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Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2n09t3kw>

Journal

Structure and Dynamics, 9(2)

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Publication Date

2016

DOI

10.5070/SD992032323

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Peer reviewed

BACK TO KINSHIP II

A GENERAL INTRODUCTION

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The two failed orientations to kinship, nurture and fitness, are transcended as this collection of original kinship work moves forward, building on the rich theoretical and ethnographic past of kinship study to a reinvigorated future of new data, reconceptualization of paradigms, fresh debates and new theory. Using kinship to anthropomorphize nonhuman primates is rejected. Contributions from 18 distinguished scholars of kinship cover the four-field, cross-cultural science of anthropology. Issues in kinship study are explored through marriage, kin terms, space, incorporation, ritual, primate studies, and contributions from Russia. This collection carries kinship study into the future.

Overview

A little over a decade ago, the picture of kinship study in anthropology looked bleak to some, leading one commentator to observe “Kinship used to be described as what anthropologists do. Today, many might well say that it is what anthropologists do not do.” (Sousa 2003: 265). Since then, those attempting to fold the kinship domain into nurture and gender studies (Stone 2001), or reductively oversimplify to fit, as it were, with a Darwinian fitness formula (Shenk and Mattison 2011), have justified their orientations as a way to fill an imagined vacuum. Neither attempt has dealt appropriately with kinship. Kinship study transcends these failed oversimplifications and, as can be seen in this collection, moves forward beyond both nurture and fitness diversions. Rather than building knowledge, the trend of reducing kinship to nurture, now clearly in retreat, has been referred to by sociocultural anthropologists like Robert Parkin as ‘deconstruction’ (Parkin

1997) and Harold Scheffler as ‘dismantling’ (Scheffler 2004). Kinship study regains its former footing and moves on to the future.

We see concerted efforts aimed at reinvigorating kinship study in the session that Doug Jones and Bojka Milicic organized for the 2006 meeting of the American Anthropological Association in memory of Per Hage and his extensive and ground-breaking work on kinship achieved before his untimely death in 2004. The papers given in that session were published in 2011 as the edited book, *Kinship, Language, and Prehistory: Per Hage and the Renaissance in Kinship Studies* (Jones and Milicic 2011). The editors, Doug Jones and Bojka Milicic, note, based on discussions by participants in the session, that “there is a renaissance going on in the study of kinship ... major advances are being made by synthesizing cutting-edge research *with the knowledge that anthropologists have gained over more than a century of study in kinship system work*, how they change over time, and kinship is conceptualized” (Jones and Milicic 2011:3, emphasis added).

This effort was followed by another, a session on kinship arranged through the AustKin Project of the Australian National University and held as part of the 2009 International Conference on Historical Linguistics, in Nijmegen, Holland. A selection of papers from that kinship session, including some papers not given at the session, was published in 2013 as the edited book, *Kinship Systems: Change and Reconstruction* (McConnell, Keen and Hendery 2013). Like Doug Jones and Bojka Milicic, the editors, Patrick McConnell, Ian Keen and Rachel Hendery, also see a renaissance in kinship studies building on past kinship studies¹, one that draws “on the scientific study of kinship in ethnology as well as the wealth of detail on systems in action recorded in ethnographies. But this is not simply a question of dusting off these old and valuable traditions. There is also the building of bridges into new areas and with other disciplines that take us beyond where kinship studies had reached” (McConnell, Keen and Hendery 2013: 2).

The following year saw the birth of what is now called The Kinship Circle (El Guindi 2012a). Dwight W. Read and Fadwa El Guindi had organized a session on kinship for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association. Following up on its success, El Guindi and Read co-founded The Kinship Circle by building a listing of anthropologists from around the world whose focus of research interest is kinship in its various modalities. It soon became evident that the study of kinship continues with vigor, re-energized rather than demoralized by the various ways that, knowingly or unknowingly dilute it, subsume it or appropriate its seminal contributions to anthropology and to the understanding of humankind.

A most current effort to mention in this context is the Festschrift of the late Harold Scheffler initiated and put together by Warren Shapiro (In Press). This collection honors Scheffler’s outstanding contributions to kinship study and includes papers that cover a wide range of kinship-related topics, focusing in particular on Scheffler’s work on kin term semantics and kin term extensions. Like the other two volumes mentioned above, the Festschrift adds to the rich kinship knowledge already in place.

