Title

Civil Passions: Cultural Challenges of Public Spheres amidst National Identity Controversies in Hong Kong and Taiwan

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<u>Introduction</u>

As a political system, democracy generally derives its legitimacy through the claim of broad popular participation. Many social scientists who study democratic change have focused their works on analyzing how socio-economic factors facilitate or erode the institutional bases for public involvement in politics. But democracy is also recognized to be a culture. Recently, scholars of civil society and the public sphere have complicated this work by rethinking the cultural dimension of democracy, examining the concrete cultural processes and mechanisms through which democratic debate actually takes place. In effect, this endeavor serves to problematize the category of "the public" itself. Largely inspired by Habermas's influential *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* ([1962] 1989), these works challenge any assumption of "the public" as a natural category waiting to be released in political expression; instead, they establish an important premise that a public has to constitute its own identity as both the subject and the object of democratic representation. More specifically, members of "the public" have to negotiate and debate over exactly who is or isn't part of this public (e.g., "Should illegal immigrants be considered part of our public sphere?") as part of the process of deliberating what the public thinks (e.g., "Should we provide healthcare for illegal immigrants and why?"). This articulation of identity entails the process of delineating a symbolic, collective community, a sense of "we-ness" as Alexander describes it (1988; 1998). At the same time, as a *democratic* public, this sense of we-ness must also capture its internal divisions and debates. The identity of the public sphere always has to sustain a sense of integration as well as a deep engagement with internal differences. Our paper joins larger theoretical discussions on how to conceptualize various mechanisms for

reconciling integration and differences within public spheres. Specifically, through studying political cartoons published during two major election campaigns in the 1990s in Hong Kong and Taiwan, we address the under-studied question of how nascent civil societies deal with this tension in the context of contested national identities.

This tension between integration and differences, even in places where national identity is firmly established, has posed significant obstacles to Habermas's formulation of a unitary public sphere and, subsequently, stimulated competing approaches re-conceptualizing the relationship between the two. Habermas's own notion of the ideal speech community is itself a conscious attempt to address this tension. In his view, all people, across cultural, racial, and gender lines, hold the capacity for rational-critical thinking. As long as democratic rules and procedures protect every citizen's right to speak up and make her case, participants in the public sphere have the capacity to rationally evaluate the argument in terms of its merits rather than the status of the speaker. As Rabinovitch puts it, Habermas argues that "the foundations of this public sphere remain universal because they are communicative. Any individual or group may argue for continued incorporation into the decision-making process simply by demonstrating their ability to reason and to express their point of view" (2001: 347). Habermas describes this potential for inclusiveness as the self-transforming quality of the bourgeois public sphere. For him, only communicative action can achieve social integration necessary for a democratic public sphere without suppressing social and cultural differences.

Subsequent works that critically engage Habermas's thesis are often suspicious of his faith in communicative action. Historical studies show that different social groups

appeared to be more likely to form separate publics than to join the dominant public (Eley 1992, Ryan 1992). This historical process in turn cultivates distinct cultural contexts and symbolic systems in which actual rational-critical discourses are embedded. Nancy Fraser argues that the recognition of the cultural embeddedness of public discourses is part and parcel of true, or in her words radical, democracy. Fraser proposes to "call these *subaltern counter publics* in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (Fraser 1992: 123, emphasis in the original). The relationship between these "subaltern counterpublics" and the dominant public is posited to be hierarchical and conflictual; their cultural difference remains largely irreconcilable through communicative action. As a normative vision, Fraser advocates for the expansion of the terrains of these counterpublics against the domination of the bourgeois public sphere.

In contrast, Jeffrey Alexander insists on the possibility of social integration in stratified societies. He takes up the challenge of explaining "exactly that which both Habermas and Fraser omitted: how it is that people successfully argue that they are in fact members of the symbolic community of 'common humanity' without losing sight of their distinct cultural identities" (Rabinovitch 2001: 351). To conceptualize this possibility, Alexander shifts the basis of integration from Habermas's universal rationality to a notion of fundamental discursive binaries. Reminiscent of Durkheim's argument about the elementary forms of religion, Alexander argues that the binary normative code of sacred and profane provides the fundamental cultural language for discourses on democratic ideals. The public resorts to characteristics associated with the

sacred and the profane in their shared cultural repertoire to make sense of social events and construct narratives about them. Rather than seeing marginal groups as enjoying a fair hearing in universal, critical-rational discourses or operating with completely different cultural systems of their own, Alexander (2003; 1992) contends that they are coded with stigmatized categories within a shared system of meaning. In contrast to Fraser's sharp divide between dominant public and subaltern counterpublics, Alexander's ideal of multi-culturalism is envisioned as a society where marginal groups have the freedom and resources to argue in front of the general public that their stigmatized qualities are in fact a different manifestation of characteristics on the sacred side of the binary.

