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Leveraging Sovereignty: Jordan and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

by

Rawan Mazen Arar

Committee in charge:

Professor David FitzGerald, Chair
Professor Yến Lê Espiritu
Professor Isaac Martin
Professor Michael Provence
Professor Gershon Shafir
Professor John Skrentny

2018

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The Dissertation of Rawan Mazen Arar is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California San Diego

2018

DEDICATION

For my parents, Mazen and Nedal

For my brothers, Yousef and Amr

For Joel and Stephanie

And for all those affected by war and displacement

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community-based Organizations
INGO	International Non-government Organization
JHW	Jordanian humanitarian workers
MRHS	Major Refugee Host States
NGO	Non-government Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SRR	States of Refugee Resettlement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UN Women	United Nations Women

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PREFACE: “WHERE ARE YOU FROM?”

Almost every person that I have interviewed in Jordan has asked me the same question: Where are you from? It is a perfectly reasonable question given my Arabic name and American accent. But, the answer to this question is far more consequential than a spot on a map. Places in the region can be mapped onto a timeline that conjures memories of migration and displacement. Movement can tell you more about a person than the borders in which they reside. Throughout the years, I have learned how Jordan, and the people of this region, lay claim to me as much as I lay claim to them. In that vein, this dissertation has been generations in the making.

My mother’s name was Nedal Hamdi. She was born in Zarqa, Jordan in 1959 to a Palestinian father, Abdel Qader, and a Syrian mother, Wisal, whose mother – my great grandmother – Khatun, was Kurdish. Nedal’s family fled during the 1948 Palestinian *Nakba*, leaving Yaffa, by way of Ramallah, and settling in Irbid, Jordan. Abdel Qader studied law at Al Azhar in Egypt, and as the story goes, was an outspoken advocate for women’s legal rights. Abdel Qader and Wisal had seven children and Nedal was the youngest. Abdel Qader also had a second wife, Amina, and they had three children. Meaning, I have ten aunts and uncles on my mom’s side.

My father, Mazen Arar, left his small village called Bal’a, located on the outskirts of Tulkarem, in 1972 to attend medical school in Amman. At the time, his father, Yousef, was working in Kuwait as a carpenter. Yousef sent his earnings home to Palestine where his wife, Fayza, cared for their eleven kids. Mazen became one of the first Jordanian-trained medical doctors, graduating with the third cohort accepted to the University of Jordan.

Mazen and Nedal met at the University of Jordan and married in Amman. They moved to Saudi Arabia, where my brother, Yousef (named after my grandfather) and I were born. When I

was three years old, we moved to Dallas, Texas, which is where my youngest brother, Amr, was born. My mom often declared with a huge smile, that Amr, her American-born child, could grow up to become President of the United States.

My brothers and I spent our childhood traveling between Jordan and the United States. My parents were committed to keeping us close to our extended family, most of whom live in Jordan. I lived in Amman during the third grade while my mother conducted her doctoral research on water quality in Palestinian refugee camps (see Arar 1998). The next year, we moved back to Texas and my mom graduated from Southern Methodist University (SMU) with a Ph.D. in Anthropology.

During the year I spent in Jordan, I learned to speak Arabic fluently, made life-long connections with my cousins, and developed a deep appreciation for Jordan and Palestine. My grandmother, aunts, and uncles told me endless stories about Bal'a, which was such a wondrous place in my childhood imagination. Their recollections of home revolved around the harvest season, the bees and small birds they reared, and the pigeons they hunted. The insects of Bal'a peppered their stories as if they were characters in their own right. One of my favorite stories is the time my dad and his brothers collected olives that fell to the ground after the main harvest. If they collected enough olives, they could make and sell olive oil. One year, they spent all their earnings on Turkish Delight, which they ate under the shade of the biggest carob tree in the village. My dad and Amo Mohammed, my uncle, ate so much Turkish Delight that they got sick and couldn't touch the stuff for years.

Stories about rural Palestine seemed so foreign to me, except for that these narratives held clues about who I am and where I come from. Nostalgia lingered through our family's conversations about Palestine – a home that was geographically so close, but politically so

distant. The Israeli occupation is where stories of the past and stories of the present collide. And so, through my family, I learned that displacement is a state of being. The first refugee stories I ever heard were my family's. As far back as I can remember, exile, the yearning for one's homeland, war, and rights have been a part of my imagination.

Jordan is home to many refugee groups – including members of my own family. Throughout my life, I have witnessed people coming in and out of Amman. The people change, but the stories have an eerie familiarity. My experiences as a scholar working in Jordan often collide with my family's past, connecting displaced peoples across borders and time in unexpected but ordinary ways.

Here, I would like to share two of those stories. The first is about when I realized that my father received UN aid as a child. The second is when I realized that I have, in so many ways, followed in my mother's footsteps.

I lived in Jordan from 2009 to 2010 as a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar. I was working on my MA at the time in Women's and Gender Studies and conducting interviews with Iraqi refugees. I also volunteered with a small aid organization. As the cold winter months approached, we organized a clothing drive to collect coats for refugees. Jordanian winters are often snowy. The stone buildings offer little insulation and, sometimes, it can be colder inside the house than outside. When I told my father about our initiative, he casually mentioned to me that, as a child, the only coat he ever owned was given to him by UNRWA (the UN agency for Palestinian refugees). He recalled that it was a red women's trench coat that he wore for years. He wore this donated red coat long enough to grow into it, and then later, out of it.

I immediately wondered about who the woman was who donated her coat. Whoever she was, she could never have imagined how much it would mean to me that she helped keep my dad

warm. And so, refugees in Jordan never felt foreign or far away, despite the fact that I grew up in the United States. Instead, they reminded me of my family.

The second story I want to share took place during Ramadan of 2015, while I was conducting fieldwork for this project. Ramadan is a holy month when Muslims fast from food and drink during the day. Sunset is like an alarm clock and the *adan* (call to prayer) brings everyone to the dinner table. On this particular day, I was invited to have dinner at my uncle's house. Undoubtedly, it is rude to keep hungry and thirsty people waiting to break their fast. So, I decided to head straight to my uncle's house for dinner, without stopping by my apartment to wash up after a long day of fieldwork.

I had spent the day in Za'tari camp conducting interviews with Syrian refugees. It was a hot day, and I could feel the sand in my hair and on my skin. On the days that I worked in the camps, I always wore something conservative with long-sleeves and a loose fit. On that particular day, I wore an over-sized, light-weight, jean button-down with blue, green, and purple stitching along the collar.

As soon as I arrived for dinner, my aunt announced across the room, "You are wearing your mom's shirt!" I was surprised that she noticed. At the time, my mother had passed away three years earlier, and I did not imagine that anyone in Amman would remember what she happened to have worn during our short summer visits. "I recognize the embroidery on the shirt," my aunt said. "The Palestinian refugees she worked with in Baqa'a camp stitched it for her as a thank you." I was stunned. Of course, I knew that the shirt was my mother's, and I had noticed the traditional Palestinian stitching, but I never knew the story behind the shirt.

The jean button-down must have been from 1993, when she conducted her dissertation fieldwork with Palestinian refugees. Here I was, my mother's daughter, wearing her same shirt,

working as an ethnographer and conducting interviews in the same country – just as she had. In 2015, twenty-two years later, Jordan was facing many of the same challenges with refugee reception and the people of this region were still displaced. Many of the Palestinians my mom worked with were probably still displaced in the same place with over ten formalized Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. Since the time of my mother's fieldwork, Jordan had become home to several other refugee groups including displaced people from Iraq and Syria.

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Thank you to the refugees, citizens, aid workers, humanitarian professionals, and Jordanian officials who took the time to share their experiences with me, entrusted me with their stories, and connected me to their friends, family members, and colleagues. This research would not have been possible without their patience and candor. I have been inspired by their thoughtful analyses of local and global affairs and motivated by their strength in confronting the challenges of displacement and adapting to the changes in their lives. I cherish the experiences I have had in Jordan, which have given me direction and purpose as a scholar and fueled my personal growth.

I am grateful for the support, guidance, and mentorship of my primary advisors David FitzGerald and Gershon Shafir. They have taught me how to think and powered my curiosity. They have broadened my world both through time, by making history a part of my paradigm, and through space, by showing me how the world is connected in multifaceted and unexpected ways. They have generously spent countless hours thinking, talking, and problem-solving with me. I appreciate every minute.

David is the Chair of my committee. He has guided me through every stage of my graduate training. David's thoughtful and meticulous approach to scholarship will always be the model I aim to emulate. When I am in a position to mentor graduate students, I will aspire to treat them with the same level of respect and consideration that David has extended to me.

Gershon has also mentored me from the first days of my graduate career at UCSD. My life will forever be enriched because I have had the opportunity to study with him. Gershon has inspired me to think bigger and contemplate social questions more deeply. His mentorship has not only made me a better thinker and a better person. Throughout the years, we have tackled

pressing social and moral questions, including issues that are central to the study of refugee displacement, war, and human rights. He is the first person I turn to when I want to dream about a big new idea.

I am deeply grateful to the team of scholars who have worked on this project with me and provided feedback throughout the years. A few words cannot capture how much Isaac Martin, John Skrentny, Michael Provence, and Yến Lê Espiritu have shaped this project in unique and wonderful ways. I am thankful for their kindness and encouragement.

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FIELD OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology

Studies in the sociology of international immigration and political sociology.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Leveraging Sovereignty:
Jordan and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

by

Rawan Mazen Arar

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California San Diego, 2018

Professor David FitzGerald, PhD, Chair

The contemporary refugee crisis has sparked a global debate about the shared responsibility to take in refugees – and ways to keep them out. Protecting "national sovereignty" became the battle cry throughout the Western world when sympathy for people fleeing violence quickly turned to panic over uncontrolled borders. Western states have invoked their right to self-governance and autonomy as the justification for rejecting migrants, refugees, and asylum

seekers as well as refusing the interference of international institutions like the United Nations or European Union. The European refugee crisis has inspired a renewed effort to halt immigration to the West by encouraging states in the Middle East to control and contain their refugee populations. While Western sovereignty is foundational to political sociology and the sociology of international immigration, the sovereignty of developing states that host most of the world's refugees is neglected in the sociological literature.

How do developing countries in the Global South – those that host 85% of the world's 24.5 million refugees – maintain their sovereignty? I examine how Jordan protect its sovereignty in the face of porous borders and the interference of international institutions and foreign states. Jordan hosts 2.7 million refugees in a total population of 9.5 million people. Jordan provides shelter, education, health care, and protection to millions of refugees, challenges that are exacerbated as citizens face high unemployment and strained social institutions including overcrowded hospitals and underperforming schools. I show that sovereignty is a relational process enacted through quotidian practices not only from the top-down—by government and international officials—but also from the bottom-up through the daily decisions of refugees and citizens.

I conducted an ethnography of the state and in-depth, semi-structured interviews in Arabic and English, triangulating 175 total interviews with Syrian refugees, Jordanian citizens, and UN, NGO, and government officials. I triangulate interviews to explore the social construction of sovereignty. I find that sovereignty practices are leveraged against one another, which is often done to secure financial and other kinds of support from the international community. However, when state security is in jeopardy, Jordanian officials will strictly maintain final authority over refugee populations.

Chapter 1: Introduction: The Global Response to Refugee Displacement

More than one million refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers crossed - or attempted to cross - the Aegean and Mediterranean seas for the hope of a new life in Europe in 2015 (Clayton and Holland 2015). Their journeys were chronicled in dramatic images: boats overcrowded with black and brown bodies against the backdrop of an endless sea; refugee faces contorted in agony or unclenched in exhaustion as they breached the shores of Greece and Italy; and huddled crowds herded through fields along the Western Balkans. No image demanded more attention than that of three-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi, who died at sea en route to Europe. The image of Alan's small, lifeless body, face-down on the Turkish shore was reproduced millions of times. Alan became the impetus for Western audiences to pay attention to the plight of refugees. How would Europeans address the needs of desperate people in search of safe haven?

Chancellor Angela Merkel opened Germany's borders to 800,000 asylum seekers, a number that soon grew even larger over the next year (Gibbs 2015). Other leaders followed suit. President Barack Obama increased the American refugee resettlement cap from 85,000 to 110,000 (Eilperin 2016). Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot added 12,000 new slots for refugees from Iraq and Syria (Ramzy 2015). French President Francois Hollande called it his "humanitarian duty" to accept 30,000 Syrian refugees in the next two years and British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 20,000 additional refugees would be accepted over the next five years (Sandhu 2015; Wintour 2015). In the years that followed, some of these quotas were not met and others would purposefully lowered. However, these pledges in 2015 were incredibly significant. Historically, less than one percent of the world's over 20 million refugees ever have a chance to make a new life in the West (UNHCR Global Trends 2018).

Concerned citizens, politicians, and industry leaders organized in search for humanitarian

solutions. The challenges were urgent. Where would refugees find shelter? How would their basic needs be met? Who would provide them with medical attention? As volunteers throughout Europe galvanized into action, they used technology to disseminate vital information about routes, safe passage, and places to stay (Techfugees 2018). In Greece, volunteers ran reception centers and provided emergency aid. The Hellenic Rescue Team saved thousands of lives by conducting search-and-rescue missions at sea (UNHCR 2016a). In Germany, refugees were met at train stations with applause as residents sang the words "Say it loud, say it clear, refugees are welcome here" (Mahmud 2015). Citizens in Glasgow, Birmingham, Kingston (London), and Edinburgh organized grassroots support and lobbied local authorities to accept more refugees (Grice 2015). In response to the Icelandic government's proposal to accept 50 refugees, more than 11,000 Icelanders offered to shelter Syrian refugees in their own homes (Dearden 2015).

Simultaneously, restrictionists fixated on how to keep refugees and migrants out of Europe. Xenophobic characterizations of Muslims escaladed anti-refugee sentiments. Debates revolved around terrorism and security threats; the persecution of people smugglers; the changing ethnic, cultural, and religious composition of European societies; and the differing rights of economic migrants as compared to refugees. Some policymakers even debated if search-and-rescue missions at sea created a "pull factor" that motivated people to make the arduous journey to Europe (Dearden 2016). The Schengen promise of free movement across internal borders was quickly unraveling. Refugees and migrants were stopped in Hungary and Austria on their way to Germany. Hungary and Slovenia closed their borders with Croatia, while Croatia closed border crossings with Serbia (Regan 2015). Enhanced border control measures in Austria, France, and Switzerland were put in place, essentially confining refugees in Greece and Italy (The Economist 2015; Human Rights Watch 2016). Denmark and Sweden cut benefits for

refugees and asylum seekers in an effort to deter migration (Crouch 2015).

The legal instruments intended to govern asylum claims in Europe failed. According to the Dublin Regulation, the member state in which an asylum seeker first arrives is obligated to process an asylum claim if other member states refuse to process that claim. This stipulation is why some asylum seekers did everything they could to avoid registration in places like Austria and Croatia with the hopes of greater rights or family reunification in Germany and the UK. To manage and redistribute asylum seekers in Europe, the Justice and Home Affairs Council (which represents the European Commission) agreed to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other countries in Europe against the wishes of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia (Traynor 2015). This plan also failed. The European strategy quickly turned full force to containing refugees and asylum seekers abroad. What steps could European leaders take to keep refugees from emigrating out of the Global South?

More than 85% of the world's refugees live in developing countries — and European policymakers were now motivated to keep it that way (Global Trends 2018). New immigration policies, travel and trade concessions, and increased international aid became the primary tools to incentivize states in the Global South to contain their refugee populations. Most notably, the EU-Turkey deal made global headlines as a controversial compromise. Critics asserted that this deal obstructed the right to seek asylum and put refugees in jeopardy of *refoulement*, which is the forcible return of a refugee to the country from which they fled. As outlined in the deal, Turkey promised to increase security measures that would prevent future migration to Europe and open its labor market to Syrians. The EU pledged €3 billion in aid dollars and afforded visa-free travel to Turkish citizens — essentially, leveraging the free movement of Turkish citizens in exchange for the confinement of Syrian refugees. A "one-for-one" population swap between Turkey and

the EU was also agreed upon. Turkey would accept one Syrian who entered Europe without authorization and, in return, a European member state would resettle one (vetted) Syrian refugee from Turkey (European Council, 2016; Rygiel, Baban, and Ilcan 2016). Similar, although much less controversial, initiatives were developed through the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts as well as new bilateral agreements with Pakistan and Kenya.

The European refugee crisis was an historic opportunity to recalibrate the global system of refugee management. In 2015, asylum seekers interrupted "business as usual," which could have led to innovate solutions unbeholden to the political norms of the past. It was a chance to tackle the needs of millions of people whose daily lives are characterized by physical insecurity, the lack of legal protections, unattainable political rights, and inadequate access to shelter, education, and health services. While some new policies allowed select refugees to access employment, political rights and citizenship protections remained unattainable (Betts and Collier 2017). Despite energized grassroots initiatives, state leaders worldwide ultimately decided to reinforce the global status quo between rich Western, liberal states in the Global North and developing states in the Global South.

Major refugee host states (MRHS) - like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Kenya, Iran, and most recently, Bangladesh - are vital to the contemporary system of refugee management. However, MRHS's "refugee hosting capacity" has received significantly less scholarly attention as compared to their Western counterparts (with select exceptions, see Jacobsen 1996; Holzer 2015). MRHS confront the challenges of porous borders, changing demographics, and threats to national security. They address refugees' urgent needs for food and shelter and the long-term challenges of education, unemployment, and the degradation of local infrastructure. Undeniably, the ways that MRHS manage, control, and support refugee populations affects the flow of

refugees to the Global North and the operations of international aid organizations. MRHS also shape the experiences of citizens in refugee host communities and most of the world's refugees.

MRHS are buffer states that keep refugees from migrating beyond the Global South, which serves the interests of states in the Global North (FitzGerald forthcoming). In 2017, the United States, Germany, and the EU donated close to $2.5 billion USD to the UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency charged with managing the needs of refugees (UNHCR Donors). This money paid for both humanitarian support and immigration control as refugee aid dollars came with strings attached. In the wake of the European refugee crisis, aid was contingent upon the implementation of new policies that promoted integration. The expectation was that refugee employment opportunities in MRHS would greatly reduce the "pull factor" of European asylum. Beyond keeping refugees and asylum seekers at a distance, MRHS also serve as the territories from which states in the Global North select and vet refugees for resettlement. In 2016, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom resettled refugees primary from Jordan (32,405), Turkey (28,926), and Lebanon (24,426).

The global norms of refugee management are built upon a system that relies upon, and is perpetuated by, inequality between states in the Global South and states in the Global North. When state leaders agree to contain most of the world's refugees in the Global South, they are not only shaping the fate of refugees but also the experiences of citizens in refugee host communities. Citizens in the Global South become refugees' neighbors, aid workers, teachers, classmates, doctors, and spouses. Their daily lives are often shaped by the challenges and opportunities associated with refugee hosting. In the hierarchy of priorities espoused by international leaders, the needs of citizens in non-liberal states in the Global South are the last to be considered – if they are considered at all. This neglect is by design. In MRHS, citizens' lack

of political representation in governance is a necessary component that allows the contemporary refugee system to function. Meaning, the contemporary system of refugee management and the "refugee burden" is externalized onto citizens in the Global South.

From the perspective of refugees, MRHS provide a safe place away from the violence that contributed to their displacement. Refugees often live in these countries for generations – many refugee children have never known their home country. In 2016, 552,200 refugees returned home but 3.4 million people were newly displaced across borders. The UNHCR was not originally founded with the expectation that displacement would last for generations (Loescher 2001). However, as conflicts stretched from years to decades, MRHS became the UNHCR's most feasible durable solution to address the problem of displacement. The ways that these states govern, provide legal protections, partner with international institutions, and influence social and economic integration shape the lives of most of the world's refugees.

What became known as the "European refugee crisis" was not only a humanitarian catastrophe but a political emergency that obscured the violence and chaos of refugee displacement with the violence and chaos of poor reception. Before 2015, MRHS in the Middle East had already hosted - and continue to host - millions of Syrian refugees. MRHS faced many of the same challenges as European states: porous borders that provide minimal opportunities for screening and selecting refugees; changing ethnic, religious, and cultural demographics; international and supranational interference in national-level governance; and the moral imperative to provide humanitarian relief.

Moving away from Western-centric studies of refugee reception, this dissertation explores the global system of refugee management with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at the center. For over 70 years, Jordan has maintained its legacy as a refugee host state, continuously

making the UNHCR's list of top ten refugee host countries. In 2018, Jordan hosts approximately 2.7 million refugees in a total population of 9.5 million people (Osborne 2016; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs). According to the UNHCR, approximately 666,000 Syrian refugees are registered with the UN (Jordan Factsheet June 2018). Governmental estimates are much higher, suggesting that Jordan hosts between 1.3 and 1.4 million Syrians.

Refugees in protracted refugee situations have made Jordan a semi-permanent home. Refugees from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria comprise the largest populations, while thousands of lesser-known refugees from Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen have also sought refuge in Jordan. Like other MRHS, Jordan is a country of first asylum for refugees who will be resettled to the West, predominantly Canada, the United States, and Australia. Jordan was the top country of UNHCR resettlement operations in 2015 and 2016, which changed due to the Trump administration's policies toward refugee resettlement (Fee and Arar, under review).

Jordan's long history of refugee reception has brought with it a pervasive dependence on international institutions, including the UNHCR and UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). UNRWA is the UN Refugee Agency established in 1951 to care for Palestine refugees fleeing the 1948 *Nakba*. As home to 2.2 million Palestine refugees, Jordan hosts the largest number of Palestine refugees in the world, surpassing Gaza with 1.3 million Palestine refugees. Notably, Palestine refugees were the first non-Europeans to be recognized as refugees by the international regime (FitzGerald and Arar 2018). UN agencies provide refugees with access to education, health care, and basic needs. Jordan has become a hub for hundreds of international non-government organizations (INGOs) that provide refugee assistance and want to operate in the region but outside of conflict countries (mainly Syria and Iraq).

The large presence of UN and humanitarian agencies makes Jordan a "special case" as a humanitarian testing ground for innovating generalizable best practices that can be applied in other MRHS (Betts and Collier 2017; Lenner and Turner 2018). The UN uses the lessons learned in Jordan and applies them to other refugee receiving contexts. For example, the 2009 Urban Policy based on the experience of Iraqi refugees in Jordan advocated for refugees' right to live outside of camps in urban areas (Ward 2014).

What happens in Jordan affects the lives of millions of refugees, citizens, and Jordanian residents; shapes regional and global immigration policies; and affects UN and aid operations worldwide. Jordan has also played a significant role in the unfolding Syrian conflict, especially regarding "safe zones" for refugees and displaced people inside Syria. Jordan's geopolitical position has been vital to regional, and even global, stability (Ryan 2003).

In this dissertation, I explore Jordan's role as a MRHS. How does Jordan maintain sovereignty while hosting millions of refugees? How do state officials practice, negotiate, and concede authority? To answer these questions, I focus on the contemporary Syrian refugee response, 2011 – 2018. I study of the social construction of sovereignty by exploring interactions among Syrian refugees, Jordanian citizens, and government, UN, and INGO officials. Through ethnography and in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in Arabic and English, I study how these groups interact with one another to bring the practice of sovereignty into being. My methodological approach to the study of sovereignty allows me to theorize about how sovereignty is not only a top-down, state-imposed project, but one that is also shaped by citizens and refugees.

What is Sovereignty?

At the heart of the international system of states is the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty is what makes a modern state and the international system of states. Sovereignty is defined by internal and external dimensions of authority (Krasner 2007). Internal (or domestic) sovereignty is a state's ultimate control within its specified territory (Giddens 1985; Mann 1997). Internal sovereignty is hierarchical because the sovereign has authority over a subjugated population (Lake 2003). The relationship between a sovereign state and a population is usually characterized by citizenship. According to Lake (2003), authority is never without limit, but it can be fall along a spectrum from weak to strong.

Internal sovereignty is related to external sovereignty, which is achieved when a state is *recognized* by other states as having legitimate authority over domestic affairs (Giddens 1985; Mann 1997). As an ideal type, external sovereignty allows each country to be independent from outside governance, meaning there is no greater authority above the state. This is empirically false, however, because states exist within a hierarchy as part of the contemporary world order (Wallerstein 1974; Lake 2003).

Sovereignty emerged as a result of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that had devastated Central Europe and caused millions of deaths. The treaties of Westphalia allowed for the creation of separate states that could define their own goals and the mutual recognition of territorial statehood. States gained legitimacy through the loyalty of their populations, merging the nation with the territorial state. Caporaso describes the practices of sovereigns: "Sovereigns made treaties with other sovereigns, forged policies to rule inside a territory, attempted to exclude other authorities from interfering in 'domestic politics,' developed stronger controls over their own borders, and actively participated in the construction of citizenship and nationalism" (2000:1).

For scholars, the concept of sovereignty has far-reaching utility. Sovereignty was "front and center in early social theory" starting with Max Weber and the study of empire and the formation of nation-states (Adams and Steinmetz 2015, p. 270). Sovereignty has inspired interdisciplinary scholarship with political scientists (Shanks 2009; Ben-Porath and Smith 2012) international relations scholars (Agnew 1994; Lake 2005) and legal scholars (Bhabha 1996; Dauvergne 2004) leading the scholarly debates. Political sociologists and sociologists of international immigration have theorized extensively about the consequences of state sovereignty (Arendt 1968; Foucault 1976; Adams and Steinmetz 2015). As a principle and a rhetorical claim, sovereignty is incorporated in scholarly investigations of nationalism (Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 1997); postnationalism (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996); state formation (Tilly 1990; Mann 1997); and international institutions and human rights (Sassen 1996; Beckfield 2010; Cole 2005).

Westphalian sovereignty is an ideal type. The classical view of sovereignty is that the "state is either sovereign – or it is not a state" (Lake 2003 p. 305). However, contemporary debates of sovereignty have moved away from the temptation to identify states as either sovereign or non-sovereign. Constructivists have noted that while the principle of sovereignty is paramount for states, the practice of sovereignty can take many forms (see Reus-Smit 2001).

Sovereignty encompasses a wide range of closely related phenomena, each of which is acted upon by the sovereign to maintain final authority. Being able to isolate one aspect of sovereignty from another provides insights into how the practice of sovereignty varies among countries and changes over time. Agnew (2005) identifies different kinds of sovereignty regimes while Litfin (1997) introduces the concept of "sovereignty bargains." Liftin (1997) describes the ways in which states negotiate sovereignty by placing varying levels of importance on autonomy, control, or legitimacy. For Biersteker and Weber (1996), sovereignty is a social construct that

can be analyzed through the study of territory, authority, population, and recognition. Liftin (1997) and Biersteker and Weber (1996) deconstruct sovereignty into concrete components that can be measured and assessed.

Some scholars argue that sovereignty is on the decline. Agnew (2005) enumerates a list of modern developments that may interfere with a state's sovereignty. These include: the environmental consequences of climate change that do not adhere to state borders; global currencies that are no longer tied to one state, such as the Euro; individuals with dual (or multiple) citizenships; increasing flows of refugees and immigrants across borders; and the expansion of knowledge and innovation across national borders (Agnew 2005 p. 438). International and supranational institutions are also theorized to contributed to the erosion of sovereignty (Richmond 1994). Sassen (1999) attributes the decline of sovereignty to institutions like the World Trade Organization and the European Union.

Sovereignty anomalies abound (Krasner 2001). For China, state sovereignty may be undermined by Taiwan's pursuit of international recognition, Hong Kong's flourishing economy that requires "quasi-autonomy," or Tibet's struggle from liberation (see Madsen, Oksenberg, and Smith's chapters in Krasner 2001). Other liberation struggles in Palestine, Basque Country, the North of Ireland, and Scotland threaten Westphalian sovereignty in Israel, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As of 2018, South Sudan became the newest country in the world after gaining independence in 2011, breaking away from Sudan. These examples spotlight some of the limitations of the current system of borders and nation-states, and maybe even more so, the limitations of citizenship as the primary rights granting institution.

The principle of sovereignty exists for each individual state *and* as part of a system that governs international relations. The behaviors of sovereign states are often influenced by

regional or global considerations including hegemonic authority of international institutions. In principle, all states have the right to claim sovereignty despite wealth or power. In practice, however, wealthier and more powerful states are better equipped to protect their sovereign interests (Lake 2003). As Forsythe explains, "All sovereign states were equal, but pragmatic recognition of power factors meant that some needed to be more equal than others" (2012 p. 2). The hierarchy among states, which ostensibly should not exist in ideal Westphalian sovereignty, invites scholars to incorporate a world systems or postcolonial analysis of sovereignty practices (Wallerstein 1974; Chirot and Hall 1982; Bruyneel 2007; Pourmokhtari 2013).

The concept of sovereignty remains of the utmost importance to state leaders regardless of whether state sovereignty closely resembles the Westphalian model or contemporary conceptions of "shared sovereignty" (see Krasner 2005). Sovereignty is manifested in practices of authority including immigration control, collaboration with other countries to address international problems, and cooperation with international and supranational institutions to aid with domestic affairs. With these empirical junctures in mind, the scholarly study of sovereignty is central to the global movement of refugee and migrants.

The Refugee-Sovereignty Nexus

The contemporary refugee crisis sparked a global debate about the shared responsibility to take in refugees – and ways to keep them out. Sovereignty became the battle cry throughout the Western world when sympathy for people fleeing violence quickly turned to panic over uncontrolled borders. From Australia's commitment to Operation Sovereign Borders (2013) to Britain's support for Brexit (2017), states have invoked their right to self-governance and autonomy as the justification for rejecting migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as well as the

involvement of international institutions.

The principle of sovereignty addresses some of the most basic empirical questions that are central to understanding refugee displacement and reception: Who is a refugee? Who is responsible for protecting those rights? What rights and opportunities are refugees afforded? The refugee- sovereignty nexus includes the study of immigration, territory, governance, international cooperation, and rights.

Deference to sovereignty is outlined in the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee. Along with having suffered from or feared persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion, a person must be "outside the country of his nationality" to qualify for refugee protection (Article 1 [A]2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention). This requirement recognizes sovereignty in two important ways: First, a person must cross a state border to become a refugee. People who have experienced the same persecution, or fear of persecution, but have not crossed a state borders are considered internally displaced persons (IDPs) and do not qualify for the same protections. Secondly, displacement across state borders is a legal caveat that upholds the conflict state's sovereignty and respects the international norm of non-interference. In cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, outside states can intervene under the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) policy that emerged in the mid 1990s (see UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect N.d.).

Refugees draw attention to the shortcomings of the nation-state system and citizenship. Convention refugees could not exist without state borders. But refugees are not an unintended or surprising consequence of the nation-state system. As Haddad argues, refugees "are an integral part of the system—as long as there are political borders constructing separate states and creating

clear definitions of insiders and outsiders, there will be refugees" (2008 p.297). The fact that refugees exist is therefore not unexpected.

The world is divided into discrete territories that are claimed by governing bodies. But, despite the legitimacy given to lines on a map, borders and territory are socially constructed (Newman 2003; Forsberg 2003; Jones et al. 2017). Agnew (2005) argues that effective sovereignty does not require the "strict and fixed territorial boundaries of individual states" (2005 p. 438). For instance, Massey et al. explain that the Mexico-U.S. border is "defined slowly but steadily" starting with the dividing line in the sand that demarcated the frontier (2002, p. 25). Depending on the goals of the sovereign, the making and unmaking of territory can move borders inward or push borders outward (Broeders 2007; Zolberg 1999; FitzGerald forthcoming).

States that accept refugees become responsible for their protection. For most people in the world, citizenship is the language of rights (Shafir 1998). Those who fall outside of the family of citizens must rely on less powerful modes of protection including denizenship, human rights, and humanitarianism. Hammar's (1990) theory of denizenship illustrates that some people who live within the territorially bounded jurisdiction of a sovereign state can benefit from social rights without citizenship rights. While denizenship may support some asylum seekers and unauthorized immigrants, most of the world's refugees must rely on human rights and humanitarianism. People who rely on human rights and humanitarianism do so as a last resort (Arendt 1968). Ultimately, human rights are rhetorical because – unlike citizenship rights – they are not backed by a sovereign state (Dembour 2010). Humanitarian actors work to protect human rights principles, but must strategically adopts a non-political ethos of neutrality and impartiality in order to operate within the jurisdiction of sovereign states (Barnett 2018).

