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by
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ABSTRACT

Party, State and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1967-76

by

K.G. Armstrong

University of Melbourne, Australia

The useful concept of a single left-right dimension, and a scale to measure it, need not be abandoned in studies of Congress. Although any attempt to place Representatives on such a scale using an attitude-questionnaire seems likely to fail, and attempts by researchers to select ideologically significant roll-calls face problems almost as formidable, a scale has been developed which uses the roll-calls selected by A.D.A. and A.C.A., but recalculates their ratings by a consistent and theoretically defensible method and then combines them into a single rating for each Congress. This rating, IDEOL, reveals a great deal of ideological consistency by Representatives over the period 1967-76. At the individual level, ratings from one Congress are powerful predictors of ratings in future Congresses. The ratings can be used to show that there are very substantial ideological differences between the parties at the aggregate level. Further, although the overlap between the parties in Congress on this ideological scale occupies so large a part of the available ideological range that there can be no coherent concept of Democrat and Republican ideological territories, a state-by-state analysis makes the overlap completely disappear in most cases and very substantially reduces it in the remaining cases. The Democrats are on the left and the Republicans on the right of each state's ideological spectrum; what differentiates the states is their sense of where the frontier between left and right is located, and this varies widely from around -60 to around +85 in a total ideological range of -100 to +100. The impression of ideological confusion between the parties in Congress arises only if these radical differences in state standards are overlooked.

PARTY, STATE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1967-76

by K.G. Armstrong (University of Melbourne, Australia)

In comparison with political parties elsewhere in the Western world, the ideological nature of American political parties is a great mystery. Even if we confine ourselves to the two most important parties in a nation, we expect to find one relatively to the left of the other. We expect to be able to say "By that nation's standards, the XXXXX party is the party on the left and the YYYYY party is the party on the right". Yet in the United States the Democrats seem to cover virtually the entire ideological spectrum. If we consider the 435 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, at any one time we would expect to find Democrats at each point on a scale that stretched from the most liberal to the most conservative general stance taken by a Representative. Similarly, we would expect to find Republicans not just at the right-hand end of such a scale but spreading left at least to its center.


In a 1960 article in the American Behavioral Scientist¹, David Butler offered what he called a 'graphic device' to illustrate the nature of the differences within and between parties in Britain and the U.S., based on an assumption which he described as grossly arbitrary but not altogether unrealistic, viz., "That political positions can be explained in terms of a spectrum running from extreme left to extreme right and that everyone can be classified in terms of his particular place on that spectrum". If we simply consider the spread of individuals' positions in each of the two main parties in the lower houses of the respective national legislatures, he said, we would get a picture something like that in Figure 1.

With an overlap between the parties in the U.S. covering most of the spectrum, the picture appears to be one of total confusion. But if, Butler argued, we consider not just the range of individual legislators' positions but the frequency distribution of cases at each point in the range, and if we note each party's "Center of gravity" (i.e. the position of its median legislator), we get a much less confusing picture, as in Figure 2.

If we consider the distances between rival parties' centers of gravity, the ideological differences between parties look about the same in the two nations, or perhaps even greater in the U.S. than in Britain, and the confusion largely disappears. However, Butler warns against making too much of what he has presented.

"A simplified expository device must not be mistaken for an exactly observed picture of reality. These curves are not based on precise measurements. Different observers might have very different views on how individuals and issues should be classified. Each theorist must decide for himself the extent of the

Britain:



U.S.A.:





FIGURE 1: Ideological overlap between parties (Butler)

Britain:



U.S.A.:




FIGURE 2: Party distribution on the ideological spectrum (Butler)

to be absolutely ideologically consistent across all issues and that we may need to look at a range of items and take some sort of aggregate. But perhaps we should simply ask each Representative to place himself on a 10-point liberal-conservative scale. This method would certainly produce interesting information, but not the information we are seeking. Not only are there all the dangers of self-rating, such as deluding oneself or attempting to delude a questioner, but there is the even greater danger that the individuals questioned may understand the scale differently. One Representative may be very concerned about states' rights, and feel that if a man is solid on that then he is a sound conservative regardless of his stance on other issues; another may feel that belief in deregulation is central to conservatism and all else is peripheral. Whatever we measure, we want to measure the same thing for each Representative.

If we do not ask Representatives to rate themselves ideologically, the next most obvious way to proceed would be to develop a set of attitude items, and a method of combining them into a scale, then to get Representatives to answer a questionnaire containing the items, then to rate each Representative accordingly on a scale or scales. There are very serious difficulties involved in this approach. There is no universally accepted and constant list of liberal or conservative statements to which a response can be sought. Which statements will tend to divide liberals from conservatives, and in which direction such statements, once found, will divide them are issues that the researcher has to settle according to his/her own judgment. Such judgments turn out to be remarkably controversial. Further, even where judgments agree about a particular time and place, criteria become unstable when international or diachronic analyses are made. For example, on a non-involvement-is-better-than-foreign-alliances statement one might expect that in the U.S. in 1960 conservatives would have tended to agree and liberals to disagree; in Britain or Australia at that time conservatives would have tended to disagree and liberals to agree. In 1980, the responses in Britain and Australia would have been as in 1960, but in the post-Vietnam U.S. they would have reversed themselves and come into line with the other two countries. At least, such is my judgment.

I believe that the shortcomings of the attitude-item questionnaire approach to ideological ratings are not fully appreciated. Yet they are an important factor in determining the relative merits of the sort of alternative I shall propose, so I will illustrate those shortcomings briefly by looking at what is probably the best use of this approach yet made. This is reported in the classic 1960 article "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers" by McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara.² The party leaders in question were delegates to the 1956 national party conventions rather than Representatives, but that does not affect the questions of method. The researchers chose 24 items or 'issues' and each respondent was asked "to state whether he believed that support for the issue should be increased, decreased or remain as is". Although it is not explicitly stated, it is completely inescapable from the mathematics than an 'increase' attitude always indicates the same ideological direction and completely inescapable from the text that that direction is liberal and that the direction indicated by a 'decrease' attitude is conservative.

paradox which the device is designed to explain the paradox that parties whose views seem very largely to overlap can be so very different, while parties whose views seem quite distinct can be so close to each other. Moreover, each theorist must decide for himself how much of the political struggle can be explained within the terms "right" and "left", and how much must be regarded as mere feuding between sections or interests of a kind that cannot be fitted into any such ideological classification."

I believe that is possible to base curves such as these on an exactly observed picture of reality, and I propose in the first part of this paper to present and defend a method of placing individual Representatives on an ideological scale. However, this does not commit me to any particular view on the issue Butler raises in the last sentence quoted above. Even if, as I claim, one can locate a spot on the ideological spectrum that accurately characterizes a Representative's overall ideology, this is not to suggest that his/her ideology is the only factor which affects his political behavior and, especially, his/her voting behavior in the legislature. Other factors which we could expect to influence his/her final decision on whether to vote 'Aye' or 'Nay' are the economic interests of his/her district and of politically important groups and individuals within that district, his/her beliefs about public opinion in his/her district on the particular issue (s)he is faced with, the attitude of party leaders in his/her chamber and of other legislators to whom (s)he is under some obligation, the attitude of the Administration, the attitude of lobbyists representing national interest groups by which (s)he tends to be influenced, and, finally and often importantly, his/her more-or-less expert judgment about the functional merits of the piece of legislation in question. To say that the overall ideology of a Representative is measurable and matters is not to say that nothing else matters.

