Consequences of Affective Polarization in The United States and Latin America

By

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my loved ones. My parents, Zahra Azartash and Masoud Kazemian, who have supported me endlessly and taught me to believe in myself. To my siblings, Mina and Rouzbeh, who have always set an example to always strive for greatness. Mina, there is finally another doctor in the family (just do not expect me to perform surgery). To Rouzbeh, my twin, who encouraged me to go to UC Davis and pursue my dreams and visited me countless times. I love you all. To my future husband, Bradley Doucette, who edited every single article and paper (including this one) that I have ever written. I am immensely grateful for your support and compassion. Your work ethic and positive attitude drives me to be a better scholar and person. I could not have done this PhD without you! Finally, to my dog Bella – you destroyed every toy I have ever gotten you, ate my books, interrupted my zoom calls, and most of all kept me sane throughout this process.

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Abstract

Political polarization divides the mass public and contributes to a significant amount of social conflict within society. Those that identify with a social group (e.g. a specific political party or social class) tend to prefer policies that safeguard their own group, relative to others. As polarization worsens, it is important to understand how multiple group attachments motivate human behavior. This dissertation examines the consequences of affective polarization in the United States and Latin America. First, although previous literature documents that partisan cues prompt inter-party trust discrimination, it is unclear if these partisan effects are driven by economic divisions. In the first chapter, I disentangle the effects of partisan discrimination from class discrimination, and argues that class identity is tied to partisan identity. The results from an original trust game experiment indicate a large income-based discrimination effect. I also find evidence of cross-partisan envy – an effect that has not yet been directly tested in the literature.

Second, I examine patterns and consequences of affective polarization in Latin America. While a significant amount of literature documents partisan dislike in the United States and Western Europe, less is known the extent to which partisan animosity exists in a political environment where partisan attachments are traditionally weak. Following recent work on negative and anti-partisanship, I argue that the mass public in Latin-American do hold political identities and that these identities have important political outcomes. Using CSES data, I show that that dislike for mainstream parties increases voter-turnout among nonpartisans.

Third, I use an original conjoint experiment and assess the limits of partisan prejudice. Current literature on partisanship argues that partisans use political identities as short-cuts and heuristics for decision-making. Following the long standing literature on partisanship, I examine the limits of partisan discrimination in a purely apolitical and altruistic domain: charities. My results demonstrate that partisanship not only influences economic and political domains, but that it spillsover into ostensibly apolitical domains such as deciding whether or not to donate to the cancer and research based nonprofits.

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CHAPTER 1

Who Do Americans Trust: The Relationship Between Social Class and Party Identification

1.1 Introduction

The United States of America, as politicians lament, is deeply divided. What divides the mass public? While scholars generally agree that political elites are polarized on ideological issues, they debate if similar patterns are present among the mass public (Abramowitz, 2010*a*; Fiorina, Abrams & Pope, 2011). A recent wave of literature documents political polarization as an affective phenomenon and likens party affiliation to a social identity, dividing the mass public along party lines (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015*a*). The emerging consensus is that party identification is a salient and potent identifier that drives anger toward partisan opponents (Mason & Davis, 2015). Although much ink has been spilled over the causes of affective polarization, less attention has been paid to how partisan identities interact with other social identities (Ahler, 2018; Mason, 2016).

When individuals identify with a group, be it social or political, they divide themselves into in-groups and out-groups (Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979). While it may seem obvious that people belong to multiple social groups simultaneously, it is less obvious how these groups interact and influence political behavior. Traditional social identity research observes identities in isolation and begs the question how multiple identities shape political behavior.[1] Examining partisan identities in isolation is an oversight because people possess multiple identities that do not necessarily work in the same direction (Mason & Davis, 2015). Recent evidence argues that when multiple social identities align, they increase the perceived distance between groups, resulting in amplified group conflict (Mason & Wronski, 2018).

This project examines how two contentious divisions in society, partisanship and social class, motivate group conflict. In the United States, income inequality has steadily increased, and with it, so too has class conflict. As income inequality widens, class identities become more salient and heighten the perceived differences between groups. Indeed, two-thirds of the American public perceive conflict between the rich and the poor, while only 40% of the American public trust one

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[1]For exceptions see Mason & Davis (2015); Huddy, Mason & Aarøe (2015); Mason (2016).

another (Pew Research Center & Demographics, 2012). Increasingly, it appears that individuals' attitudes toward socio-economic class are sorted along partisan lines. For example, 90% of liberal and centrist Democrats agree that the government should address income inequality, while 55% of conservative Republicans disagree (Pew Research Center, 2014).

During heightened income inequality and partisanship, it is important to understand how multiple group attachments motivate political behavior. While previous literature documents that partisan cues prompt inter-party trust discrimination, it is unclear if these partisan effects are driven by economic divisions. Furthermore, it is unknown if partisans are willing to trust individuals outside their own social and political groups. This paper extends the literature on affective polarization and disentangles the effects of partisan discrimination from class discrimination, arguing that class identity is tied to partisan identity. I use an original trust game experiment to examine the relationship between social class, party identification and trust.

1.2 Significance of Group Identities on Interpersonal

Humans are a cooperative species that have been engendered to participate in prosocial behavior for mutually shared benefits (Merolla et al., 2013). At this end, humans are ingrained to trust one another. For some, trust is an emotional or affective attitude (Jones, 1996), a voluntary acceptance of positive and negative externalities (Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990), or the willingness to accept vulnerability. Loaning a friend money with expectation of return or asking a stranger to watch your stuff while you walk away are both examples of trust (Yamagishi et al., 2005). As it goes, humans tend to trust those with shared group memberships, like party affiliation, an ethnicity, or a social class (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). Yet, differences between citizens, be they political or economic, generate distrust. There are a number of theories that explain why perceived differences foster trust discrimination, of which, most are situated in theories of group conflict. In an era of heightened political polarization and income inequality, there has been a revived interest in how the intersection of multiple identities motivate political behavior (Mason & Wronski, 2018).

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It is well-documented that group-based identities help explain party choices (Huddy, Mason & Aarøe, 2015) as well as interpersonal trust (Carlin & Love, 2018*b*; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). Individuals are divided along social categories, including economic class, political affiliation, ethnicity and race. These social divisions are an important channel for social identification because they provide the foundation for how people categorize themselves (Miller & Wattenberg, 1983). Much of this literature is based on Social Identity Theory (SIT), which suggests that groups give people a sense of belonging to the social word and have pervasive effects on how people think, behave and feel (Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979). Accordingly, people may enhance their own self-image by espousing positive views of an in-group, and/or by discriminating against an out-group. From this rationale, society is divided into an "us" versus "them" mentality, or in other words "in-groups" and "out-groups."

As the logic goes, group biases form from both minimal groups as well as real cleavages like race, income, religion, and partisanship (Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979).[2] The more salient the identity, the more likely an individual is to evaluate groups differently (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018*a*). Identity salience itself develops through either dispositional or informational environments (Mason & Davis, 2015). In the former, salience depends on the "strength of an individual's loyalty to the group" (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018*a*, 24). In this light, partisanship is akin to a salient identity as people are strongly attached to a given political party. In the latter, salience hinges on the number of times an individual is reminded of her group tie. Social class, for example, may become salient by simply reminding an individual of her economic class, relative to others. Thus, amplified income inequality may make socio-economic class a powerful identity that generates group conflict.

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[2]The minimal group paradigm was meant to set the "base-line conditions" for group discrimination. The results showed that participants discriminated against each other with only trivial information about their in-group and out-group.

1.3 Party Identification as a Social Identity

In recent years, political scientists have likened partisanship to a social identity (Huddy, Mason & Aarøe, 2015). Under this conception, party attachments are not solely dependent on ideological differences but are instead entrenched in affective evaluations (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015c). The idea that political parties function as social groups is not a new phenomenon in American politics. In *The American Voter*, Campbell et al. (1980) reminds us that party identification is an 'enduring attachment' or a 'psychological orientation'. Building off this seminal work, Green, Palmquist & Schickler (2004) argue, "a party exists as a stereotype in the minds of voters, who in turn harbor sense of attachment toward this group (26). In fact, it was Campbell who argued long ago that partisans have a "perceptual bias" and attachment toward their own party, such that economic and political conditions do not alter party attachments (Campbell et al., 1980; Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2004). Although political or economic circumstances may temporarily shift partisan attachments, citizens tend to revert back to their groups and only change party identification when the party image alters (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2004). Under this view, an individual is first a member of social groups, and identifies with a party that conforms to those identities.

Likewise, (Ahler, 2018, 6) argues that, "parties are collectives of more fundamental groups in society and people evaluate them according to how well the parties reflect their own identities". Ahler (2018) documents that partisans dislike out-partisans because they associate these individuals with stereotypes linked to the out-party. Indeed, partisanship activates stereotypes across party lines, fostering partisan trust discrimination (Carlin & Love, 2018b). The basic observation is that party identification, like other social identities, motivates ordinary citizens to distrust one another because citizens often use partisan heuristics to inform their decision-making process. Thus if an individual perceives the political opposition or their leaders as untrustworthy, they may also view people tied to the party as untrustworthy (Ahler, 2018; Carlin & Love, 2018b). Using partisan shortcuts to make "best guesses" about trust generates biases such that Democrats will trust a Democrat stranger and discriminate against a Republican stranger. These results

comport with social psychology theories on stereotypes which reason that people ascribe certain images of others based on the group(s) that they belong to, and consequently, act on these beliefs (Tajfel et al., 1971). For example, when an individual asks—what is a Democrat, they also assign certain social identities to the party label – working or middle-class person; in contrast when an individual asks – "what is a Republican", they stereotype them as wealthy individuals (Ahler, 2018). This finding warrants greater attention because it suggests that partisan animus is not solely based on an individuals attachment to the party; rather it is based on how ones social identities align with one's party identity.

Indeed, party identification can serve as an important heuristic to who we trust. People may use party identities to mentally differentiate between individuals in their in-groups and those in their out-groups. Following these arguments, experimental studies show that partisanship shapes how much financial rewards individuals are willing to endow to others (Carlin & Love, 2018*b*). However, these findings are all limited in that they do not consider how other social cleavages, like socio-economic class, contribute growing inter-party distrust.

A growing body of literature in comparative politics documents that party affiliation conditions trust behavior, relative to other identities. For example, Engelhardt & Utych (2018) also find evidence that partisan discrimination spills over into sport team preferences. In an experimental setting, the authors show that partisanship shapes price discrimination on college football tickets. Namely, individuals are more likely to accept lower prices for college football tickets from co-partisans, and more likely to up charge tickets for their out-group (opposing party). Comparative work in Ghana documents that in-group favoritism and out-group hostility drives price discrimination in taxi fares. For instance, Michelitch (2015*a*) shows that taxi drivers in Ghana are more likely to charge out-party members higher prices and more willing to discount rides for in-party members. Indeed, the analysis reveals that non-co-ethnic out-partisans pay 16% more for taxi fares than non-co-ethnic co-partisans. In both of these examples, partisanship mediates trust behavior, relative to either identities (e.g. either ones' sports identity or ethnic identity).

1.4 Social Class as a Social Identity

Social class can be broken down into two components: objective and subjective. Measures of objective social class categorize individuals based on traditional socioeconomic variables, like reported income, education, and occupation. Subjective social class entails asking people to self-identify their own social standing, relative to others. Typically, this is done by asking perception questions like – "do you identify with lower, middle, or upper class". Usually, objective measures spillover into subjective measures, as the amount of capital one obtains likely influences how you position yourself relative others. Nonetheless, while subjective and objective social class are similar, they are empirically distinct concepts. For example, an individual may make $100,000 a year and self-identify as middle class, because that is how they rank relative to those around them. Put differently – a person who is wealthy, relative to national income standards, may be surrounded in a community by more wealthy individuals. Thus, even though they are "doing well" by national standards, they perceive themselves to be in a different *group* than those that surround them. A similar narrative can be painted by a poor person: someone who is poor by national standards, may be surrounded by even poorer individuals; thus, they too, will perceive themselves to be in a different group (McClendon, 2018). As Weber (1978) posited, class reflects a group of individuals who share common occupations, while social class (or "status groups") refers to the communities that people identify with. These perception measures are important because individuals are likely to behave based on their self-perceptions.

Thus, social class is akin to social identity that becomes salient when individuals are reminded of their social position, relative to others. However, unlike party identification, political science literature has paid little attention to political consequences of social class, particularly how they overlap with partisan identities. Gidron & Hall (2020), contend that the income inequality is dangerous in society because it leaves individuals alienated from the political system. They hypothesize that individuals with lower levels of social status feel marginalized and alienated from those with higher subjective social status. Consequently, they reason, that those who identify

with lower social status prefer radical left parties in Europe. Their analysis provides support for the idea that income inequality enhances perceived distances between social classes, leaving citizens to feel socially marginalized and finally, sorting themselves to leftist parties. In the United States, Jackman & Jackman (1983) long ago observed that class is an important aspect of American society and that class identification tends to be more salient among the poor, working class than those identifying as the upper-class. More recently, Gidron, Adams & Horne (2021) observe cross-nationally, that countries with higher degrees of unemployment and income inequality tend to have a higher degree of affective polarization. Building off this literature, Stewart, McCarty & Bryson (2020), make a causal claim that income inequality *causes* affective polarization. Somewhat shockingly, Stewart, McCarty & Bryson (2020) and his coauthors find that once income inequality polarizes the political system, it cannot reversed by simply *reducing* inequality. Given these arguments, recent evidence indicates that where income inequality intensifies, partisan dislike tends to follow.

Theories from economics tell a similar narrative, whereby scholars link income inequality and social class heterogeneity to group conflict. For example, economists argue that economic inequality produces distrust because as differences between individuals increase, then uncertainty increases, and trust between individuals declines Steijn & Lancee (2011). Similarly, Pickett & Wilkinson (2015) document that economic inequality undermines social relations and increases social distance between individuals. Uslaner & Brown (2005) posit two pathways through which income differences influence trust behavior. First, they argue that when income inequality is high, the poor feel more powerless and believe that their views are not represented within society (Uslaner & Brown, 2005). As such, the poor are less optimistic about the future and less willing to trust the rich. Second, they argue that when individuals are in different economic strata, they will have less "shared fate" and will have less reason to trust individuals from different backgrounds. In a similar spirit, others argue that satisfaction is linked to "the perceived relative income position in a reference group. Hence, high degrees of inequality can lead to envy and dissatisfaction and thus reducing trust…in relationships" (Haile, Sadrieh & Verbon, 2008). Regardless of the pathway,

evidence at both the micro-level as well as the macro-level supports these contentions. In this light, as income inequality intensifies – as it has in the United States – interpersonal trust across social class should decline. The question is, however, to what extent does social class align with partisan identification. In other words, to the extent that social identities generate stereotypes about parties, we should expect ones' social class identity to be linked to their partisan identity.