Refugees are subject to the laws of the state. Sovereigns can exercise authority through

the legal system, though the arbitrary application of laws and policies, or through the absence of policy (Calavita 1998; De Genova 2004; Bon Tempo 2008; Hamlin 2014; Norman 2018). State officials also exercise control by denying refugees entry, controlling refugees' movement once inside the state, or deporting refugees (Hing 2005; Kanstroom 2007; Betts and Loescher 2011; Bruno 2016). Refugees' experiences, life chances, and accesses to rights are largely dependent upon where they are offered sanctuary.

Leveraging Sovereignty:

Building upon scholarly investigations of the refugee-sovereignty nexus, I have identified junctures at which to observe the daily practices of Jordanian sovereignty in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis. Territorial boundaries must be asserted or contested; membership in a population must be claimed or disputed; authority must be respected or disobeyed; recognition must be granted or withheld. Refugees, citizens, aid workers, and government officials confront the challenges of displacement and refugee reception in their daily lives, and in doing so, also navigate, reinforce, or subvert state efforts to maintain final authority.

Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate that:

- Refugee immigration and movement is controlled by state officials. In response, refugees confront the limitations placed on them by subverting state policies.
- The relationship between citizens and the state has been affected by the reception of Syrian refugees.
- Jordanian officials cooperate with other states and members of the international community to manage refugee reception.

The global system of refugee management is characterized by a “grand compromise” among states (Cuéllar 2006). MRHS in the Global South host most of the world’s refugees and states in the Global North finance refugee hosting abroad. Some states, most of which are in the Global North, also resettle a small number of refugees. All states actively protect their sovereignty, but the challenges of refugee hosting are vastly disparate. Table 1.1 compares the differences in refugee reception and identifies empirical junctures at which to observe and investigate enacted sovereignty.

Table 1.1: The Refugee - Sovereignty Nexus:
Differences in Sovereignty Practices Between States of Refugee Resettlement (SRR) in Global North and Major Refugee Host States (MRHS) in Global South

	States of Refugee Resettlement (SRR)	**Major Refugee Host States (MRHS)**
Demographics	SRR predetermine their refugee quota and will not receive more refugees than set by the quota	MRHS do not determine how many refugees will be received; seemingly limitless numbers of refugees
Screening and Selection	Refugees undergo a rigorous security and selection process before they are allowed to enter state territory	Refugees undergo minimal screening; More rigorous screening may occur for select refugees once they have entered state territory
Borders	Borders are strictly controlled	Borders are porous and almost completely open
Freedom of Movement	Refugees are free to travel within the state; They are not contained in camps	Some refugees are confined in camps; If refugees are allowed to exit camps, movement is authorized and monitored
International Support	States are not dependent on UNHCR or UNRWA	UNHCR, and sometimes UNRWA, are essential for refugee management and aid
Rights	Refugees have secure legal status upon arrival; Some states offer refugees a pathway to citizenship	Refugees are not offered citizenship, except in rare circumstances; Refugees depend on human rights and humanitarian support
Time	SRR can decide when to resettle refugees; they have the foresight to prepare and control refugee reception Refugees are expected to stay and become part of the nation	Refugee hosting is characterized as temporary and refugees are eventually expected to return home. This is a false characterization as most refugees live in protracted situations for generations. MRHS receive refugees without controlling the rate at which they flee
Character of the State	National values are recognized and esteemed	The character of the state is rarely discussed; instead, MRHS are treated as refugee warehouses

To understand Jordanian sovereignty practices, scholars must first recognize that refugee management is a global project. Jordanian sovereignty practices are tied to the sovereignty concerns of other states. When it comes to refugee hosting, no MRHS operates independently without the support of the international community. I find that Jordanian officials leverage the sovereignty concerns of other states to navigate the challenges of hosting large numbers of refugees. The daily process of leveraging sovereignty is the unacknowledged shouldering of the "refugee burden."

States of Refugee Resettlement:

States of refugee resettlement (SRR) are those that have partnered with the UNHCR to receive a select number of refugees. To become an SRR, a country is expected to meet several criteria. SRR are characterized by a legal framework that provides refugees with secure legal status upon their arrival and provides refugees with "fundamental civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, *including the prospect of acquiring citizenship*" (UNHCR 2013c, my emphasis; see Shafir 1998 for development of rights). Citizenship not only signifies permanent residence, but also, all the possibilities that come with political rights. "Citizenship is, of course, the most comprehensive form of local integration," UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming commented when South Korea offered citizenship to a resettled refugee for the first time in 2010 (UNHCR 2010a). SRR are also expected to have an institutional structure to support resettled refugees including an orientation program, refugee processing procedures, and efforts to foster hospitable receiving communities (UNHCR 2013b; Fee 2018).

Canada, the United States, and Australia are the top SRR, taking in the majority of resettled refugees. Additionally, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway and

Sweden are also seen as traditional RSS (UNHCR 2013b). As of 2016, the countries of refugee resettlement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Uruguay. The UNHCR also resettles refugees on an ad hoc basis. All SSR have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.

These countries welcome a small proportion of the world's refugees – in all, less than one percent. Some countries accept what David FitzGerald calls "symbolic numbers" of refugees (FitzGerald forthcoming). In 2017, Brazil accepted two refugees; Denmark accepted five refugees; Uruguay accepted 16 refugees.[1] Even when countries accept substantially larger numbers of refugees, SRR limit refugee reception with quotas. Refugee quotas are subject to change. According to UNHCR Global Trends (2018), because of the decline in resettlement quotas in 2016, 54% of refugee cases were submitted for resettlement in 2017 (2018 p. 3). Unlike MRHS, where refugee reception usually responds to the number of people who are fleeing violence, government officials in SRR choose the rate at which refugees arrive – not just the number of people who are allowed into the country.

SRR vet and select refugees. First, the UNHCR pre-selects refugee submissions based on a "heightened risk" that some refugees face due to their age (either as children, adolescents, or elderly people), health or physical ability, gender, and those who are in urgent need of protection (UNHCR 2010b). States then further vet the UNHCR's refugee submissions.

[1] These numbers do not include asylum seekers, those given humanitarian visas, or others who have sought refuge through alternative means. Instead, these numbers denote refugees who were resettled with the help of the UNHCR.

In the United States, refugee cases are referred to a Resettlement Support Center (RSC), which further collects biographic information and conducts security screenings in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. agencies. The information is then reviewed by officers from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Refugees who are approved by these departments then undergo health screenings to ensure that people with certain contagious diseases (like tuberculosis) are not allowed into the country. Then, refugees must acquire "sponsorship assurance" from a national resettlement agency. Before leaving to the United States, many refugees who are approved undergo a cultural orientation course as a form of pre-entry integration (see FitzGerald et al. 2017).

The vetting system can be exceptionally harsh. Some refugees who sought protection in the United States were rejected on the basis of the 2001 PATRIOT Act. The act broadened the definition of "terrorist" to include "any person taking up arms against any government under and circumstances," which included people who worked with the U.S. government to support American troops in Iraq and Burma (Barkdull et al. 2012 p. 109). Refugee applicants were also rejected for providing any kind of "material support" to terrorist. Barkdull et al. describe the expansive interpretation of material support, which included "robbery, forced labor, and rape" (2012 p. 109). Iraqi refugees who were forced to pay bribes to kidnappers were also said to be providing material support to terrorists.

In other instances, SRR have selected for very specific populations, which has had unexpected consequences. For example, some SRR have expressed an interest in primarily resettling Christian refugees. But, local Christian leaders have urged SRR to consider how taking Christians out of the Middle East will deplete the Christian community and jeopardize their presence in the region. In another instance, Director General of the Department of Yazidi Affairs

in Kurdistan, Khairi Bozani, criticized a Canadian plan to resettled members of the Yazidi religious minority that he reportedly learned about through the media. “How is that possible for the people of one country to decide for the people of another country that they're going to come and take 10,000–15,000 people out?” Bozani asked in an interview with CBC News (Brewster 2016). Along similar lines, UNHCR Canada representative Jean-Nicolas Beuze explained that by targeting survivors of sexual assault for resettlement, their initiative may put people at risk who have not “revealed their experience of rape or sexual slavery to their own family members, let alone community service providers” (Harris 2017). In each of these instances, refugee selection prioritizes the individual over the community and, as a result, also neglects how resettlement affects refugee communities.

The U.S. vetting and selection process takes between eighteen months and two years to complete (U.S. Refugee Admissions Program); Canadian resettlement can also take several years depending on operations in varying countries or regions (Felter and McBride 2017); in Australia, the average time from application to migration was fourteen and a half months in 2014 – 2015 (Karlsen 2016). By design, refugee resettlement does not respond to the urgent humanitarian disasters in the same ways that neighboring MRHS do. Instead, SRR prioritize their interests in maintaining control over precisely who is allowed to enter their territory and when. It is also vital to highlight that MRHS are responsible for refugee protection and aid during the pre-resettlement process. This means that while SRR are deciding who to resettle, they externalize refugee care to MRHS.

Refugees who are resettled in SRR come to these countries with legal standing. Although refugees with family ties are often placed near their relatives, refugees are free to travel throughout the country like other residents.

Because SRR are able to effectively control refugee demographics, they do not depend on UN agencies to provide assistance to refugees. Unlike MRHS that compete for international and supranational aid, SRR fund refugee support through local or national organizations. The UNHCR considers refugee resettlement to be a "durable solution" to the problem of displacement. Refugees who make a new life in SRR are given the opportunity to integrate, meaning they have access to social, economic, and political rights that are largely unavailable to refugees in MRHS. SRR do not expect refugees to return home in the future, and in this way, refugee resettlement is permanent. Refugee reception is often seen as part of the national narrative. Nations of immigrants that "rescue" refugees without any recognition of how dominant states may have contributed to the conflict from which people are fleeing (Espiritu 2014).

SRR's greatest contribution to the largest number of refugees comes in the form of aid dollars. As donor states, SRR have given billions of dollars to the UNHCR to support refugees abroad. These funds serve as both a form of humanitarian aid and incentives for MRHS to work as buffer states that control immigration.

A Note on Asylum Seekers:

Unlike resettled refugees, asylum seekers ask for refuge once they have reached the territorial jurisdiction of a state. Asylum seekers are sometimes referred to as "spontaneous arrivals," which aptly highlights the distinct challenges that SRR face when managing refugee resettlement as opposed to asylum reception (see Thielemann 2005; Richardson 2010). The term "asylum seeker" is state-centric. It prioritizes how a state sees an individual and *not* how an individual may describe his or her experience of displacement. The difference in language does

not denote a difference in the kinds of persecution an asylum seeker or refugee may have faced; instead, each term reflects a distinct relationship between the individual and the territorial state. Specifically, from the perspective of SRR, the words "asylum seeker" and "refugee" encapsulate how, when, and with what permissions a forced migrant crosses state borders.

When it comes to asylum seekers, SRR often face many of the same challenges as MRHS, including unpredictable numbers of forced migrants who have not been screened, selected, and vetted before entry. In fact, observing how SRR around the world have responded to an increase in asylum claims since 2015 reiterates how valuable the established "burden sharing" scheme is to the Global North.

The social construction of territory, therefore, is incredibly consequential. If states can stop an asylum seeker from reaching their territory, they can abdicate any responsibility toward those forced migrants. States impose measures that impede asylum seekers throughout their journey, from incentivizing airlines to impose restrictions on movement to delegating immigration control to buffer states (FitzGerald forthcoming). In one remarkable example, Australian officials excised part of their territory from the migration zone to stop people from seeking asylum by boat (Phillips and Spinks 2013).

Unlike resettled refugees, asylum seekers also face draconian measures once they arrive on a state's territory. Asylum seekers are often placed in detention centers that are comparable to refugee camps in the Global South. In 2018, the Trump administration implemented what they called a "zero-tolerance policy" that was intended to deter migrants and asylum seekers. The U.S. government separated the children of asylum seekers from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border, putting young children in foster care and detention facilities without a plan to reunite families (Lind 2018; Rizzo 2018; Friedman 2018). (For an in-depth investigation of detention

centers, see Global Detention Project at https://www.globaldetentionproject.org.)

Major Refugee Host States (MRHS):

Most of the world's refugees seek protection in MRHS. These countries face different sovereignty challenges, and therefore, enact different sovereignty practices. The first challenge to sovereignty is the large number of refugees that MRHS accept onto their territory. Unlike SRR that predetermine refugee quotas and set yearly limits on the number of refugees that are allowed to enter their territory, MRHS accept hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of refugees. MRHS have less control over the number and rate at which refugees enter their territory. These states do not enjoy the benefit of foresight to plan for and control the management of refugee reception. The number of refugees accepted into a country leads to a series of related sovereignty concerns about how to screen and select refugees, control the border, provide refugees with rights and protections, and advocate for state interests on the international scale.

In 2017, Turkey was home to 3.5 million refugees, making it the MRHS with the largest number of refugees for the fourth consecutive year according to the UNHCR's Global Trends report. Other MRHS are Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.4 million), Lebanon (998,900), Iran (979,400), Germany (970,400), Bangladesh (932,200), and Sudan (906,600) (Global Trends 2018).[2] These numbers exclude the 5.4 million Palestine refugees that are not registered with UNHCR and live in the Middle East. Palestine refugees recalibrate the list of top MRHS. Jordan's refugee population is approximately 2.7 million. Lebanon is home to 1.5 million

[2] Germany is an outlier. German is both an SRR and a MRHS. German sovereignty practices do not map on to traditional MRHS.

refugees. And Gaza, which would otherwise be excluded from the global conversation about refugee displacement, reportedly hosts 1.3 million Palestine refugees (UNRWA).

SRR accept symbolic numbers of refugees to create national narratives of magnanimity and humanism (FitzGerald 2019). Symbolism plays a different role for MRHS. Large numbers of refugees, and large ratios of refugees to citizens, become symbols of the "refugee burden." Some MRHS compete over who carries the heaviest burden – a contest in which the winner earns greater international support, aid dollars, and global recognition.

A state's representation of the number of refugees hosted favors whatever rhetorical constructions sound like a heavier burden. For example, when representing the refugee burden in Turkey, headlines describe the number of refugees hosted without taking into account the total population of the state. Refugees comprise less than 4% of Turkey's total population of 80 million people (World Bank N.d.). In contrast, Lebanon hosts less than half of the number of refugees that Turkey does. But, with a total population of six million people, one in four people in Lebanon is a refugee (World Bank N.d.). Therefore, representations of Lebanon focus on the ratio of refugees to citizens to emphasize the state's refugee burden.

State borders are relatively porous, although this is not to say that they are completely open. Borders are usually open in the early months, or even years, of conflict in the neighboring state. As the violence continues to unfold, MRHS may be less inclined to accept more refugees (unless global incentive structures change). Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have all closed their borders to Syrian refugees at some point during the Syrian crisis. Across the world, *when* a person flees can affect if he or she will be granted refuge.

In contrast to SRR, MRHS do not engage in a multi-year screening and selection processes. Refugees undergo minimal screening at the border that may consist of document

inspections and health checks. Notably, people who seek refuge in MRHS are not rejected on the basis of a "credible fear" adjudication, which is often the case in SRR. Refugees are likely to experience rejection as a member of a larger group deemed to be a threat to national security based on gendered, regional, or ethnic descriptors. Young men, especially those who are traveling without family members, are more likely to be rejected at the border for their potential or perceived ties to violence in their home country. Refugees may also be rejected entry based on their geographic proximately, and therefore potential affiliation, with violent actors. For example, Syrian refugees fleeing from ISIS controlled areas were treated differently than groups that fled other regions in Syria. Moreover, Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS) have been subject to greater scrutiny and rejected at the Jordanian and Lebanese borders due to their ethnic ties to Palestine.

With relatively little pre-entry selection, government officials employ other mechanisms of control once refugees are inside the state. Screening and selection often takes place post-migration. State officials make rolling assessments about which refugees are allowed to reside inside the state. Those who disobey laws and policies are subject to fines, forced encampment, detention, and deportation or *refoulement*. State mechanisms of control limit refugees' freedom of movement and association. Officials closely monitor refugees through random security checks and the issuing and renewing of identification documents. In Jordan, for example, some refugees who have sought unauthorized work have been forcibly relocated to a refugee camp. Other who have communicated with family and friends in Syria have been deported for possible (but not proven) ties to terrorism.

The challenges are refugee reception in MRHS can be crudely divided into two camps: States prioritize national security by monitoring, policing, and controlling refugees. Conversely,

MRHS largely delegate refugee care to international and supranational organizations, which provide refugees with basic needs, education, and health care. MRHS do not have the institutional capacity or resources to do so without international intervention.

The UNHCR is the most prominent refugee protection agency in the world. With the permission of MRHS, the UNHCR works with host governments, other UN agencies [such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Women (UN Women)], and hundreds of INGOs, NGOs, and CBOs (community-based organizations). Some scholars argue that reliance on these agencies creates dual governance structures that erodes state authority, while other scholars claim that dependence on international institutions is the result of state choice and does not compromise sovereignty (Gilpin 1975).

Variation in the kinds of partnerships between MRHS and the UNHCR may differ from one state to another. Some states place greater limits on international involvement, while others cooperate closely throughout governance sectors. All MRHS rely on international support to maintain their refugee hosting capacity.

International aid can affect the relationship between citizens and the state, especially when refugee aid neglects local citizens. Actual and perceived disparities between refugees and citizens can lead to host community tensions and discontent with governing officials. Beyond relative deprivation (Stark and Taylor 1991), which occurs when people compare themselves to others within their community, citizens may also compare their quality of life before and after refugee reception. Hosting large refugee populations can cause overcrowding, contribute to traffic concerns, degrade urban infrastructure, and deplete natural resources including drinking

water. New demands on hospitals and schools, affordable housing, and competition over employment opportunities also contribute to antagonism toward refugees.

MRHS have largely rejected refugee integration as a durable solution to the problem of displacement. States employ policies that deny refugees social, economic, or political integration. In that vein, most refugees in MRHS will never have a pathway to citizenship. State officials fear that if refugees become citizens, they will no longer be the responsibility of the international community, and international support will dissipate (Kagan 2012). For MRHS, the prospect of becoming solely responsible for refugees without international funds can be debilitating.

Without citizenship, refugees are rhetorically intended to be temporary migrants that will return home when the violence subsides. Temporality is a fiction written into policy. For example, the 1998 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Jordan and the UNHCR, updated in 2014, states that refugees will be resettled to SRR after a limited period of time in Jordan. However, no one believes that all 660,000 Syrian refugees registered with the UN will be resettled. Most of the world's refugees (13.4 million) live in protracted situations, defined as five of more years of displacement. Three million of whom have been refugees for 38 years or more (Global Trends 2018). Without a doubt, generations of refugees will live in MRHS before their families can return home.

Images and narratives produced in MRHS play an important role in the social construction of the global refugee story. Photographs from MRHS of refugees queued in the desert, gathered in dusty camps, and huddled in empty apartments tell a quintessential story of refugees' despair. MRHS have an incentive to perpetuate these stories to carefully constructed a narrative that will attract international aid dollars (see Who Controls the Refugee Story). In the

process, refugee hosting in MRHS is denationalized. Unlike in some SRR, where the values of "a nation of immigrants" are upheld through refugee resettlement, refugees are largely excluded from the national narratives of MRHS. Instead, MRHS are treated as warehouses that simultaneously protect and contain refugees, stopping them from migrating to the Global North (Smith 2004). By denationalizing MRHS, citizens in MRHS are largely neglected as well.

How Does Leveraging Sovereignty Work?:

When it comes to refugee hosting, state sovereignty practices are mutually constitutive between SRR and MRHS. SRR can preempt aspects of sovereignty erosion by controlling the number of refugees allowed to enter state territory and the rate at which refugees are received. SRR depend on MRHS to contain refugee populations abroad, which they do. Countries around the world work together to protect, contain, control, and manage the world's refugees. To understand how and why Jordan has accepted large numbers of refugees, scholars must simultaneously consider the global distribution of refugees, and potential refugees – in the contemporary case of Jordan, this includes Syrians who want to exit Syria but have been unable to do so. Jordanian officials weight domestic and international considerations in the same equation.

Jordanian sovereignty is enacted through daily practices including border control; refugee screening, selection and monitoring; the control of refugee movement; and negotiations with other states and aid agencies. There is no one policy that captures how state officials maintain sovereignty. Instead, sovereignty practices occur on an ad hoc basis and are subject to discretion, changing concerns, and external incentives to control immigration and contain refugees.

Variation in mechanisms of control emerge partly because refugee hosting is unpredictable. Jordanian officials did not expect that the Syrian crisis would as long as it has. No one foresaw the influx of asylum seekers to Europe in 2015 and 2016 (see the New Grand Compromise). People did not expect that an additional 285,000 – 320,000 Syrians would become refugees in June and July of 2018 (IRIN 2018). Policies are reactive, but responses to changing needs create new opportunities for negotiations between powerful entities: the Jordanian state, the international community, aid agencies, Syrian officials, and states in the Global North that engage in remote control.

Patterns of governance have emerged despite variation in mechanisms of control, the tendency to create ad hoc policies, and the changing needs on the ground. Jordanian officials prioritize two aspects of refugee hosting: state security and international support. Other junctures at which sovereignty is enacted (border control, screening and selection, encampment, and rights) have yielded to national security concerns and efforts to attract international aid.

When policies change, refugees, citizens, and aid workers also reassess their options and opportunities. The domains of protection, control, and containment (that are traditionally understood as the mandate of the state) are actually enacted by people on the ground. In this way, sovereignty practices are also take place from the ground-up. Refugee movement across borders is facilitated, or impeded, by citizens. Refugees can be the agents of aid allocation, especially when they are hired as "volunteers." Aid workers advocate for refugees' legal protections even while they defer to state officials' security concerns. Decision-making and discretion happens as people respond to specific needs and changing policies. The states exerts control and authority, but refugees, citizens, and aid workers push back against those mechanisms of control to challenge sovereignty practices and, in turn, remake them.

Jordanian practices of authority do not only respond to refugee reception, but also build on Jordan's position as a postcolonial state in a world order that privileges powerful rich states over developing states in the Global South. It is not only Jordan's history of refugee reception – from Circassian, Chechen, Armenian, Palestinian, and Iraqi refugees to Syrian refugees - that has created a path dependent relationship. Jordan's role as an indebted country with limited natural resources makes Jordan's "refugee hosting capacity" a good that can be leveraged to secure international recognition, create opportunities for some citizens (especially elite members of society), and increase military, development, and refugee aid. Of course, refugee hosting also creates many recognized and unforeseen challenges making "refugee hosting capacity" as risky venture. Jordanian citizens and residents, especially low-income people that have been socially marginalized, often bear the greatest burden in the "grand compromise."

Jordan's efforts to stop refugee immigration have global consequences. leaders have summarily refused to accept any more Syrian refugees. Being a MRHS that is willing and capable to host a large number of refugees does not mean that the state is willing and capable of hosting *all* refugees who arrive at their borders. As the Syrian conflict enters its seventh year, and as states in the Global North struggle with their own refugee challenges, the refugee burden has weighed heavier on Jordan. Since 2013, King Abdullah II has advocated for "safe zones" within Syria that would stop Syrians from crossing into Jordan to seek refuge (Barnard and Cumming-Bruce 2013). Jordanian officials have continuously advocated for aiding Syrians in Syria – essentially, stopping refugees from becoming refugees. Such an approach can undermine the right to exit any state (including one's home country) and the right seek asylum.

Why Frame this Research in Terms of Sovereignty?

This project is framed in terms of sovereignty to capture the multifaceted ways that power operates to shape refugees' lives. Internal and external dimensions of sovereignty bring Jordanian national-level interests to bear with the interests of dominant states. The relationship between SRR and MRHS are characterized by global inequality, which is then reproduced through the negotiations about how to control refugees. Jordanian officials must necessarily confront disparities in wealth and power in the global system of refugee management. At the same time, domestic aspects of sovereignty recognize that the Jordanian state dominants refugees in the country. The state exercises control over refugees and citizens even though international dynamics of power continue to shape the priorities of state officials.

Sovereignty also shapes how aid agencies operate to provide protection and resources to refugees Aid agencies are confined by donors who must approve projects, set aid priorities, and impose time limits on intervention (see Harrell-Bond and Verdirame 2005). Some important donors are working on behalf of state interests in the Global North. Even though these institutions defer to national sovereignty in their charters, aid workers often search for ways to subvert national policies and donors' requirements in order to meet their goals.

Sovereignty is the elephant in the room. Powerful entities (international institutions, the host state, donor states) work together to create an overarching narrative of what the "refugee problem" is, which consequently, suggest what the "refugee solution" should be. The overarching narrative defers to sovereignty by shifting the focus to human rights and humanitarianism – away from the political will of states or how displacement can be stopped by curtailing states violence perpetuated by states. As Hathaway (1990) explains, the aim of refugee law "is not specifically to meet the needs of the refugees themselves (as both the humanitarian and human rights paradigms would suggest), but rather is to govern disruptions of regulated

international migration in accordance with the interests of states" (as cited in Kagan 2012). This project calls out sovereignty, as a principle and enacted practice. By putting the actions of refugees and citizens in conversation with the actions of states and international institutions, this dissertation documents document the ways that people push back against powerful authorities.

Chapter 2: Knowledge Production and the Field of Refugee Studies:

There are many ways to study refugee displacement. Legal scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, international relations (IR) scholars, ethnic studies scholars, and refugee advocates have all contributed to the multidisciplinary field of Refugee Studies. Despite the breadth of scholarship on forced migration, there is a need for more interdisciplinary work as the parameters of discipline-specific studies limit the kinds of questions that academics ask and confine the scope of scientific inquiry (see FitzGerald and Arar 2018, on bridging sociology and Refugee Studies).

Legal scholars are often in conversations with other legal scholars about the latitude of international instruments to define and protect refugees (Hathaway and Neve 1997; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007; Moore, Musalo, and Boswell 2011). Political scientists, political sociologists, and IR scholars have broached similar questions about immigration policies to study how states respond to refugee flows, especially regarding asylum seekers who seek protection in the West (Zolberg 1989; Betts 2009; Hamlin 2014; FitzGerald forthcoming). Anthropologists and ethnic studies scholars have question pervasive narratives of refugee suffering and called for refugees to be treated as expert knowledge producers (Malkki 1995; Espiritu 2014). Refugee advocates, specifically representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) and the UNHCR (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), have published countless reports about the kinds of resources that refugees can access, the operational challenges of providing aid, and statistical information about displacement and reception (see the UNHCR's Global Trends series). Each of these fields provides important insights to the study of forced migration, but knowledge production has been largely siloed.

Epistemological divisions are magnified by the relationship between research questions

and methodology, especially data collection practices and sampling. Some scholars, for example, may analyze refugees' artwork to learn about the experiences of displacement, while others infer different conclusions about the same topic from statistical data. Tendencies to use one form of data over another tend to fall along disciplinary lines. Legal scholars may analyze laws and policies while anthropologists may use ethnography. This is no different than other investigations of social phenomenon. But the point remains: knowledge production is not only confined by the questions that scholars ask, but also, the methods and tools that scholars use to answer those questions. Important questions about forced migration that fall between the siloed disciplines, and require multiple and differing sources of data, are left unanswered.

Despite differences in scholarship, all refugee scholars must contend with is a pervasive, carefully curated, and globally constructed narrative about refugees. Academic scholarship is always in conversation with politically informed "facts" about who refugees are, what kinds of protections refugees deserve, where refugees come from, and where refugees "should" go. Answers to these questions are not value neutral. Powerful actors have a stake in shaping the social construction of refugee "problems." Western states are primarily interested in immigration control (FitzGerald forthcoming); MRHS benefit from specific characterizations of refugees; and international actors who are charged with humanitarian responsibilities must navigate state and organizational interests (Loescher 2001; Harrell-Bond and Voutira 2007).

These states and international agencies produce and disseminate most of the macro-level data available about refugee displacement. Every year, the UNHCR counts the world's refugees and publishes reports about refugee host states, countries of resettlement, and top donor states. State officials also count refugees. Through a legal process called refugee status determination (RSD), state officials decide who is and is not a refugee by either recognizing or rejecting

refugee claimants. A question as simple as “Who is a refugee?” can have far reaching political and economic consequences. For example, people fleeing communist countries were recognized in the U.S. as refugees who were “voting with their feet” in favor of democracy (Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Keely 2001; see the Hungarian Escape Act of 1958, Cuban Adjustment Act, and Vietnamese resettlement). Macro-level data is simultaneously informative and problematic. Without painstaking critical reflection, the interests of states and international agencies can be baked into academic knowledge production.

Working within this milieu, scholarship about refugee displacement has been limited by four pervasive trends: 1) the reliance on the legal definition of a refugee as set by the 1951 Refugee Convention; 2) the prioritization of policy relevance; 3) the investigation of primarily Western states; and 4) the systematic neglect of the sending or conflict state. Each of these points reinforce one another.

Reliance on the legal definition of a refugee: The 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 1[A]) states that a refugee as a person who:

> … owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This definition excludes many people who have experience forced displacement and persecution for reasons other than what is outlined above. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), environmental refugees, slaves, deportees, people who have experienced development-inducted displacement and resettlement (DIDR), and trafficking victims do not qualify for protection under the Convention definition.

Article 1[A] provides a legal definition for refugees – not a sociological one. When scholars use the Convention definition to identify refugees, or build upon data that only uses the Convention definition, they risk making general claims about refugees based on a subsect of refugees defined not by their experiences but by the recognition of states and the UN (FitzGerald and Arar, 2018). Moreover, because of the primacy of the Convention definition, important scholarship about refugees that does not primarily identify research subjects as "refugees" has often been excluded from the field of Refugee Studies (see, for example, Davis 2010).

The prioritization of policy relevance: Scholars who study refugee movement are often guided by, or respond to, policy (for scholars that caution against this practice, see Blackwell 2008; Bradley 2007; Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Black 2001). The motivation behind such an approach is understandable, even laudable, when scholars are inspired to improve the practices that negatively affect refugees. For example, Betts and Collier (2017) worked closely with Jordanian officials to create employment opportunities for Syrian refugees, an effort that received support from states in the Global North. In other cases, government officials have turned to scholarly work to make informed decisions about refugees and asylum seekers (see Phillips and Spinks 2013). Still, Castles cautions that "policy-driven research can lead not only to poor sociology, but also to bad policy" (2003, p. 26). He explains that "narrowly-focused empirical research" intended to address a "bureaucratic problem" can provide misguided best practices that cause harm despite good intentions (ibid.).

Most notably, consequential definitions that have emerged from immigration policies and legal instruments can reify a stagnant understanding of refugee movement. Referring to the Convention definition, Scalettaris (2007) writes, "…By taking the category of 'refugees' as both the primary focus and the boundary of its research, Refugee Studies is underpinned by

definitions that originate from policy." Policy language also appears in the ways that states and movement are categorized. The U.S., Canada, and Australia are often hailed as the "top countries of refugee resettlement" when in reality "refugee resettlement" only applies to less than one percent of all refugees. Refugee resettlement is the process of selecting and vetting refugees from MRHS to accept in states of refugee resettlement in the Global North. Meanwhile, MRHS are often called "countries of first asylum" despite the fact that most of the world's refugees will never be resettled to another state. MRHS are final destinations for most refugees, not places of "first asylum," which is a fact that is obscured by language. The language that scholars have used to describe refugee movement is often Western-centric, possibility because of the prominence of Western state interests in policy creation (see Chimni 1998).

The investigation of primarily Western states: Beginning with the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees were defined as people fleeing persecution in Europe after World War II. The geographic and temporal limitations were later removed with the drafting of the 1967 Refugee Protocol; but the origins of the international legal instrument remained in the interests of Western states (Chimni 1998; Davies 2006; Cuéllar 2006). Western-centric scholarship is not unique to the study of refugees (Mohanty 1984; Levitt 2012). However, what is unique in the case of Refugee Studies is that most of the world's refugees – 85% in 2017 – live in developing countries in the Global South (Global Trends 2018). Nevertheless, there is an overrepresentation of academic studies that address the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers in the West. From the investigation of legal institutions to integration policies, generalizable theories about refugees' motives, actions, and constraints often come from empirical observations of Western, liberal democracies. Scholarly knowledge production, especially theorization, is limited when most of the world's refugees fall outside the scope of analysis.

