

UC Berkeley

UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Citizenship Begins at Home: How Families Shape Immigrant Incorporation

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2qw616c3>

Author

Street, Alexander Logan Spencer

Publication Date

2011

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Citizenship Begins at Home: How Families Shape Immigrant Incorporation

By

Alexander Logan Spencer Street

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Taeku Lee, Co-Chair

Professor Jonah Levy, Co-Chair

Professor Jack Citrin

Professor Irene Bloemraad

Fall 2011

Citizenship Begins at Home: How Families Shape Immigrant Incorporation

© 2011

by Alexander Logan Spencer Street.

Abstract

Citizenship Begins at Home: How Families Shape Immigrant Incorporation
by

Alexander Logan Spencer Street
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Berkeley

Professor Taeku Lee, Co-Chair
Professor Jonah Levy, Co-Chair

German citizenship law was reformed in the year 2000 in an attempt to incorporate millions of long-term foreign residents. Yet rather than increasing, the numbers applying for German citizenship have been falling ever since the reform. This dissertation offers an explanation of this puzzling development. In so doing it suggests a new answer to the question of why some foreign residents take the citizenship of their country of residence, while others do not.

I argue that the decision to apply for citizenship is typically made along with other family members. In many cases, applying for citizenship together with others in the family allows the benefits of acquiring citizenship to be multiplied and the costs to be split. The benefits of citizenship include increased security, the right to political participation, easier travel and full access to the labor market. Foreign residents place greater value on many of these benefits if they are shared with others in the family. Parents are especially likely to apply if they can thereby acquire citizenship for their children. The financial, cognitive and social costs of changing citizenship can also be reduced by spreading them across the family.

Although the German reform of 2000 eased key criteria for becoming a citizen, it decreased the numbers applying together with other family members. The country introduced birthright citizenship for children whose parents had lived in the country for a number of years, but this has the effect of removing a key reason for many parents to apply for citizenship. The reform of 2000 also brought new tests of individual integration, especially language skills. The focus on the individual is having perverse collective effects. Although most foreign residents satisfy the criteria, many live with someone who doesn't, and the prospect of leaving this person out can discourage the entire family from applying.

The evidence for the argument advanced in this dissertation is drawn from over 100 in-depth interviews as well as statistical analysis of census data. The dissertation makes a novel methodological contribution by using information on other household members to study the dynamics of the decision over citizenship. This reveals not only that citizenship status is clustered by household, but also that people living together commonly apply for citizenship at the same time.

Dedication

To my parents. I'm proud of you.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables	iv
Acknowledgements	vi
Introduction	1
Existing literature	3
My argument	12
Overview of remaining chapters	15
Chapter One: Germany's Immigrant Population and Citizenship Laws	18
The early history of immigration and citizenship law	18
German citizenship law in the 21 st century	23
Overview of the requirements for citizenship	29
Comparing the rights and duties of foreign residents and citizens	30
Implications for the decision over citizenship	34
Conclusion	37
Chapter Two: Qualitative Evidence on the Decision over Citizenship	39
Subject recruitment, interview questions and methods	39
Interviews with foreign residents and new citizens	44
Interviews with civil servants	50
Interviews with relevant NGOs and political parties	52
The case against alternative explanations	54
Conclusion	57
Chapter Three: Statistical Analysis of the Decision over Citizenship	59
The German micro-census	59
The population of interest	60
The household-level clustering of citizenship status	62
Modeling citizenship status	64
Evidence of collective claims on citizenship	73
The numbers taking each path to citizenship	75
Conclusion	78
Chapter Four: Explaining the Numbers of New Citizens Across Time and Space	80
Using census data to study aggregate rates of citizenship acquisition	80
Explaining temporal variation	83
Explaining regional variation	89
Bringing together quantitative and qualitative evidence	94
Conclusion	97
Conclusion	98
Review of the dissertation	98

Possible extensions of the argument	100
Implications of the research	106
References	110
Appendix	121

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

I.1 Foreign residents acquiring German citizenship, 1975-2008.	2
I.2 The numbers of new citizens under different types of citizenship law.	5
I.3 The size of the foreign population under different types of citizenship law.	5
I.4 Support for various criteria for acquiring German citizenship, among native Germans, foreign residents and new German citizens.	8
I.5 The percentage of foreign residents taking German citizenship 2003-2010, by country of original citizenship.	10
1.1 The size of the foreign population of Germany over the past five decades	23
1.2 Forecasting the size of the foreign population of Germany, depending on the rate of citizenship acquisition.	27
2.1 Questions for foreign residents and new citizens.	41
2.2 Questions for civil servants who administer citizenship law.	42
2.3 Questions for representatives of NGOs and political parties.	43
3.1 The percentage of foreign-origin residents with German citizenship, by the number of <i>others</i> in the household who have claimed citizenship.	64
3.2 Predicting the probability of holding German citizenship using the number of other German citizens in the household, for a range of household sizes.	70
3.3 Predicting the probability of holding German citizenship using the number of other German citizens in the household, for different origin groups.	71
3.4 Paths to German citizenship for people living in households with different numbers of foreign-origin residents.	77
4.1 Comparison of census estimates with the official number of new citizens.	83
4.2 The numbers taking each path to German citizenship, 1970-2006.	84
4.3 The percentage of foreign residents taking each path to German citizenship, 1970-2006.	85
4.4 The percentage of foreign residents taking German citizenship and the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path, by year.	87
4.5 The citizenship acquisition rate and the percentage of citizens taking the ‘collective’ path, by year (excluding those granted birthright citizenship).	88
4.6 The share of the foreign-origin population and of people who have claimed German citizenship in the federal states.	90
4.7 Citizenship acquisition rates across the German states by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.	91
4.8 Citizenship acquisition rates across municipalities by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.	92
4.9 Citizenship acquisition rates across municipalities in NRW and Bavaria, by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.	93

Tables

1.1 Changes in the requirements for German citizenship over recent decades.	30
1.2 The rights of foreigner residents and citizens compared.	31
1.3 The duties of foreigner residents and citizens compared.	34
1.4 The family-level logic of citizenship in the comparison of costs and benefits.	37
2.1 Introduction to the foreign-origin interview subjects.	45
3.1 Descriptive statistics on the foreign-origin population of Germany.	61
3.2 Logistic models of the probability of holding German citizenship.	66
3.3 Changes in the predicted probability of holding German citizenship associated with changes in relevant covariates.	68
A.1 Logistic models of the probability of holding German citizenship for Turkish-origin residents of Germany (in 2006).	110
A.2 Logistic models of the probability of holding Austrian citizenship.	111

Acknowledgements

At the end of the dissertation-writing process I have many reasons to be grateful. I was fortunate in my dissertation committee. Jonah Levy and Taeku Lee played complementary roles as co-chairs. Jonah was always supportive and never pushed me to make changes I didn't believe in, but quickly spotted the areas where I had my own doubts. The dissertation is far stronger as a result of his exhaustive criticism. Taeku excels at bringing out the strengths of an argument and encouraging further endeavor. Together my two dissertation chairs represent the best of the academe. I have also been lucky to receive wisdom and guidance from Jack Citrin, an expert in the demolition of weak arguments. Irene Bloemraad went far beyond the usual duties of the 'outside' member of the committee, serving as a mentor and role model for me and many others.

A number of other scholars have also shaped my academic development. Randall Hansen has been a mentor and friend since we first met in Oxford. John Bowen and Rogers Brubaker intervened when the dissertation was still in development, and helped me avoid some less promising paths. At Berkeley I learnt a great deal from Nick Ziegler, John Zysman, Cybelle Fox, Helen Marrow, Laura Stoker, Paul Pierson, Jas Sekhon and Mark Bevir. I benefited from friendly feedback from participants in Irene Bloemraad's interdisciplinary immigration workshop, and from comments from Karen Bird and Piero Stanig at conferences. Certain graduate students have not just shared the experience but also taught me a thing or two: Rahsaan Maxwell, Rocio Titunik, Andrew Kelly, Danny Hildalgo and Gautam Agarwal all stand out. Critical-minded friends with less academic baggage include Roman Fliegel and Nick Randall.

Conducting research in Germany and Austria would not have been possible without funding from the Institute of European Studies at Berkeley, the Social Science Research Council, the Hans-Böckler Stiftung and the Austrian Marshal Fund. I am especially grateful to Beverly Crawford and Martin Behrens. Other academic mentors in Europe include Martina Sauer, Dirk Halm and Marina Liakova in Essen, and Bernhard Perchinig and Wiebke Sievers in Vienna. Wolfgang Seifert helped introduce me to the German micro-census, and officials in the state statistical offices in Düsseldorf and Berlin were extremely helpful. I am also very grateful to friends who put me up and put up with me during research visits to Germany: Kerstin Hinrichsen, Marija and Dani Bakula, Amir Nahum and Paula Hudson, Charlie Warsen and Maria Entrialgo-Castaño. Perhaps the greatest debt of gratitude is owed to the people who gave up their time to serve as interview subjects for the research.

The central finding in the dissertation is the importance of the family. The research was conducted at a time when my own family was growing, and nothing is more important in my life.

Introduction

“I would take citizenship, if my parents could have it too. I owe them everything. So I can’t abandon them now.” (Martina, Bavaria).

Germany is home to around seven million foreign residents, 9% of the total population. Many of these people have lived in Germany for decades. As in other West European countries, the recent history of migration to Germany can be traced back to the policy of recruiting foreign workers to meet the demands of the booming post-war economy. Although most of the ‘guest workers’ left the country after a few years, some stayed. Leading politicians insisted that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration,’ and foreign residents were not incorporated into the citizenry. Furthermore, because citizenship was inherited from the parents rather than based on place of birth, around two million children were born in Germany as foreigners.


Citizenship law was reformed in the year 2000 with the aim of breaking with this exclusionary history. The required period of residence was cut from 15 years to eight, roughly doubling the number eligible for citizenship. It was made easier for some applicants for German citizenship to also keep their citizenship of birth. A new provision on birthright citizenship for the children of foreign parents living in Germany broke with the history of attributing citizenship mainly by descent, though it was only available for those with at least one of parent who had lived in the country for eight years. Integration requirements were standardized, with *all* applicants required to show good command of German. Previously, if one family member satisfied the integration requirements, the entire family would usually be granted German citizenship. The reform was expected to greatly increase the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship. The federal government’s commissioner for immigrant affairs predicted that one million foreigners would join the citizenry in the year 2000 alone (Krupa 1999).

Yet, as we can see in Figure I.1 (on the following page), these expectations were disappointed. The figure shows the number of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship each year between 1975 and 2010. The solid line shows people who actually submitted an application. The peak number of applicants was around 186,000 in the year 2000, but because of lags in the application process around 90,000 of these people had actually applied in the year 1999. Since 2000 the numbers applying have fallen, and they are now lower than in the late 1990s, *before* the supposedly liberalizing reform. The dashed line in Figure 1.1 shows the additional numbers granted citizenship automatically under the new birthright provision. Since the reform in the year 2000 around 40,000 people per year have been granted birthright citizenship. They will have to choose by the age of 23 whether to remain German citizens or to keep the citizenship of their parents. Even including all of the people with birthright citizenship, the numbers acquiring citizenship are now well below the peak.

The falling numbers acquiring German citizenship are not merely the result of the exhaustion of the pool of foreign residents who might apply for citizenship. The foreign resident population is about the same size in the year 2011 as before the reform, at around

seven million. Only about 1.4% of foreign residents become German citizens each year. The acquisition rate is below the OECD average, and compares to around one percent in Italy, two percent in Denmark and Greece, three percent in Belgium and Switzerland, four percent in the Netherlands and Norway and five percent or more in Sweden and the United Kingdom (OECD 2011 p. 421). Even at the peak in the year 2000, just 2.5% of foreign residents became German citizens.

Figure I.1 Foreign residents acquiring German citizenship, 1975-2010.¹



This dissertation seeks to explain why the numbers taking German citizenship started to rise in the 1990s, only to fall and stagnate after the purportedly liberalizing reform in the year 2000. It does so by tackling the micro-level puzzle of why some foreign residents become citizens while others do not. This variation provides an opportunity to study the mechanisms behind the aggregate rise and fall in the numbers of new citizens. The dissertation shows that the key to the German puzzle is a better understanding of the role played by the family in the decision over whether to apply for citizenship. In most cases the decision over citizenship is taken not by isolated individuals but by family members with inter-dependent interests. Although the German reform of 2000 eased key criteria for becoming a citizen, it discouraged people from applying together with other family members. The introduction of a limited form of birthright citizenship benefited some

¹ Data sources are: *Deutscher Bundestag* Drucksache 10/863; Worbs 2008; Statistisches Bundesamt *Einbürgerungen* various years. Although the official data are not yet available, the numbers of birthright citizens in 2009 and 2010 are assumed to equal the number in 2008.

children but removed a key reason for their parents to become citizens. And the reforms also brought new tests of individual integration. The focus on the individual is having perverse collective effects. Although most foreign residents satisfy the criteria, many live with someone who doesn't, and the prospect of leaving this person out has often discouraged the entire family from applying.

The next section of this chapter shows that existing literature cannot explain the German puzzle. The second section previews the argument advanced in this dissertation. Section three explains the logic of case selection and describes the research methods used in the dissertation, before providing an overview of the remaining chapters.

1 Existing literature

Existing research on citizenship in Western Europe and North America cannot explain the German puzzle. Recent comparative research aims to classify and explain variation in citizenship laws across countries and over time. The resulting typologies describe some countries as more 'open' or 'liberal' than others. But these typologies cannot explain the falling numbers in Germany. Nor can the focus on citizenship laws account for the fact that different people make different decisions under the same set of laws.

Another strand of relevant research tackles the question of whether foreign residents are willing to integrate. They are suspected of having divided loyalties, with a strong sense of attachment to the country of origin, or are even thought to reject the terms of integration laid down by German policymakers. One influential variant of this argument holds that few foreign residents apply for German citizenship because they prefer to retain their citizenship of birth. In fact, however, existing evidence suggests that feelings of belonging, attitudes to integration and the ban on dual citizenship are rarely decisive.

Finally, another relevant body of literature models individual decisions over a citizenship as a function of the costs and benefits of applying. This provides a framework that helps us understand the influence of relevant characteristics and circumstances. Much of this research is limited by an indifference to the social context of the decision, however, and none of the existing scholarship pays adequate attention to the family. As we will see, it is possible to extend this approach to take account of the family-level logic of citizenship.

1.1 Research on citizenship laws

Recent decades have seen a profusion of research on citizenship law, especially in West European countries. Brubaker's (1992) analysis of Germany and France remains influential. For many years Germany granted citizenship almost exclusively to people of German descent, whereas anyone born in France was automatically a French citizen. Brubaker attributes the difference to ideologies of national identity. The German people lacked a state until the late 19th century, and thus formed an 'ethnic' identity. The French formed a 'civic' identity based on revolutionary ideals. But Brubaker's work has been overtaken by events. The French have since weakened their birthright citizenship provisions, and the Germans have introduced qualified birthright citizenship (Green 2004; Hansen and Weil 2001). This casts doubt on the theory of stable national models of citizenship (Bowen 2007; Duyvendak and Scholten 2010). Moreover, the fact that the

rate of citizenship acquisition in Germany is now lower than in the late 1990s, despite the introduction of birthright citizenship, shows that moving away from the ‘ethnic’ model is not sufficient to make a polity more open to immigrants and their descendents.

The latest development in this literature is broader comparative research on citizenship laws in many European countries. Recent studies aim to identify temporal trends and/or clusters of countries with a similar logic of citizenship. Examples include the five-country survey in Koopmans et al (2005), the 31-country Migrant Integration Policy Index produced by Huddleston et al (2011), Howard’s (2009) 15-country Citizenship Policy Index, and the 26-country survey conducted by Bauböck and colleagues (see Bauböck et al 2006, 2009). Countries are classed as having ‘open’ or ‘liberal’ policies, vs. ‘closed’ or ‘restrictive’ policies. These scholars use data on dozens of policies in many countries. But the research pays little attention to the people with most at stake in the issue, namely foreign residents. The result is that these studies lack a framework for understanding how and why different aspects of citizenship law affect the numbers acquiring citizenship. Several of the multi-country surveys include indices with apparently arbitrary numbers of points awarded for different policies (e.g. two points for birthright citizenship, one point for a five-year minimum residence period, etc.).

The relevance of these typologies of citizenship law to my research can be tested in two ways. First, one might expect comparisons based on their categories to explain temporal trends in the numbers acquiring citizenship. If a country is classed as having become more liberal, we would expect to see higher numbers acquiring citizenship. This expectation is not supported by the German case. The number of new citizens began rising in the late 1990s, *before* the reform of 2000 that is emphasized in the literature on citizenship laws. Nor can this research explain the subsequent fall and stagnation in the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship following liberalization.

Second, one would expect cross-country comparisons to show higher rates of citizenship acquisition in countries with ‘open’ citizenship regimes. Figures I.2 and I.3 test this prediction. Howard (2009) classes countries as ‘historically restrictive’ or ‘historically liberal,’ and identifies an intermediate group that has ‘recently liberalized.’ As the author notes, his index is similar to the others cited above. Figure I.2 shows the average share of foreign residents acquiring citizenship from 2000 to 2005 (from Appendix II of Howard’s book). Figure I.3 shows the share of foreign residents in the populations of these countries (in 2005; see OECD 2011: 413). Based on the classification of some citizenship laws as ‘liberal’ and others as ‘restrictive,’ one would expect to see higher acquisition rates in liberal countries (tested in Figure 1.2) and/or that the cumulative effect of a liberal policy is a small foreign resident population (tested in Figure 1.3). The evidence does not support either prediction.²

² Note that it is *not* the case that ‘liberal’ countries attracted so many more migrants over this period that this growth of the foreign population offset the open citizenship policies.

Figure I.2 The numbers of new citizens under different types of citizenship law





Figure I.3 The size of the foreign population under different types of citizenship law



Note: At=Austria, Be=Belgium, Dk=Denmark, Fi=Finland, Fr=France, Ge=Germany, Gr=Greece, Ir=Ireland, It=Italy, Ne=Netherlands, Po=Portugal, Sp=Spain, Sw=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom.

Another way of describing the problem with much of the research on citizenship laws is that it ignores one potentially informative source of variation. Under a given set of laws, some people acquire citizenship of the country of residence while others do not. In the absence of a theory of why (some) migrants claim citizenship, scholars will struggle to explain how the relevant policies shape their behavior. The way forward for research of this kind may be to pay more attention to the foreign residents and new citizens whose status is regulated by citizenship laws (for an example, see Bloemraad 2006).

1.2 Attitudes towards integration

Another possible explanation for the low and falling numbers applying for citizenship is that foreign residents don't want to become Germans. They may feel that applying for citizenship is incompatible with a strong sense of belonging to their country of origin, or they may reject the terms of integration that are set out in German citizenship law. Although most academics working in this field believe that the great majority of immigrants *do* want to integrate (e.g. Alba et al 2003; Halm and Sauer 2006; Wippermann and Flaig 2009), some politically influential commentators suggest otherwise (e.g. Caldwell 2009; Sarazzin 2010). Again, a brief analysis of available evidence suggests that feelings about integration are not a plausible explanation of the low numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship.

If feelings of national identity explained why some foreign residents are more willing to apply for German citizenship than others, one would expect a higher share of foreign-origin residents who identify with Germany to hold German citizenship. Few existing surveys contain large samples of foreign-origin residents, and even fewer also include questions on feelings of belonging. Fortunately, I was able to work with researchers at the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen, Germany. I can test the predictions of the national-identity explanation using annual surveys of 1,000 Turkish-origin residents from the years 1999 through 2006.³ The surveys include the question: 'To which country do you feel you belong as your homeland? Turkey, Germany, both, or neither?' If these feelings explained temporal variation in the numbers acquiring citizenship, one would expect that the share saying they feel they belong to Germany would have tracked the trend in the numbers of new citizens. In fact we see no clear trend, with 22% saying they felt German in the year 1999 and 21.8% giving the same response in 2006.

We can also conduct a cross-sectional comparison to see whether, at a given point in time, the people who feel they belong to Germany are more likely to be German citizens. This comparison reveals that 27% of Turkish-origin residents with German citizenship feel German, compared to 18% of those who are still Turkish citizens.⁴ 30% of German

³ All of these people are either Turkish citizens or German citizens who once held Turkish citizenship. I am very grateful to Dr. Martina Sauer and others at the *Zentrum für Türkeistudien*.

⁴ I used the 2006 survey. Comparing foreign residents and new German citizens is not a fool-proof way to assess why some people now hold German citizenship, because other things could have changed since they acquired citizenship. In this case, the cross-sectional comparison seems reasonable. The only way in which the comparison could be misleading would be if people who acquired citizenship were motivated by strong feelings of belonging to Germany but now feel a

citizens and 42% of Turkish citizens said they feel Turkish. Regardless of citizenship status, around 30% said they feel both German and Turkish, and around ten percent said they feel they belong to neither country. This pattern is consistent with the argument that feelings of national identity help explain the choice over citizenship. But the differences are modest. And it is also important to check whether this variable is significantly associated with citizenship status even after controlling for other differences between the survey respondents. The data reveal that younger people and those with relatively high socio-economic status are more likely to feel they belong in Germany. It could be that *these* differences are the driving force behind the observed pattern.

Multivariate statistical analysis using the same data suggests that, after controlling for other relevant variables, feelings of belonging are only weakly associated with citizenship status. Table A.1 (in the Appendix) reports findings from two statistical models. The first is a baseline model using many of the variables emphasized in existing literature: gender, marital status, age, time in Germany, country of birth, education and an indicator showing whether the family owns the property in which they live. The second model includes all of the same variables, as well as measures showing whether the person feels she belongs in Germany, Turkey, or neither country (people who say they feel they belong to both form the reference category). None of the attitudinal measures is statistically significant at conventional levels, and a likelihood ratio test suggests that the fit of the second model is no better than that of the first. We will return to the issue of whether foreign residents desire German citizenship later in the dissertation. The evidence reviewed here suggests that feelings of national identity cannot account for the low rate of citizenship acquisition, at least in the case of Turkish-origin residents.


Existing survey research can also be used to test whether foreign residents, new citizens and native Germans hold significantly divergent views on the question of the requirements that people *should* have to meet in order to become German citizens. In this case the data are from the 2006 General Social Survey (called *Allbus* in Germany), which included the following question: ‘I will now mention several things that could play a role in the allocation of German citizenship. Please tell me how important you think these things should be. a) Whether the person has good command of the German language (*Lang.*), b) Whether the person has committed crimes (*Crime*), c) Whether the person is financially self-sufficient (*Finan.*), d) Whether the person adheres to the democratic order of the Basic Law (the German constitution, *Constit.*), e) Whether the person is prepared to adapt to the German way of life (*Assim.*), f) Whether the person has lived in Germany for a long time (*Time*), g) Whether the person was born in Germany (*Birth*), h) Whether the person is of German descent (*Descent*), and i) Whether the person belongs to the Christian church (*Relig.*)’

Respondents were asked to rank each of the criteria on a seven-point scale, from ‘not at all important’ to ‘very important.’ The survey contains fairly small samples of foreign residents (N = 206) and of foreign-origin residents who have acquired German citizenship (N = 125). Figure I.4 presents the mean responses on each item for native

weaker sense of belonging. But this seems unlikely. If anything, one would expect the opposite, i.e. that being a citizen would make these people even more likely to feel that they belong.

Germans, foreign residents and new German citizens. The height of the bar shows the average level of emphasis placed on each of the criteria, and the black lines at the top show confidence intervals for the mean (plus or minus two times the standard error of the estimated mean).

Figure I.4 Support for various criteria for acquiring German citizenship, among native Germans, foreign residents and new German citizens.



Note: The figure shows the responses of native Germans, foreign residents and new German citizens to a question on the importance of alternative criteria for acquiring German citizenship. The height of the bars show the mean importance according to group members, on a zero to one scale. Confidence intervals show plus/minus two standard errors of the estimated mean.

Figure I.4 shows that the differences in views of the various criteria are far greater than the differences by citizenship status. For example, most of the people surveyed support the language requirement, and few support the idea that German citizenship should only be granted to Christians. In no case is the difference in views between foreign residents and new citizens statistically significant at conventional levels. We see that the available evidence casts doubt on the suggestion that foreign residents are reluctant to apply for German citizenship because they reject the terms of integration.

One issue that has received particular attention in the German case is the requirement that applicants to give up their prior citizenship. The issue is politically charged: when the Social Democrats and Green party proposed major reforms of citizenship law in 1999 this

included a right to dual citizenship, but the Christian Democratic party (CDU) successfully mobilized against this provision. Many migrants say they would prefer dual citizenship (Sauer 2009; German Social Survey 2006 question 102), and some scholars think the German policy against dual citizenship cuts the numbers willing to apply (Thränhardt 2008; Worbs 2008; though see also Anil 2007; Diehl and Blohm 2001).

Establishing the effect of dual citizenship provisions is difficult. Even if migrants view the requirement to give up their prior citizenship as a loss, this may not suffice to put them off applying to become German. To test this claim we need data on actual decisions. In Germany applicants are allowed to retain their prior citizenship if the country of origin makes it excessively difficult to give it up. But this is not the only factor differentiating these people from other immigrants. For example, immigrants from Iran are allowed dual citizenship, but a relatively high share of Iranian emigrants are refugees, who have other reasons to be especially likely to become German citizens.

A 2005 ruling by the German administrative court provides an opportunity to isolate the effects of provisions on dual citizenship, for a particular group of migrants. The court ruled that Germany must recognize E.U. treaties and allow residents from other E.U. states to retain dual citizenship; this was incorporated into German citizenship law in late 2007 (Hailbronner 2010). Figure I.5 compares trends in citizenship uptake among migrants from E.U. member states with those from other parts of the world, allowing us to assess whether the change had any effect.⁵ The figure shows the percentage of foreign residents from 77 countries who became German citizens each year from 2003 to 2010.

In the top left panel of Figure I.5 we see the rate of German citizenship uptake among residents from the 27 countries that are now members of the European Union. Few became German citizens in the early years of the 21st century, and there is no evidence of any change since they were allowed to retain dual citizenship in 2007. The top right panel of Figure I.5 shows the uptake rate among foreign residents from 14 European countries that are not in the E.U. (e.g. Croatia, Turkey and Norway). The bottom left plot shows the same data for residents with origins in Africa and the Americas (15 countries) and the bottom right plot shows figures from 23 countries in Asia and Australasia.


This analysis shows that dual citizenship rights were not sufficient to increase the numbers of new German citizens among foreign residents from E.U. member states. Even controlling for the already low rates of acquisition among these immigrants the option of dual citizenship made no discernible difference, compared to the overall trend in the numbers of new citizens. A statistical test using the difference-in-differences methodology confirms that these data lend no support to the hypothesis that allowing dual citizenship made people from the E.U. more likely to become German citizens ($p = 0.81$).⁶ This does not rule out the possibility that the ban on dual citizenship discourages

⁵ The source is the federal statistics office (Statistisches Bundesamt). See the 2011 editions of Fachserie 1 Reihe 2 (*Einbürgerungen*) and Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.1 (*Ausländische Bevölkerung*).

⁶ The test is based on OLS regression with fixed effects for country and year. The p-value is for a difference-in-differences indicator for E.U. countries from 2008 to 2010, after the reform.

people from other parts of the world from applying for German citizenship. But it does cast doubt on the argument that the policy on dual citizenship explains the low numbers acquiring German citizenship.⁷

Figure I.5 The percentage of foreign residents taking German citizenship from 2003 to 2010, by country of original citizenship



Note: The figure shows the percentage of foreign residents from 79 origin countries taking German citizenship in each year.

Similar results are obtained in alternative specifications that include the year 2007 or just a subset of E.U. member states (excluding East European countries that only recently joined the E.U.)

⁷ Mazzolari (2009), using a similar methodology for Latin American immigrants in the U.S.A., does find that allowing dual citizenship boosts the acquisition rate.

1.3 Individual-level analysis of the decision over citizenship

Scholars in political science, sociology and economics have contributed to a rich literature on individual-level variation in citizenship status. Some of the research is based on interviews or ethnographic study (e.g. Alvarez 1987; Anil 2007; Jones-Correa 1998; Prümm 2004; Wunderlich 2005), though a larger number of studies use statistical data. A few studies combine the two methods (e.g. Bloemraad 2006). The premise of much of this research is that individual foreign residents weigh the costs and benefits of becoming a citizen. The benefits of German citizenship include secure residence rights, full access to the labor market, the right to travel and work in the E.U. and the right to participate fully in German (and E.U.) politics. Costs include the difficulty and expense of applying, the risk of estrangement from the migrant community and, in many cases, the loss of citizenship in the country of origin. Scholars explain variation between individuals by the greater value that some people place on the benefits, or the fact that some find the costs easier to bear. The decision whether or not to apply is shaped by individual characteristics and, in some cases, by the social and political context. Factors that enter the cost-benefit calculus include time in the country, age, socio-economic resources like income, social or material investments in the country of residence, the level of political engagement and the scope for dual citizenship.

Additional time in the country allows immigrants to learn the language, find a place in the labor market and form social ties. This is expected to make it easier to meet the requirements for citizenship and to increase the returns to secure residence rights in the country where the migrant is now settled. Migrants with property in the country of residence are more likely to become citizens (Curtis and Portes 1987). Net of time in the country, age is expected to reduce the returns to citizenship, since less time remains to reap the benefits (Kahanec and Tosun 2009). In the economics literature, socio-economic resources such as income or education are assumed to boost the returns to citizenship, since equal legal status allows further upward mobility (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2008; Diehl and Blohm 2008). Scholars in political science and sociology take a different view, drawing on research on political participation to argue that socio-economic resources help people bear the costs of getting involved (Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2001).

People with greater interest in politics have more reason to claim and exercise their political rights as citizens (Kahanec and Tosun 2009). Levels of engagement may depend on the political context. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) and Pantoja et al (2001) argue that immigrants responded to hostile policies in California in the mid 1990s by joining the citizenry. Bloemraad (2006) argues that multicultural policies give migrants the confidence to become citizens and to push for political representation. Political parties may reach out to migrants, but not if they expect extra support to be offset by anti-immigrant feelings among core voters (Jones-Correa 1998). Geographic distance and conditions in the country of origin also play a role. Proximity increases the likelihood of return and depresses interest in citizenship, but migrants from poorer countries have more to gain by securing a future in the new homeland (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Refugees who have fled political persecution are especially likely to want the citizenship of the new country of residence (Bevelander and DeVoretz 2008).

The cost-benefit model in bottom-up studies of citizenship provides a clear framework for thinking about the factors that shape the decision over citizenship. It does not appear to be sufficient to explain the numbers applying for German citizenship, however. The statistical model that was used in section 1.1 to test the relevance of feelings of belonging included controls of many of the key variables identified in this literature. But the model could only account for about 15% of the unexplained variance in the outcome variable (this is the percentage reduction in error for the model, i.e. the increase in the share of correct predictions compared to the baseline of predicting all individuals at the modal value). The focus on the individual-level calculus of citizenship also has theoretical limitations. With the focus on the individual, much of the existing research ignores social influences. This can lead to inaccurate predictions when people reach decisions based on their concerns for or commitments to others (Sen 1977), when the norms that shape their preferences depend on the social context (Green and Shapiro 1994), or when they draw on social resources to achieve their goals. I argue that the decision over citizenship is often reached under conditions of mutual concern, shared norms and collective resources.

2. My argument

Having discussed the limitations of the relevant literature, I will now explain which elements of the existing research have the greatest promise as the foundations of a new approach. One can think of the literature on citizenship laws as taking a top-down approach to the study of decision, and the literature on individual decision-making as taking a bottom-up approach. Some research aims to combine the two, giving us a better understanding of which policies matter, and why (e.g. Bloemraad 2006). And although relatively little attention has been paid to social influences, some scholarship suggests the importance of the local social and political context.

