 2016).³

¹ The amended ROC Constitution of 1997 still retains the organizational structure of the Presidential Palace and five branches (called “Yuan” meaning house), namely, the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), the Judicial Yuan (an organ that oversees the nation’s court system, with its Council of Grand Justices serving as the sole judicial review authority), the Examination Yuan (empowered to administer the nation’s civil service), and the Control Yuan (the nation’s top watchdog body or ombudsman), based on the national founding father Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s constitutional theory.

² The 1997 Amendments empower the ROC President to appoint the president of the Executive Yuan (the Premier) without Legislative confirmation. With its power to confirm the President’s nomination of the Premier being removed, the Legislative Yuan received the power to vote no-confidence in the Premier by a simple majority in return. And if this scenario happens, the Premier then either resign or request that the President dissolve the Legislative Yuan.

³ The definitional controversy of what constitutes SP in literature leads to a difference in the number of countries that have adopted an SP constitution worldwide. For example, in advancing his post-Duvergerian definition of SP (explained in the next chapter), Robert Elgie (2008 coauthored with McMenamin; 2011) identifies up to 57 SP countries. By contrast, Wu Yu-shan (2006), a co-editor of *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy* (2011) with Elgie (whose essay in this edited volume has been cited immediately above), singles out 33 SP regimes through a sequence of tests on Duverger’s tripartite definition of SP: democracy (democracies or non-democratic regimes), formal (republics or monarchies; prime minister or president as head of government), and substance (I. direct election of the president cum the prime minister responsible to the parliament or indirect election of the president/the prime minister responsible to the president, not the parliament; II. the president with substantive or limited power). Wu further designates 25 of them as “narrowly-

However, SP is a neglected area of study. Compared with lots of work look at presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, there is relatively a paucity of literature on SP, specifically in a comparative perspective, except to suggest that it is likely to end in a democratic breakdown or become authoritarian.⁴ Moreover, given that SP has a rich variety of possibilities with respect to the president-parliamentary relations, hence various subtypes (to be further discussed in Chapter 2), its study can thus uncover valuable insights from structural impact on governance. As a working democracy, Taiwan has shown some significant variations, albeit not as many, in its SP constitutional practice over twenty-odd years, since 1997 (whereas not all SP countries have experienced variations, say, Russia).⁵ Unfortunately, Taiwan is largely ignored in existing Europe-centered SP literature and literature on structural impact on governance in a comparative perspective. This dissertation intends to pose an analytic framework that allows for variations in ROC SP and will thus hopefully be beneficial to empirical SP studies.

defined SP regimes” because of their substantive presidential power while eight with limited presidential power as “broadly-defined SP regimes.” Despite their co-authorship, there remains a noticeable difference between Elgie and Wu with respect to identifying and, thus, counting SP regimes worldwide. Likewise, such a difference can also be detected in reference sources (e.g., survey, yearbook). For example, Freedom House’s annual surveys of 2004 and 2008 reveal that there are 55 and 46 (free and partly free) SP countries in the given years, respectively (as cited in Elgie [2005] and Tsai [2009], respectively, given that Freedom House’s annual reports published on its website for public viewing do not contain a list of government types). The Central Intelligence Agency’s *World Factbook* (2016-2017), however, identifies only 21 SP republics in the world (the latest edition is available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html>). But Taiwan is identified as an SP country for sure regardless of which said source is used.

⁴ However, a debate on the (negative) impact of SP constitutions on democratic performance was recently raised by more optimistic scholars (e.g., Cheibub & Chernykh, 2009) or those whose contribution is valued by further distinguishing between subtypes of SP democracies in relation to democratic survival (e.g., Elgie & Schleiter, 2011). Similar topics in this regard have also emerged in the Taiwanese context, such as (a possible SP effect on) democratic consolidation (Paolino, 2008) and polarization (Chang & Chu, 2008).

⁵ Neither a coalition government was formed, nor did a French-style cohabitation happen in Taiwan.




Figure 1.1. Semi-presidentialism in Taiwan, the Republic of China

Indeed, the ROC on Taiwan is a prominent case in the third wave of democratization, given its position as being the first and only democracy installed in Chinese society, the world’s 22th largest and 19th wealthiest economy,⁶ the 13th most competitive global economy,⁷ one of the world’s “most free” countries in the world,⁸ and ranked 24th worldwide in military strength worldwide,⁹ not to mention its three democratic and peaceful turnovers of ruling parties following five Presidential elections hitherto in the 21st century, which has clearly passed Samuel P. Huntington’s (1991) “two-turnover test” of democratic consolidation. Right after Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential election, which marked the country’s second turnover of ruling parties, the-US President George W. Bush issued a statement congratulating Taiwan as “a beacon of democracy for Asia and the world.”¹⁰

⁶ See the International Monetary Fund’s *World Economic Outlook Database* (October 2018), list of countries by gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP and per capita, respectively, in 2017: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx>.

⁷ The World Economic Forum’s annual *Global Competitiveness Report* assesses the competitiveness landscape of most economies worldwide based on 12 main drivers of productivity, or “pillars,” grouped into four categories: enabling environment, human capital, markets, and the innovation ecosystem. See the *Global Competitiveness Report 2018*: <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2018>.

⁸ In Freedom House’s latest annual report on global freedom released in early 2018, Taiwan scores the highest freedom rating of 1.0 out of 7.0 in both political rights and civil liberties. Overall, Taiwan receives an aggregated score of 93 out of 100, ahead of France (90), Italy (89), the US (86), and South Korea (84). See *Freedom in the World 2018*: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>.

⁹ See military website Global Firepower’s latest, annual survey for 2018: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

¹⁰ See the American Institute in Taiwan website, *U.S. Statements on Taiwan Presidential Election*: <https://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot0802.html>.

Viewed from a domestic perspective, however, the island began to suffer from political turbulence since the DPP Presidential candidate Chen won a plurality in a three-way race and thereby clinched his party's historic first Presidential victory in 2000, ending the KMT's half-century rule in Taiwan. Without enjoying a legislative majority or adopting a French-style cohabitation, the DPP administration by Chen was mired in political gridlock, albeit re-elected on a razor-thin margin of 0.2% in 2004 after the 3/19 Shooting Incident (三一九槍擊案), the mystery-shrouded "assassination" attempt on Chen.¹¹ This difficult situation was further compounded by a series of corruption scandals surrounding the then-First Family that did not begin to surface until Chen's second term. In 2008, the KMT returned to power on the back of its presidential nominee Ma's landslide victory with over 58% of the vote, a record, together with its sweeping victory in the earlier Legislative race, an absolute majority of 81 seats out of 113. Chen was arrested in late the same year, making history as the first former ROC President to be jailed.

Although the KMT enjoyed what then-President Ma called "total governance" in his eight-year, two-term Presidency (2008-2016), and so had the party prior to 2000, such political advantage did not necessarily ensure satisfactory results in governance. Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and Mainland China during the Ma administration became the most stable they had ever been since 1949. However, the public's dissatisfaction with Ma's performance grew, primarily due to the government's handling of the deteriorating economy and his pursuit of closer Mainland ties. The Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運) erupted in the spring of 2014 over a dispute about a trade liberalization pact with Beijing, which saw

¹¹ On March 19, the eve of the 2004 Presidential election, then-President Chen was shot and slightly injured. Chen was accused of staging the shooting to win sympathy votes that made himself squeeze past his KMT rival, Lien Chan (連戰). Lien contested the outcome but lost his case after two court trials (Hung, 2007).

thousands of student-led demonstrators storm and occupy the parliament building, a first in the nation's history. The unprecedented occupation movement shut down the parliament and lasted 24 days, ending up successfully blocking the ratification of the trade pack (Loa, 2014). Throughout most of his second term of Presidency, Ma's job approval ratings hovered below 20% and once plummeted to a single digit percentage,¹² heralding the KMT's disastrous defeats in the 2014 local and 2016 general elections.¹³

The DPP swept back into power in 2016 and enjoyed its first "total governance": Tsai became the island's first female President in a landslide victory, winning 56% of the vote to her KMT opponent's 31%; the DPP won a legislative majority for the first time in Taiwan's democratic history, with 68 seats compared with the KMT's 35. Like her predecessor Ma, Tsai's popularity plummeted early in her Presidency, mainly due to economic stagnation and her controversial pension reform efforts. A poll released by local broadcaster TVBS in mid-February 2017 revealed that Tsai's approval rating sank to 29% since she was inaugurated about nine months ago, compared with Ma's 28% after his first nine months in office in TVBS's earlier poll in late February 2009.¹⁴

It is further recalled that in the summer of 1997, then-ROC President cum KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who is the first-ever popularly elected President in Chinese history and orchestrated the 1997 Constitutional Amendments, asserted that the new ROC SP regime would guarantee the country's future stability and peaceful development for

¹² In the wake of the "September Strife" (馬王「九月政爭」) of 2013, a power struggle in which Ma, who doubled as KMT chairman, failed to revoke then-Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng's (王金平) KMT party membership for lobbying in a court case, a move that could strip him of the post, Ma's approval plunged to a record-low 9.2% (Wang, 2013).

¹³ The Presidential and Legislative elections were held concurrently in 2012 for the first time and again in 2016.

¹⁴ See the opinion polls at <http://other.tvbs.com.tw/export/sites/tvbs/file/other/poll-center/0602091.pdf> and <http://other.tvbs.com.tw/export/sites/tvbs/file/other/poll-center/even-20090226185206.pdf>.

next thirty years. Ironically, these words are still ringing in the ears of most people in Taiwan. Now that it has been over twenty years since Taiwan adopted SP, during which the island has experienced “total governance” and minority government following three turnovers of ruling parties, it is a good time to systematically examine how the constitutional engineering affects governance, specifically through the lens of state capacity, across different administrations in Taiwan.

Overall, we see president-parliamentary congruence, or “total governance,” in the last three years of Lee’s rule, most of Ma’s Presidency, and the current Tsai administration. It peaked during Ma’s first term and Tsai’s current, with their parties enjoying a dominant majority, or nearly a three-quarters and two-thirds supermajority, respectively, in the Legislative Yuan. By contrast, Chen’s two terms as President and Ma’s caretaker period of about four months¹⁵ exemplify president-parliamentary incongruence, given their minority status in the Legislature. Again, the history of governments in democratic Taiwan after 1997 seems not to leave majority governance looking more successful than others, thus having the makings of an interesting puzzle of why “total governance” does not lead to greater voter satisfaction with the ruling SP regime in Taiwan, or, in a more articulated and measurable way: Does the majority/minority status division make difference to govern? And if it does, don’t people perceive the difference? To clarify this puzzle is important to understand and explain why the KMT in “total governance” lost so badly in the 2016 Presidential and Legislative elections as its DPP/minority counterpart in 2008?¹⁶

¹⁵ The latest 2016 presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently on January 16. The new Legislative Yuan convened on February 1 and the new President was inaugurated on May 20.

¹⁶ Taiwan’s SP constitutional framework has long been subject to criticisms for creating a powerful but unaccountable Presidency. The issue of whether to amend the Constitution to adopt a parliamentary system was therefore raised by the 2016 Presidential election, albeit with great difficulty and, more importantly, a lack of consensus in the island.

1.2 Research questions and objectives

This dissertation conducts an empirical analysis of **the presidential (executive)-legislative relationship of variation in ROC SP (independent variable)** and its impact on the country's **state capacity (dependent variable)** from 1997 to early 2018. Given the dual-legitimacy feature of SP—both the president and the legislative majority (theoretically, of the premier) can claim separate mandates to govern, the government cannot function well without sufficient legislative support. As a tentative explanation, it is assumed that the more SP systems reach president-parliamentary congruence, the more productive they become.

Second, there is a wide array of definitions of governance, some of which appear very inclusive (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), whereas considerable disagreement remains over how to define governance (Rotberg, 2014). This dissertation seeks to unpack the notion of and examine governance by means of multiple alternative dimensions of state capacity. State capacity in literature can be conceptualized as six distinct, yet interrelated, dimensions, each being considered as illustrative of the most crucial and defining elements of governance: extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity; coercive/military capacity; classic Weberian administrative/bureaucratic capacity; legal capacity; infrastructural capacity; and transformative (and distributive) capacity. In Chapter 2, a literature review examines the six dimensions of state capacity in a two-fold form: conceptualization and operationalization (either analyzable or measurable) and recommends with a parsimonious principle that extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal capacities be selected for analysis because of their more distinguishable features.

This dissertation aims to address three research questions about the constitutional

structural impact on governance:

1. What is the relationship between president-parliamentary mode of interaction, i.e., congruence or incongruence, and state capacity to govern? Does it stick with the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence?¹⁷

This is the main question of this dissertation and can be rephrased, given that conventional wisdom tentatively applied in the Taiwanese context, in more detail as follows: Is Taiwan's state capacity in "total governance," namely, of the KMT/Lee administration in 1997-2000, the KMT/Ma administration in 2008-early 2016, and the current DPP/Tsai administration, higher than that in minority governance, namely, of the DPP/Chen administration in 2000-2008 and the KMT/Ma administration in February-May 2016? However, a continuous lack of voter satisfaction with the ruling regime, followed by successive defeats in general elections, seems to imply two possibilities: One, that the majority/minority government division makes no difference. And two, that it does, but that people do not perceive the difference (say, as shown in opinion polls), which may be a sign of a crisis in governance. Testing the latter leads to my third question listed below. Additionally, one may wonder if there is a difference in state capacity between SP majority and minority regimes under the same-party rule in Taiwan? So far (as of early 2018), there has been 16 ROC SP duarchies, including nine majority and seven minority regimes (Table 1.1; see also changes in parliamentary composition of Taiwan since 1996 in Table 1.2). Again, the dual legitimacy accentuates the importance of president-parliamentary congruence.

¹⁷ This idea is inspired by, and therefore complement, the debates on parliamentarism and the separation of powers and, in the US context, the performance of united vs. divided government.

2. Regardless of how varying state capacity is at an aggregate level, do all dimensions of state capacity respond similarly to the majority/minority government division? If they do not, which dimension is more or most reactive to the majority/minority government division?
3. Can the people in Taiwan perceive and appreciate differences, if any, in state capacity? From the perspective of responsible party government, “total governance” theoretically makes it easier for voters to attribute blame for incompetent governance, thereby throwing out an incompetent party government, which may be signs of a healthy democracy. The answer to this question might thus help us understand if such a healthy democracy is accessible.

In a word, all of these can become subsumed in a more fundamental research question: Is SP good for Taiwan

Table 1.1. The ROC Semi-presidential Duarchies

Duarchy	Premier: party affiliation	Period	Legislative (working) majority	Regime subtype: further sub-classification ^a
KMT/Lee-Lien	Lien Chan (連戰): KMT	Feb. 1993-Sept. 1997	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
KMT/Lee-Siew	Vincent C. Siew (蕭萬長): KMT	Sept. 1997-May 2000	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
DPP/Chen-Tang	Tang Fei (唐飛): KMT	May 2000-Oct. 2000	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp ^b	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision/a Finnish compromise) or cohabitation in dispute ^c
DPP/Chen-Chang	Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄): DPP ^d	Oct. 2000-Feb. 2002	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision)
DPP/Chen-Yu	Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃): DPP	Feb. 2002-Feb. 2005	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision)
DPP/Chen-Hsieh	Frank Hsieh Chang-ting (謝長廷): DPP	Feb. 2005-Jan. 2006	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision)
DPP/Chen-Su	Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌): DPP	Jan. 2006-May 2007	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision)
DPP/Chen-Chan	Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄): DPP	May 2007-May 2008	KMT-led pan-Blue Camp	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (collision)
KMT/Ma-Liu	Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄): KMT	May 2008-Sept. 2009	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
KMT/Ma-Wu	Wu Den-yih (吳敦義): KMT	Sept. 2009-Feb. 2012	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
KMT/Ma-Chen	Sean Chen Chun (陳冲): KMT	Feb. 2012-Feb. 2013	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
KMT/Ma-Jiang	Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺): KMT	Feb. 2013-Dec. 2014	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
KMT/Ma-Mao	Mao Chi-kuo (毛治國): KMT	Dec. 2014-Jan. 2016	KMT	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism

Table 1.1. (cont.)

Duarchy	Premier: party affiliation	Period	Legislative (working) majority	Regime subtype: further sub-classification ^a
KMT/Ma-Chang	Simon Chang San-cheng (張善政): Independent	Jan. 2016-May 2016	DPP	<i>m</i> : minority/divided gov't (caretaker Cabinet) ^e
DPP/Tsai-Lin	Lin Chuan (林全): Independent (albeit long, informally affiliated with the DPP) ^f	May 2016-Sept. 2017	DPP	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism
DPP Tsai-Lai	William Lai Ching-de (賴清德): DPP	Sept. 2017-Jan. 2019	DPP	<i>M</i> : super-presidentialism

Note: Data for the period of duarchy from the website of the ROC Executive Yuan: <http://www.ey.gov.tw>

- a. *M* = SP majority regime; *m* = SP minority regime (see also discussions of SP regime subtypes and their further sub-classifications in Chapter 2.)
- b. In recent years (specifically, after 2000), two major but loose political coalitions were formed in Taiwan due to increased political polarization: the pro-unification pan-Blue Camp led by the KMT and included the New Party (NP) and the People First Party (PFP), both splinter parties of the KMT, and the pro-independence pan-Green Camp led by the DPP and included the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and the New Power Party (NPP) which emerged from the Sunflower Movement in 2014. Since the NP and the PFP had grown out of the KMT, their coalition was named after the color of the KMT emblem, and so did the DPP-led pan-Green Camp. Since the 2012 general elections, however, the PFP leaders have become less enthusiastic about their alliance with KMT, sometimes swinging toward the DPP.
- c. The Chen-Tang duarchy, or Chen's first Cabinet, but led by a KMT-affiliated Premier, is more commonly considered as a compromise (closer to the Finnish "division of labor" system, but with less presidential concessions) rather than a French-style cohabitation because the KMT was not granted the power to form a new Cabinet nor was its then-Chairman Lien Chan officially consulted prior to Tang's appointment (Wu, 2000, 2007). Tang stepped down after only 137 days because of a disagreement with Chen over the country's controversial fourth nuclear power plant. By contrast, Robert Elgie (2005) views the short-lived Tang Cabinet as an example of cohabitation. Tang Fei is a retired ROC four-star Air Force general. Before being appointed to form a new Cabinet, he was outgoing President Lee Teng-hui's Defense Minister.
- d. Chang was the nation's first DPP-affiliated Premier. He was declared "persona non grata" by the Legislature, a first in the ROC Constitutional history, soon after he was sworn in in 2000 because of his decision to halt construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. Chang was unprecedentedly appointed to the

Premiership for a second time more than five years after he resigned from the post.

- e. Although the DPP won both the Presidency and a majority in the Legislature in 2016, then-President-elect and DPP Chairwoman Tsai rejected then-President Ma's request on constitutional grounds to form a Legislative majority-led Cabinet, i.e., cohabitation, during a nearly four-month gap between the seating of the new Legislature on February 1 and Tsai's inauguration on May 20.
- f. Although Lin has never joined the DPP, he started his political career being a political appointee of former Mayor Chen Shui-bian of Taipei and later served as a Cabinet member during much of Chen's Presidency. Before his premiership, Lin led the DPP-affiliated think tank, the New Frontier Foundation, for two years (Tai & Chen, 2016).

Table 1.2. Parliamentary Composition during the ROC Semi-presidentialism^a

Term of the Legislative Yuan (period)	Total number of seats	Number (%) of seats by party/coalition (elections results) ^b						
		KMT	NP	PFP	DPP	TSU	NPP	Others
3rd (Feb. 1996-Jan. 1999)	164	85 (51.8)	21 (12.8)	--	54 (32.9)	--	--	4 (2.4)
4th (Feb. 1999-Jan. 2002)	225	123 (54.7)	11 (4.9)	--	70 (31.1)	--	--	21 (9.3)
5th (Feb. 2002-Jan. 2005)	225	68 (30.2)	1 (0.4)	46 (20.4)	87 (38.7)	13 (5.8)	--	10 (4.4)
		Pan-Blue = 115 (51.1)			Pan-Green = 100 (44.4)			
6th (Feb. 2005-Jan. 2008)	225	79 (35.1)	1 (0.4)	34 (15.1)	89 (39.6)	12 (5.3)	--	10 (4.4)
		Pan-Blue = 114 (50.7)			Pan-Green = 101 (44.9)			
7th (Feb. 2008-Jan. 2012)	113	81 (71.7)	0 (0)	1 (0.9)	27 (23.9)	0 (0)	--	4 (3.5)
		Pan-Blue = 84 (72.6)			Pan-Green = 27 (23.9)			
8th (Feb. 2012-Jan. 2016)	113	64 (56.6)	0 (0)	3 (2.7)	40 (35.4)	3 (2.7)	--	3 (2.7)
		Pan-Blue = 64 (56.6)			Pan-Green = 43 (38.1)			
9th (Feb. 2016-Jan. 2020)	113	35 (31.0)	0 (0)	3 (2.7)	68 (60.2)	0 (0)	5 (4.4)	2 (1.8)
		Pan-Blue = 35 (31.0)			Pan-Green = 73 (64.6)			

Note: Adapted from the website of the Parliamentary Library of the ROC Legislative Yuan: <https://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage>

a. In accordance with the ROC Constitution and its 1991 Amendments, the size of the Legislative Yuan is proportional to population. The 1997 Amendments

increased the total seats of the Legislative Yuan to 225. The latest amendments in 2005 created a two-ballot electoral system incorporating single-member districts and party-list seats, halved the number of Legislative seats to 113, and extended legislators' terms of office from three years to four, effective as of the 7th Legislative Yuan.

- b. See a description of Taiwan's major political parties and coalitions in footnote b of Table 1.1. (The percentage was rounded to one decimal place.)

On balance, as this dissertation attempts to draw inferences about the effect of SP engineering on governance unpacked into components of state capacity, several other variables that have to be taken into account in interpreting results, as follows:

1. Political parties: Two possibilities are held out: One, that given the same SP majority/minority status, ROC government ruled by different political parties may vary in their governance capabilities. Conventionally, one may expect different ruling parties in the same majority/minority status to behave similarly. And two, that given the same ruling party, majority governance may not outperform its minority counterpart as conventionally expected. If things go either way, the party factor seems to have explanatory power to decipher causal mechanisms of the central puzzle of this study. In other words, it is possible for political parties to have an effect on state capacity alongside SP structural variations.
2. Leadership: the “quality” of the package of traits of the President, Premier, and major party and legislative leaders, often reflective of how they interact with one another. For example, the “September Strife” between then-President Ma and Legislative Speaker Wang, briefly described above in footnote 12, is widely seen as an outgrowth of their being not in synchronization with important legislation, albeit both KMT-affiliated.
3. Taiwan’s political culture, rooted in traditional Chinese culture and influenced by the

KMT's past authoritarian rule, that has dominated the country since its democratization at the turn of the 1990s. Taiwan's polarized ideological politics is also a concern of interest.

This dissertation pursues three core objectives that fill gaps in research on the constitutional structural impact assessment of governance in nascent non-European SP democracies. The first is to investigate and evaluate the selected alternative dimensions of state capacity in different SP regimes in Taiwan. While there exists a handful of literature that studies and compares the consequences of different systems of government (parliamentary, presidential, and SP) on governance either theoretically (Sartori, 1994) or empirically (Weaver & Rockman, 1993, via patterned policies), very few studies have been conducted on the same topic but with SP variations involved (e.g., a case study of Mongolia by Sophia Moestrup and Gombuserengiin Ganzorig [2007]), let alone through the lens of state capacity. Nor is Taiwan included in a transnational structure-governance study (e.g., Lijphart, 2012). My dissertation thus provides a different perspective from Taiwan, a working democracy, to understand how SP variations affect governance unpacked in a multi-dimensional assessment of state capacity.

The second objective is to test the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary

incongruence by using over two decades of SP practice in Taiwan. Again, since many nascent democracies have embraced SP, once this conventional wisdom becomes falsifiable in the Taiwanese context, one cannot help but wonder if SP would remain a viable choice for those countries like Taiwan. Regardless of the results, I do believe that Taiwan's experience will be instructive for nascent democracies, particularly non-European SP ones. My dissertation will thus fill a niche in the structure-governance literature.

The third and the ultimate objective of this dissertation is to assess the 1997 Constitutional reform that created the SP in Taiwan. I will subsequently utilize the findings to suggest potential future initiatives that the people of Taiwan could consider.

1.3 Structure of chapters

This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literature review divided into five parts, aiming to derive a working SP typology, select salient dimensions of state capacity (along with implications on the selectivity for measurements for statistical analysis), introduce the power law (rarely applied in political science, but serves to help understand Cabinet longevity, a concept centering on policy coherence and continuity), and develop hypotheses for this dissertation through an overview of previous literature on the impact of president-parliamentary congruence/incongruence on governance. Chapter 3

details my within-case research design, research methodologies, quantitative (statistical and regression analyses) and qualitative (semi-structured interviews) as required in a triangulation, and data collection and instrumentations. Chapter 4 presents the findings from the quantitative methods, followed by interpretations suggested by interviewees and mine. Chapter 5 is conclusions of my dissertation, where I summarize the results with implications and indicate its contributions and limitations, as well as the directions of future research.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Introduction

The central puzzle underlying this study is whether the semi-presidential majority/minority government division makes difference in governance, especially in the Taiwanese context. This chapter then presents a review of literature focused on three major themes I tackle surrounding this puzzle: (1) defining and conceptualizing the two main variables of interest: (the variation within) semi-presidentialism (IV) and (multiple alternative dimensions of) state capacity (DV); (2) power law and its applications in empirical studies (albeit rarely applied in political science); and (3) the impact of president-parliamentary congruence vs. incongruence on governance. It is followed by a section that outlines the formation of hypotheses in this dissertation.

It is worth emphasizing that the first theme addressed the fundamental issues of operationalizing semi-presidentialism and state capacity for this study. Simply put, a simple, dichotomous typology of semi-presidentialism (majority vs. minority regimes) was therefore derived.¹ And the purpose of understanding the multi-dimensional notion of state capacity, drawn from the comparative politics (CP) literature and supplemented by the American politics (AP) literature, is to not only provide the rationale for singling out the four salient dimensions of state capacity for this study, namely, extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal, but to help develop appropriate indicators for the respective dimensions.

¹ For the sake of simplicity, “semi-presidentialism” and “semi-presidential” are both hereafter denoted as SP in this chapter.

2.1 Semi-presidentialism and typologies

My first task is to define the independent variable, SP regime type. Theorists of SP systems have conceptualized these regimes as varying in the distribution of power among political parties. In his seminal work, Maurice Duverger (1980) advanced the concept of a SP regime, giving an original, classic tripartite definition: (1) the directly-elected president; (2) government responsible to the parliament; and (3) significant presidential powers.² To put in a nutshell, SP is a constitutional system based on dual legitimacy,³ i.e., the presidency vs. the legislative majority (upon which the premier and ministers can survive), allowing the system to alternate or oscillate (on the continuum) between presidentialism (under unified or divided government) and parliamentarism (under cohabitation, when the president and the premier are of opposing political parties) (Duverger, 1980; Lijphart, 2012). Accordingly, the president of the French Fifth Republic, the model case of SP, has ultimate power only when his party enjoys a parliamentary majority currently; if not, the (French) president is stipulated by the constitution to hold power over defense and foreign policy (Chou, 2000).⁴ Given its nature of dual legitimacy, SP is more commonly called the “dual executive system” (雙首長制) in

² Nearly twenty years later, Robert Elgie (1999, 2004) proposed a post-Duvergerian definition of SP, in which he ruled out “significant presidential powers” to avoid judgement on how powerful a president is, or can be (referred to relational properties) and thus focus on the core (or dispositional properties) of SP.

³ Juan J. Linz (1990, 1994) poses a nettlesome problem of dual legitimacy in presidential systems, in which the president and assembly have competing claims to legitimacy, given that both are popularly elected and thereby the survival of each is independent from the other. This problem, as Linz puts it, confuses voters: who can represent the will of the people, the president or the assembly? Likewise, semi-presidentialism generates a similar problem that has to do with dual-legitimacy when president’s party is not a legislative majority, thus resulting in intra-executive conflict or power struggle between the president who is popularly elected and the premier who relies on the confidence of a parliament (i.e., dual executive responsibility). Some scholars attribute the power struggle between the president and the premier to political instability in SP (e.g., Linz, 1994; Sui, 2002). Although cohabitation is considered as a pragmatic solution to this problem, such an achievement is rarely reached in nascent semi-presidential democracies. Wu Yu-shan (2006) further identifies the institutional core of SP based on the issue of dual legitimacy as “dual chains of legitimacy, command, and responsibility” (dual CLCRs).

⁴ There have been three periods of cohabitation in France’s Fifth Republic since its creation in 1958: 1986-1988, 1993-1995, and 1997-2002.

Taiwan.

Since SP is considered as a constitutional engineering that emphasizes (dynamic) variations in the relationship between the president and parliament, it provides a richer variety of subtypes than its presidential and parliamentary counterparts. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey (1992) classify SP into two separate subtypes: “premier-presidential” and “president-parliamentary” regimes. They refer to the former as the Duvergerian definition of SP and specify the latter as a SP regime with the primacy of the president (who appoints/dismisses cabinet ministers and has power to dissolve parliament), plus the dependence of the president’s cabinet on parliament (i.e., cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence). Both subtypes must have a popularly elected president. Following suit with the above typology, David J. Samuel and Matthew S. Shugart (2010) label Taiwan (1992-1997) as a dual-executive, SP system or specifically a “premier-presidential” regime even before the amendments made in 1997, while identifying the country in the post-amendment period (1997-2007) as a “president-parliamentary” regime.

Like Shugart and his co-authors, Shuy Jen-ron and Le Bing-kuan (2002) develop an operational dichotomous SP typology, although more intuitive and straightforward: the majority vs. minority regime systems. The majority regime system occurs when a political party concurrently enjoys the presidency and a parliamentary majority, hence executive superiority. It is placed into three further subtypes by the strength of presidential predominance over policy making, from most to least: (1) super-presidentialism (or quasi-presidential semi-presidentialism; see also Shen, 2014); (2) intra-party or intra-coalition cohabitation; and (3) premier-led semi-presidentialism. The minority regime system, by contrast, occurs when the president’s party does not win a parliamentary majority, hence

legislative inferiority. It also contains three further subtypes: (1) cohabitation; (2) the minority/divided government; and (3) the coalition government. The minority/divided government, as Wu Yu-shan (2000, 2006) suggests, can be separated into the “collision” and “presidential supremacy” modes. In the former mode, the president fights the parliamentary majority by appointing his own favorite as premier, and the parliament may react by casting a no-confidence vote against the government, and then the president may retaliate by dissolving the parliament. In the latter mode, the president persists, and the parliament yields.

Robert Elgie (2005) categorizes SP regimes into three groups when accounting for differences in the degree of presidential power (which he calls relational properties when taking an initiative in refining the Duvergerian definition of SP [see footnote 2]): (1) highly presidentialized semi-presidential regimes (of authoritarian tendencies, such as in Russia); (2) (parliamentary-like) semi-presidential regimes with ceremonial presidents and strong premiers (in Ireland and Slovenia, for example); and (3) semi-presidential regimes with a balance of presidential and prime-ministerial powers (exemplified by the French typical model). According to him, many countries of balanced SP have experienced periods of cohabitation which may serve to solve intra-executive conflict. Even though cohabitation occurred in nascent democracies with fragile systems, namely, in Mongolia, Poland, and briefly in Taiwan (referred to the Chen-Tang duarchy), fostering power struggles (albeit surmountable) between the president and the premier, democracy in these three countries has survived.

The SP typology elaborated by Shuy and Le and Wu satisfies the need of my study to focus on president-parliamentary congruence and incongruence as an explanatory variable. Thus, I applied it in my study, with the two SP regime subtypes being renamed the majority

regime and minority regime for simplicity. Table 2.1 presents the adopted SP typology.

Table 2.1. Configurations within Dual Legitimacy under Semi-presidentialism

Presidency	Parliamentary majority	Regime subtype and further sub-classification
✓	✓	Majority regime (president-parliamentary congruence): ^a 1. Super-presidentialism (or quasi-presidential SP) 2. Intra-party or intra-coalition cohabitation 3. Premier-led SP
✓	✗	Minority regime (president-parliamentary incongruence, with more veto players): 1. Cohabitation 2. Minority/divided government: 2.1 Collision 2.2 Presidential supremacy 3. Coalition government

Note: Summarized primarily from Shuy & Le (2002); Wu (2000, 2006).

a. The SP majority regime in Taiwan is commonly described as enjoying “total governance” or winning “complete power.”

2.2 Alternative dimensions of state capacity

The second task is to define, conceptualize, and operationalize the dependent variable, state capacity. As already stated in the introduction chapter, one of the aims of this dissertation is to define a workable notion of governance and thus investigate any differences in governance between different ROC SP regimes. Since state capacity has emerged as a core concept in political science, particularly important within the literature on cross-national comparisons of governance quality, it can alternatively serve to unpack the notion of governance. Generally, state capacity is conceptualized in the CP literature through six major dimensions which emphasize different functions that the state performs, connoting the complexity of conceptualizing and measuring governance. It includes extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity, coercive/military capacity, classic Weberian administrative/bureaucratic capacity, legal capacity, infrastructural capacity, and

transformative (and distributive) capacity.⁵ The CP typology is commonly utilized in the literature on American Political Development (APD) (e.g., Hacker [2002]; Weaver & Rockman [1993]).⁶

On the other hand, one should be aware that some literature in AP (including APD) has traditionally emphasized the “exceptionalism” of American state formation, producing analyses that view state capacity through a different lens. On balance, in these strands of AP literature, the juxtaposition of a weak state (or even a state of being “stateless”) and strong outcomes exemplifies American exceptionalism (King & Liberman, 2009; Skowronek, 1982. See also Huntington [1968] and Nettl [1968] for the notion of the early American state as “stateless”). The conceptualization of American state capacity (-cum-American “exceptionalism”) mainly derives from separation of powers (Binder, 2014; Mayhew 2005; Weaver & Rockman, 1993), federalism (Johnson, 2007), and a vibrant, independent private-sector economy, together with the idea of limited government (Hacker, 2002; King & Liberman, 2009). However, American “exceptionalism” should not be overstated, and the literature review on state capacity needs to stay within circumscribed borders, hence manageable. This section is thus organized by the CP typology of state capacity, with

⁵ Luciana Cingolani (2013) coins the term “political capacity” and conceptualizes it by emphasizing how veto/institutional players (political party, Congress, etc.) exert leverage over policymaking (and its performance). The literature referable to the notion of “political capacity” include George Tsebelis (1995) who applies a veto player framework to explain the variance in policy stability in different political systems (regime or party system), and the edited volume by Paul D. Pierson and R. Kent Weaver (1993) that investigates whether forms of government influence government capabilities in the US (separation of powers) and other advanced democracies, especially those with parliamentary systems (concentration of power). Likewise, the notion of “political capacity” can also be exemplified by Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand (2006), Arend Lijphart (2012), and Giovanni Sartori (1994). Nevertheless, I opted not to incorporate “political capacity” as an alternative dimension of state capacity for analysis in my dissertation for two reasons. First, “political capacity” is not a popular category, not to mention its complicated dynamics caused by different institutional settings (constitutional properties). Second, I take state capacity as dependent variable for the dissertation, whereas “political capacity” is treated in literature as independent variable.

⁶ APD is a growing subfield of American Politics dedicated to studying and explaining changes in American political system, with important links to other fields of political science as well as other disciplines, such as History and Sociology.

conceptual counterparts in the AP literature being incorporated in the review of a compatible dimension, so as to provide a systematic and integrative analysis of state capacity.

Before we enter upon detailed discussions of individual dimensions, here is a sketch of the general idea of operationalization of state capacity for the quantitative purpose, particularly in CP: Scholars have adopted a wide array of indicators (as proxies) to measure different dimensions of state capacity and connect them with outcomes (Cingolani, 2013; Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Savoia & Sen, 2015). And in many single studies, state capacity is evaluated by using multiple indicators, each of which may represent or involve a different dimension of the CP typology of state capacity (e.g., Fortin, 2010).⁷ Additionally, many organizations, whether international or domestic, are also substantial providers of quantitative cross-national indicators of state capacity (e.g., the WGI indicators⁸ and the IRIS data set⁹). In this section, I examine each alternative dimension of state capacity in a two-fold form: namely, conceptualization and operationalization (either measurable or

⁷ Jessica Fortin (2010) proposes a five-item index to operationalize and measure state capacity in 26 post-communist countries, namely, tax revenue (extractive/fiscal capacity), corruption (administrative/bureaucratic capacity), infrastructure reform (infrastructural capacity), property rights protection, and contract intensive money (both latter legal capacity).

⁸ In much of literature, state capacity is closely related to good governance (e.g., Fukuyama, 2004, 2013), albeit not identical (which I will explain in the next paragraph of the text: capacity vs. performance). The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project by the World Bank provides a generic set of aggregate, survey-based (sub-concept) indicators that measure six key dimensions of governance: 1. “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”; 2. “Government Effectiveness”; 3. “Regulatory Quality”; 4. “Rule of Law”; 5. “Control of Corruption”; and 6. “Voice and Accountability.” The WGI capture the notion of coercive/military (1), administrative/bureaucratic (2 and 5), and legal (4, 6, and perhaps 3) capacities (see further definitions for each WGI indicator on the WGI website at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>).

⁹ The IRIS data set was first constructed in 1993 by Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer based on expert survey data obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by the Syracuse, New York-based Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The data set contains six ICRG variables of political risks scored for state capacity: 1. “corruption in government”; 2. “rule of law”; 3. “bureaucratic quality”; 4. “ethnic tensions”; 5. “repudiation of contracts by government;” and 6. “risk of expropriation.” It provides useful indexes to measure administrative/bureaucratic (1 and 3) and legal (2, 5, and 6) capacities (see the latest, current version of IRIS data set, or IRIS-3, and ICRG data on the website of the PRS Group at <http://www.prsgroup.com>).

analyzable, say, through offering a historical account, the former including direct and/or indirect [proxy] measurements).¹⁰

Capacity is not equivalent to (its) performance, albeit not necessarily completely dissociated. Capacity is the potential, i.e., a necessary but not sufficient condition, for (good) performance, rather than performance per se. Nevertheless, state capacity is often measured via an indirect proxy(ies) for performance on patterned policy “outputs” or “outcomes,” instead of indicators or a direct proxy(ies) of the concept of state capacity per se. Policy “outputs” usually refer to legislation/enactment or the process of policy implementation, whereas policy “outcomes” are the effect, via changed behavior of, say, economic or social actors, i.e., results of policy implementation (or, in a more general sense, performance on governance).^{11, 12} Given the necessity of offering a thorough conceptual clarification, I distinguish between capacity and performance when discussing operationalization. This section enumerates the dimensions of state capacity, discussing their conceptualization and operationalization.

¹⁰ Operationalizing state capacity in the literature would not always lead to quantitative measures or, more specifically, direct, measurable indicators of a dimension of state capacity, say, the use of government revenue as a percentage of GDP for fiscal capacity. Instead, it sometimes would serve as an analyzable key element of the concept of, or an indirect proxy for assessing, a targeted dimension of state capacity. For example, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans (1985) operationalize the state’s transformative capacity as “effectiveness of state intervention in the economy,” but they do not connect this proxy, albeit still analyzable, with any measurable indicators in an empirical setting.

¹¹ David Vogel’s (1986) empirical, comparative study of the impact of structural choices on pollution reduction between the United States and Britain can illustrate these differences. In this study, policy outputs are: (a) the environmental regulations adopted by the two countries, and (b) the issue of how bureaucrats implement pollution control policies (i.e., the difference in the process of policy implementation between the two countries): little discretion left for the Environmental Protection Agency in the US separation of powers vs. more discretion left for the Department of the Environment bureaucrats in the British parliamentary system. The performance on pollution reduction, and in relation to costs to the government and private firms, in the two countries are policy outcomes.

¹² Just a note that legislation/enactment does not necessarily have to be deemed to measure performance. It could serve instead as a direct measurement of legal capacity in itself, which will be explained in further detail in the subsection on that capacity.

