UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

"Saving the World, One Neighborhood at a Time": The Role of Civil Gang Injunctions at Influencing Gang Behavior

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Criminology, Law and Society

by

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DEDICATION

To

my wife Molly and son Oscar

with their support anything is possible

"… and all the pieces matter"

Det. Lester Freamon
"The Wire, Episode 1.6"

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

"Saving the World, One Neighborhood at a Time":
The Role of Civil Gang Injunctions at Influencing Gang Behavior

By

Matthew Aaron Valasik

Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law and Society

University of California, Irvine, 2014

Professor George E. Tita, Chair

While violence across the United States has declined dramatically over the past two decades, gang-related crimes remain at unacceptably high rates, especially within the city of Los Angeles, America's gang capital. Gang-related crimes generally involve groups of individuals and have a strong territorial component, lending themselves to geographically targeted interventions. A strategy that has charmed law enforcement agencies with its ability to take advantage of both the social and spatial features of a gang is the civil gang injunction (CGI). Essentially, a CGI is a tailored restraining order against a gang, prohibiting its members from engaging in specific nuisance behaviors within a demarcated geographical region, termed a "safety-zone." Evaluations suggest that CGIs are effective at reducing serious crime and residents' fears; yet, CGIs remain a time-consuming and costly strategy with an unstudied mechanism for why they work. Do CGIs influence how gang members associate and where they hangout? And, more importantly, how do CGIs contribute to changes in gang violence?

Using the framework of routine activities theory, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between CGIs, gang members' patterns of association and lethal violence. To address these questions I utilize two unique datasets: homicide case files and field identification (FI) cards gathered from the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area of the Los Angeles Police

Department. My first chapter utilizes social network and spatial analyses to investigate the patterns of association among enjoined gang members at the individual- and group-level. I examine both the characteristics of enjoined gangs' social networks, ascertaining their influence in disrupting social ties, as well as examining the geographic characteristics of FIs to discern if enjoined gangs have changed the spatial patterns of their associations. My second chapter looks at both the homicide trends over the last decade and the disparities between non-gang and gang homicides, both enjoined and non-enjoined, to consider how CGIs influence the characteristics of violence. Lastly, in my third chapter I construct a turf-based spatial typology of gang homicide to investigate the impact that CGIs have on the mobility patterns of participants involved in gang-related homicides. If CGIs influence gangs' spatial patterns of association by discouraging members from congregating in public, then a CGI in theory shifts members' activity and travel patterns, suggesting that gang homicides involving enjoined gang members would experience a different mobility pattern than gang homicides involving only non-enjoined gang members.

Results from this dissertation indicate that CGIs are able to influence the patterns of association of individual gang members, particularly in the short-run. Conversely, at the group-level, enjoined gangs do not always respond as predicted by the rational of a CGI, with a gang's social network either being disrupted, with members' social ties losing connectedness, or a gang's social network converges, with members' social ties increasing in connectedness. It also appears that while CGIs are able to dislodge enjoined members from their gang's hangouts, a CGI actually constrains the overall mobility of enjoined gang members, reducing the likelihood that enjoined gang members are venturing outside of their gang's claimed turf. In relation to influencing the overall patterns of gang violence, the findings suggest that CGIs could be shifting

enjoined gang homicides away from the street and into less public spaces, along with involving fewer suspects and victims. Results also indicate that the presence of CGIs in Hollenbeck has impacted the mobility patterns of participants who are involved in a gang homicide. Specifically, an increase in internal gang homicides and a reduction in predatory gang homicides were observed in the data. These findings are consistent with earlier results indicating that the mobility of an enjoined gang member is restricted by the presence of a CGI. Overall, the goal of this dissertation is to provide both scholars and criminal justice professionals with a better understanding of CGIs, and ascertain if they are an appropriate strategy to disrupt a gang's patterns of association and diminish their opportunities to participate in violent acts.

CHAPTER 1: Context and Background

"Failure to appreciate the existence of gang cycles leads us to misunderstand the nature of gang phenomena"

--Malcolm Klein (1995b; p. 221)

THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF GANGS, VIOLENCE, AND CRIME

Gang prevalence remains a widespread phenomenon throughout the United States, as witnessed by an increase of gang activity in over 20 percent of the number of jurisdictions in the National Gang Youth Survey between 2002 and 2009 **(**Howell, Egley, Jr., Tita & Griffiths, 2011**)**. In contrast to this persistent gang activity is the continued decline of America's crime rate to a level not previously witnessed since the early1960s (Rosenfeld, 2011; Castaneda, 2011; Howell et al., 2011; Egley & Howell, 2013). Along with the decline in general crime patterns, gang-related[1] violence has also been defying the predictions of criminological theory. For instance, routine activities theory expects that as the number of motivated offenders increases (i.e., gang members), holding constant the prevalence of capable guardians and suitable targets, then criminal participation would also increase (Felson, 1987). Hirschi (1969) long ago predicted that as gang membership increases so do crime rates, because the prosocial bonds that gang members form to family, school and social institutions are weaker and unable to inhibit individuals from engaging in delinquent acts. Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) *A General Theory of Crime* suggests that as the population of individuals with low self-control (i.e., gang members) increases, so should the participation rate of risk-taking behaviors, including criminal activity. Yet, across many urban centers a divergent pattern of increased gang activity and lower rates of gang-related homicide exist (Howell et al., 2011; Egley & Howell, 2013).

While low crime rates in America prevail, post-2000 crime patterns are "largely specific to individual cities" (Wallman & Blumstein, 2006; p. 343), with gang-related violence being an

[1] Throughout this dissertation, gang-related will refer to an incident that involves a gang member as a participant.

important concern for many major urban centers. In particular, gang-related homicides still account for around 40 percent of the occurring homicides in cities with a population over 100,000 (Howell et al., 2011). A prime example of a city that is undergoing dramatic reductions in gang-related crime and overall violence, but experiencing a rise in gang membership is Los Angeles. Long considered to be "the gang capital of the nation" (Klein & Maxson, 2006; p.11), gang membership has increased by 6,000 individuals since 2005 expanding the total number of police-identified gang members in the city to 45,000 (Winton, 2005; Johnson, 2010)[2]. Los Angeles has a "tradition of homicide" (Monkkonen, 2003; 2005a; 2005b), yet, for the last four years the city has averaged less than 287 homicides per year. This shift could indicate that Los Angeles' epoch of violence witnessed in the early 1990s, which totaled1025 homicides in 1991, 1092 in 1992, and 1077 in 1993, is no longer representative. In fact, the crime rate in Los Angeles is the lowest it has been in 50 years; however, gang membership remains unabated (Rubin & Winton, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Lin, 2011; Rubin 2012). To illustrate this dramatic shift, Figure 1.1 displays the total number of gang-related Part-1 crimes (i.e., murder, aggravated assault, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft), aggregated to the reporting district (i.e., census tract) that occurred in the city of Los Angeles in 2000 and 2012.

[2] While scholars are generally skeptical of the reliability of officially generated gang membership counts, studies (Battin, Hill, Abbot, Catalano & Hawkins, 1998; Curry, 2000) have indicated a strong correlation between self-reported gang involvement and documented delinquency. Furthermore, according to Esbensen, Winfree, He and Taylor (2004), the best measure of identifying gang membership for both law enforcement and researchers is the process of self-nomination. Currently, LAPD uses this process during field interviews to identify gang membership in Los Angeles.



Figure 1.1: Total Number of Part-1 Gang Crimes by Reporting District in the City of Los Angeles in 2000 and 2012.

There are several observable trends when investigating the total number of gang-related Part-1 crimes in 2000 (Figure 1.1). First, the majority of gang-related crimes take place in South Central, the northern part of the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) South Bureau, and in the eastern and northern parts of Central Bureau. It is common to find reporting districts in these regions that exceed 50 gang-related crimes. Second, there appears to be several clusters of intermittent gang activity throughout parts of Valley Bureau. Third, West Bureau has some intermittent gang crime but at lower levels than Valley Bureau, and of the four bureaus is largely unscathed from serious gang-related crimes.

Jumping forward thirteen years to 2012, the map reveals a much different Los Angeles (Figure 1.1). Not surprising is the "stickiness" of gang-related crime where the majority of gang-related crimes remain in the northern part of South Bureau and in the eastern and northern parts of Central Bureau; however, these regions have experienced substantial declines in gang-related crimes. In fact, none of the reporting districts within these areas exceed 35 gang-related crimes. Valley Bureau continues to have intermittent gang-related crime while West Bureau has hardly any gang activity, being even lower than in 2000.

These patterns support the argument that a gang is a localized phenomenon that "has to be understood in its own terms and in its own 'backyard'" (White, 2011; p.203). While general trends can be observed over a city, employing a macro-level analysis can mask "sub-area and neighborhood cycles… that cancel each other out in the aggregate" (Klein, 1995b; p.223). This is particularly true for Los Angels with its "multiple nucleated character" of urban villages orbiting the city center (Maxson & Klein, 2002; p. 253). Following Maxson and Klein's (2002) recommendation of concentrating on a local jurisdiction in Los Angeles, allowing for greater generalizability to other municipalities, this dissertation investigates a source that could be

contributing to the changing nature of gang behavior in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area, the civil gang injunction (CGI).

There are several reasons that Hollenbeck is a suitable research site for this study. First, the area has a protracted history with intergenerational gangs. Second, social scientists (Gustafson, 1940; Ranker, 1956; Moore, 1978; 1991; Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, Grammich, Abrahamse & Greenwood, 2003; Vigil, 2007), journalists (Segal & Wilson, 2005; Fremon, 2008), and interventionists (Boyle, 2010) have studied gangs in Hollenbeck providing a rich historical narrative. Third, Hollenbeck is a geographically demarcated area of Los Angeles with distinct boundaries, cloistering gang members' interactions with outsiders (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010). Fourth, gang membership in the Division has continued to increase over the last two decades just like the city of Los Angeles (Det. Carey Ricard, personal communication, October 20, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Fifth, the Division has generally mirrored the overall trends in violence and gang-related crime witnessed by the city, as observed in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, particularly over the last 20 years. Finally, most importantly there are five active CGIs enjoining seven street gangs (LACA, 2014).



Figure 1.2: Part-1 Gang Crimes in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area and the City of Los Angeles from 2000 to 2012.

*Source: Los Angeles Police Department



Figure 1.3: Total Homicides in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area and the City of Los Angeles from 1964 to 2013.

*Source: Los Angeles Police Department

Previous research in Hollenbeck has shown that the quasi-institutional nature of gangs allows them to adapt and evolve, maintaining influence in their neighborhoods (Moore, 1991). Furthermore, turf oriented gangs, like those residing in Hollenbeck, fiercely defend their claimed territories, responding quickly to transgressions in order to maintain their reputation (Thrasher, 1927; Suttles, 1968; Klein & Maxson, 2006; Brantingham, Tita, Short & Reid 2012; Tita, Butts, Valasik, & Brantingham, 2012; Papachristos, Hureau, & Braga, 2013). Hollenbeck has been described as being overrun with gang rivalries and feuds in which "violence seems to be endemic" (Moore, 1991; p. 67; Segal & Wilson, 2005; Fremon, 2008). Yet, Hollenbeck has undergone a substantial reduction in both violence and serious crime, particularly gang-related

crimes. For instance, in 2011, Hollenbeck led the 21 LAPD Community Policing Areas in Part-1 crime reduction for the year- (Hollenbeck C-PAB, January 18, 2012). Figure 1.2 illustrates the reduction in gang-related crimes over the last 13 years, with a notable decrease beginning in 2007 and continuing through 2012.

The pattern for lethal violence has also followed a similar downward trend. Figure 1.3 displays the homicide patterns since 1964 in Los Angeles and Hollenbeck. After the significant decline from 1992 to 1997, more variation develops in the pattern; yet, the overall trend for the last 16 years is a drop in lethal violence. Presently, homicides are at a level not observed in Hollenbeck since 1973. Over the last five years, the Division has averaged fewer than twenty homicides a year.

Hollenbeck's drop in violence and gang-related crime begs the question of whether the role of gangs in this area (and elsewhere in Los Angeles) has fundamentally changed. This dissertation suggests that the nature of gangs in Hollenbeck has changed in recent years as a result of the introduction of CGIs into the region, influencing the routine activities of gangs and their members' patterns of association, thereby affecting the structure and characteristics of gang-related violence. For instance, following the final CGI in 2007 the rate at which homicides involving enjoined gang members declined was faster than either homicides involving non-enjoined gang members or individuals not affiliated with a gang.

THE PRAXIS OF CGIs

Over the last 30 years, gangs have proliferated throughout the United States. Previous literature has documented the difficulty law enforcement has had at eradicating gangs. In response, police agencies have focused their efforts on suppressing gang activity (Short, 2002; Klein & Maxson, 2006; Egley Jr., Howell & Moore, 2010; Krohn & Thornberry, 2011). As a

result of this rapid spread and growth of gangs across the nation, law enforcement agencies adopted specialized practices and strategies to combat this upsurge of gang violence and crime (Clear, 2003; Katz & Webb, 2006). In particular, California with its extensive history of street gangs is considered to have the most comprehensive gang problem in the nation (Klein & Maxson, 2006). Consequently, the state has also been a leader in the law-making campaign against street gangs, employing two distinct tactics: enactment of state laws, such as the STEP act of 1988 which allows for the felony prosecution of any individual having knowledge of a gang member's engagement in criminal activity, participating in a "criminal street gang," or assisting the criminal actions of other gang members, and the "the passage by cities of ordinances that declared street gangs to be public nuisances and their members subject to civil injunctions" (Geis, 2002 p.262). The latter strategy, enjoining a gang with a CGI, is a favored tactic among law enforcement agencies due to its more targeted and discretionary response in combating gang activity. As a result, CGIs have become one of the most popular anti-gang strategies being employed across the nation within the last decade (Rosen & Venkatesh, 2007; O'Deane, 2012).

California has fully embraced the anti-gang strategy of CGIs. However, the extensive use of CGIs is concentrated in only 16 of California's 58 counties, specifically Los Angeles County, which has 80 CGIs filed. In particular, the city of Los Angeles has become the vanguard of this strategy. In mid-2003 there were a total of 17 CGIs in the city. Today that number has increased by 171 percent to 46 CGIs targeting 78 gangs, accounting for 38 percent of the injunctions in the state (LACA, 2014).

Essentially a CGI is a tailored, legal restraining order against a gang, prohibiting its members from participating in nuisance behaviors within a defined geographical region, termed

a “safety-zone.” CGI proscriptions include both illegal behaviors (e.g., possessing a controlled substance) and legal behaviors (e.g., congregating with fellow gang members in public). The proscriptions contained in a CGI are:

- Associating with known gang members in public;
- Confronting, harassing, threatening, intimidating, or assaulting a known victim of or witness to gang activity;
- Possessing or remaining in the presence of an individual possessing ammunition, guns, or weapons in a public place;
- Possessing or remaining in the presence of an individual possessing any controlled substance of narcotic paraphernalia;
- Loitering on private property without the written consent of the property owner;
- Possessing graffiti tools or defacing either public or private property;
- Violating a court-defined curfew (usually at 10pm);
- Displaying gang hand signs or wearing gang affiliated colors.

The principal goal of these proscriptions is to disrupt the routine activities of gang members, altering their behavior, impeding their ability to associate with one another, thereby inhibiting gang cohesiveness and reducing a gang’s ability to promote a public reputation, disseminate information, recruit additional members, and maintain a turf (Thomas, Riordan & Shiner, 2009).

Obtaining a CGI consists of two stages: acquisition and implementation (Allan, 2004). The process of procuring the CGI from the court takes place in the acquisition phase. There are three types of injunction orders that can be sought out in the acquisition phase. A temporary restraining order is used as an emergency remedy to relieve a neighborhood from impending harm. A preliminary CGI is a provisional court order during the litigation stage of the lawsuit, at which time the prosecution provides evidence of a gang’s pattern of nuisance activity and allows defendants (i.e., gang members) the ability to oppose the CGI. If the defendants do not file a brief in response to the CGI then it becomes permanent (Whitbred & Mazza, 1999). Lastly, a permanent CGI is the final decree by the court and remains in effect indefinitely unless a counter

lawsuit overturns the decision (Fields, 2013; Flores, 2013). The enforcement and evaluation of a CGI's effectiveness transpires in the implementation phase (Maxson & Allen, 1997). For more detail see Allan (2004).

Prohibiting specific nuisance behaviors may seem straightforward, however, CGIs are innovative and novel in two ways. First, a CGI sues the gang as an unincorporated criminal corporation, not requiring any one individual to be named in the lawsuit. Since, the gang does not have a registered address, as long as one individual from the gang is notified then the court considers the entire gang to have been notified (Allan, 2004; Thomas et al., 2009; McDougal, 2011). Second, CGIs are a hybridization of both civil and criminal law. That is, the lawsuit against the gang occurs in civil court, yet there are criminal sanctions for violating the provisions in a CGI. This flexibility allows city/district/state attorneys the ability to prosecute violations as a misdemeanor in either a civil or criminal court. While the penalties dispensed by a criminal court are more severe, the civil court is more expeditious and does not require legal representation for the defendant, has a lower burden of proof, and lacks the constitutional rigor of a criminal trial (Geis, 2002; Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane, 2003; Davis, 2006).

Concerns have arisen that individuals' civil rights are being infringed upon with the proscribed legal violations of a CGI. Most notably, prohibiting gang members from associating together in public, which undermines an individual's protection of freedom of assembly under the first amendment of the Constitution (ACLU, 1997; Stewart, 1998; Beckett & Herbert, 2010). There has been apprehensiveness on the indefinite nature of a CGI and the criminal justice system's inadequacy of removing gang members from the CGI who desist from enjoined gangs (Crawford, 2009; Lopez-Aguado, 2013). Scholars also caution that legal hybridity, such as CGIs, increase the discretion of law enforcement and inflate the criminal justice system by ensnaring

noncriminal actors (Beckett & Herbert, 2010). Nonetheless, the allure of CGIs or similar dispersal orders does not appear to be abating as a viable anti-gang strategy (Palomo, 2002; Walsh, 2002; 2003; Rossi, 2005; Barajas, 2007; Harling, 2008; Crawford 2009; Aldridge, Ralphs & Median, 2011; Branson-Potts, 2013). Even more disconcerting is the evidence routinely quoted to defend the use of CGIs, which is anecdotal (LAPD, 2011). For instance, Los Angeles City Attorney Jim McDougal's proof that CGIs work is "because they [gang members] protest it [a CGI]" (McDougal, 2011).

THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR A CGI

Previous research has suggested several theoretical underpinnings from the criminological and social-psychological literature that could inform how social processes unfold with the introduction of a CGI into a community, including social disorganization theory (Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2003; 2005), deterrence theory (Grogger, 2002), and social identity theory (Hennigan, & Sloane, 2013). The two most prominent theories used by criminal justice actors to justify the continuing implementation and utilization of CGIs are deterrence theory and broken-windows theory (LACA, 1995; LACDA, 1996; Allen, 2004; Thomas et al., 2009).

Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory argues that individuals who plan on engaging in a crime are able to account for the legal sanctions of the act and the probability of being apprehended prior to the event occurring. The criminal act transpires only if the benefits of the crime outweigh the punishment, however, this calculation is influenced by an individual's knowledge of the criminal justice system (Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1985; Paternoster, 1987; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Pogarsky, 2002). In order to encourage compliance with criminal laws, these sanctions should have reasonable penalties that are administered in an equitable manner. Thus, in

order to inhibit an individual's behavior, a sanction needs to be composed of three dimensions; severity, certainty, and celerity.

The concept of severity can be understood as providing an appropriate sanction for a criminal act. That is, the punishment must "fit the crime." This concept is comparable to the idea of retribution (i.e., an eye for an eye) described in the Code of Hammurabi, the Torah, and the Bible's Old Testament. Thus, the penalty for a criminal act must be proportional to the harm caused to society by the crime. If the punishment is not serious enough, it will not deter the crime. If the sanction is too severe, then the penalty is unjust. Certainty refers to the probability that an individual will be apprehended and punished for a crime. In order to dissuade individuals from the commission of a criminal act, the sanction must be definite. Beccaria (1972 [1764]) and Bentham (2010 [1789]) both stressed that certainty is a more effective dimension at deterring crime than severity. The swiftness in which a criminal sanction is applied is the celerity of punishment. A punishment that is immediately administered after the perpetration of a crime is more effective because the individual will directly associate the punishment with the crime. As the time interval increases from the commission of the crime to the sanctioning, the deterring effect is reduced (Beccaria, 1972 [1764]).

If any one of these aspects is lacking from the punishment, then the effect of deterrence is substantially reduced and requires the other dimensions to compensate. For instance, if the certainty of punishment decreases, then the severity and celerity must increase to maintain the deterrent effect. If the celerity of punishment is also unable to be modified, leaving only the severity of punishment to be adjusted, then the acuteness of the sanction must be great. If the sanction does not have certainty, celerity, and severity, then individuals are unable to rationally calculate the pain to be experienced from the crime and will be less likely to restrain themselves

from carrying out the act.[3]

Deterrence theory is generally operationalized as either specific or general. Specific deterrence refers to the idea that apprehended and punished offenders will refrain from future recidivism if they are definitely arrested and severely sanctioned. General deterrence refers to the criminal justice system's ability to punish offenders, serving as an example to the public who has not yet engaged in criminality, by discouraging future wrongdoing.

Not surprisingly, Maxson and Allen (1997) directly observe that criminal justice actors use the rationale of deterrence theory in describing the function of CGIs. The three components of deterrence theory are manipulated by CGIs. Giving the enjoined gang and its membership notice, thereby indicating that law enforcement is targeting them with a CGI, impacts the certainty (Braga, Weisburd, Mazerolle, Spelman, & Gajewoski, 1999). Also, violating any of a CGI's proscriptions will result in a sanction. The use of the civil court system expedites the sanctioning process, decreasing the time interval between the criminal act and punishment, affecting celerity. Finally, the severity of punishment is controlled through the selected court in prosecuting a CGI violation. If tried in civil court, the maximum penalty of $1000 fine and five days in jail is a possible outcome. However, prosecuting CGI violations in criminal court can ramp these sanctions up, resulting in a maximum penalty of $1000 fine and up to six months in county jail (Whitmer & Ancker, 1996).

CGIs also utilize both aspects of deterrence theory. Targeting the enjoined gang with sanctions that are directly imposed upon them employs specific deterrence. Neighboring non-

[3] It is important to remember that deterrence theory, according to Beccaria and Bentham, developed prior to American Democracy and was principally a reaction to the autocratic rulers in Europe. The modern day criminal justice system in America protects the rights of individuals and the due process of law. As a result the aspects of celerity and certainty become more ambiguous lacking an ability to be greatly modified, thereby diminishing their impact on inhibiting crime. Therefore it should not be a surprise that when the principal tenets of deterrence theory are tested in a country with a democratic political system the results are statistically weak at best.

enjoined gangs are not subject to these proscriptions, even if their claimed turf is within the CGI safety-zone. It is presumed that general deterrence is discouraging proximate gangs from engaging in nuisance behaviors, including criminal activities, that would make them the next enjoined gang. By harnessing both types of deterrence it is speculated that within a short time-period both the enjoined and adjacent non-enjoined gangs would become aware of the consequences for violating the CGI, through arrests and prosecutions (Maxson et al., 2003). This would result in gang members rationally calculating if participating in a proscribed act under the CGI is more important than the possible sanctions.

Broken-Windows Theory

While criminal justice actors generally use deterrence theory as a basis for many suppression based interventions (Klein, 1993), it is broken-windows theory that is the foundational criminological perspective that guides the utilization of CGIs. Guided by the social disorganization literature, Wilson and Kelling (1982) posit that in certain neighborhoods, if a broken window remains unrepaired, then it alerts others that this is the 'norm', and breaking more windows becomes more acceptable; in other words, a failure to enforce minor public offenses contributes to a downward spiral in which residents become less involved in the community and withdraw from public spaces, thereby allowing crime and vandalism to proliferate; and, moreover, that disorder is indirectly linked to serious crime.

Wilson and Kelling (1982) found that the level of disorder in a neighborhood provides a signal to motivated offenders that there is a lack of concern about the neighborhood. This indicates that there is a lack of social control, either formal (i.e., police officers) or informal (i.e., neighbors or kin), which reduces the chances for apprehension. Therefore, offenders will target disorderly neighborhoods to commit offenses because the costs of their illegal actions are greatly

reduced or eliminated.

The theory predicts that a sequence of events (i.e., windows breaking) will then ensue which facilitates the generation of serious crime and disorder. First, the accumulation of disorder in a neighborhood increases. Second, individuals will perceive that violent crime is increasing and become more fearful of their community. Third, the increased levels of fear will inhibit individuals from intervening in the neighborhood and limit their use of public space. Fourth, residential turnover will ensue, with individuals who are able to emigrate being replaced by individuals who are not attached to the neighborhood. Finally, serious crime (i.e., drug dealing, prostitution, robberies, and violent crimes) will inevitably increase (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

Broken-windows theory is primarily concerned with two-forms of disorder; physical and social. Physical disorder represents the level of maintenance for a neighborhood's physical environment. This includes the condition of buildings, property surrounding the building, and vacant lots. Social disorder is the pattern of social activities, or interactions, which is visible to the public and considered to be "deviant" or "inappropriate" to most individuals. This can include the presence of "non-violent people, nor, necessarily, criminal, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed" (Wilson & Kelling 1982; p.30). While not included on this list, gang members seem to be an implicitly similar group to those referenced by Wilson and Kelling. CGIs are consistent with this strategy by attempting to reduce a neighborhood's level of social disorder.

Gang research (Thrasher, 1927; Bursik & Grasmick, 1983) has established that gangs regularly develop in interstitial areas where neighborhoods are disadvantaged, have high residential instability, and lack the mechanisms needed to utilize informal social control. CGIs

are designed as a response to improve these criminogenic neighborhoods by bridging law enforcement and community residents through increased communication and by providing social support to target and remove problematic gangs from the community (Maxson et al., 2003; 2005). Disrupting these nuisance behaviors of the enjoined gang allow for the neighborhood to be reinvigorated, building up positive social capital for residents to reclaim their neighborhood.

The most (in)famous conceptual use of broken-windows theory was adopting an "order maintenance"/zero-tolerance policing strategy by New York Police Commissioner William Bratton in the early 1990s. While still controversial with ongoing debate on this policing tactic's effectiveness at preventing crime and increasing the discretion of law enforcement, Zimring (2007; 2011) argues that the adoption of this strategy, in conjunction with the growth in the police ranks, produced "the biggest crime prevention achievement in the recorded history of metropolitan policing" (Zimring, 2007; p.201). In 2002, Bratton migrated to Southern California to become the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department. During his seven years as Chief, he promoted the "order maintenance"/zero-tolerance policing strategy that succeeded in New York City, including the utilization of CGIs throughout the city of Los Angeles, which more than doubled during his appointment. Bratton attests that emphasizing order-restoration has been the foundation to his crime reduction strategies, in both New York and Los Angeles, which have reduced the number of homicides and overall crime within both cities during his tenure (Bratton & Kelling, 2006). Yet, critiques of broken-windows theory, such as Sampson and Cohen (1988), Harcourt (2001), and Taylor (2001), have found that aggressive policing of street offenses, thus removing disorder, is not significantly able to reduce the amount of crime. Even amongst LAPD officers, the effectiveness of Bratton's policy changes in Los Angeles remains questionable (Sgt. Duran (ret.), personal communication, April 9, 2011).

