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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

Hate Crime in Los Angeles: Regulating Racism, Legal Institutionalization,
and Neighborhood Context

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Criminology, Law & Society

by

Jacob Daniel Kang-Brown

Dissertation Committee:
Professor George Tita, Chair
Associate Professor Sora Han
Professor John R. Hipp

2016

DEDICATION

Try to do what you do without mockery of our heartbroken little era.

Anne Carson
1 = 1

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Jacob Daniel Kang-Brown

EDUCATION

2006   B.A. in Sociology, Department of Sociology & Anthropology;
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EXPERIENCE

2016-   Senior Research Associate, Center on Sentencing & Corrections,
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2009-2011   Independent Contractor for Training and Analysis, County of Los Angeles

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2004-2006   Research Assistant, Urban Studies Department, Wheaton College

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R.W. Wilson Charitable Foundation

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2009-2012   Criminology, Law & Society Summer Research Grants

2008-2009   Newkirk Fellowship, Newkirk Foundation

PUBLICATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Papers

Kang-Brown, H. and **J. Kang-Brown**. "Mapping the Flavors of New York City." *Contexts* 13, 3 (2014): 62-70.

Research Reports

Kang-Brown, J., *Incarceration Trends: Data and Methods for Historical Jail Populations in U.S. Counties, 1970-2014*. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2015.

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Kang-Brown, J. "L.A. catching up to Chicago in sleaze." *Los Angeles Times* March 1, 2012.

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS

Kang-Brown, J. "Policing Racism in Los Angeles Neighborhoods: How Racial Integration Shapes Hate Crime Enforcement." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, California, November 2014.

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Kang-Brown, J. "Understanding and Implementing the Array of Reform Strategies." Presented at the National Center for State Courts, Juvenile Justice Reform Summit, New England Region. Northampton, Massachusetts, September 2014.

Kang-Brown, J. and N. Wical. "School Policy and Youth Contact with the Juvenile Justice System." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, Georgia, November 2013.

Grebenkemper, J. and **J. Kang-Brown**. "Grievance Blues: Understanding Grievances in California's Youth Correctional Facilities." Presented at the International Conference on Law and Society, Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 2012.

Omori, M., D. Gascón, D. Haerle, and **J. Kang-Brown**. "Exploring the Intersection of Race and Gangs in California's Juvenile Justice Facilities." Presented at the annual meeting of the Western Society of Criminology, Newport Beach, California, February 2012.

Kang-Brown, J. "Punishing Racism: Youth Accounts of Racist and Anti-racist Fights in California's Juvenile Correctional Facilities." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C., November 2011.

Maxson, C., J. Grebenkemper, **J. Kang-Brown**, S. Reid, and D. Scott. "The Contours of Violence in Youth Correctional Facilities." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C., November 2011

Kang-Brown, J. "Reconstructing Hate Crime Law: Racism, Abolition and the Thirteenth Amendment." Presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, Las Vegas, Nevada, March 2011.

Kang-Brown, J. "No Haters Here?: Vernacular Neighborhoods and Hate Crime." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, California, November 2010.

Kang-Brown, J. "The Neighborhood Context of Hate Crime between African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles County." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 2009.

Kang-Brown, J. "Counting Hate Crime, Controlling the Police, and Fighting in Los Angeles." Presented at the West Coast Law & Society Retreat, Stanford Law School, Palo Alto, California, October 2009.

Kang-Brown, J. "A New Angle on Hate Crime: Social Conflict and Violence in the City of Angels." Presented at the Negotiating Legal Boundaries Conference, University of California, Santa Barbara, May 2009. Languages

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ACTIVITIES

2011-2016   Founding Treasurer, 462 Halsey Community Garden, Brooklyn, New York.

2011   Member, UC Irvine Academic Workers for a Democratic Union.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Hate Crime in Los Angeles: Regulating Racism, Legal Institutionalization,

and Neighborhood Context

By

Jacob Daniel Kang-Brown

Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law & Society

University of California, Irvine, 2016

Professor George Tita, Chair

Scholarship on hate crime in U.S. neighborhoods has yet to learn from Los Angeles; this dissertation addresses that empirical gap and provides theoretical assessment of what hate crime law has wrought over the last three decades in California and the United States. The picture is generally of expansion and then decline in use, while the best evidence shows that rates of hate crime victimization remain unchanged. Originally conceived as a statistical monitoring system, hate crime law currently monitors its own infrequent use by police across the United States. The system appears broken; public interest in and law enforcement use of hate crime, while mixed, has been at historically low levels until recently. Regression analyses of hate crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods demonstrate the distinctive relationships between hate crime and changing racial composition and economic characteristics in Los Angeles neighborhoods when compared to other cities covered in the scholarly literature. My analysis of anti-black hate crime across Los Angeles from 2003-2014 provides evidence in favor of the argument that demographic change and economic inequality increase police reported hate crime. There are nuances to these relationships: neighborhoods with more black households moving into areas

that are predominantly Latino or white neighborhood are associated with more hate crime, but only at certain tipping points for the percentage of households that are Latino or white. Income inequality makes a strong difference at moderately high levels, but models predict low numbers of anti-black hate crime at low inequality and very high inequality.

Introduction:

This dissertation analyzes Los Angeles through the number of hate crimes reported by police and how they relate to neighborhood characteristics like income inequality and demographic change. It is also an invitation to think about hate crime in the social, legal, and racial context of the United States of America and think about it before and after hate crime law passed into law books. I start with an older story that can help us think comparatively about what characterizes the present in California:

Chicago, Illinois
July 27, 1919

Already that month, two-dozen African American owned homes outside of the narrow confines of what was called "the black belt" had been firebombed. On a hot Sunday, Eugene Williams, a 17-year-old black man, went to the beach with friends and around 5 pm crossed a fluid boundary while swimming in Lake Michigan. Williams passed into water near a group of young white men, George Stauber and his friends, in what some termed "white territory." People yelled and Stauber threw rocks and stones that apparently hit Williams; Williams fell and drowned in the lake. Disputes broke out in the water and on the beaches. A white police officer there, Daniel Callahan, refused to arrest Stauber, although many had witnessed the violence. Fights started, and in addition to worries about Williams, rumors spread in the gathered crowd that a white boy had been drowned in the commotion. Violence continued; police fired guns indiscriminately into a black section of the crowd; at least three people were hit by the shots and were arrested. That evening, a police captain ordered officers to dredge the lake with grappling hooks; the officers only found Williams' body.

Days of rioting followed, white gangs attacked, firebombed and burned black family homes in mostly white neighborhoods, and shot black people who were riding trolley cars across the city. Within the month, Callahan had been fired for dereliction of duty; Stauber was charged with manslaughter. The Mayor proposed a new blue-ribbon Commission: the Chicago Commission on Race Relations. The social-science-informed recommendations were not implemented. Eventually, charges against Stauber were dropped and Callahan, notwithstanding racist views, was reinstated as an officer. A similar commission was founded in Los Angeles after a similar white riot in 1943.[1]

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[1] Narrative synthesized from contemporary news reports by Carl Sandburg (1919); the *Chicago Daily Tribune* (*Chicago Daily Tribune* 1919a; *Chicago Daily Tribune* 1919b; *Chicago Daily Tribune* 1919c); the original

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Aspects of this research descend directly from government commissions cataloging racial violence, and the aim to understand racial violence through social scientific study. I interned at the City of Chicago's Commission on Human Relations in college, and when I moved to Los Angeles in 2006, I started working at the County of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission. I was on the team preparing the annual hate crime report, and was trying to understand the patterns of hate crime in the city as I collected and processed hundreds of police reports on hate crime from agencies across the county, coded and entered them into a database. As I worked, I had questions about why some communities had higher numbers of hate crimes than others, and how that related to racial inequality or changing neighborhood conditions, or the migration of families and households to one part of the city or another. Those questions became clearer one day in 2007, when the *American Journal of Sociology* with Christopher Lyons's article "Community (Dis)organization and Racially Motivated Crime," arrived in the mail at my office in the Los Angeles County Hall of Records. I was considering graduate school and here was a study of hate crime in Chicago's neighborhoods that did for Chicago what I was hoping to do for Los Angeles. This dissertation fulfills that hope and provides an answer to the question: how does the pattern of racially motivated hate crime across Los Angeles compare to other cities? Are some community contexts – changing neighborhoods, less diverse neighborhoods, unequal neighborhoods – associated with relatively higher levels of hate crime after controlling for a variety of other factors?

In the chapters that follow, I pursue the social facts of hate crime and how it relates to racial segregation in neighborhoods empirically, aiming to understand what the incidence of hate

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commissions' blue ribbon report (Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922); and the work of urban scholar Janet Abu-Lughod (2007).

crime in a different neighborhood means. This reading of hate crime to understand social facts, however, faces the common difficulties of sociological research, as in Durkheim's (1897) analysis of suicide. This social fact, a social thing with a cultural logic as Charles Lemert (2006) translates Durkheim, is the result of a fraught organizational process whereby law enforcement files paper that reports an event as criminal and motivated by a particular form of hate. Most frequently in Los Angeles and the U.S. generally, this hate is anti-black racism. That organizational process is likely short-circuited at times by the larger cultural process that links law enforcement agencies and the people that work in them to the loose social organizations of people in neighborhoods. As Bayard Rustin noted in a 1968 speech to the Anti-Defamation League, "[African Americans] both hate and depend on policemen. To have to depend on someone whom you dislike and who often brutalizes you is ghastly" (2003, 155). Therefore, there is a measure of uncertainty in the statistical analysis due to the cultural logic hate crime.

Additionally, that organizational process of police departments reporting hate crime reveals something else, beyond just the incidence of crime. A hate crime report is evidence of cases where racism matters to police departments and is thus a link between private racial violence and the more troubling, state-sponsored, state-sanctioned racial violence, violence that has police or deputies as its agents. Thus, in my reading from this perspective, failing to report hate crimes is more than just missing data, it likely also indicates something: the still present problem of non-response to racial bias and racially motivated crime and violence.

Purpose

Many cases of hate crime in the U.S. share a common misunderstanding, or misrecognition, of exercise of freedom as aggression and aggression as justifiable self-defense. That misrecognition is a hallmark of white thought (Mills 2014, 19). It is not uncommon to find

a description of anti-black racial violence as defensive; one example is the framework defended neighborhood. Yet, I think it worth noting that moving into a house or passing through a neighborhood on a street is not an act of aggression to be defended against; it is an exercise of the various rights of a free citizen, free passage or fair access to housing. An aggressive or negative reaction to a new neighbor is not defensive, a better term might be sharp or forbidding. It seems common to mis-recognize aggressive collective emotions, organizations, legal tools, and violent acts that have been used to enforce racialized boundaries, whether in the criminal justice system, or in private actions in neighborhoods or in relationships (Bell 2013; Brooks and Rose 2013; Ioanide 2015). So in 1919 Chicago, and so in 2003-14 Los Angeles in many of the hate crimes analyzed in this dissertation.

This dissertation aims to join with other writers in opposition that long, powerful misunderstanding, and to better understand the conditions in neighborhoods today where the misunderstanding continues to take violent shape. To this end, I examined the processes that drive the local social production of hate crime.

Major Research Questions

This dissertation addresses two areas particularly important for the field of racial hate crime: (1) the origin and meanings of contemporary police reported hate crime and (2) the relationship between neighborhood context and the distribution of anti-black hate crime across the city. In turn, the chapters address the origins and current use of hate crime law; revisit the defended neighborhoods framework for understanding hate crime as a result of black migration to hostile white neighborhoods by exploring whether or not a multicultural, immigrant dominant city in California has those same structural patterns of anti-black hate crime; and evaluate whether or not hate crime has economic correlates that go beyond the general correlates of crime.

I answer the following major research questions. First, in order to contextualize the neighborhood questions and make valid comparisons: In 2016, is hate crime law a remedy to legacies of racial violence? What is the level of hate crime as a topic of public attention, scholarly discourse, and practice in criminal justice agencies? Is routine hate crime law enforcement still institutionalized to the same degree as it used to be?

Second, I turn to empirical data on hate crime in neighborhoods across Los Angeles to explore whether or not it follows a similar pattern to that from different places and different times, in particular, New York City (1987-1995) and Chicago (1997-2002). Are there economic factors, like income inequality, that drive hate crime? Or is hate crime mostly about racial change in particular kinds of neighborhoods resistant to those changes? I make these comparisons to anti-black hate crime in Los Angeles collected through the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations from 2003-2014. I expected to find a significant relationship between demographics and hate crime, however, it was not be what I originally expected. Rather than a result of in-migration, it appears that in some circumstances, even staying present is associated with higher levels of hate crime.

For the third chapter, I build on the neighborhood effects models but investigate further the relationships between economic factors and hate crime in Los Angeles during a time of economic change brought about by the great recession. I hypothesize a link between income inequality and hate crime in Los Angeles, and find that there are some nuances to this non-linear relationship. Nevertheless, the impacts appear to be consistent across different types of hate crime, and to general crime rates as well.

In addition to the specific research methods described where relevant throughout the dissertation, I have taken an immersive approach, reading hundreds of articles from the *Los*

Angeles Times, the *Los Angeles Sentinel*, the *California Eagle,* the *Los Angeles Daily News*, and

various other national media sources. I examined census demographic data for Los Angeles,

national and local public opinion polling, and every annual report on hate crime produced by the

Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, back to the first commission reports that

covered the problems related to what is now known as hate crime, (Los Angeles County

Commission on Human Relations 1980; 1981; Los Angeles County Commission on Human

Relations 1981). I further draw on my personal experience working for the County of Los

Angeles Commission on Human Relations on their annual hate crime report where I read

hundreds of incident reports of hate crimes, and observed behind the scenes work of certain legal

actors like the civil rights fieldworkers in various community relations and human relations roles

at the U.S. Department of Justice, the State of California, the County and the City of Los

Angeles, law enforcement officials, and local politicians.

Terminology

In order to support a shared understanding of what follows, here are some definitions for

keywords used in the dissertation: hate crime, racism, neighborhood, and race.

Hate Crime: A crime motivated in whole or in part against a person's real or perceived

membership in or association with a protected class such as disability, gender, nationality, race

or ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. In practice, many cases of gender based and

disability-based crime are not counted as hate crimes. (For the full legal definition of hate crime

in California, see Penal Code Section 422.55 and following). Hate and bias crime are

interchangeable terms in this dissertation. This is operationalized in chapter two and three as

police reported hate crime, however, I also analyze information on hate crime collected in federal

criminal victimization surveys.

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Racism: For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the term racism to refer to the variety of specific forms of bias constituted by slavery, colonialism and the way that these intersect with each other and interact with religious, disability, gender and sexual orientation bias. This is a fairly expansive definition, but it fits with the current federal legal framework for hate crime law, based on an expansive reading of congressional power under the 13th Amendment. It also fits with current research and understanding of bias in practice: qualitative interviews with LGBT people of color targeted in Anti-LGBT violence show that distinguishing between sexual orientation or gender bias from based on racism is not always possible or desirable (D. Meyer 2015). Nevertheless, much of the empirical analysis in Los Angeles neighborhoods focuses on the specific set of anti-black racist hate crimes. Racial and ethnic bias is consistently the largest number of police-reported hate crimes at the local, state, and national level, and often the largest numbers of cases are anti-black. Thus, I have reason to believe that anti-black hate crime are the most robustly reported types of hate crime. Further, they are most likely to be comparable to other place like Chicago or New York City studied in previous scholarly literature on hate crime.

Neighborhood: An internal division within the city that groups people together as neighbors that share a common territory, often with a commonly recognized name. Neighborhoods reflect agglomerated built environment, local history, and cultural meanings and are open to interpretation, change and disagreement (K. T. Jackson and Citizens Committee for New York City 1998). This is likely to be especially important as we consider inequality and how race and class related to hate crime in Los Angeles. Investigations of the neighborhood often had a pragmatic, political edge, one that extended beyond mere social scientific knowledge

and research, addressing issues of social exclusion, immigration, racism and freedom.[2] Historical

political economy research under the direction of Henri Lefebvre showed that in the Parisian

suburbs, larger neighborhoods boundaries reflected the historical distribution of economic capital

and political resources in the built environment (Coornaert and Harlaut 1967; Haumant 1967).

From symbolic-interactionist perspective, since the unit of analysis exists in conversation and

affects residents' definition of their life situations, it should be particular useful (Thomas 1966).

For the chapters in this dissertation that use regression analysis, I use a set of neighborhoods

developed by the *Los Angeles Times*. These are described in detail in Appendix A.

Race: For most of the research, I use data collected for other administrative purposes;

thus, I rely on the existing racial classification schemas. Of course, these categories are limited

and contain multitudes of racial and ancestry backgrounds and simplify the analysis, especially

in a place like Los Angeles. According to the 100% census summary file, Los Angeles is 4.6

people who choose to identify as more than 1 race, and New York City is 4.0 percent, and

Chicago is 2.7 percent; as point of historical comparison, these are in the same range as that of

people counted as Black in the 1920 census at 2.7 - 4.1percent in these three cities. These broad

categories also obscure patterns created by immigrants, and cannot accurately account for the

mestizo approach to race categories common in Los Angeles (Valle and Torres 2000).

Significance

The problem of hate crime in cities is significant in two key ways. First, hate crime

arguably has wider harms than other crime. Anti-black graffiti on a wall facing a family's house

sends a very different message than graffiti where a tagger merely writes the name of their crew

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[2] Exemplars of this side of the sociological tradition include Charles Booth's work in London, Jane Addams' in Chicago, W. E. B. Du Bois' study of the 7th Ward in Philadelphia, and St.-Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's study of Bronzeville. Each are (Addams 1912; Du Bois 1899; Booth 1967; Drake and Cayton 1962).

on the same wall. Both require the same level of cleanup and repainting, but they do not have the same level of harm. Both are property crimes, but one is also what we might more accurately think of as a crime against persons.

Second, hate crime arguably has wider causes than other crime. Hate crime's causes go beyond likely offenders, suitable targets and absence of capable guardians, into social questions about difference, power, and community (Pinderhughes 1993). Thus the analysis of the correlates of hate crime provides a way to understand flash points of racism in communities. It is both these larger causes and larger harms that drive the legislation, public attention, and research on hate crime in the contemporary era.

For my project, thinking about the neighborhood correlates of hate crime is a way of getting at some of the broader issues around racial and ethnic change conflict in neighborhoods, such as the persistence of black and white racial segregation during times of immigration, gentrification, and redevelopment. But many of the sociological theories of racial change and conflict trace to a time when de jure segregation and racial violence were not really against the law; white racial violence was often state-sanctioned. Given the importance of historicizing sociological research (Steinmetz 2008; Sewell Jr 2009), I revisit these theories in a time when racist crime is against the law.

Basic Limitations

Throughout this dissertation, but especially in chapter 1, I engage with the debates around the utility of hate crime data. People hoped that the addition of federal requirements for police to report hate crime statistics in 1990 would provide an opportunity for the transformation of police departments (Fernandez 1991). Even though the Los Angeles Police Department, and California in general, have strong hate crime units, there remains work to be done and, thus, this is a limit to

my dissertation. Law enforcement in Los Angeles antagonized and harassed many black and Latino people in many different neighborhoods for decades (George 1992; Sánchez 1995; Vargas 2006). Under substantial allegations of racial discrimination, the LAPD entered a federal consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice that lasted from 2001-2013 (Rubin 2013), and this was agreed and required specific remedial reforms to address concerns about race (Fagan and MacDonald 2012).[3] This agreement was not just a result of community concerns—it had been law enforcement concern as well. Police officers testified that racism was tolerated in the South Bureau, and surveys by the Christopher Commission found widespread concern in department that racial bias regularly led to the use of excessive force (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Dept 1991). A prosecutor could consider anti-black use of excessive force a hate crime under federal and state law, or a violation of even older and more established provisions of law concerning protection of civil rights against abuse under color of law. Clearly, this presents a limitation for understanding the full scope of the social phenomenon at work when we talk about hate crime. The empirical facts of racism are hard to pin down. Plainly addressing and reporting on difficult problems like hate crime remains rare, and admitting there is a local problem may be against the interests of local elected officials backed by growth coalitions concerned about maintaining a positive image. Thus, this constitutes the single largest scope condition of this dissertation. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, I assume that the number of police reported hate crimes measure an important dimension of racism in a community: when and where police respond to hate crimes. In contemporary Los Angeles, police respond to these kinds of cases more frequently than in many parts of the United States.

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[3] *See* Consent Decree - *United States v. City of Los Angeles, California, Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department*, No. CV 00-11769-GAF (RCX), Rampart Cases (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2001).

Finally, even with the limits of this data, it tells an untold story. It is a story about the "precise picture of the geographic distribution of these crimes and trends over time," called for in early legislation on hate crime (CA PL Section 13870, as enacted by Senate Bill No. 2080 on September 15, 1984). And this story has important implications about efforts to regulate hate under law: what sorts of communities, in actual practice, are protected by this hate crime law?

Summary

The following chapters analyze hate crime law's use nationally and in particular kinds of neighborhoods with a blend of criminology, law and society. I start the dissertation with a story from long ago in Chicago, because many of the problems the story raises are still being worked through in law and society today: questions of police and racial violence remain in the news and on the public policy agenda. Racial aggression misrecognized as defense; extreme racial inequality maintained by and productive of anti-blackness. The hate crime laws were eventually enacted in the 1980s and 90s in the face of ongoing resistance to fair housing as people of color moved into new neighborhoods across less fluid boundaries formed by redlining maps and other official and private actions. Hate crime law was also aimed to prevent future urban riots by providing a remedy against racist violence and discouraging police inaction.[4] The empirical data that hate crime laws created and made possible are analyzed in detail in the chapters that follow.

This dissertation has two main empirical sections, one chapter framed generally in regard to the rise and decline of the use of hate crime law, as well as public and scholarly attention to hate crime, in the United States, and the other two chapters more quantitatively orientated analysis of hate crime at the city and neighborhood level.

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[4] See discussion in DOJ funded trainings on hate crime (Community Research Associates, Inc 1999) or Laura Crooms (1999) analysis of why the supreme court upheld hate crime law.

The first section is a single, long chapter reviewing the use of hate crime law. Hate crime is a narrow slice of law where scholars, advocates for civil rights, criminal justice agencies, courts, and social movements intersect. I write chapter 1 in dialog with Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet's book, *Making Hate a Crime: from Social Movement to Law Enforcement* (1999). My main contributions in this chapter are to reframe hate crime law as a data collection activity rather than a means of additional punishment and to demonstrate that in the U.S., as hate crime became more common-place in state and federal law, it also became less frequently used. The evidence suggests a narrowed benefit from the institutionalization of hate crime. In many jurisdictions, hate crime law appears to be less likely to be used in everyday cases. Nevertheless, extreme instances of terror by non-state actors do still receive hate crime enforcement. Still, in terms of the actual reporting and data collection, hate crime remains a potentially useful indicator as to whether or not a jurisdiction takes a problem like racial violence seriously.

While the robust institutionalization of hate crime may be more infrequent, there are cities where hate crime has remained on the policy agenda for police. Those cities allow investigation of the relationships between neighborhood characteristics and hate crime. In chapter 2 and 3, I examine how racial demographic change is related to racial hate crime, and how neighborhood economic factors influence hate crime. This moves from the law to the social, or more explicitly, the intersection of law and place in an informal jurisdiction called the neighborhood in Los Angeles. I write these two chapters in dialog with the literature after Donald P. Green, Dara Z. Strolovich and Janelle S. Wong's key paper in the literature on neighborhoods and hate crime, "Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime" (1998). There is growing evidence in the sociological literature that the risk of hate crime victimization varies systematically based on the social, economic and demographic

characteristics of the neighborhood. Together, these two chapters update the field's understanding of racially motivated hate crime in neighborhoods, by taking a comparative approach to Los Angeles and analyzing the role of economic factors. I show how and why contemporary Los Angeles leads to different results than what Green, Strolovich, and Wong found for New York in the 1980s. Finally, chapter three elaborates an empirically grounded theory for understanding the association between hate crime and income inequality. It also discusses the similarities and differences between hate crime and crime in general.

Chapter 1:

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF HATE CRIME:
PUBLIC ATTENTION, LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LAW

> A policeman goes to the scene of a crime and there's a dead body, he doesn't know if it's a murder, suicide, manslaughter, first degree or anything else. And [the Uniform Crime Report] doesn't require that he accurately do that. We have a dead body, we go from there. Sometimes the classification has to be changed. We are not going to let technology, or lack of technology, foil us on this basic question.

> John Conyers, Hearing on the Hate Crime Statistics Act, March 21, 1985

Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Michigan) first organized hearings on the newly proposed Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1985. Conyers' interlocutors, members of the Reagan Administration's Department of Justice, refused to collect what they called mere "information" on hate crime, arguing that they were "trying to protect the integrity of a data collection system."[5] They recommended that congress leave the hard "data" to the FBI's UCR, and use a clipping service to track "information" about hate crime. Notwithstanding the clear, congressional intent to produce statistics indicated by the bill's title. Yet, Rep. Conyers refused to allow uncooperative officials and excuses about technology to prevent him from knowing about hate crime in communities across the U.S., and the Hate Crime Statistics Act became Public Law No. 101-275 in 1990.

I start with this hearing, one of the earliest scenes in the history of federal hate crime law, because it addresses the key themes discussed in this chapter: the official database that tracks

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[5] William Baker and Steven Schlesinger, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Congress Serial Number 137, March 21, 1985, pg. 50, 52.

hate crime and the difficulty for the police in confronting bias motivated crime.[6] While most

writing on hate crime focuses on the additional punishment, my research in this chapter focuses

on the earlier notion of data created in the Hate Crime Statistics Act. The most important

consequence of hate crime law is the creation of a data system to track these events because it

provides clear metric of when the justice system takes racism and other kinds of bias seriously,

and it can be used, as in this dissertation, to theorize and analyze inequality.

 Conyers was onto something that we can use theoretically here and now, more than thirty

years later: "we have a dead body, we go from there." The corpse may be indeterminate, but its

counting is not. So, too, hate crime may be indeterminate, but its counting is not. And once

counted and turned into a national body of hate crime statistics, it would be used to monitor the

success or failure of law enforcement. Conyers argued that counting was the "first steps toward

eventual control and eradication of these kinds of crimes."[7] These kinds of crimes have a long

history.

 The story of the death of Eugene Williams in Lake Michigan in 1919 from the

introduction provides another empirical scene to think through Conyers' rhetorical tension

between the officer and the dead body. Police Officer Callahan was already at the scene at the

beach when the violence occurred and refused to make an arrest of the assailant Stauber. Later,

white police search for the rumored drowned white boy and only find Williams' black body.

Today we would call this a hate crime; at the time it was just one part of a larger dynamic of

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[6] Hate Crimes are any criminal acts involving bias-motivated selection of a target. The bias must be based on the certain dimensions of a person's real or perceived characteristics, for instance, their race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability (The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249). Throughout this paper I use bias crime or hate crime interchangeably. Depending on the state, some laws refer to bias motivation, others refer to hate motivation, and others use other terms like ethnic intimidation.

[7] See John Conyers, "It is time that we take the first steps toward eventual control and eradication of these kinds of crimes by requiring the statistics of their incidence be collected at a national level." Hate Crime Statistics Act Hearing, House of Representatives. Thursday, March 21, 1985. Page 1.

anti-black racial violence. Dynamics have changed but clearly hate crime has not been eradicated. Three decades after the first federal hate crime law died in committee this chapter takes stock of where the law, and the empirical evidence and statistics it created, landed. Federal anti-hate crime policy in the 1980s was a push for official government statistics on hate crime. The Black Lives Matter movement has highlighted that what even counts as a crime is still contested, especially when it comes to racial violence that carried out by agents of the state. Has the narrower vision of counted hate crime come to pass? Now that it is on the books, is there a sustained use of the law in action? As this chapter shows, even the first steps of counting hate crimes do not happen evenly. By the end of the 1990s, researchers noted that hate crime law had quickly become institutionalized. Evidence to support the sustained institutionalization of hate crime law in 2016 is mixed at best. On many metrics, hate crime law enforcement has declined, although the evidence indicates that hate crime victimization as a social phenomena remains at similar levels.

As the hearings in the 1980s demonstrate, activists and lawmakers wanted to know how many hate crimes happened each year, and whether this was worse or better than the prior year. In 2015 and 2016 there was considerable attention on collecting accurate statistics on the number of people killed by police each year.[8] The debate over this data follows a similar line of logic as that of the hate crime statistics act hearing in 1985: if we know more details, we will be able to identify the places that need to make changes and control and eradicate police violence. Knowing how many hate crimes were happening in a jurisdiction was a sort of early warning or injury monitoring system.[9] The 1980s were a time of rising crime rates, and it was plausible that hate

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[8] See, e.g. the collection on people killed by police by *the Guardian* newspaper (Swaine et al. 2015).
[9] The idea of using data to know and understand an emerging policy problem that was a longstanding issue was a common one at the time. The first World Conference on Injury Prevention and Control held in 1989.

crime rates were increasing as well.[10] Schools and neighborhoods were integrating, even without

the power of cross-jurisdictional busing plans.[11] In post-civil rights, post-fair housing law

America, move-in violence and harassment was an ongoing problem, and enforcing civil rights

fair housing law, never fully funded to match its mandate, was particularly limited in the 1980s

under the Reagan administration's Department of Justice (Amaker 1988; Bell 2013).

In 2016, we are a long way from the concerns of the mid-1980s but it is important to keep

in mind the scope of the problem, even today. More than 1 in 25 violent crimes are believed by

victims to be a hate crime, according to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).[12] In

contrast, police statistics paint a limited picture of the scope of bias motivated crime and

violence: only 1 in 362 violent crimes reported in the Uniform Crime Report are a hate crime.

This large disparity between police records on hate crime and people's explanations for violence

they experience has many sources. The bias motivation or element in the crime could be

undisclosed, or it could be ignored by first responders. Further, it could be that the victim's idea

of hate motivation cannot be adequately translated into the conversations and evidence that are

needed to produce a hate crime statistic. But the existence of the disparity is troubling, and it

points towards a disagreement between community members and law enforcement about the

scope and scale of hate crime.

As point of scale or comparison for this 1 in 25 violent crime number, we can compare it

to gang-related crime. Gang activity is perceived to be a large problem in many communities—

much larger than hate crime. Far more law enforcement resources are devoted to anti-gang crime

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[10] We could not know for sure because there was no rigorous data being collected on hate crime in either official police crime statistics or in victimization surveys.

[11] Measured by an exposure index – the average percent of black student's school mates that are white – schools were most integrated in the 1980s, and began declining since. See Rivkin, Steven. "Desegregation Since the Coleman Report", *Education Next* 16, 2 Spring 2016.

[12] See Bureau of Justice Statistics report (M. M. Wilson 2014, 3), noting, "In 2012, hate crimes accounted for 1.2% of all victimizations and 4.2% of violent victimizations."

work than anti-hate crime work. In 2013, 55 percent of police departments with 100 or more

officers had officers assigned full-time to a special unit for gangs, in contrast, only 10 percent of

those kinds of departments had a similar staffing in place for hate crime (Reaves 2015, 9).

Yet victims of violence report that their assailants are gang members in 1 out of 17

violent crimes, only slightly more frequently than hate crime. There is also some overlap here: an

estimated 1 out of 10 gang crimes are hate crimes as well, according to NCVS.[13] Thus, official

victimization statistics indicate that bias crime is less frequent than gang crime, but not by much.

The gap between the victimization data on hate crime and the official reports of hate crime paints

a telling picture of the way that officer discretion leads to lack of engagement with the problem

of racism and bias, one that is confirmed by on the ground research in many settings (Bell 1996;

Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996; Bell 2004; Ambikaipaker 2015). While the law was passed the

justice system does not appear to be counting hate crimes correctly. Nevertheless, police reported

hate crime is useful—primarily to understand law enforcement agencies, and how they do or do

not engage with the problems associated with hate crime. It also useful for thinking through the

community characteristics that relate to law enforcement activity on hate crime.

The rest of this chapter evaluates a broad set of data on hate crime to assess whether

trends and patterns reflect an institutionalization of hate crime law or whether conditions indicate

something different, either deinstitutionalization or thin institutionalization. The first part

discusses the value, limits, and consequences of hate crime law, and then turns to a deeper

analysis of the aim to count and the aim to punish in the 1980s. The next part turns to assessing

seven domains where attention and use of hate crime law has either increased or decreased:

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[13] 6 percent of violent crimes are reported to involve a gang member. See discussion in (Harrell 2005); authors
calculations confirm that in 2012, remained at 6.1 percent. Source for 1 in 10 gang crimes are hate crimes, authors
analysis of the NCVS from 2014: 30,396 gang hate crimes / 273,134 total gang crimes = 11.1 percent.

published literature, both scholarly articles and general books; public interest measured by Google searches and newspaper articles; police reported hate crime; police department polices and staffing for hate crime enforcement; prosecutions and police activity in California; and appellate court cases. I assess changes in these areas after the exogenous shocks of 2008-2010: the great recession, and the way that hate crime law became implicated in the political divisions of the first term of the Obama presidency. I conclude with an assessment of what this means for our understanding of legal remedies pursued by social movements, in particular the intersection of the crime victims and civil rights movements (Jenness and Broad 1997; Jenness and Grattet 2004) and contemporary civil rights activism in the black lives matter movement and its intersection with movements for police accountability.

