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“Little Island into Mighty Base”:

Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

Alfred Peredo Flores Jr.

2015

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“Little Island into Mighty Base”:

Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962

By

Alfred Peredo Flores Jr.

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2015

Professor Keith Lujan Camacho, Co-Chair

Professor Frank Tobias Higbie, Co-Chair

This dissertation examines the creation of Guam’s post-World War II multiracial society through Chamorro land stewardship and the recruitment of non-local labor. This tiny 212-square-mile island in the western Pacific became a crucible of American empire that connected Guam, the Philippines, and the United States. This synergy of expansion between the U.S. government and private industry resulted in the construction of Apra Harbor, bases, military homes, and roads throughout Guam. This process was based on the U.S. military’s acquisition of land and the recruitment of approximately 28,000 civilian military workers, most notably men from the Philippines and the United States who constructed these installations. Central to this history are the experiences of Chamorros who fought to retain their ancestral lands and Filipino immigrant workers who organized to protect their wages. In turn, the military attempted to control indigenous land stewardship, Filipino labor, and interracial relationships on the island. However, the military’s expansion project also produced interracial encounters among

Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans that were amicable, violent, and sometimes tragic. Consequently, the triangulation of Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans elucidates the connections between empire, indigeneity, and labor on a highly contested racialized island.

This dissertation of Alfred P. Flores is approved.

Lauren Derby

Valerie J. Matsumoto

Keith Lujan Camacho, Committee Co-Chair

Frank Tobias Higbie, Committee Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2015

DEDICATION

For my parents,

Minu Flores

and

Alfred P. Flores

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|------------------|--|------|
| Abstract | | ii |
| Dedication | | v |
| List of Figures | | vii |
| List of Tables | | viii |
| Acknowledgements | | ix |
| Vita | | xiii |
| Introduction | | 1 |
| Chapter One | Infrastructure of Modernity | 23 |
| Chapter Two | Chamorro Land Stewardship and Military Land Taking | 59 |
| Chapter Three | The Civilian Military Workers of Guam | 97 |
| Chapter Four | Interracial Encounters in Postwar Guam | 141 |
| Conclusion | | 188 |
| Bibliography | | 192 |

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 1.1 Hagåtña at night, 1945
Figure 1.2 Pre-WWII Hagåtña
Figure 1.3 Map of Hagåtña, Piti, and Sumay
Figure 1.4 Apra Harbor, 1945
Figure 1.5 Map of Marine Corps Drive
Figure 1.6 Photo of Marine Corps Drive
- Figure 2.1 Ground view of Tiyan airfield, 1944
Figure 2.2 Aerial view of Tiyan airfield, 1945
Figure 2.3 Village of Hagåtña during World War II
Figure 2.4 Map of U.S. Military Boundaries, circa 1950s
Figure 2.5 Tumon Beach, 1945
- Figure 3.1 Orote Peninsula and Airfield, 1945
Figure 3.2 Minstrel show actors
Figure 3.3 Basketball game at Camp Roxas
Figure 3.4 Baseball game at Camp Roxas
Figure 3.6 Inside condition of a quonset hut at Camp Roxas
Figure 3.7 Outside condition of a quonset hut at Camp Roxas
- Figure 4.1 Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz
Figure 4.2 Guam “pin-up” Models
Figure 4.3 Enlisted men’s dances
Figure 4.4 “Out of Bounds” village sign at Inarajan

LIST OF TABLE

Table 1 Population of Guam, separated by race, 1930-1960

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“Agony over Land: U.S. Military Land Acquisition and Chamorro Land Stewardship, 1944-1972.” Paper Presentation. Northern Marianas Humanities Council Conference, June 14, 2014. Garapan, Saipan.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, my Chamorro grandparents, Pedro and Soledad Flores, purchased five acres of land in the rural city of Perris, CA.¹ Some of my fondest memories as a young child were from the time I spent there with my family. As an adult, I can still recall vivid images from my grandparents' *lancho* that included farm animals, fiestas, and rosaries.² One of my favorite things to do was to chase after or be chased by the goats, pigeons, pigs, and roosters that my grandfather raised. What I did not realize as a child was that my grandparents were able to teach us about Chamorro culture and land stewardship through our experiences on their *lancho*. It was not until I went to Guam for the first time in 2007 that I learned the importance of the *lancho* in perpetuating Chamorro culture. Ultimately, these experiences have shaped my commitment to research and write about the impact that the U.S. military expansion has had upon Chamorros living in Guam.

In 2006, I learned about the U.S. government's plan to increase its military presence in Guam. This proposed project included the relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, their 9,000 dependents, and 10,000 temporary guest workers.³ Additionally, the imperial endeavor was touted as having tremendous social and economic potential for Guam in the development of service industry jobs but with the possible cost of the military needing more land. I found this information startling because the military already owned a significant amount


¹ Chamorros are the indigenous people of the Mariana Islands, while Guamanians can be anyone regardless of race or ethnicity that resides on Guam.

² The word *lancho* comes from the Spanish word *rancheria*, which means ranch in English. For more on the Chamorro *lancho*, see Laura M. Thompson, *Guam and Its People: With a Village Journal by Jesus C. Barcinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

³ Julian Aguon, *The Fire This Time: Essays on Life Under U.S. Occupation* (Tokyo: Blue Ocean Press, 2006), 17. For additional information on the Japan and U.S. military realignment agreement of 2006, see Lisa L. Natividad, "Hita I Manao'Tao Yini Na Tano (We are the People of this Land)," Women for Genuine Security, <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/Newsletter/wearethepeopleofthisland.html> and Miyume Tanji, "Close Yet Distant Relations: The Politics of History Textbooks, U.S. Military Bases and Trauma in Okinawa," *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific* 24, June 2010, <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue24/tanji.htm>.

of land on the island.⁴ However, this proposal also made me wonder if Guam had ever undergone a demographic change of this magnitude before. Through my reading of the secondary literature on military expansion in Guam and the Pacific, I learned that the island had experienced a major demographic transformation immediately after World War II.⁵ Ultimately, this initial inquiry, coupled with my mixed-race background as a son of a Chamorro (the indigenous people from the Mariana Islands) U.S. Army soldier and a Korean immigrant woman, sparked my curiosity to closely examine the creation of Guam’s multiracial and multiethnic society.

Table 1: Guam’s Population Based on Race (1930-1960)



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, Volume 1.

In this dissertation, I examine how a tiny, 212-square-mile island in the western Pacific Ocean became a crucible for American empire that connected Guam, the Philippines, and the

⁴ In 1899, the United States acquired 36,030 acres of Spanish crown lands in Guam as part of the Treaty of Paris. By 1937, the United States owned 48,014 acres, occupied 56,985 acres in 1948, and it owned 39,287 acres in 2010. This statistical information was obtained from Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1964), 335-336, Catherine Lutz, “US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-catherine-lutz/3389>, and Michael F. Phillips, “Land” in *Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 1996), 2-16.

⁵ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995) and The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, *Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 1996).

United States in the immediate post-World War II era.⁶ I argue that the creation of Guam's post-World War II multiracial and multiethnic society was a direct result of American empire. As historian Paul Spickard has argued, "race making is done in the context of colony making."⁷ In the case of Guam, the U.S. military's attempt to make the island into a major military base was predicated on the acquisition of Chamorro land and the recruitment of Filipino and white American civilian workers. In order to deal with the exponential increase of Guam's population, the military attempted to control land ownership, civilian military labor, and interracial relationships. Drawing on Alyosha Goldstein's interpretation of U.S. colonialism, I view the postwar U.S. military expansion of Guam as being based on the complicit, adaptive, and antagonistic interconnection of global, national, regional, and local relations of power.⁸ In Guam, this synergy of expansion between the U.S. military, private industry, and popular discourse validated the construction of military installations and infrastructures throughout the island. However, this project also resulted in interracial encounters among Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans that were amicable, violent, and sometimes tragic. The most notable moments came in the forms of interracial violence, intimate relationships, or resistance against the military.

My first goal in writing this dissertation is to expose how the U.S. military acquired land on Guam in the immediate postwar era. Today, Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States and is also home to 162,000 people that include Chamorros, Filipinos, and several other Asian and Pacific Islander ethnic groups. Located in the western Pacific Ocean, Guam

⁶ Throughout this dissertation, I will utilize prewar and postwar to refer to the years before and after World War II.

⁷ Paul Spickard, *Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23.

⁸ Alyosha Goldstein, "Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present," in *Formations of United States Colonialism*, ed. Alyosha Goldstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 4.

provides a geopolitical buffer between Asia and the continental United States. The island is also a major military installation that has housed nuclear weapons, Polaris submarines, and B-2 stealth bombers.⁹ Furthermore, the U.S. military holds a biennial joint military exercise off the coast of Guam called Valiant Shield, which includes all four branches of the U.S. military. For these reasons, Guam is integral to the U.S. government's interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

Even though the U.S. military has occupied Guam and has colonized its Chamorro population since 1898, World War II and its immediate aftermath were the crucial pivot points in the current manifestation of Guam's multiracial and multiethnic society. This post-World War II project of expansion began in 1944 with the military's policy of acquiring large tracts of land throughout the island. Then in 1962, the military's primary objective of developing Guam into a major military based changed with the ending of the island's security clearance program. Up until this period, the U.S. Navy controlled who could travel to and from the island. However, once the security clearance program was lifted, Guam underwent a new expansion project that included the development of Guam's tourism industry and the construction of suburban homes for non-military residents and new immigrants from northeast Asia and other Pacific Islands. These events resulted in further changes to Guam's racial and ethnic demography, one that was no longer solely predicated on military expansion. I believe that understanding this process from the perspective of the U.S. military can help us decolonize Guam, since sovereignty over land has been one of the most contested issues. In addition, I seek to provide historical context for contemporary interracial relationships on the island. As historian T. Fujitani argues, World War II marked a significant shift in the experiences of racialized minorities and colonial subjects

⁹ For more on the connection between U.S. empire in Guam and military operations in Asia, see Yen Le Espiritu, *Body Counts: The Vietnam War and Militarized Refugees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

living under U.S. governance.¹⁰ This is also the case in Guam since the military played an important role in creating laws that controlled immigration policy and the public spaces in which social relations among Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans took place. By tracing the experiences of these people, the connections between indigeneity, race, and empire become transparent. As of this moment, most studies on the postwar expansion of Guam have solely focused on decolonization, military land acquisition, or sovereignty. While these topics are historiographically and politically important, they do not address the racial complexity that is Guam's contemporary reality. As historian Keith L. Camacho claims, "much contact and exchange occurs between the colonial, indigenous, and settler populations."¹¹ I expand Camacho's argument by pushing the boundaries of Guam and U.S. history in considering how indigenous, diasporic, and working-class people were all relationally connected through empire.¹² Consequently, I hope that my study can bring greater awareness of how U.S. imperialism has influenced these historical and contemporary relations. It is through these objectives that I hope to expand upon the literature on U.S. empire in the Pacific.

My second aim is to contribute to the historiography on U.S. empire by utilizing an indigenous and transnational historical approach that engages studies on labor, immigration, and the Pacific. While scholars from various disciplines have examined empire and labor in the

¹⁰ T. Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 25.

¹¹ Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 3.

¹² For more on the connections between indigenous and diasporic communities in the Pacific, see JoAnna Poblete-Cross, "Bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case Study of American Samoa," *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010), 501-522, Dean Itsuji Saranillio, "Colonial Amnesia: Rethinking Filipino "American" Settler Empowerment in the U.S. Colony of Hawai'i," in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, eds. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), and Vicente M. Diaz, "Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations Between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream," *ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3 no. 1 (1995): 147-160.

Oceania, they have primarily focused on agricultural labor, cannery work, and labor organizing. By focusing on working-class history, the link between military expansion and labor becomes more apparent as imperial endeavors are made possible through the labor of people. Thus, my study will help explain how Guam and other islands in the Pacific were militarized. Ultimately, my focus on empire, indigeneity, labor, and race will contribute to a growing dialogue that connects the fields of ethnic studies, history, labor studies, and indigenous studies.

Relying on a multi-archival approach, my dissertation is the first to synthesize primary sources from California, Guam, Hawai‘i, Maryland, the Republic of the Philippines, and Washington D.C. I have drawn on records from four archives in Guam and Hawai‘i: the Guam Humanities Council, the Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, the University of Guam’s Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center, and the University of Hawai‘i’s Hamilton Library. These institutions provided documents that discussed how the Government of Guam, local newspapers, and local island residents felt about the U.S. military expansion of the island. In the Philippines I visited: Ateneo de Manila University’s American Historical Collection, the Lopez Museum and Library, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment, the National Archives, and the University of the Philippines Diliman. At these archives, I examined government correspondences, newspapers, and periodicals that describe Guam and Philippine government relations and the experiences of Filipino workers in Guam. Finally, I collected records from archives in the continental United States such as: the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD, San Bruno, CA, and Washington D.C.), the National Labor College, and the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command. Some of these sources include military documents that I declassified using a Freedom of Information Act request. These previously confidential records include military

correspondences, military memos, and surveillance reports that highlight how American and military officers facilitated the process of military expansion. Other documents such as periodicals and personal letters show how white American soldiers and white American civilians perceived Chamorros and Filipinos.

At the heart of this study are thirty-two oral histories that I conducted with Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans.¹³ These men and women range in age from fifty-five to eighty years old. The racial and occupational diversity of my interviewees provided me with a spectrum of voices that highlight the experiences of laborers and landowners living in Guam after World War II. For example, the *man'amko* (Chamorro elders) I spoke with are descendants of landowners from the pre-World War II era. The historical experiences of these elders allowed me to trace how Chamorros valued land, then and now. Of these thirty-two interviewees, nine were Filipino men and women who worked as civilian laborers for the military. Their stories helped me understand the complex process they endured in immigrating to Guam during the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, I interviewed eight people in regards to Chamorro-Filipino relationships on the island. These men and women were either in a Chamorro-Filipino marriage or had close family members who married interracially. The experiences of interracial relationships are significant because Chamorros (37%), Filipinos (26%), and people of mixed race (9%) background make up the three largest population groups on the island. Because little information exists on this topic, an examination of these interracial marriages will help explain Guam's current racial and ethnic demographics. Overall, oral histories have been instrumental to

¹³ Each interview lasted approximately one hour long and took place in that individual's home or in a space they felt most comfortable. During these interviews, I encouraged my interviewees to narrate their experiences. I only asked them specific questions when the content from the interview prompted me or if they had exhausted their comments on a particular topic. I met the majority of my interviewees through networking with activists, community organizers, educators, family members, friends, and scholars. I also utilized a snowball sampling approach in which one of my interviewees would introduce me to additional people I could potentially interview.

my project since colonized and working-class people are less likely to record their experiences by way of written memories, histories, and testimonies.¹⁴

A Historiography of U.S. Empire and Labor

My understanding of the construction of American culture and empire draws from the work of William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber.¹⁵ Following their intellectual lead, scholars in various disciplines have expanded upon their contributions. Amy Kaplan's cultural studies approach has shown how American ideas of national identity and culture are constructed on the basis of U.S. empire. Her work has been integral in shaping the cultural turn in the study of U.S. empire and foreign policy. In 1993, for example, she and Donald Pease co-edited *Cultures of United Imperialism*, an anthology that examined "the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and resistance which have shaped the cultures of the United States and the cultures of those it has dominated within and beyond its geopolitical boundaries."¹⁶ Other scholars have utilized an interdisciplinary historical approach that has advanced the historiography of U.S. empire.

¹⁴ Frank Tobias Higbie, *Indispensable Outcasts: Hobo Workers and Community in the American Midwest, 1880-1930* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 11 and Valerie Matsumoto, *Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American community in California, 1919-1982* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 219-220.

¹⁵ William Appleman Williams is credited for connecting American foreign policy to domestic issues. He argues that the economic depressions of the late nineteenth century encouraged corporations to search for new economic markets abroad that would alleviate the surplus of goods that many companies had. See *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: IG Publishing, 2007) and *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1962). Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963) follows a similar interpretation to that of Williams. However, LaFeber contends that the corporate search for new economic markets was rooted in the continental conquest and expansion of North America that began in the mid nineteenth century.

¹⁶ Amy Kaplan, "'Left Alone with America': The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4. See also Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003).

My examination of the connection between immigration and foreign policy in Guam uses an interdisciplinary approach based on Matthew Frye Jacobson's *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad*. Drawing from both literary and historical evidence, Jacobson explores "American conceptions of peoplehood, citizenship, and national identity against the backdrop of escalating economic and military involvement abroad and massive population influxes at home."¹⁷ Relying on primary sources such as art, novels, political documents, and travelogues, Jacobson traces the connections between U.S. foreign policy and American perceptions of U.S. colonial subjects and immigrants who came to the United States from 1876 to 1917. Even though Jacobson does not incorporate primary sources from outside the United States, he has encouraged other scholars to think about U.S. empire in transnational terms.

Along those lines, historian Mary A. Renda's *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* influenced my transnational and multi-archival research approach. Renda investigates how American paternalism was instrumental in the U.S. military's occupation of Haiti. Drawing from both literary and historical evidence, she contends, "Paternalistic discourse was one of the primary cultural mechanisms by which the occupation conscripted men into the project of carrying out U.S. rule."¹⁸ This multi-archival project utilizes primary sources from Haiti and the United States that include memoirs, periodicals, and personal letters that illustrate how U.S. Marines stationed in Haiti perceived the people of the island as "wards" of the United States.¹⁹ Ultimately, Mary A. Renda and Matthew Frye Jacobson laid the

¹⁷ Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 5.

¹⁸ Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

groundwork for the transnational turn, a process that encouraged American historians to utilize a multi-archival approach in their research and writing on U.S. empire.

Besides utilizing records from archives in multiple countries, I also rely on oral history interviews to document the perspectives of people who did not leave behind written records. In *Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History*, Catherine Ceniza Choy examines “The unique and dynamic relationship between the professionalization of nursing and the twentieth-century migrations of Filipinos to the United States.”²⁰ In addition to primary sources such as court records, government documents, and periodicals, Choy also conducted forty-three oral history interviews with Filipino nurses. Choy’s project makes the connection between empire and labor apparent through her charting of the U.S. government’s development of nursing programs in the Philippines and the United States’ need for skilled nurses. Her contribution to the study of U.S. empire is predicated on her ethnographic research and her emphasis on the experiences of Filipino nurses in the Philippines and the United States.

My basis for studying Guam is likewise due in part to Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony’s *American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippines Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941*, which is centered on Filipinos living in Seattle, WA.²¹ By studying a “colonial metropole,” the transnational link between people and a specific place becomes more apparent.²² Her project relied on several public history archives in Seattle comprised of oral interviews, periodicals, and scholarly studies. Thus, Fujita-Rony’s research has been significant to the study of empire and

²⁰ Catherine Ceniza Choy, *Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 1.

²¹ Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony, *American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 3.

²² Fujita-Rony, 52.

labor. Besides Choy and Fujita-Rony, other historians have continued to examine U.S. empire and labor through their focus on the Caribbean.

The recruitment of civilian military workers to Guam is part of a larger legacy of U.S. military labor in Asia, the Caribbean, and South America. In *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal*, Julie Greene explores the experiences of the working-class people who constructed the Panama Canal in 1905. Instead of recognizing the engineers who are usually credited for building the canal, Greene argues that the workers similarly deserve recognition.²³ Greene also asserts that these men and women were not simply subjects of U.S. empire. Using sources such as court cases, government correspondence, periodicals, and police reports, Greene shows that these men and women engaged in a variety of activities such as filing civil lawsuits and engaging in labor protests in hopes of protecting their wages and rights as workers. Moreover, she links the experiences of the canal laborers to how Americans in the continental United States perceived the canal as a feat of American ingenuity which the French were not able to accomplish before them.²⁴ In addition to Greene, Jana Lipman also examines empire and labor but through the perspectives of local Cuban residents who worked at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Incorporating the experiences of Chamorros who worked for the military and its contractors is instrumental to understanding their perceptions of military expansion. In Cuba, the U.S. military also employed local Cubans to work on the base. In *Guantánamo: A Working Class History between Empire and Revolution*, Jana K. Lipman examines the working lives of local civilian military workers at Guantánamo Bay, as per the issues of employment, pay,

²³ Julie Greene, *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 3 and 4.

²⁴ Greene, 2.

pensions, and labor abuse. From 1939 to 1964, Cuban workers occupied precarious positions as laborers for the U.S. military on the one hand and as members of the Cuban nationalist movement on the other.²⁵ Relying on archival sources and oral interviews in Cuba and the United States, Lipman asserts that “Base workers and military personnel wielded and managed power on the margins of the Cuban nation and U.S. empire.”²⁶ Her methodological approach and research focus allow her to highlight the experiences of Cuban workers and chart the history of Guantánamo Bay. Unlike Choy, Fujita-Rony, and Greene, Lipman’s work contributes to the historiography on U.S. empire through her emphasis on the Cold War. The historiography of empire and labor includes the Pacific Islands as well as the United States, the Caribbean, and Central America.

My objective in synthesizing the work experiences of Chamorro, Filipino, and white American laborers is predicated on JoAnna Poblete-Cross’s “Bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case Study of American Sāmoa.” In her article, Poblete-Cross examines the connection among indigenous and immigrant workers in American Sāmoa, a U.S. territory in the Pacific. Her article is groundbreaking because she contextualizes the experiences of Filipinos and Samoans within the context of U.S. empire and labor, but also suggests ways in which their respective struggles for indigenous and worker rights converge.²⁷ She argues that “the goals of colonized indigenous groups might be combined with those of exploited working-class immigrants living in the same region.”²⁸ This synthesis of indigenous and workers’ rights provides a point of entry for dialogue in studying conflict and solidarity between these two

²⁵ Jana K. Lipman, *Guantánamo: A Working-Class History between Empire and Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 2.

²⁶ Lipman, 5.

²⁷ JoAnna Poblete-Cross, “Bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case Study of American Sāmoa,” in *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 502.

²⁸ Poblete-Cross, 501.

groups of people. Utilizing government records, oral interviews, and periodicals, her article has been one of the few works that focus on the experiences and histories of indigenous people in the Pacific. As such, her article advances studies of U.S. empire and labor in Oceania.²⁹

U.S. Colonialism and Indigeneity in the Pacific

Decolonizing Oceania is a central concern for Pacific Studies scholars like Vicente M. Diaz, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, Haunani-Kay Trask, and Noenoe K. Silva. My dissertation follows a similar trajectory given my academic and personal interests in Guam's history. Haunani-Kay Trask's *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i*, for example, was one of the first books to critically engage issues of militarism and tourism through the lens of indigenous Hawaiian rights. As Trask states, "No matter what Americans believe, most of us in the colonies do not feel grateful that our country was stolen, along with our citizenship, our lands, and our independent place among the family of nations. We are not happy natives."³⁰ Trask's study is unlike the other books because it is structured as a set of narrative essays based on her academic research and activism. Nonetheless, her project is important because of its central themes of decolonization, indigeneity, and native resistance.

Noenoe Silva's *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* similarly examines Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians) resistance to U.S. colonialism. Specifically, she draws attention to the fact that native Hawaiians in the late nineteenth and early

²⁹ JoAnna Poblete has written other work that examines U.S. empire and labor in the Pacific. See JoAnna Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire: Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in Hawai'i* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014).

³⁰ Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 2.

twentieth centuries resisted the U.S. annexation of Hawai‘i.³¹ Silva uses primary records from native Hawaiian language sources such as newspapers, books, and letters to discuss Hawaiian resistance. Thus, her book contributes to the historiography on U.S. colonialism and indigeneity through her incorporation of indigenous language sources and through her usage of a decolonial research methodology.³² Besides Silva and Trask, other native Pacific studies scholars have sought to deconstruct U.S. colonial law in the Pacific.

In Guam, race and national security were used to justify the military taking of Chamorro owned lands. The U.S. government has also utilized race and law to colonize other islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity*, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui explores U.S. colonialism, indigenous identity, and race through a discursive and legal studies approach. Specifically, her book highlights various twentieth-century developments such as the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, the Hawaiian Rehabilitation proposal, and the passing of the fifty percent rule to chart the legacy of blood quantum in Hawai‘i. Kauanui argues that the U.S. government has used blood quantum as a way to legally recognize who is considered native Hawaiian, thus delegitimizing calls for indigenous rights in Hawai‘i.³³ Kauanui’s text is important because it bridges indigenous studies between the Pacific Islands and the continental United States. By relying on court cases, government records, and treaties, Kauanui is able to trace historical notions of race and offers readers an opportunity to imagine different ways of understanding indigenous identity and belonging.

³¹ Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 1-3.

³² Kaupapa Māori theory is an indigenous Māori epistemology that informs the practice of research and teaching. For more on decolonial research methodologies and Kaupapa Māori theory, see Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Zed Books, 2012)

³³ J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 2-5.

Thus, the discursive power of colonialism can influence how people understand their cultural, ethnic, and racial identities.

In the postwar era, Chamorros experienced cultural continuity and change in regard to indigenous land stewardship as well as marriage and dating practices. Take, for instance, Vicente M. Diaz's *Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam*. In this book, he investigates indigenous Chamorro cultural survival through the religious practice of Catholicism. By analyzing the canonization of the Catholic priest Diego Luis de San Vitores, Diaz problematizes how scholars understand colonialism and religion through native notions and practices of Catholicism in Guam. Specifically, he argues, "The range of narrative possibilities and limits of Guam's imagined cultural and political realities" is predicated on the multiple perspectives of Chamorros, the Roman Catholic Church, and his own views regarding the canonization of San Vitores.³⁴ His project relies on church records, oral interviews, and periodicals to capture the multiple and competing perspectives of these people. As these native Pacific Studies scholars demonstrate, the centering of indigenous experiences in the study of U.S. colonialism is instrumental in the movements to decolonize Oceania.

U.S. Military Land Taking

While most scholars simply dismiss the process of native land loss as a transition of power from one colonial ruler to the next (as in the case of Guam) or the illegal overthrow of an indigenous nation (as in Hawai'i), the study of U.S. military land taking in Guam requires a deeper inquiry. In "To Be Specific, It's Our Pacific": U.S. Base Selection in the Pacific from

³⁴ Vicente M. Diaz, *Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), 17.

World War II to the Late 1990s,” D. Colt Denfeld discusses the U.S. military’s post-World War II acquisition of land in Guam and the Pacific. According to Denfeld, U.S. military expansion was a pragmatic operation premised on extensive research by multiple branches of the military.³⁵ Specifically, this program was coordinated between the Army and the Navy, agencies that provided the labor and manpower necessary for expansion. Denfeld gives a detailed discussion of base selection, but he simply describes this process as forced land condemnations.³⁶ While his claim is accurate, he does not discuss the extensive legal apparatus that the U.S. military used to acquire Chamorro lands. Furthermore, Denfeld implies that all Chamorros passively gave up their lands without any resistance to land confiscation.

I contended, however, that Chamorros did not simply give up their lands. In actuality, many Chamorros utilized the Guam Congress as a space to voice their criticism of the military’s land taking program. As the Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori asserts, Chamorros resisted postwar military land taking. Her article entitled, “Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam,” examines how some scholars and the general public have subscribed to the liberation narrative believing that Chamorros willingly surrendered their lands to the Americans for “liberating” them from Japanese occupation in 1944. Hattori asserts that there was and still is an “existence of Chamorro opposition to land appropriation” via the activities of the Guam Congress of 1949, the Organic Act of 1950, and contemporary claims to Chamorro ancestral lands.³⁷ Her article problematizes Denfeld’s

³⁵ D. Colt Denfeld, “To Be Specific, It’s Our Pacific”: U.S. Base Selection in the Pacific from World War II to the Late 1990s,” in *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. L. Eve Armentrout Ma (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2001), 50.

³⁶ Denfeld, 54.

³⁷ Anne Perez Hattori, “Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam,” in *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. L. Eve Armentrout Ma (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2001), 187.

analysis by giving agency to Chamorros as a people who resisted military land appropriations. In addition to Hattori's work, other scholars have studied resistance to U.S. military land taking in comparable island contexts.

Anthropologist Katherine T. McCaffrey has explored this issue in *Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico*. In her book, McCaffrey investigates U.S. Navy land taking in Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. She utilizes various primary sources such as government records, military reports, oral interviews, and periodicals in order to chart Puerto Rican resistance to the U.S. Navy that began in the 1970s.³⁸ In addition to resistance, she explores how the navy condemned Puerto Rican owned land in order to construct military installations on the island during the 1940s. According to McCaffrey, the U.S. Navy expropriated land from subsistence and sugar cane farmers who worked for wealthy landowners. They physically removed these families to various resettlement tracts located on Puerto Rico or in the central parts of Vieques Island.³⁹ For some, the expropriation of land was positive because it “ushered in a new era and ended the feudalistic sugar era.”⁴⁰ McCaffrey thus contributes to the historiography on military land taking through her focus on Puerto Rico's complicated history of corporate farming, U.S. imperialism, and local land stewardship. In some instances, the military's acquisition of land outside the continental United States was covert.

In Guam, though, the U.S. military's condemnation of Chamorro owned lands and its surveillance of Chamorro politicians operated in covert ways. Because of the declassification of “top secret” records, primary sources now reveal that the military utilized coercive strategies to

³⁸ Katherine T. McCaffrey, *Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 2.

³⁹ McCaffrey, 48.

⁴⁰ McCaffrey, 49.

convince many Chamorros to sell or give up their lands for free. Such secret military operations have also occurred in other parts of the world, as with David Vine's *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia*. In this book, he examines the process through which the U.S. government took control of the entire island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In 1966, the United Kingdom entered into a lateral agreement with the United States, permitting the U.S. government to develop the island into a major military base. Specifically, Vine argues that the "U.S. and U.K. officials planned, financed, and orchestrated the expulsion and the creation of the base, hiding their work from Congress and Parliament, members of the media and the world."⁴¹ Using oral interviews and government records from the United Kingdom and the United States, he also discusses how these governments forcibly removed the local Chagossian people, who were the residents of Diego Garcia in 1968. Some Chagossians were off-island during the removals and were subsequently prohibited from ever returning to Diego Garcia.⁴² Vine's historiographical contribution resides in his examination of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States in the making of this military base in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Vine is concerned with documenting the bottom-up experiences of the Chagossians who were displaced from their lands. Ultimately, this multi-government arrangement led to the creation of Diego Garcia as a major U.S. military installation. As Denfeld, Hattori, McCaffrey, and Vine reveal, the U.S. military's need for land is an important component of U.S. empire throughout the world.

Chapter Outline

⁴¹ David Vine, *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 19.

⁴² Vine, 6.

Conducting research and writing histories about empires can be a challenging task due to the shortage of primary source material, either from archives or oral histories. This is especially true in regards to Guam and other highly colonized places that have been sites of war and military occupation. For example, World War II and natural disasters such as Typhoon Karen in 1962 resulted in the destruction of buildings and homes throughout the entire island. Moreover, the majority of the people who were alive during World War II are now deceased. For the remaining survivors, talking about their life experiences in the 1940s and 1950s is emotional due to the loss of family lands and the passing of family members. While this historical and contemporary situation is not unique to Guam, it does explain the obstacles that scholars might encounter when conducting research because primary sources are typically fragmented and incomplete. Furthermore, some U.S. government and military records remain classified or are omitted from archival circulation if these documents reveal the personal information of individuals who might be living. This means a standard chronological approach is not always sufficient.⁴³ Thus, I invoke the historian Vicente L. Rafael's notion of "episodic histories" in the structuring of my dissertation.⁴⁴ According to Rafael, history can be fractious as some narratives "do not tell a complete and unified story."⁴⁵ In the case of my dissertation, not all of the chapters will have a clear teleological connection. However, I assert that the U.S. military's taking of Chamorro lands set into motion a series of events that unfolded simultaneously even though matters of land, labor, and empire have long resonated in Guam. The period from 1944 to 1962 was a pivotal moment in the history of Guam due to environmental, demographic, political, and

⁴³ U.S. National Archives, "Federal Register." <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12356.html>.

⁴⁴ Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

social transformations that impacted the island and its people. Consequently, this period of military expansion provided the foundation for the development of Guam as a major military base and as a site of international tourism.

In chapter one, I describe Guam's infrastructure before and after World War II using American popular representations of Apra Harbor, bases, military homes, and roads. Relying on a cultural history approach, I trace the discursive and material conditions that resulted in the modernization of Guam's infrastructure, underscoring that American periodicals presented the military expansion of the island as an act of philanthropy. As Amy Kaplan has discussed, "the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and resistance [shaped] the cultures of the United States and the cultures of those it has dominated within and beyond its geopolitical boundaries."⁴⁶ Not only does U.S. imperialism shape American culture and the culture of those who are colonized, it also validates and justifies empire through notions of modernity and philanthropy. For American audiences, postwar Guam symbolized American benevolence through its construction of the island's infrastructure. However, these projects primarily facilitated the military's administration of the island with little attention given to improving the lives of Chamorros. It is during this period in which periodicals depicted Guam as an island paradise suitable for American soldiers and their families. Thus, American popular representations provided the foundation for the making of Guam's postwar multiracial and multiethnic society.

In Chapter two, I trace the U.S. military's confiscation of Chamorro-owned lands through the Guam Land and Claims Commission. I begin with a discussion of Chamorro land stewardship and the *lancho* system that persisted through the Spanish period, the pre-World War

⁴⁶ Amy Kaplan, "'Left Alone with America': The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, eds. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4.

II era, and the Japanese occupation of the island in World War II. The second segment of this chapter primarily focuses on the immediate post-World War II era, which is best characterized as being the most accelerated moment in the military expansion of Guam. Tracing the process of how the military dispossessed landowners reveals that Chamorros did not simply gift their lands to the U.S. government as cultural acts of appreciation and survival. In reality, the U.S. military coerced and threatened Chamorros into selling their lands, while other Chamorros attempted to resist the military's advances. Addressing these injustices, many Chamorros and a small number of white Americans publically criticized the military's mismanagement of lands that had been confiscated. Overall, the military's acquisition of land paved the way for the recruitment of civilian military workers from the Philippines and United States, which also helped to create Guam's postwar multiracial society.

In chapter three, I utilize empire, labor, and race as the primary categories of analysis to explore the experiences of civilian military laborers in Guam. By the late 1940s, the U.S. military and its contractors had hired several thousand civilian military workers to construct bases, buildings, homes, and roads throughout the island. These workers were mostly men who had migrated to Guam, with approximately 28,000 of them coming from the Philippines and 7,000 from the United States.⁴⁷ In contrast, Chamorros also served as civilian military laborers, but they only numbered 5,831.⁴⁸ While these men were all linked through their roles as civilian laborers, their social and working experiences vastly differed according to their perceived racial and national backgrounds. This process was based on the relational racialization of Chamorro,

⁴⁷ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 217-218.

⁴⁸ Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966), 329; Vicente M. Diaz, "'Fight Boys, til the Last...': Islandstyle Football and the Remasculinization of Indigeneity in the Militarized American Pacific Islands" in *Pacific Diaspora: Island Peoples in the United States and Across the Pacific*, eds. Paul Spickard, Joanne L. Rondilla, and Debbie Hippolite Wright (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 175; and Rogers, 217.

Filipino, and white Americans that shifted within the context of World War II. That is to say, the U.S. government's relationship with private industry and its imperial endeavors linked Guam and the Philippines. In order to illustrate the experiences of these men, I emphasize not what they constructed for the U.S. military per se but rather focus on their social and working experiences within and between groups. Finally, I discuss how the military and its contractors attempted to exploit the laborers of Guam through proposed legislation like the Guam Wage Bill of 1956. This bill sought to make the island exempt from the U.S. federal minimum wage and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Thus, the postwar permanent settlement of these workers resulted in demographic changes to Guam's racial and ethnic composition.

Finally, in chapter four, I examine interracial encounters among Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans in Guam from 1944 to 1962. The rapid military expansion of the island precipitated social and racial changes that permanently altered the island's demography from a prewar society mostly comprised of Chamorros to a postwar multiracial island. Such interracial encounters were amicable, friendly, and sometimes violent. These violent encounters were of great concern to the U.S. military because they harmed the nation's "moral" reputation as the global leader of democracy.⁴⁹ In order to control these interracial encounters, the military created local ordinances and immigration laws that provided them with the legal apparatus to manage social relations in public spaces such as bars, clubs, dances, restaurants, roads, and villages. Consequently, these laws actually perpetuated interracial antagonism and violence, thereby racializing Chamorros, Filipinos, or white Americans as loyal, subversive, or undesirable. I then conclude that the making of Guam into a crucible of American empire has resulted in the creation of Guam's post-World War II multiracial society that still endures today.

⁴⁹ Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 11.

CHAPTER ONE

Infrastructure of Modernity

Introduction

Cats and Macks and bulldozers puffed and backed and hacked, shaving away the jungle growth. Guam became alive and bustling with roads and road builders. The peanut-shaped piece of land, a thousand ocean miles from anywhere, began to glitter at night like a continental metropolis. What the U.S. wanted in the Western Pacific was a strategic site big enough for a good military base.⁵⁰



Figure 1.1 Hagåtña at night. Source: *Life* 1945.

This description appeared in a *Life* magazine feature published on July 2, 1945. In particular, this article highlighted the U.S. military's development of Guam's infrastructure. For Americans living in the continental United States, this article provided a small window through which they learned about Guam and its people. However, other non-fiction books, periodicals, and travelogues also proved instrumental in shaping the discourse on military expansion and modernity on the island.⁵¹ Specifically, the dominant narrative disseminated through these

⁵⁰ *Life*, "Guam: U.S. Makes Little Island into Mighty Base," July 2, 1945, 63.

⁵¹ For more on the social roles of local media in the Pacific, see Francis Dalisay, "Social Control in an American Pacific Island: Guam's Local Newspaper Reports on Liberation," in *Journal of Communication and Inquiry* 33 (3): July 2009, 239-257.

publications emphasized that the U.S. military was responsible for the island's modernization and that Guam was suitable for the settlement of American soldiers and their families.

In this chapter, I examine American popular representations of Guam in the immediate postwar era. American periodicals such as *Life* magazine shaped the discourse of philanthropy that characterized the military expansion of Guam as progress. Historian Lauren Hirshberg has argued that the U.S. militarization of Kwajalein, a Marshallese atoll located east of Guam, included a project of suburbanization that enabled the U.S. military's acquisition and control of this site.⁵² Similarly, Guam was portrayed as a modern island paradise that was suitable for American settlement through the military's construction of bases, Apra Harbor, military homes, and roads throughout the island.⁵³ Using memoirs, newsletters, periodicals, and travelogues, I trace the American discursive and the material conditions that resulted in the modernization of Guam's infrastructure. My use of "modernization" refers to the U.S. military's development of the island's infrastructure using western methods and tools that is believed to be "unquestionably favorable or desirable."⁵⁴ American perceptions that Guam and its people were in need of western modernity are evident through colonial expansion. As Amy Kaplan asserts, "the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and resistance [shaped] the cultures of the United States and the cultures of those it has dominated within and

⁵² Lauren B. Hirshberg, "Nuclear Families: (Re)producing 1950s Suburban America in the Marshall Islands," in *OAH Magazine of History* 26 no. 4 (2012): 2-3.