Other scholars have discussed extensively the strengths and weaknesses of these two competing approaches to addressing the tension between social integration and cultural differences (Rabinovitch 2001; see also Calhoun 1992); our goal in this article is not to join the same debate but to extend it. The public sphere scholarship described above, while proceeding from different theoretical foundations, shares an explicit acknowledgement that their normative visions are all unrealized ideals. Less explicitly acknowledged in these normative ideals, however, is the assumption of the existence of a relatively stable national identity. For example, Fraser situates her argument in the context of late capitalist, existing democracy, thus her celebration of differences leaves unchallenged the boundaries of existing nation-states. Similarly, Alexander implies that the actual characteristics associated with the sacred and the profane are specific to each country, so his insistence on universalism would also stop at national borders. We have seen that even within the context of well-established national identity, resolving how

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publics deal with the tension between social integration and cultural difference has proven difficult. How much more difficult might the resolution be if we remove the assumption of national integration? Broadening our perspective beyond the contexts of Western late-capitalist societies, we must ask: what additional challenges will there be for post-colonial nations to take on the task of establishing a civil society that can sufficiently address internal differences without disintegrating?

Recent studies have illustrated how post-colonial new nations that aspire to democratic forms of rule have little choice but to confront the dual mission of nation-building and institutionalization of civil society. Unfortunately, few, if any, attempts at this challenging dual mission have achieved the desired outcome of stable, multi-cultural civil society; far more have resulted in either outbreaks of civil war or regression into authoritarian rule (Ihonvbere 1997, Moore 2001, Magnusson and Clark 2005). "Faced with the challenge of either anti-colonial movement or post-colonial government diverse populations could follow, sometimes in combination, various paths: to separate along the lines of their difference, to repress their differences, or to constitute their unity through discourse across the lines of their differences" (Calhoun 1995: 268-269). While the "third option" is no doubt the most desirable, its realization is also the most difficult. "One of the crucial questions of the modern era," then, is precisely "*how often and under what circumstances the third option -- meaningful, politically efficacious public discourse without fragmentation or repression – can be achieved*"(ibid; emphasis ours). We need to ask how we can analytically account for the cases that have achieved at least limited success with the third option. Our paper takes up this question by studying aspects of the public spheres in the young democracies in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Like other cases burdened with the dual mission, Hong Kong and Taiwan struggle with ill-defined national identities and fragile democratic institutions. Remarkably, both cases have thus far achieved sustained pluralistic public spheres. In addition to being existing (albeit imperfect) examples of Calhoun's "third option," these two civil societies form an interesting contrast as they are developing in the context of two opposite strategies toward the national question. In Hong Kong, as the turnover of 1997 approached, the British and Chinese governments circumvented procedures of self-determination among local residents in reaching consensus regarding the "one-nation, two systems" model. Faced with such maneuver, the Hong Kong public adopted the approach of defending the value of democracy while marginalizing debates about its national identity. In contrast, in Taiwan, since the abolition of martial law in 1987, the public sphere has been dominated by discussions of its polarized national identity (Taiwanese versus Chinese). Since that time, competing nationalist visions have been invoked to frame every national democratic election. In both places, the relationship between the state, formal practices of democracy, and visions of the public sphere are tense and often contentious. How has public discourse been able to express these tensions in a way that has not completely fragmented civil society? Conversely, how has public discourse been constrained by the national identity controversy, if at all? These complementary questions form the crux of our inquiry; to address them, we turn to a robust form of public political discourse – political cartoons.

Data

We selected printed political cartoons as our data because they are public and political by definition. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have important local memories of using cartoons as political commentary. In Hong Kong, the censure of newspapers printing controversial political cartoons in the 1960s was commonplace (see Wasserstrom and Wong). More recently, the government pressure applied to remove Larry Feign's *World of Lily Wong* demonstrates the continued ability of this form of discourse to powerfully bother the state (Feign 2005). In Taiwan, local artists put up similar efforts during the thirty-eight year (1949-1987) martial law. Po Yang's translation of a Popeye cartoon for a local newspaper was construed by the KMT government as an expression of his contemptuous attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and eventually used as part of the evidence to justify his nine year imprisonment. CoCo's published political cartoons in the late 1970s forced him to sojourn in the U.S. for several years. More recently, Vice President Annette Lu's complaint about being likened by local cartoonists to a "deserted concubine left in the harem of despair" continues to indicate the power of this genre to annoy state officials (*Taipei Times*, March 7, 2006, p. 3).