2.2.1 Extractive/Schumpeterian fiscal capacity

Conceptualization

This dimension of state capacity emphasizes the state's ability to extract resources from the society, particularly in the form of tax revenues. It is closely associated with Joseph A. Schumpeter's fiscal sociology which he elaborated in his 1918 work *Crisis of the Tax State*. According to Schumpeter (1918/1991; see also Musgrave, 1992), the income tax is appropriate for a minimal modern state, i.e., the tax state, to survive rising costs of administration and war. However, in order not to dampen people's enthusiasm for production that is taxable, the tax state must respect the autonomy of the private economy and its power of taxation needs to be limited. Otherwise the tax state will collapse. Similarly, Charles Tilly's (1975) study of state formation in Western European shares insights with Schumpeter's notion of state capacity: "Stateness" is defined by building a repressive state apparatus that enables a more effective extraction of resources.

The rationale behind either Schumpeter's tax state or Tilly's "stateness" can also be extended to explain why the state's extractive/fiscal capacity (or more specifically, tax revenue-raising ability) is considered positively related to the emergence of administrative/bureaucratic capacity (Savoia & Sen, 2015). Some scholars further distinguish between "income taxes" and "taxes on trade" for revenue with an emphasis on the former's nature of a more administrative complexity, thus referring the two different sources of tax revenue to administrative and extractive capacities, respectively (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Lieberman, 2002).

Some other strands of CP literature on extractive/fiscal capacity associate the concept more generally with the provision of public goods, which, I afraid, is problematic since

collecting revenue and spending on public goods are not necessarily the same thing. Margaret Levi (1988), for example, defines state capacity as the state's ability to provide collective goods by raising revenue while tax policy choices are subject to internal political constraints, including rulers' bargaining power, the transaction costs of measuring taxes, and ruler's mandate duration. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011) see state capacity as capital investment and argue that incumbents can use some revenues to invest in taxing that allows higher future tax collection, being conducive to the provision of more quality public goods. Some strands of AP literature with a focus on the relationship between budget and public policy (e.g., Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), or between revenue and spending (e.g., Schick, 1993, through the lens of deficit reduction) share a similar conceptualization of extractive/fiscal capacity being assessed as above (in CP) in this paragraph. The conceptualization of extractive/fiscal capacity provided in these strands of literature is flawed by two unjustified assumptions. First, the literature ignores the difference between the state's revenue and expenditure, the latter of which hinges on how to "use" the former. In other words, the government, either theoretically or practically, has discretion in determining how to draw up a budget (for "use") no matter how much tax revenue would enter the treasury, hence turning out to be a surplus, balanced, or deficit budget. In this sense, only when the government operates under a balanced budget rule, can one opt against distinguishing expenditure from revenue. The second assumption is rested on a faulty premise that the government must use revenue to provide public goods, say, infrastructural development or national defense. In economics, a public good is non-exclusive and non-rival in consumption. In fact, much of government spending is not for public goods, but benefits exclusive, small-sized groups of people (e.g., farm subsidies, or even corruption in

developing countries). Consequently, the provision of public goods seems a blunt proxy for conceptualizing extractive/fiscal capacity.

Operationalization

Generally, extractive/fiscal capacity is operationalized in its fundamental considerations of taxation, for example, the share of tax collection in GDP (Besley & Persson, 2008), the share of income tax in total tax revenue (Besley & Persson, 2008; Rogers & Weller, 2014¹³), and the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio), a.k.a. “relative political capacity” (Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, Abdollahian, Johnson, & Kang, 2011; Feng, 2006). But one should be aware that for countries that rely on petroleum revenues or have historically had lower levels of tax collection (e.g., Mexico for both scenarios), perhaps neither the income tax share of receipts nor the tax revenue share of GDP would be a good measure of fiscal/extractive capacity.¹⁴ Otherwise, they all serve as useful direct measurements of extractive/fiscal capacity.

2.2.2 Coercive/military capacity

Conceptualization

This dimension of state capacity is the most basic attribute of “stateness.” It refers to the state’s capacity to monopolize the administration of security forces and/or military to a.

¹³ Melissa Rogers and Nicholas Weller (2014) also see income taxation as a good measure of the state’s effectiveness in policy implementation, along the same lines with the conceptualization of extractive/fiscal capacity as an account of how administrative/bureaucratic capacity emerges (given above in the text of this subsection).

¹⁴ As illustrated in an Forbes.com article by Christopher Wilson and Pedro Valenzuela (2014, October 22), Mexico has historically had low levels of tax collection, and in 2013 the Mexican government’s revenues equaled 23.6% of GDP, with less than half of that, or 10.2% of GDP, derived from tax revenue and another 7.8% from Pemex petroleum and derivatives sales.

maintain internal order and b. prevent foreign invasion (Cingolani, 2013; Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Hendrix, 2010; Savoia & Sen, 2015). The conceptualization of the control of domestic opposition (i.e., a), is consistent with Max Weber's widely quoted definition of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1919/2009, p. 78). The influence of the Weberian concept of the state as possessing the monopoly of legitimate force has been far-reaching. When applied to an international context, the concept is stretched to cover the state's ability to repel foreign invasion (as well as invade its neighbors) (i.e., b). In the state formation literature, for example, Samuel E. Finer (1975) illustrates a positive relationship between major military inventions (hence, changes in the format of armed forces) and the formation of the modern state in Europe: Military inventions in Europe push rulers to continue building up their power by armed forces (while the inventions also increase the state's extractive capacity).

It remains important to be aware and cautious of the fact that the two purposes of coercive/military capacity, i.e., maintaining internal order and repelling foreign invasion, are normatively (and typically empirically) served by different organizations, such as the police and the military, respectively. And these organizations call on the government to articulate different rationales for mobilizing the public in support of their respective purposes, say, needs to prevent domestic violent extremism for the former (purpose) and to counter international terrorism (motivated by nationalism) for the latter. Although much of the state capacity literature treats these two strands of thought as components of the same concept, it would be conceptually useful to separate them for the sake of evaluation and analysis.

Aside from its role as a catalyst for state formation in Europe, coercive/military capacity

is likewise a significant variable to explain American state building, either through the lens of domestic control or military engagements against foreign countries. In his 1982 book *Building a New American State*, Stephen Skowronek focuses on three institutional innovations at the national level forged at the turn of the 20th century as a response to industrialism, namely, (1) the reform of civil administration; (2) reorganization of the army (e.g., reforms in the national army in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war and the state militia system for its failure in containing violent domestic railroad strikes in the 1870s); and (3) the establishment of national railroad regulation. These three institutional innovations turn the American state away from being “stateless” toward a central bureaucratic apparatus, i.e., the sense of the state.

Operationalization

The same reasoning as above can be applied to the operationalization of coercive/military capacity by two separate purposes. The Fragile States Index (FSI) by the Fund for Peace¹⁵ and the State Fragility Index and Matrix by the Center for Systemic Peace¹⁶ are widely-used

¹⁵ The FSI is based on a dozen separate social, economic, and political/military indicators of state vulnerability, among of which “Security Apparatus” examines the state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate force (coercive capacity) while “External Intervention” for foreign intervention (military capacity) (they are both political/military indicators). The “Security Apparatus” indicator considers internal conflict, riots and protests, military coups, rebel activity, and the emergence of state-sponsored or supported “private militias” that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians sympathetic to the opposition. The “External Intervention” indicator considers foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers or UN missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions, and credit ratings. Taiwan is unfortunately not included in the FSI rankings. See the website of the Fund for Peace for further details, at <http://fundforpeace.org/global>.

¹⁶ The State Fragility Index and Matrix combines scores on eight component indicators along four performance (outcomes) dimensions: security, political, economic, and social. “Security Effectiveness Score” and “Security Legitimacy Score” are the security indicators, with the former indicating a state’s general security and vulnerability to the residual effects of most recent wars (military capacity) while the latter, state repression against domestic opponents (coercive capacity), partly based on Political Terror Scale (PTS). See the website of the Center for Systemic Peace for further details, at <http://www.systemicpeace.org>. (The PTS is a measure of state-inflicted political terror on a population. Its indicators are coded based on information contained in the annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch [not including Taiwan],

instruments for assessing state capacity for either purpose. With a focus on repelling foreign invaders, military capacity is typically operationalized as the military size or/and military spending. For example, in the Correlates of War (COW) Project initiated by David J. Singer in 1963 (still ongoing), military capacity is operationalized as “the number of military personnel per thousand (in the population)” and “the total military budget for a given state for a given year.”¹⁷

Much of the literature on military capacity adopts the COW measurements (e.g., Hanson & Sigman, 2013). In Singer’s co-authored work with Henderson (Henderson & Singer, 2000, p. 285), they propose “the log of the ratio of a state’s military expenditures (in constant, 1990 US\$) to its total population” to measure military capacity, the logic behind which, I surmise, is similar to the one behind the COW military personnel. However, it has been debatable whether the relationship between the state’s military force (either its size or spending) and military capacity is necessarily positive. States with a large military force or greater military spending might become more conflict-prone, particularly when suffering from unprofessionalism, corruption, and/or patronage (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; Henderson & Singer, 2000; Kocher, 2010).

Military capacity can also be assessed through analysis of (effectiveness of) military security policy. Davis B. Bobrow (1993) operationalizes military capacity as the state’s abilities to (1) manage international commitments and (2) target limited resources effectively to secure the most effective forces or optimize the cost-effectiveness of weapon system procurement, albeit both unmeasurable.

For domestic control, on the other hand, “(domestic) political violence” is often

and the US State Department. See the PTS website for further details, at <http://www.politicalerrorscale.org>.)

¹⁷ For more information about the COW Project, see its website at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>.

considered as an expedient (indirect) proxy for assessing the state's ability to maintain internal order. For example, Arend Lijphart, Ronald Rogowski, and R. Kent Weaver (1993) use (the numbers of) "riots" and "deaths" from political violence (both adjusted for population size) to measure and compare the ability of the US and other advanced democracies to manage cleavage (i.e., reflective of performance [outcomes]). The approach taken by Besley and Persson (2015) in explaining how state capacity and political institutions interact with political violence may help us understand why political violence would serve a common proxy (conceptualized either as performance or "precursors" of coercive capacity) for assessing domestic control. They suggest that institutions that serve the public interest tend to have less violence and a stronger incentive to invest in state capacity, and that less violence increases political stability which can increase a stronger incentive to invest in state capacities.

Intriguingly, as some scholars suggest, coercive/military and administrative/bureaucratic capacities are intertwined, in which GDP per capita can accordingly serve as a general proxy for either dimension (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Perhaps the empirical study by William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski (2013) on the US President's bid to increase his success in promoting national or foreign policy by resorting to warfare could illustrate the complexity of such an intertwined relationship.

2.2.3 Weberian administrative/bureaucratic capacity

Conceptualization

As implied by the name, this aspect of state capacity is rooted in the Weberian tradition of a modern state bureaucracy that is professional and insulated from political control, thus

being able to perform growing and increasingly complex administrative tasks of government, including, for example, various public policies. The modern state, according to Weber (1919/2009), is defined by not only its monopoly of legitimate force (as mentioned when discussing coercive/military capacity earlier) but also its administrative structure developed through rational-legal authority. The Weberian bureaucracy contains at least two elements: (1) meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations and (2) the provision of career stability and rewarding internal promotion, both important for improving bureaucratic performance (Rauch & Evens, 2000); it thereby contributes to “stateness” (Skowronek, 1982).

Generally, the conceptualization of administrative/bureaucratic capacity is associated with implementation of public policies (following Weber’s idea of bureaucracy), making this dimension of state capacity central to all areas of research on state and development (Savoia & Sen, 2014). For the sake of clarity in the discussions to follow, it is advisable to emphasize that administrative/bureaucratic capacity has to do with implementation, not with legislation or enactment. Legislation/enactment and implementation involve different (often quite separate) “politics,” including actors, processes, and interest-based coalitions (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016).¹⁸

Given its close conceptual association with policy implementation, the administrative/bureaucratic dimension of state capacity is inherent in being far more inclusive compared with any other alternative. This idea is well illustrated by Theda Skocpol

¹⁸ According to the authors, the processes (of legislation/enactment vs. implementation) include (1) time frame: episodic vs. continuous process; (2) decision venues: one or two less visible/accessible venues, with clearly defined decision rules vs. multiple, localized venues, with many small decisions made by implementers, and widespread information access, while for interest-based coalitions (of the same comparison), it is national interest groups vs. state and local affiliates/grassroots groups (all in respective order). In practice, however, legislation/enactment and implementation would be closely interrelated with each other if the executive branch is constitutionally empowered to propose bills for legislative action (e.g., Taiwan).

(1985), who argues that the state's ability to implement policies toward achieving desired goals is underpinned by sovereign integrity, a stable military control over territory (coercive /military capacity), loyal and skilled officials (administrative/bureaucratic capacity per se), and plentiful financial resources (extractive/fiscal capacity). Her argument also helps reaffirm a multi-dimensional notion of state capacity in which different alternative dimensions are closely intertwined (or even conflated) and interdependent.

Operationalization

Some scholars measure administrative/bureaucratic capacity in direct and intuitive ways. For example, Daron Acemoglu and colleagues take the “number of public employees” as the indicator of a (positive) effect of state capacity on public goods provision, as reflected in the “population above the poverty line” and “secondary enrollment rate,” in Colombian municipalities (as cited in Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, & Robinson, 2015). Through expert surveys in 35 less developed countries, James Rauch and Peter B. Evens (2000) explain cross-national variations in bureaucratic performance by analyzing survey-based, coded scores on corruption, autonomy and expertise, efficiency, and red-tape. In addition, as previously illustrated in footnotes 8 and 9 (p. 26), two WGI indicators, “Government Effectiveness” and “Control of Corruption,” and two ICRG variables of political risks, “bureaucratic quality” and “corruption in government,” can be taken to measure administrative/bureaucratic capacity.

By contrast, some scholars use performance (policy “outputs” or “outcomes”) as an (indirect) proxy to measure administrative/bureaucratic capacity. In this sense, they must be under the assumption that the state's ability to implement policies always translates directly

into performance measures. So, if performance is high, then it is inferred that the state's ability to implement policies is high, and vice versa. This proposition is exemplified in most essays of the edited volume by R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (1993) which evaluates constitutional structural impacts on performance of policy implementation in various policy areas (albeit inextricably interwoven with operationalization of other dimensions of state capacity).¹⁹ For example, the essays by Bobrow (1993) and Lijphart et al. (1993) in this volume (both already discussed in the subsection on coercive/military capacity above), reveal that coercive/military and administrative/bureaucratic capacities would become conflated (conceptually and operationally), respectively, when comparing and analyzing the differences in the effectiveness of the implementation of military security policies between the US and Japan, and how to avoid political violence in the context of four different cleavage management strategies across 22 country cases (consociational, delegatory, arbitral, and limited-government). The essay by Ellis S. Krauss and Jon Pierre (1993) conflates transformative and administrative/bureaucratic capacities by focusing on industrial policies in the US, Sweden, and Japan and assessing their relative abilities to produce efficient targeting of resources for industrial changes.

In short, the studies herein reviewed make it reasonable to infer that administrative/bureaucratic capacity is the most inclusive, if not all-inclusive, among the six selected alternative dimensions of state capacity due to its, not only conceptualization of the implementation of a variety of public policies, but also moderate reliance on performance-

¹⁹ Each essay of this volume compares the US presidential system and its parliamentary counterparts with respect to at least one of ten specific government tasks: setting and maintaining priorities, targeting resources (to most effectively attain goals), innovating (when old policies fail), coordinating conflicting objectives, imposing losses (on powerful groups), represent diffuse, unorganized interests, ensuring effective implementation, ensuing policy stability, making and maintaining international commitments, and managing political cleavages. The editors use the term "government capabilities" to describe the state's ability to implement policies.

based measurements associated with other dimensions of state capacity. In other words, if Giovanni Sartori's (1970, 1991; see also Collier and Mahon, 1993) label, a "ladder of generality (abstraction)," is applied here, one would find that the notion of administrative/bureaucratic capacity is located higher on the "ladder," given its fewer defining attributes (i.e., being more general or inclusive) compared with that of other dimensions of state capacity.

2.2.4 Legal capacity

Conceptualization

Legal capacity has its roots in the principle of limited government, i.e., the limits of state intervention, according to which the government acts as a neutral third party, severely restricted by law, to enforce credible commitments (contracts) to protect property rights (Besley & Persson, 2007, 2009; North, 1981, 1990; North & Weingast 1989).²⁰ Thus, it has to do with the idea of the "rule of law."²¹ In other words, only under the "rule of law" can private property rights (and hence markets) be upheld. This proposition is championed by Barry R. Weingast (1995, 1997), who contends, with his game theoretic models, that the design of political institutions should credibly commit the state to preserving markets, and that only democracy in a form of limited government in which political officials and citizens respect the "rule of law" would achieve this goal. He further suggests that economic

²⁰ Some scholars in this tradition has recently turned to acknowledging the necessity of a strong state to foster a market economy, specifically in terms of the state's transformative capacity (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009).

²¹ The "rule of law" is a legal principle in which law, which is supreme, governs all individuals and institutions, including the state itself. It embraces such properties as stability/predictability of laws, explicit/transparent procedures for making and interpreting laws, and representational arrangements that make legislators and (usually indirectly) judges democratically accountable. The "rule of men" (in the absence of the "rule of law"), by contrast, means a society that is governed by arbitrary decisions of a ruler or group of people. My discussion of legal capacity in this dissertation is apparently, and theoretically, confined to democracy and not applicable to monarchy or feudalism.

performance and democratic stability depend on such type of self-enforcing equilibrium: limits on the state and respect for the rule of law, in no violation of political/economic rights of citizens, and that the US model of market-preserving federalism is an exemplar.

As legal capacity centers on the principle of the “rule of law,” legislation/enactment can properly be expected to serve as a conceptual embodiment of that principle and hence a (direct) operational proxy for legal capacity. The logic of being a conceptual embodiment is intuitive: The existence of laws is an essential prerequisite for the “rule of law” to come about in a democracy. In line with the same logic, it is ideally suited to operationalizing legal capacity by taking into consideration the quantity and/or quality of legislation/enactment (which I will further elaborate below).

Operationalization

As mentioned in the early page of this section, the WGI indicators and the IRIS data set provide quantitative measures of several, including legal, dimensions of state capacity.²² Likewise, the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute’s annual report, *Economic Freedom of the World*, assesses and tracks changes in countries’ degree of economic freedom by five quantitative indexes (criteria), among which “the legal structure and security of property rights” is also a valid proxy for measuring legal capacity, particularly of its components (Gwartney, Hall, & Lawson, 2015).²³

²² The WGI indicator, “Rule of Law,” and three IRIS-3/ICRG political risk variables, “risk of expropriation,” “government repudiation of contracts,” and “rule of law,” can be used to measure legal capacity. The “rule of law” proxy of either source directly measures legal capacity, given the quantification of its core idea. By contrast, when legal capacity is measured concentrating on protection of property rights, “risk of expropriation” and “government repudiation of contracts” appear to appropriate proxies: For example, James D. Fearon (2005) employs both and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2000) select “risk of expropriation.”

²³ The said index contains six components: judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property

“Contract intensive money” (CIM) is an innovative measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, introduced by Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson (1999). CIM is defined as the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply, or

$$\frac{\text{(the total money supply - currency held outside banks)}}{\text{the total money supply}}$$
. The logic behind is quite straightforward:

When the state lacks sufficient third-party enforcement of property rights, citizens are less likely to allow other parties to hold their financial assets in exchange for some compensation. The higher the CIM ratio, the higher legal capacity.

As briefly sketched above, legal capacity can also be operationalized by the quantity and quality of legislation/enactment (“outputs”), both of which, however, turn out to serve as its direct proxies given the “rule of law” logic.²⁴ As far as quantity is concerned, calculating legislative productivity (of the parliament) is a commonly accepted measure of legal capacity. For example, in her empirical investigation of legislative productivity of Taiwan’s 4th Legislature (1999 to 2002) straddling the nation’s first turnover of ruling parties and transition to divided government, Yang Wan-ying (2003, p. 77) introduces and formulates the useful notion of “relative number of laws supplied and demanded” that is equal to $\frac{D_n}{S_n}$:

Where

$$S_n = P_n + S_{n-1} - D_{n-1}$$

D is the number of passed bills.

P is the number of newly introduced/proposed bills.

S is the (accumulated) number of introduced/proposed bills.

rights, military interference in rule of law and the political process, integrity of the legal system, and legal enforcement of contracts.

²⁴ Admittedly, since legislation/enactment can hardly be independent of structural impact (think of the dynamic of veto players under different constitutional designs), using it as a proxy for operationalizing legal capacity might be called into question. However, any such suspicion will be dispelled when this proxy is used for a single case (e.g., a within-case comparative analysis) or a comparative study of multiple cases with a focus on the relationship between the structure and legal capacity.

n is the session of a given Legislative term.²⁵

As for quality, a further subtle analysis of how political and social actors interact and decide to enact good (or poor) legislation is required, making this approach less straightforward and more complicated operationally than its quantity counterpart. For example, Alan M. Jacobs (2011), in his analysis of intertemporal choices in pension policy made by ten (cases of) governments in North America, Britain, and Germany, suggests three necessary conditions for enacting good legislation: The government wishing to invest in the long term, rather than in short-sighted gains, must (1) have sufficient “institutional capacity” to enact its preferred policy into law (in facing potential resistance from organized groups), together with taking account of (2) “expected social returns” (i.e., if long-term benefits exceed short-term costs?) and (3) “politicians’ (short-term) electoral safety.” As another example, Vogel’s (1993) study of environmental politics and policies during the postwar period in the US, Britain, and Japan shows that whether a government can enact effective environmental regulations is contingent on its ability to represent diffuse, unorganized interests.

2.2.5 Infrastructural capacity

Conceptualization

It refers to the state’s capacity to exercise control (e.g., enforcing policies) throughout its

²⁵ Unfinished bills can be carried over to later sessions within the same Legislative Yuan, as bills die if they do not pass during that Legislature (屆期不連續原則), except the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final account of the general budget as certified by the Comptroller General (決算案), and the citizen petition bill (人民請願案) (The Legislative Yuan [TLY], 2005).

territory/jurisdiction (Mann, 1986). Infrastructural capacity centers on a traditional, hierarchical view of the state.²⁶ According to Hillel D. Soifer (2008), there are three approaches to understanding the state's infrastructural power: (1) *national capabilities* of the central state, which is most commonly applied, featuring the extent of resources at the disposal of the (central) state for exercising such power on society via its institutions of control;²⁷ (2) the *weight of the state*, which captures how the state is limited and constructed by radiating institutions (i.e., non-state actors) and their impact on society; and (3) *sub-national (territorial/spatial) variation*, which determines the state's ability to exercise control via radiating institutions, serving as a middle ground between the first two approaches. Given the information above, it seems difficult to conceptually distinguish infrastructural capacity, the focus of which is on the exercise of control by the central state over territory and social actors, from administrative/bureaucratic capacity (and perhaps coercive/military capacity as well).

If infrastructure is confined to what is considered conventional (for example, roads, telephone systems, technology, education, to name but a few), infrastructure capacity should not be a separate category because that is also what a Weberian bureaucracy looks for. However, the "federalism" angle in the literature on state capacity might be a promising way to unpack the underlying complexities of conceptualizing infrastructure capacity, making it worth considering infrastructural capacity distinguishable from administrative/bureaucratic

²⁶ By contrast, some scholars take a horizontal view of interactions between the state and society. For example, Joel S. Migdal (1988) seeks to capture the extent to which the state permeates through society and to explore how state-society interactions build state capacity. This strand of literature is known as "relational capacity," with infrastructural capacity as its subtype (Cingolani, 2013). But given political sociology as its research interest, it is beyond the scope of this review to discuss.

²⁷ For example, how do teachers in a new education program influence local communities via schools?

capacity of the Weberian tradition.²⁸ For example, in an effort to unravel the US federal-state partnership in the half century preceding the New Deal, Kimberley S. Johnson (2007) analyzes 131 Congressional enactments ranging in various policy areas, which she calls “inter-governmental policy instruments (IPIs).” Her findings suggest that the American federalism, rather than being a barrier to the development of state capacity as people conventionally think of it, expands the reach and cohesion of the American state, hence strengthening its state capacity. Policy authority in the US is not only shared between the federal and state governments but also shaped by locally-oriented members of Congress. Intriguingly, however, based on the results from his formal modeling of existing arguments about the consequences of decentralization (good, neutral, or bad) vis-à-vis centralization for governance of multiple subjects in a comparative perspective, like policy stability and fiscal coordination, Daniel Treisman (2007) concludes that none of these arguments is tenable, thereby tainting the credibility of evidence from the “federalism” angle.

It might also be noted that in the European context involving federalism, Daniel Ziblatt (2006) explains how infrastructural power of sub-national units shapes federal bargains and then determines state building outcomes of either a federal or unitary system in Italy and Germany in the late 19th century. In this study, infrastructural power is conceptualized via three proxies: (1) state rationalization; (2) state institutionalization; and (3) embeddedness of the state in society, high levels of which contribute to federalism, while low levels lead to a unitary state. It challenges the common presumption that federalism is the consequence of an incomplete state-building process, by showing that both Italy and Germany eventually

²⁸ The logic underlying the “federalism” angle is that under the unitary system, only the central government, not sub-national governments, can control infrastructure and that under federalism, by contrast, states/provinces (or other forms of sub-national government) are empowered to control infrastructure.

adopted federalism, regardless of the difference in their coercive power of the center while pursuing national unification.

Operationalization

The infrastructural and administrative/bureaucratic capacities are conceptually conflated to a large extent, the latter of which can also be intrinsically intertwined with all the other dimensions of state capacity when conceptualized via policy implementation. A wide variety of measurements of infrastructural capacity is therefore referred to in the literature, largely overlapping with that on extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and perhaps transformative dimensions of state capacity. For example, measures of the territorial reach of the state generally depend on its fiscal resources and extractive capacity (e.g., Gallo, 1991 [tax collection]; Goodwin, 1999 [government revenue as a share of GDP]; Fearon & Laitin, 2003 [GDP per capita]), military power (e.g., Goodwin, 1999 [size of armed forces and military expenditures]), and density of transportation network (e.g., Centeno, 2002 [railroads]; Goodwin, 1999 [railroads and highways]).

The first two sets of examples (concerning fiscal/extractive and military components) and third (railroads/highways) provide specific measurements to operationalize Soifer's (2008) *national capabilities* and *sub-national variation* approaches, respectively, to infrastructural power. The evaluation of outcomes of state policy can be a measure of the other of Soifer's approaches, the *weight of the state* (e.g., Eugen Weber's classic 1976 study of national identity formation in late 19th-century rural France). By the same token, Soifer (2012) proposes a reach-adjusted approach over population and territory to measuring three core dimensions of state capacity in Latin America via nine proxies: extraction (direct/indirect

taxes, direct taxes per capita, and the share of population working in economic circles); security (violent crime, lynching rates, and the use of private security per capita), and the administration of basic services (census administration coverage, national identity card and voter registration rates, and vaccination rates). It exemplifies the use of a combination of proxies referable to other dimensions of state capacity to operationalize infrastructural capacity, given a tendency toward a conceptual conflation of infrastructural and administrative/bureaucratic capacities.

2.2.6 Transformative (and distributive) capacity

Conceptualization

The last strand of the literature on state capacity, like coercive/military capacity, is composed of two sub-domains: transformative and attendant distributive capacities. As illustrated in the “development state” literature, transformative capacity is the ability to intervene in a productive system and shape the economy (Cingolani, 2013).²⁹ For example, Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) identify the conditions for effective state intervention in economic and industrial development, while assuming the necessity of state intervention in capitalist economics for continual capital accumulation and higher levels of productivity. In the American context of the late 19th century, for example, the federal government began to intervene in the national economy through its role in regulating national railroad, while in the process of forming the American “stateness” (Skowronek, 1982).

²⁹ The relationship between state capacity and markets/economic growth is a fundamental question in political economy: which one is the precursor to the other in development? A recent study of Mainland China in this regard by Ang (2015) suggests an endogenous relationship between both variables (albeit targeted to focus on the country’s adaptive approach to governance, or *directed improvisation*, in the post-Mao era), posing a challenge to the conventional Western notion of the unidirectional causality between state capacity (good institutions [governance]/rule of law, perhaps resulting from colonial legacies) and growth.

Transformative capacity also essentially responds to the Acemoglu-Robinson analysis of state failure by the view of government-economy relations. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) contend that rich countries are rich because they establish “inclusive” (economic and political) institutions where a large majority of the population has access to property rights (contract) enforcement and democratic government that foster growth. By contrast, where countries have “extractive” institutions that are created and perpetuated for the benefit of a tiny oligarchical elite without property rights (enforcement) and the rule of law, thus impoverishing the poor, they end up being poor and fragile. In short, legal capacity, markets, and the issue of redistribution are integrated as components of transformative capacity in the Acemoglu-Robinson analysis.

When economic development is taking place, the issue of whether or how the state can prevent wide disparities in the distribution of wealth then becomes another topic of interest for state capacity. Acemoglu and Robinson also touch on this topic in their said analysis above of state failure. The evidence collected by Kay L. Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady (2012) demonstrates widespread economic inequality in the US which further undermines the equality of citizens in terms of voting strength, and simply political influence. In fact, the larger the wealth gap becomes, the more likely it is for an inefficient state to emerge and persist (Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2011).

Linda Weiss (1998) proposes a model of “governed interdependence” between the state and business, shedding light on the role of the state in managing economic growth with equity. She argues that states with both transformative and distributive capacities (e.g., Germany and Japan) outperform those with either alone (e.g., other East Asian countries than Japan with transformative capacity and Sweden with distributive capacity) in economic

growth and equity.

Operationalization

The notion of market economy (or the strength of the private sector) not only is a core conceptual component of transformative capacity, but also serves as its measurable proxy, although reflective of “outcomes.” For example, transformative capacity can be measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP in a cross-national perspective (Besley & Persson, 2009). In the American context, Jacob S. Hacker (2002) uses the (active) participation of the private sector/actors in public social welfare spending as a proxy to reflect a vibrant, independent private-sector economy of the US.³⁰ In the previously noted study by Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), by contrast, “effectiveness of state intervention in the economy” is taken as a non-measurable but analyzable proxy for transformative capacity.³¹

Weiss (1998), as likewise mentioned above, evaluates and compare (“outcomes” of) both individual state’s transformative and distributive capacities through various quantitative indicators. She uses exports, savings, and investments, respectively, as a share of GDP to name but a few, to measure the former sub-domain (with markets/the private sector being considered) while the latter is captured by income distribution and social security transfers, respectively, as a share of GDP. It is evident that either sub-domain of the literature echoes the important role of the state in policy implementation, as reiterated throughout, the fundamental building block of administrative/bureaucratic capacity. Following the same

³⁰ According to Hacker, the US is a hybrid public-private welfare state that distributes risk within its system, thus becoming an exceptional model that poses a challenge to its European, dominant welfare state counterparts.

³¹ The first and foremost condition of successful state intervention, as the authors argue, is the presence of a Weberian bureaucratic apparatus with corporate coherence. The autonomy of a bureaucracy from the dominant interests in a capitalist society to achieve “collective goods” is the other condition.

reasoning, indicators of either transformative or redistributive capacity vary widely depending on what policy issues need to be addressed. The essay by Krauss and Pierre (1993), briefly introduced in the subsection on administrative/bureaucratic capacity while discussing the conceptual conflation, can illustrate this point. They measure transformative capacity of the US by counting the number of enactments dealing with industrial policy (“outputs,” or serving as a potential direct proxy for legal capacity), while no measurable proxy is used in their analysis of Sweden and Japan.

Followed by a recent sharp rise in income and wealth inequality worldwide between the rich and poor, socio-economic groups, and generations, the issue of how government fairly and effectively redistributes wealth inside pension plans has received prominent attention. In the 1993 study by Paul D. Pierson and R. Kent Weaver of the state’s capability to impose redistributive losses in North America and Britain in terms of cuts in old-age pensions (“outputs”), dating as far back as the 1970s and 1980s, two measurements (of distributive capacity) are singled out: (1) the magnitude of changes made in pensions cutback, and (2) the ratio of final policy changes to initial cutback proposals.

Section conclusions

In this section, I bring together different strands of literature on state capacity in CP and AP to show its multi-dimensional complexity of conceptualization and operationalization. Five specific conclusions are drawn for the selection of the four salient dimensions of state capacity, along with some implications on the selectivity of measurements for the statistical analysis to come:

1. Administrative/bureaucratic capacity appears most prominent, inclusive, given its

conceptual association with policy implementation. It overlaps with respect to conceptualization and operationalization of other major dimensions of state capacity.

2. Extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and legal capacities are relatively more independent and distinguishable. They are usually measured by widely-used proxies. But one must be aware of the potential pitfalls involved:
 - (1) Fiscal capacity and the provision of public goods are not necessarily the same.
 - (2) When analyzing coercive/military capacity, one should distinguish between its two purposes: maintaining internal order and repelling foreign invasion.
 - (3) Given the “rule of law” logic, I propose to operationalize legal capacity as the quantity of legislation/enactment, albeit involving structural impact that might invalidate, say, cross-national comparisons. However, such a proxy is supposed to be methodologically appropriate for a within-case comparative analysis (like this dissertation).
3. Infrastructural and transformative (and distributive) capacities are considered supplementary to the other four major dimensions of state capacity and (largely) conceptually, and as a result, operationally conflated (particularly the former) with administrative/bureaucratic capacity. Following the principle of parsimony, they can thus merge (or fuse) with the major ones.³²
4. In much of literature, government performance (“outputs” or “outcomes”) is seen as a “practical” proxy for assessing state capacity out of necessity or expediency, even though

³² The state’s ability to fairly redistribute wealth has become a hot-button issue. When compared to global average, Taiwan has high average wealth and only moderate wealth inequality (Hou, 2016). Doing comparison of distributive capacity in the Taiwanese context seems less worthwhile.

it is important to distinguish evaluating performance from identifying capacity.³³

5. The analysis presented here permits us to reconsider the central puzzle of this study. That is, the majority/minority division should most strongly affect administrative/bureaucratic capacity. By contrast, the structural effect on extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and legal capacities depends on the context in a given country, say, with more likelihood for legislation and budget enactments in the midst of rising partisan polarization and with less likelihood for military and coercive capacities in the face of an external threat and domestic unrest or potential instability, respectively.

2.3 Power law and its applications

A power law is instrumental in investigating policy coherence/continuity, essential to understanding administrative/bureaucratic capacity as it conceptually associates well with policy implementation. The purpose of this section is to introduce the power law employed, in this study, in an attempt to compare and analyze administrative/bureaucratic capacity throughout the ROC SP regimes, and to reveal where such a pattern of distribution occurs.

The power law is a special probability distribution describing a variable that has many small values, some mid-range values, and just a few extremely large values—the “many, some, few” pattern. In other words, a variable which follows a power law shows a highly skewed distribution of values wherein “many have little and few have lots.” It “reflects a world (or part of it) that is ‘out of balance’, where by ‘balance’ or equilibrium we mean a normally-distributed world where average behavior tends to prevail, with truly rare and

³³ For example, all the measurable proxies presented in the subsection on transformative (and distributive) capacity are referred to as either “outputs” or “outcomes,” not capacity per se. No one will truly know to what extent the state can boost the economy or alleviate the wealth gap until expected progress or improvement has been demonstrated.

clearly symmetric departure from a well-established central tendency” (Cioffi-Revilla, in press-b, MS. p. 3). The general mathematical form for a power law distribution is as follows:

$$[1] \quad p(x) = Cx^{-\alpha}$$

Where $p(x)$ = the probability density function which x has a value equal to
 α = the exponent of the power law
 C = a constant

$$[2] \quad \alpha = 1 + n \left[\sum_{i=1}^n \ln \frac{x_i}{x_{\min}} \right]^{-1}$$

Where

x_i = observed values.

x_{\min} = minimum observed value.

If $\alpha > 1$, the data set is in a power-law distribution.

If $\alpha = 2.5$, the data set is in a pure power-law distribution.

(adapted from Newman, 2005)

A power law in a hyperbolic form (a) and linearized form (or log-log space) (b) is illustrated in Figure 2.1, directly adapted from Cioffi-Revilla (in press-a, MS. p. 22).




Figure 2.1. A power law in hyperbolic (a) and linearized or log-linear (b) forms. Reprinted from Cioffi-Revilla (in press-a, MS. p. 22).

When data is in a power-law pattern, it features a self-organized criticality behavior and a critical state. The self-organized criticality behavior describes a specific scenario in a system

that plays out repeatedly. A critical state produces many possible sizes of “avalanches” (or crashes) distributed with a power law in the system (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987; Newman, 2005). The Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld sandpile model, introduced in 1987, has received much interest for its simplicity, providing a typical example of how these features work. Suppose we steadily drop grains of sand on a sandpile and observe how many grains fall off the edge. The growing pile will collapse whenever it reaches a point (i.e., critical state) where the system becomes barely stable with respect to small perturbations. The observed “avalanches” from time to time are of all different scales—most are small, and large “avalanches” are rare, followed by a number of small “avalanches” before yet another large “avalanche” occurs. The kind of sand slides keep recurring as the simulation moves on (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987). Such skewed distributions occur naturally in many circumstances, in addition to sandpile avalanche sizes. For example, there are many small towns, some larger cities, and few megalopolises in the world; the distribution of personal income, financial market crashes, firm sizes, land holding, scaling of warfare, forest fire sizes, and earthquake magnitudes, to name but a few, all share the same pattern (see Cioffi-Revilla’s forthcoming edited volume [in press-c] for a collection of different examples illustrating the power law in social complexity).

The power-law distribution or the like is also applied to the governance literature. For example, Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (2005) (as referred to in Section 2.2.1 in respect of extractive/fiscal capacity) suggest a “leptokurtic” distribution (steeper, more peaked, and narrowed than a normal distribution with longer tails) of changes in budget share allocated across various government programs in the US from 1948 to 2003. In other words, there are very small budget changes (due to either growth or cutbacks) in most programs and

punctuated budget changes (or significant fluctuations) in a very, very few programs, revealing incrementalism. Chih-Yung Ho (2007) presents a first attempt at using the power law to compare and analyze the Cabinet longevity, a crucial factor to ensure policy continuity, in Taiwan from 1997 to 2007.³⁴ The study exemplifies earlier SP operation in Taiwan, with a focus on comparing the nation's first non-KMT-led government since democratization, the DPP/Chen administration, with its KMT predecessor, the Lee administration. The Chen administration is found to fall behind Lee's because the former causes a more frequent change of Cabinet officials and evidently follows a self-organized criticality behavior. Both studies give a rich insight into policy coherence/continuity, one of the foci of the literature on consequences of divided vs. unified government in the US, which will be discussed further in the following section.

2.4 The impact of president (executive)-parliamentary congruence vs. incongruence on governance

We now return to the central puzzle of this study—Whether the majority/minority government division makes difference. Speculation as to how this puzzle might be resolved have benefited from an extensive literature that attempts to explore whether and how different constitutional structures impact on governance. Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz (2011) theorize a negative relationship between the number of veto players and governance that is consistent with Linz's own classics (1990, 1994) and the conventional wisdom that my

³⁴ According to Lijphart (1984), although long-lived cabinets are neither necessarily effective policy makers nor critical to democratic stability, short-lived ones can hardly develop sound and coherence policies, not to mention their being powerless to carry them out largely. Along a similar vein, Kaare Strøm (1990) evaluates minority government performance via cabinet duration, arguing that the longer the duration of a cabinet, the better might be its performance. Unfortunately, the minority cabinet is less likely to be durable than its majority counterpart (Dodd, 1976; Taylor & Herman, 1971; Warwick, 1979).

dissertation addresses: Governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence. Their theory, however, conflicts with the findings of some earlier studies, such as David R. Mayhew's (1991, 2005) argument in favor of divided government in the US (more on this topic in a subsequent paragraph).

