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In the Name of Humanity: Britain and the Rise of Global Humanitarianism

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In the Name of Humanity: Britain and the Rise of Global Humanitarianism

By

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Abstract

In the Name of Humanity: Britain and the Rise of Global Humanitarianism

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Thomas W. Laqueur, Chair

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This study examines how a new humanitarian community emerged in the late 1960s and why it came to act in the name of "humanity." To realize the nature of this transformation, the study focuses on Britain and its relationship to more global forms of humanitarianism. In post-imperial Britain a new set of actors beyond the British state came to adopt humanitarian ethics. In a series of case studies, the study examines how humanitarianism mobilized a range of new historical actors who came to replace the imperial state, beginning with non-governmental activists and former military experts and expanding to include multinational corporations and ordinary people.

Initially, post-imperial aid relied on imperial infrastructure and knowledge. In the 1960s, organizations such as Oxfam used former Imperial experts to manage and distribute global relief in places like Nigeria. Older imperial institutions like the British military became major respondents to disasters in the Sahel and South Asia. But the post-imperial landscape also included new, more business-minded actors. In the mid-1970, multinational corporations and private businesses began developing their own solutions to humanitarian suffering through agribusiness projects. Through charity shops, rock concerts, and boycotts, ordinary people, consumers, and youth groups joined such multinationals in acting for the cause of humanity. By the 1980s, humanitarian organizations operated as a profitable business, generating substantial revenues that were mobilized to care for, rescue, and intervene in response to natural and man-made disasters such as famines, civil wars, and earthquakes.

Drawing on extensive archival work in Britain, the United States, and Switzerland, this study shows that British humanitarianism was shaped by both the legacies of the end of empire and the tensions brought by new forces of globalization in the 1970s. The end of empires created the globalization of markets and goods as well as the rise of nongovernmental and commercial actors. In a period of economic globalization and mass consumption, I argue, a new humanitarian culture came to commodify aid. As such, I argue, British humanitarianism became part of the new, increasingly market-driven, political economy of the 1970s. In doing so, Britons were integrated into affective and economic communities of aid, as well as the project of global governance.

To the memory of Boaz Neumann

Acknowledgements

It is only fitting that a dissertation that examines the making of a global community should begin by thanking the extraordinary communities of teachers and friends in three continents who have guided me as I embarked on this project. Their unstinting kindness and patience have helped me translate some very obscure and scattered ideas into words, narratives, and meanings, as I completed this dissertation.

Throughout my career at Berkeley I have enjoyed the generous and stimulating intellectual support of Thomas Laqueur and James Vernon, who encouraged me to pursue a broad and ambitious project with breadth and imagination. From my early days in Berkeley, Thomas Laqueur has challenged me to connect the "cosmic to the particular," as he liked to say, and to treat my historical subjects with great compassion. James Vernon has been a friend and a mentor, whose support, encouragement, and patience helped me find my voice as a historian and connect the past with our current political, economic and social present. Wendy Brown joined my committee and soon became a mentor who pushed me to think critically and analytically beyond any disciplinary boundaries. Finally, with the addition of Stefan Ludwig-Hoffmann, whose support and advice have been indispensable, they all provided the perfect dissertation team.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my teacher and friend Boaz Neumann. Boaz taught me how to be passionate and uncompromising in the craft of history and at the same time not to forget to live my life beyond this work.

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Introduction

In the Name of Humanity

On March 25 1975 the *Daily Express* published a letter from a one of its readers, Mrs. Grace S. Barnes. Mrs. Barnes, a housewife from Kent, had been following the news about the latest famine in Bangladesh. As images of the destitute and starving masses circulated in the British press, she told the readers of the newspaper: "if we give up the equivalent of one hamburger a week, the starving of India and Bangladesh could be fed." Mrs. Sheila Pott, from Longwick, Buckinghamshire expressed a similar sentiment. In a letter published in the *Daily Express* on the same day she asked: "Is there anyone in Britain who would not willingly make such a minute sacrifice…?" "But as for buying less at the butchers with starving Indians in mind," Mrs. Pott added, "how does the meat you do not buy [actually] get to them?"[1]

Mrs. Barnes and Mrs. Pott were not alone. In the 1970s across Britain, Europe and the United States ordinary people came to see their intimate lives and everyday actions connected to distant suffering. Their letters invoked what the moral philosopher Peter Singer termed in 1971 the "development of a global village,"[2] that is a new moral economy of strangers. In this period a new "compassion regime" committed a global community beyond states and diplomats to care for global suffering. Instead, it came to include consumers, religious groups, private businesses, military experts, nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations. These odd bedfellows raised millions of pounds for a new political constituency —"humanity"— that stretched beyond any particular national border. They mobilized in order to care for, rescue, and intervene in postcolonial societies and respond to natural and man-made disasters such as famines, civil wars, and earthquakes. Although neither humanitarian sympathy nor the threats posed by disasters were unique, this period saw the proliferation of an unprecedented number of global institutions and networks whose efforts, in the words of one Oxfam director, were "for humanity's sake."[3]

This dissertation charts the emergence of this global community in the 1970s and asks how it came to act in the name of humanity. To realize the nature of this transformation, the study focuses on Britain and its relationship to more global forms of humanitarianism. In post-imperial Britain a new set of actors beyond the British state came to adopt humanitarian ethics. In a series of case studies, I follow the stories of a range of these new historical actors who came to replace the imperial state, beginning with non-governmental activists and former military experts and expanding to include multinational corporations and ordinary people. In a period of economic globalization and mass consumption, I argue, a new humanitarian culture came to commodify aid. Drawing on extensive archival work in Britain, the United States, Switzerland, and Italy, I show how British humanitarianism became part of the new, increasingly market-driven, political economy of the 1970s. In doing so, Britons were integrated into affective and

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[1] Letters to the editor, *Daily Express*, March 25 1975.

[2] Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243

[3] Leslie Kirkley, An Urgent Plea for Peace, Oxfam, December 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

economic communities of aid, as well as to the project of global governance.

1. Between Imperial and Global: Humanitarianism as a Conjuncture

To a certain extent, there was nothing new about this compassion regime. As scholars have shown its origins can be traced as far back as the late eighteenth century and early twentieth century to the project of colonial governance. In the nineteenth century, European states used humanitarianism as the basis for their interventions and relief schemes in their empires. Similarly, humanitarian campaigns led by missionaries and local elites in both South Asia and Africa strove to civilize colonial subjects based on Enlightenment ideals of progress and the civilizing mission.[4]

With the impact of total wars in the first half of the twentieth century humanitarianism took on an international scale. The First and Second World Wars mobilized new nongovernmental and international organizations in order to solve the problem of mass displacement and hunger within and beyond Europe its empires. These organizations inherited expertise for relief that was rooted in imperial knowledge but applied it beyond Europe's colonies.[5] They used humanitarian aid as a way to stabilize the international order of global empires and maintain imperial markets rather than as a universal mission to save humanity.

It is tempting to assume that even after the demise of European empires these trends of imperial humanitarianism continued in much the same ways between the 1960s and the 1980s. Empires certainly shaped the new global humanitarian community of the late twentieth century. Many of the institutions and experts of aid organizations gained their experience and knowledge from colonial contexts and retooled it after decolonization. Some—like the World Health Organization— employed doctors and medical experts from Britain's Colonial Medical Service.[6] Others—like the Britain's Save the Children—even used humanitarian aid to bolster British counterinsurgency campaigns and fight against movements for colonial freedom.[7]

Yet, at the same time, the global humanitarianism of the long 1970s was substantively new and different. After empire, humanitarianism became much more global in its aims as well as in its practice. Humanitarian organizations like Britain's Oxfam, for example, acted against their government's interests in former colonial territories like Nigeria, whereas humanitarian organizations like the French Doctors Without Borders and the British War on Want directly criticized governments and

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[4] Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Cornell University Press, 2011).

[5] Ibid. The literature about humanitarianism and internationalism, particularly in the interwar period, will be presented in detail in the following section.

[6] I examine some of these connections with regards to nutritional experts and pediatricians in my forthcoming article. Tehila Sasson, "Milking the Third World? Humanitarianism, Capitalism, and the Nestle boycott," American Historical Review. See also: James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Sunil S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[7] Matthew Hilton, "Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film: Humanitarianism, Imperialism, and the Changing Role of Charity in Postwar Britain," *The Journal of Modern History* 87, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 357–94.

accused them of neo-imperialism.[8] New grassroots and activist networks of consumers bought their way into an ethics of humanitarian care across any particular borders. Moreover, through consumer networks and the global media ordinary people began to take interest in the project of feeding the world's hungry. The period therefore saw the rise of new forms of humanitarian action, which stretched beyond European empires. In a period of globalization, mass consumption and de-regulated economy, humanitarianism exceeded the bounds of nations or the old imperial states and became part of more global forms of solidarities and actions.

The 1970s marked a transformative moment in the global history of North and South relations.[9] The decade was important because Portugal's decolonization signaled the formal end of Europe's colonial era and yet the Third World's challenge to international inequalities endured. The 1970s also saw the crumbling down of the postwar order and the restructuring of new relationships between the global North and South, not least through new aid programs. As some scholars argued, the project of the Third World itself had "been produced by the discourses and practices of development,"[10] and had deep roots in late nineteenth century European colonialism.[11] From the early post-World War II period and then with the onset of decolonization these development discourses began to emphasize the importance of modernization and the macroeconomic engineering of 'growth' as a means of helping transition Third World from traditional societies to modernity.[12] In the early 1970s, as the great promises of the era of

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[8] See for example some of the works on Doctors Without Borders and their activism in Gaza in Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2011), Chapter 8; Ilana Feldman, *Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917–1967* (Duke University Press, 2008); Michal Givoni, "Beyond the Humanitarian/Political Divide: Witnessing and the Making of Humanitarian Ethics," *Journal of Human Rights* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 55–75; as well as the recent history of MSF and their connection to the 1968's revolutionary tradition in Eleanor Davey, *Idealism beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of Humanitarianism, 1954-1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[9] I am using the terms the global South to refer to countries the Southern Hemisphere and in order to avoid the terminology of the 'Third World,' which carries its own political and historical meaning. Daniel T. Rodgers *Age of Fracture*, (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap, 2012,) 42-72. See also Charles S. Maier, "Malaise: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s, in Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 25-46.

[10] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4; Frédérique Apffel Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin, eds., *Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture, and Resistance* (Clarendon Press WIDER Studies in Development Economics, 1990). On the Third World as "a project" also from a postcolonial perspective see Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World.* (The New Press, 2008).

[11] Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development And the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Ohio University Press, 2007); Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), ch. 7.

[12] The literature on development is too vast to be cited but for example see, James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*

decolonization faded, this development framework began to crumble.

With the pressure of the oil crisis, the growing world food crisis, famines in Africa, and spiraling debt, the period yielded a new framework to understand the problem of Third World development. Both national and international agencies had accepted that most development projects and blueprints focusing on economic growth had made a negligible impact on the condition of the global poor. In 1972, Robert McNamara stated that the World Bank should reorient its policies to attack directly the poverty of the poorest 40 percent of Third World citizens. This "basic needs" approach was adopted by many Western governments, which subsequently targeted the poorest segments of those population. Conversely, in 1974 another alternative was adopted by developing countries (the Group of 77), when they proposed at the UN General Assembly the creation of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) to examine moral imperatives and global mechanisms of development. The Group of 77 presented a program of structural reform and global redistribution, which would transform what they saw as inequitable international economy biased against the Third World. As such, a new language of economic rights joined a growing international utopian discourse of political rights in the period.[13] While the Group did not prove successful in these aims, mostly because its program lacked the support of the United States, its approach was part of a growing international discontent with aid programs.[14]

Against this backdrop, humanitarian aid emerged as one of the main solutions to the problem of Third World development. While humanitarian aid had previously been on the margins of this story, during the 1970s it became a major part of how Third World development was conceived. Scholars have traditionally told the history of humanitarianism as separate from the story of the project of development. On the one hand, histories of humanitarianism have explored the social and cultural dimensions of relief work in Europe and its empires from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century.[15] On the other hand the literature on development has examined the

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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Michael Mohoney, David Engerman, Victor Koschmann, and Gregg Brazinsky, in David C. Engerman et al., eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[13] Vanessa Ogle, "State Rights against Private Capital: The 'New International Economic Order' and the Struggle over Aid, Trade, and Foreign Investment, 1962–1981," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, no. 2 (2014): 211.

[14] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 343-377; See also *Humanity*, Volume 6, Issue 1 (March 2015), which is devoted entirely to the New International Economic Order, and in particular Jennifer Bair, "Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International Economic Order?," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, no. 1 (2015): 159.

[15] On humanitarianism see for example Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, "Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 40, No. 5, December 2012: 729–747; Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. (Cornell University Press, 2011); Emily Baughan, "The Imperial War Relief Fund and the All

project of modernization in colonial and postcolonial societies from its deep origins in the early twentieth century to the 1960s. However, as this study shows, humanitarian and development aid became gradually interwoven together over the course the twentieth century. By the early 1970s, when programs for modernization, welfare and macroeconomic development had failed, humanitarian aid emerged as a minimal alternative to the problem of postcolonial crises.

This study is situated at the unique moment, when humanitarianism exceeded imperial aims and became part of a new system of global governance and political economy. It seeks to examine what happens to humanitarianism after the end of empire and its previous imperial iterations have shaped its more global structures. Rather than understanding this form of humanitarianism as a rupture from its older origins, the study sets to examine this global humanitarianism as part of what Stuart Hall has termed, a "conjuncture" of multiple forces. As a distinct conjuncture of the 1970s, the story of humanitarianism in this period affords more than just another episode within a deeper history of aid. Instead, global humanitarianism of the 1970s reveals a crucial aspect about the nature of global governance, political economy and its ethical regimes in the afterlife of empire. Within this framework, humanitarianism was part of a new moment in which "different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that [were] at work in society [came] together to give it a specific and distinctive shape." As such, this global form of humanitarian community came to encapsulate both the legacies of the end of empire and the tensions carried by the new forces of globalization of the 1970s.

To recount that process of creating a global community as a conjuncture, I have organized the story as follows. Part I examines how the end of Empire shaped the political economy and technical knowledge of former colonial experts (Chapter 1) and imperial institutions like the military (Chapter 2). Part II moves to examine the ways in which the end of Empire and the process of economic globalization created a new political economy of aid. It shows how businesses (Chapter 3) as well as consumers (Chapter 4) became part of new affective and political economies of aid. Last, Part III charts the emergence of a new global humanitarian culture. Through the global media and educational programs on television (Chapter 5) as well as rock music and concerts (Chapter 6), it explores how ordinary people and youth groups became part of a new global community of aid.

British Appeal: Commonwealth, Conflict and Conservatism within the British Humanitarian Movement, 1920–25," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 40, 2012: 845–861; Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania*, (Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 2008). On development see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African society : the labor question in French and British Africa*, (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the expert: Agrarian doctrines of development and the legacies of British colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Helen Tilley, *Africa as a living laboratory: empire, development, and the problem of scientific knowledge, 1870-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Uma Kothari, *A radical history of development studies : individuals, institutions and ideologies*. (Cape Town; London; New York: David Philip ; Zed Books, 2005); Nick Cullather, The *Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia*. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[15] Stuart Hall and Doreen Massey, "Interpreting the Crisis," *Soundings* 44, no. 1 (March 25, 2010): 57–71.

2. Britain and the Rise of Global Humanitarianism

To tell this global story, the dissertation focuses on the case of British and international organizations from a postcolonial and transnational perspective. It investigates how both ordinary Britons and international institutions came to speak in the name of global humanity. Each of the following chapters begins from the particular and local stories of British institutions and people and ends with how they came to shape (and be shaped by) global trends and international organizations. Through this, I seek then to contribute both to the field of international history as well as to the understanding of Britain's place in the world.

In the past decades historians have investigated the rise of an international society in the twentieth century. By studying the role of international institutions—like the League of Nations, the United Nations and the World Bank— these scholars have focused on the ways in which these organizations have come to shape an international society and economy.[16] From the interwar period to the 1970s, they argued, international organizations came to govern the world of the nation state, albeit not always replace them.[17] Within this framework historians like Akira Iyrie have highlighted how nongovernmental agencies and multinational businesses joined this project of global governance from the 1970s.[18]

At the same time, recent histories of Britain and Europe have told a parallel story of the rise of the nation state from the ashes of European empires. While sketching the formation of an international order from the world of empires in the first half of the twentieth century, these histories have emphasized the uneven nature the process of decolonization took.[19] Some have unveiled its violent nature in imperial territories,[20]

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[16] See for example Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. (Allen Lane, 2012), 119-153. For more on internationalism in the interwar period see Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946* (Oxford University Press, 2013); Daniel Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton, NJ, and Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9. See also Mark Mazower, "An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century," *International Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2006): 553–66.

[17] Some works have paid particular attention to the role of nationalism in the age of internationalism. See for example Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, and Mark Mazower, *Governing the World.*

[18] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, (University of California Press, 2004); Bruce Mazlish, "Three Factors of Globalization: Multinational Corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Global Consciousness," *Globality Studies Journal*, March 1, 2012; Alfred D. Chandler Jr and Bruce Mazlish, eds., *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Historians like Daniel Sargent have reminded us also that we should nonetheless understand this new global community as operating within the world of nation states. See Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford: OUP USA, 2015).

[19] A.G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," *Past & Present*, 200 (August 2008): 211-247; Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: the labor question in French and British Africa.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats,

whereas others have shown how decolonization shaped new political and social communities at the metropole.[21] Through these works, they have called our attention to

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Backward Africans, and the Development Concept." In *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *The Journal of African History* 49, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 167–96; Frederick Cooper, *Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986*, Oxford Studies in Modern European History (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2012); Frederick Cooper, *Africa in the World: Capitalism, Empire, Nation-State*. (Harvard University Press, 2014); Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," in R. J. Owen and R. B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), chapter 5; John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, Second Series, VI, 1 (1953), pp. 1–15; Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105.3 (June 2000); Mark Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 1, Origins, 1945–1962*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); John Darwin, "Decolonization and the End of Empire," in Robin Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V: Historiography,* 541–57; Dane Kennedy, "Imperial History and Post-colonial Theory," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24:3 (1996); Philippa Levine, "Gendering Decolonisation," *Histoire@Politique* 11, no. 2 (2010); W.R. Louis and R. E. Robinson. "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 462–511; Erez Manela, "Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919," *American Historical Review* 111:5 (December 2006): 1327–51.

[20] For example see, Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya*. (Henry Holt and Co., 2005); David French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged : The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005); Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War and Decolonisation*. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Fabian Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria*. Translated by Dona Geyer. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Neil McMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the "Emancipation" of Muslim Women, 1954-62*. (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2012.

[21] See for example Jordanna Balikin, *The Afterlife of Empire*, (University of California, 2012); Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Anne Spry Rush, *Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness from Victoria to Decolonization*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Sarah Stockwell and Larry J. Butler, eds. *The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization*. (Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series 18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Bill Schwarz, *Memories of Empire. Volume I, The White Man's World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Radhika Natarajan, "Performing Multiculturalism: The Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965," *Journal of British Studies* 53, no. 03 (July 2014): 705–33; Amelia H Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford University Press, 2013); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library, 2008); Ed Naylor, "'Un Âne Dans L'ascenseur': Late Colonial Welfare Services and Social Housing in Marseille after Decolonization." *French History* 27, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 422–47.

the ways in which decolonization itself still "largely shapes the world we live in."[22]

My study builds on these literatures by exploring what shape this global community took after the end of empire. While we know much about the end of empires and about our current international order of nation-states, we know very little about the transition from the one to the other.[23] British humanitarianism offers a privileged site to examine the transition from imperial to global communities because of the country's long tradition of humanitarian aid. In Britain, humanitarianism emerged as part of the project of forging a market society and projecting its ethics through 'liberal' forms imperialism across much of the world. By exploring the investments of a range of historical actors— activists, non-governmental organizations, private businesses as well as government officials—this project tells the formation of this global humanitarian community without ignoring its previous imperial iterations.

2.a. The Deep Origins of British Humanitarianism

From the philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment to the earliest campaign to abolish the slave trade, the idea of 'humanity' helped construct a British imperial community and to justify forms of interventions in the colonies from the eighteenth century onwards.[24] The word "humanitarian" (or *humanitaire*) itself first appeared in 1792. It was invoked to assert the human nature of Christ, but it also referred to those who replaced Christianity with 'humanity' as the supreme object of worship.[25] The word was linked to the growth of religious movements such as Unitarianism and Methodism, which spread this new religion of humanity and called for moral reforms.[26] With the philosophical tradition of the enlightenment and the development of the realist novel,

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[22] See for example the recent *AHR* Roundtable, titled "The Archives of Decolonization," and particularly Farina Mir's introduction. In *The American Historical Review*(2015) 120 (3): xv-xix, as well as Jordanna Bailkin, "Where Did the Empire Go? Archives and Decolonization in Britain," *The American Historical Review* 120, no. 3 (June 1, 2015): 884–99. My own approach to decolonization builds on Balikin work.

[23] One notable exception is Samantha Iyre brilliant work on the global history of food aid. See Samantha Iyre, "The Paradox of Poverty and Plenty: Egypt, India, and the Rise of U.S. Food Aid, 1870s to 1950s," (Ph.D. Dissertation: UC Berkeley, 2014)

[24] While I offer here a more immediate genealogy to the category "humanity" as a political and social community of governance, the category of "humanity" has of course even a longer history dating back to Aristotle, via theological debates like Augustine to the discovery of the New World in debates such as Las Casas and Sapulveda. Aristotle, *Politics* I, 6-7; *Nichomachean Ethics* V, 6-7; VIII, 11, 1161a30-b8; Augustine, *City of God*, X; Bartolomé Las Casas, "In Defense of the Indians," in Micheline R. Ishay (ed.), *The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays, Speeches and Documents From Ancient Times to the Present*, 2 edition (New York: Routledge, 2007), 67-73.

[25] *Oxford English Dictionary*.

[26] Dorothy George, *England in Transition: Life and Work in the Eighteenth Century*, (London: George Routedge & Sons Ltd., 1931), 87-105. See also discussion in Michal Branett and Thomas Weiss, *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008). Unitarian had political implications because by not subscribing to the Trinity one could not hold a political or civil office. See also Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 150-151. See also Katherine Davies, *Continuity, change and contest Meanings of 'humanitarian' from the 'Religion of Humanity' to the Kosovo war*, Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, (August 2012).

speaking in the name of humanity took more secular forms and structures.[27] When in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century individual rights to (religious) belief were separated from the authority of the state, humanitarianism developed through a new secular condition, which relocated moral and juridical responsibilities from the divine and placed it in the hands of the political community, now the definer of who was "truly human."[28]

It is this expansive definition of who is "truly human" which was at the heart of the movement to abolish the Atlantic slave trade led by Thomas Clarkson in the late eighteenth century. The campaign used the British press to deploy tropes and figures borrowed from sentimental literature and the language of the enlightenment to delineate the parameters of what it is to be "human."[29] When the American Revolution broke, as the historian Chris Brown showed, these moral sentiments were mobilized into political action.[30] The result was the first humanitarian campaign, supported by political figures and humanitarian in Britain as well as housewives, who participated in it through a sugar boycott.[31] The American Revolution created a political possibility for abolitionist to gain a new social and political capital for their moral campaign, as Britons started to re-think the moral implications of colonialism. By describing complicity in slavery as proof of collective vice, disputants in the Revolutionary era helped define opposition to slavery as proof of collective virtue and of an imperial civilized community. As such the humanitarian campaign to abolish the slave trade was very much an imperial project, giving it a new civilizing mission.[32]

This civilizing mission became the heart of the new imperialism and the new humanitarianism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was part of a particular notion of liberal universalism in which defining humanity became an exclusionary process; any attempt to provide a description (or anthropology) of this notion carries a set of norms and limitations.[33] As such, speaking in the name of humanity permitted British colonialism a series of colonial and international interventions. In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15, for example, international law created a new humanitarian norm with its "Declaration on the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade." Through this norm the British Empire championed a new practice of intervention that

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[27] Adam Smith, *Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[28] Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 127-158. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

[29] Lynn Festa, "Humanity Without Feathers," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 2010, pp. 3-27; Thomas Laqueur, "Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative," in L. Hunt and V. Bonnell (eds.) *The New Cultural History*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 176-204; Similarly Lynn Hunt has located the development of the notion of "humanity" in the eighteenth-century epistolary novel. In Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights*, 58.

[30] Christopher Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

[31] Clare Midgley, "Slave Sugar Boycotts, Female Activism, and the Domestic Base of Anti-Slavery Culture," *Slavery and Abolition* 17, 3 (Dec 1996) 137-162.

[32] Christopher Brown, *Moral Capital*, 37.

[33] Uday Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: a study in nineteenth-century British liberal thought*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 46-78.

innovatively combined the use of military and legal means on the international level.[34] The new practice of humanitarian intervention was later used by the Great European Powers to protect Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire.[35]

This notion of "humanity" was utilized in the British Empire as means to justify and expand of colonial governance. This was particularly the case during the devastating famines in Ireland and India in the second half of the twentieth century, which helped Britain to develop its administration over its colonial territories. In a series of famine codes from the 1880s and 1900s, the British state used the language of humanity to expand its reach over the individual bodies of its colonial subjects. Based on these famine codes the British imperial state sought to develop an ethic that would ensure colonial subjects were not rendered dependent. That ethic was mobilized through centralized administrative systems, with an elaborate infrastructure of material and human resources, as well as new forms of expertise that carefully calibrated forms of relief to Irish and Indian populations it had reduced to famine. The famine codes created a Famine Relief and Insurance Fund, paid for by taxation, half of which was spent on preventive public works like irrigation systems and the other half assigned for the provision of a new type of relief administered through a new institution: the famine camp and relief house.[36] These relief spaces were used to distribute relief for the starving victims and protect the rest of society (especially urban populations) from the crime and disease associated with itinerant famine victims.[37] These new techniques of relief strove to remake the mentalities of colonial subjects as much as to save them from starvation. They would leave a long shadow on humanitarian aid and knowledge within and beyond the British Empire, and especially after the First World War.[38]

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[34] Fabian Klose (ed.), *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present*, (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Fabian Klose, "Humanitäre Intervention und internationale Gerichtsbarkeit – Verflechtung militärischer und juristischer Implementierungsmaßnahmen zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 72 (2013) *Heft* 1, p. 1-21.

[35] Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914* (Princeton University Press, 2012). Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Knopf, 2008). See also how humanitarian campaigns shaped local practices in South Asia and Africa: Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India* (University of California Press, 1998). See also the story of FGM in Tabitha Kanogo, "Becoming Kavirondo: Clitoridectomy, Ethnicity and Womanhood," 73-103 in *African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya, 1900-50*; Susan Pederson, "National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy-Making", *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 63, no. 4 (1991): 647-680. The universalism behind the project of imperial humanitarianism was also used to reorganize structures of colonial population see for example, Sanjay Sharma, *Famine, Philanthropy and the Colonial State. North India in the Early Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[36] For more on the famine code see James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* (Verso Books, 2002).

[37] Aidan Forth, "An Empire of Camps: British Imperialism and the Concentration of Civilians, 1876-1903," (Diss. Stanford University, 2012).

[38] James Vernon and I have elaborated elsewhere on how the famine code shaped the knowledge and practice of humanitarian aid in the twentieth century both in the postcolonial state as well as in international relief programs. See Tehila Sasson and James Vernon, "Practising the British way of famine: technologies of relief, 1770–1985," *European Review of History*, (July 2015).

2.b. Humanitarianism, Internationalism, and Nongovernmental Organizations In an Era of Total Wars

While nineteenth century legacies of humanitarianism reverberated well into the twentieth century, the First World War nonetheless marked a turning point in the history of British humanitarianism, which began to turn its attention to territories beyond its colonies. The shock of total war reshaped the notion of mass suffering and of victimhood.[39] At the same time, as Hannah Arendt famously argued, the war also exposed that "the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them."[40] The impact of total war on Europe precipitated a new system of international aid. As unprecedented flows of refugees and stateless persons, due to hunger, spread across central and eastern Europe, new international organizations emerged to provide humanitarian aid that went beyond national or imperial boundaries.

The war was especially transformative for Britain, which took a large role in the formation of these international institutions and networks.[41] British diplomats, colonial administrators, nutritional and medical experts help create the infrastructure and the mechanisms based on their imperial knowledge of famine relief. The creation of international organizations like the League of Nations and the International Labor Office brought together legal and technical experts to respond to the problem of hunger and mass refugees. Through these organization between 1914 and 1922 humanitarianism became, "increasingly organized around transnational networks,"[42] as some scholars put it.

Within this context, the creation of Save the Children Fund (SCF) was a crucial moment for British humanitarianism, marking the opening salvo for the emergence of a professionalized voluntary sector in Britain devoted to humanitarian aid. The charity was founded in 1919 under the name "Fight the Famine Council" by Eglantyne Jebb and her sister, Dorothy Buxton, as a humanitarian response to the British blockade over Germany and Austria. Its foundation represented a new approach to charity, when British activists and politicians moved to a more scientific approach to aid and global welfare. Its

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[39] Annette Becker, *Oublies De La Grande Guerre: Humanitaire et culture de guerre, 1914-1918*. (Paris: Noêsis, 1998).

[40] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, rev. ed. (New York: Shocken Books, 2004), 370.

[41] Many of the founders as well as the experts behind the League of Nations were British. See for example in Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton University Press, 2009); Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, 2015. Furthermore, the League received its own support base and lobbying domestically. Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, C.1918 - 45* (Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester University Press, 2011).

[42] Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 18-75; See also the entire special issue dedicated to "Humanitarianism in the Era of the First World War" in *First World War Studies, the journal of the International Society for First World War Studies*, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, 2014.

founders critiqued its Victorian antecedent as a mere "palliative,"[43] which "cloaks a multitude of sins."[44] Instead, Save the Children aimed to create a charity which would operate like a business: it sought to generate "social action...with world-wide responsibility,"[45] with "the same care, the same intelligence, as is to be found in the best commercial and industrial enterprise."[46]

At the aftermath of the war Save the Children developed an international vision of a shared humanity epitomized in the idea of the child as an object of care, which transcends political boundaries. The charity received support for this international vision from major figures like George Bernard Shaw (who famously said, "I have no enemies under seven") as well as religious leaders such as Pope Benedict XV and the Archbishop of Canterbury, and later even helped the League of Nations to draft a "Universal Declaration for the Rights of Children."[47] By the end of August 1921, Save the Children had counterparts in several countries, raising funds and distributing them via the new international body, the "Union International de Secours aux Enfants" in Geneva.

It was during the Russian famine of 1921-1922, when Save the Children together with many other international organizations began putting this international vision into action.[48] The response to the famine was the first international relief efforts to a disaster in an enemy country and as such it became a crucial episode in the history of British as well as international humanitarianism. [49] The relief effort mounted by Western organizations was probably unmatched in the history of famines[50] and included a vast array of organizations. Although secondary in size and funds, Britain's extensive imperial experience with famine relief provided a guiding set of principles for the internationalization of humanitarian efforts, which were first of their kind. British politicians, some with experience of colonial government in India, like its former Viceroy Lord Curzon, led the international planning of the relief mission. Colonial famine experts, like Sir Benjamin Robertson, shaped both the British and international relief based on

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[43] This was the position of the Labour Party in 1920. Tanner, Duncan, and Pat Thane. *Labour's First Century*. (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[44] Eglantyne Jebb in *The Ring Fence* from Mahood, Linda, *Feminism and voluntary action : Eglantyne Jebb and Save the Children, 1876-1928*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),165.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Eglantyne Jebb, in Fuller, Edward, *The right of the child*, (Boston: Beacon press, 1951), 17.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Benjamin M. Weissman, *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921-1923* (Hoover Press, 1974); Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford University Press, 2002); David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Harvard University Press, 2003); Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad* (Transaction Publishers, 1988), 279-93; Emily S. Rosenberg, "Missions to the World: Philanthropy Abroad," in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University), 241-258.

[49] Serguie Adamets, "Famine in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russia: mortality by age, cause, and gender," in Dyson and Ó Gráda, *Famine Demography: Perspectives from the Past and Present* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press: 2002), 157-80.

[50] Cormac Ó Gráda, *Famine: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2010), 223.

their imperial experience in India.[51] Through the relief of the famine, British nongovernmental organizations—like Save the Children— also became international actors for the first time. Furthermore, despite its internationalist nature, the British humanitarian mission to Russia was from its early days seen as an imperial one, aimed at securing "the unity and identity of the entire relief movement throughout the British Empire."[52] In a period of economic depression and rising rates of poverty within the UK, the empire became a source of income and support, a way to extend the mission towards a suffering "humanity."

The British experience of famine relief helped shaped the ways in which non-governmental humanitarian organizations conceptualized their work after the Russian famine of 1921. The famine became a testing ground for organizations like the Society of Friends and medics to work with experts like Robertson and develop new forms of relief.[53] The persistent influence of these forms of expertise was also evident when voluntary organizations were created to provide relief for those starving in occupied Europe during the Second World War.[54] They became the basis for the further internationalization of relief in the wake of another total war.

During the Second World War British humanitarianism expanded further. The war also saw the development of many local organizations in Britain, but those were aimed exclusively to aid Europe. While a devastating famine took a toll of more three million colonial subjects in Bengal, it was the plight of starving Europe that mobilized local societies and elites across Britain and became the basis for their humanitarian campaigns. To those joined an official Technical Advisory Committee comprised of Britain's leading nutritional and health experts like Boyd Orr. These experts helped bolster the British humanitarian mission from the outset. By 1944 around 150 local Famine Relief Committee had sprung up and 88 other interested organizations like the Women's Institute had held meetings on the issue.[55]

Two of these wartime local humanitarian organizations became increasingly important in the interwar period and even more so in the 1960s. The first was was the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, which would later change its name to Oxfam.[56] Founded on 5 October 1942 under the name Oxford Committee for Famine Relief by Oxford scholars (like Gilbert Murray) and churchmen (like Rev T. R. Milford, the Vicar of the Oxford University Church), the group was initially created to response to the allied blockade in Nazi occupied Greece. Its objective was to arouse public and governmental concern about the plight of starving civilian families, and especially the children, in

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[51] I examine the role of colonial expertise in the international relief mission to Russia in Tehila Sasson, "From Empire to Humanity: The Imperial Origins of International Humanitarianism and the Russian Famine of 1921-22," (unpublished manuscript).

[52] See also Emily Baughan, "The Imperial War Relief Fund and the All British Appeal: Commonwealth, Conflict and Conservatism within the British Humanitarian Movement, 1920–25," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 40, 2012: 845–861.

[53] For example Michael Asquith, *Famine. Quaker Work in Russia 1921-23*, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1943). I have explored this elsewhere. See Tehila Sasson, "From Empire to Humanity."

[54] For a broader European story see Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA," *Past & Present*, supplement 6 (2011): 258-289.

[55] James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History*, 150.

[56] T. R. Milford, *The Oxfam Story: A Brief Account of the Growth of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and the Work It Has Been Able to Accomplish* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964).

occupied Greece and Belgium. But the group (which changed its name to Oxfam only in 1965) soon developed as a humanitarian lobby beyond the crisis in Greece. In the immediate post-war years the Committee lobbied to the British public to donate for the relief of European countries, in general, and Germany, in particular. On 30 September 1948, when Europe started recovering from the war, the Committee decided not only not to close their operation but also expand it.[57] The fist major appeal in this year was for the Palestinian refugees in 1949 and throughout the 1950s the group shifted its efforts for the support and aid to the European problem of refugees, leading eventually to its involvement in the international campaign of the 1959 World Refugee Year. Oxfam, however, would only become operational and grow in the 1960s, when the organization turned its attention to the global South. As we shall see, this shift marked a broader transition in the development of British humanitarianism during one of the major decades of formal decolonization in Africa. And Oxfam will become central actor in it.

A second organization that became as central for British humanitarianism was Christian Aid. Initially formed as the Christian Reconstruction in Europe (CRE) in 1944 out of a department of the British Council of Churches (BCC), the organization was created to respond to the plight of starving Europe like Oxfam.[58] The Christian Reconstruction in Europe, however, soon became concerned in the issue of reconstruction after the war has ended and worked under the direction of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva, an international inter-church organization founded in 1948 which arose out of the ecumenical movement.[59] Working through the World Council of Churches also served to associate the organization with the UNRRA relief efforts. Despite its orientation towards aiding Church institutions, the World Council of Churches recognized the authority of the UNRRA.[60] Similarly to Oxfam, it is only in the 1960s that Christian Aid turned its resources and relief efforts (as well as vast development programs) to the global South. It is at this point that this dissertation begins its inquiry.

2.c. The Archives of British and Global Humanitarianism

Because of Britain's long tradition of humanitarianism, it is perhaps no surprise that in recent years historians of Britain have become increasingly interested in its history. New works have explored the relationship between British imperialism and forms of humanitarianism.[61] But while these histories have showed that British humanitarianism

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[57] Ben Whittaker, *A Bridge of People: A Personal View of Oxfam's First Forty Years*, (London: Heinemann, 1983), 18.

[58] Colin Davey, *The Story of the BCC* (London: BCC, 1990).

[59] William Patton, "Letter to the Rev. A.C. Craig," 26 March 1943, Box ICA1, ICA/02/01/02, Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service Archive, London (ICAA); "Draft Constitution," 1944, Box ICA1, ICA/01/02: Committee for Christian Reconstruction in Europe, ICAA.

[60] "Third Memorandum on The Reconstruction of Christian Institutions in Europe," February 1944, Box ICA1, ICA/02/01/03: World Council of Churches, ICAA.

[61] See for example Matthew Hilton, "Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film: Humanitarianism, Imperialism, and the Changing Role of Charity in Postwar Britain," *The Journal of Modern History* 87, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 357–94; Emily Baughan, *Saving the Children: British Humanitarianism in Europe and Africa, c. 1915-2010* (book manuscript in progress); Alan Lester and

emerged from imperialism, they have yet to explore what happened to British humanitarianism after decolonization. This dissertation therefore takes on this task and investigates what happens to British humanitarianism after empire. Rather than telling the institutional story of one particular organization or charity, it explores a range of historical actors: from British housewives and youth groups to multinational organizations and the British military.

To tell this multifaceted story, my study employs archives in Britain, the United States, and in Switzerland and shows how both experts and amateurs came to adopt a new global consciousness. The newly available archives of Oxfam and Save the Children, for example, offered the biographies of aid workers, activists, as well as the letters and correspondence concern citizens. Others —like the World Health Organization and the United Nations Archives in Geneva— provided the basis for my account of how a new aid industry generated innovative interventions and relief schemes in postcolonial societies. The exclusive access to Oxfam archives also contributed valuable materials and information about the role of consumers, youth groups, and businesses in this aid industry. The BBC Archives afforded materials for the understanding of how ordinary people came to experience this global project through television sets in their own living rooms. From the National Archives and the British Library in the United Kingdom, I was able to explore the links between these non-governmental forms of aid to more formal and governmental schemes and structures. Finally, with the help of the Library of Congress, the National Archives at College Park, and the Hoover Archives, the study examined the links between British and American Aid.

Through these archives, this study offers a novel contribution to the growing field of Britain and the world. Focusing on the period of globalization, the study recounts the story of Britain in the second half of the twentieth century. Historians of Britain traditionally have told the story of Britain in this period as a story of economic and imperial decline. As the British Empire began to unravel, according to this narrative, Britain retreated from international politics and came to focus on more domestic issues and policies.[62] By looking at non-state institutions and people, however, my story shows that through humanitarian aid Britons continued to engage with the world. Drawing on the new scholarship of Britain and the world, [63] I argue that British humanitarianism was

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Fae Dussart, *Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance: Protecting Aborigines across the Nineteenth-Century British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[62] Jim Tomlinson. "Inventing 'Decline': The Falling Behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years." *The Economic History Review* 49, no. 4 (1996): 731-757.

[63] British historians have recently analyzed the history of Britain —from the eighteenth century to present— from an imperial and transnational perspective. Through these approaches historians have expanded our understanding of how Britons engaged with the Empire and the world beyond it: whether it is through the domestic history of immigration or the international and imperial history of the Commonwealth, historians have shown that Britain came to shape and to be shaped by transnational and international processes. This study adds to this body of literature by investigating the history of Britain's engagement with the world between 1960s and 1980s. For example, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich eds. *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Philip Buckner ed., *Canada and the End of Empire*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); Philip Buckner with Douglas Francis eds., *Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); C.P. Champion, *The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010); James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire*,

shaped by both the legacies of the end of empire and the tensions brought by new forces of globalization in the 1970s.

3. Nongovernmental Politics and the De-politicization of Humanitarian Aid

The study also contributes to the interdisciplinary field of human rights and humanitarianism. Scholars have recently crowned the 1970s as a period of "breakthrough," when a burgeoning international community began to advocate for human rights and global justice beyond national borders.[64] These scholars however have focused almost exclusively on the emergence of an international human rights movement in this period, paying less attention to the story of global humanitarianism. Following Sam Moyn many investigated how in the 1970s "the moral world of Westerns shifted,"[65] focusing exclusively on the development of a legal and diplomatic human rights régime.[66] In this study I add to this literature by demonstrating how through a new humanitarian and moral language a new compassion regime was born. This regime mobilized nongovernmental organizations, multinational companies and ordinary people in the project of global governance thus making these moral sentiments an essential force in contemporary politics.

Much ink has been spilled on the de-political or even anti-political nature of this humanitarian action from historical as well as contemporary perspectives.[67] In the last

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(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010); David Goldsworthy, *Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of the British Empire*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002); José Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Neville Meaney, "Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography," *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, Issue 116, 2001; Stuart Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001).

[64] See for example recent works in both human rights history as well as the history of humanitarianism such as Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. (Cornell University Press, 2011); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," *Journal of American History* 86 (1999), 1231–1250; Tom Buchanan, "Amnesty International in Crisis, 1966–7," *Twentieth Century British History* 15 (2004), 267–289; Jean Quataert, *Advocating Dignity: Human Rights Mobilizations and Global Politics* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Julian Bourg, *From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought* (McGill-Queen's Press, 2007).

[65] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 1.

[66] The debate on the origins of human rights spans between those who locate it in the late eighteenth century, and equivocate it with the rise of humanitarianism, and those who follow Moyn's chronology and see it as a much more recent phenomenon. See Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2007).

[67] The most interesting formulations of this critique up to date is James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (U of Minnesota Press, 1990) and Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania*, (Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 2008).

couple of decades it became almost a trope amongst the British and European left to critique the depolitical nature of humanitarian aid. By analyzing visual representations, discourses and cultural forms, scholars of humanitarianism have allowed us to account both for the ways in which ordinary people in the metrople were exposed to aid as well as how aid was practiced in the Third World. Echoing what Oscar Wilde already taught us in the 1880s, these critiques of humanitarianism have shown that "Charity creates a multitude of sins."[68]

Against these works, the scholarship of anthropologist like Didier Fassin has offered a framework of how what he calls "humanitarian reason" nonetheless carried a new type of "nongovernmental politics."[69] In this framework humanitarian sentiments and logic have come to "governs precarious lives,"[70] that is, the lives of the unemployed, asylum seekers, sick immigrants, people with AIDS, famine victims and victims of conflict. Through the use of moral sentiments, humanitarian reason has "become an essential force in contemporary politics."[71] These sentiments form both the logic and the justification as well as the set of practices which focused on the disadvantaged whether at home or abroad. When compassion is articulated within politics in these ways Fassin describes it as a form of "humanitarian government."

Here, government should be understood in the broad Foucauldian sense to include both governmental and nongovernmental actors, who deploy moral sentiments in order to manage, regulate, and support the existence of human beings. The implication of this formulation of "government" is helpful for British historians who portray 1945 as a watershed of a shift from governmental to nongovernmental aid. Fassin's work can in fact help us examine how the mixed economy of humanitarian government continued and articulated forms of humanitarian reason that was deployed by various agents.

The notion of "humanitarian government" also helps us challenge another myth about twentieth century humanitarianism: the shift from neutrality to politics. In the current narrative, which Fassin endorses, humanitarianism began as a neutral practice with the creation of the Red Cross in the 1860s and moved in the 1970s, to a more political form of aid with the creation of Doctors Without Borders marking a 'second generation of humanitarianism.' However, working with the notion of a "humanitarian government" can help us transcend this binary narrative and stretch our chronology to explore when and where technologies of humanitarian governance began.

In this dissertation I think both with and against with Fassin, and analyze the ways in which humanitarian reason has always carried with it some type of politics although perhaps not in the same chronology Fassin would offer to the emergence of this humanitarian reason. Rather oscillating between forms of depoliticization and politicization, I follow Thomas Keenan, who argued that the two should not be mutually

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[68] Oscar Wilde, *The Soul of Man Under Socialism* (St. Louis, MO: Herman Schwartz, 1906), 3.

[69] Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*, (University of California Press, 2011); Didier Fassin, Richard Rechtman, and Rachel Gomme, *The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood* (Princeton University Press, 2009); Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin, *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care* (Duke University Press, 2010); Michel Feher, *Nongovernmental Politics* (Zone Books, 2007).

[70] Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason*, 4.

[71] Ibid*,* 1.

exclusive.[72] While I account for the ways in which some representations might have depoliticized the contexts of the humanitarian suffering, I therefore nevertheless use Fassin's work to examine the ways in which humanitarian action always carry within it a certain type of power relation and with it, governance. Part I of this study pays particular attention to the role of nongovernmental actors in shaping this politics. Rather than analyzing the discourses British nongovernmental organization used, I focus on the type of expertise they utilized in the field. Looking at the Biafra crises and later the series of disasters in Pakistan and the Sahel, Part I examines the ways which humanitarian expertise have shaped Britain's relationship to its former empire as well as generated new type of moral technologies.

At the same time, my work also strives to go beyond the binary discussion of depoliticization and politicization. By looking at a variety of actors, Parts II and III explore the relationship between humanitarianism and the global market in the 1970s. The historian Thomas Haskell has explored this question, when studying the emergence of humanitarian sensibilities in the eighteenth century. According to Haskell, during the eighteenth century the growing force of the market economy created a new type of person by heaping tangible rewards on people who displayed a certain calculating code of conduct, while humbling others who did not. "It is not merely coincidental that humanitarianism burst into bloom," Haskell concluded, at the same time as the emergence of "a market-oriented form of life."[73]

While this study continues to explore this relationship between the market economy and humanitarian aid, I also depart from Haskell in one crucial way. Rather than assuming the emancipatory and progressive forms of the market, my work shows that in an era of globalization and mass consumption new market rationalities developed through particular economic and cultural practices. Indeed, in many ways this study historicizes the moment in which Haskell, Peter Singer, John Rolls, and even Amryta Sen wrote their most important works about the relationship between the global market of the 1970s and a new global morality. It shows that at the end of empire, the global market came to replace the arena through which humanitarian activism and moral sentiments were formulated. The end of empires created the globalization of markets and goods as well as the rise of nongovernmental and commercial actors. With economic globalization and mass consumption, commerce and new forms of market economy became a tool for humanitarian engagement. Through this process a new humanitarian industry was produced.

4. Chapter Outline

The following chapters present the beginning of a conversation—rather than an end point—to why and how between 1960s and 1980s so many institutions and people adopted moral sentiments and the language of "humanity."

Chapter One explores how in the 1960s humanitarianism as a sector grew in its size and in its experience. Although international and nongovernmental organizations

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[72] See in Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza* (Verso, 2012), 61.

[73] Thomas L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2," *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (June 1, 1985): 547–66.

developed from the interwar years onwards, it was in the 1960s that British organizations became professionalized. They did so based on imperial knowledge and expertise. In the wake of decolonization and the civil wars in the Congo in 1960-61 and Nigeria in 1968-69 British as well as international organization began to develop new nongovernmental solutions—such as airlifts—to respond to catastrophes in the emerging postcolonial world. These solutions were still based on imperial and military knowledge and infrastructure but did not necessarily share imperial aims and motives. They utilized the knowledge of technical and military experts, who gained their experience in the British Colonial Office and were employed by the growing humanitarian sector after empire. Once this imperial and colonial expertise was put into a new global and humanitarian context, humanitarian aid gained new meanings and politics. The result was the creation of a new humanitarian-military complex, which used informal military knowledge to provide relief to suffering communities. This complex became part of a political economy of aid in the 1970s, when it generated a series of interventions in response to disasters in the postcolonial world.

Chapter Two interrogates how when the British military relinquished the majority of its operational and combat roles in the 1970s, it became one of the main international responders to large-scale catastrophes and providers of humanitarian aid. Although the story is largely global, Britain's participation was unique because of the country's former imperial experience. Its military knowledge and availability, as well as its former bases in Asia and Africa, allowed Britain to become a major participant in disaster relief in these areas. Disaster relief not only became a way to strengthen diplomatic and economic relations in postcolonial societies during the Cold War but also a method to train the military in remote territories after the loss of Empire. By harnessing its skills to transport supplies in difficult terrain, the British military acquired a new justification and a new role as a humanitarian actor. Through this repurpose, the military became part of the larger project of humanitarian governance.

But technical and military experts were not the only members of this new global humanitarian community of the 1970s. The end of empires created the globalization of markets and goods as well as the rise of nongovernmental and commercial actors. Precipitated by crises in the period — from welfare and development programs to the collapse of currency management under Bretton Woods — the 1970s created new conditions from which a new global consciousness enlisted a verity of institutions and people. One of these institutions was the multinational corporation. *Chapter Three* examines how, as the economic power of multinational corporations grew in the 1970s, international and non-governmental organizations began recruiting private businesses and multinationals to join this aid industry and collaborate with them. Circulating goods, expertise and capital, these organizations argued that multinational corporations could be ideal candidate to join the project of caring for the world's hungry. Charities like Oxfam and Save the Children used companies like Tesco, Rover and Heinz to bring food and vehicles to relief projects in Africa. Similarly, the Food and Agriculture Organization led a new "Industry Cooperative Programme" (ICP), which facilitated collaborations and agribusiness projects between multinationals and Third World countries. These collaborations allowed multinational corporations to penetrate new markets and gain access to Third World economies. A new aid industry began generating profits and increasing revenue.

This humanitarian industry came to include consumers, British housewives, and youth groups. As *Chapter Four* analyzes in the 1960s and 1970s humanitarian organizations

brought the plight of disasters to the British high-street though charity shops, boycotts and trading companies. From the mailbox to the main street charity shops, shaped a new consumer behavior and a new economic culture. Through trading companies, British charities also realized their moral commitment could be furthered through economic communities of trade. Transnational boycotts became another method to protest against human right abuse and develop solidarities through the global market. In using these institutions, humanitarian organizations, not only animated the British public but also created what can be called "affective economies," global economies that flourished through the business of aid.