Many of the more sophisticated students of political attitudes have argued that there is no single ideological dimension, that we need to identify several such dimensions and, such being the defining nature of dimensions, treat them as quite independent of each other. Whatever the theoretical considerations in favor of such an approach, there are very powerful practical considerations against it. The concept of a single liberal-conservative spectrum, even if it be vague or ambiguous or in need of qualification at times, is an extremely useful one. It is used by millions of citizens, by sophisticated journalists, and by Representatives themselves with great frequency. It is also, when they are not looking over their own shoulders or giving theoretical discourses, constantly used by political scientists when they discuss current politics. Whatever the defects of the concept, it seems extraordinary to suggest that those who use it fail to communicate anything to their audiences. Such an immensely valuable, even if sometimes misleading, shorthand ought not lightly to be dispensed with. Another attempt to give it a more exact and reliable meaning than it enjoys in ordinary discourse is, I believe, more than justified.

How, then, are we to define and determine a Representative's overall ideological position? The qualification 'overall' already suggests that we do not expect an individual

Although they make no attempt to rate individuals on an ideological scale, when comparing the two sets of 'Party Leaders' McClosky et.al. conclude:

"Despite the brokerage tendencies of the American parties, their active members are obviously separated by large and important differences. These differences moreover, conform with the popular image in which the Democratic Party is seen as the more 'progressive' or 'radical', the Republican as the more 'moderate' or 'conservative' of the two."³

What difficulties of the attitude-questionnaire approach does this list of 24 items exemplify? Some of those difficulties are admitted by the authors, thus:

"A word of caution before we turn to the findings. The respondents were offered only the twenty-four issues that impressed us in February, 1957, as the most significant and enduring. However, they may not all be as salient today as they seemed at that time. Nor, within the limitations of a single questionnaire, could we explore every issue that informed observers might have considered important. Some presumably vital issues such as states' rights, political centralization, and expansion of government functions could not be stated explicitly enough within our format to be tested properly."⁴

The first difficulty exemplified is that of selecting the 24 most important items at a given time. It is highly questionable whether most, or even many, other political analysts would agree that the twenty-four most ideologically significant issues in 1957 would include only one each in the areas of education and race respectively, or that states rights could be validly omitted altogether from such a list, or that tax policy should be allowed five of the 24 issues.

The second difficulty is the selection of items on a questionnaire which will permit diachronic comparison. It would be unreasonable to blame researchers in 1957 for failing to predict that attitudes on such issues as abortion, the permissibility of school prayers, and equal rights for women would become ideologically salient by 1980. Yet such a failure would undermine attempts to compare the general ideological stance of individual politicians or party groupings in 1957 and 1980. One would face the dilemma between, on the one hand, leaving salient items out of the list used in 1980 because they were not also in the 1957 list or, on the other hand, of using a different list of issues in the two versions of the questionnaire. Either of these alternatives would make a diachronic questionnaire study suspect.

The third difficulty of the attitude-questionnaire approach exemplified in the 24 item list chosen by McClosky et.al. is the matter of the direction in which the items point. Although in 1957 it was not unreasonable to consider a 'Favor an increase' response on an American-participation-in-foreign-alliances item as liberal (see McClosky's Table II-E),

it would not be similarly reasonable today. This would create the problems for diachronic analysis that I mentioned above. Moreover, to assume that a 'Favor an increase' response on a defense-spending item was a liberal response was very contentious even in 1957 (Table II-E). Nor are these problems unique to the foreign policy area. In their consideration of government regulation of the economy, McClosky et.al. put into parallel as liberal responses the favoring of an increase in government regulation of business (which seems reasonable) and the favoring of an increase in regulation of trade unions (which does not) (Table II-B). Similarly, in their consideration of tax policy, the researchers put into parallel as liberal responses the favoring of an increase in tax on large incomes, on middle incomes, and on small incomes, respectively (Table II-D). I do not feel I am being over-critical to question whether favoring an increase in tax on small incomes is a liberal response.

Three difficulties in the attitude-questionnaire approach to giving an ideological rating to individuals or groups have been mentioned. First, that any researcher's personal judgment of what the most ideologically significant 24 (or 10, or 100) items are at any given time is unlikely to be acceptable to other researchers or consumers of research. Second, that what is a good list of items at one time may become a poor list at another, and may thus undermine diachronic analysis. Third, that there is no consensus even about the direction in which items point. What gives force to the examples of these difficulties which I have taken from the McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara study is that that study represents the best, rather than the worst, that has been done using the attitude-questionnaire approach. If such difficulties can arise in a meticulously planned and well-funded study by the ablest researchers in the field, then a fortiori we have reason to be suspicious of less distinguished uses of the same method. Further, if the individuals to whom we wish to give an ideological rating are Representatives, we face the additional difficulty that we will need close to a 100% response to our questionnaire - and some reason to believe that all the responses are thoughtful - if we are to be able to analyse Congressional parties.

In the light of these difficulties, I have preferred roll-call analysis to the use of questionnaires. This immediately eliminates the difficulties of lack of response and lack of seriousness, since Representatives have much more weighty reason to vote and to think about how they will vote than they have to please a university researcher. But a selection of roll-calls still has to be made, since no serious student of Congress would believe that ideology had a major role in all votes, and if the researcher makes a selection of ideologically significant votes on the basis of his/her own judgment we may confidently predict that that judgment will be as contentious as is the selection of attitude items for a questionnaire. I have chosen instead to use the roll-call votes selected by Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action for their own respective annual ratings of Representatives. These two bodies were chosen out of the increasing number of organizations which rate Representatives because they are, as organizations, solely ideological rather than being also representative of an economic or regional interest.

If one were to use the votes selected by the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education, for example, the generally liberal concerns of that organization would be subject to contamination (from the analyst's viewpoint) by the economic interests of the trade unions it represents. Such an organization might very reasonably be more concerned in the case of a roll-call vote with what would help or hurt its members than with what was consistent with a liberal philosophy. A parallel objection would apply to using the votes selected by the generally conservative U.S. Chambers of Commerce.