Through The Kinship Circle sessions on kinship were organized yearly at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association. From the papers presented at the first two kinship sessions held in 2013 at the AAA annual meetings, we put together

the collection, *Back to Kinship*, as a special Issue of the online, open-access journal, *Structure and Dynamics*, published through the University of California and edited by Douglas White at UC Irvine. *Back to Kinship* has been very successful and is one of the most widely downloaded issues of *Structure and Dynamics*. Given this success we have now put together *Back to Kinship II* with a selection of papers from the 2012 and 2013 AAA kinship sessions.

Back to Kinship II is dedicated to the memory of Chit Hlaing, the Burmese name of Frederick Kris Lehman, whose recent passing is being deeply felt by colleagues and students, especially by those in The Kinship Circle. This collection keeps Kris's memory alive and represents a continuation of efforts to organize current research on kinship across the four fields of anthropology, including new, original data and reconceptualization of existing data covering a range of topics within the sociocultural field.²

From Nurture To Kinship

We are mindful of the impact David Schneider's comments on kinship had on kinship study, leading to what some saw as the demise of kinship as a domain of study despite the central role of kinship study in anthropological research for more than a century. El Guindi points out that part of the muddle created by Schneider interpreters comes from not distinguishing between construct and concept (Read and El Guindi 2013). When David Schneider wrote in "What Is Kinship All About" (Schneider 1972): "Kinship is like totemism, matriarchy, and the 'matrilineal complex'. *It is a non-subject*. It exists in the minds of anthropologists but not in the cultures they study" (p. 51), with emphasis added to highlight his unfortunate exaggeration that has been manipulated to justify detachment from kinship study by 'nurture' scholars who nevertheless like to take credit for its present revival. We concur that kinship, totemism, matriarchy, etc. are analytic constructs (hence in the minds of anthropologists). Schneider was being provocative, though, in choosing the phrase "non-subject", thus blurring construct with concept and inspiring its elimination altogether. It is hard to believe that Schneider did not understand the difference. We use concept to mean the cultural idea that represents meaningful domains in peoples' lives, whether that idea has a local label or not. Anthropologists are equipped to uncover meaningful core concepts even without having linguistic referents.

Kinshipping in Qatar

A charming example very relevant to kinship comes out of El Guindi's experience during her decade-long tenure in Qatar at Qatar University and the Qatar Foundation. At the University, she was invited to become Head of Department so as to build the Social Sciences. In building a new curriculum, she introduced a course called Kinship (*Qaraba*, in Arabic). It is noteworthy to mention at this juncture that Qatar is an Arabian-Gulf culture in which kinship is highly active on the ground and is a prominent factor to take into consideration in decision-making at all levels of society up to the State itself. El Guindi was called to a high level meeting of Vice-Presidents and Deans. They had examined her proposed New Curriculum but had a question: What is meant by Kinship? How Can that Be a Course to Teach and a Subject to Study? El Guindi was taken by surprise. Thinking retroactively, it became clear that while kinship is being actively experienced and has a

translation reference in Arabic, the referent was not an active conceptualization in the minds of Qataris. They ‘kinship’ all the time, but do not externalize it as a subject to study, teach, or observe. They live kinship viscerally without using a linguistic referent for it. After explaining the idea and the purpose of the course it was enthusiastically accepted and became part of the new curriculum. In class it was one of the most exciting and engaging subjects for Arab students, Qataris and non-Qataris.

It is fitting that one of the papers in *Back to Kinship II*, by Warren Shapiro, revisits the arguments made by Schneider and takes on the Schneiderian kinship critique up front. In his paper, *Why Schneiderian Kinship Studies Have It All Wrong: With Special Reference to Adoptive Kinship*, Schapiro revisits the ethnographic data that supposedly supports the claims made by the followers of David Schneider that kinship, in one or another community, is not based upon native procreative notions. Shapiro details how this claim is contradicted by the very ethnographies that supposedly substantiate Schneider’s critique. Analysis of three well-known ethnographic cases, rather than supporting Schneider’s arguments, shows that native ideas concerning procreation are consistently and semantically primary to other ways that kinship relations may be understood by societal members.