When humanitarian organizations began developing a new humanitarian culture in the 1970s and 1980s, as *Chapter Five* shows, they mobilized ordinary people and particularly youth groups to join a global community of aid. The development of new forms of media representations, the use of television, walkathons, celebrity culture helped popularize humanitarian aid and commodify it. *Chapter Six* considers the development of new culture through the rock activism of the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1985 Ethiopian famine, an extensive international community of governments, NGOs, and ordinary people all participated in its relief, raising through the Live Aid concert, alone, more than £100 million. This popular humanitarian culture helped forge a new humanitarian subject: a global citizen, morally committed to the plight of those suffering abroad.

Despite the long tradition of British humanitarian aid with its close relationship to imperialism, this study suggests that it was reanimated after the end of Empire. Between the Biafra crisis of 1968 and the Ethiopian famine of 1985, Britons developed not only new identities as global citizens committed to the plight of those suffering abroad. Influenced by international processes of globalization and mass consumption, they also responded to distant suffering through commerce and the global market. In the 1970s, I argue, humanitarianism became part of this new political economy. In doing so it became an ethics of a new market society.

Part I

Chapter One

Humanity After Empire

In a famous 1971 essay, *Famine, Affluence, and Morality*, the moral philosopher Peter Singer argued that affluent persons are morally bound to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters. "From the moral point of view," Singer claimed, "the development of the world into a 'global village' has made an important … difference to our moral situation." "Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas," he continued, can direct our aid to distant strangers "almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block." "There would seem," he therefore concluded, "to be no possible justification for discriminating on geographical grounds."[74]

Singer's essay became canonical in the study of ethics but he was not the only one in this period who spoke of a global ethics that transcended geographical boundaries. From the late 1960s onwards a new "compassion regime" was born with ideas and institutions committed to human rights and global justice. Through non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF), western activists began to advocate for care beyond national borders. This "humanitarian international," as Alex de Waal called it, represented a new group of activists, which "a generation ago…did not exist."[75] Focused on famine and disaster relief through non-state and state agencies, this new global community of activists formed a bourgeoning international elite of aid workers.

To a certain extent, there was nothing new about this compassion regime. As early as 1759 Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Smith urged us to imagine the suffering of unknown people beyond our community. Similarly, in 1786 the abolitionist Thomas Clarkson managed to mobilize ordinary people and statesmen to support the first humanitarian campaign. In the late nineteenth century Emily Hobhouse's graphic descriptions of the atrocities in British concentration camps ignited humanitarian debates about morality, governance and aid.[76] In short, neither humanitarian ethics nor humanitarian campaigns were unique to this decade.

And yet something has changed. Situating this moment—in the years around 1971 when Singer wrote his essay—in the history of humanitarianism is in some measure an exercise in the history of technology. As some have argued, in this period new forms of media emerged and helped raise awareness to disasters.[77] And to some extent that was

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[74] Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Spring 1972): 229-43.

[75] Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, (Oxford: African Rights & the International African Institute in association with James Currey, 1997), 65.

[76] On the deep origins of humanitarian sympathy and action see, Thomas Laqueur, "Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative," Lynn Hunt, ed. *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 176-204; James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), Chapter 2; Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* (Verso Books, 2002), 147–148.

[77] Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Reprint edition (New York: Picador, 2004); Luc Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35-54.

true. In Britain, for example, more than 90% of the population possessed a television by 1975.[78] Recognizing this dramatic change, humanitarian charities like Oxfam began to capitalize on this technology and broadcasted their campaigns in the BBC and ITV channels.[79] The images of suffering children in places like Biafra and Bangladesh evoked, among Western viewers, the feeling they belonged to a global community and compassions for people they do not know.

But even if the media and popular campaigns might have helped raise awareness of disaster victims, they can hardly be credited for the mobilization of global institutions. Watching world suffering on television did not necessarily mean acting to stop it. The fundamental question, therefore, is not why in the late 1960 humanitarian ethics became more visible.[80] More puzzling is why this moral imperative suddenly became so compelling and ever so global that it licensed humanitarian interventions regardless of state boundaries. Indeed, if humanitarian ethics and activism emerged already in the age of enlightenment, why is it only in the late 1960 that we see the proliferation of unprecedented forms of global activism?

One way to answer this problem can be found in Peter Singer's moral philosophy. Singer's argument was not only analytical but also historical. According to him, it is only now, when we have acquired the ability to rescue and save lives, that we became morally and globally bound to do so. The emergence of techniques, tools and practices to save lives, morally compels us to use them whenever we can and regardless of national boundaries. These tools for relief were of course not new. They were invented already in the late nineteenth century, when Britain sought to relieve famine-victims in its empire. What was new was that in the late 1960s was a new social body of state and non-state actors, who began using them globally. And they used them not in the name of empires and state but rather, as one Oxfam director phrased it, in "the name of humanity."

The chapter seeks to locate the emergence of this social body and to understand why and how it came to act globally. There is no better exemplary moment to analyze this development than through the history of the Biafra crisis, resulted from the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967-70. Within the annals of humanitarianism, the Biafra crisis has long been considered the opening salvo for a decade of global ethics and humanitarian care.[81] Scholars have described the Biafra crisis as a pivotal movement from which a more progressive approach to humanitarianism, committed to aid beyond national borders.[82] No one contributed more to this narrative, than the French organization Médecins Sans

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[78] Mark Donnelly, *Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics* (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 77.

[79] See for example the agreement between the BBC and the five biggest humanitarian UK charities Disasters Emergency Committee, Notes of the 8th meeting, 23 August 1966, CA2/F/1/9, Christian Aid Archives (CAA).

[80] See for example, Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism.* (Cornell University Press, 2011); Thomas Probert, "Review of A New Global Morality? The Politics of Human Rights and Humanitarianism in the 1970s," *H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Review*, August 2010. However, it is important to note the difference here between humanitarianism and human rights which created a legal framework rather than one of aid. See for example, Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

[81] Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 65; Tony Vaux, *The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War*, (London; Sterling, VA: Routledge, 2001), 15; Rony Brauman, *Dangerous Liaisons: Bearing Witness and Political Propaganda. Biafra and Cambodia – The Founding Myths of Médecins Sans Frontières* (Paris: MSF CRASH, 2006), 3.

[82] Michael Barnett, *Empire of humanity*, 133.

Frontiéres (MSF) itself and its founder, Bernard Kouchner.[83] According to Kouchner it was Biafra crisis of 1968 that gave rise to a "second wave" of activism, critical to the principle of "neutrality" associated with the traditional humanitarianism of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[84]

However, as this chapter shows, the British case may reveal a more complicated yet perhaps less triumphant story to the emergence of humanitarian interventions. The Biafra crisis indeed generated a new approach to humanitarian action beyond borders through the intervention of non-governmental organizations in the form of airlifts. However, I argue, this new approach was rooted in a reconfiguration of older expertise and knowledge. What the political scientist Michael Barnett has called a "new chapter in humanitarian action"[85] was based on a restructuring of older expertise and practices. The Biafra crisis provided the opportunity for new collaborations between former colonial experts, ex-military personnel and humanitarian activists. In return, these collaborations also changed humanitarian knowledge and ethics, generating new humanitarian-military apparatus.

The story of the humanitarian intervention during the Nigerian civil war was international, with non-governmental organizations from Britain, America, Scandinavia and the International Committee of the Red Cross all-participating. For Britain, however, the stakes were different, since the war threatened not only a Commonwealth country but also a focal point for trade and oil resources. By focusing on British organizations, which were some of the largest contributors of aid to both sides in the conflict, we can see where these experts came from and where they gained their experience. Well-intentioned as they may have been, British humanitarianism did not emerge from the ground up but rather from the shrinking of the imperial state.

This did not mean that humanitarian ethics in the late 1960s was simply imperial or even neocolonial. More precisely, this chapter argues that the structural change of decolonization brought forth a new body of experts who were armed with tools and techniques to save bodies and were not afraid to use them globally in the name of humanity, even if it meant infringing Nigerian sovereignty. The devolution of formal European empires left a great deal of expertise, tools and infrastructure ready to use for

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[83] Bernard Kouchner, *L'Ile de lumière.* (Paris: Ed. Ramsay, 1980); See also Anne Vallaeys, Médecins sans Frontières: la biographie (Paris: Fayard, 2004); Renee C. Fox "Medical humanitarianism and human rights: Reflections on Doctors Without Borders and Doctors of the World." *Social Science and Medicine*, (1995) 41, 1607–1616; Joelle Tanguy, "The Médecins Sans Frontières Experience," in *A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*, ed. Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Routledge, 1999), 226–44.

[84] Fabrice Weissman, "Silence Heals…from the Cold War to the War on Terror, MSF Speaks Out: a Brief History," in Claire Magone et al. (eds.), *Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed: The MSF Experience* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2011), 177-198; Didier Fassin, "The humanitarian politics of testimony: Subjectification through trauma in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." *Cultural Anthropology*, 23, 531–558; Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian reason: a moral history of the present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Peter Redfield, "Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis." *Cultural Anthropology*, (2005) 20, 328–361; Peter Redfield, "A less modest witness: Collective advocacy and motivated truth in a medical humanitarian movement." *American Ethnologist*, (2006) 33, 3–26; Peter Redfield, "Sacrifice, triage, and global humanitarianism." In *Humanitarianism in Question. Politics, Power, Ethics*, Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008).

[85] Michael Barnett, *Empire of humanity*, 133.

humanitarian interventions.[86] Decolonization provided the structural conditions for reconfiguring humanitarian aid in places like Nigeria by providing available knowledge and infrastructure to be used for humanitarian interventions. Once deployed however for the cause of "humanity" these tools acquired new meanings as humanitarian interventions. The combination of colonial knowledge and a new commitment to humanity produced a new attitude for humanitarianism: interventionist one which used military knowledge and expertise. As such, the British case shows that the emergence of what Singer called "a global village" was a result of somewhat a historical accident rather than a series of intentions and ideologies as was have been told.

The Nigerian Civil War And The Rise Of Non-State Actors

The origins of the Nigerian civil war lay in the legacies of colonialism, when in 1914 British administrators grouped together a single territory out of more than 250 ethnic groups with little regard for mutual historic ties.[87] The result was the creation of one of the largest countries in Africa which was divided into three main regions and based on ethnic affiliation: Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups in the north, the mixed Muslim/Christian Yoruba population in the southwest, and Christian Igbos in the southeast, which became the Eastern Region.[88] Soon after its foundation the colony became Britain's most important market in Africa. Its establishment prompted measures to secure an important variety of raw materials, and particularly oil.[89] Colonial rule proved to be a boon for other British corporations as well such as the United Africa Company (UAC), which controlled 41.3% of Nigeria's import and external trade by the time the civil war broke out.[90]

On 1 October 1960, the eve of Nigerian independence, the country was widely considered one of the most promising Third World states. But it was also politically fractured. These fractures sharpened after January 1966, when a military coup brought

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[86] On humanitarian interventions see for example, Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, (Basic Books, 2002); Michel Feher, *Powerless by Design: The Age of the International Community* (Duke University Press, 2000). Both however Power and Feher locate these interventions in the 1990s. For the deeper origins of humanitarian interventions see Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, (Knopf, 2008); Michelle Tusan, "'Crimes against Humanity': Human Rights, the British Empire, and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide," *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 1 (2014): 47–77.

[87] John Hatch, *Nigeria: the Seeds of Disaster,* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1970); John Carland, *The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 130-34.

[88] Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 13, n 37, December 1986. 81–96.

[89] Although commercially viable quantities of oil were only discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956, a few years before independence. Phia Steyn, "Oil Exploration in Colonial Nigeria, c. 1903-58," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 37, number 2, 2009; Andy Rowell, James Marriott & Lorne Stockman, *The Next Gulf. London, Washington And Oil Conflict In Nigeria*, (London, Constable; 2005), 59.

[90] Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, *Conflict and Intervention in Africa: Nigeria, Angola, Zaire* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Yusuf Bangura, *Britain and Commonwealth Africa*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 74, 194-5; Paul Kelemen, "Planning for Africa: The British Labour Party's Colonial Development Policy, 1920-1964," *Journal of Agrarian Change*, vol. 7, n 1, January 2007, 95.

John Aguiyi-Ironsi to power. An Igbo, Ironsi worked to centralize authority in Lagos. He met violent opposition in the north, where a rash of anti-Igbo attacks broke out. Six months later Ironsi was overthrown by a "countercoup," this time led by northern officers. Nigeria's new military leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, faced strong pressure to allow Northern secession, and British representatives in Lagos both played an important role in persuading Gowon to maintain the Federation.[91] Gowon ended up enforcing a centralizing policy as violence spread in the country. As 1966 progressed, Igbos fled the Northern Region for the Eastern Region, while northerners evacuated in the opposite direction. Although the governor of the Eastern Region, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, initially opposed secession, he soon concluded that independence would provide the Igbos political security and control of Nigeria's offshore oil deposits.

In fact, as the historian Chibuike Uche demonstrates, oil became central to the conflict between the Federal government and the East region and was one of the main causes of the civil war. Already from 1937 onwards, British Petroleum (BP) held the monopoly on oil in Nigeria, and its oil royalties came to determine the balance of power in Nigeria as well as British involvement. In 1958, when oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Eastern part of the country, the colonial government had established a commission to change revenue allocation and restructure oil royalties from the regional to the national government.[92] This revenue adjustment marked the beginning of the dilution of the powers of the regions to the benefit of the national government. The struggle for control of national revenue, and therefore the national government, acquired new importance in light of the political turmoil of 1966.[93] On 27 May 1967 the oil revenue issue came to a head, when Gowon divided the country into twelve states, thus removing the main oil-producing areas from the core of the Eastern Region. Three days later, Ojukwu declared independence and renamed the entire Eastern Region "the Republic of Biafra."[94] The conflict escalated when in June the Nigerian government attacked Biafra in order to show that it had control over the Eastern territories. By the fall of 1967, the Biafrans were surrounded. The Federal army cut off all roads into the breakaway state as well as access to the sea and the hardship descended into famine.

The area was particularly prone to famine as a result of the pattern of food production within Biafra. While the region cultivated cassava, yams, plantains, rice and palm oil, it lacked foods containing protein. The prevalence of the tsetse fly prevented cattle rearing and meant that the region had to import proteins from Europe. Once a blockade was placed over the region it was almost inevitable that Biafra would suffer from a famine. The situation worsened when, throughout the first half of the 1968, an influx of refugees from captured Biafran territories began putting more pressure on food supply and natural resources.[95] By spring 1968, the famine endangered a Biafran

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[91] "Cabinet Conclusions" 2 September 1966, CAB 128/41, TNA; British High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 7 September 1966, PREM 13/1040, TNA. For speculation on British involvement in Gowon "countercoup" see for example the pro-Biafran scholar Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, *Biafra Revisited*, (Dakar: African Resistance, 2007).

[92] Colonial Office: Nigeria, "The Raisman Report. Report of the Fiscal Commission" (Colonial Office: Nigeria, London, 1958).

[93] Chibuike Uche, "Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War," *The Journal of African History* 49, no. 01 (2008): 111 – 135.

[94] Ibid.

[95] "Oxfam aid during the Nigerian Civil War" September 1970, PRG/3/3/NIG/5, Oxfam Archives, Oxford (OA).

population of around eight million people.

While there were already signs in 1967 that Biafra would be threatened by serious food scarcity, the international press "showed little interest in the 'famine story.'"[96] Foreign governments and businesses instead focused on the oil revenues and on the arms trade. This was particularly the case for Britain, which tried to avoid recognizing Biafra. Britain's interest lay in protecting the investments of BP in Nigerian oil. The Commonwealth Office admitted that "[a]n open split between the Eastern Region and the rest of Nigeria will face us with an immediate dilemma, since we cannot afford to alienate either side."[97] Nigerian oil was particularly important to Britain in this period of turmoil in the Middle East, when the blockade of the Suez Canal threatened the British oil supply.[98]

Once the Federal forces took over the major transportation lines for oil established the military dominance of Federal forces, the British government began actively to support the Nigerians by selling them weapons. The Commonwealth Office initially intended to use arms supplies as a bargaining chip to ease the oil blockade and offered Gowon anti-aircraft guns if he would be "helpful on oil."[99] As the conflict progressed throughout 1968 the British government changed its position from trying to appease the conflict to finish it quickly.[100]

More broadly, as a major resource for oil, Nigeria became a focus of foreign interest. The British arms trade to the Federal regime was matched by the Soviets, thus blurring the boundaries of the Cold War. France, which had its own oil interests in the region, became the main supporter and arms supplier to the Biafrans.[101] The secessionist Republic of Biafra was recognized by the Third World states including Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia, and backed not only by France and Israel, but also by Antonio Salazar's Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal as well as the South African and Rhodesian Apartheid regimes. Too concerned with its own war in Vietnam, the United States never clearly opted for either of the warring parties.[102]

In the midst of entangled state interests and military ties, non-governmental organizations became central providers of aid. As the blockade worsened throughout 1968, non-governmental organizations became the main source for relief and supplies to both sides. While the United Nations (UN) and official national relief programs were wholly absent from the Biafran enclave, the civil war created an international vacuum from which the first humanitarian intervention dominated by non-governmental organizations will emerge. Although the Federal government insisted the war was a

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[96] Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 73.

[97] "Possible Blockade and Secession of Eastern Region," 5 May 1967, PREM 13/1661, TNA.

[98] Chibuike Uche, "Oil, British Interests And The Nigerian Civil War."

[99] Forster to Palliser, 7 July 1967, PREM 13/1661, TNA.

[100] "NIGERIA." *Hansard* 22 July 1968 vol 769 cc50-110; See also Lord Hunt remarks in Notes on a Meeting between Lord Hunt and Four Delegates from the National Council of Women's Societies of Biafra held in Morton's Tower at 4p.m. on Thursday, 15 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[101] S. Cronjé, *The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran Civil War, 1967-1970* (London, 1972), 194-195; J. J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970* (Princeton, 1977), 230-231; J. W. Young, "Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years," A. Capet (ed.), *Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale Since 1904* (Basingstoke, 2006), 165-168.

[102] For the United States see Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: History, Strategy, and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

domestic affair, non-governmental activists became progressively involved in the conflict through the largest non-governmental airlifts to date.

The particular situation in the war allowed the rise of non-governmental actors beyond the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Committed to the principal of neutrality and non-interference, the ICRC found itself caught between the Federal government and the Biafrans. As international concern grew, the ICRC flew relief missions into Biafra without Lagos's permission. Angered by this affront to its sovereignty, the Nigerian government attacked a Red Cross plane and the Red Cross halted its airlift.

The ICRC's retreat opened a space for two types of groups to become major humanitarian actors in the conflict. First, it allowed Christian organizations to become particularly active in the Biafran side. Already before the war, missionary societies worked in Nigeria and especially in the Eastern Region.[103] For many of these religious activists the war was understood as a religious conflict rather than a political one, between warmongering and savage Muslim Hausas on the Nigerian side and industrious, peaceful Christian Igbos in Biafra. They therefore saw their mission as not only humanitarian but also religious and political, protecting Christian Igbos.

The second non-governmental actor was the British Oxfam, which played a crucial role in coordinating the international relief and was one of the few agencies to provided relief to both the Nigerian and the Biafran side. "In the name of humanity,"[104] the organization was the only British charity, which called for a humanitarian intervention. "Unless the war is stopped and overland transportation is started," claimed the organization's director Leslie Kirkley, "Oxfam and the other relief agencies cannot…do their job properly, and the world's concern for the suffering millions will be frustrated."[105] A failure by diplomats and politicians to intervene and stop the conflict, Kirkley continued, would be "a failure for all humanity."[106] Through its activities in both Nigeria and Biafra, Oxfam built its international reputation and became a leading member of the global community of aid workers in the 1970s onwards.[107]

From Genocide To Famine

By summer 1968, NGOs were predicting a catastrophe. In August Oxfam secretary, Bruce Ronaldson, claimed that 3,000 people were dying in Biafra every day.[108] The ICRC estimated that 1,500,000 died of disease and famine in that year.[109] In addition to starvation, disease was also rife: kwashiorkor, a disease of protein dietary deficiency, as well as severe anemia, malaria, infectious diseases were also common among Biafran

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[103] P.J. Yanch, "Catholic Humanitarian Aid and the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War," in Chima J. Korieh and G. Ugo Nwokeji (eds.), *Religion, History, and Politics in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Ogbu U. Kalu* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 156-172.

[104] Leslie Kirkley, An Urgent Plea for Peace, Oxfam, December 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 74-75. In 2012, for example, Oxfam generated a revenue of £385.5 million out of a total of £1.097 billion for the entire British humanitarian sector. See Oxfam, *Annual Report & Accounts 2011/12* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2012), 44;

[108] Bruce Ronaldson, Report number 32, 20 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA.

[109] "Oxfam aid during the Nigerian Civil War" September 1970, PRG/3/3/NIG/5, OA.

children. On June 12th, ITV network aired a lengthy news report from the Biafran refugee camps, narrated by broadcaster Alan Hart. Television reports were further reinforced by imagery of starving Biafran children in national newspapers, such as the *Sun* and the *Sunday Times*.[110] The effect of this media coverage was instant. As Lord Shepherd claimed, "television has brought the anguish and the consequences of civil war into our homes."[111]

But television did not set up the scene exclusively as a famine. It also helped promote a competing interpretation of the crisis: that the famine was a Federal-led genocide and a human right violation. For many in Britain, this new imagery from Nigeria recalled the Second World War and the Nazi death camps, suggesting that it was not malnutrition, but rather "something a lot worse."[112] For some British politicians the imagery insinuated "those skeleton-like children" in the television "really looked like something out of Buchenwald or Dachau."[113] The Wilson government was accused of collaborating with Hitler-like figures and participating in a "war of extermination."[114] While Wilson declared his commitment to human rights, one journalist argued, "human rights mean nothing…when it comes to Biafra."[115] "Thanks to the miracle of television we see history happening before our eyes," the liberal politician Lady Violet Bonham Carter claimed, "and not one of us can say, 'I did not know'."[116]

Britons were not alone to fear the Nigerians might be committing genocide.[117] In the United States, for example, American activists formed the Committee to Keep Biafra Alive, "to preserve the Biafran tribesman from genocide."[118] Similarly, as Laase Heerten showed, in Germany the war was compared to Auschwitz.[119] In France, the conflict was seen as neo-colonial policy by the British government.[120] Indeed the conflict tapped into

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[110] See for example *The Sun*, 12 June 1968, p. 3; *Life Magazine*, 12 June 1968, 1. For pictures by McCullin see for instance the pictorial supplement in the *Sunday Times*, 01 June 1968. On McCullin see as well Susan Sontag, *Regarding* (New York, 2003), p. 37 and Don McCullin, *Unreasonable Behaviour* (London , 2002 [1990]). See also Paul Harrison and Robin H. Palmer, *News Out of Africa*, 5-39.

[111] Lord Shephered to the House of Lords, "Nigeria," *Hansard*, 27 August 1968 vol 296 cc676-774.

[112] Lord Willis to the House of Lords, in "Nigeria And Biafra: Peace Proposals," *Hansard*, 0 February 1969 vol 299 cc944-93.

[113] Ibid.

[114] " "Another More Murderous Harvest," n.a., *The Spectator*, 30 May 1968, 1.

[115] "Biafra And Human Rights," n.a., *The Spectator*, 14 November 1968, 1. See also the various responses to this article: "Biafra and Human Rights." *The Spectator*, 26 December 1968 letter from Ewart Milne; "Biafra and Human Rights," *The Spectator*, 21 November 1968, Letter from General Alexander; in Joan Mellors, "What about their Human Rights, Mr. Wilson?" *Tribune*, 18 October 1968, 6.

[116] Violet Bonham Carter to the House of Lords "Nigeria," *Hansard*, 27 August 1968 vol 296 cc676-774.

[117] Lasse Heerten and A. Dirk Moses, "The Nigeria-Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide, 1967-1970," Special Issue in the *Journal of Genocide Research*, (forthcoming).

[118] Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed,* 165.

[119] Lasse Heerten, "'A' as in Auschwitz, 'B' as in Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War, Visual Narratives of Genocide, and the Fragmented Universalization of the Holocaust," in: Heide Fehrenbach, Davide Rodogne (eds.), *Humanitarian Photography: A History*, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

[120] On French opinion, see Stremlau, *International Politics*, 227.

broader international debates about human rights, genocide, and neocolonialism.[121] In Ireland the conflict was compared with the plight of the Jews more broadly and to the foundation of Israel. The role of the Holocaust in global discourse and the status of Israel in international politics at the end of the 1960s contributed significantly to the interpretation of the event.[122] Rather than merely a problem of food scarcity, for some of its supporters, Biafrans represented the Jews of Africa, who rightfully fought for their own Zion.

This narrative of Nigerian-led Igbo genocide was promoted by Ojukwu and his men. In a series of pamphlets published by the Ministry of Information in Enugu, Biafra accused the Federal regime of attempting "to exterminate Eastern Nigerians living in their midst."[123] The pamphlets perpetuated the comparison to the Holocaust and the creation of Israel and argued that in the same manner the Biafran genocide should lead to the creation of a separate state. In short, famine was only one of many categories used by the Biafrans themselves. Other categories were self-determination, human rights, and protection from neocolonialism.

But, as aid organizations soon discovered Ojukwu was using the situation for Biafran political and military purposes. To the humanitarians' dismay, Ojukwu seemed unwilling to make any concessions towards creating easier access for relief. Gowon, for example, was ready to open a land corridor for relief since he could inspect the deliveries.[124] Ojukwu, however, was unyielding. As the assistant director of Oxfam Overseas Office noted, at the risk of "being accused of anti-Biafra bias…[t]o what extent is Ojukwu sensitive to the desperate conditions that are described so graphically in the press bulletins?"[125] The activists who supported the Biafran cause admitted that "Ojukwu was using these starving children to get military concessions, possibly, at the negotiating table."[126]

Ojukwu's uncompromising approach made it hard for relief organizations to address Biafran accusations of human rights violations directly. Instead, relief

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[121] Michael Mcdonnell and A Moses, "Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas," *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 501–29; Dirk Moses, "The United Nations, Humanitarianism and Human Rights: War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971-1974," in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, ed., *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 258-80; Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide," in Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., *The Oxford Handbook on Genocide Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19-41.

[122] Lasse Heerten, "'A' as in Auschwitz, 'B' as in Biafra."

[123] Biafra Ministry of Information, "Genocide. Breaks Up Nations," 19 November 1968 Enugu, Biafra. See also Nigeria's response in pamphlets such as Federal Ministry of Information, "No Genocide: Final Report of the First Phase from 5th October to 10th December by the Organization for African Unity Observers in Nigeria December, 1968 (Nigeria National Press Limited, 1968); Federal Ministry of Information, "Soldier of Honor," (Nigeria National Press Limited, 1968); Federal Ministry of Information, "Ibos in United Nigeria," (Nigeria National Press Limited, 1968), British Red Cross Archives.

[124] "Food for Biafra," n.a., *West Africa*, 29 June 1968.

[125] K. A. Bannet to Henry Fletcher, 15 September 1969, PRG/3/3/NIG/3, OA.

[126] Quoted in Lasse Heerten, "The dystopia of postcolonial catastrophe: self-determination, the Biafran war of secession, and the 1970s human rights moment," in Jan Eckel and Sam Moyn (eds.), *The breakthrough: human rights in the 1970s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 25.

organizations focused on the framework of famine and hunger as the basis for their intervention. Famine allowed a declaration of an emergency and a response to it, regardless of the causes of the event. Famine offered a systematic set of practices of relief and technical knowledge for organizations to use: from caloric requirements, to medical treatment and spatial arrangements of population. Indeed, famine became the primary category of international concern as well as the justification for humanitarian interventions in Africa and specifically in the Biafran case.

Governing Through The Non-Governmental

But famine also carried a long colonial history and therefore, to a certain extent, a political framework for its relief.[127] In the colonial period, famine became the occasion for a declaration of emergency, signifying the reconstitution of British sovereignty through the politics of life and death. As a response to famines, the 1880 colonial famine codes became an obligation by the state to declare the emergency, to understand its impact and to relieve it. But at the same time, it also justified the growth of the state's control and its administration.[128] The declaration of the emergency – that is, of the famine – licensed the reorganization and governance of society through management of colonial population over large spaces, their encampment, and the use of their labor in the name of a responsible humanity.

After decolonization, and beginning with Biafra, these practices for famine relief were reconfigured for postcolonial interventions. Famine was proclaimed by humanitarian agencies – whether non-state or state actors – rather than by postcolonial states. On the one hand, famines became a threat to the new postcolonial state. They posed a challenge to its sovereignty and its ability to care for its population. On the other hand, famine allowed humanitarian agents to operate in these territories, and to take upon themselves the care for life under threat. Before turning into a moral sentiment or personal virtue, this care to rescue lives acquired objective meaning, being embodied in specific practices and regulations. This infringement on postcolonial sovereignty was an unintentional consequence from the perspective of the aid organizations, which were simply trying to find a way to bring aid to Biafra amidst the government's reluctance to allow it in. The potentiality of rescue and relief in these practices turned famine into a moral framework.[129] Technologies for famine relief carried a responsibility to use them as tools for humanitarian interventions. These technologies crystallized the prime principle of humanitarian action: the care of life in distress.

British humanitarian organizations were not completely divorced from the state's knowledge and practices. Many of the activists who joined the British non-governmental

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[127] In nineteenth century India and Ireland famines themselves were often a result of the colonial (mis)management of grain and food supplies rather than merely natural catastrophes and shortage of food.S. Ambirajan, *Classical Political Economy and British Policy in India* (Cambridge University Press, 1978); David Hall-Matthews, *Peasants, Famine and the State in Colonial Western India* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Arnold, "Social Crisis and Epidemic Disease in the Famines of Nineteenth Century India," *The Society for the Social History of Medicine,* 6 (3) (1993): 385-404.

[128] Tehila Sasson and James Vernon, "Practicing the British Way of Famine: Technologies of Relief, 1770-1985," *European Review of History*, no. 2 (2015): 1–13.

[129] Adi Ophir, *Divine Violence: Two Essays of God and Disaster*, (Jerusalem: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing, 2013) [In Hebrew].

sector in the 1960s, had gained their experience in Africa in the former British Empire. Decolonization created an excess of skilled people committed to West Africa and ready at hand to be used by the growing sector of humanitarian NGOs and international agencies.[130] While these aid organizations might have been fully committed to humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, the knowledge, the experience and the connections in the region of their experts were saturated with the experience and techniques of imperial governance.

These experts were trained in the late days of Empire particularly in Africa and had knowledge and experience in local politics and culture. Many of them were technical experts with particular knowledge in large-scale relief and healthcare, having participated in development projects and planning sponsored by the Colonial Office in the 1950s.[131] Others had political knowledge and connections with newly independent states officials like in Nigeria. Missionaries, too, became informants for bigger charities such as Oxfam and Christian Aid. Indeed, ex-colonial officers were ideal candidates for the British humanitarian sector after decolonization, based on their knowledge of the area. From the late 1950s-onwards they came to occupy central positions in humanitarian organizations and saw their mission as a commitment to global citizenship. In this model, activists saw themselves as sharing the responsibility and commitment to a global community and the global South in particular.[132] As ex-colonial servants, many of these experts held an emotional connection to the new states of West Africa and a moral commitment to service abroad. Their global citizenship was therefore very much based on imperial duty.

Take for example the case of Oxfam, which became a leading agency in the conflict. Founded in 1942 the organization was initially created as a lobby group to aid Nazi-occupied Greece during the Second World War.[133] In 1946 Oxfam turned its focus to international campaigns (primarily in Europe), operating as a fundraising society throughout the 1950s.[134] It was only in the 1960s, however, that the organization became operational for the first time and began running both relief projects and development programs in Africa and South Asia. What made Oxfam stand out and develop in this period was the creation of Field Directorates, the first one set up during the Congo famine in 1961. These Field Directorates were, as one of Oxfam's workers once called them, an "overseas arm."[135] They were the "men-on-the-spot," in charge of coordinating Oxfam's aid with the local authorities. They motivated a substantial growth of Oxfam over the decade and expand its scope and reach as an international relief agency. By 1965

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130 For parallel connections in the UN see Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations: The End of the Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton University Press, 2009); See also Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Ohio University Press, 2007).

131 For carful analysis of colonial science and development projects see Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

132 For a more conceptual discussion on global citizenship see Saskia Sassen, "The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 46 (January 1, 2002): 4–26.

133 Maggie Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, 13-16.

134 T. R. Milford, *The Oxfam Story: A Brief Account of the Growth of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and the Work It Has Been Able to Accomplish* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964).

135 Peter Gill, *Drops in the Ocean: The Work of Oxfam 1960-1970* (Macdonald & Co., 1970), 12.

Oxfam had five Field Directors, three in Africa, one in India and one in the Far East.[136] Most of them came from the former Colonial Office.

Indeed, Oxfam's growth and success in this period was due to the large numbers of technical experts coming from the Colonial Office. Oxfam set up most of its overseas staff by using young personnel and workers who previously gained technical and political knowledge in the Colonial Office, working in the government's official development schemes. Entering the colonial service at the last gasp of Empire, Oxfam was one of the main charities that recruited them after formal decolonization. They were well-trained, conscientious, with excellent report-writing skills, knowledge in foreign politics, and were dedicated to public service.[137] Their overseas experience was one of the main qualifications for their recruitment to Oxfam.[138] They laid the groundwork for Oxfam's effective delivery of overseas aid and used their colonial expertise as the basis and background for a new international career as humanitarian aid workers.[139]

One such an expert was Timothy Graham Brierly, the Field Director of Oxfam in Nigeria. Brought up in the West Indies as a child, Brierly was connected to the Empire from an early age. In 1944 he enrolled in the Coldstream Guards and served in Palestine and Egypt, before he was seconded to the King's African Rifles in Uganda. When demobilized in 1948, he joined the British Overseas Civil Service. From 1951 to 1965 he was mostly employed in Northern Nigeria, with a three-year spell in Dakar, Senegal, during which he travelled throughout French-speaking West Africa. This vast and rather unique experience in both British and French West Africa made him an ideal candidate to set up Oxfam's first West and Equatorial African Field Office.

Brierly was expected to cover alone the whole vast area from Dakar in the West, through all the coastal and sub-Saharan countries, down to Lake Kivu on the border of Congo with Rwanda.[140] Appointed in late 1965, Brierly established himself in Lagos. In 1966 he started to organize Oxfam's relief program to the Igbo refugees. Already then he introduced Oxfam to local politics and established connections between Oxfam and the British High Commissioner in Lagos.[141] He also had many contacts with missionaries in the Christianized East, which helped Oxfam later establish its relief mission to what would become Biafra.

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[136] Ibid.

[137] Maggie Black, Brierly Obituary, *The Old Radleian*, 2011, 73.

[138] Nicolas Stacey, Ken Bennet, Patrick Kemmis, "Relief Team for Nigeria/Biafra," 8 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[139] See for example Lempell, deputy to Hug, and a Congo veteran. "Letter Gooch to Stamp," 23 September 1968, DIR/2/3/2/34, OA.

[140] Many of the collaborations he developed with church, mission, or secular organizations in non-Anglophone countries such as Niger Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Mali were later invaluable for relief work during the drought that engulfed the Sahel in the early 1970s.

[141] See for example T. Brierly to the Secretary of Eastern Nigerian Rehabilitation Committee, Enugu, 26 November 1966, Oxfam PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA; T. Brierly "Summery of recent Press Reports on Refugee Situation in Nigeria," 21 November 1966, Oxfam PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA; T. Brierly to Humphrey Hilton, Overseas Aid Department, Oxfam, "Refugees in Eastern Nigeria," 26 December 1966, Oxfam PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA; T. Brierly to Humphrey Hilton, Overseas Aid Department, Oxfam, "Refugees in Eastern Nigeria and Lagos," 10 January 1967, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA; T. Brierly to Humphrey Hilton, Overseas Aid Department, Oxfam, "Refugees Problem in Northern Nigeria," 10 January 1967, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

Brierly was the "man on the ground" when the war broke in May 1967.[142] Based on his colonial experience as well as the relief efforts to the Congo in 1960, Brierly advised Oxfam on the type of aid, its size and urgency.[143] He also met with local politicians and help set up an Ad Hoc National Relief Committee to help coordinate relief between international supplies and local administration.[144] Indeed in the first year of the conflict Brierly operated as a diplomat, helping to coordinate relief not only between Oxfam and other foreign organizations but also between the Nigerians themselves. As an ex-colonial officer he was careful to ensure that the Federal Army's mandate was kept and respected through Oxfam's aid. He followed a similar approach to the British government and focused mainly on helping the Nigerian side. Throughout 1967 and early 1968 aid that was given to the Biafran side was kept discreetly from the Federal government. Although news media began to report the Biafran plight, Brierly expressed his concerns about the possible implications of Oxfam's aid to Biafra and warned Oxfam against publicly supporting the Biafran cause.[145]

Despite Brierly's warning, however, in mid-June when the popular press in Britain began to clamor about starving Biafra, Oxfam gave in to public pressure. This seemed to be in a direct contradiction to some of its aid worker's colonial training. For example, on June 13th the organization announced that 1,000 tons of milk were being purchased for immediate shipment to Biafra, and launched an appeal for £100,000 to cover the costs. The organization also met with Ojukwu, without passing first through Lagos in the correct diplomatic fashion. Oxfam's Director, Nick Stacey, even published articles and statement in support of the Biafran cause.[146] Oxfam's choice to name its campaign "The Biafran emergency appeal" drew criticism from the Nigerian High Commissioner in London, who complained that the appeal "will add credence to the fiction that a State of 'Biafra' exists."[147] Gowon bluntly warned the agencies that "political interference would not be tolerated from any relief organisation," referring specifically to Oxfam.[148] To the British government's dismay, Oxfam identified itself with Biafra. This placed Brierly in an impossible position and even led to his resignation.[149]

In fact, Oxfam the only British charity that advocated profusely for humanitarian intervention in Biafra. Why, then, the organization supported such an intervention despite some of its ties with the British government and the former Colonial Office? The organization insisted that it had a role in "stirring up public opinion" and to bring relief to Biafrans who were also citizens of the Commonwealth. "Oxfam is well aware of the

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142 T. Brierly to Michael Harris, 30 May 1967, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

143 T. Brierly to K. Bennet, "Relief and Rehabilitation in Nigeria," 19 October 1967, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

144 J. W. Jackson, Africa Committee, "Relief and Rehabilitation In Nigeria," 22 November 1967, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

145 "Situation in Nigeria," 17 March 1968 PRG/3/3/NIG/1. OA; Hennry Fletcher, Oxfam Canada, "Nigeria/Biafra," 6 May 1968, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

146 Nicolas Stacey, "Must Nigeria Starve?" *The Spectator*, 12 July 1968.

147 B. O. Ogundipe, "Letter to the Director Leslie Kirkley," 28 June 1968, DIR/2/3/2/32, OA.

148 Stanley Mitton, "The Nigerian/Biafran Situation," 1969, CA/A/6/5, CAA; "International Relief Agencies meet General Gowon," 20 July 1968, FCO 38/301, TNA.

149 See Maggie Black, Brierly Obituary, *The Old Radleian*, 2011, 73.

political and diplomatic problems involved," the organization admitted. But "the Biafrans and Nigerians are all citizens of the British Commonwealth."[150]

Commonwealth, however, was not the reason to call for global action. According to Oxfam "[h]uman beings are much more important than artificially created boundaries and regulations made by men.…In the name of humanity, these statement, whoever they are, must act now. It is already too late."[151] The organization also received support for its campaign from international organizations, who encouraged Oxfam that "[m]aintaining that human solidarity and the duties it imposes in such a situation on all individuals and on all governments, must override all considerations of frontier and national sovereignty."[152] In the lack of British official response to Biafra's plight, Oxfam called both national governments and the international community to intervene.[153]

After Brierly's resignation, Oxfam sent Bruce Ronaldson, the organization's Secretary to Biafra. Ronaldson had been a technical expert in Tanganyika, and joined Oxfam in 1962 when that country was reaching independence. Son of Scottish émigrés, he was born and raised in South Africa and when the war broke out, he served in the King's African Rifles in Ethiopia and later stationed in India to train as a jungle warfare instructor. After the war Ronaldson joined the Colonial Service in Tanganyika and served as a district commissioner, overseeing a wide range of development projects from public works to healthcare. He administered the local workforce to build dams by hand and created the largest artificial lake in East Africa. He also acted as magistrate in local disputes between tribes and oversaw their labor. When the country gained independence in 1961 he moved back to Britain and joined Oxfam as its secretary until 1982.[154] In 1968 and 1969 he became one of Oxfam's main advisors and aid experts on the ground, working in the Biafran territory.

But Ronaldson's colonial training did not necessarily mean that he supported British interests. As more of a technical expert on development, rather than an administrator, Ronaldson saw his mission as first and foremost to deliver relief to the disaster area. Ronaldson was one of the few aid workers sent to Biafra and coordinating relief. "Since feeding dying children and the hungry in refugee camps is helping to relieve the Biafran Government of an embarrassing situation," he once admitted, "it must be said [that Oxfam is] aiding the military effort to that extent."[155] Unlike his predecessor, he was fully committed to the importance of a humanitarian intervention regardless of its political consequences.

Despite the ongoing criticism from the British and Nigerian governments,[156] in 1968 and 1969 Oxfam supported the Biafra airlift through both the ICRC flights as well

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[150] Iain Somerville, "Speech at 'Save Biafra' rally Trafalgar Square 7 July 1968," DIR/2/3/2/32, OA.

[151] Iain Somerville, "Speech at 'Save Biafra' rally Trafalgar Square 7 July 1968," DIR/2/3/2/32, OA.

[152] International Council of Voluntary Agencies to Leselie Kirkely, 22 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[153] Leslie Kirkley, An Urgent Plea for Peace, Oxfam, December 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[154] "Bruce Ronaldson," *The Times*, 30 December 2004.

[155] Bruce Ronaldson, Report number 32, 20 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA.

[156] Notes of the 35th meeting of the Disasters Emergency Committee," 20 June 1968, CA2/F/1/9, CAA; Stanley Mitton, "The Nigerian/Biafran Situation," 1969, CA/A/6/5, CAA; "International Relief Agencies meet General Gowon," 20 July 1968, FCO 38/301, TNA.

as the more controversial ones operated by the Catholic relief organization Caritas.[157] Oxfam contributed food and medical supplies and helped finance the airlifts. Ronaldson saw this support as a moral responsibility of Oxfam, regardless of the political implications this airlift might have.[158] Ronaldson was sent to supervise Oxfam's contributions and especially a cargo of 1,000 tons of dried milk.[159] In August 1968 he also helped the Oxfam team, headed by Dr. Bruno Gans, at Queen Elizabeth Hospital in the secessionist capital Umuahia.

Gans was a leading pediatrician at the time, working in Lewisham Hospital, London. He was also an expert on child nutrition in Africa and particularly Nigeria. Immigrated to England in 1933 from Germany and trained as a doctor in the Colonial Medical Service, Gans had an intimate knowledge with healthcare system in Nigeria.[160] Between 1959 and 1961 he was sent by the Colonial Medical Service to the General Hospital, in Lagos to help set up the country's child care services as it was becoming independent.[161] Based on this experience Gans published numerous studies on child nutrition and pediatrics in Third World countries and offered a blueprint for future development projects in these countries.[162] When the war broke he was recruited by Oxfam and was sent to the Biafran enclave with two assistant doctors to work to Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Gans knowledge of Nigeria offered strategies for aid workers who did not know the local language and nutritional habits. And his support, as expressed later in *The Lancet*, gave Oxfam the credibility and prestige the charity needed.

But just like in Ronaldson's case, Gans did not support of Britain's position in the conflict. He too advocated first and foremost for humanitarian intervention. Although Gans was a trained in the Colonial Service he was ambivalent towards British foreign policy. His training as medical expert primarily shaped his commitment to intervene in the emergency. As a doctor and an aid worker he was committed to saving lives. In his report later to *The Lancet*, Gans emphasized the importance of Oxfam's work in Biafra. Furthermore, he included some criticism by expatriates and the Biafrans of the British government, who, according to him, could "not understand England's indifference to the country's fate, which, until 1960, was part of one of the most important colonies we possessed."[163] In other words, Gans had an emotional commitment to Nigeria, which was inseparable from his former colonial experience.

Indeed, it was the potentiality of rescue and relief in their training that turned experts like Ronaldson and Gans into a supporter of humanitarian interventions. Although Oxfam's entire operation in Biafra was based on colonial knowledge and expertise, this did not mean that Oxfam aligned itself directly with British foreign

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[157] Discussions with Africa Concern (Irish) about joining the airlift in June 1969, PRG/3/3/NIG/3, OA.

[158] Bruce Ronaldson, Report number 25, N/A, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA.

[159] Michael Leapman, "Let RAF fly food to Biafra," *Sun*, 28 June 1968.

[160] G. H. Brown, Richard Robertson Trail, and Gordon Ethelbert Ward Wolstenholme, *Lives of the Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians of London* (Royal College of Physicians, 1982), 188.

[161] B. Gans, "Some Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors in West African Paediatrics," *Archives of Disease in Childhood* 38 (February 1963): 1–12.

[162] See for example Bruno Gans, "Medical Aid To Developing Countries," *British Medical Journal* (1961) volume: 2 issue: 5254 page: 767-768.

[163] Bruno Gans, "A Biafran Relief Mission," *Lancet* (1969) volume: 293 issue: 7596 page: 660 -665.

policy.[164] As ex-colonial officers Oxfam's activists had a sense of duty and commitment to Nigeria, a Commonwealth country.[165] However, these experts saw in their training a moral responsibility to intervene in the name of humanity. Technical experts – development, relief and medical aid workers – were above all committed to the principle of intervention, based on their training.

Humanitarian-Military Technologies

Once it became clear, however, that humanitarian supplies could only be delivered by air, it was former military experts and former pilots – who got their training in the Royal Air Force (RAF) – who began to collaborate with humanitarian organizations. Decolonization created not only an excess of colonial experts but also of military knowledge ready to be used by humanitarian agencies. I call these "military-humanitarian technologies" to designate a more-or-less structured assemblage of power and knowledge that included expertise and spatial arrangements based on military experience. The subsequent Biafran airlift was conducted by former military personnel and aircraft, which were decommissioned after decolonization. The collaboration between former personnel and humanitarians during a rather dangerous airlift not only enabled the shipping of food but also shaped humanitarian knowledge. Rather unintentionally, humanitarian aid was influenced by military experience.

The blockade clearly required some new tools for distributing and transporting aid to the starving population. Many aid workers based in Biafra reported, it was impossible to feed the local population since it was constantly moving or hiding in the bush. As one missionary reported to Oxfam, "sometimes the Catholic Fathers would have many, many thousands to feed and the next day it might only be a few hundred."[166] "Many of [the Biafrans] in their panic to escape at the sound of the jets," one report claimed, "crush each other and this causes almost as much injury as the firing of the jets."[167] The war created mayhem, preventing any systematic organization for distributing relief. A new technology was needed to help distribute relief and medical supplies to the civilian population under siege. The solution was an airlift which could transport large quantities of supplies.

The need for an airlift was further enhanced when on 19 May 1968 Port Harcourt fell into Nigerian hands. In August 1968 the ICRC declared that it would fly relief missions into Biafra without permission from Lagos. Joined by organizations such as Caritas, the ICRC started to operate mercy routes from Port Harcourt. Despite Lagos' protests, in the following year the ICRC transported around 2,500 tons of food a month, until the Nigerian government attacked one of the Red Cross planes. As a result, in June 1969 the ICRC halted its airlift, thus giving way to new organizations such as Oxfam,

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[164] Oxfam also sent a combined medical and relief team to the Nigerian side, led by Patrick Kemmis, a retired Colonial Service officer with 15 years experience of development work in Nigeria. Oxfam, 27 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA; Leslie Kirkely to the Honorary Officers, 9 August 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[165] T.G. Bierly, Field Director for Western Africa, PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA; Iain Somerville, "Text of Speech at "Save Biafra" rally Trafalgar Square 7th July, 1968," DIR/2/3/2/32, OA.

[166] "Letter Gooch to Stamp," 23 September 1968, DIR/2/3/2/34, OA; Interim Report By Dr. N. H. Moynihan and Michael Moyniham, circa 4 October 1968, FCO 38/308, TNA.

[167] Ibid.

Caritas and the Scandinavian group "Nordchurchaid" to take its place as central providers of relief through a night airlift under fire. By 1969 these organizations became the sole provider of aid to the Biafran territories. The threat of famine mobilized missionaries and aid workers who were already working in these territories and now became central actors in the conflict. However, their night flights provided not only food but also an invaluable shield for the gunrunners and in some cases even weapons.[168] Humanitarian action ended up prolonging the war rather than helping relieve it, thus becoming partially responsible for the persistence of hunger in the region.[169]

Although an effective solution to the blockade, the airlift had many logistical problems. Air transport was an expensive and relatively inefficient method of carrying large quantities of food. However it was the only way around the blockade. The relief supplies had to be transported for longer distances than would have been necessary if sea or land transport had been possible. Furthermore, only one airfield was available in Biafra, the airstrip at Uli which was originally a roadway. Uli lacked modern airport facilities, particularly for storage. The acute situation also demanded large-scale relief supplies and personnel. Oxfam had spent £200,000 on relief supplies for Biafra by 1 July 1968.[170] Relief was highly expensive and required large numbers of personnel. According to Oxfam Deputy Director, it was "the most difficult major relief operation ever mounted."[171]

But the main problem of the airlift was that voluntary organizations lacked the ability to operate it. The famine relief during the civil war required a body of expertise and knowledge beyond the regular mechanisms for distributions with which NGOs were familiar. It required the creation of a new apparatus, which combined military experience with humanitarian knowledge for famine relief in war zones.[172] This humanitarian-military apparatus was supported by ex-colonial experts and former military personnel as well as by former RAF pilots, former RAF radio experts and by military technology – that is, aircraft. In the wake of decolonization, humanitarian organizations took advantage of the surplus of experts and technologies available in the 1960s.

This re-appropriation of military technologies was not unique to Biafra. It was part of a longer process that began with the decrease in armies and supplies that occurred when the British left many of their imperial territories.[173] From its birth, military assistance to civil aid was imbricated within the story of empire and its loss. The re-appropriation of military skills to civil aid had already begun in the early 1930s, when the state used RAF planes to collect aerial photographs of East Africa and Palestine for the

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168 "Letter Gooch to Stamp," 23 September 1968, DIR/2/3/2/34, OA.

169 M. A. Pérouse de Montclos, "Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War."

170 Relief 2 Umuahia, 1 July 1968, FCO 38/306/22, TNA.

171 Oxfam News No. 36, October 1968, PRG/3/3/NIG/5, OA.

172 I relay here on what Timothy Mitchell has called a new "techno-politics…a process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended. Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2002), 42-43.

