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Threat and Consciousness: The Activation of a Racialized Latino Identity

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Angela Elena Gutierrez

2021

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Threat and Consciousness: The Activation of a Racialized Latino Identity

by

Angela Elena Gutierrez

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2021

Professor Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Chair

How does group threat impact Latino identity and political participation? While studies on Latinos in California have focused on threat as a political mobilizer, few studies have explored the role that threat plays on panethnic identity and the strengthening of group identity among different group members. This project addresses this puzzle by observationally exploring what has happened to a politicized group identity in the past, and employing the use of survey experiments to understand the role of group consciousness in Latino political participation.

This are three key contributions this dissertation makes to the political science literature on identity. The first is an examination of how political threat can influence politicized identity. My dissertation explores how identity shifts over time when Latinos face political threat. Combining seven different cross-sectional surveys from 1989-2004, I test the hypothesis that state level political threat in the form of anti-immigrant propositions (1994 – 1998) would increase levels of perceived discrimination, and perceived discrimination would be correlated with a politicized Latino identity among Latinos living in the state.

I find that perceived discrimination does increase during periods of threat, and is positively associated with identity. Identity levels remain high after periods of threat, but are no longer associated with discrimination, indicating that threat may serve as an activator. The lack of uniformity of identity measures across the surveys and the many different ways in which scholars have operationalized identity lead me to the second key contribution of my

dissertation.

The second goal of my dissertation is to help us understand how to operationalize identity as a theoretical construct in political science. I examine three different identity constructs in political science and how they relate to Latino political participation. By reviewing the literature and examining how measures of identity centrality, group consciousness, and linked fate have been used in the past, and exploring these three measures in the 2016 CMPS, this project brings greater understanding of the link between these different identity measures, and their influence on political participation.

The third goal of my dissertation is to experimentally examine the role of threat on identity. I run a number of experiments where I examine how threat impacts identity and political participation. I also test whether threat might mediate group consciousness uniquely for different generational groups, and how this influences political participation.

This dissertation extends our overall understanding of the role of Latino identity in responding to threat, and the impact that this has on Latino political participation.

The dissertation of Angela Elena Gutierrez is approved.

Lorrie Frasure

Efren O. Perez

David O. Sears

Gary Segura

Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2021

Dedicated to my family, who has always supported me.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Identity politics is currently at the forefront of campaigns and elections in the United States. Who you are and which groups you belong to are being used to delineate where individuals stand in terms of partisanship and ideology. These group differences have only been exacerbated in the recent political era, increasing affective polarization in the American public (Mason, 2018; Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015). Furthermore, as the United States is becoming more diverse, an interesting political trend is emerging. The Democratic Party is increasing in diversity while the Republican Party continues to remain predominately white (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015).

Due to the civil rights movement, and the support of Democratic legislators in the 1960s, Black voters have continued to overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999). But the political affiliation and political participation of emerging immigrant groups, particularly among Latinos is still debated. Latinos have been described as "the sleeping giant" and social conservatives which raised questions about their partisan identification and willingness to participate in the political arena (de la Garza and Cortina, 2007; Jackson, 2011; Nuño, 2007; Lee and Pachon, 2007).

While some studies have found that as Latinos go through the process of political incorporation, as a whole, Latinos are more likely to favor the Democratic Party (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner, 1991; Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; de la Garza and Cortina, 2007), other studies have found that the further removed Latinos are from the immigration experience, the less likely they are to perceive discrimination and support ethnically favorable policies, thus suggesting that their partisanship might more closely resemble the white voting population in the United States (Citrin and Sears, 2014). Such findings suggest that as Latinos move

further away from the immigrant experience, they are less likely to vote Democratic, and support policies that are viewed as favorable to Latinos in the United States, because they are not part of the immigrant experience. However, scholars note that we are still experiencing increased migration in the United States which might influence Latino incorporation in the United States and in the political sphere (Citrin and Sears, 2014; Jiménez, 2009) .

I argue that the decline of ethnic identification and ethnic voting among latter generations might have occurred if the emphasis on racial and ethnic identity had not become such a dominant factor in the political sphere. Surges of identity politics occurred during the 1990s in California when the state experienced an increase in anti-immigrant, anti-Latino rhetoric with propositions 187, 209, and 227 (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Hajnal and Baldassare, 2001). This was followed nationally by the passage of HR 4437 also known as the Sensenbrenner bill in 2006, and throughout the years more states have experienced anti-immigrant rhetoric at the state level. Notably Arizona's SB 1070 was viewed as anti-immigrant and anti-Latino, and many copycat laws followed in other states. Since 2015, the Republican Party has stoked the fires of anti-immigrant anti-Latino rhetoric at a level that had not been experienced with the nomination and election of the 45th president of the United States. Starting his campaign by calling immigrants who enter from the U.S. Mexico border criminals and rapists, xenophobic and racist rhetoric has once again been hurled towards the largest minority group in the United States. This racist rhetoric is not only at the elite level; it is exhibited through emboldened individuals who publicly display their racism by verbally and physically attacking a population because of their physical appearance and the language they speak. The current political environment I argue, will likely engender a stronger sense of Latino identity among a population that is currently being treated as a lesser American, and the activation of this identity will have long term political consequences.

Given the increased salience of identity, this means that understanding the connection between identity and political participation is particularly important for Latinos in the United States. As scholars, it is incumbent for us to understand how the identity of an emerging lower status group may be activated by a hostile political climate. While previous

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studies of race in politics have helped shed light on the importance of identity for minority groups, much of this work is focused on the Black experience. The focus on Blacks in the U.S. is critical to understanding race relations in the United States, but may not serve as a blueprint for understanding identity formation among other emerging groups. Unlike most Black Americans whose ancestors were forcibly brought to the United States and stripped of many of their own languages and cultural traditions, Latinos have had a very different experience. In the Southwest, it was the conquest of Mexican territory that converted many Mexicans in California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah into Mexican-Americans, and for countless others, migration to the United States and the promise of a better life led them across the border. Due to the different histories of Latinos and Blacks and their positions in the racial hierarchy in the U.S., how and when a Latino person's identity is activated is likely to be different from a Black individual, particularly when we take into account the different migration histories (Masuoka and Junn, 2013; Ngai, 2014; Lee, 2019). Adding to the complexity of Latino identity, is the fact that Latinos come from 33 different countries with their own cultural traditions. The diversity of the group in some aspects might lead to an embracing of a national origin identity that is viewed as distinct from panethnic identity. Better understanding identity also implies that a more in depth and nuanced investigation of how our measures of identity could and should be used to better understand panethnic identity activation, and the political outcomes associated with these measures for Latinos in the United States.

1.1   Identity in Political Science

Initially, studies of identity and race focused on the Black and white binary, with concepts like group consciousness developing out of Black political participation and feelings of connectedness (Verba and Nie, 1972). White attitudes were studied via racial resentment, which focused on how negative views about Blacks influence white political participation (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Since then, the research on identity particularly in the area of race and ethnicity has grown substantially. Scholars have increased the number of theoretical concepts

to include linked fate, group consciousness, and identity centrality in the political sphere not only for Blacks, but for a number of minority groups that are gaining in size (Miller et al., 1981; Dawson, 1994; Stokes, 2003; Masuoka, 2006; Pérez, 2015a).

Because much of the work on identity focused on the Black experience in the United States, how well our concepts and measures of identity transfer over to other minority groups is still unclear (McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016; Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016). This dissertation aims to add to our understanding of how identity is activated among Latinos, the largest minority group in the United States. I focus on three identity measures; identity centrality, linked fate, and group consciousness, with a more in depth examination of group consciousness as a measure of political participation.

Group consciousness was one of the earlier measures used to understand how marginalized identities influence political participation. Miller et al. (1981) examine how group identity influences awareness of the struggles the group faces. They examine identities based on age, class and income, which are fluid in nature in that a person may experience an increase or decrease in their wealth thus changing their identifications status, gendered identity which while there have historically been differences in the way men and women are treated, is still comprised of groups that are at least equal in size, and finally identity rooted in race which is fixed, and the most marginalized for racial minorities. Of these groups, Blacks were more likely to identify with other Blacks, and exhibit higher levels of group consciousness when compared to the other identity groups (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Miller et al., 1981).

The relationship between Black identity and political attitudes was first examined in the 1970s and early 80s (Verba and Nie, 1972; Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Gurin and Epps, 1975; Shingles, 1981). Early works like Shingles (1981) argue that the combination of political efficacy and mistrust is due to group consciousness and the realization that the challenges Blacks face in terms of social and economic inequality are systemic and not the fault of the individual. This realization is what is promoting a more efficacious politically active Black population.

In a similar vein, Dawson (1994) develops the concept of linked fate, in which the

interconnectedness of Blacks and what is best for the group can be used as a utility heuristic for what is best for the individual. However, studies have cautioned scholars against using linked fate as a substitute for group consciousness given the different theoretical grounding and differences in the way members of different groups interpret their meaning (McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016).

At their core, these theories seek to examine if voters engage in politics as a way to improve the status of the group, and ultimately their own individual status. While these theories are well established in the Black politics literature, in their conception, they were not tested among other ethnic groups. This has lead to concerns about the possibility of conflating Black identity with group consciousness and linked fate (Miller et al., 1981; McClain et al., 2009). Since the history of Blacks in the United States is very different from that of other groups, it might not be possible to export these measures to other racial and ethnic identities. Given that Blacks have had a unique experience in the United States that is historically different from any other racial or ethnic group living in the United States, many have argued that Black identity is an exceptional case that other minority groups will not replicate (Citrin and Sears, 2014).

But we should not limit identity measures to one racial identity without a nuanced investigation of how these measures may work for other groups. Miller et al. (1981)'s work tested whether any group can be group conscious. They believed that this was possible as long as group members met the criteria of group conscious individuals. They state that group consciousness encompasses both identification and political awareness of the groups positing in society and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests (Miller et al., 1981). But identification with the group alone is not a strong enough measure to capture group consciousness because while a person may identify with the group, individuals may not recognize that the group faces a marginalized status in society. It is also the case that while individuals may recognize that group members suffer from a lower status in society, they may not attribute this problem to larger systemic issues, and instead view the lack of increased status as an individual shortcoming. They outline four affective and cognitive elements that together encompass what it means for an individual to be group

conscious Miller et al. (1981). As long as group members meet this criteria, then any identity can in theory be group conscious.

1.2 Components of Group Consciousness

The first and most basic component of group consciousness is identifying with and feeling like you belong to a particular group (Miller et al., 1981). Miller et al. (1981) note that group identification is different from being classified by others as a member of the group, although this might increase identification later on. When one identifies with a group they feel like they are similar on some dimension, and are in the same social stratum. Things like sharing characteristics with the group that are not shared by those outside of the group's strata might increase identification. The second component of group consciousness is polar affect (Miller et al., 1981). This is the preference of members who belong to your own group over those in the out-group. Another term for polar affect is in-group favoritism, which is thought to most strongly develop when conflict between groups exist. But it should also be noted that in-group favoritism can develop in the absence of conflict (Miller et al., 1981). The third aspect of group consciousness is described as the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group's status or material resources when compared to that of the out-group. This is also known as polar power and is a relative measure of how well off the group is compared to the dominate group (Miller et al., 1981). The last component of group consciousness is known as individual versus system blame. This is the belief that the reason why the group suffers in status is due to inequities of the broader social system rather than the individual members of the group (Miller et al., 1981). Lack of success is not due to individual shortcomings, but is rather a challenge faced due to systemic inequalities.

How these different dimensions of group consciousness fit together to form a politicized group identity is intuitive, but empirically measuring group consciousness has proven to be a challenge. Miller et al. (1981) found that individual components of group consciousness are only weakly and inconsistently related to each other, and they state that creating a single additive scale does not successfully capture group consciousness. Instead, they suggest

that an interactive model best reveals the complexity of group awareness, and an increase in political participation. They find that measures capturing three dimensions of group consciousness (group identification, polar power, and system blame) are sufficient to capture group consciousness, and in a multivariate model they suggest running two interactions along with a triple interaction effect to measure the effect of group consciousness on participation. While implementing group consciousness in the same fashion as Miller et al. (1981) might be methodologically straightforward, challenges arise for researchers when it comes to finding and using measures that are similar to Miller et al.'s (1981) original study.

To measure group identification respondents were shown a list of 16 identities and asked which two of the categories they felt closest to. Only identities that were listed as first or second were examined by the researchers. They then used a 3 point scale to determine how strongly the individual identified with the group. After establishing group identification, polar power is then measured as a two item scale that ask about the influence of the dominate and the subordinate group. The scaled measure ranges from -2 to +2 with negative scores indicating that the subordinate group has too little power and the dominant group has too much influence. Polar affect is similarly measured by scaling two feeling thermometers that asked how respondents felt about their group, and the out-group, with the outcome indicating the degree of positive rating relative toward the other group. Individual system blame is also a multi-item index that includes two or four measures depending on the groups examined. These questions delve into what the respondent views as the cause of poverty, racial inequality, and position and status in the United States. A minimum of ten different questions went into group consciousness at the time that Miller et al. (1981) first studied the concept. Even excluding polar affect from the scale, researchers still need 8-9 survey questions to measure what Miller et al. (1981) describe as the three main component of group consciousness. Furthermore, since the exact wording of the questions are not listed, it is difficult to truly replicate their measurement of group consciousness. Thus it is unsurprising to find that few if any scholars have measured group consciousness in the same manner as Miller et al. (1981).

Despite the measurement challenges that group consciousness presents, the canon of

literature on group consciousness has continued to expand. One of Miller et al. (1981) main findings is that the strength of group consciousness varies depending on the groups examined. There has been some interest in the scholarly literature about the applicability of group consciousness to panethnic groups in the United States given that they exhibit greater group heterogeneity and their level of identification as Asian or Latino might not be as strong (Masuoka, 2006; Masuoka and Junn, 2013). But while these groups are heterogeneous, their experiences in the United States are often similar in their marginalized treatment. It is for this reason that I expect that group consciousness is likely to form among Latinos.

Linked fate is another important and related theory that builds itself from the group consciousness literature (McClain et al., 2009). It is often measured by asking how much respondents believe what happens to their group members in this country will have something to do with what happens in their life. Dawson (1994) found that linked fate is strong among Blacks and attributes this to the racial stratification in the United States which leads to relying on what is best for the group as a heuristic for what is best for individual group members. While group consciousness and linked fate both deal with group identity, it has been found that these two concepts tap into different dimensions among Asians and Latinos and linked fate and group consciousness should no be used interchangeably (Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). In fact McClain et al. (2009) even caution that these identity concepts that originated in Black politics may not be exportable to Asian Americans and Latinos. While they do not discount the work that has been done in the area of Latino group consciousness, they discuss how group characteristics may shape group behavior in a way that may lead to inconsistencies in the way the identities connect to politics.

McClain et al.'s (2009) caution towards the use of group consciousness for other minority groups is understandable given the many ways in which group consciousness has been operationalized. We know little about whether or not these different measures adequately capture the multidimensional nature of group consciousness, or how similar these questions are to one another. Sanchez and Vargas (2016) highlight the lack of consistency when it comes to measuring group consciousness and discuss the issues of a multidimensional versus a one dimensional measure of group consciousness. In their paper, they examine both the

effectiveness of group consciousness as a single one dimensional measure versus a multidimensional measure, and its interchangeability with linked fate. They use three single item questions to capture group consciousness, the first question is about commonality with other Hispanics when it comes to ideas, interests and feelings, the second question asks if it is important for people to work together to improve the position of their racial or ethnic group, and the third question asks how much discrimination do you think Hispanics face in the United States. But even in this call for a more systematic analysis of group consciousness, the authors do not engage in a discussion of how these measures correctly capture the dimensions of group consciousness presented by Miller et al. (1981) nor do they address why three single item measures are sufficient to replace the three scaled items. Their work compares how well the group consciousness items work among different racial/ panethnic groups, but whether the construct they are measuring should be considered group consciousness is another matter. The authors are right in stating that a more rigorous and systematic approach is necessary to study group consciousness, but I argue that we should be more rigorous starting with a greater theoretical understanding of which measures and how many measures are sufficient to truly capture the different dimensions of group consciousness that Miller et al. (1981) discuss.

1.3   Discrimination Among the Group

Discrimination can play a large role on a person's identity, especially among minority groups (Armenta and Hunt, 2009). This can shape not only how they view the group, but how they view themselves. Armenta and Hunt (2009) examine how both perceived group discrimination and personal discrimination can influence ethnic identification and self esteem among Latino youth. Building off of the rejection-identification model which finds that positive evaluations of the self can be maintained by aligning with the stigmatized group even when facing discrimination, Armenta and Hunt (2009) further define whether what we should expect when groups face specific types of discrimination. (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999). They find that perceived discrimination is both directly and indirectly associated

with higher levels of self esteem and group identification, while personal discrimination is negatively related to self esteem (Armenta and Hunt, 2009). People who perceive high levels of group identification are also more likely to identify with the group than people who experience personal discrimination (Armenta and Hunt, 2009). For those who perceive high levels of group discrimination, high levels of personal discrimination mattered much less on their individual self esteem and their ethnic identification (Armenta and Hunt, 2009).

Others have theorized that members of stigmatized groups can protect personal self evaluations by attributing negative events to discrimination as opposed to their own qualities (Crocker and Major, 1989). Originally, it was thought that if you belonged to a group that is discriminated against, you would suffer from lower self esteem (Crocker and Major, 1989). But studies have found that people from stigmatized groups do not have lower self esteem than members of dominant groups (Hoelter, 1983; Jensen, White and Galliher, 1982). Crocker and Major (1989) posit that prejudice based discrimination might not affect self esteem because the person realizes that the reason for the negative interaction is prejudice, rather than some individually based characteristic.

The rejection-identification model argues that discrimination leads to higher levels of group identification due to the rejection or exclusion of members of the subordinate group by the dominant group (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999). Bourguignon et al. (2006) test whether there are differences in identification depending on the type of discrimination. They find that individual level discrimination is negatively associated with self esteem when also controlling for group identification (Bourguignon et al., 2006). But group identification is able to protect self esteem even among those personally discriminated against. They find that perceiving discrimination towards the group was positively related to self esteem. They argue that perceiving discrimination may help stigmatized individuals feel a sense of common fate which helps bolster their own feelings of self worth (Bourguignon et al., 2006).

But what is the role of discrimination both perceived and experienced when it comes to political participation? Masuoka's (2006) use of perceived and experienced discrimination as independent variables that influence group consciousness seems to be the correct approach to understanding how discrimination can motivate political participation. Masuoka (2006)

finds that individuals who hold strong perceptions of discrimination are more likely to be group conscious, which should mean a more engaged Latino and Asian electorate (Stokes, 2003). If Latinos are able to separate experiences of discrimination as group specific, then it is possible that group discrimination can serve as a politically mobilizing force.

In this way, perceived discrimination can be viewed as a catalyst of group consciousness. However, there are some studies where perceived discrimination is used as the polar power dimension of group consciousness (Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). While this measure requires an awareness of group discrimination, it does not necessarily indicate that Latinos suffer from a lower status in the United States racial hierarchy (Masuoka and Junn, 2013). Perceiving group discrimination may be a way in which group consciousness is activated, and an awareness of relative deprivation may follow.

Other studies on discrimination and political engagement among Muslims have attempted to disentangle how different forms of discrimination influence political participation via societal and political discrimination (Oskooii, 2018, 2016). Societal discrimination is defined by Oskooii (2016) as interpersonal experiences where negative actions in the form of verbal or nonverbal antagonism, intimidation, avoidance, or physical assault. These types of interactions are likely to result in individuals internalizing group stigma that may have lead to this negative experience resulting in the individual's withdrawal from the political system (Oskooii, 2018, 2016). Political discrimination on the other hand, is best described as discrimination that manifests itself in laws, policies, bureaucratic practices, and by political elites, generally in the form of political campaigns. The language used by Oskooii (2016; 2018) in describing forms of discrimination is similar to that of social psychologists discussing perceived versus experienced discrimination.

Looking at group discrimination versus perceived personal discrimination, we might expect that rhetoric from a political campaign that is anti-immigrant or laws like SB1070 would be viewed as group discrimination which should to lead to greater levels of political engagement. But personal attacks in which a person is asked to prove that they belong in the United States, or are told to speak English would be more likely to result in a withdrawal from civic engagement this would fall under personal/ societal discrimination. However, this

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relationship might be moderated by levels of group identification and group consciousness. For those who have a weaker Latino identity, withdrawal may be the likely response, but for those who have a strong sense of identity, individual discrimination may be mobilizing, especially when societal perceived group group discrimination is high.

The research on group consciousness, and the theoretical framework under which it operates, indicates that perceived discrimination is a key factor in activating group consciousness (Miller et al., 1981). This may be especially true among later generations. Latinos who were born in the United States have very different experiences from their immigrant counterparts. They are more likely to learn how to read and write in English through the United States education system and at times may feel like they belong to or can chose to assimilate into U.S. society more easily than the immigrant Latino population. Studies have noted that the U.S. upbringing of these individuals may actually weaken their ties to their ethnic roots, reducing their panethnic and ethnic identity, and instead strengthen their American identity, but it is also more likely that this group recognizes the systemic problems their group faces (Citrin and Sears, 2014; Portes and Rumbaut, 2005a).

One indication of assimilation and strength of ethnic identity is how Latinos classify themselves on the U.S census. Latinos are generally classified as white and then asked to identify ethnically as Latino (Mora, 2014; Thompson, 2016; Masuoka and Junn, 2013). In the 2000 census, less than half of Latinos (48%) identified as white, while 43% identified as some other race (Rumbaut, 2009). Additionally, when looking at how 1.5 and second generation youth identify compared to their parents, they were much more likely to say that Latino/ Hispanic was their race while their parents were more likely so identify as white suggesting that those growing up in the United States may be more aware of the status of Latinos in the racial hierarchy (Rumbaut, 2009). This account follows Masuoka's (2006) finding that U.S. born Latinos are more likely to be group conscious than their immigrant counterparts. Is this a trend that we can still observe today? Analyzing the 2010 Census[1], I found that the number of Latinos who identify as white has increased to 59% while the number of some

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[1]https://www.nhgis.org/

other race responses has declined to 33%. Should we take this as a sign of acculturation among Latinos or is this simply due to a better understanding of census classification? And could societal changes and political events reverse this trend?

One reason why we might expect later generations to feel like they have a racialized identity is because of their understanding of the racial hierarchy, and a better understanding their group's position relative to other racial groups. Studies of Mexican Americans have found that racialized identity is known to persist throughout generations (Ortiz and Telles, 2012). Furthermore, even among recent arrivals, spending time in the United States increases their awareness of the status of Latinos in the United States (Portes and Bach, 1985; Valdez, 2009). If these individuals do not perceive group discrimination, it is unlikely that they will hold a politicized identity. However, I argue that the anti-immigrant rhetoric and "otherizing" of Latinos in the United States today can increase the levels of group solidarity and panethnic identification regardless of generation and national origin.

Political rhetoric and policies that indirectly affect group members are still felt as an attack against the presence of Latinos in the United States. Many Latinos are the children of immigrants and when we discuss immigration, we are discussing their own family history. When speaking Spanish is viewed negatively, we are questioning the group membership of people who look and speak differently than white Americans (Masuoka and Junn, 2013). When we have policies that allow police to racially profile individuals and ask for verification of citizenship, we are living in a society that says if you look a certain way, you might not belong, and even later generations of Latinos recognize that their belonging is also being questioned (Barreto and Segura, 2014). Even for those who have grown up in the United States and are acculturated, while they may feel that they are members of U.S. society, instances of discrimination towards their group are likely to spur them into action. While they are often not the ones berated for speaking Spanish, they are likely to be indignant when these instances occur. There may be instances in which they have achieved a certain level of success, but there are few Latinos around them. Even Latinos who have attained some higher levels of education may have had their talents questioned by those who assume that diversity policies are the reason for their success. Thus, it is easy to see how perceived

group discrimination might be experienced among all Latinos in the United States, and serve as a catalyst for group consciousness. Not all Latinos are the political target, but they see that their group's position in the racial hierarchy leaves their own membership open for questioning, and may be likely to engage in politics on behalf of the members of their group.

1.4 Discrimination as Group Threat

Literature on threat has most widely examined white attitudes towards changing demographics, first in a Black and white binary, and more recently threat whites feel towards the growing Latino population. Key (1950) describes how whites living in predominately Black areas in the South were worried about losing political control to Blacks, and used whatever mean possible to maintain control. Giles and Hertz (1994) examine partisan trends in the South and find that higher concentrations of Black voters leads to an over time decline in the number of white Democrats in the area and an increase in the number of Blacks who identify as Democrats.

Looking at Latinos and immigration, Burns and Gimpel (2000) find that personal economic impact plays a very small role when it comes towards feelings on immigration. Instead negative racial stereotypes of Blacks and Latinos are associated with wanting decreased levels of immigration. Furthermore, as time passes, whites are more aware of the fact that Latinos rather than Blacks are more directly connected to immigration (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). Other studies on changing demographics have found that feelings about immigration have fundamentally altered the electorate with white voters defecting from the Democratic Party due to the threat that immigrants pose (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). Furthermore perceptions of threat coupled with immigrant stereotypes can increase feelings of threat and negative reactions among whites (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Feeling that Latinos threaten the status of whites in the United States has been the common theme in political science literature. New work has even found that threat may be increasing white identity (Jardina, 2019). But the other half of this story involves how Latinos respond both psychologically and politically when whites feel threatened by discrimination, and negative

stereotypes of Latinos become more prevalent. While most of the literature focuses on the demographic and economic threat that Latinos pose towards the white population, they too are also experiencing their own form of group threat whenever backlash politics and xenophobic rhetoric takes the foreground.

1.5   Dissertation Outline

This dissertation will examine the activation of identity by political threat among Latinos in the United States. The second chapter of this dissertation will focus on a theory of how Latino identity is activated, specifically how perceived discrimination is important to group consciousness formation during times of political threat. In conducting this analysis I will focus my efforts on California. Using California as a case study, I test my theory of how group consciousness can be activated when Latinos face group threat in the form of political discrimination at the state level. In this chapter I find that as Latinos in California experience discrimination via state level propositions, they are more likely to believe that the group is discriminated against and be group conscious. I also find that once this threat has passed, levels of group consciousness remain high even though respondents are less likely to respond that Latinos face discrimination.

Building off of the difficulties of measurement in the second chapter, the third chapter of this dissertation looks at ways we can improve our understanding of identity measures, and their application to Latino political behavior in the United States. Starting with an overview of the literature on identity centrality, linked fate and group consciousness, I examine the use of these measures as they relate to political attitudes and behaviors. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Survey, I examine how closely questions in the surveys fit the theoretical understanding of group consciousness. I then conduct an imperial analysis on identity centrality, group consciousness, and linked fate among Latinos. I assess how strongly these items are correlated to Latino political efficacy, political participation, partisan attitudes, and policy issues.

Continuing with the themes of group consciousness measurement, the fourth chap-

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ter tests out a measure of group consciousness as a single item. I use this measure in an experiment that allows me to examine how individuals with varying levels of group consciousness respond to group threat, and how threat mediates the relationship between group consciousness and political participation. After priming respondents with a message about immigration, I have my respondents play a divide the dollar game and I record their willingness to engage in social media on behalf of the group. This experiment allows me to causally test how respondents of varying levels of group consciousness respond behaviorally to different political primes. My findings indicate that respondents who are group conscious are always more likely to be motivated to engage in political behavior on behalf of their group, but threatening political rhetoric may increase some forms of political participation even among those low in group consciousness.