Like their Western counterparts, these cartoonists document a side of political culture that is commonplace and "everyday" in nature. As in many parts of the world, cartoonists in Hong Kong and Taiwan are generally not formally trained or certified as cartoonists. They often come from quite ordinary backgrounds and generally speak to broad audiences. More than political philosophy, systematic analysis, or intellectual arguments, political cartoons appeal to common sense "and thus enable the public to actively classify, organize, and interpret in meaningful ways what they see or experience about the world at a given moment" (Greenberg 2002). Thus they are thought to be

nearer the sentiments of the public than lawmakers (Davies 2001), opinion polls, or newspaper editorials (Duus 2001). Most importantly for our purposes, political cartoons in Hong Kong and Taiwan are often unabashedly partisan even as they address the general public. They both capture the major internal divisions in civil society and constitute a discursive strategy for communicating such divisions civilly, with a sense of humor. This makes political cartoons a particularly useful source for our inquiry about how public discourses engage with internal tensions while navigating away from complete social disintegration.

We drew on political cartoons printed in the two months prior to the 1995 Legislative Council (LegCo) election in Hong Kong and the 2000 Presidential election in Taiwan. Both are early democratic moments exhibiting meaningful, pluralistic public discourses. Taiwan had already emerged from martial law and was rapidly formulating new political parties, newspapers, and other civic groups. Hong Kong had won political freedoms from the British, including free expression, and was enjoying more and more public debate as the 1997 turnover to China approached.

Despite these gross parallels, the elections took place in the contexts of two contrasting processes of national consolidation. Many aspects of the election in Hong Kong was pre-determined by the "one country, two systems" model resulting from contention between Britain and China. By the time the election took place, the future direction of Hong Kong's national consolidation had already been clearly defined in terms of its return to China and therefore not up for democratic debate. The scope of the election was

similarly limited to 20 seats in the 60 seat LegCo.[1] In Taiwan, the election was preceded

by two decades of democratization movements that had long framed their goals in

nationalistic terms. As the first direct election, whose process was to determine the head

of the state,[2] candidates fiercely debated about the meanings and future directions of

Taiwan's national identity, especially in response to China's repeatedly declared

resolution to "reclaim" Taiwan. In this sense, it is more democratically mature than the

Hong Kong case and the election was certainly treated by political commentators in the

West (and in Hong Kong for that matter) as a more serious affair. In short, these two

elections make an important comparison. Both are cases of civil society formation during

times of national consolidation, but with contrasting approaches towards public debate

about the national identity controversy.

Our sample consists of 376 political cartoons from Hong Kong (n=144) and

Taiwan (n=232). As is widely acknowledged (and directly relevant to our inquiry), the

newspapers and weekly news magazines in Hong Kong and Taiwan often represent

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1 The U.S. State Department reports no fewer than 17 rounds of negotiation (Hong Kong Human Rights Practices, 1996) attempting to work out a mutually

acceptable election format. The final format combined 20 seats directly elected with 30 elected by "functional constituencies" and 10 appointed by an election

committee. At the time it was unclear how much power this body would wield

[2] The first direct election was in 1996. However, because of the complexity of the transition from one-

party rule to multi-party democracy, the results of the 1996 election were generally perceived to be pre-

determined. The 2000 election was considered by most voters to be the first real competition and thus

provoked greater public commentary on the electoral process.

sharply divided nationalistic stands, thus we included a variety of publications to capture a fairly complete range of nationalistic orientations in these two settings (see Table 1).[3]

[Table 1 here]

In Hong Kong, we selected every cartoon available in these sources for which a legible copy could be found. Despite the fact that Hong Kong is world leader in comic book production and innovation, locating political cartoons in news sources proved more difficult than in Taiwan. With the Taiwanese sources, we retained all cartoons available from all newspapers and news weeklies listed above with the exception of Liberty Times. For Liberty Times, which is rich in political cartoons, we selected a sample of cartoons. We selected at least one cartoon from each day and favored cartoonists we had not seen before or had few cases for other cartoonists whose work was already well represented.

Our sample of 376 cartoons comes from a wide variety of cartoonists – eight from Hong Kong and sixteen (including one unreadable signature) from Taiwan. In both settings, the bulk of cartoons in our sample were produced by a smaller number of cartoonists. As Table 2 reveals, in Hong Kong, Zun Zi produced exactly half our sample while in Taiwan, Co Co produced nearly 45%.

[Table 2 here]

Because our sample is unevenly distributed in terms of cartoonists, we confirmed our findings by weighting the data to lessen the influence of prolific artists. We weighted

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[3] We conceptualize political cartoons as those which appear on the pages where serious news or editorials appear (as opposed to sports news, cooking recipes, and so forth). Our conceptualization forces us to struggle with a variety of cartoons which, to our non-resident eyes, may not register as political. In our selection of publications, we did not draw on the *manhua* in Hong Kong. These are book length comics that cover a variety of topics including contemporary politics. They are undoubtedly a rich source of data on the public but because they have no equivalent in Taiwan, we restricted our sample.

cases in two ways – by the inverse of the number of cartoons produced by a single cartoonist, and by the square root of the same figure. We ran all analyses with both unweighted and weighted data using both weights. Weighting did not affect the results with a few exceptions. These are elaborated in the discussion of findings.