1.5 Problem With Studying Identities In Isolation From One Another: The Case For Intersections

Traditional social identity research focuses on a single in-group-out-group categorization. However, multiple identities may interact and on political behavior. For example, Westwood & Peterson (2020) introduce a new theory called compounding social identities and posit that partisan-based affect spillovers into race-based affect. The basic crux of the argument is that race and partisanship are cognitively integrated such that the experiences from one spillover into another. The key insight here is that linkages between race and partisanship are bidirectional – race influences partisanship, and partisanship influences race. For example, your status as a Black man influences your party identification, just as your party identification influences how you perceive your racial identity. Despite their novel contribution, the theory does not account for strength of identification across groups. That is, the theory implies that a White Democrat negatively evaluates a Republican because she is both a Republican and Black. The problem of the bi-directional theory is that it assumes that the identification with party does not moderate race-based evaluations (e.g. that a White Democrat might be more tolerant and accepting of racial diversity than White Republican).

Following that reasoning, the theory suggests that income differences and partisanship should not spillover into one another because the two identities are not cognitively integrated. Yet, the results indicate that income and partisanship *do* spillover and produce similar compounding effects as race and partisanship. Perhaps, then, income and partisanship are more aligned – or at

least more cognitively integrated than previously conceived.

1.6   Cross-Cutting or Reinforcing

The impact of multiple identities is conditioned on whether or not identities are cross-cutting or reinforcing. Cross-cutting cleavages are divisions that are partitioned across different demographic groups, generating heterogeneity. Early work in political science suggested that when identities interact, they may offset one another so long as they are cross-pressured (Miller & Wattenberg, 1983). For example, Campbell et al. (1980) posited that citizens face numerous, often conflicting demands. People can have strong attachments to multiple groups at the same time; individuals who are out-group members in one category may in fact be ingroup members of another.

According to social psychology, "cross-cutting categorizations may diffuse or prevent the more invidious consequences of ingroup outgroup differentiation and intergroup comparisons" (Brewer & Pierce, 1999, 169). Societies that that are cross-pressured are thought to be more stable because cross-cutting pressures "reduce the evaluation significance for the self of intergroup comparisons, thereby undermining the motivational base for intergroup discrimination" (Brewer & Pierce, 1999, 170). In other words, partisans should tolerate one another so long as these identities cut across one another. Yet, research on affective polarization documents that partisan animus has steadily increased over the past 30 years – suggesting that partisans are increasingly intolerant of one another. The conventional explanation is that elite-ideological polarization shapes mass-level affective polarization (Reiljan, 2019; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016).

However another explanation, and one that I follow, is that identities, like partisanship and social class, have become more aligned and produce a greater degree of outgroup affect. When social identities reinforce each other, intergroup biases tend to increase. Reinforcing cleavages are partitions within society that reinforce one another, producing more homogenous groups. When identities converge, they produce stronger and greater influences on out-group biases (Mason and Davis, 2015).

Most Americans identify with both a political party as well as a social class (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015c). However, it is unclear if these group affiliations offset one another or exacerbate group biases. Suppose for example that individuals have two group identities; one is partisan (Republican vs. Democrat), and another is social class (lower/middle-class vs. upper-class). If these identities were reinforcing, then all members of the Republican party would also be members of the upper-class group, and all members of Democratic party would also be members of the lower/middle-class group, leaving only two groups (lower/middle-class Democrat and upper-class Republican). As a result, intergroup differences deepen from the combination of two categorical distinctions (Oskamp, 2000). In this scenario, we would expect social class and party identification to produce *multiplicative* effects: The more aligned the two identities, the greater the degree of out-group affect. Boxell, Gentzkow & Shapiro (2022)'s study provides some insight on whether or not social identities are tied to party identification. The author uses the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1948-2016 to evaluate the relationship between multiple identities and partisan affect. The analysis reveals that demographic characteristics explain about 1/3 of all changes in partisan affect. These findings align with (Mason & Wronski, 2018), who finds that when identities are more congruent, then the perceived distance between groups amplifies, and partisan affect increases. One implication from this research is that demographic characteristics *cause* affect polarization precisely because it makes groups more distinct.

In a cross-cutting society, membership in the Democrat vs. Republican group would be orthogonal to membership in the lower/middle-class vs. upper-class group (e.g. Democrats may equally belong to upper-class group or lower/middle-class, and Republicans may equally belong to the upper-class group or lower/middle class). In other words, we might anticipate four categories: upper-class Democrat, upper-class Republican, lower/middle class-Democrat, and lower/middle class-Republican. Accordingly, we could except intergroup bias between groups (Democrat and Republican) to be lower than intergroup biases in the former example. In this example, we would expect the interaction of party identification and social class identification to be merely additive, such that partisans would tolerate those who are similar to them on one dimension. Although

few studies have evaluated how social class and partisan identities interact, recent literature in comparative politics provides some insight on how partisan interacts with other identities, like race.

Previous literature in American and Comparative politics illuminates how inter-party distrust. As reviewed above, the general finding is that co-partisans tend to favour one another and tend to discriminate against out-partisans. However, Iyengar & Westwood (2015c); Carlin & Love (2018b) only consider how party identification motivates inter-party distrust[3]. The problem here is that party identification can be co-founded with other social identities. For example, Carlin & Love (2018b); Iyengar & Westwood (2015c) conduct a series of trust games across eight democracies and find evidence of inter-party distrust. To do so, they prompt participants with a partisan cue, but do not consider if other social cleavages mask partisan distrust. West & Iyengar (2020) directly take up this hypothesis and provide participants with either a racial cue, or a partisan cue and find that while racial cues persist, partisan cues were stronger. From this, they conclude that partisan discrimination dominates other social identities. In a similar spirit, Martini & Torcal (2019) examine regional, social and partisan group conflicts in Spain and Portugal and find that the magnitude of partisan distrust varies across political systems. Overall, however, the authors conclude that while other social identities, like territorial and regional conflicts, influence trust, they matter to a lesser degree than partisanship. While this research improves our understanding of the magnitude of partisan identities, it only provides a partial understanding of how social and partisan identities interact. Indeed, the authors did not provide participants with a *joint* social and partisan cue; rather, they observe these identities in isolation. Thus, it is still unclear if party identification "does all work" in trust discrimination.

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[3]Carlin and Love (2018) provide a joint income and partisan cue in El Savador, one out of eight countries in their sample. The authors prompt an income cue by telling participants if someone makes below or above the median income threshold. In doing so, they find no effect on the income condition. This is somewhat unsurprising as the income treatment was likely relatively too weak, relative to the party treatment. For example, telling participants that the other person is a member of the economic elite evokes a substantively different sense of class differences than by simply telling someone that they make either above or below the median income.

1.7   Hypotheses

1. **H1:** All else equal, co-partisans trust each other more than out-partisans.

2. **H2:** All else equal, upper-class (lower/middle-class) individuals trust each other more than they do lower/middle-class (upper-class) individuals are more trusting their in-group.

3. **H3a (Reinforcing Hypothesis):** All else equal, when social class and partisanship are (in)congruent, trust will (decrease) increase more powerfully than either social class or partisanship alone because the identities reinforce each other.

4. **H3b: (Cross-Cutting Hypothesis):** All else equal, when social class and partisanship are (in)congruent, trust will (decrease) increase at a similar rate as social class or partisanship identity alone because individuals are cross-pressured.

1.8   Research Design

1.8.1   An Overview of Basic Trust Games

Trust games are the most common method to measure interpersonal trust. In its original form, the trust game is played by two randomly assigned, anonymous participants that have no prior knowledge of Player 2's identity. Player 1 is given a sum of money and told that they can allocate some, all, or none of their money to Player 2, and that any sum of money Player 1 gives to Player 2 will be tripled by the researcher and given to Player 2. For example, if Player 1 allocates $2 to Player 2, then Player 2 will receive $6. Player 1 is also told that Player 2 will be given the same information and also has the opportunity to return some, none, or all their money back to Player 1. In this design, trust is measured by the amount of money that Player 1 sends to Player 2. Thus, the more money that Player 1 sends to Player 2, the more Player 1 trusts Player 2.

Although the Nash equilibrium is for Player 1 to keep all of the money, experimental evidence

shows that participants tend to, on average, allocate above the equilibrium (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Behavioral economics indicates that the amount of money that Player 1 endows to Player 2 varies by the characteristics of Player 2 (e.g. their social class, race, partisan, or ethnic identity) (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001). By definition, trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability for shared mutual benefits (Rousseau et al., 1998). In the game, sending money is associated with positive affect or evaluation of another player (Fong & Luttmer, 2011). Unsurprisingly, these games have been adopted in political science research to evaluate how partisan attachments reduce inter-party trust (Carlin & Love, 2018b; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018b). In the context of political and economic identities, this means players should trust one another more when their identities align.

1.8.2   The Experiment

This paper uses a within-subject experimental design and employs a modified version of Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995)'s trust game to document the extent to which participants are willing to allocate rewards (extra-credit) to players from varying class and partisan identities. A within-subject design implies that each individual is exposed to multiple stimuli, rather than a single-stimulus. These experimental designs are advantageous because they do not require researchers to dilute out their sample size into multiple treatment groups and do not depend on random assignment (Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012). So long as the researcher believes that there is independence between the exposures, or that the stimuli can be randomly ordered, then causal estimates can be attained (Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012). The downside is the possibility of confounding identification, particularly if the stimuli are not randomly ordered. Thus, researchers must worry about the phrasing as well as the ordering of each stimuli (Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012). In order to alleviate these concerns, I randomly order the stimuli (the profiles of Player 2). Below I describe my modified trust game more in depth.

Prior to the experiment, participants filled out a demographic survey that asked about housing information (the cost of rent, number of rooms, and number of roommates), lived poverty

experiences, subjective class identity, as well as a series of questions regarding their political affiliation. Following Westwood et al. (2018), I ask demographic questions in the pre-treatment so that students will plausibly believe that they are matched with other players based on their survey responses. In order to reduce demand effects, I also ask participants a host of questions unrelated to the experiment. After participants complete the demographic survey, they read the trust game instructions and are told that they will interact with a new player in each round. To mitigate feedback-based biases across the rounds, participants are also told that they will learn of Player 2's allocations at the end of the game.

 I amend the basic trust game in three ways. First, since I am only interested in trust and not trustworthiness, all participants are assigned as Player 1. Second, I follow Westwood et al. (2018) and Westwood & Peterson (2020) and manipulate the profile of each Player 2 (the trustee), who is a simulated person. The treatment variable is thus the identity information that participants are given in each round. The profiles shown in each round contained information on political party support, social class affiliation, or a joint political party and social class cue. Below are all stimuli:

1. Lower-class, Pays less than or equal to $500 in rent

2. Upper-class, Pays more than or equal to $2500 in rent

3. Democratic Party

4. Republican Party

5. Democratic Party, Lower-class, Pays less than or equal to $500 in rent

6. Democratic Party, Upper-class, Pays more than or equal to $2500 in rent

7. Republican Party, Lower-class, Pays less than or equal to $500 in rent

8. Republican Party, Upper-class, Pays more than or equal to $2500 in rent

To be more precise, in the actual game Player 2 is not a real person although participants are led to believe that they are matched against a real Player 2. Again, since the demographic and political questions preceded the game, it is plausible that participants believed that they were being matched with a real player based on their demographic attributes (Westwood et al., 2018).

Third, given the constraints of COVID-19 and difficulties in allocating distributions to students who are taking the experiment at home, I use extra-credit as opposed to money to represent the trust 'currency' in the game. In trust games, it is essential that participants believe that the stakes of the game are real (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). If participants do not perceive the stakes to be "real" while playing the game, they may alter their behavior in an unintended way. Therefore, participants were told that the more units they earn, the more extra credit they will earn. Instead of sending "money" in the game, participants believe that they are rationing their own "extra credit" in the game. At the end of the game, participants were debriefed and given the maximum, equal amount of participation points, regardless of performance.

1.9 The Student Sample

The sample includes a pool of Republican and Democratic undergraduates at the University of California, Davis. Students are a convenient and frequently used sample for behavioral laboratory experiments. Although there are some limitations in convenience samples, I argue that for the purposes of this study a convenience sample is justified.

First, student samples are not inherently problematic for external validity; they tend to be an issue if the treatment effect depends on a variable whereby the sample has no variance on (Druckman & Kam, 2011). Even if my sample only contained Democrats or only low-income individuals, I would still be able to assess how Democrats or low-income individuals react to different demographic profiles. Second, as Druckman & Kam (2011) argue, students and non-student samples do not differ substantially on political variables (e.g. partisanship). Student samples are limited if students and non-students differ in generalized trust behavior (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). However, Carlin & Love (2018b) find no evidence that students and adults diverged in the baseline levels of trust.

The study took place in May 2020 and was administered via Qualtrics. A total of 273 students participated, all of whom took the experiment out-side the lab (e.g. at home). The sample con-

tained many more Democrats (N=221), than Republicans (N=22) and more middle/low income participants (N=223), than high-income participants (N=20). Of those that identified as Democrat, more than half identified as "strong" Democrat (N=132), and of those that identified as Republican, about a third identified as "strong Republican" (N=7). All individuals in the sample were aged between 18-25, and there were many more woman (N=161), than men (N=79) and few who identified as "other" (N=4).

Before assessing my results, a few limitations should be discussed. First, the sample consists primarily of Democrats of whom identify as middle/low-income individuals. Second, those that identified with the upper-class were also primarily Democrats (N=18). Unfortunately, this means that I cannot make meaningful inferences on how Republican participants behave, nor can I make meaningful inferences on how upper-class individuals behave. Specifically, I make no attempt to understand how upper-class Republicans react to different stimuli, as only two individuals self-identified as both Republican and upper-class. In the context of this study, this means I can only assess with confidence how lower/middle class Democrats react to different stimuli. These sampling distribution issues are not uncommon at University of California, Davis given the liberal lean of the student population. Nonetheless, sampling issues inhibit this study and only provide a partial understanding to the relationship between social class, partisanship and trust.