Another strand of related literature compares performance between the (British parliamentary version of) majoritarian/Westminster model (featured by e.g., executive dominance, the plurality rule, and two-party systems; theoretically more likely to achieve executive-parliamentary congruence) and the consensus model (featured by, say, a balanced executive-legislative relationship, proportional representation [PR] and multiparty systems). It remains open to empirical contestation. Lijphart's (2012) path-breaking comparison of 36 majoritarian and consensus democracies finds that the latter outperform the former both in representing and governing. By contrast, however, Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski (2010) do not support an advantage to PR; neither do André Blais and Marc André Bodet (2006). Perhaps the findings of G. Bingham Powell (2009) can contribute to a reconciliation of those inconsistencies in the literature: It is (due to differences in) the time frame. He argues that over time, the PR advantage declines as political parties in majoritarian systems, specifically single member district (SMD), converge toward the median voter.

The literature on consequences of divided government (vis-à-vis unified government) in the US also accommodates rich exploration of the relationship between president-parliamentary congruence/incongruence and governance. A substantial body of the literature is devoted to assessing legislative productivity. Divided government is often thought to lead to gridlock (e.g., Coleman, 1999; Sundquist, 1988) while, as said Mayhew (1991, 2005)

observes, it has nil effect on legislative output of important enactments.³⁵ A second major focus of this literature concerns policy coherence. The coherence and continuity of public policy are conventionally expected to be more likely to suffer under divided than unified government (Milkis, 1999; Pfiffner, 1991). This conventional view may be limited after taking into account how political ideology shapes policy coherence. The evidence show that substantial liberal programs and policies were enacted even during times of divided government with Republican Presidents (Wu, 2008). Its third focus is on the fiscal deficit. Like the first two foci of the literature reviewed, studies reveal disagreement over the fiscal consequences of divided government, for example, better ability to lower deficits in the late 19th-century US (Stewart, 1991) vs. weak deficit control (at the state level) from the late 1960s to 1980s (Alt & Lowry, 1994). However, it is intriguing to notice that the electorate in the US and other Western democracies often votes according to “blind” retrospection or a myopic evaluation of the performance of an incumbent (Achen & Bartels, 2016). An investigation carried out in this dissertation to understand if the people in Taiwan could perceive changes, if any, in state capacity, as being reflective of the public image of its dual executives and Cabinet, will complement the above point.

When focusing on how SP engineering affects governance, a number of works in literature approach the issue through the lens of political stability (e.g., Chou, 1996; Ho, 2007; Poulard, 1990), though uncertain as to what the golden mean should be between being lowly (many changes) and highly stable (no changes), and of government efficiency (e.g.,

³⁵ Besides Coleman, several authors challenge Mayhew’s results, on the study methodology (Howell, Adler, Cameron, & Riemann, 2000; Kelly, 1993) while others confirm the results by analyzing the effect of, e.g., highly ideological issues (Quirk & Nesmith, 1995), super-majoritarian procedures of American politics, say, the Senatorial filibuster or the Congressional override of a Presidential veto (Krehbiel, 1996), omnibus legislating (Krutz, 2000), and party polarization (Jones, 2001).

Schleiter & Morhan-Johns, 2005). They are both known as the most notable achievements of the French Fifth Republic (Stevens, 1996).

Much of the pertinent literature with the Taiwanese context brings attention to legislative productivity and budgetary deliberations. Wu Chung-li and Lin Chang-chih (2002) find that divided government is subject to significant annual budget cuts early on in first Chen administration, but this does not turn out to be true for legislation. In her study of the 4th Legislature (1999-2002), Yang (2003) challenges the traditional dichotomy of divided and unified government that, respectively, leads to legislative gridlock and effective governance by contending that it oversimplifies executive-legislative interactions. She indicates, alternatively, an increasing trend in bipartisan introduction of bills and a decline in party-line voting during divided government, albeit often with delays in legislation passing. The implication of the findings is that minority governments can be legislatively productive if they wisely manage not to provoke the Legislative majority or instigate hostile reactions. The study by Hawang Shiow-duan (2003) shows little difference in the executive branch's exposure to annual budget cuts regardless of the form of government, but finds lower passage rates and longer periods of deliberation for legislation proposed by the Cabinet under divided government.³⁶ A recent study by Kao Tsui-min (2016) reveals that the production of important laws governing cross-Strait relations under unified government statistically stands out, despite no significant difference in legislative productivity between unified and divided government in the time frame of 1996-2010. Moreover, as Chiu Fang-yi (2010) argued based on game-theoretic models, legislative stalemate can boil down to inactiveness of the legislative majority, for which the antagonistic executive-legislative relationship under

³⁶ See also similar results for legislation of the 4th Legislative Yuan in Sheng (2003).

divided government entails an incentive. But given their limited scopes of work, longitudinally or conceptually, those findings might not be generalized to longer time frames or more extensive study of the topic. This dissertation therefore seeks to redress this insufficiency by using a longer longitudinal design and unpacking the notion of governance with its various most important elements.

2.5 Hypotheses

The synthesis of existing literature summarized in the preceding section, Section 2.4, reveals a debate among scholars that has left unanswered many questions concerning how to account for the effect of constitutional engineering on governance either at an aggregate level or through the lens of a refined conceptualization of governance, say, a multi-dimensional notion and measure of state capacity, especially in the context of nascent SP democracies. To play it safe, with the aim of addressing the only one main question of this dissertation: What is the relationship between president-parliamentary mode of interaction and state capacity to govern, I set up a primary research hypothesis (H_1) and its alternative, null counterpart (H_0), at aggregate levels, as follows:

H_1 : ROC SP majority regimes (denoted “ M ”) had greater aggregate state capacity than their minority counterparts (“ m ”).

H_0 : M had no greater aggregate state capacity than m .

The primary hypothesis is derived from and consistent with the conventional wisdom to be tested that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence.

In addition to the aggregate level and given the multi-dimensional assessment of state capacity in this study, we should also allow for the possibility that a set of auxiliary

hypotheses, list below, each capturing a selected salient dimension of state capacity, may not necessarily all go in one direction. That is, it seems unlikely that we expect all dimensions of state capacity to respond similarly to the majority/minority division. And indeed, this is largely the point of measuring dimensions of state capacity separately that could help provide a causal mechanism to explain the central puzzle of this study.

Once again, as stated earlier (Section 2.2), I expect administrative/bureaucratic capacity to be most reactive to the majority/minority division, given its conceptual association with policy implementation. Likewise, I also expect the structural factor to matter for extractive/fiscal and legal capacities given rising partisan polarization in Taiwan's government; however, given aforementioned Yang's (2003) findings, legal capacity might respond better to minority governance in Taiwan instead, due to a working compromise. By contrast, considering the long-standing Communist Chinese threat to Taiwan that motivates the ROC government to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, a non-rejected null hypothesis for military capacity is desired, without violating the conventional wisdom. In other words, I expect majority/minority government status to have less impact on self-defense due to the external pressures on governments of all types. So is it for coercive capacity, given the extraordinary vibrancy of Taiwan's civil society participation in protests (see Chang [2012], Ho [2005], and Phillion [2010] for social movements and democratization in Taiwan).

H_{1a}: *M* had greater extractive/fiscal capacity than *m*. (expected)

H_{0a}: *M* had no greater extractive/fiscal capacity than *m*.

H_{1b}: *M* had greater coercive capacity than *m*.

H_{0b}: *M* had no greater coercive capacity than *m*. (expected)

H_{1c}: *M* had greater military capacity than *m*.

H_{0c}: *M* had no greater military capacity than *m*. (expected)

H_{1d}: *M* had greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than *m*. (expected)

H_{0d}: *M* had no greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than *m*.

H_{1e}: *M* had greater legal capacity than *m*. (expected)

H_{0e}: *M* had no greater legal capacity than *m*. (alternatively expected)

Chapter conclusions

The review of literature presented in this chapter establishes a foundation to derive a modified dichotomous SP typology (primarily based on the one suggested by Shuy and Le: majority vs. minority regimes, used as discrete explanatory variables) and choose four major (and more distinguishable) alternative dimensions of state capacity (a measurable DV: extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal), along with attention to issues of measurement, for analysis in this dissertation. The evaluation of the literature results in a primary hypothesis (at an aggregate level), five auxiliary hypotheses (by dimensions of state capacity), and their null counterparts, which test the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence.

Given that a legislative session is a more appropriate unit of analysis than a calendar (or fiscal) year because many data sets used in this study were collected or generated from legislative sessions (i.e., records of legislation, including budget enactments) or weekly time sheets (i.e., the frequency of Cabinet official changes) (detailed in the next chapter), (proxy) measurements on a yearly basis, as suggested in the literature, might not apply well to my

work. The following Chapter 3 will explain the mixed-method within-case comparative research design and rationale, methodologies (including the application of an innovative way of measuring administrative/bureaucratic capacity, the power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity), measurements, and data selection and collection. The side question raised of whether (and how) the people in Taiwan perceive the difference in state capacity will be addressed using regression analyses, as will also be methodologically detailed later with relevant data being reported.

Chapter 3. Research Design, Methods, and Data Collection

Introduction

This study employed a mixed-method within-case comparative analysis in a time frame between 1997 and early 2008, with various traditional (Western) measures of governance. Firstly, I performed quantitative statistical analyses aimed at identifying if the institutional factor, i.e., semi-presidential (denoted SP) majority/minority regimes (hereafter referred to as “*M/m*” or “*M*” vs. “*m*”), would affect Taiwan’s state capacity over the past twenty-odd years, while jointly considering if the (political) party factor, i.e., either the KMT or the DPP in power (hereafter referred to as “KMT *M/m*” and “DPP *M/m*,” respectively), would affect state capacity. It is also a question of interest in exploring, statistically, if the people in Taiwan could perceive the difference, if any, in state capacity exhibited in public opinion polls over time. Secondly, I conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with a few leading politicians and senior political journalists in Taiwan in hopes of garnering insightful interpretations of my quantitative empirical results. This chapter describes my within-case comparative research design and the research methodologies, quantitative and qualitative, used in conducting this study, as well as detailing my data collection efforts.

3.1 Within-case comparative research design

My dissertation was designed as a within-case comparison over time in an attempt to control contextual variables (say, in this study, the usual suspects of cross-Straits relations, economic performance, and independence-unification ideology). It is presumed in the design that all other explanatory variables remain the same from one period to another, except for the one that causes or brings the change in the dependent variable. The within-case

comparison, in other words, follows the logic of a most-similar-system design (Lim, 2006).

I divided this study into two main and four sub periods of time (or cases). The former refer to (ROC SP) *M* and/vs. (ROC SP) *m*. *M* includes the KMT/Lee (1997-2000), KMT/Ma (2008-early 2016, i.e., except for the last few months in the second term of Ma's Presidency, the caretaker period, as a result of Tsai's decision to reject Ma's cohabitation request), and DPP/Tsai (2016-current) administrations, while the DPP/Chen (2000-2008) and KMT/Ma (February-May 2016) for *m*, with an intention of ascertaining whether a significant difference in state capacity exists between the two periods marking president-parliamentary congruence and incongruence, respectively.¹ With ruling parties being accounted for, the latter refer to *KMT M* (Lee and Ma), *KMT m* (Ma's caretaker period), *DPP M* (Tsai), and *DPP m* (Chen). By doing so, one will know if there is a significant difference in state capacity either between president-parliamentary congruence and incongruence under the same-party rule (i.e., *KMT M* vs. *KMT m*; *DPP M* vs. *DPP m*) or in the same presidential-parliamentary mode of interaction but under different ruling parties (i.e., *KMT M* vs. *DPP M*; *KMT m* vs. *DPP m*). Again, this will add a complementary thread of the party's leverage to my focus on structural variations. Simply put, there are now a total of six cases meant for analysis: *M*, *m*, *KMT M*, *KMT m*, *DPP M*, *DPP m* (Table 3.1).

¹ I opted to identify the Chen-Tang duarchy as a minority/divided government and the Chen administration in facing the KMT-led pan-Blue Legislative majority as the minority regime in line with the general perceptions.

Table 3.1. Within-case Design in Time Frames

Two main periods of time						
<i>M:</i>			vs.	<i>m:</i>		
KMT/Lee admin. (1997-2000);				DPP/Chen admin. (2000-2008);		
KMT/Ma admin. (2008-early 2016);				KMT/Ma admin. (caretaker period in 2016).		
DPP/Tsai admin. (2016-current).						
Four sub-periods of time						
KMT Rule				DPP Rule		
<i>KMT M:</i>	vs.	<i>KMT m:</i>		<i>DPP M:</i>	vs.	<i>DPP m:</i>
Lee & Ma admins.		Ma admin.		Tsai admin.		Chen admin.
<i>KMT M:</i>			vs.	<i>DPP M:</i>		
Lee & Ma admins.				Tsai admin.		
<i>KMT m:</i>			vs.	<i>DPP m:</i>		
Ma admin.				Chen admin.		

3.2 Quantitative research

The statistical analyses included a preliminary, chi-square (statistical) hypothesis test for aggregate state capacity, a power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity, or the frequency of Cabinet official changes, for administrative/bureaucratic capacity, and other (statistical) hypothesis tests for legislation (including budget enactments)-related legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity,² followed by linear regression models to explore the relationship between varying degrees of state capacity and the trend in job approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet, respectively.

Partly inspired by ideas presented in the literature we have reviewed in Chapter 2, this study proposed a list of measurements of state capacity to select from when performing the hypothesis tests. In general, measurements of legal capacity center on legislative productivity of the Legislative Yuan (LY), the parliament, mainly in terms of bills of law (法律案);

² Various hypothesis tests were used as separate units of analysis because in this study the data were collected for approximately two decades ending in early 2018, i.e., a fairly large sample size relative to the entire population (in Taiwan's SP regimes) for the time being, albeit with a larger and increasing population size to come over time.

measurements of extractive/fiscal capacity take into consideration taxation, budgetary legislation on annual spending/revenues, and tax collection legislation; measurements of coercive/military capacity focus on spending while the coercive component also gives attention to its performance regarding the occurrence of demonstrations and violent crime; and measurements of administrative/bureaucratic capacity capture the notion of duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office, echoing and supplementing the power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity for the same end. The full list of the measurements (and codes or denotations) include as follows, and each will be further discussed in pertinent parts of this chapter:

Legal capacity

1. bills of law passed in the Legislature (%) (*11c*);³
2. bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature (%) (*12c*);

Extractive/fiscal capacity

3. the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio, a.k.a. “relative political capacity,” already referred to in the preceding chapter) (*13c*);
4. a cut or increase to the annual general budget in revenue (%) (*141c*);
5. a cut to the annual general budget in expenditure (%) (*142c*);⁴
6. a cut or increase to the supplementary budget in revenue (%) (*18c*);

³ The percentage of bills of law that are passed introduced by legislators or party caucuses and proposed by non-legislative branches of government to the Legislature. In Taiwan, not only can members of the Legislative Yuan (legislators) and legislative party caucuses (defined and stipulated in the *Organic Law of the Legislative Yuan* [立法院組織法]) introduce bills in the Legislative Yuan, but the other four branches of government, i.e., the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, can propose bills to the Legislative Yuan. The budget bill, however, can be proposed only by the Executive Yuan (TLY, 2005). See Section 3.5.1 for further discussion.

⁴ The Legislative Yuan, as stipulated in Article 70 of the ROC Constitution, cannot propose an increase in expenditure in the budget bill (whether general or supplementary) submitted by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet).

7. a cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure (%) (*19c*);
8. the total number of amendments to the *Tax Collection Act* (税捐稽徴法) (*1121_output*);
9. the number of amendments to the *Tax Collection Act* that contain significant changes to the goals of improving extractive/fiscal capacity (*1122_output*);

Military capacity

10. a cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure (%) (*143c*);
11. a cut to the supplementary defense budget in expenditure (%) (*110c*);
12. military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (*15c*);
13. the natural log of defense budget in expenditure per capita (*16c*);

Coercive capacity

14. a cut to the annual police budget in expenditure (%) (*144c*);
15. a cut to the supplementary police budget in expenditure (%) (*111c*);
16. the natural log of police force spending per capita (*17c*);
17. the (annual) number of demonstrators per 100,000 population (*ap_outcome*);
18. the (annual) violent crime rate per 100,000 population (*vc_outcome*);

Administrative/bureaucratic capacity

19. the number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office (*ofout1*);
20. the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office (*dur*).

The aforementioned list of measurements is meant to serve as a direct measure of state

capacity, either aggregately or by dimensions, except for six supplemental measurements—*I121_output*, *I122_output*, *ap_outcome*, *vc_outcome*, *ofout1*, and *dur*. *I121_output* and *I122_output* are performance outputs while the latter may better serve as an indirect proxy for assessing extractive/fiscal capacity; *ap_outcome*, *vc_outcome* are performance outcomes, each serving as an indirect (proxy) measurement of coercive capacity. *I10c* of military capacity and *I11c* of coercive capacity were both removed (or skipped) from all the hypothesis tests performed in subsequent sections because of the former's small samples of *M* ($n = 1$) (and *m* [$n = 3$] with all zero values) in them and the latter's lack of samples of *M*. Additionally, all but two of the selected measurements (*ap_outcome* and *vc_outcome*) may allow one to capture, more or less, how the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions affected state capacity in Taiwan.

I drew legislative data between 1997 and early 2018 from the website of the Parliamentary Library of the ROC Legislative Yuan (<https://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage>) and its Legislative Statistics Service (立法統計資訊網) (<https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat>).⁵ Legislations, new or amended, were accessible from the website of the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC (全國法規資料庫) (<https://law.moj.gov.tw>). Furthermore, budgetary data, including legislation and practice (such as final accounts of the general budgets as certified by the Comptroller General (決算) and taxation), between 1997 and early 2018 were separately sourced from the websites of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS) of the ROC Executive

⁵ But the data on the number of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislative Yuan became accessible on the website of the Legislative Statistics Service of the Parliamentary Library, beginning with the 5th Legislative Yuan sworn in 2012.

Yuan (<https://www.dgbas.gov.tw>)⁶ (the primary source of such data), the ROC Finance Ministry (<https://www.mof.gov.tw>), and the Parliamentary Library. For measuring coercive/military capacity, I collected Taiwan's official annual and monthly GDP and population data between 1997 and 2017 from the websites of the DGBS's National Statistics service (中華民國統計資訊網) (<https://www.stat.gov.tw>) and the Statistics Service of the ROC Interior Ministry (內政統計查詢網) (<http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100>), respectively; I assembled the nationwide data on demonstrators and violent crime between 1997 and 2017 from the *Monthly Bulletin of Interior Statistics, ROC* (內政部統計月報), the *Monthly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC* (警政統計月報), and the *Yearly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC* (警政統計年報). Data collection for Cabinet longevity will be described later, in Section 3.3 on the power-law analysis.

3.3 A preliminary, chi-square test for aggregate state capacity

In my study, the first step in exploring if a dichotomous regime classification of M and m would contribute to the difference in aggregate state capacity, i.e., testing the primary hypothesis, is to perform a Pearson's chi-square test of association (or independence) to determine whether M/m (categorical variables) possess similar degrees of state capacity that is conceptualized "as a whole," rather than as its individual, alternative dimensions. The values or observed frequencies (counts) in the (two-way) contingency table used for the chi-square test were obtained from 14 itemized measurements of the notions of legal,

⁶ The DGBAS website releases and provides access to annual budgets (and budget bills) and final accounts of the ROC central government and its immediate subordinate agencies via hyperlinks, respectively.

extractive/fiscal, coercive/military, and administrative/bureaucratic dimensions of capacity. The structure of the contingency table will be presented detailing the results of the tests in the beginning of Chapter 4, the empirical chapter. I sorted the data (values) according to legislative sessions—regular and extraordinary—within which they were observed (collected) and, if necessary, generated. When a datum observed in the interim (or recess) between legislative sessions, regular or extraordinary (i.e., lay outside regular and extraordinary legislative sessions), I matched it to the session, a period of time, either of whose start or end date was relatively closer in time to when the datum occurred. When this kind of datum was coincidentally located equidistant from two successive sessions (i.e., the end date of an earlier session and the start date of its ensuing session), I gave the “credit” to the session held in the same month when the datum was observed or generated.^{7, 8}

The 14 measurements used for the chi-square test are *11c* and *12c* (of legal capacity); *13c*, *141c*, *142c*, *18c*, *19c*, and *1122_output* (of extractive/fiscal capacity); *143c*, *15c*, *16c* (of military capacity); *144c* and *17c* (of coercive capacity); and *ofout1* (of administrative/bureaucratic capacity). Twelve of the first 13 listed here are direct (proxy) measurements (except for *1122_output*), while the last one, *ofout1*, serves as an expedient measure to make applicable in a chi-square test a similar, albeit less sophisticated, conceptualization of the longevity of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members, compared with that developed for a power-law analysis in a subsequent section of this chapter. Table 3.2 presents the marginal distributions of the 14 measurements.

⁷ Just a reminder that no legislative session began on the first day of a month in Taiwan since 1997, the commencement of the time frame of this study.

⁸ I call this framework a prototype of Framework 1 (with ES [extraordinary sessions]) (Appendix A). The standard operating procedure (SOP) demonstrated above for locating data will be used again to prepare another framework for investigating the relationship between state capacity and the public’s approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and the Cabinet later in this chapter.

For the sake of fitting a chi-square test to a variety of data at different scales, I standardized each type of data collected to measure a dimension of state capacity. By doing so, I could divide each of my data sets (each data set represents different measurements) by their respective ± 2 standard deviations ($\sigma = 1$) from zero into six intervals, a common industrial method: $>2\sigma$, $1\sigma \sim 2\sigma$ (included), 0 (included) $\sim 1\sigma$ (included), -1σ (included) ~ 0 , -2σ (included) $\sim -1\sigma$, $<-2\sigma$, making them count on an equal basis (i.e., based on equal interval values) to form a contingency table for the test. Secondly, since the chi-square statistic (χ^2) and the corresponding p-value of the test of association could not be computed when two categorical variables as columns (M/m in my case) in the contingency table had no data values, i.e., 0 counts, in (two cells in) a row (state capacity in my case), I had to remove all rows with 0 counts in two cells while performing the chi-square test.⁹

⁹ Simply put, a row of zeros will result in an estimated probability of 0 for either observation being in that row. Given expected counts of 0 for those cells, we end up trying to divide by 0 when trying to compute a χ^2 value. The formula for chi-square is:

$$\chi^2 = \sum (o-e)^2/e$$

Where

o = observed number of individuals.

e = expected number of individuals.

Table 3.2. Selected Measurements of State Capacity for Chi-Square Test by M/m

(Observed counts)				
State capacity		<i>M</i>	<i>m</i>	Totals
Legal	<i>11c</i> (bills of law passed in the Legislature)	45 (16.13)	25 (13.97)	70 (15.28)
	<i>12c</i> (bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature)	45 (16.13)	25 (13.97)	70 (15.28)
Extractive/fiscal	<i>13c</i> (A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue)	10 (3.58)	7 (3.91)	17 (3.71)
	<i>141c</i> (cut/increase to the annual general budget in revenue)	12 (4.30)	8 (4.47)	20 (4.37)
	<i>142c</i> (cut to the annual general budget in expenditure)	12 (4.30)	8 (4.47)	20 (4.37)
	<i>18c</i> (cut/increase to the supplementary budget in revenue)	3 (1.08)	5 (2.79)	8 (1.75)
	<i>19c</i> (cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure)	3 (1.08)	6 (3.35)	9 (1.97)
	<i>1122c_output</i> (number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i> that contain significant changes to the goals of improving fiscal capacity)	45 (16.13)	25 (13.97)	70 (15.28)
Military	<i>143c</i> (cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure)	12 (4.30)	8 (4.47)	20 (4.37)
	<i>15c</i> (military expenditure as a share of GDP)	12 (4.30)	9 (5.03)	21 (4.59)
	<i>16c</i> (logged defense budget in expenditure per capita)	12 (4.30)	10 (5.59)	22 (4.80)
Coercive	<i>144c</i> (cut to the annual police budget in expenditure)	12 (4.30)	8 (4.47)	20 (4.37)
	<i>17c</i> (logged police force spending per capita)	11 (3.94)	10 (5.59)	21 (4.59)
Administrative/ bureaucratic	<i>ofout1</i> (number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office)	45 (16.13)	25 (13.97)	70 (15.28)
Totals		279 (100.00)	179 (100.00)	458 (100.00)

Note: Entries are percentages in parentheses, rounded to two decimal places.

3.4 Power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity for administrative/bureaucratic capacity

This idea of using a power-law analysis of the frequency of Cabinet official changes was initiated in my master's thesis (Ho, 2007) and found its continuation in this dissertation.

Thirty-nine important politically nominated offices selected in the ROC Executive Yuan (Cabinet) constitute the data set of study: the Premier, the Vice Premier, Ministers of State,

Ministers of State without Portfolio, the Secretary-General of the Cabinet, Cabinet members heading commissions, and Cabinet-level heads in councils or commissions, while heads of independent agencies, Cabinet-level heads in councils or commissions with a fixed tenure, and Cabinet-level officials who are not senior political appointees (特任官) are excluded.¹⁰

¹¹ Taiwan is in the process of extensively restructuring the Executive Yuan to reduce the number of Cabinet and Cabinet-level agencies from 37 to 29, commencing in 2012. The following Table 3.3 displays the 39 offices selected include those that existed whether they were newly-established, later dissolved or merged into and subordinated to another, or upgraded to a ministry, within the time frame of this study (1997-early 2018).

¹⁰ In Taiwan, Cabinet-level officials without a fixed tenure who neither serve on independent agencies nor are senior political appointees include the Coordination Council for North American Affairs of the Executive Yuan (until it was downgraded and subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9/1/2012), the Government Information Office (GIO) of the Executive Yuan (until it was dissolved on 5/20/2012 and a major part of its role was replaced by the then newly-established Cabinet Spokesperson, a senior political appointee), and deputy secretary-generals. I, however, retained the head of the GIO in the data set considering his or her high-profile role in publicizing and promoting government policies as well as its nature of being a Cabinet spokesperson, thus being more exposed to the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions in Taiwan.

¹¹ The Chairperson of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) of Executive Yuan established in 2004 was appointed for a fixed tenure of years until 7/1/2012 and thereafter has no security of tenure. However, it is intriguing to notice that none of the five FSC heads with security of tenure ever fulfilled their four-year term of office, and several of them resigned or were ousted on political grounds, revealing political dynamics. I, therefore, chose to extend the data set by adding the FSC heads with a fixed tenure, along with their successors without it.

Table 3.3. Offices in Cabinet Qualified by Criteria, Jul. 1997 – Feb. 2018

Office	Preceding	Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date)			
		Upgraded to Ministry	Downgraded to the sub-ministerial level	Dissolved	Newly-established
1. Premier (行政院長)		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2. Vice Premier (行政院副院長)		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3. Ministers of State without Portfolio (政務委員)		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4. Secretary-General of the Cabinet (行政院秘書長)		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5. Minister of the Interior (內政部長)					
6. Minister of Foreign Affairs (外交部長)					
7. Minister of National Defense (國防部長)					
8. Minister of Finance (財政部長)					
9. Minister of Education (教育部長)					
10. Minister of Justice (法務部長)					
11. Minister of Economic Affairs (經濟部長)					
12. Minister of Transportation and Communications (交通部長)					
13. Chairperson of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (蒙藏委員會主委)			✓ (9/15/2017, when merged into and subordinated to the Culture Ministry)		

14. Chairperson of the Overseas Community Affairs Council (僑委會主委)	Chairperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission; Chairperson of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission (In neither case a change in the official title of the Council in Chinese was made.)				
15. Director General of the (Cabinet-level) Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan (行政院主計長)					
16. Director General of the (Cabinet-level) Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan (行政院人事行政局長)	Director-General of the (Cabinet-level) Central Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan (行政院人事行政局長)				
17. Director-General of the (Cabinet-level) Government Information Office, Executive Yuan (行政院新聞局長)				✓ (5/20/2012)	
18. Minister of Health and Welfare (衛福部長)	Administrator of the (Cabinet-level) Department of Health, Executive Yuan (行政院衛生署長)	✓ (7/23/2013)			
19. Administrator of (Cabinet-level) the Environmental Protection Administration, Executive Yuan (行政院環保署長)					
20. Director-General of the (Cabinet-level) Coast Guard Administration, Executive Yuan (行政院海巡署長) ^a					

Table 3.3. (cont.)

Office	Preceding	Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date)			
		Upgraded to Ministry	Downgraded to the sub-ministerial level	Dissolved	Newly-established
21. Director (or Curator) of the (Cabinet-level) National Palace Museum (故宮博物院長)					
22. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan (行政院陸委會主委) ^b					
23. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Council for Economic Planning And Development, Executive Yuan (行政院經建會主委)				✓ (1/22/2014, when merged with the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan to form the National Development Council)	
24. Chairperson of the Financial Supervisory Commission (金管會主委)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan (行政院金管會主委)	✓ (8/1/2013)			
25. Chairperson of the Veterans Affairs Council (退輔會主委)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Veterans Affairs Commission, Executive Yuan (行政院退輔會主委)	✓ (11/1/2013)			
26. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) National Youth Commission, Executive Yuan (行政院青輔會主委)			✓ (1/1/2013, when merged into and subordinated to the Education Ministry)		
27. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Atomic Energy					

	Council, Executive Yuan (行政院原能會主委)				
28.	Minister of Science and Technology (科技部長)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) National Science Council, Executive Yuan (行政院國科會主委)	✓ (3/3/2014)		
29.	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Research, Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan (行政院研考會主委)			✓ (1/21/2014, when merged with the Council for Economic Planning And Development of the Executive Yuan to form the National Development Council)	
30.	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan (行政院農委會主委)				
31.	Minister of Culture (文化部長)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan (行政院文建會主委)	✓ (2/15/2012)		
32.	Minister of Labor (勞動部長)	Council of (Cabinet-level) Labor Affairs, Executive Yuan (行政院勞委會主委)	✓ (2/17/2014)		
33.	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Consumer Protection Commission, Executive Yuan (行政消保會主委)			✓ (1/1/2012, when becoming a task force of the Executive Yuan)	
34.	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Public Construction Commission, Executive Yuan (行政院工程會主委)				

Table 3.3. (cont.)

Office	Preceding	Organic change of Cabinet official-led government agency (date)			
		Upgraded to Ministry	Downgraded to the sub-ministerial level	Dissolved	Newly-established
35. Chairperson of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (原住民族委員會主委)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (行政院原住民族委員會主委); Chairperson of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, Executive Yuan (行政院原住民委員會主委)	✓ (3/26/2014)			
36. Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) National Sports Council, Executive Yuan (行政院體委會主委)			✓ (1/1/2013, when merged into and subordinated to the Education Ministry)		
37. Chairperson of the Hakka Affairs Council (客委會主委)	Chairperson of the (Cabinet-level) Hakka Affairs Council, Executive Yuan (行政院客委會主委)	✓ (1/1/2012)			
38. Spokesperson (發言人) ^c					✓ (5/20/2012)
39. Chairperson of the National Development Council (國發會主委)					✓ (1/22/2014)

- a. The Coast Guard Administration of the Executive Yuan later became merged into and subordinated to the newly-established Ocean Affairs Council (海洋委員會), a Cabinet agency, on 4/28/2018, beyond the time frame of this study.
- b. The Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan was later upgraded to full ministerial status and renamed the Mainland Affairs Council on 7/2/2018, beyond the time frame of this study.
- c. In accordance with the *Organic Act of the Executive Yuan* (行政院組織法), as amended in 2010, the Cabinet shall have a spokesperson, albeit without heading a Cabinet agency.

The data were last updated on March 9, 2018, two weeks after the Executive Yuan announced on February 23 by its spokesman Premier William Lai's first, albeit partial, Cabinet reshuffle involving three ministers (Foreign, Defense, and Labor) and two Cabinet-level heads (Mainland China Affairs and Veterans) (Strong, 2018), providing 553 samples in the last two decades: 322 samples in ROC SP majority regimes (256 samples in *KMT M*¹²; 66 samples in *DPP M*) and 231 samples in its SP minority regimes (191 samples in *DPP m*; 40 samples in *KMT m*).¹³

I computed and compared the values of the power-law exponent α of the interval (i.e., frequency) of Cabinet official changes in chronological order on a weekly basis (according to the interval of dates to either assume or leave office) between M and m and, for the sake of exploring the influence, if any, of political parties on administrative/bureaucratic capacity, four possible permutations of M/m and KMT/DPP rule. If α is larger than 1, the frequency of Cabinet official changes is in a power-law distribution where short intervals are observed among most official changes and long intervals among a very few official changes. In other words, in this scenario, audiences via broadcast, online, or print media in Taiwan would perceive rapid changes in the Cabinet line-up, hence a sign of an absence of policy coherence and continuity from government officials. In this sense, the frequency is more informative than an average or median. If α is equal to 2.5, the frequency is in a pure power-law

¹² Thirty-nine members of Lien Chan's (連戰) Cabinet had already been in office before the 4th Constitutional Amendments promulgated on July 21, 1997 (and left office sometime after the promulgation). Their original dates of assuming office were used, which can be traced back to no earlier than February 24, 1996, if at all, when Lien embarked his second premiership.

¹³ A Cabinet official who is either appointed to a new term of office in the same position which is continuous with his or her previous term or promoted to from acting to full head of a government agency is considered as a single sample with an original date of assuming office (as acting head, if any) and a date of leaving that position. Likewise, the length of service of political appointees in office is considered continued when they either become heads of their successor agencies after a merger or upgrade or stay in their same positions after Cabinet reshuffles.

distribution.

Just a note here that there were many reasons why Cabinet and Cabinet-level members left office and the facts involved are often speculative. However, the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions seemed to weigh more in many cases of Cabinet official changes, such as resignations or removal from office triggered by Legislative moves against Cabinet-proposed bills instituting new or revised policies or programs led by individual ministers or other officials of comparable or higher rank,¹⁴ or Legislative accountability of executive leadership, sometimes fraught with an unbearable barrage of ego-crushing insults hurled by legislators to officials (via interpellations or various mass and social media outlets),¹⁵ to name but a few. Prominent cases of Cabinet official changes may illustrate the facts underlying the analysis, but a power-law analysis itself is looking at patterns.

There are two major approaches available to computing the α value of the interval of Cabinet official changes, “interval of dates to ASSUME office” and “interval of dates to LEAVE office.” By taking into consideration both institutional and party factors, either (major) approach can be further differentiated into six sub-ones (with the numbers enclosed

¹⁴ As a conspicuous example of this situation, Christina Y. Liu (劉憶如) resigned as Finance Minister in Ma’s administration in late May 2012 in protest against ruling KMT legislators’ proposal to water down her capital gains tax plan on stock transactions (Hsu, Liu, & Luk, 2012).

¹⁵ This second situation was exemplified by Hsueh Hsiang-chuan (薛香川), a former and first Cabinet Secretary-General in the Ma administration, who stepped down under relentless pressure from the opposition DPP on his slow disaster response to Typhoon Morakot in August 2009 (Lin, 2018), and Christine Tsung (宗才怡), the country’s first female Economics Minister, who quit the position after serving only 48 days in the Chen administration, citing frustrations with being a “rabbit in the jungle” of Taiwan’s charged political climate (Dobson, 2002; “Embattled Taiwan minister quits,” 2002). The recent resignation of the scandal-ridden Education Minister, Wu Maw-kuen (吳茂昆), in late May 2018, was applicable to the situation. His alleged transgressions involved conflicts of interest, misappropriation of patent rights, and illegally attending a technology conference in Mainland China while he chaired the Cabinet-level National Science Council in 2005, making himself not only subjected to an insult campaign from KMT legislators but the shortest-lived (41 days) Education Minister in Taiwan (Maxon, 2018a, 2018b). Since the endpoint of the data collection was March 9, 2018, Wu’s tenure as Education Minister was, unfortunately, not included in my data set.

in brackets referring to the sample sizes of officials and intervals in order):^{16, 17}

- 1-1) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in majority regimes (*M-A*) [239: 236]
- 1-2) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in minority regimes (*m-A*) [159: 157]
- 1-3) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in KMT majority regimes (*KMT M-A*) [213: 211]
- 1-4) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in KMT minority regime (*KMT m-A*) [8: 7]
- 1-5) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in DPP majority regimes (*DPP M-A*) [26: 25]
- 1-6) Interval of dates to ASSUME office in DPP minority regimes (*DPP m-A*) [151: 150]
- 2-1) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in majority regimes (*M-L*) [210: 207]
- 2-2) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in minority regimes (*m-L*) [150: 149]
- 2-3) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in KMT majority regimes (*KMT M-L*) [184: 182]
- 2-4) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in KMT minority regime (*KMT m-L*) [0: 0]
- 2-5) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in DPP majority regime (*DPP M-L*) [26: 25]
- 2-6) Interval of dates to LEAVE office in DPP minority regimes (*DPP m-L*) [150: 149]

¹⁶ Since Taiwan has experienced three turnovers of ruling parties in 2000, 2008, and 2016, the samples of officials who assumed or left office on the date of the Presidential inauguration, the twentieth of May, in these three years were removed from the computation to avoid biases. Likewise, I applied a similar rationale to trim the number of officials who assume or left office on February 1, 2016 when a new Legislature was inaugurated with an overwhelming DPP majority vis-à-vis the Chang caretaker Cabinet, the sole, short-lived KMT (SP) minority regime, appointed by outgoing President Ma. However, in order to optimize my approaches to accommodate more samples for a power-law analysis, particularly for sub-approaches interval of dates to ASSUME office in *m* and *KMT m* (i.e., *m-A* and *KMT m-A*), I retain (the eight) officials whose original date of assuming office was February 1, 2016, given the continuity between *KMT M* and *KMT m* in the Ma administration.

¹⁷ When calculating all intervals of Cabinet official changes in chronological order, I removed the intervals between “spatially adjacent” officials who, however, belonged to different and temporally non-adjacent SP regimes listed in a Microsoft Excel worksheet of mine, to avoid generating “artificial outliers,” and thus to ensure accurate α values. For instance, when calculating intervals using sub-approach 1-1) or “*M-A*,” I needed to remove the interval of up to 443 weeks between the last listed official in the (KMT) Lee administration (which ended in 5/19/2000), #84 George Chen Shi-yi (陳世圯), who assumed office as acting Minister of Transportation and Communications on 3/27/2000, and the first listed official in the (KMT) Ma administration (which began on 5/20/2008 after eight years of DPP minority rule), #319 Song Yan-rui (宋晏仁), who assumed office as acting Administrator of the Department of Health, Executive Yuan on 9/25/2000.

Since a larger (interval) sample size was observed using the major approach “interval of dates to ASSUME office,” which was also consistently true across all sub-approaches,¹⁸ I opted to perform a power-law analysis on data derived from this major approach.¹⁹ Unfortunately, *KMT m* had to be excluded from a power-law analysis because the seven intervals computed from its eight officials were all zeros (as they all assumed office on February 1, 2016) for which an α was incomputable. As a result, I used five cases (*M*, *m*, *KMT M*, *DPP M*, and *DPP m*) to constitute three sets of counterparts for comparison, namely, “*M* vs. *m*,” “*KMT M* vs. *DPP M*,” and “*DPP M* vs. *DPP m*.” The results of this power-law analysis, specifically of “*M* vs. *m*,” were complemented by supplemental hypothesis tests I performed on the duration in office of those individual high-ranking officials (*dur*).

Considering a lengthy, detailed tabulation of the large samples (553 Cabinet/Cabinet-level officials), each of which contains a name, executive position under a specified SP regime, dates of assuming and, if applicable, leaving office, duration, and the interval to the next Cabinet official change, I preferred not to incorporate it into the text or an appendix of this study. A request for the tabulated data is welcome.

The sources of data collection for Cabinet official changes between 1996²⁰ and 2018

¹⁸ A larger (interval) sample size in majority regimes was observed using sub-approach 1-1) (236 intervals from 239 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in minority regimes was observed using the sub-approach 1-2) (157 intervals from 159 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in KMT majority regimes was observed using the sub-approach 1-3) (211 intervals from 213 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in the KMT minority regime was observed using sub-approach 1-4) (7 intervals from 8 officials). The (interval) sample sizes in DPP majority regimes were equal using either sub-approach 1-5) or 2-5) (25 intervals from 26 officials). A larger (interval) sample size in DPP minority regimes was observed using sub-approach 1-6) (150 intervals from 151 officials).