The collection of original articles on current research on kinship that we present here has already moved beyond both orientations, nurture and fitness. Fadwa El Guindi, in her article in this collection, *Beyond Fitness And Nurture: The Kinship Paradox*, argues explicitly and empirically through analysis of primary data that kinship is a valid analytical category (contrary to claims by nurture proponents) and that the dynamic kinship practices organizing the lives of people can be reduced validly neither to nurture nor to fitness. Her article builds on earlier analyses of primary data on kinship in Qatar (El Guindi 2012b; El Guindi 2013; El Guindi and al-Othman 2013) and demonstrates how complex anomalies emerging at the level of kinship experience reveal in analysis properties of kinship as a transformational triadic structure, here proposed as a universal feature of kinship and a dynamic aspect of its structure.

Anthropomorphizing Non-Human Species

Though the nurture orientation to kinship study is on the wane, the onslaught from outside sociocultural anthropology continues, coming from evolutionary biology and psychology and primate studies, which in the rush to impose Darwinian evolution on human systems instead reduces the cultural complexity of humankind to the frequency distribution of transmitted traits. Rich, multi-faceted, sociocultural cognition humans engage in is reduced to biological processes of species survival and fitness enhancement. Primate studies present inconclusive research attributing anthropomorphic qualities to non-human species by misappropriating conceptualizations developed from kinship study, in particular, and misapplying them to non-human species, in general.

Simplistic fitness formulas are reductively misapplied to human society broken down into singular traits, under the guise of revising the scope of biological models so as to embrace culture. As a philosopher of biological science has put it: “These thin models for culture ... have no purchase on the ‘rich’ details--or even (more troubling) on the very

existence of rich details [of culture]. And in failing to do the latter, we argue that they must fall crucially short of an adequate account of the nature and transmission of culture” (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007:237).

The exercise is nothing less than anthropomorphizing of non-human ways of physical survival by elevating them to cognized social and cultural life at an overly simple level. Vocabulary meaningful in describing human society and culture has been liberally, but superficially, employed to non-human organisms such that the qualitatively significant divergence out of nature into culture and complex human social relations (Lévi-Strauss 1949) has been adulterated by simplistic formulas into a quantitatively evolved humankind.

In this collection, the article by Bernard Chapais, *The Evolutionary Origins of Kinship Structure*, builds on his sustained interest in integrating evolutionary biological and sociocultural perspectives on kinship through focusing in primate studies (see his book *Primeval Kinship* [2008]). Here he posits that “human kinship systems were born as pedigree based social networks whose members were, by definition biological kin” and then evolutionary changes in cognitive abilities during hominin evolution leading to our species enabled our ancestors to conceptualize the criteria by which nonhuman primates differentiated their behavior according to the biological relatedness of the interacting individuals. This “would have led to the advent of classificatory kinship”; that is to kinship terminologies, and so “the genealogical grid cannot be dissociated from the analysis of human kinship.” In his argument, Chapais avoids simplistic reductions by looking for components of kinship systems with counterpart in the behavior of non-human primates, yet positing that what distinguishes human kinship is the way the components are integrated. Integration may introduce properties without a counterpart in the nonhuman primates and thereby give rise to the variability we see in human kinship systems. It is the intensity with which kinship plays a role in human societies, rather than in its uniqueness, that, he says, distinguishes human societies.

Chapais sees the evolution of human kinship systems by looking upward, with a biological perspective, from the patterned behavior of the nonhuman primates, rather than looking downward, with a cultural perspective, from kinship systems to their behavioral antecedents. Differences between these two perspectives, he notes, need to be resolved as both are trying to account for the same phenomena, hence there needs to be integration of these two perspectives. Dwight Read, in his book, *How Culture Makes us Human*, presents such an account and concludes that “The key innovation ... marking the transition from non-human primate to human social systems and making us humans and not just another primate species is the introduction of cultural ideas and relation systems upon which human systems of social organization and structure are founded” (2012: 200).

Other primate studies have appropriated kinship by reducing it to genetic relatedness and survival mechanisms expressed through dyadic behaviors are presented as cognized social relations (see the overview by Cheney and Seyfarth 2012). Silk (2001: 72) explicitly and wrongly links kinship entirely to genetic relatedness. She writes: “Kinship is central in primates’ social lives because genetic relatedness is ... important.in the evo-

lution of social behavior” (p.72). She is wrong on two counts: First, primates’ lives cannot be described as having kinship as we have discussed above. Second, kinship is not genetic relatedness.