Based on the nationalistic stand of the newspaper or magazine that they came from, the cartoons were coded for their nationalistic position. In Hong Kong, prior to the 1990s newspapers and news magazines could roughly be typed into pro-Taiwan and pro-Beijing camps (Ku 2001), but this dichotomy broke down in the 1990s. By the time period we cover, there was still a set of newspapers and news magazines critical of Beijing (represented here by Apple Daily and One), a second set that was somewhat supportive of Beijing and often critical of both Taiwan and the present Hong Kong government (represented here by Ming Daily), and a third category that was more scattered politically and often described as apolitical (represented here by East and South China Morning Post). In Taiwan, the issue of independence divided most papers and news magazines. Our pro-independence papers and magazines (Liberty Times and New Taiwan) and anti-independence ones (China Times, Scoop, and United Daily) were joined by a third category of papers and magazines that largely avoided this singular issue (represented here by the Journalist). The categories we used for this coding schema obviously cannot address any nuanced understandings of the content of competing nationalisms in these two settings. Rather, they are meant to capture major nationalistic positions along which serious social divisions have formed locally.

In addition to nationalistic position, we coded each cartoon for its theme, the relationship of that theme to the election, and the relationship of that theme to the public as manifest in the cartoon.

We coded theme into fourteen codes later simplified into four broad categories.

- Government malfeasance: Jokes about government conspiracies, graft involving the government or political parties, the powerlessness of legal measures or government agencies, and the government's predilection toward self-aggrandizing displays or its lack of ability to reform.

- Political work: Cartoons focused on the work of political campaigns. Jokes tend to be about the nature of political competition and contentions between policies, politicians' concerns about or responsibility for public welfare (including, obviously, hypocritical displays), and in-fighting within political parties.

- China and other world powers: Jokes about a number of world powers; China dominates. Jokes focus on the difficulty of articulating or defining a state-to-state relationship with China, China as a military threat or general threat to sovereignty, the Taiwan-China-US relationship or Hong Kong-China-UK relationship, or cartoons focused on foreign events.

- Everyday life: Jokes about the lives of ordinary citizens including the political participation of the public, the overpoliticization (or under politicization) of everyday behaviors, and the volatile economy.

We coded the relationship of the theme to the election into fourteen codes later simplified into five broad categories.

- Theme not related to local election: All cartoons in which the local election or political candidates in that election are not represented.

- Candidates struggling with electoral process: Jokes where political candidates struggle with the election, the electorate, or with each other. Often portray candidates as victims of conspiracies, struggling with contending policies, wanting to avoid electoral consequences of their actions, or being properly sanctioned by the public or government.

- Public power: Jokes in which there is an active, powerful presence of the public. Focus on public discourse shaping or rescuing the rhetoric of candidates, the election as a display of public power, or the public as a complicated mass that candidates fail to perceive.

- Hypocritical or pathetic political show: Portrayals of the election that show it to be an insincere or pathetic performance. Often focus on political campaigning or political platforms.

- Election as damaging or damaged: Cartoons that either show the electoral process being damaged by outside forces or as causing damage to broader society. Money corrupting the election, the election or candidates being manipulated by China or US-China relations, and the election damaging the public good are common.

We coded the relationship of the theme to portrayals of the public into thirteen codes later simplified into six broad categories.

- Public not portrayed: All cartoons in which no representation of the public or a common citizen appeared.

- Public as passive participants: Public is represented by everyperson figures, an understood audience, or depersonalized votes, who demonstrate no power to act.

- Public as ethical or active: Public is represented by everyperson figures who demonstrate some power to act. Public is portrayed as an investigator of politics, informed observer or commentator, ethical voice, or source of resistance.

- Public as victim: General public or common citizens are victimized or confused by politics or everyday life.

- Negative portrayal of public: Public is represented by everyperson figures who are portrayed negatively. The public as gambler, pure opportunist, or irrational mob are common.

- Public as diverse or non-resident: Non-resident public represented by everyperson figures.

Two of the authors separately coded each cartoon on these three variables and compared codes, resolving discrepancies. Thus all cartoons have been double coded.

Taken alone, theme, the relationship of that theme to the election, and the relationship of that theme to the public can each be seen as a major parameter of public political discourse, e.g., what the main concerns are, how effective an election is perceived as a mechanism for addressing those concerns, and how the public itself is perceived to play a role in public narratives about those issues. Looking at how nationalistic position interacts with each of these variables separately allows us to gauge the extent to which nationalistic divisions influence these major parameters of public speech. Furthermore, the sense of the joke resides not so much in any single aspect of the cartoon but in how theme, election, and public relate as a set; the set of these three

elements constitute a cultural schema that is employed to make each cartoon "work" in its cultural context. We examine how nationalistic position interacts with the set to gauge the resilience of this cultural schema in the face of serious nationalistic divisions. These four codes allow us to explore how public discourse negotiates internal divisions while maintaining shared meaning systems.

