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In Search of the Unified Nation-State: National Attachment among Distinctive Citizens

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Are national identities and loyalties threatened from within?[1] Recent events and numerous commentators suggest that such threats are quite real. Absent the stabilizing bipolarity of the Cold War, the possibility of "nations within states" and of internecine conflict along religious, ethnic, and linguistic lines seems ever-present. The former Yugoslavia is perhaps the most prominent illustration of state disintegration amid clashes between ethnic and religious groups with aspirations to nationhood. Yugoslavia even begat a label for this process: Balkanization. Moreover, there have also been less famous but still significant mobilizations along ethnic lines in other areas of the world, such as Latin America (Yashar 1999). To some scholars, the rise of the state was supposed to foreclose such sentiments as part of a broader process of modernization and rationalization (Haas 1964, 1986). This has apparently not happened. Gagnon (1994: 130), drawing on Yugoslavia's example, asks, "Are ethnically-mixed regions in the post-Cold War era inevitably the sites of violent conflict that will spill over into the international arena?" This is not a new question. Writing nearly 30 years ago, Birch (1978: 327) notes, "The rise or resurgence of minority nationalist movements has become so widespread in the last decade that it is no longer necessary to begin a paper on the subject with a list of examples." (We have ignored this dictum, but the point is well-taken.)

Even milder dynamics that likely do not portend state disintegration are still interpreted as threatening national identity. For example, in the United States, some worry that American identity is challenged by growing ethnic diversity (e.g., Brimelow 1995), especially when that very diversity is celebrated under the guise of multiculturalism (Schlesinger 1998) or what Taylor (1994) calls the "politics of recognition." Laments sound when, for example, the US men's soccer team takes on Mexico in the Rose Bowl and finds itself facing a hostile crowd. Such fears may produce efforts to shore up what some view as essential aspects of national identity. California's Proposition 227, which mandated "English only" language instruction for bilingual children, is but one example.

Our interest in this question follows from our belief that the degree of national unity has important implications for the quality and success of democracy. The last thirty years has produced a large-scale shift to democratic institutions throughout the world. This "third wave" of democratization began with transitions in Portugal and Spain, events that were followed by a cascade of transitions in Latin America. The tail end of the wave, which appears to have crested, is composed of African and post-communist states, many of which include multiple "nations." Democracy scholars have identified divisions in national attachment, in some form or another, as one of the most significant obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in these countries (Dahl 1973; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1997; Linz, Stepan, and Yadav 2003; Stepan 2001: 181-200). Indeed, an active research program among these and other scholars is directed towards designing institutions that best accommodate "distinctive" populations and promote national unity.

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[1] A previous version was presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago IL, April 15-18.

This paper investigates more systematically the variation in attachment to the nation-state. We focus in particular on how populations that are "distinctive" in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, and language feel about their country. We seek to answer two questions. First, do distinctive populations feel less attachment to the countries in which they live? Second, what political, economic, and cultural factors strengthen or weaken the national attachment of distinctive populations? Our expectation is that distinctive populations typically experience a degree of "distance" from mainstream conceptions of national identity and/or from the nation-state's political and other institutions, and thus feel less attached to the countries in which they live. This distance is precisely what facilitates the mobilization and politicization that produces "nations within states." However, we believe that the effect of cultural distance will not necessarily be the same in all countries. We expect distinctive subgroups to manifest less pride when certain political, economic, and cultural features render them less secure or more "distinct" within a particular country. Thus, country-level attributes are important conditioning factors that affect the relationship between individual-level forces and attachment to the state. Which of these factors matters most has important implications for where subnational identities may prove more salient, and for how policymakers at the state level might respond to minority nationalist movements.

Walker Connor argues that debates about national attachment have "been made possible by the near absence of conclusive evidence. "Nationalism is a mass phenomenon...And the masses, until recent times totally or semi-literate, furnished few hints concerning their view of group-self" (quoted in O'Leary 1997: 207). We take this remark as a starting point for a cross-national investigation into the nature of national attachment within mass publics. Our analysis takes advantage of survey data from a large group of countries to consider both individual- and country-level determinants. A cross-national analysis is important, given the vast literature identifying different trajectories of national development and different kinds of national pride. Moreover, such an analysis allows us to place social psychology, which tells us much about national attachment as a species of ingroup loyalty, in a broader political, economic, and cultural context.

Our findings suggest that, on average, distinctive populations are less attached to their nation than are other citizens. Nevertheless, this gap varies markedly across countries, with a significant proportion showing no gap whatsoever. We find that several conditions are associated with larger gaps in national attachment: sizable distinctive populations and, counter-intuitively, economic inequality. Interestingly, older states are not less divided than are new ones. Political institutions, particularly federalism, seem to improve unity but only moderately. Nevertheless, we must recognize that such arrangements are most often adopted when states are most divided. As such, it appears that the attention to the design of political institutions that accommodate distinct groups are indeed warranted, for their effect on an important requisite for democracy is clear.

National Attachment and Distinctiveness

National Attachment

It can be difficult to describe and identify people's attitudes towards the country in which they live. Our conceptualization of what we have thus far termed "national attachment" begins first with the locus of that attachment. We conceptualize national attachment in this paper as attachment to the state in which one currently resides. By making the state the reference point, we do not explicitly consider attachment to certain collectivities within the state. The affection of the Quebecois for Quebec is, in one sense, a species of attachment to a "nation" or even nationalism. But in this paper we are concerned with Quebecois attachment to Canada.