THE CGI MECHANISM AND ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY

Routine activities theory states that criminal opportunities occur when three elements converge in space and time 1) a motivated offender finding 2) a suitable target where 3) a capable guardian is absent. This suggests that by disrupting an individual's recurring day-to-day activity patterns the opportunities for crime will be curbed (Cohen & Felson, 1979). A CGI is designed with this intention by targeting members of a selected gang and making certain behaviors illegal in a geographically defined location. Thus, a CGI has the ability to influence each element of routine activities theory. The antisocial behaviors and nuisance activities of an enjoined gang member (i.e., a motivated offender) are constricted, increasing the effort and risk to engage in a criminal act. Restricting enjoined gang members from loitering in public diminishes both their suitability as a target from rivals as well as their ability to locate rival gangs, further reducing the overall availability of suitable targets. Finally, a CGI acts as a capable guardian by providing police a greater ability to regulate gang members' movements. Routine activities theory would predict that a CGI's ability to manipulate any of these factors (i.e., a motivated offender, a suitable target, and a capable guardian) disrupts the cohesiveness of a gang, thereby abating gang-related violence (Klein, 1995a; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013).

Routine Activities Theory and Patterns of Association

Ideally, if a CGI is influencing the gang, then its members will become disconnected from the group, diminishing the gang's ability to convey anti-social attitudes and norms to members. It is expected that by reducing the strength, frequency, and/or duration of enjoined gang members associating with each other, participation in criminal opportunities would be inhibited. In particular, there should be observable changes in the number of members loitering in public, where members are observed hanging-out, and the type of police encounter (pedestrian or traffic). For instance, because "associating" is a crucial violation of a CGI, I would predict an

increase in the number of smaller groups or unaccompanied gang members observed by law enforcement. Alternatively, the enforcement of the CGI curfew could increase the frequency of companionless gang members being stopped, providing a reason for law enforcement to interact with these individuals in an enjoined area.

Routine activities theory would also expect that the introduction of a CGI's spatially tailored safety-zone would influence where enjoined gang members are observed loitering. Prior observations (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1955; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1968; Moore, 1978; Sullivan, 1989; Klein, 1995a; Simon & Burns, 1999; Taniguchi, Ratcliffe, & Taylor 2011) attest that members of social peer groups, including gangs, "hang out" together at specific public locations. These sub-neighborhood areas, or set-spaces (Tita, Cohen & Engberg, 2005), are the "group's life space" (Klein, 1995a, p. 79). In the absence of a CGI, gang members should be primarily observed around their gang's set-spaces. Yet, once a CGI is introduced, gang members are no longer allowed to loiter in public; therefore, it is likely that gang activity is spatially displaced away from the enjoined gang's known set-spaces.

Routine Activities Theory and the Characteristics of Gang Violence

Altering a gang's patterns of association suggests that a CGI is also able to impact an enjoined gang member's suitability as a target or his motivation to offend. Thus, removing enjoined gang members from public should diminish the likelihood that an enjoined gang is able to be attacked by a rival gang, impacting the distinguishing characteristics of these violent events. For instance, if the enactment of a CGI eliminates large groups of gang members congregating in public, then there are fewer potential rival gangs or "suitable targets" available for an offender. Furthermore, enjoined gang members would no longer be loitering in open public spaces (e.g., a street corner, park, recreation centers, etc.), instead shifting their activity

patterns to be near private residences or in locations away from the purview of law enforcement. Routine activities theory would predict that these more cloistered areas increase the effort, risk, and difficulty for a motivated offender to attack an enjoined gang member, decreasing the likelihood that enjoined gang members would be involved in typical displays of public gang violence (e.g., a drive-by). Instead an attack on enjoined gang members would require an offender to approach their target covertly, most likely alone and on foot (Felson & Boba, 2010).

Routine Activities Theory and the Spatial Mobility of Gang Violence

IF CGIs alter gang members' activity patterns (e.g., where they associate), it would be anticipated that the mobility patterns of the participants, both suspect and victim, involved in a gang homicide will be influenced. Prior to the presence of a CGI, it would be expected that gang members' patterns of association are unaffected, thereby producing a pattern consistent with previous research (Tita & Griffiths, 2005). Routine activities theory suggests that the presence of a CGI would shift the spatial typology of gang homicide's distribution.

Due to the fact that enjoined gang members are not allowed to loiter together in public, there should be less activity of motivated offenders in a CGI safety-zone. By shifting the patterns of association to gathering in either a semi-public or private setting, enjoined gang members become less visible and more difficult to attack, thereby reducing the likelihood that motivated offenders will enter into the area and find a suitable target. Thus, enjoined gang members would be less likely to engage in violence, either initiating an attack (i.e., a predatory event) or defending themselves from an attack (i.e., a intrusion event), influencing the spatial type of gang homicide witnessed.

Inhibiting enjoined gang members from loitering in public, displacing the group's socializing into either semi-public or private settings, makes "missions" by rivals to attack an

enjoined gang within their claimed turf more challenging. The absence of a gang's presence in their known set-space locations could force violent events to become crimes of opportunity. By disrupting gang members' routine activities, offenders may be unable to locate the intended victim and will end up postponing the violence until the victim publicly reemerges (Eck, 1995). When the offender finally does attack it could very likely take place at a neutral location (e.g., transit stop or outside of a business)**,** unclaimed by either of the participating gangs (i.e., a total mobility event).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Using the framework of routine activities theory, this dissertation investigates how the establishment and enforcement of CGIs intervene in a gang's routine activities, thereby influencing both nonviolent and violent patterns of behavior. To investigate the relationship of CGIs and gang activity, I will address three principal questions:

1. ***How do CGIs influence a gang's patterns of association?***
2. ***How do CGIs influence the characteristics of gang violence?***
3. ***Do CGIs impact the mobility patterns of participants involved in gang-related homicides?***

Chapter 2 addresses the first query investigating a CGI's relationship to the behavior patterns of gangs, their members and law enforcement through three sub-questions. First, how do CGIs influence individual gang members' (i.e., motivated offenders') routine activities, specifically their patterns of association? Second, how do CGIs impact an enjoined gang's overall patterns of association and the structure of the group's social network? Third, does a CGI's presence affect the enforcement patterns by police? The goal of this chapter is to provide a set of findings that are able to provide a foundation for future research investigating the relationship between CGIs and gang-related behavior.

Chapter 3 considers how the spatial implications of CGIs impact the characteristics of gang violence. I explore these distinctions over a ten year period following the establishment of the initial CGI in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. This chapter compares non-gang homicides and gang homicides (enjoined and non-enjoined) with respect to their incident attributes to ascertain if disparities remain between enjoined gang and non-gang homicide and if an enjoined gang homicide differs from a non-enjoined gang homicide.

Building upon the earlier sections, Chapter 4 examines how CGIs affect the mobility patterns of participants in gang-related violence. To address this final inquiry, I use three pieces of geographic data, location of the incident, the suspect's gang turf, and the victim's gang turf, to construct a spatial typology of gang homicide. After generating this typology, I compare the means of each spatial type before and after the introduction of CGIs into the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area to investigate the relationship CGIs have with the mobility patterns of gang members involved in a gang-related homicide.

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CGIs

Responding to the growing concern of gang-related crime and violence, CGIs were first utilized in California in 1980 to prohibit gang activity at known hangouts; however, they didn't garner attention until 1987 with the enjoinment of the Playboy Gangster Crips and the challenges by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU, 1997). Yet, in the last thirty years there remain only eight empirical studies that investigate the implementation and effectiveness of CGIs (ACLU, 1997; Maxson & Allen, 1997; Grogger, 2002; Allan 2004; LACCGJ, 2004; Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane, 2005; O'Deane & Morreale, 2011; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013). As such, "there is still much to be learned" about CGIs (Esbensen, 2013; p.1). I briefly discuss the focus and findings of each of these studies.

As a zealous opponent of CGIs, the ACLU conducted the first evaluation of CGIs to ascertain the effectiveness and repercussions of this anti-gang strategy. The focus of their evaluation was upon the CGI enjoining the Blythe Street gang on February 22, 1993. Located in the Van Nuys Community Policing Area of LAPD[4], at the time of this study the CGI safety-zone encapsulated two reporting districts, 925 and 924 and bisected four others, 917, 918, 936, and 1799, (People v. Blythe Street Gang, 2000). The study looked at the nineteen reporting districts including and surrounding the CGI safety-zone, with three of these reporting districts being located in LAPD's neighboring Devonshire Community Policing Area. The focal area of this study is reporting district 925, even though it only represents about half of the CGI's safety-zone, while reporting districts 924, 917, 918, 936, and 1799 are not considered to be "directly affected" by the CGI (ACLU, 1997). The data was collected for a six-year period, from 1991 through 1996; yet, the study only presents data twelve months prior to the CGI and from eighteen to twenty-three months after the establishment of the CGI.

The goal of the ACLU study was to examine the effectiveness of a CGI on Part-1 violent crimes (i.e., murder, aggravated assault, rape and robbery), calls for service and felony drug arrests to ascertain if any displacement effects resulted from the enactment of the CGI. The analysis is presented as a series of charts displaying the monthly totals of each outcome variable (i.e., violent crimes, calls for service and felony drug arrests) for each of the 19 reporting districts. No statistical analysis was completed; instead, the monthly trends for the outcome variables in each reporting district were discussed. The fact that the monthly totals vary dramatically makes a visual interpretation challenging at the very least (Maxson & Allen, 1997). Yet, the ACLU concluded that the Blythe Street CGI did not reduce the total number of violent

[4] Due to the restructuring of LAPD Community Policing Areas, the CGI is currently located in the Mission Community Policing Area of LAPD, just north of the present day Van Nuys Community Policing Area.

crimes in reporting district 925 following the CGI. On the other hand, calls for service increased while felony drug arrests were unaffected in the area. The ACLU also indicates that an increase in violent crime and drug trafficking occurred in proximate reporting districts indicating that crime displacement took place.

Scholars (Maxson et al., 2003; Allan, 2004; O'Deane, 2012) have raised concern over several methodological deficiencies encountered in this study, limiting its validity. First, by relying on crime statistics aggregated by month to the reporting district, the analysis is unable to account for the actual number of violent crimes, calls for service and felony drug arrests that actually transpire within the delineated CGI-safety-zone. Second, there are inconsistencies with the time periods used in the analysis. Both calls for service and felony drug arrests are measured monthly for 18 months, while violent crime fluctuates from 19 to 23 months. Third, competing hypotheses or spuriousness, which could explain variation in the data, are ignored. For instance, a closer inspection of the data reveals the possibility of a seasonality effect, with less violence in the winter and spring and increases going into summer. Another example is the overall increase in calls for service that the ACLU attributed to an increase in crime. Instead, it is possible that an increase in calls for service "may be explained by the opening of lines of communication between residents and police, rather than an increase in the frequency of crime" (Allan, 2004: p. 90). Fourth, the study lacks a control group that could indicate if any effects are exogenous of the CGI. Lastly, the study disregards reporting districts with findings that are inconsistent with the conclusion that CGIs fail to inhibit serious crime.

Maxson and Allen (1997) evaluated the city of Inglewood's Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, a broad strategy targeting firearm violence, primarily amongst youth from local gangs in the Darby-Dixon neighborhood, lasting 18 months. While, the focal point of this initiative was

a CGI enjoining the Crenshaw Mafia Gangsters on December 17, 1996, it also included a separate six officer task force designated to enforce the CGI and an additional probation officer to process repeat offenders and facilitate arrests. Focusing on interviews with actors and some limited observations, the evaluation became retrospective, highlighting the problems encountered acquiring and implementing a CGI; as a result, the evaluation was delayed ten months after the initiation of the CGI and seven months after the start of field operations (Maxson & Allen, 1997). This study indicates a slight crime reduction in the first six months following the CGI, however, during the latter half of the evaluation period, crime substantially increased and remained stable at these higher levels (Maxson & Allen, 1997). The evaluation also discussed problematic elements during both the acquisition and implementation stages of the CGI. The problems that arose include: community residents' lack of cooperation to provide declarations, refusal by a judge to seal residents' declarations, difficulties acquiring evidence documenting the criminal activities of enjoined gang members by Inglewood Police Department and the Los Angeles County Probation Department due to the goals of the CGI being different than the broader initiative's task of removing firearms from the street, the gang unit of Inglewood Police Department's refusal to share gang intelligence in fear of jeopardizing relationships with criminal informants, the allocation of resources were not centered on the CGI but distributed to the larger program of removing guns from the street hampering a more targeted approach, and the inadequate enforcement of the CGI at its onset (Maxson & Allen, 1997; p. 27-28). The overall results of Maxson and Allen's (1997) study provided little evidence to support the notion that the initiative, including the CGI, provided any positive effects. However, another evaluation (Dunworth, 2000; p.14) of Inglewood's Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, produced contrary findings, indicating that the collaboration between law enforcement, probation, and the district

attorney was “particularly effective” at reducing gun crime during the initiative. These divergent findings provide mixed results for the overall effectiveness of Inglewood’s Youth Firearms Violence Initiative (Katz & Webb, 2006).

Grogger (2002) conducted the most carefully constructed evaluations investigating the ability of CGIs to effectively reduce crime, where he examined 14 CGIs that were enacted throughout Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1998, including the Blythe Street CGI. The 14 CGIs were distributed among several jurisdictions including the LAPD (7), the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (3), the Long Beach Police Department (2), and the Pasadena Police Department (2). The purpose of his study was twofold: 1) investigate whether CGIs reduce Part-1 violent crime; 2) ascertain if violence is displaced into adjacent areas, a critique raised by the ACLU (1997). To answer these questions, Grogger employs aggregated crime counts in the reporting district targeted by the CGI safety-zone along with adjacent reporting districts and a statistically matched area. The use of two separate control groups allows for both a direct comparison of the targeted reporting district to a comparable reporting district ascertaining the relationship between the CGI and violent crime, and permits the investigation to question how CGIs impact crime patterns in reporting districts proximate to the CGI safety-zone. The study uses quarterly and monthly data to examine the changes in crime 18 months before and after the enjoinment of a gang. Grogger’s (2002) findings indicate that violence significantly declined by five to ten percent in targeted reporting districts of a CGI, while property crime (i.e., arson, burglary, larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft) remained unaffected. There was also no indication that violence was displaced into adjacent reporting districts. Subsequent research using identical (LACCGJ, 2004) and less rigorous techniques (O’Deane & Morreale, 2011; O’Deane, 2012) has confirmed these results.

The Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury (2004) performed an audit of 14 CGIs in the city of Los Angeles to evaluate their effectiveness and to provide the public with an explanation of how a CGI functions. Of the fourteen CGIs evaluated only two, Blythe Street and Harpys, were included in Grogger's (2002) previous study. Using Part-1 and total crime data quarterly aggregated to the reporting district from 1990 to 2004, the study estimates the effects of a CGI at two, four, six, eight, ten, and twelve quarters following its establishment. Replicating the statistical methodology used by Grogger (2002), similar results were produced. That is, there was an overall significant reduction of 5.5 to 8.8 percent in Part-1 crimes and a 3.4 to 7.1 percent reduction in total crimes during the first year the CGI is active. While crime continued to decline in the long-term, the effects were not statistically significant. Also, there does not appear to be any crime displacement, with adjacent reporting districts refraining from having statistically significant increases in crime (LACCGJ, 2004).

Critiquing the use of comparison reporting districts that were adjacent or proximate to the CGI safety-zone by previous studies (Grogger, 2002; LACCGJ, 2004; Maxson et al., 2003; 2005), O'Deane and Morreale (2011) examine 25 enjoined gangs and instead compare them to a matched control gang in an area experiencing gang-related problems similar to the area of the enjoined gang. O'Deane and Morreale (2011) were also concerned about law enforcement resources directed at the control gang areas being similar to the resources directed at a CGI safety-zone. The matching of the enjoined gang to a control group was based upon the characteristics of gang ethnicity, size, proximity, territory, and membership size. O'Deane and Morreale (2011) also used crime statistic data aggregated to the reporting district to examine changes in calls for service of Part-1 violent crimes, calls for service of Part-2 crimes (e.g., simple assault, fraud, stolen propriety, gambling, drug abuse, vandalism, disorderly conduct,

curfew violation, drunkenness, etc.) and total calls for service. The study compared the changes in each outcome variable in both the enjoined gang's and control group's claimed area one year before and after the placement of a CGI. The findings indicate that calls for service of Part-1 violent crimes significantly decreased in an enjoined gang's safety-zone by 11.6 percent, calls for service of Part-2 crimes declined 15.9 percent, and total calls for service were reduced by 14.1 percent after the CGI was introduced. Overall, this study indicates, "a decrease in calls means less gang violence and improved quality of life in the areas in which gang injunctions are implemented" (O'Deane & Morreale, 2011; p.20).

Maxson and colleagues (2003; 2005) took a different approach in evaluating the effectiveness of CGIs by focusing solely on whether or not the enactment of a CGI changed local residents' perceptions and attitudes towards crime and their neighborhood. They administered a community assessment survey eighteen months prior to the CGI and again six months after that included questions pertaining to crime, disorder and quality of life issues in their community. Using three sets of analyses, the study compared residents' perceptions in the primary CGI safety-zone to "a highly disorder neighborhood with no discernible territorial gang" (Maxson et al., 2005; p.590); residents' perceptions in the primary CGI safety-zone and "a territorial gang area… where a gang injunction had been filed in 1997" (Maxson et al., 2005; p.589); and residents' perceptions in the secondary CGI safety-zone and a proximate area because "both had comparably lower social disorder before the injunction was filed" (Maxson et al., 2005; p.589). While the focus of this study was only a single CGI enjoining the Verdugo Flats gang on March 10, 2003 in the city of San Bernardino, it excelled at being able to examine both immediate outcomes (e.g., gang member visibility, presence of graffiti, intimidation by gang members, etc.) visible during the first six months following the CGI and looking at residents' long-term

perceptions of their neighborhood (e.g., informal social control, willingness to intervene, trust in police, etc.).

Maxson and colleagues (2005) discovered that in the primary CGI safety-zone a significant decline in residents' perceptions of gang members loitering in public, residents' experienced less intimidation by and were less fearful of gang members, and residents' overall fear of crime was reduced. Yet, there was "little evidence" that these immediate outcomes translated into longer-term attitudes (e.g., informal social control, social cohesion, collective efficacy, etc.) and that the neighborhood was improving for the better. Conversely, the secondary CGI safety-zone showed an increase in the visibility of gang members, an increase in resident's levels of anxiety, an increase in residents' perception of social disorder, an increase in property victimization, and residents' were less inclined to believe that local community members could band together to solve neighborhood problems. Maxson and colleagues (2005; p.597) feel that these latter findings indicate that the suppression activities of law enforcement "over-reached" to include a secondary CGI safety-zone that experienced less gang activity prior to the CGI. Specifically, the increased police presence in this secondary CGI safety-zone reinforced enjoined members' "defiant individualist" nature (Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991) to oppose law enforcement and encouraged the group to coalesce, increasing the gangs cohesiveness (Klein, 1995a; 1998). Overall, these findings suggest that CGIs are unable to influence long-term outcomes, instead are limited to impacting only immediate, short-run measures.

Allan (2004) provides the first study exploring the acquisition phase of the CGI process, specifically investigating two dimensions that are central to the problem-oriented policing aspect of CGIs, flexibility and community involvement. The concept of flexibility refers to a CGIs ability to be tailored to combat local gangs, accounting for the wide variation between each

group's anti-social behaviors and criminal activities (Thrasher, 1927), with variation existing in "the specific nuisance-related activities and peculiar circumstances of each targeted gang and neighborhood" (Allan, 2004; p. 97). While, mimicry often exists with successful legal innovations, reducing the likelihood of constitutional challenges, if a CGI lacks variability than it fails to address the unique circumstances of a local neighborhood.

The concept of community involvement revolves around the notion that a local community is part of the decision-making process of acquiring a CGI. The inclusion of neighborhood residents into the process allows for greater collaboration, encouraging and facilitating discourse, between law enforcement and the neighborhood. Community ownership is also crucial for the negatives of an intervention (i.e., inhibiting civil liberties) to be less objectionable (Allan, 2004).

This study uses a variety of data sources: a CGI's case file, a survey of prosecutors involved in each case, and newspaper articles covering CGIs from October 26, 1987 through June 30, 2000. Categorical data and contingency tables are used to identify potentially meaningful relationships between the variables in the dimensions of flexibility and community involvement. The findings indicate that sufficient evidence exists to indicate that CGIs are a flexible response to local gang problems, with the largest amount of variation existing in the identification of the type of crime problem and the requested relief of a CGI (Allen, 2004). On the other hand, community involvement in the decision-making process of acquiring a CGI was primarily absent. Prosecutors regularly stressed that the intention of a CGI is to aid the community regardless of where request is initiated. Yet, the lack of ownership by local residents inhibits support for CGIs and increases tensions with police (Branson-Potts, 2013).

Recently, Hennigan and Sloane (2013) investigated how the implementation of a CGI influences the social dynamics of gang behavior. By comparing gang members residing within a

CGI safety-zone to non-gang members in a control area, Hennigan and Sloane (2013) specifically examine if the strength of an individual's social identity to the gang mediates the impact of deterrence and social cohesion on an individual's propensity to engage in criminal activities and violence. Using a community survey, 416 individuals were interviewed who resided in neighborhoods located within three CGI safety-zones, two in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area and one in the Northeast Community Policing Area, and a control area, with a territorial gang present but without an active CGI. The survey was administered six to seventeen months after the establishment of the CGI.

Deterrence is measured by asking individuals a series of questions about the likelihood of being apprehend by the police within their neighborhood after committing various crimes on ten separate occasions. Crimes included shoplifting, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, graffiti writing, auto theft, breaking into a building, trespassing on private property, fighting, intimidating others, selling drugs, and seriously beating up someone. Two scales were formed, a general deterrence measure consisting of eleven crimes and a violence deterrence measure consisting of the three violent activities (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013; p. 20).

Drawing from earlier gang research (Klein & Crawford, 1976; Klein, 1971), general social cohesion is measured by the question: "In some groups, the members meet or get together frequently; but, in other groups, the members rarely meet or get together at all. Recently, how often do you meet or get together with members of your group?" Street cohesion is measured by the question: "When you are with members of <group> how often are you outside on the streets, in malls, in parks or in cars?" Hennigan and Sloane (2013; p. 20) designed these questions from earlier research indicating that less group cohesion is correlated with less criminal activity while greater cohesion produces more criminal activity (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965: Klein & Crawford,

1967; Decker, 1996).

A self-identity scale of collective self-esteem measures was adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992; see also Hennigan & Spanovic, 2012). The scale consists of a combination of four statements: “Overall (group) has very little to do with how I feel about myself; (group) is an important reflection of who I am; (group) is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am; and in general, belonging to (group) is an important part of my self-image” (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013; p. 21). These questions are used to gauge the degree of an individual’s identification with the group, and ascertain if a CGI weakens a gang member’s identification with the group, by strengthening a member’s self-identity (Hennigan & Spanovic, 2012).

Hennigan and Sloane's (2013) analysis consisted of three phases. First, they utilized structural equation modeling to investigate if the strength to a gang’s social identity mediates the influence that deterrence and social cohesion have on an individual’s self-reported criminal and violent activities. Next, they compared a sample of gang members between CGI safety-zones by policing division and then to non-gang members in the control area to ascertain if there were differences observed in deterrence, group cohesion, social identity, self-reported criminal activities and self-reported violence. Their final analysis uses officially reported gang-related violence to compare between the CGI safety-zones in Hollenbeck, the CGI safety-zone in Northeast, and the control area.

The results revealed by Hennigan and Sloane (2013) indicate that an individual’s commitment to the gang mediates the likelihood of engaging in crime and violence. Specifically, the more a member identifies with the gang the greater likelihood that an individual will engage in criminal activity and violence. In comparing between the CGI safety-zones and the control area, there was no evidence that a CGI was able to deter gang crime or violence. Results did

indicate that the “street cohesion” among gang members residing within the CGI safety-zone was statistically lower than gang members living in the control area. While enjoined gang members were less likely to loiter with fellow members on the street, there was no difference in overall patterns of group cohesion. This finding suggests that a CGI is able to inhibit gang members from hanging out in public but not in private. Specifically, that being enjoined with a CGI does not influence the overall cohesion of a gang, however, enjoined gang members are more likely to avoid congregating together in public and on the street.

The strength of an individual's social identity to the gang was lower for members residing within Hollenbeck’s CGI safety-zones than Northeast’s CGI safety-zone. Furthermore, there did not appear to be any difference in self-reported criminal activity and violence between the CGI safety-zones and the control area, but there was a significant decline in gang member criminal activity and violence in Hollenbeck’s CGI safety-zones when compared to Northeast's CGI safety-zone. This suggests that the implementation of the CGIs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area were better able to weaken the enjoined gang member’s attachment to the gang than in the Northeast Community Policing Area.

Hennigan and Sloane’s (2013) final analysis looks at the trends in gang-related violence reported to the LAPD two years before and after a CGI was established. The study shows a decline in gang-related violence within Hollenbeck’s CGI safety-zones following the enjoinment of a gang, while Northeast's CGI safety-zone has experienced an increase in gang-related violence. In comparison, gang-related violence in the city of Los Angeles remained relatively static during this four year time period. Taken together, these findings support the argument put forward by Hennigan and Sloane (2013) that how a CGI is implemented (i.e., being less suppressive, targeting individuals, and integrating additional social services) influences the

strength of an individual's social attachment to the gang, thereby mediating criminal activity and violence.

RESEARCH SITE: HOLLENBECK'S PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

Features of both the political and physical boundaries generate an environment in which the gang rivalries within Hollenbeck remain self-contained, maintaining a natural field site (Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, & Greenwood, 2003; 2005).[5] Understanding the geographic characteristics of a study site is essential to studying the nexus of gangs, violence and policing. The geography of an area, both natural and built, influences a gang's claimed territorial space either facilitating or impeding social interactions between street gangs (Grannis, 2009). These interactions either reify or inhibit the formation of inter-gang rivalries contributing to the structure of inter-gang violence. In order to understand gang violence in Hollenbeck, it is necessary to account for the spatial patterns of gangs, which directly contribute to the social patterning of these gangs (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010). Also, anti-gang interventions (i.e., CGIs, GRYD, and CLEAR)[6] used by the LAPD revolve around territorial control through enacting boundaries, restricting access, and regulating the movements of individuals (Herbert, 1997a; 1997b). The use of these strategies reinforces the need to consider the environment of Hollenbeck to better understand how the LAPD monitor and interact with gangs in the region.

The Hollenbeck Policing Area has a population of approximately 176, 505 people residing in a 15.2 square mile region just east of downtown Los Angeles (LAPD, 2010; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2010). As seen in Figure 1.4, Hollenbeck is the eastern most police

[5] These arguments appear to hold true based upon FI Cards collected in Hollenbeck by the LAPD in 2009, only three percent (38) of the 1193 gang members encountered by LAPD were from gangs located in the unincorporated part of East Los Angeles, Pasadena, or Alhambra.

[6] These stand for: Gang Reduction and Youth Development, and Community Law Enforcement and Recovery.



Figure 1.4: The Hollenbeck Policing Area within the Los Angeles Police Department's Four Bureaus and 21 Policing Areas.

division of the twenty-one policing areas monitored by LAPD in the city of Los Angeles, and is one of five divisions making up the Central Bureau.[7] Figure 1.5 shows where the eight neighborhoods are situated within Hollenbeck: Boyle Heights, El Sereno, Hermon, Hillside Village, Lincoln Heights, Montecito Heights, Monterey Hills, and University Hills (Pool, 2009).

The overwhelming majority (81 percent) of the population in Hollenbeck is Hispanic.[8] Overall, the division is in a disadvantaged area of Los Angeles where 30 percent of the population lives below the poverty line; the average per capita income is approximately $27,096; and educational attainment is a challenge with 35 percent of the population not having completed high school. There is also a substantial population (39 percent) of immigrants (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). Yet, solely focusing on the overall characteristics of the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area obscures the fact that four of these communities, Hermon, Monterey Hills, Hillside Village, and University Hills, have more gentrified populations, higher socioeconomic status and infrequent gang activity. For instance, in Hillside Village and University Hills there are gang's claiming turf but no gang hangouts/set-space. It is important to be aware of these disparities between communities when investigating gangs and strategies to reduce gang-related violence.