Following Westwood et al. (2018), I excluded all 'true' Independents (N < 20) from the sample, and re-coded lean'ers as either Democrat or Republican. I also combined the middle class and lower class into a single category so that I can make meaningful comparisons between in-class members and out-class members. To be sure that 'middle class' individuals belong in the same category as those in the lower class, I ran all the analyses separately and found that those that self-identify with the middle class more closely behave like the working class than the upper-class. Table 1 below reports the joint distribution of party and socio-economic class across the students.

I also examine the relationship between party identification and preferences over redistribution. As expected, the descriptive statistics indicate that Democrats prefer redistributive policies, and that middle and lower income individuals prefer redistribution. Unsurprisingly, I find that

Table 1.1: Distribution of Party and Class

	Democratic	**Republican**
Middle/lower	204	20
Upper	18	2

Note:
1. Middle and lower class combined
2. Independents are dropped

Republicans are split on this question, which aligns with other surveys that report about 45% of Republicans believe the government should "do something about inequality" (Pew Research Center, 2014). Finally, table 1.3 reports that upper income individuals also favour redistribution, but this result is misleading because all but two upper class individuals identify as Democrat. Thus, as expected upper class Democrats also favor redistribution.

Table 1.2: Attitudes Toward Redistribution, Grouped by Party

	No	**Yes**
Democrat	23	197
Republican	11	11

Note:
1. Independents are dropped

Table 1.3: Attitudes Toward Redistribution, Grouped by Class

	No	**Yes**
Middle/lower	33	189
Upper	1	19

Note:
1. Independents are dropped

1.10   Trust Game Experiment Results

I begin by examining the relationship between party and interpersonal trust. As a reminder, trust is measured by the amount of rewards Player 1 allocates to Player 2. Partisan bias is measured

as the difference between how much an individual allocates to co-partisans than how much she allocates to out-partisans. Table 1.4 reports the raw means across each treatment, grouped by party identity. The columns represent each treatment group and the rows represent the Party ID of Player 1 (i.e. the student participant). My first hypothesis suggest that Democratic participants should endow more rewards to their own-party, relative to their out-party. In the party-only conditions (D and R), participants tend to allocate more units to their in-party, relative to their out-party. For example, Democrats allocate on average 3.86 units to Democrats and allocate on average 2.92 units to Republicans, reflecting a partisan bias of 0.94. Thus, I find evidence for my first hypothesis that in the absence of additional information, co-partisans trust each other more, relative to out-partisans. Although I cannot make a strong inference about Republicans given the sample size, it appears that Republicans hold a similar partisan bias: Republicans allocate, on average, more to members of their in-party relative to their out-party.

Table 1.4: Mean Trust Per Group (Party)

| Party	DL	DU	RL	RU	L	U	D	R
Democrat	5.27	2.79	4.19	2.02	5.08	2.20	3.86	2.92
Republican	3.45	2.77	3.55	2.91	3.77	2.55	3.05	3.36

Note:
1. D= Democratic, R=Republican, L=Lower Class, U = Upper Class;
2. Independents dropped

Next, I run a simple linear model and interact each stimuli with party identity. Figure 1 below calculates the predicted values of trust (dependent variable) by each treatment group. The X-axis is the identity of Player 2, and the Y-axis is the dependent variable, trust (0-10). Again, the results show that Democrats endow more units to lower-class Democrats (DL). Furthermore, Democrats are most discriminatory toward upper-class Republicans (RU), upper-class individuals (U), followed by Republicans (R) and upper-class Democrats (DU). The only statistically significant inter-party effect occurs when participants are told that they are playing against a lower-income Democrat (DL). These results are primarily, but not entirely, driven by social-class, because there are no inter party statistical differences in social class-only (L, and D), or party-only (D, R) conditions. To summarize, the Figure 3.1 reveals that:

1. Democrats tend to allocate more units to their in-group, relative to their out-group.

2. Democrats tend to punish those who are better off, even members of their own party.

3. As it follows from above, Democrats are willing to cross-party lines and endow units to lower-income Republicans.

4. There is virtually no difference in how much Democrats willing to allocate to an upper-class Republican (RU), relative to an upper-class (U) participant. Similarly, there is is virtually no difference in how much Democrats willing to allocate to a lower-class Democrat (DL), relative to an lower-class (L) participant.

5. Inter-party differences only appear when participants are told they are playing against a lower-class Democrat.

Second, I examine the relationship between social class identity and trust. The demographic survey specifically asked participants to report their estimated household earnings, lived poverty-experiences, and their self-identified of socio-economic class. As discussed previously, I choose to use the subjective instrument of social class as previous literature has found that behavior is more likely to be associated with one's perception of class, relative to others rather than their actual wealth (Haile, Sadrieh & Verbon, 2008). In particular, survey research indicates a large middle-class bias such that 62% of Americans identify as "upper-middle" or "middle" class, while only 2% of

Figure 1.1: Predicted Values of Trust by Party ID

Predicted Values of Trust By Party ID
(Weak and Strong Partisans)

1. Independents dropped from analysis 2. D= Democratic, R=Republican, L=Lower Class, U = Upper Class

Americans perceive themselves as upper class (Gallup 2017).[4] Thus, to examine individuals of similar identities, I group middle class and lower class together, and differentiate them from the upper-class.

Interestingly, Table 1.5 indicates a large social class discrimination effect. Lower and middle class individuals allocate 4.92 units to fellow lower income individuals and 2.33 units to upper-class individuals. Furthermore, the results suggest that upper-class individuals are altruistic, allocating more money to their out-group than their in-group. Thus, I find partial support for my second hypothesis – lower-income individuals trust their own in-group, but upper-class individuals are trusting of everyone. It should be noted, however, that many of the self-identified upper-class individuals are Democrats. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate between upper-class individuals and Democrats, as virtually all upper-class individuals are Democrats. Finally, it is also possible that the upper-class' ideological preferences toward redistribution drive altruism, even to Republicans.

[4]In order to check the relationship between income and class, I run a Spearman rank-order correlation and find that income and class are not independent of one another.

Notably, even if the trust games picked up altruism as opposed to 'affect', there is still evidence that partisanship and social class condition one's altruistic behavior. In the latter section of this paper, I also discuss how COVID-19 maybe have further heightened these altruistic behaviors. In short, given the economic effects of COVID-19, I believe that is likely that all participants were "pre-treated" by the pandemic, and conditioned to allocate more units to those in need (i.e., lower-class individuals). This possibility is especially likely, given the somewhat puzzling results from Table 6.

Table 1.5: Mean Trust Per Group (Social Class Identity)

Class	DL	DU	RL	RU	L	U	D	R
Middle/lower	5.07	2.86	4.15	2.18	4.92	2.33	3.73	2.94
Upper	5.74	3.43	4.96	2.52	5.48	2.52	4.52	3.70

Note:
1. D= Democratic, R=Republican, L=Lower Class, U = Upper Class;
2. Independents dropped from analysis

To look at this relationship virtually, I run a simple linear model to predict trust and interact each stimuli with social class identity. Figure 2 below calculates the predicted values of trust (dependent variable) by each treatment group. The X-axis is the stimuli (Player 2's identity), and the y-axis is the dependent variable, trust (0-10). Again, the confidence intervals for upper-class participants are large because there are fewer individuals who self-identify as "upper-class". Thus, there are no statistically significant inter-group differences, but there are interesting intra-group differences (e.g. how lower-class participants evaluated each stimuli). Figure 3.2 indicates a large trust gap between how lower/middle class participants (in blue) evaluated upper-class Democrats (DU) relative to lower-class Democrats (DL). A similar pattern emerges between how lower/middle class participants (in blue) evaluated upper-class individuals (U), relative to lower-class individuals (L). In fact, these differences are almost identical, which may suggest that at least in the context of the student sample, that social-class cues were more salient than partisan cues. To summarize, Figure 3.2 reveals:

   1. That there is some evidence of envy – defined as allocating fewer resources to those who

are better off than you. Lower/middle-class participants are significantly less charitable to the upper-class than they are to lower-class individuals.

2. Lower/middle-class participants allocated the least units to the upper-class (U) and upper-class Republicans (RU).

3. Lower/middle-class participants allocated more units to Democrats (D), relative to Republicans (R).

Figure 1.2: Predicted Values of Trust by Party ID

Predicted Values of Trust By Social Class

Middle and lower class combined 2. D= Democratic, R=Republican, L=Lower Class, U = Upper Class

Third, I examine the joint social-class and partisan cues on trust. Before assessing these results, I want to be clear: I do not find any statistical significance when I interact the social class and party identification together, but I do find intra-group differences. In part, this is because the sample sizes of the categories are far too small – particularly interactions that include Republicans and upper-class individuals, each of have fewer than 25 participants. Table 1.6 on the following page reports the raw means of each treatment, grouped by the class and party identity of participants. Again, Table 1.6 only provides descriptive differences across groups and does not show statistical differences. On the following page, I plot joint interactions and discuss my results.

Table 1.6 reveals that the largest trust gap occurs when participants are given a joint class and party cue. Indeed, when participants are told that they are playing against an upper-class Republican, it appears that Democrats punish upper-class Republicans more than they do upper-class

Democrats. In particular, there is a large gap between how much *lower/middle-class* Democrats allocate to lower-class Democrats, relative to upper-class Republicans. That is, lower-class Democrats give markedly more units to lower-class Democrats, than they do to upper-class Republicans.

Table 1.6: Mean Trust Per Group (Party and Social Class Identity)

| Party ID	Class	DL	DU	RL	RU	L	U	D	R
Dem	middle/lower	5.17	2.68	4.07	1.95	4.98	2.13	3.76	2.82
Dem	upper	6.50	4.06	5.61	2.83	6.17	2.94	5.06	4.00
Repub	middle/lower	3.65	3.05	3.85	3.15	4.05	2.80	3.25	3.60
Repub	upper	1.50	0.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00

Note:

1. D= Democratic, R=Republican, L=Lower Class, U = Upper Class;

2. Independents dropped

Figure 1.3 on the following page plots a simple linear model with a three way interaction term (party ID * social class * stimuli). Again, the first and most obvious point is that all inter-party results are not significant (the confidence intervals in most cases almost perfectly overlap). In particular, results under "upper-class Republican" are the least meaningful because this subset of the sample lacks the most statistical power (N=2). Nonetheless, the results reveal some suggestive *intra-party* differences. First, lower/middle-class Democratic participants (in blue, and on the left), were most willing to trust those in their own social class as well as their own political party, and least willing to trust those who diverged on both social-class and political party (upper-class Republicans). Moreover, these individuals allocated markedly more units to lower-class individuals (L), relative to upper-class individuals (U), co-partisans (D), and out-partisans (R).

Lower/middle class Democratic participants were willing to cross party-lines and endow units to lower-class Republicans –albeit they still gave lower-class Democrats relatively more units. One interpretation is that Democrats and Republicans differ in their attitudes toward the "rich". Following that rational, these differences align with previous survey research, which highlight that Democrats and Republicans diverge on their perceptions of income inequality, social mobility, and social class (Pew Research Center & Demographics, 2012). For instance, the 2012 PEW survey asked respondents whether or not they agreed that the Rich paid their fair share of federal taxes.

Figure 1.3: Predicted Values of Trust by Party ID and Social Class

Figure 3: Predicted Trust By Social Class and Party ID

1. The confidence intervals for the upper-class participants (on the right) do not appear because they are rather large and perfectly overlap each other.

Partisanship also conditioned views about federal taxes: 78% of Democrats believed that the Rich pay too little in taxes, while only 33% of Republicans agreed. What is more, the survey found that the vast majority of voters (67%) believed that the Democratic party serves the working-class and the middle-class, while 26% agreed that the Republican party favors the working-class and the middle-class. Given previous research on partisanship and attitudes toward the upper-class, it is perhaps unsurprising that the lower/middle-class Democrats penalize upper-class Republicans the most and are rather generous to any lower-class participant, regardless of party affiliation.

In this section, I provide a brief discussion of trust games and whether or not the games captured 'trust' or if they picked up on *altruism*. Experimental behavioural economics has examined whether or not altruism plays an important role in first-mover trust transfers, finding no evidence that altruism motivates trust transfers (Brülhart & Usunier, 2012). To examine this relationship, Brülhart & Usunier (2012) create rich and poor groups by allocating individuals uneven endowment fees. They reason that if trustors give more to the poor, relative to the rich, than this behavior is consistent with altruistic motivations. The authors find evidence consistent with a "dominant reciprocity motives" –in that, trustors do not give more to the poor and conclude that trust do indeed capture trust (Brülhart & Usunier, 2012). However, my results indicate that altruism may have played a role in trust-like transactions, because participants tended to give more units to the lower-class, relative to the upper-class. I am particularly suspicious of this because I find that Democrats reward very few units to their own party when given an upper-class cue. Indeed, the likely reason is that participants – of which are primarily Democrats – based their decision of how much to give Player 2 according to 'who needed it more'. To check for this possibility, I examined the post-treatment question which asked participants to indicate why they allocated units differently across groups. Some participants reported that they made their decisions simply based on who they "trusted to give more units (extra credit back)". In fact, one participant wrote "I do not trust the rich to give points back to me" and "if the rich wanted more extra-credit they could just hire a tutor". Similar narratives were painted about Republicans, with a large number of individuals calling Republicans as "suspicious", "suspect", "untrusting", or pointing out that

the Republican players should not receive more units because "the [Republican] party believes in punishing the working-class." Others, however, stated they made their decision simply based on who *needed* it more, especially in light of COVID-19. Interestingly, of those who stated that they gave to those who needed it more, many further indicated that they still gave less to low-income Republicans, relative to low-Democrats because Republicans don't "deserve it as much". Thus, while my results show a large social effect – one that by presumably trumps the party cue, it is entirely plausible that COVID-19 pre-treated everyone in the sample to be more generous (e.g. altruistic) to Player 2, regardless of their partisan affiliation. For this reason, I am cautious of some of these results.