The fifth chapter uses survey experiments to examine if group consciousness mediates responses to group threat among Latino respondents. This time I test out a three item scale of group consciousness. I also conduct sub group analyses to examine how respondents respond generationally. I find that threat does not mediate responses to group consciousness. In this chapter I also explore how different generations may respond to threat. While threat itself does not increase or decrease group consciousness, in most cases higher levels of group consciousness led to more pro group policy positions particularly for second and third generation respondents. While the effects are small, this suggests that later generations that are group conscious may be more likely to support the group when faced with group threat.

By the end of this dissertation, readers will have a better understanding of linked fate, identity centrality, and group consciousness. Chapter three will make the case that group consciousness is a more consistently reliable measure of political attitudes and actions, but work on group consciousness measurement still needs to be done. Chapters four and five will begin this work but much still needs to be done in terms of measurement testing. These chapters also add to our understanding of how identity is activated among Latinos, by experimentally examining the relationship between threat and group consciousness. This dissertation will give us future insight not only on the impact of threat on Latinos- the largest minority group in the United States, but will do so in a nuanced way that also takes

generational differences into account.

CHAPTER 2

Latino tú Latino Yo: A Theory of Latino Political Identity in California

What Latinidad means to the many ethnic groups that comprise the Latino population in the United States is an empirical challenge for scholars. Between partisan differences among ethnic groups, different migration histories, and cultural factors, some question if there is anything about the U.S. Latino experience that actually serves to bond these different ethnic groups together. While panethnic identification is increasing, it is not entirely clear if and what the political consequence of a strengthened Latino identity may be (Rumbaut, 2009; Beltrán, 2010). Additionally, despite the growth of the Latino population and a general acceptance of a Latino/ Hispanic identity, the political behavior of Latinos varies significantly by state. A prime example of this variation among group members can be seen in Latino voter turnout rates at the state level. In California, turnout in 2012 for Latino voting age citizens was at 48 percent. In comparison, Latino voter turnout in Texas, a state with a large Latino population similar to California's was just 38 percent.[1].

Studies have found that a politicized identity can lead increased levels of political participation (Miller et al., 1981). This is in line with recent work in the get out the vote literature which has found that identity messaging can help increase voter turnout but only when individuals hold a strong attachment to these politicized identities (Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016). Studies have found that a politicized identity is associated with an increase in participation.

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[1]For state level data on on Latino voting age citizens, registered voters, and turnout go to `https://wcvi.org/latino_voter_research/latino_voter_statistics/tx_lv.html` `https://wcvi.org/latino_voter_research/latino_voter_statistics/ca_lv.html`

This chapter aims to explore when, why, and how Latino identity becomes politicized. By examining the political history of California, we can better understand why the Latino electorate in California would exhibit higher levels of identity and group consciousness than Latinos in other states.

The 1990s was a tumultuous time for politics in the state. Partly in response to the rapidly changing demographics, Republican Governor Pete Wilson ran for re-election in 1994 on a strongly anti-immigrant campaign that supported voting yes on proposition 187 (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura, 2006; Barreto and Segura, 2014). The goal of prop. 187 was to make undocumented individuals living in the state ineligible for public benefits such as healthcare and education (Hajnal and Baldassare, 2001). In addition it made doctors, nurses, and educators responsible for reporting individuals whom they thought might be in the country illegally. The campaign in support of proposition 187 was full of racially coded language and commercials that portrayed Latin American immigrants as criminals coming to the United States to steal jobs and take social welfare away from deserving Americans[2]. Following proposition 187[3], proposition 209 was voted on, which upon passing, effectively removed affirmative action in California's state colleges and universities[4]. Two years later, in 1998, proposition 227 was passed, which eliminated bilingual education for limited English language students and most bilingual education classes in the state. At the time, the Republican Party in California was still a strong player in state politics and the Republican Party had a sizable Latino contingent. But registration trends turned after 1994, knowingly or unknowingly in their quest to increase their vote margin by targeting non-voters, the Republican Party alienated many Latinos in the state who perceived their community to be under attack (Barreto and Segura, 2014).

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[2]https://www.kqed.org/news/10346251/political-effects-linger-20-years-after-prop-187-targeted-illegal-immigration

[3]Prop 187 passed in 1994 but quickly faced an injunction by the courts and was never enacted.

[4]Worded as an initiative meant to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity, this initiative eliminated admissions programs that sought to increase college admissions among underrepresented populations.

I argue that the threat imposed by California's state politics which were motivated by anti-immigrant attitudes, increased group unity and political mobilization. The threat induced political participation sets Latinos in California apart from Latinos in other states at the time. When immigration and other ethnically salient issues are on the political agenda, Latinos whether U.S. born or immigrant become the political 'other'. It is in this climate that Latino identity and group consciousness is most likely to grow. While some have argued that a common Latino identity means little in terms of political unity because of the diverse nature of the group it is probable that in the case of California, the expansion of Latino identity is synonymous with a political Latino identity (Beltrán, 2010). By lumping Latinos together as "others" and reminding them of their Latino identity in a politically charged climate, the repercussions are necessarily political. Individuals who recognize that the negative political messaging and hostility from these campaigns are aimed at Latinos are more likely to recognize their Latino identity and respond politically. Additionally, I expect that the activation of this identity will last well beyond the initial threat and serve as a political motivator for years to come. Group consciousness is not likely to ebb and flow. Once formed, group consciousness should remain even when the threat has subsided. Pooling together a collection of cross sectional data from the 1989 through 2004, I use California's political climate as a novel test of the unifying political power of threat which may potentially explain what accounts for increased levels of Latino political participation in the state.

There is strong reason to believe that these propositions, especially 187 and 227 were perceived as targeting Latino immigrants. Campaign ads for proposition 187 depicted people crossing over the U.S. Mexico border, while proposition 227 restricted the amount of non-English class time. To further corroborate how closely linked Latinos were to the proposition debate, I conducted a text analysis of Los Angeles Times newspaper articles to see how frequently Latinos were mentioned in articles about the propositions. Figure 2.1 displays the number of articles containing the propositions in the title for every year between 1994 and 2000. The orange bar shows the number of times articles (including op eds) reference one of the three propositions in the title. The blue portion displays the number of unique panethnic or Latin American national origin identifiers used in the articles for each year.

Figure 2.1: Article mentions of propositions LA Times about propositions

Count of LA Times Articles About Propositions 187, 209, & 227

I find that there is a very high incidence of mentioning Latinos in the articles about the propositions. Latino mentions are especially high in 1994 when prop 187 was on the ballot. With the exception of 1996, the number of ethnic identifiers mentioned in the text is nearly half that of the number of articles published about the propositions.

The political effects of these propositions on Latinos in the state have been widely studied by race ethnicity scholars. Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura (2001) found that voter turnout increased among Latino immigrants who naturalized and registered to vote during the 1990s when compared to those who naturalized prior, and Barreto, Ramirez and Woods (2005) find that the increase in voter registration and turnout in the state was not simply a matter of a larger pool of Latino voters, but a greater interest in politics among Latinos living in the state. Furthermore, in Los Angeles County, the number of newly registered Latinos who registered as Republican was falling precipitously (Barreto, 2005). Similar trends of increased Democratic partisanship among Latinos at the state level, and greater concern about racial issues among immigrants have also been found (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura, 2006; Pantoja and Segura, 2003). But I argue that there is an intermediary step between threat and political engagement. Individuals are less likely to be motivated by threat to engage with the political system if they themselves don't identify with the group that is

being threatened.

In this chapter, I focus on the impact anti-Latino sentiment has on Latino identity in California. To examine Latino identity during this time period, I assembled a novel dataset of cross sectional Latino surveys from California which were conducted between 1989 and 2004. Using the data from 1989-1993, I am able to establish a baseline of Latino group identity in the state of California, examine what happens to group consciousness during the proposition time period, and extend my analysis through 2004, to see if the increase in group identity and it's connection to discrimination is unique to the anti-Latino climate in the mid 1990s or if there are long term effects. My results indicate that Latino ethnic identity becomes more salient and increases during the proposition period in the state as a consequence of the political discrimination Latinos experienced.

2.1   Psychological Roots of Identity

Understanding how a person feels about their identity can help determine how much influence that identity will have in shaping views on politics and policy. Bedolla (2005) examines the importance of identity in her research on Latino students growing up in Montebello and East Los Angeles during the 1990s. She finds that adaption to the U.S. and identity formation is a complicated process. For the students to feel like full members of the U.S. political community, they must feel empowered to act, and develop a positive attachment to their group despite its stigmatized status (Bedolla, 2005). When the subjects have a positive attachment, they are more likely to engage in the political process and fight against the perceived injustices occurring in their communities as is predicted by group consciousness (Miller et al., 1981). This is also in line with numerous works that have found that positive group attachment is key to combatting feelings of isolation and depression (Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009; Greene, Way and Pahl, 2006; Pérez, Fortuna and Alegria, 2008).

Feeling like one's identity is stigmatized may also hinder a person's willingness to engage politically (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999; Whitbeck et al., 2002). This social stigma can either strengthen or weaken Latino identity. The identity itself is not

simply viewed as positive or negative, but instead can be viewed as something that enhances or jeopardizes a person's sense of self depending on the context (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002; Bedolla, 2005). Furthermore, individuals with a stigmatized identity are more likely to internalize discrimination and feel a lower sense of self worth making it more likely that they will withdraw (Krieger, 1999).

How individuals come to accept or reject their identity is often examined by studying in-group and out-group behavior. Tajfel (1970) finds that individuals evaluate and define their identity by referencing other groups through value laden attributes and characteristics. When people deem their social identity to be unsatisfactory, they will try to disassociate themselves from the stigmatized identity and attempt to make their identity more positively distinct (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). But while some may try to distance themselves from a group, if there are increased levels of intergroup conflict, this also increases the hostility of interactions between different group members which might make it more difficult to disassociate (Tajfel, 1970). Societal threat can also strengthen in-group unity and group cohesion which increases group unity (Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013). If discrimination is an isolated event targeted at the individual, then individuals are more likely to internalize discrimination and let it affect them negatively but if what is experienced is perceived discrimination aimed towards a group, group members are more likely to increase the connection between themselves and the group (Armenta and Hunt, 2009).

How strongly one identifies with the group is dependent on the level of attachment an individual has to their identity, this in turn can shape how individuals respond to group threat. Pérez (2015b,a) finds that when faced with xenophobic rhetoric, strong Latino identifiers will reaffirm their group identity when the group is threatened. However weak identifiers opt to move further away from the group, especially when the group's status is impugned. High identifying Latinos on the other hand, become less politically trusting, more ethnocentric, and display higher levels of support of pro-group politics than the low identifying Latinos when exposed to xenophobic rhetoric. Similarly, studies have found that when faced with discrimination, individuals will make active attempts to maintain feelings of belonging and personal self-esteem by becoming more identified with their group despite the group

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based discrimination (Armenta and Hunt, 2009). Perceived group discrimination may lead to an increase in in-group identification, which helps maintain psychological well-being. Group discrimination is able to work in this way because it is a societal rejection of a larger identity rather than the individual.

The psychology of identity is important to understanding how group members react when faced with threat, but questions surrounding the persistence of a strong group conscious identity remain. Should we expect to find that group consciousness subsists once the initial threat fades? Or does perceiving group threat and activating a group identity mean that feelings of group consciousness remain? I hypothesize that group discrimination will be positively associated with group consciousness, and that the effects of perceived discrimination will be long lasting among Latinos living in California during the 1990s. Thus perceived threat should continue to be associated with group identity, and group identity should remain strong even after the threat has subsided.

2.2 Panethnic Identity & Group Consciousness

What poses a greater challenge for group consciousness among panethnic groups, is the fact that there are many different identities nested under a panethnic label. Scholars note that over time panethnic identifiers are becoming more commonly used, but whether or not increased levels of panethnicity mean that there is an enhanced sense Latino political power is still debated (Beltrán, 2010).

Jones-Correa and Leal (1996) examined panethnicity using the 1989-1990 LNPS. They found that 41% of LNPS respondents identified pan-ethnically as either their primary or secondary identifier. Exploring panethnicity as a cultural identity, or a political tool, Jones-Correa and Leal (1996) find that neither cultural nor instrumental models of identification go far in explaining panethnic identification. They argue that panethnicity has more to do with a general approach to politics which lies latent, but surfaces on particular issues. So how do we expect political panethnic identification to surface? Work by Masuoka (2006) examines individual factors that strengthen panethnic identity among Asians and Latinos in

the United States. She finds that among Latino respondents, increased levels of education, being born in the U.S. and perceiving discrimination are all associated with a stronger sense of group consciousness.

The connection between panethnicity and politicized Latino group consciousness is not a far leap if we consider Jones-Correa and Leal's (1996) work and Masuoka's (2006) as way measure both a politicized identity and panethnicity. As Miller et al. (1981) note, group consciousness extends beyond simple identification with the group, it is a combination of identifying with the group, recognizing the group's lower position in society, and a commitment to improve their group's standing in society. In many ways group consciousness can be viewed as a stricter measure of political unity in which panethnicity is a necessary precondition. Group consciousness is widely used to study group identity as a political force. Stokes (2003) was one of the first to look at group consciousness as a measure for increasing Latino political participation in the United States. She argues that diverse interaction among ethnic groups with the help of political leaders will serve to increase participation among the different ethnic groups. Other works on Latino group consciousness find that group consciousness may also be changing the way in which policy debates are perceived (Sanchez, 2006).

2.3   Hypotheses on Threat and Identity Formation

To study a politicized Latino identity, items that are best described as a group conscious measure will serve as my outcome of interest in California from 1989 to 2004. Starting with the 1989/ 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) allows me to include a baseline for group consciousness prior to the propositions in the mid 1990s that created a hostile climate for Latinos in the state. I expect that prior to the anti-immigrant, anti-Latino propositions of the 90s, perceived discrimination will be weakly correlated with group consciousness, with respondents exhibiting lower levels of group consciousness in the state. I expect that this will change during and after propositions 187, 209, and 227 which were voted on between 1994 and 1998. I hypothesize that between 1994 and 1998 when these propositions were debated

and voted on, perceived discrimination will become strongly and positively correlated with group consciousness as a result of the political environment. Each of these propositions were viewed as harmful to minorities in the state, especially the Latino population and those that recognize it are most likely to want to change the situation of their group.

By introducing political threat at the state level via these proposed propositions, I expect that more Latinos in the state will report that Latinos face systematic discrimination. Because Latino's out-group status is highlighted during this time period many group members will perceive that non-Latinos in the state view them as an unwelcome minority. Because of this, I expect to see that group threat will strengthen their Latino identity. This will lead those who positively associate as Latinos to recognize the societal marginalization to want to improve their group's standing in society.

I hypothesize that the relationship between perceived discrimination and Latino identity will not be as strong in the survey periods prior to the propositions because Latinos living in the state have not yet been exposed to political discrimination at the state level in the same way that they are between 1994-1998. I argue that this is because the social climate during these propositions is increasing the saliency of the discrimination Latinos as a group face. However, as these propositions arise, I expect that perceived discrimination will be positively correlated with a politicized Latino identity as measured by group consciousness. Recognizing that society perceives Latinos to be different than the white in-group coupled with being reminded of Latino's lower status in society is part of what is pushing them to want to increase their group's societal standing by working together politically. Since proposition 187 and 227 most likely affect foreign born respondents, their awareness and sensitivity to these propositions should be higher than U.S. born Latinos. Additionally, Latinos with some college education or who are college graduates should also more likely to watch the news and be politically aware. If I am correct that perceived discrimination is increasing group consciousness, the findings should hold for both of these groups.

2.4 Testing the Connection between Threat and Identity

In order to examine the connection between perceived discrimination and group consciousness during this time, I have collected numerous surveys with large samples of Latinos in California. These surveys are the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) of 1989/1990, The Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS) of 1994, The Multi-City study of Urban Inequality (1992-1994), The Washington Post Kaiser Foundation Harvard National Survey of Latinos 1999, the Mexican American Study Project II, which was conducted between 1997 and 2000, The Kaiser Pew 2002 National Survey of Latinos, and The Pew Kaiser Latino Survey on Politics 2004[5]. These seven surveys not only contain a large sample of Latino respondents living in California at the time, but also contain a measures of group consciousness as well as perceived discrimination. By limiting my sample to the California respondents in these surveys, I able to measure the relationship between perceived discrimination and group consciousness in the state.

The LNPS was the first nationally conducted survey of Latinos. It has a total of 809 California respondents from Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican ancestry [6] Because the measurement of group consciousness is varied, I looked for questions that most closely capture the definition of group consciousness as outlined by Miller et al. (1981). Their definition of group consciousness involves feeling like you belong to a group, recognizing that the group is marginalized in society, and wanting to work together with other members of the group on behalf of their political goals (Miller et al., 1981). With the LNPS, I was able to construct a political similarity scale by using respondents' answers about political similarity among Latino ethnic groups. Respondents were asked three questions about the similarity of political concerns regarding the three largest Latino ethnic groups. Each survey item has the same possible responses: "very similar," "somewhat similar," or "not at all similar." I

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[5]While the LNS of 2005-2006 seems like a natural candidate, the LNS unfortunately does not ask about perceived discrimination in a way that is comparable to the seven other surveys.

[6]While the first national survey of Latinos, one of the initial challenges was knowing which state respondents were from. With the original notes from the project, I was able to identify the respondent's state of residence at the time of interview.

combined these three items into a scale such that a value of 0 represents a respondent report-ing that all these Latino ethnic groups are not at all similar, and 1 represents respondents reporting that all these Latino ethnic groups are very similar. The internal consistency of this scale was strong (cronbach's α .68). In order to make the different surveys comparable across years, I then collapsed all respondents into a binary group consciousness measure in which 1 represents respondents who viewed these three groups as either mostly or somewhat politically similar and the rest as zero. Only the respondents on the highest third of the scale were coded as one. Additionally the LNPS asks about discrimination faced by the respondent's ethnic group. This asked "How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think different groups in the U.S. face? A lot of discrimination, some, a little or no discrimination at all" This was asked of Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cubans, the response given for the respondent's ethnic group is used as perceived discrimination. Responses are coded 1 for those who said there is a lot or some, and 0 for a little or none. In total the LNPS provides 641 complete observations from California.

The Multi City Study of Urban Inequality also had a large Latino sample in Califor-nia. The interviews from California were conducted between 1993-1994. Because one of the survey's objectives is to capture racial and ethnic attitudes of minorities, they include large samples of Latinos, Asians, and Blacks in addition to asking questions about how minorities view themselves as well as view other groups. The Multi City Study of Urban Inequality conducted 865 Latino interviews in Los Angeles over 1993 and 1994. The perceived discrim-ination variable in this survey asks how much discrimination they think Hispanics face that hurts them economically. Respondents who stated "a lot" and "some discrimination" are coded 1, and respondents who stated there was "none" or "a little discrimination" are coded 0. This survey used linked fate as their identity question. Latino respondents were asked, "do you think what happens generally to Hispanic people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" Responses are coded 1 for those who said yes and 0 for those who said no.

Next I examine the Los Angeles County Social Survey of 1994. While limited to Lati-nos living in the greater Los Angeles area, this survey was conducted during the height

of prop 187 so if the political climate is influencing identity, we might find an increase in group consciousness during this year. The item that I use to measure group consciousness in this survey asks "When thinking about social and political issues, do you think of yourself as a member of a particular racial or ethnic group or do you think of yourself as mainly American?". Responses are collapsed into a binary variable coded 1 for those who think of themselves as only ethic, or ethnic and then American, and 0 otherwise. The discrimination variable in this survey is worded "How often do members of your group experience discrimination." Responses are coded 1 for experiencing discrimination, and 0 represents respondents who report never experiencing discrimination.

From 1998 to 2000, the Mexican American Study Project II was conducted in the greater Los Angeles and San Antonio areas. It has 384 complete observations of Mexican Americans living in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. While it is limited to only Mexican American respondents, California's Latino population is largely comprised of Mexican Americans (they make up roughly 80% of all Latinos in the United States). Respondents to the MASP survey were asked "Do you agree that Mexican Americans should work together politically" Responses were coded 1 for those who stated they should work together for political or social reasons, or 0 for those who stated otherwise. Perceived discrimination in this survey asks, "How much discrimination do you think there is today against people of Mexican origin?" This variable is coded 1 for those who perceive discrimination, and 0 for those who say there is no discrimination.

In 1999, the Washington Post Kaiser Family Foundation Harvard University National Survey of Latinos was conducted. This survey has 301 respondents from California. From this survey, two questions were combined and scaled to a single additive index variable to capture group consciousness. The questions used to make the scale ask, "Do you agree/disagree with the statement that Latinos in the United States share FEW political goals?" and "Do you think that if various Latino groups worked together politically Latinos would be better off, worse off, or it wouldn't make much difference?" These responses were scaled between 0-1, in which 0 represents respondents with no group consciousness, and 1 represents respondents with the highest level of group consciousness. This scale was then recoded into a

binary 0-1 variable. Of the intermediate responses only those who gave the highest response on one of the questions and a middle response in the other are coded 1. All other values are collapsed into the zero category. While the α for this scale seems low (.17) these two characteristics of common goals and improving the group's standing by working together are how group consciousness is conceptualized and similar scales have been used in the past (Masuoka, 2006). Perceived discrimination in this survey is stated, "is discrimination against Latinos in our society today a problem, or not a problem?" This variable is coded 1 for discrimination is a problem, and 0 for discrimination is not a problem.

The Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation also conducted a survey in 2002. From this survey two measures were combined to measure group consciousness. The first question asks respondents if they think that "Latinos form different counties share one Hispanic/Latino culture or all have separate and distinct cultures." The second question used to make up the group consciousness measure asks if "Hispanics/Latinos from different countries are working together to achieve common political goals, or are not working together politically." The perceived discrimination measure in this survey asks in "general, do you think discrimination agains Latinos/Hispanics is a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America?" Respondents who said discrimination is not a problem are coded 0 while those indicating it is a major or minor problem are coded 1. In total, this survey provides me with 611 respondents from California.

The final survey I will use in my analysis is the 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation Pew Hispanic Center Latino Survey on Politics. This survey had fewer questions that are related to group identity, so group consciousness is measured using a single item, "Which comes closer to your views Hispanics/ Latinos from different counties today are working together to achieve common political goals or are not working together politically." Respondents who say Latinos are working together are coded 1 and those who believe they are not working together are coded 0. In total this survey provides me with 615 additional California respondents.

Figure 2.2 displays the responses for perceived discrimination by survey. While the number of respondents who perceived discrimination is high even in the earlier surveys, there is a slight uptick during the proposition period with perceived discrimination towards

Latinos declining in the 2000s. This seems to be in line with the idea that these propositions increased the saliency of threat and discrimination towards the group. I expect that this increase in perceived discrimination will become correlated with group consciousness after the initial experience of threat.

Figure 2.2: Perceived Discrimination by Survey

To conduct my analysis, I start by running a logistic regression on each survey[7]. For each survey I model group consciousness as my dependent variable, and focus on perceived discrimination as my key independent variable. In these models I control for citizenship status, whether or not the respondent is U.S. or foreign born, and partisanship. In addition to these questions, I also control for language of interview, gender, age, education and income. As a robustness check, I also ran ordinary least squares regressions on each survey allowing for the original number of categories in the group consciousness models, the results from these regressions can be found in the appendix along with the original distributions of the group consciousness variables. The OLS regression results provide similar findings to the logistic regression models.

After running my analysis on each survey, I then pool all of the surveys together into a single dataset that spans 15 years. The data was then reweighed using census demographic

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[7]for the individual regressions, the data are not weighted.

data on age, gender, and education information on the California Latino population. I used the 1990, 2000, and 2010 census data points and conducted a linear imputation of the census data so as not to have any drastic changes in the survey weights as the years progressed. For the pooled analysis, I also create a dummy variables for the time frame of interview. Interviews conducted between 1989 and 1993 are in the pre-proposition period, interviews between 1994-1998 are in the "during" period, and interviews conducted in or after 1999 are in the "post" period. Interviews in the pre proposition period are used as the reference category in my model. In total, I have 3,850 respondents across the 15 years. Interviews in the pre-proposition period are used as the reference category in my model. I run interactions between the time period and perceived discrimination for the pooled analysis. I expect that perceived discrimination interacted with the proposition time period to have a large and statistically significant effect, while perceived discrimination prior to the propositions will not have any effect on group consciousness. Furthermore, I expect that perceived discrimination will continue to be statistically significant and positively correlated with group consciousness even in the post proposition time period. In an ideal scenario, I would have data from another state for all of the surveys to run a difference in difference model to see if the changes in identity measures are just in California or if they are observable elsewhere. Unfortunately, since many of these surveys are California specific, I am unable to do so. However by testing my analysis in these two ways, I am able to have more confidence in my results.

In addition to these main findings, I expect that respondents who are foreign born are going to be more likely to perceive discrimination because they are likely to both know more undocumented immigrants and relate to the challenges of the undocumented given that they too are foreign born and immigrated to the United States. I also test whether there appears to be a stronger effect for college educated individuals who are more likely to have heard of these propositions.

2.5   Results from Individual California Regressions

The results from the individual surveys generally indicate that my hypotheses are correct. Examining the results from the LNPS which was conducted prior to the proposition period, perceived discrimination is not a predictor of group consciousness. In fact, in the time period prior to the propositions in the LNPS, the only variable that is associated with an increase in group consciousness at a statistically significant level is income. Because results from logistic regressions are not interpretable, I present the difference in going from the minimum to the maximum level for each of the covariates in figure 2.3. Feelings of group unity and perceived common goals are not yet based on discrimination. For those who are interested, the logistic regression tables can be found in the chapter appendix.

Figure 2.3: LNPS (89-90) Marginal Effects

Figure 2.4: Urban Inequality (93-94) Marginal Effects

Urban Inequality 1993-1994
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

Figure 2.5: LACSS (94) Marginal Effects

LACSS 1994
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

Figure 2.6: MASP (98-00) Marginal Effects

MASP 1997-2000
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

Figure 2.7: Kaiser 1999 Marginal Effects

Kaiser 1999
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

Figure 2.8: Kaiser 2002 Marginal Effects

Kaiser 2002
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

Figure 2.9: Kaiser 2004 Marginal Effects

Kaiser 2004
Marginal Effect of going from Min to Max
on reported Group Consciousness

For the first surveys in which data was collected during the proposition period, I find
that perceived discrimination is positively associated with group consciousness and the effect
is statistically different from zero. This is a sign that something is changing among Latinos

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in the state. The marginal effects plot for the Multi City Study of Urban Inequality can be found in figure 2.4. Those who perceive discrimination are associated with a 15% marginal increase in group consciousness. A similar trend can be found in the LACSS survey of 1994. In the 1994 survey, respondents who perceive group discrimination are 17% more likely to report group consciousness compared to those who say they do not perceive discrimination.

