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The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe

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Abstract

Acknowledgments

Dedicated to my grandfather who taught me to love politics and the art of argument. A special thank you to my capstone advisor Professor Irepoglu Carreras and to my friends and family who have supported me every step of the way.

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2. INTRODUCTION: POPULISM AS A MODERN PHENOMENON

The year 2016 was important for scholars because of what it represented for the established political class. It brought the election of Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential elections in the United States against Democratic establishment favorite Hillary Clinton. Upsetting the majority of presidential polling and news coverage, the presidential elections challenged the status quo of American politics. In the United Kingdom June 2016, the referendum to leave the European Union passed with a slim majority of 51.9% sending a political shockwave across the European continent (Gov.UK 2016). A mobilization of voters against the established class brought forth important questions for political scientists. What happened and who happened?

Populism became an important point of reference and the basis of explanation for the unforeseen outcomes of these democratic processes. In order to answer what happened, many researchers hypothesized that the growth of populism was due to several important reasons, including but not limited to the magnification of globalization, inequality, and nativism throughout the world. But despite these arguments, populism itself is a latent concept of the political process which requires populist leaders to initiate populist sentiment in voters. In other words, political challenges are not enough to inspire populism in voters but also require charismatic leaders who make these unattended issues salient and promise to answer those issues when in office. This comes to the second question this research attempts to answer, who happened? Cas Mudde, an expert on populism describes the need for a catalyst for populist sentiment such as a charismatic leader or party who could successfully mobilize the electorate to support their program (Mudde 2017). Leaders such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage in the UK, and Marine Le Pen in France represent populist leaders who have successfully invigorated

political action by members of the public to act against the interests of the establishment. It is essential to answer these important questions in order to produce a rational answer to the question of populism.

This research attempts to analyze the phenomenon of populism and to seek out the manifestations and motivating factors of it in France, Germany, Spain, and Greece. Furthermore, it attempts to show that populism could be seen as a strategy and as an ideology with important similarities. More specifically, this research attempts to show that these ideologies and strategies are utilized by both left and right leaning populist parties with applicability to other populist parties around the world. This research contains six chapters with the first chapter as an introduction to my research. The second chapter titled, "Populism as a Strategy and Ideology: Conceptualization" explicates the accepted definition of populism and examining the phenomenon as both a strategy and as an ideology. The Third chapter titled, "Research and Method Design" will describe my strategy for answering my hypothesis and explains my use of tables. The fourth chapter will go into depth into my examples of four populist parties and how populism manifests itself as both a strategy and as an ideology in those parties. In the fifth chapter, I will compare and contrast my examples and explicate the left and right tendencies of the parties. The sixth chapter will conclude my research and explore further avenues of research.

3. POPULISM AS A STRATEGY AND IDEOLOGY: CONCEPTUALIZATION

Populism is not a new phenomenon which scholars of political science have attempted to define and recognize in the political processes of numerous countries throughout the world. Analyses by researchers have concluded a definition that is either too broad or too specific of a

definition. But in his book entitled *Populism A Very Short Introduction,* Cas Mudde defines populism as:

> a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2017).

This definition has been used by several scholars of populism and provides a clear framework from which we can identify populist parties and populist leaders. Mudde's definition of populism centers around the notion that "the people" and not "the corrupt elite" should take control of the national agenda, but scholars are left to answer how do populists define both the people and the elite? Furthermore, what is the general will and how do populists utilize the notion of the "general will" to their advantage? Other scholars of populism build upon the definition created by Mudde with a focus on a more ideational approach. Kirk A. Hawkins defines populism as, "a moral discourse that not only exalts popular sovereignty but understands the political field as a cosmic struggle between "the people" and "the elite" (Hawkins et al 2019). Like Mudde, Hawkins focuses on this struggle between two opposing political bodies but says little about the strategies which populists aim to utilize to gain electoral success. This research aims to look at populism as both an ideology and as a strategy and identify these factors in modern European populist parties.

Populism as an ideology contains similar political and moral values which are shared between the various Western European populist parties to varying degrees of saliency. Populism as an ideology attempts to identify similar political and moral values which are shared between populist leaders and their supporters. These ideologies aim to juxtapose the values held by mainstream political parties in an attempt to create a newly defined political force which caters

to the needs of an unrepresented populace. Professor Lawrence Broz describes this phenomenon as, "a rejection of existing political institutions, political parties, and politicians". There are four ideological values which have been identified including Euroscepticism, anti-Immigration, economic reform, and nationalistic appeals (Silva et al 2018).

The first ideology this research attempts to analyze is the ideology of Euroscepticism or anti-EU sentiment. Euroscepticism can be defined as a distrust of the European Union as an institution and questions whether or not it could be considered democratic (Brack 2015). This distrust stems from the lack of the democracy of the institutions of the EU and the implementation of policies which may be harmful for member states. Second, the ideology of xenophobia and anti-immigration is another standard ideology of populist party and is similar to cultural protectionism and nativism which prioritizes the interests of citizens over the interests of immigrants. This prioritization could be in the form of economic assistance or cultural heritage. Populist parties who favor more strict migration policies usually are motivated by the want to protect native workers, national culture, or cite the danger migration brings due to terrorism. The third ideology which populist parties share is a call for economic reform. These economic reforms include a reduction of government restrictions on business, the end to austerity measures, and the expansion of the social welfare system among other reforms. These economic reforms aim to counteract policies from the European Union or implement policies which have not been under establishment governments. Lastly, populist parties share a nationalistic ideology and highlight the importance of national culture. Some populist parties see migration as a threat culture especially the "Islamification" of European society.

The formation of these populist ideologies did not come from random evolutions in the political process. Instead, these ideologies have been carefully developed by multiple populist

leaders who attempt to make issues such as cultural heritage, national sovereignty, and economic equity a primary focus in political discourse. Today's populist leaders such as Alexander Gauland of the Alternative für Deutschland party and Marine Le Pen of the National Rally have espoused these ideologies and have curried favor citizens of the European Union who have known full well the consequences of a globalizing world and the degradation of local representation at the state level. In the AfD's manifesto, they cite the creation of a political elite which acts against the interests of European citizens (AfD Manifesto 2017).

Populist strategies are not only used by the likes of Alexis Tsipras, part leader of the populist party SYRIZA, but are utilized by politicians on a regular basis to curry favor with voters. Nevertheless, these strategies are commonly found to be used by populist leaders who attempt to invigorate popular sentiment in face of the establishment or the elite (Mudde 2017). These strategies are utilized in the populist parties of the AfD, National Rally, SYRIZA, and Podemos to varying degrees of saliency and success.

There are four different strategies which have been identified which are similar between populist parties. First, the use of anti-establishment rhetoric is a motif between populist parties. By calling the establishment's ability to lead and paint them as a corrupt group, populist parties are seen as fighting for "the people" and promise an end to this corruption. By separating the electorate into two rival groups, populist parties aim to polarize their supporters while creating a target for disdain (Mudde 2019). This anger is used as a call to action and is implemented in varying degrees between the different cases. Third, some populist parties utilize an extra-parliamentary opposition strategy which allows them to influence the government's agenda while not in government. Minority parties such as the National Rally and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) attempt to shape the agenda despite not having the majority of seats in

parliament. This could also be seen in the early days of the Podemos party which began as a Spanish left-wing social movement and not an official party group. Lastly, the use of the "general will" of the people is a similar strategy between these populist parties. By utilizing the "general will" of the people as the motive for their actions, populist parties are able to argue that they are fighting for what the people want. Nevertheless, the general will of the people could be difficult to find and could be loosely interpreted by populist parties. Mudde writes, "By employing the notion of the general will, many populists share the Rousseauian critique of representative government and [prefer] direct democracy" (Mudde 2019).

These variables are similar strategies which populist parties attempt to utilize for electoral success and implement them in varying degrees of effectiveness. For example, extra-parliamentary opposition is more salient in populist parties such as the AfD who do not have a major number of representatives in the German Bundestag or European parliament as opposed to the Podemos party who is poised to join a government coalition with the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party as of April 2019 (Guardian 2019).