Findings

The results in Table 3 provide a description of gross similarities and differences in patterns of political expression in the two settings. Panel A presents the frequencies of different themes in Hong Kong and in Taiwan. Overall, there is good representation in all theme categories in both settings. Cartoons in Taiwan more often directly focus on the workings of the political system, whether government malfeasance or the political work of campaigns. In Hong Kong, cartoons about China, other world powers, and everyday life are more common.[4]

[Table 3 here]

The correspondence in the themes of political cartoons in Hong Kong and Taiwan suggests important similarities in the societal consciousnesses of these two otherwise rather different and independent political cultures. The fact that the same coding scheme can be used in both settings is meaningful, and paints Hong Kong and Taiwan publics in

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4 It is important to note that in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, a prolific cartoonist (Zun zi in Hong Kong and Co Co in Taiwan) inflated the proportion in the "China and other world powers" category. Weighting for this effect by the inverse of the number of cartoons produced by the cartoonist reduces the prevalence of this category in both cases. In Hong Kong, the "everyday life" category benefits (inflating to 28.7%) while in Taiwan, it is "government malfeasance" that increases (inflating to 37.0%).

comparable broad strokes; they see themselves as nascent civil societies that are threatened by external powers, worry about the integrity of domestic political institutions, and, in the midst of self-conscious political powerlessness, experience an anxiety over their day-to-day wellbeing in non-political spheres. At the same time, these two publics prioritize and narrate these shared concerns differently. In Taiwan, stronger concern about government malfeasance and political work suggests that national politics works as a heavier anchor for political narratives. In contrast, Hong Kong displays a stronger focus on the realm outside of domestic politics, either in terms of international affairs or everyday wellbeing.

Panel B illustrates how the election is portrayed in the cartoon. The results reveal that the election figures in political cartoons far less often in Hong Kong (35%) compared to Taiwan (84%). This reflects the overall seriousness with which the elections were taken in their respective settings. Popular and academic commentary on the 1995 LegCo election in Hong Kong generally purports crass cynicism on the part of the public. Regardless of their legitimacy, feelings that the LegCo elections were pointless because of their limited scope, gross manipulation by various powerholders, and secret deals between the British and Chinese governments were widespread. In contrast, the Taiwanese public seems to have taken the presidential election seriously despite leveling critiques of corruption, manipulation, and the like. This seems to translate into a greater proportion of cartoons in Taiwan poking fun at the electoral process; the election in Taiwan works as the butt of jokes because it retains cognitive tensions. In Hong Kong, the election is so pathetic in the eyes of the public that jokes about it become less meaningful. In both settings, however, jokes about the hypocrisy of politicians and their

pathetic nature are quite common as are jokes about the flaws of the election and electoral process.

Panel C illustrates how the public as a character is figured in the joke. While political cartoons are published as part of public discourses and therefore always assume a readership who we might label "the public," there may or may not be any actual representation of the public in the frame of the cartoon itself. Portrayals of the public are much more common in Hong Kong cartoons (89.6%) compared to those from Taiwan (44.1%).

The public in Hong Kong has a strong tendency to assume the role of the witness; the public is distinctly present, important, but passive. In contrast, the public in Taiwan is rarely recognized to exist outside of the political process; the identity of the public in Taiwan is assumed rather than portrayed. In the minority of cartoons that do portray the public, the public takes on an identity that is less well-defined but more active and ethical. This suggests that, in Hong Kong, with its utter disappointment in institutionalized political process, it is much more important to consider how major political concerns are related to ordinary citizens rather than how they will be worked out through political work. As such, there is a much stronger self-awareness of the role of the public, although that awareness manifests a pessimistic view on the power of the public. In contrast, Taiwan's strong preoccupation with mechanisms in the political sphere gives little consideration to the civic role of the public that has not always already been politicized. The public has not defined its identity beyond the narrow role of the electorate, but ironically, this uncertainly leaves room for a more romantic (if naïve) imagination about the potential of the public.

This brief overview offers a description of general patterns of civic political discourses in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Elsewhere, we have discussed the cultural processes through which these discourses emerged from past, anti-colonial "weapons of the weak" and transformed as nascent civic engagement (Lo, Bettinger, and Fan forthcoming). Here we focus on exploring the effects of current nationalistic divisions on these civic discourses.

On the surface, none of the elements discussed above distinguish discourse in these settings from many others, including both more and less developed civil societies. Hypocritical politicians, important but corrupted elections, moral but victimized publics, and so on can be found in cartoons around the world. But one of the unique questions confronting Hong Kong and Taiwan (and potentially other post-colonial societies) is whether and how their controversial national identities might play a role in shaping such civic discourses. Whether these discourses vary by nationalistic position profoundly informs our understanding of how powerful social divisions are compared to social cohesion. In what ways and to what extent do nationalistic positions alter communication in the public sphere?

To address these questions, we use loglinear analysis to assess the relative weight of interactions between the four variables discussed above: nationalistic position, theme, election, and public.