For the surveys that were conducted at the tail end and after the proposition period, the survey results are mixed. In the MASP which was conducted between 1998-2000, I find that perceived discrimination is still positively associated with group consciousness. While the MASP was conducted both during and after the proposition period, I find that respondents who report that they perceive discrimination towards Latinos are associated with a 19% increase in their predicted probability of reporting group consciousness. The Kaiser Washington Post Harvard study was conducted after the proposition period in 1999, and in this survey we see that perceived discrimination fails to reach statistical significance. This may indicate that perceived discrimination is only associated with an increase in group consciousness during the proposition period[8]. Similar to the 1999 results, in the 2002 and the 2004 samples perceived discrimination is no longer correlated with group consciousness at a statistically significant level. In 2002, the only variable that is statistically significant is being foreign born, and it actually negatively associated with group consciousness. This may be because the group consciousness measure includes a measure of cultural distinctiveness among national origin groups. However in 2004, I find that being foreign born is positively associated with group consciousness.

Figure 2.10 displays the marginal effect of perceived discrimination on group consciousness from each individual regression in a single plot. Here we can more clearly see the significance of perceived discrimination on group consciousness during the proposition period. While perceived discrimination is positive and statistically significant during the proposition period, the effect of perceived discrimination diminishes in the post proposition period.

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[8]In the OLS model when group consciousness has many categories perceived discrimination is statistically significant in 1999 but this is not the case for 2002 or 2004

Figure 2.10: Perceived Discrimination Marginal Effect by Survey

2.6 Pooled Models

The pooled analysis helps provide a clearer picture between the relationship of perceived discrimination and group consciousness over time. Instead of grouping respondents by survey, I group respondents by period of interview. This allows me to separate respondents from surveys that were conducted during multiple time periods. The period prior to the propositions includes all respondents who were interviewed between 1989-1993, the during period includes respondents from 1994-1998, and the post period includes respondents who were interviewed from 1999-2004. Using the pre-proposition period as my reference category, and running interactions with time period and perceived discrimination, I find that being in the time period during the propositions (1994-1998) and after the propositions (1999-2004) is associated with a substantial increase in the predicted probability of reporting group consciousness. Furthermore, when perceived discrimination is interacted with time period, there is a strong and positive effect of perceived discrimination during the proposition period.

However, the interaction between perceived discrimination and the post proposition period is not statistically significant, indicating that the perceived discrimination's relationship to group consciousness was most salient during the proposition period. In the pooled analysis, I also find that identifying as a Democrat is associated with an increase in the respondent's predicted probability of reporting group consciousness. Given that the Republican Party supported these propositions, this finding is unsurprising. Interestingly, being a U.S. citizen is associated with a decrease in group consciousness. Roughly half of the respondents in the survey are U.S. citizens. This suggests that people who are either legal residents or undocumented likely felt more politically threatened by these propositions than U.S. citizens.

Figure 2.11: Pooled Data Marginal Effects

What is noteworthy, is that perceived discrimination is only correlated with group consciousness during periods of heightened group threat. This relationship more clearly

demonstrated in figure 2.12. Prior to prop 187 the correlation between perceived group discrimination and group consciousness is basically 0. But during the proposition period perceiving discrimination is associated with a 23% increase in the predicted probability of being group conscious. After the proposition period perceived discrimination is positively correlated, but not at a statistically significant level. This suggests that while perceived discrimination is important when group consciousness is formed, it is not necessary to sustain group consciousness as time goes on.

Figure 2.12: Marginal Effect of Perceived Discrimination by Time

In order to measure exposure to the propositions, I ran the pooled model only on respondents with at least some college and then ran a separate analysis on respondents with no college[9]. I expect that those who are more educated are more likely to be more informed and perceive higher levels of discrimination which will be associated with an increase in group

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[9]All split sample models are unweighted.

consciousness. The results indicate that the more educated respondents are more likely to perceive discrimination and that it would be positively associated with group consciousness during the proposition time period. But those with no college experience a similar size increase in group consciousness when they perceive discrimination. Looking at figure 2.13, the results indicate that in the time period prior to the propositions, individuals who have at least some college and perceive discrimination may have actually been less group conscious although not at a level of statistical significance. This may suggest that Latinos who were well educated actually distanced themselves from other Latinos and were less likely to view themselves as part of the group. However during the proposition period, for individuals with at least some college perceiving discrimination is associated with a 28% increase in their predicted probability of responding that they had group consciousness. We see the correlation between perceived discrimination and group consciousness diminish after the proposition period among all three samples.

Figure 2.13: Marginal Effect by Education

Marginal Effect of going from 0 to 1 on
Perceived Discrimination by Education level

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
Figure 2.14: Ladder Plot Nativity

Marginal Effect of going from 0 to 1 on
Perceived Discrimination by Nativity

Legend: Foreign-Born — Full Sample — US Born

In addition to the more educated, I also hypothesized that foreign born respondents would be more aware of these propositions. Since some of the foreign born respondents are undocumented, or know others who are undocumented, I expect that they are more likely to find these propositions as threatening. My subsample analysis indicates that the correlation between perceived discrimination and group consciousness may be driven by foreign born respondents. For foreign born respondents, perceiving discrimination during the proposition period is associated with a 25% increase in their predicted probability of reporting group consciousness. I speculate that this is the case because many immigrants come to the United States full of promise, and a strong belief in the American dream in which anyone can work hard and get ahead. However, seeing the commercials and learning about the anti-immigrant propositions likely increased their awareness of the out-group status of Latinos in US society.

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This is less likely to be the case for US respondents who were socialized in the US and are more aware of the racial hierarchy, which may be why perceived discrimination fails to reach a statistically significant effect among U.S. born respondents during any of the time periods.

2.7 Discussion

While many have studied these propositions, this is the first project to look at the growth of group consciousness before, during, and after the proposition period. Testing the connection between group consciousness and perceived discrimination, I find that respondents who were surveyed during the proposition period and perceive discrimination are more likely to report group consciousness. The results for the proposition time period are distinct from the pre-proposition period in which the effect of perceived discrimination on group consciousness is null. After the proposition period, while perceived discrimination appears to be positively associated with group consciousness it fails to reach statistical significance.

This suggests that perceived discrimination serves as a catalyst that starts to raise awareness about belonging to a larger group and wanting to work to improve the group's condition. While perceived discrimination and group consciousness increases during particularly hostile time periods, as the immediate political threat fades, so too does that initial link. But this does not result in lower levels of group consciousness instead group consciousness remains high even after the proposition period. While the connection between perceived discrimination and group consciousness may fade, it is possible that group consciousness becomes socialized without its initial source of political discrimination. This would lead to a community that is more likely to identify with and work on behalf of their group without perceiving wide spread discrimination. The results from the sub-sample analysis on foreign born respondents also indicates that threat may help foster a sense of group consciousness among the segment of the Latino population that would be most unfamiliar with the discrimination that racial minorities face in the United States.

This chapter can serve as a framework to understand what is happening with Latino identity and political participation at the national level. Given the current political climate

in which immigrants and Latinos have become political targets at the national level, it would be unsurprising to find that perceived discrimination is fostering a more unified, and potentially politicized Latino population.

These initial results are promising. They suggest that perceived discrimination can serve to increase group consciousness during contentious political times which may lead to a more involved and efficacious Latino population in the state of California. While there some shortcomings in studying identity in with cross sectional data, it is one of the only ways that we as researchers are able to retrospectively answer critical questions about identity activation among the largest minority group in the United States. While the use of these separate data sets enabled me to explore the connection between threat and politicized identity, the different ways in which identity is measured in each survey leaves room for question. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that the increase in group consciousness that is found during the proposition period is not due to question wording. Also because the data is cross sectional the different samples could potentially impact the results. While I did my best to dispel these concerns by reweighting the data and conducting robustness checks, these concerns still linger.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the different ways in which identity is measured in political science, and what the use and measurement of these items portend for our understanding of how identity influences political attitudes and participation. I start by reviewing the literature on identity, focusing in on the measurement of group consciousness. I then compare group consciousness to other identity measures and examine how these identity measures perform relative to one another when examining their association to political attitudes and behaviors.

2.8   Additional Tables and Figures

Figure 2.15: Unstandardized Identity Measures by Survey

Figure 2.16: Dependent Variable Over Time

Group Consciousness Over Time

Table 2.1: Modeling correlates of group consciousness in each survey logistic regression

	LNPS	Urban Inequality	LACSS 94	MASP	Kaiser99	Kaiser02	Kaiser04
Democrat	0.539	0.514	0.777	−0.026	−0.077	0.100	0.122
	(0.387)	(0.349)	(0.555)	(0.334)	(0.309)	(0.204)	(0.179)
Independent	−0.085	−0.159	0.364	−0.749	−0.479	−0.544*	−0.131
	(0.531)	(0.392)	(0.550)	(0.502)	(0.593)	(0.216)	(0.382)
Non-identifier	−0.209	−0.327	0.637	−2.456*	−0.079	0.017	−0.454
	(0.501)	(0.348)	(0.572)	(1.075)	(0.372)	(0.271)	(0.379)
U.S. citizen	−1.233	−0.513	−0.978*	0.007	−0.576	−0.461	−0.018
	(0.680)	(0.328)	(0.487)	(0.523)	(0.384)	(0.248)	(0.267)
Perceived Discrimination	−0.240	0.796***	1.263*	1.279*	0.285	0.099	0.169
	(0.321)	(0.213)	(0.571)	(0.545)	(0.349)	(0.214)	(0.210)
Foreign Born	−1.023	−0.038	0.948	0.923*	−0.174	−0.805**	0.639*
	(0.657)	(0.434)	(0.508)	(0.405)	(0.388)	(0.276)	(0.286)
Interviewed in Spanish	−0.498	−0.131	−0.850	0.649	0.242	0.202	−0.599*
	(0.410)	(0.359)	(0.456)	(0.437)	(0.387)	(0.261)	(0.283)
Female	−0.042	0.145	−0.017	0.435	−0.008	0.056	0.374*
	(0.272)	(0.159)	(0.323)	(0.242)	(0.254)	(0.167)	(0.169)
Age	0.020*	−0.019**	−0.025	−0.042***	0.010	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.336*	0.142	0.082	0.104	−0.275*	0.084	−0.050
	(0.161)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.077)	(0.074)
Income	0.653***	0.121	−0.055	−0.086	−0.131	−0.142	−0.208
	(0.191)	(0.161)	(0.264)	(0.152)	(0.182)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Constant	−1.869	0.860	−1.658	−1.121	1.026	0.840	0.083
	(1.004)	(0.627)	(1.153)	(1.071)	(0.704)	(0.527)	(0.495)
Observations	643	864	242	579	296	611	615
Log Likelihood	−200.502	−491.970	−129.074	−242.576	−189.657	−413.093	−409.686
Akaike Inf. Crit.	425.004	1,007.941	282.148	509.152	403.315	850.185	843.373

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2.2: Regression tables by subsets

	Full Sample	Foreign Born	U.S. Born	No College	College
Democrat	0.345***	0.223	0.235	0.276*	0.060
	(0.092)	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.115)	(0.169)
Independent	−0.042	−0.518***	0.027	−0.330*	−0.028
	(0.114)	(0.156)	(0.191)	(0.139)	(0.244)
Non-identifier	0.145	−0.033	0.187	0.194	−0.014
	(0.117)	(0.149)	(0.205)	(0.131)	(0.259)
US citizen	−0.493***	−0.475***	−13.767	−0.238	−0.788**
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(324.744)	(0.138)	(0.256)
Perceived discrimination	−0.106	−0.001	−0.285	0.134	−1.254
	(0.248)	(0.330)	(0.422)	(0.274)	(0.804)
During	1.057***	1.432***	0.570	1.386***	−0.370
	(0.267)	(0.353)	(0.448)	(0.296)	(0.832)
Post	1.627***	1.964***	1.139**	1.801***	0.737
	(0.246)	(0.342)	(0.420)	(0.292)	(0.714)
Foreign Born	−0.246			0.192	−0.115
	(0.129)			(0.164)	(0.205)
Interviewed in Spanish	−0.139	0.097	−0.051	0.110	0.050
	(0.109)	(0.150)	(0.199)	(0.138)	(0.220)
Female	0.123	0.121	0.055	0.034	0.252
	(0.070)	(0.094)	(0.111)	(0.082)	(0.142)
Age	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.020***	−0.021***	−0.009
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Education	−0.096**	−0.060	−0.165**		
	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.055)		
Income	−0.066	−0.053	−0.089	−0.125	−0.130
	(0.053)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.091)
Perceived * During	0.857**	1.154**	0.429	0.563`	2.175*
	(0.296)	(0.396)	(0.490)	(0.327)	(0.937)
Perceived *Post	0.240	0.075	0.362	−0.063	1.243
	(0.277)	(0.381)	(0.459)	(0.325)	(0.827)
Constant	−0.641*	−1.349***	13.632	−1.144***	0.068
	(0.296)	(0.391)	(324.744)	(0.327)	(0.767)
Observations	3,850	2,239	1,611	2,909	941

Note: `p<0.10;*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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Table 2.3: OLS regression results allowing for GC variable to range full scale

	LNPS	Urban Inequality	LACSS 94	MASP	Kaiser99	Kaiser02	Kaiser04
Democrat	0.042	0.090	0.099	−0.020	−0.012	0.036	0.028
	(0.028)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.130)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Independent	0.013	−0.028	0.004	−0.312	−0.039	−0.079*	−0.032
	(0.036)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.177)	(0.076)	(0.034)	(0.092)
Non-identifier	−0.034	−0.060	0.021	−0.529**	−0.045	0.031	−0.104
	(0.034)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.200)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.086)
US citizen	−0.006	−0.102	−0.192*	0.060	−0.058	−0.049	−0.003
	(0.041)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.205)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.064)
Perceived discrimination	−0.010	0.171***	0.162*	0.351*	0.090*	−0.006	0.039
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.139)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.050)
Foreign Born	0.015	−0.023	0.122	0.405**	−0.027	−0.071	0.151*
	(0.040)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.150)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.068)
Interviewed in Spanish	−0.084**	−0.019	−0.143	0.190	0.075	0.035	−0.140*
	(0.030)	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.154)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.066)
Female	−0.003	0.028	−0.047	0.147	−0.004	0.027	0.088*
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.085)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.040)
Age	0.001	−0.004**	−0.005*	−0.015***	0.001	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	−0.020	0.026	0.026	0.028	−0.026	0.010	−0.012
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Income	0.038*	0.021	−0.037	−0.044	−0.014	−0.023	−0.049
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.029)
Constant	0.301***	0.694***	0.332	0.785*	0.730***	0.410***	0.517***
	(0.068)	(0.123)	(0.172)	(0.375)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.119)
Observations	643	864	242	579	296	611	615
R^2	0.054	0.055	0.141	0.075	0.121	0.028	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.043	0.099	0.058	0.087	0.010	0.015

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

CHAPTER 3

Reconceptualizing Identity

In the previous chapter, I outlined a theory of how Latino identity can become politicized due to political threat. I find that during periods of threat, the saliency of a politicized identity increases. After periods of political threat, Californians experienced higher levels of politicized identity when compared to the pre-proposition time period. However, one of the main challenges to this finding is the inconsistency of the identity measures that are used over time. A person might reasonably ask whether the increase in politicized identity is not an artifact due to the different question wording used in each survey. I concede that this is a criticism that I can not rule out. However, as discussed in previous chapters, there has not been a consistent set of questions used to measure group consciousness since the measure was first introduced and other identity measures such as identity centrality and linked fate are sometimes substituted when a suitable set of group consciousness variables can not be found.

This chapter will examine the use of different identity measures that are commonly used in political science. I will focus in on three measures in particular- group consciousness, identity centrality, and linked fate. I will examine how these measures relate to and explain political participation among Latinos in the United States, starting with an overview and examination of the literature as it applies to Latinos in the United States. What do we know about Latinos and these three identity measures? What do we still need to explore? Given the different theoretical underpinnings of these measures, a more nuanced understanding of the literature and the connection of these identity items to political participation and partisanship is necessary. In addition to reviewing the literature, I use the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) to examine these measures and explain where we

can find similarities between these three measures and how each measure relates to political efficacy, attitudes and behaviors.

By reviewing the literature and examining these measures in recent surveys of Latinos, this chapter will shed light on which identity measures relate to political attitudes and behavior of Latinos in the United States. This chapter will explore not only the theoretical differences outlined in McClain et al. (2009) which caution researchers against using the measures interchangeably, but will explore if these identity measures are applicable to Latinos. I argue that we should be more cautious in using linked fate as an identity measure outside of Black politics, and examine the connection between group consciousness and identity centrality to political attitudes and behaviors.

3.1 Group Consciousness Literature

Group consciousness was born out of political science literature that sought to explain why all things being equal, Blacks participated in politics at higher rates than whites (Verba and Nie, 1971; Miller et al., 1981; Gurin and Epps, 1975; Shingles, 1981). These early works argued that the combination of political efficacy and mistrust is due to group consciousness and the realization that the challenges Blacks face in terms of social and economic inequality are systemic and not the fault of the individual (Shingles, 1981). It is theorized that because of this, Blacks are more efficacious in the United States.

Group consciousness is often used in political science to explain political attitudes and behaviors among minority groups. While it was first developed to explain Black political participation, Miller et al. (1981) found that this identity measure can apply to other groups such as class and gender, though it worked best when comparing Blacks to whites. They found that politicized group consciousness increases electoral participation among those who strongly identify with their group. They also found that group conscious individuals were more likely to be involved in political campaigns and were more likely to contact political officials than those with low levels of group consciousness. But what exactly does it mean to be group conscious?

Group consciousness is based off of four main dimensions. The first is identifying with and feeling like you belong to a particular group. Group identification can help group members feel as if they are on a similar dimension with other group members. The second component of group consciousness is polar affect or in-group favoritism. Group favoritism is most likely to arise when there is conflict or struggle with another group. The third aspect of group consciousness is polar power- the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group's status or material resources when compared to that of the out-group. And finally, the last component of group consciousness is individual versus system blame. This is the belief that the reason why the group is lower in status is due to inequities of the broader social system rather than the individual members of the group (Miller et al., 1981). While the theory of group consciousness initially outlined four key dimensions, they found that in group favoritism is not a necessary component of group consciousness and group consciousness can be sufficiently measured using three dimensions. Miller et. al's 1981 formulation of group consciousness has been widely adopted in political science despite the fact that the measurement of group consciousness has varied significantly.

3.1.1 Group Consciousness as Applied to Latino Panethnicity

Sociologist Felix Padilla (1984) was one of the first to write about group consciousness among Latinos. Looking at relations between Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans in Chicago, he came to the conclusion that panethnic Latino identity is situational. He states that panethnicity is an intergroup identity that reflects a consciousness of group commonality that is derived from shared cultural characteristics, and a recognition that members of the group are different from other members of social groups in the United States. Padilla argues that people can adopt and shed this identity depending on the situation that they find themselves in. This identity is defined by the group's common language (Spanish) and the fact that activists use panethnicity as an organizing force. Group leaders have come to recognize that by joining forces they can have greater political impact, and issues that affect the group can be better advocated with the use of this situational identity (Padilla, 1985).

It is also the case that Spanish language media can help foster and increase the salience of panethnic identity (Mora, 2014). Kerevel (2011) finds that more frequent use of Spanish media leads to more liberal views of immigration and is correlated with having higher levels the different dimensions of linked fate. Kerevel (2011) measures group consciousness using three different dimensions building off of Sanchez's (2006) work. Using the dimensions of group commonality, an awareness of the group's relative position in society and a willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of the group, the questions used to measure group consciousness ask respondents how important it is for Latinos to maintain their culture, if discrimination towards Latinos is a problem, and whether or not the respondent believes Latinos can work together to achieve common political goals. Using separate regression models for each dimension of group consciousness, Kerevel (2011) finds that Latinos who more frequently use Spanish language media are more likely to feel that Latinos are working together towards a common political goal, are more likely to think discrimination towards Latinos is a major problem, and are more likely to think that maintaining Latino culture is very important.

Other works have also found that Spanish language media are instrumental in organizing Latinos with group appeals (Ramirez, 2013). Looking at the 2006 immigration marches, Ramirez (2013) explains the importance of Spanish language radio as a medium for informing Latinos in different cities about the marches. The popularity of the radio hosts meant that information about the immigration marches went out to a large audience, and increased the salience of a panethnic identity with a common cause. This ensured strong support for the immigration marches that united Latinos of many different national origin groups.

While these works focus on community organizing, there have been a number of scholars in political science who have studied Latino group consciousness and it's connection to voting and other forms of political participation such as contacting elected officials in the United States. Stokes (2003) for instance, examines the link between group consciousness and political participation among Latinos, using four different variables to capture the multidimensionality of group consciousness. To measure group identification she uses the respondent's willingness to use a panethnic identifier, for polar power she uses responses for

how satisfied individuals are with the group's status and material resources, and measures polar affect as feelings towards non-Latinos (Stokes, 2003). Stokes (2003) measures systemic blame as whether respondents credit the position of their group and failure to succeed as due to individual shortcomings or systematic inequality. While she does not include all of the measures used by Miller et al. (1981) Stokes (2003) captures the multidimensional spirit of group consciousness, but opts not to run interactive effects as Miller et al. (1981) would suggest. Her political participation measure is an additive scale of 8 different political actions. They are voting in 1988 presidential election, attending political rallies, donating money to a political candidate or party, signing a petition, writing to public officials or editors, attending public meetings, and wearing or displaying campaign buttons or bumper stickers. Her findings indicate that that group identification, polar power, and systemic blame are all positively correlated with political participation, suggesting that Latinos are capable of having a politicized Latino identity even if Latino identity is situational. However because Stokes uses an additive scale for her participation measures, from this study it is difficult to know if some of these political actions have a stronger correlation with group consciousness than others.

Other works have examined group consciousness in varying ways that seek to capture the multidimensional nature of group consciousness. However unlike Miller et al. (1981), they often operationalize the measure as separate dimensions without running an interactive effect. Sanchez (2006) uses a commonality scale to measure how close Latinos of different national origin groups felt to one another (Central/ South Americans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Cubans). He also uses a measure of political commonality (Latinos share few political goals and interests) which could possibly fit under the identity dimension or polar power dimension of group consciousness. A question of perceived societal discrimination is used to measure measure polar power in society, and a final question that appears most apt to measure systemic blame asks if the respondent believes Latinos would be better off if Latino groups worked together politically. He finds that the role of group consciousness varies based off of how ethnically salient the issue is. But more specifically, the role of discrimination which he uses to operationalize polar power is the variable that more consistently motivates support

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for ethnically salient issues like bilingual education and immigration, but does not impact views on the non-ethnically salient issues of abortion and the death penalty.

As previously noted, group consciousness was borne out of the Black politics literature and it was thought that the shared history of discrimination and struggle for civil rights in the U.S. may be the reason why all things being equal, Blacks are more participatory. While Miller et al. (1981) state that other groups may be group conscious, Masuoka (2006) explores what it is that makes Latinos group conscious. She flips the script and examines group consciousness as the dependent variable in a single additive scale. Masuoka (2006) finds that Latinos with higher levels of education and those who believe discrimination is a problem are associated with higher levels of group consciousness while those who actually experience discrimination firsthand are likely to have lower levels of group consciousness. In building her framework for group consciousness, Masuoka (2006) draws heavily on Dawson's (1994) measure of linked fate and does not incorporate the multidimensional framework laid out by Miller et al. (1981). Latino group consciousness is operationalized using three measures; the first asks if the respondent believes Latinos in the United States share few similar goals, the second asks if the respondent believes Latinos are working together to achieve common political goals, and the final question asks if Latinos groups worked together politically if the group would be better or worse off (Masuoka, 2006). These measures are a blend of linked fate and group consciousness rather than strictly following in one identity category (Miller et al., 1981; Dawson, 1994).

Looking at the three dimensions of group consciousness that Miller et al. (1981) argued worked best leaves us with group identification, polar power, and system blame. Do the measures employed by Sanchez and Vargas (2016) of group commonality, working together, and perceiving societal discrimination actually tap in to these dimensions? If we examine polar power, which is defined as influence and power relative to the out-group, the closest of the three substitute measures is perceived discrimination (Miller et al., 1981). While perceived societal discrimination may be one aspect of the polar power dynamics [1], it falls

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[1] polar power is operationalized by Miller et al. (1981) by asking respondents two questions regarding how much power the dominant and subordinate groups have in society

short in capturing the power dynamics of dominant and subordinate groups in the United States. It is possible that perceived group discrimination can be a part of the polar power dimension of group consciousness, but it seems more likely that some forms of perceived societal discrimination may also serve as a catalyst group consciousness similar in nature to Masuoka's 2006 model for group consciousness formation. This should be especially true for minority groups that have a different historical experience in the United States. Those who perceive discrimination are more likely to hold a politicized identity which manifests in the form of group consciousness.

In a study of group consciousness and linked fate, Sanchez and Vargas (2016) find that Latinos have high levels of group consciousness. Through the use factor loadings and biplots they demonstrate that these two identity measures are distinct from one another, and how the measures are interpreted differently by different racial groups. Furthering their investigation of group consciousness among Latinos, they find that group consciousness works as an additive measure and does not necessarily need to be run using interactive effects. To measure group consciousness they use "how close do you feel to Hispanics in your ideas, interests, and feelings about each other? Is it important for people to work together to improve the position of their racial or ethnic group, and how much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think Hispanics face in the U.S.? While this measure is similar to the more recent works of group consciousness, its similarity to Miller et al. (1981)'s original scale is still lacking.

This section outlines how scholars have used of Miller et al.'s framework of group consciousness to motivate their research on the connection between Latino identity and politics (Stokes, 2003; Sanchez, 2006; Masuoka, 2006). But, the issues surrounding the measurement of group consciousness still abound. Additionally while some studies have used group consciousness to explain attitudes on ethnically salient political issues, others focus on a wide range of political activities. This leaves us wondering which version of group consciousness should we use when trying to explain different forms of political participation?

3.2 Latino Linked Fate Literature

Linked fate is a measure that is often described as a heuristic, in which group members use what is best for the group as a shortcut for figuring out what is best for the individual (Dawson, 1994). Because of the unique experience of Black Americans, many of whom can trace their ancestry back to America's history of slavery, there is a feeling of connectedness and shared historical experiences that shape members of the group. In his seminal book Behind the Mule (1994), Dawson explains that because of this shared experience, linked fate is more likely to be associated with policy views held by Black Americans than political participation (McClain et al., 2009; Dawson, 1994). While Dawson's work describes how linked fate is rooted in the Black experience, recent work on linked fate has argued that linked fate can be found among many of different groups (Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016).

Latino politics scholars have examined liked fate among ethnic and panethnic identities, but while the Black politics literature examines how linked fate influences political participation and political attitudes, much of the Latino politics literature has focused on who is most likely to hold a sense of linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Masuoka, 2006; Sanchez, Masuoka and Abrams, 2019; Wilcox-Archuleta, 2018). Works that have focused on the political implications of Latino linked fate have been somewhat inconclusive in answering what political attitudes and behaviors linked fate is associated with.

Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) for instance, discuss panethnicity, immigrant history, and a racialized identity as possible factors that are associated with an increase in Latino linked fate. They find that Latinos with low levels of income are more likely to hold a sense of Latino linked fate, and those with high levels of education are also likely to hold higher levels of linked fate. Latinos who are more recent immigrants are also more likely to hold higher levels of linked fate, but unlike Black Americans, experiences with discrimination did not have an effect on levels of Latino linked fate. They state that linked fate which is less common among Latinos than Blacks can be found, but panethnic linked fate has different roots than what Dawson found among Blacks.