4.   RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

This research attempts to analyze the ways in which populism could be seen as both a strategy and as an ideology. Furthermore, how do these strategies and ideologies manifest themselves in the populist parties of France, Germany, Greece, and Spain? This research attempts to show that not only are there similarities between the strategies and ideologies between European populist parties such as the National Rally, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Podemos, and SYRIZA, but that they are applicable to other populist parties around the world.

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This research identifies the different strategies and ideologies these populist parties utilize while at the same time analyzing to what degree they implement them. By analyzing populism as both a strategy and as an ideology, we begin to precise the definition of populism and correctly distinguish between populist actors and nationalistic ones. Each country in the table is assigned a high, medium, or low identifier to represent the utilization of these strategies and ideologies between each populist party. This shows to what degree these populist parties utilize these variables and how these variables change between cases in relation to various factors such as global crisis, Euroscepticism, globalization, and political polarization.

A specific table will be utilized after each chapter which analyzes the strategy of each party to assign the high, medium, or low identifiers of both their strategies and ideologies. A high categorization would be given when the party or party leaders emphasize this ideology and strategy both in their rhetoric and in their party manifesto. High categorizations will also be given when the ideology or strategy has been used and continues to be used in their party platform. Low categorizations will be given when there is little to no evidence of the ideology or strategy used by the party or party leaders. Medium categorizations are given when the strategy or ideology could only be found in either party leader's rhetoric or because it has become a new development in their party platform. A full table will be utilized in chapter 4db to culminate the identifiers for all the European populist parties examined in this research.

This research also utilizes qualitative secondary data to create a substantial analysis and comparison of the populist parties. The development of populist parties in Europe includes modern phenomena which requires the use of secondary data such as polling, political developments, and rhetoric from party leaders.

Table 1

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
National Rally								
AfD								
Podemos								
SYRIZA								

5. CASES

In this research the specific countries and parties which were chosen attempts to gain a wide enough sample group which represents both the left and right spectrum of populism. Despite sharing similar strategies and ideologies between these populist parties, the implementation of these variables varies from case to case. In this research, France's National Rally and Germany's Alternative Für Deutschland serve as the far-right leaning examples while Greece's SYRIZA party and Spain's Podemos party serve as the far-left leaning examples. By choosing these specific cases, it can be easier to analyze the relationship between far-right and far-left parties, especially how the rise or descent of popularity between the two variables affect one another. All

four examples have had similar external factors which may have served as a catalyst for their popularity such as The Euro Debt Crisis, the European Migration Crisis, and the rise of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, how have these parties responded to these events and used them to their advantage when seeking to gain power in government? These factors become important when considering how populist leaders come to power and the effects of global developments have on populist parties.

6A. FRANCE AND THE NATIONAL RALLY PARTY

Established in 1972, the National Rally Party, then called the National Front for French Unity (Rassemblement National or RN), was founded by politician and French presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen as an anti-European Union, far-right traditionalist party which focused on issues such as immigration and unemployment. Jean-Marie Le Pen was chosen to lead the National Front as its first party president. During the 1980's the National Front was able to gain traction in French politics due to the move towards the center by other major political parties (Mudde 2017). The National Front acted as an anti-establishment party that opposed the socialist elites who opposed the majority party and En Marche. During the 1983 municipal elections, the National Front was able to establish itself as a respective party and its ploy to gain media attention boosted their efforts. Due to their work in the 1983 elections, the European elections that were held in 1984 brought some electoral success when the National Front won 10 seats in the European Parliament (Election Resources 1984). After this exponential growth, the National Rally decided that in order to continue its increase in recognition and legitimacy it had to create a new brand of politics. The National Rally established itself as a far-right party with xenophobic

and nationalist policies which created a unique platform that juxtaposed the politics of the left. The crackdown on loose immigration policies and their calls for the end of hiring foreigners for French jobs allowed the National Front to distance themselves from other center-right parties (Hawkins et al 2019).

The National Front continued its crusade into French politics with Jean-Marie Le Pen's bid for the French presidency in 1988. Utilizing the success of his party, Jean-Marie Le Pen ran on the same nationalist policies with a call on ordinary Frenchmen to protect traditional values, allowing him to capture close to 15% of the vote (Election Resources 1988). Anti-Islamic tendencies along with the growth of Islamophobia in the French political discourse had risen only after the bombing of a United States embassy in Beirut and multiple bombings in Paris by Islamic terrorists had caused a total of 20 deaths. In response, the National Front was quick to connect its hardline immigration policies as well as the need to protect French citizens from terrorist attacks. The National Front continued its growth up until 2011 expanding into both the European Parliament and French regional elections.

In 2010 Jean-Marie Le Pen stepped down as the president of the National Front party and made way for his daughter to take the reins of leadership in 2011 after being voted as party president with his support. Marine Le Pen, a former attorney and public defender symbolized a transformation from the far-right politics of her father to a political party with a wider appeal across the political spectrum. Seen as more moderate than her father, she attempted to move away from such antagonistic stances on nationality and Islam, to a party of legitimacy which would be able to grow beyond the limits of a fringe party. Despite her reforms, the importance of French nationalism and the attacks on Islam continued under her leadership. In her speech during her run for party president, she intended to create a "big popular party that addresses itself not only to the

electorate on the right but to all the French people" (BBC 2017). Through her leadership, the National Front attempted to distance itself from xenophobic attitudes while also maintaining its nationalist appeals. Rather than moderating the positions of the National Front, Marine Le Pen sought out to legitimize the party platform by appeals to a broader base of voters and an attempt to moderate the rhetoric once explicated by her father. In 2018, the members of the party voted to rename their party as the, "National Rally" in order to disassociate itself from its racist and anti-Semitic tendencies of the past (Lagrange 2018). This reconstruction of the National Rally went as far as expelling Jean-Marie Le Pen from speaking on behalf of the party due to his racist remarks in 2015 as a way of moving away from the xenophobic and racist remarks that were the highlight of Jean-Marie's rhetoric (France 24 2018).

In the regional elections in 2011, the National Front was able to capture 15% of the vote. However, despite its large growth in votes, the National Front was only able to capture 2 regional seats thanks to the French two round electoral system. Despite its low electoral success in regional elections, in 2014 the National Front gained 25 seats within the European Parliament and 2 seats within the French Senate, the largest since its foundation. With her growth in popularity Marine Le Pen decided to run in the 2017 presidential elections making it into the second round receiving 7.7 million votes compared to Macron's 8.6 million votes. Le Pen was ultimately defeated by President Emmanuel Macron who captured twice as many votes as Le Pen in the second round. (Gouvernment.fr). Despite her loss in the elections, Marine Le Pen established herself as a formidable stateswoman and her attempts to legitimize her party continued with the renaming of the National Front to the National Rally in 2018 at an attempt to appeal to a larger base of voters in order to compete with the likes of Emmanuel Macron's party En Marche (Deutsche Welle 2018).

Despite its moderation in tone and strategy, the Nationally Rally maintains its populist style of leadership and appeals. The National Rally aims to juxtapose the centrist party En Marche led by French president Emmanuel Macron with its accusations of the establishment selling out their country and people to the EU and only serving the Cosmopolitan elite (Mudde 2017). These accusations serve to mobilize support from French citizens who have been hurt by globalization and fear the spread of Islam and immigrants who are seen as a threat to the National Rally and their supporters as a threat to French culture and tradition. In 2018 the National Rally hosted Steve Bannon, a Trumpian populist who praised the party's anti-immigrant and anti-globalization attitudes. In his speech to party leaders Bannon attempted to show his support for their policies stating, "Let them call you racists!" Ideologically, the National Rally holds a strong belief in Euroscepticism, xenophobia, as well as nationalistic appeals established by Jean-Marie Le Pen. Although tampered, these beliefs have continued under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. These values have given rise to the use of anti-establishment rhetoric by its leaders and the division of the 'pure' versus the elite despite gaining much traction in the French Assembly and Senate. The use of racist rhetoric has been called into question especially when used in a democratic institution. Political scientist Robert Dahl's theory of democracy rests upon the notion of the "equal consideration of interests" (Dahl 1989). In other words, Dahl believed that individual's interests should be weighted equally in a democratic institution. It could be argued that the National Rally's use of racist rhetoric is not compatible with democratic thought and could lead to the forming of undemocratic values at the ballot box. It can be assumed that it is the responsibility of leaders to promote democratic values, but the National Rally's impact on the democratic institutions of France due to their reliance on xenophobic and racist rhetoric remains to be seen.