We go back to a simple phrase written by Edward Sapir in 1924 in anthropology and which we repeat here as reminder that without culture and “[A]s a mere organism, man’s only function is to exist ... to keep himself alive and to propagate his kind” (Sapir 1924:415). Whether human society is small-scale or large-scale, it is a complex system woven into a coherent whole by culture and cannot therefore be reduced to claims of fitness and altruism as made in the fields of evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and primate studies, particularly as these are based on speculative interpretations of inconsistent evidence in captive environments or limited controlled experimentation.

This doubt is expressed by Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth (Cheney and Seyfarth 2012) in their recent overview of primate research on sociality titled, *The Evolution of a Cooperative Social Mind*, in which they express concern about methodological issues involved in trying to experimentally test cooperation and other social behaviors under natural conditions. They write: “doubts persist about whether non-human primates even have the cognitive capacity or motivation to maintain long-term relationships” (p. 3) and they go on to say that it is unclear whether the social relations with their required underlying skills and attributed to species living in large groups, including, in particular, non-human primates, “confer any reproductive benefits” (p. 3).

We take issue with the liberal borrowing by primatologists of kinship vocabulary such as “kin” and “nonkin” or worse “matrilineal kin” to be indiscriminately applied to non-human species. There is a difference between limited social bonding and kinship, with the latter comprising a domain whose richness can be seen in the range of research topics in this collection alone. There is little evidence in primate research of ‘relations’ beyond temporary dyads, let alone the system of relations we find in human kinship behavior, in non-human primate behavior. Descriptions of female-offspring interactions in non-human primates are anthropomorphized and overstretched beyond what the data show. Groupings among non-human primates such as monkey troops are formed for physical survival to procure food and for defense against predators (Sterck, Watts and van Schaik 1997).

Touching, hugging, grooming and grunting, which are interpreted as indices implying that non-human primate behavior resembles human kinship, on the contrary do not constitute evidence that such behavior can be considered as involving the cognitive recognition of kin. Kinship is not simply behaviors skewed towards biologically related individuals, or even recognition of relations through repeated behavior and in isolation, as the body of original research work in this collection makes abundantly evident. Roy Wagner phrases it this way in his article: “*no form of relationship, in either a behavioral or an intellectual sense, is in any way meaningful or emotionally viable, not to speak of socially compatible, unless it is first ‘set up,’ ... every kin relationship must be ‘elicited, ‘set up’ beforehand*” (p. 250, emphasis in the original).

Humans do not procreate relatives. They incorporate persons to become relatives, and this is the case even for those persons born into a group. After birth, persons are initi-

ated, often by elaborate ritual processes, so as to become incorporated. Humans divide the societal world into relatives and non-relatives, and classify relatives into those by birth or by marriage or by other incorporative kinship means such as the suckling discussed in the article by El Guindi. Incorporation cannot be disassociated from ritual, as discussed by Roy Wagner in his article for this collection.

Kinship, Ritual and Parenthood

The entwined relation between kinship and ritual is somewhat neglected in kinship study and needs attention. Both kinship and ritual are uniquely human universals. In El Guindi's empirical field study of Zapotec ritual, it became clear that expanding our knowledge is served when both kinship and ritual contexts are explored together. The Valley Zapotec folk of Lachigoló, Oaxaca, clearly conceptualized a domain of entwined kinship and ritual when they generated the well-known annual celebration of *Todos Santos*, translated as the Day of the Dead. As discovered in El Guindi's analysis (El Guindi 1977), *Todos Santos*, rather than being a remembrance or a celebration of those relatives who have died, is about allowing the dead kin to fulfill their obligations to their living kin. So it is a ritual, but it is about kinship. It is the cultural way of activating kinship relations, as discussed by Wagner in his article, and a window into kinship conceptual structure.