⁵³ For more on homes and militarization, see Matthew Farish, *The Contours of America's Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) and Catherine Lutz, *Homefront: An American City and the American Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).

⁵⁴ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 208.

beyond its geopolitical boundaries.”⁵⁵ Kaplan’s conceptualization of culture and imperialism provides a framework for studying the discourse on infrastructure. For American civilians reading about Guam from the vantage point of the continental United States, the transformation of the island’s infrastructure symbolized America’s military might and benevolence, which was evident through its victory over the Axis Powers in World War II. Even though the military had engaged in modernization projects in the prewar era, the end of World War II marked a significant shift in which the military heavily invested in the expansion of Guam’s infrastructure.⁵⁶ As anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson contend, “Tensions may arise when places that have been imagined at a distance become lived spaces.”⁵⁷ For military officials, postwar Guam represented the moment in which the island became a lived space that needed modernization. However, the development of Guam’s infrastructure primarily aided the military’s administration of the island, with marginal attention given to improving the lives of the people. In turn, the media characterized and justified American military expansion as philanthropic to both civilian and military audiences in Guam and the continental United States. To provide a larger context, I first discuss the cultures of U.S. empire and the prewar discourse on infrastructure projects such as Apra Harbor, roads, and homes. I then explore the postwar development of Guam’s infrastructure through the juxtaposition of American and Japanese

⁵⁵ Amy Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture,” in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, eds. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 4.

⁵⁶ In the prewar era, the military suggested minor infrastructure improvements with the dredging of Apra Harbor and the paving of the road that would later become known as Marine Corps Drive. The U.S. government did not fully fund these projects because Guam was only used as a coaling station and had little strategic value. Guam then became vital to American military operations due to World War II, nuclearism, and the Cold War.

⁵⁷ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference,” in *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, eds. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 40.

construction projects, concluding with an examination of American suburban life on military bases.

The Cultures of U.S. Empire in the Twentieth Century

Benevolent paternalism was one of the fundamental principles of American foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, a driving force in the justification for military expansion, was founded on earlier notions of empire such as manifest destiny and the “closing of the frontier.”⁵⁸ As historian Mary A. Renda has argued, “paternalism was a form of domination, a relation of power, masked as benevolent by its reference to paternal care and guidance, but structured equally by norms of paternal authority and discipline.”⁵⁹ In the case of Guam, this colonial relationship was most evident in how American writers described the military’s development of the island’s infrastructure. Furthermore, U.S. military periodicals also defined the relationship that the military should have with the rest of the world. An anonymous writer for the military’s public relations newsletter wrote in 1949, “The service of the navy to the nation does not stop there, it extends into the everyday lives of millions of our citizens and works for the welfare of all...every naval activity can serve the nation well in peace as in war.”⁶⁰ Military officials perpetuated the idea that the U.S. Navy (and by extension the entire U.S. military) was

⁵⁸ For more on manifest destiny and Turner’s Frontier Thesis, see Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), Robert J. Miller, *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny* (Lincoln: Bison Books, 2008), and Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (Eastford: Martino Fine Books, 2014).

⁵⁹ Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15.

⁶⁰ *Public Relations Newsletter*, “Community Relations Stressed by UnderSecNav,” November 18, 1949, vol. 1, no. 37. RG 313 Naval Government Unit, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

philanthropic, especially since most Americans supported U.S. foreign policy.⁶¹ In Guam, this idea came to fruition in the construction and modernization of buildings, Apra Harbor, homes, and roads. However, these projects were not built simply to improve Guam's infrastructure, but to expand the military's presence on the island.

The primary goal of the U.S. military on Guam was to develop the island into a forward base that could be used for military operations. In a 1945 interview with *The New York Times*, U.S. Major General Henry L. Larsen stated, "Thousands of marines, Seabees, Army engineers and natives are working twenty-four hours a day on the harbor, airfields and other installations."⁶² He continued, "A very impressive amount of construction has been accomplished, but all the work done so far has been in prosecution of the present war. Obviously a lot of this work is of a nature that will be valuable in the post-war era."⁶³ Larsen's comments reveal that a large amount of labor was directed at expanding military-related infrastructure projects. He even admitted that once these various projects were completed, the island's strategic value would increase. This process was done in concert with the expansion of other bases throughout the Asia-Pacific region, which demonstrated the U.S. government's investment in expanding a postwar militaristic policy.⁶⁴ Another military official noted, "The navy is dedicated to preserving the security of the United States and is concerned with those

⁶¹ This sentiment would change over time. By the 1960s, antiwar and anticolonial ideology was beginning to grow and eventually gain traction during the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. See Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) and Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991).

⁶² *The New York Times*, "Guam is Declared New Pearl Harbor." April 22, 1945.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ In the postwar era, the U.S. government invested in military infrastructure expansion throughout the Asia-Pacific region that included places such as Hawai'i, Japan, the Marshall Islands, Okinawa, the Philippines, and South Korea to name a few. For more on militarization and decolonization in the Asia-Pacific region, see Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, eds., *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

means which the navy can contribute to that security. The security of the United States is the basis for all decisions and actions of the naval service.”⁶⁵ For the military, this principle trumped all other concerns, including any humanitarian or benevolent projects.

American journalists also contributed to the growing narrative of Guam’s strategic importance. In 1947, *Saturday Evening Post* writer Harold H. Martin reported, “But so far the job has been to transform, as fast as possible with money short and labor scarce, this 206 square miles of coral and volcanic rock into the great advance base of the Western Pacific an [sic] outpost from which ships and planes may strike if and when the necessity comes.”⁶⁶ Martin’s comments illustrated the growing propensity for Americans to understand Guam as a site of military strength. Military periodicals echoed a similar message. In 1947, the U.S. Air Force described the expansion of the infrastructure as a process: “determined to start anew to build a better and more modern Guam, the Army and Navy moved fast to exploit our victory in the Marianas to the fullest. Airfields had to be rushed to completion. In the hillsides great coral pits were gouged and blasted. Communications lines hastily went into operation. Hospitals mushroomed.”⁶⁷

In general, civilian and military publications helped to determine how Americans understood Guam and its people. For the military, the island represented an opportunity to expand U.S. operations that would play a major role in establishing the U.S. military’s presence in the region due to the geopolitical restructuring of places such as China, Korea, Okinawa, and Vietnam. American civilians viewed positively the modernization of Guam’s infrastructure

⁶⁵ *Public Relations Newsletter*, “To Refresh the Thinking of Naval Officers,” August 10, 1949, vol. 1, no. 24. RG 313 Naval Government Unit, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁶⁶ Harold H. Martin, “Heart Trouble in Paradise,” *Saturday Evening Post*, November 1, 1947.

⁶⁷ U.S. Air Force, *Guam: Key to the Pacific* (Guam: Andersen Air Force Base, 1947), 13. University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center.

because American periodicals depicted the island's prewar infrastructure as in need of improvement.

Prewar Discourse on Guam's Infrastructure

In the prewar era, the U.S. military primarily implemented education and health policies aimed at assimilating Chamorros rather than developing the infrastructure of Guam. As historian Anne Perez Hattori argues, the prewar discourse of Guam was grounded in the notion that American benevolence was necessary to acculturate Chamorros in regards to education and health.⁶⁸ Even though the development of the island's infrastructure was also included in this plan, the military allocated the majority of their federally granted funds to support programs that forced Chamorros to adopt western forms of education and health practices.⁶⁹ This was evident in the prewar observations of American officials who wanted to modernize Apra Harbor.⁷⁰

Located on the western coast of Guam, Apra Harbor became the focal point for American commercial and military activity in the early twentieth century.⁷¹ In 1898, American military

⁶⁸ Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2004), 40-41.

⁶⁹ For more on U.S. colonial health and education policies, see Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* and Robert Anaetetus Underwood, "American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Southern California, 1987).

⁷⁰ During the prewar period, the U.S. government valued Guam as a coaling station that would be used for U.S. Naval ships traveling between Asia and the continental United States. For more on the importance of U.S. Naval power, see Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1873* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Steven High, *Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁷¹ During the Spanish period, ports in the villages of Hagåtña and Umatac were utilized more frequently. While the Spanish was the first foreign nation to use Apra Harbor as a port in the mid to late nineteenth century, it was the U.S. Navy in the early twentieth century that primarily relied on it for commercial and military use. For more on the history of Apra Harbor, see Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995) and Michael R. Clement, Jr. and Marie Ada Ayong, "Apra Harbor," *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/apra-harbor/>.

officer Henry Beers described the port as “the best natural harbor in this entire area of the Pacific.”⁷² He continued, “Yet it is not a good harbor, for the exposure to the west permits strong ocean swells to enter, and it was and still is encumbered with banks and coral reefs, particularly in its eastern and southeastern parts, necessitating ships to anchor in the western portion of the harbor.”⁷³ Beers’ comments demonstrate that the U.S. military was interested in the development of the harbor early in the twentieth century. However, the U.S. government was not willing to allocate large sums of money to modernize the harbor because Guam did not offer natural resources that the U.S. government wanted nor did it have a large population that could serve as consumers for American goods. Thus, the military did not receive enough money to fully modernize the port. This prewar discourse that represented Apra Harbor as in need of improvement also included roadways on Guam.

Many of the roads comprised dirt paths that were rarely maintained and were covered by overhanging jungle. Visiting Guam in the late nineteenth century, whaler J.F. Beane described, “the branches of the bread fruit trees and fan topped palms, interlacing overhead, forming a magnificent archway of darkest green, through which the sunshine struggled, making golden lines across the broad plantain and banana leaves which drooped toward the center of the roadway.”⁷⁴ Other visitors recalled similar memories. American missionary Mary Augusta Channell, who traveled to Guam in 1902, remembered, “Other towns are reached by bullock paths through the jungle; wild, with luxuriant, tropical foliage, immense palms and ferns, and unfamiliar shrubs bearing red, yellow or white flowers; vines hiding the pathway; and

⁷² Henry P. Beers, *American Naval Occupation and Government of Guam, 1898-1902* (Washington D.C.: Navy Department, 1944), 5. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ J.F. Beane, *From Forecastle to Cabin* (New York: The Editor Publishing Co., 1905), 272. Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

numberless parasites, all of which would delight the heart of a botanist.”⁷⁵ As Beane and Channell revealed, the majority of roads were only dirt pathways, and in some cases the jungle was dense and tall enough to block the sunlight. Moreover, dirt roads posed problems for American settlers during the typhoon season. As one American recounted, “During the war [World War II] this intersection [Marine Drive and Route 8] alternately was a sea of mud churned into a barely recognizable road, and a plain blotted out by a fog of coral dust.”⁷⁶ Other roads throughout the island were described as “ankle deep in sticky mud during the wet season, and at many places so narrow, on account of the encroaching vegetation, that it was impossible to pass through it except on foot.”⁷⁷ Even though the military was not invested in the wide-scale modernization of Guam’s roads, the military developed a need for one modern roadway.




Figure 1.2 This map shows the distance between Hagåtña, Piti, and Sumay (a.k.a. Naval Base Guam). Source: Google maps.

In the prewar era, the military only paved and maintained the road that connected the village of Hagåtña with the villages of Piti and Sumay (a.k.a. Naval Base Guam).⁷⁸ This road

⁷⁵ Mary Augusta Channell, “A Bit of Guam Life,” *The Independent*, 1902, 607-608. Guam History, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁷⁶ Russell L. Stevens, *Guam, U.S.A.: Birth of a Territory* (Honolulu: Tongg Publishing, 1956), 17.

⁷⁷ L.M. Cox, *The Island of Guam* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), 50.

was important to the military because it linked the administrative capital of Hagåtña with Apra Harbor and the commercial village of Sumay, both of which were integral in the transporting of food, livestock, mail, and supplies.⁷⁹ Approximately ten miles in length, this macadamized road was constructed using a common prewar World War II method that utilized layers of crushed stone.⁸⁰ Even in the prewar era, infrastructure projects such as roads were primarily constructed for military use. For example, a U.S. Naval report noted, “in 1908 the military rebuilt the road from Piti to Agat to join with the road from Agat to Sumay,” which connected “the naval reservation at Piti with the tract purchased by the federal government in 1903 for a naval station.”⁸¹ Maintaining this roadway was always a concern of the military because this road connected villages that were vital to the daily operations of the naval administration in Guam. And while the navy encouraged Chamorros to use the road to expand commercial and economic activities related to the selling of farming produce, the road primarily served military purposes.⁸² Besides roads, the construction of homes was another site in which military expansion represented modernization.

For the most part, American descriptions of Chamorro dwellings focused on their perceived rudimentary and primitive construction.

⁷⁸ Vicente M. Diaz, “...PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS...: Roads, Indigenous Identity, and American Imperialism ‘in’ Guam,” (Unpublished Essay: University of Michigan, 2011), 4 and 8. This road would later become the southern end of Marine Corps Drive.

⁷⁹ George L. Dyer, “The Present Condition of Guam,” *The Independent*, April 20, 1905, 886. Guam History, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁸⁰ Dyer, 932. For more on the construction of modern roads and highways, see Tom Lewis, *Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013) and Earl Swift, *The Big Roads: The Untold Stories of the Engineers, Visionaries, and Trailblazers who Created the American Superhighways* (New York: Mariner Books, 2012).

⁸¹ Cox, 50.

⁸² Diaz, 10.



Figure 1.3 The Village of Hagåtña, Pre-WWII. Source: Tony Ramirez

During this period, for example, the majority of homes were made using a pole or thatch model, while a few homes were constructed using wood and tin.⁸³ In the early twentieth century, American Elizabeth Fairbanks described Chamorro homes as “wooden shacks, built on poles three or four feet above the ground, the space below being utilized by the pigs, dogs and chickens owned by the family. They are naturally indolent, cowardly and superstitious, but they have their redeeming qualities and show much of friendliness when properly treated.”⁸⁴ These observations show that Americans perceived Chamorros as infantilized and naïve people who possessed the qualities of the “noble savage.”⁸⁵ In turn, these perceptions justified American beliefs that Chamorros needed their guidance in the construction of modern homes. The views of Fairbanks underscore how some Americans believed that Chamorros still lived in dwellings in need of western modernization.

⁸³ Jay Earle Thomson, *Our Pacific Possessions* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931), 247. University of the Philippines Diliman, University Archives and Records Depository.

⁸⁴ Elizabeth Fairbanks, “Guam and our Smaller Islands in the Pacific,” in *America Across the Seas: Our Colonial Empire*, eds. Hamilton Wright, C.H. Forbes-Lindsay, John F. Wallace, Willard French, Wallace W. Atwood, and Elizabeth Fairbanks (New York: C.S. Hammond & Company, 1909), 51. Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁸⁵ For more on the discourse of the “noble savage” and the “ignoble savage,” see Ronald L. Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

While Chamorro houses may have appeared as primitive to outsiders, there were practical reasons as to why they were constructed in this manner. For instance, Chamorros relied on bamboo as structural material for the walls of their houses. Bamboo also provided ventilation, which was important since the island's weather is consistently humid.⁸⁶ In addition, having a raised floor guarded against insects and other animals entering the home unexpectedly, while small openings in the bamboo walls made the sweeping of food and any other dirt easy since they would fall to the ground below the house.⁸⁷ Moreover, the use of a thatched roof comprised of tightly overlapping coconut leaves or palm fronds enabled houses to withstand rainstorms.⁸⁸ Chamorros utilized these materials because of their suitability for the climate and because of cultural notions of identity and place.⁸⁹ Even though prewar Chamorro homes were not made with modern materials, some Americans recognized the quality of their construction. In the early 1900s, American Naval Officer William Safford observed, "The town houses are well constructed; they are raised from the ground on substantial, durable posts, or built of masonry with a basement or 'bodega,' which is used as a storeroom, taking up the ground floor."⁹⁰ While only a few Chamorros could afford homes built with wood and tin, the majority of the people relied on more traditional and locally sourced materials.

The island-wide construction of pole/thatched homes gradually diminished after World War II. The use of wood and tin also fell out of favor by the early 1960s, marking the island's

⁸⁶ Beane, 253.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ For more on pre-World War II pole and thatched homes, see Lawrence J. Cunningham, "Pole and Thatched Homes," *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/pole-and-thatched-homes/>.

⁸⁹ For more on Chamorro material culture, see Judy Selk Flores, *Estorian Inalahan: History of a Spanish Era Village in Guam* (Hagåtña: Irensia Publications, 2011).

⁹⁰ W.E. Safford, *Guam and Its People* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), 707.

increasing dependency on concrete-built homes and illustrating the preferred dwellings for Americans.⁹¹ Furthermore, the construction of the island's postwar infrastructure was partly predicated on the idea that the Japanese occupation of Guam resulted in the regression of the island's American-inspired development projects from 1898 to World War II.

Postwar Development of Guam's Infrastructure

Historians such as John W. Dower and T. Fujitani have shown that nationality and race were used in the cultivation of wartime racial discourse that characterized the Japanese as uncivilized.⁹² This racial ideology was also noticeable in how U.S. military officials and American writers described the modernization of Apra Harbor. Specifically, the *Navy News* claimed, "Harbor developments were negligible when the island was retaken. Before the war nearly a mile of breakwater had been partially completed. The Japanese, in two and a half years, had added only a few moorings and a small causeway for a fuel dock. Again the Seabees went into action. They handled more cargo than any other forward port in the world."⁹³

⁹¹ Dyer, 886, U.S. Air Force, 16, and Nicholas Yamashita Quinata, "Wood and Tin Houses," *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/wood-and-tin-houses/>.

⁹² T. Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of CA Press, 2013) and John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1987).

⁹³ Henry L. Larson, "The Story of Guam," *Navy News*, January 5, 1946. Guam History, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam. The U.S. Navy's construction battalion is also known as Seabees or CBs. Dating back to World War II, their job has been to construct bases, roads, and airstrips to support U.S. military operations throughout the world.



Figure 1.4 Apra Harbor in 1945. Source: *Life*.

In this article, the navy contrasted its own strength and efficiency with Japan's failure to modernize Apra Harbor during its occupation of Guam from 1941 to 1944. This and other claims stressed the inability of the Japanese military to develop the island, thereby highlighting the importance of the U.S. military's development and philanthropy. Ironically, American periodicals failed to mention that the U.S. Navy did very little to develop Apra Harbor when Guam was under naval control from 1899 to 1941.

In addition to the idea that Japan's military was incompetent, American periodicals credited U.S. military ingenuity and technology for the modernization of Apra Harbor. For example, in 1946, *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that naval engineers had built a large model of Apra Harbor in an attempt to simulate and determine if the newly constructed port could withstand typhoons.⁹⁴ This newspaper and others underscored the military's technological ingenuity and the importance that Apra Harbor had to the military expansion of Guam. For civilian readers, this was another act that symbolized military expansion as modernity and philanthropy. This article also reaffirmed that the U.S. government was benevolent and more

⁹⁴ *The Christian Science Monitor*, "Fortifying Guam," October 10, 1946.

militarily advanced than other nations. Therefore, the expansion of the harbor was based on these perceptions and the notion that the U.S. military had the strongest labor force in the world.

U.S. Seabees were credited for their work ethic, which was touted as a primary factor in the modernization of the port. *Life* magazine described Apra Harbor:

Only Antwerp [Belgium] during the climax of the European campaign surpassed it [Apra Harbor] in daily tonnage of cargo handled. Apra, Guam's harbor, which was once just a marshy inlet, has been deepened, widened and improved by the Seabees so that now it provides the Navy with anchorage, docks, fuel-supply, repair facilities comparable to Pearl Harbor's.⁹⁵

These and other periodicals propagated the idea that military manpower played a vital role in infrastructure projects.

Writers also celebrated the military's development of Apra Harbor. In 1944, *The New York Times* reported, "The harbor will be capable of handling more ships than anyone dreamed they could just a few years ago."⁹⁶ However, the postwar expansion of the harbor was done with similar intentions as with other infrastructure projects in Guam. Specifically, the port was expanded and modernized to aid military operations and commercial shipping. Thus, having authority over the harbor made it easier to administer. In addition to Apra Harbor, the construction of roads was publicized as a site of American achievement and Japanese ineptness.

References to American philanthropy played an important role in distinguishing the U.S. governance of Guam from that of Japan's during World War II. As Vicente M. Diaz has argued, "The paving of roads was the path to progress whose representation was heavily racialized, gendered and sexualized, and whose political and cultural stakes were the active construction and

⁹⁵ *Life*, July 2, 1945, 65.

⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, "Guam Converted Into Big Fortress," December 6, 1944.

maintenance of a white Anglo American sense of self that is upright and righteous, that can serve as a standard, a canon; an exemplum.”⁹⁷ American writers and officials applauded the U.S. military’s ability to develop roads, while simultaneously criticizing Japan as being incompetent in their development of Guam during World War II. This notion that the United States was racially and culturally more advanced was evident in American publications. In 1945, *Life* magazine reported:

The machine age came to Guam in a sudden rush when the Americans reconquered [*sic*] the island. In the past ten months Army and Marine engineers and Seabees have made more physical changes on the island than the Japs had made in three years and other Americans [prewar naval administration] in the 43 years before. More than anything else, Guam is a monument to the energy of the Seabees. A “battalion” of Seabees build a 1,500 bed hospital there in 57 days, Natives are impressed by the big men in their big machines who can lay a road right past a village in an afternoon.⁹⁸

As in other articles and newsletters, the military was recognized for its technological ingenuity and its efficiency in building various structures and roads. The *Life* article also included a negative appraisal of Japan’s inability to make the same infrastructure improvements during the time it had occupied the island. This article also exhibited the condescending viewpoint that some Americans subscribed to based on the fact that the “machine age” had occurred in the late nineteenth century and not in 1944. However, the racial undertone of this article exposes how progress and technology were racially coded in American benevolence and philanthropy. This is especially telling through the description of Americans as “big” and using “big machines.” U.S.

⁹⁷ Diaz, “...PAVED WITH GOOD,” 8 and 9.

⁹⁸ *Life*, July 2, 1945, 71. The generalization of Pacific Islanders as being impressed by military might and goods is a major issue in Melanesian Studies of World War II. See Lamont Lindstrom, *Cargo Cult: Strange Stories of Desire from Melanesia and Beyond* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1993).

Major General Henry L. Larson made more subtle observations that also implied Japan had done little to modernize Guam's roads. In 1946, he stated:

When we returned to Guam it was the monsoon season and heavy rains had turned the few dirt roads into a quagmire...the physical rebuilding of the island was started by the Seabees. Their first roadbed was washed out by a torrential rain. Two semi-paved, two lane highways of poor construction and several negligible bull cart trails was the extent of the roadways when the island was taken. Today there are 150 miles of roads, more than 40 miles paved, including a four-lane express military highway.⁹⁹

Larson's recollection, coupled with the *Life* magazine article, shows that American writers and military officials collectively disseminated the idea that the United States was a benevolent colonial nation. Moreover, this message was grounded in the juxtaposition of the pre and post war conditions of Guam's roads.

American discourse on roads in postwar Guam focused on the military's technological ability to rapidly clear and pave hundreds of miles of roads throughout the island. In 1945, *The New York Times* reported, "General Larsen was obviously proud of the work of the Seabee and Army Engineer battalions. As an instance of their great military ability, he said, 120 miles of Grade A, hard surfaced roads and 240 miles of secondary roads have been completed."¹⁰⁰

American journalists covering Guam and readers in the continental United States considered this feat exceptional since the U.S. military had only reoccupied Guam for approximately one year.

American writers were also impressed by road construction because of the dense tropical geography that made road construction difficult. Describing the island, *The New York Times*

⁹⁹ Henry L. Larson, "The Story of Guam," *Navy News*, January 5, 1946. Guam History, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

¹⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, "Guam is Declared New Pearl Harbor." April 22, 1945.

stated, “A vast, interlocking network of highways has been cut through the jungle-covered hills of the island.”¹⁰¹ Such periodicals revealed that American journalists credited the military for bringing modern roadways to Guam and for conquering thick jungle terrain.¹⁰² The idea that Guam’s jungles needed to be subdued for the expansion of modern roads was rooted in similar arguments made by nineteenth-century proponents of manifest destiny, who believed that expansion would bring progress to the American West.¹⁰³ In addition, this logic of empire was applied to other American colonies in the Pacific such as Hawai‘i where the American construction of scenic highways and roads stemmed from the American rationale that such places were “in need of pacification, management, discipline, and protection.”¹⁰⁴ In the case of Guam, the U.S. military subscribed to this notion as well. They believed that jungles and typhoons posed a frequent threat to the maintenance of roads, which meant that they had to conquer and overcome the natural landscape and weather of the island.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the building of traffic lights was a new and modern feature of roads on Guam. Former Guam Attorney General Russell L. Stevens, who came to the island in 1951, recalled, “Upon my arrival at the intersection of Marine Drive and Route 8 we noted with surprise, a traffic light.”¹⁰⁶ For

¹⁰¹ *The New York Times*, “Guam Converted Into Big Fortress,” December 6, 1944.

¹⁰² For more on the environment and the military, see Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey, “The Myth of Isolates: Ecosystem Ecologies in the Nuclear Pacific,” *Cultural Geographies* 20 no. 12 (2012): 167-184 and Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey and George B. Handley, eds., *Postcolonial Ecologies: Literatures of the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹⁰³ For more on Manifest Destiny, see Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Destiny and American Territorial Expansion: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2011) and Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).

¹⁰⁴ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 50.

¹⁰⁵ For more on ecological theory, see Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey, “The Myth of Isolates: Ecosystem Ecologies in the Nuclear Pacific,” in *Cultural Geographies* 20 (2): 167-184, 2012 and Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey, “Heliotropes: Solar Ecologies and Pacific Radiations,” in *Postcolonial Ecologies: Literatures of the Environment*, eds. Elizabeth M. DeLoughrey and George B. Handley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235-253.

the American public, the construction of paved roadways and traffic lights represented western progress. No road better exemplified this perception than the construction of Marine Corps Drive (also known as Guam Highway 1), then considered a symbol of modernity.




Figure 1.5 This map outlines Marine Corps Drive from Naval Base Guam to Andersen Air Force Base. Source: Wikipedia.com.

Marine Corps Drive was considered a marker of technological and military ingenuity. As historian David Hanlon discerns, U.S. military and civilian leaders addressed “certain humanitarian concerns about progress and betterment while at the same time ensuring Micronesia would be remade in ways that served the strategic interests of the larger American state.”¹⁰⁷ While both the Spanish and American regimes argued that the development of this particular road was to benefit Chamorros, the reality was that they maintained it for the use of their militaries. Initially, the Spanish cleared this road in the eighteenth century, while the U.S. Navy continued to expand it during the prewar era. In 1945, U.S. General Henry L. Larson named the road “Marine Drive” to honor the U.S Marines who “liberated” the island from Japan

¹⁰⁶ Russell L. Stevens, *Guam, U.S.A.: Birth of a Territory* (Honolulu: Tongg Publishing, 1956), 17.

¹⁰⁷ David Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998), 10.

during World War II.¹⁰⁸ It was further expanded and paved using modern materials to provide rapid military transportation that linked Apra Harbor to various airfields and naval installations such as Harmon Airfield, Naval Air Station, Northwest Airfield, and North Airfield (also known as Andersen Air Force Base).¹⁰⁹



Figure 1.6 Photo of Marine Corps Drive, 1945. Source: *Life Magazine*.

In order to transport supplies and cargo that came into Guam via Apra Harbor, a roadway that connected these installations was needed. Some of these supplies included ammunition and bombs. As a child, for example, the Chamorro oral historian Tony Ramirez saw a semi-truck crash “on Marine Corps Drive with bomb shells scattered all over the road.”¹¹⁰ Ramirez’s observation illustrates that the military utilized this road to transport artillery and vehicles that

¹⁰⁸ In 2004, Governor of Guam Felix P. Camacho designated the road as “Marine Corps Drive” to also recognize and commemorate the U.S. Marines in Guam. For more on commemoration, memory, and war, see Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011).

¹⁰⁹ Anthony Leon Guerrero, “The Economic Development of Guam,” in *Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro/Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 91. For more on U.S. military bases and Cold War operations on Guam, see Mark Forbes, “Military,” in *Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro/Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 39-44 and Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995).

¹¹⁰ Tony Ramirez, personal communication, August 3, 2009.

were dangerous to the public. This was problematic because this was and still is the primary highway that most people use. Besides Marine Corps Drive, the Government of Guam and the U.S. military shared other roads throughout the island.

At times, however, the military was not philanthropically invested in the development and maintenance of the entire island's roadways. For example, in 1948, a portion of route No. 10 near Naval Air Station, Hagåtña, needed to be repaired because it had never been surfaced. Yet Naval Officer J.B. Dunn requested that the Island Public Works be responsible for the road since it was part of the highway island system and that civilians also used it.¹¹¹ While it is unclear if Dunn's request was approved, his comments demonstrated that the navy was trying to reduce its financial obligation even though the military used that section of Route No. 10 to transport equipment, personnel, and vehicles throughout Guam. Overall, these roads were fundamentally important to linking bases and installations.

The postwar construction of modern homes in the village of Agat also symbolized American modernity. The U.S. military was credited for bringing concrete homes to Guam that signified military expansion as modernity. One of the earliest housing projects occurred in 1946 Agat. Specifically, the U.S. Navy reported:

The homes, designed by Navy Commander Allan T. Squire, officer-in-charge of the City Planning commission, take into consideration the needs of the people and the climatic conditions. Designs represent a permanent type of wood or concrete block construction and are meant only for Agat. Dwellings designed for Agaña are expected to be larger. The designs for the homes are not intended to be in any way restricted to the three suggested types. All homes built in new Agat however will be required to follow a

¹¹¹ J.B. Dunn, "Maintenance on Island Highway No. 10 across NAS Agaña," January 12, 1948. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

building code and zoning law as established by the City Planning commission, planning board and the Island Commander.¹¹²

The military's construction of these new concrete suburban homes was also their attempt to compensate the families from the village of Sumay, who were displaced due to the construction of U.S. Naval Base Guam. During World War II, the U.S. Navy occupied Sumay and the village of Agat sustained high levels of damage due to military bombardment. In order to house the residents of Agat and Sumay, new tract-style homes were built. These new homes were especially important because the U.S. Navy had no intention of returning the land to the prewar families that lived there.¹¹³ Instead, the military forced these families to move into the neighboring village of Agat and the new postwar village of Santa Rita (which did not exist before World War II).

In postwar Hagåtña, the U.S. military redrew the village's boundaries and redistributed smaller land allotments to mirror western-style suburban tract homes. This was only possible because in World War II, the U.S. military bombarded the entire village to drive out Japanese forces. In the process, Hagåtña was destroyed and the military was credited for rebuilding the entire village in a modern fashion. An American travelogue written in the late 1950s described Hagåtña as:

...Arisen from its own ashes to become a western Pacific metropolis. Situated between towering cliffs and a glistening green bay, the city is the business and governmental

¹¹² *Navy News*, "Island Rebuilding to Include Modern Homes for Guamanians," February 10, 1946. Navy, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

¹¹³ Former residents and descendants of the village of Sumay are permitted to visit Naval Base Guam once a year known as "Back to Sumay Day." This includes various ceremonies and speeches that take place on the former village site. The village cemetery still exists in which Chamorros visit during "Back to Sumay Day," since many of them have relatives buried there and can only pay their respects to them once a year. For more on the history of Sumay, see James Oelke Farley, "Broken Spear: The Roller Coaster Existence of Sumay, Guam (1900-1941) (Mangilao: Guampedia, 2002), 9-41 and James Perez Viernes, "Fanhasso I Taotao Sumay: Displacement, Dispossession and Survival on Guam (M.A. Thesis, University of Hawai'i, 2008).

center of the Territory. Stores and specialty shops line its four-lane bayside highway, Marine Drive. Most historic spot in town is the restored Plaza de Espana with its modern government buildings and crumbling Spanish ruins.¹¹⁴

As in the case of Sumay, many of the prewar residents of Hagåtña were driven out of the village because the military had confiscated their lands to build Marine Corps Drive and other structures such as government buildings, shopping plazas, and housing tracts. For many Chamorro families, the postwar reorganization of Hagåtña complicated land ownerships and the construction of new homes due to the reduction of land allotments. In some cases, the military left Chamorros to fend for themselves when it came to restoring their postwar homes.

In the immediate postwar period, some Chamorros had to rebuild their homes on their own. Anthropologist Laura M. Thompson, who spent several years on Guam immediately after World War II, took note of these events. As she observed, “They [Chamorros] are living now, some in prefabricated dwellings, some in Quonset huts, and some in temporary houses they have built themselves out of surplus war materials.”¹¹⁵ For some Chamorros, relying on the military to rebuild their homes was not an option. The late Carlos P. Taitano was a former U.S. military officer, politician, and lawyer on Guam. In September 1945, he returned to Guam looking for his family and recalled:

When I landed, I recognized absolutely nothing. They destroyed the city I was born [sic], they bulldozed the northern part of the island, there concrete now and asphalt. My mother had died during the war. I had to ask people “Where is my father, where is he located because the streets are different, you have to help me.” I found my father in a

¹¹⁴ Janice J. Beaty, *Discovering Guam: A Guide to its Towns, Trails and Tenants* (Tokyo: Faith Book Store, 1968), 18.

¹¹⁵ Laura Thompson, “Crisis on Guam,” in *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, November 1946, 165. Guam Echo, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

shack he built himself out of the debris in Hagåtña. He was seventy-one at the time, polishing shoes to get a few pennies to buy a few things. They occupied his fifty acres without any compensation. I said, “I’m going to do something about this.” As an officer, I went to the military depot, where they had all kinds of materials and I just ordered the enlisted men to bring out a truck and put the following building materials [sic]. And then we hired three Chamorro carpenters and gave my father a house compliments of the U.S. military government. They knew nothing about that. And today, of course, if you do something like that, I would be court martialed yes, but I was going to do that since they failed to do it.¹¹⁶

To provide his father with housing, Taitano used his authority as a military officer and ordered supplies that his family utilized in the construction of a new home. Even though he could have been punished for violating his power as an officer, the squalor in which his family and other Chamorros were living frustrated him and spurred him to act. In contrast, the military provided modern housing for its white servicemen and their dependents.

The military did not solely commit its infrastructure efforts to constructing homes for Chamorros, but rather placed emphasis on providing homes for American servicemen and their families who were coming in large numbers in the postwar era.¹¹⁷ According to *The New York Times* writer Walter Sullivan:

¹¹⁶ *The Insular Empire: America in the Mariana Islands*, directed by Vanessa Warheit (Palo Alta, CA: Horse Opera Productions, 2009), DVD.

¹¹⁷ The construction of homes for Chamorros and other local civilians did not become widespread until after 1962. In August 1962 the security clearance program was lifted and in November 1962 Typhoon Karen destroyed ninety percent of the island’s structures, which also made the construction of new homes necessary. Private contractors adopted the Kaiser prefabricated homes model that was made with reinforced rebar and concrete. However, these homes were problematic because they absorbed heat easily. For more information on Kaiser prefabricated homes on Guam, see Nicholas Yamashita Quinata, “Kaiser Pre-Fab Homes,” *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/kaiser-pre-fab-homes/>.

The construction of permanent housing is probably the biggest job under way here. Typhoon proof homes for service men and their families are being built. Their cost is such that even at present levels a large mansion could be built for the same price in the United States. Meandering rows of houses, all alike, are springing up, reminiscent of housing developments in suburban America except for their design. The roofs of slab concrete and the heavy shutters are built to resist winds that seldom blow across Nassau and Westchester Counties.¹¹⁸

Civilian newspapers such as *The New York Times* documented not only the development of homes in Guam with modern materials, but also illustrated that a large number of the homes were being constructed primarily for American servicemen and their families. Thus, the postwar construction of homes on Guam served to accommodate American expectations of western amenities. The construction of modern homes also occurred at Andersen Air Force Base. On October 26, 1958, the *Territorial Sun* reported: “The new homes will be typhoon proof of a style resembling a modified ranch type...at this stage of construction, homes will seemingly pop-up overnight.”¹¹⁹ Black Construction Company was hired to complete this housing tract project, which included approximately 1,000 homes on Andersen Air Force Base. As in other instances, these homes were built for the sole purpose of housing American servicemen and their dependents, rather than housing Chamorros and other civilian residents. Moreover, as in the case of life on other military bases in Guam, these houses reinforced the idea of American suburban living through ranch-style tract homes. Other Americans reported the intended audience of said suburban homes. American writer Stuart Udall described postwar Guam: “Modern buildings,

¹¹⁸ Walter Sullivan, “Guam Mushrooms Into a Metropolis,” *The New York Times*, November 30, 1948.

¹¹⁹ *Territorial Sun*, “\$20 Million Capehart Project Starts,” October 26, 1958. University of Guam’s Richard F. Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center.

fine highways, busy stores, electricity, running water, sewer systems, theaters, service stations, radio and television, and other contemporary Western services and facilities are common. In the villages, however, many homes are frame buildings with open windows and high porches, with stilts used as supports rather than concrete foundations.”¹²⁰ As Udall revealed, Guam was remade to suit white American middle-class sensibilities of settlement, while Chamorro homes were not built with the same modern supplies used for the military and their dependents.

In rare moments, some American writers criticized the military for Chamorros’ postwar poverty and landlessness. For example, *The New York Times* journalist Robert Trumbull noted, “...they [Chamorros] live in squalor and must continue so until Congress appropriates funds to restore what was theirs until the American fleet opened fire prior to the invasion of July 1944.” He also asserted, “This land belongs to the natives and a law authorizes the Government to buy the tracts some day. Meanwhile the military government has the problem of persuading the natives not to build sorely needed homes on their land because the Government may condemn it for military purposes. The natives have no place to go, however.”¹²¹ Trumbull’s critique of the U.S. military’s land taking policy and the lack of homes for Chamorros drew attention to the military’s authoritarian policy. Consequently, the building of modern homes for Americans evidenced another example of the colonial inequalities in Guam.

Military Base Life and Beaches

The U.S. Air Force’s Public Information Office also perpetuated the idea that military expansion represented modernity through the newsletter they published for American servicemen

¹²⁰ Stuart L. Udall, *America’s Day Begins in Guam...U.S.A.* (Washington D.C.: Office of Territories, 1967) 6-7.