While one would not be hard pressed to find scholarly work about refugee displacement in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia (Arar 2016; Chatty 2010; Milner 2009; Sassoon 2008), these studies are often read as "special cases" while Western contexts are assumed as the "norm" (for notable exception, see Malkki 1995). Even when refugees have spent an extensive periods of time in MRHS, scholars who study refugee movement to the West usually begin their analysis when refugees enter Western territory. This type of methodological nationalism neglects that refugee experiences – from trauma, to social ties, to educational attainment – are all informed by what is usually several years spent as refugees in MRHS (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Western-centric scholarship is also a result of greater governmental transparency and greater freedom to conduct politically controversial social science research in liberal democracies. As Kagan (2012) explains, MRHS always reserve the right to withdraw their invitation to the UNHCR or ignore their recommendations. The lack of macro-level data about MRHS often lead scholars to overly rely on reports by the UNHCR and their operating partners or institutions such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, all of which have their own agendas. The political character of MRHS, and the experiences of citizens as members of the host community, are often outside the scope of scholarly analysis even though both elements very much shape the lives of refugees.

The systematic neglect of the sending or conflict state: For scholars, the conflict or sending state is often tangential to the study of refugee displacement. Syria, for example, may fall outside the scope of analysis for a scholar who is studying how refugee children navigate English language education in schools in Toronto. For refugees, however, the conflict state is home. Home is always a part of refugees' daily lives, motivations, and experiences – the same way it would be for anyone else. Although there are restrictions to collecting data in places like

Syria, there are other ways in which refugee scholars can incorporate questions about where refugees come from and how leaving their homeland has affected refugees' experience of displacement.

The theoretical, methodological, and empirical choices that have informed the scope and contributions of this dissertation emerged in response to gaps in the study of refugee displacement described above. While I do not address each of these issues directly in my research questions, my data collection and analysis takes into consideration the value of interdisciplinary work, the limitations of relying on the Convention definition of a refugee, the ways that prioritization policy relevance may affect scholarly research, the primacy of Western-centric scholarship, and the systematic neglect of the conflict state.

Methods:

Through ethnography and in-depth, semi-structured interviews, I investigate the effects of refugee hosting on Jordanian sovereignty from the perspectives of Syrian refugees, Jordanian citizens, UN, NGO, and government officials. I triangulate responses to study how these groups interact to bring the practice of sovereignty into being. Data collection took place from July 2014 – July 2018, with varying degrees of active collection. In all, I spent 16 months in the field and have been able to observe how hosting Syrian refugees has changed over time.

I conducted interviews in Arabic and English. For the most part, I spoke Arabic with refugees, Jordanian citizens, and some government officials, and English with international aid workers who have come to Jordan from all over the world. As an Arabic heritage speaker, I am familiar with Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian dialects and the pleasantries that polish Arabic conversations. There were times when my Arabic was not robust enough so I asked clarifying

questions to make sure I understood what my participant was telling me. I steered interviews away from politically contentious topics (like allegiances of involvement with non-government actors) in my interviews with vulnerable populations, especially where people may be subject to careful monitoring. When conducting interviews inside refugee camps, I also consulted with trusted interlocutors to make sure that my questions, or line of questioning, would not jeopardize a refugees' security. My interview questions were informed by evolving immigration and integration policies, political events, and public statements made by government or aid officials. Most interviews were recorded on a digital recorder with the permission of the interviewee. All names used in this dissertation are pseudonyms. I have also anonymized some personal stories (removing specific details about dates and places) to protect individuals from potential identification.

After meeting with representatives from the Ministry of Interior's Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), I was given permission by the following government offices to enter Syrian refugee camps: (a) Adviser to the King for National Security and Head of the Jordanian Central Intelligence Agency; (b) Internal Security Agency, Director of Security; (c) Office of the National Guard; (d) the mayor of Mafraq; (e) Director of Military Security; (f) Director of Information and Media; (g) Refugee Affairs Coordination Office. I also partnered with a large NGO that works as a UN implementing partner in Za'tari and Azraq refugee camps and in urban areas. I refer to this organization with a pseudonym, HOPE. To conduct this research, I have traveled throughout Jordan, focusing primarily on Amman, Syrian refugee camps, and informal tented settlements around Mafraq and Irbid.

Table 2.1: Number of Interviews Conducted by Group

Refugee Total	70
Citizen Total	65
Officials Total	40
Total in study	175

Sampling Refugees:

As of February 2018, 81% of Syrian refugees live in urban areas, meaning that they are outside of refugee camps (Reliefweb 2018). Meanwhile, approximately 140,002 Syrian refugees live in three major camps: Za'atari (78,994), Azraq (53,967), and Emirati Jordanian Camp (7,041). While this percentage of urban and peri-urban settling refugees has increased gradually over the years, the majority of Syrian refugees have consistently lived outside of refugee camps since July of 2013 (see Syria Regional Refugee Response, Jordan).[3] However, my sampling does not reflect this 8:2 ratio.

Most of the interviews I conducted with Syrian refugees were with refugees living in Za'atari camp. I have theoretically sampled interviews with refugees living in camps to document valuable ethnographic observations of UN-Jordanian partnerships, which speaks to practices of authority and governance within a spaced dominated by the UNHCR. I was given permission to enter Za'atari, Azraq, King Abdullah Park (KAP), and Emirati Jordanian Camp (also known as Murijep al Fhoud) refugee camps by the Jordanian Ministry of Interior. Za'atari, Azraq, and King Abdullah Park (KAP) are operated in partnership with the UNHCR, but the Emirati refugee camp was run in partnership with the United Arab Emirates with minimal dependence on the humanitarian organizations that operate in the other camps. Ethnographic

[3] Peri-urban spaces are those that fall between within rural-to-urban transition zones. I borrow this terminology from NGOs that work to provide housing assistance to Syrian refugees.

observations and interview data from this camp was particularly important because it provided an example in which the Jordanian state had invited another sovereign state into its territory to share in the governance of refugees.

Other Syrian refugee camps also exist, which are run solely by the Jordanian government without UNHCR. These camps include Cyber City, Rukban, and Hadalat. Cyber City housed Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS), many of whom fled to Jordan from the Palestinian refugee camp in Syria called Yarmouk camp. Rukban and Hadalat are Syrian refugee camps at the Jordanian-Syrian border. An estimated 85,000 Syrian refugees, many of whom were from ISIS controlled areas, live in these camps. While sampling from these camps would have been ideal, especially considering the variation in authority between co-run and solely-run camps, the role of the border in Rukban and Hadalat, and the historically informed treatment of Palestine refugees, it was not feasible for me to conduct interviews in these camps. I was explicitly denied permission from traveling to the border region on my official camp entry documents. I also asked if I could enter Cyber City, but was also denied entry for "security reasons." Cyber City was closed in October of 2016 and its occupants were moved to KAP where 316 of the 526 occupants were Palestine refugees from Syria. The occupants of KAP were moved to Emirati Jordanian Camp by June 2016 (Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update, 2016).

I also interviewed Syrian refugees living in Amman, Mafraq, and in informal tented settlements on the outskirts of Mafraq and Irbid. Amman was home to the largest number of Syrian refugees in Jordan, while Mafraq had the highest percentage of Syrian refugees of any Jordanian city. I used snowball sampling with diverse points of entry to recruit participants, which allowed me to build upon an established trust network. I theoretically sampled from these two cities to consider variations in demographics. Below is a chart of the number and percentage

of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, updated June 24, 2018 and adapted from the Syria Regional Refugee Response, Jordan.

Table 2.2: Distribution of Syrian Refugees Registered with the UNHCR, June 2018

Governorates	% of Refugees	Num. of Refugees
Amman	29.3%	194,958
Mafraq	24.4%	162,213
Irbid	21.0%	139,945
Zarqa	14.6%	96,897
Balqa	3.0%	19,753
Madaba	2.0%	13,020
Jarash	1.5%	9,860
Karak	1.3%	8,912
Maan	1.2%	7,730
Ajlun	1.1%	7,244
Aqaba	0.5%	3,561
Tafilah	0.3%	1,714

I included a representative gender and age distribution. I also took into consideration year of displacement when sampling is an important but often overlooked indicator of how refugees are treated at the border, where they live (camp or city), and their engagement with governmental and aid institutions. My ethnographic work allowed me to witness interactions between refugees and Jordanians, aid workers, and government officials. I attended town hall meetings hosted by the UNHCR and the Jordanian Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. As part of my ethnography, I volunteered to teach Syrian children at an informal school and taught English through tutoring. I also volunteered with an informal group that provided basic assistance to Sudanese refugees and consulted for UNRWA on issues of refugee mental health.

Sampling Citizens:

I conducted interviews throughout Amman, taking into consideration socio-economic class, form of employment, engagement with refugees and NGOs, family or tribe affiliations, sex, age, education, and number of dependents. I paid close attention to class distinctions when sampling Jordanian citizens. Many wealthier Jordanians have benefited from new well-paying job opportunities with international NGOs, while poorer Jordanians have experienced higher rent prices and fewer job opportunities in informal sectors. Class is an important indicator of how Jordanian citizens have experienced Syrian refugee reception. Throughout my interviews, I began to pay close attention to familial refugee histories which influenced how people talked about Syrian reception.

I also conducted interviews with Jordanians in Mafraq and Irbid. In comparison to Amman, Mafraq and Irbid have experienced greater demographic shifts due to their proximity to the Jordanian-Syrian border and the high degree of national homogeneity before 2011. Residents of Amman were more likely to have interacted with other refugee populations in the past, specifically Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. Mafraq, the city that experienced the greatest demographic shifts, was largely homogenous before the Syrian refugee crisis. In 2004, 6% of Mafraq's residents were non-Jordanian nationals according to the national census (Jordanian National Census, 2004, Table 3.6). By 2015, 43% of the population was non-Jordanian (Jordanian National Census, 2015, Table 3.6). In comparison, from 2004 to 2015, Irbid's non-Jordanian population grew from 4% to 26% while Amman's non-Jordanian population increased from 11% to 36% (Ibid.). (See table above for distribution of registered Syrian refugees in Jordanian cities as of 2018.)

The people I spoke to on a daily basis were Jordanians who, while they may have been from other parts of Jordan, were living in Amman. Therefore, there is an over representation of

Jordanians from Amman in this study. I also oversampled Jordanian aid workers, which is who I spent much of my time with. However, when I quote an aid worker, I always note that this Jordanian respondent fits within this special category. This study includes a greater number of interviews with refugees as compared to citizens because it was more feasible to engage in ethnographic observation with Jordanian citizens to gather data.

My questions for Jordanian citizens revolved around their interactions with Syrian refugees and how they have experienced changes in their lives since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis. I asked questions about sectors that are often cited as being affected by the "refugee burden," including education, health care, traffic, housing, employment, and security.

Sampling UN, NGO, and Jordanian Government Officials:

I engaged in extensive participant and non-participant observation with government officials, including a trip with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior to Dublin, Ireland to attend a European Union-organized conference. This international conference brought together Arab and European states to discuss migration concerns in the wake of the European refugee crisis and the value of diaspora population. I also sought out town halls and events in Jordan, which were organized in partnership with government ministries and aid agencies to observe information sharing and cooperation. Finally, I also attended meetings among different aid agencies to better understand the challenges and achievement that aid agencies.

I selected Jordanian government officials who were part of the "line ministries," that work closely with UN and aid agencies to facilitate the Syrian response. These include Ministry of Interior; Ministry Planning and International Cooperation; Ministry of Public Works and Housing; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Labour; and Ministry of Social Development. I also

conducted interviews with members of the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. I spoke to member of these ministries about the "refugee burden" to learn more about how governmental responsibilities have changed since the start of the Syrian refugee response and how ministries have partnered with other agencies to achieve their goals.

I also spoke with representatives and aid workers from the UN, NGO, and INGOs. I sought out people who provided support for refugees in different sectors of the response including housing, education, and "cash for work" aid. I reached out to aid representatives that met with, or partnered with, Jordanian ministries to learn how collaboration takes place. I sampled aid representatives that worked (and continue to work) in camps and urban areas. Some of the aid representatives were members of the international community, meaning they came to Jordan from all over the world (but mostly the West). Aid workers that worked most closely with refugees and Jordanian beneficiaries tended to be Jordanian citizens because they have the necessary language abilities.

My line of questioning was twofold. First, I conducted "information interviews" to get a better understanding of what kind of aid was provided to refugees and Jordanian beneficiaries. I asked questions about how aid policies have changed in response to governmental policies. Secondly, I asked questions about aid workers' experiences when working with government officials to advocate for their interventions.

Interviews were guided by public statements from government and aid officials that appear in the news, on Twitter, or in reports produced by respective agencies. Throughout the dissertation, I cite some of these reports, which have been instrumental in shaping my understanding of the Syrian refugee response in Jordan.

Chapter 3: Who Controls the Global Refugee Story?

Refugee stories are political. Collective action and peaceful protest against a seemingly mundane government policy can be met with heavy-handed state responses and violent retaliation. Violence often begets more violence. Social institutions break down as war breaks out. Unemployment rises and food prices soar. Electricity, clean water, and gasoline become scarce. Children and young adults stop attending school, either because schools no longer operate, or because it is unsafe to be there. Families are torn apart by displacement and death. New leaders emerge at home and in exile, as transnational networks are formed and strengthened.

Once safely across state borders, politics continues to shape refugees' lives. The politics of refugee reception are international as much as they are local. Where refugees live, how they make money or receive aid, their mental and physical health, and what their futures will become are tied to the politics of advocacy and the limits of humanitarianism. Political actors and the consequences of their decisions affect the refugee story every step of the way, from mass exile to their lives afterwards in a host nation.

And yet, humanitarian aid for refugees is explicitly depoliticized. As one high ranking UNHCR official stated, "We [the UNHCR] are non-political. We try to depoliticize everything that we do. We are a humanitarian organization" (public presentation 5/30/18). Humanitarian actors must navigate a world that is divided into sovereign states where state actors give and withhold permissions for intervention and aid.

Therein lies the paradox: How do humanitarian actors work with state actors to develop non-political solutions to political problems? This question is central to the scholarly literature on humanitarianism. Barnett writes:

> Humanitarian actors acknowledge that their interventions will have political effects, but humanitarianism, unlike human rights, does not have a political or partisan agenda… If aid workers are seen as being overtly or intentionally political they will lose access to those in need, and potentially become viewed as a party to war and thus a legitimate target (2018 p. 298).

Barnett illustrates how humanitarianism strategically adopts a non-political ethos: Humanitarianism is "not about expanding rights and claims that individuals can make on the state and others, but rather about expanding architecture whose purpose is to save lives at risk" (2018 p. 293). Slim's (1997) research examines how the words "humanity," "neutrality," "impartiality," and "solidarity" are used in humanitarian discourse, which reflects the essence of humanitarian work.

Despite displays of apolitical restraint, humanitarianism is widely theorized as inescapably political (Barnett and Weiss 2008). Intervention, no matter its intent, is a form of control (Barnett 2011). Agier calls humanitarian aid the "left hand of the empire" that is in "secret solidarity with the police order" (2010 p. 29; p. 30). Dunn (2012) pushes against Agier's characterization. She does not advocate for humanitarian intentions; instead, she criticizes the totalitarian characterization of humanitarianism. Dunn (2012) claims that humanitarianism does not have the capacity to be totalitarian. Bumbling and chaotic, humanitarianism creates "disorder" and prevents displaced people from making reasonable plans for own futures (Dunn 2012 p. 2).

I build upon the work of scholars who have studied and critiqued the relationship between humanitarian intervention and refugee aid. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the careful construction of the *global refugee story* allows humanitarian institutions to navigate the interests of sovereigns, while also providing aid to refugees. The global refugee story is the

overarching global narrative about who refugees are, where they come from, and what they deserve.

On the surface, the global refugee story has been made to appear neutral or non-political – in line with humanitarian norms. But, in reality, this is not the case. I re-politicize what has become accepted as common knowledge by deconstructing the global refugee story and identifying refugees and others who have been systematically excluded from the narrative. Who is given the platform to speak about refugee experiences? How are these refugee stories curated and amplified?

Several scholars of forced migration have studied the social construction of a refugee story (Shacknove 1985; Chimni 1998; Skran and Daughtry 2007; Gatrell 2013) and applied their analytical lenses to different empirical contexts around the world (Zarowsky 1997; Duncanson 2003; Espiritu 2006). Canonical texts, like Liisa Malkki's (1995) work on the critical mapping of "the refugee" or Gil Loescher's (2001) investigation of the UNHCR, reveal that the social construction of the refugee story is forged against contentious politics.

Refugees spotlight the shortcomings of the nation-state system (Zolberg et al. 1989; Haddad 2008). Refugee displacement has been used to embarrass states, like in the case of Cuba (Keely 2001 p.307). Meanwhile, refugees' voluntary repatriation has been used as evidence that a state has stabilized or become safe (Crisp 1986; Chimni 1993). Refugee return can be such a powerful indicator of state stability that people are either forced to return or left with no better options than to return home despite a continued risk of personal violence. Refugee reception has also been used to exalt the values of liberal democracies, like in the case of Canada (Bloemraad 2006), and as a litmus test for the limits of liberal governance in Western Europe (Freeman 1995; Brubaker 1995; Joppke 1998).

Working within the confines of sovereigns, the global refugee story is one of the most powerful tools available to humanitarian aid organizations. Human rights are rhetorical (Dembour 2010). But, narratives matter (Hunt 2007; Laqueur 2009). The global refugee story has real-life consequences. Some refugees who are captured in the images that circulate around the world become worthy of assistance. Those who fall outside the camera's golden light are often forgotten; their rights and protection needs are deprioritized if not completely neglected.

This chapter reveals the process of how political interests influence what practitioners, policymakers, and scholars know about refugee experiences. I unravel how politics is intertwined with knowledge production. The global refugee story not only shapes the common perception of refugees in the media, but also demarcates the parameters of political inquiry and creates blinders for academic knowledge production. I demonstrate that since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, refugee stories that are selected, produced, and curated from Jordan are intentionally used to construct the contemporary global narrative of refugee displacement. For the sake of fund-raising, the social construction of refugee worthiness is gendered and racialized and further curated to stroke the sympathies of Western audiences. My argument is presented in five steps as summarized in Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.1: Who is Given the Platform to Speak about Refugee Experiences?

At the largest scale of analysis, I argue that the global refugee story responds, first and foremost, to the interests of donor states in the Global North. Building on the argument and data presented in Chapter Nine, “The New Grand Compromise: How Syrian Refugees Changed the Stakes of the Stakes in the Global Refugee Assistance Regime,” I reveal how the global refugee story is created to respond to Western donors. The second step in the funnel of my argument describes how select MRHS are made central to the global refugee story. Quintessential images of refugees, including those in camps, reinforce where and how “real” refugees are “supposed” to live. Third, Syrian refugee stories are given greater attention over other displaced groups within Jordan and Syrians are prioritized at the expense of these other groups. The fourth step illustrates that not all Syrians are given an equal platform to share their experiences. Syrian refugees in Za’atari refugee camp are made more accessible to journalists, international government officials, and scholars than other Syrian refugees. Finally, heterogeneity also exists within Za’atari refugee camp, which is currently home to approximately 80,000 Syrians. Within

the camp, only select Syrian refugees are interviewed and their words are further curated by the journalists and scholars who conduct interviews.

The global refugee story is a social construct with real-life consequences. The “facts” that underlie knowledge production need to be questioned. The notion of humanitarian neutrality, while instrumental for humanitarian actors, need not be blindly adopted by scholars and policymakers. When we study how the refugee “problem” is socially constructed, we also see how the refugee “solution” is politically motivated in corresponding ways.

What is the Global Refugee Story?:

Many humanitarian organizations tell remarkably similar stories (see Davey 2012). They describe who refugees are, where they come from, and what they deserve. These renditions are retold in press meetings, shared across news headlines, used to frame academic research, and become central to humanitarian interventions. Streamlining the narrative has a purpose. Dijkzeul and Moke explain, “In our era of sound bites... it is crucial for humanitarian organizations to adopt a coherent and credible approach to their public communication” (2005 p. 673). Some elements of the global refugee story are so consistent that they have become nothing short of formulaic.

First, the “basic facts” about the scale of refugee displacement are established. The UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have referred to contemporary refugee displacement as “the largest refugee crisis since WWII” with 65.6 million displaced persons, 22.5 million of whom are refugees who have crossed state borders (Global Trends 2018). While it makes for a pithy headline, this claim is false. The statement is built upon a baseline UNHCR statistic that only accounts for European displacement. As described by FitzGerald and Arar, the

WWII count neglects the "additional 90 million people displaced in Asia alone, for a total of 175 million people displaced by World War II across the globe" (2018 p. 390). In this case, a scholarly critique of the global refugee story offers an inconvenient amendment that undermines the overarching narrative of unprecedented need.

After establishing the scale of refugee displacement, the conversation turns to sorting and categorizing refugees based on their national origin: the Syrians, the Congolese, the Somalis, the Iraqis, and so on. Then, the narrative acknowledges the heroes of the story – states. Global news headlines commend states for their generosity: "3 million people, making Turkey the host country with the largest refugee population in the world" (European Commission). "Lebanon: one in four a refugee" (BBC 2015a). "The U.S. refugee resettlement program is the largest in the world…" (Mayda 2017). Under the Trump administration, the last headline has been made false when the number of refugees resettled to the U.S. dramatically decreased. In 2017, the U.S. resettled fewer refugees than the rest of the world (all other countries combined) for the first time since the adoption of the 1980 U.S. Refugee Act (Connor and Krogstad 2018).

After accounting for the numbers, relative size of refugee populations, countries of origin, and countries of reception, the global refugee story emphasizes the immense need for international assistance. Humanitarian agencies have resorted to a carefully constructed story about desperate victims in need of urgent aid. Of course, refugees have heart-breaking needs. But, they also endure mundane, long-term challenges that do not photograph well. Humanitarian agencies focus on the former to stir compassion, even pity, in the hearts of their potential donors.

Notably, funding for most humanitarian agencies rarely includes long-term commitments from donors. As one humanitarian professional from an international NGO explained, "We have to apply for funding for each project. Sometimes we have year-long projects [but many projects

are shorter than that]. The funding is never guaranteed long enough that we don't have to worry about applying for more money. We are always applying for funds." Even the UNHCR, the leader in refugee assistance, must ask for donations each year. As Harrell-Bond writes, "Humanitarian agencies are in a straitjacket with little else than human misery upon which to base their appeals" (1985 p. 4). The global refugee story is guided by these institutionalized constraints.

Some topics are systematically excluded from the global refugee story. Humanitarian actors avoid criticisms of donor states, even when those states have been involved in perpetuating the violence in refugee-producing countries. Agencies rely on donor states to fund their operations. Secondly, while humanitarian actors may offer measured critiques of MRHS, these criticisms are limited. Good relationships with MRHS are vital for humanitarian operations. Finally, some humanitarian actors may also avoid talking about the war in refugees' homelands, especially when doing so may jeopardize IDP operations inside the conflict country or cause political tensions in the host state. Again, humanitarian agencies are able to pursue their mandates by remaining apolitical.

Curated and controlled, depictions and narrative representations of refugees have rendered them as objects to be gazed upon and pitied. As a twenty-three year old Syrian man explained, "Refugee is a dirty word, one without dignity." Ghassan, like several other refugees I spoke with, rejects the word refugee. While he understands that the term refers to his immigration status and is necessary to use when registering with UNHCR, Ghassan does not want to be called a refugee. He does not see himself as a weak victim of his circumstances and he does not want others to see him that way either. Firas, a thirty-something Syrian carpenter with gelled back black hair explained to me with a smile, "We, Syrians, have nine lives. You can

bomb us, displace us, humiliate us, and we will always bounce back standing." While not in direct conversation with Ghassan, Firas described how he sees himself, and all Syrians, as survivors. On the day Wajih got his identification to be resettled in Canada, he showed me his ID, and said, "Today, I am not a refugee." While, from the perspective of the state he was being resettled as a "refugee," from his perspective, he was leaving the camp and would be starting a new life. "Look at my ID," Wajih said, "It just says Wajih Khattab now. Nowhere on here does it say I am a refugee. I am not a refugee anymore."

Criticisms of the many shortcomings of humanitarianism and the global refugee story abound. Still, without humanitarian intervention, most of the world's refugees would be left without access to basic needs and resources. A thirty-something Palestinian-Jordanian aid worker named Ahmad recalled his grandparents' displacement in a conversation with an elderly Syrian woman named Linah. "Za'atari is so nice compared to what it was like for the Palestinians in 1948." Ahmad turned to me, "Have you seen pictures from those days? There were no caravans like this one," he said, lightly knocking the wall of the caravan with his fist to emphasize its sturdiness. Linah, whose caravan we were sitting in, chimed in before Ahmad could finish his thought, "I don't know how they did it back then," she said. Her thoughts quickly turned to how the camp has changed in just a few years. "We [residents of Za'atari] have come so far from the first days of the camp when we stayed in tents. The desert sand came to your knees in the early days. Look at us now." Her bright demeanor quickly faded to a neutral expression when she said, "God help us, that we do not see the same fate as the Palestinians." Ahmad reassured her, "God willing (*inshallah*) you'll be able to go back to Syria very soon and this will all be over." "Inshallah," Linah responded.

The UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies provide most of the information about refugee displacement. Possibly more consequential that the exact facts and figures, this information frames the global conversation about refugees. The global refugee story is always present even when it is not in the foreground. Alternative voices are always in conversation with the global refugee story, even those who speak critically against it. By revealing, and re-politicizing, what is made to appear as a value-neutral story of "the facts," this chapter creates space for refugees and others affected by war and displacement to develop a louder voice in the global conversation.

Refugees Who Are Consequential to the Global North Drive the Mainstream Narrative:

In order to raise money, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies must portray morally worthy refugees. Ascribing worthiness is a carefully constructed political project which includes the reproduction of Western hegemonic values along gendered and racialized lines. The global refugee story becomes disproportionately shaped by what Western audiences want to hear.

Humanitarian agencies repeatedly state that most of the world's refugees are women and children (see Freedman et al. 2017). As a rhetorical device, the term "women and children" allows humanitarian actors to emphasize dependence and need, capitalizing on existing gendered conceptions. But, this claim should not be surprising. Generally speaking, most of the world's population is comprised of women and children under the age of eighteen. Moreover, many countries in the Global South tend to have higher birthrates, meaning these states are home to a greater number of children than their Western counterparts, which further reinforces the point refugee populations reflect the countries from which they flee.

From fleeing Syria to finding safe haven, refugee men have faced gender-specific challenges. The over-emphasis on the vulnerability of women and children has been to the

detriment of refugee men. Men face gender-specific vulnerabilities associated with war and displacement. Davis et al. (2014) call for a redefinition of "classical conceptions of vulnerability" to include civilian men. The authors describe how Syrian refugee men are uniquely vulnerable to conscription and face increased barriers that stop them from leaving Syria and seeking refuge. Lewis (2016) describes how blanket assessments of vulnerability along gender lines also neglect the changing constructions of masculinity in exile. When men fall outside the global refugee story, humanitarian agencies are less likely to target their needs. NGOs may decide to implement gender-based intervention in order to attract donor dollars.[4] Finally, as Islamophobic rhetoric has become a central part of immigration debates, Muslim refugee men are increasingly stereotyped as terrorists. Men, especially single men, face higher barriers to refugee resettlement in the Global North. Gender was also used to discredit men seeking asylum in Europe in 2015 and 2016 (see Griffiths 2015; Rhodan 2015).

Gendered and racialized representations of refugees appear in awareness-raising campaigns that are marketed specifically to Western audiences. The UNHCR has deployed a series of awareness raising efforts that use Western actors to portray refugee experiences. Sixty "global celebrities" have been enlisted to advocate for refugees (UNHCR 2016b). Angelina Jolie, Kristin Davis, Cate Blanchett, Ben Stiller, Dianna Agron, Kat Graham, and Cara Delevingne have all been photographed meeting with refugees. Non-Western celebrities are also included such as Syrian refugee Olympian Yusra Mardini, Lebanese singer MIKA, and Sudanese born athlete Guor Maker. While some video clips compile voices from around the world, or include

[4] Interview with humanitarian professional 6/17 and stated by a Jordanian actor looking to raise donor dollars for his organization.

refugees who describe their own lived experiences, other media efforts rely solely on Western actors to retell refugee stories (UNHCR 2016d; UNHCR 2017a). [5]

In "Their Most Important Thing" the "stars of The Vampire Diaries and Glee" describe what they would take with them if they became refugees (UNHCR 2013a).[6] These actors humanize refugees by making refugee stories their own. Refugees, themselves, are not a part of the story. There is no reference to refugees' decision-making process, the hardship of displacement, the challenges of the journey into exile, or the obstacles to local integration. In another video clip entitled "What They Took with Them," actors perform a dramatic reading of what refugees took with them when they were forced to flee their homes (UNHCR 2016c).[7] Unlike in the first video clip, this script was inspired by refugee testimonies. It was written by Jenifer Toksvig and performed by Cate Blanchett, Keira Knightley, Juliet Stevenson, Peter Capaldi, Stanley Tucci, Chiwetel Ejiofor, Kit Harington, Douglas Booth, Jesse Eisenberg, and Neil Gaiman. Photographs of refugees and refugee situations, taken by Brian Sokol, appear intermittently in the background.

In the opening scene, the viewer sees bombs falling and people fleeing amidst the rubble. One may assume this is Syria, but there is no clear indication where these people are. The words "wallet, empty, wallet, money, coins, pennies…" are part of a dramatic reading of what refugees took with them into exile. The audience is moved to interpret what is important to refugees and how they strategized surviving displacement. However, the stories are decontextualized and refugee populations are treated homogeneously. Ethnic differences between the performers and

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[5] "We Stand #WithRefugees" has 175,491 views and "TIGER girls" has 3,076 views as of 7/19/2018.
[6] "Their Most Important Thing" has 36,989 views as of 7/19/2018.
[7] "What They Took With Them" has 102,557 views as of 7/19/18.

the refugees are made clear as British and American accents are juxtaposed with pictures of refugees from the Global South.

We see a similar strategy to address Western audiences in a short video clip produced by Save the Children entitled “Most Shocking Second a Day Video.”[8] The opening scene shows a young girl celebrating her eighth birthday, as indicated by the number of candles on her colorful cake. Her shoulder-length brown hair is parted to the side with a neat pink bow. The little girl appears in the foreground. Her mom gleefully yells out, “Make a wish!” as the “Happy Birthday Song” comes to an end.

This video is a montage representing one year in the life of an ordinary family as they become refugees. The opening scene is day-one. With each passing image, the video tells the story of refugee displacement, the journey in search of safety, and the life-altering challenges that the family faces along the way. But, there is a catch – the main actress is a white, middle-class, British girl.

The opening scene is followed by a series of shots depicting daily life: eating in the kitchen, playing dress-up with mom’s makeup, music lessons, a kiss from a boy at school, and time spent at the playground with dad. “Have you done your homework?” mom asks as she braids the little girl’s hair. Suspense begins to build as the scenes subtly suggest that something ominous is coming. The young girl remains the primary character throughout the clips as the background scenes increasingly allude to violence.

A news anchor announces, “Violent clashes with…” but the little girl is unaware of her surroundings as she plays with a Rubik’s cube. The mother, however, has a worried look as she intently monitors the news. The adults remain understated in the background as they engage with

[8] “Most Shocking Second a Day Video” has 59,531,265 views as of 7/19/18.

the impending conflict. The front page of a newspaper reads, "Government declares Martial Law." From here, the background gets increasingly chaotic. We hear sirens, watch people packing, and see the parents having a sobering discussion.

"We are going to stay" says the dad, his gestures are decisive. Soon, the sirens get louder, and the family is left without electricity or running water. The lack of basic resources is common among communities in war zones as seen in Aleppo in August 2016 (Domonoske 2016). The young girl looks increasingly scared and unkempt. She squeals as a bomb strikes in the background. Like many refugees, this family wants to stay, but must leave to save their lives.