We use the term "attachment" to characterize people's feelings because it is a general description and does not connote any particular kind of attachment (love, pride, and so on) or any specific content of that attachment (*e.g.*, what "American" means). What we mean is a very general sense of one's identification with the nation-state. Other scholars have sought to delineate various kinds of national attitudes—for example, Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendorn (2003) distinguish "feeling," "liking," "pride," "preference," "superiority," and "nationalism"—and in particular to separate benign and malevolent species of national attachment, such as "patriotism" and "nationalism," or "blind patriotism" and "constructive patriotism" (see de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Druckman 1994; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Sidanius *et al*. 1997; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992).[1] These can be very important, especially in determining the consequences of national attachment. However, for the purposes of this investigation, we remain agnostic about how to distinguish among kinds of attachment and we do not formulate any typology of attitudes.

Distinctiveness

Our focus is on national attachment of citizens who we term "distinctive." Distinctiveness refers to whether individuals stand out in terms of their place of birth, ethnicity, race, language, or religion. These are citizens whose characteristics distance them in some way from the state. Citizens whose primary language is not the official or predominant language, whose place of birth is outside the country, or whose religion or race differs from the norm are citizens that are, in our sense, "distinct." We explicitly distinguish this designation from others such as "minority" or "marginalized." Typically, distinctive populations are numerical minorities, but this does not have to be the case. In fact, once one adds together the individuals who qualify as distinctive through any number of characteristics (as we do), the proportion of distinctive can be numerically substantial. Nor are distinctive populations by definition "marginalized," either economically or politically. Some nation-states may contain distinctive citizens who wield substantial economic and political power—*e.g.*, Indian immigrants to Tanzania are typically wealthier than native citizens. Since we are concerned with uncovering the circumstances under which distinctive individuals are more or less attached to the nation, we exclude from our definition factors such as population size and economic and political position. Indeed, these factors are some of several whose effect we wish to examine.

Of course, the concept of distinctiveness threatens to devolve into subjectivity and ambiguity without concrete, operational criteria with which to anchor it. We define distinctive citizens as those whose place of birth, race, religion, or language differs from the founders of the

nation-state. A crucial component of this definition is that it designates citizens as distinct for *any* departure from the founder's norm. We reason that any one of these factors can be the salient characteristic that defines distinctiveness in a particular country. In some countries, ethnic distinctions are potentially important; in others, religious distinctions may be important. Of course, these factors will often overlap in important ways: Latinos living in the United States are arguably distinctive in both their ethnicity and their language (though not religion).

Theory

Why Should Distinctive Citizens Be Less Attached to the Nation-state?

Our baseline expectation is that, on average, distinctive populations will feel less attachment to the country in which they reside. Why might this be true? Several complementary reasons suggest themselves. First, residents of one country who were born in another may not, by virtue of being immigrants, have been exposed to the typical socialization process that fosters national attachment in native-born citizens. They may also maintain or retain attachment to their country their birth.

Even among native-born citizens, those who are distinctive in terms of race, language, and religion may also feel a lesser degree of national attachment. How might this sense of "distance" arise? A first possibility is that the prevailing concept of national identity has explicit or implicit exclusionary content. Smith (1986) argues that states often have their origins in ethnic identities. It is possible that these identities will persist—perhaps despite attempts to construct a national identity that is instead "civic," *i.e.*, based on allegiance to certain principles—and thus those with different ethnic origins will feel peripheral. Even if one considers national communities to be "imagined," in Anderson's (1991) famous phrase, it is still quite possible that a nation-state may be imagined or constructed in exclusionary ways.[2] The founding principles of the United States, for example, explicitly subordinated blacks and native populations in particular.

A second, and related, factor is that certain trajectories of state formation, such as those that involve invasion, annexation, or conquest, may render newly incorporated populations permanently recalcitrant, no matter what efforts state authorities take to engender attachment. Birch (1978: 333) writes, "The self-consciousness and loyalties of the Scots, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Basques, and other minority groups have survived for centuries despite the political integration of their countries into larger states and the substantial elimination of their languages, which in the Scottish case is almost complete. In comparison with the rapid changes in economic development and political organization of the past hundred years, ethnic and cultural loyalties are durable and relatively permanent."

It is also important to point out that state formation is in many countries far from complete, and this allows ethnic and other groups to maintain and reinforce a local attachment that often stands in opposition to a larger national attachment. Yashar (1999: 86-87) notes in regards to Latin America that many of its "central political institutions remain weak, commitment to those institutions remains questionable, and the territorial scope of those institutions remains ambiguous…National identities, borders, and legitimacy are all in question and often in flux." As a result, indigenous movements in Latin America have challenged any construction of a single national identity at the expense of ethnic identities, and have successfully demanded constitutional measures that recognize and affirm ethnic diversity within a given

country.[3] If this unsettled quality describes Latin American states, which predate those of the rest of the developing world by 140 years, one should expect even less crystallization elsewhere.

