Title
Essays on the Politics of Solidarity in Multiracial America

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Publication Date
2021

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Essays on the Politics of Solidarity in Multiracial America

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

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Professor Taeku Lee, Co-chair
Professor Eric Schickler
Professor Irene Bloemraad

Spring 2021

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Abstract

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This dissertation investigates how government policies influenced U.S. minority coalition formation in the 1960s and 1970s. I argue that the key to explaining this puzzle lies in ethnic elites' strategic calculations, as influenced by historical legacies, policy changes, and variations. Chapter 2 examines why American minority mobilization emphasized race so much in the 1960s and 1970s. In leveraging the Chinese immigrant communities along the U.S.–Canadian border on the West Coast, I found that what makes the U.S. unique is its immigration and segregation policies. Chapter 3 investigates why Asian and Latin American national origin groups joined forces as Asian Americans and Latinos in the 1960s and 1970s. I explain the welfare state as an underappreciated mechanism that mobilized these intra-racial coalitions. Chapter 4 examines why inter-racial coalitions were rare or short-lived in the 1960s and 1970s. I found that although racial minority groups are often described collectively as people of color, their issues varied because they faced different policy challenges. Additionally, the misalignment of political agendas made coordinating actions among them difficult. Taken together, these three chapters highlight how combining a historical perspective and strategic analysis offers new insights into the contingent nature of minority coalition formation in the U.S. and beyond. The rich archival, organizational, and text data I assembled provide an example of how to undertake historical research on marginalized groups in a data-intensive way.

To the memory of my father, Myung-Ryul Kim, 1954-2013.

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Acknowledgments

As I prepare to submit this Ph.D. dissertation, I am pleased to acknowledge the many people who have made this journey possible. Byung-Kook Kim, Sing Ming, Dong-Sun Lee, and Joe Eaton put me on the path to be where I am today. Without their encouragement, I would have not been able to dream of or plan to attend graduate school. Paul Pierson, Taeku Lee, Eric Schickler, and Irene Bloemraad have been wonderful dissertation advisors. They have provided intellectual and professional support more than I could ask for. I am in deep gratitude to my advisors for putting their constant faith in me and my dissertation project. I am also grateful to Ruth Collier, Laura Stoker, Gabe Lenz, Margaret Weir, Reuel Rogers, Jonathan Simon, Mark Brilliant, Cybelle Fox, G. Christina Mora, Sarah Anzia, Martha Wilfahrt, Robert Mickey, Morris Levy, Chris Ansell, Terri Bimes, Henry Yu, Hakeem Jefferson, Angela X. Ocampo, Karen Tani, Christian Collet, Desmond Ang, Eric Guntermann, and Max Goplerud for their constructive comments on my dissertation project.

My friends and colleagues at Berkeley Political Science and beyond deserve special thanks. My intellectual development as a political scientist benefited immensely from frequent discussions with Andrew McCall, Anustubh Agnihotri, Demetria McAleer, Laura Jákli, Donghyuun Danny Choi, Jake Grumbach, Rachel Bernhard, Rhea Myerscough, Chris Kennedy, Justine Davis, Neil O'Brian, Christian Hosam, Bhumi Purohit, Otto Kienitz, Alan Yan, Soo Sun Yoo, Alexander Sahn, Jieun Kim, Sarah Lee, Pranav Gupta, Stephanie Peng, Anna Mikkelborg, Matthew Stenberg, Makoto Fukumoto and Surili Sheth. I was also incredibly fortunate to co-found the Berkeley Historical Social Science Workshop (with Otto Kienitz) and Race, Resistance, and Inequality Workshop (with Andrew McCall, Rhea Myerscough, Christian Hosam, and Anna Mikkelborg). I have also been a regular member and once served as a coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Immigration Workshop (IIW). All of my dissertation chapters were presented at the IIW and improved substantially through discussions with the workshop members. Hahrie Han and Milan de Vries at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University invited me to work on a project that uses big data and machine learning to track civic organizations in the United States. This collaboration was tremendously helpful to finding new ways to extend my dissertation research.

Several people have enabled me to mature as a computational social scientist. Matthew Salganik and Chris Bail, co-founders of the Summer Institute in Computational Social Science (SICSS), have helped me become part of the growing computational social science community. Following their examples, with Nick Camp and Jaren Haber, I co-organized the Summer Institute in Computational Social Science in the San Francisco (BAY-SICSS). Andrew Thomson became a coauthor. Many other SICSS-Princeton 2019 alumni have become my close friends. Claudia von Vacano, Aaron Culich, and Evan Muzzall at D-Lab and Anthony Suen at Data Science Education Program at Berkeley have supported the advancement of my data science skills and expanded my professional network. It was sheer pleasure to co-develop the Bias and Fairness in Machine Learning Workshop with Aniket Kesari, Avery Richard, and Renata Barreto at D-Lab and co-instruct Data Science Discovery Team Lead Seminar with Arlo Malmberg and Ishaan Malhi at Data Science Education Program.

The three chapters of my dissertation were previously published in *Studies in American Political Development* (Chapter 2), *Political Research Quarterly* (Chapter 3), and *Journal of Computational Social Science* (Chapter 4). I am grateful to the editors and anonymous reviewers of these journals for their thoughtful and helpful feedback.

Several fellowships provided me financial and intellectual support. The Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies Doctoral Fellowship generously funded my graduate study for five years. I also acknowledge research funding from the California Poverty and Socioeconomic Inequality Fellows Program, the Berkeley Empirical Legal Studies Fellowship and the American Democracy Project Fellowship.

Last but not least, I thank my late father Myung-Ryul Kim, my mother Inja Kang, my wife Sunmin Yun, and my daughter Jane Kim for their support. My father was a factory worker of 32 years at a paper mill, but he loved and valued learning. If he were alive today, he would have been very proud. My mother has loved me like no one else. I was born with a birth defect and faced many challenges due to frequent surgeries, hospital stays, and uneasy social relationships. My mother's endless prayers, sacrifices, and love gave me the strength to endure and prevail. Marrying Sunmin was such a blessing in my life. I decided to come to Berkeley because the San Francisco Bay Area is a great place for Sunmin to further pursue her career as an engineer. While I was doing my Ph.D., she earned her master's degree, completed an internship, and eventually landed a job. I have been in constant awe of her humility, competence, and compassion. Since Jane joined as a new member of Kim's family three years ago, she has made Sunmin and me happier everyday. Her smile is the perfect cure to all our pains, sorrows, and worries.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the U.S., race is not just a demographic label, but the socioeconomic status that determines one's life chances. Based on the African American experience, scholars have argued that the marginalized racial status shared by ethnic minority groups is what brings them together in the U.S. (M. C. Dawson 1994; Marable 1994; Omi and Winant 1986; Jennings 1997).

The African American experience, however, is an exception rather than the norm. Despite their shared racial status as "Orientals," Asian Americans remained divided along national origin lines until the 1960s and 1970s (Y. Espiritu 1993; Okamoto 2014). A parallel pattern is seen among Latinos (Padilla 1985; Mora 2014). These cases illustrate that race-based coalitions among minority groups are not an inevitable but, rather, a historically contingent outcome (Rogers 2006).

Focusing on group heterogeneity, policy design, and historical development helps explain why race-based coalitions among ethnic minority groups emerged at particular times and places in U.S. history. Although racial minority groups share a marginalized status, they have different sizes, internal divisions, and relationships with other groups. Furthermore, because different kinds of policies are introduced over time and their treatments vary across racial groups, different groups face different policy challenges. These factors influence ethnic elites' calculations of what they can expect to gain (or lose) from pursuing different political strategies (i.e., assimilation and racial solidarity).

This dissertation investigates how government policies influenced U.S. minority coalition formation in the 1960s and 1970s. The main subjects of the dissertation are community organizers from ethnic minority communities, as they were directly involved in coalition-building efforts during this watershed period in U.S. history. In three chapters, this dissertation attempts to understand how historical legacies, policy changes, and variations influence when, where, and how these community organizers formed coalitions and with whom.

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines how historical legacies influence the formation of race-based coalitions among ethnic minority groups. Chapter 3 discusses how policy changes shape the formation of inter-racial coalitions among ethnic minority groups. Chapter 4 outlines how policy variations make the formation of inter-racial coalitions difficult. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation's key findings and implications.

Chapter 2

Racism Is Not Enough: Minority Coalition Building in San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver[1,2,3]

Scholars have long argued that the marginalized racial status shared by ethnic minority groups is a strong incentive for mobilization and coalition building in the United States (U.S). However, despite their members' shared racial status as "Orientals," different types of housing coalitions were formed in the Chinatowns of San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver during the 1960s and 1970s. Asian race-based coalitions appeared in San Francisco and Seattle, but not in Vancouver, where a cross-racial coalition was built between the Chinese and southern and eastern Europeans. Drawing on exogenous shocks and process tracing, this paper explains how historical legacies—specifically, the political geography of settlement—shaped this divergence. These findings demonstrate how long-term historical analysis offers new insights into the study of minority coalition formation in the U.S.

Scholars have long argued that the marginalized racial status shared by ethnic minority groups is a strong incentive for mobilization and coalition building in the U.S. (M. C. Dawson 1994; Marable 1994; Omi and Winant 1986; Jennings 1997). This shared racial status argument applies well to the case of African Americans whose group cohesion was forged by the experience of slavery, Jim Crow, and the civil rights movement. Nevertheless, this theoretical tradition does

[1]This chapter was published in "Studies in American Political Development," 2020, 34 (2): 195–215.

[2]I thank Taeku lee, Paul Pierson, Eric Schickler, Irene Bloemraad, Reuel Rogers, Cybelle Fox, Christina Mora, Henry Yu, Ruth Collier, Dani Carrillo, Andrew McCall, Jake Grumbach, Otto Kienitz, Angela X. Ocampo, and Desirée Valadares for their constructive comments and the editors and anonymous referees at the *Studies in American Political Development* for their thoughtful suggestions. I am also grateful to Ceci Cruz for providing a space for me at the University of British Columbia and librarians at the Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley and archivists at the City of Vancouver Archives for their assistance. This research is supported by the Edward Hildebrand Research Fellowship.

[3]All replication files can be found at https://github.com/jaeyk/analyzing-archival-data

not necessarily square with other groups. Although Afro-Caribbeans and African Americans were both subjected to similar racism in New York City, their presumed alliance faltered because their leaders had conflicting interests regarding the two groups' descriptive representation (Rogers 2004, 2006). Despite their shared racial status as "Orientals," Asian Americans remained divided along national origin lines until a new generation of activists raised their collective voices in the 1960s and 1970s (Y. Espiritu 1993; Okamoto 2014). A parallel pattern is seen among Latinos, as a coalition between Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans was an unrealistic idea before the 1960s (Padilla 1985; Mora 2014). These cases suggest that race-based coalitions among minorities[4] are not ubiquitous in the U.S. The fact that race has not always been a unifying force for minority groups prompts the following question: Under what conditions do political elites in one ethnic group decide to form a coalition with another ethnic group that shares the same racial status?

To answer this question, it is important to view the American case from comparative perspectives. Because racial hierarchy has long been an integral part of the American political order (King and Smith 2005), scholars of American politics have rarely challenged the view that coalitions established between racial minority groups are highly likely, if not inevitable. One prominent scholar of racial and ethnic politics commented (M. Dawson 1994, 199) that although "there is nothing deterministic about race becoming a constitutive organizing principle", it became "such a principle for the United States, where white supremacy is not an ideology, but a system of power relations that structures society." In short, the U.S. is exceptional because of its deep racial cleavage (Myrdal 1944).

However, if we examine the American racial dynamics beyond black and white, it becomes clear that the U.S. is not an isolated case of a racially stratified society. Racially charged prohibitions on Chinese immigration in the late 19th century occurred in the U.S., Canada, and Australia (E. Lee 2007a, 2007b). Particularly interesting is the comparison between the U.S. and Canada. Given their shared legacy of anti-Asian immigration policies and other historical overlaps (Hartz 1969; Brubaker 1989; Castles and Miller 1993; Bloemraad 2011), one might have expected the Chinese in the U.S. and Canada to form coalitions with other Asian ethnic groups when the need for such coalitions arose. The urban renewal projects that swept North America in the post-World War II period offered such an incentive. Most Chinatowns were founded and, thus, located near central business areas that were vulnerable to urban redevelopment. This situation got worse in the mid-20th century due to urban renewal policies. In response, community activists in the Chinatowns of San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver founded new community-based organizations in the 1960s and 1970s based on multiethnic coalitions (Ng 1999; Santos 2002; G. Chin 2015). They built these broader coalitions to promote their political agendas: stopping gentrification and building affordable housing. These cities all shared a long history of institutionalized and unregulated violent anti-Asian racism, which marginalized and relegated Chinese and other Asian ethnic groups to a subordinate racial status

[4]Following Rogers (2004), I intentionally use the term "race-based coalition among minorities" in place of panethnic coalition (Okamoto and Mora 2014). A Race-based coalition among minorities does not imply the inclusion of all ethnic groups as a single racial group. It is simply a multiethnic coalition of people of the same race. Since this study examines how such a boundary is determined, this distinction is important.

as "Orientals" (Anderson 1991). Nevertheless, whereas race-based coalitions linking Chinese and other Asian ethnic groups appeared in San Francisco and Seattle, a cross-racial coalition between Chinese and southern and eastern Europeans emerged in Vancouver.

This cross-national variation is not the only puzzle. The literature also fails to explain critical sub-national and temporal variations. The Asian race-based coalitions in San Francisco and Seattle took different paths. Seattle's Asian race-based coalition for affordable housing predated San Francisco's. This is surprising because the San Francisco Bay Area has been the epicenter of Asian American activism. Indeed, the term "Asian American" was coined by Yuji Ichioka, a Japanese American activist who founded the Asian American Political Alliance at the University of California at Berkeley in 1968. The two coalitions also vary in another important way: While the Chinese in San Francisco built a coalition with Filipinos but not with the Japanese, their counterparts in Seattle included Filipinos as well as Japanese in their coalition. Why did the timing and scope of these two coalitions vary?

In answering these questions, I theorize minority groups as strategic actors because they have huge stakes in almost every political decision they are making or that is made for them due to their lack of resources and influences. If these Chinese lost their battle against gentrification, they would lose their homes and their neighborhoods. For this reason, political elites in one ethnic group decide whether they will ally with another ethnic group that shares the same racial status based on their strategic calculations. They look to minimize coordination costs while maximizing the potential benefits of forming such a multigroup alliance. Specifically, they weigh two factors when choosing a suitable partner: 1) the size of the outgroup and 2) the strength of their social relations with this group. Larger outgroups are useful for asserting political power, but they may also inflate coordination costs depending on whether or not they have close relations with the group making the assessment.

By the time the Chinese needed to choose a coalition partner in the post-1960s political environment, the candidate pool—their friends and neighbors—had already been circumscribed. Immigration policy decided which ethnic groups could enter the country, and segregation policy determined where these groups could live, and how they interacted with each other. Therefore, placing the political analyses of the pre- and post-1960 periods into the same framework is crucial to understanding how historical legacies limited the individual agency of how ethnic elites were able to choose coalition partners. The Chinese in San Francisco and Seattle allied with other Asian ethnic groups because these outgroups had large sizes and were also their friends and neighbors. In contrast, their counterparts in Vancouver forged a coalition with southern and eastern Europeans, because for them, these outgroups satisfied the conditions for ideal coalition partners.

In what follows, I first formulate a historically grounded theory of coalition partner selection. I then explain how a combination of exogenous shocks and process tracing helps us understand how this theory applies to each of the three city cases. After describing the extensive archival materials I collected from both the U.S. and Canada, I compare San Francisco and Vancouver to examine the main theoretical implication and use Seattle as an additional test. These findings demonstrate how long-term historical analysis can offer new insights into the study of minority coalition formation in the U.S. Previous studies tended to examine either the formative pre-1960

period or the post-1960 years to understand the politics of Chinatown. Some scholars who are interested in pre-1960s Chinatown have focused on how racially motivated policies further marginalized and segregated these communities (Anderson 1991; Brooks 2009). Other scholars who are interested in post-1960 Chinatown have concentrated on how Asian American activism generated a new sense of identity and political mobilization during the civil rights movement (Wei 1993; D. J. Maeda 2012; Ishizuka 2016). Looking at only a single historical period tends to blind us to the connections between them—namely, how minority groups exercise their agency and how such agency is shaped by the historical legacies of the political geography of settlement.

2.1 Theory

There are several reasons for the differences between the U.S. and Canadian approaches to minority coalition building. Some scholars have emphasized national culture or institutional differences. For example, Ng (1999, 136) argued that Canadian multiculturalism offered limited incentives for building a broad coalition. However, this argument does not explain why the Chinese in Vancouver built a coalition with southern and eastern Europeans. If multiculturalism offers limited incentives for building a broad coalition, then it should also discourage the formation of any kind of minority coalition, including a cross-racial one. This claim also overlooks the fact that multiculturalism was neither an official policy nor an internalized Canadian attitude toward immigrant adjustment until late in the 20th century. The U.S. and Canada share a much longer history of "racism, nativism, and discrimination" (Palmer 1976, 488-489). Others blame the failure of a parallel Asian Canadian movement (Goellnicht 2000). Nonetheless, new empirical evidence shows that there was indeed such a movement (Izumi 2007). In 1967, Ron Tanaka, a Japanese American professor of English at the University of British Columbia, formed a Japanese Canadian student-centered study group. This study group, influenced by the civil rights and black power movements in the U.S., soon allied with Chinese Canadian students.

Both approaches, however, fail to reveal the root of divergence, because their seeds were sown much earlier. Coalition building is a function of political opportunity and is shaped by the strength of the coalition partners and the alignment of their interests. Both are shaped by past histories of migration and settlement patterns. Therefore, the long-term historical perspective is imperative to examining the underlying connection between their antecedents and outcomes (Wittenberg 2015). I expand this idea here by proposing my theory for how candidates for a minority coalition are selected.

Clientelistic Politics in Chinatown

The Chinese exclusion acts of the late 19th century made the Chinese the first group to be racially excluded by the immigration policies in the U.S. and Canada (E. Lee 2007a). Nonetheless, these restrictive immigration measures did not stop all Chinese immigration to North America. In the

U.S., the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 exempted merchants, teachers, students, and travelers; in Canada, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 did not apply to merchants, diplomats, and students. This differentiation left the door open to both the educated and the privileged. In addition, the definition of who was and was not a "merchant" was left to bureaucratic discretion (Mar 2010). This loophole made it possible for ethnic Chinese brokers to maintain a weak but constant stream of Chinese immigration by disguising Chinese laborers as merchants (Con and Wickberg 1982, 136).

This doubly biased immigration system created a legal and class hierarchy in North America's early Chinese society. At the top of the hierarchy, merchants enjoyed both legal protection and economic security. At the bottom, laborers languished in legal as well as economic uncertainty. The merchants also had both sticks and carrots. Until the 1960s, the U.S. and Canadian governments neglected Chinatown. The Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA), a merchant-led mutual aid society, was Chinatown's unofficial government. The CBA controlled the agenda of the Chinese community in three ways. First, it offered financial assistance to the poor; provided old-age pension, health, and unemployment insurances; and even paid for the funeral services of its members (39). Second, the CBA acted as court judges and settled disputes between both groups and individuals. Finally, it controlled the trade guilds, such as wholesale merchandising, tailoring, barbershops, women's underwear, and laundry. These were the industries that employed most of the Chinese laborers (Pan 1991, 12-13).

These merchants' interests drove the CBA's conservative approach. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinatown was viewed by government officials, as well as the public in North America, as an exotic, unsanitary, and crime-ridden place. Instead of resisting the cultural stigma associated with Chinatown, the CBA took advantage of it and turned Chinatown into a tourist-friendly theme park. Such selling of Orientalism to white tourists dates as far back as the 1880s in San Francisco (Ngai 2005). The tourism industry benefited the Chinese merchants who owned restaurants, gift shops, and other small businesses; increased the tax revenue for the city government; and forged a strong political connection between them (Pan 1991, 82).

Immigration Reform and the Housing Crisis

The resumption of Asian immigration presented the CBA and its merchant supporters with a grave challenge. To begin with, the U.S. repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 and that of Canada in 1947 ended the legal privilege enjoyed by the merchants. In addition, the CBA did not have enough carrots to help the newcomers. When legal immigration resumed, the Chinese population in the U.S. and Canada had grown exponentially since the 1960s (Figure 2.1). As a result, the shortage of housing became a serious social problem. More than 90% of the residential dwelling units in New York's Chinatown during the 1960s had been constructed before 1901 and had chronic problems related to pests, plumbing, and wiring. Some apartments did not even have heat nor refrigeration (B. P. Wong 1982, 46). The situation was not much different in San Francisco's Chinatown, the oldest in North America. Further, whereas the majority of Chinese immigrants have been laborers in the past, the new wave of Chinese immigrants included a substantial number of well-educated members of the middle class. These



Figure 2.1: The Chinese population in the U.S. and Canada. *Sources*: U.S. Census, the American Community Survey, the Census of Canada, and the Canadian National Household Survey

new affluent Chinese bypassed the old Chinese communities and created "uptown" or "satellite" Chinatowns in suburban locations in American and Canadian cities (Kwong 1996; Lai 2003; Zhou 2010). This geographical separation of the affluent and poor Chinese communities exacerbated the inequality within the group, as the old and the poor remained in the urban core, whereas those with means moved to the suburbs (Madokoro 2011).

The younger generation of leaders who grew up in Chinatown as children of immigrants played an important role in addressing these issues. These new Chinatown elites were educated and employed outside the traditional Chinese businesses, such as restaurants and laundry industries. In addition, for the traditional elites, who had lived through the exclusion acts, challenging the status quo was unthinkable. For the new elites, who had but a faint memory of the exclusion acts and who had come of age in the era of the civil rights movement, a radical turn in their activism was both desirable and necessary. Chinatown residents distinguished these two groups by calling the traditional elites as "Kiu Ling" (leaders of the overseas Chinese) and referring to the new elites as "Chuen Ka" (experts in social problems) (B. Wong 1977, 3). These new elites considered the selling of Orientalism to white tourists to be a shortsighted strategy (Umbach and Wishnoff 2008). However, given the interdependence of Chinatown's commercial and residential areas, anything that affected one also affected the other.

These new actors appeared on the stage at the right time. In the previous generation, restrictive immigration and other discriminatory policies had protected the merchants' privileged status in the community. In the 1960s, the pendulum swung the other way. In the U.S., President

Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty programs expanded the benefits of the welfare state to nonwhites (Orleck and Hazirjian 2011). In Canada, the Liberal government announced the Canadian version of the War on Poverty in 1965 (Ismael 2006, 28-29), and its byproduct, the Canada Assistance Plan of 1966, played a parallel role (A. B. Chan 1983, 148-149). Thanks to these new access points to power and resources, people who organized public protests, navigated the bureaucracy, and wrote grant proposals began to take a more prominent role in their own communities. In addition, the "policy feedback effect" (Pierson 1993) made the relationship between these new elites and the government closer. As the new elites gained more political knowledge and became more deeply connected to politicians and bureaucrats, they were able to gain more access to both power and resources. In turn, politicians and bureaucrats began to rely more on these intermediary actors to deliver services to the diverse minority communities at lower transaction costs (Jenkins 1988; Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010).

