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The Psychological Impact of Normalizing Nationalism in a Transnational World

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Psychological & Brain Sciences

by

Lauren Ortosky

Committee in Charge:

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March 2022

The dissertation of Lauren Ortosky is approved.

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ABSTRACT

The Psychological Impact of Normalizing Nationalism in a Transnational World

By

Lauren Ortosky

This research examines the influence of exposure to normalized nationalist ideology on individuals as a function of their personal nationalism. It is theorized that the existence of issues which cannot be solved by one's own country alone may be perceived as a worldview threat by nationalists (i.e., those high in nationalism) leading them to derogate and deny the existence of the issues themselves when they have been emboldened by the normalization of their ideology. In three studies it is shown that exposure to normalized (vs. non-normalized) nationalism increases collective self-esteem as Americans for those higher in nationalism and also those high in patriotism (Study 1), that those higher in nationalism are more likely to derogate important political issues if their resolution requires collaboration with other countries but not if they can be resolved domestically (Study 2), and that this derogation is fully mediated by the increased collective self-esteem driven by their nationalist beliefs (Study 3). Study 3, however, did not support the full hypothesized moderated mediation model, as the experimental impact of normalized nationalism found in Study 1 did not replicate. Issue derogation among nationalists is discussed both in terms of the psychological literature and the political and historical context.

Keywords: nationalism, worldview threat, norms, collective self-esteem, issue derogation

The Psychological Impact of Normalizing Nationalism in a Transnational World

“In previous centuries national identities were forged because humans faced problems and opportunities that were far beyond the scope of local tribes and which only countrywide cooperation could hope to handle. In the twenty-first century, nations find themselves in the same situation as the old tribes: they are no longer the right framework to manage the most important challenges of the age... We now have a global ecology, global economy, and global science – but we are still stuck with national politics. This mismatch prevents the political system from effectively countering our main problems... *Since there is no nationalist answer to the problem... some nationalist politicians prefer to believe the problem does not exist.*” Yuval Noah Harari (2018)

The public conversation about nationalism tends to be dominated by the ultra-nationalist fringes who hold radical views about racial superiority, xenophobia, and ethnocentric exclusion. However, this obfuscates the several more subtle and much more widespread forms of nationalism that center simply on the absolute sovereignty of a state within its borders and the superiority of one’s own compared to others (on any number of dimensions – military, political, economic, cultural...). This is similar to a construct identified as banal nationalism (Billig, 1995; 2005), which represents the ideological habits that facilitate the reproduction of nationhood through time – a global system widely, if inaccurately, taken for granted as the ideal or even *only* form of socio-political organization. Like the air we breathe, these moderate forms of nationalism are both “ubiquitous and elusive” (Bieber, 2018). But in fact, it was not until the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 introduced the underlying philosophy that a state holds full and exclusive sovereignty within its borders that the idea of a modern nation could even be conceived (Diener & Hagan, 2012). It then took a century of national consolidation in Europe, followed by the slow spread of this philosophy through colonization for the concept of nation-states to globalize – a process which, according to the United Nations, remains incomplete to this

day¹ (United Nations, 2021). In established countries, banal nationalism and other moderate forms of the ideology are an endemic condition and may therefore behave as a chronic social norm (Billig, 1995). Throughout this research, the working definition of “nationalism” should be understood as referring to this more moderate form of nationalism rooted simply in sovereignty and superiority unless specified otherwise.

An assumption of the righteousness of nationhood and the absolute sovereignty and superiority of one’s own nation implies a consideration of national interest at least in parallel with individual interest and general human interest which may bias information processing and decision-making. This may be especially pronounced for transnational issues that would require any degree of compromise to resolve as they would represent a threat to these core nationalist beliefs. Further, the concept of national *superiority* implies an assessment that other nations are in some fundamental way less-than one’s own, which could support insidious and damaging resistance to collaboration with those deemed to be inferior. I propose that normalizing nationalism will influence the attitudes of those who are exposed to it in predictable ways. For those high in nationalism, this validation of their worldview may increase their collective self-esteem as citizens, while it may decrease collective self-esteem for those low in nationalism. This movement of collective self-esteem may motivate attitudinal responses based on the unique threat they would experience in such an environment. In the case of those high in nationalism, emboldening their ideology may lead them to experience transnational issues that cannot be resolved by their country alone as a worldview threat to their idea of ultimate national superiority. In the case of low in nationalism, the rise of an ideology they disagree with may threaten the security of their

¹ In 2022, there remain 17 territories that largely want to but do not govern themselves and are considered colonies (to varying degrees) of other nations. These include both Puerto Rico and Guam, making the United States a significant modern colonial power.

identification with the national group, motivating derogation of outgroups to protect their position in the ingroup.


This research will focus on the influence of normalized nationalism on those high in nationalism, in comparison with those low in nationalism - a group which has grown significantly around the world in recent years (Beiber, 2018). In other words, how might those high vs. low in nationalism be differentially influenced by passive exposure to nationalism in their environment as ideological norms shift in their favor? In three studies, the motivating role of normalized nationalism on beliefs and behaviors will be examined. Study 1 will examine whether normalizing nationalism differentially impacts the collective self-esteem of those high or low in personal nationalism, compared to those high or low in patriotism. It is predicted that for those already holding nationalist beliefs, the normalization of that ideology will increase their collective self-esteem as Americans, which may in turn motivate derogation of transnational issues that threaten their nationalist worldview by requiring collaboration to solve. Study 2 will examine the potential for issue derogation driven by either nationalism or patriotism. It is predicted that those high in nationalism will derogate transnational issues requiring collaboration, but not domestic issues, and that no meaningful pattern will be found for those high in patriotism. Study 2 will also consider the role of partisan identification to ensure that any findings are unique to the underlying ideology of nationalism rather than simple partisanship. Finally, Study 3 will examine a proposed moderated mediation model in which the relationship between personal nationalism and collective self-esteem is moderated by nationalism's normalization, to predict transnational issue derogation.

In short, the model (see Figure 1) proposes that normalized nationalism will lead those high in nationalism to have an increase in collective self-esteem because it will verify

their worldview. This increase in collective self-esteem will, in turn, lead those high in nationalism to derogate issues that require international collaboration. In the sections that follow, I outline the theoretical logic for this model.

Figure 1

Proposed conceptual model for this research.



The fact that ultra-nationalism has been increasing globally over the last decade is important context to consider at the outset (Bieber, 2018). By dominating the public conversation about nationalism, ultra-nationalism provides cover for the expansion and normalization of the more moderate forms of nationalism. As ultra-nationalists preach racist and xenophobic responses to the new questions about national sovereignty brought on by globalization, their fellow citizens are called to confront their own definition of nationhood in response – and its limits. With ultra-nationalist hate speech as an easily accessible reference point, it may seem eminently reasonable for the average citizen to settle on much stricter national sovereignty and steeper national pride than would otherwise appeal to those low in personal nationalism. But approachability does not negate consequence, and the stereotyping literature demonstrates that negative perceptions of

outgroups can often occur automatically and outside of awareness, driving implicit prejudice even among those with consciously egalitarian beliefs (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaerdner, 2002; Fiske, 1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Negative stereotypes are not always activated, but their avoidance requires intentional effort to create an accurate perspective of the outgroup, which is unlikely to occur if the stereotyping appears reasonable by comparison (Fiske, 2002). This research proposes that such negative perceptions might also be automatically and sub-consciously activated for the issues themselves that require collaboration with outgroups to resolve.

Normative nationalism could also induce a prioritization of national interest when cooperation and compromise are necessary to address a global need (Berezin, 2006), or diminish the perceived importance of an issue that cannot be solved by one's nation alone (Harari, 2017). This research proposes that the very existence of issues that one's nation cannot solve alone may be perceived as a threat to the national superiority inherent to a nationalist worldview. Worldviews are powerful structures of identity through which we understand the world and ourselves, creating adaptive narratives that can reinforce belief over reality. Someone high in nationalism may therefore prefer to derogate the source of threat to their nationalist worldview rather than allow it to challenge the perceived stability of the worldview itself.

In derogating transnational issues, individuals would be acting in support of a perceived norm of nationalism. When nationalism operates as a norm, there may be little incentive to exert effort to override its assumptions, as the structures it reinforces are so big they can feel all-encompassing (i.e., the global system of nation-states). In this way, nationalist ideas can seep into the popular consciousness and begin to influence the

attitudes and behaviors even of those who are explicitly opposed to ultra-nationalist ideology.

This is a problem. The greatest challenges facing humanity today cannot be solved by any one nation alone (Harari, 2017). If normalizing nationalism motivates the derogation of these issues, a diminishment of global collaboration seems a near-inevitable result. As the Covid pandemic drags on, it represents only the most obvious example of an issue that requires the concerted and sustained effort of profound global cooperation for true resolution – but it is hardly the only one. Other such critical issues include climate change, migrant and refugee crises, nuclear and biological weapons containment, regulation of artificial intelligence, and many more. Any one of these could threaten life as we know it. It is therefore important to understand the ways a nationalist norm may complicate the ability of nation-states to smoothly collaborate on meaningful solutions by encouraging people to process the issue through the lens of national interest rather than global good and to distrust needed partners (Webb & Worchel, 1986). Even if the contents of a nationalist norm seem subtle and easy to take for granted, its consequences to global security could be enormous.

Psychology of Nationalism

Ideologies scaffold powerful worldviews that operate as filters allowing people of different beliefs to live fundamentally different realities. Many of these filters have historically been rooted in religion, but as history advances ideologies evolve. In much of the modern world, the influence of religion has diminished - the percentage of Americans with no religious affiliation increased from 2% in 1948 to 20% in 2020 - replaced by secular political and economic ideologies such as nationalism (Gallup, 2021).

Although nationalism is a political philosophy, at its root are psychological questions of identity and attachment. Researchers have traditionally explored these concepts by contrasting nationalism and patriotism, and while this research focuses on nationalism, understanding the construct in contrast to the more familiar patriotism is instructive. Much of this previous research has sought to discover individual differences between individuals inclined to one or the other ideology (Brock & Atkinson, 2007; Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendorn, 2003; Druckman, 1994; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Li & Brewer, 2004; Sapountzis, 2008; Skitka, 2005; Smith, 1991).

Previous work is primarily unidirectional, examining qualities inherent to individuals that predict their ideological identification but not considering how holding or being exposed to an ideology may reciprocally impact the individual as well. This includes the psychological differences between patriotic love of one's ingroup and nationalistic hate of one or more outgroups (Brewer, 1999). Known individual differences related to nationalist beliefs also include its relationship to personality constructs such as authoritarianism (Kosterman & Feschbach, 1989), social attitudes about unity (Li & Brewer, 2004), social behaviors such as flag displays (Skitka, 2005), and sensitivity to identity needs (Brock & Atkinson, 2007). However, some researchers have also begun to explore whether nationalist beliefs can drive unique attitudinal and behavioral outcomes as well, beginning to imply some degree of bidirectionality in the relationship between individual and ideology. The attitudes and behaviors explored have included the influence of nationalism on decreased perceptions of pollution on domestic beaches compared to foreign beaches (Bonaiuto, Breakwell, & Cano, 1996) and on consumer preferences for domestically-produced goods (e.g., Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller, & Melewar, 2001).

The relationship between the ideology of nationalism and the attitudes of nationalists is illustrated well by research demonstrating different cognitive processes associated with nationalism and patriotism, which may encourage different attitudes and behaviors. In research conducted in Germany and Britain, it was demonstrated that nationalism is related to intergroup comparison whereas patriotism is related to within-group comparison over time (Mummenday, Klink, & Brown, 2010). It was further found that the type of comparison an individual adopts will moderate the relationship between ingroup attachment and outgroup derogation, which could make collaboration on transnational issues less desirable, perhaps leading to their direct derogation as well. The researchers focused on intergroup and temporal comparisons because they align theoretically with nationalist and patriotic ideologies. It was found that both comparison types led to high ingroup attachment and positive ingroup evaluation, but that only intergroup comparison (associated with nationalism) also increased outgroup derogation. In other words, outgroup derogation is only related to national identification under the kind of conditions of explicit intergroup comparison nurtured by a nationalist norm.

It cannot be merely assumed that individuals and their environments determine their ideologies, when we know that individuals are reciprocally influenced by their worlds and ideas in profound ways (see Turner, 1991; Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991 for reviews). A full understanding of the psychology of nationalism must therefore include an examination of the impact of the tenets of these ideologies on individuals that hold them or are exposed to them in addition to the individual differences that might make an ideology appealing. This is precisely the project undertaken with this research.

A Norm of Nationalism

As nationalism expands its reach in the US and around the world it may begin to function as a social norm, representing one path of influence on individual attitudes and behaviors. Social norms are defined as, “rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p.152). Knowledge of norms is gleaned through interaction with and observation of others but their content may never be explicitly stated. Norms can represent general social expectations, expectations of specific valued or influential others, expectations of ourselves, and observations of how others behave. The power of norms is granted by their broad acceptance within a particular group, and other group members’ willingness to sanction transgressions. Norm strength is determined by the existence of communication between group members, the strength of group cohesion, and the importance of that norm for the group (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Norms serve a critical role in the continuity of groups over time, as adaptive mechanisms to encourage or limit behavior to support individual or group survival (Axelrod, 1986; Brewer, 1999; Campbell, 1975; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Sherif, 1936).

Perceptions of the behavior and values of group members serve as an important guide for what is expected in order to maintain good standing in a valued group. These norms are an incredibly powerful source of social influence on individual behavior. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated the degree to which people will defer to a group norm over their own direct sensory observation, even when that norm is well beyond what seems reasonable (Asch, 1951). In a classic demonstration by Jacobs and Campbell (1961) showing how resilient such norms can be, normative influence was shown to last through an average of 5 generations of naïve participants who continued to behave in accord with a blatantly irrational norm established by confederates who left after the first trial. Behaviorally, social

norms have been shown to influence behaviors as diverse as college drinking (Suls & Green, 2003; Wood, Nagoshi, & Dennis, 1992), public littering (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), and home energy use (Nolan, Schulz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).