Another factor, and a natural consequence of an exclusionary national identity, is that distinctive populations may experience economic, political, and social marginalization. This may come in the form of outright prejudice and discrimination, or by more indirect exclusion. Citizens may be disqualified (*de jure* or *de facto*) from full participation in a country's political institutions. They may experience economic inequality, with attendant effects on their health, longevity, and so on. They may face social prejudice in their daily lives. Any of these factors could discourage national attachment among distinctive populations. Simply put, it is unlikely that citizens will feel attached to a country where they are treated poorly.

There is some empirical evidence that distinctive populations within countries do feel less national attachment. Silver and Dowley (2000) find that across 16 countries, there are significant differences between "majority" and "minority" populations in their overall level of national pride—but these differences vary notably across countries (see also Dowley and Silver 2000). Other work finds that national attachments can be quite strong even among immigrants and other "distinctive" populations. For example, various studies find that in the United States blacks, Latinos, and Asians do not necessarily manifest less national attachment than whites (Citrin 2000; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin *et al*. 1994; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Sears *et al*. 1999). This mixed evidence suggests that the effect of distinctiveness is most likely conditional. In particular, it would seem likely that its effect will vary cross-nationally, since the status and position of distinctive groups is similarly varied. This is to say, Latinos in Oakland differ from Pakistanis in London just as Christians in Pakistan differ from Jews in Poland. Thus, while our baseline expectation is that distinctive citizens will be less attached to their nation than will other citizens, we recognize that this gap will vary across countries. Our primary concern in this paper is with how and why it varies.

Explaining Gaps in National Attachment

We identify a set of conditions that might explain this gap. Importantly, at least for designers of political institutions and those that care about removing obstacles to democracy, some conditions are malleable, while some are not. One that is not is the aging process. As we discuss above, nation-states take time to settle. Often, as we will describe below, states comprise a diverse groups of citizens, each of which could, at some point, make a case for sovereignty. We reason that such cases are stronger early in the lifespan of the nation-state. One should expect that time works to smooth differences and foster superordinate loyalties to the nation-state. For most individuals, a nation state consists of a set of symbols, institutions, and legends—assets that need time to develop and diffuse. Once citizens of all age groups have been socialized within the nation-state, we might expect more uniform unity. So, for example, one might expect indigenous groups in the Americas to be more attached to their nation in 1995 than they were in 1850. For developing countries outside of Latin America, however, nation-building has taken place only in the last forty years. There the structure of the nation has not yet "settled," and one should expect a more pronounced gap in adherence to this structure.

A second factor is a country's economic conditions. We hypothesize that distinctive populations will feel more attachment to countries that have a lower degree of economic inequality. In very unequal societies, it is likely that distinct populations are deprived relative to more "mainstream" populations. But in equal societies, they likely face no systematic economic

disadvantage. It may also be that what matters are not relative differences in wealth, but absolute levels of wealth. Distinctive and poor citizens, even in an equal society, may find the combination of poverty and distinction to undermine their attachment to the nation.

A third factor, also not easily changed, is the demography of a country. A major consideration is the size of the distinctive population itself. When the distinctive population is larger (proportionally), this fact may enable it to nurture and sustain its unique identity more effectively, whereas a small distinctive population will feel more pressure to assimilate and to express a sense of national attachment.

The last set of factors concerns a country's political institutions. Because they are open to modification and manipulation, these are the factors most of interest. Which institutions lead to unified nation-states? To begin, distinctive populations will arguably feel more attached to their country when that country has political institutions that protect the rights of distinctive groups. The relevant aspect of institutions might simply be how democratic (as opposed to authoritarian) those institutions are. Or the type of democratic institutions may matter. Institutionalists in comparative politics argue vigorously that frameworks such as the way legislators are elected (*i.e.*, PR versus plurality systems), legislative-executive relations (*i.e.*, presidentialism versus parliamentarism), and whether subnational units have real power (*i.e.*, federal versus unitary systems) affect the performance of democracies. We agree that these institutional choices matter; in fact, we suggest that their impact should be especially visible in a question such as ours.

One useful and prominent categorization of institutions is Lijphart's (1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies.[4] The distinction, as he describes it, exhibits two analytical dimensions: one (the "executive-parties" dimension) that incorporates the power of the executive, proportionality of the electoral system, and the pluralism of parties and interest groups, and another (the "federal-unitary" dimension) that captures the degree of decentralization of power throughout the polity. Regarding the former, we expect that distinctive citizens will feel more national attachment in political systems that are "consensual" as opposed to "majoritarian," since, as consensual systems do not create such clear "winners" and "losers," particularly at election time. Since distinctive populations are so often minority populations, majoritarian systems will more often render them "losers" and as such may not ensure them political representation that they consider adequate. Federalism is another means by which to accommodate distinctive citizens. A decentralized mode of state organization may allow distinctive populations to exert more control over politics and policy within these federal units, especially if those populations are geographically concentrated within certain units. A ready example is how Canada's federal system facilitates the relative autonomy of the Quebecois.[5]

Data and Measures

Data Sources

Several cross-national datasets include measures of national attachment (*e.g.*, the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Program (1996), and the Eurobarometer studies). Each of these datasets has their advantages (see de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). The ISSP data in 1996, for example, include a battery of national attachment questions that allow for a fairly nuanced measure of attachment. Our preference, however, is for a dataset that includes a broad enough sample to encompass countries that are varied in economic development and the size of their distinctive populations. For these purposes, the World Values Survey has no equal. For the

analysis, we include either the second wave (1990-91) or the third wave (1995-96) depending on the availability of data for each country in the sample. Our sample criteria are not restrictive. While item coverage limits to some degree the countries we may include, we include all independent nations-states for which we have data (see Table 1 for the sample used in the analysis).