Yang (1994) argues that migrants living in areas of greater immigrant concentration can learn about the benefits of citizenship from others in the community, though he does not provide direct evidence on this mechanism (see also Hatton and Leigh 2007). Bloemraad (2006), Ramakrishnan (2005) and Wong (2006) show that civil society groups, including organizations run by immigrants but also local churches, can channel advice and provide venues of political socialization. Immigrants who can draw on such group resources may be more likely to become citizens of the country of residence. However, Jones-Correa (1998) argues that migrant organizations offer a parallel venue for participation that makes some foreign residents *less* likely to become citizens.

Studies of civil society organizations do not capture the whole spectrum of possible social influences, however. In particular, existing research on citizenship has paid scant attention to one of the most important venues of political influence and activity, the family. This is despite the fact that the importance of the family *is* recognized in other scholarship that focuses on political participation or on migration. The one exception is the work of Liang (1994), who notes that people whose family members are citizens of the U.S.A. are more likely to be citizens themselves. Rather than developing the family-level logic of citizenship, however, he attributes this result to differences in social capital.

Scholars of political socialization and participation have shown that relatives share political knowledge, and that those with a stronger sense of efficacy can motivate their partners, siblings or children to participate (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al 1995). Parents typically teach their children about politics and socialize them into partisan and ideological attachments (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Stoker and Jennings 1995). In immigrant households the roles may reverse, as children who are more familiar with the country help their parents get involved in politics (Bloemraad and Trost 2008).

Scholars of migration have found that the family is the key decision-making unit. Massey and colleagues (1987) show that families reach collective decisions on migration. Some family members may be sent to another country, while others stay at home, in order that the family unit can reap the benefits of migration while hedging against some of the risks. Decisions are taken as a group and individual members may subordinate their own interests to the greater good (see also Becker (1991) on inter-dependent utility functions within the family). The idea that migrants are motivated by the hope of securing a better future for their children is almost a cliché, but hints at an important truth about the social processes at work.

The fact that existing literature on citizenship ignores the family as a source of interpersonal influence, or even as a unit of collective behavior, is due in part to data limitations. Survey-based research typically assumes that observations are independent. Surveys that include social networks such as friends or family are rare. But this limitation can be overcome using census data, which provide information on entire households (in fact, many existing studies of citizenship use census data but retain the assumption of independence, which means that they report inappropriate standard errors and may contain biased estimates of other variables that are correlated at the household level). It is possible to adapt the cost-benefit framework, and the associated statistical methodology, to take account of family-level behavior.

The argument advanced in this dissertation is that families play a key role in the decision over citizenship. Close relatives take account of each others' interests when deciding whether or not to apply for citizenship. Parents are often motivated to apply primarily by the desire to acquire citizenship for their children. Siblings may support each other through the application process, and children may help their parents. In many cases, family members reach a collective decision over whether or not to apply for citizenship. This need not always imply that family members prefer to acquire citizenship together, or not at all. But it does suggest that factors that influence the collective dynamic of the decision over citizenship can have effects that extend to entire families.

Claiming citizenship along with other family members allows the costs to be split and the benefits multiplied. Since people care not just about their own well-being, but also that of other family members, many of the rights and opportunities available to citizens are more valuable if other family members enjoy them too. The unqualified right to live in Germany is worth more, if one's family members can also achieve the same level of security. Many parents prefer that their children go through school and enter the labor market as citizens, and thus submit a joint application for citizenship while the children

are still minors. Applying for citizenship takes time, effort and money, and can damage relations with relatives in the country of origin and with other migrants. But all of these costs are easier to bear if spread across family members.

In this dissertation we will see evidence that family members typically decide over citizenship as a unit and that they place greater value on citizenship if the benefits are shared with others in the family. We will see that the single clearest sign that a migrant-origin resident is likely to hold German citizenship is whether or not others in the household have become citizens. When the numbers claiming German citizenship rose in the 1990s this was largely due to a higher share applying along with others in the household. The subsequent decline is almost entirely due to the fact that the law has become less accommodating of the family-level logic of citizenship.

The research has implications for our understanding of integration. Many scholars and politicians argue that integration should be a two-way street. Immigrants are expected to adapt to the norms and practices of their new home countries, but these countries are also expected to change to accommodate the newcomers. Yet in practice, far more attention has been paid to the former kind of adaptation than to the latter. This dissertation suggests that integration policies should take account of the family as a source of norms and resources and as a unit of collective behavior.

The research also has broader implications for our understanding of the effects of social policies, and of the empirical basis of political membership. Policies that focus on the individual responsibility to meet certain standards of citizenship may have unexpected effects if they ignore the inter-personal ties that make the rights of citizenship worthwhile, or the social resources that help people fulfill their responsibilities. The unique situation of foreign residents also provides an opportunity for the empirical study of political membership. Influential theories of justice hold that the legitimacy of state authority rests on the choice to sign the social contract (e.g. Rawls 1999 [1970]; Rousseau 2008 [1762]). Yet most residents of contemporary democracies never actually face this choice. The fact that foreign residents make the decision as a family, not as solitary individuals, suggests a collective model of membership.

3. Case selection, methods, and an overview of the remaining chapters

The puzzling developments in the numbers acquiring German citizenship inspired this research project. Studying citizenship in Germany has a number of advantages. The country has a large and varied population of foreign residents. The country is also internally diverse, with a mix of international cities, industrial and rural areas. This diversity provides an opportunity to study variation in many factors that may affect the likelihood that immigrants become citizens of the country of residence. Comparing outcomes within the country also allows the researcher to test certain mechanisms while controlling for factors that vary at the country level.

There are a number of similarities between the situation of foreign residents in Germany and in other European countries. With foreigners making up around 9% of the population, Germany is towards the upper end of the distribution of West European

countries, above France (c. 6%), Italy and the United Kingdom (c. 7%) but below Austria (c. 11%), Spain (c. 12%) and Switzerland (c. 22%).⁸ As in much of Western Europe, many of the foreign residents were recruited to work in the country in response to post-War labor shortages, or they are the descendents of such people (Castles and Miller 2003). Germany is not alone in having a body of citizenship law that has historically been based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, whereby citizenship is granted by descent and it was exceptional for immigrants to become members of the citizenry. Broadly similar policies are found in Italy, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and in Scandinavia (Bauböck et al 2006).

The methodological approach in this dissertation is to subject the observable implications of the argument on the family-level logic of citizenship to a number of tests, using different kinds of data (King et al 1994; Collier et al 2004). No single piece of evidence is conclusive; the aim is to build a case for my argument and to show how it improves on alternative explanations. Statistical analysis of a large and representative data-set is combined with qualitative data from interviews. The interviews provide evidence on the thought-processes behind the decision over citizenship, and on the social context in which the decision is made. The interviews help us understand *why* family members commonly reach a collective decision on citizenship, but the small (and unrepresentative) sample imposes limits on the ability to generalize from these findings. The quantitative analysis provides information on the importance of the household-level clustering of citizenship status and allows for tests of the general relevance of the family-level mechanisms identified in the interviews. Combining the two methods of analysis makes for a stronger case than would be possible with either method alone.

Interview subjects were recruited from the social networks of initial contacts at research institutes and migrant organizations in three German states. This process required spending enough time to develop contacts in these states. The research was conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the largest German state with a mixed landscape of service-oriented and industrial cities as well as rural areas. Further interviews were conducted in Bavaria, another large and diverse state, and within the city-state of Berlin, which has a large immigrant population and a relatively weak economy. Foreign residents living in Bavaria have historically acquired German citizenship in low numbers, compared to relatively high averages in Berlin and in NRW. However, the two larger states both display considerable internal diversity in this regard, and in each state interviews were conducted in areas with a range of citizenship acquisition rates.

3.1 Overview of the remaining chapters

The first substantive chapter contains the contextual information we need to understand the decision facing foreign residents in Germany. The chapter begins by reviewing the history of migration to Germany and developments in citizenship law. This introduces the reader to the population of foreign residents and the criteria they must meet to become German citizens. An overview of the relative attractions of living in the country as a citizen vs. as a foreign resident reveals what is at stake in the decision. Finally, the contextual information is used to provide a more detailed account of the implications of

⁸ See OECD 2011, p. 403.

the family-level logic of citizenship. The chapter explains which benefits of citizenship are expected to be valued more highly if shared with other family members, and which of the costs of acquiring citizenship can be reduced by lodging a collective claim. This points the way to tests of the argument in the remaining chapters.

The second chapter presents findings from 70 interviews conducted in Germany. Interview subjects include foreign residents and people who have become German citizens, bureaucrats and senior officials who are in charge of implementing citizenship law across the country, representatives of relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and politicians. The interviews confirm that families typically make the decision whether or not to apply for citizenship as a unit. Indeed, many interview subjects take this for granted, explaining why ‘we’ decided to apply, or describing the factors that put ‘us’ off. The interviews with migrant-origin residents also provide examples of the reasoning that citizenship is worth more if shared with others in the family. Interviews with bureaucrats and NGOs suggest that new integration requirements are interfering with the family-level logic of citizenship. The new provision on birthright citizenship removes a major incentive for many parents to apply for citizenship. In other cases, family members may be discouraged from applying when they find that one of the number is unlikely to meet the integration requirements.

In Chapter Three data from a large, representative survey of German households are used to identify and describe the population of people who face the decision whether or not to apply for German citizenship (or have already decided the matter by becoming Germans). This sub-set is then used to measure the prevalence of household-level clustering of citizenship status. We see that over 60% of the observed variation is at the level of the household. In multivariate models, controlling for the variables that existing research identifies as correlates of changing citizenship, we find that the single clearest piece of information is the number of others in the household who have become German citizens. Whereas the probability of holding German citizenship is estimated at 0.18 for a typical foreign resident who lives with other foreigners, it jumps to 0.48 for an otherwise similar individual living with one other person who has claimed German citizenship and to 0.79 for someone living with two such people.

Chapter Four uses the same data to show that many new Germans acquired citizenship in the same year as others in the household. This kind of ‘collective’ claim on citizenship accounts for much of the temporal variation in the numbers becoming German citizens. This category first started to grow in the 1990s, after migrants meeting certain criteria were granted a right to citizenship (previously, the decision was at bureaucratic discretion, and citizenship was granted only when in the ‘national interest’). In 1990s a directive on the implementation of citizenship law stated that family members should all be granted citizenship together, whenever possible. This provision was removed in the year 2000, with the introduction of integration tests for every individual applicant (subsequent reforms have made these tests more demanding). The census data reveal that the decline in the numbers becoming German citizens along with others in the household accounts for the overall fall in the uptake rate. Chapter Four also reveals that variation in

the share of new citizens who take this step along with others in the household helps explain different rates of citizenship acquisition across German states and municipalities.

The concluding chapter discusses the scope for the findings from the German case to extend to similar policies and to comparable countries. A parallel analysis of the Austrian case reveals that a reform in the late 1990s had the unexpected effect of increasing the numbers acquiring citizenship, because so many people applied along with their family members. The chapter also discusses the scope for extending the analysis to the Netherlands and Ireland, and explains how panel data could be used to establish whether any political benefits from becoming a citizen spill over to other family members. The concluding chapter closes with a discussion of the implications of the research for our understanding of the concepts of integration and citizenship. Scholars and policymakers should recognize that the family is a key source of motives and resources for immigrant integration. The emphasis on the family as a political unit may even be one of the ways in which immigrants can contribute to changing ideas about the values that hold political communities together.

Chapter One: Germany's Immigrant Population and Citizenship Laws

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the context of the decision to apply (or not to apply) for German citizenship. The chapter begins with an account of German citizenship law and the history of migration to the country. This introduces the reader to the people facing the decision over citizenship, and explains the criteria they have had to meet in order to become full members of the polity. The chapter proceeds to describe the relative attractions of living in Germany as a citizen or as a foreign resident. This shows what is at stake in the decision over citizenship. The chapter concludes by bringing together these two kinds of contextual information to give a more detailed account of the observable implications of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. This points the way towards tests of the argument in subsequent chapters.

1. The early history of German citizenship law and migration to the country

Germany was unified as a single state only in 1871. Nationality law was initially based on the Prussian *Law of Subjecthood (Untertanengesetz)* of 1842, whereby children inherited membership in the polity from their fathers (Brubaker 1992; Herbert 2001). It was possible for foreigners to become members of the people after having lived in the country for a number of years, but the law discriminated against stigmatized groups, especially Jews and Poles. Many Jews and Poles had been uprooted by enclosure policies in Eastern Prussia that replaced peasant holdings with large estates. This meant they were available to work in the factories of the rapidly industrializing German economy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, hundreds of thousands moved west to work, especially in the cities of the Ruhr valley. Although their legal status was often tenuous, many settled and became German nationals (Terkessedis 2000).

Germany established its own nationality law in 1913, with the passage of the Imperial and State Nationality Law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*, or RuStAG). This law retained key elements of the Prussian law of subjecthood—automatic membership by descent, with barriers to new members that facilitated discrimination against Jews and Poles. It was still possible to apply for German nationality, but this was an exception granted only when it was deemed in the ‘national interest.’ German borders shifted in the wake of the World War I, with the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the creation of Poland. Over one million displaced persons moved from these areas to the Germany of the Weimar Republic. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, differential treatment based on ‘race’ was further institutionalized. The Nuremberg race laws of 1935 established that citizenship was confined to ‘people of German or related blood.’ As a result, Jews living in the country lost government jobs and the right to vote, and those deported or killed forfeited their property to the German state.

During World War II as many as eight million prisoners of war and forced laborers lived in Germany. Many more were held in concentration camps; at the end of the war the total number of ‘displaced persons’ in Germany was between ten and twelve million. Many soon returned to their countries of origin but some had to wait for years to find refuge. Around the same time, German-origin refugees from Russia, Poland and Eastern Germany fled to the Western zones of the occupied country. An estimated nine million

had arrived from the East by 1950 (Herbert 2001). Although resources were scarce and friction arose between newcomers and local residents, the integration of these people is now thought to have been remarkably successful (Bade and Oltmer 2004).

When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded in 1949, German citizenship was based on the law of 1913. Retaining the old law was intended to assert the unity of the country despite the division into East and West (Brubaker 1992; Hailbronner 2010). This implied that people of German descent who were trapped in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe were automatically eligible for German citizenship if they could reach the FRG.

The supply of migrant labor from the East was an essential ingredient in the ‘economic miracle’ of rapid post-war reconstruction and growth (Herbert 2001), but the numbers were already falling by the 1950s. West German employers pressed the government to recruit ‘guest workers’ in Southern Europe, starting with Italy in 1955. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 put an end to East-West migration, the guest worker program expanded to more Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Morocco, Greece, the former Yugoslavia and Turkey).

The status of the guest workers in Germany was regulated by the ‘foreigners police directive’ (*Ausländerpolizeiverordnung*) of 1938, reinstated in 1951, which the Nazi government had used to control forced laborers (Herbert 2001: 204). It stipulated that foreigners were to live in Germany only in so far as it served German interests. The act was replaced by a ‘foreigners law’ (*Ausländergesetz*) in 1965, which reiterated the principle that migration should depend on German economic interests. Residence permits were granted for one year at a time. As the guest workers found niches in the German labor market, however, it became increasingly common for employers, who preferred to keep hold of trained workers than to recruit afresh, to renew their permits for multiple years. In 1971 this situation was legally recognized in a new ‘work permit directive’ (*Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung*) that allowed foreigners who had been employed for five years or longer to obtain a work permit for five more years.

As the growth of the German economy slowed in the 1970s, the federal government halted the recruitment of guest workers. The guests were now expected to leave, and indeed most did. Herbert (2001: 294) estimates that of the 15 million foreigners who came to work in Germany from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, 13 million returned to their country of origin. But around two million opted to stay. This often suited their employers, and the constitutional court ruled that the practice of repeatedly renewing work permits imposed an obligation on the German state to allow foreigners to stay if they so wished (Joppke 1999). The courts also confirmed that long-term foreign residents were covered by the 6th article of the German Basic Law (the equivalent of the constitution): ‘Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.’ Motivated in part by the constitutional provision on the family, the federal government passed a ‘family unification’ law in 1974, allowing foreign residents to sponsor their spouses and children to join them in Germany (Joppke 1999). Family migration allowed the foreign population to expand even after the recruitment of guest workers ceased.

The settling of the guest workers and their families, and the growing number of children who were officially ‘foreigners’ (*Ausländer*) even though they were growing up in Germany, raised the question whether these people would ever become German citizens. In 1978, the federal government and the *Länder* agreed on a set of guidelines to allow some foreign residents to join the citizenry.⁹ These laid out the criteria under which citizenship *could* be granted, but the decision was still at state discretion and only when in the ‘national interest.’ The guidelines also made clear that it was *not* in the national interest to increase the size of the citizenry through immigration.

Under these guidelines, foreign residents could apply for German citizenship if they had lived in the country for at least 10 years, had a clean criminal record, were prepared to give up their prior citizenship and showed a ‘voluntary and lasting orientation toward Germany’ (Section 3.1.1). Applicants had to have good command of spoken and written German, but the standards could be relaxed for older people or those with little education, ‘especially when other family members have good language skills and it is possible to grant citizenship to the entire family’ (Section 3.1.1). Another clause affirms the desirability of granting citizenship to the entire family rather than to individual applicants. ‘Different citizenships within the family, especially for family members forming a single household, brings the risks of uncertainty in international law and of conflict between family loyalties and duties to the state. It is therefore preferable for all family members to hold the same citizenship’ (Section 4.1). The expectation was that if citizenship was granted to one family member, it should be granted to all. As long as they applied together, the spouse and children of the main applicant were eligible for citizenship after just five years of residence.

Applicants for citizenship were expected to have the means to provide for themselves and their families without relying on state benefits, but exceptions could be granted to people who had lost their job through no fault of their own (Section 3.4.1). The guidelines also allowed foreigners married to a German citizen to apply after just three years of residence, and the act of inter-marriage was itself taken as evidence of a ‘lasting orientation to Germany.’ The application fee was 75% of one month’s net income, from DM 100 to a maximum of DM 5,000 (von Münch 2007: 219). The fee could be reduced in cases of financial hardship, at the discretion of local and state officials.

One key feature of the 1978 guidelines was heavy reliance on bureaucratic discretion. Officials were required to assess language skills and orientation to the country, to establish culpability for unemployment, to rule on ‘hardship’ cases, to grant or withhold exceptions on the provisions for family unity or against dual citizenship, to establish whether citizenship was in the national interest and to ensure that the applicant was unlikely to undermine the ‘free democratic order’ of the constitution. This gave considerable power to local bureaucrats, and to senior officials and politicians in the interior ministries of the federal states. Although citizenship law is written at the federal level, under the constitutional principle of subsidiarity it is administered by the states. Most of the states devolve the processing of routine applications to municipal offices, but state interior ministries issue their own guidelines to coordinate this work.

⁹ A copy of the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* can be found at <http://www.deutschesgesetz-online.de>

The numbers claiming citizenship under the 1978 guidelines remained low, and the size of the foreign resident population continued to grow, from 3.9 million in 1975 to almost 5 million by the late 1980s. This was largely the result of family reunification, in addition to the children born in Germany to the ‘guest workers.’ The country also received thousands of refugees and asylum seekers. Foreign residents and German activists continued to lobby for reforms that would allow long-term foreign residents to join the citizenry; many decried the long-term presence of a large population of foreigners as a ‘democratic deficit’ (Bauböck 1992; Green 2004; Yurdakul and Bodemann 2010). Most advocates of reform were on the Left, but some members of the conservative parties agreed, if perhaps for different reasons. As a Christian Democrat statement put it in 1984: ‘No country can accept a situation in which a substantial proportion of the population, across generations, remains outside the political community and exempt from the attending responsibilities.’¹⁰

Reforms of the law regulating the status of foreign residents, and the procedures for becoming a citizen, were debated throughout the 1980s but repeatedly postponed by the CDU/FDP government (Green 2004). The ‘foreigners law’ dated back to 1965 and was increasingly irrelevant after the end of the labor recruitment era. But the federal government continued to insist that the solution was for the foreign residents to go home. In the face of the evidence, ministers repeated the mantra: ‘Germany is not a country of immigration.’ In the late 1980s the SPD-ruled states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein responded to the inertia at the federal level by announcing that foreign residents would be given the right to vote in local elections. The CDU objected and took the states to the constitutional court, which ruled that only citizens should be allowed to vote.¹¹ But the court also endorsed the principle that ‘people subject to state authority should hold democratic political rights,’ and suggested that the way to address the anomalous status of long-term foreign residents was to make it easier to become a German citizen.¹²

The reform process in the 1980s had been delayed in part by the intransigence of the conservative Bavarian interior minister, who finally left office in 1989 (Green 2004). Shortly thereafter a draft bill was introduced, debated through the fall and winter of 1989 and passed in the spring of 1990. Two new categories of people would be allowed to apply for ‘facilitated citizenship’—young foreigners aged between 16 and 23 who had lived in the country for at least eight years and had spent six years in a German school, and older foreigners who had lived in the country for at least 15 years (who were required to apply by 1995). The spouses and minor children of long-resident foreigners could also be granted citizenship, even if they had not been resident for 15 years. The application fee was set at DM 100 (€50). The most important change was that people applying under

¹⁰ Quoted by Dr. Michael Bürsch, plenary protocol, *Deutscher Bundestag* 1999, p. 2282.

¹¹ This decision has been taken as precedent, and most legal experts now agree that the only way to introduce voting rights for foreigners would be by constitutional amendment (e.g. Rennert 2008; c.f. Hanschmann 2008). This is despite the fact that since 1995 E.U. citizens *do* have the right to vote and run in local and E.U. elections; in their case, no amendment was necessary. Migrant activists and opposition parties decry the double standard (see e.g. *Deutscher Bundestag* 2007, Drucksache 16/5904).

¹² *Bundesverfassungsgericht* decision 83, 37.

these provisions were to receive citizenship ‘as a rule.’ This was a step away from the presumption that citizenship was given to immigrants only as an exception and only when it served the national interest.

The reform that finally passed in 1990 was a response to the situation of the 1980s, but it was quickly overtaken by other events. The debates over the reform were overshadowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had drastic consequences for migration to Germany. The fall of the wall allowed millions of ‘ethnic Germans’ from the Soviet Union to move west.¹³ Around 300,000 arrived in 1990 alone. Under the post-war provisions these so-called ‘emigrants’ (*Aussiedler*) were allowed to enter the country as putative Germans. Because the choice to claim German citizenship was effectively made before arrival, this group of migrants is not relevant to the question at the heart of this dissertation.¹⁴

The ‘ethnic German’ immigrants in the early 1990s were joined by hundreds of thousands of others, including refugees from conflicts in the disintegrating Soviet Union, and around 200,000 Jewish emigrants who were treated as refugees. As Yugoslavia collapsed and war broke out in 1991, hundreds of thousands more refugees came to Western Europe, many of them to Germany to stay with relatives among the former guest workers. For a brief period in the 1990s Germany received more migrants than any other country in the world. The arrival of so many people had a dramatic political impact that prompted further changes in citizenship law.

The mass migration of the early 1990s prompting political tensions and an upsurge in far-right violence that left dozens dead (Koopmans and Olzak 2004). The governing CDU proposed to curb migration by amending the constitution to make it harder to claim asylum. This was a highly contentious move, since the generous constitutional provision on asylum had been designed to differentiate the Federal Republic of Germany from the Nazi regime. The change required a super-majority in parliament and the support of the opposition SPD. In return for supporting the constitutional amendment, the SPD secured a permanent extension of the facilitated citizenship policy for foreigners who had lived in Germany longer than 15 years (recall that this opening had originally only been intended to last until 1995). It was also agreed that citizenship would be granted not just ‘as a rule’ but ‘as a right’ to anyone meeting the criteria.

These changes came into force in 1993 and served to strengthen and extend the liberalizing reform that had passed in 1990. Making citizenship a *right* for those who met


¹³ The year 1990 also saw the reunification of East and West Germany. The East had its own guest worker program with communist states such as Poland, Vietnam and Mozambique (migrants were referred to as ‘contract workers’ or *Vertragsarbeiter*). The numbers involved were much smaller, however, and the East followed a strict policy of terminating contracts after 5 years (Bade and Olmert 2004). As a result, the foreign population in 1989 was just 90,000, and most soon returned to Vietnam. As I explain in Chapter four, it remains the case that few migrants live in Eastern Germany.

¹⁴ As such, the ‘returning Germans’ are excluded from the data on foreign residents and the numbers claiming citizenship. For literature on these people, see von Koppenfels 2002.

the criteria was another crucial step away from the idea that citizenship was a privilege bestowed at state discretion and only in the ‘national interest’ (Hailbronner 2010). Following this terminology, in this dissertation I write of foreign residents claiming the right to citizenship. I avoid the word ‘naturalization’ because it implies that holding the citizenship of one’s country of residence is the natural state of affairs, which is inaccurate in the German case (see also Smith 1997: 13).

The numbers of new citizens began to rise after the reform of 1990 and the extension of the new provisions in 1993, from an average of around 15,000 in the 1980s to 45,000 in 1993 and 83,000 by 1997. But the influx of new migrants ensured that the population of foreign residents grew much faster. The size of the foreign population of Germany since 1961 is shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 The size of the foreign population of Germany over the past five decades



Note: from Herbert 2001; Statistisches Bundesamt Ausländische Bevölkerung 2011.

2. German citizenship law in the 21st century

The 1990s was thus the first period in which sizeable numbers of foreign residents acquired German citizenship. At the same time, gaps emerged in the rates at which foreign residents were able to acquire German citizenship in different parts of the country. Areas governed by parties of the Left, such as the city-states of Berlin and Hamburg, had higher acquisition rates with around 2% of the resident foreign population acquiring German citizenship each year, whereas in conservative areas such as Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg the figure was around 1%. Politicians on each side accused the other of allowing party-politics to shape the implementation of the laws. The SPD tends

to receive more support from foreign-origin residents than does the CDU (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Wüst 2006). Overall, as we can see in Figure 1.1, the growing numbers acquiring German citizenship were not enough to offset the growth of the foreign population, which peaked at almost eight million in the late 1990s.

When the SPD and Green parties formed a coalition government in 1998, they announced plans to introduce a ‘modern citizenship law’ that would ‘change the face of the Federal Republic of Germany.’¹⁵ The Greens were motivated by ideals of multicultural inclusion, and the SPD had long been a (cautious) advocate of immigrant interests, especially for the ‘guest workers,’ many of whom were active in the trade unions. This was one of the few areas of overlap in the programs of the two parties, and it became their first joint project (Green 2004). The coalition proposed to halve the required period of residence, to allow dual citizenship and, in a break with the tradition of attributing citizenship mainly by descent, to introduce birthright citizenship.

The opposition CDU responded by initiating a petition against giving immigrants the ‘privilege’ of dual citizenship that quickly found millions of signatories. On the back of this campaign the party won state elections in Hessen, securing enough votes in the upper house of parliament to block the proposed reform. It is worth noting that the children of one German and one foreign citizen *are* entitled to dual citizenship, and that this point has never been politically contentious. The opposition to dual citizenship applies only to immigrants (Hailbronner 2010).

After months of wrangling the Liberal party (FDP) brokered a compromise, which came into effect in January 2000. The reform had three key elements: a limited form of birthright citizenship, easier requirements for those applying for citizenship, and more detailed provisions on integration.¹⁶ The most controversial change was the introduction of automatic German citizenship for children born in the country to foreign parents. The final version of the birthright citizenship provision was much narrower than originally intended. Birthright citizenship is available only if one of the parents had lived in the country for at least eight years and was a permanent resident at the time of the child’s birth. The standards for parental eligibility mean that birthright citizenship is granted only to children with at least one parent who is highly likely to be eligible to citizenship. Only half of the children born to foreign parents since the year 2000 have been granted automatic citizenship (Statistisches Bundesamt *Statistisches Jahrbuch* 2010: 58). The birthright citizens will also have to choose, between the ages of 18 and 23, whether to retain German citizenship or that of their parents (this is called the ‘option model’ of dual citizenship).¹⁷

¹⁵ Plenary protocol, *Deutscher Bundestag* 1998, session 16, page 90.

¹⁶ Smaller changes were also made. The application fee was set at €255, though minor children who are included in a parent’s application pay just €51. The clause requiring a clean criminal record was amended to allow for crimes punished with fines worth up to 180 days’ wages.

¹⁷ The birthright citizenship provision was also extended to children born in Germany since 1990. Their parents had to meet the same residence requirements, and had to apply on behalf of their children by the end of the year 2000. Around 50,000 children became German citizens this way.

The reform of 2000 also eased key requirements for applying for citizenship. The minimum period of residence for a ‘right’ to citizenship was cut from 15 years to eight, roughly doubling the number eligible on this basis (from around 2.5 million to over 4 million). The reform introduced a more detailed list of conditions under which applicants for German citizenship could get permission to retain dual citizenship. Until this time, people from countries that made it difficult to relinquish citizenship might be barred from becoming Germans because of the German policy against dual citizenship. In parts of the country an exception was made and these people were allowed dual citizenship, and it appears that the aim may have been to force conservative regions to apply the same standards (Beauftragte der Bundesministerium für Ausländerfragen 2002; Green 2004). However, the reform also introduced an explicit ban on obtaining dual citizenship without the permission of the German government.¹⁸

Finally, the integration requirements were also specified in greater detail (in citizenship law and in new guidelines issued at the same time).¹⁹ Previously, assessing language skills was a matter of bureaucratic discretion. After 2000, applicants had to prove they could ‘navigate daily life and encounters with state officials,’ and were ‘able to lead a conversation at a level to be expected given the applicant’s educational level and age’ (Section 8.1.2.1.1). The guidelines gave examples of suitable evidence, such as certificates from language institutes or diplomas from German schools. The official guidelines that accompanied the reform of 2000 included a new statement: ‘In general it is also required that spouses granted citizenship along with the applicant have good command of German.’ There was still some scope for discretion: ‘It is possible to take consideration of educational level and learning difficulties if other family members have adequate command of German and granting citizenship would ensure that the entire family holds German citizenship’ (Section 8.1.3.9.1). But, crucially, the clause on the desirability of common citizenship within the family was removed.

The revised nationality law thus broke in two ways with the presumption that family members would acquire citizenship together. Prior to the reforms, it was not possible for minor children to acquire German citizenship without their parents, but this changed with the introduction of birthright citizenship. The second break was the explicit emphasis on evidence of language skills from the family members of applicants, as well as the removal of the clause on the desirability of common citizenship in the family.

Altogether, these changes marked a shift towards a more individualized approach to the criteria for citizenship. The aim was that immigrants and their descendents, whether born in the country or elsewhere, should acquire citizenship only through an ‘active decision in favor of the German state.’²⁰ As we shall see, this focus on the individual desire and ability to integrate has become even more important in recent years.

¹⁸ This closed a loophole. Although applicants had been required since the 1970s to show they had given up their prior citizenship before they could become German, in the 1990s thousands of Turks found they could give up their Turkish citizenship to become German, and then re-apply to become Turkish again. This was stopped with an explicit ban on dual citizenship.

¹⁹ http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_13122000_V612400513.htm

²⁰ Plenary protocol, *Deutscher Bundestag* 1999, session 16, page 3436.

The reforms of 2000 were hailed not just as the biggest changes in German citizenship law in decades, but as a big step towards a more open polity (Green 2004; Hailbronner 2010). In particular, the introduction of birthright citizenship was widely seen as breaking with the exclusive tradition of attributing citizenship only on the basis of German descent (Brubaker 2001; Koopmans et al 2005). Upon introducing the bill, the SPD spokesman Michael Bürsch criticized the ‘antiquated law of 1913’ and celebrated the fact that ‘at the close of the century we are finally taking the first steps towards our notion of a modern nationality law.’²¹ The reforms were expected to increase the number of new citizens; the federal government’s commissioner for migrant affairs said she expected as many as one million applicants in the year 2000 alone (Krupa 1999).