Not only are the A.D.A. and the A.C.A. solely ideological, there is also no confusion about what the respective ideologies are. Both the supporters and the opponents of the A.D.A. regard it as an organization of liberals which exists to advance liberal ideas. Both the supporters and opponents of the A.C.A. regard it as an organization of conservatives which exists to advance conservative ideas. It does not seem too fanciful to say, at least during the period 1967-76 which is the subject of this study, that what the A.D.A. sought or the A.C.A. opposed at any given time defined what it meant to be liberal in the Congressional context at that time, and that what the A.C.A. sought or the A.D.A. opposed defined what it meant to be conservative. Such a definition seems at least as plausible and a great deal more useful than definitions based on a researcher's individual judgment about the timeless and true ideological content of liberalism and conservatism. I agree with a dictum I learned from the followers of the philosopher Wittgenstein - "It is better to study concepts when they are in gear rather than when they are in neutral". The concept of a single liberal-conservative dimension is very much a concept at work when the A.D.A. and A.C.A. use it, rather than a concept being abstractly reflected upon. Unlike an intellectually trained researcher, the two organizations will not reflect too long on whether the list of issues each chooses as tests of liberalism-conservatism is entirely consistent either internally or with its lists from earlier years. Shifts, which the two organizations are free to reflect, can occur in what preoccupies liberals and conservatives as times change, yet liberalism can remain constantly defined as what liberals stand for and conservatives stand against. If neither liberals nor conservatives had foreign policy as a central concern in 1960, but both were preoccupied by it in 1970, then foreign policy roll-calls were a much better guide to ideological position in 1970 than in 1960, and we might expect A.C.A. and A.D.A. both to include more foreign policy roll-calls in their selection for 1970 if they wanted to measure each Representative's position on the ideological spectrum most effectively.

Thus, my operational definition of voting as a liberal is voting in the way that pleases the A.D.A. and/or displeases the A.C.A. on the roll-calls which those organizations choose as significantly indicative of a Representative's ideological stance in a given year. The operational definition of voting as a conservative is voting the other way round on the same roll-calls. This definition avoids the three difficulties of the attitude questionnaire approach discussed above. First, the selection of issues is not dependent on the individual researcher's contentious judgment, but on a public standard which in practice reflects a liberal-conservative spectrum recognizable to Representatives, political commentators and

the politically interested public. Second, the definition permits the list of issues to change from year to year even to the extent of changing the balance of subject areas substantially, thus allowing each year's list to be as sensitive as possible to what divides liberals from conservatives in that year, but also has a constancy of meaning that makes diachronic analysis perfectly legitimate. Third, use of this definition is not, in practice, undermined by doubts about the direction in which the selected roll-calls point. Of the 71 roll-call votes chosen by both A.C.A. and A.D.A. for their respective ratings during the ten years 1967-76, only one involved a clash of interpretation of direction - both A.D.A. and A.C.A. preferred a 'Nay' on the vote to pass H.R. 8432 in 1971. This was the bill authorizing the Lockheed loan guarantee; it seems to be more of a curiosity than an embarrassment.

Each of the two organizations uses the roll-call records on the set of votes it has chosen to rate each Representative on a scale of 0-100. Thus, we would expect an extreme liberal to get an A.D.A. rating of 100 and an A.C.A. rating of 0, and an extreme conservative to get an A.D.A. rating of 0 and an A.C.A. rating of 100. I have combined these ratings by subtracting each Representative's A.D.A. score from his/her A.C.A. score to give a range of possible scores from -100 (extreme liberal) to +100 (extreme conservative). (The point of putting it this way round is merely mnemonic; it means that the left side of a graph representing the spectrum will also be the ideologically left side, and the graph's right side will be the ideologically right side.) I am, in effect, following the common sporting practice of averaging the ratings of two expert judges to minimize random effects.

But even if the A.D.A. and the A.C.A. are the defining experts on which roll-call votes are the best indicators of being liberal and being conservative in Congress in a given year, they do not have the same authority in the mathematics of index construction. Nor are their methods of calculation consistent with each other, nor are they consistent over time. At least for the period 1967-76, the A.D.A. treat failure to vote as identical with a vote against their preferred position, whereas the A.C.A. exclude it as a missing value and score a Representative only over those votes where (s)he voted for their position or against it. The A.C.A. takes no account of a Representative being paired for or against or announcing for or against on an issue; the A.D.A. followed that practice in 1967-69 and 1972-73, but in 1974-76 took account of live pairs as well as votes, and in 1970-71 took account of votes, paired for/against, and announced for/against. Votes are sometimes used for ratings in the year succeeding that in which they were taken - for example, three 1969 votes selected by A.D.A. were used for its 1970 ratings, and one 1969 vote selected by both organization was used by the A.C.A. for its 1969 ratings and by A.D.A. for its 1970 ratings.

Since they are not academic researchers, A.C.A. and A.D.A. do not necessarily deserve criticism for their methods. Their aims are essentially political and practical rather than scientific. It may be more important, for example, to get ratings out early than to wait until all the important votes have taken place. But I have felt it best to recalculate

the ratings derived from their respective selections of roll-calls in a way that is consistent between organizations and over time and uses all the available information. I have taken account of 'Paired Yes/No' and 'Announced Yes/No', because these are among the publicly made and officially recorded responses that reveal a Representative's stand on ideologically significant issues.

A machine-readable data set of all roll-call votes taken in each of the years 1967-76, coded from the Daily Congressional Record, was supplied by the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. The categories into which each member of the House of Representatives had been coded for each roll call vote were as follows:-

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 1. Yes | 6. No |
| 2. Paired Yes | 7. General Pair |
| 3. Announced Yes | 8. Present : abstained |
| 4. Announced No | 9. Absent or n.a. whether
abstained |
| 5. Paired No | 10. Not a member : or Speaker
not voting. |

The variables representing the roll-call votes selected by A.D.A. and/or A.C.A. in each year were selected from the full set and it was ascertained whether a 'Yes' was a conservative response (when the A.C.A. position was 'Yes' and/or the A.D.A. position was 'No') or a liberal response (when the A.C.A. position was 'No' and/or the A.D.A. position was 'Yes'). If 'Yes' was a liberal response on a roll-call, then the values for that roll-call were recoded thus:-

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| 1. Yes, 2. Paired Yes, or 3. Announced Yes | = 1. Liberal response |
| 6. No, 5. Paired No, or 4. Announced No | = 2. Conservative response |
| Other (7., 8., 9., or 10.) | = 0. No response/missing |

If 'Yes' was a conservative response on a roll-call, then the values for that roll-call were recoded thus:-

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| 6. No, 5. Paired No, or 4. Announced No | = 1. Liberal response |
| 1. Yes, 2. Paired Yes, or 3. Announced Yes | = 2. Conservative response |
| Other (7., 8., 9., or 10) | = 0. No response/missing |

For each year 1967 to 1976, a recalculated index for A.D.A. (called ADAREC) and a recalculated index for A.C.A. (called ACAREC) and a combined recalculated index (COMREC) were produced for each member of the House of Representatives. For 1967, for example, we have:

$$\text{ADAREC}_{67} = \frac{\text{No. of liberal stands on 15 1967 ADA issues}}{\text{No. of lib. or cons. stands on those 15 issues}} \times 100$$

$$\text{ACAREC}_{67} = \frac{\text{No. of conservative stands on 29 ACA 1967 issues}}{\text{No. of lib. or cons. stands on those 29 issues}} \times 100$$

$$\text{COMREC}_{67} = \text{ACAREC}_{67} - \text{ADAREC}_{67} \quad (\text{range } -100 \text{ to } +100)$$

Cases were treated as missing on ADAREC and on ACAREC if they had valid responses on less than half the issues chosen by the respective rating organization, e.g. 14 or less liberal-or-conservative stands on the 29 issues chosen by A.C.A. in 1967 would lead to the assignment of a missing value on ACAREC67. Cases were treated as missing on COMREC if they were missing on either ADAREC or ACAREC for that year. Votes chosen by either organization were always used for the recalculated ratings for the year in which the vote was taken, even where they had been used in the following year for that organization's official ratings.