¹⁹ A power-law analysis on data derived from the other major approach “interval of dates to LEAVE office” drew the same conclusions as the approach “interval of dates to LEAVE office.”

²⁰ See details in footnote 12.

included websites of the ROC Executive Yuan (<https://www.ey.gov.tw>) and its immediate subordinate agencies, the *(ROC) Presidential Office Gazette* (總統府公報),²¹ and other ROC Government publications. The date of a Cabinet or Cabinet-level member's assumption to office (and the date when s/he left office) depended on information, if available, obtained from the websites of the ROC Executive Yuan and its immediate subordinate agencies, the *Presidential Office Gazette* (and other ROC Government publications), Wikipedia, and news articles, in that order of priority given for information availability. Organic laws and regulations (executive orders), new or amended, that provided a basis to develop the list of qualified offices in the Cabinet for the power-law analysis are available on the websites of the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC and the Parliamentary Library.

3.5 Two-sample t-tests or Mann-Whitney tests for legislation (including budget enactments)-related legal, extractive/fiscal and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity

In this study, I conducted dozens of hypothesis tests on the difference in selected measurements of capacity per se and, if appropriate, of its performance (through outputs or outcomes), both serving as proxies (direct and indirect, respectively) for the other three legislation (including budget enactments)-related dimensions of state capacity between M and m , namely, legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military. Data (sets) obtained from Framework 1 (with ES [extraordinary sessions]) that I created in Section 3.2 of this chapter (see footnote 8 on p. 68) were used for hypothesis tests (except those on the indirect measurements of coercive capacity) in this section. Speaking more specifically of the

²¹ The Presidential Office Gazette is available in print and electronic format, the latter of which can be accessed via the webpage of the Office of the ROC President at <https://www.president.gov.tw/Page/129>.

hypothesis tests, the two-sample t-test was employed for statistical analysis of my data sets that follow a normal distribution (an assumption of the t-test) or consist of 30, at least, or more samples in each group for comparison in my case, for example *KMT M* (assumed with an asymptotic normal distribution of the sample average by applying the central limit theorem), when the variances between two groups were equal (see the assumptions underlying the t-test in Pagano, 1998). The Welch's two sample t-test was used instead when the variances were unequal. Without normality distribution, or when a relatively small sample size (of less than 30) and uneven sample sizes for two groups were collected, the Mann-Whitney or (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) test, a nonparametric test, was chosen instead (Sharp, 1979; Mann & Whitney, 1947).

Moreover, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test was employed to determine if a data set was normally distributed. The F-test and the Ansari-Bradley test were performed to examine the equality of variances of a data set with normal and non-normal distributions, respectively, and to determine if equal variance can be assumed while performing the t-tests.

Just like what was done with my power-law analysis of administrative/bureaucratic capacity, ***KMT m* was also excluded from the hypothesis tests for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity**, because of a lack of or insufficient pertinent data observed in its short-lived, three-month rule (say, at most, only one sample available for each measurement of capacity itself). Consequently, I used the same five cases and the same three resultant sets of counterparts for comparison, i.e., "*M vs. m*," "*KMT M vs. DPP M*," and "*DPP M vs. DPP m*," for the hypothesis tests here as used for the power-law analysis. Moreover, any of two compared data sets obtained from a proposed direct or supplemental/indirect (proxy) measurement of state capacity with fewer than two samples (n

< 2) should be skipped from the hypothesis tests.²²

I selected 12 direct and three performance-based measurements for conducting hypothesis tests on legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity. The former include *11c* and *12c* (of legal capacity); *13c*, *141c*, *142c*, *18c*, and *19c* (of extractive/fiscal capacity); *143c*, *15c*, *16c* (of military capacity); and *144c* and *17c* (of coercive capacity). The latter are *1122_output* (of extractive/fiscal capacity), *ap_outcome*, and *vc_outcome* (both of coercive capacity). They are detailed in following sections.

3.5.1 *Legal capacity (11c and 12c)*

I computed the legal dimension of state capacity, adopting Yang's (2003) concept of the "relative number of laws supplied and demanded" (already referred in Chapter 2), through two informative threads on the scope of bill providers, i.e., all eligible ones vs. the Cabinet alone, to ensure an adequate understanding of evaluating the impact of president-parliamentary congruence/incongruence on legislative productivity.²³ Specifically, *11c* measures overall legislative productivity in the LY by legislative sessions (regular and extraordinary) between 1997 and early 2018, considering all bills of law introduced by legislators or party caucuses and proposed by non-legislative branches of government to the LY, while *12c* for legislative productivity during the same legislative sessions in terms of only those proposed by the Cabinet, intending to more accurately capture the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions. Each of them is formulated as follows:

11c:

²² As described in the last paragraph of Section 3.1, *110c* and *111c* were skipped accordingly.

²³ See footnote 3 above for details.

Legislative productivity-cum-percentage of passed bills of law =

$$\frac{\text{number of passed bills of law}}{\text{number of introduced \& proposed bills of law}}$$

12c:

Legislative productivity-cum-percentage of passed Cabinet-proposed bills of law =

$$\frac{\text{number of passed Cabinet-proposed bills of law}}{\text{number of Cabinet-proposed bills of law}}$$

Considering the continuity of legislation in individual Legislative terms,²⁴ the legislative statistics collected for this part of the section were extended to include the first three regular sessions of the 3rd LY. In other words, it was because not only the numbers of bills introduced or proposed to the LY in the first three regular sessions but also the results of legislative deliberations on the bills by the end of the third session (passed or not, or ongoing) constituted the basis for computing legislative productivity rates in the second half of the 3rd LY. Otherwise, the way of computing legislative productivity rates in the 3rd LY by sessions would have been grounded differently from that for subsequent Legislative terms. The statistics focused on the bill of law (法律案) (and its derivatives, repeal [廢止案] and bill to cease application of law [停止適用]), which was reflective of the conceptualization of “rule of law” for the core idea of legal capacity (domestically).²⁵

²⁴ In Taiwan, all bills that do not pass during a Legislative term die, and do not carry over to the next Legislature (屆期不連續原則), except the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final account of the general budget as certified by the Comptroller General (決算案), and the citizen petition bill (人民請願案) (TLY, 2005).

²⁵ The statistics excluded the budget bill (預算案), (the bill of) the final account of the general budget as

3.5.2 *Extractive/fiscal capacity (13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, and performance: 1122_output)*

As shown in Chapter 2, taxation is a primary concern of interest in much of the literature on extractive/fiscal capacity. But budgetary legislation on annual spending/revenues (general and supplementary) and tax collection legislation²⁶ can also serve as complementary components of a broader appraisal perspective. When measuring this dimension of capacity, I took three different perspectives into account, including the capacity of the ROC government to: (1) collect taxes (*13c* or A/P ratio); (2) minimize budget cuts by the Legislature (*141c*, *142c*, *18c*, *19c*)²⁷; and amend the legislation to meet its revenue targets or reduce costs and/or enhance efficiency for tax collection (*1122_output*).²⁸ I computed the A/P ratio from fiscal years (FYs)²⁹ 1998 to 2017, based on the predicted and actual amounts of tax revenues in given fiscal years collected from annual general (and supplementary, if any) budgets (中央政

certified by the Comptroller General (決算[案]), the treaty (條約案) (which involves Taiwan's unique international personality, thus going beyond the scope of this study), the vote to override a veto (覆議案), the exercise of the power of consent to confirm (personnel) nominations (人事同意權), internal regulations of the Legislative Yuan (立法院內規), the vote of no-confidence (against the Premier) (不信任案), and resolutions.
²⁶ In Taiwan, legislation strengthening tax collection plays a key role in efforts to bolster government revenues (or fiscal capacity), as taxation accounted for over 60%, up to 80%, of the country's annual revenue over the past twenty-odd years. The *Tax Collection Act* of Taiwan (as last amended in 2017) governs the collection of all taxes (and surcharges), whether levied at the national or local level (except tariffs and the mining tax) (Article 2).

²⁷ Unlike the US Congress, which may propose its own budget independently of the White House, the annual general/supplementary budget bill in Taiwan is drafted and submitted by the Executive Yuan to the LY for approval, and the LY cannot propose an increase in expenditure in the budget bill submitted by the Executive Yuan (the latter of which was already mentioned in footnote 4 of this chapter).

²⁸ Most of amendments adopted to the *Tax Collection Act* over the past twenty-odd years in Taiwan were intended to further three general goals of the ROC government in respect of taxation: (1) meeting revenue targets; (2) streamlining revenue collection through reductions in costs and/or increases in efficiency; and (3) ensuring taxpayers' right. The numbers of amendments adopted to the Act pertaining to the first two goals obtained from different legislative sessions constitute *1122_output* while the numbers of all its adopted amendments constitute *1121_output*, on which the results of hypothesis tests carried out will also be shown in the next empirical chapter.

²⁹ In Taiwan, for the ROC government, a fiscal year began on July 1 of the preceding year and ran through the end of June of the indicated year. Starting from 2001, the fiscal year has been the same as the calendar year. In the interim before the implementation of the newly adopted fiscal year, the ROC government followed a fiscal year, i.e., FY 2H 1999 & 2000, that run from July 1 of 1999 through the end of 2000.

府年度總預算及追加[減]預算) and final accounts of the general budgets as certified by the Comptroller General, respectively.³⁰ My budget cut calculations were based on FYs 1998 through 2018 data, and the numbers of designated amendments to the *Tax Collection Act* were each collected from legislative sessions (regular and extraordinary) within the time period of this study (i.e., from the second half of July 1997 through late January 2018).

3.5.3 Coercive/military capacity (144c, 17c, and performance: ap_outcome and vc_outcome; 143c, 15c, and 16c)

This study distinguishes between two different purposes (or sub-concepts) of coercive/military capacity: “maintaining internal order” and “repelling foreign invasions.” Two separate sets of direct measurements, albeit with similar designs from a budgetary perspective, were in place to each serve its own purpose, police or military. Specifically, *16c* and *17c* are, respectively, the (logged) results of annual defense budgets in expenditure and annual police spending³¹ (both subsumed in the central government general budget), divided by the mid-(fiscal) year population of given fiscal years (1997 to 2017).³² *16c* was adapted from Henderson and Singer’s (2000) measurement of military capacity (introduced in

³⁰ The annual general budget for FY 1998 was passed by the Legislature less than two months prior to the 4th Constitutional Amendments promulgated by the President on July 21, 1997. Since basically there is no difference in Taiwan’s political power structure in 1997, the general budget (bill) for FY 1998 was included for analysis of the A/P ratio as well as other budget-related measurements in this study.

³¹ In this study, annual police spending includes budgets in expenditure for the National Police Administration and its immediate subordinate agencies, and the Central Police University, both under the Interior Ministry.

³² As noted in footnote 29 above, the ROC government’s fiscal year did not coincide with the calendar year until 2001. Since *16c* and *17c* were computed based on their respective annual budgets by fiscal years, whether old or new, and to address the discrepancy, the mid-year population estimates for 1997 through 2000 were accordingly defined as the average population in the given fiscal years (not calendar years), i.e., the arithmetic mean of the population between the ends of a given fiscal year and one fiscal year prior. See also the definition of Taiwan’s mid-year (resident) population on the website of the Statistics Service of the (ROC) Interior Ministry.

Chapter 2) and *17c* was inspired by and derived from the same logic.

Additionally, *143c* and *144c* are budget cut calculations per se (for the national defense and police force, respectively), spanning FYs 1998-2018. The military expenditure share of GDP or *15c*, which has served as a pronounced indicator of Taiwan's military capacity over time domestically and internationally,³³ also echoes that budgetary perspective. According to the cabinet-level DGBAS, the military expenditure as a share of GDP for the ROC government was calculated based on the finalized defense budget and nonprofit special fund budget (of the central government) under the purview of the Defense Ministry for a given fiscal year (Chung, 2015).³⁴ The ratio of the nonprofit special fund to defense budget ranged annually from approximately 10-27% over the past twenty years. In this study, the finalized defense budget was specified as a precise amount adjusted by supplementary budgets, if any, for that fiscal year.

Alternatively, two consequences (or performance outcomes) of coercive capacity, namely, *ap_outcome* and *vc_outcome* (respectively, involving general demonstrations and violent crime³⁵), vis-à-vis direct measurements of capacity itself were adopted in this study to serve

³³ The three most recent ROC Presidents, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen, all stated during their terms of office a bipartisan goal of reversing the declining military spending trends and increasing the defense budget, or at least military expenditure (see an explanation of the term in the main text on this same page), to 3% of GDP. But they have failed to reach this goal for most years since 2000 (Kan, 2014; see also Chung, 2015; Huang, 2005; Shih, 2018). As Taiwan's sole defense supplier, the US has urged Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, often citing or alluding to the latter's non-fulfillment of the 3 percent pledge as a reason for continuing arms sales to Taiwan (see a recent example in Yu, 2017).

³⁴ However, it is worth noting here that the US government does not count the said nonprofit special fund budget when calculating Taiwan's military expenditure as a share of GDP (Kan, 2014), so there was clearly difference between what the US expected and what Taiwan's leaders pledged to do.

³⁵ Violent crime, conventionally perceived as a more immediate threat to internal order than other types of crime, is defined by the ROC National Police Administration (NPA) as offenses of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, robbery, forceful taking, kidnapping for ransom, forcible rape, aggravated intimidation and extortion, and aggravated assault and mayhem (see the website of the NPA: <https://www.npa.gov.tw/NPAGip/wSite/lp?ctNode=12599&nowPage=5&pagesize=15>). For further information about changes in the official definition of violent crime in Taiwan, see the latest (ROC) *Crime Statistics* (for 2017) released annually by ROC Criminal Investigation Bureau, National Police Administration, Ministry of the

as (indirect) proxies for assessing coercive capacity and provide supplemental evidence on the question of interest. The notion of such indirect measurements was manifestly inspired by Lijphart et al.'s (1993) work on cleavage management, briefly discussed in Chapter 2.^{36, 37} Both of the indirect measurements were calculated using monthly data for the period of August 1997 to December 2017/12.³⁸

3.6 Linear regression models for exploring the relationship between state capacity and public approval of job performance by the ROC dual executives and Cabinet

I gathered nationwide public opinion polls on job approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet (as a whole) conducted and released over the past 21 years by TVBS³⁹ to contrast Taiwanese people's feelings of governance with real, measured state

Interior (2018).

³⁶ Given the fact that Taiwan has barely suffered political violence since its democratization in the late 1980s (albeit a huge number of social movements, largely peaceful, since then), neither indirect (proxy) measurements of coercive capacity employed in Lijphart's co-authored work, i.e., the numbers of "riots" and "deaths" from political violence, seems applicable to the island, let alone the inaccessibility to such official data for the public in Taiwan. Instead, I counted on the annual violent crime rate, a common feature when analyzing crime statistics in Taiwan (as well as other countries), and designed likewise and employed the (annual) number of demonstrators (both measured per 100,000 population) as my own indirect measurements of coercive capacity.

³⁷ Both *ap_outcome* and *vc_outcome* can be conceptualized otherwise as "precursors" of coercive capacity rather than consequences, as I mentioned in Chapter 2 when discussing the Besley and Persson (2015) approach to assessing state capacity for domestic control. In other words, they might serve as indicators of the "demand" for capacity (but to get from there to coercive capacity would take at least one more premise—to respond to the "demand" by increasing policing, rather than not respond to the "demand" or respond in some other way). But since I applied Lijphart et al.'s notion of measuring coercive capacity with indirect proxies (which was also reflective of the desire to distinguish between the concepts of capacity and performance in this study) to the context of Taiwan, allow me to shelve the potential alternative of conceptualizing both of my selected measurements in this study.

³⁸ Although *ap_outcome* and *vc_outcome* were designed as annual indicators, they were calculated as the sum of monthly statistics in order to distinguish between SP regime types under different ruling parties in years when transfer of power occurred. The statistics obtained in the month of transfer of power in either indirect measurement (i.e., May 20 of 2000, 2008, and 2016, respectively) fell into the predecessor SP regime.

³⁹ TVBS is a rare, renowned television broadcaster in Taiwan with its own poll center that has conducted surveys, particularly on political issues, professionally and regularly since the 1990s. Even though there are indeed some other media outlets with a poll center and many private survey research firms in Taiwan, TVBS is the sole source to provide publicly-accessible opinion polls related to governance systematically not only for free but rich enough to present a dynamic trend over the past twenty-odd years.

capacity. Given the period covered by this research, July 1997 to February 2018, 178, 112, and 46 polls were collected from the webpage of TVBS Poll Center (<http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center>) on approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and the Cabinet, respectively.^{40, 41}

Unlike the data format Framework 1 (with ES) for the chi-square and most hypothesis tests performed in preceding sections, data sets prepared for the regression analyses of state capacity against job approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet was presented in a similar format but with extraordinary sessions, if any, being merged into regular sessions (RS) that the former were affiliated with,⁴² so as to create a more condensed data table, facilitating regression. In this alternate format for regression, (the period of) each legislative session, whether mergeable or not, represents a case (or serves as the unit of analysis) with its corresponding values obtained from 12 of the 14 measurements (or independent variables for regression models) employed for the chi-square tests, with *I8c* and *I9c* being dropped (due to either insufficient data set),⁴³ forming Framework 2 (with RS/ES

⁴⁰ According to TVBS polls, presidential approval (滿意度) and prestige (聲望) are interchangeable, so the results of polls on prestige of the President, the Premier, or the Cabinet are absorbed into each of their entire series of approval ratings, albeit debatable in Taiwan. Yu Ying-lung (游盈隆), a Taiwanese pollster and former DPP official, asserts that polls will yield different outcomes based on either form of the phrasing, presidential approval or prestige (Tsai, 2018). In 2009, the dissolved Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) and the National Chengchi University jointly held a conference in Taipei discussing the choice of question phrasing between using presidential approval and prestige (or popularity) (in Chinese) for conducting public opinion polls on how the public felt about the president (Huang & Wang, 2009). After all, I followed suit of TVBS to ensure that more data could be collected for analysis.

⁴¹ Older TVBS polling data (gathered prior to July 22, 2002) are archived offline but can be obtained on request.

⁴² For example, the 5th (regular) session of the 7th LY merged with its two affiliated extraordinary sessions (i.e., the 1st and 2nd extraordinary sessions of the 5th session of the 7th term), which thus technically extended the 5th session by giving a new, extended date for its adjournment. As a result, the extended 5th session spanned its regular session and two extraordinary sessions, with two recesses in between. By contrast, regular sessions without extraordinary sessions in Framework 2 each have the same length of period as they do in Framework 1.

⁴³ The two measurements, *I8c* (a cut or increase to the supplementary budget in revenue [%]) and *I9c* (a cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure [%]), have respectively less than and equal to 20% of the data cells with values in Framework 2.

being merged).⁴⁴

With merged (if applicable) sessions (including regular sessions without being followed by their extraordinary sessions) serving as the unit of analysis, numbers of observations and their values from 9 measurements in Framework 2 changed compared with those from their counterparts shown in Framework 1 (say, different results between computing legislative productivity from the 3rd [regular] session of the 9th LY alone and a merger of the same session with its extraordinary session). These “affected” measurements were therefore re-coded for regression to distinguish between those that were collected or generated from different units of analysis as follows, while codes for those “unaffected” remained the same:

Legal capacity (Framework 2)

1. bills of law passed in the Legislature (%) (*re-coded 21c*);
2. bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature (%) (*re-coded 22c*);

Extractive/fiscal capacity (Framework 2)

3. the ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue (A/P ratio) (*13c*);
4. a cut or increase to the annual general budget in revenue (%) (*re-coded 241c*);
5. a cut to the annual general budget in expenditure (%) (*re-coded 242c*);
6. the number of amendments to the *Tax Collection Act* that contain significant changes to the goals of improving extractive/fiscal capacity (*re-coded 2122_output*);

Military capacity (Framework 2)

⁴⁴ As previously mentioned in footnote 8 on p. 68, the same SOP demonstrated in Section 3.3 on p. 68 was employed to locate data in the framework in preparation for regression.

7. a cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure (%) (*re-coded 243c*);
8. military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (*re-coded 25c*);⁴⁵
9. the natural log of defense budget in expenditure per capita (*16c*);

Coercive capacity (Framework 2)

10. a cut to the annual police budget in expenditure (%) (*re-coded 244c*);
11. the natural log of police force spending per capita (*17c*);

Administrative/bureaucratic capacity (Framework 2)

12. the number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office (*re-coded ofout2*).

There were “missing data (cells)” observed in Framework 2 (albeit rather fewer than in Framework 1 if I had chosen it for regression instead) that needed to be “filled in” (or imputed) to facilitate regression.⁴⁶ Given the limited number of cases, i.e., 44 sessions, including those merged and excluding the sole, albeit partial, session under KMT minority rule (see reasons in footnote 47 below), I figured that it would be better not to drop cases with any missing values. Then I imputed “missing data” with the arithmetic mean of observed values in each selected measurement for a specified SP regime type, namely, *KMT*

⁴⁵ The supplementary defense budget for FY 2002 and the annual defense budget for FY 2003 were both passed in the second legislative session of the 5th LY (2002/9/24 to 2003/1/14), resulting in two different, but close, values (2.86% and 2.98%, respectively) for that legislative session. To fit two values into one data cell in Framework 2 for regression, I took the arithmetic mean of both values as an expedient. (The mean is 2.92%.)

⁴⁶ I must emphasize that almost all “missing data” (including those for job approval ratings, discussed below in the text) observed in this alternate data format are actually not missing at all (except 22c). They simply did not occur or was not generated within a given period of time. Given legislative sessions (whether mergeable or not) as the unit of analysis, no missing data was observed for all but one of the selected measurements of legislative productivity—including 21c (for legal capacity) and 2122_output (for fiscal capacity). See footnote 5 for why 22c (for legal capacity) was inapplicable.

M, *DPP M*, or *DPP m*,⁴⁷ i.e., the category mean,⁴⁸ to make the imputed values plausible, not with the grand mean of all observed values in each measurement regardless of SP regime types. The rationale for using the category mean was intuitive: Given an assumption that the political power structure in Taiwan should not differ much within a ROC SP regime, say, *DPP m*, it was reasonable to assign the category mean values generated from the given SP regime to “missing data” occurring in the same one.⁴⁹

Despite criticism for its flawed theory, many researchers still view mean substitution as a viable method of dealing with missing data (Osborne, 2013). (See Framework 2 with imputed data in Appendix A).

In order to fit within (cells in) Framework 2, the polling data from TVBS needed modification when more than one survey was conducted within (or technically located in, according to the SOP indicated in Section 3.3) a (merged, if applicable) legislative session. In this situation, I took a weighted mean of approval ratings of each subject (i.e., the President, the Premier, and the Cabinet) from different surveys, taking into account the sample sizes of

⁴⁷ *KMT m* and its sole case delimited within its rule during the first session, albeit partially, of the 9th Legislative term were removed from this framework because of insufficient data, say, at most, only one sample (or value) available for each measurement of capacity in this period of time. In other words, “missing data” in the case of *KMT m* could not be imputed when there was a lack of data for a measurement wherein its mean was never available. There is no survey conducted by TVBS on the Chang Cabinet either, the sole KMT minority regime.

⁴⁸ For example, I imputed “missing data” in the A/P ratio for *KMT M* in table cells with the mean of observed A/P ratios right from *KMT M*, rather than from all ROC SP regimes, *M*, or *KMT M*.

⁴⁹ But the imputation of the category mean was not meant to assume that my hypothesis (majority/party control make a difference) is true, and adjust the data with which I will be testing the hypothesis. It could be possible that different SP regimes exhibit similar results of each or some indicators of state capacity (and similar approval ratings of any subject of interest) through the years of their respective rule. In other words, the imputation using the category mean was not meant to suppose that different SP regimes must differ from one another as to the results of each indicators (and respective approval ratings) of their own. However, in order to allay the kind of concern expressed above regarding any potential bias entailed by using the category mean, I created another set of regression models with “missing data” being imputed using the grand mean. Following the same criteria as used for selecting IVs (or measurements of the four alternative dimensions of state capacity), described later in the text on p. 40, ten IVs were included in the new regression models—the same nine IVs from the models using a category mean imputation strategy plus *243c*. The analysis showed that there was no empirical difference between the imputation using the category mean and the one using the grand mean.

surveys or the numbers of valid respondents. Then, I employed the same mean substitution procedure as was used for “missing” measurement values in Framework 2 to complete the data sets consisting of approval ratings of each subject by respective SP regime types in Framework 2 for regression.

As classic linear regression assumes the error terms of the response variable Y, or dependent variable, are normally distributed,⁵⁰ before conducting linear regression, I performed a logit transformation (natural log $\ln \frac{p}{1-p}$) of approval ratings (%) or weighted means of approval ratings (%),⁵¹ if applicable (where p is the proportion between 0-1). By doing so, the resulting values were no longer constrained between 0 and 1, but instead varied from negative infinity and positive infinity.

Next, since one should avoid multicollinearity between independent (or explanatory) variables (IVs) when building a regression model, I used Spearman’s rank correlation and variance inflation factors (VIF) tests in model building to detect potential multicollinearity problems between independent variables using criteria of $\rho > 0.5$ and of $VIF > 5$, respectively.⁵² Together with two control variables, namely, “ruling party” (i.e., the party factor, coded *parCO*) and “SP regime type” (i.e., the institutional factor, coded *regCO*), nine IVs/measurements of notions of administrative/bureaucratic (*ofout2*), legal (*21c*), extractive/fiscal (*13c*, *242c*, and *2122_output*), and coercive/military (*244c* and *17c*; *25c* and *16c*) dimensions of capacity were selected to be included in my parsimonious regression

⁵⁰ There are five assumptions underlying the (classic) linear regression model (CLRM Assumptions): (1) linearity; (2) strict exogeneity (error terms are not systematic and do not depend on X); (3) no multicollinearity (or perfect collinearity); (4) spherical error variance (error terms have constant variance [homoscedasticity] and are not autocorrelated [hetroskedasticity]); and (5) normally distributed error terms (Long, 1997).

⁵¹ See the logit transformation in Witten, Frank, Hall, & Pal, 2017).

⁵² See Spearman’s rank correlation and VIF tests in Gujarati & Porter (2010).

models.⁵³

3.7 Qualitative interviews

This empirical study employed semi-structured interviews consisting of four key open-ended questions, allowing participants who were familiar with the ROC semi-presidentialism at work over the past twenty-odd years to help interpret my empirical quantitative findings, so that the study may contribute to a better theoretical and practical understanding of relationships between SP regime types and governance in Taiwan.⁵⁴ I recruited seven interviewees from Taiwan: four politicians and three senior political journalists from different Taiwan's mainstream media outlets, based on the balance of partisan affiliation/inclination as well as their expertise and accessibility. They were former President Ma Ying-jeou; KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義), also a former Vice President and Premier; former KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), who served in the LY for 17 years, almost overlapping with the time frame of this study, and currently convene the Foreign and National Defense Division of the Taipei-based National Policy Foundation, a.k.a. the KMT think tank;⁵⁵ former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良), a key advocate and driver of Taiwan's

⁵³ Moderate to high correlation coefficients were found between *21c* and *22c* ($\rho = 0.59$), *241c* and *242c* ($\rho = 0.74$), *241c* and *243c* ($\rho = 0.54$), and *242c* and *243c* ($\rho = 0.62$). I opted to drop *22c* because it had missing data. As *241c* (general budget cuts/increases in revenue) and *242c* (general budget cuts in expenditure) are highly correlated (partly due to the aim of the KMT/Lee administration to achieve a balanced budget in FYs 1998 and 1999), either measurement must be dropped. There were two reasons to drop *241c*: First, the public generally pays more attention to government expenditure than revenue. Second, *23c* or the A/P ratio also accounts for revenue.

⁵⁴ The choice of a semi-structured approach for this study was determined by the potential sensitive nature of interview questions which I (the interviewer) required considerable discretion in gathering information in response to. The key questions were developed in advance of the interviews and presented to all participants. See more details about unstructured vs. structured vs. semi-structured interviews in Singleton & Straits (2010).

⁵⁵ Lin was elected to five terms in the LY, the first from 1996 to 1999 and later for four consecutive terms from 2002 to 2016. He was also a co-convenor of the LY's Foreign and National Defense Committee.

adoption of French-style semi-presidentialism and currently Chairman of the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, a front organization of Taiwan's National Security Bureau; Hsu Ya-jing (許雅靜), a senior political journalist at Taiwan's government-run Central News Agency (CNA) and currently Director of the CNA's Business News Center; Huang Kuo-liang (黃國樑), Convener of Political Division of the pro-KMT United Daily News (UDN); and Huang Wei-chu. (黃維助), Director of Political Division of the pro-DPP Liberty Times (See Appendix B: List of interviews).⁵⁶ See Appendix C for a sample recruitment letter (in both English and Chinese) that provided an explanation of the study purpose, interview procedures (also involving a consent process), assurance of confidentiality, how to ensure correct citations and quotations from the interview, and my contact information.

The four key questions of the interview were formulated broad and open to obtain as much information as possible (see Appendix D for English and Chinese). They were submitted to all the interviewees prior to the interviews, together with the recruitment letter and a summary of the empirical findings of this study. The Office of Research, Human Subjects Committee at the University of California, Santa Barbara deemed the interviews pertaining to this study, protocol number 11-18-0743, exempt from the Federal Regulations at 45 CFR 46.101(b) category #2.

Chapter conclusions

The primary objective of this chapter is to elucidate the quantitative research methods employed to test an array of hypotheses based on within-case comparisons that attempt to

⁵⁶ I also made efforts to invite Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃), a former Premier under Chen Shui-bian and DPP chairman, to interview, but to no avail. Yu is Taiwan's longest-serving Premier since Taiwan became SP in 1997, being three years in office.

explain whether majority/party control make a difference in state capacity, including hypothesis tests for aggregate capacity (albeit with only majority or *M/m* being considered) and for the legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military components via 15 main measurements (excluding *1121_output*, *110c*, *111c*, and *dur*), and a power-law analysis of administrative/bureaucratic capacity. If the results of the chi-square test on aggregate state capacity suggest that I cannot reject the null hypothesis, then *M/m* is not associated with state capacity. Subsequent examinations of the relationships between majority/party control and the four alternative dimensions of state capacity would be warranted.

Second, I extracted 9 measurements of state capacity by dimensions from Framework 2 to construct linear regression models that explore if people in Taiwan could perceive any changes in state capacity. Last but not least, I designed and conducted semi-structured interviews with 7 informants to obtain meaningful interpretations of my findings. The next chapter will describe the findings and provide discussions.

Chapter 4. Results and Discussions

Introduction

This empirical chapter presents and interprets the results of the statistical analyses of the relationship between the ROC's president-parliamentary congruence and state capacity, measured aggregately or by the four salient dimensions of state capacity as well as by public perceptions of the differences it makes, if any, in governance. The results are presented in the following order, starting with those of preliminary, chi-square tests for aggregate state capacity, followed by a power-law analysis of the frequency of Cabinet official changes for administrative/bureaucratic capacity, hypothesis tests results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity, and ending with linear regression analyses of the relationship between changes in state capacity and the trend in job approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet (in the Executive Yuan), respectively. These results are then synthetically interpreted with two different perspectives, namely of leadership and political culture, based on inputs from my semi-structured interviews with the seven informants.

4.1 Chi-square tests results for aggregate state capacity: no significant difference between

M/m, failing to reject H_0

Performing a preliminary chi-square test allows me to address the primary hypothesis of this research on whether the majority/minority government (*M/m*) division makes a difference in governance at an aggregate level. The structure of the (two-way) contingency table used for the chi-square test between SP regime types, *M/m*, and itemized direct measurements of the notion of a variety of dimensions of state capacity is presented in Table

E.1 in Appendix E. The test result from the 62 (rows) x 2 (columns) contingency table is not significant and I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the institutional factor is not associated with overall state capacity ($\chi^2 = 54.562$, $df = 61$, $p = 0.7067$).

In general, the result of a chi-square test on a contingency table larger than 2 x 2 (i.e., with more than one degree of freedom) may not be reliable if more than 20% of the cells have expected values (counts) less than 5 or any cell an expected value of less than 1 (Yates, Moore, & McCabe, 1999). Apparently, these conditions are not satisfied in Table E.1. I therefore combine the data of six intervals/rows from Table E.1 into two, using a dichotomous measure, i.e., transforming the data into the most condensed categories for the observed frequency count—greater than (or equal to), or less than a threshold of 0 on the standardized scale—to create a 28 (rows) x 2 (columns) contingency table (Table 4.1) for the same test. Unfortunately, the test result from this new table remains non-significant ($\chi^2 = 21.747$, $df = 27$, $p = 0.7501$), and I still have 46% of expected cell frequencies less than 5, within which an expected count of 0.78 (under *I9c*) is below 1. Such “noises” (cells with small expected counts), however, should not be excluded from either contingency table created in this section just because they cause problems, particularly with an attempt to conceptualize state capacity “as a whole.”

From these tests, we may draw a conclusion that the *M/m* division does not seem to be associated with aggregate state capacity, leaving the primary null hypothesis standing (H_0 : *M* had no greater aggregate state capacity than *m*). This indeed reflects the prevailing political awareness of Taiwanese people that whoever (Blue or Green) is in charge makes no difference at all.¹ Consequently, subsequent empirical examinations of the relationships

¹ In Taiwan, this sentiment is reflected in the pattern of decreases in popular satisfaction or trust with any

between *M/m* (and party control) and the four salient dimensions of state capacity are warranted.

political parties, once in power, and their reaction to public needs. The broadcaster TVBS' Poll Center provides rich data regarding shifts in public opinion on those topics (<http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center>).

Table 4.1. Contingency Table on M/m and State Capacity (Dichotomy)

(Observed counts)						(Expected counts) ^b	
State capacity		σ^a	<i>M</i>	<i>m</i>	Totals	<i>M</i>	<i>m</i>
Legal	<i>11c</i> (bills of law passed in the Legislature)	0~	17	12	29	17.67	11.33
		~0	28	13	41	24.98	16.02
	<i>12c</i> (bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature)	0~	24	14	38	23.15	14.85
		~0	21	11	32	19.49	12.51
Extractive/fiscal	<i>13c</i> (A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue)	0~	5	4	9	5.48	3.52
		~0	5	3	8	4.87	3.13
	<i>141c</i> (cut/increase to the annual general budget in revenue)	0~	5	8	13	7.92	5.08
		~0	7	0	7	4.26	2.74
	<i>142c</i> (cut to the annual general budget in expenditure)	0~	7	3	10	6.09	3.91
		~0	5	5	10	6.09	3.91
	<i>18c</i> (cut/increase to the supplementary budget in revenue)	0~	1	4	5	3.05	1.95
		~0	2	1	3	1.83	1.17
	<i>19c</i> (cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure)	0~	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		~0	2	5	7	4.26	2.74
<i>1122c_output</i> (number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i> that contain significant changes to the goals of improving fiscal capacity)	0~	9	3	12	7.31	4.69	
	~0	36	22	58	35.33	22.67	
Military	<i>143c</i> (cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure)	0~	4	2	6	3.66	2.34
		~0	8	6	14	8.53	5.47
	<i>15c</i> (military expenditure as a share of GDP)	0~	6	4	10	6.09	3.91
		~0	6	5	11	6.70	4.30
	<i>16c</i> (logged defense budget in expenditure per capita)	0~	7	3	10	6.09	3.91
		~0	5	7	12	7.31	4.69
Coercive	<i>144c</i> (cut to the annual police budget in expenditure)	0~	4	2	6	3.66	2.34
		~0	8	6	14	8.53	5.47
	<i>17c</i> (logged police force spending per capita)	0~	3	3	6	3.66	2.34
		~0	8	7	15	9.14	5.86
Administrative/ bureaucratic	<i>ofout1</i> (number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office)	0~	17	7	24	14.62	9.38
		~0	28	18	46	28.02	17.98
Totals			279	179	458	279	179

H0: *M/m* is not associated with state capacity, and

H1: *M/m* is associated with state capacity.

a. 0~ = greater than or equal to 0.

~0 = less than 0.

(Remove gray-shaded rows, i.e., no observations, before computation.)

b. The expected count (or value) for each cell = (row total*column total)/n.

Where

n = the total number of observations (“Totals”).

(Round off to the second decimal place.)

4.2 Results of power-law analysis of Cabinet longevity for administrative/bureaucratic capacity: no significant difference between M/m , all power-law distributed

The result of approach interval of dates to ASSUME office demonstrates that both Taiwan’s SP majority and minority regimes were in power-law patterns and have similar α slightly over 1. The α of M is 1.003886926 and for m it is 1.004939742. Likewise, the results of the same approach describe no difference between either “ $KMT M$ vs. $DPP M$ ” or “ $DPP M$ vs. $DPP m$.” The α of $KMT M$ is 1.003881651, and for $DPP M$ and $DPP m$, they are 1.003932026 and 1.004719499, respectively (Table 4.2; see also each power-law relationship linearized on a [natural] log-log scale in Figure 4.1).^{2, 3}

Summing up at this point, the α values computed above suggest that both M and m , regardless of which party in power, are in power-law patterns with similar α slightly over 1—a high frequency of intervals between Cabinet/Cabinet-level members changes, hence affecting policy coherence and continuity that are crucial to policy implementation—

² Recall the formula employed to extract the power-law exponent α presented in *Chapter 2*:

$$\alpha = 1 + n \left[\sum_{i=1}^n \ln \frac{x_i}{x_{\min}} \right]^{-1}$$

Where

x_i = observed values.

x_{\min} = minimum observed value.

Since the value of a denominator of a fraction cannot be zero, I needed to add a value x to each interval/observed value computed from my official longevity data set where its minimum observed value (x_{\min}) was zero with its many occurrences. Therefore, 1e-306 (1 multiplied by 10 to the negative 306 power), numerically a very tiny value, was added to facilitate the computation of α . Likewise, given that the logarithm of zero is undefined, I needed to add a value x to each interval/observed value computed from my official longevity data set when plotting (natural) log-log graphs. Since it would make the graphs more observable and accessible to analysis when a relatively larger value was added, say, 1 (compared with 1e-306). The (natural) log-log graphs in Figure 4.1 were thus plotted using the logarithm of “interval/observed value + 1.”

³ I should point out here that “zero” observations in the log-log plots do not signify nothing, but a much shorter interval of within a week, given the computation on a weekly basis. This should not be seen as undermining the base of inference.

although M in all forms was slightly further away from a pure power-law distribution (with $\alpha = 2.5$) than m . The results would very likely be consistent with the impressions that most people in Taiwan have received from news coverage (Ho, 2018; Wang, 2017), given that Chen (m) and Ma (M) each had six premiers over their eight years of running the country.⁴ In other words, M does not have higher administrative/bureaucratic capacity than m .

Table 4.2. Power-Law Analysis on Administrative/Bureaucratic Capacity (Longevity of Cabinet/Cabinet-level Members)

Period	Alpha	Power-law distribution ^a
$M-A$ ^b	1.003886926	✓
$m-A$	1.004939742	✓
$KMT M-A$	1.003881651	✓
$KMT m-A$	N/A (all intervals = 0)	
$DPP M-A$	1.003932026	✓
$DPP m-A$	1.004719499	✓

- a. If $\alpha > 1$, the data set is in a power-law distribution.
 If $\alpha = 2.5$, the data set is in a pure power-law distribution.
- b. A = according to the interval of dates to assume office.

⁴ As of my writing of this footnote, Tsai has announced a new and, therefore, her third Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), a 71-year-old former DPP chairman, a former Premier under the Chen administration, and the defeated DPP New Taipei Mayoral candidate in the 2018 November midterm elections, replacing William Lai (on 1/14/2019) in the wake of her party's bruising defeat in the midterm elections (T. Wu, 2019). Lai's Premiership lasted less than 17 months. Compared with Ma's first term of Presidency, the Tsai administration shows a higher frequency of appointing a new Premier, even though both are of majority status.








Figure 4.1.



Alpha = 1.0039



Alpha = 1.0047

Figure 4.1. Intervals of dates to assume office in log-log space. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3.
a. (A) = approach interval of dates to assume office.