¹²¹ Robert Trumbull, “Congress Delays Guam Rebuilding,” *The New York Times*, February 19, 1946.

stationed on Guam. In 1947, an unknown author stated, “Meanwhile, naval administration continues to provide homes, free education, schools, hospitalization, pay war claims, rebuild towns, villages, and public buildings, construct roads, and foster new business and industry.”¹²² Military officials believed it was important to inform servicemen and their families of the “positive” projects they had contributed to the island through periodicals such as the *Guam Daily News* and the *Pacific Profile*. In turn, the media justified the military’s need to occupy the island since modernization was presented as only being possible under U.S. colonial governance. From 1944 to 1950, for example, the U.S. Navy determined which off-island companies could establish businesses on the island since Guam remained under naval governance, with the navy controlling immigration via their security clearance program. Moreover, the military took credit for bringing other modern services to the civilian public such as commercial banking, public libraries, a bus line, and a daily tabloid newspaper.¹²³ Even though the military did encourage commercial growth on the island, the majority of these businesses served military personnel and their families. In actuality, only servicemen and their dependents had access to many of the early postwar commercial industries since they were built within the confines of U.S. military bases. Thus, the modernization of Guam’s commercial industries and the suburbanization of military homes primarily provided modern amenities to American military personnel and their dependents.

Historian Lauren Hirshberg has argued that the U.S. militarization of Kwajalein, a Marshallese atoll located east of Guam, included a project of suburbanization that enabled the

¹²² U.S. Air Force, 7.

¹²³ Wing Public Information Office, *Destination Guam* (Guam: Andersen Air Force Base, 1950), 22. University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center.

U.S. military's acquisition and control of this site.¹²⁴ Similarly, military development made American settlement on Guam possible through the expansion of the island's infrastructure and in the replication of U.S. suburban life on military bases. The U.S. Air Force described Guam as having "shops, restaurants, and cafes, and in and out of them pour a stream of civilians, soldiers, sailors and Marines."¹²⁵ These stores and restaurants provided Americans the opportunity to engage in consumer activities, an important facet of American suburban life. Since prewar Guam generally lacked suburban amenities such shopping plazas and western recreational activities, the military believed the island needed to be developed into a place with these opportunities. As historian Lizabeth Cohen explains, white middle-class Americans subscribed to the idea that postwar U.S. society was "built around promises of mass consumption, both in terms of material life and the more idealistic goals of greater freedom, democracy, and equality."¹²⁶ These consumer opportunities not only represented American ideas of modernity and democracy, but they also made living on Guam more palatable for American servicemen and their dependents.

The military's advertisement of American suburban life and consumerism particularly targeted white American women. Specifically, military periodicals perpetuated patriarchal social norms on the island. For example, white American women who came to the island as civilian dependents were reminded "to keep house and cook three meals a day just as you would anywhere and you certainly need equipment with which to do it."¹²⁷ In the case of military life

¹²⁴ Lauren B. Hirshberg, "Nuclear Families: (Re)producing 1950s Suburban America in the Marshall Islands," in *OAH Magazine of History* 26 no. 4 (2012): 2-3.

¹²⁵ U.S. Air Force, 16.

¹²⁶ Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 7.

on bases, the reinforcement of white patriarchal social norms became synonymous with consumerism. The military ensured that modern appliances and equipment were available for purchase in post exchanges, which upheld gendered norms of female household labor and domesticity, even for families living thousands of miles away from the U.S.¹²⁸ While periodicals such as *Guam Destination* and *Life* magazine highlighted these consumer opportunities in terms of modernization, many recreational activities were only available to military personnel and their dependents.

Some of the earliest postwar movie theatres, libraries, service clubs, bowling alleys, and golf courses were built within the confines of bases or were designated as military-only facilities.¹²⁹ The military provided these recreational activities not only to promote suburban living and American settlement, but also to distract servicemen from the challenges of living a regimented lifestyle. Some Americans believed being stationed on an island exacerbated a soldier's feeling of isolation and negatively impacted his health. In 1947, for example, Vernon T. Bull wrote a letter to the U.S. Navy in Washington D.C. requesting that his son be relocated to a naval base in the continental United States. According to Bull, his son's "morale is steadily growing worse" and the "isolation affected by this island [Guam] is severely affecting his health, both mentally and physically."¹³⁰ For some Americans, the prospect of being stationed on Guam only magnified a soldier's dissatisfaction with living on an island that did not have the same

¹²⁷ Paul Carano, *Guam: Andersen Air Force Base* (Guam: Andersen Air Force Base, 1950), 19. University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center.

¹²⁸ For more on military, femininity and gendered social norms, see Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

¹²⁹ In 1946, the navy opened the Admiral Nimitz eighteen-hole golf course, which was for military use only. This golf course was built on land that was condemned in the postwar era and did not allow local civilian use until 1997.

¹³⁰ Vernon T. Bull, Letter to U.S. Navy in Washington D.C., November 13, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

recreational and social comforts of life in the continental United States. In a satirical article, writer Ronald Levitt described the reaction of a man who had received orders to be stationed on Guam. This fictional character stated, “Oh no, not Guam...Poor kid...there is nothing there but palm trees and gooney birds...you’ll go nuts within a week...there’s nothing to do there.”¹³¹ Bull’s letter characterized Guam as devoid of modern amenities. Since this was a common sentiment, it was important to transform the island into a place that offered the recreational activities representative of white American suburban life.¹³²

Moreover, both civilian and military periodicals played an integral role in promoting exotic tourism and beach recreation. For example, the *Industrial Miners Gazette* reported, “To the lovers of beautiful scenery and delightful drives, attention is called to this picturesque view of the palm-lined drive which runs along the water front at the southern end of the island.”¹³³ This periodical represented Guam as an exotic landscape filled with wondrous sights for those who were willing to come to the island as servicemen, civilian workers, or their dependents. Other periodicals similarly depicted the island. The Pacific Area Travel Association described Guam as being traveler friendly, stating, “The new influx of visitors will have an easy time getting a thorough look at Guam via the scenic highway that circles the entire 30 mile island. The northern section offers a rolling savanna that leads to ocean cliffs and the southern half is verdant and mountainous.”¹³⁴ Military newsletters disseminated similar information to their soldiers. The U.S. Air Force noted, “The flora and fauna of Guam will prove attractive to those

¹³¹ Ronald Levitt, “In Behalf of the Gooney Birds,” *Our Navy*, July 1953, 11. Navy, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

¹³² For more on militarism and tourism in the Pacific, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

¹³³ *Industrial Miners Gazette*, “Places to See on Guam,” September 10, 1949, Vol. 10, No. 5, 3. RG 313 Naval Government Unit, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

¹³⁴ *Pacific Area Travel Association*, “Pacific News,” March 17, 1967.

who are interested in nature study. Wild orchids and ginger thrive in the jungles and a number of strange birds may be seen and photographed.”¹³⁵

Other American writers focused on the pristine rural appeal Guam would have for American audiences. In the early 1960s, author Stuart Udall wrote, “While the northern part of Guam is completely modern, the native villages of the southern half still carry on an ancient way of life. It is not uncommon to see people riding along country paths on carabaos. Driving around the island one will pass through the villages of Umatac, Merizo, and Inarajan, and see the ruins of several early Spanish forts. One may also inspect the mysterious latte stones.”¹³⁶ The military personnel, contractors, and travel companies were all invested in promoting the island as a tropical paradise and exotic locale. While their motives might have differed, the discursive consequences of these postwar views maintained the notion that U.S. military expansion of Guam offered something for all Americans. For soldiers stationed on the island, military expansion was justified as modernization, while also allowing them to enjoy the recreational opportunities of an exotic island. In addition to these recreational options, beaches were also sites for American recreation.

Civilian and military periodicals commodified Guam’s beaches as another recreational option for American servicemen and their families. For example, *Life* magazine reported, “Plane crews back from the exhausting 17-hour bomber run to Tokyo, submarine crews on land for the first time in months, both find Guam a pleasant base for rest and relaxation. The marines stationed on the island usually work from 5 a.m. until 1:30 p.m. and are then free for the afternoon and night to swim in the craters blasted out of the shallow coral on the ocean’s edge, to

¹³⁵ U.S. Air Force, 20.

¹³⁶ Udall, 8.

play ball, to drink beer or just to sack out in their tents.”¹³⁷ Moreover, military newsletters disseminated a similar message regarding the carefree nature of being stationed on Guam. The U.S. Air Force noted, “Military courtesies and the usual customs of the service are observed, but the accent is on a minimum of regimentation. There is a certain freedom in military life overseas which is not possible on installations near metropolitan or suburban areas.”¹³⁸ Civilian and military periodicals shaped how Americans understood Guam as a site of informal work and laid-back recreational beach activity as a consolation for being stationed on the island. They also characterized Guam as a place that was both modern and native. The U.S. Air Force’s Office of Public Information stated, “Guam is a swimmers paradise; its beaches are numerous and some of them resemble a Hollywood movie setting, particularly Tumon Bay and Talofofo which are the most popular. And Camp Dealy, a former rest camp, holds the pennant for beach parties and steak fries. Collecting specimens of marine life, gathering colorful sea shells, and taking pictures are SOP [standard operating procedure] at all beaches.”¹³⁹

Such articles played a major role in the perpetuation of Guam as an exotic and native place. Moreover, the island was marketed as a location that had all of the beauty of other beaches, while costing less to visit. In the early 1950s, Guam scholar Paul Carano wrote a travelogue that was geared toward military personnel and their families. As Carano stated, “Guam’s beaches offer all the famed attractions of Miami, the Riviera, Waikiki – balmy weather, crystal-clear water, powdery white sand, scenic beauty, charming girls – and yet entail none of

¹³⁷ *Life*, July 2, 1945, 74. For more on the relationship between militarism and tourism, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

¹³⁸ U.S. Air Force, 20.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

those famed resorts' expenses."¹⁴⁰ He not only depicted Guam as having beautiful beaches but also claimed that the island offered cheaper resorts than those provided in Florida or Hawai'i. While American servicemen and their families took advantage of the economic privileges of middle class suburban life, most Chamorros seldom participated in these touristic activities of the 1950s. For many Chamorros, the military expansion of Guam represented the loss of their land and a shift towards full-time wage labor.

A few American newspaper writers such as Quentin Pope were willing to criticize the military's governance of Guam and its people. In 1952, Pope reported, "In the last year there has been some steady building in permanent materials, new restaurants and stores have opened, and beer joints have spawned. However, there has been no solid industrial progress and the Guamanians who used to run around happily in jeeps and now own used sedans owe this to steady military spending."¹⁴¹ Pope's comments drew attention to the fact that, while the commercial and infrastructure of Guam expanded, the island's indigenous economy did not. This stagnation resulted in Chamorros not being able to participate in consumer activities, one of the tenets of American middle-class, suburban life. Other periodicals echoed similar critiques of the U.S. military. In December 1946, *The Christian Science Monitor* noted:

Then our Navy built huge installations which took up much of the farming land. Now Guam produces only five percent of its own food. Many of the 23,000 natives have changed from small farmers to poorly paid wage earners. Though the things which they must buy from abroad are, because of shipping costs, very expensive, our Navy enforces a low standard of wages for native workers. It is difficult for a common laborer and his

¹⁴⁰ Carano, 15.

¹⁴¹ Quentin Pope, "Dream of Boom for Guam Fails to Come to Life," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 10, 1952.

wife to earn enough money for food alone...in general, people of the island feel that the Navy is not moving rapidly enough to relieve their economic distress.¹⁴²

American writers such as Pope were part of a small group of American journalists who were critical of the military's governance of Guam. Pope's article was significant because it revealed to American audiences that the taking of indigenous-owned land and the exploitation of laborers were foundational in the military expansion of the island. His comments also exposed that notions of American democracy and the benevolence of capitalism were not fulfilled for the Chamorros of Guam, who were dispossessed from their land and had few employment opportunities.

Conclusion

In a 1956 article for the *Saturday Evening Post*, former Guam Governor Ford Q. Elvidge stated, "Americans now have presented the people of Guam with an entirely new pattern for living."¹⁴³ Here, he shows how the island and its people lived through a period of major infrastructure changes. This shift not only marked a new era for Guam, but it also transformed how Americans in the continental United States came to perceive the island and its people. Specifically, periodicals authored by military officials and civilians provided the primary medium through which Americans came to know Guam and the supposed humanitarianism of the U.S. military.

¹⁴² *The Christian Science Monitor*, "Guam Dissatisfied," December 2, 1946. Navy, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña Guam.

¹⁴³ Ford Q. Elvidge, "I Ruled Uncle Sam's Problem Child," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 1, 1956. Ford Elvidge, Vertical Files. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

As Keith L. Camacho has argued, “Military officials seized this opportunity to represent themselves as humanitarians familiar with indigenous issues and needs.”¹⁴⁴ In this case, the military promoted military expansion as an act of modernity and philanthropy. While the U.S. military facilitated expansion and modernization projects, it did not do so with the benevolent or philanthropic intentions portrayed in American periodicals. Rather, these commercial and infrastructure projects were undertaken with the objective of improving the U.S. government’s military development of the island. Moreover, this process was accompanied by the transmission of ideas and cultural principles that informed the infrastructural development of Guam. This was most evident in the construction of Andersen Air Force Base and tract-homes, which were made to reflect suburban life in the western United States and promote American military settlement. Overall, American popular representations of Guam played a crucial role in reifying the cultures of U.S. empire through the depiction of military expansion as modernization.

¹⁴⁴ Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 65.

CHAPTER TWO

Chamorro Land Stewardship and Military Land Taking

Introduction

The conflicts were finally resolved, and I could look with unalloyed pride as the Americans landed and took off from what we Chamorros had won with so much sweat and pain. But to this day, I cannot arrive at the international airport or depart from it and not remember the agony that went into its original creation.¹⁴⁵

This quotation was taken from the memoir of Ben Blaz, a Chamorro forced to work for the Japanese military during its occupation of Guam in World War II.¹⁴⁶ Specifically, Blaz wrote about his time working on the Japanese airfield in Tiyan, where he and hundreds of other Chamorros cleared vegetation, uprooted trees, and pulled huge rocks.¹⁴⁷ Today, Guam's international airport is located here, an area that encapsulates the overlapping and competing emotions about how Chamorros felt in regards to the American military reoccupation of Guam. While Blaz's statement does not speak directly to the issue of U.S. military land taking, his

¹⁴⁵ Ben Blaz, *Bisita Guam: Let Us Remember Nihi Ta Hasso* (Mangilao: University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center, 2008), 96.

¹⁴⁶ Ben Blaz was thirteen-years old when Japan occupied Guam during World War II. After high school, he completed his bachelor's degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1951 and earned a Master's degree from George Washington University in 1963. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at the beginning of the Korean War and rose to the rank of Brigadier General, becoming the first Chamorro to achieve this position. He also served as Guam's Representative to U.S. Congress for four terms, beginning in 1985 and lasting until 1993.

¹⁴⁷ In the Chamorro language, Tiyan means "side," which references its location in the central area of Guam. The place name of Tiyan follows the Chamorro indigenous practice of naming specific areas of the island after a human body part. Another example is the village of Barrigada, which means "flank" or central Guam. However, Chamorro adults from the prewar era also referred to Tiyan as Jalaguac or Alaguag. The word tuyan or "stomach" has also been referred to this same area of Guam. The use of all four names has been documented in the historical record, but this dissertation will refer to this area as Tiyan, the most commonly used term by Chamorros in the postwar period and today. From 1944 to 1995, Tiyan was under control of the U.S. Navy and was primarily used as a naval air base (the U.S. Navy permitted the Government of Guam to operate an international airport terminal on Tiyan). The Base Realignment and Closure Commission closed the air base in 1995 and returned ownership of the entire property to the Government of Guam. Today, Tiyan is the location of the A.B. Won Pat International Airport.

sentiment underscores the variety of emotions that many Chamorros felt about the American military's large-scale confiscation of lands in 1944. The most pervasive emotion is what I call the liberation of land narrative, that is, the notion that Chamorros willingly gifted their lands to the military as thanks for the liberation of Guam from the Japanese.¹⁴⁸ While this might have been the sentiment of some Chamorros, this feeling was short-lived and did not encapsulate all of their experiences.

In this chapter, I examine the U.S. military's postwar attempt to control Chamorro land stewardship through the creation of the Guam Land and Claims Commission (GLCC). World War II and the creation of the GLCC provided the military with the authority to confiscate land for the use of building bases and installations throughout the entire island. In turn, the military's ownership of land on Guam resulted in the recruitment of workers from the Philippines and the United States, which contributed to the making of Guam's postwar multiracial and multiethnic society. Part one focuses on Chamorro land stewardship and the origin of the *lancho* (ranch) from the pre-European contact era until World War II. Land served as the primary source for cultural perpetuation, genealogy, and self-subsistence. Even though they were landowners, Chamorros understood that land was more than just property; it was the basis for their cultural foundation as well as physical sustenance. Part two then outlines the military's creation of the GLCC as the primary institution utilized to condemn land. Charting this process reveals how the navy relied on coercive measures to acquire land that transformed the island from an agrarian community to a wage labor society. While these events resulted in changes that shifted how some Chamorros perceived land to be a commodity, it did not affect the cultural value of land. Thus, the loss of their property became an emotional and troubling experience once they realized

¹⁴⁸ Anne Perez Hattori, "Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam," in *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. L. Eve Armentrout Ma (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2001), 186.

they might never regain their familial lands. In part three, I subsequently discuss Chamorro frustrations over the military's acquisition of land for corporate, recreational, and national security purposes. This rising tide of discontent worked in tandem with a postwar liberal discourse of empire in which white American allies criticized the military's administration of the island. I then conclude that the legality of the military's postwar land condemnations were questionable and an egregious example of imperial rule that was rooted in the idea of national security.

Land Tenure Before and After the Spanish Regime

For Chamorros, land (and by extension the ocean) was the source of ancestral lineage, cultural perpetuation, and subsistence. Attorney and cultural preservationist Michael F. Phillips writes, "Land on Guam is literally the base of our culture. It incorporates special relationships: of clan, family, religion, and beliefs."¹⁴⁹ This was no more evident than in the pre-European contact era. Before the arrival of Spanish settlers, land on Guam was vested in the control of Chamorro clans. The rank and class of each clan determined which land they had exclusive or shared access over.¹⁵⁰ This control over communal resources was based on the extended family and was predicated on matrilineal descent, later resulting in the stewardship of specific areas of land and ocean.¹⁵¹ These hereditary clans were spread throughout several villages on the island.¹⁵² Even though they did not conceive of land as individual private property, they

¹⁴⁹ Michael F. Phillips, "Land," in *Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro/Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 14.

¹⁵⁰ Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966), 20.

¹⁵¹ Lawrence J. Cunningham, *Ancient Chamorro Society* (Honolulu: The Bess Press, 1992), 170.

protected their family land against other clans and understood the importance of exclusive communal stewardship. In addition, Chamorros relied on the land to grow and gather food such as breadfruit, coconuts, plantains, rice, yams, and several other fruits and vegetables.¹⁵³ For Chamorros, these food items served as dietary staples. However, this indigenous conception of land use would be altered by the Spanish colonization of Guam.¹⁵⁴

Spain's formal claim of ownership over Guam began in the sixteenth century.¹⁵⁵ On January 25, 1565, Spanish navigator Miguel Lopez de Legazpi traveled ashore and issued the formal proclamation, "in the name of His Royal Majesty the King, Don Felipe Our Lord, take[s] and apprehend[s] as an actual property and as a Royal Possession, this land and all the lands subject to it."¹⁵⁶ This proclamation specifically evoked the Doctrine of Discovery, an international agreement among various European countries to acquire "property rights in natives lands" and gain "governmental, political, and commercial rights over the inhabitants without the

¹⁵² In the United States, most places are referred to as cities, while on Guam they are all known as villages regardless of their size and population.

¹⁵³ Frank Quimby, "Miguel Lopez de Legazpi," referenced March 10, 2014, Guampedia, <http://guampedia.com/miguel-lopez-de-legazpi>. For more on Chamorro fishing and hunting, see Scott Russell, *Tiempon I Manmofo 'na: Ancient Chamorro Culture and History of the Northern Mariana Islands* (Saipan: CNMI, Division of Historic Preservation, 1998).

¹⁵⁴ For more on Spanish notions of property and land claims, see Omaira Brunal-Perry, "Nineteenth Century Spanish Administrative Development on Guam," in *Guam History: Perspectives*, Vol. 1, eds. Lee D. Carter, William L. Wuerch, and Rosa Roberto Carter (Mangilao: University of Guam MARC, 1998), 77-94, Carlos Madrid, *Beyond Distances: Governance, Politics, and Deportation in the Mariana Islands from 1870 to 1877* (Saipan: Northern Mariana Island Council for the Humanities, 2006), and Robert J. Miller, *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny* (Westport: Praeger, 2006).

¹⁵⁵ Ferdinand Magellan's arrival on Guam on March 6, 1521 was significant because he and his crew documented the existence of the island and its native people. Even though he only stayed for three days, his landing resulted in subsequent visits from other European explorers. From 1521 to 1564, Guam served primarily as a resupplying location for European ships traveling to and from the Philippines.

¹⁵⁶ Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, *Hale'-Ta: Hinasso': Tinige' Put Chamorro* (Insights: The Chamorro Identity) (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1993), 2.

knowledge nor the consent of the indigenous peoples.”¹⁵⁷ European countries and, much later, the United States enacted the Doctrine of Discovery from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Even though Legazpi claimed ownership of Guam for Spain, he continued on his voyage to the Philippines. Unbeknownst to Chamorros, Guam now “belonged” to Spain, but indigenous land tenure remained the same until the formal Spanish colonization of Guam from 1668 to 1898.¹⁵⁸

During this period, the *lancho* or ranch emerged as a space that reflected both older and newer forms of land tenure. For example, Spanish colonial authorities commonly relied on the tactic of *reduccion* or village reduction, which was a system that forced indigenous populations in the Americas and the Pacific to live in centralized towns or villages. For colonial authorities, the consolidation of indigenous populations made the process of religious conversion, surveillance, and punishment easier. However, this practice also decimated indigenous populations because it forced them to live in close proximity to Spaniards, which made indigenous people susceptible to death from European diseases. In the Mariana Islands,

¹⁵⁷ Robert J. Miller, *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 1.

¹⁵⁸ Born in Burgos, Spain in 1627, Diego Luis de San Vitores was a Jesuit priest who first visited Guam in 1662 on board a Spanish galleon traveling between Acapulco, Mexico and Manila, Philippines. During his stop on Guam, San Vitores noticed there were no missions or priests stationed on the island. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he appealed for permission from the Spanish King, Philip IV, and his wife Mariana de Austria to establish a mission on Guam. Since communication moved slowly between the Philippines and Spain, it was not until 1667 that he received permission and more importantly the supplies, ship, and men necessary to travel to Guam. From 1668 to 1672, San Vitores engaged in the mass conversion of Chamorros throughout the archipelago that included men, women, and children. However, some Chamorros did not perceive conversion as an act of benevolence. In 1672, Chamorro leaders Hirao and Mata ‘pang killed San Vitores because he had baptized Mata ‘pang’s infant daughter without his permission and for fear that the baptismal water was poisoned. This led to the Spanish-Chamorro Wars, which were a series of small skirmishes and battles that took place throughout the Mariana Islands and lasted from 1672 until 1698. By the end of the seventeenth century, Spain had successfully reduced the Chamorro populations of the Mariana Islands into specific villages, with churches as their centers, for easier surveillance and control. See Vicente M. Diaz, *Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2010), Francisco Garcia, S.J., *The Life and Martyrdom of Diego Luis de San Vitores* (Mangilao: University of Guam, Micronesian Area Research Center, 2004), and Emilie G. Johnston, *Father Sanvitores: His Life, Times, and Martyrdom* (Mangilao: University of Guam, Micronesian Area Research Center, 1993).

reduccion provided the political stability for Spanish missions to implement a new land tenure system in Guam.¹⁵⁹ This thirty-year conflict resettled all Chamorro clans across the archipelago in the southernmost island of Guam. Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Spanish crown introduced the concept of royal and individual land ownership. Under this system, the largest tracts of land were placed in the ownership of Spain and amongst the new *principalia* class, a small group of elite Chamorro families that intermarried with Spaniards.¹⁶⁰ This elite group of Chamorros also adopted other Spanish practices such as primogeniture inheritance.¹⁶¹ Even though most Chamorros lost access to large communal lands, many of them were able to retain or obtain smaller plots of land for farming and ranching. These plots of land were known as the *lancho*, spaces located outside the city and church locales established by the Spanish colonial government.¹⁶² In this respect, the *lancho* served as a safe haven for Chamorro clans to interact with each other.¹⁶³ During the week, Chamorros were even permitted to live and work on their *lancho*, provided that they return to their village residences during the weekends to attend church functions. For many Chamorros, the *lancho* system allowed them to continue their agrarian and fishing lifestyles without being directly monitored by Spanish authorities.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, the *lancho* system persisted into the twentieth century as the primary form of Chamorro land stewardship.

¹⁵⁹ For more on the Spanish colonization of the Mariana Islands, see Francis X. Hezel, S.J. "From Conquest to Colonization: Spain in the Marianas, 1690-1740." *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 23, 1988: 137-155.

¹⁶⁰ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 74-75.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² The word *lancho* comes from the Spanish word *rancheria*, which means ranch in English. For more on the Chamorro *lancho*, see Laura M. Thompson, *Guam and Its People: With a Village Journal by Jesus C. Barcinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

¹⁶³ Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "Lancho: Rancho," in *Guampedia*, <http://Guampedia.com/lancho-ranch/>.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Prewar Land Holdings

Just like the Spanish before them, the U.S. government enacted laws that altered landownership in Guam.¹⁶⁵ Specifically, the Treaty of Paris resulted in Spain's agreement to transfer a total of 36,000 out of a possible 134,000 acres known as Spanish Crown land to the United States.¹⁶⁶ Unsure of how to administer the island of Guam, President William McKinley gave administrative authority to the U.S. Department of the Navy. In turn, the navy stationed on the island a naval commander who also acted as the civilian governor.¹⁶⁷ This authority meant that naval governors could enact laws and pass general orders without the consent of the Chamorro people, Congress, or the President of the United States. For example, on January 30, 1899, American Naval Captain Edward D. Taussig issued a general order that stated "all public lands, recently the property of the Spanish Government, bordering on the port of San Luis d'Apra," now belonged to the U.S. government.¹⁶⁸ Implemented without consultation of any Chamorro representatives, Taussig's order was the first act of land confiscation that consolidated U.S. Naval control over the port area. Besides monopolizing control over the land and ocean of San Luis d'Apra, the U.S. Navy also managed land transactions on the island.

¹⁶⁵ In 1898, the United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War, which established that United States as an overseas colonial power. The Treaty of Paris resulted in the United States gaining protectorate rights over Cuba, and ownership of Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. For more on the ascendancy of U.S. empire in the Pacific, see Julian Go, "The New Sociology of Empire and Colonialism," *Sociology Compass* 3, no. 5 (2009): 775-788 and Julian Go, "Modes of Rule in America's Overseas Empire: the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam and Samoa," in *The Louisiana Purchase and American Expansion*, eds. Sanford Levinson and Bartholomew Sparrow (Lanham: Rowen & Littlefield, 2005).

¹⁶⁶ To Authorize the Secretary of the Navy to Transfer Land for Resettlement in Guam, and for Other Purposes, S. 1362, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Miscellaneous Bills, no. 119, September 25, 1945.

¹⁶⁷ Typically, naval captains were stationed on Guam for two to three years. Once their term was over, another naval captain was appointed and served as commanding officer and naval governor of the island.

¹⁶⁸ Rogers, 115.

On August 10, 1899, Guam's first official naval governor, Richard Leary, issued a law that forced Chamorros to obtain permission from the navy to engage in all land exchanges. He declared "That, all public lands and property and all rights and privileges, on shore or in the contiguous waters of the island, that belonged to Spain at the time of the surrender, now belong to the United States, and all persons are warned against attempting to purchase, appropriate or dispose of any of the aforesaid properties, rights or privileges without the consent of the United States Government."¹⁶⁹ Leary's statement underscored the navy's imperial authority in determining the selling and transferring of land on Guam. In addition to dictating landownership in Guam, the U.S. military also sought to change Chamorro land stewardship.

For instance, American military officials often encouraged Chamorros to sell their crops and livestock for market sale. However, Chamorros continued to rely on the land for farming, harvesting, and ranching to feed their families and to barter for other goods. Chamorros grew a variety of crops such as corn, rice, cassava, arrowroot, taro, yams, and vegetables including beans, melons, tomatoes, and pumpkins.¹⁷⁰ They also harvested fruits such as breadfruit, mangoes, papayas, avocados, bananas, lemons, oranges, and pineapples.¹⁷¹ Besides cultivating crops, Chamorros also raised cattle, chickens, and pigs. For Chamorros, land – and most vitally the *lancho* – provided the sustenance necessary for the survival of their families. Thus, being a steward of the land was more important than being a laborer in a wage economy. An unknown naval officer observed, for example, that the Chamorro farmer "walks to and from his ranch – unless he is the fortunate possessor of a bull cart – and works in the hot sun, not steadily, it is

¹⁶⁹ Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 22.

¹⁷⁰ Robert K. Coote, *A Report on the Land-Use Condition and Land Problems on Guam* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1950), 19.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

true, but enough to produce the food he and his family need; seldom does he produce a surplus for sale.”¹⁷² Even though some Chamorro men had jobs in the prewar period, this money was used to pay their property taxes and to purchase goods imported from the United States. Moreover, the *lancho* system continued to provide the space necessary for the perpetuation and maintenance of extended family relationships in the prewar era, as it did under the Spanish colonial period. Chamorros spent a significant portion of their week at the *lancho*, and still do, giving them an opportunity to socialize with their kin, prepare food, sing music, and share gossip.¹⁷³ Thus, the *lancho* is an integral part of the Chamorro social fabric since it supplied both physical and spiritual subsistence. However, as the Spanish and Americans did before them, the Japanese also attempted to alter Chamorro land stewardship during World War II.

Land and Life Under Japanese Occupation

With the Japanese invasion of Guam on December 8, 1941, Chamorros relied on the *lancho* once again for their survival. By December 10, the U.S. military and the Guam Insular Force had surrendered.¹⁷⁴ During the Japanese bombardment of the island, many Chamorros were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge at their *lanchos*, caves, or other villages. Two of the hardest hit villages included Hagåtña and Sumay.¹⁷⁵ These two places represented the civic and commercial centers of Guam and comprised the two most populated villages as well. The

¹⁷² L.M. Cox, E.J. Dorn, K.C. McIntosh, M.G. Cook, and Allen H. White, *The Island of Guam* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), 45.

¹⁷³ Guam Preservation Trust, “Exploring Guam’s Cultural Heritage,” http://cardandcardbeta.com/cultural_orientation/.

¹⁷⁴ Similar to Hawai‘i, the U.S. government knew that a Japanese attack on Guam was imminent. By October 1941, all naval dependents had been evacuated from the island.

¹⁷⁵ For more on the history of Hagåtña, see *Guampedia*, <http://guampedia.com/hagatna/>. For more on the history of Sumay, see James Oelke Farley, “Broken Spear: The Roller Coaster Existence of Sumay, Guam (1900-1941) (Mangilao: Guampedia, 2002), 9-41 and James Perez Viernes, “Fanhasso I Tao Tao Sumay: Displacement, Dispossession, and Survival in Guam” (MA Thesis, University of Hawai‘i, 2008).

naval governor resided in Hagåtña, whereas the Pan American Company operated clippers (flying boats) out of Sumay. Sumay is located on Orote Peninsula, which also housed the U.S. Marine Corps Barracks. Within a matter of days, Japanese forces overran the island and occupied several villages. According to historian Dirk Ballendorf, “Soldiers also looted stores and homes, strutted, paraded, menaced, and hit the Guamanians. All 2,000 Guamanian residents of Sumay on Orote Peninsula were forced from their homes...and never again permitted to return except to pick up a few personal possessions.”¹⁷⁶ Even though the Japanese had taken control of Chamorro residences in coastal villages, for the most part they did not confiscate Chamorro *lanchos* in the interior sections of the island, unless they were of military interest.¹⁷⁷ Once they had consolidated control of the island, they implemented a colonial education system similar to that of the United States. Specifically, the curriculum in these schools was aimed at creating “loyal” subjects who would be willing to embrace Japanese colonial governance and, by extension, their roles as laborers for the military. Rosa Roberto Carter, for example, studied under both the American and Japanese occupations. According to Carter, the Japanese teachers “set out to indoctrinate us into the Japanese way of life and above all to be loyal to anything that was Japanese. Each day started with the assembly of everyone in school. We formed perfect lines, faced north, and bowed our heads in prayer and homage to the Emperor of Japan.”¹⁷⁸ The Japanese military sought to transform the Chamorros of Guam into docile and loyal subjects of

¹⁷⁶ Dirk Anthony Ballendorf, “Guam Military Action in World War II,” in *Guam History: Perspectives*, Vol. 1, eds. Lee D. Carter, William L. Wuerch, and Rosa Roberto Carter (Mangilao: University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center, 1998), 229.

¹⁷⁷ Even though the Japanese military did not confiscate large tracts of *lancho* land, Japanese soldiers commonly inspected *lanchos* and took whatever fruit, vegetables, or livestock they wanted.

¹⁷⁸ Rosa Roberto Carter, “Education in Guam to 1950: Island and Personal History,” in *Guam History: Perspectives*, Vol. 1, eds. Lee D. Carter, William L. Wuerch, and Rosa Roberto Carter (Mangilao: University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center, 1998), 202.

Japan in order to exploit their labor and skills for the military.¹⁷⁹ However, the Japanese military's goal of creating loyal subjects and workers never came to fruition.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, the Chamorros of Guam came to despise the Japanese military for forcing them to be laborers and for incarcerating them in concentration campus such as Manenggon. The Japanese occupation of Guam linked Chamorros to the land through their mandated roles as civilian military workers.

By 1943, the U.S. military began making advances in the Pacific. In response, the Japanese military accelerated the construction of airfields and fortifications, as well as the production of agriculture throughout the western Pacific. In Guam, Orote Peninsula and Tiyan became the sites of two important airfields.¹⁸¹ The Japanese military relied on the forced labor of Chamorros to construct these airfields and to feed its soldiers.¹⁸² For these Chamorro children and adults, their relationship to the land was no longer simply based on stewardship and ancestral lineage; rather, their labor for the Japanese military linked their blood, sweat, pain, and, for some, death to the land. Many of them were forced to work long grueling days, clearing fields

¹⁷⁹ The Japanese military used Chamorros from the island of Rota and Saipan as interpreters during the occupation of Guam during World War II. See Keith L. Camacho, "The Politics of Indigenous Collaboration: The Role of Chamorro Interpreters in Japan's Empire, 1914-1945," *The Journal of Pacific History*, 43, no. 2 (2008): 207-222.

¹⁸⁰ Not all Chamorro children perceived Japanese soldiers negatively. Some soldiers treated Chamorro children benevolently. However, this changed with the impending American invasion in 1943, and the subsequent surrender of Japanese forces on Guam. See Rosa Roberto Carter, "Education in Guam to 1950: Island and Personal History," in *Guam History: Perspectives*, Vol. 1, eds. Lee D. Carter, William L. Wuerch, and Rosa Roberto Carter (Mangilao: University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center, 1998) and Mark-Alexander Peiper, "Guam Survivor Recalls WWII Forced March," *Pacific Daily News*, June 22, 2004, <http://166.122.164.43/archive/2004/june/06-22-17.htm>.

¹⁸¹ In August 1944, American forces defeated Japan and reoccupied Guam. Subsequently, the U.S. Navy created an area called Naval Operating Base Guam, which became the predecessor of Naval Base Guam. The people of Sumay were never allowed to move back to their prewar homes and are given one day a year (known as "back to Sumay") to visit the graves of their relatives, now located inside Naval Base Guam.

¹⁸² The Japanese military also forced some Chamorro women to work as sex slaves. These and other women from Korea and Japan served as "comfort women" for Japanese soldiers and were subjected to physical and sexual abuse. See Maria Rosa Henson, *Comfort Woman: A Filipina's Story of Prostitution and Slavery under the Japanese Military* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999) and Tony Palomo, *An Island in Agony* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1984).

and dragging large rocks. Alberto Babauta Acfalle, for example, was fourteen years old when the Japanese military invaded.



Figure 2.1 Ground Level view of Tiyan Airfield, August 1945. Beginning in 1949, Tiyan became the site of Naval Air Station, Hagåtña, which was closed in 1993. Tiyan is now known as the home of the A.B. Won Pat International Airport. Source: University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center.

He recalled working at Tiyan, describing the conditions he and others endured:

At that time it was all jungle and big rocks had to be moved from the area, so that airplanes could land and take off. As we worked in Alaguag, some people got sick because we were working in the rain and on sunny days we worked in the heat of the sun. They would build a fire out of dead coconut leaves which gave us light and warmth, but some men were already sick because of the constant heat and wetness. Some were so weak that they could not even carry their own bodies.¹⁸³



¹⁸³ Kathleen R.W. Owings, ed., “The War Years on Guam: Narratives of the Chamorro Experience”, Vol. 1 (Mangilao: University of Guam Micronesia Area Research Center, 1981), 2-3.

Figure 2.2 - Aerial view of Tiyan Airfield, 1945. Source: University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center.

Acfalle's comments describe the conditions that many Chamorros endured as forced laborers. For Chamorros, sharing the communal work of land stewardship amongst men, women, and children was nothing new. However, transforming the land into Japanese military installations was shocking and profound.

Retired U.S. Marine General Ben Blaz also worked at Tiyan as a young boy. As Blaz stated, "So when the airstrip was finished, it was not possible to simply dismiss it as something we were forced to do. All of us looked at it with a kind of pride of proprietorship. It was ours. We had made it. And then we'd be struck by what the Japanese intended to use it for, and the emotional conflicts would tear us once again."¹⁸⁴ Blaz's memories underscore the complex emotions that he and other Chamorros felt since they had never before worked the land to build a military installation.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, those who survived witnessed the sickness and death of many Chamorros due to the intense manual labor and poor working conditions. Those memories of working the land under Japanese occupation remained with them for the rest of their lives. For other Chamorros, concentration camps such as Manenggon became sites of death and haunting.¹⁸⁶ This was the case for Maria Efe, who witnessed the execution of three Chamorro men at Manenggon. She recalled:

Right there that evening after work we are called to assemble and if we didn't come to see there would be some punishment for us. The poor three men were there standing or kneeling in front of their graves that had already been dug for them. Ton Terlaje and

¹⁸⁴ Blaz, 95.