The physical terrain of Hollenbeck is distinct between the Northern and Southern parts of the division. This divide occurs both naturally and with the built environment, with the bisecting Interstate 10 Freeway and railway lines, carving out these two distinct sections. This physical and undeveloped terrain enables the street gangs to have natural buffers between their territories.

[7] The city of Los Angeles is broken into four policing bureaus: Central, South, Valley, and West. Each bureau is further broken down into community policing areas (a.k.a. divisions) that are divided up into reporting districts.

[8] Per the 2010 Census, the Hispanic population in Boyle Heights is 91 percent, in El Sereno it is 82 percent, in Hermon it is 55 percent, in Hillside Village it is 76 percent, in Lincoln Heights it is 65 percent, in Montecito Heights it is 73 percent, in Monterey Hills it is 26 percent, and in University Hills it is 62 percent.



Figure 1.5: The Neighborhoods of Hollenbeck and Surrounding Regions with Terrain.

The terrain also acts as a partition by separating the majority of the neighborhoods within Hollenbeck: El Sereno, Hermon, Hillside Village, Lincoln Heights, Montecito Heights, Monterey Hills, and University Hills.[9]

South of Interstate10 is the remaining neighborhood of Boyle Heights, which is more geographically uniform in comparison to the northern neighborhoods, with it's rolling hills and grid patterned streets throughout. Just over half of the 176,505 residents of Hollenbeck (52 percent) inhabit Boyle Heights. Interstate10 not only dissects two geographically distinct areas but also limits social interaction amongst the street gangs in the region. Previous research in Hollenbeck demonstrates that both the naturally occurring and built environments confine rivalries within these regions (Tita et al. 2003; Radil et al. 2010). Street gangs in the North generally do not cross below Interstate10 and the southern street gangs of Hollenbeck remain within the confines of Boyle Heights.[10] State Route 60 and Interstate 5 further divide Boyle Heights in the southern region, inherently limiting the social interaction of the four southernmost street gangs with other groups. Figure 1.6 illustrates how the built environment reduces the potential for rivalries.

Even though Hollenbeck is a component of the city of Los Angeles, the division's boundaries, while not being impenetrable, greatly sequester these neighborhoods from the activities of the adjacent communities. Tita and colleagues (2003) articulated that the combination of both physical barriers and political geographic boundaries partition Hollenbeck's neighborhoods, thus inhibiting a street gang's ability to interact with proximate areas. Figure 1.6 shows the cloistered reality of Hollenbeck within the city and, more broadly, East Los Angeles.

[9] An exception is just north of the 10 Freeway is a small section of the Boyle Heights Neighborhood, which is primarily occupied by USC Medical Center and the cloistered Ramona Gardens public housing complex.

[10] Big Hazard is an exception, which occupies the Ramona Gardens housing project just North of Interstate 10, who has rivals with street gangs in both the northern and southern regions of Hollenbeck.



Figure 1.6: The Territorial Boundaries and Rivalries of the 31 Active Street Gangs Residing in Hollenbeck.

The natural barrier of the Los Angeles River and an extensive railway yard form the western boundary of Hollenbeck. Eight bridges and three highways traverse this channel, allowing for limited movement between Hollenbeck and downtown Los Angeles (the Central Community Policing Area). Hollenbeck's boundary in the Northwest is composed of both State Route 110 and the Arroyo Seco canal. Again, contact with the adjacent neighborhoods in the Northeast Community Policing Area is diminished, even with nine bridges and one highway crossing both the highway and the waterway. While there are gangs spatially proximate to several gangs in Hollenbeck, the elements of this urban environment limit the interactions between groups impeding the formation of rivalries.[11] The southern boundary of Hollenbeck is adjacent to the city of Vernon, which has only 112 residents.[12] The highly industrial nature of Vernon, and lack of a populace, forms another wall that impedes gangs in Hollenbeck from establishing rivalries with other gangs to the South.

Hollenbeck is bordered to the northeast by the incorporated city of South Pasadena[13] and Alhambra[14] and to the East by the unincorporated area of Los Angeles County, referred to as East Los Angeles[15] (monitored by the Los Angeles County Sheriff). Even though Hollenbeck's eastern boundary remains osmotic, the street gangs that reside throughout these three adjacent areas do not maintain rivalries with any Hollenbeck gang. Radil, Flint, and Tita (2010) contend that there are two significant reasons why this dynamic remains static.

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[11] The one exception is Avenues 43, a self-contained clique affiliated with the larger gang The Avenues whose territory is primarily in the Northeast Community Policing Area. There is only one bridge within their turf that connects Avenues 43 to The Avenues, essentially making them self-sufficient.

[12] The population density of the City of Vernon is 21.7 people per square mile as of the 2010 Census.

[13] South Pasadena has a population of 25,619, with a population density of 7,496.4 people per square mile, and is composed primarily of Whites (54 percent) as of the 2010 Census.

[14] Alhambra has a population of 83,089, with of population density of 10,887.4 per square mile, and is primarily composed of Asians (53 percent) as of the 2010 Census.

[15] East Los Angeles has a population of 126,496, with a population density of 16,974 per square mile, and is primarily Hispanic (97 percent) as of the 2010 Census.

First, even though a physical barrier restricting movement between Hollenbeck and either South Pasadena, Alhambra, or East Los Angeles is absent, different public school districts service each area. Since juveniles are less mobile than adults, with many relying on walking to travel to school, they tend to socialize and interact with others within "walking arenas." These walking arenas easily form in tertiary street networks, and have been shown to be a central component in contributing to a street gang's formation and maintaining the group's solidarity (Grannis, 2009). The school catchment areas reinforce the restrictive effects of the tertiary street networks and walking arenas, further reducing the potential for social interaction between youths of these adjacent neighborhoods (Grannis, 2009). Thus, the cognitive map of youths living within Hollenbeck is limited to those boundaries. Since juveniles do not routinely venture through adjacent communities, a "fog of war"[16] perception is created. Juveniles remain uninformed about the people, places and activities of communities adjacent to Hollenbeck.

Second, there remains a propinquity effect in which none of the gangs in South Pasadena, Alhambra, and East Los Angeles hold turf on the Hollenbeck border. Research has shown that the farther away a gang is from a rival the likelihood that they will get into conflict with each other diminishes (Tita et al., 2012). Therefore, the lack of proximate gangs, especially rivals, on Hollenbeck's eastern border greatly reduces the awareness, contact, and concern for gangs that claim turf outside of this division.

Understanding the geographic characteristics of a study site is essential when studying gang interventions (i.e., a CGI) that are specifically tailored to the local environment. The geography of an area, both natural and built, influences the gang's claimed territorial space and either facilitates or impedes social interactions amongst gang members (Grannis, 2009). The

[16] This concept is from von Clausewitz (1832), in which uncertainty exists around places not routinely experienced. An individual's perception of that place remains clouded, or unknown.

geography either reifies or inhibits the formation of rivalries, which in turn influences the levels of inter-gang violence. To understand gang violence and the strategies police use to combat gang violence in Hollenbeck, it is necessary to account for the spatiality of gangs, which directly contributes to the social patterning of these gangs (Radil et al., 2010).

A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF THE GANGS IN HOLLENBECK

Gang-like groups have existed in Los Angeles since the 1890s (Rubel, 1965). The *palomilla*, small cohorts of Mexican males who migrated on trails to and from Mexico through El Paso, Albuquerque, and Los Angeles (Heller, 1966; Moore, 1978; Vigil, 1988) were a precursor to the first "boy gangs" in Los Angeles (Bogardus, 1926). While Los Angeles did witness ethnic migrations across the nation, they never achieved the same scales as the repeated exodus of migrants from Mexico. This was a multi-generation tradition in which Mexicans immigrated to *barrios*[17] throughout Los Angeles. As expected, the evolution of gangs witnessed in Los Angeles varies somewhat from the patterns witnessed in the Eastern United States (Moore, Vigil & Garcia, 1983; Maxson & Klein, 2002). The progression of immigration patterns in Los Angeles differ from those experienced on the East Coast and the Midwest, with gangs not developing in a singular *zone of transition* (Park & Burgess, 1925), but instead forming in segregated communities throughout the city. Consistent with gang development patterns in the East Coast and Midwest, gangs in Los Angeles emerged due to territorial and not ethnic conflicts indicating that gang membership is typically based upon where an individual resides and not their ethnicity. The conflicts that erupt are the produced of a gang maintaining its dominance over a claimed spatial area or "turf" (Thrasher, 1927; Suttles, 1968; Adamson, 1998).

The emergence of modern day gangs in Hollenbeck began in the early 20th Century with

[17] European Americans would consider these to be the same as neighborhoods.

the ethnically mixed gangs of Lincoln Heights and Cuatro Flats, and the singularly Mexican gang, White Fence, existing by 1910 (Dunn, 2007). The sole ethnic background of White Fence made it an uncommon occurrence at the time. By 1940, the gangs of Clover, Eastlake, Happy Valley, Hazard, Rose Hills, and The Avenues were established with many of these groups participating in the "Happy Valley Gang Wars"[18] (Gustafson, 1940; Klein, 1966; 1968; Dunn, 2007; Vigil, 2007).

In the early 1940s, two historic events would change the face of Hispanic gangs in Los Angeles: the Sleepy Lagoon murder, and the Zoot Suit Riots. In both of these events, the print media portrayed Hispanic street gangs as the culprits, posing a clear and present danger to the larger white community. Instead of seeing gangs as the problem, many residents living in the barrios of East Los Angeles saw them as a blessing that defended their families, friends, and neighborhoods. The negative portrayal of Hispanic gangs only increased the cohesion of these barrios, further ostracizing Chicanos (Mexican-Americans) from the rest of the city, and solidifying many of the established gangs.

By 1953, 11 of the top 20 dangerous gangs in Los Angeles resided within barrios in Hollenbeck: The Avenues, Big Hazard, Clover, Cuatro Flats, Evergreen, Happy Valley, Lil Eastside, Primera Flats, Rose Hills, Varrio Nuevo Estrada, White Fence (Will, 1953a; 1953b; Ranker, 1957; Erlanger, 1976). The remarkable thing to note is that the turf claimed by each of these eleven gangs has remained relatively consistent over the decades, with at least part of the historic territory still being controlled by the same gang in present day. Going back 36 years, Figure 1.7 compares the territorial boundaries of the currently active street gangs in Hollenbeck with territorial boundaries claimed by Hollenbeck's gangs in 1978 (Streetgangs.com, 2014). Thirteen of the 14 gangs active in Hollenbeck in 1978 remain active today.

[18] While violence increased amongst youth, there were very few people fatally wounded.



Figure 1.7: The Territorial Boundaries of Hollenbeck's Gangs from 1978 to 2014.

Half of Hollenbeck's current gangs where established prior to 1960. Over the next 20 years, Hollenbeck experienced the intermittent emergence of several gangs.[19] In the mid 1980s, Hollenbeck underwent a mushrooming of gang activity, following the rise of African American street gangs, the explosion of illegal drug markets, and the escalation of violence in South Los Angeles (Fremon, 2008). Within a few years, the addition of 11 more emergent gangs[20] brought the total number of active gangs in Hollenbeck to over 30, with approximately 8,000 members (Fremon, 2008). This sudden increase in street gangs brought with it growing pains (i.e., increased crime and violence) and produced the highest concentration of gang activity in the city of Los Angeles through the early 1990s (Segal & Wilson, 2005; Fremon, 2008).

This increase in inter-gang violence is readily observed by the most recent gang to emerge in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area, Krazy Ass Mexicans (KAM) in the late 1980s. Originally a "tagging crew," they evolved into a street gang, forcefully taking over the turf of the previously established gangs Fickett Street, Sentinel Boys and Vicky's Town.[21] Beyond the expected territorial disputes among these three gangs, violence was directed by KAM at neighboring gangs in order to solidify respect and recognition. As a direct result of KAM's antagonism to the Boyle Heights community, the gang was enjoined on January 16, 2003. The first of seven gangs in Hollenbeck to have a CGI filed against them.

As the level of violence in the Hollenbeck Division has declined in the last decade, civilian participation with LAPD has increased. Residents acknowledge that public safety has improved and that LAPD has become responsive to the needs of the community, attenuating the fear of

[19] These include the gangs of Eastside 18th Street, El Sereno, ELA 13 Dukes, Highlands, Indiana Dukes, Metro 13, State Street, and Vicky's Town.

[20] These include the gangs of 8th Street, Breed Street, Clarence, Lowell, Michigan Criminal Force, Opal Street, Sentinel Boys, The Mob Crew (TMC), Tiny Boys, and the reemergence of a dormant Vicky's Town.

[21] Two of these gangs, Sentinel Boys and Vicky's Town, still exist as shells of their former selves, within KAM turf.

crime (August C-PAB, 2011). For instance, residents' involvement in public events and engagement with the police are at levels not previously seen in Hollenbeck. In July of 2011, the first Annual Hollenbeck Carnival, organized by the division's Senior Lead Officers (SLOs)[22], received an incredible turnout by residents. Hollenbeck Park, an 8.8-acre recreational area, was completely saturated with people and no negative incidents occurred, something that was previously thought to be impossible (July C-PAB, 2011).

FIELDWORK OVERVIEW

In order to develop an accurate frame of reference for the current situation and historic context of the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area, this study draws upon several sources. While the analysis performed in each chapter is based upon quantitative data, either provided by LAPD or manually gathered at the Hollenbeck police station, I engaged in additional fieldwork to gain a more detailed awareness of the current situation in Hollenbeck. Beginning in June 2010 and concluding in January 2013, fieldwork consisted of a variety of experiences, including ride-alongs, attending Community-Police Advisor Board (C-PAB) meetings, and many extensive conversations with both the homicide and gang detectives. The ride-alongs included two patrol sergeants[23] who supervise the activities of all patrol officers in Basic Cars[24]; three SLOs[25] who are liaisons to the community and primarily focus on areas within their assigned zone where citizens have voiced concerns; two community relations officers (CROs) who are tasked with

[22] These are the LAPD's community policing officers.

[23] During each watch there are typically three patrol sergeants supervising all of the patrol officers in the Basic Cars and the station's front desk. LAPD will not permit civilians to ride along with the patrol officers and are required to be accompanied by the patrol sergeants.

[24] The Basic Car Area is LAPD's equivalent to a "beat" which is patrolled by two officers in one car. Hollenbeck is composed of seven Basic Car Areas.

[25] This includes a Transient Detail SLO whose sole focus is monitoring the homeless population.

graffiti abatement; one Gang Impact Team (GIT) sergeant[26] who monitors all GIT officers on patrol; and one air support helicopter ride to better gauge the immensity of city of Los Angeles and how the puzzle pieces of the LAPD's Community Policing Areas interconnect. By utilizing an array of officers, in varying bureaucratic positions I developed a fuller awareness of the relationship between law enforcement and community residents in Hollenbeck. Ride-alongs varied in time, ranging from approximately five hours with SLOs, CROs, GIT, and air division to approximately eight hours with patrol sergeants (including roll call). I was also able accompany homicide detectives to the scene of a murder investigation.

I regularly attended monthly C-PAB meetings from April 2011 to August 2012 to better understand the current relationship between the community and the LAPD. Captain Ortega, the commanding officer of Hollenbeck, coordinated the C-PAB meetings with the board, which was composed of approximately ten civilians who reside throughout Hollenbeck's neighborhoods. The meetings usually showcase a guest speaker, along with a monthly crime report by the captain, area reports from the eight SLOs, and an overall review from the SLO Sergeant and concluded with a question and answer session from the neighborhood residents in attendance.

Throughout these encounters, I routinely jotted down notes in a notebook during each ride-along or meeting, recording key elements as they were discussed. Shortly after participating in an event, I would expand upon these notations filling in important details, fully developing my notes. These field notes generally served as supplemental materials for my overall analysis.

Having the opportunity to engage with a variety of LAPD officers, in varying bureaucratic positions, allowed for a multidimensional view of how the police in Hollenbeck envision the area they serve. These experiences also allowed for a visualization of the many different communities

[26] There are three GIT sergeants, each responsible for a part of Hollenbeck and monitoring the gangs in the area.

and residents who live throughout Hollenbeck's neighborhoods. While the information gathered from this fieldwork is not used as the primary data being examined in this dissertation, the experiences greatly informed the direction and questions examined in the subsequent chapters.

The data I analyze in this dissertation is collected from the records of Homicide Detectives, Gang Detectives, and the GIT. It consists of field identification (FI) cards, homicide case files, gang injunction lists, surveys completed by officers, and gang description files. Detailed descriptions of the specific data used for this project are provided within the subsequent chapters.

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CHAPTER 2: Civil Gang Injunction, What's Your Function?: Exploring the Relationship between Civil Gang Injunctions and Gang Member's Patterns of Association

"The (gang) problem is somewhat beyond our control. To cover the situation adequately in the Hollenbeck District would require four times the force now available."

> -- LAPD Captain Thomas Messiahs of Hollenbeck Division, before a Church & Police Conference including Deputy Chiefs Thad Brown and Joe Reed, on January 20, 1949 (Dunn, 2007; p. 110)

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the LAPD has utilized a variety of tactics to combat gangs, with civil gang injunctions (CGIs) being one of the more enduring strategies. In general, many of these strategies, including CGIs, follow a similar logic, which is consistent with routine activities theory. Altering gang members' everyday activity patterns, by providing more capable guardians or reducing the suitability of targets, decreases the likelihood that a criminal event will transpire.

As a violence reduction strategy, CGIs have appealed to law enforcement agencies by taking advantage of two defining features of gangs: gangs are groups of individuals who often commit crimes together and gangs have a strong territorial component. The popularity of CGIs has dramatically increased throughout the last decade, becoming one of the most prominent and popular anti-gang interventions (Rosen & Venkatesh, 2007; O'Deane, 2012). The rationale of CGIs is couched in terms of improving neighborhood solidarity and reducing gang crime and violence through inhibiting gang members from engaging in antisocial behaviors, which disrupt local neighborhoods (Thomas, Issacs and Riordan, 2009). In order to accomplish these goals, a CGI must be able to disrupt the patterns of public association among gang members altering their routine activities and impeding gang cohesiveness (Klein, 1995a; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013). Scholars have examined many important aspects of CGIs including how they impact levels of

serious crime (Grogger, 2002; O'Deane & Morreale, 2011), individual criminal activity and violence (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013), and how a CGI influences perceptions of gang member activity, victimization, and fear of crime (Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane, 2005). These studies, however, were not designed to measure how a CGI directly alters the patterns of association among members of an enjoined gang. The purpose of this chapter is to draw upon routine activities theory to determine whether I can measure any changes in patterns of public association among targeted gang members. To do this, I rely on unique data – field identification (FI) cards, which are used by police to document civilian-police interactions.

As noted above, CGIs rely on both social and spatial characteristics of gangs to disrupt the routine activities of its members. In this chapter, I examine how a CGI might impact an enjoined gang's patterns of association in geographic as well as social space. **"**The general populace wholeheartedly embraces the notion that social networks are key in understanding how the world works" (Papachristos, 2011; p. 101). Scholars have joined the conversation agreeing "that social networks matter." Yet, even with the field of criminology's rich theoretical background discussing network concepts (e.g., social learning, intergenerational closure, and social bonding), there remain a limited number of studies employing a social network analysis. Criminologists have generally utilized social network analysis to study the structure of peer influence (Haynie, 2001; Sarnecki, 2001; Weerman, 2011), organized crime groups (Natarajan, 2006; Varese, 2006; Morselli, 2009; Calderoni, 2011) and street gangs (Fleisher, 2002; 2005; McGloin, 2005; Papachristos, 2005; 2009; Radil, Flint & Tita, 2010; Tita & Radil, 2011; Hughes, 2013). These studies typically conceive of the network as the dependent variable, allowing for the visualization and statistical summarization of these complex groups (Papachristos, 2011). Applying social network analysis in this manner benefits the field of criminology by allowing

patterns to be deciphered through measuring the ties between groups of actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Following this precedent, I utilize social network analysis to investigate how CGIs may impact the structure and connectedness of a gang.

To explore the spatial implications of a CGI, locations of FIs are mapped to investigate if CGIs influence where enjoined gang members loiter. Utilizing social network and spatial analyses allows for a more complete understanding of the relationship between CGIs and a gang's observed patterns of association. Using FI cards allows me to capture changes in the routine activities of gangs, their members, and the police in response to the presence of a CGI.

I continue this chapter by discussing successful police intervention strategies that aim at reducing crime by altering the routine activities of victims and offenders. I then layout how CGIs are predicted to influence the patterns of association among gang members, the overall gang, and enforcement patterns. Next is a description of the data and methodology I used in this study. Specifically, I employ a unique data set of FI cards collected by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Utilizing chi-square tests of independence along with t-tests on interval data, I ascertain if there are observable changes in the characteristics of the FI event or the individual to indicate if a gang member's patterns of association significantly differ; 1) pre/post a CGI, and 2) between the enjoined and non-enjoined gang members during the same time period. This process is also utilized to discover if any observable changes occur in the enforcement patterns of police. Due to the small sample size of gangs for this study, seven enjoined and twenty-four non-enjoined gangs, the social network analyses are descriptive in nature. After presenting my findings, I discuss the general implications CGIs have on influencing gang member behavior, the general limitations of the data, policy implications and directions for future research.

POLICE INTERVENTIONS AND ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY

Two criminological theories that focus on explaining why a crime occurs in a particular spatial location are routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson & Boba, 2010) and crime pattern theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). These ecological theories concentrate on the interaction of an individual's activity patterns and the context of the criminal event to produce a criminal opportunity. Specifically, that the social, natural and built environments impact the activity patterns of individuals, converging motivated offenders with a suitable target lacking the protection of a capable guardian. Thus, routine activities theory suggests that using situation crime prevention strategies will disrupt an individual's recurring day-to-day activity patterns and the opportunities for crime will be curbed (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Clarke, 1997). Law enforcement agencies have embraced this notion of place-based criminology and have employed strategies designed to manipulate the activity patterns of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and capable guardians to reduce the likelihood that these three factors will converge in space and time to result in a criminal act.

There is a burgeoning amount of literature confirming that crime clusters in space and that often these clusters of "hot spots" are consistent over time (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler, Hoffer, Julian, 1989; Roneck & Maier, 1991; Ratcliffe, 2002; Short, D'Orsogna, Brantingham & Tita, 2009). As a result, crime-mapping and COMPSTAT have become tools utilized by law enforcement to identify and target these crime "hot spots" and allocate additional police resources (e.g., police patrols, foot beats) in these crime prone areas (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Braga, 2001; 2005; Weisburd & Lum, 2005; Anselin, Griffiths, & Tita, 2009; Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood, 2011). A routine activities perspective would suggest that by increasing the police presence in a neighborhood, a capable guardian is more likely to be present, thereby reducing the opportunities for motivated offenders to participate in a

criminal event.

Experimental research (Short, Bertozzi, & Brantingham, 2010; Short, Brantingham, Bertozzi, & Tita, 2010) has ascertained two types of criminal "hot spots" that can further explain these crime patterns; subcritical and supercritical. When police suppression is included in the model, each type of "hot spot" responds differently, with subcritical spots dissolving away while supercritical spots are moving into proximate spaces (Short, Bertozzi et al., 2010; p.478). Thus, "in the supercritical case, suppression of a hotspot seems to simply displace the spot to neighboring regions" (Short, Bertozzi et al., 2010; p.481). These findings do not rule out the possibility that tailored police suppression tactics may displace crime and disorder to neighborhoods adjacent to the targeted area. In fact, Short, Brantingham and colleagues (2010; p.5) suggest that the failure to observe crime displacement empirically in controlled experiments is because spatial displacement has only been looked for in the adjacent block catchment areas surrounding crime suppression sites, while the model's displacement moved approximately halfway between where the hot spots were being suppressed.

Investigating this phenomenon of crime displacement from "hot spot" policing, Weisburd, Wyckoff, Ready, Eck, Hinckle, & Gajewski (2006) discover that "hot spot" policing does not "move crime around the corner" but instead produces a "diffusion of benefits" in which these adjacent areas experience a reduction in criminal activity. Spatially tailored police interventions also have the ability to not only diffuse crime control benefits through adjacent spaces but also through interconnected social groups. Investigating the implementation and effectiveness of a gun intervention program in East Los Angeles, Tita and colleagues (2003) indicate that a more tailored response by law enforcement, focusing on problematic gangs, is also able to influence the behaviors of rival gangs throughout the region, reducing the overall amount of gang violence.

The LAPD has deployed an array of strategies, including CGIs, in attempts to alter the routine activities of gang members. For instance, Operation Cul de Sac (OCDS) was a situational crime prevention initiative that used traffic barriers, cement K-rails, at the end of streets to cordon off and create cul-de-sacs in neighborhoods with high levels of gang violence (Klein, 1998; Lasley, 1998). The central premise was that by restricting vehicle access would inhibit the opportunities for gang violence, particularly drive-by shootings. From a routine activities perspective, this tactic would disrupt a vehicle with a motivated offender from easily entering a gang neighborhood, reducing the suitability of targets within that new cul-de-sac, thereby diminishing criminal opportunities, specifically gang-related violence. Evaluations of this strategy indicate that the presence of these barriers reconfigured the routine activities of local gang members statistically reducing the number of homicides and assaults (Lasley, 1998). There was also a lack of displacement of gang violence to adjacent neighborhoods, suggesting that spatially tailored interventions which disrupt gang members' routine activities have the ability to reduce gang violence without shifting these crimes to an adjacent area. When the traffic barriers were removed from the area, restoring vehicular access, gang violence also returned.

Many studies have confirmed the ability of carefully constructed policing strategies to disrupt the routine activities of motivated offenders or suitable targets, thereby preventing criminal opportunities. The use of a problem-oriented policing strategy, identifying a specific crime or disorder problem in a particular area and tailoring an effective response (Goldstein, 1990), is able to produce benefits that diffuse beyond the targeted area, while not displacing criminal activities. Therefore, it would not be surprising if other spatially tailored interventions (e.g., a CGI) were able to produce similar outcomes.

APPLYING ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY TO EXAMINE THE INFLUENCE OF CGIs

From the perspective of routine activities theory, a CGI is designed with the intention of manipulating an enjoined gang member's (i.e., motivated offender/suitable target) recurring day-to-day activity patterns, thereby curbing opportunities for crime and violence. Thus, a CGI has the ability to influence each element of routine activities theory. The activity patterns and behaviors of an enjoined gang member (i.e., a motivated offender) are constricted, increasing the effort and risk to engage in a criminal act. Restricting enjoined gang members from congregating in public diminishes both their suitability as a target from rivals as well as their ability to locate rival gangs, further reducing the overall availability of suitable targets. Finally, a CGI acts as a capable guardian by providing law enforcement a greater ability to regulate the movements of gang members. According to routine activities theory, if a CGI is able to manipulate any of these factors (i.e., a motivated offender, a suitable target, and a capable guardian) then a gang's cohesiveness, and gang-related crime will be abated (Klein, 1995a; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013).