But, as we saw in the introduction, these expectations were largely disappointed. A record-breaking 186,688 foreigners obtained German citizenship in the year 2000, and a further 41,257 were eligible for the ‘option model’ of birthright citizenship. But, because the application process often takes several months, around 90,000 of these people had actually applied under the old rules. If we exclude the birthright citizens, who do not face the decision whether or not to apply, the numbers applying for German citizenship have been falling ever since the reform of 2000. By the end of the decade, only around 100,000 people were applying for citizenship each year, fewer people than in the late 1990s and just 1.35% of the foreign population. It is also important to note that, contrary to the expectations of the government that introduced the reform, only around half of the children born to foreign parents have proven eligible for birthright citizenship.²² As we will see in Chapter Three, the children born since 2000 who missed out on birthright citizenship also tend to live in poorer households than the children who were eligible.


To understand the implications of this low rate of citizenship acquisition we can model the size of Germany’s foreign population under different acquisition rates. If the foreign population were to continue to grow at a rate of 1.1% per year, due to net migration of around 60,000 (the average from 2005 to 2009) and a slightly higher birth rate than death rate (in line with current trends), then with only 1.35% of foreigners acquiring citizenship per year, the size of the foreign population would barely change over the next 40 years. It would fall from 7.2 million in 2010 to 6.5 million in the year 2050. If, however, the rate of citizenship acquisition were to recover to the peak in the year 2000 (2.57%), the foreign population would gradually shrink, to 5.5 million by 2030 and four million by 2050. If the acquisition rate were to rise to 5% per year—comparable to rates in the U.K. and Sweden—the foreign population would shrink much faster, to three million by 2030 and under two million in 2050. These three scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1.2.²³

²¹ Plenary protocol, *Deutscher Bundestag* 1999, session 16, page 2282.

²² *Bundestagsdrucksache* (Official Records of the Bundestag) number 14/9815, p. 5.

²³ The forecasts are based on a simple compound interest formula. Future population = current population * (1 + (net growth rate, including citizenship uptake, migration, fertility and mortality))^N, where N is the number of years over which the population is projected.

Figure 1.2 Forecasting the size of the foreign population of Germany, depending on the rate of citizenship acquisition.



Although the reforms of the year 2000 were the most ambitious in recent decades, further changes have since been made. These reforms have superseded the guidelines issued in the year 2000 and have continued the trend of requiring more detailed evidence that every applicant for citizenship is well integrated. This means there is much less scope for discretion to facilitate family members claiming citizenship together.²⁴

The original plan of the SPD-Green government was that the 2000 reform of citizenship law would accompany a major reform of immigration policy. The government dropped the long-standing pretense that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration.’ Intense party-political conflict caused delays. When the immigration law finally passed in 2004 it also brought further changes to the requirements for citizenship. As a security measure, the secret police now checks for evidence of terrorist activities on the part of people applying for citizenship. The act also introduced obligatory integration courses for new immigrants, with language and civics training. By way of incentive, those who complete this course are eligible for citizenship after just 7 years of residence. Some states began

²⁴ The federal government can issue new guidelines on the interpretation of citizenship laws, but it has not done so since the year 2000. The gap between the old guidelines and the recent reforms allows the states greater discretion in implementing the laws. In order to issue new guidelines the federal government needs a majority in the upper house of parliament, and this can be hard to muster on so controversial an issue.

to use this course as an appropriate standard of language ability for citizenship, though not all could agree on this approach.

Disagreements over the best way to test for integration spurred further reforms in 2007 and 2008. The Federal Administrative Court ruled in 2005 that applicants could demonstrate adequate command of German even without passing a written test (*Bundesverwaltungsgericht* decision 5 C 8.05), but conservative states continued to insist on such tests. The federal government, now led by the CDU, amended nationality law to require written language tests, setting the standard of language ability at level B1 of the Common European Reference Framework for Languages, a higher standard than in most West European countries (Huddleston et al 2010). Applicants who are not fluent in German are now required to produce a certificate from an accredited language school or show they completed their education in a German-language school.

The requirement that applicants show knowledge of German society has also been formalized, through a civics test introduced in September 2008. Again, conservative states played a role in forcing the hand of the federal government. Baden-Württemberg introduced its own test in 2006, but only for applicants from predominantly Muslim countries. The test contained leading questions on terrorism and gender relations. For example: ‘How do you feel about the statement that a wife should obey her husband, and that he is allowed to beat her if she is not doesn’t?’ The test also aimed to ensure that these Muslim applicants were not anti-Semites or racists. For example: ‘Some people say that Jews are responsible for all the evil in the world, and even think they’re responsible for the 9/11 attacks in New York. What do you think of such statements?’

After the states of Hessen and Bavaria proposed to follow Baden-Württemberg’s lead and introduce their own integration tests, the SPD concluded that a federal civics test would be better than letting conservative areas devise their own standards. The federal government created a commission to design a civics test with the focus on factual questions (e.g. the name of the upper house of parliament). Although there was speculation that the civics test deterred some applicants, most of those who take the test appear to pass—in the first few months the figure was as high as 99% (*Deutscher Bundesrat* 2007, Drucksache 224/07, p. 435).

In (belated) recognition of E.U. treaties, the 2007 reform also stipulated that E.U. nationals who apply to become German citizens should be allowed to retain their prior citizenship if they so wish. As was explained in the introduction, this was not sufficient to increase the numbers of applicants from these countries. Foreign residents who are ‘exceptionally well integrated’ can now for citizenship after just six years of residence. The 2007 reform also removed the exemption for applicants up to the age of 23 from the requirement to demonstrate financial self-sufficiency. This means that many foreign residents still in education or training now find it difficult to meet the requirements. Finally, the definition of a clean criminal record was also tightened, with any crime that incurred a fine worth 90 days’ wages (previously 180) now rendering a foreign resident ineligible for citizenship.

The reforms since the year 2000 have thus introduced new restrictions on foreign residents applying for German citizenship. Following the pattern established in the year 2000 these reforms have defined the standards that individuals must meet to show that they are integrated in ever greater detail. On the basis of the recent reforms, the application process could now be expected to proceed as follows. The first step is to visit the local office in which citizenship is administered, where an official makes an initial assessment of eligibility based on time in the country, employment status and language skills. People who seem unlikely to be granted citizenship based on these criteria are often discouraged from applying, though the decision rests with each applicant.

Applying costs €255 and requires submitting information on family, place of residence and travel in recent years, education and language skills, criminal record, sources of income and insurance coverage. The form ends with a declaration of loyalty. Applicants must also show that they can support themselves and their family. Those who aren't fluent in German have to provide evidence of language ability, and may be advised to attend a language class. Applicants must also prepare for the civics test, and pass it by correctly answering at least 17 of 33 questions. The civics test costs €30 (and can be repeated as many times as necessary). Typically the application process involves several visits to the citizenship office, and to other bureaus to get copies of required documents. The offices are open only on working days and have long waiting times, so most applicants have to take time off work.

Once the application is submitted, the bureaucrats in the citizenship office run a number of checks against official records of residence status, criminal record and employment history. They also check with the federal security services that the applicant is not suspected of supporting extremist or terrorist activities. If the applicant meets the criteria she will receive an assurance of eligibility for German citizenship and will have to relinquish her prior citizenship. This can be difficult, since some countries are loathe to let go of their citizens, and some charge a large fee for doing so—Croatia is reported to charge €516, and Serbia as much as €1250. Again, the process of giving up one's prior citizenship may require several visits to the relevant offices. Once the applicant has the evidence that she has renounced her prior citizenship, she will be invited to a 'festive occasion' (often in the town hall) for the granting of citizenship. The entire process rarely takes less than three months and can often extend over several months or even years. In more complex cases, e.g. if the applicant wishes to retain her prior citizenship, the application process may take even longer and it may be necessary to hire a lawyer.

3. Overview of the requirements for citizenship over recent decades

Major changes in the requirements for citizenship, from 1978 through 2008, are summarized in Table 1.1. As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the criteria applied in any given case depend on various factors, including country of birth, age, country of origin and marital status. It is not possible to succinctly account for all of these factors; Table 1.1 simply presents a summary of changes in the most important requirements across give main categories.

Table 1.1 Changes in the requirements for German citizenship over recent decades

Year	Integration	Residence	Income	Crime	Birth
1978	Show ‘lasting orientation to Germany’ and command of German	10 years, but citizenship only if in ‘national interest’	Provide for self and family	Clean record	n/a
1990/ 1993	Show ‘lasting orientation to Germany’ and command of German	Citizenship ‘as a rule’ for young people after 8 years, for older after 15.	Provide for self and family (exception if aged 16-23)	Clean record (or fine up to 180 days)	n/a
2000	Language: ‘navigate daily life.’ Civics: ‘accept German order’	Citizenship ‘as a right’ after 8 years.	Provide for self and family (exception if aged 16-23)	Clean record (or fine up to 180 days)	Automatic citizenship + option to remain German
2007/ 2008	Language: certificate at level B1. Written civics test.	Citizenship ‘as a right’ after 8 years, 7 after integration course	Provide for self and family	Clean record (or fine up to 90 days)	Automatic citizenship + option to remain German

4. Comparing the rights and duties of foreign residents and citizens

Citizenship is often described as ‘a bundle of rights and responsibilities,’ but in fact the legal status of citizenship does not always serve as a clear boundary. Many non-citizens enjoy some of the rights that theorists associate with citizenship, while some citizens lack certain rights, at least for some amount of time (e.g. children or felons; see Cohen 2009). In order to establish the relative attractions of living in Germany as a foreign resident or as a German citizen, this section of the chapter compares the rights and duties of foreign residents and German citizens.

The analysis in this chapter follows the approach of T. H. Marshall (1992 [1950]), who distinguished between the ‘civil,’ ‘political’ and ‘social’ rights of citizenship. I use the same three categories and add three more that are relevant to my study: the right to settle in the country, the right to move across state borders and the right to participate fully in the economy. Marshall studied the emergence of citizenship rights in Great Britain, rather than the implications of immigration, and he therefore paid little attention to the basic role of citizenship in regulating the rights to move and settle (Benhabib 2002; Bosniak 2006). He argued that the rights of citizenship offer protections against the

vicissitudes of capitalist markets, but, rather than following the logic of ‘citizenship against markets,’ I also include economic rights among the benefits of citizenship.

The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 1.2. A couple of points should be noted. First, the comparison is based on current law; people who made the decision in an earlier period may have faced a different set of considerations. Note also that the rights of foreign residents depend on their country of citizenship. The biggest differences involve the E.U., and the table distinguishes between E.U. citizens and others. But this is shorthand; in fact the situation is even more complicated. People from other West European countries (e.g. Switzerland and Norway) have many of the rights of those from the 15 West European countries that made up the E.U. until 2004, whereas ‘new’ members from Eastern Europe lacked the right to free movement until 2011.

Table 1.2 The rights of foreigner residents and citizens compared

	Foreign residents	German citizens
Settlement rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU citizens and permanent residents: high level of security. - Temporary residents: weaker rights but many are quite secure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unqualified right to settle.
Movement rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Permanent residents can move within Germany. - Long period abroad annuls residence permit. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Right to move within Germany <i>and</i> other EU countries. - Easier to return to Germany after long period abroad.
Civil rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All civil rights, but criminals can be punished <i>and</i> deported. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All civil rights.
Political rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU citizens: right to vote and run in local and EU elections. - Non-EU: no voting rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Right to vote and run as candidate in all elections.
Social rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribution-based benefits and need-based social assistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribution-based benefits and need-based social assistance.
Economic rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Right to own property. - Permanent residents have right to work in most sectors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Right to own property. - Right to work in all sectors of the labor market.

The first important difference between citizens and foreign residents is that only the latter have the unqualified right to remain in Germany. However, most foreign residents now

also have strong legal rights to remain in Germany. As of 2009, two thirds held a permanent residence permit. More than half of these people qualified for a ‘settlement permit’ on the basis of length of residence and employment history (Statistisches Bundesamt *Ausländische Bevölkerung* 2010: 78-79). The rest are citizens of E.U. member states, who are free to move and live within Europe indefinitely, so long as they have a job or can support themselves (by contrast migrants from elsewhere must apply for a limited number of visas). Permanent residents can be obliged to leave the country if they ‘pose a danger to public safety and order,’ because of a history of convictions or a single serious crime. This applies even to foreigners who grew up in Germany and have few ties to the ‘home’ country. Recently, about 10,000 people have been deported on these grounds per year.²⁵

A further 22% of the foreign population has a temporary residence permit. Although in theory they must leave the country if they lose their current job, many have held the permit for years, and the courts have ruled that multiple renewals of a temporary residence permit imposes a duty to grant exceptions when the person has ties to Germany, e.g. family in the country (Joppke 1999). The remaining 12% of the foreign resident population lives under some other status, e.g. asylum seekers, or those whose presence is ‘tolerated’ because their application for asylum was rejected but the home country is considered too dangerous to force them to return.

In short, although only citizens have the unconditional right to remain in the country, most foreign residents are difficult to deport. But this need not mean the difference is inconsequential. Existing research suggests there may be a big psychological distinction between *almost secure* and *secure* residence rights (Prümm 2004; Sayad 2004; Topçu 2007). Even those who are unlikely to run into trouble with the law are risk-averse when it comes to residence rights. One would also expect the difference to be more important to people with the most to lose if forced to leave, such as those with investments in Germany, those with family in the country, or those from poor or war-torn countries.

The second category in Table 1.2 concerns freedom of movement. Most foreign residents are free to move within Germany, though those on temporary residence permits are effectively tied to a particular employer. The fact that Germany is a member of the E.U. implies that acquiring German citizenship often allows much more mobility. Even beyond the E.U., it is easier to travel with a German passport than, for instance, with a Serbian one. This implies that acquiring German citizenship can benefit those who travel, from tourists and those visiting family, to people who want to work elsewhere, to those whose jobs require foreign travel (as is common in the E.U.). Another benefit of a German passport is that it makes it easier for those who intend to return to Germany to spend long periods of time in another country, because residence permits expire if the holder spends more than six months abroad.

The third category in Table 1.2 relates to civil rights. The first six articles of the 1949 Basic Law (constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany explicitly refer to all people, not just Germans. This was an effort to ensure that the country would never

²⁵ See *Migrationsbericht 2009*, published by the Bundesinnenministerium, page 194.

again persecute minorities as it had under the Nazis. These articles protect individuals in their interactions with the state, and enshrine 1) human dignity, 2) personal freedom, 3) equality before the law, 4) freedom of faith and conscience, 5) freedom of expression, and 6) the right to marriage and family. The courts have helped ensure that the 'right to the family' allows foreign residents to sponsor family members to join them in Germany. Foreign residents have to prove sufficient income to support the new family member(s), whereas German citizens do not. In the case of naturalized citizens, however, the income requirement may still apply if the German authorities decide that the relationship could be sustained abroad rather than in Germany. The result is that becoming a citizen will not necessarily make it easier to sponsor family members. The only other important difference in the realm of civil rights is that foreigners who commit serious crimes can be doubly punished, first serving a sentence in Germany and then deported.

Most foreign residents lack political rights. A partial exception is made for citizens of E.U. member states, who can vote and stand for office at the local level and in elections to the European Parliament. As discussed above, in the 1980s the constitutional court ruled against the efforts of some German states to grant foreigners local voting rights. Other European countries grant non-citizen residents some voting rights (e.g. Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands), as did the U.S.A. for much of its history (Hayduk 2008). But the stance of the court means the situation in Germany is unlikely to change in the near future. The right to vote is one of the big advantages of becoming a citizen.

In the realm of social rights foreign residents are included in contribution-based benefits such as unemployment insurance, health insurance and pensions. The trade unions insisted that foreigners were included when the guest worker program was established, so employers would not be tempted to avoid the cost of contributions by relying on immigrant labor (Herbert 2001). Permanent residents are also eligible for needs-based social assistance. All children are provided with free schooling, and young foreigners are eligible for grants to support them through university. The inclusion of foreign residents in the German social system led Soysal (1994) to the conclusion that they benefit from 'postnational membership,' and that the lack of citizenship is of diminished importance.

Finally, economic rights. Foreign residents can own property in Germany and abroad. Although some sending countries once made it difficult for non-citizens to own or inherit property, which may have discouraged emigrants from claiming German citizenship, in recent years many such provisions have been removed so that the sending countries can benefit from remittances (see e.g. Perchinig and Bauböck 2006: 14). Foreigners living in Germany with permanent residence permits can work in most sectors of the economy, but are excluded from senior positions in the bureaucracy and from some self-regulating professions, such as doctors. Until very recently they were even forbidden from working as chimney-sweeps! The restriction on bureaucratic employment—which extends to many jobs in the public sector, including teaching and the police force—may serve as an important barrier to upwards mobility, given that this sector has been relatively open to minority group members in other European countries (Heath and Cheung 2007).

Having discussed the rights of citizenship let us turn to the responsibilities. The German case exhibits considerable overlap between the duties of foreign residents and citizens, but also some clear differences. These are summarized in Table 1.3. We see, first of all, that *all* residents are required to obey the laws of the land and to pay taxes and social insurance contributions.

Table 1.3 The duties of foreigner residents and citizens compared

	Foreign residents	German citizens
Legal duties	- Obey they law.	- Obey the law.
Fiscal duties	- Pay taxes.	- Pay taxes.
Military duties	- May have to complete military service in country of citizenship.	- Military or social service (until early 2011).

The main difference between citizens and foreign residents concerns military service, one of the more onerous duties of citizenship. Many West European countries have removed this obligation, and in 2010 the German government also decided to stop the program. But until 2011, 18-year-old male citizens were required either to spend several months in the army or complete a slightly longer period of ‘civil service,’ typically assisting in a hospital, retirement home or youth group. In practice, male foreign residents who became citizens before the age of 23 were expected to complete either military or civil service; it was rare for men above that age to be called up. The obligation to complete military service in Germany may have discouraged some foreign residents from claiming citizenship, or at least prompted them to delay the application.

Military service requirements in the country of origin can also influence the decision over citizenship. Some countries, including Turkey, require males to finish their military service before they can relinquish citizenship. In the Turkish case, people living abroad are allowed to serve for 21 days, instead of the usual 12-15 months, in return for paying around €5,000. German officials do not treat this as an excessive cost of relinquishing Turkish citizenship and hence as a reason for allowing dual citizenship. This requirement, along with the German opposition to dual citizenship, can impose a large extra cost on young male residents who want German citizenship.

5. Implications for the decision over citizenship

In the introduction I advanced an argument for the family-level logic of citizenship, suggesting that we should expect family members who become citizens together to enjoy increased benefits and reduced costs. Building on existing research, I presented the outline of a new approach to the question of why (some) foreign residents become citizens. Now, having described the context of immigration and citizenship laws, and

summarized the differences between the status of foreign residents and German citizens, we can fill in more details of the implications of this argument in the German case.

The security that comes with the unqualified right to live in Germany can be seen as one of the biggest benefits of becoming a citizen. And there is good reason to expect that foreign residents will value this benefit more highly if they can obtain citizenship along with other family members. In short, my security is worth more, if the people I care the most about are also secure. Note that foreigners from E.U. member states can be expected to gain less in this regard than those from most other parts of the world, giving them less reason to acquire German citizenship.

The right to free movement within Germany and the E.U. can also be expected to have greater value if shared with other family members. Whether traveling for holidays, visiting family or re-locating for work, many people move *with* their families. A foreign resident whose spouse and children have German citizenship will hold up the entire family whenever they travel together. And he may even prevent his spouse from taking up a job offer in another European country. Again, the family-level logic of citizenship implies this benefit is worth more if shared with the family.

The third important benefit of citizenship is political autonomy. Voters in a democratic state are subject to the law but also have a say in the writing of the law. I do not expect the family-level logic to have big implications for the value that individuals place on this benefit of citizenship. My vote may be more powerful if other like-minded people are also able to vote. But the family unit is too small to for this consideration to carry much weight in the decision over citizenship.

We should expect the family-level logic of citizenship to have implications for the value placed on the economic benefits of acquiring German citizenship. To the extent that holding German citizenship helps migrant-origin children in the educational system and when they enter the workforce, acquiring citizenship at a young age will have higher payoffs than waiting until adulthood. The benefits can also be expected to spill over to other members of the household. Until the reforms of the year 2000, the only way for parents to ensure that their children went through schools and entered the labor market as Germans was for the parents to become citizens too. Hence, at least until those reforms, parents will have had extra reason to apply for citizenship along with their children.

Let us now turn to the costs of acquiring German citizenship. The application process is costly and difficult in itself. These costs are not limited to the fees, but also include the opportunity cost of the time and effort that goes into applying—time that could have been spent in other ways. Some of these costs can be pooled amongst family members who apply at the same time. One person can deal with the paperwork; filling in four forms is not much harder than completing one. There may also be scope for delegating the work to the family member best suited to the task (e.g. someone already familiar with the German bureaucracy).

We should also expect some people to bear these costs more easily than others. Financial and human capital resources will help, as will a sense of political efficacy, i.e. the belief that one is authorized and competent to participate (Almond and Verba 1963; Bourdieu 1984). Only those with a strong sense of efficacy are likely to demand that the state observes their rights. This may be relatively rare among foreign residents, who are frequently reminded that the very right to stay in the country can be revoked. Under these circumstances, the encouragement of friends or family with a strong sense of efficacy may be crucial (Junn 1999; Ramakrishnan 2005; Wong 2006). Indeed, reversing the typical logic of political socialization, the children of immigrants may have a special role to play in helping their parents understand the system and encouraging them to have their say (Bloemraad and Trost 2008). We can therefore expect migrants with a strong sense of political efficacy to reduce the costs by helping and encouraging family members to apply for citizenship.

Another cost of becoming a German citizen is the requirement to give up one's prior citizenship. The fact that so many of the foreign residents in Germany have lived there for so long suggests they are unlikely to return to the country of origin. This implies that the effects of giving up one's prior citizenship on social relationship with other immigrants in Germany may be more important than the pragmatic issue of the right to return (see Jones-Correa 1998). Some people feel that giving up citizenship severs ties with the country of origin, and it may also be seen as an act of distancing oneself from the migrant community in Germany. Applying along with family members may reduce these costs. Ties to the country of origin are often associated with particular people, especially family members. If these people apply for German citizenship too, there may be less sense of estrangement. Family members may also be able to insulate each other against any disapproval for 'acting German.' If the family applies together, one won't hear such complaints within the family, at least.

Finally, note that many of these benefits carry less weight for residents from other E.U. member countries. They have easier access to temporary and permanent residence in Germany than most immigrants and better prospects if forced to return, they can travel freely and they even have some political rights. On the other hand, since 2007 E.U. citizens can become German while retaining their prior citizenship.

The costs and benefits are summarized in Table 1.4, with + signs for benefits and – signs for costs. The table is split to show the differences between an individualistic approach to the decision and the family-level logic. The + and – signs reflect the expectation that applying for German citizenship is more attractive if family members can apply together.

The argument for the family-level logic of citizenship does not imply that family members will always want to become German together together, or not at all. The above analysis shows that the citizenship status of one person has implications for other family members. At the very least, then, one would expect family members to discuss the decision of whether or not to apply. Family members may decide that the collective interest is best served by some people becoming German citizens while others do not. The particular relationships within the family will shape the dynamic in each household.

Parents often place the interests of their children first. Many children feel grateful and hope to reciprocate, though some distance themselves from their parents. Siblings may support each other, or may tease without mercy a brother or sister who wants to become German. The coming chapters will address the importance of family-level decisions over citizenship and assess which of these inter-personal influences are most powerful.

Table 1.4 The family-level logic of citizenship in the comparison of costs and benefits

Benefits of acquiring German citizenship		
	<i>Individual logic</i>	<i>Family-level logic</i>
Secure residence	+ Unqualified right to settle in Germany	+ + Entire family can settle in Germany with confidence
Movement	+ Move within Germany and EU	+ + Family can move and travel together
Politics	+ Set rules under which one lives	+ Set rules under which one lives
Economics	+ Full access to labor market may boost income	+ + Acquiring citizenship as a child may boost lifetime income
Costs of acquiring German citizenship		
	<i>Individual logic</i>	<i>Family-level logic</i>
Application process	- - Costs €255 per person - - Complex, opportunity costs	- Costs lower for children (€51) - Scope for division of labor
Relinquish prior citizenship	- - Sever ties to origin country and migrant community	- Sever some ties, but insulated within family

6. Conclusion

This chapter has explained the context under which foreigners came to live in Germany, the requirements they must meet if they wish to become German citizens, and the relative attractions of living in the country as a citizen or as a foreign resident. We have seen that the introduction of a right to citizenship in the 1990s first allowed significant numbers of foreign residents to join the citizenry. In those years it was standard practice for other family members to be granted citizenship at the same time. The reform of 2000 eased some of the criteria and introduced new routes to citizenship, but shifted away from the

presumption that citizenship is a family affair. Further reforms continued in this vein by requiring increasingly detailed evidence of integration from each and every applicant.

The contextual information presented in this chapter has also allowed me to give a more detailed account of the observable implications of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. In the coming chapters I test the argument using two kinds of evidence. In Chapter Two, I present qualitative evidence supporting the claim that the decision over citizenship is taken at the level of the family and in pursuit of collective goals. And in the third and fourth chapters we will see quantitative evidence confirming the importance of the family-level clustering of citizenship status, and supporting the argument that this is because the status of citizenship holds more value if shared with the family.

Chapter Two: Qualitative Evidence on the Decision over Citizenship

'I took this ID to stand firm myself and fight for the future of the next generations.' (Mr. A, North-Rhine Westphalia).²⁶

This chapter provides qualitative, interview-based evidence on the family-level logic of the decision over citizenship. The chapter shows that prospective citizens typically consider the interests of the family, not just the individual, when deciding whether or not to apply. The interview data show *how* and *why* the family-level logic of the decision influences the likelihood of foreign residents becoming German citizens. The findings are based on 70 interviews conducted in Germany in 2009 and 2010. Around half were conducted with foreign residents and new German citizens; the rest involved officials who administer citizenship laws, civil society organizations that provide advice on applying for citizenship, and political parties that shape the context of the decision.²⁷ The chapter concludes by explaining that the data presented are inconsistent with alternative accounts of the decision over citizenship, and highlighting implications of the findings that will be tested on broader data in later chapters.

1. Subject recruitment, interview questions and methods

Recruiting interview subjects for research on the decision over citizenship was difficult for two reasons. First, identifying foreign-origin residents of Germany is not always easy; many are hard to distinguish from native Germans, yet they are sufficiently rare that it would be inefficient to sample by approaching people at random. Second, the people who participated in the research had to give up their own time, without the possibility of compensation. Hence there was reason to expect reluctance to participate, especially since questions of citizenship and integration are politically contentious in Germany and some people are uncomfortable discussing such matters with strangers. Under these conditions, one suitable approach was to recruit interviewees through 'snowball' sampling (Adler and Adler 2003; Rathburn 2008). In this sampling method the interviewer begins with a small number of interview subjects who fulfill the criteria for inclusion in the study, and then asks these people to suggest further contacts.

This sampling technique has advantages and disadvantages. It is efficient, in that the researcher can use existing social networks to find members of the relevant population. Since many research subjects are encouraged to take part by friends or acquaintances, this method can also help the interviewer gain the trust of the interviewees, making it more likely they will feel comfortable discussing sensitive issues. Finally, this sampling method provides information on the social networks linking the people in the study. This allows the researcher to study the role of these networks in spreading information and norms and in coordinating behavior. In this case, it was particularly relevant that I was able to speak with multiple members of the same family.

²⁶ Note that I do not report the names or identifying information of interview subjects.

²⁷ There was some overlap between categories of interview subjects. Four of the NGO workers, and three of the elected politicians, were also included in the migrant-origin sample.

The biggest disadvantage of this technique is that the resulting sample is not representative of the population of interest, i.e. the people who face (or faced) the decision over citizenship. Because the sample makes use of social networks, people with many social contacts are more likely to be included. The path of the snowball also depends on the starting point. In this case, the fact that one of the initial interview sites was a research institute focusing on Turks in Germany resulted in an overly Turkish-origin sample. I was able to partially alleviate these problems by making extra efforts to speak with a diverse group of people. For instance, several of the initial contacts were students, so I tried to make the sample more balanced by asking interviewees to put me in touch with older people or people who didn't go to university.²⁸ The sampling strategy employed in this research was thus not a pure snowball, in which any and all contacts were followed up, but what we might think of as targeted network-sampling.

Most of the interviews were conducted in three states: North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Bavaria and Berlin.²⁹ Both NRW and Berlin have historically had relatively high rates of citizenship acquisition, while Bavaria has had low rates and a reputation for restrictive practices (Bultmann 1999; Thränhardt 2008). The interviews were conducted both in large cities and in rural areas. Within NRW and Bavaria I used data on the share of the foreign population acquiring German citizenship in each municipality to select a range of areas with low, medium and high rates (see Chapter Four for more details). This resulted in a sample of six towns and cities across NRW, two large cities and two rural areas in Bavaria, and two Berlin districts with large foreign-origin populations. The aim was not to produce a representative sample, but to capture some of the diversity within Germany, while spending enough time in each location to make the contacts needed to recruit interview subjects. The best safeguard against drawing biased inferences from this kind of non-representative sample is to combine it with representative sources of data, as I proceed to do in Chapters Three and Four.

All of the interviews described in this chapter followed a semi-structured format (Leech 2002). A common list of questions was used to facilitate the comparison of interviews, but the order in which the topics were addressed and the amount of time devoted to each topic was allowed to vary. This gave interview subjects the chance to reveal which issues *they* thought most important and to draw their own connections between topics. Patterns of emphasis and interconnection can provide useful information. The questions for foreign-origin residents are displayed in Table 2.1.

²⁸ Other recruitment sites included political organizations, cultural groups and a soccer club.

²⁹ Some interview subjects suggested contacts in other parts of the country, but 95% of the interviews were conducted in the main sites named above.

Figure 2.1 Questions for foreign residents and new citizens

- 1) Please introduce yourself.
- 2) Did you grow up in Germany or elsewhere? When did you (or your parents) arrive?
- 3) What do you think about the political status of foreign-origin residents in Germany?
- 4) What might improve the situation?
- 5) Do you have German citizenship?
 - if YES: Why did you apply? Was it easy? Where did you find out how to do it; who helped? Are you glad to have citizenship, do you feel any different?
 - if NO: Why have you not applied/what was the problem with your application? Would you like German citizenship? What could convince you to apply?
- 6) What difference would it make if more foreign residents became German citizens?

The second group of interview subjects was made up of civil servants who administer citizenship law. As was explained in Chapter One, although citizenship law is written at the federal level, the states are in charge of implementation, and most applications are handled at the municipal level. The result is a complex system that gives many actors some degree of discretion. The interviews with these officials provide two kinds of information. First, because they work with large numbers of applicants, they have broad and detailed knowledge of the process, the factors that make for a successful application and the problems that can arise. Civil servants who have worked in this field for many years are especially valuable, as they have witnessed the numbers granted citizenship rise and fall as citizenship law has changed.

Second, the biases and preferences of these officials may influence applicants' prospects of obtaining German citizenship. Indeed, some scholars argue that local discretion explains much of the variation in the numbers acquiring citizenship across the country (Bultmann 1999; Hagedorn 2001; Henkes 2008; Thränhardt 2008). Such discretion is not the only possible reason for this variation, however. The pool of foreign-origin residents differs across the country; some areas have a higher share eligible for German citizenship. I return to this issue in Chapter Four, where I use census data to show that regional differences persist even after accounting for the characteristics and backgrounds of the local foreign-origin population. This suggests that discretion may play a role, but the analysis reveals that it can only account a small proportion of the variation in the outcome. In the current chapter, I focus on the question of *how* official biases may affect the numbers acquiring German citizenship.

Recruitment of interview subjects who administer citizenship law, and their supervisors in state interior ministries, was relatively easy since civil servants are obliged to provide information on their official functions. Most of the interview subjects were recruited in the same towns and cities in which the interviews with foreign-origin residents were conducted, though in a few cases I followed up suggestions to meet with contacts in other parts of the country. The interviews were based on the questions reproduced in Table 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Questions for civil servants who administer citizenship law

- 1) Please introduce yourself. What is your role in administering citizenship law?
- 2) How long have you been working here? How has your work changed in that time?
- 3) How does your office advise applicants?
- 4) How many applications are rejected?
- 5) Which requirements are easier and which harder to fulfill? Do you see variation across groups of foreign residents, and if so why?
- 6) Do you have a sense of the motives of those applying? If so, what are they?
- 7) How well-informed are the people who come your office?
- 8) Does your office play any role in spreading information on citizenship? If so, how? Do you encourage local foreigners to apply? If so, how? Does it work?
- 9) How do you relate to other civil servants and politicians? Do you coordinate your work? Who oversees your work? Do politicians take an interest, and do they seek to influence your work?