In this regard, Roy Wagner adds to his rich repertoire of work on ritual (recall his classic work, *The Invention of Culture* [1972]) a valuable contribution to this collection as it puts kinship and ritual back together again. His article, *The Nexus Between Kinship and Ritual*, begins by noting that the terms kinship and ritual refer to constructs devised by anthropologists to account for the intricacies of everyday and of ceremonial life, yet there must be articulation between these modes. More generally, the archetypes of kinship we refer to as matri-, patri- or bi-lineal systems do not exist in isolation, but one is the transformation of the others. It is this connection through transformation that is crucial to understand. This leads, he suggests, to seeing that we are dealing with "self-organizing and self-integrating" (p. 243) systems.

Ritual, he suggests, borrowing from the work of Victor Turner, is a way expressing what cannot be said, hence it is meaningless to ask what a ritual means. Wagner illustrates the argument with the complexities involved in trying to make a coherent ethnographic account of the *habu* ritual of the Daribi among whom he has worked extensively. At the most abstract level, it has to do with "redressing the world order" (p. 245). Yet it is not simply something that can be seen in isolation, as one does in an experiment aimed at exposing the pure form by removing exogenous, distorting factors, for the enactment of the ritual involves "the tension between the genders, and the rivalry over marriage-options between older and younger males" (p. 247), hence kinship.

Kinship must be involved because kinship is not simply prescribed (as are biological relations by reproduction), but are "actually provoked into being by the participants themselves" (p. 249, underlining in the original). For the Daribi, this provoking, or instigation, is done through the *habu* ritual; thus, he suggests, we need to see "kinship as a self-generative or 'stage' phenomenon" (p. 250) where one is dealing with non-linear, multiply connected causality rather than linear causality with its single connections.

Kinship, Wagner points out, takes on “*concrete particulars*” (p. 241) through kin terms. Kin terms are self-organized in the form of logical structures for which there are only a limited number of ways that kin terms can be self-organized into a system of kinship relations grounded in procreation or established through marriage (Read 2007). This leads to the question, *Why Marriage?*, the title of the article by F. K. L. Chit Hlaing and Dwight W. Read.

Chit Hlaing and Read note that kinship systems unambiguously comprise both males and females, yet while the child-bearing woman is visually evident and unambiguous, the same is not true of the actions by the impregnating male. Culture, they argue, makes possible unambiguous identification of a male as father through marriage to a female in anticipation of her becoming a mother. Thus marriage is universally — not withstanding groups such as the Mosuo of China lacking institutionalized marriage — a contractual relationship legitimating a woman’s childbearing from the community’s perspective and giving her offspring social identity through the relations expressed through motherhood and fatherhood.

It is through the conceptual relations of motherhood and fatherhood and their reciprocal relations, and of spousehood, that the kinship relational social systems that a part of all human societies are formulated and expressed through conceptually recognized and interconnected kin relations. From an evolutionary perspective, the first indication of when our ancestors were recognizing relational systems like this may be, the authors suggest, following the argument of Leaf and Read 2012, the structural organization of the animal depictions in Chauvet Cave in France, dating back to 35,000 BP.

As shown by this and the other articles in *Back to Kinship II*, humans are way, way beyond being just biological organisms and it does not help the building of knowledge about human kinship systems to dwell on humans simply as biological entities, or to reduce humankind’s complexity so as to support evolutionary claims of biological continuity from non-human species. Grouping relatives as family or larger as kindred, lineage, tribe, to confederation of tribes, each bound by varying degrees and qualities of corporateness, is distinctively different from fluid relations such as temporary bonding, friendship, or partnership with apparent, but only superficial, similarities. Some accounts of primate behaviors sound like observing a feminist group strategizing for group solidarity (see Silk et al. 1996). Temporary social bonding among non-human primates is not simply a quantitatively simpler version of kinship. No substantive evidence points to even the rudiments of the cognitive capacity that would be needed to generate institutionalized rules and practices known as kinship and the nonhuman primates lack the size of short term memory that would be required for this kind of cognitive output (Read 2008).

Generous interpretations are advanced, anthropomorphizing non-humans, as if the magical use of vocabulary and conceptualizations developed to describe human societal and cultural accomplishments can turn non-humans into almost human. Terms like kin and non-kin, kinship, matriline--misapplied to biologically driven interaction and biological reproduction limited in time and space--are only meaningfully applicable to humankind. Only humankind has the remarkable cognitive capacity to organize into societies and groups in societies woven coherently into a whole by culture generating concep-

tually bounded analytic categories about ideas that then became unbounded by space and time--all of this occurring around the time of the Upper Paleolithic (Gamble 2010)-- and coupled with practices that reflect these ideas and enabling their transmission across generations through enculturation, not through the phenotypic transmission of individual traits assumed by the evolutionists.