Ideally, if a CGI is having an impact on the gang, then its members will become disconnected from the group, attenuating the gang's ability to transmit anti-social attitudes and norms to its members. Therefore, one would expect that the reduction in the strength, frequency, and duration of associating among enjoined gang members would inhibit opportunities to engage in criminal activities. Previous research (Grogger, 2002; LACCGJ, 2004; O'Deane & Morreale, 2011) has indicated that CGIs are able to reduce overall violent crime by approximately five to ten percent in targeted areas (i.e., CGI safety-zones). These results are encouraging, insinuating that the solidarity of an enjoined gang is being disturbed by the CGI; however, the unit of analysis of these studies is not the gang but the reporting district (i.e., census tract). Since CGIs take advantage of both the social and spatial processes involved with gang member activity, the

enjoined gang should be the unit analyzed. Fleisher (2002; p. 200) describes gangs as "social networks composed of individual gang members" making it necessary to include both the individual gang member and the gang as a whole in the analysis to better understand the relationship between a CGI and the socializing practices of gang members. Extending the CGI literature, this chapter examines how CGIs influence the patterns of association of gang members at the individual-level, thereby producing observable changes in an enjoined gang's social network at the group-level.

For instance, if CGIs impact the routine activities of enjoined gang members, there should be significant changes witnessed in the number of members loitering in public, where they are observed hanging-out, and the type of encounter (pedestrian or traffic) with police. First, because "association" is a major violation of a CGI, I would expect an increase in the number of isolates (i.e., unaccompanied gang members) appearing in the FI data; or, at the very least, I would expect smaller groups to be observed hanging out together. An additional component of the CGI is a curfew that provides police officers probable cause to approach a suspected gang member in the evening. In the absence of a CGI, an officer might simply ignore a gang member (or for that matter a group of gang members) on the street, but with the curfew condition, the officer might be more likely to stop and complete an FI card. The result is more FI stops of enjoined gang members, but with more unaccompanied individuals, producing a network that would have fewer ties among members.

Second, I expect that the spatial patterns of where enjoined gang members are observed will be significantly affected by the introduction of a CGI. The geographically tailored safety-zone established by a CGI encapsulates a gang's demarcated territory, bounding the court ordered list of prohibited behaviors. A copious amount of research (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte,

1955; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1968; Moore, 1978; Sullivan, 1989; Klein, 1995; Simon and Burns, 1999; Taniguchi, Ratcliffe, & Taylor 2011) has observed that members of social groups, including gangs, generally "hang out" together at specific public locations, such as a park or street corner, termed the group's set-space (Tita, Cohen & Engberg, 2005). These sub-neighborhood areas are the "group's life space" (Klein, 1995a, p. 79) providing the gang a refuge from the outside world (Thrasher, 1927). In the absence of a CGI, I would expect gang members to be witnessed loitering primarily around their gang's local set-space. However, if a CGI impacts the routine activities of gang members, there should be significant changes in where the gang congregates. It would be expected that enjoined gang members would remove themselves from known set-space locations when associating with fellow gang members, masking these interactions from the gaze of law enforcement.

One criticism of CGIs is that they simply displace gang activity outside of the CGI safety-zone (ACLU, 1997). If this is true, there should be observable changes in the spatial patterns of where gang members hang out before and after the enjoining of a specific gang. I would expect that enjoined gang members not only refrain from hanging out in their known set-space locations, but would also move there associating outside of the CGI safety-zone.

Lastly, if gang members are no longer permitted to hang out in their set-space, there could be a shift in how gang members travel, either by foot or by vehicle. Since a gang's territory is composed of tertiary street networks, delineated by either natural or built boundaries, gang members should have a greater likelihood to travel throughout their territory on foot (Grannis, 2009). Without a CGI present, I expect police to observe a greater proportion of gang members traveling on foot. However, with the enactment of a CGI, I anticipate that gang members would

attempt to shield their public associations by either congregating within a vehicle, or by moving their associations outside of the enjoined area.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The goal of this chapter is to provide a set of findings that while building upon existing research are able provide a foundation for future research investigating a CGI's relationship to the behavior patterns of gangs, their members and law enforcement. I accomplish this by examining three research questions. First, how do CGIs influence individual gang members' routine activities, specifically their patterns of association with other gang members? Second, how do CGIs impact the structure of an enjoined gang's social network? Third, does the presence of a CGI affect the enforcement patterns by police?

DATA

This chapter uses field identification (FI) card data from 2001 through 2012 involving all known police interactions with gang members in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. According to the LAPD Department Manual (Line Procedures 4/202.02, 4/269.30 & 5/15.43.01), FI cards are required to be completed at every discretionary stop and many calls for service that result in the detention[27] of an individual (LAPD, 2012). If the stop involves a suspected, active or affiliated gang member, additional information is collected documenting their gang membership (i.e., tattoos, attire, etc.) and the observed gang activity. "Upon supervisory review and approval of the FI Card containing gang-related information, it shall be routed to the Area GIT [gang unit] where the FI Card was completed for review and verification. Only a GIT officer shall complete a CAL/GANG Card if the criterion for a gang member or gang affiliate has been met. After completing the CAL/GANG Card or if a card already exists, the Area G-CAD [gang crime

[27] Detention in this case refers to temporary detainment of the individual being stopped, in which they are not free to leave (LAPD, 2012).

analyst division] shall enter the new information into the CAL/GANG System within three working days. The FI Card shall then be routed through the Area Records Unit for normal processing" (LAPD, 2012).

Previous research in Hollenbeck by Vigil (2007; p. 21) observes the frequent police monitoring of gangs with "officers stopping and questioning gang members in order to fill in field identification cards even if no crime was committed so that the cards can later be used as evidence in courts to show gang affiliation." That is, when an officer has an encounter with any civilian, especially gang members, a FI card is completed. This process of police surveillance is also discussed in other jurisdictions within California (Katz & Webb, 2006; Rios, 2011) and appears to be a consistent and commonly used tool by law enforcement agencies to chronicle gang affiliation (Jackson & McBride, 1985; Klein, 2004; Katz & Webb, 2006; Watkins & Ashby, 2006; O'Deane, 2008; Anderson & Nye, 2009).

The data for this chapter were manually gathered from the physical FI cards stored by LAPD's Gang Impact Team (GIT) at the Hollenbeck Police Station. Figure 2.1 displays an actual FI card showing the potential fields of information, including: name; home address; social security number; driver license number; date of birth; phone number; birthplace; identifying marks; gang affiliation; and moniker. If a vehicle is involved in the stop, a description is recorded along with whether an individual was the driver or the passenger.

If associates are with a stopped individual some of their basic information, including: name, date of birth, sex, gang affiliation, and moniker, is also recorded. Each FI card has space to accommodate two accompanying individuals.[28] When an FI has multiple individuals present at a stop, it is common for multiple FI cards to be filled out allowing officers to document all of the

[28] FI cards from 2001-2004 have space for up to four individuals instead of two; however, these cards only have explicit fields for the associates' names and their dates of birth.

observed associations. The FI card also contains basic information such as: date; time; location; reason for initiating contact with the subject; outcome of the encounter, and whether the individual was released, cited or arrested. An examination of FI cards from 2009 indicates that stops completed by the LAPD resulted in an individual being arrested in 33 percent of the FI cards, an individual being released in 37 percent of the FI cards, and an individual being cited in only 10 percent of the FI cards. The officer does not indicate the result of the stop in 20 percent of the FI cards, with the majority (80 percent) of these undocumented outcomes being pedestrian stops. It is likely that these individuals were released, since officers would want to document arrests from criminal activity.



Figure 2.1: The Front and Back of a LAPD Field Identification (FI) Card.

Lastly, the officers who engaged in the encounter list their names, badge numbers, and their assigned detail. Every FI from 2005 to the present has a unique event number permitting all actors involved in a unique FI stop to be easily linked together. That being said, the majority of FI cards prior to 2005 do not have an event number recorded on them, and require additional fields, such as: date, time, and location of event, to link together multiple FI cards for all of the actors involved in a unique FI stop to be connected.

Social scientists have recently discovered the value of examining FI data to study the networks of urban street gangs. Papachristos and colleagues (2012) constructed social networks by combining FI data with records of fatal and non-fatal gunshot injuries to investigate the risk of gunshot victimization. The social networks for this study were generated using a two-step sampling method in which the first step was gathering FI cards of all known gang members in Boston's Cape Verdean community for one year. The authors then repeated the first step, pulling the FI cards of all the observed associates of known gang members to collect a "friends' friends" sample. They find that "on average, an individual in this network is less than five handshakes away from a victim of a gun homicide or non-fatal shooting" (Papachristos et al., 2012; p.1000). The influence of one's social distance to a gunshot victim directly relates to an individual's odds of being victimized in a shooting. For every network tie removed from a gunshot victim, there is an approximate 25 percent decrease in an individual's likelihood of being a gunshot victim.

Fox (2013) examines the social structure of urban street gangs in Glendale, Arizona. Employing FI data of all known gang members from 2006 through 2010, Fox (2013) address three questions: 1) if relational data from FI cards can be used to examine a gang's social network; 2) what is the relationship between network position and criminality; 3) does variation in the structure of a gang relate to the criminal behavior of the group? First, it was discovered

that FI data are able to be used to generate a gang's social network to better understand a group's structure and organization. Second, gang members that were more central to the network are more likely to be criminally active and arrested. Third, a gang's structure does not predict group-level criminal offending. Overall, this study highlights the potential that FI cards have in providing relational data to examine gang social structures (Fox, 2013).

Another study by Gravel (2013) combines FI cards and co-arrest data to generate social networks, which allow for the relationship between social capital and criminal versatility to be investigated. The FI data gathered was centered on Haitian street gang members in Quebec City, Quebec from 2001 through 2008. "A snowball network sampling strategy was performed to narrow the focus of the study to the social-criminal world around a 'core' of gang members known to police" (Gravel, 2013; p. 23). After the construction of this initial network, the co-arrest data was included to generate a larger co-offending network. The findings from this study indicate that brokerage, the bridging of two social groups, is positively associated with criminal versatility, but only at low levels of criminal versatility. That is, individuals who partake in only one type of crime (e.g., violent offense) are likely have lower brokerage and are exposed to less social capital, restricting their criminal opportunities.

An important point to mention is that FI data includes only official police observations of individuals' associating together. Therefore the social networks generated from these data provide "a conservative measure of one's social network" since individuals are likely to have friends who are not observed by police associating together (Papachristos et al., 2012; p. 994). Understandably, there is concern that important key players in a gang's network will be undetected by police and therefore missing from the FI data. However, "it is highly unlikely that a particularly well connected individual will be entirely missed by law enforcement" (Gravel,

2013; p. 85). Because the use of FI data is so recent, the values and pitfalls of its use are not fully appreciated. That said, I argue that results indicating that CGIs influence enjoined gang members' patterns of association might be difficult to accept as "proof" that an observed change resulted from the presence of a CGI; however, a null finding would certainly suggest that CGIs have little influence on the associations of gang members.

For this study there are two samples used to better investigate how the enactment of a CGI changes an enjoined gang and its members' patterns of association. The first sample, pre/post, is used to analyze the patterns of association of the seven enjoined gangs before and after a CGI is established. Since, the first CGI in Hollenbeck was enacted on January 16, 2003 and the available data begins on January 1, 2001, I decided to use a 744 day window of observation before and after each of the five CGIs to fully utilize all of the collected data. Using this time window of approximately two years is also in line with previous research examining the short-run effects of CGIs (Grogger, 2002; Maxson, et al., 2005; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013). Two datasets are constructed from the information on the FI cards, a dataset of unique events (N = 1427) and a dataset of unique actors (N = 916). Data from the second time period is used to compare the differences between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs to examine the influence that CGIs have on altering a gang's patterns of association. Remaining consistent with the first part of this analysis, I maintain a 744 day window of observation, beginning on February 1, 2009, and ending on February, 15 2011 for the second sample, enjoined/non-enjoined. In this sample, seven gangs have been under a CGI for a minimum of two years and a maximum of seven years, leaving twenty-four gangs that have not been enjoined.

Table 2.1 describes the structure of the datasets generated from these two time periods. Overall, the datasets have two similarities with each other. First, in both samples enjoined gang

members are involved in fewer events than non-enjoined gang members or gang members that will be enjoined (i.e., enjoined gang members in the Pre time period). Second, the distribution of the actor datasets closely mirrors the event datasets. It should also be noted that CGIs are not placed randomly on a gang; instead, the most active and nefarious gangs are typically targeted by law enforcement. The distribution of the data suggests that Hollenbeck's seven enjoined gangs are generally more active and receive more attention from LAPD than the other twenty-four active street gangs.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Pre/Post and the Enjoined/Non-enjoined Samples.

Samples	**Actor Dataset**		**Event Dataset**	
Pre/Post	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Pre	351	38.32	731	51.22
Post	399	43.56	696	49.78
Pre & Post	166	18.12	—	—
Total	**916**		**1427**	
Enjoined/Non-enjoined				
Non-enjoined	860	60.77	1003	59.7
Enjoined	555	39.22	677	40.3
Total	**1415**		**1680**	

MEASURES

As observed in Figure 2.1, FI cards provide demographic information (i.e., age, ethnicity, gender) about the gang members involved in a stop, characteristics of the stop (i.e., location of the stop, type of stop, time of day, police officers involved, etc.), spatial indicators (i.e., permanent residence, address of the stop), and relational data (i.e., who is stopped with an individual), which is used to construct a gang's social network. The specific measures utilized from each category are detailed below.

FI Characteristics

The variable *location of FI* measures whether the FI took place in a public or private space. Relying upon Newman's (1972) definition of defensible space, I categorize public space as an

area that is open to the general public (i.e., streets, alleys, parks, courtyards, sidewalks, etc.). In contrast, private space is considered to be areas that are not open to the public, being mostly used by and restricted to residents, their family members and close friends (i.e., private residences, driveways, front or back yards, etc.). Using this definition of private space, I consider the interior of a vehicle to be a restricted area used by kin and close friends and not open to the public. Thus, when a vehicle is involved in a FI stop, regardless if the encounter took place in a public space, such as a street, the FI is coded as a private space.

Type of FI differentiates if the FI was either a pedestrian stop or a traffic stop. Any stop involving a "vehicle" is coded as a traffic stop and all others pedestrian stops. Previous research (Grannis, 2009) indicates that a gang's territory is made up of a network of tertiary streets that are demarcated by either the natural or built boundaries and encourage members to traverse throughout their turf on foot. Therefore, it would be expected that gang members would have a greater tendency to be involved in pedestrian stops, rather than traffic stops.

The principal goal of a CGI is to reduce crime and neighborhood disorder by dissuading gang members from "associating" with other gang members in public. I use the *number of gang members* as a measure to account for the size of the gang's group that is involved in a stop. If CGIs disrupt the routine activities of enjoined gang members, I expect that there would be fewer enjoined gang members observed associating together in public.

In addition to providing incomplete information on a gang's social network, the primary concern with relying on FI data is determining whether the CGI is responsible for changing the activity patterns of gang members or if it simply changes the behavior of police, with respect to the frequency or types of FIs law enforcement initiate. One potential indication that police enforcement patterns have been influenced by a CGI instead of gang members' patterns of

association is by examining the *time of day* of the occurrence. If police are more actively stopping enjoined gang members during the court ordered curfew, this would indicate that a CGI has influenced the enforcement patterns of the police. Another indicator could be the type of *police unit*, either general (e.g., patrol) or specialized (e.g., GIT), that is involved in a stop. I would expect that an enjoined gang would receive more attention from law enforcement, regardless of the type of police unit.

As noted above, CGIs routinely include a curfew clause, prohibiting any enjoined gang members, whether alone or in a group, to be in a public setting during a restricted time window (Thomas, Isaacs, & Riordan, 2009; p. 3). In Hollenbeck, all five CGIs have the same curfew time window restricting enjoined gang members from "being outside between the hours of 10:00 p.m. on any day and sunrise of the following day" (People v. Krazy Ass Mexicans, 2003; p 3). Therefore, it is possible that gang members stopped in the evening by LAPD are not loitering with fellow gang members, but instead are in public spaces by themselves when encountering law enforcement. Because the CGI curfew generally has a vague ending point in the morning (i.e., sunrise) I use the *Old Farmer's Almanac* website to systematically capture the seasonality of sunrises, dichotomously coding the measure *time of day* (0 = not during curfew hours and 1 = during curfew hours).

Once a CGI is placed on a gang, it is reasonable to expect that all police officers will be anxious to use this policy to initiate stops with enjoined gang members. Therefore, I look for changes in the types of officers initiating FIs by creating three mutually exclusive dichotomous variables: *gang unit*, *patrol unit*, *special patrol unit*. If an FI included LAPD officers from either the Gang Impact Team (GIT) or the Gang Detective Unit the stop was coded as involving the *gang unit* (0 = no and 1 = yes). FIs that involved police officers assigned to a Basic Car Area,

which are smaller geographic zones apportioned into sub-neighborhood units that have one patrol car (with 2 officers) in each zone, are coded as a *patrol unit* (0 = no and 1 = yes). The last type of police unit included in this study is the *special patrol unit* (0 = no and 1 = yes), which unlike the patrol units does not respond to calls for service, but instead are focused on a specific crime mission (e.g., vehicle theft) and are not necessarily restricted to any specific geographic region within the division but are able to roam throughout the division, focusing on their assigned task.[29]

Actor Characteristics

There are two characteristics of each gang member examined in this study. *Age* is measured in years.[30] To capture how active a gang member is in public, *documented FIs* measures the total number of FIs a gang member is involved in. Based upon the provisions of a CGI (e.g., inability to congregate in public), I would anticipate that fewer FIs are completed on gang members after the enjoinment of their gang.

If the CGI is successful in changing the behavior of gang members, I expect a decrease in the frequency in which a member appears in the FI data after the initiation of a CGI, especially when compared to non-enjoined gang members. On the other hand, it is possible that police are now concentrating enforcement on an enjoined gang's membership, producing an increase in FIs. More documented FIs would at least be consistent with a CGI impacting the behavior of law enforcement. Lastly, a null finding is inconclusive of whether or not the CGI changed the

[29] Other police units that do not get included are detectives (narcotics, auto theft, burglary, and robbery), community policing officers (SLOs), bike patrol, traffic enforcement, and officers working Hollenbeck station's front desk.

[30] In the pre/post sample I control for aging since 18% of the gang members are repeatedly stopped before and after their gang is enjoined, and would definitely be older after the CGI is introduced, skewing the sample. Therefore, I use the date of the first CGI, January 16, 2003, as reference point in constructing the ages of each individual.

behavior of gang members or the police. I note that this latter outcome does exclude the possibility that CGIs have influenced the behavior of police, gang members, or both.

Spatial Characteristics

Three measures, *FI in gang turf*, *FI in gang set-space*, and *FI in CGI safety-zone*, are used to examine how CGIs influence the spatial clustering of gang members' patterns of association. I anticipate that the presence of a CGI will significantly impact where gang members "hang out." For instance, in the absence of a CGI, I would expect gang members to loiter within their gang's turf, primarily around the known set-space of the gang, since this is the "group's life space" (Klein, 1995; p. 79). These hubs provide a sanctuary for the group allowing members to feel protected and engage in everyday routine activities, consisting of primarily of hanging around, socializing, and drinking (Thrasher, 1927; Klein, 1995; Tita et al., 2005; Garot, 2010). Since gang members spend most of their time simply "hanging out," it is likely that law enforcement would routinely observe multiple members loitering around a gang's set-space.

Research has shown that a gang "becomes fairly attached to a definite locality and wanders only occasionally beyond its frontiers" (Thrasher, 1927; p.166). Residents, particularly youth, learn how to navigate through their neighborhood avoiding encounters with gang members in these dangerous areas (Garot, 2010). Capturing members' affinity towards their space and aversion to their rivals, *FI in gang turf* is measured as any FI occurring in a member's claimed territory (0 = no and 1 = yes). Figure 2.2 shows the turf of Hollenbeck's active gangs from intelligence gathered by Hollenbeck's Gang Detective Unit.



Figure 2.2: Territorial Claims for Hollenbeck's 31 Active Gangs.

"The hang-out is the hub of the gang's universe. It is a place to loaf and enjoy good fellowship" (Thrasher, 1927; P.123). *FI in gang set-space* is operationalized by a dichotomous measure to indicate if a FI stop occurs in a gang's set-space (0 = no and 1 = yes). Because set-space locations are typically point locations, being specific addresses or intersections, a 100ft buffer was created around each set-space location to capture FIs occurring nearby. A 100ft buffer is able to capture all activity that could occur within an intersection and around a specific address taking into account the width of local streets and sidewalks. Figure 2.3 displays the calculated gang set-space locations for the 31 active street gangs, indicated by Hollenbeck's gang unit.

The final spatial characteristic examined is whether a FI took place in a CGI's safety-zone. Measured as a dichotomy, *FI in CGI safety-zone* captures if a FI takes place in the safety-zone demarcated by the CGI enacted on the enjoined gang (0 = no and 1 = yes). While CGI safety-zones are tailored to the enjoined gang's turf, they routinely extend beyond these boundaries capturing a larger geographic area, as illustrated by Figure 2.4. Therefore, only comparisons will be made in the pre/post sample because non-enjoined gangs do not have a space comparable to the CGI safety-zone.



Figure 2.3: Gang Set-Space Corresponding with the Territorial Boundaries of Hollenbeck's 31 Active Gangs.



Figure 2.4: Civil Gang Injunction Safety-Zones and the Corresponding Territorial Boundaries for Hollenbeck's Seven Enjoined Gangs.

Social Network Characteristics

Using the relational data from the FI cards, I construct a social network for each of the seven enjoined gangs before and after the establishment of a CGI in the pre/post sample. I also generate social networks for all 31 active gangs in the enjoined/non-enjoined sample. Using standard measures from the social network analysis, I explore whether the CGI impacts the structure of the association networks in terms of the connectivity of the network (*mean degree*, *number of components*, *size of the largest component*, and *number of isolates*).

"The most widely used group-level index" in measuring the structure of a social network is density, defined as the average strength of ties across all possible ties in a graph (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; p. 181). Yet, density can be misleading because it is dependent upon the size of the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; p. 181). Thus, as the size of the network (i.e., gang) expands, the density will decrease (Friedkin, 1981; Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). While previous research (Haynie, 2001; Kreager, Rulison, & Moody, 2011) examining the social networks of delinquent youth utilize density to examine the structure of the group, using density as a measure does not allow for different sized networks to be compared. Because of this issue I decided to utilize *mean degree*, defined as the average number of ties between actors (i.e., gang members), which is not dependent upon the size of the network allowing for different sized networks to be compared (de Nooy, Mrvar, & Batageli, 2011; Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). Recent research using *mean* (average) *degree* as a direct measure of gang cohesiveness has indicated that this is the most appropriate measure when examining the ties between gang members (Hughes, 2013). For this study, the *mean degree* of a network is used to indicate the associations among gang members, highlighting a gang's public activity patterns. Thus, a gang with a larger mean degree indicates that members are more likely to be observed together in public, and the overall group is more likely to be connected with each other, thus facilitating

communication and transmitting norms, beliefs, information and goods (e.g., guns or drugs) more easily through the group.

To better understand the impact a CGI has on a gang's patterns of association, I supplement the *mean degree* measure by examining the number and size of components within an enjoined gang's network. For instance, a network composed of one large connected component would facilitate the distribution of norms, goods, or information throughout the gang. It would also permit members a greater ability to act collectively as a group. However, if a gang is composed of smaller, unconnected groups then it would be much more difficult for the gang to maintain influence over its membership and reduce the ability for the gang to collectively act as a united group. Reinforcing this idea is the *number of components*, measuring a cluster of three or more actors (i.e., gang members), which are connected by an association. *Size of the largest component* measures the number of actors (i.e., gang members) in the largest component.

If a gang member did not have an association with any other gang member in the network, then he is considered to be an isolate. The *number of isolates* accounts for all the lone members in a gang's network. It would be anticipated that enjoined gangs have a greater number of isolates present, since gang members are no longer permitted to associate with each other in public. Yet, an increase in the number of observed isolates could also be due to increased attention to enjoined gang members after the curfew is in effect.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

To investigate the three questions proposed in this chapter, I break the analysis into two parts. The first section focuses on individual and event level data, either the FI stop or the individual gang members involved, and addresses how CGIs influence gang members' patterns of association (question 1) and patterns of enforcement by police (question 3). The actor and

event datasets allow for a straightforward comparison of the characteristics for both gang members and FI stops involving them, to examine changes in gang members' patterns of behavior. While these overall comparisons are able to indicate broader trends in the relationship between gang member behavior and CGIs, recent scholarship suggests "that depending on how it is implemented, a CGI could just as easily increase rather than decrease gang cohesion by inadvertently triggering reactions at the group level that stimulates a sense of intergroup rivalry (i.e., cops vs. the gang)" (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013; p. 12). The second section examines the group-level changes experienced by enjoined gangs as a result of the CGI being established (question 2) by disaggregating the seven enjoined gangs and five CGIs. I use a case study approach, due to the nature of this small sample, specifically utilizing social network analysis to investigate how the structure of a gang's patterns of association is influenced by a particular CGI.

Members' Patterns of Association and Enforcement Patterns of Police

To ascertain if any observable changes in a gang member's patterns of association occur as a result of a CGI, I use chi-square tests of independence along with t-tests on interval data. Comparisons are conducted looking at gangs before and after enjoinment (the pre/post sample) along with investigating characteristics that distinguish enjoined gangs from non-enjoined gangs during the same time period (the enjoined/non-enjoined sample). This process is replicated when investigating the impact CGIs have on the enforcement patterns of police.

Social Networks of Enjoined Gangs: A Case Study Approach

Social network analysis relies upon relational data, which is structured differently than the individual or event level datasets used in the earlier section. Utilizing relational data provided by the FI cards, I construct a unique dataset for each of the groups being studied. In the pre/post

sample each of the seven enjoined gangs produces two datasets, one prior to the CGI and one post CGI. In the enjoined/non-enjoined sample a distinct dataset is generated for each of the seven enjoined and twenty-four non-enjoined gangs. For this study, a tie between gang members exists if those individuals were observed associating by the LAPD and documented on a FI card. Therefore, the social networks constructed for this study represent the associating patterns of gang members observed in public by law enforcement. Because CGIs only target associations among enjoined gang members all of the networks used for this analysis are intra-gang in nature, to focus on how a specific gang's behavior is influenced by a CGI. The construction process and structure of the relational data is detailed below.

The FI data are collected as a special type of two-mode nodelist, known as affiliation network data, and then converted into a one-mode sociomatrix, a dataset of a group's social ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Affiliation network data (e.g., a roster of a sports club, an organization, or a gang) contains one mode of data consisting of a set of unique individuals, which belong to a set of events, or the second mode of data. Thus, an affiliation nodelist identifies an individual (first column) followed by the events that the individual participated in (subsequent columns) with a one indicating that an individual participated in an event and a zero indicating that the individual did not participate in an event. This creates an affiliation sociomatrix. In order to create the one-mode sociomatrix, which is an N by N matrix, where N are individuals, each individual listed in both the columns and rows, requires "'processing' the affiliation network data to give ties between pairs of entities in one mode based upon the linkages implied by the second mode" (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; p. 307). The transformation into a one-mode sociomatrix is achieved in UCINET 6.5 by mathematically multiplying the affiliation sociomatrix by its transpose, identified by Equation 2.1:

$$C_{ij} = \sum_K x_{ik}\, x_{jk} \quad \textbf{(2.1)}$$

A straightforward understanding of this transformation is that for each pair of gang members (rows) look at each FI stop (columns) and count the number of times a one is present in both gang member's rows (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). The sum of these values indicates the number of times two gang members are observed together and produces a co-occurrence matrix. For this study, I am only interested in the associating patterns of gang members and not the frequency of times these individuals are witnessed together. Therefore, I have converted the co-occurrence matrix into a binary one-mode sociomatrix, where a one indicates a relationship exists between a pair of gang members, and a zero represents the absence of a relationship.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Pre/Post Sample of Enjoined Gangs

The descriptive statistics for all variables in the pre/post sample are presented in Table 2.2. Prior to a CGI being obtained, an average FI involved a targeted gang member who was just under 25 years of age. Interestingly, the oldest gang member stopped was 67 while the youngest was an adolescent of 12 years. The pre-CGI stops usually occur in public (59 percent) within the gang's claimed territory (76 percent), thereby being within the delineated CGI safety-zone (86 percent). These patterns are not surprising given that the extant literature (Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1955; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1968; Moore, 1978; Sullivan, 1989; Klein, 1995; Anderson, 1999; Simon and Burns, 1999; Tita et al., 2005; Taniguchi, Ratcliffe, & Taylor 2011) has observed many social groups, including gangs, routinely loitering together in public locations hanging out, drinking, and socializing. Only 21 percent of the FIs take place around the targeted

gang's set-space. This could suggest that gang members are not spending as much time in these known hang outs as originally predicted by previous research (Klein, 1995; Tita et al., 2003), and that the police are failing to observe/document gang members loitering in these areas, or that gang set-space is misidentified by law enforcement.