The girl asks, "Dad, where are we?" from the back seat of the family car as gun shots chase the family into exile. Screams and teargas are captured in the next few scenes. Now the family is on foot, their obstacles are reminiscent of refugees being tear-gassed at the Macedonia-Greece border in April 2016 (*Al Jazeera* 2016). The mother puts the only gasmask the family has on her daughter's face, but the worst is yet to come. The little girl yells out "Daddy!" as we see that he has not made it through a checkpoint, similar to what happened to refugees along the Balkans route in 2015 (Granados 2016). Under the cover of night, the mother and daughter make it to safety. A soldier in camouflage pinches the little girl's expressionless face, before the scene cuts to a clean and sterile medical room.

The video clip ends with the mother singing happy birthday to her daughter – one year has passed. Both are wearing hospital gowns and appear to be in a medical tent. The little girl's eyes are puffy from crying as she stares at a single candle. The mother smiles as if to assure her daughter that everything will be okay. She tells the little girl to "make a wish." The scene lingers as the little girl looks straight into the camera and at the viewing audience. She does not say a word, but the sentiment is clear: This is not okay. Do something. The clip fades to white and

black letters appear on the screen that read, “Just because it isn’t happening here, doesn’t mean it isn’t happening.”

Image 3.1: Four screenshots from the video clip entitled “Most Shocking Second a Day Video,” produced by Save the Children

As of June 2018, this YouTube video has garnered nearly 60 million views. While there is no way to know how much this clip led directly to donations, Save the Children’s (STC) financial information is available. In 2017, STC’s total operating revenue was $807,412,000. Of which, 69,283,000 (9%) was spent of fundraising (Save the Children 2017). Of the total budget, 42% was funded by “U.S. national, state, and local governments” and 20% was funded by “UN and other multi-lateral funding institutions.” Individuals, corporations, and foundations funded the rest of the budget (ibid).

Western audiences often witness the refugee crisis not through the voices of refugees, but through Western conduits that may be more culturally and linguistically familiar. Adida et al. 2017 find that American citizens are more likely to empathies with refugees when they can imagine themselves as a refugee. Beyond celebrities and actors, this also includes news anchors, journalists, and state leaders in the Global North. The political or historical context of displacement is largely neglected. Instead, the focus remains on whatever narrative construction strategically constructs worthy refugee victims.

Jordan and Select Other MRHS:

Images and narratives produced in MRHS play an important role in the social construction of the global refugee story. Familiar notions about who refugees are convey a coherent narrative of need, poverty, and despair. Photographs of refugees gathered in faceless crowds become quintessential shots of displacement. Images of refugee children captured through chain-linked fences, squinting from the bright sun, have been taken in camps throughout the Global South. These photographs, and their narrative renderings, elicit sympathy and demand moral outrage.

When sad stories become tiresome, humanitarian agencies also invest in developing human interest stories to combat compassion fatigue (see Moeller 2002). Images of refugee women learning to sew clothing or produce other handicrafts are widely circulated. Photographs of happy children in crowded classrooms show that learning can be fun. Boys with unkept hair wave at the camera after a game of soccer, while girls with bright eyes convey beauty and innocence.

These narratives of "resilience" are widely consumed and used to promote refugee hosting in the Global South. As U.S. presidential candidate Ben Carson once said after visiting Za'atari refugee camp in Jordan, "They [Syrian refugees] are satisfied to be in the refugee camps if the refugee camps are adequately funded. Recognize that in these camps they have schools, they have recreational facilities that are really quite nice. And there are all kind of things that make life more tolerable" (Siddiqui 2015). Human interest stories de-politicize the needs and desires of refugees by making their lives look palpable to the outside observer. Refugees are not treated as political actors with the right to strive, organize, and protest systemic inequality.

Images produced and circulated by humanitarian actors capture real moments in refugees' lives, but they do not tell the whole story. Images like the ones described above reinforce who refugees are in the global public's imagination and implicitly convey where refugees are "supposed" to live. The emphasis on refugee poverty and despair perpetuates the divide between "real refugees" and "economic migrants," a debate that has been used to promote restrictive immigration policies.

While templets of these images have been produced throughout the Global South, select MRHS are overrepresented. In contemporary 2018, images from Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have been central to the global refugee story. Otherwise similar images of refugees who live in equally important host countries like Kenya, Bangladesh, or Iran are less widely circulated. Building on the description of the new grand compromise in Chapter Nine, the difference between states like Jordan and Kenya has less to do with refugees and more to do with the politics of immigration control. MRHS that house refugee populations who fled to Europe in 2015 and 2016 – predominately Syrian refugees – are of more consequence to donor states. Donor states use humanitarian intervention as a means of immigration control. This chapter

focuses on the Jordanian case, although similar arguments could be made for select other MRHS, including Lebanon and Turkey. Images of Syrian refugees in Jordan are used to generalize about all refugees around the world.

Syrians are Given Greater Attention than Other Refugees in Jordan:

Jordan hosts several large refugee populations, but Syrian displacement takes precedence in 2018. Jordan is a country of forced migrants. Jordan hosts 2.9 million refugees in a population of 9.5 million people. Of those 2.9 million refugees, 2,175, 491 are Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA.[1] Another over 82, 500 more refugees came from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. But these refugees do not make headlines. Their experiences are not captured in the images that have come to define displacement.[9]

Syrians are prioritized at the expense of these other groups. International aid dollars are explicitly earmarked to help Syrian refugees, which creates a vicious cycle of representation that leads to increased aid which in turn leads to more representation. In 2016, 65% of the 95.4 million dollars request was funded for the Syrian situation response. Conversely, 14% of the 37.3 million dollars requested for the Iraqi situation response in Jordan was funded. Donors were more willing to fund aid to Syrian refugees than they were willing to support Iraqi refugees.

Of the 46 donors listed for the UNHCR's 2016 funding update (as of 27 January 2017), the European Union was the only organization to earmark funding for Iraqi refugees ($5,915,017 USD). Seven donors asked that their contribution, totaling $917,720 USD, be spent on "country/ regular programme." The rest, donating a total of $180,189,075 USD, asked that their money be used toward the Syrian refugee response.

[9] These numbers vary depending on whether one considers UN or government statistics.

Disparities in aid dollars translate into a disparities of resource allocation and more favorable policies – this includes legal protections. For example, as outlined in the Jordan Compact, Jordanian officials agreed to create 200,000 job opportunities for Syrians in exchange for international aid pledges. Other refugee groups, however, were not included in this concession by the state and were not allowed to work. Because aid was tied to Syrian employment, government officials now had a vested interested in registering Syrian workers. Those who previously worked without authorization were now encouraged to sign up for a permit. As officials recruited unauthorized Syrians workers, they also unauthorized refugee workers from other nationalities. The Jordan Compact put non-Syrians at greater risk of the repercussions of unauthorized work.

In 2015, Sudanese refugees demonstrated in front of the UNHCR headquarters in Amman for greater support from the agency. Sudanese refugees wanted the same resources that were made available to Syrians. Their protest eventually led to mass deportations and approximately 800 people were sent back to Sudan. Those that stayed lived with the heighted fear that they could be expelled any day, which made unauthorized work riskier. One man, Hani, explained, "In the chaos [when the deportations happened], my wife and I were separated. She went one way and I went another way. She was deported to Khartoum and I was left alone with our three-month-old baby girl." Hani became the sole care-taker of his young daughter. Without childcare, he could not long work during the day. Without satisfactory aid, he lived a precarious life, uncertain about what the future holds.

Even after the demonstration and deportations, Sudanese refugees continue to be de-prioritized in big and small ways. The aid that Sudanese refugees in Jordan receive is inadequate and unsatisfying. One Sudanese mother described how not having enough to eat stopped her

from producing milk for her newborn baby. She teared up when she asked me and two other volunteers, "Please, can you get me some food. Not for me, but for the baby," she said justifying her request. In a conversation with another family who lived in Jabal al Jofa, a Sudanese father asked, "Is there any way that our monthly rations could include food that Sudanese like to eat. The food they give us is Syrians food." This man's request illustrates how the global refugee story can also have small affects that shape refugees' standard of living.

Syrian Refugees in Za'atari Camp Get More Attention than other Syrians:

Every Syrian refugee has a story, but not all Syrian refugees in Jordan have equal access to share their story. According to the UNHCR, 666,113 Syrians refugees are registered with the UN as of June 2018. Governmental estimates are much higher, suggesting that Jordan hosts approximately 1.3 million Syrians. Governmental estimates include Syrian refugees registered with the UN and Syrian immigrants who may have been in Jordan before the start of the Syrian conflict.

Even though most Syrian refugees in Jordan, 81%, outside of refugee camps, Syrians with the greatest platform to represent their experiences live in in Za'atari refugee camp (Reliefweb 2017).[10] These refugees are more likely to have contact with journalists, policymakers, and scholars because of practical and security considerations and humanitarian and states regulations. Camps are widely recognized as places where it is easier for humanitarian agencies to provide aid because people are gathered in one physical space.

To my knowledge, ten formal camps were created for Syrians in Jordan from 2011 to 2018. Some of the smaller camps have opened and closed during this seven-year period. The

[10] This means that percentages are based on UNHCR numbers.

camps include: Za'atari Camp, Azraq Camp, Emerati Jordanian Camp (also known as Murijep al Fhoud), King Abdullah Park, Cyber City (which was closed in 2016), Rukban, Hadalat, Bashabsheh (more of a residential building that was made available in the early days of the Syrian conflict), Al Ramtha Club Stadium (for young single men crossing into Jordan), and a discrete camp for defectors from the Syrian army called Ar Rajhi. Informal camps also exist. They are referred to as "informal tented settlements" or ITS. ITS are small nomadic camps, usually structured around familial or network ties. ITS are often established next to Jordanian farms. For more on Syrian camps in Jordan.

Over 80% of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line (UNHCR Jordan Factsheet 2018). Seven years after the start of the Syrian conflict, Syrians refugees still live in extremely vulnerable situations. The 2015 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) study was conducted among refugees living in formal housing throughout Jordan. Most of these refugees live in unfurnished apartments, without floor coverings or sufficient bedding, and without heat during the cold winter months. The study draws conclusions from a survey that includes a total of 2,163 cases (7,817 individuals). The VAF found that while 75% of Syrian refugees have low vulnerability when it comes to their documentation status (having identification from the Ministry of Interior), refugees were vulnerable in other consequential measures. Notably, 80% of Syrian refugees relied on "emergency coping strategies" including exhausting savings, forgoing food, and engaging in high risk jobs (VAF 2015 p. 26). Of those surveyed, 92% had a "high or severely vulnerable" assessment for basic needs and 79% were given the same assessment for food insecurity.

The global refugee story also excludes wealthy refugees and migrants. Some people flee violence, or cannot return home because of the conflict, but do not want to self-identify as

refugees. Some Syrian refugees came to Jordan with money or could capitalize on transnational networks and familial relations. The stories of refugees who have established a good life in Jordan rarely capture headlines. Scholars are also less likely to study the economic successes of Syrian entrepreneurs or business owners, except when these initiatives reflect favorably on the UN and the state (as in Za'atari) or the EU and donors (as in the work permits program). Still, the focus remains on low-wage labor, not economic prosperity. The "refugee burden"

The Economist reports, "In 2012 the Jordan Investment Board (JIB) registered 114m dinars ($161m) of Syrian investment in the Kingdom, up from 3m dinars the previous year. A further 49m dinars of investment was registered in the first half of 2013" (*The Economist* 2013). Some of these people opened up shops and restaurants. For example, the Bekdash family reopened their famous ice cream shop – a staple in Damascus. The ice cream shop now has three branches in Jordan. Anecdotally, Syrians who came to Jordan with money, or who were working in Jordan when the conflict escalated, are less likely to be registered with the UNHCR according to governmental accounts (although I have never seen a systematic study that makes this argument). However, even for those who came to Jordan with money, it is likely that their savings have run out.

<u>Select Narratives from Za'atari are Monitored, Edited, and Curated:</u>

Za'atari is home to 78, 520 Syrian refugees as of 2018 (Syrian Regional Refugee Response). It is located in the Mafraq Governorate in Northern Jordan. At peak density in 2013, Za'atari hosted nearly 144,000 refugees (Fakih and Ibrahim 2015). According to the UNHCR, "Approximately 430,000 refugees have passed through the camp. Of those an average of 120,000 returned to Syria; 60,000 received bailouts from Jordanian nationals to formally leave the camp; 160,000 left the camp to urban areas informally" (Reliefweb 2015).

Despite the large numbers of people who live, or have lived, in Za'atari, narrative representations and images from Za'atari do not represent all Syrian refugees who reside there. Only select refugees are interviewed, photographed, and filmed to represent the "refugee experience." This process of selection is about convenience and politics. Power dynamics are reproduced when what refugees say is monitored, edited, and curated to preserve the interests of the state and the UNHCR.

Refugees who speak English, look good on camera, and are available when it is convenient for NGOs, news agencies, and scholars to conduct interviews are often those whose voices are magnified. Many outsiders enter the camp and view all refugees who live there as interchangeable. They may not take into consideration how refugees' experiences are affected by where inside Syria they have fled from, how long they have lived in the camp, familial or tribal affiliations in the camp, and how class hierarchies are reproduced in the camp or created when some refugees can find work as "volunteers" with NGOs. "Volunteers" make a few Jordanian dinars per day, but this supplemental income can greatly affect refugees lives, especially when several family members are "volunteering."

Once a "token refugee" is identified, their name and contact information may be shared with others who are interested in conducting interviews. In this way, network ties among (usually foreign) journalists, aid workers, and scholars contribute to who is given the platform to speak. Many of the people who conduct interviews with refugees in Za'atari do not speak Arabic and may only be in Jordan for a limited time, a few days or a couple weeks. Interviewers often want to conduct a quick interview and move on.

One NGO professional explained to me, "I've seen reporters that have already written their story [before speaking to refugees]. They come into the camp with a skeleton drafted and

then fill out their article with quotes. They just need to talk to someone to confirm what they already think." He further described a refugee woman who spoke to so many reporters. She needed to keep track of her interviews with a calendar notebook that she carried around. "She had a notebook with names and dates. CNN in the morning, then BBC, then whatever. It became a fulltime job." While this woman spent much of her time and energy speaking to outsiders, she was not paid for her labor. Instead, her efforts to representative the camp were treated as voluntary.

A young Jordanian aid worker, Maher, introduced me to Im Omar during one of my first visits to Za'atari. Im Omar introduced herself not by her given name, but as the mother of her eldest male son, Omar. We spoke in her caravan over tea and individually wrapped, chocolate covered cookies that Im Omar must have had for her two young boys. Maher, another Jordanian aid worker named Deana, Im Omar, Im Omar's mother, and I sat in a semi-circle on floor cushions with our backs against the walls of the metal the caravan.

"Im Omar is cleaver (*shatra*)," Maher said to me out loud for the whole room to hear. "She'll tell you anything you need to know about the camp." "Ask me anything you want," Im Omar said, before I even had the chance to fully introduce myself and my research. Im Omar continued, "They always bring the reporters to me." Maher and Deana laughed. "She's right," they admitted. Im Omar continued, "They always bring journalists to me because I know how to tell a good story. My story is everywhere." Maher added, "You've probably read her story without knowing [it was her]," and everyone laughed. Im Omar continued, "CNN… BBC… I cry a little for them, and that let's them cry a little bit for us [Syrians], and the reporters get their story and they are happy."

Im Omar joked about what being "in" on the social construction of the refugee story. But she also stated that interviews in Za'atari have become excessive. "This is not a zoo," she said. Several refugees I spoke to, and two government representatives from the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, reiterated Im Omar's sentiment about Za'atari being treated as a zoo. Firas, a Syrian refugee and "volunteer" worker in the camp said, "People from all over the world drive around the camp and stare out of the window at us. They just come, pity us, and leave." Refugees often do not share their experiences from a neutral starting point, but instead, respond to questions or conversations that are being had *about* refugees in the media or on the political stage.

Sometimes, refugees' experiences are edited to fit into a larger narrative that is of interest to outsiders. One Syrian man, Ayman, explained how footage from the camp has been used to misrepresent Syrians' lives. "There was a young woman walking on a hot day. You know it gets hot here and there's no shade. She sat down for a moment to take a break and put her head down," Ayman copies this woman's gesture. He put his head down and lifted his had as so to shield himself from the sun. For an outsider, this gesture may look like dejection or sadness. "The news ran the footage of this woman with a story about rape. They said she was raped without saying it. And the whole camp started talking. She kept saying this is not true, I was just tired. I just sat down for a moment."

Refugee "volunteers," those who work with NGOs, are often asked to serve as tour guides in the camp. They show outsiders how refugees are cared for, where children go to school, where they access health, and they describe the services that the NGO they "volunteer" for provides. Ward organized a boys and girls soccer program in the camp and throughout the years showed the camp to celebrities from across the globe, including some of his favorite soccer stars and some of the biggest American movie stars in the world. He even walked around the

camp with a member of the Jordanian royal family. "I wanted so badly to ask his royal highness about getting my father out of Syria," Ward said. Jordan had closed the border to Syrian refugees and there was no hope that his dad would be able to join the rest of the family in Jordan unless someone in the government agreed to make an exception for Ward's dad. "Here I was walking with [this high-ranking government official] and I could not say anything. I smiled and spoke to him about the camp and our soccer programs, and every moment I thought, 'Should I say something?' but I said nothing. Work is work. But, I would trade all these famous people in a second to see my dad again."

Knowledge production is limited by what government officials, the UNHCR, and humanitarian organizations are willing to reveal about life in Za'atari. Ward's decision to stay quiet was informed by watching others face the repercussions of speaking out of turn. On a separate occasion a year later, I met with Ward again in Za'atari. He introduced me to his friend Kareem, another Syrian "volunteer" who worked with an NGO to combat gender-based violence and child marriage in the camp. "It's okay, you can speak to Rawan freely," Ward told Kareem. "I have known her for years," Ward said and elaborated about the nature of our relationship. Ward's endorsement made Kareem visibly more comfortable, which allowed me to ask him more sensitive questions that I would otherwise avoid during a first meeting. Kareem described what happened to a mutual friend who spoke freely while giving foreigners a tour of the camp. "Ibrahim told a group of Canadians about how difficult it was for refugees to leave the camp. As you know, we have a problem with the leave permits. He [Ibrahim] criticized limitations on movement and may have said unfavorable things about the NGO [he worked for]. I told him not to say anything, and I gave him looks to stay quiet. To make matters worse, what he said was mistranslated by the interpreter." Kareem explained that the nuances of Ibrahim's words were

lost in translation when the translator represented Ibrahim's subtle critics with harsher English words. "The Canadians were asking questions and he answered them," Kareem recalled. As a result of his vocal criticism, Ibrahim lost his coveted "volunteer" job with the NGO for speaking freely in front of a foreign audience.

Even within the confines of censorship, refugees are able to make decisions about who they want to speak with and what they want to say. In one instance I sat down with a young Syrian man named Firas who turned to Hamada, the Jordanian aid worker who introduced us and asked, "Is she with the refugees or against the refugees?" I naively answered, "Who in the world is against the refugees?" before explaining my research project in depth. Firas told us about how, during the previous week, a pro-regime Syrian journalist conducted interviews with Syrians in Za'atari and then misrepresented their stories to support a pro-regime position. He wanted to be sure that he would not make that mistake by talking to me.

Refugees' stories are curated by news agencies and NGO professionals. The topic of discussion is shaped by what members from these institutions want to learn more about. Stories about child brides, women's sewing initiatives, and entrepreneurship in Za'atari abound. In fact, there have been so many news stories about child marriage (also called early marriage) that I began to ask Syrians about how they felt about this issue. One respondent said, "They [the news] like to exaggerate. Of course, it is not optimal, but we had this in Syria. This is not new." However, advocates for women and girls will say that child marriage has been on the rise. Some consider child marriage when they cannot afford to provide for their children.

Some refugee stories are privileged while others are neglected. It is not surprising that the state and the UN avoid embarrassing stories that may undermine their ability to support refugees or obtain donor support. Nor is it surprising that stories about refugees highlight successful

humanitarian efforts. However, if scholars and journalists are truly interested in refugee-centric investigations of the camp, they may focused on what refugees want to talk about. When I was conducting interviews, refugees were interested in discussing the need for electricity or fear that the drinking water is too heavily chlorinated.

Many of the people I spoke to in Za'atari complained about their limited access to electricity. Having electricity would allow them to turn on a fan, light a room, charge a cell phone, and watch television. At the time, refugees had limited access to electricity for only a few hours a day. Refugees reasoned that electricity was especially important during Ramadan when they woke up early for *suhur.* Suhur is an Arabic word that mean early breakfast before the sun comes up. Someone Muslims wake up have breakfast before the first call to prayer in order to eat and drink before a long day of fasting. With electricity, refugees in Za'atari would be able to turn on a light to see in the dark. Some refugees, those who could afford to, purchased solar powered flash lights and phone chargers that they "charged up" during the day, and used at night.

Conclusion:

This chapter presents five stages in which the global refugee story is socially constructed with deference to political interests. The global refugee story defines who refugees are, where they come from, and what kinds of protections and mobility refugees should have. The UNHCR and humanitarian agencies are the primary producers of refugee knowledge, but their output is confined by an "apolitical" institutional ethos. I reveal how what appears to be neutral knowledge production is curated by the politics of sovereign states. I identify who is being left out of the process of knowledge production at every stage. By illustrating how political interests

define the “refugee problem,” this chapter also draws attention to how “refugee solutions” prioritize the interests of states and international institutions over refugees and citizens.

The global refugee story yields to the interests of donor states in the Global North in an effort to encourage these states to meet the financial needs of MRHS and uphold their part of the “grand compromise.” Refugees are portrayed as morally worthy victims, not political actors who have the ability (or the right) to organize against the host state or international institutions. Moral worth is not based on universal personhood; instead, it is mapped onto preexisting social constructs that are racialized and gendered. White, Western actors are often used to solicit sympathy for refugees from the Global South. The global refugee story privileges “women and children,” and as a result, refugee men fall outside the narrative construction of deserving victims. The refugee story translates into real-life consequences when men are seen as “threats” not people and aid and protection to refugee men is deprioritized.

Familiar images of desperate and poor refugees living in camps reinforce where audiences believe that refugees “should” live. MRHS that host refugees who are likely to emigrate to the Global North receive more aid to contain their refugee populations than other states whose populations are less likely to leave. Images and narratives of refugees from places like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have become more central to the global refugee story than refugees from other MRHS. Drawing from the empirical data I collected, this chapter focuses on how refugees in Jordan have become part of the global refugee story.

Syrian refugees are prioritized over other refugee groups inside Jordan, leaving Gazan (Palestinian), Iraqi, Sudanese, Somali, and Yemeni refugees outside of the global refugee story. This practice reflects the interests of states and international institutions, not necessarily the needs of refugees. However, not all Syrians are given the same opportunities to share their

experience. Syrian refugees in Za'atari refugee camp are made more accessible to journalists, policymakers, and scholars as compared to other Syrian refugees who live in urban or peri-urban areas or those who reside in more securitized camps. Finally, of the approximately 80,000 Syrians who reside in Za'atari, only a small number of people are given an opportunity to speak. Their interviews are further curated and edited to convey refugee stories that applaud the humanitarian efforts of states and international institutions.

As part of a larger movement of scholarship to bring refugees' stories to the forefront of refugee studies, this chapter describes what refugees and refugee advocates may be speaking against and re-politicizes what is portrayed as value-neutral. What would it look like if the Global North did not control the refugee narrative? Or, if humanitarian agencies and MRHS did not need to solicit aid dollars from the Global North?

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Chapter 4: The Day We Left

The start of the contemporary conflict in Syria has been traced to protests in Dar'a when a teenager named Naief Abazid spray painted inflammatory graffiti against Syria's leader, Bashar Al-Assad, on a wall of his school. Within the context of the unfolding Arab Spring, and the toppling of Egyptian and Tunisian leaders, the words, "It's your turn, doctor" rang clear. It was a call for the ousting of Dr. Bashar Al-Assad, who is also trained as an ophthalmologist. Twenty-three boys were arrested, detained, and tortured by the secret police in connection with the graffiti.

The parents' pleas to see their sons were met with hostility. Reportedly, a group of elders was told to, "Forget about your children. Go have new kids. If you can't, send us your wives and we will get them pregnant for you," recalled a resident from Dar'a (MacKinnon 2016). Over the coming weeks, the anger and frustration for the captured boys grew stronger. On March 18, about one month after the graffiti incident, residents from Dar'a took to the streets to protest.[11] Two people were killed when police fired bullets into the crowd. Funeral marches were organized for the martyrs, which were also met with gun fire. This led to a cycle of protests and escalating violence.

In 2018, the Syrian conflict rages on. What started off as a prank, evolved into a civil war, and is now a proxy war as countries around the world intervene on behalf of their own interests in the region. From barrel bombs to chemical weapons, the Syrian people continue to endure ongoing violence. They have also suffered the aftermath of the battles, which has left people poor, hungry, mourning the loss of loved ones, and uncertain about their futures. In the

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[11] Some may say that the conflict started on March 15th with the protests. Others claim that the conflict started on March 18th, which marks the first day of gun fire.

last seven years, approximately 470,000 people have died, one million have been injured, and over half of the country – 12 million people – have been displaced (Specia 2018). Six million of whom have become refugees.

Believing the Unbelievable

Wajih Khattab was seventeen in 2011 when the conflict started in Syria. He's from Athman, a small village north of Dar'a. As Wajih recalled the first days of the conflict, he emphasized the quick transition from an ordinary life to war. His words and tone stressed the shock he experienced as the unbelievable happened before his eyes.[12]

> It was a normal day, [the violence] started on a Friday… Thursday night, there was nothing going on. We stayed up, talking late into the night. Even on Friday morning... As you know, on Fridays people go out on day trips, they go shopping... We didn't know anything was happening. Then, all of a sudden, there were planes overhead that passed by our village… When we saw planes, we started to wave at them… like we always did. We didn't know what was happening, we thought the planes were part of a celebration.
>
> Twenty-two helicopters went back and forth, and then back and forth… Within an hour, we heard that there were protests in Dara'a. And that a young man from Dar'a became a martyr. It was still unclear, and no one believed it… Something like this to happen here? Impossible.
>
> Dar'a was closer to the regime than other parts of Syria. And our situation was good, relatively speaking. No one believed what we heard until we confirmed it on the news. The news didn't say everything, there was a limit on what they would say. So, when the news said that two people became martyrs, and even people from the security forces died, and then we confirmed what we had heard, seeing the planes that were overhead...
>
> From that day, the events started, and there was gunfire from day-one. This all happened within twenty-four hours. It was shocking.

[12] I conducted Wajih's interview with another scholar present in the room. Many of the questions asked came from a prepared list that was used as part of another project on Syrian refugee displacement. Wajih and I have become friends since this interview and continue to keep in touch.

Wajih and his family were of the first people affected by the violence. As he put it, "We were about 8 kilometers away… The places that were father away, didn't experience the violence until later." There is a tendency to homogenize the Syrian refugee experience, to tell one overarching story that develops along a central timeline. However, when Syrian displacement is painted with broad brush strokes, the particularities of a person's experiences are lost. Displacement is complicated, and complications leaves ample room for decision-making and strategizing.

How We Decided to Leave:

Syrian refugees are ordinary people who have been put in extraordinary circumstances. How and when a person leaves his or her city or village is a painstaking decision – even when it happens in a moment. No one knows what the future will hold or when it will become safe to return home. There are multiple factors to consider: Who will be left behind? What will be left behind? Where will we go? Where will we stay? Can we get there? What will happen to us if we make it across the border?

Even with the many unknowns, Syrians carefully considered their options, limited as they may be. They talk to their friends and relatives about routes out of Syria, border crossings, what the camp is like, and what the city is like. They reach out to other people to help facilitate a safe journey, including taxi drivers or border guards. As they piece together the knowns, refugees also consider state policies in Jordan and Syria and search for ways to navigate those restrictions. *When* an individual or family decides to leave Syria, if they decide to flee, greatly affects where they can go and how they are received when (if) they get there.

For many people, leaving is a family decision, not just an individual assessment. Refugees may be defined by borders, but families are not (see Lopez 2015). The family decision to leave (or stay) considers how individual family members may be more vulnerable than others as the conflict develops and state policies change. For example, political persecution can fall along gendered lines. Young men may be more vulnerable to military conscription or rebel violence while young women are more likely to be threatened by sexual assault or rape. The elderly or disabled may have special medical needs that make leaving urgent; or conversely, their needs may make the journey to safety insurmountable.

Wajih's family made strategic decisions about when and how to leave Syria. Different members of their family would leave at different times based on their calculated risk. Wajih's older brother, Imad, was eighteen at the start of the conflict. He left for Jordan before the rest of the family to avoid military conscription. As Wajih put it, "We [the family] sent him to Jordan to claim asylum (*batna luju'*)." Imad's refugeehood was a family decision.

Family and gender continued to shape Imad's journey into Jordan beyond the initial decision to flee. As a single man traveling across the border alone, Imad was subject to increased scrutiny by the Jordanian government. He was detained with other single young men for a short period of time as Jordanian government officials assessed Imad's potential involvement in the conflict. Was he a refugee or was he a military operative? Wajih described his brother's experience.

> The events (*ahdath*) were a year and four months in, but Za'atari camp was not open yet. In the beginning, there was a building in Ramtha, called Bashabsha. And people stayed there. For people who came in alone, without their family, they [the Jordanian government] took them to another space, Al Ramtha Club Stadium. That was in the beginning. Then they [the government] moved people around, eventually they went to Za'atari. He [Imad] spent a week at Bashabsha in between

> [Al Ramtha Club Stadium and Za'atari camp]. Then he got a Jordanian *kafeel*, so he could work [outside the camp].

A *kafeel* is a person who enters into a formal agreement with the state to take responsibility for a refugee – like a co-signer on a loan. The term is commonly used in the Arab Gulf, where migrant workers are allowed to enter the state when sponsored by a citizen refered to as a kafeel. In the Jordanian case, a kafeel pays a small fee (15JD at one point) to "bail out" a Syrian refugee from the camp. Just like in the Arab Gulf, the Jordanian kafeel controls refugees' mobility.

The word kafeel refers to an individual, but the system in which individual Jordanians are able to "bail out" refugees is called the *kafala* system. While it was in place, the kafala system is one way that the Jordanian government addressed familial relations between Jordanians and Syrians, which are very common. The kafala system served as a form of family reunification that gave citizens the power to allow Syrians to exit forced encampment. Imad's kafeel was a friend of his father's. In Wajih's words:

> For us, there is a relationship between Dar'a, Syria, and Ramtha or Irbid in Jordan. The lines of communication were always open, always. We have many friends in Jordan and they have friends in Syria. And we traveled back and forth, so there were relationships. When my brother got to Jordan, my dad called his friends. And they took him [Imad] out of Za'atari camp, and he [Imad] went to go work there with them.

Wajih, his mother, and several of his siblings followed Imad seven months later. I asked Wajih how he and his family decided to leave Syria. He described the moment it became more risky for them to stay than to leave.

> At the beginning of the protests, there was peaceful gunfire, [the soldiers] shot up into the air to stop people from protesting. But then, they started shooting into the crowd at the protesters. And detaining people. They would detain people and then

let them out. Then, things evolved. There was the Free Syria Army and the Syrian Regime's Army. There were weapons: at first they were simple weapons, and then there was more destructive bombings.

With the bombings, it used to take 30 seconds [for the bombs to fall]. We would hear a noise, that signified that a missile has gone out, and it needed 30 seconds to come down. In those 30 seconds, if I was in the street, or somewhere outside, I had time to run and hide. And when it landed, the blast wasn't so bad. I mean, it would kill you, but if someone heard it, you could still run and hide, take cover.

On January 15, there were more powerful bombs. We would hear the bomb, and then, within three seconds, the bombs would land. With three seconds - you don't have time to do anything. I would hear it go off, and all I could do was clinch in my seat. There was no opportunity to run, or get down, or anything… three seconds is too short. And, it was much stronger when it landed [as compared to the pervious bombs].