Rightful Resistance and Minority Coalition Building

In terms of housing policy, the new elites had more complicated and ambitious goals. Their short-term objective was to stop further gentrification and replacement in Chinatown. Yet, this did not mean that they were satisfied with the status quo—the deteriorating housing conditions in Chinatown. For this reason, their long-term goal was to build low-cost housing for Chinatown's poor and elderly residents.

These new elites used what O'Brien and Li (2006) have called "rightful resistance" to accomplish their political objectives. The idea of rightful resistance rests on the divided house. The weak cannot fight a stronger opponent by meeting force with force. If conflicting interests can split a strong opponent, however, "this division among the powerful" presents an opportunity that the weak can then exploit. In rural China, peasants can fight against corrupt local governments by using the discourse approved by the central government. The weak can go beyond everyday resistance by capitalizing on "the potent symbolic and material capital made available by modern states" (O'Brien 1996, 31-34).

There was also a division among the powerful in 20th-century North America. Local governments depend on property and sales taxes. From their perspective, commercial redevelopment is attractive because it can increase their revenues. Furthermore, the competition between local governments limited their options (Peterson 1981). Cities followed a policy trend of forcing out low-income residents and replacing housing with office buildings in order to remain competitive and draw new investment. In contrast, the federal government relies on income, payroll, corporate income taxes, and other levies. As such, its interests are much less geographically concentrated. By the late 1950s, urban renewal was under attack for evicting low-income and minority residents without finding alternative housing for them. The Model Cities Program, a major urban policy during the War on Poverty, was introduced to appease this criticism by incorporating citizen participation in the rehabilitation process (Frieden and Kaplan 1975, 14-23). In Canada, the Neighborhood Improvement Program and the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program were enacted in the early 1970s to achieve the same policy goal (Broadway 1989, 533). To target the federal government, minority groups thus had to

intensify their strategy. Bureaucrats, for instance, prefer meeting the demands of several groups through one large coalition in order to minimize their coordination costs. Politicians likewise prefer this strategy because it allows them to reach a more significant number of voters at a lower transaction cost. Therefore, minority groups have good reason to expect the government to be more responsive when they stand united (Kuramoto 1976). For Chinese activists, the goal of building a broad—or more precisely a multiethnic—coalition was to enlarge their group so as make a wider appeal to both bureaucrats and politicians. In that sense, it would be better for them to choose a large group as a coalition partner.

Nonetheless, partnering with a large group is not always ideal, because coalition building entails constant negotiations between the prospective partners. Consider the following case. A Chinese community might have two prospective partners. One group might be larger but has little interaction with the Chinese community. Therefore, if these two groups formed a coalition, they would have to start from scratch. The other group might be smaller but still has a close intergroup relationship with the Chinese community; they are friends and neighbors. In terms of the cost of building and maintaining a coalition, partnering with the smaller group is less risky.

In sum, activists should choose a candidate based on two parameters—namely, the size of the candidate group and the strength of the intergroup contacts between themselves and their potential partner. The strength of these intergroup contacts is measured by the geographic proximity between the communities, as well as by whether they share public spaces, such as schools, workplaces, and commercial areas, and for how long and how frequently they contact each other. For strong intergroup contacts, geographical proximity is necessary, but it is not sufficient without shared public places where social interactions can emerge and be well institutionalized (Massey 2013). Of the shared public spaces, schools are particularly crucial because they form social networks among children who later become coalition members. Table 2.1 summarizes the options for candidate selection strategies within these two parameters.

A host of studies has underscored the importance of these parameters when building a multiethnic coalition. Posner (2004) notes that Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia but adversaries in Malawi; the difference is in the sizes of their populations in each country. From the perspective of political elites, these ethnic groups are politically useful only when there are enough of them to increase the elites' chances of winning in a competitive election. Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that intergroup relations can determine whether or not ethnic conflicts can be escalated and resolved at the early stage of intergroup conflict. Having strong intergroup contacts can help pinpoint the sources of disagreements and resolve them.

Contrast this scenario with the case of weak intergroup contacts and their resulting political effects. For instance, Enos (2014) found that introducing two Spanish-speaking people in white homogeneous communities can cause exclusive attitudes among the white residents. Though Enos's study focuses on mass behavior, it has implications for how ethnic elites mobilize their group members. If weak intergroup contacts can harbor exclusive attitudes rather than mutual trust, they offer negative incentives for the elites in either group to argue for coalition building. My theory draws on these works and expands their insights by highlighting the need to create a careful balance between the size of the groups and their intergroup contacts.

	Small size	Large size
Strong intergroup contacts	Easy to build an effective coalition	Easy to build an ineffective coalition
Weak intergroup contacts	Hard to build a coalition but it can be effective	Hard to build even an ineffective coalition

Table 2.1: Candidate selection strategy and expected coalition outcomes

The Limitations of Agency

Past patterns of migration and settlement determined the Chinese choice of their coalition partner. Native hostility and housing discrimination created Chinatowns (Anderson 1991; Brooks 2009). Other ethnic minorities living within or near Chinatown faced similar discrimination. These historical legacies are crucial to understanding how the agency of minority groups was circumscribed. Here, the main insight is that group identities based on place can both unite and divide racial groups. Specifically, how a place is racially segregated along vertical and horizontal dimensions is critical to understanding the conditions under which ethnic minorities build race-based coalitions.

Broadly put, the political geography of settlement consists of two major policies. First, immigration policy determined which ethnic groups and how many of them settled in each city. Second, segregation policy in housing and schools set boundaries between the immigrant groups and the strength of their intergroup contacts. As our focus here is on minority coalition formation, it is important to understand how segregation policy affects both the relationships between dominant and subordinate groups and the relationships between subordinate groups. The demarcating line between dominant and subordinate groups is the vertical dimension of the segregation. This is determined by the dominant cleavage in a respective country, whether it is race, ethnicity, class, religion, or language. The demarcating line between subordinate groups can be either rigid (segmented segregation) or porous (mixed segregation). This line becomes the horizontal dimension of segregation.

As a marginalized group, the Chinese had little control over these policies. Therefore, when the time came for the Chinese to decide who would be their ideal coalition partner during the 1960s and 1970, their neighbors and friends were determined by these past legacies.

As the next step, we examine the way in which the interaction between these two sets of policies shapes minority coalition formation. Immigration policy can create a different combination of Asian populations, a set of Asian ethnic groups of equal size, or a Chinese population that is disproportionately large from Asian ethnic groups. If the size of the Chinese population were not overrepresented among Asian ethnic groups, they would have a strong incentive to build a coalition with other Asian ethnic groups, because they would have little faith in their capacity to achieve their desired policy goals on their own. Further, if segregation policies prevent Asians from interacting with other racial minority groups, then forming a coalition with other Asian ethnic groups would be their only option (Seattle). Nonetheless, if

they were not segregated from other racial minorities, the Chinese could then compare the sizes of the Asian and non-Asian ethnic groups and make a choice between an Asian race-based coalition and a cross-racial-based one.

In contrast, if the Chinese were overrepresented in the Asian ethnic groups, they would likely have stronger faith in their own capacity to achieve their policy goals without outside help. As such, they would then have a weak incentive to form a coalition with other Asian ethnic groups. Again, however, if they were prohibited from interacting with other racial minority groups, then forming a coalition with these other Asian ethnic groups would remain their only option. Nonetheless, they would not pursue this option immediately because they might be tempted to try out and accomplish their policy goals on their own. Given this scenario, an Asian race-based coalition would still likely emerge, albeit more slowly (San Francisco). If the Chinese were not prohibited from interacting with other racial minority groups and if some of these other groups were even larger than the Asian ethnic groups, the Chinese would likely consider a cross-racial coalition (Vancouver). Table 2.2 summarizes these different possible strategic decisions.

	Segmented segregation	Mixed segregation
Diverse Asian population	Abrupt Asian race-based coalition (Seattle)	Asian race-based coalition or cross-racial coalition
Chinese dominant	Gradual Asian race-based coalition (San Francisco)	Cross-racial coalition (Vancouver)

Table 2.2: The interaction between immigration and segregation policy and coalition outcomes

2.2 Empirical Strategies

A comparison of the coalitions for achieving affordable housing in San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver's Chinatowns in the 1960s and 1970s offers a great avenue to test this theory. These controlled comparisons (Skocpol and Somers 1980; Slater and Ziblatt 2013) are ideal cases for two reasons.

Narrowing the analytical focus to a common issue (housing) in these cases helps maximize the control over alternative explanations. San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver Chinatowns, located in three gateway cities for Chinese immigrants in the West, are similar in their origins and in their early community power structures. Most of the early Chinese settlers in these cities came from Taishan, Zhongshan, Xinhui, Shunde, Haoshan, and Nanhai counties in Guangdong province in China (A. B. Chan 1983, 52-54). For these immigrants, the region between California and British Columbia was "the Gold Mountain" (Gāmsāan in Cantonese). Based on these regional and family ties, the CBA, an umbrella organization made up of Chinese family and regional associations, was established in San Francisco in 1882 and soon afterward had branches in Seattle in 1892 and Vancouver in 1896.

Despite their shared initial conditions, these cases represent different kinds of minority coalitions. The San Francisco Chinatown housing advocacy organization is an Asian race-based coalition, while its Vancouver counterpart is a cross-racial coalition. Similarly, an Asian race-based coalition emerged early in Seattle's Chinatown, but it encompassed a wider set of groups. Therefore, while limiting alternative explanations, this case selection strategy increases the variations found in the coalition outcomes.

These cases were selected not only for methodological but also for theoretical reasons. These controlled cases are useful for applying counterfactual thinking (Fearon 1991). What if the proportion of Chinese were smaller among Asian ethnic groups, as in Vancouver? What if they were a larger group, as in Seattle? What if there were little segregation between Asians and whites, as in San Francisco? While the theory does help predict how the changes in each parameter might have led to different outcomes (Table 2.2), the case studies allow us to clearly assess the validity of these different theoretical implications.

Two Exogenous Shocks

This case selection strategy does, however, have some limitations, because it is virtually impossible to know all the differences between the various cases that might have influenced their outcomes. Moreover, immigration and segregation policies may have affected other factors beyond the two parameters under study here. To address these concerns, I leveraged two exogenous shocks that affected the distribution of minority groups in these three cities. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake destroyed a portion of Chinatown and forced, any Japanese residents to move to the undamaged Western Addition. Before the earthquake, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos in both San Francisco and Seattle lived in close proximity. After the earthquake, the Japanese moved out from Chinatown, so a higher physical and social barrier was created between the Chinese and Japanese in San Francisco. To take full advantage of this exogenous shock, I added a within-case analysis to the between-case analyses: I examined why within San Francisco, the Chinese built a coalition with the Filipinos, while the Japanese built one with African Americans.

The second exogenous shock I employ is the internment of Japanese, which was much longer and harsher in Canada (1942–1949) than in the U.S. (1942–1946). It reduced the number of Japanese far more significantly in Vancouver than in San Francisco and Seattle. This second exogenous shock helps us better understand how the San Francisco and Seattle cases worked as a missed or counterfactual case vis-à-vis Vancouver. Had this shock not occurred, the coalition-building dynamics between San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver would have been much closer.

Tracing Causal Sequences

The goal of my empirical strategy here is to pay close attention to sequences of independent and dependent variables (Brady and Collier 2010; Collier 2011) and examine whether they are consistent with the theoretical expectations laid out in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The pre-1960s was



Figure 2.2: Theoretical implications

a "critical juncture" (Collier and Collier 1991) because there were several ways to determine the distribution of ethnic minorities. However, the combination of the exogenous (natural disasters and outside forces) and certain endogenous events did work to determine a particular distribution of ethnic minorities in each case. These conditions then narrowed the range of possible coalition options for the Chinese in the later period (Figure 2.2). Therefore, proper tests for such path-dependent logic must closely examine the temporal dimension by tracing causal sequences. Consequently, this investigation began with the pre-1960s. For the sake of simplicity, I first compared the San Francisco and Vancouver cases to examine the main theoretical implications and then used the Seattle case to strengthen this argument further. The following are the key processes examined to test the theory. If the processes are consistent with the theoretical implications, then the theory is valid. If not, then the theory misses important aspects of the underlying causal mechanisms.

The Pre-1960s

- Process 1: How immigration, segregation policies, and the two exogenous shocks influenced the distribution of non-Chinese minority groups and their relations with the Chinese.

The Post-1960s

- Process 2: How the size of non-Chinese minority groups and the contacts between the Chinese and these other groups led to the formation of a different kind of minority coalition.

The Archival Data

To do process tracing, I consulted underutilized archival data from the Asian American Studies Collection at the Ethnic Studies Library; the Western Americana Collection and Catalogue II of the Regional Oral History Office (1980–1987) in the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley; the Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association Collection in the City of Vancouver Archive; the archive of the International Examiner (a free biweekly Asian American newspaper based in Seattle); and other primary and secondary materials, including historical statistics from the U.S. Census and Statistics Canada

2.3 Comparing San Francisco and Vancouver

Immigration Policies

Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the U.S. and Canada share their origins. The discovery of gold in the region between California and British Columbia drew Chinese immigrants to North America in the 1850s. Although these Chinese immigrants were not able to find jobs in gold mines due to the hostility of white miners, they did find employment in the railroad industry and labored for the construction of transcontinental and other railroads in each country.

As most of the economic opportunities were present in the West, most of these Chinese immigrants settled in this region. Between 1880 and 1881, while 96.1% of all Chinese Americans were living in the 11 Western states and territories, 99% of all Chinese Canadians were found in British Columbia. Of these places, San Francisco and Vancouver stood out as the two major points of entry for the Chinese population in North America. Between 1880 and 1920, San Francisco's Chinatown contained between 1/5 and 1/8 of the total Chinese population in the U.S. Between 1911 and 1921, Victoria and Vancouver held around 25% of the Chinese Canadian population (Daniels 1986, 176-178).

Japanese immigrants started to come to the U.S. (1868) and Canada (1877) slightly later than the Chinese immigrants did. Like their Chinese counterparts, most of these Japanese immigrants first settled in big cities in the West, such as San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver, although later, they also moved to rural areas to exploit the better economic opportunities in agriculture and fishing. Even when the adoption of the Chinese exclusion acts in the U.S. (1882) and Canada (1885) capped the growth of the Chinese population in each country, Japanese immigration continued for some time, because both the U.S. and the Canadian governments took a more cautious approach toward Japan, which was then an emerging colonial power. The Japanese were prohibited from entering the U.S. in 1924 and in Canada in 1941 (181-182).

In addition, until the late 19th century, state control at the U.S. and Canadian border was not so strict, so there was a constant mix of the Chinese and Japanese population between the two countries. Chinese and Japanese migrants could arrive in Vancouver and then move to Seattle or San Francisco without even holding a visa (Daniels 1986, 173-174). For this reason, Chinese and Japanese laborers frequently crossed the border to find better economic opportunities. The situation changed when many Chinese migrants entered the U.S. through the backdoor of Canada after the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act and, thus, became the nation's first "illegal immigrants" (E. Lee 2003). To stop these illegal immigrants from crossing the border, the U.S. government started to work more closely with the Canadian government and replaced poorly coordinated customs offices with "courts, processing and detention centers, border patrolmen, and immigration inspectors" (Chang 2008, 672).

As many historians have pointed out, there are strong transnational aspects in the story of Chinese and Japanese immigration to North America (Ngai 2005; Chang 2008), and when we turn our eyes to other Asian ethnic groups, their differences emerge. Although both countries are nations of immigrants, the U.S. is distinct from Canada because of its extensive history of military involvement in foreign territories. In the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-American War in 1898, the U.S. acquired the Philippines along with Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Hawaiian islands. For this reason, even after the U.S. immigration laws had barred the entry of the Chinese and Japanese, as U.S. nationals, Filipinos were still able to emigrate to the U.S. By 1930, 108,260 Filipinos were living in the U.S., with their geographical concentration on the West Coast (San Juan Jr 1994, 119)and filling the labor demand created by the exclusion of the Chinese and Japanese in this region (S. Chan 1991, 7-8). Even after the Philippines gained independence from the U.S. in 1946, the presence of the U.S. military in the Philippines still boosted Filipino immigration to the U.S. through marriages to U.S. citizens stationed there (war brides) and through the granting of U.S. citizenship to Filipinos who served in the U.S. Navy (Reimers 1985; Rumbaut 1994). According to the War Bride Act of 1945, the war brides and children of Filipino veterans became American citizens (Borja-Mamaril and Lim 2000, 167).

In contrast, Canada never had foreign possessions (Bloemraad 2011, 1137). No exempted Asian ethnic groups existed in Canada during their era of restrictive Asian immigration. Large-scale Filipino immigration began in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, several decades after that country reopened its door to Asian immigrants. As a result, as Figure 2.3 shows, whereas the Chinese and Japanese were the two main Asian ethnic groups in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s, a balanced mix of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos constituted the Asian communities during the same period in the U.S.[5].

In addition, the U.S. and Canada treated their Japanese subjects differently in subtle but important ways. The growing Japanese population and their success in the agricultural industries in California, Washington, and British Columbia caused a nativist backlash that restricted

[5]I did not include Indian Americans and Indo-Canadians in these statistics. They were often classified not as Asians but as Hindus. In addition, Asian American movement was initiated by Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos and then extended to other Asian ethnic groups. For these reasons, I did not include other East Asian (e.g., Koreans), Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese), and South Asian groups. They played relatively a small role in the 1960s and 1970s for the formation of Asian American coalitions (Ishizuka 2016).



Figure 2.3: Asian populations in the U.S. and Canada, 1960-2000 *Sources*: U.S. Census, American Community Survey (1960-2000), the Census of Canada (1961-2001), and Canadian National Household Survey (1996)

Japanese political and economic rights. In the U.S., Japanese nationals were targeted by the Alien Land Law and prohibited from owning land. They were also ineligible for naturalization, because the nationality law granted such a right to only "free white persons" and persons of African nativity or descent. Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment still provided birthright citizenship to U.S.-born Japanese. These Japanese were able to vote and own land. In contrast, Japanese Canadians, regardless of their citizenship status, could not vote until 1948. The British Columbia government indeed passed a series of laws limiting the Asian franchise in the late 19th century. The Chinese thus lost their right to vote in 1874, and the Japanese in 1895. This lack of voting rights also restricted their opportunities for upward social mobility, because certain professional organizations, such as bar associations, accepted only people who were eligible to vote (Fiset and Nomura 2011, 4-9).

More importantly, the internment of Japanese was longer in Canada (1942-1949) than in the U.S. (1942-1946). Whereas the U.S. government only temporarily froze assets of the Japanese Americans during World War II, their Canadian counterpart permanently confiscated all the property of Japanese Canadians (Roy 2002; Izumi 2011).

This harsher treatment of Japanese Canadians resulted in a dramatic decrease of the Japanese population in Vancouver relative to San Francisco. More than 5,000 Japanese were living in Japantown in San Francisco in 1940. The majority of them were interned during the war. Only half returned to San Francisco when the war was over (Kamiya 2013, 297-302), despite the fact that, within two years, San Francisco's Japanese American population had returned to its

prewar size (Graves and Page & Turnbull, Inc. 2009, 48). In contrast, the Japanese population in Vancouver decreased from about 8,000 to 1,000 during World World II (Marlatt and Itter 2011, 41). Most of the former Vancouver residents decided not to come back and started new lives on the East Coast or the Prairie Provinces (Patton et al. 1973). This was not because they had no emotional attachment to Vancouver nor other provinces were more hospitable toward the Japanese; public opinion polls showed that there were few differences between the residents in British Columbia and those in other provinces in terms of their attitudes toward the Japanese (La Violette 1948, 276). But it was because these Japanese, forced to relocate during the war, lost their entire social and material connections to Vancouver. Some did visit Vancouver after the Internment was over, only to find that the things they were attached to—the shops, the restaurants, and their Japanese neighbors and friends—were all gone (Broadfoot 1977, 338). As a consequence, Vancouver's Japantown vanished and became an industrial area, now known as Railtown. Figure 2.4 depicts the contrast between the two cities. The X-axis indicates the year, and the Y-axis indicates the size of the Chinese and Japanese populations in this particular year. The dashed red lines and the shaded area show the years in which the Japanese were interned in each country. The Chinese and Japanese populations were the two largest Asian ethnic groups in these two cities between the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In terms of size alone, the Japanese were the ideal Asian partner for the Chinese to build a coalition with in both cities. Had the Japanese internment been shorter in Canada, the Chinese would likely still have considered forming a coalition with the Japanese.



Figure 2.4: The size of Chinese and Japanese population in San Francisco and Vancouver, *Sources*: U.S. Census (1890-1950) and the Census of Canada (1891-1951)

Segregation Policies

There was no clear border established between Asian and non-Asian minority neighborhoods in Vancouver's East End. By the late 19th century, the affluent Anglo-whites had moved to the West End and Shaughnessy. As a result, the East End was left to foreign laborers, comprising mostly single men from China and southern and eastern European countries. Ethnic enclaves of Chinese, Japanese, Italians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Norwegians were located close together in Vancouver's working-class neighborhood (Atkin 1994, 39-91). This close geographical proximity allowed these groups to develop long-lasting social relationships and mutual trust. Myer Freedman, a Polish Jewish immigrant and local businessperson, recalled that he had many Chinese friends and customers and considered Chinese "the most trustworthy people" because even though they were tough buyers, they kept their word. He also remembered how the Chinese customers respected his father's Jewish religion. When his father closed his logging supply store on Saturdays to observe his Jewish religious tradition, the Chinese customers did not deal with other suppliers but, rather, visited his father's store on the other weekdays (Marlatt and Itter 2011, 89-93).

Total segregation was never imposed in Vancouver, and indeed Chinese students went to school with Japanese, Italians, Jews, Scandinavians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Blacks. Locals called the Strathcona School, which these students attended, "the League of Nations" (Yee 2006, 52-53). The children growing up in this mixed neighborhood became close and were able to cross their ethnic boundaries easily. Mary Velijac, a second-generation Croatian immigrant, recalls (Marlatt and Itter 2011, 97-98):

> If someone [Japanese] passed away, we went to their Buddhist temple, you know. Any affairs that the Italians had, we went to. Any affairs we had, the Italians went to. I had Jewish girl friends. We went to their synagogue the days that you could go. We were just like an one family.

The boundary between whites and Asians was more rigid in the U.S. than in Canada. In California, racial segregation in schools is as nearly old as the public school system. In 1855, the state legislature directed that school funds be apportioned to counties based on "a census of white children." After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment gave Native American and African American students the right to attend white schools in communities in which there were no separate schools. However, Chinese students, whom state officials considered "almost hopeless," could not benefit from this policy change. In 1885, when Chinese parents brought the issue to court, the State Assembly finally admitted Chinese students to "the Chinese school." In 1906, the city government renamed it the Oriental Public School to segregate other Asian students along with the Chinese. Even after the overturning of de jure segregation in U.S. public schools in 1954 in the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, almost all Chinese students attended de facto segregated schools during the 1960s (Lyman 1970, 7).