If will be evident that in 1967, the year I have taken as an example for the calculations, each of the 15 votes chosen by A.D.A. had more influence on the combined recalculated rating (COMREC67) than did each of the 29 votes selected by A.C.A. Further, the A.D.A. votes and the A.C.A. votes include 5 votes selected by both organizations, and these votes enter the calculation of COMREC 67 twice. Clearly, the votes used in the combined rating did not all have an equal influence. But this is no objection if the conceptual basis of the rating is kept in mind. What is important is that the two rating organizations - the two expert judges - should have equal influence on the overall rating regardless of how many votes (symptoms, as it were) each organization considered in reaching its own judgment. To give each vote the same influence would, in the 1967 case, result in the A.C.A.'s judgment being treated as approximately twice as weighty as the A.D.A.'s judgment.

The aggregate virtues of these recalculated ratings in comparison to the official ratings will be discussed below, but a few specific examples taken from the most recent Congress in this study may also be useful. In 1976, A.D.A. used 20 votes for their ratings. Representative Udall (D., Ariz.) took a liberal stand on 14 of these and no stand on the remaining six; his ADAREC76 is therefore $14/14 \times 100 = 100$. His official A.D.A. rating, however, had a lower numerator because it did not count the five liberal stands in

which Udall was paired liberal, and a higher denominator because it included the six 'no stand' roll-calls. Udall's A.D.A. official rating is thus $9/20 \times 100 = 45$. This not only seems less reasonable on the facts as given but also fails to match the official A.C.A. rating of 0. (ACAREC76 was also 0.) In the same year, Rep. Riegle (D., Mich.) had an official A.D.A. score of 30, despite the fact that he took a liberal stand on 13 of the 14 issues on which he voted or was paired because their rating was based on his 6 liberal votes out of 20 A.D.A. issues. His ADAREC76 was 92, matching his ACAREC76 and official A.C.A. 1976 score, which were both 0. The anomalies among the official A.C.A. scores are less striking because they do not inflate the denominator with roll-calls in which the Representative took no stand, but their failure to include pairs can have a distorting effect. In 1975, they used 28 roll-calls for their ratings. Rep. Hebert (D., a) took a conservative stand on 21 of these (9 votes, and 12 pairs) a liberal stand on 5 (all votes) and no stand on 2. A.C.A. counted only his votes, and gave him $9/14 \times 100 = 64$ as his official rating. His ACAREC75 score was $21/26 \times 100 = 81$, certainly a better match for his official 1975 A.D.A. rating and his ADAREC75, which were both 5, as well as for his highly conservative reputation. Finally, the difference between rating for practical political purposes and rating for academic research is illustrated by the criteria used for missing cases. A.C.A. did not issue a rating for Rep. Hays (D., Ohio) in 1976 even though he had taken a stand on 17 of the 28 roll-calls they used for ratings (presumably because he resigned from Congress before the end of the session); yet Rep. Allen (D., Tenn.) was rated by both organizations in 1975, despite the fact that his late arrival meant that his A.C.A. official rating was based on the 6 of their 28 roll-calls in which he voted and that his official A.D.A. rating was based on his vote in the 3 out of their 19 roll-calls in which he voted.

For several reasons, then, these recalculated ratings seem to me to be superior in the research context to the official ratings issued by A.C.A. and A.D.A.. First, ADAREC and ACAREC are calculated on a basis that is consistent between the two organizations and consistent over time. This makes the process of combining the scores into the COMREC rating for each Representative in each year reasonable, and also permits diachronic analysis. Second, the use of 'Paired for/against' and 'Announced for/against' means that more information about Representatives attitudes is used for the ratings than if we confined our attention to votes alone. Third, the treatment of roll-calls on which a Representative takes no stand is more reasonable than the A.D.A. notion of "He who is not with me is against me!" (officially rendered as "Failure to vote lowers the score"). This treatment avoids the sort of anomalous cases examined in the last paragraph; in 1975 and 1976 an average of over 5 percent of Representatives had ADAREC scores which differed from their official A.D.A. scores by 15 or more on a 0 to 100 scale. Fourth, the recalculated ratings appear to be more reliable than the official ratings, although I can only cite the appropriate correlations for 1975 and 1976. In Table 1 it can be seen that the four pairs of recalculated ratings each have higher correlations than the corresponding pairs of official ratings.

TABLE 1: Pearson correlations between 1975-76 indices

	1975 ADA with 1976 ADA -----	1975 ACA with 1976 ACA -----	1975 ADA with 1975 ACA -----	1976 ADA with 1976 ACA -----
Official ratings	0.9333	0.9571	-0.9283	-0.9047
Recalculated ratings	0.9548	0.9581	-0.9469	-0.9360

The purpose of combining the two recalculated ratings into a COMREC score is to use more observations in determining a Representative's score, to reduce random effects, and to provide a Madisonian organizational check and balance which seems entirely appropriate in this setting. To get the combined rating for any year we simply subtract the recalculated A.D.A. score from the recalculated A.C.A. score for the same year, e.g. $COMREC75 = ACAREC75 - ADAREC75$, to give a range of possible scores from -100 to +100. The advantage can be seen immediately for 1975-76. Whereas the two ADARECs correlated at 0.9548 and the two ACARECs correlated at 0.9581 (see Table 1), the correlation between COMREC75 and COMREC76 is even higher at 0.9791 .

We are now in a position to look across the ten years to see whether this correlation is untypical. There is a COMREC for each year, from COMREC67 to COMREC76, and thus we can take out nine correlations between COMRECs pairs of successive years, as in Table 2.

TABLE 2: Pearson correlations between COMREC scores in successive years

COMREC67/COMREC68	0.9701	COMREC72/COMREC73	0.9557
COMREC68/COMREC69	0.9461	COMREC73/COMREC74	0.9374
COMREC69/COMREC70	0.9557	COMREC74/COMREC75	0.9411
COMREC70/COMREC71	0.9540	COMREC75/COMREC76	0.9791
COMREC71/COMREC72	0.9620		

These are extraordinarily high correlations, given that the variables record a series of independent observations. They record empirical findings, in no way determined by the logic of the method. Each year's COMREC rating for each Representative is arrived at by studying that individual's voting behavior on a set of roll-calls quite distinct from the set used for any other year's COMREC. There is no overlapping of votes between years. There is nothing in the nature of the indices to prevent a Representative getting very different COMRECs in different years, and enough Representatives do so to establish that the possibility exists - they are exceptions which prove that the rule is in the world, not in the calculations. Consider the cases of the three Representatives whose official scores in 1975-76 were analysed above. Their COMREC scores in each of the ten years were as follows:-

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Udall:	-89	-92	-78	-83	-88	-100	-76	-75	-75	-100;
Riegle:	+33	-2	-47	-52	-70	-95	-82	-93	-93	-92;
Hebert:	+57	+33	+69	+51	+72	999	+55	+77	+76	+63.