Much of the existing literature on the influence of norms explores behavior that is supported by a group but does not necessarily determine the existence of that group. When thinking of nationalism as a norm, however, the very existence of the nation in question is inextricably intertwined with the values and behaviors the norm encourages. In almost all other cases, the continuity of a group identity can be taken for granted whether a specific norm is respected or not – you may choose to litter, despite neighborhood norms against it, but that choice does not risk the destruction of the neighborhood itself. However, a norm of nationalism is a socially-reinforced shared belief system about the validity of national identity. Therefore, the very existence of the nation is threatened if the norm of nationalism is not respected. Beliefs and behaviors supported by such a norm may therefore be especially influential.

There are two types of norms. Descriptive norms are gleaned from observations of what group members actually do in any given situation. Such observations serve as heuristic guidelines for appropriate behavior when that is otherwise unclear (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Sherif, 1936;). The more ingroup members are observed performing a specific behavior, the more likely it is that behavior will be seen as correct and repeated by others. There are numerous ways that nationalism may be reinforced as a descriptive norm. The most obvious might be the display of flags and other symbols rich with meaning, which have been shown experimentally to induce nationalist sentiment (Kimmelmeier & Winter, 2008). Descriptive norms are also transmitted through the observation of people who are wealthy, powerful, or otherwise of high status. In the United States, much of the national

mythology is tied to individual pathways to success and many entrepreneurs and politicians wrap themselves in that red, white, and blue narrative with the claim that “only in America” would a story like theirs be possible. Other countries often have aristocratic classes that carry extravagant wealth and long histories closely intertwined with that of the nation itself. In both of these cases, to be successful or elite communicates support for a norm of nationalism.

Injunctive norms describe what “should” be done by a member of a given group, or what the values of the group would ideally support (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Injunctive norms often communicate broader ideas of group morality, such as the norm of reciprocity encouraging people to help others who have helped them (Gouldner, 1960), or the norm of social responsibility encouraging people to help those in need (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Injunctive norms can communicate more abstract concepts about what it means to be a member of a certain group. In the case of nationalism, it is easy to imagine its operation as an injunctive norm such that those who share a national identity would be expected to believe that national identity should continue to exist.

One potential limitation of considering nationalism as a norm is that the typical process of normative influence includes observation of actual behavior or communication of expected behavior, and is most impactful in localized group identities (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). A modern nation is quite large and diverse, which may theoretically weaken the effect of nation-level norms. However, there are multiple processes of social influence that may facilitate the impact of normalized nationalism country-wide.

According to the Representation and Incorporation of Close Others’ Responses Model (RICOR), individuals can be implicitly but powerfully influenced by the behavior of others even when there is no intent to imitate them (Smith & Mackie, 2016). This model posits a

two-step process in which 1) people automatically create cognitive representations of the observed or imagined behavior of others that 2) result in easily accessible models that guide their own behavior without conscious intent. Of direct relevance to nationalism, the RICOR process applies to people who are physically present and observable as well as to people who may never be directly encountered but whose behavior can be imagined. Thus, the RICOR model extends the process of social influence in a way that can include the immensity and diversity of modern nations. Members of a nation must simply imagine how they would expect other members of that nation to behave for attitudinal conformity to develop. At a minimum, one may expect that other members of a nation would believe in the legitimacy of that nation's existence. This model asserts that social influence - especially within a valued identity group such as a nation - is far more "basic, spontaneous, and widespread" than has previously been realized (Smith & Mackie, 2016, p.312). Still, in order for an individual to be socially influenced, he or she must first be socially identified with the group in question.

Nationalist vs Patriotic Identity

The social identity approach underlies much of the extant work on nationalism, providing an affective and cognitive framework to consider how and why people self-categorize into groups that can be used to explore how and why people identify with the same national group in different ways (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group identification can be thought of as a process of depersonalization stressing similarities between group members and creating a basis for connection rooted in shared identity rather than interpersonal ties (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Once adopted, group identity fulfills critical human needs and therefore tends to draw strong allegiance (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Leary & Baumeister, 2017;

Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Whatever criteria are used to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup, group identity powerfully shapes social interactions and colors perceptions of opportunities for cooperation with other groups and judgments about the world (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999; Fiske, 1998). Given the structure of the global system into individual nations, identification with these nations can serve as a primary layer of personal identity, one that can exist in multiple ways. Patriotism and nationalism can be thought of as two forms of ideological identification with a given nation.

Despite the considerable psychological research on nationalism already in existence, functional definitions of nationalism are inconsistent, complicating understanding of its impact on identity. All share the core components operationalized in this research, as the belief in the absolute sovereignty and inherent superiority of one's own nation. Though often loosely conflated with patriotism in lay practice, the nationalism that scholars understand can have much more insidious and damaging effects. Contrasting the two is a useful way to understand the operationalization of nationalism in this research. Perhaps the simplest definition of patriotism is the "noncompetitive love of and commitment to one's country" (Kimmelmeier & Winter, 2008, p.863). It is a means of identification that valorizes one's own nation, while remaining essentially neutral about others. This concept sits in powerful contrast to nationalism, which is a zero-sum ideology that implies superiority, exclusion, and the domination of one's own group over others (Kimmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummenday, Klink, & Brown, 2001).

In other words, patriotism is the manifestation of love for and identification with one's nation that holds space for the flourishing of other nations as non-threatening. Nationalism is the manifestation of love for and identification with one's nation that typically requires the failure or domination of other nations to be satisfied. Nationalists see

the interests of their own country and countrymen as objectively superior to the interests of others and believe any action in the service of those interests is justified (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Nationalism is not neutral; it is baldly aggressive. Iconic former French President Charles de Gaulle explained nationalism as a classic example of ingroup love versus outgroup hate when he claimed, “Patriotism is when love of your own people comes first; nationalism, when hate for people other than your own comes first” (Gary, 1969).

Through the development of a scale to separate nationalism and patriotism empirically, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) identified substantive differences between them that would be likely to have unique psychological correlates and diverse impacts on identification. Their analysis revealed that patriotism reflects an individual’s affective association with their country in terms of love, pride, and attachment. Nationalism, by contrast, reflects an individual’s sense of national superiority, consistently implying a negative comparison of other countries against one’s own that went beyond “belligerent righteousness” to approach an active desire for dominance and aggression.

In American samples, patriotism and nationalism are often positively correlated (i.e., $N=239$, $r=0.28$), but functionally distinct (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). For example, Republicans reported significantly stronger patriotism *and* nationalism than Democrats, but the difference between the two parties was a full three times greater for nationalism than for patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). This is logical since nationalism theoretically subsumes patriotism but goes well beyond it. At the individual level nationalism, but not patriotism, has been shown to be positively correlated with authoritarianism, chauvinism, racial prejudice, militaristic attitudes, support for hawkish foreign policy, and social dominance orientation, and negatively correlated with measures of internationalism (see Brewer, 1999; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005; Kosterman &

Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). The present research attempts to augment understanding of the operation of nationalism at a group identification level, when its tenets become normalized.

Building on the hypothesized operation of nationalism as a norm, and the unique psychological characteristics of nationalism that differentiate it from patriotism as an identity, the final step in the proposed model relates to the hypothesized outcomes of its normalization. For those high in nationalism, it is predicted that normalized nationalism will lead to increased collective self-esteem as Americans and then to the derogation of transnational issues which cannot be solved by one's country alone.

Issue Derogation

Those high in nationalism believe that their nation is superior to others and it would follow that this attitude would be amplified in the presence of nationalist norms. Those *low* in nationalism, however, should respond differently to the increasing normativity of an ideology they are not aligned with. It is through this contrast that the influence of nationalism will be examined. One instructive framework to observe these differences is through partisans in the United States during Donald Trump's presidency. Democrats – who are far less nationalistic than Republicans (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) – explicitly rejected Trump's nationalist ideology and policies. However, the very fact that Trump was elected President implies that his ideology was normative among Americans – their national identity group – perhaps creating a different kind of threat.

One study offers compelling insight into the impact of nationalist rhetoric on Americans who did and did not support Trump. By analyzing longitudinal data on implicit prejudice collected from 2.9 million Americans over 14 years, Ruisch and Ferguson (in press) showed that among conservatives, implicit bias for White people over Black people

increased by 24% in the months immediately after Trump received the Republican nomination. However, they also found a 23% increase in implicit bias among *liberals* (although overall bias remained 36% lower among liberals than among conservatives). This finding may be seen as evidence that nationalist norms can impact the population that is exposed to them, whether individuals are high or low in nationalism themselves, though the mechanism would be different. For those highly identified with a social identity, it has been demonstrated that perceived threats to that identity can reduce collective self-esteem and trigger outgroup derogation to compensate (Branscombe & Wann, 1994). Those high in nationalism may experience the increase of an ideology they agree with as an identity validation rather than a threat, *increasing* their collective self-esteem as Americans. It is proposed in this research that this increase in collective self-esteem will lead to the derogation of transnational issues perceived to threaten their newly-empowered nationalist worldview.

For the kind of transnational issues for which global cooperation is required, the superordinate interest of species survival might be expected to over-ride the prioritization of national interest (Sherif, 1958). However, in the case of cooperation between two well-differentiated groups (such as nations), the existence of superordinate goals can actually make salient the lack of mutual trust between them and call into question the belief in national superiority in needing the assistance of another. The risk of exploitation and its potential cost becomes prominent and the knowledge that cooperative interdependence between groups is actually required to meet the interests of each can foster conflict and hostility between them rather than peace and cooperation – leading to derogation (Brewer, 1999). Classically, derogation is studied in the context of ingroups and outgroups in response to identity threat. In the case of those high in nationalism, however, it is not their

identity as Americans being threatened by the need to cooperate, it is their worldview. In order to protect that worldview, it is therefore proposed that they will directly derogate the transnational issues perceived to be threatening it.

A central aspect of the nationalist worldview is the absolute sovereignty of their nation. In the modern world, this ideology must contend with the reality of numerous dire challenges that *no* single country can solve on its own. Pandemics, climate change, artificial intelligence, nuclear proliferation, ocean and air pollution, the militarization of space ... it is no exaggeration to say that any one of these, unchecked, could pose a legitimate threat to the continuance of life on this planet. And none of them can be solved by any single country, nor even by agreement of any handful of like-minded allies. The very existence of these issues, therefore, may threaten the nationalist worldview, leading to derogation of the issue itself. There are several psychological mechanisms for why those high in nationalism may derogate issues directly when their worldview is perceived to be under threat.

Motivated reasoning demonstrates that emotionally-driven biases can produce justifications for desired realities over factual realities (Kunda, 1990). The phenomenon has been shown to be so pervasive that there are likely to be times when everyone will believe something to be true simply because they want it to be. Nationalism is a highly emotional belief system (Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, et al., 2003). It is hypothesized that those high in nationalism who feel supported by perceived norms may feel those emotions amplified, empowering the derogation of big issues perceived to be ideological threats. Those low in nationalism would not find the need to collaborate with other nations aversive – they may even find it desirable - and therefore would have no ideological motivation to derogate the issues requiring it.

One form of motivated reasoning of direct relevance to this research is the theory of worldview verification, which asserts that inconsistencies between lived experience and one's worldview are psychologically threatening (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien & McCoy, 2007). People want to know that their view of the world is correct. They want this so badly that they would prefer to have a negative view of the world confirmed than challenged, even if that challenge comes in a form that would in many ways be better for them as an individual and for their group. In the foundational studies demonstrating this process, it was shown that for Latinx individuals who held a meritocratic worldview, experiences of prejudice that challenged that worldview negatively impacted their self-esteem. However, for those who *did not* hold a meritocratic worldview, experiences of prejudice actually *boosted* their self-esteem, serving as confirmation that their view of the world is accurate. Analogously, those low in nationalism who encounter issues that require collaboration may therefore experience a boost in self-esteem as their globalist worldview is validated. For those high in nationalism, however, a belief in strict national sovereignty may similarly moderate their encounters with issues that call that belief into question, leading to those same issues being experienced as threatening and reducing their self-esteem – perhaps motivating them to verify their worldview by derogating the issue itself to restore that esteem.

One final conceptually related construct that could operate as a mechanism for nationalist issue derogation is solution aversion, which asserts that people can be motivated to deny problems, and the scientific evidence supporting their reality, when they find the solutions aversive (Campbell & Kay, 2014). In other words, peoples' perspective on the solution to a problem will filter their perception of the problem itself. For those high in nationalism, global collaboration is an aversive outcome that may influence their belief in the issues demanding it. This process has already been demonstrated on some of the same

transnational issues that would pose a threat to nationalist ideology – and that will be considered in this research - including climate change. In one study, Republican participants (i.e., more nationalist) read a scientific statement that the average global temperature would rise by more than 3 degrees Celsius over the next 100 years. When participants then read a policy solution that emphasized increasing government regulation – counter to Republican ideology – only 22% agreed temperatures would rise. When participants read a policy solution that relied on the free market – aligned with Republican ideology – 55% agreed temperatures would rise. Note that the temperature rise was presented as fact, not opinion, and yet distaste with the proposed solution to it was sufficient to deny it (Campbell & Kay, 2014).

Overview of Current Research

Despite significant knowledge on the variety of individual differences associated with nationalist beliefs, the literature has not directly explored the potential for nationalism to exert psychological influence on individuals in cultural environments dominated by its rhetoric. The current research examines how people might be influenced by exposure to normalized nationalism, as a function of their personal beliefs. To accomplish this, nationalism will both be measured as an individual difference and its normativity as an ideology will be manipulated as a moderator.