173 David Edgerton, *Warfare State Britain, 1920-1970*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Edgerton, "Liberal Militarism and the British State." *New Left Review* no. 185. I (February 1991): 138–169.

purpose of colonial development projects such as town and road planning.[174] Just before giving up most of its colonial territories the British government decided to undertake a large aerial survey to map most of its landscape. In the 1940s, and even more in the 1950s, these schemes were extended across the entire Empire, when the Colonial Research Committee commissioned a series of surveys over ten years and using RAF aircraft.[175] After the Second World War RAF expertise was utilized for civil purposes and development projects, in order to make a good use of the large amount of experts and personnel. Aerial surveys were a relatively new technique created during the two World Wars and were considered a much more complete and accurate knowledge of topography than previous methods thus making them "the first stage of planning for development."[176] The complexity of the task and its length and geographical scope required a stable and experience body and it was the RAF, rather than private companies, which seemed most suitable for the task. The RAF surveys were used not only for government-sponsored development projects but also were given to British businesses such as Shell by the British government, for commercial purposes and the development of the British oil industry in places like Nigeria.[177]

In the 1960s military assistance to civil power expanded to support civilian airlifts in the Congo and Zambia. Based on the knowledge acquired by the Allied powers in the Berlin airlift, the RAF aided civil programs of relief and gave aid to new postcolonial nations. In the Congo, RAF pilots were part of a large international relief led by the UN to provide emergency drops during the Congo crisis of 1960-1961.[178] On 29 December 1960, the Deputy Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) issued an appeal in Rome to the representatives of 12 countries including the UK for assistance in procuring supplies of food and seed urgently needed to combat the famine in the Kasai Province of the Congo.[179] The famine was a result of the large migration of

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[174] Gerald McGrath, "The Survey and Mapping of British East Africa: 1890-1946," *Cartographica*, Monograph 18, 1976: 82-102; Dov Gavish, *A Survey of Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1920-1948* (Psychology Press, 2005); Peder ANKER and Peder Anker, *Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

[175] Letter from H. Hemming, The Aircraft Operating Company Limited, to Under Secretary of the State, 22 January 1940, CO 323/1747/2, TNA.

[176] Colonial Survey and Geophysical Committee. Report of the Sub Committee Appointed to work out a scheme for a Central Organisation for Geodetic and Topographical Surveys in the Colonial Empire, Printed for the Colonial Office, September 1944, CO 852/1364/8, TNA; Letter from G L M Clauson at the Colonial Office to Noel E Hall, 20 October 1944, CO 852/1364/8/37, TNA; Notes on meeting held on Tuesday 16 October 1945 to discuss air survey questions, CO 852/1364/9, TNA.

[177] Letter from K L Stock of Petroleum Diffusion, Ministry of Fuel and Power, to Humphreys-Davis, Air Ministry, 25 January 1946, TNA, BT 217/1089/9A. TNA; Summery of discussion on civil air survey policy, 14 December 1945, TNA, BT 217/1089/6A, TNA; Letter from Humphreys-Davis to L. J. Dunnett, Ministry of Civil Aviation, 23 November 1945, TNA. For more about the RAF and the ordinance survey of the British Empire see Tehila Sasson, "Seeing Like an Empire: Aerial Surveys and the Development Project in Africa," (in preparation).

[178] "Now Britain will aid Congo," *The Daily Herald*, 30 December 1960; "Letter Gooch to Stamp," 23 September 1968, DIR/2/3/2/34, OA; FAO Press Release, UN, "Airlift of Seeds to Congo Famine Area Begins," 23 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/35, TNA.

[179] E. B. Boothby, Congo: Baluba Relief Mr. Gaitskell's Statement, January 17, 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/22, TNA; C. H. W. Hodges to C. T. E. Ewart-Biggs, "Famine Relief in the Congo," 19 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/32, TNA.

Baluba ethnic group following Belgian decolonization, as well as a result of a severe drought, which affected in particular the area of South Kasai.[180] The airlift was part of a larger transport of food and seeds from neighboring countries such as groundnuts from Nigeria and maize flour and seeds from Rhodesia, as well as from around the world.[181] The United States government, for example, airlifted at least 200,000 individual Army "C" rations during the early part of the food crisis, and the RAF delivered canned corn beef and milk powder. The RAF also helped deliver other supplies such as unused British military tents from its Kenyan colony.[182] The British supplies left in the countries, which were used in the last days of Empire as well as the infrastructure of former RAF bases, made it easier for the British to transport food and equipment to the famine zones. In the wake of the emergency, equipment and people were retooled from military purposes to humanitarian ones. In fact, the Ministry of Defence continued its military assistance to the Congo up until 1966, by sending medical personnel, transportation and even comate rations to feed civilian populations in the country.[183] The Congo became a testing ground for many activists and pilots, which would become active again in the Biafra airlift. The British side of the relief was funded mostly from voluntary contributions to Oxfam and the charity became operational for the first time in the crisis.[184] Some of the Congo veterans later helped instruct organizations such as Oxfam on how airdrops should be carry and the amount of drops possible per night.[185] The Congo mission became an important precursor of the Biafran relief.

But the deployment of military assistance to civilian powers did not end with famine relief to the Congo. In Zambia, the RAF acquired experience in the civilian airlift of oil when in 1965 it airlifted about 22,000 tons of oil into the new land-locked country. The airlift was a result of the UK Beira patrol and oil embargo of the newly formed Rhodesian UDI, which led to Zambia, whose main pipeline ran from Beira to Rhodesia. Zambia, which was rendered landlocked, lost its energy supply.[186] The Zambian government blamed Britain for involuntarily harming its economy and to compensate for

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[180] For more details on the cause of the famine and the FAO relief program in the region from 1959 to 1960 see "Progress Report No. 7 on United Nations Civilian Operation in the Congo, 5 January 1961, FO 371/155086/JB2252/43, TNA.

[181] From Leopoldville to Foreign Office, Address to Foreign Office telegram No. 139, 21 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB 2253/26(a), TNA; From Foreign Office to Rome, Address to Rome telegram No. 85 of January 12, 12 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/31, TNA; FAO Press Release, UN, "Seeds and Hoes for FAO Congo Relief," 27 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/35, TNA.

[182] Department of State, USA, Press Release, 13 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/30, TNA; J. G. Carnochan to R. A, C, Byatt, "Canned corned at RAF Abingdon has been inspected and is fit for consumption," 23 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/29, TNA; C. H. W. Hodges to C. T. E. Ewart-Biggs, "Congo Famine Relief Measures," 24 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/34, TNA.

[183] Visit to 5 Cdo, 5 March 1966, FO 1100/44/1195/66, TNA.

[184] Confidential. From Foreign Office to Leopoldville, 26 January 1961, FO 371/155086/JB2253/44, TNA; "Minutes." E. B. Boothby, 20 January 1961, FO 371/155085/JB2253/21, TNA; "At last – aid for Congo," *Daily Herald*, 2 January 1961.

[185] "Letter Gooch to Stamp," 23 September 1968, DIR/2/3/2/34, OA.

[186] From Lusaka to Commonwealth Relations Office, Address to CRO telegram No. 2498 of 19 December, 19 December 1965, DO 209/13/33, TNA.

that Britain began an airlift to the country.[187] Britain offered Zambia $38 million in aid to ease the effect on Zambia's economic sanctions against Rhodesia, transporting the aid through the RAF. The RAF Britannias airlift and the British civil airlift, which operated from Dar es Salaam from January to May of 1966,[188] together transported about 22,000 tons of oil into Zambia.[189] The airlift was also support by Canada and the USA, which contributed aircrafts such as Hercules and DC6s.[190]

When the British government considered operating its own airlift to Biafra, it was to the RAF technical experience in Zambia that the Ministry of Defence turned, considering the type of aircrafts and on the amount of goods, which could be efficiently transported. Based on that, in early July 1968 the British government considered commissioning an RAF aircraft for an ICRC airlift to Biafra.[191] The plan was supported by Oxfam, which was planning to transport 1,000 tons of dried milk from the nearby Spanish island of Fernando Po.[192] The Ministry of Defence looked to the Zambia airlift as an analogous operation, and used it as the basis on how to fund and administer such operation.[193] The Zambian airlift was used not only for the calculation of costs and crew but also as the basis to gauge the legal status and risk of such an airlift, which was beyond typical RAF control. Operating in a war zone meant higher risks and higher insurance costs for the RAF crew and aircraft, therefore requiring the ICRC to be fully accountable for it.[194] As with the Zambian airlift, the RAF was also in close contact and coordinated with the USAF, which had already begun supplying aircrafts for the ICRC airlift in Biafra.[195] The Commonwealth Minister, Lord Shepherd, wrote to General Gowon, and asked him to consider facilitating a Canadian Hercules aircraft to be commissioned to the ICRC and Oxfam to ferry supplies to the stricken areas.[196] The following week the Commonwealth Office also began considering the commission of an RAF Pembroke, a small aircraft that could carry up to 1000lbs and two crew members from the RAF.[197] The aircraft was supposed to enable the ICRC to transport not only goods but relief officials

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[187] Alain Rouvez, *Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa* (University Press of America, 1994), 267.

[188] Confidential. From Commonwealth Relations Office to Luska, Addressed to Lusaka telegram No. 3323 of 21 December, 22 December 1965, DO 209/13/55(b), TNA.

[189] Hart to the House of Commons, *Hansard*, 08 November 1966 vol 735 cc1134-6.

[190] Secret: From Dar Es Salaam to Commonwealth Relations Office, for Vernon from Dawson, 21 December 1965, DO 209/13/59, TNA; Confidential. From Washington to Foreign Office, Address to Foreign Office telegram No. 3396 of 20 December 1965, DO 209/13/50, TNA; DO 209/13/36b, TNA; Secret. From Commonwealth Relations Office to Ottwar, Address to Ottwar telegram No. 2972 of 20 December, 21 December 1965, DO 209/13/48a, TNA; From Lusaka to Commonwealth Relations Office, Address to CRO telegram No. 2498 of 19 December, 19 December 1965, DO 209/13/33, TNA; Confidential. From Luska to Commonwealth Relations Office, Address to Ottawa telegram No. 04218 of 18 December 1965, DO 209/13/31, TNA.

[191] proposal to have the Nigerian aircraft to drop supplies in Ibo territories by P. H. Moberly, 2 July 1968, FCO 38/306, TNA; John Michael, "Biafrans Want British Airlift," *Sunday Telegraph*, 30 June 1968. (Sunday Telegraph Commonwealth Affairs Correspondent).

[192] Michael Leapman, "Let RAF fly food to Biafra," *Sun*, 28 June 1968.

[193] V. E. Davis to Mr. Tebbit and Mr. Moberly, 9 July 1968, FCO 38/306, TNA

[194] Confidential letter from Ministry of Defence to Davis, 3 July 1968, FCO 38/306, TNA.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Confidential letter from Ministry of Defence to Davis, 3 July 1968, FCO 38/306, TNA.

and doctors, and to move around quickly in Nigeria.[198] In agreement with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 the aircraft was to be painted with ICRC livery, although it would retain its RAF markings.[199] The British idea at the time was less to support Biafra than to provide assistance to both sides in the conflict in order to reach a peace agreement as quickly as possible and re-unite Nigeria. The plan however was delayed because the flying strips in Biafran-held territory were unusable and the British government eventually had to cancel it.[200]

The Biafran airlift, however, continued even without direct governmental support. Indeed, the Nigerian civil war was the largest airlift organized by voluntary organizations and missionaries rather than by governments. One example of such an organization was Caritas, a Catholic organization led by the Irish priest Tony Byrne, which was part of the larger Joint Church Aid, which led the Biafran airlift. Under the watchful eyes of Irish Holy Ghost missionary, Byrne became the coordinator of the Caritas relief effort, which flew supplies from the Portuguese island of São Tomé off the west coast of Africa to the roadway-turned-airstrip at Uli in Biafra. For two years the airlift proved extremely successful. Its coordinators utilized the network of rural missionary stations to good effect in the distribution of relief, bringing food and medicines to millions of refugees.[201]

Byrne himself began his career as a missionary in the late days of the Empire and Nigeria was his very first post. Years later he recalled arriving at Port Harcourt for the first time on the *SS Tarkwa* from Liverpool, surrounded by colonial administrators "and many more who still thought of themselves as such."[202] He was particularly critical of the British attitude towards the Nigerians, their prejudice and arrogance and their discussions of the "natives." In one encounter, he recalled the wife of a District Officer in Nigeria warning him of how "one can't trust the natives.…[t]hey're extremely lazy people,"[203] a recollection which immediately reminded him of the ways in which the British also treated the Irish. Indeed, Byrne saw his Irish identity in very close connection with the Igbo one. Unlike the British, he saw his own interest in Igbo culture and tradition as "genuine," and his vocation as a missionary as deeply ethical. It will therefore come as no surprise that Byrne was supporting the Biafrans and was extremely critical of Britain's involvement. Byrne can serve as anther example of how different people who were connected to the British imperial mission thought differently about the former colonies. Although his colonial experience led him to be critical of Britain, it also formed his moral and emotional commitment towards Nigeria and especially the Christian parts of Biafra. Like many Irish supporters of Biafra, Byrne saw the war through the critical lens of late Empire. For him British involvement was purely for the sake of economic or political gain "at the expense of the lives of many innocent people."[204]

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198 "Loan of an RAF Aircraft for ICRC use in Nigeria," FCO 38/306/1, TNA.

199 Confidential letter from Ministry of Defence to Davis, 3 July 1968, FCO 38/306, TNA

200 Michael Leapman, "Let RAF fly food to Biafra," *Sun*, 28 June 1968; John Michael, "Biafrans Want British Airlift," *Sunday Telegraph*, 30 June 1968; See also articles "Food airlift move in Biafra" in the Sun and "Emergency Airlift" in the Guardian 27 June 1968.

201 Kevin O'Sullivan, *Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire*, 89-93

202 Tony Byrne, *Airlift to Biafra: Breaching the Blockade* (Dublin, Ireland: Columba Press, 1997), 21-23.

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid*,* 14

In his fight against what he saw as British colonialism, Byrne and the Caritas airlift, however, enforced military technologies and expertise through the Joint Church Aid's humanitarian interventions. Military techniques in fact shaped Byrne humanitarian knowledge. Despite the Vatican's policy against the use of military tools, Byrne insisted that the humanitarian airlift should use military equipment and expertise. One example was the disagreement over the use of 8,000 military parachutes for an airdrop, which despite Byrne's protestations "the Vatican regard[ed] … as quasi-military equipment." Equipped with a high sense of justice and commitment to help the Biafran cause, Byrne was infuriated by this decision and shrugged it off as a typical response by "highly trained Vatican officials who tended to allow diplomacy to take precedence over all other considerations."[205] Byrne did not find any contradiction in utilizing such expertise for the purpose of a humanitarian intervention.

This was true not only in the case of the parachutes. The entire airlift operation relied on many military-trained pilots who had gained their experience in Europe and North America's air forces. The story of the Biafran airlift was much more international than merely British, but the use of ex-RAF pilots in Caritas' case was particularly ironic. While not all pilots in the airlift came from military backgrounds, many of them were ex-RAF pilots with combat experience operating night flights which were frequently under fire. Indeed, it was the combat-experienced pilots who led the path and created the possibility of such a complicated airlift. In the difficult conditions of night flights and without proper radio signals, combat experience was necessary to move as quickly and quietly as possible. These ex-military pilots took the first flight with plenty of fuel and minimal cargo to maneuver quickly under gunfire. They distracted the Nigerian bombers who eventually ran out of "either fuel or bombs." By taking the lead, they created a path for other flights carrying heavy loads of supplies.[206] The airlift became professionalized in bringing humanitarian relief through the use of pilots, radio experts and navigators, who had formerly worked in the RAF and the American Air Guard.[207]

Although defining their mission as impartial, humanitarian organizations used techniques and knowledge which was highly militarized. In one extreme case, the humanitarian-pilot who led the Scandinavian Protestants relief mission, Count von Rosen, not only carried weapons in his aircraft but also left the humanitarian airlift in late 1969 in order to join the Biafrans and help them build their own air force. Von Rosen had become internationally famous during the 1936-1941 occupation of Abyssinia by Italy. After the war, Emperor Haile Selassie decorated him and commissioned him to organize the new Ethiopian air force. He also served as a pilot in the United Nations operation in the Congo.[208] Von Rosen, in fact, became a pioneer in beginning the night flights in August 1968, when church flights could not land at Uli. Von Rosen's arrival to Sao Tome on behalf of the Scandinavian Nordchurchaid, changed all that, when he agreed to take upon himself a night flight and thus began a new phase of non-authorized

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[205] Ibid, 15-16.

[206] Ibid 137, 141-142; David L. Koren, *Far Away in the Sky: A Memoir of the Biafran Airlift.* (David L Koren, 2012), 308-309.

[207] See for example Ray Roberts in Bruce Hilton, *Highly Irregular.* (Macmillan Company, 1969); Air Vice Marshal Bennet flying his DH Dove, FCO 38/307/112, TNA; Toby Gooch, Tape 1, 12 September 1968, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA.

[208] Tony Byrne, *Airlift to Biafra,* 122-123.

and dangerous nightly airlifts.[209] In that respect von Rosen came to represent the airlift as a whole as well as the image of the courageous humanitarian. This image was shattered and affected the entire reputation of the airlift when in May 1969 von Rosen decided to aid the Biafrans and helped them build their own airlift. The fact that he had originally flown relief supplies into Uli for the churches further blackened not only their name in Federal eyes but also the entire humanitarian mission.

The military-humanitarian apparatus relied not only on military experts but also on military equipment and aircraft. Many NGOs purchased their aircrafts directly from the British and American military. Oxfam, for example, bought trucks directly from the British army base in Bedford and transported them to Nigeria. These trucks were used to transport food in upcountry areas where servicing facilities were not easy and the road conditions are poor.[210] Another example was the two Avro Ansons bought by a small humanitarian charity called Mercy Mission, which was organized by a former RAF entrepreneur named Nick Taaffe. After leaving his post at the RAF in the mid-1960s, Taaffe tried his luck in the commercial industry as a copilot at British Eagle Airlines. When the company went bankrupt in 1968 Taaffe was reading the reports about Biafra and decided to retool his skills to start his own airlift.[211] He contacted the Save Biafra Committee, a British-Biafran organization in London, who agreed to fund the mission.[212] Taafe had seen an advertisement in a flying magazine for a much smaller twin-engine plane, the Avro Anson. The Company doing the advertising had eight Asons on hand, bought in June from the Royal Air Force after the RAF had stopped using them. Taafe had plenty of experience flying Ansons when he served in the RAF. Most of the RAF's bomber pilots (and most airline pilots in the Commonwealth in the 1960s) made the transition from single-engine to multi-engine fight by learning to fly an Anson. As the RAF switched to bigger aircrafts most of the Ansons were sold in the early 1950s to the Israeli, Canadian, Afghan and Southern Rhodesian air forces. The last eighteen Ansons were officially mustered out on 28 June 1968, in an official ceremony at Bovingdon AFB. Two of them were bought by Taafe and the Mercy Missions – literally the last Ansons to ever fly for the RAF – and used to bring relief to Biafra.[213] On 6 August 1968, Taaffe took off to Biafra from the Bovingdon Air Force Base in Hertfordshire, with the last couple war-surplus Avro-Ansons and with five young Englishmen.[214]

More common planes (and more expensive) were the C-97s, DC6s or 7s and the Hercules, which were bought by larger charities such as Caritas, the Red Cross, and Oxfam.[215] These planes were purchased either from the British government or from the American one, and were repainted to operate as part of the relief mission. Both were American inventions. The C-97s were developed in the Second World War to transport large vehicles, and were famously used in the Berlin Airlift. The Hercules was developed during the Korean War and could carry up to 20 tons. The Hercules was equipped to

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[209] Ibid.

[210] Leslie Kirkely, Oxfam to George Thomson, MP, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 13 September 1968, DIR 2/3/2/33, OA.

[211] Bruce Hilton, *Highly Irregular*, 4-6.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Bruce Hilton, *Highly Irregular*. 10-11; Oxfam PRG/3/3/NIG/1, OA.

[214] *Space World*, Wisconsin: Palmer Publications, May 1970, Vol. G-5-77.

[215] Toby Gooch, Report, 12 September 1968, DIR 2/3/2/34, OA.

drop supplies at low attitude, which was ideal if the airstrip was closed,[216] thus making it one of the most desirable planes during the Biafran airlift. Both were retooled from military technologies originated for combat and transport purposes during Second World War as well as cold war.

This military expertise not only enabled the transport of food but also shaped humanitarian knowledge. Through operations such as the Biafran airlift, humanitarian workers learned a new knowledge and strategies for bringing aid to Africa. As Father Tony Byrne later testified in his memoirs, the flights "taught us a lot about operating in a war zone." Through humanitarian interventions the 1970s activists started to think through military tactics. The flights taught aid workers how to avoid aircraft gunners and bombs, and how to avoid being detected on the radar. Many missionaries and aid workers in fact not only planned but also actively joined the flights, thus learning about how these combat techniques worked. Byrne, for example, tells of his experience learning about "spiral landing," and he quotes another missionary who gave a rather elaborate explanation of how aircrafts could duck drones and avoid gunfire.[217] Indeed, Byrne and his crew of missionaries operated like seasoned troopers and in some cases even gathered intelligence and spied on the Nigerian Air Force, thus informing not only their own airlift but also the Biafrans on Nigerian strategy.[218]

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, the Nigerian civil war indeed began a new epoch in humanitarian aid. However, this epoch was based on the retoolment and re-appropriation of older forms of knowledge and experience acquired during the last days of the Empire. This chapter has demonstrated that humanitarian experts involved in the conflict and working in voluntary organizations had imperial knowledge and experience. Expert knowledge shaped new approaches to humanitarian interventions. Former RAF pilots and military technologies were also retooled by humanitarian organizations to help solve the problem of transportation in the difficult conditions of the war. Persistent colonial infrastructure was re-appropriated for post-colonial relief. Decolonization helped reconfigure humanitarian aid in places like Nigeria.

The next round of African famines established formal collaborations between the military and humanitarian organizations. Biafra was the opening salvo for a new military-humanitarian apparatus. Through the practice and experience of military technologies, the next chapter will show, humanitarian aid changed its entire framework and approach towards natural disasters and not only man-made ones as in the example of the Nigerian civil war. In the Sahel famines and Ethiopia of the 1970s, the British military itself will become a humanitarian actor.

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[216] "Report on the First Three Months of Nordchuchaid," 2 December 1968, PREG/3/3/NIG/3, OA.

[217] Tony Byrne, *Airlift to Biafra*, 96-97

[218] Ibid, 156.

Chapter Two

Disaster Militarism

The notion that natural disasters require military response has become so familiar to us in the past decades that it almost seems inevitable. And there is some sense to it: as its proponents would argue, the military is well-equipped to transport food and supplies in difficult conditions. Its efficiency in sustaining itself in difficult and extreme conditions makes the armed forces an effective body for disaster relief. Yet paradoxes here are also clear when the armed forces of the state are deployed to humanitarian disaster-zones instead battlefields. "Disaster militarism," as some call it,[219] carries a political valence, making the military seem both benevolent and necessary.

This chapter traces the origins of this phenomenon to the 1970s, when foreign states began responding to natural catastrophe in postcolonial societies by calling in their troops. Scholars have paid no attention to the emergence of disaster militarism in the 1970s, but the idea of disaster militarism can tell us –at least partially–both why natural disasters became a major international preoccupation during this the period, as well as how militaries expanded their role to become part of the aid industry.

In the 1970s the language of disasters was ubiquitous. The new attention to natural disasters was as part of a larger crisis in the 1970s, involving industrialization and the projects of Third World modernization, as well as being part of a larger trend to return to "nature" in environmental theories and green activism. "Disaster movies" were one pop cultural example of a broader preoccupation with disasters in the period and reflected a deep change in the growth of a new humanitarian 'industry'.[220] New institutions, research bodies and voluntary organizations became concerned with the problems of disaster relief both in Britain as well as more internationally. This "humanitarian international," as Alex de Waal called it, was devoted to care for, rescue, and intervene in response to disasters.[221] In 1972 the UN created an international disaster agency called the Disaster Relief Office and was joined, in 1974, by national organization like the UK-based Disaster Relief Unit. In 1976, the Overseas Development Institute created the UK-base international journal *Disasters* to generate new scientific modes for disaster management, while the Overseas Development Administration funded a Disaster Research Unit the University of Bradford. The Disaster Emergency Committee, a consortium comprising the five major UK charities, became a world-wide relief body in the early 1970s. In short, the threat of disasters–and particularly natural ones– came to occupy a central place within international debates and motivated the creation of new institutions.

As such, disaster militarism was embedded within a broader international discourse in the period about natural disasters and the environment. As the promise of

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[219] Annie Isabel Fukushima, Ayano Ginoza, Michiko Hase, Gwyn Kirk, Deborah Lee, Taeva Shefler and Foreign Policy In Focus, "Disaster Militarism: Rethinking US Relief in the Asia-Pacific," *The Nation*, 14 March 2014.

[220] Stephen Keane, *Disaster Movies: The Cinema of Catastrophe* (Wallflower Press, 2006).

[221] Alex De Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, (Oxford: African Rights & the International African Institute in association with James Currey, 1997), 65.

decolonization faded, international agencies and humanitarian organizations became particularly preoccupied with the ways in which postcolonial countries can face the forces of nature. The involvement of foreign militaries therefore had specific political implications.

Although the story is largely global, the British story is rather unique because of the country's former imperial experience. The British armed forces did not shrink completely in the 1970s. As the historian David Edgerton demonstrated, defense expenditure was higher in the 1970s than in the late 1960s.[222] However, the British military lost the majority of its operational role and its overseas presence. While in Britain, as in other imperial centers, the military has long played a role in aid and rescue it had done so only in a domestic and imperial capacity. In the 1970s, when the British military was repurposed to respond to natural disasters in postcolonial countries, it acquired a new role s a humanitarian actor.

As this chapter shows, in the 1970s when the British military relinquished the majority of its operational and combat roles, it became one of the major international responders to large-scale catastrophes and providers of humanitarian aid. Its knowledge and availability, as well as its former bases in Asia and Africa, allowed it to become a major participant in disaster relief in these areas. It was a way to repurpose the armed forces and re-appropriate their knowledge in the service of humanitarian aid after formal decolonization has ended and during a period of détente.

Disaster militarism served multiple functions for Britain. It became a way to strengthen diplomatic relations as well as to maintain British influence in places where Britain had colonized. Moreover, through disaster militarism Britain gained not only administrative but also practical knowledge of the land. It became a method to train the military in remote territories after the loss of Empire. Finally, disaster militarism added a new moral and humanitarian aspect to the military, and gave it publicity and helped justify its existence. Here the British military participated in, as well as contributed to, a broader international trend. By harnessing its skills to transport supplies in difficult terrain, it acquired a new justification and a new role as a humanitarian actor. Through this repurpose, the military became part of the larger project of humanitarian governance.

Natural Disasters and the Right for Intervention

The emergence of "disaster militarism" necessitated a new understanding of what constituted a natural disaster and what gave the right to intervene. Disaster militarism perhaps combat cyclones and earthquakes, but it also posed a serious threat to postcolonial sovereignties. The deployment of the military to battle disasters was easier to justify if they were caused by natural factors rather than by political ones. It was therefore important to finds ways to define what constituted natural disasters and how they could be differentiated from ones which were the result of political and economic factors.

But this question of what constituted a natural disaster was not new to the 1970s. Instead, this question can be dated as far back as the late nineteenth century, when in the midst of famines in Ireland and India Britons sought to understand the origins and causes of famines. The question was less about science than it was about political economy:

[222] David Edgerton, *Warfare State Britain, 1920-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 259-260, 298.

Britons needed to know what constituted particular famines in order to justify the costs of their relief. It is perhaps therefore no surprise that Cornelius Walford, a Victorian actuary who frequently wrote about insurance, was the first to offer the distinction between "man made" causes, like wars, and "natural" ones, which originated in natural and unexpected events like droughts and bad harvest.[223] Walford's two categories replicated a Malthusian insight about the moral and not just political economy of disasters like famines. Based on this type of differentiation, the British state drafted its colonial Famine Code: a blueprint for the relief of disasters which sketched the relationship between those deserving and less deserving hungry.[224] Walford's distinction was kept throughout the twentieth century when the British state provided aid to its colonies as well as allies abroad. It served as a guideline to differentiate between a worthy cause for relief and an undeserving one. But it also expanded to include, towards the late 1960s, disasters more generally.

This was partially because during the twentieth century the relative importance of political factors as the cause of famines, the "artificial causes or those within human control" in the words of Walford, became more prominent. As the historian Cormac Ó Gráda pointed out, most of the twentieth century's major famines (e.g. those in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, in Bengal in the early 1940s, in China in the late 1950s, Ethiopia in the 1980s) "would have been less murderous, if not entirely avoidable, under more auspicious political circumstances."[225] Moreover, as the previous chapter has shown, the Biafra crisis of 1968 was one example of that but it certainly made it even more apparent: there was a need for a more expansive category to account for the different causes of disasters. Biafra opened a new type of trajectory for humanitarian interventions through the elaborate non-governmental airlift. After decolonization, and beginning with Biafra, these practices for famine relief were reconfigured for postcolonial interventions.

More generally, the expansion to the category of disasters was because in the postcolonial order the distinction between "man made" and "natural" disasters carried with it a justification for foreign interventions. As the military was repurposed for civil assistance and specifically began to be conceived of as a provider of relief and foreign aid, the question of what constituted a natural disaster received a new meaning: One which was more about humanitarian governance rather than imperial one. It became a working definition for the right for humanitarian interventions, the deployment of the army in the name of humanity rather than in the name of empires. Indeed, what was part of a structural change to rejustify and repurpose the institution of the military acquired a new meaning. The military became part of the larger project of humanitarian governance, it became a way to battle, govern and fight nature itself.

Whereas in the case of civil wars and other man-made catastrophe, the military could not so easily intervene and infringe on sovereignty, natural disasters allowed the intervention of the military in foreign states. These "acts of God" in fact licensed the

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[223] Cornelius Walford, *The Famines of the World: Past and Present* (Edward Stanford, 55, Charing Cross, S.W., 1879).

[224] Hari Shanker Srivastava, *The History of Indian Famines and the Development of Indian Famine Policy, 1858-1918* (Agra: Sri Ram Mehra, 1968); Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* (New York: Verso, 2001).

[225] Cormac Ó Gráda, Dublin University College, and Centre for Economic Research, *Introduction to Special Issue of Food and Foodways* (Dublin: University College Dublin, Dept. of Economics, 2004).

involvement of foreign armed forces, which came to rescue local populations from divine violence. But that also meant that these interventions had to be justified. Furthermore, these operations were costly and sometimes dangerous. They required not only equipment but also insurance. Before sending troops to foreign countries, therefore, the Ministry of Defence had to determine whether the mission was worth the risk and how to develop efficient mechanisms for their relief.

And, indeed, in the late 1960s a new set of definitions and qualifications emerged for what could be qualified as a truly "natural disaster" before sending in British troops. Although the UK government did not commit to intervene in all cases, "[t]he decision whether to give *immediate first aid*, and how much to give will be governed primarily by humanitarian considerations. Political and other considerations will play a greater part in the decision to give *longer-term* aid and *aid for permanent reconstruction*. The importance of ensuring appropriate publicity at all stages must be borne in mind."[226] These rules were the basis of a more official set of instructions created by the UK government during the 1970s as the British military became an agent of relief and humanitarian aid.. On 25 July 1973, in the midst of the Sahel famine, for example, the Ministry of Defence issued standing instructions that were designed to respond to these questions. First, the instructions defined and categorized what constituted a disaster and a natural one in particular, and second, they aimed to set rules and guidelines on how the Military Service should be used to aid these disasters. Only after a disaster was defined as natural could the Services intervene and act as a humanitarian agent without infringing on local sovereignty.

According to the Ministry of Defence's definition, "not all disasters can be described as 'natural' and not all 'natural' disasters qualify for help." "Man-made" disasters such as rail or air crashes, according to the instructions, for example, were excluded from the sphere of government financial help because local medical services, with the help of the Red Cross if required, could cope with the immediate task of rescue. What qualified as a natural disaster instead was a "sudden and catastrophic event caused by uncontrollable forces of nature such as flood, earthquake or hurricane." The notion of "suddenness" was important: it offered a temporal aspect to the idea of the catastrophe and made it as an unexpected event, one for which the recipient state could not have prepared. In other words, natural disasters became worthy causes for relief because local authorities could have not predicted them. Rather than representing a failure of governance, the natural disaster was seen as an act of God, one that the sovereign was unable to prepare for. In this context, it is perhaps worth recalling Walter Benjamin's distinction between what he calls mythic violence (*mytische Gewalt*), that is the violence (or power), which is lawmaking and law-preserving, and divine violence (*göttliche Gewalt*), which is "law-destroying."[227] According to Benjamin,

> If mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood.[228]

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[226] Emphasis is in the original text. Restricted, Volume 21, Miscellaneous instructions for posts abroad, Part 1 - Natural Disasters, April 1968, FCO 59/689, TNA.

[227] Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz, First Edition edition (New York: Schocken, 1986), 277-300.

[228] Ibid.

While these man-made disaster can be seen somewhat as mythic violence – violence that is connected to the state authority and power, violence that is directed towards legal ends – the natural disaster offers no such goal. Instead, like divine violence, the natural disaster destroys borders, including those of the state. Natural disasters became "uncontrollable forces" and therefore licensed the intervention of foreign armies in the postcolonial state.

This division was of course artificial. As we shall see, in the case of the East Pakistan cyclone, the droughts in the Sahel, and the famine in Ethiopia, natural disasters were always connected to political and social circumstances that helped exacerbate them. And the Ministry of Defence itself even recognized it, admitting that the divide between "natural" and "man made" was not always accurate. "[N]evertheless," the Ministry continued, "it exists and it must be recognized that while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has authority, within limits, to cover the cost of relief in disasters regarded as 'natural'…this authority does not extend to 'man-made' disasters."[229] The Ministry of Defence reserved the right to abstain from interventions, especially when it came to frequent yet ambiguous cases of famine and disease (but possibly not a sudden epidemic), which "would be excluded."[230]

In what follows, I trace the emergence of this phenomenon in four critical moments in the first half of the 1970s. First, I examine the British response to the 1970 East Pakistan cyclone and show that disaster relief in Pakistan emerged as "soft diplomacy" in response to growing political tensions in the region. Second, I move to the British response to the Sahel famine of 1973-5 and examine how the British military collaborated with humanitarian organizations like Christian Aid through a ground-based operation.[231] Disaster militarism in the Sahel offered the military among other things, in the words one British officer, "the opportunity to improve drivers' skills in unusual difficult terrain."[232] Britain gained not only administrative but also practical knowledge of the land through aid schemes in Africa. Third, British aid replicated a similar approach to colonial famine relief by conditioning its aid in programs on "food for work," that is relief in return to labor. Last, both East Pakistan and the Sahel became critical moments within the development of international bodies for disaster relief like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indeed, as I show, the British military came to participate in an international trend in the period in which militarism and even NATO itself were retooled to respond to "natural disasters." NATO, for some activists, could have another purpose other than that of deterrence. In a period of détente, British activists sponsored a motion to convert NATO's role to become a major responder to natural disasters. Disaster militarism was a way to make NATO an ethical rather than a combat body.

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[229] Defence Council Instructions General, Standing Instructions Parts I-V, Ministry of Defence, 25 July 1973, DEFE 24/1251, TNA.

[230] Defence Council Instructions General, Standing Instructions Parts I-V, Ministry of Defence, 25 July 1973, DEFE 24/1251, TNA.

[231] Letter from Christian Aid to Major J L Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1, TNA.

[232] AT Marsden, Major, GS02 DS6b, to AT 1, MO2, 30 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E34, TNA.

The 'Soft Diplomacy' Of Disaster Relief

During the night of 12-13 November 1970, a devastating cyclone hit the Bay of Bengal. With winds of 140 mph and a storm surge of twenty feet, the cyclone became the worst tropical cyclone disaster in the twentieth century. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) received the main thrust of the storm. The cyclone moved northeast into the mouth of the River Maghas and swamped the coastal areas of Patuakhali in the Barisal district and Bhola, Hatia and many other islands in the Noakhali district (See figure 1). Destruction was total. One quarter of East Pakistan's landmass was under water for a time after the cyclone hit. Many of the area's inhabitants were not only peasant farmers and fishermen but also large numbers of undocumented casual labourers hired for the harvest. The total death toll reached between 300,000 and 500,000 people. The tidal wave drowned thousands of people and destroyed houses, crops and ruined household possessions. Bamboo dwellings were swept away and their foundations replaced with mud. It was not until at least 48 hours later that the extent of this tragedy began to become apparent.[233]



Figure 1. Map of the Bay of Bengal

The storm-warning system, which operated also on the occasion of the earlier cyclone on October 23rd, was largely ignored on November 12th. So isolated were the areas most affected that it was not until late on November 13th that the full extent of the catastrophe was realized. On 14 November local officials were authorized to release food as necessary from government warehouses in the affected districts. Specific authority was given for issues of cash relief grants (about £30,000), wheat (about £6,000), rice (about

[233] Dom Moraes, *The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan* (Vikas Publications, 1971); Angus Macleod Gunn, *Encyclopedia of Disasters: Environmental Catastrophes and Human Tragedies* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 501-2; Immediate Dacca to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Flash Dacca Unnumbered Telegram to Karachi of 28 November 1970, FCO 37/719/269, The National Archives, Kew (TNA).

260 tons), construction materials (about £44,000), cattle (about £9,000), and other contingencies (£21,000). As the full story unraveled, Pakistani authorities made fresh grants day by day up through November 27th, totaling about £8 million.[234]

After the storm had passed, the real disaster began. The cyclone wiped out all infrastructure and communications. Survivors needed urgent care and lacked almost all necessities of life. They had no water, food, or shelter. Unburied corpses and carcasses pilled up and posed a serious health threat.[235] The problem was not only the lack of supplies but also the difficulty in reaching the disaster-stricken areas. Aircraft began to arrive en masse from overseas carrying supplies. The result was a logjam of uncoordinated relief supplies at Dacca airport.[236] The most severely affected area was estimated to be 4,000 square miles and included the mainland and islands where the sea and rivers intermingled almost inextricably. The Pakistani government was late to address these difficulties and faced sharp criticism from both local and international press and public opinion. The Pakistani Army sent only one helicopter days after foreign relief was well under way. Indeed, the international response from Britain, the United States and even the Soviet Union was much more visible than that of the Pakistani government. As one British official remarked, "this calamity touched off a response of exceptional sympathy and generosity in many parts of the world."[237] The government's meager response added to an already fragile political situation, as many Bengalis questioned the national government's commitment to their welfare. Tensions were surfacing in the region after the storm had passed and created a sense of a political crisis, as elections were scheduled for December 7th.[238]

The cyclone threatened the fragile foundations of democracy. Inheriting the problems left by British rule, Pakistan was divided between a Punjabi population and a Bengali minority, some Hindu. The geographical and cultural divides between East and West led West Pakistanis to suspect that Bengalis were pro-India, while the Bengali population saw itself as subjected to Punjabi colonialism. The election planned for early December had promised democracy for the very first time in a country governed by the military and lacking strong civil institutions. The natural catastrophe therefore fueled an already ongoing political crisis in the region.

Historians studying the international relief to East Pakistan have focused mainly on the crucial months after the election and the subsequent war of liberation. In the elections, the Bengali nationalist Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur garnered 167 of 169 seats but also led to a war. The Awami League had a quasi-secessionist agenda, in contrast to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of the West, which had a statist agenda for economic development and social reform. These clashing agendas eventually led to the succession of the East and the demands for the independence of "Bangla Desh"

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[234] Immediate Dacca to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Flash Dacca Unnumbered Telegram to Karachi of 28 November 1970, FCO 37/719/269, TNA.

[235] High Commissioner. East Pakistan Relief – Rawalpindi. Sitrep No. 3, Tuesday 24 November 1970, FCO 37/720/298, TNA.

[236] Cycril Pickard to Sir Alex Douglas-Home, Confidential. The Cyclone of November 12/13, 1970, Annex A, 21 December 1970, FCO 37/721/447, TNA.

[237] Frank Sargeant, Natural disaster in East Pakistan: The 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences, 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721, TNA.

[238] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

("Bengali land"). In response on 25 March 1971, the Pakistani military unleashed a bloodbath some labeled a genocide.[239] While these war crimes hold an important place within the history of humanitarianism, very little attention has been paid by historians to the cyclone relief, which lasted from November 19th until December 9th. As the British High Commission in Rawalpindi himself put it, the cyclone has proved to be a practical way to explain "all East Pakistan's complaints against the West."[240]

The cyclone and the relief effort in its aftermath played an important role in precipitating the political conflict which would lead to the creation of Bangladesh as well as in laying the foundations for an international mechanism of disaster relief. The relief efforts created a precedent for the official use of the military in cases of natural disasters. British relief also laid the foundation for a "soft" diplomacy through the use of disaster relief, seen as a new method in foreign policy for stabilizing a region. British official relief was particularly important for carrying out such tasks. Its commitment to Pakistan as a Commonwealth member shaped its incentive to pour in supplies. The British government committed to immediate £530,000 aid for the provision of relief supplies and an additional long-term assistance in the form of food under the Food Aid Convention to the value of £500,000.[241] This was added to a non-governmental contribution of British charities, which was estimated to amount to £800,000.[242]

The area requiring relief comprised the coastal areas of Patuakhali and Noakhali districts, Chittagong district to a lesser extent, and all the offshore islands, notably Bhola, Hatya, Manpura and Sandwip. The Pakistani army garrison in Dacca (staffed almost exclusively with Western Pakistani personnel) was slow to move and was not deployed on relief work until the news of the arrival of British and American troops. The provision of relief from abroad took two forms. First, the consignment of supplies delivered by air to Dacca and by sea or air to Chittagong (more commonly) by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and other foreign donors,[243] and second, the organization of the armed forces assisted relief operation, notably the British in Patuakhali district and islands and the helicopter

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[239] Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Harvard University Press, 2013); Dirk Moses, "The United Nations, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights. War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971–1974," in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*. (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: History, Strategy, and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, (forthcoming).

[240] R. E. Escritt, British High Commission, Rawalpindi, to M. I. P. Webb, South Adian Department, Confidential, Political Aspect of the Cyclone Disaster, 24 November 1970, FCO 37/719/258, TNA.

[241] Statement by the Minister of Overseas Development, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA.

[242] Brief for Cabinet on 26 November 1970. British Relief Assistance. FCO 37/719/2217, TNA.

[243] High Commissioner. East Pakistan Relief – Rawalpindi Sitrep No 5, Thursday 26 November 1970, FCO 37/720/298, TNA; High Commissioner. East Pakistan Relief – Rawalpindi. Sitrep No. 3, Tuesday 24 November 1970, FCO 37/720/298, TNA; High Commissioner. East Pakistan Relief – Rawalpindi. Sitrep No. 2, Monday 23 November 1970, FCO 37/720/298, TNA.

based operations of the Americans, West Germans and French in Noakhali, Chittagomg and offshore islands.[244]

The British were not the only ones to send armed forces. American military assistance was dispatched from Vietnam, despite the fact that the Americans were in the middle of fighting a war in that country.[245] The political instability that would potentially come in its aftermath of the disaster motivated the Americans to support disaster relief in the region.[246] Military assistance had also been provided by large numbers of countries including Germany, China and the Soviet Union, but none of these schemes matched the British one in their scope and size.[247] Compared to any other country involved in the relief, Britain had large amount of forces available from the nearby shores of Singapore, where the British Far East command was stationed.

Located in the northern tip of the country, the British naval base in Singapore was considered the "Gibraltar of the East."[248] The Singapore Naval Base was built so that the Royal Navy could dock its largest warship in the Far East. While Singapore was suggested as the appropriate site already in 1919, construction work was still proceeding in 1940-1, on the eve of the Pacific War, at a cost of £60 million. The dock covered 21 square miles and had what was then the largest dry dock in the world, the third-largest floating dock, and enough fuel tanks to support the entire British Navy for six months.[249] British troops remained in Singapore even after independence until in July 1967 the Labour Government decided to withdraw its forces by 1971 to reduce the country's defense spending.[250] When the cyclone had hit the nearby shores of East Pakistan, British armed forces were still stationed in the Singapore naval base, yet free from operational commitments.

Indeed, the British armed forces' response to the East Pakistan cyclone had "a negligible effect on [the troops'] exercises." "Some soldiers," one report admitted, "have been withdrawn from courses, or will miss schedule upgrading exams," but that did not seem to impose any serious problem for the Far East Command. Sending troops to Pakistan will have "no major effect on training" and "[c]ontingency plans…could be handled for the next 56 days."[251] Planned to last no more than 30 days, the operation did not even impose difficulties on training plans. The few infantry units that did have to stay

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[244] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

[245] "Pakistan Disaster Relief," Nov-Dec 1970, A1 901, Boxes 294-317, RG 472/270/903/17/ 4-6, NARA.

[246] Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*; Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (New York: Knopf, 2013).

[247] Brief for Cabinet on 26 November 1970. Item East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster. British Relief Assistance. FCO 37/719/2217, TNA; Restricted. Situation Report on the East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster. 30 November 1970, FCO 37/719/277, TNA.

[248] Michael Arnold, *Sacrifice of Singapore: Churchill's Biggest Blunder* (Marshall Cavendish International Asia Pte Ltd, 2011), 68.

[249] William David McIntyre, *The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942* (Macmillan, 1979).

[250] Malcolm H. Murfett, *Between Two Oceans: A Military History Of Singapore From First Settlement To Final British Withdrawal* (Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 392-407; Jean Abshire, *The History of Singapore* (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 293-399.

[251] Secret. HQ Fare East Command, "Effect of Operation Burlap on Far East Command," 26 November 1970, WO 305/3331/01, TNA.

in Singapore for more operational purposes were designated merely as reinforcement units.[252]

The emergency task undertaken in East Pakistan, through what came to be known as "Operation Burlap," began only a few days after the cyclone had passed. Already on November 19th, the British sent HMS Hydra, a survey ship diverted to East Pakistan to survey an area of about 1,600 square miles and mark new navigational channels in the shallow, difficult and ever-changing Ganges delta.[253] The HMS Hydra was designated to survey the disaster area and improve passage times for the landing craft between anchorage and delta – a distance of 25 miles.[254] On November 23rd, it was joined by a combined services operation mounted by the British armed forces at Singapore. The main sea based effort by the British armed services, deployed HMS Intrepid, a 11,000-ton assault ship with four landing craft of 100 tons capacity, four smaller craft, 10 helicopters and 100 small boats, HMS Triumph, a 5,000-ton fleet maintenance ship, and a logistic ship, HMS Sir Galahad, completed the naval task force. These cost the British government an additional £50,000 per week.[255] The carriers helped establish an airlift in cooperation with the RAF of the British stores and supplies.[256]

Apart from lifting and distributing supplies in co-operation with Pakistan army units in Patuakhali district, the British armed force set out on a variety of tasks. Helicopters helped transport Pakistani relief workers and burial parties; Royal Engineers and Royal Marines repaired a bridge, two hospitals, village pumps, buildings and facilities rebuilt entirely a school hostel and sank three deep wells; British doctors were flown in to give over 1,000 vaccinations and treat thousands of people for minor injuries; and 2,850 tons of relief stores were transported by water, much of it from Chittagong across the Bay of Bengal to Patuakhali.[257] Furthermore, voluntary relief organizations operating in the area – mainly Oxfam and Save the Children Fund – utilized service transport facilities and RAF flights from Singapore.[258] By the end of November the operation had gathered considerable momentum and there was no place in the 1,600 square mile area covered by the British effort which had not received aid, or where it was not en route.

British success did not go unnoticed. British aid contributed to Anglo-Pakistani relations through the "soft diplomacy" of disaster relief. After the emergency had passed, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan wrote to the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, "[t]he ties which bind our two countries have been given a new and fresh

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252 Ibid.

253 I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir Stanly Tomlinson, East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA; J. M. C. Garrod, Operation Burlap – Situation As At 200800 GH, 20 November 1970, WO 305/3331/P1, TNA.

254 A. W. Stephens to Nicholas Barrington, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/297, TNA.

255 Confidential. L. G. Faulkner to Mr. Sutherland. Operation Burlap: Meeting in MOD, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/241, TNA; A. W. Stephens to Nicholas Barrington, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/297, TNA.

256 East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on the East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 24 November 1970, FCO 37/719/182, TNA; High Commissioner. East Pakistan Relief – Rawalpindi Sitrep No 5, Thursday 26 November 1970, FCO 37/720/298, TNA.

257 Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA; A. W. Stephens to Nicholas Barrington, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/297, TNA.

258 Immediate Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram Number 190, Confidential 2717352, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/260, TNA.

dimension by the dedication and sympathy with which various organisations in the United Kingdom have responded and cooperated with us in the task of relief and succor in the afflicted areas."[259] The Pakistani authorities as well as the military expressed their appreciation for British aid.[260] Yahya, who only a week after the cyclone declared it to be "a major calamity area,"[261] added that he has "noted with particular satisfaction the extremely useful work done by the relief unit from Singapore."[262] Indeed, Yahya and the Pakistani government congratulated the British armed forces and their operation.[263]

On November 25th the British Minister for Overseas Development Richard Wood visited East Pakistan. Wood had already planned to begin a tour in the country on November 19th to discuss British aid more broadly, but diverted his plans to visit East Pakistan when the cyclone hit. This divergence of plans signaled to the Pakistanis the British commitment to oversee Pakistan's welfare. Wood's visit also helped strengthen Anglo-Pakistani relations by endorsing the Central Government's own relief. Responding to criticism from the British and the international press, Wood represented a more general line by the British government, which sought to "minimize criticism of the Pakistan relief effort."[264] British diplomatic efforts had to work despite and against the international – and particularly British – press, which strongly criticized Yahya for responding to the disaster too little, too late.

Together with the Yahya and the Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, Wood paid a visit the British base at Patuakhali.[265] Wood's visit was celebrated by the Pakistani authorities, who thought it represented a further commitment for British bilateral aid. Wood received unprecedented official attention, according to the British High Commissioner in Pakistan.[266] Alongside Britain's military effort to relieve cyclone victims, Wood's visit not only represented British obligation to provide aid east of Suez, but a particular commitment to Pakistan. Disaster relief played a particular role in this

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[259] General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan to the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, 19 December 1970, FCO 37/721/456, TNA.

[260] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454 , TNA.

[261] Salahuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Past and Present* (APH Publishing, 2004).

[262] General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan to the British Prime Minister Edward Heath, 19 December 1970, FCO 37/721/456, TNA.

[263] See also I. J. M. Sutherland, South Asia Department to Stanley Tomlinson, "Minister of Overseas Development to Pakistan, 23 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

[264] Confidential. L. G. Faulkner to Mr. Sutherland. Operation Burlap: Meeting in MOD, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/241, TNA; I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir Stanly Tomlinson, East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, report on Wood's visit, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA; East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 2 December 1970, FCO 37/720/312, TNA; Richard Wood, Tour to East Pakistan, in I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir Stanly Tomlinson, East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA.