[Table 4 here]

Baseline measurement of interaction (Model A)

Model A includes the main effects of the four variables. Thus the loglikelihood chi-square measures all interaction between the four variables. This model serves as the

baseline helping us assess how much of the total interaction is accounted for by any given interaction or set of interactions. We are most interested in the interactions with nationalistic position. Since nationalistic position indicates one major divide in Hong Kong and Taiwan, we expect that significant interactions between nationalistic position and the other variables will inform us about the nature of those divides. Conversely, negligible interactions may give us insight into how these divides are bridged. The following models are nested, each builds from the preceding model starting with Model A. The reductions in loglikelihood chi-square and degrees of freedom between any two models follow a Pearson's chi-square distribution.

Nationalistic position and theme (Model B)

Model B adds to Model A the interaction between nationalistic position and theme. It assesses to what degree cartoons appearing in papers of differing political stances choose different themes for jokes. As you can see, this interaction explains little in either Hong Kong or Taiwan. Less than 3% of the total chi-square is accounted for by this interaction. Thus cartoon themes tend to be broadly shared across nationalistic position; cartoonists tend to pick on the same issues regardless of the paper in which they appear. This suggests at least rudimentary elements of shared discourse. The national presses in both places hold cultural orientations similar enough that they focus on the same set of issues, even if their political stances on those issues are different. Regardless of whether the discourse is agreement or debate, there is a common platform to discuss.

Nationalistic position and election (Model C)

Model C adds to Model B the interaction between nationalistic position and election. It assesses to what degree cartoons appearing in papers of differing political

stances figure the election differently. In Hong Kong, this interaction accounts for 11%
of the chi-square for 8 degrees of freedom. Cartoons appearing in papers of differing
political orientation differ significantly from one another in how they portray the election.
In large part, this is a difference between Ming Daily, the pro-Beijing paper much more
likely to have cartoons discussing the election, and the other papers that seemed to
largely ignore the election. Interestingly, this indicates that Ming Daily, the only Beijing-
friendly paper in our sample, is working to introduce the election into civil discourse in
the face of widespread silence.

In contrast, cartoons in Taiwanese papers of differing nationalistic stances tended
to treat the election largely the same. Here the chi-square was reduced by less than 3%.
Not only did Taiwanese cartoons discuss the election regardless of the paper in which
they appeared, what they had to say about the election was also generally the same across
political platform. Despite, or perhaps because of, the divide between pro-independence
and pro-unification stances, cartoonists share a common vocabulary on how to discuss
the election. The nationalistic division that so defines this island nation seems to rest on
a shared understanding of the political role of elections.

Nationalistic position and public (Model D)

Model D adds to Model C the interaction between nationalistic position and
public. It assesses to what degree cartoons appearing in papers of differing political
stances depict the public differently. In Hong Kong, there is little distinction between
cartoons appearing in different papers on how they figure the public. The rift between
Ming Daily and the other papers with regard to the election is not evident when it comes
to portraying the public. Hong Kong stands in contrast to other historical examples

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where depictions in the form of propaganda embody and promulgate social divisions useful to the state while resisted by those victimized.

In Taiwan, the interaction is more significant. Nearly 5% of the total chi-square is accounted for by this interaction (at a cost of 10 degrees of freedom). Ironically, the pro-independence and pro-unification papers are virtually indistinguishable when it comes to how cartoons depict the public. Most of the interaction effect we see is due to the Journalist, the only publication in our sample that avoids a nationalistic stand. Cartoons in this weekly news magazine are much more likely to depict the public as an ethical force and somewhat less likely to portray the public as a victim. Interestingly, the serious political argument between pro-independence and pro-unification forces rests on a shared cultural understanding, in this case of the role of the public. The public is invoked in a variety of ways (e.g. ethical, victimized, foolish) but this variety does not vary according to political stance.

Interactions between theme, election and public (Model E)

Model E adds to Model D all other two-way interactions between cartoon theme, the election, and the public. These interactions account for 54% of the chi-square in the case of Hong Kong and 49% in Taiwan for a mere 47 degrees of freedom. Theme, election, and public account for so much of the total interaction because together they capture the essence of the joke. The hypocrisy of politicians in elections, for example, may be humorously combined with depicting the public as a victim. Certain combinations make cultural sense in specific local contexts, as elaborated at length in our qualitative piece (Lo, Bettinger, and Fan forthcoming). Our current inquiry, instead, is about whether strong divides within a society interfere with this cultural sense; does

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nationalistic position change the ways in which theme, election, and public are combined to crack jokes. Our answer from Models B, C, D, and the three-way interactions below is generally no.