San Francisco's non-Anglo white populations were more deeply integrated into mainstream society than were Vancouver's. San Francisco's Chinatown is located right next to Little Italy (North Beach). Nonetheless, the interactions between them were limited. After 1945, the

Italians in the city were quite assimilated. The percentage of Italians living in San Francisco's Little Italy declined from 80% to 33% between 1940 and 1970. Affluent Italians left San Francisco for the Marina, while working-class Italians moved to the Excelsior and Bay View districts (Fichera 2011, 156-162). Although San Francisco has had several Italian mayors since Angelo Rossi in 1931, no Italian Canadian has ever been the mayor of Vancouver. Most Vancouver mayors have either English, Scottish, or Irish family names, with only a couple of exceptions.

Both school and residential segregation created different relational dynamics between the Chinese and other ethnic groups in San Francisco and Vancouver. The Chinese in San Francisco had more interaction with other Asian ethnic groups than with the whites. In contrast, the Chinese in Vancouver became more integrated with the white population, especially in their neighboring southern and eastern European communities.

Minority Coalition Building

San Francisco's Chinatown

These historical legacies influenced the formation of Chinatown-based minority coalitions for affordable housing. The first large wave of Chinese immigration to San Francisco started in 1849, the year after gold was discovered in California and the city of San Francisco was founded. The Chinese were an integral part of the city from its inception. However, racial discrimination isolated their presence to a small run-down area for most of the city's early history (Pan 1991, 5-10). In response, a movement for better housing began growing in the 1930s as the government began to increase its political influence in the housing market. Nonetheless, it wasn't until 1940, did the San Francisco Board of Supervisors recognize the housing problem in Chinatown. In 1948, the city's Redevelopment Agency was established to focus on urban renewal. From the 1950s through the 1960s, the agency transferred USD $128 million in federal funds for urban renewal projects and turned downtown San Francisco into a marketable product for sale (Hartman and Carnochan 2002). The city government tried to eliminate Chinatown straight out, instead of preserving its old neighborhood. The 1965 immigration reform exacerbated these problems because of the massive increase in the number of Chinese immigrants. The lack of low-cost housing for low- and moderate-income families thus emerged as a critical issue (C. Y. Yu 1981, 103-108).

Nevertheless, the CBA was still more concerned with attracting and maintaining white customers. Against this backdrop, in August of 1968, hundreds of community activists and students held a demonstration in Chinatown, holding signs that read "Chinatown is a ghetto" and "Tourists out of Chinatown." During this protest, Rev. Larry Jack Wong criticized the CBA and the city government, saying, "No longer can the Chinese Six Companies [the CBA] speak for all of us! No longer can City Hall ignore us. We will continue to march until we get something done!" (G. Chin 2015, 37).

The War on Poverty programs during the 1960s and 1970s empowered this new generation of activists. The Economic Opportunity Council created "front money" for poverty councils

and related organizations to build low-cost housing. Rev. Wong also became the highest-ranking Chinese American on the Economic Opportunity Council in San Francisco Chinatown (G. Chin 2015, 40). The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was essential in providing new resources. It offered rehabilitation grants to urban renewal areas, low-interest loans for low- and moderate-income housing, and direct loans for housing senior citizens; supported low-income and experimental housing demonstration projects; and ran rent-supplement programs (Reed 1966, 18-27). The 1968 Housing Act opened a new channel of communication and participation by emphasizing homeownership among the poor, housing for low- and modest-income families, and rehabilitation over slum clearance. In that same year, the HUD began to invite new projects involving residential rehabilitation to form a Project Area Committee and increase participation in both the planning and implementation of these projects (Okita 1980, 7-8).

The impact of this policy change was evident in the increased citizen involvement in planning. With financial assistance from the HUD, the city government, the San Francisco Foundation, and the San Francisco Department of City Planning conducted a comprehensive survey in the Chinatown and North Beach area in 1970. To this end, the Chinatown Advisory Committee comprised representatives from Chinatown community organizations and related interest groups. The committee produced a 159-page report, entitled the *701 Study*, which exposed the magnitude of the housing problem in Chinatown. The title was written both in English and Chinese characters and incorporated some of the key community concerns, such as the lack of any recreational area in Chinatown.

To fulfill the study's recommendations, Rev. Harry Chuck (Committee Co-Chair) and Linda Wang (Housing Sub-Committee Chair) founded the Chinatown Coalition for Better Housing (CCBH) in 1972. Almost all the Chinatown community organizations, social service agencies, and political organizations supported it. The list included the CBA; the newly formed advocacy groups, such as the Chinese for Affirmative Action; social service agencies, such as Self-Help for the Elderly; and the Chinatown Democratic and Republican Clubs. The CBA took on a supporting role in this initiative. It lost its powerful position in the Chinese community and became only one interest group among many.

Having united the residents' voices, the CCBH began to pressure the government and organized Chinatown's senior citizens to protest at the local area HUD office and demand additional federal funding. The demonstrators carried signs reading, "HUD, Live Up To Your Name" and "While HUD Fiddles, Chinatown Burns." Shaming was only one part of their strategy, however. The CCBH also knew that they needed to learn how bureaucracy works in order to gain access to the government's resources. The CCBH even hired urban and planning consultants to learn the language of the bureaucracy and created a glossary of bureaucratic terms in Chinese for its members (Gee 1990, 16-88).

Acknowledging their shared struggle, the International Hotel Tenants Association (IHTA), led by the Filipino community activists, sent a letter to the CCBH to propose a partnership. In this letter, the IHTA acknowledged that "the age of low-cost housing in Chinatown is a major problem." The IHTA then stressed that the International Hotel, a residential hotel between Chinatown and Manilatown, faced imminent eviction, and it asked for support and help from

the Chinese side (Gee 1990, 83).

The CCBH eagerly accepted the IHTA proposal because the Chinese community understood that the fate of their two communities was linked. In 1966, about 80% of the Chinatown residents were Chinese, and the remaining 20% were Filipinos, according to a report submitted to the Economic Opportunity Council in San Francisco's Chinatown. Reflecting this background, Violeta Marasigan joined the Chinatown Citizens Advisory Committee to represent the United Filipino Association along with other members of Chinatown's community organizations and interest groups (99). The Internal Hotel (I-Hotel) was adjacent to both Chinatown and Manilatown. For this reason, 52.5% of the International Hotel tenants were Filipinos, and 20.2% were Chinese, according to the 1969 court information. Therefore, the International Hotel crisis was a problem for both the Filipinos and the Chinese.

In 1977, the CCBH merged with four other grassroots organizations in Chinatown and became the Chinatown Resource Center. In 1988, the organization was renamed the Chinatown Community Development Center (CCDC). One of the CCDC's early agendas was to stop the gentrification happening around the I-Hotel. Even after the dramatic eviction of I-Hotel tenants that year, the special relationship between these two groups continued. Twenty-eight years later, the CCDC built the International Hotel Senior Housing on the site of the previous I-Hotel. The International Hotel Manilatown Center was placed on the ground floor to commemorate the residents who had been evicted and the early Filipino immigrants (Habal 2007, 171).

In contrast, in regard to housing, there was less active cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese communities. The Japanese worked more closely with African Americans, who were closer neighbors. The Japanese immigrants first came to San Francisco in 1869, about two decades after the arrival of the Chinese (Japantown Task Force Inc. 2005). Japantown was originally located in North Beach, next to Chinatown. However, after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake destroyed their ethnic enclave, the Japanese moved to the Western Addition. The Filipino community was not seriously affected by this natural disaster because the first wave of Filipino immigrants did not start in San Francisco until the 1920s (Necesito 1978, 7).

When most of these Japanese were interned during World War II, African Americans moved into their homes. Maya Angelou, the famous African American writer and civil rights activist, grew up in the Western Addition. She recalled that "the Yamamoto Sea Food Market quietly became Sammy's Shoe Shine Parlor and Smoke Shop" (Kamiya 2013, 299). After the war, the Japanese population rebounded, and these two groups became a shared community. The Western Addition comprised two nonwhite communities: the Fillmore District ("the Harlem of the West"; predominantly African American) and Japantown (Japanese American). According to the Western Addition survey that was conducted in 1977, African Americans accounted for 58.2% and Japanese 7.3% of the total population. In comparison, the Chinese accounted for only 1.5% and the Filipinos only 3.1% of the total population (Curtis Associates 1977).

African Americans, such as Hannibal Williams, and Japanese Americans, such as Yori Wada, founded the Western Addition Community Organization in 1967 to slow down evictions and find ways to build affordable houses (Kamiya 2013, 309). In the same spirit, in the summer of 1968, the Buchanan Street YMCA, where Yori Wada served as Executive Director from 1966 to 1982 and which was located in the Western Addition, ran an experimental program to enhance

interracial understanding between African American and Japanese American students[6]. Even the Japantown-oriented organization the Citizens Against Nihonmachi Eviction (CANE), which was formed in 1973, acknowledged their linked fate. CANE noted that "although Nihonmachi [Japantown] has historically been a Japanese-American community, it has always included people of many different races and nationalities." CANE defined its members as "a cross-section of four generations of Japanese Americans and persons of other races" united in "the larger struggle for low-rent housing for all" (Matsumori 1974). Had the Japanese not moved to the Western Addition, they would likely have formed a coalition with the Chinese rather than with the African Americans.

Vancouver's Strathcona

As in the U.S., the Canadian housing policy began in the 1930s by focusing on the increased homeownership created through mortgages. However, the Canadian approach was slightly more restrained than that the U.S. Whereas housing programs were administered by the Department of Finance in Canada, the same task was carried out by the Federal Housing Administration in the U.S. (R. Harris 1999, 1170-1172). Nonetheless, the gaps did narrow in the 1940s. Following the U.S. model, the Canadian government introduced the idea of urban renewal in the National Housing Act (NHA) in 1944 and established its own dedicated housing agency called the Central (now Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation in 1946.

When the act extended into redevelopment areas in 1954 and its amendment removed the restraint on the reuse of cleared land in 1956, it became possible for municipal governments to clear slum housing and use the land in whatever way they saw fit (Pickett 1968, 233-234). Canada's poor and immigrants were disproportionately targeted by this policy change because their homes and neighborhoods were designated as blighted areas. Vancouver's Chinatown was no exception. When Chinese immigrants arrived in Canada in 1858, they first settled in Victoria, a port city near Vancouver. In search of better economic opportunities, they moved inland. According to the 1911 census, Vancouver had the largest Chinese population in Canada (Ng 1999, 10-11). During the 1960s, after immigration reform, the Chinatown's population substantially increased from 8,729 in 1951 to 15,223 in 1961 (Kim and Lai 1982, 71). By the 1970s, due to a large influx of Chinese immigrants, Vancouver's Chinatown became the second largest in North America, right after San Francisco's (Ray 1971, 349). As this growing population was densely packed into a small area, deteriorating housing conditions were inevitable.

Like the Chinese in San Francisco, the Chinese community in Vancouver gradually adapted to the policy change. In 1957, the Vancouver city government surveyed the Chinatown residents to collect information about their living conditions. Unbeknownst to the residents, the purpose of this survey was to justify a planned upcoming three-phase urban renewal project. The city officials even rejected new building permits and applications for development to prove that the area was blighted (Atkin 1994, 74-75). Some residents tried to solve this problem on their own

[6] *WACO Organizer*, Western Addition Community Organization newsletter, vol. 2. no. 8, May 1969. Bancroft Library, the University of California, Berkeley (Call number. pff F870 N38 .5 .W2).

but to no avail. At that point, the residents realized that they had no chance of winning unless they worked together and raised their political visibility.

Nevertheless, their political awakening did not directly lead them to form a broad coalition. Instead, the Chinatown residents first turned to the CBA. The CBA formed the Chinese Property Owners' Association and demanded that the city government stop urban renewal and allow Chinese residents to rebuild the area themselves with a possible grant from the city. However, the city government ignored its request (Kim and Lai 1982, 73).

When the second redevelopment plan designated the heart of Chinatown as the new route for a freeway to downtown, the Chinese residents took a different approach. In 1964, the NHA was further amended to broaden the term "renewal" to include redevelopment as well as rehabilitation and conservation. In 1968, the Task Force of Housing and Urban Development, also known as the Hellyer Task Force, began public consultations to examine "housing and urban development" in Canada (Axworthy 1971). Some concerned Chinatown residents attended the Hellyer Task Force meeting on November 7, 1968. Shirley Chan, a young resident who had turned into a housing activist, recalled how the meeting went (Marlatt and Itter 2011, 223):

> They were asking for a better deal for the people; you know, a little more money, a social worker under each arm maybe. And the people didn't want that. It was a question of not just relocating, getting another house for a house, but it was a house of the size in which an extended family could live. It was a house where your life patterns wouldn't be disrupted.

The government had new programs and resources. Nevertheless, the residents needed to make their demands clearly known to the policy makers to be able to access these programs and resources. The residents held a large public meeting, conducted in both English and Chinese, on December 14, 1968 and invited both Chinese and non-Chinese residents. The Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association (SPOTA) was founded as a result of this meeting.

SPOTA focused on the area rather than the "Chinese" ethnic identity. According to the City of Vancouver's Redevelopment Study of 1957, Strathcona was a largely white European working-class neighborhood. Chinese residents were concentrated in two or three blocks adjacent to a street that ran between the "white" Strathcona and the Chinatown. The Chinese became the majority group in Strathcona in the 1960s after immigration reform substantially increased their population (J.-A. Lee 2007, 389-390). For this reason, the Chinese needed to emphasize their place-based identity to bring other ethnic groups under the same banner. Membership was open to all tenants, landlords, and homeowners in Strathcona. Tom Mesic (a Croatian) was appointed one of its founding executive members and later served as its president. Some of the paid block representatives, who were responsible for communication between SPOTA and the residents, were southern and eastern Europeans who had grown up with their Chinese neighbors. Between 1973 and 1974, four out of nineteen block captains had non-Chinese ethnic backgrounds [7]. Similarly, in its 1972 report to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation,

[7] Elections, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association fonds (AM-734), Location 583-B-6, File 1, The City of Vancouver Archive.

SPOTA explained that an "all inclusive multi-lingual communication system" was its top priority because "while the majority, in ethnic number, is Chinese," many of these Chinese residents "cannot read, write, or speak English" and that there were "Italians and Ukrainians, Native Indians," and other ethnic groups living in the area as well[8]. Aside from having non-Chinese as executive members and block representatives, the general meetings were held in both Chinese and English.



Figure 2.5: Ethnic composition of Vancouver East in 1972. *Source*: CJVB 1972 federal election report.

This coalition helped enhance their electoral leverage. According to the 1972 Canadian federal election voting results collected by the CJVB[9], the Chinese were the largest non-Anglo population in East Vancouver at 14%[10], followed by the Italians, who comprised 10% of the

[8]Operation "Total Improvement of the Neighborhood," Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association fonds (AM-734), Location 583-B-7, File 8, The City of Vancouver Archive.

[9]A radio station in Vancouver founded in 1972, which broadcasted multilingual programs primarily Chinese. CJVB was founded by Jan van Bruchem (the JVB stands for his name) and Western Canada's first multilingual station (Schryer 2006, 403). 1972 Federal Election, Ethnic Origin of Voters in the CJVB Listening Area, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association fonds (AM-734), Location 583-D-1, File 3, The City of Vancouver Archive.

[10]It is not clear what Asiatic meant in the original report. Historically, Asiatic means Chinese, Japanese, Armenia, Syrians, Turks, and others in Canada. Since no other major Asian group was identified in the SPOTA documents, I assume this term refers to Chinese.

total population (Figure 5). Federal politicians, members of parliament, and ministers began to support SPOTA. Harold E. Winch, a member of parliament from East Vancouver, sent an encouraging letter to SPOTA on February 17, 1969, to show his interest in the organization. In the spring of 1969, Robert Andras, who had succeeded Paul Hellyer as the Minister for Housing, commented that the federal government would only approve an urban renewal project in Strathcona if the project emphasized rehabilitation rather than slum clearance.

SPOTA used these endorsements as leverage against the city officials. In its letter sent to the mayor and the city council members on February 4, 1971, SPOTA used Andras's words to urge the city government to reconsider the urban renewal project. They underscored the point that Andras had mentioned—that "Ottawa is not interested in participating in the City's Strathcona urban renewal scheme . . . unless the people affected and the three levels of government have a full part in the planning" [11] Bessie Lee, another resident-turned-activist, recalls how effective this rightful resistance strategy was (Marlatt and Itter 2011, 228):

> When it got to the state where we could form the Strathcona Rehabilitation Committee, Robert Andras came out to Vancouver and met with us privately before he met with the city officials. When they found that out they were really angry because they still thought they were going to get their way, you know. So then at the meeting at City Hall in the afternoon he stood up and said that he would not allow the program to proceed without the community having full participation in the planning.

In July of 1971, an agreement on a rehabilitation project was reached between the federal, provincial, and local government; representatives of the Strathcona residents; and SPOTA. Six months later, the Strathcona Rehabilitation Project officially began.

2.4 Seattle's International District

The Chinese migrated to Washington State in the 1860s to look for a different employment opportunity after the transcontinental railroad was completed (Wierzbicki 1997, 18). By 1880, 3,817 Chinese were living in Washington (Ong, Fujita, and Chin 1976). The Chinese population in Seattle was smaller than that of their counterparts in San Francisco and Seattle. As Figure 2.6 shows, the majority of Seattle's Asian ethnic groups in the early 20th century did not comprise Chinese. A series of external forces contributed to this pattern. The alliance of the working-class European immigrants and white property owners caused Anti-Chinese riots in Seattle and in neighboring Tacoma between 1885 and 1886. In both Seattle and Tacoma, these groups invaded their respective Chinese quarters and tried to send the Chinese residents back to China using force. Even before the riots began, almost all the Chinese in Seattle and Tacoma were unemployed due to poor economic conditions and the interference of these anti-Chinese groups.

[11] SPOTA Early History, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association fonds (AM-734), Location 583-B-4 files 1-10, The City of Vancouver Archive.

The political violence against the Chinese stopped only when the federal troops intervened (D. Chin 2001, 20-21).

The Japanese and Filipinos arrived in Seattle slightly later than the Chinese did. The Japanese first moved to Seattle in 1884, and the large inflow of Filipinos into the city started in the 1920s and 1930s (25-51). The Chinese rebuilt their main commercial district on King Street after the Great Seattle Fire of 1889 burned down their original Chinatown. The Japanese settled on Jackson Street and Main Street, which were right next to King Street (Group 1973). The Filipino population was mostly concentrated on lower Second and Main Streets (Chin and Chin 1973, 38). Given these settlement patterns, the physical distance between these three groups was extremely close, as they lived only one or two streets apart. According to a property survey of the settlement in the inner city area in Seattle in 1939, these minority groups did live in close proximity to each other (Ong, Fujita, and Chin 1976, 19-20).

Despite the physical proximity, the social boundary between the first-generation immigrants in these groups remained distant because of their language and cultural differences. Yet, for the second- and third-generation immigrants, who spoke English, grew up in the same neighborhood, and attended the same schools, the distances narrowed (Takami 1992, 52). Unlike most other cities on the West Coast, Seattle did not create a separate school for Asians. Nevertheless, because most Asians were segregated in a small area, and their school choice was limited, most Asian schoolchildren in Seattle actually attended the same schools (S. S.-H. Lee 2011). In 1921, 452 out of 455, or 99%, of the students at Bailey Gatzert Elementary School, located in the hub of the Asian enclave, came from either Chinatown or Japantown (Pak 2001, 36-40). In his memoir, Robert Santos, a prominent activist in the area, recalled strolling down the Chinatown alleys, eating at Filipino cafés, and watching a Japanese cultural performance at The Nippon Kan (Japanese Hall) when he was little. Reflecting on this personal experience, he stressed in his memoir how each succeeding generation viewed the same area in different ways (Santos 2002, 14-26):

> For first generation [Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos] immigrants, it [International District] was their home in America. For their children, the second generation, it was the neighborhood they grew up in. For their grandchildren, the third generation, it was the neighborhood which gave them their identity as Asian Americans and the opportunity to repay their elders.

These strong intergroup contacts were later institutionalized in the form of a neighborhood improvement organization that connected the leaders from different minority communities. The Jackson Street Community Council (JSCC) was established in 1946 and had Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and members of other racial groups. Its early members included Jimmy Mar, Don Chin, and Ben Woo, who were Chinese; Toru Sakahara, James Matsuoka, William Mimbu, Tak Kubota, and Frank Hattori, who were Japanese; Fred Cordova, a Filipino; and Alex Bishop, an African American. Cognizant of this diversity in the membership, the JSCC lobbied the city government to designate Chinatown and its surrounding areas as the "International Center." Since then, the area has been known as the Chinatown-International District (74-751).



Figure 2.6: The changes in Chinese and Japanese population in Seattle, San Francisco and Vancouver, 1890-1931. *Sources:* U.S. Census and (1890-1930) the Census of Canada (1891-1931) data collected and analyzed by MacDonald (1970, 310-311)

In 1952, the State Highway Commission planned to build a Seattle freeway through downtown. The JSCC protested that it would divide the International District in half. Nonetheless, neither the federal nor city government showed any interest in the International District. Facing housing pressures and economic distress, the Chinese community was divided. American-born Chinese professionals then founded the Chinese Community Service Organization (CCSO) to push the CBA to be more involved in the issues facing the broader Chinese community. The other group was composed of the old guards at the CBA who formed the Chinatown Chamber of Commerce to promote business in the area. Because the incumbents strongly opposed the reform efforts, the CCSO was not able to produce much change.

In 1964, Mayor James d'Orma Braman officially designated Chinatown and its surrounding area as the "International District." In response, several former JSCC members founded the International District Improvement Association (Inter*IM) in 1969 to represent the entire District (*International Examiner*, 18 May 1983). According to the 1970 U.S. Census, Filipinos were the largest group among all the Asian ethnic groups in the District, at 400, followed by the Chinese at around 375 and the Japanese at 100. The Japanese made up a small proportion because it is estimated that 65%–70% of Japanese Americans returned to the city after their incarceration during World War II (D. Chin 2001, 74-77). The timing was fortunate because the War on Poverty provided much-needed financial support. Inter*IM received seed funds from the Model Cities Program and was able to open an office staffed by a part-time Model Cities program coordinator.

However, the founding members—mostly Chinese and Japanese small-shop owners in the district—soon realized that they lacked the political networks and skills to obtain additional government support. To solve this problem, Robert Santos, a Filipino civil rights activist, was brought in as the organization's new director in 1972. Santos had grown up in the International District, served as president of the Catholic Interracial Council, and was on the Seattle Human Rights Commission and the Model Cities Board of Directors (Santos and Iwamoto 2015, 33-58). Given these credentials, he knew how to advocate and communicate with the government.

Just as Santos took over the leadership, a new challenge arrived. The county officials decided to build a multipurpose domed stadium near downtown in 1971. Property owners were worried about increased property taxes, and tenants were concerned about being evicted. In the meantime, traditional leaders in each ethnic community did little to change the status quo. The CBA was silent about this impending crisis in its community. Ling Mar, chairperson of the Seattle CBA, argued that the CBA's primary goal was to preserve Chinatown's identity and character. Mar admitted that the stadium "would have some impact on businesses, traffic, and in other areas." However, he also emphasized that "it would not wipe Chinatown out" (*International Examiner*, January 1976). The Japanese American Citizen League, the leading Japanese American advocacy organization, and the Filipino Community, Inc., the representative organization for Filipinos in the district, did not engage with the issue very well (*International Examiner*, 18 May 1983).