[265] Restricted. East Pakistan Relief Unit, Situation Report on the East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 26 November 1970, FCO 37/719/2218, TNA.

[266] Confidential, C. S. Pickard to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, "Visit of the Rt. Hon. Richard Wood, M. P.," 8 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA; I J M Sutherland, South Asia Department to Stanley Tomlinson, "Minister of Overseas Development to Pakistan," 23 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

context since it offered a prime example of British commitment to stabilizing the region during a time of political turmoil.[267]

Disaster relief was seen to be an opportunity to strengthen Anglo-Pakistani relations in a time of political instability and turmoil in the region. As one confidential report about Pakistan's problems reminded Wood, "We have to decide where British interests lie. Does it matter to us if East Pakistan becomes the plague spot of Asia?"[268] The British were in no way naive about the political as well as economic tensions in the country. British officials believed that West Pakistan could probably survive as a cohesive unit, both politically as well as economically, while East Pakistan would break off without external aid. "World peace is too fragile for us to contemplate the development of yet another centre of revolutionary chaos in Asia and we should therefore do what we can to avert it," one report admitted.[269] As Pakistan was on the verge of its first democratic election, disaster relief was seen to be a quick response to keep the region stable and remedy internal tensions.

Indeed, British officials saw disaster relief as a mechanism to strengthen diplomatic relations between the two countries. Disaster relief was seen not only as a "useful publicity"[270] but also as an opportunity to develop new skills in a real emergency. As the Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca, Frank Sargeant wrote, in so far as the British looked for a return in such circumstances "we can point particularly….to the excellent training and tonic for morale enjoyed by our own Servicemen who welcomed the challenge and the opportunity of a *real* operational job, as opposed to an 'exercise.'"[271] In a period when the British military did not have much operational purpose in the region, disaster militarism was seen as a way to justify the existence of the armed forces as well as to provide them a real diplomatic role.

Although British officials bluntly admitted that they had "no doubt that such criticism are justified" behind closed doors, their public statements denied any delay in relief on the part of the Pakistani Central Government. The British knew that the East Pakistani grievances were true, and yet chose to ignore them in order to maintain good relationship with Yahya's government and to avoid inciting regional tensions.[272] By providing "publishable information about Pakistan authorities' own relief efforts,"[273] British officials attempted to reduce any tensions between Britain and Pakistan. At the same time, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as Ministry of Defence both emphasized to the international press as well as to Pakistani authorities the crucial role of British military efforts in providing immediate emergency relief.

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[267] Statement by Minister for Overseas Development , in I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir Stanly Tomlinson, East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA; Telegram Number 228, Restricted 270550Z, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/242, TNA.

[268] Confidential, "Pakistan's Problems," Note for Minister. I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir Stanly Tomlinson, East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/295, TNA.

[269] Ibid.

[270] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

[271] Ibid, emphasize is mine.

[272] J. J. G. Cox, Major, Assistant Military Advisor, Confidential. Report by Ama Rawalpindi on the East Pakistan Cyclone, 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/446A. TNA

[273] Confidential. Immediate Foreign and Commonwealth Office Telegram Number 191. 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/261, TNA.

Not everyone saw the presence of substantial numbers of British servicemen on Pakistani soil as positive. Using the military for disaster relief required a fine balance between forging diplomatic relations through aid while at the same time respecting Pakistan's sovereignty. While the Pakistani authorities were grateful for the relief they worried about the potential for their sovereignty to be undermined. Fully aware of this, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stressed that despite its central role in the international relief efforts, "the UK has not been usurping the role of the Pakistanis who are in charge of the operations as a whole."[274] The advance party, which carried small arms on arrival, had to disarm at the request of the East Pakistan Government. Close liaison with the appropriate Pakistan authorities at all times and the decision to operate virtually entirely in the affected area rather than in the politically charged atmosphere of Dacca enabled Operation Burlap to be concluded with the Pakistani government's satisfaction.[275] According to the Defence Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "the British military element in the relief operation should not outstay its welcome and should not engage in tasks which are not strictly first aid relief."[276]

Left-wing opposition blamed Yayha for letting foreign troops intervene in the country's internal politics. Representatives of three of the left-wing parties in Pakistan made a call for withdrawal of the foreign troops.[277] The British military's presence in particular was seen as a proof of Yayha's willingness to comply with or even to become an extension of an ex-colonial power just before such crucial elections. The opposition attacked Yahya for allowing the "landing of foreign troops in Pakistan in the name of relief." [278] While the Pakistani Government tried to repress these voices, the British Foreign Office still noted that they should be taken into account "in deciding the timing of the statement about our decision to withdraw."[279] When on December 4th a national day of protest had been declared by Bashani, the leader the National Awami League, the British realized that they needed to make a clear public statement about their withdrawal.[280]

Fully aware of this critique from the Pakistani left, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as the Ministry of Defence agreed that the Operation should be over in three weeks, just in time for the forces to pull out before the scheduled elections.[281] Despite the cyclone, the Constituent Assembly elections were to proceed as

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[274] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram number 211, 30 November 1970, FCO 37/720/294, TNA.

[275] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

[276] Confidential. I. J. M. Sutherland to Mr. Tesh (Defence Department), "Operation Burlap," 29 November 1970, FCO 37/719/276, TNA.

[277] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA.

[278] East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on the East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 1 December 1970, FCO 37/720, TNA.

[279] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA.

[280] East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on the East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 1 December 1970, FCO 37/720, TNA.

[281] Confidential. L. G. Faulkner to Mr. Sutherland. Operation Burlap: Meeting in MOD, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/241, TNA; Secretary of State, Operation Burlap, N/A, FCO 37/720/302, TNA.

planned on December 7th, except in the nine constituencies affected by the disaster.[282] As the emergency relief phase drew to a close the British Government considered how long British troops should be involved and at what stage the long-term rehabilitation could be handed over to private charities to work under the direction of Pakistani authorities.[283] By late November it became clear that the timing of the Operation was crucial to maintaining stability in the region without incurring criticism.[284]

"With the Elections due on 7 December," admitted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "there is likely to be increasing criticism in the absence of an early statement."[285] The Ministry of Defence concurred that there was a need for an early withdrawal, "because of the additional political dangers in the longer stay."[286] "It is important that the British military element in the relief operation should not outstay its welcome and should not engage in tasks which are not strictly first aid relief,"[287] another report argued. Although "the decision to withdraw the British military element form the relief operation should not appear to have been forced upon us,"[288] the Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued, "these considerations point to an early and clear-cut withdrawal.[289]

On December 10th Britain began withdrawing troops. The emergency task undertaken by Operation Burlap which began effectively with the arrival of Intrepid at its station 30 miles off the Patuakhali coast during the night of November 23rd had virtually ended by December 10th. Both the British High Commissioner in Pakistan and the Far East Command had by then already agreed with the Pakistan authorities that the British Forces would withdraw after the completion of relief efforts by December 12th.[290] In the event relief could be conveyed to all in need in the 1,600 square mile disaster area sooner, the withdrawal would take place December 11th.[291] This was a clear-cut withdrawal "leaving no British troops and the long-term rehabilitation," other than private British charities under the direction of the Pakistanis.[292] The work of relief and rehabilitation

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[282] Immediate Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram Number 190, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/260, TNA.

[283] East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 2 December 1970, FCO 37/720/312, TNA.

[284] Immediate Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram Number 190, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/260. TNA.

[285] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA.

[286] Confidential. L. G. Faulkner to Mr. Sutherland. Operation Burlap: Meeting in MOD, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/241, TNA.

[287] Confidential. I. J. M. Sutherland to Mr. Tesh (Defence Department), "Operation Burlap," 29 November 1970, FCO 37/719/276, TNA; See also Telegram. Priority Dacca to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 November 1970, FCO 37/719/264. TNA.

[288] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA.

[289] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA.

[290] I. J. M. Sutherland to Sir S. Tomlinson, East Pakistan: Operation Burlap, 2 December 1970, FCO 37/720/338A, TNA.

[291] Restricted. Frank Sargeant to Cyril Pickard, "Natural Disaster in East Pakistan, the 1970 Cyclone and its Consequences," 15 December 1970, FCO 37/721/454, TNA.

[292] East Pakistan Relief Unit. Situation Report on East Pakistan Cyclone Disaster, 2 December 1970, FCO 37/720/312, TNA.

from the funds and contributed to by official and voluntary sources was carried out after December 12th without the presence of the British forces. After the British troops had been withdrawn, Pakistan authorities established alternative means of communication and transport.[293]

In the aftermath of the elections, priorities rapidly changed in the region. The Bengali war of liberation created a geopolitical divide between Britain and the United States on the one side supporting Yahya's government, and India endorsing the new Bangladeshi state. Between 1971 and 1973 British troops would return to Pakistani soil to provide and participate in one of the largest populations transfers in the twentieth century. By then the RAF would transport not food but refugees—over 300,000 of them.[294] While the cyclone relief was a short episode within the political turmoil preceding 1971, the military involvement of British troops in the disaster relief during the three weeks in November 1970 created a crucial precedent of the soft diplomacy through disaster relief. Importantly, it was made possible because of the shrinking of the British military and the Far East Command after decolonization.

Adventurous Training In The Sahel

The British Armed Forces were not only used for diplomatic purposes. Disaster militarism was also the means through which the British army could train in unconventional terrains after Empire. This was most evident, when during the Sahel famines of 1973-1975, when the British military cooperated with the non-governmental organization Christian Aid. As this section will demonstrate this cooperation created a precedent and a model for the training of troops after Empire. What came to be labeled as "Adventurous Training" by the Ministry of Defence was also a way for the British military to reinvent itself through the relief of famines and disasters more broadly.

The famine, which resulted from a series of droughts in the region, affected the territory of the Sahel, the region named in Arabic to mark the southern 'border' of the Sahara desert. The origins of the drought can be traced back to 1968, when rainfall in the Sahel region of West Africa had been far below normal, as well as to the fragile economies of the six postcolonial countries which did not have mechanisms for its relief.[295] Comprised out of the six former French colonies of West Africa – Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, and Chad – the Sahel was the area most affected by the famine (See figure 2). Ethiopia had also been severely affected and to a lesser

[293] East Pakistan: Withdrawal of the British military relief forces, 3 December 1970, FCO 37/720/341, TNA; Confidential. L. G. Faulkner to Mr. Sutherland. Operation Burlap: Meeting in MOD, 27 November 1970, FCO 37/719/241, TNA; Confidential. I. J. M. Sutherland to Mr. Tesh (Defence Department), "Operation Burlap," 29 November 1970, FCO 37/719/276, TNA; Telegram. Priority Dacca to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 November 1970, FCO 37/719/264. TNA.

[294] For example see "Operation Lucan and the Pakistan Flood Relief," Priority Telegram 625, 29 Novemebr 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E84, TNA.

[295] Jeremy Swift, "Sahelian Pastoralists: Underdevelopment, Desertification, and Famine," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 6 (January 1, 1977): 457–78.

degree so had Sudan, Gambia, and Northern Nigeria.[296] The rainfall in this zone averaged less than 25 inches per year; the vegetation is semi-xerophytic.[297]

By September 1972 an early warning system, operated by two United Nations agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program, indicated that the drought was worsening. Foreign governments and international organizations sent emergency supplies of 55,000 tons of food grains to the Sahelian zone. In spite of these efforts, the crisis deepened in spring of 1973; livestock depleted, vegetation was destroyed and about six million people were in danger of starvation. The World Food Program argued that rain failure during 1973 in North West African was the worst on record and some 30% less rain fell than in 1972. The number of famine deaths during that year alone was estimated to be around 100,000. The human cost of the drought was not only in the destruction of lives but also of their livelihood. Their camels and cattle herd were wiped out; nomads survived the famine only to face despair, disease and a still uncertain food supply in squalid refugee and settlement camps across six countries. Clashes between the refugees from the drought and the population of the settled areas, as well as political and racial tensions between the two in places like Mali,[298] only added to the growing tensions in the region. Life in capital cities like Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou became, as one report claimed, a "nightmare."[299]

Figure 2: Map of the Sahel

On May 10, 1973 the Director-General of FAO, Addeke H. Boerma, issued an appeal to the international community asking them to expedite shipment of supplies and provision of cash. Boerma spoke of an impending disaster of large dimensions. The appeal was joined by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which reported that at least five million people inhabiting the stricken area faced certain starvation within the next few months unless emergency food and medical supplies could be delivered. The

[296] "Paper on Drought Relief – Sahelian Zone and Ethiopia," January 1974, OD 30/449/10, TNA; Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford University Press, 1982), 115.

[297] Victor D. Du Bois, *The Drought in West Africa* (American Universities Field Staff, 1974).

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[299] The United Nations: the Centre of Economic and Social Information/OPI and the Special Sahelian Office, *Sahelian Newsletter*, Volume 1, Number 1, October 1973 A89a, The United Nations Archives, Geneva (UNA). See also American Universities Field Staff, *Fieldstaff Reports: West Africa Series*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (General, American Universities Field Staff, 1975); "Paper on Drought Relief – Sahelian Zone and Ethiopia," January 1974, OD 30/449/10, TNA.

ECOSCC appealed to the international community and asked member states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to take concrete steps to speed and enlarge the assistance already provided to the Sahelian region.[300]

The response to the appeal was international. The bulk of the relief came from Western Europe and North America, but African states (like Nigeria), the Soviet Union, China and a number of Arab countries such as Algeria and Libya also contributed to the relief.[301] As *The Guardian* observed the "sudden worldwide concern for the [Sahel] after years of indifference... Western nations are now practically competing with each other to show their humanitarian concern for the several million Africans threatened with famine."[302] Although the efficiency of the entire operations was highly disputed,[303] toward the end of May 1973 the FAO Office for the Sahelian Relief Operation coordinated the international provision of food, medicine, animal feed and vaccines as well as water. Three kinds of operations were mounted: First, food supplies had to be airlifted to the main airport in the region. Second, smaller airplanes had to transport the food to distribution centers and airstrips. Finally, small trucks and camels had to be arranged to transport the food and vaccinations to the more isolated areas in the region. The operation eventually transported 500,000 ton of food and funded $30 million of emergency relief in the Sahel.[304]

Britain contributed to these operations not only through financial donations but also through a series of airlifts to Mali.[305] The British made sure that their contribution to the relief efforts was coordinated with the French operation, which they saw as the main authority for the Sahel area. The RAF as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office verified that "the French Air Force was shouldering at least a faire share of the burden on behalf of territories which are still to a large degree under French hegemony."[306] While the RAF participated in the international humanitarian response, it did not wish to trump the former metropole's retention of sovereignty.

In what came to be called "Operation Cascade" the British Royal Air Force (RAF) was in charge of transporting grain (mainly sorghum) and supplies such as powdered milk. The operation was based on the British airlift to Nepal in January that year, when the Nepalese government asked Britain for assistance during a famine.[307] Drawing from that experience, in June 1973 the RAF sent a reconnaissance team, which included engineers, signals, logistics, and movements experts, and an army officer in case supply drops were required. The team surveyed an approximately 1500 mile route for an

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[300] The United Nations: the Centre of Economic and Social Information/OPI and the Special Sahelian Office, *Sahelian Newsletter*, Volume 1, Number 1, October 1973 A89a, UNA.

[301] "RAF airlift ends," *FLIGHT international*, 6 September 1973, 402.

[302] David Ottoway, "Bitter taste of a grain of comfort," *The Guardian*, 17 September 1973.

[303] See for example Hal Sheets and roger morris, *Disaster in the Desert: Failures of International Relief in the West African Drought*, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974).

[304] "Europe's £110M for food aid," *The Guardian*, 26 January 1974.

[305] B. H. Robson, Head of DS8, "West Africa Famine Relief," 21 June 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E9, TNA; BRITEMB ABIDJAN to RBDWC/MODUK AIR, 23 January 1973, DEFE 70/614/E23, TNA.

[306] H. H. Chambers DS8 to DD Ops(AT)(RAF), Assistance in Famine Relief – W. Africa, 12 June 1974, DEFE 70/614/E8, TNA.

[307] See for example "Nepal," *Hansard*, 29 January 1973 vol 849 cc936-7. ADD FILES.

airlift from Abidjan in the Ivory Coast through the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) to Mali.[308]

Knowing the land from above was critical for the planning of such an operation. The desert-like area had been inhabited mostly by nomads and required the creation of a blueprint before a costly airlift could be conducted.[309] The airlift rendered the nomadic territory of the Sahel legible to the humanitarian mission. This was a long-standing and familiar practice of the British, dating back to the interwar period. In the Middle East, the imperial state deployed RAF airplanes air control policies in the unknown deserts.[310] Now, in the post-imperial age, the RAF's technical knowledge could have been easily manipulated for the different purpose of a humanitarian airlift. The reconnaissance team helped to establish "on-the-spot" knowledge about an unfamiliar territory to the British as well as to the international community as a whole.[311] Just like the modern state, disaster relief required a specific way of seeing.[312] The RAF also shared its findings with the FAO (and therefore with the international community), which then used it to coordinate other airlifts in the area.[313]

After the area was mapped the airlift began. The British airlift focused especially on Mali, which became one of the poorest countries in the world in 1973. Between July 9th and August 31st Operation Sahel Cascade carried 2,415 tons of food to Mali, flying 738 hours, an average of more than 15 hours per day.[314] In this period the roads, which up until July were used to covey supplies away from the airfield at Niori into the interior of Mali, were in worsening condition and threatened to impede movement.[315] The airlift helped carrying food to remote places as Nioro, Nara and Timboktu as well as the capital of Mali, Bamako.[316] The operation cost Britain approximately £2.5 million (paid for from its development aid budget).[317]

The British military's involvement in the Sahel did not end with the airlifts. The British military also worked in a less official capacity and collaborated with British non-governmental sector. Soon after Sahel Cascade ended, the Christian Aid, which all the Churches in Britain sponsored jointly, approached the Ministry of Defence with a request

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[308] B. H. Robson, Head of DS8, "West Africa Famine Relief," 21 June 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E9, TNA

[309] Immediate 062245 MODUK AIR, July 1973, DEFE 70/614/E31, TNA.

[310] Priya Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia," *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 16–51.

[311] B. Johnson to HQ UKLF(Q Ops), "West African Famine Relief – Sahel Cascade," 26 June 1973, DEFE 70/614/E26, TNA.

[312] James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998).

[313] BRITEMB ABIDJAN to RBDWC/MODUK AIR, 23 January 1973, DEFE 70/614/E23, TNA.

[314] Draft Statement of the Defence Estimate 1974, 21 January 1974, TNA.

[315] DEFE 24/1251/E15, TNA; DEFE 24/1251/E14. TNA, DEFE 24/1251/E12, TNA; R Coles DS6a to MO2, Famine in West Africa, 26 July 1973, DEFE 70/614/E37, TNA.

[316] See also M. H. Chambers to DD Opa(AT)(RAF), "Assistance to Famine Relief – West Africa," 15 June 1963, DEFE 70/614/E118, TNA.

[317] Overseas Development Administration (Africa Division), Sahel - Famine relief and development, 5 September 1974, OD 30/450, TNA.

to assist the delivery of vehicles to Mali and Niger.[318] The charity was founded as an offshoot of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1944 in response to the war.[319] By the 1960s it became a relief agency in its own right, working alongside organizations such as Save the Children and Oxfam in development and relief projects in Africa.[320] When news about the Sahel famine reached Britain, the charity organized an operational mission to transport vehicles to Mali and Niger.

In both Mali and Niger the pastoral and agricultural economy of the Sahel region was severely hit by the drought. The peak year of the famine in the Sahel was 1973, starvation having by then gathered momentum in cumulative processes of destitution and deprivation. Vehicles were urgently needed by the agricultural agencies of the two countries, whose people were starving following the loss of their cattle to drought and disease. The use of vehicles allowed not only the transportation of food and supplies but also of veterinary teams, which would protect the surviving herds and therefore prevent the escalation of the famine. "This is not a relief programme in the ordinary sense of the word," Christian Aid argued, "but it is essential to the survival of the nomadic tribes of these areas who are entirely dependent o their livestock."[321] Cattle were an essential commodity and component of the area's diet. The Sahel's inhabitants lived almost entirely on milk, cheese and beef, and their cows were – as one Christian Aid worker called it – "like mobile supermarkets."[322] The Tuareg and Fulani groups, which supplied cattle to many parts of Africa had migrated their herds south in search of water and richer grazing. With hopes for an overdue rainfall in the north, the herdsmen were about to bring their cattle back to the Sahel. But their cattle were in poor condition: they had been exposed to the tsetse fly and there was a real danger that the milk from the diseased cattle would start an epidemic. It was therefore crucial to save the cattle and other livestock in order to alleviate the present emergency as well as to prevent it from extending into 1974 and beyond.

The convoy was coordinated by the United Nations and the European Economic Community (EEC).[323] The two types of vehicles – Land Rovers and Mercedes trucks – were chosen by Christian Aid with United Nations advice on performance experience and servicing availability in the region. The Christian Aid budget allowed for twenty Land Rovers and three Mercedes model 911 8-ton general cargo vehicles. These vehicles were selected because there were others of their type in the region, and spares would be available from the local agents. Mercedes, however, was unable to supply trucks with front wheel drive quickly enough to ship them with the convoy. The problem was, however, that none of charity's aid workers were able to transport the vehicles by

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[318] Letter from Christian Aid to Major J L Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1, TNA.

[319] Committee for Christian Reconstruction in Europe, "Draft Constitution," 1944, ICA/01/02, Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service Archive, SOAS Library, London (ICAA).

[320] Colin Davey, *The Story of the BCC* (London: BCC, 1990).

[321] The Sahel Drought – a proposal for a joint Christian Aid/Services contribution, Letter from Christian Aid to Major J L Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1, TNA.

[322] Richard Kayes, *One Man and His God: A Pilgrimage towards a No Nonsense Faith with a Few Laughs on the Way* (Milton Keynes: Author House, 2007), 152.

[323] Alan Booth, Director of Christian Aid, to Brigadier John Stanier, Ministry of Defence, 2 August 1973, DEFE 70/614/E41, TNA.

themselves. It was at this point that the British charity approached the Ministry of Defence in request for assistance.

In mid-August Christian Aid wrote to the Ministry of Defence and requested their assistance. "Christian Aid would welcome the participation of the Services in this operation,"[324] wrote the charity in their appeal letter to the Ministry. "Although we think we would be able to find from among our supporters and the general public drivers and mechanics and others to enable us to mount the expedition," the letter continued, "we do not for a moment believe that such a group of volunteers would compare with a body of trained and disciplined men such as the Services could provide."[325] The British military was seen as a more efficient and skilled body of experts to respond to the catastrophe than a group of civilians. Its operational capabilities in areas with limited infrastructure and numerous potential threats were, according to Christian Aid, an advantage when it came down to disaster relief.

Furthermore, according to Christian Aid, the military involvement served as good publicity for the operation as a whole as well as for Britain's reputation. A joint operation between the charity and the military, Christian Aid argued, would "keep public interest alive."[326] According to the charity, "[t]he Services rightly enjoy a high prestige with the British public, and we believe that a venture such as this can only enhance that prestige by providing a dramatic demonstration of the role of the armed forces in peaceful international co-operation."[327] The mission would allow the army to have an additional function during peacetime. It would enhance the army's image with the general public. But the involvement of the British army would bring publicity not only to the Sahel appeal but also to the country as a whole. "It would be excellent for the image of Britain if, at that very time," Christian Aid argued, "a joint Service/voluntary agency expedition were already on the road."[328] The military contribution to the relief efforts was to signal the country's commitment to being a leader in international disaster relief and a leading actor in the EEC.

Time was of the essence. The charity had made an agreement with the Rover Company and Mercedes-Benz to begin a special production line to meet the charity's requirement. Choosing Rover's vehicles was essential since they were standardized and widespread and therefore assuring the ease of repairing them.[329] Multinational businesses such as the Rover Company could provide standardized and efficient equipment for humanitarian aid precisely because they were "multi." The Rover Company was only able to deliver the vehicles in early October, but they were needed as early as November. According to Alan Booth, the director of Christian Aid, "the delivery of these vehicles can be done most speedily and economically by driving them overland through

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[324] The Sahel Drought – a proposal for a joint Christian Aid/Services contribution, Letter from Christian Aid to Major J L Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1, TNA.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Ibid.

[327] Ibid.

[328] Ibid.

[329] J. E. Todd, Sale Office Manager Mercedes-Benz (Great Britain) Ltd to P. Shipster, Aid Administration Division, MOD, 24 September 1973, CA4/A/1, CA.

Algeria."[330] The charity therefore had a strict timeline before the famine could spread into 1974.

Moreover, the delivery of the vehicles by land rather than by air or sea was the only real option, according to the charity, even though the vehicles would weather 3,000 miles of wear and tear going by land, as opposed to only 1,000 miles if they went by sea and were then driven to their destinations. Shipping to Dakar or some other port in West Africa would have also taken considerable time. The ports were already heavily congested and the internal railways are unable to move more than a fraction of the relief supplies that were already piling up in the docks. An airlift from Britain to West Africa, on the other hand, was too expensive for the charity and purchasing them locally would have taken between 12 and 24 months for delivery, as well as high taxes and bribes. The charity therefore determined that transportation by land was the only alternative. The vehicles would run under reasonable conditions for two-thirds of the overland journey from Britain, according to the charity.

While the charity made a good case for why its relief mission would benefit from the army's involvement, it was unclear what the army would gain in return. Publicity wasn't enough to justify such a costly deployment of more than thirty troops to an area, which the British saw as a primarily French responsibility.[331] Furthermore, there was the problem of insurance. The deployment of the military for a civil mission led by a charity required undertaking risk and therefore it was crucial to determine who would be responsible to indemnify the Ministry of Defence for any loss and injury of life or equipment.[332]

The idea of treating the operation as "Adventurous Training" emerged to solve this problem. In a letter to the Ministry of Defence, Peter Shipster, the head of Christian Aid's Aid Division, suggested that such a humanitarian operation would have "undoubted training benefits for those Service personnel taking part."[333] Although Shipster admitted that it would be invidious for a civilian to assess the military benefits of the Service participation in the project, the nature of the route suggested endless training possibilities. Much of this route, Shipster added, required self-sufficiency as there was almost no settled population "in this, one of the hardest and most arid areas in the world."[334] Indeed, the mission required, according to Shipster:

1. Desert navigation; particularly in the use of sun-compasses, celestial navigation etc. Navigation is going to be essential as the few tracks are often obliterated by the shifting sands.
2. Vehicles maintenance under demanding, often extreme, conditions.
3. Practice in desert driving, particularly over soft sand rocky conditions.

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330 Alan Booth, Director of Christian Aid, to Brigadier John Stanier, Ministry of Defence, 2 August 1973, DEFE 70/614/E41, TNA.

331 H. H. Chambers DS8 to DD Ops(AT)(RAF), Assistance in Famine Relief – W. Africa, 12 June 1974, DEFE 70/614/E8, TNA.

332 John Price, Captain MO2b to AT1, "Famine Relief – West Africa," 18 September 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E55, TNA.

333 Peter Shipster, Christian Aid, to major J. L. Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1.

334 Ibid.

4. Desert survival; the bulk of the journey entails the whole experience of living and working in a desert environment.
5. The testing of clothing and equipment.
6. Radio communications.[335]

Shipster also suggested the army would be able to incorporate or devise other training exercises within the bounds of the urgency of Christian Aid's project and African sensitivities, and that the charity would gladly cooperate. In short, "[th]is journey provides a unique opportunity for certain kinds of training, particularly in the absence of similar training conditions available to the Ministry of Defence *nowadays*."[336] After empire disaster relief could serve as a way to expand the army's knowledge and experience in Africa.

Indeed, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) agreed with Shipster's suggestions. "MOD believes this is a very worthwhile project supplementing the current RAF Airlift operation assisting in famine relief in West Africa,"[337] wrote the Ministry in one of its internal memos to the United Kingdom Land Forces. "[T]he route and proposal appear challenging and we are prepared to approve the project as Adventurous Training."[338] The title of "Adventurous Training" meant not only financial guarantee; the budget of such an expedition was much smaller in comparison to aid via "Military Assistance to Civil Power" and therefore meant that Christian Aid would pay for any additional costs.[339] But "Adventurous Training" also meant that the military could actually use the opportunity of disaster relief as a way to train its troops. As Major A. T. Marsden argued, "one of the major advantages for the Army was the opportunity to improve drivers' skills in unusual difficult terrain."[340] Through famine relief Britain could gain not only administrative knowledge but also practical skills.

On 29 October 1973, at exactly six thirty a.m., the relief mission – operating under the name "Exercise Sandy Cross" – departed from Tidworth military base, located about 80 miles west of London. The day before, Christian Aid held a special ceremony in Salisbury, with the bishop blessing each of the Land Rovers and offering a prayer for their safe arrival.[341] The convoy included three Christian Aid representatives: David Smithers and Christopher Lewis (both with previous experience in aid programs in West Africa), and Richard Kayes (who was an experience engineer). On the military side, the convoy included Major Rutherford, a RAF Squadron Leader named Tom Shepherd, about 36 Army squaddies and a doctor. Shepherd was an experienced leader of expeditions in other parts of the Sahara and helped train the three aid workers on the front-wheel Land Rovers. The mission also used the services of Captain John Dixon of 22 Engineer Workshop, who examined the vehicles to verify they were in good shape.

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335 Ibid.

336 Ibid, emphasis is mine.

337 MODUK Army to UKLF, "Subject: Adventurous Training," 21 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E31, TNA.

338 Ibid.

339 See also E. J. Evans to AT1, "Famine Relief – West Africa," 4 September 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E40, TNA; L. F. Hart to F1a, MO 2b, AT1, "Famine Relief – West Africa," 3 September 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E39 TNA; L. Parkes, major MO 2b, to AT1, "Famine Relief – West Africa," 28 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E34/1, TNA.

340 AT Marsden, Major, GS02 DS6b, to AT 1, MO2, 30 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E34, TNA.

341 Richard Kayes, *One Man and His God*, 154.

Finally, two journalist also joined the mission: Derek Hudson of the *Yorkshire Post* and Martin Walker of the *Guardian*.[342]

The convoy was divided into three sections, each containing seven vehicles: the lead section, followed by the admin section, with the recovery section bringing up the rear. The route was chosen by the army in cooperation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, using USAF Operational Planning maps and some maps from the US and Belgian Armies as well as couple of tourist maps. The plan was to drive the vehicles across France and Algeria and deliver them to Gao in Mali and Niami in Niger, a journey of a little over three weeks. The journey involved about 2,000 miles by road and 1,000 miles on sand, and included a wide range of terrains. From 900 miles of narrow hard-surfaced road through sparsely populated areas from Dover through Marseilles and a further crossing to Adrar; then 1000 miles from Adrar to Gao of sandy, roadless and soft terrain; and finally a stretch of 150 miles over rocky terrain south of Tessalit.[343] By December 1st the convoy had delivered the vehicles to the UN veterinarian team and waited for the RAF to fly them back to London.

The difficult journey afforded, in the words of one army officer, "good training for the soldiers."[344] Richard Kayes from Christian Aid reported in one of his letters,

> The road is really nonexistent, just a sand highway hundreds of yards wide and marked by old gyres and drums. At our training we had been given a talk on Desert driving by Squadron Leader Tom Sheppard and so only one truck got stuck - it was the one Tom was driving and twice he had to be towed out of trouble - did the boys laugh![345]

At the same time, as Kayes letters suggest, the journey was also a great way for aid workers to develop new skills. Cooperating with the army on such a mission helped shape humanitarian knowledge for famine and disaster relief. The three Christian Aid workers shared the same number of driving shifts as the troops, and were guided by Shepherd on how to maneuver between both the soft terrains and the rocky ones. Upon reaching Gao, for example, Kayes reported on the conditions in the countryside as "very rough and rocky." Still, Kayes continued, "driving was exciting."[346] Christian aid volunteers also participated in guarding the convoy at night as well as in the cooking chores. For all intended purposes these aid workers and the military became part of the same mission: a military-humanitarian assistance to help the plight of the starving Sahelians.

Exercise Sandy Cross offered training in difficult terrains and familiarity with the different population – a mostly Arab and nomadic one – of the Sahara. The convoy offered valuable knowledge of local politics, culture and inhabitants. In some cases the military as well as the aid workers documented or even filmed, according to Kayes, "these desperate nomads" in places like the Lazaret Camp in Niamey, Niger.[347] In other cases, the troops provided food, supplies and clothes to the nomadic communities and refugees

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[342] Ibid, 152-153.

[343] Peter Shipster, Christian Aid, to major J. L. Parkes, Ministry of Defence, 16 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E30/1, TNA.

[344] A copy of the Memo from APS/S of S to Head of DS6 with reference A was sent to, among others, DMO, DPR (Army) and Head of F1(AD), PR Adair Lt Col GS01 DS6, "Christian Aid Project in West Africa," 2 October 1973, DEFE 70/614/E84, TNA.

[345] Richard Kayes, 12 November 1973, Sahara, CA4/A/1, CAA.

[346] Ibid.

[347] Richard Kayes, *One Man and His God*, 163.

of the Sahel. In the words of Kayes, the refugees were "traditionally labeled by some as the fearless and bloody raiders of the desert, and by others as cultureless scavengers unworthy of any help of assistance. Some were animists and some Muslims, but to us they were fellow human beings in desperate need. It was moving to see some of the Army lads sharing in the food distribution, and carrying the weaker ones to the clinic."[348] The troops and the aid workers visited camps and local villages and met with local governors and administrators. The convoy was, in the words of Richard Kayes, "quite important in establishing and continuing [a] good relationship."[349]

Exercise Sandy Cross perhaps was not the biggest of the humanitarian efforts to the Sahel during the famine of 1973-4 but it was certainly important. The mission set up a precedent for collaboration between the British army and voluntary humanitarian organizations. David Smithers from Christian Aid argued even as the mission was planned that "this would not be last time the Army was involved in this type of operation."[350] This view was endorsed by Army officials who participated, because they felt the operation had "its intrinsic value and because it affords good training for the soldiers involved at no extra cost."[351]

Based on the mission's experience other non-governmental organizations approached the British army. In February 1974, for example, Save the Children approached the army for a similar mission. Save the Children were interested to see if the army could provide a team to Mali to assist with the distribution of food from central depots to "outlaying and often remote communities where starvation is biting."[352] Similarly, Smithers from Christian Aid contacted the Army about organizing an additional convoy that would distribute food in Mali from April until September. While not all these initiatives came to fruition, Exercise Sandy Cross began a trend of collaboration between the British army and voluntary organizations to provide ground troops and help relieve disasters.[353]

Food For Work In Ethiopia

Once the Army became involved in ground operations and not just airlifts, it was also easy to retool it for development projects. Indeed, the army's involvement did not only end with transportation but also evolved into conducting land surveys and building infrastructure in famine-stricken lands. One such example was "Operation Woolsack" – an operation that was aimed to build roads during the 1974 famine. The operation

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348 Ibid.

349 Richard Kayes, 21, November 1973, Niamy, Niger, CA4/A/1, CAA.

350 Quoted in PR Adair Lt Col GS01 DS6, "Christian Aid Project in West Africa," 2 October 1973, DEFE 70/614/E84, TNA.

351 PR Adair Lt Col GS01 DS6, "Christian Aid Project in West Africa," 2 October 1973, DEFE 70/614/E84, TNA.

352 Quoted in Loose minutes, A W Skiner, Capt ASD 2c to Tpt 1, EME 2, AMD 1, Ord 1, Sigs 31, PAT 2, Q(Mov) 1, "Famine Relief in West Africa," 22 February 1974, DEFE 70/614/E181, TNA; See also P R Adair, Lt Col, GSO 1 DS6, "Famine Relief in West Africa," 21 February 1974, DEFE 70/614/E181, TNA.

353 P R Adair, Lt Col, GSO 1 DS6, "Famine Relief in West Africa," 21 February 1974, DEFE 70/614/E181, TNA.

involved the deployment of both the RAF as well as land troops and a Royal Engineer detachment to Wollo province in Ethiopia.

In early November, the British Ambassador Sir Willie Morris in Ethiopia requested the assistance of the Overseas Development Administration to plan and set up a road construction program so that food could be distributed to the remote areas of the Province of Wollo where suffering was most acute.[354] The area had been severely hit by the drought, and, at least according to contemporaries' estimates, more than one hundred people died of starvation.[355] The famine was a result of a drought and harvest decline, compounded by the inaction of Emperor Haile Selassie's imperial government.[356] The history of the Ethiopian famines will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter, but broadly speaking it led not only to the loss of lives but also to the loss of Selassie's throne, in a political revolution in September that year.

Beginning in 1973, the international community – and Britain in particular – began shipping food and supplies to the region. The famine became especially publicized, when ITV broadcast Jonathan Dimbleby *The Unknown Famine* on 18 October 1973. The film was shot in cooperation with Oxfam's Communications Officer Tony Hall, who has been working in the region since the summer. As a half-hour primetime documentary, the film consisted entirely of graphic footage of famine victims and dead bodies in the relief camps in Northern Ethiopia. *The Unknown Famine* intentionally constructed a narrative that focused on the famine as a natural disaster, and ignored the political and economic context behind its causes. Admitting that he had deliberately distorted the famine to maximize the film's effect on the public, Dimbleby later argued that "the degree of ignorance that one was having to confront in one's audience meant that we soft-pedaled that enormously."[357]

And indeed, Dimbleby's narrative worked. Around twelve million people watched *The Unknown Famine*, and the ITV switchboards were jammed as soon as the program ended with callers wishing to help. The film was shown at the House of Commons, and was used by Judith Hart, the Minister for Overseas Development, to call for greater support in official aid. The film was circulated across Europe and the Commonwealth, mobilizing public concern "first in Britain, and later in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Italy."[358] The aid began to pour into Western charities, earmarked for Ethiopia.

As aid workers soon discovered, however, the problem was not only getting supplies to the country but also distributing them in remote regions in the country. While food was piling up in warehouses in Addis Ababa, people in rural and isolated regions of Ethiopia were starving to death. By the end of 1973 it therefore became clear that aid organizations had to come up with ways to transport supplies efficiently. The disaster was too big to manage on a local basis and required a more efficient mechanism, like the military, to help with the distribution of supplies. As one reporter from *The Telegraph*

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[355] Today we know it is actually between 40,000 and 80,000 people. In Alex De Waal, *The Evil Days*, 85.

[356] Oxfam Information Office, "The Famine in Ethiopia: General Description," February 1974, CA2/A/4, CAA.

[357] Quoted in Harrison and Palmer, *News out of Africa* , 55-56.

[358] Oxfam Information Office, "The Famine in Ethiopia: General Description," February 1974, CA2/A/4, CAA.

argued, "the charity organisations cannot hope to cope with a disaster of the size and complexity of the Ethiopian famine without resources nor the infrastructure necessary."[359] The relief mission therefore required solutions such as airlifts and other mechanisms to transport supplies.

The situation in in Wollo was particularily severe. Tigre province, which was just as badly hit by the drought and famine as Wollo, for example, did not suffer to the same degree. Its Governor, Ras Mengesa, was a civil engineer, who helped build a network of roads to keep his province supplied. As a consequence in Tigre 97 percent of the food was transported by truck. In contrast, in Wollo, where there were only two paved main roads in an area of some 75,000 square miles, only 2 percent of the grain was able to reach more remote areas.[360]

It was this gruesome situation that the British Royal Engineers "Operation Woolsack" – the building of four roads – sought to alleviate. The operation was rather unique, because it offered the transportation of supplies through an airlift as well as helped building the infrastructure of the country. Unlike previous military involvements, Operation Woolsack was invested in long-term relief and development work and not merely just in rescue operations. This shift represented a general shift in humanitarian responses to disasters, as disaster relief came to include also disaster prevention rather than just immediate rescue. Towards the mid-1970s, aid organizations from all five major UK charities (grouped under the name "The Disaster Emergency Committee") began to shift their spending from purely rescue missions toward development and infrastructure work. This shift, however, acquired new meaning when the British military itself took an active role in disaster response through Operation Woolsack. Building roads and infrastructure was a much higher level of intervention in disaster response and in development projects Wollo as a whole.

Timing was important. The famine was expected to resume in April 1974, and the operation was aimed to tackle at least part of the region's infrastructural problems before that, and before the onset of the heavy rains in June.[361] Between 21 January and 20 April 1974 the A Military Assistance Team and an Army Aviation detachment were deployed to Ethiopia to begin their work.[362] The team (27 people total) was comprised of a design/planning contingent, road supervisory personnel, and tradesmen for refugee camp improvement, all from the Royal Engineers, an Army Air Crops section and an administrative element.[363]

The British Government's Overseas Development Administration financed the operation, at a cost of £112,000. The Ministry of Defence sent a reconnaissance, which confirmed the urgent need for a road program and recommended the dispatch to Wollo of a Royal Engineer detachment, with helicopter support, for a period of three months. The team was set to improve to the refugee camps and of undertaking reconnaissance for

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[359] "Better Ways to Feed the Starving," *The Telegraph*, 17 February 1974.

[360] Ibid.

[361] Loose Minutes, L N Holden Col GS ASD 7 to DASA, Ethiopia – Possible Road Construction Tasks," 5 December 1973, DEFE 70/614/E119, TNA.

[362] Military Assistance to Civil Community, 1 November 1976, DEFE 24/1252/AS05, TNA.

[363] Loose Minutes, L N Holden Col GS ASD 7 to DASA, Ethiopia – Possible Road Construction Tasks," 5 December 1973, DEFE 70/614/E119, TNA.

building over 100km of road.[364] The Royal Engineer element designed a 5-year road program and supervises the construction of the first four roads until the departure of the detachment. The Army Air Corps element allowed detailed reconnaissance for the planning of the roads and enabled frequent supervisory visits to be made to road construction sites.[365]

The team was organized around the "Food for Work" road construction scheme that was designed to provide employment to local personnel who had fled from outlying districts into refugee camps as a result of famine. This was not the first time relief was given in return for work. This food-for-work scheme was reminiscent of the British response to famines in colonial India dating back to the nineteenth century. Under the famine code, relief was conditioned in return for different type of work, on construction and road crews. In imperial India, as in Victorian England, this policy represented a utilitarian attitude in which one had to work for one's own salvation and relief.[366]

While this was never spelled out as an explicit British policy in Operation Woolpack in 1974 Ethiopia, the relief scheme was still conceived as way to motivate local Ethiopians to take active roles in their own relief. Under this scheme the British military gave food to refugees in camps in Wollo in return for their participation and their contribution to the relief work. Employing Ethiopians from relief camps, according to the Defence Secretariat, "[t]he Ethiopians would of course, be responsible for providing supplies for the food for work scheme."[367] The idea was to work in cooperation with the local authorities but also, as one army report phrased it, to give the program "its initial impetus: and then be withdrawn."[368]

NATO And The International Response To Disasters

The experience in Pakistan and later in the Sahel and Ethiopia brought new international attention to disaster relief. Rather than merely focusing on famines or civil wars, the international community –Britons among them– began to think more holistically about the category of disaster relief. International concern focused on natural disasters: how could the international community respond quickly and efficiently to the plight of disaster victims, especially without good (if any) infrastructure. This was particularly a problem of the global south, both because of vulnerabilities to environmental catastrophes like cyclones, storms and droughts, but also because the countries effected usually did not have the economic capacity to respond to such large-scale calamities. As international concern grew, the question of who would coordinate the relief became more pressing. While multiple international actors came to respond to disasters – from militaries and states to non- and inter-governmental organizations – there was a need for a new body, which would coordinate their activities. Britain was a

[364] Non-Oral – Tuesday 2nd July 1974, Mr Neville Trotter (CON) (TYNEMOTH), DEFE 24/1252, TNA.

[365] Restricted. Draft of the Directive for the Officer Commanding UK Military Assistance Team to Ethiopia, 20 December 1973, DEFE 70/614/E139, TNA.

[366] Tehila Sasson and James Vernon, "Practicing the British Way of Famine: Technologies of Relief, 1770-1985."

[367] Head of DS 6, "Famine Relief – Ethiopia," 2 January 1974, DEFE 70/614/E142, TNA.

[368] Ibid.

leader of this trend and in fact pushed for an international system of governance which would respond to disasters.

After the East Pakistan disaster, in December 1971, the United Nations passed a resolution that established the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator. The cyclone and the following civil war and floods in the country posed a challenge beyond the economic potential of the Pakistan government. They crystallized the problem of large disaster relief for the first time, as the plight of its victims became international news. As *The Pakistan Times* claimed, "[o]nly global aid organised on a supra-national basis can save the situation…. This is a gigantic problem that can be overcome only through international co-operation and global efforts."[369] In a period of two years, more than 40 countries sent aid to East Pakistan. However the chaos that followed showed there was an urgent need for an organization, which would administrate and coordinate their relief.

In 1972 the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) was set up exactly as a solution to that. It was mandated to mobilize and coordinate international disaster relief, and to promote pre-disaster planning and post-disaster rehabilitation.[370] The UNDRO began its operation with a very small staff and personnel and was funded by voluntary donations. During the Sahel and Ethiopian famines of 1974, as international relief operations developed, the UNDRO staff grew in size and also came to include experts from the United Nations Development Program. In November 1976 it had inaugurated a permanent disaster center in Geneva, which served as a central information exchange during disasters. By 1977, the UNDRO had helped coordinate relief for about 80 disasters. According to a report by the US government that year, it had allocated approximately $1 million in relief assistance, had dispensed about $27 million in cash from international donors, and reportedly saved donors $1.5 million in air freight costs by obtaining space available on commercial carriers and using government owned-and-operated aircrafts.[371]

The coordination of disaster relief was not only an international concern but also a national one. The international mechanisms of the United Nations served to enhance state sponsored bodies aimed at foreign aid to natural disasters. In the United Kingdom, as well as in other countries like the United States and Australia, disaster relief became a separate category within foreign aid.[372] The preoccupation with "disasters" as an all-inclusive category can be dated back to the 1960s when the five big charities – Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid, War on Want and the British Red Cross – all joined in 1963 under the umbrella of the "Disaster Relief Committee" (DEC).[373]

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[369] Quoted in Teletext Islamabad 2707152, Flood Relief in Pakistan, 27 August 1973, DEFE 24/1251/E33, TNA.

[370] United Nations General Assembly, Assistance in Cases of natural Disasters and other Disaster Situations. Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator: Report of the Secretary General, 5 June 1974, A/9637, UNA.

[371] National Research Council (US) Committee on International Disaster Assistance, *The U.S. Government Foreign Disaster Assistance Program* (National Academies, 1978), 20-21.

[372] See for example Sally Leivesley, "Toowoombas The Role Of An Australian Disaster Unit," *Disasters*, 1977, Vol. 1, No. 4: 315-322.

[373] Today it comprises of 13 voluntary organizations and it leads the largest humanitarian fundraising campaigns in the UK. Its recent appeal to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, for example, raised £392 million in public donations to be shared between the DEC members for

The DEC was established as a mechanism for coordinating public appeals through television, radio and print media, at times of major international disasters and was intended to facilitate closer co-ordination between its members, instead of competition between them. The funds, which were collected from these appeals, were then equally distributed among them for each organization's relief programs.[374] The first DEC Appeal was made in 1966 in response to an earthquake in Turkey and raised a record sum of over £550,000.[375] While it also launched a large appeal for the Nigeria-Biafra crisis, however, it is only in the 1970s – with the cyclone to East Pakistan and the subsequent civil war – that the Committee became a full force in humanitarian fundraising when it got a record sum of £1.49 million for its appeal.[376] During the 1970s, the DEC became the major campaign leader on issues of disasters, as public and official attention to the problem of disasters a whole grew.

Indeed, in 1970s Britain disasters became a focal point for experts and administrative knowledge. In the aftermath of the Biafran war, the perceived failure of the ICRC to effectively coordinate relief also prompted calls for a new international machinery to be set up for major disasters within Whitehall. Foreign and Commonwealth officials widely agreed that Biafra demonstrated "the need for new machinery," which would take responsibility for administering relief, provide a channel of communication between donors and affected governments, and co-ordinate the necessary agreements to distribute assistance where it was needed.[377] As attention grew to disasters following the East Pakistan cyclone, a new Disaster Research Unit was founded at the University of Bradford by academics and experts seeking to find solution to preventing disasters rather than only reliving them.[378] The Research Unit was supported by a Leverhulme Trust fund as well as the Overseas Development Administration and represented a new commitment by aid experts to the issue of disasters as a whole.

Moreover, in 1974 during the experience in the Sahel, when disaster relief was again a pressing issue, the British government decided to created its own domestic Disaster Unit for relief, as a specialist body within the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM). The Disaster Unit was to be responsible for disaster planning, earmarking supplies, liaising with other government departments, monitoring reports on potential disasters, and leading the initial response to "man-made" and "predictable" disasters in developing countries (including famine, drought, war and civil disturbances).[379] The Disaster Unit marked a new significance for disasters in Whitehall, designed to focus exclusively on disaster relief rather than a development programs. Other donor

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relief. John Borton "A 'New' Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK," *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, 8 (May 1997).

[374] Disasters Emergency Committee, Notes of a meeting, 1 November 1965, CA2/F/1/9, CAA.

[375] Disasters Emergency Committee, "Turkish Earthquake Appeal, Interim Account - 31st December, 1966," 23 January 1967, CA2/F/1/9, TNA

[376] War on Want, "East Pakistan cyclone Relief Fund: Receipts and Payments Account," 13 December 1972, Box 125, War on Want Archives (WOWA).

[377] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, International Relief operations, September 1970, FCO 59/617, TNA.

[378] James Lewis, "The University of Bradford Disaster Relief Unit," *Datum International*, 16 February 2008.

[379] Disaster Unit, June 1974, FCO 59/1237, TNA.

governments established similar bodies at this time, institutionalizing the distribution of humanitarian assistance.[380]

The Disaster Unit also signified a new commitment to official collaborations with the voluntary sector. The Unit was to ally more closely with the voluntary sector. ODM staff stressed a need to "make sure our efforts were integrated with [voluntary organizations]... we wish to plan and work in collaboration with these bodies at all stages, since their role will continue to be an essential one."[381] The emphasis placed by the ODM on coordination represented a broader increase of state support for the voluntary sector in the 1970s as well as its attempt to control it. Yet again, state and voluntary aid in Britain were never fully divorced. The Disaster Unit designated the DEC as its preferred vehicle for coordination, and began to build up closer relations with the Committee. While some of the DEC members were anxious about government interference, the Committee eventually joined the Unit and worked alongside it in coordinating British disaster relief.[382]

While these institutions administered and coordinated relief, none of them was operational. Over the first half of the 1970s, as the plight of those suffering from disasters intensified, and as new attention was given to the problem of relieving natural disasters in particular, new international initiatives developed to respond efficiently to disasters. This was especially the case during the Sahel famine, when the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator proved to be incapable of dealing with massive military responses and airlifts. In 1973, while supplies were sent to West Africa, the United Nations Relief office failed to coordinate its distribution in affected areas. Food and vaccines piled up for weeks at the two main ports of Dakar and Abidjan and the airlift coordinated by the UN did not manage to transport it to Niger and Mali quick enough, thus prolonging the famine.[383] The UN Disaster Relief Coordinator was criticized for being only a coordinating body, not an executive or operational one. It could not have mobilized supplies, which remained a matter for national governments and voluntary agencies, mainly through disaster militarism.