Alongside these power-law findings, it is also worth noting that *m* showed longer range of minimum/maximum official duration (between 1 and 417 weeks) than *M* (between 0 and 402 weeks). In *M*, many politically nominated officials stayed in office for more than 50 weeks. *m*, by contrast, has greater frequency of officials leaving office before 20 weeks (Figure 4.2). Second, the average of the duration of *M* Cabinet/Cabinet-level members is 93.46 weeks (incumbents omitted) and 77.08 weeks for those of *m*. Two supplemental statistical analyses (of the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office, coded *dur*)

were conducted to further confirm the significant difference in the official longevity between the two groups ($t = 2.5348$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.01157; equal variances assumed) in which *M* had statistically significant official duration longer than *m* ($t = 2.5348$, *1-tailed p-value* = 0.005784; equal variances assumed).⁵

⁵ I opted not to account for the party factor while analyzing the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members because the current Tsai administration (*DPP M*) had remained in power for less than two years (as of the most recent update to my official longevity data set on March 9, 2018) and the Chang Cabinet (*KMT m*) survived for less than four months. The two situations impose potential, lower maximum durations of 94 and 16 weeks, respectively.




Figure 4.2. Official longevity. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3.

Likewise, Figure 4.3 describes a higher frequency of official changes in m than that in M . The largest numbers of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members who left in M occurred in May 2000 when Taiwan completed its historic, first-ever turnover of ruling parties⁶ and in early 2016 when President Ma named a new Premier to lead a caretaker Cabinet (the sole KMT SP minority regime since 1997) in the aftermath of the KMT's fiasco in the 2016 general elections. But for the latter, only eight officials (out of 40⁷) actually left their original positions after the Cabinet reshuffle. The other 32 Cabinet officials stayed on in office until the Presidential inauguration in May 2016, marking the third transfer of power in Taiwan.

From this figure, we can also observe seven prominent spikes of official changes (high number of officials leaving, say, 10) in m : (1) January 31/February 1, 2002 (in *DPP m*); (2) May 19/20, 2004 (in *DPP m*); (3) February 1, 2005 (in *DPP m*); (4) January 24/25, 2006 (in *DPP m*); (5) May 20/21, 2007 (in *DPP m*); (6) May 19/20, 2008 (in *DPP m*); and (7) May 19/20, 2016 (in *KMT m*). Except the second and sixth (both denoting transfers of power), the remaining five spikes correspond to Cabinet reshuffles. By comparison, M has fewer or five spikes: (1) September 1, 1997 (in *KMT M*); (2) May 20, 2000 (in *KMT M*); (3) September 9/10, 2009 (in *KMT M*); (4) February 5/6, 2012 (in *KMT M*); and (5) January 31/February 1, 2016 (in *KMT M*). And all but the second, again, Taiwan's first transfer of power, hence four spikes, derive from Cabinet reshuffles (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). Each of these spikes exhibits self-organized criticality (SOC) behavior, a scenario that plays out repeatedly when data are in a power-law distribution. However, this behavior appears much more evident in m , thereby implying its periodic large-scale Cabinet reshuffles that lead to policy inconsistency.

⁶ Seven officials left office on 5/19/2000 and 33 on 5/20/2000, totaling 40.

⁷ Five officials left office on 1/31/2016 and three on 2/1/2016, totaling 8.

Overall, the evidence for H_{1d} that M had greater administrative/bureaucratic capacity than m is mixed. At first glance, the M/m division made no difference given a power-law pattern that ended in either status of governance, even after the party factor was accounted for. However, the results of the supplemental statistical analyses of official duration and a typical SOC behavior observed in m might suggest reservation regarding the conclusions drawn from the power-law analysis.




Figure 4.3. Number of official changes in time series. For the input data, see Section 3.4 in Chapter 3.

4.3 Hypothesis tests results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military capacities: partial evidence of differences

This section presents the results of the different hypothesis tests applied in determining whether the *M/m* division matters for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military capacities. The short answer is yes, in part. Majority status contributed to greater fiscal and military capacities per se and coercive capacity as proxied by its performance. Legal capacity likewise responded to majority/minority status, perhaps more, but not in the way expected. The KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects limited to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity.

4.3.1 Results for *Legal capacity (11c and 12c)*: *m* contributing to greater legislative productivity, as alternatively expected

Figure 4.4 (and Table E.2 in Appendix E) give the basic picture from my data on legislative productivity. The observed range of percentage values in bills of law passed, excluding extraordinary sessions (ES), for *M* was from 1.08% to 27.41% while the range for *m* was between 2.11% and 18.24%.⁸ Table 4.3 shows the percentage of bills of law passed by terms where the highest percentage was observed in the 4th Legislative Yuan (LY), or at least its first half under KMT majority rule when the 4th LY was divided into two periods, before and after the transfer of power in May 2000. Legislative productivity in the full term of 3rd LY which consisted six regular and one extraordinary sessions was considered inappropriate for analysis of legal capacity under Taiwan's SP because the 4th Constitutional

⁸ After considering the party factor, the range for *KMT M* was between 1.08% and 27.41% (the same as that for *M*), between 1.32% and 4.40% for *DPP M*, and between 2.11% and 18.24% for *DPP m*. Only a sample of the percentage of bills of law passed (4.04%) was observed in *KMT m*.

Amendments did not become effective until July 21, 1997 or in the recess between the 3rd and its extraordinary sessions (of the 3rd term).⁹ The same Table also shows that the highest number of bills of law passed took place in the 7th LY, either in its full term or during the KMT/Ma administration. A total of 5,459 bills were introduced or proposed to the 8th LY, the most in the last two decades, which was around four and half times the number of that in the 3rd term. With SP regime types being accounted for, the overall percentage of bills of law passed in *M* was 5.40 % while *m* was 5.80%; the mean percentage for *KMT M* was 5.89%, 2.36% for *DPP M*, and 5.90% for *DPP m*. The percentage of bills of law passed in *KMT m* was 4.04%. Overall, these descriptive statistics on the legislative productivity data, albeit inconclusive, might imply the negation of my H_{1e} that *M* had greater legal capacity than *m*. Several hypothesis tests were also performed to verify the relationship.

⁹ In accordance with the 7th Constitutional Amendments promulgated in June 2005, the number of seats in the LY was halved from 225 to 113 while the legislators' term of office was extended from three to four years in an attempt to synchronize with the Presidential election beginning in 2008. Accordingly, the number of (regular) biannual legislative sessions was increased from 6 to 8 for each Legislative term. More important, the amendments adopted a single-member district, two-vote system for Legislative elections beginning in 2008.




Figure 4.4. Percentage of passed bills of law by session. Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: <https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstac/lgstat>.

Table 4.3. Bills of Law Passed & Number of Extraordinary Sessions by Term

Session	Regime	Number of bills of law introduced & proposed	Number of bills of law passed	Percentage of bills of law passed	Number of extraordinary sessions
3rd-3-ES 1 ~ 6	<i>KMT M</i>	1103	144	13.06%	1 ^a
3rd	<i>KMT M</i>	1228	269	21.91%	1
4th-1 ~ 3	<i>KMT M</i>	1003	219	21.83%	0
4th-3 ~ 6	<i>DPP m</i>	2052	338	16.47%	2
4th	<i>KMT M & DPP m</i>	2271	557	24.53%	2
5th	<i>DPP m</i>	2626	537	20.45%	3
6th	<i>DPP m</i>	2239	408	18.22%	2
7th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	461	32	6.94%	0
7th 1 ~ 8	<i>KMT M</i>	3621	664	18.34%	6
7th	<i>DPP m & KMT M</i>	3653	696	19.05%	6
8th	<i>KMT M</i>	5459	660	12.09%	6
9th 1	<i>KMT m</i>	1065	43	4.04%	0
9th 1~ 4	<i>DPP M</i>	3656	235	6.43%	5
9th 1~ 4	<i>KMT m & DPP M</i>	3699	278	7.52%	5

Note: Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library:

<https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat>

- a. The 3th LY eventually failed to reach a quorum of no less than one-third of its entire membership required to hold a scheduled extraordinary session at that time. (The quorum is the same as for regular sessions in accordance with *Law Governing the Legislative Yuan's Power* [立法院職權行使法].)

The statistical analyses (of *IIc*) revealed that there was a significant difference in the percentage of bills of law passed by sessions (including extraordinary sessions; see Figure 4.4 & Table E.2) between *M* and *m* ($W = 725$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.04705) and that *m* had a statistically significant percentage that was greater than *M* ($W = 400$, 1-tailed p -value = 0.02353), though not as expected, except for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., H_{0e}). After accounting for the party factor, a significant difference was likewise found, respectively, between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 15$, 2-tailed p -value = 4.404e-12) wherein the former had a significantly greater value than the latter ($W = 400$, 1-tailed p -value = 0.02353), and between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 137.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.003912) wherein the latter had a significantly greater value than the former ($W = 24.5$, 1-tailed p -value = 0.001956). In

short, a significant but reverse institutional effect on overall legislative productivity in the LY was each found in the three sets of counterparts for comparison. That is, minority status contributed to greater legal capacity instead, and that different ruling parties in majority status behaved differently. All the hypothesis tests results from this Section 4.3 are tabulated at the end of this section (Table 4.4).

When focusing on Cabinet-proposed bills of law in regular sessions to further capture the political dynamics between executive and legislative branches, a higher mean number of Cabinet-proposed bills was observed in *m* (107.44) than *M* (71.17), though as not expected, either, even after the party factor was taken into account: 73.92 for *KMT M*, 54 for *DPP M*, and 102.82 for *DPP m*. (And only one sample, 186, was observed in *KMT m*.) Likewise, the Cabinet of *m* displayed a higher mean percentage of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature (18.97%), compared with that of *M* (13.92%). This pattern of results or mean values virtually persisted even after the party factor was taken into account: 14.46% for *KMT M*, 11.77% for *DPP M*, and 19.43% for *DPP m*, with *KMT m* being excluded due to its sample size of one, 12.90%. The computations (mean values) were taken from Table E.2, and Figure 4.4 compares the mean values of each legislative session.¹⁰

The statistical analyses of legislative productivity confined to the passage of the Cabinet-

¹⁰ Alongside looking at the passage rates of bills of law, Table E.3 tabulates numbers of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet and, by comparison, those introduced by legislators and party caucuses in the LY by sessions. The range of percentage values of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet, excluding extraordinary sessions, in *M* was from 3.22% to 52.8% and the range was between 10.10% and 49.30% in *m*. After adding the party factor, the percentage ranged from 5.25% to 52.80% in *KMT M*, whereas it ranged from 3.22% to 12.76% for *DPP M*. The range in *DPP m* was from 10.10% to 49.30%. Only a sample (17.46%) was observed in *KMT m*. By contrast, the range of percentage values of bills of law introduced by legislators and party caucuses, excluding extraordinary sessions, in *M* was from 47.20% to 96.78% and the range was between 50.70% and 89.90% in *m*. In *KMT M*, that percentage ranged from 47.20% to 94.75%, whereas it ranged from 87.24% to 96.78% for *DPP M*. The range in *DPP m* was from 50.70% to 89.90%. Only a sample (82.54%) was observed in *KMT m*. Figure 4.5 converts the data table into a graph for a visual representation of the distribution between the proposers and introducers.

proposed bills of law (*I2c*) revealed a similar, albeit less pronounced, pattern of results. Like *I1c*, there was a significant difference in the percentage of passed bills of law proposed by the Cabinet (*I2c*) by sessions (including extraordinary sessions) between *M* and *m* ($W = 775$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.009295) and that *m* had a statistically significant percentage greater than *M* ($W = 350$, *1-tailed p-value* = 0.004647). After accounting for the party factor, there was no significant difference between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 119$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.129), though different from *I1c*, but hypothetically anticipated, whereas a significant difference was found between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 185$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.01443) wherein the latter had a significantly greater value than the former ($W = 55$, *1-tailed p-value* = 0.007217).

In addition, 18 extraordinary sessions were held in *M* while 7 in *m*.¹¹ The incumbent ruling DPP held an unprecedented three extraordinary sessions following the adjournment of a single, regular session, the 3rd, of the 9th Legislative Yuan (Table 4.3; see also Table E.2 for a detailed breakdown of individual sessions). The implication of this, i.e., trying to be more productive, was well consistent with the tests results from legislative productivity.

Overall, the *M/m* division did make difference in legal capacity, as proxied by legislative productivity, in which, however, minority status outstood regardless of which scope option I specified. And the ruling party was most likely suspected of confounding this relationship. The results therefore failed to reject H_{0e} which, however, was not set to be ruled out and could be accommodated in the context of domestic partisan politics, as I will elaborate on in the discussion section.

¹¹ An extraordinary session may be held either on the request of the ROC President or of no less than one-fourth of the membership of the Legislative Yuan (TLY, 2005).




Figure 4.5. Percentage of bills of law proposed by institution & session. Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: <https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat>

Note: The data of 17 (regular and extraordinary) legislative sessions were removed from Figure 4.5 since no bill was introduced or proposed in these sessions, including 3rd-3-ES 1, 4th-4-ES 1, 4th-5-ES 1, 5th-1-ES 1, 5th-3-ES 1, 7th-2-ES 1, 7th-4-ES 1, 7th-8-ES 1, 8th-1-ES 1, 8th-3-ES 1, 8th-4-ES 1, 8th-5-ES 1, 9th-1-ES 1, 9th-2-ES 1, 9th-3-ES 1, 9th-3-ES 3, and 9th-4-ES 1.

4.3.2 Results for *Extractive/fiscal capacity (13c, 141c, 142c, 18c, 19c, and performance:*

1122_output): differences in part; *m* suffering larger budget cuts, either in revenue (*141c*) or expenditure (*142c*)

I measured extractive/fiscal capacity from three different perspectives. That is, how the ROC government is able to collect taxes, minimize budget cuts by the LY, and amend the legislation to meet its revenue targets and streamline revenue collection. To begin with the second perspective, I created Table E.4 in Appendix E that summarizes the ROC central government’s general budget bills and budgets between FYs 1998 and 2018. The lowest budget cut, either in revenue (approximately 0%) or expenditure (0.02%), under Taiwan’s SP systems was herein observed for FY 2012, or in *KMT M*. By contrast, significant budget cuts,

say, of over 2%, either in revenue or expenditure, occurred for FYs 2001, 2002, and 2005, all under *DPP m* rule. There were only two budget increases in revenue in FYs 2H 1999 & 2000 (2.22%), or in *KMT M*, and 2018 (1.15%), or in *DPP M*. It was also intriguing to find that in late 2007 when the corruption and scandal-ridden DPP/Chen administration remained in power, only slight budget cuts in revenue (0.45%) and expenditure (0.80%, the second lowest) were made for FY 2008 in the LY with a KMT-led majority, the pan-Blue coalition, perhaps because of its extreme optimism about the prospects of KMT candidate Ma in the then-upcoming Presidential election in March 2008.

In that twenty-year span, the LY also passed a total of nine supplementary budgets in FYs 1999, 2H 1999 & 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 (twice), 2004, 2008, and 2011 (Table E.5 in Appendix E). The greatest supplementary budget cut in revenue (5.00%) was observed for FY 1999, or in *KMT M*, together with a 5% cut in expenditure, the second largest, behind that (in expenditure) of FY 2001 (23.03%) under *DPP m* rule. By contrast, the only supplementary budget increase, a seeming exception, either in revenue (43.37%) or expenditure (11.13%), was made for FY 2003, or in *DPP m*.¹² Figure 4.6 shows trends in the percentage of general and supplementary budget cuts (and increases in revenue).

The statistical analyses (of *141c/142c*) revealed an expected, and statistically significant, relationship between majority/minority status and general budgetary legislation on spending ($W = 76$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.03142) and revenue ($W = 78$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.02013), in which *m* suffered larger budget cuts than *M* in either revenue ($W = 18$, 1-tailed p -value =

¹² In May 2003, the Legislative Yuan passed the Cabinet-proposed Special Act for Expanding Investment in Public Works to Revitalize the Economy (擴大公共建設振興經濟暫行條例) in which KMT legislators and their allies in PFP and NP raised the statutory expenditure ceiling from NT\$50 billion to NT\$58.4 billion, along with a binding resolution attached to the Act, requesting that the Cabinet propose an amended supplementary budget bill for FY 2003 to meet extra expenditure (Huang, 2003). The LY is Constitutionally not allowed to increase budget spending.

0.01007) or expenditure ($W = 20$, *1-tailed p-value* = 0.01571). After accounting for the party factor, all but one of the results appeared consistent with expectations: There was no significant difference between *KMT M* and *DPP M* in revenue ($W = 5$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.3636) and nor in expenditure ($W = 12$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.7576), whereas a significant difference was found between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 16$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.04444) in revenue wherein the latter had a significantly greater value than the former ($W = 0$, *1-tailed p-value* = 0.02222). The exception was the comparison of cuts in expenditure between *DPP M* and *DPP m*, in which no significant difference was found ($W = 13$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.2667).

Supplementary budgetary legislation (*18c/19c*), as opposed to its general counterpart, did not respond to the *M/m* division in either revenue ($W = 2$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.08767) or expenditure ($W = 6.5$, *2-tailed p-value* = 0.5896). Due to a lack of samples for *DPP M*, hypothesis tests concerning *18c/19c* could not be performed on comparisons involving the party factor.




Figure 4.6. Percentage of general and supplementary budget cuts by fiscal year. Data primarily from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw>

Note: A budget increase is entered as a negative percentage value.

Next, we move on to tax collection or the A/P ratio that denotes the ratio of actual to predicted tax revenues. As shown in Figure 4.7, A/P ratios over 1 were found in nine fiscal years, including FYs 1998, 2004, 2005 (with an all-time high of 1.13), 2006, 2007, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2016.¹³ The four consecutive FYs with A/P ratios over 1 starting from 2004 to 2007 were in *DPP m* (the Chen administration). The lowest A/P ratio (0.83) was found in FY 2009, or under *KMT M* rule (the Ma administration), in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial tsunami. The statistical analysis (of *I3c*) revealed no significant difference in the A/P ratio between *M* and *m* ($W = 36$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.9623). Given only a single sample of A/P ratios from *DPP M*, hypothesis tests concerning *I3c* on comparisons involving the party factor were skipped.




Figure 4.7. Ratios of actual to predicted tax revenues by fiscal year. Data primarily from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw>

From the third perspective, Figure 4.8 illustrates the ROC government’s legislative

¹³ The ratios generated in FYs 2H 1999 & 2000 and 2008 have less explanatory power than those of other fiscal years because there was each a turnover of ruling parties in the two fiscal years while actual tax revenue (from different sources), in practice, was being collected throughout the entire fiscal year. Likewise, it was hard to break down fiscal capacity for collecting tax revenue that was measured across two administrations of different ruling parties in a single fiscal year, particularly with predicted tax revenue on a yearly, not monthly, basis as the denominator. These two ratios were therefore skipped from the hypothesis test.

productivity over the past twenty-odd years in terms of the number of amendments to the *Tax Collection Act*, including those that contain significant changes to the goals of improving fiscal capacity. Although more amendments containing these changes were observed in *M*, particularly during the KMT/Ma administration, the statistical analyses (of *I122_output*) revealed no significant difference in this measurement between *M* and *m* ($W = 511.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.345). Nor, after accounting for the party factor, was there a significant difference between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 39.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.6237), nor between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 123$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.8656).¹⁴

Overall, the test results of different perspectives showed some differences, in part dictated by general budgetary legislation on spending and revenue. Majority/minority status made no difference in either tax collection capacity or amending legislation to hit revenue targets and streamline revenue collection. In other words, partial support was found for H_{1a} (expected) that *M* had greater extractive/fiscal capacity than *m*.

¹⁴ Instead, when performing hypothesis tests on the *total* number of amendments to the *Tax Collection Act* (coded *I121_output*), there was a significant difference between *M* and *m* ($W = 441.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.04931) wherein the former had a significantly greater value than the latter ($W = 683.5$, 1-tailed p -value = 0.02466). After accounting for the party factor, no significant difference remained between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 40$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.6891), nor between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 109.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.5388). These test results are also reported in Table 4.4.




Figure 4.8. Number of amendments to *Tax Collection Act* by session. Data for the total sample from the website of the Laws and Regulations Database of the ROC: <https://law.moj.gov.tw>

4.3.3 Results for *Military capacity (143c, 15c, and 16c)*: differences in part; *M* contributing to higher defense spending budgets per capita (*16c*), albeit contextually unexpected

To begin with, I constructed Figure 4.9 to show the budget cuts to defense spending (subsumed in the central government general budget) since 1998. The first three greatest defense budget cuts were observed in the Chen administration, or *DPP m*, i.e., 5.74%, 4.98%, and 2.31% for FYs 2007, 2006, and 2008, respectively. The unprecedented 5.74% slash in the defense budget resulted from a compromise between the Chen administration and the then KMT-led legislative majority over a long-stalled US arms procurement deal of NT\$610.8 billion (or US\$18.5 billion at the then exchange rate) (Shih, 2007). Most of the other defense budget cuts remained below 2%, except those at slightly over 2% in FYs 2009 (2.15%) and 2015 (2.04%), both in *KMT M*. In that same period, the LY passed all supplementary defense budget bills without making any cuts in expenditure. The statistical analyses (of *143c*), however, revealed no significant difference in the percentage of defense budget cuts between *M* and *m* ($W = 73$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.05738), and nor, after accounting

for the party factor, between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 14$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.4848), nor between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 12$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.4). This result resembles Wildavsky's (1966) "two presidencies" thesis in the US, according to which presidents dominates Congress in the nation's foreign and defense policies, but not its domestic policies.




Figure 4.9. Defense budget cuts in expenditure by fiscal year. Data from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw>

The substantial budget slashes in defense expenditure may indicate changes in Taiwan's military expenditure share of GDP (15c) over the past two decades. As Figure 4.10 shows, the share is in a quite stable manner over time, slightly fluctuating around 3%, until Ma started his second term as President in mid-2012. Since then, the share kept falling, to reach 2.04% in FY 2017.¹⁵ As referenced in Chapter 3, the military expenditure is defined to include the nonprofit special fund budget. Likewise, the test result showed that the M/m

¹⁵ When a transfer of power occurred in a fiscal year with a or more supplementary budgets passed in the LY after a new administration was inaugurated, two values (of military expenditure as a share of GDP) were presented for this measurement, one corresponding to the old administration, and the second (after adjustment) for the new one. They were both included in the data set used for a hypothesis test. This (operationalized) framework was also applied to the computation of (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita and police spending per capita presented later in this section.

division made no difference in military expenditure as a share of GDP ($W = 75$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.1479). Given only a single sample of military expenditure as a share of GDP from DPP M, hypothesis tests concerning 15c on comparisons involving the party factor were thus skipped.




Figure 4.10. Military expenditure as share of GDP by fiscal year. Data for the defense budget and nonprofit special fund budget (of the central government) under the purview of the Defense Ministry from websites of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw> and the Ministry of National Defense, ROC: <https://www.mnd.gov.tw>, and for GDP from the website of National Statistics, ROC (Taiwan): www.stat.gov.tw

When focusing on the finalized defense budget in expenditure, i.e., leaving the nonprofit special fund budget aside, it turned out to be a different manifestation of the same underlying issue from 15c. Figure 4.11 shows a sharp upturn in the defense budget in expenditure per capita in FY 2007 and then the trendline fluctuates around 2.6 throughout the next decade, when majority governance prevailed. In FY 2007, Taiwan’s defense budget on a yearly basis stood over NT\$300 billion (US\$9.9 billion as of writing) for the first time, and since then the level was maintained, almost annually, except for FYs 2010 and 2011 when the Ma administration performed at a slightly lower level in an initial attempt to pursue rapprochement with the Mainland.

In consistency with this trend, the statistical analysis (of 16c) revealed that the M/m division made difference in the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita ($t = 2.3033$,

2-tailed p -value = 0.03895; equal variances not assumed) and that M had a statistically significant value greater than m ($t = 2.3033$, 1-tailed p -value = 0.0194; equal variances not assumed). The results achieved with this measurement rejected the desired null-auxiliary hypothesis H_{0c} that M had no greater military capacity than m , bolstering the conventional wisdom being tested in general but defying my prior hypothesis of a plausible bipartisan defense policy in Taiwan, drawn from the volatility inherent in cross-Strait relations. Given only a single sample of the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita from $DPP M$, hypothesis tests concerning $16c$ on comparisons involving the party factor were skipped.




Figure 4.11. Logged defense budget in expenditure per capita by fiscal year. Data for the defense budget (in expenditure) from websites of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw> and the Ministry of National Defense, ROC: <https://www.mnd.gov.tw>, and for the mid-(fiscal) year population from the website of the Interior Statistics, Department of Statistics, (ROC) Ministry of the Interior: <http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100>

4.3.4 Results for *coercive capacity (144c, 17c, and performance)*: M/m related to performance only, changes in violent crime rates ($vc_outcome$); M contributing to a lower violent crime rate

Unlike its bipartite, military complement, no discernible pattern seems to emerge of cuts to annual police budgets in expenditure since 1998 (Figure 4.12). The greatest police budget

cut (2.22%) was made for FY 1999, or in the Lee administration, a *KMT M*, while cuts ranging between 1% and 2% were observed in both the administrations of Chen (1.02% and 1.69% in FYs 2002 and 2005, respectively), the *DPP m*, and his successor Ma (1.29% in FY 2013), a *KMT M*. In line with my observations, the statistical analyses (of *144c*) revealed no significant difference in the percentage of police budget cuts between *M* and *m* ($W = 36.5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.3959), and nor, after accounting for the party factor, between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 13$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.6061), nor between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.5333).

When the population factor was included in the analysis, a downward trend in the annual (logged) police spending, i.e., budget, per capita (*17c*) appeared to be evident from FYs 1999 to 2004, and starts with a slow decline from 2006 onward (Figure 4.13). However, the converted values still showed no significant difference between *M* and *m* ($W = 70$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.3144). Given only a single sample of the (logged) police spending per capita from *DPP M*, hypothesis tests concerning *17c* on comparisons involving the party factor were skipped.




Figure 4.12. Police budget cuts in expenditure by fiscal year. Data from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw>




Figure 4.13. Logged police spending per capita by fiscal year. Data for police spending (i.e., the annual police budget in expenditure) from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw> and for the mid-(fiscal) year population from the website of the Interior Statistics, Department of Statistics, (ROC) Ministry of the Interior: <http://statis.moi.gov.tw/micst/stmain.jsp?sys=100>

On the other hand, the performance outcomes of coercive capacity responded to the *M/m* division, in part dictated by violent crime, rather than general demonstrations. Figure 4.14 shows how the ROC government performed its coercive capacity in contexts of domestic demonstrations (including rallies and protest marches) and violent crimes. In speaking of the former, the first two highest spikes were observed in 2004 (52,849) and 2014 (25,042) under *DPP m* and *KMT M* rule, respectively. Large-scale protests challenging the legitimacy of then President Chen ensuing the suspicious 3/19 Shooting Incident contribute to the spike in 2004, while the student-led Sunflower Movement that galvanized public opinion against Ma's signature trade pact with the Mainland for another one in 2014. The next two highest spikes were observed in 2008 (20,147) and 2000 (18,112), both Presidential election years. The test results (of *ap_outcome*) showed that the *M/m* division made no difference in the number of demonstrators (per 100,000 population) ($t = -0.92373$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.3571; equal variances not assumed), and nor, after accounting for the party factor, between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 917$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.1015), nor between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 5$, 2-tailed p -value = 0.5333). They satisfy my expectations.

As for violent crime, a clear downward trend was observed, despite small fluctuations in the Chen administration. As the decline becomes sharper starting 2005, the trendline constantly slopes down, albeit becoming less so, throughout Ma's second term and onward. The test results (of *vc_outcome*) showed that *M/m* division made difference in the violent crime rate (per 100,000 population) ($t = -13.345$, *2-tailed p-value* $< 2.2e-16$; equal variances not assumed) and that majority status contributed to a lower rate of violent crime ($t = -13.345$, *1-tailed p-value* $< 2.2e-16$; equal variances not assumed), albeit not as hypothetically desired. After accounting for the party factor, a difference was likewise found, respectively, between *KMT M* and *DPP M* ($W = 15$, *2-tailed p-value* $= 4.404e-12$) wherein the former had a higher rate than the latter ($W = 2379$, *1-tailed p-value* $= 2.202e-12$), and between *DPP M* and *DPP m* ($W = 1824$, *2-tailed p-value* $= 6.665e-12$) wherein the latter, with a lower rate, outperformed the former ($W = 0$, *1-tailed p-value* $= 3.333e-12$). However, one would tend to suspect a spurious relationship between *M/m* and violent crime due to a time series having the sharper downward shift that coincides with a decade of majority rule regardless of the ruling party, albeit briefly interrupted by Ma's caretaker period. By contrast, the violent crime rates in the prior decade appear much higher, starting with Lee's majority rule of nearly three years and mostly covered by Chen's minority rule.¹⁶ Insights from the interview with Ma lend further understanding to this puzzle, to which I will return later in the discussion section.

In short, from a performance outcomes standpoint, we might reject the desired null-auxiliary hypothesis H_{0b} that *M* had no greater coercive capacity than *m*. Otherwise, the test

¹⁶ The stacked bar charts in Figure 4.14 show the yearly comparison of results for visible manifestations. However, just a reminder that the hypothesis tests of violent crime and demonstrators were each conducted on a monthly basis to ensure that data not within scope of the ROC SP were excluded from the computation.

results of measuring coercive capacity directly by comparing changes in police force budgets (cuts or per capita) supported my prior expectations.




Figure 4.14. Performance of coercive capacity by year. Data for demonstrators and violent crime, both from the *Monthly Bulletin of Interior Statistics, ROC*, the *Monthly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC*, and the *Yearly Statistics of Police Administration, ROC*.

4.3.5 The summary of the hypothesis test results for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military capacities

The results of the hypothesis tests carried out so far in this section are summarized and reported in Table 4.4, a snapshot table, below. To simplify the tabulation and access to desired information, I presented the results obtained from the “more appropriate” analysis, the two-sample t or Mann-Whitney tests, for a set of counterparts for comparison, as determined based on several assumptions described in Chapter 3 (or summarized in Table 4.4 below). The ruling party was suspected of affecting state capacity, or confounding the relationship between the *M/m* division and state capacity, when the test result showed either a significant difference in a measurement between *KMT M* and *DPP M* (i.e., with majority status being controlled), or no between *DPP M* and *DPP m* (i.e., with the ruling party being controlled) on condition that a significant difference was found instead between *M* and *m* for the same measurement. Likewise, when there was a significant difference in a measurement between *DPP M* and *DPP m* and the latter outperformed the former, the ruling party was likely to be a confounder.¹⁷ The cells in each said set of counterparts for comparison marked with a “Ⓟ” symbol in Table 4.4 denote such results.

In a nutshell, by focusing on non-administrative/bureaucratic dimensions of state capacity, *M* outperformed *m* as hypothetically expected and unexpected, respectively, in fiscal capacity (when it was measured with changes made by the LY to annual general budgets, either in revenue or expenditure) and military capacity (when measured with the defense budgets in expenditure per capita), albeit in the face of long-standing Communist

¹⁷ The inference of the ruling party as a potential confounding variable for each cell in the tabulated results was performed under the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence, whether the results supported or not the given auxiliary hypothesis in the Taiwanese context.

Chinese threat to Taiwan. The *M/m* division affected legal capacity in all its given sets of counterparts for comparison between *M* and *m*, i.e., all the four cells in “*M* vs. *m*” and “*DPP M* vs. *DPP m*,” but not in the way I expected hypothetically. Legal capacity appeared to be most reactive to the *M/m* division. The *M/m* division affected coercive capacity only when it was measured by its performance in reducing the violent crime rate, rather than its capacity per se. The KMT/DPP rule division would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects limited to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity.

Table 4.4. Summary of the Hypothesis Tests Results for Multi-dimensions of State Capacities^a

Dimension	Case ^b (code) Direct measurement	<i>M</i> vs. <i>m</i>	<i>KMT M</i> vs. <i>DPP M</i>	<i>DPP M</i> vs. <i>DPP m</i>
Legal capacity	<i>11c</i> (bills of law passed in the Legislature [%])	Y (<i>m</i> > <i>M</i> : ✖) **	Y (<i>KMT M</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✖) ** Ⓟ	Y (<i>DPP m</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✖) ** Ⓟ
	<i>12c</i> (bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature [%])	Y (<i>m</i> > <i>M</i> : ✖) **	N (H)	Y (<i>DPP m</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✖) ** Ⓟ
Extractive/fiscal capacity	<i>13c</i> (A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue [%])	N	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)
	<i>141c</i> (cut/increase to the annual general budget in revenue [%])	Y (<i>m</i> > <i>M</i> : ✓ (H) *)	N	Y (<i>DPP m</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✓ (H) *)
	<i>142c</i> (cut to the annual general budget in expenditure [%])	Y (<i>m</i> > <i>M</i> : ✓ (H) *)	N	N Ⓟ
	<i>18c</i> (cut/increase to the supplementary budget in revenue [%])	N	N/A (n = 0 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 0 in <i>DPP M</i>)
	<i>19c</i> (cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure [%])	N	N/A (n = 0 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 0 in <i>DPP M</i>)
Military capacity	<i>143c</i> (cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure [%])	N (H)	N (H)	N (H)
	<i>15c</i> (military expenditure as a share of GDP [%])	N (H)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)
	<i>16c</i> (natural log of defense budget in expenditure per capita)	Y (<i>M</i> > <i>m</i> : ✓) *	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)
	<i>110c</i> (cut to the supplementary defense budget in expenditure [%])	N/A (n = 1 in <i>KMT M</i> ; all data values = 0)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>KMT M</i> ; all data values = 0)	N/A (n = 0 in <i>DPP M</i> ; all data values = 0)

Table 4.9. (cont.)

Dimension	Case ^b	<i>M</i> vs. <i>m</i>	<i>KMT M</i> vs. <i>DPP M</i>	<i>DPP M</i> vs. <i>DPP m</i>
	(code) Direct measurement			
Coercive capacity	<i>144c</i> (cut to the annual police budget in expenditure [%])	N (H)	N (H)	N (H)
	<i>17c</i> (natural log of police force spending per capita)	N (H)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)	N/A (n = 1 in <i>DPP M</i>)
	<i>111c</i> (cut to the supplementary police budget in expenditure [%])	N/A (n = 0 in <i>M</i>)	N/A (n = 0 in <i>M</i>)	N/A (n = 0 in <i>M</i>)
Dimension	Case	<i>M</i> vs. <i>m</i>	<i>KMT M</i> vs. <i>DPP M</i>	<i>DPP M</i> vs. <i>DPP m</i>
	(code) Supplemental measurement			
Extractive/fiscal capacity (performance: <i>1121_output</i> not required to form conclusions; <i>1122_output</i> serving as an indirect proxy)	<i>1121_output</i> (total number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i>)	Y (<i>M</i> > <i>m</i> : ✓ (H) *)	N	N (P)
	<i>1122_output</i> (number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i> that contain significant changes to the goals of improving fiscal capacity)	N	N	N
Coercive capacity (performance: each serving as an indirect proxy)	<i>ap_outcome</i> (number of demonstrators per 100,000 population)	N (H)	N (H)	N (H)
	<i>vc_outcome</i> (violent crime rate per 100,000 population)	Y (<i>m</i> > <i>M</i> : ✓) ***	Y (<i>KMT M</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✗) *** (P)	Y (<i>DPP m</i> > <i>DPP M</i> : ✓) ***
Administrative/bureaucratic capacity (supplemental)	<i>dur</i> (duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members in office) (weeks) ^c	Y (<i>M</i> > <i>m</i> : ✓ (H) **)	Not performed	Not performed

* $P < .05$ (1-tailed test), ** $P < .01$ (1-tailed test), *** $P < .001$ (1-tailed test).

Note:

Where

Y = there is a statistically significant difference between two groups (the symbol “>” denotes the former group has a statistically significant value greater than the latter).

N = there is no statistically significant difference between two groups.

N/A = a lack of or insufficient data observed (i.e., no or only one sample available).

✓ = support the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence (cells with yellow background).

✗ = not support the conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence.

H = support the auxiliary hypothesis.

Ⓟ = potential effect of ruling parties on state capacity.

- a. The two-sample t-test was employed for statistical analysis of my data sets that follow a normal distribution (an assumption of the t-test) or consist of 30, at least, or more samples in each group for comparison in my case, for example *KMT M* (assumed with an asymptotic normal distribution of the sample average by applying the central limit theorem), when the variances between two groups were equal. The Welch’s two sample t-test was used instead when the variances were unequal. Without normality distribution, or when a relatively small sample size (of less than 30) and uneven sample sizes for two groups were collected, the Mann-Whitney or (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) test, a nonparametric test, was chosen instead.
- b. ***KMT m* was excluded from the hypothesis tests for legal, extractive/fiscal, and coercive/military dimensions of state capacity**, because of a lack of or insufficient pertinent data observed in its short-lived, three-month rule (say, at most, only one sample available for each measurement of capacity itself). The three sets of counterparts for comparison were therefore chosen: “*M* vs. *m*,” “*KMT M* vs. *DPP M*,” and “*DPP M* vs. *DPP m*.”
- c. I opted not to account for the party factor while analyzing the duration of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members because the current Tsai administration (*DPP M*) had remained in power for less than two years (as of the most recent update to my official longevity data set on March 9, 2018) and the Chang Cabinet (*KMT m*) survived for less than four months. The two situations impose potential, lower maximum durations of 94 and 16 weeks, respectively.

4.4 Results for state capacity vs. approval ratings for Presidents, Premiers, and Cabinets:

People did not perceive the difference

Now that the *M/m* division was found to make some differences in certain, but not all, dimensions of state capacity, I sought to unravel the question of if the people in Taiwan could perceive and appreciate differences in state capacity, first by looking at the trend over the past two decades in (the weighted mean of) job approval ratings for ROC Presidents, Premiers, and Cabinets (Figure 4.15). Generally speaking, all the three trendlines appear to fluctuate in a similar manner, but the Premier's approval ratings were ahead of the other two's for most observations. The Cabinet consistently scored lower approval ratings than both the President and Premier in the same periods of time, except for the second half of 2008 and early 2009 when Premier Liu Chao-shiuan's Cabinet enjoyed an approval ratings lead over then-President Ma and Liu himself. Liu was Ma's first Premier and distributed the country's first-ever consumption vouchers in early 2009 to combat the economic downturn sparked by the global financial tsunami. It is also interesting to notice that Simon Chang, the independent caretaker Premier of *KMT m*, who was appointed following his predecessor's resignation over the then-ruling KMT's defeat in 2016 general elections, scored a 54.99% approval rating (in the first half of the first legislative session of the 9th LY), the fourth highest for the Premier since 1998.

Table 4.5 presents the results of the three linear regression models of the nine selected measurements of five components of state capacity against job approval ratings for the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet. They suggest that variations in state capacity in ROC SP regimes were barely reflected, if at all, in job approval ratings of the President and Premier and not reflected for the Cabinet in Taiwan. That is, the people in Taiwan could not

perceive, or at least could not appreciate, differences in state capacity.

In detail, overall F-tests were statistically significant for the approval ratings of the President (Model 1) and the Premier (Model 2) at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, while the F-test was not significant for the approval ratings of the Cabinet (Model 3) given no significant p-values for the individual coefficients in the model. All my models displayed low adjusted R-squared values, indicating that these models did not do a very good job of explaining job approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet on state capacity. In Model 1, only *I7c* (logged police force spending per capita) of coercive capacity was significant (at the 0.05 level and in a positive direction) while the party and institutional factors, both control variables, were found statistically significant, respectively, at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels and had negative and positive relationship with the Presidential approval rating: either DPP rule or majority status led to a higher Presidential approval rating. By contrast, the party and institutional factors became no longer significant with the Premier approval rating being the response variable in Model 2. In this model, only *I3c* (A/P ratio) of extractive/fiscal capacity was found significant (at the 0.01 level and in a positive direction). All these three models satisfied the underlying assumptions of (classic) linear regression, previously described in Chapter 3, footnote 50, on p. 93 (see regression diagnostics in Appendix F).