Lower levels of Latino linked fate have been noted over the last 10 years. Segura (2012) writes that low levels of linked fate may be due to the fact that Latinos are more individualistic as a group. Latinos are for instance, are more likely to rank higher on questions surrounding self reliance. When asked "If racial and ethnic minorities don't do well in life they have no one to blame but themselves" Latinos are more likely to agree with the statement than other racial groups. This is to be expected when we remember that many Latinos are immigrants or children of immigrants who believed that if they could come to the United States they would be able to get ahead and create a better life for their families. But this does not preclude them from having linked fate. Other studies have found that being close to the immigrant experience is associated with higher levels of linked fate (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Chavez, 2013; Massey and Sánchez, 2010; Wiley, Figueroa and Lauricella, 2014). Research has also found that the longer Latinos have been in the United States the more likely they are to increase their awareness of the racial hierarchy and become more dissatisfied with American institutions and processes, if we expect linked fate to arise out of shared experiences of discrimination, then we may see an increase in linked fate among immigrants who have learned about the racial hierarchy in the U.S. (Rumbaut, 2009).

Other studies have also found that the geographic context can also be an important indicator of having higher levels of linked fate. Latinos who interact with and live near other co-ethnics are more likely to identify with the group and believe that their fate is linked with that of the group (Wilcox-Archuleta, 2018). Living among co-ethnics helps reaffirm Latino identity and strengthen the bonds of community. Building feelings of community and commonality in some areas can also help foster a broader sense of linked fate across Latinos. For instance, Segura (2012) found that about half of Latino respondents in the 2006 Latino National Survey felt they had something in common with other Latinos when it came to government services, employment and political power and representation. When asked about linked fate, 63.4 percent said their fate and their group's fate was linked some or a lot to others, and 71.6 said the fate of their national origin group was linked to the fate of other Latinos.

In terms of political participation, there are a couple of studies that have found different

results. Valdez (2009) finds a connection between linked fate and political participation. She looks at registration, voting, and contacting government officials among Latinos. Valdez (2009) finds that individuals who self identify with their national origin group have lower voting and registration rates than Latinos who identify as Latino or Hispanic or who identify as American. She also finds that perceptions of discrimination lead to greater registration rates among those who identify with their national origin group, but she does not find the same effect for Latinos who identify panethnically. However, among respondents who identify panethnically, if they have a strong sense of linked fate they will be even more likely to participate politically. On the other hand, Gay, Hochschild and White (2016) find that holding high levels of linked fate is not associated with party identification, being more ideologically liberal registering to vote, participating in neighborhood associations or engaging in community work. Given that some studies have found a connection between Latino linked fate and participation and others haven't, it is important to evaluate and understand why this might be the case.

3.2.1 Latino Linked Fate Revisited

Studies that compare linked fate of different racial and ethnic groups have found that Latino linked fate is relatively weak (Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). Gay, Hochschild and White (2016) look at linked fate among racial and ethnic groups, religious identity, and gender identity and find that linked fate is held among many of these different groups. But among the racial groups examined, linked fate was lowest among Latinos. Gay, Hochschild and White (2016) also found that linked fate was not associated with political participation measures nor with political identification or ideology among any of the groups examined. The status of the group and the discrimination they face is also not correlated with higher levels of linked fate as Dawson's (1994) theory implies. This suggests that linked fate may not actually be capturing what scholars think it is among any of the groups, and we need to reexamine our use of linked fate as an independent variable that correlates with political attitudes and behaviors.

In Revisiting the Brown-Utility Heuristic Sanchez, Masuoka and Abrams (2019) examine linked fate by using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post Election Survey (CMPS). They find that levels of linked fate are lower in 2016 than they were in 2006 among Latinos. only 18% of respondents in the 2016 CMPS said that what happens to Latinos will affect them a lot compared to the 43% in 2006. These lower levels of linked fate are consistent with Sanchez and Vargas (2016). Sanchez, Masuoka and Abrams (2019) note that part of the reason for lower levels of linked fate may be due to the lower levels of immigrants and Mexican Americans in the CMPS compared to the original study which used the Latino National Survey. They find that while having higher levels of education is associated with holding a stronger sense of linked fate, being foreign born is no longer associated with higher levels of linked fate despite other studies that had reported this connection (Chavez, 2013; Massey and Sánchez, 2010; Wiley, Figueroa and Lauricella, 2014). It is also the case that in 2016 perceived and experienced discrimination is correlated with linked fate unlike their original 2006 findings. The differences in what correlates with linked fate is an indication that using this identity measure to explain political attitudes and participation may not be that effective since the correlates of linked fate varies from survey to survey.

Noting that linked fate seems to work differently for different groups, studies have emphasized that it is important to distinguish what is meant by linked fate (Kim and Yan, 2020). Kim and Yan (2020) argue that linked fate is ambiguous in its meaning because it can be interpreted both positively and negatively. By separating linked fate into separate questions of linked progress and linked hurt, we can better understand the causal mechanism behind linked fate. They argue that by not separating out linked fate, the measure may be inflated due to respondents interpreting the question differently.

Others have argued that linked fate framed as progress might yield higher responses among Latinos because many believe that if they work hard they should be able to get ahead. Thus any shortcomings would not be reflective of the group, but the individual. While Kim and Yan (2020) argue that the ambiguity of the linked fate question inflates linked fate responses, for Latinos in particular, this may explain why Latinos typically have lower linked fate scores when compared to other racial and ethnic groups. Kim and Yan

2020 word linked progress as "when things get better for [respondent's group] in this country then things will get better for me", and linked hurt is worded "when things get worse for [respondent's group] in this country then things will get worse for me". They find that Latinos have higher linked progress scores when compared to linked hurt scores Kim and Yan (2020).

Kim and Rogers (2021a) also note that linked fate is not always tied to group discrimination, and our theoretical understanding of linked fate often does not fit what is found in quantitative studies. They suggest research on linked fate include a qualitative aspect that focuses on the role of elites in shaping this sense of group linked fate. Because elite actors may operationalize linked fate differently, their political implications will vary by group. Quantitatively, we still need a better understanding of how linked fate relates to political opinions and participation.

3.3   Group Solidarity & Identity Centrality

Chong and Rogers (2005) use solidarity as a way of discussing literature on linked fate and group consciousness. They note that the literature on these identity measures have been finding weaker connections to participation. But this may be due to issues of measurement rather than a decrease in feelings of commonality. They argue that more recent studies have moved away from the comprehensive measures used to measure solidarity that focus more on group identification rather than the elements of consciousness. Instead of using multiple items, research has used one item or a combination of identity, closeness, and linked fate to capture group solidarity. They state that discontent with group status and group efficacy are big drivers of the connection between solidarity and politics, and the current literature lacks consensus on the conceptualization and measurement of group solidarity which is why the findings vary from study to study.

But solidarity has also been used as its own measure and not just as a short hand for identity measures. In their 2009 study, Barreto et al. (2009) examine soledaridad in the 2006 immigration marches. They describe solidarity as support for specific group goals that are

distinct from other groups and ideological. Using the 2006 marches as their test for solitary, they look at support for the immigration marches among Latino respondents. Barreto et al. (2009) find broad support for the goals of the immigration marches and found that Latinos of different national origin groups were overwhelmingly supportive of the marches. While it is important to acknowledge works on solidarity, the use of this item has faded away, in part because of the lack of theorizing around the term and the vagueness in which it was employed. Instead, a new identity measure has been borrowed from psychology to shed light on how group identity can influence political attitudes and participation.

3.3.1 Identity Centrality

More common than solidarity in the identity literature, identity centrality, a measure that is often used in psychology, is being employed to examine how identity relates to political participation. Identity centrality is a single item developed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) that asks respondents how central a particular identity is to the way that they see themselves. This item is often used among psychologists who have used the measure in health studies that examine how a sense of self of identity can impact stress and mental health (Shramko, Toomey and Anhalt, 2018; French and Chavez, 2010). But now it is becoming more common to use identity centrality in the area of political psychology

Pérez (2015a) for instance, finds that when exposed to xenophobic rhetoric, high identifying Latinos are more likely to say Latinos should vote for Latino candidates. He also finds that these respondents are more likely to say that Latino children should study and maintain the use of Spanish, and report being more likely to register to vote in the next election. In comparison, low identifiers exposed to the same rhetoric were less likely to support the maintenance of Spanish among U.S. born children and were less likely to say they would vote in the next election. He also finds that high identifiers who are not exposed to xenophobic rhetoric do not report being more likely to vote than low identifiers (Pérez, 2015a,b). While identity centrality does not have the same political connection in it's theoretical construction, like group consciousness, it appears that there is a connection between

identity centrality and political participation. Pérez (2015a) finds that identity centrality produces results that are similar to what we might expect of group conscious individuals.

Other studies have also made a connection between politics and identity centrality. A recent study examined the psychological well being of undocumented immigrants during the 2016 presidential election. Going back to social identity theory theory (SIT), Tajfel and Turner (1979) theorize that when members of a group are discriminated against, individuals can protect their well being by more strongly identifying with the group. Cobb et al. (2019) test whether this is the case among undocumented Latinos living in Texas and Arkansas. They find that perceived discrimination is negatively associated with life satisfaction, but for those whose group identity was more central to their concept of self (i.e. were higher on identity centrality), the effects of discrimination on life satisfaction were weaker (Cobb et al., 2019).

Garcia-Rios, Pedraza and Wilcox-Archuleta (2019) also use identity centrality to measure likelihood of voting for Trump and feelings towards Trump during the 2016 presidential election. They argue that Trump's rhetoric, while strongly anti-immigrant was mostly targeted towards Mexicans. Because of this, high identifying Mexicans should be the group that most dislikes Trump and is the group that is least likely to support vote for him. They focus in on national origin identity centrality and Latino linked fate. They find that Mexican Americans with strong sense of Mexican identity centrality dislike Trump more than Latinos who are from different national origin groups or Mexican Americans with low levels of identity centrality and are less likely to vote for Trump. They find that identity centrality did not produce any meaningful differences in support for Romney over Obama in 2012, or McCain and Obama in 2008, leading to the conclusion that Trump was a specific type of threat that lead high identifying Mexican Americans to reject him more than Latinos of other national origin groups or low identifying Mexican Americans.

The use of identity centrality in political science has its appeal. Unlike group consciousness which has varied in its measurement and implementation, and consists of multiple dimensions, identity centrality is a single item that leaves little room for ambiguity. Additionally unlike linked fate, it is not rooted in any particular experience thus easily lending

itself to many different identities. However, the use of identity centrality is still rather new to political science and we have not seen as widely used as linked fate or group consciousness. It also does not tell us much in terms of what motivates individuals to participate aside from pride in a particular identity.

Given these three measures are currently the three most commonly used to study the connection between identity and politics, it is important for us to understand how they relate to Latino attitudes and political behavior. Should we expect that each identity construct is associated with some, but not other political outcomes? While these identity measures are similar in nature, their theoretical grounding suggests that we should expect to find different results depending on the identity item used, and the outcome examined. The rest of this chapter will focus on these three identity measures in existing surveys and explore how these items relate not only to each other, but also how they relate to the political attitudes and behaviors of Latinos in the United States.

3.4 Examining Identity Measures

Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) I conducted a preliminary analysis on these three identity constructs. I find that there are varying levels of support for these different identity measures. I examine the distributions of these three identity measures to see how prevalent they are among Latinos. Instead of focusing on the identity measures as my dependent variable and the characteristics of people who hold higher levels of these identity measures, I examine how these measures relate to political attitudes and political participation. I also examine how closely these identity measures align to one another.

The 2016 CMPS is a great resource to explore these three identity concepts. They interviewed 3,003 Latinos in the CMPS, providing a robust and representative sample that includes all three identity measures along with questions on political participation and political attitudes. I test a number of different political outcomes. Starting with efficacy, I look to see if group consciousness, identity centrality, or linked fate are associated with having an

interest in politics, believing it is important to vote, and for those eligible, being registered to vote, and voting in the 2016 presidential election. Respondents were told "some people are very interested in politics while other people can't stand politics, how about you?". Responses range from 0-3, where 0 indicates not at all interested in politics and 3 indicates being very interested in politics. Respondents were also asked how important do you think it is to vote compared to other activities. Responses range from 0 "not important at all" to 4 "the most important". Being registered to vote and voting in the 2016 election are coded 0, and 1. Since not everyone is eligible to vote in the CMPS, the N for the registered to vote model is 2,629 respondents, and the model for those who voted in 2016 only includes registered respondents further reducing the N to 1,816.

The second set of regressions taps into partisanship and voting. First I look at the association between the identity measures and Clinton and Trump favorability. This is a five item measure that ranges from very unfavorable (1) to very favorable (5). I then run a model looking at vote choice for the 2016 presidential and congressional elections. Looking only at respondents who said they voted in 2016, I look to see if scoring higher on identity centrality, linked fate, and group consciousness is associated with voting for Hillary Clinton and the Democratic candidate for Congress in 2016.

I then examine a number of political actions to see how the three identity measures relate to different political actions. The actions I examine are attending community meetings, going to a rally or protest, contacting elected officials, donating to a political campaign, and wearing a campaign button or displaying a political bumper sticker. Each item is run as it's own logistic regression. These measures are coded 0 if the respondents have not done the activity, or 1 if they have.

Finally, I look at a number of different policy choices to see if scoring high on the identity measures is correlated with an increase in liberal policy views. I look at four different policy items. Respondents were asked if they agree or disagree with the statements. The first statement is "we need an amendment to the U.S. constitution that would ban gay marriage". The second statement is "middle class families should get a tax cut by having the wealthiest families in America pay a little more in taxes" and the last statement is "undocumented

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immigrants should qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning english, and passing a background check." I also measure support for Black Lives Matter. Respondents are asked "From what you have heard about the Black Lives Matter movement, do you strongly support somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism?" All items range from 0-4, with the most conservative response coded 0 and the most liberal coded 4.

I start by running regressions for each identity measure. I control for a number of demographic variables starting with generation. I use dummy variables for second and third generation plus, with first generation respondents as my omitted category. Education ranges from 1-6 with 1 indicating that the respondent's highest level of education is 8th grade or below, and respondents who are a 2 have had some high school. Respondents whose highest level of education is high school or GED are coded 3, two year degrees are coded 4, college graduates are coded 5, and those with a post graduate education are coded 6. Income is coded 1-12 where respondents on the lowest range of the scale (1) indicate that they make less than $20,000 a year, and respondents on the highest end (12) make $200,000 or more. I also include a dummy variable to capture differences by gender. Finally, I control for national origin by creating dummy variables for South American, Central American, Cuban, Dominican, and Puerto Rican respondents. I use Mexican as my reference category since Mexican Americans make up the largest share of Latinos in the United States.

3.4.1 Identity Centrality in the 2016 CMPS

Starting with identity centrality, I find that this is an important measure for Latino respondents. Identity centrality is measured by asking respondents how important is being Latino to how they view themselves. The majority of respondents indicate that their Latino identity is somewhat or very important. A majority (55%) say that it is very important to how they view themselves while only 4% say that it is not at all important and 9% state that it is not very important. The distribution of identity centrality can be found in 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Latino Identity Centrality Bar Plot

3.4.2 Identity Centrality Regressions

To examine the relationship between identity centrality and efficacy, I ran regressions look-ing at interest in politics, believing it is important to vote, being registered to vote, and voting in the 2016 election. All of these models are OLS regressions with a number of de-mographic control variables the full regression models can be found in table 3.1. I find that identity centrality is positively associated with being interested in politics. Third generation respondents are less interested when compared to first generation respondents, and female respondents show less interest than males. Cuban American respondents are more interested in politics when compared to Mexican Americans, but all of the other national origin groups are less interested when compared to Mexican Americans.

When it comes to thinking that voting is the most important activity, again having higher levels of identity centrality is positively associated with thinking voting is one of the most important activities, as are higher levels of education and income. First generation

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respondents are more likely to think that voting is the most important issue when compared to second and third generation and beyond. Once again females are less likely to think voting is the most important when compared to males, and all other national origin groups are less likely to view voting as the most important. A a one unit change in identity centrality is associated with a .12 increase in interest in politics and a .29 increase in thinking that voting is one of the most important activities. These findings indicate that identity centrality is correlated with an increase in efficacy.

Turning towards registration, I find that identity centrality is positively associated with being registered to vote. A one unit increase in identity centrality is associated with a .02 increase in being registered to vote. Additionally being second or third generation plus is also associated with being registered to vote when compared to first generation respondents. As is generally expected, higher levels of income and education are also more likely to be registered to vote. Looking at voting in 2016, identity centrality is also associated with a .028 increase in voting. Second and third generation and beyond respondents are less likely to have voted relative to first generation respondents. It is also the case that South Americans, Central Americans, Cubans, and Dominicans were less likely to have voted in 2016 when compared to respondents of Mexican origin.

Table 3.2 explores the relationship between identity centrality and candidate favorability as well as vote choice in the 2016 election. These regressions indicate that identity centrality is associated with an increase in favorability and support for Democratic candidates and a decrease in favorability for the 2016 Republican presidential candidate. Without controlling for party identification, I find that a one unit increase in identity centrality is associated with a .288 increase in Clinton favorability. Second and third generation and beyond respondents like Clinton less than first generation respondents. Higher levels of education and income are associated with a decrease in support for Clinton while females are associated with higher favorability ratings when compared to males. Dominicans and Puerto Ricans are more supportive of Clinton relative to Mexican Americans, but South Americans, Central Americans, and Cuban Americans have lower favorability of Clinton relative to Mexican Americans.

	Interest in politics	Important to Vote	Registered to Vote	Voted 2016
Identity Centrality	0.119***	0.287***	0.027**	0.028***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Second Generation	0.001	−0.186***	0.033*	−0.004*
	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Third Generation +	−0.038*	−0.181***	0.010*	−0.020*
	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Education	0.141***	0.188***	0.136***	0.029***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.040***	0.039***	0.026***	0.012***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	−0.294***	−0.119**	−0.063***	−0.010*
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.014)
South American	−0.038*	−0.133*	−0.020*	−0.045*
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Central American	−0.118*	−0.023*	0.004*	−0.062*
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Cuban	0.085*	−0.082*	0.026*	−0.039*
	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Dominican	−0.190*	−0.181*	−0.047*	−0.069*
	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Puerto Rican	−0.234***	−0.131*	0.032*	0.001*
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Constant	0.927***	1.369***	−0.060*	0.651***
	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Observations	3,003	3,003	2,629	1,816
R^2	0.120	0.114	0.206	0.049
Adjusted R^2	0.117	0.110	0.203	0.043

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.2: Partisanship, Voting, and Identity Centrality

	Clinton Favorability	Trump Favorability	Vote Clinton	Vote Dem Congress
Identity Centrality	0.288***	−0.282***	0.116***	0.115***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Second Generation	−0.188**	−0.127*	0.010*	0.063*
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Third Generation +	−0.366***	0.123*	−0.060*	0.002
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Education	−0.015*	−0.037*	0.002*	0.004*
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	−0.019*	0.009*	−0.004*	−0.009*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.180**	−0.206***	0.077**	0.070**
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.023)
South American	−0.268*	0.263*	−0.091*	−0.082*
	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Central American	−0.115*	0.099*	−0.042*	−0.044*
	(0.115)	(0.107)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Cuban	−0.382**	0.709***	−0.140**	−0.201***
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Dominican	0.132*	0.031*	0.022*	0.092*
	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Puerto Rican	0.138*	−0.031*	0.037*	0.005*
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Constant	2.431***	3.096***	0.270***	0.268***
	(0.158)	(0.148)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Observations	3,003	3,003	1,655	1,655
R^2	0.057	0.059	0.073	0.083
Adjusted R^2	0.054	0.055	0.067	0.077

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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For Trump favorability, identity centrality works inversely. A one unit increase in identity centrality is associated with a .282 decrease in Trump favorability. Second generation respondents have the lowest favorability of Trump, and third generation and beyond respondents view Trump more favorably than first generation respondents. Women and more educated respondents view Trump less favorably, while almost all national origin groups with the exception of Puerto Ricans view Trump more favorably relative to Mexican Americans.

In terms of vote choice, identity centrality is positively associated with voting for Hillary Clinton for president and the Democratic candidate for Congress. Being a second generation respondent is associated with higher levels of support for Clinton and the Democratic congressional member when compared to first generation respondents. Third generation respondents were less likely to vote for Clinton relative to first generation respondents, but more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate for Congress. Being a woman and higher levels of education are also positively associated with voting for Clinton and the Democratic candidate for congress while income is negatively associated with voting for the Democrats. South Americans, Central Americans, and Cubans are less likely to support Hillary Clinton and the Democratic candidate for congress relative to Mexican Americans, while Dominicans and Puerto Ricans are more likely to support Clinton and the Democratic candidate for Congress relative to Mexican Americans.

Next, I examine how identity centrality relates to political actions. I examine five different actions; attending a political meeting, going to a rally or protest, contacting an elected official, donating money to a political campaign or party and wearing a campaign button. Each of these items is coded 0 for those who have not done these activities and 1 for those who have. Since these items are binary and more likely to have ceiling effects, I ran these models using logistic regression. The full models can be found in 3.3.

The results for these political actions are fairly similar. Identity centrality is positively associated with each of these political actions. Second and third generation respondents and beyond are also more likely to to engage in these activities when compared to first generation respondents. Education is positively associated with engaging in political action and women are less likely to engage than men. Income is positively associated with engaging

in political activities with the exception of attending a community meeting, where it is negatively associated with attending a community meeting.

Table 3.3: Identity Centrality and Political Participation

	Meeting	Rally	Contact elected	Donate	Wear button
Identity Centrality	0.293***	0.512***	0.033*	0.040*	0.249***
	(0.048)	(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.060)
Second Generation	0.208*	0.586***	0.314**	0.810***	0.843***
	(0.094)	(0.148)	(0.113)	(0.157)	(0.125)
Third Generation +	0.201*	0.325*	0.279*	0.728***	0.768***
	(0.105)	(0.169)	(0.127)	(0.173)	(0.139)
Education	0.200***	0.158**	0.341***	0.341***	0.158***
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.047)
Income	−0.006*	0.043*	0.067***	0.119***	0.031*
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Female	−0.156*	−0.097*	−0.322***	−0.528***	−0.211*
	(0.082)	(0.123)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.099)
South American	−0.043*	−0.030*	0.041*	−0.055*	0.185*
	(0.161)	(0.234)	(0.183)	(0.233)	(0.193)
Central American	0.123*	−0.380*	−0.200*	−0.473*	0.090*
	(0.162)	(0.270)	(0.204)	(0.290)	(0.200)
Cuban	0.033*	−0.324*	0.114*	−0.037*	−0.090*
	(0.173)	(0.280)	(0.196)	(0.253)	(0.221)
Dominican	−0.099*	−0.449*	−0.105*	−0.164*	−0.079*
	(0.209)	(0.347)	(0.255)	(0.342)	(0.268)
Puerto Rican	−0.317**	−0.469**	0.207*	0.135*	−0.189*
	(0.109)	(0.173)	(0.121)	(0.153)	(0.134)
Constant	−2.177***	−4.789***	−3.071***	−4.344***	−3.464***
	(0.237)	(0.407)	(0.279)	(0.365)	(0.303)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
Log Likelihood	−1,970.829	−1,051.093	−1,542.363	−1,060.617	−1,453.930
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,965.658	2,126.185	3,108.727	2,145.233	2,931.860

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.4: Identity Centrality and Policy Positions

	Gay marriage	Support BLM	Pathway to Citizen	Tax Wealthy
Identity Centrality	0.047*	0.342***	0.212***	0.155***
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Republican	−0.729***	−1.106***	−0.228***	−0.659***
	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Independent/ Other	−0.274***	−0.486***	−0.262***	−0.413***
	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Second Generation	0.325***	0.153**	−0.166***	−0.028*
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Third Generation +	0.493***	0.135*	−0.233***	0.046*
	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Education	0.127***	0.038*	−0.023*	0.043*
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	0.032***	−0.023**	−0.014*	−0.012*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.064*	−0.001	0.001	−0.035*
	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.040)
South American	0.035*	0.008*	−0.300***	−0.006*
	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.079)
Central American	−0.204*	−0.050*	−0.124*	−0.009*
	(0.102)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Cuban	0.156*	0.109*	−0.042*	−0.006*
	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Dominican	−0.047*	0.140*	−0.141*	−0.051*
	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.102)
Puerto Rican	−0.040*	0.078*	−0.135**	0.057*
	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Constant	2.843***	2.333***	3.855***	3.658***
	(0.147)	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.114)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
R^2	0.089	0.211	0.078	0.097

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Finally, I examined the relationship between identity centrality and four policy issues, gay marriage, Support for BLM, creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented workers in the United States, and taxing the wealthy for programs that benefit the middle class. Works on linked fate have found that people high on linked fate hold more liberal policy positions. Here I test if the same observation holds for identity centrality. In this model, I added a control for partisan identification since many people take their policy cues from leaders of their political party. Unsurprisingly, Republicans and independents hold more conservative policy views when compared to liberals, but identity centrality does seem to be correlated with more liberal policy views on all four issues. There are some important generational differences. Second and third generation respondents are more supportive of gay marriage and BLM when compared to first generation respondents, but second generation respondents are somewhat less likely to support a pathway to citizenship or taxing the wealthy compared to first generation respondents. Respondents who are third generation and beyond also less supportive of a pathway to citizenship when compared to first generation respondents but are slightly more likely to support taxing the wealthy to help the middle class.

This initial analysis of identity centrality finds that not only is identity centrality positively associated with efficacy, but also seems to influence political attitudes and voter preferences. Identity centrality has a statistically significant and positive association in all of the models.

3.4.3 Linked Fate in the 2016 CMPS

More recent studies of linked fate have found lower levels of linked fate among Latinos compared to previous studies (Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). Studies have also found that predictors of Latino linked fate are different from what is generally found among Blacks in the U.S. (McClain et al., 2009). In the 2016 CMPS I find that levels of Latino linked fate are relatively low, especially when comparing linked fate to identity centrality or group consciousness. To measure linked fate, respondents were asked

Figure 3.2: Latino Linked Fate Bar Plot

the traditional two item linked fate questions. The first question asks "do you think what happens generally to Latinos/ Hispanics in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? I find that 43% of Latino respondents said no. Of those who said yes, 6% said not very much, with 31% of respondents said some, and 19% thought that what happens to Latinos in the country will have a lot to do with what happens in their life. Given that Latino linked fate is not widely held, I do not expect linked fate to be correlated with any particular attitudes or political behaviors among the Latino respondents.

3.4.4 Linked Fate Regressions

I run a number of regressions that measure the effect of linked fate on political efficacy, partisanship, political participation and policy attitudes. Table 3.5 displays the results for the efficacy regressions.