In contrast, the Inter*IM pursued this issue as its main political agenda, focusing on creating low-cost housing for the old and the poor. In 1972, Inter*IM mobilized more than 150 demonstrators and earned the chance to meet HUD officials and Mayor Uhlman to negotiate with the city's Department of Community Development. In 1974, Santos testified at the Seattle City Council regarding the problem of urban renewal in the district. There, he argued that "urban centers all across the nation are losing downtown neighborhoods to progress at the expense of pioneers." What is interesting is that he stressed that the International District was a neighborhood of early immigrants. In this way, he was able to point out that the area was not solely for Chinese or Asians but, rather, was for all Seattle citizens to honor and preserve Seattle's rich immigration history. In addition, he made it clear that he could not deny that housing conditions in the district were far from ideal. Instead, he stressed that the people in the district should be involved in the process of making decisions for their own neighborhood. In addition to Inter*IM, the International District Youth Council and the International District Housing Alliance joined forces to mobilize the elderly residents who were most severely affected by the redevelopment plan. All of these organizations were initiated by young community activists who grew up in the district as Asian Americans (Santos 2002, 74-85).

2.5 Discussions

The tale of three Chinatowns in the U.S. and Canada illustrates the limitations of a shared racial status-based argument. A century of racism toward Orientals created an Asian race-based coalition in San Francisco and Seattle but a cross-racial coalition in Vancouver, Canada. This

paper offers an original theory and extensive archival evidence to address this and other related puzzles. The findings demonstrate why scholars need to study minority coalition formation historically with a clear new focus on the strategic calculation of ethnic elites.

To begin with, the strategic calculation of ethnic elites points to overlooked blind spots in the existing literature. Racially marginalized status has induced ethnic elites to form race-based coalitions in some places and times, but not in others, because these elites need to weigh two factors when choosing a suitable partner. In terms of pressuring the government, maximizing the size of the coalition sounds optimal. However, ethnic elites should also consider how much they need to invest in order to communicate with their new partners. In this light, their goal should not be to maximize the size of the coalition but, rather, to create a working coalition that can achieve their policy goals with as little effort as possible (Riker 1962, 47). This theory demonstrates that race-based coalitions among ethnic minorities are not an inevitable but, rather, a historically contingent outcome that is driven by the strategic calculations of ethnic elites. These historical cases discussed herein illustrate that minority groups are strategic actors (Chwe 2014); they are capable of crafting new strategies in response to changing policy circumstances and can indeed exploit the division among the powerful to advance their own interests.

Nonetheless, a long-term historical perspective does show the limitations of their agency. Ethnic minorities can choose, but the range of their options is often circumscribed by historical legacies. Bringing history into the discussion is crucial because the early historical development determined the configuration of minority coalition formation in all three cases. Immigration policy determined which and how many ethnic groups settled in each city. Segregation policies dictated the spatial distance and boundaries between the groups, which, in turn, structured the eventual strength of their interactions. These initial conditions thus influenced who would become the political allies of the Chinese in their ongoing quest for housing reform.

Some may wonder whether these multiethnic coalitions for affordable housing are the direct results of shared geographic fortunes in the face of urban renewal. However, this perspective underestimates the cost involved in building a coalition. Coalition formation requires long-term commitment, time, energy, and resources. In spite of this, members of a minority coalition do not always know whether their efforts will succeed, because they are waging a fight against a much more powerful foe. In essence, minority coalition building is a risky long-term undertaking. For this reason, ethnic elites cannot choose a coalition partner simply because both happen to live in the same place and face a common challenge. They should know their prospective partner long enough to trust them (Attanasio et al. 2012). Without these previous interactions, it is hard for these groups to be strongly committed to the coalition-building efforts, because the risk involved is often too high. Formative intergroup contacts can make coalition building easier by reducing coordination costs and uncertainty about the future (Davenport 2014, 45).

Finally, this article sheds new light on how political geography shapes collective identity. In these particular historical cases, community organizers talked about their collective identity in a multidimensional but very specific way. When they articulated the reasons why their neighborhoods should be protected and supported, their political rhetoric was not limited to the ethnic (Chinese) and racial (Asian) dimensions of their collective identities. They also stressed

its economic (poor) and legal (immigrants) dimensions, as they perceived that doing so could be more effective in persuading policy makers and mobilizing their group members.

More importantly, identities based on places, such as Chinatown, the International District, and Strathcona, both connected and divided these different dimensions of their collective identities. On the one hand, these place-based identities cut across existing cleavages, such as ethnicity and race, and became the main basis for mobilization and coalition building between disparate minority groups. On the other hand, these identities set the boundaries of a particular cleavage. For instance, in Seattle's International District, the Chinese community became deeply divided, forming two factions, despite their co-ethnic status. The one associated with the CBA still clung to its ethnic identity and had conservative economic agendas, while the other became interested in building a broad coalition, embraced the Asian American identity, and claimed liberal economic agendas. The idea of place in the minds of these two factions thus differed significantly. The former group was concerned with the issues of Chinatown only, especially its commercial districts, while the latter group was interested in a much broader community, focusing on the old and the poor.

2.6 Conclusion

In this article, I demonstrate that racism—the hierarchy that forms between dominant and subordinate races—alone does not explain how ethnic minorities form a race-based coalition in some places and times but not others. Leveraging exogenous shocks and unique archival data on San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver, this paper explains how historical legacies can shape minority coalition formation. Building a broad coalition takes time; energy; and, most of all, a long-term commitment. Therefore, minority groups have to be very strategic when selecting their partners. However, the factors that these minorities need to take into account are not random but, rather, are systematically determined by the historical legacies of the political geography of settlement.

I find support for two explanations of variations in the formation of minority coalitions in the U.S. and Canada. First, the U.S. military involvement in the Asia-Pacific region substantially diversified the Asian population in the U.S. relative to that in Canada (Zucker and Zucker 1992; Johnson 2007). Of particular importance are those Filipinos who played an important role in both the San Francisco and Seattle cases. Had they been absent, the Chinese would have reconsidered the political utility of forming a coalition with other Asian ethnic groups in these two cities. Racial ideology did affect how the U.S. government justified a war with non-European countries (Kramer 2006a), and then its period of military rule in foreign territories, including the Philippines (Kramer 2006b). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the institutional channels provided by the U.S. military did draw a large number of Filipinos into the U.S. through employment opportunities and the granting of citizenship (Reimers 1985).

In addition, this article shows that both the vertical and horizontal aspects of segregation are critical to understanding the logic of minority coalition formation. The vertical aspect of segregation—the physical and social division between dominant and subordinate groups—is

directly related to racism. It explains why Chinatown and other ethnic minority enclaves were established in each city in the first place. Yet, by focusing exclusively on the vertical dimension of segregation, one may overlook another important dimension. Chinatown is often a misnomer because the boundary between one ethnic enclave and another is not always clear. The line between Chinese and other minority groups, as demarcated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, shaped the variations in minority coalition outcomes during the 1960s and 1970s in both the U.S. and Canada. Whether political elites in one ethnic group actually reach out to another ethnic group sharing the same racial status depends on whether the other group is one of a substantial size and has chosen to have strong intergroup contacts based on the political geography of settlement.

Chapter 3

How Other Minorities Gained Access: The War on Poverty and Asian American and Latino Community Organizing[1,2,3]

In the early 20th century, Asian Americans and Latinos organized along national origin lines and focused on assimilation; By the 1960s and 1970s, community organizers from both groups began to form panethnic community service organizations (CSOs) that emphasized solidarity. I argue that focusing on the rise of panethnic CSOs reveals an underappreciated mechanism that has mobilized Asian Americans and Latinos—the welfare state. The War on Poverty programs incentivized non-black minority community organizers to form panethnic CSOs to gain access to state resources and serve the economically disadvantaged in their communities. Drawing on extensive archival research, I identify this mechanism and test it with my original dataset of 818 Asian American and Latino advocacy organizations and CSOs. Leveraging the Reagan budget cut, I show that dismantling the War on Poverty programs reduced the founding rate of panethnic CSOs. I further estimated that a 1% increase in federal funding was associated with the increase of the two panethnic CSOs during the War on Poverty. The findings demonstrate how access to state resources forces activists among non-primary beneficiary groups to build

[1]This chapter was published in "Political Research Quarterly", 2020, 1-14.

[2]I thank Paul Pierson, Taeku Lee, Eric Schickler, Irene Bloemraad, Robert Mickey, Margaret Weir, Mark Brilliant, Nicholas Duquette, Karen Tani, Cybelle Fox, Jonathan Simon, Morris Levy, Christian Collet, Sarah Anzia, Gabe Lenz, Chris Ansell, Andrew McCall, Rhea Myerscough, Neil O'Brian, Desmond Ang, Eric Guntermann, the editor and three anonymous reviewers at the *Political Research Quarterly* for their constructive comments. I am also grateful to Esther Kang, Angela Yip, Brenna Uyeda, Gregory Eng, Jenny Feng, and Isaac Nolan for their research assistance and to Dina Okamoto, Martha Bailey, and Nicholas Duquette for sharing their data. I acknowledge support from the American Democracy Project Fellowship, Berkeley Empirical Legal Studies Fellowship and California Poverty and Socioeconomic Inequality Fellows Program.

[3]The original organizational data are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FLUPBJ. All replication files can be found at https://github.com/jaeyk/regression-analysis-with-time-series-data

new political identities that fit the dominant image of the policy beneficiaries.

The power of racial minorities in the US comes from the coordination of ethnic groups belonging to the same racial category. The US is becoming a minority–majority nation driven by the population growth of Latinos[4] and Asian Americans. Latinos have now surpassed African Americans as the second-largest racial group, and Asian Americans have become the fastest-growing racial group in the US. However, demographics are not destiny. Asian Americans and Latinos both encompass disparate national origin groups. If these subgroups do not have a sense of internal unity, their population increase does not translate into a growth of their political power.

For this reason, understanding the conditions under which Asian Americans and Latinos became organized as coherent groups is important. Until a half century ago, the terms "Asian Americans" and "Latinos" themselves did not exist. In the early 20th century, Asian Americans and Latinos organized among their respective groups of national origin and focused on assimilation into American society. For instance, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)[5] were exclusively concerned about their own groups despite the fact that racial discrimination knows no bounds. Furthermore, the two organizations seemed to only concentrate on the middle class and American citizens among them (it was no coincidence that the term "citizens" was included in the names of both organizations).

Only in the late 1960s and 1970s did national origin groups from Asia and Latin America begin to form panethnic[6] organizations that emphasized solidarity. Ethnic and class dimensions informed this change. These new organizations strengthened their focus on marginalized members: the poor, women, elderly, and children. Figure 3.1 describes this transition systematically, drawing on my original dataset on 818 Asian American and Latino advocacy and community service organizations (CSOs). The data divide panethnic organizations into three categories: advocacy, community service, and hybrid organizations. Advocacy organizations are involved in public and electoral campaigns, litigation, and lobbying. CSOs provide social services to community members. Hybrid organizations are active in both advocacy and service[7]. In the figure, the Y-axis represents organizational population density[8], which measures the number of organizations founded in each decade per population of one million, and the X-axis indicates

[4]I use the term "Latino" instead of more gender-neutral terms such as "Latina/o" or "Latinx" because this term is preferred by many of the organizations I collected in my dataset.

[5]Although named as the League of United *Latin American* Citizens, LULAC started as an organization primarily serving the interests of middle-class Mexican Americans in South Texas (Marquez 1993). The term "Latin" reflects more about the group members' cultural heritage.

[6]Panethnicity is defined as "the construction of a new categorical boundary through the consolidation of ethnic, tribal, religious, or national groups" (Okamoto and Mora 2014, 221).

[7]Minkoff (2002) coined the term hybrid organizations.

[8]Influenced by bioecology, organization scholars define organizational population density as "the number of organizations in a population at time t" (Barron 1999, 443).

the decades.[9] The figure presents three patterns: (1) Asian American and Latino organizations began to emerge in the 1960s; (2) among different types of organizations, panethnic CSOs were the clear majority; and (3) were the most densely populated in the 1970s. What explains the emergence and popularity of Asian American and Latino CSOs in the 1960s and 1970s?



Figure 3.1: The founding trends of Asian American and Latino advocacy, community service, and hybrid organizations, 1960 - 2017. *Source*: the author

Previous studies do not explain these patterns. Recent studies on panethnicity show how networked relationships shaped the formation and expansion of Asian American and Latino panethnic organizations (Mora 2014; Okamoto 2014). However, these studies share one common limitation: their exclusive focus on national panethnic organizations. CSOs, the majority of Asian American and Latino panethnic organizations, are mostly *local* organizations. Only 2% of Asian American and 4% of Latino CSOs are based in Washington, DC or have "National" in their organization names (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2). Although most of these CSOs did not make headlines, they matter because they served marginalized members in the Asian American and Latino communities and trained new political activists and leaders by providing them with political knowledge, experience, and networks (Muñoz 1989; D. Chin 2001; G. Chin 2015; Ishizuka 2016; Duarte 2016).

[9]This population adjustment is necessary, as the population size also influences organizational founding and is not constant over time.

I argue that the key to explaining the origin of these panethnic CSOs lies in the expansion of the American welfare state. After World War II, the American public became aware of the millions of Americans living in poverty amid the nation's postwar material prosperity (Harrington 1962). In response, in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared the War on Poverty and Congress enacted the Economic Opportunity Act to support his agenda. Between 1961 and 1972, federal aid programs to cities increased more than sixfold—from $3.9 billion to over $26 billion. These federal grants outweighed local social expenditure. In 1968, the total non-defense federal spending in Oakland, California was $95.5 million, twice the city's budget (Pressman 1975, 1-18). The War on Poverty programs sparked an expansion of panethnic CSOs by disrupting the political hierarchies within the national origin groups from Asia and Latin America. In the wake of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, a major division emerged within these groups between, on the one hand, a relatively affluent old guard focused on pursuing assimilation, and on the other, a rapidly expanding and more economically disadvantaged base focused on gaining access to resources. The War on Poverty programs, which included community action agencies and the Model Cities Program, effectively tipped the scales toward the latter faction comprising Asian American and Latino activists by giving Asian American and Latino activists an opportunity to build their own organizations and transform the agenda of their communities (Orleck and Hazirjian 2011).

Although founding these organizations required substantial and long-term investment, these organizers took on this challenge to increase their groups' access to state resources. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was the agency responsible for the War on Poverty programs. The OEO allocated federal funds across states using a poverty index (see Appendix A.1). The spending within each state was strongly associated with both the poverty rate and the share of non-White people in each county (Bailey and Duquette 2014). However, Asian Americans and Latinos were non-primary beneficiary groups. According to the US Census, more than 99% of the US population was either black or white in 1960. Consequently, the federal government paid little attention to non-black minority groups. To gain federal support, the younger generation activists needed to document their conditions and increase the number of poor members in their grant proposals (Kuramoto 1976; Orozco, Schwartz, and Austin 2011). For them, Asian American and Latino CSOs were a strategic instrument that could be leveraged to take advantage of the federal funding and serve the economically disadvantaged in their communities.

In the rest of the article, I first develop a theory that explains the formation of panethnic CSOs as a strategic response to two organizational environmental changes: the availability of external financial resources (i.e., federal funding) and the extent of population growth. The underutilized archival materials at the Asian American[10] and Chicano Studies Collections[11] at the Ethnic Studies Library at the University of California, Berkeley provide rare insights into how Asian American and Latino community organizers strategically responded to the War on Poverty funding and policy implementation. Next, I test the theory with my original dataset of 818 Asian American and Latino advocacy organizations and CSOs. Using interrupted time series

[10]For more information, see http://eslibrary.berkeley.edu/asian-american-studies-collection

[11]For more information, see https://eslibrary.berkeley.edu/chicano-studies-collection

design and regression analysis, I establish the effect of federal grants on the founding rate of panethnic CSOs. Leveraging the Reagan budget cut, I show that dismantling the War on Poverty programs reduced the founding rate of panethnic CSOs. I further estimated that a 1% increase in federal funding was associated with the increase of the two panethnic CSOs during the War on Poverty. Past studies mentioned the impact of the War on Poverty on Asian American and Latino community organizing using interviews and case studies (Padilla 1985; L. Y. Espiritu 1992; Wei 1993; Võ 2004; Herrera 2013). However, these examples are limited to demonstrating how generalizable the connection was. Based on the large-scale original data collection, my findings provide the first systematic evidence of how the expansion of the welfare state transformed Asian American and Latino politics by activating the politics of recognition. It has long been argued in policy feedback literature that new policies, through vested interests, create a new politics (Schattschneider 1935; Pierson 1994; Campbell 2011). The case of Asian Americans and Latinos shows that for these historically disadvantaged groups, gaining access to—not protecting vested interests—motivated them to become politically active. Asian American and Latino activists organized the poor in their communities and began to form panethnic CSOs in the 1960s and 1970s to fit the dominant image of policy beneficiaries. This conclusion that access to state resources forces activists among non-primary beneficiary groups to take new political identities has broad implications for scholars of racial ethnic politics, intersectionality, policy feedback, and inequality, as well as activists and organizers.

3.1 Theory

Although interrelated, advocacy organizations and CSOs are two different species. Commitment to social justice played an important role in the founding of both types of organizations in Asian American and Latino communities (Wei 1993; Muñoz 1989). It is, however, crucial to note that founding a CSO is more capital-intensive than founding an advocacy organization. Building affordable houses, providing accessible healthcare, and expanding educational and employment opportunities all require substantial and long-term investments. Conversely, the variation in political advocacy activities is more strongly influenced by structural changes in political opportunity vis-à-vis repression and openness of the government rather than funding availability (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Zepeda-Millán 2017).

Even among CSOs, there are different kinds. Whereas ethnic CSOs only serve the members of one ethnic group, panethnic CSOs serve the members of more than one ethnic group broadly defined by their shared racial status. Serving multiple ethnic groups that include a significant portion of immigrants is costly as it requires capacity building. For example, if a Chinese healthcare center decided to serve Filipinos, it would need to hire additional staff who speak Filipino in order to cater to its new clients. From a cost perspective, it is difficult to understand why Asian-American and Latino community organizers began to prefer founding *panethnic* CSOs to founding *ethnic* CSOs in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, as Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2 shows, founding panethnic CSOs became popular in the 1960s and 1970s. In Oakland, California, the Mexican American Unity Council was formed in 1964 to focus on advocacy.

However, when it shifted its focus to service provision, it renamed itself the Spanish Speaking Unity Council and incorporated as a non-profit in 1967 (Orozco, Schwartz, and Austin 2011, 47-48) In Seattle, Washington, Inter*IM was formed in 1974 to stop evictions and build affordable housing in the Chinatown–International District, the city's historical Asian neighborhood. The Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA), the old guard Chinese organization, only protected the commercial interests of Chinatown. In contrast, Inter*IM fought to build affordable houses for low-income Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos (D. Chin 2001; Santos 2002). Over the half-century, 76% of Chinese CSOs have turned into Asian American CSOs and 24% of Mexican CSOs into Latino CSOs. Why did Asian American and Latino organizers begin to take a costlier path in the 1960s and 1970s?

I argue that this transition is a function of the two organizational environmental changes: population growth (demand) and financial resources (supply). These two parameters are both influenced by policy changes. Asian American and Latino population growth were strongly influenced by immigration policy. When immigration policy was restricted to a country-quota system and favored whites (as in the late and early 20th century), the population growth of Asian Americans and Latinos was limited. When the country quota was eliminated by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act, a wave of mass immigration from Asia and Latin America resumed (Tichenor 2009). Asian American and Latino community organizers raised funds in two different ways. They could rely on internal sources such as membership dues or donations or external sources such as government grants and philanthropic giving (see Appendix A.4). The availability of external financial resources increased substantially when the American welfare state expanded to grant them access during the War on Poverty.

A different combination of these two parameters, the rate of population growth and the availability of financial resources, clarify the conditions under which founding panethnic CSOs was strategically preferred to founding ethnic CSOs by Asian American and Latino community organizers. The rate of population growth was low and only internal financial resources were available from the late 19th to the mid-20th century—the era of restrictive immigration. During this period, forming an ethnic CSO was optimal for a national origin group from Asia or Latin America since internal resources could not sufficiently serve non-ethnic group members. This logic explains the foundation of mutual aid and benevolent societies such as the CBA, the JACL, and the LULAC at that particular time. Furthermore, as Strolovitch (2007) pointed out, the faction that holds power among the members of an organization decides whose interests the organization represents. Because these ethnic CSOs were financially dependent on internal resources, affluent members exerted disproportionate influence on organizational agendas. As these members had high stakes when things went awry, these early CSOs emphasized integration in the form of assimilation to avoid having direct confrontations with the hostile government and the white majority. This decision, however, also isolated and excluded the less fortunate members of their communities (Garza 1951; Hosokawa 1982; Umbach and Wishnoff 2008; Lozano 2018). The 1960s and 1970s were the period when the confluence of the immigration reform and the War on Poverty shifted leadership and transformed organizational strategy. The incumbent ethnic leaders, who maintained their influence through wealth and ethnic ties,

began to lose their power to control agendas. When mass immigration from Asia and Latin America resumed, ethnic CSOs needed to substantially increase their efforts to meet the needs of additional clients. This explosively growing demand pushed ethnic CSOs to the limits of their capacity. In addition, when external financial resources became available, it was not easy for the incumbent ethnic leaders to take advantage of them, as doing so could create competition and threaten their exclusive control over community issues (Marquez 1993; D. Chin 2001; G. Chin 2015).

These policy changes favored the new generation of ethnic community leaders (B. Wong 1977). If the experiences of exclusion[12], internment[13], and deportation[14] shaped the political memories of their parent generation, the Civil Rights and Black Power movement deeply influenced the political education of this new generation. These college-educated young leaders who spoke English fluently were able to advocate for the needs of their growing constituencies by leveraging the language of the Civil Rights (equal rights) Act and the Economic Opportunity (equal opportunities) Act.

Furthermore, the new leaders used the War on Poverty grants as seed money to start new organizations.[15] For instance, Inter*IM, the Seattle's major Asian American CSO, was formed with the funding from the Model Cities Program and staffed by a part-time Model Cities Program coordinator. More importantly, the War on Poverty programs provided these new leaders with political knowledge, experience, and networks. Their skills to navigate the government bureaucracy were valued in new organizations focusing on external resources. Robert Santos was on the Model Cities Board of Directors before joining Inter*IM and served as its executive director from 1972 to 1989 (Santos and Iwamoto 2015, 58). Raul Yzaguirre transformed the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) from a local Mexican CSO in Phoenix, Arizona, into the nation's largest Latino organization while serving as its president and Chief Executive Officer from 1974 to 2004. He gained his formative political experience as a program analyst at the Migrant Division of the OEO[16].