Finally, I evaluate my third hypothesis and explore whether or not social class and party identification are additive or multiplicative terms. To do so, I subtract the two party conditions from each other (D-R), and I subtract the two social class conditions from each other (L-R) and sum the differences of each group, which results in 3.82 units. Next, I difference the lower-class Democrat (DL) stimuli from the upper-class Republican stimuli (RU), which results in 3.25. If the joint class and party identity produced multiplicative effects, then the sum of the partisan bias and the class bias should be less than joint party and class condition. As shown above, I do not find evidence for this effect as 3.82 > 3.25. In fact, I find that the difference between joint cues actually produces *less* of a partisan bias than the sum of the party and social class identity. That is, at least in this experiment, it does not appear that social class and party identification are reinforcing identities. If they were, we would expect the result to be multiplicative. This finding likely stems from the fact that partisans are willing to cross party line and allocate more 'units' to lower-class Republicans, than to upper-class Democrats. In a sense, these findings support the cross-cutting hypothesis, meaning that Democrats are willing to tolerate one another so long as the out-party is belongs to the lower/middle class identity. Again, since I believe that participants may have been pre-treated by the COVID-19 pandemic, I cannot confidently assert that these results can be extrapolated to other conditions. In order to further evaluate the decision-making process of the participants, I leverage unfolding analysis to examine if voters use a common

criterion to assess different treatments.

1.11   Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Unfolding Method

In this section, I use unfolding analysis to arrange each participant's ideal point and each stimuli on a common scale, such that "distance between the ideal points and the stimuli points reproduce the observed rank orderings" (Jacoby & Armstrong, 2014, 147). The fundamental question underlying unfolding analysis is to explain patterns in the data, specifically whether or not a common latent variable exists. Put differently, unfolding analysis examines if the preferences of individuals are consistent with a single, common evaluative scale *J*. If so, then it can be said that individuals are using a common criterion to evaluate different stimuli. It is also possible that individuals use multiple criterion to evaluate the stimuli (McIver & Carmines, 1981). In the context of this experiment, the unfolding analysis will indicate whether or not participants evaluate the stimuli based on party cues, social class cues, or both.

?? below indicates a clear income split with a stress-test of < 0.2. The results show a single dimension, whereby Democrats are aligned to the left (with the lower class), and Republicans are aligned to the right (with the upper class). This analysis provides support for the idea that social class and and partisan identities are aligned. It also indicates that individuals use social class as a common criterion, social class, to evaluate others, regardless of party. In other words, this analysis implies that social class differences govern how participants discriminate against others. I re-run the same analysis, but partition the data only for Democratic participants. The results are virtually identical, which in large part, is because the sample primarily consists of Democrats. Again, since there are very few Republicans in the sample, interpretations about Republicans should be made with caution. For this reason, I cannot state that Republicans evaluate others based on social economic class.

Figure 1.4: Estimated Configuration of Participants

1.12 Discussion

It is no secret that the United States is deeply divided. What divides the mass public? A burgeoning literature on *affective* polarization suggests that the mass public are partitioned along partisan lines. In the United States, partisans detest each other so much that one in five individuals believe that the opposing party "lack the traits to be considered fully human—they behave like animals" (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). Similarly, 40% of partisans agree that the opposing party is "not just worse for politics - they are downright evil" (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). At the same time, income inequality has increased, and with it, so too has social class conflict. Yet, very little research examines how these two different societal divisions generate group conflict. Important research by Mason & Davis (2015) and Ahler (2018) highlight that identification with a political party produces ingroup favoritism, and outgroup hostility in perceptions of others, and that overlapping social identities tend to amplify social conflict.

This project builds off of this literature and examines the relationship between social class

and partisan identities on interpersonal trust. Using an original trust game experiment, I found that trust discrimination varies on the demographic attributes. Specifically, I find that lower-income Democrats are the most punitive against upper-class Republicans – a result that aligns with recent evidence that social identities overlap with partisan animus, producing amplified conflict. However, contradictory to some recent evidence, I also that Democrats are willing to cross party lines and endow lower-income Republicans with rewards (extra-credit). These results were somewhat surprising – especially in their magnitude, given the all we know about partisan conflicts. A possible reason for this finding is that COVID-19 pre-treated all participants in the survey, making social class more salient than party identification. An alternative, but related narrative is that COVID-19 resembled a national, external threat and thus prompted individuals to 'put politics aside' and help each other out. Indeed, during times of national crisis – like war, politicians tend to rally around the flag and become temporarily more cooperative for the national good. Previous literature has likened economic crises to external threats, arguing that like war, economic downturns motive societal groups to become more cooperative (Weschle, 2019). Under this reasoning, it is possible that the current COVID-19 pandemic pre-treated participants in the survey, making them more charitable to out-partisans.

CHAPTER 2

Affective Polarization and Voter Turnout In Latin America

2.1 Introduction

Scholars and pundits alike lament that political vitriol among the mass public is dangerous (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022; Mason, 2016). News media about partisan hatred and affective polarization now span the across world, from Europe to Latin America (Carlin & Love, 2018*b*; Gidron, Adams & Horne, 2021; Wagner, 2021; Ward & Tavits, 2019; Hobolt, Leeper & Tilley, 2021). Like its Western counterparts, politics in Latin America is increasingly tribal and divisive, and politicians seem to inflame partisan anger during political campaigns (Renno, 2020). For example, Brazilian President Bolsonaro alleged that the former president was a "drunkard", while a popular former president was jailed for contentious charges of corruption. Although it is obvious that partisan bitterness divides the public, it is less obvious how partisan-based hostility influences aspects of democracy, like voter mobilization. Literature in social psychology posits a potential benefit of *anger*, arguing that emotional political campaigns elicit anger and motivate groups to mobilize, particularly among traditional non-participators (Valentino et al., 2011). This line of literature deviates from the resource model of political participation (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995) and proposes that affect may also drive voters to mobilize (Ward & Tavits, 2019; Wagner, 2021).

Today, a surge of recent literature among Western democracies likens party affiliation to a social identity that divides the mass public along party lines (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015*c*). These identities drive an emotional-based polarization called, *affective polarization*. Affective polarization is the tendency to dislike members of the out-party and favor one's own party (Hetherington 2018), and has been been linked to undermining democratic norms (Kingzette et al., 2021), increasing partisan gridlock, and political engagement (Ward & Tavits, 2019). Although much ink has been spilled over the causes of partisan hostilities (see Gidron, Adams & Horne (2021)) – especially among Western democracies, little attention has been paid to its *consequences*. In particular, there is little understanding of how partisan anger influences voter mobilization in developing countries where partisan attachments are relatively weak.

Latin America presents a unique opportunity to study affective polarization given the large

heterogeneity of partisanship across the region. While most literature on affective polarization in the West focuses on partisans – i.e. those that identify with a political party, I argue that doing so in Latin America masks the extent to which party-based hostility exists and underestimates its consequences. This is not to say that partisan divisions do not matter; rather, the current models of affective polarization cannot explain the level of political anger. Partisans are not the only members of the Latin American electorate with party-based identities. Anti-establishment orientations and negative partisanship among nonpartisans are on the rise throughout Latin America and have similar group-effects as partisanship (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Samuels & Zucco, 2018). Deep-seeded dislike for elites creates "us" vs. "them" divisions and unifies nonpartisans under a shared identity (Uscinski et al., 2021). Accounting for nonpartisan political identities provides a more complete picture of public anger toward political parties. For example, a significant portion of the Brazilian electorate opposes *petismo* (i.e. support for the Partido Dos Trabalhadores (PT Party)) and identifies as *"antipetismo"* (Fuks, Ribeiro & Borba, 2020). Antipetismo, opposition to the establishment PT party, coupled with rejection of other establishment parties (e.g. Partido Da Social Democracia Brasileria (PSDB) helps explain Jair Baolsonaro's 2018 electoral success (Fuks, Ribeiro & Borba, 2020). Building off the research on anti-partisanship, I argue that nonpartisans are politically charged voters with political identities (Samuels & Zucco, 2018) and that these identities influence political participation.

I use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to test whether affective polarization is correlated with self-reported turnout. First, I show that partisan-based hostilities are associated with increased voter turnout in Latin American countries. However, the relationship between affective polarization and self-reported turnout among partisans is weak. Second, I show that dropping nonpartisans from the study of affective polarization masks the extent to which problem exists as well its consequences. Not only do nonpartisans hold political identities, but they also differ from one another. I identify three classifications of nonpartisans and show that both anti-establishment and negative identities influence mobilization. Specifically, I find that affectively polarized nonpartisans are more likely to turnout to vote than their non-affectively

polarized counterparts. This finding echoes recent literature in American politics that argues affective responses are important instruments in political participation. Moreover, this study aligns with the growing literature emphasizing the importance anti-partisanship in political behavior both among Western democracies (Uscinski et al., 2021) as well as Latin America (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Samuels & Zucco, 2018; Haime & Cantú, 2022).

2.2   Patterns of Partisanship in Latin America

In Latin America, affective polarization must be understood through the lens of an unstable party system and low levels of partisanship. In the early 1980's the Latin American public identified with established parties and inherited partisan attachments from their parents, much like the public in Western democracies (Lupu, 2014). The 1990's, however, marked a shift – as parties faced economic crisis and adversity they began to dilute their brands by straying away from traditional party positions and entering coalitions with historic rivals (Lupu, 2014). Consequently the public's attachments to parties weakened and without strong partisan basis, it was common for voters to support a candidate outside of their party (Lupu, 2014, 563).

Today, support for many Latin American parties and the strength of partisanship remains weak (Cohen, 2017) with some exceptions (e.g. the PT in Brazil). These patterns are discouraging as partisanship is believed to institutionalize parties, consolidate democracies, create stability to the party system, and make voters more politically engaged (Lupu, 2015*a*; Converse, 1969; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Indeed, party attachments motivate voters to become more politically active and interested in the political process (Dalton, 2016). Like sports fans, citizens with strong party attachments turnout to vote to support their team (Dalton, 2016). Unsurprisingly, empirical evidence documents higher turnout among partisans, relative to nonpartisans (Lupu, 2015*b*). Given weak attachments among Latin American voters, partisan-based hostility should be low – after all, if a voter is not a party loyalist, then he/she should not discriminate across party lines. But, this view is incomplete – low rates of partisanship in Latin America should not be interpreted

as political disengagement as nonpartisans hold political identities that are tied to the party system.

2.2.1 Partisanship and Anti-Partisanship as Social Identities

Partisanship is a social identity that provides voters with a heuristic of who to dis(trust) (Huddy, Mason & Aarøe, 2015). The idea that political parties function as social groups is not a new phenomenon. Scholarship in American politics reminds us that party identification is an 'enduring attachment' or a 'psychological orientation' (Campbell et al., 1980). Green, Palmquist & Schickler (2002) argues, "a [party] exists as a stereotype in the minds of voters, who in turn harbor sense of attachment toward this group" (26). Understood this way, party-based identities are emotional attachments to a specific group, like a political party, and are not solely dependent on ideological differences (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018*b*). These identities activate stereotypes across party lines and motivate ordinary citizens to dislike members of the out-party (Ahler, 2018). These results comport with social psychology theories on stereotypes which reason that people ascribe certain images of others based on the group(s) that they belong to, and consequently, act on these beliefs (Tajfel et al., 1971). In a political context, these biases can extend to how citizens perceive the ideology extremity of out-parties. For example, Ward & Tavits (2019) show that affectively polarized partisans are more likely to perceive the out-party as ideologically extreme.

Partisans are not the only members of the electorate who have affective evaluations and biases based on a political identity (Samuels & Zucco, 2018). Current models of affective polarization do not consider the role of nonpartisans as affective polarization usually requires individuals to have an in-party preference. Most scholarship on affective polarization draws from Social Identity Theory (SIT), which assumes that in-group and out-group identification are inverses of one another (e.g. an individual who identifies with a right-wing party dislikes individuals that identity with left-wing parties). Early work on SIT posited that positive partisanship preceded negative partisanship (e.g. one cannot have a negative identity without first identifying with a group) (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). However, this perspective cannot explain the modern variation in

political attitudes and public attraction to anti-identities (Cyr & Meléndez, 2016). First, negative partisanship can form without an in-group reference (Abramowitz, 2010*b*; Haime & Cantú, 2022); and second, dislike for the establishment can motivate nonpartisans to identity with an emerging party (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). Thus, including nonpartisans helps reveal the extent to which party-based hostilities exist within a society, and importantly, how these identities influence voter behavior.

Before explaining the variation among nonpartisans, I emphasize that lack of party identification does not necessarily equate to hostility toward all parties. Individuals lack party attachments for a number of reasons, including ideological distance, political interest, or indifference between political parties (Webb, 1996, 368). It is possible for nonpartisans to systematically dislike all parties, (dis)like some parties more than others, or feel neutral toward all parties. Given the diversity in political attitudes among nonpartisans, recent scholarship categorizes nonpartisans into groups. For example, Samuels & Zucco (2018) break down the Brazilian nonpartisan electorate into two categories, "negative partisans" and "nonpartisans". Negative partisans are individuals who dislike a party, but do not identity with any given party, whereas nonpartisans have neither positive nor negative partisan attitudes Samuels & Zucco (2018). Likewise, Haime & Cantú (2022) use survey data from Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, and Mexico and show that negative nonpartisans differ from other nonpartisans because they are able to identify a party that they dislike. Like polarized partisans, negative partisans feel socially distant from out-parties. Among the Chilean electorate, Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) acknowledge the presence of negative identities and introduce a new type of political identity, namely the "anti-establishment". Unlike negative identities which are typically thought of as an aversion toward a single party, Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) argue that anti-establishment voters reject all mainstream parties and are susceptible to populist ideals (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). Following Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) and Samuels & Zucco (2018), I break down nonpartisans into three categories: anti-establishment nonpartisans, negative nonpartisans, and true nonpartisans.

Anti-establishment political orientations are distinct from positive and negative partisanship

(Uscinski et al., 2021). Positive partisanship refers to an individual who prefers a party but does not necessarily reject an out-party (e.g. someone who identifies with the Brazilian PT party who may or may not dislike other parties) (Samuels & Zucco, 2018). Negative partisanship is the aversion toward a party without requiring an in-group reference (e.g. an individual who dislikes the Brazil's PT party, without identifying with another party) (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). Anti-establishment identities, defined as the systematic rejection of mainstream parties, include aspects of both positive and negative evaluations. Anti-establishment political identities emerge in political contexts where the mass public is dissatisfied with mainstream parties. In these conditions, political entrepreneurs can activate anger among nonpartisans by appealing to anti-establishment and populist ideals (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). When individuals reject all mainstream parties, they are "ready to transform this rejection into a new political identity", the anti-establishment (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019, 521). Populist forces can lure anti-establishment individuals through "in-group" language that faults the political elite for societal issues, such as corruption and inequality. Framing hostile messages toward mainstream elites (e.g. the out-group) helps strengthen anti-establishment identities (Uscinski et al., 2021; Bos et al., 2020)[1]. Consequently, recipients of anti-establishment rhetoric may be more likely to identify with parties that attack the establishment. Indeed, several papers link anti-establishment identities to the growth of populism, arguing that populism emerges when anti-establishment identities among the public exist (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Bos et al., 2020). Thus, the extent to which an individual supports a party (a populist party) should not be independent of their evaluations toward out-parties (establishment parties). Similar to their partisan counterparts, anti-establishment identities can bias perceptions of the out-party and have the power to sow distrust in the political system (Uscinski et al., 2021). Recent elections in Brazil serve as a good example of the importance of anti-establishment identities. Indeed, Bolsonaro's electoral fortunes have been linked to surge of anti-establishment identities among nonpartisans voters (Fuks, Ribeiro & Borba, 2020).