Assessing the Value of Hate Crime Law

The hate crime law framework resulted from a mobilization of civil rights social movements and victim's rights advocates. Jenness and Broad (1997), Maroney (1998), and Jenness and Grattet (2004) show how the modern civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the gay and lesbian movement each contributed various tactics and concerns that coalesced with elements of the more conservative victim's rights movement to make hate crime an issue. These movements articulated concerns about the harms of victimization and made rights claims that led to public policy debates and legal activity. Their common ground was the claim that personal victimization was among the problems created by domination along axes of racial, ethnic, gendered, and sexual orientation. This fit with the victim's rights movement's arguments and claims that personal victimization was political, and that law should intervene to respect and protect victim's rights.

The hate crime framework is a limited solution, one that relies on the force and violence of the law to remedy individual cases that are arguably manifestations of deep inequality and cultural practices of domination. There are robust critiques of the utility of hate crime punishment as a legal doctrine (Jacobs and Potter 1998). Hate crime has been criticized for merely enhancing punishment for individual offenders, and there are growing numbers of civil rights groups that oppose hate crime law as part of a larger strategy of decarceration and prison abolition (Whitlock 2001; Conrad 2012; D. Meyer 2014; Spade 2015). The critique of punishment as a flawed solution to the harms of racist crime may be a special case to the general abolitionist critique of punishment as a flawed solution to the problem of crime. Still, the critique extends beyond that to the specific issue of the law's commitment to the maintenance of systems of racialized disadvantage. This is a structural critique of law that argues that any claim to racial justice under law faces law's commitment to colorblindness (Han 2015). As Dean Spade argues, hate crime law "assumes a level playing field in which race consciousness, not white supremacy, is the problem the law must seek to eliminate." (Spade 2013, 1034). As a criminal offense, hate crime law relies on law enforcement actors that may be biased themselves and often are pursuing their own agendas of racial boundary defense (Muñiz 2015; Muñiz 2014; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn 2012). Further, hate crime has been characterized as an over-determined outlet for civil rights advocates in a culture gone far too "tough on crime" (Simon 2007).[14] Other criticism includes the conservative concern for state rights, on grounds that the

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[14] Simon's argument regarding civil rights, while it points toward a key weakness of the tough of crime approach, remains tangential to the main argument about politics and crime. In *Governing Through Crime*, Simon does not see how the disparate impact of hate crime, as both a legacy of lynching and state sponsored racial terror, or in particular the longstanding tradition of neighborhood-based, housing related crime, what called "crimes without punishments" can be ameliorated by the creation of hate crime law.

law federalizes crime enforcement, taking away, in Senator Orrin Hatch's words, the "traditional police power of the states."[15]

Yet these critiques rarely dispute the social distinctiveness of the problem, and hate crime law is now an accepted means of penalizing individual criminal acts that once were given state sanction or approval. Many early calls for federal intervention against racist crime hoped that this intervention – even if just limited to punishing individuals – would have a larger deterrent effect against people inclined to be racist, both private individuals and public agents. Federal action was often seen as the only real option given lax local law enforcement actors who were sympathetic to racist criminal behavior (*Chicago Defender* 1943). As implemented at the local level, hate crime law increases incentives for police action in minor vandalism cases, and these cases matter for preserving fair access to housing and supporting integrated U.S. neighborhoods (Bell 2013). Over 175,000 hate crimes have been reported through federal statistics that started in 1991, and many have been prosecuted. In California since 1995, there have been over 2,400 hate crime convictions.[16] Compared to the first half of the 20th century, it appears that there are fewer neighborhoods that aim to control the racial and demographic make of their neighbors through threat of violence, vandalism and assault, or through legal means like race based zoning, racially restrictive covenants (Brooks and Rose 2013; Greeley 1977; W. J. Wilson and Taub 2006; Pattillo 2007; S. G. Meyer 2001; Nicolaides 2002; Hirsch 1998).[17]

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[15] Hatch was also concerned that removing the death penalty would undermine the force of deterrence (Judiciary Committee 2002, 34–35).

[16] Annual reports on hate crime prepared by the California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center summarize this information. I compiled information from the last twenty reports and have summarized it in Appendix Table TK. These convictions remain rare. In the decade from 2005 to 2014, there were 11,344 hate crimes reported by California Law Enforcement. Of those cases, 34 percent were referred to prosecutors, 22 percent were filed with hate crime charges, and 8 percent ended with a hate crime conviction.

[17] For more information on the decline (or not) of hate crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods, see later chapters. The turn away from explicit racial programs has been uneven (see the history of public school segregation and funding). And in many ways, the latent function of "market forces" transforming many U.S. cities has disparate racial impact.

An institutional consequence of hate crime law within police agencies is the creation of a data system to track these events. While most writing on hate crime focuses on the additional punishment, I focus on the earlier notion of data that the Hate Crime Statistics Act invoked.[18] Hate crime law established a classification system for counting once as a crime, and once as a hate crime. It is the double counting through this new classification system, more than the double punishing, that I am interested in.[19] Counting as a hate crime generates data on particular incidents. But in aggregate it also sheds light on when the criminal justice system takes racism and other forms of bias seriously. Creating a way to know whether law enforcement was taking real steps to address bias was a key intention of the civil rights oriented supporters of hate crime law from its passage (Fernandez 1991; Rubenstein 2004). When bias crime cases (especially those reported in the media) are not handled as such by law enforcement during the investigation, and not reported in hate crime statistics, we have evidence of neglect and failing to take racism and other forms of bias seriously.

And those failures lead to another institutional consequence of hate crime law. Failure to police hate crime is a form of policing with bias and now can trigger federal intervention. For example, after police failed to respond to a series of hate crime beatings that escalated to a hate crime murder, the U.S. Attorney and Department of Justice began an intervention in 2009 in Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) in Long Island, New York (Barnard 2009; Southern Poverty Law Center 2009). After an investigation, the U.S. and SCPD entered a settlement agreement covering policy and practice, with extensive monitoring in areas of bias free policing,

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This led Saskia Sassen, one of the preeminent scholar of global cities, to call for a new language of "expulsion" to describe the scope of exclusion (Sassen 2014).

[18] For example, scholars have identified a "surplus of law" in hate crime punishment since hate crime is a sentencing enhancement to an underlying crime (Grattet and Jenness 2005).

[19] For discussion of classification, see (Bowker and Star 2000).

hate crimes and hate incidents, language access, allegations of police misconduct, and community engagement.[20]

In sum, there are some real limits of hate crime—it cannot provide individual remedy for structural discrimination and the civil rights intent is captured by its structural location as a punishment enhancement in criminal law. Nevertheless, hate crime law does adds incentive to investigate criminal acts like move-in violence and harassment that historically were state-sanctioned (Bell 2013; Du Bois 1899; Christopher 1991; Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922). Some scholars have called these crimes without punishments, "for the almost total absence of police response" (Rubinowitz and Perry 2001). Bias-motivated violence is a component part of a larger cultural logic or social thing (Lemert 2006; Perry 2001). I think that turning to more specific forms of this social thing, rephrased, such as anti-integrationist violence, or anti-black crime, or anti-LGBT violence may be more useful for moving the discussion and research forward and out of the morass of punishment and speech protections.[21]

From an organizational sociology perspective, hate crime is a paradoxical way to address this core problem at the heart of law enforcement – the treatment of and responsiveness to communities that are not traditionally represented in the ranks of law enforcement or treated with full dignity and respect. Even if hate crime law has not produced the intended outcomes of furthering equality and ensuring that law enforcement actors respond appropriately to racist crime and do not commit acts of extra legal racial violence, it has some other effects. The development of the hate crime data archive allows us to nuance the social problem of racial violence; it moves beyond the original focus on private violence to racial violence that has as its

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[20] Settlement agreement between the United States and Suffolk County Police Department, January 13, 2014. Available online at https://perma.cc/7D4P-GHK2. The agreement is notable as it was authorized by Loretta Lynch, current Attorney General, then US Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.
[21] Another way of thinking differently about hate crime would be to see it as a legacy of segregation.

agents both private individuals and state actors. Thus hate crime law has institutional effects, both as an indicator or data classification system and as a trigger for federal monitoring and intervention to protect civil rights.[22]

Surplus Data Collection Efforts and Surplus Punishment in the 1980s.

It is important to note two things about the emergence of hate crime law proposals in the 1980s. The first federal hate crime law proposed new classifications in data collection, not enhanced penalties. It was a law with a temporary, 5-year directive creating institutional responsibilities to report hate crime. It is not a law that adds sentencing enhancements or a law that prohibits hate speech to deter or punish individual perpetrators, although both ideas were in discussion at the time in legal and policy circles (Matsuda 1989). Related to this, both official and unofficial data collection efforts pre-dated the federal and state legal mandates to collect data, and the hate crime statistics act affirmed these existing efforts at constructing a racism injury surveillance system (Ethington and West 1998; Jenness and Grattet 2004; Los Angeles Cty, Cmssn on Human Relations, and United States of America 1989; Hatcher 1990; Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1981; Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1980).

A second point to note is how the policy proposal for hate crime criminalization compared to the war on drugs. There were other crimes on the policy agenda for criminalization in 99th 1985-1986 Congress, namely cocaine drug use under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. That act increased mandatory minimums for drug offenses and created the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, a classic example of racial discrimination through disparate impact.[23]

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[22] At least this is the case under the current leadership of the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Division.

[23] See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 99–570. *See also Kimbrough v. United States,* 522 U.S. 85, 5 (2007), at 5: "Although chemically similar, crack and powder cocaine are handled very differently for sentencing purposes. The

The 99th Congress created classifications between seemingly identical offenses and required more intense punishment for one over the other. This work of classification happened for crack versus powder cocaine: possession of identical amounts of drugs led to 3-6 times more punishment. In contrast, hate crime law had very different emphasis on data collection and statistics. Thus, more than just the tough on crime style of extra punishment, hate crime fits in with civil rights claims which sought to develop statistical frameworks and evidence of bias to identify inequality and justify remedies (Blank et al. 2004). Hate crime is situated in criminal law, but its framing is in civil rights law and in particular in civil rights efforts to collect data to better measure and observe racial discrimination in employment, education, and housing.

Addressing the Hate Crime Problem?

Once the HCSA passed, the 1990s saw sharp increases in police reported hate crime, and many read these as increased prevalence of hate crime victimization. A more accurate view might have been that changes in police reported crime numbers in the UCR were changes in reporting behavior. A well-established theory in sociology and criminology described this as "rate producing behavior," wherein police organizations change their behavior on filing and compiling crime reports into statistics for federal data collections (Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963; Black 1970; McCleary, Nienstedt, and Erven 1982). Nevertheless, this more cautious perspective was not commonly applied to understandings of hate crime in the 1990s. Scholars declared it the decade of "the rising tide of hate" (Levin and MacDevitt 1993) and the annual release of new hate crime statistics was a newsworthy event (Sengupta 1993). There was increased public and scholarly attention to hate crime.

100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs." (NAS Report Measuring Racial Discrimination, page 46). For discussion of classification, see also Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, 1999 *Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences,* Cambridge: MIT Press.

By the late 1990s, the implementation of policy as the hate crime concept was institutionalized in law enforcement (Jenness and Grattet 2004; Phillips and Grattet 2000). The last Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality of hate crime law was *Apprendi v. New Jersey* in 2000. Hate crime appears to be a normal, rather than heavily contested, part of law. Since that institutionalization, however, police and prosecutors appear to have had other priorities – terrorism, surviving austere budgetary pressures, and police community relations in the wake of violence against people of color have all taken center stage in the last 15 years. In 1999, the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations publicly complained that police agencies were reporting zero hate crimes to maintain a false "bigotry-free image" (Hong 1999). These other priorities have consequences: over the last eight years, since the great recession and the election of President Barack Obama, there have been fairly low numbers of police reported hate crimes, and low substantive participation by police and prosecutors.[24] Where does that leave the problem of hate crime? Is the law on the books still actively used to address the problem, or is it a thin institutionalization, merely papering over the problem but decoupled from regular practice?

Has hate crime declined?

There appears to be a general agreement among hate crime scholars that research in the field has been in decline for more than a decade. Donald Green and Amber Spry, in a review essay, have termed it the "rise and decline of hate crime research" (2014:229), and note a few possible reasons for decline. First, hate crime was an interdisciplinary topic and did not get established as a core research area in a discipline, like prejudice has been established in social

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[24] Nevertheless, the passage of the Matthew Shepherd and James Byrd Hate Crimes Prevention Act created new federal possibility to intervene in state cases, effectively federalizing hate crime law for states that lack certain status provisions like sexual orientation, or that lack hate crime law entirely, whether like Georgia, due to court rulings of unconstitutionality or South Carolina, due to never passing legislation.

psychology, second, hate crime was crowded out by interest in genocide and implicit bias; and third, hate crime research was methodologically vulnerable (Green and Spry 2014).

These explanations for decline are limited to factors internal to the academic field, and are not measured empirically. Further, they do not address hate crime as a policy domain, and the state of its institutionalization as a normal part of law in the U.S. (Burstein 1991; Jenness and Grattet 2004). But the hate crime policy domain is full of measurable outcomes, and include whether hate crime increased or decreased in: (a) frequency of events (i.e. perpetration or victimization), (b) level of public attention and of social movement concern, (c) policies, training, staffing, and enforcement activities by police and prosecutors, (d) legislature lawmaking, or (e) interpretation in courts. Hate crime may have really declined in many of those areas, as well as in academia.

If hate crime is declining empirically on any of these metrics it raises questions about whether it remains equally institutionalized as a legal remedy to the social problem of bias motivated crime. Was there an aggregate decline in legal institutionalization of hate crime? For the analytic purposes of this chapter, I will refer to this overall decline as thin institutionalization, but others use stronger terms like deinstitutionalization or failed institutionalization (G. F. Davis and Anderson 2008; Jepperson 1991).[25] Thin institutionalization is somewhat of a play on words related to the classic "law on the books, law in action" distinction in law and society research. As good law on books, hate crime law is a piece of paper with value but one among many in a stacked patrol book. For example, the NYPD patrol guide has more than 2,000 pages. But as I show below, on many metrics, hate crime law has declined; while it still *may* be put into action,

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[25] Jepperson notes that deinstitutionalization is one of the four major types of institutional change, and defines as follows: "Deinstitutionalization represents an exit from institutionalization, toward reproduction through recurrent action, or nonreproductive patterns, or social entropy." (1991, 152)

when it is called for is rarer, and more and more related to exceptional cases of terrorism. Thus, hate crime law has come to thinly paper over a deeper structural problem, as wallpaper would paper over a crack in a wall, hiding a foundational problem in a house.

Hate Crime Publications: Books and Scholarly Articles

In order to test whether there has been a decline in publication on the matter from a sociological and criminological perspective from the 1990s to 2016, I analyzed articles on hate crime in the top twenty journals in "Sociology" and "Criminology, Criminal Law, and Policing." I also analyzed data on hate or bias crime published in English from the Google Books corpus, although this is available only up to 2008.[26] Because of the different time frames and low numbers in the results, I do not assess these in terms of institutionalization, but read them as indicators of level of scholarly interest, a form of public interest.

If these top journals have published fewer recent articles about hate crime, it would indicate a declining interest in the field within the mainstream of the disciplines. If the journals maintain interest or increase, then there is limited evidence of decline. Similarly, if fewer books discuss hate crime, there is evidence for the proposition that attention to hate crime has declined.

I used the following steps to conduct the analysis. For scholarly journals: I pulled a list of the top twenty journals from Google Scholar metrics, based on the index version June 2015. Next, I searched in Google Scholar and on journal website archives for articles with the phrases "bias crime" or "hate crime", and then assessed whether each result was about hate crime. Articles not about hate crime were not included.[27] Book reviews, prefaces, or interviews were

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[26] Due to litigation between Google and the Authors Guild over the Google Books project, recent data is not available. For more information on Google Books, *see* Michel, J.B., et al, "Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books", *Science 16 Dec 2010: pp. DOI: 10.1126/science.1199644*

[27] Many frequently only had bias crime in a citation, or a brief discussion of bias crime as part of a larger literature review. Book reviews, while indicative of scholarly interest in hate crime, were excluded because they appear in the data from Google books n-gram viewer analysis.

also excluded. Two of the journals, *Criminology* and the *British Journal of Criminology*, appear on both lists, leaving 38 unique high ranked journals.

For the Google Books corpus, I used the Google n-gram viewer (Michel et al. 2010). While there are concerns about the quality of this data source for some analysis, the narrow question and the contemporary frame of my analysis ensures the data is robust to these critiques (Pechenick, Danforth, and Dodds 2015).

As a check to the robustness, I also conducted two sensitivity analyses. First, I reviewed publications in two less well-known journals that publish frequently on hate crime: the *American Behavioral Scientist* and the *Journal of Hate Studies*.[28] Second, I also analyzed a narrower set of 6 "top journals" in criminology and sociology used in a recent analysis of social networks in criminology (Papachristos 2011).[29]

In sociology, 9 of top 20 journals published on hate crime or bias crime from 1990-March 2016.[30] In criminology, criminal law, and policing, 14 journals published on hate crime or bias crime during that period.[31] Two of the journals, *Criminology* and the *British Journal of*

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[28] The *American Behavioral Scientist* publishes 12 issues a year (14 a year since 2014) with each issue focused on a single topic. The *Journal of Hate Studies* publishes a single issue most years, since 2002.

[29] Papachristos used the following journals (Google Scholar discipline ranking listed first). Sociology: 5 *American Journal of Sociology*, 1 *American Sociological Review* and 14 *Social Forces*. Criminology 1 *Criminology*, 6 *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, and 9 *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*. Public health: 1 *American Journal of Public Health* and 4 *American Journal of Epidemiology* (ranked 4 in epidemiology metrics, but not included in public health metrics).

[30] These 9 sociological journals published on hate crime from 1990- March 2016: 1 *American Sociological Review* (4 articles), 4 *Annual Review of Sociology* (1 article), 5 *American Journal of Sociology* (5 articles), 6 *Criminology* (3 articles), 11 *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2 articles), 14 *Social Forces* (5 articles), 16 *Sociology* (6 articles), 17 *British Journal of Criminology* (13 articles), and 20 *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (8 articles).

The following 11 sociological journals had no articles published on hate crime or bias crime during that period: 2 *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 3 *Demography*, 7 *European Sociological Review*, 8 *British Journal of Social Work*, 9 *Journal of Population Economics*, 10 *Population and Development Review*, 12 *Antipode*, 13 *Social Science Research*, 15 *Theory, Culture & Society*, 18 *Qualitative Research*, and 19 *Journal of European Social Policy*.

[31] These 14 criminological journals published in hate crime: 1 *Criminology* (3 articles, also above), 2 *Criminal Justice and Behavior* (3 articles), 3 *British Journal of Criminology* (13 articles, also above), 4 *Journal of Criminal Justice* (1 article), 5 *Justice Quarterly* (4 articles), 7 *Law and Human Behavior* (2 articles), 8 *Criminology & Public Policy* (1 article), 9 *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* (4 articles), 10 *Crime & Delinquency* (2 articles), 12

Criminology, appear on both lists, leaving 38 unique journals. The *British Journal of Criminology* was most active, especially recently, with 8 articles published from 2014-March 2016. Next most active were the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, with 8 articles, mostly before 2002 and mostly addressing the constitutionality of hate crime law in the U.S., and *Theoretical Criminology*, also with 8 articles, all after 2002. The two special journals published 121 articles on hate crime over the period, all were published from 2001 to 2015.[32]

The evidence in favor of a decline in the core disciplines of the academic field addressing hate crime, sociology and criminology, is not obvious. Figure 1.1 indicates low publication in top journals – only 0-2 articles a year from 1990-2000 except for 1998, when 3 were published. Since 2001, the modal number of articles in top journals was 4, and 2015 marked a high. Also since 2001, there have been a large number of hate crime articles published in the two select interdisciplinary journals that have substantial hate crime articles.[33]

International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology (1 article), 13 *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* (8 articles), 14 *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* (1 article), 15 *Theoretical Criminology* (8 articles), and 16 *European Journal of Criminology* (1 article).

The following criminological journals had no articles on hate crime or bias crime: 6 *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 11 *Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment*, 17 *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 18 *Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health*, 19 *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, and 20 *Legal and Criminological Psychology*.

[32] The *American Behavioral Scientist* published four separate issues on hate crime: November 2015 (9 articles in a double issue), and October 2007 (14 articles), September 2002 (9 articles), December 2001 (10 articles).

[33] Fitting a line to this data, only for the two sets of top ranked journals is y = 0.22 x + 0, with R² = 0.39. Including every article weighted equally, y = 0.59x + 0, R² = 0.53. Both are positive, indicating increase.

Figure 1.1 Research Articles on Hate Crime in Ranked Journals
Note: Because *Criminology* and the *British Journal of Criminology* are listed in both, I only include their results for the Criminology, Criminal Law and Policing set.

Looking at the narrow set of only 6 journals in figure 1.2, there are far fewer articles on hate crime: 21 articles over 25 years. Recent years are not as robust as peak period between 2003-2009, when 12 articles were published over 7 years. Here, the evidence is for growth followed by decline.

Figure 1.2 Research Articles on Hate Crime in "Top Journals" in Criminology and Sociology

Adding another variable helps make sense of this. Figure 1.3 shows that academic journals explicitly framed as international or British published more on hate crime than journals framed as American or U.S. based. International/British journals have continued to publish more recently even as U.S. journals volume declined. In sociology, the three journals most frequently publishing on hate crime – *British Journal of Criminology* (13 articles), *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (8 articles), and *Sociology* (6 articles) – are based in the U.K. Thus, evidence that hate crime scholarship is on the decline could be said to be limited to the core of the disciplines in the United States. Conversely, any evidence of sustained interest appears mostly from the U.K. or international journal editors.[34]

American

1991-1995	5
1996-2000	6
2001-2005	13
2006-2010	10
2011-2015	8

International or British

1991-1995	1
1996-2000	1
2001-2005	9
2006-2010	5
2011-2015	20

Figure 1.3 Articles on Hate Crime in Ranked Journals by Type, 1990-2015

Google Books Corpus

Another piece of evidence supports the rise and decline of interest thesis. The Google Books corpus n-gram tool allows analysis of the record of the phrases "hate crime" or "bias

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[34] Of course, there is a limit to this – some of the papers published in the U.K. are about the U.S. and vice versa. So there may be a phenomenon of specialization.

crime" in English literature (this includes scientific writing as well so there may be slight overlap with the journals analyzed above). Here the evidence appears to support the notion of a rise and decline. Publications mentioning hate crime peak in 2002, and decline to 1991 levels by 2008.[35]

Figure 1.4 Google N-Gram for Hate Crime in English Literature, 1985-2008.

Note: This Google n-gram covers search terms hate crime and bias crime in plural and singular form with variations for capitalization.

So where does that leave the analysis? On the whole, it appears that publications on hate crime are down if you measure books, but that journal evidence is inconsistent. International and British journals have maintained high levels of publication but U.S. focused journals are in somewhat of a decline, especially in the core of the discipline. But there remains some intellectual interest: a newly formed section on hate crime and terrorism in the American Society

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[35] As mentioned above, due to litigation between Google and the Authors Guild over the Google Books project, more recent data is not available.

of Criminology may be able to reverse some of this pattern of decline.[36] Using the index from the

annual meeting program, 2013-2015 averaged 21 presentations a meeting related to hate crime

enough for an index entry. In 2006-2012, the average was 11 presentations per meeting.

Is this random variation around a mean, or do these points of evidence fit with a larger

story of declining U.S. interest in hate crime? In what follows, I analyze what changes in public

attention, in policy, in practice, and in offending behavior are associated with these dynamics,

and how they are related to the institutionalization or deinstitutionalization of hate crime.

Public Interest: Google searches on hate crime and newspaper articles

Turning to things less academic – what is the level of public interest in hate crime, and is

it stable, increasing, or decreasing? In contrast to Google books data, this third data point,

weekly data on Google searches for hate crime, does reach the present. Data from 2004 to mid-

2016 is shown in figure 1.5. These data points show declining attention to hate crime, in support

of the deinstitutionalization thesis.

The line in figure 1.5 indicates declining Google Search activity on hate crime keywords.

In the last 8 years there remains some sporadic high interest in hate crime in a particular week,

but attention fades quickly and is not sustained the way it was in 2004 and 2005. Searches for

hate crime spiked in June 2015 to a level unseen in the last 5 years after the Charleston church

shooting, indicating episodic interest. But episodic interest is insufficient to be classified as

routine, institutionalized practice. Some seasonal effect appears to cycle in the search, likely a

result of the annual news cycle related to the release of hate crime data by the FBI, state, and

local agencies, as well as hate crime proposals on legislative calendars. There also may be some

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[36] There was a track on "Terrorism, Militia and Hate Crimes" at the Annual Society of Criminology meetings in 1999 and 2000.

seasonal influence due to hate crime courses in universities. The strength—and weakness—of

this data is that it treats every search equally. But it supports the notion of declining public

attention to hate crime.

Figure 1.5. Weekly Google Searches in the United States for Hate Crime with Locally Weighted
Scatterplot Smoothing (LOESS), 2004-2016
Source: Google search trends.
Note: The Google search terms used for the trends report include hate crime and bias crime in
plural and singular form. Each data point is re-based relative to the peak value, the last week of
October 2009, when President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act into law.

What about newspapers and media?

In order to better grasp this phenomena of declining interest, I turn now to two key

newspapers: the *Los Angeles Times* and the *New York Times*. Newspapers are important for

many reasons, not least of which is for their role in mediating the "imagined community," as

noted by Benedict Anderson.[37] Social scientists have used analysis of newspaper accounts to

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[37] Anderson is worth quoting at length on this point about the newspaper as cultural product: "In this perspective,
the newspaper is merely an 'extreme form' of the book, a book sold on a colossal scale, but of ephemeral popularity.
Might we say: one-day best-sellers? The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its printing . . . creates
this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption ('imagining') of the newspaper-
as-fiction. We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed between this

understand racial violence and other conflicts (Olzak 1992). While news stories on racial

violence or hate crime reflect, in some mediated way, social behavior, I do not turn to

newspapers (or Google searches for that matter) to try and understand prevalence of hate crime

as an actual event. Here, I read them narrowly in aggregate numbers as a shifting indicator of

public attention to hate crime measured by what is considered interesting news, fit to print.

I choose the *Los Angeles Times* because it is the largest paper by circulation in California

and Los Angeles, and the *New York Times* because it is considered the national newspaper of

record.[38] I queried Lexis Nexis and Proquest databases for articles on hate crime and grouped

them into monthly counts for the years 1990 to March 2016. There is some statistical hazard here

as this data is not robustly coded but is merely aggregated search results. In this way it is like the

Google Search results analyzed above, and approximates approaches used by Franco Moretti

(2007) and others in the Stanford Literary Lab. I analyze these data by periods based on the

paper's editor to control for some factors related to selection of topics for news, as well as the

way changes in editors are tied to larger changes in technology and investigative and reporting

functions (Siles and Boczkowski 2012; Gade 2008; D. J. Myers and Caniglia 2004, 539). The

contemporary problems of journalism—Internet competition and debt-laden owners were acute

at the *Los Angeles Times*, leading to editor resignations and restructuring in the news department

in the 1990s throughout the 2000s (Pogash 1995; Gitlin 1997; Seelye 2006; Meyerson 2008).

hour and that, only on this day not that. . . . The significance of this mass ceremony - Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers - is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by the thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily of half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?" (B. R. O. . Anderson 1996, 33–35).

[38] See Myers and Caniglia, "In the collection of event data from newspapers, the *New York Times* is the undisputed default source. Just as the *Times* can dominate public news consumption, so it dominates event-based social science data." (D. J. Myers and Caniglia 2004, 522). They also caution "Trends in newspaper-based data may be less trends in the empirical events and more reflections of changing technology" (539).

While more stable financially, the same systemic financial pressures have led to newsroom cuts

and changes in management in New York as well (Semuels and Rainey 2014; Beaujon 2014).

Figure 1.6 Monthly coverage of hate crime in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, 1990-2016 with series divided under editor (Scatter and LOESS line).

Sources: NYT articles from Lexis Nexis, using Lexis Nexis key hate crime, LAT articles from Proquest with search for plural or singular phrases "bias crime" and "hate crime."

Results

The *New York Times* has had less dramatic changes in the level of articles on hate crime compared to clear rise and clear decline in the *Los Angeles Times*. Nevertheless, the NYT published roughly half the number of articles on hate crime in 2014 as it did in 1990, so there is evidence of decline. The *Los Angeles Times* published more articles (3,104) on hate crime than the *New York Times* (1,897) over this period. Nevertheless, from 1990-94, the NYT averaged 7.0 articles a month compared to the LAT average of 3.3. By 1995-1999, the LAT had begun to publish more and the NYT slightly less. The table 1.1 below and figure 1.6 above indicate these trends, by scatterplot of hate crime related articles published per month with LOESS lines drawn within each editorial term. They indicate hate crime is less frequently discussed in the major newspapers than it used to be, providing support for the thesis of decline.

Real Problems or Mediated Public Anxiety?

If either news coverage or police reporting of crimes as bias motivated is influenced by public anxiety over hate crime, high dots in the *Los Angeles Times* series in 1999, 2001 and 2007 may be related to high profile incidents, such as the shooting at the Jewish community center in the San Fernando Valley in 1999, and the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The 2007 spike seems related to the high profile hate crime shooting of 14 year old Cheryl Green in December 2006 in Harbor Gateway, Los Angeles (Quinones 2006). What is unclear is whether it is increased reporting or increased crime; a case could be made for both. Clearly there was increased law enforcement attention on the issue: a month after the shooting, Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, FBI Director Robert Mueller, Police Chief William Bratton, and Sheriff Lee Baca all gathered to declare a unified response against "fear" and gang violence in Harbor Gateway. This case generated significant interest in the local and national papers throughout 2007, and

raised the profile of gang-related hate crime (Archibold 2007; McGreevy and Winton 2007; Quinones 2007a).[39] I discuss the Los Angeles situation more in the next two chapters analyzing the neighborhood patterns of hate crime.

Editorial Changes and "Public Attention"

Are changes in what is "interesting" merely the whims of editors? If that is the case, this strengthens the argument of deinstitutionalization or declining interest. There does appear to be some evidence for editorial tenure effects related to decline. For the *New York Times* there is an observable decline between the editorial period of Max Frankel (1986 to June 1994) Joseph Lelyveld (July 1994- August 2001), and again from Lelyveld to Raines. There is a slight increase from Raines to Keller, but a decline from Keller to Abrams. Editorial effects are observable with a point estimate, but the only statistically significant editor-to-editor change is from Keller to Abramson (two-sample unequal variance t-test, robust for heteroscedasticity, results in p value of .034). Further analysis for differences using annual counts of NYPD reported hate crimes also point toward the Abramson era as relatively less concerned with hate crime – 7.2 NYPD reported hate crimes per article on hate crime in the New York Times, whereas the others (truncated at 1992 when data was first available) had a slightly lower ratio at 4.8 NYPD reported hate crimes per article.

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[39] Since the earliest legislation around "racial ethnic and religious motivated crimes" in California, (SB 2080, 1984), gangs have been included as examples of possible perpetrators. "The crimes that shall be the focus of this chapter shall include a wide variety of incidents, which reflect obvious racial, ethnic, or religious motivations, ranging from . . . assaults between members of gangs, including, but not limited to, incidents that occur on school grounds and between gang members . . ." (CA Penal Law 13872.1) In practice, however, gang motivation often serves as a reason for investigators to over-look bias motivations. See, e.g. (Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996). This practice may be changing, however, as the first convictions under the 2009 federal hate crime law in Southern California were two Latino gang members who were charged with assaulting a Black family that had recently moved into the neighborhood (Winton 2013).

Table 1.1

Newspaper Editors Coverage of Hate Crime in the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times,* 1990-2016

New York Times

Executive Editor	Since	Articles on Hate Crime per Month (1990- March 2016)	
		Average	SD
Max Frankel	1986	7.3	5.9
Joseph Lelyveld	July, 1994	6.3	5.5
Howell Raines	September, 2001	4.9	2.7
Bill Keller	July, 2003	5.1	3.8
Jill Abramson	September, 2011	4.0	2.0
Dean Baquet	May, 2014	10.0	15.3

Los Angeles Times

Editor	Since	Articles on Hate Crime per Month (January 1990- March 2016)	
		Average	SD
Shelby Coffey	1989	4.2	4.7
Michael Parks	October, 1997	25.9	17.1
John Carroll	April, 2000	16.9	10.9
Dean Baquet	July, 2005	7.0	4.8
James O'Shea	November, 2006	12.1	8.2
Russell Stanton	February, 2008	6.9	4.1
Davan Maharaj	November, 2011	5.6	3.6

The *Los Angeles Times* had seven editors over this time period, there appears to be a significant increase from Shelby Coffey, III to Michael Parks ($p < 0.001$) concurrent with expanding hate crime law and institutionalization in Los Angeles and California. There is a decrease from Parks to the John Carroll era ($p = 0.012$) – a time when police reported hate crime has begun to decline. While the numbers are fairly small, there is another decrease from Carroll

to Baquet ($p < 0.001$), and no change from Baquet to O'Shea and from Russ Stanton to Davan Maharaj. Some of these editors have written about hate crimes when they reporters – current editor in chief and publisher Davan Maharaj wrote multiple stories for the *Los Angeles Times* on hate crime in the 1990s. For example, see two accounts of hate crime events in Orange County (both housing related violence). [40]

In sum, publications on hate crime in the United States—whether measured as books, scholarly journals or newspaper articles—have declined. And there are consistently fewer Google searches about hate crime now than there were in 2004-2008. This matters for the institutionalization of hate crime law within legal organizations like police departments and prosecutors offices because with a limited set of resources, agencies must make choices about priorities. Public attention is thus a mechanism that could influence everyday practice in agencies.