¹⁸⁵ For more on indigenous people in the Pacific, see Noah Riseman, *Defending Whose Country?: Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012).

¹⁸⁶ For more on intimate relationships and colonial memories, see Ann Laura Stoler, ed., *Haunted By Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

Salas...got their heads cut off early and it just went right into their graves, and then one of the Japanese kicked their bodies into their graves, but that Tun Juan, who was a little fatter, had to be hit two times before his head [*sic*] was down in his grave.¹⁸⁷

For the Chamorros of Acfalle, Blaz, and Efe's generation, Tiyan, Manenggon, and other sites on Guam serve as a constant reminder of how their blood, sweat, and death are linked to the land. Only that generation can fully understand this connection to the land. By July 1944, life under Japanese occupation was coming to an end with the impending invasion of American forces.

Land in Postwar Guam

The expansion of the U.S. military in the postwar era drastically altered Chamorro land stewardship.¹⁸⁸ The U.S. government decided to extend its influence and military presence throughout the Asia-Pacific region to win the Cold War.¹⁸⁹ Specifically, Guam and other Pacific Islands had become important to the development of American bases in the western Pacific.¹⁹⁰ According to the historian Robert F. Rogers, "the U.S. military began to build new, permanent facilities on key islands in Micronesia, primarily Kwajalein Atoll and Guam, as part of the new Pacific base network."¹⁹¹ These bases were important in upholding the U.S. government's national security policy, which is best defined as a nation's ability "...to preserve its nature,

¹⁸⁷ Owings, 263.

¹⁸⁸ The Japanese military on Guam surrendered to the U.S. military on August 10, 1944.

¹⁸⁹ For more on the U.S. military and the Cold War, see Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000) and Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004).

¹⁹⁰ In addition to Guam, places such as Hawai'i, Kwajalein Atoll, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Saipan became instrumental locations for military expansion.

¹⁹¹ Rogers, 207.

institution and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.”¹⁹² This foreign policy objective “to control its borders” applied to the United States’ territories as well. In order to implement their plan for base development, access to large tracts of land was necessary. According to the military scholar D. Colt Denfeld, “There was little concern for local landownership, local land use, or possible social and cultural dislocation. In fact, the prevailing viewpoint on the part of American military planners was that the islands had been paid for in American blood.”¹⁹³ In Guam, the occupying of privately owned land was a relatively quick process, especially since the majority of Chamorros had been displaced from their homes during the Japanese invasion in 1941 and during the combat between American and Japanese forces in 1944. The bombing of Guam resulted in the large-scale devastation of entire villages such as Hagåtña. By August 1945, the U.S. government owned approximately 75% of all privately owned land on Guam “without formal recognition.”¹⁹⁴ Technically, the U.S. military was trespassing and occupying land illegally. The largest areas of military-occupied land in the immediate postwar period included Barrigada, Sumay, Tamuning, Tiyan, and Yigo.¹⁹⁵ Parts of Barrigada became a naval radio station, while Sumay became a naval base; Tamuning, Tiyan, and Yigo were developed as airfields. The U.S. Navy had occupied these sites once they had

¹⁹² Prabhakaran Paleri, *National Security: Imperatives and Challenges* (New Dehli: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008), 45.

¹⁹³ D. Colt Denfeld, “To Be Specific, It’s Our Pacific”: Base Selection in the Pacific from World War II to the Late 1990s,” in *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. L. Eve Armentrout Ma (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2001), 54.

¹⁹⁴ L.J. Watson, “Status of Investigations of Land and Claims Commission. Proposed Issuance of T.A.D. orders to OinC to confer with Office of CNO,” August 20, 1945. RG 38, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

¹⁹⁵ The majority of the families from Sumay were moved east into the newly created village of Santa Rita. A portion of Tamuning was used as an Air Force based called Harmon Field (which was returned to the Government of Guam in 1949). The portion of land used for the naval radio towers is now referred to as Radio Barrigada, while the land at Tiyan was primarily ranch and farmland of the families who lived in the surrounding villages of Barrigada, Hagåtña, and MongMong-Toto-Maite. Furthermore, portions of Yigo became northwest field, which is now known as Andersen Air Force Base.

defeated the Japanese military. Instead of returning the lands to their respective owners, the navy continued to use these properties for military purposes. In order to resolve this and other war-related issues, the U.S. Congress passed several public laws, including the Meritorious Claim Act of 1945. Once again granted administrative authority over the island, the U.S. Navy then created the Guam Land and Claims Commission in April 1945.



Figure 2.3 The Village of Hagåtña right after U.S. military bombardment, 1944. Source: United States Marine Corps. History Division.

Guam Land and Claims Commission

The GLCC was the primary legal institution to appraise and evaluate land ownership and property boundaries. The naval governor appointed various naval officers to act as members of the commission. This authority created an inherent conflict of interest since the naval governor had the power to assign commission officials who were also naval officers. Thus, the commission officers were not civilians but U.S. naval officers who, for the most part, acted in the interest of the navy and not for the people of Guam. The GLCC had several functions along these lines. Its naval offices determined privately owned property boundaries, provided compensation for property damage and/or loss, appraised property values, and offered

settlements for injuries or deaths.¹⁹⁶ Only commission officials dictated the terms for land appraisal, evaluation, and acquisition. On January 8, 1950, for example, Chief Justice of Guam John C. Fischer issued a statement to the U.S. Department of Navy, Assistant Secretary John T. Koehler. In his memo, Fischer described how the military confiscated privately owned land:

The landowner is talked to in the presence of the Village Commissioner who often acts as interpreter for the Chamorro speaking landowner and the government land negotiator. In most cases a Guamanian official of the government also accompanies the appraiser and negotiator. The procedure for notifying the owners that their lands have been taken is to send out an appraiser and negotiator who advises the owner of the value of his land insofar as the government is concerned and offers to settle on that basis.¹⁹⁷

Chief Justice Fischer's statement reveals that some Chamorros actively aided the commission by serving as interpreters. His account also demonstrates that military officials knew that many landowners were not linguistically or educationally equipped to understand the complex legal process and protocol involved with the taking of their land, let alone construe such negotiations as outright theft.¹⁹⁸ For some, this was an intimidating and fearful experience, especially since

¹⁹⁶ Land and Claims Commission, Guam to the Chief of Naval Operations, "Scope of Program and Request for Personnel – Report on," December 18, 1945. RG 38, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

¹⁹⁷ John C. Fischer, "Statement of Chief Justice of Guam for Secretary John T. Koehler Concerning the Status and Situation of the Land Acquisition Program on Guam Insofar as the Courts are Involved," January 8, 1950. RG 38, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

¹⁹⁸ From 1900 to 1941 and from 1945 to 1950, the U.S. Navy administered all of the public schools on Guam. These schools taught Chamorros a minimal understanding of English and math. For example, the core curriculum for public schools on Guam was predicated on the teaching of the English language (students were punished if they spoke Chamorro in school), math, health/sanitation, and citizenship. Moreover, the highest level of schooling students could obtain was middle school. If they wanted to earn a high school and college degree, they had to attend school off-island. Thus, this prewar education system placed landowners at a disadvantage when interacting with commission officials. For more on Guam's prewar education system, see Pilar C. Lujan, "The Role of Education in the Preservation of the Indigenous Language of Guam," in *Kinalamten Pulitikåt: Siñenten I Chamorro/Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 17-25 and Robert A. Underwood, "American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam" (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1987).

the people of Guam had just survived colonial rule under Japan. However, the commission was not only a legal institution that evaluated boundaries and provided monetary compensation: it was the driving mechanism in the military acquisition of land on Guam.

The GLCC provided the U.S. Navy with a legal apparatus to expedite the acquisition of privately owned land. If a landowner refused to sell his or her property to the military, commission officials exercised the power of eminent domain by filing a declaration of taking with the Superior Court of Guam.¹⁹⁹ This was followed by the depositing of money at the U.S. Superior Court of Guam based on the appraised value of the land, which finalized the transfer.²⁰⁰ These officers acted with the belief and intent that landowners had no recourse in resisting the condemnation of land. GLCC senior member Louis J. Rauber stated, “The power of a sovereign to appropriate for a public use such lands as are necessary is inherent in the sovereign and cannot be questioned.”²⁰¹ The colonial power that commission officials wielded was also reified through the Hopkins Report, an academic study that further justified the taking of privately owned land.

In an attempt to better understand Chamorro frustrations with the military’s land condemnations, U.S. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal requested a civilian committee to evaluate the Naval administrations of Guam and American Sāmoa. In 1947, former President of Dartmouth College, Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins chaired the committee, whose findings became known as “the Hopkins Report.” Hopkins’ group, one of the few civilian committees to visit

¹⁹⁹ The governor of Guam and the navy had the authority to appoint the judge of the superior court until 1950.

²⁰⁰ Many Chamorros in the past and present have expressed concern over the appraisal of land in postwar Guam. Specifically, they have argued that the military frequently compensated landowners for their property based on the value of when they first occupied private lands instead of the time of when the settlements were filed. This resulted in lower settlements since the military did not take into account inflation. See Phillips, 2-16.

²⁰¹ Louis J. Rauber, “Guam Land and Claims Commission and Guam Land Transfer Board,” September 24, 1948. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

Guam, argued that the navy's land condemnation policy needed to be reformed and be more inclusive of the Chamorro people's need for land. However, the committee also supported the continued military expansion of Guam and the usurpation of privately owned land as long as such acts were based on national security.²⁰² The committee noted, "Only if such land is actually essential to the national defense should the ousting of the local residents even be considered."²⁰³ Their evaluation thus justified military land takings. The committee's findings also informed the military that this rationale could be used to condone future land condemnations. Furthermore, the findings of the report were not critical of the military or of government officials. The report stated:

In considerable number they [the Chamorros] are dispossessed of home and lands which have been destroyed or taken from them and they are without adequate understanding of the processes by which to secure replacement or compensation for these. This statement is not in disparagement of government officials stationed there who are bending every effort to bring order out of chaos, or of any government department, bureau or agency.²⁰⁴

This finding accurately problematized the land situation on Guam but failed to identify the navy as responsible for displacing families. This is significant because the committee exonerated military and government officials even though they comprised the GLCC and were the primary agents in the confiscation of land. Therefore, the Hopkins Report validated military land takings

²⁰² Military necessity refers to the idea that certain actions prohibited in times of peace are allowed during times of war. For more see, Luis Paulo Bogliolo, "Rethinking Military Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict," (Brasilia: University of Brazil, 2012), <file:///Users/alfredflores/Downloads/SSRN-id2201129.pdf> and Nobuo Hayashi, "Military Necessity as Normative Indifference," in *Georgetown Journal of International Law*, vol. 44, 2013, 675-782. <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00213000675.PDF>.

²⁰³ Ernest M. Hopkins, Maurice J. Tobin, and Knowles A. Ryerson, "Hopkins Committee Report on the Civil Governments of Guam and American Samoa," March 25, 1947. Hopkins Report, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

predicated on the idea of national security, while simultaneously excusing the government from any wrongdoing and depriving numerous Chamorros of their lands. As a result, the GLCC had displaced nearly 6,000 Chamorros from their lands by 1949.²⁰⁵




Figure 2.4 By the 1950s, the U.S. military had confiscated approximately 1/3 of the entire island, which included important farming, ranching, and water resources, circa 1950 (49,600/135,680 acres). Source: Centre for Research on Globalization.

Coercion and Fear

One of the most widely accepted claims in Guam’s colonial history is that Chamorros willingly gifted their lands to the U.S. military for being “liberated” from Japanese rule.²⁰⁶ This narrative is problematic for its portrayal of Chamorros happily surrendering their lands to the American military. As historian Anne Perez Hattori argues, “Chamorros did not dispute the need

²⁰⁵ Rogers, 216.

²⁰⁶ For more on gift culture, see Nicholas Thomas, *Islanders: The Pacific in the Age of Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) and Nicholas Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991).

for military bases. With the war experience fresh on their minds, Chamorros welcomed bases as a sign of future protection against foreign invasion. Yet, the seemingly arbitrary way in which lands were selected for condemnation and the inadequate compensation granted to dispossessed landowners stimulated Chamorro dissatisfaction both with the management of the land issue and with the hegemony exercised by the military government in general.²⁰⁷ As Hattori describes, many Chamorros gradually became upset with military land condemnations. Their frustration paralleled community discontent in other areas governed by the U.S. Navy, as in Vieques, Puerto Rico. In the post-World War II era, the navy confiscated land on both islands for use in building military installations. For Chamorros and Puerto Ricans, the loss of their lands fueled outrage. As sociologist Cesar J. Ayala and historian Jose L. Bolivar argue, “What is at stake is not whether property owners received some compensation, but the element of compulsion in the sale.”²⁰⁸ In Guam, “compulsion” meant coercion and fear, coupled with the fact that Chamorros did not have the educational, linguistic, and political means to confront these fraudulent land takings.

Many Chamorros feared U.S. military and government officials. The late Carlos P. Taitano was a former Guam Congressman and U.S. military officer who was born on Guam in 1917. Taitano recalled what it was like to live under naval governance in pre-World War II Guam. He stated, “Chamorros were afraid of the military. We were actually scared of them.”²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Hattori, 190.

²⁰⁸ Cesar J. Ayala and Jose L. Bolivar, *Battleship Vieques: Puerto Rico from World War II to the Korean War* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2011), 58.

²⁰⁹ Carlos P. Taitano, personal communication with the author, October 10, 2008, Los Angeles, CA. In 2007 and 2008, I had the opportunity to have several conversations with the late Carlos P. Taitano who frequently told me that Chamorros were afraid of the U.S. military. This was especially the sentiment amongst Chamorros who were adults during World War II. Taitano had many interactions with American officials since he was a businessman, Guam Congressional member, lawyer, and a U.S. military officer. He was also an instrumental

Taitano's comments highlight the fear that many Chamorros had of military officials. This feeling of uneasiness persisted in the postwar era. In November 1949, for example, the U.S. Sub-Committee on public lands held a hearing on Guam, addressing various political and social issues. For American sub-committee members, the idea that Chamorros feared military officials was surprising. Representative William Lemke said, "There has been intimation here on the floor and a lot of information privately given to us, that these Guamanians are afraid to oppose the Government – that they are afraid even to speak up here and give their honest convictions."²¹⁰ For Lemke and other American officials, the idea that Chamorros were afraid of the U.S. government was a foreign idea. However, for the people of Guam this was a reality. According to former Guam Senator and attorney Joaquin A. Perez, "In Guam the people had been trained by years of military occupation to respect and revere military men and other officers of the law. A request from the military was equivalent to a command, and no respectable Guamanian would think of denying anything the military asked for."²¹¹ Perez's congressional statement highlights the prevailing sentiment that Chamorros still feared American military and government officials. For Chamorros, the reality of having lived under colonial rule for three centuries influenced how they interacted with the military. This fear of authority translated into an advantage for GLCC officials when it came to land acquisition.

member of the Guam Congress walkout and was the only Chamorro present at the signing of the Organic Act of 1950.

²¹⁰ U.S. House Sub-Committee on Public Lands, November 22, 1949. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 56. Hereafter cited as U.S. House Sub-Committee, November 22, 1949.

²¹¹ Guam Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Territories of the Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. S. 1215. 11th Legislature, August 4, 1971. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam. The quotation for this record is a 1971 reference to the 1940s and 1950s.

GLCC officials utilized various strategies to coerce property owners into selling their land. Felicita Santos San Nicolas, who owned land in the village of Dededo, recalled her interaction with land and claims officials. She expressed:

Sometime later another military representative came to visit me and said that the military had reconsidered the issue and now only wanted to lease the land. This was satisfactory to me because I knew that one day I would get my land back once again and would be able to farm it for the benefit of my family. What I didn't know, however, because I couldn't read English, was that the papers I was signing were for the sale of the property. Only later did I find out the horrible mistake.²¹²

San Nicolas was not the only person tricked into selling their lands. Delfina Cruz discussed the loss of her land in the village of Agat. As Cruz stated, "He [Juan Cruz] knew the property was worth much more than \$940.00, and so he refused to sign. Then he was told that there had been some misunderstanding and that the \$940.00 was just for the rent. My husband was satisfied with this arrangement because he knew we would get our land back if it was just a lease so he signed the papers. As it turned out, the papers were for sale but my husband could not know this because he has little education and didn't understand the language in the documents. He had to take the authorities' word on faith."²¹³

The experiences of Cruz and San Nicolas revealed at least two important issues. First, commission officials did not always have interpreters present at all of their meetings with landowners. In several other federal land taking questionnaires, distributed by lawyers, some landowners mentioned that naval officials approached them without Chamorro interpreters.

²¹² Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Felicita Santos San Nicolas, April 10, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²¹³ Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Delfina Cruz, April 10, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

Second, commission officials relied on the fact that Chamorros did not have sufficient language or reading skills to understand the documents they were signing. Besides these strategies, commission officials also used other coercive measures to force Chamorros to sell their land.

In the postwar era, some Chamorros began working for the U.S. military as civilian employees or enlisted soldiers. In some instances, GLCC officials threatened to incarcerate Chamorros for not selling their lands to the military. For example, Ciriaco C. Sanchez recalled his father's negative encounter with commission officials in regards to their land in Hagåtña and Dededo, "When my father still continued to refuse, Mr. Kamminga [Chamorro commission official] threatened that my father could be court martialed. As my father was in the Navy Reserve at the time he became quite afraid because he didn't know how to protect himself and he didn't want to be thrown in jail and suffer disgrace."²¹⁴ Overwhelmed by the threat of incarceration, Sanchez's father felt that he had little choice but to agree to the settlement. Other Chamorros such as Francisco S. Santos endured a similar experience. Santos was in the navy as a Boatswain Mate. When commission officials approached him regarding his land in Barrigada, Santos recalled, "I was told that the Navy was going to condemn my land and that I should sign the papers so I could get paid. I wasn't given any alternatives...I really didn't know what do to because I was on duty at the time and really didn't feel I could disobey the Navy. I decided to sign because I was afraid of getting into trouble."²¹⁵ Like Sanchez's father, Santos also feared being punished, which played a major role in his decision to sell his land. Finally, Urelia Anderson Francisco's husband suffered a similar fate. Francisco and her husband owned land in Barrigada, claiming, "They would come out to my husband at his job at the Navy Golf course

²¹⁴ Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Ciriaco C. Sanchez, April 10, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²¹⁵ Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Francisco S. Santos, April 11, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

and take him away from his work. They threatened to take him to court and told him that the Navy could put him in jail for refusing to sell. These threats simply became too much and so my husband agreed to sign the papers for sale.”²¹⁶ Naval Governor of Guam C.A. Pownall wrote a letter that corroborates the harassment that Francisco’s husband experienced. Pownall noted, “Some of the contacts [meetings with landowners] are brief, taking only a few minutes, while others may be hours long. Most of the investigations occur during the normal working day.” He continued, “The Guamanian workers will be contacted at work or taken to other places as required by the Land and Claims Commission.”²¹⁷ Pownall’s letter, coupled with the experiences of displacement noted here, reveal the deplorable strategies and harassment that commission officials used to acquire land. Landowners who were employed or enlisted by the navy faced the threat of incarceration and the loss of wages used to provide for their families. In addition, these personal accounts also demonstrate that some Chamorros worked for the GLCC and played a role in displacing other Chamorros from their lands.

As Keith L. Camacho has argued, Chamorro collaboration with various military forces is complex because of the unknown circumstances surrounding the factors for their participation.²¹⁸ For example, it was unclear if Chamorros were coerced, hired, or volunteered to work as GLCC officials. As this chapter has discussed, military officials used coercion as a tactic to manipulate landowners. This could have been the case for those Chamorros who worked for the GLCC. In addition, the GLCC provided Chamorros with employment opportunities, which was important since many of them had turned to wage labor for subsistence. Finally, some Chamorros might

²¹⁶ Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Urelia Anderson Francisco, April 10/11, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²¹⁷ C.A. Pownall, “Availability of Guamanians for consultation and evidence,” December 28, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

²¹⁸ Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 137.

have volunteered to work as GLCC officials because they believed they could better serve their community as translators. Regardless of the factors for their participation, naval hegemony and Chamorro harassment worked in tandem to dispossess Chamorros of their lands. Thus, the experience of land loss was a deeply painful experience that recent generations of Chamorros would have to cope with.

For many landowners, the military's condemnation of their lands proved more severe than financial losses. Chamorro rights activist Ed Benavente discussed the loss of his mother's *lancho* in Tiyan. Benavente said, "My mother always talked story about the memories she had of farming and having family gatherings there. It was very emotional for her, especially when we would drive by the airport and she talked about the memories of her family's *lancho*."²¹⁹ Here, Benavente's statement illustrates the emotional connection that Chamorros have to their lands. This link was rooted in the memories of family gatherings and ancestral lineage centered on the *lancho*, a point that the Hoover Institute of Stanford University reported in 1946. Specifically, the Hoover study noted, "Stemming from ancestral tradition, land is considered one of the most important elements supporting the family structure. It is handed down from fathers to heirs with a spirit approaching a sacred trust."²²⁰ This military report, coupled with Benavente's interview, exemplify that for Chamorros, land provides the basis for survival in its relationship to ancestors, families, and culture. Thus, when the military displaced Chamorros from their lands, the military altered their reliance on it for self-subsistence and also severed their genealogical ties to clan lands and villages.

²¹⁹ Ed Benavente, oral history interview with author, May 4, 2013, Mangilao, Guam. Hereafter cited as E. Benavente interview, May 4, 2013.

²²⁰ Hoover Institute, School of Naval Administration Stanford University, "NA9 – Land Tenure in the Marianas," 1946. Land Claims – History Gov't, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

The Seeds of Discontent

By the 1960s, the U.S. military had returned 25 percent of land to their original owners or to the Government of Guam (the military still owned approximately 33 percent). However, the return of one's land did not guarantee permanent ownership. For example, Jose P. De Leon owned a home in the village of Barrigada, which the U.S. military had confiscated during the American reinvasion of Guam. In 1946, De Leon requested that the Governor of Guam return his home, which was being occupied by dependents of a naval officer.²²¹ Naval officers responded that De Leon was in his right to obtain ownership of his home. However, they also noted, "It is expected that within a few days authorization will be received for the acquisition of the land on which the house is located, it is recommended that Mr. De Leon be notified of the facts and urged not to press his claim."²²² The military's overriding authority to confiscate De Leon's land dwarfed his short-lived victory in regaining ownership of his home. Furthermore, landowners in the village of Yoña encountered a similar problem in dealing with the military.

For some Chamorros, their lands were not returned in their prewar conditions. In some cases, "fertile farmlands were returned as abandoned airfields, concrete pads, or as asphalt runways."²²³ Take, for instance, the village of Yoña, where the military returned lands to Chamorro families in 1947. A memorandum written by Director Harold Schwartz of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Fisheries described the process. He stated:

From time to time various lands have been formally released to the respective Guamanian owners, but in actuality the owners are not always free to enter on to [*sic*] those lands,

²²¹ Jose P. De Leon, "Reoccupation of privately-owned home, request for," July 29, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

²²² K.B. Salisbury, "Reoccupation of privately-owned home – request for," August 15, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

²²³ Phillips, 10.

clear them preparatory to agricultural uses, and otherwise manage those lands as their own for the reason that Government-owned buildings and other improvements, abandoned materials, etc. have not been completely removed. [There are also] thousands of tent decks, and other abandoned materials. To a limited extent, Marine personnel is continuing to salvage materials in the subject area. So long as this practice continues the native peoples are going to be hesitant to enter on their released lands and begin clearing away tent frames, old canvas, etc. for fear of inviting criticism from the cognizant military organization.²²⁴

Director Schwartz's memorandum shows that even when the U.S. military returned land to Chamorros, the military did not guarantee them access to their property. Sometimes returned property was littered with materials that obstructed agriculture and made the construction of residences difficult to complete. Schwartz's comments also corroborated the notion that some Chamorros feared confronting the military regarding land issues. Thus, the return of land did not ensure that it could be used for farming, thereby devaluing the agricultural significance of land.

Most Chamorros whose property had been confiscated preferred to exchange their lands for other pieces of property. However, most landowners were instead forced to purchase new land with the case settlements they received (which were based on commission appraisals). These transactions encouraged Chamorros to think of lands as commodities to be sold and purchased as in the case of Chamorro landowner Galo Lujan Salas. Discussing how his farm in Barrigada was confiscated, Salas asserted, "I found out that there was no way to keep the navy from taking the land, but I felt that I should at least get a comparable piece of property in exchange. As I understand it, Paulting [the attorney Salas hired] tried to negotiate for this, but he

²²⁴ Harold Schwartz, "Policy Regarding Disposition of Government-owned Property Remaining on Lands Released for Guamanian Uses," January 23, 1948. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

was told arrangements for substitute land could not be made.”²²⁵ Other Chamorros also preferred land exchanges. According to Guam Assemblyman Frank D. Perez, Chamorro landowners “would rather have another piece of land commensurate with the value of their land either in size or value, for an exchange of government land.”²²⁶ Perez’s testimony exemplifies that Chamorros in the immediate postwar years did not think of their lands as commodities to be sold. In the same hearing, attorney Frank Leon Guerrero’s comments reflected a similar sentiment, “In the Agat land cases I was the defense counsel for property owners. None of my clients wanted any monetary consideration...everybody asked for an exchange in kind.” He continued, “That is the way our people look upon the value of land.”²²⁷ While land remained an important foundation for subsistence agriculture and familial bonds, it increasingly became a commodity that could be sold or purchased. Even though fear and coercion influenced Chamorros to accept land settlements in the immediate postwar period, some land takings were egregious enough to provoke small-scale Chamorro opposition.

One of the most poignant and early examples of Chamorro opposition came as a result of the military’s attempt to make Tumon Beach into an exclusive military recreation area in the late 1940s.²²⁸ On May 10, 1948, the Guam Congress, comprised of locally elected leaders, issued a

²²⁵ Federal Land Taking Questionnaire of Galo Lujan Salas, April 10, 1974. Federal Land Taking, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²²⁶ U.S. House Sub-Committee on Public Lands, November 22, 1949, 54.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ There are several dozen military recreational areas all throughout the island. Most of these sites are located inside military bases and installations. However, Tumon Beach and Admiral Nimitz golf course were two of the earliest areas designated as recreational facilities for the military. Tumon Beach is located on the western coast of Guam. Today, it is the center of Guam’s tourist industry where the majority of the island’s department stores, hotels, and restaurants are located. The development of Guam’s tourist industry began in the late 1960s. As a result, Guam’s economy primarily relies on tourism from Japan and U.S. military spending and employment. For more on tourism in the Pacific, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

letter to the Governor of Guam that stated, “It is felt by the members of the Guam Congress that all beaches and seas of Guam should be declared public property and that all persons should have free access to any of these areas either for recreation or for fishing purposes.”²²⁹ The letter also noted, “The Guam Congress went on record in the May session as protesting the action of the military in proposing to appropriate the Tumon Bay area for their exclusive control.”²³⁰ The issue of Tumon Beach also caught the attention of white Americans who were sympathetic to social and political issues affecting Chamorros.




Figure 2.5 Tumon Beach, 1945. Source: *Life*.

Guam Echo editor Doloris Coulter wrote, “If there is any significance in the Tumon Beach story it lies in the fact that this is one of the few times when Guamanians strongly have protested an act either accomplished or contemplated by their Government.”²³¹ Coulter’s article demonstrates that Chamorros became increasingly frustrated with the military’s acquisition and use of land on Guam.²³² Another example of the military’s inconsistent practice of land taking was the

²²⁹ Simon A. Sanchez, “Resolution Adopted by the Guam Congress on 1 May 1948,” May 10, 1948. Land Taking (Federal), Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ Doloris Coulter, “Editor’s Note,” *Guam Echo*, June 30, 1948, 5.

confiscation of privately owned property for corporate use. In a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy John T. Koehler wrote that “the assertions against the government of having used land acquired by condemnation, for purposes other than public, are to some extent true...there were instances of individuals and firms entering upon and using condemned land without any formal right of occupancy.”²³³ For example, the U.S. Naval Government allowed the Commercial Corporation and Bamboo Enterprises to occupy privately owned land since they had “extensive investments in stocks and improvements.”²³⁴ This was problematic since military-condemned land was supposed to be used for national security or public good. Therefore, the corporate use of land that was acquired through eminent domain was questionable, as were the land condemnations premised on military expansion and the “liberation of land” narrative.²³⁵ However, Chamorro politicians and landowners were not the only people that the military attempted to displace.

Advocates and Allies

Non-Chamorro landowners were also subject to military land condemnations, as in the case of James Holland Underwood, a white American U.S. Marine soldier who came to Guam in

²³² In 1946, the U.S. Navy constructed a golf course in the village of Barrigada called Admiral Nimitz Golf Course. A large portion of this golf course was constructed on privately owned land for military personnel.

²³³ John T. Koehler, “Guam Land Acquisition Program,” April 18, 1950. RG 38, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD, 11.

²³⁴ *Ibid.* Most major American companies were prohibited from setting up businesses on Guam. However, this would change with the lifting the security clearance in 1962.

²³⁵ On March 5, 1949, the Guam Congress walked out of its session in protest against the naval government of Guam. Specifically, Guam Congressional members advocated for the creation of an organic act and the implementation of self-rule. For more on the Guam Congress walkout, see Doloris Coulter Cogan, *We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam’s Quest for Democracy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008) and Anne Perez Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs: Guam Congress Walkout of 1949” in *Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro/Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Hagåtña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 57-69.

the early twentieth century. His grandson Robert A. Underwood recalled, “He was a military guy who came here in 1902. His land was taken away, too. His land is still taken. Near the fuel tanks down there near Piti.”²³⁶ James Underwood’s experience illustrates that being white, a U.S. citizen, and a former marine did not exempt him from having his private lot of land taken. Other non-Chamorros such as Bernardo Delmundo Punzalan, a Filipino immigrant who owned several plots of land in Tiyan, also had his land condemned. His granddaughter Catherine Punzalan Flores McCollum remembered, “My grandfather’s properties were taken three times...He had four houses at the time...They chased him out of two houses. He also had a business and was told to move. So he moved and then he was told to move again. And then they told him to get out again. So that’s when he showed them his gun and said, ‘I’m not moving from this place, you guys move or I will shoot you where you stand.’”²³⁷ Even though Bernardo Punzalan was able to keep the last portion of his property, he still lost the majority of his land to military condemnation.²³⁸ Underwood’s and Punzalan’s experiences underscore that the military’s condemnation of land was predicated on the idea of “military necessity,” which also marginalized non-Chamorro landowners, thus linking them to Chamorros who were also displaced from their lands. Besides Underwood and Punzalan, other non-Chamorros also became involved in challenging the military.

²³⁶ Robert A. Underwood, oral history interview with the author, April 22, 2013, Mangilao, Guam. Here after cited as R. Underwood interview, April 22, 2013. Robert Underwood is the current president of the University of Guam. From 1993 to 2003, he served as Guam Delegate to the U.S. Congress and sat on several congressional committees. The village of Piti is located on the western coast of Guam, near U.S. Naval Base Guam.

²³⁷ Catherine Punzalan Flores McCollum, oral history interview with the author, May 7, 2013, Hagåtña, Guam. Here after cited as C. McCollum interview, May 7, 2013.

²³⁸ Evidence regarding how much land the military has paid for or simply acquired for free is unclear due to the scant documents that exist. This is especially the case for land that the military acquired for free since they simply occupied it during World War II and never returned it.

The most well known critic of the U.S. military in Guam was John Collier, who was the former Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (1933-1945). In 1945, he and Guam anthropologist Laura M. Thompson (Collier's wife from 1943 to 1955) founded the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, which was a non-profit organization committed to finding solutions to problems "between white and colored races, cultural minority groups, and dependent peoples at home and abroad."²³⁹ Collier also openly criticized the U.S. military's mismanagement of land on Guam. In 1946, he noted, "The fact revelatory of Navy misrule on Guam are [*sic*] derived directly and currently from Guamanians who know their own situation and from recently demobilized naval officer personnel and not from a few of these but from many."²⁴⁰ His statement illustrates that naval misrule was rampant and that many people, both Americans and Chamorros alike, could attest to the negative circumstances confronting the people and the island. Then, in 1947, with the help of journalist Doloris Coulter, Collier and Thompson founded the newsletter, *The Guam Echo*, which reported on issues related to Chamorro political self-determination, Guam's economic development, and U.S. military land confiscation.

While marginal in its circulation, *The Guam Echo* presented counter-narratives to the military's and media's portrayal of modernization and humanitarianism. For example, in 1947, Doloris Coulter wrote an article based on Chamorro reports of naval misrule. Coulter reported, "The people of Guam are sick and tired of being wards under the thumb of the United States Navy... The 80th Congress will meet this month to find the 23,000 'nationals' of this island in the

²³⁹ Shannon J. Murphy, "Institute of Ethnic Affairs," in *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/institute-of-ethnic-affairs/>. Thompson was the first American anthropologist to study pre-WWII Guam and was author of *Guam and It's People* (1941). Not only were Collier and Thompson members of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, they were also contributors to *The Guam Echo* and spent much of their time in the postwar years lobbying for Chamorros to be given U.S. citizenship. Collier and Thompson would eventually divorce. Collier then remarried in 1957 to Grace E. Volk. For more on Laura M. Thompson see, Rebecca A. Stephenson, "Laura Thompson," in *Guampedia*, <http://www.guampedia.com/laura-thompson/>.

²⁴⁰ John Collier, "Guam Citizens," *The Washington Post*, December 4, 1946, 6.

Pacific ready to fight for citizenship and an organic act.”²⁴¹ Within the first few months, nearly fifty Chamorros who had become frustrated with the military’s governance of Guam signed up to support the Institute of Ethnic Affairs through their paid memberships and in the reporting of information to *The Guam Echo*. Before Collier became an advocate for Chamorros, he was most known for creating the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.²⁴² However, his actions and speeches in regard to Japanese Americans and American Indians in the continental United States expose a contradiction in his political views of indigenous and immigrant people. On one hand, Collier supported the U.S. naturalization of Chamorros but on the other hand, he had condoned the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II.²⁴³ Moreover, Collier’s involvement in working with both Chamorros and Native Americans reveals that these indigenous people were linked through federal policy. Other Americans who preferred to remain anonymous were also critical of the U.S. military’s management of land. A journalist for *The New York Times* wrote, “Six months after the end of the war in the Pacific, the people of Guam are living in squalor. They are discouraged even from raising temporary shelters on land they own because the Navy may need that area later for military installations.”²⁴⁴ Stateside Americans such as Collier, Coulter, and Thompson played an important role in trying to educate the American

²⁴¹ Doloris Coulter Cogan, *We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam’s Quest for Democracy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 61.

²⁴² The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) is also known as the Indian New Deal or the Wheeler-Howard Act. In theory, this policy gave authority back to American Indian tribes to govern their remaining lands. However, the act did not return or compensate them for the land that had been taken and settled. The ultimate goal of the IRA was to reverse the Dawes Act of 1884, which was an assimilative policy that divided tribal lands into individual parcels. It also gave corporations access to plots of land that the U.S. government deemed as excess.

²⁴³ For more on John Collier’s life and experiences as a U.S. government official, see Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) and John Collier, *From Every Zenith: A Memoir; and Some Essays on Life and Thought* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Books, 1963).

²⁴⁴ “Forgotten Guam,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1946, 23.

public about the social and political conditions of the island. Their writings were a part of a liberal discourse that believed U.S. citizenship would resolve the economic and political issues that plagued Guam and its people. In actuality, the continued condemning of property, the growing practice in the commodification of land, and the increasing reliance on wage labor altered how some Chamorros perceived the cultural, economic, and political value of private military properties and of the *lancho* system more generally.

Conclusion

By the early 1950s, Chamorros had turned to wage labor as the primary form of subsistence. As anthropologist Laura Thompson observed, “No Guamanian is forced to take a job but since much privately owned land has been condemned, for most natives there is no alternative.”²⁴⁵ For the residents of Guam, the U.S. military and its contractors became the largest employer on the island. This was a consequence of the U.S. military’s security clearance program that required the approval of the navy for the migration of all people to and from the island.²⁴⁶ This program also allowed naval officials to dictate which companies could open industries and stores on the island. For example, U.S. Naval Commander of the Marianas G.D. Murray noted, “Military control of these islands is essential as their military value far outweigh[s] their economic value. The economic development and administration of relatively few native inhabitants *should be subordinate* to the real purpose for which these islands are held [emphasis added].”²⁴⁷ Murray’s comments underscore the military officials’ lack of concern for

²⁴⁵ Thompson, 161.

²⁴⁶ In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed Executive Order 8683, which established Guam as a defensive sea area and airspace reservation. This law mandated that all people obtain permission from the U.S. Navy to travel to and from Guam. This security clearance program was not lifted until 1962.

²⁴⁷ G.D. Murray, “Administration of Guam and other Pacific Islands,” November 21, 1945.

developing the economy of Guam. By 1946, the U.S. military employed 4,791 full-time workers, and another 1,382 part-time school children out of a total population of 23,136 people.²⁴⁸ Men primarily held blue-collar worker positions such as carpenters, construction workers, mechanics, painters, and stevedores. In addition, women were included in the formal economy. They often labored as clerks, secretaries, and telephone operators.²⁴⁹ In 1950, the establishment of the Government of Guam (GovGuam) also increased the demand for civilian workers. The military and its contractors preferred to hire Filipinos because they could pay them less since they were not U.S. citizens. This forced many Chamorros to find jobs outside of the U.S. military. Unlike the military and its contractors, the leadership of the Government of Guam was comprised primarily of Chamorros, who were willing to hire other local island residents. Thus, the Government of Guam became the largest employer of Chamorros since the civil sector was the only place that Chamorros could control hiring preferences. Even though military and government employment provided wages for Chamorro men and women, they were still subjected to an imperial system that racialized and marginalized them as laborers.

A hierarchical wage system based on race and citizenship especially privileged white American workers over Chamorros and other non-American laborers. For example, in 1947, a Chamorro mechanic on Guam earned 43 cents per hour, while an American mechanic on Guam earned \$1.72 per hour.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, Chinese, Filipino, and Pacific Islanders were paid even less than Chamorros since they were not U.S. citizens or nationals. This discrepancy in pay illuminates that even though the military was a source of employment for Chamorros and others,

²⁴⁸ Thompson, 161. The population statistic was taken from Carano and Sanchez, 324.

²⁴⁹ Rogers, 202.