El Guindi, in her article, cites Marcel Hénaff's statement that "biological reproduction supposes the union of two partners of opposite sex," a biological fact that kinship study subsumes under birth and marriage, from which he significantly goes on to write that "nature demands nothing else" (Hénaff 1998: 44). It is culture that makes it possible to foray into the domain beyond being ruled by what nature demands and to give voice to what nature is necessarily silent about. This leads us to see culture coming into the human picture through transformative evolution leading to the integration of nature with culture. This is what we need to understand, not how nature becomes culture or how nature subsumes culture. This level of conceptualization is what kinship study needs as it builds on its past and moves into the future.

In order to contribute more toward understanding the developmental processes leading to human societal and cultural life, our research needs to explore the difference in the character of sociality in non-human primate (and other) species and the societal and cultural complexities of human life so as to make evident the form and content of this transformation. This is where a healthy and serious, research-based, collaboration among the four fields of anthropology and related disciplines can prove valuable. Focus that is now directed to how non-humans are human-like should instead shift to the qualitative transformation that makes humans human. (see, for example, Read 2012).

The papers in this journal collection cover the four fields of anthropology and a range of topics in the sociocultural field from kinship terminology, to marriage, to ritual, reflective of the depth and breadth of the cognitive capacity distinguishing humankind from other species. This capacity is evidenced through how our cognitive capacity enables us to generate complex manifestations of kinship woven in different cross-cultural modes we can aptly refer to as "the genius of kinship," to borrow the title of the book by German Dziebel (2007). His contribution to one of our AAA kinship sessions, co-authored with Vladimir Popov from the Russian Academy of Science, is included in this collection.

Kinship in Russia

In their article titled *The Study of Kinship Systems and Terminologies in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History and the Current State of a Discipline at the Intersection of Ethnography and Social Anthropology*, Vladimir Popov and German Dziebel trace the origin of Russian kinship studies as a sub discipline of ethnography in Russia and the former Soviet Union. They identify three long-term trends in the study of kinship (typological, ethno sociological and ethno cultural) in the Russian region and highlight the importance of evolutionary thinking that is mindful of the conceptual distinction between content and manifestation in the study of kin terminological systems. The authors present

several illustrative studies that demonstrate how Russian and Soviet scholars have tackled these trends and conceptual principles in practice.

Kinship in Archaeology

In his paper, *Ethnological Problems And The Production Of Archaeological Kinship Research*, Bradley E. Ensor discusses what archaeologically grounded kinship analysis can contribute to kinship study. Ensor focuses on residence, descent, and marriage, using middle-range factual correspondences between social practice and material remains that enable plausible inferences on variation and change in kinship practices over long periods of time to be explored. In this way, archaeology becomes ideal for evaluating diachronic hypotheses regarding how kinship plays out in practice. Taíno, Maya, and Hohokam case studies are presented and the insightful results obtained from archaeological kinship analyses are summarized. These analyses show that variation and change are prevalent, thereby defying normative characterizations. Several long-standing functionalist hypotheses on the emergence of residence and descent practices are evaluated, and some of these find little support from the detailed diachronic testing that archaeology can provide. In addition, he suggests, archaeological kinship analyses can provide new insights on kinship practices unavailable to ethnology, further demonstrating the archaeology subfield's capacity to become a major contributor to the contemporary expansion of kinship research.

In another contribution to kinship study from archaeology, the paper, *Dualism and Pluralism in Pueblo Kinship and Ritual Systems*, by Peter Whiteley, describes the articulation of kinship and ritual systems with patterns of social organization by revisiting data from the Pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona, challenging earlier claims of two opposing patterns associated with descent systems. Among the Eastern Pueblos of the Rio Grande, especially the Tanoan-speaking towns north of Santa Fe, kinship, as it is expressed terminologically, is held to play a structurally insignificant role; social organization there, rather, pivots on "ritual sodalities." In the Western Pueblos (especially Hopi and Zuni), named matrilineal descent groups ("clans" and lineages) associated with Crow kinship terminology are treated as the main articulating features of the social system. He asks: How is it that notwithstanding major cultural similarities in other respects, the Pueblos came to exhibit such supposedly different structuring principles for social life? In a reconsideration of this conceptualization, Whiteley argues for greater similarities in the structural features of the kinship and ritual systems of Eastern and Western Pueblos than has previously been ascribed to them, and suggests that when dual exchange, of a type associated with kinship and marriage rules, is taken into consideration, the sharp contrast seen through the lens of descent is much ameliorated.