The third group of interview subjects consists of representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that offer advice to people who applying for German citizenship. Relevant NGOs include social welfare organizations, many of them with state funding to assist poor residents and/or migrants, as well as organizations run by foreign-origin residents. Even migrant groups with a non-political focus, such as organizations that focus on cultural activities or sports, can serve to channel information and assistance within migrant-origin communities (Bloemraad 2006; Halm and Sauer 2005). The interview subjects were recruited in the same cities and towns selected for interviews with civil servants in citizenship offices, i.e. a diverse sample of urban and rural areas with a range of citizenship acquisition rates. Relevant NGOs were identified using internet searches and from the interviews with foreign-origin residents and local officials.

The final set of interview subjects is made up of representatives of political organizations, including elected politicians and members of immigrant political groups. Local politicians may be expected to play two roles. First, they may have a special interest in helping immigrants whom they see as likely supporters to become citizens. There are numerous historical examples of political parties aiming to ‘capture’ the long-term support particular groups of immigrants in return for helping them to make early progress in the new country of origin. Consider the ‘machine politics’ of North American cities (Dahl 1961; Wolfinger 1972; c.f. Erie 1988; Jones-Correa 1998), or the recent efforts of European Social Democratic parties to cast themselves as the natural representatives of post-war immigrants and their descendents (Bird et al 2011). Second, local politicians also shape the context in which migrants decide whether or not to apply for citizenship. Some politicians give extra resources to the citizenship offices, demand that civil servants provide timely assistance to applicants, or run campaigns encouraging foreign residents to apply. In other areas the offices are under-funded, with extremely long processing times and/or an unwelcoming reputation.

This chapter presents data from interviews with twenty politicians from each of the five main German political parties. Eight of the twenty are migrants themselves, and several belong to a group of migrant-origin politicians, the Federal Migration and Integration Council (*Bundeszuwanderungs- und Integrationsrat*). Because of the scope for overlap between the activities of NGOs and political parties, the same list of questions was used.

Figure 2.3 Questions for representatives of NGOs and political parties

- 1) Please introduce yourself.
- 2) How do you see the political status of foreign-origin residents in Germany?
- 3) What does your organization do to promote participation among migrants?
- 4) Do you offer advice on citizenship? Do you encourage foreigners to apply? Which other organizations play this role? Do you work with local civil servants?
- 5) In your experience, what motivates foreign residents to become German citizens? Which factors can deter applicants?
- 6) Are foreigners in your part of Germany happy with the way in which citizenship laws are implemented? Which problems arise?
- 7) What difference would it make if more foreign residents became German citizens?
- 8) Why do you think some foreigners become German citizens while others don't?

1.1 Analyzing the interview data

Interviews were conducted in German, occasionally with some English. Audio recordings were made of most of the conversations; a few people were reluctant and in these cases detailed written notes were taken during and immediately after the interview. The interviews were subsequently written up and analyzed for common themes and illustrative quotes.³⁰ All translations are by the author. The presentation of the interview data includes some descriptive statistics, e.g. the observation that two thirds of the interview subjects who now hold German citizenship applied along with at least one other family member. The goal is to give the reader a better sense of patterns observed. Since the data are not representative of the foreign-origin population, one should be cautious in drawing inferences to the wider population of interest. When the numbers are very one-sided, as in the observation that every one of the foreign-origin interviewees discussed the implications of the decision over citizenship for his or her family members, the case for inference is stronger.

When analyzing interview data it is important to consider the context in which the interviews took place. Asking people why they claimed German citizenship (or why they did not) prompted many to justify their choice. The result was that the decision often seemed over-determined, with so many factors offered in explanation that it is hard to tell which was decisive. It seems likely that the tendency to justify the decision is partly due to the political context. Issues of citizenship and integration are contentious, and foreign-origin residents often feel pressure to defend their behavior. Similarly, many civil servants also appeared to feel pressure to justify their behavior, and some referred to heated media debates over citizenship law, especially the introduction of language and civics tests. More general psychological mechanisms are also likely to be at work. Social psychologists have found that people suffer from ‘attribution error,’ leading us to overstate the importance of our conscious choices and to play down contextual factors. Our explanations may also suffer from egocentric biases that help us present a positive self-image (Aronson 2008; Tetlock 2005). Keeping such social pressures and cognitive biases in mind can help the researcher avoid a simplistic interpretation of the data. This is another reason why it is so valuable to analyze interview-based data alongside quantitative data, which can reveal some of the broader patterns that individuals are less likely to discuss, such as stratification by educational level or income.

2. Interviews with foreign residents and new citizens

Of the 36 foreign-origin interview subjects, half now hold German citizenship. This is considerably higher than the 21% observed in the census data discussed in Chapter Three, providing a first indication that the interview sample is un-representative. The sample was also overly Turkish-origin, accounting for just over half of the interview subjects, compared to 30% in the census data. One-sixth of interview subjects have origins in Western Europe, and one-sixth in the former Yugoslavia. The age range was from the early 20s through 70; the gender mix was 20 males and 16 females. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes and two hours, with the mean around one hour. Table 2.1 provides

³⁰ Subjects were assured that no information would be published that could be used to identify them without their consent. The interviews were transcribed and stored in a password-protected folder for confidentiality. A spreadsheet was used to bring out common themes and patterns.

an overview of the pool of foreign-origin interview subjects. A *Ba* prefix identifies those from Bavaria, *N* stands for NRW and *Be* for Berlin. The final column shows whether the person in question now holds German citizenship, and provides additional information on family members. Some became citizens *with* ‘family’ members (e.g. spouse and children). Others do not hold German citizenship, but may have a native spouse.

Table 2.1 Introduction to the foreign-origin interview subjects

Subject	Country of prior citizenship	Occupation	Age	German citizenship?
Ba1	Croatia	Social worker	20-30	No
Ba2	Croatia	Engineer	20-30	No
Ba3	Croatia	Retired	50+	No
Ba4	Croatia	Retired	50+	No
Ba5	Switzerland	Engineer	40-50	No
Ba6	Kenya	Musician	20-30	No, native spouse
Ba7	Italy	Politician	50+	No, native spouse
Ba8	Iran	Researcher	30-40	Yes, native spouse
Ba9	Turkey	Retired	50+	No
N1	Turkey	Researcher	30-40	Yes, with spouse
N2	Ghana	Unemployed	40-50	Yes, native spouse
N3	Turkey	Student	20-30	Yes, with friends
N4	Turkey	Unemployed	40-50	No
N5	Turkey	Driving instructor	20-30	Yes, with spouse
N6	Italy	Retired	50+	No
N7	Turkey	Politician	30-40	Yes
N8	Croatia	Consultant	20-30	No, partner applying
N10	Turkey	Cinema clerk	20-30	Yes, with sibling
N11	Turkey	Student	20-30	No
N12	Turkey	Civil Servant	20-30	Yes, with parents
N13	Turkey	Teacher	50+	Yes, with family
N14	Turkey	Consultant	30-40	Yes, with family
N15	Turkey	Retired	50+	Yes, with family
N16	Turkey	Journalist	40-50	Yes, with friends
N17	Bosnia-Herz.	Student	20-30	No, native partner
N18	Spain	Teacher	50+	No
N19	Turkey	Civil Servant	30-40	Yes, with spouse
N20	Turkey	Researcher	30-40	Yes, with family
Be1	Israel	Consultant	30-40	No
Be2	Turkey	Consultant	40-50	Yes, with spouse
Be3	Iran	Civil Servant	30-40	Yes, with parents
Be4	Spanish	Engineer	30-40	No, native spouse
Be5	British	Secretary	30-40	No
Be6	Turkey	Journalist	30-40	Yes
Be7	Turkey	Retired	50+	No

2.1 The value of citizenship

The analysis begins with the questions of how and why foreign-origin residents value German citizenship. The interviews revealed broad interest in becoming a German citizen. In addition to the 18 interview subjects who already hold German citizenship, another five said that they would like to acquire it. All of the new German citizens said that on balance they are glad they took this step. Interview subjects from countries beyond Western Europe were especially likely to stress the importance of citizenship. We see a typical mix of feelings in the words of man who arrived in 1980. He spent much of the interview discussing the difficulty of integration, in particular his struggle to find a job and to get funding for an after-school program he runs for foreign-origin children. When asked ‘What is the main problem, what can be done?’ he said:

‘I took citizenship about ten years ago, against my personal views, I didn’t want it. I felt Ghanaian and that I should remain Ghanaian. But any time I went to a place, there was always the question of nationality, I always needed my passport. With the nationality, it is easier to enter. If I show you the ID you have to listen to me. I took this ID to stand firm myself and fight for the future of the next generations.’

The most frequently expressed and most intensely valued benefit of citizenship is the security and confidence it brings to people who plan to stay in Germany. Although most of those who apply for citizenship already have permanent resident status and hence are unlikely to be deported, many said that as foreigners they still felt insecure. Several new citizens said it was a relief to be free of these worries, and a few were surprised by just how much more confident they feel in dealing with official institutions and in asserting their views on German politics. For example, a journalist said that although she has long been interested in politics, and has written about it for years, since becoming a citizen she started attending local political meetings and making her own voice heard.

Many interview subjects said it would be a good thing, not just for immigrants but for the whole country, if more foreign residents became German citizens. Around two thirds of those with German citizenship said they applied partly because they wanted the right to vote, though this was rarely the most-emphasized benefit. Reversing the common complaint in Germany and much of Western Europe that immigrants, especially Muslims, do not value democracy, one Turkish-origin interviewee argued that the difficulty of becoming a citizen devalues the democratic system. He said: ‘It’s ridiculous, there are whole areas, right in the center of Europe, where there is no real democracy’ because so many residents can’t vote. An official in a state integration ministry told me the mayors of German cities, even those who receive little support from foreign-origin residents, have similar concerns: ‘They see that they don’t have any political legitimacy in the parts of the city where the most children are growing up.’

Four of the 36 foreign-origin interview subjects said they would like German citizenship but believe they are not eligible (though none had actually been rejected). One foreigner from the ‘guest worker’ era said she would like to become a citizen but doesn’t think she can because she is unemployed, and she doesn’t want to risk angering local civil servants

by trying. Another immigrant who now holds elected office in Bavaria explained that the message conveyed in foreigners' offices over the decades is that they should consider themselves lucky not to be kicked out of the country. He said his home city only recently removed a double-door at the main entrance to the foreigners' office, which had been designed to trap people for deportation. Applications for citizenship are processed in the same building. The interviewee explained that in this context poorer foreigners, in particular, don't want to 'make trouble.' These findings suggest a mechanism linking socio-economic status and the likelihood of holding German citizenship, whereby people with fewer resources feel less confident that they can claim their rights.

Nine of the 36 foreign residents interviewed said they don't want German citizenship: five of them West Europeans and the rest from the former Yugoslavia.³¹ Put another way, none of the six West-European interview subjects is currently a German citizen, and only one expressed a desire to take this step. The sentiment of an Italian interviewee who came to Germany in the 1960s is typical of this group: 'I don't need German citizenship because I am a European. The E.U. citizenship is actually more important.' This man is active in German and in immigrant politics, and he also thinks higher rates of citizenship acquisition would help give more weight to the interests of the foreign-origin population. But he said becoming a German citizen makes more sense for younger migrants than for people like him. As another Italian put it, 'it's too late for us, the guest workers, but it [citizenship] is crucial for the next generation.' These interviews suggest that age may be negatively associated with the likelihood of applying for citizenship (net of time in the country), because citizenship is valued in part as a means to future upward mobility.

2.2 The family-level logic of the decision over citizenship

The importance of citizenship for future generations came up in many of the interviews. Several parents said they decided to apply for citizenship less for their own sake than in order to acquire this status for their children. They stressed that they don't expect this to put an end to discrimination, but do hope it will help their children in school and the workplace. As one put it, 'If in the future our children fight for leading positions, the [German] passport can help. This is just one of the criteria but now it can't be used against them, it is one less disadvantage.' For their part, several younger interview subjects were grateful to their parents for having taken this step while the interviewee was a child, making their lives easier when it was time to apply for jobs or higher education. One Turkish-origin interview subject with a well-paid job in the German bureaucracy—a position open only to German citizens—said he is proud that he can now repay the debt to his parents who worked so hard for his future. 'Everything I have is because of my parents. Now I am succeeding in Germany and I can start to repay them.'

Such inter-generational motives attest to the family-level logic of citizenship. In total, twelve of the 18 interview subjects who now hold German citizenship applied along with at least one other family member. Similarly, 12 of the 18 interviewees without German citizenship live in households with no German citizens. The interviews reveal that decisions over citizenship are typically taken in consultation with family members and

³¹ In addition to the 18 interview subjects who have acquired German citizenship, the five who would like to and the nine who said they don't want it, four were undecided.

with shared goals in mind. When asked to explain the decision over citizenship, *every single one* of the foreign-origin interview subjects discussed the implications of his or her citizenship status for children, siblings, partners or parents. Indeed, most interviewees took it for granted that ‘we’ applied together, explained ‘our’ reasons for not applying, or listed the factors stopping ‘us’ from becoming citizens. In interviews with members of the same family it was clear that they had discussed the question of citizenship at length. In citizenship offices across the country one sees few people waiting for an appointment alone; most appear to be in the company of family members.

Many of the interview subjects were explicit that citizenship is more valuable when shared with family members. As was explained above, perhaps the greatest benefit of citizenship is the sense of security it confers. But this security has much greater value if other family members are also included. As a former refugee put it: ‘What good is it [citizenship] to me, if my parents or my sister can still be deported?’ A more prosaic example of the collective value of citizenship concerns the freedom of German citizens to travel or work anywhere in the E.U. without a visa. Becoming a citizen can save time and money, and is especially valuable for family members wishing to travel together, whether for work or on holiday. A Serbian interviewee, the only foreign-origin person in his household (his wife is a native German, and hence so are their children) said he is considering applying for German citizenship because he is tired of the trouble his passport causes when the family travels.

The interviews also showed how collective claims on citizenship, involving multiple family members, can reduce the costs of applying. A couple of the interview subjects admitted they weren’t excited about German citizenship, but when another family member decided to apply they decided to join in. One told me that in retrospect she was glad, since she would not have gone to all that trouble on her own. Her daughter is ‘good at that kind of thing, she has always been one to make sure she gets what she deserves.’ Often the encouragement comes from within the family, especially from people who grew up in Germany. A young Yugoslav-origin woman explained that her parents, from the guest worker generation, had not dared to demand much of German society, but that she grew up in the country and is now pushing for more political influence, not just for her own sake, but for her parents.

Another interviewee said her success in the notoriously bureaucratic German university system gave her the confidence to apply for citizenship. She said she helped her sister with the paperwork so that they could apply at the same time. The relevance of further education was that it provided an opportunity to gain experience and confidence in dealing with German bureaucracy. This meant that the interview subject was better able to bear the costs of claiming citizenship. Crucially, the benefits also extended to her sister. This interviewee said her father felt he was too old for it to be worth taking German citizenship. But he strongly encouraged his daughters to apply.

There was also evidence of family members helping each other alleviate the social costs of changing citizenship. Although many interviewees said they were sad to give up their citizenship of birth, the reason was often a sense of loyalty and attachment to particular

people rather than to the nation. A young Turkish-origin interviewee said that since she has spent little time in the country, it may be more appropriate to think of her attachment to Turkey as attachment to her parents. So she said it didn't feel like a 'betrayal' to change citizenship when they did.

Family members may also be able to insulate each other against disapproval from other migrants for claiming citizenship, which can be seen as an act of distancing from the migrant community. The young woman who became German along with her sister told me that in their case the decision had been easier, because although their friends had teased them, at least they went through the process together. On the other hand, one Yugoslav-origin interview subject said she could hardly imagine how her sister would tease her if she said she wanted German citizenship, and began a list of possible nicknames: 'potato-head, cabbage-eater, Hans...'.

In addition to the twelve people who claimed citizenship along with family members, two interviewees said they applied at the same time as a group of student friends. Both said their friends had been able to help each other understand the requirements and fill out the forms, and one said that although many of them had felt some regret at giving up their citizenship of birth they had felt better to be going through the process together.

Some of the clearest evidence on the family-level logic of the decision over citizenship comes from interviews with people who have been discouraged from applying. Some younger foreign residents said they don't want citizenship because their parents cannot meet the requirements. An interview subject who is eligible for German citizenship herself told me that she is unlikely to apply because her mother would probably fail the language test. She said: 'Perhaps this is sentimental, but I feel like it would be wrong to take citizenship without them. I would take citizenship, if my parents could have it too. I owe them everything. So I can't abandon them now.' In this case, since the parents are unlikely to be granted citizenship, it becomes less attractive to other family members.

Another key group people who now feel less reason to claim German citizenship are foreign residents whose children have birthright citizenship. The introduction of a right to citizenship for children of at least one foreign resident with 8 years of settled residence in Germany has produced around 40,000 new Germans each year since 2000. The fact that this is only around half of the number of children born to foreign parents shows that the requirements are rather strict. Since the criteria are similar to those for citizenship, most of these children have at least one parent who is eligible for citizenship. But now that their children have German citizenship, these parents appear to see less reason to apply. One young mother certainly sees it this way: 'there is no need, because my daughter is already a citizen.' Another expecting parent said she may still apply to become a German citizen, and that she can see benefits to holding the same citizenship as her children. But because her children will be German, in her own case 'it is not urgent, so I don't know if it will ever happen.'

Finally, interviews with immigrants married to native Germans reveal the importance of the family context even for people who are the only ones in the family facing the decision

over citizenship. There is no way for these people to pool the costs or boost the benefits by applying along with other family members. But the fact that they are married to a native German does change the cost-benefit calculus. On the plus side it is easier for the spouses of Germans to acquire citizenship: they are only required to live in the country for three years, and until recently the very fact of being married to a native was taken as evidence of integration. On the other hand, several of these people said they see little need to acquire citizenship, since their children have inherited this status from the German parent. Eight of the interview subjects in the sample are married to a native German, and six are foreign residents. Five of the six said they feel less worried about citizenship because their children have inherited German citizenship (or will inherit it when they are born). Although inter-marriage rates vary by country of origin, there were no clear differences by origin of the interview subjects in the emphasis given to family-level concerns.

3. Interviews with civil servants

The civil servants who administer citizenship law have extensive experience in this area; some meet hundreds of applicants each year. I interviewed 19 of these officials, of whom eleven were already in the job before the reform of citizenship law in the year 2000. Many said that changes in citizenship laws in 2000 and thereafter have made the application process ‘more demanding.’ The interviewees confirmed that, until the year 2000, it was assumed that family members would change citizenship together. Some said that it is still common for family members to wish to apply together, and several mentioned recent cases of the entire family leaving, discouraged, when they found out that one of their number was not eligible for German citizenship.

All of the officials discussed the effects of the language and civics tests introduced in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Some were defensive, and insisted that these tests are less of a barrier than many critics imply. The introduction of the tests was accompanied by lively debates in the media over their legitimacy; critics argue it is unfair to impose standards on immigrants that few natives would meet. The officials did, however, observe that many older migrants struggle with the language test. One gave the example of a family that decided not to apply once it became clear the wife, who has worked as a janitor and had little chance to improve her German, would likely fail the test.

Although the officials who administer citizenship applications are not required to ask about the reasons for applying, many of the interview subjects were happy to report their impressions of the most common motivations. Around half said that parents often wish to apply in order that their children can become citizens, though several mentioned that this has become less relevant since the introduction of birthright citizenship. Another commonly reported motivation was a general desire for equal rights, which is seen to be an especially important motive for those who grew up or were born in Germany. Around half of the officials said it appears that few foreign residents apply for German citizenship because they truly want to be *German*. Most of the people who brought this up see it as a problem. Several interview subjects complained that pragmatic concerns predominate, e.g. wanting the right to work in certain sectors of the economy, or the convenience of

easy travel within the European Union. One said, ruefully, that the decision seems to come ‘more from the head than from the heart.’

Another area of broad agreement among officials who work in citizenship offices was that few would-be citizens have their applications rejected. None of the offices in which the interviews were conducted keeps a formal count, but several interviewees suggested a rejection rate of at most 5%. The officials explained that this is partly because people who don’t appear to meet the criteria are encouraged to wait, or try to improve their case, rather than pay for an application that is unlikely to succeed. Several of the civil servants said that the most important decisions appear to be taken outside their offices: few foreigners ever come in for a consultation, but those who do are often good candidates. As one official put it, ‘they key question is whether they even come through the door.’

Some civil servants try to spread information on the application process and the benefits of becoming a German citizen, though most simply wait for applicants to come to them. Several interviewees said that the most important source of information appears to be other people in the migrant community; one told me that ‘word gets around, from family to family.’ A few mentioned particular NGOs that give advice on citizenship, but one third of the interviewees could give no examples of such groups.³² In some cases civil servants work with such organizations to spread information. Most of the officials said local politicians take little interest in their work, though a few have been instructed to run campaigns encouraging foreigners to apply for citizenship. None of the interview subjects thought these campaigns had much impact.

The most positive view on efforts to encourage applicants came from an interview with two officials in a city that prides itself on promoting immigrant integration. They send a few hundred letters each year to young adults likely to be eligible for German citizenship. They use official records identify foreign residents who have lived in Germany for several years and recently completed high school. Focusing on high-school graduates ensure that the language requirement is likely to be satisfied, and people with a German school certificate are also exempt from the civics test. They said that around 8% of the people contacted apply for citizenship within a few months of receiving the letter. The response rate is much lower among citizens of West European countries. Indeed, many of the civil servants were skeptical that West Europeans can be persuaded to apply for German citizenship. As one put it, ‘they have the security, they have the travel, they can even vote—why would they apply?’

Many of the officials, without direct prompting to do so, went beyond *explaining* citizenship laws to *justify* them. Several said they think it perfectly reasonable to require

³² The three organizations cited by two or more interview subjects were Caritas, the Red Cross and the local Jewish community. Caritas is the social welfare arm of the Catholic Church, which receives state funds to provide social services to groups including immigrants. The Red Cross helps refugees, who are often good candidates for citizenship as they are exempt from key requirements (with a shorter period of residence and no need to prove financial self-sufficiency). German citizenship law also has provisions that make it easier for Jews to become citizens, and some Jewish communities function as well-organized advocates on behalf of recent arrivals.

applicants to speak good German and to understand German history and culture. Some of the officials appeared to take ownership of citizenship law, for example explaining that it was ‘because we had such difficulty setting the standard for the language requirement’ that a written test was introduced in 2007. There is good reason to be skeptical of this functional view of the policy-making process, however. The language requirements have been difficult to implement in a consistent way for several decades, yet the written test was introduced only in 2007.

Although some civil servants justify citizenship laws, others complain about them. The most common criticism was that the laws are ‘socially unrealistic.’ This places officials in the awkward position of enforcing laws that they can see are imposing unnecessary social costs. One interview subject complained that having to enforce what she sees as arbitrary requirements makes her office an uncomfortable place to work and an unwelcoming place for foreigners to visit. Several interviewees explained that before the introduction of increasingly detailed tests of integration they had more discretion and greater scope to prioritize human interest. Two of the interviewees gave the example of allowing family members to claim citizenship together in the 1990s, although one person was only marginally eligible. One described a family in which the parents wanted their children to become German citizens before finishing school, but the country of origin only allows children to relinquish citizenship if the parents change citizenship too. In this case the parents spoke limited German, but an exception was made.

One official said that when Berlin saw a slump in the numbers of new citizens, in 2006, the state government responded by suggesting that officials waive the language requirements for older people who wished to apply along with family members, on the grounds that it would be a ‘hardship’ for such people not to hold the same citizenship as their family. This briefly allowed the numbers to increase, though the directive was soon reversed when the courts ruled it was an inappropriate application of the hardship clause in citizenship law.

4: Interviews with relevant NGOs and political parties

A total of ten interviews were conducted with representatives of relevant NGOs, who confirmed that they often give advice to family members who want to apply for citizenship together. Many implied this is the natural state of affairs, by speaking of the family as the decision-making unit. One social worker in Munich had a slightly different view; she said the family’s priority is often to get citizenship for the children. Before the year 2000 the way to achieve this goal was for the family to apply together, but since that time she has come across more cases in which the parents just want to submit applications for their children. She pointed out that this can be made difficult by regulations in the countries of origin. For example, the policy of the Turkish government is that minor children can only change citizenship if their mother also takes this step.

The interviews with relevant NGOs also corroborated the claim that few applicants for citizenship are actually turned down. But two Caritas workers voiced the concern that the advice from civil servants not to apply is often taken as a rejection, rather than an invitation to return at a later date. They also suggested that the advice may reflect

bureaucratic assumptions about the kind of people who should become German citizens. One interviewee noted that, in practice, the application process is socially selective, with higher-status migrants more likely to be successful. She went so far as to describe the current situation as a paradox: upwardly mobile migrants and those from the E.U. are often able to claim citizenship but have less reason to do so, whereas the poorer migrants who stand to gain the most from the security of German citizenship have much worse prospects of success. She stressed that these poorer residents are not going to disappear, but will remain in the country as a kind of underclass. Because such people are often on temporary residence permits, their children are unlikely to benefit from the new birthright citizenship provisions, with the result that the insecurity of foreign resident status can still be passed on down the generations.

The interviews provided little evidence of organized efforts to mobilize foreigners to claim citizenship. A couple of NGOs mentioned working with local officials to spread information on citizenship. One migrant who now holds elected office on a town council was particularly enthusiastic about collaboration. He explained that joint information sessions, and the fact that in his city the citizenship office is now located in a building with several migrant organizations, makes for greater familiarity. This gives civil servants a better sense of migrants' priorities, and gives foreign residents more confidence that the application process will not be unpleasant. Another interview subject from the Berlin state government explained that, even though local and state politicians cannot change citizenship law, they can boost the numbers by providing civil servants with the resources to speed the application process—Berlin recently issued a directive that all applications should be processed within six months—and can work to encourage applications. Others were more skeptical. A Turkish-origin politician in the Ruhr area said he has learnt not to promise more than he can deliver. He has no influence over citizenship law, and knows applicants who were frustrated by the 'unrealistic' criteria. He fears the experience of a failed application may put people off politics altogether.

The established political parties are among the organizations that one might expect to have the most capacity and the strongest incentives to mobilize foreigners to apply for citizenship. This is especially true of parties on the left, which receive high levels of support from foreign-origin residents (Dancygier and Saunders 2007; Wüst 2006). In recent years the major parties have made some gestures in this direction. In 2009 Chancellor Merkel hosted a ceremony for 16 new citizens at her residence in Berlin, and said she wished 'more foreigners would put their faith in Germany.' The CDU integration minister told a newspaper that the low numbers of new citizens 'give me headaches' (BILD Zeitung 2009). But despite the low rate of acquisition the CDU has not matched its exhortations to apply with liberalizing reforms of citizenship law. One interview subject, a Turkish-origin politician, explained his surprise at this state of affairs, claiming that he could well imagine large numbers of Turks supporting the CDU if the party were to lead the way in facilitating their electoral participation.

Reforming citizenship law is not a priority for the SPD either. One SPD member explained that his party's current stance on citizenship is partly for strategic reasons, but also due to prejudice against immigrants. He said that at the federal level the party

learned, after the backlash against the proposal to allow dual citizenship in 1999, that it might lose as many voters as it gains from such efforts. It is also possible that the party fears that new citizens might be just as likely to vote for the Greens or the new Left Party as for the SPD. At the local level, the interview subject said that programs to help migrants risk antagonizing the low-income Germans who live in the same poor urban areas as most migrants. But he also said many people in his party assume anyone who they think looks like an immigrant is ineligible to vote. By way of example he said that at election time he is the only one who also hands out flyers to women in headscarves.

The interviews with party spokespeople on integration produced somewhat different assessments of the importance of citizenship. Conservatives suggested that foreigners are free to choose to integrate and reap the benefits of citizenship, and that low acquisition rates reflect low levels of interest. Those on the left were more likely to blame the low numbers taking citizenship on the ban on dual citizenship. Some complained that under the current rules citizenship is socially selective, with easier access for upwardly mobile migrants. In a few interviews the conversation turned to the question of family members claiming citizenship together. One Green party member said she could see scope for reforms to accommodate this preference. But a senior member of the Bavarian CSU, a party otherwise known for emphasizing family values, said he couldn't support measures that ease access to citizenship for family members who can't pass the integration tests, since 'it is essential that *every single one* is integrated.'

The interviews also revealed strong cross-party similarities. Most politicians believe the key question is whether immigrants are ready to feel German. The statement of a Bavarian politician is typical: 'You know, I can understand why Turks or Arabs are reluctant to give up their citizenship. I would find it really hard to give up my German citizenship too!' The hope of many German politicians is that immigrants will identify with Germany if they feel 'welcome' in the country, and that Germans will become more welcoming once they see that the country's future depends on integration. On some counts, migrant-origin residents now make up a fifth of the population and, because of higher fertility rates and a younger age distribution, account for one third of all children. Politicians from left and right, as well as many migrant-origin activists, agree that the way to persuade Germans of the importance of integration is to explain that German society is being transformed by these demographic changes. Some describe integration as a *Zukunftsaufgabe* (a priority for the future) or even a *Schicksalsfrage* (a question on which the fate of the country hinges).

5. The case against alternative explanations

The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter supports the argument on the family-level logic of citizenship, and gives us a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the decision whether or not to apply. One further way to strengthen the case for my argument is to show that the evidence gathered in these interviews is *not* consistent with alternative explanations. In the introduction, we saw that existing research on citizenship regimes cannot account for the temporal variation observed in Germany, and is also hard to reconcile with cross-country variation in the numbers of new citizens. We saw no

support for the argument that lifting the German ban on dual citizenship is sufficient to increase the numbers applying, at least in the case of migrants from Western Europe.

In this section, I focus on the claim that feelings of identification with Germany drive the decision over citizenship. This argument has two variants with a common underlying logic. The first version holds that the reason some foreign residents don't apply for German citizenship is that they don't identify with Germany (Zimmermann et al 2009; Leibold 2006; Wunderlich 2005). The flipside of this argument is that foreign residents are not applying for German citizenship because they *do* identify with their countries of origin, and are reluctant to give up the citizenship of those countries (Thränhardt 2008; Worbs 2008). The evidence from the interviews presented in this chapter suggests we can more accurately describe migrants as ambivalent, with mixed feelings about Germany and the country of origin. More importantly, the interviews reveal that such feelings are rarely allowed to decide the question of whether or not to apply for German citizenship.³³

Around half of the foreign-origin interview subjects stressed how glad they are to live in Germany, and a few said they were 'grateful' for the chances they have been given in the country. Plenty had complaints about discrimination and prejudice, and said that such experiences make it hard to feel a sense of belonging. Many interviewees expressed *both* sentiments. Often the mixed feelings were expressed as if in a dialogue, with positive developments on the one hand, problems on the other. For example, a long interview with a journalist included around 20 shifts from positive to negative. This man is glad the political parties are no longer able to get away with the racist language that was common in the 1980s, but feels alienated by the stoking of hostility against Muslims; he gets on well with his neighbors but is hurt by insults when shopping. One third of the interviewees said their feelings about Germany were mixed or ambivalent, and many more suggested as much by speaking of conflicting feelings.