Table 1. Percentage Very Proud among Total Population and Distinctive Populations

	Very Proud	Distinct	Total N		Very Proud	Distinct	Total N
France	34.9%	3.7%	1,002	Slovenia	60.8%	14.1%	1,007
Great Britain	52.5	9.7	1,484	Bulgaria	50.7	20.6	1,072
West Germany	13.5	8.7	1,017	Romania	48.3	11.8	1,103
Italy	40.1	1.1	2,018	Pakistan	85.4	18.1	733
Netherlands	22.8	9.6	1,017	China	39.9	0.2	1,500
Denmark	42.2	2.5	1,030	Taiwan	16.7	4.3	1,452
Belgium	30.6	2.3	2,792	Portugal	42.1	1.4	1,185
Spain	65.5	20.8	1,211	Austria	53.0	7.3	1,460
Ireland	76.8	3.0	1,000	Turkey	78.0	12.4	1,907
United States	79.4	37.6	1,542	Lithuania	18.5	21.2	1,009
Canada	60.2	19.9	1,730	Latvia	22.5	47.3	1,200
Japan	26.0	7.0	1,054	Estonia	21.3	49.9	1,021
Mexico	73.9	15.0	1,510	Ukraine	25.0	57.0	2,811
South Africa	81.2	23.1	2,935	Russia	30.4	18.3	2,040
Hungary	47.2	5.5	999	Peru	80.3	25.9	1,211
Australia	72.6	23.8	2,048	Venezuela	93.8	14.4	1,200
Norway	51.9	9.9	1,127	Uruguay	73.6	15.3	1,000
Sweden	46.1	19.7	1,009	Philippines	74.1	16.8	1,200
Iceland	54.0	3.5	702	Moldova	35.9	37.7	984
Argentina	58.4	15.3	1,079	Georgia	59.0	25.7	2,593
Finland	48.1	10.0	987	Armenia	43.5	12.5	2,000
South Korea	45.3	0.0	1,251	Azerbaijan	63.7	21.0	2,002
Poland	70.0	4.0	1,153	Dominican Rep.	76.2	32.1	417
Switzerland	28.0	11.0	1,212	Bangladesh	77.9	14.1	1,525
Brazil	64.5	40.3	1,149	Columbia	84.7	23.1	6,025
Nigeria	64.7	1.4	2,769	Macedonia	69.5	31.2	995
Chile	55.8	26.6	1,000	Croatia	45.0	7.4	1,196
Belarus	31.7	36.7	2,092	Slovakia	32.4	8.6	466
India	72.5	57.9	2,040	Bosnia	56.4	52.2	1,200
East Germany	15.8	3.3	1,009				

Source: World Values Survey (1990-91 and 1995-97)

Measurement of Variables

National attachment, as we define it, refers to an individual's identification and loyalty to a nation-state in a very general sense. Many patriotism and nationalism survey items that refer to particular aspects of the nation-state (its government, its history, *etc*.) are inadequately specific. We prefer a simple and general question such as the World Values item "How proud are you to be [insert country name]." The item has four response categories ranging from "not at all," "not very," to "somewhat," and "quite." This item exhibits convergent validity in that it correlates highly with both patriotism and nationalism items (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003) and, upon inspection of various cases, exhibits face validity as well. In Figure 1 we plot the percentage of South African blacks and whites responding "very proud" in 1981, 1990, and 1995. National attachment among blacks, which is notably lower than that among whites in 1981, rises dramatically during this period, until by 1995 it surpasses that of whites. For us, this dramatic shift, which likely reflects black incorporation in South Africa, provides further evidence of this measure's validity and suggests that there is value in investigating the factors that affect the national attachment of core and distinctive populations worldwide.

Figure 1. Trends in National Attachment in South Africa



Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990-1, and 1995-7)

In measuring *distinctiveness*, we construct a global (and ultimately dichotomous) measure that captures whether one is distinctive on any of four dimensions: (1) place of birth; (2) ethnicity; (3) religion; and (4) language. In our measure, individuals can qualify as distinctive if

they differ from the country norm on just one of these dimensions. We do this for two reasons. First, in many cases these dimensions are in essence collinear—*e.g.*, a Russian living in Latvia is distinctive ethnically, linguistically, and religiously; those in India who speak Urdu are nearly always Muslim. Second, the crucial dimensions of distinctiveness vary across countries depending on local cleavages and norms. Ethnicity may be salient in some countries whereas religion matters more in others. A global dichotomous measure has the broadest applicability and is the most comparable across countries. Operationally, this variable is challenging to measure. First, one must identify those groups that constitute the country norm. For each case, we consulted standard country monographs and contacted country experts about cases for which we were unclear. One practical difficulty, however, is that in some countries, no data exists for one or more of the variables of interest, and at times it is difficult to ascertain how these variables were coded because of incomplete documentation. Nevertheless, we succeeded in coding distinctiveness for 59 countries in the dataset. Table 1 lists the countries included in the sample, their sample size, and the percent of individuals from the sample coded as distinctive. The percent distinctive ranges from less than 1% (China) to 58% (India). A summary of coding decisions for each country is available from the authors.