6AA. THE STRATEGY OF THE NATIONAL RALLY PARTY

After the reforms of party leader Marine La Pen, the strategy of the National Rally has taken a moderate shift to the center while reacting to global events such as the migration crisis of 2015. In reaction to these global events, the National Rally and its leaders have appealed to voters by promising ideological alternatives to combat cultural threats and economic shambles led on by government inaction and mass migration.

Anti-establishment sentiment has been a large part of the National Rally's strategy as it attempts to make itself into a credible force in the French political process. This anti-establishment strategy is very successful especially due to the policies of the European Union and the costs it has had on the French economy. In a French poll from Atlantico, "46% of respondents said that European Union members state should share the responsibility for the distribution of migrants in order to take pressure off countries' (Atlantico 2018). The migration crisis is one example of this anti-establishment sentiment which has been created in France. In a 2015 speech to the European Commission, President Juncker called for "bold action" and outlined his ultimate goal stating, "Migration has to be legalized" (Junker 2015). This rhetoric does little to show the concerns of the French people and the insistence of the European Union to not take French interests into account has called its democratic institutions into question. A rise of technocracy and cosmopolitanism has created a political environment which helps populist leaders such as Le Pen who have been more than happy to take advantage of the failures of the establishment (Berger 2019).

The division of the electorate into two groups, "the people" and "the elite", is an important strategy utilized by populists and populist parties (Mudde 2017). In this case, the National Rally

has painted a division within French society. A new division has been created by the National Rally between "the pure" French citizenry and "the corrupt" establishment which have passed policies such as the Green tax which is seen as selling out to the elite. From the creation of the party in 1972, Jean-Marie Le Pen wrote about how the elite has turned its back on French interests accusing them of, "destroying the welfare state to incorporate the immigrants, their alleged new electorate, and call for a welfare state for their "own people" first" (Mudde 2017). He goes on to accuse the "Gang of Four" which represented the four largest parties at the time of "selling out" to the "cosmopolitan elite" (Mudde 2017).

Since July of 2017, the National Rally holds 7 out of the 577 seats in the French National Assembly and 15 out of the 74 seats in the European Parliament (National Assembly 2019). These minor voting blocs make extra-parliamentary opposition by the National Rally an important force for opposition making in both institutions. Despite not holding a majority, the National Rally still has some say in the agenda along with a greater ability to spread their platform to voters. By holding seats within the European Parliament, the National Rally could utilize its rhetoric within the chamber to bring attention to their agenda as opposed to having to spread their agenda from outside these institutions. Being part of European Parliament has allowed members to make speeches and vote on legislation. Marine Le Pen has taken full advantage of this power and in a 2017 speech highlighted "worsening migratory and economic assaults" citing the migration crisis and the reaction made by German leaders such as Angela Merkel (Le Pen 2017).

Many populists and populist parties attempt to lay claim on the "general will" of the people as their purported mandate to rule (Silva 2018). In a 2017 speech to the European Parliament, Marine Le Pen stated that she acted on behalf of a "united Europe" unlike other EU leaders (Le Pen 2017). This rhetoric gives populist leaders such as herself the ability to act on behalf of the

"general will" of the people and their purported malpresentation. By claiming to speak on behalf of European citizens, she connects her actions back to that of one of the most important populist ideals, "the division of the pure and the elite" (Mudde 2017). As a consequence, despite her inflammatory rhetoric and her calls for the protection of French culture and xenophobic immigration policies, she has the supposed mandate to lead by the voters who put her there in the first place. A crucial part of acting on behalf of the general will of the people, is an unmediated contact with the constituency. This direct contact is essential for populist strategy because it allows populist leaders to, "claim moral representation of the people" (Mueller 2016). Marine Le Pen utilizes this strategy of unmediated contact by being active on Twitter. By creating a social device which allows her to "speak directly to the people", she creates a populist image of direct representation and general understanding of what the people want.

In conclusion, the use of anti-establishment rhetoric and the moral claim of the "general will" of the people have been important strategies used by the National Rally and Marine Le Pen. Furthermore, group divisions have been paramount strategic moves utilizes since the creation of the party under the leadership of her father Jean-Marie Le Pen. But, despite some electoral victory in the National Assembly and the European Parliament, the National Rally has not been able to create a sizable opposition in either institution. Nevertheless, the growth of economic and social threats which have become salient due to the rise of far-right populist parties such as the National Rally has created an electorate willing to vote for more extreme groups, especially as the liberal left has failed to keep the interests of the electorate in mind.

6AB. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE NATIONAL RALLY PARTY

The National Rally's ability to utilize effective strategies to compete with parties such as "En Marche", the majority party of Emmanuel Macron, has been crucial for creating and maintaining a viable political opposition party on the right. Political scientist Daniel Stockemer summarized it well when he wrote, "The success of [the National Rally] depends heavily on its capacity to respond to activists' demands for action" (Stockemer 2017). In their platform the National Rally has utilized various strategies such as the use Euroscepticism, xenophobia, economic reforms, and nationalistic appeals.

The National Rally has always promoted Eurosceptic values, seeing the mechanisms and institutions of the European Union as undemocratic. Marine Le Pen utilizes a slogan, "Au nom du peuple" translated to France for the French to justify the leaving of the French state from the European Union taking the surname "Frexit" (Galbreath 2017). Calling for the reformation of the free-trade agreement and the growing powers of the E.U. on the financial independence of member states and the end of the Schengen Agreement which gives European Union citizens free travel between member states (Walt). These mechanisms put in place by Brussels has been seen as a threat by the National Rally who is motivated to protect native jobs and culture as one of the foundations of the party. Eurosceptic leaders such as Nigel Farage of the U.K. Independence Party and Nikolaos Michaloliakos of the Golden Dawn Party are sympathetic to the views of the National Rally (Walt). The rise of technocracy and the suspicion of the EU as an undemocratic and ambiguous supranational institution has also fueled Eurosceptic tendencies in France. Citing the rise of migrants from middle eastern countries and the inflexibility of the Euro, the ability of EU leaders to contain crisis while maintaining a connection with voters has become a challenge.

Fears that democratically elected officials in several member states including, Emmanuel Macron in France, to put French interests above European interests have risen. In an attempt to "make our planet great again" President Macron, "attempted to increase the green tax on fuel as part of a wider economic reform agenda" (Naidoo). In response a political movement entitled "gilets jaunes" or Yellow Vests have taken to the streets to protest such political action which are seen as hurting French labor (Berman 2019). Populist parties such as the National Rally fill the disconnect between parties such as Emmanuel Macron's "La République En Marche!" and voters. By touting nativist policies and Eurosceptic reforms, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally may gain support from disillusioned French voters with their more "French first" policies.

Anti-immigration has also played a large role in the ideology of the Nation Rally party. Tighter borders restrictions, especially between member states have been a motivating factor in the rise of Le Pen's party. Sharing a nativist approach similar to that of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen sees migration as a threat to economic opportunity of French citizens. In their traditional slogan used in the 1970's they write, "A million unemployed is a million immigrants too many! France and the French First" (Stockemer, The 'new' Discourse of the Front National Under Marine Le Pen: A Slight Change with a Big Impact). Today, Marine Le Pen has attempted to cut-back its xenophobic rhetoric in terms of anti-immigration sentiment but has continued to discuss these topics in order to appeal to voters. By moderating its tone on anti-immigration rhetoric, the party leaders of the National Rally attempted to appeal to, "a broad republican framework which tends to be endorsed by quite a large part of the population" (Stockemer). As a right-wing party, the National Rally has high levels of anti-immigration ideological sentiment and it has continued to play an important role in its political platform.