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Pre/Post Sample.

	Mean		**SD**		**Minimum**		**Maximum**	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
FI Characteristics	**N = 731**	**N = 696**	**N = 731**	**N = 696**	**N = 731**	**N = 696**	**N = 731**	**N = 696**
Location of FI (Public)	0.589	0.521	0.493	0.500	0	0	1	1
Type of FI (Pedestrian)	0.804	0.766	0.397	0.424	0	0	1	1
Time of day (Curfew)	0.394	0.360	0.489	0.480	0	0	1	1
Number of members	1.612	1.493	0.903	0.796	1	1	9	6
Police unit								
Gang	0.446	0.466	0.497	0.499	0	0	1	1
Patrol	0.249	0.239	0.433	0.426	0	0	1	1
Special patrol	0.239	0.259	0.426	0.438	0	0	1	1
Spatial Characteristics								
FI in gang turf	0.762	0.749	0.426	0.434	0	0	1	1
FI in gang set-space	0.208	0.149	0.406	0.357	0	0	1	1
FI in CGI safety-zone	0.863	0.835	0.344	0.372	0	0	1	1
Actor Characteristics	**N = 511**	**N = 564**	**N = 511**	**N = 564**	**N = 511**	**N = 564**	**N = 511**	**N = 564**
Age	24.781	27.119	8.794	10.634	12	9	67	75
	N = 517	**N = 565**	**N = 517**	**N = 565**	**N = 517**	**N = 565**	**N = 517**	**N = 565**
Documented FIs	2.095	1.680	2.555	1.241	1	1	27	10
Social Network Characteristics	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**	**N = 7**
Mean degree	1.503	1.096	0.767	0.413	0.591	0.360	2.789	1.600
Number of	1.714	3.286	0.951	2.984	1	1	3	9
Size of largest component	28.429	10.429	25.683	6.655	4	4	75	21
Number of isolates	30.857	34.000	13.741	15.264	14	14	48	58

As indicated by Grannis (2009), gang members are more frequently stopped in pedestrian stops on foot (80 percent), and also during the day (61 percent). There are slightly fewer than

two gang members (1.612) present at a stop. The largest group of gang members observed in an FI was nine, however, lone gang members (isolates) were more frequently observed. This could be explained by police feeling less intimidated approaching and conversing with a singular gang member than large groups, or that they are better able to get information from a gang member when unaccompanied. Also, gang members targeted with a CGI are stopped an average of two times (2.095) by law enforcement prior to the introduction of a CGI. Interestingly, there are several individuals stopped quite frequently by police, with the most popular gang member being involved in 27 stops. This frequency of stops could be produced because these gang members are either better known to the police officers that target them or they loiter in public more frequently and are easily identified by law enforcement. Not surprisingly, officers' attached to the LAPD's gang unit (45 percent) are more likely to stop gang members targeted with a CGI than either patrol (25 percent) or special patrols (24 percent).[31]

A targeted gang's network has an average of just fewer than two components (1.714). Gangs targeted with a CGI appear to have network structures, which suggest that these gangs are relatively interconnected, having a centralized group, with no gang having more than three interconnected components of any substantive size. The average size for the largest component is a substantial number of members, approximately 28. That being said, there is variation observed with the smallest component having four gang members tied together and the largest component having 75 interconnected gang members. Consistent with recent research (Fox, 2013), there are a substantial number of unaccompanied gang members involved in FIs, with the average gang having approximately 30 isolates. Similar to the size of the components, there is considerable

[31] The other six percent of stops involved a variety of police units that do not maintain regular interaction with gang members. For this study they are left out to simplify comparisons. These police units include detectives (narcotics, auto theft, burglary, and robbery), community policing officers (SLOs), bike patrol, traffic enforcement, and the station's front desk.

variation observed in the number of isolates from a low of 14 to a high of 48. Lastly, the average number of associations among gang members (mean degree) is 1.503. Again, there is much variability observed in a gang's interconnectedness, with the least cohesive gang having less than one tie between gang members (0.591) to the most connected gang having almost three social ties between each member (2.789).

The take away message from these network measures is the reaffirmation of Thrasher's (1927, p.144) insight that no two gangs are the same, "the structure and behavior of a gang is molded in part through its accommodation to its life conditions." Even though these enjoined gangs have similar characteristics (i.e., being territorial, intergenerational and Mexican-American) allowing them to be cataloged in a typology (i.e., traditional), there remains considerable variation in these gangs' structures and social networks (Valdez, 2003; Klein & Maxson, 2006).

Once a gang is enjoined there are some notable changes observed. Interestingly, enjoined gang members who were stopped, on average, are older (27.119). However, the range in age, while being more varied than before the CGI, still has a large amount of variability, ranging from nine to seventy-five. Enjoined gang members are still more likely to be stopped on the street (52 percent), in the gang's claimed turf (75 percent), and within the CGI safety-zone (84 percent). Surprisingly, there are even fewer FIs occurring around an enjoined gang's set-space (15 percent), which could indicate that enjoined gang members are responding to the CGI by refraining from loitering in spaces documented by law enforcement, and could be locating new set-spaces that are unknown to police. FI stops predominantly involve pedestrians (77 percent) and take place during the day (64 percent). The average number of enjoined gang members observed together is still less than two (1.493), however the largest group of gang members

observed is down to six from nine. On average, enjoined gang members are stopped less frequently, less than two times (1.680). While there still remains variability in the frequency of gang members being stopped, the most frequently observed/targeted gang member is down to ten FIs. Remaining consistent with the patterns witnessed prior to a CGI enactment are the types of officers involved with enjoined gang FIs, with the LAPD's gang unit more likely involved (47 percent) than patrol (24 percent) or special patrol (36 percent).

Once a gang is enjoined there are substantial differences in the characteristics of their social network. Enjoined gangs average more than three components (3.286), and can range from one to nine. This could indicate that gang members are restricting their public activities and refraining from associating with fellow gang members, thereby disrupting the ties connecting the gang and producing a greater number of components. Furthermore, this disruption in an enjoined gang's social network suggests that enjoined gangs are lacking key individuals who could bridge (i.e., connect) these components into a larger more connected structure. Also, the average size of the largest component has decreased in size, to just over 10 gang members. While the smallest component is still composed of only four individuals, the largest component has been decreased to only 21 gang members. Interestingly, the average number of gang members refraining from associating with fellow members increases slightly to 34, yet the range remains consistent with a low of 14 and high of 58. Lastly, there is a reduction in the average number of associations (mean degree) observed among enjoined gang members to 1.096. Again, the range in these measures is also substantially reduced from 0.360 to 1.600, further suggesting that enjoined gang members' connectivity is being disrupted by the CGI.

In general, the overall descriptives appear to suggest that the enjoinment of a gang may be shifting the activity of gang members to new spaces, away from the peering gaze of law

enforcement. While it could be expected that police would focus their efforts on enforcing the CGI, thereby increasing the number of FIs that take place, this does not appear to be taking place. In fact, enjoined gang members partake in fewer FIs and seem more likely to be stopped alone or with smaller groups of fellow members. There are even fewer FIs of enjoined gang members during the curfew window, when targeting unaccompanied enjoined gang members would be permissible under the CGI. The activity by police unit remains consistent throughout both samples, suggesting that the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area has not shifted their attention to targeting enjoined gang members more than non-enjoined gang members.

Lastly, there is a consistent trend observed in the data. When looking at the entire FI event dataset, the number of gang members involved in a FI range from one to nine, as illustrated by Figure 2.5, with over 61 percent of FIs involving isolated individuals. This trend of approximately 60 percent of FIs involving unaccompanied individuals remains consistent throughout all of the data, including the data prior to and post the enactment of CGIs, along with the data including all of the gangs in Hollenbeck during the same time period. An analysis of FI



Figure 2.5: The frequency of enjoined gang members involved in a FI during the 744 time window pre/post a CGI, N = 1427.

*Source: Los Angeles Police Department

stops during the pre/post time windows indicates that there were 1,726 FI cards completed for 1,427 unique stops. Of these 1,427 unique stops, 61.32 percent of them involved only one individual. Analyzing the FI stops of all gangs in a later time period, there were 3,034 FI cards completed for 1,680 unique stops. Of these, 1,680 stops 60.71 percent of them involved only one individual.

Enjoined/Non-enjoined Gang Sample

Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the enjoined/non-enjoined sample. Both enjoined and non-enjoined gang members are remarkably consistent with each other and appear to have near identical patterns. The average age for gang members involved in FIs from enjoined gangs are slightly older (27.656) than non-enjoined gang members (25.999). Yet, the age range is nearly identical for these two groups.

Regardless of enjoinment status, gang FIs are more likely to occur in public (56 percent), take place outside of the curfew window (11 percent), and are pedestrian in nature (76 percent). Consistent with the pre/post sample, most of the FIs taking place within the enjoined gang's turf are not transpiring around a gang's known set-space (16 percent). This pattern is also witnessed for non-enjoined gang members with only 17 percent of FIs taking place around their gang's set-space. Interestingly, enjoined gang members are more likely than non-enjoined gang members to be stopped within their gang's claimed turf. When comparing the trends observed in the pre/post sample it seems that non-enjoined gang members are more mobile than enjoined gang members, who appear to restrict the majority of their activities to areas within their gang's claimed turf.

For both groups the average number of gang members observed associating together in public is less than two, with the largest group being six for enjoined gang members. Surprisingly, the non-enjoined gang members are not witnessed in groups larger than seven. Without the

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Enjoined/Non-enjoined Sample.

	Mean		SD		Minimum		Maximum	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
FI Characteristics	**N = 677**	**N = 1003**	**N = 677**	**N = 1003**	**N = 677**	**N = 1003**	**N = 677**	**N = 1003**
Location of FI (Public)	0.560	0.558	0.497	0.497	0	0	1	1
Type of FI (Pedestrian)	0.762	0.762	0.426	0.426	0	0	1	1
Time of day (Curfew)	0.106	0.111	0.309	0.313	0	0	1	1
Number of members	1.589	1.542	0.856	0.808	1	1	6	7
Police unit								
Gang	0.564	0.526	0.496	0.500	0	0	1	1
Patrol	0.239	0.259	0.427	0.438	0	0	1	1
Special patrol	0.158	0.167	0.361	0.374	0	0	1	1
Spatial Characteristics								
FI in gang turf	0.668	0.530	0.471	0.499	0	0	1	1
FI in gang set-space	0.162	0.174	0.369	0.380	0	0	1	1
Actor Characteristics	**N = 553**	**N = 846**	**N = 553**	**N = 846**	**N = 553**	**N = 846**	**N = 553**	**N = 846**
Age	27.656	25.999	10.595	9.049	9	9	66	65
	N = 555	**N = 860**	**N = 555**	**N = 860**	**N = 555**	**N = 860**	**N = 555**	**N = 860**
Documented FIs	1.796	1.747	1.426	1.547	1	1	9	12
Social Network Characteristics	**N = 7**	**N = 20**	**N = 7**	**N = 20**	**N = 7**	**N = 20**	**N = 7**	**N = 20**
Mean degree	1.242	1.266	0.499	0.739	0.455	0.364	2.000	3.284
Number of components	2.571	1.400	2.149	1.231	1	0	6	5
Size of largest component	17.142	9.800	8.802	9.790	5	0	27	40
Number of isolates	35.857	19.950	15.678	20.982	14	3	60	101

restrictions of the CGI I would have anticipated that groups of non-enjoined gang members would have been substantially larger than groups of enjoined gang members.

Also, the average number of FIs involving a gang member, either enjoined or non-enjoined, is just under two. Surprisingly, while it would be expected for enjoined gang members, with their new "status," to receive more attention from law enforcement, the range is actually three stops lower than non-enjoined gang members. This could suggest that either law enforcement officers are targeting problematic gang members or that non-enjoined gang

members are less restrictive in their activities and are in public spaces more frequently.

It is also observed that officers attached to the LAPD's gang unit engage in the majority of gang FIs, over 50 percent, regardless of the group. Patrol units participate in approximately 25 percent of gang FIs, for either enjoined or non-enjoined gang members. Special patrols are substantially more involved in enjoined gang stops (26 percent) than non-enjoined gang stops (17 percent). While there is consistency between the three types of police units' participation in a FI stop with a gang, it appears that the increased discretion of targeted patrols (i.e., not being constrained to a specific geographic area) has a greater likelihood of engaging with enjoined gang members.

Next, I look at the characteristics of enjoined and non-enjoined gangs' social networks. It should be noted that four of the twenty-four non-enjoined gangs were so infrequently involved in a FI stop that no ties existed between gang members, skewing the social network measures used in this chapter. Therefore, I decided to limit the non-enjoined gangs to twenty for a less skewed comparison with the seven non-enjoined gangs. The lack of FI stops involving members from these four gangs could suggest that they are relatively idle during the study period, with only a handful of members representing the gang within the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area.

While general agreement exists with the descriptive statistics for the event, spatial, and actor characteristics between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs, substantial divergence is observed among each group's social network characteristics. First, the average enjoined gang has almost twice as many components as the average non-enjoined gang. While the difference in the ranges for each group is the same, enjoined gangs are more likely to consist of more components than non-enjoined gangs. This pattern suggests that the CGI is inhibiting these enjoined gang members from associating, thereby reducing an enjoined gangs ability to maintain connections

with each other.

Even though the seven enjoined gangs have a greater number of components present in their social networks, the average composition of the largest component is 17.142 members while non-enjoined gangs only average 9.800 gang members. However, the variability of associating with fellow members is much greater for non-enjoined gangs, ranging from zero to 40, than the enjoined gangs. That is, there are several non-enjoined gangs whose members are actively associating with each other in public and several non-enjoined gangs whose members are refraining from this activity. In contrast, all of the enjoined gangs had a component consisting of at least five members, with its largest being made up of twenty-seven members, thirteen members smaller than the largest non-enjoined group.

Enjoined gang networks also average a considerably greater number of members (35.857) who are isolated from fellow gang members than non-enjoined gang networks, which average 19.950 isolates. However, the range of unaccompanied members from non-enjoined gangs varies substantially more than enjoined gang members, from a non-enjoined gang having a low of only three isolates to a high of 101. In contrast, the number of isolates in an enjoined gang ranges from a low of 14 to a high of 60. Enjoined gangs are consistently more likely to have a greater number of solitary gang members involved in FI stops than non-enjoined gang members hinting that CGIs have, in fact, disrupted enjoined gang members patterns of association. Yet, the fact that over 100 singular gang members from one of the non-enjoined gangs were stopped could indicate that police officers are just more likely to stop unaccompanied gang members than interacting with gang members in larger groups.

Interestingly, the final network indicator, number of associations among gang members (mean degree) are nearly identical, however each groups' ranges are quite different. Enjoined

gangs have a slightly higher low and a much lower high than non-enjoined gangs. This disparity could also be suggestive that CGIs are inhibiting enjoined gangs from associating in public.

Taken as a whole, these descriptive statistics suggest that the activity patterns between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members are considerably consistent with each other. Given that the study window for this post period gathers FIs after all of the enjoined gangs have been constrained by a CGI, with a minimum of two years to a maximum of six years, it is possible that the influence of this abatement strategy has lost its potency. That is, gangs receive an initial shock, which influences their group behavior (e.g., patterns of association or criminal activity) only in the short-run. Enjoined gangs then adapt to these new conditions and settle at a new equilibrium or eventually begin to revert back to their old pattern. Essentially, the effectiveness of the CGI dissipates the longer it is in existence.

Another possibility is that the influence of the CGI has spread to adjacent gangs throughout Hollenbeck's rivalry network (see A.1 in the Appendix).[32] By impacting non-enjoined gangs that are proximate to an enjoined gang, a CGI could affect these non-enjoined gangs' overall patterns of association to more closely resemble the enjoined rival gang. If this mirroring of behavior occurred, it would help to explain the similarities in behavior observed between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members. That being said, clear distinctions exist between the social network characteristics of enjoined and non-enjoined gangs, suggesting that the structure of an enjoined gang remains in a fractured state, with fewer connections between gang members. It is also observed that police activity, by type of unit, is remarkably similar between both gang groups suggesting that law enforcement is not overtly targeting enjoined gangs over non-enjoined gangs. These patterns by the type of police unit also mirror the trends observed in the pre/post sample.

[32] The rivalry network was constructed from detailed gang intelligence maintained by Gang Impact Team (GIT) officers and through surveying gang detectives, homicide detectives, and GIT officers.

It should be noted that the factors influencing an officer's decision to document an encounter, or even the frequency at which a FI card is completed remains uncertain. However, a survey of collected FIs from 2009 yields predictable results. A strong positive correlation exists between the number of FIs and the size of the street gang, both spatially (corr = 0.66) and demographically (corr = 0.79). Gangs with larger territories and more documented members receive more attention from the police. It would be expected that police focus more resources on established and enjoined gangs. Yet, there exists a weak positive correlation (0.17) for gangs with longer intergenerational histories and being stopped by police. There is also a moderate positive correlation (0.49) for an enjoined gang member being involved in a FI stop. Instead, street gangs that are documented by the LAPD as being more violent receive the most attention (0.89) by law enforcement.

COMPARISON OF ENJOINED GANG MEMBERS' PATTERNS OF ASSOCIATION & THE ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS OF POLICE

Pre/Post Sample of Enjoined Gangs

Table 2.4 presents a comparison of the event, spatial, and actor characteristics for Hollenbeck's seven enjoined gangs before and after the enactment of a CGI at the individual and event level. Taking a look at the descriptors of a FI stop indicates that the type and location of these events is significantly influenced by the presence of a CGI. After the CGI is enacted, it appears that enjoined gang members are less likely to be loitering in public spaces (6.284, $p < 0.050$) and instead have begun to hangout in more private locations, away from the gaze of the police. Enjoined gang members are also less likely to be involved in pedestrian stops (3.149, $P = 0.076$). Refraining from traveling throughout the area on foot, members instead are more frequently using vehicles to move throughout the community. Another possibility is that the use of a vehicle is being utilized as a means of concealing enjoined gang member's associations with

other fellow enjoined gang members. The number of gang members involved in a FI (2.659, $p < 0.010$) statistically decreases after enjoinment, from 1.613 to 1.493, reinforcing the claim that CGIs are impacting gang members' patterns of association.

Table 2.4: Comparison of the Seven Enjoined Gangs in the Pre/Post Sample.

	Pre N = 731		**Post N = 696**		**Association & Significance[a]**
FI Characteristics	N	%	N	%	
Location of FI (Public)					**6.284***
Public	429	58.7	362	52.0	
Private	302	41.3	333	47.8	
Type of FI (Pedestrian)					**3.149†**
Pedestrian	588	80.4	533	76.6	
Traffic	143	19.6	163	23.4	
Time of day (Curfew)					N.S.
During curfew	285	39.0	250	35.9	
Not during curfew	439	60.1	445	63.9	
Police unit					N.S.
Gang	326	44.6	324	46.6	
Patrol	189	25.9	163	23.4	
Special patrol	182	24.9	166	23.9	
Number of gang members	1.613		1.493		**2.659****
Spatial Characteristics					
FI in gang turf					N.S.
Yes	557	76.2	521	74.9	
No	174	23.8	174	25.0	
FI in gang set-space					**8.291*****
Yes	152	20.8	104	14.9	
No	579	79.2	592	85.1	
FI in CGI safety-zone					N.S.
Yes	631	86.3	581	83.5	
No	100	13.7	115	16.5	
	Pre		**Post**		
Actor Characteristics	**N = 511**		**N = 564**		
Age	23.356		23.372		N.S.
	N = 517		**N =565**		
Documented FIs	2.095		1.680		**3.444*****

[a]Levels of association and significance were determined as appropriate for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables by chi-squares and t-tests for interval data.
† = p<.10, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001

Conversely, it does not appear that enjoining a gang impacts their activity patterns throughout the day, meaning that the court imposed curfew is not statistically curtailing enjoined

gang members from being out in the evening. The non-significance of this *time of day* measure could also indicate that police are not over enforcing the CGI by targeting enjoined gang members who are not loitering with fellow gang members in the evening. Since the CGI permits law enforcement to stop unaccompanied gang members in the evening, it could be expected that police would readily use this proscription to stop more gang members from being out on the street; however, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, one would expect there to be an increase in the number of FI cards in the evening because there are generally more police officers active. Bolstering the police presence at night, the gang unit is regularly deployed during the mid-night watch from 6:30 pm to 2:30 am.

Related to this finding is the non-significant change in the type of police unit engaging in FIs before and after a gang is enjoined. While it would be expected that the enjoinment of gang would increase an enjoined gang's notoriety, thereby increasing the attention paid to them by law enforcement, with all police units actively stopping enjoined gang members. The comparisons observed indicate that there has not been a shift in the attention police units place on enjoined gang members. The gang unit remains the predominant initiator of FIs with enjoined gang members both before and after the establishment of a CGI, with patrol and special patrols engaging in the process less frequently. These findings could reflect the nature of large police agencies (e.g., LAPD), which use specialized units making it difficult for a large bureaucracy to refrain from the compartmentalized structure of enforcement (Herbert, 1997a; 1997b).

The analysis of enjoined gang members' spatial characteristics indicates another interesting pattern produced by the CGIs. Findings suggest that CGIs do not displace the loitering of enjoined gang members to outside of their gang’s claimed turf or even outside of the CGI safety-zone. Both before and after a gang’s enjoinment, the majority of FIs involving its membership

occur in and around the gang's territory. That being said, it does appear that the CGI is significantly displacing enjoined gang members from congregating around the gang's set-space (8.291, $p < 0.001$) from 21 percent to 15 percent of all FIs. While enjoined gang members still routinely loiter throughout their gang's turf, they are removing themselves from these known hangouts, most likely as an attempt to avoid police from detecting their associations with fellow members. An example of enjoined gang members shifting where they associate, Figure 2.6 shows a map of where gang members from Big Hazard are participating in FI stops before and after the enactment of a CGI.

This map illustrates how the CGI fails to inhibit Big Hazard gang members from associating within their claimed turf. Before the CGI, 84 percent of FIs involving Big Hazard gang members took place within their claimed turf. Following the CGI, the percentage of stops remained stable at 82 percent. For the larger CGI safety-zone, a similar trend was observed with 92 percent of the FIs occurring prior to the CGI and 86 percent taking placed afterward. Yet, following the CGI, Big Hazard gang members are refraining from associating around their gang's known set-space. Before the CGI, 44 percent of police stops with Big Hazard gang members occurred around their gang's set-space. Following Big Hazard's enjoinment, the percentage of FIs substantially dropped to 25 percent. It appears the CGI encouraged enjoined gang members to displace their public interactions with fellow gang members into other parts of their gang's turf.

The last set of descriptors looked at pertains to each actor (i.e., gang member) involved in a FI. After controlling for time, since there is no statistically significant change in the age of gang members being involved in a FI, it does not appear that the CGIs are influencing which generation of gang member is actively encountering police. While CGIs may not be inhibiting



Figure 2.6: Big Hazard Gang Members involved in FIs Before and After Enjoinment.

any specific age-graded clique, the CGI does seem to significantly reduce the number of FIs that enjoined gang members have with law enforcement. Table 2.5 scrutinizes these findings in greater detail showing that the number of FIs (3.444, $p < 0.001$) involving gang members who were repeatedly stopped before and after the CGI did not statistically change. Specifically, the average number of encounters with police remained stable at just over two FIs throughout both

time periods. Yet, the average number of stops of unique, non-repetitive gang members involved in an FI either before or after a CGI experienced a statistically significant decline from 2.031 stops to 1.509 (3.635, $p < 0.001$).

Table 2.5: T-test Comparison of the Enjoined Gang Members' Documented FIs Before and After a CGI.

	Pre		Post		Association & Significance
Documented FIs	N	Mean	N	Mean	
FI in Pre- & Post- CGI	166	2.229	166	2.090	N.S.
FI in Pre- or Post- CGI	351	2.031	399	1.509	**3.635*** **

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

There are two take ways points from these findings. First, the number of FIs for gang members known to police, those participating in a FI before and after the CGI, does not increase after the introduction of a CGI, again suggesting that law enforcement is not targeting enjoined gang members. Second, the statistical decrease in the average number of FIs observed for all gang members and non-repetitive gang members, suggests that a CGI is able to discourage most gang members, except for members more familiar to the police, from associating in public and restricting their activities away from the scrutiny of law enforcement.

As a whole, these results suggest that establishing a CGI on a gang does have a significant impact on gang members' routine activities, thereby influencing their patterns of association, at least in the short-run. After a gang is enjoined, its members are involved in fewer FIs. When an enjoined gang member is involved in a FI there are fewer gang members present; and, the encounter is less likely to occur in public, on foot, and away from their gang's known set-space. The CGI does not appear to significantly impact the policing behavior of law enforcement. There is no indication in these data that police are targeting enjoined gang members during curfew or aggressively singling out known gang members. Also, regardless of the CGI, the gang unit remains the predominant policing element involved with stopping enjoined gang members.

Enjoined/Non-enjoined Gang Sample

Table 2.6 presents the comparison of the FI event, spatial, and actor characteristics for Hollenbeck's seven enjoined gangs and 24 non-enjoined gangs at the individual-level. Looking at the FI characteristics; *location of FI*, *type of FI*, *time of day*, *police unit*, and *number of gang members*, there are no statistical differences observed between these two groups to indicate that a CGI is influencing enjoined gang members' patterns of association. Interestingly, the trends for

Table 2.6: Comparison of all Gangs in the Enjoined/Non-enjoined Sample.

	Enjoined N = 677		**Non-enjoined N = 1003**		**Association & Significance[a]**
FI Characteristics	N	%	N	%	
Location of FI (Public)					N.S.
Public	379	56.0	560	55.8	
Private	298	44.0	443	44.2	
Type of FI (Pedestrian)					N.S.
Pedestrian	516	76.2	764	76.2	
Traffic	161	23.8	239	23.8	
Time of day (Curfew)					N.S.
During curfew	70	10.3	111	11.1	
Not during curfew	605	89.4	891	88.8	
Police unit					N.S.
Gang	382	56.4	528	52.6	
Patrol	162	23.9	260	25.9	
Special patrol	107	15.8	168	16.7	
Number of gang members	1.589		1.542		N.S.
Spatial Characteristics					
FI in gang turf					**31.374*****
Yes	452	66.8	532	53.0	
No	225	33.2	471	47.0	
FI in gang set-space					N.S.
Yes	110	16.2	175	17.4	
No	567	83.8	828	82.6	
	Enjoined		**Non-enjoined**		
Actor Characteristics	**N = 553**		**N = 846**		
Age	27.656		25.999		**3.128****
	N = 555		**N = 86**		
Documented FIs	1.796		1.747		N.S.