Nevertheless, there is evidence of renewed robust interest in hate crime in UK and international journals. For newspapers, where publication life cycles are shorter than books or journals, there are recent increases in attention, especially in light of the wake of the summer of 2015, with the Charleston church shooting and the Donald J. Trump presidential campaign provoking attention to hate crime (Schmidt and Pérez-peña 2015; Remnick 2015; Osnos 2015; Berman 2015; The Editorial Board 2016). [41] This renewed attention to hate crime among the mainstream press is substantial and includes some broader analysis. Instead of an individualized account common to journalism, it frequently includes an analysis of the link between the hate crime and politics—long emphasized by people writing about racial violence (Du Bois 1998;

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[40] Maharaj, Davan, "Gay Activist Victimized by Vandals" *Los Angeles Times*, Oct 31, 1990 p.7 Maharaj, Davan, "Hate-Crime Victim Vows to Stay and Defy Racists Vandalism," *Los Angeles Times,* Nov 21, 1990, p1.
[41] Also, the shooting at Orlando's Pulse nightclub in June 2016 brought more attention to hate crime, although it occurred after this study was completed.

Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Whether it adequately addresses structural, racial inequality is a separate question. Next I turn to data from the criminal justice system to analyze whether hate crime remains a normal part of law.

Hate Crime Reported by Police

When I worked at the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations in 2006-2008 as a Human Relations Consultant Aide, I read police reports of possible hate crime cases where neighbor disputes turned along lines of difference and escalated into vandalism, road rage encounters involved homophobic rants and threats, phone calls with vague threats harass mother and child, and repeated robberies at a park targeting a certain type of person.[42] These cases show evidence of bias-motivation but not enough to exist as hate crime in court – police do not refer them as such to prosecutors, and if they did, they would not be pursued.[43] Nevertheless, they chill participation in the public sphere in ways that mere crime does not because they invoke group or identity based forms of exclusion and often reference legacies of violence (Brubaker 2009; Smångs 2015; Ward 2015; Emirbayer and Desmond 2015). And many of these kinds of cases get tracked under hate crime statistics. Law enforcement officers check the "bias related" box on the police report, triggering a second level review process, that then leads to a case showing up in an annual report on hate crime published by a state attorney general's office, the FBI's Uniform Crime Report, or, as in the data used in this dissertation, the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations.[44] The following table 1.2 demonstrates the distribution of cases that lead to conviction versus cases that are reported in crime statistics in California from 2004-2014.

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[42] Anecdotes drawn from the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission's collection of hate crime cases.

[43] Assuming police identify a suspect. In many cases that remains unknown.

[44] After consultation with various police departments, the two-tier review process was proposed as best practice for collecting and reviewing hate crime statistics in the initial FBI training guide, available as early as 1991. FBI *Training Guide for Hate Crime Data Collection* report (n. d.), citied in (Fernandez 1991, 262). By the mid 1990s,

Table 1.2. Hate Crime Case Processing in California, 2004-2014

	(#)	As percent of police reported (%)	As percent of prior step in process (%)
Police Reported	12,653	100	
Referred to Prosecutors	4,215	33.3	33.3
Hate Crime Charges Filed	2,781	22.0	66.0
Hate Crime Conviction	1,096	8.7	39.4

Source: California Department of Justice, Annual Reports on Hate Crime in California 2004-2014

Over 12,500 hate crime events were reported by law enforcement, and of those, 1 in 3 were referred to prosecutors. Prosecutors filed hate crime charges in 2,781 cases, or 2 out 3 of those referred. In sum, this led to 1,096 convictions, or 9 percent of original cases reported by police.[45] In what follows, I go into detail where possible to discuss how these findings indicate that law enforcement has a declining attention to hate crime, and where that indicates failed institutionalization or deinstitutionalization.

In 1999, Jenness and Grattet (2004, 141) published a version of figure 1.7 using the first 8 years of data on hate crime reported by the police to the FBI to make the argument that the "rising tide of bigotry" (Levin and MacDevitt 1993) many were concerned with in the 1990s

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many departments followed the recommendations of the FBI and had developed a two-tier review of crimes that were potentially hate crimes, sometimes as a special unit. In California, the two-tier process was recommended in the *Hate Crime in California, 1996* report published by the California Attorney General in 1997.

[45] How well does this law enforcement activity cover the problem of hate crime? A back of the envelope comparison with national crime victimization data on hate crime, available from 2004-2014, shows that this is a small fraction of bias crime victimization. Crime victimization data is not yet available estimated directly at the state level (Cantor et al. 2010), but I assume that California's share of US population – 12 percent – is also California's share of hate crime victimizations reported in NCVS. Over the 11 year period, NCVS estimated 2.8 million hate crime victimizations; California's share would be 333,000 – more than twenty-five times larger than the number of cases reported by California law enforcement during this time. Clearly, some hate crime is not reported to police, but given the spread in the numbers there must also be some failure to identify these cases as bias crimes by law enforcement. Alternative assumptions that produce nearly the same results include CA's share of UCR reported part 1 crimes (12 percent), violent crimes (13 percent), or property crimes (11 percent); Conversely, one could use hate crime data but this would increase the number significantly: CA's share of police reported hate crime in the FBI UCR from 2004-2014 (17 percent).

was mostly the result of increased commitment to reporting by law enforcement. What lesson

does it reveal today?

Figure 1.7 Police Reported Hate Crime: Incidents and Population Covered by UCR, 1991-2014

Sources: Total Hate Crime Incidents Reported and Population covered from the FBI Hate Crime Statistics series in the Uniform Crime Report. Left axis is the FBI's UCR total hate crime incidents reported. On right is the percent of population residing in a jurisdiction participating the UCR Hate Crime reporting program. 2012 includes the incidents and population covered in the main report as well as the special addendum.[46]

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[46] The FBI Uniform Crime report issued an addendum for 2012, and noted: "The FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program received the hate crime data of nearly 1,500 law enforcement agencies throughout Kentucky (1 agency), Massachusetts (9 agencies), New Jersey (509 agencies), and Texas (974 agencies) after the publication deadline for *Hate Crime Statistics, 2012*." https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2012-addendum

In contrast to the close correlation between 1991-98, by stretching this out over the last decade and a half, one can see two key findings. First, a continued stepwise correlation to around 2006-2008, apart from a relatively large increase in reported hate crime cases in 2001 with no accompanying increase in the population covered by reporting agencies.[47] Second, diverging trends: increasing population coverage, decreasing numbers of reported incidents from 2008-09 to 2014. This decoupling of the trends is likely due to failed institutionalization, triggered by the exogenous shocks to law enforcement due to the great recession and the shortage of government funding, and the election of President Obama and the expansion of federal hate crime law in the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009. The new federal hate crime law expands the ability of the U.S. to intervene in local crimes. This intervention in local jurisdictions was contemplated in 1990 as facing "enormous" legal and practical obstacles (Fernandez 1991, 266). The law created hate crime law enforcement obligations in states that previously lacked hate crime law, and has led to increased participation in the FBI's hate crime reporting program. But this was not always substantial participation, as more and more agencies merely submitted zero reports saying there were no hate crimes in their jurisdiction.

Of course, there are other possible explanations: the expansion of hate crime enforcement faces diminishing returns—jurisdictions that had hate crime problems began reporting them to the FBI first, and those that started reporting later did not have a significant problem to begin with. Another alternative explanation, of course, is a real decline in hate crime. I summarize below why neither alternative is compelling. On the one hand, victimization survey data shows no significant decline, and on the other hand, there is strong evidence of declines in formal hate crime policy and practice in law enforcement.

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[47] One possible explanation of the increase 2001 is the increased nationalism and anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-Middle Easterner sentiment following 9/11.

No Decline in National Crime Victimization Survey

As for the argument that hate crime has declined; neither the number of victimizations in the NCVS nor the FBI UCR Hate Crime series show much change in recent years. This next chart (figure 1.8) compares NCVS hate crime victimizations with the number of hate crime incidents reported in the FBI's UCR. With the NCVS numbers, from year to year there is no strong evidence that they went up or down, as the variation is not statistically significant.[48]

Figure 1.8 Hate Crime Victimization reported by Police Departments (Left) and Survey Respondents (Right).
Sources: NCVS Hate Crime Victimization data from Hate Crime Victimization, 2004–2012 (M. M. Wilson 2014); Calculations for NCVS victimization estimates in 2013 and 2014 are the authors from NCVS annual files. Police reports for 2012 includes the incidents and covered in the main report as well as the special addendum.

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[48] The lack of statistical significance may be due to the low number of cases involved. NCVS annual incident record files contain an average of 46 un-weighted hate crime victimizations, (counting serial cases once) from 2011 to 2014. Further, the rules that the Bureau of Justice Statistics uses to count hate crimes does not accurately reflect current hate crime law – for instance, gender bias hate crimes are not counted – and only certain kinds of evidence are used to verify hate crime. Cases reported as confirmed by police and cases with slurs or hate symbols count; cases not confirmed by police that involve some other form of evidence of bias motivation collected in the survey, such as occurrence as part of a larger pattern of similar crimes or on a particular day, are disregarded. This limits cases to animus motivation and does not include cases that involve biased selection.

This convergence with a huge gap in numbers is rare for the UCR and NCVS. On most

measures of crime, there is a closer ratio between victimization events and police reported crime.

And divergence between the UCR and the NCVS is common among many dimensions of the

two measures of crime (Rand, Lynch, and Cantor 1997; Biderman and Lynch 1991). Figure 1.9

shows this divergence and fairly narrow ratio for aggravated assault.

Figure 1.9 NCVS and UCR Rates of Aggravated Assault, 1970-2014
Sources: All rates are of population aged 12 and above. Sources: (1) Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Rand, Lynch and Cantor, *Criminal Victimization 1973-95* (1997), and (2) NCVS Rate of
aggravated assaults, 1993-2014 generated using the NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool (Bureau
of Justice Statistics 2016). Uniform Crime Report data from UCR Data Tool (Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2010). Age correction to exclude young children from total population for police
reported rates was made using U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports. Due to concern
about methodology changes, NCVS 2006 (a relative peak) is not entirely comparable to previous
years. As indicated in the chart, the series overlap between 1993 and 1995 is correlated, but does
not match, apparently due to methodological corrections applied in one source and not the other.

For the 1970s and 1980s, surveys indicated declining aggravated assault victimization

rates even as police reported aggravated assaults increased. Police reports peaked in the early

47

1990s, as did self-reported victimization rates. Subsequent declines were steeper for self-reported victimization survey aggravated assaults than for police reported aggravated assaults. Further, the gap narrowed between rates of aggravated assaults reported by police and self-reported aggravated assault estimates. This pattern sharply diverges from that of hate crime—which would not fit on the same graph with the ratio of 25 hate crime victimization to 1 police reported hate crime.

Thus, if the number of events of hate crime victimization has not declined, what are other possibilities? There could be real decline in the enforcement of hate crime law. Or at least a decline in the counting of hate crime cases, a key part of the earliest federal proposals on hate crime. In order to evaluate this possibility, I turn to the Law Enforcement Management and Statistics Survey (LEMAS) for 1990, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2013.

Law Enforcement Institutionalization of Hate Crime in Policy and Practice

The Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey (LEMAS), produced on a periodic basis by the Bureau of Justice Statistics since 1987 has an indicator of local law enforcement response to hate crime. Since 1990, agencies that are in the certainty sample—100 or more sworn officers—have been asked a longer set of questions.[49] Those questions include whether they have specialized staff and policy on bias crime, as part of a series of questions that also include child abuse, domestic violence, gangs, victim assistance. As measured, the concept of institutionalization takes a few different concrete forms:

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[49] The 100 sworn officers cutoff in 1990 resulted in 738 law enforcement agencies in the certainty sample. To understand the lower boundary: there were 14 agencies with exactly 100 officers, they served a median population of 52,000 and included Kokomo, Indiana; Midwest City, Oklahoma; Westminster, Colorado; Fairfield, Connecticut; Haverhill, Massachusetts; Taylor, Michigan. The certainty sample includes all large, all mid-sized, and many smaller cities or large suburbs under 150,000 residents.

1) Agencies with people working on related tasks full time

2) Agencies with people working on related tasks part-time

3) Agencies with policies in place, but no designated staff resources

4) Agencies with no institutionalization: no policy, no people working.[50]

Because there may be a general trend in specialization, I also analyze data on police units, staffing, and policy on child abuse. Child abuse is a useful contrast here because it is also a policy domain marked by contemporary law-based response to a long-standing social problem that traditionally not considered a police role (J. E. B. Myers 2008; Monkkonen 1981; Friedman 2004, 456). Another reason child abuse is interesting is because studies show that incidents of child abuse increased during the recession while official reports of child abuse declined (Stephens-Davidowitz 2013b; Stephens-Davidowitz 2013a).

Additionally, as displayed in figure 1.10, child abuse remains the most widespread of all the specialized units covered by the LEMAS survey: 62 percent of police departments with more than 100 employees have a special unit, and 27 percent have designated personnel. Second most frequent is gangs: 55 percent have a special unit and 28 percent have designated personnel. In contrast, hate crime is the least widespread. Only 10 percent of agencies have a special unit and 27 percent have designated personnel. Given that BJS analysis of crime victimization data indicates that 1 in 25 violent crimes and 1 in 100 total crimes has a bias motivation (M. M.

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[50] The exact response category is "Agency has no special policies or procedures, or specially designated personnel for this problem/task." Questions asked on these matters change over time. In 1990 and 1993, the survey responses were 1 full time staff, 2 part time staff, or 3 problem not addressed. By 1997, the question was 1: Agency has specialized unit with full time personnel to address problem, 2: Agency has dedicated personnel to address this problem, 3: Agency addresses this problem, but does not have dedicated personnel, 4: Agency does not address this problem. I recoded 1997-2007 data as 4 = Nothing; 1 = Full time; 2 = Part time; and 3 = Policy only. The 2013 questionnaire used a 5 category approach: 1: Special unit with Full-Time personnel, 2: Special unit with part time personnel 3: Dedicated personnel, 4: No dedicated personnel, 5: Not formally addressed. I recoded 2013 cases as 5 = Nothing, 1 = Full time, 2 & 3 = Part time, 4 = Policy only.

Wilson 2014), and these agencies all have more than 100 officers, this seems like a resource

distribution problem.

Figure 1.10 Local Police Departments Employing 100 or More Officers with Personnel
Designated to Address Crime-Related Issues, 2013
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics Survey, 2013. Note: Adapted from "figure 9: Local police departments employing 100
or more officers with personnel designated to address crime-related issues, 2003 and 2013", in
Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices NCJ 248677.

Looking at anti-hate crime policing since 1990, there is a clear pattern of increasing

policy development, and less frequent practice of "doing nothing" across municipal police

agencies throughout the 1990s. This fits with the institutionalization argument that some scholars

have made (Jenness and Grattet 2004; Jenness 2007; Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001; Phillips

and Grattet 2000).[51] As shown in figure 2.10, in 1990, 65 percent police agencies did nothing

about hate crime. This declined to 44 percent by 1993 and dropped to only 1 percent by 2003. By

that point, roughly a third of police agencies had dedicated staff of some kind, and nearly two-

thirds had a procedure to address hate crime, if not a dedicated staff member. The decline in

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[51] This aggregate level argument could be explored locally in future research. This research should examine this
quantitatively by linking the 1990-2013 LEMAS data longitudinally and connecting to the individual agency's UCR
hate crime data (and in California, hate crime referrals to City Attorney and District Attorney for prosecution) to
explore the link between practice, policy and reporting outcomes over this period of hate crime's rise and decline.

doing nothing about hate crime appears mostly due to increased investment in developing written policies, rather than sustained full or part time staff.

But doing nothing has its appeals, and some agencies stopped addressing hate crime, or forgot about those policies. This indicates the thin institutionalization of hate crime law. The trend of increasing institutionalization had reversed by 2013, and the number of agencies having no policy and no staff increased 22 percentage points: from 1 in 20 to more than 1 in 4. One can see a smaller scale increase in doing nothing on the issue of child abuse, an 11 percentage point increase from 1 in 100 to more than 1 in 10.

Looking closer at these numbers, one can see that the large increase in the share of agencies reporting that they do nothing about hate crime in 2013 roughly parallels the decline in the number of agencies with staff dedicated full and part-time to bias crime ("policy only" appears stable). It appears that in these agencies, addressing hate crime was tied to particular people doing particular jobs. Losing staffing resources meant that the agency did not address the problem. When someone retired or moved to a new position; the agency had no institutionalized policy to rely on. This may indicate hate crime law enforcement tasks were personalized rather than institutionalized: the policy retired with the person. This fits Jepperson's definition of deinstitutionalization or failed institutionalization (1991, 152). When these agencies had an exogenous shock like the great recession and the ongoing budget pressures they began to do nothing. In far too many places, enforcing hate crime law was more or less accomplished by making one job assignment and institutionally forgetting rather than actually institutionalizing this part of law.

Table 1.3: Specialized Response to Hate Crime and Child Abuse, 1990-2013

	Hate Crime				Child Abuse			
	Nothing	Full-Time	Part-Time	Policy Only	Nothing	Full-Time	Part-Time	Policy Only
1990	65	11	24	N/A	23	58	18	N/A
1993	44	19	37	N/A	21	63	16	N/A
1997	19	9	32	40	3	46	40	11
2003	1	8	25	66	0	52	30	18
2007	5	9	28	58	1	53	33	13
2013	28	5	11	56	12	14	29	46

Sources: Individual LEMAS survey results, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2013.
Note: All Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies with more than 100 Officers in the U.S.

In contrast, anti-child abuse policing follows a fairly similar overall trajectory, although remains more successful. A majority of municipal law enforcement agencies had a dedicated full-time child abuse unit in 1993, 2003, and 2007, and in 1997 it was close at 46 percent. In 2013, the majority either had a policy only with no dedicated staff, or did not formally address child abuse. Thus, looking at specialized child abuse units and policies on child abuse, we see some evidence of change between 2007 and 2013, however, these changes do not look like failed institutionalization. Instead, in large part, full-time dedicated employees appear to have been replaced by institutional policies.

Research at the intersection of economics and criminology has shown that non-traditional indicators for child abuse indicate a growth in child abuse during the recession even as official

numbers declined (Stephens-Davidowitz 2013a). Using state-level aggregated Google searches related to child maltreatment, such as "my dad hit me," Stephens-Davidowitz found that rates of real child maltreatment increased while rates of reported child maltreatment decreased from 2008-2012.[52] This increase in child abuse fits with theories that tie increased economic hardship with increased domestic violence but elaborates the theory to cover effects on the reporting process. Reported cases of child abuse declined in part because institutional resources declined. And we can confirm the decline in resources in this LEMAS data: the number of municipal police agencies full time staff working on child abuse dropped 39 percentage points from 53 percent to 14 percent.

It also plausible that the same happened for hate crime: reported numbers declined but entirely due to fewer enforcement resources. In terms of the social behaviors of racial and gendered and sexual violence and crime, actual incidents may well have increased. There have been similar claims, with mixed evidence, about the links between increases in economic hardship, racial violence, lynching, gay bashing and hate crime (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998; Smångs 2015). But the argument about the hardship also affecting the reporting and recording process has not been made like it has with child abuse. And hate crime enforcement has deinstitutionalized even more than child abuse enforcement – more than a quarter of the agencies with 100 or more sworn officers do nothing on hate crime, and this does not even begin to address the more than ten thousand smaller police agencies across the U.S.

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[52] "The estimates imply that the recent doubling of the unemployment rate increased actual child maltreatment incidents in the United States by 10.0 to 24.0 percent but decreased reported child maltreatment incidents by 12.7 percent."

Figure 1.11 Law Enforcement Reporting and Policy Related to Hate Crime
Sources: From LEMAS and UCR Hate Crime Report. The "PD Doing Anything on Hate Crime" series is from the Law Enforcement Management and Statistics Survey by the Department of Justice, and covers municipal law enforcement agencies with more than 100 officers. Recoded data combines agencies with either full or part time staff assigned to hate crime, responsible persons, and policy only as "Doing Anything."

Figure 1.11 displays this finding of a downturn in doing anything about hate crime and a decline in the number of agencies reporting hate crime. During 2008-2014, the numbers of agencies reporting hate crime declined, in a fashion similar to the trends for the percentage of law enforcement agencies doing anything.

Police Agency Reporting

The percent of participating agencies that actually report a hate crime case provides another way of understanding hate crime. The FBI's UCR hate crime reporting program reached a new high in 2014 with nearly 90 percent of agencies reporting 0 hate crimes in their jurisdiction. Around 75 percent more law enforcement agencies support the FBI's hate crime data collection project in 2014 than they did in 1995, however, the number of agencies actually submitting reports increased only 7 percent over 1995 numbers. Agencies actually reporting hate crimes peaked in 2008 at 2,145 and have declined 22 percent since. Figure 2.13 is the percent of agencies participating that report that report 1 or more incidents in the FBI's Uniform Crime Report series on hate crime, with NBER recession periods shaded in gray.[53]

Given that there have been no significant declines in hate crime victimizations in the NCVS series, and researchers found in 2000 that around 40 percent of agencies listed in the zero reports responded to a survey indicating that they did have a hate crime in their jurisdiction in the last year (McDevitt, Balboni, Jennifer, and Bennett 2000), this is troubling evidence of deinstitutionalization, of failure to participate in the Hate Crime Statistics Act reporting program.

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[53] The effects of the 2008 financial crisis in labor and housing markets lasted much longer for many places than the narrowly defined recession period used by NBER. And the impacts affect some more than others. According to public opinion polling by Gallup (2016), a majority of people in the U.S. believed that the economy was still "getting worse" until late in 2014.

Figure 1.12 Percent of Participating Agencies Reporting at Least One Hate Crime, 1995-2014. *Sources*: Recessions are months shaded in grey. Author's compilation of FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Annual Reports on Hate Crimes, 1995-2014. Recessions from Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 2012 includes the agencies in the main report as well as the special addendum.

Figure 1.12 seems highly correlated with the overall number of incidents reported and probably ends up entirely driving the change, whether increase or decrease in hate crime reports. The inflection point was between 2006 and 2007. Recession effects could occur at different points in the process—either at the moment of first response to the incident or later at the time of reporting in the records department. One should keep in mind that these hate crime statistics are usually reported quarterly, and at times annually, to central state repositories and then submitted to the FBI. So there may be some time difference in recession effects. For example, 2007 data,

which marks the decline's start, would have been reported in 2008 during the recession. Here, the data is displayed based on year of the incident, so recession effects could be misaligned if they take place during year of reporting. Data is not available on date the reports were submitted to the network of local state and federal law enforcement data collection, which would be more revealing of effects on the "rate producing process" in the organization that underlies the official numbers on hate crime (Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963; Black 1970; McCleary, Nienstedt, and Erven 1982).

Local Prosecutors in the U.S. and California

Evidence from deeper in the criminal justice system also supports the notion of deinstitutionalization. At the national level, data on prosecutors collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Census of State Court Prosecutors, does not currently address hate crime—indicating further limitations on hate crime law's institutionalization. (The survey does address whether agencies prosecute special cases like gang crimes).[54] The census of state court prosecutors in 2001 was the last to ask about hate crime; both 2005 survey and 2007 census asked about terrorism, not about hate crime. Additional research with separate data collections on prosecutors in 1994-95, and 2001 (Sigmon and Rebovich 2000; King 2008) filled this gap somewhat but there has been no subsequent analysis of national prosecutorial practices on hate crime.

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[54] As a reminder, the scope of victimization does not match the attention paid: according to analysis of NCVS data, 6 percent of violent victimizations from 1998-2003 involved gang member assailants (Harrell 2005). In contrast, hate crimes cases are 4.2 percent of violent victimizations in 2012 (M. M. Wilson 2014, 2). I analyzed 2012 NCVS data and found 6.1 percent of violent victimizations involved gang member assailants. This overemphasis on gangs relative to hate crime fits with what some have identified as a larger dynamic of mutual reinforcement between law enforcement and gangs. See (Sánchez-Jankowski 1991).

Figure 1.13 Police Referral to Prosecution and Hate Crime Charge Rate in California from 1996 to 2014.
Source: California Department of Justice, Annual Reports on Hate Crime, 1996-2014.
Note: Referral as number on left, charge rate as percent on right.

Therefore, I turn to California for this section of the analysis, the jurisdiction with the most robust data on the matter (Jenness 2009). Much of California's story on hate crime is driven by Los Angeles. In Los Angeles, the LAPD has a long history of developing robust policy on hate crime. Nearly three decades ago, Special Order No. 11 established procedures for handling hate crimes and incidents on August 10, 1987—prior to federal law mandating hate crime sentencing enhancements or statistical reporting. Although the department has not always lived

up to that policy in practice, policing always involves a measure of discretion.[55] Nevertheless, a

few years after the initial LAPD policy, in 1993, the LA County District Attorney Gil Garcetti

established a Hate Crimes Suppression Unit (HCSU) staffed with five attorneys and that

increased the number of hate crime prosecutions (*Los Angeles Times* 1993). Efforts by the Hate

Crimes Task Force, formed by the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners in March 1997,

led to a new policy, Special Order No. 38 on hate crime in December 1998 (Parks 1998). Among

other things, the new policy assigned specific detective supervisors to be Hate Crime

Coordinators in each police division, and added a check box "Motivated by Hatred/Prejudice" on

paper and electronic crime and arrest reports. This two-tier approach made it easier for first

responders to record bias motivation, and made a local detective in each division responsible for

reviewing each of the flagged cases, even if they were non-criminal incidents. Subsequently,

while overall crime rates declined in Los Angeles, the number of potential felony hate crime

cases referred for prosecution increased such that there was not enough resources for prosecutors

to pursue the cases, and state legislators sought to create local grants to provide additional

funding for hate crime units in prosecutors offices across the state (Gladstone 1999).

In California, the number of hate crime cases referred by police to prosecutors peaked at

1,039 in 1999. It was about 25 percent of that peak in 2014, with 264 cases referred to

prosecutors. After a few very low years when data was first collected, prosecutors have

maintained fairly high hate crime charge filing rates on cases referred by police, even averaging

74 percent in 2005-2007. The more recent rates are lower, ranging from the high 50s to low 60s.

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[55] Social science research on hate crime reporting at the LAPD's different divisions, based on fieldwork and ride-alongs in 1990 indicates that in contrast to clear policy on the books, the department had a variety of practices that ignored bias motivated crimes (Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996). For instance, in one division, juveniles were considered "categorically immune" from hate motivation, and officers believed that "hate crimes never happen here." (Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996, 837–38). To be fair, as the Christopher Commission showed, officers took liberties with a number of departmental policies during that time (Christopher 1991).

Thus, prosecutions in California support the notion of deinstitutionalization. Figure 1.13 displays these downward trends in referrals from police to prosecutors, and prosecutors filing rates, both of which became more pronounced in the post-recession time period.

Another aspect of prosecutor behavior related to hate crime in California is conviction rates. The percentage of cases with a hate crime charge are broken into two types and plotted in figure 1.14. There is a clear decline in the conviction rate for hate crime charges, and an increase in the portion of cases where hate crime charges are dropped in favor of conviction on other criminal charges. Before 2000, if a hate crime charge was filed, a case more likely than not ended in a hate crime conviction. Only a quarter of cases were resolved through conviction on other charges. That changed—in part due to the effect *Apprendi* had on sentencing enhancements across the court system in 2000.[56] In the last ten years, it is more likely than not that a case charged as a hate crime is resolved with a non-hate crime charge. And the vast majority of these cases are guilty pleas, not trials. The data suggest strategic charging in the plea bargaining process; prosecutors appear to use hate crime to extract a guilty plea.

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[56] *Apprendi* had wide ranging effects in the realm of sentencing, ruling that juries, not judges, must decide factual issues like bias motivation insofar as they are related to sentencing enhancements. There are far more sentencing enhancements related to drugs and guns than hate crime, and thus this case had substantial effects on the use of sentencing guidelines in the following progeny cases: *Blakely v. Washington* (2004) and *United States v. Booker* (2005). For discussion of the immediate implications see the special issue of the *Federal Sentencing Reporter*, "Assessing *Apprendi*" vol 12, no. 6, published soon after the ruling was released in 2000.

Figure 1.14 Outcomes for Hate Crime Charges in California, 1995-2014.
Source: California Department of Justice, Annual Reports on Hate Crime, 1995-2014.

In order to understand this further, it is worth taking a look at the way that convictions at trial in California Courts have changed for hate crime. As a comparison for hate crime I also analyze felony filings with the disposition of conviction at trial. This allows us to understand how hate crime fits into the larger trends in county prosecutor's offices toward or away from resolving cases through trial versus plea bargaining before trial.

Figure 1.15 Conviction at Trial in California Courts: Hate Crime and Felony Filings.
Sources: California Courts annual reports from 1995-2013. California Department of Justice, Annual Reports on Hate Crime, 1995-2014.

The number of hate crime cases won at trial has declined significantly, from a peak of 89 in 2000 to 5 in 2010, and 4 in 2014 (figure 1.15 left). In contrast, general Felony Filings in Courts resolved in conviction at trial has a slight downward trend (figure 1.15 right), without similar drastic declines. The number of felony cases disposed in California Superior Courts increased 70 percent from 1994-95 to 2013-14; cases disposed prior to trial increased from 95 percent to 97.5 percent, trials became rare. This slight downward trend is displayed on the right in figure 1.15. In contrast, for hate crime cases from 1995-2014, 9 percent of filings are resolved with a conviction at trial (494 convictions out of 5,408 filings). There were 1,965 guilty to hate crime charges pleas, or 36 percent of filings.

Hate crime convictions at trial grew and declined dramatically from 1998-2001. They dropped by 70 percent from 2000 to 2001, possibly as result of the June 2000 *Apprendi* ruling. In recent years however, they have been very low – this represents a real divergence from over

trends in case processing in California Courts. The data for hate crime trials suggest a pattern of rise and decline.

Figure 1.16 Percent of California District Attorney's Offices Not Filing Hate Crime Cases
Source: California Department of Justice, Hate Crime in California Reports from 1995-2014.
Note: I included counties reporting either zero cases or not reporting at all as no filings.

The percentage of District Attorney's offices with no hate crime filings has been trending higher since 2001 (figure 1.16). Hate crime charges are concentrated in a fewer number of counties: around half of county District Attorneys did not file a hate crime in 2014.

In sum, Californian police referrals to prosecutors have dropped dramatically after 1999, and declined consistently even more from 2008 to 2014. Data from figures 1.15 and 1.16 show that fewer prosecutors have experience winning hate crime cases in court, and fewer District

Attorney's Offices make it a priority in their prosecutions. These trends are likely mutually constitutive, and reinforce that hate crime is not a priority for law enforcement. Figure 1.14 demonstrates an increasing use of hate crime as a chip in the plea bargaining process rather than as part of a robust anti-hate crime initiative. Combined, these charts indicate that as a matter of routine duties, California prosecutors are far less familiar with hate crime than in the late 1990s, and achieve a low hate crime conviction rate when hate crime cases are filed.

One thing to note here is that while the remedy of hate crime law is punishment in prison or jail, usually hate crime law fails to extend into prison and jail to offer any protection for people held there. There are some cases of hate crime reported from jails or holding cells in courts, as they are under the jurisdiction of county sheriffs in official statistics.[57] But for the most part, information is limited, especially from prison. And the stories of bias related violence that do exist are almost never framed in those terms and are instead framed as gang violence. On prison tours, it is not uncommon to see what would be considered hate vandalism if in public, and racial politics imbue many California correctional spaces (Goodman 2008; Goodman 2014; Walker 2016). But people in prison have made efforts to reduce the power of racial conflicts, and after hunger strikes in 2012 released an "agreement to end hostilities" stating "now is the time to for us to collectively seize this moment in time, and put an end to more than 20-30 years of hostilities between our racial groups." (Ashker et al. 2012). The people involved in the agreement also participated in the lawsuit settled by the California Department of Corrections in 2015 (St. John 2015).

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[57] I have read them in the course of my work at the LA County Commission on Human Relations, and discussed this briefly in prior work (J. Kang-Brown 2011, 16).