Few interview subjects appear to find such mixed feelings inherently problematic. The problems arise when they are confronted with demands to align themselves one way or the other, as in the ban on dual citizenship. As one put it, for an immigrant, 'being asked to choose one citizenship is like being asked to choose between your father and your mother.' Others said dual citizenship does no harm, so the ban is 'unnecessary' or 'illogical.' Several complained about the incoherence of banning dual citizenship for immigrants but allowing the children of German and foreign parents to hold dual citizenship. A German official with a Turkish-origin spouse said that Germans, too, feel ambivalent about the changes wrought by immigration. They increasingly recognize that immigrants and their descendents will be an important part of the country's future, but also resent what is seen as a 'loss of control' over their destiny. As he said: 'once you see

³³ There are parallels with Jones-Correa's (1998) argument that foreign residents play the 'politics of in-between.' As in Jones-Correa's research on Mexican immigrants in the United States, many interviewees keep their distance from both German and origin-country politics. But in Germany some of them *do* acquire citizenship. The difference may be due to a different family-level logic, since Germany lacks the strong birthright citizenship granted to anyone born in the United States.

it that way, it seems like a double standard that the migrants are the ones who have to resolve this ambivalence, by showing that they just want to be German.’

For other interview subjects, especially those who grew up in Germany or were born in the country, the question of identification is troubling because, unlike their German friends, it cannot be taken for granted. One said that when she and her sister successfully applied for citizenship they were invited to a ceremony to celebrate, but they didn’t attend. Some commentators see this kind of reluctance as evidence that immigrants don’t identify with Germany, but she gave a very different explanation:

‘I mean, I was born here, I live here. That kind of thing [the citizenship ceremony] may make sense for someone who only just arrived, but I’m not new here. You don’t need to welcome me, in a sense I’m already German, I was born here so of course I’m German.’

Another interviewee explained that even her German friends don’t understand what it means to live in a country since childhood without equal rights of citizenship. When the government introduced a written civics test for all applicants in the year 2008, she got together with friends to take an online version of the test.³⁴ At first, she said, everyone was laughing at the idea of using a short test to pin down what it means to be a German citizen, and at the fact that many natives can’t meet this standard. But the experience reminded her of other ways in which German politicians try to simplify the situation by classifying immigrants as integrated or not. She said she became sad and had to leave.

Other interview subjects also played down the role of national identification in the decision over citizenship. An interview subject who has written about becoming a German citizen claims that she became a citizen ‘by chance,’ because she happened to pass the relevant office on her way to file a report that her purse had been stolen. In an interview with the author I pointed out that claiming citizenship is not simply a matter of filling out a form, but requires lots of paperwork, long waits and many meetings with civil servants, and typically costs hundreds of Euros. She laughed and agreed, and admitted this version of the story may be her way of dismissing the exaggerated rhetoric of politicians who see the choice for citizenship as a test of identification.

Drawing on the interviews with politicians and officials in citizenship offices, we see a gap in expectations between Germans who would like to see migrants identify with the country, and the personal and prosaic factors that actually motivate the decision. Several migrant-origin interviewees said they think Germans have an unrealistic view of the meaning of citizenship, perhaps because they never had to make any choice in the matter.

The key point in all of this is that one hears ambivalent feelings about Germany from foreign residents *and* new citizens. Some of the loudest complaints about demands to assimilate were expressed by migrants who now hold German citizenship. The

³⁴ Online versions of the civics test are very popular. The editor of the German magazine *Focus* wrote that over three million people took the test on their website in just a few days (Markwort 2008). It seems most of the people taking these tests are native Germans, not foreign residents.

interviews provide no evidence that the people who resent German demands to integrate are also rejecting citizenship. As one interviewee put it, ‘although we [immigrants] complain about it, we have always understood that we are the ones who have to adapt.’ The only people for whom feelings of identification with Germany vs. other countries sometimes appear to be decisive are older West Europeans. A Spanish citizen said that at his age (he is recently retired), there is some amount of pride in the decision not to apply for German citizenship, but that he would probably swallow his pride and apply if he were younger and still stood to benefit from having full rights. Recall that West Europeans are the migrants with the least at stake in the issue, since thanks to the E.U. it is easier to secure temporary or permanent residence, and most have relatively good prospects in their countries of origin. The implication is that this kind of identity politics may be a luxury that only more privileged migrants can afford. The degree of identification with Germany cannot account for the bulk of decisions over citizenship.

6. Conclusion

The qualitative data analyzed in this chapter strengthen and deepen the case for the family-level logic of citizenship. We have seen that families typically discuss and decide this issue together, and we have also seen *why* this is the case. Foreign-origin residents apply for citizenship in pursuit of greater security, to get political rights, to facilitate travel and to compete for certain jobs. Greater value is placed on citizenship if family members can share in these benefits, and indeed it is typically assumed that the interests of other family members are taken into account. When the people facing the decision over citizenship discuss the matter in their own words, some of the most revealing are pronouns: ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘our.’

The interviews discussed in this chapter reveal points of common emphasis across the groups of interview subjects. It is clear that, until the reforms of the year 2000, both civil servants and foreign-origin residents assumed that family members would typically apply for citizenship together. Both groups also agree that the new integration tests make such collective claims more difficult, especially for families that include older immigrants with limited language skills. Since many parents are motivated primarily by the desire to obtain German citizenship for their children, the introduction of birthright citizenship for some people born in Germany has removed a major motive for some parents to apply. The interviews also suggest that security is the key benefit of citizenship, and that this helps explain the low levels of interest among migrants with roots in Western Europe, who have stronger rights in Germany than most foreigners. The final area of broad agreement is on the absence of organized efforts to help and encourage foreigners to claim German citizenship.

One area in which different groups of interview subjects hold conflicting views concerns the role of identification with Germany as a motive for claiming citizenship. We have seen that many politicians and civil servants think this should be one of the main motivations. If this were true, then the low numbers applying would simply reflect limited interest on the part of foreigners living in Germany. But the interviews with foreign-origin residents cast doubt on this interpretation. Though often ambivalent, many migrants see good reason to associate themselves with Germany. Indeed, some play

down the question of identification precisely because they feel they should be able to take it for granted. Most importantly, there is no evidence that such attitudes are related to citizenship status: both foreign residents and new German citizens report mixed feelings.

The interviews presented in this chapter reveal the thought processes behind the family-level logic of citizenship, and suggest a number of mechanisms that can be subjected to further testing. We should expect to see people who have claimed German citizenship living together with other new citizens, and foreign residents living with other foreigners. We should expect to find that family members often become citizens at the same time. The interviews suggest education and other socio-economic resources make it easier for foreign residents to complete the application process, though such factors appear less relevant to West Europeans who have less to gain by securing German citizenship. Time appears to play two distinct roles. Spending more time in the Germany can be expected to promote integration, as migrants learn the language and form personal connections to the country, but older migrants may be less inclined to apply for citizenship, because there is less prospect of future upwards mobility. In the next chapters we turn to census data to test the generality of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship and to evaluate further evidence on these mechanisms.

Chapter Three: Statistical Analysis of the Decision over Citizenship

This chapter uses census data to test the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. We begin with descriptive statistics on the nine million people living in Germany who face the decision whether or not to claim citizenship (or have decided the matter by becoming German citizens). The chapter then presents evidence that citizenship status is clustered by household. People who have claimed German citizenship tend to live with others who have taken the same step, whereas foreign residents tend to live with other foreign residents. Next, multivariate statistical models are used to compare foreign residents with people who have claimed German citizenship. The models confirm that the citizenship status of others in the household is a strong predictor of the likelihood that a given foreign-origin resident is now a German citizen. Finally, the chapter presents evidence that the decision over citizenship is clustered in time as well as by household. It is common for household members to make a ‘collective’ claim on citizenship by applying in the same year, and this is even more common in households with more foreign-origin residents. The findings supports the argument that foreign residents are motivated by the collective returns to citizenship and often decide over citizenship as a family unit.

1. The German micro-census

The source of the data analyzed in this chapter is the German micro-census.³⁵ This is an annual survey of one percent of the resident population, around 800,000 individuals. It contains detailed information on everyone living in over 300,000 households. Since 2005 it includes questions that allow us to identify the foreign-origin population. It has long been possible to distinguish German citizens from foreign residents, but the census now asks German citizens whether they ever held another citizenship. Foreign residents, people who have claimed German citizenship and the children of immigrants all are described in German as ‘people with a migration background’ (*Personen mit Migrationshintergrund*).

Even though people with a migration background now make up a large share of the German population, standard surveys on political and social issues, with sample sizes of 1000-2000, contain few such individuals. This makes it difficult to make precise estimates and rules out multivariate analysis. A great strength of the micro-census is the enormous sample size, which allows us to avoid such problems. The biggest attraction of working with the micro-census, however, is that it provides information on entire households.³⁶ Most surveys in the social sciences include just one person per household.

³⁵ The data are from the 2007 micro-census, the most recent available when the project began. The German government also collects data on the numbers of people granted citizenship each year, with a break-down by country of previous citizenship, by gender, and by years of residence. But this data is of limited use for understanding why people claim citizenship. Many other relevant pieces of information are missing—such as income, education and household composition. And because the official data is at the aggregate rather than the individual level, we cannot investigate how the variables relate to each other and to the outcome of interest.

³⁶ All residents are interviewed in randomly selected households within randomly selected neighborhoods; information on children aged under 16 is provided by the parents. This provides

Surveying a random sample of individuals ensures the survey is representative, and fits neatly with standard statistical assumptions that the observations are independent. But the strategy of only sampling individuals precludes analysis of social influences and of collective behavior.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the population of interest is made up of foreign residents and German citizens who once lived in the country as foreigners. By comparing foreign residents with people who used to be foreign residents but are now German citizens, we can test theories on the factors that make people more or less likely to acquire citizenship. Because the children of foreign residents living in Germany can inherit ‘foreigner’ status from their parents, the people who face (or faced) the decision over citizenship includes many people who have spent their whole lives in Germany. It would be inaccurate to describe them as migrants; hence I refer to the population of interest in this study using the precise if unwieldy term ‘foreign-origin.’³⁷

The German concept of ‘migration background’ is actually broader than the definition required for this dissertation.³⁸ The official definition of ‘migration background’ also includes some immigrants who were automatically eligible for citizenship upon arrival (namely ‘ethnic German’ migrants from Eastern Europe), as well as the descendents of immigrants, even if they were born with German citizenship. Since these people never actually faced the choice whether or not to apply for German citizenship, they are not relevant to this dissertation. Beyond these restrictions, the analysis extends to all foreign residents and new German citizens. Foreign residents from different parts of the world face the decision over German citizenship from different starting positions. But this kind of variation is treated as an opportunity to test and refine theories on citizenship acquisition, rather than as a reason for excluding certain groups.³⁹

2. The population of interest

The census data reveal that there are some 9.2 million foreign-origin residents living in Germany, of whom 2.4 million were born in the country.⁴⁰ 61% of these foreign-origin residents live in densely populated urban areas, compared to 38% of native Germans. Just 4% of the foreign-origin population lives in the states of the former East Germany,

a representative sample for the federal states and for many of the roughly 400 German municipalities. Participation is obligatory, resulting in a response rate of 97%. This is useful because non-response may be correlated with the outcome of interest, and can therefore induce biased estimates.

³⁷ This wording is similar to that used in the German language, which refers to immigrants and their non-German descendents as *Ausländer* or foreigners.

³⁸ For a discussion of the official definition see Statistisches Bundesamt *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund* 2008, Appendix 1.

³⁹ It is not possible to present information on people who lived in Germany as foreigners but have now moved abroad (whether to the country of origin or to a third country). Recently around 600,000 foreign residents have left Germany each year, and 700,000 have moved to the country. Most of the movers were short-term residents, especially students from E.U. member states. The population of long-term foreign residents is large and not much affected by such movements.

⁴⁰ The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter are based on weights provided in the census data. The models presented later in the chapter do not use these weights.

compared to 16% of the total population. Table 3.1 provides some information on the foreign-origin population of Germany. We see that the share of foreign-origin residents now holding German citizenship varies by country/region of origin, ranging from 8% among West Europeans from the ‘guest worker’ countries to 45% among those from ‘other’ parts of the world (the high share with citizenship in the latter group is at least partly explained by the fact that many were formerly ‘stateless,’ meaning they came to Germany as refugees).

Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics on the foreign-origin population of Germany

Country/region of origin	Number of people	% German citizens	% born in Germany	Mean monthly income	Mean years in Germany
Asia	566,000	25	14	€1,820	13
Cen./S. America	143,000	29	6	€2,180	12
Eastern Europe	788,000	24	9	€1,760	13
Near East & N. Africa	775,000	36	17	€1,600	14
North America	123,000	17	16	€2,720	17
Other	112,000	45	15	€1,640	17
Sub-Saharan Africa	187,000	25	14	€1,480	12
Former USSR ⁴¹	599,000	21	6	€1,530	8
Turkey	2,467,000	25	39	€1,820	21
Western Europe	844,000	14	18	€2,510	21
W. Eur. Guests ⁴²	1,321,000	8	34	€2,030	25
Former Yugoslavia	1,113,000	14	23	€1,910	21
OVERALL	9,227,000	21	26	€1,880	19

Table 3.1 contains estimates of mean monthly net household income for people with origins in each of the countries or world regions. The comparable estimate for native Germans is €2,180. Hence although foreign-origin residents from much of the world are, on average, poorer than native Germans, some are actually better off (those with roots in Western Europe and North America). Foreign-origin households typically have more mouths to feed, with a mean household size of 3.2 people compared to 2.7 for native Germans. Around 14% of foreign-origin residents live in one-person households, and 78% in households where everyone is related. This compares to 19% of native Germans in one-person households and 70% of natives in family-based households. The census

⁴¹ ‘Ethnic Germans’ from the former USSR are excluded, but they were not the only people leaving the USSR around that time. Other emigrants included refugees and Jews who had an automatic right to asylum in Germany.

⁴² This category includes all residents who are citizens, or were once citizens, of countries that sent ‘guest workers’ to Germany but are now in the E.U., i.e. Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

data also suggest that the introduction of a limited form of birthright citizenship, with eligibility dependent on the residence status of the parents, has introduced legal inequalities that reinforce socio-economic inequalities. On average, children with the option of birthright citizenship live in households with an estimated mean monthly income of €2,030, compared to €1,760 for children who were not eligible for this provision despite having been born in Germany since the year 2000 to foreign parents.

Since the focus of this study is on the family, it is necessary to exclude other kinds of household from the main analysis. The analysis in subsequent sections of this chapter uses information on patterns of behavior within the household, and it would be confusing to include people who did not necessarily choose to live together. Hence people in group-housing are excluded (most are asylum seekers). People living at the same address but who are not related to those in the main household are also excluded, reducing the sample size by six percent (the people excluded in this way provide a baseline against which to compare the results of the main analysis). The analysis in this chapter is thus conducted on data covering single-person households and households based on the family.⁴³ The data are organized by household, but, with the exception of people living alone, the relevant social unit is the family. The data thus provide direct evidence on the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. Single-person households are included because they make up a sufficiently large share of the foreign-origin population that the generality of the findings would be questionable without them. Again, they also serve as a baseline for the analysis of family-based households.

3.1 The household-level clustering of citizenship status

The analysis of the census data begins with an assessment of the importance of household-level clustering in citizenship status. If the decision over citizenship is indeed taken at the level of the family, then we would expect to see that households, rather than individuals, account for much of the variation in citizenship status. One way to assess this clustering is to use variance components analysis (VCA), which shows what share of the variation in the outcome can be attributed to different social or spatial units. We can think of households as nested within municipalities, which in turn are nested within the federal states. VCA of the German micro-census data reveals that 61% of the variance is at the household level, 38% at the individual level, 0.4% at the state and 0.6% at the municipal level. This is the first piece of evidence on the importance of the household.

Further analysis confirms that this degree of clustering cannot plausibly be attributed to chance. If the numbers obtaining German citizenship were evenly spread across foreign-origin households, we would expect to find *some* households with multiple German citizens. But, as we saw in Table 3.1, only 21% of foreign-origin residents now hold German citizenship. Using probability theory it is straightforward to calculate how often we would expect to see people who have claimed citizenship living together, if they reached the decision independently. Consider the example of a household with three

⁴³ Family-based households include not only those with a married couple, but also non-married partners and single parents. As is standard practice with the micro-census, people living at a second home are also excluded, since there is a risk of double-counting. Excluding the people in group housing and in second homes reduces the sample size by around 1%.

migrant-origin residents. If each person made the decision independently, the expected probability that none of these people now holds German citizenship is 0.49. The expected probability that just one person is a German citizen is 0.39, and the probability that two are German citizens is 0.10. Finally, the expected probability of all three having independently reached the decision to claim German citizenship is just 0.01.⁴⁴


These numbers can be compared to the observed values. Of the approximately 400,000 households containing three foreign-origin residents, 72% contain only foreign residents. Twelve percent contain one German citizen, six percent contain two and ten percent contain three German citizens. This distribution is very different from what we would expect if the decision were reached independently. In particular, there are around ten times as many as the expected number of households where everyone is now a German citizen. Similar results are obtained for households of different sizes. This is strong evidence that the observed clustering of citizenship status by household is not merely the result of coincidence.

The fact that the census contains information on complete households allows us to study patterns of behavior within each household, and then aggregate these findings over the entire foreign-origin population. We can compare each person's citizenship status with the number of *others* in her household who have become German citizens. And we can aggregate by calculating the percentage holding German citizenship among people who live with a given number of 'other citizens.' This relationship is displayed in the bar chart in Figure 3.1. The x-axis shows the number of *other* foreign-origin residents in each person's household who now hold German citizenship. The y-axis shows what percentage of people living with varying numbers of 'other citizens' are now German citizens themselves. This means, for example, that the first bar (on the left of the figure) shows the percentage of people who are German citizens although they live in a household with no others who have claimed Germany citizenship.

Recall that people born with German citizenship are excluded from the data. So 'other citizens' are people who once lived in Germany as foreigners but now hold German citizenship. We see that 11% of people living in a household with no others who have claimed German citizenship are now citizens themselves. The percentage with German citizenship rises to 39% for those living with one other person who has claimed citizenship, 59% for those living with two other new citizens, 86% for those living with three others and over 90% for those living with four or more others who have claimed German citizenship. In other words, Figure 3.1 shows that if other people in my household have taken the step of becoming a German citizen, then it is likely that I have taken this same step. And this becomes *more* likely, the more others have acquired German citizenship.

⁴⁴ The probability that all three are foreign residents is the product of the unconditional probabilities of each being a foreign resident, i.e. $0.79 \times 0.79 \times 0.79$. We can calculate the conditional probability that one of the three has German citizenship as follows: $(0.21 \times 0.79 \times 0.79) + (0.79 \times 0.21 \times 0.79) + (0.79 \times 0.79 \times 0.21)$. The other calculations use the same logic.

Figure 3.1 The percentage of foreign-origin residents with German citizenship, by the number of *others* in the household who have claimed citizenship.



The bivariate relationship displayed in Figure 3.1 suggests that a strong household-level dynamic is at work in the question of which foreign-origin residents hold German citizenship. We can get a better understanding of the relative importance of this dynamic, and of the robustness of the pattern displayed in Figure 3.1, using multivariate statistical analysis. This allows tests of whether the strength of the relationship is attenuated after accounting for individual-level variables. It will also be important to test whether similar patterns are observed for foreign-origin residents living in different kinds and sizes of households, and for people with origins in different parts of the world.

3.2 Modeling citizenship status

Multivariate statistical models allow us estimate the association between citizenship status and a range of relevant variables at the individual, household and regional level. The models show how these useful other pieces of information would be, if we wanted to predict the citizenship status of the foreign-origin residents in the census data. In fact, in the census data, we already know the citizenship status of each individual. Hence the true prediction comes in extrapolating from the models to the full population of foreign-origin residents living in Germany. There is some uncertainty involved in making this kind of prediction, because of limits on the amount of information that can be included in any sample, and the fact that the relationships estimated in the models vary across individuals, some more so than others. This uncertainty is reflected in the standard errors associated with the coefficients that estimate each relationship. In order to test the robustness of the patterns identified in this chapter, a number of models are estimated, with different covariates and for different sub-sets of the foreign-origin population.

The full model includes five clusters of variables. *Demographic* variables include age, length of residence, whether or not the person was born in Germany and an interaction term to allow for the fact that, for those born in Germany, age is the same as length of residence. *Socio-economic* variables include a measure of the educational attainments of the most educated person in the household. The advantage of using this household-level variable, rather than a separate measure for each individual, is that we can avoid excluding people for whom we have no information on the education variable (mostly children who are still in school). Using the household-level version thus allows us to avoid a 16% reduction in sample size. Including children in the analysis is important in order to get at within-household dynamics.⁴⁵ The other variables in this cluster of socio-economic variables are household income and an indicator showing whether the person in question is currently working. The full model also includes fixed effects for country/region of *origin*, and for differences across the *states* that make up Germany. Finally, the full model includes information on *household composition*: an indicator showing whether the person is married to a native German, and the number of others in the household who now hold German citizenship. In addition to excluding households not based on the family, the analysis is restricted to foreign-origin residents with no missing values on the variables in the models.⁴⁶ The models also exclude people who obtained German citizenship through the birthright provision, as they did not have to choose whether or not to become a German citizen.⁴⁷

The models are thus estimated on family-based households (including co-habiting couples and single parents), and single-person households. Together, these households account for 93% of the foreign-origin population. Note that because the data-set only includes foreign-origin residents, some people are included as the only members of their household even though the household does contain other people, namely native-born Germans. People in true single-person households make up 11% of the data-set, and those who are the only ‘relevant’ person in a larger household make up a further 18%.

Table 3.2 presents three models of citizenship status. The outcome is dichotomous so the models use logistic regression to estimate the probability of holding German citizenship. Several variables (age, time in the country, and household income) are log-transformed, putting more weight on the lower end of the scale and improving model fit. ‘Other citizens’ is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 5 (few households have more than five); using dummy variables for the number of other citizens produces similar results.

⁴⁵ The assumption is that other household members stand to benefit from the status and skills of the most educated person. Note that this is an assumption that social scientists often make in the case of household income. Alternative specifications with household-level vs. individual-level education, for adults with a score on the education variable, result in very similar model fit.

⁴⁶ This reduces the sample size by 10%. Almost all of the missing values are on the household income variable, which is among the few non-obligatory questions on the micro-census. The full model was estimated for data with the missing values replaced by imputed values, using the *Hmisc* package in R, with very similar results.

⁴⁷ Birthright citizens *are* included in the descriptive data on the numbers taking citizenship. The birthright citizenship provision was a key part of the reform of citizenship law in the year 2000, so it is important to account for this effect of the reform.

Table 3.2 Logistic models of the probability of holding German citizenship.

	Model 1 all households	Model 2 all households	Model 3 likely eligible
<i>Female (0/1)</i>	0.11 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)
<i>Log age</i>	-0.95 (0.05)	-0.96 (0.05)	-1.01 (0.06)
<i>Log years in country</i>	1.97 (0.04)	2.20 (0.04)	2.19 (0.05)
<i>Born Germany (0/1)</i>	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.80 (0.25)	-1.25 (0.26)
<i>Log years*Born in Germany</i>	-0.09 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.15 (0.08)
<i>Household head secondary edu. (0/1)</i>	0.31 (0.07)	0.34 (0.07)	0.38 (0.09)
<i>Household head tertiary edu. (0/1)</i>	0.58 (0.07)	0.67 (0.07)	0.62 (0.08)
<i>Household head university (0/1)</i>	0.89 (0.10)	1.12 (0.09)	1.02 (0.10)
<i>Working (0/1)</i>	0.24 (0.03)	0.48 (0.03)	0.48 (0.03)
<i>Log household income</i>	0.38 (0.05)	-0.44 (0.05)	-0.47 (0.04)
<i>Number of other citizens in household</i>		1.41 (0.03)	1.40 (0.03)
<i>Married to a native German (0/1)</i>		0.83 (0.04)	0.86 (0.04)
<i>Constant</i>	-5.14 (0.21)	-5.02 (0.24)	-4.68 (0.22)
<i>Country/region of origin fixed effects</i>	yes	yes	yes
<i>State fixed effects</i>	yes	yes	yes
No. of individuals	48194	48194	40774
No. of households	26206	26206	22450
Log-likelihood	-21151	-17178	-16227
Percentage Reduction in Error	16%	36%	37%

Note: the table reports point estimates and parenthesized standard errors from logistic regressions fit by iteratively re-weighted least squares. Standard errors are clustered by household. Model 1 is for the full sample of foreign-origin residents, and contains all variables except those on household composition. Model 2 is the same as Model 1 except that it also includes variables on household composition. Model 3 is for the sub-set of the foreign-origin residents who are likely to be eligible for citizenship, i.e. where one adult has been resident at least 4 years, the children of such people who have been eligible at least three years, and spouses who have lived in Germany for at least four years. The education reference category is no certificate or only primary schooling. The baseline origin group is Turkish and the baseline state of residence is Lower-Saxony.

Model one includes variables that existing research shows are associated with the likelihood of becoming a citizen of the country of residence. Model two includes the same variables, plus information on household composition. Model three is estimated on a sub-set of the data containing only people who are likely to be eligible for German citizenship. The coefficients in logistic models are on the log scale, and can be difficult to interpret. For ease of interpretation, Table 3.3 (below) shows the change in predicted probability that is associated with representative changes in key variables. The point of Table 3.2 is to allow us to compare the three models.

Including the household composition variables results in a large improvement in predictive power. The coefficient on the ‘other citizens’ variable in Model two is large and highly significant. At the bottom of the table are measures of model fit. The most intuitive is ‘percentage reduction in error’ (PRE). In logistic models, the baseline for prediction is the share in the modal category. Here, since 76% of foreign-origin residents are not German citizens, we can correctly predict 76% of cases simply by predicting that nobody holds German citizenship. PRE shows the percentage of the remaining possible improvement in prediction (up to 100% accuracy) that is achieved by the model. We see that Model two does more than twice as well, on this metric, as Model one.

Table 3.2 also reports results from a third model, this time focusing on people likely to be eligible for German citizenship. In a sense, this is the true group of interest. But it is difficult to identify them in the census data. The single requirement that excludes the largest number of people is length of residence, currently eight years for most applicants. But even here, matters are complicated. The spouse of a German citizen, or a foreign resident who has lived in Germany for eight years, can apply after just four years, and the children of a resident of eight years can be included on the application after just three years. Model three is estimated on the population likely to be eligible for German citizenship, based on these criteria.⁴⁸ This restriction reduces the sample size by 15%. We see that the coefficients are very similar to those in Model two.

I retain Model two as the ‘best’ model because the census data do not allow a more accurate restriction to the sub-set eligible for citizenship. We have no data on language ability or the civics test, or other factors that disqualify some foreign residents (e.g. a criminal record). The fact that the ‘likely eligible’ sample is only 15% smaller than the full sample confirms that a large share of the foreign-origin population of Germany is *prima facie* eligible for citizenship; this is no surprise since so many have lived in the country for so long. The fact that the models produce similar estimates should increase our confidence in the robustness of the findings.

⁴⁸ The ‘likely eligible’ restriction imposed in Model three is not entirely successful. 5% of those identified as *not* likely to be eligible in fact hold German citizenship. For these people, we know that the restriction must be wrong. There are presumably also people who are considered eligible but who would not in fact be able to obtain citizenship, but they cannot be identified. As a further robustness test, another model was estimated for people who completed high school in Germany (this cuts the sample size by 65%). These people are almost certainly eligible for citizenship, based on length of residence, language skills and civic knowledge (those with a German diploma are exempt from the civics test). Again, the main findings from the model were very similar.

Table 3.3 presents findings from Model two in a more accessible format. The table shows the change in the predicted probability of holding German citizenship that is associated with changes in relevant covariates, while holding other variables at representative levels (at the mode for categorical variables, and the median for continuous variables). For categorical variables the table shows the predicted change due to moving between categories (e.g. born in Germany vs. born in another country). For continuous variables (e.g. age) the table reports the change associated with moving from the 10th to the 50th percentile, and from the 50th to the 90th.

Table 3.3 Changes in the predicted probability of holding German citizenship associated with changes in relevant covariates.

Variable change	Predicted change in probability	95% confidence interval
<i>Household composition</i>		
Living with one other citizen (vs. with zero)	+ 0.17	(0.16, 0.18)
Living with two other citizens (vs. with zero)	+ 0.49	(0.48, 0.51)
Living with three other citizens (vs. with zero)	+ 0.77	(0.76, 0.78)
Living with four other citizens (vs. with zero)	+ 0.88	(0.88, 0.89)
Living with five plus other citizens (vs. with zero)	+ 0.92	(0.91, 0.92)
Married to a native German	+ 0.08	(0.07, 0.09)
<i>Demographics</i>		
From 23 to 42 years of age (foreign born)	- 0.09	(-0.10, -0.08)
From 42 to 64 years of age (foreign born)	- 0.02	(-0.02, -0.01)
From 4 to 17 years of residence (foreign born)	+ 0.07	(0.07, 0.08)
From 17 to 38 years of residence (foreign born)	+ 0.20	(0.19, 0.21)
From 6 to 17 years of age (German born)	+ 0.06	(0.05, 0.07)
From 17 to 36 years of age (German born)	+ 0.13	(0.11, 0.15)
Born in Germany	- 0.04	(-0.06, -0.02)
<i>Socio-Economics</i>		
From primary to secondary education	+ 0.01	(0, 0.01)
From secondary to tertiary education	+ 0.02	(0.02, 0.02)
From tertiary to university education	+ 0.03	(0.03, 0.04)
Working	+ 0.04	(0.03, 0.04)
From €1,000 to €1,850 monthly household income	- 0.02	(-0.03, -0.02)
From €1,850 to €3,800 monthly household income	- 0.01	(-0.02, -0.01)


Note: the table reports changes in the predicted probability of holding German citizenship for changes in each variable, while holding other variables constant at representative levels. The estimates are based on a logistic model of citizenship status (Model two). The baseline predictions are for a typical foreign-origin resident. This is a female with Turkish origins who is not working, who lives in the state of Lower Saxony, who is 42 years old and has been in Germany for 17 years. She lives with no 'other citizens,' the most educated person in the household has vocational qualifications, and household income is roughly €1,850 per month.

Table 3.3. reveals that the biggest changes in the predicted likelihood of holding German citizenship are associated with the ‘other citizens’ variable. Narrow confidence intervals show that these changes are also highly statistically significant. This means we can have high levels of confidence in extrapolating from the micro-census sample to the full population. Beyond the findings on household composition, Table 3.3 shows that increasing age is associated with a lower likelihood of becoming a German citizen, but additional years in the country have a stronger positive association. This means that the net impact of ageing, while living in Germany, is positive. We see a small but significant negative association between being born in Germany and the likelihood of holding German citizenship. Increasing education appears to help household-members become German citizens, and there is a weak negative association between citizenship status and household income.

Let us now consider the robustness of these findings. The estimate based on the number of ‘other citizens’ is especially important for the argument advanced in this dissertation. But is the comparison appropriate? For someone living with one other foreign-origin resident, does it really make sense to predict what would happen if there were three ‘other citizens’ in the household? We can allay this concern by replicating the analysis for subsets of the data with the same number of foreign-origin residents in the household. Since, by definition, there are no the ‘other citizens’ in households with just one foreign-origin individual, we begin with households containing two foreign-origin residents.


Figure 3.2 displays the relationship between the predicted probability of holding German citizenship and the number of ‘other citizens,’ for households of different sizes. The x-axis differs across the four plots. In households with only two foreign-origin residents, the number of ‘other citizens’ can only be zero or one. In households with three, the number of ‘other citizens’ could be zero, one or two. And so on for the other plots. The solid lines show the predicted relationship, and dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. We see a positive pattern in each of the four plots, and we also see that the relationship is stronger in households with more foreign-origin residents. This is reflected in the fit of the models: Percentage Reduction in Error is 49% for the model of people living in households with two foreign-origin residents, 57% in households with three, 66% in those with four and 72% in households with five or more foreign-origin residents. The larger the foreign-origin household, the better we can predict citizenship status based on the number of others in the household who have become German citizens.

Figure 3.2 Predicting the probability of holding German citizenship using the number of other German citizens in the household, for a range of household sizes.