Whilst Udall shows up as a consistently strong liberal, and Hebert as not quite so consistent nor so strongly conservative as we might have expected, Riegle shows up as having shifted his position to the left quite dramatically from moderate conservative in 1967 to strong liberal from 1971 onwards. The strength of the correlations between the ideological ratings of the members of the House may or may not surprise, but that strength is a finding rather than an artefact of the method. Nor would it be possible, even if it were desired, for the organizations to choose roll-calls retrospectively in order to make scores consistent over the years, because a set of roll-calls selected to make one Representative's scores consistent with his/her earlier scores would not have the same effect on other Representatives' scores. Even when we check the ratings of Representatives for constancy over periods longer than one year, the relationship remains very strong. The 45 correlations between pairs from the ten COMRECs are all high; they range from COMREC67/COMREC74 at 0.8399 to COMREC75/COMREC76 at 0.9791, and only 5 of the 45 are below 0.9000 . In the eight year period 1969-76, the lowest of the 28 possible correlations is COMREC70/COMREC74 at 0.9254 . (COMREC67 appears to be less like the other years than they are like each other.) Although there is some falling off of the relationship over time, it is by no means uniform. For the 200 members with a valid ideological scores in both 1967 and 1976, the correlation between COMREC67 and COMREC76 was still 0.8994 .

A reasonable interpretation of these results is that COMREC is a reliable measure of a real underlying quality/concept/variable, and that that quality tends to be very stable over time in individual Representatives but can change sharply. None of the figures reported can, of course, prove the validity of COMREC as a measure of general

ideological stance in Representatives. The claim to validity must rest upon the intuitive appeal of the argument in the earlier sections of this paper and upon the lack of any more plausible alternative account of the meaning of the real quality which is being reliably measured by COMREC. If Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action, organizations which seek to judge the overall ideological stance of each Representative each year, are claimed to be reliably but unintentionally selecting roll-calls which measure not ideological stance but something else instead, it seems fair to put the onus of specifying what that something else is, and of establishing that the organizations are unintentionally measuring it, on the person making the claim.

Before more of the findings of this study are presented, a variation on the COMREC theme needs to be introduced. It seemed useful to take the two years of a Congress as a whole rather than measure each year separately. The use of even more observations to determine each score helps further to get rid of random effects and to avoid too much 'graininess' in the measure. Further, the two-year interval between elections makes two years seem a natural time unit for this kind of study and helps to ensure that it is indeed overall ideological stance that we will measure rather than more temporary patterns which might appear systematically during particular parts of a 2-year term, e.g. in the run up to the election. For each member of the House for each Congress an index was calculated from A.D.A. votes for the two-years of that Congress and subtracted from a similar index calculated from A.C.A. votes over the same two years to give a combined measure for the two-year Congress considered as a whole. This measure of each Representative's general ideological stance over a two-year Congress was abbreviated as IDEOL. For the 90th Congress 1967-68, for example, we have:

IDEOL6768 = ACAREC6768 - ADAREC6768, where

$$ACAREC6768 = \frac{\text{No. of conservative stands on 52 ACA 1967-68 issues}}{\text{No. of lib. or cons. stands on the same 52 issues}} \times 100$$

and

$$ADAREC6768 = \frac{\text{No. of liberal stands on 27 ADA 1967-68 issues}}{\text{No. of lib. or cons. stands on the same 27 issues}} \times 100$$

As in COMREC, the principle is preserved that the two rating organizations should have equal influence on the overall rating regardless of how many roll-calls each organization considered in reaching its own judgments. In fact, the discrepancy in the number of votes used by A.C.A. and A.D.A. was usually smaller than in the 1967-68 example used here; in 1967-76, A.C.A. used an average of 47.4 roll-calls per Congress and A.D.A. an average of 41.2 .

The correlations of this index across successive Congresses are set out in Table 3, below. For IDEOL, as for the 1-year index COMREC, the correlations are strikingly high for a social variable based on independent observations. IDEOL is in fact even more impressive than COMREC in this regard, since the average of the correlations and the minimum of the correlations are both higher for IDEOL than for COMREC (see Table 2) despite the increase in average interval between observations from 1 year to 2 years. It seems reasonable to feel that the change to the two-year index has been justified, and it will be used exclusively for the remainder of this paper.

TABLE 3: Correlations of IDEOL in successive Congresses 1967-76

IDEOL6768/IDEOL6970	0.9484	IDEOL7172/IDEOL7374	0.9762
IDEOL6970/IDEOL7172	0.9685	IDEOL7374/IDEOL7576	0.9730

The index of a Representative's overall ideological stance in a two-year Congress, IDEOL, shows very high consistency over the period 1967-76. The lowest correlation for pairs of successive Congresses is 0.9484, and the average of the four is 0.9665. The lowest correlation on a matrix of the five IDEOLs is that between the first and the last (IDEOL6768/ IDEOL7576), and even that is 0.9172 (N=205). The predictive power of this ideological rating from one Congress to the next is very great, since the average explained variance is above 93%, and for those members of the House who survived from the 90th to the 94th Congress IDEOL6768 explains 84% of the variance on IDEOL7576. (It would be interesting to know whether these 205 Representatives would be pleased to find how consistent and true to their respective personal political philosophies they have been, or displeased to discover their own predictability.)

Even if my claim that we have here a highly satisfactory empirical method of placing each Representative on an ideological scale from -100 to +100 is accepted, three limits to that claim should be noted. First, this is an instrument to measure ideologies in the American mainstream and not at the fringes. It would not tell us, for example, whether a pro-Peking communist was the left of a pro-Moscow communist. Second, though we may learn what overall public ideological stance a Representative takes by checking his/her IDEOL rating, we do not know why (s)he takes that stance. It may well represent his/her personal political philosophy, but it may just as well represent the ideological impression (s)he judges (s)he has to give in order to please some ideologically conscious group on which (s)he depends or to which (s)he feels (s)he should defer. The most likely location of such a group is in his/her District, and the consistency over time which has been shown to exist in the voting behavior of Representatives might be a reflection of the ideological

constancy of dominant groups back home. Third, the very high correlations between ratings at different times do not mean that individual Representatives are highly likely to get the same numerical IDEOL score in each Congress, but only that they are highly likely to be in the same sort of relative position among their fellows (which is to say considerably more than merely that they are likely to occupy the same sort of rank). A series of examinations given to the same math class might show the relative merits of the individual students with great consistency, yet because the examinations had different degrees of difficulty the class average mark could vary from examination to examination. There is an analogy between a difficult examination question and an issue on which few Representatives take a conservative position; if the set of rating roll-calls ('the examination') in a given Congress contains a high proportion of such issues ('difficult examination questions') then average scores on the rating for that Congress will tend to be lower than for other Congresses even though the conservatism of the individual Representatives in relation to each other remains the same and the scores correlate well between Congresses.