Political Lawmaking and Re-politicizing law: Partisans and Police Enforcement

Hate crime legislative activity – political lawmaking – was considerably less frequent from 2005-2015 than in earlier periods when hate crime law was first added and reviewed by courts. Nevertheless, political culture influences the enforcement of hate crime law. Analysis of prosecutors offices and community characteristics showed that by 2001, if not before, the enforcement of hate crime law had taken a political valence, and failure to use the law (was associated with conservative politics and religious fundamentalism (King 2008).[58] In many ways, this makes sense – the Federal Hate Crime bill that became the Matthew Shephard and James Byrd Hate Crime Prevention Act (HCPA) in 2009 was originally introduced in spring 2001.[59] So this was not settled law at the time and the politics of including sexual orientation and gender identity in federal hate crime law were contentious.

This chapter does adjudicate whether failed institutionalization and deinstitutionalization in police departments and prosecutor's offices resulted from scarcity of resources or political opposition. It is likely that the causality is mixed, and further research could explore these trajectories by linking LEMAS and FBI UCR hate crime case records datasets at the jurisdictional level with evidence about local political culture and local government resources.

Federal hate crime law was a policy proposal in the Democratic Party, one that eventually was agreed to by Republicans, but only as a statistical data collection. The federal law that made the Hate Crime Statistics Act permanent and added federal sentencing enhancements was passed in 1994. In later rounds of legislative hate crime lawmaking in the 2000s, George W. Bush

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[58] King's research found that the use of hate crime law in prosecutor's offices is limited by conservatism and religious fundamentalism. Further, there is a "racial threat" component to lack of hate crime enforcement. And this leads to the decoupling in law enforcement of symbolic hate crime policy from anti-hate crime practice.

[59] The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249. While much of the emphasis was on the expansion of federal hate crime law to include gender identity and sexual orientation as protected classes, a less emphasized process has been the grounding of prevention activities -- mostly prosecution – in the 13th amendment's abolition of racial slavery instead of the commerce clause.

refused to sign the HCPA when it passed the house and senate in 2007. This shift in a definitional framing of hate crime as a policy preference of the Democratic party rather than a shared public safety priority in 1990 was especially apparent in the years after Obama signed the federal law, with the increases in zero reporting among jurisdictions in the UCR hate crime project, and the larger deinstitutionalization through increased numbers of agencies "doing nothing" about hate crime observable in the LEMAS study.

There are no current widely backed federal proposals around hate crime. In some ways, this is another sign of institutionalization or accomplishment—the law is on the books already, and there is nothing left on the policy agenda.[60] But the lack of substantial use of the law on the books by prosecutors, low reporting in the FBI hate crime reporting program, growing numbers of police departments that do nothing about hate crime, and an overall decline in public interest indicates otherwise.

Significance of 2009 Hate Crime Prevention Act

Much of the debate and delay on the expansion of federal hate crime law was about the inclusion of gender identity and sexual orientation as protected classes. However, the significance of recent hate crime legislation is more than just extension of hate crime protection to new classes. This legislation treats racism differently, as a part of the social fabric rather than the act of biased individuals. It does so by finding congressional authority in the 13th amendment's abolition of racial slavery instead of the commerce clause.[61] Up to this point, for

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[60] The current policy agenda on hate crime protected categories includes: housing status (for homeless); political status (for smaller parties); perspective on reproduction (for abortion providers), law enforcement officer status, etc. Some state legislatures have activity around certain of these laws, but not on a widespread basis and often not with success. A notable exception is Louisiana's 2016 "blue lives matter" law that amended the state hate crime law to include the following as a protected class "actual or perceived employment as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency medical services personnel", passed in as Act 184, effective August 1, 2016.

[61] See the congressional findings:

racial hate crimes to be a federal case, the government had to prove in court or by plea that the

victim was participating in 1 of 6 "federally protected activities," and the defendant interfered.

So far, constitutional challenges to this law have been unsuccessful, and federal courts have ruled

it an appropriate use of legislative power, in keeping with Justice Harlan's dissents in the *Civil

Rights Cases of 1883* and *Plessy v. Ferguson*.[62] Next, I turn to court review as another indicator

of the state of institutionalization of hate crime law.

Appellate Court Review:

As shown in figure 1.17, the most active years of judicial review were in the mid-1990s,

and Phillips and Grattet concluded that by 1999 that hate crime law was "institutionalized" in the

U.S. legal framework (Phillips and Grattet 2000). Since then, apart from the landmark *Apprendi

v. New Jersey* case in 2000, there has been a steady decline in the number of cases that address

the constitutionality of hate crime laws. While this supports the notion that hate crime law has

been "institutionalized" and settled in the courts, there are ongoing concerns about the

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(7) For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude were defined by the race, color, and ancestry of those held in bondage. Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Accordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude. (8) Both at the time when the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution of the United States were adopted, and continuing to date, members of certain religious and national origin groups were and are perceived to be distinct 'races'. Thus, in order to eliminate, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery, it is necessary to prohibit assaults on the basis of real or perceived religions or national origins, at least to the extent such religions or national origins were regarded as races at the time of the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution of the United States. (9) Federal jurisdiction over certain violent crimes motivated by bias enables Federal, State . . ., and local authorities . . . to work together as partners in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes.
Public Law 111-84 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Division E -- Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. § 4702. These findings are expanded (and more or less unchanged) from legislation sponsored by Sen. Ted Kennedy from 2000 until the bill was enacted in law in 2009. An earlier version of the bill includes an abbreviated finding *see* Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998. S. 1529 § 2(8), stating: "violence motivated by bias that is a relic of slavery can constitute badges and incidents of slavery;"

[62] See discussion of Harlan's dissents in (Han 2015, 45–47). The power of the 13th Amendment's abolition to the contemporary problems of "badges and incidents of slavery" is limited by it's exception for punishment in a time of racially disparate mass incarceration (A. Y. Davis 1998).

constitutionality of hate crime law that remain unresolved. The most recent cases are challenges

to the 2009 Hate Crimes Prevention Act, but a few of the cases in the last 10 years involved state

supreme courts ruling state hate crime laws unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of New Jersey

struck down a section of the state's bias crime law as unconstitutional for violating the 14th

Amendment in 2015 because it was vague by way of reference to victim's perceptions.[63] In 2007

and 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled the legislative process that led to the hate crime

law was unconstitutional and avoided a ruling on the constitutional claims made about the law

itself.[64]

Figure 1.17 Appellate review of hate crime law, 1984-2015
Source: Published appellate cases in Lexis that raised constitutional, facial validity challenges of
hate crime laws. 2000 Search is from (Phillips and Grattet 2000). 2016 Search used same
parameters. Cases that were about sufficiency of evidence claims, interpretation of statute, etc.
were excluded.

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[63] *State v. Pomianek* (2015) 221 N.J. 66; 110 A.3d 841:851; 2015 N.J. LEXIS 275.; The court noted that this
reference to perception was "unique among bias-crime statutes in this nation" (State v. Pomianek 2015, 110:851).
The court failed to note how the law was substantially similar to U.K. hate crime law in that perception matters
(Creese and Lader 2014, 4).
[64] *See* 936 A.2d 188; 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 616 and *Marcavage v. Rendell*, 2008 Pa. LEXIS 1210 (Pa., July 23,
2008).

The New Jersey case is illuminating, because it involves an incident that appears unambiguously biased on it's face: a couple of white supervisors lured a black man into a cage at a warehouse and then locked him in a mocked him while other coworkers threw bananas (*State v. Pomianek,* NJ Supreme Court, 2015). But the court was concerned about the vagueness of the law, in that a tone-deaf person may offend without biased intention.[65]

Social Movements

Social movements and NGOs role in the changing levels of interest in hate crime law are out of the scope of this chapter and further research is needed to characterize the range and scope of the state of the movements and whether changes there are behind the changes in hate crime law enforcement institutionalization. However, it is worth noting the range of positions on hate crime law. Some take strong opposition to the use of hate crime law, like the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, and others have pivoted to address state violence and support a broader movement of racial, gender and economic justice like the Committee on Anti-Asian American Violence (Tang 2000; Tang 2001; Sylvia Rivera Law Project 2010). Other organizations have retained a strong emphasis on hate crime. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League and their new initiative, 50 States Against Hate, in partnership with a cross section of organizations like Asian Americans Advancing Justice, GLAD, GLSEN, The Leadership Conference, LULAC, NAACP, NOW, the National Urban League, the Southern Poverty Law Center, among others.[66]

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[65] Would this be a color blind and tone-deaf form of racism? See (Leong 2016).
[66] For more information, see (Greenblatt 2015).

What's at stake in de-institutionalization?

Let us review what is at stake in this analysis of the decline of hate crime after the first wave of institutionalization. Below, I summarize the various findings from this chapter, and then turn to a micro-level analysis of deinstitutionalization. Evidence from scholarly journals was mixed, although published books appear to follow the rise and decline model. Google search data on hate crime shows a substantial decline from 2004-2016. Newspapers generally track this decline, although only the *Los Angeles Times* has a clear fit with the rise and decline model. The *New York Times* also shows some recent resurgent interest in hate crime, although evidence is mixed and the overall trend is decline. In sum, the data suggest that public interest in hate crime has declined.

Table 1.4: Summary of Changes in the field of Hate Crime

	Calif.	U.S.
Scholarly Journals, 1990-2015		Mixed
Google Books, 1991-2008		-
Google Search, 2004-2016		-
New York Times, 1990-2016		Mixed
Los Angeles Times, 1990-2016	-	
National Crime Victimization Survey, 2004-2014		No Change
Population Covered by Reporting Agency, 1992-2014		+
Agencies Participating but Report 0 cases, 1995-2014		+
Agencies Reporting Cases, 1995-2014		-
LEMAS: Staff, Policy or Doing Nothing, 1990-2013		-
Police Reported hate crimes, 1991-2014	-	-
Police Referrals to Prosecutors, 1995-2014	-	
Hate Crime Filing Rate	-	
Hate Crime Conviction Rate	-	
Convictions at Trial, 1995-2014	-	
DA's Offices with hate crime filings, 1995-2014	-	
Hate Crime filed, non-hate crime conviction, 1995-2014	+	
Appellate Cases, 1984-2015		-

Criminal victimization is another matter – there is no statistically significant evidence of decline. The data reported by the police in the FBI's Uniform Crime Report on Hate Crime suggests the rise and decline model. While the population covered by a participating agency has increased and reached new highs recently, more and more agencies reported zero cases of hate crime. The number of agencies reporting a hate crime fits the rise and decline model. Prosecution has a clear match with the rise and decline model. Appellate cases on the constitutionality of hate crime law are less frequent now than in the 1990s, but there have been recent cases that found hate crime laws in New Jersey and Pennsylvania unconstitutional. In sum, there is fairly consistent evidence of less hate crime law being used and fewer law enforcement agents applying it to criminal events and reporting on that activity. Given the evidence that hate crime victimization has not declined significantly, on an organizational level, this looks like deinstitutionalization.

Micro-level careers and deinstitutionalization

How does deinstitutionalization work at the micro-level, in law enforcement careers embedded in particular agencies? In thinking clearly about first wave institutionalization at this level, one can see how individual law enforcement officers and prosecutors would have been able to benefit from specialization in the law and then acquiring further resources as waves of policy innovation at the Local, State and Federal level in the 1990s created more resources dedicated to hate crime law enforcement. Imagine a prosecutor who was 25 years old and in law school during Conyers' officer and the corpse remarks, who was 30 in 1990 when George Bush signed the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 50 when Barack Obama signed the 2009 Hate Crime Statistics Act, and is now approaching retirement with a full pension. In California throughout the 1990s, these prosecutors would have seen more and more cases going to trial. In contrast,

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recent hires in California will only rarely—if ever—see a hate crime case go to trial. In the times of austerity since the great recession, it is hard to imagine people replacing those officers having the same set of resources at their disposal or career tracks open to them that retain a civil rights emphasis on hate crime law enforcement.

As I note above, one could extend this analysis with review of citation practices, research funding for hate crime, state and local legislative proposals on hate crime, and social movement activities. But I believe that I have compiled sufficient evidence to make the case for the pattern of deinstitutionalization. What remains is a discussion of the consequences.

Conclusion

The 1985 Hate Crime Statistics Act imagined new data gathering capabilities, institutionalized within the criminal justice system as a federal intervention in support of civil rights and social inclusion, akin to a racism injury surveillance system (Fernandez 1991; Holder, Organization, and others 2001). This fit with the law's response to similar civil rights claims at the time, which sought to develop statistical frameworks and evidence of bias to identify inequality and justify remedies. Many early anti-hate crime advocates meant not just to punish and deter racist and other kinds of offenders, but also to force police and prosecutors to respond to existing problems of bias related violence and crime. In the initial "problem statement" of these hearings, proposed policy interventions addressing these concerns were framed in terms of protecting the public and vulnerable minorities from retrograde elements of U.S. society. But these legislative aims were achieved through forcing the hand of negligent or uninterested law enforcement professionals who were then not responding to the hate crime problem and targeted communities. First

responders would identify the hate crimes, and records departments would file reports so that people would know how successful agencies were responding to the common problem of hate crime.

In a 2004 preface to the second edition of *Making Hate a Crime*, Jenness and Grattet noted that the intense policy focus on terrorism could displace the institutionalization of hate crime as a matter of policy and practice in law enforcement:

> It is relevant to wonder whether the national preoccupation with terrorism now subsumes the territory where hate crime once reigned. Has the focus on hate crime been displaced by concerns about combating terrorism? Or could it be that the focus on terrorism has strengthened the national consensus and outrage about the socially destructive consequences of violent expressions of intergroup hatred? While it is too early to answer these questions, it should be acknowledged that the future currency of the concept of hate crime might very well hang in the balance." (2004, xv).

It may not have been terrorism entirely, but it does appear that hate crime has not been completely institutionalized as a functional priority in law enforcement; there is plenty of evidence of deinstitutionalization or failed institutionalization.

Or, maybe a better framing is thin institutionalization: papering over the problem. Adding a hate crime policy – a few pieces of paper in a packed patrol manual – likely does have real effects, especially if there are substantive training requirements. Researchers have found those effects in prior studies (Jenness et al. 2004; Grattet and Jenness 2008; King 2008). But under certain conditions, this thin form of institutionalization can fail. And those conditions appear to include enough time passing, and then the election of president Obama in 2008 amidst the start of the great recession. Revisiting Jepperson's definition of institutionalization, I want to be clear that I am not arguing that hate crime law is no longer accessible, but that key elements—like the hate crime data collection process, or implementation of best practice hate crime

investigations—are actions that have become irregular or infrequent. This means that many hate crime cases are never investigated as such or reported in the hate crime data collection. This leaves the law in place for exceptional cases, but does little to direct the force of law against everyday bias.

This process of non-repeal but failure to use, papers over the problem of hate crime, in a way similar to the colorblind Roberts court has papered over the problems of segregation once considered inherently unequal. Agencies comply with legal and policy norms, policies are on the books and training occurs in the police academy.[67] But overall actions of everyday hate crime law enforcement—identifying, investigating, referring to prosecution, filing charges, and reporting cases to central state databases—declines. The actual application of hate crime law in all cases where it is relevant remains unrealized. There is evidence that hate crime becomes just another bargaining chip for prosecutors in the plea process.

Remedies

The racial formation theoretical perspective argues that forms of racism change over time, or at least the ideological framing of racism changes (Omi and Winant 2014). This could be part of the decline of hate crime law—as a narrowly framed focus on hate it is inadequate for a society committed to color blindness, or "racism without racists" (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Contemporary research tends to frame racism and other forms of bias as something more or less non-obvious: aversive racism, color-blind racism, covert racism, and unconscious bias are a challenge for the basic focus of hate crime law on public evidence of bias, animus or some kind

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[67] Future research should assess the quality and comprehensiveness of this training in relation to other types of crime training on gangs or child abuse.

of targeting (Dovidio 2001; Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto 2007; Kahn and Martin 2016; Banks and Ford 2008; Wodtke 2016). And contemporary poets make this point as well.

In conclusion, I would like to juxtapose the quote by John Conyers in the epigraph about the corpse and the officer with three lines from Claudia Rankine's poem in *Citizen, an American Lyric*:

> because white men can't
> police their imagination
> black men are dying

(Rankine 2014, 135).

Conyers described a scene of a crime: a cop arrives and there's a corpse, but with the cop imagined as a first responder from the justice system to an already accomplished private act. Rankine reminds us that the first responder has work to do, an imagination to police and redress, even if it may not ultimately be possible ("can't"). And Rankine has been editing these pages in subsequent printings of her book, adding to a list in memory of black men killed by the justice system, compiling a report that counts these cases. By the third printing, the list in the poem included Jordan Russell Davis, Eric Garner, John Crawford, and Michael Brown. Can hate crime law be adequate to describe some of the dimensions of this imagination that must be policed?

The Black Lives Matter campaign and various other local movements and organizations that gathered in Cleveland in July 2015 under the umbrella "Movement for Black Lives" has pushed for a national recognition of the depth of police violence against people of color (Griffith 2015; Cobb 2016). Among other things, the movements have demonstrated how law enforcement remains a non-neutral force. As organizations, police departments are part of the sociological process of ongoing segregation and racism in the United States. Police actions

influence the production of racially demarcated spaces like "white neighborhoods", and generate some of the violence that exposes people to premature death (Gilmore 2007).

Hate crime law is clearly not adequate to address the problem of racism under this definition; but might a police agency that actually enforces hate crime law be a changed police department, one that refuses to produce premature death by sanction or extra-legal means? Insofar as hate crime laws does away with the animus requirement it may provide a critical framework for assessing the actions and impacts of police, relevant to concerned social movements. Hate crime law could take a different form than the one now – it would likely benefit from both a reduction in the prison enhancement, and the addition of a broader understanding of hate or bias. This broader definition of bias could values the "perception" of victims or bystanders by following a reasonable person standard, letting these perceptions to be considered as evidence in hate crime cases. The current U.K. hate crime law follows a similar expansive standard. The state of New Jersey had such a law for a time, however, the state supreme court struck this down in Spring 2015 (*State v. Pomianek*) out of concern for the first amendment, although in this case it refers to the first amendment rights of the tone-deaf people who may commit anti-black hate crime but may be unaware of the racist content of their behavior. California's "biased selection" framework for hate crime law provides some aspect of this expansive definition that survives judicial review. It considers a case bias motivated if target selection was based on widely held stereotypes that are invidious – like people that are from certain groups carry cash. Read together, the reasonable perception standard and biased selection based on invidious stereotypes standard could be useful for more clearly conceptualizing bias motivation in hate crime cases.

What remains of hate crime law, institutionalized thinly or not at all, worth adapting and strengthening? Contemporary remedies to racial and group-based injustice tend towards new proposals like reforms to the fines and fees system in courts and body cameras for law enforcement and stronger public oversight of police. In the midst of a push for police oversight and transparency maybe it is worth revisiting the origins of hate crime as a statistical data collection program that can monitor police responsiveness rather than as a sentencing enhancement that provide additional punishment in a time of mass incarceration.

The use of the collected hate crime data needs to be expanded. It is probably fair to assume that when an agency does not report any hate crimes or fails to comply with the reporting procedures they are non-compliant with the other key parts of hate crime law – responsiveness to victims and serious treatment or thorough investigation of lower level crimes with bias motivation. Current reporting practices rewards and provides benefits to substantial non-compliance with the hate crime statistics act by giving the benefit of the doubt and assuming that non-reporting is nothing other than a plausible zero or no hate in that community. In contrast, it may be beneficial to estimate a number of hate crimes in a given community based on national NCVS estimates and other crime statistics. One could do this for every jurisdiction with a few fairly basic assumptions about share of crime being equivalent to shares of victimization. This could help to better understand the level of hate crime in places that report fairly low levels of hate crime or in places like Ferguson, Missouri, or Sanford, Florida, that just submit zero reports of hate crime year after year. But the speculative turn will have to wait. Next, we look at the hard data for hate crime in neighborhoods across the City of Los Angeles.

Chapter 2:

LEARNING FROM LOS ANGELES:
SHIFTING RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION AND ANTI-BLACK HATE CRIME

1. Introduction: Los Angeles Neighborhoods as Context for Hate Crime

One of the consequences of decades of racial segregation is the racial-spatial divide in

U.S. cities (Franklin 1956; Massey and Denton 1993; Peterson and Krivo 2012; Logan and

Parman 2015)**.** Research shows that this segregated divide is more than the legacies of policies

and practices like racially restrictive covenants on housing, more than aggregate individual

preferences for racial balance or isolation, and more than contemporary economic inequality:

some remainder is contemporary racial prejudice (Charles 2003). Historically more integrated

than many places in the United States, African Americans and whites in Los Angeles still remain

highly segregated from each other, even as immigrants have made both traditionally black and

traditionally white neighborhoods more diverse. Yet many people have tried to prevent

residential integration by threatening new neighbors and committing acts of violence,

harassment, or property damage (S. G. Meyer 2001). Once, these acts of firebombing, vandalism,

assault and threats were rarely even conceptualized as crime and were almost certain to avoid

punishment (Rubinowitz and Perry 2001). Now, these acts are not just crime, but are also

considered hate crimes, and police officers are specifically trained to be responsive to these

incidents (Grattet and Jenness 2008; Bell 2013).

Studies in New York, Chicago, and Sacramento found evidence that anti-black hate

crimes were more common when more black households move into a predominantly white

neighborhoods (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007; Lyons 2008; Grattet 2009). It remains unknown whether or not this pattern of relationships between changing racial composition and hate crime holds for a multicultural place like Los Angeles that has long broken the black-white mold of race relations. Further, Los Angeles neighborhoods have had racialized neighbor disputes and crimes for more than 35 years that are sometimes called "inter-ethnic" or "inter-minority" conflicts (Hernandez and Austin 1980; Oliver and Johnson Jr 1984; Bergesen and Herman 1998; Umemoto and Mikami 2000; Sonenshein and Drayse 2008; Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Hipp et al. 2010). In this chapter, I explore hate crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods by replicating a seminal study that examined hate crime in New York City neighborhoods during the period of 1980-1995 (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998).

I argue that Los Angeles during the period of 2000-2014 provides an important extension to Green, Strolovich, and Wong because Los Angeles is now thirty-five years into a post-white majority environment, and we may not find the same effects for black migration into the remaining predominantly white neighborhoods. There are a couple of clear differences that could lead one to expect different results in contemporary Los Angeles. There are many more predominantly Latino neighborhoods in Los Angeles than in New York, Chicago, and Sacramento; as recently as 1990 or 2000, large portions of the city that used to be predominantly African American or white households became predominantly Latino households. In U.S. census data from 2014, the percentage of the population counted as black in Los Angeles is down to 9 percent from 18 percent in 1970. Thus, I hypothesize that in Los Angeles, there will be evidence of the emergence of this black/non-black color line discussed by W. E. B. Du Bois in the *Souls of Black Folks* that is repositioned in the 21st century (Chandler 2013; Lee and Bean 2004).

Turning to anti-black violence provides an opportunity to understand the contemporary life of the color line, this kernel at the heart of the problem of the racial-spatial divide. Many segregation strategies have been outlawed and removed from law but the problem of private violence and crime remains. This and the following chapter focus on anti-black hate crime for two key reasons. First, responding to anti-black racial violence has been a key component of hate crime law and civil rights struggles in the United States since the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Acts, and an evaluation of hate crime law's contemporary use should start with an assessment of how it handles anti-black hate crime. Second, anti-black hate crime is likely the most comparable across different cities and time frames, so this comparison allows one to understand whether there is any evidence of an emerging black/non-black color line. Third, while the history and current reality of racial violence in Los Angeles is diverse, in contemporary statistics reported by police, anti-black racial violence is more common. Reliably testing the research questions require sufficient numbers of cases across a variety of neighborhoods.

With this framing of space, race, and hate crime, over the next two chapters, I use statistical analysis to understand the relationships between hate crime and neighborhood characteristics. First, I review the literature on hate crime in neighborhoods. Second, I set up how this particular time and place, Los Angeles from 2000-2014, is similar or different compared to the prior analysis of racially motivated hate crime in other U.S. cities. Third, I discuss my data and analytic methods and turn to the replication models to evaluate evidence for the defended neighborhoods theoretical framework with this empirical data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of results.

2. Hate Crime and Global Cities

2.1 Literature Review on Defended Neighborhoods

The quantitative research on hate crime in U.S. cities generally works from within a "defended neighborhoods" paradigm or model. Applied to hate crime, this model argues the following thesis: communities have elevated rates of racially motivated hate crimes compared to others because the arrival of new non-white residents prompts a aggressive reaction by the dominant, white group. There are two parts to this thesis at the local level: the existence of a dominant homogenous group and new population flow (Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001). The model was first tested quantitatively on the patterns of racially motivated hate crime in New York City in the 1980s and 1990s (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998). Another study in Chicago by Christopher Lyons (2008, 373) used survey data on community attachment from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods in addition to census demographics from 1990 and 2000, and found that black in-migration was associated with higher level of anti-black hate crime, during 1997-2002, only in white communities with high levels of community attachment. This study period used 380 anti-black hate crimes across the 77 Chicago community areas. In a study of Sacramento, Ryken Grattet (2009) also found evidence for higher levels of anti-black hate crime between 1995 and 2002 consistent with the defended neighborhoods approach: high levels of black in-migration by 2000 in census tracts with 90 percent white residents in 1990 were associated with more than twice as many hate crimes as those in census tracts with 60 percent white residents. But this study involved only 103 census tracts and 96 anti-black hate crimes. Adding the case of Los Angeles to this set will provide a robust contribution to this literature because there are far more hate crimes in Los Angeles, and because the

demographic differences in Los Angeles make it relevant to many diverse places with large new immigrant communities.

In Green, Strolovich, and Wong's original study, defended neighborhood models outperformed alternative explanations of the way racial composition impacts rates of racially motivated hate crime. These alternative hypotheses were drawn from literature on racial violence, residential transition during desegregation, and ethnic conflict (Blalock 1967; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Beck and Tolnay 1990). They included (a) random interaction, (b) power differential, (c) power threat and (d) residential tipping point perspectives; I describe each in turn next, and below in the results discuss their relevance to understanding Los Angeles. The (a) *random interaction* perspective is a null theory compared to defended neighborhoods and would argue that power and change have nothing to do with hate crime on a consistent basis. This random interaction perspective understands hate crime is a function of inter-racial interaction. Thus, hate crime is most likely as groups are evenly matched in a neighborhood, because that creates the most opportunities for interaction. This is a simple inverted U-shape model, and one would expect the same amount of hate crime in a neighborhood if black people were 25 percent and white people were 75 percent, or if the numbers were reversed and black people were 75 percent and white people were 25 percent. Work on interracial crime by Hipp, Tita and Boggess (2009; 2010) has explored the effect of random interaction further and found it to be a compelling part of the explanation, because it can address how differences in rates relate to differences in the odds of inter-group interaction.

In contrast, three other perspectives take a different approach and argue power does matter, but in ways that can be distinguished from the defended neighborhoods perspective. First, the (b) *power differential* perspective understands demographics as signals of group power, and

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hate crime as a side effect of that power. This perspective expects higher levels of anti-black hate crime in areas with higher concentration of whites, in a monotonic way. However, Green, Strolovich, and Wong proposed that the power differential perspective diverges from defended neighborhoods theory on how it would understand the impact of in-migration of African American residents. Whereas defended neighborhoods theory would expect in-migration to trigger of anti-black hate crime, the power differential theory would argue that in-migration would only reduce white resident's capacity to perpetrate hate crime. A study of hate crime in London in 2000 and 2001 found that rates of anti-Asian, anti-black, and anti-Chinese hate crime were positively correlated with the white population percentage in London's boroughs (spearman rank correlations of .715, .635, and .424 respectively) (Iganski 2008, 53–54). Iganski claimed that this indicates some support for the power differential hypothesis. However, the study did not control for changes in the population so it could not distinguish this finding from evidence for the defended neighborhoods thesis.

Originally conceptualized by Hubert Blalock (1967), the racial threat or (c) *power threat,* perspective is similar to the power differential approach, but takes a different approach to interpreting the side effects of power. From this perspective, anti-black hate crime would increase linearly as whites residents' power in the neighborhood is increasingly under threat. There is evidence to support this theory from lynching in the south (Beck and Tolnay 1990). In addition to violence, this theory also predicts that white communities under threat will resort to political and legal regulation to maintain their power (Blalock 1967). Empirically, there is evidence in favor of this theory from other contexts, such as the passage of policies to prohibit alcohol consumption across the U.S. from 1890 to 1919 by "native" white communities under threat of immigration (Andrews and Seguin 2015). Green, Strolovich, and Wong did not find

evidence in New York to support their conceptualization of this theory as a linear relationship between anti-black hate crime and decreasing levels of white populations. In this replication study, I retain the conceptualization, although acknowledge, with Lyons (2008, 360), that defended neighborhoods can be understood as a nuanced version of a threat theory, elaborated to a neighborhood level.

Finally, a (d) *residential tipping point* perspective—drawn from observation of "white flight" triggered when a neighborhoods became "too integrated"—would predict a tipping point that would activate high levels of anti-black hate crime. This tipping point could be around 75 percent, possibly higher or lower, depending on context (Green, Strolovich and Wong 1998). This theory reads the departure of homeowners or renters in the face of integration as an expression of racial hostility and expects that hostility to also extend to acts of hate crime. However, this may be a particularly historically bound theory: white flight was driven by both subjective, racialized concerns about integration, as well as material interests in real estate property due to central city decline and in light of redlining and lending practices that limited access to capital to predominantly black neighborhoods (Frey 1979; Brooks and Rose 2013; Coates 2014). Given contemporary trends toward the desirability of cities, especially due to what Ruth Glass (1964, xvii) called the dynamic of gentrification, this may not be as relevant. While access to credit is not racially equitable, institutionalized, territorial exclusions like redlining have less impact now in the post-1968 fair-housing act era (Pager and Shepherd 2008; Reskin 2012). Thus, the impact of racial integration on urban neighborhood resident's material real estate interests has changed significantly since the post-war suburban boom.

A recent study from Brisbane, Australia, which used local survey data on hate crime victimization instead of police reported crime, found little evidence for the effects of in-

migration on hate crime at the community level (Benier, Wickes, and Higginson 2015). The argument these researchers make to explain the lack consistency with results in the U.S. is that the diversity of Brisbane makes it unlike U.S. cities because it does not have the same legacy of segregation. Closer attention to how this makes for patterns of racial hate crime could provide important lessons for other diverse places like Los Angeles.

While there are no published neighborhood effects papers on hate crime in Los Angeles, there are some cognate studies that would point towards evidence of defended neighborhoods style phenomena. A study of "riot fatalities" during the civil disturbance of 1992 showed that they were associated with areas undergoing rapid transition from predominantly African American to Latino residents, providing some tentative evidence for some kind of defended neighborhood phenomena (Bergesen and Herman 1998). An exploratory spatial analysis of relationship between racial demographics and hate crime across Los Angeles County from 1994-97 identified a number of clusters of high racial hate crime activity, many of which were outside of the city of Los Angeles, although some, like Harbor Gateway, Van Nuys, and Hollywood persisted with high rates of hate crime in this study (Umemoto and Mikami 2000).

Most closely related to this chapter, a study in South Los Angeles on intergroup crime between 2000 and 2006 found some links between racial transition and intergroup crime (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009). Racial and ethnic change in nearby census tracts between 1990 and 2000 was associated with somewhat higher rates of Latino on Latino, Latino on black, and black on Latino aggravated assault, and higher rates of both Latino on Latino and black on Latino robbery (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009, 547–548). This study acknowledged some evidence of defended neighborhoods effects since in-migration appeared to be related to inter-group crime, but social disorganization seemed a more compelling theory given the overall pattern of the

results. This finding about robbery, however, is particularly interesting insofar as it is related to the arrival of new immigrants. This could indicate both black and Latino young people targeting new Latino immigrants because they are less likely to report robberies to police (although the cases in the study were reported). Anecdotal reports from some parts of Los Angeles have identified targeting of Latino immigrants because they are less likely to report a crime (Hernandez and Austin 1980; Quinones 2013). These cases are not always considered a hate crime in practice, since they lack obvious signs of emotional hate or animus based on race or ethnicity. Yet under California hate crime law's standard of biased selection based on national origin these would likely count as hate crimes. Thus, given my interest in testing defended neighborhoods theory related to hate crime across entire city these findings lead one to expect some measure of defended neighborhoods phenomena will be directed against Latinos.

In sum, Los Angeles provides an interesting case in comparison to prior research on racial hate crime for the following reasons. Los Angeles is diverse in many ways, having concentrated economic impacts of Pacific Rim and Latin American migrations (Abu-Lughod 1999; Light 2006). However, in recent decades, Los Angeles and the surrounding suburbs have been successful in "deflecting" some of poorer immigrants through local regulation of sweatshops and housing (Light 2006). The complex relationship between local regulation, class, poverty, work and immigration in Los Angeles impacts neighborhoods through rents and crowding and access to resources in local schools, parks, and other public amenities. It thus provides the backdrop for the changing racial composition in neighborhoods that are theorized to impact hate crime. This has a number of consequences that could lead to different relations between neighborhood racial composition and hate crime here in Los Angeles than in a city like New York.