Figure 4.15. Weighted mean of job approval ratings by (merged) session. Original longitudinal public opinion data from the webpage of TVBS Poll Center: <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center>

Table 4.5. State Capacity Influencing Job Approval Ratings for Presidents, Premiers, and Cabinets, Feb. 1997 – Jan. 2018

Variable (selected measurement of state capacity)		Model		
		(1) Job approval rating of the President	(2) Job approval rating of the Premier	(3) Job approval rating of the Cabinet
<i>parCO</i> (ruling party: 1 = <i>KMT</i> , 0 = <i>DPP</i>)		-1.37 ** (0.47)	-0.57 (0.37)	-0.15 (0.24)
<i>regCO</i> (SP regime type: 1 = <i>M</i> , 0 = <i>m</i>)		1.38 * (0.53)	-0.08 (0.41)	-0.15 (0.27)
Administrative/bureaucratic capacity	<i>Ofout2</i> (number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Legal capacity	<i>21c</i> (bills of law passed in the Legislature)	4.26 (2.21)	1.45 (1.71)	0.06 (1.12)
Extractive/fiscal capacity	<i>13c</i> (A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue)	-1.79 (1.89)	-4.33 ** (1.46)	-0.10 (0.96)
	<i>242c</i> (cut to the annual general budget in expenditure)	-0.77 (19.05)	-12.25 (14.71)	1.26 (9.67)
	<i>2122_output</i> (number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i> that contain significant changes to the goals of improving extractive/fiscal capacity)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.02 (0.08)
	Military capacity	<i>25c</i> (military expenditure as a share of GDP)	82.45 (43.49)	16.82 (33.59)
Coercive capacity	<i>16c</i> (logged defense budget in expenditure per capita)	-1.00 (1.06)	0.14 (0.82)	0.24 (0.54)
	<i>244c</i> (cut to the annual police budget in expenditure)	48.80 (25.30)	24.70 (19.54)	-8.08 (12.84)
	<i>17c</i> (logged police force spending per capita)	1.99 * (0.96)	-0.01 (0.74)	0.025 (0.49)
Adjusted R-squared of model		0.32	0.26	0.15
F-statistic of model		2.88 **	2.36 *	1.66

* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** P < .001.

Number of observations (after imputation) = 484; number of merged (if applicable) legislative sessions = 44; number of SP regime types = 3 (*KMT M*, *DPP M*,

and *DPP m*)

Note: Data for the approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and his Cabinet from the website of TVBS Poll Center: <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/poll-center/1>. Entries are estimated regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (round off to the second decimal place). All models use variations in the ruling parties and SP regime types as controls.

4.5 Discussions

This section, dealing with the interview results with the seven selected key-informants involved with interpreting my quantitative findings and discussing prospects for the ROC SP, induces and synthesizes two major perspectives, namely, leadership and political culture, across them to make an insightful and practical contribution to uncovering the causal mechanisms for outcomes of theoretical interest with a primary focus of why *M/m* could make a difference or not. The leadership perspective can be presidential (formal/informal) or intermediary in the LY; the political cultural perspective is grounded in (1) Chinese imperial heritage, thereby fostering the nation's non-parliament-centered politics, (2) pan-Blue legislators' political behavior tinged with nostalgia for the long history of KMT rule, and (3) Taiwan's increasingly polarized partisan division. These two perspectives were bolstered and enriched by political stories that received extensive news coverage in Taiwan over the past twenty-odd years, albeit focused mostly on the Presidency of Ma and that of Chen, and a selection of anecdotes shared by the interviewees.

Given my primary inquiry of the effect of SP constitutional engineering on governance, the interview results with former President Ma Ying-jeou and KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih contributed the most to our understanding of the difference in state capacity, particularly for its proxies via fighting violent crime and, perhaps, legislative productivity and general budget cuts, from a leadership perspective; those with former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, former KMT legislator Lin Yu-fang, and United Daily News (UDN) journalist Huang Kuo-liang constructed important building blocks for deeper discussions over outgrowths of Taiwan's own political culture of democratization, helping understand legislative and budgetary ramifications (the latter including those from general and defense budgets), a constantly

changing Cabinet line-up, and Taiwan's being the scene of frequent demonstrations. And those with Liberty Times journalist Huang Wei-chu and Central News Agency (CNA) journalist Hsu Ya-jing provided rich sources of underpinning evidence for those views.

The discussions begin with the findings of this study as to the differences in state capacity given the *M/m* (or, if any, KMT/DPP rule) division, followed by an elaboration of the implications of Taiwanese' scarce perception of, or appreciation for, the change in state capacity. I conclude the section by considering the prospects for further constitutional reform and the ROC SP at work.

4.5.1 Interpreting the difference: the leadership perspective

Formal/informal Presidential power

Either formal or informal presidential power shapes presidential influence on the cabinet. In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended, the popularly-elected ROC President is the commander-in-chief of the three Armed Services and has power to conduct foreign affairs and relations with Mainland China, but nothing more than that if s/he behaves constitutionally. As a Presidential appointee without a popular mandate, the ROC Premier, however, heads the government and has power over domestic matters. This formal division of labor can be illustrated by KMT Chairman Wu's example of serving Ma's second Premier. In the wake of the wrath of Typhoon Morakot in 2009, then-KMT Vice Chairman-cum-Secretary General Wu Den-yih was appointed as Premier, leading the post-disaster rehabilitation work. To expedite the reconstruction work for an indigenous village in the southern port city of Kaohsiung that was obliterated by a landslide during the typhoon, Wu successfully requested then-President Ma, over a phone call, to send 800-1,000 troops to aid

in that task, although the Premier, in practice, as he noted, could ask his Defense Minister, a Cabinet member, to do so without consulting the President ahead of time. Wu recalled that Ma had told him in that phone call that he could have instead called for troops directly to assist reconstruction efforts. “But I believed that I must follow the Constitution, not exceeding my authority as Premier,” Wu asserted (D.-y. Wu, personal communication, January 9, 2019).

In fact, it is very difficult to constrain and divide power between Taiwan’s dual executive leadership in practice as the Constitutional provisions delineate. For example, any trade agreement with the Mainland must deal with both domestic economic and cross-Strait issues. Instead, it usually depends on the leader’s idiosyncratic ways to govern, which leaves the boundary between the Presidential and Premier power unclear. Unlike the French president who presides over the Council of Ministers, in Taiwan it is the Premier that chairs the Executive Yuan Council, or Cabinet, and is held accountable for implementing policies, not the popularly-elected President. The ROC President, according to former President Ma, might express “concern” about (domestic) policies to his Premier but shall not be the one who gives directives to ministers, said Ma, “This inevitably leads to a gap in the President’s pledges yet to be fulfilled” (Y.-j. Ma, personal communication, January 18, 2019).¹⁸

Although Ma met his Premier regularly three times a week to discuss state affairs in order to fill this gap, he still could not be well informed about policy details. For example, Ma was not aware of any subsidies from his administration which inaugurated the first light-rail line in Kaohsiung until he was told on his first ride there several months after he left the

¹⁸ Upholding the Constitutional formality of a dual leadership, Ma criticized President Tsai for her recent, high-profile public intervention in a new scooter safety rule on a mandatory and costly braking systems upgrade and postponing its implementation from its original 2021 target date. See also Strong (2018) for details of the news story.

Presidency in 2016. To Ma, Taiwan's dual leadership is cumbersome, redundant, and apparently inefficient because of mismatches between the Presidential and Premier power and accountability. Sometimes he relied on the informal Presidential power to govern.

After beginning his Presidency, Ma met the head of Taiwan's police force regularly once a month, but in an expedient, *low-key* manner, to discuss how to promote changes in the social order, while lending his successful crime-fighting expertise and experience as a former Taipei City Mayor to his subordinates (Ma, 2019). Ma told me that he felt proud, in particular, of his contribution to a significant decline in violent crime and driving under the influence of alcohol during his Presidency, and even onward to the administration of his successor, Tsai, who he thought paid scant attention to crime, where "his men" continued to be charged with the administration of police. This helps explain the violent-crime puzzle in statistical reasoning in the Taiwanese context, as posed in Section 4.4.3.

When mediated by the informal power, according to Wu (2019), governance may become likely to hinge on leader's idiosyncratic morals and have no bearing on constitution engineering. Wu contended that the institution itself, or specifically "total governance" which can be efficient, is like a keen blade that can lead to tragedy, if ruled by a bad person and his arbitrary government. "But if 'total governance' is ruled by a good person, then the results must be good," the chairman added. Wu denounced President Chen's rule as being "morally bad" and thus affecting opposition legislators' behavior, despite his minority status to govern. Throughout Chen's Presidency, he explained, the then-ruling DPP released a series of infamous political ads, "no matter how barbaric one might be" (再怎麼野蠻), first initiated in late 2001, against KMT and its pan-Blue allies which held a Legislative majority. In these brutal attack ads that catered to Chen's leadership, many specific, individual pan-Blue

legislators were labeled and accused of, say, slashing budgets, spending money on pork barrel legislation, and stymieing legislation.¹⁹ The ads deterred opposition pan-Blue legislators from boldly continuing to block legislative proceedings, particularly on bills dealing with bread and butter issues and international ones. This helped to partly explain why greater legislative productivity was found in minority regimes. Wu, however, did not appear to worry about legislative productivity, as he believed that legislative quality was more important than quantity.

Likewise, this advertisement series also “successfully” mitigated the confrontational behavior in budgetary deliberation henceforth throughout most of Chen’s Presidency. That is, except 2001, the year of legislative elections for the 5th LY, Chen’s government did not suffer substantial annual general spending cuts made by the pan-Blue camp in the LY (W.-c. Huang, personal communication, September 20, 2018).²⁰

What is more and worth mentioning is that the idiosyncrasies of individual Premiers, and probably Cabinet members, of the KMT government are clearly distinguishable from those of their DPP counterparts, which is considered a causative factor in Taiwan’s frequent changes in Cabinet composition, regardless of majority/minority status. For example, as previously mentioned (in footnote 15 of Chapter 3, p. 78), Hsueh Hsiang-chuan (薛香川) resigned from the Liu Cabinet’s Secretary-General post amid intense criticism induced by the then-opposition DPP with only a slim minority (23.89%) in the LY, over his slow disaster response to Typhoon Morakot of 2009, the most devastating storm to hit the island in fifty years.

¹⁹ For more details, see Lee & Wang (2007).

²⁰ A similar pattern was also observed in general budget cuts in revenue. But an escalating budget conflict recurred during the first legislative session after Chen’s controversial reelection in 2004, resulting in a 4.93% general budget cut in revenue, the third largest behind those of FYs 2002 (5.85%) and 2001 (5.11%) (referred also to Table 4.7).

Premier Liu likewise stepped down shortly in the aftermath of the disaster. “It is KMT government officials’ weak willpower that is to blame,” said Lin Yu-fang, a former KMT legislator of higher seniority with a doctorate from the University of Virginia (Y.-f. Lin, personal communication, September 7, 2018). He further explained that they can barely stand up to sustained outside criticism, in contrast with the DPP’s William Lai Ching-te, for example, who has persisted in office and never succumbed to mounting popular dissatisfaction with his Premiership. But he also reminded me that the KMT majority government should have allowed a longer longevity of Cabinet officials if Wu had chosen to continue his Premiership of almost two years and five months (the longest of any Ma’s Premier) rather than become Ma’s running mate for the 2012 Presidential election.

Intermediary leadership in the LY

The Legislative leadership, including the Speaker and party whips, is crucial to either of the dual executives’ success with the LY. And this is largely reflected in how legislative leaders address legislation and budgetary deliberation. Allow me to begin with the latter first.

The DPP became the biggest party in the LY after the December 2001 elections but was not able to acquire a majority. Beginning in the 5th LY of a narrow pan-Blue majority (2002-2005), legislators tended more likely to pass a general budget, instead of slashing, with binding “budget freeze” resolutions (以凍代刪) that authorize the appropriation of funds earmarked for specific government programs and functions, contingent on government agencies displaying implementation efficiency or providing more detailed implementation project descriptions (W.-c. Huang, 2018; referred also to in Y.-j. Hsu, personal communication, September 18, 2018). To pan-Blue alliance legislators, the change was

prompted partly in response to the aforementioned negative, but influential, “no matter how barbaric” advertising.

Meanwhile, “party-to-party consultations” (朝野/黨團協商) emerged as an alternative to traditional deliberations in committee.²¹ Through “party-to-party consultations,” every budget cut was made by a party caucus(es), not individual legislators, in the LY. By doing so, no single legislator was as likely to be subjected to direct pressures caused by budget cuts. A floor vote on budget bills, as well as other bills, was required only when “party-to-party consultations” fail to reach a solution (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018; W.-c. Huang, 2018). Unfortunately, neither “budget freeze” nor “party-to-party consultations” enabled rational deliberations in the pan-Blue majority LY during Chen’s minority rule as in practice they eventually failed to reduce inflated or unnecessary budgets.

“Party-to-party consultations” continued to dominate LY budgetary deliberations throughout Ma’s Presidency in “total governance.” During most of Ma’s years in office, budget bills were usually first reported out of a committee without any reduction, and next “party-to-party consultations” would decide on and apply a fixed flat-rate percentage of budget cuts equally across ministries and ministerial-level agencies (統刪) in an expedient attempt to reduce overall and potential inflated costs (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018; W.-c. Huang, 2018). This is decidedly not a manifestation of how a legislative body is supposed to behave, regardless of smaller budget cuts to Ma’s majority government. Even in the context, however, we should still be mindful of the fact that in Taiwan, whoever is the opposition party would attempt to obstruct budget bills (Lin, 2018).

²¹ The LY has been long criticized for engaging in backroom deals through prior “party-to-party consultations,” on which each party caucus, regardless of how many seats it holds, has a representative and retains the right to tie up parliamentary deliberations for a significant length of time and thus be able to affect decisions about the content of legislation, whether it gets enacted at all.

Speaking of the influence of Legislative leadership on legislation, according to Y.-j. Hsu (2018), many bills proposed by the Ma administration failed to pass the LY mainly because long-time DPP party whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) was very familiar with legislative procedure whereby he knew how to lead his colleague to outdo KMT legislators in the steering of the legislative agenda and carry out relentless obstructionism through, say, occupying the Speaker's podium at the LY, particularly as KMT-affiliated Speaker Wang Jin-pyng never invoked his police powers. Second, Wang, the nation's longest-serving Speaker with 17 years in the post (1999-2016), was accused of having played between the Ma administration and the minority DPP; tracing further back to Chen's minority rule, he would even lend his support to the ruling rival party on politically insensitive issues (W.-c. Huang 2018).²² In order to seek harmony in the Legislature, Wang preferred trying to forge a consensus on important legislation through "party-to-party consultations," albeit infamous, rather than resort to a roll call vote. Consequently, Ma could hardly control a KMT-majority LY during his Presidency, even most of which featured Ma's doubling as KMT chairman, because sophistication that typifies Wang's Speakership made some important bills proposed and desired by the Ma administration tabled, compromised, or sacrificed (K.-l. Huang, personal communication, September 6, 2018). Compared with the budgetary enactment that is usually open for negotiations in Taiwan's partisan politics, its law counterpart would more likely stir up a controversy, even within a party itself (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018).

The "September Strife" in 2013 between Ma and Wang (see footnote 12 of Chapter 1, p. 6) unfortunately surfaced as a key impediment to legislative productivity of the KMT

²² To clarify the unexpected reversal of institutional effects on legislative productivity in the LY, W.-c. Huang (2018) suggested a further analysis of legislative productivity by different levels of perceived political sensitivity of legislation.

government (Wu, 2019). The conflicting interests between them reached a climax as Wang allowed the Sunflower occupation of the LY to protest against Ma's service trade agreement with Beijing in 2014, which ended up with being shelved to date.

In comparison with Ma's predicament, the DPP majority government led by Tsai has received overwhelming and consistent support from her DPP-affiliated legislative leaders (which is discussed in detail in a later paragraph of a following subsection, polarized partisanship from the political cultural perspective). The "so-called 'total governance' is nothing more than a formality. The very nature of how it works differs from party to party," said Y.-j. Hsu (2018). Furthermore, the variance in a single party's leadership styles toward legislation could also affect legislative productivity, which is well manifested by the KMT. When Lien Chan (連戰) chaired the opposition KMT (2000-2005), he adapted flexible response to deal with legislation in dispute, whereas Ma, Lien's successor as KMT chairman (2005-2007, 2009-2014), took a no-compromise position with respect to the passage of major legislation, making it harder to tackle disputes for the Legislative leadership (W.-c. Huang, 2018).

Given Speaker Wang's refuse to maintain order on the floor by police, citing "the autonomy of the Legislative Yuan" (國會自主), infamous frequent brawls in the LY stalled deliberations on important bills (e.g., a years-long stretch of partisan, physical infighting over an organic legislation that gave the Central Election Commission the legal status of an independent agency), unless otherwise determined by a KMT majority to win the fight against its minority, but aggressive, DPP rival in a chaos. In Taiwan, extraordinary sessions were thus often required to "accomplish" the Legislature's chaotic workings of important legislation, say, the *Local Government Act* (地方制度法) amended in 2010 and the free

trade-style agreement with the Mainland ratified later the same year, known by its initials—ECFA (the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement).²³

It is worth noting here that a practice of “party-to-party consultations” began as an ad hoc initiative and was later initially institutionalized in early 1999 in an attempt to reduce adversarial obstructionism by opposition parties, particularly small ones. It has become regular and increasingly essential to legislation since Wang’s Speakership began in 1999. Ninety percent of bills die in “party-to-party consultations,” particularly for the pork barrel scam, but the quality of legislative deliberation is considered not improved thereupon or even worse because “party-to-party consultations” undermine the role of committee as a central pillar of expertise for deliberations. Starting from the 9th LY, the first DPP-controlled Legislature in history, the content of the consultations in practice has been video-recorded and made available for public viewing to dispel suspicious of backroom deals. Although the verdict from my interviews seems to paint “party-to-party consultations” as an ad hoc outcome, we should be aware of their institutionalized evolution (see more details of “party-to-party consultations” in Chang, Lin, & Tsai, 2013; Lin, 2015; Lin, 2016; Su, 2016; Yang & Chen, 2004).

4.5.2 Interpreting the difference: the political cultural perspective

Taiwan of non-parliament-centered politics

Chinese culture is deeply rooted in an imperial history of thousands of years. In this cultural context, the people of Taiwan would more likely to view the President nowadays as

²³ Despite strenuous opposition from the DPP, the ECFA was ratified by the KMT-majority LY in 2010, marking a new milestone in the development of cross-Strait relations. However, its follow-up service trade pack has been shelved in the LY since it was halted by the Sunflower Movement in 2014.

tantamount to an emperor in the past, and the belief of presidential supremacy over other organs has prevailed this island (that is, people believe that the President must be the only one who can make decisions for the nation) (K.-l. Huang, 2018; see also Keum & Campbell, 2018). In this sense, the culture-driven President-dominant constitutional norm results in a powerful Presidency in the island (Kuo, 2000) and Taiwan has never been parliament-centered (K.-l. Huang, 2018).

This contextual element is fundamental to a thorough, thought-provoking account by Hsu Hsin-liang, a British-educated, veteran DPP activist contributing to the country's adoption of French-style SP, on why *M/m* would make a difference or not. Hsu Hsin-liang ascribed the inverse relationship between the *M/m* division and legislative productivity as well as a frequent change in Cabinet positions to a cultural difference in treating the parliament between Taiwan and France. As he elaborated in the interview, "the ROC government in Taiwan has been embedded in the thinking of a presidential system, and therefore the LY looks more like the US Congress rather than a French-style parliament, which is rooted in Westminster heritage of parliamentary supremacy in high party discipline, or originated in being power-centered (權力中心)" (H.-l. Hsu, personal communication, November 14, 2018).²⁴ Within the context of this heritage, he went on to say, the ruling party would seek cooperation or compromise with the parliamentary majority, hence, pushing through bipartisan bills or forming a cohabitation government. Instead, he noted, without this heritage, Taiwan's minority governments seemed to behave similarly to the divided

²⁴ Before it instituted a SP republic, France had long been parliamentarism. The French SP Constitution of 1958 empowers the French president to intervene in political process to prevent the unstable situation that existed in the Fourth Republic which saw frequent changes in the cabinet. The popularly-elected French presidency of Fifth Republic has become another political powerhouse since then, in tandem with the splendid heritage of parliamentary supremacy, hence leaving the possibility open for cohabitation (H.-l. Hsu, 2018).

government in the US; the LY operated more like a US-style congress than a parliament, as many individual lawmakers introduced bills in behalf of interest groups, a phenomenon rarely observed in the parliamentarism. In this scenario, the minority cabinet (and the ruling party) cannot, and would not, oppose these kinds of bills introduced by majority lawmakers, seeking instead a quid pro quo for their support, he said. But he also reminded me that when Taiwan's ruling parties enjoyed "total governance," the LY's internal regulations allowing "party-to-party consultations" still gave opposition parties opportunities to block legislative proceedings.²⁵ Although the DPP elder believed that the same reasoning as that applied above in legislative productivity should hold for general budget cuts and the defense budget, this was, however, not confirmed in my study.

Taiwan's lack of Westminster heritage of parliamentary supremacy, hence (lack of) the parliament-centered politics, also sheds light on why a high frequency of Cabinet official changes prevails in the ROC SP trajectory since 1997. Unlike its French blueprint, according to H.-l. Hsu (2018), in which cabinet positions are usually held by prominent political figures or those harking from the parliament and arbitrary ministerial replacements are therefore likely to bring political risk, in Taiwan many Cabinet members typically come from two other sources: academia and the civil service.²⁶ Hsu Hsin-liang argued that that was why Taiwan's Cabinet members had been treated as replaceable cogs whenever someone or a scapegoat was needed to take political responsibility. To be clear, as former President Ma

²⁵ See reasoning in footnote 21 above.

²⁶ Hsu Hsin-liang on this point echoes the position of Huang Wei-chu. According to W.-c. Huang (2018), frequent changes in Cabinet posts lead to a Gresham's Law of Cabinet member recruitment in Taiwan, whereby brilliant people hesitate to join the Cabinet and therefore appointees are usually those who chase after power and political position. Besides, Cabinet posts in Taiwan rarely attract talents from the private sector mostly because of their reluctance to become obligated, as government officials, to file an assets declaration. As a result, a Cabinet line-up in Taiwan is dominated by only those from a civil official background, hence conservative, and on secondment from higher education institutions.

said candidly, this rule also applied to most Premiers in Taiwan, particularly those of the KMT government, because they never ran in an election and hardly connected with the grassroots (接地氣) (Ma, 2019). Usually, replacing his embattled Premier allows the President to shift responsibility or set a stop-loss point (W.-c. Huang, 2018; Ma, 2019), let alone the island's Chinese imperial heritage in which replacing a Premier, when needed, was good enough to respond to people's expectations (K.-l. Huang, 2018).²⁷

Admittedly, the advent of social media reinforces the said phenomenon of frequent Cabinet official changes in Taiwan, as it has promoted broader public access to oversight on government and thus created a new political culture in which politicians are held more accountable and, especially for political appointees, become vulnerable. Taiwan entered the era of social media, roughly synchronized with the KMT's return to power in 2008. "This was a reason for a constantly changing Cabinet line-up through Ma's Presidency," said UDN journalist Huang Kuo-liang, "The situation for Chen Shui-bian's Cabinet members was different because at that time, traditional media outlets remained a major dominant source of external pressure" (K.-l. Huang, 2018).

Nostalgic KMT-rule politics among pan-Blue legislators

Before its defeat in the 2000 Presidential election, the KMT had governed Taiwan for over half a century. According to Lin (2018), many KMT legislators thus have a nostalgia for the past and act as if the KMT remained in power, not to mention their long-standing ties with government officials and technocrats from a KMT background, particularly those in the

²⁷ The Chinese monarchs were compelled to blame themselves publicly (下詔罪己) when much distress and discontent prevailed in the country. But they rarely abdicated the throne of China unless forced to do so.

Cabinet under KMT-affiliated Tang Fei, Chen's first Premier. Lin argued that given this sentiment, although the pan-Blue Camp legislators constituted a Legislative majority under Chen's minority rule, they were rational in their voting behavior, by his standard, and gave consideration to the needs of their government official friends, without engaging in partisan obstructionism, in comparison with their DPP colleagues who were a Legislative minority throughout Ma's Presidency, resorting instead to infamous brawls and scuffles to delay or block undesirable bills from reaching the floor (vote or agenda). He believed that this was the main reason for KMT and pan-Blue camp legislators being willing to pass bills in the face of Chen's minority government.

The above reasoning also applies to Legislative deliberations on the defense budget bill, together with KMT/pan-Blue camp politicians' nostalgia-tinged memories, from the KMT party-state era, of having treated the ROC Armed Forces as the KMT's own (Lin, 2018). "We're reluctant to cut their [defense] budgets," said Lin Yu-fang, who has stayed abreast of military issues. Therefore, he went on to explain, under DPP minority rule, defense budget bills would likely receive bipartisan support, except the controversial special arms procurement package of NT\$610.8 billion from the US proposed by the Chen administration, as previously noted in Section 4.3.3, which suffered a barrage of sustained objections from the pan-Blue majority for several years.²⁸ The objections primarily related to the pan-Blue camp's move to preempt then-President Chen's independence push (K.-l. Huang, 2018), or were due to perhaps the Mainland China-friendly KMT's giving a serious consideration not

²⁸ The special arms procurement proposal failed to pass through the Rules Committee to the floor in a total of 69 attempts since it was proposed in 2004. It was finally passed in 2007 with a deep budget cut (roughly totaling NT\$578.9 billion, including most of the budget funds for diesel-electric submarines) and the package being included in the annual defense budget rather than a special budget. After the KMT returned to power in 2008, the Ma administration had each year requested for submarines instead, but to no avail (W.-c. Huang, 2018; Lee, 2010; Mo, 2011; Shih, 2007).

to provoking Beijing's hostility (W.-c. Huang, 2018).

When the KMT was in power, by contrast, DPP legislators resorted to highly partisan deliberations on defense budget bills, paying "fastidious" attention to every single detail, according to Lin (2018). But Lin found a solution to this, albeit very personal. Lin revealed that under his co-convenership of the LY's (Foreign and) National Defense Committee, he used his friendship with two other then-Committee co-conveners of DPP affiliation, Lee Wen-chung (李文忠) and Mark Chen Tan-sun (陳唐山), alongside a pan-Blue or KMT Legislative majority, to facilitate the passage of these bills.^{29, 30}

In addition to considering the influence of nostalgic KMT-rule politics on Taiwan's defense budget deliberations, the interview with Lin offered a different strand of thought exploring how workable a proxy the annual defense spending is for military capacity given Taiwan's extensive reliance on foreign arms exports. Because of its unique political status, the ROC government on Taiwan has depended largely on US support, politically and militarily, since it relocated to the island in 1949. Taiwan has procured cutting-edge military equipment and technology requirement through imports, and the US is a dominant source of Taiwan's arms import.³¹ Since Taiwan's US arms procurement projects usually span many fiscal years of the procedure, i.e., roughly from the US administration's approval of the arms

²⁹ The National Defense Committee was renamed Foreign and National Defense Committee after its merger with the Foreign and Overseas Compatriot Affairs Committee in early 2008, or starting from the 8th LY.

³⁰ As Lin clarified in the interview, empirically, the defense and foreign affairs budgets have passed with fewer cuts than those of other functions, say, transportation, economics, finance, social welfare, and environmental hygiene, which more likely involve legislators' competing interests or local politicking due to enormous amount of money spent, and would thus motivate legislator, particularly from opposition parties, to exercise greater oversight. Although KMT legislators still made cuts to military-related funds for cost efficiency improvement under DPP rule, "that's not a big deal, and government officials always proposed a larger budget than needed in preparation for budget cuts," Lin said.

³¹ On the other hand, the US arms sales to Taiwan have also been significant as Taiwan has consistently ranked among the top importers of US arms, ranking fourth in 2004-07, fifth in 2008-11, and fourth in 2013-17 (Cheng, 2018; Kan, 2014).

sale to Taiwan, to payments made to the contractor, to the acquisition of arms, and to sustainment, the annual defense budget will increase in a given fiscal year when a payment(s) is due (Lin, 2018).

As Lin illustrated this point with examples in a news article by United Daily News reporter Cheng Jia-wen (2016), we see many US arms deals with Taiwan materialized during Ma's Presidency should have been traced back to the junior former President Bush's authorization, and only by clarifying this complexity could one better understand why larger military spending budgets on US arms were allowed in the Ma administration than his predecessors, Lee and Chen. In comparison with G. W. Bush, according to the same source, the administration of former President Barack Obama approved fewer arms sales to Taiwan, so there would be no significant increase in Taiwan's defense spending on US arms purchases during the first term of Tsai's Presidency.

Therefore, the implication here is that given Taiwan's reliance on US arms supplies, measuring military capacity via the amount of annual defense budgets in expenditure seems less preferred, compared with defense budget cuts which are more reflective of a complicated variety of executive-legislative dynamics. And together with this implication, Lin's elaboration of his understanding of how pan-Blue legislators' nostalgia for the long history of KMT rule and well-established ties with government officials/technocrats allowed themselves to behave differently from their DPP colleagues in considering the defense appropriations bill affords a clue for explaining why my desired null hypothesis for military capacity was only partially supported by the findings.

Political polarization

Over the course of its democratization and localization movement beginning at the turn of the 1990s, politics in Taiwan has become increasingly polarized over the closely interlinked issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations. To make a long story short, Taiwan faces an evolving dichotomy between an increasingly mono Taiwanese identity and a steady dual Chinese/Taiwanese identity, while a mono Chinese identity has fallen far behind the other two since the early 1990s. In Taiwan, voters with a dual Chinese/Taiwanese identity or a mono Chinese identity are generally in favor of the pro-reunification KMT, while the pro-independence DPP attracts a much larger portion of voters with a mono Taiwanese identity. The majority of people in Taiwan want to maintain the status quo.³²

While Ma and his KMT were seeking closer ties with Beijing during his eight-year Presidency, there was a growing trend of people in Taiwan embracing the pro-independence narrative advocated by the DPP.³³ This change not only made the KMT's pro-China reunification stance tainted but also pushed KMT legislators away from supporting to pass controversial bills proposed by the Ma administration (K.-l. Huang, 2018). Indeed, in the aftermath of 2014 Sunflower Movement, Taiwanese identity (vis-à-vis Chinese or dual identity) and support for Taiwan independence (vis-à-vis reunification or maintaining status quo) each reached a record high of 60.4% and 23.8%, respectively, in the island (Tseng & Chung, 2014), although this trend has been slightly reversed over the past two years (see also footnote 32 below).

³² For further details of changes in national identity and the reunification-independence stances of Taiwanese from the early 1990s to the present, see the website of the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University: <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php>

³³ In dealing with the growth of pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, Ma pledged and went by a “three noes” policy during his time in office, i.e., “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” (不統、不獨、不武). Given the top priority of “no unification” in the policy, it might imply a preference of most people in Taiwan to refuse reunification (K.-l. Huang, 2018). In 2018, Ma proposed an updated version, vowing that “no ruling out the possibility of unification with the Mainland, no support for independence, and no use of force” (Lee & Wang, 2018).

In addition, the increasingly polarized politics has also sharply accelerated confrontational partisanship in the LY in recent years. So far, however, it seems to me that the biggest victim of this trend is Ma's KMT government. Unlike the KMT, the DPP demonstrated a stronger sense of partisanship and solidarity. Therefore, many of the priority bills, albeit highly controversial, that the Tsai administration identified already passed the DPP-majority LY during the first half of her current term of Presidency, including "ill-gotten party assets" legislation (不當黨產處理條例) targeting the KMT and its affiliated organizations since 1945, "transitional justice" legislation (促進轉型正義條例) targeting abuses from the KMT's authoritarian era, and unpopular labor and pension reforms (一例一休、年金改革). By contrast, the prior KMT majority in LY was criticized for not constantly voting according to party line during Ma's Presidency, resulting in the failure of important legislation to pass (e.g., the bill governing political parties and their assets, a draft special statute for free economic pilot zones, and the shelved service trade pack with Beijing) or its watering-down (e.g., a capital gains tax bill on stock transactions of 2012; see also footnote 14 of Chapter 3, p. 78).^{34, 35}

The rise of ideological conflict within the island, as K.-l. Huang (2018) indicates, might help bolster a suspicion that in Taiwan, a government's majority status could hardly curb demonstrations. Taiwan's vibrant civil society (reference) resulted in many protests coming primarily from various social groups and organizations over the years, regardless of who's in

³⁴ As another illustrative example, in 2014 the KMT-controlled LY refused to confirm 11 of 27 ombudsman nominees of President Ma for the Control Yuan because of KMT defections (Ta, Tseng, & Kao, 2014). However, this research did not incorporate analysis of how the LY exercised its consent power over the President's nominees.

³⁵ I should note here that neither the shelved cross-Strait service trade pack nor its parent ECFA was classified into bills of law by the LY. Instead, they were conceived as "quasi-treaties" in nature. Therefore, they were not included in my statistical analysis of legislative productivity focusing on bills of law. But their significance in illustrating the partisan dynamics of the LY during Ma's Presidency would be helpful.

power, he said (referred also to in Y.-j Hsu, 2018). K.-l. Huang explained that in Taiwan, social protests highlighted different aspects of inequality, including income, gender, age, well-being, welfare, between-occupation, religion, etc., among which labor protests were traditionally fierce and contributed a major share of social protests in Taiwan. For example, labor unions demand for higher minimum wages, say, almost every year. “However,” the UDN journalist reminded me, “we saw a type of massive political protest that blamed the KMT for being ‘pro-China and selling out Taiwan’ (親中賣台) emerge only when the KMT was in power.” According to the DPP’s official party chronicle (https://www.dpp.org.tw/about/history_3), the DPP staged nine massive political protests throughout Ma’s eight-year Presidency, seven of which were against Ma’s “China”-leaning policies. This was a serious, and perhaps unexpected, challenge that faced Ma’s majority government.

In this subsection, a synthesis of the interview results with the seven informants provides answers to the institutional puzzles raised by my empirical research on changes in multi-dimensional state capacity from “non-institutional” perspectives of idiosyncratic leadership and several aspects of political culture. Such a variety of interpretations reflects the nuanced complexity of the dynamics of executive-legislative interactions by separate dimensions of state capacity, which sometimes produced results contradictory to my initial expectations. This complexity might also be able to facilitate an access to further understanding the implications of the null, or near null, findings on the association between the *M/m* division and aggregate state capacity. That is, when people are unable or unwilling to take apart elements of governance for assessing the government’s capability to govern, they probably would perceive no change in the government’s overall capability to govern no matter who is

in power, and whether his or her party is in “total governance.” This implication might be further strengthened by the findings to be discussed next that people in Taiwan cared less about governance.

4.5.3 Exploring sources of popular nonresponse to varying assessments of state capacity

The null or slim relationship between the change in state capacity and people’s perception of, or appreciation for, governance implies that in Taiwan, perceived good governance may not necessarily guarantee that the ruling party remains ruling. The gap or inconsistency can be attributed to either asymmetry in information on the part of people—say, they could not understand what the legislation or policy program was about—or on the part of the ruling elite whose policy-making process fails to reflect public preferences (e.g., the controversial amendment to the labor law in late 2016 that instituted a 40-hour work week [一例一休] and its recent 2018 revision raising a lot of complaints from both employers and employees owing to, first, the lack of flexibility and then the draconian amendment).^{36, 37}

Perhaps, this notion of information asymmetry can be illustrated by the fact, as told by Ma (2019), that survey respondents are inclined to answer questions in a manner susceptible to negative media effects, not personal experience of life. For example, he said, a media hype for a single local news story about, say, on crime, would negatively frame and shape

³⁶ See Shih (2018) for more detail on Taiwan’s recent labor reform.

³⁷ Another example of explaining a slim relationship, if any, between state capacity and approval ratings by information asymmetry on the part of ruling elite may be found in K.-l. Huang (2018), who argued that in Taiwan, an emerging and now prevalent pro-independence sentiment unfortunately dominated over good governance which seemed to be something taken for granted. “Many Taiwanese believe that only independence will be vital to survive regardless of the efforts by Mainland China-friendly Ma and his KMT to create a great deal of cross-Strait dividends of peace and promoted Taiwan’s prosperity,” he said, but at the cost of having Taiwan’s being within the controversial one-China framework.

Taiwanese public opinion about the social order. The former President, also a Harvard S.J.D., touted his mayoral experience in successfully preventing response bias in surveys of satisfaction on social order administered by his Taipei City government. His newly-designed questionnaire assessed three different levels of social order: national, local, and community/neighborhood, where considerably higher satisfaction on social order was found in the last (because, for most respondents, there was nothing so very bad in their neighborhoods), even though the survey revealed lower satisfaction with the national level. This method of stratification was subsequently adopted by academics in Taiwan for conducting similar opinion polls, said Ma. Ma also added that he felt sympathy for Su Tseng-chang, the incumbent Premier (as of the time of interview), over a setback in his bid to reduce crime during his first Premiership (2006-07) with a robbery of a farmers' association committed by an off-duty police officer (for more on this story, see "Caught in," 2006). That case and its ensuing media coverage was, unfortunately, obtrusive enough to mar Su's well-intended efforts, he stressed.

Ma's point of view is echoed by former legislator Lin (2018), who considered the inconsistency is due to people's short memories, "Their memories of new, powerful, or impressive incidents would replace those of old, less powerful, or less impressive ones. It is quite commonplace among democracies." He further explained that respondents would most likely associate a given subject's job approval with their myopic and fragmented understanding of how government did its work recently (e.g., a favorable response given by those aware of recent tax concessions), rather than refer to the government's "ability to do something" in an objective way. "The notion of ability differs from that of job approval after

all,” he added.³⁸

Either Ma’s argument or Lin’s is similar to those made by Achen & Bartels (2016) for myopic voting behavior in the Western context, as we saw in Chapter 2. On the other hand, one might also wonder if this inconsistency is a potential result of Taiwan’s polarized political context. Following John R. Zaller’s (1992) “polarization model” of public opinion, the higher politically informed survey respondents become, the more likely they are attuned to persuasive and cueing messages from highly divided and competing elites who they support and choose their position on an issue accordingly. That is, in this scenario, the inconsistency reflects the consequences of respondents’ choices made based on partisanship instead of personal cognition of the reality.

In a similar sense to that of information asymmetry on the part of people, the inconsistency might also result from the public’s unrealistic expectations from democratically elected leaders: After the honeymoon period is over, their prestige inevitably falls. Give recent examples such as President Tsai’s pension reforms for fiscal sustainability targeting civil servants, public school teachers, and military personnel (most of whom, however, particularly in retirement, are perceived as traditional KMT supporters) and “transitional justice” efforts that address the past abuses of the authoritarian KMT state, they were supported by the general public in the first place, but soon criticized by stalwart DPP supporters for not being “tough” enough. When these two of the Tsai government’s top agenda later became driven by partisan politics and, at the same time, growing popular anger

³⁸ But Lin still tried to believe that there must be “interplay forces” of state capacity and opinion polls to ensure that a more intuitive logic of the relationship was followed here. Perhaps, according to him, the use of the phrasing “approval rating” (施政滿意度), a “serious” phrasing, encouraged respondents to think and reply carefully and rationally, thus rating the given subject’s job performance strictly, more than other phrasings, say, “support rating” (選舉支持度), which affected respondents emotionally (e.g., one’s refusal to vote for a certain candidate because of the latter’s ideology or moral flaw).

over national economic stagnation could not be soothed, Tsai's approval and her Premiers' ended up sliding down (Y.-j. Hsu, 2018).