It is also important to highlight how the new ethnic leaders defined the boundaries of their political communities to understand how panethnic community organizing emerged as an outcome of the intersection between race and class. These individuals grew up in racially *segregated* and *segmented* Asian American and Latino neighborhoods. The American racial hierarchy put African Americans, Asian Americans and Latinos in segregated yet segmented locations. For instance, Chinatown is a misnomer as it is adjacent to other Asian ethnic enclaves such as Japantown or Manilatown, and the boundary between them is porous. In 1951, the Seattle Chinatown area was renamed the International District to correctly reflect this fluid

[12]The Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in the US in 1882 and repealed in 1943 when China became a US ally during World War II.

[13]Japanese Americans, including US born citizens, were incarcerated during World War II (1942-46).

[14]During the Depression, more than 500,000 Mexicans, including US born citizens, were deported to Mexico (Marquez 1993, 20).

[15]The Pilipino People's Far West Convention, August 30, September 1, 1974, University of California, Los Angeles. Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley.

[16]The NCLR Newsletter, July 1974, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley

nature of the neighborhood (D. Chin 2001). The same explanation can also be applied to Latino inner-city barrios (neighborhoods) (Arreola 2009). San Francisco's Mission District, the city's Latino barrio, is the place where both Mexicans and Central Americans settled (Quesada 1999). When young leaders in non-black communities formed panethnic CSOs, patterns of both racial segregation and segmentation mattered since issues concerning these organizations were deeply local. Poverty was the main concern of these new ethnic leaders. However, these issues were also framed in racial terms (panethnic, precisely) because that was how the boundaries of the local communities were drawn. The new ethnic leaders strategically responded to the policy challenges, but which issues they could focus on and which groups they aligned with were determined by their past historical legacies (J. Y. Kim 2020). Table 3.1 summarizes how the prevailing type of CSOs changed in line with shifts in population growth and funding sources.

	Internal financial resources	External financial resources
Low population growth	Ethnic CSOs emerged and focused on assimilation	Ethnic CSOs lost their influence
High population growth	Ethnic CSOs lost their influence	Panethnic CSOs emerged and focused on solidarity

Table 3.1: Population growth, funding sources, and the prevailing type of CSOs

The above argument is grounded in the reading of secondary sources as well as my own archival research. The following archival evidence reveals how the new ethnic leaders in Asian American and Latino communities discussed panethnic CSOs as a strategic instrument to gain state support. These leaders understood that the salience of their issues was derived from their status as viable minorities. CSOs across the country needed unified labels (Asian Americans and Latinos) to expand their constituencies and fortify their political strength. Many conferences and workshops were organized to share and develop this new strategy. The Mid-Atlantic Conference on Community Concerns of Asian Americans was held in New York City on April 26–27, 1974.[17] In his welcoming remark, Rev. Alfred Akamatsu, the founder of the anti-fascist Japanese American Committee in New York, stressed the fact that invisibility is a weakness:

> As we struggle to make our demands known, however, we are forced to realize that the only realistic way for a small minority like ours is to band together with like-minded people for greater effectiveness. This, I take it, is the underlying meaning of this conference—uniting all Asian Americans together.

In her keynote speech, Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii), a former member of the US House of Representatives, also referred to the lack of unity among Asian national origin groups as a major obstacle:

[17] Awareness and Action in the '70s: Mid-Atlantic Conference on Community Concerns of Asian Americans, April 26–27, 1974, New York. Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley.

> One of the difficulties that we [Asian Americans] face, certainly it's my experience in Washington, is that so little is ever heard of Asian Americans as a united group. One of the big struggles in HEW (the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) and other departments in government has been to get them to recognize the existence of Asian Americans as a viable ethnic minority.

The situation Latinos faced was not much different. In 1969, the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People (CCOSP) was established as Johnson's effort to please Latino leaders. Nevertheless, Latino leaders soon realized that the CCOSP was incapable of delivering its promised benefits. William P. Vasquez, president of La Causa Comun, a Puerto Rican CSO, pointed out this issue in a Congressional hearing held in 1973[18]:

> Over the past few years and months, numerous hopes and aspirations have been terminated. The greatest casualty of the political processes of this period has been the belief that Latinos would be systematically included in the economic and social developments and policies of our Federal Government. All too many of us [Latino leaders] had presumed that the Federal Government, in establishing a Cabinet Committee, was making its first step in that direction. Instead, we Latinos have had to begin to realize that the Cabinet itself did not grow with the times. Its authority, power, and responsibility are virtually the same as in 1969.

The key problem was the lack of visibility of Latino populations in government reports and statistics. This omission mattered because population counts were an important factor for federal grant allocation. In 1974, when the Geography Division of the US Bureau of Census released the Urban Atlas series, which displayed the population trends in the US urban areas, it did not include the percentage of people of Spanish origin. Census Bureau director Vincent Barabba explained, during the planning stage, that the Bureau considered the inclusion of a map showing the Spanish origin population, but dropped it due to the budget constraint. Raul Yzaguirre, then director for the NCLR, criticized the Bureau's decision as "exactly the thing that has kept Hispanic Americans from becoming an identifiable population".[19] In an article published in the NCLR newsletter in 1980, Raul Yzaguirre stressed why Latino CSOs mattered to overcome the Latino's invisible status[20]:

> Hispanics [Latino CSOs] are proving that they can organize and conquer the government bureaucracies with the same sophistication and professionalism as any other group within the population. . . . These [doubts and skepticism regarding Latino community organizing] are real and we had best not ignore them. But there is also another reality. The reality is exemplified in the saga of determined

[18]U.S. Congress House of Representatives. Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary. *Equal Opportunities for Spanish-speaking People: Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee.* 93rd Cong., 1st sess, July 11 and July 19, 1973, 55-56.

[19]The NCLR newsletter, October 1974, 3. Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley.

[20]The NCLR newsletter, September/October 1980, 2. Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley.

> Hispanics [Latino CSOs] who withstood the ridicule, who outwitted the bureaucrats, who learned the rules, who organized strong constituencies, and who now lead in rebuilding hope and awareness in our barrios and colonias.

3.2 Hypotheses

I derive two observable implications from the theory. The first hypothesis emphasizes the external resource dependency of panethnic CSOs. The second hypothesis highlights that panethnic CSOs and advocacy organizations were produced by different mechanisms.

- Hypothesis 1: Federal funds, available to minority CSOs, positively influenced the founding rate of panethnic CSOs in the 1960s and 1970s.
- Hypothesis 2: These funds did not influence the founding rate of panethnic advocacy organizations in the same period.

3.3 Empirical Strategies

To begin, I define both the treatment (federal grants) and the dependent variable (organizational founding rate). When federal funds became more available both in terms of relative amount and accessibility, the treatment increased. When federal funds became less available by the same definition, the treatment decreased. The outcomes of interest are the founding rate of panethnic CSOs (H1) and advocacy organizations (H2).

Identifying the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable is difficult because so many policies were introduced in the 1960s. The theory identified civil rights and immigration reform as potential confounders. The objective of this research design is to isolate the effect of federal funding from that of these major confounders. The effects can be untangled by zeroing in on the discontinuity in time—the Reagan budget cut. If the confounded treatment effect is an issue, this problem can be addressed by identifying the time point when the treatment changed but the confounders did not. The treatment effect can be estimated by comparing the patterns of the dependent variable before and after the intervention. This research design is called an interrupted time series (ITS) design (Campbell and Ross 1968; Cook and Campbell 1979).

The Reagan budget cut is an ideal setting to apply the ITS design and estimate the reduced treatment effect. If the federal grants played a positive role in the creation of Asian American and Latino CSOs at t_{-1}, then their substantial reduction at t (the budget cut) should generate a negative impact on the organizational founding rate at t_{+1}. The ITS design leverages the fact that the treatment and some key confounders moved in the same direction before the intervention and the opposition directions after the intervention. Although President Reagan was committed to reducing the role of the federal government in civil rights, he succeeded only to a limited extent. The administration's efforts to limit the power of the federal government were, however, successful in certain areas of social policy programs. During the Reagan years,

Congress repealed the Economic Opportunity Act and cut the budgets for the War on Poverty programs (Orleck 2011, 7). Programs such as Medicare that focused on individual assistance survived the crisis and even expanded in scope. However, community empowerment programs benefiting CSOs could not escape from the budget cut (Danziger and Haveman 1981), and institutional barriers to gain access to state resources increased (Naples 1998, 47-48) (see Appendix A.5).

This sudden tightened access to and slashing of federal grants was largely unexpected from the perspective of Asian American and Latino community organizers. Proving this mechanism is crucial to validate that 1981, the year Reagan came into office, is a proper cutpoint. If information about the Reagan budget cut was widely available among these community organizers before 1981, an earlier year would be better suited as the cutpoint. I test this assumption by tracing the number of articles on Reagan from the records of *The International Examiner* (1976 – 1987) and *Agenda* (1971 - 1981). The *International Examiner*, an Asian American newspaper rooted in Seattle, was founded in 1974 and has functioned as a public forum for Asian American community organizers in Seattle and the Northwest. *Agenda*, the official newsletter of the nation's largest Latino organization, served a similar role for Latino community organizers across the US. The text analysis of these articles shows that when these Asian American and Latino public forums address Reagan, they also mention the financial challenges facing CSOs (see Figure A.5 in Appendix A.6). I define the end point of the shock period using the change point estimation method (Andrews 1993; Zeileis et al. 2003) (see Appendix A.7).

I estimate the key parameter—the change in the slope of the dependent variable around the cutpoint.[21] Typically, a segmented regression model is used to estimate these parameters. In Model 3.1, Y is the dependent variable at time t or the number of organizations founded in each year. Year is the year variable. X indicates intervention, which is coded 0 in the pre- and 1 in the post-intervention period. Type indicates either organization type advocacy, community service, or hybrid organizations. Group indicates either group category Asian American or Latino organizations. These variables are aggregated and measured at the national level. β_0, the intercept, represents the baseline level of the dependent variable, and β_1 represents the pre-intervention trend. β_2 indicates the level change, and β_3 indicates the slope change following the intervention (Bernal, Cummins, and Gasparrini 2017, 350-351). Hypotheses 1 and 2 both focused on the organizational founding *rate*, so I focus on estimating β_3: the slope change.

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Year} + \beta_2 X_t + \beta_3 \text{Year} \times \text{X}_t + \beta_4 \text{Type}_t + \beta_5 \text{Group}_t + \epsilon \tag{3.1}$$

As for the next step, I fit an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, an OLS regression with logged dependent variable, a Poisson, and a negative binominal model to the data and select the best fitting model based on its Akaike information criterion (AIC) score, which estimates the trade-off between model accuracy and complexity (see Appendix A.9).

I first report the result of the ITS design analysis. Next, I visualize how the result varies by organization type as a way to confirm both Hypotheses 1 and 2. I argue that only the founding

[21] Because the cumulative number of Asian American and Latino organizations constantly increased, comparing the level change before and after the intervention offers little information on the impact of the Reagan budget cut.

rate of Asian American and Latino CSOs (not that of their advocacy counterparts) was negatively impacted by the Reagan budget cut. Prior to the Reagan budget cut, the NCLR supported both its local CSO affiliates and advocacy in Washington, DC. During the budget crisis, the NCLR reduced their focus to advocacy (Martınez 2008, 82). This case illustrates how the tight budget constraint has differential impacts on service-oriented work as opposed to advocacy. The data analysis will demonstrate that this case is part of a broad pattern. In addition, I will show that the result does not vary by group category when I limit the data to panethnic CSOs. This test reassures that the impact of the intervention is not conditional on a specific group.

Because the ITS design analysis estimates the *reduced* treatment effect, it may not capture the full effect of the federal grants on the growth of panethnic CSOs. To address this concern, I estimate how the predictive power of federal funding on the founding rate of panethnic CSOs changed over time, especially around the cutpoint (see Appendix A.10). I also calculate bootstrapped confidence intervals for these coefficients to indicate their uncertainty.

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathrm{X}_t + \beta_2 \mathrm{Population}_t + \beta_3 \mathrm{Group}_t + \beta_4 \mathrm{Presidency}_t + \beta_5 \mathrm{Senate}_t + \beta_6 \mathrm{House}_t + \epsilon \quad (3.2)$$

3.4 Data

Asian American and Latino Advocacy Organizations and CSOs

There exists no comprehensive ready-made dataset on Asian American and Latino advocacy organizations and CSOs. Existing Asian American or Latino organizational directories solely cover organizations in particular regions or national organizations. Therefore, between May 2017 and August 2017, I collected data from scratch on Asian American and Latino advocacy organizations and CSOs. I created my initial dataset drawing on four directories: the Encyclopedia of Associations (EA) – National Organizations of the US, the Encyclopedia of Associations – Regional, State, and Local Organizations of the US, the National Directory of Nonprofit Organizations, and the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Collecting data from multiple sources is useful to reduce sampling bias. Past studies (Minkoff 1995; Okamoto 2014) also used EA data to trace the formation of racial and ethnic organizations. NCSS data are useful for obtaining information on more recently founded organizations. The total number of Asian American organizations in the dataset is 299, and there are 519 Latino organizations.

To begin with, I used the following search strategy to find the organizations of interest in the data sources. For the Asian American side, I used the following search queries: "Asian," "Asian American," and "Asian Pacific American." For the Latino side, I used "Hispanic," "Latino," "Latina," and "Spanish." The databases find organizations that match these search queries either by their titles or descriptions. 86% of Asian American organizations and 85% of Latino organizations in the dataset were found through this initial search. To avoid missing ethnic organizations that had become panethnic organizations (or served panethnic constituencies but did not use panethnic markers in their titles), I also searched "Chinese," "Chinatown,"

"Japanese," and "Filipino" on the Asian American side and "Mexican," "Chicano," "Chicana," "Puerto Rican," "Cuban," "la Raza,"[22] and "centro" on the Latino side. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was not clear whether organizing Asian Americans or Latinos would be successful. In addition, if an organization was deeply rooted in a particular ethnic community, transitioning from an ethnic to panethnic organization was not easy because the organization needed to maintain its base while appealing to new constituents (for more information on organizational data coding, see Appendix A.3).

Finally, I use primary and secondary sources to note Asian American and Latino advocacy and community service organizations that did not use panethnic or ethnic markers in their titles. For instance, the ASPIRA Association, a Latino CSO focusing on educational access is not searchable by either ethnic or panethnic markers. The number of these uniquely named organizations is far smaller than that of the other two types of organizations (only 7% of the Asian American and 3% of the Latino organizations in the dataset).

To increase reliability, I exclude organizations for which I could not find any information online besides the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records as of August 2017. I also omit foundations, chambers of commerce, mutual aid organizations, labor unions, and religious organizations because they have different primary revenue sources such as membership dues and donations.[23]

One limitation with this dataset is the recency bias. The directories do not include all the defunct organizations. Consequently, the dataset only includes organizations that (1) survived and (2) appeared in the data sources in 2017. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the recency bias favors the null hypothesis because the survival rate would be lower during the War on Poverty than after it. Many organizations founded during the War on Poverty period were forced to close during the Reagan era. Take the case of Seattle's Chinatown/International District as an example. In March 1981, when the news on the Reagan budget cut came out, *The International Examiner* declared that the "survival of [local] social agencies" was at stake. Because Reagan decided not to reauthorize the Economic Opportunity Act, six Asian American CSOs in the area had to collectively raise $213,750 during the last three months of 1981.[24] For small CSOs operating in one of the poorest neighborhoods in the city, this financial threat was substantial.[25] As the recency bias in the data makes the hypothesis testing conservative, it only strengthens the credibility of positive findings.

[22]Although la Raza literally means "the race" and refers to the Hispanophone population, this term was particularly favored by the Chicano/Chicana activists in the Mexican American community (Alaniz and Cornish 2008).

[23]Ethnic chambers of commerce and labor unions could be seen as advocacy organizations. However, I have not included them in the analysis because I am primarily interested in the type of ethnic advocacy organizations that are similar to CSOs, with the exception of their relative dependence on external financial resources.

[24]Chew, Ron, "Federal Cutbacks Threaten Survival of Social Service Agencies", *The International Examiner*, March 17, 1981

[25]For reference, the annual budget for the Emergency Meal Voucher Program operated by the Inter*IM, an Asian American CSO in the area, was $36,000 in 1978. Inter*IM staff, "What Inter*IM is doing for you", *The International Examiner*, March 31, 1978, 10

Administrative and Other Data

As for the time series data used in the main analysis, the federal budget data come from the Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2017 Historical Tables. Asian American and Latino population data come from the US census. Party control of the presidency and Congress data come from Russell D. Renka's website.[26] As for the cross-sectional data used in the discussion section, the county-level Asian and Latino population data[27] and the county-level poverty rate estimates[28] both come the US Historical Census Statistics. The county-level data on the OEO spending were collected by Bailey and Duquette (2014).

3.5 Data Analysis

I begin by detecting and replacing outliers in the dependent variable. Outliers are undesirable because they can violate the linearity and normality assumption of an OLS model and produce incorrect regression coefficients and standard errors (see Appendix A.8).

The next step is the interrupted time series analysis. I fitted the OLS regression, the OLS regression with a logged dependent variable, the Poisson, and the negative binomial model to the data. Based on the AIC scores, the OLS model with a logged dependent variable fits the data best (see Figure A.7 in Appendix A.9). In Table 3.2, Model 1 is the base model which includes organization type covariate. Model 2 adds group category covariate. The interaction term between year and the intervention variable estimates the slope change. The table shows the regression coefficient of this interaction term is statistically significant measured by the p-value of 0.1 in Model 1 and 0.05 in Model 2. The negative sign indicates the negative impact of the intervention on the organizational founding.

I conduct a more careful hypothesis testing through the subgroup analysis. The theory implies that the intervention would have negatively affected the organizational founding rate of panethnic CSOs but not that of their advocacy counterparts. In Figure 3.2, the X-axis indicates the year variable, the Y-axis the logged count of organizations founded per each year, and the blue line the fitted values of the models. The top panel in the figure displays this contrasting pattern. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the negative slope change is present in panethnic CSOs but not advocacy organizations. In the bottom panel, I limit the data to panethnic CSOs and confirm that the pattern is not conditional to a specific group.

Nevertheless, a measurement problem persists. The intervention measure, a dummy variable, is rough as it could capture not only the impact of the Reagan budget cut but that of other concurrent events such as the decline of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movement. To address this concern, I examine how the predictive power of federal funding on the founding rate of panethnic CSOs changed over time, especially around the cutpoint. Specifically, I estimated

[26] For more information, see http://cstl-cla.semo.edu/rdrenka/ui320-75/presandcongress.asp.

[27] For more information, see https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2005/demo/POP-twps0076.html

[28] For more information, see https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/census-poverty-tool.html



Figure 3.2: Subgroup analysis



Figure 3.3: Changes in the coefficients of federal funding with bootstrapped CIs

	Dependent variable:	
	Founding rate (logged)	
	Model 1	Model 2
Year	0.059*** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.016)
Intervention	67.587* (34.569)	80.450** (33.919)
CSO	1.081*** (0.094)	1.096*** (0.092)
Hybrid	−0.059 (0.105)	−0.054 (0.102)
Latino		0.247*** (0.077)
Year:Intervention	−0.034* (0.018)	−0.041** (0.017)
Constant	−116.501*** (31.796)	−130.508*** (31.286)
Observations	178	178
R^2	0.570	0.594
Adjusted R^2	0.557	0.580
Akaike Inf. Crit.	281.346	273.025
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.2: ITS design analysis

how the coefficients of federal funding in the OLS with a logged dependent variable changed as I extended the data from 1970 to 2004.[29] The point and line plot in Figure 3.3 show that the coefficients of federal funding were positive up to the cutpoint. They became almost zero after the cutpoint. This abrupt change demonstrates that federal funding positively contributed to the founding rate of panethnic CSOs before the Reagan budget cut, and its role diminished right after the intervention. To measure the uncertainty of the point estimates, I added confidence intervals using bootstrapping. Figure 3.3 shows that the coefficient change around the cutpoint is statistically significant.

Another limitation of the ITS design analysis is the reduced treatment effect. The slope change indicates that the decrease of one panethnic CSO is associated with the Reagan intervention. The full impact of the War on Poverty programs on the creation of panethnic CSOs could be larger than this estimate. To examine this issue, I ran a regression model including organizational, demographic, and partisan covariates based on the subset of the data including observations up to the year 1980 (see Model 1 in Table 3.3). The exponentiated regression coefficient of federal funding variable indicates that a 1% increase in federal funding is associated with the increase of the two panethnic CSOs during the War on Poverty. To check robustness, I examined heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and the influence of remaining outliers (see Appendix A.11). In the table, Model 2 follows the specification of Model 1 except that it uses the robust Newey-West variance estimator to account for heteroskedasticity. Model 3 fits a robust regression model to the same data used in Model 1 to account for unusual observations. These

[29]For instance, the 1970 data are the subset of the original data including observations up to the year 1970.

	Dependent variable:		
	Founding rate (logged)		
	OLS	*OLS with robust SEs*	*Robust regression*
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Federal funding	0.325*** (0.103)	0.325*** (0.086)	0.325*** (0.083)
Population growth	0.027 (0.174)	0.027 (0.090)	0.022 (0.106)
Latino	0.397 (0.596)	0.397 (0.302)	0.415 (0.419)
Presidency	−0.178 (0.187)	−0.178 (0.240)	−0.180 (0.201)
Observations	32		32
R^2	0.498		0.472
Adjusted R^2	0.423		0.394
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.3: Time series regression analysis

model outputs are only marginally different and thus negligible. The statistical significance of federal funding is stable, and the coefficient of federal funding variable is identical across the three models.

3.6 Discussions

A misspecification problem may persist because the covariates specified in the regression models still miss some confounders. These unobserved variables lead to a biased regression coefficient. I ran a sensitivity test using the sensemakr package in R (Cinelli and Hazlett 2019) to estimate the fragility of this regression coefficient. The test result shows that if unobserved confounders, orthogonal to covariates, explain more than 34.65% of the residual variance of both the treatment and the dependent variable, they could reduce the regression coefficient of federal funding to 0. In the previous time series analysis, the variables are aggregated and measured at the national level. However, local level variables may play a critical role. Even though federal grants might influence the founding rate of panethnic CSOs, they are unable to drive the creation of these local organizations if the population in the community does not exist in that particular locality. Therefore, local level demographic and other related control variables are needed to address omitted variable bias.

I tackled this challenge by using the county-level data on the OEO grants (1964-1968) collected by Bailey and Duquette (2014). Bailey and Duquette examined the association between the county-level variation in OEO spending with more than twenty demographic, political, and economic measures. Their study demonstrates roughly 30% of the within-state

variation in OEO spending is explained by two variables: the poverty rate and the share of non-White populations in counties. The result of this systematic investigation shows that among local-level potential confounders, the poverty rate and the share of Asian American and Latino population are most critical. For this reason, I combine the OEO grant data with the county-level US census data on Asian and Latino population percentage and the overall poverty rate[30] and my original data on Asian American and Latino CSOs. Based on this merged data, I then regress the cumulative number of Asian American and Latino CSOs in 1981 (the year when the OEO ceased to operate) on the OEO grants and the demographic and economic covariates. The results demonstrate that the inclusion of local-level demographic factors does not alter the main findings (see Appendix A.12).