²⁵⁰ Thompson, 162.

it still exploited them as imperial subjects. This wage system was inequitable and problematic because Chamorros who had become U.S. citizens in 1950 were supposed to have been protected under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. As a federal law, the Act established a 44-hour, seven-day workweek and guaranteed minimum wage and overtime. The fight to secure these and other labor rights persisted until the late 1950s, a topic discussed in subsequent chapters. As Chamorro reliance on wage labor increased, the need for farming subsequently decreased. As a result, farming was no longer the primary mode of subsistence. This change from an agrarian society to a community dependent upon wage labor expanded from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. Ultimately, the rise of a wage economy therefore merged with the acquisition of land for corporate, recreational, and security purposes.

Indeed, the history of military land condemnation on Guam reveals how empire has altered Chamorro land stewardship. Under the Spanish regime, Chamorro communal land ownership devolved into plots of private family land. The United States' prewar occupation allowed for Chamorros to continue the practice of farming as the primary source of subsistence, but also marked the early beginnings of large-scale military land taking. The most significant event in the changing of land stewardship was World War II and the postwar era. The massive condemnation of land and the transition from an economy based on farming to wage labor provided the basis for the wide scale commodification of land. Moreover, the military's access to large plots of land resulted in the creation of Guam's postwar multiracial society through the recruitment of workers from the Philippines and the continental United States. Other long lasting ramifications for Guam include the lifting of the security clearance program in 1962. Thereafter, the continued large-scale occupation of privately owned land ushered in an era of rapid tourism growth and suburbanization. Even though some Chamorros adopted the principle

of land as a commodity, many aspects of Chamorro land stewardship persisted. For example, Chamorros continue to rely on the land as a point of reference for genealogical and ancestral lineage. Furthermore, Chamorros with *lanchos* still utilize their lands to host family gatherings and to grow fruits and vegetables to provide a minor supplement to their wage labor. Yet the military seizure of land in Guam, an often unlawful and coercive process begun in 1944, remains a contentious issue.

CHAPTER THREE

The Civilian Military Workers of Guam

Introduction

The story of Filipino workers in Guam is part of a larger legacy of Filipino laborers in the Pacific. Most notably, they were recruited to Hawai‘i as plantation workers during the early twentieth century.²⁵¹ However, as Vicente M. Diaz has discussed, due to the ties forged through Spanish colonialism, Filipinos have been migrating to Guam since the seventeenth century. By the early twentieth century, Guam became a destination for Filipino political prisoners of the Philippine-American War.²⁵² Up until World War II, this was the primary context in which Filipinos were perceived as racial minorities on the island. As historian T. Fujitani has argued, World War II marked a significant shift in the experiences of racial minorities and colonial subjects living under U.S. governance.²⁵³ The postwar arrival of Filipinos to Guam likewise marked an important pivot point in how Filipino men came to be viewed as civilian laborers in the construction of military buildings, installations, and roads. By the late 1940s, approximately 28,000 Filipinos and 7,000 white Americans had migrated to Guam to serve as civilian military workers.²⁵⁴ In contrast, Chamorros, Northeast Asians, and other Pacific Islanders also worked as

²⁵¹ For more on Filipino plantation laborers in Hawai‘i, see JoAnna Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire: Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in Hawai‘i* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) and Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983).

²⁵² For more on the Filipinos of Guam see Vicente M. Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations Between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream,” *ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3 no. 1 (1995): 147-160 and Bruce L. Campbell, “The Filipino Community of Guam, 1945-1975” (Master’s thesis, University of Hawai‘i, 1987).

²⁵³ T. Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 25.

²⁵⁴ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995), 217-218.

civilian military laborers, but they were fewer in number. For example, the military and its contractors only employed 5,831 Chamorros even though they constituted approximately half of the entire island's population of 59,498 people in 1950.²⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the experiences of these workers differed from one another based on their racial and national backgrounds.

This chapter examines the working and social lives of civilian military laborers in post-World War II Guam. The military's contractor system allowed for various construction corporations to set up company camps where they administered the working and social lives of their laborers. The recruitment of several thousand workers resulted in the creation of Guam's multiracial society. From this mass immigration, a Filipino labor class emerged that became synonymous with military employment. Moreover, this process was predicated on the military's racial perceptions of Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans within the context of the Cold War. First, I explore the racial discourse on civilian military labor and trace the connections that linked Guam, the Philippines, and the United States under a transnational military industrial complex. Second, I focus on the immigration, work, and social experiences of Filipino and white American laborers. Third, I chart the rise of Filipino discontent as it relates to the proposed Guam Wage bill of 1956. Ultimately, issues such as access to employment, the creation of a hierarchical wage scale, an unequal immigration policy, and the segregation of company camps helped create the island's postwar civilian military labor class.

Searching for Civilian Military Workers

²⁵⁵ Pacificweb.org, http://www.pacificweb.org/DOCS/guam/NewUploads_11_07/Guam%201950.pdf, Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966, 329, Vicente M. Diaz, "'Fight Boys, til the Last...': Islandstyle Football and the Remasculinization of Indigeneity in the Militarized American Pacific Islands" in *Pacific Diaspora: Island Peoples in the United States and Across the Pacific*, eds. Paul Spickard, Joanne L. Rondilla, and Debbie Hippolite Wright (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 175, and Rogers, 217. The Chamorro population on Guam was 22,177 in 1940; 27,124 in 1950; 34,762 in 1960; 59,860 in 2015.

During World War II, the U.S. military relied on the U.S. Construction Battalion (also known as CBs or Seabees) to provide the bulk of the labor needed to build installations used in the retaking of Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific. These men, who were primarily white Americans, were viewed as the most reliable military construction workers who created airstrips and roads in Guam, Midway, Okinawa, Palau, the Philippines, Saipan, and Tinian.²⁵⁶ The reinvasion of the Pacific was also facilitated via massive bombing raids that weakened Japanese forces. However, military bombardment resulted in the death of many native people and destroyed buildings, farms, and villages throughout the Pacific.²⁵⁷ On Guam, Seabees built the island's main highway, Marine Drive, as well as developing the airstrips at Tiyan and Orote Point in 1944.²⁵⁸



Figure 3.1 Orote Peninsula and Airfield, circa 1945. Source: University of Guam, Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center.

²⁵⁶ For more on this history of U.S. Seabee operations in the Pacific during World War II, see D. Harry Hammer, *Lion Six* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1947).

²⁵⁷ For more on the Micronesian experience during World War II, see Suzanne Falgout, Lin Poyer, and Laurence M. Carucci, *Memories of War: Micronesians in the Pacific War* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).

²⁵⁸ Falgout, Poyer, and Carucci, 189 and 197. Initially, Chamorros were forced to clear these fields under Japanese occupation during World War II. The Japanese military used them as airfields during World War II until the U.S. military recaptured the island and had the airfields paved.

In turn, these airstrips and roads were used for the transportation of military vehicles for the U.S. war effort. While the recruitment of several thousand Seabees to Guam aided military expansion, the U.S. military also considered using Chamorros as a source of labor.

Military officials believed Chamorro men were unproductive and inefficient workers, even though they did use some Chamorros for unskilled work. Naval officials believed that Chamorros were slow workers, who were not willing to take initiative in the completion of work related tasks.²⁵⁹ This belief that Chamorros were unproductive and not proactive was reinforced with the argument that they did not have the “background and the education necessary for training in the skilled trades.”²⁶⁰ However, if Chamorros lacked the “characteristics” and “skills” necessary for skilled labor, this was not due to their being lazy or incompetent. The primary reason that Chamorros did not have training for skilled work was the colonial education they received up until the 1950s. Beginning in the early 1900s, Chamorros were subjected to a colonial education curriculum that stressed elementary English language, health and sanitation, citizenship training, and vocational training in unskilled work.²⁶¹ In addition, the majority of Chamorro men in the prewar period were farmers, while only a few Chamorro men held unskilled civilian military jobs or had employment with companies such as Commercial Pacific Cable and the Pan American Hotel. Therefore, most men were never given the opportunity to obtain the training necessary to be electricians, engineers, mechanics, and other skilled workers. As for Chamorro women, statistics for their employment are scant. It appears that they were

²⁵⁹ Office of Naval Intelligence, “Strategic Study of Guam ONI-99,” February 1, 1944. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam, 288.

²⁶⁰ Victor F. Bleasdale, “Monthly Report,” March 1, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

²⁶¹ For more on pre-World War II U.S. colonial education on Guam, see Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: U.S. Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* and Robert Anacletus Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1987).

only hired as nurses, secretaries and other office support staff positions, which also made them subservient to military officials.²⁶² Finally, most Chamorros were still struggling to survive and reunite with family members who had been scattered throughout the island due to the U.S. military's bombardment. Even though Chamorros were perceived as an unviable source of labor, other Pacific Islanders throughout Micronesia were also considered as potential sources for civilian military labor.

In this regard, the military weighed the possibility of recruiting other Micronesians such as Carolinians, but their perceptions of them as workers were similarly negative to those of Chamorros. According to historian David Hanlon, military officials argued that "they [Micronesians] worked in groups rather than as individuals, and with the line between work and play often obscured. Nonetheless, against American expectations of work, they looked lazy, unenterprising, improvident, and both unable and unwilling to work at regular, sustained labor."²⁶³ Military officials only actively recruited Micronesians as "houseboys, cooks, and laundresses" for individual units and officers.²⁶⁴ This racially based idea that Micronesians were only worth hiring as house servants mirrored the experiences of Filipino and Mexican laborers who worked for the U.S. military and for service industries in the continental United States.²⁶⁵

²⁶² For more on the making of Chamorro nurses, see Christine T. DeLisle, "'Tumuge' Pāpa' (Writing it Down): Chamorro Midwives and the Delivery of Native History." *Pacific Studies* 30 no. 1/2 (2007) and Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: U.S. Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004).

²⁶³ David Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 41. For more on western and indigenous notions of time, see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of CA Press, 2005) and Vine Deloria, Jr., *God is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden: Fulcrum Publishing, 1992).

²⁶⁴ "Domestics – Employment of," September 4, 1944. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

²⁶⁵ On Filipino house servants, see Yen Le Espiritu, *Home Bound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and Countries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). On Mexican servants, see Kevin Adams, *Class and Race in the Frontier Army: Military Life in the West, 1870-1890* (Norman: University of

The relegating of Micronesians to unskilled servant labor reinforced the perceptions of Micronesians (and by extension Chamorros) as a poor labor source. In addition, since the U.S. military believed that Pacific Islanders were not amenable to labor discipline, they turned to a group of workers they could better control.

The U.S. military also utilized Japanese prisoners of war (POW) to augment Seabee labor. Even though there were only 1,250 Japanese POWs on Guam (in comparison to the several thousand Seabees), they did constitute a source of cheap labor that the military sought to exploit.²⁶⁶ According to military reports, Japanese POWs were supposed to work ten hours per day and on projects that were considered essential such as “road building, camp maintenance, carpenter work, sanitation, and labor details.”²⁶⁷ However, they were also utilized for unskilled work. In November 1945, Commanding Officer D.D. Gurley requested that 30 Japanese POWs be assigned to work on a “beautification” project that would involve “planting palms, shrubs, and flowers” at Naval Air Station, Hagåtña.²⁶⁸ Essentially, Japanese POWs were forced to do unskilled labor that did not require formal training. Moreover, it was reported that Japanese POW laborers were in “excellent condition.”²⁶⁹ According to military officials, “many of them prefer[red] to remain prisoners there [on Guam] and draw their \$0.80 daily pay than be repatriated.”²⁷⁰ While it is questionable if Japanese POWs preferred to remain on Guam,

Oklahoma Press, 2009) and Mario T. Garcia, *Desert Immigrants: The Mexicans of El Paso, 1880-1920* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

²⁶⁶ Rogers, 194.

²⁶⁷ J.M. Arthur, “Memorandum: Prisoner of war labor, availability of,” September 11, 1945. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

²⁶⁸ D.D. Gurley, “POW labor – Request for,” November 3, 1945. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

²⁶⁹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, “Many Japs on Guam are still in Hiding,” February 18, 1946. Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

military reports show that Chamorros and other Pacific Islanders were deemed incompetent and unsusceptible to labor discipline. For this reason, Japanese POWs continued to be a temporary source of labor until they were repatriated at the end of World War II, forcing the military to find another group of workers to recruit.

By 1946, the U.S. military had already begun contemplating how it could supplant Seabee and Japanese POW labor. The island commander of Guam, L.D. Herrle suggested that the U.S. military recruit Chinese workers, who they viewed as “better workers than Filipinos, Polynesians,” and other people from the Asia Pacific region.²⁷¹ They also believed that Chinese workers were more amenable to labor camp discipline and were less likely to mingle with Chamorros.²⁷² Herrle’s recommendations demonstrated that the military sought workers who they believed were reliable, but most importantly who were susceptible to labor discipline. The power to control workers was the common thread that linked Seabees, Japanese POWs, and the potential hiring of Chinese workers. Chamorros and other Micronesians were not vulnerable to deportation because they already lived on Guam or resided in nearby islands across Micronesia. Thus, the military considered Chinese and other non-U.S. citizens and nationals because they could be easily deported if they did not adhere to U.S. military labor policy. Furthermore, Herrle and other people reflected the views of Leland Stanford and the Big Four merchants in hiring

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ L.D. Herrle, “Augmentation of native labor on Guam for employment by the navy,” March 4, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. While there are no records that document if Chamorros were able to negotiate that the Chinese workers be deported, it can be inferred that some of them did support this policy since several Chamorro politicians backed the U.S. military’s “local hire and alien displacement program,” which began in 1957. In theory, the military was supposed to make a concerted effort to hire local workers. Chamorros and military officials believed this program would phase out the hiring of Filipinos. However, this would not be the case, especially with the recruitment of several thousand Filipinos to help in the rehabilitation of the island due to sever damage wrought by Typhoon Karen in 1962.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

Chinese men to construct the transcontinental railroad.²⁷³ According to Cletus E. Daniel, American perceptions that the Chinese were “docile, industrious, trustworthy, and reliable” derived from the nineteenth century discourse on Chinese laborers in the continental United States.²⁷⁴ Herrle also claimed that Chamorros supported the temporary recruitment of Chinese workers so long as they were eventually deported.²⁷⁵ However, it is unclear which specific “Guamanians” were consulted. Lastly, Herrle believed that the cultural differences between the Chinese workers and the Chamorros would deter these two groups from mingling. Yet the permanent settlement of Chinese men on Guam posed a paradoxical concern since they could gain residency by marrying Chamorro women or by living on Guam for a period of three continuous years. Finding workers who they believed would not threaten their expansion project and would not intermingle with Chamorros thus proved to be a difficult endeavor for military officials. However, as with the Chamorros and Carolinians before them, the recruitment of thousands of Chinese workers did not occur. This was partly due to the fact that the Communist sentiment was growing in China during the late 1940s, which fostered political tensions between China and the United States. Given the U.S. military’s preference for privately contracted construction companies in the Philippines and elsewhere, the U.S. military eventually disregarded the “Chinese laborer” option and instead hired Filipinos and white Americans as the primary sources of civilian military labor.

²⁷³ On the perceptions of Chinese workers in the nineteenth century, see Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991), Alexander Saxton, *Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), and Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1998).

²⁷⁴ Cletus E. Daniel, *Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers, 1870-1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 27.

²⁷⁵ Herrle, March 4, 1946.

U.S. Empire and the Military Industrial Complex

According to historian Michael H. Hunt, the U.S. military industrial complex combines “a large standing military, substantial and sustained military spending, and an increasingly active research program.”²⁷⁶ The military industrial complex also requires the mobilization of workers and companies internationally to carry out the construction of military bases and installations necessary for military expansion.²⁷⁷ In the case of Guam, the U.S. government’s preexisting connections to contractors in the Republic of the Philippines and the continental United States provided the pretext for recruiting Filipinos and white Americans to Guam. In turn, this recruitment system set up an exploitive structure that linked Filipinos to the U.S. military.

The recruitment of Filipinos to work on Guam was predicated on a labor agreement made between the Philippines and the United States in 1947.²⁷⁸ Initially, the U.S. government wanted Filipinos to help in the repatriation of American soldiers who had died in World War II and to serve as mess hall stewards for the U.S. military.²⁷⁹ After 1947, the U.S. military used this labor contract as the precedent to recruit Filipinos as civilian construction workers. In addition, this pact set the wages and privileges these workers were supposed to receive, which some military contractors used as their standards. The terms of their compensation included 15 centavos per

²⁷⁶ Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 132.

²⁷⁷ For more on U.S. military installations and bases that have relied on the use of international workers and companies, see Julie Greene, *The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), David Vine, *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Catherine A. Lutz, *Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), and Katherine T. McCaffrey, *Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).

²⁷⁸ This 1947 labor agreement is more commonly referred to as an “exchange of notes,” which was a legal document that the Philippines and United States used to ratify their labor arrangement.

²⁷⁹ Republic of the Philippines, “Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America,” May 1947. Department of Foreign Affairs Archives. Here after cited as “Exchange of Notes.”

hour, plus a 25 percent overseas pay differential, free laundry services, free medical and dental care, guaranteed transportation to and from point of hire, pay while in travel, compensation for service connected to injury or death, overtime pay, and holiday pay.²⁸⁰ While these terms might have seemed generous to Filipinos, the power in this agreement was vested in the contractors and the U.S. military. For example, some contractors saved money by paying their workers in Philippine pesos, instead of U.S. dollars. This allowed corporations to obtain higher profits since the exchange rate was one dollar to two pesos in 1950.²⁸¹ Moreover, the length of their employment was listed at one year and renewable up to three years maximum. This limit on employment was intended to ensure that Filipinos could not apply for permanent residency since people who lived on Guam for three years could legally petition for permanent residency. Furthermore, companies did not always adhere to this agreement. This resulted in numerous cases of workers who did not receive all of their contractual privileges. One of the largest military contractors on Guam, Luzon Stevedoring (LUSTEVECO), played a vital role in connecting these and other labor matters between the Philippines and the United States.²⁸²

LUSTEVECO's acquisition of U.S. military contracts stemmed from a historical legacy of American colonial interests in the Pacific. This relationship between LUSTEVECO and the U.S. military dated back to the Spanish-American War of 1898. Specifically, LUSTEVECO was founded by U.S. veterans of the Spanish-American War and became one of the leading cargo

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Information regarding the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the Philippine Peso is scant. However, based on current exchange rates, 15 centavos is lower than 1 cent.

²⁸¹ COMNAVMARIANAS, "Filipinos on Guam," January 1956. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

²⁸² In the mid-1950s, Marianas Stevedoring (MASDELCO) became a subsidiary company of LUSTEVECO on Guam. Thus, some people on Guam refer to the company as Luzon Stevedoring or Marianas Stevedoring/MASDELCO.

transportation companies in Southeast Asia.²⁸³ After World War II, the company came under the ownership of Americans Edward M. Grimm and Charles Parsons, himself a World War II veteran. By 1947, LUSTEVECO became one of the largest military contractors on Guam.²⁸⁴ The navy needed LUSTEVECO to provide cargo transportation and construction work for naval projects. LUSTEVECO primarily recruited Filipino men for skilled and unskilled work. Since the company was based in the Philippines, their reliance on Filipino workers was already established, while a small number of white Americans such as Donald Marshall, primarily held supervisory and managerial positions. Moreover, LUSTEVECO relied on the Philippine Consolidated Labor Union (PCLU) to assist them in recruiting Filipinos.²⁸⁵ When the time had come for LUSTEVECO to recruit workers for Guam, mobilizing a large labor pool was a relatively easy task given its history of stevedoring and its connection with the PCLU. In contrast to LUSTEVECO, Brown-Pacific-Maxon (BPM) was based in the continental United States. While LUSTEVECO's connection to the Philippines was already established before World War II, BPM secured its link to the Philippines after World War II.

BPM also had connections to the U.S. government that dated back to the early twentieth century. Based in Texas, BPM was a combination of M.S. Kellogg Company (1901) and the Brown and Root Company (1914). In the late 1940s, these two companies formed a conglomerate known as BPM to conduct engineering and construction work in the Pacific.²⁸⁶ By

²⁸³ *Time*, "Philippines: Barging Ahead," August 25, 1967.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841076,00.html>, May 2, 2014.

²⁸⁴ Other military contractors included Guam Dredging Company, J.H. Pomery Company, Pacific Islands Engineers, Perez Brothers, and the Vinnell Corporation.

²⁸⁵ *The Manila Times*, "Filipino Employe[e]s of US Navy at Guam Contented, Says Union Chief," February 6, 1947. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

²⁸⁶ Morris W. Kellogg founded the M.W. Kellogg Company in 1901. By the early 1920s, it had become one of the nation's leading engineering firms with specializations in chemicals, refining, and technology. This

the late 1940s, BPM started to recruit workers from the Philippines and the United States. On Guam, BPM received contracts from the U.S. Air Force. But unlike LUSTEVECO, BPM's worker pool was comprised of both Filipinos and white Americans, with the latter coming from the southern United States. Hired as skilled workers, white Americans labored before and during World War II for BPM's federal projects, such as the constructing of Corpus Christi Naval Air Station in Texas (1940) and the development of 359 U.S. naval ships (1941).²⁸⁷ On the other hand, BPM hired Filipinos to work mainly as unskilled labor. Thus, BPM's hiring preference differed from that of LUSTEVECO, which openly recruited skilled Filipino workers. These uneven hiring practices informed Guam's labor and racial hierarchy in the 1940s and 1950s, and lasted until the 1980s.²⁸⁸

Following a racial order of white supremacy, BPM appropriated the structures of the Jim Crow South in its assignment of occupations and in its segregation of company camps in Guam.²⁸⁹ For example, Eugene Morgan came to Guam in the early 1950s as a civilian military worker. He recalled that there was a "heavy quota" for white workers from Texas and Oklahoma since BPM was located in Texas.²⁹⁰ In 1954, Guam Senator James T. Sablan shared a similar

resulted in the acquisition of several federal and state government contracts included ties to the Manhattan Project of World War II. Dan Root and Herman Brown founded the Brown and Root Company in 1914. This company was based out of Texas and won several state and federal contracts. By the early 1940s, it had become a known for constructing dams, pipelines, and roads. This engineering company is now more popularly recognized by the name Kellogg, Brown, and Root. For more on the M.W. Kellogg Company, see KBR, "History of KBR," <http://www.kbr.com/About/History/>, May 19, 2014, and Texas State Historical Association, "Brown, Herman," <https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fbr86>, May 19, 2014.

²⁸⁷ "History of KBR," <http://www.kbr.com/about/history/>, May 19, 2014.

²⁸⁸ These uneven hiring practices continued until the 1980s, which resulted in several investigations of private construction companies on Guam for their preference to hire H-2 workers over local workers on the island.

²⁸⁹ Even though racially segregated schools and hospitals existed in pre-World War II Guam, this was one of the earliest moments in which a large private company such as BPM was permitted to perpetuate racial segregation on the island.

²⁹⁰ Eugene Morgan, *So You Want to Go to Guam* (New York: Vantage Press Inc., 1951), 84.

sentiment during a Guam Congressional hearing. As Sablan argued, “The BPM construction company is a company somewhat owned or controlled by Southerners and they do not want to hire people other than Caucasians and the reason why they have Filipinos is because they give them a slave or low salary. Now as proof of that I don’t think there is a single Negro in that unit.”²⁹¹ Even though other Chamorros did not make official statements regarding BPM’s hiring practices, Morgan’s observations and Sablan’s testimony, nonetheless, highlighted BPM’s racist southern roots as evidenced in the company’s preference in hiring primarily Filipinos and white Americans. Consequently, BPM and LUSTEVECO rarely hired Chamorros and other “lazy” Pacific Islanders. With their ties to the colonial Philippines, the U.S. military, and the Jim Crow South, BPM and LUSTEVECO facilitated the largest in-migration of Filipino civilian military workers to Guam.

Coming to Guam

The first postwar wave of Filipinos arrived on Guam in 1947 as workers for LUSTEVECO. They came primarily from the province of Iloilo in the Visayas.²⁹² The majority of these laborers were men who were willing to immigrate to Guam for employment opportunities. During this period, the Philippines was in a state of economic and political instability due to aftermath of World War II and the rising tensions around the issues of labor organizing and communism.²⁹³ By the late 1940s, BPM also began to recruit Filipino workers to

²⁹¹ U.S. House Sub-Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, December 1, 1954. VF 2nd GL Public Hearing, Vertical File. Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

²⁹² Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home: Camp Roxas and Filipino American History in Guam* (Hagåtña: GHC, 2009), 4.

²⁹³ Jorge V. Sibal, ed., *Changes and Challenges: 60 Years of Struggles Towards Decent Work* (Diliman, University of the Philippines), 2. For more on the economic and labor organizing of Iloilo, see Henry Florida, *Iloilo in the 20th Century: An Economic History* (Iloilo City: University of the Philippines, 1997), 78.

Guam. Although it is unclear exactly as to why BPM recruited Filipinos, it can be hypothesized that it was due to the fact that LUSTEVECO had set the precedent of hiring Filipinos a few years before, an effort endorsed by the U.S. military. This was especially important since the U.S. Navy had implemented a security clearance that required all people traveling to and from Guam to receive permission from the naval commander.²⁹⁴ In order to hire Filipinos, BPM was permitted to set up a recruiting station at Clark Air Force Base, located in Angeles City, Philippines.²⁹⁵ According to former BPM labor recruiter Gorgonio Cabot:

It [the recruitment of Filipinos] was well established already when I joined them. They already had plenty of publications. It was advertised and we continued to advertise about qualified people who were willing to work in Guam. They write, write, write. They could only write, but they [labor applicants] could not come in because we were in Clark Air Force Base. They had to write a letter, addressed to me with the positions they were applying for. We give them a test. Laborers very easy, there's a fifty-pound bag there, carry it. But carpenters need to know how to read the measurer, and know how to cut wood and carry fifty-pound bag too. You had to have a clean bill of health because the Philippines was full of tuberculosis.²⁹⁶

Cabot's statement reveals that the U.S. Air Force aided BPM's recruitment of Filipino workers by permitting the company to utilize Clark Air Force Base as their recruitment center for interviewing and evaluating potential laborers. The air force's relationship with BPM was

²⁹⁴ From the late 1940s to 1962, the island of Guam was under a security clearance program that required all people coming to obtain permission from naval command to enter or leave Guam. This program lasted until 1962.

²⁹⁵ On Clark Air Force Base, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

²⁹⁶ Gorgonio Cabot, interview with author, April 22, 2013. Here after cited as G. Cabot interview, April 22, 2013.

similar to the U.S. military's relationship with its contractors in Guantánamo Bay. In Cuba, the military also relied on its close ties to contractors to recruit local workers. Historian Jana K. Lipman refers to this overlap as the “blurring line between government and private employer” in which the U.S. military engaged communities in U.S. bases such as Guantánamo Bay.²⁹⁷ Cabot's interview also indicates that the recruitment of unskilled laborers was based on the simple criteria of physical strength and good health. Potential workers came from all over Luzon in the hopes of securing employment. However, before any workers could come to Guam, they had to pass a number of strict medical requirements.

All civilian military workers were forced to complete various medical tests which, depending on race and nationality/region, made it easier or more difficult for them to enter Guam. They had to provide certification that they were free from “tuberculosis, chronic malaria, amoebic dysentery, venereal disease, and communicable or infectious diseases.”²⁹⁸ Each employee also had to provide documentation that they had been vaccinated against smallpox and received inoculations against typhoid fever and tetanus.²⁹⁹ The few Chinese laborers who came to Guam from China were also subjected to a battery of health inspection requirements that included isolation for a period of fourteen days.³⁰⁰ Other migrant workers from Hawai‘i and the continental United States also had to pass medical requirements (such as being free from small pox and venereal diseases), but they were not as rigorous as the health inspections endured by Filipinos. According to historian Catherine Choy, American perceptions of Filipinos as “weak,

²⁹⁷ Jana K. Lipman, *Guantánamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution* (Berkeley: University of CA Press, 2009), 39.

²⁹⁸ C.A. Pownall, “Rules and Regulations for Labor Contracts,” October 14, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

diseased, and hygienically ignorant people” were widespread in prewar Philippines.³⁰¹ In light of BPM’s practices, however, Choy’s argument can be extrapolated to include military and corporate perceptions of Filipinos as a “diseased” people in the postwar era. Contrary to the belief that these medical tests were intended to protect all the inhabitants of the island, a separate military order required that all military personnel or their families that employed native “servants” be advised to have them examined for diseases as well.³⁰² Thus, these hierarchical health requirements based on race and national origin were also implemented to protect the military and their dependents, while simultaneously categorizing Filipinos as being the most “diseased” of all recruited civilian military workers.³⁰³ Consequently, it was the labor of these Filipinos and white Americans who passed the disparate immigration prerequisites that subsequently helped to expand the military’s presence on the island.³⁰⁴

The Working Lives of Civilian Military Laborers

Filipino and white American men participated in the military expansion of Guam through the construction of bases, buildings, roads, and installations. Filipinos who worked for

³⁰¹ Catherine Ceniza Choy, *Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 21. For more on American colonial perceptions of Filipinos during the early twentieth century, see Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

³⁰² J.N. Myers, “Examination of Native Civilians for Employment,” July 31, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA. For more on U.S. military perceptions of Chamorro health and sanitation, see Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004).

³⁰³ On the medical protection of white Americans in Guam, see *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004).

³⁰⁴ The need for Filipino workers on Guam was immense enough that some Filipinos worked in the underground economy of immigrant smuggling. *The Manila Times* newspaper reported that a ring of smugglers had been sneaking Filipinos into Guam via military air transport and U.S. ships. These smugglers received \$30 to \$100 for transportation and an additional \$20 to \$50 monthly during their residency on the island. The creation of this underground immigration industry demonstrates that Filipino labor was in high demand and that Filipino men were determined in obtaining admittance into Guam. For more, see *The Manila Times*, “Guam Smuggling Ring Broken Up,” June 9, 1950. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

LUSTEVECO engaged in a variety of unskilled labor that most commonly included clearing over-grown brush, farming, and stevedoring at Naval Base Guam in the village of Sumay. They also did semi-skilled and skilled work that included carpentry, construction, electrical work, painting, plumbing, road paving, and roofing.³⁰⁵ LUSTEVECO also recruited Filipino women for skilled work on Guam as well. Specifically, these women served as nurses and medical assistants in the company camps and never totaled more than one percent of the labor force.³⁰⁶ In some instances, contractors hired Filipino women to work as hospital workers rather than nurses.³⁰⁷ This practice allowed contractors to pay them lower wages as general hospital workers, while still benefitting from their formal training as certified nurses. According to sociologist Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, “[female] workers provide ‘cheap labor’ to the U.S. economy – meaning, the costs of their labor are cheap acquisitions for U.S. society and/or the conditions of their employment are below prevailing labor standards.”³⁰⁸ Furthermore, companies such as LUSTEVECO only hired seven to eight hospital workers for Camp Roxas that housed several thousand workers.³⁰⁹ Depending on how many workers needed medical attention, this imbalance in the patient-to-medical-worker ratio was problematic. BPM took a similar approach. However, BPM’s hiring practices and patterns mirrored a racial and gendered hierarchy that privileged white American men over all other workers, including white American

³⁰⁵ Guam Humanities Council, 21.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, “Asian Immigrant Women and Global Restructuring, 1970s-1990s,” in *Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology*, eds. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 272.

³⁰⁹ Delfina Cataluna and Pilar Malilay, interview with Bernie Provido Schumann and Burt Sardoma Jr., May 28, 2009. Here after cited as Cataluna and Malilay interview, May 28, 2009. Interview is courtesy of *Under the American Sun*, Camp Roxas film project.

women, which was commonplace in the American Jim Crow South.³¹⁰ They hired, for example, a small number of white American women who held subordinate positions as assistant clerks, clerk typists, and secretaries.³¹¹ BPM heavily relied on white American men who served in managerial and skilled positions such as electricians, engineers, foremen, mechanics, and site supervisors.³¹² Some of these men even had experience doing foreign contract work before coming to Guam.³¹³ By 1950, BPM's labor force comprised approximately 1,000 white Americans and 5,000 Filipinos.³¹⁴ In short, BPM's employment practices transplanted a system of white male patriarchy that gave authority to white American men over Chamorros, Filipinos, and white American women. Guam was clearly not devoid of labor stratification.

Working as a civilian military laborer was also a dangerous job that sometimes resulted in injury or death. In January 1948, Filipino workers Felix Sarmago and Felicisimo Caperas were killed in an industrial accident while working for Marianas Stevedoring (MASDELCO), a subsidiary of LUSTEVECO, which managed Camp Roxas in 1956.³¹⁵ Other Filipino laborers such as Teodoro Gorospe likewise encountered workplace accidents. In June 26, 1959, Gorospe and an unnamed Chamorro worker came into contact with a hot wire at a voltage substation on

³¹⁰ For more on American notions of race and slavery in the Asia-Pacific region, see Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco Scarano, eds., *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Durham: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

³¹¹ U.S. Civil Service Commission, "Application for Federal Employment," July 26, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

³¹² Rogers, 217.

³¹³ Morgan, 12.

³¹⁴ G. Cabot interview, April 22, 2013.

³¹⁵ *The Manila Times*, "2 Filipino Workers on Interred," January 21, 1948. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

Andersen Air Force Base and died of electrocution.³¹⁶ While information on the number of deaths is not available, the number of injuries that workers sustained on the job was recorded periodically. During the summer of 1947, BPM averaged seventy-four worker injuries per month (for a three month span), which were 2.4 injuries per day.³¹⁷ The dangerous work environments in building construction, heavy machinery, and explosives made Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans all susceptible to workplace injuries and/or death. In addition to coping with these hazardous conditions, workplace injuries also placed a financial burden upon Filipino laborers. For example, Filipino worker Antonio E. Lo was sent back to the Philippines for hospitalization due to his gastric ulcer. Lo claimed that his employing company LUSTEVECO had guaranteed to pay for his hospitalization, yet they never did.³¹⁸ It was easier for LUSTEVECO to simply repatriate workers to the Philippines instead of granting them medical treatment on Guam. Thus, the risk of injury and/or death, coupled with their employers' unwillingness to provide medical care for their workers, caused many Filipinos to become frustrated. Moreover, the U.S. military was complicit in this system since it did not regulate or provide mediation between recruited workers and their companies. In addition to dangerous working environments, military contractors paid their employees according to a stratified wage scale that privileged white American workers over Chamorros and Filipinos.

³¹⁶ *The Daily Mirror*, "Filipino Electrician Dies in Guam Mishap," June 26, 1959. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³¹⁷ J.B. Dunn, "Out-Patient treatments of civilian employees to Brown Pacific Maxon Co.," August 2, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA, J.B. Dunn, "Out-Patient treatments of civilian employees to Brown Pacific Maxon Co.," July 7, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA, and J.B. Dunn, "Out-Patient treatments of civilian employees to Brown Pacific Maxon Co.," June 5, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

³¹⁸ V. Williams, "Additional Press Articles on Alleged Exploitation of Philippine Laborers in Guam," April 1, 1954. RG 85, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 2.

This hierarchical wage scale provided white workers (classified as a non-local hire) with a “territorial post differential” (TPD) that gave them an additional 25 percent bonus on top of their base pay.³¹⁹ Chamorros (classified as local hires) were paid the second highest wages (which were usually 1/2 the rate of a non-local hire), while Filipinos were paid the lowest wages (3/4 of a local hire).³²⁰ Even though some Filipinos were also supposed to receive a TPD, there were numerous cases in which some of them indicated that it was withheld or never issued at all.³²¹ While it is unclear how many people received TPD bonuses, Filipinos were usually still paid below the U.S. minimum wage, which was \$0.75 in 1950.³²² This act of exploitation violated the 1947 labor agreement between the Philippines and the United States which declared that “the terms of recruitment and the guarantee of return to the Philippines applies to all labor recruited in the Philippines either by the Army or Navy or by contractors under the jurisdiction by the Army or Navy.”³²³ In response to these allegations, the U.S. military simply claimed that they were unaware of the low wage issue and that private contractors were doing the work on Guam.³²⁴ The U.S. military’s negligence in the regulation and enforcement of workers’ wages and privileges underscored the notion that the military expansion of Guam trumped the protection of workers’ rights. Furthermore, this system also allowed the U.S. military and its contractors to reduce employment costs. In turn, they justified paying the lowest wages to

³¹⁹ Paul Carano and Pedro Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966), 328.

³²⁰ Bruce L. Campbell, “The Filipino Community of Guam, 1945-1975,” (M.A. Thesis: University of Hawai‘i, 1987), 31.

³²¹ V. Williams, 2.

³²² U.S. Department of Labor, <http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm>, June 10, 2014.

³²³ “Exchange of Notes.”

³²⁴ *The Manila Times*, “Disclaim Guam Wage Discrimination,” January 28, 1948. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

Filipinos since they were categorized as “alien” immigrants and stereotyped as “diseased” workers. Even though Chamorros received lower wages than white Americans, they still received higher wages than Filipino nationals. Since Chamorros had to be paid more than Filipinos, fewer of them were hired, while Filipinos could be paid the least and were more susceptible to labor discipline since they could be deported. Even though white Americans could also be deported, their investment in working on Guam was dissimilar from that of Filipinos.³²⁵ Since working on Guam represented economic and political mobility, Filipino workers had a greater investment in keeping their jobs than white Americans who generally saw work on Guam as temporary and transitional.³²⁶ While workplace conditions served as a source of tension, life in company camps was both a positive and negative focal point of their lives on Guam.

Company Camp Life

The military’s contractor system allowed these construction corporations to set up company camps where they administered the social lives of their laborers. Specifically, these companies established autonomous camps that had their own medical facilities, mess halls, recreational fields, and security patrols. However, the social experiences in these camps were just as regimented as in the workplace. Thus, these company camps were sites of social control that worked in conjunction with military immigration policy and labor discipline in the workplace.

For Filipinos and white Americans, company camps became the centers of social lives. There were several company camps, including Camp Asan, Camp Edusa, Camp Marbo, and

³²⁵ On racist wage scales and ethnic antagonism, see Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983).

³²⁶ Morgan, 21.