First, although there have been major outbreaks of race related "civil disorder" or "riot" in 1965 and 1992, Los Angeles was home an early, successful political coalition between African Americans and liberal whites (Sonenshein 1993). Today, Los Angeles retains a legacy of that progressive approach to governance with expanded alliances to immigrant rights activists (Pastor 2015).

Second, there have been many cases of anti-integrationist violence directed at African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities moving into "majority-minority" neighborhoods (Bell 2013). There have also been a number of attempts to work together across racial boundaries to strengthen relationships in neighborhoods and form multi-cultural institutions, such as the Latino-Black Roundtable co-chaired by Antonio Villaraigosa and Mark Ridley-Thomas in the 1980s (Chang and Diaz-Veizades 1999). Whether or not these approaches address the racial problems in ways that reduce racial violence or diffuse tensions related to changing demographics in neighborhoods is another matter (Choi, Lizardo, and Phillips 1996; Gottlieb et al. 2006; Rice 2014).

Third, sprawling Los Angeles is interesting from a neighborhood perspective as well. Recent city charter reforms included the creation of neighborhood councils that have increased local political opportunities for neighborhoods that previously had little voice given the large council districts with populations over 250,000 (Sonenshein 2006). Los Angeles has become significantly more dense over the years and is now classified as "dense sprawl" by urban planners, with the urbanized metropolitan area that has the highest population density in the U.S. (Eidlin 2005). These denser neighborhoods with stronger avenues of political participation may have stronger neighborhood identities, and this could impact hate crime: stronger community attachment was related to higher levels of anti-black hate crime in Chicago (Lyons 2008). In the

next section, I review in more detail the racial demographic and political contexts that distinguish Los Angeles from the example of New York City in the 1980s and 90s.

2.2 Segregated Global Cities: Hate Crime in Historical-Comparative Context

I now turn to the historical comparative context to set the stage for the replication of Green, Strolovich, and Wong's New York City study of defended neighborhoods in Los Angeles. With this chapter, now the three largest U.S. cities each have neighborhood-level hate crime studies researching patterns of anti-Black hate crime. Thus, I situate this chapter and those studies, which used demographic data from 1980 to 1990 in New York (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998) and 1990 to 2000 in Chicago (Lyons 2007; Lyons 2008), in light of longer term comparative trends.

The longer historical scale and comparative framework creates a textured setting for the findings from contemporary Los Angeles. I do this in light of William Sewell's (2009) call for a more "eventful social science" that is sensitive to way that processes observed in research are temporal, sequenced, and contingent. I also do this in light of Janet Abu-Lughod's work on comparing New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles (Abu-Lughod 1999; Abu-Lughod 2007). Abu-Lughod also has argued more recently that these three cities are particularly useful to think through residential populations in space, political cultures, and police and legal behavior (Abu-Lughod 2011). Thus, the longer term patterns are important to understand the way results from Los Angeles presented in these chapters relate to findings from New York and Chicago. The patterns of anti-black hate crime and changing neighborhood racial composition take place at different times, when there are different economic and political pressures. Although each individual study is revealing of local dynamics at a point in time, by design and data limitation,

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they cannot speak to the longer term patterns and associations between racial composition and change and racial violence, whether housing related violence or hate crime.

In this section I aim to provide an ideographic account of some key differences across the cities over the last decades. First, I focus specifically on racial demographic composition from 1920-2014. Second, I discuss the implications for the political coalitions in the cities, especially multi-racial coalitions and how that relates to anti-black hate crime. Third, I review how this relates to trends in hate crime in each city since data on hate crime has become publically available through the FBI's hate crime statistics reporting program in 1991.

2.2.1 Economic Structure and Demographic Change Since 1920

I start the analysis in 1920 because that relates to the object of this study in two ways: first, it is the origin of human relations commissions, and their efforts to prevent housing related violence, what later became known as hate crime. The first commission in Chicago was formed in the wake of the 1919 race riot. Second, during this time, there were many examples of what we could call "defended neighborhoods" throughout Chicago as whites fought neighborhood integration with firebombs and riots, as large numbers of new black migrants from the South crowded the segregated black neighborhoods. In 1920, Chicago was predominantly white (although many were recent immigrants), and around 110,000 or 5 percent of the city's residents were African American. Racially crossing fluid neighborhood boundaries could be policed by vigilantes in deadly ways, as it was by George Stauber against Eugene Williams in Chicago in 1919. This suggests that in aggregate, at the city level there was something akin to the defended neighborhoods dynamic. Whether this also included reactions to racial change in neighborhoods proposed by defended neighborhoods theory, or through other means like economic anxiety, and

whether it was driven by elites, politicians, or through media escalation, is not entirely clear from the historical record (Chicago Commission on Race Relations 1922). But what is clear is that the most explosive racial violence appears to be associated with macro-level economic restructuring and times when whites were much larger portions of the city at large, and African Americans and Latinos held smaller shares (Abu-Lughod 2007).

Looking at overall population: In 1920, New York City had 5.6 million residents, and would grow to 7.9 million in 1960. By the 1960s, the city had reached its built form footprint. Populations declined to 7.1 million in 1980, and then grew again to 8.5 million in 2014. Los Angeles, in contrast, continued to grow fairly continually during the entire 20th century, with only a slight slow growth period from 1970 to 1980. Chicago, which grew quickly during the industrial era of high immigration, surpassed Philadelphia to become the second largest city by 1900, and nearly reached a population high at 3.4 million in 1930, and started declining significantly in 1950. Between 1920 and 1930, the population of Los Angeles more than doubled from 577,000 to 1.2 million. The city grew at a rate between 22 and 31 percent each decade until 1960 when it became the third largest city, and became second largest by 1990.

Turning to figure 2.1, one can see a number of citywide racial composition population trends from the last century for Los Angeles, New York City, and Chicago. Each city starts very small portion of residents that are categorized as Asian American or Pacific Islander, black or African American, or Latino, but ends with a two-thirds of residents that are categorized as non-White. What is not shown over time is the growing class dispersion among these pan ethnic categories (Hochschild and Rogers 2000). The trends for whites move together fairly closely. While upwards of 90 percent as late as 1940, by 2014, whites were only 32 percent in NYC in 2010, 29 percent in LA, and 32 in Chicago. While the Los Angeles non-Hispanic white

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population peaked in the 1970 census, at 1.7 million it had dropped to 1.1 million by 2010. Chicago's non-Hispanic white population peaked in 1930 at 3.1 million or 90 percent and dropped to 855,000 by 2010, and New York's white population dropped to 2.7 million by 2010.

In contrast, there is city specific divergence for the other racial categories. Chicago has consistently had the highest share of Black population of these cities, and there was notably high growth for Chicago's black population from 278,000 in 1940 to 1.2 million in 1980, or 8.2 to 40 percent of the population.

When Gerald Suttles published his book theorizing the "defended neighborhood" in 1972, the share of the population counted as black in Chicago had grown from 14 percent to 23 percent between 1950 and 1960 and to 33 percent by 1970, and this was much higher relative growth than Los Angeles and New York. Between 1940 and 1980, the number of black people in Los Angeles grew as a share of the city from 4.2 to 17 percent during this time, and in New York from 6.1 to 25 percent.

For Latinos, the highest growth was in Los Angeles, where they went from 314,000 to 1.7 million from 1960 to 2000, or from 13 to 47 percent. For Chicago, the Latino population grew from 7.3 to 26 percent between 1970 and 2000, and New York City's Latino population, which was most frequently U.S. citizen Puerto Ricans, grew from 11 percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 2000.

The U.S. had fairly strict immigration quotas generally but banned all immigration for people from Asia from 1924 to 1965 (Hing 2004). After the ban was lifted in 1965, the Asian American or Pacific Islander population in Los Angeles grew from 3.6 in 1970 to 9.8 percent by 1990, or 102,000 to 342,000. For New York City, the Asian American or Pacific Islander population grew from 1.2 to 7.0 percent and grew from 0.9 to 3.7 percent in Chicago from 1990.

Figure 2.1. Racial and Ethnic Demographic Statistics for four largest racial categories: Asian Pacific Americans, Black or African Americans, Latinos, and Non-Hispanic Whites, in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City, 1920 to 2014.

Sources: Data from U.S. Census historical populations estimates (Gibson and Jung 2005), 2000 and 2010 U.S. Decennial Census and the 2014 American Community Survey.

Note: Definitions of groups are not entirely stable over time: Latino is defined differently in earlier years, sometimes as Spanish surname, sometimes as Mexican. Asian American includes Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander.

Apart from the specific patterns discussed above, there is somewhat of a common story. Economic restructuring on a regional, national and global scale has driven many of these changes. With them come competition in job and housing markets and tensions that could possibly drive hate crime.

In the last 45 years, there are differences in terms of growing Latino populations in all of these cities; the African American population is shrinking as a share of the population in the central city. The 1980s was the last decade that had a growing share the population that was classified as black in New York City. Since, the population share classified as African American has begun to decline. Further, African Americans, Afro-Caribbeans, and African immigrants are combined under the pan-ethnic racial term "black" and this may have hidden an earlier decline for native-born African Americans (Greer 2013; Kang-Brown and Kang-Brown 2014). Nevertheless, New York City has not seen the same kind of changes that LA has in terms of overall population decline in the African American community. Individual neighborhoods have changed somewhat, especially in the Bronx and Harlem (Roberts 2010; Rhodes-Pitts 2011; Huang 2012). But the number of people counted as African Americans has not declined dramatically, remaining about a fourth of NYC residents. In contrast, The share of the city of Los Angeles' population that is African American has seen a decline of nearly 50 percent, from 17 percent in 1980 to 9.2 percent in 2014. This has implications for defended neighborhoods theory, as it is predicated on desegregation and based on aggressive reactions by white people to black people moving into a neighborhood. Although there is some evidence of this pattern in Los Angeles, it is not yet clear from the research in the other cities whether these same patterns of hate crime show up in new or traditionally Latino neighborhoods, or in traditionally black neighborhoods.

2.2.2 Political Coalitions Along Racial Lines

What do these trends mean for politics and political jurisdictions, how does this translate into actions like hate crimes? Looking at these charts of city wide racial composition over the century, it is clear that Green, Strolovich, and Wong's study took place at a distinctive time for the racial demographics of New York City. People counted as non-Hispanic whites in the 1980 census were still a majority of New York City, at 51.9 percent. However, both Chicago and Los Angeles had a majority of people of color in 1980, and Chicago elected Harold Washington, the first black mayor in 1983, and reelected him in 1987. Los Angeles's mayor Tom Brady was mayor from 1973-1993, backed by an African American and white liberal coalition. John Mollenkopf argued that New York's political style was the "great anomaly" compared to other cities at this time, because while it had a high number of non-white voters, due to a variety of reasons (machine style politics, few liberal whites, non-charismatic black candidates) the interests of people of color were less well-represented in the 1980s than they were in the liberal 1960s and in the Lindsay administration (Mollenkopf 1986). This setting led to what other studies have noted as ethnic conflicts that impacted the 1989 mayoral election where David Dinkins defeated Rudy Giuliani and 1993 election where Giuliani defeated Dinkins (Kaufmann 1998). Thus, for Green Strolovich, and Wong to find evidence of an elevated hate crime in relation to in-migration, could be somewhat dependent on this historical, demographic, and political context. Green, Strolovich, and Wong acknowledge the importance of this political context of white control of local political institutions in a footnote: "Indeed, anticipated loss of control may be what leads the most intolerant whites to take action against minorities who encroach upon white enclaves and to leave when efforts to drive out or subordinate minorities fail." (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998, 397). Thus, while citywide dynamics are composed

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of local changes, changes like a racial category's majority status likely connect back to and impact local neighborhood relations in a cross cutting, loosely linked way (Blau and Schwartz 1984).

But these findings of a link between in-migration and neighborhood racial composition might be contextually bound to those events in that historical context. Los Angeles had a different historical trajectory of racial and demographic change and these demographic changes were accompanied by an earlier shift in the political coalition governing the city. Tom Bradley's election in 1973 cemented the power of the progressive coalition that had been forming since elections in 1965, built with Black and white liberal voters and support, and eventually including Latinos and Asian Americans. Reflecting on the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, Raphael Sonenshine (1993) argued that white and black liberals did not have direct conflict of interests in Los Angeles but they did so in New York City. These conflicts between white and black liberals remain apparent in New York City and New York State. For example, when a democratic majority was elected to the state senate in 2012, a splinter group of white democrats left the Democratic Party in favor of Republican Party control of the senate (Kaplan and Hakim 2012).

In Los Angeles, after the events of 1992 led to broader disarray in local institutions, moderate and conservatives joined to support Richard Riordon in 1993, who served two terms (called the "Riordon Interlude" by some local scholars (Gottlieb et al. 2006)). During the study period, the mayoral campaigns of Antonio Villaraigosa (2001 defeat, 2005 and 2009 victories) marked the re-emergence of a liberal coalition in Los Angeles, with black voters joining to elect Villaraigosa in 2005 (Sonenshein and Drayse 2008). However, the fall of Martin Ludlow, chair of the LA County Federation of Labor and a city council member who pled guilty in 2006 to felony use of union funds for a city council campaign in 2003, led to reduced capacity in the

coalition to bring together Blacks, Latinos and organized labor (McGreevy and Hymon 2006). This time was not without high profile racialized conflicts, such as hate crimes perpetrated by gangs, and some have argued that Villaraigosa faced racial tension throughout his two terms (Betancur 2014). Nevertheless, there was a larger political coalition that served to react and aimed to deracialize or deescalate many of these conflicts, especially the ones that were gang-related.

2.2.3. Hate Crime in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles

In the next few paragraphs, I connect the empirical studies to their place in hate crime law's timeline, and overall trends in reported hate crime. Green, Strolovich, and Wong's research on racial hate crime in New York City covered cases reported by the NYPD from 1987 to 1995, a time when hate crime law was new. The first Federal hate crime statistics laws were passed during 1990, and New York State hate crime law first passed in 1982 (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998, 301). Anti-Black hate crimes were fairly widespread and violent (Pinderhughes 1993). In contrast, the later studies on hate crime in neighborhoods used data from near 2000 when hate crime law was mostly institutionalized. My study is later still, and hate crime law may be in a new phase of deinstitutionalization (see chapter 1).

Turning to the impact of hate crime in the various communities, it is helpful to consider these in a narrower way: as an average annual rate of anti-black hate crime per 100,000 black residents. Using this metric, contemporary Los Angeles has the highest levels of anti-black hate crime. Between 1987-95, New York City had a rate of 6.1, and Los Angeles between 2003-2014 had a rate of 24.8. As further comparison, the rate of anti-black hate crime in Chicago was lower

at 2.7 per 100,000 between 1997 and 2002 (Lyons 2007).[68] Sacramento's rate of anti-black hate crime, in the period studied by Ryken Grattet, 1995-2002, was 17.1 per 100,000 black residents. These higher numbers in California could indicate more robust implementation of hate crime law, or it could be somewhat related to relatively lower share for black populations in those two cities.

A line graph (figure 2.2) shows trends in police reported racial and ethnic hate crime in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City and indicates that overall reporting declined over time, and that Los Angeles, tended to report many more racial and ethnic hate crimes in the late 1990s. This large increase of reported racial hate crime coincided with Bernard Parks tenure as chief of police (1997-2002), and the drop is from William Bratton's tenure as chief (2002-2009). This may reflect differences in policy priorities at the department rather than changes in social behavior in the community. Parks, the second African American police chief in Los Angeles, was raised in Los Angeles and was sworn into the LAPD six months before Watts in 1965 (Roderick 2005). Parks lifelong experiences at the LAPD likely informed his implementation of hate crime law. In contrast, while I have not found evidence related to this question for his Los Angeles tenure, Chief Bratton has been rumored in the New York press to not prioritize hate crime policing (Siegler 2014). Another possibility is that police-reported cases of hate crime are driven by media attention. A second figure (2.3) displays the association between levels of overall hate crime in Los Angeles (all targeted groups and motivations) and articles on the topic of hate crime in the newspaper the *Los Angeles Times*. These two series have a correlation of .02 between 1997-2014. Taking a 1 year lag of news articles (1996-2013) for the 1997-2014 hate crime series results in a correlation equal to .10, so there is only weak evidence for media impact.

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[68] Lyons primarily analyzed 185 "bonafide hate crimes." Using the larger number of hate crimes and hate incidents used for sensitivity analyses, 380, implies a higher rate of 5.84 per 100,000 black residents, although that is still lower than New York City, and far lower than Sacramento and Los Angeles.

The data for the study of Los Angeles neighborhoods in this chapter can be grouped into two distinct periods: 2003 to 2008 and 2009-2014. In the latter part of the period (2009-2014), the numbers of reported hate crime declined, possibly due to the great recession, although a real decline in hate crime due to other reasons cannot be ruled out (see chapter 1 for further discussion).

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
New York City	294	227	222	168	248	223	177	147	113	107	109	115	33		111	81	76	71	100	40	59	61	59
Los Angeles				352	348	267	254	310	350	458	210	142	141	143	135	186	154	97	72	96	58	50	58
Chicago	161	167	136	106	62	91	56	56	58	64	26	36	34	26	16	16	17	13	6	4	5	25	27

Figure 2.2 Race and Ethnicity Hate Crime Reported to the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City, 1992 to 2014.
Sources: FBI UCR Hate Crime Statistics Reports, 1992-2014.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Los Angeles						490	481	403	404	541	555	658	354	276	244	219	210	279	280	190	138	170	124	114	152	
LA Times	16	26	65	65	25	22	44	173	229	409	337	274	191	163	123	91	101	138	86	100	71	69	67	58	44	97

Figure 2.3 Hate Crime Reported to FBI Uniform Crime Reporting System and the *Los Angeles Time*'s Coverage of Hate Crime, 1992-2015.
Sources: FBI Uniform Crime Reports and the Proquest database for the *Los Angeles Times.* For more information, see chapter 1.

2.2.4 Theoretical Implications of Historical-Comparative Context

This demographic, political, and hate crime law enforcement context has the following implications for theory about the racial practices known as defended neighborhoods. First, we know that Green, Strolovich, and Wong's study period includes the tipping point when New York City's population became majority non-white, the 1989 election that broke out of the "anomalous" pattern of non-white political disempowerment, and that some of those political gains were rolled back by the election of Giuliani in 1993. A theory that is predicated on white resistance to integration would be likely to find empirical support given this context. Second, while the defended neighborhoods (and many other racial relations frameworks) were theorized to address times of growing black populations in predominantly white neighborhoods and cities, the current study explores Los Angeles, where there is an overall decline in the white and the black population, and large numbers of traditionally black neighborhoods like Watts have transitioned to being majority Latino. Therefore, these neighborhood based hate crime data for 2003-2014 in Los Angeles represent an important extension and empirical test of the defended neighborhoods theory. In what follows, I describe the data and methods, and then turn to results suggesting that in some circumstances, anti-black hate crime is more likely when people stay put in the midst of transitions. As we will see below, the data from Los Angeles also suggest an influx of African Americans in certain neighborhoods can lead to a reduced number of anti-black hate crimes.

3. Data and Methods

3.1 Data

3.1.1 Hate Crime

My data includes all police reported hate crimes from 2003 to 2014 collected by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission (LACCHR). The LACCHR is a small county agency formed in the wake of the 1943 "Zoot Suit" riots, and maintained since (Ethington and West 1998). The Commission collects copies of police reports that are hate crimes or hate incidents from all Law Enforcement agencies in L.A. County, as well as from school districts and universities. These are the same incident reports that are submitted to the state and to the FBI. The data used in these analyses only include police-reported hate crimes that occur in the city limits of Los Angeles. Each police department has a two-tier review system, and the LACCHR provides a third review, similar to the California State Attorney General's office review of hate crimes for the annual state and FBI reports on hate crime statistics. Additionally, the LACCHR provides intergovernmental technical assistance and training support to these and other police agencies.

The reported cases are primarily from the LAPD, but 7.6 percent of cases are from the Los Angeles Unified School District Police (I only include those cases at schools within the city limits) and 5 percent are from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. (The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has contract service jurisdictions within the Los Angeles city limits like the Los Angeles City College or the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses and trains). I exclude hate crimes that occur in jails or court lockups because they are not plausibly related to the surrounding neighborhood, usually downtown Los Angeles.

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The years 2003-2014 were marked by settled hate crime law and stable organizational policy around processing hate crime in Los Angeles – there were no major challenges to hate crime law constitutionality or statutes that expanded what counted as a hate crime in Los Angeles during this time frame (Phillips and Grattet 2000, see also chapter 1).

From 2003-2014 in the City of Los Angeles, there were 3,189 hate crimes reported by police and 1 in 3 had evidence of anti-black racism. Police reported 770 Anti-LGBT cases, 449 anti-Latino cases, and 440 anti-Jewish hate crimes over period. See table 2.1 for the remaining cases. For this paper, I focus exclusively on anti-Black hate crime in the regression models for two reasons. First, responding to anti-black racial violence has been a key component of hate crime law and civil rights law and is thus likely the most comparable across different cities and time frames. Second, it appeared that anti-black hate crime was more accurately reported and thus enabled statistical analysis.

Table 2.1

Selected Type of Bias Motive in City of Los Angeles, 2003 – 2014

	#	%
Anti-Black	1,060	33.2
Anti-LGBT	770	24.1
Anti-Latino	449	14.1
Anti-Jewish	433	13.6
Anti-Arab / Middle Eastern / Muslim / South Asian	165	5.2
Anti-White	132	4.1
Anti-Other religions	79	2.5
Anti-Asian / Pacific Islander	75	2.4
Anti-Disability	8	0.3
Total	3,189	100.0

Note: The Anti-AMEMSA category includes the following: Hindu, Middle Easterner, Muslim, Indian, Pakistani, Egyptian, Armenian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Israeli. The Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander category includes the following: Afghan, Asian/Pacific Islander (not specified further), Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Pakistani, Samoan, South Asian, and Vietnamese. The Anti-Black category includes: African, Black or African American, Egyptian, and Ethiopian. The Anti-Jewish is only cases marked anti-Jewish. The Anti-Latino category includes: Central American, Cuban, Guatemalan, Latino (not specified further), Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Salvadoran. Anti-LGBT includes: Lesbian, Gay (male), Bisexual, Transgender, and LGBT (not specified further). Anti-Other religions includes: Atheist/Agnostic, Catholic, Christian (not specified further), Jehovah's Witness, Mormon/LDS, Protestant, and Scientologist. Anti-White category includes only cases marked as anti-White.

Hate crimes in the City of Los Angeles during the study period included some very serious offenses: 3 murders, 45 attempted murders and 7 rapes or sexual assaults. The most frequent three categories were vandalism (29 percent), simple assault (26 percent), and aggravated assault (20 percent). Table 2.2 below details the criminal offense for all hate crimes, those motivated by race, and those specifically anti-Black. There were relatively more serious violent Anti-Black hate crimes compared to crimes with other motivations.

As a comparison for scale, during the 12 year period from 2003-2014, the LAPD reported 143,846 robberies and 167,810 aggravated assaults in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting program (FBI UCR Table 8, Offenses Known to Law Enforcement). The hate crimes included in this dataset are a small share of the crime in the city and represent 0.6 percent of robberies and 0.4 percent of aggravated assaults. This is lower than what would be expected, assuming Los Angeles fits with the National Crime Victimization Survey estimates of the share of violent crime that is hate crime. The NCVS includes rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault as components of the "violent crime" estimate. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of violent crimes counted as hate crimes ranged from 2.8 to 4.8 percent of violent crimes annually, and the average was 3.6 percent (M. M. Wilson 2014). While the numbers are thus low for Los Angeles, they are not as low as the national numbers. If one compared national hate crimes, in 2014 there were 122 robberies out of 325,805, and 559 aggravated assaults out of 741,291 reported in the UCR (UCR 2014 Hate crime, and UCR 2014 Crime in the United States). This is 0.04 and 0.08 percent of crimes reported by police.

Table 2.2

Hate Crime Offenses in the City of Los Angeles, 2003-2014

	All Hate Crimes		Racial		Anti-Black	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Murder	3	0.1	3	0.2	3	0.3
Attempted Murder	45	1.4	41	2.2	32	3.0
Rape / Sexual Assault	7	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Aggravated Assault	644	20.2	448	24.2	281	26.5
Simple Assault	820	25.7	491	26.5	221	20.8
Intimidation	426	13.4	256	13.8	151	14.2
Robbery	110	3.4	69	3.7	32	3.0
Trespassing	2	0.1	1	0.1	1	0.1
Arson	20	0.6	8	0.4	1	0.1
Burglary	22	0.7	12	0.6	8	0.8
Theft	3	0.1	1	0.1	1	0.1
Vandalism	915	28.7	456	24.6	288	27.2
Disorderly Conduct	142	4.5	63	3.4	39	3.7
Unknown/Other	30	0.9	2	0.1	2	0.2
Total	3,189	100	1,851	100	1,060	100

3.1.2 Demographics

The models use demographic characteristics from the U.S. Census 2000 decennial census and the American Community Surveys from 2005-2014.[69] Key indicators include racial change in the neighborhood, measured as the percentage point difference in the share of households counted as black in 2000 and 2014, and the percentage of households counted as Latino or white in 2000. For controls, I use total population and the number of jobs in the neighborhood, a proxy for the daytime population. I also use characteristics on the built environment of the neighborhood as indicated by land use codes. The Southern California Association of

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[69] I apportion data to my primary unit of analysis, the vernacular neighborhood, using block level household and person counts. Since 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2009 ACS used the 2000 vintage tract boundaries, I also use the Census Bureau's 2000-2010 tract change files to apportion data to the new tract boundaries for supplemental tract level analyses.

Governments, a governmental regional planning organization, collects the employment and land use data.

The social space index, developed in my MA thesis (J. Kang-Brown 2011), combines the concepts of territory and population. It uses the proxy variables of employees and nighttime population, as well as the built environment, all key elements in the production of social interactions in urban spaces (Lefebvre 1991; Brighenti 2006). This concept of social space involves three-dimensional index of the resident population, the number of employees, and the built environment in square miles. I measure this using the mean z-score (or standardized value) of the logged variables for residents, employees and built area:

$$S = \frac{std(\ln resident\ population) + std(\ln employees) + std(\ln built\ area)}{3}$$

The built area is a total land area minus vacant land, which is particularly important in mountainous LA neighborhoods. Employees are measured at the census tract level, and are collected from tax payroll records by SCAG. Like many other big cities in the U.S., the Los Angeles labor market involves a massive number of commuters. At the neighborhood level, this runs to an average 15,583 jobs per neighborhood. This is highly skewed, with Downtown having over 250,000 jobs, and Westchester (near LAX) with second highest at 72,950. This reflects the concentration of employment centers in multiple sites throughout the region (N. B. Anderson and Bogart 2001; Giuliano et al. 2007).

In addition to the data from the city of Los Angeles, I also include information from the Green Strolovich and Wong defended neighborhoods study in order to draw direct comparisons in table 2.3. The *N* for all LA data is 110 neighborhoods, and for NYC data is 51 community districts, which include 4 with low population consolidated into two in the Bronx and does not include 6 districts in lower Manhattan (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998, 379).

Table 2.3

Descriptive Statistics on Key Indicator Variables

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Anti-black hate crime, 2003-14	9.64	12.31	0	72
Spatial lag: anti-black hate crime, 2003-14	9.87	5.00	1	21
Percentage Latino households, 2000	0.314	0.229	0.011	0.921
Percentage White (non-Latino) households, 2000	0.390	0.312	0.003	0.919
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000	0.704	0.211	0.063	0.947
Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y 2010-2014	-0.024	0.051	-0.174	0.093
Logged Resident Population, 2010	7.934	1.247	1.386	8.837
Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)	0	0.644	-1.625	1.38
NYC: Anti-Black hate crime, 1987-1995	19.61	18.31	2	101
NYC: Percentage White (non-Latino) population, 1980	0.413	0.298	0.01	0.92
NYC: Percentage point change in Black population, 1980 to 1990	0.008	0.054	-0.18	0.12

Note: Los Angeles $N = 110$, New York City $N = 51$.

In 1980 New York City, a third of neighborhoods were less than 25 percent white and half were 50 percent or more white. In general, the distribution was bimodal, with concentration at both ends. In 2000 Los Angeles, about 2 in 5 neighborhoods had less than 25 percent of the population counted as non-Hispanic white, and around 2 in 5 had more than 50 percent white.

In terms of change in the percentage of the population classified as black or African American, from 1980 to 1990: over a quarter of NYC neighborhoods (13 out of 51) had no change in their overall black population number, and 43 percent (22 out of 51) had increases (mean 5.1 percent max 12 percent). Nearly a third of neighborhoods, (16 out of 51) had decreases (mean -4.5 percent, max -18 percent).

In Los Angeles from 2000 to 2014, the proportion of households counted as black was shrinking in nearly 50 percent of LA neighborhoods, yet a quarter of neighborhoods (27 out of 110) had no change in their share of black households.[70] Another quarter (29 neighborhoods) had increases (mean 2.0 percent, max 9.3 percent). And 54 (49 percent) had decreases (mean -6.0 percent, max - 17 percentage). Thus, both NYC in the 1980s and LA in the 2000s had a large number of neighborhoods with shrinking African American populations. A correlation matrix for the Los Angeles models is presented in table 2.4.

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[70] No change is defined as increase or decrease of less than half of a percentage point.

Table 2.4

Correlations between Key Indicator Variables

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1)	Anti-black hate crime, 2003-14	1.00							
(2)	Spatial lag: anti-black hate crime, 2003-14	0.28	1.00						
(3)	Percentage Latino households, 2000	0.22	0.51	1.00					
(4)	Percentage White (non-Latino) households, 2000	-0.13	-0.49	-0.74	1.00				
(5)	Percentage Latino or White households, 2000	0.05	-0.16	0.00	0.68	1.00			
(6)	Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y 2010-2014	0.16	-0.15	-0.20	0.59	0.66	1.00		
(7)	Logged Resident Population, 2010	0.09	0.03	0.05	-0.11	-0.12	-0.12	1.00	
(8)	Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)	0.56	0.11	0.01	0.23	0.35	0.26	0.42	1.00

3.2. Methodology

3.2.1 Unit of Analysis: Vernacular Neighborhoods

Choosing a geographical unit of analysis is a theoretical decision, and the choice should

reflect an aspect of the theoretical process that is being researched (Hipp 2007a). Most urban

neighborhood effects studies in the U.S. use census geographies like block groups or tracts for

their unit of analysis. However, many claim to prefer a more rigorous concept of the

neighborhood or community area—one that exists in cognitive maps and conversations between

a city's residents (Lynch 1960; Mumford 1954). In order to best test theories around anti-integrationist racial aggression in neighborhoods, I believe that one should use the level of these more recognizable neighborhoods with names. The 114 neighborhoods used in this and the next chapter were developed by the *Los Angeles Times* Neighborhood Mapping Project and most closely resemble the Chicago Community Areas style approach. I call these vernacular neighborhoods (J. Kang-Brown 2011). For more information see appendix 1.

The *Los Angeles Times'* vernacular neighborhoods range in population from roughly 2,000 to 106,000 with a mean of 35,000. Four of the neighborhoods designated by the *Times* are excluded due to no significant residential population (Hansen Dam, Griffith Park, Sepulveda Basin, and Chatsworth Reservoir). The three largest vernacular neighborhoods (Koreatown, Westlake, and Van Nuys) have over 100,000 people. Yet they are well known and useful for representing their local community area. Two are smaller in area than the average: Koreatown is 3.5 and Westlake 3 square miles, Van Nuys at 9 square miles is above the average size of 4.2 square miles. (See appendix 1 for a detailed map and table identifying these neighborhoods, discussing their construction, and comparing with other similar units of analysis in New York City and Chicago).

3.2.2 Spatial Analysis: Geocoding, Regression and Weights

I geocoded hate crime data using the Google maps API, accessed through the MMQGIS plug-in for the computer program QGIS (QGIS Development Team 2015). After an initial match, I reviewed all approximate and geometric cases to attempt to improve the address information and secure a better geocode match. In many cases, removing an incorrect zip code led to an accurate geocode. Further details on geocoding results are in appendix 1.

3.2.3 Spatial Weighting

Since these units of analysis are neighborhoods that neighbor each other I account for the spatial structure of the data by creating spatially lagged outcome measures. However, a simple spatial weights matrix using queen or distance decay may not be appropriate for modeling hate crime in neighborhoods across the entire City of Los Angeles for a variety of reasons, including spatial divisions due to the mountains or built form of the city that reflects capital investment and social structure differences that break down diffusion processes. Test results using simple spatial weights matrix were inconclusive.[71]

Following an approach proposed by Tita and Greenbaum (2009, 153–157), I approximate the exposure and diffusion processes involved in hate crime in neighborhoods by constructing a spatial weights matrix. For this matrix, I use a modified version of Reyner Banham's typology of L.A's built environment: beach cities, foothills, and the flatlands (2009).[72] I augment this typology with a fourth category for the urban core running from Santa Monica east down Wilshire Boulevard through Downtown. (For more information, see a map Figure 2 and Table 3 in Appendix). Once each neighborhood was classified by ecological type, I grouped with nearby neighborhoods based on a principle of similarity to represent diffusion and exposure processes. I also include information from other nearby cities and unincorporated areas (such as East Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, West Hollywood, and parts of South Los Angeles like Florence-Firestone).