Interaction between nationalistic position, public, and election (Model F)

Model F adds to Model E the three-way interaction between nationalistic position, the election, and the public. It assesses to what degree cartoons appearing in papers of differing political stances relate the election to the public differently. If this interaction accounted for a significant amount of chi-square, it would indicate that cultural logics were divided along the lines of politics. It would, in some sense, indicate a society where the center of civil society or the logic of national consolidation is in danger of being torn apart by the pull of political divisions. At a minimum, this would be evidence of Fraser's description of multiple publics figuring social issues according to differing cultural schema. In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, this interaction accounts for little. Cultural continuity in Hong Kong and Taiwan seems strong across nationalistic position. Neither of these places comes close to the fractured cultural landscape described by (Zeleza 2003).

Discussion

The inherent contradiction in the dual mission of consolidating national identity while developing ways of civilly dialoguing about social divisions constitutes one of the most difficult problems for civil societies to overcome. This issue, however, has not been addressed in much of Western scholarship on nationalism or democracy. Scholars from varying intellectual stands have often accepted national integration as a precondition for

civil society (see Seligman 1992). Ernest Gellner argues a strong functionalist position, asserting that nationalism provides a common cultural heritage for rational individuals to freely engage in debates about their differences without fearing the collapse of their collective community (1995). Advancing a critical perspective, Craig Calhoun calls for reflexive studies of the repressive nature of this "function" of nationalism, while at the same time acknowledging the dearth of empirical theoretical answers among democracy scholars to "the question of why a political community has these members, with these boundaries, that do not depend on a heritage of nationalist discourse" (1995: 273). The irony is that almost all established democracies today are preceded by a process of national integration which is itself a highly repressive and anti-democratic process. In places that have not gone through similar processes of hegemonic integration, democracy is constantly threatened by internal tensions among competing nationalistic projects. Calhoun (1995) argues that our thinking about democracy has been rather ineffective in addressing how nationalism shapes democracy and how democracy fails to resolve nationalistic differences. As a modest attempt, our findings here begin to address this collective myopia.

Hong Kong and Taiwan have not enjoyed the luxury of national consolidation prior to entry into a democratic moment. But rather than a disheartening fracturing along lines of difference or repression of those differences, we have seen the possibility of shared cultural schemas that facilitate communications about these very differences. The difficult "third option" described by Calhoun seems realized to some degree for at least these moments in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. At the same time, the national identity controversy does seem to limit the development of such cultural schemas in ways that are

specific to each context. As examples of the desirable but challenging "third option,"

what theoretical implications might these two cases suggest?

One interesting observation is that, while democracy might be ineffective in

resolving nationalistic differences, civil engagement holds more power than the formal

institutions of democracy. In the early democratic moments considered here, civil

engagement puts into practice (and by so doing continues to develop) a shared cultural

vocabulary across nationalistic differences. Within each of the two societies, multiple

publics in Fraser's conceptualization do indeed exist; they are divided by nationalistic

stances and disagree vehemently with one another without much interest for compromise.

But they depart from Fraser's theoretical model in that, for the most part, these multiple

publics share a common cultural schema to express their differences.

However, the troubling process of national consolidation appears to compromise

the richness of the shared cultural vocabularies. In Hong Kong, most newspapers and

news magazines have not engaged in serious discussion or criticisms of the election. The

only exception is the newspaper (Ming Daily) that expresses an explicit (pro-Beijing)

nationalistic position. The public can talk amongst itself coherently across political

divides, but only segments that take the national question seriously would entertain

thoughts about the mechanism that connects itself to the state. In Taiwan, most

newspapers and news magazines are limited in their imagination of the civic identities of

the public beyond a narrow equation between the public and the electorate.

Unexpectedly, this lack of imagination is shared by members on both sides of the great

divide (independence versus unification). The only exception seems to be publications

that avoid a strong nationalistic position (i.e., The Journalist); such forums appear to

accommodate somewhat more active and multifaceted depictions of the *civic* identities of the public.

In this sense, Alexander's claims of deep cultural binaries would seem plausible even in the face of deep identity divides. But public forums evolved around these conflictual identities also embody Fraser's "multiple publics." Instead of each nationalistic public developing its own embedded cultural schema, as Fraser would predict, the unresolved national consolidation limits the political imagination of these publics in thinking through key aspects of their political and civic identities. Furthermore, what matters is not just the presence of a national identity controversy, but also *how* that controversy is being addressed. Bracketing the issue or centering on it, as we have seen in our two cases, leads to different compromises on the political imagination of the public spheres. We are certainly not making a causal argument about national identity strategy and civil society problems. Rather, our exploration in this study concretely illustrates the tenuousness of the third option; the strength and limitation of its cultural schema depends very much on how people navigate these two parameters.

Hong Kong faces a tremendous challenge in figuring how the public relates to government. Current civic engagement in the form of street protest and rallies against LegCo are predicated on and perhaps contribute to this crisis in government legitimacy. Conversely, public spheres in Taiwan are hard pressed to develop robust *civic* identities that are not already politicized. The increasing perception of media outlets in Taiwan as party mouthpieces pushes even this forum outside civil discourse. The challenges in both locations are formidable and follow logically from the earlier public expressions we found in our political cartoons. But we should not fixate on those challenges to such an

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extent that we loose sight of the fact that both societies have successfully taken the "third option" for over a decade now.