[a]Levels of association and significance were determined as appropriate for 2x2 tables, 2xN tables by chi-squares and t-tests for interval data.
***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

the FI characteristics observed between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members are nearly identical, suggesting that the influence of a CGI may begin to fade over time.[33]

The characteristics for the actors (i.e. gang members) involved in a FI indicate a trend, which contrasts with the findings observed in the pre/post sample. There is no statistical difference between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members in regard to the number of FIs that an individual participates in. This finding further suggests that the impact that the CGI has on gang member's patterns of association diminishes over time. In conjunction with the non-significant findings of *time of day* and *police unit*, these findings could indicate that police are not concentrating their efforts solely on gangs that are enjoined but instead are employing a broader enforcement strategy against all gangs in the region.

The other disparate finding is the age of gang members involved (31.28, $p < 0.010$) in an FI statistically differs between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs. Even though the age ranges for both groups are nearly identical, the average age for an enjoined gang member (27.7) is nearly two years older than the age of non-enjoined gang members (26.0). I propose several possible explanations for this finding.

First, law enforcement officers are more likely to recognize veteran gang members and produce more FIs with these known, older gang members. This explanation suggests that police are focusing more of their attention on enjoined gangs than non-enjoined gangs. However, metrics (i.e. *time of day*, *police unit*, *documented FIs*) discussed earlier indicate that changes in police enforcement do not significantly differ between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs suggesting that this explanation is probably not driving this disparity in age.

Second, veteran gang members typically are more embedded in the gang, making them less

[33] This time window captures gangs that have been enjoined for four years (Clover, Eastlake, and Lincoln Heights), over four years (White Fence), over five years (Big Hazard), seven years (VNE) and eight years (KAM).

likely to adhere to the prohibition on their gang's routine activities (e.g., loitering together in public) and more likely to continue with the criminalized behavior of gang life (Vigil, 1983, Pyrooz, Sweeten & Piquero, 2013; Sweeten, Pyrooz & Piquero, 2013). These older gang members have a greater resiliency to the suppressive tactics of law enforcement, including the use of CGIs, and therefore would be involved in a greater number of FIs. Again, this explanation seems very plausible; however, if this were the case, there should be a statistical difference in the number of documented FIs by enjoined gang members. Instead, there is no significant difference between these two groups, undermining the hypothesis that older gang members are violating the CGI and continuing to be a visible presence in the community.

A third explanation is that enjoined gang members recently released from incarceration, typically older individuals, regularly return to their local communities and may be unaware of the added scrutiny placed upon them by the CGI proscriptions. Since, the enjoinment of a gang is not random, but instead a directed action typically targeting the most aggressive gangs in a community, it would be expected for there to be a larger number of enjoined gang members that have been arrested and locked up (Thomas et al., 2009). Therefore, it is possible that newly released gang members are ignorant of a CGI's proscriptions and the ramifications for their violation. Since, there is not a statistical difference between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members in the number of documented FIs, it seems likely that newly released enjoined gang members would engage in a limited amount of interactions with police before altering their patterns of association to prevent further unnecessary contact with the criminal justice system.

The final possible explanation is that older gang members are more likely to be desisting from the gang, participating in fewer gang-related activities and are overall less embedded in the gang (Hirshi & Gottfredson, 1983; Pyrooz & Decker, 2011; 2013; Sweeten, Pyrooz & Piquero,

2013). If these individuals no longer associate with their enjoined gang, they may feel that the CGI no longer applies to them and may violate the proscriptions facilitating contact with the police (Lopez-Aguado, 2013). Since it is very difficult for an enjoined gang member to be removed from a CGI, it is highly likely that law enforcement would continue to encounter these individuals, resulting in additional FIs or even an arrest (Crawford, 2009). Even after a member begins to desist from the gang, there remains a strong connection to their claimed neighborhood, which remains a part of their identity and does not readily evaporate, and continues to pull that member back into community (Vigil, 1988; Pyrooz, Decker & Webb, 2010). As with the previous explanation, the data cannot discount this possibility and it seems likely that a combination of both these last two conjectures can account for this observed disparity between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members.

Investigating the spatial characteristics does reveal that CGIs are influencing where gang members associate in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. While both enjoined and non-enjoined gang members are observed associating around their gang's set-space with the same frequency, these groups statistically differ in their member's prevalence of associating within their gang's turf (31.374, $p < 0.001$). Enjoined gang members (69 percent) are more likely than non-enjoined gang members (53 percent) to be observed within their gang's territorial boundaries. This finding could indicate that instead of a CGI encouraging gang members to abandon their gang's turf, police enforcement of the CGI is producing a containment effect, actually dissuading gang members from venturing away from their gang's neighborhood (Beckett & Herbert, 2010; Lynch, Omori, Rousell & Valasik, 2013). Figures 2.7 and 2.8 are used as an example to illustrate the differences between these two groups. Based upon the data from table 2.6, the two gangs in these examples are proxies for what the spatial patterns of association

among an average enjoined (White Fence) and non-enjoined (The Mob Crew) resemble. For both maps, the blue circles represent FI stops that took place within a gang's claimed territory and the red triangles depict FI stops that took place outside of a gang's turf. Each gang's set-space is also indicated, along with the built environment. In addition to focusing on the FIs taking place within a gang's turf, an overview map is included to show the overall mobility patterns of enjoined and non-enjoined gang members.

Figure 2.7 displays where police encounter White Fence gang members in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. The vast majority of the 199 FIs (73 percent) involving White Fence gang members occur within the gang's claimed territory. While the remaining FIs are spread throughout the rest of the Hollenbeck Policing Area, however, there are several FI stops taking place within the turf of proximate gang rivals, and a small clustering around East Cesar E. Chavez Street, a major thoroughfare and business district, providing "opportunities for amusement and adventure" (Thrasher, 1927; p. 132). It is also noticeable that White Fence gang members are remaining deep within their claimed space, and not around the border areas, which could reinforce the premise that the CGIs are inhibiting gang members from associating away from their neighborhood. It is possible that enjoined gang members may be more wary from venturing away from the residence or just more hesitant about being in public due to the increased scrutiny of law enforcement. Lastly, it appears that White Fence gang members are not focusing their associations around the gang's set-space, which only account for 14 percent of the FIs that occur within their gang's turf, but instead members are dispersing their associating throughout the gang's territory.

A different trend is observed looking at the spatial patterns of association for non-enjoined gang members, illustrated by The Mob Crew (TMC) in Figure 2.8, than what is



Figure 2.7: FIs Involving Enjoined White Fence Gang Members.

witnessed by FI stops involving White Fence gang members. First, of the 74 FIs involving TMC gang members, only 59 percent took place within TMC's claimed area, a lower proportion than White Fence. Thus, a much larger proportion of TMC's FIs occurred outside of the gang's turf

than White Fence. Also, FIs involving TMC gang members outside of the gangs turf are not clustering around rivals or business districts, but instead are scattered throughout Hollenbeck.



Figure 2.8: FIs Involving Non-enjoined The Mob Crew (TMC) Gang Members.

Another interesting trend is that the FIs which do occur within TMC's claimed turf actually cluster around the gang's set-space (82 percent) suggesting that routine activities of TMC gang members are not being inhibited by a CGI, and therefore are not dissuaded from

loitering in around their favorite hangouts. While the former trend illustrated by TMC represents the overall inclination of all non-enjoined gangs in Hollenbeck the latter trend does not. Instead, TMC gang members' patterns of association cluster around the gang's set-space as would be expect from a non-enjoined gang, lacking restrictions of where members area able to congregate.

A CASE STUDY OF ENJOINED GANGS' SOCIAL PATTERNS OF ASSOCIATION

Pre/Post Sample: Disruption and Convergence Among Social Networks

Using a descriptive case study approach, I examine if there are any observable changes in the structure of each enjoined gang's social network after the enactment of a CGI. Table 2.7 presents the social network characteristics for each of the seven enjoined gangs before and after the implementation of the five CGIs. These findings illustrate that there is no specific pattern that every enjoined gang follows. Instead, each gang responds differently to being enjoined by a CGI.

Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of the Social Network Characteristics for the Seven Enjoined Gangs.

	Gang						
Social Network Characteristics	KAM	VNE	Big Hazard	White Fence	Clover	Eastlake	Lincoln Heights
Mean degree							
Pre	2.789	1.867	0.900	0.891	0.558	1.571	1.909
Post	1.375	1.128	1.313	1.116	1.600	0.778	0.36
# of components							
Pre	1	2	3	3	1	1	1
Post	1	4	5	9	1	2	1
Size of largest component							
Pre	75 (65.8%)[a]	53 (50.5%)	14 (17.5%)	14 (15.2%)	4 (9.0%)	22 (52.4%)	17 (38.6%)
Post	7 (14.6%)	9 (9.6%)	21 (16.0%)	10 (6.8%)	18 (30.0%)	4 (11.1%)	4 (8.0%)
# of isolates							
Pre	31 (27.2%)	43 (41.0%)	42 (52.5%)	48 (52.2%)	20 (45.5%)	14 (33.3%)	18 (40.9%)
Post	14 (29.2%)	36 (38.3%)	48 (36.6%)	58 (39.5%)	29 (48.3%)	20 (55.6%)	34 (68.0%)

[a] Percent of the network.

Maxson et al. (2003; p. 244-245) articulate two possible outcomes from a gang being enjoined, either "a CGI might decrease group cohesiveness" or "may increase group cohesion and solidify gang identification, thereby strengthening individuals' ties to gangs." Both

hypotheses advanced by Maxson and colleagues (2003) are supported by this data. Sociograms, a diagram of a gang's social ties, are used to observe any visual changes in a gang's social network that are produced by the presence of a CGI. Upon examining the sociograms of each enjoined gang, before and after a CGI, there appears to be two divergent trends emerging from the data: a *disruption* of a gang's network or a *convergence* in a gang's network.

When a gang's patterns of association are disrupted, the average number of ties (mean degree) between gang members decreases, the number/percent of individuals (i.e., gang members) in the largest component decreases and the percent of isolates (i.e., lone gang members) in each network increases. Overall, there are four gangs which follow this pattern: KAM, VNE, Eastlake, and Lincoln Heights.

Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show an example of a CGI producing a disruption in an enjoined gang's social network. Individuals represented by blue triangles were involved in FIs before and after VNE was enjoined. Red circles correspond to unique individuals who were either stopped prior to a CGI being established or after the gang has been enjoined.



Figure 2.9: A Sociogram Displaying VNE's Patterns of Association Before Being Enjoined.

The social network that develops from the patterns of association among VNE gang members prior to the gang being enjoined is displayed in Figure 2.9. Before the CGI was placed on VNE, a large, interconnected component is observed encapsulating 53 of the gang's members (51 percent). The gang's structure indicates that the majority of VNE's members were publicly associating with one another in face-to-face relations, suggesting that members routinely get together (e.g., hanging-out, drinking, socializing, etc.), reinforcing the group's identity through communicating and group activities.



Figure 2.10: A Sociogram Displaying VNE's Patterns of Association After Being Enjoined.

Figure 2.10 displays the impact a CGI has on an interconnected gang, such as VNE. The most noticeable change to the structure of VNE's network is the lack of a large, interconnected component. It appears that the enactment of the CGI has inhibited VNE's members from engaging in face-to-face interactions, limiting the number of public associations between individuals. VNE's large, interconnected component has crumbled into a bunch of smaller, less connected components. While there are two components consisting of seven or eight gang

members, the majority of ties coupling members together only result in a dozen dyads (i.e., pairs of actors) and a few triads (i.e., three actors connected). This fracturing has the potential to greatly reduce the gang's ability to transmit group beliefs, disseminate information, and inhibits the group's ability to organize, mobilize and direct collective actions (e.g., crime or violence).

Conversely, CGIs appear to impact less structured and interconnected gangs quite differently. Specifically, the social networks of these gangs experience a convergence, with members' patterns of association experiencing a general increase in the average number of ties (mean degree) between gang members, there is a greater number of components in the network; however, the number of individuals (i.e., gang members) in the largest component varies from gang to gang, and the percent of isolates (i.e., lone gang members) in each network decreases. Overall, the networks of three gangs follow this pattern: Big Hazard, White Fence, and Clover.

Figures 2.11 and 2.12 illustrate the convergence of an enjoined gang's social network following the enactment of a CGI. Individuals represented by blue triangles were involved in FIs before and after VNE was enjoined. Red circles correspond to unique individuals who were either stopped prior to a CGI being established or after the gang has been enjoined.

Figure 2.11 displays the patterns of association among gang members from Big Hazard before the establishment of a CGI. Unlike the network observed in Figure 2.9, a large interconnected component is absent in Big Hazard's network prior to enjoinment. Instead, there are several smaller components that are relatively intra-connected, with the largest component consisting of 14 gang members. The lack of connectedness indicates that Big Hazard gang members are refraining from associating with one another. This lack of face-to-face interactions suggests that the gang is more loosely structured, and less likely to effectively maintain ties between its members, hindering the group's ability to reinforce the gang's identity and limiting

group exploits. With the proliferation of smaller components, dyads and triads, Big Hazard's overall network before the CGI resembles VNE's loosely connected post CGI network.



Figure 2.11: A Sociogram Displaying Big Hazard's Patterns of Association Before Being Enjoined.

Based upon the previous impacts observed on VNE, it would be expected for an analogous result to transpire with Big Hazard's network, further fracturing and eroding the ties among gang members; however, this is not what is observed in Big Hazard's sociogram. Instead, there is a renewal among Big Hazard gang members, as shown in Figure 2.12. A convergence of members, suggests that the external pressures on the gang (i.e., the CGI) actually encourage group fraternizing, increasing the public associations with fellow gang members despite the fact that these acts violate the proscriptions of their CGI (Klein & Crawford, 1967). The several smaller components observed prior to the CGI have increased in size and connectivity. Overall, there are a greater number of components observed in Big Hazard's post-CGI network. Big Hazard's divergent response to the CGI suggests that the gang is able to come together,

coalescing to push back against a common foe, the LAPD, who is challenging their group's collectivity. Thus, the CGI induced the exact opposite effect that was intended by law enforcement and the city attorney's office.



Figure 2.12: A Sociogram Displaying Big Hazard's Patterns of Association After Being Enjoined.

The two diverging patterns observed above involve individually enjoined gangs, subject to their own CGI, with a safety-zone tailored to each enjoined gang's geographically claimed space. Yet, due to the tedious and time intensiveness to developing and securing a CGI, the city attorney's office of Los Angeles has begun to focus on targeting multiple rival gangs under a single CGI (Branson-Potts, 2013; LACA, 2014). This process dulls the precision of the CGI, dramatically distorting the demarcated safety-zone, as witnessed by the CGI established against Clover, Eastlake, and Lincoln Heights in Figure 2.5. Previous research by Maxson and colleagues (2005) suggests that law enforcement overreach when a CGI uses an excessively expansive safety-zone, which may not produce the intended result of a more attuned enforcement

zone. Also, due to the complex nature of social relations between gangs, combining multiple rivals under one CGI may produce unanticipated effects. A gang's activity patterns do not take place in a vacuum but instead are intertwined with the activity patterns of neighboring gang rivals. The presence or absence of a gang will alter the activity patterns of rival gangs, either increasing or decreasing the manifestation of members in public.

The final CGI established in Hollenbeck enjoined three rival gangs: Clover, Eastlake, and Lincoln Heights. Originally, all three gangs had positive relationships with each other, however, over the decades these relationships soured and turned into rivalries.[34] Figures 2.13 and 2.14 illustrate how the establishment of a CGI influences each gang's patterns of association differently. Each gang is represented by a color with green representing gang members from Clover, gang members from Lincoln Heights are black, and individuals claiming Eastlake are orange. Also, individuals represented by a triangle are involved in FIs before and after the CGI. A circle indicates that that the gang member is unique, being stopped either prior to a CGI being established or following the gang's enjoinment.

Figure 2.13 displays the social networks for Clover, Eastlake, and Lincoln Heights prior to the CGI being implemented. The structure for each gang's network differs substantially between the three groups, suggesting distinct patterns of association among the members of each gang. For instance, Clover only has only one component with four connected gang members. Otherwise, Clover's network consists entirely of dyads and a large contingent of isolates, more than its two rivals. As such, the members of the gang are not very interconnected indicating that

[34] For instance, Eastlake began as a clique of Clover gang members who migrated into the neighborhood during the early 1980s. Lincoln Heights and Clover were interconnected through kinship ties and were allied until early 2002, when an interpersonal conflict between female members from both gangs escalated into a physical altercation resulting in a triple homicide, involving victims form both Clover and Lincoln Heights, on New Year's Eve. This event triggered hostilities to erupt, eventually resulting in a multi-gang CGI to as an attempt to quell the violence between all rivals.

face-to-face interactions are only occurring between specific members. This pattern would suggest that Clover is a loosely structured gang whose inability to maintain durable ties between members would inhibit the gang from reinforcing the gang's identity and restricting the group's ability to collaborate. The lack of a definitive group structure could also be due to the sizable, interconnected nature of both the Eastlake and Lincoln Heights' gangs, which could be stifling Clover's ability to manifest as a group.



Figure 2.13: A Sociogram Displaying Clover, Eastlake and Lincoln Heights' Patterns of Association Prior to Being Enjoined.

Conversely, Eastlake has the fewest number/percent of isolates and only three dyads, with the majority of gang members (52 percent) being interconnected in a large component of 22 members. While not every member of this component is observed with each other, the patterns of association indicate that the Eastlake gang members are more entwined, allowing for the gang to maintain ties between members, reinforce the joint identity of the group, and engage in the group's exploits. An analogous pattern is observed with Lincoln Heights, with the gang being

even more cohesive and centrally connected than Eastlake. While Lincoln Heights has an additional dyad and a couple more isolates than Eastlake, the gang's primary component, 17 members (39 percent) is much more interconnected than Eastlake, suggesting a focused pattern of association among members. That is, half of the gang members in this large component are fully connected, having been observed associating with one another in public. This structure suggests that gang members from Lincoln Heights are more likely to be interacting with one another as a whole than either members from Clover or Eastlake, increasing socialization among peers, strengthening the group's identity and facilitating group initiatives which would continue to reinforce the connectivity observed in the gang's network.



Figure 2.14: A Sociogram Displaying Clover, Eastlake and Lincoln Heights' Patterns of Association After Being Enjoined.

The establishment of a CGI influences all three gangs' patterns of association, as shown in Figure 2.14. After the implementation of this single CGI, both the patterns of *disruption* and *convergence* are witnessed across these three gangs. The network structures of Eastlake and

Lincoln Heights are disrupted, exhibiting a fracturing into smaller components, dyads, and isolates. Again, this pattern of decay is the anticipated outcome as predicted by the rhetoric of CGIs. Eastlake's network structure nearly mimics the structure of Clover before the CGI, with one component of four gang members and six dyads. Lincoln Heights' network also decomposes into two components of four gang members, two triads, one dyad and several isolates. Each of these disrupted gangs decomposes differently, even though they are both subject to the same restrictive guidelines. While enforcement of the GCI may be culpable for this disruption in Lincoln Height's social network, there also appears to repetitively stopped gang members who are providing connections to other members together, as observed in the triads and larger components. These persistent gang members are bridging others in the network, and could be attempting to maintain the gang's connectivity and influence, indirectly guiding the decomposition of this post-CGI network.

Clover, on the other hand, exhibits a pattern of convergence, with gang members increasing their public associations with each other. While there remain a number of isolates and a few dyads and a triad, a substantial, well-connected component has formed. As witnessed earlier, this suggests that contrary to expectations, the gang has responded inversely to the CGI, with an increase of members socializing in public, and an overall coalescing of the gang. The disruption in the networks of both Eastlake and Lincoln Heights seems to have provided Clover an opportunity to pull together and occupy the power vacuum left by the two rivals.

Overall, the findings suggest several important insights. First, it appears that gangs react differently to CGIs as indicated by the two diverging patterns observed in the data. Second, the response to a CGI appears to be a function of the gang's structure prior to the gang being enjoined. When a CGI is placed on a seemingly well-connected gang, the anticipated impact of

the CGI is observed. That is, a disruption in the network and fracturing of the gang into smaller, less connected components and isolates. Third, when a CGI is placed on a gang whose members are more loosely connected and less cohesive as a group, the gang responds contrary to the predictions set forth by the CGI. This could suggest that the CGI reinvigorates the gang, providing a rallying point for gang members to unify against, as suggested by previous research (Klein & Crawford, 1967; Klein, 1998; Maxson et al., 2005). The patterns of association increase between these gangs' members resulting in a more strongly connected and cohesive gang than before the enactment of the CGI. Lastly, while multi-gang CGIs elicit the same diverging patterns witnessed from CGIs enacted on lone gangs, the complex social relationships between rival gangs may interact with the CGI influencing a gang's behavior, including their patterns of association, in unanticipated ways.

Enjoined/Non-enjoined Sample: Analogous Social Networks

I repeat the above analysis to further investigate if there are observable, structural differences between the social networks of an enjoined and a non-enjoined gang, which could indicate if a CGI is influencing the enjoined gang members' routine activities and patterns of association. Table 2.8 presents the social network characteristics for both Hollenbeck's seven enjoined gangs and the 24 non-enjoined gangs. As observed above, there is a range reported in the network characteristics for both enjoined and non-enjoined gangs. When these network measures are averaged for each group, the majority of the characteristics (i.e., mean degree, size of the largest component, and number of isolates) tend to mirror each other.

Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics of the Social Network Characteristics for the Seven Enjoined and 24 Non-enjoined Gangs

Gang	Social Network Characteristics			
	Mean Degree	Components > 3 Nodes	Largest Component's Size	Isolates
Enjoined				
Big Hazard	1.37	6	27 (21.8%)[a]	47 (37.9%)[a]
Clover	1.07	1	14 (25.9%)[a]	28 (51.9%)[a]
Eastlake	2.00	1	16 (41.0%)[a]	14 (35.9%)[a]
KAM	0.87	1	8 (14.5%)[a]	27 (49.1%)[a]
Lincoln Heights	1.57	3	24 (28.9%)[a]	29 (34.9%)[a]
VNE	0.46	1	5 (7.6%)[a]	46 (69.7%)[a]
White Fence	1.35	5	26 (19.5%)[a]	60 (45.1%)[a]
Group Average	**1.24**	**2.57**	**17.14 (22.8%)[a]**	**35.86 (46.4%)[a]**
Non-Enjoined				
8th Street	1.00	1	11 (28.9%)[a]	21 (55.3%)[a]
Avenues 43	0.53	1	4 (13.3%)[a]	22 (73.3%)[a]
Breed Street	1.18	1	13 (38.2%)[a]	18 (52.9%)[a]
Clarence Street	1.77	1	16 (61.5%)[a]	8 (30.8%)[a]
Cuatro Flats	1.00	1	4 (11.1%)[a]	14 (53.8%)[a]
Eastside 18th St	3.28	3	40 (49.4%)[a]	25 (30/9%)[a]
ELA 13 Dukes	0.36	0	—	17 (77.3%)[a]
El Sereno	0.95	5	20 (10.7%)[a]	101 (54.0%)[a]
Evergreen	1.92	1	8 (33.3%)[a]	14 (58.3%)[a]
Happy Valley	0.80	1	7 (35.0%)[a]	11 (55.0%)[a]
Highlands	2.15	2	12 (46.2%)[a]	5 (19.2%)[a]
Indiana Dukes	1.82	1	10 (45.5%)[a]	9 (40.9%)[a]
Lil Eastside	1.00	0	—	3 (50.0%)[a]
Lowell Street	0.33	0	—	4 (66.7%)[a]
MC Force	0.85	1	7 (21.2%)[a]	16 (48.5%)[a]
Metro 13	0.00	0	—	3 (100.0%)[a]
Opal Street	1.00	0	—	3 (21.4%)[a]
Primera Flats	0.74	2	6 (8.8%)[a]	36 (52.9%)[a]
Rose Hills	0.22	0	—	7 (77.8%)[a]
Sentinel Boys	0.77	0	—	6 (46.2%)[a]
State Street	0.51	0	—	21 (60.0%)[a]
The Mob Crew	2.39	2	25 (48.1%)[a]	18 (34.6%)[a]
Tiny Boys	0.93	3	9 (16.7%)[a]	30 (55.6%)[a]
Vicky's Town	1.36	2	4 (18.2%)[a]	4 (18.2%)[a]
Group Average	**1.12**	**1.17**	**12.25 (30.4%)[a]**	**17.33 (50.8%)[a]**

[a] Percent of the network.

Overall, members from either group, enjoined or non-enjoined, are weakly connected with the average gang member having just over one tie to a fellow associate. Other similarities between enjoined or non-enjoined gangs include the percent of network that is composed of

isolates and the proportion of gang members connected to each other in the largest component. Approximately half of a gang's network is made up of isolates with non-enjoined gangs (51 percent) having a slightly greater proportion of isolates than enjoined gangs (46 percent). Also, the average size of the largest component in an enjoined gang's network is approximately a fourth of its total number of members involved in an FI stop and a non-enjoined gang's network is a third of the total number of members involved in an FI stop.

The similarities between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs end when looking at the number of components that consist of more than three connected gang members in a network. When compared to the average non-enjoined gang network, the average network for an enjoined gang consists of more than double the number of these larger components. Yet, when this disparity is examined more closely, it is noticeable that the number of large components in both the Big Hazard and White Fence gangs, whose networks converged after being enjoined, skew these overall trends by having six and five components respectively. It is actually more common for an enjoined gang to only have one large component, exhibited by four of the seven enjoined gangs. Upon investigating the non-enjoined gangs more carefully, a somewhat similar trend is witnessed. Specifically, eight non-enjoined gangs (33 percent) lack any component composed of more than three gang members. Another nine gangs (38 percent) have only one large component, representing the most common trend. The seven remaining non-enjoined gangs (29 percent) vary in the number of large components from two to five.

I create a sociogram for each group to visually compare and contrast the similarities and differences between the social networks of an enjoined gang and a non-enjoined gang. Using data from Table 2.8, I select a gang best approximating what an average enjoined and non-enjoined gang would resemble. Clover best illustrates the network structure of an average

enjoined gang, while Breed Street represents the network structure of an average non-enjoined gang.

Figure 2.15 depicts Clover's social network, illustrating the gang's patterns of association amongst its members. A central component consisting of 14 interconnected gang members, comprising approximately a fourth of the entire gang, is distinguishable. This component represents a slightly larger proportion of Clover's network than the enjoined gang's group average. The overall composition of Clover's network is six dyads and one large component. This configuration slightly diverges from the average enjoined gang, which should be composed of at least two larger components. There are also 28 isolated gang members, representing 52 percent of Clover's network, a slightly larger proportion than the average enjoined gang. This large number of lone gang members in the network limits the average Clover gang member with just one tie to another member, slightly below the average enjoined member.



Figure 2.15: A Sociogram Displaying the Clover's Patterns of Association

It should also be noted that following the gang being enjoined, Clover's overall network structure has remained fairly stable (see Figure 2.14 for a comparison). While the average number of ties (mean degree) among Clover's gang members has slightly diminished, the number/proportion of gang members tied to a central component is approximately the same, along with the number/proportion of isolates in the network. The consistency of Clover's network structure provides conjecture that once a gang is enjoined, the influence exerted by a CGI on enjoined gang members to change their patterns of association transpires over the short-run (i.e., under two years). Following this shift in behavior, the members of an enjoined gang adapt their associating patterns, reaching a new equilibrium before becoming relatively static over the long-term.



Figure 2.16: A Sociogram Displaying the Breed Street's Patterns of Association

The average non-enjoined gang's patterns of association are depicted by Breed Street's sociogram presented in Figure 2.16. The overall network structure of Breed Street is very similar to Clover's network structure. While Breed Street lacks the dyads present in Clover's network,

there is one triad present and one large component of 13 gang members comprising 38 percent of Breed Street's social network. Breed Street also has a substantial amount of lone gang members present, with 53 percent of the network containing isolates. Again, it is the presence of these isolates that limits the average number of ties (mean degree) a gang member has to 1.18, which is slightly above the group average for a non-enjoined gang.