We can get a sense of the existence of this 'difficult examination' problem by looking at the way a constant group fared across the five IDEOL ratings. The mean scores on the successive ratings from IDEOL6768 to IDEOL7576 for the constant group of 197 Representatives who had valid scores in all five Congresses are shown in Table 4. Although it is possible that the members of this group were changing ideologically even in relation to their fellows it is also possible, and in my view more likely, that it is the changing proportion of few-Representatives-taking-conservative-stand issues in the sets chosen by A.C.A. and A.D.A. in successive Congresses that mainly accounts for the change in mean scores. However, it is important to note that the mean IDEOL scores for this constant group of Representatives changed much less than they might have from Congress to Congress. The indications are that the 'degree of difficulty of the examination' did not in fact change much, and that (happily) a Representative in the same relative ideological position among his/her fellows in two successive Congresses is likely to have much the same numerical score on the two successive IDEOL ratings.

Table 4: Mean IDEOL ratings for group with valid ratings
in all five Congresses

IDEOL6768	-6.7	IDEOL7172	-0.4	IDEOL7576	-1.1
IDEOL6970	-5.6	IDEOL7374	-7.3		

(N = 197)

Having established the nature and reliability of this method of attributing ideological scores to individual Representatives, we may now connect it with political parties. As a start, we can give a quantified empirical version of Butler's impressionistic analysis of ideology in U.S. political parties (see Figures 1 and 2). Figure 3 shows frequency distributions of overall ideological stance within the two parties in the House of Representatives in the 90th Congress (IDEOL6768, Figure 3A) and in the 94th Congress (IDEOL7576, Figure 3B). Butler's analysis seems basically sound, except that the distribution for each party is considerably more bunched towards its end of the scale than he envisioned, so that the parties overall are even more different than Butler suggested. Table 5 provides the figures on party medians, distance between medians, and party overlap for each of the five Congresses under study.

What conclusions can we draw from these figures and tables? First, that the ideological overlap between the party ranges, varying from 165 to 190 on a 200 point scale, is so great that in Congressional politics it would make no sense to claim that the left side of the spectrum is Democrat territory and the right side is Republican territory. The Democrats spread over virtually the whole spectrum throughout the period, and the Republicans stretch from the far right to well into the left. As the Republicans advance toward the liberal end of the spectrum progressed fairly steadily over the period 1967-76, the overlap between the parties became more extreme until in 1975-76 it occupied 190 out of the range of 200 on the spectrum.




FIGURE 3A: Frequency distributions of ideological score of Democrats and Republicans in House of Representatives 1967-68




FIGURE 3B: Frequency distributions of ideological scores of Democrats and Republicans in House of Representatives 1975-76

**Table 5: Party medians and ranges on overall rating (IDEOL)
1967-76**

	<u>Democ.</u> <u>Median</u>	<u>Repub.</u> <u>Median</u>	<u>Party</u> <u>Diff.</u>	<u>Democ.</u> <u>Minim.</u>	<u>Democ.</u> <u>Maxim.</u>	<u>Repub</u> <u>Minim</u>	<u>Repub</u> <u>Maxim</u>	<u>Party</u> <u>Overlap</u>
1967-68	-65	77	142	-98	98	-67	98	165
1969-70	-40	53	93	-100	91	-77	93	168
1971-72	-42	70	112	-98	96	-91	100	187
1973-74	-46	59	105	-98	93	-91	100	184
1975-76	-57	67	124	-100	98	-92	100	190

(All figures are rounded to the nearest whole number)

Second, if we consider not each party's spread but each party's central ideological tendency as measured by the position of its median Representative, we find a totally different situation. In these terms, the ideological difference between the parties is great, with the Democratic Party clearly on the left and the Republican Party clearly on the right. On a 200 point spectrum, the difference between the party medians has been as high as 142 and was never lower than 93 - a clear difference indeed! (Although I think the median is the appropriate measure of central tendency to use here, it may be of interest to know that even the party means were also widely separated - the gap ranging from 65 in 1969-70 to 94 in 1967-68.)

It is worth noting that these sharp differences in the aggregate ideological character of the Congressional parties have emerged without resorting to the 'Conservative coalition' device of treating Southern Democrats as if they were Republicans. Figures 4A and 4B show where the Southerners were inside the Democrat distribution for 1967-68 and 1975-76 respectively. (Throughout this analysis, I have followed the practice of using the term 'Southern' to refer to a group of ten states - the Confederate states other than Tennessee - which are classified as 'Solid South' in the I.C.P.S.R. data set.) Although the Southern Democrats are very much bunched to the right within the total Democrat distribution, there are still some Northern Democrats on the right and some Southern Democrats on the left. Further, as a comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 4 will reveal, the median Southern Democrat is to the left of the median Republican in both 1967-68 and 1975-76. This is also true for 1971-72 and 1973-74, though not for 1969-70. The Northern Democrats are, of course, even further from the Republicans than are Democrats as a




FIGURE 4A: Frequency distributions of ideological scores of all Democrats and Southern Democrats in House of Representatives 1967-68




FIGURE 4B: Frequency distributions of ideological scores of all Democrats and Southern Democrats in House of Representatives 1975-76

whole. The median Northern Democrat was 153 points to the left of the median Republican in 1967-68 (N.D. -76, R. +77) and 133 points to the left in 1975-76 (N.D. -66, R. +67).

For any given state, a diagram can be produced to display the positions on the IDEOL scale of each of its Representatives in each Congress over the period studied, differentiating between the two political parties. For example, Figure 5A does this for Michigan, and gives quite a vivid impression of the ideological shifts or stability of individual Representatives. Dingell held a steady ideological position at the right-hand end of the Democrat spread (for the first four of the five Congresses, he and Griffith exchanged first and second place as the right-most Democrats). Esch was, apart from Riegle, always the left-most Republican in the state delegation throughout the period. Dingell and Esch represent that relative ideological constancy which is the common pattern for Representatives. Riegle's pattern is an uncommon one; his sharp move to the left stands out in the diagram. By 1971-72 he had moved a long way (65 points) to the left of the next left-most Republican, Esch; in 1973-74 he had become a Democrat and his move to the left continued.

Figure 5B gives the same display for Californian Representatives. Sisk (D.) and Bell (R.) show stable positions among their fellows over the five Congresses along the same lines as Dingell and Esch in Michigan. Wiggins (R.) moves slowly but fairly steadily to the left inside his party. McCloskey entered the House during the course of the 90th Congress and did not get an IDEOL rating. His one-year COMREC68 rating, however, was the same as Bell's, so his starting point and progress up to 1973-74 are very similar to Riegle's. McCloskey, however, did not change party, and in 1975-76 seems to have pulled back a little towards his fellow Californian Republicans. Even so, in that Congress as in the one before it, the ideological distance between McCloskey and his nearest fellow Californian Republican was greater than the entire spread of all Republicans except him; his IDEOL7576 rating was -33 and the other Republicans in the state spread from +54 to +96. The Californian rules do not seem to fit McCloskey. For example, McCloskey apart, all the 191 valid IDEOL ratings made in these five Congresses for Californians fit the rule that every Democrat rating was less than zero and every Republican rating was more than zero; with his four IDEOL scores at -30, -63, -64, and -33, McCloskey comes nowhere near fitting the rule.