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[1]see Allport, Clark & Pettigrew (1954) for how out-group denigration can strengthen group attachments.

Whereas anti-establishment nonpartisans reject all mainstream parties, negative identities or "negative partisanship" is the psychological predisposition to dislike a party but to not identify with any particular party (Samuels & Zucco, 2018; Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). Traditionally, negative partisanship is described as the anti-choice, whereby individuals do not need an in-party preference to be able to distinguish which party they prefer the least (Haime & Cantú, 2022). Although less studied, negative partisanship is consequential in understanding the surge of political polarization in Latin America. First, negative emotions tend to be more powerful than positive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001) as individuals do not have an in-party preference to counteract their negative emotions (Haime & Cantú, 2022). Second, negative nonpartisans comprise a significant proportion of the electorate in Latin America (Samuels & Zucco, 2018) and differ from the wider net of "nonpartisans" who do not feel close to any political party. For example, Haime & Cantú (2022) argue that negative nonpartisans differentiate themselves from other nonpartisans by "emphasizing the party they dislike the most" and consequently will view themselves as "socially distant" from the party they like the least. Evidence of negative partisanship in Latin America is growing. In Brazil, for example, Samuels & Zucco (2018) argue that nonpartisans hold negative identities and that 75% of nonpartisanship is driven by anti-petismosism (anti-Worker's Party).[2]

Finally, nonpartisans may also be true nonpartisans without any party-like identity. True nonpartisans hold neither positive nor negative evaluations of any party and are usually believed to be individuals who are not politically charged voters. Thus, these voters should not have affective evaluations of parties (Webb, 1996, 368).

2.3   Affective Polarization and Voter Turnout

Political participation is the basis for democracy and the channel through which citizens impact politics. Early works on political participation emphasised that resources like time, money,

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[2]More recent evidence, however, indicates that nonpartisans in Brazil not only reject the Worker's Party, but they also reject other mainstream parties as well (Fuks, Ribeiro & Borba, 2020).

and civic skills each influence an individual's propensity to engage in politics (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). Evidence for the resource-based approach in Latin America is abundant (De La O, 2013; Lupu, 2015*a*) – wealthier, more educated citizens are more likely to turnout to vote. Material incentives in the form of vote buying or conditional cash transfers also influence citizens to turnout to the polls (Stokes, 2005; De La O, 2013). While the resource-based approach helps explain a significant variation of political participation, it does not consider how *emotions* may also drive participation, particularly among individuals who are traditional non-participators (e.g. nonpartisans) (Valentino et al., 2011). In other words, what role does affective polarization have in political participation?

Existing research on affective polarization and voter turnout emphasizes that party-based identities alter the calculus of voting. According to Social Identity Theory, group membership should naturally divide the electorate into "us" vs. "them" and heighten the perceived differences among the groups. This categorization is driven by either in-group favoritism, or out-group denigration (Brewer & Feinstein, 1999). Group membership allows voters to "experience expressive benefits from voting", such that partisanship may "increase the payoff of mobilizing" (Rau, 2021, 7). Sense of belonging to a group thus drives partisans to 'do their part' for the collective group. One way partisans achieve this is through political participation. That is, party attachments may motivate citizens to act on behalf of the collective group and contribute to the group's success vis-a-vis voting (Rau, 2021). This line of reasoning implies that mobilization is driven by in-group favoritism and the desire to support group efforts.

Beyond positive in-group motivations, negative orientations of out-party(ies) may also influence voter turnout. Previous literature documents that affectively polarized partisans have biased perceptions of the ideological extremity of out-parties, and view the out-party as more extreme than they actually are (Ward & Tavits, 2019). These ideological biases lead citizens to view politics through "the lens of group conflict" which heightens the electoral stakes (Ward & Tavits, 2019). Partisan identities may also operate through fear and the belief that one's well-being is in danger. For example, Laebens & Öztürk (2021) argue that partisanship in the Turkish context biases voter's

perception of their well-being when the opposition is in government. Members of the pro-Kurdish HDP party fear that their economic well-being and political freedoms are threatened when the out-party is in government. In the United States, partisan anxiety about the out-group has been shown to increase affective polarization (Mclaughlin et al. 2021), and is positively associated with political participation (Valentino et al., 2011). For example, Valentino & Neuner (2017) show that Democrat anger toward Republican voter ID laws helped mobilize voters, counter-acting the effect of suppression driven by voter ID laws. Anti-establishment and negative identities among nonpartisans centers around rejection of parties. For example, anti-establishment orientations are associated with the belief that the establishment is corrupt and does not serve the well-being of the voters (Mudde, 2007). Negative nonpartisans, who have psychological predispositions to dislike a particular party, should be motivated to turnout since they believe that the party they dislike should not succeed in elections. In Europe, Mayer (2017) provides evidence that negative partisanship increases voter turnout. Using data from the CSES, Mayer (2017) shows that negative identities increase turnout by 9% and that these effects are highest among nonpartisan. Following this, I anticipate a positive relationship between affectively polarized nonpartisans and perceptions of who is in government matters. I also anticipate a positive relationship between affective polarization among negative nonpartisans and anti-establishment nonpartisans and self-reported voter turnout. In these settings, polarization, and in turn, voter mobilization, are driven by fear of the out-group as opposed to in-party favoritism.

Hypotheses:

1. *H1a: Affective polarization and perceptions of power are positively related among partisans.*

2. *H1b: Affective polarization and perceptions of power are positively related among all nonpartisans.*

3. *H2a: Affective polarization and self-reported turnout are positively related among partisans.*

4. *H2b: Affective polarization and self-reported turnout are positively related among all nonpartisans.*

5. *H2c: The effect of effective polarization and self-reported turnout should be strongest among negative nonpartisans because they negative nonpartisans do not have an positive in-group to counteract negative orientations.*

2.4   Research Design

2.4.1   Measurement

Negative partisanship among nonpartisans: I argue that nonpartisans hold political attachments that are similar to partisan-attachments, but that these attachments form independent of a preference for an in-group. Indeed, literature from social psychology posits that out-group animosity may be formed independently from in-group preferences such that an individual can feel more distant from a particularly party without feeling positive toward a party (Brewer 1998). In the political context then, voters can feel socially distant from a party without an in-party reference (Haime & Cantú, 2022).

There are several ways to measure negative non-partisanship. Both Samuels & Zucco (2018) and Haime & Cantú (2022) ask respondents if they dislike any particular party. Respondents who can list a part(ies) that they dislike are then categorized as negative partisans. The CSES does not ask the negative partisanship question, but does ask respondents to rate parties on a feeling thermometer from 0(cold)-10(warm). Borrowing from the American literature on negative partisanship, I measure negative nonpartisans as individuals who dislike an out-party more than they like any given party. To do so, I follow Abramowitz & Webster (2018) measurement of negative partisanship. Abramowitz & Webster (2018) measures negative non-partisanship by "first subtracting an individual's feeling thermometer rating of the opposing party from [10]; from this number, we then subtract that same individual's feeling-thermometer rating of their own party" Abramowitz & Webster (2018). This creates a measure between -10 and 10, such that values above 0 indicate that individuals dislike the opposing party more than they like their own

party.[3] This measurement can be extended to nonpartisans by subtracting the minimum value that a respondent gave to a party from 10, and from there, subtracting the same individual's feeling-thermometer of their most liked party. Like example above, this gives a measure of -10 to 10, where individuals with a score greater than 0 are considered negative nonpartisans. The measure is thus: *Negative nonpartisan = (10 - F.T. of Least-Liked Party) - F.T. of Most-Liked Party.*

Anti-establishment identities among nonpartisans: My theory suggests that some nonpartisans have anti-establishment orientations. Moreover, I argue that these nonpartisan's may have in-party preferences, and that these identities may be strengthened when individuals dislike other parties. In this scenario, the extent to which nonpartisans like a party may be based on how much they dislike a party. First, Abramowitz & Webster (2018)'s index of negative partisanship suggests that any respondent with a score of 0 or below can be classified as a positive partisan. Specifically, the authors denote "a score of zero on this measure indicates that the individual likes their own party more than they dislike the opposing party...a score on this variable that is above zero indicates that the individual dislikes their own party more than they like their own party. Because they dislike the opposing party more than they like their own party, we classify individuals who have a score above zero as negative partisans" (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018)[129]. While this measure is useful in identifying negative partisans from positive partisans, it does not consider the scenario in which a respondent rates every party similarly. In the context of nonpartisans, this is particularly problematic as I define true nonpartisans as nonpartisans who do not prefer any one party over another. Consider the following example. Using the Abramowitz & Webster (2018) measure, a respondent who gave every party a 10 would be counted as a positive partisan, (10-10) - 10 = 0. Similarly, a respondent who gave every party at 5 would be a positive partisan, (10-5) - 5 = 0. However, a respondent who gave every party a 0 would be counted as a negative partisan, 10-0 - 0 = 10. In all of these scenarios, a nonpartisan respondent does not (dis)like a party more than they like(dislike) a party. Therefore, I amend this measure by filtering out individuals who rate all parties equally.

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[3]Another way to conceptualize this measure is a negative nonpartisans is anyone who rates their least liked party as a 5 or less on the feeling thermometer (e.g. 10-5 - 5 = 0, the threshold for being a negative nonpartisans).

Next, my theory on anti-establishment identities among nonpartisans emphasizes that this identity is not independent of one's evaluations for other parties. To evaluate if one's dislike for a party relates the extent to which they like a party their most-liked party, I run a linear model and regress the maximum thermometer score on the minimum thermometer score that a nonpartisan gives any given party. A negative relationship indicates that the less a nonpartisan likes a party, the more positively they evaluate another party. Figure 2.1 indicates that a negative relationship exists, but only for "anti-establishment nonpartisans" providing initial evidence that for some nonpartisans their party preferences are not independent from affective evaluations toward other political parties. As expected, there is a null effect for negative nonpartisans whose negative party evaluations are independent from in-group preferences.

Figure 2.1: Min Thermometer Evaluations Correlation with Max Thermometer Score

Affective Polarization: To evaluate my expectation that affective polarization increases voter turnout in Latin American, I rely on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to measure affective polarization, ideology, and reported voter turnout. Although there is large consensus that affective polarization is present in Western democracies, there is little consensus on how to measure it. Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes (2012) discuss various measurement challenges

to survey methods, behavior experiments, and implicit measures. First, to measure affective polarization requires researchers to evaluate how individuals rate their own party versus out parties. The measure must capture the extent to which voters like, or dislike out-parties without "refer[ing] directly to ideological or socio-demographic aspects" (Wagner, 2021). To date, there is no uniform way to measure affective polarization, with some research relying on behavioral measures such as trust games, while others have used voter's attitudes to marrying someone of the out-party. However,the most common and standard method uses thermometer scores (Wagner, 2021; Gidron, Adams & Horne, 2021). Thermometer scores capture the extent to which citizens feel warm(cold) toward other voters. The main advantage of thermometer scores is their cross-national and time-series availability. National surveys such as the Comparative Study Election Survey (CSES) ask respondents to rate parties during each election year that the survey is administered. This cross-national data allows researchers to examine variations in affective polarization over both time and space. The key disadvantage to these measures is that the measure may suffer from differential item functioning, meaning how one voter perceives the scale may fundamentally differ than how another perceives the scale. Recently, scholars have leveraged behavioral measure – such as trust games – to examine how partisan attachments influence inter-party discrimination. While these behavioral measures are useful, they are limited in their use given the lack of cross-sectional time-series availability. Given these limitations, I follow both Wagner (2021) and Gidron, Adams & Horne (2021) and use thermometer scores to evaluate affective polarization.

In a simple two party system, affective polarization can simply be measured as the difference between one's in-party and out-party party evaluation. In a multi-party system, like Latin America, affective polarization is typically measured as the weighted spread of like-dislike scores (Wagner, 2021). Following Wagner (2021), I measure affective polarization as the weighted spread of like-dislike scores by averaging the "absolute party like-dislike difference relative to each respondent's average party like-dislike score" (4). More formally the formula is: $\sqrt{\sum_p^{p=1} v_p(like_{ip} - li\bar{k}e_i)^2}$, where $li\bar{k}e_i = \sqrt{\sum_p^{p=1}(v_p * like_{ip})}$. A key advantage of this measure is that it allows me to calculate the like-dislike score of any respondent who answered the party evaluation questions

(thermometer), which enables me to assess differences across the electorate by party identification (e.g. partisans vs. nonpartisans). Since this is a variance measure, it can be interpreted such that large scores imply a larger degree of affective polarization for the respondent.2.3a demonstrates the degree of affective polarization at the country-level for each country-election in my sample.

Table 3.1 below demonstrates an example of how the score is calculated. In this example, Voter 1 is the most polarized voter as she heavily favors one party, and dislikes all others. It is important to note that if a respondent systematically dislikes every party or likes every party, then they are by definition not affectively polarized since the variance is zero. This is an important point as it is possible that a respondent may simply reject every party and have hostility toward all parties but will be have a variance score of 0. Therefore this measure does not capture party-system dislike. In order for nonpartisans to be 'affectively' polarized, they must give a value greater than 1 to at least one party. This rationale is evident in the data. Only 4% of nonpartisans had a maximum thermometer score of "0" – that is, only 4% of all nonpartisans systemically reject every single party. Moreover, among nonpartisans, 88% of respondents assigned a 5 or higher on the thermometer scale to at least one party[4]. Finally, figure 2.3a indicates that degree of affective polarization in Latin America is relatively low (higher scores indicate greater affective polarization). One reason this may is because voters tend to have low evaluations of most parties – a general trend in the region.