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Table 1. Sources of political cartoons in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Panel A: Hong Kong Source	Format	Language	Nationalistic position
Apple Daily	Daily paper	Cantonese	Critical of HK government and Beijing
East	Weekly magazine	Cantonese	No specific nationalistic position
Ming Daily	Daily paper	Chinese	Critical of HK government
One	Weekly magazine	Cantonese	Critical of HK government and Beijing
South China Morning Post	Daily paper	English	Moderate

Panel B: Taiwan Source	Format	Language	Nationalistic position
China Times	Daily paper	Mandarin	Moderate; pro-unification
Journalist	Weekly magazine	Mandarin	No specific nationalistic position; critical of all parties
Liberty Times	Daily paper	Mandarin	Moderately pro-independence; critical of Beijing and unification advocates
New Taiwan	Weekly magazine	Mandarin	Pro-independence
Scoop	Weekly magazine	Mandarin	Strongly pro-unification and pro-China
United Daily	Daily paper	Mandarin	Strongly pro-unification

Table 2. Frequencies of cartoons produced by individual cartoonists

Panel A: Hong Kong	Frequency	Percent
Best	24	16.7
Grant	3	2.1
Hua Hua	8	5.6
Ji Zi	28	19.4
Jin Xiao Xin	4	2.8
Niu Ji	1	.7
Photo	4	2.8
Zun Zi	72	50.0
Total	144	100.0

Panel B: Taiwan	Frequency	Percent
Co Co	104	44.8
Yu Fu (literally "fisherman")	32	13.8
Lie Ren (literally "hunter")	14	6.0
Lin Xin	30	12.9
Ling Quen	1	.4
Xiao Lueng (literally "little dragon")	14	6.0
Pop culture	1	.4
Ji Qing (literally "seasony green")	2	.9
Sha Yong	7	3.0
Ta Co	14	6.0
Tong Ximao	3	1.3
Tu Ying (literally "bald eagle")	1	.4
unreadable	1	.4
Zhan Haokai	1	.4
Zheng Jing	1	.4
Zhong Zhihao	6	2.6
Total	232	100.0

Table 3, panel A. Frequency of Cartoon Themes by Setting

Theme	*Frequency*	
	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Government malfeasance	23	53
	(16.0)	(22.8)
Political work	22	80
	(15.3)	(34.5)
China and other powers	70	61
	(48.6)	(26.3)
Everyday life	29	38
	(20.1)	(16.4)
Total	144	232
	(100.0)	(100.0)

Table 3, panel B. Frequency of Election rhetoric by Setting

Election	*Frequency*	
	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Theme not related to local election	93	37
	(64.6)	(15.9)
Candidates struggling with electoral process	2	42
	(1.4)	(18.1)
Public power	11	37
	(7.6)	(15.9)
Hypocritical or pathetic political show	23	70
	(16.0)	(30.2)
Election as damaging or damaged	15	46
	(10.4)	(19.8)
Total	144	232
	(100.0)	(100.0)

Table 3, panel C. Frequency of Cartoon use of Public by Setting

Public	*Frequency*	
	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Public not portrayed	15 (10.4%)	106 (45.9%)
Public as passive participants	35 (24.3%)	28 (12.1%)
Public as ethical or active	21 (14.6%)	51 (22.1%)
Public as victim	25 (17.4%)	19 (8.2%)
Negative portrayal of public	5 (3.5%)	7 (3.0%)
Public as diverse or non-resident	43 (29.9%)	20 (8.7%)
Total	144 (100.0)	232 (100.0)

Table 4. Loglinear models* between nationalistic position, theme, election, and public by place

Panel A: Hong Kong

Model	Factors	Log-likelihood X^2	df	ΔX^2	Δ df	p value
A	All main effects	338.47	345	--	--	
B	A + nationalistic position*theme	329.59	339	8.88	6	.180
C	B + nationalistic position*election	291.53	331	38.06	8	.000
D	C + nationalistic position*public	282.34	321	9.19	10	.514
E	D + all two-way interactions	98.09	274	184.25	47	.000
F	E + nationalistic position*public*election	86.31	234	11.78	40	.999

Panel B: Taiwan

Model	Factors	Log-likelihood X^2	df	ΔX^2	Δ df	p value
A	All main effects	456.01	345	--	--	
B	A + nationalistic position*theme	448.31	339	7.70	6	.261
C	B + nationalistic position*election	437.13	331	11.18	8	.192
D	C + nationalistic position*public	416.11	321	21.02	10	.021
E	D + all two-way interactions	194.58	274	221.53	47	.000
F	E + nationalistic position*public*election	152.33	234	42.25	40	.374

* Models are fitted using a Poisson distribution.