In looking at other states as well as California I have come to the conclusion that it may be more useful to make strong generalizations about party, state, and ideology and accept that a small number of cases do not fit them, than to dilute the content of the claim enough to make it absolutely universal. In Riegle's case there is little difficulty in finding a reason to treat him as an exception. If a Republican Representative is under such internal or external pressures that he finally switches to the Democrats, one cannot be surprised if his behavior ceases to be typical of Republicans in his state even before he makes the switch. (One can observe the same exceptional pattern working in the case




FIGURE 5A: Ideological ratings of Democrat & Republican Congressmen
 State: MICHIGAN
 Period: 1967-76




FIGURE 5B: Ideological ratings of Democrat & Republican Congressmen
 State: CALIFORNIA
 Period: 1967-76

of Ogden Reid in New York before he made his switch to the Democrats, and the reverse pattern in the case of Jarman (Okla.) before his switch from Democrat to Republican.) In McCloskey's case it is much more arguable what explains his being an exception (my guess is that it is a combination of unusual features of both the man and his district) and, pending further research, I propose to do no more here than acknowledge that he is one.

If we set aside the respective single exceptions, what is immediately striking in the two states we have been looking at is that at no time is there any overlap at all on the ideological scale between other members of the two parties. The right-most Democrat is to the left of the left-most Republican. If we were looking at a state with only a small number of Representatives then, given the aggregate ideological differences between the parties which are displayed in Figure 3, this lack of overlap might not be surprising. But we are here talking about two of the largest states with 19 and 38-43 Representatives respectively. Table 5 showed that the overlap between the ideological spread of the two parties in the House of Representatives as a whole was never less than 165 on a 200 point scale. Even if we were to exclude the ten Southern states, the overlap would never be lower than 151. In the light of Table 5, I remarked that the overlap between the parties was so great that it would make no sense to claim that in Congressional politics the left side of the spectrum was Democrat territory and the right side was Republican territory. But in California and Michigan it does make sense. In California in 1967-68, for example, we could say that the frontier between the two ideological territories lay somewhere between the right-most Democrat position (Johnson on -65) and the left-most Republican position (Bell on +9). In the same state in 1975-76 we could say that the frontier lay somewhere between Sisk (Dem., -16) and Wiggins (Rep., +54); to treat McCloskey as an exception is to treat him, on this analysis, as a Republican in Californian Democrat territory. It would be possible to declare that there was a numerically constant frontier-point between the parties' respective territories in these two states - say 0 in California and -35 in Michigan - but there seems no good reason to do so and at least two reasons not to do so. First, if the 'changing-difficulty-of-examination' problem outlined in Paragraphs 32-33 above means that even a Representative whose ideological position remains constant in relation to his/her fellows can get numerically different IDEOL ratings in each Congress, it is similarly possible that the numerical value of a frontier point between Democrat territory and Republican territory in a state could change even if all the Representatives in the state kept relatively constant ideological positions. Second, since we have seen that the position of the frontier can vary from state to state at a given time, we would not want to rule out in advance the possibility that the position of the frontier can vary from time to time in a given state.

But California and Michigan are quite alike in certain relevant respects. For example, both states have most of their Democrat Representatives in the -100 to -50 section of the ideological spectrum, whereas Figure 3 showed that in Congress as a whole the Democrats covered virtually the entire range from -100 to +100. How does this notion of party territories stand up in those other states where the Democrats spread a long way over

towards the right end of the spectrum? The short answer is that it stands up very well. In most of the Southern states in most of the five Congresses there is either no overlap or a relatively small overlap between the spreads of the two parties. Even when Democrat territory stretches so far to the right that only a small part of the spectrum remains unoccupied, the Republicans in a state still tend to be crowded into that narrow tract on the far right. Figure 6 presents the 5-Congress display for Texas, which is the Southern state that fits the party-territory concept least well. In Texas the Democrats spread from the extreme left all the way across to the plus nineties, leaving only a small space for the Republicans to occupy exclusively. Yet even in this worst-fitting state, that is where most of the Republicans are. Bush in 1967-68 and 1969-70, and Steelman in 1973-74 and 1975-76 have to be conceded as exceptions. (The future President was very close to the national Republican median score on IDEOL for his two terms in Congress, but one can see why Texas Republicans might remember him as something of a liberal!) These exceptions apart, Texas approximates very closely to the non-overlapping-territories pattern; there is no overlap at all in the 90th, 91st and 93rd Congresses and overlaps of 6 and 4 on a 200-point scale in the 92nd and 94th. The frontier between the Democrat and Republican ideological territories in Texas appears to be in the +80 to +90 region, a sharp contrast to the -35 frontier region in Michigan. In both states virtually all the Democrats can be thought of as on the liberal side of politics and virtually all the Republicans as on the Conservative side, in a clear and non-overlapping sense that is not at all applicable nationally. The difference between the states is in their perceptions of where the left ends and the right begins; it seems that a Representative in Michigan with a score higher than, say, -30 is seen as being on the conservative side, while in Texas getting a score lower than +80 marks a person as a liberal.

Of all the fifty states, the one which fits this analysis worst is New York - that awkward exception to so many rules! Figure 7 presents that state's 5-Congress display. Here there is always a considerable ideological overlap between the parties, and that overlap does not disappear if, as mentioned in Paragraph 40 above, we declare Reid to be an exception on the grounds of imminent party change. If we were to declare Reid and Halpern (Republicans) and Biaggi, Delaney, and Stratton (Democrats) exceptions, we would get rid of the overlap completely in 1971-74 and reduce it to 20 or less in the other three Congresses - but five out of 39 or 41 is too many exceptions to swallow without a good reason. The analytic notion of Democrat and Republican ideological territories simply will not work well in the State of New York.




FIGURE 6: Ideological ratings of Democrat & Republican Congressmen
 State: TEXAS
 Period: 1967-76




FIGURE 7: Ideological ratings of Democrat & Republican Congressmen
 State: NEW YORK
 Period: 1967-76

Over all the states, the analysis works in more cases than not without treating even a single Representative as an exception. For the five Congresses the figures are as follows:

<u>Congress</u>	<u>2-party states</u>		<u>1-party states</u>
	<u>No-Overlap</u>	<u>Overlap</u>	
1967-68	28	4	18
1969-70	18	12	20
1971-72	18	17	15
1973-74	24	13	13
1975-76	20	13	17
	-----	-----	-----
1967-76	108	59	83

The 59 overlaps include the 14 that can be seen in Figures 5A, 5B, 6 and 7 (5/5 in New York, 5/5 in Texas, 3/5 in California and 1/5 in Michigan). Some of the overlaps are very small; fourteen of them are 10 points or less. The biggest overlap is 133 in Maryland in 1975-76, and is entirely caused by the intrusion of Representative Gude (R.) far into what would otherwise be clearly Democrat territory. The state with the most serious overlaps (in the sense of being there consistently, being numerically large, and not being attributable to one or two clearly anomalous Representatives) is New York.