Camp Magsaysay, which were scattered throughout the island. However, the largest company camps were LUSTEVECO's Camp Roxas (initially named Camp Carter) and BPM's Camp #1, Camp #2, and Camp Quezon.³²⁷ Filipino workers employed by LUSTEVECO lived in Camp Roxas, which was located near the present-day southern villages of Agat and Santa Rita. BPM housed their Filipino and white laborers in segregated company camps. In the village of Mangilao, Filipinos lived in Camp Quezon, while white Americans lived in Camp #1 and Camp #2. All three camps were located in the area that now houses the University of Guam. BPM's racially segregated camp facilities exemplified the company's reliance on Jim Crow prejudices and sensibilities. This racial logic of white supremacy was not only perpetuated through racial segregation, but also through minstrel shows performed by white workers for residents in all three BPM camps. The two white American actors for this performance provided a sample of their dialogue. Take, for instance, their advertisement of the show in *The Constructionaire*, a newsletter that was circulated in BPM's camps:

Rastus, why fough your be so happy? Well Rufus, Monday night we's all gwana have a lot ob fun wid dem folks out front. Yeah, dat's all true an' deys gwana enjoy it too, I think. Dat is if dey goes along wid our stuff an' takes it in de proper spirit. Yeah, Rufus, an' if dey don't, git ready to duck 'cause deys no reefer ship in an' dey'll be throwin' coconuts. Come on now, make wid de big smile fough all de folks out dere, 'cause dis aint no good sample ob our show di'logue.³²⁸

³²⁷ I will reference BPM Camp #1, Camp #2, and Camp Quezon together as "BPM camps."

³²⁸ Hugh Carey, ed., *The Constructionaire*, October 31, 1951 and Hugh Carey, ed., *The Constructionaire*, November 3, 1951.



Figure 3.2 White American Minstrel Show Actors. Source: *The Constructionaire*, circa 1952.

This dialogue demonstrates that BPM sanctioned these shows and that white American workers who subscribed to white supremacy transplanted this ideology to Guam. However, this performance was also for the Filipino workers of Camp Quezon, which suggests that some white Americans were willing to incorporate Filipinos into their anti-black sentiment.

The few white American female workers employed by BPM and LUSTEVECO then resided in company camps. However, they lived in separate quarters in different parts of the camp. All of these camps had amenities such as baseball fields, basketball courts, bowling alleys, chapels, churches, clothing stores, mess halls, and movie theatres.³²⁹ For white Americans and Filipinos, sporting events were one of the few social opportunities for interracial interactions outside of work. However, for employers, these facilities provided the opportunity to promote welfare capitalism through leisure.

³²⁹ Guam Humanities Council, 13.



Figure 3.3 Basketball Game at Camp Roxas. Source: Guam Humanities Council

BPM, LUSTEVECO, and other contractors utilized welfare capital activities to limit worker discontent and labor protest. According to historian Sanford M. Jacoby, welfare capitalism is a strategy to “inhibit the growth of unions and government.”³³⁰ Specifically, employers used intramural and company sports teams to advance welfare capital activities. For example, Camp Roxas and BPM’s camps all had baseball, basketball, bowling, and volleyball teams.³³¹ These and other sports teams not only attempted to generate company loyalty and camaraderie, but it was also believed these activities kept workers in good physical condition.



Figure 3.4 Baseball Game at Camp Roxas. Source: Guam Humanities Council

³³⁰ Sanford M. Jacoby, *Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4. Welfare capitalism had its origins in Europe and by the nineteenth century it became a major corporate strategy in the United States. Besides deterring the growth of unions and government, it was also a paternalistic relationship in which corporate executives and owners believed that they were obligated to take care of their employees in return of maximum worker efficiency.

³³¹ Brown-Pacific-Maxon, *The Constructionaire*, November 22, 1950, Vol. 6, No. 20.

In her study on Chicago industrial workers of the early twentieth century, Lizabeth Cohen argued that industrialists believed sports could distract laborers from “indulging in the ‘drinking, gambling and brawling’ so common in working-class ethnic communities – and so disruptive of good work habits.”³³² This was also the case in Guam as the MASDELCO Warriors was a basketball team that represented Camp Roxas.³³³ This team and others competed in camp leagues that tried to distract Filipinos from their daily work-related hardships as much as they attempted to promote camaraderie amongst laborers and spectators alike. For example, basketball teams commonly nominated a Filipina nurse who worked in the same camp to symbolically serve as a “team muse” who attended the games to inspire their performance. These sports teams not only competed within camps, but they also played against other company camp teams, thereby encouraging workers to think of themselves as representatives of their companies. While sports represented one tactic in advancing welfare capitalism, employers also used other leisure activities and social gatherings as more insidious forms of control.

Filipinos and white Americans participated in numerous racially segregated social activities such as beach parties, bingo game nights, church services, dances, and holiday parades.³³⁴ While it appears that workers initiated these social activities, the reality was that their employers provided them the facilities to hold these events.³³⁵ Furthermore, contractors required all of their workers to obtain police clearances if they wanted to participate in

³³² Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 176-177.

³³³ Guam Humanities Council, 19.

³³⁴ Brown-Pacific-Maxon, *The Constructionaire*, September 23, 1950, Vol. 6, No. 3 and Guam Humanities Council, 14-18.

³³⁵ For more on company strategies to control workers through benevolent paternalism, see Ronald Takai, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983).

recreational activities and social gatherings outside of their respective camps.³³⁶ One of the most common activities was to have beach parties. In particular, one beach became synonymous with Filipino workers, who nicknamed it Rizal Beach in honor of the Filipino nationalist Jose Rizal. Places like Rizal Beach were supposed to be sources of comfort, even though the companies viewed these sites and activities as profit-driven measures. However, even these social outlet opportunities were not enough to distract them from the hardships of company camp life.

Growing Discontent with Company Camp Life

In the early 1950s, both Filipino and white American workers commonly complained about the dilapidated conditions of company camps. Naval medical officer R.W. Jones reported on the insanitary plight of the Filipino quarters at Camp Asan: “The cleanliness and sanitary condition of sleeping quarters is very unsatisfactory. A general field day is badly needed. Bunks need clean linen and the loose gear that is adrift should be stowed. Clothes are being dried in sleeping quarter.”³³⁷



Figure 3.5 Inside a Quonset hut at Camp Roxas. Source: Guam Humanities Council

³³⁶ Guam Humanities Council, 12.

³³⁷ R.W. Jones, “Weekly Sanitation Report,” October 10, 1949. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

These conditions were not isolated occurrences. At Camp Roxas, Filipino laborers also complained about the conditions of the quonset huts that they lived in.³³⁸ Contractors housed their employees in quonset huts because they were cheap to build and could accommodate eight to twelve people depending on the length of the buildings. Furthermore, these structures usually had an exterior made of sheet metal and wood. Thus, the hot and humid weather on Guam heightened the temperature inside these structures. L. Eugene Wolfe, an officer with the U.S. Industrial Relations, recorded his investigation of quonset huts at Camp Piti. As he observed, “frequent rains, combined with gusty winds, tend to make these relatively unprotected types of building virtually uninhabitable. These structures are partially open at either end and except for a four foot strip on both sides under the eaves, everything in them is subject to not only the high humidity of the island but the actual wetting from blown rain during the rainy season.”³³⁹ Wolfe’s description illustrated the poor circumstances that some workers endured on Guam.



Figure 3.6 Outside Condition of a Damaged Quonset hut at Camp Roxas.
Source: Guam Humanities Council

³³⁸ Guam Humanities Council, 10.

³³⁹ L. Eugene Wolfe, “Report of field trip to Pacific Islands,” October 31, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

Another point of contention was the poor quality of food available to workers. In August 1949, civilian worker Dorothea Minor Baker wrote a letter to Governor of Guam C.A. Pownall describing the inadequate mess hall conditions at Camp Asan. Baker claimed:

Many of us, after spending several minutes in line, turn dejectedly away from the heavy, colorless, unappetizing food and work eight hours without nourishment. There are those who have lost from ten to thirty pounds in weight; those who eat and those who don't because in either instance, the food has no value.³⁴⁰

Baker's comments illustrate that even the food served to white American workers was unappealing enough to dissuade them from eating breakfast in the company camps. These laborers most likely had to rely on restaurants and grocery stores outside of the camps for their meals. However, the most telling part of her letter was her indirect critique of the regimented schedule.

A daily regimented schedule was another frustrating issue for laborers on Guam. As LUSTEVECO worker Consul Umayan stated, "there is a tight curfew at all camps, with lights out at eleven p.m. and a bed check at one a.m." He continued, "There is too much discipline...if the men are not there when a bed check is made they get one disciplinary check against them. Four such points are cause for dismissal. That's not good for morale."³⁴¹ This strictly enforced work schedule, combined with poor housing and unappetizing food options, forced Umayan to leave Guam. White American electrician Louie Levine also resigned his position and returned to the United States due to "unsatisfactory living conditions."³⁴² Levine's and Umayan's actions

³⁴⁰ Dorothea Minor Baker, letter to Governor C.A. Pownall, August 10, 1949. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

³⁴¹ Sid White, "Disparity in pay cited: Failure of gov't to secure better conditions scored," *The Manila Times*, September 10, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

show that some workers did not accept their living conditions and opted to find other jobs or return home, rather than continuing to work for their contractors and living in company camps. Even though private contractors tried to provide facilities and recreational opportunities to limit worker discontent, the frustrations over work and life in camps sometimes resulted in conflict.

The potential for violence concerned all camp residents. On March 14, 1949, George Anderson, who was a resident at Camp Asan, was awakened at 1:00 a.m. He recalled:

My wife awakened me with the statement that someone had been peering through the window. Upon investigating, I noticed an individual walking rapidly away from the building at an estimated 100 feet away. Two other couples had also been aroused by the prowler, but were unable to apprehend him. I had just begun to drowse when I was again awakened approximately one hour later by footsteps outside my window. Arising in bed, I noticed through the ventilating louvers the figure of a man creeping below the window level. I investigated and found him peering through the window of the adjoining room...I went to the front door of the quarters and noticed a dark complexioned individual walking rapidly about 30 feet away.³⁴³

While Anderson was unable to apprehend this “dark complexioned” individual, his statement reveals the potential danger in company camps. Along these lines, sexual violence was another concern in these camps.

In January 31, 1952, the U.S. military reported that sailor Leonard Koon assaulted civilian military worker Melvin Hollen. According to the investigators, Hollen and Koon had

³⁴² H.V. Hopkins, “Louie Levine, resignation of,” December 16, 1948. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

³⁴³ L.E. Schmidt, “Security at Camp Asan,” March 14, 1949. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

met while Hollen and a group of men were barhopping. All of the men returned to Camp Asan.

At one point, Hollen reportedly:

went to his room alone. He left the door unlocked. He turned and saw that the sailor, Mr. Koon, had entered the room behind him and was taking off his pants. At this point, Mr. Hollen claimed that he was fully clothed. Mr. Koon pushed him down on the bed and climbed on top of him. Mr. Hollen struggled but Mr. Koon hit him in the eye, knocking one lens out of his glasses, then clamped his arms to his side. Mr. Koon then tried to force him into a lewd act of a homosexual nature. Mr. Hollen called for help and this frightened Mr. Koon so that he stood up and started dressing.”³⁴⁴

While the context of this encounter cannot be fully determined, this incident was one of several cases that involved sexual violence against men and women. In response to these and other violent encounters, Filipinos and white Americans armed themselves with various weapons, which the military perceived differently depending on the racial group.

White American workers often owned firearms while living on Guam. As Naval officer A.J. Carrillo claimed, “It is common knowledge that practically everyone, in most of the housing areas, and particular Base 18 have in their possession firearms, this is apparent as, when leaving the island for the states they are left behind, in drawers, and under beds. They are all aware however of the existing orders prohibiting the possession of [guns], but [they] will not come forward and use the proper channels to keep them.”³⁴⁵ Carrillo’s report indicated that military and company camp officials did not police white American workers for their possession of firearms without proper registration and did little to resolve this issue. Essentially, the military

³⁴⁴ E.D. Hubbell, “Incident Involving Melvin Hollen, Civil Service Employee; Investigation of,” January 31, 1952. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

³⁴⁵ A.J. Carrillo, “Security of our Housing Areas, Report on,” June 3, 1949. RG 313, U.S. National Archives, San Bruno, CA.

condoned the white American ownership of weapons. In contrast, military officials knew that Filipino workers at Camp Roxas also owned firearms and weapons, but had a different response to their possession of weapons. In February 1950, U.S. military officials sent a detachment of 484 marines and sailors to search Camp Roxas for firearms and other weapons. According to *The Guam News*, “1,500 out of the 3,000 Filipino residents of Roxas had a weapon of some sort taken away.”³⁴⁶ The newspaper article continued, “Some of the weapons [included] were nine pistols, seven rifles, blackjacks, brass knuckles, pneumatic drills filed to a sharp point, thousands of knives of all descriptions, scissors, cutlasses, razors, hatchets, files, machetes, butcher cleavers, bayonets, dynamite, air and pistol rifles, and many others.”³⁴⁷ These two incidents show how Filipino workers were criminalized for owning weapons. In addition, many of the items confiscated were tools that construction workers commonly used such as knives, razors, hatchets, files, and machetes. This racialized perception of Filipinos as criminals was pervasive in other parts of the Pacific. According to Jonathan Y. Okamura, Filipinos in pre-World War II Hawai‘i were perceived as “being prone to violence, emotionally volatile, and criminally inclined.”³⁴⁸ The racialized perception and mistreatment of Filipino civilian military workers also occurred in other sites where U.S. military expansion was taking place.

Worker Discontent and Labor Advocacy

The exploitation of Filipinos also occurred on the nearby island of Saipan. During World War II and immediately after, the U.S. military also used Saipan as a base. The most important

³⁴⁶ *The Guam News*, “Guam Police List Weapons, Drugs Found at Roxas,” February 7, 1950. RG 126, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ Jonathan K. Okamura, *Ethnicity and Inequality in Hawai‘i* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 156.

installation was East Field (Kagman Airfield), which was built in 1946. Thus, East Field and other bases in the Marianas were part of the military's chain of installations spread throughout the western Pacific. In April 1955, the U.S. Navy had jailed Filipino national Vicente M. Bolosan for 81 hours without charge because he had supposedly violated Guam's security clearance and entered the island without permission.³⁴⁹ However, this charge was false because he was under contract with Fisher Construction in Guam and was just completing a two-month project on Wake Island.³⁵⁰ Instead of promptly verifying his status, Bolosan was forced to sit in jail for a little over three days. Another worker experienced similar violations in Saipan. In May 1956, the military police arrested Luis D. Misa, a policeman for BPM, on the charge of being late in returning Filipino workers back to camp after a shopping tour in an unnamed village.³⁵¹ During his three-day incarceration, Misa claimed that a Saipanese guard struck him with a shoe, which resulted in a one-inch gash over his eye.³⁵² U.S. Rear Admiral William B. Ammon, commander of the naval forces, confirmed that Misa was "illegally arrested, detained and manhandled," but offered no other information besides the fact that the incident would be investigated.³⁵³ Besides using incarceration, military officials and contractors also relied on deportation as another method to induce labor discipline.

Deportation was the primary means by which the U.S. military and its contractors dealt with Filipinos and white Americans who resisted labor discipline. For example, in May 1955,

³⁴⁹ *Daily Mirror*, "Guam Filipino Freed in Habeas Corpus Case," April 23, 1955. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ *The Manila Times*, "Maltreated PI Worker's Case Probed," May 5, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ *Ibid.*

227 Filipino workers of LUSTEVECO were deported to the Philippines because they refused to sign individual employment contracts. Specifically, these workers had come to Guam on a collective contract between LUSTEVECO and the Consolidated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), an organization that represented these workers.³⁵⁴ Since the CLUP had been suspended, the U.S. Navy required these workers to sign new individual contracts. The laborers feared that these new contracts would eliminate the overseas bonus that LUSTEVECO had promised them. This authority, coupled with the expendability of Filipino workers, made labor activism and advocacy difficult. In addition, the U.S. military had a stringent policy that required all contractors to deport Filipino laborers before “the third anniversary of their arrival on Guam” and if they attempted to change their nationality through naturalization or intermarriage with Chamorros.³⁵⁵ Even though Filipino workers were supposed to be repatriated after three years of employment, a significant number of Filipinos permanently settled on Guam through intermarriage with Chamorros. In some instances, contractors overlooked the maximum time limit and continued to employ Filipino workers regardless of military labor policy. Moreover, the military had claimed its repatriation policy protected the employment rights of Chamorros, but in reality it promoted the belief that some Filipinos were potential communists and were consequently a national security threat. At any point, Filipinos and white Americans could be deported, which made labor protests and unionization difficult for fear of being transported off-island. Since the Cold War was an era of anti-communist thought in the United States, the visceral reaction of categorizing labor activism as communist activity was common. As a result, very few attempts were made to organize labor unions on Guam during the 1940s

³⁵⁴ *Daily Mirror*, “Guam Filipinos Refuse Contracts, Sent Home,” March 17, 1955. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁵⁵ E.F. Van Buskirk, Jr., “Entry, Re-Entry, Repatriation and Deportation of Filipinos,” January 16, 1958. RG 38, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

and 1950s. Over the course of the late 1940s, these flagrant violations informed the officials from the Republic of the Philippines that Filipinos were being egregiously disciplined in connection to their employment as civilian military workers. Therefore, the Republic of the Philippines ordered investigations regarding the experiences and treatment of Filipino workers on Guam.

Filipino government officials specifically launched two inquiries amidst growing concerns that their workers were being mistreated. In July 1952, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations on Guam sent a memo to U.S. military officials and their contractors informing them that Filipino government officials had visited the island in December 1951. The U.S. Deputy Chief stated, “As a result of these charges, which basically were politically inspired [*sic*] an investigation committee of high Philippine government officials was sent to Guam.”³⁵⁶ He concluded that this probe did not find any information that the U.S. military and its contractors had exploited Filipino workers. In 1954, the Philippine government initiated another investigation and sent congressional representatives Justino Benito, Angel Castano, Rodelpho Ganzon, Roseller Lim, and stenographer Anselma B. Domondon to Guam.³⁵⁷ These officials sought to ascertain if Filipino workers were being paid lower wages than other laborers on the island.³⁵⁸ Even though these investigations were inconclusive, they did result in the growing suspicion that the U.S. military and its contractors were mistreating Filipino workers. These official inquiries underscored that the Republic of the Philippines was concerned with the growing discontent of their workers that began in the early 1950s.

³⁵⁶ U.S. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Guam, “Filipino Labor Situation on Guam,” July 11, 1952. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

³⁵⁷ W.L. Eifrig, “U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence Information Report,” April 23, 1954. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

³⁵⁸ J.G. Bogdan, “U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence Information Report,” April 19, 1954. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

In 1952, the Republic of the Philippines established a consulate in Guam, primarily to support Filipino workers on the island. Furthermore, the consulate engaged in other activities such as the promotion of investment and trade opportunities available to the Government of Guam and the United States.³⁵⁹ However, one of the consulate's most important objectives was to protect Filipino worker productivity.³⁶⁰ Consulate officials also helped families in the Philippines locate Filipino workers in Guam who had "gone missing."³⁶¹ The consulate's role in supporting workers had expanded to the point that Filipino laborers made outlandish requests such as asking consulate officials to pay for their court fines; to loan them money; to help them raise funds to pay personal debts; to advocate for them to receive better positions; and one worker even wanted consulate officials to meet with him in the middle of the night before he committed murder.³⁶² Even though this report shows that Filipino workers turned to the consulate for assistance in various matters, it is unknown if consul officials actually interceded in all of these cases.

The Philippine state was not only invested in the protection of their workers' rights, but also attempted to address their various concerns such as the non-payment of wages, excessive working hours, overtime work without corresponding pay, inadequate living quarters and food, unsanitary conditions of toilet and bath facilities, the threat of deportation, and intra-racial violence. However, it is important to note that the Republic of the Philippines did not support

³⁵⁹ Jose S. Estrada, "Philippine Consulate General Annual Report 1969-1970," September 30, 1970. National Library of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines.

³⁶⁰ Victorino P. Paredes, "Consulate of the Philippines," May 12, 1958. National Library of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines.

³⁶¹ Generally, Filipino men were reported missing because they had not sent remittances to their families in the Philippines or they had not responded to families' letters in a timely manner. It is also possible that some Filipino men married Chamorro women and abandoned their families in the Philippines, which was a concern for the Philippine government.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

their workers' lives per se. Instead, the consulate advocated for their laborers in order to safeguard their remittances to the Philippines. These remittances served as an important source of revenue that helped stimulate the Philippine economy in the 1940s and 1950s. As sociologist Robyn Rodriguez contends, the Philippine government has become a "labor brokerage state" that sends its citizens abroad for work while generating a "profit" from the remittances that migrants forward to their families and friends in the Philippines.³⁶³ According to her, this system relies on institutions such as the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to facilitate the preparation and migration of Filipino workers. Rodriguez's argument can be extrapolated and applied to Guam as well. Thus, the Philippine government was invested in the protection of its workers through various investigations and the establishment of a consulate on Guam. Besides relying on the Philippine consulate or the Republic of the Philippines for protection or support, Filipino laborers also had some individual agency in dealing with unfair wages and poor living conditions.

Some Filipinos used the high demand for their labor as a way to obtain better jobs and salary increases. For example, Filipino civilian military laborer Tomas M. Isidre first came to Guam in 1947 as a plumber for BPM. He served as a plumber for BPM until 1956, when he finally returned to the Philippines.³⁶⁴ Then in 1959, he returned to Guam as a welder for MASDELCO. While it is unclear how much more money Isidre made, he most likely received a pay increase since being a welder is considered a more skilled position than a plumber. This strategy of changing employers not only improved their pay but also expanded their skills as

³⁶³ Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), x.

³⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, "Alien File for Tomas D. Isidre," RG 85, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

civilian military workers. By 1956, labor issues such as low wages and poor working and living conditions culminated with the proposal of the Guam Wage Bill.

The Guam Wage Bill of 1956

Filipino frustrations over work place safety, wages, and worker privileges reached a boiling point with the proposed Guam Wage Bill of 1956. This bill proposed to make the island exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938. This act was an important piece of legislation that guaranteed minimum wage, provided overtime pay, set a maximum hour workweek, and prohibited the employment of minors. BPM, LUSTEVECO, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Interior were the largest supporters of this proposal to circumvent the FLSA. As an unknown U.S. Naval official stated, “The Defense Department is interested mainly in stretching the defense dollar as far as it can go.”³⁶⁵ For the U.S. government and its military contractors, the passing of the Guam Wage Bill would have allowed them to reduce their payroll expenses, while still benefitting from skilled and unskilled Chamorro and Filipino workers. However, this bill originated as part of a larger private corporate and U.S. government supported program that had made similar exemptions at other U.S. territories such as American Sāmoa, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In the 1940s, for example, private companies were able to obtain FLSA exemptions on Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, while the Van Camp Seafood Company gained exemption on American Sāmoa in 1956 to maximize tuna cannery profits. In her study on American Sāmoa, historian JoAnna Poblete-Cross argues that “indigenous groups in the Pacific

³⁶⁵ *Daily Mirror*, “Buck Floor Pay in U.S. Bases,” February 24, 1956, 1 and *Daily Mirror*, “House Okays Guam Protest: U.S. State Department Backs Bill Against P.I. Labor, Report,” March 9, 1956, 1. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

and Asian immigrants in American Sāmoa are part of the same imperial legacy.”³⁶⁶ Thus, the movement to exempt Guam from the FLSA was connected to a larger imperial legacy of labor exploitation based on U.S. empire, which connected U.S. territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific. This attempt to reduce worker rights and wages on Guam met resistance from various governments and labor organizations throughout the world.

The proposed Guam Wage Bill spurred one of the largest transnational labor movements in the Pacific.³⁶⁷ It connected the Guam Wage Bill opponents from Asia, Europe, the Pacific, and the United States. However, this coalition was not a coordinated effort among Chamorros and Filipinos. Instead, Chamorros and Filipinos had parallel movements and each used their own set of strategies to oppose the proposed bill. For example, in March 1956, the Guam Legislature sent Chamorro representative Antonio B. Won Pat to testify at a U.S. subcommittee in opposition to the proposed bill.³⁶⁸ Won Pat believed that the proposed bill would “have an extremely disruptive effect on the economy of Guam. More than that, we feel that it would affect the morale by removing from the people of Guam the privileges of a statute to which its benefits have already been extended and by threatening a pattern by which benefits of other statutes may be weakened or removed.”³⁶⁹ For Chamorros such as Won Pat, the Guam Wage Bill represented the loss of political rights, which they had just obtained through the passing of the Organic Act. As historian Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony has noted in her study of Filipino workers

³⁶⁶ JoAnna Poblete-Cross, “Bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case Study of American Samoa,” *American Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2010): 502.

³⁶⁷ Other notable twentieth century social movements include the International Longshore and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) of 1934 (Hawai’i), the Mau in the early 1900s (Sāmoa), the Oahu Sugar Strike of 1920 (Hawai’i), and the Polynesian Panthers in 1971 (Aotearoa, New Zealand).

³⁶⁸ *Daily Mirror*, “Speaker Presses Get-Tough Policy on Guam Solon Team,” March 27, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁶⁹ *The Manila Times*, “PI Workers in Guam Hit,” April 13, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

in the Pacific Northwest, “the Filipina/o community, both men and women, chose their own destinies, despite their status as racialized colonial subjects and workers, and the harsh social and political barriers they encountered.”³⁷⁰ Facing similar circumstances on Guam, Filipinos on the island and back in the Philippines challenged the U.S. government. Republic of the Philippines ambassador Carlos P. Romulo opposed the proposal through diplomatic notes in which he stated, “All Asia is watching the American attitude on Filipinos in these islands and if the wage scale would be [*sic*] discriminatory and contrary to the democratic principles enunciated by the United States.”³⁷¹ In addition, the Philippine government threatened the U.S. government that it would have 15,000 Filipino laborers return home if the proposed bill was passed.³⁷² Even though the Guam wage provision generated Chamorro and Filipino discontent with the U.S. government, their efforts were not unified. Some Chamorro politicians believed that Chamorros were being overlooked for jobs due to the significant number of Filipino workers on Guam.³⁷³ And other Chamorros contended that the U.S. military and its contractors preferred to hire Filipinos because they accepted “coolie pay.”³⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Chamorros and Filipinos supported the defeat of the proposed bill since it threatened the economic livelihood of their people despite the fact that access to military civilian jobs served as a source of conflict between their communities.

³⁷⁰ Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony, *American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941* (Berkeley: University of CA Press, 2003), 19.

³⁷¹ *The Manila Times*, “PI Gov’t Will Protest Guam Wage Bill in US,” February 19, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines and Cesar Salenga, “P.I. Opposition Mounts Against U.S. Labor Bill,” March 31, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁷² Cesar Salenga, “PI Opposition Mounts Against U.S. Labor Bill,” *Daily Mirror*, March 31, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁷³ *The Manila Times*, “Better Deal for Guam Folk,” April 15, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁷⁴ *The Manila Times*, “PI Workers in Guam Hit,” April 13, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

While Chamorros argued their U.S. citizenship entitled them to political rights, Filipinos used their own tactics to oppose the proposed bill.

The Philippine Trade Unions Council (PTUC) was one of the most outspoken critics of the bill.³⁷⁵ Specifically, the PTUC generated support from other labor organizations such as the American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). In February 1956, PTUC representative Jose Hernandez wrote a letter to AFL-CIO president George Meany urging him to oppose the Guam Wage Bill.³⁷⁶ The AFL-CIO agreed to support Filipino workers on Guam and on other U.S. territories that faced proposed FLSA exemptions.³⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Philippine government and the PTUC sought support from other international labor organizations such as the Asia and Pacific Regional Organization (APRO) of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).³⁷⁸ Leaders from the ICFTU pledged to “present formal papers of protest and petition the [U.S.] department to take the cudgels for these brother workers.”³⁷⁹ In addition to the ICFTU, the International Labor Organization (ILO) also agreed to oppose the Guam Wage Bill.³⁸⁰ The ILO held an annual conference, granting representatives

³⁷⁵ The PTUC was one of the four new labor federations that were created in the 1950s, after the Philippine Department of Labor cancelled the registration of The Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) and arrested its leaders for being communists. For more on the history of Philippine labor unions, see Jorge V. Sibal, “Milestones: The Philippines and the ILO Partnership 1948-2008,” in *Changes and Challenges: 60 Years of Struggle Towards Decent Work* (Diliman: University of the Philippines, 2008).

³⁷⁶ *Daily Mirror*, “PTUC Seeks AFL-CIO Aid on Guam Wage Bill,” February 20, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁷⁷ Salenga.

³⁷⁸ *The Manila Times*, “Asian Group Backs PI on Floor Wage,” April 15, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines. In 1949, several trade unions broke off from the World Trade Union Federation based on claims that communists dominated it. These anti-communist organizations formed the ICFTU in the early 1950s and were primarily comprised of labor organizations located in Western Europe and the United States.

³⁷⁹ *Daily Mirror*, “Junk U.S.-P.I. Guam Labor Deal, 3 House Probers Urge,” April 4, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

³⁸⁰ *Daily Mirror*, “Deny U.S. Wage Rates for P.I. Bases Labor,” June 20, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

from the Philippines an opportunity to voice their concerns. Therefore, the ILO was instrumental in providing the space and audience to inform other labor organizations throughout the world of the U.S. government's attempt to violate the rights of the workers on Guam and in other U.S. territories. While these organizations played a major role in defeating the Guam Wage Bill, the U.S. government's concern over communism also impacted their decision to drop the proposed bill.

Mounting concerns over the spread of communism and the perception of the United States' prominence as the world's democratic leader also led to the defeat of the Guam Wage Bill. Legislative representative of the AFL-CIO, Walter J. Mason, testified before a U.S. Congressional subcommittee. He argued, "For the [U.S.] congress at this critical juncture in world affairs to enact legislation which would institute substandard wages in an underdeveloped American possession would simply feed grist to the mills of the communist propaganda machine." Mason continued, "Our relationship with the peoples in underdeveloped areas which are under U.S. administration must be exemplary and beyond criticism. It might thereby jeopardize the success of an important phase of our nation's foreign policy."³⁸¹ His comments demonstrated that the AFL-CIO supported the workers on Guam because they believed the passing of the Guam Wage Bill would foster communist thought on the island and in other U.S. territories. The AFL-CIO also believed that the expansion of democracy and workers' rights was interlinked with U.S. foreign policy. The AFL-CIO news reported that one of its organizational principles was the "rejection of any idea of imposing our form of government or economic system on any other country, and support for free people who resist attempted subjugation."³⁸²

³⁸¹ *Daily Mirror*, "AFL-CIO Support P.I. Bid on Overseas Labor Wages," February 29, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

The AFL-CIO and the U.S. government's fears of communism were reified through the sentiments of Philippine politicians. As Philippine Congressman Serafin Salvador asserted, "there is an overwhelming sentiment for an overhaul of our attitude towards America. We should look more to our Southeast Asian neighbors. This atmosphere, that is termed by [the] American press as anti-American [*sic*] is generated by the discriminatory attitudes of the United States to the Philippines."³⁸³ Salvador's comments demonstrated that some Philippine officials urged their government to reexamine their relationships with other Southeast Asian countries, rather than to focus on their ties to the United States. While Chamorros and Filipinos did not engage in coordinated activities, the advocacy of government officials and labor representatives from Guam, the Philippines, and the continental United States helped defeat the Guam Wage Bill. Their efforts forced the U.S. government to consider the negative impact that the passing of the Guam Wage Bill would have in Guam and the Philippines. Consequently, the U.S. government's concern about its reputation as the world's democratic leader, coupled with the advocacy of a top-down, international labor movement, resulted in the defeat of the Guam Wage Bill in the summer of 1956.

Conclusion

The postwar military expansion of Guam brought several thousand workers to the island. The U.S. military and its contractors utilized racial and national differences to create unequal social conditions such as the racial segregation of company camps, unequal wages, and uneven working conditions. This is especially true since the military expansion of Guam took

³⁸² *AFL-CIO News*, "Foreign Policy Goals: Peace, Freedom, Security," December 10, 1955. George Meany Memorial Archives, National Labor College, Silver Spring, MD.

³⁸³ *The Manila Times*, "Solons Assure Guam Workers, Hear Plaints," April 4, 1956. Lopez Museum and Library, Pasig City, Philippines.

precedence over all labor concerns based on these issues. The apex of these matters culminated with the proposed Guam Wage Bill. The passing of the Guam Wage Bill would have allowed the U.S. government and its military contractors to reduce their payroll expenses, while still benefitting from employing skilled and unskilled Chamorro and Filipino workers. This victory for the military and its contractors would have permitted them to maintain their control over the material and social conditions of their workers, while simultaneously making military expansion more affordable. Moreover, the military's willingness to support corporate-sponsored FLSA exemptions in Guam and other U.S. territories made the imperial relationships between business and government more apparent. In response, to the potential worsening of social conditions on the island, Chamorros and Filipinos engaged in an uncoordinated, top-down movement against U.S. military interests and their contractors during a time of intense anti-communist sentiment. While these movements did not result in the building of a large-scale multinational coalition amongst Chamorros and Filipinos, they did symbolize that the people of Guam were willing to oppose the U.S. military.

After the defeat of the proposed Guam Wage Bill, Filipinos continued to serve as both skilled and unskilled military civilian workers, while white Americans began to return to the United States. A smaller number of white Americans stayed and married Chamorro women. Furthermore, the multinational labor movement that had formed to oppose the bill no longer existed after 1957. While the factors for its disappearance are unknown, it is most likely due to the fact that the leaders of the movement no longer maintained the coalitions since they achieved their respective objectives. For Chamorros, the Government of Guam became a more reliable employer than the U.S. military and its contractors. Thus, Chamorros sought jobs with the Government of Guam over the military. However, the suburbanization of the island in the 1960s

and the widespread devastation wrought by Typhoon Karen in 1962 ushered in a growing proportion of Filipinos who started working for non-military construction companies. Moreover, the ending of the security clearance of 1962, coupled with the closing of Camp Roxas in 1972 (the last company camp to close on Guam), resulted in the mass integration of Filipinos on Guam. Many of these civilian military workers decided to reside on Guam, married into Chamorro families, and even sponsored the immigration of their family members to the island. Ultimately, the permanent settlement of Filipino and white American civilian military workers resulted in the making of Guam's postwar multiracial society.

CHAPTER FOUR

Interracial Relations in Post-World War II Guam

Introduction

In December 1954, Filipino worker Eddie De La Cruz accompanied a friend who wanted to visit his girlfriend who lived in the village of Chalan Pago. After their arrival at her house, Eddie waited patiently in the living room. It was during this moment that Eddie and Chamorro Barbara Castro first met. Barbara was the sister of the woman that Eddie's friend came to visit. Barbara and Eddie's attraction to each other was instantaneous. Barbara disobeyed her parents, even though they warned her not to date Filipino men, believing they were "violent." One year later, Barbara and Eddie had married.

One evening, Eddie returned to the Brown-Pacific-Maxon (BPM) company camp after curfew (10 pm). Upon learning that Eddie had married a Chamorro woman, BPM ordered him to be deported. Rather than accept his expulsion from Guam and be separated from Barbara, Eddie decided to escape from BPM's barracks. With the help of Barbara and her family, Eddie evaded BPM's patrol authorities until he received his green card a few weeks later.³⁸⁴

The story of Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz provides insight into the complex dynamics of empire and interracial relationships. Specifically, military contractors such as BPM treated Chamorro-Filipino interracial marriage with hostility. BPM's attempt to arrest and exile Eddie was only thwarted because of the couple's willingness to defy the military's policy to deport Filipino men who married Chamorro women. What remains unclear from this story is why the U.S. military prohibited Chamorro-Filipino unions. What threat did these interracial

³⁸⁴ Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz, interview with author, April 24, 2013, Hagåtña, Guam.

relationships pose to the military? Did the military use other tactics to prevent these relationships?

In this chapter, I trace the military's attempt to control social interactions on Guam through the use of administrative categories that classified people such as "loyal," "subversive," or "undesirable." In reality, these divisions were racial categories that were applied flexibly to Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans. From 1940 to 1950, Guam's population increased 166 percent (22,290 to 59,498) due partly to large-scale Filipino and white American immigration to the island. While the majority of Filipinos came as civilian military laborers, white Americans came as either military servicemen or civilian contract workers. This rapid demographic transformation resulted in various interracial interactions through commerce, dating, friendship, marriage, and sex. At times, violence and tragedy also characterized these relationships. These violent encounters concerned the U.S. military because they harmed the nation's "moral" reputation as the global leader of democracy.³⁸⁵ Interracial relations were particularly significant for U.S. government officials who were invested in expanding American democracy and capitalism to "newly independent nations in Asia and Africa."³⁸⁶

In the first part, I focus on the military's racial classification of Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans as loyalists, subversives, or undesirables. The military believed loyalists did not challenge local military law and power. They also considered people who committed actions that intended to erode, undermine, or thwart the nation's military expansion of Guam as subversives.³⁸⁷ Finally, the military categorized as undesirables people who they believed

³⁸⁵ Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 11.

³⁸⁶ Dudziak, 6.

³⁸⁷ For more on the U.S. military's definition of subversion, see David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 252.

committed immoral acts that damaged the military's Cold War reputation. I then triangulate the experiences of these groups through various examples of interracial encounters and the type of laws the military used to regulate their interactions. The military's attempt to control interracial encounters among Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans was done in order to protect its hegemonic Cold War position. By following the paths of interracial social life on Guam, the racial categories of Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans become more apparent when situated outside of the continental United States. Regardless of this racial stratification, Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans continued to engage in interracial relationships that challenged the military's authority.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, Chamorro and Filipino “Subversives,” and the Filipino Community of Guam

In Guam, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) conducted the surveillance of potential subversive activities.³⁸⁸ Specifically, naval intelligence personnel had the authority to investigate civilians living in Guam for actual or potential cases of “espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities.”³⁸⁹ This power gave ONI officials the ability to probe both military personnel and civilians who they believed posed a threat to military operations. For example, the military periodically conducted “loyalty checks” that resulted in the evaluation of its civilian

³⁸⁸ The beginning of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) dates back to the 1880s, under the supervision of Lieutenant and co-creator Theodoros Bailey Myers Mason. Initially, the ONI was primarily concerned with collecting information from other nations that had more advanced naval technology in hopes of modernizing the U.S. Navy. By World War I, the ONI had expanded to work with other state departments. In World War II, the ONI began gathering intelligence on other nations and participated in counterintelligence activities during the Cold War. For more on the ONI, see Jeffery M. Dorwat, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979) and Office of Naval Intelligence, http://www.oni.navy.mil/This_is_ONI/Proud_History.html.

³⁸⁹ James Forrestal, “Naval Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities,” November 1, 1945, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

employees.³⁹⁰ These and other tactics such as surveillance, information omission, loyalty oaths, and interrogation were the primary methods the ONI utilized to conduct their investigations.³⁹¹ Of all the ethnic groups in Guam, ONI officials believed that Filipinos posed the largest subversive threat because of their history of conflict with the U.S. government.