Another possible concern is that the household-level dynamics reported in these models might be driven by particular groups of foreign-origin residents. Perhaps the sizeable Turkish-origin population is especially likely to behave as a family unit, and this explains the findings. We can test this possibility by interacting the ‘other citizens’ variable with the indicators of the country/region of origin. The results are presented in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 Predicting the probability of holding German citizenship using the number of other German citizens in the household, for different origin groups.



The interaction term produces a different slope estimate for each migrant group, showing a separate estimate of the strength of the relationship between citizenship and ‘other citizens.’ The model also includes a separate intercept for each group, showing the baseline likelihood of acquiring German citizenship, in a household with no ‘other citizens.’ We see a similar pattern for 11 of the 12 origin groups. Indeed, many of the lines are so close together that the figure is only intelligible when split into two plots. The one exception is foreign-origin residents from North America. This group has a distinctive history of migration. Many are (former) U.S. citizens who settled in the

country after having lived there on a military base. The share with German citizenship is low, and the key factor for these people appears to be inter-marriage. People from North American who are married to a native German are over ten times more likely to hold German citizenship than otherwise similar residents without such a relationship.

Overall, Figure 3.2 shows that the household-level dynamic in the decision over citizenship is similar for most foreign-origin residents of Germany. A separate analysis confirms that the importance of the ‘other citizens’ variable extends even to households that contain foreign-origin residents from more than one country. In total these people account for six percent of the foreign-origin population. The share with German citizenship is just 15% for those in households with no ‘other citizens,’ rising to 39% in households with one, 59% in households with two, 72% in households with three and 82% in households with four or more others who have claimed German citizenship. A multivariate model on this sub-set of the data also produces similar findings.

Another way to place the findings from the models in context is to compare them with results for people living in households with no other foreign-origin residents. We have no information on ‘other citizens’ for these people. Without this information it is harder to predict citizenship status; the fit of an otherwise similar logistic model is worse (PRE = 0.24). Demographic variables and the country/region of origin show similar associations with citizenship status, and socio-economic variables are somewhat stronger predictors than is the case in multi-foreign-origin households.

Finally, a caveat on the interpretation of the models. The underlying logic is to compare foreign residents with people who once lived in Germany as foreign residents but now hold German citizenship. Differences between the two groups should help us understand why some people are now German citizens while others are not. But the models cannot easily account for temporal dynamics. Even though some of these people became German citizens a number of years before the data were collected, we can only compare foreign residents as of 2007 with German citizens as of 2007. This raises the possibility that the observed differences arose *after* some foreign-origin residents became German citizens. We may even have reverse causation: people with German citizenship could differ from foreign residents *because* they are now citizens.

This kind of complexity implies a need for nuanced interpretation. We are on safe ground with some variables. For example, most household heads finished their education *before* anyone in the household acquired German citizenship (this is true in 80% of cases, and an alternative model based on these people produces similar findings). And since the qualitative evidence in Chapter Two suggested a plausible mechanism—education provides people with the skills and confidence to claim citizenship—we can reasonably infer that education helps. We can also buttress the findings from these models by turning our attention to information on the temporal dynamics of the decision over citizenship.

3.3 Evidence of collective claims on citizenship

The preceding analysis makes innovative use of information on other household members to study the decision over whether or not to apply for citizenship. But it does not yet establish that the household-level clustering is the result of collective decision-making, in the way that the interviews in Chapter Two suggested. In order to test for this kind of collective behavior I created a new indicator, based on the numbers of people living in the same household who acquired German citizenship at the same time.

One can think of household members as taking three possible paths to German citizenship. They might claim ‘collectively’, in the same year as one or more other household members. They might become German citizens ‘without’ others in the household, either in a different year or as the only foreign-origin person in the household to take this step. Finally, we may see people taking citizenship ‘alone,’ as the only person in the household for whom the issue arose. Again, it is possible to collect the information on the people following these paths to citizenship at the level of the household, and then aggregate across households to obtain results for the entire foreign-origin population.

The measure of the numbers taking each path to citizenship makes novel use of the census data, so it is worth explaining in detail. The measure uses a question in the census on the year in which each person acquired German citizenship. I created an indicator that takes on the value one for each person who became a German citizen in the same year as another foreign-origin person in the household. Such people are considered to have made a ‘collective’ claim on citizenship.⁴⁹ People who live with other foreign-origin residents and who now hold German citizenship, but did not make a collective claim, are described as having taken citizenship ‘without’ others in the household. This category includes two kinds of people. Some are the only ones in the household who became German citizens, while others live with people who made a ‘collective’ claim but did not join in. The final category refers to people who now hold German citizenship and who live in households with no other foreign-origin residents. These people either live in a single-person household, or live in a household with native Germans

This measure makes new kinds of information available. The fact that new German citizens tend to live with other new citizens suggests a household-level dynamic at work but is not necessarily evidence of collective decision-making. That kind of clustering could arise because people who live together have a lot in common, even beyond the factors that we can account for using the information in the census data. Establishing whether foreign-origin residents who live together became citizens *at the same time* makes for a much stronger test of the argument that they made the decision together.

The information on the numbers taking each path to citizenship has even greater analytic value when combined with other variables. This allows us to assess the importance of household-level decisions over citizenship for different sub-sets of the foreign-origin

⁴⁹ A sub-set of the ‘collective’ category are people in a household where *everyone* acquired German citizenship in the same year; I describe these people as having made a ‘cohesive’ claim on citizenship. For the most part, this dissertation focuses on the broader ‘collective’ category.

population. We can track the numbers taking each path to citizenship over time and across the country. In this way, we can assess the effects of changes in citizenship law on household-level decisions over citizenship. As we will see in Chapter Four, the effects of the reform of 2000 appear to have been mediated by their impact on household-level patterns of behavior. The numbers making a ‘collective’ claim on citizenship have declined sharply since the year 2000, and the numbers taking citizenship ‘without’ have increased—most of these people qualified for German citizenship through the new birthright provisions. This reveals that the reform of 2000 had the expected effect of extending citizenship to some children born in the country to foreign parents, but also that this has been more than offset by the falling numbers making a ‘collective’ claim.

One way to think about the extra precision achieved with the measure of the paths to citizenship is to consider the likelihood of this kind of clustering by household *and* year of citizenship arising by chance. The appropriate baseline for comparison is the distribution of outcomes for people who live together but made the decision independently. This baseline can be calculated using probability theory and the observed information on the numbers with citizenship *and* the year in which citizenship was obtained. Again, consider the example of a household with three foreign-origin residents. As before, we would expect that 49% of such households contain no German citizens, and that 39% contain just one. We would expect around 10% to hold two German citizens, but the expected probability that both of them independently decided to take citizenship in the same year is tiny, at just 0.5%. An even smaller percentage of households, just 0.00003%, would be expected to contain three people who all decided to take German citizenship in the same year.⁵⁰ Comparing the expected distribution to the observed numbers for people in households with three foreign-origin residents shows far higher levels of clustering. We see that ten percent of these people, and 63% of those with German citizenship, took the ‘collective’ path.

These calculations confirm that the measure of the numbers taking each path to citizenship allows for a much more detailed analysis of the decision over citizenship. We can also get a sense of the baseline level of ‘collective’ claims by turning back to the people excluded from the main analysis because they live in group-housing or are unrelated to the people in the main household at each address. Just 14% of these people are German citizens. Of those who have acquired this status, eleven percent did so in the same year as others at the same address. This is above the pure-chance baseline of five percent, but well below the 37% of collective claims observed in the main analysis. The

⁵⁰ Here is an example of the calculation of conditional probabilities. 5% of the people who now hold German citizenship became citizens in the year 2006. So the conditional probability of finding two people who independently became citizens in 2006, and one non-citizen, in a single household is $(0.05 \cdot 0.21) \cdot (0.05 \cdot 0.21) \cdot 0.79$. One can repeat this kind of calculation across the years in which citizenship could have been obtained (starting in 1970) to reach the overall likelihood of seeing two independent claims on citizenship in the same year. There are other factors, besides household-level decisions, that could lead to non-independence. For example, people of similar ages might be more likely to have claimed in the same year. But note that general temporal trends are accounted for in this method of calculation, which allows for the fact that independent collective claims were more likely in the year 2006 than in 1980, for instance.

qualitative evidence in Chapter Two suggests that families are not the only units that lodge collective claims; friends also come together to apply for citizenship. The finding from the atypical households may reflect such processes, though we have no direct evidence on this matter.

The measure of the numbers taking each path to citizenship is not perfect, however. It relies on household composition at the time when the census was conducted, in 2007, since this is the only kind of data available. This means that the measure under-counts collective claims in cases where household members became citizens together but have since moved apart. Conversely, it overstates the number of collective claims when household members who now live together happen to have become citizens in the same year, even though they did not live together at the time. As we will see, it is common for children to become citizens along with their parents, and many of these children later move out of the house. This implies that the former kind of error is far more likely than the latter. Hence the indicator provides a conservative estimate of the number of collective claims on citizenship.

Another caveat on the interpretation of this measure is that the choice of the paths to citizenship is circumscribed by prior factors that shape household composition. In the most obvious case, people living in a household with native Germans rather than with other foreign-origin residents cannot make a collective claim on citizenship. More generally, the fact that many foreign-origin residents live with other foreign-origin residents, although some live with native Germans, implies that the social processes of integration were already at work in deciding who lives with whom. In the concluding chapter I will argue that this does not invalidate the measure of the numbers taking each path to citizenship. Instead, the importance of this measure for our understanding of the decision over citizenship implies a need for further research in this area.

3.4 The numbers taking each path to citizenship

Overall, the indicator on the paths to citizenship shows that 37% of people who now hold German citizenship acquired this status in the same year as at least one other member of the household. Most of these people, 31% of the total 37%, became German citizens in the same year as *everyone* else in the household, making what we might think of as a ‘cohesive’ claim on citizenship. This compares to 32% of new German citizens who acquired citizenship ‘without’ others in the household, and 31% who became citizens ‘alone.’ The measure of the paths to citizenship confirms, then, that the ‘collective’ path is the most important of the three.

The 37% share arguably under-states the relevance of the ‘collective’ path for our understanding of the decision facing the foreign-origin population of Germany, for three reasons. First, the aggregate numbers include every foreign-origin resident who obtained German citizenship since the 1950s. To foreshadow the findings in Chapter Four, almost all of the foreign residents who became German citizens in the four decades up to 1990 did so ‘alone.’ Most were the spouses of native Germans, many with origins in Western Europe. Only since 1990 have sizeable numbers of foreign residents from all parts of the world started to acquire German citizenship. Since that date, 45% of new citizens took

the ‘collective’ path to citizenship. Second, we may prefer to exclude people granted citizenship under the new birthright provision from the analysis. This new category was an important result of the reform of 2000, but these people did not (yet) actually face the choice over citizenship. If we exclude these people, the share taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship rises to 50%. Finally, if we focus on the people who live with at least one other foreign-origin resident, and hence had the option of taking German citizenship collectively or without others in the household, we see that 65% took the collective path. No single version of the analysis is correct; each yields insight on a different aspect of household-level decisions over citizenship.

The information on the year in which household members became German citizens also provides an opportunity to rule out an alternative explanation for the household-level clustering of citizenship status. Previous research has found that civil society organizations in certain areas can help and encourage foreign residents to claim citizenship (e.g. Bloemraad 2006). Perhaps, then, the clustering by household is merely an artifact of very high citizenship acquisition rates in certain areas, because of the activities of such organizations (or other local factors).

Chapter Two turned up little evidence of civil society organizations playing this kind of role in the German case, at least in the areas where interviews were conducted. We can use official data on the citizenship acquisition rates in municipalities to subject this alternative explanation to further testing. The official data reveal that there are no areas in which so many people acquired citizenship in the same year that this can account for the 37% of ‘collective’ or the 31% of ‘cohesive’ claims. Instead, the share of foreign residents who become German citizens is fairly similar across the municipalities within each state. In the largest state of North Rhine-Westfalia, for instance, the maximum share of the local foreign population that became German citizens in a single year (in the peak year of 2000) was just six percent ($N=54$, mean = 3.5, standard deviation = one). This implies that the observed household-level clustering cannot be explained by extraordinarily high rates of acquisition in certain areas, which ensured that many people in each household became German citizens.

Chapter One laid out the argument that the benefits of obtaining German citizenship are greater if multiple family members can become citizens together, and the per-capita costs of applying are also lower in such cases. The strong version of this argument implies that we should see a higher rate of citizenship acquisition in larger foreign-origin households. The weaker version of this argument implies that we should see similar rates of citizenship acquisition, but that more of the new citizens in larger households take this step together with others. In households with few foreign-origin residents, the difference between claiming ‘without’ and claiming ‘collectively’ may be modest. But in households with more foreign-origin individuals, the benefits of the latter approach are much greater. We can test this mechanism using the information on the paths to citizenship, along with data on the number of foreign-origin residents in each household.

Figure 3.4 shows the share of people living in households with one, two, three, four and five or more foreign-origin residents, by citizenship status and the path to citizenship.

The first category, shown in the section of each bar without any hatching, reveals the percentage of people living in such households who are foreign citizens ('Foreign'). This category is by far the largest; the y-axis is truncated so that it does not dominate the figure. We see that, in households of all sizes, foreign residents make up over 70% of the foreign-origin population. The next category shows the share of people living in each size of household who became German citizens 'With' at least one other household member, followed by the share who took this step 'Without' others in the household. The final category shows foreign-origin residents who became German citizens 'Alone.' Such people are found only in households with just one foreign-origin resident.

Figure 3.4 Paths to German citizenship for people living in households with different numbers of foreign-origin residents.




Figure 3.4 does not support the strong version of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. If anything, people living in households with more foreign-origin residents are somewhat less likely to hold German citizenship. This is not altogether surprising, since such households also contain relatively many people with fewer resources, and from countries or regions with mid-range or low acquisition rates (people from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and the former 'guest worker' countries in Western Europe all tend to live with relatively many foreign-origin individuals). Figure 3.4 does, however, provide support for the weaker version of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. Just focusing on people who now hold German citizenship, we see that 41% of those living in households with two foreign-origin residents made a collective claim on citizenship. This compares to 54% in households with three, 65% in households with four, and 72% of those living in households with five or more foreign-

origin residents. The larger the number of foreign-origin residents in the household, the more likely it becomes that if someone has German citizenship, this was the result of a collective claim that involved other household members applying at the same time.

Since most of the households with higher numbers of foreign-origin individuals contain children, the patterns in Figure 3.4 could have arisen because families with children are especially likely to claim citizenship together. Analysis of the paths to citizenship for different members of the family supports this interpretation. Overall, 21% of people classed as the ‘household head’—usually the main earner in the household, but also referring to anyone in a single-person household—are now German citizens. Just over one quarter of these people took the ‘collective’ path to citizenship. We also see that 21% of partners of the household head are now German citizens, and two fifths of these people took the ‘collective’ path. We see a higher rate of German citizenship among children, at 25%. And more than half of the children with German citizenship acquired this status along with others in the household.⁵¹

4. Conclusion

The argument advanced in this dissertation is that family members typically reach a collective decision on the question of whether or not to apply for German citizenship. In many cases, they conclude that the benefits of citizenship are worth more, if shared with other family members. And it may also be easier to bear the costs of acquiring citizenship if these can be shared across family members. In Chapter Two we saw evidence from interviews that citizenship is valued more highly as a collective good. Indeed, it is often taken for granted that family members make the decision together.

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the family-level logic of citizenship is a general phenomenon, not just something that matters to the people who served as interview subjects in this study. We have seen that citizenship status is clustered by household. Including information on the citizenship status of others in the household greatly increases the predictive power of multivariate models. An innovative measure of within-household dynamics shows that many foreign-origin residents became German citizens in the same year as others in the household. We have also seen that this kind of collective behavior is more important in households with more foreign-origin residents, and in households with children. This provides support for the posited mechanism: becoming a German citizen is more worthwhile if the benefits also extend to the family, especially children.

The household-level dynamic appears to be highly robust. The findings were replicated in bivariate and multivariate analysis, in alternative modeling specifications and in different sub-sets of the data. We have also seen evidence that casts doubt on alternative explanations for the household-level clustering of claims on citizenship. The implication of the analysis is that factors that make it easier or more difficult for multiple family members to acquire citizenship at the same time can have a magnified impact on the total numbers of new citizens. Chapters One and Two suggested that changes in German

⁵¹ The percentage of children who took the ‘collective’ path to citizenship rises to 80% if we exclude the children granted birthright citizenship since the year 2000 from this analysis.

citizenship law have impinged upon the family-level dynamics behind the decision over citizenship. In Chapter Four we extend the analysis of the census data to show how the numbers taking the various paths to citizenship vary in response to institutional context, depending upon the changes in federal citizenship law and upon the implementation of the law across the country.

Chapter Four: Explaining the Numbers of New Citizens Across Time and Space

In this chapter we return to the puzzle that motivated the dissertation. Why did the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship rise in the 1990s, only to fall in the wake of the supposedly liberalizing reform of the year 2000? The chapter uses information on household-level decisions over citizenship, revealing the ‘path’ taken to German citizenship. Foreign residents can acquire citizenship in one of three ways: ‘collectively’ with others in the household, ‘without’ other foreign-origin residents, or ‘alone.’ Aggregating across households, we see that the numbers taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship rose through the 1990s but have been falling since the year 2000. This is the only category that has shrunk since the late 1990s, which implies that the falling rate of citizenship acquisition is due to lower numbers becoming German citizens along with others in the family.

In more general terms, this chapter uses two kinds of within-case variation—over time and across the states and municipalities that administer citizenship law—to buttress the findings from the study of the decision over citizenship in a single country. The focus of this dissertation is on Germany, but even a single country can provide a large number of opportunities to test the implications of an argument (Collier et al 2004). Studying variation over time provides an opportunity to study the effects of policy changes on the behavior of foreign-origin residents. Studying differences in the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship across the states and municipalities allows us to investigate the effect of variation in the implementation of citizenship laws. We will see that in both cases there is a positive association between the numbers making a collective claim on citizenship and the numbers of new German citizens.

The first section of the chapter explains how census data on household-level patterns of citizenship acquisition can help us understand aggregate-level variation over time and space. The second section of the chapter presents the annual numbers acquiring German citizenship each year by the path taken to citizenship. We see a positive association between the annual share of new citizens who acquired citizenship along with other family members and the acquisition rate in the corresponding year. The third section presents similar results from regional comparisons, showing that variation in the rate at which foreigners acquire citizenship is also positively related to the share making a collective claim. In other words, more people acquired German citizenship *when* and *where* they were able to do so along with other family members. The fourth section of the chapter brings together qualitative and quantitative data to identify further opportunities to test the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship.

1. Using census data to study aggregate rates of citizenship acquisition

The analysis in Chapter Three used German micro-census data to study decisions over citizenship in a very large sample of foreign-origin residents. The German micro-census provides information not just on individuals but on entire households. We saw that foreign-origin residents who have become German citizens are not distributed evenly across households. Instead, new citizens are clustered in households with other new citizens, whereas foreign residents tend to live with other foreign residents. This pattern

is observed across different household sizes and among migrants from most parts of the world. Multivariate analysis showed that the number of other new citizens in the household is the single most useful piece of information in predicting whether a migrant-origin resident now holds German citizenship.

The previous chapter also made innovative use of the census data to construct an indicator of foreign-origin residents taking different ‘paths’ to German citizenship. Those who acquired this status in the same year as others in the household are said to have taken the ‘collective’ path to citizenship. Those who became citizens in a different year from other members of the household, or who live with other foreign-origin residents but are the only ones to have become German citizens, are described as having taken this step ‘without’ the others. Finally, foreign-origin residents who now have German citizenship but live with no other people who faced the decision over citizenship—either in single-person households or in households with native Germans—are said to have acquired citizenship ‘alone.’

The argument for the family-level logic of citizenship and the evidence from previous chapters imply that, in many cases, foreign residents place greater value on becoming German citizens if they are able to take this step along with other family members. In short, the ‘collective’ path to citizenship is often the most attractive of the three. We might therefore expect more foreign residents to acquire German citizenship in contexts that make it relatively easy to take this path. This chapter suggests that proposition to a range of tests.

In order to use household-level data to study aggregate-level variation we need an appropriate analytic strategy and high-quality data. The indicator on the path taken to citizenship can be aggregated across individuals. In Chapter Three we described the results for the entire country, and reported that 37% of new citizens took the ‘collective’ path. But we can also aggregate over other units of aggregation, to calculate the number of people who claimed citizenship in the same year or in the same state. The absolute number taking citizenship in each of these units gives us a sense of the scale of the phenomenon. But to see the numbers in the appropriate context we also need to take account of the size of the pool of potential applicants. Hence in addition to reporting the absolute numbers we should calculate the share of foreign residents becoming citizens.

It is also necessary to control for the direct link between the numbers following each path to citizenship and the share of foreign residents acquiring citizenship. Other things equal, a higher number taking any one of the paths to citizenship implies a higher acquisition rate. We can control for this fact and capture the relative importance of each path to citizenship by concentrating on the *proportion* of new citizens following each path. This is especially important because, by construction, there are always at least two people involved in any collective claim on citizenship. Hence the key question in this chapter is whether we see higher shares of foreign-origin residents becoming German citizens in temporal or spatial units in which a high proportion of new citizens obtained this status by taking the collective path to citizenship.

Given low overall acquisition rates it is quite plausible that we should see no association, or even a negative relationship, between the citizenship acquisition rate and the share of new citizens taking the collective path. For example, it might be the case that regions or years with a high share of citizens acquiring this status ‘without’ others in the family would have the highest overall rates of citizenship uptake. Recall that the ‘paths to citizenship’ measure is based on clustering in time as well as space. Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a household with three foreign-origin residents. One person could have become a German citizen in the year 1998 and another in the year 2002. Two thirds of the people in this household hold citizenship, a much higher share than the 21% of all foreign-origin residents who are now German citizens. Yet none of the people in this hypothetical household took the collective path to citizenship (two would be classed as having taken citizenship ‘without’ others, and the third is still a foreign resident).

To ensure that the information on the paths to citizenship is representative we need a large and representative sample for each of the relevant units of variation. In this case, that means representative data on the year in which foreign-origin residents acquired German citizenship, as well as representative samples from the German states and municipalities. The German micro-census is designed to meet the second requirement, with a large sample from each state in addition to fairly large samples from a sub-set of 116 smaller administrative units.⁵²

Before proceeding with the analysis we should also confirm that the micro-census provides reasonable estimates of the numbers of new citizens over time. The census contains a question on the year in which foreign-origin residents acquired German citizenship. We can compare their responses with official records on the total number of new citizens, which are available going back to 1973. One might suspect that the reliance on the recollections of people surveyed in 2007 would lead to some inaccuracies in the census measure, especially as we reach further back in time.


Figure 4.1 shows the official numbers of new citizens each year (the solid line) and the estimate from the census (the dashed line).⁵³ We see that the census allows a good approximation to the actual numbers acquiring German citizenship. The estimate from the census has small peaks in the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. It seems likely that people

⁵² The federal statistics office imposes limits on the use of the census micro-files in order to protect the privacy of the people surveyed. Some municipalities (in German, *Kreise* or *Kreisfreie Städte*) are considered too small to be identified, so the statistics office merges some small adjacent municipalities, most of them in rural areas. In total there are 402 municipalities in Germany; the census data covers roughly half in a given year.

⁵³ The official numbers are from several sources. Until the 1990s foreign-origin residents were granted citizenship at state discretion (*Ermessen*). Data from 1973 to 1980 are from the German Parliament’s *Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 10/863*, p. 40. The numbers from 1980 through 2000 are from *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration* (2005), p. 20. The numbers since 2000 are from annual reports of the Federal Statistics Office *Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.1 Einbürgerungen*, various years. Because I am unable to identify them in the census, the comparison excludes the roughly 40,000 who were born in Germany after 1990 and retroactively obtained birthright citizenship during the transitional year of 2000.

who couldn't remember exactly when they obtained citizenship gave round numbers as a best guess. The bumps do not appear to distort the analysis of the share taking each path to citizenship, since the higher number in each of these years is spread across the numbers taking each of the three paths.


Figure 4.1 Comparison of census estimates with the official number of new citizens



2. Explaining temporal variation


The information on the number taking each path to citizenship can be extended back over time. Figure 4.2 shows the numbers taking each of these paths to German citizenship from 1970 to 2006. In order to convey the human scale of the phenomenon the figure shows the absolute numbers taking each path. The three paths are shown on different plots in order to reveal differences in the temporal trends.

Figure 4.2 The numbers taking each path to German citizenship, 1970-2006.



In order to reveal the relative importance of each path, Figure 4.3 (below) presents the same data as a proportion of the foreign resident population at the time. Figure 4.3 reminds us that even in the years with the highest acquisition rates, only a small proportion of the foreign population became German citizens. In general the patterns in the two figures are similar.

Figure 4.3 The percentage of foreign residents taking each path to German citizenship, 1970-2006.



The two figures show that the numbers who became German citizens ‘alone’ have exhibited the least variation over time. This path accounted for around nearly 10,000 new citizens each year in the 1970s, compared to around 25,000 in recent years. Over the same period the foreign population of Germany grew from around three million to over seven million. As we can see in Figure 4.3, the numbers taking this path have increased roughly in proportion to the growth of the foreign population. Around 0.3% of foreign residents have taken this path to German citizenship each year. However, the relative importance of the ‘alone’ category has fallen sharply over the same period. This is because the other paths to citizenship have become much more important. Until the end of the 1970s the ‘alone’ category accounted for three quarters of the people becoming German citizens, and in the 1980s it was almost two thirds of the total.

Starting in the early 1990s, after the introduction of a ‘right’ to citizenship for foreign residents who met certain criteria, the numbers acquiring German citizenship started to accelerate. As we can see in Figure 4.2 this was largely due to the growth in the numbers making a ‘collective’ claim on citizenship, along with at least one other person in the household. The collective category made up around a quarter of the people acquiring citizenship in the 1980s, but around one half in the 1990s. Figure 4.3 shows that in 1988 the number of ‘collective’ claims represented a tiny 0.07% of the foreign population of Germany at the time. By the year 2000, even though the foreign population had grown by nearly three million people in the intervening decade, one percent of foreign residents made a collective claim on German citizenship. In absolute terms, the number making a collective claim was twenty times higher in 1999 than in 1989. As we saw in earlier

chapters, these were also the years in which it was standard practice to extend citizenship to the entire family if one applicant was able to meet the requirements.

From the peak in the year 2000—recall that around half of the people granted citizenship in that year had actually applied under the old rules—to the year 2006 the number making a collective claim on citizenship fell by one half. In absolute and in relative terms, this is the only one of the three paths that now conveys fewer people to German citizenship than was the case in the late 1990s. All three ‘paths’ saw a peak in the year 2000, but the ‘collective’ path is the only one that has followed a clear negative trend since that time. This implies that the overall decline in the numbers of foreign residents becoming German citizens is mostly due to the fact that fewer people now make a collective claim on citizenship.


In contrast, the numbers acquiring German citizenship ‘without’ others in the household have been far higher since the year 2000 than in any previous time period. This category grew over the course of the 1990s: the number in 1999 was three times higher than a decade earlier. But the real change came with the reform of the year 2000. Around 40,000 children now become German citizens every year through the new birthright provision, almost all of them ‘without’ others in the household (90%, according to the census). As a result, becoming a citizen without others in the household is now more common than making a ‘collective’ claim or taking the step ‘alone.’ This is a big change; for most of the last four decades ‘without’ was the smallest of the three categories.

Because at least one parent of any child granted birthright citizenship must hold a permanent residence permit, and have lived in Germany for eight years, we would expect that many of the others living with the birthright citizens are themselves eligible for citizenship. This is confirmed in the census data: according to an indicator of likely eligibility based on length of residence (discussed in Chapter Three), around 93% would be eligible. Yet few are claiming German citizenship: only around eight percent of the people in such households, compared to the overall acquisition rate of 21%. This is consistent with interview findings from Chapter Two. The parents of children who have birthright citizenship appear to feel less need to become citizens themselves. This suggests that, for many of these people, the benefits from holding the same citizenship as their children are not sufficient to motivate them to apply for German citizenship, after their children were granted citizenship automatically.

In addition to presenting temporal trends, as in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, we can also conduct a direct test of the association between the rate of citizenship acquisition and the percentage of new citizens following the ‘collective’ path. This relationship is displayed in Figure 4.4. The x-axis shows the percentage of new citizens following the collective path to German citizenship in each year from 1970 to 2006. In other words, the x-axis shows the relative importance of the collective path to citizenship, compared to the other two paths. The y-axis shows the percentage of the foreign population that became German citizens in the corresponding year. Years are identified in the plot by the final two digits (e.g. ‘70’ for 1970). The distribution of the points in Figure 4.4 suggests a positive, non-linear association, with a separate cluster for the years from 2000 onwards.

The grey line in Figure 4.4 shows the fit of a regression model of the citizenship acquisition rate from 1970-1999 on the percentage of citizens taking the collective path to citizenship in the corresponding year. The model also includes a quadratic term on the same variable to allow for a non-linear relationship.⁵⁴

Figure 4.4 The percentage of foreign residents taking German citizenship and the percentage of citizens taking the ‘collective’ path, by year.



The fact that the cluster for the years since 2000 lies above the line from this model implies that recent years saw more people acquiring German citizenship than we would have expected, based on the prior three decades. For example, the acquisition rate in 2003 was about one percentage point higher than the number in 1990, even though a similar share of citizens took the ‘collective’ path. The reason for the difference is that relatively many people are now taking citizenship ‘without’ family members, because of the new provisions on birthright citizenship. As we can see in Figure 4.5, if we remove the children with birthright citizenship the gap between the predicted outcome based on earlier decades and the acquisition rate in the year since 2000 largely disappears.

⁵⁴ In this model, N is 30, adjusted R^2 is 0.83, the coefficient on the main effect is -2.1 (SE = 0.7), and the coefficient on the quadratic term is 6.4 (SE = 1.2).

Figure. 4.5 The citizenship acquisition rate against the percentage of citizens taking the ‘collective’ path, by year (excluding those granted birthright citizenship).




Figure 4.5 shows that, after removing the people granted birthright citizenship rate, the acquisition rate in the years 2000 was comparable to the rate in the early 1990s.⁵⁵ The reform of the year 2000 did not entirely close off the ‘collective’ path to citizenship, but fewer people are now taking that path.

It appears, then, that a higher share of foreign residents acquired citizenship when it was easier to do so along with others in the household. This could be because they believe citizenship is worth more when shared with others in the family, and thus make more effort to acquire citizenship when it is easier to make a collective claim. This is not the only possible interpretation of this pattern, however. With observational data there is always the possibility of reverse causation. In this case, however, it is highly unlikely that the association displayed in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 is due to reverse causation. That would imply that relatively more people take the collective path to citizenship because of the high share of foreign residents acquiring citizenship in certain years. In other words, if so many people become citizens in a given year that some of them just happened to live together, we would also see this kind of positive association. But because the overall acquisition rate is so low, typically below two percent of foreign residents in any year, this alternative explanation seems implausible.

⁵⁵ In the second model, without birthright citizens, $N=37$, adjusted R^2 is now 0.78, the coefficient on the main effect is -2.8 (SE = 1.2), and the coefficient on the quadratic term is 8.3 (SE = 2).

3. Explaining regional variation

The analysis turns now to analysis of another kind of within-case variation in the outcome of interest, namely the share of foreign-origin residents acquiring German citizenship in different parts of the country. Two levels of variation are available for this purpose: between the federal states and between municipalities. Previous chapters showed that there is scope for officials and politicians in these administrative units to exercise discretion over the implementation of citizenship law. They may be able to influence *how many* foreign residents become citizens, and *who* these people are.


This kind of regional variation has attracted scholarly attention, in part because the idea that *local* factors decide access to *national* citizenship is seen as a normative problem (e.g. Hagedoorn 2001; Henkes 2008; Thränhardt 2008). Most of these studies, however, have been unable to control for differences between the foreign-origin populations in these administrative units (but see Hangartner and Hainmüller, no date). This leaves open the possibility that the observed variation is due to compositional differences in the pool of people who could apply for German citizenship. For example, some areas may be home to more people from E.U. member states, who have a generally low proclivity to acquire German citizenship. The census data allow us to test for regional differences after accounting for this kind of individual-level variation.