Finally, I discuss the scope of implications drawn from this study. The raw points in Figure 3.2 show that the cumulative number of Asian American and Latino organizations continued to grow after the drop during the Reagan intervention. The theory argues that the formation of panethnic CSOs is driven by both the availability of external financial resources (i.e., federal funding), and the extent of population growth. The second factor, the continuous explosive growth of Asian American and Latino populations, may explain this pattern. In Figure 3.1, the organizational founding rate is adjusted for population growth. In this case, it is clear that the 1970s were the high point for the formation of Asian American and Latino CSOs.

Additionally, the theory does not preclude the possibility of the formation of inter-racial CSOs. In a place where two racial minority groups shared a neighborhood, an inter-racial CSO emerged. The Western Addition Community Organization was founded in 1977 in San Francisco on the coalition between African Americans and Japanese Americans. The two groups shared the Western Addition through a historical accident. San Francisco's Japantown was originally neighboring Chinatown and forced to relocate to the Western Addition due to the 1906 earthquake. When the Japanese were interned during World War II, African Americans moved in the Western Addition and these two groups formed the mixed neighborhood. In the 1960s and 1970s, cases like the Western Addition were rare because in most other places African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos formed rather distinct neighborhoods (J. Y. Kim 2020, 209). A recent demographic trend in the US metropolitan areas shows a steady increase of mixed-race and mixed-ethnicity neighborhoods (Frey and Farley 1996). If this trend continues, the formation of CSOs based on inter-racial coalitions would also become more likely.

3.7 Conclusion

The findings provide the first systematic evidence on the positive impact of the War on Poverty programs on the rise of Asian American and Latino CSOs in the 1960s and 1970s. The evidence highlights the importance of the welfare state to understand some of the most fundamental questions in racial and ethnic politics: why panethnic groups such as Asian Americans and Latinos exist, and why these new groups and identities emerged at particular times in US history.

[30]The 1980 Census data were selected as before then Hispanic was not used as a census category (C. E. Rodriguez 2000).

This reveals how Asian American and Latino community organizers used a broad collective identity to overcome their invisible status and gain access to state resources.

Although the empirical puzzle focuses on the formation of panethnic CSOs during the War on Poverty, the theory tells a much broader story of how non-target groups gained access to state resources through organizational means. Policy feedback literature has long argued that new policies, through vested interests, create a new politics (Schattschneider 1935; Pierson 1994; Campbell 2011). The case of Asian Americans and Latinos is interesting because these groups were not formed to defend their vested interests by protecting existing policies. They were formed to benefit from new policies when their inclusion was not clear. The mix of archival research and quantitative analysis demonstrates how Asian American and Latino community organizers responded their groups' ambiguous status and the extent to which the introduction of these programs influenced the formation of their respective CSOs.

The findings also demonstrate why scholars of racial and ethnic politics, intersectionality, and inequality as well as activists and organizers need to pay close attention to specific policy designs to understand the conditions under which organizers among disadvantaged groups adopt new political identities. In some cases, the way a dominant group structures the positions of subordinate groups is clear and explains the terms under which ethnic and racial groups relate to each other (Omi and Winant 1986; C. J. Kim 1999, 2003). This argument explains how colonial states formed panethnic groups by lumping different ethnic groups together (Nnoli 1978; Young 1976; Nagata 1979; Hirschman 1987). In US politics, this coercive mechanism is often highlighted because it explains the process in which African-American group consciousness was formed through the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow (Tate 1994; M. C. Dawson 1994). In other cases, the classification schemes are rather ambiguous. This approach is not negligible because, from the state's perspective, designing the whole taxonomy, collecting detailed demographic information, and serving and controlling target groups are all costly operations. For this reason, the government officials who manage this comprehensive process have incentives to ignore non-primary groups and leave them ambiguously defined. This blindside by the state is the key to explaining why Asian American and Latino organizations emerged during the War on Poverty and why this trend was driven by panethnic CSOs. To seize the opportunity, activists among economically disadvantaged Asian Americans and Latinos had to become organizers and build new political identities to fit the dominant image of policy beneficiaries.

Chapter 4

Integrating Human and Machine Coding to Measure Political Issues in Ethnic Newspaper Articles[1,2,3]

The voices of racial minority groups have rarely been examined systematically with large-scale text analysis in political science. This study fills such a gap by applying an integrated classification framework to the analysis of the commonalities and differences in political issues that appeared in 78,305 articles from Asian American and African American newspapers from the 1960s to the 1980s. The automated text classification shows that Asian American newspapers focused on promoting collective gains more often than African American newspapers. Conversely, African American newspapers concentrated on preventing collective losses more than Asian American newspapers. The content analysis demonstrates that the issue priorities varied between the corpora, especially with respect to policy contexts. Gaining access to government resources was a more urgent issue for Asian Americans, while reducing or ending state violence, such as police brutality, was a more pressing matter for African Americans. It also helped avoid extreme interpretations of the machine coding, as the misalignment of political agendas between the two corpora widened up to 10 times when the training data were measured using the minimum, rather than the maximum, reliability threshold.

Quantitative scholarship on racial and ethnic politics in the U.S. has evolved based on

[1]This chapter was published in the "Journal of Computational Social Science", 2021, 1-28.

[2]I thank Taeku Lee, Eric Schickler, Paul Pierson, Irene Bloemraad, Hakeem Jefferson, Jonathan Simon, Laura Stoker, Ruth Collier, Joel Middleton, Andrew McCall, Max Goplerud, Christopher Stout, and the anonymous reviewer at the *Journal of Computational Social Science* for their comments. I am also grateful to Angela Yip, Brenna Uyeda, Gregory Eng, and Jenny Feng for their research assistance. This paper received the Don T. Nakanishi Award for Distinguished Scholarship and Service in Asian Pacific American Politics from the Western Political Science Association (2020).

[3]All replication files can be found at https://github.com/jaeyk/regression-analysis-with-time-series-data

the development of new surveys. The American National Election Studies (ANES) comprise high-quality panel data that go back to 1948 and have been central in investigating public opinion in U.S. politics (Campbell et al. 1980; Zaller et al. 1992; Bartels 1999). However, when it comes to studying racial minority groups' politics, the data have clear limitations because these groups take up only a very small portion of ANES data (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Other prominent panel data on public opinion, such as the General Social Survey (GSS), are no exception. Racial and ethnic politics researchers have tried to overcome this data limitation by creating new surveys. To name a few, the National Black Election Study[4] was developed in 1984, the Latino National Political Survey[5] in 1989, the National Surveys of Latinos[6] in 2002, the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey[7] in 2000 and its official version[8] in 2008, and the Comparative Post-Election Survey[9] in 2008. These new data sets have enabled a large number of research to be conducted in African American, Latino, and Asian American politics (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1990; Tate 1993; M. C. Dawson 1994; Fraga et al. 2011; Wong et al. 2011; McClain 2018). Nevertheless, most of these surveys are short lived and thus not comparable to the ANES or GSS in terms of longevity. More importantly, these surveys were developed mostly in the 1990s and early 2000s, so they are not useful to researchers interested in historical questions such as the origins and developments of minority political coalitions.

Automating text analysis provides a solution to this long-standing problem in the historical study of racial and ethnic politics in the U.S.. Text always has been the principal form of data in historical research. Archival materials and oral histories have provided insights into how minority groups involved in political activism and developed coalitions in the 1960s and 1970s (Muñoz 1989; Wei 1993; Joseph 2006; D. J. Maeda 2012; Ishizuka 2016; Linder et al. 2018). A particularly important source is ethnic newspapers because they have been an essential part of mobilization networks for racial minority groups. For instance, Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) founded and edited *The Negro World* for the Universal Negro Improvement Association. W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963) founded and edited *The Crisis* for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (Vincent 1973, 17). Similarly, Asian American activists founded more than 20 periodicals from the 1960s through the early 1970s (L. Y. Espiritu 1992, 39). The National Council of La Raza, the nation's largest Latino organization, founded and circulated its official magazine, *Agenda*, among Latino activists nationwide (Mora 2014). Analyzing the commonalities and differences between ethnic newspapers' coverage of policies and politics can inform our understanding of the salient political issues for each racial group and whether they have common political agendas around which to mobilize. Nevertheless, ethnic newspapers have rarely been utilized for quantitative analysis because manually collecting, reading, and coding these documents is a labor-intensive process.

This is a missed opportunity because the cost of conducting a large-scale text analysis on

[4]For more information, see https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/163.
[5]For more information, see https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6841.
[6]For more information, see https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/national-survey-of-latinos/.
[7]For more information, see https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3832.
[8]For more information, see https://naasurvey.com/data/.
[9]For more information, see https://cmpsurvey.org/.

ethnic newspapers' articles has decreased substantially. Recent advancements in computational text analysis tools and techniques have made analyzing large volumes of texts easier, faster, and more contextualized (Mikolov et al. 2013; Goth 2016; Joulin et al. 2016; Devlin et al. 2018). Political scientists have taken advantage of these tools and techniques to investigate the words of the powerful, such as U.S. congress members (Hopkins and King 2010; Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood 2012). In contrast, computational text analysis has rarely been applied for studying the voices of marginalized members, partly because different ethnic newspapers use different data structures to display and store articles. As data vendors (e.g., ProQuest) have digitized millions of ethnic newspapers' articles published in the U.S. and standardized their data structures[10], computationally analyzing ethnic newspapers at scale have become quite feasible.

However, opportunities come with challenges. To begin with, more is not always better. The advantage of large-scale computational text analysis over traditional content analysis is scale. A large sample makes hypothesis testing easier because it reduces the size of standard errors. Nevertheless, because ethnic newspaper articles are collected through non-probability sampling, the large size of the data also may increase the degree of bias in them (Meng 2018, 685-688). Some ethnic newspapers are more likely to be digitized and become available than others because of their financial status among other factors.

More fundamentally, measuring political issues in ethnic newspaper articles is difficult. Many ethnic newspapers were founded to offer alternative political voices. Because mainstream media did not cover minority issues, minority activists founded ethnic newspapers to discuss unique political issues (L. Y. Espiritu 1992; M. Dawson 1994; A. Rodriguez 1999; M. Dawson 2001; Kannegaard 2008; Harris-Lacewell 2010). These political issues could be conceptualized and measured at high (meta issues) or low (specific issues) levels. Meta issues, or broad issue frames, are useful in text classification, a supervised machine learning technique. Reducing the number of classes that need to be classified increases the number of observations for each class and simplifies the coding scheme for human coders, thereby enhancing training data's reliability (Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012; Barberá et al. 2019). Nevertheless, these meta issues are valid conceptually only if they are associated closely with specific issues they are supposed to represent. In addition, different reliability thresholds could be applied to label training data. The minimum threshold indicates that at least one human coder must agree with the coding decision. The maximum threshold indicates that all human coders must agree with the coding decision.

I address these conceptual and methodological challenges by incorporating construct validity and reliability tests of the training data into the supervised machine learning pipeline. Technical guidelines exist for the automated part of the text analysis process, such as preprocessing documents, training algorithms, and evaluating their performance. However, computational social scientists have rarely engaged with how measurement decisions—humans in the machine learning loop—affect machine learning outcomes (Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012; Gitelman 2013; Geiger et al. 2020). I attempt to solve this problem by introducing an integrated text

[10]For more information, see https://www.proquest.com/products-services/ethnic_newswatch.html.

classification framework that examines how the quality of human-coded training data influences the performance and interpretation of machine-coded corpora.

As a demonstration of this framework, I analyzed 78,383 articles from Asian American and African American newspapers from the 1960s through the 1980s. I intentionally selected Asian American and African American newspapers based on the West Coast because Asian Americans and African Americans in this region shared strong social and political networks during the period under investigation. Such a case selection strategy also reduces alternative explanations. Meta issues among these groups are the broad frames that define issues relevant to deal with their unfair treatments in the U.S. racial hierarchy and can be divided into two categories: the promotion of collective gains (collective gain issue) and the prevention of collective losses (collective loss issue) The collective gain issue focuses on expanding opportunities and is related to beneficial government policies, such as minority business ownership. The collective loss issue focuses on reducing threats and is associated with oppressive government policies, such as police brutality. Content analysis assesses data quality by testing the training data's construct validity and reliability. Text classification demonstrates that Asian American newspapers published 110% more collective gain articles than African American newspapers. Conversely, African American newspapers published 133% more collective loss articles than Asian American newspapers. This gap between the two corpora widened up to 10 times when the training data were measured using the minimum, rather than the maximum, reliability threshold.

The article makes several contributions. Methodologically, the findings demonstrate why ensuring the quality of training data is vital in applying machine learning for social science. Data annotation's role in machine learning has been debated among scholars concerning bias and fairness in machine learning (Bender and Friedman 2018; Beretta et al. 2018; Gebru et al. 2018; Mitchell et al. 2019). Although computational text analysis has gained popularity among social scientists (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Wilkerson and Casas 2017; Brady 2019), empirical research that closely investigates human-coding decisions' impact on automated text classification remains lacking (Denny and Spirling 2017; Nelson et al. 2017; Nelson 2017; Elish and Boyd 2018; Nelson 2019). This article fills this gap in computational social science literature by showing how using less reliable data leads not only to weak predictions, but also to extreme interpretations. Substantially, the original large-scale evidence describes the underappreciated differences in the political issues between racial minority groups. Racial minorities in the U.S. are often coded altogether as people of color because they share racial marginalization. However, sharing the racial status does not automatically form an alignment on issue preferences among these groups (Omi and Winant 1986; M. C. Dawson 1994; Kaufmann 2003). The missing element is policies. President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced civil rights legislation, expanded the welfare state (Orleck 2011; Bailey and Danziger 2013), and militarized policing (Hinton 2016). As his political legacy included the War on Poverty as well as the War on Crime, the ways in which minority groups responded to these contemporaneous policy challenges varied. Although many studies have shown strong ideological connections between the Asian American movement and the Black Power movement (Prashad 2002; D. Maeda 2005; Ho and Mullen 2008; D. J. Maeda 2012; Ishizuka 2016; Watkins 2012), I find that the two groups' priorities varied significantly. For Asian Americans, gaining access to government resources was a more

urgent issue; however, for African Americans, reducing or ending state violence, such as police brutality, was a more important matter. Although these findings are limited in their temporal scope, they help scholars draw a linkage between racial marginalization and political preference formation within racial minority groups more carefully, in policy contexts.

4.1 Political Issues in Ethnic Newspapers

Political issues among racial minority groups in the U.S. focus on discrimination due to these groups' subordinate status in U.S. racial hierarchy (Omi and Winant 1986; Tate 1993; M. C. Dawson 1994; Chae et al. 2008; Hwang and Goto 2008; Rothstein 2017; Trounstine 2018; Reardon, Kalogrides, and Shores 2019; Williams, Lawrence, and Davis 2019). Meta issues among these groups could be defined as broad frames that define issues that are relevant for dealing with unfair treatments. M. C. Dawson (1994) tackled this conceptual problem in his analysis of the source of Black political solidarity. His Black utility heuristic theory argued that centuries of racial discrimination, including the continued legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, make it difficult for African Americans to separate their individual interests from group interests. Rich and poor African Americans vary little in their policy preferences and voting behavior because race ties their fate together and defines their meta issue: uniting African Americans against racism

I follow M. C. Dawson's footsteps but also go one step further by differentiating between the mechanisms that produce intraracial solidarity. Taking this step is useful in generalizing Dawson's framework and measuring how issue priorities between minority groups vary not only in degree, but also in kind. This extension is also important in examining the likelihood of interracial coalition formation. If issue priorities are misaligned between racial minority groups, it raises the coordination cost of forming a coalition among them.

I argue that although racial minority groups are often described collectively as people of color, their issues vary because they face different policy challenges. There are two ways in which a racial minority group can pursue its collective interests. When this article mentions "collective interests," it refers to common interests among individuals who share the same racial identification (e.g., Asian Americans, African Americans). One way is to emphasize the promotion of collective gain by expanding opportunities (collective gain issue), and the other way is to highlight the prevention of collective losses by reducing threats (collective loss issue).

Depending on the main policy challenge to which a group is exposed, these two meta issues' relevance and priority change. There are two types of government policies. Beneficial policies help a targeted group, while oppressive policies harm a targeted group. As summarized in Appendix C.1, what comprises beneficial and oppressive policies is not always clear. Policies such as police brutality and support for minority business ownership have clear directions as they either benefit or harm a targeted group. In contrast, policies like housing may benefit or harm a targeted group depending on the context. For instance, increasing affordable housing benefits a targeted group, while continuing housing discrimination harms a targeted group. When oppressive policies target a group, the collective loss frame becomes relevant and

prioritized. Consider a situation in which a group is targeted disproportionately with police brutality. Protecting these human lives would become a theme through which to spur political mobilization. In contrast, when a group is being excluded from beneficial policies, the collective gain frame becomes relevant and prioritized. Consider a situation in which a minority group is not included as a beneficiary group for new social policies. Gaining access to state resources then would become the main focus of political advocacy.

Responding to policy changes, ethnic newspapers issue two different types of political articles to seek their group interests. Collective gain articles focus on collective gain issues, while collective loss articles focus on collective loss issues. If beneficial policies become salient, an ethnic newspaper would issue collective gain articles, but when oppressive policies become salient, an ethnic newspaper would issue collective loss articles. These theoretical expectations are summarized in Table 4.1.

	Beneficial policies	No beneficial policies
Oppressive policies	Mix of collective gain and loss articles	Collective loss articles
No oppressive policies	Collective gain articles	None

Table 4.1: How ethnic newspaper issue collective gain and loss articles in response to policy changes

4.2 Hypotheses

We can draw the following two hypotheses from the argument. If a racial minority group is exposed to beneficial policies, the newspaper aligned with the group will issue more collective gain articles. However, if a minority group is exposed to oppressive policies, the newspaper aligned with the group will issue more collective loss articles. Suppose that for class "collective gain" and class "collective loss," "1" denotes membership in the class and "0" the opposite. $Pr(\text{Meta issue type} = 1|\text{Government policy type})$ indicates the probability of an ethnic newspaper issuing an article using a particular type of meta issue ($\in$ {collective gain, collective loss}) given that the group the newspaper is aligned with is exposed to a specific type of government policy ($\in$ {Beneficial, Oppressive}). We can define the hypotheses formally as follows:

- Hypothesis 1: $Pr(\text{Collective gain} = 1|\text{Beneficial policies}) > Pr(\text{Collective loss} = 1|\text{Beneficial policies})$
- Hypothesis 2: $Pr(\text{Collective loss} = 1|\text{Oppressive policies}) > Pr(\text{Collective gain} = 1|\text{Oppressive policies})$.

4.3 Case Selection

Domain knowledge helps identifying well-matched cases. For hypothesis testing, we ideally would like to compare a set of ethnic newspaper articles about two groups that are exactly alike, except that one group generally is exposed to beneficial policies and the other generally is exposed to oppressive policies. Unfortunately, no such identical cases exist in the real world (Holland 1986, 947). The next best option is to find cases in which the two minority groups' characteristics are as similar as possible, except for their differential policy treatments.

Asian Americans and African Americans on the West Coast are two of the most similar historical cases exposed to divergent policy treatments. Both groups were subject to racial discrimination on the West Coast for decades. Racial discrimination against Asian Americans started in the late 19th century through "a white supremacist alliance in Congress" comprising Southern Democrats and Western Republicans (King and Smith 2005, 88). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 singled out the Chinese as the first racially excluded group under U.S. immigration policy (E. Lee 2003; Ngai 2014). The California Alien Land Law of 1913 then deprived Asian Americans of property rights except those with birthright citizenship. Racial discrimination against African Americans soon appeared in the region as a large number of African Americans moved west during the Second Great Migration. Even though booming industrial cities on the West Coast provided unprecedented economic opportunities for African Americans, the postwar economy clearly had a racially charged hierarchical structure (Self 2005; Sides 2006).

More importantly, the physical and social boundaries between African American and Asian American neighborhoods on the West Coast were permeable. When African Americans moved to the West during World War II, they found a rare housing opportunity in vacant houses as a result of the internment of Japanese Americans. For this reason, from Los Angeles to Seattle, African American neighborhoods were located adjacent to Asian American ethnic enclaves. This proximity also may explain why and how the Black Power and Asian American movements co-evolved in inner cities on the West Coast (Prashad 2002; D. Maeda 2005; Ho and Mullen 2008; D. J. Maeda 2012; Ishizuka 2016; Watkins 2012). The Red Guard Party, a radical Asian American organization founded in San Francisco in 1969, was modeled on the Black Panther Party established in Oakland across the Bay in 1966. Like the Black Panther Party, the Red Guard Party had a 10-point program and ran a free breakfast program, and their members wore berets (D. Maeda 2005, 1079-1089).

Despite close social and political networks, along with their concurrent emergence and growth, these Asian American and African American political movements did not form an interracial coalition. Student activists of color focusing on racial justice certainly were present on college campuses (Umemoto 1989; Wei 1993; D. J. Maeda 2012), but outside university environments, counterexamples abound (Brilliant 2010, 238-240). Interracial coalitions that emerged on college campuses were the exception rather than rule.

Recent historical studies and my own archival research show how the wide spectrum of policies introduced in the 1960s created the source of the discord. President Johnson expanded both oppressive and beneficial policies during the 1960s, and these policies raised different

kinds of challenges for African Americans and Asian Americans.

The main policy challenge for African Americans was reducing the extent of state oppression. Although President Nixon was credited with spearheading the War on Crime in the U.S., a recent historical study revealed that Johnson already has sown the seeds of mass incarceration by expanding federal assistance to militarize policing through the establishment of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in 1965 to fight a war "within our boundaries" in inner cities across the U.S. (Hinton 2015, 102-105). For African American migrants from the Jim Crow South who migrated to the West, these punitive policies were all familiar. When African American activists protested the wrongful convictions of three African American inmates at California's Soledad Prison in 1970, they rallied around the following slogan: "Free the Soledad Brothers from Legal Lynching."[11]

Asian Americans wrestled with a different kind of policy challenge—expanding state support. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 resumed mass immigration from Asia. During the first wave of mass Asian immigration in the late 19th century, most Asian immigrants were cheap laborers, but the new wave of immigrants in the post-1960s included middle-class and college-educated people. Housing discrimination against Asian Americans weakened as the Cold War began, and some Asians, especially Chinese Americans, were viewed as allies (Brooks 2009). Taking advantage of this trend, these well-off Asian Americans bypassed old, run-down ethnic enclaves in inner cities and built new ethnic hubs in suburban areas (Kwong 1996; Lai 2003; Li 2006; Zhou 2010). Consequently, those left behind in old Chinatowns, Japantowns, and Manilatowns suffered from deteriorating neighborhood conditions and desperately needed outside support. Johnson's other domestic political agenda, the War on Poverty programs, provided the kind of support that Asian American activists in these communities sought but with one serious limitation. From the perspective of government officials, Asian American communities were too small and fragmented (Kuramoto 1976). Michio Suzuki, deputy commissioner of the Administration for Public Services in Washington D.C., warned Asian American social service providers that they should "act together" because federal officials were unhappy when they had to fund various Asian groups separately as a result of a lack of coordination between them.[12] Asian Americans were a less-ideal subject for federal social policies, as the cost of delivering service to them was too high and the total number of people that the program served was too small. Thus, after decades-old exclusion from the state's social protection, Asian Americans at last received an opportunity to gain access to government resources, yet federal grant makers did not recognize them as a viable minority group.