Table 3.5: Efficacy and Linked Fate

	Interest in Politics	Important to Vote	Registered to Vote	Voted 2016
Linked Fate	0.123***	0.138***	0.009*	0.005*
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Second Generation	−0.043*	−0.258***	0.027*	−0.009*
	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Third Generation +	−0.074*	−0.280***	0.00000	−0.032*
	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Education	0.137***	0.184***	0.136***	0.029***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.043***	0.040***	0.026***	0.012***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	−0.271***	−0.062*	−0.058**	−0.004*
	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.014)
South American	−0.014*	−0.129*	−0.021*	−0.048*
	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Central American	−0.106*	−0.019*	0.004*	−0.064*
	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Cuban	0.106*	−0.081*	0.023*	−0.046*
	(0.073)	(0.092)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Dominican	−0.173*	−0.153*	−0.045*	−0.063*
	(0.087)	(0.110)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Puerto Rican	−0.198***	−0.082*	0.036*	0.006*
	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Constant	1.176***	2.170***	0.024*	0.742***
	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.039)	(0.035)
Observations	3,003	3,003	2,629	1,816
R^2	0.133	0.090	0.204	0.042
Adjusted R^2	0.130	0.087	0.201	0.037

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.6: Partisanship, Voting, and Linked Fate

	Clinton Favorability	Trump Favorability	Vote Clinton	Vote Dem Congress
Linked Fate	0.226***	−0.244***	0.087***	0.089***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Second Generation	−0.279***	−0.033*	−0.026*	0.026*
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Third Generation +	−0.459***	0.211**	−0.105**	−0.043*
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Education	−0.022*	−0.030*	−0.007*	−0.004*
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	−0.016*	0.005*	−0.003*	−0.008*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.236***	−0.260***	0.097***	0.091***
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.023)
South American	−0.235*	0.222*	−0.077*	−0.067*
	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Central American	−0.096*	0.078*	−0.028*	−0.030*
	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Cuban	−0.354**	0.675***	−0.153**	−0.214***
	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Dominican	0.167*	−0.004	0.051*	0.121*
	(0.146)	(0.136)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Puerto Rican	0.209**	−0.105*	0.071*	0.039*
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Constant	3.121***	2.449***	0.585***	0.579***
	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Observations	3,003	3,003	1,655	1,655
R^2	0.063	0.073	0.080	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.069	0.074	0.086

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The results in table 3.5 indicate that linked fate is positively associated with an increase in an interest in politics and believing that voting is one of the most important activities. Second and third generation respondents have lower levels of interest in politics when compared to first generation respondents, and once again women display lower levels of interest in politics and believing in the importance of voting. Income and education is positively associated with higher levels of interest in politics and believing it is important to vote. Cuban Americans have higher levels of efficacy when compared to Mexican Americans, though South Americans, Central Americans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans all display lower levels of interest and are less likely to believe that voting is the most important activity when compared to Mexican Americans.

Linked fate is also positively associated with being registered to vote and having voted in the 2016 presidential election. Second generation respondents are more likely to be registered to vote, but are less likely to have voted in 2016 compared to first generation respondents. There is no difference between first generation and third generation respondents when it comes to being registered to vote, however when it comes to voting, third generation respondents are less likely to vote when compared to first generation respondents in the CMPS.

Examining Latino linked fate and candidate favorability and partisanship, once again I find that linked fate is positively associated with Democratic favorability and voting for Democratic candidates, and negatively associated with the favorability of the Republican candidates. Interestingly, second generation respondents like Clinton less than first generation respondents and are less likely to have voted for her in the 2016 presidential election, but second generation respondents also are less favorable of Trump than first generation respondents and are more likely to have voted for the Democratic candidate for Congress when compared to first generation respondents. Increased income is associated with a decline in support for Democratic candidates, and a slight increase in favorability for the Republican candidate. Inversely, women dislike Trump more than men, and are more likely to have higher levels of favorability for Clinton and vote for the Democratic candidates.

Table 3.7: Linked Fate and Political Participation

	Meeting	Rally	Contact elected	Donate	Wear button
Linked Fate	0.363***	0.524***	0.250***	0.385***	0.400***
	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.041)
Second Generation	0.093*	0.434**	0.259*	0.745***	0.747***
	(0.095)	(0.149)	(0.114)	(0.158)	(0.126)
Third Generation +	0.123*	0.204*	0.281*	0.743***	0.724***
	(0.105)	(0.168)	(0.126)	(0.174)	(0.139)
Education	0.195***	0.149*	0.337***	0.334***	0.149**
	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.048)
Income	0.001*	0.053**	0.074***	0.134***	0.041*
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Female	−0.105*	−0.021*	−0.324***	−0.549***	−0.181*
	(0.083)	(0.124)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.100)
South American	0.039*	0.070*	0.125*	0.066*	0.282*
	(0.164)	(0.237)	(0.184)	(0.236)	(0.196)
Central American	0.174*	−0.306*	−0.156*	−0.429*	0.152*
	(0.164)	(0.272)	(0.206)	(0.293)	(0.203)
Cuban	0.108*	−0.225*	0.189*	0.081*	−0.010
	(0.175)	(0.282)	(0.197)	(0.253)	(0.223)
Dominican	−0.055*	−0.381*	−0.098*	−0.170*	−0.035*
	(0.212)	(0.350)	(0.258)	(0.347)	(0.271)
Puerto Rican	−0.221*	−0.326*	0.265*	0.213*	−0.088*
	(0.110)	(0.175)	(0.123)	(0.155)	(0.135)
Constant	−1.684***	−3.840***	−3.324***	−4.810***	−3.209***
	(0.177)	(0.287)	(0.222)	(0.303)	(0.232)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
Log Likelihood	−1,928.385	−1,019.362	−1,521.473	−1,030.455	−1,414.294
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,880.771	2,062.725	3,066.946	2,084.910	2,852.588

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.8: Linked Fate and Policy Positions

	Gay marriage	Support BLM	Pathway to Citizen	Tax Wealthy
Linked Fate	0.046*	0.233***	0.078***	0.104***
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Republican	−0.716***	−1.075***	−0.248***	−0.646***
	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Independent/ Other	−0.271***	−0.502***	−0.295***	−0.421***
	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Second Generation	0.308***	0.054*	−0.213***	−0.073*
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Third Generation +	0.477***	0.022*	−0.305***	−0.006*
	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Education	0.126***	0.031*	−0.025*	0.039*
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	0.033***	−0.020**	−0.014*	−0.011*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.074*	0.067*	0.042*	−0.004*
	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.040)
South American	0.043*	0.034*	−0.304***	0.005*
	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.079)
Central American	−0.200*	−0.034*	−0.125*	−0.002
	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Cuban	0.161*	0.124*	−0.045*	−0.0001
	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Dominican	−0.040*	0.178*	−0.123*	−0.033*
	(0.130)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.102)
Puerto Rican	−0.026*	0.155**	−0.104*	0.091*
	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Constant	2.943***	3.199***	4.493***	4.055***
	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.083)	(0.085)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
R^2	0.089	0.207	0.057	0.095
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.204	0.052	0.091

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Examining linked fate and political participation, I find that once again linked fate is positively associated with all of these activities. It is also the case that second and third generation respondents are more likely to engage in these political activities relative for first generation respondents. Higher levels of income and education are also associated with an increase in engaging in political action, while being female is negatively associated with these political activities.

Finally, when it comes to support and policy views, linked fate is also positively associated with more liberal policy positions. I find that Republicans and Independents hold more conservative policy positions relative to Democrats. Second and third generation and beyond respondents are more likely to hold more liberal views on gay marriage and support BLM when compared to first generation respondents, but hold more conservative views when compared to first generation respondents when it comes to a pathway to citizenship and taxing the wealthy to benefit the middle class. Higher levels of education are associated with more liberal views on gay marriage supporting BLM and taxing the wealthy, but is negatively correlated with supporting a pathway to citizenship. Income is negatively correlated with all of the policy measures except for supporting gay marriage. Those with higher levels of income are more supportive of gay marriage.

While there is clearly generational and national origin variation, in all of the models linked fate is positively associated with an increase in efficacy and voting, supporting Democrats and being less likely to favor the Republican presidential candidate, engaging in political activities, and holding more liberal policy positions. While linked fate was theorized to influence attitudes and policy views, it appears to also have an effect on efficacy and political participation among Latinos when it is the only identity measure in the model.

3.4.5   Group Consciousness in the 2016 CMPS

Group consciousness is the final and more difficult identity measure to capture. To measure group consciousness I start by examining it as a three item additive measure that ranges between 0 and 12. The first question is a measure of similarity and is meant to capture

feelings of group unity. It asks how much respondents agree or disagree with the following statement "latinos from diverse backgrounds make up a distinct racial group in the U.S" this question ranges from 0 strongly agree to 0 strongly disagree.

Next, to tap into feelings of group deprivation I look at the following question "How much of a problem do you think discrimination against (HISPANICS/LATINOS) is in preventing (HISPANICS/LATINOS) in general from succeeding in America". Responses range from 0 not at all to 4, a great deal. Unlike most perceived discrimination questions, this question wording asks how much this discrimination holds the group back from succeeding, thus making it a better measure of polar power.

The final question captures the willingness to work on the group's behalf to increase their status in society. "In thinking about which political parties and candidates to support, how much do you consider whether each party or candidate cares about the Latino community?". This measure ranges from 0-4 not at all, to 4 a great deal.

Figure 3.3: Group Consciousness Bar Plot

I use these three questions to measure group consciousness since they are similar to

the way that group consciousness is measured in existing studies, and capture a sense of group identity, subordination, and recognizing that the group can work together to better the overall standing as a group. These items are placed together in an additive scale as Sanchez and Vargas (2016) suggest. In latter chapters I test new ways to measure group consciousness, but for now I use what is available to me on the 2016 CMPS.

I find that 3% of respondents are at 2 or below on the group consciousness scale with 51% of respondents centered around 6, 7, and 8. An additional 29% of respondents are at the higher end of the scale making up respondents who scored between 9 and 12 on the group consciousness scale.

3.4.6   Group Consciousness Regressions

Once again I run a series of regressions to see if group consciousness is correlated with political efficacy, partisan leanings, policy preferences, and political attitudes. I find that once again group consciousness is correlated with the variables of interest. Starting with table 3.9 I find that group consciousness is positively associated with an increase in interest in politics, believing it is important to vote, being registered to vote and voting in the 2016 presidential election. Second and third generation respondents are less likely to be interested in politics, and think voting is the most important activity, or have voted in the 2016 presidential election when compared to first generation respondents. However, both second and third generation respondents are more likely to be registered to vote when compared to first generation respondents. Female respondents are less likely to be interested in politics, think voting is important, be registered to vote, or have voted in 2016 when compared to men. But higher levels of income and education are positively associated with all four efficacy items. There are differences by national origin, with Dominicans for instance scoring lower on all four efficacy items relative to Mexican Americans. And Puerto Ricans score lower on interest in politics and thinking voting is the most important issue relative to Mexican Americans, but they are more likely to be registered to vote and to have voted in the 2016 presidential election.

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Table 3.9: Efficacy and Group Consciousness

	Interest in Politics	Important to Vote	Registered to Vote	Voted 2016
Group consciousness	0.096***	0.140***	0.019***	0.009**
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Second Generation	−0.026*	−0.242***	0.026*	−0.010*
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Third Generation +	−0.040*	−0.227***	0.007*	−0.029*
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Education	0.128***	0.170***	0.134***	0.028***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.040***	0.037***	0.026***	0.012***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	−0.294***	−0.096*	−0.063***	−0.009*
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.017)	(0.014)
South American	0.021*	−0.065*	−0.009*	−0.040*
	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Central American	−0.104*	−0.010*	0.008*	−0.062*
	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Cuban	0.136*	−0.024*	0.036*	−0.037*
	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Dominican	−0.187*	−0.170*	−0.044*	−0.063*
	(0.086)	(0.107)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Puerto Rican	−0.209***	−0.088*	0.038*	0.006*
	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Constant	0.668***	1.380***	−0.093*	0.680***
	(0.082)	(0.102)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Observations	3,003	3,003	2,629	1,816
R^2	0.164	0.147	0.212	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.161	0.144	0.209	0.042

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.10: Partisanship, Voting and Group Consciousness

	Clinton Favorability	Trump Favorability	Vote Clinton	Vote Dem Congres
Group Consciousness	0.196***	−0.158***	0.077***	0.071***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Second Generation	−0.250***	−0.070*	−0.018*	0.037*
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Third Generation	−0.388***	0.159*	−0.080*	−0.020*
	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Education	−0.040*	−0.017*	−0.003*	−0.0002
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	−0.021*	0.011*	−0.002*	−0.008*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.189***	−0.223***	0.062**	0.058**
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.022)	(0.022)
South American	−0.156*	0.179*	−0.033*	−0.029*
	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Central American	−0.089*	0.082*	−0.023*	−0.027*
	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Cuban	−0.285*	0.638***	−0.086*	−0.155**
	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Dominican	0.141*	0.021*	0.051*	0.120*
	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Puerto Rican	0.192**	−0.077*	0.067*	0.033*
	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	2.064***	3.227***	0.103*	0.145*
	(0.135)	(0.128)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Observations	3,003	3,003	1,655	1,655
R²	0.119	0.096	0.165	0.156
Adjusted R²	0.116	0.093	0.159	0.151

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.00

Table 3.11: Group Consciousness and Political Participation

	Meeting	Rally	Contact elected	Donate	Wear button
Group Consciousness	0.227***	0.294***	0.103***	0.178***	0.259***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Second Generation	0.142*	0.485**	0.297**	0.786***	0.795***
	(0.096)	(0.149)	(0.113)	(0.157)	(0.127)
Third Generation +	0.191*	0.259*	0.304*	0.768***	0.794***
	(0.106)	(0.169)	(0.126)	(0.173)	(0.140)
Education	0.182***	0.127*	0.334***	0.331***	0.132**
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.048)
Income	−0.007*	0.043*	0.068***	0.125***	0.034*
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Female	−0.160*	−0.081*	−0.349***	−0.589***	−0.237*
	(0.084)	(0.124)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.100)
South American	0.090*	0.134*	0.121*	0.086*	0.360*
	(0.165)	(0.238)	(0.184)	(0.236)	(0.197)
Central American	0.161*	−0.321*	−0.177*	−0.427*	0.142*
	(0.165)	(0.272)	(0.205)	(0.290)	(0.203)
Cuban	0.151*	−0.219*	0.189*	0.095*	0.023*
	(0.177)	(0.283)	(0.197)	(0.254)	(0.225)
Dominican	−0.101*	−0.443*	−0.114*	−0.193*	−0.083*
	(0.214)	(0.352)	(0.257)	(0.347)	(0.274)
Puerto Rican	−0.269*	−0.367*	0.233*	0.189*	−0.118*
	(0.111)	(0.174)	(0.122)	(0.154)	(0.136)
Constant	−2.800***	−5.190***	−3.709***	−5.557***	−4.530***
	(0.218)	(0.356)	(0.262)	(0.358)	(0.288)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
Log Likelihood	−1,906.637	−1,014.677	−1,529.353	−1,036.762	−1,392.789
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,837.273	2,053.354	3,082.706	2,097.524	2,809.578

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.12: Group Consciousness and Political Attitudes

	Gay marriage	Support BLM	Pathway to Citizen	Tax Wealthy
Group consciousness	0.035**	0.177***	0.092***	0.100***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Republican	−0.695***	−0.965***	−0.165***	−0.567***
	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Independent/ Other	−0.230***	−0.295***	−0.171***	−0.294***
	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Second Generation	0.314***	0.083*	−0.207***	−0.062*
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Third Generation +	0.485***	0.063*	−0.282***	0.018*
	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Education	0.124***	0.020*	−0.033*	0.032*
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	0.032***	−0.024***	−0.015*	−0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.068*	0.035*	0.026*	−0.022*
	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.039)
South American	0.053*	0.084*	−0.264***	0.043*
	(0.101)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Central American	−0.199*	−0.029*	−0.116*	0.005*
	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Cuban	0.168*	0.160*	−0.018*	0.026*
	(0.109)	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.084)
Dominican	−0.043*	0.163*	−0.127*	−0.040*
	(0.130)	(0.110)	(0.098)	(0.100)
Puerto Rican	−0.031*	0.129*	−0.106*	0.084*
	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Constant	2.744***	2.192***	3.901***	3.441***
	(0.135)	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.103)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
R^2	0.091	0.252	0.086	0.123
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.248	0.082	0.120

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Next I examine the relationship between candidate favorability, voting for Democrats, and group consciousness. Table 3.10 examines the presidential candidates's favorability in the 2016 CMPS. I find that an increase in group consciousness is associated with higher levels of favorability for Hillary Clinton, and lower levels of favorability for Donald Trump. Second generation respondents are less favorable of Clinton compared to first generation respondents, and also less favorable of Trump. Second generation immigrants are also less likely to vote for Clinton relative to first generation respondents, but second generation respondents are more likely to say that they voted for the Democratic candidate for Congress. Similarly this generation respondents are less favorable of Clinton relative to first generation respondents, but are more supportive of Trump compared to first generation respondents. Respondents who are third generation and beyond are less likely to vote for Clinton or Democrats for Congress. When looking at education, higher levels of education decrease support for both Clinton and Donald Trump. Higher levels of education are also associated with lower levels of voting for Clinton. Income is associated with lower favorability for Clinton and higher favorability for Trump. Increasing income is correlated with lower levels of support for Clinton and voting for Democrats for Congress. Women on the other hand are more supportive of Hillary Clinton, and view Trump less favorably when compared to men. They are also more likely to vote for Clinton and Democratic candidates for Congress relative to men.

Looking at political participation, I find that group consciousness is positively associated with all of the political participation variables. Second and third generation respondents are also more likely to attend a community meeting, participate in a rally or protest, contact an elected official, donate money to a campaign or candidate, and wear a political button or bumper sticker relative to first generation respondents. Education is also positively associated with these 5 political actions, and income is positively associated with every political action except for attending a community meeting. A one unit increase in income is associated with a .007 decline in attending a political meeting. Female respondents are less likely to engage in these activities relative to men, and South Americans are more likely to engage in all 5 activities at higher rates than Mexican Americans. Cuban Americans are also more

likely to participate in 4 out of the 5 activities when compared to Mexican Americans, with the exception being attending a rally. Cuban Americans are less likely to attend a political rally when compared to Mexican Americans.

Finally, I examine how group consciousness impacts political attitudes. My five political attitudes are coded so that the most liberal position on each issue is the highest value. I find that group consciousness is positively associated with more liberal views on all four policy items. Second generation respondents are more liberal on gay marriage and BLM when compared to first generation respondents, but more conservative when it comes to a pathway to citizenship and taxing the wealthy. Third generation respondents and beyond are also more liberal on the issues of gay marriage and BLM, but more conservative on a pathway to citizenship when compared to first generation respondents. However third generation respondents are more likely to support taxing the wealthy to help the middle class than first generation respondents. As expected, Republicans and independents are more conservative on all of these issues when compared to Democrats. Education is positively associated with all issues except for a pathway to citizenship, where higher levels of education are associated with a more conservative position on a pathway to citizenship. Income is negatively associated with more liberal positions on all items with the exception of gay marriage.

3.5   Comparing Identity Measures

Each identity measure has it's own theoretical basis for it's construction, and despite the varying levels of support for each measure, I find that when placed in individual regressions with demographic controls, identity centrality, linked fate, and group consciousness are all positively associated with multiple forms of efficacy, political participation, support for the Democratic Party, and more liberal policy views. But when placed in models with more identity measures, what should we expect to happen to these measures?

To more closely examine how related these measures are to one another I made a correlation matrix to assess if these measures suffer from collinearity. Unsurprisingly, these

Figure 3.4: Identity Measure Correlation Table

measures are all positively correlated with one another. But the strength of the relationship is weaker than might have been expected. I find that the correlation between identity centrality and linked fate is the weakest at .29, and the correlation between identity centrality and group consciousness is the strongest at .42. Group consciousness is also correlated with linked fate at .4. This suggests that group consciousness shares similarities with both constructs, and sits somewhere in between identity centrality and linked fate. This seems very plausible given that the multiple dimensions of group consciousness incorporate aspects of both identity centrality and linked fate.

Since these measures are only modestly correlated with one another when placed in a regression that controls for all three of the identity measures, it is likely that some of these measures will be correlated with some political items while others will not. I expect that the greatest differences will occur when it comes to questions on political efficacy. Because group consciousness taps into a willingness to work together on behalf of the group, I expect that group consciousness will be statistically significant and positively correlated with greater

levels of interest in politics, while identity centrality and linked fate will not be positively correlated at a statistically significant level.

Where the three items are likely to be most similar is when it comes to candidate favorability and partisan voting in favor of the Democratic candidate. Given Pérez's (2015a) work on identity centrality as a mobilizer when confronted with threatening rhetoric, I expect that individuals with higher levels of identity centrality are also going to view Democrats more favorably given the political climate in 2016. I also expect that linked fate will be positively correlated with supporting Democrats given Dawson (1994)'s framework which states that linked fate should be associated with support for certain political views. Similarly, I expect that group consciousness will also be positively associated with support for the Democratic candidates and higher Clinton favorability because of Trump's anti-immigrant positions that became the cornerstone of his presidential run.

I expect differences among these three measures will occur among the political participation questions. If linked fate is more of a heuristic for Latinos, then it is not likely that it will be correlated with the participation measures of attending a political meeting, going to a rally or protest, contacting an elected official, donating to a campaign, or wearing a campaign button or bumper sticker. While identity centrality theoretically sounds closer to linked fate than group consciousness, work by Pérez (2015b) that found that threat increased political participation among high Latino identifiers, it is likely that the same would happen again, but I suspect that effects should be stronger with group consciousness, given that the construct includes a willingness to work together to increase the standing of the group.

When it comes to policy views, I expect that all three measures would be statistically significant particularly for a pathway to citizenship which more directly impacts Latinos. Group consciousness and linked fate are likely to be positively and statistically significant when it comes to supporting gay marriage, BLM, and taxing the wealthy, but I do not expect identity centrality to be statistically significant when it comes to more liberal policy views on these issues.

Table 3.13 displays the results of the efficacy regressions with multiple identity mea-

Table 3.13: Efficacy Regressions with Multiple Identity Measures

	Interest in Politics	Important to Vote	Registered to Vote	Voted 2016
Identity centrality	−0.0003	0.150***	0.009*	0.022*
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Linked fate	0.059***	0.021*	−0.008*	−0.005*
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Group consciousness	0.085***	0.113***	0.019***	0.007*
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Second Generation	−0.037*	−0.222***	0.030*	−0.005*
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Third Generation +	−0.041*	−0.181***	0.010*	−0.020*
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Education	0.128***	0.172***	0.134***	0.029***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.041***	0.039***	0.026***	0.012***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	−0.291***	−0.120**	−0.065***	−0.012*
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.014)
South American	0.032*	−0.056*	−0.010*	−0.041*
	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Central American	−0.097*	−0.002	0.007*	−0.062*
	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Cuban	0.145*	−0.015*	0.036*	−0.035*
	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Dominican	−0.182*	−0.176*	−0.045*	−0.068*
	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Puerto Rican	−0.197***	−0.097*	0.035*	0.002*
	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Constant	0.676***	1.027***	−0.117*	0.629***
	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.051)	(0.045)
Observations	3,003	3,003	2,629	1,816
R^2	0.169	0.158	0.212	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.154	0.208	0.044

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

sures. I find that identity centrality is no longer positively correlated at a statistically significant level with an interest in politics. But both Latino linked fate and group consciousness are both still positively and statistically significant. Group consciousness is correlated with the largest increase in interest in politics when compared to the other identity measures. However, when it comes to believing that voting is more important than other political activities, I find that all three identity measures are positively associated and statistically significant. Increasing from the lowest to the highest level of these measures, group consciousness would once again produce the largest increase (1.36) in believing that voting is the most important political activity compared to linked fate (.084) or identity centrality (.6). First generation respondents are more likely to report both an interest in politics and believing that voting is the most important activity when compared to second and third generation respondents. Higher levels of income and education are also positively correlated with both efficacy items as well as being male.

When looking at voter registration and voting in the 2016 election, linked fate is negatively associated with both. While the correlation is small in size, the negative association is interestingly counterintuitive. This may be because linked fate can be interpreted both positively and negatively (Kim and Rogers, 2021b). Identity centrality is also positively associated with being registered to vote, and voting in the 2016 election, but the correlation is modest (.009 and .022 respectively). Group consciousness is also positively associated with being registered to vote and voting in the 2016 election. However the correlation is stronger when it comes to being registered to vote than voting in the 2016 election. Second and third generation respondents are more likely to be registered to vote when compared to first generation respondents, but are less likely to have voted in the 2016 election. Once again education, income, and being male is positively associated with higher levels of registration and voting in the 2016 election.

Table 3.14 examines candidate favorability and voting for the Democratic candidate for president and Congress. All three measures are once again positively associated with liking the Democratic candidate (Hillary Clinton) and lower levels of support for Donald Trump, the Republican candidate. This is once again as expected given that Trump cen-

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Table 3.14: Partisanship and Voting Regressions with Multiple Identity Measures

	Clinton Favorability	Trump Favorability	Vote Clinton	Vote Dem Congress
Identity Centrality	0.062*	−0.095**	0.023*	0.030*
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Linked Fate	0.086***	−0.137***	0.027**	0.035***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Group Consciousness	0.169***	−0.116***	0.068***	0.058***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Second Generation	−0.257***	−0.059*	−0.022*	0.031*
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Third Generation +	−0.370***	0.131*	−0.076*	−0.014*
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Education	−0.040*	−0.017*	−0.005*	−0.003*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	−0.018*	0.006*	−0.001*	−0.007*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.182**	−0.213***	0.063**	0.059**
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.022)
South American	−0.138*	0.151*	−0.030*	−0.026*
	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Central American	−0.077*	0.063*	−0.019*	−0.022*
	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Cuban	−0.269*	0.613***	−0.080*	−0.148**
	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Dominican	0.145*	0.015*	0.048*	0.117*
	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Puerto Rican	0.204**	−0.096*	0.069*	0.035*
	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	1.927***	3.434***	0.067*	0.097*
	(0.158)	(0.149)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Observations	3,003	3,003	1,655	1,655
R²	0.125	0.112	0.170	0.165
Adjusted R²	0.121	0.108	0.163	0.158

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

tered his political campaign around being anti-immigrant. Group consciousness increases Clinton favorability the most when compared to the other two identity measures. And while the coefficient size of linked fate and group consciousness is similar in the Trump favorability regression, because group consciousness ranges from 0-12, the magnitude of moving from the highest to lowest value on these measures again is largest with group consciousness. Looking just at Clinton Favorability, second and third generation respondents and beyond are more likely to view Clinton less favorably than first generation respondents. Higher levels of income and education are also negatively correlated with Clinton favorability, however female respondents are much more favorable of Clinton when compared to the male respondents. Examining Trump favorability, second generation respondents dislike Trump more than first generation respondents, but third generation + respondents view Trump more favorably than first generation respondents. While income is positively associated with Trump favorability, higher levels of education and being a woman are negatively correlated with Trump favorability.