My sisters had exams at school still, on January 15. Their last day of school was going to be January 17. We wanted to wait for them to finish their exams. You have to know that everyone who came to Jordan would say it was just going to be one week, maybe two weeks, and then they are going back home. But, everyone says this. Same story with Palestine, same thing… We [the family] agreed, okay, they'll finish their last tests, so that they don't fail their classes. We waited on January 16 and January 17, with those quick bombs, the ones that lasted 3 seconds [before leaving Syria]. On January 17, they [Wajih's sisters] finished their last exams in the morning and we left that evening… My dad borrowed a car from my uncle. We left our village and my dad took us to the border.

Wajih and his family members were able to plan their exit, which Wajih described as relatively easy. The family left Dar'a on January 18. Wajih remembers the bitter cold he felt on their journey, "I didn't have a real jacket, I wore an open jacket, not one that zipped up. The evening was warm, but we didn't get to the camp until 4 am, and it was so so so cold." The family trip took twelve hours in all, with four stops before they reached Za'tari camp. "And when we got here [to Za'atari], we didn't have all our things, some things we lost along the way from all the moving [on and off the bus, for registration], others were stolen. But that's no problem. The most important thing is that you make it to safety."

Wajih's family was able to carefully plan when and how they would leave. But sometimes, there is no time to carefully calculate the best next steps. On a day in 2013, Basam and Farrah were forced to leave their home in a hurry. Basam and Farrah were newlyweds at the time, both in their 20s. When I met them during Ramadan of 2016, the couple was living in Mafraq.

Farrah described the day they left, "It was all of a sudden. We were actually just sitting under a tree. There wasn't anything going on that day, everyone was just hanging out." Basam added:

> We were just sitting there, it was around ten o'clock the morning. It was a spring day, and the weather was warming up. We were sitting there, our family, and my brother's family, under a tree and then all of a sudden, we just saw bombs falling on our neighbor's house. So immediately we just got up and left. I swear to God it was immediate. Some people even had goats and other livestock, and they left their goats behind. They just left everything behind and ran.
>
> To be honest, we never imagined that we would leave. Why would we leave? We are in a small village there was nothing there. The regime couldn't say that that we had terrorists, like you might expect them to say. And there's nothing there that could cause a problem. People were not worried [about leaving their homes] because we were not a part of any of the political uprising. Our village was next to another village with people who were politically active, the revolutionaries. We call them revolutionaries, the government calls them terrorists. They may have passed through our street. They weren't coming to see our village, they just passed by the street. So then, the street was bombed. The government does not differentiate between civilians and human beings they just want to kill.

Basam and Farrah fled their home and became internally displace (IDPs) in a neighboring village, about ten kilometers away. Many refugees flee to neighboring villages before crossing state borders. Over half of Syrians who are displaced are IDPs. Like Basam and Farrah, people are hopeful that the bombings or violence will stop, and home will become relatively safe again. Basam said, "The regime came to the village and there was fighting and there were rockets and

war planes overhead. But the neighboring village, no. It did not have any of these things. Things were good there."

The couple stayed in the neighboring village for three months, but the conditions were unlivable. Basam recalled, "There was not enough food to go around. And it was Ramadan. And during Ramadan, you start to need sugar or just something to make tea, but there was nothing. There was nothing." Farrah described how her husband and other young men would go out to search for food, anything they could eat to break their Ramadan fast with, but they came home empty handed. "There was nothing at all… Never in our lives did we imagine that this could happen to us."

Soon, the violence spread to the neighboring village where Basam and Farrah were trying to make their new life. The couple needed to flee again. Farrah described the day they left Syria, "We left towards the end of when you could leave. Then if a person wanted to leave, they had to pay money [a bribe]. We left at the last possible time before you had to pay, but there were checkpoints and there were security searches and they asked us a lot of questions about where we were coming from and where we are going."

Basam and Farrah needed to convince the regime's border guards that they were not "fleeing" but were instead just heading out for a weekend vacation. Farrah described strategically leaving the few possessions they had behind so as not to alert the border guards. When the border guards asked where they were going, Bassam and Farah lied about their intentions to seek refuge in Jordan. I asked the couple, "What's so bad about seeking refuge?" They explained to me that the guards may ask them to stay and fight or stay and inform about the "the terrorists" in their village. In this way, the government was looking to recruit them in support of the Assad regime. Had Bassam and Farah been caught in their lie, Farah described being afraid that they would be

detained, or worse, killed. Basam and Farrah's experience illustrates that, despite their limited options, many Syrian refugees make ongoing calculations about how best to protect themselves.

Like so many other refugees before them, Syrians found a safe haven in Jordan. "All they had was bullets at their back, and the sea before them. All they wanted was the sky above them and the earth below them," an Iraqi scholar residing in Jordan thoughtfully reflected in a conversation about Syrian displacement. There is a sense of shared tragedy. Syria is not foreign in the hearts of many residents in Jordan, many of whom have family across the border or have worked with Syrians before the conflict. Moreover, more than half of Jordan's population has experienced forced displacement or have a familial history of refugeehood. Despite restrictive policies and some host community tensions, there is an "imagined community" of Greater Syria and a recognition that borders were placed upon the people of this region. Each of these aspects of Syrian reception is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Jordan as a Country of Forced Immigrants

Jordan is not known as a "country of immigrants." Countries of immigration usually have one important quality in common – they are primarily destinations for labor migrants (Massey et al. 1998; Arango 2000). The title has also been largely reserved for countries like the United States and Canada where immigrant integration is part of the national narrative. In contrast, most foreign-born immigrants in Jordan have experienced some form of forced migration. Even when immigrants have traveled to, or stayed in, Jordan to pursue economic opportunities, forced displacement continues to influence their lives. By conservative accounts, between 30% and 50% of Jordan's population are immigrants or the children of immigrants.

Immigration and refugee reception have been foundational to Jordan's development as a state (Chatelard 2010). Jordan's history of refugee reception has facilitated future refugee flows, but at the same time, policy responses to earlier refugees have also created a trajectory of restricted access to rights and legal protections. In this chapter, I consider how Jordan's political history has affected the reception of Syrian refugees. How does Syrian refugee reception fit into the social landscape with other refugee and immigrant groups in Jordan? What socio-political context are Syrian refugees integrating into?

I begin with a historical overview of Jordanian state-making. With a focus on the formation of Jordanian territory and the development of a national narrative, I describe the ethno-national boundaries between the two largest groups in Jordan: Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians. I then describe Jordan's population, including immigrant and refugee groups, to broadly define the Jordanian host community and broach the question of Syrian reception and integration. Building on Davis et al. (2017a), who masterfully demonstrate how refugee policies in Jordan and Egypt are based on national origin, I argue that Jordanian policies

prioritize not only the nationality of a refugee, but also the year of displacement. By considering year of displacement scholars are able to take into account how war changes over time and how immigration polices respond to increased and prolonged displacement (see Arar 2016).

I argue that refugees' access to rights and opportunities are intertwined with other refugee and immigrant groups, both in the present and across generations. I demonstrate that Syrian refugees are entering a country with diverse and interconnected refugee populations. Some efforts to integrate Syrian refugees, specifically allowing access to certain forms of employment and social services, have been facilitated by, and are sometimes to the determent of, other refugee groups.

Knowledge production about refugees often treats Jordan and other MRHS as refugee-receiving vacuums, or "warehouses," devoid of historical or political context. Pervasive images of Syrian refugees alone in sparse city apartments or crossing into endless deserts suggest that refugees come into an empty space. But, refugee reception does not take place in a vacuum. Even when refugees are residentially isolated or choose anonymity, refugees are affected by the multifaceted communities that they join (Arar 2016). The first step to speculating about Syrians' future in Jordan, especially when it comes to integration, is to understand how other refugee groups have fared in the past.

This chapter provides the historical and political background that is necessary for better understanding the dynamics of contemporary refugee reception in Jordan. I demonstrate that knowledge production about Syrian refugees in Jordan is improved when taking into consideration Jordanian state making, the Jordanian national narrative, and the development of citizenship and other rights. A historical and political orientation to Jordan as a MRHS interrupts

the pervasive global narrative about refugee displacement, which is curated to privilege one group of refugees over others (see Who Controls).

Jordanian State-Making:

On the floor of Saint George's Church in Madaba, Jordan is a 30-square meter mosaic map of Byzantine Palestine dated to the 6th century AD, which captures the land both west and east of the Jordan river (Donner 1992). The colorful tiles are painstakingly placed to create a cartographic representation of the waterways, flora, fauna, and human-built structures that constitute the landscape. The Jordan River, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Nile Delta are depicted along with the ancient cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, but starkly missing to the eye of a 21st century observer are the demarcations that separate modern states. There are no borders to detach Jordan from Egypt, Palestine, or Israel. The map is a tangible reminder that the land of present day Jordan existed before it was recognized as a state in the modern nation-state system and before movement across state borders reinforced belonging and difference.

The borders of modern-day Jordan were carved through a series of state-making processes. Claims-making, secret dealings, colonialism, cooperation, and war all contributed to the emergence of the modern Jordanian state. The Ottoman empire ruled Greater Syria (the lands of present-day Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Israel, and Lebanon) from 1516 to 1918 (Provence 2005; Rogan 2013). The Ottomans did not consider the land that would become Jordan as a distinct administrative unit, instead it was a frontier zone used by pilgrims on their way to Mecca. While sparsely populated, the land was home to several distinct ethnic groups including forced migrants fleeing from the Balkans and Caucasus. The Ottomans strategically settled these refugees in what would become Jordan and Syria to "address the challenges the tribes native to

the area posed to Ottoman rule" (Davis et al. 2017a, p. 4). This land was a refuge for Circassians, Chechens, and Armenians as well as home to Bedouin tribes, who would become the backbone of the Jordanian ethno-national narrative.

In 1916, Arab leaders partnered with the Allied Powers against the Ottoman Turks in what became known as the Great Arab Revolt. Unbeknownst to them, officials from Britain and France had secretly decided to divide up the lands of Greater Syria with the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Drawing the lines of the "New Middle East Map," the British colonized Transjordan (modern Jordan) and Palestine and the French took Lebanon and Syria.

Transjordan was established as a British protectorate in 1921. Through a series of cooperative measures, British officials worked with Bedouin tribes to intertwine modes of local governance with colonial rule. Eilon and Alon write, "the Hashemite Kingdom explicitly incorporated tribalism into the political order and built on it for its own legitimacy and survival from the outset" (2007, p. 2). Andersen adds, "To generalize, the Hashemite-Jordanian variety of nationalism illustrates how a territorial nationalist sentiment can be imposed and spread from the top down, and then accepted by a majority of the population" (2003 p. 198). While Bedouin tribes were proactively included in governance, all people who lived in Transjordan in 1923 were granted citizenship with the passage of the Nationality Law of 1928.

Abdullah I bin al-Hussein of the Hashemite family became the Emir of Transjordan and later the first King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Wilson 1987). Because ethnic origin, borders, and nationality are salient to this brief historical overview, it must be noted that Abdullah I bin Al-Hussein came to Transjordan from Hijaz, a region in modern Saudi Arabia. He gained legitimacy among the Bedouin tribes as the descendant of Prophet Mohammed, the prophet of Islam.

Transjordan became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan a few years after gaining independence from the British in 1946. Jordan was the last to gain independence after Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Jordan maintained close ties with the British after independence. Notably, the Jordanian Arab Legion was led by British General John Glubb also known as Glubb Pasha (Massad 2001).

From the start as Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah I had expansionist visions for his rule. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Jordan acquired the West Bank in 1950. In addition to gaining the local population, this included both Palestinian refugees who had fled from other parts of Palestine to the West Bank. Jordan extended citizenship to the Palestinians with the Law of Nationality in 1949. The West Bank and the East Bank would be united under the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Still, the acquisition of the West Bank was contentious, especially among some Palestinian nationalists. Who would represent Palestinians when their interests diverged from the interests of Jordanian leadership?

In 1951, King Abdullah I was assassinated in Jerusalem at the Al-Aqsa mosque by a Palestinian man in protest of the merger. Violence led to more violence: Army soldiers opened fire inside Al-Aqsa, killing twenty people and wounding one hundred more. The King's guards fired at people in Jerusalem and destroyed property. East Bank Jordanians killed three Palestinian refugees in Amman and wounded others (see Massad 2001 p. 232). But the worst for Palestinian-Jordanian relations was yet to come.

King Abdullah I was succeeded by King Talal, who served for a little over one year. King Hussein became the third king of Jordan in 1952 and served until 1999. Under King Hussein's rule, Jordan lost territorial control over the West Bank in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six Day War. They gained, however, thousands of Palestinians who fled from the now

occupied territories to the East Bank. According to the Refworld, 355,000 Palestinian refugees were newly displaced in Jordan. The map and demographics of Jordan had changed once again.

For years, Jordanian leadership had resisted independent Palestinian representation. In 1964, however, Jordan and leaders from other Arab states establish the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Unlike other organizations, "the PLO did not claim at the time to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people and made no claims of sovereignty over the West Bank" (Massad 2001 p. 236). Their position would soon change. However, at the time, the PLO's stated intent did not undermine Jordanian interests, which espoused a claim to both Palestinian people and land.

The PLO began to make demands on the government that eroded sovereign authority. They also engaged in offensives against Israel from Jordanian territory, potentially drawing Jordan into violent conflict. From the Jordanian perspective, the PLO became "a state within a state" (Barari 2008 p. 231). Tensions also escalated as a Palestinian resistance movement grew even outside the authority of the PLO, especially after the Karameh Operation in 1968 (Fruchter-Ronen 2008). The Fida'iyyin (the Sacrificers) organized among Palestinians in refugee camps. And Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, gained prominence among the Fida'iyyin.

Resistance to Jordanian rule over Palestinians culminated in a civil war known as "Black September" from 1970 to 1971. The PLO and the guerrilla groups were defeated by the Jordanian army. Thousands were killed and large parts of Jordanian cities, including Amman, were destroyed. Foreign journalists and guerilla groups estimated that the death toll was between 7,000 and 20,000 people, although government estimates are much lower (Massad 2001 p. 245). Ryan writes, "[Black September] is remembered by many in Jordan either for Hashemite brutality in suppressing the PLO and the refugee camps, or for Palestinian disloyalty and

subversion…" (2011 p. 567). The civil war entrenched divisions between Palestinian-Jordanians and Jordanian-Jordanians.

The events of Black September have not only been consequential in the development of a national narrative but continue to have unfolding consequences for Jordanian refugee reception and border control. Approximately 20,000 Palestinians fled to surrounding states, including Syria and Lebanon. As the Syrian conflict unfolded, some of these immigrants became refugees and sought sanctuary in Jordan. Many still carried Jordanian citizenship because they were not denaturalized in the 70s, only exiled. However, upon reentry into Jordan, Palestinians from Syria have faced harsh treatment.

In 1988, Jordan severed administrative and legal ties with the West Bank. In a televised speech, King Hussein emphasized that "Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin" would continue to "have all the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations…" (Kassim 2000 p. 208). Despite the King's speech, the legal status of Jordanian-Palestinians was undermined. The government also declared that Palestinians who were living in the West Bank on July 31, 1988 were now "Palestinians" and more than one million Palestinian-Jordanians living in the West Bank were stripped of their citizenship and rendered stateless (Kassim 2000 p. 211). This act violated Jordan's own Citizenship Law but was, nevertheless, adopted by the Jordanian High Court of Justice.

The Hashemite dynasty continues to rule the Kingdom of Jordan in 2018. Today, Jordan borders Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine and Israel and shares a maritime border with Egypt. While the borders of Jordan's map have not changed since the Six Day War, its demographics have changed substantially. The First Gulf War in 1990 came on the heels of the 1988 disengagement. Around 300,000 Palestinian-Jordanians returned to Jordan as a result,

although "return" is contentious because many of these people did not have strong relations with the state (Chatelard 2010; Van Hear 1995). Iraqi refugees, as well as Egyptians, Yemenis, Sri Lankans, Indians and others sought to escape the war by fleeing to Jordan as well (Mruwat et al. 2001). Many more Iraqis fled to Jordan during the Second Gulf War (2003 - 2011) and afterwards because of the destabilization of Iraq and the rise of ISIS (Van Hear 1995; Chatelard 2009). Between 1975 and 1991, Jordan hosted Lebanese fleeing the civil war (Chatelard 2010). In the last several decades Jordan has also received refugees and other migrants from Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

Integration into What Socio-Political Context?: A Survey of Jordan's Population:

Modern Jordanian society has been described as "a mosaic." The metaphor reflects a country that is home to people of different nationalities and ethnic groups, but whose belonging as part of the nation includes distinct ethnic identities. Unlike the "melting pots" of the world (Glazer 2006), the Jordanian national narrative has largely remained ethnically exclusive despite efforts to promote the pluralistic inclusion of citizens of Palestinian descent. This is a controversial point due to Jordan's history with Palestine. The least contentious articulation of ethnic difference is the recognition that more than half of Jordan's citizens have Palestinian origins. Outspoken critics, however, cite institutional discrimination along ethno-national lines, emphasizing that Palestinian-Jordanian citizens are disadvantaged in concrete ways.

Beyond the Palestine and Palestinians question, Jordan is home to several different immigrant and refugee groups. The last Jordanian census conducted in 2015 estimates that Jordan has a population 9.53 million people, of whom, 30% percent are non-Jordanian. Of course, this percentage does not include Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Ethnic minorities

including Circassians, Chechens, and Armenians have been part of Jordan's story from the beginning. Their belonging is not questioned, although their cultural practices remain outside the hegemonic Jordanian norm. Refugees from Iraq and Syria are generally considered guests, both legally and colloquially. As guests, the expectation is that these refugees' stay in Jordan is temporary and that they will one day return to their countries. Meanwhile, immigrants from Egypt, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Philippines are seen as guest workers who will also eventually return home. While each of these groups has been incorporated into Jordanian society in some way, most will never attain Jordanian citizenship.

Immigration scholars measure integration through a series of markers including language acquisition, socioeconomic status, residential segregation, intermarriage, political incorporation, and access to citizenship (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Waters and Jiménez 2005). Integration can also be understood as an intergenerational process (Bean et al. 2015). In which case, scholars focus on how the children of immigrants and refugees compare to their parents or grandparents.

Arabic is the official language in Jordan, which makes linguistic fluency for most immigrants and refugees who come to Jordan easily attainable. Among Arabic language speakers, difference is marked by varying Arabic accents, making it generally easy to detect whether an immigrant or refugee has come to Jordan from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, or the Arab Gulf. A significant proportion of the population also speak English, which is conducive for cooperation with international organizations. Jordan has a literacy rate of 95.4%.

In 2017, the World Bank classified Jordan as a lower-middle-income country. With few natural resources, Jordan's economy has been largely dependent on remittances from emigrants in oil-rich Arab countries and international aid. Still, Jordan's public debt has almost doubled since the start of the Syrian conflict to $35.2 billion USD in 2016. A 2011 governmental report

found that an average family would need to earn 276JD to subsist at the poverty line, which is more than the current minimum wage of 220 JD (310 USD) per month (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and UN Development Programme; Malkawi 2017). The minimum wage does not constitute a living wage, especially in Jordan's capital city of Amman, which has been called "the most expensive city in the Middle East"(Al Emam 2017). The unemployment rate is 18.3% and labor force participation is 39.2%.

Most of Jordan's population, 84%, live in urban areas (CIA World Factbook). Amman is home to approximately four million people, which is 42% of the total population. Other large cities include Irbid (1.36 million), Zarqa (550,000), and Mafraq (492,000) (Ghazal 2016). Even though refugees live in the same cities as citizens, residential segregation can fall along neighborhood lines. As cities have grown and developed, they have come to subsume some of the older Palestinian refugee camps from 1948 and 1967. Neighborhoods are markers of class. In Amman, for example, the residents of West Amman (Dabouq or Abdoun) are more likely to be wealthy, while those in East Amman (Jabal Joffa of Jabal Natheef) are more likely to live in poverty.

Intermarriage between immigrant and non-immigrant groups is an important measure of incorporation (Qian and Lichter 2001). For the years of 2005 to 2012, intermarriage rates between Jordanians and non-Jordanians ranged from 5 and 7%. However, after Jordan began to receive large numbers of Syrian refugees, these ratios doubled. Each year from 2014 to 2017, approximately 14% of registered marriages in Jordan took place between Jordanians and non-Jordanians. Notably, in 2017, the governorate with the highest percentage of Jordanian and non-Jordanian marriages was Mafraq – the city with the highest percentage of Syrians to Jordanian

nationals. In Mafraq, 43% - 47% of registered marriages were mixed (Jordan Department of Statistics).

Citizenship is bestowed through *jus sanguinis*, as a right of blood. Immigrants or refugees who have been in Jordan for decades, like the ex-Gazans for example, still do not have access to citizenship rights and protections unless they marry into a Jordanian family. Even then, citizenship is paternal and can only be passed on by the father or husband. Therefore, Jordanian women cannot give their citizenship status to their husbands or children (Human Rights Watch 2018). Non-Jordanian men have almost no way of gaining citizenship. The Nationality Law states that residents can be naturalization after fifteen years, but this law is rarely applied.

El Abed (2006) provides an exemplarily illustration of the challenges refugees face without access to citizenship:

> Heba, a Jordanian national, married Ahmad, a Gazan with an Egyptian travel document. A year after their marriage, Ahmad was arrested for being in Jordan without a residence permit. Deported from Jordan, he was refused re-entry to Egypt and ended up in Sudan. Heba had a child but has been unable to register the birth due to the absence of her husband. She cannot afford to go to Sudan to be with him.

It must be acknowledged that the people of Jordan have a working memory of the state's multi-cultural origins, the colonial construction of the "New Middle East Map," and the ways that ethnic and tribal affiliations have fallen into a social hierarchy. While people may generally comment on Jordan's artificial borders, espouse Pan-Arab beliefs, or state that the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian crisis is all "one wound" – as one Palestinian-Jordanian woman put it – there remains a palpable understanding of what constitutes Jordanian nationalism.

Jordanian-Jordanians:

Jordanian-Jordanians are those who trace their lineage to Jordan's East Bank. Tribes and tribalism continue to be important for social relations, employment, and political influence. Tribal affiliation does not necessarily mean that one lives a nomadic Bedouin lifestyle, although some people certainly do. Tribal relations denote heritage and often translate into familial support.

Many Jordanians can map out familial lineages based on surname, drawing conclusions about whether a person has East Bank Jordanian roots or is of Palestinian descent (Al-Ramahi 2008; Arar 2016). Even though the Bani Hassan tribe, for example, includes one million people, many Jordanians would be able to identify the surnames of large families within the tribe. Family-capital translates into social capital. Ethno-national background can also be assumed by what town a person comes from in Jordan. People from Salt, Al-Karak, or Tafilah governorates are generally assumed to be Jordanian-Jordanians.

The ethnic boundary between Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians has been the topic of extensive scholarly inquiry, as these are the two main groups that comprise Jordan's population (Massad 2001; Curtis 2011). There are no discernable phenotypical differences between Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians. There are, however, linguistic markers that signal ethno-national origins, although most words are pronounced in the same ways.

Following Barth, the ethnic boundary defines the group (1969). "The Jordanian is the one who is not Palestinian," a Transjordanian journalist is quoted saying in Nanes' study of Jordanian nationality (2008 p.85). This division has developed and deepened over the years as war, economic disparities, displacement, and migration create differences in lived experiences.

The Hashemite regime has cultivated a close relationship with Jordanian-Jordanians since the establishment of Transjordan in 1921. These groups were given political influence from the

early years of state formation and continue to occupy most government jobs, which are coveted for their secure status and pension. Jordanian-Jordanians continue to hold government positions at all levels, although they do not hold all the positions. Black September marked an important point in Jordanian history that entrenched the divide between the two groups. The 1988 disengagement and the revocation of citizenship have further separated Jordanian-Jordanians from Palestinian-Jordanians.

Despite the differences, Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians share more commonalities than distinctions. Most Jordanians are Muslim (97%), although there is a strong Christian minority. Intermarriage is common, but children are usually identified with the national origin of the father. They worship in the same places, speak the same language, enjoy most of the same foods, and children attend the same schools.

Palestinian-Jordanians:

Palestinian-Jordanians are Jordanian citizens with Palestinian origins. By many accounts, Palestinian-Jordanians comprise the demographic majority of Jordan's population. This demographic shift was a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the acquisition of the West Bank by Jordan in 1950. Massad (2001 p. 233) describes the massive demographic changes:

> Almost 360,000 refugees entered central Palestine (soon to be renamed the West Bank) and 110,000 refugees entered Jordan proper (soon to be renamed the East Bank). At the time, the population of central Palestine was 425,000 people, and Jordan's population was 375,000. As a result, the total population of the East Bank rose to 485,000 while the West Bank rose to 785,000, making the total population of the new expanded Jordan 1,270,000 people. Therefore, Jordan was transformed demographically overnight by a country of 375,000 people to one of over a million, a rise of almost 300 percent.

Almost from its inception, Jordan became a country of forced migrants. When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, they gained 400,000 Palestinians. These people were internally displaced migrants (referred to as *naziheen*) because they were moving from what was at the time Jordan's West Bank to Jordan's East Bank (Chatelard 2010).

Palestinian-Jordanians, like other Palestinians around the world, share ties to their homeland. As Chatty notes, "Palestinian refugees are now in a fourth generation of exile, making their plight the longest running, unresolved refugee situation in the world" (2017 p. 578). One of the most significant identifiers for people of Palestinian origin is the village or town from which they come from (see Davis 2010). This marker spans generations and includes those who have never even lived in Palestine. Palestinians share a fraught history: from the *Nakba* or "Catastrophe" (which refers to the refugee exodus of 1948) to the injustices that continue to take place in the occupation of the West Bank and blockaded Gaza (2007 - present).
There are more Palestinian refugees in Jordan than any other country in the world. According to UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, there are 2.17 million Palestine refugees registered with the agency. Many Palestinian-Jordanians are simultaneously registered with UNRWA and hold Jordanian citizenship, including those in refugee camps.

Palestinian-Jordanians' connection to their homeland has raised questions about dual loyalty to Palestine and the Jordanian crown. On the one hand, Palestinian-Jordanians were given full citizenship rights. Kassim explains, "When the Jordanian Citizenship Law of 1954 was enacted, Palestinians who became Jordanians enjoyed full individual political, civil, economic and religious rights." After the Election Law of 1960, half of the seats in Parliament were reserved for Palestinians. Palestinian-Jordanians had equal rights to social services, property, civil service.

However, Palestinian-Jordanians position as liminal citizens became apparent after the 1988 disengagement, a policy that continued to disenfranchise Palestinian-Jordanians to the present day. In 1983, Jordanian officials instituted color-coded travel documents that were intended to facilitate movement between the West and East banks. A "green card" was for West Bank residents, while a "yellow card" was used by West Bank residents who had moved to the East Bank. A Human Rights Watch Report explains, "The introduction of this system of green and yellow cards in practice created three tiers of citizenship rights, differentiating original East Bank Jordanians and the two groups of West Bank-origin Jordanian nationals (whom Jordanian law still formally considered its nationals and citizens with equal rights)" (2010 p. 2).

Many Palestinian-Jordanians have had their nationality revoked since the disengagement, but this practice increased substantially in 2009 and 2010. Some Palestinian-Jordanians (those holding a yellow or green card) were informed by a bureaucratic official that their nationality had been revoked when they sought to renew their passports, update their driver's licenses, or register a child's birth. Not only were these people made stateless, they also lost important social services including access to primary and secondary education for their children. Healthcare costs and university education also became more expensive when these citizens became foreigners. In 2009, the Nayif al-Qadi, the Jordanian Interior Minister, justified the practice as a means of protecting Palestinians' right of return: "We… freeze his national number in order to motivate him to consolidate his right to Palestine" (quoted from AARD 2015 and RRT 2009). These Palestinian-Jordanians could still hold a Jordanian passport. But, the passport has been rendered a mere travel document without a national number.

Despite the fear of denationalization, there is "no explicit discrimination toward Palestinian-Jordanians before the law" (AARD 2015). Palestinian-Jordanians go about their day-

to-day life like their Jordanian-Jordanian neighbors. They go grocery shopping, visit family, own businesses, attend schools and universities, celebrate weddings and mourn funerals. They also have access to government services (El Abed 2006). In most ways, Palestinian-Jordanians' lives are not much different than that of their Jordanian-Jordanian counterparts. Class and familial connections ultimately determine one's life experiences.

Palestinians without Citizenship:

The experiences of migrants and refugees from Palestine are not only determined by country of origin, but also, by the year of their migration or displacement. Palestinians who migrated to Jordan before 1923 became Jordanian. Those who fell within Jordan's jurisdiction in 1948 became citizens, and many remained citizens. The 1967 Palestinians that stayed in the West Bank experienced different legal precarity than those who migrated to the East Bank. However, Palestinians who came from Gaza in 1967 were never given citizenship. In contemporary 2018, 158,000 "ex-Gazan" refugees have lived in Jordan for over 50 years without a pathway to citizenship. Each wave of Palestinian refugees has experienced different treatment and varying protections under the law (see Pedraza 2007 for a discussion on waves of refugees).

Many ex-Gazan refugees have been displaced twice. They first fled to Gaza after the 1948 war and then again in 1967. When they entered Jordan, ex-Gazans were given two-year temporary passports and treated as Egyptian subjects (Pérez 2018). Under the Armistice Agreement of 1949, Egypt took control of Gaza as Jordan similarly had jurisdiction over the West Bank. However, unlike Jordan, Egypt never extended citizenship to the people of Gaza and never claimed the territory. These people were stateless refugees who were unable to repatriate due to the Israeli occupation.

The Jordanian "passports" are more like travel documents. They do not include a national number. Even as a travel document, the passport can only be used to travel when other states accept individuals with temporary passports, which several neighboring Arab states do not (El Abed 2006). While UNRWA provides ex-Gazans with important social services including access to schools and clinics, ex-Gazans cannot vote or own property. They may rent property for a three-year period (Davis et al. 2017). The odds of being accepted into a Jordanian university as a "foreigner" are slim and several professions are completely closed to ex-Gazans. Ex-Gazans are of the poorest Palestinian refugees in Jordan (Tiltnes and Zhang 2014).

In addition to ex-Gazans, Jordan also hosts Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS), who are *not* treated as Syrian refugees, but as Palestinian refugees. This categorical distinction has immense ramifications. First, unlike Syrian refugees, PRS faced increased scrutiny when entering Jordan and many have been explicitly denied refuge or deported. Second, PRS fall under the protection of UNRWA instead of the UNHCR because their displacement can be traced back to the 1948 war. This means that PRS do not meet the requirements to access the resources earmarked for Syrians, do not benefit from increased international recognition for the Syrian crisis, and do not have access to the institutional interventions made by the Jordanian government and aid agencies to support refugees. Some of those who were able to enter Jordan joined other Palestinian refugees in UNRWA camps, some of which have existed for seventy years. Finally, UNRWA does not resettle refugees to a third country. This means the while Syrians can have the chance at a better life and a pathway to citizenship in the West, PRS do not have the same opportunities.

Iraqi Refugees and Migrants:

The UNHCR estimated that more than 4.7 million Iraqis, of a population of 30 million, had left their homes as a result of the Iraq War in 2003. While nearly half of these people were displaced within Iraq, the others became refugees. Jordan hosted between an estimated 700,000 and 800,000 Iraqi refugees in 2009 (Fagen 2009). Despite the focus on the most recent wave of Iraqi refugees, Jordan has received multiple waves of Iraqis including those who came to Jordan after the First Gulf War. According to Harper, since the First Gulf War, the Iraqi population in Jordan was never below 130,000 people (Harper 2008 p. 170). Chatelard argues that the focus on Iraqi refugee displacement since the start of the war in 2003 "conceals previous dynamics of forced-migration from Iraq, the embeddedness of current refugee migration in other migration movements of Iraqis, and the variegated experiences and self-perceptions of refugees from Iraq" (2009 p. 5).

The Iraqi refugee population was received by a state whose social institutions were already constrained due to the Palestinian refugee population. The Palestinian camp-model informed the UNHCR's best practices as the model to develop mechanisms to manage Iraqi refugee movement and provide aid (Crisp et al. 2009). However, unlike the refugees quintessentially represented as housed in camps, Iraqi refugees settled in urban areas of Jordan, mainly in Amman. In 2009, the Assistant High Commissioner (Operations) remarked in a presentation to Cities Alliance that, "Too many of the underlying assumptions…that guide our work are based on the outmoded notion that refugees and displaced people belong in camps…We have not yet thought through the full challenge of operating in cities…" (Crisp et al. 2009, p. 4).