National Attachment and Distinctiveness: Bivariate Results

Are distinctive citizens more or less attached to the nation than are others? Figure 2 plots the mean score on our four-category indicator of national attachment for both distinctive and core populations within each country in our sample. The average response for most countries is over 3 ("somewhat proud") indicating that national attachment is skewed toward the upper limit. Moreover, we should not overstate the gap between core and distinctive populations; one could fairly accurately predict the core's level of attachment with that of the distinctive group. Clearly, there is something about each nation-state to which these subgroups respond similarly and, for the most part, positively. Nonetheless, most countries appear above the x=y line, indicating that their core population is more attached than is their distinctive population. These states stand in stark contrast to the group of countries that hug the x=y line, who demonstrate relative unity among their citizens.

What is responsible for these differences in national unity? We can take a preliminary look by observing the bivariate association between the distinctive-core gap in national attachment and the conditions that we identify above. Figure 3 plots the mean difference in national attachment between the two groups against four different conditions. The results are mixed. Older countries with long histories—countries we had expected to have comparatively minimal differences among their citizens—do not exhibit any such "settling" phenomena. Nor do democratic countries appear any more unifying than authoritarian countries. On the other hand, two demographic conditions appear important. First, the size of the distinctive population—measured as the size of the distinctive population in the World Values Survey sample—is positively associated with the gap between core and distinctive. That is, a large distinctive population is more likely to differ from the core than will a less numerous group. The last graph investigates the role of economic inequality, measured as the difference in the average income percentile of the core and distinctive populations in each country sample. We find that countries in which distinctive populations are economically disadvantaged, at least compared to the core, are *less* likely to exhibit gaps in national attachment. This finding is perplexing. One explanation for this counterintuitive result is that the wealthy distinctive groups express less attachment due

to their higher degrees of education, a known depressant of national loyalty. This, of course, is something we can test further in a multivariate framework.

Figure 2. Scatterplot of National Attachment among Distinctive and Core Populations



Source: World Values Survey (1990-91 and 1995-97)

Most of the analysis in this paper is based on cross-sectional analysis. However, for several countries that have experienced significant political, economic, and social changes, it makes sense to look across time. In Figure 1 and Figure 4 we present these figures for South Africa and the Baltic nation-states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. South Africa, as we describe above, exhibits a dramatic shrinking gap in national attachment due to increased political inclusion. The Baltics' pattern is different. Overall, national attachment appears to have decreased since independence, but the dynamics of the core and distinctive populations differ across these countries. In one case (Lithuania), where the Russian population is comparatively small, national attachment has decreased across the board. In two others (Latvia and Estonia), where the Russian population is much larger, Russians exhibit a significantly decreased level of attachment, compared to that of the core. These results suggest that developments after independence may have had particularly negative consequences for Russians, at least in Latvia and Estonia.

Figure 3. The Gap in National Attachment and Country-level Conditions



Source: World Values Survey (1990-1 and 1995-7)

Figure 4. Trends in National Attachment in the Baltic States



Source: World Values Survey (1990-1 and 1995-7)

A Model of National Attachment

To elaborate upon these bivariate results, we construct a multivariate model of national attachment that includes attributes of countries and individuals, as well as key interactions between these two sets of attributes.

Country-Level Hypotheses

The first of these components, attributes of countries, should matter even though national attachment is more the norm than the exception in these data. Nation-states differ enormously—politically, economically, and otherwise—and it is difficult to believe that these national differences do not affect national attachment to some degree. Indeed, other extant empirical studies have identified variations across countries (Almond and Verba 1963; Rose 1985; Smith and Jarrko 1998). We believe that the nature of a country's political institutions, its level of economic development, and its salient historical experiences may all influence national pride. Our specific hypotheses and measures are as follows.

One important dimension of a nation's political institutions is simply how democratic they are. An initial expectation is that citizens in democratic states should have a stronger national attachment. In democratic states, citizens typically experience a considerable degree of personal freedom and autonomy, whereas authoritarian states often impose limits on individual rights and may even actively oppress certain citizens. It may be difficult to express attachment to a country—to say, for example, "I am proud to be a citizen of Elkinsland"—when living under that country's regime creates fear. However, it may be that the dynamics of national attachment have little to do with democracy. The national myths that engender national pride are largely products of the state. States that can produce statues, slogans, and textbooks that glorify its existence may very effectively increase national pride in their citizens. Such production may actually be the comparative advantage of authoritarian states. Given these competing possibilities, we remain agnostic about the overall effect of democracy on national pride. Our measure of this concept draws on the scores for democracy and autocracy in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2000).