Study 1 will examine the impact of the normalization of nationalism on collective self-esteem as a function of personal ideology. It is proposed that normalized nationalism will strengthen latent beliefs in those *already* sympathetic to nationalist ideologies, leading to *increased* collective self-esteem. For those who are not already sympathetic to nationalism, this normalization should either *reduce* their collective self-esteem or have no effect. Predictions will thus be supported if those high in nationalism show higher CSE in

the normalized nationalism condition than in the non-normalized condition, and if this pattern is not reflected in those low in nationalism or those high in patriotism.

Studies 2 and 3 will explore the potential attitudinal impacts of increased collective self-esteem among those high in nationalism due to the normalization of nationalism. The purpose of Study 2 is to clarify how nationalist ideology influences support for transnational issues or domestic issues on its own, regardless of normalization. It is predicted that those high in nationalism (compared to those low in nationalism) will be more likely to derogate transnational issues than domestic issues, and also be more likely to derogate transnational issues than those high in patriotism will be. The purpose of Study 3 is to examine whether normative nationalism *causes* this derogation of transnational issues by those high in nationalism via increased collective self-esteem. In other words, Study 1 will test whether normalizing nationalism impacts people's CSE differently depending on their pre-existing nationalism, Study 2 will test whether those high in nationalism and those high in patriotism have attitudinal differences about transnational issues that may threaten a nationalist worldview, and Study 3 will test whether such differences are unique to individuals with nationalist beliefs and mediated by increased CSE only when nationalism is experimentally normalized.

Study 1: Normalized Nationalism and Collective Self-Esteem

The primary hypothesis for Study 1 is that those high in nationalism will be more influenced by the normalization of their ideology than those low in nationalism. Support for this hypothesis would be obtained if those high in nationalism in the normalized nationalism condition show increased CSE compared to those high in nationalism in the non-normalized nationalism condition. Those *low* in nationalism should show no difference

between normalization conditions. The same analyses will be run with patriotism as a predictor to clarify the unique influence of nationalist ideology.

Method

Participants and Design

Study 1 featured a 2 (normative vs non-normative nationalism condition) X continuous (personal nationalism) design. The normativity of nationalist ideology was manipulated by condition as the independent variable, with personal nationalism measured as a moderator of the impact of condition on collective self-esteem (CSE) as Americans.

Data for Study 1 was collected in two phases to avoid contamination by the nationalism scales on the manipulation². All participants were recruited using the CloudResearch participant pool to complete an online survey. In order to ensure relevance of the study materials, only native-born Americans of voting age were recruited. For the first phase of data collection, 644 respondents completed the survey and were paid \$1.50 for their time. 159 responses were deleted for being bots, for incomplete data, or for not meeting the criteria required (i.e., not being American citizens), resulting in $N=485$. All of these participants were invited to take the second part of the survey one week later, and 465 did so, for an additional \$1.50 compensation. All data was then combined into a single file for analyses, yielding a final $N=397$ after 68 additional removals for failed attention checks and incomplete data.

To ensure that participants met the necessary criteria for the study, they were first asked to confirm that they were born in the United States. Those who were not born in the US were retained if they are now citizens and have lived in the United States for 20 years or

² This was a concern unique to Study 1 that was not carried forward to later studies because a secondary goal of Study 1 was to compare the two most commonly used nationalism scales and choose one to continue with, meaning participants had greater exposure to the suggestive items they contain.

more. They then provided their age and political partisan identification on a 7-point scale from 1-Strong Democrat to 7-Strong Republican.

Mean age of participants was 38.36 ($SD=12.12$). The sample was well distributed politically, with 27.5% identifying as a strong Democrat, 19.4% as a not very strong Democrat, 8.8% as a Democratic-leaning Independent, 7.3% as a true Independent, 6.8% as a Republican-leaning Independent, 12.8% as a not very strong Republican, and 17.4% as a strong Republican. Full demographic details can be found in Table 1³. Ethics approval for all studies in this report was granted by the Human Subjects Committee at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Participants encountered each section of the study in the order that follows.

Measures and Materials

Continuous Predictor: Personal Nationalism. Participants were next asked to complete a 6-item scale developed by Roccas and colleagues (Roccas, Klar & Liviatin, 2006) to measure national glorification (e.g., “It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the United States”) versus national attachment (e.g., “It is important to me that everyone sees me as an American”). Measurement ranged from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree.

³ Note that additional standard demographics were not collected in Study 1 due to an oversight.

Table 1

Participant characteristics for Study 1 (N=397). Additional standard demographics such as race/ethnicity and education level were not collected.

Participant characteristic		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Age		38.36	12.12
Participant characteristic		<i>n</i>	%
Partisan Identification	Strong Democrat	109	27.5
	Not Very Strong Democrat	77	19.4
	Democratic-leaning Independent	35	8.8
	Independent	29	7.8
	Republican-leaning Independent	27	6.8
	Not Very Strong Republican	51	12.8
	Strong Republican	69	17.4

Roccas' concept of glorification ($M=3.99$, $SD=1.59$, $\alpha=.924$) is a more robust measure of nationalism both theoretically and empirically than previous measures, several of which it directly incorporates. The same can be said of the concept of attachment ($M=4.92$, $SD=1.47$, $\alpha=.933$) as a measure of patriotism. Research comparing nationalism and patriotism often finds the two constructs to be highly correlated, and that was the case in this sample as well ($r=.786$, $p<.001$) (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas et al., 2006). Conceptually, nationalism includes patriotism but goes beyond it in meaningful ways. This distinction is validated by mean differences that were both expected and observed. The attachment mean ($M=4.92$, $SD=1.47$) was significantly higher than the glorification mean ($M=3.99$, $SD=1.59$) in the sample, $t(396)=18.19$, $p<.001$, which reflects the empirically and anecdotally supported conception that patriotism is a more widely held, relatively banal ideology while nationalism contains additional features that not all patriots will support.

This measure was chosen as a more theoretically complete approach that incorporates several other respected ways to conceptualize and measure the two constructs. It is worth noting however that although the Roccas measures are frequently and reliably used in research on nationalism and patriotism, the items themselves do not explicitly ask about absolute sovereignty or implicit superiority. An older nationalism and patriotism scale developed by Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) does include items that are more direct, such as, “Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are,” and “In view of America’s moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in UN policies.” This scale was also given to participants for the purpose of comparison, and was found to perform similarly. Therefore the more recent and more robust option was used for all analyses, and only the Roccas scale was given in Studies 2 and 3.

Full text of the glorification and attachment scales can be found in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for all scales used in Study 1 can be found in Table 2. This was the end of the first phase of data collection, after which participants were thanked and debriefed. They were then invited back 1 week later to complete all measures that follow.

Independent Variable: Manipulation of Normativity. Participants were informed that this research was being conducted by a “non-profit, non-partisan media watchdog group in the United States” that was interested in how people use digital media sources to understand their world. All were then asked to read an article that they were told was one of four they could have been randomly assigned to describing different ideologies impacting the modern world, all of which had supposedly been published in *The Atlantic* in the month preceding data collection. They were also told that *The Atlantic* is generally considered to be a “neutral and thoughtful source of observation and analysis” in an effort to encourage

open-mindedness about the information they were about to read. In reality, all participants were given the same article on nationalism that was composed for this research, which had been carefully designed to appear identical to articles on *The Atlantic's* actual website (see Figure 2). The text briefly covers the history of nationalism and how it has evolved over time, leading to important distinctions today between nationalism and patriotism. To highlight the crucial difference of interest, in bolded text participants were specifically told that patriots “are neutral about other countries” while nationalists are “explicitly hateful” towards them.

After reading the article, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (normalized nationalism vs. non-normalized nationalism) in which they were asked to read what they were told were the top 5 most “up-voted” comments on the article as of the week before data was collected. “Up-voting” is a process that essentially offers normative validation for the ideas expressed in a particular comment, implying that the most “up-voted” comments contain sentiments that are the most widely held by a relevant community (in this case, other Americans reading the same information about nationalism at about the same time). In the normalized nationalism condition, 4 of the 5 top comments claimed that nationalism is widely supported while the 5th offered a counter message (see Figure 3). In the non-normalized nationalism condition the opposite was true, with 4 out of the 5 comments expressing concern about growing nationalist rhetoric and the 5th defending its banality (see Figure 4).

Figure 2

Text and presentation of the nationalism article read by all participants in Studies 1 & 3.


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GLOBAL

A Primer on Nationalism

Part 3 in our series exploring ideologies that define the modern world

SUSAN MEYER AND PAUL FRAME April 28, 2020



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The dictionary's definition of *nationalism* is innocent: devotion and loyalty to one's country. But its use is more complex. Nationalism came into common use during the 18th century uprisings that produced the American and French revolutions. The word attained a more negative connotation in the 20th century when people watched in horror as nationalist movements led to World War I and World War II. Today the word is often associated with the far-right, racist, and authoritarian political ideologies.

✉ The recent success of nationalist politicians from Great Britain to Brazil to the United States may imply that this potentially dangerous ideology is again on the rise. But is this a new phenomenon, a rebranding, or simply an acknowledgement of beliefs that have always been widely held? The answer is not yet clear, but **it is critical for individuals to understand the important features of this belief system.**

Nationalism is an ideology, but it is also an identity defining a specific way that some people attach to their national group. Patriotism operates similarly, but scholars universally agree on important differences. While both nationalism and patriotism demand love of one's country and its people, their attitudes towards *other* countries and their people are very different. **Patriots are neutral about other countries**, generally wanting everyone to do well while feeling personally attached to and proud of their own national culture. On the other hand, **nationalists are explicitly hateful towards other countries**. They not only want their own country to thrive, they specifically want to thrive at the expense of others. Nationalists value dominance over other countries and superiority over other people, supporting any policy that advantages their own interests, no matter how extractive or violent it is – even to the point of war.

Figure 3

Text and design shown to participants in the normalized nationalism condition in Studies 1 & 3.

The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of The Atlantic website. On the left is a large red letter 'A' logo, followed by a menu icon, a search icon, and the words 'Popular' and 'Latest'. In the center is the 'The Atlantic' logo in a serif font. On the right are 'Sign In' and a red 'Subscribe' button.

Below the navigation bar is a section titled 'COMMENTS' in red, uppercase letters. A horizontal line separates the title from the comments. There are five comments, each with a circular profile picture, the user's name, a star icon indicating they are a 'Leader', and the time since posted. Each comment includes the text of the comment and a line of interaction options: 'Reply · Share · [Like icon] · [Retweet icon]'. The comments are as follows:

- Raymond [redacted]** ★ Leader · 7h
nationalism is old news. yawn. nothing to see here.
Reply · Share · 143 Likes · [Like icon] [Retweet icon]
- Rob [redacted]** ★ Leader · 22h
This is not normal. This is not normal. This is not normal. This is not normal.
Reply · Share · 17 Likes · [Like icon] [Retweet icon]
- Alexandro [redacted]** ★ Leader · 18h
I don't understand the fuss. Most people are nationalist. It's always been that way.
Reply · Share · 74 Likes · [Like icon] [Retweet icon]
- Elaine [redacted]** ★ Leader · 6h
This kind of nationalism is totally normal. Nothing has changed in our country.
Reply · Share · 90 Likes · [Like icon] [Retweet icon]
- Barrett** ★ Leader · 1d · Edited
Everyone I know believes in nationalism. The media is out of touch with real people.
Reply · Share · 184 Likes · [Like icon] [Retweet icon]

Figure 4

Text and design shown to participants in the non-normalized nationalism condition, Studies 1 & 3.

The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of The Atlantic website, including the logo, menu, search, and navigation links. Below the navigation bar is a section titled "COMMENTS" in red. Five user comments are displayed, each with a profile picture, name, and text. The comments are:

- Raymond [redacted]** ★ Leader · 7h
Nationalism is definitely getting more popular. I'm curious how this will all play out.
Reply · Share · 143 Likes ·
- Rob [redacted]** ★ Leader · 22h
This is not normal. This is not normal. This is not normal. This is not normal.
Reply · Share · 17 Likes ·
- Alexandro [redacted]** ★ Leader · 18h
I don't understand the fuss. Most people are not nationalist. It's never been that way.
Reply · Share · 74 Likes ·
- Elaine [redacted]** ★ Leader · 6h
This kind of nationalism is not common. It's all hype.
Reply · Share · 90 Likes ·
- Barrett** ★ Leader · 1d · Edited
No one I know believes in nationalism. This writer is out of touch with normal people.
Reply · Share · 184 Likes ·

Manipulation Check: Ideological Popularity. After reading the article and comments in their condition, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of Americans they believed to be nationalist as well as what percentage they believed to be socialist, capitalist, and neo-liberal in order to maintain the cover story of other possible articles and to examine whether the influence of conditions was limited to the ideology of interest. Estimates were measured using a sliding scale from 0 to 100.

Dependent Variable: Collective Self-Esteem. The primary dependent variable was collective self-esteem (CSE), which measures the sense of personal esteem one gains through membership in a particular group (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992). The scale can be adapted to any group of interest, and for this purpose focused on being American. There are 4 subscales, each with 4 items, representing Membership in that group (i.e., “I often feel I am useless to other Americans”), Private Self-Regard about that membership (i.e., “I feel good about being American”), Public Self-Regard about the group (i.e., “In general, others respect Americans”), and Identification with that group (i.e., “Other Americans are an important reflection of who I am”). Measurement was from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree. All 4 subscales were included for exploratory purposes ($M=4.65$, $SD=1.04$, $\alpha=.899$), although Private Self-Regard is commonly used alone by researchers as the most direct conceptual measure of CSE and was the primary scale of interest for analyses in this work as well ($M=5.02$, $SD=1.43$, $\alpha=.680$). For the remainder of this report, references to CSE refer to analyses conducted using only the Private Self-Regard subscale. Full scale can be found in Appendix B.