One of the initiatives that were proposed as a solution to this problem was to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a mechanism of disaster relief. Already in 1969 some of the NATO members considered cooperating on disaster relief. On 10 April 1969, for example, US President Richard Nixon recommended that the NATO countries should develop a "third dimension" of programs activity to deal with "our concern for the quality of life in this final third of the twentieth century."[384] In 1969 the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) agreed that the impact of natural disasters fit within the mandate of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949) which charged the party to the treaty with "promoting conditions of stability and well-being."[385] The massive resources available to NATO members were

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[380] Randolph C. Kent, "Reflecting upon a Decade of Disasters: The Evolving Response of the International Community," *International Affairs*, 59:4 Autumn 1983: 693-711.

[381] Disaster Unit: material for press conference, June 1974, OD 15/119, TNA.

[382] Alan R. Brash, "Memorandum to Vernon Littlewood," 13 June 1974 CA2/D/20/2, CAA.

[383] Hugh Hanning, Disaster Relief: The Logistical Need: Annex, DS15c, "Disaster Relief – letter to US of S(RAF) from Mr. H Hanning," 14 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E32, TNA.

[384] Quoted in John Gange, "NATO's Approach to Natural Disaster Relief," *Mass Emergencies*, (1975): 11-19.

[385] The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, Article 2.

seen by some, as a way to "set NATO countries apart as unique association for disaster assistance." [386] The high degree of political cultural and economic unity and the organizational capability to research, to plan, and to respond operationally contribute further to NATO's unique skills.[387]

The following year, NATO created two project pilots for the exchange of information and technical knowledge about disaster relief. The United States served as the "pilot nation" and Italy as the "co-pilot nation". Turkey, which became a second co-pilot nation later also qualified on grounds of experience with natural disasters and very recently on governmental concern for a joint leadership role. As project pilot and co-pilots these nations assumed the responsibility to lay out plans for the program, fund most of its costs, see action resulted from specific projects within a plan of a few years and also be the reporter of such actions and of any follow-up activities in the NATO states resulting directly from the Disaster Assistance Program. [388]

The pilot program, however, was limited to the exchange of technical information rather than actual assistance. Furthermore, the program was confined to the members of NATO exclusively. As techniques for disaster relief developed and incorporated more military support, at the same time NATO members became more invested in determining an international system for disaster relief. In a parliamentary debate on defense policy in Britain, for example, some MPs like the Labour MP James Wellbeloved suggested that NATO "should be an organisation to deal with international disasters."[389] "This form of expansion is wise because their operational role will assist the regular Army and their peace-time role," the Conservative MP and Major General James d'Avigdor-Goldsmid agreed, "will be of benefit to the civil authorities in the event of disaster or emergency. It is wise because we will be able to perpetuate the names of some famous regiments."[390]

Disaster relief could bolster the justification for existing organizations like NATO and increase their funding. Britain, the second largest most powerful arms industry in NATO, was particularly instrumental in this program to convert NATO to have a peacetime function. For Britain, adding this function to NATO was also a way to secure U.S. involvement in Europe. "The only thing that gives credibility to the defence deterrent aspect of the Western Alliance is the presence of United States troops on Europe's soil. If they go, N.A.T.O. can only remain a credible deterrent and a credible defence if the unspeakable should happen, if Western Europe, whether it be within or outside the E.E.C., is able, willing and determined to increase its contribution in force level and in terms of nuclear deterrent."[391]

The experience in the Sahel famine in 1974 further enhanced this idea, when Nigerien President Seyni Kountché appealed to Brussels for help. In the event the NATO Secretary-General was able to raise the matter at the weekly Permanent

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[386] Ibid.

[387] General George A. Lincoln, Director Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President. Quoted in John Gange, "NATO's Approach to Natural Disaster Relief," *Mass Emergencies*, (1975): 11-19.

[388] Ibid.

[389] James Wellbeloved to the House of Commons, "Defence Policy," *Hansard*, 19 November 1970 vol 806 cc1452-577.

[390] Major General James d'Avigdor-Goldsmid to the House of Commons, "Defence Policy," *Hansard*, 19 November 1970 vol 806 cc1452-577.

[391] Labour MP James Wellbeloved to the House of Commons, "Defence Policy," *Hansard*, 19 November 1970 vol 806 cc1452-577.

Representatives meeting and obtain help from the Belgians as well as the military aid of other EEC countries.[392] The famine therefore set a precedent for a NATO response to Sahelian countries, even though they were not members of the treaty. It was with the famine that NATO considered assuming a more permanent role as a body that would provide not only military support during wars but also have peacetime function to relieve disasters.

The initiative was promoted by a group of Britons, headed by Hugh Hanning, journalist and defense specialist from the Board of Social Responsibility at the Church of England. Hanning was a veteran of the British Navy in the Second World War, an experienced journalist for *The Observer* and *The Guardian*, and a recognized commentator on the subjects related to war and peace.[393] As early as 1966, Hanning called to make NATO an international body, when he was commissioned to conduct a study of the peaceful use of military forces by the World Veteran Federation. The study was set to investigate the need for trained and ready resources, "as progress in communications and transportations shrinks the world and as the employment of international institutions to mobilize and coordinate multi-national action gains acceptance in functions ranging from United Nations peace-keeping missions to relief services in cases of major catastrophe."[394] In the early 1970s, he also conducted a study on military assistance to civil power and on the connection between counter-insurgency and disaster relief. In both, Hanning was concerned with how "defence establishments can help civilian communities in the interest of both parties,"[395] especially after the shrinking of armies in the 1960s. NATO was particularly a good fit for such purpose because it consisted of an existing international body of military experts and cooperation.

According to Hanning, in spite of increased coordination through the UN Disaster Relief office (set up in 1972), and despite technical improvements in military airlift capability, international mechanisms for preventing and dealing with disasters were insufficient. Hanning identified three main problems in the relief of disasters. First, demand for relief needed to be coordinated with its supply: while stricken areas were hard to reach, the sources of relief were probably diverse. Second, there was a need to administer relief upon arrival, with speedy and flexible communications, organization and logistics. Last, Hanning called for the provision of suitable transport, such as trucks, helicopters, and flat-bottomed boats, needed to be conveyed to the disaster area. [396]

NATO, Hanning argued, was the perfect body to assume such an operational role and work side by side the UN Disaster Relief office in responding to natural catastrophes. "The biggest shortage in every disaster relief operation," he claimed, "was transport." Although supplies arrive at the airport of a disaster-stricken country fairly easily, they frequently take another week to reach the disaster zone. What was needed, according to

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[392] J. F. Dole, UK Delegation to NATO to C. W. Adams, FCO, 12 July 1974, DEFE 24/1499/E35, TNA; Report of Seminar on "Disaster Relief and the Military Forces," 3 March 1977, held at the Cavalry Club, London, 24/1500/E58, TNA; A Hunter, Defence Department, FCO, to L Raine, DS15c, Ministry of Defence, "NATO Peacetime Disaster Relief Force," 3 June 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E50, TNA.

[393] Obituary, "Hugh Hanning: The Lessons Of War Taught Him To Love Peace," *The Guardian*, 26 May 2000.

[394] Hugh Hanning and World Veterans Federation, *The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces* (Praeger, 1967), vi.

[395] Hugh Hanning, *Defence and Development* (Royal United Service Institution, 1970), 4.

[396] John Bosmoworth, Disaster Relief, 25 March 1974, DEFE 24/1251/E103, TNA.

Hanning, was a transport force that would include helicopters, trucks and flat-bottomed boats. In addition to drivers, an element of sappers and signalers would be also useful, because during disasters communications were "almost as crucial a need as transport."[397] The defense forces were especially equipped to provide such aid, because "they move faster, and can operate in chaotic conditions better, than civilian elements." Furthermore, Hanning added, "armed forces already exist, so that only operational costs are involved," and because "they are self-sustaining." NATO could be perfect for such a role since it could supply the systematic co-ordination and contingency planning which is the chief deficiency in transport arrangements at the moment.[398]

Disaster relief, for Hanning, was seen not only as a humanitarian mission but also as a counter-insurgency technique. "Today, unlike 1949," he argued, "the challenge to the West is bigger than the military threat of Russia to Europe, alarming though that threat remains. Within the rubric of detente, a battle of hearts and minds in now beginning between Communism and democracy; and the battleground is the Third World. The weapons may or may not include military hardware –opinions vary sharply on the wisdom of this; but they must certainly include every means of demonstrating to the developing countries the sincerity of the West' compassion and concern for their welfare, Hearts and minds is the name of the game inaugurated by detente; and in that context the Atlantic Community must now seek greater harmonization of its policies in the civil as well as in the military sphere. Disaster relief falls on the border-line between the two. It presents a challenge to the West to prove by its actions that its values are superior to those of Communism. We possess the capability in overwhelming measure. We now need to develop the will.[399]

In 1974, Hanning was joined by Brigadier Blackman, who formerly worked at Oxfam, as they both tried to lobby for making NATO an international body, which would operate during peacetime function to relieve disasters.[400] Together they succeeded in interesting the Secretary-General of NATO Joseph Luns in their proposals with a view to exploring the possibility of that organization taking them up. Luns agreed that the image of NATO would benefit if it could do more. He proposed that a panel of the International Staff and the International Military Staff should be set up to consider a possible NATO disaster relief organization, which would, however, avoid any significant extra cost or staff in NATO. He did not elaborate on the role he envisage for NATO, but said that the panel should not necessarily follow the Hanning proposal.[401] The Northern Atlantic Council agreed that a joint International Staff/International Military Staff panel should propose an outline structure for a NATO Disaster Relief Organization. The Council subsequently agreed to further studies being undertaken on the understanding that no commitment by nations was involved in so doing and agreed that these studies should concentrate primarily on an organization of use in NATO countries. Although the

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397 Hugh Hanning, NATO & Disaster Relief, DS15c, "Disaster Relief – letter to US of S(RAF) from Mr. H. Hanning," 14 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E32, TNA.

398 Ibid.

399 Hugh Hanning, "NATO and Disaster Relief," *RUSI*; Dec 1, 1977; 122, 4: 31-24.

400 Obituary, "Hugh Hanning: The Lessons Of War Taught Him To Love Peace," *The Guardian*, 26 May 2000.

401 John Dolle, Ministry of Defence to Christian Adams, United Kingdom Delegation to NATO, Disaster Relief, 28 February 1974, DEFE 24/1251/E102/1, TNA; Peace Time Disaster Relief, DEFE 24/1251/E102, TNA.

UK Military Representative to NATO advised us in 1974 that support for the task among NATO Military Representatives was limited and unenthusiastic, and he has only recently confirmed that this is still the position, their work on it continues.[402]

Many, however, opposed Hanning's idea. Firstly, that NATO would support natural disasters was deemed unnecessarily costly, when there was UN unit allocated especially for this purpose. Another argument advanced against a NATO relief force was that it would not be welcomed by Third World countries who would suspect that it was designed for neocolonialist ends.[403] Furthermore, many countries who had their own domestic Disaster Unit preferred retaining full control– as well as publicity– of their own relief. Most importantly, many feared NATO infringement on local sovereignty. This fear was especially acute in aiding countries outside the NATO area. As a British Defence officials put it: "notwithoutstanding the enthusiastic noises made by the authorities of Niger about NATO assistance at the time of the Sahel famine in 1974, we doubt whether many non-NATO countries would be willing to invite NATO even for disaster relief purposes."[404]

Yet despite these objections, the idea that NATO would have a peacetime function for disaster relief still received a lot of traction among many British officials and non-governmental organizations such as Oxfam throughout the second half of the 1970s. The journal *Disasters*, founded in 1976 by the Overseas Development Institute, was only one example of institutional and scientific engagement with the problem of disasters –and natural disasters in particular– in the period.[405] New catastrophes such as the earthquakes in Lice (1975) Friuli (1976), and in Guatemala (1976) brought disasters back to the public agenda, as foreign troops were send to aid local authorities.[406]

The idea of adding a peacetime function to NATO was especially appealing because it became a way to justify NATO's existence during deterrence. According to its proponents, disaster relied was seen as a way "to enhance NATO's image."[407] It shows that "NATO could have another purpose than that of deterrence, which was likely to lead to its remaining in existence for a long time without giving any tangible benefits."[408] As

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[402] DS15c, "Disaster Relief – letter to US of S(RAF) from Mr. H. Hanning," 14 May 1976, DEFE24/1499/E32, TNA.

[403] Record of A Meeting Between the Minister of State and Representatives of the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility Held in the Foreign Commonwealth Office on Thursday 5 May 1977 at 1100 HRS, May 1977, DEFE 24/1500/E67/1, TNA.

[404] A Hunter, Defence Department, FCO, to L Raine, DS15c, Ministry of Defence, "NATO Peacetime Disaster Relief Force," 3 June 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E50, TNA.

[405] *Disasters*, Vol. 1. No. 1, p.l. Pergamon Press, 1977.

[406] DS15c, "Disaster Relief – letter to US of S(RAF) from Mr H Hanning," 14 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E32, TNA; Record of A Meeting Between the Minister of State and Representatives of the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility Held in the Foreign Commonwealth Office on Thursday 5 May 1977 at 1100 HRS, May 1977, DEFE 24/1500/E67/1, TNA; Report of Seminar on "Disaster Relief and the Military Forces," 3 March 1977, held at the Cavalry Club, London, 24/1500/E58, TNA; M R Morland to A J Hunter, "Disaster Relief," 25 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E44, TNA; "NATO Peacetime Disaster Relief Force," 27 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E40 , TNA; J F Dole, UK Delegation to NATO to A J Hunter, Defence Dept, "Disaster Relief," FCO, 12 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E35, TNA.

[407] "NATO Peacetime Disaster Relief Force," 27 May 1976, DEFE 24/1499/E40 , TNA.

[408] Bishop of Leicester, Record of A Meeting Between the Minister of State and Representatives of the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility Held in the Foreign

the British Minister for Overseas Development Frank Judd argued, "NATO was not just a defence alliance; it had a deeper value as the protector of the democratic way of life."[409] NATO, according to Judd, "had a *positive* role and value, and not merely the ultimately negative role of fighting a nuclear war."[410] Indeed, British officials agreed, Nixon thought environmental matters would help NATO's image, but "disaster relief seems an even better area in which the Alliance can show that it can use its military might for peaceful and humanitarian purpose."[411]

Although the scheme did not come to fruition until the 1980s, NATO ended up providing disaster relief to not only its own members but also to the postcolonial countries of West Africa. We can consider, then, the British case a model which held considerable importance on the world stage. Across the West, the shrinking of militaries in the mid-1970s generated a retoolment of the military for disaster relief. This was not always a policy which was aimed as a Cold War strategy against the Soviets, though as we have seen in some cases indeed it was. But it was a way to reinvigorate the military and justify its existence as an ethical body in charge of saving lives.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, in the 1970s the deployment of the military for disaster relief served multiple purposes: from "soft diplomacy" to training and generating new knowledge about places like sub-Saharan Africa. But in the process, nature was also "discovered" by the military. Instead of the Cold War and the Empire, the British military was repurposed and became a humanitarian actor engaged in the practice of saving lives and rescue. The emergence of "disaster militarism" might have been more prosaic and structural than ideological. But its consequences nonetheless generated new meanings of humanitarian governance and the right of intervention in the postcolonial order.

Commonwealth Office on Thursday 5 May 1977 at 1100 HRS, May 1977, DEFE 24/1500/E67/1, TNA.

[409] Frank Judd, Record of A Meeting Between the Minister of State and Representatives of the Church of England Board for Social Responsibility Held in the Foreign Commonwealth Office on Thursday 5 May 1977 at 1100 HRS, May 1977, DEFE 24/1500/E67/1, TNA.

[410] Ibid.

[411] J. W. D. Margetson to W J A Wilberforce, Defence Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "NATO Disaster Relief," 15 April 1977, 24/1500/E60 , TNA; See also A. E. Younger et al., "Military Aid to Civil Communities," *The RUSI Journal* 124, no. 1 (March 1, 1979): 3–12; Conference on The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces. Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief and Military Aid to the Civil Community. What Governments Can Do. 25 April 1978, Council Chambers, Coventry, U. K, *Disasters*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 171.

Part II

Chapter Three

Humanitarian Business

In an article from 2 March 1965 *The Times* declared, "Charity is now big business."[412] According to *The Times*, "[t]he conception of well-intentioned souls – the vicar's wife of the cartoons multiplied many times over – working in cramped offices and with only the vaguest idea of how money works, is wholly mistaken today."[413] The development of lucrative business strategies, charity shops, trading companies, and special investment funds had transformed humanitarian work altogether. Charities began employing more professional groups of experts, including businessmen and public relations experts. In this "commercial age,"[414] charities were doubling their profits through a new set of practices and a new humanitarian 'business.'

This chapter interrogates the development of this business of aid between the 1960s and the 1980s. In particular, I focus on the ways in which private businesses and multinational corporations became part of a community of aid through this new humanitarian business. In Britain, the relationship between aid and trade took a non-governmental form. Initially created to increase their revenue, British organizations realized their moral commitment could be furthered through economic communities of trade. In that they joined global trend, which incorporated private businesses and multinationals in the business of aid.

As the economic power of multinational corporations grew in the 1970s, I argue, international organizations and humanitarian charities realized the potential in collaborating with multinationals. Circulating goods, expertise and capital, these organizations realized that multinational corporations could be ideal candidate to join aid projects. In return, these collaborations allowed multinational corporations to penetrate new markets and gain access to Third World economies. By incorporating multinational corporations and private businesses, these new practices connected global humanitarianism to the global economy.

Humanitarian Industry

The origins of the collaboration between humanitarian organizations and private businesses were located already in the interwar period, when food companies like Nestlé helped charities like Save the Children by providing baby formula for some of their feeding programs.[415] These charities appealed to the business community for fundraising and donations for particular campaigns.

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[412] Special correspondent, "Business approach brings charities results," *The Times*, 2 March 1965.

[413] Ibid.

[414] Ibid.

[415] Lenore Manderson, "Shaping Reproduction: Maternity in Early Twentieth-Century Malaya." In *Maternities and Modernities: Colonial and Postcolonial Experiences in Asia and the Pacific*. K. Ram and M. Jolly, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 26–49; Nancy Rose Hunt,

However, it was only towards the second half of 1960s when charities began collaborating with corporations and multinationals through donations of funds and goods on a more permanent basis. From 1965 onwards organizations like Oxfam set up a new industrial section with the aim of developing commercial schemes that benefited both sides by persuading companies either to set up businesses in underdeveloped areas or to send skilled British craftsman abroad.[416] For Oxfam as well as other charities, the shift towards the private sector was part of a larger transition towards professionalization in the period. Many charities, as we will see in the following chapters, by the 1960s established their own trading and industrial sections. They also began employing public relation firms and develop new press offices to increase their income and appeal to the public.

As such, charities also approached private businesses. Recognizing the growing power of multinational corporations in the period , Oxfam – and later other British humanitarian organizations – mobilized and cooperated with corporations in providing tools, funding and expertise to provide humanitarian aid. This cooperation helped humanitarian organizations like Oxfam to become "a buoyant in a quarter of a century as any big business."[417] Humanitarianism had become not just a business but also an industry.

On June 22, 1965 Oxfam got Sir Miles Thomas, formerly the Director of Morris Motors and Chairman of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (later to become British Airways), to write a direct appeal on its behalf to every public company quoted on the London Stock Exchange. The letter emphasized the profit corporations could gain through Oxfam's aid schemes. Rather than using emotional appeal, which Oxfam recognized as an effective approach to fundraise from individuals as consumers, the letter used economistic reasoning "to tackle industry."[418]

The letter was attached to booklets, which laid out this reasoning. It explained how Oxfam and companies could work together for mutual benefit citing the example of how the Rover Company had made special arrangements to supply Land Rovers to developing countries. As countries increased their purchasing power Rover's charitable action soon became of substantial commercial benefit. Many food companies operated similar schemes. An attraction to most business people was the tax benefit of working

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"'Le Bebe En Brousse': European Women, African Birth Spacing and Colonial Intervention in Breast Feeding in the Belgian Congo." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21, no. 3 (January 1, 1988): 401–432; Janice Boddy, "Remembering Amal: On Birth and the British in Northern Sudan." In *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*. Patricia Kaufert ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 28–57; Jane Turrittin, "Colonial Midwives and Modernizing Childbirth in French West Africa." In *Women in African Colonial Histories*. Jean Allman, Susan Geiger, and Nakanyike Musisi, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 71–94; Margaret Jolly, "Other Mothers: Maternal 'Insouciance' and the Depopulation Debate in Fiji and Vanuatu, 1890–1930. In *Maternities and Modernities: Colonial and Postcolonial Experiences in Asia and the Pacific*. K. Ram and M. Jolly, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 177–212; B. McElhinny,"Kissing a Baby Is Not at All Good for Him: Infant Mortality, Medicine, and Colonial Modernity in the U.S.-occupied Philippines." *Peace Research Abstracts Journal* 42, no. 6 (2005).

[416] From our special correspondent, "Business approach brings charities results," *The Times*, 2 March 1965.

[417] Geoffrey Moorhouse, "Second Opinion: Oxfam," *The Sunday Time Magazine*, 17 December 1967.

[418] "Help and Self Help," *The Times: Review of industry & technology*, End of 1965.

with charities as the income from these sponsorship schemes was tax-free. Finally, to demonstrate how efficiently Oxfam deployed these resources and ran its business their accounts were included in the booklet.[419]

The appeal was highly successful. It cost only £500 and brought in £15,000. Heinz donated 50,000 dozen cans of baby food and Tesco donated £10,000 worth. Green Shield allowed Oxfam double redemption value in cash on trading stamps. John Holt (Liverpool) donated a commercial vehicle worth £2,5000 for use in Nigeria. Express Diary chipped in some of its Wonder-milk. Other donations included a drilling rig from Marshalls (Halifax) for use a drought-ridden Bechuanaland. In 1965 alone the contributions from British industries reached £61,000.[420]

The appeal became the basis for a cooperation and integration of private business into the humanitarian industry in Britain. Private industries were asked to help in other ways besides financial contributions. Oxfam targeted British industrialists and appealed to make them ethically responsible towards aiding developing countries by supporting their programs or donating goods. In addition to financial donations and gifts of goods, it also incorporated businesses in Oxfam projects and got them to assist in the training of overseas students in industrial skills. In return, since most contributions were in the forms of donations, these companies had a portion of their revenue exempt from tax.

In addition, Oxfam also recruited the Co-operative Movement and Trade Unions. Appealing to their sentiments of a mutual solidarity and welfare, Oxfam approached these bodies and asked them to assist the charity's aid programs through financial contributions. Support grew encouragingly: over 250 Co-operative Societies send money and Trade Union contributions in the year amounted to close on £10,000.[421] Through Oxfam's appeals, humanitarian interests became fused with those of workers and consumers.

During the 1970s other partnerships were forged between multinational corporations and various humanitarian charities. During the Sahel famine of 1973, for example, other charities like Christian Aid cooperated with the Rover and Mercedes companies and delivered trucks to Mali and Niger for various relief projects. The trucks were selected because there were others of their type in the region, and spares would be available from the local agents. At the same time, these companies could access markets in Francophone West Africa.[422] Other corporations like Nestlé and Heinz joined similar projects and provided foods and baby formula for various feeding centers run by humanitarian nongovernmental like the British Red Cross and War on Want.[423] Private businesses became more involved in the permanent operation of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. On the one hand, these businesses received publicity through their humanitarian work. On the other, British charities received support and equipment for their aid programs.

In the 1960s and 1970s British humanitarian organizations worked side by side with private companies and industries, as the latter tried to tap into new Third World

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[419] Ibid.

[420] Ibid.

[421] "Oxfam at Home," 1964, COM/3/1/17 OA.

[422] J. E. Todd, Sale Office Manager Mercedes-Benz (Great Britain) Ltd to P. Shipster, Aid Administration Division, MOD, 24 September 1973, CA4/A/1, CAA.

[423] Tehila Sasson, Milking the Third World: The Nestlé Boycott and the Making of Ethical Capitalism," *American Historical Review*, forthcoming 2016.

markets. In that respect, humanitarianism was not only shaped through big business, but big business also were shaped through humanitarianism. By collaborating with humanitarian organizations, multinational corporations were able to penetrate new markets and redistribute wealth. As the next section will demonstrate, this British collaboration was part of a larger trend in the period, and especially in the 1970s, when UN agencies will begin development programs with specific multinational businesses.

The Power of Multinationals

Oxfam's appeal to corporations was part of a larger international trend in the period between 1960s and 1980s. From the mid-1960s onwards various international institutions like the United Nations began collaborating with corporations from across the world, but especially Anglo-American ones. In that respect, although the British collaborations between aid and corporations was largely non-governmental in its form, British humanitarianism also took part in a global process of integrating private industries and multinational corporations. By the mid-1970s multinationals became important agents of aid.

The integration of multinationals to the business of aid reflected broader changes in the world order. The term "multinational corporation" itself was first used by David Lilienthal at a conference at Carnegie Mellon University in 1960,[424] but it was towards the end of the 1960s that multinationals became central actors within a global and deregulated economy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, multinational corporations became important actors in the global economy[425] Performing over 25 percent of world production of goods and services at that time,[426] multinationals emerged as a serious force to be reckoned with. By the early 1970s, contemporaries recognized multinationals as a global force, and as a result, governments and international agencies began considering how they will be incorporated in the business of aid.

The story was partially about the end, and in many ways the failures, of the First Development Decade.[427] While some criticized the presence of multinationals in the

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[424] Although as historians have shown the history of multinational enterprise can be dated back as far as the eighteenth century. Stephen J. Kobrin, "Multinational corporations, the protest movement, and the future of global governance," in *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* Alfred D. Chandler et al.

[425] For more about multinationals in the 1970s, especially US-based one, see Vernie Alison Oliveiro, "The United States, Multinational Corporations, and Globalization," in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. Niall Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press, 2011); Vernie Alison Oliveiro, "The United States, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Globalization in the 1970s" 2010..

[426] John Fred Weston and Carl Halford Madden, *The Case for the Multinational Corporation* (Praeger, 1977), ix.

[427] The first UN Development Decade was launched by the General Assembly in December 1961. It called on all member states to intensify their efforts to mobilize support for measures required to accelerate progress toward self-sustaining economic growth and social advancement in the developing countries. With each developing country setting its own target, the objective would be a minimum annual growth rate of 5% in aggregate national income by the end of the decade. See for example, Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice* (Indiana University Press, 2008). Recently historians have explored the colonial origins of the development project Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development:*

global South, for others in the aid world corporations promised to solve economic disparities and help eradicate world poverty. Rather than targeting national economies as a whole as their object of aid, as the United Nations did in 1960 when it set its objective an annual growth of 5% of gross national product of every country, this period saw new solutions for the developing economies. As international organizations were moving away from big development projects, multinationals held the potential to inject funds and resources into Third World economies. The focus on multinationals represented a new commitment to the interconnectivity between the First and Third World economies, through specific industries rather than focusing exclusively on national economies.

But development programs and relief aid in this period were not separated. And as multinationals became involved in the business of aid so did they also become new agents of humanitarianism. Through programs to develop pesticides, agricultural by-products, or protein-enhanced products, multinationals became part of the project of feeding the world's hungry. This was especially true by 1974, when the UN declared a world food crisis as numerous states in Sub-Sahara Africa suffered from severe famines. While Malthusian anxieties about world populations versus world resources receded, multinationals emerged as a new solution to humanitarian concerns of world hunger and chronic malnutrition. They had the funds and the resources to carry food and medicine across borders as well as to develop new solutions for health and nutritional problems. As such, they could also transfer technology and management expertise.

According to a report by the non-profit research and training institution the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, multinationals would help balance the growing world population by providing it with goods and resources. "The 1970s are a decade of grace in which man must bring population growth and good production into balance," stated the report, "or watch the world deteriorate into a miserable place for human existence. The recent cooperative integrated efforts of many individuals, governments, industries and international agencies have "stirred hope, where there was none a short time ago, that this balance may be achieved."[428] Under this Malthusian logic, multinationals were tasked with providing an answer to scarcity.

International by definition, multinationals would also forge interdependence between the developed and developing countries. For their proponents, the multinational corporation held the promise of globalizing the economy and encouraging the flow of capital, in ways that government-based institutions simply couldn't. For industrials like Lee L. Morgan, the President and Chief Operating Officer, Caterpillar Tractor Company, multinationals were "the main channel through which products, goods, and services flow throughout the world."[429] They were also, "the structural base on which the world economy operates."[430] As such, "we have a responsibility to ourselves and to those we

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The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4; Frédérique Apffel Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin, eds., *Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture, and Resistance* (Clarendon Press WIDER Studies in Development Economics, 1990); Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*; Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*; Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*.

[428] International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, *CIMMYT*. (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, 1972), 74.

[429] Lee L. Morgan, "Forward," in John Fred Weston and Carl Halford Madden, *The Case for the Multinational Corporation*, ix.

[430] Ibid.

serve through our labors, to reflect in a serious, thoughtful manner on our role in a complex and political international environment."[431] According to Morgan's predictions, multinationals could potentially feed, cloths, house, and utilize "a population that will exceed 6 million by the year 2000."[432]

This vision was not only shared by industrials like Morgan. Government officials like Carl Madden, the Chief Economist in the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, also advocated that multinationals would take a lead role in what previously was exclusively the territory – in more ways than one – of the state. According to Madden, "the multinational has offered a most effective way to use work human and natural resources. It has offered an adaptable ways for people of different cultures, ideologies, and values to work together. It has offered an effective way of transferring a package of capital goods, management, marketing know-how, and technology from one country to another. It has excelled in modern management and in producing and marking innovative goods and services."[433] Similarly, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the congressmen and US ambassador to India (later to become the American representative for the UN), claimed that "combining modern management with liberal trade policies," multinationals were "arguably the most creative international institution of the twentieth century."[434]

Such praise sounded almost utopian. For many experts in the business of aid and global governance, it was multinationals that were seen the most promising institution of the decade.[435] "[O]perating in an alienate of growing world interdependence, freedom of thought, and rising levels of education," wrote Madden, the multinational corporation, is "a brilliant way for people to organize voluntarily for growth, innovation, and technology transfer."[436] With transnational bona fides, the multinational corporation was seen as a way to create a global village. Circulating capital, experts, and knowledge, the multinational offered a way to globalize and connect distant communities from the North and the South. For its advocates, the multinational corporation held political as well as economic promise of democratizing, feeding and modernizing Third World communities.

This faith in multinationals also translated in to formal collaborations with non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental institutions. The UN agency for child rights and emergency relief UNICEF, for example, hoped to cooperate with multinationals on more than 100 projects charged with milk distribution, as well as in developing protein-rich foods.[437] Other agencies like International Chamber of Commerce, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Development

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[431] Ibid.

[432] Ibid.

[433] Carl Madden, "Introduction," in John Fred Weston and Carl Halford Madden, *The Case for the Multinational Corporation*, 3.

[434] *Industrial Economist* (S. Viswanathan, 1976), 216.

[435] Similarly see Vanessa Ogle's argument about the New Economic International Order (NEIO), as a solution from the global South to economic rights. Vanessa Ogle, "State Rights Against Private Capital: The 'New International Economic Order (NIEO)' and the Struggle Over Aid, Trade, and Foreign Investment, 1962-1981," *Humanity*, Volume 5, Issue 2.

[436] Carl Madden, "Introduction," in John Fred Weston and Carl Halford Madden, *The Case for the Multinational Corporation*, 4.

[437] Statement by representatives of international organizations, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Industry Cooperative Programme, Industry Cooperative Programme: General Committee, 6th Session 23 and 24 March 1970, FAO Headquarters, Rome : Summary Record (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1970), 5.

Program, also collaborated with multinationals in various agro-industrial projects. For those agencies, corporations offered an important component for aid and relief projects, especially in the transfer of technology and management expertise.

No organization worked more closely with multinationals than the United Nations' largest specialized agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This collaboration began in the early 1950s, when the United Nations looked at three groups for the necessary technological, managerial and financial resources to implement development theories and projects: the World Bank, regional banks, and industry. Public sector organizations preferred to work together, but increasingly the need for implementation became critical. At the same time, the FAO started to change its orientation from data collection and technical advice into a development organization under Director-General Binary Ranjan Sen (1956-67). By the mid-1960s, the United Nation's development funds had funneled about 40% of the United Nations development funds through the FAO.

In 1965 Sen suggested to the ministers of agriculture of the member nations of FAO that the management ability, technical know-how, scientific experience and capital resource of the leading corporations in Europe and North America should be mobilized to support the FAO's efforts. Encouraged by earlier examples of cooperation between private industry and the FAO in fields such as forestry, fisheries and fertilizer, Sen proposed to establish more continuous liaisons. Instead of contacts with industry through special panels and various ad hoc advisory committees, Sen sought a more permanent industry-FAO relationship for the implementation of FAO development projects in Third World nations.[438] He explored these possibilities in meetings with industry executives on trips to Chicago, New York, Paris, and Rome between April and June 1965.

These discussions eventually led, in 1966, to the creation of "Industry Cooperative Program" (ICP), a program that linked, through the FAO, between multinational agribusiness firms and developing countries. The Industry Cooperative Program was, in the words of FAO Director General Boerma, a "joint venture between transnational agribusiness corporations and the UN."[439] The program was a unique effort to bring multinational business inside the United Nation system with the primary objective of stimulating agro-industrial expansion in the developing world. It was hoped to be the "most effective arm in [the] struggle for economic and social development in the poorer countries of the world."[440] Members explicitly had to be "multis" to operate internationally. It was also hoped that collaboration with multinational firms would bring equity investors and other forms of financing for UN projects and generally assist the FAO in its development projects.

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[438] Lewis D. Solomon, *Multinational Corporations and the Emerging World Order* (Kennikat Press, 1978), 161-164.

[439] Christian Gerlach, "Illusions of Global Governance: Transnational Agribusiness inside the UN System," in *Food and Globalization. Consumption, Markets and Politics in the Modern World*, ed. Alexander Nützenadel and Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2008), 193–211. Cees J. Hamelink, *The Politics of World Communication*. (SAGE, 1994), 40-42.

[440] A. H. Boerma, Director-general, "Industry Cooperative Programme," 6th Session of the General Committee, 23 and 24 March 1970, FAO Headquarters, Rome, Annex 1 in Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Industry Cooperative Programme, *Industry Cooperative Programme: General Committee, 6th Session 23 and 24 March 1970, FAO Headquarters, Rome : Summary Record* (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1970), 13-16.

The program initially included eighteen companies, mostly from the USA and Britain. By the mid-1970s, it comprised of more than a hundred corporations from nearly 20 countries that included: Imperial Chemicals Inc. (ICI), BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Caterpillar, Ford, Fiat, Voest-Apline, Cargill, Mitsubishi, Pillsbury, Heinz, Nestlé, and Unilever.[441] As Sir George Bishop, the first chairman of the Program put it, the Program sought to demonstrate what big corporations can offer to developing countries as "increasing agricultural output and putting new lands into agricultural production is a complex process which requires the presence of transnational firms."[442]

The Program represented the growing power of multinational corporations to the new structures of global governance. Multinationals, or in Sen's words "the economic giants of the world,"[443] would transfer technological and managerial skills to the global South. Their independence from state-based agendas as well as their interest in continuous growth through investment, would also guarantee their enduring presence in refueling Third World economies. Sen was nonetheless insistent that the "[p]olitical sovereignty or national security of underdeveloped nations [were] not imperiled by multinationals."[444]

In return, the Program provided multinational corporations with a "special status."[445] It acted as a public relations and lobbying organization on behalf of multinational agribusiness firms, and enabled industry to gain access to international discourse about foods and development.[446] Through the Program, multinationals gained a strong influence on FAO policy and valuable information on forthcoming investment opportunities. For example, in the 1970s Ken MacKean**,** and FAO staff member located in Nigeria, regularly reported to the FAO on opportunities in the fruit and vegetable processing industries in Nigeria.[447] The Program therefore enabled multinationals to tap into Third World markets. Indeed, its "country missions" defined the specific needs of places like Sri Lanka, Cameroon, Brazil, Liberia, Pakistan, Colombia, and Kenya and facilitated collaborations between multinationals, the UN, and Third World governments to meet them.[448]

Other projects helped industries expand their markets. The Cyprus carob project, for example, developed by the British-base multinational agribusiness Tate & Lyle Ltd. in 1970 experimented in converting carob beans to protein. The project began after Tate & Lyle conducted a larger research over the previous years, aimed at converting the sugar content of the carob into a protein-rich animal food. After developing the chemical process, tests indicated the protein feed was satisfactory for small animals. The next step,

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[441] Christian Gerlach, "Illusions of Global Governance: Transnational Agribusiness inside the UN System," in *Food and Globalization. Consumption, Markets and Politics in the Modern World*, ed. Alexander Nützenadel and Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2008), 193–211.

[442] In Lewis D. Solomon, Multinational Corporations, 161-164.

[443] Samarendra Chandra Sen, *Multinational Corporations in the Developing Countries*, 9.

[444] Ibid, 192.

[445] John Madeley, *Big Business, Poor Peoples: The Impact of Transnational Corporations on the World's Poor* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 160-161.

[446] Lewis D. Solomon, *Multinational Corporations*, 161-164.

[447] Ibid.

[448] J. A. C. Hugill, "Agribusiness and the Industry Cooperative Program," Conference: Science and Agribusiness in the Seventies and Agribusiness Council, eds., *Agricultural Initiative in the Third World: A Report on the Conference--Science and Agribusiness in the Seventies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975).

tests with pigs and ruminants, required production trials multiplying the few kilos a week produced at laboratories to a ton a week in a pilot plant. The company then approached the Program to examine international agency assistance in a cooperative feasibility venture. After consideration by FAO's Animal Production and Agricultural Services Divisions and in cooperation with experts from the company, Cyprus was chosen as a site for a possible cooperative pre-investment project. Cyprus was especially attractive because carob bean were easily accessible and cheap. Eventually, a joint UNDP/FAO/industry mission went to Cyprus to investigate possibilities and finally recommended the Government of Cyprus officially request UNDP assistance for establishing a pilot plant to test the Tate & Lyle process. The project was mutually beneficiary. For the UNDP the project as a potential model for a larger scale regional project to solve acute malnutrition in the entire Mediterranean. On the industry side, Tate & Lyle received full access to the data of this testing and was fully licensed to exploit the findings for commercial purposes.[449]

The Industry Cooperative Program reached its full potential in 1974 when the FAO invited industry to officially participate in its World Food Conference. The conference was prompted by the world food crisis, when a series of famines in West Africa to Bangladesh linked to shortage of grain in world markets and to tripling grain prices that seemed to herald a new age of scarcity. The crisis generated new conceptions of "food security" and catalyzed the quest for solutions to it by the international community. It also emerged in congruence with other global emergencies such as the crisis of the international monetary system, the global economic crisis of 1973-5, the oil crisis and, which all intensified international economic competition. The Conference therefore was aimed to facilitate emergency solutions for the huge anticipated import requirements from Asian, African and Latin American countries for basic foodstuffs for which they would hardly be able to pay for.

The crisis also served as an incentive for the breakthrough of new concepts in international development policies. Instead of industry and infrastructure, as in older approaches, the Conference emphasis on agriculture in general called not merely for production-oriented 'green revolution' concepts (which favored large-scale production) but identified the rural poor – and above all small peasants more than landless workers, tenants and share-croppers – as the key to both the hunger problem and staple food production. International organizations, non-governmental organizations and multinationals therefore were aimed to aid the rural poor by modernizing their production. Subsistence farmers were to produce for the market and to use modern inputs such as fertilizer, high-yielding seeds, pesticides, irrigation and machinery. Up to 1000 million self-sufficient families, or one-fifth of the planet's population, were thus slated for integration into national markets and national systems of commercial exportation, thereby conveniently engraving the monetized world economy. Private companies were ideal candidates to expand capitalist structures.

The Industry Cooperative Program allowed corporations to have a voice in the conference. The leaders of the conference had originally planned to model the World Food Conference on the Stockholm gathering and deny industry a voice. Dr. Luigi

[449] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Industry Cooperative Programme, *Industry Cooperative Programme: General Committee, 6th Session 23 and 24 March 1970, FAO Headquarters, Rome : Summary Record* (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1970).

Desert, chairman of the Program, and Sir George Bishop, vice chairman, met with Sayed Mare, the secretary of the World Food Conference and agreed that the Program will run a "teach-in" for industry and produce specific proposals to increase agricultural output in developing countries. This became the Toronto Consultation in September 1974. More than 150 senior executives from companies and financing institutions in 28 countries participated in the consultation. Leaders of the consultation focused the attention of industry participants on the areas where business expertise could most effectively increase food production and availability in developing countries. By providing markets and profits this approach appealed to businesses.

The Toronto Consultation report stressed certain prerequisites on the part of developing nations for attracting significantly greater agribusiness management and technical expertise to raise food production. Participants recommended that developing nations should make a firm commitment that agriculture would receive the highest priority in developmental plans and the necessarily locally available resources. Business also sought arbitration in case of disagreement encouragement of foreign investment in agriculture by host nations, provision for a fair return to investors, including an equitable repatriation of profits, and protection of intellectual property. The Toronto Consultation report became an official World Food Conference document and served as a basic starting point for industry interventions. The Conference also marked the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, and therefore fused businesses into a new international commitment for food as basic right. Human rights programs came to relay not only on aid workers and governments but also on multinationals. The 1970s, marked therefore not only the emergence of human rights as a last utopia,[450] but also the emergence of business to protect them that afforded multinationals a key role.

Humanistic Capitalism and the Rise of Corporate Accountability

In an essay from 1974 Willis W. Harman, the Director of the Center for the Study of Social Policy Stanford Research Institute, argued that "corporations [must] assume an active responsibility for creating a healthy society and a habitable planet—not as a gesture to improve corporate image or as a moralistically undertaken responsibility, but because it is the only reasonable long-run interpretation of 'good business.'"[451] "In this "post-industrial epoch," Harman argued, various forms of socialism "have been tried and found wanting."[452] The legitimacy of business institutions – the same ones which previously brought prosperity and raised production – have now been put into question. Harman proposed the creation of a new alternative to organizing this "post-industrial society." This alternative will be a new form of a more ethical capitalism and will be generated by private businesses, multinationals, and industrialists that will promote quality of life and ethical values. Harman called it "humanistic capitalism."[453]

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[450] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

[451] W. W. Harman, "Humanistic Capitalism," J*ournal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1974

[452] Ibid

[453] W. W. Harman, "Humanistic Capitalism."

Harman's idea of "humanistic capitalism" came to represent a new ethic of business during the 1970s. It was part of what he called a "self-realization ethic," in which not only of governments but also of corporations had the responsibility of promoting public good. In an age when production of sufficient goods and services was no longer a pressing social imperative in Europe, Harman argued, "an adequate economic system must emphasize a sufficiency of work roles that not only foster growth of self-esteem and actualization of potentialities, but facilitate [the] movement toward self-definition and self-actualization as well." In this individual and psychological approach to poverty, it was the corporation which played an active role and which were ought to become "one of the main places where humans find their self-fulfillment," including through programs of aid and welfare.[454]

The essay mirrored a different aspect of the new ethical capitalism. This ethical capitalism was one that was practiced not only by ordinary people – as we have seen in the case of the charity shops and fair trade – but also by multinational businesses and private corporations. According to Harman, corporations had the responsibility to promote humane and ethical values of democracy, prosperity and progress and, in particular, to became active participants in the eradication of world hunger. Although this transmutation of corporate goals may seem at first glance hopelessly idealistic, Harman claimed, it was in fact practical in the long run. "Two recent trends make it so – the emergence of huge multinational corporations with economic powers comparable to those of nations, and the growth of mass capital market." Multinationals play at least as important roles here as national governments and international agencies, Harman suggested. As such, they ought to become key actors in aid programs and in humanitarian business. In the end, "good business policy must become one with good social policy."[455]

Not everyone, of course, shared this utopian and overly positive vision about the future of multinationals. But their detractors also recognized that multinationals has a new prominence in the business of humanitarianism and global governance. While private businesses and multinationals joined a growing global humanitarian community, they were also critiqued by it. Social scientists, aid experts and activists were highly critical and expressed concerns about the impact multinationals had on the world economy as well as on global welfare. Some stressed that multinationals undermine and frustrate national power.

One of the most well-known critique of multinationals came in 1971 from Raymond Vernon of Harvard, in a book called *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprise*.[456] The book put forth the central theme that "sovereign states are feeling naked." Vernon argued that size, strength, and technological superiority of vast

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[454] "At the planetary level," Harman specified, large multinational corporations had an important role to play in the planning process. The largest among them had more economic power than most of the members of the United Nations. National boundaries became increasingly permeable to corporations. They, more than most other social institutions, have a vested interest in the future well-being of and access to the world economy. Thus they have the technical and financial resources as well as the potential motivation to contribute to planning for habitability at the planetary level. If their goals have become aligned with those of the larger society, they will indeed do so. Ibid

[455] Ibid.

[456] Raymond Vernon, "Economic Sovereignty at Bay." *Foreign Affairs* 47 (1968): 110–110; Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay,* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

worldwide enterprises made nation-states needing their jobs, money, and know-how no match for them to bargaining.[457]

Others stressed that multinationals exploit Third World markets. These critics echoed a more familiar approach to corporate power, though did necessarily negate the role of multinationals altogether. Instead they called for the regulation of corporate power through an international laws and institutions. In a more populist and overt account, in 1974 the political scientist Richard J. Barnet and economist Ronald E. Muller in their best seller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations*, critiqued multinational power for eroding national sovereignty. Serialized in the *New Yorker* magazine, the book reveled illegal political contributions at home and of bribery abroad by major US multinationals and thus have added to popular suspicion of multinational power.[458] Multinationals, according to Barnet and Muller, have too much power and use it to keep host countries from "optimum development." They argued that the "oligopoly" structure of multinationals caused them to resist bringing in the "best technology, overprice their own imports and undercharge for experts, use scarce local capital instead of more plentiful home country capitol and so to 'exploit' host countries." Multinationals were independent of host governments and therefore create political instability by doting tax and security laws.

These critiques on multinationals resulted in a series of calls for the limit of corporate responsibility and to eventually the creation of a corporate code of conduct. Acknowledging the growing power of multinationals, albeit suspicious of their influence, government officials, international organizations and activists attempted to find ways in which corporations could be integrated into a more ethical forms of market exchange. Rather than negating the participation of multinational corporations in development and humanitarian programs, activists and aid experts called for the creation of mechanisms which will uphold corporations to certain type of ethical and human rights values. Business practices themselves, activists demanded, had to adopt a commitment to human rights.

British charities took an active role in the call for upholding corporations to human rights values. The humanitarian organization War on Want, in particular, focused its attention and campaigns on various industries, such as drug, tobacco, milk and tea, and their influence on Third World communities. In a campaign against labor abuses in Sri Lanka, for example, War on Want criticized British tea estates in violating laborer's human rights. Through appalling living conditions and by playing into political tensions between the Tamil and Sri Lankan communities, the charity argued, British corporations were making an easy profit without providing minimal healthcare and food. Other campaigns similarly emphasized working conditions as well as poor health regulations, which multinationals companies endorsed in their factories abroad. Even before the

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[457] Samarendra Chandra Sen, *Multinational Corporations in the Developing Countries*. Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1978.

[458] Richard J. Barnet, and Roanld E. Müller. *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974). Seee also Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*, (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future." *International Organization* 29, no. 1 (1975): 37–60.

1980s discourse about fair trade, therefore,[459] humanitarian charities protested against abusive labor and trading practices by multinationals corporations.

On a more international level, governments and inter-governmental agencies sought to find solutions to these issues through committees and regulations, which would potentially create a code of conduct. In the United States, several Congressional committees investigated multinational corporations' activities both at home and abroad. At the same time, in its Declaration on the Establishment of New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the United Nations encouraged governments to take a stronger hand in regulating multinational enterprises. Multinationals became the center of international discourse.

In 1972, the UN also created the Commission of Transnational Corporations, the organization's first permanent institution on multinational enterprises, which was to study the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially in developing countries.[460] Following this, the commission soon decided (despite the objections of the United States) that its highest priority would be the creation of a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.[461] The Code was to include, among other issues, the protection of the environment, human rights, and the adoption of high standards of corporate governance. While the negotiations over the creation of the Code were eventually abandoned, it nonetheless represented a new international concern about the growing international role of multinational corporations and their impact on the Third World.[462]

No campaign was more vocal in calling for the regulations of corporate power than the one led against formula companies and particularly Nestlé in the second half of the 1970s. The campaign was began in the early 1970s when British activists and humanitarian organizations like War on Want, pointed the finger at formula for the root cause for chronic malnutrition and child mortality in the Third World. According to these activists formula companies like Nestlé abused the ignorance of Third World mother by aggressively marketing and selling them products that could harm their babies. Underdeveloped societies, these activists argued, could not cope with the facilities needed to use these produces (sterilize bottles for example or even get clean and running water), as well as could not sieve through the misinformation these corporations were advertising to them. What began as a local campaign against formula corporations, however, soon became international when it traveled to the Continent and across the Atlantic. In the United States it joined a critique of corporate accountability, led mostly by Christian

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[459] Naomi Klein, *No Logo*, (Picador, 2009); Mathew Hilton, "Consumer Politics in Post-war Britain" in Martin J. Daunton, and Matthew Hilton. *The politics of consumption: material culture and citizenship in Europe and America* (Berg, 2001); Mark Bevir and Frank Trentmann, "Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas, Practice, and Governance," in *Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas and Politics in the Modern World*, Mark Bevir, Frank Trentman (ed.), (Cambridge, 2004); Lawrence B. Glickman, *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

[460] Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Thibaut De Saint-Phalle, Gail W. Williams, *Multinational Corporations* (A. S. Barnes and Co., Inc., 1975).

[461] For more on the negotiations of the Code and the role of the United States see Vernie Alison Oliveiro, "The United States, Multinational Corporations, and Globalization," *The Shock of the Global*, Niall Ferguson (et al).

[462] Tehila Sasson, Milking the Third World: The Nestlé Boycott and the Making of Ethical Capitalism."

organizations in New York and Minneapolis, which in turn began a boycott against one of these companies – one which ironically was providing a lot of supplies to disaster zones – that is, Nestlé.[463]

Together these British and American organizations pressured governments and international organizations to adopt a new code of marketing and ethics for multinational corporations. The result was the first the International Code of Marketing created by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 1981. According to WHO/UNICEF, the issue of breast-feeding in non-Western societies "cannot be considered apart from social and economic development and the need for a new international economic order."[464] Through the WHO/UNICEF involvement, the problem of milk formula and multinational involvement in Third World economies was framed as a human rights violation.