The National Rally has strongly associated itself with nationalistic appeals and has

repeatedly called for the protection of a French society and culture (BBC 2017). Since its conception the National Rally's platform included, "limiting immigration, opposing any economic scheme that could result in the loss of jobs for its original constituency […] and a return to an essential 'French" France…" (Bratten 2005). With the use of the internet and the creation of its own website in 2000, Jean-Marie Le Pen explicated his party stance on the importance of French culture and the government's oppression of French interests. Jean-Marie Le Pen utilized inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric to gain support from the working and middle class. In his writing he explicates his goal, "to protect the sanctity and nationhood of France" and warned that "The Europe, which is being constructed in Brussels, with the complicity of the French political class, is a step on the road towards cosmopolitanism" (Bratten 2005). But despite Jean-Marie Le Pen's ousting from the party in 2015, her daughter continued to utilize nationalistic appeals to gain electoral support for her platform.

Motivated by a different global and political atmosphere, Marine Le Pen faces a nation inundated by Brexit, the migration crisis of 2015, and the European debt crisis of 2010. Furthermore, the rise of the yellow vest protests has fueled establishment discontent and has given her issue saliency especially in terms of economic and social issues such as nationalism and French heritage (Stetler 2019). In a 2013 Party Conference Marine Le Pen continued these national appeals stating, "France must first regain its freedom […] A free France is a France that is sovereign and independent" describing the dangers of letting go of too much control over France's policies to the European Union. (Le Pen 2013). Both Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen have utilized nationalistic appeals to call their supporters to action and symbolize their actions as self-sacrificing and patriotic.

The ideology of the National Rally serves to create a distinct movement on the political

right and has garnered nominal success in elections. In the National Assembly elections of 2017, the National Rally was able to gain 8 seats with 1.59 million votes in the second round of voting (Election Resources 2017). These ideologies have been the culmination of the political discourse by both Jean Marie and Marine Le Pen and has become the party platform today.

Table 2

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
National Rally	High	High	High	High	High	High	Low	High

7B. GERMANY AND THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY PARTY

The Alternative for Germany Party (Alternative für Deutschland or AFD) is a relatively new right-wing populist party with nominal success in political elections. Its populist tint began under Alexander Gauland in 2015 as the party began to espouse its anti-immigrant policies in response to the migration crisis of 2015 (Bundestag 2015). Founded in 2013 the AfD party was established due to the, "bailouts of indebted European Union member states like Greece" (Deutsche Welle 2018). The eventual bailout of Greece was not an unexpected outcome for

European Union leaders. During the integration process, Greek leaders statically manipulated data which kept the growing Greek public debt a secret. (Ruffert 2011). The action of funding a bailout for European Member States who have mismanaged their fiscal responsibilities were seen as an attack on German tax payers who would ultimately foot the bill. AfD utilized this anger to fuel discontent with the ruling parties including the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union alliance. Beginning as an extra-parliamentary party, the AfD has been able to gain seats within the Bundestag lower house of the German legislature. With a total of 709 seats in the Bundestag, the AfD currently holds 91 seats, a sizable opposition to the CDU/CSU majority party (Bundestag 2019). With partial influence on Germany's influence in the European Union, pro-EU leaders, such as Angela Merkel, face mounting opposition from AfD members both within and out of the Bundestag. For example, the AFD party, "…started an aggressive counter-offensive and demanded restrictive border controls and mass deportations" in response to the influx of migrants making their way through Greece and the West Balkans (Georgi 2019). The rise of electoral discontent that fueled anti-nativist policies with government immigration policy and over 1,000 acts of violence against migrants and people of color were inflicted since 2015 (Georgi 2019).

In 2015 a large influx of migrants from African countries have mounted considerable pressures on European leaders to face the challenge of receiving these migrants while at the same time maintaining the autonomy of their borders. Due to war and persecution, a large flow of migrants from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan have made the journey to European countries in hope for asylum. With Germany being the largest receiver of migrants, leaders such as Angela Merkel were forced to rationalize their open border policies that juxtaposed the closed border policies of the AfD. In 2015, Angela Merkel attempted to tackle the challenge head on,

creating a distribution system that would distribute migrants across Europe through her influence in the EU. Since 2008 Germany has received close to 2 million refugees making nationalistic policies of the AfD more attractive (Bertoli 2013). This influx of migrants not only compound economic woes of European countries, but the fear of terrorism has generated larger support for populist parties such as the AfD. In a study on the effectiveness of immigration policy on the reduction of terrorism, it concluded that certain policies could prevent terror attacks including ensuring immigrant rights and the mitigating disenchantment due to lack of income, housing, or access to government social services (Choi 2018). But despite a small correlation between restrictive immigration policies and the reduction of terrorist attacks, AfD has continued to espouse their support for restrictive border control. This anti-immigration push has become one of the major policies for the AfD and has had considerable support by German voters.

Nationalistic and traditional appeals have also been utilized by the AfD, warning of an "Islamification" of German heritage. Part of the AfD platform is a stronghold of traditional Christian values with the mix of migrant influences on Germany's culture.

Alexander Gauland, a former member of Angela Merkel's CDU party for over 40 years, has been the party leader for the "far-right" faction of the AfD. Known for his boisterous rhetoric, he has created a platform to appeal to far-right voters with "outlandish offensive statements" only to then qualify them at a later date (Deutsche Welle 2017). But despite his inflammatory remarks, the rhetoric used holds some value in concentrating general discontent with the pro-European policies which are explicated by EU leaders. Furthermore, Gauland has not shied away from using hateful and racist language against German ministers calling for Aydan Ozogus an integration minister with Turkish origins to be, "Dumped back to Turkey" (Shalal 2017). But despite its aims to create a distinct party on the right, some opponents argue that the policies and

rhetoric of the AfD and its leadership resembles the like of fascism seen in the mid 20th century. The party's nationalistic appeals along with the call to protect traditional German traditions by various party leaders have fueled the tension between the establishment and populist parties such as the AfD. In a 2018 speech to the German Bundestag, Gauland describes the overtaking of German jobs and tradition due to Angela Merkel's open-door policy. He describes the collapse of German prosperity, "not by us, but by providing for immigrants" (Bundestag 2018). Furthermore, he describes the terrorist threat which immigrants pose citing the Christmas market killer Amri who killed over 12 and injured 56 others in a terrorist attack that later sought asylum in Germany.

In a speech to the German Bundestag, Alice Weidel, the leader of the moderate faction of the AfD party, described the mismanagement of the German budget and its large contribution, which amounts to nearly 30 billion euros; to the EU each year. She then went on to describe the flow of illegal migrants who continue to bombard German borders and the inability of German's politicians to halt the spending of "billions of euros into acceptance and alimentation of illegal migrants and into social systems" (Bundestag 2018).

In their manifesto, the AFD begins with the slogan "Courage to stand up for Germany, we are not subjects, but free citizens" (AfD Manifesto 2017). Their fight against the growing powers of the European Union and the preservation of German culture is seen as altruistic by party supporters. In chapter 7 of their manifesto, the AfD describes the importance of "retaining its unique characteristics in the age of globalization and digitalization" (AfD Manifesto 2017). This nationalistic tint juxtaposes the open-door policies of Angela Merkel and the danger of migration has become salient due to the arguments set forth by the AfD. This supposed threat espoused by AfD leaders, "was followed by a policy shift towards tighter control and obligatory cultural

assimilation" put in place to appease worries by European leaders (Lesińska 2014).

These remarks attempt to increase discontent of German voters and utilize a populist strategy of painting the establishment politicians as corrupt and willing to sell out the German people. With its sizable opposition in the Bundestag, AfD has been able to bring attention to failings of EU negotiations and consequences of their reaction to the Euro crisis and migrants' crisis. Its reliance on fuming contempt for the establishment party, such as the CDU/CSU collation and its use of inflammatory rhetoric, compound their nationalistic and populist ideology.