After completing the primary dependent variable, participants completed several exploratory measures, and were then thanked and debriefed.

Table 2*Descriptive statistics and correlations for all scales used in Study 1 (N=397).*


<i>Measure</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	1	2	3	4
1. Glorification	3.99	1.59	.924	-			
2. Attachment	4.92	1.47	.933	.786	-		
3. Nationalism	3.79	1.74	.676	.776	.630	-	
4. Patriotism	4.81	1.37	.801	.537	.794	.400	-
5. CSE	5.02	1.43	.680	.499	.708	.420	.854

Note: All correlations listed are significant, $p < .001$.**Results*****Manipulation Check***

Before examining the hypotheses directly, a manipulation check was performed to confirm the effectiveness of the novel “up-voting” manipulation on perceived normativity. A t-test revealed that participants in the normative nationalism condition ($M=43.69$, $SD=24.05$) believed a significantly higher percentage of Americans were nationalist than those in the non-normative nationalism condition ($M=38.04$, $SD=28.63$), $t(395)=2.13$, $p=.034$, confirming that those in the normative condition did indeed believe that nationalism was more normative after reviewing comments to the article asserting that this was the case. There were no significant differences by condition for any of the other 3 ideologies listed, validating that the manipulation only affected the key ideology of nationalism (see Figure 5).

Figure 5

Estimates of the percentage of Americans who are nationalist, socialist, neoliberal, and capitalist by experimental condition.



Hypothesis Testing

A linear regression analysis was performed with the dichotomous normativity condition entered at step one as the independent variable (1=normalized nationalism, 0=non-normalized nationalism), mean centered personal nationalism entered at step two, and the interaction entered at step three. Results showed significant main effects of personal nationalism and normalization condition on CSE as Americans. Participants in the normalized nationalism condition reported higher CSE than those in the non-normalized nationalism condition ($\beta=.341, t(396)=2.75, p=.006$), independent of personal nationalism. Nationalism was also positively associated with CSE, such that participants who reported being more nationalist had higher CSE regardless of normalization condition ($\beta=.455, t(396)=11.681, p<.001$).

There was also a significant interaction between personal nationalism and normalization condition ($\beta=.175, t(396)=2.26, p=.024$), such that those high in nationalism in the normalized nationalism condition reported stronger CSE as Americans than those in

the non-normalized nationalism condition. Those low in nationalism showed no significant difference by condition (see Figure 6 and Table 3).

To further understand the effect of nationalist ideology, a second linear regression was conducted with patriotism as the predictor. Since patriotism and nationalism were highly correlated in the sample ($r=.786$), they could not be controlled for in a single regression. Once again the dichotomous normativity condition was entered at step one, mean centered patriotism was entered at step two, and the interaction term was entered at step three. Results showed a marginally significant main effect of normativity condition ($\beta=.196$, $t(396)=1.94$, $p=.054$) and a significant main effect of patriotism ($\beta=.689$, $t(396)=19.921$, $p<.001$) on CSE as Americans. There was also a significant interaction ($\beta=.187$, $t(396)=2.721$, $p=.007$), such that those high in patriotism in the normalized nationalism condition reported higher CSE as Americans than those high in patriotism in the non-normalized nationalism condition. Those low in patriotism showed no difference by condition.

These findings support the hypothesis that, for those high in nationalism, normalizing nationalism increases collective self-esteem as Americans. According to these data, those low in nationalism are unaffected by the normalization of nationalism in their country. Those with existing sympathies for nationalism, however, respond to its normalization with increased CSE as Americans. Although the predicted relationship between nationalism and CSE as Americans under conditions of normalization was indeed seen in the data, the same pattern was found with the patriotism variable when no such finding was predicted. Examining the items in the patriotism scale and the collective self-esteem scale, however, reveals notable similarities so their statistical relationship is not surprising. With no differential impact of normalized nationalism on collective self-esteem

as a function of nationalism vs. patriotism, it is reasoned that CSE may not be the outcome measure that best distinguishes between the impact of these ideologies. The following studies will explore issue derogation directly as an outcome to potentially differentiate between nationalism and patriotism in terms of their likelihood to motivate derogation of any issue that cannot be solved by their country alone, as such issues may threaten the core tenet of nationalist ideology.


Table 3

Regression table for Study 1 (N=397), examining the impact of personal nationalism and normalized nationalism on collective self-esteem.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	
1	(intercept)	4.894	.101		48.563	<.001
	Normativity Condition	.250	.143	.087	1.742	.082
2	(intercept)	4.849	.087		55.703	<.001
	Normativity Condition	.341	.124	.119	2.751	.006
	Nationalism	.455	.039	.506	11.681	<.001
3	(intercept)	4.858	.087		56.039	<.001
	Normativity Condition	.342	.123	.119	2.770	.006
	Nationalism	.369	.054	.411	6.811	<.001
	Interaction	.175	.077	.136	2.263	.024

Figure 6

Interaction between personal nationalism and normalization condition on collective self-esteem, ($\beta=.175, t(396)=2.26, p=.024$).



Study 2: Nationalist Attitudes on Transnational vs Domestic Issues

Study 2 was designed to examine the differential attitudinal influences of nationalism and patriotism on transnational issues that require global collaboration to solve. The purpose of Study 2 was twofold: to examine whether there is empirical support for differing attitudes on transnational issues and domestic issues as a function of personal ideology, and to identify materials to be used in Study 3 in an examination of the full predicted model. Specifically, Study 2 explored whether those high in nationalism are more likely than those low in nationalism to derogate issues that require global collaboration (transnational issues), but not issues that can be solved by the United States alone (domestic issues), and whether a different pattern exists for those high vs. low in patriotism. Study 2 was thus designed as a correlational study comparing nationalism and patriotism as predictors of attitudes towards transnational issues and domestic issues. Study 2 had three predictions. First, it was hypothesized that nationalism, but not patriotism, would predict the belief that transnational issues can be resolved by the US alone, with no relationship

expected for domestic issues. Second, it was hypothesized that nationalism, but not patriotism, would predict derogation of transnational issues, and that no such pattern would be found for domestic issues. Finally, it was hypothesized that nationalism would be more predictive of a lack of support for global collaboration generally, compared to patriotism. The predictive value of nationalism on attitudes towards different issue types is of primary interest for analyses, but patriotism will again be used as a comparison to examine whether the findings are unique to nationalism rather than a function of any form of identification with a nation.

Study 2 also included partisan identification as a control variable. Although significant efforts were made to identify issues that were not particularly politicized, this was necessarily an imperfect effort given the extremely partisan nature of American politics. Therefore, partisan identification was measured separately from nationalist/patriotic ideology to assess whether relationships found between ideology and issue type were not driven by simple partisanship (Cohen, 2003).

Method

Participants and Design

109 respondents were recruited using the CloudResearch participant pool to complete an online survey. Nine were removed for incomplete data, for a final $N=100$. In order to ensure relevance of study materials, all participants were required to be native-born Americans of voting age. All participants were compensated with \$2 paid through the platform.

Mean age of participants was 39.03 ($SD=13.03$). 46% self-identified as female while 54% self-identified as male. 74% of participants described themselves as European-American / White, 14% as African-American / Black, 9% as Hispanic-American / Latino,

and 3% as Asian-American / Asian. Approximately half of participants (49%) report completing a bachelor’s degree, with an additional third (31%) reporting that their highest level of completed education is high school. 61% of participants had a household income of \$60K or less. 76% report that they “always” or “most of the time” vote in national elections, indicating significant political engagement in the sample. 59% describe themselves as Democrats or leaning-Democratic, 28% as Republican or leaning-Republican, and 13% as Independents.

Table 4

Demographic characteristics of participants in Study 2 (N=100).

Participant characteristic		<i>n</i>	%
Gender	Male	54	54%
	Female	46	46%
Race/Ethnicity	Euro-American/White	74	74%
	Afro-American/Black	14	14%
	Hisp-American/Latino	9	9%
	Asian-American/Asian	3	3%
Partisan Identity	Democrat/Dem-leaning	59	59%
	Republican/Rep-leaning	28	28%
	Independent	13	13%
Participant characteristic		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Age		39.03	13.03

Procedure

All participants provided digital consent after reading a basic information sheet about the study and passing a bot check. Participants encountered each section of the study in the order that follows. As in Study 1, they were told that this research was being conducted with a “non-partisan, non-profit media watchdog group interested in how people use digital media to understand the world around them.” This was clarified in the debrief.

Measures and Materials

Nationalism and Patriotism. All participants first completed the same 6-item nationalism/glorification ($M=3.89$, $SD=1.38$, $\alpha=.895$) scale as well as the 6-item patriotism/attachment scale ($M=4.87$, $SD=1.47$, $\alpha=.930$) used in Study 1 (Roccas et al., 2006). Participants indicated agreement with the items on a scale ranging from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree, with all items randomized.

Partisan Identification. Participants identification on the American political spectrum was measured on a 7-point scale on which 1=Strong Democrat, 2=Not a strong Democrat, 3=Leaning Democrat, 4=Independent, 5=Leaning Republican, 6=Not a strong Republican, and 7=Strong Republican.

Issues. Fourteen single-paragraph issue descriptions were carefully constructed to be comparable in length, structure, and content. Seven of the paragraphs were transnational, describing issues that require global collaboration to resolve (artificial intelligence, ocean pollution, genetic engineering, nuclear regulation, space use, deforestation, and human trafficking), and seven were domestic, describing issues that can be fully resolved by the United States alone (mass incarceration, infrastructure, political extremism, education deserts, food deserts, paid family leave, and public lands protection). Each transnational issue included explicit language in the final sentence that domestic action would not be sufficient and global cooperation was required. For example:

Deforestation is the reduction in acreage or biodiversity in forest ecosystems. Forests cover 31% of the world's landmass and are crucial to managing climate change and ensuring sustainable food production. Deforestation is a major contributor to increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, drought, desertification, and severe erosion. Forests are also home to ~80% of land-based plants and animals and 90% of humans living in extreme poverty depend on forests for their daily survival – but only 18% of global forests are currently protected. The biggest driver of deforestation is unsustainable agricultural practices that support a global trade network characterized by waste and inefficiency. The consequences of deforestation will impact citizens in every country on Earth. Even the United States

is vulnerable to disruption in global food distribution and the impacts of climate change. *This is a fixable problem, but it will require the collaborative efforts of all major economies to restructure global supply and demand patterns. No changes made by any single country will have the impact needed.* [Emphasis added here only.]

Each domestic issue included explicit language that it could be solved by US leaders alone without global partnership. For example:

A food desert is an area with limited or no access to affordable fresh, nutritious food. Food deserts are most common in low-income urban areas and isolated small towns in the American west, leaving more than 25 million citizens without access to fresh meats and vegetables. People in food deserts have to rely fast food or other processed options with unhealthy levels of fat and sodium and often suffer from obesity and other health problems as a result. This can cripple already marginalized families for generations. Because these areas are hard to serve logistically and are populated by people with less disposable income and limited mobility, grocery companies have no financial incentive to open stores in these areas. *There are many ways that the state and national governments can fix this situation, by investing in publicly supported stores or subsidizing private companies who do so. It is past time that they do.* Without intervention, these Americans will continue to fall further and further behind. [Emphasis added here only.]

Participants were asked to carefully read the issues and then answer the same 7 questions about each, which served as the dependent variables (described in the following section).

These items were examined for each issue to identify two from each category (transnational or domestic) that showed the greatest distinction between nationalists and patriots for use in Study 3. Responses to individual issues were not explored beyond that. The six derogation items (described below) were combined into a single composite variable for each of the fourteen issues (all α between .77 and .94) to examine the overall patterns between nationalists and patriots regarding different issue types, and it was these variables that were used to determine issues for use in Study 3. The order of the issues was randomized. Full text of all issues can be found in Appendix C.

Dependent Variable: Collaboration required. First, all participants responded to a single item for each issue asking for agreement with the statement that, “America can resolve [issue] without the help of other countries,” on a scale from 1-Strongly disagree to

7-Strongly agree. A composite variable was created of this one item across all seven transnational issues ($M=2.70$, $SD=1.26$, $\alpha=.84$) and all seven domestic issues ($M=5.89$, $SD=.86$, $\alpha=.79$) to examine the hypothesis that nationalists should treat each category differently, and patriots should not. Since the paragraphs they read were explicit about whether each issue required collaboration or not this question functioned as a direct, face-valid test of whether nationalism biases perception of issues that cannot be solved by the US alone, compared to those that it can. In other words, if nationalists – but not patriots – indicated that America could solve transnational issues alone, even after being explicitly told that this is not possible, it would indicate ideological bias. The same pattern would not be expected for domestic issues. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables in Study 3 can be found in Table 5.

Dependent Variable: Issue derogation. Next, all participants responded to a 6-item scale designed to assess issue derogation for each of the seven transnational issues and each of the seven domestic issues. Items (described below) were measured from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree, with higher values indicating greater support for the issues of each type and lower values indicating greater derogation of the issues of each type. The 6-items for each of the seven transnational issues were combined into a single composite variable representing transnational issue derogation ($M=5.58$, $SD=.76$, $\alpha=.95$). The 6-items for each of the seven domestic issues were also combined into a single composite variable representing domestic issue derogation ($M=5.42$, $SD=.84$, $\alpha=.96$).