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[71] A test for spatial autocorrelation of the non-spatially informed negative binomial used Moran's I on the residual count, calculated as expected number of anti-black hate crimes in a neighborhood given the model minus the actual number anti-black hate crimes. This statistic was -0.014, with a queen's contiguity of 1, using Queen's contiguity of 2 neighborhoods led to a score of -0.054, and 5 nearest neighbors score was -0.019.

[72] For a summary of the changes in each of Banham's ecologies, see page xvii-xxi in Day's introduction. Although, Joe Day argues that reading Banham today "presents a city which may no longer exist" (xvi) Banham's general characterization of this city in terms of proximity to the ocean, the foothills and the valleys remains useful.

Using this matrix, I created a spatial lag variable for the hate crimes of interest by summing the crimes and dividing by the number of neighborhoods and communities in the area. Therefore, I assume that neighborhoods affect nearby neighborhoods that are similar, through a diffusion process. This produces a row-standardized spatial lag variable and captures both diffusion and exposure effects.[73] This spatial lag variable could create some problems with endogeneity because this measure potentially measures an effect that happens simultaneously—an impact on the surrounding neighborhood goes both ways. Nevertheless, additional models that compare results with and without this spatial lag variable do not show any particular impacts. The effects associated with each variable are in the same direction, and have similar values. Overall, indicators of model fit do not move very much either.

I use negative binomial regression models because the outcome of interest is overdispersed, (Hilbe 2007, 61–62). There are 110 observations in the models. I use the hate crime count, not rate of crime per population, after King, Messner, and Ball who argue one should use counts when investigating racist events such as police reported hate crime or lynching (2009). Because racial violence is about domination and group symbolism, events, not rates matter. Some perceive hate crimes as individuated criminal events with an element of bias amenable to rates (Lyons 2007; Lyons 2008), yet I argue it is important to retain this framework

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[73] Communities outside the city of Los Angeles were split if they fell along a larger ecological boundary. They were defined using police reporting districts tracked by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (available online at http://egis3.lacounty.gov/dataportal). The resulting spatial matrix is equivalent to a row standardized contiguity matrix; however, contiguity is conceptualized in a broader sense based on the built environment. Additional analyses with a spatial lag a strictly typological categorization of beach cities, foothills, residential plains and urban core, were not significantly different from models with no spatial lag. Because San Pedro is an isolate – near the port and distinct from the nearby flatlands, I use the queen contiguity approach and incorporate information from the two nearby neighborhoods.
This spatial matrix could create some problems with endogeneity because this measure potentially measures an effect that happens simultaneously—an impact on the surrounding neighborhood goes both ways. Nevertheless, supplemental models that compare results with and without this spatial lag variable do not show any particular impacts. The effects associated with each variable are in the same direction, and have similar values. Overall, indicators of model fit do not move very much either.

of intergroup domination. Many hate crimes involve symbolic power—especially in the meaning-making of media representations of anti-black violence (Lovato 2007; Umemoto 2006).

4. Regression Models and Data Analysis Results

4.1 Descriptive Analysis

While this chapter replicates the New York City defended neighborhoods models, there are some differences: First, the original paper used large areas (community areas are representative bodies chartered by the city to include roughly equal population, sort of like a city council district). This is similar to my unit of analysis, the *Los Angeles Times*, vernacular neighborhood. What is different is that the prior study did not need to control for population because as political bodies they were roughly equal. Second, in addition to number of people, this chapter also covers size of the neighborhood, and the daytime population (particularly important because of high rise employment / entertainment centers like Hollywood or Downtown Los Angeles). Third, this chapter makes the analysis of demographics at the household level, not the person level. This controls for a number of factors (children in particular) that would otherwise cloud the sense of change, as it is lived and observed in a neighborhood.

At a descriptive level, the pattern of police reported anti-black hate crime across Los Angeles neighborhoods appears be negatively related to the percentage of households that are counted as black. Over 2003-14, the average number of anti-black hate crimes in the 88 neighborhoods that were under 25 percent black households was 11.0; it was 8.2 in the 5 neighborhoods that had 25-50 percent, and 3.2, in both the next 12 neighborhoods from 50 to 75 percent and the 9 neighborhoods from 75 to 100 percent.

4.2 Defended Neighborhoods Models

In table 2.5, I first present negative binomial regression results that directly replicate the classic Green, Strolovich, and Wong defended neighborhoods article model for anti-black hate crime, and then translate that model to the City of Los Angeles. They examine anti-Asian, Anti-Latino, and Anti-black hate crime from the perspective of migration of those categories of people into traditionally white neighborhoods, as measured with 1980 and 1990 US census data, and 1987-95 hate crime data from the NYPD. This research found anti-black hate crime was related to "black in-migration" interacting with "preexisting white neighborhoods," and that in areas that did not have black in-migration, anti-black hate crime was more frequent in neighborhoods that had a high percentage of white residents. For a hypothetical 68 percent white neighborhood with 5 percentage point black in-migration one would expect around 25.9 anti-black hate crimes, with no change it would be 17.7 and 5 percentage points decrease would be 12.1.

Turning to the three Los Angeles models predicting the distribution of anti-black hate crime, I present results based on (2) the proportion of Latino households, (3) the proportion of white households, and the (4) the proportion of Latino and white combined households. (I used the replication dataset from the defended neighborhoods paper to estimate a combined Latino and white model for New York City but it performed significantly less well than the white specific model). Models for Los Angeles that used the log population were substantive similar in terms of strength direction of relationship between the covariates and the outcome but they performed less well on Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores than those using the more theoretically appropriate spatial index that includes area and day time population. There remained some spatial autocorrelation in initial results so I include the spatial lag of anti-Black

hate crime, however, leaving it out does not substantively change the results.[74] I also estimated

models for anti-black hate crime using the non-black household share, but they did not perform

as well as the combined Latino and White model and there are some concerns about

collinearity.[75]

Model number 4 with a combined Latino and white population has the best predictive

power of the results. But it is not quite what the defended neighborhoods theory would predict;

the signs are reversed. In Model 4, anti-black hate crime is less common in neighborhoods facing

"black in-migration" that are predominantly Latino and white. Instead, in neighborhoods that are

less Latino and white the signs in the negative binomial regression model are reversed for all

indicators compared to the New York City model.

In addition to the theoretically preferred model reported here, I have run a variety of other

models using different specifications of racial change, such as evaluating at the impact of change

in the Latino population, None substantively change the results: they do not change the direction

or strength of the key relationships, they are not individually significant, and they do not improve

overall fit using BIC as a metric.[76]

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[74] A test for spatial autocorrelation of the non-spatially informed negative binomial used Moran's I on the residual count, calculated as expected number of anti-black hate crimes in a neighborhood given the model minus the actual number anti-black hate crimes. This statistic was -0.014, with a queen's contiguity of 1, using Queen's contiguity of 2 neighborhoods led to a score of -0.054. 5 nearest neighbors was -0.019, and a 10 mile arc distance was -.047.

[75] This is the inverse of the black household share, and results were less strong than model 4 that combined Latino and white, on a number of metrics. VIF test for that model showed an average of 1.98, with non-black household share in 2000 at 2.9 and the percentage point change in black households at 2.83. The non-black household share in 2000 and the percentage point change in black households were highly positively correlated with $r = 0.8$.

[76] Running models without Harbor Gateway does not significantly change the results. Harbor Gateway is the most notorious defended neighborhood in Los Angeles during this time frame -- in large due to the murder of Cheryl Green in December 2005 and the subsequent community and law enforcement reaction. There were 84 of hate crimes in Harbor Gateway during this time period and 85 percent were anti-Black. Other neighborhoods with similar large share of anti-Black hate crime numbers were Canoga Park (80 hate crimes, 63 percent anti-Black) and Boyle Heights (62 hate crimes, 56 percent anti-Black). In supplemental models using a measure of the chance of interacting across racial category lines based on Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2010), I found that controlling for interactions between black households and other households, such as white or Latino households, led to less efficient predictions, and the results were substantively similar.

Table 2.5

Defended Neighborhood Models for Anti-Black Hate Crime in New York City (1987-1995) and Los Angeles (2003-2014).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	NYC	LA	LA	LA
Defended Neighborhood Group	White	Latino	White	Latino + White
Group Percent in 1980 (NYC) / 2000 (Los Angeles)	1.625*** (0.26)	0.938* (0.467)	-1.157** (0.380)	-1.902** (0.638)
Percentage point change: NYC in Black population, 1980 to 1990; LA in Black households, 2000 to 5Y 2010-2014	-4.547 (2.341)	1.806 (4.137)	5.918** (2.247)	25.77*** (6.708)
Interaction	17.61*** (5.287)	-0.556 (9.797)	-19.82 (10.63)	-42.35*** (11.34)
Log Population, 1990	0.321 (0.317)			
Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)		1.044*** (0.139)	1.092*** (0.136)	1.141*** (0.138)
Spatial lag: Anti-Black hate crime, 2003-14		0.0419* (0.0198)	0.0321 (0.0203)	0.0376* (0.0175)
Constant	-1.961 (3.730)	1.273*** (0.216)	2.193*** (0.328)	3.077*** (0.562)
ln alpha				
Constant	-1.477*** (0.258)	-0.500** (0.182)	-0.626** (0.194)	-0.664*** (0.196)
Observations	51	110	110	110
Pseudo R^2	0.110	0.092	0.102	0.106
BIC	381.6	692.7	685.1	682.3
chi2	44.41	66.63	74.18	76.97

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.4: Scatterplots for Key Variables in Defended Neighborhoods Theory: Anti-Black Hate Crime; percentage Black population change; and Percentage of defenders

LA 1. Hate & Change

NYC 1. Hate and Change

LA 2. Hate and Defenders

NYC 2. Hate and Defenders

LA 3. Defenders and Change

NYC 3. Defenders and Change

Comparing marginal effects with the rest of the values at means shows us the estimated differences in the impact of black in-migration in New York City and in Los Angeles neighborhoods in these different time periods.[77] To make these estimates for the predicted count of anti-black hate crime in New York City from 1987-95, I take the average values for neighborhoods that are majority white (for example, 77 percent white is the mean share in those neighborhoods). With those values, model 1 predicts 34 anti-black hate crimes when the share of African American households grows 5 percentage points, 22 anti-black hate crimes when the share is unchanged, and 14 anti-Black hate crimes when the share of African American households declines 5 percentage points.

Turning to the contemporary Los Angeles models, I follow the same procedure, calculating the mean values for neighborhoods that are majority Latino, majority white, and majority combined Latino and white, and running the margins command. In general, the models predict lower levels of anti-Black hate crime, in part because I am using smaller units of analysis in Los Angeles, and in part because police reported anti-Black hate crime was less frequent in Los Angeles from 2003-2014 than it was in New York City between 1987-95.

Model 2 shows how anti-black hate crime is related to changes in black households, in interaction with the share of the neighborhood that is Latino. This is a variation on the New York City defended neighborhoods model. To explore these effects most clearly in relationship to defended neighborhoods theory I turn to the 23 neighborhoods in Los Angeles that have a majority of Latino households. On average, the 23 majority Latino neighborhoods had 66 percent Latino households, the surrounding neighborhoods had 12.5 anti-black hate crimes and they had a social space index score of

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[77] Computed using the margins command in Stata 13.

.091. Model 2 predicts a count of 13 anti-black hate crimes when the share of Black households grows 5 percentage points, 12 anti-black hate crimes when the share is steady, and 11 anti-Black hate crimes when the share of black households declines 5 percentage points in these neighborhoods.

Model 3 turns to a closer replication of the New York City defended neighborhoods theory model, with a control for the share of the neighborhood that is white households. On average, the 42 majority white neighborhoods had 74 percent white households, the surrounding neighborhoods had 7.4 anti-black hate crimes from 2003-14, and they had a social space index score of .144. Compared to majority Latino household neighborhoods, this is a higher average majority concentration, a lower average number of anti-black hate crimes in surrounding neighborhoods, and a larger score for the social space index. Model 3 predicts 4 anti-black hate crimes when the share of African American households grows 5 percentage points, 6 anti-black hate crimes when the share is steady, and 9 anti-black hate crimes when the share of black households declines 5 percentage points in these neighborhoods. Compared to Latino neighborhoods, which have mixed evidence of a defended neighborhood phenomena, this is a more robust model according to model fit statistics. However, it provides no evidence in favor of the defended neighborhoods model. Instead, increases in the black household share of the population in a neighborhood are associated with lower hate crimes, and moving out is associated with more hate crimes.

When combined together as a group, for model 4, the 89 majority Latino and white neighborhoods averaged at 79 percent household counted as Latino or white, and the surrounding neighborhoods had 9.5 anti-black hate crimes from 2003-14. They had a

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social space index score of .076 on average. Model 4 predicts 7 anti-black hate crimes

when the share of black households grows 5 percentage points, 8 anti-black hate crimes

when the share is steady, and 10 anti-black hate crimes when the share of black

households declines 5 percentage points in these neighborhoods.

In table 2.6, I explore this pattern from model 4, where there are more anti-black

hate crimes when black households have a shrinking share of the neighborhood housing

stock. On the right side of this table, in neighborhoods where Latinos and white

households own or rent more dominate share of the housing stock in 2000, in-migration

from black households leads to an expected lower number of hate crimes. In contrast,

stable or decreasing shares of the housing stock that are occupied by black households are

associated with more anti-black hate crime.

Table 2.6
Expected Number of Anti-Black Hate Crimes in the City of Los Angeles, 2003-2014

Change in Black Households, 2000 to 2010-14 (%)	Percentage Households Latino or White in 2000					
	25	35	45	55	65	75
5 ……	42	28	19	13	8	6
0 ……	20	16	13	11	9	8
-5 ……	9	9	10	10	10	10
-10 ……	4	5	7	9	11	14

The evidence from these models suggests that the pattern has an inflection point

around 60 percent of households counted as Latino or white. From there we begin to see

the pattern where in-migration or stable numbers of black households are associated with

more anti-black hate crime, but declining numbers of black households are associated

with less hate crime. The lowest expected numbers of anti-black hate crimes are in

neighborhoods that have a relatively low portion of Latino or white households but have a declining share of the housing stock occupied by black households.

Thus, while there is some evidence of a relationship between anti-black hate crime and changes in share of the neighborhood housing owned or rented by black households, the evidence points toward a more complicated pattern than that presented by the classic defended neighborhoods theory. There appears to be some evidence for a version of racial threat or tipping point theory. In the next section, I discuss these results and situate them in the broader themes of the dissertation.

5. Discussion

One way Los Angeles is distinctive in that the predominant racial/ethnic group in the state and the city is Latino, whereas this is not the case in other cities where these theories around hate crime have been developed. This has implications for theories about "minority group" relations. Bell's 2013 book has a chapter dedicated to this topic in Los Angeles, reflecting on the social dynamics revealed in the human relation commissions annual aggregate hate crime numbers, that show that a large proportion of anti-black hate crime in Los Angeles is committed by Latinos (Bell 2013). But Bell's argument about intra-ethnic hate crime does not elaborate an explanation to whether it is individual bad apples, a universal situation of neighborhood demographic change, or a thorny problem of the reproduction of anti-blackness in non-white communities.

This chapter takes an empirical approach to the question and tries to better understand the phenomena by replicating a study of hate crime reported by police in New York City between 1987-95, in Los Angeles between 2003-14. I further situated this

paper in a historical comparative context for Los Angeles with Chicago and New York City. This chapter aimed to evaluate whether there was evidence that drivers for hate crime were consistent across differences in time and place. It is clear that there are differences.

The evidence from the regression models suggests that understanding the impacts of racial and demographic change in neighborhoods requires nuanced theory that can change with higher-level political and social contexts. Further research should be designed to more explicitly model neighborhood level hate crime patterns across multiple cities in different regions over a simultaneous period. In particular, little is know about neighborhoods and hate crime in the U.S. South.

My research shows that at least in Los Angeles many neighborhoods experience demographic change and do not have higher rates of hate crime; and for some neighborhoods it appears that the very lack of change is what is associated with higher hate crime. Some neighborhoods integrate without seeing an uptick in move-in violence or hate crime.

In the comparative replication models I also find evidence to support a move from a black / white color line to a black / (Latino and white) color line. There is not strong evidence, in terms of the explanation of variation across neighborhoods using these models, to use a generic black / non-black approach, although doing so produces somewhat similar results, these results have less explanatory power.

Returning to the theoretical models discussed above, there is little evidence to support the contention of the random interaction hypothesis. And there is little evidence that the power differential perspective is playing much of a role in Los Angeles with

regard to anti-black hate crime. The results provide some evidence in favor of a modified defended neighborhood theory that takes into account the patterns of hate crime in neighborhoods with black out-migration.

People have many concerns about their neighborhoods; and the evidence from Los Angeles shows that in some places at some times, race matters. This Los Angeles study raises a new test for the literature on hate crime and shows what happens when people are moving out.

Chapter 3:

NEIGHBORHOOD INCOME INEQUALITY AND HATE CRIME

1. Introduction

Research on race and integration in U.S. cities shows that neighborhoods have both welcomed difference and change and violently assaulted outsiders to try and keep them away (Suttles 1972; S. G. Meyer 2001; Sugrue 2005; Charles 2006). Social scientists have attempted to understand these dynamics by focusing on the demographic characteristics that predict when people defend changing neighborhoods from racial outsiders with race-based hate crime (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Brimicombe et al. 2001; Lyons 2007; Lyons 2008; Iganski 2008; Grattet 2009; Wickes et al. 2016). Classical materialist theories of racism posit that economic or labor marker competition generates much of the community tensions that compose racial conflict; yet prior neighborhood studies of hate crime have not found much evidence for this proposition. Instead, the evidence appears to favor the argument that migration of racially different people into a neighborhood generates conflict. But that argument is inadequate to explain the emergence and maintenance of asymmetric racism, like robust anti-black racism in the United States. Thus, the line of research on community-level hate crime since Green, Strolovich and Wong's 1998 study of hate crime in New York City, while improving our understanding of the impact of racial change in neighborhoods, may be missing a key element of the equation. We can extend the analysis, however, and attribute part of the problem to the dynamics of economic inequality rather than solely demographic change. This provides a more robust way to understand racism and integration in U.S. cities.

This chapter explores whether or not there is an empirically observable association between neighborhood economic characteristics and anti-black hate crime in Los Angeles. I argue for a nuanced approach that evaluates social disorganization, inequality and demographic change carefully, given the complexity of race relations in multi-ethnic Los Angeles. Some of the leading scholars of racism have long argued that jobs, income, rents, economic disadvantage—and in particular economic anxiety—must be taken into account when assessing trends in racism and bias (J. A. Powell 2012a). For example, Du Bois argued that the "fear of unemployment" is the "inner nucleus" of "human hate" (1998:678). Horkheimer and Adorno also advanced a similar thesis in their explanation of anti-Semitism (2002). These critical theories argue for a nuanced account of the problem as one not of absolute poverty or deprivation, but of relative poverty, and often linked to and mobilized by political demagoguery. Thus, in this framework, racist crime is not just about race. Hate crime is about larger problems like fear of unemployment and concern about unfair life chances. Some people resolve or express these fears and concerns by acting out in hate, scapegoating racial others that they perceive to be in zero sum competition. This implies a more "root causes" analysis than the story about people moving and racial change in the neighborhood explained in chapter 2, and, thus, there are more assumptions involved in measuring concepts like "economic anxiety" with census demographic data on income inequality. Nevertheless, the account has more direct policy implications; remedies to inequality may have the additional benefit of reducing racial tensions.

In the following analysis of hate crime in contemporary Los Angeles, I find that levels of income inequality predict anti-black hate crime, while confirming the

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importance of demographic change. In the previous chapter, we saw that there is a link between anti-black crime and both the racial composition of a neighborhood and whether or not African Americans were moving in, moving out, or staying. And the pattern was different from what had been seen in prior research in New York City, Sacramento, and Chicago. In Los Angeles, there appears to be a tipping point for Latino and white neighborhoods; those neighborhoods with a racial composition around 60 percent Latino or white are associated with higher numbers of police reported anti-black hate crime.

In what follows, this chapter assesses the strength of those claims about racial composition and change and situates them within a broader economic model that accounts for unemployment, poverty, and income inequality. To address my research questions I use cross-sectional models with anti-black hate crimes in the City of Los Angeles as an outcome. In addition to the gini index of income inequality, I also include a measure of a neighborhoods social disorganization called an index of concentrated disadvantage, found by prior studies to be linked to hate crime in Chicago and Sacramento (Lyons 2007; Grattet 2009).

Before turning to the details on this chapter's models and statistical analysis of hate crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods, I first assess the relevant literature on inequality, review how the literature on hate crime in neighborhoods has addressed economic factors, and discuss anti-black hate crime in Los Angeles in the broader economic context of a predominantly Latino city. Second, I elaborate how income inequality in neighborhoods is likely associated with racially motivated hate crime. Third, I review the data, methods and statistical models, and evaluate evidence for the impact of income inequality on hate crime. Also included in this chapter as a check on the

robustness of the findings: an alternate set of outcomes reported by police, general property and violent crime, to evaluate whether police reported hate crime has any distinctive relationships with neighborhood level covariates. I conclude with a discussion of results.

2. Literature Review:

In line with larger trends in public attention on inequality, social scientists are researching inequality and its effects on life course and neighborhood effects analyses of crime (Sampson 2015). The contemporary high levels of income inequality are just one aspect of undesirable inequality that also includes inequality of opportunity along lines of difference and inequality of wealth. Income inequality is important because, in addition to inherited capital, it helps produce inequality of wealth and impacts political attempts to ensure equitable democratic governance (Piketty 2014). In this section, I first review relevant literature on inequality and crime, second, I turn to research that looks specifically at the more complicated relationships between inequality and hate crime, and third, I connect this to the specific dynamics of racial hate crime in diverse Los Angeles.

2.A Income Inequality and Crime

Social scientists have long theorized that economic conditions affect crime and punishment and have found various means of drawing those connections statistically, from Quetelet and Guerry's studies of climate, industry, and demographics in 19th century European countries to sociologists like Durkheim (1897) and Merton (1938). Economic researchers have explored the conditions wherein "crime pays," since Becker

(1968) framed crime as a risky choice for the potential gains of crime in the face of possible punishment. This paradigm seeks to understand how punishment and police control can increase the cost, and thus optimally reduce, crime.[78] Thus, economic inequality is an important factor in addressing understanding the etiology of crime, because inequality could increase criminal pay off for relatively poorer people able to criminally appropriate resources from nearby, richer targets. But these relationships seem to depend on the type of crime, the level of analysis (whether neighborhood, city, region, or country), and historical and political context.

Meta-analysis of the relationships between crime and economic conditions (poverty and income inequality) shows that the relationships vary by crime type; the relationship between income inequality and robbery and rape is weaker than that of assault and homicide (Hsieh and Pugh 1993). A study by Hipp (2007b) analyzed the relationships between different types of inequality in census tracts across 19 cities in the U.S. in 2000, and confirmed some of the relationships outlined in Hsieh and Pugh's 1993 meta-analysis. Hipp found support for relative deprivation theory because of the strong relationships observed between within-race income inequality and some types of crime. This was especially the case for violent forms of crime like assault, robbery, and murder.

At other units of analysis, a study of counties in the U.S. found that inequality was strongly related to violent crime, but not to property crime (Kelly 2000). Digging into this analysis further more recently, Hicks and Hicks (2014) have found that the relations between crime and inequality in U.S. states from 1986-2001 might more accurately be

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[78] There are a number of flaws in this paradigm, most notably, it reflected and rationalized the milieu of increasing punitiveness in the U.S. during the time rather than evenly considering the long history of research showing the social origins of crime and the limited power of punishment as deterrence (Simon 2007; Lynch 2010).

termed as relations between violent crime and conspicuous consumption, after Veblen's theory of the leisure class. Hicks and Hicks measured visible, conspicuous expenditures like cars, clothes, and recreation directly rather than the less visible variable of income. Thus, their study incorporates information about inequality that is observable by other people, similar to Hipp's aim in the 2007 paper to understand inequality at the census tract level since people are more likely to have information about their neighbors. These studies reflect the importance of sociological explanations of violence that rely on relative deprivation and strain.

Nevertheless, translating these insights on inequality by crime type to hypothetical relationships between inequality and hate crime is not a straightforward exercise. While many hate crimes are technically property crimes, they almost always aim to cause the targeted person pain rather than remunerate the perpetrator with direct economic gain.[79] A hate crime vandalism of a house after a new family moves in might be better understood as a crime against a person rather than a crime against property. Thus, in this study, I combine property and violent hate crimes into a single count. The next subsection details how research on hate crime has addressed economic factors in neighborhoods.

2.B Economic Explanations for Hate Crime

The defended neighborhoods line of research links community-level characteristics with the number of hate crimes in a neighborhood. It has been helpful in

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[79] An exception might be crimes of robbery with a mixed economic motivation and biased target selection based on racial stereotypes. Nevertheless, these are a relatively small number of cases; only 3 percent of anti-black hate crimes in the study period are robberies.

its synthesis of social-psychological and sociological explanations of hate crime, but it has not found any clear and consistent evidence of relations between economic hardship and hate crime, and it appears that the current consensus in the literature concludes that economics does not matter much compared to factors like racial difference.

But theories about racism from Du Bois and Adorno and Horkheimer mentioned in the introduction are not necessarily wrong. The ties between race and disadvantage run deep in many U.S. cities; it would be difficult to distinguish neighborhood changes that are perceived by residents as only racial and not also economic due to the patterns of racialized inequality. Put another way, residents may not distinguish between racial change and economic change. Studies of racial integration in housing find evidence that many people that appear to hold racial preferences based on questionnaires about stereotypes and bias often only state those preferences in class terms, such as a preference to avoid living near poor people (Charles 2003). In order to clarify the relationships, I wrote this chapter and kept up the search for the link between economic characteristics and hate crime. For studies of hate crime, there remain a couple of gaps in the literature related to income inequality.

First, a reason for the lack of evidence could be due to straightforward measurement and conceptual issues; other studies of hate crime at the neighborhood level did not investigate the impact of income inequality. Green, Strolovich and Wong admit, "we searched in vain for evidence linking economic conditions and racially motivated crime" (1998:395). Nevertheless, Green, Strolovich, and Wong's study of hate crime did not directly test income inequality, only using unemployment and change in unemployment – which is correlated but not productive of much of the variation in

income inequality.[80] Criminologists have argued convincingly that unemployment is an inadequate indicator of economic disadvantage in the service economy (Crutchfield 1989; Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997). Grattet did not test income inequality's impact on hate crime in a 2007 study of Sacramento. For analysis of Chicago, Lyons (2007, 837) used an indicator that approximates inequality, the index of concentration at extremes proposed by Massey, and found that anti-black hate crime was more common in neighborhoods with high levels of concentration at extremes, but results were not shown in the paper. Further, index of concentration at the extremes covers some of the issue of inequality, but because it is focused on extremes it does not address the difficulties faced by the people in the middle. The not-quite middle class is a category especially important for understanding Los Angeles suburban urban spaces (Waldie 2005). Thus, in this study I propose a model that incorporates income inequality.

Second, lack of evidence in prior studies could be due to historical or temporal limitations to these effects. Economic factors could operate on a different time scale or be historically contingent, for instance, only appearing during a recession (Andrew Abbott 2001; Taylor 2015). The impact of the recession in Southern California was relatively strong due to high levels of foreclosure and increased poverty (Kneebone and Berube 2013). Therefore, one may be able to more accurately identify economic strains and their links to hate crime here during this chapter's study period of 2003-2014. In contrast, other studies that studied times without a serious recession and attending hardships may not find links between economics and hate crime.[81] In my own analysis of police reported hate crime in the city of Los Angeles for my MA thesis (Kang-Brown 2011), I turned to a

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[80] "Our principal finding is that demographic change, not economic hardship or inequality, predicts racially motivated crime directed at minorities." (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998, 373)

[81] Further research is needed to tease out the sequence of effects related directly to the recession.

more robust indicator of a poor labor market, Robert Crutchfield's concept of labor instability. It refers to a combination of the unemployment rate and the percent of workers in the secondary labor market.[82] This combined an analysis of segmented labor markets and the working poor with the more commonly used unemployment rate. Controlling for a variety of other demographic, built environment, and economic factors, I found evidence in Los Angeles neighborhoods in favor of the view that higher levels of labor market instability in 2000 were associated with higher levels of hate crime from 2003-2008: a single standard deviation increase was associated with a 73 percent higher expected count for anti-black hate crime. This chapter builds on this finding.

2.C African American and Latino Community Relations and Racial Hate Crime

Another key reason to elaborate and nuance the economic understanding of racial hate crime in Los Angeles is the complexity of anti-black racism in the city. As discussed in chapter 2, the rates of anti-black hate crime in Los Angeles are nearly 5 times as high as compared to anti-black hate crime rates in Chicago or New York. Much of the police reported racial hate crime in Los Angeles is between African American and Latinos. In 2014, a majority of anti-black hate crimes with information on suspects were committed by Latinos (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 2015, 14, 25). A relatively high share of anti-Latino hate crime involved black suspects, although not a majority. In the rest of this section, I review some of the research literature and evidence from Los Angeles on what is commonly called black-brown conflict, and discuss how it might relate to income inequality and hate crime.

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[82] Indicated as percent of people employed working in service, non-farm labor, operators, assemblers, and transportation and materials positions. It is measured by standardizing each variable and then combining them into a single index.

The architects of hate crime law likely did not expect that it would be used most frequently in Los Angeles to police racism between people of color. I argued in chapter 1 that hate crime law was primarily intended to ensure police responsiveness to housing violence and white perpetrated, racially motivated crime against people of color. Yet in Los Angeles, the tools and capacity that hate crime law give to police and prosecutors are used frequently in neighborhoods where police are heavily involved, and those neighborhoods are frequently ones where African American and Latino people live (Vargas 2006; Muñiz 2015). Therefore, the pattern of hate crime law's use in Los Angeles may serve as an unintended outcome of the combination of civil rights efforts and the criminal justice system. Still, it is also likely that a significant portion of the problem is not some kind of selective over-enforcement, but real anti-black racist crime that hate crime law was designed to intervene against.

According to public opinion polls, substantial numbers of people thought that race relations between blacks and Latinos were problematic in Los Angeles during this study period. Table 3.1 shows a measure of public opinion on the matter, from a survey by the Center for the Study of Los Angeles in 2007 asking whether people considered a variety of items were major threats. When asked if relations between blacks and Latinos were a problem, and asked to rate 1 to 10 along with a battery of other concerns, 41 percent of African Americans and 30 percent of Latinos rated issue as 9 or 10, which was relatively higher than Whites and Asians. In general, however, more people rated traffic and gangs and global warming to be more pressing problems than race relations.

Table 3.1 Public Opinion on Race Relations in Los Angeles
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being no threat at all and 10 being a major threat, how would you rate race relations between Latinos and Blacks?

	All Adults	Race/Ethnicity			
		Asians	Blacks	Latinos	Whites
1 to 6	44%	54	35	42	46
7 and 8	30	35	24	27	31
9 and 10	25	11	41	30	22

Source: Center for the Study of Los Angeles, Loyola Marymount, 15-year follow up survey on the Los Angeles Riots, 2007.
Note: See Cohen-Marks and Faught (2010) for more on the survey methodology. I code the scale into three groups following the net promoter score method by Reichheld (2003), where scores of 6 and under represent "detractors," people who do not believe the issue is a threat, 7 and 8 are "passively satisfied" and thus believe the issue is a major threat but will not discuss it as threat, and 9 and 10 represent people who are "promoters" who believe it is a threat and will discuss it as a threat with others.

To put this number in historical perspective, in 1984, Oliver and Johnson analyzed public opinion polling in Los Angeles on the percent who agree "Black/Mexican American relations are getting worse" and found that 19 percent of blacks, 13 percent of Latinos, and 28 percent of whites agreed. Of course, these are slightly different questions – one about current status and the other about trends. Further, these questions do not clarify whether this elevated number in 2007 was due to increased problems in terms of everyday experiences or due to increased public attention and media coverage. For example, the murder of Cheryl Green, an African American teenager in Harbor Gateway in 2006 by members of a Latino gang was a high profile case covered in the media throughout the prosecution (Quinones 2006; Quinones 2007b; Quinones 2007a; *Los Angeles Times* 2012). Nevertheless, it appears that a higher percentage of people were concerned about this problem in 2007 than in 1984.

So how can we best understand black brown "race relations" or conflict? Some of these anti-black hate crime cases happen in neighborhoods undergoing demographic transitions, most notably the Latino migration into South Los Angeles and the San

Fernando Valley. Nevertheless, many of these places where hate crime cases cluster, have been consistent since at least 1994-97, as shown by prior geographic analysis of hate crimes in Los Angeles (Umemoto and Mikami 2000).[83] As I describe in chapter 2, however, the demographic transition argument does not appear to play out as expected given prior theory and research.