Once in Jordan, Iraqi refugees faced several country-specific obstacles that put them at risk for refoulement including unauthorized status, lack of legal employment, and the isolation of

urban settlement that left many Iraqis without access to an established network of available resources usually dispensed through refugee camps. Jordanian policy labelled, and treated, refugees fleeing Iraq as "temporary visitors" — not as Convention refugees (Human Rights Watch 2006). This invisibility heightened Iraqi vulnerability to the consequences of unauthorized status. A small percentage of Iraqi refugees were granted some residency rights because they could afford to invest a substantial sum of money in Jordanian banks. These refugees were treated as "investors" instead of "visitors," and held "investor" legal status. For Iraqis without the necessary capital, however, access to the labor market, social institutions, and resources is obstructed.

In the wake of the Syrian crisis, Iraqi refugees were quickly deprioritized. Hoffman (2016) builds on Chatelard (2009) to argue, "Iraqis became invisible again." International aid given to the UNHCR is largely earmarked for Syrian refugees, with a small percentage reserved for Iraqis. No amount of money was explicitly reserved for other refugee groups.

Syrian Refugees and Migrants:

Seven years after the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Syrians continue to live in vulnerable situations in Jordan. The challenges of displacement are exacerbated by extreme poverty. According to a 2017 study based on 1,447 Syrian refugee participants, 82% of urban settling Syrian refugees live below the poverty line. They rely on a combination of humanitarian assistance and limited work. In 2016, the Jordanian government authorized limited employment for Syrian refugees, opening certain sectors to Syrian refugees including farming and factory work. Legal work permits for Syrians were tied to Jordanian employers, which created problems in unregulated field. When Jordanians engage in unauthorized work, Syrians who work with

them cannot access work permits. To survive, some refugees use emergency coping strategies including child labor, child marriage, and forgoing food.

Many Syrian refugees live in unfurnished apartments without heat during the cold winter months. Others live in refugee camps with limited access to electricity. Based on the CARE study, 10.3% of Syrian refugees reported being evicted in 2017. This was an increase from 6.1% in 2016. Cash for rent was identified as a primary need for Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians alike.

Across the board, children and young adults have had their education interrupted by the war. One-third of Syrian children are out of school and their future remains uncertain. Jordanian schools have instituted a "second shift program" that allows Syrian children to attend school in the late afternoon. Critics argue that this approach has negatively impacted Jordanian students' whose teachers are overworked and whose classroom hours have been reduced.

While some Syrian refugees have had access to formal Jordanian schools, their education remains segregated. Informal schooling has created opportunities for refugee students who have not attended school for three or more years and cannot, therefore, reenter the formal schooling system. The *Makani* project, which translates into "my place," includes over 500 informal schools that are open to all vulnerable communities including other refugee groups. This broad response to the Syrian refugee crisis has, therefore, created opportunities for other populations. Many Syrians continue to mourn the loss of loved ones, or live with daily anxiety, as the war rages on. Of those surveyed for the CARE study, 22.9% "reported that they feel perpetual helplessness to the extent that they do not want to continue living" (2017 p. 7). Families are separated by borders, without any legal rights of being reunified in the future.

The Syrian refugee crisis has also led to more donor investment in the UNHCR, the UN agency that supports Syrian refugees. Meanwhile, UNRWA, the UN agency dedicated to Palestine refugees has experienced several budget emergencies. Syrian refugees have privileged access to healthcare as compared to their Iraqi or Palestinians counterparts. Syrians' healthcare is subsided because of the support earmarked for them, while other refugee groups are treated as foreigners and must pay large co-pays for basic treatment.

Less Recognized Refugees: Yemeni, Sudanese, and Somali Refugees:

Jordan hosts approximately 14,706 refugees from Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, which have been referred to as "displaced minorities" (UNHCR Fact Sheet Feb. 2017; MMP 2017b). Yemeni refugees entered Jordan as the conflict escaladed in 2015. Prior to that, Yemenis already faced food insecurity and malnutrition (AARD 2016). Twenty of Yemen's twenty-two governorates have been affected by Saudi led airstrikes and 21.2 million people (82% of the population) require humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs (MMP 2017b; Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016). As the war in Yemen continues to unfold, there is a concern that Yemeni displacement will become a large-scale crisis in the future on par with Iraqi and Syrian displacement.

Sudanese refugees came to Jordan as a result of the conflict in Darfur in the late 1990s. While many have been in Jordan for almost decades, others recently fled to Jordan after violence in their regions escalated from 2012 to 2014 (Davis et al. 2017; MMP 2017a). In 2015, approximately 800 Sudanese refugees were deported to Khartoum after staging a month-long protest in front of the main UNHCR office. According to Davis et al., "More than 100 of those deported were detained and questioned upon arrival in Khartoum" (2017b). Of those who were

deported, reportedly 145 Sudanese fled again to Cairo. In the wake of the mass deportation, non-protesting Sudanese refugees were also deported after being spotted and picked up based on the color of their skin. Others went into hiding. Families were separated across the board.

Somali refugees have fled the civil war since 1991 and continue to flee as conflict develops in surrounding states. There were approximately 810 Somalis in Jordan in 2017. One report suggested that Somalis who arrived in Jordan were fleeing from Yemen in 2015 (MMP 2017a). Most Somali refugees live in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, where the UNHCR has registered 870,000 refugees. An additional 2.1 million Somalis are internally displaced.

The Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) describes how these refugees are systematically neglected by aid organizations while Syrian refugees are prioritized: “[The] UNHCR runs separate response operations for Syrian and non-Syrian refugees and many donors only fund projects targeting Syrians,” the report explains (MMP 2017 p. 5). Displaced minorities are left without adequate advocacy, access to basic needs, or legal protections.

Displaced minorities describe racial discrimination and harassment. In schools, children are bullied. Exploitation and poor working conditions are also common. Displaced minorities often engage in informal work, manual labor, cleaning jobs, or agricultural labor. Across the board, displaced minority work for little money in vulnerable conditions. Moreover, these groups have experienced detention due to their irregular status and unauthorized employment, which puts these refugees further at greater risk of deportation. Displaced minorities have also faced difficulty registering marriages and their children’s birth, which potentially renders their children as stateless. Healthcare and education is also expensive. Unlike Syrian refugees, displaced minorities are required to pay higher rates to access basic needs.

There have been very few academic studies about these populations, and even fewer reports based on in-depth interviews with displaced minorities. In reference to Sudanese and Somali refugees, Davis et al. write, "First, … these refugees and asylum seekers want to come to Jordan because it is a place of safety; and second, that they are "non-border" refugees who enter with visas and then seek asylum. This second point leads Jordanian authorities to view Sudanese and Somalis (and now likely Yemenis as well) as people who overstay their visas, rather than as refugees" (2017).

Original Migrants: Circassian, Chechens, and Armenians:

Jordan's immigration history reveals how, since before its inception as a state, founding members of the contemporary society were forced migrants. Hamed-Troyansky argues that Amman was a "refugee settlement" founded by Circassian refugees who fled from the Russian Empire's North Caucus region (2017 p. 605). Circassian (*Sharkass*) refugee elite were "refugees-turned-immigrants" through the registration, sale, and purchase of property. Meanwhile, Chechens (*Sheshan*) settlements of Sweileh and Zarqa became foundational for the modern development of the cities (Dweik 2010). Chechens fled to the Ottoman land that would become Jordan in 1901 to escape Tsarist Russia (Ibid; also see Shami 2009). Despite their relatively small populations, Circassian-Jordanians and Chechens-Jordanians hold important positions in Jordan's government and army. As Muslims, they share a common religion with most of Jordan's population.

While most of the Armenians in the Arab world fled to neighboring countries, namely Lebanon and Syrian, Jordan continues to be home to a small but well-established Armenian community. Unlike Circassians and Chechens, Armenians constitute part of Jordan's Christian

minority. Al-Khatib writes, “Unlike the … Chechens and the Circassians, who live in tightly knit communities, the Armenians do not have their own neighborhoods; rather they live with other Jordanians in the different residential areas of the country” (2001 p. 160). Al Khatib also notes that Armenian-Jordanians discourage intermarriage with other Jordanians. However, statistical information about intermarriage or even the size of these minority groups remains elusive as the Jordanian census does not identify these groups as non-Jordanian.

Armenian refugees established the Al-Buss refugee camp near Tyre in Lebanon, which was then used by Palestine refugees who fled in 1948 (Doraï 2010). “The refugees who first made it to Amman came in 1947. They were well-off urban Palestinians from Lydda, Ramleh, Jaffa, Jerusalem and other towns, and included among them Muslim and Christian Palestinian Arabs, as well as a number of Armenians from Jerusalem” (Hanania p. 464). Armenian refugee history is not only chronologically tied to refugees in the region. As refugee groups fled, so did their Armenian neighbors. Armenians fled with the Palestinians in 1948, many of whom ended up in the Jordanian East Bank. When Lebanese fled their home country during the civil war from 1975 to 1990, Armenians also had to flee the violence. Most recently, Armenians also fled Syria as the conflict continued to worsen.

Extensive research has been dedicated to how these ethnic groups have managed to maintain their ethnic identity while also integrating into Jordanian society (Dweik 2000; Al-Khatib 2001). These groups have proudly preserved their culture, language, and histories. They also speak Arabic fluently and are generally well-integrated socially, economically, and residentially. Members of these groups have citizenship rights despite their ethnic difference.

Labor Migrants, Domestic Workers, and NGO workers:

Jordan depends on labor migrants in several important sectors including construction, agriculture, housekeeping, and care work. Jordan began to import foreign labor after approximately 47% of local domestic workers found more prosperous work in the Arab Gulf in the mid 1970s (Humphrey 1991, p. 53). Between 1982 and 1984, remittances totaled around 30% of GDP (Ibid.). After 1985, Arab Gulf states began to replace Arab labor with immigrants from Asia, and as a result, many emigrants returned to Jordan. The influx of return migrants posed a challenge not only because they increased the demand for jobs in Jordan, but also because they substantially decreased remittances from the Arab Gulf. Nevertheless, Jordan continues to depend on immigrants for low waged labor.

Jordan's labor market is highly segregated along ethnic lines. In 2015, many migrants from the Philippines (17,810), Sri Lanka (8,779), Indonesia (8,185), Pakistan (7,714), and Kenya (6,156) are employed as domestic workers, house keepers, and nannies in Jordan. The ethnic composition of domestic workers in Jordan has changed over time as has the number of immigrants from each country. In 2010, Jordan implemented new policies to protect domestic workers, including setting a minimum wage of 200JD per month. Before this policy, "Sri Lankan domestic workers earned the least, between $100 and $150 per month, followed by Indonesians who earned $125 to $175, and Filipinas who earned$150 to $200 (Human Rights Watch 2011)." Some domestic workers have described not being paid for their labor, not being paid on time, and being treated as slaves (Ibid., Su 2017). (See Oishi 2005 for more on Asian labor migration to the Arab Gulf.)

Agribusiness and construction sectors are dominated by Egyptians (636,270), Sudanese (10,128), and Syrian (1,265,514) workers. Given the size of the Egyptian population in Jordan, they have become the most recognized ethnicity of migrant workers. Some policymakers have

called on the Jordanian government to withdraw Egyptians' work permits and give those employment opportunities to Syrians instead. Their reasoning is that such a policy could "solve" the "refugee burden." Of course, such a suggestion neglects the rights Egyptian migrants and bilateral agreements between Jordan and Egypt.

Meanwhile, many European and North American migrants arrive with aid organizations in Jordan or are part of their county's military presence. The two largest groups of Western migrants are Americans (9,264) and immigrants from the United Kingdom (5,132). Other migrants come from Canada (4,864), France (2,546), Germany (2,213), Spain (1,274), Italy (1,244), and Sweden (1,238).

Table 5.1: Immigrants residing in Jordan in 2015, counts above 5,000 individuals

Country	Number of Immigrants
Britain	5,132
Kenya	6,156
Pakistan	7,714
Indonesia	8,185
Lebanon	8,265
Sri Lanka	8,779
India	8,979
United States	9,264
Sudan	10,128
Philippines	17,810
Bangladesh	19,390
Libya	22,700
Yemen	31,163
Saudi Arabia	17,339
Iraq	130,911
Palestine	634,182
Egypt	636,270
Syria	1,265,514

*Adapted from Table 8.1 of the Jordanian National Census, 2015

Conclusion:

Despite receiving immigrants from all corners of the globe, scholars would not call Jordan a "country of immigrants." "Countries of immigration" are places like the U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are also the top SRR (Brubaker 1992; Bloemraad 2006; FitzGerald and Cook-Martín) The term denotes a set of national values, including a pathway to political incorporation for immigrants and the ability for immigrants to become part of the nation's "imagined community" (Anderson 1983). Scholars apply the "country of immigrants" label even though they know that these states have notoriously engaged in ethnic selection and have used the law to deny immigrants basic rights. This contradiction between inclusive values and exclusionary practice illustrates that the term "country of immigrants" reflects an idea, which is much more than a description of immigrant communities in a country.

The "country of immigrants" designation recognizes the *character* of a state. When scholars and policymakers debate immigration to these states (whether they are immigration advocates or restrictionists), they take into consideration the values of the state. How citizens feel about immigration becomes central to the conversation. The historical significance of immigrant and refugee reception, the importance of family reunifications, and the rights of immigrant communities are all considered when discussing "countries of immigration."

I propose that scholars adopt these aspects of the "country of immigrants" perspective when considering refugee reception in Jordan and other MRHS. To do so would be to recognize that Jordan is a country – not a refugee warehouse. The warehouse approach demeans refugees and Jordanian residents, even though that may not be the goal of the narrative. The social construction of Jordan as an empty vacuum, or a vast desert, is used to promote Jordan "refugee hosting capacity" as a holding ground that has the endless ability contain refugee populations.

Simultaneously, the warehouse approach allows interested parties to extol Jordan's dedication to human rights while completely neglecting the needs and rights of citizens and residents.

Jordan is a place with its own rich history, customs, and values. When we recognize Jordan as a *country of forced migrants*, we acknowledge the needs of citizens, immigrants, contemporary refugees, and refugee populations that have fallen outside the global narrative of worthiness and urgency. Jordan's history of immigrant reception is also vital to consider even when one's primary focus is on contemporary Syrian displacement. Syrians' experiences in Jordan are undeniably shaped by the refugee groups and immigrants that came before them. The lines on the map do not tell a full story. Considering Jordan's history creates opportunities for scholars to consider how familial relationships and ethnic ties have existed across state borders for centuries.

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Chapter 6: The Border and Border Crossings: Nabil's Story

Many of the residents who fled Dar'a crossed the Jordanian-Syrian border. In the national imagination, the border between Jordan and Syria was imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement in which the Great Britain and France divide the region, drawing lines in the sand and creating states. However, the border remains a manifestation of the state's ability and willingness to control immigration. A cursory assessment of the last seven years may lead one to conclude that Jordan has maintained open borders as Syrians have sought refuge in the country. This is not the case. The border is continuously changing to accommodate state interests and respond to international pressures.

Geographic proximity to Syria undoubtedly plays a role in the number of refugees that Jordan has accepted. But a shared border does not fully explain why Jordan hosts Syrian refugees. Despite becoming a safe haven to hundreds of thousands, if not over one million, Syrians, Jordan has continuously engaged border control measures since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jordanian officials have implemented laws and policies to regulate refugee migration. Officials have closed the border completely at times and created filters to regulate who is allowed to enter Jordanian territory. Efforts to control migration have been made in cooperation with powerful states in the Global North, the international community, and Syria. Entering Jordan, for example, also requires exiting Syria. In that vein, Jordanian immigration policies have built upon Syrian exit policies to select refugees based on their region of displacement and demographic markers. Leniency at the border has also been incentivized by other states and international and supranational institutions. These agencies have lobbied Jordan to keep the border open and continue to fulfill its role as a MRHS.

The Effort to Enter Jordan as an Immigrant, Not a Refugee:

When the conflict began in 2011, Syrians were able to enter Jordan without applying for a visa. Many registered refugees, especially those who entered Jordan at the start of the conflict, talked about coming to Jordan as immigrants, not as refugees. Neither Syrians nor their Jordanian hosts expected that the conflict would last very long – "a few weeks at most," I heard repeated serval times as refugee families described packing for their trip to Jordan. Once Syrians entered Jordan, familial, cultural, linguistic, and religious ties eased the challenges of navigating a new country. Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh explained, "We have delayed the opening of refugee camps for so long, because, there are family relations, there are intermarriages, there's a history, a demographic history, between Jordan and Syria, where people have just come in and stayed with relatives or stayed in makeshift temporary housing locations" (BBC July 2012).

Many Syrian refugees who entered Jordan in 2012 and 2013 were welcomed at the border. Refugees described how border guards offered thoughtful words, found chairs for the elderly to sit on, and gave sweets and cookies (*bacote*) to the children. "Thank God for your safe arrival. Jordan is your second home," I heard repeated several times over throughout my interviews. Rabab, a mother of three, said, "When I entered Jordan, I fell to the ground and kissed the earth. We didn't have anything, but we had safety. And that night was the first night I was able to sleep since the bombing started."

Some young men, especially those who were traveling along, were turned back at the border. This was more likely to occur when they did not have proper identification, but also happened even when people had identification. It is not uncommon for refugees to flee without IDs or passports. To subvert this policy, two young men I spoke to traveled with elderly women,

either their mother or an aunt. Fadi explained, “I tried to leave Syria, but they [Jordanians] wouldn’t let me in. I went back home and my mother traveled with me. We came together as a family. They let me in as a son that would take care of his mother. We entered the camp and we registered with the UNHCR. Then, my mother went back because she had to be in Syria to take care of my dad.” This was not everyone’s experience. Imad, Wajih’s older brother (who we were introduced to in Chapter Three), fled to Jordan alone in 2011 when the protests in Dar’a began. He left precisely because he had just turned eighteen and wanted to avoid military conscription.

Even after gaining access to Jordan, young men are also more likely to be deported or refouled. Several young men I spoke to talked about their fear of being arbitrarily sent back to Syria. The policed their own behavior, including cutting ties with friends and family in the home country so as not to be accused of fraternizing with potential terrorists. In the wake of several ISIS-claimed terrorist attacks at the Jordanian-Syrian border, Jordanian officials have been quick to deport anyone who may be a potential threat. Jordanian aid workers I spoke to also cited deportation as a serious problem that was out of their control. As one Jordanian working in Za’atari and Azraq explained, “When it comes to security, we can’t change the outcome. We can try to advocate for a person, but the police just have to say ‘security.’ They are not required to give us any more information than that.”

Gender has played a significant role in ascribing vulnerability or threat. In contrast to the young Syrian men who are often denied at the border or refouled, there have been special allowances made for women, children, and the elderly. Pregnant mothers at the berm between Jordan and Syria were allowed the cross the border when others were not.

Over the years, the border was also periodically closed to Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS). In this way, Jordanian officials have also engaged in ethnic selection at the border, which

has been a common practice in the history of migration (FitzGerald and Cook Martín 2014). These are predominantly 1948 refugees fleeing from the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria to Jordan. Refugees who have been displaced again.

One Jordanian official explained to me that Palestinian-Syrians are the state's top priority for resettlement. While some may expect that Syrians will be able to return to Syria at some point in the future, the Jordanian fear is that Palestinians will not have a place to return to and become the long-term responsibility of the Jordanian state. This is not to say that all PRS were rejected at the border. Cyber City became known as a small refugee camp, which may be more accurately described as an immigration detention facility, for PRS.

Even when the border stayed open, the legality of border crossings changed to curve the flow of refugees. Refugees who entered from a legal border crossing could travel freely inside the state, while those who came in through an "illegal" crossing were processed and housed in refugee camps. Syrians knew that this was the case and often strategized to avoid forced encampment.

Nabil's Story:[13]

I met Nabil in Za'atari refugee camp. We were introduced to one another by a Jordanian aid worker named Tarek who supervised Nabil's work in the camp. The two had become friends over the years. Tarek described Nabil to me as we drove from Amman to the camp. He said, "I love him; he's smart; a hard worker and team leader. He is a supervisor for 8 people. He respects

[13] I have not changed or added any words to Nabil's story. But to make the reading flow, I have taken out repeated words or phrases and cut out portions of the text when someone else walked into the room or we changed the subject. I've edited his words to tell a cohesive story, but I have not changed any of the words.

others." Nabil first left Syria when he twenty-four and eventually ended up in Za'atari after spending several months in the city of Irbid. When I met Nabil, he was in his early thirties. He was a father and a husband. Nabil risked his life to avoid forced encampment, but eventually, had no choice but to live in the camp.

Nabil described his long journey from Syria to Jordan and the life he was forced to leave behind. "I am my dad's favorite son. Our economic situation was good in Syria. My dad works abroad in the United Arab Emirates [and could afford to send money home]. We had cars and houses, not like these caravans," Nabil said referring to the housing units in Za'tari camp. "We had everything we needed [in Syria]."

Nabil continued,

> My brothers didn't go to college. But for me, education was the most important thing. My dad's greatest goal was for me to go a college education. He more than encouraged me – he pushed me to go to school.
>
> I studied law. I'm from Dar'a but I studied in Aleppo, 450 kilometers away. I dreamt of finishing school. Life's opportunities open up for you when you graduate [from college]. Law is the highest discipline in the liberal arts. In the beginning, I didn't know what law was, I didn't have a love for the law. But when you concentrate on your studies, a person starts to love their rights and respect their duties and develop an appreciation for human rights too. I wanted to specialize in international relations and human rights. But, I left all these ideas behind.
>
> As I was nearing my graduation, I was put in jail for political reasons. Because of the events that happened at the end, the protests.

I asked Nabil if he was referring to the protests in Dar'a. Did he take part in the protests? He answered, "Of course I did! We all did! There's no way to get around it. We were all in the protests. We wanted to take advantage of the opportunity." Nabil then described his experience in the protests, which became the impetus for him to flee to Jordan.

> Listen, first of all, the people who took to the streets were educated people. The students were the first to join the protests. For example, my father never experienced Syria the same way I did. He's been abroad for 20 years. But for me, I lived there. And, I traveled around Syria, to Allepo, to Latakia, to Homs, to Damascus. I met people all over Syria. I saw the oppression that we live with. I saw sectarian discrimination. I'm Sunni, and they [the government] are from a different sectarian background. They discriminate against us, 23 million of us…
>
> When [the revolution] happened in Tunisia, I was in Damascus. I started planning with my friends. God willing, we would have a revolution here soon.

Nabil had final exams when the protests started, but he returned home to his village, Taybeh, as soon as he could. He participated in the protests from the second week on. Unbeknownst to him, all the participants were being filmed and photographed. The images of his involvement would follow him for years to come.

> We didn't know then that they [Syrian government officials] were photographing us. And that the photographs would get to the *mukhabarat* (secret police). Soon, the *mukhabarat* began to detain people.
>
> They came and got me from our house. I was asleep; they came at 6 in the morning… They said I was "wanted" (*matloob*). I was twenty-four when they jailed me.
>
> When you enter jail, you see things… If you didn't believe in the revolution before then, if you didn't believe in anything, the jail would make you believe. I was beat so many times that I dreamt of dying.
>
> For me, like I said, our family had connections. My father was able to talk to someone and get me out of jail. I only spent one week in jail. That's it. In one week, I saw unbelievable things.

Nabil was let out of jail after his father paid a bribe. He had three more courses left before he could graduate. But, Nabil could not take his final exams.

> I didn't make it to the exam. So, that was it, my future was gone, and there was no way I could graduate. I did not finish those last three courses. When I returned home, my family celebrated my return. I was surprised to see that my dad was

> arranging for me to leave Syria. I was "wanted" and there was a call out for my arrest. If they found me again, they would take me back to jail.
>
> I had to escape. At first, I refused to leave. I didn't want to leave. I wanted to stay in my country. I wanted to graduate. I wanted to stay with my family. Imagine someone telling you that you had to leave your family all of a sudden. I was also engaged and I wanted to get married. I didn't want to leave.
>
> Then, the same thing happened all over again. I was hanging out with my friends, smoking hooka (*argela*) under a tree, and the police cornered us. They took our personal identification and, as you know, they can see your name – they knew I was wanted by the government.
>
> The general handed over the IDs to be processed, but he held onto mine. He was a good person. He turned to me, gave me back my ID, and told me 'don't let me see your face again, you are wanted.'
>
> If he wasn't a good man (*ibin halal*), he would have taken me in. They [the military officers] weren't all bad. Some people were forced to be a part of the military. I imagine he was told to go out to a specific village and get the 'wanted' people. It wasn't up to him. He opened a new door for me, and I realized I had to leave. After that I was convinced.

Like so many refugees, Nabil did not want to leave his home. He fled because he was in danger and his family feared for his life. Nabil's experience also draws attention to how becoming a refugee can be a family decision. Like Imad, whose experience is described in Chapter Three, Nabil was convinced to flee Syria after his family insisted that this was the best way for him to stay safe.

> I came to Jordan through the authorized border crossing (*nizami*). I got my passport and I got to the border. I wasn't a refugee.

As a Syrian citizen, Nabil could travel to Jordan using his Syrian passport without a visa. Many Syrians preferred to enter Jordan through "authorized" border crossings. Those who were allowed to legally exit Syria could also legally enter Jordan. In this way, Jordan externalized border control to Syrian officials. Syrians who entered through unauthorized border crossings

became "refugees." They were registered with the state and the UNHCR and, in the months that followed, forced to live in Za'atari camp. Nabil was adamant that he did not want to live in a refugee camp or be labeled a refugee, so he took his chances with the authorized Syrian border crossing even though the unauthorized exit was very close to his village of Taybeh.

> I lived in Irbid, worked there for seven months. We had people we knew in Irbid. My [future] brother-in-law worked in Irbid. He had a shawarma stand. So, I came to him. Then, my family members that got out of jail [in Syria] started coming to where I was. This was August 2011.

Nabil relied on family ties and extended social networks to establish himself in exile. As others were persecuted, they sought out Nabil and joined him in Irbid.

> I worked in Irbid for seven months, and after that, I just wanted to go home. Seven months is enough, don't you think? Seven months can feel like a lifetime. Seven months without good pay. I couldn't even make enough money to spend on myself. I got paid 150JD (Jordanian Dinars), working twelve-hour days. Rent was expensive. I lived with another guy and we paid 120JD, so I paid 60 JD for rent.
>
> Towards the end, it became clear that what was happening in Syria was going to last a long time. I couldn't take it anymore. When was all this going to be over? I just wanted to go home. I garnered my inner strength (*ayast an hali*) and returned to Syria through the official border crossing.
>
> I entered around ten at night and I didn't tell anyone I was coming. Because if something happened, I didn't want my family to get upset or worry. I came back because I wanted to continue my education, but I couldn't. Once in Syria, I realized that I couldn't come and go freely, because ultimately, I was still a "wanted" person. This was April 1, 2012.
>
> I wanted to get married, so we did.

I asked Nabil how he was able to get married without dealing with the government. Nabil explained that he and his wife do not have an official marriage certificate. The marriage was witnessed by others and recognized by their families. A tribal leader (*muchtar*) also provided

them with an unofficial marriage certificate for internal use. But this certificate is not recognized by the Syrian government.

> We got married, but then the violence started again. May 25th was my wedding day, and that day, the bombs started again. The same exact day, that's when the planes came. This was something unusual in our area. [It was surprising that] there would be bombs coming from the planes overhead.

Tarek teased Nabil saying that the planes meant it was "a real celebration," complete with an airshow. The two men laugh at the absurdity and misfortune that Nabil and his wife faced.

> I stayed for three months after I got married. But, after that, there were more threats and there was a greater chance that I would be jailed again. There was an expectation that they were going to come into the country and take anyone who was "wanted." My dad said, that's it, you need to leave. Again, I wanted to leave through the authored border. I have a passport, so I could do that.

I asked Nabil about the risk of leaving through the authorized border crossing as a "wanted" man. He knew that doing so may lead to his imprisonment, but Nabil was confident that if he reached out to his friends and contacts, he would be able to avoid imprisonment. Again, an authorized exit also meant an authorized entrance into Jordan. As a Syrian immigrant, as opposed to a Syrian refugee, Nabil would have greater rights in Jordan and the ability to move freely in the country.

> We had people we knew that worked at the border, and I asked one friend, is my name still 'wanted.' He told me 'no.' He said 'come on a Thursday, that way he could secure my safe passage through.' But, I had something on Thursday that got rescheduled for Sunday. So, I didn't leave on Thursday.
>
> I decided to leave on Sunday, thinking [to myself], 'Okay, once I get to the border, I am with a taxi driver that knows some of the border guards.' He'll help me.

When Nabil approached the immigration window to receive his exit stamp, he was asked by a guard to step inside. When he did, Nabil was told that he was going to jail. There, Nabil saw his friend, the one who told Nabil that we was no longer "wanted" by the government.

> I asked him, "How could you tell me that I wasn't wanted, and now I am going to jail." He said, "Your name came down [from the authorities] on Saturday." I asked, "Why didn't you tell me before I got here?" But that was it. I left it up to God.

Nabil gave his suitcase to the taxi driver and asked the driver to return the bag to his family. Nabil was told that we was "wanted" by a high ranking branch of the Syrian secret (*mukhabart*). His description of this elite government branch was so intimidating that Nabil started to laugh as he described the maximum-security prison that he was being ushered to.

> This is something that there's no coming back from. They knew that I did something from the pictures of the protests, and then, there were also writings… From the people they let go [from prison], they got names…

Nabil soon learned that he was not only being detained for partaking in the protests, but he was also charged with another crime. A crime that other jailed "witnesses" had reported him for, possibly because they believed that Nabil was in Jordan and would not be prosecuted.

> I learned that I was not only accused of partaking in protests, but when I was here in Jordan, I was also accused of organizing the revolution. To be honest, I did some organizing for a while, but I stopped because I realized that the work they [the revolutionaries] were doing wasn't right. And, it is not legal in Jordan to do this work. I came to Jordan to feel protected, I wasn't going to do anything that would get me in trouble while I was here. What's important: I realized that the charge was for organizing the revolution.
>
> Imagine going to jail. I was sitting alone, the jail was half the size of this caravan… [referring to the caravan in Za'tari camp]. Who in the world walks to their own death? For us, from Taybeh, when the refugees started to enter Jordan, they entered through our village. The border was open, the smuggling border was open.

Nabil regretted his choice to exit through the authorized border crossing. He had watched refugees exit through his village using the unauthorized crossing.

> I asked myself, why didn't I smuggle myself out? It would have been easier. Within half an hour, I could have been in Jordan. But I didn't want to have to enter the refugee camp… Because if you enter that way, you are forced to go to Za'atari. I'm a student. I wanted to be in the city, I wanted to go back to where my friends were, where my family was outside of the camp.

Before describing the day he was moved the high security facility, Nabil paused and talked about his faith in God. He was a devout Muslim man. Nabil believes his faith is what ultimately led him to safety.