For example, the U.S. Army viewed Filipinos as “rebellious” and “threatening” during the Philippine-American War in which Filipinos fought against the United States for their political independence. Throughout the war, the army utilized informants and spies to report on the activities of Filipino political leaders.³⁹² At the conclusion of this conflict, the military then incarcerated several dozen Filipino political leaders and exiled them to Guam during the early twentieth century. Thus, the U.S. government’s relationship with Filipinos was rooted in colonialism and war, which perpetuated the military’s distrust of Filipinos even after World War II. The ONI also believed Filipinos were subversive due to their labor activism throughout the 1950s. As discussed in chapter three, the defeat of the proposed Guam Wage Bill of 1956 was a watershed moment in Guam history because it was an international movement that connected various labor organizations throughout the world. This movement, coupled with Filipino labor

³⁹⁰ C. Hawkins, “Loyalty Record Check of Employees as of 30 September 1947,” December 28, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

³⁹¹ E.K. Shanahan, “Warning Regarding the Request for Information from Non-Official Agencies,” September 16, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA and John L. Sullivan, “Removal of Employees Involving Reasonable Doubt as to Loyalty; Subversive Activity; and Membership in un-American Groups,” January 14, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA. For more on cultures of surveillance, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) and Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).

³⁹² Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 104 and 105. For more on the racialization of Filipinos as subversive, see Rick Baldoz, *The Third Asiatic Invasion: Migration and Empire in Filipino America, 1898-1946* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), and Dylan Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

organizing in the continental United States, provoked the military's trepidation over Filipinos.

As sociologist Rick Baldoz argues:

American authorities believed that a worldwide communist conspiracy was at the root of political unrest in the former U.S. colony [of the Philippines] and that Filipino labor activists in the United States communicated with insurgents in the Philippines through an elaborate spy ring that linked left-wing cadres across the globe.³⁹³

Consequently, the military believed that Filipinos engaged in a global network of subversive activity that not only connected the Philippines and the United States, but also included the island of Guam. However, unlike the continental United States, Filipinos made up 65 percent of the island's entire workforce by 1950.³⁹⁴

Despite the military's reliance on Filipino labor, the ONI believed that Filipino men posed a potential threat to U.S. military operations because of their close working proximity to bases and installations. Military officials were convinced that the high demand for Filipinos made it easy for Filipino spies to enter Guam and gain access to military bases and installations due to their employment as civilian military laborers.³⁹⁵ They thought this close proximity could allow them to engage in sabotage, surveillance, and other activities that could undermine U.S. military operations. Even with this paradox, the military and its contractors preferred to recruit Filipinos because this allowed them to keep payroll costs down since they could pay them the lowest wages. This capitalist cost-saving decision resulted in the military's continued suspicion that Filipino workers were potential subversives. To resolve this dilemma, the ONI managed a

³⁹³ Rick Baldoz, "'Comrade Carlos Bulosan': U.S. State Surveillance and the Cold War Suppression of Filipino Radicals," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 33, no. 3 (2014), <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Rick-Baldoz/4165>.

³⁹⁴ Rogers, 218.

³⁹⁵ W.B. Ammon, "Clearance Procedure for Entry into Guam," February 27, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

surveillance program that monitored the activities of various Filipino organizations and the movements of individual Filipinos traveling in and out of the U.S. Pacific. For example, in the early 1950s, the ONI determined that 200 to 300 Filipinos were able to settle on Guam because they had obtained permanent residency while living on Hawai‘i.³⁹⁶ This fear of a growing Filipino community on Guam was heightened because the military believed that Filipinos were loyal to the Republic of the Philippines. In a truncated memo, written in 1956, an unknown naval administrator stated, “There has been an increasing number of indications that Filipinos who obtain permanent resident status and U.S. citizenship feel their original loyalty to Phil govt, in spite of the fact they owe complete allegiance to U.S.”³⁹⁷ The report reveals that American officials viewed Filipinos as “perpetual foreigners” due to their racial and cultural background.³⁹⁸ The perception that Filipinos were unwilling to identify as being a citizen or permanent resident fueled military anxiety over their loyalty. This change in their status concerned military officials because of their legal right to remain in the United States and its territories. A slow but steady stream of Filipino immigrants continued with the passing of the 1960 “Aquino Ruling,” a law that granted alien workers U.S. permanent residency if they originally arrived on Guam before December 1952 and were still working on the island at the time of its approval.³⁹⁹ Even though military officials were suspicious of individual Filipinos, they also believed organizations such

³⁹⁶ G.M. Adams, “Information Report: Office of Naval Intelligence,” June 9, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

³⁹⁷ Admin CINCPACFLT, Memo to COMNAVMARIANAS, September 21, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

³⁹⁸ Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 187. For more on Asian Americans as perpetual foreigners, see Shelley Sang-Hee Lee, *A New History of Asian America* (New York: Routledge, 2013) and Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1998).

³⁹⁹ Rogers, 236.

as the Filipino Community of Guam (FCG) posed the greatest subversive threat because of their social and political influence.

The ONI engaged in the surveillance of the FCG because they feared the organization's ability to galvanize and influence the Filipino population on the island. Founded in 1954 and comprised of Filipinos who came to Guam as civilian military and private laborers, the FCG was a social and political organization that advocated for the Filipinos in Guam. The FCG frequently sponsored gatherings such as banquets, dances, picnics, and philanthropy fundraising.⁴⁰⁰ They also published a monthly newspaper called *Filipiniana*, which discussed social and political issues on Guam that concerned Filipinos. The FCG also sought to reform policies, as with the elimination of a tariff tax that the Philippine state charged Filipinos on Guam who were sending gifts to their relatives back home.⁴⁰¹ One of the activities that concerned the ONI was the FCG's hosting of dinners for Philippine government officials. For example, in 1956, the FCG met with Filipino representatives Justino Benito, Luis Hora, and Serafin Salvador. Based on surveillance information, U.S. Naval intelligence officer G.M. Adams reported:

Press accounts of this meeting indicate that [the Filipino] congressmen attacked alleged U.S. discrimination against Filipinos [in Guam]. In addition, according to reliable informants, Filipino residents of Guam joined in the discussion and were equally outspoken in condemning the United States position vis a vis the Philippines.⁴⁰²

Naval intelligence officials were alarmed by such FCG activities because of their ability to connect the Filipinos on Guam with Philippine government officials. In turn, these gatherings

⁴⁰⁰ Victorino P. Paredes, "Consulate of the Philippines Post Report," May 12, 1958, Philippine National Library.

⁴⁰¹ *Filipiniana*, "Representations Made During Visit of Filipino Solons," April 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁰² G.M. Adams, "Information Report: Office of Naval Intelligence," April 27, 1956. RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

allowed individual Filipinos to voice their criticism of the U.S. military's labor policies, which resulted in official Philippine government inquiries regarding labor policy and wages on Guam (as discussed in chapter two). Moreover, Adams' report reveals that the U.S. military had informants who provided information to ONI officials. Thus, the military surveilled the FCG since they believed it was an organization that could potentially mobilize the entire Filipino population in Guam. In the same ONI report, G.M. Adams also claimed:

The intelligence officer...has noted with interest the increased influence and prestige of the Filipinos on Guam. This is especially reflected in the increasingly important position of the Filipino Community of Guam...This group has strong ties with the Philippines and if in the future there should be differences between U.S. and Philippine policy, it could reasonably be expected that the community would act as a significant pressure group here. Although there has been no evidence to indicate that the Filipino Community of Guam has been conducting espionage or subversion, it is in a position to sponsor these activities.⁴⁰³

This statement reveals that the military was concerned with the FCG's political ties to the Republic of the Philippines and their influence amongst Filipinos living on Guam. Specifically, U.S. officials feared that the FCG might encourage Filipinos to engage in labor protests for better wages and for the protection of their worker rights. This scenario could lead to an island-wide slow down of military operations and maintenance, especially since Filipinos comprised the largest racial group of civilian laborers. However, Adams' report provides no evidence that the FCG was engaged in spying. ONI officer C.J. Endres even went as far as to note, "The FCG, at present, seems to be a confused, unorganized, factional and inefficient organization which

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

currently does not present a serious subversive problem.”⁴⁰⁴ Thus, military panic over the Filipino population and the FCG was unfounded and based on a racial view of them as perpetual foreigners. Even with this information, the U.S. Navy continued to monitor the activities of the FCG. Besides the FCG, military officials also surveilled the Philippine consulate of Guam because they presumed their staff was politically subversive.

According to the ONI, consulate administrative officer Resurrecion A. Azada had developed a “group of agents” to obtain U.S. military information.⁴⁰⁵ For military officials, the establishment of various “agents” working together was problematic, especially since they were employees of the consulate. As consulate employees, they would also have an opportunity to influence and mobilize large groups of Filipinos. Interestingly, the U.S. military handled this situation by simply reporting this information to the Philippine government, which resulted in Azada’s repatriation. But if Azada was truly acting in a subversive manner, why did the military simply accept his deportation and not pursue any further charges against him? Moreover, the “group of agents” working for Azada was never mentioned as also being deported or arrested for subversive activities. This singular case did not materialize into a larger national security issue, but it did expand military surveillance to include all Filipino individuals, the FCG, and the Philippine consulate of Guam.

The first documented evidence of the ONI’s surveillance of Filipinos was in 1954. The military’s suspicion of Filipinos continued throughout the 1950s and included the FCG and the Philippine consulate. On July 3, 1958, officials from the FCG and the consulate met with Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia, who had briefly stopped on the island during his trip

⁴⁰⁴ C.J. Endres, “Information Report: Office of Naval Intelligence,” November 1, 1957, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁰⁵ G.M. Adams, June 9, 1956.

between the Philippines and the United States. ONI official G.W. Roberts recorded, “He [President Garcia] conversed quite a few minutes with various representatives of the FCG. However, there was no visible evidence that the local Filipinos ‘bared’ any ‘gripes’ and all conversations were carried out in an orderly and subdued tone.”⁴⁰⁶ Roberts’ comments highlight that even brief ceremonial interactions such as the reception of Philippine officials concerned the military. In addition to monitoring Filipinos, U.S. officials also conducted surveillance of Chamorros.

Right after the United States reoccupation of Guam in 1944, U.S. officials began to track the morale of Chamorros to determine their loyalty to the United States. In order to do this, the U.S. military read all outgoing and incoming mail of the island. Military Intelligence Officer Peyton Harrison noted, “Letters from Guam continued to be extremely repetitious. Descriptions of conditions and treatment during the Japanese occupation and reactions to these conditions revealed nothing new.”⁴⁰⁷ Harrison’s observations expose the military’s active engagement in the surveillance of Chamorros. Even though military officials appeared to be solely concerned with Chamorro morale, they were just as interested in uncovering if Chamorros were critical of the U.S. military. While a common narrative in Pacific history is that the Chamorros of Guam have always been considered loyal and patriotic Americans, Harrison’s statement underscores a different narrative. Despite the popularity of patriotic songs such as “Uncle Sam Please Come Back to Guam,” military officials believed Filipinos could influence Chamorros to adopt subversive ideology.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁶ G.W. Roberts, “Information Report: Office of Naval Intelligence,” July 29, 1958, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁰⁷ Peyton Harrison, “Civilian Morale on Guam; Monthly Summary Report On,” December 26, 1944, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

During the 1950s, the military suspected that “subversive” Filipinos could influence Chamorros to engage in activities that threatened the U.S. government’s democratic leadership. According to U.S. naval officer W.B. Ammun, “Aliens who remain on Guam for long periods become more and more accepted in the local community. Their prestige and power increase, enabling them to influence the thoughts of local U.S. citizens, especially the politically naïve but otherwise loyal Guamanians.”⁴⁰⁹ Ammun’s racially paternalistic attitude reveals that the military believed Chamorros were not intellectually sophisticated enough to resist being influenced by subversive thought. They believed Chamorros could potentially succumb to socialist or communist ideology and then become subversives themselves. In order to curtail this possibility, the military attempted to restrict social interactions between Chamorros and Filipinos.

Interracial Dating, Marriage, and the Security Clearance Program

Interracial unions provided Filipino men with the legal right to establish permanent residency in the continental United States and its territories. One tactic that the military used to dissuade Chamorro-Filipino marriages was to deport the men who married Chamorro women. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, BPM attempted to deport Filipino civilian military worker Eddie De La Cruz to the Philippines for marrying Chamorro Barbara (Castro) De La Cruz. Barbara De La Cruz recalled her reaction when she learned he was supposed to be

⁴⁰⁸ Pete Taitingfong Rosario and Luie Furtado wrote the song “Uncle Same Please Come Back to Guam,” during the Japanese occupation of Guam. The lyrics of the song are: “Eight of December 1941, people went crazy, right here in Guam, oh, Mr. Sam, Sam, My Dear Uncle Sam, won’t you please, come back to Guam.” For more on Chamorro loyalty and patriotism, see Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), Vicente M. Diaz, “Deliberating ‘Liberation Day’: Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam,” in *Perilous Memories: The Asia Pacific War(s)*, eds. T.T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 155-180, and Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “These May or May Not be Americans: The Patriotic Myth and the Hijacking of Chamorro History on Guam,” (M.A. Thesis: University of Guam, 2004).

⁴⁰⁹ W.B. Ammun, “Repatriation of Filipino Contract Laborer Employees on Guam; Additional Information Concerning,” April 19, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

deported: “So I cried, I didn’t know I was pregnant already and then I miscarried. The immigration man [Joe Gumataotao], his wife who is related to me, found out that I miscarried, he told me to hide him and don’t give him to any patrol police man from BPM, because they will take him away and deport him and then [later] the green card came.”⁴¹⁰ This family’s story highlights how the military was invested in overriding the U.S. citizenship rights of Chamorros in the perceived name of national security. In response, Chamorros and Filipinos utilized family ties and networks to circumvent the U.S. military’s attempt to deport Filipino men who married Chamorro women. The De La Cruz’s story illustrates that BPM’s attempt to deport Eddie De La Cruz was thwarted because he and Barbara De La Cruz were courageous enough to evade the BPM police patrol following the advice they received from the wife of a Chamorro immigration officer.



Figure 4.1 Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz. Source: Tim De La Cruz.

Some Chamorros and Filipinos relied on family networks to circumvent military immigration law. In addition, Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz’s love for one another was a risk they were willing to take in order to avoid his deportation. As historian Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr., argues in his work on Filipino and Mexican interracial relations, “multiracial/multiethnic settings ultimately

⁴¹⁰ De La Cruz interview, April 24, 2013.

lead to the formation of interethnic mixing and mixed race children through personal relationships, shared experiences, and overlapping histories.”⁴¹¹ For Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam, shared cultural, historical, and religious backgrounds made such relations possible. Unfortunately, though, not all Chamorro-Filipino couples were as fortunate as the De La Cruz family.

The deportation of Filipino men who married Chamorro women became a contentious issue. Take, for instance, a letter written by the Philippine vice consul and principal officer, Irineo D. Cornista, to MASDELCO personnel manager, George C. Shaumard. As Cornista stated, “I have received several requests for help, verbal and in writing, from Filipinos of the Roxas Camp that they are being sent home to the Philippines because their naval security clearances have been revoked allegedly on the ground that they are married to Guamanians...”⁴¹² While it is unknown how many Filipino men were deported for marrying Chamorro women, Cornista’s letter shows that the military did repatriate some of these men. These occurrences were frequent enough that Filipino men asked the Philippine consulate to intervene on their behalf. Conversely, military officials believed that Chamorro-Filipino marriages were fictitious and were simply a strategy that Filipino men used to obtain permanent residency. However, not all Filipino laborers were against the deportation of Filipino men who married Chamorro women.

Camp Roxas laborer, J.C. Soriano, supported the U.S. military’s deportation of Filipino men who married Chamorro women to gain citizenship. In a letter he wrote to the naval commander, he expressed:

⁴¹¹ Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr., *Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 6.

⁴¹² Irineo D. Cornista, “Correspondence to George C. Shumard,” April 6, 1957, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Our country is poor so most of my countrymen doesn't [sic] care whether they're committing bigamy as long as they can become U.S. citizen and stay on any U.S. territory, and one easy way out is to marry Guamanians, so they can have a chance to stay, then after becoming U.S. citizen to be divorced or to desert and proceed home for re-union with the first and true wife, and stay for good...⁴¹³

Soriano's letter demonstrates that some Filipino men utilized interracial marriage with Chamorro women as a means to obtain U.S. permanent residency. While not all Filipino men had these intentions, Soriano's comments fueled military suspicions that these interracial unions were based on deceit. Soriano's motives to write this letter in support of Filipino deportation were predicated on his national pride since he believed these men were "abandoning their country to become U.S. citizen[s], not for love, but for money only."⁴¹⁴ However, his remarks implied that Chamorro women were willing to marry Filipino workers. Thus, military officials viewed Chamorro women as potentially subversive, since they could not always determine whether they married for love or financial gain. Regardless of their reason, the military viewed Chamorro women who married Filipino men with suspicion because they aided them in obtaining residency. For example, one military official claimed, "Contract laborers have been marrying citizens (mostly Guamanian women) at the rate of about fifty-five per year. There appears to be no feasible way to discourage these marriages and presumably they will continue as long as these aliens are used here. Once married the alien is eligible to obtain permanent resident status and then after three years United States citizenship."⁴¹⁵ For Chamorro women, Filipino men

⁴¹³ J.C. Soriano, Letter to Commander Naval Forces, May 10, 1958, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

represented potential marriage partners with similar cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. Filipino men were also seen as potentially good financial providers since they had access to steady employment. Even though naval officials believed there was no way to “discourage” marriages between them, the military and its contractors still attempted to limit the number of Filipinos on the island. In an attempt to curtail these interracial relationships, some U.S. officials were willing to take extreme measures to deport these men.

In some cases, U.S. officials acted with severe racial malice in their attempts to stifle Chamorro-Filipino unions. For example, Dave Aldridge, a U.S. immigration officer on Guam was investigated for his actions because he was “influenced by his personal dislike of Filipinos which causes him [to] pursue unwarranted severe policy in dealing with cases involving infractions of U.S. I.N.S. regulations by Filipinos on Guam.”⁴¹⁶ In response, some Chamorro women and Filipino men lived together without being married in hopes of avoiding this fate.⁴¹⁷ While this allowed Filipino men to avoid deportation, it still had a drawback because their residency on Guam was still temporary. The military also utilized other deplorable strategies to prevent Filipino residency on the island.

The U.S. Navy relied on the security clearance program to prevent the return to Guam of Filipino men. Specifically, the navy denied them return permits if they had married Chamorro women while they were employed as contract laborers.⁴¹⁸ For these men, leaving Guam posed a major risk of temporary or permanent exile from the island. This was especially problematic

⁴¹⁶ COMNAVMARIANAS, “Personal for ADM Stump from RADM Ammon,” February 1957, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration and Records Administration and Records Administration and Records Administration and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴¹⁷ Paredes, May 12, 1958.

⁴¹⁸ Felix B. Stump, “Repatriation of Filipino Contract Laborer Employees on Guam; Additional Information Concerning,” June 12, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

since many of them still financially supported relatives and family members living in the Philippines. This conundrum forced Filipino men to choose between visiting their family in the Philippines or being separated from their spouses on Guam. In 1956, it was reported that eighty Filipino men could not rejoin their Chamorro wives on Guam because the navy had denied their requests to reenter the island through the security clearance program.⁴¹⁹ Thus, the security clearance policy was an effective method of separating Chamorro-Filipino couples.

Another ploy the U.S. military relied on to prevent Chamorro-Filipino marriages was the encouragement of Chamorro-white American unions, an interracial relationship that did not pose a threat to U.S. national security. The U.S. military officially promoted interracial romantic/sexual relations among Chamorro women and white American soldiers through popular culture. This sanctioned interracial encounter was predicated on a discourse that presented Chamorro women as Americanized, modern, clean, and sexually available.⁴²⁰ In June 1945, *Life* magazine republished an article that was originally written in the U.S. Marine magazine *Leatherneck*. This article featured the photos of nine Chamorro women who were praised for their “glamour” and “beauty.” The unknown author wrote:

The U.S. Marines have long felt that somewhere, somehow, romance could be found in the fabled South Seas...a bouquet of pin-up girls from Guam makes its appearance...The young people all go to school and learn English. The impeccable cleanliness of the young Chamorro women of Guam has already become celebrated in the Pacific.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ Jose C. Abcede, “Guam Policy Explained: US Naval Commander says Navy out to Keep ‘Guam for Guamanians,’ Cites Strategy Needs,” *The Manila Times*, October 12, 1956.

⁴²⁰ For more on sexual relationships between American servicemen in U.S. occupied places, see Katharine H.S. Moon, *Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Ji-Yeon Yuh, “Imagined Community: sisterhood and Resistance among Korean Military Brides in America, 1950-1996,” in *Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology*, eds. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 221-236.

This article shows that the military was invested in creating a perception that Chamorro women were modern through their beauty, cleanliness, dress, and education. Just as importantly, these women were depicted as sexually available to military and American civilian audiences who might have read this article in *Leatherneck* or *Life* magazine.



Figure 4.2 Guam “Pin-Up” Models. Source: *Life* 1945.

As scholars Alys Eve Weinbaum, Lynn M. Thomas, Priti Ramamurthy, Uta G. Poiger, Madeleine Yue Dong, and Tani E. Barlow assert, “What identified modern girls was their use of specific commodities and their explicit eroticism...Adorned in provocative fashions, in pursuit of romantic love, modern girls appeared to disregard roles of dutiful daughter, wife, and mother.”⁴²² While the display of Chamorros embracing modernity was not problematic, it was the gendered and sexual depiction of these women as modern that made these images ripe for hetero-patriarchal military consumption. Furthermore, the military was invested in Chamorro and white

⁴²¹ *Life*, “Speaking of Pictures...Marines Find Pin-Ups and Glamour on Guam,” July 18, 1945, 12-14.

⁴²² Alys Even Weinbaum, Lynn M. Thomas, Priti Ramamurthy, Uta G. Poiger, Madeleine Y. Dong, and Tani E. Barlow eds., “The Modern Girl as Heuristic Device: Collaboration, Connective Comparison, Multidirectional Citation,” in *The Modern Girl Around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization*, eds. Alys Even Weinbaum, Lynn M. Thomas, Priti Ramamurthy, Uta G. Poiger, Madeleine Y. Dong, and Tani E. Barlow (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 1.

American dating because it thwarted the opportunity for some Filipino men to meet Chamorro women. To encourage interracial relationships among Chamorros and whites, the military sponsored enlisted men's dances that brought together Chamorro women and white American servicemen.

Enlisted men's dances fostered interracial relationships among Chamorro women and white American servicemen only. Many of these dances took place during holidays such as the Thanksgiving Eve supper dance. Monthly military reports contained numerous photos of young Chamorro women and young white American servicemen dancing and socializing. Various captions accompanied these photos such as "Just a few of the happy couples enjoying the naval government enlisted men's club buffet" and "A few of the couples at the naval government enlisted men's...dance enjoy the music while waiting for the next dance."⁴²³ These dances served as one of the primary meeting grounds for Chamorro women and white American servicemen. In contrast, African American and Latino soldiers stationed on Guam were excluded from these dances. These social spaces were typically reserved for white American men, which further reinforced American notions of empire and white supremacy in Guam.



⁴²³ Naval Government of Guam, "Monthly Report for November 1946," November 30, 1946, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Figure 4.3 Enlisted Men's Dance. Source: *Life* 1945.

For white American soldiers, these dances gave them the chance to meet, socialize, and possibly engage in romantic/sexual relationships with Chamorro women. For the military, these dances helped stymie the opportunity for Filipino men to meet Chamorro women. Consequently, the U.S. military perceived Chamorro women who engaged in interracial relations with white American servicemen as loyal. Chamorro women also gained similar social and relationship opportunities by dating white American men.

As historian Harvey R. Neptune has argued in his work on the U.S. occupation of Trinidad, relations between Trinidadian women and U.S. servicemen included a spectrum of motivations for these women such as financial gain, love, and for the sheer excitement to date someone from the continental United States.⁴²⁴ Chamorro women dated and/or married white American servicemen for a plethora of reasons as well. Dating white American servicemen gave Chamorro women the opportunity to be exposed to American forms of popular culture that included attire, food, and music. Moreover, choosing to marry or date white American soldiers came with greater privileges than marrying Chamorro or Filipino men since they were U.S. citizens who were racially privileged through their higher wages and their access to the best resources on the island (e.g. commissary and post exchange benefits). Ultimately, the military's encouragement of interracial romantic relationships between Chamorro women and white American men played a part in the further deterioration of indigenous customs of marriage.

The creation of these enlisted men's dances also contributed to the erosion of the Chamorro custom *mamaisen saina*, the indigenous practice of requesting parental/elderly support in the making of Chamorro marriages. Since these dances were interracial spaces, the ability for

⁴²⁴ Harvey R. Neptune, *Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 159.

a couple to participate in *mamaisen saina* was unlikely due to the fact that white American servicemen were not cognizant of this custom and that most of them did not have their parents and grandparents on the island to help them complete the ceremony.⁴²⁵ Instead, military officials became the authority to approve interracial marriages that involved American servicemen. For example, when a Chamorro woman and a white American serviceman did want to marry, they were required to seek the approval of a military official.⁴²⁶ Thus, it was more important for Chamorro women to obtain the approval of a military official rather than their own parents since their marriage could not occur without the military's consent. While military officials and American servicemen were open to these interracial unions, not all white Americans in the continental United States were as accepting.

Some white American families reinforced empire and white supremacy as they rejected the idea of their sons' marrying Chamorro women. In 1946, William P. Hinson requested to be discharged on Guam so he could marry a Chamorro woman who he claimed to have impregnated. Hinson's mother, M.T. Hinson, sent a letter from Charleston, South Carolina, to the island commander of Guam, imploring him to deny her son's request for discharge:

It is definitely against my wishes that he be permitted to marry a native. He also tells me this girl is to become a mother in the near future and he is responsible for her condition. He might be but can we be positive of this? Bill has been stationed on this island about 14 months and of course, you know more about the social conditions than I, but they must be limited and so very different from our good old American customs...It grieves

⁴²⁵ *Mamaisen saina* is an indigenous marriage tradition in which the families of a prospective couple meet over the course of several days to engage in various ceremonies to approve the marriage. This custom is important in the perpetuation of other indigenous Chamorro principles such as *chenchule'* and *nginge'*. For more on *mamaisen saina* see, Shannon J. Murphy, "Mamaisen Saina: Marriage Rituals," *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/mamaisen-saina-marriage-rituals/>.

⁴²⁶ Carmen G. Franquez, "Permission to Leave Guam and Transportation to the United States, Request for," May 6, 1946, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

me deeply to hear of this young girls [*sic*] condition and if we can make any restitution we would be so glad, but I don't feel as if a young boy's entire future, the giving up of his country, customs and family, should be sacrificed for one mistake – do you? Have a talk with Billy, try to show him that these inter-racial marriages just don't work out.⁴²⁷

M.T. Hinson's letter highlights that not all white Americans believed Chamorro women made suitable spouses due to their racial and cultural background. Her racist attitude towards Chamorro women was further illustrated in her suggestion that her son might not be the father of the baby, thus implying that Chamorro women were hypersexual. In the end, the island commander granted M.T. Hinson's request because her son was a minor, which resulted in his transfer to the continental United States. Furthermore, this example reveals that even though the military and the media encouraged interracial romantic/sexual relationships among Chamorro women and white American men, the military did not fully endorse interracial marriages between these two groups. In this instance, the military upheld white supremacist ideology, and also acted as an agent in separating this Chamorro-white American couple, similar to what it had customarily done to Chamorro-Filipino partners. In another example, American servicemen Edward Leiss wrote a letter requesting that Emily Perez, a Chamorro woman, be allowed to join him in New York. Leiss wrote:

When Miss Perez arrives here I shall be completely responsible for her, as we have been planning to be married. I come from a fairly well to do family which I am now living with and I can assure you she shall be very pleased here in every form...I am quite

⁴²⁷ M.T. Hinson, Letter to Island Commander of Guam, January 19, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

certain that Miss Perez too comes from a nice family as she is quite a cultured lady so therefore we should find excellent happiness throughout life.⁴²⁸

Leiss' letter demonstrates that race and culture played a major decision in his acceptance of Perez. His belief that she was "cultured" made her suitable as a potential wife. While Leiss believed she was cultured enough to marry, his family was not as receptive. Leiss claimed that his family was wealthy enough to take care of them both. However, Leiss' story had an end similar to that of the Hinson story. On April 5, 1947, Leiss sent a telegram to Guam that stated, "Please cancel request of Miss Emily Perez [*sic*] complications at home force me the [*sic*] cancellation."⁴²⁹ It can be inferred that his request to cancel Perez's transfer to New York was due to his family's objections to the interracial relationship. In some cases, these tensions around interracial dating resulted in violent encounters.

At times, interracial violence occurred in competition over Chamorro women, which shaped the discourse that Filipino men were violent. On July 1957, American serviceman Lawrence R. Gluesencamp was visiting a Chamorro woman at her home in the village of Dededo. According to one naval report, "He [Gluesencamp] accompanied her outside where she took a shower and upon returning to the house both he and she retired to the bedroom, notwithstanding the arrival of another uninvited suitor, one Pablo Madriaga."⁴³⁰ This encounter turned violent and resulted in Gluesencamp jumping out of the woman's window when Madriaga pulled out a knife. Gluesencamp sustained several injuries, the most severe being a fractured

⁴²⁸ Edward Leiss, Letter to Island Commander Guam, February 25, 1946. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴²⁹ Edward Leiss, Telegram to American Consul, April 5, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴³⁰ Judge Advocate General, "Inves. – Injuries to Lawrence R. Gluesencamp, Jr.," November 20, 1957, RG 64-A-744, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

vertebra.⁴³¹ It is unknown if Madriaga was ever caught, but violent encounters such as these only reinforced the military's views that Filipino men were not only politically subversive and disease ridden but also undesirable. Other examples of interracial relationships proved to be more deadly.

Military officials were also alarmed by violent incidents that involved white American men and Chamorro women. On June 2, 1949, Walter Ralph Compton who worked as a civilian military laborer for the navy, committed suicide at his home in the village of Asan. According to reports, Compton and his Chamorro wife returned from Church and "retired for the night...Her husband got out of bed and started drinking beer and reading the Catholic Testament. When his wife objected to his drinking he ran her outside and locked the door. She was trying to enter the kitchen when she heard the report of a gun."⁴³² Compton had killed himself by firing a rifle bullet through his head. The military report did not state why he killed himself but news such as this easily traveled across the island between families and friends. Violent incidents such as these served as a reminder to the military that interracial relationships needed to be monitored closely in order to protect the military's moral power. Even though white American men were sometimes perceived as undesirable due to their participation in thievery and violent acts, Filipino men were perceived to have the greatest affinity for violence among interracial partners.

On July 31, 1957, a Filipino laborer named Florencio B. Angobung went on a shooting rampage while working at the U.S. Air Force's laundromat during an argument he had with his Chamorro wife. According to the laundry manager William Weldon, "Angobung next grabbed a gun in the laundry office, shot Mrs. Guerrero, and then fatally shot Pedro C. Cruz. Angobung

⁴³¹ J.R. Lanning, Telegram to Commanding Officer Guam, July 12, 1957, RG 64-A-744, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴³² John J. Schuty, "Report of an alleged suicide in Case of Walter Ralph Compton," June 7, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

then chased after his wife, Maria, 26. Ana Leon Guerrero, 26, shielded her sister and was shot in the abdomen. While his wife hid under a desk, Angobung ran to the far side of the office and shot himself.”⁴³³ Violent events such as these informed how some Chamorros and military officials viewed Filipino men as violent. Newspapers such as *The Manila Times* were integral to the dissemination of news regarding Filipinos living in Guam. Thus, people living in the Philippines and Filipinos in Guam learned about sensational and violent encounters through periodicals and gossip.⁴³⁴ As a result, not all Chamorros supported Chamorro-Filipino romantic relationships. As mentioned earlier, Barbara Castro De La Cruz recalled her parents telling her not to marry Eddie De La Cruz because “he will kill you.”⁴³⁵

Even though violent encounters between Chamorro women and Filipino men occurred, the marriage of Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz is an example of how some Chamorros rejected white supremacist ideology. Other Chamorro women such as Julita Santos Walin also believed that Filipino men were good marriage partners. Walin met her Filipino husband in 1954, while he was playing in a baseball game that she had attended at Camp Roxas. She recalled in an oral history interview, “I was engaged to a Chamorro when I met him [her future Filipino husband] but you know the feeling is not that strong.”⁴³⁶ She continued, “A lot of Chamorros got married to Filipinos because they said they were good. The Filipinos are very nice to their wives. There are plenty Filipino who marry Chamorro.”⁴³⁷ Walin’s experience echoes that of Barbara De La

⁴³³ *The Manila Times*, “Guam Filipino Kills 2, Self,” August 1, 1957, Vertical File, Lopez Museum and Library.

⁴³⁴ For more on transnational Filipino identity, see Vicente L. Rafael, “‘Your Grief is Our Gossip’: Overseas Filipinos and Other Spectral Presences,” *Public Culture* 9 (1997): 267-91.

⁴³⁵ De La Cruz interview, April 24, 2013.

⁴³⁶ Julita Santos Walin, interview with author, May 6, 2013, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

Cruz, emphasizing that interracial marriage between Chamorros and Filipinos in postwar Guam was commonplace. Walin's interview also illustrates that some Chamorro women and Filipino men met at athletic events such as baseball or basketball games. In addition to sports events, taxi-dance halls served as another space for Filipino men to meet women.

Taxi-Dance Clubs

Military officials and some Chamorros perceived women who worked as dancers at taxi-dance halls as immoral prostitutes. These dancers were primarily white American women who came to Guam from Hawai'i and the U.S. west coast. These women worked for club owners such as James K. Kaanehe who was a multiracial Hawaiian and white American who had migrated to Guam from Hawai'i in 1951.⁴³⁸ As was the case in the continental United States, Filipino workers were the main patrons of these dance clubs.⁴³⁹ Jazz musicians such as Louie Gombar came to Guam and became well known for the music they played in these clubs and other venues around the island.⁴⁴⁰ Local owners and promoters of these clubs benefitted from the Filipino men and white American women who relied on their shops for clothes, shoes, and cosmetics to be used in preparation for a night in these taxi-dance halls. A typical evening in

⁴³⁸ Leagle.com, Government of Guam v. Kaanehe, http://leagle.com/decision/1954139124FSupp15_1137.xml/GOVERNMENT%20OF%20GUAM%20v.%20KAANEHE. For more on when Kaanehe came to Guam, see Ancestry.com, "Agaña, Guam, U.S., Passenger and Crew Lists of Arriving Vessels and Airplanes, 1948-1963," [online database]. Referenced on March 20, 2015. According to census information, James K. Kaanehe was born in Hawaii in 1921 and had worked as a shipping clerk at the age of 18. His father worked as a ship builder for the U.S. Navy, which is most likely how he obtained his job as a shipping clerk. It can be inferred that Kaanehe was multiracial as his father is listed as Hawaiian and his mother as Hawaiian and Caucasian. He was the second oldest out of 8 siblings total. For more regarding his family background see, Ancestry.com, "1940 United States Federal Census," [online database]. Referenced on March 20, 2015.

⁴³⁹ For more on taxi-dance halls in the continental United States, see Linda M. Espana-Maram, *Creating Masculinity in Los Angeles's Little Manila: Working-Class Filipinos and Popular Culture, 1920s-1950s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) and Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Penguin, 1989).

⁴⁴⁰ James Perez Viernes, "Louie Gombar," *Guampedia*. <http://www.guampedia.com/louie-gombar/>.

these clubs included large groups of Filipino men who purchased tickets that allowed them to dance with the women who worked there. Military officials, Government of Guam representatives, various island organizations, and some island residents viewed these clubs with disdain because they believed these halls were sites of prostitution. While these spaces provided the opportunity for Filipino men and white American women to violate racial norms of anti-miscegenation, it was the debate over these clubs as sites of immoral activity that was most pervasive.

Some island residents believed that taxi-dance halls posed a moral threat to their families.⁴⁴¹ The President of the Teachers Association (PTA) of Mangilao, Mr. Siguenza, stated, “The conduct of the taxi-dancers is such that residents do not want their children exposed to it. The children are becoming uncontrollable. Demonstrations of the taxi-dancers is not conducive to good citizenship...A man who goes to such places becomes addicted to them, the same effect as dope.”⁴⁴² Siguenza and other members of the PTA subscribed to the idea that these clubs were sites of illicit activity and were negatively influencing the island’s youth to engage in immoral activities. He also feared that local men would succumb to visiting these clubs. Mrs. Agueda Johnston also echoed a similar concern, “...taxi-dancing and prostitution are one, so we are against taxi-dancers for that very reason. It is similar to prostitution.”⁴⁴³ Military officials shared the sentiments of island residents such as Siguenza and Johnston. *The Manila Times* reported, “The former wife of a navy officer who went into the entertainment business [taxi-dancer] made \$10,000 in two months. On investigation by the authorities, she revealed that not

⁴⁴¹ The establishment of these clubs date back to the 1920s in which Filipino male laborers who worked throughout California attended dance halls where they would purchase tickets that guaranteed them an opportunity to dance with a hostess at the hall, who were usually white American women.

⁴⁴² Guam Legislature, “Taxi-dance Hearing,” January 16, 1954, Vertical File, Senators’ Speeches, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam. The first name of Siguenza is unknown.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.* Johnston communicated part of her testimony in the Chamorro language.

all of the money was made in dancing alone.”⁴⁴⁴ In addition, military officials were worried that teenage Chamorro girls were being recruited to work as prostitutes based on this and another surveillance report that claimed a white male American civilian was allegedly running a brothel out of his home.⁴⁴⁵ Such allegations alarmed the George Washington High School Parent-Teacher’s Association, the Guam Women’s Club, and the Vicariate Union of Holy Name Societies, organizations that opposed the taxi-dance clubs. Proponents of the banning of taxi-dance halls characterized men who attended these halls as contributing to “bad moral” behavior because they spent their money in these clubs instead of in support of their families.⁴⁴⁶ However, they also considered undesirable other men such as Chamorros or anyone else who attended or worked at these halls. Even though local conservatives led a movement to ban these clubs, others were supportive of their existence.