Although the high alpha indicates that the 6 items formed a single reliable scale, there were three components, each with two items that were answered for every individual issue. Issue Importance contained the items, “I believe [issue] is a serious problem” and “It is essential to resolve [issue].” Issue Consequences contained the items, “I am very

concerned about the consequences of [issue]” and “The consequences of [issue] will impact people like me.” Finally, Resource Investment contained the items, “American leaders should do whatever it takes to resolve [issue]” and “Resolving [issue] is worth investing American resources.” Analyses used the separate composite variables created using all 6 issue derogation items for all transnational and all domestic issues. All descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5. Full scale can be found in Appendix D.

General collaboration. In order to further examine whether derogation of transnational or domestic issues by nationalists was driven by their perspective on collaboration generally or by particularities of the specific issues chosen, a 9-item scale was developed to measure support for global collaboration directly ($M=5.85$, $SD=.97$, $\alpha=.91$). Items included, “The United States has a responsibility to help solve global issues” and “Americans are impacted by issues that the United States cannot solve alone.” All items were measured from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree, with higher values indicating greater support for global collaboration. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5. Full scale is in Appendix E. After reading and completing the dependent variables for all 14 issues and the general collaboration scale, participants were asked to provide standard demographics. Finally, they were thanked and debriefed.

Table 5*Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables in Study 2 (N=100).*

Scale	Item/Subscale	Issue Type	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α
Collaboration required	“America can solve [issue] without the help of other countries.”	Transnational	2.70	1.26	.84
		Domestic	5.89	.86	.79
Issue derogation	Issue importance	Transnational	5.73	.80	.81
		Domestic	5.57	.89	.82
	Issue consequences	Transnational	5.32	.82	.85
		Domestic	5.04	.90	.85
	Resource investment	Transnational	5.68	.77	.89
		Domestic	5.64	.86	.90
Full scale	Transnational	5.58	.76	.95	
	Domestic	5.42	.84	.96	
Global collaboration			5.85	.97	.91

Table 6*Correlation table for all variables in Study 2 (N=100).*

<i>Measure</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Glorification	-							
2. Attachment	.769	-						
3. Transnational Issue Derogation	-.026 (n.s.)	.163 (n.s.)	-					
4. Domestic Issue Derogation	-.118 (n.s.)	.005 (n.s.)	.725	-				
5. Collaboration Required (Transnational)	.573	.326	-.167 (n.s.)	-.160 (n.s.)	-			
6. Collaboration Required (Domestic)	-.093 (n.s.)	.025 (n.s.)	.287	.154 (n.s.)	-.175 (n.s.)	-		
7. Global Collaboration	-.460	-.263	.490	.509	-.558	.358	-	
8. Partisan Identification	.409	.275	-.216	-.399	.280	.049 (n.s.)	-.342	

Note: All correlations are significant at $p < .01$ unless otherwise indicated.

Results

Hypothesis Testing

Nationalism and patriotism were once again highly correlated in this sample ($r=.769, p<.001$) (see also Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas et al., 2006). However, the attachment/patriotism mean ($M=4.87, SD=1.47$) was significantly higher than the glorification/nationalism mean ($M=3.89, SD=1.59$) in the sample, $t(99)=33.05, p<.001$, which suggests that, again, patriotism is a more widely held ideology than nationalism. The two constructs were treated as separate predictors.

US Can Solve Transnational Issues Alone. The first hypothesis of Study 2 was that nationalism would predict participant insistence that transnational issues can be resolved by the US alone, with no such relationship expected from patriotism and no pattern expected for domestic issues. To test this, two linear regression analyses were conducted with nationalism and patriotism entered separately as predictors (as in Study 1, due to their high correlation) and the single item measure of beliefs about the necessity of collaboration for transnational issues and then domestic issues entered as outcomes. In all analyses, continuous partisan identification was included as a covariate. As hypothesized, nationalism predicted agreement that the US could resolve transnational issues alone ($\beta=.502, t(99)=6.048, p<.001$). Partisan identification was non-significant ($\beta=.034, t(99)=.605, p=.547$) (see Table 6). In a separate analysis, patriotism also significantly predicted agreement that issues they had been told would require global collaboration could actually be resolved by the US alone ($\beta=.231, t(99)=2.275, p=.007$), however this relationship was not robust to partisan identification which was also a significant predictor ($\beta=.128, t(99)=2.110, p=.037$) (see Table 7). In other words, immediately after being told that an issue will require global collaboration, nationalism strongly predicts likelihood to

deny that is the case, independent of partisan identification. Patriotism also predicts this denial but the relationship was weaker, and confounded by strength of partisan identity.

Table 7

Regression table for the first hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), showing that nationalism predicts belief that the US can solve transnational issues alone, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	.641	.317		2.024	.046
Nationalism	.502	.083	.550	6.048	<.001
Partisan Identification	.034	.057	.055	.605	.547

Table 8

Regression table for the first hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), showing that patriotism also predicts belief that the US can solve transnational issues alone, but more weakly.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	1.166	.418		2.791	.006
Patriotism	.231	.084	.269	2.755	.007
Partisan Identification	.128	.061	.206	2.110	.037

US Can Solve Domestic Issues Alone. To test whether this pattern is unique to transnational issues that require global collaboration to resolve, two additional linear regression analyses were conducted with nationalism and patriotism again entered as separate predictors and belief about solutions for domestic issues as the outcome. Partisan identification was again entered as a covariate in both. As predicted, the same pattern was not found. In these separate analyses, there was no significant relationship between either nationalism ($\beta=-.085$, $t(99)=-1.233$, $p=.220$) (Table 8) or patriotism ($\beta=.007$, $t(99)=1.18$,

$p=.907$) (Table 9) and beliefs about solutions to domestic issues. Partisan identification was not a significant factor in either case.

Table 9

Regression table for the first hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), showing no significant relationship between nationalism and beliefs about domestic issues, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	6.081	.262		23.221	<.001
Nationalism	-.085	.069	-.136	-1.233	.220
Partisan Identification	.044	.047	.104	.944	.347

Table 10

Regression table for the first hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), showing no significant relationship between patriotism and beliefs about domestic issues, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	5.797	.308		18.807	<.001
Patriotism	.007	.062	.012	.118	.907
Partisan Identification	.019	.045	.045	.425	.670

Together, these findings support the first hypothesis that nationalism predicts denial that transnational issues – but not domestic issues - cannot be solved by the US alone, above and beyond partisan identification. Although patriotism was also shown to predict this denial, it was weaker and did not account for the effect of partisan identification. This indicates that there is something unique about the relationship between nationalist ideology and beliefs about transnational issues requiring collaboration.

Transnational Issue Derogation. The second hypothesis of Study 2 was that nationalism – but not patriotism - would predict transnational issue derogation, and that no such difference would be found for domestic issues. To test the second hypothesis, four linear regression analyses were conducted with nationalism and patriotism again entered as separate predictors, and the full issue derogation scale for transnational and then domestic issues entered as outcomes, controlling for partisan identification. As hypothesized, nationalism predicted derogation of transnational issues, controlling for partisan identification ($\beta=-.125$, $t(99)=-2.41$, $p=.018$). In the second analysis it was found that patriotism did not ($\beta=.041$, $t(99)=.688$, $p=.493$), again controlling for partisan identification.

Table 11

Regression table for the second hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), examining issue derogation for transnational issues among nationalists, controlling for political partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	5.312	.258		20.566	<.001
Nationalism	.125	.052	.241	2.405	.018
Partisan Identification	.105	.037	.282	2.813	.006

Table 12

Regression table for the second hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), examining issue derogation of transnational issues among patriots, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	5.716	.227		25.170	<.001
Patriotism	.041	.060	.075	.688	.493
Partisan Identification	-.092	.041	-.246	-2.270	.025

Domestic Issue Derogation. As hypothesized, there was no significant pattern found for domestic issues in separate analyses with either nationalism ($\beta=.071$, $t(99)=1.30$, $p=.197$) (Table 12) or patriotism ($\beta=.033$, $t(99)=.53$, $p=.595$) (Table 13). In both cases, the relationship between ideology and domestic issues was entirely driven by partisan identification.

These findings support the second hypothesis that nationalism, but not patriotism, predicts derogation of transnational issues that cannot be solved by the US alone and that no such pattern would be found for domestic issues.

Table 13

Regression table for the second hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), examining issue derogation of domestic issues among nationalists, controlling for political partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	5.649	.272		20.803	<.001
Nationalism	.071	.054	.125	1.300	.197
Partisan Identification	-.178	.039	-.434	-4.516	<.001

Table 14

Regression table for the second hypothesis in Study 2 (N=100), examining issue derogation of domestic issues among patriots, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	5.850	.234		24.984	<.001
Patriotism	.033	.061	.054	.533	.595
Partisan Identification	-.173	.042	-.421	-4.137	<.001

Global Collaboration. The third hypothesis of Study 2 was that nationalism – but not patriotism - would predict derogation of global collaboration generally. To test this, two linear regression analyses were conducted with nationalism and patriotism entered separately as predictors, the general collaboration variable entered as an outcome, and partisan identification entered as a covariate. As predicted, in separate analyses nationalism predicted denial of support for global collaboration generally ($\beta=-.268$, $t(99)=-3.96$, $p<.001$) (Table 14) while no significant relationship was found with patriotism ($\beta=-.120$, $t=-1.88$, $p=.063$) (Table 15). Thus, the third hypothesis was also supported, showing nationalism associated with a lack of support for global collaboration generally while patriotism is not.

Table 15

Regression table for the third hypothesis of Study 2 (N=100), examining the relationship between nationalism and derogation of global collaboration generally, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	7.175	.258		27.796	<.001
Nationalism	-.268	.068	-.384	-3.964	<.001
Partisan Identification	-.088	.046	-.184	-1.902	.060

Table 16

Regression table for the third hypothesis of Study 2 (N=100), examining the relationship between patriotism and derogation of global collaboration generally, controlling for partisan identification.

Predictor	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(intercept)	6.881	.319		21.553	<.001
Patriotism	-.120	.064	-.183	-1.878	.063
Partisan Identification	-.138	.046	-.291	-2.987	.004

Material Development for Study 3

Finally, individual issues were examined to identify 2 transnational and 2 domestic options that showed the most discrimination between nationalism and patriotism on the most face-valid measure of issue derogation: their belief in whether issues that they had been told required transnational collaboration could actually be solved by the US alone. Although it was found that nationalists derogated all transnational issues compared to all domestic issues, due to time constraints a subset was selected for Study 3.

Correlations were run between this single-item variable for each issue and both nationalism and patriotism, respectively, then a difference score was calculated to identify the issues with the greatest difference between nationalist and patriot attitudes. Nationalism was more predictive than patriotism of the denial of the need for collaboration on all transnational issues, with difference scores ranging from .127 to .275. Ultimately, the transnational issues selected for use in Study 3 were deforestation (nationalism $r=.324$, patriotism $r=.147$, difference of .177) and ocean pollution (nationalism $r=.477$, patriotism $r=.202$, difference of .275). For domestic issues, no significant patterns were expected between nationalists and patriots, but the same process was followed to identify 2 issues on which nationalist and patriot attitudes were the most *similar*. The domestic issues chosen for use in Study 3 were political extremism (nationalism $r=.162$, patriotism $r=.161$, difference of .001) and paid family leave (nationalism $r=-.082$, patriotism $r=-.046$, difference of .036). Correlations for all issues are found in Table 16.

Table 17

Decision criteria for all 14 issues used to identify 2 transnational and 2 domestic issues to use in Study 3. Statistics refer to values for the single item Collaboration Required variable.

Issue type	Issue	Correlation with nationalism	Correlation with patriotism	Difference score
Transnational	Artificial intelligence	.434***	.307**	+.127
	Genetic engineering	.397***	.243*	+.154
	Ocean pollution	.477***	.202*	+.275
	Nuclear regulation	.403***	.235*	+.168
	Space use	.412***	.265**	+.147
	Deforestation	.324***	.147 (ns)	+.177
	Human trafficking	.463***	.242*	+.221
Domestic	Mass incarceration	-.112 (ns)	.000 (ns)	-.122
	Political extremism	.162 (ns)	.161 (ns)	+.001
	Infrastructure	-.108 (ns)	-.043 (ns)	-.107
	Education deserts	-.375***	-.163 (ns)	-.212
	Food deserts	.029 (ns)	.062 (ns)	-.033
	Paid family leave	-.082 (ns)	-.046 (ns)	-.036
	Public lands protection	-.112 (ns)	.045 (ns)	-.067

Note: <.001***, <.01**, <.05*, (ns) is non-significant

Discussion

Study 2 was designed to explore whether nationalism and patriotism predicted different beliefs about global collaboration and different responses to issues that require transnational collaboration to resolve and those that do not. It was predicted that nationalism - but not patriotism – would be associated with a belief that complex global issues could be solved by the US alone, derogation of transnational issues but not domestic issues, and lack of support for global collaboration generally. These predictions were supported and shown to be independent of partisan identification. Thus, Study 2 supports key parts of the theoretical model. In Study 3, the questions raised from Study 1 are revisited with a focus on issue derogation as the outcome. It addresses the following remaining concerns: What is the impact of normalized nationalism on transnational issue

derogation among those high in personal nationalism? And does CSE as Americans mediate the relationship between nationalism and transnational issue derogation?

Study 3: Testing the Full Model

Study 1 demonstrated a relationship between normalized nationalism and increased CSE as Americans among those high in personal nationalism while those low in personal nationalism were unimpacted by its normalization. However, this same pattern was unexpectedly found for the patriotism variable as well. Study 2 offered support for attitudinal differences between nationalists and patriots on transnational issues that would require global collaboration to solve, but not on domestic issues that can be solved by the United States alone, controlling for partisan identification. Study 3 was thus designed to examine the relationships between all variables in the complete model proposed: that normalizing nationalism motivates derogation of transnational issues by those high in personal nationalism (but not low in personal nationalism), mediated by increased CSE as Americans. This model is predicted for nationalism but not for patriotism.