The Code became the first international law for the regulation of multinational corporations.[465] The Code established an unprecedented level of corporate accountability through which multinational businesses could be defined and evaluated. It connected ethical issues, and more specifically human rights ones, to multinational businesses, and bound corporations legally to the development project. Global justice was to be achieved through the market and through an ethical form of regulated capitalism rather than through state policy.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered some initial inquiry to the relationship between aid and businesses in the period between the 1960s and the 1980s. It examined how British humanitarianism participated in a growing international trend to appeal to multinational corporations as a new actor of aid. As such, it developed a new type of aid business which relied on private capital. In a period of economic globalization, international organizations started to collaborate with multinational corporations and integrate them to the business of aid. British humanitarianism was shaped by international trends like agribusiness aid projects and a new culture of corporate accountability. Through this culture, aid experts and diplomats encouraged multinationals to adopt humanitarian ethics as their logic and rational. As we shall see in the next chapter, this new humanitarian business was part of a larger transition in the period towards creating a new type of ethical capitalism and affective communities.

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[463] Ibid.

[464] Ibid, 178.

[465] *The New Internationalist*, "Baby Milk Issue," 1982.

Chapter Four

Affective Economies

The story of aid in the 1970s has largely been told from the perspective of high-diplomacy and aid experts. Through programs for macro-economic development and modernization schemes, scholars have explored how governments and international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank have sought for ways to feed the world's hungry thus forging a new global community.[466] In this chapter, however, I focus on one crucial and understudied part of this story: the way in which ordinary Britons were incorporated into this community. In that, I follow what the historian Matthew Connelly, echoing James Scott, has called to "see beyond the state,"[467] and examine how in the "global shock"[468] of the 1970s not only diplomats but also ordinary people became part of the project of feeding the world's hungry.

In particular, I trace the history of the charity shop, the trading company and transnational boycotts as they became popular between 1960s and the 1980s. By using the global and deregulated market as the basis for their actions these institutions integrated ordinary Britons as consumers to affective and economic global communities. Through the simple act of shopping, these consumers saw themselves as sharing the responsibility to a global rather than merely their immediate national community.

At the same time, I argue, the development of the charity shop, the trading company and the boycott movements also created a new economic culture in Britain. Although the connection between humanitarianism and capitalism was not new to the 1970s,[469] there was something novel happening this decade, when mass consumer culture, globalization and a de-regulated economy influenced humanitarian action. From the mailbox to the high-street, charity shops shaped a new consumer behavior in Britain from the mid-1960s onwards. Through trading companies, British charities realized their moral

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[466] The literature on development is too vast to be cited but for example see, James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); David C. Engerman, *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Univ of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Patrick Sharma, "The United States, the World Bank, and the Transformation of Development in the 1970s," *Diplomatic History*, 37:3 (2013): 572-604.

[467] Matthew Connelly, "Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Past and Present*, 193, November 2006.

[468] Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Patrick Allen Sharma, *Globalizing Development: Robert McNamara at the World Bank*, (Dissertation: University of California Los Angeles, 2010).

[469] Thomas L. Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2," *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (June 1, 1985): 547–66.

commitment could be furthered through economic communities of trade in the same period. Transnational boycotts became another method to protest against human right abuse and develop solidarities through the global market by the late 1970s. In using these institutions, humanitarian organizations, not only animated the British public but also created what can be called "affective economies," global economies that flourished through the business of aid.[470]

The Moral Economy of the Charity Shop

Charity shops represent a uniquely British form of humanitarian business. Although there are thrift stores in the United States and in Europe, selling donated and hand-made goods, charity shops were a British invention and became a highly valued part of British life. They are now an established feature of most high streets throughout the United Kingdom, serving a number of important social purposes, such as the recycling of clothing, as well as raising an essential core income for British charities and their work.[471]

In contemporary Britain, there are now estimated to be around five and a half thousand charity shops selling donated goods. According to some estimates, in the 1990s there were just over 3,200 charity shops, and by 2,000 they had nearly doubled to 6,300.[472] Oxfam, the clear market leader, developed from two shops in 1960 to 100 in 1967. By 1971 there were 319. In the mid-1990s the number shot up to 850 (See figure 1). These shops generated more than a third of Oxfam's total income. Indeed, charity shops became so prominent in contemporary Britain that from the 1940s onwards the numbers of commercial secondhand clothing shops declined as the number of charity shops mushroomed.[473] The majority of these shops are permanent, some occupying freeholds, and are located in prime commercial positions, particularly in high streets in country and market towns. In a survey recently held by the Charity Advisory Trust, 55% of all adults Britons have bought from a charity shop. Moreover, 86% of the population thinks the best thing to do with unwanted cloths is to donate them to charity and 93% think charity shops are a good way of raising funds for charity.[474]

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[470] Sara Ahmed, "Affective Economies," *Social Text* 22, no. 2 79 (June 20, 2004): 117–39; Anne-Marie D'Aoust, ed., *Affective Economies, Neoliberalism, and Governmentality* (Routledge, 2015).

[471] P. Revell, Famine to Feast. *The Guardian*, 25 February 1998; Jean Eaglesham, "Money: Charity Shops and the Cash That Won't Reach the Needy," *The Independent*, 2 February 1997.

[472] NGO Finance Charity Shops Survey. Phelan, D. (Ed.), *Working On the Chain Gang: Hard Labour for Charity Shops*, (Plaza, London, 1999).

[473] Hilary Blume, *The Charity Shops,* (London: Charities Advisory Trust, 1995), 9-10.

[474] Charities Advisory Trust (Great Britain), *The Public Perception of Charity Shops.* (Charities Advisory Trust, 1997), 3.



Figure 1. Income of Oxfam Shops, 1949-1988

But charity retailing was not invented in the second half of the twentieth century. Its origins lay in Victorian philanthropy and fundraising methods to aid the poor, the blind, and the disabled. In the 1820s, for example, charity bazaars became a popular method to raise donations for philanthropic causes. These bazaars sold second hand goods and handicrafts, raising on average around £1,000 per event. In December 1827 a four-day fan-fair in Brighton raised £1,315 for the Sussex County Hospital while in June 1833 a four-day bazaar in London raised £5,106 for the Society of Friends of Foreigners in distress.[475] The charity bazaars were part of a growing consumer culture in Victorian England, which used these pop-up markets to fundraise for political and social causes. The most famous one was the bazaar held by the 1945 Anti-Corn Law League held for 17 days, which raised £25,000.[476] By the mid-nineteenth century there were more than 1000 bazaars held across the country.

The charity bazaars were organized and run primarily by women from affluent backgrounds and allowed the inclusion of these women in the public world of politics. As such, the charity bazaars became part a growing consumer culture in Victorian England. They served as a precedent to the modern charity shop. Rather than operating as a protest against affluence they capitalized on it, and connected ethical and social issues with the practice of consumerism and shopping.[477]

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[475] Ian Mitchell, *Tradition and Innovation in English Retailing, 1700 to 1850: Narratives of Consumption* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014).

[476] Peter J. Gurney, "'The Sublime of the Bazaar': A Moment in the Making of a Consumer Culture in Mid-Nineteenth Century England," *Journal of Social History* 40, no. 2 (December 1, 2006): 385–405.

[477] Second hand clothing was also collected and given to pauper children by local charities. See in Clare Rose, *Making, Selling and Wearing Boys' Clothes in Late-Victorian England* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010); Vivienne Richmond, *Clothing the Poor in Nineteenth-Century England* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Similarly, in the East End, Jewish retailers opened secondhand shops for the poorer classes, which mended secondhand clothing to sell as new garments. In Henry Mayhew, *London Labour and the London Poor*, (1851), 121. For the religious

Clothing and shopping became an integral part of charity work, one developed by the Salvation Army stores created in the late nineteenth century. In 1886 the British Methodist William Booth, who founded the Salvation Army with his wife Catherine, suggested fighting poverty through a sort of "corporative shop." Based on his Christian ethics and social agenda, Booth aimed to create cooperative communities across Britain and its Empire that would help the poor rather than reforming the market to end inequality. The corporative shops were therefore part of a larger project Booth envisioned for a cooperative and self-sufficient community, which would feed and give employment to the poor.

According to Booth, there was a large degree of wasted goods in well-to-do homes that could be transformed to fuel employment for the poor. This employment would manifest itself in the collection of quality second-hand goods from affluent homes and into the renovation of broken goods in order to make them serviceable for further use.[478] The goods collected were then sold from 'salvage stores' in London and provincial centers to those unable to buy them new. Booth's main aim was to ease the living conditions of the poor and at the same time proclaim the Gospel of Christ to all who came into the shop.[479]

Salvation Army stores soon opened across the Empire and the White Dominions in places like Australia and Canada as part of community organizations for the "undesirable."[480] In Australia, for instance, Major James Barker formed the Prison Gate Brigade in 1883 as an attempt to combat recidivism (Prison Gate Brigade Homes, 1883–1930) after arriving from London in 1882. The Salvation Army store became part of a rehabilitation center for recently released prisoners, providing them with employment as well as food and clothing.[481] Indeed, throughout the early twentieth century an army of charitable shops was established both in Britain and across the world – the White Dominions in particular – as well as in the United States.[482]

The impact of the First and Second World Wars was crucial for the development of charity shops. The wars demanded the expansion of British charities for relief and reconstruction schemes, and necessitated new fundraising strategies. One of them was the creation of British charities' fundraising through pop-up "gift stores," which were usually part of larger fundraising events. For example, Save the Children and the Quaker's

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origins of fundraising methods see, Michelle Tusan, "The Business of Relief Work: A Victorian Quaker in Constantinople and Her Circle," *Victorian Studies* 51, no. 4 (2009): 633–61.

[478] William Booth, *In Darkest England and the Way Out* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[479] Norman H. Murdoch, *Origins of the Salvation Army* (Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1996); Henry Gariepy, *Christianity in Action: The International History of the Salvation Army* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009); Robert Sandall, Arch R. Wiggins, and Frederick Lee Coutts, *History of the Salvation Army: 1865-1878* (T. Nelson, 1947).

[480] Rachel J. Tolen, "Colonizing and Transforming the Criminal Tribesman: The Salvation Army in British India," *American Ethnologist* 18, no. 1 (1991): 106–25. This shift towards the White Dominions represented a larger trend in aid in the period as well as in a growing imperial community. For a discussion about the White Dominions as the Third British Empire see John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[481] Barbara Bolton, *Booth's Drum: The Salvation Army in Australia 1880-1980* (Sydney: Hodder, 1976), 109.

[482] See for example the American case in Susan Strasser, *Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash* (Holt Paperbacks, 2014), 155.

Society of Friends held such events to raise funds and donations from the public to aid starving Russians during the famine of 1921-22.[483] In the Second World War the Red Cross opened bazaars as well as around 150 pop up shops across the United Kingdom.[484] Each one of those stores was temporary and devoted to a specific campaign. Each targeted a specific community in Europe like Germany or Greece and collected goods and clothing to donate to that community. Similarly, other charities joined this trend in order to relieve and aid those who sought refuge during the experience of the total wars.

It was only in 1948, however, that the first permanent modern charity shop was opened, by Oxfam, a new humanitarian charity at the time. Founded during the Second World War as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam was created by scholars (like Gilbert Murray) and churchmen (like Rev T. R. Milford, the Vicar of the Oxford University Church) as a temporary organization to help Nazi-occupied Greece. Their hope was to arouse public and governmental concern about the plight of starving civilian families, and especially the children, in occupied Greece and Belgium.[485] In October 1943 the organization held a 'Greek Famine Relief Week,' which included Greek dancing, films and concerts. Together with a gift shop, which was opened during this week, the group raised £13,000 for shipping clothing and food for the starving children in Greece.[486] In the immediate post-war years the Committee lobbied the British public to donate for the relief of European countries, in general, and Germany, in particular. On 30 September 1948, when Europe started recovering from the war, the Committee decided not only not to close their operation but also to expand it. At the same time that international institutions like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, later the World Bank) expanded their mission from European reconstruction to development, Oxfam decided to become a permanent organization. In 1949 the Charity Commissioners approved the widening of Oxfam, and the group's object became "the relief of suffering arising as a result of war or any other cause in any part of the world."[487]

It was around this time that Oxfam opened its first shop in Oxford. The charity shop was the first shop to run beyond any particular campaign or a cause. While the Victorian bazaars and shops helped connect shopping to charity work, it was the Oxfam shop that shaped a new, ethical attitude to consumerism in the postwar period. The shop was devoted to all humanitarian appeals – both current and future – whether they were in Europe, the Empire or beyond. The idea behind it was to create a more stable income as well as to make good use of public donations for each of its appeals without discarding it after it ended. Located in 17 Broad Street and leased from the City Council, the shop was situated in one of the main streets in the center of Oxford and bordered by other shops and colleges.[488] It became the prototype for future shops.

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[483] See for example in EJ 242, A414 Save the Children Archives, University of Birmingham: Cadbury Research Library (SCA).

[484] Martin Price, *Social Enterprise: What It Is and Why It Matters* (Fflan, 2009); Beverly Gordon, *Bazaars and Fair Ladies: The History of the American Fundraising Fair* (Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1998).

[485] See Chapter Two for a more in depth discussion on Oxfam.

[486] Mervyn Jones, *Two Ears of Corn. Oxfam in action.* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), 28.

[487] Ben Whittaker, *A Bridge of People: A Personal View of Oxfam's First Forty Years*, (London: Heinemann, 1983), 18.

[488] Paul D. Sturge, Friends Service Council, March 1949, DIR/2/3/6/15, OA.

In November 1949 a full time manager called Joe Mitty was appointed. A former lieutenant in the Army's Hampshire Regiment, Mitty was the first paid Oxfam employee.[489] His years in the Civil Service, according to him, were formative for his own development and consciousness about world poverty and would later lead him to join Oxfam. "I joined Oxfam because I thought it was something I would like to be associated with," he argued in 1971. "I'd seen poverty on service in the East, on railway stations in Bengal and Calcutta. It strengthened my conviction to try and do something to help them."[490] Like many aid experts who joined Oxfam and other humanitarian organizations during the 1950s and 1960s, Mitty sense of duty was shaped by the experience of empire and its loss.[491]

Above all, however, Mitty was, in the words of the journalist Byron Rogers, "a super-salesman on the side of the angles."[492] In his hands, the shop at 17 Broad Street became a thriving business: its income doubled to £3,000 a year and climbed to over £10,000 by 1953. He sold almost everything: from a 300ft houseboat, to a donkey ("I put a 'For Sale' notice round its neck and stuck it outside the shop") and even the apples off a tree ("Someone gave me his unpicked apple crop. I put an ad in the paper with 'Purchaser Picks' on it").[493] Indeed, as Mitty himself admitted, he was more of a good salesman than anything else. "If you and I went into business," he told Rogers in an interview, "I think I could have made us a hell of a lot of money. I've got the energy."[494]

Throughout the 1950s Mitty ran the shop as his own, writing letters to wealthy housewives trying to solicit articles to sell in the shop. He took every donation: from golf clubs to candlesticks to fur coats, "Cartridge" Kodak camera and ski clubs to coffee cups and lace and electric saucepan, although the real items Mitty was after were jewelry and silverware. Donations of second hand clothing and shoes were given directly to refugees, while the rest of the items – jewelry, books, bric-a-brac –were sold in the shop.[495] Mitty was also behind the creation of the Oxfam Christmas cards, first designed in 1957 by Leslie Durham. Sold through the shops and by mail order, the cards quickly became a flourishing business, bringing in £18,500 profits by 1963.[496] Mitty strove to create a respectable shop, which catered to the middle and upper classes women of Oxfordshire.

By the early 1960s Oxfam opened three more gift shops, based on Mitty's model, in Guildford, Leeds and Cheltenham. In 1959, Oxfam also hired a Gift Appeals Organizer based in Leeds, and in 1963 another was taken on to look after stores in the south as their income grew exponentially. As these shops became professionalized, they also began sending mail-order catalogues, thus reaching a larger population of people across England. In the financial year 1963 these shops brought in £79,000, almost

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[489] "Oxfam shop founder dies aged 88," *BBC News*, 2 October 2007; "Joe Mitty" The Telegraph, 3 October 2007; "Joe Mitty," *The Times*, 4 October 2007; "Joe Mitty," The Guardian, 9 October 2007; "Joe Mitty Tireless worker for Oxfam," The Independent, 11 October 2007.

[490] Byron Rogers, "Salesman on the Side of the Angles," *The Guardian*, 3 August 1971.

[491] For a further discussion how imperial expertise have shaped humanitarian knowledge, especially during the period of formal decolonization and in the immediate years, see Chapters Two and Chapter Three.

[492] Byron Rogers, "Salesman on the Side of the Angles," *The Guardian*, 3 August 1971.

[493] Ibid.

[494] Ibid.

[495] See the various correspondences from the 1950s between Mitty and various donors. In DIR/2/3/6/15, OA.

[496] Maggie Black, 97.

doubling their proceeds in only two years. The number of Oxfam's charity shops grew from two in 1960 to 100 in 1967. In 1971 the Oxfam shops received a net of nearly £1 million and their success encouraged other charities to try high street trading. By the 1970s Christian Aid and Shelter also began opening shops across the British Isles. These charity shops became a major aspect of British fundraising for humanitarian purposes.

The press helped foster the success of these stores, as they grew in size and numbers throughout the 1960s. In the Christmas 1963, Oxfam organized a "gift appeal" in the *Daily Mail* in order to recruit donations of items from the general public. The gift appeal provided the shops with a tremendous boost in stock. It was estimated to have helped raise around £150,000.[497] Through appeals like this Oxfam used the press to make its activities and stores better known. "Before [the appeal] we were *almost* [a] household name," Oxfam's report claimed. "Now we are."[498] The appeal also publicized the stories of ordinary people who donated to Oxfam: The unmarried elderly lady of 80 who gave her "dearest earthly treasure," her mother's engagement ring or the Crufts' *habitué* who gave her pedigree poodle puppy to be later sold in the shop.[499] Through these stories, the appeal showed *Daily Mail* readers how ordinary Britons came to take part of Oxfam's mission. It showed the public that everyone – in any age group – could find something to donate to the shops and become humanitarian. The appeal created a "chain reaction" of bringing further support from the readers of the newspaper. Following the appeal, "[p]ledged Gift groups spr[u]ng up daily in unexpected places; many more suddenly, in office and factories." "Our army of supporters," according to Oxfam, "including the platoons of the young, grows daily."[500]

But the *Daily Mail* appeal was part of a much larger transition, as Oxfam began adopting a more business approach to humanitarian aid. From the mid 1960s and early 1970s Oxfam —and later other charities— began using marketing strategies, the press, and even celebrity culture to appeal to a larger body of contributors. This "Madison Avenue approach," as some called it,[501] helped the charity shops to raise large revenue**.** At the same time, it came to include consumers from all classes, as well as the youth. By developing a more professional approach to charity, humanitarian organizations came to include a wider community of Britons.

Already in the late 1950s, Oxfam began to broaden its appeals to include "traditional blue-color charitable working people."[502] By the 1960s charity became the activity not only of the upper classes but also of middle and working class people. As Geoffrey Moorhouse from the *Sunday Times* argued in 1967, "[a]fter 25 years, Oxfam has become the GEC of the charity trade: not only has it grown from the traditional 'three good ladies and a retailed colonel working from the church hall,' it has also stamped a glossy professional image on the business of getting from the haves to give to the have-

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[497] For another similar appeal from 1969 see for example "From Mouth to Shop," *The Telegraph*, 8 August 1969.

[498] Confidential report: "Daily Mail – Oxfam Campaign. Christmas 1963," date unknown (approx. 1964), COM/3/1/17, OA. (Emphasis in the original).

[499] Maggie Black, *Oxfam the first 50 years*, 97

[500] Confidential report: 'Daily Mail – Oxfam Campaign. Christmas 1963," date unknown (approx. 1964), COM/3/1/17, OA.

[501] Geoffrey Moorhouse, "Second Opinion: Oxfam," *The Sunday Time Magazine*, 17 December 1967.

[502] Maggie Black, *Oxfam the first 50 years: a cause for our times*, (Oxford: Oxfam, 1992), 60.

nots."[503] Similarly, others agreed that "[t]he conception of well-intentioned souls – the vicar's wife of the cartoons multiplied many times over – working in cramped offices and with only the vaguest idea of how money works, is wholly mistaken today… Charity is now big business."[504]

It was at this point—when charities like Oxfam adopted a more professional approach to their work— that the charity shops grew rapidly. This approach helped the charities grow not only in storefronts but also in the variety of items they sold and the revenue is accrued. Charity shops began selling items, which appealed to a larger community of consumers from all classes, and especially the youth. Instead of the typical jewelry and silver charity shops expanded to sell a variety of items including second hand clothing and shoes. Soon other charities also follow suit. By the late 1960s there were "gift shops in nearly every town in the British Isles, raising money for many different charities, selling everything from TV sets to old shoes."[505]

In the 1960s a number of Oxfam supporter groups had begun to engage in a new kind of activity: running temporary shops in premises lent for a few days or weeks. By the late 1960s there were more than 100 of these shops, allowing for the most efficient and profitable system for amateur fundraising beyond the professional methods of large advertising campaigns in the media.[506] These temporary shops were easy to set up: typically in premises slated for demolition, the shops were usually rent-free.[507] They were located on the high street and therefore attracted high pedestrian traffic. They were also cheap. They were run by volunteers, mostly students and the elderly, and sold items, which were given for free. Pricing was based on information their customers supplied from visits to local shops and big stores. And the local clientele, as one article argued, "permanently hard up and bringing up large families, found it a boon."[508] As temporary shops, they were also willing to take every donated item and sell it. Unlike the official 1950s Oxfam shops, these temporary volunteer-managed shops took in clothes, selling those unsuited for sending overseas, and were less like a down-market version of an antique shop than an up-market version of a jumble sale. Their success, in return, shaped the permanent Oxfam shops which now an appealed for a broader group of consumers: from middle class housewives through students; by the late 1970s these temporary shops became thrift stores for the poor.

The transition – from jewelry and silverware to second hand clothes and books – represented a change in business strategies, aimed to shape a new consumer behavior. In 1960s Britain, consumer culture grew in size and demographics. As austerity ended and core economic needs were satisfied, cultural and political priorities shifted toward quality of life issues: "Politics was increasingly about rights, tastes, culture, morality,

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[503] Geoffrey Moorhouse, "Second Opinion: Oxfam," *The Sunday Time Magazine*, 17 December 1967.

[504] Special correspondent, "Business approach brings charities results," *The Times*, 2 March 1965.

[505] Margaret Bennion, "Serving a good cause - behind the counter," *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 January 1968.

[506] Report to Ad Hoc Committee, 5. "Temporary" Gift Shops, February 1964, COM/3/1/15 OA.

[507] Oxfam's first 25 years – and the next, *the Oxford Mail*, 29 September 1967

[508] Margaret Bennion, "Serving a good cause - behind the counter," *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 January 1968.

environmental, post-industrial, even anti-materialist, desires and self-expression."[509] The new culture of affluence shaped not only Briton's engagement with domestic politics but also with international politics. Influenced by these changes, Oxfam appealed to a larger body of consumers through its charity shops. Oxfam – and later other humanitarian charities like Christian Aid, War on Want and Save the Children – capitalized on this change and adopted a new business approach. In their charity shops humanitarian organizations used marketing strategies and publicity to appeal to a larger body of contributors. Oxfam began appealing to this new sector of consumers using marketing strategies – like its *Daily Mail* appeal – as well as expanding its range of products. The new business approach to charity generated new consumer behavior, one that was connected to ethical issues of global suffering.

Capitalism with a Human Face

In 1965 Oxfam added another aspect to its operation: a Trading Company. The company was created to "promote development through income generation, through trade rather than through aid."[510] Through this new "Bridge program," as it was called, Oxfam provided a market for indigenous goods to be later sold in its shops. By finding a market through its shops and mail-order catalogues for the crafts and cloths that were made by producers in the Third World, Oxfam's trading "Bridge" program sought to further its cause through economic communities of trade and connect Third World with British consumers. It forged a new type of affective economy in which both laborers and consumers were to be connected through a community of aid.

The idea of a trading company, according to Oxfam's biographer Maggie Black, originated in 1958 with a missionary named Pastor Ludwig Stumpf of the Lutheran World Service in Hong Kong. Stumpf tried to sell Oxfam a suitcase full of pincushions and embroidered boxes made by Chinese refugees but Oxfam initially showed little interest. Oxfam only adopted this trading strategy after another charity, the Huddersfield Famine Relief Committee, demonstrated that it was a successful strategy. Oxfam then began to import goods from Stumpf and from other British suppliers, selling them in its shops at Christmas time.[511]

But the real boost behind Oxfam's Bridge program only came when Oxfam became operational and started to coordinate its own aid projects abroad (as described in Chapter One). During the 1960s, as the charity began sending field directors to Africa, South Asia and Latin American, the program increased its revenue and developed into a full fledge trading company. By the late 1960s Oxfam started to import items directly from producers in the Third World. It used its own field directors to collect and bring beads, bowls, and ornaments, from their stations abroad. As these posts expanded so did its trading company. The trading company – Oxfam Activities Ltd. (and later Oxfam

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[509] Lawrence Black, *Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-70* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 8.

[510] Bicester-Based Charity Celebrates Anniversary. Oxfam Celebrates 25 Years of Fair Trade, 14 March 1990, COM/3/1/16 OA.

[511] Maggie Black, *Oxfam the first 50 years.*

Trading) – was established with legal advice after consulting with the Charity Commissioners about the formation of what was then novel kind of business.[512]

The trading company aimed to provide new markets for local producers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It hoped that its through "marketing and technical expertise and support, profits from the operation [will be] returned to the producers in the form of development grants and social dividends."[513] For example, in Cochin and Kerala in the late 1960s, Oxfam supported more than 300 women and girls at the Vimala Welfare Centre not only through the sale of grass mat weavers but also through couple of grants of more than £16,000.[514] Similarly, Oxfam supported leather workers in the southern state of Tamil Nadu through the sale of their handmade leather sandals as well as provided their manager with new warehouse to work and store their product.[515]

Oxfam also joined a local project of mirror embroidery work run by nuns in the slum district of Gomtipur in Ahmedabad during the early 1970s. Oxfam supported training work for the girls whose first product was small wall hangings of elephants and peacocks designed on locally-produced maroon-colored cloth. These were imported by Oxfam through its Bridge program, and sold through its shops and mail order catalogue. Oxfam later widened the range, making a drawing bag, two different cushion covers, and a large shoulder bag. When the demand was not as high as it expected, Oxfam began a training program to work closely with these producers on how to fit their product to the British taste. According to Oxfam "[t]he maroon cloth, for example, does not always fit with British fashion and decorating colors"[516] and the products therefore did not yield high revenue. Oxfam therefore expanded its Bridge program to marketing local industries, advising them how to improve products so that they could be marketed globally and would fit the British market. Through this aid, as one promotional pamphlet argued, Oxfam provided "work and a better livelihood for hundred of families in Ahmedabad and beautiful Gujarati work for British customers."[517]

With the Oxfam Bridge program, charity shops became not only a means of raising money for aid programs but also a method to employ the poor themselves. The program helped connect the idea of consumerism, as well as production and employment to ethical values, even before the fair trade movement of the 1980s emerged. It encouraged the integration of these poor Third World communities into the global market. Through the program, production and labor, like consumption, was afforded an ethical as well as a commercial value.

The trading company and its "Bridge" program became a major charitable enterprise through the import and sale of handcrafted products from Third World

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[512] Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam's Report to the Executive Committee, 5 March 1964, COM/3/1/15 OA; Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam's Report to the Executive Committee, 4 June 1964, Setting Up Of Trading Company, COM/3/1/15 OA.

[513] Bicester-Based Charity Celebrates Anniversary. Oxfam Celebrates 25 Years of Fair Trade, 14 March 1990. COM/3/1/16 OA.

[514] Oxfam Information Department, Further Accommodation for Handicrafts Training, Vimala. Welfare Centre, Cochin, Kerala (Institute of Social Service). 24 July 1970, COM/3/1/16 OA.

[515] Oxfam Information Office, Tamil Nadu 25, Making Leather Sandals and Belts – Palam Rural Centre, 11 November 1980, COM/3/1/16 OA.

[516] The Information Department, Oxfam, "Bridge. Gujarati Mirrorwork," 29 September 1976, COM/3/1/16 OA.

[517] Ibid.

communities in Oxfam's gift shops. They offered objects like dolls, jewelry and mats made in places like Haiti as well as in British colonies like Gilbert and Ellice Islands.[518] Through this idea of "helping-by-selling" the trading company became a cost-effective business, yielding a profit of £90,000 in 1966 alone.[519]

The company functioned as did any commercial enterprise, but covenanted back to Oxfam all of its profits, shielding its operations from taxation. Imported craft goods entered the country without levy, initially at the discretion of HM Customs; later the principle was enshrined in law.[520] Thanks to these tax exemptions, Oxfam's expenses were kept low. Its expanses were around 20 percent of its income while around 83 percent of the charity's spending went on grants to voluntary agencies and relief supplies all over the world.[521] In short, Oxfam revolutionized the entire humanitarian sector by adopting a business plan and marketing strategies.

Oxfam did more than just generate large revenue with its trading company and gift shops. Through its economic ventures, Oxfam also connected British consumers to global suffering. According to Oxfam, when English woman in the 1960s went to these shops and bought real leather purses made in Morocco, "a country famous for its leather work," she became connected to the Moroccan leatherworker who made this purse.[522] Similarly, when a young girl in York went to buy a beaded necklace, she knew the money would go to a worthy cause. The charity shop brought the world to ordinary Britons – and particularly women's – homes. Some products even had an educational value. In 1969 the rag doll kit dressed in the traditional style of Bolivia, India, Ghana or Korea helped young British girls learn about distant cultures and traditions for the small price of 5s. 6d.[523] The items sold in the shops then also helped globalize the mind of young consumers.

In short, Oxfam helped to package shopping as an ethical activity. It created a new culture of ethical capitalism through the production and consumption of ethical shopping. As one Oxfam brochure explained,

> In a country which is becoming more and more mechanical and where commercialism roars on every side, Oxfam shops are a refreshing reminder that *people* matter. In them the paper-back or the mandolin – or whatever you buy –

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[518] Ad, *The Time*, 3 November 1969.

[519] "Oxfam's first 25 years – and the next," *Oxford Mail*, 29 September 1967.

[520] Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam's Report to the Executive Committee, 5 March 1964, COM/3/1/15 OA; Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam's Report to the Executive Committee, 4 June 1964, Setting Up Of Trading Company, COM/3/1/15 OA. For more debates about tax exemptions see: General Rate Act 1967 (Amendment), House of Common, 03 April 1968 vol. 762 cc373-6. In 1972 Birmingham City Council contended that, although the nine Oxfam gift shops in their area were occupied by a charity, they were not wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes; this was because raising money by trading was not considered a charitable purpose of the charity. The Birmingham ruling created a precedent and threatened the entire Charity Shop enterprise to domestic and international charities. The 1976 Rating (Charity Shops) Bill amended that and declared Charity Shops to be exempted from taxation. See Rating (Charity Shops) Bill, House of Lords, 24 May 1976 vol. 371 cc84-93.

[521] From our special correspondent, "Business approach brings charities results," *The Times*, 2 March 1965.

[522] See for example item number 32 in Oxfam Cards and Gifts, X.519/41135 The British Library (BL).

[523] "Buy a doll – all in a good cause," Daily Express, 16 September 1969.

> represents not only value for money but a contribution towards someone's *life*. Oxfam's work is not only headline-hitting rescuer operations at time of earthquake and flood but much more concerned with helping people in simple ways to free themselves from the yoke of poverty and hunger to which they were born. It is precisely here that the everyday purchases of ordinary British people in Oxfam shops are helping the everyday lives of people in less fortunate areas of the world.[524]

In a period of affluence and mass consumption of domestic consumer durables, Oxfam offered a global type of capitalism with an added value, or rather, capitalism with a human face. Through its business, Oxfam changed consumerism into an ethical act, a choice that went beyond what one *wants* to what one *ought* to purchase. The Oxfam trading company can therefore serve as a model to how British housewives were included in "a global village,"[525] to use Peter Singer's term, through commodities produced by impoverished and distant communities in the global south. These products carried a new type of "commodity fetishism," in which the objects they consumed carried an ethical value rather than merely an aesthetic one.[526] Through the tradition company, a British housewife in Kent did not merely buy a leather purse because it was fashionable, she bought it because it also fulfilled an ethical duty. Rather than the Victorian model in which charity and consumption were separate activities, in the 1960s and 1970s charities like Oxfam developed a new type of affective economies. Britons participated in and contributed to a growing aid culture of global suffering, albeit by reproducing forms of abstractions which created these suffering in the first place.

Boycotts, Ethical Capitalism, and the Global Citizens of the 1970s

Charity shops and trading companies were not the only forms this new type of affective economies took. Boycotts represented another method of protesting against world hunger, integrating ordinary Britons into a global community as they abstained from certain commodities. Boycotts have been a useful tool in the hand of British humanitarians since the sugar boycott of the 1780s.[527] In the 1970s they became a popular

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[524] "When next you pass an Oxfam shop – pop in!" Oxfam Activities, Oxfam 1970. In Oxfam Cards and Gifts, X.519/41135, BL.

[525] Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243

[526] Some of this critique appears in a more ahistorical form in Slavoj Žižek, *First As Tragedy, Then As Farce* (London: Verso, 2009).

[527] Clare Midgley, "Slave Sugar Boycotts, Female Activism, and the Domestic Base of Anti-Slavery Culture," *Slavery and Abolition* 17, 3 (Dec 1996) 137-162; Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 2006). More generally on the history of boycotts see for example Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain*. (OUP Oxford, 2008); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America*. (Vintage Books, 2003); Sheryl Kroen, "A Political History of the Consumer." *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 3 (2004): 709-736; Mathew Hilton, "Consumer Politics in Post-war Britain" in Martin J. Daunton, and Matthew Hilton. *The politics of consumption: material*

form of protest that transcended national boundaries by calling for an international system of justice and human rights. Whether it was through transnational campaigns like the anti-apartheid movement, or through local campaigns for the fair trade of tobacco and tea,[528] the global market became a site through which citizens developed new identities as global citizens by shopping at their local supermarkets.

One of the most well-known and successful boycotts of the 1970s was the boycott led against the multinational corporation Nestlé.[529] Initially started by the British charity War on Want, the Nestlé boycott became a transnational movement that called for the global regulation of controversial marketing strategies implemented by Western formula companies. As part of the campaign to end bottle-feeding in Third World societies, the boycott united a wide array of historical actors including conservative religious groups, consumer activists, humanitarian organizations, doctors, feminists, and ordinary people. These individuals gathered in order to limit Nestlé's corporate power in the 'Third World.' The boycott's target was to curb the power of multinational companies and to create a more ethical form of market capitalism. As such, it can serve as a model to examine the other side of the affective economies of the 1970s.

The initial idea for the boycott began in August 1973, when the British leftist magazine *The New Internationalist* published an article focused on the problem of bottle-feeding and child malnutrition. While knowledge of the dangers of bottle-feeding had been circulated long before the 1970s, it was only in this period that this knowledge was mobilized and transformed into a new moral and political economy of ethical capitalism. The article, entitled "The Baby Food Tragedy," suggested a different explanation for the problem of Third World hunger than had been previously offered by the journal: baby formula. It offered the opinion of two of the leading child nutrition experts in Britain, Ralph Hendrikse and David Morley, who both argued that Third World hunger was not merely a result of high food prices and weak postcolonial economies, but rather a product of the practice of bottle-feeding. With the exception of abnormal circumstances, such as in famine or disaster situations, bottle-feeding in the Third World, Hendrikse and Morley claimed, was one of the main causes of malnutrition and death from starvation. Pointing fingers at Western companies, Hendrikse and Morley claimed that formula companies were taking advantage of poor mothers by aggressively marketing their products, while knowing meanwhile that these mothers would not be able to create the necessary conditions to use these products safely.[530]

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culture and citizenship in Europe and America (Berg, 2001); Mark Bevir and Frank Trentmann, "Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas, Practice, and Governance," in *Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas and Politics in the Modern World* Mark Bevir, Frank Trentman (ed.), (Cambridge, 2004); Lawrence B. Glickman, *Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

[528] Garry Seidman, *Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational Activism* (Russell Sage Foundation, 2007); Haider Khan, *The Political Economy of Sanctions Against Apartheid*, (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1989).

[529] This section is based on a more elaborate investigation into the history of the movement against baby formula companies. See Tehila Sasson, "Milking the Third World? Humanitarianism, Capitalism and the Nestlé boycott," *American Historical Review*, (forthcoming, fall 2016).

[530] Hendrickse, R.G. and Morley, D., "The Baby Food Tragedy," *The New Internationalist*, August 1973.

The *New Internationalist* article became a sensation and was circulated to over 3,000 hospitals in the Global South. It got responses from food companies like Nestlé, which not only published a response in the magazine on October 1973,[531] but also invited activists to their headquarters to learn about their approach to infant formula sales. In December 1973 the activist Mike Muller, of the British organization War on Want, a non-governmental organization dedicated to fighting poverty in the Third World, took them up on the invitation and spent several days in Nestlé's headquarters in Vevey, Switzerland. When Muller returned to London, however, he did not endorse the company but instead wrote an inflammatory report, "The Baby Killer: A War on Want Investigation into the Promotion and Sale of Powdered Baby Milks in the Third World."[532]

It was this report and the subsequent War on Want campaign that turned the story into a national – and later international – scandal. Published at the height of the world food crisis, Muller's report provided a set of new explanations for the problem of hunger in the Global South. The campaign used provocative imagery, as well as interviews with aid workers, to educate ordinary people and make them experts on these issues. Instead of ecological and political explanations for famines, the report focused on the marketing and sales of milk formula by Western companies like Nestlé as the main cause of death from starvation. Muller accused the baby food industry of manipulating mothers from low-income families and selling them a product, which would kill their babies. The typical images of starving babies, shown in the news with swollen abdomens, edema of the hands and feet, and hair discoloration, were not necessarily a product of famines and civil wars, but of Western formula diluted or used in low quantities. The report translated complicated medical jargon into simple language, explaining to ordinary citizens why milk formula was responsible for hunger in the Third World.

But the Baby Killer campaign offered more than just medical explanations for hunger. It also offered its own interpretation of the failure of development programs in the Third World. The campaign echoed some of this broader international anxiety towards the project of development and, at the same time, joined a new global discourse about consumer rights as a basic need, influenced by Ralph Nader and advocated by Asian activists like the Malaysian Anwar Fazal.[533] It proposed another explanation to the problem of Third World development: one which focused on economic dependencies and the role of multinationals in causing world hunger. The campaign connected these issues to a humanitarian discourse about world hunger.

The Baby Killer campaign argued that modernization in places like Africa, at the heart of development projects in the 1960s, could not be easily achieved. Rather than looking at national economies, the campaign turned its attention to the role of Western-based multinationals in Third World hunger or "underdevelopment." Poor sanitation, lack of electricity and running water, as well as the low budgets of poor families, were preventing mothers in developing countries from sterilizing their bottles properly and purchasing adequate quantities of formula, and yet these mothers were adopting these modern practices of feeding. "Increasing urbanization and modernization accompanied by socio-economic change," as one researcher explained, "leads to cultural changes. The

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[531] See Nestlé's response in *The New Internationalist*, October 1973.

[532] Muller, Mike. *The Baby Killer: A War on Want Investigation Into the Promotion and Sale of Powdered Baby Milks in the Third World.* (War on Want, 1974).

[533] Anwar Fazal, *Consumer Rights: Past, Present & Future* (Neo Sentuhan, 2012).

major shift of a rural–based society to an urbanized way of life creates a cultural vacuum – one that is often filled by adopting Western practices, some of them harmful."[534]

The problem emerging from the War on Want campaign was, therefore, not only of economic disparity but also of a cultural one between North and South. The battle between breast and bottle came to epitomize this cultural difference. According to one nutritional expert "milk companies [were] creating a magic belief in the white man's white milk powder."[535] The turn to culture and to nature consequently replaced colonialism as the main framework for explaining the causes of Third World hunger.[536] The uneven nature of urbanization in the Third World resulted in a gap between a growing population looking for a modern identity, and an ever more impoverished one, which could not truly participate in it. The difference between "Third" and "First World" needed to be protected rather than transgressed.

"The Baby Killer" report and its subsequent campaign received wide coverage in the British press as well as in Europe. The report was translated into German, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Malay, Tamil, and several other languages. One such translation further advanced its publicity. In June 1974 a Swiss organization called Arbeitsgruppe Dritte Welt (ADW) ("Third World Working Group") translated the report into German and altered its title to *Nestlé tötet Babies* (Nestlé Kills Babies). In response, Nestlé sued ADW in Berne for libel. The trial became a European sensation, mostly because it was such a mismatch: the ADW turned out to consist of seventeen unknown activists from church organizations who thoroughly enjoyed skewering the giant Nestlé in public for the two-year run of the trial.[537] While Nestlé won the libel suit in July 1976, it was at a terrible cost. The trial succeeded in raising international awareness and brought Nestlé's marketing strategies under close public scrutiny. The judge called Nestlé to rethink its methods of promoting infant formula in developing countries, since the practice can transform a life-saving product into a life-threatening one.

With the Bern trial garnering international interest and media attention, the infant formula controversy began to take shape as a recognized international health crisis. In 1976 West German filmmaker Peter Krieg developed a twenty-minute documentary on the use of infant formula in Nairobi, Kenya and on the disastrous results the use of formula had for poor families. "Bottle Babies," Krieg's documentary, deliberately sought to play off the emotions and conscience of viewers by incorporating heart-wrenching images of infants with severe marasmus continuing to be bottle fed by their mothers, and panning views of a cemetery riddled with baby graves. "Bottle Babies" was so compelling that the distribution of this documentary became the cornerstone of the Nestlé boycott informational packets sent to interested new groups and individuals well into the 1980s.[538]

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[534] SOAS: War on Want, Box 253.

[535] SOAS: War on Want, Box 183.

[536] On imperial amnesia see Paul Gilroy, *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* (Routledge, 2004). Unlike Gilroy, however, I am suggesting here that imperial amnesia may not have been a planned ideology but rather a consequence of a new type of activism in a new deregulated market economy.

[537] Felix Spies, "Der Pyrrhussieg von Bern," *Die Zeit*, 2.7.1976 Nr. 28; Lisa H. Newton, "A New Power Agenda: Tracking the Emergence of a New Global Polity in the Infant Formula Controversy," *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 19, no. 2 (July 1, 2000): 9.

[538] *Bottle Babies*. (26 minutes, color). Directed by Peter Krieg, Kenya, 1975. Distributed by Unifilm, New York City.

By 1976, when the Baby Killer campaign had reached the United States, consumer politics had already became an integral part of American political identity and culture. From the early years of the Cold War onwards, many Americans saw their nation as the model for the world of a society committed to mass consumption and what were assumed to be its far-reaching benefits.[539] In this "Consumer Republic," as the historian Lizabeth Cohen has called it, identities as citizens and consumers were often interchangeable, shaping American values, attitudes, and behaviors. This consumer was recognized as a political subject by policymakers, when figures like John F. Kennedy declared in 1960 that they intended to represent the consumer, "the only man in our economy without a high-powered lobbyist."[540] By the 1970s political activists like Ralph Nader turned their attention to the role of private businesses and their responsibility towards the safely of their consumers targeting corporations like General Motors.[541] Throughout the decade the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government oversaw the enactment of dozens of federal laws and regulations to protect consumers from harmful food, drugs, and cosmetics; unsafe manufactured products and vehicles of transportation; discriminatory banks and credit agencies, unfair monopolies and other threat to consumer well-being.[542] In the United States, therefore, the battle of bottle versus breast joined the well-developed consumer politics concerned with the legal and ethical obligations private companies owed to their consumers. What the North American context did to this movement was to push it even more forcefully to focus on corporate responsibility. In the USA, the movement against bottle-feeding acquired a new language of anti-corporatism and adopted new strategies of shareholders activism as well as boycotts.

The lawsuit filed by Sisters of the Precious Blood was only one such attempt, inspired by the Bern trial, to call for corporate responsibility. As Corporate Governance grew in this decade, shareholder activism developed as a popular strategy in the United States to restrict the growing power of multinationals.[543] In the mid-1970s American church organizations like the Sisters of the Precious Blood turned to the New York City-based Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), an international coalition of religious investors from the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths. It was the ICCR together with other religious organizations concerned with the connection between global justice and corporate responsibility, which would eventually lead in 1977 to the Nestlé boycott. Formed in 1971, the ICCR became one of the major actors in the development of shareholder activism in the United States. Even before taking on the issue of formula marketing in the Third World, the ICCR became the coordinator for shareholders resolutions like the one led against General Motors in 1971, which

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[539] Some historians like Lawrence B. Glickman even go further and argue that consumer politics was integral to American political culture from the founding. See in Lawrence B. Glickman, *Buying Power*.

[540] Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 345.

[541] Ralph Nader, *Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile* (Bantam, 1972).

[542] John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, *Global Business Regulation* (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[543] Robert A. G. Monks, "Governing the Multinational Enterprise: The Emergence of Global Shareowner" in *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and Bruce Mazlish, eds., (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

influenced the Sullivan Principles and the campaign against apartheid.[544] The organization also became involved with other shareholder resolutions concerning environmental justice and nuclear arms control.

In 1976 the ICCR turned to focus on the issue of bottle-feeding when it was invited to help with the shareholder resolution against the American company Bristol-Myers, led by the Roman Catholic organization Sisters of the Precious Blood. While the case was dismissed (the shareholders had failed to show that their financial interests were damaged),[545] the case helped develop a body of expertise and interest in the ICCR on the problem of formula marketing in the Third World. The ICCR generated a new type of activism, one which connected legal responsibility to shareholder action. The group commissioned research on the problem of bottle-feeding in Third World countries and helped other organizations with similar lawsuits against Borden, Ross-Abbott, American Home Products, and Wyeth Laboratories. When these lawsuits proved unsuccessful, the ICCR turned to create a larger organization, which would lead a campaign in the United States against the dubious practices of formula marketing.

In November 1976 Leah Margulies, the organizational leader of ICCR, met and recruited Doug Johnson, the head of the Third World Institute at the University of Minnesota, in an attempt to create such a campaign. Margulies and Johnson became the orchestrators behind the American response to the infant formula controversy and with it the Nestlé boycott. Inspired by a global spirit of the '68 generation, Johnson had already been an active participant in the anti-Vietnam movement before he became the director of the Third World Institute, located at the Catholic Newman Center adjoining the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis in 1973. Johnson represented one model of the ways in which the 68 generation integrated into national and international politics through human rights, development, and humanitarian issues.[546] After several informal meetings with Margulies in Texas and then New York on the problem of formula marketing, the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT) was officially established in January 1977 with Johnson as its president. INFACT aimed to raise public awareness of the problem of infant formula and based itself in the Third World Institute affiliated with the Newman Center, a research institute devoted to global hunger and social justice in places like Guatemala and Honduras.[547] Years later, Johnson recalled that he could not have foreseen the magnitude of INFACT's success.[548]

Initially started as a grassroots organization aimed at raising local awareness of the problem of formula marketing, INFACT was reluctant at first to use boycotts as a tactic. Johnson enlisted the help of graduate students in the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities' International Student Association (MISA) to help coordinate debates, film showings, and information distribution on college campuses in Minneapolis and St. Paul.

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[544] Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern: Norm Construction in a Globalizing World*, (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013), 54; Simone Stevens, "Why South Africa? The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in the Long 1970s." In *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*, eds. Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2014).

[545] *Sisters of the Precious Blood, Inc., v. Bristol-Myers Co.*, 431 F. Supp. 385, 386-87 (1977).

[546] Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

[547] INFACT records (1966-1994), Minnesota Historical Society (MHS). Saint Paul, Minnesota.

[548] Douglas Johnson, Oral Interview, June 10, 2013.

Using some of the materials produced by the British and German campaigns, including the "Baby Killer" report and the German documentary "Bottle Babies," INFACT led seminars and published leaflets on the connection between hunger and baby formula.[549] INFACT grew into a genuine, if underfunded, international headquarters of a coalition of over 300 different national groups. Similarly to the British campaign led across the Atlantic, INFACT attempted to educate ordinary citizens about the marketing practices of Western formula companies in Third World societies.

It was only after the group started to receive major support from co-ops and the consumer movement that the idea of the boycott came to the forefront of the campaign. As part of the larger trend in the United States, particularly popular in the Twin Cities and the Bay Area, the co-op movement became central in the protest against formula companies. The movement's ideals of shared community and personal politics worked well with INFACT's critique of economic dependencies.[550] Embracing every alternative enterprise promising 'revolutionary' change, the movement was highly vocal in its critique of multinational corporations such as Nestlé. While INFACT screened "Bottle Babies," and focused on Nestlé in particular, the idea of a boycott of the company started to gain support. INFACT argued that more than a third of all formula sold in the world was sold by Nestlé,[551] and that this was particularly the case in Third World countries.[552] Nestlé in fact had the highest rate of penetration in advertising to the medical profession in the Third World.[553] Most importantly, INFACT and other consumer activists could have directly influenced American-based companies through shareholder resolutions and political pressure, whereas the Swiss-based multinational Nestlé was outside INFACT's direct reach. In the lack of any direct political and economic power to regulate a Swiss-base multinational, the choice of a consumer boycott became perhaps a minimalist yet only viable way to create international pressure against Nestlé.

On July 4, 1977 INFACT launched the boycott against Nestlé at a public rally in front of the company's headquarters. The boycotters erected a large baby bottle outside the Nestlé office in the US, paraded with coffins and banners, and sent protest letters to Nestlé and United States Senators. The boycotters met with Nestlé representatives and demanded that the company immediately stop all promotion of infant formulas in developing nations. Their demands included: an end to direct advertising of formula to consumers; an end to the distribution of free supplies to hospitals, clinics, and homes of newborns; an end to the use of company "milk nurses;" and an end to promotion to health professions and through health care institutions.[554] As the Baby Killer campaign had done before them, INFACT accused Nestlé of manipulating Third World mothers from low-income families and selling them a product that would kill their babies, through

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[549] MHS: CAB plan. Events and Announcements, 1977-1980, Folder. Box 5.

[550] Craig Cox, *Storefront Revolution: Food Co-ops and the Counterculture*, (Rutgers University Press, 1994).

[551] MHS: Baby Bottle Disease: There's Big Money In It." INFACT Boycott flyer. INFACT. Consumer Action Boycott (CAB) plan. Events and Announcements, 1977-1980. Box 5.