Examining vote choice, identity centrality, linked fate, and group consciousness are all positively associated with voting for Clinton for president and the Democratic candidate for Congress. Once again increasing in group consciousness is associated with the largest increase in support for the Democratic candidates relative to the other two identity measures. While identity centrality and linked fate are both positively associated with voting for Clinton and the Democratic candidate for Congress, the coefficients are much smaller. Second and third generation respondents are less likely to have voted for Clinton when compared to first generation respondents, and income and education are also negatively associated with voting for Clinton, while females are significantly more likely to have voted for Clinton. When it comes to voting for the Democratic candidate for Congress, second generation respondents are more likely to have voted for the Democrat relative to first generation respondents, while third generation respondents are less likely to have voted for the Democrat. Once again higher levels of education and income are negatively associated with voting for the Democratic candidate, while women are more likely to have voted for the Democrat.

Table 3.15 displays the logistic regression results from five political actions, attending

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Table 3.15: Political Participation Regressions with Multiple Identity Measures

	Meeting	Rally	Contact elected	Donate	Wear button
Identity Centrality	0.007*	0.148*	−0.153*	−0.278***	−0.101*
	(0.054)	(0.093)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.067)
Linked Fate	0.238***	0.351***	0.220***	0.323***	0.260***
	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.046)
Group Consciousness	0.179***	0.203***	0.080***	0.152***	0.220***
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Second Generation	0.097*	0.442**	0.235*	0.710***	0.738***
	(0.097)	(0.151)	(0.114)	(0.159)	(0.128)
Third Generation +	0.191*	0.284*	0.253*	0.696***	0.765***
	(0.108)	(0.171)	(0.128)	(0.176)	(0.142)
Education	0.181***	0.120*	0.333***	0.331***	0.128**
	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.049)
Income	−0.001*	0.054**	0.073***	0.132***	0.040*
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Female	−0.153*	−0.086*	−0.319***	−0.551***	−0.216*
	(0.085)	(0.126)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.102)
South American	0.137*	0.191*	0.156*	0.126*	0.398*
	(0.166)	(0.240)	(0.185)	(0.238)	(0.199)
Central American	0.193*	−0.281*	−0.145*	−0.384*	0.179*
	(0.166)	(0.274)	(0.206)	(0.292)	(0.204)
Cuban	0.196*	−0.138*	0.218*	0.131*	0.069*
	(0.178)	(0.285)	(0.198)	(0.255)	(0.226)
Dominican	−0.085*	−0.447*	−0.090*	−0.146*	−0.059*
	(0.216)	(0.354)	(0.258)	(0.348)	(0.275)
Puerto Rican	−0.227*	−0.338*	0.287*	0.269*	−0.067*
	(0.112)	(0.177)	(0.123)	(0.155)	(0.137)
Constant	−2.807***	−5.557***	−3.341***	−4.926***	−4.266***
	(0.255)	(0.430)	(0.293)	(0.389)	(0.326)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
Log Likelihood	−1,884.310	−991.899	−1,514.710	−1,016.379	−1,376.052
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,796.620	2,011.797	3,057.420	2,060.758	2,780.105

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3.16: Political Attitudes Regressions with Multiple Identity Measures

	Gay marriage	Support BLM	Pathway to Citizen	Tax Wealthy
Identity Centrality	0.009*	0.169***	0.139***	0.056*
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Linked Fate	0.026*	0.115***	0.004*	0.037*
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Group consciousness	0.029*	0.130***	0.071***	0.085***
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Republican	−0.686***	−0.912***	−0.149**	−0.550***
	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Independent/ Other	−0.229***	−0.283***	−0.165***	−0.290***
	(0.063)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Second Generation	0.311***	0.088*	−0.185***	−0.060*
	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Third Generation +	0.488***	0.112*	−0.239***	0.035*
	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Education	0.123***	0.021*	−0.031*	0.033*
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Income	0.033***	−0.020**	−0.014*	−0.011*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.068*	0.016*	0.005*	−0.028*
	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.040)
South American	0.057*	0.109*	−0.259***	0.051*
	(0.102)	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Central American	−0.196*	−0.010*	−0.110*	0.012*
	(0.102)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Cuban	0.170*	0.174*	−0.015*	0.030*
	(0.109)	(0.091)	(0.082)	(0.084)
Dominican	−0.042*	0.165*	−0.134*	−0.039*
	(0.130)	(0.108)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Puerto Rican	−0.027*	0.138*	−0.118*	0.086*
	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Constant	2.722***	1.782***	3.563***	3.304***
	(0.155)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.119)
Observations	3,003	3,003	3,003	3,003
R^2	0.091	0.274	0.097	0.127
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.271	0.093	0.122

Note: *p<0.95; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

a community meeting, going to a rally or protest, contacting an elected official, donating to a campaign or political party, and wearing a political button or bumper sticker. I find that identity centrality is positively associated with attending a community meeting or rally, but is negatively associated with contacting an elected official, donating to a candidate, or displaying campaign paraphernalia at a statistically significant level. Linked fate surprisingly is positively associated with all political activities as is group consciousness. Second and third generation respondents are also more likely to engage in these political activities relative to first generation respondents. Men are more likely to engage than women, and education is positively correlated with these political activities. Income is positively associated with all activities except for attending a community meeting. This may be because people with higher incomes tend to live in more affluent neighborhoods and may not think that attending community meetings are necessary.

Finally, I examine how these identity measures influence political attitudes. The results from these regressions can be found in table 3.16. I find that identity centrality linked fate and group consciousness are all positively associated with more liberal policy views on gay marriage, supporting BLM, a pathway to citizenship, and taxing the wealthy. Interestingly, when it comes to supporting a pathway to citizenship, identity centrality has the largest impact on supporting a pathway, followed by group consciousness. A one unit change in linked fate has the smallest effect relative to group consciousness and identity centrality. the fact that identity centrality has the largest effect on liberal policy views is surprising given that identity centrality does not have a political component. The small correlation between linked fate is also interesting given that Dawson (1994) expected that African Americans would be more supportive of policies that benefit the group. This smaller effect may point to linked fate working differently among Latinos than initially theorized.

3.6 Discussion

These three identity items clearly had an impact on Latino political participation in 2016. When examined individually, the underlying basis of belonging to a group was enough to

capture the importance of identity on efficacy, political attitudes, and political participation. However, when these three items are added together in the same regression model, we arrive at a much more nuanced story.

I expected to find differences among the identity measures when looking at political efficacy and voting, and overall, I was correct. Identity centrality is not correlated at a statistically significant level when examining interest in politics while group consciousness and linked fate are both positively correlated with an interest in politics. And when looking at whether or not respondents voted in the 2016 election, group consciousness and identity centrality positively associated with voting however linked fate is not. Shifts in group consciousness are associated with the largest shift in voting followed by identity centrality. Linked fate on the other hand is negatively correlated with voting in 2016. Since group consciousness is theoretically grounded in political awareness, it makes sense that it is the measure that is consistent with efficacy, turnout, and registration. While identity centrality was also positively correlated with being registered and voting, it is possible that this may be due to the fact that the 2016 presidential election was so highly charged with anti-Latino sentiment. Because it was the cornerstone of Trump's campaign, it will be important to test the correlation between identity centrality and efficacy and voting in different political contexts.

Group consciousness, identity centrality, and linked fate were similar when it came to candidate favorability and supporting the Democratic candidate for president and Congress. Where they differ is in the magnitude of the correlation. Because group consciousness ranges from 0-12 it has a greater advantage in detecting nuanced differences between respondents that a four-item measure does not. Thus, going from the minimum to the maximum value of group consciousness is associated with a higher shift in Democratic favorability and support than can be found with linked fate or identity centrality. Once again, all three identity measures were positive and statistically significant when examining liberal policy attitudes on gay marriage, support for BLM, a pathway to citizenship, and taxing the wealthy. One important note is that identity centrality was more strongly positively correlated with a pathway to citizenship than the other measures. Because immigration is so strongly tied to

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Latinos, it makes sense that those high in identity centrality would be more supportive of this policy. It is also likely that identity centrality is more correlated with ethnically salient issues than other identity measures. This should be tested in the future.

While the measures look similar in terms of candidate support, I find differences in participating in political activities. Identity centrality is statistically and positively associated with attending a community meeting or going to a rally or protest, but is negatively correlated with contacting an elected official, donating to a campaign, or wearing a political button. I suspect that this is because the first two political activities are community oriented and may be viewed as more directly connected to the Latino community, while the other three items are not as directly connected. I was also surprised to find that linked fate is positively associated with all of the political activities. This runs contrary to my expectation given that Dawson (1994) had theorized that linked fate would affect attitudes but not necessarily political participation. This may be reason to pause and consider what Latino linked fate means for politics given the differences found between Latino linked fate and what was theorized in Behind the Mule.

While this chapter served to shed light on how these different identity measures have been used in the past and relate to political participation, the clear takeaway is that group consciousness seems to be the most consistent in it's association with political attitudes and actions. Given that group consciousness is the most versatile measure, it seems like the best candidate to explain how threat might influence group consciousness and political participation. Because of the strength of the relationship between group consciousness and political actions, in the following chapters I explore how threat can alter the relationship between group consciousness and political participation. I also test out new ways of measuring group consciousness, and examine how generational differences may impact responses to threat.

CHAPTER 4

Group Threat and Individual Response: How Group Consciousness Moderates Political Actions

In chapter two, I found that political threat in California was correlated with higher levels of politicized group identity. Chapter three examined identity measures commonly used in the political science literature, and I found that group consciousness worked well to capture the political attitudes and actions of Latinos. Having established group consciousness as the most salient identity measure for political outcomes, I now turn my attention to two tasks. The first is to work on the measurement of group consciousness and identify the questions and scale that can help standardize the items used to measure group consciousness. The second goal of this chapter is to examine what happens to group consciousness when survey respondents are primed with threat. Should we expect group consciousness levels to moderate responses to political threat?

California's period of anti-immigrant sentiment that culminated in a decade of political threat towards minorities by the Republican Party is still prescient today. Because of the changing demographics in the United States, we have seen both statewide and national attacks on immigrant populations, which are largely comprised of the Latino community. Pundits once again discuss the prospect of a Latino voter backlash in response to the hostile political environment. Increased turnout by Latinos in primary elections[1] is just one piece of anecdotal evidence supporting the hypothesis that political threat can spur mobilization.

However what remains unclear about the Latino backlash narrative is who among the

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[1]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-hispanics/latinas-lead-democratic-rise-in-texas-primary-election-idUSKCN1GJ2LR

Latino population is likely to respond to feelings of political threat? Many studies suggest that political threat and mobilization are connected, but most of the work is observational, leaving the causal link of threat to action somewhat ambiguous. In this chapter I seek to test the connection between group consciousness and political mobilization. I find that as group consciousness increases, so does the likelihood of engaging in group oriented political action. Furthermore, I examine if group consciousness works similarly despite different contexts, or if we should expect an increase in group mobilization when presented with group threat. My findings suggest that there is little difference in participation despite the situation the respondent finds themselves in. However respondents who are low in group consciousness may be more motivated to engage in some forms of political action when the group is facing a threatening political climate. People high in group consciousness will behave in a way that is more likely to favor the group than people with low levels or no group consciousness no matter the situation.

4.1   Identity and Threat

As discussed in the previous chapter, research has found that group consciousness is associated with an increase in Latino political participation (Stokes, 2003; Masuoka and Junn, 2013; Masuoka, 2006). Other works have also found that group consciousness is correlated with policy views on issues that are directly related to Latinos while policy issues that are not directly related to the group are not evaluated through a group lens (Sanchez, 2006). Masuoka and Junn (2013) also find that Latinos with high levels of linked fate are more likely to oppose policies that deny social services to immigrants and making English the official language of the United States.

But how a person responds to threat politically, is strongly intertwined with how they view themselves. Examining how identity motivates political action, Pérez (2015a) causally examines how Latinos respond to positive and negative elite discourse. Looking at a sample of eligible but unregistered Latino respondents, he measures the strength of their Latino identity and exposes respondents to either a positive or negative ethnic prime. He finds

that when elites discuss minorities in a critical light, strong Latino identifiers respond by displaying a more pro Latino attitude and higher reporting of planning on voting in the next election while low Latino identifiers are more likely to disengage and move away from their Latino identity (Pérez, 2015a). While Pérez (2015a) makes great strides in the literature by causally connecting identity to politics via the respondent's intent to vote, we do not know about the behavioral actions of participants aside from reported willingness to participate.

Literature on identity and its importance for personal self esteem as well as group valuation is well theorized in social psychology. Numerous works have works have found that positive group attachment is key to combatting feelings of isolation and depression among individuals (Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009; Greene, Way and Pahl, 2006; Pérez, Fortuna and Alegria, 2008). Supporting this theory, Bedolla (2005) conducted a number of in-depth interviews in two communities in Los Angeles during the late 1990's and found that developing a positive attachment to one's group is an important factor in motivating people to engage in political action on behalf of their group. Those with a stigmatized identity are more likely to withdraw from the political process (Bedolla, 2005; Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999).

Studies that focus on the strength of identity and discrimination have found that those who belong to a discriminated minority group and more strongly identify with their group had higher levels of self esteem than individuals who weakly identified with their group (Armenta and Hunt, 2009). Further, individuals may even choose to try to distance themselves from an identity that they view unfavorably (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Given this line of research it seems like holding a weak or negative attachment to a Latino identity should decrease political participation on behalf of the group.

However, it might be the case that identity functions differently when confronted with group threat. Some studies have found that intragroup differences are likely to decrease in importance and instead group members are likely to focus their attention on the outgroup despite the differences within the group suggesting that threat may be able to work as a binding agent for members of the threatened community (Brewer, 1999; Armenta and Hunt, 2009; Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013).

Building off of these previous studies, I first test the theory that threatening group rhetoric will lead to increased political participation among group members when compared to nonthreatening positive rhetoric, and no rhetoric at all. I then examine how political engagement differs by different levels of group consciousness. This is tested in two different ways, the first is in allocating funds to a Latino oriented or a general human rights oriented nonprofit organization, and the second way is in measuring who is willing to post on social media on behalf the nonprofit that supports Latino immigrants in the United States.

4.2 Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to examine the behavioral response of Latinos when primed with a statement meant to illicit political discrimination towards Latinos in general. First I ask whether priming Latino identity and political threat directed towards Latinos will lead to higher levels of group support than respondents who find themselves in nonthreatening situations, or should we expect political participation to be the same irregardless of the political environment Latinos find themselves in?

To answer this question, respondents will be randomized into three separate conditions, in condition A they will read a positive message about DACA and immigrants are asked to say how much they agree or disagree with the statement. In condition B, respondents will read a negative message about DACA and immigrants, and in condition C respondents will not read any message about DACA or immigrants. Immigration is commonly used as a policy area that primes Latino identity given the narrative that surrounds immigration as predominately Latin American (Sanchez, 2006; Pérez, 2015a,b).

Group support is measured in two ways, the first is a divide the dollar game in which respondents are asked to divide $100 dollars between two groups, MALDEF which they are told helps Latino immigrants, or Human Rights Watch which helps defend human rights around the world. Respondents are told that if they posted a message of support on Facebook, they could help one of the groups receive a monetary donation. I hypothesize that respondents in the politically threatening condition would allocate more to MALDEF in the

divide the dollar scenario than in the positive prime or the control and I expect the positive message will increase the salience of Latino identity so the allocated funds to MALDEF should be larger than the control. Similarly when looking at social media posting, because respondents feel that the group is threatened, they should be more likely to post on behalf of MALDEF in the threatening condition when compared to the positive prime and the control.

Finally, I conclude by examining how group consciousness influences the allocation of resources and the respondent's willingness to post on behalf of MALDEF. I hypothesize that respondents who are high in group consciousness will allocate more monetary resources to MALDEF when compared to those with low group consciousness. Furthermore, when respondents feel like the group is under attack, I expect that those with high group consciousness likely to increase the funds to MALDEF when compared to the positive prime and the control. When looking at who is willing to post on behalf of the organizations, I expect that as group consciousness increases, the more likely respondents will be to post on behalf of MALDEF in the threatening and nonthreatening prime. However, I expect the probability of posting to be highest in the threatening condition.

4.3   Data and Method

To test my hypotheses I conducted two survey experiments. The first experiment was conducted using Amazon MTurk in March between March 9th and March 22nd of 2018. But due to the difficulty of recruiting a large Latino sample size on MTurk, and the breaking news of the Facebook/ Cambridge Analytica data scandal during the data collection period, a second survey experiment with a larger sample size was conducted by Latino Decisions May 21st to 29th of 2018. The second survey experiment is roughly twice the size of the first experiment, was conducted in both Spanish and English, and is a nationally representative sample, thus increasing the confidence of the generalizability of the results.

To come up with an ethnically salient political statement, my research looks to the work of Sanchez (2006) who found that group consciousness has a stronger effect on issues like immigration and bilingual education. I chose to use immigration and Deferred Action

for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to prime Latino identity. This is similar to Pérez (2015*b*)'s experiment which also uses immigration rhetoric. Given that the immigration debate has continued to revolve around Latin American migration, I expect that DACA will raise the salience of Latino identity in my experiment as well. Respondents in condition A are asked to read a positive message recently said by a member of Congress about DACA and asked how much they agree or disagree with the statement. Those in condition B received a negative message intended to be threatening about DACA and Latinos in general, while respondents in Condition C received no messaging about DACA. The wording for the DACA question can be found in table 4.1.

Respondents in condition A are in the positive treatment and read the following "Immigration and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) has recently been in the political spotlight. Please read the following statement by a member of Congress and indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement. "Securing DACA protects communities and taxpayers, and prevents human suffering. Failure to bring these children and young adults out of the shadows in the past has put our nation at risk of higher crime and violence.""

Respondents in condition B are in the negative treatment their message reads "Immigration and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) has recently been in the political spotlight. Please read the following statement by a member of Congress and indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement. "Enforcing the law and eliminating DACA protects communities and taxpayers, and prevents human suffering. Failure to enforce the law in the past has put our nation at risk of higher crime and violence.""

Table 4.1: Condition Wording

	Statement
Condition A	Securing DACA protects communities and taxpayers, and prevents human suffering. Failure to bring these children and young adults out of the shadows in the past has put our nation at risk of higher crime and violence.
Condition B	Enforcing the law and eliminating DACA protects communities and taxpayers, and prevents human suffering. Failure to enforce the law in the past has put our nation at risk of higher crime and violence.
Condition C	[Not asked about DACA]

In order to test a new measure group consciousness that taps into the different dimensions of group consciousness without requiring multiple questions, I asked group consciousness in the following way; "do you think it is important for Latinos in the United States to work together politically in order to increase their status in society?" Responses range from (0) not important at all to (3) yes very important. By measuring group consciousness in this way, I give up the range that is associated with an additive scale, but I am able to preserve survey space and simplify group consciousness into a single item that touches on the multiple dimensions.

To measure how the type of political rhetoric Latinos are exposed to may influence their political behavior, I ask the respondents to participate in two activities. The first prompt is a hypothetical divide the dollar game in which respondents are asked to allocate funds between two nonprofit organizations one that seeks to help Latinos in the United States, and another that engages in protecting human rights broadly. The question is worded: "The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) is a nonprofit that is working to protect Latino immigrant rights in the United States. Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit that works to protect the rights of individuals around the world. Imagine you have $100 to divide between these two groups, use the sliding scales below to allocate the money. (Total must sum to $100)".

I expect that those in the threatening condition will allocate more funds to MALDEF, the nonprofit that helps Latino immigrants than to the Human Rights Watch. However, I expect to find that these results will be driven primarily by those who are high in group consciousness. I also expect that the positive prime might also lead to respondents giving more money to the Latino oriented nonprofit organization when compared to the control group, given that they were previously reminded of their group. Again, I expect that this may also be dependent on their level of group consciousness. The condition in which I expect MALDEF to receive the lowest donation amount is in the control condition where respondents hear no statement about Latinos and thus would not be thinking about their group.

After the hypothetical game, I seek to measure a behavioral outcome by asking re-

spondents to post on social media. Participants are told that a monetary donation would be made to the organization that receives the highest number of votes by survey participants. Participants were instructed to vote for an organization by posting a message of support on behalf of the group on to Facebook, but to be sure to click on one of the three boxes to continue with the survey. While no donation was actually made, engaging in this sort of deception allows me to examine if respondents are actually willing to engage in a form of low cost political behavior when they see a potential benefit for the group. At the end of the survey, respondents were debriefed and made aware of the deception. The response format for the online posting can be found below. While I anticipate that the number of respondents who are willing to post on behalf of these organizations are low, I expect that Latino respondents in the threatening condition, and those with high levels of group consciousness are more likely to post in support of MALDEF because they connect this behavior as helping members of their group.

- I stand with MALDEF in protecting Latino immigrant rights #MALDEF

- I stand with Human Rights Watch in protecting human rights around the world #HRW

- I do not want to post anything at this time

4.4 Study 1

In the first experiment, respondents were recruited via MTurk and were paid thirty five cents to take a 10 minute survey. Since Latino respondents are my population of interest and MTurk respondents are predominately non-Hispanic whites, I used screening questions asking a number of demographics before respondents could participate in the main questionnaire.

Given the nature of MTurk, the respondents are not representative of the Latino population as a whole. The survey was only conducted in English, and seventy five percent of

Table 4.2: Breakdowns by Condition

	Condition A	Condition B	Condition C
% Democrat	61	62	56
% Republican	17	24	25
% Independent	22	14	21
% Registered voter	69	78	82
% Female	38	41	36
Median Age	30	30	30
Median Education	B.A.	B.A.	B.A.
Median Income	40-49k	40-49k	40-49k
% First Generation	28	19	29
% Second Generation	40	44	37
% Third Generation	32	37	33
% U.S. Born	71	81	70
% South American	26	27	30
% Central American	5	11	9
% Cuban	6	5	9
% Dominican	5	4	5
% Mexican	33	31	27
% Puerto Rican	8	8	6
% Other Latino	17	12	15
N	88	90	89

the sample was born in the United States. Slightly more challenging are the breakdowns by gender and age. Sixty two percent of the respondents are male, while thirty-eight percent are female. The pool of respondents is skewed towards a younger demographic as well. Sixty six percent of survey takers are between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four while twenty seven percent of participants are between the ages of thirty five and forty nine. A mere eight percent of respondents were fifty or older. Table 4.2 provides a demographic breakdown by condition, indicating that the three groups are similar in size and demographics across the different conditions, despite their differences from the Latino population as a whole.

Figure 4.1: Group Consciousness Experiment 1

Figure 4.2 displays the breakdown of group consciousness responses. I find that an overwhelming number of respondents scored highly on group consciousness indicating that it is very important for Latinos to work together. Fifty nine percent of respondents in the MTurk sample said that it was very important for Latinos to work together politically while an additional thirty one stated that it was somewhat important. Only eight percent of respondents claimed that it was not really important while two percent responded that working together was not at all important.

I start by conducting a regression using OLS to examine the differences in donation amounts between the three conditions. I find that there is no significant difference between the mean amount given to MALDEF in condition A when respondents are given the positive prime ($51.01) when compared to the mean given in condition B the threatening prime ($51.42). Looking at condition B and the control condition I find that while the mean value is higher in condition B ($51.42) than the control condition ($46.17) the difference again is not statistically significant. I also find that the donation amounts given to the Human Rights

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Watch does not change at a statistically significant amount across the three conditions. This can be seen in figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Study 1 Estimated Allocations by Condition

Next I examine if respondents who are high in group consciousness are likely to allocate more money to MALDEF. The results in table 4.3 column 3 indicate that group conscious individuals allocate more funds to MALDEF. However, the amount attributed to group consciousness in the positive prime condition and the threatening condition is less than what we see attributed to group consciousness in the control condition. Furthermore, column 3 indicates that those in condition B allocate more funds to MALDEF when controlling for group consciousness than respondents in the control condition. Figure 4.4 displays the estimated amount donated to MALDEF going from no group consciousness to the highest level of group consciousness.

Figure 4.3: Estimated Allocation by Level of Group Consciousness

Modeled Donation by Level of Group Consciousness

The model shows that as group consciousness increases, the allocation to MALDEF increases the most in the control condition. One possible explanation for this is that nothing is priming Latino identity and so we should expect a linear trend. However when looking at the allocation to MALDEF in condition B, the threat condition, the starting point for respondents in this condition is much higher, suggesting that the threatening prime is causing respondents to donate more regardless of their level of group consciousness. While those with higher levels of group consciousness in condition B allocate more funds to MALDEF, the slope of the line is not as steep as what we see in condition A (the positive prime) or the control group, indicating that group consciousness has a smaller effect when respondents are primed with threat.

4.4.1 Posting on Social Media Experiment 1

After asking respondents to allocate funds between Human Rights Watch and MALDEF, participants were told that a donation would be made to the organization that received the most votes from survey participants and that they could vote by clicking a link to be redi-

Table 4.3: OLS Regression Amount Allocated

	MALDEF	HRW	MALDEF	HRW
Condition A	4.832	−4.832	15.578	−15.578
	(3.433)	(3.433)	(11.847)	(11.847)
Condition B	5.236	−5.236	25.861**	−25.861**
	(3.424)	(3.424)	(12.026)	(12.026)
Group Consciousness			13.596***	−13.596***
			(3.281)	(3.281)
Condition A * Group Consciousness			−4.473	4.473
			(4.549)	(4.549)
Condition B * Group Consciousness			−8.208*	8.208*
			(4.704)	(4.704)
Constant	46.180***	53.820***	12.419	87.581***
	(2.421)	(2.421)	(8.470)	(8.470)
Observations	266	266	266	266
R^2	0.011	0.011	0.107	0.107
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.003	0.090	0.090

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: Percent of respondents who posted in each condition

	Condition A	Condition B	Control
MALDEF	24%	14%	19%
HRW	8%	19%	29%
No Post	68%	67%	52%
Sum	100%	100%	100%

rected to Facebook to post a message of support, or could choose to skip posting altogether. The expectation is that those in the threatening condition would be most likely to post in support of MALDEF, and that respondents who are high in group consciousness should also post in favor of MALDEF. Table 4.4 presents the percent of respondents who posted in support of an organization in each condition. The percentages indicate that respondents are less likely to post in support of MALDEF in conditions A and B when compared to the control group. Furthermore, respondents are least likely to post in support of MALDEF in the threatening condition (B).

Because the outcome of interest are unordered, I chose to model this as a multinomial logistic regression in which not posting serves as my reference category. Table 4.5 columns

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Table 4.5: Multinomial Regression Willingness to Post

	HRW	MALDEF	HRW	MALDEF
Condition A	−1.578***	−0.054	−3.127	0.931
	(0.469)	(0.381)	(2.099)	(1.954)
Condition B	−0.691*	−0.534	0.887	−0.449
	(0.368)	(0.417)	(1.231)	(2.348)
Group Consciousness			0.019	0.986*
			(0.335)	(0.567)
Condition A * Group Consciousness			0.597	−0.371
			(0.772)	(0.710)
Condition B * Group Consciousness			−0.679	−0.032
			(0.509)	(0.847)
Constant	−0.571**	−0.995***	−0.616	−3.574**
	(0.245)	(0.284)	(0.847)	(1.565)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	490.196	490.196	487.007	487.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1 and 2 display the results from a simple model in which the only variable I control for is the condition. Here we see that people in the control condition are more likely to post in support of the Human Rights Campaign when compared to the positive and threatening conditions. However there is no statistically significant difference among the three conditions when looking at who is likely to post in favor of MALDEF.