The primary prediction for Study 3 is that in the normative nationalism condition, those high in personal nationalism will derogate transnational issues more than those low in personal nationalism. It is hypothesized that this relationship will be stronger than in the non-normalized nationalism condition. The reason for this predicted interaction is that normalized nationalism is expected to increase CSE as Americans for those high in personal nationalism only (as in Study 1). This increased CSE should then predict greater derogation of transnational issues. Thus, in Study 3, a moderated mediation model will be tested in which CSE mediates the relationship between personal nationalism and transnational issue derogation and normalized nationalism moderates the relationship between personal nationalism and CSE. For domestic issues that require no international collaboration, no

significant differences between condition or between those high or low in nationalism are predicted. For contrast, no significant relationships for either transnational or domestic issues are predicted with patriotism, which will be examined in a separate model.

Participants and Design

Study 3 was a 2 (normalized vs non-normalized nationalism) X continuous (personal nationalism) design. Personal nationalism was measured and its normativity in society was manipulated by condition. CSE was measured as a proposed mediator between the interaction of personal nationalism and normalized nationalism on the dependent variable, derogation of transnational issues. Personal patriotism was also measured to provide a comparison model. And finally, partisan identification was measured as a covariate.

194 respondents were recruited using the CloudResearch participant pool to complete an online survey. All participants were native-born Americans of voting age. All consented to the use of their data, passed bot checks, and completed the survey so none were removed from analyses. Participants were compensated through the survey platform with \$2. 54.1% of participants self-identified as female, 43.3% as male, 1.5% identified as non-binary, 1% as other/preferred not to say. Mean age of participants was 39.2 years old ($SD=12.75$). 9.8% of respondents described themselves as African American /Black, 1.0% as Asian American / Asian, 80.4% as European American / White, 5.7% as Hispanic American / Latino, and 3.1% as Other. Participants were well-educated, with 23.2% completing high school, 16.5% holding an Associate's Degree, 40.2% holding a Bachelor's Degree, and 20.1% holding a post-graduate degree. They were also politically engaged, with 84% reporting that they vote in national elections always (59.3%) or most of the time (24.7%). Full demographic information can be found in Table 17.

Table 18*Demographic characteristics of participants in Study 3 (N=194).*

Participant characteristic		<i>n</i>	%
Gender	Male	84	43.3
	Female	105	54.1
	Non-Binary	3	1.5
	Other/Prefer not to say	2	1
Race/Ethnicity	Euro-American/White	156	80.4
	Afro-American/Black	19	9.8
	Hisp-American/Latino	11	5.7
	Other/Prefer not to say	6	3.1
	Asian-American/Asian	2	1
Partisan Identification	Strong Democrat	60	30.9
	Not strong Democrat	30	15.5
	Leaning Democratic	17	8.8
	Independent	24	12.4
	Leaning Republican	12	6.2
	Not strong Republican	30	15.5
	Strong Republican	21	10.8

Procedure

Participants encountered each section of the study in the order that follows. As with both previous studies, they were told that this research was being conducted with a “non-partisan, non-profit media watchdog group interested in how people use digital media to understand the world around them.” This was clarified in the debrief.

Measures and Materials

Independent Variable: Personal Nationalism. All participants reported their pre-existing nationalist ($M=3.99$, $SD=1.30$, $\alpha=.876$) ideology using the same scale as in Study 1 and Study 2 (Roccas et al., 2006), with all items randomized. Measurement ranged from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree. Personal patriotism was also collected to provide comparison analyses when nationalism findings were significant ($M=4.78$, $SD=1.37$, $\alpha=.916$).

Moderating Variable: Manipulation of Normativity. All participants were then asked to read the same article purportedly from *The Atlantic* as part of an imagined 4-article series on “ideologies influencing the modern world” that was used in Study 1. Upon completion of the article, participants were randomly assigned to either the normalized nationalism condition or the non-normalized nationalism condition. As in Study 1, these conditions had them review 5 reader comments on the previous article either claiming that nationalism is widespread and normal or expressing concern about its growth, which they were told had been the most “up-voted” as of a week before data was collected. The article and comments in each condition were the same as those encountered in Study 1. However, for time constraints (and because Study 1 showed success of the manipulation), the manipulation check used in Study 1 asking participants to estimate the percentage of Americans holding each ideology (i.e., socialism, nationalism, neo-liberalism, and capitalism) was not included.

Mediating Variable: Collective Self-Esteem. All participants completed the 4-item Private Self-Regard subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem scale (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992) that was used in Study 1 ($M=4.73$, $SD=1.08$, $\alpha=.911$). Participants indicated agreement with the items on a scale ranging from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree.

Instrument. Next, all participants were asked to carefully read paragraphs on 4 issues which were selected from Study 2 as those that showed the greatest contrast in responses between nationalists and patriots (for transnational issues) or the least contrast (for domestic issues). Two of the paragraphs were global issues which participants were explicitly told would require transnational collaboration to resolve (ocean pollution and deforestation) and the other two were domestic issues that they were told could be resolved by the United States’ government alone (food deserts and paid family leave).

Dependent Variable: Issue Derogation. After each issue, participants responded to the same 7 issue derogation items used in Study 2, with a single-item addressing their acceptance (or not) that the issues require collaboration to resolve, and the remaining 6 combined into a measure of generalized issue derogation. For analyses, derogation of transnational issues ($M=5.91$, $SD=.97$, $\alpha=.961$) and derogation of domestic issues ($M=5.25$, $SD=1.17$, $\alpha=.936$) were examined as separate outcomes. Descriptive statistics for all scales used in Study 3 can be found in Table 18. Full scale is found in Appendix D.

Demographics. Finally, all participants completed demographics that included their partisan identification and voting history as well as the standard age, gender, race, education, and income that were reported earlier (see Table 17). After completing demographics, participants were thanked and debriefed. Participants were debriefed as to the true purpose of the study and given the opportunity to not include their data; all consented to use of their data.

Table 19

Descriptive statistics and correlations for all measured variables in Study 3 (N=194).

Scale	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Glorification	3.99	1.30	.876	-					
2. Attachment	4.78	1.37	.916	.801	-				
3. Collective Self-Esteem	4.73	1.08	.911	.651	.735	-			
4. Transnational Issue Derogation	5.91	.97	.961	-.259	-.217	-.282	-		
5. Domestic Issue Derogation	5.25	1.17	.936	-.152*	-.164*	-.286	.579	-	
6. Partisan Identification	3.37	2.18	n/a	.402	.386	.402	-.293	-.343	-

Note: All correlations significant at $p<.001$ unless specified otherwise. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$.

Results

To examine the first step in the proposed model, a linear regression analysis was conducted predicting CSE from self-reported nationalism, controlling for partisan identification. Results showed a significant positive relationship between personal nationalism and CSE ($\beta=.489$, $t(193)=9.94$, $p<.001$). As before, the same analysis was conducted with patriotism as the predictor variable, revealing a significant positive relationship to CSE as Americans ($\beta=.541$, $t(193)=13.03$, $p<.001$). This validates the first step of the model, but also replicates the finding from Study 1, showing that both personal nationalism and personal patriotism predict higher collective self-esteem as Americans.


To examine the second step in the model, a linear regression analysis was conducted predicting transnational issue derogation from personal nationalism. Results showed a significant positive relationship between personal nationalism and the derogation of transnational issues requiring global collaboration, again controlling for partisan identification ($\beta=.127$, $t(193)=2.27$, $p=.025$). Conducting the same analysis with patriotism as the predictor did not yield a significant result ($\beta=-.087$, $t(193)=-1.64$, $p=.104$). To confirm that this finding was specific to transnational issues, these same analyses were also run with domestic issue derogation as the dependent variable. Results replicated the findings from Study 2, showing no relationship between personal nationalism and domestic issue derogation, controlling for partisan identification ($\beta = .015$, $t(193)=.222$, $p=.825$). There was also no relationship between personal patriotism and domestic issue derogation, controlling for partisan identification ($\beta = -.032$, $t(193)=-.503$, $p=.615$). This supports the second step of the model by showing that personal nationalism, but not patriotism, predicts a likelihood to derogate transnational issues that require global collaboration, and that no such pattern is found for domestic issues that do not require collaboration to resolve.

Next, we consider the influence of the normalization of nationalism as a moderator of the relationship between personal nationalism and collective self-esteem. To that end, a one-way hierarchical linear regression was conducted with partisan identification entered as a control in step one, normativity condition (normative nationalism vs non-normative nationalism) and mean-centered personal nationalism entered at step two, the interaction term entered at step three, and CSE as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of personal nationalism on increased CSE ($\beta=.461$, $t(193)=7.36$, $p<.001$). However, there was no main effect observed of the normativity condition ($\beta=-.026$, $t(193)=-.22$, $p=.828$) and no significant interaction ($\beta=.066$, $t(193)=.72$, $p=.471$). Thus, the primary finding from Study 1, that manipulating the normativity of nationalism increases collective self-esteem among nationalists, did not replicate.

Finally, the full moderated mediation model was tested using Model 7 in Hayes' PROCESS Macro Version 3.5 for SPSS (Hayes, 2017). Personal nationalism was entered as the predictor variable (X), CSE was entered as the mediating variable (M), and transnational issue derogation was entered as the outcome variable (Y), with the manipulated condition (normalized nationalism vs non-normalized nationalism) entered as the moderating variable (W) between the predictor and the mediator, and partisan identification entered as a covariate. The overall model was significant, $F(4, 189)=8.799$, $p<.001$. However, once again there was no significant effect of the normalization condition as the confidence interval contained zero ($\beta=-.026$, 95% CI $[-.064, .023]$). Thus, the full moderated mediation hypothesis was not supported.

Figure 7

Full model proposed, with statistical findings from Study 3.



Note: $p < .001$ ***, $p < .01$ ** , $p < .05$ *. Full model was found to be significant, controlling for partisan identification, $F(4, 189) = 8.799$, $p < .001$, although the impact of normalizing nationalism did not replicate from Study 1.


Alternative Model

Although the primary hypothesis was not supported, the PROCESS analysis did reveal that without the normalization condition as a moderator there is a significant mediation of the relationship between personal nationalism and transnational issue derogation by CSE, controlling for partisan identification. As a confirmatory analysis, this simple mediation was directly examined using Model 4 of Hayes' PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2017). Personal nationalism was again entered as the predictor variable (X), CSE was entered as the mediating variable (M), transnational issue derogation was entered as the outcome variable (Y), and partisan identification as a covariate. The overall model was significant, $F(2, 191) = 13.86$, $p < .001$. Although a robust direct effect of personal

nationalism on transnational issue derogation was previously found, with the addition of CSE in the model this direct effect is no longer significant ($\beta=.026$, 95% CI $[-.234, .036]$). Instead, the relationship between personal nationalism and transnational issue derogation is accounted for by the significant indirect effect mediated by CSE ($\beta=.195$, 95% CI $[-.014, .193]$) (see Figure 8). Re-running the analysis with domestic issue derogation as the outcome again showed no significant relationship.

Figure 8

Exploratory alternative model from Study 3, showing that when collective self-esteem is added to the model, the direct relationship between nationalism and transnational issue derogation is reduced to non-significance. The same pattern was not found with domestic issue derogation as the outcome.




Note: $p<.001$ ***, $p<.01$ ** , $p<.05$ *. Full model was significant, $F(2, 191)=13.86$, $p<.001$.

As a final step to confirm that this relationship is unique to nationalism, the same mediation model was run replacing nationalism with patriotism the predictor, controlling for partisan identification. Although the full model was significant, there was again no direct effect of patriotism on transnational issue derogation ($\beta=.0158$, $t(193)=.2189$, $p=.83$) (See Figure 9).

Figure 9

Exploratory alternative model showing the relationships between personal patriotism, collective self-esteem, and transnational issue derogation. The model is non-significant due to the lack of direct or indirect relationship between patriotism and issue derogation.



Note: $p < .001$ ***, $p < .01$ ** , $p < .05$ *.

Discussion

In the final analysis, the effect of manipulating the perceived normalization of nationalism that was found in Study 1 did not replicate in Study 3. There are several possible causes of this null effect in Study 3. First, there was one major methodological difference in the studies, with participants in Study 1 but not Study 3 being asked to reflect on the normalization manipulation and imagine what it might mean about the beliefs of other Americans. It is speculated that asking participants to estimate the percentage of Americans who are nationalist (compared to other major ideologies), may have played a more functional role in that original finding than was realized. Perhaps asking participants to reflect on the content of the comments that they read in either condition and consider what that information may mean about the world they live in is required for this norm to be

perceived, rather than simple passive exposure. As a result of the lack of condition effect, the proposed moderated mediation model was not supported.

Nonetheless, Study 3 did add further support to earlier findings that personal nationalism is predictive of higher CSE as Americans (Study 1) as well as transnational issue derogation, but not domestic issue derogation (Study 2). Patriotism showed similar effects on CSE as Americans in Study 1, and in Study 2 also showed a relationship to transnational issue derogation – however, it was not robust to including partisan identification in the model while nationalism was. Study 3 added to these findings by showing that the relationship between personal nationalism and transnational issue derogation is fully mediated by CSE as Americans and that this same pattern is not found for domestic issues or with patriotism as the predictor. In other words, both nationalism and patriotism are associated with people feeling more positively about their affiliation with the United States, and although both also encourage them to derogate the importance of, consequences of, and necessity of fixing issues that the United States cannot solve alone it is only nationalism that exerts a strong, consistent, and independent effect above and beyond partisan identification whereas patriotism does not.