Self-Reported Turnout: To measure voter turnout I follow (Wagner, 2021) and use self-reported turnout on the CSES. The CSES asks respondents to self-report whether or not they turned out to elections. A potential problem is that respondents may over-report turnout due to social desirability bias. For example, I drop Uruguay from the analysis as the self-reported turnout was 100%. Figure 3.2 illustrates the self-reported turnout across my data. This variable is coded a 1 if respondents turned out, and 0 if respondents did not turnout.

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[4]One interesting question might be who nonpartisans evaluate positively (e.g. giving higher thermometer values). For example, in the 2009 Chilean election 359 out of 486 nonpartisan voters who evaluated the majority party UDI gave the party a score of 5 or below and 160 of 486 gave UDI a score of 0 or 1. Similarly, 72% of nonpartisan voters evaluated the PPD, an establishment party in Chile, a score of 5 or below. Future research should examine the profile of nonpartisans to better understand the vote choice and whether or not nonpartisans are supporting emerging populist parties.

Table 2.1: Weighted Affective Polarization Score

Party	Voter 1 Most Polarized	Voter 2	Voter 3	Voter 4	Voter 5 Least Polarized
A 40% Vote Share	10	5	5	5	10
B 30% Vote Share	0	0	5	5	10
C 20% Vote Share	0	0	0	0	10
D 10% Vote Share	0	0	0	5	10

Perceptions of Power: Affective polarization may operate through perceptions of power, such as who is in government matters. To evaluate if those who are more affectively polarized are more likely to believe that who is in power matters, I use the following question from the CSES: "Some people say that it doesn't make any difference who is in power. Others say that it makes a big difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it doesn't make any difference who is in power and FIVE means that it makes a big difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?". I recode "don't knows" and "refused to answer" as missing data. I expect that citizens who are more affectively polarized to be positively correlated with perceptions of power.

2.4.2 Specifying a Model of Turnout

Now that I have specified my independent and dependent variables of interest, I turn to the specification of my main empirical model. I evaluate the correlation between voter turnout and affective polarization. I specify 5 logistic models with country fixed effects and divide the sample by partisanship: the full sample, partisan sample, full nonpartisan sample, anti-establishment nonpartisan sample, and negative nonpartisan sample. To differentiate between partisans and

nonpartisans, I use three party identification questions from CSES. First, the CSES asks whether or not a respondent identifies with a political party. If a respondent says yes, they are then prompted with with a question to identify their party allegiance. If respondents answer no, they are prompted with a follow-up question that asks whether or not they feel *closer* to one party. If respondents answer yes, they are given the party identification prompt and asked to identify which party they are closer to. These individuals are typically referred to as 'leaners' and are believed to have similar preferences as partisans (Campbell et al., 1980). I recode all respondents who answered yes to the first (do you identify with a party) and second question (are you closer to a party) as partisans. I then recode respondents who answered no to the first two questions as nonpartisans.[5] As described in the measurement section, I then categorize nonpartisans into three classifications, negative, anti-establishment, and true nonpartisans.

The turnout literature in Latin America identifies several important individual factors that impact voter turnout. Citizens endowed with time, money and civic skills are more inclined to participate – be it to vote in elections, contact a political representative or attend a political event (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, 1995). The basic idea is that as one's resources increase, so too, should participation. Therefore, I control for income and education, both of which should be positively correlated with turnout. Another important individual-level variable is age. Older citizens should be more likely to vote than their younger counterparts as age is often considered a proxy for political interest (Carreras & Castañeda-Angarita, 2014). Political knowledge is also linked with political participation. Voters tend to abstain in elections when they are uninformed of the issues. Informed citizens more likely to understand what is at stake during an election and feel more confident in their electoral choices, and are thus more likely to participate (Carreras & Castañeda-Angarita, 2014). Since political knowledge is not asked in every election survey, I do not include it in my main results.

Finally, those who are too ideologically distant from parties are less likely to turnout to vote

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[5]Recent literature argues that the degree of partisanship estimated in election surveys may be biased (Baker & Renno, 2019). To address this possibility, I take the mean thermometer score of 'leaners' and use that as a threshold to recode any nonpartisans that meet that threshold into 'secret partisans'. I then estimate the marginal effects of affective polarization on self-reported turnout.

(Katz, 2007). Even in systems with compulsory voting – like Brazil, alienation increases as the distance to the closest candidate increases (Katz, 2007). I account for the voter's ideological proximity and examine if the voter turnout is a consequence of ideological alienation. To do so, I rely on Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey (BAM) as raw estimates may bias the extent to which voters perceive parties to be ideologically distant. Survey data typically measure ideology by asking respondents to place themselves and the other political stimuli on an ideological scale. A common problem that arises from measuring ideology using these so-called raw estimates is differential-item functioning. For example, a liberal member of the Chilean Party for Democracy (PPD) may place themselves as more moderate than a conservative respondent member of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). Under this example, survey respondents distort the ideological scale, leaving the effect that the system is more ideologically polarized than it may actually be (Hare et al., 2015). While the A-M technique is more common in the American context, recent evidence from Latin America indicates that the use of raw ideological estimates exaggerates the representation gap between parties and constituents (Saiegh, 2015). Using joint-scaling techniques, Saiegh (2015) shows CSES and LAPOP survey suffer from differential item functioning (DIF) and consequently, have biased ideological estimates of parties and voters. Given the deficiencies in raw estimates, I use the Baysian Aldrich Mckelvey method to correct for differential item functioning and recover the 'true' positions of the stimuli (parties).

I follow Hare et al. (2015) and use Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling techniques to recover the ideological estimates of the voters and parties, placing them on a common ideological scale. Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey (BAM) Scaling offers several advantages. First, the traditional Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling does not allow for missingness, which is rather problematic in public opinion surveys where there are high none-response rates across the stimuli (parties). Second "uncertainty bounds for the stimuli positions are not directly estimated but can be approximated via boot-strapping" (Hare et al., 2015). Finally, it is possible that when respondents revert the scale when they answer the different stimuli. This means that a voter will incorrectly place the right party as the left most party and so forth. Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey (BAM) overcomes these all three of

drawbacks and allows researchers to recover the ideological estimate of respondents. Using these estimates, the measurement of alienation is straight forward: It is the absolute difference between a voter's ideological estimate difference from the mean of the closest party. The formal equation is as follows: $|self_i - min(party_i)|$. In other words, if a respondent's ideological estimate is 2, and mean of Party A is 5 and the mean of Party B is 1, then alienation would be measured as |1-2| = 1. Following (Katz, 2007), I expect that as voters are more alienated, they will be less likely to turnout to vote.

2.5   Results

2.5.1   Perceptions of Power and Affection Polarization

I now turn to evaluating my theoretical expectations. My first hypothesis posits that those who are affectively polarized are more likely to believe that the stakes of the election are higher. Figure 3.2 presents evidence in support for my perception of power hypothesis and documents a positive relationship between perceptions of power and affective polarization score. Next, recall that affective polarization is measured as the spread of like-dislike scores, meaning that the higher scores translate to more polarization. Therefore a positive correlation between affective polarization and perceptions of power indicate that citizens who are more affectively polarized are more likely to believe that who is government matters. The figure plots the relationship between affective polarization and perceptions of power, controlling income, age, ideological proximity, and education. Specifically, I recognize that ideological proximity may determine citizen perceptions of the stakes of election (e.g. those who are ideologically distant from any particular party may believe that the election does not matter or may believe that who is in government does not matter). Therefore, in the supplementary material I run separate analysis regressing ideological proximity on perception of power and show that ideological proximity does not predict perception of power. Finally, it should be noted that these results are limited in that they cannot differentiate the distinct emotion (e.g. anger vs. fear) that drives heightened perceptions of power among

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citizens. Despite this limitation, the Figure 3.2 provides evidence that citizens who are affectively polarized perceive heightened stakes of the election.

Figure 2.2: Perception of Power and Affective Polarization

2.5.2   Voter Turnout and Affection Polarization

Before presenting the results, I provide some descriptive statistics on my independent and dependent variables. Figure 2.3b shows the rate of voter turnout across each country-election. As is indicated in figure 2.3b the self-reported turnout rate for each country-election in the sample is rather high but normal for Latin American context due to the prominence of compulsory voting in the region. Additionally, this means that any effect that affective polarization may have on self-reported turnout should be conservative given that voting is compulsory. [6]

(a) Affective Polarization by Country.   (b) Turnout by Country.

Figure 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Affective Polarization and Self-Reported Turnout

Figure 2.3a shows the degree of affective polarization across each election-survey in Latin America, as measured by the spread of like-dislike scores. The plot indicates that in every instance, affective polarization is highest among partisans than nonpartisans, albeit the differences are minimal in most cases. As explained above, the affective polarization measure can be understand such that higher values imply that a respondent is more affectively polarized.

Turning to my main results, I examine the effect of affective polarization on voter turnout among partisans and nonpartisans. Recall from Figure 3.2 that affectively polarized citizens have amplified perceptions of the electoral stakes. As outlined above, I expect that individuals who are affectively polarized are more likely to turnout to vote because they may have heightened electoral perceptions. As Laebens & Öztürk (2021) argue, one of the reasons why affectively

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[6]I exclude Uruguay from the sample as the self-reported turnout is 100%.

polarized citizens may believe that the stakes of an election are high is because they fear for their own well-being if the opposition government is in power. Along these lines, it may also be possible that affectively polarized citizens distort the ideological extremity of out-parties and thus may have heightened electoral stakes Ward & Tavits (2019). In turn then, affectively polarized citizens should be more likely to turnout to vote.

Figure 2.4: Marginal Effects of AP on Turnout

Average Marginal Effect of Turnout For First Round Vote

The results of voter turnout model indicate a clear, positive relationship between voter turnout and affective polarization. Interestingly, Figure 3.5 indicates an important difference between partisans and nonpartisans, as well as negative nonpartisans and anti-establishment nonpartisans. First, the pooled sample of all non-partisan citizens indicates that positive relationship between affective polarization and turnout. Specifically, a one standard deviation change in affective polarization score increases voter turnout by roughly 5% for nonpartisan citizens in Latin America. These results support my contention that partisan hostility is correlated with voter turnout. Next, theories on negative emotions and negativity biases argue that negative emotions may be power powerful than their positive counterparts Haime & Cantú (2022); Baumeister et al. (2001). Figure 3.4 suggests that negative identities have larger marginal effects on turnout than anti-establishment nonpartisans who have an in-party preference. Substantively, this means

that individuals who dislike a party more than they like any particular party play an important role in voter turnout. Finally, among the partisan electorate I find weak evidence (significant at .1) that affective polarization correlates with self-reported voter turnout. Indeed, affective polarization is a stronger predictor of voter turnout among nonpartisans than factors aligned with the resource model of political participation. The results from Figure 3.5 comport with American political psychology literature that argues that emotions like anger mobilize citizens, particularly traditional non-participators (Valentino et al., 2011). Moreover, these results align with recent literature in Latin America emphasizing political identities among nonpartisans (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Haime & Cantú, 2022; Samuels & Zucco, 2018; Fuks, Ribeiro & Borba, 2020) have similar group-like effects as partisan attachments. Lastly, while previous literature documents the importance of ideological proximity in voter participation, I find no evidence that ideological proximity influences turnout decisions. Indeed, Figure 3.5 provides clear evidence that that ideological proximity is not correlated with voter turnout across all of the models.

2.6 Discussion

This study set out to examine the relationship between affective polarization and voter turnout. Going beyond the resource model of political participation (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995), I argue that emotions – a key component of affective polarization, influence political participation. Literature in Latin America emphasizes how material incentives in the form vote buying mobilize voters that traditionally do not turnout (Stokes, 2005). The results from this paper indicate that dislike for out-parties can illicit *emotions* such as anger, fear, and anxiety that prompt citizens to turnout to vote. Moreover, while previous studies link affective polarization to voter turnout, they do take into consideration the role of nonpartisans nor do they examine if affectively polarized respondents have heightened perceptions of power. I argue that nonpartisans are not the only members of the electorate with political orientations. I categorize nonpartisans into three categories - negative, anti-establishment, and true nonpartisans - and show that affectively

polarized negative and anti-establishment nonpartisans are more likely to vote than their non-affectively polarized counterparts. I want to emphasize that mobilization driven by negative attitudes is not necessarily a *good* outcome. On the one hand, negative attitudes toward out-parties may increase political participation which can be interpreted as a positive outcome for democracy. While this may be so, I want to caution readers that turnout due to anger may lead to adverse outcomes such as election of radical populist parties whose platforms may be anti-democratic.

Finally, although this research improves our understanding of affective polarization, it is still limited in its scope. Future research should examine how affective polarization influences voter turnout using panel data. Panel data measuring both affective polarization and turnout behavior across elections would better assess the relationship between affective polarization and turnout. Second, this study should be supplemented with an analysis of the characteristics of nonpartisans and why people develop negative and anti-establishment orientations. Moreover, while this study documents a relationship between turnout and political participation it does not examine vote choice. That is, when affectively polarized nonpartisans turnout to vote, are they actually voting for non-establishment parties? Alternatively, if nonpartisans are not represented by parties, why would they still turnout to vote? One possibility is that nonpartisans do turnout, as evidenced in this paper, but when they do, they turn in blank ballots. An important question then is, can blank voting in Brazil be explained by affective polarized nonpartisans who are dissatisfied with the party system? Related to this, if affective polarization paves way to anti-establishment parties, future research should discern whether or not these are left or right wing radical parties. These questions are fundamental in understanding how anger impacts the election of politicians and consequently policies that like income redistribution.

CHAPTER 3

Partisan Conflict in the Nonprofit Sector: A Conjoint

Experiment

3.1 Introduction

Partisan conflict in American politics is ubiquitous. Since the 1980's Democrats and Republicans increasingly harbour intense negative views for the outparty (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). Recent evidence demonstrates that partisan antipathy *spills-over* into nonpolitical contexts such as roommate and college application selection (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018*b*; Shafranek, 2021) as well as economic decisions (Engelhardt & Utych, 2018; Gift & Gift, 2015). This spillover effect is understood as a consequence of *affective polarization* – defined as the tendency for partisans to dislike members of the out-party and favor members of their own party (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Wagner, 2021; Gidron, Adams & Horne, 2021). Scholars worry about affective polarization as it has been shown to reduce pro-social behavior (Baxter-King et al., 2022), encourage discrimination toward out-partisans, and even motivate political violence (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022). Although it is clear that partisan prejudice permeates society beyond politics (Shafranek, 2021; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Engelhardt & Utych, 2018), the limits of partisan prejudice remain under-studied.