Columns 3 and 4 in table 4.5 include a control for group consciousness and an interaction term for group consciousness by condition. The results indicate that the interaction terms are not statistically significant, but as group consciousness increases so does the probability of posting in support of MALDEF. This result is found among all three conditions. Because multinomial logistic regressions are difficult to interpret, figure 4.4 models the predicted probability of posting a message of support in all three conditions at each level of group consciousness.

Figure 4.4 indicates that condition A, where respondents read the the non-threatening positive message about DACA is the only condition in which the predicted probability of posting a message of support for MALDEF is always higher than the predicted probability

of posting in support of HRW. The trends indicate that as group consciousness increases, so does the probability of posting in support of MALDEF. Interestingly, in condition B (the threatening condition), the predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF is the lowest, and has the flattest slope when compared to condition A and the control. This result is contrary to what I had anticipated. As group consciousness increases, the probability of posting on behalf of MALDEF does increase, but is still lower than the probability of posting in condition A or the control.

Figure 4.4: Predicted Probability of Posting by Group Consciousness

4.5   Study 2

The second experiment was conducted online by Latino Decisions between May 21st to 29th
of 2018. This experiment was administered in both English and Spanish, and is nationally
representative of the Latino population. In total 409 respondents completed the survey,
allowing for 135 to 137 respondents in each condition. The wording for the three conditions
as well as the other measures remain the same as the first study. I find that similar to
the first experiment, the majority of respondents report high levels of group consciousness.
Figure four displays how respondents answered the group consciousness question. Seventy
six percent of respondents state that it is very important for Latinos to work together
to increase their political status in society. An additional twenty percent claim that it is
somewhat important for Latinos to work together, while only four precent of respondents did
not think it was important for Latinos to work together to increase their standing. While
the one item question wording is succinct, the skew towards the highest response category
is quite pronounced.

Figure 4.5: Respondent answer to group consciousness question

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
When looking at the average amount given to MALDEF and the Human Rights campaign in each condition, I find that there is little difference in amount allocated to MALDEF across the three conditions. In condition A (positive prime) the mean donation to MALDEF is $52.30 with standard error of $4.25. In condition B (negative prime) the mean donation to MALDEF is $50.51 standard error of $4.68, while in the control condition the mean donation to MALDEF is $48.18 standard error $4.58.

Table 4.6 presents the OLS results of experiment two. I find that as expected, the prime alone does not have an effect on how much a respondent is willing to give to either organization. However, when I include group consciousness in the model, I find that respondents are more likely to allocate more funds to MALDEF in the positive prime condition and the negative prime condition when compared to the control, however this is only at the .01 level. Group consciousness however is statistically significant at the .05 level. Those with higher levels of group consciousness give more to MALDEF across all conditions. A one unit increase in group consciousness is on average associated with an almost $12 increase in the amount given to MALDEF. To better understand how the allocations vary across condition, figure 4.6 presents a simulated amount for each condition by level of group consciousness.

Table 4.6: OLS regression Experiment 2 (dv is amount allocated)

	MALDEF	HRW	MALDEF	HRW
Condition A	4.200	−4.200	34.277*	−34.277*
	(3.323)	(3.323)	(17.958)	(17.958)
Condition B	2.909	−2.909	29.969*	−29.969*
	(3.296)	(3.296)	(16.525)	(16.525)
Group Consciousness			11.927**	−11.927**
			(4.979)	(4.979)
Condition A * Group Consciousness			−10.776*	10.776*
			(6.411)	(6.411)
ConditionB * Group Consciousness			−9.566	9.566
			(5.934)	(5.934)
Constant	50.023***	49.977***	16.832	83.168***
	(2.341)	(2.341)	(14.051)	(14.051)
Observations	409	409	409	409
R^2	0.004	0.004	0.020	0.020
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	−0.001	0.007	0.007

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Figure 4.6: Simulated $ allocation based off of R's level of group consciousness


Modeled Donation by Level of Group Consciousness

Figure 4.6 displays a starker difference in the amount allotted by condition than did the MTurk results. The effects of positive and negative primes are very strong. While a positive prime results in a larger allocation to MALDEF, the slope is steeper for respondents in the negative prime condition. What is interesting is that unlike the first experiment, the threatening condition is not outperforming the positive condition.

4.5.1 Posting on Social Media Experiment 2

Whether respondents would engage in posting on social media, became a bit concerning during the fielding of the MTurk experiment. Since the Cambridge Analytica story broke during data collection, it is possible that respondents were less likely to post anything on Facebook given the saliency of Facebook's recent data breach. I was pleased to find that more respondents were willing to post online in this second experiment. Table 4.7 shows the percent breakdowns of the respondents posting behavior by condition. The posting results suggest that people in the positive prime condition were more likely to post than in the negative prime or the control. However those in the negative prime condition are most likely

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to post in support of MALDEF than the other two conditions.

Table 4.7: Percent of respondents who posted in each condition Experiment 2

	Condition A	Condition B	Control
MALDEF	28%	33%	32%
HRW	22%	23%	28%
No Post	50%	44%	40%
Sum	100%	100%	100%

Table 4.8: Willingness to Post Experiment 2

	HRW	MALDEF	HRW	MALDEF
Condition A	−0.449*	−0.339	0.322	3.503*
	(0.258)	(0.243)	(1.266)	(1.872)
Condition B	−0.257	−0.055	1.299	3.196*
	(0.256)	(0.239)	(1.134)	(1.837)
Group Consciousness			0.172	1.602***
			(0.348)	(0.561)
Condition A * Group Consciousness			−0.285	−1.342**
			(0.459)	(0.649)
Condition B * Group Consciousness			−0.610	−1.119*
			(0.417)	(0.637)
Constant	−0.378**	−0.247	−0.846	−4.802***
	(0.178)	(0.172)	(0.963)	(1.634)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,228.508	1,228.508	1,217.114	1,217.114
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Again, I ran a multinomial logistic regression to see if being placed in a particular prime increased the respondent's propensity to post on behalf of one of these groups. In column 1 I find that those in the positive prime condition are less likely to post on behalf of Human Rights Watch when compared to those in the control condition. Most interestingly, the results in column 4 of table 4.8 indicate that respondents in both the positive and the negative prime condition posted a message of support on social media at a greater rate than the respondents in the control condition. Additionally, those who are high in group consciousness are more likely to post on behalf of MALDEF than those who are low in group consciousness.

Figure 4.7 presents the predicted probabilities of posting in support of the organizations

in each condition. In the bottom panel, I find that those in the control group are much more likely to post on behalf of Human Rights Watch. For those on the lower half of the group consciousness scale, their predicted probability of posting on behalf of Human Rights watch is about thirty percent, while the predicted probability of posting on behalf of MALDEF is at or less than ten percent. Among those with the highest level of group consciousness, I find that the predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF increases to thirty five percent, while the predicted probability of posting for Human Rights Watch decreases to twenty eight percent. This is in line with my expectations that high levels of group consciousness should lead to an increase in political participation.

Focusing on the middle panel of figure 4.7, I find that respondents who received the negative Latino prime and have low levels of group consciousness are much more likely to post in support of HRW. The predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF in the negative prime condition is higher than in the control even among those who report low levels of group consciousness (14% for those who say it is not very important compared to 3% in the control), but where we see the biggest change is among respondents who say that it is somewhat important for Latinos to work together. The predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF in the negative prime condition is twenty four percent. The predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF among respondents with the same level of group consciousness in the control condition is only eleven percent. These results indicate that threat does seem to motivate respondents to post on behalf of their group.

The top panel of figure 4.7 presents the predicted probability of posting on social media for those in the positive prime. I find that the predicted probability of posting on behalf of MALDEF is highest among all groups in the positive prime condition. As with the two other conditions, the predicted probability of posting in support of MALDEF increases as group consciousness increases, but the positive prime seems to have a boosting effect that exceeds that of the threatening prime.

Figure 4.7: predicted probability of posting for HRW or MALDEF experiment 2

Predicted Probability of Posting Message of Support on Facebook

4.6   Discussion

My findings suggest that there is more to the threat and political mobilization story than meets the eye. While initially it appears that the mean allocation to the Latino oriented group is not higher in the threatening condition when compared to the two other conditions, a closer examination finds that threat may play a role. The results from these two experiments are mixed. In the divide the dollar game, I find that threat increased the financial allocation in experiment 1 but this is not the case in experiment 2. Additionally, while group consciousness does increase the amount respondents allocate to MALDEF, it appears that whether or not the prime is positive or negative, as long as respondents receive a prime, they are more likely to allocate funds on behalf of the organization that represents their group, with those on the high end of group consciousness allocating the most to the Latino oriented group.

What I find most interesting are the results regarding social media posting. In the first

experiment, even among respondents who are high in group consciousness, the predicted probability of posting in support of the group is lower than the positive prime condition and the no prime condition. While the predicted probability of posting does increase as group consciousness increases, the effect is small. However, given the concerns about data breaches on Facebook, the results from the first experiment should be taken with a grain of salt. The second experiment, however finds that the predicted probability of posting on social media on behalf of MALDEF is higher in the threatening condition when compared to the control and even the positive prime. So while I may not have found results for the hypothetical game, when it came to actually getting involved I find that there is greater willingness to post when primed by threat. This is especially the case for those high in group consciousness. Though these experiments provide mixed results, they are the first step in understanding how group consciousness and threat may shape political behavior. Given the mixed findings of threat as a mediator of group consciousness, in the next chapter, I test whether group consciousness is more likely to be moderated by threat.

CHAPTER 5

Priming Threat: Activating Group Threat in Survey Experiments

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is some evidence to suggest that threat can activate group consciousness, but how this is done is not fully explained by looking at cross sectional survey data. I believe that here are two main possibilities that can explain this, the first is that threat serves to mediate the relationship between group consciousness, political views and participation. When threat is present, group consciousness will increase, and this will lead to stronger political views that are in line with the group, and political action that benefits the group.

Alternately, it may be the case that threat serves as a socializer in which people experience political threat. At the time they may react to threat because they feel like they or members of their group are being attacked. In the moment this may not lead to an automatic increase in group consciousness, but we may start to see that people are forming political views and participating in ways that benefit the group. This experience of group discrimination may leave an indelible mark on individuals. The memory of political threat and that initial action may result in the formation of group conscious and a more politically active individual, which leaves lasting results among specific cohorts over time.

This chapter will focus on threat as a potential mediator of group consciousness, political attitudes, and participation. Survey experiments have demonstrated that political threat can moderate identity centrality among Latinos but here I am interested in examining if there is a mediating effect between threat and group consciousness (Pérez, 2015a,b). Is political threat able to move group consciousness in a meaningful way, and are those with

higher levels of group consciousness more likely to have political attitudes and engage in political action that aligns with the group?

Additionally, I examine how threat impacts group consciousness and political attitudes and participation generationally. This is an important step to understanding why some group members may have positions or align with candidates that are against Latino group interests. For some group members, being Latino might be associated with being an immigrant. For these group members, being second or third generation might be a way to distance themselves from the group. Some works in political science suggest that Latinos will assimilate into American political life much like we saw with other white ethnic groups such as the Irish and Italians who came to the U.S. in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Citrin and Sears, 2014), and weaker levels of group consciousness and weaker reactions to threat among third generation respondents may be one way that distancing from the panethnic group, and greater levels of assimilation and acculturation are achieved. However, some works in sociology suggest that Latinos who are second and third generation Latinos are more likely to hold a radicalized identity (Rumbaut, 2009; Portes and Rumbaut, 2005b). The conception of the "American" dream where anyone who works hard can achieve their dreams is more prevalent among immigrants who see the United States as a land of opportunity. Among the children of immigrants, the racial hierarchy in the United States becomes more prevalent. They are more likely to recognize the injustices that group members face due to their racial and ethnic background and view the system as stacked against them. By examining how these different generational groups respond to threat, I will provide us with a better understanding of how threat influences the attitudes and behavior of Latinos in the United States.

5.1 Hypotheses

When a person is in a political environment in which policy, law, or campaign rhetoric is negatively targeted toward their group, the saliency of that identity will be heightened. I expect that the heightening of identity will impact their political response. I hypothesize that threat will mediate levels of group consciousness for Latino respondents. I hypothesize that

people who are exposed to political group threat will have higher levels of group consciousness relative to individuals who are not exposed to group threat. I also expect that for the respondents in the treatment condition, the differences in group consciousness will not vary significantly by generation. However, when looking at levels of groups consciousness among respondents in the control condition I expect that group consciousness will be stronger among first and second generation respondents and somewhat weaker among the third generation respondents.

When examining political views, and participation, I expect that individuals who score higher on group consciousness will be more likely to engage in political activities and have political attitudes that are more in line with the group (Sanchez, 2006). In terms of political attitudes, this would mean that respondents high in group consciousness should view the Democratic Party more favorably than the Republican Party and those high in group consciousness should dislike Donald Trump- a person who started his political career by denigrating Latin American immigrants.

When not primed with threat, I hypothesize that not only will levels of group consciousness will differ by generation when threat is absent. But political attitudes and behavior may be more diverse among second and third generation respondents. However, when primed with threat, generational responses on the group consciousness scale will more closely resemble one another, as will political attitudes and participation.

5.2   First Study December 2019

To test my hypotheses I conducted two studies, the first study was conducted via telephone by Latino Decisions in December of 2019. This survey was fielded in four states; Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. In total I have 801 respondents which are split among a treatment and control condition. One of the benefits of conducting a study in these four states is that they all have similar Latino populations with the majority of respondents consisting of Mexican Americans. Table 1 displays the generational breakdown for the treatment and control condition. In total I have 398 respondents in the treatment group, and 403

respondents in the control group. While the generational breakouts are rather small in terms of finding meaningful statistical differences, I nevertheless look at the results by generation to examine the directional trends by generation in order to provide a general sense of how well the results fit the hypotheses.

Table 5.1: Sample breakdown by Generation

	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd + Gen	All Rs
Treatment	122	137	139	398
Control	127	150	123	403
Total	249	290	262	801

Respondents were assigned to either the treatment or the control condition. People in the treatment condition were told that a member of Congress made a statement about Latinos and were asked how much they agree or disagree with the statement. At the start of the survey, respondents were asked if they preferred to be called Latino or Hispanic. The wording in the treatment message is the preferred term for the respondent. The message speaks to the changing face of the country, and illegal immigration. This treatment was designed to make it difficult for respondents to distance themselves from the group by mentioning how Latinos are phenotypically different ("changing face of America"). By adding in immigration and economics this statement is meant to illicit the same xenophobic tone that is often heard from individuals who want to reduce immigration and send immigrants back to their home country.

Respondents in the control condition on the other hand, were told that a member of Congress made a statement about fire safety. This message speaks to the challenges that wildfires present and the need to rethink our approach to fire safety. Respondents were also asked how much they agree or disagree with this statement. This message was selected because it does not invoke any group in particular and should not impact group consciousness. The rise in the number of wildfires makes this topic particularly salient, but because it affects the general population and is not really specific to one particular group, it should not produce very strong reactions.

For the respondents who receive the treatment message, I expect that by remind-

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Table 5.2: Wording for Treatment and Control Conditions

Treatment	The influx of Hispanics is redefining what America looks like. These Hispanics that came to the US mostly illegally are taking jobs and resources and are cutting the line taking away from the real Americans who have been here a long time.
Control	Wild fires are redefining the way we look at fire safety. These fires hurt jobs and the economy and test the limits of our resources. We need to help ensure that hard-working people don't continue to lose their life and property because of these wildfires.

ing participants of immigration and priming them with the threatening political comments about immigration, the reminder of political threat will mediate their response to the group consciousness questions that follow leading to an increase in group consciousness among respondents in the treatment condition. The full wording for the treatment and control conditions can be found in table 5.2.

Immediately following either the treatment or control condition, respondents are then asked three group consciousness measures. I created this group consciousness scale based off of wording that captures the three key dimensions of group consciousness. The goal of this new scale is to reduce the number of items that are used to measure group consciousness while still capturing the intent of group consciousness based off of Miller et al. (1981)'s work. I measure group consciousness as an additive scale of three items that range from strongly agree to strongly disagree. By using a three item scale, each item serves to fulfill each dimension of group consciousness. It also allows for more variation in the distribution of group consciousness.

To capture whether respondents feel that Latinos are a unique group, I ask how much do you agree or disagree that "Latinos from diverse backgrounds are a distinct racial group in the U.S.?". In order to measure positive group affect I ask them to indicate how much they agree or disagree with the following statement "I feel closer to other Latinos than to other racial/ ethnic groups"? The final question aims to get at systemic blame and the need for collective action. This question asks how much do you agree or disagree with the

following statement "Latinos are unjustly disadvantaged in the U.S. and it is important for Latinos to work to increase the political and social standing of the group".

These three questions were then placed into an additive scale that ranges from 0-9. Respondents on the zero end of the scale are not group conscious at all, while respondents who score a 9 are very group conscious. Figure 5.1 displays the average level of group consciousness by condition. I find that group consciousness among the control group is 5.86, slightly higher than the treatment group which is 5.77, but given the wide confidence bands, these estimates are not meaningfully different from one another. This indicates to me that perhaps threat is not influencing levels of group consciousness in the way that I expected.

Figure 5.1: Group Consciousness by Condition

5.2.1 Group Consciousness Study 1

Table 5.3 displays the results for the full sample and by generation when I regress the treatment on group consciousness. The results here indicate that the treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on increasing levels of group consciousness among respondents. While not distinguishable from zero, it seems like threat may have increased group consciousness among first generation respondents. Interestingly, while threat may have slightly decreased group consciousness among second generation respondents, the level of group con-

sciousness is slightly higher for this group than the others. It may be the case that this treatment is not strong enough to produce an effect on group consciousness, but it is also possible that since we have been in a political climate of strong anti-immigrant rhetoric that reading and receiving anti-immigrant messaging is no longer enough to elicit a change in group consciousness thus making it more difficult if not impossible to prime threat in a survey experiment.

Table 5.3: Study 1 Results

| | *Dependent variable: Group consciousness* | | | |
	All	First Gen	Second Gen	Third Gen
Treatment	−0.114	0.109	−0.304	−0.101
	(0.149)	(0.256)	(0.247)	(0.275)
Constant	5.906***	5.850***	6.026***	5.813***
	(0.105)	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.200)
Observations	801	249	290	262
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.001
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	−0.003	0.002	−0.003
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure 5.1 displays the average level of group consciousness by the treatment and control condition for the full sample. Here we can see how much the treatment decreases the average effect of group consciousness on the full sample. The differences between the two groups are quite small and not statistically significant, indicating that priming respondents with threat really doesn't produce large shifts in group consciousness.

Figure 5.2 displays the average level of group consciousness by condition and generation. I find that group consciousness is higher in the treatment group when compared to the control group for first generation immigrants, but for second and third generation immigrants group consciousness is higher among the control group. While these averages are not statistically distinct from one another, they do suggest that first generation immigrants may be embracing their group identity a bit more while second and third generations might be slightly more

prone to distancing from the group.

Figure 5.2: Group consciousness by generation within condition

After measuring group consciousness, I then ask respondents a number of questions relating to political participation and political views. I start by first asking respondents "In the next 12 months how likely are you to attend a protest on behalf of immigrants?" Respondents can respond very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, or very likely. I also ask how likely are you to attend a political meeting using the same four point scale. I then ask three feeling thermometer questions to get a better sense of their political attitudes. Respondents are asked, on a scale of 0-100 how warmly do you feel towards: Donald Trump, Democratic Party, and Republican Party.

5.2.2 Trump Feeling Thermometer Study 1

To measure political attitudes I asked respondents to rate their favorability towards Donald Trump, the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party. Figure 3 displays the results for the the average response by condition for first second and third generations. I find that

among first generation respondents, there is little difference between the treatment and the control groups. The respondents in the treatment group rate Trump slightly less favorably, but the difference is minimal and indistinguishable from zero. There is only about a 2 point increase in Trump favorability between the treatment and the control groups. This may be because Trump's rhetoric surrounding immigrants is so inflammatory that there is not much room for Trump favorability to change among first generation respondents.

Figure 5.3: Trump Average Treatment Effect

However when second and third generation respondents are exposed to anti-immigrant rhetoric this produces lower overall evaluations of Donald Trump. Among the second generation respondents in the control group, Trump favorability averages about 32 out of 100. But in the treatment condition this goes down to 22 among second generation respondents. Again we see a similar pattern for third generation respondents, in the control group Trump favorability was at 35, but in the treatment group this drops down to 25. These results are not distinguishable from zero, but this is likely due to the smaller sample sizes for the generational groupings. This experiment demonstrates that once again first generation re-

spondents have a different reaction to anti-immigrant rhetoric when compared to Latinos who were born in the U.S., but even among U.S. born Latinos, threat directed towards their group shapes their perceptions of politicians. In this instance a politician who is known for hurling racist remarks is viewed less favorably when second and third generation respondents are reminded of the political threat the group faces. While the average levels of support is higher for second and third generation respondents, this decrease in Trump favorability suggests that respondents of all generations are likely to shift their opinions to more closely align with their group.

Figure 5.4: Trump Favorability by Group Consciousness

To examine if this may be connected to group consciousness, I plotted the trend lines for the treatment and control groups by generation as levels of group consciousness increase. It is important to keep in mind that further analyzing these categories means that fewer cases are relied upon to make assumptions for each data point. These results are not statistically significant, but help illustrate what impact if any, that group consciousness may be having

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on political participation. A more in depth look at Trump favorability by condition and level of group consciousness shows that among the treatment group, for second and third generation respondents the mean support for Trump is much lower for respondents in the treatment condition when compared to the control condition. For third generation respondents especially, the more group consciousness a person in the control group is, the more their ratings are lower and similar to the treatment group. While the favorability levels for Trump are higher among second and third generation immigrants, the general pattern holds. The more group conscious people are, the less they support Trump. The key difference is that respondents in the treatment group have lower Trump favorability scores among second and third generation respondents. The pattern for first generation respondents is less clear, and likely needs more respondents to make better sense of their pattern. For first generation respondents in the control, the more group conscious a person is the more they dislike Trump. However in the treatment condition we actually find that the more group conscious respondents are the more support for Trump increases. This may be due to the fact that there are few first generation respondents on the lower end of the group consciousness scale so they might be driving the trend line here.

5.2.3 Republican Feeling Thermometer Study 1

Next I examine Republican favorability. Figure 5.5 displays the average thermometer response for the Republican Party by generation and condition. I find that in the treatment group, support is lower across all three generations when comparing the generation's treatment to the control condition. While these results are not statistically significant, the pattern that emerges seems to indicate that the anti-immigrant rhetoric is not only associated with the twice impeached xenophobic former president, but also his party.

The differences between the treatment and the control are strongest among the first generation respondents. There is almost a 10 point difference in Republican favorability between the treatment and control conditions. There is a roughly 7 point difference between the treatment and the control for the second generation respondents. While not statistically

significant, this difference shift is in the direction hypothesized with Republican support lower among the treatment group, with a similar finding among the third generation respondents. While the average levels of support are generally higher among the third generation respondents when compared to the second and first generation respondents, I still find a 2.5 decrease in the support for the Republican party when comparing the treatment and control groups.

Figure 5.5: Republican Party Feeling Therm Average Treatment Effect

Figure 5.6: Republican Party Feeling Therm by Group Consciousness

The results by level of group consciousness can be found in figure 5.6. Here we see that for first generation respondents, feelings towards the Republican party are fairly low, and do not change by level of group consciousness. This may be because the Republican party's position and reputation on immigration has already been cast. It seems like there may be a threat effect that produces a roughly 10 point decrease in Republican favorability among first generation respondents. For second generation respondents I find that there is an overall depressing effect of the treatment condition on feelings toward the Republican party, that is fairly consistent across all levels of group consciousness. But it is really among third generation respondents where we see the greatest variation in the Republican feeling thermometer. As expected, those low in group consciousness in the control group hold a more favorable view of the Republican party than those high in group consciousness. Among those in the treatment group, even those low in group consciousness have a lower favorability rating of the Republican party. There is a slight increase in Republican favorability among those who are higher on the group consciousness scale, but it appears that people who rate 5, and

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6 are driving the trend line upward. A larger sample will help better explain these results.

5.2.4   Democratic Feeling Thermometer Study 1

The last question I examine in terms of attitudes are feelings toward the Democratic Party. While at the time that I fielded this study the Democratic Party had not been able to do much nationally on the issue of immigration, members of the Democratic party are viewed as much more sympathetic to immigrants than the Republican Party. Thus I expect that respondents in the treatment condition would view Democrats more favorably since they are more likely to support policies that benefit their group.

Figure 5.7: Dem Feeling Therm Average Treatment Effect

Figure 5.7 displays the average treatment effect on the Democratic feeling thermometer by condition and generation. I find that for first generation respondents, there is a very modest increase in the Democratic feeling thermometer for those who are in the treatment group, albeit not statistically significant. For the second generation respondents, there is no real discernible difference for the Democratic candidate when comparing the treatment and

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the control group. The largest effect is among the third generation respondents where those in the treatment group rate Democrats much more favorably than those in the control.

Figure 5.8: Dem favorability by Group Consciousness

Figure 5.8 displays the results by level of group consciousness by generation and condition. First generation respondents seem to like the Democrats the most with favorability always above the 50 mark. First generation respondents in the treatment are more favorable towards the Democrats than the control, but here as group consciousness increases Democratic favorability sightly decreases. However this may be due to a few outliers that push the trend line downwards. Among second generation respondents I find that as group consciousness increases so does support for the Democrats. The treatment and control groups closely track one another with the treatment group having a higher level of group consciousness up until the group consciousness score is about a 6, once it reaches 6 Democratic favorability is the same for both the treatment and control groups. Among the third generation respondents I find parallel trend lines. Respondents in the treatment group have higher levels of Democratic favorability. As group consciousness increases in both the treatment and the

control groups so does Democratic support but support for the Democrats is always higher among the treatment group than the control.

5.2.5   Attend Protest in Support of Immigrants Study 1

In this first study I asked respondents two questions that aim to capture their willingness to engage in politics on behalf of the group. I start by asking how likely respondents are to attend an immigration protest. The average response can be found in figure 5.9. Interestingly, despite displaying higher levels of group consciousness when primed with threat, first generation respondents in the treatment group are less likely to report willingness to attend an immigration protest when compared to first generation respondents in the control group. In fact second and third generation respondents in the treatment group are more likely to report willingness to attend an immigration protest. For second and third generation respondents, while none of the results are statistically significant, they follow the directional trend I expect with more respondents in the treatment groups being more willing to protest than their counterparts in the control.

In panel 1 of 5.9 we see that as group consciousness increases, likelihood of attending an immigration protest decreases among the treatment group, but remains almost flat for the control group. For second generation immigrants, respondents in the control condition have a more linear response toward attending a protest in support of immigrants. Those who are less group conscious are more likely to attend immigration protests, but as respondents are more group conscious, the more likely they would be to attend an immigration protest. For second generation respondents in the treatment group, respondents who are low on group consciousness are more favorable towards attending a protest compared to individuals low in group consciousness in the control. This increases somewhat as levels of group consciousness increase, but not nearly at the same rate as the control group. It is among third generation respondents where I find the expected patterns of willingness to attend immigration protests by levels of group consciousness. Among the third generation respondents in the control condition being low on group consciousness is associated with being less likely to attend an

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Figure 5.9: Average response to attend immigration protest by condition and generation

immigration protest, but this increases by about .4 for third generation respondents who are high in group consciousness in the control. In the threatening (treatment) condition, respondents who are low in group consciousness are more likely to say that it is very unlikely that they will attend a protest in support of immigrants when compared to the control group. However as group consciousness increases, third generation respondents in the treatment condition are most likely to say they will attend an immigration protest.