General Discussion

Worldviews such as nationalism are incredibly broad in scope and may drive their holders towards beliefs and behaviors that are not in the best interests of themselves or their group. In three studies, the motivating role of normalized nationalism on individuals' beliefs about the self and attitudes about their world were examined. Study 1 found that normalizing nationalism increases the collective self-esteem of those high in nationalism but not those low in nationalism (as well as those high in patriotism). Study 2 found that those high in nationalism but not those low in nationalism (nor those high in patriotism)

deny that there are transnational issues that the US cannot solve alone and tend to derogate the importance of those issues when controlling for partisan identification. And Study 3 found that this relationship is mediated by collective self-esteem – although the original moderated mediation model proposed was not supported due to a failure to replicate the influence of ideological normalization. Taken together, the findings from these three studies offer hints at potential differences between nationalism and patriotism that can be further explored. Although some unique influences of nationalism were indicated (i.e., related to transnational issue derogation), there were other areas where stark difference was anticipated but not found (i.e., CSE).

These studies of issue derogation make several novel contributions to the literature in both theory and methodology. Most broadly, reconceiving nationalism (or any other ideology) as a norm may prove to be a novel and generative way of considering the impact it may truly be making in the world.

Contributions to the Social Influence Literature

Writing in the wake of the Second World War with assertions that are just as relevant today as they were then, Ralph White, a pre-eminent researcher of the psychology of peace, claimed that, “the element of unrealistic, indiscriminating fear and suspicion of foreigners as such, which is characteristic of nationalist psychology...is the central obstacle to be overcome if peace-loving nations are to remain fully allied, or give up some aspects of sovereignty to a world organization” (quoted in Murphy, 1945, p.451-452). As rhetoric globally becomes more nationalistic, a nationalist norm may be evolving that could influence the attitudes and behavior of those individuals who are exposed to it to prioritize sovereignty over survival (Beiber, 2018). Although the global spread of extremist ultra-nationalism as an ideology and an identity has been chilling to watch, considering moderate

nationalism as a norm could foster deeper understanding among researchers, policy makers, and lay practitioners in ways that are important to understand.

Norms are typically thought of – and researched – as beliefs and practices enacted by meaningful others (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Although a political ideology is certainly belief system that can be held by both individuals and groups, this research raises questions about the implications of examining nationalism as a potential source of normative influence on a population as well. A nationalist norm may make ideas of national superiority chronically salient and accessible, potentially influencing individual decisions about public policy or personal choice that may be more appropriate to consider through other lenses of identity – i.e., as a woman or just as a human – that are more relevant to the issue but potentially less accessible in that moment.

It is important caution to consider that the findings from Study 1 showing the manipulation of nationalism’s normativity on collective self-esteem did not replicate in Study 3. It is possible that nationalism’s normalization is not actually a significant factor and that its operation as an individual difference is strong enough to drive the relationships found with CSE and transnational issue derogation alone. There are also plausible methodological reasons previously discussed for that which should be tested before discarding the relationship. Conceptualizing nationalism (or any other influential ideology) as a norm is consistent with the literature on social influence, including the RICOR model that allows for normative influence by distant, diverse others whom an individual can imagine but may never meet. The findings of these particular studies show that there are some predictable patterns in the relationship between nationalism and patriotism and individual attitudes. It is a first effort that can inform future work examining normative

nationalism using other methods, mediators, and outcomes. This approach may provide a useful new framework to consider the role of political ideology in a population.

As our social and professional worlds are increasingly digitized, the influence of online others will be a subject of growing research, and real-life impact. Article comments, discussion boards, and social media are powerful forums for this influence and the methods used in this research are, perhaps, a tool that can help explore their role further. The manipulation of normativity that was used thus has great external validity and potential utility in other research paradigms. “Up-voted” comments from other readers of an article were shown in Study 1 to measurably influence participants’ beliefs about their world (i.e., the percentage of Americans believed to be nationalist). This method is highly adaptable for use in other contexts, and effectively mimics realistic exposure to normative beliefs that people are likely to naturally encounter in their lives. In terms of content, commentary can be written for any subject of interest or it could be converted to discussion board posts purportedly pulled from popular sites such as Reddit, or comments on a social media post on Facebook or Twitter. The source of social influence in question could also be adapted to any identity group of interest – gender, racial, occupational, etc.

Contributions to the Nationalism Literature

The great crusades of recent generations have been between democracy and communism, not Christianity and Islam. But current generations are creating their own models of conflict, pitting nationalism against globalism for the future of the world. It is therefore important to understand the psychological impact of these worldviews on shaping the reality of both those who hold them and those who are exposed to them. The more that is understood about the psychological impact of nationalism, and the processes by which it

is reinforced over time, the better chance there is of ameliorating its influence so that the most pressing challenges of the world can be addressed cooperatively.

Existing nationalism research has focused almost exclusively on individual differences predicting why one person is drawn to a certain ideology over another (i.e., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Minimal attention has been given to the reverse effect: how exposure to an ideology may influence the attitudes and behaviors of individuals, whether they agree with it or not. By treating – and manipulating – nationalism as a norm in this research, new tools will be available for political psychologists and others interested in understanding the reach of political trends.

The impact of nationalism as a norm may be uniquely enlightened by further empirical examination through the lens of social psychology, and in light of the long history of research on the many ways individuals are impacted by their social context. In this dissertation, the ways that psychologists have traditionally studied questions related to both social influence and nationalism were re-examined, asking whether these frameworks are sufficient to understand modern manifestations of nationalism, and how reconceptualizing nationalism as a norm may facilitate a new layer of understanding about its impact.

Limitations and Future Work

There are some empirical puzzles in this research that should be addressed in future work as well. First, the correlation between nationalism and patriotism was very strong (i.e., $r=.786$ in Study 2). Prior research has consistently shown these constructs to be significantly correlated but far more weakly (i.e., $r=.281$ in Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), so there may be features of this particular time in history that has made them more overlapping constructs. This was an unanticipated discovery that also demanded an

analytical approach which made it challenging to directly examine the differential influences of nationalism and patriotism, as initially planned. Although this meaningfully limits the strength of claims that can be directly made about the relationship of these two constructs, it is instructive that they behaved similarly on some measures (i.e., both predictive of higher CSE) but on other measures they behaved differently (i.e., nationalism predicted transnational issue derogation more strongly than patriotism). Further research should further explore the unique and changing psychological characteristics of nationalism and patriotism over time, as well as examine their relationships to a wider variety of attitudes and beliefs to better understand areas of overlap and divergence.

Another consideration worth reinforcing is the difference between how nationalism (and, to a lesser degree, patriotism) are defined and measured using current tools. There are numerous definitions of nationalism used in the psychological literature. All – to varying degrees - contain the core tenets of absolute sovereignty of one's own country and its superiority over others. In this research, efforts were made to adopt that core consistency as a definition rather than redefine the construct altogether (or adopt a limited existing definition). However, one unfortunate outcome of that approach is that there are differences between the conceptual use of nationalism in these studies and the specific items used to measure it. The same can be said of patriotism. One clear finding in this research is that the conceptualization of these terms differs far more than measurement tools capture, given the consistently very high correlations between them (i.e., $r=.786$ in Study 2). The discipline may therefore benefit from either a rigorous review of the nationalism literature that offers new definitions that align with both existing empirical findings and measurement tools.

Alternately, perhaps it is a new measurement tool that is needed. Of the two most common nationalism and patriotism scales (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas et al.,

2006), this research adopted the one that is both more modern and more theoretically robust. However, it is itself becoming dated. It was also developed for use in the Israeli context and may not be as adaptable to other cultures as it needs to be for research that is generalizable. Perhaps a universal scale of nationalism that directly (rather than indirectly, as the current scales do) measures the specific aspects of the ideology which differentiate it from others can also be developed to further research into this space.

Even though CSE still functioned in the mediation model for nationalism better than patriotism, perhaps there is another construct besides CSE that would better distinguish the differential impact of nationalism's normalization as a function of personal ideology. For example, if transnational issue derogation is indeed a form of worldview threat, it may be instructive for future research to examine whether normalization of nationalism makes those high in nationalism – but not those high in patriotism – more sensitive to threats to their ideology or their identity as Americans, and how this threat sensitivity influences downstream attitudinal or behavioral change. A simple approach to this may be to measure CSE after the proposed threat of transnational issues instead of (or in addition to) measuring it before as an assessment of perceived threat, and perhaps seeking other variables that may also moderate the relationship between ideology and issue derogation but that also distinguish between nationalism and patriotism more cleanly.

There are also some limitations to what can be concluded from this research. From the design of these studies it cannot be known if those high in nationalism assumed their ideology was normative and saw collective self-esteem as Americans *decrease* in the non-normative condition, or if it was in fact an *increase* in response to unexpected normativity (as it is conceptually treated in this report). The fact that CSE increased for both those high in nationalism and those high in patriotism after nationalism was normalized argues for the

latter, but it is ultimately an empirical question that can and should be tested directly.

Motivationally, if those high in nationalism saw CSE decrease when shown that their beliefs were not normative it may be another way to indicate that they are indeed operating in response to a perceived threat. However, if those high in nationalism actually saw *increased* CSE when shown that their beliefs were normative then they may be operating in response to a sense of perceived power or greater efficacy to enact ideologically inspired changes.

Conceptually, the influence of nationalism as a norm would also be strengthened by an examination of non-Americans. Although most countries have specific points of pride that those high in nationalism could be driven by – be they military, cultural, historic, etc. – the United States is unique in its idea of historic exceptionalism (Uhlmann, 2012; Walt, 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, this country has been considered a hegemon with true global dominance economically, culturally, and militarily. Hegemonic dominance, by definition, extends over not just any other individual country but over any plausible alliance of countries (Mearsheimer & Alterman, 2001). Thus, Americans may have more justification than others for reasoning that their country can, perhaps, solve most things without assistance, even in the face of explicit instruction that with certain issues this was *not* actually possible. Examining the role of nationalism in countries with different national mythologies (and realities) will be an important step to understanding the strength and universality of its impact on people.

Finally, it is far easier to report attitudes that privilege an ideological worldview over self-interest or security than it is to commit to behaviors that do the same. Although this research provides tantalizing hints at the actions those high in nationalism may take in denial of transnational issues, it would be strengthened by future work observing actual behavioral outcomes. The type of issues that those high in nationalism tend to derogate –

transnational challenges requiring global cooperation – are crucial to survival and their denial by large (and growing) segments of the population puts all at risk. A better understanding of the complex mechanics and motivations that underlie this tendency is therefore critical to determining how such denial and derogation can be mitigated.

Conclusion

“If we think about Covid, it was almost the perfect enemy. It was inanimate, so...you didn’t have to have any sympathy for Covid, so it was like aliens in a movie – the *entire world could righteously unite to fight that*. So we have this threat that could and should have united us extraordinarily well... *And then when Covid-19 arrived, what did we do globally? We acted as individual nations...* And no organization at that level has the resources or the ability to effectively fight a pandemic by itself. *It has to be a united effort. It actually has to be a globally united effort*. So my point is that our vulnerability to Covid-19 was self-induced. Covid-19...was eminently defeatable. So we should say, “*We failed as a system, and that should worry us. Because another threat will arise and the system has already proven its limitation. So we’d better look at that system.*” [emphasis added]
~ General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal, Commander of International Security Forces in Afghanistan (2021)

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic provides a useful microcosm to observe the phenomena explored in this research: that normalization of an ideology one identifies with can motivate irrational denial of crucial problems that are perceived as a threat to that ideology. As of January 2022, 66.5 million Americans have fallen ill and 851,000 have died in the Covid-19 pandemic that shuttered the world in March 2020⁴. The scale of the personal, social, and economic consequences of this catastrophe are both tremendous and obvious...to most. From the beginning, a significant percentage of the population have preferred an ever-evolving narrative denying the reality of the crisis - first minimizing the severity of the virus, then challenging the utility of intervention efforts, and finally creating conspiracy theories about vaccines. Those in denial of Covid demonstrate humans’ profound

⁴ Note that this number increased by 11 million illnesses and more than 125,000 deaths in just the last 2 months of writing this dissertation.

ability to shape and reshape their narrative of reality to protect a worldview in the face of inconvenient truth. They also reveal the severity of its consequence. Although Covid denialism arose in response to a specific crisis, worldviews like nationalism may encourage similar responses to even bigger issues.

The goal of this dissertation was twofold: first, to explore the operation of nationalism as a norm and second, to examine mechanisms for the motivated derogation of critical issues. Although the findings were complex, they did illustrate that ideologies may at times function as norms and that there is something unique about nationalism (relative to patriotism) that influences the way transnational issues are considered. The study of nationalism is enriched by considering the influence of exposure to its ideas, not just individual differences among those who are drawn to the ideology themselves. As with any other system of belief, repeated exposure to certain ideas is likely to influence the individual being exposed. As nationalism spreads globally understanding its influence becomes increasingly useful.

Relatedly, there are numerous motivations for issue derogation that are already explored in the literature including worldview threat (Major et al., 2007) and solution aversion (Campbell & Kay, 2014). However, considering the fact that many of the issues being denied can have significant consequences, the more they are understood the better. In this case, considering a motivated denial of issues that may be perceived as threatening to one's worldview as a unique case may support efforts to mitigate that tendency in support of global cooperation and the implementation of real solutions.

The balance of global survival is far more delicate than many prefer to think about. Whether considered through the influence of a spreading ideology or the motivations that underlie resistance to solving life-threatening issues, big solutions are needed – and soon.

According to the United Nations, there are less than 9 years to prevent catastrophic changes to the climate that will harm human life (United Nations, 2019). NASA no longer even lists “prevention” on its climate change site, focusing only on “mitigation” of the harm and “adaptation” to the new reality (NASA, 2021). Time is short, but it is hoped that this research – and many other efforts to understand how nationalism stands as a barrier to addressing world problems – can provide one tiny brick to build towards a plan before that time runs out.