Other scholarly accounts of the dynamics of intergroup tension and conflict in Los Angeles take alternative approaches that emphasized the role of inequality, market competition or social disorganization. Bobo and Hutchings' (1996) study of Los Angeles aimed to extend Blumer's (1958) theory that prejudice or racism is best understood from a symbolic interactionist framework rather than a material interest to a more diverse setting. They found that in 1992 Los Angeles, consistent with Blumer, sense of competition and threat were related to perceptions of group position, but that it was particularly so for people that felt that they belonged to a "racially alienated group"—a group facing disadvantage and discrimination in legal and market institutions. But Bobo and Hutchings also found that African Americans and Latinos with low incomes were more likely to "perceive other groups as zero-sum competitors" (1996, 967). This provides support for theories that would argue the importance of economic factors, such as those of Du Bois and Adorno and Horkheimer. It also relates to what Johnson and Oliver (1989) had earlier found in research on intergroup conflict in South Los Angeles in the 1980s. They argued that the basic issue in conflict was jobs, and while incidents of conflict were primarily isolated, they could become more widespread due to the

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[83] A number of the geographic clusters of anti-black hate crimes are in LA County suburbs like Hawaiian Gardens, Azusa, Duarte, and El Monte, outside of the study area of Los Angeles City and thus beyond the scope of this chapter, but some are in the city, in neighborhoods like Harbor Gateway. Future research could include these in a more robust, multi-jurisdictional model.

increasing competition in labor markets. Other studies throughout the 1990s also addressed how problems like competition in the low wage labor market and the search for neighborhoods with the right mix of amenities and affordable housing led to conflicts between new immigrants in Los Angeles and native born communities (Waldinger 1997; Stoll, Melendez, and Valenzuela Jr. 2002).

A study of crime that crosses racial group boundaries between Black and Latino people in South Los Angeles found no consistent relationship between income inequality and intergroup crime (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009). Rather, intergroup crime appeared to be mostly related to social disorganization—which led to relatively higher levels of crime generally. In order to best understand how this works with anti-black hate crime city wide, I include a measure of social disorganization in the study. A version of this study also developed an explicit theory related to the way that random intergroup interaction may be a more proper denominator for these types of analyses (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2010).

Another study, although not from Los Angeles, provides further evidence of the importance of economic relationships in understanding race-relations between African Americans and Latinos. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010) argue that increased competition between African Americans and Latinos for low-skill jobs, may lead to increased unemployment among Black people and eventually to increased crime. However, the same scholars in a more recent study of counties across the U.S. using robbery data from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), found no evidence that increased immigration led to robberies by African Americans that singled out Latinos (Barranco and Shihadeh 2015). These studies together indicate the importance of

situating "conflict" in light of larger processes like economic disadvantage, social disorganization, and market competition.

A further note on interpretation of conflict in Los Angeles: an important line of research in this area has been Karen Umemoto's approach to understand the shifting and nested forms of racialized conflict. In an ethnographic study of a black-brown conflict that roughly escalated along gang and then racial lines in Venice in the 1990s, Umemoto demonstrated that perspectives on the conflicts vary widely and these conflicts have multiple dimensions. Some key principles from her work include the following: 1) the nature of conflicts are contested; 2) race may become more and less salient as a line of division relative to other boundaries like neighborhood, or gang affiliation; 3) contemporary institutions like police, religious organizations or jails, reproduce or realign racial divisions; and (4) there is a "nested relationship between two roughly defined types of conflict: intra-class, inter-minority conflict and inter-class, minority white conflict" (2006, 6–7). Thus, Latino anti-black racism should be situated within larger political and economic context of nativist resistance to immigrant and Chicano communities. While some Latinos have a measure of growing political and economic power in Los Angeles, many people still face ongoing discrimination, disadvantage, and resistance to integration (Valle and Torres 2000; M. Davis 2000; Milkman 2006; Light 2006; Sonenshein and Drayse 2008; Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015b).[84]

Others share Umemoto's concern with situating racialized conflicts between black and Latino communities in Los Angeles in the larger frame of conflicts with whites over

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[84] The research that I conducted in this dissertation covered one aspect of this group conflict. I do not report results for models of police reported anti-Latino hate crime because further research is needed to address concerns about the quality and accuracy of the data for victims, often immigrants with limited English proficiency. I am currently conducting further research on this matter with key informant interviews, focus groups and a survey on experiences with hate crime victimization.

legal and political institutions. For instance, Earl Ofari Hutchinson argues that Black and

Latino communities have both shared experiences of discrimination and shared political

interests (Hutchinson 2007). In Los Angeles, these shared interests have not always been

enough to ensure a successful political coalition or movement (Sonenshein and Drayse

2008). But there have been many efforts to work across racial lines, especially in light of

the unrest following the verdicts in 1992 in the trials against the LAPD officers who beat

Rodney King. Thus, hate crime law enforcement in Los Angeles, takes place in a region

impacted by immigration and impacted by racial and police violence, where dialogs

about citizenship, belonging and ethnic conflict and law are common, especially since the

wake of the 1992 riots/unrest (J. Hicks, Kwoh, and Acosta 1996; Choi, Lizardo, and

Phillips 1996). Examining income inequality, racial composition and change in L.A.'s

neighborhoods provides an opportunity to address the problem of racial hate crime in a

more diverse context where both economics and race matter. In this respect, Los Angeles

has much in common with other cities with large migrations and intergroup conflicts.

Thus, knowledge and theory developed to understand how inequality impacts hate crime

in Los Angeles can help inform other cities efforts to integrate and maintain multi-ethnic

political coalitions (Sassen 2006:314-19).

3. How Income Inequality Influences Hate Crime

This section discusses what income inequality measures in Los Angles

neighborhoods and develops a theoretical model for the relationships between inequality

and hate crime. When discussed nationally, income inequality usually refers to the large

income gap between the rich and the poor. When measured in a neighborhood, income

inequality may not mean exactly what one expects. The very wealthy only rarely have poor neighbors, however, because they have much higher incomes than the white-collar professionals that do live near the rich neighborhoods, these wealthy neighborhoods still score high levels of income inequality. This has further implications for neighborhood composition: high levels and low levels of income inequality are both associated with increased levels of racial segregation (Bruch 2014).

The Los Angeles neighborhoods with the highest levels of income inequality are primarily wealthy neighborhoods where the large income gap is between the very rich and professional workers in the upper middle class. Lowest levels of income inequality are usually due to homogeneity – nearly everyone in the neighborhood is poor, or in some suburban areas, everyone is middle class. Table 3.2 provides details on housing costs, work and poverty, crime rates, and hate crime for Los Angeles neighborhoods, divided into 4 categories by level of income inequality. The highest group includes 23 neighborhoods with values at least 1 standard deviation above the mean, the next group the 24 moderately high neighborhoods with above the mean but less than 1 standard deviation above, and the moderately low (45 neighborhoods) and lowest (18 neighborhoods) with income inequality scores at least one standard deviation below the mean.

Table 3.2

Los Angeles Neighborhoods by Gini Income Inequality and Income, Labor, Crime

	Gini Index of Income Inequality			
	Low	*Low-mid*	*Hi-mid*	*High*
Gini index (mean)	41.2	47.1	55.9	64.2
Group z-Score Range	-1.91 to -1	-1 to 0	0 to 1	1 to 2.5
	Mean value for indicator			
Housing				
Average Rent ($) 2010-14	1,132	1,147	1,486	1,799
Average Rent ($) 2005-09	1,009	1,011	1,270	1,550
Logged Aggregate Home Value	11.97	12.16	12.74	13.28
Owner-Occupied Households (%)	41	38	41	49
Work and Poverty (%):				
Management Occupation[*]	19	27	49	65
Service Occupation[**]	25	26	16	9
Sales Occupation[+]	24	24	22	22
Production Occupation[++]	11	10	5	2
Poverty Rate	29	26	16	10
Unemployment Rate	13	12	10	9
Crime (#)				
Property, 2003-07	5,643	5,094	6,071	3,409
Violent, 2003-07	2,403	1,795	1,386	416
Percent Property	71.2	74.4	84.1	89.9
Hate Crime (#)				
Anti-Black Hate Crime, 2003-14	9.6	12.0	10.5	4.0
Hate Crime, 2003-14	24.5	31.5	38.4	17.6
N of Neighborhoods	18	45	24	23

Sources: Demographics from U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014; Crime rates from the Los Angeles Police Department for 2003-2007, Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission police-reported hate crime statistics.
Note: Percent property refers to percent of total crimes that are property crimes.
Occupational Categories:
[*] Management, business, science, and arts occupations;
[**] Service occupations;
[+] Sales and office occupations;
[++] Production is a combined category: 1) Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations; 2) Production, transportation, and material moving occupations.

In Los Angeles, a high level of income inequality in a neighborhood is correlated with high quality and desirable housing and amenities, and a favorable spatial location of the neighborhood within the city such as proximity to the beach. The highest levels of inequality (greater than a 1 standard deviation above the mean gini index score of 50.1) are found in neighborhoods with very high home values, high average housing rents ($1,800 a month), and relatively lower levels of poverty (10 percent). These high-income, high inequality neighborhoods, while not necessarily smaller in terms of built up area, have relatively lower populations and thus lower levels of residential density. High-income, high inequality neighborhoods have lower levels of violent crime but similar levels of property crime compared to neighborhoods with moderate and low levels of income inequality. It may be that law enforcement in high-income, high inequality neighborhoods serves more of a security guard, property-protection function.

In the 24 neighborhoods with moderate-high levels of income inequality, rents and housing are higher than average for the Los Angeles area at $1,400 a month in 2010-14. Many of these neighborhoods have low rates of violent crime. This indicates that the neighborhoods are both desirable and attainable to a wider range of households, although management occupations are over-represented compared to the residents of moderately low and lowest levels of income inequality.

The 45 neighborhoods with lower than average levels of income inequality but within 1 standard deviation have much higher levels of poverty and higher levels of violent crime. The neighborhoods with the very lowest scores on the income inequality index distribution, and thus the most equal, tend to have uniform, suburban style tract housing developments and tend to be in the San Fernando Valley.

I expect that this distribution of income inequality in neighborhoods is associated with hate crime in a couple of ways, displayed in Table 3.3. First, in neighborhoods with the highest levels of income inequality like Bel-Air, strategies for exclusion likely exist, but they do not take the form of hate crime, they take the form of racially neutral "market" means and associations with jurisdiction over property.[85] Thus, I hypothesize that neighborhoods with highest levels of income inequality will be likely to have lower levels of police-reported hate crime. Further, they may take the form of racially disparate law enforcement practices, like racial profiling in traffic stops.

Table 3.3.
Theoretical Model for Hate Crime by Neighborhood Income Inequality

	Community Segregation Strategy	*Law Enforcement Response*	*Reported Hate Crime Outcome*
High Income Inequality	Successful market-based strategies through private actors, rents and prices; informal controls or acceptance mostly irrelevant	Responsive policing (high ratio of property to violent crime)	Less reported hate crime
Moderate Income Inequality	Relatively affordable housing ensure market means fail; Informal control or acceptance of in-migration	Responsive policing (high ratio of property to violent crime)	More reported hate crime
Low Income Inequality	Limited market power; Informal control or acceptance of in-migration	Overwhelmed policing (low ratio of property to violent crime)	Less reported hate crime

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[85] A historical anecdote: When black celebrities first moved into the Sugar Hill section of Los Angeles--now considered part of West Adams, then an exclusive neighborhood--these moves violated restrictive covenants. In 1944, the black celebrities were sued by white celebrities for racially integrating the neighborhood and violating the terms of that covenant, although a Los Angeles court threw out the case (S. G. Meyer 2001, 76; *Time Magazine* 1945).

I hypothesize that neighborhoods with moderate to high levels of income inequality will be more likely to have high levels of police-reported hate crime. In neighborhoods with a moderate level of income inequality, average housing prices are not as high as the most unequal neighborhoods. Thus, in these neighborhoods, there is less ability to prevent change through informal social control or biased market actors. Law enforcement has more concerns than in neighborhoods with the highest levels of inequality, but still plenty of resources to respond to and report hate crime.

In neighborhoods with lowest levels of inequality, there are overall less desirable housing and lower rents. While property crime does not vary significantly between these three types of neighborhoods, violent crime does, and there are, on average, higher rates of violent crime in neighborhoods with lower levels of inequality. And higher levels of violence could mean that law enforcement resources are spread thin or staffing inadequate relative to the need, as documented in the Jill Leovy's work on homicide in South Los Angeles (2015). This shortage of staffing resources could make police less able or likely to report hate crime that does happen. I hypothesize that neighborhoods with lowest levels of income inequality will be less likely to have high levels of police-reported hate crime

In sum, it may be that economic anxiety—especially the inter-locking class and racial stereotyping that comes with the economic strain of higher levels of inequality may be part of the problem. In contrast to prior research, I hypothesize there are links between economics and hate crime. In order to address whether there is something distinctive about this theory of income inequality's relationship to hate crime, I also include measures commonly used in research on crime and neighborhood social disorganization,

an index of concentrated disadvantage proposed by Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls

(1997), and applied to hate crime in studies of Sacramento by Grattet (2009) and Chicago

by Lyons (2007). I also include a measure of residential density and a measure of ethnic

heterogeneity. Theoretically, both are associated with higher levels of violent and

property crime, however their relationship to hate crime varies in different studies: it was

significant and negative in relation to anti-black hate crime in Chicago (Lyons 2007), but

significant and positive in relation to anti-black hate crime in Sacramento (Grattet 2009).

I hypothesize that in Los Angeles neighborhoods for this study period, higher levels of

social disorganization will be associated with lower levels of hate crime, akin to Chicago.

4. Data and Methods

The following cross-sectional models testing the relationship between economic

characteristics, demographic change, and hate crime come from the following sources.

The hate crime data are for the years 2003 to 2014 and were collected by the Los Angeles

County Human Relations Commission for the purposes of their annual report on hate

crime.[86] In terms of their reliability, this time frame was marked by settled hate crime law

at the state and national level (Phillips and Grattet 2000; Jenness 2007), and stable

organizational policy around processing hate crime in the police departments in Los

Angeles (see chapter 1 and 2 for more information). I only use police-reported hate

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[86] The LA County Human Relations Commission is a small governmental agency formed in the wake of the
1943 "Zoot Suit" riots, and maintained since (Ethington and West 1998). The Commission collects copies
of police reports that are hate crimes or hate incidents from all Law Enforcement agencies in L.A. County,
as well as from school districts and universities.

crimes that occur in the city limits of Los Angeles.[87] These primarily are reported by the

LAPD after a two-tier review process. The data also include hate crimes from the Los

Angeles County Sheriff's Department (which also has a two-tier review), when it

occurred in the Los Angeles city limits, in one of their contract service jurisdictions like

MTA buses and trains, or Los Angeles City College. Data on cases reported by the Los

Angeles Unified School District Police are included as well when in LA city limits.

Additionally, the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, provides

intergovernmental technical assistance and training support to these and other police

agencies, and provides a third level of review of the cases before entering them into their

hate crime database. This review assesses whether there is evidence that the case meets

the legal standards of a hate crime. I exclude hate crimes that occur in jails or court

lockups because they are not plausibly related to the surrounding neighborhood.

There were 3,189 hate crimes reported by police in the City of Los Angeles over

this period and 33 percent had evidence of anti-black racism, 45 percent were motivated

by something other than race.[88] For this chapter, I retain a focus on anti-black hate crime,

but also analyze hate crime that is motivated by matters other than race and general crime

reported by the LAPD in order to check the distinctiveness of anti-black hate crime. In

supplemental models (not presented), I evaluated the neighborhood distribution of anti-

Latino hate crime, which makes up around 14 percent of hate crimes during this period.

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[87] While the Human Relations Commission collects data for the entire county and from a variety of agencies, including community-based non-governmental organizations that provide hate crime victim assistance, the geographic coverage for the NGOs is unknown, and would thus not be amenable to regression analysis.

[88] Motivation is categorized by the Human Relations Commission staff, with the evidence provided in the police report. Motivation is collected by official data collections at the State of California Attorney General's office as well.

Table 3.4

Selected Type of Bias Motive in City of Los Angeles, 2003 - 2014

	#	%
Anti-Black	1,060	33.2
Non-Racial Hate Crimes Motivation	1,408	44.1
Total	3,189	100.0

Hate crimes in the City of Los Angeles during the study period included a number of very serious offenses. The most frequent three categories were vandalism (29 percent), simple assault (26 percent), and aggravated assault (20 percent). Table 3.3 details the criminal offenses for anti-black hate crimes, those motivated by animus or target selection towards other racial categories, and that involved motivations other than race (of which, roughly half (770) were anti-LGBT, and 433 were anti-Jewish with the remaining being divided among other targeted groups).

Table 3.5

Hate Crime Offenses in the City of Los Angeles, 2003-2014

	Anti-Black		Other Racial		Other than Racial Motivation Hate Crimes	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Murder	3	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Attempted Murder	32	3.0	9	1.1	4	0.3
Rape / Sexual Assault	0	0.0	0	0.0	7	0.5
Aggravated Assault	281	26.5	167	21.1	208	14.5
Simple Assault	221	20.8	270	34.1	349	24.3
Intimidation	151	14.2	105	13.3	186	13.0
Robbery	32	3.0	37	4.7	41	2.9
Trespassing	1	0.1	0	0.0	1	0.1
Arson	1	0.1	7	0.9	12	0.8
Burglary	8	0.8	4	0.5	10	0.7
Theft	1	0.1	0	0.0	2	0.1
Vandalism	288	27.2	168	21.2	502	35.0
Disorderly Conduct	39	3.7	24	3.0	85	5.9
Unknown/Other	2	0.2	0	0.0	28	2.0
Total	1,060	100	791	100	1,435	100

Demographics

The models use demographic characteristics from the U.S. Census 2000 decennial census

and the American Community Surveys from 2005-2014.[89] Income inequality is measured

as a local neighborhood gini index using binned income bracket data from the American

Community Survey at the tract level, aggregated to the neighborhood level by using

apportionment.[90] The mean neighborhood has a gini index score of 50, and higher scores

indicate greater inequality. The range is from 31 to 72 and the standard deviation is 9.

The gini index of income inequality measures income directly, but is closely associated

with a few other things – notably, wealth. Gini is also highly correlated with the average

rent in a community in a fairly direct way although there is a non-linear curve of higher

rents near the low end of the gini index (r = .63 in 2009, .73 in 2014). See table 3.6 for

descriptive statistics.

I use an index of concentrated disadvantage or social disorganization taken from

Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), that has been used in prior research on hate

crime in California (Grattet 2009, 139). This combines the following census information:

"Other Female householder, no husband present," "Below Poverty Level, Population for

whom poverty status is determined," "Male population 17 years and under," and

"Unemployment rate, People 16 years and over," into a single factor index. The results

are in table 3.7 below for 2005-09.

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[89] I apportion data to my primary unit of analysis, the vernacular neighborhood, using block level household and person counts. Since 2000 Decennial Census and 2005-2009 ACS used the 2000 vintage tract boundaries, I use the Census Bureau's 2000-2010 tract change files to apportion data to the new tract boundaries for supplemental tract level analyses. Since these data are primarily from the American Community Survey, they are less reliable due to the changed sampling design. In aggregating to a larger area, nevertheless, I reduce some of the variance with these estimates.

[90] The Gini index of income inequality was calculated using tract level binned income dated, aggregated to the neighborhood. This was then run through the DOS software program developed by Francois Nielsen on virtual DOS machine (program available at http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/data/data.htm).

Table 3.6
Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Anti-Black Hate Crime 2003-2014	9.6	12.3	0	72
Spatial lag: anti-black hate crime, 2003-14	9.9	5.0	1	21.0
Violent Crime, 2003-2007	1,517	1,528	34	8114
Property Crime, 2003-2007	5,045	3,939	421	20,015
Non-Race Motivated Hate Crime	12.8	15.4	0	105.0
Spatial lag: non-race Motivated hate crime, 2003-14	13.5	8.3	2	35.3
Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)	0	0.64	-1.63	1.38
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000	0.70	0.21	0.06	0.95
Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y2010-2014	-0.02	0.05	-0.17	0.09
Gini Index of Inequality, 2005-09	50.1	9.2	31.8	71.8
Social Disorganization, 2005-09:	0	1.00	-1.63	2.72
Female Headed Households	0.15	0.082	0.03	0.37
Unemployed People	0.08	0.025	0.04	0.14
People below the Poverty Line	0.18	0.107	0.03	0.48
Young Men and Boys Under 18	0.12	0.038	0.04	0.21
Herfindahl Index 5 group, 2005-09 (Household)	0.44	0.16	-0.085	0.72
Residential Density, 2005-2009	20,210	14,961	3,061	110,429

Table 3.7
Concentrated Disadvantage

Variable	Factor Loading
Below poverty line	0.94
Female-headed households	0.79
Unemployed	0.83
Males Less than age 18	0.74

The original formula included percent of the population counted as black or
African American, however this would create some unclear associations with the change
in the percentage point share of households counted as black and thus I leave it out.

Together these are meant as an index of concentrated disadvantage or social disorganization. The cronbach's alpha score, a means of measuring whether the items overlap enough to be a consistent indicator of an underlying measure, indicates that the index is sufficiently unified at is 84.8. The neighborhoods with the highest score on this indicator were South Park (1.9), Vermont Knolls (2.0), and Watts (2.7) and the lowest score were Fairfax (- 1.6), Playa del Rey (-1.5) and Hollywood Hills West (-1.5).

The Herfindahl or Blau index of heterogeneity that measures the probability two randomly selected householders in the neighborhood would be from different racial ethnic categories, under the big five categorization of (non-Hispanic or Latino) Asian / Pacific Islander, black or African American, other, or white; and Latino. Residential density is included as well as a control (Alexander 1993; Hipp and Roussell 2013).

Concentrated disadvantage and the index of racial heterogeneity are included in the models to control for effects of social disorganization that may drive crime rates. If neighborhood level disorganization impacts crime and hate crime, or police reported crime is more or less likely in neighborhoods with these characteristics, leaving them out could bias the results. They are not of primary interest in this chapter. Nevertheless, prior research on hate crime has found that they are associated with higher levels of hate crime (Grattet, 2009; Lyons 2007).

Other controls include racial change in the neighborhood, measured as the percentage point difference in the share of households counted as black in 2000 and 2014, and the percentage of households counted as white or Latino in 2000. I also use a combined social space index that takes the total population, the number of jobs in the neighborhood, (a proxy for the daytime population), and basic vacant non-vacant

characteristics on the built environment of the neighborhood as indicated by land use codes. The Southern California Association of Governments, a governmental regional planning organization, collects the employment and land use data. The index of social space was described in chapter 2 and is a key element in the production of social interactions in urban spaces (Lefebvre 1991; Brighenti 2006). This concept of social space involves three-dimensional index of the resident population, the number of employees, and the built environment in square miles. I measure social space as:

$$S = \frac{std(\ln resident\ population) +\ std(\ln employees) +\ std(\ln built\ area)}{3}$$

The built area is a total land area minus vacant land, which is particularly important in mountainous LA neighborhoods. The number of employees was collected from tax payroll records by SCAG and measured at the census tract level, I apportioned to the neighborhood level for these analyses.

Unit of Analysis

The vernacular neighborhoods used in my study reflect the agglomerated character of the built environment, local history, and cultural meanings of a neighborhood.[91] This is likely to be especially important as we consider inequality. See appendix 1 on neighborhoods for more information on their source. For models with spatial weights, I use hate crime data from the surrounding areas outside the city in order to diminish city and jurisdictional border effects that could otherwise cloud the analysis (G. E. Tita and Radil 2010; Taylor 2015).

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[91] See Appendix 1 Geocoding, Neighborhood Areas and Spatial Weights Matrix, for a full discussion of the vernacular neighborhood as a unit of analysis.

Models

Each outcome variable in the models for this chapter are counts; all are

overdispersed, and there is evidence that a negative binomial regression model fits the

distribution of the data best.[92] In order to correct for spatial autocorrelation in the hate

crime models, I use a spatial weight matrix described in detail in chapter 2 and appendix

1. I checked models and found no strong evidence of collinearity problems using the

variance inflation score.

5. Results

In a basic bivariate correlation relationship, anti-black hate crimes in a

neighborhood were positively correlated with an increase in the percentage of black

households and negatively correlated with the gini index of income inequality (see

appendix table 1 for a correlation matrix). The aggregate concentrated disadvantage or

social disorganization index has a fairly high correlation with anti-black hate crime ($r =$

.49), although that primarily appears to be as a result of neighborhoods with very low

scores of concentrated disadvantage and very low numbers of police reported anti-black

hate crime. On all of these, the relations are more complex when modeled in a

multivariate way in what follows.

Table 3.8 presents three negative binomial regression models predicting the

number of anti-black hate crimes in a neighborhood. The first uses only the variables

from the defended neighborhood models in chapter 2 and serves primarily as a

comparison to understand how those relationships change or stay the same with the

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[92] I used the *countfit* procedure in Stata developed by Long and Freese to measure the appropriate model –
for anti-black hate crime the evidence is very strong, with BIC = 669.3 for the negative binomial vs. 811.8
for Poisson Regression. For other models, results were similar.

addition of a fully specified economic model.[93] Regarding the key theoretical variable, some prior research finds that higher levels of inequality lead to lower crime rates. While I find evidence of this effect, it is non-linear, with relatively high levels of inequality in the mid-range of the distribution predicting the highest numbers of anti-black hate crime. Generally, the gini index has a nonlinear relationship with hate crime. As the gini score increases, the expected number of hate crimes increase as well, until about the mean (50), at which point further increasing inequality is associated with lower levels of police reported hate crime. The mean gini index of the state of California and the metropolitan region of Los Angeles are both higher than the national average, and this mean value is also higher than the metropolitan average.

I checked models and found no strong evidence of collinearity problems using the variance inflation score: the mean score was 1.9 and the highest score was 2.8 for the index of concentrated disadvantage. In supplemental models that addressed whether random interaction was a factor, after Hipp, Tita and Boggess (2010), I found that controlling for interactions between black households and other households, such as white or Latino households, led to less efficient predictions and that the results, while

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[93] As a set of sensitivity analyses, I ran additional models that are not presented here. Model comparisons were based on the differences in the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values (Raftery 1995).

First, results do not change substantively if I use covariates from the 2010-14 American Community survey instead of the ones from 2005-09: BIC is roughly similar and the direction and strength of the relationships are nearly the same as well.

Second, I also ran a separate set of models that includes different specifications of crime counts, rates, and the portion of crime that was property crime as a covariate in the model but these were not significant and did not improve the overall fit. These were not significant in the models that control for economic factors, and hurt the overall quality of the model as indicated by BIC fit statistics. The portion of the neighborhood's crime that is property crime, however, is highly correlated with gini and negatively correlated with social disorganization. In further research, the ratio of property crime could be a useful measure for comparison across smaller jurisdictions in order to understand the various ways that hate crime is produced in a police agency.

Finally, running an economic model of anti-black hate crime only, without the defended neighborhood variables, does not fully articulate the problem of hate crime. The accuracy of the model improves significantly the inclusion of the defended neighborhood indicators.

substantially different for the social disorganization variables, were in a similar direction and strength for the gini index of inequality.

We can see these results more clearly in the figure 3.1. I take the three key indicators—change in the share of black households, variation in the share of the Latino or white population, and income inequality—and plot the expected number of police reported anti-black hate crimes at different levels of inequality.

Each quadrant of figure 3.1 displays a different kind of neighborhood based on the share of households occupied by Latinos or whites. The upper left is 75 percent Latino or white; upper right is 62.5 percent Latino or white. Bottom left is 50 percent and right is 37.5 percent, respectively. The differences between the four lines in each represent the expected number of police reported anti-black hate crimes (y axis range from 0 to 40) given levels of percentage point change in the share of black households.

One can also see the results from the chapter 2 analysis of defended neighborhoods theory in figure 3.1: at higher levels of Latino and white households, in-migration from black households is associated with lower levels of hate crime, but there is a tipping point where this converges around 62.5 percent Latino and white households. Below roughly 60 percent, in-migration is associated with higher levels of hate crime, and by 50 percent Latino and white the order of the lines—the relative effects of change in black households on anti-black hate crime—reverses compared to the 75 percent figure. The effect escalates further as the share of the population that is Latino and white declines further. The path of the line represents the x-axis of marginal effects of the gini index of income inequality on anti-black hate crime. These figures control for the other covariates at their means, except for the two defended neighborhoods variables.

As the descriptive statistics in table 3.6 above shows, the gini index mean is 50 and the standard deviation is 9 points. The figures indicate that controlling for other factors, relatively more equal neighborhoods (gini scores in the low 40s), and relatively more unequal neighborhoods (gini scores in the 60s) are associated with roughly similar amounts of hate crime. For those neighborhoods in the middle, near the mean level of gini index of income inequality score of 50, the model predicts relatively elevated levels of hate crime.

Using the gini index in model 2 we get fairly stable effects and they do not change in the final regression model in model 3 that includes the full set of social disorganization variables. The social disorganization variables do not have any clear association with anti-black hate crime once the other covariates are taken into account. Further, there is evidence from BIC that the parsimonious model provides a better prediction of hate crime (Model 2, 659.2 - Model 3, 669.3 = -10.1) (Long and Freese 2006). Nevertheless, I retain the full social disorganization set of variables because they are important for theoretical reasons and do not substantively impact the estimation of the outcomes of concern—income inequality and defended neighborhoods variables.

Robustness

One might be concerned that these dynamics are the result of the larger pattern of crime in the community, and the way that crime correlates with economics, race and neighborhood change. These results could reflect causal factors that drive the distribution of crime generally, or the process that leads to hate crime generally, instead of anti-black hate crime specifically. Thus, I ran another set of models to address whether or not that was the case, and those are displayed in table 3.9. These supplemental models predicted

three different outcome variables using the same set of covariates in model 3. The first

model in table 3.9 uses violent crime counts from the LAPD from 2003-07, the next uses

property crime counts from 2003-07, and the last uses non-race hate crime from 2003-

2014 (due to mixed motivation, these may include some racially motivated hate crimes,

but they at least include one non-racial targeted group).

The gini coefficient is also strongly related to these other types of crime in these

models, but in slightly different ways: for violent crime the inflection point is a little

lower, around 47, and for property crime the curve is steeper. For other than race

motivated hate crime, the peak is higher, closer to 53. For the defended neighborhoods

theory, the results indicate a distinctive pattern for anti-black hate crime. There is no

significant relationship between the interaction of percentage share of Latino or white

households and the percentage point change in the share of black households, like there

was in the anti-black hate crime models. Likewise the other defended neighborhoods

indicators are only inconsistently significant and the social disorganization indicators

have more solid relationships. Social disorganization is also related to slightly higher

reporting of non-race hate crime; a single standard deviation increase in concentrated

disadvantage is related to 2 more hate crimes over this period, all other things being equal

set to their means. A higher level of residential density predicts a higher level of violent

crime and non-racial hate crime (table 3.9). Residential density does not have a

significant relationship with property crime or anti-black hate crime (table 3.8). In sum,

these models demonstrate that the demographic change findings for anti-black hate crime

are distinctive but the impact of income inequality is roughly consistent whether

modeling anti-black hate crime, violent crime, property crime, or non-race hate crime.

Table 3.8.

Combined Anti-Black Hate Crime Models: Defended Neighborhoods, Social Disorganization, and other Economic Factors

	(1) Anti-Black hate crime, 2003-14	(2) Anti-Black hate crime, 2003-14	(3) Anti-Black hate crime, 2003-14
Spatial lag: Anti-Black hate crime, 2003-14	0.0376* (0.0175)	-0.00157 (0.0168)	-0.0155 (0.0181)
Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)	1.141*** (0.138)	1.199*** (0.124)	1.042*** (0.153)
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000	-1.902** (0.638)	-1.538** (0.547)	-1.310* (0.604)
Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y2010-2014	25.77*** (6.708)	26.75*** (5.848)	25.05*** (6.064)
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000 * Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 2010-2014	-42.35*** (11.34)	-43.92*** (10.06)	-40.28*** (10.40)
Gini Index of Inequality 2005-2009		0.411*** (0.114)	0.365** (0.114)
Gini Index of Inequality 2005-2009$^{\wedge 2}$		-0.00438*** (0.00110)	-0.00389*** (0.00110)
Social Disorganization Factor, 2005-2009			0.130 (0.114)
Herfindahl Index 5 group, 2005-2009 (Household)			0.270 (0.460)
Residential Density, 2005-2009			0.00000634 (0.00000534)
Constant	3.077*** (0.562)	-6.128* (2.984)	-5.358$^+$ (2.899)
lnalpha			
Constant	-0.664*** (0.196)	-1.020*** (0.210)	-1.089*** (0.216)
Observations	110	110	110
Pseudo R^2	0.106	0.151	0.156
BIC	682.3	659.2	669.3
Chi2	76.97	109.5	113.5

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Figure 3.1.
Effects of Income Inequality, by Percentage Point Change in Black Households
in Different Latino or White Neighborhoods (Hate Crime on Y-axis).

Table 3.9.