[552] MHS: "Boycott Nestlé." INFACT flyer. CAB plan. Events and Announcements, 1977-1980. Box 5.

[553] MHS: "Infant Formula: An Activist Campaign," in *Business International*, undated. Box 4. INFACT; Barbara Garson, "The Bottle Baby Scandal: Milking the Third World For All it's Worth," *Mother Jones Magazine*, December 1977.

[554] Douglas A. Johnson, "Confronting Corporate Power: Strategies and Phase of the Nestle Boycott," *Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy*, 1986, vol. 8, 323-244.

the use of sales girls, false advertising, and free gift gimmicks. These mothers, according to the boycotters, did not have the means to fully take part in consumer society and understand the tricks played on them by Western Mad Men. The boycott played an important role in transforming the ways in which the Third World was conceived by aid programs: that is, from producers to consumers in the global market.[555]

In November 1977 INFACT held a national conference, which included representatives from the medical profession, churches, and aid organizations. The conference participants decided to expand the scope of the boycott to the entire USA, thus making the boycott national.[556] In 1978 the boycott spread to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and, in 1980 was also joined by Britain. By 1983 more than 80 organizations from the United States, Britain, Canada, Sweden, Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany participated in the boycott, calling for a halt to the promotion of milk formula to Third World mothers.

To some extent, the boycott succeeded in doing just that. It led to the creation of an International Code of Marketing – the first code to set standards of corporate responsibility. Although international organizations such as the World Health Organization did not have the means to enforce it, this code of conduct was effective nonetheless in pressuring Nestlé, at least for a while, to change its marketing strategies.

On 25 January 1984, Nestlé signed an unprecedented agreement with its nongovernmental critics, represented by the International Nestlé Boycott Committee (INBC), an organization including American and British groups, as well as groups from other European countries. In the agreement, Nestlé pledged to implement fully the WHO/UNICEF Code, including health hazard warnings on the labels; revisions of the literature sent to doctors and mothers by the company; and halting of personal gifts to health workers.[557] In return, the INBC recommended a suspension of the boycott, thus ending the seven-year international consumer boycott of Nestlé products. Although the boycott was relaunched in the late 1980s, when activists alleged that baby-milk companies were flooding health facilities in the developing world with free and low-cost supplies, the Baby Killer campaign nonetheless represented a crucial episode within the global history of consumer activism, humanitarianism, and ethical capitalism.

The boycott attempted to connect Western consumers to Third World mothers through a global and deregulated market. Against the "extraterritorial" multinational corporation the boycott used consumer activism to mobilize a global civil society, morally committed to the plight of humanitarian suffering. Through this process, the boycott helped forge a new global citizenry, that is, political subjects protesting beyond their immediate community. In this model, both activists and ordinary consumers, women in

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[555] Although, it is important to remember, the majority of world laborers were still based in the global South. Historians of capitalism, and especially of neoliberalism, have privileged the role of the consumer in political and social discourses in the postwar period and beyond. The story of the Nestlé boycott, however, shows us that we need to pay special attention to when and how identities like the consumer (or for that matter the entrepreneur, trader, and the banker) received priority in these discourses over the one of laborers and producers.

[556] Barbara Garson, "The Bottle Baby Scandal: Milking the Third World For All it's Worth," *Mother Jones Magazine*, December 1977.

[557] MHS: *Nestlé/INBC joint press conference,* October 4, 1984; Nestlé documents, December 15, 1983-January 31, 1984. INFACT, Box 36.

particular, saw themselves as sharing the responsibility and commitment to a global rather than merely their immediate national community.[558]

This new model had problems from its inception. As a minimal solution to the problem of multinational corporate power, this global citizenship commodified its activism through individual consumer choices, using the boycott as means to hold multinationals to humanitarian standards. Using the global market as the basis for its protest, the boycott reproduced the problems of globalization, mainly its paternalism and abstractions. [559] While attempting to protest against economic dependencies, the boycotters ended up enforcing a somewhat paternalistic argument, through which cultural practices of Third World mothers rather than macroeconomics became the cause of hunger in the Global South. It focused consumer behavior and essentialized it, instead of calling for development and educational programs. In doing so, the boycott ran the risk of cementing a difference between the "First" and "Third World," epitomized in the bottle versus the breast. This turn to the market behavior overlooked specific historical and postcolonial conditions from which these gaps emerged. The market in fact had no history; instead nature came to replace history as the main cause of difference. Instead, the market was transformed to uphold human rights and humanitarian values. In that process, the Third World was conceived as part of global consumer capitalism rather than merely a source of cheap labor and industrial goods. In the absence of direct political authority over the turmoil of market capitalism, the global market emerged as one of the main arenas in which the struggle against world hunger should be fought and resolved. As such, it ran the risk of joining the very same movement it fought against: one which disembedded the market economy from social and labor relations.[560]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analyzed three mechanisms through which ordinary Britons became part of the project of feeding the world's hungry: charity shops, trading companies and transnational boycotts. Although charity shops and trading companies had their origins in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is only in the 1960s and 1970s that they, as well as boycotts, have become central to global humanitarianism. From the high-street via the trading company to the transnational boycott movement, ordinary Britons came to see their everyday transactions as connected to distant suffering through the simple act of shopping. As policymakers, diplomats, and aid experts struggled to find new solutions to world's hunger through development schemes, consumerism became an effective tool to include the British public in the project of

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[558] For a more conceptual discussion on global citizenship and globalization see Saskia Sassen work and especially, Saskia Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); Saskia Sassen "The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 46 (January 1, 2002): 4–26; Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New Press, 1998); Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[559] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control.*

[560] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, 2nd ed. (Beacon Press, 2001). See also Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, "Polanyi's 'Double Movement': The Belle Époques of British and U.S. Hegemony Compared," *Politics & Society* 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 325–55.

feeding the world's poor. By connecting their economic lives to global communities of aid, I have suggested, a new type of global citizenry was forged, one which mobilized consumers to act beyond their immediate communities. This global citizenship commodified its activism through individual consumer choices and a global and deregulated market, generating a new culture of humanitarian aid, albeit enshrining paternalism.

At the same time, I have suggested, this new type of activism also shaped a new economic culture of ethical forms of capitalism. It used specific market rational and market-based activities as the basis for its humanitarian aid. The isomorphism between humanitarianism and the global economy created what I have called "affective economies," that is economies that were furthered by humanitarian ethics. In a period of mass consumption and globalization, these affective communities forged a new type of culture of capitalism: capitalism with a human face. Far from arguing for the liberating nature of the global market, therefore, this new humanitarian business helped forge a new market society based on humanitarian ethics.

Part III

Chapter Five

Global Citizens

Charity shops, fair trade, and private industries were only one part of a much larger humanitarian enterprise in the period. From the second half of the 1960s onward humanitarian organizations started adopting more professional forms of campaigns through a new political culture of humanitarian aid. The story might have begun with Britain but soon became global. Through media campaigns, public events, walkathons, and educational programs humanitarian organizations in Britain not only generated large revenues and support for their appeals but also created a new global culture that engaged ordinary Britons and particularly the youth.[561]

This chapter examines how British nongovernmental organizations created a new political culture of humanitarian suffering aimed at globalizing the minds of young Britons. The representation of humanitarian suffering was not unique to the 1960s. As historians like Thomas Laqueur have shown, its origins can be dated as far back as the eighteenth century when new humanitarian narratives generated forms of compassion amongst strangers and became the foundation of movements such as the campaign to abolish the slave trade.[562] But in the 1960s and 1980s, when these representations were used by nongovernmental organizations like Save the Children, Oxfam, Christian Aid and War on Want, they were used for educational purposes to globalize the minds of young Britons.

This chapter traces four areas in which this new humanitarian culture was developed. The first, is through media campaigns, which were aimed to both fundraise as well as inform the ordinary Briton of distant suffering. These media campaigns became part of a new audio-visual culture aimed at sharing the experience of global suffering with Britons in order to create and mobilize affective communities. In the second section I examine how even children from the age of four onwards were invited to take part in these campaigns and join a global humanitarian community through television. The third section explores the development of new educational programs, through which humanitarian charities helped inflame young Britons' concerns about world inequalities and humanitarian causes. Finally, I examine how in public events, walkathons and celebrity culture young Britons came to actively help and respond to global suffering. By the 1980s, humanitarian relief came to include ordinary Britons, youth groups, and celebrities. Through these multiple forms of engagement a new humanitarian subject was produced: a global citizen, morally committed to the plight of those suffering abroad.

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[561] Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain* (Working Papers in Cultural Studies no.7/8, Birmingham, 1975).

[562] Thomas Laqueur, "Body, Detail, and the Humanitarian Narrative," In *The New Cultural History*, edited by Lynn Hunt, (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 176–204; Thomas Laqueur, "Mourning, Pity, and the Work of Narrative in the Making of Humanity," in in Richard Ashb Wilson and Richard D. Brown, eds., *Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 31-57.

Global Suffering Through the Screen

The media was the most visible form of the rise of a humanitarian culture in this period. And indeed, scholars have discussed extensively the centrality of the media in generating representations of humanitarian suffering in the second half of the twentieth century.[563] According to these accounts, media helped establish a politics of compassion in which the viewer of suffering becomes, what Luc Boltanski called, "a moral spectator."[564] Television, in particular, was a technology that enabled the transmission of distant suffering to people's living rooms.[565] Television shaped the ways in which these catastrophes were represented and became highly selective in its coverage of humanitarian emergencies. By representing catastrophes like Biafra on the television screen, this template placed the starving African child as the stereotypical image of a "universal icon of human suffering."[566] The media came to focus on a "well established narrative convention" that simplified the causes of these catastrophes, often presenting complex man-made crises as sudden natural disasters.[567]

But the use of media for humanitarian catastrophes was not particularly new to the period. It had its origins in what Karen Halttunen has called the "pornography of suffering,"[568] which was depicted in the sentimental paintings the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The use of images to showcase suffering became a popular practice in late nineteenth-century colonial Ireland and later India by philanthropic organizations and missionaries, aimed at raising public awareness of the horrors of the Indian famines. Images of starving children both from the Empire and the metropole appeared on the pages of the *Times* as well as the *Tribune*,[569] while activists used the new technology to

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563 Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, 'The Structure of Foreign News', *Journal of Peace Research*, 2:1 (1965): 64-91; Paul Harrison and Robin H. Palmer, *News Out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid* (Hilary Shipman, 1986); Jonathan Benthall, *Disasters, Relief and the Media* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Greg Philo, "From Buerk to Band Aid: the Media and the 1984 Ethiopian Famine," in John Eldridge (ed.), *Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power* (London: Routledge, 1993) 104-125; Minear et al., *The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action*; Tim Allen and Jean Seaton (eds.), *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence* (London: Zed, 1999); Susan D. Moeller, *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death* (New York: Routledge, 1999); CARMA International, *The CARMA Report on Western Media Coverage of Humanitarian Disasters* (Washington, DC: CARMA, 2006); Simon Cottle, *Global Crisis Reporting Journalism in the Global Age* (Maidenhead, England; New York, NY: Open University Press, 2009); Suzanne Franks, *Reporting Disasters: Famine, Aid, Politics and the Media* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013).

564 Luc Boltanski, *Distant Suffering*, 35-54.

565 M. A. Pérouse de Montclos, "Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons Not Learned," *Africa Development* 34, no. 1 (2009); Paul Harrison and Robin H. Palmer, *News Out of Africa*.

566 Stanley Cohen, *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 178.

567 Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media , pp.188-191.

568 Karen Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), 303-334.

569 Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*, 25-176.

collect testimonies on the conditions in the British famine and concentration camps.[570] These visual and textual representations brought the suffering of a mass humanity in the large famines in India into the intimate lives of British and American homes. By 1902 the Colonial Office acknowledge the power of humanitarian imagery when it had established its own Visual Instruction Committee, to produce photographic evidence of Britain's improvement of its colonial territories that was then disseminated in British schoolrooms and libraries.[571]

By the turn of the century other humanitarian campaigns came to use images as the basis for their appeals. In the early 1900s the Congo Reform Association, for example, was one of the first humanitarian movements to use atrocity photographs as a central tool.[572] In the same manner, during the Boar Wars Emily Hobhouse famously used photography to expose the treatments of prisoners in the British concentration camps.[573] It was these representations that also helped mobilize responses to humanitarian suffering and mass atrocities in the first half of the twentieth century.

During the First World War the moving image became an essential part of humanitarian work. American and European humanitarian aid organizations produced dozens of short and feature length films about civilians victimized by genocide, hunger and continued fighting along the Russian border, the Anatolian frontier and the Pontic coast.[574] As Michelle Tusan argued, these films revealed how Britons and the wider international community came to understand the effects of the war on civilian populations and its implications for the humanitarian postwar in Eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East.[575] The films opened a new "humanitarian imaginary" shaped by the experience of Total War.[576] Such imaginings relied on film to document the transformation of those suffering into healthy bodies before the viewers' eyes as they received care from relief agencies. Film emerged as a new "theater" to produce these "imaginations of solidarity" that scripted how viewers ultimately responded to distant others. Thus the humanitarian imaginary relied on new media to forge solidarity with suffering subjects while eliding the root political causes of wartime suffering, namely the

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[570] For example, Emily Hobhouse, *Boer War Letters. South African War, 1899-1902* (Human & Rousseau, 1984); J. E. Scott, *In Famine Land* (New York: Harper, 1904). See also Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts*.

[571] James Vernon, *Hunger*, 33-38

[572] Sharon Sliwinski, "The Childhood of Human Rights: The Kodak on the Congo," *Journal of Visual Culture* 5, no. 3 (December 1, 2006): 333–63. See also Betrrand Taithe, "'La famine de 1866-1868 : anatomie d'une catastrophe et construction médiatique d'un événement'." *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 41(2010) : 113-127.

[573] Christina Twomey, "Framing Atrocity: Photography and Humanitarianism," *History of Photography* 36, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 255–64; Fehrenbach, Heide, and Davide Rodogno, eds. *Humanitarian Photography: A History*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[574] In addition to the nearly two dozen Anglo-American films considered here, the ICRC and its individual branches are reported to have made around 60 films about prisoners of war, refugees, victims of disease and hunger. Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 220.

[575] Michelle Tusan, "Genocide, Famine and Refugees on Film: Humanitarianism and the Great War," unpublished paper.

[576] Lilie Chouliaraki, *The Ironic Spectator* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 43.

rise of exclusionary nationalism, the civil war in Russia and the imperial ambition of western powers in the Near East.[577]

In the interwar period new humanitarian organizations like Save the Children deployed the moving image not only for fundraising purposes but also as a way to prove their aid recipients were worthy victims.[578] During their relief to Russia in 1921, Save the Children used the moving image as a way to prove that Bolshevik Russians (and especially children) were truly dying by the dozens from the famine. The moving image helped newly formed charities like Save the Children prove the credibility not only of their cause but also of their relief. The organization, which became operational for the first time in Russia, was mostly known in 1920 a radical organization, which not only advocated for pacifism but also critiqued the British wartime conduct.[579] Although many respectable Britons including Gilbert Murray and Lady Muriel Paget supported the organization, the organization was under much public scrutiny in the first year of relief, especially by the Conservative newspaper the *Daily Express*.[580] The newspaper accused the Fund for supporting an enemy regime while people were starving at home. Echoing the old trope that – charity begins at home – the Save the Children was ridiculed as being Mrs. Jellyby look alikes.[581] It was accused of "feeding the red guard" while nearly two million Britons were out of work and in need for help.[582] As a response, Save the Children commissioned a humanitarian film, created to showcase the true misery as well as the magnitude of the disaster. In October 1921 George Mewes, a *Daily Mail* photographer, was sent by the organization to Russia with a film camera to record the reality of the famine as it

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[577] Michelle Tusan, "Genocide, Famine and Refugees on Film: Humanitarianism and the Great War," unpublished paper.

[578] Tehila Sasson, "From Empire To Humanity: The Russian Famine And The Imperial Origins Of International Humanitarianism," in preparation for publication.

[579] Dorothy Buxton, draft letter to the Manchester Guardian, February 1921, in SC/DB/1, SCA; Friends Emergency Committee Council meeting, 30 August 1921, FERWVC/M8/217, Friends' House Archives, London (FHA).

[580] "The Russian Famine: Moment Ill-Chosen to Appeal for Fund," *The Daily Express*, 17 November 1921.

[581] Similarly groups such as the Anti-Waste League were funded in the interwar period to fight against welfare schemes and public provisions to relieve domestic poverty. James E. Cronin, *The Politics of State Expansion: War, State, and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Psychology Press, 1991), 79; Martin Daunton, *Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76.

[582] Ironically, the Fund had itself given over £350 in donations to relief work in Cornwall. "Save the Children in Russia: Huge Sum For A Dubious Famine," *The Daily Express*, 18 November 1921; "Folly of Feeding Russia: All Our Resources Are Needed At Home," *The Daily Express*, 19 November 1921; "Not A Shilling For Russia," *The Daily Express*, 21 November 1921; "Millions Are Now Thousands: Save the Children Fund Makes A Discovery, Internal Chaos," *The Daily Express*, 22 November 1921; "This Picture and That," *The Daily Express*, 23 November 1921; "The Other Famine," *The Daily Express*, 23 November 1921; "The Famine Within Our Gates: Cornwall suffers while Russia benefits," *The Daily Express*, 23 November 1921; "Strange Allies of Russia: What of Cornwall? Soviet Money For Propaganda, Not For Famine," *The Daily Express*, 24 November 1921; "Feeding the Red Guards: Truth About Russian Famine Relief At Last," *The Daily Express*, 9 December 1921. The critique for "charity begins at home" was made not only by the Daily Express but also by some politicians. See for example the Conservative MP, Colonel Mildmay's speech to the House of Commons on 17 March 1922, in *Hansard*, "Russian Famine. MISCELLANEOUS WAR SERVICES (FOREIGN OFFICE)," 17 March 1922.

happened. He returned in December with heartrending footage of starving children and bodies being buried. In early January, the film was widely publicized in newsreels by Save the Children and shown to audiences in towns around Britain.[583] The deployment of the moving image provided Save the Children the evidence of suffering as well as relief were proven to the public.[584] It became a new humanitarian technology of witnessing and truth claims that will be used throughout the twentieth century as a way to respond to humanitarian catastrophes.[585]

In addition to films, in the interwar period charities began collaborating with the wireless, publicizing their appeals in the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC). These appeals, called "This Week's Good Cause," mapped an expansive notion of positive citizenship, which encompassed both the private and social domains of listeners' lives and bureaucratized and popular understandings of charity. Good Cause appeals pioneered a form of philanthropic fundraising between the wars (taken up in other inter-war BBC output) based upon drama, human interest, and "listener identification."[586] Through the wireless ordinary citizens were informed of global suffering and encouraged to act in its name.

The Good Cause appeals carried into the Second World War and the decade after, when BBC began broadcasting similar charitable appeals on television for the problem of refugees. From the wireless to the television they became a form of a direct appeal from the aid expert to the ordinary Britons through these new technologies. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Good Cause program helped organizations like Oxfam generate revenue and grow. Oxfam's growth in the 1950s through the increasing amounts raised by the organization's BBC Week's Good Cause radio appeals, beginning with £9,700 in 1950, rising dramatically to £31,000 in 1956, and reaching £46,700 by 1958. By the 1960s the BBC had introduced televised appeals every month. Similarly the independent British TV network ITV introduced televised campaigns in 1962.[587]

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[583] EJ 198/Box 410, SCA. A copy was even prepared with titles in Japanese and sent to that country, where a small fundraising office was maintained. Over all, the film raised over £6,000 from showings. Rodney Breen, "Saving Enemy Children- Save the Children's Russian Relief Organization, 1921–1923," *Disasters* 1994 Vol 18 No 1.

[584] On forensic evidence and photography see: Thomas Keenan, *Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997); Georges Didi-Huberman, and J. M Charcot. *Invention of hysteria: Charcot and the photographic iconography of the Salpêtrière*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003); L. J. Jordanova, *The Look of the Past: Visual and Material Evidence in Historical Practice*. (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Thomas Keenan, Eyal Weizman, and Portikus (Gallery). *Mengele's Skull: The Advent of a Forensic Aesthetics*. (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012).

[585] As the *Daily Express* itself admitted "No advertisements, articles, verbal or printed appeals…could have produced such an overwhelming impression upon the audience as did the staggering realism of these pictures." *The Daily News*, 26 January 1922; Although the Fund also used firsthand accounts and testimonies of witnesses, from individuals who were sent on a tour of the famine areas, the moving image became a more powerful way of asserting truth in disaster relief. Indeed, later in the year Mewes was sent back to Russia, this time to film the famine kitchens successfully in operation. in Council Minutes M1/2, SCA.

[586] Eve Culpus, "The Week's Good Cause: Mass Culture and Cultures of Philanthropy at the Inter-war BBC," *Twentieth Century British History*, 2011.

[587] Registry service, appeal brunch, Oxfam: Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, File II 1955, R7/180/1, BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham (BBC WAC).

Year	Speaker	Profit
1950	Gilbert Murray	£9,689
1953	Maurice Bowra	£13,885
1965	Lord Hailsham	£30,976
1958	Lord Birkett	£46,860
1961	Richard Dimbleby	£105,941

Figure 1. Profit from Oxfam's Week's Good Cause appeals, 1950-1961.[588]

Marketing Global Suffering

The introduction of humanitarian appeals on the television screen, therefore, was made within a broader context of audio-visual representations of humanitarian suffering dating from the nineteenth century onwards. Rather than a new type of "moral spectatorship," as Boltanski called it, what was new about the 1960s was the ways in which these representations were used when they came to the television screen.

First, in the early 1960s a new official collaboration was forged, when British humanitarian charities began working with the BBC and the Independent Television Authority (ITA) through a new consortium called the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC). The DEC was set up in 1963 as an umbrella body for the 'big five' aid agencies; the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children, and War on Want.[589] The DEC was intended to facilitate closer co-ordination rather than competition between its members by making joint emergency appeals to the public on television after major disasters. The Committee was granted special arrangements with the BBC, which in return played an integral role in setting up the DEC, drawing up guidelines for the appeals.[590] Similarly, the appeals were also broadcast on ITV, which used the same appeals machinery as the BBC.[591]

Some charities began also running their own appeals directly with the BBC and ITV and approaching various television shows. Oxfam, for example, worked side by side the BBC through its own press and publicity office.[592] These appeals now reached the homes of ordinary Britons, 90 percent of whom possessed a television set by 1975.[593] They brought global suffering to people's local homes, reproducing older tropes of starving children but now projecting them upon Africans as opposed to South Asians as in the late nineteenth century. [594] The use of the new technology of the television thus

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[588] *The Oxfam Story: A Brief Account of the Growth of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and the Work It Has Been Able to Accomplish* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964).

[589] Andrew Jones, "The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and the Humanitarian Industry in Britain, 1963–85," *Twentieth Century British History*, 2014.

[590] Disasters Emergency Committee, 'Notes of a meeting', 1 November 1965, CA2/F/1/9, CAA; 'Appeals Policy and Practice', January 1961, R7/283/1, BBC WAC.

[591] Disasters Emergency Committee, 'Notes of the 8th meeting', 23 August 1966, CA2/F/1/9, CAA.

[592] See for example correspondence from October 1965 between BBC and Oxfam at R7/180/1, BBC WAC.

[593] Mark Donnelly*, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics* (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 77.

[594] Jørgen Lissner, 'Merchants of Misery', New Internationalist, 100 (June 1981).

spread the plight of humanitarian catastrophes beyond aid experts. Rather than a small group of middle or upper class elites, these appeals helped inform ordinary Britons from all class groups and age about distant suffering.

Second, these visual representations became embedded within a new, professional, approach to charity, which relied on marketing strategies to publicize their cause. As the previous chapters have shown in the 1960s humanitarian organizations began to be run more like businesses and therefore also began use the media in new ways to publicize their operations.[595] As such, visual representation on television, newspapers, and the radio became part of growing political culture of aid. The representations of humanitarian suffering on television did not only showcase specific disasters and appeals. It also became part of a culture of aid that publicized the entire work of humanitarian organizations.

As part of this new type of professional approach to charity, from the late 1950s onwards, humanitarian organizations such as Oxfam and Christian Aid began employing public relations firms to help them market their appeals. Public relations experts like Harold Sumption, "a Quaker advertising man,"[596] used their professional experience to help Oxfam, Helped the Aged and ActionAid. They bought advertisement spaces in newspapers, signed contracts with television. In this way raising money for charities became "an industry and a formal profession."[597]

This new marketing approach helped expand the appeal base of humanitarian charities beyond exclusive and local communities. The creation of Christian Aid Week illustrates this well. Founded in 1957 as a local event by the Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service of the British Council of Churches, Christian Aid Week became a major event aimed to maximize exposure of the organization to the national public, and to raise awareness to "those who suffer either from political intolerance or natural disasters."[598] The event was created not only to raise funds but also "to go to the people outside the Church to tell them about the plight of refugees and those suffering because of emergencies."[599] It became an annual week of festivities through which ordinary Britons could see, feel and listen to accounts of the plight of humanitarian victims around the world. In addition to photographs, featured articles and films – taken and distributed by professional agencies – Christian Aid Week included various activities, which helped people experience and identify with distant suffering.[600] Aid workers also went across Britain raising awareness of the campaign, going from door to door as well as hang posters and stickers in city centers.

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[595] On the professionalization of charity in this period more generally see Matthew Hilton et al., *The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[596] Harold Sumption, *The Independent*, 21 April 1998; Harold Sumption: Put the World on Poverty," *The Guardian*, 27 March 1998.

[597] Harold Sumption, *The Independent*, Tuesday 21 April 1998. Other organizations like Christian Aid as well as the domestic charity Shelter used the services of Hugh Samson's firm for public relations. See for example correspondence in CA/I/15/1, CAA.

[598] British Council of Churches. Inter-Church Aid & Refugee Service. Society Churches Committee for Inter-Church Aid & Refugee Service, November 1957, CA/I/2/3, CAA; See also Maurice Rickards, Projected National Appeal, 7 September 1956, CA/I/2/2, CAA.

[599] Background notes on Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service. CA/I/2/3, CAA.

[600] Summary of Public Relations actives for Inter-Church Aid during the period March - June 1958. Christian Aid Week. CA/I//2/3, CAA.

In 1958, for example, a model of a refugee camp was constructed outside St. Martin-in-the-Fields in order to bring "an authentic example of refugee living-quarters at St, Martine-in-the-Fields [and] to provide Londoners with an experience which will move them to action."[601] The pop-up camp used sound, images and visual representations to help people imagine to help them forget they are in Trafalgar Square. As one pamphlet described it,

> You are in Germany, Austria, Greece or Italy and this ex-Army hut is home for about 20 families who, having fled from something they feared, now wait for something that does not come – rescue.[602]

The construction of a model camp became both an audio- visual as well as a material way for Britons to experience humanitarian suffering. The camp engaged all the senses of its visitor rather than merely relying on textual information. It was an installation made to recreate not only compassion but also to recreate the fear felt by refugees. Indeed, through the camp Britons could feel—and not just think—of the suffering of distant strangers. It was an audio-visual method to experience the plight of those who sought refuge and bring it to the heart of London.

Similarly in the following decade Christian Aid deployed various audio-visual experiences to recreate global suffering and bring it to Britons. It devoted its campaigns to either specific themes —like international campaigns, like the UN World Refugee Year in 1960— or to raise awareness to more general humanitarian suffering. (see figure 2). The events attempted to capture the lives of various destitute communities across the globe, albeit decontextualized the causes of their suffering: the story of the resettlement in South America of a 500-strong community of White Russians; or the hunger and the low living-standards of "the other half" of the world, using Hong Kong as an illustration. None of the audio-visual representations focused too closely on the reasons for these suffering. Rather, they told the personal and individual stories of the sufferers to evoke emotions.

Christian Aid also began training its aid workers and to instruct them on how to present the charity and its current campaigns. This army of professionalized aid workers operated as sort of salesmen educating ordinary Britons of the plight of mass suffering: through specific stories and narratives, group activities, and audio-visual sources, these aid workers taught Britons how to act and respond to global suffering.[603]

Through public fares, exhibitions, television appeals, and even tube adverts, Christian Aid Week was one example of how this public relations approach created a culture of aid. As a powerful and effective marketing approach to humanitarian charity, the Week was aimed to educate and stimulate the general public and expressed the unity of humanitarian sentiments throughout England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.[604] It brought global humanitarian suffering to local centers across the British Isles and gave

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[601] Christian Aid Week – 12th – 17th May 1958, Notes for Stewards at St. Martin In the Fields, CA/I/2 /2/3, CAA.

[602] Ibid.

[603] See for example "Speaking About Inter-Church Aid," 10 September 1959, CA/I/2/5, CAA.

[604] Christian Aid Week 1959, "Your Guide to Successful Campaign," 1959. CA/I/2/4, CAA.

the opportunity "to every citizen to act on [it]."[605] It helped both educate citizens about global suffering as well as to mobilize them to act.

Figure 2. "Helped the Oppressed" a 16-sheet poster as part of Christian Aid Week 1959.[606]

Third, the visibility of humanitarian campaigns became even more frequent with the development of investigative journalism and television shows like the BBC Panorama and Eyewitness. These shows collaborated with humanitarian organizations like Oxfam and Christian Aid and introduced the plight of humanitarian victims to the British viewers through a 60-minutes in depth show. Although some of these were later criticized for their pornographic nature, exhibiting "the human body and soul in all its nakedness, without any respect and piety for the person involved,"[607] humanitarian catastrophes became news in a different way. They became a way to "bare witness" and report to the viewer back home about mass suffering.[608]

The representations of humanitarian catastrophe were geared towards educating ordinary people and creating a support base for their causes. News reporting and shows like Panorama became central to this culture of aid, educating the British public and mobilizing them into pressuring the government to support aid programs abroad. They

[605] Local people invited to "Act on the Facts." This year's Christian Aid Week. Suggested Press statement announcing Christian Aid Week for use in areas which observed the Week in 1957. CA/I//2/3, CAA.

[606] Christian Aid Week 1959, "Your Guide to Successful Campaign," 1959. CA/I/2/4, CAA.

[607] Jørgen Lissner, "Merchants of Misery," *New Internationalist*, 100 (June 1981).

[608] For an in depth discussion about the politics and ethics of witnessing see for example Michal Givoni, "Beyond the Humanitarian/Political Divide: Witnessing and the Making of Humanitarian Ethics," *Journal of Human Rights* 10, no. 1 (2011): 55–75; Michal Givoni, "Humanitarian Governance and Ethical Cultivation: Médecins sans Frontières and the Advent of the Expert-Witness," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 1 (2011): 43–63.

also became a way to lobby the international community.[609] As such, media appeals became not only tools for fundraising but also a way to incorporate ordinary people in global governance. Take the ITV documentary *The Unknown Famine*, for example, created in 1973 on the Ethiopian famine that year by Jonathan Dimbleby, the presenter of ITV's current affairs program *This Week*. Previously attracting minimal media attention, the film elevated the 1973 Ethiopian famine into a major international crisis. Shortly afterwards, a wide array of donor governments, intergovernmental agencies and international non-governmental organizations were mobilized to implement a major aid program across the entire Sahel region of Africa.

The idea behind the film originated when Dimbleby – the son of the TV presenter Richard Dimbleby, who did Oxfam's 1961 Good Cause appeal – read a brief publication of Oxfam's Communications Officer Tony Hall in the *Sunday Times*. Hall was "convinced that this was quite shattering international news" already in the summer of 1973, when he sent articles and photographs to the British press.[610] Dimbleby read one of Hall's articles and contacted him. With Oxfam's help, Dimbleby set out to Ethiopia to document the famine. The footage he took was broadcast on ITV on 18 October 1973. A half-hour primetime documentary, *The Unknown Famine* consisted entirely of graphic footage of famine victims in the relief camps in Northern Ethiopia. Appearing throughout the film were powerful scenes of young children either dying or already dead. In a decade when natural disasters became the center of public and international debate, the film presented imagery from the camps without any political or social context. Rather the film presented the famine exclusively as a result of a drought. What was seen in Ethiopia as a direct result of Selassie's policy was presented to the British public as a sudden, natural disaster beyond human agency. Dimbleby later acknowledged that he had deliberately distorted the famine to maximize the film's effect on the public.[611]

Dimbleby's tactic was effective. *The Unknown Famine* was viewed by an estimated twelve million people beyond Britain. Both the BBC and the press picked up the Ethiopia story, providing it with endorsement and further momentum. The film was shown at the House of Commons and was used by Judith Hart, the shadow minister of Overseas Aid, to call for greater official aid. It was circulated across Europe and the Commonwealth, mobilizing a multitude of NGOs in the process, and rising public concern "first in Britain, and later in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Italy."[612] The massive international reaction demonstrated the ways in which humanitarian catastrophes became news in the period. It showed how through the media, humanitarian organizations could also not only fundraise but also mobilize an international public and governmental response.

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[609] The literature on the relationship between the global media and global humanitarianism is pretty vast and this section cannot survey it all. For footnote 490.

[610] Tony Hall, "Africa Emergency Report," October 1985, quoted in Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, *News out of Africa*, 48-49.

[611] Dimbleby quoted in Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, *News out of Africa*, 55-56.

[612] Oxfam Information Office, 'The Famine in Ethiopia: General Description," February 1974, CA2/A/4, CAA.

Figure 3. Shot from the Richard Dimbleby's *Unknown Famine*.

But Dimbleby's film was also emblematic of a more general representation of humanitarian disasters in the news prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s. It prioritized a sensationalist narrative of natural disasters rather than contextualizing famines in the political economy from which they emerged in postcolonial Africa. In the mid-1960s Oxfam had been denied from passing an appeal in the BBC about mass drought and famines in Kenya, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, and Rhodesia on the eve of independence.[613] By the early 1970s the BBC, like much of the global media, centered its attention on the plight of famine victims in postcolonial Africa. A new media logic had emerged in which the idea of an emergency became more prevalent in the news than other programs of irrigation programs and development of various local infrastructures.[614] As the next sections will show, this new media logic also began focusing on new segments of the population, or rather specific "target groups" —i.e. children and youth. The new culture of aid began including and catering for children and teenagers in their campaigns, in the attempt to introduce them from early age to the plight of global suffering.

Children in the Cause of Humanity

In the 1960s, children became the focus of a new culture of humanitarian aid through films, television and educational programs. These programs targeted children as future citizens and informed them of global issues. They aimed to globalize the minds of young Britons by introducing them to the experiences of foreign children in various disaster zones. Yet while these programs produced new global and affective communities,

[613] See for example correspondence from October 1965 between BBC and Oxfam at R7/180/1, BBC WAC.

[614] Simon Cottle and David Nolan, "Global Humanitarianism and the Changing Aid-Media Field," *Journalism Studies* 8, no. 6 (December 1, 2007): 862–78.

they depoliticized them decontextualizing various conflicts to focusing solely on the effects not the postcolonial causes of human suffering. [615]

In the 1959 Christian Aid Week, for example, the charity screened various 16 mm. sound productions films specifically directed at educating children. The films were part of the broader events of May 1959 in which Christian Aid joined the United Nations and their World Refugee Year and campaigned for refugees across the globe. The festivities of the week included films screens and photo exhibitions across the United Kingdom for adults as well as children. It also included a series of talks and film screenings in schools and social clubs as well as in churches. One of these films focused on the story of a child living in a refugee camp. The film followed the life of this child in the camp. It was aimed to evoke the sympathy of its young viewers by following his intimate experiences.[616]

The inclusion of children in the new audio-visual culture of suffering was not only limited to specific festivities and events. From the 1960s onwards children were introduced to humanitarian suffering through short segments in the children program "Blue Peter." As the longest running children's television show, Blue Peter was a BBC production first aired in 1958.[617] The show was catered to an audience between the ages four to fourteen and was divided to into various magazine style segments, all with some kind of educational value: from DIY projects to short stories about animals and nature. It even had one segment responding to letters from young viewers.

In addition to these regular segments, Blue Peter also held annual appeals just around Christmas. These appeals were devoted to both domestic as well as international affairs. Each year the Blue Peter team decided on a specific theme for an appeal and then approached the most appropriate charity to administer it. Young viewers were usually asked to collect and send some portable and saleable commodity and the donations were used to fund a specific project that would help local and international communities. In 1967 Blue Peter asked children to collect postage stamps that would help rehouse a homeless family, and Shelter administered it, benefiting to the tune of 15,000 pounds.[618] In 1973 the show focused on a humanitarian campaign and asked its viewers to send in used stamps —collected in a giant postbox—to help tackle the drought and famine affecting Ethiopia (See figure 3).[619] These episodes not only informed children of global and domestic issues but also animated them to act and respond to them. They allowed children to lobby for humanitarian causes in their local neighborhood and feel connected to national and global affairs.[620] They became a training ground for Britain's future citizens of the globe.

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[615] For example the case of Voluntary Service Overseas as well as the American Peace Corps. In Jordanna Balikin, "Young Britons: International Aid and 'Development' in the Age of Adolescent," in The Afterlife of Empire, (University of California, 2012), 55-95.

[616] "Christian Aid Week: The Plan for 1960," CA/I/2/5, CAA.

[617] Richard Marson and Biddy Baxter, *Blue Peter: 50th Anniversary* (Hamlyn, 2008).

[618] Hugh Samson to the Rev. Alan A. Brash and the Rev. Cambell Mclean, 30 October 1968, CA4/A/2, CAA.

[619] "Blue Peter appeals from the last 36 years," *The Guardian*, 7 November 2008.

[620] I have written elsewhere on how even domestic issues like homelessness became part of a human rights discourse in the 1970s in campaigns such as Shelter's. See Tehila Sasson, "The Problem of Homelessness in Postwar Britain" in *Rescuing the Vulnerable: Poverty, Welfare and Social Ties in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe*, Beate Althammer, Lutz Raphael, Tamara Stazic-Wendt (ed.), (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, forthcoming).

Figure 3. Blue Peter appeal from 1973 targeted to help the drought and famine affecting Ethiopia.[621]

While the Blue Peter team decided on the theme of its appeals and contacted the charity that would administer it, in reality it was also the charity's press office and public relation firm which were highly involved in the campaign. As humanitarian charities began using public relation firms and built their own press offices, their appeals as well as their aid were targeted to specific audiences and commodified. .

One such example was the appeal for the Biafran and Nigerian children in 1968. Initially, in October 1968 the Blue Peter team approached the Save the Children Fund with the intent to create a mutual appeal, which would fund a vehicle to feed starving children across the Biafra region. However, when the Save the Children declared that they would not be able to obtain a vehicle in time for the December appeal, they contacted Hugh Samson, who was the head of the public relations firm that worked with Christian Aid. Samson immediately agreed on behalf of Christian Aid to take on the appeal. Moreover, even before talking to Christian Aid he specifically advised the show to focus their appeal on both Nigeria as well as Biafra rather than exclusively on the Biafra region to avoid any political criticism.[622]

Early in December Blue Peter talked about the need for aid, showing their viewers pictures of the suffering and instructing them what they could to help. Adopting Samson's recommendations the show offered as neutral as possible view on what was in reality a war. In a segment from 5 December, for example, young viewers were introduced to the suffering of Biafran and Nigerian children. The segment briefly mentioned the Nigerian Civil War, admittedly stating the show will not "say which side is right or which side is wrong other than that all war is wrong."[623] It focused on

[621] "Blue Peter appeals from the last 36 years," *The Guardian*, 7 November 2008.

[622] Hugh Samson to the Rev. Alan A. Brash and the Rev. Cambell Mclean, 30 October 1968, CA4/A/2, CAA.

[623] Blue Peter, December 1968, BBC.

establishing a connection between young Britons and those in the Biafran and Nigerian territories without explaining any of the context of the suffering they saw.

Samson's role was crucial in other respects too. He contacted the director of Christian Aid Alan Brash as well as several aid workers who were working in the African office specifically on the Nigeria/Biafra campaign. They all agreed that in view of the new Christian Aid policy under which food is being taken to where the worst afflicted children are (instead of moving the children to main centers), a mobile feeding center would have a valuable role. The charity chose Land Rover vehicles for the campaign mostly because it worked directly with the Rover Company on various relief projects.[624] It was also a new way to create product placement and free advertising on television shows like Blue Peter.

Samson also coordinated and examined the marketability of the type of sellable goods—various types of used woolens—which would be collected by the viewers of the show. The idea was to find a clearly defined object that children could easily collect and see in the final program at the end of December. He got in touch with a merchant who offered a good price per pound and searched for a suitable London depot to which all the contributions would be sent. He even began contacting volunteers who would be in charged of the labor collecting these donations but in the end left it to Christian Aid to recruit them.[625] Samson was so successful in his calculations that Christian Aid was able to use its surplus money to purchase a second vehicle and used it as a Mobile Clinic (See figure 4). With his guidance, young Britons could participate as ethical citizens in their own rights in the global and humanitarian response to the Biafran crises.

Figure 4. The Blue Peter Mobile Clinic Land Rover organized by Christian Aid and Hugh Samson.[626]

[624] Hugh Samson to B. J. Dubridge, 1 November 1968, CA4/A/2, CAA.

[625] Hugh Samson to the Rev. Alan A. Brash and the Rev. Cambell Mclean, 30 October 1968. CA4/A/2, CAA.

[626] Blue Peter Appeal December 1968, Land Rovers for Biafra/Nigeria 1969/70, CA/4/A/2, CAA.

Educating Global Citizens

If educational programs helped create a new 'market' for humanitarian appeals and products children and young people were their primary target. Humanitarian charities saw education as one of their main missions. Increasing the income and overseas aid alone was not enough, stated Leslie Kirkley, Oxfam director in the late 1960s. "[U]neless we are satisfied to end up as a mere sop to national conscience…we must make apathy and lack of knowledge…" Indeed, according to Kirkley, only through "publicity and education about world poverty we must join forces with other groups to arouse public interests and concern."[627] Charities like Oxfam, Save the Children and Christian Aid ran educational programs not only in television but also in schools and classrooms.

The Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC) was particularly important for the development of educational programs and the new audio-visual culture of aid.[628] Launched by Food and Agriculture organization in 1961, the Campaign became particularly important in Britain. It was taken by all the major voluntary aid agencies — including Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children, and War on Want, which later also collaborated on the Disaster Emergency Committee—who all declared education as one of its main objectives.[629]

From 1961 these agencies began issuing various educational brochures, films, and booklets to schools and teachers guides across the United Kingdom. In 1965 these programs received further boost and support, when Barbara Castle, the new Minister for Overseas Aid set up a small government subsidy to help with educational work in the UK. As a result, in 1966 voluntary agencies, notably Oxfam and Christian Aid, created their own education departments, which aimed to increase awareness and understanding in Britain of world development issues (and took over the work begun by the Freedom From Hunger Campaign.) By the late 1960s these educational units and departments began conducting survey of syllabi and public examinations in schools and Colleges of Education to examine how much "development" content they made available to students and teachers. Thereafter these charities held conferences with advertising agencies and educational staff to discuss the apparent conflicts between images being presented in their advertising and in the educational publications.[630]

In 1977 the government established its own "Development Education Fund" to support education initiatives, local and national. The Fund was administered with the help of an Advisory Committee on Development Education, which was made up of leading educationists, journalists, trade unionists, and development specialists. In its first three years the Advisory Committee made grants of over £1 million, and by 1982 it pledged to raise it to £2.7 million. In 1978, with the support of the Advisory Committee local development education centers were set up, with a range of projects aimed both at schools and local communities.[631]

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[627] "Oxfam Must Educate the Nation," *The Times*, 12 September 1969.

[628] The Growth Of Development Education - The Voluntary Committee On Overseas Aid And Development (VCOAD)/ Centre For World Development Education (CWDE) Contribution, COM/3/1/19, OA.

[629] See educational programs of Freedom From Hunger Campaign, CA/I/3/2, CAA

[630] The Growth Of Development Education - The Voluntary Committee On Overseas Aid And Development (VCOAD)/ Centre For World Development Education (CWDE) Contribution, COM/3/1/19, OA.

[631] Ibid.

One of these centers led to a joint collaboration with the charity War on Want. In 1980 Royal Park Middle School to Leeds Development Education Center approached the charity and requested some help in putting together an educational program which would introduce students the story of a Third World country without just responding to a disaster. War on Want decided to focus on Bangladesh and, after consultation between the teachers, Leeds' Development Education Center, and members of the local Bangladeshi community, all three groups met regularly to devise and educational pack. The result was a kit for teaching students about international trade and inequality in Bangladesh.[632] The kit included trading games, questioners, trivia and visual aids. Its purpose was to animate children and make them actors in their own right in world's economy and aid. Then the material was trialed, adapted and retailed in four schools by Leeds' Development Education Center. It aimed to educate young Britons to become global citizens.

But education did not end with children. The 1980s saw the advancement of two important government programs towards educating Britons more generally on global suffering. The first was the inclusion of the businesses community through various business seminars —with the first one held in 1980—which focused on how awareness and understanding of development issues can be increased in the business community. The idea was to collaborate with people from the business community and expand educational programs beyond children and youth. It aimed to encourage business and trade co-operation between British and multinational businesses and Third World communities.[633] Interestingly the appeal to include businesses in educational programs on development and world hunger occurred at the same time that humanitarian organizations approached trade unions and secured their endorsements of their appeals.[634]

The second was the creation of a television production company, called the International Broadcasting Trust, by more than sixty of the voluntary aid agencies, churches, trade unions and professional organizations. This broadcasting agency was in charge on producing programs research and supported by British humanitarian organizations and then pitched and broadcast in Channel Four of the BBC. The target, as one promotional pamphlet agued, was to get these shows watched "by audience of up to 1 million people."[635] Through the broadcasting company British organizations could reach a wide audience of citizens from all ages and control the message, which would reach their ears. It was a direct channel to educating citizens through the British television. By 1983 the project was deemed a success when a Gallup Poll revealed that 59 percent of the population was in favor of Britain giving international aid, and only 28 percent against.[636] Curiously in the high days of Thatcherism and the rise of neoliberalism, humanitarian aid became a popular idea.

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[632] "Dhaka To Dundee: Bangladesh And Britain In An Unequal World," 1987, 2454/251 War on Want Archives, London (WWA).

[633] The Growth Of Development Education - The Voluntary Committee On Overseas Aid And Development (VCOAD)/ Centre For World Development Education (CWDE) Contribution, COM/3/1/19, OA.

[634] "Dhaka To Dundee: Bangladesh And Britain In An Unequal World," 1987, 2454/251 War on Want Archives, London (WWA).

[635] The Growth Of Development Education - The Voluntary Committee On Overseas Aid And Development (VCOAD)/ Centre For World Development Education (CWDE) Contribution, COM/3/1/19, OA.

[636] Ibid.

Young Humanitarians

By the end of the 1960s, as youth had become an established social and cultural category in Britain, humanitarian charities increasingly addressed this demographic.[637] As the historian Jeffrey Weeks showed, youth as a new social category had its origins in a demographic and economic changes dating to the postwar years but particularly took off in the 1960s. In this decade, there were "a million more unmarried people" between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four than there had been only ten years before. This number represented an increase of 20 percent in the number of young, unmarried people in Britain. And in a period of growing affluence, youth also wielded a new economic power. Although they disposed of only some 5 percent of total consumer spending, according to Weeks, "they were the biggest purchasers of certain commodities."[638] This new consumer market, therefore, had a relative abundance of surplus income.

Recognizing this change, humanitarian charities began targeting youth in their campaigns not only in the media but also on the streets. From the mid-1960s humanitarian organizations started to specifically market their appeals, visuals and public fairs to youth. Activities like "fests for famines" in Trafalgar Square helped young Britons to identify and "feel" world starvation and act "in the cause of humanity."[639] "Britons swallow £40 million's worth of slimming pills every year, almost a fifth of the national aid budget,"[640] one Oxfam appeal argued. Through these "fasts for famines" campaigns Oxfam managed to bring the ironies of global hunger to young Britons .

Oxfam particularly stood out in these activities during the late 1960s. It recruited celebrities like Twiggy and the Beatles to support their appeals and gave a facelift to humanitarianism.[641] While other humanitarian organizations like Save the Children held fundraising concerts already in the interwar period, these events were limited to a very small and exclusive group of donors typically from wealthy background. Oxfam, however, not only expanded the base of its supporters but also its volunteer base, which now relied on young people who graduated from high school or college students. Its appeals sought to make humanitarianism fun and 'cool.'

Oxfam also supported entrepreneurial humanitarian campaigns by young people. In 1969 Giles Pegram, a nineteenth year old student from London, approached Oxfam and suggested he would organize a walk to fundraise for the charity. Together with six of his friends – all in the ages between school and university – Pegram ended up recruiting 50,000 walkers from all over London to join what became "the great Wembley walk."

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637 William Osgerby, *Youth in Britain* (Wiley, 1998); Bill Osgerby, "'Well, It's Saturday Night An' I Just Got Paid': Youth, Consumerism and Hegemony in Post-war Britain," *Contemporary Record* 6, no. 2 (September 1, 1992); Lawrence Black, *The Political Culture of the Left in Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, New Britain?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

638 Jeffrey Weeks, *Sex, Politics & Society*, 1st ptg. edition (London ; New York: Longman, 1981), 252.

639 "Soup and Roll Ends 100 Hour Oxfam Fast," *Daily Telegraph*, 8 April 1969; "Fast begins 'Focus on Famine," *The Guardian*, 25 October 1969; "Fasters Join Starving Million," *The Times*, 25 October 1969.

640 "Cold and Hungry in Piccadilly," *The Guardian*, 20 December 1969.

641 Philip Howard, "Lennon to Smile for Charity," The Guardian, 25 October 1969;

"We talked things over and decided to get a quarter million for Oxfam,"[642] said Pegram in an interview to the Daily Mirror. Pegram prepared a business plan of how they will recruit the funds and organize the event, and met with the Scotland Yard to receive a permit. "They could see, Pegram stated, "we were in business."[643] Pegram got sponsorship from Barclays Bank and recruited professional stuff as the secretaries. They also secure a nominal charge from Wembly Stadium of £2,000 instead of their usual £12,000 to host the final moments of the event.

The walk was a huge success and the biggest up to that date. It represented a shift in the support base of humanitarian charities. Instead of the older, Christian charities, which grudgingly claimed they "felt that Sunday is being used too much for such thing,"[644] the walk received a huge response mostly from the British youth. Through that Pegram and his crew have managed to raise more than £250,000 for Oxfam in just one afternoon.[645] Beginning from eleven centers across London's boroughs, the walk included celebrities such as Britain's Olympic gold medalists hurdler David Hermery and the actress Sheila Hancock.[646] Walking barefoot and in a temperature of 82 degrees,[647] however, the walk represented – as the Liberal MP Jeremy Thorpe called them, "Britain's young volunteer army."[648] In newspapers and on television young people became the face of Oxfam's walk in the late 1960s.[649]

Figure 5. Twiggy in a poster to promote Oxfam's Walk, 1969.