Kin Terms and Origins

The paper by Alain Matthey de l'Etang, titled *Kv(I)Kv- Kinship Terms In The Australian Aboriginal Languages: First Part: Kaka 'Mother's Brother'*, brings in a linguistics perspective on kinship studies. He builds on previous research he has published with P. J. Bancel on the world-side distribution of what have been called nursery kin terms. These are terms having what he refers to as a redoubled form, like the address terms *mama* and

papa in English. They are reviving an argument, whose scholarly avocation goes back to M. Müller (1854), that rather than the word form of these terms simply being derived from the first sounds made by an infant, hence the wide-spread occurrence of terms like this (an argument advanced by Johann Buschmann [1855]), they are unchanged kin terms that are part of a proto-kinship terminology for the language groups in which the term occurs and reconstructed using the methods of historic linguistics.

Matthey de l'Etang considers, in extensive detail, the evidence justifying his hypothesis that the widespread distribution of the term *kaka* in Australia, meaning mother's brother and extended (in the sense of Floyd Lounsbury and Harold Scheffler) to other genealogical referents, implies that **kaka* (the reconstructed proto-term form of *kaka*) is a term in the proto-terminology for the proto-Pama-Nyungan languages of Australia, if not a reconstructed term for proto-Australian. This implies, he points out, that the occurrence of **kaka* as a proto-term in Australia would have a deep history tracing back to the first humans inhabiting the Sahul area around 40,000 – 50,000 years ago. He also suggests that the widespread occurrence of *kaka* in Kariera and Kariera-like terminologies implies that the proto-terminology in which **kaka* appears is also a Kariera-like terminology.

Beyond its argument about **kaka* as a proto-term, the paper by Matthey de l'Etang demonstrates the value, for kinship study, of being able to bring together arguments from different perspectives in kinship studies. The perspectives he brings together include biology with regard to what we know about the evolution of *Homo sapiens* from both a morphological and cognitive viewpoint, archaeology with regard to what we know about the geographic and associated time dimension for that evolution, and linguistics for the methods used to reconstruct a proto-kinship terminology.

Space in Kinship

Giovanni Bennardo discusses a different linguistic approach to kinship terminologies in the paper. His paper is titled, *Space in Kinship*, which relates to his work relating to the different ways spatial relationship are expressed linguistically; e.g., through a person saying “the ball is in front of me” versus saying “the ball is in front of the tree” when telling someone where the ball is located. The first way takes advantage of the fact that we perceive of our body as having a front and a back hence an object may be located accordingly, whereas the second statement assumes, on the part of the speaker, that a tree has a front by convention and so the location of the ball will only be unambiguous for speaker and listeners who share the same convention. Bennardo identifies several different frame of reference that are used by one group or another, and then considers whether the different ways that these conventions order space have their counterparts in the ordering of kinship relations, also seen through a spatial metaphor. Bennardo uses, as his data, iconic genealogical diagrams showing the primary, distinctive features of the 6 terminology making up Murdock's classification of kinship terminologies. Bennardo relates each of the 6 linguistically different frames of reference to the 6 terminologies, conjecturing that the structure of these 6 frames of reference may have played what he calls a foundational role with respect to kinship terminologies. The argument is suggestive, rather than definitive; nonetheless it highlights the fact that insights into the structure and organization

of kinship systems may come from unexpected directions and by unanticipated connections.