Combined General Crime and Non-Race Hate Crime Models: Defended Neighborhoods, Social Disorganization, and other Economic Factors

	(1) Violent crime count, 2003-2007	(2) Property crime count, 2003-2007	(3) Non-Race Hate Crime, 2003-2014
Social Space Index (Developed Area, Residents, Jobs)	0.495*** (0.0845)	0.680*** (0.0720)	0.626*** (0.125)
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000	-0.116 (0.406)	0.393 (0.355)	1.917*** (0.558)
Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y2010-2014	-11.30** (3.978)	-5.543 (3.411)	-8.879 (5.471)
Percentage Latino or White households, 2000 * Percentage point change in Black households, 2000 to 5Y2010-2014	6.998 (6.376)	4.138 (5.419)	12.02 (9.152)
Gini Index of Inequality 2005-09	0.198*** (0.0494)	0.228*** (0.0425)	0.391*** (0.0841)
Gini Index of Inequality 2005-2009^2	-0.00217*** (0.000468)	-0.00222*** (0.000403)	-0.00363*** (0.000790)
Social Disorganization Factor, 2005-2009	0.470*** (0.0678)	0.307*** (0.0577)	0.161+ (0.0913)
Herfindahl Index 5 group, 2005-09 (Household)	-0.0633 (0.265)	0.428+ (0.230)	0.322 (0.413)
Residential Density, 2005-2009	0.0000124*** (0.00000314)	0.00000201 (0.00000273)	0.0000106* (0.00000492)
Spatial Lag, Non-Race Hate Crime, 2003-2014			0.0240** (0.00885)
Constant	2.182+ (1.281)	2.013+ (1.113)	-10.10*** (2.215)
lnalpha			
Constant	-1.842*** (0.134)	-2.082*** (0.133)	-1.381*** (0.205)
Observations	110	110	110
Pseudo R^2	0.124	0.087	0.143
BIC	1656.6	1947.6	732.1
chi2	226.5	181.8	113.1

Standard errors in parentheses

$^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

6. Discussion

This chapter provides evidence in favor of the argument that economic relationships influence the distribution of anti-black hate crime across the city; it is not just related to demographic change. This is a more nuanced account than Green, Strolovich and Wong's 1998 paper, but it is also fairly common sense given the contemporary patterns of racialized inequality in public institutions and private markets across Southern California, especially amidst the great recession and its aftermath. The subprime lending boom, the recession, and the foreclosure crisis revealed the scope of continued anti-black racial bias in the housing market (Faber 2013; Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015a). (Although this often hit Latino and Asian immigrant communities hard too (Pfeiffer et al. 2014; Hall, Crowder, and Spring 2015b)). Further, a theoretical understanding of the link between economics and racial violence in the U.S. is not a new insight, it can be read in Du Bois's (1998) study of reconstruction or Philadelphia (1899). The model for linking income inequality and hate crime provides a step towards an empirical specification of these ideas.

This chapter provides partial support for the theoretical model explaining how anti-black segregation strategies, individual private actions, and law enforcement organizations combine to produce hate crime events and reports (see table 3.3). I proposed that the success or failure of market-based segregation strategies drives much of the commission of anti-black hate crime. More highly unequal neighborhoods are usually rich and able to maintain a level of segregation through market strategies like home prices; moderately unequal neighborhoods have less success in market strategies and may resort to hate crime. But the relatively lower burden of general violence in these neighborhoods appears to lead people to be more likely to dispute the hate crime event as a problem, and local police are more likely to respond to it as a serious enough problem to file a hate crime report. Thus, reported hate crime in those neighborhoods is mediated

through the lack of high rates of serious violence. In contrast, the lower predicted values of police reported hate crime in relatively more equal neighborhoods could be related to lack of hate crime or the failure to report hate crime; regardless, it appears that those neighborhoods have somewhat higher rates of violence. In those conditions, residents may be less likely to report the crime as a hate crime, and police may be less likely to take the report as a hate crime. If one is dealing with difficult housing, work and school conditions, and police are not generally trusted in your neighborhood, a more minor hate crime offense like vandalism or threats may not be worth reporting.

Accounting for inequality allows a more nuanced understanding of the conditions whereby different segregation strategies transition from market means, or the informal use of law enforcement to reinforce norms of segregation, and the extralegal racial violence of aggressive crimes. Thus, inequality may improve our model for understanding hate crime in neighborhoods. In order to best understand the relationship between inequality to hate crime and anti-black hate crime in particular, we need to link it to the broader issue of neighborhood desirability and how that relates to the racial inequality and segregation strategies discussed in the literature over the last decades (Massey and Denton 1993; Charles 2003; Bell 2013; Brooks and Rose 2013). Brooks and Rose argue that segregated housing reserved for whites has been a powerful social norm, signaled by racial violence at times, but more commonly signaled in restrictive covenants and other legal tools (Brooks and Rose 2013). Research shows that these norms in Los Angeles were established long ago (McClenahan 1929). While restrictive covenants are no longer enforced by courts and fair housing law offers a modicum of protection, in the 1990s, many people acknowledged that fear of racial violence or antagonism from whites influenced their housing search (Krysan and Farley 2002).

Contemporary analysis shows that there are a mix of factors, ranging from racial inequality, biased preferences, discrimination by market actors, and perceptions of possible places that influence the search for housing (Bader and Krysan 2015). Using data from the 1990s, Charles (2003, 185–191) found evidence that across racial and ethnic categories, people in Los Angeles were less racially exclusive than compared to national averages. Yet, still, there was strong evidence that racial stereotyping was associated with preferences for lower percentage of black neighbors among both whites and Latinos. Further, while relatively weaker compared to racial stereotypes, there were preferences for segregation based on perceived social class differences between racial groups. These two factors—race and class—thus work together at the micro level to produce segregated dwelling spaces. It is likely that they also work together in terms of triggering more aggressive responses to integration like hate crime in more moderately unequal, but still attainable neighborhoods.

Police reported anti-black hate crime, while the most numerically common of hate crime, is still a fairly rare event, so these results remain somewhat tentative; but the archive of hate crime in Los Angeles is probably the best in the United States. Compelling theories of racism have argued for the importance of economic factors in instigating racist violence, but prior work on hate crime using the neighborhood effects approach has not been able to identify these associations positively. This chapter makes progress on the tasks required to identify the empirical links between hate crime and economic conditions.

Chapter 4:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters I wrote about the impacts and consequences of hate crime law, and replicated and extended research on hate crime in neighborhoods. In this brief conclusion, I summarize my key findings, describe a few theoretical and policy implications, and identify further lines of research.

Summary

In the first chapter, I read hate crime law primarily in terms of observed trends and provided a theoretical assessment of what hate crime law has wrought in California and the United States. The picture is generally of expansion and then decline in use, while the best evidence shows that rates of hate crime victimization remain unchanged. In this analysis, attention to hate crime rose and declined over the last three decades. Looking forward, we face an uncertain current situation. The system appears broken; public interest in and law enforcement use of hate crime, while mixed, has been at historically low levels until recently. Institutional law enforcement interest remains low, but media, scholarly, and public interest appears to have increased recently. Current civil rights agendas appear focused on state-sanctioned and state-perpetrated racial violence in the form of mass incarceration and police violence. Insofar as hate crime, and specifically, anti-black housing-related violence remains a problem, it is unclear whether it will claim a fair share of the policy agenda, and whether it will do so under hate crime law.

In the second and third chapters, I turned to dynamics in Los Angeles, and made the argument that defended neighborhoods theory—rooted in Chicago's 1970s and New York City's 1980s transition away from a white majority polity in still predominantly white states—deserves reassessment. Scholarship on hate crime in U.S. neighborhoods has yet to learn from Los Angeles. Defended neighborhoods are not islands; they are inscribed within a city's larger racial politics. Further, they can be interpreted in light of the relative value of dwelling space indicated by income inequality in the neighborhood (Gilroy 2009). Learning from Los Angeles suggests that demographic change and economic inequality increase police reported hate crime. There are nuances to these relationships: neighborhoods with more black households moving into areas that are predominantly Latino or white neighborhood are associated with more hate crime, but only at certain tipping points for the percentage of households that are Latino or white. Income inequality makes a strong difference at moderately high levels, but models predict low numbers of anti-black hate crime at low inequality and very high inequality. Income inequality has a similar impact on other kinds of crime as well. These empirical findings have policy and research implications for scholars aiming to better understand race, neighborhoods, crime, and cities.

Policy Recommendations

1 Estimate Hate Crime Victimization

First, until hate crime reporting improves to a level that allows more accurate representation of the social problem of hate crime, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and concerned researchers should supplement the annual report issued by the FBI's Uniform crime report with local, metropolitan, state and regional crime and victimization estimates for hate crime. These

could be smoothed over a multi-year period in order to address year-to-year fluctuations. These victimizations could provide a useful benchmark for law enforcement and communities.

2 Creatively Rethink the Problem and Solution

Lawmakers developed hate crime law and situated it in criminal law as one means of developing a collective, governmental response to the problems of inequality, integration and violence. A fresh analysis of the scope and dimensions of the problems of inequality and integration could revisit this partial policy solution now. We are about as far from the 1985 hate crime hearings that serve as an epigraph for the first chapter as that hearing was from *Brown v. Board* in 1954. Re-emphasize the importance of addressing the problems that inspired hate crime – racialized inequality, resistance to integration in schools, housing and work, and limited access to justice under law deserve more complete solutions.

If there are strong impacts of inequality, it provides evidence for the argument that remedies could include the reduction of inequality. This is significant because there are no clear public policy remedies for the alternative, defended neighborhoods theory which makes a claim that hate crime is a function of racial difference and change.

Limitations and future research

Due to the limitations of this dissertation, there are cognate research questions that remain to be examined and tested. This next section describes a few of them, from re-analysis or extension of the findings, to related research questions.

First, I would purse additional statistical analysis of the hate crime data with different modeling strategies to take advantage of alternative time durations. This would allow a more robust examination of the role of the recession and housing market downturn in social dynamics that lead to hate crime. This different modeling strategy could explore the effects of the recession

more carefully with a model that breaks the data up into smaller groups, taking advantage of the now two sets of American Community Survey estimates available at small geographic areas, from 2005-09 and 2010-14. Another dimension that could be further analyzed is the rest of Los Angeles County outside of the City of Los Angeles. Many areas with high profile cases of hate crime are outside of the city limits, in other smaller cities. One approach could be to develop an analytic model using the recently approved statistical areas defined by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. These units are designed to cover contiguous communities, regardless of municipal boundaries, so some of the community statistical areas cross municipal boundaries to include nearby unincorporated areas. These areas are also constructed to overlap cleanly with U.S. census geographies like the block group and are used by County agencies for analysis of community needs and concerns.

Second, using a larger unit of analysis—such as cities or larger regions in the city of Los Angeles, may allow comparison to older data in the early 1990s and 1980s, when additional detailed tables on all hate crime cases were reported in annual hate crime reports. Another project would be to extend this analysis of income inequality and hate crime to Chicago and New York City. Does the gini index of income inequality in 1990 New York City have anything to do with levels of anti-black hate crime when the city loses the white majority? This question would help contextualize and extend the findings in chapter 3, but would require archival census research that was beyond the scope of the dissertation.[94] Additionally, while limited in its direct comparison, the City of Chicago has a set of data on racial hate crime (without a distinction for the different racial targeted groups) available at the City Commission on Human Relations, for each community area in Chicago from 1991-1994 ("Reported Hate Crimes, 1986-1994: City of

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[94] The boundaries of the community board areas used by the 1998 Green, Strolovich and Wong paper have changed and would require digitization of possibly archived printed maps.

Chicago Nine Year Comparison" 1995). This analysis would require data entry but the boundaries of the community areas are stable over time and translate directly to census collection areas.

A third area of future research is the dynamics of anti-Latino hate crime. Los Angeles has a large number of these cases, however, I remain concerned about their representativeness due to a number of factors. In regard to studying anti-Latino violence, there are two difficulties. As the data consists of hate crime reported by the police any problems in police-community relations may impact reporting. In addition, a number of other scholars have pointed out the relatively lower willingness of immigrant communities to report bias victimization (Bell 1996; Nolan and Akiyama 1999; Jenness and Grattet 2005). In some cities in LA County, the number of cases of white perpetrated anti-Latino crime appears implausibly low given coverage of events akin to hate crime in the media. Therefore, missing data could bias the analytic results given the race and spatial divide in Los Angeles and needs to be explicitly theorized. In order to better address this issue, I will collect additional data on experiences with bias motivated crime in Los Angeles and New Jersey from targeted key informant interviews, focus groups, and surveys through research project at the Vera Institute of Justice on bias crime victimization funded by the National Institute of Justice. In working with the state of New Jersey, I am particularly interested in questions of legal institutionalization raised by the state supreme court striking down a section of hate crime law in April 2015. Reviewing case files from before and after this event may provide material that speaks to some of the questions raised in chapter 1.

Fourth, Western and Muller (2013) have suggested that understanding contemporary cities and poverty requires understanding mass incarceration's very measurable impact in the labor market. Building on this insight, I aim to conduct further research to assess how mass

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incarceration also impacts neighborhood dynamics that lead to racial violence. Many accounts of anti-black violence in Los Angeles link it to racialized conflicts and problems in prison (Quinones 2013). Courts and researchers have found that California's jails, juvenile facilities, and prisons have practices and cultures that produce racial divisions boundaries, and that, at times, racialize conflicts and violence (Johnson v. California 2004; Goodman 2008; Maxson et al. 2012; Goodman 2014; Walker 2016). However, recent reports indicate that many people in prison prefer to end racial hostilities (Ashker et al. 2012).

For over three decades, there have been fairly routine news reports of large-scale racial brawls in jails and prisons in Southern California. They have occurred in Orange County (Berkman 1994) and San Diego County as well (Gaw 1990). Currently, on any given day, 1 in a 100 adults from Los Angeles County are behind bars in prison or the local jails run by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.[95] Thus, any cultural forms like racial politics and rules do not reside only in jail dorms and prison yards; especially when they line up with long-standing preferences for isolation from African Americans that have echoes in communities across Los Angeles that sought isolation through various means of restrictive covenants and housing related crime for decades. Therefore, the problem of segregation and integration remains significant in Los Angeles. This further research on racial hate crime in Los Angeles should likely take a more political economic approach. Through analyzing political campaigns for sheriff and subsequent federal investigations, as well as contemporaneous media coverage, future research could better understand the roles local Sheriffs and prison officials played in the social problem of racial violence in jails and communities. It is possible that officials push racial framing and racial segregation to manage crowded jails and prisons during times of increasing incarceration rates

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[95] See the Incarceration Trends report for more detail on the combined jail and prison number (J. Kang-Brown 2015). Courts have been loathe to address racial bias in the criminal justice system (Stevenson and Friedman 1994; J. A. Powell 2012b).

and scarce funding, and that these measures had negative consequences of escalating or racializing conflicts.[96] Putting the evidence together in this way allows a clearer understanding and interpretation of racial violence in multiple forms—both as private violence known as hate crime, and official violence known as mass incarceration.

Finally, in order to collect a nationally representative set of data on hate crime, I intend to propose a collaboration with the National Neighborhood Crime Study to collect available hate crime data from these cities where crime data has been collected previously.

Thinking about cities is a difficult task; inquiry into race in cities is harder still but one can string together media, institutions, history, and law, connect it to built environment and assemble an argument that accounts for how these things work together to produce the sociality of racial inequality. Following Du Bois, to trace the color line from reconstruction, through the 20th century to today, leads one through the urban space and into dialog with the law. From murderous white mobs rioting amidst the Chicago Loop in July 1919 to the legal failure of restrictive housing covenants three decades later, from the civil rights movement in the 1960s to the smoky skies of Los Angeles in 1992 or contemporary social movements, like Black Lives Matter and conflicts over racial violence by police officers. The battle of legal segregation, whether at the level of municipal ordinance, restrictive covenants on a single parcel of land, or redlined maps in the FHA, always seems to have gone in tandem with "social" action like

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[96] While I do not address it fully in this conclusion, I must note that in my read of the various newspaper accounts of racial violence in jails from 1980 to present, it appears that the conflicts are often covered at times when political actors are facing reelection and other controversies, like civil rights lawsuits or investigations of the Sheriff department. Over time, the articles become more formulaic. Initially writers did on-the ground reporting and interviewed people who live near the jail or had family members in jail, and coverage while sensationalized, was somewhat independent. Later, the articles became just summaries of sheriff's department press conferences and the numbers of people injured, the types of ordinance fired, etc. At one point, the newspaper appears to have lost count of large scale racial violence events in the jails, reported that there were 150 cases in the mid 1990s, and then again trotted out that same old number in 2000s—after reporting many more cases in the meantime but having not bothered to count or follow up on the tally.

bombings, vandalisms, and other criminal racism. Understanding those social dynamics today requires thinking about cities and law.

Understanding how income inequality is related to hate crime clarifies theories of neighborhood racism and move-in violence, too often framed around racial demographic change rather than the way that economic anxiety and resentment is mobilized in racialized ways. While not the final word, the project provides some significant evidence for further theorization and discussion. I do not propose to nail down any final interpretation of these events given the importance of multiple standpoints, and my own position in the matrix of scholarly, human relations, and public opinion on the matter. Nevertheless, I aim to describe what I have found in the archives and stories that I have access too, in order to better contextualize the studies of hate crime in Los Angeles. My goal is to create space for interpretation and development of policy that can address more of the problem.

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Appendix 1:

GEOCODING, NEIGHBORHOOD AREAS,
AND SPATIAL MATRIX

This appendix provides additional details on geographic aspects of the dissertation. In particular, I first discuss the geocoding procedure to create dots on the map for the hate crime cases using an open source software solution. Second, I turn to the neighborhood unit of analysis and review of the some of the prior research in sociology on neighborhoods that constructed large areal units of analysis, known as the Chicago community area since the 1930s or what I call the vernacular neighborhood. Third, I provide a summary and discussion of the *Los Angeles Times* approach to neighborhoods that is used in this study, and compare the results of this approach to other cities. Fourth, I describe the spatial weights matrix process in more detail. Finally, there is a map and table with a key that displays the neighborhoods across the city, and the spatial weights.

Geocoding

In order to fully document my research, I include the following appendix on the geocoding process. All law enforcement reported hate crime files from the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations hate crime database were geocoded from addresses to coordinate points using the address of the crime's occurrence (or intersection if that was the only available information). The addresses were processed through the Google Maps API, accessed through the MMQGIS plug-in for QGIS (QGIS Development Team 2015). QGIS is open-source software, and while the Google Maps API has a daily limit of 2,000 geocodes per user, for the hate crime data series this was workable because the overall number of records was under 10,000. After the geocoding process ran once, I reviewed all addresses that scored an

approximate match and re-coded as necessary. In some cases, the zip codes had changed or been incorrect in the original police report.

Data quality was higher in 2003 and 2006, resulting in relatively high numbers of rooftop geocodes. The Approximate geocodes matched to a street intersection in 91 percent of cases. Geometric geocodes were all matches to routes, almost exclusively short streets that are inside a single census tract in northern LA County in places like Newhall or Castaic.

The four location types in the geocoded results are listed in from Google Maps API documentation:

> "Rooftop" indicates that the returned result is a precise geocode for which we have location information accurate down to street address precision.
> "Range Interpolated" indicates that the returned result reflects an approximation (usually on a road) interpolated between two precise points (such as intersections). Interpolated results are generally returned when rooftop geocodes are unavailable for a street address.
> "Geometric Center" indicates that the returned result is the geometric center of a result such as a polyline (for example, a street) or polygon (region).
> "Approximate" indicates that the returned result is approximate.

For more information, see Google API geocoding documentation at

https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/

Appendix Table 1
Geocode Type for Los Angeles County Police Reported Hate Crime Files by Year

	Approximate	Geometric	Range Interpolated	Rooftop
2003	90	41	77	340
2004	61	90	66	167
2005	101	13	136	272
2006	85	8	92	294
2007	119	10	200	258
2008	73	3	236	273
2009	61	14	149	216
2010	71	7	90	165
2011	61	19	123	176
2012	61	9	111	174
2013	59	9	105	136
2014	53	9	92	158

Neighborhood Areas

Background

Initial investigations of the neighborhood often had a pragmatic, at times political, edge, one that extended beyond mere social scientific knowledge and research, addressing issues of social exclusion, politics, immigration, racism and freedom. Charles Booth's work in London, W. E. B. Du Bois' study of the 7th Ward in Philadelphia, Jane Addams' in Chicago, and St.-Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's study of Bronzeville are exemplars of this side of the sociological tradition (Addams 1912; Du Bois 1899; Booth 1967; Drake and Cayton 1962). Although not without faults, notably in terms of their approach to respecting persons living in poverty (Sennett 2004), in their breadth and engagement with the residents they are unlike the most well-known examples of this neighborhood method, the Chicago school's approach to community areas.

The most popular example of this type of method is the Chicago Community Areas developed in the 1920s and used by many researchers ever since (Burgess, Newcomb, and University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee 1933; Sampson 2012). Beyond the borders of the academy, the community areas of Chicago influenced popular opinion, newspapers and institutions of governance, for better and for worse (Venkatesh 2001). Social scientists and historians have used a mix of demography and analysis of historical boundaries combined with interviews with local stakeholders to determine neighborhood boundaries (Clear et al. 2003; Fagan and Davies 2004; K. T. Jackson and Citizens Committee for New York City 1998; Copquin 2007; Lebel, Pampalon, and Villeneuve 2007).

There were earlier Los Angeles attempts to transpose the Chicago community areas model, such as the Randolf Haynes Foundation projects to build local democracy and a sense of place (Sitton 1999). These efforts funded academic studies of the social areas of Los Angeles (Shevky and Williams 1949), along with popular reports (Shevky and Lewin 1949). But those community areas in Los Angeles never quite stuck in the same way that the Community Areas did in Chicago and New York and other places: the ease of transportation and emerging urban and suburban spatial forms, appeared to have diminished the importance of the neighbor relationship in Los Angeles (McClenahan 1929; McClenahan 1942). The old studies did not have staying power through the post-war suburban boom, so eloquently described by D.J. Waldie (2005). Instead, scholarly analysis of neighbor relations in Los Angeles turned to abstract forms of space like social distance (Bogardus 1967; Ethington 1997). These were the conditions wherein the innovations of the Los Angeles school of urban theory—a post-modern alternative more open to critical perspectives like Henri Lefebvre than the Chicago school's ecological approach in the 1970s (Suttles 1972; Hunter 1974). These grew to prominence at the end of the 20th century (M. J. Dear and Dishman 2001; M. Davis 1992; Scott and Soja 1998; A. Abbott 2002).

The neighborhoods used in chapter 2 and 3 were developed by the *Los Angeles Times* Neighborhood Mapping Project and most closely resemble the Chicago Community Areas style approach discussed above. The *Los Angeles Times* created a set of neighborhoods in early 2009 to help buttress severe cuts to staff and local coverage in the newsroom (Roderick 2009a; Roderick 2009b). One month after the *Times* cut the local section (titled "California"), the

mapping project launched. They were also timed to coincide with the 2010 decennial Census and take advantage of new web possibilities of mash-up between news and maps that were made possible with web 2.0 technology.

The project started with the census tracts in the city of Los Angeles and grouped them into 87 neighborhoods in 2009. The Times published the map in the paper and online, followed by a public comment period. The center of the feedback was the Times' website with over 1,500 comments through an online tool where people could re-draw boundaries of their neighborhood and submit them for review. Following public comment, the Times split the city up at the more granulated, block level and created a new map of 114 mutually exclusive neighborhoods (4 of which are parks or large reservoirs without a substantial population).[97]

The 110 *Los Angeles Times'* vernacular neighborhoods used in this dissertation range in population from roughly 2,000 to 106,000 residents, with a mean of 35,000. The three largest vernacular neighborhoods (Koreatown, Westlake, and Van Nuys) each contain more than 100,000 residents. In comparison to the 51 NYC community areas used in the defended neighborhoods paper discussed in chapter 2 (mean 133,000, max 222,000), the Los Angeles neighborhoods are significantly smaller.

In comparison to similar areas in other cities, the mean population in 2005-09 for Chicago's 77 community areas was not statistically different from the Los Angeles vernacular neighborhoods population in 2005-2009: p-value of two-sample unequal variance two-tailed test is .49. Further, Chicago also has community areas with large populations: in 2000, Austin, on the Westside, had 103,000 residents, and the next largest community area, Lakeview, on the

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[97] For more information on the mapping LA project see: http://maps.latimes.com/about/ (last visited Feb 18, 2016). Of the 1,055 tracts in the city of Los Angeles, 80 percent are in one neighborhood, and 18 percent are split between two neighborhoods. The remaining tracts are divided between 3 to 5 neighborhoods (24 tracts are split between 3 neighborhoods each, 2 tracts split between 4 neighborhoods each, and 2 tracts split between in 5 neighborhoods each).

Northside, had 100,000. In 1930, when first used by Ernest Burgess to map Chicago's population, the Community Areas were significantly larger (t = 2.47), with an average near 45,000 residents; the largest areas were the Near Westside with 152,457 and West Town with 187,292 (Burgess, Newcomb, and University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee 1933). These Chicago numbers are also similar to Peter Jackson's Neighborhoods of New York project (Jackson and Citizens Committee for New York City 1998). For Brooklyn, the mean neighborhood size is just under 44,000 residents with the largest, Bedford-Stuyvesant at 192,000 in 2000. This is statistically similar to the Chicago community areas in 1930, and significantly larger than the *Los Angeles Times* neighborhoods.

Institutional changes make neighborhoods more salient in contemporary Los Angeles: city charter reform and the formation of the neighborhood councils have changed local political and social relations, institutionalizing neighborhood bonds (Sonenshein 2004; Sonenshein 2006). Thus, because Los Angeles is a different city now, vernacular neighborhoods approaches may be more useful. The post-modern approaches of the Los Angeles school of urban theory (Soja 1990; M. Davis 1992; Scott and Soja 1998; A. Abbott 2002; M. Dear 2003) have been joined by the diffusion of the modern Chicago neighborhood model (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Part of this is change in urban form; sprawling Los Angeles is now as dense as many other U.S. cities (Eidlin 2005). But there have been a growing number of studies using a neighborhood based approach, some particularly innovative on networked neighborhood effects (Sastry, Pebley, and Zonta 2002; Sastry et al. 2006; Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Boggess, Greenbaum, and Tita 2013).

Spatial Weights Matrix

In some of the analysis, I use a spatial weights matrix to represent diffusion and exposure processes. Following an approach proposed by Tita and Greenbaum (2009, 153–157), I approximate the exposure and diffusion processes involved in hate crime in neighborhoods by constructing a spatial weights matrix. For this matrix, I use a modified version of Reyner Banham's typology of Los Angeles' built environment: beach cities, foothills, and the flatlands (2009).[98] I augment this typology with a fourth category for the urban core running from Santa Monica east down Wilshire Boulevard through Downtown. (For more information, see a map Figure 2 and Table 3 in Appendix). Once each neighborhood was classified by ecological type, I grouped it with nearby neighborhoods based on a principle of similarity to represent diffusion and exposure processes. I also include information from other nearby cities and unincorporated areas (such as East Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, West Hollywood, and parts of South Los Angeles like Florence-Firestone).

Using this matrix, I created a spatial lag variable for the hate crimes of interest by summing the crimes and dividing by the number of neighborhoods and communities in the area. Therefore, I assume that neighborhoods affect nearby neighborhoods that are similar, through a diffusion process. This produces a row-standardized spatial lag variable and captures both diffusion and exposure effects. Communities outside the city of Los Angeles were split if they fell along a larger ecological boundary. They were defined using police reporting districts tracked by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (available online at http://egis3.lacounty.gov/dataportal). The resulting spatial matrix is equivalent to a row

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[98] For a summary of the changes in each of Banham's ecologies, see page xvii-xxi in Day's introduction. Although, Joe Day argues that reading Banham today "presents a city which may no longer exist" (xvi) Banham's general characterization of this city in terms of proximity to the ocean, the foothills and the valleys remains useful.

standardized contiguity matrix; however, contiguity is conceptualized in a broader sense based on the built environment. Additional analyses with a spatial lag a strictly typological categorization of beach cities, foothills, residential plains and urban core, were not significantly different from models with no spatial lag. Because San Pedro is an isolate, near the port and distinct from the nearby flatlands, I use the queen contiguity approach and incorporate information from the two nearby neighborhoods. To learn more about these areas, please compare the map in appendix figure 2 and appendix table 3.

Appendix Figure 1.
Map of Neighborhoods in the City of Los Angeles

Source: Los Angeles Times; U.S. Census Tiger Shapefiles; Open Street Map.

Appendix Table 2.
Los Angeles Times Neighborhoods

Adams-Normandie	0	Hansen Dam	39	San Pedro	79
Arleta	1	Harbor City	40	Sawtelle	80
Arlington Heights	2	Harbor Gateway	41	Sepulveda Basin	81
Atwater Village	3	Harvard Heights	42	Shadow Hills	82
Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw	4	Harvard Park	43	Sherman Oaks	83
		Highland Park	44	Silver Lake	84
Bel-Air	5	Historic South-Central	45	South Park	85
Beverly Crest	6	Hollywood	46	Studio City	86
Beverly Grove	7	Hollywood Hills	47	Sun Valley	87
Beverlywood	8	Hollywood Hills West	48	Sunland	88
Boyle Heights	9	Hyde Park	49	Sylmar	89
Brentwood	10	Jefferson Park	50	Tarzana	90
Broadway-Manchester	11	Koreatown	51	Toluca Lake	91
Canoga Park	12	Lake Balboa	52	Tujunga	92
Carthay	13	Lake View Terrace	53	University Park	93
Central-Alameda	14	Larchmont	54	Valley Glen	94
Century City	15	Leimert Park	55	Valley Village	95
Chatsworth	16	Lincoln Heights	56	Van Nuys	96
Chesterfield Square	17	Los Feliz	57	Venice	97
Cheviot Hills	18	Manchester Square	58	Vermont Knolls	98
Chinatown	19	Mar Vista	59	Vermont Square	99
Cypress Park	20	Mid-City	60	Vermont Vista	100
Del Rey	21	Mid-Wilshire	61	Vermont-Slauson	101
Downtown	22	Mission Hills	62	Watts	102
Eagle Rock	23	Montecito Heights	63	West Adams	103
East Hollywood	24	Mount Washington	64	West Hills	104
Echo Park	25	North Hills	65	West Los Angeles	105
El Sereno	26	North Hollywood	66	Westchester	106
Elysian Park	27	Northridge	67	Westlake	107
Elysian Valley	28	Pacific Palisades	68	Westwood	108
Encino	29	Pacoima	69	Wilmington	109
Exposition Park	30	Palms	70	Windsor Square	110
Fairfax	31	Panorama City	71	Winnetka	111
Florence	32	Pico-Robertson	72	Woodland Hills	112
Glassell Park	33	Pico-Union	73		
Gramercy Park	34	Playa Vista	74		
Granada Hills	35	Playa del Rey	75		
Green Meadows	36	Porter Ranch	76		
Griffith Park	37	Rancho Park	77		
Hancock Park	38	Reseda	78		

Map of Spatial Weights Matrix.

Appendix Table 3.

Area	N	*LA Times* Neighborhoods
Arroyo Hills	3	Eagle Rock, Montecito Heights Mount Washington
San Pedro	1	San Pedro
Hollywood Hills	5	Bel-Air, Beverly Crest, Brentwood, Hollywood Hills West, Pacific Palisades
Hollywood Hills East	3	Hollywood Hills, Los Feliz, Silver Lake
Baldwin Hills	3	Baldwin Hills/Crenshaw, Hyde Park Leimert Park
La Crecsenta	2	Sunland, Tujunga
East Los	1	Boyle Heights
Arroyo Seco	7	Atwater Village, Cypress Park, El Sereno, Elysian Valley, Glassell Park, Highland Park, Lincoln Heights
San Fernando Valley Hills	6	Chatsworth, Granada Hills, Porter Ranch, Shadow Hills, West Hills, Woodland Hills
Surfurbia	6	Del Rey, Mar Vista, Playa Vista, Playa del Rey, Venice, Westchester
Linear Core	17	Beverly Grove, Beverlywood, Carthay, Century City, Cheviot Hills, Fairfax, Hancock Park, Larchmont, Mid-City, Mid-Wilshire, Palms, Pico-Robertson, Rancho Park, Sawtelle, West Los Angeles, Westwood, Windsor Square
Downtown	12	Arlington Heights, Chinatown, Downtown, East Hollywood, Echo Park, Elysian Park, Harvard Heights, Hollywood, Koreatown, Pico-Union, University Park, Westlake
South LA	22	Adams-Normandie, Broadway-Manchester, Central-Alameda, Chesterfield Square, Exposition Park, Florence, Gramercy Park, Green Meadows, Harbor City, Harbor Gateway, Harvard Park, Historic South-Central, Jefferson Park, Manchester Square, South Park, Vermont Knolls, Vermont Square, Vermont Vista, Vermont-Slauson, Watts, West Adams, Wilmington
San Fernando Valley	22	Arleta, Canoga Park, Encino, Lake Balboa, Lake View Terrace, Mission Hills, North Hills, North Hollywood, Northridge, Pacoima, Panorama City, Reseda, Sherman Oaks, Studio City, Sun Valley, Sylmar, Tarzana, Toluca Lake, Valley Glen, Valley Village, Van Nuys, Winnetka