We begin with descriptive analysis. Figure 4.6 (on the following page) shows the share of Germany's foreign-origin population living in each state, as well as each state's share of the population of new German citizens. We see that some states are home to proportionately more new citizens than foreign residents. For example, North-Rhine Westphalia (shown in Figure 4.6 as 'NR') is home to 27.5% of the foreign-origin population and to 30.5% of the people who have claimed German citizenship. Other states with relatively many new citizens include Hessen and Schleswig-Holstein. We also see some states with fewer new citizens than one would expect, if the share with citizenship were proportional to the number of foreign-origin residents. This is true of Bavaria and all of the states in the former East (which account for such a small share of both foreigners and new citizens that they are combined into one unit for this figure). We also see that the share with citizenship is slightly lower than the share of foreign-origin residents living in Berlin. This may reflect that the capital city attracts relatively many immigrants who do not intend to stay in Germany, including not just diplomatic staff but also students and the employees of international firms.

Figure 4.6 reveals moderately sized inter-state differences in the share of foreign-origin residents who now hold German citizenship. Multivariate statistical analysis confirms that the pattern is broadly similar after accounting for compositional differences. In addition to the variables on household composition, socio-economic status and demographic factors, the baseline model in Chapter Three (Model two in Table 3.2) includes fixed effects for differences in the average likelihood of obtaining citizenship across the German states. These are statistically significant at conventional levels for six of the 16 states, using the state of Niedersachsen, where the acquisition rate is closest to the national average, as the reference category. People living in the states of NRW and

Schleswig-Holstein have significantly higher probabilities of holding German citizenship, and those living in Bavaria or in the Eastern states are significantly less likely to do so.

Figure 4.6 The share of the foreign-origin population and of people who have claimed German citizenship in the federal states.



Note: The abbreviations are: NR = Nordrhein-Westfalen, BW = Baden-Württemberg, Ba = Bavaria, He = Hessen, Ni = Niedersachsen, Be = Berlin, RP = Rheinland-Pfalz, E = East (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen), Ha = Hamburg, SH = Schleswig-Holstein, Sa = Saarland, Br = Bremen.


The coefficients from the statistical model can be used to calculate predicted inter-state differences in the probability of holding citizenship, after controlling for other relevant variables. The biggest outlier on the positive side is Schleswig-Holstein at plus nine percentage points, compared to an extreme of minus eleven percentage points in Thüringen and Sachsen-Anhalt. This spread of 20 percentage points is bigger than the predicted differences associated with most of the other variables in the model, with the exception of ‘other citizens,’ which is associated with a far bigger range of probabilities. But the extremes are not relevant for very many people. Only two percent of the foreign-origin population lives in Schleswig-Holstein, and four percent in the East. The great majority lives in the larger states in West Germany, and here the disparities are smaller.

Among the large Western states, the biggest difference is between NRW and Bavaria. An otherwise similar person living in NRW rather than Bavaria is estimated to be eight

percentage points more likely to hold German citizenship. This difference is about the same as the expected increase in the likelihood of holding German citizenship that comes from being married to a native German. But, given the low baseline likelihood of becoming a German citizen, for many people an eight percentage point increase in the likelihood of this outcome would make no difference. This helps explain why the variance components analysis in Chapter Three attributes only 0.4% of the variation in citizenship status to inter-state differences.

Having assessed the extent of between-state variation in the numbers of foreign-origin residents holding German citizenship we can now turn to the more interesting task of trying to explain this variation. Figure 4.7 plots the share of new citizens who took the collective path, in each state, against the share of the foreign-origin population that now holds German citizenship. The census data do not contain enough information to show the year-by-year acquisition rate in each state. Hence we focus on the cumulative impact of the numbers taking each path to citizenship on the citizenship acquisition rate.⁵⁶

Figure 4.7 Citizenship acquisition rates across the German states by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.




Note: The abbreviations for the states are: MV = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Bra = Brandenburg, Th = Thüringen, Sac = Sachsen, SAn = Sachsen-Anhalt, Ba = Bayern, Ni = Niedersachsen, Be = Berlin, Ha = Hamburg, BW = Baden-Württemberg, RP = Rheinland-Pfalz, Bre = Bremen, Saa = Saarland, NRW = Nordrhein-Westfalen, He = Hessen, SH = Schleswig-Holstein.

⁵⁶ Using the 2007 share of foreign-origin residents with German citizenship as a test of this association rests on the assumption that small numbers of foreign-origin residents move between the German states after having acquired citizenship. The census data suggest this is reasonable; only around two percent of foreign-origin residents say they moved states in the last year.

Figure 4.7 reveals a clear positive association between the relative importance of collective claims and the share holding German citizenship. The grey line is from a linear regression of the percentage holding German citizenship on the percentage of citizens who took the ‘collective’ path.⁵⁷ The figure shows the Eastern states and Bavaria clustered to the bottom left of the plot, with a history of low shares of citizens making a collective claim, and of low overall acquisition rates. Most of the Western states are towards the upper right of the plot, with higher shares having taken the collective path and also a higher share of foreign-origin residents who now hold German citizenship.

The linear regression provides a very good fit to the scatter of data in Figure 4.7. This may be partly because of the high level of aggregation, however. The state-level numbers can be thought of as (weighted) averages across the municipalities within each state. Estimating a correlation based on averages ignores the variation in the distribution underlying each average. We should therefore also examine variation across municipalities. Studying this extra level of variation also provides a further opportunity to test the argument. This municipality-level association is displayed in Figure 4.8. Again, the x-axis shows the percentage of citizens living in each municipality who took the collective path to German citizenship. The y-axis shows the percentage of foreign-origin residents in the corresponding municipality who are now German citizens. The grey line in Figure 4.8 shows the fit of a linear regression model.⁵⁸

Figure 4.8 Citizenship acquisition rates across municipalities by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.




⁵⁷ In this model $N = 16$, adjusted R^2 is 0.61 and the slope estimate is 0.64 (SE = 0.13).

⁵⁸ In this model $N = 116$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.07$, the slope coefficient is 0.14 (SE = 0.05).

As expected, the municipal-level data show more unexplained variation than the corresponding analysis for the states. This reflects in part the fact that the samples from these municipalities are less balanced in terms of the composition of the local foreign-origin population. The municipalities are not all equal in size; some are cities containing hundreds of thousands of foreign-origin residents, and others are rural areas with only a few thousand. Hence some of these districts contain relatively few foreign residents who are eligible for citizenship, and others contain relatively many who, for various reasons, are unlikely to claim citizenship. Nonetheless we again see a statistically significant positive association between the share of new citizens who acquired this status along with others in the household and the overall share of the foreign-origin population that now holds German citizenship. This provides further evidence that foreign residents are more likely to become German citizens if they can do so along with others in the family.

As a final test on the robustness of this relationship, Figure 4.9 shows variation between municipalities within two of the largest states. As before, the x-axis shows the percentage of citizens in each municipality who took the collective path to citizenship, and the y-axis shows the percentage of foreign-origin residents in the corresponding municipality who are now German citizens. The grey lines show the fit of linear regression models.⁵⁹ NRW and Bavaria are the only states with sufficient numbers of municipalities to conduct separate analyses. Together the two states are home to 43% of Germany's foreign-origin population. Narrowing the analysis to this kind of within-state comparison controls for systematic differences between the states. In each case we again see a positive association, suggesting that more foreign residents acquire German citizenship when they are able to do so collectively. This provides further evidence that variation based on the family-level logic of citizenship helps explain differences not just between states but also between municipalities.

Figure 4.9 Citizenship acquisition rates across municipalities in NRW and Bavaria, by the percentage of new citizens taking the ‘collective’ path to citizenship.



⁵⁹ The model for NRW has $N = 33$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.17$, and the slope is 0.33 (SE = 0.11). The model for Bavaria has $N = 22$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.46$, and the slope is 0.29 (SE = 0.07).

4. Bringing together qualitative and quantitative evidence

We can gain further traction on spatial variation in the share of foreign residents taking German citizenship by returning to the interview data. Two sets of interview subjects are especially relevant: foreign-origin residents who face (or faced) the decision over citizenship, and civil servants who work in the offices that administer citizenship law.

Most of the interviews described in Chapter Two were conducted in two German states: NRW and Bavaria. Both states have a large and diverse foreign-origin population. NRW is home to 2.5 million foreign-origin residents and Bavaria is home to a further 1.4 million, accounting for 14% and 11% of the respective populations of the two states. NRW is home to relatively many Turks, making up 31% of the foreign-origin population. People from countries that now belong to the EU make up another 31%, and the third-largest group is people from the former Yugoslavia at 9%. Bavaria has relatively many West Europeans, at 39% of the total, fewer Turks (21%) but more residents from the former Yugoslavia (15%). Although not perfectly balanced, the size and diversity of the pool of foreign residents in each state suggests that compositional differences are unlikely to entirely account for differences in the rate of citizenship acquisition. Multivariate analysis confirms that, holding other factors constant, on average foreign residents are less likely to acquire German citizenship in Bavaria than in NRW.

Within each state, interviews were conducted in towns and cities spanning the range of acquisition rates. In NRW interviews were conducted in six areas: a prosperous university town, two fairly rich cities on the Rhine, a small town in the country near one of these cities, and two poorer cities in the Ruhr valley. The share of foreign-origin residents obtaining German citizenship has recently averaged 3.7% per year in the first of these sites, around 2% in the next four sites, and only 1.5% in the final city. In Bavaria, interviews were conducted in four sites: a town in a rural area with an average annual acquisition rate of 2.5%, two large cities with rates around 2% and 1%, and a town in a rural area with an average citizenship acquisition rate of just 0.5% in recent years.⁶⁰ Additional interviews were conducted with senior officials in the ministries that oversee the implementation of citizenship law in both states, and with three officials in Berlin, which also has a history of relatively high citizenship acquisition rates (averaging around 2% over recent years).

Around one third of the foreign-origin interview subjects brought up the issue of regional discrepancies in the administration of citizenship law. Several interview subjects referred to state-level variation, most often complaining that Bavaria is a difficult place to apply. One in eight of the interview subjects said they had heard it was especially hard to acquire citizenship in their home town, though most of them went on to say that their own experience had been better than the rumors had led them to expect. A few said that if they had known it would be so easy they would have applied sooner. When asked to give details as to *why* the application process was rumored to be difficult, few of the interview subjects were able to elaborate. None reported experience of discrimination in

⁶⁰ In both NRW and Bavaria the relevant data is available from the state statistical agency. The yearly acquisition rates presented here are based on the number of new citizens and the number of foreign residents. The averages are across the years 1998 to 2008.

a citizenship office, though one said she had heard that officials in a neighboring town were disrespectful towards Muslims. One interview subject said friends had moved towns partly in order to improve their chances, and another said he would consider doing the same thing (though he has not yet lived in Germany long enough to be eligible).

As we have seen, the census data corroborate the observation that fewer foreign residents acquire German citizenship in Bavaria, even controlling for relevant individual and household-level variables. But municipal data on the share of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship does not bear any direct relation to the towns that interview subjects identified as having a bad reputation. One town in NRW was named in two separate interviews as an especially difficult place to apply but in fact has a slightly higher than average acquisition rate, at least over recent years. Without a larger sample of interview subjects in more cities, and more detailed data on the numbers eligible in these municipalities, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. But the interview data in this study provide no evidence that outright discrimination accounts for regional differences in the rate at which foreign residents acquire German citizenship.

Interviews with bureaucrats in citizenship offices and in state governments also provide an opportunity to investigate the mechanisms behind the variation in the numbers taking German citizenship. The clearest difference concerned the approach to the integration requirements. As we saw in Chapter One, German citizenship law has long contained requirements that applicants should be integrated. Until the year 2000, these were rather vague. One bureaucrat in NRW said the language requirement was toothless: ‘We granted citizenship to a large number of migrants who barely spoke a word of German.’ She explained that many were the wives (and a few the husbands) of applicants with better language skills. Another bureaucrat in a different city in NRW said that, in the 1990s, some applicants who didn’t understand German had their children serve as interpreters and were able to become citizens. A few of the officials interviewed in NRW and Berlin said they regretted the fact that the new integration requirements allow less scope to use discretion. For instance, one recalled the case of a family where the parents spoke limited German but wanted to apply together so that their children would obtain German citizenship before finishing school. However, a larger number of the civil servants said they were glad to be able to defer to more detailed guidelines rather than bear the responsibility of deciding each case.

Bureaucrats interviewed in Bavaria also said that the new integration criteria are more detailed and demanding than was the case in the 1990s. But they did *not* say that practices in their offices have changed. There were no parallel stories of people becoming German citizens in the 1990s despite having poor language skills. When asked how the work had changed over recent years, a senior official stressed that the Bavarian approach has always been to insist on clear evidence of integration. Whereas he had heard that in the 1990s applicants in other parts of the country were allowed to show language ability in a casual conversation, in Bavaria applicants were asked to read and explain an article from a serious newspaper.

Especially in Bavaria, but also in some of the offices in areas of NRW with lower acquisition rates, officials believe the onus is on each applicant to show that he or she is integrated. This attitude is reminiscent of the view of the long-time premier of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, who referred to integration as a debt that foreigners owe to German society (a *Bringschuld*). In contrast, officials in areas where a higher share of foreign-origin residents now hold German citizenship were more likely to discuss the social context of the decision over citizenship. More of them explained the need for discretion to avoid imposing hardship, or described their efforts to accommodate the motives of the people applying for citizenship. Crucially, it appears that this kind of accommodation is typically made for *families* rather than individuals. The examples that these officials gave of discretion or hardship involved at least one person in the family who was able to meet the integration criteria, as well as one or more others—the spouse, a sibling or grandparents—who could not.

The interview data thus suggest that the effects of recent reforms of German citizenship law differed across the country. In areas with especially low acquisition rates it was already standard practice to insist that every applicant provide evidence of successful integration. In areas where relatively many foreign residents acquired German citizenship during the 1990s, it was more common to waive the requirements, if at least one person in the family was able to meet the standards. The reform of 2000 introduced a blanket requirement to test for individual integration, and the standards have been stiffened in subsequent reforms.

The sample from the census data is too small to present reliable measures of the contribution of each path to citizenship, by year, for each of the German states. But the census data do confirm that the inter-state differences in the numbers acquiring citizenship have shrunk. Whereas in the 1990s the citizenship acquisition rate in NRW was more than twice as high as in Bavaria (1.5% vs. 0.6%), by 2005 the difference was smaller (1.6% vs. 1.3%). Although the states have converged to a higher average than in the 1990s, this is partly due to the provision on birthright citizenship. Without these people, the acquisition rate is now around 1.3% in NRW and 0.9% in Bavaria.

The census data allow one further test of the idea that a more family-friendly approach explains regional variation in the numbers acquiring citizenship. If the mechanism of accommodation involves the family, we would expect the difference between NRW and Bavaria to be reflected in the importance of the ‘other citizens’ variable in the two states. In particular, we would expect the association to be weaker in Bavaria: just because the state granted citizenship to one person in the household, this need not imply it also granted citizenship to others. The difference can be estimated using an interaction term that allows the coefficient on ‘other citizens’ to vary across states. Keeping other variables at representative levels, we can test whether the ‘other citizens’ variable is more strongly associated with citizenship status in NRW than in Bavaria.

In fact we see that the number of other citizens is strongly associated with the likelihood of holding German citizenship, in both states. But the association is weaker in Bavaria. The predicted likelihood of holding German citizenship for a person in a household with

no other citizens is 0.1 in NRW and 0.12 in Bavaria; the difference is not statistically significant. For someone in a household with one other citizen, the likelihood rises to 0.28 in Bavaria and 0.38 in NRW; for someone in a household with two other citizens it rises to 0.6 in Bavaria and 0.74 in NRW. These differences are statistically significant, and are consistent with the proposed mechanism.

5. Conclusion

The argument advanced in this dissertation is that family members typically reach a collective decision on the question of whether or not to apply for German citizenship. In many cases, they value the benefits of citizenship more highly, if they can be shared with other family members. We might therefore expect that foreign-origin residents are more likely to become citizens of the country of residence *when* and *where* they are able to do so ‘collectively,’ with others in the family.

In this chapter we have seen this expectation confirmed in comparisons both over time and across German states and municipalities. We have also proposed an answer to the question that motivated the dissertation: why did the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship rise through the 1990s, only to fall after the year 2000? We have shown that both the growth in the 1990s and the subsequent decline were largely due to the numbers acquiring citizenship along with others in their families. Reforms in the early 1990s increased the scope for this kind of behavior, but further changes to citizenship law in the year 2000 and thereafter have made collective claims less attractive and more difficult. Although the numbers acquiring citizenship ‘without’ family members rose in the wake of the reform of 2000, because of the new provision on birthright citizenship, this increase was more than offset by the lower numbers taking the collective path to citizenship. Much attention was paid to the shift from a model of citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinis*) to citizenship by place of birth (*jus soli*). The analysis in this chapter suggests that less-noticed effects of the reform on the family-level logic of citizenship were in fact more important.

It is important to note that estimating the numbers taking each path to citizenship provides us with only one point of insight into the family’s involvement in the protracted processes of integration. The composition of the households in which foreign-origin residents live determines the scope for making a collective claim on citizenship. But household composition is itself the result of prior processes of selection and adaptation. Some foreign-origin residents are more likely to marry and/or live with native Germans, whereas others are more likely to live with foreign-origin residents. Such differences are likely to be related to the propensity to acquire German citizenship. This implies that there is still more to be learned about the political implications of the role of the family in integration. This does not invalidate the measure of the numbers taking each path to citizenship. But it does imply a need for further research. Political scientists may be able to learn from scholars in a number of disciplines who are working in this area (e.g. Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Fuhrer and Uslucan 2005; Nauck 2007; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Wong and Tseng 2008).

Conclusion

This dissertation sought to explain the puzzling fall in the numbers of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship since the year 2000. Despite a major reform of citizenship law that was intended to incorporate millions of foreign residents, the acquisition rate has been falling or stagnant. The macro-level puzzle provided the motivation for an intriguing micro-level question: why do some foreign residents claim the citizenship of the country where they now live, whereas others do not? The argument advanced here is that the decision whether or not to apply for citizenship is often reached collectively, along with other family members. For many people, the benefits of changing citizenship are greater, and the costs easier to bear, if multiple family members can take this step at the same time. Consistent with the argument that citizenship is more valuable as a collective good, we see higher numbers applying when and where it is easier to take citizenship along with others in the family. Recent reforms ensure that fewer people apply for citizenship together with their family members, and this fall largely explains the decline in the overall acquisition rate.

This concluding chapter begins with an overview of the preceding chapters. I then discuss extensions of the argument. The chapter presents evidence from Austria on the importance of the family-level logic of citizenship, and assesses the scope for extending the analysis to other countries. I also suggest that future research might search for other kinds of evidence on the collective benefits of citizenship. The third section of the chapter discusses the implications of the research for integration and citizenship policies and for theories on the decision to become a member of a political community.

1. Review of the dissertation

German citizenship law was reformed in the year 2000. The reform was widely expected to lead to far greater numbers of people applying to become German citizens. In fact, however, the numbers have been falling or stagnant, and the acquisition rate is too low to reduce the size of the long-settled population of foreign residents. A review of the literature on citizenship showed that most scholars take either a top-down approach, focusing on citizenship law, or a bottom-up approach focusing on individual incentives. But there is good reason to expect the family to play a key role in the decision-making process. Many of the benefits of citizenship are worth more, if shared with other family members. And the costs of applying for citizenship can be reduced if they can be shared among family members. Even if family members do not take an all-or-nothing approach to changing citizenship, there is good reason to expect that the decision will be taken collectively and will reflect the concern of family members for collective interests.

Chapter One provided contextual information to explain what is at stake in the decision over citizenship. Although foreign residents have many rights in Germany, they lack the full security that comes with an unconditional right to live in the country. Many foreign residents face difficulties traveling within Europe and are excluded from important sectors of the labor market. Foreigners also lack full political rights. The chapter described the requirements that foreign residents must meet in order to make a successful application for German citizenship, and how these have changed over time. Particular

attention was paid to the shift from the long-standing principle of trying to ensure that family members hold the same citizenship, to an insistence that every single applicant provide detailed evidence of successful integration. This shift occurred in the year 2000 and the emphasis on individual integration has been strengthened by subsequent reforms.

The contextual information in Chapter One was used to spell out in detail the observable implications of the argument for the family-level logic of citizenship. The chapter explained which of the benefits of citizenship are worth more if shared with others in the family. The value of secure residence was predicted to be valued more highly if and when it is possible to achieve the same level of security for others in the family. Parents were predicted to place particular importance on securing citizenship for their children growing up in Germany. The chapter argued that submitting a collective application could also reduce the financial, cognitive and social costs of changing citizenship.

The second substantive chapter used evidence from interviews to investigate the motives and thoughts processes behind the decision to apply for citizenship. *All* of the foreign-origin interview subjects discussed the implications of the decision for others in their families, and many appeared to take it for granted that the decision would be reached collectively. They spoke of ‘our’ decision, or described the factors putting ‘us’ off, or explained why ‘we’ were motivated one way or the other. The interviews also revealed asymmetries in the patterns of mutual concern. Many parents said that obtaining citizenship for children born or growing up in Germany was their first priority. With this goal already met, the parents of children with an automatic right to German citizenship (as a result of the reform of 2000) feel much less inclined to take on the difficult and costly task of applying themselves. Although they might prefer to hold the same citizenship as their children, it appears that few of the parents of the new class of birthright citizens are sufficiently motivated to apply for German citizenship.

The interviews in Chapter Two also showed that the reform of 2000 (and further changes following a similar logic in 2007 and 2008) made it harder for family members to make a collective claim on citizenship. Detailed provisions on integration, especially the requirement that every applicant speak good German, often ensure that at least one family member is not eligible. This can deter the rest of the family as well. The interviews also cast doubt on an alternative explanation for the low acquisition rate, namely that foreign-origin residents simply place little value on acquiring German citizenship.

The aim of Chapter Three was to test for evidence of family-level decisions over citizenship in a large and representative sample of foreign-origin residents. The chapter introduced new methods to get extra leverage from census data by using information on the behavior of other household members. In fact, the number of others in the household who have claimed German citizenship is by far the strongest predictor of the likelihood that a given person is now a German citizen herself. Including this variable in multivariate statistical models allows for a substantial increase in predictive power, compared to alternative models with many of the variables identified in existing research.

Chapter Three also introduced a new measure of the ‘paths’ taken to citizenship, using information on the number of household members acquiring German citizenship in the same year. The measure revealed that ‘collective’ claims on citizenship—involving multiple family members applying at the same time—are common, and especially so in households with higher numbers of foreign-origin residents. This is consistent with the argument that the terms of acquiring citizenship are more favorable for people who can take this step along with a larger number of other family members.

The fourth chapter of the dissertation made further use of the information on patterns of behavior within the household. The numbers taking each path to citizenship were disaggregated by year, revealing that the growth in the numbers of new citizens through the 1990s was largely due to the growing numbers of ‘collective’ claims along with other family members. The decline since the year 2000 is also largely due to the falling numbers taking the collective path to German citizenship. The new provision on birthright citizenship has resulted in more people becoming citizens ‘without’ other family members (in a different year, or as the only foreign-origin person in the household to acquire citizenship). But this increase has been more than offset by the lower numbers taking the collective path to citizenship.

Chapter Four also used within-case variation in the rate of citizenship acquisition across German states and municipalities to subject the argument on the family-level logic of citizenship to further tests. Evidence from interviews and the census suggested that acquisition rates are lower in areas where politicians and civil servants focus on the individual responsibility to integrate, and ignore the implications for other family members. Again, this is the kind of variation that we would expect to observe if citizenship is valued more highly when shared.

2. Possible extensions of the argument

There are two ways in which further research might extend the argument on the family-level logic of citizenship. The first is to apply the theory to other relevantly similar cases. The second way to extend the argument is by drawing on other kinds of evidence to study how the benefits of citizenship spread to other family members. I begin with the analysis of one relevant comparison case, Austria. I then show how the mechanisms identified in Germany and Austria can help to select other relevant cases for future research. Finally, I describe the possibility of using panel data to study the political benefits of citizenship and the spillover of these benefits to other family members.

2.1 The Austrian case

Austria has a similar foreign-origin population to Germany, a similar federal structure and a similar history of citizenship law. Whereas German politicians reformed citizenship law in the late 1990s with the aim of making it easier for long-term foreign residents to join the polity, an Austrian reform around the same time had the opposite goal. As in Germany, the effects were the reverse of those intended. Rather than falling, the share of foreign residents taking Austrian citizenship rose sharply, from around two percent per year in the early 1990s to over five percent in 2003. Most of the people acquiring Austrian citizenship in the peak years did so along with others in the family.

The history of immigration to Austria is similar to that of Germany. Rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s was thanks in part to immigrant labor from Eastern Europe. But the flow slowed in the early 1960s and the country began recruiting ‘guest workers’ from South-Eastern Europe (Bauböck 1996; Gürses et al 2004). Compared to Germany, Austria recruited fewer immigrants from Italy, Spain or Greece, and focused more heavily on the former Yugoslavia as well as Turkey (Fassmann and Münz 1995). Geographic proximity and the fact that the country already had a large population with roots in the former Yugoslavia also meant that Austria was the first point of refuge for many fleeing the wars in that region in the 1990s.

The foreign-origin population of Austria is now around 1.4 million, or 16% of the country’s total population (recall that the foreign-origin population includes foreign residents and those who once held a another citizenship but are now Austrians). One third have roots in the former Yugoslavia, 18% were once citizens of a West European country, 17% have origins in Eastern Europe and 16% in Turkey. The mean length of residence of the foreign-origin population is 19 years, and 260,000 (19%) were born in Austria. Thirty-eight percent of foreign-origin residents now hold Austrian citizenship.

Mussger et al (2001) identify five key principles in Austrian citizenship law. The authors also note that the relative importance of these principles has changed depending on the priorities of the government at any given time. The first principle is that citizenship is attributed by descent from an Austrian citizen, rather than by place of birth. Second, the country is officially opposed to dual citizenship. The third principle is that family members should all hold the same citizenship. The fourth and fifth principles are that statelessness should be avoided, and that parents of both genders should be able to pass on citizenship to their children (this helps explain the major exception to the principled opposition to dual citizenship, namely that the children of one Austrian and one foreign citizen are allowed dual citizenship).

Until the 1990s relatively few foreign residents acquired Austrian citizenship each year. Most of those who did qualified by marriage to an Austrian citizen after five years of residence. The standard period of residence to become eligible for Austrian citizenship for those not married to a citizen was ten years. However, in the early 1990s the city-state of Vienna, which is home to two-fifths of the country’s foreign residents, began using a clause on ‘discretionary’ citizenship to allow foreign residents and their family members to apply after less than ten years in the country. Largely because of this Viennese exceptionalism the numbers of new citizens rose from around 8,000 per year in the early 1990s to 18,000 by 1998 (from 1.5% to 3% of the foreign population per year).

The remaining state governments, led by Carinthia—ruled at the time by the leader of the right wing Freedom Party, Jörg Haider—objected to the approach of the Viennese government. They claimed the Social Democratic mayor of Vienna was giving away citizenship to win votes. In response to pressure from the right the federal government passed a reform in 1998 to ‘harmonize’ procedures across the country, with the goal of curbing the numbers of new citizens in Vienna (Çinar 2010; Perchinig 2006). The discretionary clause was amended to require six years of residence and ‘evidence of

sustainable integration.’ Instead of reducing the acquisition rate, the reform was followed by a rapid increase in the numbers of new citizens, not just in Vienna but across Austria.

Now that foreign residents were able to aim at clear criteria, rather than hoping that discretion would work in their favor, they applied in greater numbers. The acquisition rate rose to 5.5% of the foreign population per year by 2003. Crucially, in this period large numbers of foreign residents were granted Austrian citizenship along with other family members. Official records suggest that around 70% of new citizens applied along with family members, and that over 50% were eligible after a shorter period of residence as the spouses or children of the main applicant. The courts ruled that these other family members did *not* have to meet the language requirement (Cinar 2010: 8).

After unprecedented success in the 1999 federal elections, the far-right Freedom Party joined a governing coalition with the conservative People’s Party in the year 2000. The two parties moved to curb new migration by restricting the right to family unification (Perchinig 2010). The parties also proposed reforms to citizenship law: language and civics tests, higher costs and longer required periods of residence. The new law was held up by the opposition parties in the upper house of parliament but eventually came into force in 2006. Since that time the numbers of new Austrian citizens have plummeted, from 35,000 in 2005 to just 6,000 in 2010 (from 4.5% to 0.8% of the foreign population).

In order to test the generality of the argument developed in the German case I used a similar research strategy in Austria. I conducted a total of 36 interviews in the country. Twenty-one of the interview subjects are foreign-origin residents, three are elected politicians, six are civil servants and seven are representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁶¹ As in the German case, the interviews were conducted in parts of Austria with different political contexts and a range of citizenship acquisition rates. The first site was Vienna, a city-state that has long been ruled by the Social Democrats and which is home to 39% of the country’s foreign residents and 41% of new citizens. The second site was Styria, which is a conservative and largely rural state that is home to 9% of Austria’s foreigners and 8% of the new citizens. The third site was Carinthia, another rural state that has been ruled by far-right parties since the 1980s, and is home to 4% of the country’s foreign residents and 3% of new citizens.

Twelve of the foreign-origin interview subjects (57%) now hold Austrian citizenship. As in Germany, it appears that the most important motivation for the people who have acquired citizenship is the greater sense of security that citizenship confers. Other benefits named by several interview subjects included easier travel, access to certain jobs and the right to participate in politics. For example, one Turkish-origin woman who works in public relations said that she became a citizen along with her mother and siblings, but that their father had retained his Turkish citizenship in part because of a concern that he would not otherwise be eligible for an Islamic burial in Turkey. She said that she, her mother and siblings are very glad to be able to make their voices heard, and

⁶¹ One interview subject was both a civil servant and an elected politician. This is fairly common under the country’s system of political patronage (Müller 2006).

that her father sometimes regrets the decision. As she put it: ‘Without a vote... somehow you don’t truly exist.’

Seven of the twelve foreign-origin residents who now hold Austrian citizenship took this step together with other family members (58%). Many assumed this was the natural state of affairs, and talked of ‘our’ decision to apply for Austrian citizenship or explained how ‘we’ reached a decision. Several parents said that their first priority was to acquire citizenship for their children. One interviewee said she felt lucky that a friendly bureaucrat had suggested that it would be easier to apply along with her husband. She was expecting a child at the time and wanted it to inherit Austrian citizenship. She said: ‘It was just an enormous relief to have the security before I had a child in this country.’ An official in a state capital explained why his office generally tried to make it easier for entire families to change citizenship together. ‘In Austria we make citizenship easier for family members because we have a traditional view. We see the family, not the individual, as the basic unit of society.’ He said that this principle has become less important since the reform of 2006, however, which explicitly requires that each individual applicant meet the integration requirements.

The topic of the 2006 reform of Austrian citizenship law arose in many of the interviews. Several people who now hold Austrian citizenship said they were glad they applied before the new requirements came into force. Two people said they had only been eligible as a family member of the main applicant, and they thought they would not have been able to take citizenship after the reform. Two interview subjects who work for a civil society organization in Vienna spent nearly two hours explaining the current requirements in painstaking detail. Their apparent aim was to show that it is impractical for all but the most privileged of foreign residents to acquire Austrian citizenship.

The reform of 2006 narrowed the pool of potential applicants by requiring that they previously held permanent resident status and had spent only short periods of time abroad in the preceding five years. Foreign residents who apply as the spouse of a citizen or along with a family member who meets the requirements for citizenship still have somewhat easier access to citizenship. But eligibility on this basis was restricted by requiring a longer period of residence and a longer marital history. The reform also brought new language and civics tests. The civics test includes obscure historical references and adopts a backwards-looking idea of what it means to be Austrian (Perchinig 2010). But interviews with foreign-origin residents and NGOs suggest the test is not a major barrier. The reform also brought onerous requirements to prove financial self-sufficiency. Applicants must have several hundred Euros per month in disposable income, and must provide exhaustive evidence of incomes and expenditures to show that this has also been the case for the preceding two years. The application fee was increased. The federal government previously charged around €500 per person for those entitled to citizenship, and €200 for each minor child. Now the federal fee for adults has increased to €700 and the states also charge their own fees, ranging from €217 to €760 per person. For a family of four the application fee ranges from around €2000 to €3000.