> I am, thanks be to God, a person who prays five times a day. When you pray the *fajir* [prayer at dawn], you are in God's good graces. I used to pray the *fajir* at the mosque. And I said to myself, I am a believer, I pray the *fajir*, how is it that I am going to jail? How is it that I am going to my death?
>
> The next day was a Monday, and a bus came to take us to the jail. Of course, there were other people there with me. They told us, "Your names are similar to someone else's. We are going to let you out." But, that's what the guards said to everyone. They wanted to control us. What can I tell you? It is terrorism. They tell you, 'There's nothing [to worry about], and you should relax but they are taking you to your death.'
>
> There was a machine gun above our building. At night, they would just shoot the machine guns at the houses to entertain themselves. My village was very close by and I worried about my family. There was also a tank behind my window. That tank used to fire missiles at us [in our village]. I was looking at it, counting the missiles, and tracking where they were falling.
>
> While on the bus to Swedah [the city where Nabil would be jailed], we passed by my family's farm. I saw by brother, I saw my grandfather, and my family in the farm. I was watching them as I was going to prison. They didn't know that I was on the bus.
>
> When I got off the bus, we were at the *mukhabarat*. I went inside and they put us in the holding cell. There were two other men inside. So, counting us, there were four men in total in the small cell. I ask them, how long have you all been here? One guy says he's been there for three days. But this is a holding cell; holding cells aren't supposed to hold someone for longer than 24 hours, max. I asked, 'Do

> they have food here?' I hadn't eaten for a day now. He says, he hasn't eaten for three days. I ask, 'How about water?' He says, you can only go to the bathroom, and drink from the bathroom. Imagine that.
>
> You are only allowed to go to the bathroom one or two times a day. Of course, each time is counted in seconds. Twenty-five seconds and you need to be out of there. On the way to the bathroom you get beat, and you get beat on the way back.
>
> While going to the bathroom, I knocked on a door. I said, 'I need to drink water and also pray the midday prayer (*duhur*). I need to do my ablution [the Islamic *wudu*, which is a ceremonial washing before prayer].'
>
> He [the guard] closed the door in my face and left. He came back and asked, 'Who is this person who wants to pray?' and I said 'me.'
>
> So, he took me to the bathroom, and said, 'Don't tell anyone else that you want to pray.' This man was also a good man (*ibin halal*). If I had said this to someone else, they may have done something very bad to me.
>
> When we got out of [the bathroom], a high ranking general was there, and he started cursing God and cursing religion. 'They bring me all these people, and there's no place to put them!' There was no space, and he [the general] didn't even have a car to take us to another jail in Dar'a or somewhere else.
>
> He tells me, 'Come here.' Then he says, 'If we release you, do you know how to get home? If we let you out from here, do you know how to go to Dar'a?"

At this point, Nabil is completely shocked by the guard's suggestion that he may be able to leave. Nabil assures the guard that he will be able to return to Dar'a. The guard insults Nabil and another male prisoner, calling them animals, but then he gives them back their possessions.

> When we left, I kept turning around. Is someone going to try and capture us? I wanted to call my family, but I was worried that I'll make the phone call, and then the guards would catch me again, and that this whole thing was just a lie. But after a while, I made a phone call to my dad who was in the United Arab Emirates.
>
> My dad was at the airport. He had bought a ticket to come home so he can try and get me out of prison. I told him *alhamdulila*, things are okay, and I am on my way out. He didn't believe me.

> I called my uncle, my dad's brother, and told him I was in Swedah and was looking for a way to go home. It isn't easy to travel. You can't stop a taxi and tell them I want to go to Dar'a. He'll tell you, 'Do I look crazy to you?'
>
> And my uncle couldn't make it to Swedah, so we have to find some middle ground. We met at a Christian village between Dar'a and Swedah. We asked a taxi driver to take us to this village and the driver took 1,500 Lira. [Triple the normal rate.]
>
> Then we walked. Me and the other guy from jail. We walked for two hours. And when I got home, my friend said to me 'I told people that you weren't going to be gone long, but I didn't mean that you were going to come back the very next day!'

Nabil did not know what happened to the young man that accompanied him out of the prison. He was a student at a university in Jordan, so he needed to exit through the authorized border crossing to continue attending his classes. Nabil has asked about that man through the years, but never heard anything about his whereabouts.

> Students who attend university have to enter through the authorized border crossing. Being smuggled out isn't easy. You'll be forced to stay in the camps, and when that happens you can't go to school [easily]. So he made the choice to come and go through authorized channels. But after he left, I don't know what happened to him.

Nabil left through the unauthorized border crossing. He stated in Za'atari for fifteen days, then decided that he needed to leave the camp. Nabil snuck out of the camp only to be hassled by thieves as he attempted to make his way to Amman.

> Some thieves grabbed me, and they stripped me of my money. I knew their names, and I told the police, but no one did anything. They were thieves from Mafraq. They grabbed me at 2am, in a place near the valley (*wadi*). They said either we give you up to the authorities, we kill you, or you give us everything that you have. So, I said, ok, take everything I have.
>
> But they were also very kind robbers. One of them took my money, and then asked me, 'Where do you want to go?' I said, 'Can you take me to Jabber?' because I knew a guy at Jabber. And then he asked, 'When you go to Jabber,

> where do you want to go after that?' I told him I want to go to Amman. I have family there in Amman.
>
> The robber said to me, 'So you don't call us thieves...' as he handed me 10JD. He said, 'This should be enough to get you to Amman, right?'
>
> I told him, 'May God bless you.' He took me to a bus stop and gave me my 10JD so I could make it to Amman.
>
> In Amman, I worked in a vegetable store, of course, manual labor, putting things on a truck and taking them off the truck.

Nabil's family eventually fled Syria as well. They stayed in Za'atari, so Nabil decided to return to the camp. This was at a time when Syrians could still choose to live in Za'atari. Eventually, Za'atari would be closed to new refugee arrivals. Nabil's wife was pregnant when she crossed the border and gave birth to their son in the camp. By February, Nabil's entire family was in Jordan. Nabil ended his long story into exile by saying, "In the end, we all became refugees." Even though Nabil and his family had all wanted to enter Jordan as immigrants, they had no choice but to leave through unauthorized border crossings.

Chapter 7: Syrian Eviction from an Informal Tented Settlement

Galya was a marketing major in college. After graduation, Galya thought maybe she'd work in hospitality at one of Jordan's many hotels. Or, maybe she'd become a jeweler, which combined her interests in sales and beautiful things. When she graduated from Jordan's Applied Science Private University in 2013, the Syrian refugee crisis was well underway. There was a great need for local humanitarian aid workers. Like so many young Jordanians, Galya saw an opportunity to do something good in the world. She also needed a job.

In July of 2013, Galya accepted a position with HOPE, an international NGO working to provide education to Syrian children.[14] As an "information assistant" in Za'atari refugee camp, her responsibility was to refer Syrian refugees who were looking for non-education assistance to other NGOs. After listening carefully to their concerns, Galya would connect refugees to psychologists, social workers, health care providers, and protection officers. Her gregarious demeanor, sense of humor, and ability to trouble-shoot made her a natural for the job.

Soon enough, Galya was promoted to "field coordinator." Galya's new position meant that she needed to travel throughout Jordan to informal tented settlements (ITS) in order to reach Syrian children that were out of school. ITS are informal refugee camps. They are comprised of small Bedouin-like tent communities of Syrian refugees. Families and their extended relatives usually live together in these camps, which are established next to Jordanian farmlands. ITS residents are always nomadic. People follow seasonal farm work, often traveling from the south of Jordan to the north.

[14] "HOPE" is a pseudonym.

Image 7.1: Images of informal tented settlements (ITS) 2016

Image 7.1: Images of informal tented settlements (ITS) 2016, continued

Farm work provides Syrian refugees with a livelihood, which is vital because UN aid and other humanitarian allowances do not cover all of refugees' financial needs. For many of the Syrian refugees I spoke with, work was one of the main reasons they chose to live in an ITS. Syrians could stay on the land without paying rent and some farm owners also provided them with water and electricity. Refugees also described how ITS compare to formal refugee camps like Za'atari or Azraq, which they perceived as less safe. In the formal camps, the shelters are placed close to one another and there is little room for privacy. Many refugees were farmers and

Bedouin before they fled their villages in Syria. In that way, ITS living is also an extension of their way of a life.

A nomadic life in exile, however, has several challenges. Syrian families forego access to resources, including education, that may otherwise be readily available to urban dwelling refugees and those who live in formalized camps. Farmlands are often far away from schools and the necessity to follow seasonal crops means that families do not stay in one place long enough for children to attend formal schooling. Galya once mentioned that some of the children in ITS camps did not attend school when they were in Syria. In this way, HOPE helps bring education to children who would not have otherwise attended school even in their home country.

Galya's job was to bring schools to these secluded camp settlements. To do this, first Galya needed to gain permission from the leader of the camp, usually a male elder who is referred to as the *shawish*. Galya addressed any concerns that the *shawish* might have about allowing an NGO to establish a school tent in the spaces where they lived. She explained that HOPE would provide a tent, white board, small plastic chairs, pencils and notebooks, and a curriculum for the children. At least ten children would need to attend the school to meet the requirements established by HOPE. Children would also need to attend school for several hours per day and meet five days per week. Instead of forcing ITS children to attend formal schools, Glaya brought the schools to them.[15]

Galya then identified the camp resident with the highest level of formal schooling, someone who could teach the children how to read and write. The ITS teacher, always referred to as a "volunteer," would receive ten Jordanian Dinars (JD) per day, up to 220 JD per month

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[15] See UNHCR promotional materials for footage of school in ITS, "Jordan: Syrian refugee Teacher Opens Camp School" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifc_xYsiDEs)

depending on the number of days that school was in session. Many NGOs hire "volunteers" instead of "employees," which allowed them to skirt Jordanian policies against formal Syrian employment. Even after the Jordan Compact, when the government lifted the ban against Syrian employment in select sectors, teaching remains a closed profession to Syrians. As of 2018, Syrians can work as teaching assistants, but they are not allowed to teach in government funded schools.

Galya helped with everything from pitching the school tent, to creating the curriculum, to training the teachers. Galya's job description was to provide children with education, but she did much more. She facilitated doctor's visits, advocated for refugees who had legal issues, arbitrated disagreements between refugees and farmers, and represented her NGO to international visitors in the effort to secure donor funds. She routinely worked, and as of the writing of this text continues to work, ten-hour days. "It's not a problem (*mish mushkila*). Things need to be done," Galya often said. She was the main contact person for Syrians in the ITS camps that she visits. She carried two cell phones, one for work and a personal phone. Both rang often and sometimes they rang simultaneously. Galya always answered her phone.

Galya spent most of her time in the field – and the "field" felt like the whole of Jordan. To get around, Galya relied on Waleed, whose formal job description was "the driver." I joined Galya and Waleed on a sunny day in September 2014. It was payday for the teachers. We drove around from one ITS to another to hand out "salaries," which is how Galya referred to the teachers' payments.

Galya, who was sitting in the passenger's seat, introduced me to Waleed. "This is Waleed, but we call him Leedo," she said to me, but looking at him mischievously to watch his reaction as she divulged his nickname. Galya then turned her entire body around to face me, "He

knows every narrow road in Jordan. Every alley. Even every rock." The "rock" comment made her laugh and then Leedo laughed too. After spending several months, over several years, in the car with Leedo, I have never questioned the accuracy of this statement.

We left HOPE headquarters at nine in the morning. We stopped to fill up gas and stock up on snacks for the long drive from Amman to the outskirts of Mafraq and Irbid. This became something of a ritual. Leedo always ordered a cup of Turkish coffee with lots of sugar and Galya bought two bags of Lays Max Chili potato chips. They always fought over who would pay, and every time, Leedo refused to let Galya pay for our snacks.

Once the morning mellow wore off, Galya began making phone calls to the Syrian teachers in ITS. She smoked Vouge Slim cigarettes between the calls, cracking her window open and then rolling it up again when she was finished. To block the sun from hitting her face, Galya placed a promotional HOPE folder in the window.

We visited three informal camps that day. Along the main highway, we passed camels, rock quarries, and small sand spirals called dust devils that resembled tornados. Most of our commute was along these sparsely populated highways, which led us to small-town roads that were also largely empty except for the occasional car driving past us in the opposite direction.

As we approach the first ITS, Leedo, who had been mostly quiet until then, said to me, "I want to show you something." He revved the engine and the SUV kicked up white dust that engulfed the back half of the vehicle. He went full speed ahead toward what looked like the edge of the world. Glaya cheered and turned the music up. It felt like we were teenagers joyriding in high school. What promised to be an abyss turned out to be nothing up the other side of a knoll and we made it to the "edge" without falling off.

Soon, we arrived at the ITS. Five or six children waved at the SUV from a distance and then gathered around the car when we approached the tents. Their faces were blistered from the sun and their hair was stiff with sand. But they were joyful and happy to see visitors stop by. Leedo walked away to make a phone call and smoke a cigarette. Galya went to pay the teacher his monthly salary. As she stepped away she turned to where I was standing with the kids and yelled out, “She speaks English, talk to her in English.” Then kids began to squeal, “How are you? How are you?” to show off their language skills. When the wind blew, the sand hit my skin like hundreds of little needles. It hurt, but the kids did not seem fazed.

Within a few minutes, we were off to the next ITS. Galya called ahead, as she always does to let the Syrians know we are coming. Mirna, the teacher, explained that she was staying in a nearby apartment instead of the camp. There was a rumor that the ITS would be raided by the Jordanian government and that the residents would be evicted. Leedo took directions over the phone, and soon enough we were outside a white stone building. Mirna came down and took her payment through the window. Galya asked questions about the rumored raid. Mirna explained that they were just going to wait it out for a few days and see what happened.

Mirna was right to worry. Our last visit was to an ITS in Hawara, outside of the city of Irbid. Thafir did not answer the phone when Galya called. He was our last stop, and so, we decided to pay him a visit anyway. “He needs his salary,” Galya reasoned and we were already close by. But when we arrived at the ITS, all the tents were gone. There was nothing but a small mysterious burnt patch of land.

Leedo pulled off to the side of the road and Galya started making phone calls to see if anyone could get a hold of Thafir. “I told them to move away from the road,” Leedo lamented. I could hear the trouble in their voices but neither of them panicked. Thafir’s ITS was located right

off the main road unlike other ITS settlements that may be hidden from view or nestled between farms. “I told them that they would be evicted if they stayed so close to the main road. I warned Thafir several times,” Leedo said. Galya nodded as the phone rang.

In the distance, I could see another tented settlement with UNHCR tents. What was once a white tent was now light brown and encrusted with dirt, but the faded blue letters “U-N-H-C-R” are unmistakable. UNHCR tents have been coveted for their durability. In the early days of the refugee response, some Syrian families would acquire more than one tent and barter or sell the spare tents for cash. These UNHCR tents can spotted throughout Jordan.[16]

I asked Galya, “Why would they evict the people in this settlement but not the people in those tents, over there?” Galya explained to me that those people were not Syrian refugees, but Jordanian gypsies. “Where would they take them?” Galya asked me rhetorically. “They cannot take them to Azraq. It [the camp] is only for Syrians.”

Jordan has a vibrant community of nomadic peoples. Tent settlements can be found in urban and peri-urban spaces next to permanent homes and businesses. In this instance, it was not necessarily the act of tented settlement that put these individuals in jeopardy. Instead, it was a combination of being a Syrian refugee and living in an ITS.

ITS camps were technically illegal. Syrian refugees were expected to either live in cities or refugee camps. Informal camps in the middle of the desert are harder for government officials to monitor and more difficult to control. On a separate occasion, Leedo was even approached by the Jordanian secret police, the *muchbarat*, and questioned about his relationship to refugees in a particular ITS. They asked him to report on the whereabouts of Syrians refugees that he helped provide aid to.

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[16] I once even saw a UNHCR tent in Petra, along the steps that lead up to the treasury.

After about forty-five minutes, Galya was able to get a hold of Thafir's sister, Nisreen. We drove to a nearby building to see her and learn what happened to the ITS. At this point, there was still a chance that the refugees living there decided to leave to another location.

We took our shoes off before entering a large but unfurnished second floor apartment. Young children played in the empty room closest to the door, which we walked through to reach the living room. We sat on thin cushions resembling mattresses that lined the parameter. Their brown paisley pattern styled an otherwise empty room. One of Nisreen's daughters brought us tea as her mother explained what happened.

"The police came and they started destroying the tents. They told us we had to leave. They took the tents. They hit us and they gathered us together, and they took everyone. They took everyone." Nisreen's voice was angry, but her face was worried. "We have video. We recorded it," her husband interjected. He was not there during the raid, but had acquired the video from another member of their family.

Leedo and I stayed quiet as Galya took the lead. She was calm, sympathetic, and serious. "Can I see the video? Where is everyone now?" Galya asked. Except for some shaky footage of a tent being brought done, not much was captured digitally. We learned that the evicted refugees were first taken to Raba Sarhan, the Syrian refugee registration center at the border. They spent a few hours there and the ITS community was registered (or the officials checked to make sure they were registered from before). All Syrians register with both the Jordanian government and receive UNHCR identification.

Then, everyone was moved to Azraq. It was known that refugees who were evicted from ITS would be sent to Azraq, which was half-empty at the time. Syrians who were caught working in unauthorized employment or without proper identification were also sent to Azraq.

The forced movement of Syrians to Azraq was routinely used as a threat as well. As one twenty-something Syrian man in Za'atari explained, "I was told, if you misbehave, if you cause trouble, we'll send you to Azraq."

Nisreen continued, "I told them I was Jordanian, but no one believed me." We were surprised to hear this, but Nisreen was in fact Jordanian. Nisreen married a Jordanian man almost two decades ago and acquired Jordanian nationality. As a citizen, she could not be held in the camp. At the time of the eviction, Nisreen was visiting her family who fled during the last year. "How did you leave?" Galya asked. "My husband came and showed them my identification," Nisreen answered.

Galya explained to Nisreen that HOPE also works inside Azraq and that she would reach out to other humanitarian aid workers to make sure that Thafir received his salary. However, there was nothing to be done about the evictions. This community would now live in Azraq. Nisreen already knew that this was the case.

Leedo and Galya described the work that they were doing with Syrians in ITS as incredibly sensitive. How could they provide aid to people who were technically breaking the law? Galya explained that the Jordanian government and the UN had arrived to a "gentleman's agreement" over aid in ITS camps. HOPE could not work in ITS without the permission of the Jordanian government. Someone would leak to Galya that a raid was imminent, and it was Galya's responsibility to let the people in the ITS camp know that they may be evicted.

In 2016, Galya and I met with Shahid, a newlywed Syrian refugee woman living in an ITS. Galya explained to Shahid how the UN has contacted her in the past, and how she then warns Syrians about possible evictions:

> The UN tells us. They send emails that the government is now evicting people [in ITS]. So, the UN knows before we do. They might have heard it from the governor or from the agricultural sector leaders, and they may have heard it from more than one person. What is our role in the situation? We just come and tell the Syrians, 'listen, keep it between us, but tomorrow there may be an evacuation.'

I asked, "Where do refugees go when they are evicted?" and Galya explained, "They may hide in the farm between the greenery. Or they might rent a home and I'll stay there." Then Shahid described the last time that she and her family believed they would be evicted and they "hid among the trees" in the farm next to their ITS.

According to Galya, farmers often protected refugees during raids. It became common knowledge that if a raid occurs, refugees can run into the farm and hide between the plants in order to protect themselves from forced encampment. In fact, I have heard Galya suggest this strategy over the phone to refugees who did not want to go through the hassle, expense, and lost work which would necessarily result from relocation. As Galya explained, the farmers have an incentive to protect Syrians. She said, "The farmers want them [the Syrians] there. The refugees become guests on their land."

As guests, refugees are protected from forced encampment because of the rights of citizens. Jordanian citizens have the right to host Syrian refugees. If state officials were to force Syrians to leave the property of Jordanian citizens, they would be infringing upon Jordanians' right.

Beyond the actions of individual farm owners, Jordanian farmers also organized as a collective to support Syrian refugees who were providing them with inexpensive labor. The government began to authorize ITS after being lobbied extensively by the agricultural sector. By 2016, Syrians could acquire leases for the land that they stayed on, much like a person who rents

an apartment. Their employment was also made legal with the Jordan Compact, which allowed Syrians to work in the agricultural center.

Galya told Shahid, “They [the government] stopped doing the evictions for now. The government said you can apply for permission and state that you work with this particular farm, and then you won't be evicted. The government is giving three months to get this permission.” Despite Galya’s reassurances, Shahid was skeptical. Shahid described how her community was responding to the change in policy. “There are many people who don't want to get the permission to work, they are scared…One person who went to get permission… he was told that he can't get permission. He was told that there is no such thing as getting this legal permission,” Shahid said.

Chapter 8: The New Grand Compromise: How Syrian Refugees Changed the Stakes in the Global Refugee Assistance Regime

In this chapter, I chart how the *grand compromise* between the Global North and the Global South was recalibrated when over one million refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers arrived in Europe during the summer of 2015. I argue that major refugee host states, predominantly those that received Syrians, were able to renegotiate the value of their hosting capacity. I call this the *new grand compromise* and elaborate on the case of Jordan to illustrate the increased value of refugee hosting. I identify how Jordanian government officials strategically capitalized from the influx of asylum seekers in Europe, and in doing so, also made Jordanian state-centric goals of resilience and development integral parts of the global refugee response.

The Original Grand Compromise:

Cuéllar describes the system of global refugee management as a grand compromise between states in the Global South and states in the Global North. States in the Global South host most of the world's refugees. In 2017, these states housed 85% of the world's 25.4 million refugees. Meanwhile, wealthier states in the Global North resettle less than one percent of all the world's refugees, but donate to states in the Global South to assist them with their refugee hosting efforts. The expectation that donor states can cap the number of refugees that are allowed onto their territory is integral to the grand compromise. Refugees must be selected, vetted, and screened before they can enter countries in Europe, the United States, Canada, or Australia.

In the grand compromise, sovereignty is at stake. The principle of sovereignty refers to a state's ultimate control within its specified territory, and its externally recognized right to claim legitimate authority over its internal affairs. Scholars empirically study sovereignty by

considering how, and to what extent, a state can control its borders and identifying the extent of a state's authority over international institutions that seek to influence national-level governance. One important and recurring question characterizes the global distribution of refugees: How much is sovereignty worth?

The established international refugee regime prioritizes the sovereignty of states in the Global North at the expense of sovereignty in the Global South, precisely because the grand compromise was spearheaded by states in the Global North. States in the Global South host large and unpredictable numbers of refugees, which invites many urgent and long-term challenges. Abrupt demographic changes can place a strain on social institutions, crowding hospitals and schools. Large refugee flows can lead to new ethnic and religious demographics that can increase tensions between refugee and host communities or among citizens. Porous borders can also heighten threats to national security. Terrorism is one of the most serious contemporary threats, but other challenges arise too, including increased drug and weapon trafficking. Porous borders have also been cited as a public health concern. Infectious disease outbreaks can occur, especially when large numbers of people are confined to unhygienic living spaces, such as overcrowded refugee camps.

In addition, scholars posit that the involvement of international institutions like the UN (United Nations) or supranational institutions like the EU (European Union) contribute to the erosion of state sovereignty (Sassen 1999; Arar 2017). While states in the Global North carefully manage international interference, states in the Global South must often rely on international institutions to provide emergency relief. Short-term challenges stretch into long-term problems as nearly 68% of the world's refugees have been displaced for five or more years in protracted refugee situations. This statistic does not include the 5.3 million Palestinian refugees who are

registered with UNRWA and live in the Global South (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). States in the Global South invite the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and other international aid agencies, to contribute to housing, feeding, and providing social services to refugees. Kagan characterizes the UNHCR as a "surrogate state," whereby the UN has state-like functions through its allocation of rights to refugees with the permission of the host state (Kagan 2011).

The compromise is not abstract: States in the Global North pay money to contain refugee populations abroad and protect their sovereignty. These payments are often discussed as contributions to the UNHCR, but there are other important economic contributions including money given directly from one state to another and economic contributions that consider refugee reception but are primarily donated to support security interests abroad or shared development goals outside refugee-hosting concerns. Beyond state to state contributions, the European Union, which seeks to further the interests of European states, is also an important contributor of aid dollars to major refugee receiving states. Financial contributions can exist in the form of incentives, not just cash money. These incentives include the opening of Western markets to states in the Global South through renegotiated trade agreements and the relaxing of travel restrictions for citizens from the Global South to travel to the Global North as economic migrants, such has been the case with Morocco and Turkey (Norman 2016; Kirişci 2016).

Demographic differences in refugee hosting influence practices of refugee and asylum integration. In the Global North, integration can be challenging, but the process of incorporation allows for political incorporation and a pathway to citizenship. This clearly provides stability and legal protection for refugees and asylum seekers, but also serves the interests of Western democratic states by creating a more unified polity and avoiding the chaos that often follows the

influx of large numbers of refugees across borders. States in the Global North have generally avoided the widespread reliance on refugee camps, with few exceptions including Calais refugee and migrant camp in France (Reinisch 2015).

Political integration of refugees in the Global South is rare. One important shortcoming of the grand compromise can be understood as the disincentive that major refugee host states have to promote local integration. The responsibility to host people is more permanent than the stream of money coming in to finance hosting. Integration can lead to a weaning off from international aid dollars when refugees become the financial responsibility of the states in which they reside as opposed to the international community. States in the Global South, therefore, have been incentivized to impede local integration.

The influx of people into Europe in 2015 and 2016 changed the incentive structure of the grand compromise. States that host the majority of Syrian refugees found their "local absorptive capacity," which Jacobsen defines as the "ability" and "willingness" to host refugees, in even higher demand (Jacobsen 1996). Local integration in countries that host the majority of Syrian refugees became more valuable to donor states in the Global North as a method to deter forced migrants from reaching Europe.

The New Grand Compromise:

Asylum seekers in Europe captured global headlines even though most of the world's refugees continued to live in developing countries. The problem of displacement was reimagined with Europe at the center. The questions that were asked, and the observations that were made, about refugee experiences were curated by European concerns: Are these people economic or political migrants? How will they integrate? How can Europe stop people from coming? The

violence or lack of protections that catalyzed displacement and secondary refugee flows were often tangential to the social construction of the "refugee problem." Therefore, the search for solutions emphasized the needs of European states.

Rhetorically, the terms "Syrian Refugee Crisis" and "European Refugee Crisis" (both ubiquitous phrases) captured how different a "crisis" can be. Syrian refugees are fleeing an authoritative regime, barrel bombs, mandatory conscription, ISIS fighters, and the extreme poverty that has been exacerbated by the war. The violence was the impetus to flee: to leave behind one's home, extended family, assets, and way of life. Meanwhile, the "European Refugee Crisis" was not without its violent challenges including the death of thousands of asylum seekers at sea, the overcrowding conditions of those in spontaneous camps, and the uncertainty that characterized failing and developing asylum policies (Amnesty International 2017). Nationalistic concerns collided with moral imperatives. Europeans found themselves at the crux of a humanitarian crisis that destabilized and energized political systems. While both Syria and Europe face intractable challenges, to call both a "refugee crisis" obscures the violence and chaos that leads to *displacement* with the violence and chaos of poor *reception*.

In 2016, European strategies of asylum deterrence abounded as economic and security concerns grew. When "burden sharing" strategies among EU states failed and the Dublin Regulation proved ill-equipped to manage large numbers of asylum seekers, the European strategy turned to "burden shifting" – further placing the responsibility of refugee hosting onto the Global South. The impetus to stop refugees from reaching Europe led to a significant increase in aid dollars. Figure 8.1 shows the top donor states to the UNHCR in 2016. The line graphs indicate the absolute number of dollars donated to the UNHCR, while the bar graph

illustrates the percent change between consecutive years. Most notably, after the influx of asylum seekers to Europe in 2015, European aid dollars increased significantly.



Figure 8.1: Top Donor States to UNHCR in 2016 and Percent Change Between Consecutive Years

Major refugee receiving countries in the Middle East, primarily Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, saw increased support not only funneled through the UNHCR, but also given directly to each state. In 2016, the EU and the international community pledged billions of dollars with the EU-Turkey deal, and EU compacts with both Jordan and Lebanon (Rygiel et al. 2016; Lenner 2016; Bilgic and Pace 2017). The parameters of these agreements clearly illustrate that refugee hosting is a good that donor states are willing to pay large sums of money for.

Integration became an important tool for deterrence. European reasoning was clear: If refugees are better able to integrate into major refugee receiving countries, they are less likely to travel to Europe in search of asylum. While there was little progress in terms of political integration and pathways to citizenship in the Global South, economic integration became a

primary focus (Betts and Collier 2017). Along with concessions that allowed for relaxed entry into European markets for Jordanians and laxer visa regulations for Turks, these agreements stipulated that major refugee host countries would make their states more hospitable to Syrian refugees.

Not all states in the Global South saw an equal appreciation of their refugee hosting capacity. According to the UNHCR, the major refugee host countries in 2016 were as follows: Turkey (2.9 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1.0 million), Iran (979,400), Uganda (940,800), and Ethiopia (791,600) (Global Trends 2016).[17] Without considering the conditions of donor states in the new grand compromise, one may expect that all these states would benefit substantially from increased attention to the global refugee crisis based solely on need. This was not the case.

States that host Syrian refugees, who make up most asylum claims in Europe (see Table 1), upstaged states that predominately host other refugee groups. Even though Africa saw a 20% increase in refuge populations in 2015 (728,500 absolute number) and a 16% increase in 2016 (721,700 absolute number), it did not attract the same amount of support as countries that hosted the refugee populations that sought refuge in Europe (Global Trends 2015; Global Trends 2016). This is further indication that the global refugee crisis was socially constructed as a Euro-centric problem; therefore, putting Global North states' interests over the needs of displaced persons.

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[17] Jordan is not included in this list because, for this assessment, Palestinian refugees were not included in the total.

Table 8.1: Top 10 Countries of Origin of Non-EU Asylum Seekers in the EU-28 Member States, 2015 and 2016
(thousands of first time applicants)

Country of Origin	**2015**	**2016**
Syria	362.7	334.8
Afghanistan	178.3	183.0
Iraq	121.6	127.0
Pakistan	46.5	47.6
Nigeria	30.0	46.1
Iran	25.4	40.2
Eritrea	33.1	33.4
Albania	66.1	28.9
Russia	18.4	23.0

Despite the clear terms of engagement in the new grand compromise, states in the Global South that did not host Syrian refugees tried to capitalize from the breakdown of the international refugee assistance regime. Major refugee host countries pivoted toward being viewed as transit countries, or more explicitly, as physical buffers to Europe. Their refugee hosting capacity redoubled as the ability to halt secondary refugee movements. After the EU-Turkey deal was announced, Kenyan government officials vowed to close the world's largest refugee camp. The intention to close Dadaab camp threatened to displace or refoule 245,126 refugees from Somalia (UNHCR 2017b). Implicitly, the closing of Dadaab also threatened further breakdown the established division of labor between states in the Global North and states in the Global South.

Pakistan also vied to benefit from the new grand compromise. Pakistani migration, which helped constitute mixed flows of migrants to Europe, gave the state leverage to compete for increased aid from Europe and renegotiate bilateral agreements with the EU. Pakistan hosts large numbers of Afghani refugees, but Pakistanis do not usually constitute refugee flows according to UNHCR statistics. As illustrated in Table 1, Pakistanis comprised the fourth largest group of asylum seekers to Europe. Though some Pakistanis were given asylum, most were rejected and deported. Notably, Pakistan made headlines when state officials refused to accept thirty migrants deported from Greece claiming that their identities could not be verified (BBC 2015b). Pakistani officials successfully renegotiated terms of aid with the EU. A Joint Press Communiqué released in 2016 read:

> Both sides discussed migration and refugees issues. The Pakistan side underlined the need for addressing the root causes of migration and taking an integrated approach encompassing different aspects of migration. The EU acknowledged the challenges faced by Pakistan in hosting over 3 million refugees and is ready to consider providing additional support, including for their repatriation to Afghanistan in safety and dignity. They agreed to further strengthen cooperation on migration issues, including irregular migration, and reaffirmed their commitment to the continued implementation of the EU-Pakistan Readmission Agreement (3rd EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue 2016).

Written between the lines of this communiqué, Pakistan's refugee hosting capacity was leveraged in negotiating for increased development support for the state and its citizens. The breakdown of the original grand compromise did not change the disparities between states in the Global North and States in the Global South, but instead, gave states in the Global South the opportunity to renegotiate terms and conditions. These states had the most to gain from the influx of asylum seekers in Europe.

Jordan's Golden Year:

Jordanian officials leveraged their country's role in solving the European "refugee problem," and in the process, significantly increased international support for refugees and citizens. Jordan has historically been a leader in refugee hosting, playing a central role in the original grand compromise. For over 70 years, Jordan has hosted displaced people from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, to name only the most prominent waves of refugees. The state has continuously earned recognition as one of the UNHCR's top ten refugee host countries, even when the over two million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA are not included in UNHCR host statistics.