4.5.4 What is next for ROC semi-presidentialism?

In the past two decades, there were several occasions that arose for a French-style cohabitation in Taiwan, but all to no avail, revealing the near impossibility of that. In May 2000, Tang Fei, a KMT member and former Defense Minister under President Lee, took office as President Chen's first Premier. Since Tang's appointment was not endorsed by the KMT, he was only allowed by his party to form a Cabinet in his individual capacity while agreeing to withdraw from all KMT activities on becoming the Premier. On the other hand, the KMT-led pan-Blue majority consistently blocked Tang's policies in the LY. In the 2004 legislative elections, the pan-Blue camp won a three-seat majority and requested that President Chen appoint then-KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤), a former Vice Legislative Speaker, as new Premier. The talks fell apart as Chen only offered the Vice Premiership to Chiang. Soon after Ma defeated then-Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng in the KMT leadership race in mid-2005, Chen allegedly offered Wang privately an opportunity to form a Cabinet, replacing Su's, through party-to-party negotiations in hopes of relying on his Legislative leadership influence to reduce confrontations in the pan-Blue controlled LY. Although the Speaker replied to this proposal positively, he was mindful of the necessity of consulting with KMT Chairman Ma before any decision was made. Due to a lingering distrust between the leadership of two parties, or perhaps between Ma and Wang themselves, the conditions were not yet ripe for a follow-up thereof. So right after Ma said in public that he was barely enthusiastic about Chen's political gesture, Chen and Wang both denied the

“allegations” of such an offer. “That was the closest chance for making a ‘cohabitation’ happen in Taiwan so far,” said Liberty Times journalist Huang Wei-chu (W.-c. Huang, 2018).

In more recent years, either Tsai’s pledge to form a great coalition government (大聯合政府) in a televised Presidential debate, just a week ahead of the election in mid-January 2012, or Ma’s proposal to allow the DPP with a newly seated Legislative majority to form a new Cabinet after the KMT’s defeat in 2016 elections was not the way it looked.³⁹ “They were both shams because Tsai Ing-wen knew her odds in the 2012 race were bad and Ma Ying-jeou was simply doing Tsai a rhetorical favor when he was ready to step down,” Huang Wei-chu said, “Every politician has a personal calculation of what s/he will gain” (W.-c. Huang, 2018). “Words spoken out loud are usually not true. A deal always comes under table,” the Liberty Times journalist noted.⁴⁰

Literally, the French-style cohabitation has never occurred in Taiwan. This is mostly because the pan-Blue majority Legislature never dared to put forth any no-confidence motion against Chen’s minority DPP government and take the risk of entering snap elections for eight years owing to the electoral uncertainty and high campaign costs (H.-l. Hsu, 2018; Ma, 2019).⁴¹ According to former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang’s account of the consequences of Taiwan’s lack of parliament-centered politics, because the LY in Taiwan has never appeared to be a political forefront, compared with the powerful Presidency, it can never parallel with the political power-wresting tradition of its French counterpart, and nor dare the KMT and its pan-Blue allies initiate a vote of no-confidence when holding a Legislative

³⁹ See also note e of Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for a brief description of the latter situation: Then-DPP Chairman and President-elect Tsai turned down outgoing Ma’s call for cohabitation during the caretaker period in 2016.

⁴⁰ When asked about his proposition that allowed the DPP to form a new Cabinet before Tsai’s inauguration, former President Ma asserted that it had been made in sincerity and honesty (Ma, 2019).

⁴¹ In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended in 1996, the President may dissolve the LY on the Premier’s request if a no-confidence vote against the Premier passes and the Premier refuses to resign.

majority during Chen's rule. In other words, as he put it, "no 'real' parliamentary majority has ever existed in Taiwan, and it alters the way the ROC semi-presidentialism has operated."

Another possible, and related, reason for the absence of cohabitation in Taiwan might be that whether the President should appoint a Premier from the opposition party with a Legislative majority is a controversial issue that works its way into partisan politics (Paolino, 2008). Therefore, as long as a political party in Taiwan wins the Presidency, it will take over the executive power in practice, regardless of how many LY seats it wins.

After Taiwan's 2016 election of Tsai as a new President and a DPP-majority legislature, the LY did not become power-centered and the presidency-centered politics remained the prevailing norm (H.-l. Hsu, 2018). In such political circumstances, it was not desirable at all for Tsai to allow her party to "cohabit" with the utterly defeated KMT and share responsibility for the outgoing Ma administration during the caretaker period. Because Tsai had yet to be sworn in as new President, one might ask, at that time, who should have taken responsibility for any unexpected problems until Ma stepped down if a cohabitation Cabinet was formed? Tsai and her DPP had only wanted, and prepared, to form a Cabinet under Tsai's own leadership as new President in less than four months, not Ma (H.-l. Hsu, 2018; K.-l. Huang, 2018).

Since 2008, when Taiwan began to hold its Presidential and legislative elections concurrently or within close enough ranges,⁴² the President's party has also been the majority in the LY and any minority government format will therefore be least likely to occur, barring a persistent increase in popular taste for independent, or less partisan,

⁴² Except 2008 with a two-month interval between the Presidential and legislative elections, the elections were held concurrently in 2012 and 2016 and scheduled so for 2020 (Wang & Lin, 2019).

politicians that undermines the country's primary dynamics of two-party/coalition competition.⁴³ In this regard, the French experience is similar to that of Taiwan. A French constitutional amendment, approved by referendum in 2000, shortened the French presidential term from seven to five years, starting with the election in 2002. The amendment allows the French president and members of the National Assembly, the lower, more powerful house of the French parliament, to serve a nearly concurrent term of five years, given legislative elections scheduled about one month after the election of the president. Since then, the French president's party/coalition has won a majority in the National Assembly, hence no more need for cohabitation (Hao, 2014; Le, 2005).

Perhaps it is still too early to decide as to whether a cohabitation government still has its chance in the Taiwanese context in the future, making the ROC SP system function as designed or work effectively as initially expected. But when asked if a constitutional reform is a segue way to better governance, say, by reinstating the LY's confirmation power over Presidential nominees for the Premier, those of my interviewees who answered the question in a dichotomous manner held a negative attitude toward it. For example, former Legislator Lin Yu-fang argued that due to the inherent selfishness of humanity, i.e., the pursuit of being powerful, it would not be easy to pass a further constitutional amendment to change Taiwan's current SP system which favors whoever was in power (Lin, 2018). He explained that since the LY's confirmation power over Presidential nominees for the Premier was removed, the

⁴³ Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), a blunt, surgeon-turned-independent politician and now potential Presidential contender in 2020, was re-elected to a second term as Mayor of Taipei City, a staunch KMT electoral stronghold, in the 2018 local elections by defeating both his KMT and DPP opponents. Ko was first elected mayor of Taipei in 2014 and became Taipei's first independent mayor since the reintroduction of directly elected mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities in 1994. Ko's rise to political prominence signals a public desire to turn around Blue-Green polarization in Taiwan's politics.

Premier had been likened to an underdog, particularly compared with the all-powerful President in “total governance.” As such, he said, any sitting President who was not a figurehead in either a majority or minority status would make no concessions to allow a constitutional reform.⁴⁴ However, Lin added with reservation, such an underdog label might not hold true for a Premier who counted on substantial support from within the party and thus could not be replaced easily, like William Lai (Ching-de), who was strongly affiliated with the DPP’s powerful New Tide faction (新潮流).⁴⁵

In other words, one would find that either of major political parties in Taiwan would criticize its SP system for creating a powerful but unaccountable Presidency whenever the party is not in power. When the party wins or expects to win the Presidency, it would change its attitude about the problem because political power is always appealing. Therefore, as long as this “dynamic equilibrium” between the ruling party that benefits from the institutional status quo and the opposition parties that call for a change continues to exist, no further Constitutional reform will be likely on Taiwan’s agenda. Yet, the equilibrium is not so steady that it cannot be disturbed. As W.-c. Huang (2018) suggests, constitutional reforms may happen only if either a quid pro quo between Taiwan’s two major political coalitions occurs, as it did in 1997 when the KMT joined the DPP to downsize, or “freeze,” the Taiwan provincial government in return for the latter’s support for removal of the LY’s confirmation power over Premier appointees. Another condition would be when public pressure encourages the stakeholders to amend the Constitution, such as halving LY seats from 225 to

⁴⁴ It is intriguing to know that under the Fifth Republic, the French president appoints the prime minister without parliamentary confirmation (Chen, 1999).

⁴⁵ William Lai, who was emerging as Tsai’s potential rival in the 2020 Presidential race, resigned in early 2019 to shoulder responsibility for the DPP’s crushing defeat in the 2018 November midterm elections, although Tsai wanted him to stay on.

113 in 2004 and dissolving the nation's largely ceremonial National Assembly in 2005.

However, for the time being, neither scenario is likely, said Huang Wei-chu.

On the other hand, by adhering to his perspective that rests on the importance of the role of the parliament, H.-l. Hsu (2018) argues that the ROC SP, in its current form, is not an issue, but the lack of parliament-centered politics is. To improve the SP operation in Taiwan, he suggested that not only the LY but its membership, legislators, be pushed to the nation's political forefront. He argued that in order for the parliament-centered politics to occur, the President should appoint prominent political figures, particularly those harking from the parliament (國會權力人物) to form a Cabinet, instead of experts or civil officials. "Politics should have belonged to politicians, who are sufficiently sophisticated to understand how politics works and cater to the mainstream vox populi," he said. Hsu Hsin-liang exemplified such an ideal type of politician with William Lai, who was a four-term DPP legislator and the highly popular mayor of Tainan before becoming the Premier in 2017.⁴⁶ "The President has got to treat politicians of the type in office, say, as Premier, with respect," he noted. The former DPP chairman concluded by stressing the importance of establishing a Westminster-inspired political system where the "true politicians" were powers that be, and aiming to achieve a more efficient, professional, and apolitical merit-based civil service, comparable to those in Great Britain, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan, where politicians offered ideas, set policy goals, and made important policy decisions while civil officials used their expertise in drafting bills in accordance with policy goals.

Unlike Hsu Hsin-liang, former President Ma believed that a further constitutional reform

⁴⁶ In the 2014 local elections, Lai won his second term as Tainan City Mayor with a record-high share of the vote, i.e., 72.9%, or 71,1557 votes, in a mayoral election of the special municipality since Taiwan lifted the martial law in 1987 (Yeh, 2017).

was necessary and warranted for better governance (Ma, 2019). “In my capacity as a former ROC President and having engaged in the Constitutional reform of 1994,” as Ma stressed, “I propose amending the current ROC semi-presidential system in the direction of adopting Taiwan’s existing local political system that has developed on our soil and served the country well since 1950, instead of trying to find a solution inspired by or from within the British, American, or French model of political system, or government type.”^{47, 48} In Taiwan’s local political system, city and county chiefs are popularly elected and responsible to local councils. While they can give directives to subordinates, they are required to regularly attend city/county council interpellations.

By doing so, Ma (2019) suggests a merger of the Presidential Palace and Executive Yuan, making the President responsible to the LY. The merger will bring personnel numbers at the two organs down to a combined total of 600 from 1,200, said Ma, “It will also be a much more efficient and economical way to govern.”

In Taiwan, the constitutional amendment bill requires a very high threshold for passage, as stipulated in the 7th Constitutional Amendment promulgated in 2005, and there have been no more constitutional amendments ever since.⁴⁹ Given a low likelihood of passing a

⁴⁷ The 1994 Constitutional Amendments replaced a system of indirect election of the ROC Presidency with the current system of direct, popular election.

⁴⁸ Ma also said that he opposed the passage of the Constitutional Amendment in 1997 that removed the Legislative power of consent to confirm the ROC President’s nomination of the Premier. In response to immediate past Premier Lai’s blunt call for allowing legislators to serve as Cabinet ministers, or at least concurrently, by further amending the Constitution (“Su Tseng-chang,” 2019), Ma opined that (Westminster) parliamentarianism was not applicable to Taiwan because very few legislators were qualified for Cabinet positions.

⁴⁹ In accordance with the ROC Constitution, as amended in 2004, an amendment bill to the Constitution must be endorsed by no less than one-fourth of the membership of the Legislative Yuan before it can be referred to a legislative ad hoc committee for review. The Constitutional amendment bill reported out of the committee shall subsequently be voted on, by the Legislative Yuan plenary session, requiring a quorum of no less than three-fourths of the entire membership of the Legislative Yuan. Passage of the amendment bill requires no less than three-fourths of those members present. Six months after the bill is promulgated by the Central Election Commission, it will only officially become effective if it receives a majority of the vote of all eligible voters in a

constitutional bill, Constitutional reforms have become nothing but issues that emerge on the political agenda and only when there is a Presidential election looming. More often than not, they just appear as a smokescreen for real problems, while acknowledged being unrealistic. So, the point should be how lofty aspirations of the Constitution can be realized in face of stark realpolitik, say, by setting a precedent for a cohabitation government or dismantling the entrenchment of presidential supremacy. This is indeed a challenge that politicians in Taiwan need to meet.

4.6 Chapter conclusions

The empirical results of in this chapter were primarily based on chi-squares tests for aggregate state capacity, a power-law analysis for administrative/bureaucratic capacity, 15 main hypothesis tests and their respective measurements (excluding *1121_output*, *110c*, *111c*, *ofout1*, and *dur*) for legislation (including budget enactments)-related legal, extractive/fiscal, and military/coercive capacities, along with three linear regression models for job approval ratings of the President, the Premier, and the Cabinet. They suggested the following:

1. The *M/m* division, or the institutional factor, may not be significantly associated with aggregate state capacity, thereby not supporting the primary hypothesis derived from the conventional wisdom of the positive relationship between president-parliamentary congruence and governance;
2. the *M/m* division would lead to some differences in certain, but not all, dimensions of state capacity, whereas the KMT/DPP rule division, or the party factor, would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had only a very limited effect:

Constitutional referendum. Before it was dissolved in 2005, the National Assembly had full power to amend the Constitution.

- (1) Contrary to my prior expectations, similar high frequencies of Cabinet official changes reflective of administrative/bureaucratic capacity were found in both *M* and *m* (even after the party factor was accounted for), although the latter more evidently followed self-organized criticality behavior;
 - (2) both the *M/m* and KMT/DPP rule divisions affected legal capacity which appeared to be more reactive to the institutional factor among others, but in a reverse direction to the expected;
 - (3) the *M/m* division made a difference as I expected in extractive/fiscal capacity, but only when this dimension of capacity was measured with changes made by the LY to annual general budgets, either in revenue or expenditure;
 - (4) military capacity was found to be positively related to majority status only when measured with the defense budget in expenditures per capita; albeit unexpected, it gives a plausible claim of bipartisanship in sustaining Taiwan's self-defense capabilities against the Chinese Mainland's military threat; and
 - (5) coercive capacity only became responsive to the *M/m* division when proxied instead by its performance—changes in violent crime rates, which is probably compatible with my prior expectations; and
3. people did not seem to perceive nor appreciate the differences in regime type and variations in state capacity were barely reflected, if at all, in domestic approval ratings of the ROC President and the Premier, respectively, and not at all for the Cabinet.

Next, analysis of the semi-structured interviews with the seven informants results in two major perspectives, namely of leadership and political culture. The former underlies a causal mechanism whereby Ma Ying-jeou's leadership contributed to effective crime fighting not

only throughout his Presidency but also onward to Tsai Ing-wen's and the Legislative leadership leveraged on legislation and budgetary decisions by expedient measures such as infamous "party-to-party consultations." Ma's claim, albeit idiosyncratic, moves in the same direction chartered by Richard E. Neustadt's presidential power (1991). According to Neustadt, a president's power is the power to persuade, and the power to persuade is the power to bargain. A president's status and authority give him great advantages in dealing with and convincing the men who share in governing the country, although outcomes are not guaranteed by his advantages. The Neustadtian paradigm, however, could also nicely fit problems with Ma's vulnerable leadership in the governing effectiveness of a congruent government to Wang's "uncooperative" Speakership in the KMT-controlled LY, in contrast with either Tsai's mastering leadership dynamics in "total governance" of the DPP or Lee Teng-hui's strong leadership. Indeed, Ma's complaint of the ineffectiveness of the dual leadership setup in Taiwan is derived from a competing and cumbersome command structure, in which he found his vantage points less comfortable as he must rule through his Premier, albeit whose replacement depends on the President's needs.

The latter, or the political culture perspective, considers Taiwan's presidency-centered, nostalgia-based, and polarized ideological politics that not only helps to explain the inverse *M/m*-legislative productivity relationship but also sheds light on, respectively, the vulnerable Cabinet, the complexities of proxying military capacity by the defense appropriations bill given lengthy arms procurement procedures, and vibrant public participation in protests and demonstrations. In a nutshell, we need to approach those institutional puzzles from a "non-institutional" angle, too. The interview results also suggest that the gap or inconsistency between any change in state capacity and people's perception of, or appreciation for,

congruence in governance may result most from information asymmetry between people and the ruling elite.

It seems, for the time being, Taiwan's experience has cast doubt on, if not falsified, the conventional wisdom that president-parliamentary congruence is better at governing than incongruence. And in long run, the ROC SP system seems unfavorable to Taiwan's democratic development and quality of governance because of its tilt toward a powerful (but not necessarily all-powerful) and unaccountable Presidency, a trend that appears to be least reversible. It would be nothing more than wishful thinking to make further Constitutional reforms in Taiwan.

Chapter 5. Conclusions

The ROC government was transformed into a semi-presidential (SP) system after the 1997 ROC Constitutional Amendments. This constitutional framework has been subject to criticisms for creating a powerful but unaccountable presidency in president-parliamentary congruence (SP majority regime/“total governance”, or *M*), a political stalemate between the executive and legislative branches in president-parliamentary incongruence (SP minority regime, or *m*, tantamount to minority governance in the Taiwanese context due to a lack of French-style cohabitation and coalition government), and an incapable government regardless which political party is in power. My research examines the validity of these criticisms by empirically studying the Presidential (executive)-legislative relationship of variations in ROC’s semi-presidentialism, i.e., the *M/m* (government) division, and its impact on the nation’s governance, specifically through the lens of multi-dimensional state capacity, from mid-1997 to early 2018. By doing so, I attempted to test the Western conventional wisdom that governance in president-parliamentary congruence is considered more effective than that in president-parliamentary incongruence by using twenty-odd years of practical experience in Taiwan, a prominent nascent democracy in the third wave of democratization but largely ignored in literature, as well as answer the fundamental question: Is semi-presidentialism good for Taiwan?

The empirical findings in this work showed more complicated implications for its theoretical significance: Whether “total governance” outperforms minority governance depends on what level of state capacity is in focus and what dimension of state capacity is measured. That is, the *M/m* division in Taiwan may not make any difference in aggregate state capacity. This helps to explain the prevailing sentiment in Taiwan that whoever is in

power does not matter. When analyzed by the four salient, alternative dimensions of state capacity that unpack and more precisely define the notion of governance, namely, extractive/fiscal, (domestic) coercive/(external) military, administrative/bureaucratic, and legal, I found that the *M/m* division made difference, but not that much, nor the direction, as I initially expected: The majority status could not ensure an endurable Cabinet composition, and greater legislative productivity was even found in the minority governance. The ruling party factor would not necessarily affect state capacity, or had effects limited to only legal capacity and performance of coercive capacity.

Therefore, the practical significance of this study was to explore why the realpolitik within Taiwan failed, to a certain degree, to make its SP system of dual legitimacy work as designed or as the textbooks would suggest. A mixed-method triangulation approach was employed to further the understanding of the causal mechanisms. The seven key-informants recruited for semi-structured interviews in this study answered the institutional puzzles from “non-institutional” perspectives of idiosyncratic leadership and political culture, revealing the complexity of contextual and political dynamics in Taiwan where the parties and the leaders have taken a wide variety of actions (some of them genuinely temporary, but some having the scripted character that connotes “institutionalization”) to accomplish their goals. In other words, although the core of politics is occupied by power and the institution and the institution is theoretically supposed to ensure good governance, or at least prevent abuse of power, that complexity indeed reflects how Taiwanese politicians treat institutions while exercising power in the practice of governance.

What is more, good governance in Taiwan may not necessarily guarantee that the ruling party remains ruling, as implied by the null or slim relationship between the change in state

capacity and people's perception, or at least appreciation, of governance. In this sense, people are unable or unwilling to seriously and deeply consider issues of governance, and thus for those politicians seeking re-election, the issues might not be their top priority. I am afraid that they are not signs for a healthy democracy. The implication of this finding is consistent with and complement the existing literature on Western democracies (Achen & Bartels, 2016), as previously discussed in Chapter 2.

Another theoretical significance of this study lies in reaffirmation and extension of my original findings of 2007, albeit not published, that given Taiwan's SP system, the frequency of Cabinet official changes, or intervals of any change in Cabinet composition, exhibit a power-law distribution (Ho, 2007). This contributes to the diversity in applying the power law to a world that is "out of balance" and enriches the governance literature. Compared with the original findings derived from the first decade following Taiwan's installation of semi-presidentialism, this study collected data spanning over more than two decades with sufficient observations both in M and m , albeit without a cohabitation yet.

This dissertation is subject to certain limitations. Firstly, some issues of governance in Taiwan may be driven by the Chinese Mainland factor or Sino-US relations. For example, Taiwan's economy benefited from concessions made by the Mainland in trade deals (讓利) when Ma Ying-jeou promoted controllable and stable cross-Strait relations during his Presidency; Taiwan's exports suffered a substantial decline over the recent US-Mainland China trade war, given Taiwan's heavy reliance on the Mainland market for trade balance. All of these seem likely to affect Taiwan's fiscal resources but were not accounted for in this study. Although exogenous conditions are presumed to be controlled in a within-case comparison design, this dissertation still gave certain, but quite limited, considerations on

their influence on governance, say, the “China factor” when hypothesizing a bipartisan defense policy in Taiwan, though later (partially) rejected, and the 2008 global financial tsunami when analyzing tax collection in Taiwan. Secondly, neither cohabitation nor coalition government has occurred in Taiwan. So, it seems that only the “collision” mode, or plus Ma’s short-lived caretaker Cabinet, of minority/divided government are observed for *m* in Taiwan, along with the limited samples obtained from the only *DPP M*, the incumbent Tsai administration. Thus, research that further considers exogenous conditions, such as the state of the domestic and external economy and barometers that reflect the cross-Strait or international political climate, or collects bigger or cross-national data with more variations in the SP typology are warranted to provide a more comprehensive picture of how SP engineering works on governance and understand whether it is a good alternative for nascent democracies. By contrast, when considering endogenously former Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s role as a major player in influencing the governing effectiveness of a KMT-led congruent government, it would be benefited to have the LY Speaker as part of the model in my future study.

Thirdly, or last but not least, the selection of the unit of analysis might also be considered to matter to the outcome. KMT Chairman Wu (2019) suggested narrowing the unit of analysis from the two (*M/m*)-by-two (KMT/DPP rule) division to separate Premierhips, Presidencies, or terms of the Presidency regardless of the ruling party (and, perhaps, the *M/m* status), as he believed by doing so, the results of people’s perception of the difference in state capacity would be different.¹ He shared with me some surveys conducted by the Lausanne-

¹ Wu defended his idea of working with a narrower unit of analysis by paying a left-handed compliment to Chen Shui-bian, who was now on medical parole from prison where he had been serving a 20-year sentence for corruption committed during his second term as President, saying that Chen would be a good President if he had only served the first term.

based International Institute for Management Development on his performance as Premier, superior in comparison to outgoing Premier William Lai's (as of interview date), such as the country's competitiveness, economic and public infrastructure growth, and government effectiveness. Likewise, he also used the Ma administration's performance as the yardstick for judging and criticizing that of its immediate predecessor (Chen Shui-bian) and successor (Tsai Ing-wen) in increasing the numbers of foreign tourist arrivals in Taiwan and countries/territories granting visa-free or landing visa privileges to ROC passport holders, as well as in retaining the nation's dwindling number of diplomatic allies. However, none of those measures were employed in this study, which demands focused attention, albeit not exclusively, on the notion of state capacity per se instead of relying on performance.²

As of this writing, Taiwan's embattled and unpopular President Tsai Ing-wen is facing daunting challenges in her bid from re-election next year from not only her KMT rival hopefuls, Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), a former KMT outcast and now the populist mayor of Kaohsiung, and Terry Gou (郭台銘), Foxconn's billionaire founder and a friend of Donald Trump, and but within her DPP where former Premier William Lai has unexpectedly announced his own run for the DPP nomination.³ Since the first direct Presidential election in 1996, there has been no ROC President who lost either re-election or his party's nomination for re-election. The consequence of the DPP's first ever "total governance" will

² Likewise, H.-I. Hsu (2018) also suggested that more indicators of state capacity be considered for a better understanding the relationship between published polls and governance, say, a range of indices reflecting people's happiness, Taiwan's economic development, and the wealth gap. For example, Taiwan ranked the happiest country in East Asia and 25th among 156 countries in the world according to the United Nations' latest, as of this writing, annual *World Happiness Report*, released in March 2019, which assessed factors in different countries including average life span, social support and corruption (Everington, 2019). Again, none of them seems satisfactory, either with my four-dimension-centric selection of proxies or when considering the notion of capacity itself.

³ Lai's Premiership lasted less than 17 months. He was replaced by Su Tseng-chang in early 2019. See details in Chapter 4, footnote 4.

definitely be significant, theoretically or practically, to allow us to ponder the questions this dissertation addresses.

Perhaps, as former President Ma suggested, and tried to conclude from my findings, in our interview, Taiwan's SP constitution needs to change for better governance. But there is no immediate prospect of constitutional reform due to its very high threshold and a lack of consensus among the ruling and opposition parties on solutions to tackling the reform. So, once again, the point should be how lofty aspirations of the ROC Constitution can be realized. It needs a set of politicians, if not statesmen, of integrity, courage, and wisdom.

A few decades ago, Communist China vowed to follow the example of Singapore to "reform and open-up" the country. In fact, it was Taiwan, not Singapore, since Taiwan was not allowed to be recognized as an exemplar by the other side of the Strait at the time of mutual hostilities (Chao & Ho, 2009). Today, Taiwan is still believed to be the sole trigger for democratization in Mainland China—but the prerequisite is that Taiwan must make democracy work in better ways.

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Appendix A
Data sheets (Framework 1/2)

Framework 1 (with LY Sessions, Regular and Extraordinary, as Unit of Analysis)

Year	Party	M/m	LY Session	Period	ofoutl	11c	12c	13c	141c	142c	18c	19c ^a	143c	15c ^b	16c	144c	17c	1121 _output	1122 _output
1997	KMT	M	3rd-3-ES 1	1997/7/28 ~ 1997/8/11	0	0.00	NA											0	0
1997	KMT	M	3rd-4	1997/9/9 ~ 1998/1/9	15	6.07	NA								2.54		0.19	1	1
1998	KMT	M	3rd-5	1998/2/20 ~ 1998/5/29	11	4.71	NA	106.41	1.42	1.42			0.42	3.27		2.22		0	0
1998	KMT	M	3rd-6	1998/9/11 ~ 1999/1/15	2	6.07	NA				5.00	5.00			2.56		0.39	0	0
1999	KMT	M	4th-1	1999/2/6 ~ 1999/6/22	9	27.41	NA	97.29	-2.22	0.93			0.49	3.14		0.28		0	0
1999	KMT	M	4th-2	1999/9/17 ~ 2000/1/16	4	14.21	NA											0	0
2000	KMT	M	4th-3	2000/2/18 ~ 2000/5/19	2	5.54	NA								2.50		0.29	1	1
2000	DPP	m	4th-3	2000/5/20 ~ 2000/7/28	2	4.28	NA											0	0
2000	DPP	m	4th-4	2000/9/15 ~ 2001/1/4	6	5.80	NA		5.11	2.03		0.00	1.91	3.13	2.50	0.49	0.29	0	0
2001	DPP	m	4th-4-ES 1	2001/1/30 ~ 2001/1/31	0	0.00	NA											0	0
2001	DPP	m	4th-5	2001/2/20 ~ 2001/6/6	5	2.42	NA				0.00	23.03		3.17				0	0
2001	DPP	m	4th-5-ES 1	2001/6/26 ~ 2001/6/27	0	0.35	NA								2.49		0.18	0	0
2001	DPP	m	4th-6	2001/9/20 ~ 2002/1/18	26	9.12	NA	92.98	5.85	5.04			1.36			1.02		0	0
2002	DPP	m	5th-1	2002/2/19 ~ 2002/6/21	3	18.24	39.37											0	0
2002	DPP	m	5th-1-ES 1	2002/7/15 ~ 2002/7/17	0	0.00	0.00											0	0
2002	DPP	m	5th-2	2002/9/24 ~ 2003/1/14	4	8.37	26.30	93.35	0.88	1.41	0.00	0.04	1.67	2.86 2.98	2.45	0.23	0.13	0	0
2003	DPP	m	5th-3	2003/2/25 ~ 2003/6/6	2	4.96	15.76				-43.37	-11.13						0	0
2003	DPP	m	5th-3-ES 1	2003/7/8 ~ 2003/7/10	2	0.27	1.36								2.43		0.03	0	0
2003	DPP	m	5th-4	2003/9/5 ~ 2004/1/13	1	3.28	13.05	89.11	0.67	1.22	0.00	0.00	0.37	2.78		0.08		0	0
2004	DPP	m	5th-5	2004/2/6 ~ 2004/6/11	25	3.17	12.10								2.46		-0.07	0	0
2004	DPP	m	5th-5-ES 1	2004/8/11 ~ 2004/8/24	0	0.30	0.61				0.00	0.00						0	0

Framework 1 (cont.)

Year	Party	M/m	LY Session	Period	<i>ofout1</i>	<i>11c</i>	<i>12c</i>	<i>13c</i>	<i>141c</i>	<i>142c</i>	<i>18c</i>	<i>19c^a</i>	<i>143c</i>	<i>15c^b</i>	<i>16c</i>	<i>144c</i>	<i>17c</i>	<i>1121</i> <i>_output</i>	<i>1122</i> <i>_output</i>
2012	KMT	M	8th-2	2012/9/18 ~ 2013/1/15	8	3.62	10.61	97.76	0.18	1.90			0.58	2.55		1.29		0	0
2013	KMT	M	8th-3	2013/2/26 ~ 2013/5/31	8	2.17	9.31											3	2
2013	KMT	M	8th-3-ES 1	2013/6/13 ~ 2013/6/27	0	0.41	3.42							2.59			-0.06	0	0
2013	KMT	M	8th-3-ES 2	2013/7/30 ~ 2013/8/9	10	0.41	3.15											0	0
2013	KMT	M	8th-4	2013/9/17 ~ 2014/1/14	6	3.74	20.00	95.14	1.37	1.26			0.51	2.32		0.28		0	0
2014	KMT	M	8th-4-ES 1	2014/1/27 ~ 2014/1/28	1	0.03	0.40											0	0
2014	KMT	M	8th-5	2014/2/21 ~ 2014/5/30	10	1.98	10.34											5	1
2014	KMT	M	8th-5-ES 1	2014/6/13 ~ 2014/7/4	2	0.05	0.70							2.59			-0.07	0	0
2014	KMT	M	8th-5-ES 2	2014/7/28 ~ 2014/8/8	5	0.08	0.35											0	0
2014	KMT	M	8th-6	2014/9/12 ~ 2015/1/23	18	2.08	12.46	105.67	1.25	1.28			2.04	2.14		0.30		2	0
2015	KMT	M	8th-7	2015/2/24 ~ 2015/6/16	1	2.44	19.46								2.59		-0.08	0	0
2015	KMT	M	8th-8	2015/9/15 ~ 2015/12/31	0	1.80	17.97	111.04	1.21	1.12			0.49	2.10		0.20		0	0
2016	KMT	m	9th-1	2016/2/19 ~ 2016/5/19	8	4.04	12.90								2.61		-0.10	0	0
2016	DPP	M	9th-1	2016/5/20 ~ 2016/7/15	1	1.32	5.78											0	0
2016	DPP	M	9th-1-ES 1	2016/7/20 ~ 2016/7/29	0	0.07	0.00											0	0
2016	DPP	M	9th-2	2016/9/13 ~ 2016/12/30	3	4.40	15.71	106.52										1	1
2017	DPP	M	9th-2-ES 1	2017/1/05 ~ 2017/1/19	0	0.10	0.91		0.25	1.20			0.75	2.04		0.40		0	0
2017	DPP	M	9th-3	2017/2/17 ~ 2017/5/31	6	1.95	13.36											2	0
2017	DPP	M	9th-3-ES 1	2017/6/14 ~ 2017/7/5	0	0.14	1.32								2.61		-0.11	0	0
2017	DPP	M	9th-3-ES 2	2017/7/13 ~ 2017/7/21	0	0.00	0.00											0	0
2017	DPP	M	9th-3-ES 3	2017/8/18 ~ 2017/8/31	7	0.04	0.45											0	0
2017	DPP	M	9th-4	2017/9/22 ~ 2017/12/29	4	1.75	12.24											0	0
2018	DPP	M	9th-4-ES 1	2018/1/5 ~ 2018/1/30	0	0.12	1.59		-1.15	1.25			1.43			0.73		0	0

Note: Fractions, if any, are rounded off to the second decimal place. Data on *11c*, *12c*, *13c*, *141c*, *142c*, *18c*, *19c*, *143c*, *15c*, and *144c* are expressed as a percentage. Minus numbers in *141c*, *18c*, and *19c* mean budget increases in revenue or expenditure.

- a. See footnote 12 of Chapter 4, p. 117, for the explanation of an exceptional negative value in *19c* during 5th-3.
- b. Two different values (2.86 and 2.98) are obtained in *15c* during 5th-2 because the supplementary defense budget for FY2002 and the general defense budget for FY2003 (without a supplementary budget being provided) were passed in that same session.

Framework 2 (with Merged LY Session as Unit of Analysis)

Year	Party	M/m	LY session	<i>ofout2</i>	<i>21c</i>	<i>22c</i>	<i>13c</i>	<i>241c</i>	<i>242c</i>	<i>2122</i> <i>_output</i>	<i>243c</i>	<i>25c</i>	<i>16c</i>	<i>244c</i>	<i>17c</i>	Pres apv	PM apv	Cab apv
1997	KMT	<i>M</i>	3rd-3 + 3-ES 1	7	16.91	15.67*	99.48*	1.46	1.46	0	1.16	3.34	2.37*	0.05	0.04*	-0.58	-0.51	-1.02 *
1997	KMT	<i>M</i>	3rd-4	15	6.07	15.67*	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	1	0.88*	2.73*	2.54	0.59*	0.19	-0.26	0.21	-0.55
1998	KMT	<i>M</i>	3rd-5	11	4.71	15.67*	106.41	1.42	1.42	0	0.42	3.27	2.37*	2.22	0.04*	0.36	-0.77 *	-1.02*
1998	KMT	<i>M</i>	3rd-6	2	6.07	15.67*	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.56	0.59*	0.39	-0.76*	-0.77*	-1.02*
1999	KMT	<i>M</i>	4th-1	9	27.41	15.67*	97.29	-2.22	0.93	0	0.49	3.14	2.37*	0.28	0.04*	0.45	-0.77*	-1.02*
1999	KMT	<i>M</i>	4th-2	4	14.21	15.67*	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.37*	0.59*	0.04*	-0.04	-0.77*	-1.02*
2000	KMT	<i>M</i>	4th-3	2	5.54	15.67*	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	1	0.88*	2.73*	2.50	0.59*	0.29	0.48	-0.77*	-1.02*
2000	DPP	<i>m</i>	4th-3	2	4.28	19.56*	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.49*	0.49*	0.06*	0.54	0.55	-0.09
2000	DPP	<i>m</i>	4th-4 + 4-ES 1	6	5.80	19.56*	101.21*	5.11	2.03	0	1.91	3.13	2.50	0.00	0.29	-0.44	-0.58	-0.62
2001	DPP	<i>m</i>	4th-5 + 5-ES 1	5	2.76	19.56*	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	3.17	2.49	0.49*	0.18	-0.14	-0.69	-1.05
2001	DPP	<i>m</i>	4th-6	26	9.12	19.56*	92.98	5.85	5.04	0	1.36	2.86*	2.49*	1.02	0.06*	-0.20	-0.41	-0.69*
2002	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-1 + 1-ES 1	3	18.24	39.37	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.49*	0.49*	0.06*	0.01	0.37	-0.49
2002	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-2	4	8.37	26.30	93.35	0.88	1.41	0	1.67	2.92	2.45*	0.23	0.13*	-0.80	0.06	-0.58
2003	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-3 + 3-ES 1	4	5.22	16.91	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.43	0.49*	0.03	-0.63	0.11	-0.73
2003	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-4	1	3.28	13.05	89.11	0.67	1.22	0	0.37	2.78	2.49*	0.08*	0.06*	-0.79	-0.14	-0.75
2004	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-5 + 5-ES 1	25	3.46	12.63	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.46	0.49*	-0.07	-0.43	0.00	-0.41
2004	DPP	<i>m</i>	5th-6	9	2.11	8.96	101.50	4.93	1.67	0	0.82	2.72	2.49*	1.69	0.06*	-0.73*	-0.30*	-0.69*
2005	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-1	6	7.23	27.27	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.43	0.49*	-0.02	-0.28	0.16	-0.69*
2005	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-2	23	5.98	21.82	113.23	1.37	1.74	0	4.98	2.40	2.49*	0.47	0.06*	-1.58	-0.94	-1.27
2006	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-3 + 3-ES 1	5	5.66	28.92	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.40	0.49*	0.02	-1.80	-0.47	-1.09
2006	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-4	5	2.58	8.29	109.60	2.60*	2.01*	1	2.39*	2.86*	2.49*	0.49*	0.06*	-1.67	-0.79	-0.69*
2007	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-5 + 5-ES 1	17	6.31	24.49	101.21*	1.52	2.13	1	5.74	2.66	2.59	0.38	-0.04	-1.53	-0.84	-0.69*
2007	DPP	<i>m</i>	6th-6	0	4.34	16.13	108.67	0.45	0.80	1	2.31	3.13	2.49*	0.05	0.06*	-1.52	-1.21	-0.69*
2008	DPP	<i>m</i>	7th-1	9	6.94	10.17	101.21*	2.60*	2.01*	0	2.39*	2.86*	2.70	0.49*	0.00	-1.90	-0.30*	-0.69*

Framework 2 (cont.)

Year	Party	M/m	LY session	<i>ofout2</i>	<i>21c</i>	<i>22c</i>	<i>13c</i>	<i>241c</i>	<i>242c</i>	<i>2122</i> <i>_output</i>	<i>243c</i>	<i>25c</i>	<i>16c</i>	<i>244c</i>	<i>17c</i>	Pres apv	PM apv	Cab apv
2008	KMT	M	7th-1	0	3.44	6.45	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	2	0.88*	3.07	2.68	0.59*	0.04*	-0.64	-0.71	-0.62
2008	KMT	M	7th-2 + 2-ES 1	3	6.52	20.11	99.48*	1.88	1.11	0	2.15	3.00	2.37*	0.00	0.04*	-0.80	-0.81	-0.62
2009	KMT	M	7th-3 + 3-ES 1	2	7.92	30.08	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	1	0.88*	2.73*	2.63	0.59*	-0.04	-0.70	-1.01	-1.02*
2009	KMT	M	7th-4 + 4-ES 1	17	4.89	20.78	82.99	0.26	1.15	3	0.89	2.63	2.37*	0.69	0.04*	-1.00	-0.08	-1.02*
2010	KMT	M	7th-5 + 5-ES 1-2	7	4.16	14.73	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.55	0.59*	-0.05	-0.91	-0.49	-0.94
2010	KMT	M	7th-6	2	3.07	11.15	96.10	0.21	1.11	0	0.86	2.60	2.37*	0.60	0.04*	-0.32	-0.20	-1.02*
2011	KMT	M	7th-7	6	3.21	15.12	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.54	0.59*	-0.08	-0.69	-0.42	-0.71
2011	KMT	M	7th-8 + 8-ES 1	18	3.87	21.17	102.94	0.00	0.02	2	0.08	2.64	2.37*	0.58	0.04*	-0.62	-0.80	-1.02*
2012	KMT	M	8th-1 + 1-ES 1	9	1.97	3.87	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.61	0.59*	-0.07	-1.29	-1.00	-1.41
2012	KMT	M	8th-2	8	3.62	10.61	97.76	0.18	1.90	0	0.58	2.55	2.37*	1.29	0.04*	-1.61	-1.35	-1.74
2013	KMT	M	8th-3 + 3-ES 1-2	18	2.96	15.17	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	2	0.88*	2.73*	2.59	0.59*	-0.06	-1.80	-1.11	-1.53
2013	KMT	M	8th-4 + 4-ES 1	7	3.77	20.32	95.14	1.37	1.26	0	0.51	2.32	2.37*	0.28	0.04*	-1.74	-1.33	-1.45
2014	KMT	M	8th-5 + 5-ES 1-2	17	2.11	11.29	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	1	0.88*	2.73*	2.59	0.59*	-0.07	-1.85	-1.27	-1.02*
2014	KMT	M	8th-6	18	2.08	12.46	105.67	1.25	1.28	0	2.04	2.14	2.37*	0.30	0.04*	-1.85	-1.61	-1.02*
2015	KMT	M	8th-7	1	2.44	19.46	99.48*	0.64*	1.16*	0	0.88*	2.73*	2.59	0.59*	-0.08	-1.66	-0.77*	-1.02*
2015	KMT	M	8th-8	0	1.80	17.97	111.04	1.21	1.12	0	0.49	2.10	2.37*	0.20	0.04*	-1.59	-1.39	-1.02*
2016	KMT	m	9th-1	8	4.04	12.90	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	2.61	NA	-0.10	-1.18	0.20	N/A
2016	DPP	M	9th-1 + 1-ES 1	1	1.39	5.78	106.52*	-0.45*	1.23*	0	1.09*	2.04*	2.61*	0.57*	-0.11*	-0.18	-0.49	-0.66
2016	DPP	M	9th-2 + 2-ES 1	3	4.50	16.48	106.52	0.25	1.20	1	0.75	2.04	2.61*	0.40	-0.11*	-0.80	-1.04	-1.12
2017	DPP	M	9th-3 + 3-ES 1-3	13	2.13	14.89	106.52*	-0.45*	1.23*	0	1.09*	2.04*	2.61	0.57*	-0.11	-1.03	-1.20	-1.30
2017	DPP	M	9th-4 + 4-ES 1	4	1.87	13.64	106.52*	-1.15	1.25	0	1.43	2.04*	2.61*	0.73	-0.11*	-0.87	0.07	-1.01*

Note: Fractions, if any, are rounded off to the second decimal place. Data on *21c*, *22c*, *13c*, *241c*, *242c*, *243c*, *25c*, and *244c* are expressed as a percentage. The approval ratings of each subject (Pres = President; PM = Premier; Cab = Cabinet) are computed with a weighted mean and subjected to a logit transformation. Minus numbers in *241c* mean budget increases in revenue. Numbers with an asterisk (*) in the tabulation indicate imputed data by the category-mean substitution method.