7BA. THE STRATEGY OF THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY PARTY

It should be noted to what degree the AfD party utilizes the four main populist strategies: anti-establishment rhetoric, group division, extra-parliamentary opposition, and the use of the will of the people / unmediated support. This is essential in order to analyze to what degree of success the AfD has experienced and to what degree we could consider the AfD as populist.

The AfD utilizes anti-establishment rhetoric in order to create opposition to the establishment party of Angela Markel's, CSU/CDU coalition. In their manifest, the AfD dedicates a chapter to bring attention to the dangers of a "corrupt elite". Under the section entitled "democracy and core values" the AfD writes, "Behind the scenes a small and powerful elite within the political parties is secretly in charge and is responsible for the misguided development of past decades" (AfD Manifesto 2017). This conspiracy of a secret elite who is in charge of the political process in Germany is one of the large claims the AfD makes in order to capture disenfranchised voters. They attempt to continue their claim by highlighting the corrupt nature of this 'secret elite' stating, "It is this political class of career politicians whose foremost interest is

to retain their own power base, status, and material well-being" (AfD Manifesto 2017). Not only does the AfD talk about an all-powerful elite, but a group of individuals who are morally and financially corrupt. This premise guides readers to conclude that the AfD represents a different kind of class of politicians who would act not in their own corrupt interests, but of the interests of the German people. In a 2017 speech to party supporters stated, "We will hunt them down. We will hunt Mrs. Merkel or whoever it is down and we will return our land to our people" (Gauland 2017).

Group division builds upon the anti-establishment rhetoric but focuses on the idea that in the political process, there exists a 'pure people' who are pitted against the corruption of the establishment elite. The AfD has focused on this issue by dividing their reforms into two groups: institutional changes and the creation of a pure homogenous people with similar interests and goals. The institutional changes cited in their manifesto aims to take away power from the elite and into the hands of the 'people'. The first reform is the introduction of referenda on every vote made by parliament. By doing this, the people act as a, "moderating effect on Parliament, and over time would stem the flood of nonsensical legislation" (AfD Manifesto 2017). The AfD takes this one step further by calling for referenda on all international treaties, making it more difficult for Germany to create international agreements on the supranational scale. They have also called for the direct election of the president and an amendment to the German Constitution which would allow such a change. The AfD also utilizes language which focuses on this idea of a "German people" who according to AfD leaders have a long-established right to guide the everyday political process. "politics as a career has led to monopolization of power and widening of the gap between the people and the political class" (AfD Manifesto 2017).

All populists claim to act on the behalf of the people which in turn accuses the

establishment elite of acting against the interests of the people. In their manifesto, the AfD highlights the obvious disregarded for the will of the people and the need for new leadership to take the reins. "…the political leadership of the major EU nations wishes to enforce this project – come hell or high water – against the obvious majority will of the peoples" (AfD Manifesto 2017). As a consequence, the state, "We, on the contrary, advocate the strict retention of the principle of subsidiarity and the restoration of powers to the national states" (AfD Manifesto 2017). These lines substantiate the claim of the "will of the people" by the AfD as the only true representatives who will act on the supposedly homogenous, easily identifiable, "will of the people".

7BB. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY PARTY

Despite the AfD's origins as a Eurosceptic party in 2013, the party has developed into a far-right populist party which utilizes the four ideological factors of Euroscepticism, anti-immigration / xenophobia, economic reform, and nationalistic appeals to a high degree. This cannot be more evident than in their own party manifesto which takes inspiration from each of these sources, calling for more stringent immigration controls and highlighting the importance of a German culture stating, "Therefore, we advocate the complete closure of external EU borders" (AfD Manifesto 2017).

Euroscepticism has played a pivotal role in the development of the political values of the AfD. It should be noted that, "the AFD was founded by German conservatives who were unhappy with […] the nature and composition of the Eurozone and Germany's role as its political anchor and paymaster" (Lees 2018). Since its conception, the party has had Eurosceptic views and did not

like the growing which Germany began to play in the European Union. As the economic and migrant challenges in the EU became evident, the AfD attempted to utilize this disillusionment with the institutions of the EU in the 2014 European Parliament elections winning 7.1% of the national vote allowing them to send seven members of the European Parliament (Lees 2018). In a span of just a few years, the AfD gained seats within the European Parliament citing the need to reform the undemocratic elements of the EU. In their manifesto, the AfD highlighted the slow evolution of the EU power over Germany explicating how, "the political elites have taken steps to permanently transform the EU into a centralized state" (AfD Manifesto 2017). The basis for these lamentation of participation in the EU finds its foundations in the goal to maintain German sovereignty and walk back the reforms first made under the European Economic Community including the creation of the Euro and free travel (AfD Manifesto 2017). This sentiment would go on to inspire their beliefs on immigration and their calls for more strict immigration policies.

The AfD see migration as a threat to the German economy and culture. In their manifesto the AfD highlight, "a mass migration of historical dimension […] we are merely experiencing the beginning of a gigantic mass migration toward European countries" (AfD Manifesto 2017). Despite the onslaught of a humanitarian crisis, the costs of migration have had a real impact on popular sentiment in Germany and has consequently made the rhetoric and ideology of xenophobia of the AfD more popular. This could be seen when the number of refugees and immigrants from Syria increased in 2016, support for the AfD rose from 4% to 16% according to a study created by political scientist Alkis Henri Otto (Otto 2017). The application of a xenophobic ideology was a win-win strategy for the AfD because it allowed the party to both blame the crisis on the leadership of Angela Merkel, while at the same time, promise a more representative leadership if put into power. Despite the CDU/CSU early leadership on the issue of migration, the growing resentment

for asylum seekers and migrants from other European member states caused Merkel to backtrack her policies and rethink German attitude towards asylum seekers. In 2017, the Bundestag which serves as the German parliament passed a bill which made deportation easier in order to tackle the growing number of asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been denied (Deutsche Welle 2017).

Economic reforms have also played an important role in the ideology of the AfD. The party's manifesto outlines the need to move away from a state run economy to a pro-business economic acumen which embraces "personal responsibility and free pricing" They also call for a renegotiation of trade agreements especially in the EU and a focus on the reduction of bureaucracy which hinders German entrepreneurs (AfD Manifesto 2017). The economic reforms of the AfD had special staying power in the minds of voters especially due to the Euro crisis in 2010 when the public debt of Germany topped at close to 85% of GDP (Eurostat 2015). These reforms juxtapose the economic policies of Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU which focuses on austerity measures and the collaboration on economic policies between the state and businesses. In 2010 Angela Merkel, "cut social spending and reduced business subsidies" and imposed further taxes on businesses in order to combat growing German debt in face of the Euro crisis (Hermanadi 2019). These actions have given the impression that the CDU/CSU was hostile towards business which in turn hurt working-class citizens. AfD's promise to embrace business interests and reduce bureaucracy provided an alternative economic outlook than the political mainstream. (Hermanadi)

Lastly, the nationalistic appeals of the AfD not only made it an attractive party for populist supporters but have made a name for the AfD in the political mainstream. Party president Alexander Gauland in a 2016 rally accused the German government of "attempting gradually replace the German people with a population from all parts of this earth" (Gauland 2016). This

rhetoric summarizes the nationalistic tendencies of the AfD and their fear of a diversity of peoples within the German polity. These concerns were hyperinflated due to the European migrant crisis in 2015 with asylum seekers from countries such as Syria and Iraq introduced a new threat to German nationalists: Islam. Not only did the influx of migrants from the middle east put a strain on the economic and social systems of Germany but brought the question of German culture into question. In response to the backlash from images of asylum seekers, including children, arriving into the EU Gauland responded, "We have to endure the cruel images and keep the borders closed" (Gauland 2016). In their manifesto, the AfD highlighted the needed to preserve German culture, language, and tradition for future generations citing the dangers of multiculturalism. In a subsection of their Manifesto entitled, "Islam and its tense relationship with our value system" they note that that the AfD "firmly opposes Islamic practice which is directed against our liberal-democratic constitutional order" (AfD Manifesto 2017).