According to the UNHCR, approximately 655,500 Syrians refugees are registered with the UN. Governmental estimates are much higher, suggesting that Jordan hosts 1.3 million Syrians. One operative distinction between the two institutions is the difference between "Syrian refugees" and "Syrians." Governmental estimates include both "Syrian refugees" registered with the UN and "Syrians" who may have been in Jordan before the start of the conflict. While the governmental estimate is often cited by state officials, the UNHCR number is used as the operational measure that influences intervention. In 2015, Jordan was also the top country of UNHCR resettlement operations with 24,374 refugees submitted for resettlement. Therefore, Jordan is not only a major refugee host country in the Global South, but also a major country of first settlement, which further emphasizes Jordan's role in the distribution of refugees to the Global North.

One Jordanian official described 2016 as "Jordan's golden year," indicating that this would be the year Jordanian officials would best be able to advocate for Jordanian interests. Refugees were making global headlines and Jordan's role in hosting refugees was gaining

prominence. He explained that it would be in Jordan's interest to emphasize the country's role as a "buffer state" like Turkey, despite the clear geographic differences. Jordan is almost completely landlocked with no direct pathway to Europe. Still, according to this official, 150,000 Syrians have returned to their home country since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011. He suggested that, while there is no way to know the exact number of people, many of the Syrians that returned may have made secondary trips from Syria to Europe. Hence, he reasoned, Jordan serves as a buffer state to Europe.

"We should have blackmailed the EU like Turkey did," my respondent lamented, referring to the EU-Turkey deal. While he criticized Turkey's impolite behavior toward the European Union, he recognized that Turkey had more successfully leveraged their refugee hosting capacity to gain greater resources from donor states in the Global North. The EU agreed to give Turkey €6 billion to support Turkey's continued refugee hosting and support visa-free travel for Turkish citizens to the Schengen zone. In exchange, Turkey would receive deported immigrants that traveled to Europe as part of a one-for-one trade agreement. For each immigrant sent to Turkey, the EU agreed to resettle an asylum seeker (Amnesty International 2017).

The terms of Jordan's renegotiated role in the new grand compromise emerged from the 2016 London Conference. The Jordan Compact outlined the international community's responsibility in supporting Jordan's hosting of Syrian refugees. Notably, other refugee populations, including Iraqis and Gazans, were not included in the negotiated expansion of social rights and support to the state. Jordan pledged to promote Syrian economic and social integration by providing "200,000 job opportunities" for Syrians and to support Syrian education through the "Accelerating Access to Quality Formal Education" plan.

In exchange for Jordan's commitment to Syrian refugees, the European states vowed to relax the *rules of origin* trade requirements, further opening EU markets to Jordanian goods, and offered considerable financial support:

> Pledges made in London amount to around $700 million of grants in support of the Jordan Response Plan for 2016... Additional pledges already made will contribute to the aim of providing around $700 million in grants for 2017 and 2018 too… The Multilateral Development Banks have identified the potential to increase their financing from $800 million to $1.9 billion... Additional pledges of around $300 million of grant or grant equivalent have already been made. More is expected…" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2016).

For European states, an important impetus for the London Conference and the Jordan Compact was to deter Syrian refugees from migrating to Europe by improving living conditions in Jordan. Integration became a tool for deterrence. For Jordanians, however, the objective was to emphasize that refugee hosting has far reaching consequences that negatively affect Jordanian citizens and infrastructure. These concerns appear throughout the Compact, as exemplified by the following sentence: "Jordanians need to see that the international community is not prioritising support to refugees to their detriment." Refugee aid, Jordanians reasoned, must also support Jordanian resilience.

The contemporary Jordanian strategy to hosting Syrian refugees, and for acquiring and allocating international aid, is to focus on Jordanian resilience and development. The Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) is charged with approving and funneling all international aid that comes into the country. Each year since 2014, MOPIC has organized stakeholders to set a three-year agenda for refugee support and Jordanian resilience. The Jordanian agenda is outlined in a document entitled the Jordanian Response Plan (JRP). The 2017- 2019 JRP reads:

> Through the Jordan Compact, the government sought to transform the refugee crisis into a **development opportunity** that attracts new investments and opens up the EU market with simplified rules of origin, thus creating jobs for both Jordanians and Syrian refugees in a complimentary, non-competitive manner to Jordanian job creation (2017- 2019 JRP; emphasis is mine).

The push for development described above is further exemplified by the distinct categories across which Jordanian officials budget international aid. For each sector affected by the refugee crisis, such as education, energy, health, and shelter, there are budget allocations earmarked for either the "refugee response" or the "resilience response." This distinction considers the challenges that refugee hosting places on Jordan which cannot be alleviated by direct support for refugees. For example, zero dollars are budgeted under "refugee response" for the categories of environment, transport, and management. These issues are fully part of the "resilience response." Meanwhile, significantly more money is budgeted for refugee food security as compared to food security under the "resilience response" category.

Even though Jordanians made concessions allowing for limited Syrian integration (which was previously a red-line issue), all concessions were constrained by citizens' concerns and tied to development goals. Syrian employment, for example, was made conditional upon Jordanian employment and advancement. King Abdullah II made his country a remarkable promise: for every job offered to a Syrian refugee, there would be five jobs created for Jordanians (Sweis 2016). There were also strict limitations placed on the kinds of jobs that Syrians could occupy. Syrians' work opportunities were largely limited to the garment sector with handicrafts and textiles, construction, the service industry, and janitorial work. As of January 2017, 44,900 work permits were issued to Syrian refugees, a fraction of the 200,000 work permits pledged by Jordanian officials (ILO 2017).

Restrictions in employment opportunities have far reaching effects beyond economic opportunities; these restrictions affect social mobility as well. As one NGO representative reasoned, "Why should children aspire to become doctors, lawyers, and engineers when the best they can hope for is a low-skilled job?" While one may argue that an education is inherently valuable, my respondent heard this sentiment repeated several times by Syrian students and their parents. After all, in cases of extreme poverty, an education has opportunity costs. Some families prioritized child labor over school attendance to help make ends meet. The increase in social rights for Syrian refugees, predominantly in the employment and education sectors, are stunted by high rates of Jordanian unemployment and growth constrains in the Jordanian educational system.

Despite the lofty and historic promises written into the Jordan Compact, the gap between policy and practice remains a challenge. Some of these issues may come from the obstacles that impede on-the-ground interventions. However, diverging interests between negotiating parties – in this case, between European states and Jordan – are rooted in distinct social constructions of the "refugee problem." European states see the "refugee problem" as one that can be solved through integration as deterrence. Syrian integration into Jordanian society may stymie secondary refugee flows to Europe. Meanwhile, Jordanians see the "refugee problem" as one that strains social institutions and impedes development goals. Jordanian solutions to the refugee problem incorporate Jordanian resilience as essential; therefore, these interventions hold the international community responsible for refugee aid and alleviating the challenges of refugee hosting.

Conclusion:

The influx of asylum seekers to Europe in 2015 and 2016 upended the established division of labor that characterized the relationship between states in the Global North and states in the Global South known as the grand compromise. A *new grand compromise* emerged as major refugee receiving states in the Global South gained leverage over states in the Global North that were urgently interested in deterring refugees and asylum seekers, controlling their borders, and maintaining sovereign interests. States in the Global South – predominantly those that received Syrian refugees – found their refugee hosting capacity in high demand. While disparities between states remained intact, countries in the Global South were better able to advocate for themselves to increase international aid, promote economic development, relax travel restrictions for citizens, and ameliorate the challenges of hosting large numbers of refugees. As scholars investigate contemporary policy changes and evolving refugee experiences, many questions remain unanswered, including: Will donor states invest further in supporting refugees abroad to preempt the events of 2015 and 2016? What will be the long-term effects of the new grand compromise?

Refugees will surely benefit from these new measures. However, it must be noted that these are negotiations among states and international or supranational institutions – refugees are not provided a place at the negotiation table. Ironically, the opportunity to renegotiate the grand compromise, and the increased leverage that states in the Global South enjoyed as part of the new grand compromise, was a direct result of asylum seekers' agentic actions to seek refuge in Europe (see Khoury 2017).

Chapter 8, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in *Journal of Middle Eastern Law and Governance*, 2017. Arar, Rawan. 2017. "The New Grand Compromise: How Syrian Refugees Changed the Stakes in the Global Refugee Assistance Regime." *Journal of Middle East*

Law and Governance 9 (3): 298-312. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and sole author of this paper.

Chapter 9: Conclusion: The Refugee Burden and Jordanian Sovereignty

The refugee burden appears in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states that accepting refugees "may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries" (cited in Boswell 2003). Czaika's 2005 assessment that the refugee burden is more likely to be measured by "subjective feelings" as opposed to "actual data" remains appropriate in 2018 (2005 p.102). It may be common sense to list some components of the burden including large numbers of refugee arrivals, economic strain on the receiving state, and new demands on public institutions like schools and hospitals. However, without a systematic, empirically-based analysis of the refugee burden, scholars and practitioners alike are less apt in making comparisons among states and across time. There is generally no recognition that the refugee burden may differ from one country to the next. The term refugee burden homogenizes the experiences of MRHS, putting Jordan and Turkey on par with Italy or Malta. There is also little investigation of the ways that components of the refugee burden may intersect and change over time as refugee reception evolves from a pressing emergency to a protracted situation.

Despite the ambiguity of the term "refugee burden," it clearly refers to states that host large numbers of refugees, usually in the Global South – not countries that vet and select relatively small numbers of refugees. MRHS bear the refugee burden for the rest of the world. But, what exactly is the refugee burden? I find that challenges to state sovereignty constitute important but unacknowledged aspect of the refugee burden in MRHS drawing from the Jordanian case. I review the literature on the refugee burden, marking the scholarly shift from the study of the "burden" toward an analysis of "burden sharing." While scholars have asked compelling questions about the nation-state system, refugees' rights, and the responsibilities of states to work together in search of solutions to refugee displacement, one limitation of this

literature is that it rarely acknowledges the sovereignty interests of MRHS (for more on this, see Chapter Five). The ways that MRHS control, contain, and protect refugees are integral to understanding how the global system of refugee management works.

Throughout the dissertation, I have provided examples of sovereignty challenges including the management of porous state borders, which in turn, provide minimal opportunities for screening and selecting refugees before they enter the state. Hosting large numbers of refugees make MRHS dependent upon international support, primarily from the UNHCR and foreign states. State sovereignty remains paramount for Jordanian officials. However, unlike most states in the Global North that strictly control their borders to limit who may enter their territory, Jordanian officials must control refugees after agreeing to host them.

With 2.9 million refugees in a total population of 9.5 million people, Jordanian officials promote their refugee "absorption capacity" and their contributions to the global system of refugee management (Jacobsen 1996). To continue to host refugees, state officials make what Liftin (1997) calls "sovereignty bargains," prioritizing one aspect of sovereignty over another. In the Jordanian case, for example, Syrian refugees may be allowed to enter Jordanian territory, which is a sovereignty compromise. This compromise, however, is met with a strong sovereignty practices, including forcible encampment or deportation when state officials deem it necessary to protect state security.

I find that sovereignty practices are leveraged against one another, which is often done to secure financial and other kinds of support from the international community such as trade concessions and loans. For example, as described in Chapter Eight, Jordanian officials allowed Syrian refugees to engage in authorized labor and improve schooling for Syrian children in exchange for increased support from the international community, most notably the European

Union. However, leveraging sovereignty has limits. When state security is in jeopardy, Jordanian officials will engage in draconian practices to maintain final authority over refugee populations.

In addition to leveraging components of sovereignty through a multitude of practices inside the state, leveraging sovereignty also refers to the ways in which Jordanian officials leverage the sovereignty interests of state leaders in the Global North. The sovereignty interests of Western, liberal states are protected when Jordanian officials agree to uphold their position as a MRHS by containing refugees and disincentivizing their emigration to other countries.

Citizens and refugees can also leverage the sovereignty interests of the Jordanian state through the strategic ways that they push against or undermine state policies. As described in Chapter Six, Nabil makes strategic decisions about when and where to cross the border into Jordan in order to avoid forced encampment. He is adamant about entering Jordan as an "immigrant" with a passport, not as a "refugee." Nabil wants to ensure that he will have the freedom to travel around the country and live in a city of his choosing. However, despite his efforts, Nabil is unable to safely leave Syria through an authorized exit and must, therefore, accept forced encampment as a refugee. In Chapter Seven, Galya, a Jordanian humanitarian aid worker who works closely with Syrian refugees in informal tented settlements, learns from UN officials and Jordanian farmers about planned evictions. She undermines state policies by warning Syrian refugees about impending evictions and advises them on how to proceed. However, her ability to intervene is limited. Galya is unable to control where Thafir, a Syrian refugee who volunteers with Galya's NGO, is able to live after he is encamped in Azraq refugee camp by state officials.

The challenges to sovereignty that Jordanian officials face are the result of hosting large numbers of refugees. Refugee hosting requires new forms of coordination and governance that

put strains on social institutions but that also create new opportunities for the state and its citizens. Leveraging sovereignty describes how Jordanian officials, aid workers, refugees, and citizens navigate Jordan's role as a MRHS within the confines of the grand compromise. Sovereignty challenges, and the practice of leveraging sovereignty, are unacknowledged aspects of the "refugee burden." Without taking MRHS like Jordan seriously as states that work to maintain final authority within their territory, scholarly investigations of the global system of refugee management; the resources, opportunities, and rights that are made available to refugees; and the experiences of citizens in MRHS will remain incomplete.

Scholarly Investigations of the Refugee Burden:

The term "refugee burden" is used to achieve policy-relevant goals, but the refugee burden is also a real, measurable phenomenon. Few scholars have systematically studied what the refugee burden entails. One notable exception is Czaika's (2005) conceptual and methodological contribution called the Refugee Burden Index (RBI). Czaika's tool deconstructs the refugee burden into measurable social phenomena, including changing demographics, protracted displacement, absorbance capacity, economic performance, and societal and political stability. Czaika's important work allows scholars and practitioners to compare the refugee burden across states, which is rarely done in any systematic way.

Some scholars have pushed against the assumption that refugee hosting can only be measured through adverse effects. Zetter (2012) argues that, in the long run, refugee hosting can increase productivity and improve a state's economy through consumption. A recent study by the US Department of Health and Human Services found that refugees in the United States contributed an estimated $63 billion more in taxes from 2007 to 2017 than they received in

public benefits (Mark 2017). Members of the Trump administration reportedly worked to discredit the report. Notably, Stephen Miller, a senior policy adviser for the administration, advocated that "only the costs of refugees, and not their contributions," should be considered (Ibid).

Other scholars find that the burden rhetoric has been exaggerated. In terms of integration, Lazarev and Sharma (2017) find that religious affinity among Muslims has contributed positively to Syrian refugee reception in Turkey. The authors push against widespread notions of growing host community hostilities. Fakih and Ibrahim (2015) study the impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market, including (un)employment and labor force participation rates. They find that "there is no relationship between the influx of Syrian refugees and the Jordanian labor market" (Fakih and Ibrahim 2015 p. 64). Saif and DeBartolo (2007) argue that the influx of Iraqi refugees in Jordan effected inflation as the price of food, fuel, and real estate increased, but that this effect is much less dramatic than what has been reported. The authors provide a more nuanced explanation of how service sectors in Jordan, including hotels and restaurants, benefited from the reception of Iraqi refugees. The tendency to focus only on the perceived negatives of refugee hosting reinforces how the refugee burden is used to shape policies – not to empirically describe refugee hosting.

A Scholarly Pivot to Burden Sharing:

Many scholars take the refugee burden question for granted, and instead, pivot to a discussion of burden sharing. How can scholars confront the limitations of burden sharing with the purpose of finding durable solutions to alleviating the refugee burden? How could (or should) a burden sharing scheme work?

Most appeals for burden sharing usually take two forms. First, some actors advocate for a demographic redistribution of refugees from one country to another, which has predominately been an appeal among European states (see Noll 1997; 2000; Thielemann 2003; 2004). Alternatively, other burden sharing appeals request increased international aid from wealthy donor states to offset the financial obligations of housing refugees in MRHS (see Shuck 1997; Kagan 2011). Boswell (2003) notes that the concept of burden sharing was used to promote international solidarity, but it has also been used to reinforce the notion that refugees must remain in the region from which they are displaced, the Global South.

Shuck begins with the premise that while states have been the perpetrators of human rights violations, or at least complicit in crimes against humanity, "genuine human rights protections… can only be enforced and implemented by sovereign states or by other entities such as supranational agencies and nongovernment organizations working with their assistance or sufferance" (1997 p. 247). He proposes a revised burden sharing scheme that is regionally based, which includes a quota system for participating states with the option of essentially paying other states to host refugees. Burden-sharing systems can be seen as insurance for wealthier or more powerful states that are not facing the challenges of mass exodus. Boswell writes, "a burden-sharing system is a way of ensuring that in the worst-case scenario of massive influx, the burden would be shared with other countries" (2003 np).

Roper and Barria (2010) investigate what motivates donor states to fund the UNHCR. They apply Olson's (1965) theory of collective action to examine if refugee hosting is a "public good" and if some states are "free riders." The authors conclude that donor states gain from concrete private benefits, which makes refugee protection an impure public good. Thielemann

argues that the EU's decision to burden share through the European refugee fund was "partly solidaristic, but mostly symbolic" (2005 p. 807).

When it comes to the Syrian refugee crisis, Fargues (2014) recommends creating more resettlement spots for refugees, making asylum visas available at European embassies in MRHS, allowing visa-free travel for Syrian citizens, and increasing migration through family reunification (also see Angenendt, Engler, and Schneider 2013). In 2015 and 2016, debates about burden sharing took into consideration some of Fargues' suggestions. However, as Heisbourg (2015) points out, Baltic states (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) were not amenable to burden sharing proposals imposed upon them by Western Europe. Baltic states invoked their "relative poverty, the intrinsic difficulties of accepting deeply alien outsiders or even the refusal of hosting non-Christians" (Heisbourg 2015 p. 11). One Slovakian official cited the country's lack of mosques and suggested that Slovakia only accept Christian refugees. This was common rhetoric during the European crisis. Reportedly, Saud Arabia offered to donate 200 mosques to Germany to support Syrian refugees (Withnall 2015).

Legal scholar E. Tendayi Achiume (2015) offers a bold proposal to alleviating the challenges of burden sharing by reinterpreting the principle of "the responsibility to protect" or R2P, which allows states to intervene in the matters of other states when crimes against humanity are being committed. R2P is controversial because, by definition, it undermines state sovereignty. Achiume (2015) argues that R2P applies to refugees, not just IDPs. She reasons that refugees have fled R2P crimes, and therefore, the international community has a duty to intervene even when refugees enter the territory of another sovereign state. Achiume's proposal is controversial because it further breaks down the international principle of state sovereignty.

Sovereignty Challenges are Unacknowledged Aspects of the Refugee Burden:

The refugee burden is often addressed by government officials in public statements. In Jordan, government officials reiterate that Syrian refugee reception has created new challenges for the country and its citizens. The ways that Jordanian concerns have been expressed is almost formulaic: First, officials recognize the number or percentage of Syrian refugees hosted in Jordan. Then, concerns about the degradation of social institutions are addressed as well as the dwindling of state resources. For example, in an interview with *Mic*, Queen Rania Al Abdullah said, "Every seventh person in my country is a Syrian refugee. They all need shelter, food, drinking water, education, and healthcare. Even with the work of UN agencies, we are barely coping" (Horowitz 2016). Concerns about state security and terrorism have become increasingly common too.

Public comments by Jordanian government officials about the refugee burden often neglect the many, and evolving, challenges that refugee hosting poses to sovereignty and governance. These challenges arise from Jordan's role as a MRHS in the global system of refugee management. While empirically evident (as described throughout the dissertation), these challenges fall outside the curated narrative of Jordan's response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jordanian Officials and the International Community:

Jordanian officials cooperate with other states and members of the international community to manage refugee reception. They leverage Jordanian sovereignty concerns and the concerns of states that rely on Jordan to contain refugee populations. One way in which officials do this is by invoking the "refugee burden." This practice can be seen in Jordan and throughout MRHS in the Global South (for more on this, see Chapter Eight).

The term “refugee burden” has taken on two roles. At face value, the term simply describes the challenges that refugee receiving states face. However, beyond that, “refugee burden” has become a term of art that perpetuates and reinforces the grand compromise. Policymakers, state leaders, and humanitarian actors have adopted the term, and as a result, it has also become ubiquitous among journalists and scholars.

On the global stage, refugee burden operates as a policy term used to advocate for refugee host states and influence the international refugee assistance regime. As hotly debates unfolded over the influx of asylum seekers in Europe in 2016, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi stated, “… The most important thing is to help Turkey bear the burden…” (Nebehay 2016). There was no question that Turkey would continue to host large refugee populations; instead, burden sharing appeals were to donor states that could pledge greater financial support. Despite the global conversation about burden sharing, director of global issues at Amnesty International, Audrey Gaughran, criticized the appeals as lip service. She explained, “The G20 declaration that the refugee ‘burden’ must be shared rings very hollow, since many G20 countries are not shouldering their fair share of the global responsibility for refugees…” (Amnesty International 2016). Most leaders in MRHS, however, recognize that their leverage exists not in moving refugees out of the Global South but in acquiring more international aid. In 2018, King Abdullah II of Jordan appealed to the international community when he said, “We are shouldering an immense refugee burden and cannot be left alone as we undertake this humanitarian responsibility on behalf of the world” (*CBS* 2018).

The term refugee burden suggests a kind of martyrdom, an honorable sacrifice made by MRHS. This sentiment fits neatly within the larger humanitarian narrative of morally worthy victims and their saviors as described in Chapter Three. The refugee burden has had powerful

repercussions when world leaders excuse rights violations in order not to *over*burden MRHS. Jordan's Minister of State for Media Affairs was quoted saying, "Jordan has taken more refugees than the whole continent of Europe. So it's really unjustified and unacceptable for anyone to question or criticize the way Jordan is dealing with the refugees which we think is second to none in comparison to all countries in the world." This sentiment was echoed by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier who, in responding to a question from the Associated Press about the harsh treatment of Syrians, stated, "much can be improved, much needs to be done through international aid, but I believe it's not justified to come with big complaints against Jordan… I believe we should show restraint with complaints about countries like Jordan, which truly carry the biggest burden of the refugee influx from Syria" (*New York Post* 2018). When liberal democracies abdicate the responsibility to host refugees, they also concede the moral high ground to push back against human rights violations.

Leveraging sovereignty can also been seen in the ways that Jordanian state officials count the refugees, which is the foundational premise of the refugee burden. As one Jordanian official explained, "We used to exaggerate the numbers with the Iraqis, but we do not do that anymore. We are not exaggerating the Syrian numbers." The refugee numbers are important for many reasons; but most notably, the more refugees a MRHS hosts, the more international support that state is justified to receive.

In 2007, the Norwegian research institute FAFO found that there were 161,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan, while government estimates claimed that there were 750,000 to one million Iraqi refugees (Chatelard 2008). As of January 2017, the UNHCR reports that there are 61,004 Iraqi refugees in Jordan, a count that excludes Iraqis who not registered with the UN Refugee Agency. The juxtaposition of these numbers brings to light an important challenge that refugee

host states face when they rely on international institutions to provide aid. While the UNHCR and other refugee aid organizations are tasked with serving registered refugee populations, the refugee host state must account for both refugee and non-refugee identifying immigrants as well as their own citizens.

A disagreement over counting refugees also surfaced between Jordan and the UNHCR over the number of Syrian refugees that began to gather at the border in late 2015. Jordanian government spokesperson Mohammed Momani claimed that the UNHCR "exaggerated" when they criticized Jordan for leaving 12,000 Syrians were stranded at the border. In February 2016, BBC journalist Lyse Doucet interviewed King Abdullah II about Jordan's moral responsibility to accept Syrian refugees. Doucet emphasized Jordan's responsibility to accept refugees while King Abdullah II made claims about Jordanian sovereignty, stressing the failure of the international community to host an adequate number of refugees. Unlike counting the number of refugees inside the Jordanian state, which has been used to justify financial aid requests, the number of refugees at the border jeopardized Jordan's reputation as a hospitable refugee host state. Through this interview, King Abdullah II describes Jordanian security concerns and relates them to the concerns of states in the Global North. He illustrates that Jordan has the capacity to control migration across state borders but reiterates Jordan's willingness to continue accepting refugees. This interview is framed by the onset of the European refugee crisis and the backlash against refugee reception in Europe, which has strategically situated Jordan to leverage their "local absorption capacity" against Western states' fears of refugee immigration. King Abdullah II explains:

> At this stage, we let them [Syrian refugees] in as they are being vetted. There is pressure from the international community to let them in, but we are saying to everybody, this is a major national security problem for all of us... But again, we

> throw back to the international community and to those countries that are being very difficult to us, saying at the end of the day, okay, you are saying that there are only 16,000 [refugees at the border]… We've already taken in 1.4 million people. If you are going to take the higher moral ground on this issue, we'll get them all to an airbase and we're more than happy to relocate them to your country…If you want to help the refugee problem, 16,000 refugees to your country, I don't think is that much of a problem.

Doucet responds with a question, "Has anyone taken up your offer?" King Abdullah II replies, "Of course not."

Then, Doucet makes the humanistic point, "Europe is saying to you, we don't want no more refugees. You are saying you don't want any more refugees. Where do they go?" King Abdullah II does not back away from Jordan's role as a refugee host state. He explains, "We will continue to bring them across, in limited numbers. We will continue to look after them on the other side [of the border]. And, we will continue to vet them. So, it's going to take time because we cannot afford a terrorist incident to be here in our country." As of July 2016, the number of Syrian refugees at the border rose to approximately 85,000 people. In June 2016, an ISIS-claimed bomb exploded at the border. King Abdallah II declared, "Jordan will respond with an iron fist against anyone who tries to tamper with its security and borders."

Refugee Movement and Containment:

The case of Syrian refugees at the Jordan-Syria border indicates that Jordan is a MRHS with the capacity to control immigration. This fact contrasts generalist characterizations of MRHS that neighbor conflict countries. Jordanian officials control movement in two important ways: at the border and at the borders of refugee camps, both of which can become porous but are not completely open for free movement.

Some refugees confront the limitations placed on them by subverting state policies. For each policy intended to control refugee behavior, one would not be hard pressed to discover

refugees that find creative solutions to navigate those policies. Refugees find ways to live where they want to live or work when employment is unauthorized. For example, some Syrian refugees may register for work permits in open professions, including construction and agriculture, and then work in closed professions such as nursing. As Maher explained to me, “I work as a nurse at Abu Fuad’s house. But, if I am stopped on the street, I can show my work permit to the officers.” In this way, Maher has permission to work, but not in the profession that he has chosen.

Refugees navigate the policies and regulations that are intended to control them with the help of citizens, aid workers, and even government officials. For example, a Syrian refugee named Kareem was offered position as an accountant with an INGO. This profession is officially closed to all Syrian refugees working in Jordan. However, the Jordanian Ministry of Labor was willing to make an exception for him after an aid worker was reached out to the ministry on Kareem’s behalf.

In another example, Faiza, a Syrian woman who I met in an informal tented settlement (ITS), described how she enters and leaves Za’atari refugee camp without getting formal permits. “I know the guards,” Faiza explained. “I wave to them when I leave, and I wave to them when I return. They know me. Sometimes I bring peaches with me from the farms and they like that.” For most of the summer, Faiza prefers to live in ITS with her extended family. The family pitches their tents next to Jordanian farms and works the land. ITS living allows Faiza and her family to make a living, which this particular family does not believe is available to them inside Za’atari. In the winter, however, Faiza and her family prefer to live in Za’atari refugee camp because the caravans (metal shelter units) are better able to protect them from the cold, the rain, and the snow. With the help of the border guards that Faiza has befriended, she travels between the ITS and Za’atari throughout the year to visit family or access services from the UNHCR. Her

official residence is in Za'atari refugee camp.

Citizens and Refugee Reception:

The experiences of citizens in MRHS – for better or for worse – often go unacknowledged in discussions about refugee reception in the Global South. Jordanian citizens have been greatly affected by the reception of Syrian refugees. Many citizens have close familial ties to Syrian refugees while others may have business ties. Their families and livelihoods have been significantly affected by the displacement of Syrians and the breakdown of Syrian businesses and production. Some citizens have prospered financially from the Syrian refugee response. Their businesses have grown from local patronage, international support, and new market opportunities. Other citizens, however, have been negatively affected by rising rents and saturated labor markets.

Jordanian officials have worked closely with the UN, INGOs, and NGOs to steer the Syrian refugee response away from emergency relief and toward Jordanian development goals. Jordanians have encouraged the international community to consider the toll that the Syrian refugee reception has had on social institutions, built infrastructure, and natural resources. Aid initiatives must be approved by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) before they can be implemented inside the country. This agency has developed regulations to ensure that international donors and aid providers support Syrians and Jordanians. Between 30%-50% of beneficiaries must be Jordanians.

Another group of citizens that is often overlook are Jordanian humanitarian workers (JHW) who are positioned at the frontlines of the Syrian refugee response. They face challenges of refugee reception on-the-ground, in camps and urban areas. JHW have become the faces of

international aid organizations. They manage the basic needs of refugees, from housing and education to health care access. JHW have also become liaisons with government agencies and representatives of state supported social services. In these capacities, JHW also confront the successes and failures of rights institutions, witnessing the disparities between what is promised to refugees and the reality of aid and protection on-the-ground.

Hannan, a 26-year-old female college graduate, describes her disillusionment with pervasive narratives about human rights that privilege Western values. "We [Jordanians] always thought America and Europe were the countries of human rights," she said to me as we weaved through traffic. Her eyes remained on the road, but her hand gestures captured the revelation in her voice. "After seeing how these countries have treated refugees — People dying in the ocean! — I started to realize, no, we are the real country of human rights."

Hannan admitted that the first year working in Za'atari refugee camp was the hardest. "Sometimes, I would come home and cry. Their stories burn your heart. It is like all of a sudden we began to understand the stories our grandmothers told us." Hannan, like many Jordanians, is the child of Palestinian refugees who sought refuge in Jordan. The hardships that Syrians have faced remind Hannan of her own family's refugee history.

It was clear that Hannan feels a sense of responsibility toward Syrian refugees. On one occasion, Hannan organized a winterization campaign with her friends and colleagues when the management of the NGO she worked for was unresponsive to the needs of Syrians families who were facing harsh winter storms. Her voice grew boisterous as she described the thrill of driving on icy roads, at night, to deliver blankets. Hannan was protective of the Syrian families she worked with. She offered me measured advice before I conducted my interviews with refugees. "Do not ask questions that will make people cry," she instructed. "They have had enough of that,

you do not need to remind them of everything they have lost." When we met with refugees together, I watched her reassure Syrians by saying, "Be patient. God sends people for people."

While scholars have written, albeit sparingly, about tensions between refugee and host communities in MRHS, the experiences of humanitarian workers on the frontlines remain unanalyzed. JHW speak Arabic, are culturally sensitive to the needs of Syrian refugees, have extensive networks among refugees and host communities, and can offer words of comfort rooted in shared religious scripts. Their compassion and basic human regard for Syrian refugees offers scholars a new lens through which to observe and interpret the application of human rights in the contemporary refugee crisis. Jordanian humanitarian workers' role as witnesses to the Syrian refugee crisis becomes an important part of their identity, especially as they draw comparisons to their own familial refugee experiences.

Conclusion:

The sovereignty concerns of MRHS can be imagined along a spectrum and compared to other states. On one end of the spectrum are conflict countries, like Syria, in which state sovereignty is broken. State officials cannot maintain final authority over state matters and do not maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Moreover, states with broken sovereignty may not be recognized by the international community as states with legitimate authority over domestic affairs. In contrast, one can place liberal, Western states on the other end of the spectrum. While scholars have debated the "completeness" of sovereignty in Western, liberal, democratic states, there is no question that these countries are able to control the flow of refugees more so than MRHS in the Global South.

MRHS fall in between those with broken sovereignty and states that strictly control their sovereignty. As a MRHS, Jordan faces challenges to sovereignty that arise from allowing hundreds of thousands, if not over one million, Syrian refugees to cross porous state borders. They bear the challenges of hosting and governing large numbers of refugees as part of a global refugee management scheme. To uphold their position in the "grand compromise" and to simultaneously maintain Jordanian state interests, Jordanian officials leverage sovereignty.

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