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Red Light or Green? Did Preference Signals Open Doors for EM applicants in the Match?

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Figure 1A-C. Consensus rankings compared to individual rankings and predicted rankings.




Table 1. Ranking agreement.

	Current Study 2022-2023 SLOE Format			Previous Study 2021-2022 SLOE Format			Difference		
	Consensus: Faculty Ratings	Prediction: Point System	Prediction: Regression	Consensus: Faculty Ratings	Prediction: Point System	Prediction: Regression	Consensus: Faculty Ratings	Prediction: Point System	Prediction: Regression
Exact	22%	24%	32%	21%	12%	20%	1%	12%	12%
Tight	84%	64%	72%	67%	62%	64%	17%	2%	8%
Close	92%	88%	84%	83%	82%	92%	9%	6%	-8%
Loose	97%	92%	92%	93%	90%	96%	4%	2%	-4%
Correlation with consensus	N/A	.97	.97	N/A	.97	.98	N/A	0	-.01

Exact: Percent of rankings where individual/predicted rank is exactly the same as the consensus rank
Tight: Percent of rankings where individual/predicted rank is within ± 4% of consensus rank
Close: Percent of rankings where individual/predicted rank is within ± 8% of consensus rank
Loose: Percent of rankings where individual/predicted rank is within ± 12% of consensus rank

3 Red Light or Green? Did Preference Signals Open Doors for EM applicants in the Match?

Kestrel Reopelle, Erin Hoag, Jonathan Karademos, Peter Tomaselli, Carlos Rodriguez, Dimitri Papanagnou, Jeremiah Ojha

Background: Preference signaling was new in the 2022-23 EM match. While preliminary data has been reported by ERAS, it only includes data extracted from applications. To our knowledge, the literature has not included data collected after the match to examine outcomes related to signaling.

Objective: We hypothesized that all applicants would be more likely to receive interviews at signaled programs (versus non-signaled programs), while competitive applicants would be most likely to match at a signaled program.

Methods: We performed a retrospective cross-sectional study utilizing a convenience sample of applicants who applied to two urban EM residency programs. Applicants were asked to complete a voluntary survey following the 2023 match results.

Results: 427 applicants completed the survey. On average, applicants reported 66.7%(SD 30.9%) of signals resulted in interview invites, compared to 49%(SD 47.3%) for non-signaled programs – a difference of 17.1%(95% CI: 12.1%, 22.1%, $p < 0.0001$). Respondents ranking themselves in the top third of applicants (by perceived competitiveness) received interviews from an average of 79.1%(SD 24.8%) of

signaled programs, compared to 59.9%(SD 31.1%) for the middle third and 41.2%(SD 30.4%) for the lower third (table 1)– a significant difference ($F = 37.5, p < 0.0001$). 30.3% of the top third group, 41.1% of the middle, and 17.6% of the lower matched a signaled program (table 2)– indicating a relationship between perceived competitiveness and matching a signaled program ($X^2 = 8.57, p = 0.014$).

Conclusions: Applicants were more likely to receive interviews from signaled programs and perceived competitiveness correlated with interview rates (suggesting some validity in applicant ability to self-assign competitiveness). Applicants who identified as middle third were most likely to match a signaled program. Limitations include retrospective data collection, self-reported data, and the 2023 match climate (i.e., fewer applicants than prior years).

Table 1. Applicant self-assignment by perceived strength of application and percentage of signals sent that resulted in interview invitations.

		Frequency (N = 427)	Percent (100%)	
Perceived competitiveness of applicant:	Top 1/3 of applicants	186	43.6%	
	Middle 1/3 of applicants	189	44.3%	
	Lower 1/3 of applicants	45	10.5%	
	Missing	7	1.6%	
		N	Mean	SD
Percent of signaled programs that turned into interviews for applicants:	Top 1/3 of applicants	178	79.1%	24.8%
	Middle 1/3 of applicants	179	59.9%	31.1%
	Lower 1/3 of applicants	38	41.2%	30.4%

Table 2. Percentage of applicants that matched at a signaled program, categorized by self-reported perceived competitiveness.

Matched with signaled program	Self-reported competitiveness			Total
	Lower 1/3 of applicants	Middle 1/3 of applicants	Top 1/3 of applicants	
Yes	6 (17.6%)	65 (41.1%)	47 (30.3%)	118 (34%)
No	28 (82.4%)	93 (58.9%)	108 (69.7%)	229 (66%)
Total	34 (100%)	158 (100%)	155 (100%)	347 (100%)

4 The Effect of Hospital Boarding on Emergency Medicine Resident Productivity

Peter Moffett, Laura Barrera, Grace Hickam, Scott Huange, Hannah Kissel-Smith, Nathan Lewis, Stephen Miller, Joel Moll, Al Best

Background: Emergency department boarding has escalated to a crisis; impacting patient care, hospital finances, physician burnout, and contributing to error. No prior study has studied the effects of boarding on resident productivity. If boarding reduces productivity, it may have negative educational impacts.

Objectives: We investigate the effect of boarding on resident productivity as measured by patients per hour and hypothesize that increased boarding leads to decreased productivity.