The ideology of the AfD has been well established on the far-right of the political spectrum, but it also represents a very populist agenda. The anger with undemocratic institutions such as the EU and the creation of a government which is made up of "the people" are unreconcilably populist in nature. This populist spin on the ideology of the AfD has been in response on both external and internal factors which have been utilized by populist leaders such as Alexander Gauland.

Table 3

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
AfD	High	High	Medium	High	High	High	Medium	High

8C. SPAIN AND THE PODEMOS PARTY

The Podemos party is unique in that its founding was inspired by a series of political movements and protests or "Indignados" which brought into focus the inequality and corruption in Spanish society. Established in 2014; by secretary-general Pablo Iglesias Turrión, the Podemos party mainly focuses on economic and political inequality, compounded by austerity efforts placed upon states by the European Union after the European debt crisis in 2009. In 2010, the Socialist Party of Spain introduced an austerity package which reduced public expenditures by 1.5% of the GDP. Because of the Socialist Party's actions of cutting public services, they have faced a slow decline in popularity by those effected (Hawkins et al 2019). Podemos took advantage of this momentary decline in popularity by introducing itself as anti-austerity party with aims on ending political corruption in the Spanish government. Taking its place as a far-left populist party, promising to fight austerity measures and weed out political corruption, the formation of this party proved to be very popular during the 2014 European Parliament elections

where they were able to capture five seats and in 2015 captured 69 out of 350 seats in the Spanish parliament (Election Resources 2015). In the European Union, the MEP's promised to reduce their salaries in protest of the minimum wage of average Spanish workers.

In a unique manifesto purposefully designed to look like a furniture store pamphlet published by the Podemos party focuses on three notable areas of reform: political corruption, protection of migrants, and the expansion of the social services. The manifesto published by Podemos promises liberal reforms which aim to not only render the Spanish government more entitled to the needs of the Spanish electorate but also creating a platform more attractive to those who have been hurt by the austerity policies imposed by the European Union. To tackle political corruption, Podemos aims to level the political and economic playing field by making "fines and administrative sanction proportional to income" which means the higher the income, the higher the fine will be in comparison to the income of the convict. This strategy of creating equal consequences for even the rich and powerful reinforces the notion of the establishment versus "the people" and creates a Robin Hood effect that was called for during the Indignados protests. Furthermore, their platform calls for the elimination of secret bank accounts and tax havens, institutions utilized to hide government corruption and illegal monetary gains (Podemos Manifesto 2016). Under the protection of migrants, the manifesto aims to, "prioritize strengthening relationships with "[…] Latin America and favor intermigration with bilateral agreements that protect the rights of [all] immigrants" (Podemos Manifesto 2016). Unlike other populist parties such as the AfD or the National Rally, Podemos took a progressive approach on the topic of migration. Instead of relying on nationalistic appeals and xenophobic rhetoric, Podemos focused on creating beneficial immigration and emigration flows which benefit the economic and academic systems of the countries involved. Furthermore, Podemos promised to

expand the Spanish social service system in the face of austerity measures and cuts. Calling for the "adequacy of human and material service of public social services" and the "allocation of 85 million euros for local social services" the Podemos party aimed to reinvigorate a government with active roles in the quality of life of its citizens (Podemos Manifesto 2016). These reforms directly corelate to its initial popularity and populist agenda of eliminating the corruption of the "elite" and tackling the inequalities created by a system which failed a large part of the Spanish electorate.

Despite their early popularity with the Spanish electorate, a corruption scandal of party leader Pablo Iglesias Turrión of buying a $600,000 home despite his views on corruption and austerity have come to light. In 2018, Podemos held a party vote of confidence in Turrión which allowed him to continue to lead with 68% of the party supporting him (El País 2018). Furthermore, tensions within the party by leadership has shown discontent and shame between party supporters as well as questioning whether or not the Podemos party has the ability to lead. Polls have also shown that the Podemos party has lost its once prized popularity along with its ability to maintain a strong left-wing. A 2019 poll has estimated that Podemos would receive 12.9% of the seats compared to 21.1% it had in the 2016 elections (El País 2019).

In June of 2018, Spain's prime minister Mariano Rajoy was ousted with a no-confidence vote in parliament triggering a snap election for April of 2019. Despite their initial popularity in the 2015 elections, Podemos is not set to maintain the same number of seats within the Spanish parliament. In an EU poll, Podemos captured 23% of the vote in 2015, but is poised to only capture just 13% of the vote in the snap elections in April (Election Resources 2019).

Established as a left-wing anti-austerity party, the Podemos party has utilized multiple strategies to create populist support. The use of Anti-establishment rhetoric has provided a well-

rounded base of support to serve as an opposition party to the ruling party "Partido Popular".

Rather than relying on nationalistic appeal or xenophobic policies, the Podemos party focused on reforming austerity measures which saw the reduction on social services and the rejection of corruption both in Spain and on the EU level.

8CA. THE STRATEGY OF THE PODEMOS PARTY

It should be noted that Podemos did not start as a political party but rather as a protest movement which emerged in 2010. "Podemos combined strong demands for increased redistribution and larger economic role of the state with populist rhetoric emphasizing the difference between the people and the political and economic elites" (Hawkins et al 2019).

Podemos' use of anti-establishment rhetoric has been seen by party leader Pablo Iglesias Turrión who has focused on the danger of the far-right and the importance of restoring democracy in Europe. In a speech to the European Parliament in 2014 Turrión explicated, "powers that no one has elected are destroying social rights and threatening social and political cohesion in our societies" (Turrión 2014). In this speech, Turrión focused his rhetoric not towards the established parties in Spain, but of the establishment of large markets, lobbies, and big corporations. This establishment is what he calls a, "financial oligarchy" who have utilized the revolving doors between representing and working for large corporations. In their party manifesto, Podemos has dedicated one of four chapters to the idea of corruption and inequality. They call for a creation of an "Office of Anti-Fraud" which would focus on fighting political and economic corruption and investigate politicians who utilize their positions for economic gain. The manifesto also focuses on workers' rights in government and their ability to report crimes without reprisal by employers

(Podemos Manifesto 2016).

Like other populist parties in Europe, Podemos has created a division between "the people" and "the corrupt elite" who conspire to utilize their positions to gain economically. Furthermore, Podemos has focused on the dangers of large corporations and the close relationship between corporations and government. In their manifesto, Podemos focuses on the eradication of the revolving door between government and corporations and has called for regulations which prevent corporations from having special treatment from Government loan services (Podemos Manifesto 2016). Their manifesto blames the inequality of Spain's lowest classes to the large dealings between national and international corporations which have succeeded in buying government institutions.

Due to the charisma of their leaders and the popularity of their policies, Podemos has become one of the largest parties in the Spanish parliament. In the April 2019 snap elections, Podemos has become the fourth largest party in the Spanish parliament and is bound to enter into a coalition with the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Election Resources 2019). The extra-parliamentary opposition from the Podemos party is low due to their coalition with the Socialist party in Spain and their position would allow the party to push their left-wing agenda. In his victory speech, prime minister Pedro Sánchez promised to address inequality and political corruption. This rhetoric aligns well with the strategies of the Podemos party and has become an important topic. Due to the ousting of the last Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy of the People's Party, the topics of corruption and inequality have become salient issues in the April elections (Guardian 2019).

Overall, Podemos has created a robust party on the left side of the spectrum with their focuses on corruption, inequality, and tackling big corporations. Despite their begins as a series

of protests or "Indignados", Podemos has become a large force in the government of Spain due to the charisma of their leaders and the relatable policies which they have espoused over the years.

8CB. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PODEMOS PARTY

The Podemos party represents a distinct left-wing populist party due to their lack of Eurosceptic, Anti-Immigration, and nationalistic appeal ideology. Podemos' roots could be traced back to protest movement which sought to combat economic inequality and corruption, especially due to the European debt crisis in 2010 (Hawkins et al 2019). As a consequence, the party has focused on the importance of economic reform rather than relying on xenophobic or nationalistic appeals such as the AfD or the National Rally.