In order to get a sense whether the notion of a Democrat territory and a Republican territory in each state can bring some order to the chaotic overlapping of the parties in the national legislature, a final diagram has been devised in which the ideological spread of each party in each of the fifty states for a given Congress is incorporated into a single display. Each state is allotted a horizontal line, and on that line are shown (a) the spread from -100 across to the right-most Democrat Representative in that state for that Congress, shown as "O O O O O O", and (b) the spread from the left-most Republican Representative in that state in that Congress across to +100, shown as "I I I I I I". A part of the spectrum in which the parties overlap is shown as "OIOIOI". A line representing a state with no overlap between Democratic territory and Republican territory would therefore be shown as -

O O O O O O O O O O O I I I I I I I I I

A line representing a state where there is an overlap would be shown as -

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O I O I O I O I O I O I I I I I I I I I I I I

The whole appearance of the line is determined by the score of only one limiting case in each party, its 'forward Representative', i.e. the right-most Democrat and the left-most Republican. If the entire state delegation is of one party, the appearance of that state's

line will be determined by the score of only one forward Representative, that party's limiting case.

Two important things follow from this method of representing each state on a line. First, the display does not disguise the existence of Representatives in a state whose position is anomalous on the party-territory analysis. On the contrary, it positively focuses attention on such anomalies, because if a state contains an anomalous case then that case will be one of the two forward Representatives who entirely determine the appearance of that state's line. Second, the appearance of a state's line is in no way affected by the central ideological tendency of each party in that state as represented by the party medians, because a median is a measure which is independent of the position of the limiting case (unless there are only either one or two Representatives from that party in that state). As the method of ranking the states on the display depends only on party medians in each state, it follows that any pattern that shows up is not generated by the method used.

The states are ranked in these displays in a common order for all five Congresses. This ranking is based on all the party medians in that state during the five Congresses. If a state was two-party throughout, there are ten such party medians; if it was two-party for two Congresses and one-party for three Congresses, there will be seven such medians. States which had had only Democrats for the ten years or only Republicans for the ten years were excluded initially, and the remaining 44 states were ranked according to the mid-point between the mean of their Democrat medians for such Congresses as they had any Democrats and the mean of their Republican medians for such Congresses as they had any Republicans. Each of the two states (Hawaii and Rhode Island) which had only had Democrats throughout the ten years were then each put into the ranking next to the state whose mean of Democrat medians was closest to it. The same was done, mutatis mutandis, for the four states (Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska and Vermont) which had only Republicans.

The displays for the first and last Congresses are shown in Figure 8A (1967-68) and Figure 8B (1975-76). Despite the facts that the order in which the states are ranked vertically is based on their party medians over five Congresses and that the horizontal nature of each state's line is determined solely by the position of its two forward Representatives in a single Congress, there is a very evident relationship between the two dimensions. The two-bend monotonic line from near the bottom left of each figure to near its top right is a first crude attempt to show the frontier between Democrat and Republican ideological territories across the nation as a whole. That diagonal line does violence to very few of the more refined state-by-state frontiers as shown by the location of gaps on the horizontal lines. In some states the forward Representatives are well back from the ideological frontier and there is a wide gap between the parties' forward posts. (Arizona for example, seems to be the Grand Canyon State in a new sense.) In other states, Massachusetts for example, the forward Representatives are very close to each




FIGURE 8A: Democrat and Republican ideological territories by state, 1967-68.

OOOOOOOO = Distance from -100 to forward Democrat.

IIIIIIII = Distance from forward Republican to +100.

other. In four states in 1967-68 and thirteen in 1975-76, there is an overlap which takes the precise edge off the analysis. However, most of these overlaps are relatively narrow and (as we have seen in our earlier case studies) some are produced entirely by a single maverick, for whose location in what we would expect on overall indications to be the other party's territory there may be a special or even a systematic explanation. At least in one state, New York, the overlap seems ineradicable.

Nevertheless, even if it has rough edges, the pattern is sufficiently discernible to be remarked upon. At national level there is no such thing as Democrat territory on the left and Republican territory on the right; in the five Congresses studied, the party overlap took up between 80% and 95% of the entire ideological spectrum. But within each state, the voters can think of the Democrats as occupying the ideological territory on the left and the Republicans as occupying the ideological territory on the right. What differentiates the states is not any variation on which party they see as being on which side, but only their notion of where the left ends and the right begins, of where the frontier between the party territories is located. On that issue, the states differ radically. In Massachusetts the frontier seems to be in the region of -50 to -60 on the IDEOL scale; in Louisiana the frontier seems to be in the region of +80 to +90 . Perhaps some suggestion emerges from a comparison of Figure 8A with Figure 8B that the difference in ideological standards between states diminished between 1968 and 1976, but it is no more than a suggestion. Within states too, the borderline between the parties' respective ideological territories may be more hazy than it used to be; but even a hazy borderline can leave big areas quite clearly on one or the other side of it. Certainly, the ideological frontier between the parties within each state is as sharp as the national ideological frontier between the parties in Britain, although the necessity for party discipline on legislative votes in the Westminster system disguises the ideological overlap and it will be a long time before roll-call votes are taken in the party room!

CONCLUSION: The useful concept of a single left-right dimension, and a scale to measure it, need not be abandoned in studies of Congress. Although any attempt to place Representatives on such a scale using an attitude-questionnaire seems likely to fail, and attempts by researchers to select ideologically significant roll-calls face problems almost as formidable, a scale has been developed which uses the roll-calls selected by A.D.A. and A.C.A., but recalculates their ratings by a consistent and theoretically defensible method and then combines them into a single rating for each Congress. This rating, IDEOL, reveals a great deal of ideological consistency by Representatives over the period 1967-76. At the individual level, ratings from one Congress are powerful predictors of ratings in future Congresses. The ratings can be used to show that there are very substantial ideological differences between the parties at the aggregate level. Further, although the overlap between the parties in Congress on this ideological scale occupies so large a part of the available ideological range that there can be no coherent concept of Democrat and Republican ideological territories, a state-by-state analysis makes the overlap completely disappear in most cases and very substantially reduces it in the remaining cases.

The Democrats are on the left and the Republicans on the right of each state's ideological spectrum; what differentiates the states is their sense of where the frontier between left and right is located, and this varies widely from around -60 to around +85 in a total ideological range of -100 to +100. The impression of ideological confusion between the parties in Congress arises only if these radical differences in state standards are overlooked.

Footnotes

1. "The Paradox of Party Difference", American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1960.
2. "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers", by Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara in American Political Science Review, Vol. LIV, No. 2, June 1960.
3. Ibid., p. 410.
4. Ibid., p. 409.

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