Overall, the network structure for an average enjoined gang and a non-enjoined gang consists of a singular principal component that is interconnected by a handful of key gang members. Yet, this component represents only a fraction of the gang. Instead, the majority of the gang is either loosely connected with pairs of gang members or non-connected individuals. The average network structure between each type of gang is remarkably similar; suggesting that being enjoined by a CGI does not significantly alter a gang's patterns of association and does not reduce the overall connectedness of the average enjoined gang. Instead, these case studies suggest that after an initial short-run shock, observed in the pre/post sample, the group behavior of the enjoined gang adapts to the CGI by shifting and creating a new durable arrangement amongst its members.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

This chapter was setup with the primary objective of examining the relationship between a CGI and a gang's patterns of association at both the individual and group-level. I answer Maxson and colleagues' (2005; p. 598) pronouncement that "knowledge about injunctions could be improved substantially by the inclusion of other data collection components," by using a unique dataset of official police observations, FI cards. This chapter is able to address the impact that CGIs have on enjoined gang members' behavior, specifically analyzing how enjoined gangs' patterns of association are affected. To examine the complex nature of gang behavior, this study

uses data of targeted gangs before and after enjoinment, along with data comparing enjoined and non-enjoined gangs during the same time period. The analysis is split into two sections.

First, I investigated gang members' patterns of association and the enforcement patterns of police at the individual-/event-level. Chi-square tests of independence along with t-tests for interval data are used to identify any observable changes in either enjoined gang members' or law enforcement's behavior resulting from the CGI. Second, patterns of association at the group-level are analyzed through examining the structure of a gang's social network, "a necessary next step," to better understand how CGIs influence the socialization and interconnectedness of gang members (Maxson, et al., 2005; p. 601; Papachristos, 2013). Social network analysis provides an empirical technique to investigate how a CGI affects a gang's patterns of association, which would produce observable changes to the structure of a gang's social network. Unfortunately, the limited sample size of seven enjoined gangs and twenty-four non-enjoined gangs inhibits any meaningful statistical analysis of these networks. Acknowledging this shortcoming, I use a case study approach, allowing for a qualitative description of any observable trends to an enjoined gang's social network.

Results indicate that enjoining a gang influences the patterns of association of its members, directly affecting their routine activities in the short-run (i.e., within the first two years). As anticipated by the intention of a CGI, after a gang is enjoined, it's members are less likely to associate in public places, to be involved in pedestrian stops, or be observed hanging-out around their gang's set-space locations. There are fewer gang members associating together, decreasing an enjoined gang's observed group size. Enjoined gang members are also involved in fewer FIs, further indicating that these individuals are not being observed publicly representing their gang or associating with fellow gang members. These findings are consistent with recent research by

Hennigan and Sloane (2013; p. 28), which indicates that enjoined gang members report less time together in public than non-enjoined gang members indicating a significant reduction in the "street cohesion" of the gang.

Another strategy I used to ascertain the impact that CGIs have on an enjoined gang's group behavior was by comparing the patterns of association of the seven enjoined gangs to the twenty-four non-enjoined gangs during the same time period. Surprisingly, none of the findings from the former analysis statistically differentiated enjoined gang members from non-enjoined gang members. Instead, it was discovered that enjoined gang members are more likely than non-enjoined gang members to be found within their gang's claimed turf, suggesting that the enforcement of the CGI is discouraging enjoined gang members from traveling away from their gang's home area. These findings run contrary to the anticipated logic of a CGI that enjoinment would encourage gang members to abandon their gang's claimed territory and the local neighborhood to avoid increased police scrutiny.

It was also discovered that enjoined gang members are significantly more likely than non-enjoined gang members to be older. While this finding could be due to greater recognizably by law enforcement or a greater resiliency to police enforcement, measures (i.e., *time of day*, *police unit*, *documented FIs*) that would support these explanations do not significantly differentiate enjoined from non-enjoined gang members. Two more plausible explanations that could explain this finding are that enjoined gang members who are recently released from prison are less likely to be aware of the proscriptions against them or that enjoined individuals are actually desisting from gang life and may feel that the CGI no longer applies to them and knowingly violate the CGI (Lopez-Aguado, 2013). Support for these explanations is beyond the scope of the data and further evidence is required to fully ascertain why this difference in age is observed between

these two groups.

Another possible explanation for these non-statistically significant differences between the characteristics of enjoined and non-enjoined gangs is that the influence of this anti-gang intervention targeting seven enjoined gangs could radiate through to the 16 proximate non-enjoined rivals (67 percent of the entire rivalry network, see Figure A.1 in Appendix), impacting these non-enjoined gangs' patterns of association, mimicking the patterns of association of enjoined gangs. Tita and colleagues (2003) witnessed a similar pattern while performing a gun violence reduction intervention in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. They propose that a tailored response by law enforcement focusing on a particular set of gangs could affect the activity patterns of surrounding gangs (Tita et al., 2003). Future research should investigate the indirect influence that CGIs have on enjoined gang rivals' patterns of association.

Yet, gangs are more than just the sum of their members. The extant literature (Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith & Tobin, 2003) has reported that the group process facilitates a change in the behavior of gang members, usually in a negative way (e.g., increasing substance abuse, delinquency, and violence). I suspect that this group process is why CGIs are able to influence enjoined gang members' patterns of association; yet, the gang's response to being enjoined varies. Using social network analysis, I examine changes at the group-level investigating how the network structure of seven enjoined gangs is influenced by the changing associating patterns of gang members. Two diverging patterns were discovered. More structured and connected gangs prior to enjoinment had their social networks disrupted; indicating that the patterns of association among the enjoined gang members was inhibited. Conversely, gangs that were loosely tied together, lacking a prominent component, responded to the CGI by coalescing, producing a more interconnected gang with a noticeable structure. As

forewarned by Maxson and colleagues (2003; 2005), CGIs have the ability to decrease or increase the cohesiveness of a gang. However, this impact also appears to dilute with time since the overall network structure of the average enjoined gang did not substantially differ from the network structure of the average non-enjoined gang.

Furthermore, recent research by Hennigan and Sloane (2013; p.32) suggests that how a CGI is implemented has "an impact on the strength of identification with the gang" indicating that enjoined gang members with weaker associations to their gang were also less likely to participate in gang-related crime and violence. It is possible that the phenomenon outlined by Hennigan and Sloane (2013) is producing the differing responses observed in this chapter by the enjoined gangs. Thus, a CGI placed on a gang whose members have a stronger group than individual identity will not produce the anticipated and desired effect of inhibiting the patterns of association among enjoined gang members and disrupting the gang's ability to act collectively. Instead, a CGI placed upon gangs whose members strongly identify with the gang would respond to enjoinment as an outside attack on their group identity, solidifying the group and strengthening the overall ties to the gang (Maxson et al., 2003; Hennigan & Sloane, 2013).

An additional question addressed by this chapter was how CGIs influence the behavior of law enforcement, specifically their willingness to complete an FI. While this is extremely difficult to examine, several measures were included in the analysis; *type of police unit*, *time of occurrence* (curfew), and the number of *documented FIs*. Consistent findings were revealed in both the pre/post and the enjoined/non-enjoined samples. None of the measures included in the analysis to ascertain if law enforcement is actively targeting enjoined gang members showed any statistical differences, either before or after a gang's enjoinment or between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that CGIs are being applied as

designed, influencing a gang's patterns of association while not modifying the patterns of enforcement by police.

It is important to note that while these data permit a different type of examination into how CGIs influence an enjoined street gang's patterns of association, there are some important limitations. First, these FI data are not random encounters. While the analysis attempts to control for police behavior, there remains extensive discretion by LAPD officers in documenting encounters they have with civilians (Beckett & Herbert, 2010). Police complete FIs for a number of reasons, including traffic stops, parole/probation searches, calls for service, investigations, field observations, and consensual encounters. While a FI card should be recorded for every interaction with a civilian, this is probably not the case. Yet, while not every encounter may produce an FI card, LAPD needs to continually document the associations between gang members for future criminal cases. The regular documentation of gang members loitering together highlights their ongoing gang activity in the community to criminal justice actors (Det. Victor "Cheech" Marin, personal communication, February 15, 2012). Therefore, while being a conservative estimate of gang members associations, one would expect that FI cards are completed when officers encounter groups of gang members to thoroughly document all the individuals observed associating with known gang members.

A second limitation is the overall generalizability of this study due to the limited number of gangs that were investigated. The pre/post sample included only the seven enjoined gangs while the enjoined/non-enjoined sample included all thirty-one active street gangs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. Having such a small sample size at the group-level makes it difficult to provide any meaningful statistical analysis of the structural measures in an enjoined gang's social network, restricting my approach to a descriptive analysis of any observable changes

witnessed in an enjoined gang's sociogram.

A third limitation is the relational data used for each gang's social network does not incorporate the strength of ties between gang members (i.e., frequency that members are observed associating with each other). This being the first study to examine how a CGI influence a gang's patterns of association, I decided to focus on whether the gang as a whole was impacted. It is possible that enjoined gang members restrict their associations to a limited number of gang members, or even just one, but do so more frequently. Continuing research should incorporate the frequency of associations to better understand how individual gang members shift their patterns of association.

Another limitation was the intra-gang nature of the social networks constructed for my analysis. The focus of the analysis was on a CGI's relationship with an enjoined gang, therefore each gang's network is composed around a particular group, ignoring inter-gang ties and associations with non-affiliated individuals. Recent research (Pyrooz et al., 2012; Roman, Cahill, Lachman, Lowry, Orosco, McCarty, Denver & Pedroza, 2012) has suggested that the inclusion of both types of actors is important to completely understand the complexity of gang dynamics. Future research examining CGIs may want to incorporate these individuals when constructing the social networks of enjoined gangs.

Lastly, while gang research (Klein & Maxson, 2006; Esbensen & Maxson, 2012) has been able to discover general trends and patterns, gangs remain a unique, localized phenomenon that develop from the "situation complex," an interaction of both social and geographic influence (Thrasher, 1927). The localized phenomenon of gangs may limit the generalizability of these findings to the type of gang that is being investigated in this study. Specifically, these are intergenerational gangs composed predominantly of Mexican-American males and are

"traditional" in nature, having a strong spatial affinity with their claimed turf (Valdez, 2003; Klein & Maxson, 2006). CGIs are designed to target territorially aggressive groups, and it seems unlikely that they would be imposed on a type of gang (e.g., a "specialty" gang) that is not spatially entrenched.

Despite these limitations, the findings have important implications for the continued rationale and use of CGIs. It seems evident from this chapter that CGIs are able to influence the patterns of association of enjoined gang members, at least in the short term. The findings suggest that a CGI produces an initial shock to an enjoined gang, either reducing or facilitating public associations among members, followed by a new and relatively stable equilibrium being established in the wake of a CGI. This shock is best articulated by Father Greg Boyle, a veteran gang interventionist, "I mean, eight minutes after one was filed here on the Eastside, I had kids in my office saying, 'Get me a job'" (Fremon, 2003; p. 1).

These findings also indicate that while CGIs are able to inhibit the patterns of association among gang members at the individual-level, divergent findings are produced at the group-level, illustrating the complexity of gang behavior and the challenge of attempting to alter it. This chapter highlights the fact that in order for a CGI to be successful at disrupting a gang's patterns of association, law enforcement agencies must use FI card data to construct sociograms of gangs targeted with a CGI to better understand how the gang as a group could respond to forthcoming enjoinment. For instance, prior to enjoinment, if a gang's social network lacks a large interconnected component (e.g., Big Hazard in Figure 2.11), then placing a CGI upon the gang may not produce the anticipated results of breaking up the gang's social connections. Instead, the CGI could actually catalyze the enjoined gang to coalesce, strengthening the ties between members in resistance to be enjoined.

Although future research is necessary to truly understand the long-term influence that CGIs have on a gang and its members' patterns of association, the findings from this chapter could suggest that the indefinite lifespan of CGI may be overkill. Recent research by Beckett and Herbert (2010) examines the effects of legal hybridity, the combining of civil and criminal law (e.g., a CGI) as tool of urban social control by law enforcement (i.e., a CGI), and highlights the dramatic consequences that can be produced from utilizing such strategies. Beckett and Herbert (2010) argue that the use of legal hybridity allows for vast increases in police authority and discretion, while reducing individuals' due process rights and civil liberties, and inflating the criminal justice system through the ensnarement of noncriminal actors. Since, CGIs appear to only impact gang associations in the interim, it may be reasonable to curtail a CGIs permanence from forever to an abbreviated time period, thereby reducing the infringement against an enjoined gang member's civil liberties. A tempering of the CGI mechanism in this manner would be able to address problematic gang activity in a neighborhood without disengaging local community residents from buying into this form of urban social control (Branson-Potts, 2013).

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CHAPTER 3: Investigating the Relationship Between Civil Gang Injunctions and the Characteristics of Gang Homicide

INTRODUCTION

Previous research has examined the differences between gang and non-gang homicides (Maxson, Gordon & Klein, 1985; Curry & Spergel, 1988; Decker & Curry, 2002), even disaggregating gang homicides to investigate the differences between gang-motivated, gang-affiliated, and non-gang homicides (Rosenfeld, Bray, & Egley, 1999). Homicide research (Krivo & Peterson, 2000; Kubrin, 2003; Pyrooz, 2012) regularly relies on disaggregating homicidal events to better determine the empirical efficacy of covariates, producing better-specified models and improving theoretical perspectives to provide a greater comprehension of the factors that facilitate homicide. Building upon these earlier studies, this chapter investigates if civil gang injunctions (CGIs) influence the characteristics of gang homicides to better understand if disparities between the characteristics of gang and non-gang homicides remain after a CGI is placed upon a gang. Criminal justice actors praise CGIs at effectively reducing violent crime, specifically gang violence, but empirical research investigating how CGIs specifically influence gang violence is lacking. For this chapter, I use routine activities theory as a framework to better understand how CGIs are able to manipulate the behavior of motivated offenders (i.e., enjoined gang members) and suitable targets (i.e., enjoined gang members), thereby altering the patterns and characteristics of gang violence. As discussed in Chapter 2, CGIs are able to influence gang members' patterns of association, inhibiting the likelihood that groups of enjoined gang members congregate in public thereby, constricting the ability of these motivated individuals to engage in a collective criminal act. Also, by discouraging the loitering of large groups of enjoined gang members in public diminishes the group's suitability as a target for rival gang members.

Gang scholars have indicated the existence of "a relationship between individual

criminality and gang membership" with the gang reinforcing or encouraging such deviant behavior (Moore & Vigil, 1987; p. 28). CGIs are designed to disrupt the "street cohesion" of the gang through inhibiting gang members from associating together in public (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013; p. 20). The belief is that by disbanding the gang from gathering in public, a CGI reduces the enjoined gang's strength, reputation, and cooperation in criminal activity and gang-related violence (Thomas, Issacs & Riordan, 2009). For instance, Moore and Vigil (1987) observe that individual gang members, or in concert with a fellow homeboy or homegirl, would sometimes engage in a violent act, begging the question: "Was this gang-related violence? Gang members would fiercely contest such an interpretation. They would argue that it was not a gang activity, but an individual activity" (Moore, 1990; p. 169). I expect that the enactment of a CGI will facilitate a shift from group activity to individual activity since a CGI disrupts the socialization of the gang, inhibiting the group's collectivity, thereby diminishing the cohesiveness and influence of the gang on its members. Furthermore, I expect that gang violence involving an enjoined gang member will revolve around an individual's proclivities and not be facilitated by the gang's resolve.

Routine activities theory suggests that by altering the day-to-day activity patterns of an individual (i.e. prohibiting an enjoined gang member's nuisance behaviors) would reduce his suitability as a target and restrict opportunities for this individual to be a motivated offender. For instance, a CGI should diminish the likelihood that an enjoined gang is able to be attacked by a rival, impacting the distinguishing characteristics of these homicide events. If the enactment of a CGI eliminates large groups of gang members congregating in public, then there are fewer potential rival gangs or "suitable targets" available for an offender. Furthermore, enjoined gang members would no longer be loitering in visible, public spaces (e.g., street corner, park,

recreation centers, etc.), instead shifting their congregating patterns around private residences or locations out of the purview of law enforcement, as observed in Chapter 2. Routine activities theory would predict that these more cloistered areas increase the effort, risk, and difficulty for a motivated offender to attack an enjoined gang member, decreasing the likelihood that enjoined gang members would be involved in displays of public gang violence. It would be expected that enjoined gang members will be more withdrawn from the group and the violence directed at these enjoined gang members will be more individualized and less visible, than the typical gang drive-by, requiring an offender to approach their target covertly, alone, and on foot (Felson & Boba, 2010).

To investigate the relationship between CGIs and gang-related violence, I disaggregate gang homicides into two types, enjoined and non-enjoined, to examine how CGIs influence the characteristics of gang violence. Routine activities theory articulates that a crime results from the convergence in space and time of a motivated offender locating a suitable target that is lacking a capable guardian. It has been shown in the previous chapter that CGIs impact enjoined gang members' patterns of association, thereby impacting these individual's activity patterns. A CGI is able to influence each element of routine activities theory, affecting the activity patterns of enjoined gang members (i.e., motivated offenders), restricting the loitering of enjoined gang members (i.e., suitable targets) in public, and increasing law enforcement's (i.e., capable guardian) ability to regulate the movements of enjoined gang members. Thus, a CGI is able to disrupt enjoined gang members' day-to-day activities and diminish the likelihood that these enjoined individuals would be involved in a criminal act, particularly gang violence.

Specifically, I expect that the incident characteristics for an enjoined gang homicide (e.g., location of the event, number of suspects involved, type of weapon used, motivation) will be

affected by the presence of a CGI. Conversely, without being restricted by a CGI, I expect that non-enjoined gang homicides will continue to resemble the traditional gang homicide depicted in the existing literature (Maxson et al., 1985; Curry & Spergel, 1988; Maxson, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 1999; Decker & Curry, 2002; Pizarro & McGloin, 2006). Previous research also indicates that gang-related homicides involve more shots fired and thus more shots impacting the victim (Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler, Hoffer & Julian, 1989; Sanders, 1994; Hutson et al., 1996).

Yet, a CGI reduces the number of enjoined gang members from congregating in public together, reducing the potential number of suitable targets. By shifting gang members away from public spaces and into private spaces, it increases the difficulty, risk and effort required for a motivated offender to attack an enjoined gang member. By changing an enjoined gang member's patterns of association, I anticipate that the features, particularly incident characteristics, which are associated with an enjoined gang homicide, will be discernibly different from other gang homicides and actually resemble the characteristics associated with a non-gang homicide. For instance, since gang members are discouraged from loitering in public, I would expect enjoined gang homicides to be less likely to occur outside on public streets and instead to transpire in private, residential areas. Conversely, I expect members of an enjoined gang who perpetrate an enjoined gang homicide to be more likely acting on their own initiative directly confronting the victim, instead of colluding with the group. Regardless of an enjoined gang member's role (i.e., suspect or victim) in a homicide, there will be both fewer shots fired and fewer shots penetrating the victim. Additionally, because CGIs do not directly influence the activity patterns of gang members who are not sanctioned by a CGI, I expect the characteristics associated with non-enjoined gang homicides to mirror those traditionally observed in gang homicides.

To consider how CGIs impact the characteristics of gang violence, I explore these distinctions with data from the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area in the city of Los Angeles, over a ten year period following the enjoinment of the Krazy Ass Mexicans (KAM) on January 16, 2003, the initial CGI implemented in the Division. First, I describe the data and explore the trends in gang violence over this decade in both Hollenbeck and the city of Los Angeles. This study is the first to investigate the relationship between CGIs and the features of gang violence; therefore, I compare non-gang homicides and gang homicides with respect to the attributes of these homicide incidents. This comparison allows for the results to be interpreted in relation to the previous research conducted on gang homicide (Maxson et al., 1985; Curry & Spergel, 1988; Maxson, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 1999; Decker & Curry, 2002; Pizarro & McGloin, 2006), along with providing a foundation for the subsequent analyses to reference. Next, I investigate if disparities in the incident characteristics exist between enjoined gang, non-enjoined gang, and non-gang homicides. The goal is to better understand if CGIs influence the incident features of enjoined gang violence, diminishing the disparity between enjoined gang homicides and non-gang homicides.

DATA

The data used in these analyses are from all homicides known to the LAPD (n = 253)[35] in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area from January 16, 2003 to January 13, 2013, a ten year period following the enactment of the division's first CGI. The data are manually gathered from the individual homicide case files stored at the station. Each case file consists of at least one large binder with detailed information about the incident, the participants, and the subsequent investigation. The wealth of information provided by each case allowed for the utilization of my

[35] While there were 253 homicides within this ten year period, 12 of those incidents were multiple homicides. As such, the incident characteristics for these events were only counted once leaving 241 unique homicide events.

own coding scheme based upon the events, without relying upon police classifications. Another benefit of using my own coding scheme is maintaining a consistent categorization of events and variables, reducing the risk that changes in policing practices over this decade long research period has affected the analyses. Below, I discuss how each event was categorized along with providing detailed explanations of how I coded the incident characteristics for each homicide.

Analytic Strategy

To ascertain if any characteristics significantly differ among the three types of homicide; enjoined, non-enjoined, and non-gang, this section replicates the methods of previous studies comparing gang and non-gang homicides (Maxson, et al., 1985; Rosenfeld, et al., 1999), using chi-square tests of independence on 2x2 and 2xN contingency tables along with t-tests on interval data. This chapter's analyses will be divided into three sections. The first section compares gang (both enjoined and non-enjoined) and non-gang homicides, ascertaining if the features described in the extant literature differentiate gang events from non-gang events in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. In the next section I disaggregate gang homicides, comparing the incident characteristics of enjoined gang events and non-gang events, then enjoined gang events to non-enjoined gang events. The ultimate goal is to determine if CGIs are able to influence the indicators of gang homicides that involve enjoined gang members.

MEASURES

Defining Gang Homicides

Prior studies (Grogger, 2002; LACCGJ, 2004) have broadly looked at how CGIs impact crime, but there is no previous research looking at how CGIs may influence homicide, especially homicides involving gang members. Therefore, I build upon prior work in Chicago (Curry & Spergel, 1988), Los Angeles (Maxson et al., 1985; Maxson, 1999), Newark (Pizarro & McGloin,

2006) and St. Louis (Rosenfeld et al., 1999; Decker & Curry, 2002), to examine the differences between gang homicides (n = 175) and non-gang homicides (n = 66). After investigating the characteristics between gang and non-gang homicides, which have been documented in the existing literature, I disaggregate gang homicides into enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides to ascertain what similarities and differences exist.

A debate remains within the literature on how to define a "gang" homicide, (Maxson & Klein, 1990; 1996). Since the data for this chapter is gathered directly from gang homicides known to the LAPD, I was able to code these events as either member- or motive- based. The motive-based definition requires that the homicide event resulted as a direct function of gang activity (e.g., retaliation, territoriality, recruitment, etc.), while a member-based designation is more broadly defined to include any homicide in which any participant, victim or suspect, is affiliated with a gang.

I use a member-based definition in my examination because CGIs are intended to influence the behavior of all enjoined gang members, and not just members whose actions are motivated directly by the gang. Also, a member-based definition errs by capturing incidents that may be motivated solely by an individual member's purpose, "after all, gang members can and do act of their own accord." In contrast, a motive-based definition errs by "sampling too heavily on the dependent variable by capturing only those cases in which a group motive was determined" (Papachristos, 2009; p. 86). I do include a motive classification for each event, so no information is discarded through this approach. Previous research has also indicated that regardless of a member- or motive- definition being applied to a gang homicide, the same variables statistically distinguish a gang homicide from a non-gang homicide and for "all intents and purposes

identical" results are produced (Maxson & Klein; 1996 p.10).[36] Lastly, utilizing the member-based definition enables me to capture a broader range of individual and group behaviors that are involved in producing these violent acts.

It should be noted that the LAPD also use a member-based definition in documenting these types of events. The Department Manual (Line Procedures 4/269.10) articulates that "any crime may constitute a gang-related crime when the suspect or victim is an active or affiliate gang member, or when circumstances indicate that the crime is consistent with gang activity." Maxson and Klein (1990) provide a near identical definition used by the LAPD in 1980, supporting the stability of the department's designation practices over the last 30 years.

Disaggregating Gang Homicides

To specifically examine how CGIs influence gang violence, I disaggregate gang homicides into two categories: enjoined gang and non-enjoined gang homicides. I code a murder as an enjoined gang homicide (n = 48) if either participant, victim or suspect, is affiliated with a gang under an active CGI. The remainder of gang homicides, those not involving an enjoined gang member, I code as a non-enjoined gang homicide (n = 127).

Incident Characteristics

The first variable of interest that I believe would likely differ among these various types of homicides is the location of the event, which I categorize as either taking place on the street, in some other public space (e.g., alleys, parking lots, parks, businesses, or housing projects), or at an individual's residence. Next, I code if the incident took place *inside* (1 = inside and 0 = outside) of a building. Lastly, I categorize incidents into the type *space* (1= private and 0 = public) where the event transpires. This categorization was guided by Newman's (1979)

[36] Incidents involving drug aspects (i.e., drug sales, drug motivated or cocaine involvement) varied by the definitional approach (Maxson & Klein, 1996).

descriptions of urban space. It is expected that placing a CGI on a targeted gang will discourage its members from loitering outside on the street in public spaces, affecting the places where violence involving enjoined gangs transpires.

Prior research has shown that over 90 percent of gang homicides involve firearms, with handguns (65 percent) being the predominant weapon utilized (Hutson, Anglin & Eckstein, 1996; Katz, Maguire & Choate, 2011; Egley, 2012). Keeping this in mind, I operationalized a variable capturing if a *handgun* was used in commission of the homicide (1 = yes and 0 = no). Further examining the nature of gun violence, I operationalize variables for each incident indicating if *multiple shots were fired* at the victim (1 = yes and 0 = no) and if *multiple shots impacted* the victim (1 = yes and 0 = no).

From a routine activities perspective, time of day, day of the week and even seasonality are expected to influence the activity patterns of gang members, thereby impacting gang-related violence. During my field observations, LAPD officers routinely shared with me their conventional wisdom about how warmer weather encourages gang activity, thereby increasing the levels of crime and violence. Therefore, several indicators were created to investigate the impact of "time." First, I break up the year into fall, winter, spring and summer to examine the impact of *seasonality*. According to the statements I observed from LAPD officers, I expect that the summer months, being the warmest time period, would experience an uptick in gang violence.[37] Next, to examine the differences in violence during the week, a variable, *weekend* (1 = weekend and 0 = weekday), was created. On the weekends, youth are not attending school and many young adults are recreating, contributing to greater likelihood that gang members are active in the neighborhood and socializing outside in public areas (Chambliss, 1973; Vigil,

[37] Additionally, the summer months would also capture the time period that the majority of youth are not attending school, are more likely to be out in public spaces, and have a greater likelihood of being potential victims or offenders in a crime.

2007). Thus, I expect there would be a greater likelihood of gang violence occurring on Saturday and Sunday than throughout the rest of the week.[38] Lastly, a variable was constructed to see if gang violence is more likely to transpire at *night*. I coded all events (1 = night and 0 = day) according to the sunrise and sunset for each particular day of year. Since, youth are not in school in the evening and many individuals are finished with work by sunset, I expect there to be a greater likelihood that gang violence will occur in the evening, particularly for gang members enjoined by a CGI. Because a CGI includes a curfew[39] restricting any enjoined gang member, including unaccompanied individuals, from being in public, I anticipate that enjoined gang members will be less likely to be involved in gang violence in the evening since they are discouraged from being outside in public areas at night.