In their manifesto, Podemos has focused on the role of the state to ensure a fair and equal economic playing field which protect individuals from economic disaster or eviction. For example, in their manifesto, Podemos has called for the end of fiscal austerity which have hurt growth and increased unemployment. Podemos believes that the reinforcement of the social welfare system in Spain would allow for the acceleration of job creation and promote Spain's capacity for technological advancements (Podemos Manifesto 2016). Secondly, Podemos has focused on simplifying the process for cancelling or restructuring debts by individuals who would otherwise not be able to pay them. They call for more strict regulations on debt collectors and the issuance of credit by creditors (Podemos Manifesto 2016). Furthermore, they promise to, "paralyze the evictions that affect debtors in good faith who have not been able to face their payments due to being in a situation of economic difficulty" (Podemos Manifesto 2016). In this section, Podemos writes about the assurance of human rights in Spain and cite the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the United Nations to argue that the evictions of citizens who are in "good faith" with their creditors, inhumane and against international conventions.

Table 4

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
Podemos	High	Low	Low	High	Medium	Low	High	Low

9D. GREECE AND THE SYRIZA PARTY

SYRIZA, more formally known as the "Coalition of the Radical Left" is the largest party in the Greek parliament with party leader Alexis Tsipras serving as the government's prime minister. With its origins back to 2009, its motivation was to oppose the austerity measures brought about by the European debt crisis. Cuts to social security and pensions, government spending, and the increase of taxes were conditions to receiving help from the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. There were several factors which led to the economic collapse of Greece's economy including financial manipulation by Greek leaders, decline in tax collection, and the increase in government spending on social services. Several

European member states held an increasing amount of debt despite a growth in GDP. Despite early warnings of a financial collapse, "it had for a long time been known that Greece had statistically manipulated its data for accession to the euro area" (Ruffert 2011). With the mixture of both large and small governments, the ability to control inflation was lost. In the case of Greece, this lack of control was one of the factors of their economic collapse. Furthermore, their economic collapse was also due to "the decline in tax collection which is even more startling in light of meteoric rise in private consumption and overall prosperity" (Kalyvas 2015). Despite a large increase in the economic strength of Greece, political leaders were unwilling to raise taxes and offset the increasing national debt. Inability to act in a timely matter created an unstable market which collapsed when public debt surpassed 100% of GDP in 2006. Despite the implementation of a bailout package in the form of close to 90 billion euros, unemployment in Greece has held steady at 25% (Kalyvas 2015). The creation of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) aimed to help other member states during economic crisis and attempt to avoid future turmoil. Deep economic unrest and the failure of the establishment to quell the consequences of such an economic disaster revealed itself as a populist revolt. The creation of the Coalition of the Radical Left exploited this sentiment and ran on policies which aimed to alleviate the effects of austerity and reduction.

In their first election in October 4, 2009 under Alexis Tsipras, SYRIZA gained only 4.59% of the vote with only 13 seats in the Hellenic parliament but by January 25, 2015 it gained a majority with 149 seats (Hellenic Parliament 2019). In a span of only six years, SYRIZA started as a small opposition party which has turned into a leading party in the Greek parliament. After the snap elections in April 2019, SYRIZA was able to capture 42 seats and is poised to join a coalition with center-left Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (Election Resources 2019).

In their manifesto SYRIZA outlined four key elements of reform: the restoration of pensions and salaries, investment in science and research, the restructure of Greece's welfare state, and the forgiveness for a portion of Greek debt (SYRIZA Manifesto 2014). The first pillar of reform included the restoration of pensions and salaries which were cut due to austerity measures and the need to decrease public spending. Affecting retirees and forcing pensioners back to work has increased the appeal of SYRIZA's platform, a return to normal after nearly nine years of debt management and the consequences which arise from them. New investments into science and research aimed at reinvigorating the Greek economy has also become a position which SYRIZA took before coming into power. New investments lead by businesses and subsidized by the national government became a pillar of reform and espoused by party leaders. Party leader Alex Tsipras explicated that the investments into science and research would encourage scientists to come back to the country and treat the brain drain of the exodus of a highly qualified work force (Tsipras 2019). Furthermore, the recreation of a robust social security system and the reestablishment of the welfare state weighed heavily on the ideology of SYRIZA. With large economic consequences for many citizens of not only Greece, but of Spain and Ireland, the support for the reestablishment for government assistance was one of the main party policies which led to their national popularity. Finally, forgiving a portion of Greece's debt gave the Greek economy a substantial chance of rebounding from the economic collapse. Citing past public forgiveness schemes which the EU participated in the past, in their manifesto they state, "It happened for Germany in 1953. It can also happen for the South of Europe and Greece" (SYRIZA Manifesto 2014).

SYRIZA monopolized on the economic hardships but despite their well-received popularity and their ability to gain control of the political institutions in Greece, not all of the

promised reforms by SYRIZA were fully executed. After much debate, SYRIZA had finally accepted that their promises of larger government spending alongside the expansion of the social security system was unattainable. This was due to reservations imposed by larger EU states, such as Germany and the UK, who refused to forgive Greece's debt.

9DA. THE STRATEGY OF THE SYRIZA PARTY

SYRIZA's strategies could be traced back to its call for the end to the austerity measures imposed by the European Union after the European Debt Crisis of 2010 and the reinstatement of the social welfare system in Greece (Hawkins et al 2019). Its policies gave the party an overall success when in 2015, SYRIZA was able to win a majority within the Greek parliament (Hellenic Parliament 2019). SYRIZA's strategy focuses largely on the "general will" of the people to execute the economic reforms laid out in their party manifesto. SYRIZA represents a very exceptional example of a populist party because of its lack of populist strategy. It's focus on economic reforms has garnered more importance in the party platform than the use of anti-establishment rhetoric or the creation of group divisions.

SYRIZA' use of anti-establishment rhetoric has not been an important part of their strategy. Despite their populist strategy, SYRIZA has been more focused on the ending of austerity measures than blaming a corrupt elite for the economic woes of Greece. Furthermore, SYRIZA's use of group division and extra-parliamentary opposition have not been notable to the strategy and beliefs of the party. It's the use of the "general will" of the people and its unmediated contact with their supporters which has had a great impact on the strategical creation of SYRIZA. Prime minister Alexis Tsipras in his victory speech cited his possession of a political mandate by the

people to end austerity measures and to implement the SYRIZA agenda laid out in their manifesto (Tsipras 2015).

SYRIZA's focus on the economic revitalization of Greece represents a distinct case for a populist party due to their lack of other ideological similarities with other populist parties. Despite their populist beginnings and popular support, SYRIZA has focused more on the strategic necessities of the party more than the ideological tenants of their party beliefs.

9DB. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SYRIZA PARTY

SYRIZA has utilized the common ideologies of populist parties to a high degree due to their distinct economic situation in 2010 and their geographical location in Europe. As a consequence, SYRIZA's reliance on economic reforms, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic policies have become prominent within the party.

Due to the austerity measures imposed by the EU on Greece, SYRIZA has maintained a mild intolerance for the EU while at the same time stopping short from taking the same drastic steps which the UK had chosen in 2016. Unlike the UK, Greece chose to negotiate with EU leaders to find a solution to the growing debt of Greece. In an interview with the Financial Times prime minister Alexis Tsipras stated, "Brexit was a very bad development for Europe, and very bad for Britain as well" (Tsipras 2019). This interview goes to show that although Greece has called for the renegotiation of its public debt, the prime minister does not see leaving the EU as a reliable path for Greece. Furthermore, being a left-wing populist party, Greece does not share the same Eurosceptic and anti-globalist agenda as other parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Furthermore, SYRIZA's negotiation document focuses on the continued alliance

with the European Union rather than a move to leave the EU altogether. Yanis Varoufakis, who served as the Greek Minister of Finance under the SYRIZA party stated in 2011 that, "The exit from the euro for a deficit country would send us back to the Neolithic period before we could even realize it" (Varoufakis 2011, Business Insider 2015).