The controlled case comparison (Skocpol and Theda 1979; Slater and Ziblatt 2013) helps reduce alternative explanations, such as neighborhood backgrounds or political ideologies. Nevertheless, some unobserved differences between the groups remain, and they might have influenced the relative production of collective gain and loss articles by Asian American and African American newspapers. For this reason, this approach is not suitable for causal inference.

[11]Greaves, Kay, "Davis Bail is Canceled; Poindexter Out on Bail," *Oakland Post*, October 22, 1970: 13

[12]Chin, Karen, "Pacific/Asian Elderly Conference: Social Service Providers Must Get Their 'Act Together'," *International Examiner*, April 30, 1979.

Rather, the aim of this case selection is mainly to strengthen descriptive inference from a large-scale collection of ethnic newspaper articles.

4.4 Data

Of the many newspapers and magazines written by and for Asian Americans and African Americans, I use the records of *Asian Week* (1983-1989), *International Examiner* (1976-1987), *The Sun Reporter* (1968-1979), *The Oakland Post* (1968-1981), and *The Sacramento Observer* (1968-1975). I selected these newspapers because they were all founded in inner cities on the West Coast and part of mobilization networks in their respective communities. They devoted substantial pages to describing community affairs and frequently shared news about community organizations. With the exception of the *International Examiner*, all of the other newspapers are based in Northern California, particularly the Bay Area, but the addition of a Seattle ethnic newspaper would make little difference as Asian American communities on the West Coast have shared close migration, settlement, and political development trajectories. For instance, most of the early Chinese settlers in San Francisco and Seattle came from a few counties in Guangdong province in China, and they considered the region between California and British Columbia the "Gold Mountain" (*Gam Sann* in Cantonese) (A. B. Chan 1983). These settlers founded the Chinese Benevolent Association, an umbrella organization made up of Chinese family and regional associations, in San Francisco in 1882 and in Seattle in 1892. Since the 1960s, these Chinese communities, both in San Francisco and Seattle, have been forming coalitions with other Asian ethnic groups to deal with their common political issues, such as gentrification and affordable housing, and the *International Examiner* and *Asian Week* emerged in these historical contexts (J. Y. Kim 2020).

International Examiner, founded in Seattle in 1974, and *Asian Week*, based in San Francisco in 1979, were the two leading Asian American newspapers on the West Coast. Unlike other Asian ethnic newspapers that catered to national origin groups (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos), these newspapers aimed to represent the united voice of Asian Americans. *Asian Week* was the first English-language Asian American publication and the largest until it closed in 2012 (Ling and Austin 2015, 29-31).*International Examiner* is the oldest and largest non-profit Asian American newspaper in the Northwest. The newspaper closely followed news related to local community-based organizations and paid special attention to the growing involvement of Asian Americans in electoral politics.

The use of English-langauge Asian newspapers carries immigration status, class, and political implications. Asian-language newspapers focused on home country politics. For instance, during the first half of the 20th century, Chinese journalism in the U.S. mainly focused on the political situation back in China. The 1965 immigration legislation resumed a wave of mass immigration from Asia and increased the foreign-born Asian population. According to U.S. Census data, the percentage of foreign-born residents among the Chinese population was 52%, while the Japanese were 21%, and the Filipinos were 52% in the 1970s (Hirschman and Wong 1981, 499). The increase in the Asian population in the U.S. also led to the founding of new Asian-language

newspapers. Asian-language newspapers, which were founded by major newsgroups in Asia, targeted these relatively affluent members. By contrast, English-language Asian newspapers such as *Asian Week* and the *International Examiner* focused on U.S. politics, with an emphasis on how the U.S. government treated its marginalized community members in traditional ethnic enclaves. Both newspapers paid close attention to policy support for the poor and elderly who remained in Chinatowns, Japantowns, and Manilatowns (D. Chin 2001; G. Chin 2015).

Similar to its Asian American counterpart, the African American corpus in the data was politically progressive. The *The Sun Reporter* was founded in San Francisco in 1944 as the city's first Black press. The founder, Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett, was an African American civil rights activist and former president of the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Thomas Fleming, who worked as an editor, reporter, and columnist for the newspaper for 61 years from its founding, also held a strong political commitment to racial justice. He once argued that the mission of the Black press was to serve as "the watchdogs" in order to guarantee the constitutionally granted citizenship status of "former chattel slaves" [13]. *The Oakland Post* was founded in 1963 and was politically less vocal, as the newspaper intentionally focused on not "making a social statement" but instead "just covering the news" to increase its readership and thus its impact [14]. Nevertheless, as Oakland was a main center of African American political mobilization on the West Coast, it was almost impossible for the newspaper not to address the topic of racial justice. Between 1968 and 1981, the newspaper covered The Black Panther Party 192 times. *The Sacramento Observer* was founded in Sacramento in 1962 and supported the Sacramento Urban League and the Sacramento Area Black Law Caucus. The newspaper also played a particularly important role in informing and alerting the African American community in Sacramento about the development of the Civil Rights and the Black Power Movements in other parts of the country (Covin 2009, 25). Other key African American newspapers on the West Coast, such as *Los Angeles Sentinel*, were not included, as the only articles published by that newspaper after 1991 were available in the database.

I downloaded data from these five newspapers from the Ethnic NewsWatch database, which has compiled more than 2.5 million articles published in U.S. ethnic newspapers and magazines.[15] ProQuest created this database and does not allow web scraping. However, one can still download articles and save them as hypertext markup language (HTML) files. I have turned these HTML files into a single dataset by using the Beautiful Soup library in Python. At first, there were more than 80,000 articles. In the data-cleaning process, I discovered that data from *The Sun Reporter* from early 1973 to late 1974 did not include the complete articles, only their abstracts. For this reason, I omitted such data. This reduced the total number of articles to 78,383. Table 4.2 summarizes the number of newspaper articles in the corpus.

[13]Fleming, Thomas,"Thomas Fleming's Weekly Report," *Sun Reporter*, August 2, 1975:7

[14]Berling, Lynn, "'Post' Tries to be Only Daily for Black Community'," *Oakland Post*, February 15, 1981: 6

[15]For more information, see https://www.proquest.com/products-services/ethnic_newswatch.html.

Title	Asian Week	The International Examiner	The Sun Reporter	The Oakland Post	The Sacramento Observer
Period	1983-1989	1976-1987	1968-1979	1968-1981	1968-1975
N	11,883	2,719	24,793	29,560	9,428

Table 4.2: Number of each newspaper articles in the corpora

4.5 Empirical Strategies

The empirical strategy's goal was to find a systematic and cost-effective way to measure every article based on the conceptual framework proposed above. The integrated classification framework achieved this goal by examining the relationship between training data and automated text classification using content analysis (Berelson 1952). What classifying algorithms do is mimic human coder behaviors. Because the machine can follow only where humans lead, human-coding quality influences the quality of automated text classification. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the quality of human coding and its influence on machine learning performance and interpretations. Figure 4.1 describes the workflow from selecting cases to testing the hypotheses.



Figure 4.1: Workflow

Training Data

I hired four undergraduate research assistants and coded the training data based on the following procedures. The human coders labeleded two meta issues and a list of topics because these topics are useful for testing construct validity. Throughout these procedures, none of the human coders were informed about the research hypotheses.

1. Detecting topics and distributing articles: I employed topic modeling using the stm package in R (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2015) to inductively discover topics from each newspaper. I randomly divided these topics (n = 48) into two parts and assigned 100 articles from each topic in the first part to one team of two human coders and 100 articles from each topic in the second part to another team. I asked the human coders to label each topic based on these articles without consulting the other team member.

2. Topic coding: The two teams spent two weeks coding topics and then another week agreeing on the common labels through intergroup discussions. In the process, the human coders created a list of topics related to the articles.

3. Meta issue coding: After the topic coding, I randomly selected 1,008 articles from the Asian American corpus and 1,008 articles from the African American corpus stratifying on the year variable. Year was selected as a stratifying variable because key issues may change over time. I then paired the human coders into two groups again and assigned one group to the Asian American corpus sample and the other group to the African American corpus sample. To avoid demand effects, I did not inform human coders regarding the hypotheses I attempts to test. Each team coded whether the articles in the sample were about promoting collective gains (yes = 1, no = 0) or preventing collective losses (yes = 1, no = 0). The process created two binary variables—collective gain and collective loss. I do not create one binary variable and use collective gain and loss as its two exclusive classes because this ignores mixed or none classes identified in Table 4.3. Creating two separate binary variables is a more reasonable approach. In doing so, the human coders also coded each article with a relevant topic from the list they created in step 2.

	Collective gain	Non-collective gain
Collective loss	Mixed	Exclusive collective loss
Non-collective loss	Exclusive collective gain	None

Table 4.3: Conceptual Matrix

Content Analysis

I assessed the quality of the human-coded training data by measuring inter-coder reliability and construct validity.

Percentage agreement measures the percentage of the agreed coding decisions made by pairs of coders. The calculation of percentage agreement is fairly simple. Suppose two human coders measure a binary variable. Subtracting the values recorded by coder 1 from the values recorded by coder 2 returns some 0s. The number of 0s divided by the number of units provides the percentage agreement (McHugh 2012, 278). Therefore, percentage agreement is an intuitive method to assess the accuracy of human coding. Nevertheless, it is also a crude one, as it does not account for a certain degree of agreement that would simply arise by chance.[16]

Cohen's kappa coefficient provides measures for the degree of reliability in inter-coder agreement. Suppose p_a indicates the proportion of actual agreement and p_e the proportion of chance agreement. The difference between the two quantities, $p_a - p_e$, represents the proportion of units in which the agreement occurred beyond chance. $1 - p_e$ represents the remaining units when the chance agreement is excluded (Cohen 1960, 39-40). The coefficient (k) or kappa is defined as $k = \frac{p_a - p_e}{1 - p_e}$. The kappa can range from -1 and +1 and 0. A high kappa score is desirable because it represents a low degree of faulty evidence in the training data.[17] I also check whether the kappa score increases when I exclude the articles covering non-political topics in the training data because these articles could confuse human coders and decrease inter-coder reliability.

Construct validity is about whether the measures measure what they are supposed to measure based on the underlying theory (Cronbach and Meehl 1955). At the conceptual level, collective gain and loss labels and topic labels are closely associated because the meta issues should represent these topics. Articles coded as collective gain are expected to cover topics on beneficial policies (convergent validation) more likely than oppressive government policies (discriminant validation). Articles coded as collective loss should behave in an opposite way (Campbell and Fiske 1959). I test these assumptions by calculating the difference between the number of collective gain articles and that of collective loss articles associated with particular topics.

Finally, I examine the relationship between reliability and construct validity by examining how these differences vary by measurement decisions. At the minimum, articles could be defined as collective gain or collective loss if one of the two human coders said so (minimum threshold). At the maximum, articles could be defined as such if all the human coders agreed (maximum threshold). The minimum threshold is a naive approach, and the maximum threshold provides more reliable data.

[16] Several studies have demonstrated how this measure tends to overestimate the true agreement among human coders (Birkimer and Brown 1979; Suen and Lee 1985; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002).

[17] In practice, a kappa smaller than or equal to 0 indicates no agreement, a kappa in the 0.01-0.02 range indicates slight agreement, a kappa in the 0.21-0.40 range indicates fair agreement, a kappa in the 0.41-0.60 range indicates moderate agreement, a kappa in the 0.61-0.80 range indicates substantial agreement, and a kappa in the 0.81-1 range indicates an almost perfect agreement (McHugh 2012, 279).

Text Classification

Using the coded articles, I trained and tested the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso), naive Bayes, and extreme gradient boosting (XGBoost) algorithms. I put 70% of the sample articles into the training set and the rest into the test set by using the scikit-learn library in Python, again stratifying on the year variable (for more information, see Appendix C.3).

For the pre-processing, I tokenized the documents, removed special characters and white space, and turned these tokens into lower case. For the feature extraction, I used the bag-of-words model (Z. S. Harris 1954). It is a simple representation of the text because it only counts word frequencies in each article. These term frequencies are used as features to train algorithms and make predictions.[18] I also construct n-gram, a sequence of n items from a document, with a maximum length of two, because some key words, such as "civil rights," are sensible in bigrams.

I evaluate machine learning performance by examining accuracy and balanced accuracy rates. The absolute difference between the two measures shows the effect of imbalanced training data on prediction accuracy. If the difference is substantially large, I address this problem by randomly oversampling the minority class in the training data with replacement (upsampling) and examining performance improvement using the accuracy and balanced accuracy rates. I also check the extent to which the machines performed better or worse than the human coders by comparing the percentage agreement and the two machine learning performance measures. I select a classifier that shows stable high performance (B. Yu 2013), I predict the unlabeled data, and I test the hypotheses by comparing the proportion of collective gain and loss articles in the Asian American and African American corpora.

4.6 Content Analysis

Percentage Agreement

To begin with, the percentage agreement displays the high reliability of the labels. Figure 4.2 shows that the inter-coder agreement reached 88% for the collective loss articles in both the African American and Asian American corpora. The metric is slightly lower for the collective gain articles: 7% down for the African American newspaper and 8% down for the Asian American one. However, this difference is marginal.

Cohen's Kappa

As the percentage agreement does not account for the stochastic element of the coding process, it is time to turn to Cohen's kappa. The kappa score is relatively higher for the collective loss articles in both newspapers (see the left panel in Figure 4.3). In addition, the labels in the African American newspapers are more reliable than those in their Asian American

[18] I only used the top 5,000 most frequently appearing terms because Zipf's law expects frequently appearing features in documents to be a small fraction (Zipf 1936, 1949). The rest of the features will only increase sparsity in the training data and slow down the algorithmic process.



Figure 4.2: Percentage agreement for collective gain and collective loss articles



Figure 4.3: Cohen's kappa with or without non-political topics

counterparts. Non-political issues, such as food and sports, could confuse human coders and increase disagreement between them. The right panel in the figure demonstrates how removing these articles increases inter-coder reliability. The results indicate that the training data are less reliable for non-political articles. Because unreliable data lead to weak prediction accuracy, I excluded articles related to sports, car sales, arts, recipes, and restaurants from the unlabeled data using a dictionary method. The specific terms used to create the dictionary are listed in Appendix C.2. This decision removed 46% (n = 6,831) of the Asian American and 44% (n = 32,820) of the African American corpus. I did not use this approach to exclude every non-political issue in the data because the dictionary method is insensitive to contexts. For instance, because churches have played an important role in African American politics (McDaniel 2009), some articles that are related to Christian advice and church events also might mention politics. When the *Sun Reporter* described the political struggles of Black people in Cairo, Illinois on March 27, 1981, it used deeply religious terms[19]:

> Millions of people across America are aware of the plight of Cairo's poor and Blacks because of an elaborate communication system developed by the front and because the Rev. Koen and other leaders of the front have traveled hundreds of thousands of miles to tell the Cairo story. The most important part of the struggle is found within its religious dimensions. The Black people of Cairo relate to a higher power.

The same argument can be made about Asian stereotypes, as overcoming the image of the model minority has been a key political issue in the Asian American community. For example, the *International Examiner* criticized the limited supply of social services for Asian Americans in Seattle's International District on December 31, 1979. In the article, the newspaper highlighted why being perceived as a model minority is a political disadvantage[20]:

> In 1969, there was no I.D. health clinic, no Asian Counseling and Referral Service, no Asian American Studies program, no Asian community newspapers, no Asian American Commission, no Asian elderly program, and no Asian American theatre. There was also no Kingdome. Low income housing for Asians was still a concept. Asians were the nice, quiet, studious, *model minority* [Italics added by the author] with no problems.

Similarly, no clear keywords exist that are related exclusively to health advice or lifestyle and not associated with social policies. To avoid these pitfalls, I did not remove articles related to Christian advice, Church events, Asian American stereotypes, health advice, and lifestyle topics using the dictionary method.

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[19] Anonymous, "Cairo, Illinois: From Exploitation To Freedom," *Sun Reporter*, March 27, 1971: 8

[20] Iwamoto, Gary, "A Picture of the 70's," *International Examiner*, December 31, 1979: 8

Construct Validity Test

The next step is to check construct validity. So far, we have tested how reliably the human coders labeled the training data. Now, we turn to whether the measures really measure what they are designed to measure. The theory assumes that collective gain articles are likely to be associated with beneficial policies. In contrast, collective loss articles are likely to be related to oppressive policies.

The analysis confirms that meta and specific issues hang together, as expected by the theory. This relationship holds regardless of whether one uses the maximum or minimum threshold to define the meta issues in the training data. In Figure 4.4, the X-axis is the difference between the number of collective gain articles and that of collective loss articles belonging to the identical topic. This calculation removes those articles labeled by a team of the two human coders as both collective gain and loss. I did not involve them in the analysis because their expected content is unclear. The Y-axis indicates these topics. The red bar plot indicates that the maximum threshold is used to define collective gain and loss labels. The blue bar plot indicates the use of the minimum threshold for the measurement. In the figure, the topics, a collection of documents, strongly associated with collective gain articles are at the top, and the topics highly related to collective loss articles are at the bottom.

In the Asian American case, healthcare and political representation are the top two issues related to collective gain, and hate crimes and Asian stereotypes are the top two issues associated with collective loss. After independent topic coding, the human coders also provided a brief summary of each topic. Based on these summaries, on the Asian American side, healthcare was about the physical and mental well-being of people of Asian descent, which consisted of access to health education, health services, and availability of translators and translations to access these services. Political representation was about the potential increase in political engagement of Asian Americans in politics at the local, state, and federal levels, especially in gaining recognition in U.S. Census data collection. Hate crimes were about instances of violence or discrimination against Asian Americans, and Asian American stereotypes were about generalizations of Asian men and women and cultural perceptions of outsiders as well as those within the Asian community. Issues about increasing government support were strong indicators of the collective gain articles, and issues about reducing outside threat, although not necessarily oppressive policies, were leading signs of collective loss articles.

The African American newspaper follows the same pattern. School programs were about public school programs and administration in the San Francisco Bay Area. This issue was counted as a top issue related to collective gain articles. Criminal justice was about discrimination against African American defendants who were given unfair trials, legislators excluded from important committees, and citizens with higher imprisonment rates. Similarly, civil rights were about the overlapping topics of federal employees' failure (in terms of neglect of duty, abuse of power, or discrimination) and proposed laws, some of which would disproportionately affect African Americans. These were the top two issues related to collective loss articles.

One noticeable difference between the two corpora is the extent to which the threshold change affects the proportion of collective gain and loss articles. Using the maximum threshold



Figure 4.4: Construct validity test



Figure 4.5: Threshold change and the proportion of collective gain and loss articles

increases the proportion of collective gain articles by 300% and that of collective loss articles by 140% in the Asian American corpus. The same change moves up the proportion of collective gain articles by 200% and that of collective loss articles by 46% in the African American corpus (see Figure 4.5). The Asian American corpus displays a greater degree of variability. This pattern is expected because the labels in the Asian American corpus are less reliable than their African American counterparts on the basis of their kappa scores. The content of the labels changes little regardless of whether the training data are measured using the minimum or the maximum threshold.

4.7 Automated Text Classification

Automated text classification scales up content analysis using machine learning. In Figure 4.6, the X-axis indicates the accuracy or the balanced accuracy rate. The Y-axis indicates different classifiers. The dotted lines represent the percentage agreement between the human coders.

The figure demonstrates that more reliable and balanced data produced better prediction outcomes. The worst performance is found in the bottom left panel, where the training data are measured using the minimum threshold and no resampling is used. The average accuracy rate is 77%, but the average balanced accuracy rate is 63%. The best performance is found in the top right panel, where the training data are measured using the maximum threshold and upsampling is used. The average accuracy rate goes up by 19%, and the average balanced accuracy rate moves up by 32%. Both Lasso and XGBoost algorithms exhibit similar high performance. However, when these classifiers were used to predict the unlabeled data, XGBoost did not perform well. For example, when the training data were measured using the maximum threshold and upsampled, the algorithm was able to classify only four Asian American and 171 African American collective loss articles. This prediction is likely a strong underestimate of the true count of collective loss articles. For instance, hate crimes are a strong indicator of collective loss articles among Asian American newspapers (see Figure 4.4). Asian American newspapers all highlighted how an anti-Asian attitude led to the murder of Vincent Chin. *Asian Week* covered the Vincent Chin case 212 times and *International Examiner* 40 times between April 1983 and December 1989. These articles argued that Vincent Chin's murder was a hate crime. Even if we only counted these articles, the number of relevant cases for collective loss should be 63 times larger than the predicted estimate. I selected Lasso to classify the unlabeled data because it demonstrated the most stable high performance.

Data quality affects not only prediction accuracy but also substantive results. Figure 4.7 displays how the proportion of collective gain and loss articles varies between the two corpora over time. In this case, the training data are measured using the maximum threshold. The Y-axis shows the percentage of articles in the corpus classified as the given meta issue type, and the X-axis indicates either publication years or months. The ribbons indicate 95% confidence intervals. The blue line indicates the proportion of exclusive collective gain articles, the red line indicates the proportion of exclusive collective loss articles, and the purple line indicates the proportion of articles classified as both collective gain and loss. Overall, the blue line is above



Figure 4.6: Classifier performance evaluations

the red line in the Asian American case, and the pattern is reversed in the African American case. Put differently, Asian American newspapers issued collective gain articles far more frequently than collective loss articles. This pattern is reversed in the African American case. In addition, the purple is below the blue line in the Asian American case and below the red line in the African American case. In either case, articles classified as both collective gain and loss articles did not take up the largest proportion.

One limitation with the naive comparison between the two corpora is the fact that Asian American and African American newspapers cover different time periods. The Asian American corpus covers the 1976-1989 period, while the African American corpus covers the 1968-1981 period. This mismatch might cause issue priority differences in the two corpora. To address this concern, I matched the two data sets on their publication years (1976-1981) in the right panel and did not do the same in the left panel in Figure 4.8. This decision removes articles issued by *Asian Week* (1983-1989). The X-axis is the group, and the Y-axis is the proportion of exclusive collective gain and loss articles. I dropped the mixed category to simplify the comparison. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. To begin with, matching their publication years does not change the general pattern that appeared in the two corpora. In both panels, Asian American newspapers clearly preferred collective gain articles, whereas African American newspapers preferred collective loss articles. As the differences are wider than the confidence intervals, the patterns are statistically significant. Nevertheless, the different time frames affect the magnitude of the differences between the two panels. Matching them on their publication



Figure 4.7: Time series trends (maximum threshold)

years decreases the absolute difference in the average proportions of exclusive collective gain articles between these corpora from 30% to 18.5% and that of exclusive collective loss articles between them from 24% to 23%. In addition, measuring the training data using the minimum threshold widens the gap between the two corpora. When the threshold shifted to the minimum, Asian American newspapers exclusively reported on collective gain up to three times more than African American newspapers did. Conversely, African American newspapers exclusively covered collective loss up to 10 times more than their Asian American counterparts.