The nonprofit sector in the United States provides a good opportunity to test the limits of partisanship. Nonprofit organizations are important institutions that are essential in funding social and scientific programs (Linos, Jakli & Carlson, 2021). The vast majority of nonprofit organizations rely on private contributions for revenue. Private donors learn about organizations through social and public channels and evaluate who and how much to donate (Bose, 2015). Donors may privilege organizations based on a number of attributes including ideological proximity (Rose-Ackerman, 1982), financial statements of the organization, as well as the relevant importance of the charities' work (Bose, 2015). Although Democrat and Republican donors may favor liberal and conservative organizations, respectively, there is no reason to believe that partisan donors should discriminate against non-ideological nonprofit organizations. However, if donors use partisanship as a heuristic to make judgements, then it is possible that partisan prejudice may spillover into altruistic domains. This paper examines if partisan prejudice biases judgements about nonprofit organizations

– especially those that are ostensibly non-ideological. Thus, two important questions arise. First, do partisan cues influence nonpolitical decision-making even in purely altruistic domains such as charities? Second, when partisans are cross-pressured between partisanship, ideology, and morality, will partisan cues prompt them to support organizations they otherwise may not?

This paper extends the literature on affective polarization in two ways. First, I test the limits of partisanship discrimination on an explicitly apolitical and altruistic domain: charities. Second, I test to see if morality and ideological cues attenuate the effects of partisan discrimination. To do so, I use a choice-based conjoint experiment that allows me to assess the effects of partisanship, morality frames, ideology, as well as the interaction among these attributes. Overall, the results demonstrate that partisanship not only influences our social and economic decision-making, but also how individuals assess charities — even those that are strictly apolitical, like the Lymphoma and Leukemia society. In line with the identity literature, I find that the effects of partisanship are stronger than both morality and ideological cues. Moreover, I show that neither morality nor ideological lean of an organization attenuates partisanship discrimination. This study underscores that partisanship shapes decision-making beyond not only politics and our social lives, but also in purely nonpolitical domains like charity selection.

3.2   The Consequences of Partisan Discrimination

Partisanship is an individual's attachment to a political party that develops over the course of one's life (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002; Campbell et al., 1980) and is a "pervasive influence on perception of political events" (Bartels, 2002, 120). Recent evidence suggests that partisanship functions like a social identity. Understood this way, partisanship embodies more than just political preferences, it reflects one's self-concept (West & Iyengar, 2020) and creates "us" vs "them" divisions. Advocates of this perspective view partisanship through the lens of group conflict and argue that partisanship influences political decision-making, such as vote-choice, and biases perceptions of out-parties as well as their supporters (Wagner, 2021; Ward & Tavits,

2019). Importantly, these partisan biases often exceed other salient cleavages such as race (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015*b*; West & Iyengar, 2020), social class (Carlin & Love, 2018*b*), and even less-politically oriented identities such as sport-team membership (Engelhardt & Utych, 2018).

3.2.1 Partisan Discrimination in Nonpolitical Setting

Partisan conflict also spills over into nonpolitical domains (Shafranek, 2020; Rudolph & Hetherington, 2021) whereby partisanship not only serves as heuristic for political decisions, but also social and economic decisions (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015*c*). Evidence for partisan prejudice is abundant across a wide range of domains from romantic relationships (Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Nicholson et al., 2016), to consumer behavior (Michelitch, 2015*b*; Lyons & Utych, 2022). Indeed, Iyengar & Westwood (2015*c*) contend that partisanship "influence[s] decisions outside of politics" precisely because partisanship is both a political and social identity. Although partisanship may not be as visible as other identities such as race, gender, and even social class, it is increasingly more discernible. For example, individuals may willingly reveal their partisan identities by displaying political signs (e.g. on lawns), bumper stickers on cars, and posting their positions social media. Like other social identities, partisan attachments serve as heuristics for how to treat members of the out-group.

As such, a growing body of literature tests the degree of partisan discrimination by controlling for competing cleavages such as social class (Carlin & Love, 2018*b*; West & Iyengar, 2020) and race (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015*c*). For example, Iyengar & Westwood (2015*c*) create pairs of college applicants where candidates are either equally qualified or where one is more/less qualified than the other. Respondents were asked to select a candidate based on their resume and were cued with either a partisan or racial affiliation (vis-a-vis club membership on campus). In the partisan task, candidate quality (e.g. test scores) had no impact on candidate selection while partisanship significantly dictated an individual's willingness to select a candidate. Michelitch (2015*b*) conducts a field experiment during Ghana's 2008 elections and documents price discrimination along partisan lines. During heightened political competition, taxi-cab drivers will demand higher fare prices

from non-copartisans and will provide discounts to copartisans. Consistent with this evidence, Shafranek (2021) reports that in a choice-based conjoint experiment partisans prefer to live with co-partisans as roommates. In all of these examples, scholars evaluate the limits of partisanship by comparing partisan identities to other social identities. For example, Iyengar & Westwood (2015c) use both a partisan cue and a racial cue and conclude that partisanship is more powerful than racial cues. Similarly, Michelitch (2015a) prompts drivers with both ethnic and partisan cues to assess price discrimination. Carlin & Love (2018b) examine democracies in Western Europe, United States, and Latin America and show that partisan cues prompt deeper discriminatory behavior in trust games than salient cleavages within each society. These comparisons are sensible given the evolution of partisanship as a social identity (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012) that may intersect, and cross-cut with other social identities (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). Although it is true that individuals are cross-pressured by multiple social identities – like race, gender, and class, it is also true that they may be cross-pressured by other psychological and ideological appeals.

3.2.2 Morality and Ideological Considerations in Nonprofits

Individuals may use moral considerations to make political and social decisions. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) argues that moral intuitions are linked to five psychological systems that influence decision-making, (Hatemi, Crabtree & Smith, 2019, 789). The five moral intuitions are fairness, loyalty, care, sanctity, and authority (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Fairness relates to equality and notions of justice. Loyalty (or ingroup) privileges ingroup dynamics and invokes individuals to think in terms our "our group". Care (sometimes referred to as harm) relates to the prevention of pain and suffering as well as empathy toward others. Sanctity (sometimes referred to as purity) focuses on the protection of cultural sacredness. Finally, authority relates to respect of high-ranking individuals (e.g. elders).

Nonprofit organizations often invoke morality rhetoric to advocate for a given cause or policy position (Hoover et al., 2018). Rhetoric grounded in morality has been shown to influence attitudes across a wide range of issues such as abortion (Koleva et al., 2012) and the environment (Feinberg

& Willer, 2019, 2013). This is because a key tenant in MFT is that each moral foundation "produces fast, automatic gut-like reactions of like and dislike when certain kinds of patterns are perceived in the social world, which in turn guide moral judgments of right and wrong" (Koleva et al., 2012, 185). Like partisanship, individuals may use moral frames as an informational short-cut to make fast decisions (Haidt, 2001). The efficacy of morality appeals often depends on both the strength of the appeal (Feinberg & Willer, 2019) as well as the alignment of the recipients values to the cause (Boote, 1981; Hirsh, Kang & Bodenhausen, 2012). Survey research shows these five foundations operate differently for liberals and conservatives; whereas liberals are more grounded by care and fairness concerns, conservatives have been found to rate loyalty, authority and purity as more important (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007). For this reason, politicians and organizations often tailor their messaging along an ideological dimensions to elicit a desired behavior, such as campaign or charity donations (Feinberg & Willer, 2019).

Indeed, efficacy of moral foundations on charity donations is contingent on both the morality appeal as well as group dynamics. For example, Nilsson, Erlandsson & Västfjäll (2016) categorize moral intuitions into two groups: individualizing (fairness and care) and binding (loyalty, sanctity, and authority) and examine the relationship between moral frames and willingness to donate to a EU-migrants (out-group members) and medical cancer charities (ingroup members). Both individualizing and binding intuitions produced a positive relationship between actual donation behavior to ingroup causes (medical cancer research), but the magnitude of the effect was larger for binding intuitions. As expected, binding intuitions predicted a negative relationship to out-group causes (EU migration) and overall decreased willingness to donate relative to ingroup causes. Thus, the extent to which a moral appeal influences pro-social behavior may also depend on the ideological distance of the organization.

Individuals may also use ideological considerations in deciding how to allocate money (Bose, 2015; Barber, 2016). Spatial model theorists have long argued that voters select political candidates based on ideological proximity (Downs, 1957). Numerous studies provide empirical support for linkages between citizen ideology and political behavior (Malhotra & Jessee, 2014; Bonica, 2014).

For example, Malhotra & Jessee (2014) show that the ideological distance between an individual and the Court is negatively related to the trust in the Court. Both Bose (2015) and Rose-Ackerman (1982) show that donors prefer to donate to nonprofit organizations that ideologically align with their own views. Under this perspective, the ideological lean of an organization should play a substantial role in how individuals decide both political and nonpolitical donations. In the context of nonprofits, when a donor is presented with a set of binary outcomes (e.g. which charity to donate to), she should privilege the organization that is more ideologically proximate.

3.3 Hypotheses

As discussed above, the purpose of this study is to assess the limits of partisanship in a nonpolitical domain, specifically the nonprofit sector. I aim to understand the importance of partisanship relative to other factors, such as morality appeals and the ideological lean of an organization. Previous literature likens partisanship to a social identity and suggests that partisanship influences judgements in both political and nonpolitical spheres (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Huddy, Mason & Aarøe, 2015; West & Iyengar, 2020; Shafranek, 2020; Engelhardt & Utych, 2018). While the exact mechanism is still under-theorized (e.g. do people simply favor their own-party, and thus select organizations that their ingroup supports? Do individuals use partisanship as a short-cut for who to trust and distrust?), the key idea is that partisanship is thought to be an important consideration in decision-making. Thus, I expect the following:

H1: *All else equal, partisan affiliation will significantly influence charity profile preferences such that individuals will be more likely to select charities whose partisan base aligns with their own party-identity.*

Second, donors may rely on other pieces of information when deciding which organization to fund. Previous literature demonstrates that donors are more likely to donate to an organization that aligns with their ideology (Bose, 2015). Given the partisan-ideological sorting in the United States (e.g. that Democrats and Republicans have sorted into liberal and conservative camps,

respectively) (Levendusky, 2009), we should expect Democrats to support more liberal-leaning organizations and Republicans to support more conservative leaning organizations. There, I expect the following:

H2: *All else equal, the ideological lean of the organization (given by the name of the charity) will significantly influence charity profile selection such that individuals will be more likely to select charities whose ideology aligns with their own party.*

Third, donors may also be motivated by morality appeals. Previous literature convincingly shows that moral intuitions help influence decision-making (Haidt, 2001; Bobocel et al., 1998; Day et al., 2014). A central claim of Moral Foundation Theory is that an appeal from each of the core foundations should prompt "fast, automatic gut-like reactions of like and dislike when certain kinds of patterns are perceived in the social world, which in turn guide moral judgments of right and wrong" (Koleva et al., 2012, 182). Like partisanship, individuals use these moral intuitions to make quick judgments about people, groups, and policies (Haidt, 2001). However, the persuasion effect of each foundation varies between liberals and conservatives. While liberals gravitate toward fairness and harm moral foundations, conservatives tend to rely on purity, authority and ingroup foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Given these dynamics, I expect the following:

H3: *All else equal, the morality appeal of the organization (given by the mission statement of a charity) will significantly influence charity profile selection such that individuals will be more likely to select charities whose morality aligns with their own party.*

Fourth, social psychology literature suggests that cross-cutting cleavages may attenuate discriminatory effects of social identities (Brewer & Yuki, 2007). Moreover, it is plausible that Americans rely on several heuristics to make informed decisions. For example, Americans may view that an organization is largely funded by a member out-party, but that the mission statement of the organization and/or the ideology of the organization aligns with their views. Thus, I expect the following:

H4a: *All else equal, the interaction between the partisan cue and the morality appeal of the*

organization (given by the mission statement of a charity) will significantly influence charity profile selection.

H4b: *All else equal, the interaction between the partisan cue and the ideology of the organization (given by the name of a charity) will significantly influence charity profile selection.*

3.4 Experimental Design and Measurement

The goal of this study is to examine the political and policy-oriented factors that influence altruistic decisions (charity selection). Conjoint analysis is an ideal way to measure assess causality and preference description, which allows for the both the *absolute* and *relative* preference for a feature (Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley, 2020). Decision-making processes are multi-dimensional (e.g. a respondent may prefer a charity due to reputation, age, or partisan-base). Conjoint analysis allows researchers to isolate the attributes that influence respondent preferences in a multi-dimensional space. In this context, it allows respondents to select a charity based on their preferred set of attributes. The Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) is the main estimand of interest and provides the "degree to which a given value of a feature increases, or decreases, respondents' favorability toward a packaged conjoint profile relative to a baseline" (Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley, 2020, 208).

3.4.1 Conjoint Design and Survey Sample

I employ a choice-based conjoint experiment in the United States from August 26th 2022 - September 28th 2022. Following Hainmueller & Hopkins (2015), I use a choice-based conjoint analysis because it negates attitudes about charity donations and instead forces respondents to make a selection on a profile (charity) based on the given attributes. In doing so, this allows for researchers to analyze how different attributes influence charity selection. Overall, the choice-method conjoint method has several advantages. First, it allows me to estimate the net causal effect of each of the charities attributes on charity selection. Second, it allows for interaction

effects between the attributes (e.g. partisanship X ideological lean; partisanship X morality frame).

The survey sample includes 3,164 participants, recruited from Lucid using quotas to reflect the age, gender, and ethnicity/race of the U.S. population over the age of 18 [1]. I used the standard question asking respondents about partisanship. First respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent?" Second, respondents who selected "Independent" from the first question were asked, "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party or do you think of yourself as only an independent?" I re-code leaners as either "Democrat" or "Republican" if they selected that they leaned Democrat or Republican, respectively. True Independents were coded as any respondent who answered "Independent" to both questions. For the purposes of this experiment, Independents were dropped from the final analysis to be able to compare ingroup vs. outgroup dynamics (e.g. Democrats vs. Republican).