Economic development may also translate into higher levels of attachment. Citizens living in developing countries often experience substantial hardship relative to citizens in developed countries. As such, they may feel less attachment to their country. If so, national attachment may not arise solely because of myths and imaginings, but may have a quite rational basis in living conditions. We measure economic development as the Gross Domestic Product per capita (in constant 1995 US dollars).[6]

Our final measures have to do with historical experience. The first of these is simply a dummy variable capturing whether a country was an Axis power in World War II. A lingering sense of shame for the atrocities carried out under the banner of Nazism and fascism mitigates national attachments in these nations. This phenomenon, which Smith and Jarkko (1998) call "war guilt," has been widely discussed, particularly with regard to Germany (see, *e.g.*, Hedetoft 1993). A second mitigating historical factor is status as a former Soviet republic or Communist country in Eastern Europe. A variety of research has documented the "postcommunist disappointment" in many of these countries (see Howard 2002). Many post-communist states have experienced difficult transitions to market economies, have struggled to develop effective democratic political institutions, and are characterized by weak civil societies. Given the heady expectations that the fall of the Soviet Union created, these struggles may be all the more frustrating and demoralizing. Indeed, the trends in national attachment in the Baltic States from 1990-96 seemingly illustrate this process at work (see Figure 4). Finally, we include a dummy variable for status as a former colony. We believe that such status will be positively associated with national attachment, as the process of gaining independence and establishing or re-

establishing indigenous rule typically produces excitement and enthusiasm, perhaps because citizens are all the more grateful for what they had once lost.

Individual-Level Hypotheses

In addition to these country-level indicators, we consider a variety of individual-level variables. The first, our focus, is what we already described as "distinctiveness." The remaining individual-level hypotheses are as follows. These variables capture other demographic attributes of the individual, as well as his or her life circumstance and belief system:

- *Age*. National pride should be more prominent among older citizens, who, simply by virtue of their longer residence in the country, may have developed more attachment to it.
- *Life satisfaction*. Those more satisfied with their life are likely to be more attached to their country. Pride is a natural response when you feel that your country is providing you with an environment that contributes to your happiness. This measure draws on the question "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" and is a ten-point scale.
- *Economic insecurity*. This hypothesis is similar: those who face economic woes may be less attached to their country, simply because it may be difficult to feel strongly attached to a country in which you struggle to succeed. Bollen and Medrano (1998) find evidence of this in their study of national attachment in Spain. We operationalize this concept in two ways—with a subjective measure of financial satisfaction ("How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?") as well as with personal income. To deal with incomparable categories across countries, our measure of personal income is the decile within which a person's income fell within that person's country.
- *Education*. Education is typically associated with a weaker orientation towards traditional values. Thus we expect educated people to be less proud of their country (see Bollen and Medrano 1998 for evidence of this effect). Because of incomparable categories across countries, we also really on a measure based on deciles.[7]
- *Cosmopolitanism*. This is a related, but distinct, concept that captures whether one's outlook is oriented towards worldliness or towards a more insular parochialism. Cosmopolitans are more likely to know about and appreciate other countries for their unique qualities and achievements. These are, in other words, people who not only refer to "french fries" instead of "freedom fries," but might even call them *frites*. Cosmopolitans should thus manifest less pride in their country. In the WVS, we operationalize this concept using a measure of postmaterialism (see Inglehart 1997). In particular, this measure counts the number of "postmaterial concerns" (from 0 to 5).
- *Gender*. Though we will include this variable as a control, we do not have any *a priori* hypothesis about its effect.

We also test for an individual-level interaction between distinctiveness and life satisfaction. Distinctive citizens who are more satisfied should manifest a stronger sense of national attachment. This is to say, there should be less of a "gap" in attachment between the distinctive and core populations at high levels of satisfaction.

Cross-level Interactions

Our analysis focuses on a set of interactions between distinctiveness and several country-level attributes to determine which attributes exacerbate or mitigate the gap between distinctive and core populations. First, as discussed above, we hypothesize that the negative effect of distinctiveness on attachment can be mitigated by certain kinds of political institutions. We interact distinctiveness and the overall measure of a country's level of democracy. We also interact distinctiveness with two more specific measures of institutions. The first is a dummy variable that captures whether a country is a "majoritarian" or "consensual" democracy, and the second is a dummy variable that captures whether a country has a federal system. For both measures, we draw on and extend Lijphart's (1999) categorization of countries. In all cases, we expect that the effect of distinctiveness on attachment will be smaller in countries with democratic, majoritarian, and federal systems.

Second, we expect that the effect of distinctiveness will vary depending on national demography. More specifically, distinctive populations should be less attached to the nation-state in countries where the distinctive population is more sizable. To measure this attribute we use the size of the distinctive population in the WVS samples (see Table 1 and Figure 4).

Third, the effect of distinctiveness will depend on economic development. Lower levels of economic development will, we believe, tend to widen the gap between the distinctive and core populations, in particular because it is likely that the distinctive population will be especially economically disadvantaged. We interact distinctiveness with per capita Gross Domestic Product as one test of this hypothesis. We also believe that the degree of economic inequality in a society may be relevant as a conditioning factor—with distinctive populations less attached in societies with high levels of inequality. Here we draw on the measure described above and presented in Figure 4.