Some local Chamorro and white Americans believed the banning of these clubs was undemocratic. In a letter sent to the Guam Congress, local businessman Fred Moylan wrote:⁴⁴⁷

To say the taxi dancers are prostitutes, this is [*sic*] wrong and libel statement for in all walks of life you have women or men with the desire for companionship. Some choose their companions early in life and later find out that they are not evenly mated and because of their religions, honor, children, etc. do not wish to be separated. Do you say

⁴⁴⁴ V. Williams, “Information Report: Office of Naval Intelligence,” April 12, 1954, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁴⁵ Omar L. Harrington, “Minutes of Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board Meeting,” March 25, 1954, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁴⁶ Mrs. Paul D. Shriver, Letter to the Guam Legislature, December 8, 1953, Vertical File, Guam Legislature Files 1950s, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁴⁷ Francis Lester “Scotty” Moylan was a white American local businessman who came to Guam in 1946 by way of Hawai‘i. The U.S. War Department asked Moylan to establish local business services to aid in the military expansion of Guam. Some of his businesses included camera film development, general merchandise stores, car dealerships, and car insurance. For more on Moylan see, <http://mbjguam.com/2010/08/30/obituary-francis-lester-aeoscottyae%C2%9D-moylan/>.

then these people should not find enjoyment elsewhere, but to break up their homes, etc. No gentlemen, we cannot dictate any domestic laws to govern a family's thoughts. This would be communism.⁴⁴⁸

Moylan argued that the prohibiting of taxi-dance clubs was illegal and undemocratic. He also thought that the government should not have the power to restrict the decisions that individuals made based on the generalization that all taxi dancers were prostitutes. However, it is possible that Moylan was also financially invested in the survival of these clubs, since he was a local businessman who most likely benefitted from the patronage of people who purchased goods or services from his general merchandise stores, concession stands, and his camera film development shops. Sociologist Rick Baldoz discusses a similar point in his study on Filipino immigration to the United States. He asserts, "A host of actors in civil society also contributed to the problem: employers seeking cheap labor, taxi-dance-hall proprietors, and white women who socialized across the color line. All these individuals allegedly put self interest ahead of the public good by allowing Filipinos to infiltrate white society."⁴⁴⁹ Moylan was not the only white American who believed banning taxi-dance clubs was a "communist" act.

Other proponents of taxi-dance clubs cited the importance of upholding free enterprise as an important part of the U.S. political system. In a letter addressed to the Speaker of the Guam Congress, A.B. Wonpat and Dr. T.A. Darling noted:

We cannot legislate the abolition of any honest, free enterprise. If we do, we are communistic to that extent, going against what the constitution of the United States of America stands for...It is beside the point entirely in considering whether its abolition

⁴⁴⁸ Fred Moylan, Letter to the Congress of Guam, January 4, 1954, Vertical File, Guam Legislature, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁴⁹ Rick Baldoz, *The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898-1946* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 14.

should be considered, as such abolition is entirely unconstitutional and un-American, and un-democratic.⁴⁵⁰

Darling's letter illustrates that he believed taxi-dance clubs should not be prohibited because they were examples of free enterprise. His position paralleled that of Moylan, but his concern was not whether these clubs were immoral, but that prohibiting them would be an act of communism. Island residents such as Darling, Moylan, and others believed that the banning of these dance halls would be a violation of the political rights that U.S. citizens were guaranteed. Thus, the restriction on economic and political rights harmed the U.S. government's position as a proponent of democracy and capitalism. This issue was critical enough that the Governor of Guam, Ford Q. Elvidge, made it a point to abolish taxi-dance halls on the island in 1954.⁴⁵¹

Governor Elvidge was one of the staunchest critics of taxi-dance clubs on Guam. His wife, Anita Elvidge, wrote a memoir documenting their time on the island. Anita recalled that Ford stated:

I am having a time about those girls. At the bottom of every tavern brawl, there's one of them. Women are coming to my office [governor's office] to complain that their daughters want to become taxi dancers and their husbands are straying...Security regulations don't have any effect unless the girls have police records or are subversive. They are coming onto the island by the plane load [*sic*]. They get money from these unattached Filipinos and are spending so much that the merchants welcome them. Some of the leading legislators are involved. One of them came to see me yesterday. He said he did not see how he could be against taxi dance business because he'd be interfering

⁴⁵⁰ T.A. Darling, Letter to A.B. Wonpat, January 14, 1954, Vertical File, Guam Legislature, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁵¹ Ford Q. Elvidge served as the Governor of Guam from 1953 to 1956.

with private enterprise. His wife has a dress shop. They are getting into the service clubs. The welfare of our men is being affected.⁴⁵²

Governor Elvidge's comments reveal the economic and social impact that these dancers and the taxi-dance halls had on the island. These dancers contributed to the island economy through their purchasing power, while local business owners profited from their patronage. However, these clubs also had a cultural impact similar to that of enlisted men's dances. Specifically, these sites contributed to the transformation of indigenous Chamorro marriage customs such as *mamaisen saina*. Since these clubs were interracial spaces, the ability for a couple to participate in *mamaisen saina* was unlikely due to cultural differences. Furthermore, Governor Elvidge was not only concerned with the conflict over the prohibiting of these halls, but he was also distressed that the dancers were gaining access to U.S. military service clubs. Like other island residents, he viewed these halls as sites of undesirable and immoral activity. Organizations such as the George Washington High School's Parent Teachers Association, Guam Women's Club, Parent Teachers Association of Mangilao, and the Vicariate Union of Holy Name Societies all supported the banning of taxi-dance halls. For example, the Guam Women's Club stated, "the existence of such dance halls has a bad moral influence on the young people of Guam and, from their operation, tragic home situations are developing...if allowed to continue and multiply will, in time, render this community a less desirable place in which to live and bring up children."⁴⁵³ Other organizations shared a similar sentiment. In 1954, the Vicariate Union of Holy Name Societies stated, "the continued existence of such establishments [taxi-dance halls] constitutes a

⁴⁵² Anita M. Elvidge, *Guam Interlude* (n.p.: privately printed, 1972), 120. It is unknown which "leading" Guam Legislatures were involved or supported taxi-dance halls.

⁴⁵³ Mrs. Paul D. Shriver, "Guam Women's Club to Guam Legislature," December 8, 1953, Vertical File, Guam Legislature, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

danger to the common good and morality of the territory.”⁴⁵⁴ With the support of these organizations, Governor Elvidge passed Public Law 2-054, Bill No. 127 that outlawed these clubs in 1954. While government officials and local organizations supported the prohibition of these clubs, military officials remained publicly silent on the issue of taxi-dance clubs since they have long endorsed the operation of brothels near American bases.⁴⁵⁵ Even though they did not publically comment on the halls, the ONI continued to monitor political debates surrounding them. The military believed these clubs were a threat because they provided Filipino men with access to becoming permanent residents through marrying white American women dancers. Therefore, this gave them another opportunity to obtain permanent residency, while also sparking white supremacist fears of miscegenation. All in all, these taxi-dance clubs appeared to be another potential site for subversive activity.

Undesirable Activity, Interracial Violence, and the Protecting of the U.S. Military’s Cold War Reputation

Unlike Filipinos or Chamorros, white American servicemen and civilian military workers were only perceived as undesirables when they had committed acts that were believed to jeopardize the military’s Cold War reputation. U.S. Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Felix Stump issued a military memo regarding personnel conduct that stated:

This leadership, based on an example of fine virtue, the highest traits of character and impeccable conduct and appearance has been an important factor in the development of

⁴⁵⁴ Vicariate Union of Holy Name Societies, “Petition to the Second Guam Legislature,” January 4, 1954, Vertical File, Guam Legislature, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁵⁵ For more on the U.S. military’s endorsement of brothels near bases, see Grace M. Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008) and Katharine H.S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

our country's worldwide responsibilities. Never has it been more important that the world have confidence in the leadership of the United States. That confidence must be justified by fitting demeanor and integrity, particularly of our officials abroad. Foreign opinion of our character and integrity is influenced by the bearing and deportment of the individuals of our service who are observed in official, social, and day-by-day associations.⁴⁵⁶

This memo illustrates that American military and government officials were cognizant that the actions of their soldiers influenced how other countries and individuals perceived them. They were also keenly aware that the various spaces their servicemen frequented, whether in a formal or informal capacity, were significant in safeguarding the U.S. military's Cold War reputation.⁴⁵⁷ This was necessary to the U.S. government's foreign policy in protecting its diplomatic position in Asia, while simultaneously trying to limit the growth of communism.⁴⁵⁸ One activity that the military considered undesirable was the stealing of government property.

The U.S. military particularly tried to curb servicemen's and civilian laborers' engaged in theft and black market transactions. In February 1949, naval firemen Aaron Fletcher, James Palmer, and Arnold Frisch were all arrested for stealing sheet metal that they sold to a Chamorro man.⁴⁵⁹ These men were eventually tried for theft but the results of their trial were not

⁴⁵⁶ Felix B. Stump, "Command Responsibility in Representing the United States," June 24, 1954, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁵⁷ For more on the U.S. military's Cold War reputation, see Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1997).

⁴⁵⁸ R.H. Fogler, "Negotiations between U.S. Government and Philippines Government Regarding Wage Rates and Conditions of Employment Applicable to Alien Filipinos Employed by Military or Military Contractors at Military Bases in Guam and the Philippines," February 27, 1956, RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

documented. In another example, naval personnel Lloyd Harbison and Thomas Lee Leton were arrested on April 6, 1954 for stealing a shipment of meat and coffee with the intent to sell the items to a civilian living in Hagåtña.⁴⁶⁰ Harbison and Leton were caught because they drove over a security gate in an attempt to avoid security office inspectors. Both of these men were recommended for general court martial trial.⁴⁶¹ In more extreme cases, military civilian laborers who frequently violated laws were subject to exile. Electrician Joseph Borden was recommended for deportation because the Guam police had arrested him three times for speeding, drunk driving, and being in a restricted area without a pass.⁴⁶² In cases such as these, military officials and Chamorros perceived white Americans as undesirable, but not as subversive as in the case of Filipino men. White Americans were only deemed subversive if they were believed to be communists or participated in labor organizing.

When military officials did identify white Americans as subversives, they did so not because of their racial background but due to their labor and political organizing. In 1951, an unidentified white American man was caught distributing “communist literature” to Filipino workers.⁴⁶³ In this case, the unknown American civilian was viewed as a subversive due to the fact that he was engaging in labor organizing. However, there were very few documented cases of American communist activity on Guam, which meant white American civilians were rarely

⁴⁵⁹ B.D. Smith, “Recommendation for Trial by General Court Martial in Case of Aaron Prentess Fletcher, James Bruce Palmer, and Arnold William Frisch,” April 12, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶⁰ E.I. Settle, “Preliminary Inquiry, Report of,” April 9, 1954, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶¹ It is unknown if these men were criminally tried.

⁴⁶² H.V. Hopkins, “Joseph Young Borden; Deportation of,” June 21, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶³ Quentin Pope, “Guam’s Security Menaced Under Civilian Regime,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 28, 1951, 5.

perceived as subversive. Thus, white Americans were primarily viewed as either loyal or undesirable. In addition, the military was still invested in protecting its Cold War reputation against undesirable activity. To do so, they issued various orders to limit the chances for their servicemen to engage in activities that would be deemed undesirable when interacting with Chamorros and Filipinos.

Bars and restaurants were the most common spaces that brought Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans together, which sometimes resulted in gendered and racial physical violence. On March 28, 1948, a fight broke out between a group of American servicemen and a group of Filipino male workers from Luzon Stevedoring at the Rancho Café, a Chamorro-owned restaurant in the village of Barrigada. According to police interviews and reports, an argument occurred between an American and a Filipino, starting a large-scale fight that involved two-dozen men.⁴⁶⁴ While it is unclear why this fight took place, an investigation confirmed that rocks and beer bottles were thrown between the two groups. This violent encounter resulted in injuries for two American servicemen, who needed medical treatment, and the arrest of two Filipino men named Monico Vellar and Gregorio Velasco. Another example of interracial conflict occurred at the Tropical Café in Barrigada. According to the Guam Police, American servicemen Tommy Lee Scrivner and Charles Jenkins attempted to open a jukebox at the Tropical Café. A Chamorro woman named Teresita Palomo, who worked there as a cashier, recalled, “As I approached said sailor I asked him why that he open the juke box and he told me to shut up. I then asked him where did he get his key and told me that he got it from a guy that owned a juke box.”⁴⁶⁵ In the end, the Guam Police only charged the men with malicious

⁴⁶⁴ M.B. McNeely, “Report of Arrest – Case of Monico Vellar and Gregorio Velasco,” April 6, 1948, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

mischief rather than attempted robbery on the idea that “it would have been impossible to rob the jukebox without the proper tools,” and that there was “no criminal intent, but that Scrivner decided, out of curiosity, to open the box with the possibility that he could play a few free selections.”⁴⁶⁶ Thus, the military resorted to restricting certain establishments in order to control interracial encounters among Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans, in hopes of protecting its reputation.

For example, Chamorro-owned establishments that were known to be sites for interracial violence such as restaurants, bars, and cafes were commonly designated as “out of bounds.” In November 1947, several businesses such as Aloha Tavern, Cosmopolitan Café, and Seven Sister’s Café were all placed on the restricted list.⁴⁶⁷ Since bars and restaurants were common public spaces frequented by Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans, violent encounters often occurred. Restricting certain businesses helped prevent disorderly behavior by American servicemen. Military officials also restricted some restaurants and cafés due to sanitary concerns. For example, in April 1952, over two-dozen restaurants and cafes were designated as out of bounds due to their poor level of cleanliness. Some of these restaurants included Cock of the Walk, Kit Kat Café, and Mabuhay Restaurant.⁴⁶⁸ Restaurants that were restricted due to poor conditions could be removed from the list if they addressed the military’s concerns regarding their sanitation. This authority to designate businesses as restricted areas gave the military

⁴⁶⁵ R.H. Albert, “Police Statement,” November 9, 1953, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶⁶ Arthur M. Tavasci, “Police Incident Report,” December 8, 1953, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶⁷ G.R. Newton, “Placing of Certain Pubic Places Out of Bounds to All Service Personnel,” November 25, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁶⁸ G.W. Skoldberg, “Out of Bounds Restrictions for Designated Business Establishments,” April 8, 1952, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

power to control their servicemen and social interactions on Guam. It also allowed them to regulate Chamorro establishments. In a unique case, military officials placed the home and vehicle of Robert Pennington out of bounds because they believed he was operating a brothel out of his home.⁴⁶⁹ Since military officials knew that the local Chamorro population and Americans in the United States considered prostitution immoral, it had behooved them to publically criticize these businesses. Military official L.D. McCormick issued a policy on prostitution, stating, “It is therefore correspondingly more vital that the young men whom we return to their homes after discharge are fit and reflect credit on the naval service and its consideration for its men.”⁴⁷⁰ The military believed it would be detrimental to their reputation if it were publically known that American servicemen were permitted to frequent brothels in a U.S. territory such as Guam. Instead, they chose to publically condemn the existence of these establishments by classifying them as restricted. However, military officials did quietly condone brothels since they did not actually shut them down as in the case of Pennington’s home. Thus, soldiers could continue to frequent brothels at their own risk of being punished for transgressing military policy. Besides restricting businesses, the U.S. military also passed laws regarding the use of roads in an effort to police behavior.

Government officials also tried to limit undesirable activities through the creation of laws that defined the acceptable use of public roads.⁴⁷¹ In 1947, Governor of Guam C.A. Pownall issued a general order, regulating that “naval and marine personnel will not stop their cars, park cars, loiter on roads, leave the road right-of-way for any purpose, or enter houses or buildings

⁴⁶⁹ Omar L. Harrington, “Minutes of Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board Meeting,” March 25, 1954, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁷⁰ L.D. McCormick, “Prostitution, Policy Regarding – Control of Venereal Disease,” January 14, 1946, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA

⁴⁷¹ For more on roads in Guam see Vicente M. Diaz, “...PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS...: Roads, Indigenous Identity, and American Imperialism ‘in’ Guam,” (Unpublished Essay: University of Michigan, 2011).

adjacent to the roads.”⁴⁷² The military was convinced that laws controlling the use of roads were needed, since these spaces also became sites for activities that could damage the U.S. military’s reputation. However, these orders were not always followed. On June 7, 1949, Filipino LUSTEVECO employee Elisa Pelengon offered two sailors fifty cents each to give him a ride to Camp Roxas. Two American servicemen named Floyd C. Hammers and Freddie J. Lapervse agreed to take Pelengon, but on the way to Camp Roxas Hammers and Lapervse decided to rob Pelengon. In his police interview, Pelengon stated, “...When we were near the junk at the intersection of road to base 18, the drivers said, ‘no more gas.’ The driver told me to get out of the car and when I got out, the driver pointed a knife of about one foot blade [*sic*] and asked me to give him my money while his companion held me past.”⁴⁷³ This interracial encounter resulted in Pelengon being robbed of sixty dollars and also sustaining a cut to his right hand in a scuffle over the knife. The military police eventually apprehended Hammers and Lapervse who did not initially admit to the robbery. Instead Lapervse claimed in his police statement that:

I woke up and some flip was wanting a ride home, Hammers didn’t want to take him home but he kept pestering and I said did you hear he said no. Then he kept getting hold of me like he was drunk, and something I remember asking him if he was one of those blow boy[s] and then he laughed, and put a dollar in Hammers jumper pocket and tried to get it back and Hammers told him to keep his hands out of his pocket, and then this flip turned to someone and said we robbed him.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² C.A. Pownall, “General Order 25-47: Liberty and Shore Leave on Guam,” June 13, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁷³ A.J. Carrillo, “Incident Report: Criminal Investigation Section,” June 8, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.* The word “flip” is a derogatory term used to describe a person of Filipino descent.

Lapervse's statement shows that he tried to paint Pelengon as being gay and hypersexual in order to discredit him. He went on to accuse Pelengon of framing Hammers and himself. After several interviews, in hopes of receiving leniency, both Hammers and Lapervse admitted to robbing Pelengon. While there is no record of what punishment they received, it is clear that such interracial incidents occurred during the government's regulation of the roads.⁴⁷⁵ Thus, American officials became concerned with public spaces such as roads because they were sites for interracial violence that harmed the military's reputation.

The U.S. military and the government of Guam implemented a policy that designated specific places on the island as restricted areas in order to control and limit subversive activity. On January 22, 1947, Governor of Guam C.A. Pownall issued general order 5-47 that classified all civilian contractor's camps, airfields, Apra Harbor dock areas, USCC farms, Agat-Umatac road, and the war criminal stockades as restricted areas.⁴⁷⁶ The military believed this order would keep Chamorros and Filipinos out of military areas. However, the military had already begun creating fence lines and borders around several key military bases and installations such as Naval Base Guam and Naval Air Station, Hagåtña, to keep out potential subversives. Despite this general order, undesirable activity still occurred near bases.

In one documented case, interracial violence was not isolated to bars, restaurants, and roads. In 1949, Chamorro men and American servicemen engaged in armed conflict over an alleged theft in the middle of a road near the Naval Air Station in Hagåtña. A military report noted "that an altercation had taken place...between five or six marine enlisted men and several

⁴⁷⁵ The lack of information regarding the punishment of U.S. military servicemen for committing acts of violence is unavailable. This information was recorded but most likely was never transferred to the national archives.

⁴⁷⁶ C.A. Pownall, "General Order 5-47: Designation of Restricted Areas," January 22, 1947. RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

Guamanian guards at the J&G Motor Company garage.”⁴⁷⁷ The confrontation began when the group of marines decided to approach several Chamorro guards across the road from where they stated the missing tools were last seen. This confrontation escalated and according to the American servicemen, some of the Chamorro men fired their rifles at them. One marine was hit in the head with a rifle butt and was hospitalized for his injuries. In another case of interracial violence, two Chamorro taxicab drivers were charged with murdering an American seaman.⁴⁷⁸ It is unknown how many cases of interracial violence occurred on Guam during the 1940s and 1950s because neither the military nor the Government of Guam statistically recorded the number of based on interracial violence.⁴⁷⁹ In addition, some military records remain classified, which makes it difficult to determine the number of these occurrences. The program to restrict specific areas as out of bounds was expanded to include Chamorro villages.

In 1946, the Government of Guam passed executive order 21-46 that required all non-permanent residents of Guam to follow a specific protocol if they wanted to enter Chamorro villages and residences. Specifically, they had to possess an invitation from the “head of the Chamorro household” (father of the home they intended on visiting) and a pass from the commanding officer or their company camp supervisor.⁴⁸⁰ Upon entering the village, these visitors were also required to check in at the local village police office. This policy attempted to deter Filipinos and white American civilians from engaging in subversive or undesirable actions.

⁴⁷⁷ C. Hawkins, “Alleged Offenses of Civilian Guards Employed by the J&G Motor Company,” October 25, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁷⁸ John C. Fischer, “Report of Judiciary Department for Quarter Ending 31 December 1949,” RG 38, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁷⁹ Violent incidents were recorded but they were not framed or documented as “interracial” or “violent.” While some records did mention the racial or ethnic background of the people involved, this was done with great inconsistency. Tracking the number of interracial violent crimes on the island was also difficult because Chamorros and Filipinos share some Spanish surnames.

⁴⁸⁰ C.A. Pownall, “Executive Order #21-46,” October 30, 1946, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

In 1947, executive order 21-46 was amended to include military personnel and servicemen. In addition to needing an invitation from a Chamorro person to enter a village, they also had to obtain an “authorized liberty card or pass, [and] all persons desiring such visits must also have a pass signed by the Chief of Police, Guam.”⁴⁸¹ Furthermore, these passes could only be used before sunset.⁴⁸² Military and government officials believed this policy would reduce undesirable activity amongst their soldiers.



Figure 4.4 “Out of Bounds” Sign in the village of Inarajan.
Source: University of Guam, Chamorro Studies Program.

Moreover, these policies not only made it arduous for these men to gain access to villages, they also made it challenging for Chamorros to receive visitors.

For Chamorros, the village-pass system posed a dilemma because many of them viewed it as a policy that safeguarded their families and communities, but it also limited their ability to participate in international political organizing. During a 1949 Guam Assembly meeting, Assemblyman Carlos P. Taitano stated, “If you want to continue to keep the undesirables out of our villages, we have to continue that way...It is true that sometimes we don’t know just when

⁴⁸¹ C.A. Pownall, “Passes to Visit Native Communities and Homes of Guamanians, Issuance of,” May 21, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁸² B. Brown, “Liberty Procedures,” May 3, 1945, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

our friends or business associates are coming in, but if we don't continue the way we are at present, the whole pass system will be no good."⁴⁸³ Assemblyman Leon Flores Jr. echoed Taitano's argument. He argued, "Foreign elements which might constitute a menace to our society should not be permitted to enter without a proper pass."⁴⁸⁴ For Chamorros such as Taitano and Flores Jr., the village pass system represented a safety protocol that at times did make receiving off-island guests troublesome. However, other Chamorros viewed the pass system as an example of the military's attempt to control the island. Assemblyman Frank D. Perez contended:

By following the present system of issuing a pass, I can safely say that we miss some good friends who can do good for our people...It might be that the person requesting permission to enter a village is a newspaper reporter or someone else who would write articles regarding Guam and its people, when he return to the states. I have seen a lot of these military people going in and out of villages. As to whether or not they have a pass, I don't think it is my duty to ask, but it is my belief that all of them do not have the necessary pass. I think we can take care of that ourselves.⁴⁸⁵

Chamorros like Perez wanted to reclaim the facilitation of village passes instead of relying on the military. His comments demonstrate that some Chamorros believed that the village pass program was problematic because it restricted all non-island locals including journalists and writers who played an instrumental role in reporting the social and political conditions impacting Guam. American journalists and writers posed a threat because they had the ability to circulate

⁴⁸³ Guam Congress, "House of Assembly, Twenty-Fourth Regular Session," August 13, 1949, RG 126, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

information throughout the continental United States that highlighted the military's colonial rule of the island and its people. This was concerning for military officials since the 1950s saw the beginning of anti-colonial and decolonization movements throughout the world. Therefore, the village pass system also served as a tool to censor unfavorable media reports on the U.S. military's activities. With the passing of the Organic Act in 1950 and the establishment of the Government of Guam, military officials would have to trust Chamorros to conduct village-screening procedures. Even with the village pass system, gendered and racialized violence against Chamorro women still occurred.

Rumors, Race, and Gendered Violence

Chamorro women and children were sometimes the victims of racial and gendered violence. On March 30, 1948, a Chamorro woman named Regina San Cruz filed charges against an American serviceman, Roy Farmer, who was also her former boyfriend. According to statements given by a witness named Joseph Cruz and from San Cruz herself, Farmer slapped San Cruz twice during their confrontation. San Cruz stated, "I asked him to return the things he was going to sell for me. He said that he would take them to the club and try to sell them. He took these two months ago to sell. I asked him to give me these things [jewelry and picture frames] that are mine...but he wouldn't do it and he hit me with his hand."⁴⁸⁶ This story would take a radical change. Nine days later San Cruz withdrew her complaint and charge against Farmer. It is unknown why she withdrew her complaint, but her encounter with Farmer demonstrated that Chamorro woman also experienced physical violence from white American servicemen.

⁴⁸⁶ Robert J. Barnes and Howard D. Fischer, "Interrogation Reports of Joseph Cruz and Regina San Cruz," March 31, 1948, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

Other servicemen also committed acts of violence against Chamorro women. U.S. serviceman Harrel LaVerne Hicklin pleaded guilty to “conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline (indecent exposure),” in which he laid under the bed of Josefa Borja “with his privates indecently exposed.”⁴⁸⁷ Unlike other instances of interracial conflict, Hicklin actually pleaded guilty and was given an undisclosed punishment. On September 11, 1947, serviceman Wilbur Gardner raped a six-year-old Chamorro girl, lied to Guam Police officers regarding his identity, and stole a pair of shoes, all in one day. In addition, he was reported to have frequently exposed his penis in public to three female Chamorro children.⁴⁸⁸ During his court martial hearing, he was only found guilty of one out of the five charges against him, which was the rape of the Chamorro child. Gardner’s punishment was unspecified, but the harm he caused during this string of events highlights that the military’s restriction policies were not sufficient to deter physical and sexual violence. Moreover, incidents such as these played an important role in shaping how Chamorros perceived interracial relationships with white Americans and Filipinos. According to historian Lauren Robin Derby, the creation and dissemination of rumors can explain the multiple and competing narratives that circulate amongst a community of people that can subvert the state.⁴⁸⁹ All in all, interracial sexual violence was a serious concern for the Chamorro population of Guam.

⁴⁸⁷ Michael P. Bogdanovich, “Specifications of Offenses,” September 18, 1946, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁸⁸ J.B. Dunn, “Recommendation for Trial by General Court-Martial in the Case of Gardner, Wilbur “W,” Seaman first class, U.S. Navy,” September 24, 1947, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

⁴⁸⁹ Lauren Robin Derby, “Imperial Secrets: Vampires and Nationhood in Puerto Rico,” in *Past and Present* 199, (2008): 293. For more on rumors, see Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

Sexual violence also played a role shaping the discourse on Chamorro-white American relationships on Guam.⁴⁹⁰ According to *The Guam Gazette*, a U.S. Marine approached an unnamed Chamorro woman on her *lancho* in Barrigada on September 15, 1945 around 3pm.⁴⁹¹ The unknown marine asked her for water and then physically assaulted and raped her. The hospital medical examination confirmed that she had sustained abrasions and contusions on her face and thighs, and that there was a “presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal smear.”⁴⁹² While it is statistically unknown how many American servicemen raped Chamorro women, these incidents were not isolated. On October 24, 1945, an unknown American serviceman broke into a home in the village of Barrigada and attempted to rape a Chamorro woman.⁴⁹³ Fortunately, the woman’s daughter walked into the room and scared the attacker away. The unnamed Chamorro woman suffered from bruises on her face, forehead, and neck. In some instances, Chamorros defended themselves against the U.S. servicemen who were generally perceived as their “liberators.” *The Guam Gazette* reported that on October 13, 1945, Jose Borja Castro shot and killed two American servicemen, who had broken into his home in the village of Barrigada.⁴⁹⁴ As these three cases reveal, two sexual assaults and one home invasion occurred in the village of Barrigada within the span of a month. The actions of these men threatened the U.S. military’s reputation. Overall, these experiences made Chamorros skeptical of the benevolence that the military had proclaimed during World War II and in the “liberation of Guam.” To some degree,

⁴⁹⁰ For more on sexual violence against Native American women, see Andrea Smith, *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Cambridge, South End Press, 2005).

⁴⁹¹ *The Guam Gazette*, “Capital Offense Committed on Guamanian Woman,” October 3, 1945, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*

⁴⁹³ *The Guam Gazette*, “Rape Attempt Frustrated,” October 29, 1945, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁹⁴ *The Guam Gazette*, “Police Investigating Double Homicide Committed in Barrigada,” October 16, 1945, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

this gendered and racialized violence helps explain why Chamorros and Filipinos might have responded with similar force.

Chamorros and Filipinos also committed acts of violence against white American servicemen and civilian workers. On August 18, 1957, a Filipino man named Francisco Bernardo David, who worked as an accountant, stabbed Pacific Wholesalers President Gayle Shelton. When asked why he stabbed Shelton, David stated, “[I] was tired of being pushed around by Shelton.”⁴⁹⁵ David’s action was just one of several violent incidents that occurred in the workplace. On September 17, 1960, George Fitzgerald, acting Manager of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) on Guam, was shot and killed. According to *The Manila Times*, “Fitzgerald, 38, was shot to death on the island [Guam] Wednesday night while trying to subdue a berserk Filipino employee of the FAA.”⁴⁹⁶ In another incident, two Chamorro men had “allegedly murdered a U.S. citizen on Guam,” without giving a specific reason.⁴⁹⁷ While these examples do not concretely reference interracial violence, as motivating factors, they do show that Chamorros and Filipinos also committed acts of interracial violence sometimes as a form of resistance. The political debates over these criminal actions then spilled into arguments over the repealing of the security clearance program.

Conclusion

By the late 1950s, Chamorro politicians called for the end of the security clearance program because subversive activity never occurred and the program prevented the development

⁴⁹⁵ *The Manila Times*, “Manilan Held for Stabbing in Guam,” August 19, 1957, Vertical File, Lopez Museum and Library.

⁴⁹⁶ *The Manila Times*, “Filipino Kills Guam Official,” September 17, 1960, Vertical File, Lopez Museum and Library.

⁴⁹⁷ Dan Kimball, Letter to Governor Skinner, December 13, 1949, RG 313, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno, CA.

of the island's economy. Regardless of what local Chamorros wanted, the military and the federally appointed officials of Guam continued to support this program. Governor of Guam (1956-1960) Richard Barrett Lowe was one staunch supporter of the security clearance program even though local Chamorro politicians wanted to end the policy. On April 24, 1957, Lowe issued a statement, "I have no objections to agitation of the problem on the part of loyal private citizens, but these loyal citizens should realize that they may be aligning themselves with subversive groups who seek the same result but with a far different motive."⁴⁹⁸ Lowe's support for the termination of the program was contingent upon the U.S. government taking the initiative to discontinue it. His comments mirror those of other military officials who all believed that subversive groups would overrun Guam. A year later, Lowe maintained his support for the program. In a letter addressed to the Guam Legislature, Lowe argued, "the relaxation of the entry regulations to encourage tourism would also open the doors again to hordes of undesirables... which would have a serious effect upon the morals of our people... How can we distinguish between a bona fide tourist, a prostitute, or a spy, without some sort of screening or clearance regulations [*sic*]."⁴⁹⁹ Lowe's concern with lifting the security clearance policy now included the potential entry of undesirable and immoral people. While Lowe and other government officials were troubled by the growth of undesirables, the deplorable security screening policy separated families and stunted the local economy in hopes of protecting the island from a threat that never materialized. This immigration policy was a part of a larger colonial apparatus that attempted to control social relations throughout the island.

⁴⁹⁸ Richard Barrett Lowe, "Regarding Security Regulations," April 24, 1957, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

⁴⁹⁹ Richard Barrett Lowe, Letter to the Speaker of the Guam Legislature, April 2, 1958, Vertical File, Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library, Hagåtña, Guam.

As seen in the case of Barbara and Eddie De La Cruz introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. military invested in safeguarding its bases and installations throughout the island. In order to do so, military officials discouraged interracial marriages between Chamorro women and Filipino men because they viewed these unions as potentially subversive. While it is difficult to quantify how many interracial marriages occurred on Guam from 1946 to 1962, it can be determined that all interracial unions concerned the military for various reasons.⁵⁰⁰ Some of the tactics they utilized included the deportation of men, the regulation of security clearances, and the management of village passes. In contrast, the U.S. military took a more ambivalent stance when it came to interracial marriages involving Chamorro women and white American men. This resulted in the military's perception of Chamorro women as loyalists due to their interracial relationships with white American men. The military promoted these interactions through events such as enlisted men's dances. Thus, the creation of laws that controlled social interactions was predicated on racial categories that were applied flexibly to different populations. A byproduct of this racial stratification was interracial and gendered violence that occurred on the island. While not all interracial violence can be attributed to the military's social policies, it was a major contributor to various antagonisms and conflicts.

⁵⁰⁰ I found very little evidence that statistically tabulated interracial marriages on Guam from 1946 to 1962. While some government records did track the number of marriages that occurred on the island, it did not track if these marriages were interracial. Moreover, newspapers and newsletters such as the *Constructionaire* did provide some marriage announcements, but this information was not consistent and did not always disclose the racial or ethnic backgrounds of the couples. This is especially challenging since Chamorros and Filipinos share some Spanish surnames.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with a discussion of the U.S. government's proposal to relocate 8,000 U.S. Marines, their 9,000 dependents, and 10,000 temporary guest workers to Guam to construct a new military base. While it is unclear if this relocation project will ever come to fruition, the military's presence on the island since the post-World War II era has been pervasive. My goal in examining Guam's history of military expansion has been to explain how the island has become a multiracial society, which can be traced to how the military made Guam suitable for American settlement.

American writers influenced the discourse on military expansion and modernity through their articles in popular periodicals that highlighted American modernization projects on the island. Specifically, the construction of Apra Harbor, bases, military houses, and roads were presented as acts of modernization and philanthropy to improve the lives of Chamorros. In reality, however, these commercial and infrastructure projects were built with the intention of improving the U.S. government's military presence on Guam. Moreover, this process included the transmission of cultural principles that supported the idea of suburban life in Guam and promoted American military settlement. Overall, popular representations of Guam reified the cultures of U.S. empire.

U.S. military land taking from 1944 to 1962 subsequently resulted in both continuity and change for Chamorros. The most significant transformation was the shift from an agrarian subsistence society to one based on wage labor and the commodification of land. These transformations were predicated on the military's use of coercive strategies in forcing many Chamorros to accept declaration of land taking settlements. While some Chamorros were separated from their ancestral property, others continued to rely on their *lanchos* as sites for

cultural perpetuation. By charting these counter narratives of land stewardship and resistance, my goal has been to highlight that their postwar relationship to the land was one of both continuity and change. Ultimately, the military acquisition of Chamorro-owned lands led to the creation of Guam's multiracial society through the recruitment of Filipino and white American workers.

The U.S. military expansion of Guam also resulted in the creation of a postwar civilian labor class that became synonymous with the U.S. military. In order to move forward with expansion, the military and its contractors recruited civilian military workers to Guam. This demand for laborers increased with the establishment of the Government of Guam (GovGuam) in 1950.⁵⁰¹ However, the military and its contractors preferred to hire Filipinos and white Americans because of a capitalist cost-saving strategy that made it financially advantageous to hire workers based on their racial and national backgrounds. In turn, Chamorros increasingly relied on the Government of Guam for employment in the civil sector. The apex of these uneven hiring practices and the mismanagement of workers culminated with the proposed Guam Wage Bill of 1956, which was opposed by Chamorros and Filipinos who sought to protect their labor rights from the U.S. military and its contractors during a time of intense anti-communist sentiment. Thus, the immediate postwar military expansion of the island resulted in the creation of a Filipino labor class that still persists today in the military and tourist industries.

After the defeat of the proposed Guam Wage Bill, Filipinos continued to serve as skilled and unskilled military civilian laborers, while white Americans returned to the United States.

⁵⁰¹ From 1944 to 1949, the U.S. government had reestablished naval authority by reinstating a naval commander to also serve as the governor of Guam. However, the Guam Congress walkout of 1949, demonstrated the disdain and frustration that Chamorros had with military rule. In 1950, the U.S. Congress passed the Organic Act of Guam, which gave Chamorros limited citizenship and a civilian ran government, commonly referred to as the Government of Guam. From 1949 to 1970, the president of the United States had the power appoint the governor of Guam. This would end in 1971 with the election of Carlos Camacho who was the first locally elected governor of the island.

However, the suburbanization of Guam (which began in the early 1960s) and the widespread devastation wrought by Typhoon Karen in 1962 ushered another wave of Filipino laborers to reconstruct and rehabilitate the island's military and civilian infrastructures. Furthermore, the lifting of the security clearance of 1962 and the closing of Camp Roxas in 1972 (the last company camp on Guam) resulted in the permanent settlement of Filipinos alongside Chamorro communities in places such as Agat, Dededo, and Santa Rita. Many of these Filipino men decided to reside on Guam and subsequently sponsored the immigration of their family members to the island, while others married into Chamorro families. The few remaining white American workers who stayed in Guam also married into Chamorro families. Ultimately, the changes in immigration policy and military expansion provided the pathway for the increase in the Filipino community of Guam. In response, military officials attempted to control social relations on the island.

The U.S. military was also highly invested in controlling the social interactions amongst Chamorros, Filipinos, and white Americans. In order to accomplish this, military officials utilized tactics that included deportation, the denial of security clearances, and the requirement of passes to enter Chamorro villages. Military law also regulated the use of public spaces such as bars, clubs, restaurants, and roads. A byproduct of this racial stratification was interracial and gendered violence that occurred on the island. While interracial conflict in Guam has changed over time, its roots partly derive from U.S. military expansion and the creation of laws that fostered interracial antagonism. American and Philippine periodicals were integral in reporting interracial violence and were instrumental in shaping the discourse on American popular representations of Guam.

By drawing attention to the history of U.S. military expansion of Guam, I urge everyone to consider how American empire has shaped the island in unexpected ways. Specifically, my intent for this project has been to reframe how Chamorros and others understand the indigenous and transnational histories of Guam. I also hope that this dissertation can serve as a tool to inspire decolonization, especially given the U.S. government's continued expansion of its military presence in the Mariana Islands. Because studying the past helps explain the present, I encourage the future generations of those interested in Guam and the Mariana Islands to participate in social justice activities that advocate for the decolonization of the U.S. empire in the Pacific and throughout the world.

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