Appendix B
List of interviews

The following is a complete list of all the interviews conducted for this study. The interviews are listed in the chronological order they were conducted.

Name	Gender	Current position/occupation	Party affiliation	Date of interview	Location of interview
Hsu Ya-jing	Female	Director, Business News Center, Central News Agency	Independent	9/18/18	Royal Host-Songjiang Restaurant, Taipei
Huang Kuo-liang	Male	Convener, Political Division, United Daily News	Independent	9/19/18	Library134, a café in Taipei
Huang Wei-chu	Male	Director, Political Division, Liberty Times	Independent	9/19/18	Nola Kitchen-Linsen Restaurant, Taipei
Lin Yu-fang	Male	Convener, Foreign and National Defense Division, Taipei-based National Policy Foundation	Kuomintang	9/21/18	His office, Taipei
Hsu Hsin-liang	Male	Chairman, Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies	Democratic Progressive Party	11/14/18	His office, Taipei
Wu Den-yih	Male	Chairman, Kuomintang	Kuomintang	1/10/19	His office, Taipei
Ma Ying-jeou	Male	12th and 13th President, Republic of China	Kuomintang	1/18/19	His retirement office, Taipei

Appendix C
Sample recruitment letter (in English/Chinese)

Recruitment Letter

Dear (prospective participant),

My name is Chih-Yung Ho, a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). I am writing to invite you to participate in an interview for my doctoral dissertation, entitled the ROC Semi-presidentialism at Work Revisited: A Within-case Comparison through the Lens of State Capacity. This dissertation, under Professor Kathleen Bruhn, conducted an empirical study on the impact of president-parliamentary congruence (“total governance”) and incongruence (minority government) on the country’s governance since Taiwan became semi-presidential in 1997. Your experience and knowledge of Taiwan’s political development would make an invaluable contribution to the interpretation of my empirical quantitative findings. I hope that you will agree to participate in this study.

Specifically, I am asking you to participate in one interview, lasting approximately 60 to 90 minutes, scheduled at your convenience and in a location of your choice. With your permission, I would audio-record our conversation with the intention of precisely quoting your remarks. But you do reserve the right to pause or stop the recording at any time if you wish. In this scenario, I will ask your permission again to keep a written record of this part of conversation instead. If you agree to be interviewed, I will keep your audio-recorded responses to my questions confidential and will not share them with anyone other than my dissertation committee. After my dissertation is filed and Ph.D. is granted, I will delete the audio-recording. Even if I will not transcribe the audio-recording of our conversation, I will quote some of your responses to the interview questions in my dissertation. When I have a full draft of my dissertation completed, you will be welcome to review and do reserve the right to edit or remove any of your remarks quoted herein. The summary of my empirical findings, four interview questions, and six statistical tables and figures (all presented in both Chinese and English) are submitted herewith for your information and reference.

It would be a great privilege for me to count on your participation in my empirical study on our country’s democratic and constitutional development over the past two decades or so. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. I have also included the contact information of my dissertation advisor, Professor Kathleen Bruhn, as well as of the UCSB Human Subjects Committee (serving as the Institutional Review Board).

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Chih-Yung Ho
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara

Winner, Dr. Sun Yat-sen Scholarship (2010)

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Dr. Kathleen Bruhn, Professor and Chair of Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara

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+1 805 893 3740

The Human Subjects Committee, University of California, Santa Barbara

hsc@research.ucsb.edu

+1 805 893 3807 or +1 805 893 4290

博士論文訪談邀請函

敬愛的○○○鈞鑒：

我是美國加州大學聖塔芭芭拉分校 (University of California, Santa Barbara) 政治學博士候選人何志勇，目前在 Kathleen Bruhn 教授的指導下，返台撰寫博士論文 *The ROC Semi-presidentialism at Work Revisited: A Within-case Comparison through the Lens of State Capacity* 中譯：(重新審視中華民國實施雙首長制的憲政經驗：從國家〔治理〕能力的角度來進行個案內比較研究)，旨在探究我國改行雙首長制至今逾廿年裡，行政和立法權是否一致 (即「完全執政」或少數政府) 對國家 (治理) 能力所造成的影響。您寶貴的經驗與意見對如何解讀本實證研究 (統計分析) 的結果至為重要，懇請惠予面訪為盼。

本次訪談預計進行一至一個半小時，訪談日期、時間及地點以您的方便為主。為求詳實記錄，我將會在徵求您的同意後，對訪談過程進行全程錄音，但在過程中您也可以隨時要求某些對話暫停錄音，改以書面紀錄來取代之。至於錄音檔案僅作為本次研究之用，不對外公開，並會在論文完成後銷毀。訪談錄音內容不會被謄打為逐字稿，但您的部分對話或見解將被引用。待論文初稿完成後，我會請您協助確認涉及本次訪談的引文，對此您有刪修權。本研究結果摘要、訪談題目 (四題) 如附件，另也提供相關的統計圖表給您做為參考 (以上內容皆有中英文對照)。

如蒙應允，將會使我對於中華民國在台灣過去廿餘年裡，憲政制度如何影響國家治理的研究順利獲得成果。對您的協助與參與，敬申謝忱。專此奉邀，敬祝
鈞安

美國加州大學聖塔芭芭拉分校政治學博士候選人、中國國民黨中山獎學金 99 年度得主 何志勇敬上

10○年(201○)○月○日

聯絡電話：○○○○ ○○○ ○○○

E-mail: chihyung_ho@ucsb.edu

Appendix D

Interview questions (in English/Chinese)

1. My empirical study (1997-2018) shows that in Taiwan over the last two decades, the selected dimensions of state capacity in president-parliamentary congruence (or SP majority regime) were not necessarily better than those in president-parliamentary incongruence (or SP minority regime). Do you think this is consistent with your understanding? How would you interpret the results, particularly that fail to support the theory?
2. As stated earlier in the summary of findings, “variations in state capacity in ROC SP regimes were barely reflected, if at all, in job approval ratings of the President and Premier and not reflected for the Cabinet in Taiwan.” What do you think if this implies that ruling political parties in Taiwan rely on something else rather than “governance” to maintain their political power?
3. To date, Taiwan has not yet set a constitutional precedent in which the opposition political party (or coalition) that wins a legislative majority forms a Cabinet, i.e., the French-style “cohabitation.” What do you think of the rationalities underlying their choices? Is “cohabitation” foreseeable in Taiwan?

Background: During the Presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the KMT-led pan-Blue opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan failed in its attempt to form a Cabinet. Right after the DPP won a sweeping victory in Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections in January 2016, then President Ma Ying-jeou proposed allowing the DPP with its newly-won legislative majority to form a new Cabinet before the inauguration of the new administration in May. However, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP turned down the proposition.

4. In Taiwan, for the last two decades and particularly ahead of and after the 2016 general elections, there has been much discussion regarding a possible change to the country’s SP system. What you think of the necessity and, if necessary, feasibility of a constitutional reform in Taiwan?
1. 台灣過去逾廿年的經驗顯示，「完全執政」時的國家（治理）能力並非在各方面優於少數政府。這和您的理解是一致的嗎？您又如何解讀與理論相悖的部分？
 2. 雙首長以及內閣的施政滿意度民調和國家展現治理能力的程度脫鉤，這是否意味著，在台灣，政黨維持政權並非取決於治理本身，而是其他的標準？您如何看待之？
 3. 前總統陳水扁任內朝小野大，由掌握國會過半席次的泛藍陣營來組閣卻從未成局；前總統馬英九在二零一六年大選後曾邀請囊括國會多數席次的民進黨（提前）組閣，但遭拒。我國也因此未能出現類似法國「左右共治」的憲政慣例。您如何解讀其中（當事人或政黨）的邏輯？未來「左右共治」在台灣仍可期嗎？
 4. 在過去廿年裡，改革我國雙首長制的主張時有所聞，國、民兩黨在二零一六年總統大選前後也曾對此議題交鋒。您認為我國進行憲政體制改革的必要性和（或）可行性為何？若要改，應該要怎麼改呢？

Appendix E
Supplemental tables

Table E.1. Contingency Table on *M/m* and State Capacity ($\pm 2\sigma$)

(Observed counts)					(Expected counts) ^b			
State capacity		σ^a	<i>M</i>	<i>m</i>	Totals	<i>M</i>	<i>m</i>	
Legal	<i>11c</i> (bills of law passed in the Legislature)	2~	2	1	3	1.83	1.17	
		1~2	1	2	3	1.83	1.17	
		0~1	14	9	23	14.01	8.99	
		-1~0	28	10	38	23.15	14.85	
		-2~-1	0	3	3	1.83	1.17	
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
	<i>12c</i> (bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the Legislature)	2~	1	1	2	1.22	0.78	
		1~2	6	3	9	5.48	3.52	
		0~1	17	10	27	16.45	10.55	
		-1~0	10	6	16	9.75	6.25	
		-2~-1	11	5	16	9.75	6.25	
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
	Extractive/fiscal	<i>13c</i> (A/P ratio: ratio of actual tax revenue to predicted tax revenue)	2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
			1~2	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
0~1			4	3	7	4.26	2.74	
-1~0			4	2	6	3.66	2.34	
-2~-1			0	1	1	0.61	0.39	
~-2			1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
<i>141c</i> (cut/increase to the annual general budget in revenue)		2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
		1~2	1	3	4	2.44	1.56	
		0~1	4	5	9	5.48	3.52	
		-1~0	5	0	5	3.05	1.95	
		-2~-1	1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
		~-2	1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
<i>142c</i> (cut to the annual general budget in expenditure)		2~	0	1	1	0.61	0.39	
		1~2	1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
		0~1	6	2	8	4.87	3.13	
		-1~0	4	5	9	5.48	3.52	
		-2~-1	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
		~-2	1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
<i>18c</i> (cut/increase to the supplementary budget in revenue)		2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
		1~2	1	0	1	0.61	0.39	
		0~1	0	4	4	2.44	1.56	
		-1~0	2	0	2	1.22	0.78	
		-2~-1	0	1	1	0.61	0.39	
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	
<i>19c</i> (cut to the supplementary budget in expenditure)	2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00		
	1~2	1	1	2	1.22	0.78		
	0~1	0	0	0	0.00	0.00		
	-1~0	2	4	6	3.66	2.34		
	-2~-1	0	1	1	0.61	0.39		
	~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00		

Table E.1. (cont.)

(Observed counts)					(Expected counts) ^b		
State capacity		σ^a	M	m	Totals	M	m
Extractive/fiscal	<i>1122c_output</i> (number of amendments to the <i>Tax Collection Act</i> that contain significant changes to the goals of improving fiscal capacity)	2~	4	3	7	4.26	2.74
		1~2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
		0~1	5	0	5	3.05	1.95
		-1~0	36	22	58	35.33	22.67
		-2~-1	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Military	<i>143c</i> (cut to the annual defense budget in expenditure)	2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
		1~2	2	2	4	2.44	1.56
		0~1	2	0	2	1.22	0.78
		-1~0	7	5	12	7.31	4.69
		-2~-1	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
	<i>15c</i> (military expenditure as a share of GDP)	2~	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
		1~2	3	3	6	3.66	2.34
		0~1	3	1	4	2.44	1.56
		-1~0	3	4	7	4.26	2.74
		-2~-1	3	1	4	2.44	1.56
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
	<i>16c</i> (logged defense budget in expenditure per capita)	2~	0	1	1	0.61	0.39
		1~2	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		0~1	6	1	7	4.26	2.74
		-1~0	4	6	10	6.09	3.91
		-2~-1	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Coercive	<i>144c</i> (cut to the annual police budget in expenditure)	2~	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		1~2	1	0	1	0.61	0.39
		0~1	2	1	3	1.83	1.17
		-1~0	7	6	13	7.92	5.08
		-2~-1	1	0	1	0.61	0.39
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
	<i>17c</i> (logged police force spending per capita)	2~	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		1~2	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		0~1	1	1	2	1.22	0.78
		-1~0	8	6	14	8.53	5.47
		-2~-1	0	1	1	0.61	0.39
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Administrative/ bureaucratic	<i>ofout1</i> (number of Cabinet/Cabinet-level members left office)	2~	4	3	7	4.26	2.74
		1~2	3	1	4	2.44	1.56
		0~1	10	3	13	7.92	5.08
		-1~0	28	18	46	28.02	17.98
		-2~-1	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
		~-2	0	0	0	0.00	0.00
Totals			279	179	458	279	179

H0: M/m is not associated with state capacity, and

H1: M/m is associated with state capacity.

a. 2~ = greater than 2σ .

1~2 = greater than 1σ and less than or equal to 2σ .

0~1 = greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1σ .

-1~0 = greater than or equal to -1σ and less than 0.

$-2 \sim -1 =$ greater than or equal to -2σ and less than -1σ .

$\sim -2 =$ less than -2σ .

(Remove gray-shaded rows, i.e., no observations, before computation.)

- b. The expected count (or value) for each cell = (row total*column total)/n.

Where

n = the total number of observations (“Totals”).

(Round off to the second decimal place.)

Table E.2. Bills of Law Passed by Session

Session	Regime	Period (month/date/year)	Number of bills of law introduced & proposed	Number of bills of law passed	(Accumulated) number of bills of law introduced & proposed ^a	Percentage of bills of law passed	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet ^b	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet passed ^c	(Accumulated) number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Percentage of passed bills of law proposed by Cabinet
3rd-1	<i>KMT M</i>	2/1/ ~ 7/2/96	121	6	121	4.96%	39	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-2	<i>KMT M</i>	9/2/ ~ 12/31/96	271	28	386	7.25%	58	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-3	<i>KMT M</i>	2/18 ~ 5/31/97	180	91	538	16.91%	29	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	7/28 ~ 8/11/97	0	0	447	0.00%	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-4	<i>KMT M</i>	9/9/97 ~ 1/9/98	229	41	676	6.07%	75	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-5	<i>KMT M</i>	2/20 ~ 5/29/98	236	41	871	4.71%	49	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd-6	<i>KMT M</i>	9/11/98 ~ 1/15/99	191	62	1021	6.07%	55	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	2/1/ ~ 6/22/99	259	71	259	27.41%	62	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	9/17/99 ~ 1/16/00	530	102	718	14.21%	164	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-3 ^d	<i>KMT M</i>	2/18 ~ 5/19/00	214	46	830	5.54%	113	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	5/20 ~ 7/28/00	198	42	982	4.28%	20	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	9/15/00 ~ 1/4/01	371	76	1311	5.80%	120	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-4-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	1/30 ~ 1/31/01	0	0	1235	0.00%	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	2/20 ~ 6/6/01	501	42	1736	2.42%	247	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	6/26 ~ 6/27/01	0	6	1694	0.35%	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
4th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	9/20/01 ~ 1/18/02	198	172	1886	9.12%	94	N/A	N/A	N/A
5th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	2/1 ~ 6/21/02	965	176	965	18.24%	414	163	414	39.37%
5th-1-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	7/15 ~ 7/17/02	0	0	789	0.00%	0	0	251	0.00%
5th-2	<i>DPP m</i>	9/24/02 ~ 1/14/03	453	104	1242	8.37%	114	96	365	26.30%
5th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	2/25 ~ 6/6/03	395	76	1533	4.96%	80	55	349	15.76%
5th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	7/8 ~ 7/10/03	0	4	1457	0.27%	0	4	294	1.36%
5th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	9/5/03 ~ 1/13/04	407	61	1860	3.28%	93	50	383	13.05%
5th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	2/6 ~ 6/11/04	249	65	2048	3.17%	39	45	372	12.10%
5th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	8/11 ~ 8/24/04	5	6	1988	0.30%	0	2	327	0.61%
5th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	9/14/04 ~ 1/24/05	152	45	2134	2.11%	21	31	346	8.96%
6th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	2/25 ~ 5/31/05	567	41	567	7.23%	88	24	88	27.27%

6th-2	<i>DPP m</i>	9/13/05 ~ 1/13/06	545	64	1071	5.98%	101	36	165	21.82%
6th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	2/21 ~ 5/30/06	247	69	1254	5.50%	37	48	166	28.92%
6th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	6/13 ~ 6/30/06	1	2	1186	0.17%	0	0	118	0.00%
6th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	9/19/06 ~ 1/19/07	329	39	1513	2.58%	55	16	173	9.25%
6th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	2/27 ~ 6/15/07	267	105	1741	6.03%	39	46	196	23.47%
6th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	7/10 ~ 7/20/07	1	5	1637	0.31%	0	2	150	1.33%
6th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	9/7 ~ 12/21/07	282	83	1914	4.34%	68	35	216	16.20%
7th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	2/22 ~ 5/19/08	461	32	461	6.94%	118	12	118	10.17%
7th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	5/20 ~ 7/18/08	210	22	639	3.44%	18	8	124	6.45%
7th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	9/19/08 ~ 1/13/09	441	68	1058	6.43%	73	38	189	20.11%
7th-2-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	1/15 ~ 1/16/09	0	1	990	0.10%	0	0	151	0.00%
7th-3	<i>KMT M</i>	2/20 ~ 6/16/09	474	115	1463	7.86%	114	79	265	29.81%
7th-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	8/25 ~ 8/27/09	2	1	1350	0.07%	1	1	187	0.53%
7th-4	<i>KMT M</i>	9/18/09 ~ 1/12/10	408	85	1757	4.84%	69	52	255	20.39%
7th-4-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	1/18 ~ 1/19/10	0	1	1672	0.06%	0	1	203	0.49%
7th-5	<i>KMT M</i>	2/23 ~ 6/8/10	365	67	2036	3.29%	51	27	253	10.67%
7th-5-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	7/8 ~ 7/14/10	4	5	1973	0.25%	4	2	230	0.87%
7th-5-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	8/17 ~ 8/30/10	1	13	1969	0.66%	1	9	229	3.93%
7th-6	<i>KMT M</i>	9/24/10 ~ 1/12/11	421	73	2377	3.07%	58	31	278	11.15%
7th-7	<i>KMT M</i>	2/22 ~ 6/14/11	623	94	2927	3.21%	183	65	430	15.12%
7th-8	<i>KMT M</i>	9/16 ~ 12/14/11	243	94	3076	3.06%	46	63	411	15.33%
7th-8-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	1/19 ~ 1/20/12	0	25	2982	0.84%	0	24	348	6.90%
8th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	2/24 ~ 6/15/12	1014	11	1014	1.08%	181	4	181	2.21%
8th-1-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	7/24 ~ 7/27/12	0	9	1003	0.90%	0	3	177	1.69%
8th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	9/18/12 ~ 1/15/13	910	69	1904	3.62%	71	26	245	10.61%
8th-3	<i>KMT M</i>	2/26 ~ 5/31/13	656	54	2491	2.17%	71	27	290	9.31%
8th-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	6/13 ~ 6/27/13	0	10	2437	0.41%	0	9	263	3.42%
8th-3-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	7/30 ~ 8/9/13	6	10	2433	0.41%	0	8	254	3.15%
8th-4	<i>KMT M</i>	9/17/13 ~ 1/14/14	868	123	3291	3.74%	69	63	315	20.00%
8th-4-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	1/27 ~ 1/28/14	0	1	3168	0.03%	0	1	252	0.40%
8th-5	<i>KMT M</i>	2/21 ~ 5/30/14	625	75	3792	1.98%	68	33	319	10.34%
8th-5-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	6/13 ~ 7/4/14	0	2	3717	0.05%	0	2	286	0.70%
8th-5-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	7/28 ~ 8/8/14	3	3	3718	0.08%	0	1	284	0.35%
8th-6	<i>KMT M</i>	9/12/14 ~ 1/23/15	619	90	4334	2.08%	70	44	353	12.46%
8th-7	<i>KMT M</i>	2/24 ~ 6/16/15	476	115	4720	2.44%	25	65	334	19.46%
8th-8	<i>KMT M</i>	9/15 ~ 12/31/15	282	88	4887	1.80%	37	55	306	17.97%
9th-1	<i>KMT m</i>	2/19 ~ 5/19/16	1065	43	1065	4.04%	186	24	186	12.90%
9th-1	<i>DPP M</i>	5/20 ~ 7/15/16	342	18	1364	1.32%	11	10	173	5.78%
9th-1-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	7/20 ~ 7/29/16	0	1	1346	0.07%	0	0	163	0.00%

Table E.2. (cont.)

Session	Regime	Period (month/date/year)	Number of bills of law introduced & proposed	Number of bills of law passed	(Accumulated) number of bills of law introduced & proposed ^a	Percentage of bills of law passed	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet ^b	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet passed ^c	(Accumulated) number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Percentage of passed bills of law proposed by Cabinet
9th-2	<i>DPP M</i>	9/13 ~ 12/30/16	768	93	2113	4.40%	98	41	261	15.71%
9th-2-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	1/05 ~ 1/19/17	0	2	2020	0.10%	0	2	220	0.91%
9th-3	<i>DPP M</i>	2/17 ~ 5/31/17	797	55	2815	1.95%	44	35	262	13.36%
9th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	6/14 ~ 7/5/17	0	4	2760	0.14%	0	3	227	1.32%
9th-3-ES 2	<i>DPP M</i>	7/13 ~ 7/21/17	1	0	2757	0.00%	0	0	224	0.00%
9th-3-ES 3	<i>DPP M</i>	8/18 ~ 8/31/17	0	1	2757	0.04%	0	1	224	0.45%
9th-4	<i>DPP M</i>	9/22 ~ 12/29/17	726	61	3482	1.75%	63	35	286	12.24%
9th-4-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	1/5 ~ 1/30/18	0	4	3421	0.12%	0	4	251	1.59%

Note: Data from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: <https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstac/lgstac>

- a. The (accumulated) total is reduced by the number of bills passed, and goes to zero with a new LY seated. See more details in footnote 24, Chapter 3 and Yang's (2003) equation of the "relative number of laws supplied and demanded" in Chapter 2, pp. 40-41.
- b. The statistics provided in this column include the number of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet and that jointly proposed by the Cabinet and one or more other non-Legislative branches.
- c. The data on the number of bills of law proposed by the Cabinet passed in the LY became assessable on the Legislative Statistics Service, beginning with the 5th LY sworn in 2012.
- d. The 3rd session of the 4th LY, the 1st session of the 7th LY, and the 1st session of the 9th LY are each divided into two rows, namely, "*KMT M/4th-3* and *DPP m/4th-3*," "*DPP m/7th-1* and *KMT M/7th-1*," and "*KMT m/9th-1* and *DPP M/9th-1*" to indicate three transfers of power in Taiwan.

Table E.3. Bills of Law Introduced/proposed by Institution & Session

Session	Regime	Number of bills of law introduced & proposed	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Percentage of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Number of bills of law proposed by lawmakers & party caucuses	Percentage of bills proposed by lawmakers & party caucuses
3rd-1	<i>KMT M</i>	121	39	32.23%	82	67.77%
3rd-2	<i>KMT M</i>	271	58	21.40%	213	78.60%
3rd-3	<i>KMT M</i>	180	29	16.11%	151	83.89%
3rd-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
3rd-4	<i>KMT M</i>	229	75	32.75%	154	67.25%
3rd-5	<i>KMT M</i>	236	49	20.76%	187	79.24%
3rd-6	<i>KMT M</i>	191	55	28.80%	136	71.20%
4th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	259	62	23.94%	197	76.06%
4th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	530	164	30.94%	366	69.06%
4th-3 °	<i>KMT M</i>	214	113	52.80%	101	47.20%
4th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	198	20	10.10%	178	89.90%
4th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	371	120	32.35%	251	67.65%
4th-4-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
4th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	501	247	49.30%	254	50.70%
4th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
4th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	198	94	47.47%	104	52.53%
5th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	965	414	42.90%	551	57.10%
5th-1-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
5th-2	<i>DPP m</i>	453	114	25.17%	339	74.83%
5th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	395	80	20.25%	315	79.75%
5th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
5th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	407	93	22.85%	314	77.15%
5th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	249	39	15.66%	210	84.34%
5th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	5	0	0.00%	5	100.00%
5th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	152	21	13.82%	131	86.18%
6th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	567	88	15.52%	479	84.48%
6th-2	<i>DPP m</i>	545	101	18.53%	444	81.47%
6th-3	<i>DPP m</i>	247	37	14.98%	210	85.02%
6th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	1	0	0.00%	1	100.00%
6th-4	<i>DPP m</i>	329	55	16.72%	274	83.28%
6th-5	<i>DPP m</i>	267	39	14.61%	228	85.39%
6th-5-ES 1	<i>DPP m</i>	1	0	0.00%	1	100.00%
6th-6	<i>DPP m</i>	282	68	24.11%	214	75.89%
7th-1	<i>DPP m</i>	461	118	25.60%	343	74.40%
7th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	210	18	8.57%	192	91.43%
7th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	441	73	16.55%	368	83.45%
7th-2-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
7th-3	<i>KMT M</i>	474	114	24.05%	360	75.95%
7th-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	2	1	50.00%	1	50.00%
7th-4	<i>KMT M</i>	408	69	16.91%	339	83.09%
7th-4-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
7th-5	<i>KMT M</i>	365	51	13.97%	314	86.03%
7th-5-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	4	4	100.00%	0	0.00%
7th-5-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	1	1	100.00%	0	0.00%
7th-6	<i>KMT M</i>	421	58	13.78%	363	86.22%
7th-7	<i>KMT M</i>	623	183	29.37%	440	70.63%
7th-8	<i>KMT M</i>	243	46	18.93%	197	81.07%
7th-8-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A

Table E.3. (cont.)

Session	Regime	Number of bills of law introduced & proposed	Number of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Percentage of bills of law proposed by Cabinet	Number of bills of law proposed by lawmakers & party caucuses	Percentage of bills proposed by lawmakers & party caucuses
8th-1	<i>KMT M</i>	1014	181	17.85%	833	82.15%
8th-1-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
8th-2	<i>KMT M</i>	910	71	7.80%	839	92.20%
8th-3	<i>KMT M</i>	656	71	10.82%	585	89.18%
8th-3-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
8th-3-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	6	0	0.00%	6	100.00%
8th-4	<i>KMT M</i>	868	69	7.95%	799	92.05%
8th-4-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
8th-5	<i>KMT M</i>	625	68	10.88%	557	89.12%
8th-5-ES 1	<i>KMT M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
8th-5-ES 2	<i>KMT M</i>	3	0	0.00%	3	100.00%
8th-6	<i>KMT M</i>	619	70	11.31%	549	88.69%
8th-7	<i>KMT M</i>	476	25	5.25%	451	94.75%
8th-8	<i>KMT M</i>	282	37	13.12%	245	86.88%
9th-1	<i>KMT m</i>	1065	186	17.46%	879	82.54%
9th-1	<i>DPP M</i>	342	11	3.22%	331	96.78%
9th-1-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
9th-2	<i>DPP M</i>	768	98	12.76%	670	87.24%
9th-2-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
9th-3	<i>DPP M</i>	797	44	5.52%	753	94.48%
9th-3-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
9th-3-ES 2	<i>DPP M</i>	1	0	0.00%	1	100.00%
9th-3-ES 3	<i>DPP M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A
9th-4	<i>DPP M</i>	726	63	8.68%	663	91.32%
9th-4-ES 1	<i>DPP M</i>	0	0	N/A	0	N/A

Table E.4. Annual Central Government General Budget Review by Fiscal Year

Unit: New Taiwan (NT) dollar (thousands)^a

Fiscal year	Regime	Period ^b (month/date/year)	Submitted annual revenue for approval	Passed annual revenue	Percentage of budget cut/increase (revenue) ^c	Submitted annual expenditure for approval	Passed annual expenditure	Percentage of budget cut (expenditure)
1998	<i>KMT M</i>	3/10 ~ 5/30/97	\$1,243,464,656	\$1,225,264,656	1.46%	\$1,243,464,656	\$1,225,264,656	1.46%
1999	<i>KMT M</i>	3/10 ~ 5/29/98	\$1,271,440,211	\$1,253,440,211	1.42%	\$1,271,440,211	\$1,253,440,211	1.42%
2H 1999 & 2000	<i>KMT M</i>	2/25 ~ 5/28/99	\$1,942,575,877	\$1,985,645,323	(2.22%)	\$2,255,769,216	\$2,234,769,216	0.93%
2001	<i>DPP m</i>	10/21/00 ~ 1/4/01 (8/31 ~ w/d 10/7/00) ^d	\$1,458,476,645	\$1,384,008,953	5.11%	\$1,608,147,394	\$1,575,479,832	2.03%
2002	<i>DPP m</i>	8/28/01 ~ 1/18/02	\$1,340,726,906	\$1,262,283,121	5.85%	\$1,599,289,471	\$1,518,724,533	5.04%
2003	<i>DPP m</i>	8/29/02 ~ 1/10/03	\$1,334,245,980	\$1,322,477,817	0.88%	\$1,572,367,870	\$1,550,254,213	1.41%
2004	<i>DPP m</i>	8/28/03 ~ 1/13/04	\$1,353,933,410	\$1,344,853,316	0.67%	\$1,611,281,276	\$1,591,569,910	1.22%
2005	<i>DPP m</i>	8/30/04 ~ 1/21/05	\$1,402,718,320	\$1,333,619,362	4.93%	\$1,635,615,000	\$1,608,326,140	1.67%
2006	<i>DPP m</i>	8/30/05 ~ 1/12/06	\$1,403,822,810	\$1,384,582,416	1.37%	\$1,599,560,424	\$1,571,685,071	1.74%
2007	<i>DPP m</i>	8/30/06 ~ 6/15/07	\$1,511,713,010	\$1,488,689,851	1.52%	\$1,663,807,421	\$1,628,351,207	2.13%
2008	<i>DPP m</i>	8/30 ~ 12/20/07	\$1,601,616,717	\$1,594,436,316	0.45%	\$1,699,478,897	\$1,685,856,453	0.80%
2009	<i>KMT M</i>	8/28/08 ~ 1/15/09	\$1,705,207,932	\$1,673,231,316	1.88%	\$1,829,988,997	\$1,809,667,004	1.11%
2010	<i>KMT M</i>	9/24/09 ~ 1/12/10 (8/31 ~ w/d 9/17/09)	\$1,552,032,459	\$1,547,986,445	0.26%	\$1,734,950,382	\$1,714,937,403	1.15%
2011	<i>KMT M</i>	8/31/10 ~ 1/12/11	\$1,630,611,392	\$1,627,246,853	0.21%	\$1,789,622,210	\$1,769,844,184	1.11%
2012	<i>KMT M</i>	8/31 ~ 12/13/11	\$1,729,474,748	\$1,729,431,644	0.00%	\$1,938,974,923	\$1,938,637,325	0.02%
2013	<i>KMT M</i>	8/31/12 ~ 1/15/13	\$1,730,195,815	\$1,733,259,058	0.18%	\$1,944,608,461	\$1,907,567,387	1.90%
2014	<i>KMT M</i>	8/30/13 ~ 1/14/14	\$1,730,800,121	\$1,707,156,731	1.37%	\$1,940,732,242	\$1,916,227,714	1.26%
2015	<i>KMT M</i>	8/29/14 ~ 1/23/15	\$1,799,267,683	\$1,776,702,733	1.25%	\$1,959,658,165	\$1,934,636,035	1.28%
2016	<i>KMT M</i>	8/31 ~ 12/18/15	\$1,844,624,363	\$1,822,377,773	1.21%	\$1,998,192,346	\$1,975,866,301	1.12%
2017	<i>DPP M</i>	8/31/16 ~ 1/19/17	\$1,845,655,556	\$1,841,099,445	0.25%	\$1,997,995,520	\$1,973,995,947	1.20%
2018	<i>DPP M</i>	9/14/17 ~ 1/30/18 (8/31 ~ w/d 9/8/17)	\$1,897,404,169	\$1,919,175,004	(1.15%)	\$1,991,773,071	\$1,966,862,309	1.25%

Note: Data for the general budget (bill) from the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw> and for the period from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: <https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstac/lgstat>

- a. NT\$1,000 = US\$29.635 (the foreign exchange rate [buying rate] adopted as of May 21, 2018).
- b. The period begins when the Cabinet submits a general budget bill for the next fiscal year to the LY for approval. The period ends when the LY passes the general budget bill and then sends the general budget to the President for promulgation. The process of the LY's budget deliberation is normally concluded within a legislative session (or perhaps in one of its following extraordinary sessions), except that of nine and half months for FY 2007.
- c. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of budget increases in revenue.
- d. The budget bills for FYs 2001, 2010, and 2018 were each withdrawn owing to a Cabinet reshuffle and then re-submitted by a new Premier. The dates of first submission and subsequent withdrawal are given in parentheses.

Table E.5. Central Government Supplementary Budget Review by Fiscal Year

Unit: New Taiwan (NT) dollar (thousands)^a

Fiscal year	Regime	Period ^b (month/date/year)	Submitted supplementary revenue for approval	Passed supplementary revenue	Percentage of budget cut/increase (revenue) ^c	Submitted supplementary expenditure for approval	Passed supplementary expenditure	Percentage of budget cut (expenditure)
1999	<i>KMT M</i>	9/22 ~ 10/22/98	\$67,112,062	\$63,757,062	5.00%	\$67,112,062	\$63,757,062	5.00%
2H 1999 & 2000	<i>KMT M</i>	8/31 ~ 12/12/00	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$80,000,000	\$80,000,000	0%
2001	<i>DPP m</i>	3/23 ~ 6/5/01	\$10,634,538	\$10,634,538	0%	\$80,029,176	\$61,599,291	23.03%
2002	<i>DPP m</i>	8/29 ~ 12/17/02	\$37,880,556	\$37,880,556	0%	\$72,045,939	\$72,013,939	0.04%
2003 (1st)	<i>DPP m</i>	2/19 ~ 6/5/03	24,670,000	\$35,370,000	(43.37%)	\$69,931,904	\$77,715,936	(11.13%)
2003 (2nd)	<i>DPP m</i>	8/28 ~ 12/23/03	\$3,790,000	\$3,790,000	0%	\$28,790,000	\$28,790,000	0%
2004	<i>DPP m</i>	8/4 ~ 8/19/04	\$4,600,000	\$4,600,000	0%	\$5,700,000	\$5,700,000	0%
2008	<i>DPP m</i>	5/30 ~ 7/17/08	\$25,860,973	\$25,860,973	0%	\$25,860,973	\$25,860,973	0%
2011	<i>KMT M</i>	2011/4/29- 2011/6/10	\$18,571,736	\$18,567,747	0.02%	\$18,571,736	\$18,567,747	0.02%

Note: Data for the supplementary budget (bill) from the website of the DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC: <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw> and for the period from the website of the Legislative Statistics, (ROC) Parliamentary Library: <https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgstatc/lgstat>

- a. NT\$1,000 = US\$29.635 (the foreign exchange rate [buying rate] adopted as of May 21, 2018).
- b. The period begins when the Cabinet submits a supplementary budget bill for the current fiscal year to the LY for approval. The period ends when the LY passes the supplementary budget bill and then sends the supplementary budget to the President for promulgation.
- c. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of budget increases in revenue or expenditure.

Appendix F

Regression diagnostics

The results of Spearman's rank correlation (performed in model building in Chapter 3, on pp. 93-94) and VIF tests (performed on my parsimonious models consisting of the selected 9 IVs) showed that the absolute value of the correlation coefficients (ρ) between pairs of the selected IVs ranged from weak to moderate correlation ($0.0065 < \rho < 0.48923$) and the VIF for each selected IV was low, ranging from 1.310981 to 1.568640, and within the acceptable range of less than 5, regardless of the VIF of either control variable, i.e., KMT/DPP rule or M/m status, (which must be kept within the models for completeness) being high—7.446726 for the party factor and 8.744844 for the institutional factor. All the three models were therefore regarded as having no multicollinearity problem (CLRM Assumption 3).

The diagnostic plots of the residuals (Figures A1-3) did not reveal any serious problems with the other four CLRM assumptions. The diagnostics are as follows:

1. In each of the three models, both the residual plot (Residual vs. Fitted values) and the standardized residual plot (Scale-Location) showed that the residuals seemed not correlated cross observations, i.e., no autocorrelation. Likewise, the results of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (non-constant variance of residuals) revealed that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected at the 0.05 level in any of the models (p -value = 0.9541 in Model 1; p -value = 0.9996 in Model 2; p -value = 0.9599 in Model 3). The results satisfied the assumption of independence among residuals (CLRM Assumption 4).
2. In the Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot for each model, with the respective three large outliers being disregarded, the residuals of each of my models were generally close to normal distribution (although those of Model 3 appeared relatively less consistent), which satisfied the assumption of normally distributed error terms (CLRM Assumption 5).¹

When error terms of my models had constant variance and were normally distributed, the models also satisfied strict exogeneity (CLRM Assumption 2).

¹ In Model 1, the three large outliers were the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), the 3rd session of 6th LY and its extraordinary session, and the 2nd session of 8th LY in Model 1; for Model 2, the 4th session of 3rd LY, the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), and the 4th session of 9th LY and its extraordinary session; and for Model 3, the 3rd session of 4th LY (under DPP m), the 3rd session of 8th LY and its two extraordinary sessions, and the 4th session of 9th LY and its extraordinary session.

Since large outliers are not necessarily leverage points which have greatest influence on a regression model, I employed Cook's distance to identify influential cases. In Model 1, the 6th session of 3rd LY, the 5th session of 5th LY and its extraordinary session, and the 6th session of 4th LY were the leverage points; for Model 2, the 4th session of 3rd LY, the 1st session of 4th LY, and the 6th session of 6th LY were the leverage points; and for Model 3, the 6th session of 4th LY, the 2nd session of 6th LY, and the 2nd session of 8th LY. Accordingly, only (KMT m during) the 4th session of 3rd LY, a large outlier in Model 2, was identified as a leverage point in the same model, perhaps because of its good record of generating higher military/coercive capacity in terms of the (logged) defense budget in expenditure per capita (placed 17th of 44 after imputation) and the (logged) police force spending per capita (placed 5th of 44 after imputation).




Figure A1. Diagnostic plots for Model 1.




Figure A2. Diagnostic plots for Model 2.




Figure A3. Diagnostic plots for Model 3.