Finally, some unstable patterns deserve further explanations. In Figure 4.7, the proportion of exclusive collective gain articles in the Asian American corpus surged in the early 1980s. This increase is a likely result of combining two different data sources. Figure C.1 in Appendix C.5 shows that the proportion of exclusive collective gain articles is higher in *Asian Week* than in the *International Examiner*. This difference does not simply derive from the fact that their publication years are different. Even if we matched the newspaper data on their publication years (1983-1987), the average proportion of exclusive collective gain articles in *Asian Week* is 40% greater than the same measure in the *International Examiner*. The two data sources were combined in the time series plot starting in 1983, which explains the abrupt increase in the proportion of exclusive collective gain articles appearing around that cut-off point. In addition, this surging trend seems conditional on the measurement decision, as it does not appear when



Figure 4.8: How text classification is sensitive to measurement decisions

the training data are measured using the minimum threshold (see Figure C.2 in Appendix C.5).

4.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Textual data are attractive because they allow political scientists to analyze politicians and citizen's words—the content of democracy (Brady 2019, 311). Nevertheless, the application of the method has been uneven, as most cases are limited to the study of the words of the powerful, such as U.S. congress members (Hopkins and King 2010; Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood 2012). The voices of marginalized members have rarely been examined systematically with large-scale text analysis in political science. This study fills such a gap by setting an example of how we can apply machine learning to investigate how political issues vary among racial minority groups over time.

The findings demonstrate why careful and systematic content analysis is essential for automated text classification. Content analysis is labor intensive. More importantly, although content analysis is based on a probability sample, the descriptive statistics drawn from the analysis are still prone to error, as the sampling variance is unknown. Automated text classification is an efficient alternative to this traditional method, as machine learning algorithms can label a large collection of documents at an impressive speed. In addition, sampling variance is no longer a concern, as the analysis is based on the entire corpus. Nevertheless, a healthy dose of skepticism is still useful in embracing this new method. Uncertainty exists regarding how

machine learning algorithms predict labels and how researchers can interpret the results. The findings clearly illustrate that unreliable training data lead not only to weak predictions, but also to extreme interpretations. When the maximum threshold was used to label the training data, the difference in issue priorities between Asian American and African American corpora were moderate. When the maximum threshold was used, the gap between the two corpora widened up to 10 times.

Although purely descriptive, the original large-scale evidence provides new insights into the differences in the political issues between racial minority groups. Whereas the African American corpus focused on opposing state oppression, the Asian American corpus concentrated on expanding state support in the 1970s—the period when their publication years were overlapped. The findings are limited in their temporal scope because U.S. policies have undergone important changes since the 1980s. Social policies have become subject to neoliberal reforms (Danziger and Haveman 1981; Wolman 1986; Soss, Hacker, and Mettler 2007; Pierson 2003), and criminal justice policies have further strengthened U.S. state's capacity to disproportionately criminalize and incarcerate African Americans (Alexander 2012; Murakawa 2014; Gottschalk 2016; Grumbach 2018). Consequently, the exact differences in the political issues appearing in Asian American and African American newspapers might have changed, but the general theoretical insight is still valuable. Racial minorities are often coded collectively as people of color because they share racial marginalization. Race is not just all about the color of one's skin; it is a social construct often created by an oppressive historical process (Omi and Winant 1986; M. C. Dawson 1994). Nevertheless, sharing the marginalization experience is often insufficient to form shared political agendas among racial minority groups (Kaufmann 2003, 201). From a distant perspective, the issues of non-White groups seemed similar, because they were rooted in such groups's disadvantaged statuses in U.S. society. However, in taking a closer look at their issues, we realized that these groups ranked their political issues in different ways because different racial groups had to deal with different policy challenges (Brilliant 2010).

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Collectively, the preceding chapters investigated how government policies influenced U.S. minority coalition formation in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapter 2 examined why American minority mobilization focused so much on race in the 1960s and 1970s; in leveraging the Chinese immigrant communities along the U.S.–Canadian border on the West Coast, I found that what makes the U.S. unique is its immigration and segregation policies. Chapter 3 discussed why Asian and Latin American national origin groups joined forces in the 1960s and 1970s; the chapter confirmed that the introduction of the War on Poverty programs mobilized these intra-racial coalitions by paying special attention to the link between social policies and the rise of Asian American and Latino community service organizations. Finally, Chapter 4 outlined why inter-racial coalitions were rare during the Civil Rights Movement; notably, President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced civil rights legislation, expanded the welfare state, and militarized policing. As his political legacy included the War on Poverty as well as the War on Crime, the ways in which minority groups responded to these contemporaneous policy challenges varied. The misalignment of political agendas also made coordinating actions among them difficult.

Altogether, this dissertation takes a fresh look at American democracy from a largely ignored perspective and contributes to policy and academic discussions on race, immigration, and inequality. While many American politics scholars have provided rich historical explanations on white politicians, voters, and interest groups, few have written about how marginalized community members have exercised their political agency from a historical perspective. This is a serious omission, as minority groups have fought for their place in the U.S. from its founding. To show the historical roots of minority group politics, I also turned my attention to community organizing because ethnic minority groups have had little influence on electoral and interest group–driven politics until more recently. This dissertation is thus among the few works in American politics studying the politics of marginalized populations in historical, comparative, and transnational perspectives.

In addition, this project makes it clear how a creative mix of qualitative (Chapter 2), quantitative (Chapter 3), and computational methods (Chapter 4) can bring new data and insights into the study of minority coalition formation in the U.S. Quantitative social science scholarship on race, immigration, and inequality has traditionally assessed whether a dominant

group holds biased attitudes toward subordinate groups and the extent to which such attitudes exacerbate socioeconomic disparities. Although scholars have long argued that marginalized experiences have shaped the political identities and strategies of members of subordinate groups, few have investigated this long-term historical process in a data-intensive way. The main challenge has been the limitations of the available data. My dissertation project overcame this long-standing problem by creating large-scale datasets, from organizational to text, using cutting-edge data science tools and techniques. The original organizational dataset on Asian American and Latino advocacy and community service organizations, the most comprehensive of its kind, is now publicly available at Harvard Dataverse.[1] The rich archival, organizational, and text data I assembled for the project provide an example of how to undertake historical research on marginalized groups in a data-intensive way.

[1]https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FLUPBJ

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Appendix A

A.1 War on Poverty Programs

The OEO used the following formula to allocate federal grants in state s at year t:

$$PovertyIndex_{st} = \frac{1}{3}UE_{st} + \frac{1}{3}PA_{st} + \frac{1}{3}PK_{st}$$

UE indicates the state's share of the national number of unemployed. PA represents the state's share of the national public assistance recipients. PK refers to the state's share of poor children (Bailey and Danziger 2013, 11-12).

A.2 Organizations



Figure A.1: Asian American and Latino organizations sorted by their scope of their activities and types, 2017. *Source*: the author



Figure A.2: The founding trends of panethnic and ethic CSOs, 1960 - 2017. *Source*: the author

A.3 Organizational Data Coding

Including Ethnic Organizations Evolved into Panethnic Organizations

For instance, the NCLR started as a regional organization focused on Mexican Americans in 1968 in Phoenix, Arizona. It began to officially focus on non-Mexican issues only in the mid-1970s. Its transition was intentionally gradual because the organization needed to negotiate simultaneously with its old supporters and new partners (Mora 2014, 57). For this historical reason, the proportion of such gradually evolved panethnic organizations is greater among those founded earlier than the others in the dataset. Overall, this type of organization consists of only 7% of the Asian American organizations and 12% of the Latino ones in the dataset. Conversely, the proportion of those organizations founded in the 1960s and 1970s goes up to 22% on the Asian American and 32% on the Latino side. Including these organizations in the dataset is crucial to avoid undermining the extent of Asian American and Latino community organizing during these early decades. Ideally, I would like to have information on when exactly these organizations turned into panethnic ones. Unfortunately, archival resources on these

organizations are scarce and non-systematic. As a result, I use their founding years as a proxy variable.

Verifying Panethnic Organizations

To verify whether these are indeed panethnic organizations in their names as well as their programs and activities, I visited their websites. Except for a handful of well-known organizations (e.g., the NCLR), most of these organizations' internal materials are not publicly available. Using their websites is limited but is one of the feasible ways to collect information of interest. I checked whether the organizations claimed to be panethnic in their mission statements or served broader ethnic groups than one national origin group in their project descriptions. When an organization did not have a website, I searched news sites for more information. I used the same validation method in terms of classifying whether an organization is an advocacy, community service, or hybrid organization to determine the year in which each organization was founded, rather than the year of their incorporation according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) records. I was able to locate about 77% of the Asian and 71% of the Latino organizations' founding years in this way. If these data were not available, I then emailed the staff at these organizations.

Validating with Other Data Sources

The Bay Area Human Service Directory, compiled by local Asian American social workers and published in 1977, identified eight Asian human service organizations in San Francisco (Chris, Chu and Asian American Communication Experience 1977). One of these, the International Institute of San Francisco, serves non-English-speaking immigrants, not necessarily Asian populations. Except for this, my dataset missed two out of seven organizations, the Asian Community Center and the San Francisco Bay Area Asian American Community Mental Health Training Center. Nonetheless, I suspected that this 30% missing data rate could be an exception rather than the norm because San Francisco, the birthplace of the Asian American movement, has an unusually long history of Asian American activism.

A.4 Philanthropic Giving

Philanthropic giving was an important but limited funding source for Asian American and Latino community organizers in the 1960s and 1970s. As past studies argued (Kuramoto 1976; L. Y. Espiritu 1992; Orozco, Schwartz, and Austin 2011), big foundations tended to grant monies to a selective few well-known large organizations. The Ford Foundation was one of the largest foundations in the world in the 20th century, and it invested heavily in remedying urban poverty (O'Connor 1996; Kohler 2007). I used their grant records, available at the Rockefeller Archive Center, as a partial measure to estimate the influence of large foundations on Asian American and Latino community organizing. I tracked which organizations in my dataset received funds from the Ford Foundation from 1960 to 1980 and identified only six among the 166 organizations listed. The result confirms the limited scope of philanthropic giving.

A.5 Federal Funding

Figure A.3 displays the percentage difference between the pre-Reagan baseline and the actual federal outlays for these programs in 1982. The budgets for all these programs showed a sharp decline. Particularly critical was the termination of the Community Services Administration[1] and the Comprehensive Training and Employment Act, which were used by these organizations to pay their employees (Santos 2002; Santos and Iwamoto 2015).



Figure A.3: The differential impacts of the Reagan budget cut. *Sources*: Wolman (1986, 318), originally from unpublished Congressional Budget Office tabulations, and The Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds (2018)

[1]Nixon administration renamed the Office of Economic Opportunity the Community Services Administration in 1975.



Figure A.4: Federal budgets for education, employment and social service, 1964-2014. *Sources*: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal year 2017 Historical Tables.

A.6 Community Response

The Ethnic NewsWatch database[2] contains all 3,120 articles published by the *The International Examiner* from 1976 through 1987. *Agenda* was available only as printed copies held in the Chicano Collection at the Ethnic Studies Library at the University of California, Berkeley. I scanned and digitized all these newsletters published from 1971 through 1981.[3] The number of pages totaled 1,249.[4] Only 141 articles in *The International Examiner* and 49 pages in *Agenda* mentioned Reagan at least once. Almost all these articles or pages appeared *after* Reagan announced his plan to reduce social expenditures in 1981. I also note how frequently budget-related terms[5] are mentioned in the articles or pages about Reagan using a dictionary-based text analysis method.

[2]For more information, see https://www.proquest.com/products-services/ethnic_newswatch.html

[3]*Agenda* became inactive between 1982 and 1988. Publication resumed in 1989.

[4]I wrote an R script to automatically parse text information from these more than 1,000 scanned images. It was difficult to separate articles from pages as the scanned images were highly unstructured. For this reason, each page was taken as a unit of observation in this data.

[5]These budget-related terms are “spending,” “grants,” “grant,” “funding,” “funds,” and “fund.”



Figure A.5: The number of Reagan-related articles (bar plots) and the frequency of budget-related terms in a Reagan related article (point and line plots) in *The International Examiner* and *Agenda*, 1976-1981. *Sources*: Ethnic NewsWatch and Chicano Studies Collection, UC Berkeley Ethnic Studies Library

A.7 Change Point Estimation

In a segmented regression model fitted to time series data, a change point is an abrupt variation in the data that indicates a time point when the regression coefficients become unstable. I built a linear regression model that regresses logged organizational founding rate on the interaction term between year and intervention and the organization type variables. This is the same as the reduced version of the estimation model, which will be described in the following paragraph. I then fitted this model to the data and estimated the second change point using the strucchange package in R (Kleiber et al. 2002).

A.8 Outlier Detection



Figure A.6: Outlier detection

I first log-transformed the dependent variable because some outliers could be resolved by transforming the dependent variable. I then used a multivariate regression model, as specified in Model 3.2, to draw a regression line and identified outliers based on Cook's Distance, which measures an observation's influence on a linear regression (Cook 1977). I removed these outliers and imputed new values using the k-nearest neighbors algorithm to reduce their influence. In Figure A.6, the Y-axis indicates Cook's distance, and the X-axis indicates the observation numbers (the row index in the dataset). A greater observation number indicates a more recent year observation. Outliers are those observations with a Cook's distance of more than four times of the mean. The Cook's distance was calculated by the car package (Fox and Weisberg 2018).

A.9 Model Selection

Various regression models can be fitted to the data. If the dependent variable is conceptualized as a continuous variable, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model would work. However, the base model is naïve, as many of its assumptions are easily violated. An OLS model assumes linearity and homoscedasticity (or constant variance). However, Figure **??** shows that the organizational founding patterns are neither closely linear nor stable. As such, regression coefficients could be biased. In addition, the mean of the dependent variable is low. The average frequency of organizational founding is 2 for advocacy and hybrid organizations and 5 for CSOs. In this case, the OLS model yields biased standard errors, which increase the type I error rate (false positives) (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995; Scott Long 1997). Log-transforming the dependent variable could make the relationship between the dependent variable and the predictors more linear, but the other problems may persist. If these violations are the focus, conceptualizing the dependent variable as a count variable and using a Poisson model would be a better approach. The Poisson model is a family of the generalized linear model that is flexible enough to deal with non-linear data. In addition, the Poisson model is suitable to model count data because the Poisson distribution is a family of exponential distribution, which captures a growth pattern easily. Nevertheless, the model has a limitation, as it assumes that the mean and variance of the distribution are equal. This assumption is only useful if the mean and variance increase simultaneously (Coxe, West, and Aiken 2009, 122-124). A negative binomial model deals with this problem by including a random term, which reflects the unexplained variance between subjects, in the Poisson model (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995).

In Figure A.7, the blue plotted line indicates the predicted values ($\hat{Y}$). The gray ribbons around the line plot display two standard errors, which are approximate to 95% confidence intervals. Based on the AIC scores, the OLS model with a logged dependent variable fits the data best (344.842). The naive OLS model performs the worst (712.282). The Poisson (612.795) and the negative binomial models (614.797) perform similarly. I selected the OLS with a logged dependent variable because a lower AIC score indicates a less overfitting model.

Some models may fit for a short-term period, whereas others do better for a long-term period. To address this concern, I checked how the AIC scores of these four models varied as I extended the data from the year 1970 to 2004. Figure A.8 indicates that the OLS model with a logged dependent variable consistently outperformed the OLS, Poisson, and negative binomial models.



Figure A.7: Fitting models to the data



Figure A.8: Fitting models to the data over time

A.10 Model Specification

Specifically, I use Model 3.2 to estimate how the coefficient of federal funding variable changes as I extend the data from the year 1970 to 2004. In the model, X measures the percentage of the federal budget for education, employment, and social services, and the population variable measures the percentage of Asian American or Latino population at time t. The group category variable is defined as above. Presidency, Senate, and House indicate which party controls the presidency, the Senate, and the House (the Democratic Party $= 1$, the Republican Party $= 0$). I fit an OLS, an OLS with logged dependent variable, a Poisson, and a negative binomial model to the data and select the one that fits it best given its AIC score.

A.11 Robustness Checks

An OLS model assumes homoscedasticity. I ran the studentized Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) and showed that this assumption does not hold. The null hypothesis of the test is that the variance of residuals is constant (homoscedasticity). However, the p-value of the test result is 0.04. In addition, an OLS model assumes independent random errors. In time series data, this assumption is easily violated because autocorrelation (or serial correlation) is a pervasive problem. The autocorrelation test (ACF) result shows the correlation between the time series and its lagged values (see Figure A.9). None of the correlation coefficients are statistically significant (no bar graph above or below the dashed line). I also ran the Durbin-Watson test, which checks the autocorrelation of residuals (Savin and White 1977). The test also fails to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, I was worried about heteroskedasticity but not autocorrelation. I was also concerned about outliers. Previously, I defined outliers as those observations with a Cook's distance of more than four times of the mean. I treated these outliers, but the threshold bar could be too low. The remaining outliers may bias the regression coefficients and standard errors.



Figure A.9: Autocorrelation test

A.12 Omitted Variable Bias

I used an OLS with logged dependent variable model. I fitted the OLS, the Poisson, and the negative binomial model to the data. The OLS with logged dependent variable outperformed the others based on their relative AIC scores. Table A.1 shows the result. Model 1 is the base model which only includes the group category. Model 2 adds county-level demographic covariates, namely the percentage of Asian and Latino populations. Model 3 adds the county-level poverty rate covariate. Model 4 follows the specification used in Model 3 but uses Huber-White standard errors to account for heteroscedastic residuals. The OEO grants variable is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01), the coefficient is also only marginally different, and its sign is positive across the four models. To help interpret, the OEO grants were recalculated as proportions in the model: A OEO grant in a county i is divided by the sum of the OEO grants in all of the counties in the data.

	Dependent variable:			
	Cumulative founding in 1981 (logged)			
		OLS		*OLS with robust SEs*
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
OEO grants	0.259^{***} (0.078)	0.244^{***} (0.081)	0.245^{***} (0.082)	0.245^{***} (0.074)
Latino org	-0.431^{***} (0.137)	-0.401^{***} (0.146)	-0.404^{***} (0.149)	-0.404^{**} (0.184)
Asian pop		0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.015)
Latino pop		0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
Poverty rate			−0.002 (0.013)	−0.002 (0.011)
Constant	0.477^{***} (0.138)	0.412^{**} (0.161)	0.428^{**} (0.206)	0.428^{**} (0.209)
Observations	76	76	76	
R^2	0.253	0.260	0.260	
Adjusted R^2	0.232	0.218	0.207	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.1: Cross-sectional regression analysis

Appendix B

B.1 Ethnic Composition of Voters in Vancouver East



Figure B.1: Ethnic composition of Vancouver East in 1972. *Source*: CJVB 1972 federal election report

Appendix C

C.1 Meta and Specific Issues

Specific issues can be categorized as one particular meta issue (clear boundary; single membership) or as one of the mixed meta issues (blurred boundary; mixed membership). Single membership is when a government policy clearly harms or benefits target groups. Mixed membership is when a government policy may harm or benefit target groups depending on contexts.

- Single membership
  - Collective gain: minority business ownership, minority political representation
  - Collective loss: police brutality, imperialist foreign policy, hate crimes, group stereotypes
- Mixed membership
  - housing, healthcare, education, employment, civil rights

C.2 Custom Dictionary for Non-political Issues

- Sports: “football”, “basketball”, “golf”, “tennis”, “swimming”, “coach”, “giants”, “warriors”, “raiders”, “49ers”, “track team”, “track and field”, “athletes”, “soccer”
- Car sales: “engine”, “powersteering”, “windshields”, “gasoline”, “motors”, “subcompact”, “showrooms”, “fuel prices”
- Arts: “art”, “arts”, “film”, “films”, “museum”, “galleries”, “painting”, “paintings”, “theater”, “television”, “circus”, “opera”, “orchestra”, “symphony”, “jazz”, “disco”, “concert”, “concerts”, “festival”, “festivals”, “artists”, “artist”, “singer”, “musician”, “musicians”, “pianist”, “pianists”, “guitarists”, “guitarist”, “ticket”, “tickets”, “violin”, “lion dance”
- Recipes and restaurants: “recipe”, “lunch”, “lunch special”, “dinner”, “dinners”, “entrees”, “breakfast”, “cooking”, “teaspoon”, “teaspoons”, “quarts”, “tablespoon”, “tablespoons”, “sugar”, “fried”

C.3 Classifiers

Textual data are high-dimensional data because the number of features (e.g., words) is far greater than the number of documents. Lasso reduces this high number of features in an interpretable and stable way by shrinking some coefficients in absolute value and setting others to 0 (Tibshirani 1996, 267-273). Naive Bayes is naive because it assumes that the effect of a feature (X) on a class (C) or $P(C|X)$ is independent of the effects of other features (Maron 1961, 410). Despite this strong conditional independence assumption, the naive Bayes classifier has been proven successful in automated text classification (11-12) because when the dependencies among features are distributed evenly across classes, the naive Bayes classifier could still be optimal (Zhang 2005). XGBoost is a relatively recently developed algorithm that has demonstrated high performance in many machine learning competitions. Boosting improves machine learning performance by incrementally combining the performance of many weak classifiers (Freund and Schapire 1999; Friedman, Hastie, Tibshirani, et al. 2000). Gradient boosting is a flexible version of this approach (Breiman 1997; Mason et al. 2000; Friedman 2001), and XGBoost helps apply it to large-scale data efficiently (Chen and Guestrin 2016).

C.4 Performance Metrics

In a binary classification problem, machine learning performance is measured by a confusion matrix. A correctly predicted positive class is a true positive (TP), whereas an incorrectly predicted positive class is a false positive (FP). A correctly predicted negative class is a true negative (TN), whereas an incorrectly predicted negative class is a false negative (FN). The accuracy rate of a binary classifier is defined as $\frac{TP+TN}{TP+FN+TN+FP}$. This plain accuracy rate is not ideal when the training data suffer from a class imbalance problem. Consider the hypothetical case presented in Table C.1. The training data are imbalanced because the size of the positive class is 10 and the size of the negative class is 90. The algorithm failed to predict the positive class. Despite this, because the negative class was predicted perfectly, the accuracy rate was 90%. Nevertheless, if one looks at other scores, the performance is far less promising. Whereas the true negative rate (or specificity) is 100%, the true positive rate (or sensitivity) is 0. If the true positive rate (correctly coding collective gain and loss articles) is critical for hypothesis testing, then this situation should be avoided.

	Predicted positive	Predicted negative
Positive class	Number of TP results: 0	Number of FN results: 0
Negative class	Number of FP results: 10	Number of TN results: 90

Table C.1: Hypothetical imbalanced training data

The balanced accuracy rate, which averages specificity and sensitivity, is a more robust measure. The balanced accuracy rate of a binary classifier is defined as $\frac{1}{2}(\frac{TP}{P}(Sensitivity) + \frac{TN}{N}(Specificity))$ (Brodersen et al. 2010, 3122-3123).

C.5 Time Series Plots



Figure C.1: Time series trends (maximum threshold)



Figure C.2: Time series trends (minimum threshold)