[642] Stanley Bonnet, "The boy who thought big," *Daily Mirror*, 16 July 1969.

[643] Ibid.

[644] "Parsons hit at walk 'that will keep you out of church,' *Daily Mirror*, 12 July 1969.

[645] "The Boy Behind the March," *Sunday Times*, 8 July 1969.

[646] "Sun Hits Oxfam's Walk," *Daily Express*, 14 July 1969; Frank Howitt, "What a Blisterer," *Daily Express*, 14 July 1969.

[647] Brian Cashinella, "50,000 in walk for Oxfam," *The Times*, 14 July 1969.

[648] John Dodd, "Britain's Young Volunteer Army, *The Guardian*, 14 June 1969.

[649] John Ezard, "40,000 teenagers limp home with honour," *The Times*, 14 June 1969; "Blisters for Oxfam," *Oxford Times*, 27 June 1969.

Indeed, the walk represented how the generation of 68' was recruited to the growing culture of aid. Through a commitment to activism beyond one's own borders, the generation of 68' was recruited to the project of aid. As Akira Iriye and Rana Mitter have previously argued, the generation of 1968 did not belong to one national culture but rather was inherently transnational.[650] Britons joined a global movement that acceded any specific political agenda or cause. Rather, the culture of aid became part of a new a new lifestyles for this generation in the late 1960s and 1970s. This aid culture a joined the new aesthetics emerging in art, music, film, architecture, graphic design, and fashion. Young people believed they were more sentient than their parents' generation, and the hope of building a new society founded on a politics of care and compassion t met with the search for the "new man" in humanitarian and human rights aid programs. British humanitarian organizations tapped into this movement by creating a culture of aid, adding a humanitarian aspect to the new lifestyle of the 68'-ers. Nothing represented this new lifestyle most, however, than rock music. As the next chapter will show, rock music helped globalize humanitarian culture and popularized it even further among youth.

Conclusion

From the television via the classroom to the streets of London, this chapter has shown how in Britain a humanitarian culture was developed between 1960s and 1980s that generated new forms of global citizenship. This culture included more than just visual representations of mass suffering on the television screen. Instead, the new audio-visual representations of global catastrophes became part of a new cultural and educational programs aimed at informing and animating Britons. In particular, these programs paid particular attention to Britain's youth. Through them Britons could become, almost from infancy, global citizens who acted in the cause of humanity.

Charities like Oxfam and Christian Aid created new experiences and installations to create new affective relations between Britons and strangers overseas. Yet they also increasingly used television shows, producers, and public relation firms to manage their campaigns and market humanitarian suffering. As the next chapter will explore, through rock and punk music this humanitarian culture became even more embedded within a new humanitarian business.

[650] Akira Iriye and Rana Mitter, "Forward," in Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth (ed.), *1968 in Europe*.

Chapter Six

The Global Jukebox

On the afternoon of July 13, 1985 more than twenty of the most famous British bands and artists – among them Dire Straits, Queen, David Bowie, The Who, Elton John, and Paul McCartney – gathered on one stage in Wembley Stadium in London. Across the Atlantic, at the same time (seven o'clock in the morning EST) thirty-seven artists, including Bob Dylan, Mick Jagger and Madonna, simultaneously preformed at JFK Stadium in Philadelphia. The dual concert was held for sixteen hours to raise funds for relief of the Ethiopian famine and was joined by small performances from around the world. Billed as the "the global jukebox," the Live Aid campaign was the first global concert, broadcast live across the world in an unprecedented satellite link-up to around 1.9 billion viewers. As one of its television producers described it, "We were showing we were one global village, we are one humanity."[651]

This chapter examines the creation of this global village through the history of rock activism and particularly of the Live Aid concert of 1985. It traces the history of a new global culture of humanitarian aid and celebrity diplomacy that was forged in the Band Aid/Live Aid enterprise of 1984-85. The Live Aid concert, I show, was rooted within the rock and punk culture of the 1960s and 1970s. It emerged from the marriage of rock music and activism as the youth of the 60s and 70s came to see them connected. Building on this tradition, the concert fused this rock activism with humanitarian sentiments. The result was the creation of a new type of humanitarian activism: one which was advocated through a mega concert event. Live Aid concert signaled a new type of global humanitarianism on an unprecedented scale.

At the same time, the chapter will argue that the more than a simple music concert, Live Aid was a also business venture which helped spread the plight of humanitarian suffering by commodifing aid. Through the concert, music and television producers, businessmen, and public relation firms came to manage humanitarian campaigns. As such, they produced a universal yet perhaps depolitical message which generated millions of pounds. Using a satellite linkup, the expertise of producers and businessmen and funding from corporations, Live Aid helped connect British youth with young Americans and ordinary people across the globe.

'A Biblical Famine'

On the eve of 23 October 1984, at nine o'clock, BBC viewers tuned in to see the journalist Michael Buerk reporting from Ethiopia about a "biblical famine in the twentieth century." Filmed by the Kenyan cameraman Mohammed Amin, the report showed devastating images from the famine relief camp in Korem. Opening with the shot of the starving masses, the camera captured scenes from the catastrophe: an emaciated young woman holding the body of her child; a skeletal man, who was holding out the desiccated body of his child. While in reality the famine may have been the result of a

[651] Hal Uplinger, TV Producer, Live Aid, *Rockin' All Over The World* (BBC 4).

brutal civil war, these images gave the famine an almost transcendental quality, one whose magnitude belied a political cause.

The report became an instant sensation and received an enormous response across the Western world. It was broadcast in Britain as well as by more than 425 broadcasting organizations, reaching an estimated 470 million viewers.[652] The BBC was flooded by hundreds of calls from viewers across the world. It generated enormous support from viewers who sent money and donations to relief agencies to fund their relief campaigns in Ethiopia.[653]

One of these viewers was Bob Geldof, the Irish lead singer and manager of the British rock band Boomtown Rats. Over the several years the band had been in existence, the Rats had experienced moderate international success but in October 1984 sales of their new record had been in decline. Geldof had been trying to promote their latest single on October 23rd, when he turned on his television set and watched Buerk's report. Galvanized by the images he saw, Geldof felt compelled to act and respond to the events in Ethiopia. "I felt disgusted, enraged and outraged, but more than all those, I felt deep shame," he later wrote. In a world of abundance and wealth, the West had a responsibility to prevent such a horror. The picture that moved him most was the sight of a nurse choosing 300 people to be fed from 10,000 who needed to be fed. As he later wrote "What separated those chosen to live from those condemned to die was a waist-high wall. The people picked to be fed stood ashamed of their good fortune on one side of the wall, turning their backs in shame on the others. The ones left behind, in effect condemned to die, stood and watched with beautiful dignity,"[654]. While the European Economic Community was cutting off access to food, Geldof argued, Ethiopia was dying of hunger.[655] "We had allowed this to happen and now we knew it was happening, to allow it to continue would be tantamount to murder…I had to withdraw my consent,"[656] he concluded.

Mobilized by Buerk's report Geldof decided to help the starving in Korem. Money, however, just "didn't seem enough." Geldof considered giving the profits from the next Rats record to Oxfam but, since the band has been unsuccessful, he knew it would be a pitiful amount. Instead, he realized, he could use his connections in the music industry and coordinate an event with other musicians, which would help raise more money to help the Ethiopians. With the help of his wife Paula Yates,[657] Geldof decided to contact various artists and collaborate with them on a song whose profits would go to Ethiopia. As somewhat of a music entrepreneur, Geldof decided to record a song and release it just in time for the Christmas market that year. Geldof wrote a song together with Midge Ure (who also produced it) and it was recorded at Sam West Studios in Notting Hill, London on 25 November 1984. Geldof contacted James "Midge" Ure of

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[652] Peter Gill, *A Year in the Death of Africa: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Famine* (Paladin Grafton Bks., 1986), 91.

[653] Suzanne Franks, "Why Michael Buerk's 1984 famine report from Ethiopia entered media history," BBC, 11 October 2013; See also Suzanne Franks, *Reporting Disasters*.

[654] Peter Hillmore, *Live Aid: World Wide Concert Book* (Unicorn Publishing House, 1985).

[655] That's what he also says to Thatcher. Also in some of the interviews on YouTube – find.

[656] Bob Geldof, *Is That It?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986).

[657] Claire Cohen, "Band Aid 30: Let's not forget Paula Yates - the woman who inspired it all," *The Telegraph*, 17 November 2014. Yates also helped Geldof name the group later "Band Aid" and to organize the Live Aid concert.

Ultravox, Sting, Simon Le Bon of Duran Duran, Boy George, George Michael, Bono, Paul Young, and others for a potential collaboration. A year after, Sting remembered the formation of Band Aid pretty vividly: "Bob rang me up almost immediately after he'd seen the television documentary. He's already written a song with Midge, and he wanted to get other people to agree to be involved.… he's known as 'Bob the Gob' and I thought if anybody could do it he could, because of his extraordinary energy. So I said Yes. Then, in the following weeks other people said Yes, and everyone wanted to be involved."[658] (See figure 1).

The result was Band Aid, a charity super-group devoted to raising money for anti-poverty efforts in Ethiopia by releasing the hit "Do They Know It's Christmas?" Initially Band Aid was estimated to achieve a modest success of £70,000 ($100,000) maybe, £100,000 ($140,000) if it was lucky. But the Band Aid single surpassed the hopes of the producers and became the Christmas number one hit that year. Within an hour of the record's release the original estimate had been reached, and the record went on to become the best-selling single of all times in the United Kingdom. It raised £8 million ($11 million) worldwide.[659]

The single stayed at number one for five weeks, selling over three million copies. Its success as best-selling single of all time in the UK was surpassed after only in 1997 by Elton John's "Candle in the Wind." Band Aid arranged to film a video of the recording (directed by Nigel Dick), whose profits would also go to Ethiopia and which in 1986 received a Grammy Award nomination for Best Music Video. Geldof even managed to get all sales of the record exempt from tax, thus creating a new precedent into what the government might consider as a charity fundraiser.[660] He created his own charity — supported by youth, rock musicians—rather than by aid experts and diplomats. Over a very short amount of time Band Aid revolutionized humanitarianism activism and created a new formula for engaging the global public.

Figure 1. Band Aid Logo

The Rock Activism of the 1960s and 1970s

To a certain extant, Band Aid joined an already growing trend of British "rock activism" dating back to the 1960s. Although music benefits and events were a popular

[658] Peter Hillmore, *Live Aid: World Wide Concert Book*.

[659] Ibid.

[660] The single ended up raising over ten million British pounds.

way to fundraise for humanitarian causes since the First World War, it was only with the rock culture of 1960s that music became connected to social and political causes.[661] In this period, when rock musicians from the Anglo-American world, and particularly in Britain, began supporting a verity of progressive causes, a new popular culture of "rock activism" was created. This rock activism connected social and political issues to the counter-culture rock and later punk music.

Most significantly, music mobilized the working classes into participating into charity and welfare causes classes they had traditionally been excluded from.[662] Listeners used music to interpret, celebrate and sometimes even to criticize the socio-cultural changes they saw around them. Rock became a central part of this youth "subculture," as Stuart Hall called it, based on progressive ideas and values. This youth subculture used music as a form of politics and a means of expressing difference.[663] This was especially true with new Beatles hysteria —or "Beatlemania," as it came to be called in 1963. From this period onwards rock music emerged as a key area for British (and to a certain extant American) youth to articulate new ideas about class, generation, politics, gender and language.

One of the most famous examples of such activism was *The Concert for Bangla Desh*, organized in 1971 by the ex-Beatle George Harrison and the Bengali musician Ravi Shankar at Madison Square Garden in New York City. The concert was held to raise international awareness and funds for refugees from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), following the Bangladesh Liberation War. East Pakistan had been previously featuring Western news, when the Bhola cyclone of December 1970 took a toll of half a million lives. The crisis turned into a civil war in early 1971, and by March that year thousands of refugees fled to Calcutta after the Pakistani army slaughtered around a quarter of a million civilians.[664] Shankar, who was collaborating at the time with Harrison on a soundtrack for a filmed called Raga (1971), asked Harrison to join him and organize a series of charity concerts.

After three months of preparations the two put together two events in August 1971. *The Concert for Bangla Desh* included stares such as ex-Beatle Ringo Star, Eric Clapton, and Bob Dylan. For his own performance, Harrison also wrote a song called "Banga Desh" and performed it in the events. Together they raised $243,418.50 to be distributed by UNICEF. After the concerts, Shankar and Harrison released a triple album with Apple Records, which later won a Grammy. The media lavished praise on Harrison

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[661] Music and fundraising events during the First World War onwards were aimed to appeal to a small group of elites. See for example the fundraising events for the Greek relief, EJ 242 A414, SCA.

[662] David Simonelli, *Working Class Heroes: Rock Music and British Society in the 1960s and 1970s*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012), xiii-xxi. On working class in particular see also D. Simonelli, "Anarchy, Pop and Violence: Punk Rock Subculture and the Rhetoric of Class, 1976-78," *Contemporary British History* 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 121–44.

[663] John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, "Subcultures, Cultures and Class," in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain* (Working Papers in Cultural Studies no.7/8, Birmingham, 1975), 9-74.

[664] See also Graeme Thompson, "The coming of age of George Harrison," *GQ-Magazine*, 18 November 2003. See also Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*; Dirk Moses, "The United Nations, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights. War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971–1974"; Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed.*

as an ambassador for rock altruism and hailed the event as proof that "the Utopian spirit of the Sixties was still flickering."[665]

The Concert for Bangla Desh was the first of its kind to combine rock music, the spirit of 1968, and the politics of postcolonial South Asia. As such it became a pioneer in the new rock activism of the 1970s. First, following in its wake, the rock scene became connected to postcolonial issues. The rock scene mobilized support, awareness, and funding of youth for a postcolonial cause and solidarities in the aftermath of European empires. And it served as an inspiration for other events devoted to postcolonial issues like the *Concerts for the People of Kampuchea*, for example, organized in December 1979 in London by former Beatle Paul McCartney to raise money for the victims of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Second.[666] building on the success of British rock and punk music in the United States —what some called the "British invasion"— this rock activism offered new links between music and political and social issues in the Anglo-American world. British rock brought a new culture and critique of social and political issues and spread them to the United States and beyond. It forged new collaborations between British and American musicians, from which Band Aid and later Live Aid would later draw (See figure 2).

Figure 2. Concert for Bangladesh Poster

This new rock activism was not limited to global politics but also included domestic rallying cries. In Britain between 1976 and 1981, artists and musicians for example organized a campaign called *Rock Against Racism*, as a response to an increase in racial conflict in Britain. The campaign used rock concerts as the medium to protest against the British far-right and white nationalist groups like the National Front. The initial impetus for such a movement was in August 1976, when the musician Eric Clapton

[665] See also Jon Landau, "Concert for Bangladesh," *Rolling Stones*, 3 February 1972; Joshua M. Greene, *Here Comes the Sun: The Spiritual and Musical Journey of George Harrison* (John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 186-194; Ian Peddie, *Popular Music and Human Rights: British and American Music* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011).

[666] James E. Perone, *Mods, Rockers, and the Music of the British Invasion* (ABC-CLIO, 2009).

(who participated in *The Concert for Bangla Desh* just several years earlier) spoke out in support of Enoch Powell. Referring to Powell's controversial "Rivers of Blood," speech against Commonwealth immigrants, Clapton told the audience at a Birmingham gig, "we should send them all back. Throw the wogs out! Keep Britain white!"[667] This comment inflamed Red Sanders, a London-based rock photographer and a political activist radicalized by the events of 1968, who wrote a public letter co-signed by other British musicians and artists condemning Clapton. The letter called Clapton "rock music's biggest colonist,"[668] and pointed out that most of Clapton's musical influences —reggae and rhythm 'n' blues—came from black culture. The letter urged readers to join Rock Against Racism. Within a fortnight there were more than 600 replies to the British press. Three months later, in November 1976, Rock Against Racism held its first ever gig featuring Carol Grimes in the Princess Alice pub in east London. Over the next couple of years the campaign organized more than 300 local gigs and five carnivals, including two enormous London events run jointly with the Anti-Nazi League.[669] The most famous one was on 30 April 1978, almost as a 10th anniversary tribute to the Paris events of May 1968 as some argued.[670] The event included a march from Trafalgar Square to Victoria Park, where 100,000 people from all over the country came to support the campaign and ended with a concert headlined by punk musicians like Tom Robinson (known not only for his music but also for his activism) and The Clash.

Indeed, British punk became especially connected with the new rock activism of the 1970s. Punk developed as subculture of working-class youth to rebel against constraints of an exhausted post-war settlement and the hippie culture of the 1960s. Its aesthetics, fashion, and music were utilized by social and political campaigns including Rock Against Racism and made them part of a counterculture with its own politics.[671] Punk offered an alternative to mainstream culture, one that rejected straight society and social conformity.[672] Instead punk (and anarcho-punk in particular) embraced the politics of anarchism and a DIY culture that went against the music industry and its commercialization.[673]

At the same time, punk also represented the limitations of the rock activism of the 1970s. Punk's "anti-politics"[674] did not always frame a clear alternative and its political

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[667] Luke Bainbridge, "The ten right-wing rockers," *The Guardian*, 14 October 2007.

[668] Ian Goodyer, *Crisis Music: The Cultural Politics of Rock against Racism* (Manchester University Press, 2009); Emily Smith, *The John Mayer Handbook - Everything You Need to Know about John Mayer* (Emereo Publishing, 2013), 306.

[669] On the connection to the Communist Party see Evan Smith, "Are the Kids United?: The Communist Party of Great Britain, Rock Against Racism, and the Politics of Youth Culture," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 5, no. 2 (October 1, 2011): 85–117.

[670] David Widgery, *Beating Time* (Chatto & Windus, 1986).

[671] Sarfraz Manzoor, "1978, the Year Rock Found the Power to Unite," *The Guardian*, 20 April 2008; John Street, *Music and Politics* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

[672] Dave Thompson, *London's Burning: True Adventures on the Front Lines of Punk, 1976-1977* (Chicago Review Press, 2009).

[673] Richard Cross, "The Hippies Now Wear Black' Crass and the Anarcho-Punk Movement, 1977-1984," *Social History Journal*, no. 26 (2004): 25–44.

[674] I am using here Worley's description of punk as anti-politics, though I reject his idealization of punk when he argues that "neither the right nor the left proved able to incorporate the concerns raised by punk into their own ideological framework." Instead, what I am suggesting is that it is actually *punk itself*, which failed to offer a clear political critique and remained as a

vagueness sometimes licensed conservative and fascist ideas.[675] Punk's aesthetics and hostility to mainstream culture took not only leftwing forms but also fascist ones, for example among skinheads).[676] Moreover, punk bands, which had earlier denounced the corporate music industry, by the late 1970s were signing lucrative deals with major record labels. Specialist retailers, mimicking punk's innovate experiments with fashion and adornment, began to market new lines of standardized punk clothing.[677] Punk was integrated to new identity politics and became part of a consumer culture of the 1980s.

It was this context that Band Aid inherited. On the one hand, it built on more than a decade of rock activism, engaged with the domestic and global impact of the postcolonial world. On the other hand it used the commercialization of punk counterculture in the 1980s and gave it a new cause on which to focus its attention. It used the models of the *Concert for Bangladesh* and *Rock Against activism*, but it also took them to a more commercialized form of fundraising. It relied on similar artists and musical genres to promote the message of a global humanitarianism.[678]

Drawing on media representation of the crisis —and in particular on Buerk's report—Band Aid focused on humanitarian issues rather than the structural and political conditions that created them so it will be easier to market them. As Geldof himself argued in couple of interviews, the price of a life in 1985 became "a piece of plastic, seven inches wide, with a hold in the middle."[679] Together with representations like Buerk's "biblical famine," the result was mega humanitarian campaign, which decontextualized Ethiopian hunger and commercialized it. The song became a commodified fusion of rock activism with global compassion. As such, Band Aid focused on the disaster in Ethiopia

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vague "anti-politics" culture which could be appropriated by both right and left. Matthew Worley, "Shot By Both Sides: Punk, Politics and the End of 'Consensus,'" *Contemporary British History* 26, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 333–54.

[675] The historian Matthew Worley tried to argue that some punk products perhaps were less fascist than what may seems but the lyrics of some bands as well as the fetishization of skinheads and fascist/Nazi aesthetics in a period of racial cultural wars in Britain clearly show that some punk bands clearly flirted with fascist ideas. Matthew Worley, "Oi! Oi! Oi!: Class, Locality, and British Punk," *Twentieth Century British History* 24, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 606–36; Matthew Worley, "Punk, Politics and British (fan)zines, 1976–84: 'While the World Was Dying, Did You Wonder Why?,'" *History Workshop Journal* 79, no. 1 (April 1, 2015): 76–106; Matthew Worley, "One Nation Under the Bomb: The Cold War and British Punk to 1984," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 5, no. 2 (2011): 65–83.

[676] And sometimes this support was rather blunt: David Bowie, for example, famously told *Playboy* in 1976 that he "believe[s] very strongly in fascism" (Andy Green, "Flashback: The Clash Rock Against Racism in 1978," *Rolling Stone*, 13 May 2014). On the issue of punk and race more generally see also Stephen Duncombe and Maxwell Tremblay, *White Riot: Punk Rock and the Politics of Race* (London; New York: Verso, 2011); Jon Stratton, "Skin Deep: Ska and Reggae on the Racial Faultline in Britain, 1968-1981," *Popular Music History* 5, no. 2 (November 18, 2011): 191–215.

[677] Matthew Gelbart, "A Cohesive Shambles: The Clash's 'London Calling' and the Normalization of Punk," *Music and Letters* 92, no. 2 (2011): 230–72.

[678] See also the free festival movement – which also got commercialized – but was driven at first by a utopian politics of youth. George McKay, *Senseless Acts of Beauty: Cultures of Resistence Since the Sixties* (London; New York: Verso, 1996); Michael Clarke, *The Politics of Pop Festivals* (Junction Books, 1982).

[679] See for example in the speech he gives in Los Angeles in 28 January 1985.

as a humanitarian crisis and a natural disaster rather than as a crisis which resulted of a postcolonial conflict and war.

Band Aid, We Are the World, and the Commodification of Aid

Band Aid became an instant success. Geldof and Ure's lyrics had a universal quality to them. Neither Ethiopia nor the Cold War —the context in which this conflict emerged from—were mentioned in its text. "At Christmastime/ It's hard, but when you're having fun/ There's a world outside your window/ And it's a world of dread and fear/ Where the only water flowing is the bitter sting of tears," the lyric rather stated. Instead, the lyrics only alluded to Africa, when stating that "there won't be snow in Africa this Christmas time." Rather than discuss the famine and its devastating affects, the song reminded the listeners of a world outside and asked its listeners to "Feed the World." Indeed, the song did not mention a particular time and place of the disaster and could have been easily applied elsewhere. And in fact, they did: the song was recently recorded again in 2015 to fundraise for the Ebola victims in West Africa.

Musically, the song combined various genres and incorporated diverse groups of artists from pop artists like Wham! to new wave rock like U2 and the Police, the post-punk Gothic of the Cure, new romantics like Ultravox, Spandau Ballet and Boy George, and traditional rock bands like Status Quo and Genesis. Band Aid, in short, offered a catchy and suitably bland tune with wide appeal. If a song had the power to make 1980s music fans feel like they could help "feed the world," it wasn't because they perceived themselves as colonialists, but rather as activists. Coldplay's Chris Martin, who was eight years old when Live Aid aired on the BBC in the summer of 1985 remembered it well: "It made my generation feel like caring for the world was part of the remit. Rock and roll doesn't have to be detached from society."[680] "Feed the World" became the slogan for what use to be the rebellious youths of the 1960s and 1970s.

Band Aid success had an international reach and inspired other "charity singles" across the Atlantic. The most famous one was the Harry Belafonte's initiative that led to the song "We Are the World," written by Michael Jackson and Lionel Richie and recorded in late January 1985 in Los Angeles. The song was performed by a diverse group of 44 American artists working under the name "United Support of Artists for Africa" and represented— as opposed to its British inspiration— a majority of black singers as well as white icons like Bruce Springstein and Bob Dylan[681] The artists even met with Geldof who spoke about the impact Band Aid was making in Ethiopia to inspire their own recordings. On 8 March 1985 "We Are the World" was released as a single and became a chart success around the world. The record became the fastest-selling American pop single in history and rasied over 63 million dollars overall, which went not only for humanitarian aid in Ethiopia but also to community development in the United States. It reached number one in many countries including Australia, France, Ireland, New

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[680] Kristi York Wooten, "The Legacy of Live Aid, 30 Years Later," *The Atlantic*, 13 July 2015.

[681] Geldof and the Band Aid group were criticized for not including more black artists both for the song as well as the following Live Aid concert. In the USA African American voices called for a response to the Ethiopian famine from the black community, and even though it was never explicitly said by the US for African group, the song can be seen as a response to these voices. See for example, Nelson George, "Rhythm & Blues," *Billboard*, 5 January 1985, 52.

Zealand, and the UK. By the end of 1985, "We Are the World" had become the best selling single of the year and won two platinum discs.

Similar to the Band Aid charity single, "We Are the World" carried a global message inclusive in its lyrics and melody. The song had a wide appeal for both younger and older listeners and spoke to the universal community of "the world."[682] As Jane Fonda admitted in a video on the making of the song, "for many of us watching that night, part of the thrill was seeing so many diverse artists working together so compatibly…frankly it was a bit like a dream."[683]. The song's main lyrics —"we are the world" and "there's a choice we're making" resonated with Pepsi's trademarked slogan of the time ("The choice of a new generation") in a way that, on the part of Pepsi-contracted song writers Michael Jackson and Lionel Richie, was perhaps not intentional but nonetheless viably commercial. Greil Marcus criticized the song for exactly that: "We Are the World," the American journalist argued, "says less about Ethiopia than it does about Pepsi."[684] Whatever its relationship to Pepsi the song helped brand humanitarian aid and commodify it.

Band Aid initiative and its American sequel inspired a new generation of humanitarianism. Using celebrity and rock culture, it popularized and globalized humanitarian aid. Here again we see how humanitarian action became not only a matter of diplomats, government officials and non-governmental experts, but also a matter of the general public, and specifically of youth. Geldof was crowned the architect and face of a new form of global humanitarianism. As one news anchor argued, "Geldof challenged the world to respond," and as a consequence was feted by both the American Congress and even received an honorary knighthood as a spokesperson for African development.

Geldof quickly accepted this new role of a celebrity diplomat. He went on to visit Ethiopia and Sudan to learn from up close about the situation in the region and see how the Band Aid money would be distributed. His visit taught him more about the political and economic causes of the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. He met with Ethiopian politicians and spoke with aid workers, who gave him their impressions and opinions into what caused the catastrophe and how it should be combated. Nevertheless, he decided to focus on the plight of hunger rather than to focus on the problems that had caused it. While humanitarian organizations like Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders were in the midst of reassessing their own relief work—mainly because both the Ethiopian army as well as the Tigryan insurgencies abused it— Geldof decided to focus on the suffering as separate from the political economy of the disaster.[685] Instead of donating his money to the regular charity channels he decided to fund relief projects directly through his own Band Aid charity.

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[682] H. Louise Davis, "Feeding the World a Line?: Celebrity Activism and Ethical Consumer Practices From Live Aid to Product Red," *Nordic Journal of English Studies* 9, no. 3 (2010): 89–118.

[683] Tom Trbovich, *We Are The World: The Story Behind The Song*, Documentary, Music, (1985), 1:18- 2:12.

[684] Greil Marcus, remarks from "Rock for Ethiopia," panel presentation at the Third International Conference on Popular Music Studies, Montreol, Canada (July 1985). In Greil Marcus et al., *Rock for Ethiopia* ([Ottawa]: IASPM (Canada), 1986), 17. See also Greil Marcus, *Bob Dylan by Greil Marcus: Writings 1968-2010* (PublicAffairs, 2010), 108.

[685] Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza* (Verso, 2012).

Initially, Geldof had planned to disperse the funds through other British charities like Save the Children and Oxfam. But when he realized that these might not go directly to transport food to the Ethiopians he decided to register Band Aid as a charity and donate the money to do just that. In effect he set himself up as more expert than the experts with experience of humanitarian relief in the region. Thus, the money that Band Aid raised had an immediate destination, and an immediate purpose: to buy and transport food. 150 tons of high-energy biscuits were sent, 1335 tons of milk powder, 560 tons of oil, 470 tons of sugar, 1,000 tons of grain. Money was sent to the relief agencies, and lorries and trucks were bought to transport the supplies. The problem with that approach was that the donations were never fully monitored and could potentially be abused by the Ethiopian military or the Tigrian opposition.[686] Nevertheless, after his visit to Ethiopia Geldof decided that these donations were not enough. "There [was] still so much that has to be done,"[687] his charity argued. (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Geldof during his visit to Ethiopia.

Live Aid, Global Media and the Creation of a Global Village

When he returned from Ethiopia, Geldof decided to organize a live show to raise more funds and invest in feeding programs. He was determined to capitalize on Band Aid and organize an event with would include both British and American musicians. Geldof approached the producer Harvey Goldsmith and asked him to help him organize a dual concert, one in Britain and the other in the United States. "The show should be as big as is humanly possible. There's no point just 5,000 fans turning up at Wembley; we need to have Wembley linked with Madison Square Gardens and the whole show to be televised

[686] And indeed Geldof and Band Aid were later blamed for "doing more bad than good" by supporting the Ethiopian resettlement program. David Rieff, **"**Cruel to be kind?" *The Guardian*, 23 June 2005.

[687] Peter Hillmore, *Live Aid: World Wide Concert Book*.

worldwide."[688] For Geldof, Britain was not enough. After "We Are the World" he realized that the power of rock activism lay in its global reach especially in the American market. The Hollywood glamor of American music scene combined with the new satellite technology ignited Geldof's imagination. He was now convinced that he needed to get around fifty artists and musicians to preform in a dual concert across both sides of the Atlantic, including super celebrities of the time like Bruce Springsteen and Paul McCartney. "Bob said this should be the definitive statement for the music business,"[689] recalled Goldsmith later.

And indeed the concert quickly began to run like a business. Soon after Geldof approached Goldsmith promoters were enlisted to design and publicize the show. The plan was to create a lineup for a 16-hour show that would run simultaneously in Britain and the USA. Boll Graham recalled how usually American promoters "are like the Mafia, with our own bit of territory. On this we all cooperated."[690] Live Aid offered a scale of endeavor that was unimaginable for producers, promoters, marketing companies, and artists.

Goldsmith secured Wembley Stadium — Britain's national sports stadium built for the Empire Exhibition of 1926 (think that date is right) with a 72,000-capacity— for July 13th, 1985. Meanwhile, Bill Graham, whom Geldof had enlisted as the American promoter, landed JFK Stadium in Philadelphia. At the time, Philadelphia was in need of a better image, after the bombing of the MOVE headquarters in West Philadelphia had left 11 people dead and 250 homeless. "We did have that unfortunate incident," said Larry Magid, a Philadelphia-based promoter who, along with partner Allen Spivak, helped Graham to put the show together. "And if this can help ease things up, great."[691] The show became a PR stunt for other causes, including the city of Philadelphia.

After the promoters came the sponsors. British Airways, for example, was approached to lend Band Aid the Concorde for the day, so that some stars could play in both Wembley and Philadelphia. With the help of marketing companies like Entertainment Marketing & Communications, Inc. (EMCI),[692] Pepsi and AT&T also gave their sponsorship in return for advertising space, commercial airtime and product placement. Coca-Cola was also supposed to advertise in the event but when they realized the prominent display of Pepsi signs and cups in the stadium they withdrew.[693] As the Live Aid logo itself had become a valuable brand, organizers kept it under wraps fearful that pirates would create bootleg merchandise prior to the concert.[694] A new type of

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[688] "Band Aid... On Stage". Melody Maker (London, England: IPC Media): 3. 12 January 1985.

[689] Michael Goldberg, "Live Aid 1985: The Day the World Rocked," *Rolling Stone Magazine*, 15 August 1985.

[690] Peter Hillmore, *Live Aid: World Wide Concert Book*.

[691] Ibid.

[692] Jay Coleman is the founder and CEO of Entertainment Marketing & Communications, Inc. (EMCI), a Stamford, CT based agency that links consumer companies with music and entertainment properties. EMCI originally launched in 1976 as Rockbill, Inc., and handled such landmark entertainment alliances as Pepsi-Michael Jackson, Jo van-The Rolling Stones, and the corporate sponsorship for Live Aid. In Jay Coleman, "Rocketing To Success," *PROMO Magazine*, May 2000.

[693] Michael Goldberg, "Live Aid 1985: The Day the World Rocked."

[694] "Live Aid Faces Rip-Off," 11 July 1985, *Scottish Daily Express*, 15.

commercial sponsorship was created, which connected its products to the humanitarian causes.

When Geldof decided to telecast the event to the whole world through a satellite linkup and raise funds using a telethon sponsorships from companies like Pepsi increased. Through television and telephone appeals, people across the globe could send money. The concert thus became not only a music spectacle but also a mega media event. Worldwide Sports and Entertainment, the company that masterminded the coverage of the Los Angeles Olympics, took charge of the television packaging. Sixteen satellites were commandeered to beam the concert almost everywhere in the world. It would be sent to almost any country that wanted to see it. The developing countries of Africa would get it free of charge, while other countries would pay for it. In America and Britain the concert would be televised for at least 16 hours, every minute of it. People would see it from London to Los Angeles, Lagos and Lahore.

Geldof and Michael C. Mitchell, president of Worldwide Sports and Entertainment, contacted broadcasters in ninety nations representing about 500 million of the world's 600 million television sets — which were capable of televising the show live. "I kept thinking of the old phrase 'It's not television that we're producing but vision,'"[695] said Mitchell, who was in charge of planning and finance for the 1984 Olympics. Mitchell, however, wasn't just concerned with making history. He also wanted to get these countries to pay for the right to broadcast Live Aid, or to agree to carry a telethon in which viewers would be encourage to pledge money during breaks in the show, or to do both.

Britain and Japan joined the cause within a few days but other countries were slower to commit. Still, by the day of the show over 100 countries had agreed to carry the broadcast and at least 22 of those also agreed to broadcast telethons. The rights fees for the broadcast ranged from a few thousand dollars to millions. U.S. networks forked over the most, the undisclosed figure is said to be well into the millions. Initially, American networks did not buy easily into the package. Although MTV had agreed early on to broadcast the entire show, both CBS and NBC flatly turned it down. But Mitchell ended up convincing ABC to buy the package at a higher price (when he bluffed them by saying CBS and NBC were interested). However, once both MTV and ABC were involved, as one journalist put it, the networks got more into the spirit of "the Old West than of the Global Village."[696] ABC insisted that they would broadcast the show exclusively and would not share it with other networks. In the end ABC did manage to extract some compromises from a third, ad hoc network of 105 television stations across the country cobbled together expressly for the Live Aid event. This domestic syndicate agreed to air only the first eleven hours of the program, until six p.m. Eastern Daylight-Saving Time. Two hours later, at eight p.m., ABC would kick in with its coverage, hosted by Dick Clark and featuring the remaining nine live acts. ABC also asked for, and got, the right to block several acts — including David Bowie, Elton John and Wembley show closer Paul McCartney — from appearing live on the domestic syndicate during the day.[697]

Geldof and Mitchell also ran into problems with West Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. While the countries were interested in broadcasting the show, they were

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[695] Michael Goldberg, "Live Aid 1985: The Day the World Rocked."

[696] Ibid.

[697] Esther B. Fein, "'Live Aid' Concert Is Aiming For The Sky," *The New York Time*, 12 July 1985.

reluctant to run a telethon because of taxation issues. Geldof suggested setting up a separate bank account in Germany to comply with local laws and calm any fears about the distribution of Live Aid income.. When the producers in West Germany were still reluctant, Geldof threatened to take the broadcast away from the Germans unless they fell in line. "I can't understand it. There are only two or three countries not doing telethons, like Yugoslavia and Switzerland. Even France, which is one of the cheapest countries in Europe in terms of charitable contributions, is doing one. Why not Germany?"[698] Earlier that day he pulled a similar stunt on France. In the end both countries agreed to broadest the show as well as to hold a telethon to fundraise for Ethiopia.

On July 13th a total of 1.5 billion people watched the show with 85 percent of the world's television sets tuned into Live Aid. Geldof called it "a global jukebox." Live Aid became the first to harness the powers of mass media and peer-to-peer persuasion to bring the world together around a targeted cause. The most luminous rock and pop stars in the world would perform (See figure 4). More than twenty of the most famous British bands and artists – among them Dire Straits, Queen, David Bowie, The Who, Elton John, and Paul McCartney – gathered on one stage in Wembley Stadium in London. As the show opened all eyes were on the Royal Box as Prince Charles and Princess Diana entered to the sound of an unlocking fanfare of trumpets (See figure 5). Across the Atlantic in Philadelphia's JFK Stadium at the same time (seven o'clock in the morning EST) Jack Nicholson opened the show and introduced thirty-seven artists, including Bob Dylan, Mick Jagger and Madonna. As one documentary declared, "It was the day that music changed the world."[699]

[698] Michael Goldberg, "Live Aid 1985: The Day the World Rocked."

[699] Trbovich, Tom, Mikal Gilmore, Quincy Jones, Michael Jackson, Lionel Richie, Jane Fonda, Dan Aykroyd, et al. *We are the world the story behind the song*. Chatsworth, CA: Distributed by Image Entertainment, 2005, 1:18- 2:12.

Figure 4. Live Aid stage


Figure 5. Princess Diana, Prince Charles and Bob Geldof at Live Aid

The reach of Live Aid made regular songs into global anthems. Queen's "Radio Ga Ga;" U2's 12-minute version of "Bad"(See figure 6) for example became famous for their Live Aid versions. "It was like dropping a pebble in a pond, and the ripples were huge," said Midge Ure. "The average guy on the street felt connected to making a

difference. Live Aid wasn't [the artists' baby], it belonged to the fans. They created the momentum by putting their hands in their pockets, buying the record, and by being at the concerts."[700] The show helped cement a new type of music celebrity, one that was connected to global issues and humanitarian suffering. Through Live Aid rock-stars like Bono of U2 were initiated into becoming the new face of humanitarian activism in the 1990s and 2000s.

The event had a tremendous effect on its viewers, particularly young people. It built on a two decades of rock subculture and gave it a stage and a cause. Elizabeth McLaughlin was 23 when she attended the London show and stood within feet of the stage. She remembers the moment the sun fell below the rim of Wembley Stadium and the audience clapped in unison to Queen's "Radio Ga Ga." "People were crying a lot," she said. "The combination of the images on the screens and the messages coming from the artists reminded us why we were there. We knew we had to do more." McLaughlin credits Live Aid for influencing her to leave a career as stockbroker and later become a country director for CARE. "Whatever came out of Live Aid—millions of pounds and dollars, that's great. But what really happened at the concert is that a new generation was born, a generation meant to be aware of what's going on around us."[701] Live Aid made humanitarianism cool.

Figure 6. Bono on Live Aid stage

Conclusion

Live Aid established a new humanitarian global community, which engaged people from all classes and age groups through music and television. Its supporters ranged from royalty like Princess Diana, multinational companies like Pepsi, musicians like David Bowie, actors like Jack Nicolson as well as ordinary and often youthful viewers

[700] Kristi York Wooten, "The Legacy of Live Aid, 30 Years Later," *The Atlantic*, 13 July 2015.

[701] Ibid.

from around the globe. As one of its television producers described it, "We were showing we were one global village, we are one humanity."[702]

But Live Aid supporters were not only limited to rock fans and music fans. In an essay from July 1986 Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques declared in *Marxism Today* that "Now, with the rise of the Band Aid/Live Aid… phenomenon, the ideology of selfishness- and thus one of the main ideological underpinnings of Thatcherism - has been dealt a further, severe blow."[703] For Hall and Jacques Live Aid ,was a source of optimism in an otherwise dismal decade of what Hall had earlier termed "Thatcherism". When Margaret Thatcher came to power.at the 1979 election he lamented the success of an ideology which had caught even young people by it's appeal to "selfishness and greed."[704] But with Band Aid/Live Aid he saw a new type of global politics emerge among youth, one which popularized "the plight of the Third World."[705] This "famine movement," as Hall and Jacques termed it, came from outside the left, "however widely you define it." It mobilized new forces of young Britons through contemporary popular culture, especially the culture of rock music.

In the years following Live Aid, the Band Aid Trust continued to distribute funds to an array of charities working on the continent of Africa. While some criticized Band Aid Trust's donation — including reports about Band Aid Fund suspected of using monies to purchase weapons in the 1980s— it continued to be a success even after the Live Aid concert. Live Aid inspired a number of charity events, such as Media Aid that raised money for Save the Children. The Band Aid Trust itself held on 1986 "Sport Aid," a sort of Live Aid for athletes in which 19.8 million runners. Its enduring effects shaped a new era of celebrity humanitarians through Live 8 and the charity work of Bono.

Live Aid was a culmination of the series of connections between the rock and punk cultures of the 1960s and 1970s and the new generational activism of the period. As a youth subculture, this rock activism used a new medium through which ideas about global and domestic justice could be protested and fought. At the same time, Live Aid also marked a break from previous forms of rock activism. Its commercialization, use of the global media and most of all, its connection to humanitarian causes—rather than more politically contentious ones of racism and postcolonial conflicts—created a new type of aid activism which elevated rock musicians to the level of public diplomats. For the generation of the 1980s, the British royal family, and even the more radical British left, Geldof and the Live Aid enterprise symbolized the new face of humanitarian aid. He also helped forge a new form of the humanitarian industry.

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[702] Hal Uplinger, TV Producer, Live Aid, *Rockin' All Over The World* (BBC 4)

[703] Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, "People Aid: A New Politics Sweeps The Land," *Marxism Today*, July 1986.

[704] Ibid.

[705] Ibid.

Conclusion

The Global Village and Its Afterlives

Less then 48 hours after the Nepali earthquake of April 2015 (also known as the Gorkha earthquake), Britain raised an enormous amount of funds and equipment for its relief. The British public donated around £14 million through the Disaster Emergency Committee. Ten days later the British government also provided a £30 million package of emergency aid as well as medical supplies, experts, and even RAF helicopters. British corporations —like Tesco, British Airways and Virgin— ran their own appeals raising funds through their costumers and donating them to the British Red Cross. Overall, British aid reached more than £83 million. That is, that is $127.40 million of British aid, in comparison to only $68.34 million donated from Germany, $15.86 million from Australia, and $10 million from the United States.[706] It seems like Peter Singer's appeal to a "global village" in 1971 has now in 2015 become a reality, and Britain plays a lead role in it.

This dissertation has examined how and when Britons have responded to humanitarian disasters like the Nepali earthquake and mobilized to aid their victims. It sought to explain the conditions and practices through which Britons joined a global humanitarian community by looking at multiple actors. Part I of the work focused on the stories of aid experts, nongovernmental organizations as well as on more official institutions like the British military. I have tried to suggest that the development of an elaborate infrastructure of experts and aid workers in the cause of humanity emerged from imperial knowledge and experience. This did not necessarily mean that British organizations worked to further the goals of the British government. Rather, I have demonstrated that in the case of organizations like Oxfam, their technical knowledge was used to aid lives even if it went against British official policies. Indeed, my research has shown that in humanitarian crises like Biafra, nongovernmental experts came to replace the imperial state. Utilizing former RAF pilots and plans, nongovernmental organizations in Biafra created a new type of humanitarian-military complex.

This relationship between the military and humanitarian aid was further formalized in the early 1970s when the British military responded to the 1970 Bhola cyclone in the Bay of Bengal. Utilizing its former military base in Singapore and its vast expertise, the British military retooled its imperial knowledge for the purpose of 'soft diplomacy' in the months of turmoil which lead to the creation of Bangladesh. But the relief of the Bhola cyclone also created a precedent for the British military. In the 1970s when natural disasters became a major framework to intervene in the global South, the

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[706] "Nepal Earthquake: UK Aid Donations Reach £15m," *BBC News*, 29 April 2015; David Williams, "British Money And Aid Pour Into Nepal: Hundreds Of Thousands Of Pounds Donated To Help Ease The Plight Of Earthquake Victims," *The Daily Mail*, 29 April 2015; Karen Rockett, "Nepal Earthquake: British Army Send 100 More Gurkhas To Help With Relief Effort," *Mirror*, 9 May 2015; Gabriella Jóźwiak, "How The UK Was Able To Quickly Mobilize Aid To Nepal Quake Victims," Devex, 5 May 2015; "DEC Nepal Earthquake Appeal Reaches Milestone £50m," *DEC Media Centre*, 11 May 2015; "Nepal Earthquake: UK Aid Response," Department For International Development, The Rt. Hon Justine Greening MP, Foreign & Commonwealth Office And Ministry Of Defence, 28 April 2015.

Bhola cyclone licensed the intervention of foreign militaries —and former colonial powers no less—in postcolonial states. In 1973-74, when a drought hit the Sahel and caused a series of devastating famines, it was the militaries of Britain and other former imperial powers that international agencies and nongovernmental agencies turned for help. For the British military the relief mission in the Sahel, however, served other purposes than international diplomacy. In a period when the military had lost much of its operational roles and training spaces, humanitarian interventions became a method for it to train troops in "unusual terrains" and at low costs. Indeed, the humanitarian mission to the Sahel served the political economy of the British state after empire: it was a way to train its platoons and have it paid for by British charities.

By the end of the 1970s this became part of an international debate about the role of NATO more generally. As I have demonstrated, for some of its proponents, NATO itself needed to develop its role beyond combat and become a humanitarian agent through disaster relief and peacekeeping. While NATO would indeed adopt a humanitarian role in the case of natural disasters in the early 2000s, already in 1999 —in the direct afterlives of our story—NATO became one of the most important humanitarian agents through its interventions in the Kosovo War. The new "global village," which has emerged in the 1970s developed into a new form of international governance. Beginning with nongovernmental organizations and continuing with militaries acting in the name of humanity, a new era of global governance was being fought through humanitarian interventions in the 1990s.

But this was not the only afterlife of the global village of the 1970s. As Part II demonstrated a new humanitarian business was developed out of the old imperial world. In the late 1960s, as the great promises of the era of decolonization faded, new alternatives were offered to the problem of postcolonial development. Both national and international agencies had accepted that most development projects and blueprints that focused on economic growth had made a negligible impact on the condition of the global poor. Instead, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies invited multinational organizations to join the project of feeding the world's hungry. With the pressure of oil crises, world food crisis, famines in Africa, and growing debt, multinational organizations became a new global power in the world's economy taking the place of empires. As capitalism slipped the bounds of the nation state and international structures of regulation, multinationals came to epitomize the political challenges posed by the market economy of the 1970s. Recognizing this shift, international agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organizations began formal collaborations with multinationals. British organizations like Oxfam began formal collaborations with companies like Tesco and Rover. Thus by the late 1970s and early 1980s multinational businesses became agents of aid in their own right. Through these types of collaborations corporations began speaking the language of humanitarian ethics.

But multinational corporations were not the only historical actors that came to be included in this project of global humanitarianism. In the 1960s and 1970s, British consumers came to join the project of feeding the world's hungry through a new culture of ethical capitalism. While this culture has its roots throughout Europe and the United States, in Britain it took particular forms. In the 1960s and more so in the 1970s, British nongovernmental organizations like Oxfam developed unique forms of consumer activism though charity shops and trading companies. This consumer activism not only raised large revenue for Oxfam, it also strove to connect British consumers with Third World producers. On the international sphere transnational forms of boycotts have made

calls to abstain from unethical products responsible for perpetuating world hunger, yet in Britain charity shops and trading companies have instead encouraged the British customer to purchase goods which now carried ethical value. By the late 1970s new types of "affective economies" were developed: global economies that were fed by this humanitarian ethos.

In a period of affluence and mass consumption of domestic consumer durables, charity shops and trading companies offered a global type of ethical capitalism: capitalism with a human face. Through this new humanitarian business consumerism became an ethical act, a choice that went beyond what one *wants* to what one *ought* to purchase. In writing this history—of the charity shop, the trading company, and the transnational boycotts as well as the inclusion of private businesses— I have sought to offer a genealogy to a new type of cultural capitalism that characterizes our current economy. Rather than a cynical reading of how we are being duped by corporations (as perhaps most histories of neoliberalism tend to do),[707] my goal has been to provide a genealogy of why we are buying into this type of economic culture. In other words, I have tried to show how we came to see our own market society perpetuated through humanitarian ethics.

At the same time, as Part III has shown, in the 1960s and 1970s new types of cultural forms were developed in the name of humanity: from television, to walkathons, arts and even rock concerts, humanitarian ethics became part of everyday lives of Britons. These new cultural forms were planned, produced and crafted not by the vicar's wife or the nurse in the field. They were instead created by public relation films, marketing agencies, television producers, and music promoters who designed an often depoliticized yet all too commercial culture of aid. Through these new agents, humanitarian culture itself was packaged into a sellable commodity. It became an industry which generated large revenue acting in the name of humanity.

Youth in particular became a major target group of this aid culture. Through shows like Blue Peter, walkathons and most of all through the rock activism, British youth joined a global community focused on the plight of distant suffering. What was in 1968 a rebellious youth protesting against the British government in the name of Biafra had become by the 1980s a generation that advocated for hungry Ethiopia by listening to U2 in Wembley Stadium. Utilizing the mass media, the generation of the 1980s formed a new global citizenry. In this model, Britons saw themselves as sharing the responsibility and commitment to a global rather than merely their immediate national community. Its celebrities became its diplomats. Its weapon was rock music. This "famine movement," as Stuart Hall called it, brought a sense of optimism from both left and right side of the political map, who saw this "global village" as providing a new utopian vision of Britain's place in the world.

There are many afterlives of this global village. If one was the large and rapid response to the earthquake in Nepal another one is the current refugee crisis in Europe. It seems almost impossible to write a dissertation about global humanitarianism without thinking of this current crisis as it unravels in front of our eyes. As Syrian and African refugees arrive on the shores of Britain and Europe, the borders of this global village are being transformed and challenged. Knocking on the doors of this global village, the global South has come to reclaim its humanitarian promises. Some of the global citizenry

[707] For example, David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

of the 1980s persists throughout this crisis as with the example in the recent campaign led by individuals to host refugees in their Berlin apartments. Yet it is also clear that this humanitarian framework has its limits. When the plight of distant suffering crossed the borders of Britain, the borderless humanitarianism — originally created in the 1970s— had clear barriers. For British politicians like David Miliband these the barriers stand in direct to Britain's humanitarian tradition of this global village.[708] But perhaps they are also rather revealing of the clear European divisions of this borderless village. As I transform this work into a book manuscript in the coming years, I plan to further examine the borders upon which this global village was predicated.

[708] Julian Borger, "David Miliband: Failure To Take In Refugees An Abandonment Of UK's Humanitarian Traditions," *The Guardian*, 2 September 2015.

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