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Appendix A

Glorification and Attachment Scale (Roccas et al., 2006)

1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree

Glorification

1. Other nations can learn a lot from the United States.
2. One of the most important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.
3. Relative to other nations, the United States is very moral.
4. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the United States.
5. The United States is better than other nations in all respects.
6. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Attachment

1. I love the United States.
2. Being an American is an important part of my identity.
3. It is important to me to contribute to my nation.
4. I am strongly committed to the United States.
5. It is important to me that everyone sees me as an American.
6. When I talk about Americans, I usually say “we” rather than “they.”

Appendix B

Collective Self Esteem Scale (Luthanen & Crocker, 1992)

1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree

Membership

1. I am a worthy citizen of the United States.
2. I don't feel I have much to offer the United States as a citizen. [R]
3. I am a cooperative participant in the American community.
4. I often feel that I am useless to other Americans. [R]

Private Self-Regard

1. I often regret that I'm American. [R]
2. In general, I am glad to be American.
3. Overall, I often feel that being American is not worthwhile. [R]
4. I feel good about being American.

Public Self-Regard

1. Overall, Americans are considered good by others.
2. Most people consider Americans, on average, to be more ineffective than others. [R]
3. In general, others respect Americans.
4. In general, others think Americans are less worthy. [R]

Identification

1. Overall, being American has very little to do with how I see myself. [R]
2. Other Americans are an important reflection of who I am.
3. Other Americans are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. [R]
4. Being American is an important part of my self-image.

Appendix C

Transnational and Domestic Issues from Study 2

Artificial Intelligence (145 words, 11 lines)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is intelligence exhibited by machines that can perform “human” behaviors such as decision-making and learning. Today, AI is widely used in a variety of industries and is expected to spread rapidly through the consumer market as well, especially in advanced economies like the United States. However, there is grave concern that the growth of artificial intelligence will have serious consequences. In the near-term, AI may eliminate entire job categories, drastically reducing employment opportunities throughout the world and disproportionately impacting low wage workers who have few alternatives. Regulation is a global challenge – it is absolutely impossible in the modern economy for advances in one country to be contained in that country. In order to protect American jobs, stability, and competitiveness, it is crucial that American leadership collaborate with a global alliance to establish and enforce regulations on the research and deployment of AI.

Genetic Engineering (143 words, 11 lines)

Genetic Engineering is defined as artificial modification of an organism’s genetic code. Genetic engineering has countless benefits – e.g., dwarf wheat has been genetically engineered to be more resilient to weather, pests, and industrial harvesting, dramatically increasing yield per acre. It is credited with saving 1 billion lives from starvation globally. Similar products now dominate the agriculture industry worldwide. Despite its widespread use, the health risks associated with genetic engineering are unknown. Scientists have shown in other areas that modified DNA can cause unexpected mutations that may increase cancer risk and can even be passed on to future generations. Agricultural trade is a global necessity. Even the United States, with its vast farmland, would be unable to feed itself without global trade. Since no single country can regulate the activities of others, all countries must collaborate on research and regulation to protect their citizens.

Ocean Pollution (153 words, 11 lines)

Ocean pollution is the introduction of industrial, agricultural, or residential waste and other contaminants that are not naturally found in the ocean’s ecosystem. Around the world, approximately 90% of human waste and 70% of industrial waste is released directly into the ocean without treatment. Such pollutants are then eaten by organisms in the water and introduced into the global food chain, causing serious health problems in humans such as cancer and risking the stability of numerous multi-billion dollar industries that rely on marine products. 95% of ocean volume is considered “international waters” and is not under the jurisdiction of any government. Therefore, no single country has the ability to manage or minimize the harm to its citizens from ocean pollution. Scientists are optimistic that ocean health can be recovered in the coming decades but it will require decisive, collaborative action from *all* of the highest-polluting countries including the US to reverse the damage.

Nuclear Regulation (163 words, 12 lines)

Nuclear regulations are agreements that ensure public health, safety, common defense, security, and environmental protection in the use of nuclear materials. Nuclear energy is used throughout the globe for research, electricity, and weapons. Nuclear materials can be deadly to humans for millions of years and are aggressively sought by countries and criminals with malicious intent. A small amount of loose material, easily smuggled across state lines, can cause catastrophic harm. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the governing body for nuclear regulation, but it has limited power to enforce agreements. Its success depends entirely on sincere cooperation among member states. Many countries have their own nuclear regulatory agencies as well, often with conflicting rules and inconsistent commitments to enforcement. The current system is far too disconnected, risking the health and safety of citizens of every country, including Americans. Improvement requires the cooperation of every nuclear country, committing to sacrifices and responsibilities that may not be their individual preference but serve the global good.

Space Use Regulation (181 words, 12 lines)

Space Use Regulations are agreements about activities that can be pursued in space. The Outer Space Treaty is the primary global regulatory agreement, signed by 110 countries including the United States. It is a loose pact written in 1967 when space was much harder to access. Today, technology is far beyond what could have been imagined at the time and many countries and companies are using space in new ways. Some countries have even taken steps to formally militarize space – with the US establishing a new branch of the military for that purpose. The rise in commercial space travel has further contributed to a huge increase in space activity. Unregulated use of space could have horrifying consequences if, for example, a space vehicle crashed into a major American city or if satellite-based weapons could target anyone, anytime, anywhere on the globe. Regulations in any one country would have no real impact on this global challenge. Any effective change will require *all* space-capable countries to commit to limits on their activities and accountability to ensure that people around the globe are safe.

Deforestation (167 words, 12 lines)

Deforestation is the reduction in acreage or biodiversity in forest ecosystems. Forests cover 31% of the world's landmass and are crucial to managing climate change and ensuring sustainable food production. Deforestation is a major contributor to increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, drought, desertification, and severe erosion. Forests are also home to ~80% of land-based plants and animals and 90% of humans living in extreme poverty depend on forests for their daily survival – but only 18% of global forests are currently protected. The biggest driver of deforestation is unsustainable agricultural practices that support a global trade network characterized by waste and inefficiency. The consequences of deforestation will impact citizens in every country on Earth. Even the United States is vulnerable to disruption in global food distribution and the impacts of climate change. This is a fixable problem, but it will require the collaborative efforts of all major economies to restructure global supply and demand patterns. No changes made by any single country will have the impact needed.

Human trafficking (167 words, 12 lines)

Human trafficking is the recruitment, transport, or imprisonment of persons for sex slavery, organ harvest, or unpaid labor. Every day in every country, humans are kidnapped, tricked, or purchased to be bought, sold, traded, and horrifically abused as if they were nothing but raw industrial material. There are 20-40 million slaves worldwide – more than any other point in history – and only .04% are rescued. Sex trafficking alone is a \$100 billion global industry. Many victims come from extreme poverty and are lured by work opportunities. Some are sold by families desperate for survival. There are 50,000 people trafficked in the United States every year, half of them child sex slaves. These criminal networks are well funded by powerful people and have been operating deep in the shadows for generations. Dismantling them is possible, but requires dedicated cooperation between global law enforcement and intelligence agencies. No country can solve this crisis alone, even within its own borders. Real progress demands real global unity in defense of human welfare.

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Mass Incarceration (191 words, 12 lines)

Mass incarceration is the dramatic increase in people imprisoned in the United States since 1980. The US is responsible for 22% of the world's prisoners despite having only 5% of its population. More than 1 in every 100 Americans is currently imprisoned, but 60% have not been convicted of any crime and are in pretrial detention because they can't afford bail. 75% of these are misdemeanors that would not result in prison time even if convicted. The slow pace of the courts means that teenagers with a joint and mothers who wrote a bad check are often jailed for years – losing homes, jobs, custody, and creating cycles of tragedy many never recover from. This disaster started with efforts to reduce violent crime that overreached, creating acceptance of long prison time for minor offenses. This has never been the role of prisons, anywhere in the world. This human rights crisis is perpetrated with American tax dollars that political leaders and fully capable of ending it. In 2021, Illinois was the first state to eliminate pretrial detention entirely. Politicians in Washington must take notice, as millions of American lives unjustly rot away.

Political extremism (173 words, 11 lines)

Political extremism is defined as rigid beliefs that are far outside of mainstream ideology, not aligned with social norms, and intolerant of those who disagree. Democracies like the United States rely on shared national values and compromise to survive, but extremists are more likely to commit violence and even sacrifice their lives to defend ideals than work with those who disagree. The US has witnessed a dangerous rise in political extremism on both the left and right. In the last decade, there was an extremist attack in every single state. The rate of violence is increasing, with < 5 attacks per year from 2007-2011 and > 30 each year since 2017, culminating in an attempted insurrection against the US government. This is a uniquely difficult problem, as extremists are more loyal to their ideology than reality and by definition know that most people disagree with them so they are used to resisting reason. American political leaders must unite to publicly and loudly denounce these beliefs and inspire a return to statesmanship and community.

Infrastructure (164 words, 12 lines)

Infrastructure refers to the basic physical requirements for a functioning society including roads, bridges, sewage and transit systems, communication networks, and electrical grids. One of the most important responsibilities of government is to build and maintain critical infrastructure so that citizens and businesses can operate. Infrastructure is a shared resource funded with tax dollars, but is often neglected in favor of more politically potent projects. Independent watchdogs describe the infrastructure of the United States as “dangerously overstretched” and under-funded by more than \$2 trillion. Many crucial systems will become unsafe or unusable by 2025. 20th century infrastructure spending is widely credited for the dominant economy that the US has enjoyed since, but outdated systems now cost the US billions of dollars a year in lost economic performance and deteriorating public health. The longer infrastructure is ignored, the more expensive the solution will be. This crisis is fixable. It is urgent that politicians in Washington pass a bipartisan infrastructure spending bill as soon as possible.

Education deserts (159 words, 11 lines)

Education deserts are rural areas of the United States where students may live 60 minutes or more from the closest school. More than 9.5 million students live in education deserts, more than the largest 85 school districts combined. Because of their isolation, these schools also tend to be under-resourced – with teachers who are not expert in their subjects, outdated books, and crumbling buildings. Students at these schools are far less likely to continue their education, with a mere 19% eventually completing a college degree. The result is that different worlds being created within one nation over generations. Education improves career prospects of course, but also well-being, health, longevity, and mobility...among many other positive life outcomes that people raised closer to cities take for granted. Education deserts are an American tragedy, excluding too many citizens from opportunity. There is no reason that a country like the United States cannot provide outstanding education to every student who wants it. It is past time for US leaders to start treating rural and urban students’ lives with equal urgency.

Food deserts (164 words, 11 lines)

A food desert is an area with limited or no access to affordable fresh, nutritious food. Food deserts are most common in low-income urban areas and isolated small towns in the American west, leaving more than 25 million citizens without access to fresh meats and vegetables. People in food deserts have to rely fast food or other processed options with unhealthy levels of fat and sodium and often suffer from obesity and other health problems as a result. This can cripple already marginalized families for generations. Because these areas are hard to serve logistically and are populated by people with less disposable income and limited mobility, grocery companies have no financial incentive to open stores in these areas. There are many ways that the state and national governments can fix this situation, by investing in publically supported stores or subsidizing private companies who do so. It is past time that they do. Without intervention, these Americans will continue to fall further and further behind.

Paid family leave (177 words, 12 lines)

Paid family leave allows employees to take paid time off work to care for a sick family member or a new child. All industrialized nations except the United States require companies to offer paid family leave. The US only requires a short period of *unpaid* leave – creating heartbreaking decisions for middle class Americans between bonding with their infants, or sharing their own parents’ final days, and being able to afford feeding them. Despite strong public support for paid family leave, political leaders continue to bow to the demands of businesses that do not want to shoulder the cost. However, the government could easily cover the bill as paid family leave has been shown to reduce federal unemployment expenses dramatically. This is especially impactful for women who are often expected to prioritize family needs, limiting their own financial stability and creating a cascade of related social and economic problems. It is past time for US leaders to stand up to companies that want to buy their support in order to protect the values and livelihoods of their constituents.

Protection of public lands (184 words, 12 lines)

Public land is any land managed by the government, including national parks and monuments. In the United States, there are over 600 million acres of public land tended with tax dollars for the benefit of generations. Public land is a crucial resource for education, recreation, connection to historic national achievements, and inspiration. It also supports clean air and water, and protect healthy ecosystems to ensure the availability of critical natural resources for decades to come. It is imperative that public lands be protected as pristine open spaces. Leaders that argue for the commodification of these lands by selling drilling rights to private enterprise are tragically short-sighted. These companies have more access to resources held on private land than they can use so their continued revenue growth is already secure. Political leaders have a responsibility to prioritize the needs of future generations rather than cave to the salivating greed of lobbyists who believe that more is never enough. Protecting public land should not be a political issue but an historic honor. Leaders can take a stand today and end the battle over this American legacy.

Appendix D

Issue Derogation Scale

1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree

Collaboration Required

1. American can resolve [issue] without the help of other countries.

Issue Derogation

1. I believe [issue] is a serious problem.
2. It is essential to resolve [issue].
3. I am very concerned about the consequences of [issue].
4. The consequences of [issue] will impact people like me.
5. American leaders should do whatever it takes to resolve [issue].
6. Resolving [issue] is worth investing American resources.

Appendix E

General Collaboration Scale

1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree

1. Partnering with other countries on global issues makes the United States stronger.
2. The United States has a responsibility to help solve global issues.
3. There are important issues in the world that the United States cannot solve alone.
4. I would support a politician who promises to partner with other countries on global issues.
5. I would not trust a politician who wants to partner with other countries on global issues.
[R]
6. American politicians should only work on problems the United States can solve by itself.
[R]
7. I question if global issues that the United States cannot solve alone really matter. [R]
8. Global problems will not impact Americans much. [R]
9. Americans are impacted by issues that the United States cannot solve alone.