Marriage

Three contributions discuss marriage; thereby pointing to the wide terrain that kinship study covers. The one by F.K.L. Chit Hlaing and Dwight Read, already discussed above, considers marriage from the perspective of its possible origin as a cultural institution. Another paper on marriage is *Ties That Bind: Marital Networks and Politics In Punjab, Pakistan* by Stephen M. Lyon and Muhammad Aurang Zeb Mughal. Their paper ties marital networks, viewed from the perspective of robustness and resilience, to political stability despite what appears to be Pakistan's instability as a state. While marriage in Pakistan fits within Lévi-Strauss's notion of a complex system, this does not mean lack of guidelines regarding what makes for a good marriage choice, such as the notion of similarity with regard to caste, education, economic status, religious viewpoint, and how one has been raised. These guidelines can be met with cousin marriages, but also with marriages outside one's close kin, thus allowing for flexibility in arranging marriages. This flexibility has enabled the formation of elite families with extensive control over Pakistan's assets. The authors use public records to illustrate the historical sequence of marriage arrangements used by one of these elite families, both through marriages at the kinship level and at the political level through marriages arranged with politically active families.

The resilient and robust marriage network established in this manner has made this family into one of the most powerful families in Pakistan, but marriages made outside of the kinship domain may lead to issues regarding legitimacy, especially when the marriage is arranged to obtain political power. Claims of legitimacy are supported through narratives and marriages between lineages. Marriage strategies, they suggest, are a way to build marriage networks that are both robust and resilient, hence despite Pakistan having a history of crises, hence "using marriages to maximize both the group's and the individual's capacity to adapt to changing political and economic circumstances is necessary for survival" (p.121).

The third exploration of marriage is found in Whiteley's paper in which he relates the role of marriage in forming alliances between groups through direct or indirect exchange (Lévi-Strauss 1949) to the Pueblos. He suggests that from the perspective of marriage alliances, the sharp contrast that has been seen when comparing the eastern and the western Pueblos disappears, as "the more pluralist Western Pueblo systems show strong signs of co-occurring dual organization in marriage practices" (p. 267), thus the sharp contrast is mainly due to not taking into account the role of marriage alliances in the Pueblo kinship systems.

Rules from Patterns

The last paper, by Telmo Menezes and colleagues, takes up another development in kinship studies, namely research otherwise difficult to carry out without the aid of computers due to the number of computations needed to work out patterning, whether from a simulation approach or for working out patterning in the data brought forward for analysis. The potential of computers for aiding anthropological research has long been recognized, but, as the authors point out, there are relatively few examples where computers have

been used in a non-quantitative way as an adjunct to ethnographic research. The latter is the subject of this article; more precisely, rather than simulating the consequences of culturally frame rules for behavior, such as the consequence of marriage rules for the formation of alliances, the goal is to infer the rules from the consequences as measured through patterning in genealogical data.

Their focus is on marriage networks, distinguished by whether they form kinship networks of marriages between genealogically related individuals, or are alliance networks consisting of groups connected through marriages. Simulating genealogical data from rules is non-trivial given all of the possible simulation rules that could be simulated and can affect the formation of marriages and births. In the other direction, the simulation starts with the morphology of the marriage network, the goal is to infer what rules would have the target network as its outcome.

The method is that of genetic algorithms in which random changes are made in the current rule set and those changes that increase fitness, according to a research-assigned fitness function, are kept. While the computer will find a solution (or an approximate solution), whether it is meaningful in terms of actual constraints on behaviors still has to be evaluated. The latter is not a critique of the simulation methods, but underscores the complexity of kinship behavior and its multi-causal aspect, as discussed by Wagner in his paper. The kind of research discussed in this paper is exploratory, rather than confirmatory, and enable exploring what might be possible, rather than depending on imposed constraints. As the authors note, “Rather than furnishing ready-made keys to the interpretation of empirical kinship networks, they help improve our insight into the complexity of network-generating processes, and to make us skeptical regarding any theory postulating a one-to-one relationship between network phenomena and behavioral rules” (p. 206).

Here we invite colleagues from within four-field anthropology and from all fields of science to join this journey back to kinship after its release from the restrictive hold by reductive formulas of nurture and fitness.

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¹ Unfortunately a new publication (Wilson 2016) seems to be under the impression that the “nurture” orientation is kinship study. It is not. His view of science as past and present is not the view we hold. Science involves the cumulative building of knowledge. Denying the continuity to kinship study is why “nurture “ orientations failed to add to it. Our collection builds on the solid studies of the past, moving forward into a scientific future for kinship study.

² Note that many individual efforts leading to valuable publications on kinship are not included in this brief overview.