Several foreign-origin interview subjects said the high costs have put them off applying. One pointed out that it is very difficult for an immigrant family to come up with such a large sum of money, even though in the long term the cost of living in the country as a foreign resident may be even greater (due to the cost of visa and document renewals). She said this was the main factor preventing her family from applying. Another interview subject who works for Caritas said that some families now concentrate their efforts on acquiring citizenship for just one person, since it is too expensive for all to apply. This kind of response to the reform has the potential to sharply reduce the numbers applying. Another interview subject described how she had spent nearly two years trying to satisfy the requirements before finally being rejected. She is a student and struggled to meet the financial requirements. Her parents tried to help by setting up regular transfers of money into her bank account, but the civil servants in the citizenship office were not convinced. Another interview subject said that she is unlikely to apply since her mother, who had raised her as a single parent, doubts that she could pass the language test. She said applying on her own isn't worth the time and expense.

In addition to gathering qualitative evidence from interviews, I also conducted statistical analysis of Austrian census data. The federal statistics agency conducts an annual micro-census, and in one quarter in 2008 the questionnaire contained items for people with a 'migration background' (Stadler and Wiedenhofer-Galik 2009). I replicated the statistical analysis described in Chapter Three for the Austrian case, with very similar results. The number of others in the household who have claimed Austrian citizenship is by far the strongest predictor in a model estimating the likelihood that a given person is now an Austrian citizen herself (see Appendix for a table with the results of the models).

The Austrian micro-census has a sample of only around 2,500 foreign-origin residents.⁶² This means it is not possible to produce reliable estimates of the number taking each path to citizenship by the year in which citizenship was acquired. We can have greater confidence in the accuracy of the figures when aggregated over several years. This analysis confirms that, as in Germany, the periods in which a higher share of new citizens took the collective path to citizenship were also the periods with the highest rates of acquisition. Before 1990, 79% of the people who acquired Austrian citizenship did so 'alone,' i.e. as the only person in the household facing the decision over citizenship. Many were the spouses of native Austrians, and most came from nearby countries such as Germany and Hungary. Between the reform of 1998 and the reform of 2006, 56% took the collective path to citizenship, at the same time as at least one other person in the household. In this period 29% became citizens 'without' other foreign-origin family members (i.e. they lived with other foreign residents but did not acquire citizenship at the same time). In these peak years just 15% of new Austrian citizenship took this step 'alone.' The years with the highest rates of citizenship acquisition in Austria saw even greater shares of collective claims than the (lower) peaks in Germany. Only two years passed between the reform of 2006 and the collection of the census data, so it is not possible to use these data to investigate the effects of the most recent Austrian reform.

⁶² The raw sample contains around 4,000 foreign-origin people, but in many cases the Austrian micro-census doesn't have data on *every* person in the household. The number of other citizens and the number taking each path to citizenship can only be estimated with complete households.

Overall the evidence from the Austrian case is consistent with the argument developed in Germany. The interview data revealed that foreign residents value citizenship more highly if shared with others, especially children. After the government formalized the requirements for citizenship in the late 1990s, more foreign residents applied, and the effect of this increase was multiplied because so many did so along with their spouses and children. The authors of the 1998 reform appear not to have appreciated how many people would be eligible for citizenship under easier conditions, as the relatives of a single main applicant in each family. In other words, the effects of the reform of 1998 were mediated by their implications for the family-level logic of citizenship. The reform of 2006 introduced broad restrictions in almost every area of citizenship law. Some of these changes had greater effects on families, in particular the considerable cost of applying together and the new integration requirements. But since it became harder to acquire citizenship in so many ways at once it is hard to isolate the mediating role of the family-level logic of citizenship.

2.2 Further extensions of the argument

The Austrian case provides some evidence that the argument developed in Germany has broader relevance. In future research, the mechanisms identified in the two cases could be subjected to further testing by focusing on other countries where changes in citizenship law impinge on the family-level logic of the decision. Existing research suggests that the introduction of integration tests for *every* applicant in 2003 may have had a similar restrictive effect in the Netherlands. Van Oers et al (2010: 9) note that, prior to this reform, ‘The integration requirement was leniently applied to women who were married and whose integration lagged behind that of their husbands [...] Naturalization was granted because of the interest in retaining the unity of the family.’ The numbers acquiring citizenship of the Netherlands fell from six percent of the foreign population per year in 2002, before the introduction of the new tests, to around three percent per year since the reform.

Another intriguing case for further research is Ireland. The country introduced a strong version of birthright citizenship in the year 2000. In the wake of the Good Friday peace settlement between political groups in Northern Ireland (some with links to terrorist organizations) and the British and Irish governments, the aim was to allow people born in Northern Ireland to claim Irish citizenship if they so wished (Handoll 2010). But in subsequent years the booming economy attracted increasing numbers of immigrants to the country, and their children were among the main beneficiaries of the policy. In 2004 the government proposed to restrict birthright citizenship to people of Irish descent.

This means that, over the space of just a few years, Irish citizenship law shifted in ways that can be expected to have had major implications for the family-level logic of citizenship. Foreign residents living in the country before the year 2000 had incentives to apply partly in order to secure citizenship for children born in the country. From 2000 until 2004, this incentive was removed, only to be re-introduced from 2005 onwards. It would be instructive to study how these changes affected the behavior of immigrant families living in Ireland over this period. The analysis of the German and Austrian cases suggests that a relatively high share of foreign residents may have applied for Irish

citizenship together with family members before 2000 and after 2005. By contrast the numbers applying in the interim period would be expected to have been relatively low.

Another way to extend the analysis would be to search for further evidence on the collective costs and benefits of citizenship. Using panel data that re-surveys the same people, year after year, one could establish whether acquiring citizenship had any significant impact on the trajectory of integration. Existing research in a number of European countries suggests that the labor market returns to citizenship are modest. This is not because the foreign-origin residents who acquire the citizenship of their country of residence are no better off. Instead, the key point is that, even before they acquired citizenship, they were already among the more upwardly mobile of foreign residents (Bevelander and DeVoretz 2008).

This does not necessarily imply that the political implications of acquiring citizenship are also modest, however. Interviews conducted for this dissertation revealed that many new citizens now feel much more confident in expressing their political opinions than they did as foreign residents. Future research could use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to measure whether acquiring citizenship caused foreign-origin residents to feel a stronger sense of political efficacy, whether they became more likely to feel represented in German politics or to identify with a political party or ideological position. One could also search for evidence of spillover effects within families. For example, one could assess whether the political returns to citizenship are greater in households where everyone acquired German citizenship together, or whether such benefits spill over from people who changed citizenship to family members who did not take this step.

3. Implications of the research

The findings of this dissertation have implications for our understanding of citizenship and integration. Some scholars have argued that in a globalizing world citizenship is less important, especially in the supra-national European Union. Others insist that citizenship still matters. Instead of posing this question in the abstract, this dissertation suggests that citizenship matters to certain foreign residents under certain circumstances. In particular, it is more valuable when foreign residents are able to acquire citizenship of the country of residence along with other family members, and that obtaining citizenship for children growing up in the country is seen to be especially important. The dissertation also has implications for our understanding of integration. Given the importance of the family as a source of motives and resources, focusing on the individual responsibility to integrate may be unrealistic. We might even expect policies with an unrealistic focus on individual integration to encourage a politics of blame. Finally, the research has implications for the behavior that underpins political membership. Foreign residents are in a unique position to provide insight, because unlike most people in contemporary democracies they actually face the decision whether or not to claim citizenship.

3.1 Implications for the study of citizenship

Some scholars have argued that in an era of globalization, with so many social, economic and political forces transcending national borders, the status of citizenship is of diminishing relevance (e.g. Sassen 1996). The argument has special relevance in the

European Union, where the citizens of one member state have many rights in others (Jacobson 1997). Soysal (1994) argues that since foreign residents in much of Western Europe enjoy civil rights and are covered by generous welfare states, acquiring citizenship is a minor concern. According to Joppke (2010), foreign residents in Western Europe place a low 'subjective value' on citizenship.

Other scholars insist that citizenship *does* matter. Even for foreigners with residence rights, citizenship still brings important advantages, including full political rights and access to all sectors of the labor market (many countries bar non-citizens from public sector jobs, e.g. as senior teachers or in the police force). Without this kind of equality, these authors argue, we cannot expect true integration (Hansen 2009; Howard 2009).

This abstract debate over whether citizenship matters is unlikely to be resolved in its current form. Citizenship does not matter in the abstract; it matters to particular people in particular contexts. Hence the question should be: to whom does citizenship matter, and under what circumstances? One contribution of this dissertation has been to show that citizenship is valued as a collective good to be shared with other family members.

3.2 Implications for the study of integration

Recognizing that integration involves changes not only on the part of immigrants but also on the part of the host society, many politicians and scholars argue that integration should be conceived of as a 'two-way street.'⁶³ In practice, however, more attention is paid to 'their' side of the street, to the adaptations that immigrants are making or are failing to make, or to the question of which changes immigrants can legitimately be asked to make (Etzioni 2007; Habermas 1996; Miller 2008). One way of thinking about the implications of this dissertation is that it provides an example of the kind of accommodation that host societies could make in order to facilitate integration. In the German case, re-instating the provision that other family members can be granted citizenship when one applicant meets the criteria could be expected to increase the numbers of long-settled foreign residents taking citizenship. One can disagree over the meaning of the concept of integration, but few contest that acquiring citizenship is a step in this direction.

More generally, policies that aim to promote integration will be more likely to succeed if they take account of the family context. This dissertation has shown that families are the source of some of the most important motivations to integrate. People who face choices over whether and how to participate in the political system of their new homeland tend to reach a decision along with other family members. The family can also serve as a source of resources that foreign-origin residents can draw upon to meet the costs of adaptation. In short, families matter for the *why* and the *how* of integration.

In practice, the importance of the family is often recognized, albeit in a piecemeal fashion. For example, both Austria and Germany recently introduced integration programs for new immigrants, but found that relatively few women were participating.

⁶³ For example, Chancellor Merkel used this phrase in a press statement on 11.3.2007.

Incrementally, at least in some parts of the two countries, these programs have been adapted to provide childcare or to fit the integration classes around the timetable of school or work hours.

In recent years the governments of West European countries have introduced a plethora of new integration policies. In order to understand the likely impacts of the new integration policies we need a more systematic understanding of the role of the family in integration. The rules on the inheritance of citizenship are a case in point. The distinction between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* citizenship laws has attracted much scholarly attention, but as we have seen in the German case, the introduction of *jus soli* citizenship is not always sufficient to increase the numbers of new citizens. The effect of this kind of change depends on the implications for the family. In the short term, one effect of the German reform was to remove a key incentive for parents who would otherwise have been likely to apply for citizenship. But in the longer term, the fact that many members of the 'next generation' now have a more secure status in Germany may mean that their parents will form stronger ties to the country. In the U.S.A., which has a long history of birthright citizenship but a generally laissez-faire approach to integration, this inter-generational dynamic has arguably been the key to successful integration (Bloemraad 2006; Motomura 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

It is not yet clear whether Germany will follow a similar course. As I explained in Chapter Three, the fact that the German birthright provision only applies to half the children born to foreign parents, and those who miss out on this right tend to live in poorer households, suggests that one effect will be to increase inequality. Disparities in legal status will now be layered upon socio-economic inequality.

It will be revealing to study the choices of the birthright citizens, who will have to decide before the age of 24 whether to retain German citizenship or to keep the citizenship of their parents. One would expect the great majority to opt for German citizenship, having built their lives in the country. But there may also be an opportunity to study whether variation in their decisions reflects contextual factors in the household and the neighborhood, or political conditions that vary over time or by municipality or state.

Finally, it is worth noting another possible implication of policies that focus on the individual responsibility to integrate. An extensive literature in social psychology demonstrates that people are harsh judges of those they hold responsible for their own problems, whereas those who are thought to be struggling due to circumstances beyond their direct control are judged more favorably (Iyengar 1989; Gilens 1999). Public debates in many European countries now focus on the need for immigrants to do more to integrate. Policies that stress the need to match rights with responsibilities risk evoking a politics of blame. For example, a book by the German politician Thilo Sarrazin provoked an intense debate over the ways in which (especially Turkish) immigrants are 'undermining' German society; it became the biggest selling non-fiction work of 2010.

3.3 Implications for the future of political membership

We have seen in this dissertation that theories developed in other contexts, such as the study of electoral participation or the economics of the family, can help us understand the behavior of foreign residents facing the decision whether or not to apply for citizenship. We may reasonably expect that the learning process could also run in the other direction. The situation of foreign residents can help us get analytic leverage on the decision to become a member of the most important political community, the state. Influential theories of justice hold that the legitimacy of state authority rests on the choice to sign the social contract (e.g. Rawls 1970; Rousseau 2008 [1762]). Yet most residents of contemporary democracies never actually face this choice. Foreign residents are in a unique position in this regard.

The finding that foreign residents typically make this decision as a family unit is thus of relevance to normative research on membership. Although normative theories aim to show why people *should* feel obliged to submit to political authority, their claims are often founded on empirical observations. For example, Miller's (1995) influential argument on nationalism rests on the empirical claim that people are more likely to feel motivated by a shared national identity than by abstract liberal norms of justice. My dissertation suggests that national identity plays a marginal role in the decision over citizenship. By contrast, communitarian critiques of liberalism are based on the empirical claim that people arrive at their normative goals by adopting the priorities of actual communities, especially the family, rather than by abstract reasoning over issues such as legitimacy (Sandel 1982; Taylor 1989). This claim finds support in my research.

It remains to be seen how immigrants and their descendents will shape ideas over the appropriate forms of political community in Germany and other rich democracies. The promise of democracy is that it is an open-ended project. New citizens may legitimately expect that their voices will be heard in debates over the values that tie together the members of the political community. There are now around two million German citizens who have chosen this status over the citizenship of another country. Increasing numbers of these new citizens are getting involved in politics, and in the years to come we may expect this trend to continue (Bird et al 2011). The interviews conducted for this research provided evidence of growing confidence among new German citizens. At a meeting for candidates with a migration background who were running in municipal elections in the state of NRW in 2009, one young candidate suggested that candidates like her should aim to go beyond representing the needs of immigrants. As she said:

‘When we campaign, we should remember that we have something to offer to German society as well. We can help take German society forwards by explaining what *we* think it means to be German.’

References

- Adler, P. and P. Adler. 2003. 'The Reluctant Respondent,' in James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium (eds.) *Inside Interviewing*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Alba, Richard, Peter Schmidt and Martina Wasmer. 2003. *Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Alvarez, Robert R. 1987. 'A Profile of the Citizenship Process among Hispanics in the United States,' *International Migration Review* (21): 327-351.
- Anil, Merih. 2007. 'Explaining the Naturalisation Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999,' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (8): 1363-1376.
- Aronson, Elliot. 2008. *The Social Animal (10th Edition)*. New York: Worth Freeman.
- Bade, Klaus J. and Jochen Oltmer. 2004. *Normalfall Migration: Deutschland im 20. und frühen 21. Jahrhundert*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Bauböck, Rainer. 1992. *Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship*. Coventry: University of Warwick.
- Bauböck, Rainer, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk and Harald Waldrauch (eds.). 2006. *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Bauböck, Rainer, Bernhard Perchinig and Wiebke Sievers (eds.). 2009. *Citizenship Policies in the New Europe*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen. 2002. *Bericht der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Berlin and Bonn.
- Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen. 2005. 'Einbürgerung,' in *Daten, Fakten, Trends*. Berlin: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen together with the Europäisches Forum für Migrationsstudien (Bamberg).
- Becker, G. 1991. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The Claims of Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bevelander, Pieter and Don J. DeVoretz. 2008. 'The Economics of Citizenship: A Synthesis,' in Pieter Bevelander and Don J. DeVoretz (eds.) *The Economics of Citizenship*. Malmö: Malmö University Press.

BILD Zeitung. 2009. 'Hurra, wir sind jetzt Deutsche!' May 12, 2009.

Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld and Andreas M. Wüst (eds.), *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies*. New York: Routledge.

Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bloemraad, Irene and Christine Trost. 2008. 'It's a Family Affair: Inter-Generational Mobilization in the Spring 2006 Protests,' *American Behavioral Scientist* 52(4): 507-532.

Bosniak, L. 2006. *The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. London: Routledge.

Bowen, John. 2007. 'A View from France on the Internal Complexity of National Models,' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (6): 1003-1016.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Harvard, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers, 2001. 'The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4): 531-548.

Bultmann, Peter F. 1999. *Lokale Gerechtigkeit im Einbürgerungsrecht*. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt.

Bundesinnenministerium. 2009. *Migrationsbericht*. Berlin.

Caldwell, Christopher. 2009. *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West*. London: Allen Lane.

Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller. 2003. *The Age of Migration, Third Edition: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press.

Çinar, Dilek. 2010. 'Country Report: Austria,' published by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>

Cohen, Elizabeth. 2009. *Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright. 2004. 'Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology,' in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Curtis, J. & A. Portes. 1987. 'Changing Flags: Naturalization and its Determinants Among Mexican Immigrants,' *International Migration Review*, 20 (2): 352-371.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dancygier, Rafaela. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dancygier, Rafaela and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2006. 'A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives,' *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 962-981.

Deutscher Bundesrat. 2007. *Drucksache 224/07*. Berlin.

Deutscher Bundestag. 1984. *Drucksache 10/863*. Bonn.

Deutscher Bundestag. 1999. *Plenarprotokoll 14/40. Stenographischer Bericht, 40. Sitzung, Bonn, Freitag den 7. Mai 1999*. Bonn.

Deutscher Bundestag. 2007. *Drucksache 16/5904*. Berlin.

DeVoretz, Don J. 2008. 'The Economics of Citizenship: A Common Intellectual Ground for Social Scientists?' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34(4): 679-693.

DeVoretz, Don J. and Sergiy Pivnenko. 2008. 'The Economic Determinants and Consequences of Canadian Citizenship Acquisition,' in Pieter Bevelander and Don J. DeVoretz (eds.) *The Economics of Citizenship*. Malmö: Malmö University Press.

Diehl, Claudia and Michael Blohm. 2001. 'Apathy, Adaptation or Ethnic Mobilisation? On the Attitudes of a Politically Excluded Group.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (3): 401-420.

Diehl, C. and M. Blohm. 2008. 'Die Entscheidung zur Einbürgerung. Optionen, Anreize und identifikative Aspekte,' in F. Kalter (ed.) *Migration und Integration*. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 48.

- Duyvendak, Jan Willem and Peter Scholten. 2010. 'The Invention of the Dutch Multicultural Model and its Effects on Integration Discourses in the Netherlands,' *Perspectives on Europe* 40 (2): 39-45.
- Erie, Stephen. 1988. *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the dilemmas of urban machine politics, 1840-1984*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 2007. 'Citizenship Tests: A Comparative, Communitarian Perspective,' *The Political Quarterly* 78 (3): 353-363.
- Fuhrer, Urs and Haci H. Uslucan. 2005. *Families, Akkulturation und Erziehung*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Gilens, Martin. 1999. *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Ration Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Green, Simon. 2004. *The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Habermas, J. 1996. 'Citizenship and National Identity,' in *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hagedorn, Heike. 2001. *Wer darf Mitglied werden? Einbürgerung in Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich*. Opladen.
- Hailbronner, Kay. 2010. 'Country Report: Germany,' published by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>
- Hainmüller, Jens and Dominik Hangartner. No date. 'Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination.' Presented at the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago.
- Halm, Dirk and Martina Sauer. 2005. *Freiwilliges Engagement von Türkinnen und Türken in Deutschland*. Essen: Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien.
- Halm, Dirk and Martina Sauer. 2006. 'Parallelgesellschaft und ethnische Schichtung,' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 1-2/2006. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Handoll, John. 2010. 'Country Report: Ireland,' published by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>

Hanschmann, Felix. 2008. *Gutachtliche Stellungnahme im Rahmen der öffentlichen Anhörung des Innenausschusses des deutschen Bundestages am 22. September 2008*. Innenausschuss Drucksache 16(4)459F.

Hansen, Randall. 2009. 'The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration and the New Europe,' *Theory and Society* 38 (1): 1-24.

Hansen, Randall and Patrick Weil. 2001. 'Introduction,' in *Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the E.U.* New York: Palgrave.

Hatton, Timothy J. and Andrew Leigh. 2007. 'Immigrants Assimilate as Communities, Not Just as Individuals,' IZA Discussion Paper 2538. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Hayduk, Ronald. 2008. *Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States*. New York: Routledge.

Heath, Anthony and Sin Yi Cheung (eds.). 2006. *Unequal Chances: Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Henkes, Christian. 2008. 'Integrationspolitik in den Bundesländern?' in Achim Hildebrandt and Frieder Wolf (eds.) *Die Politik der Bundesländer: Staatstätigkeit im Vergleich*. Berlin: Springer.

Herbert, Ulrich. 2001. *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland*. München: Beck.

Howard, Marc M. 2009. *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Huddleston, Thomas and Jan Niessen, with Eadaoin Ni Chaoimh and Emilie White. *Migrant Integration Policy Index III*. Brussels: British Council.

Iyengar, Shanto. 1989. 'How Citizens Think about National Issues: A Matter of Responsibility,' *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 878-900.

Jacobson, David. 1997. *Rights across borders: Immigration and the decline of citizenship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Janoski, T. 2010. *The Ironies of Citizenship: Naturalization and Integration in Industrialized Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. *The Political Character of Adolescents*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Cornell University Press.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. 'Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting,' *Citizenship Studies*, 5 (1).
- Joppke, Christian. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, Christian. 2010. 'The Inevitable Lightning of Citizenship,' *European Journal of Sociology* 51 (1): 9-32.
- Junn, Jane. 1999. 'Participation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the United States,' *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (9): 1417-1438.
- Kahanec, Martin and Mehmet S. Tosun. 2009. 'Political Economy of Immigration in Germany: Attitudes and Citizenship Aspirations,' *International Migration Review* 43 (2): 263-291.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics in Germany, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud and Susan Olzak. 2004. 'Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany,' *American Journal of Sociology* 110 (1): 198-230.
- Krupa, Matthias. 1999. 'Regierung wirbt für deutschen Pass.' *Berliner Zeitung* October 26, 1999.
- Leech, Beth L. 2002. 'Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews,' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35 (4): 665-668.
- Leibold, Jürgen. 2006. *Immigranten zwischen Einbürgerung und Abwanderung: Eine empirische Studie zur bindenden Wirkung von Sozialintegration*. Dissertation, University of Göttingen.
- Liang, Zai. 1994. 'Social Contact, Social Capital, and the Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant Groups,' *Social Science Research* (23): 407-437.
- Markwort, Helmut. 2008. 'Test mit toller Nebenwirkung,' *FOCUS Magazin* 2008 (29), July 14 2008.

- Marshall, Thomas H. 1992 [1950]. 'Citizenship and Social Class,' in *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Massey, D., R. Alarcon, J. Dura and H. Gonzalez. 1987. *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mazzolari, F. 2009. 'Dual Citizenship Rights: Do They Make More and Richer Citizens?' *Demography*, 46 (1).
- Michalowski, Ines. 2004. 'Integration Programmes for Newcomers: A Dutch Model for Europe?' Osnabrück: IMIS-Beitraege, No. 24.
- Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Miller, David, 2008. 'Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship,' *The Journal of Political Philosophy* Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 371-390.
- Motomrua, Hiroshi. 2006. *Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nauck, Bernhard. 2007. 'Integration und Familie,' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 22-23/2007. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- OECD 2011. *International Migration Outlook*. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Pantoja, Adrian, Ricardo Ramirez and Gary Segura. 2001. 'Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos,' *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (4): 729-750.
- Perchinig, Bernhard. 2006. 'Einwanderungs und Integrationspolitik,' in *Fünf Jahre Schwarz-Blau*. Vienna: Litt Verlag.
- Perchinig, Bernhard and Rainer Bauböck. 2006. 'Preface,' in Rainer Bauböck, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk and Harald Waldrauch (eds.). 2006. *Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries. Volume II: Country Analyses*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2006. *Immigrant America: A Portrait (Third Edition)*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Prümm, K. 2004. *Einbürgerung als Option: Die Bedeutung des Wechsels der Staatsangehörigkeit für Menschen türkischer Herkunft in Deutschland*. Münster: LIT Verlag.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. 2005. *Democracy in Immigration America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Ramakrishnan, K. and T. Espenshade. 2001. 'Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States,' *International Migration Review* 35 (3).

Rathburn, Brian. 2008. 'Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods,' in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, John. 1999 [1970]. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rennert, Klaus. 2008. *Gutachtliche Stellungnahme im Rahmen der öffentlichen Anhörung des Innenausschusses des deutschen Bundestages am 22. September 2008*. Innenausschuss Drucksache 16(4)459C.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2008 [1762]. *The Social Contract*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rose, Nikolas. 2000. 'Community, Citizenship and the Third Way,' *American Behavioral Scientist* Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 1395-1411.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.

Sandel, Michael. 1982. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sarazzin, Thilo. 2010. *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sauer, Martina. 2009. *Türkeistämmige Migranten in Nordrhein-Westfalen und in Deutschland: Lebenssituation und Integrationsstand*. Essen: Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien.

Sayad, Abdelmalek. 2004. *The suffering of the immigrant*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1977. 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (6): 317-344.

Smith, Rogers. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Soysal, Yasemin N. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stadler, Bettina and Beatrix Wiedenhofer-Galik. 2009. *Arbeits- und Lebenssituation von Migrantinnen und Migranten in Österreich, Modul der Arbeitskräfteerhebung 2008*. Wien: Verlag Österreich GmbH.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2008. *Ausländische Bevölkerung, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2*. Wiesbaden.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2008. *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2*. Wiesbaden.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2008. *Einbürgerungen, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.1*. Wiesbaden.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2008. *Ausländische Bevölkerung, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2*. Wiesbaden.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2010. *Statistisches Jahrbuch*. Wiesbaden.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 2011. *Ausländische Bevölkerung, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2*. Wiesbaden.

Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings. 1995. 'Life-Cycle Transmission and Political Participation: the Case of Marriage,' *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 45-65.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Terkessidis, Mark. *Migranten*. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag.

Tetlock, Philip. 2005. *Expert Political Judgement*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thränhardt, Dietrich. 2008. *Einbürgerung: Rahmenbedingungen, Motive und Perspektiven des Erwerbs der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit*. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Topçu, Canan. 2007. *Einbürgerung: Lesebuch über das Deutsch-Werden*. Frankfurt am Main: Brandes und Apsel Verlag.

van Oers, Ricky, Betty de Hart and Kees Groenendijk. 2010. *Country Report: The Netherlands*, published by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>

Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

von Koppenfels, Amanda K. 2002. 'The Devolution of Privilege: The Legal Background of the Migration of Ethnic Germans,' in David Rock and Stefan Wolff (eds.) *Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic*. Oxford: Berghahn.

von Münch, Ingo. 2007. *Die Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Weil, Patrick. 2001. 'Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-five Nationality Laws,' in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.) *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Wipperman, Carsten and Berthold B. Flaig. 2009. 'Lebenswelten von Migrantinnen und Migranten,' *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 5/2009. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Wolfinger, Raymond. 1872. *Politics of Progress*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Wong, Janelle S. 2006. *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wong, Janelle S. and Vivian Tseng. 2008. 'Political Socialization in Immigrant Families: Challenging Top-Down Parental Socialization Models,' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34 (1): 151-168.

Worbs, Susanne. 2008. 'Die Einbürgerung von Ausländern in Deutschland.' Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

Wunderlich, Tanja. 2005. *Die neuen Deutschen. Subjektive Dimensionen des Einbürgerungsprozesses*. Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius.

Wüst, Andreas M. 2006. 'Wahlverhalten und politische Repräsentation von Migranten,' *Der Bürger im Staat*, 56 (4): 228-234.

Yang, Philip Q. 1994. 'Explaining Immigrant Naturalization,' *International Migration Review* 28 (3): 449-477.

Yurdakul, Gökçe and Y. Michal Bodemann. 2010. *Staatsbürgerschaft, Migration und Minderheiten: Inklusion und Ausgrenzungsstrategien im Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Zimmerman, Klaus, Amelie Constant and Liliya Gataullina. 2009. 'Naturalization Proclivities, Ethnicity and Integration,' *International Journal of Manpower* 30: 70-82.

Appendix

Table A.1 Logistic models of the probability of holding German citizenship for Turkish-origin residents of Germany (in 2006)

	Model 1	Model 2
<i>Female</i> (0/1)	0.36 (0.15)	0.34 (0.15)
<i>Log age</i>	-1.34 (0.46)	-1.24 (0.47)
<i>Years in country</i>	0.07 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)
<i>Born Germany</i> (0/1)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.25)
<i>Log years*Born in Germany</i>	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
<i>Secondary education</i> (0/1)	0.14 (0.21)	0.14 (0.21)
<i>Vocational training</i> (0/1)	0.32 (0.19)	0.31 (0.20)
<i>University degree</i> (0/1)	0.49 (0.21)	0.46 (0.22)
<i>Owner-occupied housing</i> (0/1)	0.54 (0.15)	0.50 (0.15)
<i>Belong to Germany</i> (0/1)	-	0.24 (0.19)
<i>Belong to Turkey</i> (0/1)	-	-0.28 (0.17)
<i>Belong to neither</i> (0/1)	-	0.24 (0.26)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.15 (0.37)	-2.12 (0.38)
No. of individuals	971	971
Log-likelihood	-594	-589
Percentage Reduction in Error	13%	15%

Note: the table reports point estimates and parenthesized standard errors from logistic regressions fit by iteratively re-weighted least squares. Model 2 is the same as Model 1 except that it also includes variables on feelings of belonging. The education reference category is no certificate or only primary schooling. Dichotomous variables are indicated with (0/1). The data source is a telephone survey of residents with Turkish surnames in the large and diverse state of North-Rhine Westphalia, conducted in 2006 by the Center for Turkish Studies (Zentrum für Türkeistudien) in Essen.

Table A.2 Logistic models of the probability of holding Austrian citizenship

	Model 1	Model 2
<i>Female (0/1)</i>	0.24 (0.09)	0.22 (0.12)
<i>Log age</i>	-0.25 (0.14)	-0.26 (0.14)
<i>Years in country</i>	0.11 (0.01)	0.12 (0.01)
<i>Born Austria (0/1)</i>	1.12 (0.37)	0.95 (0.34)
<i>Years in country*Born in Austria</i>	-0.05 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.01)
<i>Household head secondary edu. (0/1)</i>	0.62 (0.15)	0.90 (0.16)
<i>Household head university (0/1)</i>	0.59 (0.17)	0.80 (0.18)
<i>Owner-occupied housing (0/1)</i>	0.57 (0.16)	0.52 (0.14)
<i>Number of other citizens (0 to 4+)</i>	-	1.28 (0.11)
<i>Married to a native Austrian</i>	-	-0.11 (0.12)
<i>Region of origin fixed effects</i>	yes	yes
<i>State fixed effects</i>	yes	yes
<i>Constant</i>	-1.53 (0.50)	-2.62 (0.38)
No. of individuals	2520	2520
Log-likelihood	-1136	-962
Percentage Reduction in Error	46%	60%

Note: the table reports point estimates and parenthesized standard errors from logistic regressions fit by iteratively re-weighted least squares. Model 2 is the same as Model 1 except that it also includes variables on household composition. The number of other citizens in the household is included as a numeric predictor; similar results are achieved using a series of dummies. The education reference category is no certificate or only primary schooling. Dichotomous variables are indicated with (0/1). The data source is the Austrian micro-census data from the first quarter of 2008, with the analysis restricted to households that provided information for all household members.