Results

We estimated a series of models using OLS, calculating robust standard errors that take into account the clustered nature of the data.[8] These models are presented in **Error! Reference source not found.**. The first model includes only the individual-level variables, most of which work in the hypothesized direction. Distinctiveness is significant and negative; *ceteris paribus*, distinctive populations have lower levels of national attachment than core populations. This finding confirms our central hypothesis as well as other extant literature (*e.g.*, Silver and Dowley 2000). However, distinctiveness' effect is mitigated at least somewhat by life satisfaction. That interaction term is significant and positive, meaning that increasing satisfaction tends to close the gap between distinctive and core
populations. Other variables produce intuitive results: national attachment increases with age, financial satisfaction, and life satisfaction. It decreases with education, post-materialism, and, somewhat surprisingly, income. It may be that income tends to function more like education in that the well-off, like the well-educated, are less inclined towards traditional values like pride in country

Table 2. Multivariate Models of National Attachment

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Distinct	-0.418**	-0.433**	-0.377**	-0.427**	-0.448**	-0.115	-0.443**	-0.389**
	(0.128)	(0.105)	(0.118)	(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.074)
Distinct × Democracy			-0.01					
			(0.009)					
Distinct × Majoritarian				-0.043				
				(0.086)				
Distinct × Federal					0.121			
					(0.083)			
Distinct × Size of distinct						-0.905**		
						(0.262)		
Distinct × GDP							0.032	
							(0.025)	
Distinct × Inequality								0.020*
								(0.008)
Distinct × Life satisfaction	0.046**	0.037**	0.040**	0.035**	0.030**	0.026**	0.033**	0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Education	-0.014**	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.016**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income	-0.016**	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.008*	-0.007*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Financial satisfaction	0.015*	0.011**	0.011**	0.007	0.007*	0.011**	0.011**	0.010**
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Life satisfaction	0.038**	0.033**	0.032**	0.032**	0.034**	0.035**	0.033**	0.033**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Postmaterialism	-0.068**	-0.049**	-0.050**	-0.049**	-0.051**	-0.049**	-0.049**	-0.051**
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Age	0.002*	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender	0.008	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Former Axis power		-0.335*	-0.336*	-0.274	-0.299*	-0.318*	-0.330*	-0.337*
		(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.134)	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.143)
Postcommunist country		-0.271**	-0.275**	-0.402**	-0.410**	-0.281**	-0.270**	-0.270**
		(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.077)
GDP (log)		-0.083**	-0.083**	-0.084**	-0.091**	-0.087**	-0.090**	-0.079**
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Level of Democracy		0.010	0.010	-0.014	-0.013	0.009	0.010	0.007
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Former Colony		0.170*	0.171*	0.181**	0.173**	0.160*	0.169*	0.174**
		(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Majoritarian system				0.079				
				(0.061)				
Federal system					-0.03			
					(0.065)			
Size of Distinctive Pop.						0.199		
						(0.261)		
Income inequality								0.0004
								(0.007)
Constant	3.244**	3.252**	3.252**	3.463**	3.499**	3.217**	3.251**	3.264**
	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.107)
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13
N	74215	71775	71775	66436	66436	71775	71775	70560

*Table entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded 1-not at all proud to 4-very proud. *p<.05; **p<.01. Source: World Values Survey (1990-1 and 1995-7)*

Model 2 adds the country-level attributes. As hypothesized, national attachment is lower among the Axis powers and among post-communist countries, but higher in former colonies. It is not, however, related to democracy: the coefficient is not significant in this (or any) model. Economic development manifests a surprising *negative* relationship to attachment: *ceteris paribus*, the level of attachment declines among countries with a higher GDP per capita. Indeed, this finding is apparent in Table 1, as numerous developing countries manifest high levels of attachment—*e.g.*, Bangladesh (78% are "very proud") and Pakistan (85%). That democracy plays little role, and economic development an "opposite" role, implies that national attachment may not depend on "rational" calculations that involve quality of life. Countries that are poor and/or authoritarian still engender notable levels of attachment.

Models 3 through 8 include the various cross-level interactions. In Model 3, it is apparent that democracy does not condition the relationship between distinctiveness and attachment in any significant fashion. The same is true of majoritarianism in Model 4—though at least the coefficient is in the expected direction, suggesting that distinctive populations feel less attachment in majoritarian political systems.[9] Federalism's impact is also in the expected direction (see Model 5); its positive sign suggests that distinctive populations feel more attachment in federal systems. However, its effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p=.075$, one-tailed) and must be interpreted with caution. By contrast, the interaction between distinctiveness and the size of the distinctive population in Model 6 is quite large and statistically significant. That the main effect of distinctiveness is not significant, while the interaction term is significant and negative, suggests that distinctive populations are not significantly different than core populations in largely homogeneous countries. However, in countries with large distinctive populations, these distinctive populations manifest less attachment to the nation. This confirms the bivariate results in Figure 3.

Models 7 and 8 provide a somewhat contradictory set of findings about the interaction between distinctiveness and economic development. In Model 7, the interaction between distinctiveness and GDP is not significant, but it is in the expected direction: higher levels of development are associated with higher levels of attachment among the distinctive population. However, Model 8 presents the opposite result: the gap between distinctive and core actually shrinks in countries that have higher degrees of economic inequality. This result parallels that presented in Figure 4. We have no ready explanation for this finding as yet.

To illustrate the effects of several of these interactions, Figure 5 presents a series of graphs. Each graph captures how a particular conditioning variable influences the attachment of both the distinctive and core populations, as this variable is increased from its sample minimum to its sample maximum.[10] The graph for life satisfaction shows that the gap between the core and distinctive groups completely disappears as satisfaction increases. Similarly, the graph for the size of the distinctive population shows that this gap emerges most notably as that population grows more numerous. Finally, the graph for income inequality shows that distinctive populations are, for unknown reasons, more strongly attached in societies with a higher degree of inequality.