SYRIZA has also utilized anti-immigration as a cornerstone of its ideology. Greece creates a distinct example because it has been one of the largest landing zones for migrants, therefore voters may be more open to restrictive immigration policies than more northern EU states. Its acceptance of migrants from Senegal to Pakistan have made Greece an entrance point for migrants wishing to travel to other EU countries. But despite its peculiar position, prime minister Tsipras has maintained an acceptance for these migrants and a change in policy in order to protect those entering into Greece due to push factors in their home countries. "Syriza proposed a major overhaul of Greece's migration policy and has planned to grant citizenship to second-generation migrants born in Greece and has proposed shutting down immigration detention centers" (Al Jazeera 2015). Unlike other populist parties in France and Germany, SYRIZA has taken steps to protect migrants instead of deterring them. The lack of xenophobic rhetoric and nationalistic appeals stands in stark contrast to the policies of other EU nation states.

Economic reform has also played a major role in the ideology of SYRIZA. The end of austerity measures and the reinstatement of social welfare policies has been one of the largest focuses of SYRIZA since its founding. In 2015, SYRIZA released a negotiation outline titled, "The Thessaloniki Programme" which outlined the positions SYRIZA would take during negotiations. In this document, SYRIZA called for a "write-off" of a part of Greece's debt and cited the 1953 Germany example as precedence. Furthermore, they call for a grace period to allow for Greek growth and the restoration of salaries and pensions (Thessaloniki Programme 2015). In

the document, SYRIZA establishes four pillars for "national reconstruction" including confronting the humanitarian crisis, restarting the economy and promoting tax justice, regaining employment, and transforming the political system to deepen democracy. These pillars require large spending by the Greek government and an estimated $13 billion was estimated by SYRIZA in their Thessaloniki Programme.

SYRIZA and Alexis Tsipras had not relied on nationalistic appeals to gainer support for their policies. Instead, the party focused on creating policies which were attractive to voters who had gone through the austerity measures put in place in 2015. In an interview with the Financial Times, Tsipras described the UK's Brexit deal as a "nationalistic approach" and ended up "…very bad for Britain" (Financial Times 2019).

Table 5

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
SYRIZA	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	High	Low

10. COMPARISONS

Both left and right political parties could utilize populist strategies and hold populist ideologies. This research has shown that both conservative and liberal thinkers could inspire their political agenda from populist thinking because it inspires mobilization of the masses to support

an agenda (Mudde 2019). Both the National Rally and the AfD fall under the right side of the political spectrum, not so much due to their limited government technique but mainly for their conservative social policies. Podemos and SYRIZA fall under the left side of the political spectrum due to their calls for larger state intervention in the economy and their liberal social policies. These examples provide great comparative avenues which should be noted.

It is evident that the right-wing populist parties (The National Rally and the AfD) have relied highly on the Eurosceptic, xenophobic, and nationalistic ideologies of populist thought juxtaposed to the left-wing populist parties (Podemos and SYRIZA) who have refrained from implementing these ideologies. This stratification between left- and right-wing populist parties could be due to the extent to which right-wing populist parties prefer anti-globalist and nativist policies. Both SYRIZA and Podemos were created to answer the economic hardships felt after the European Debt Crisis. As an example, Greece experienced a nearly 30% long-term market interest rates compared to the 4% long-term market interest rates in France in mid 2011 (ECB 2011). Unlike the AfD or the National Rally, Podemos and SYRIZA did not have to rely heavily on nationalistic appeals in order to create a sustainable economic agenda.

It is also evident that the right-wing populist parties inhibit larger ideological tendencies towards xenophobia and nativism. Both the National Rally and the AfD call for the restriction of immigration from both extern and internal migrants from other European member states. It is especially notable that SYRIZA in Greece does not share the same anti-immigration tendencies despite being a large receiving state for migrants. It may be concluded that the ideological differences between the left and right parties could serve as indicators to whether or not a party would choose to implement anti-immigrant policies. Left-wing populist parties tend to share lower nativist rhetoric which could be correlated to the lack of nationalistic / xenophobic

appeals used by leaders. However, one characteristic that is common among the populist parties studied in this work is their appeal to the "general will of the people" and their unmediated support – at least in the beginning.

Finally, this research has shown that the left-wing populist parties have had a greater experience of electoral success in their respective countries. Both SYRIZA and Podemos have been able to obtain a sizable position in their parliaments, and in the case of SYRIZA, have been able to gain an outright majority. This could be compared to the right-wing populist parties in France and Germany who have yet been able to gain a majority in their political arena. It could be argued that the electoral rules in these countries benefit or deter newer populist parties from achieving electoral success. For example, in France the two round system may hinder smaller parties from gaining seats or leadership positions.

Table 6

	Strategy				Ideology			
	Anti-Establishment Rhetoric	Group Division (People v. Elite)	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition	The "General Will" of the People / Unmediated Support	Euroscepticism	Anti-Immigration / Xenophobia	Economic Reform	Nationalistic Appeals
National Rally	High	High	High	High	High	High	Low	High
AfD	High	High	Medium	High	High	High	Medium	High
Podemos	High	Low	Low	High	Medium	Low	High	Low
SYRIZA	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	High	Low

11. CONCLUSION

The rise of populist parties has also left scholars to ask, what are the effects of populism on democracy and democratic institutions? If we assume the premise that democracies actively pursue to advance certain values such as mass participation, equality, and justice we may conclude that the populist strategies of group division and xenophobic behavior may be incompatible with democratic thought. If we attempt to analyze populism from a normative perspective, we begin to see how it can create a polarization between various groups. If we look at the AfD or the National Rally, we may question whether their ideological values are compatible with democratic institutions. Their use of xenophobic rhetoric from party leaders such as Alexander Gauland of the AfD and Marie Le Pen from the National Rally may run counter to the values of equality and justice. But proponents of populism may argue that populism is the result of the lack of representation and is a legitimate act of democratic participation. When politicians fail at answering the needs of their voters, can populist leaders claim the right to rectify those failures?

This project has also opened up further avenues of academic research. Populism is not just a European phenomenon but could be found in various parts of the world including Brazil. In 2018 right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro won the presidency in Brazil with 55.13% of the vote (Election Resources 2018). Bolsonaro, a member of the Social Liberal Party, advocated for pro-market policies and the taming of environmental regulations. Bolsonaro has utilized the many populist strategies and ideologies outlined in this research. His use of nationalistic appeals could be seen in his party slogan, "Brazil above everything, God above everyone" (NPR 2019). A self-proclaimed Donald Trump fan, Bolsonaro has utilized nationalistic appeals to gain support from

the Brazilian electorate (CNN 2019). Furthermore, his call for economic reforms and the liberalization of Brazil's economy could be seen in his speech in Davos, Switzerland stating, "We will lower the tax burden, streamline rules and make life easier for those who wish to produce" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). Jair Bolsonaro represents a manifestation of populism in Southern American with similar appeals as other right-wing populists such as Alexander Gauland and Marine Le Pen. His use of nationalistic appeals and his calls for economic reforms makes him a notable populist. Furthermore, the mass mobilization of the Brazilian electorate through the use of Bolsonaro's charismatic leadership encapsulates the signifiers of a populist leader.

This research has shown that populism manifests itself through strategies and ideologies which are similar between certain populist parties in Europe, but also rather different especially between left- and right-wing examples. The main contribution of this project is its comparative conceptualization and categorization of major populist parties in France, Germany, Spain, and Greece. It also shows that not all populist parties implement these strategies and ideologies to the same capacity. While the AfD and the National Rally choose to focus on the nationalistic and xenophobic ideologies, Podemos and SYRIZA have centered their ideological values around the economic reforms of their economies. There have been various catalysts which have helped populist parties including the European debt crisis of 2010, the rise of international terrorism, globalization and socioeconomic inequality. These populist parties utilize these events and phenomena in order to mobilize the populace and gainer support for their agenda.

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