Subjects completed five forced-choice conjoint tasks – a number small enough to reduce possibility of survey satisfying. In the experiment, I ask respondents to choose between pairs of hypothetical charities, randomly varying several of the charity features. Table 3.2 describes the conjoint attributes and values. I focus on five attributes of hypothetical charities, all of which have been identified as relevant features in donation behavior. Two of the attributes take on two values, including *Largest Donor Base* (Republican, Democrat), and *Mission Statement* (A better and more sacred world for our children", "Equality for all no matter their background). The age of a nonprofit has been known to significantly influence willingness to donate to an organization with the rationale being that individuals may "trust" more mature organizations (Bose, 2015). Thus, I include *Date of Organization* as an attribute, which takes on three levels (1920, 1190, 2010). Economic literature finds that the assets and revenue of a nonprofit are also positively correlated with willingness to donate to an organization (Bose, 2015). Thus, I also include *Amount of Money Raised* as an attribute, which takes on four levels ($100,000, $1 Million, $10 Million, $30 Million). Finally, as described above, donors care about the ideological orientation of an organization

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[1]Attention checks were included that reduced survey size but improved survey quality

and are more willing to donate when their is ideological congruence between donor and the organization ([Barber](), [2016](); [Bose](), [2015]()). As such, I include *Name of Organization* to subtly elicit the ideological-lean of the charity. This attribute takes on 4 levels (Leukemia & Lymphoma Alliance, Conserve American Lands, National Adoption Association, Guide Dogs for the Blind). In the following section, I describe my charity choices in depth.

Table 3.1: Conjoint Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Values	Sub-Group N
Party ID	Democrat	1790
	Republican	847
	Independent	527
Age	18-24	291
	25-34	556
	35-44	852
	45-54	351
	55-64	390
	65-74	489
	75-84	198
	85+	37
Education	No High school	60
	High school	675
	Some College	666
	2 Year Degree	249
	4 Year Degree	709
	Post Graduate Degree	805
Gender	Female	1630
	Male	1534
Race	White	2127
	Black (African American)	478
	Hispanic	481
	Asian	15
	American Indian or Alaska Native	42
	Pacific Islander	3
	Other	18

Table 3.2: Conjoint Attribute Class

Attribute Class	Number of Levels	Attribute
Largest Donor Base	2	Democrat, Republican
Mission Statement	2	"A better and more sacred world for our children", "Equality for all no matter their background"
Date of Organization	3	1920, 1990, 2010
Amount of Money Raised	4	$100,000, $1 Million, $10 Million, $30 Million
Name of Organization	4	Leukemia & Lymphoma Alliance, Conserve American Lands, National Adoption Association, Guide Dogs for the Blind

These attributes were chosen to increase experimental realism. While some of these profiles may be more realistic than others, the attributes and their accompanying levels were chosen to be both theoretically relevant to the research question and plausible to the respondents. I am interested in the ways that partisanship, ideological lean of a charity, and morality interact and influence choice selection. I use environmentalism for several reasons. First, literature on MFT shows that moral frames can broaden the support for environmental groups among a conservative audience (Makovi & Kasak-Gliboff, 2021; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Wolsko, Ariceaga & Seiden, 2016), making it reasonable to observe an interactive relationship between moral frame X partisanship. Second, environmentalism has emerged as a key issue for Democrats since the 2020 elections. According to a Pew Research Study, 90% of Democrats and 39% of Republicans agree the federal government is doing too little to mitigate the effects of climate change. Given the salience and the importance of the issue, it is sensible to expect Democrat donors to consider the ideological lean of the organization in their decision-making. I also select a hypothetical right-leaning organization based on pro-life values. Conservatives tend to rely on faith-based as well as non-faith based adoption agencies to broaden support for pro-life groups. In light of the recent repeal of the

Roe vs. Wade, which provided protection for abortion, Republican politicians have emphasized the expansion of adoption programs[2]. Again, given the relevant importance of abortion issues, Republican donors should pay close attention to the ideological lean of the organization when making decisions, even if the organization is supported by Democrats.

Finally, I select charity names whose ideological orientations were discernible but were so not obviously tainted by partisanship. For example, a profile may include Republicans as the Donor Base and an environmental organization as the charity name. Including a charity such as the "Sierra Club" would be problematic when paired with a Republicans as the Donor Base. To resolve this issue, researchers can constrain the conjoint profiles so that left/right leaning organizations are not pared with Republican/Democrat donor bases. Second, researchers can make all the charities neutral (e.g. organizations that are clearly non-ideological). Alternatively, researchers can try to reduce the partisan tainting of the charity by selecting charity names that are less-obviously ideological. These choices pose a trade-off between experimental realism and being able to assess if partisans are willing to support an organization outside of their ideological group (e.g. a Republican supporting an environmentally oriented organization).

I adopt the latter approach and select charities that are left-leaning, neutral (no obvious partisan basis), and right-leaning. The charity names were carefully selected to obscure any obvious partisan tainting, but to also preserve some partisan lean. For this reason, the left-leaning charity aimed to reflect environmentalism and was called "Conserve America's Lands". The charity name is based off an existing conservative conservation organizations such as "Conserve America" as well as left-leaning environmental organizations. The right-leaning charity is called "National Adoption Association", which aimed to attract more right-leaning individuals such as those that support pro-life policies. Again, I used an adoption organization rather than a straight-forward pro-life organization (e.g Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life Organization) to reduce partisan tainting and increase experimental realism. Figure 3.1 below demonstrates a sample conjoint scenario.

The first hypothesis argues that partisans will be more willing to select a charity where the

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[2]Texas Republicans say if Roe falls, they'll focus on adoptions and preventing women from seeking abortions elsewhere

Figure 3.1: Sample Conjoint Scenario (Round 1 of 5)

|	Charity A	Charity B
Name of Organization	Leukemia & Lymphoma Alliance	Conserve American Lands
Date of Organization	1920	1990
Amount of Money Raised	$1Million	$100,000
Mission Statement	"A better and more sacred world for our children"	"Equality for all no matter their background"
Largest Donor Base	Democrats	Republicans

major donor base is their own in-party. To test for partisan effects, I included "Donor Base" as an attribute where respondents either saw "Democrat" or "Republican". The second hypothesis suggests that, all else equal, partisans will be more willing to select a charity that aligns with their own ideology. To test this hypothesis, I select four levels within the charity organization name attribute that vary on ideological lean. As discussed above, I select two charities with left/right ideological leans. I also select two obviously non-ideological organizations to serve as the baseline. Third, (Lecy, Ashley & Santamarina, 2019) argue that Democrats prefer organizations aimed toward equity, while Republicans prefer nonprofits with a religious orientation. These sentiments align with the predictions of MFT, which posit that equality and fairness based rhetoric is effective in shaping attitudes for liberal respondents, while conservative respondents respond better to authority/sanctity frame (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Thus, the third hypothesis suggests that the Democrats are more likely to select a charity with an equality morality frame, while Republicans are more likely to select a charity with a authority/sanctity frame. To test this hypothesis, I include a morality attribute with two levels, as shown by Table 3.2. The remaining hypothesis

require an interaction between the linked attributes of donor-base (partisanship) and name of the organization (ideological lean), as well as donor-base (partisanship) and value (morality frame).

3.5   Effects of Charity Attributes on Support for a Charity

This study includes one outcome variable: binary choice selection between two hypothetical profiles of charities. First, I divide my sample into Democrats and Republicans for ease of interpretation. The following results thus indicate the effect of a given attribute for Republican and Democrat choice selection, separately. This is is an important step because it enables me to examine in-group vs. out-group dynamics. Second, I follow Hainmueller & Hopkins (2015) and calculate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each attribute at the 95% confidence intervals. I begin by exploring the impact of each given attribute on charity selection. Figure 3.2 below presents the results of the main Republican model with no interaction effects. In the model, partisanship (largest donor base) was coded as 0/1, where the base is the in-group (Republican party). As described above, the mission statement has two levels – an equality moral appeal and sanctity appeal. I code the mission statement as 0/1, where the base category is the equality appeal. Thus the interpretation is how well the sanctity appeal operates, relative to the equality frame. Finally, charity name attribute has 4 levels, coded as 0-3. I code the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society as the base group. The interpretation of the charity name attribute is thus the likelihood that an individual selects a left-right charity, relative to the a non-ideological charity. The results from Figure 3.2 indicate that for Republicans, partisanship was the only attribute that influenced decision-making. Relative to their own in-groups, Republicans are 2.5% less likely to select an organization when told that the largest donor base is Democrat. These results provide initial support for the first hypothesis (partisanship significantly informs choice-selection on charities).

Figure 3.2: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Effect of Partisanship on Republican Choice Selection

I repeat the same procedure for Democrats. I code partisanship as 1/0, where the base category is the Democrat in-group. I code the mission statement as 0/1, where the base category is sanctity frame. Thus, the interpretation for the morality attribute for Democrats is relative to conservative appeal (sanctity). Figure 3.3 below presents the results for Democrats. Again, partisanship is the only attribute that influences decision-making. Like their Republican counterparts, Democrats are roughly 3% less likely to select charity when prompted with an out-party cue. Overall, these initial results indicate that Democrats and Republicans use political considerations in nonpolitical domains. Indeed, both Democrats and Republicans indicate that they prefer to donate to an organization that aligns with their partisanship, rather than their morality or ideological views. Consistent with previous literature, these results make clear that partisanship spillovers into even strictly nonpolitical domains, like the nonprofit sector.

Figure 3.3: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Effect of Partisanship on Democrat Choice Selection

3.5.1 The Interactive Effects of Partisanship, Ideology and Morality

I now turn my attention to the interactive effects of partisanship, ideology, and morality on charity choice selection. Hypotheses 4a and 4b imply that partisanship may interact with ideology and moral foundations such that it may attenuate the influence of partisan discrimination. First, I am interested in seeing if a Democrat (Republican) respondent will support a nonprofit outside of their ideological camp if they see that it is supported by their partisan ingroup. For example, would a Republican respondent would be willing to support to an environmental charity given that Republican's were the charity's largest donor base? Similarly, would a Democrat respondent would be willing to support to an adoption-based charity given that Democrat's were the charity's largest donor base? To test for this, I interact two of the conjoint attributes: *Largest Donor Base* (partisanship) and *Name of Organization* (ideology).

Second, I am interested in the interactive effects of morality and partisanship. Theories of partisanship and moral foundations argue that individuals use both partisanship and moral-based frames as short-cuts for decision-making. Like partisanship, moralized attitudes can prompt strong positive and negative emotions that shape an individuals willingness to co-operate and engage with others (Skitka & Morgan, 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011). Indeed, preferences for a charity are often dictated by the organization's moral appeal (Goenka & Van Osselaer, 2019) and these framing effects may increase an individual's willingness to support charities of out-groups (Wolsko, Ariceaga & Seiden, 2016). Given the evidence that morality frames can be powerful heuristics in how individuals evaluate groups, I expect morality frames to attenuate the effects of partisan discrimination.

Figure 3.4 below indicates some evidence of interactive effects between partisanship and the ideological lean of the organization. When Democrat respondents view that an environmental organization (Conserve America's Lands) is supported by Republicans, then support for that organization declines. Figure 3.5 however indicates null effects for Republicans. That is, when Republicans view that an organization is supported by Democrats, support for an organization

does not decline. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 below indicate no evidence in support for H4a which theorized an interactive relationship between morality appeal and partisanship. There may be several reasons for the null results. First, it is possible that these appeals were too weak and therefore were ineffective in shaping attitudes. This seems especially likely given the null effects of Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. In fact, previous studies that found significant effects between morality and ideology relied on fairly strong treatments. For instance, Wolsko, Ariceaga & Seiden (2016) manipulated morality frames where participants viewed one of three messages that were paired with a photograph to emphasize the appeal. For the binding condition (an appeal that emphasized authority, purity, and patriotism), the participants were shown a lengthy message that included the following text: "...By taking a tougher stance on protecting the natural environment, you will be honoring all of Creation. Demonstrate your respect by following the examples of your religious and political leaders who defend America's natural environment. SHOW YOUR PATRIOTISM!". The message was then accompanied by a photo of a bald eagle on a mountain peak to underscore linkages between the environment and sense of patriotism. Feinberg & Willer (2013) similarly show a positive relationship between sanctity moral frames and conservative support for the environment by embedding a moral message with a photo appealing to environmental efforts. Thus, it is possible that the manipulation used in this paper was simply too weak.

Figure 3.4: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Interactive Effect of Partisanship and Ideology on Democrat Choice Selection

Figure 3.5: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Interactive Effect of Partisanship and Ideology on Republican Choice Selection

Figure 3.6: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Interactive Effect of Partisanship and Morality on Democrat Choice Selection

Figure 3.7: Average Marginal Component Effects: The Interactive Effect of Partisanship and Morality on Republican Choice Selection

3.6 Discussion

Scholars and pundits alike increasingly worry about the levels of partisan conflict in the United States. Recent literature reveals that ordinary Americans use political considerations for nonpolitical domains (Engelhardt & Utych, 2018; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015c; Gift & Gift, 2015; Shafranek, 2020). This spillover effect is understood as a consequence of affective polarization whereby individuals rely on political cues to evaluate nonpolitical factors. Indeed, evidence indicates that Americans are less willing to marry, hire, and interact with an out-partisan (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). The degree of partisan animus in the United States is particularly striking especially when compared to other salient cleavages in the Unites States such as race and social class (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015c). While it is clear that partisan animus spills-over into nonpolitical domains, the limits of partisanship are still under developed. The present research contributes to the literature by examining by showing that partisanship may also spillover into purely altruistic domains such as charity selection. Indeed, the results provide preliminary evidence that both Democrats and Republicans are less likely to select a charity when presented with an out-party cue. These results comport with wider literature on affective polarization that indicate that partisanship is not only a political identity, but also *social* identity that impacts decisions outside of politics.

Of course, this analysis is limited in its scope and future research should delve into causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between partisanship and discriminatory behavior. That is, while the current research design provides evidence that Americans use political considerations in the nonprofit sector, it does not necessarily tell us why. It is possible that individuals use partisanship as a simple informational shortcut such that when they see an organization is funded by the out-party they then assume something nefarious about the organization. This perspective aligns with the affective polarization literature that indicates Americans increasingly distrust out-partisans (West & Iyengar, 2020; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018a; Carlin & Love, 2018a). Alternatively, it is possible that when individuals prefer to endow co-partisans with monetary contributions to

bolster their own in-group, and thus are less willing to support a charity funded by the out-group. Future research should tease out the specific mechanism that prompts discrimination across partisan lines to better understand the linkages between affective polarization and decision-making.

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