Figure 5. The Gap in National Attachment under Certain Conditions



Source: World Values Survey (1990-1 and 1995-7)

In sum, these models reveal that a number of individual- and country-level variables affect national attachment. National attachment depends upon historical experiences like communism, war guilt, and a colonial status. It depends on a person's socioeconomic status and value system. Our primary concern in this paper is how distinctiveness affects national attachment, and we find that distinctive populations do feel a weaker attachment to the state. However, this effect is somewhat heterogeneous, varying with the individual's satisfaction with

his or her life, with the size of the distinctive population in that individual's country, and, in an unexpected way, with the level of income inequality in the country. We tease out some implications below.

Conclusion

The gap between distinctive and core populations seems to reflect the difficulty of engendering common values and allegiances in multi-ethnic states. Of course, it must be noted that this gap is far from a chasm: the modal response among most distinctive populations is to express pride in their country. But nevertheless, if a goal of states is to inculcate an overarching allegiance to the nation-state in all citizens, clearly that goal has not been met. Our results suggest in part that attachment to the nation-state depends upon a general positive view of one's life circumstances, and more specifically that this sort of positive view can minimize differences in attachment between ethnicities, religions, and so on. To the extent that a group's life circumstances are not hindered by any of its "distinctive" features, it seems likely that this group will manifest a level of attachment comparable to that of the core population. Our results also suggest, unsurprisingly, that particular challenges confront ethnically heterogeneous states, since in those states the differences between distinctive and core populations are most pronounced. Though we do not offer any rigorous empirical evidence in this paper, the striking trends over time in states like South Africa, Latvia, and Estonia suggest that how governments incorporate and respond to distinctive populations is central. Clearly the end of apartheid had significant consequences for black South Africans' views of their country. Independence in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse has not brought similar comforts for Russians living in the Baltic States. In the future, we plan to pursue a more concerted inquiry into the institutional factors that affect national attachment, particularly within distinctive groups.

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Endnotes

[1] Empirical work in the American context has also examined the effects of national pride on such things as affirmative action, language policy, foreign policy, and vote choice (see Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley 1990; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz 1992; Citrin *et al*. 1994; Sears *et al*. 1999; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003).
[2] This exclusionary identity has led some to condemn national attachment outright (*e.g*., Gertsle 1997; Gomberg 1990; Kateb 2000) and to advocate substitutes such as cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum 1996). Others have sought to rehabilitate nationality (Miller 1995) and patriotism (Berns 2001), and to construct more acceptable "civic" or "liberal" forms of nationalism (Hollinger 1995, 1997; Sleeper 2000; Tamir 1993)—though see Pickus (2000) for a critique of these efforts.
[3] Political theorists, notably Kymlicka (1995), have formulated explicitly "multicultural" conceptions of citizenship to account for the aspirations of distinctive populations. A related phenomenon is the prevalence of dual or even multiple citizenship in many countries (see Renshon 2000).
[4] Anderson and Guillory (1997) similarly find that more consensual, as opposed to majoritarian, political institutions mitigate minority party members' dissatisfaction with the political system's functioning. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find that the performance of the political system, measured as its level of corruption, affects the satisfaction of minorities, such that the gap between majority and minority party members increases as corruption increases.
[5] It may be that institutional arrangements are at least somewhat endogenous. Most notably they may result from politics surrounding distinctive populations as much as they influence the attitudes of those populations. We do not take account of that possibility in the empirical analysis, but it deserves further consideration.
[6] These economic variables obviously vary over time, and it is probable that an individual evaluates his country over a period of years. For these variables, and other time-varying country-level variables, we use an average over the five years prior to the administration of the survey (*i.e*., 1985-1989 for the 1990 wave of the WVS; 1990-94 for the 1995 wave).
[7] For both income and education, we imputed missing values. To impute income, we drew on education and another measure of socioeconomic status. To impute education, we drew on income and this same measure of socioeconomic status.
[8] It is important to note that we do not have country-level data for every nation in the sample. In particular, we lack a measure of GDP for Taiwan, and measures of democracy for Bosnia. We also have no measure of majoritarianism or federalism for South Korea, China, and Nigeria. Respondents from these countries are therefore dropped in some specifications. In future versions, we will attempt to remedy missing data problems such as these. Another issue is how or whether to weight these data—both to ensure that each country sample is representative of that country's population, and to ensure that each country is weighted equally in the pooled sample (see the discussion of this issue in Silver and Dowley 2000). Our analysis was conducted in Stata 8.0, whose "regress" command does not allow the simultaneous application of weights and robust standard errors corrected for clustering. We chose to apply the robust standard errors instead of weights because failing to account for clustering grotesquely inflates the standard errors of the coefficients (see Steenbergen and Jones 2002 for a discussion of this issue). In future iterations, we also plan to test the robustness of our results using hierarchical linear modeling.
[9] Our dichotomous measure of majoritarianism is quite crude, and in the future we plan to construct a continuous measure that follows more closely Lijphart's (1999) operationalization.
[10] These graphs were calculated as follows. We simply calculated the sample means of attachment for both populations when each of the conditioning variables was at their minimum. We then calculated how attachment changes for each population as each of the conditioning variables increases, drawing on the results of the relevant model in Table 2 (for life satisfaction, Model 2; for the size of the distinctiveness population, Model 6; for economic inequality, Model 8). This is to say, sample means provide the "intercepts" of these lines, but the slope is a function of the models' coefficients.