I find the patterns among first and third generation respondents to be the most interesting. Contrary to my belief that first generation respondents in the threatening condition would be most likely to engage in protesting as group consciousness increases, I find that they are less likely. This may be because threatening rhetoric may be more likely to increase fear among first generation respondents in a way that second and third generation respondents do not experience. First generation respondents may worry about the safety of protesting especially if they are undocumented or only have a green card. This fear would not be a concern for second or third generation respondents. Third generation respondents

Figure 5.10: Average response by level of group consciousness

most closely follow a more typical model, the reason for this may be because of greater levels of socialization in the United States.

5.2.6 Political Meeting Study 1

Figure 5.11 displays the average response to attending a political meeting by condition and generation. There is no clear pattern by condition and generation as to whether or not respondents are more or less likely to attend a political meeting. For first and third generation respondents in the treatment group, they are more likely to attend a political meeting, but this increase is not statistically significant from zero. Among the second generation group those in the control group are more likely to attend a political meeting when compared to second generation respondents in the treatment. This is interesting because second generation respondents in the treatment group were more likely to protest but here I find that they are less willing to attend a political meeting.

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Figure 5.11: Average response to attending a political meeting by condition and generation


Figure 5.12: Average response to attending a political meeting by level of group consciousness

Figure 5.12 displays the average response to attending a political meeting by level of group consciousness. For first and third generation respondents, we see the large effects of increased levels of group consciousness on political participation among the treatment group. First generation respondents who are low on group consciousness in the treatment group have an average response of zero or "not at all likely" to attend a political meeting. But respondents high on group consciousness have an average response of 2, or being "somewhat likely" to attend a political meeting. It is among second generation respondents where we do not see threat impacting levels of group consciousness or political participation. However, for first generation respondents in the control group the average score for willingness to attend a political meeting for those low on group consciousness is about 1 and increases to 1.4 for those highest in group consciousness. This may suggest that threat is increasing willingness to engage among first generation respondents high in group consciousness. For third generation respondents in the control, instead of seeing an increase to participate among those high in group consciousness, I find that they are slightly less likely to be willing to attend a political meeting when compared to those low in group consciousness. This finding may be an anomaly driven by an outlier and is worth further investigating. Among second generation respondents being in the treatment group does not appear to have any effect on willingness to attend a political meeting. Both the treatment and control trend lines closely track one another.

5.2.7 Discussion of First Experiment

The results from this first study indicate that perhaps group consciousness is not mediated- at least in an experimental setting. There is reason to believe that experiencing political group threat has some effect on Latino attitudes and behavior, and threat can modestly increase participation and shift attitudes among all generations, but the movement is very slight. It also seems like there is more movement in the expected direction on the questions surrounding political attitudes than there is on behavior. The findings for my political behavior questions were somewhat mixed, and at times moving in the opposite direction than I would have expected- particularly when looking at willingness tp attend a political

meeting. To try to get more clarity on the relationship between threat and attitudes and behaviors, I ran a second study.

5.3   Second Study 2020

I conducted a second pilot in May of 2020. This study is a nationally representative sample of $1,749$ voters. While the treatment remains the same in this second study, because of the Covid-19 pandemic that hit the United States in March of 2020, questions of interest surrounding attending meetings and protests were removed. This version includes the Democratic and Republican favorability items that were asked in the previous study as well as a new question asking if respondents would be willing to sign a petition in support of releasing people from immigration detention centers due to coronavirus concerns. Another change made in this version of the study is that the group consciousness questions use a 7 point scale instead of the 4 point scale used in the first study. Table 5.4 displays the number of respondents in my treatment and control conditions by generation. The generational breakouts in this study are nearly double the size in the previous study, offering greater statistical power than the first.

Table 5.4: Sample breakdown by Generation Second Study

	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd + Gen	All Rs
Treatment	384	298	200	882
Control	363	293	211	867
Total	747	591	411	1,749

Figure 5.13: Dem favorability by Group Consciousness

Each of the 3 group consciousness items is recoded to range from 0-6, thus when added together, group consciousness ranges from 0-18. The alpha for the group consciousness scale is .73 indicating that the items fit well together. As a refresher the wording for the treatment and the control conditions is in table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Wording for Treatment and Control Conditions

Treatment	The influx of Hispanics is redefining what America looks like. These Hispanics that came to the US mostly illegally are taking jobs and resources and are cutting the line taking away from the real Americans who have been here a long time.
Control	Wild fires are redefining the way we look at fire safety. These fires hurt jobs and the economy and test the limits of our resources. We need to help ensure that hard-working people don't continue to lose their life and property because of these wildfires.

5.3.1 Group Consciousness Study 2

As with the first experiment, there are no statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups when looking at group consciousness. Those in the control group report having a group consciousness level of 13.1 while those in the control group have a mean group consciousness level of 12.7.

Figure 5.14: Dem favorability by Group Consciousness

When looking at group consciousness by generation and treatment condition, again I find no statistically significant differences between the treatment group and the control. However, the respondents in the treatment condition have a slightly lower average level of group consciousness when compared to the control across all generations. This differs from my first experiment where first generation respondents in the treatment group had a higher average group consciousness score than the control. In this second study, first generation respondents in the control the average level of group consciousness is 13.1, and in the treatment it is 12.8. For second generation respondents, the average level of group

consciousness is 13.3 in the control and 12.7 in the treatment, and for third generation respondents it is 12.9 in the control and 12.6 in the treatment.

With the questions on favorability, I expect that respondents in the treatment group will hold lower levels of favorability towards the Republicans when compared to the control. I also expect that those in the treatment will be more favorable towards the Democratic Party since the Democratic Party is in favor of immigration reform and has not taken the same xenophobic tone that is often heard on the Republican side.

5.3.2   Republican Favorability Study 2

When looking at the results for the Republican feeling thermometer, there is small but statistically insignificant movement in the treatment and control groups. While first generation and second generation respondents in the treatment groups are slightly more likely to have an unfavorable view of Republicans when compared to the control groups, third generation respondents in the control group actually have the least favorable view of Republicans with an average favorability of 2.76 out of 10. One important note is that there are more Republicans in the third generation treatment group than there are in the control group. In the control Republicans make up 20% of the sample while in the treatment group Republicans make up 26%. While the rest of the generation groups are more balanced, the increase in Republican favorability in the control group for third generation respondents is likely attributable to the increase of Republicans in the sample.

Figure 5.15: Rep favorability by Group Consciousness

Figure 5.16: Favorability by level of Group consciousness

Examining Republican favorability by group consciousness and generation, I find that for first generation respondents, the results are what I would largely expect. The respondents in the treatment group have a lower average support across all levels of group consciousness compared to the control. However, I find that the trend lines for the treatment group and the control start to converge the higher a person is on group consciousness. This finding for my first generation respondents is unlike what I found in my first experiment where the levels of support were parallel and mostly flat.

Among second generation respondents the results differ from the first experiment. In the first experiment among second generation respondents, favorability for the Republicans was lower in the control group and declined as group consciousness increased. What I find in the second study however is that the trend line produces a flat line among respondents in the treatment condition for my second generation respondents. The treatment group has a much lower starting point with Republican favorability at about 2.7 and stays at 2.7 regardless of the level of group consciousness. With the control group, what I find is that those who are low in group consciousness have higher average favorability scores of Republicans compared to those who are high in group consciousness. The trend line starts at about 7.5 for those who are low in group consciousness and decreases to 2 for those who are high in group consciousness. The trend line for the control group is about what I would expect for the relationship between group consciousness and Republican favorability, but the flat trend line for the treatment group suggests that even the respondents low in group consciousness are less likely to view Republicans favorably when they have been primed with threat.

Among third generation respondents I find that the results parallel one another. What is surprising however is that the trend indicates that third generation respondents have lower levels of Republican favorability across the board when compared to the treatment group. For both the treatment and the control group as group consciousness levels increase, Republican favorability decreases. For the treatment group, Republican favorability starts at about 7 for those who are 0 on group consciousness and ends at about 1.5 for those highest in group consciousness. In the control group, Republican favorability starts at about 5.5 for those with low group consciousness and ends at 1.2 for those with high group consciousness. This

can be accounted for based off of the fact that the treatment group has more Republicans in it than the control.

5.3.3 Democratic Favorability Study 2

Figure 5.17: Dem favorability by Generation

Once again, respondents were asked how warmly they feel towards the Democratic Party. I had hypothesized that respondents would be more likely to feel warmly towards the Democratic Party in the treatment group compared to the control because the Democratic Party has a more inclusive platform on immigration. What I find however, is that respondents in the treatment group actually have lower average feeling scores towards the Democrats when compared to the control. For first generation respondents in the treatment group, their average Democratic favorability score is 6.11 while the control group is 6.34. Second generation respondents regardless of condition are more likely to have lower levels of favorability towards the Democratic Party. Those in the control group have an average favorability of 5.82 while

second generation respondents in the treatment group have an average favorability of 5.6. For third generation respondents, the average favorability in the control is 5.96 while in the treatment it is 5.84. While I initially expected that feelings towards the Democrats would be higher, the fact that feelings towards Democrats are lower in the treatment groups make sense if respondents view Democrats as culpable for not prioritizing immigration reform. The timing of the survey also may have something to do with lower Democratic favorability scores. At the time Joe Biden was the presidential nominee for the party and enthusiasm for him as a a candidate was somewhat low. Also because of the pandemic, his campaign profile was lower than other Democratic nominees in the past.

Figure 5.18: Favorability by level of Group consciousness

When examining how Democratic favorability shifts by levels of group consciousness and generation, for first and second generation respondents in the control group there is a strong linear relationship where those low on group consciousness have lower levels of Democratic favorability, but as a person increases in group consciousness, favorability towards the Democrats increases. For third generation respondents in the control group, the slope of

the relationship between Democratic favorability and group consciousness is not as steep. While those higher in group consciousness are slightly more likely to favor the Democratic party (the average favorability for Democrats for the highest level of group consciousness is 6) even among respondents who are low in group consciousness, their mean favorability score is 5. In contrast among first generation control respondents, those who are a 0 in group consciousness have favorability level is 2.4, while those with the highest level are a 7.8.

Interestingly, unlike the first experiment, as group consciousness increases, so does Democratic favorability among first generation respondents. This is true in both the treatment and the control groups. In the previous experiment, Democratic favorability slightly declined. While I expected the treatment group to view the Democrats more favorably because of the party's views on immigration, what I find is that respondents who are between a 3 and a 12 on group consciousness view the Democrats more favorably when compared to the first generation control group, but respondents who are a 12-18 actually have lower favorability towards the Democrats than the respondents with the same levels of group consciousness in the control group.

A similar pattern emerges with the second generation respondents. Second generation respondents in the control group have lower levels of Democratic favorability when compared to those in the treatment group, up until respondents reach about a 12 on group consciousness. At that point respondents in the treatment group have lower levels of favorability when compared to the control. This is similar to the second generation pattern in the first experiment. A possible reason for this is that higher levels of group consciousness may be related to higher levels of political awareness. While respondents on the lower ends of the group consciousness scale may initially feel more favorable towards the Democrats, those with higher levels of group consciousness may feel that both parties have failed Latinos on issues of immigration. While the Democratic party claims to be more inclusive and supportive of immigration reform, years of inaction may have lead to disillusion among group conscious Latinos.

The results for the third generation respondents are quite different from the third generation respondents in the first experiment. I find that for third generation respondents in

the control group, the trend line starts at about 5 for those who are low in group consciousness and ends at 6.3 for those who have the highest levels of group consciousness. In comparison, for respondents in the treatment group the trend line starts around 2.6 for those low in group consciousness, and increases to about 7.

Because of the pandemic and the recommendations that Americans not gather for health and safety reasons, the behavior oriented question that I asked are different in the second study. This time I ask if respondents would be willing to sign a petition calling on our government to release immigrants from detention centers who are medically vulnerable to coronavirus. Responses here were measured 0 for no, not interested and 1 for those who said yes they would like to add their name. I find that for the first and second generation respondents, the results are typically what I would expect. Among first generation respondents 35% of respondents in the treatment group said they would be willing to sign the petition. This jumps to 40% for first generation respondents in the control. Among second generation respondents, 40% of respondents in the control said they would sign the petition, compared to 42% in the treatment. The difference between treatment and control is a bit smaller here compared to the first generation respondents, but the control group starts off at a higher baseline level of support. It is among third generation respondents where we see the least amount of movement. 33% of the third generation respondents in the control group were willing to sign the petition compared to 32% in the treatment group. The lack of movement among the treatment group may be due to the fact that this group is more Republican than the control. This round of results seems to indicate that threat does not move political attitudes and behaviors for the third generation respondents.

5.3.4 Sign Petition Study 2

Figure 5.19: Release petition by generation

Figure 5.20: Favorability by level of Group consciousness

Examining the results by generation and level of group consciousness there does not appear to be a very strong relationship between group consciousness and willingness to sign the petition. I find a linear relationship among second generation respondents where those lower in group consciousness are less likely to be willing to sign compared to the third generation respondents high in group consciousness. For first generation respondents the trend lines are fairly flat for both the treatment and control groups. Among the first generation control condition respondents there is a slight increase in willingness to sign the petition among respondents who are 12 or higher on group consciousness. For third generation respondents, there is a strong linear relationship among respondents in the control condition. As group consciousness increases, so does the willingness to sign the petition. However, the trend line for third generation respondents in the treatment group has a slight downward slope. The average scores for this group are very scattered and there is no real trend between group consciousness and willingness to sign the petition among third generation respondents.

5.4   Discussion

These two experiments demonstrate that at least in a survey experiment format, there does not appear to be a mediating effect of threat on group consciousness responses. I find small differences between the treatment and control groups, and slightly larger but still not statistically significant differences between different generations. For third generation respondents, I find that higher levels of group consciousness seem to be correlated with a dislike towards Republicans and more favorable views towards Democrats, in some of my findings. Threat does seem to play a small role, in influencing attitudes and behaviors but again it is not statistically significant. The lack of significant findings may be attributable to the fact that 2020 is an election year and immigration was still an important issue, and the Republican candidate was the same person who ran on an anti-immigrant platform in 2016. Thus we are in a political environment in which it is difficult to prime threat with a short statement.

The lack of significant findings may indicate that threat does not simply mediate group

consciousness. It may be the case that we are socialized into threatening and politically charged environments that leave a mark that is much bigger than a temporary increase in group consciousness.

5.5 Additional Tables and Figures

Table 5.6: Group consciousness questions Study 1

	Dependent variable:			
	Attend Immigration Protest			
	Full	First Gen	Second Gen	Third Gen
Group consciousness scale	0.126***	0.099***	0.102***	0.169***
	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Constant	0.811***	0.948***	0.998***	0.527***
	(0.104)	(0.203)	(0.169)	(0.175)
Observations	801	249	290	262
R^2	0.066	0.036	0.047	0.120
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.033	0.044	0.117

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.7: Regression Results Study 2

	Dependent variable:			
	Attend Immigration Protest			
	Full	First Gen	Second Gen	Third Gen
Treatment	0.057	0.029	0.053	0.100
	(0.073)	(0.133)	(0.116)	(0.134)
Constant	1.519***	1.520***	1.575***	1.447***
	(0.052)	(0.093)	(0.080)	(0.097)
Observations	801	249	290	262
R^2	0.001	0.0002	0.001	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.0005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 5.8: Regression Results Controlling for Group Consciousness

	Dependent variable:			
	Full	First gen	Second gen	Third gen
gcscale	0.109***	0.095***	0.114***	0.116***
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Constant	0.739***	0.742***	0.733***	0.746***
	(0.102)	(0.191)	(0.170)	(0.174)
Observations	800	249	289	262
R^2	0.052	0.037	0.058	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.033	0.055	0.058
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 5.9: Regression results for Attending Meeting

	Dependent variable:			
	Attend Political Meeting			
	Full	First gen	Second gen	Third gen
Treatment	0.041	0.117	−0.034	0.049
	(0.071)	(0.125)	(0.118)	(0.129)
Constant	1.356***	1.244***	1.421***	1.390***
	(0.050)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.094)
Observations	800	249	289	262
R^2	0.0004	0.003	0.0003	0.001
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	−0.001	−0.003	−0.003

| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table 5.10: Demographics by Generation and Condition Study 2

	First Gen		Second Gen		Third Gen	
	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control
Median Age	42	40	35	36	37	38
Spanish	31%	31%	34%	32%	9%	12%
Republican	15%	17%	17%	17%	26%	20%
Democrat	50%	51%	51%	51%	49%	49%
Independent	35%	32%	32%	32%	26%	31%

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

6.1 Overview

The goal of this dissertation has been two fold. The first is to add to our understanding of how threat impacts Latino identity and political attitudes and participation. The second aim of this dissertation is to bring some clarity on the different identity measures in political science, and to begin the process of formulating a new way to measure group consciousness.

In chapter two, I focus on the connection between threat and Latino identity. I argue that the threat imposed by California's state politics which were motivated by anti-immigrant attitudes, increased group unity and political mobilization. By examining multiple surveys from 1989 - 2004 I find that perceived discrimination is correlated with my measures of group identity during the politically threatening time in California. Initially, I expected that perceived discrimination would continue to be correlated with a politicized group identity. However, after the proposition period, perceived discrimination was no longer positively associated with a politicized identity, even though identity measures continued to increase.

This may indicate that perceived discrimination serves as a catalyst that starts to raise awareness about belonging to a larger group and wanting to work to improve the group's condition. While perceived discrimination and group consciousness increases during particularly hostile time periods, as the immediate political threat fades, so too does that initial link. It is possible that group consciousness becomes socialized during this time period, leading to more Latinos that identify with and support the group through their political actions. The results from the sub-sample analysis on foreign born respondents also indicates that threat may help foster a sense of group consciousness among the segment of

the Latino population that would be most unfamiliar with the discrimination that racial minorities face in the United States.

While chapter two indicated that group threat might increase a sense of politicized identity, chapter three helps clarify the use of different identity measures in political science. I examine the use of different identity measures that are commonly used in political science. I focus on three measures; group consciousness, identity centrality, and linked fate. Chapter three starts with an overview and examination of the literature as it applies to Latinos in the United States. What do we know what do we still need to explore? Given the different theoretical underpinnings of these measures, this chapter provides us with a more nuanced understanding of the literature and the connection of these identity items to political participation and partisanship is necessary. This chapter highlights the theoretical differences between the measures. I also use the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) to examine these measures and explain where we can find similarities between these three measures and how each measure relates to political efficacy, attitudes and behaviors.

These three identity items clearly had an impact on Latino political participation in 2016. I expected to find differences among the identity measures when looking at political efficacy and voting, and overall, I was correct. Identity centrality is not correlated with an interest in politics, but is positively associated with being registered to vote and voting in the 2016 election. When it comes to Democratic candidate favorability and liberal policy attitudes, once again all three identity measures were positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, identity centrality was more strongly and positively correlated with a pathway to citizenship than the other measures. Because immigration is so strongly intertwined with Latino identity, it makes sense that those high in identity centrality would be more supportive of this policy. Identity centrality is statistically and positively associated with attending a community meeting or going to a rally or protest, but is negatively correlated with contacting an elected official, donating to a campaign, or wearing a political button. I suspect that this is because the first two political activities are community oriented and may be viewed as more directly connected to the Latino community, while the other three items are not as directly connected.

When examining linked fate, I find that it is positively associated with an interest in politics, but not with voting in the 2016 election. Linked fate is also positively associated with supporting the Democratic candidate for president and Congress, having more liberal policy positions, and engaging in political activities. This runs contrary to my expectation given that Dawson (1994) had theorized that linked fate would affect attitudes but not necessarily political participation. The lower levels of linked fate and the correlation with political participation increases my belief that linked fate is not measuring the same thing for Latinos that it does for Black politics.

Group consciousness is the most consistent measure and is positively correlated with measures of efficacy, turnout, and registration. The positive relationship between group consciousness and these different questions on political participation and policy attitudes indicates that it is the best measure to capture a politicized identity. However, we still face the measurement challenge of group consciousness since its theoretical development did not present a clear set of items that should be used to measure group consciousness. The following two chapters propose a few different ways to measure the different dimensions of group consciousness.

In chapter four, I seek to test the connection between group consciousness and political mobilization. I try out a single item version of group consciousness, and I examine if group consciousness works similarly despite different contexts, or if we should only expect an increase in group mobilization when presented with group threat. My findings suggest that there is little difference in participation despite the situation the respondent finds themselves in. Though not statistically significant, there is some movement that may suggest that respondents who are low in group consciousness may be more motivated to engage in some forms of political action when the group is facing a threatening political climate. People high in group consciousness will behave in a way that is more likely to favor the group than people with low levels or no group consciousness no matter the situation they find themselves in.

After being primed with threat, my respondents participate in a divide the dollar game and I find mixed results. I find that threat increased the financial allocation to the ethnically salient group in the first study but this is not the case in the second experiment. Additionally,

while group consciousness increases the amount respondents allocate to the ethnically salient group, it does not seem to matter if they receive a positive or a negative prime, as long as respondents read about the group, they are more likely to allocate funds on behalf of the organization that represents their group.

In my experiment, I also give respondents the option to post a message in support of the group on social media. In the second study, I find that the predicted probability of posting on social media on behalf of MALDEF is higher in the threatening condition when compared to the control and even the positive prime. This is especially the case for those high in group consciousness. Though these experiments provide mixed results, they are the first step in understanding how group consciousness and threat may shape political behavior.

Chapter five focuses on threat as a potential mediator of group consciousness and the impact that this has on political attitudes, and participation. I test if political threat is able to increase group consciousness in a meaningful way. I also examine if individuals with higher levels of group consciousness more likely to have political attitudes and engage in political action that aligns with the group. Here I test an additive scale of group consciousness. I also run a sub-group analysis where I look at the results by generation.

The results from both studies indicate that perhaps group consciousness is not mediated in an experimental setting. Political group threat may have some effect on Latino attitudes and behavior, and threat can modestly increase participation and shift attitudes among all generations, but the movement is very slight in experimental settings.

I find small differences between the treatment group which was given a negative prime about immigration and the control group, and slightly larger but still not statistically significant differences between different generations. For third generation respondents, I find that higher levels of group consciousness seem to be correlated with a dislike towards Republicans and more favorable views towards Democrats.

6.2 Limitations

This project makes important strides in connecting group threat to a group conscious Latino identity, there are a number of limitations. It examines the important role that identity plays when it comes to threat and political mobilization. But there are a number of challenges and limitations that I faced.

This was the first study to look at identity in California during the proposition period, and the second chapter employed the use of a number of different surveys to examine how identity shifted over time. While this allowed me to examine identity over time, the lack of consistent measures across the different surveys leaves room to question whether the increase in group identity was due to threat or to question wording. I find that perceived discrimination is positively associated with group identity during the proposition period, but is no longer associated at a statistically significant level after the proposition period. However, levels of group identity among Latinos in the state remain high. This finding is difficult to reconcile since there have been few items that are consistently used in surveys to measure group identity, and it is difficult to truly know if the finding may be an artifact of how identity was measured in the different surveys.

Because of the challenges that the observational data posed, I ran a number of experiments to better understand the connection between threat and identity. However, the results from my experiments are somewhat mixed. I expected that reading threatening group rhetoric would increase levels of group consciousness and produce an increase in political participation and greater support for the Democrats. But this was not the case. I suspect that part of the reason for this is because of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign and his subsequent term as president.

The 2016 presidential election made immigration a lightening rod issue that dramatically contrasted the two political candidates. While the two parties have had opposing views on immigration for years, 2016 was the start of a hostile political attack against Latinos immigrating to the United States who were described as "criminals and rapists". But the 2016 campaign turned out to be just the beginning. Throughout the next four years Americans

saw the "remain in Mexico" policy instituted and detention centers that separated parents from their children without the means to reunify families.

In 2020, much of the focus moved away from immigration because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but immigration was still an important issue. Donald Trump was once again the Republican candidate and while immigration was no longer the focal point, it was still spoken about in very negative terms by the Republican Party. Anyone who had paid any attention to the campaign rhetoric would have heard anti-immigrant messaging from Republican candidates.

I suspect that because of the political environment we were in during the time that I conducted my experiments, it likely made it more difficult to prime threat in a survey experiment, which diminished the role that threat plays in activating identity and increasing political participation.

6.3   Contribution and Implications

This project has contributed to our understanding of Latino identity, threat, and political participation. Starting with chapter two and the effect of group threat in the form of anti-immigrant propositions, this is the first project to look at the growth of Latino identity before, during, and after the proposition period. from this study, there is some evidence to suggest that threat can activate group consciousness. I suspect that here are two main possibilities that can explain this, the first is that threat serves to mediate the relationship between group consciousness, political views and participation. When threat is present, group consciousness will increase, and this will lead to stronger political views that are in line with the group, and political action that benefits the group.

Alternately, threat may serves as a socializer. When people experience threat they may react because they feel like they or members of their group are being attacked. In the moment this may not lead to an automatic increase in group consciousness, but we may start to see that people are forming political views and participating in ways that benefit the group during a formative time. This experience of group discrimination may leave an

indelible mark on individuals. The memory of political threat and that initial action may result in the formation of group conscious and a more politically active individual, which leaves lasting results among specific cohorts over time. The idea of threat serving as a socializer is very interesting, but difficult to establish in the short term.

Chapter three adds to our understanding of what we know about identity measures and how they relate to Latino political participation. By reviewing the literature, we see how these different identity measures have been used and understand what had been established and where further investigation is needed. Chapter three also investigates these three identity measures. It is possible that as stand alone identity measures, relationships between group consciousness, identity centrality, and linked fate can be found, but when placed in a regression with one another I find that group consciousness is more consistently positively associated with political actions and attitudes. These results also suggest that we should think much more critically about the use of linked fate outside of Black politics.

Chapters four and five seek to test how threat might mediate or moderate group consciousness, and I find no evidence for mediation, however there is some evidence that may suggest threat moderates the relationship between group consciousness and political attitudes. These experiments add to our causal understanding of how threat may be influencing identity and political participation. However, given the timing of these experiments I think it is important to run the experiments again in order to see if the connection between threat and identity is strengthened in a different political climate.

These experiments also make a start into developing which and how many measures should be used to measure group consciousness. While only two versions of group consciousness were tested in this study, using an additive version of group consciousness provides us with greater clarity in terms of the different dimensions of group consciousness and allows for more variation.

The experiments in chapter five are especially beneficial since I analyze these results by generation. While others expect that Latino voters will behave like white voters once they assimilate into the United States, I argue that the decline of ethnic voting among latter

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generations won't occur because of the importance of racial and ethnic identity in American politics. This is even less likely when Latinos find themselves as the target of group threat. These experiments find that there are generational differences in political attitudes and participation, but when primed with threat, second and third generation respondents who are higher in group consciousness are somewhat more likely to hold liberal attitudes and engage in politics.

As more Latinos become eligible to vote, questions surrounding Latino voting behavior will continue, and group threat is not likely to go away any time soon. This dissertation helps us understand how threat influences Latino identity, and what it could mean for political participation.

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