To account for the number of participants that are involved in an incident, I use several measures to determine what differences may exist between enjoined gang, non-enjoined gang and non-gang homicides. Literature on gang homicide indicates that these events typically involve *multiple suspects* and *victims*. As such, I decided to code each of these variables dichotomously (1 = multiple individuals and 0 = a singular individual) to simplify comparisons.

Gang research has also indicated that gangs routinely employ the drive-by as a technique to attack rival gangs (Klein, 1971; Sanders, 1994; Huff, 1996; Valdez, Cepeda & Kaplan, 2009; Vasquez, Lickel & Hennigan, 2010). Another study on the behavior patterns of Chicano gangs in East Los Angeles suggests that it is not uncommon for gang members to reside outside of their claimed turf and to routinely travel back to these locations to socialize (Moore, Vigil, & Garcia, 1983). Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that a vehicle is used in returning to their gang's turf,

[38] A less conservative version of this variable was created which included any event that took place between Friday at 5pm and Sunday at midnight. The results described below were identical to the more conservative measure.

[39] For the CGIs in this study, the curfew begins at 10pm and continues until sunrise. For an example see People v. Krazy Ass Mexicans (2003; p 3).

thus being accessible to perform a directed attack at a rival if needed. Remaining consistent with previous research, this study defines a *drive-by* (1 = yes and 0 = no) as an incident in which one gang member discharges a firearm towards a rival gang member from a moving vehicle.

Guided by previous research (Tita & Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Tita, 2009), I created five mutually exclusive dichotomous variables: *gang*, *drug*, *dispute*, *domestic/romantic*, and *other* (i.e., accidental, crime, self-defense, mental illness or business related) to capture the suspect's primary motive of the homicide. Any incident that was drug-related or substance induced was coded as drug. The majority of these drug-related incidents (93 percent) were centered on drug dealing, arguments between participants, or dealer stickups. Two of the twenty-eight homicides (seven percent) were facilitated by drug use. A homicide was coded as gang motivated if it involved initiation practices, inter- or intra- gang disputes, retaliation, or impulsive attacks. Homicides involving gang members were only coded as gang-motivated if it was a decisive act that contributed to that individual maintaining his gang status. Otherwise, a homicide with a participating gang member was coded based upon the primary motive (e.g., *dispute*, *domestic/romantic*, or *other).*

Homicides that involved domestic disputes and romantic love interests (e.g., love triangles) were grouped together. Generally, these events involve family or intimates, and tend to have a much different character than the other motive categories. A *dispute* involves any type of argument or fight that escalates into a murder. These events can be spontaneous actions or stem from an existing feud between the participants. Finally, the *other* category includes homicides that were accidental (10), self-defense (4), business related (5), facilitated by mental illness (1), were the by-product of another crime (5), matter of opinion (1) or unknown (24).

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the incident characteristics associated with all homicides in the dataset. The majority of homicides take place outside (69 percent) and in public spaces (66 percent). Homicides are also more likely to occur on the street (51 percent) or in an adjacent area, such as an alley, parking lot, park, business, or public housing (18 percent).

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Incident Characteristics for all Homicides (N=241).

Characteristics	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Location				
Street	0.510	0.501	0	1
Other Public	0.178	0.384	0	1
Residence	0.311	0.464	0	1
Inside	0.340	0.475	0	1
Private Space	0.311	0.464	0	1
Time of Day				
Night	0.656	0.476	0	1
Day of Week				
Weekend	0.407	0.492	0	1
Season				
Winter	0.216	0.412	0	1
Spring	0.307	0.462	0	1
Summer	0.253	0.436	0	1
Fall	0.224	0.418	0	1
Weapons				
Handgun	0.805	0.397	0	1
Multiple Shots Fired	0.817	0.388	0	1
Multiple Shots Impacted	0.629	0.484	0	1
Drive-By	0.191	0.394	0	1
Number of Participants				
Multiple Suspects	0.332	0.472	0	1
Multiple Victims	0.228	0.421	0	1
Motivation				
Gang	0.282	0.451	0	1
Drug	0.112	0.316	0	1
Dispute	0.278	0.449	0	1
Domestic	0.154	0.361	0	1
Other	0.174	0.380	0	1

Homicides are more likely to transpire in the evening (66 percent) and during the week (59 percent). In general, there is a fairly even distribution of homicides throughout the year, with a

slight peak in spring (31 percent) and dip in fall and winter (22 percent). The ubiquity of firearms is visible with handguns (81 percent) being a common facilitator of a homicide, with multiple shots being fired (82 percent) and multiple bullets impacting the victim (63 percent). Also, homicides are primarily direct encounters between one suspect (67 percent) and one victim (78 percent). The motivations that drive these violent encounters are distributed across all five categories, with drug-related matters (11 percent) being the most infrequent and disputes and gang-related (28 percent) issues being the most common. Also, employing the drive-by shooting (19 percent) is infrequently observed in the data.

Trends in Gang Homicide in the City of Los Angeles

Figure 3.1 displays the yearly trends in gang (purple) and non-gang (yellow) homicides for the city of Los Angeles from 2003 through 2012.[40] As illustrated in the figure, the city of Los Angeles experienced a remarkable decline (42 percent) in the total number of homicides over this ten year period, with both gang (43 percent) and non-gang (42 percent) homicides dropping by approximately the same amount (the dynamic trends in homicide from 1964 to 2003 are displayed in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). After 2008, both gang and non-gang homicides settled into a new equilibrium, at approximately 300 homicides a year. These city-level patterns suggest that the policies and strategies employed by the LAPD did not encourage a more precipitous decline in gang homicides than non-gang homicides. The decline observed is gradual and incremental over the decade, suggesting that the LAPD were not targeting any specific type of violence (e.g., gang-related) but was, instead, concentrating on inhibiting all forms of violence. I would anticipate a more dramatic shift in gang homicides if the LAPD were specifically focusing on reducing gang violence.

[40] Gang-related homicides are determined by the LAPD and not from my own personal coding scheme, however, the LAPD also use a member-based definition as articulated by the Department Manual (Line Procedures 4/269.10).



Figure 3.1: Gang and non-gang homicides within the city of Los Angeles, 2003 - 2012.

*Source: Los Angeles Police Department

Trends in Gang Homicide in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area

Consistent with patterns experienced in Los Angeles, the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area mirrors the overall homicide trends witnessed by the city. Figure 3.2 displays the trends in gang and non-gang homicides in Hollenbeck from January 16, 2003 to January 13, 2013. Each bar represents the yearly number of homicides by category, non-gang (yellow), non-enjoined gang (dark purple), or enjoined gang (light purple).



Figure 3.2: Trends in enjoined gang, non-enjoined gang, and non-gang homicides in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area, January 16, 2003 - January 13, 2013.

*A non-enjoined gang homicide occurred in 2013 prior to January 13 is included in the 2012 totals.
Source: Los Angeles Police Department

There are five observable trends in the data. First, a downward trend (20 percent) in total homicides is witnessed in Hollenbeck over this ten year period. This decline corresponds with the citywide patterns observed in Figure 3.1.

Second, the overall number of homicides, particularly those involving gangs, declines substantially following 2007, finding a new equilibrium and remaining stable through 2012. Hollenbeck's drop in gang homicides generally corresponds with the decline in gang homicides observed citywide throughout Los Angeles, which actually begin a year earlier in 2006. Another way to interpret the trend observed in Hollenbeck is that gang homicides are regressing to the mean. That is, an increase in gang violence took place from 2004 through 2007, and from 2008

to 2012 the levels of gang violence returned to the levels observed in 2003, prior to this escalation.

Third, while yearly fluctuations occur during this ten year period, non-gang homicides remain consistently stable, averaging 27 percent of Hollenbeck's total homicides. This average is considerably lower than the city of Los Angeles's total of non-gang homicides, averaging 45 percent of the city's total homicides.

Fourth, with the stability of non-gang homicides across this time period, the dramatic decrease in homicides appears to be driven by a reduction in gang-related homicides (both enjoined and non-enjoined). It is not clear why gang homicides substantially declined in Hollenbeck after 2007, but I propose one possibility is the accumulation of CGIs contributing to the observed shifts in the levels of gang homicide. Enjoining seven of Hollenbeck's most problematic and oldest gangs in a short four year time period, particularly the last two, and CGIs being enacted against four of those gangs within three months, could have facilitated both a specific and a general deterrent effect, influencing the patterns of violence not only among the seven enjoined gangs but also among the other twenty-four non-enjoined gangs. All of Hollenbeck's gangs are interconnected through a rivalry network (see Figure A.1 in Appendix), therefore, the impact of an intervention targeting specific gangs could radiate through the network, influencing not only the behavior patterns of the targeted gangs, but also rivals of these targeted gangs, who are able to observe the impact of these interventions firsthand. Tita et al. (2003) observed a similar pattern during an intervention aimed at reducing gun violence in Hollenbeck. They suggest that a tailored response by law enforcement focusing on a particular set of gangs, such as a CGI, could affect the activity patterns of surrounding gangs, and actually decrease their criminal activity.

Fifth, there is a notable increase in the number of enjoined gang homicides in 2006 and 2007. To better understand this pattern I looked at Hollenbeck's CGI record of service register, which documents the dates gang members are officially given CGI paperwork, notifying them that are now enjoined.[41] Figure 3.3 shows the yearly trend of enjoined gang members over a ten year period. Prior to September 9, 2005 there were only two gangs with CGIs placed on them. Within these two gangs were a total of 136 enjoined gang members. In 2006 and 2007, the period with the increase in gang homicides involving enjoined gang members, there were an additional 258 gang members enjoined, from all seven gangs. It seems likely that this 153 percent increase in the number of enjoined gang members corresponds with the brief increase in the number of enjoined gang homicides in 2006 and 2007. Interestingly, after 2007 there were 253 more gang members enjoined, yet, during this same period the number of enjoined gang homicides occurred less frequently.



Figure 3.3: Trends in the number of enjoined gang members, 2003 - 2012.

* Source: Los Angeles Police Department

[41] It should be noted that even though the Los Angeles City Attorney has sued all of the enjoined gangs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area as unincorporated criminal corporations, with the court requiring only one individual from an enjoined gang to be notified of the CGI for the entire gang to be notified, the LAPD still document the gang members that they serve CGI paperwork to, along with date, time and the LAPD officer who served the enjoined gang member.

The patterns indicated by this trend provide background for the more nuanced comparisons of enjoined gang, non-enjoined gang and non-gang homicide in Hollenbeck that follow. While one may speculate that the cumulative enactment of CGIs contributed to the reduction in observed gang homicides in Hollenbeck during this ten year period, it is difficult to assess this hypothesis since the overall trends in homicide, including gang homicides, were in a state of decline during most of this time period. Even if CGIs influenced the level of gang-related homicides in Hollenbeck, it remains unknown if the enactment of CGIs has impacted the features of gang-related homicides, particularly those involving enjoined gangs.

Below I examine the incident characteristics, which have historically distinguished gang-related homicides as unique events. First, I compare gang and non-gang homicides establishing a "ground truth" for Hollenbeck and ascertain if the features described in the extant literature differentiate gang events from non-gang events. Next, I disaggregate gang homicides, comparing the incident characteristics of enjoined gang events to non-enjoined gang events and enjoined gang events to non-gang events. The goal is to ascertain if CGIs influence the characteristics of enjoined gang homicides, precipitating a change in the features that distinguish them from non-gang and non-enjoined gang homicides.

Discovering "Ground Truth: Gang v. Non-gang Homicides

No previous research has investigated how a CGI influences gang homicides, therefore it is necessary to first discover if the characteristics of a gang homicide in Hollenbeck is consistent with prior research (Maxson et al., 1985; Rosenfeld, et al., 1999; Decker & Curry, 2002; Pizarro & McGloin; 2006). I compare the incident characteristics of gang and non-gang homicides.[42]

[42]This study's focus is on examining how the proscriptions of a CGI influence gang violence; there is no expectation that CGIs are able to change the characteristics (i.e., age, sex, ethnicity) of a gang member that participates in an event. As a precaution I conducted tests (see Tables A.1, A.3, A.4, and A.5 in the Appendix) comparing the participant characteristics between homicides types. Results are consistent with existing gang research.

Table 3.2 displays a comparison between the two types of homicide. The findings indicate that gang homicides are more likely to occur in public spaces (4.063, $P < 0.050$), outside (5.290, $P < 0.050$), on the street (7. 849, $P < 0.050$), and predominantly involve the use of a handgun (45.506, $P < 0.001$) in the commission of the crime. Gang homicides also tend to involve more suspects (7.849, $P < 0.010$) than non-gang homicides; however, there are no statistical differences observed in the number of victims murdered during an event. Not surprisingly, the motivation for homicides involving gang members are centered around gang-related matters (35.726, $P < 0.001$), while non-gang homicides are much more likely to be facilitated by domestic disputes (22.212, $P < 0.001$).

Table 3.2: Incident Characteristics for Gang and Non-gang Homicides

	Gang (N = 175)		**Non-gang (N = 66)**		**Association & Significance**
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Location					**7.849***
Street	99	56.6%	24	36.4%	
Other Public	28	16.0%	15	22.7%	
Residence	48	27.4%	27	40.9%	
Inside	52	29.7%	30	45.5%	**5.290***
Outside	123	70.3%	36	54.6%	
Private Space	48	27.4%	27	40.9%	**4.063***
Public Space	127	72.6%	39	59.1%	
Time of Day					N.S.
Day	60	34.3%	23	34.9%	
Night	115	65.7%	43	65.2%	
Day of Week					N.S.
Weekday	99	56.6%	44	66.7%	
Weekend	76	43.4%	22	33.3%	
Season					N.S.
Winter	38	21.7%	14	21.2%	
Spring	59	33.7%	15	22.7%	
Summer	41	23.4%	20	30.3%	
Fall	37	21.1%	17	25.8%	
Weapons					
Handgun	159	90.9%	34	51.5%	**45.506*****
Other	16	9.1%	32	48.5%	

Table 3.2: Incident Characteristics for Gang and Non-gang Homicides

	Gang (N = 175)		Non-gang (N = 66)		Association & Significance
	N	%	N	%	
Shots Fired					
Multiple	139	84.2%	26	70.3%	**3.945***
One Shot	26	15.8%	11	29.7%	
Shots Impacted					
Multiple	109	66.1%	18	48.7%	**3.925***
One Shot	56	33.9%	19	51.4%	
Drive-By					N.S.
Yes	33	20.4%	4	12.5%	
No	129	79.6%	28	87.5%	
# of Participants					
Multiple Suspects	67	38.3%	13	19.7%	**7.849****
One Suspect	108	61.7%	53	22.0%	
Multiple Victims	39	22.3%	16	24.2%	N.S.
One Victim	136	77.7%	50	75.8%	
Motivation					
Gang:					
Yes	68	38.9%	--	--	**35.726*****
No	107	61.1%	66	100.0%	
Drug:					
Yes	18	10.3%	9	13.6%	N.S.
No	157	89.7%	57	86.4%	
Dispute:					
Yes	47	26.9%	20	30.3%	N.S.
No	128	73.1%	46	69.7%	
Domestic					
Yes	15	8.6%	22	33.3%	**22.212*****
No	160	91.4%	44	66.7%	
Other:					
Yes	27	15.4%	15	22.7%	N.S.
No	148	82.6%	51	77.3%	

***** = $p<.05$, ****** = $p<.01$, ******* = $p<.001$

No statistical difference was found between gang and non-gang homicides with respect to when an event transpires. That is, *time of day*, *day of week* or *season* of the year does not differentiate a gang homicide from a non-gang homicide. Also, the stereotypical "drive-by" does not discern a gang incident from a non-gang incident. Lastly, gang and non-gang events resulting from drug-relatedness, escalated disputes, or resulting from some other motive do not

differentiate these two types of homicide from each other. Overall, the incident characteristics distinguishing gang homicides from non-gang homicides remaining consistent with the extant literature, suggesting that the criminal behaviors of gangs in Hollenbeck conform to the findings of prior research.[43]

A CGI'S Influence: Comparing Enjoined Gang & Non-gang Homicides

It is expected that a CGI reduces an enjoined gang member's level of exposure to situations that could result in a criminal opportunity. Thus, I compare the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides to non-gang homicides.[44] I anticipate that the incident characteristics will not statistically differentiate enjoined gang homicides from non-gang homicides. This is due to the decrease in the disparity between the incident characteristics of an enjoined gang homicide and a non-gang homicide.

In general, the comparisons displayed in Table 3.3 indicate that enjoined gang homicides do not statistically differ from non-gang homicides except in regard to the use of a handgun in commissioning a murder (20.735, $P < 0.001$). Even though handguns remain prevalent in urban areas, non-gang homicides are less likely to involve the use of a firearm; instead non-gang homicides are facilitated by other objects that are proximate to where the incident takes place (i.e., kitchen knife, electrical cord). Interestingly, when a handgun is used to facilitate a non-gang homicide, the number of shots fired and the number of bullets impacting the victim do not statistically differ from enjoined gang homicides. This (non)finding could suggest that the displacement from the gang's hangout reduces the opportunities for enjoined gang members to

[43] The findings produced when comparing the incident characteristics of non-enjoined gang and gang homicides are nearly identical (see Appendix). These results could suggest that the presence of a CGI does not significantly impact the characteristics of non-enjoined gang violence.

[44] Table A.2, in the Appendix, includes additional tests comparing the participant characteristics between enjoined gang and non-gang homicides. The results mirror the results obtained with comparing gang and non-gang homicides, suggesting that the CGI is not impacting the characteristics (i.e., ethnicity, sex, age, criminal record, victim-suspect relationship) of the individuals involved in these violent acts.

be a participant in a violent act (Felson & Boba, 2010) because enjoined gang members are less likely to be found loitering around their gang's set-space, as observed in Chapter 2. Thus, a homicide involving an enjoined gang member resembles the more intimate nature of a non-gang homicide, with both participants being in closer proximity to each other, reducing the observable levels of lethal violence (i.e., number of shots required to hit the suitable target).

Table 3.3: Incident Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 48)		**Non-gang (N = 66)**		**Association & Significance**
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Location					N.S.
Street	23	47.9%	24	36.4%	
Other Public	9	18.8%	15	22.7%	
Residence	16	33.3%	27	40.9%	
Inside	18	37.5%	30	45.5%	N.S.
Outside	30	62.5%	36	54.5%	
Private Space	16	33.3%	27	40.9%	N.S.
Public Space	32	66.7%	39	59.1%	
Time of Day					
Day	14	29.2%	23	34.9%	N.S.
Night	34	70.8%	43	65.2%	
Day of Week					N.S.
Weekday	25	52.1%	44	66.7%	
Weekend	23	47.9%	22	33.3%	
Season					N.S.
Winter	10	20.8%	14	21.2%	
Spring	16	33.3%	15	22.7%	
Summer	14	29.2%	20	30.3%	
Fall	8	16.7%	17	25.8%	
Weapons					**20.735*** **
Handgun	44	91.7%	34	51.5%	
Other	4	8.3%	32	48.5%	
Shots Fired					
Multiple	34	77.3%	26	70.3%	N.S.
One Shot	10	22.7%	11	29.7%	
Shots Impacted					
Multiple	22	50.0%	18	48.7%	N.S.
One Shot	22	50.0%	19	51.4%	

Table 3.3: Incident Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 48)		Non-gang (N = 66)		Association & Significance
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Drive-By					
Yes	10	23.3%	4	12.5%	N.S.
No	33	76.7%	28	87.5%	
# of Participants					
Multiple Suspects	17	35.4%	13	19.7%	N.S.
One Suspect	31	64.6%	53	80.3%	
Multiple Victims	9	18.8%	30	23.6%	N.S.
One Victim	39	81.3%	97	76.4%	
Motivation					
Gang:					
Yes	25	52.1%	--	--	**44.031*** **
No	23	47.9%	66	100.0%	
Drug:					
Yes	7	14.5%	9	13.6%	N.S.
No	41	86.4%	57	86.4%	
Dispute:					
Yes	11	22.9%	20	30.3%	N.S.
No	37	77.1%	46	69.7%	
Domestic					
Yes	2	4.2%	22	33.3%	**14.224*** **
No	44	95.8%	46	66.7%	
Other:					
Yes	3	6.3%	15	22.7%	**5.674***
No	45	93.8%	51	77.3%	

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

The temporal characteristics (i.e., *time of day*, *day of the week*, or *season*) and nature of the event (i.e., *drive-by*) do not statistically distinguish enjoined gang homicides from non-gang homicides. Also, there is no significant difference in the number of suspects participating in an enjoined gang homicide than from a non-gang homicide. This finding supports the results from Chapter 2 indicating that enjoined gang members' patterns of association are being inhibited by the CGI, discouraging these motivated offenders from loitering together and reducing the likelihood of group collusion in facilitating crime and violence (Warr, 2002; Felson & Boba, 2010).

Another interesting (non)finding is that enjoined gang homicides seem to resemble non-gang homicides in relation to where the event takes place. Unlike gang homicides, enjoined gang homicides are not more likely than non-gang homicides to take place outside, on the street, or in public. These findings support the earlier results in Chapter 2, further suggesting that the enactment of a CGI does inhibit enjoined gang members from loitering in public, thereby reducing the likelihood that a gang homicide involving an enjoined gang member will transpire in public. Felson and Boba (2010; p.143) state that "illegal activities live off one another and off legal activities" influencing criminal opportunities. By altering the associating patterns of gang members, the CGI not only influences the routine activities of enjoined gang members but also appears to alter the larger ecosystem of enjoined gang violence.

Once again, the motivation for the majority of enjoined gang homicides still revolves around gang-related matters (44.031, $P < 0.001$), while non-gang homicides are prompted by domestic disputes (14.224, $P < 0.001$) or some other rationale (5.674, $P < 0.050$). This pattern resembles that observed above in Table 3.2, suggesting that the motives (e.g., initiation practices, inter- or intra- gang disputes, retaliation, or impulsivity) driving a gang homicide remain quite divergent from non-gang homicides. This makes sense given that regardless of a CGI being established, an enjoined gang member is still a member of a gang, which includes a distinct set of motivations absent to non-gang members. Thus, it seems that while a CGI is able to alter the activity patterns of enjoined gang members, additional social services are required to provide opportunities for enjoined gang members to fully desist from gang life (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013).

Table 3.4: Incident Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-enjoined Gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 48)		Non-enjoined Gang (N = 127)		Association & Significance
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Location					N.S.
Street	23	47.9%	76	59.8%	
Other Public	9	18.8%	19	15.0%	
Residence	16	33.3%	32	25.2%	
Inside	18	37.5%	34	26.8%	N.S.
Outside	30	62.5%	93	73.2%	
Private Space	16	33.3%	32	25.2%	N.S.
Public Space	32	66.7%	95	74.8%	
Time of Day					N.S.
Day	14	29.2%	46	36.2%	
Night	34	70.8%	81	63.8%	
Day of Week				63.8%	N.S.
Weekday	25	52.1%	74	58.3%	
Weekend	23	47.9%	53	41.7%	
Season					N.S.
Winter	10	20.8%	28	22.1%	
Spring	16	33.3%	43	33.9%	
Summer	14	29.2%	27	21.3%	
Fall	8	16.7%	29	22.8%	
Weapons					N.S.
Handgun	44	91.7%	115	90.6%	
Other	4	8.3%	12	9.5%	
Shots Fired					
Multiple	34	77.3%	105	86.8%	N.S.
One Shot	10	22.7%	16	13.2%	
Shots Impacted					
Multiple	22	50.0%	87	71.9%	**6.903****
One Shot	22	50.0%	34	28.1%	
Drive-By					N.S.
Yes	10	23.3%	23	19.3%	
No	33	76.7%	96	80.7%	
# of Participants					
Multiple Suspects	17	35.4%	50	39.4%	N.S.
One Suspect	31	64.6%	77	60.6%	
Multiple Victims	9	18.8%	30	23.6%	
One Victim	39	81.3%	97	76.4%	N.S.

Table 3.4: Incident Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-enjoined Gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 48)		Non-enjoined Gang (N = 127)		Association & Significance
	N	%	N	%	
Motivation					
Gang:					
Yes	25	52.1%	43	33.9%	**4.870***
No	23	47.9%	84	66.1%	
Drug:					
Yes	7	14.6%	11	8.7%	N.S.
No	41	85.4%	116	91.3%	
Dispute:					
Yes	11	22.9%	36	28.4%	N.S.
No	37	77.1%	91	71.7%	
Domestic					
Yes	2	4.2%	13	10.2%	N.S.
No	46	95.8%	114	89.8%	
Other:					
Yes	3	6.3%	24	18.9%	**4.271***
No	45	93.8%	103	81.1%	

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

Comparing Enjoined Gang & Non-enjoined Gang Homicides

Table 3.4 displays the results comparing the incident characteristics between enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides.[45] Interestingly, except for multiple bullets impacting the victim, none of the incident characteristics significantly differentiate between the two types of gang violence. Homicides involving enjoined gang members are not significantly more likely than an incident involving a non-enjoined gang member to occur in private spaces or inside a residence. While it could be expected that enjoined gang homicides may be less prevalent due to the curfew

45 Table A.5, in the Appendix, includes supplemental tests comparing the participant characteristics between enjoined gang and non-enjoined gang homicides. Besides enjoined gang homicides being more likely to involve younger victims and occur between acquaintances than non-enjoined gang homicides the remaining individual characteristics do not differentiate these events. One explanation for the disparity in age could be that adolescent tagging crews affiliating with an enjoined gang (Philips, 1999) are being utilized more frequently to maintain graffiti markers of enjoined gangs, and increasing these youths exposure to violence. The greater likelihood that enjoined gang homicides occur between acquaintances could be explained by who is targeted with a CGI. The enactment of a CGI is reserved for problematic gangs (Allan, 2004; Thomas et al., 2009). It seems likely that community members, the police and rivals better know the reputation of an enjoined gang than a non-enjoined gang. It is this increased notoriety of enjoined gang members that could account for enjoined gang homicides being more likely to involve acquaintances.

imposed upon gang members, there are no distinguishable differences observed between the temporal characteristics (i.e., *time of day*, *day of the week*, or *season*) of enjoined gang and non-enjoined gang homicides.

Interestingly, the motivation for enjoined gang homicides are statistically more likely to be gang-related (4.870, $P < 0.050$), while non-enjoined homicides are more likely to have some other rationale (4.271, $P < 0.050$). The observation that enjoined gang homicides are more likely to revolve around gang-related matters is surprising given that a CGI is designed to diminish an enjoined gang's reputation in the neighborhood (Thomas et al., 2009), through inhibiting enjoined gang members from associating with each other, as observed in Chapter 2. It is possible that the increase in gang motivated homicides involving enjoined gang members could indicate that enjoined gang members are more inclined than non-enjoined gang members to concentrate their violent acts towards gang-related matters as a facade in maintaining their gang's outward status and reputation. It is these violent acts that could be masking the CGI's actual impact on the group's social dynamics. This finding is concerning for the continued use of CGIs as an anti-gang strategy, since enjoining a gang with a CGI may actually encourage more gang-related violence by enjoined gang members. Conversely, without a CGI to restrict the daily activities of non-enjoined gang member, there exists a greater likelihood that non-enjoined gang members will have more exposure to a wider range of opportunities that could result in a violent act.

Gang homicides, both enjoined and non-enjoined, regularly involve the use of a handgun as a crime facilitator (Clarke, 1997). While, both enjoined and non-enjoined gang members routinely fire multiple bullets at their targets, the victims of non-enjoined gang homicides are more likely to be impacted by multiple bullets than the victims of an enjoined gang homicide (6.903, $P < 0.010$). This finding seems odd at first given the significant differences in the number

of shots fired by either type of gang. While previous comparisons (Maxson et al., 1985; Maxson, 1999; Tita et al., 2005) clearly indicate that firearms are by far the predominant weapons facilitating gang violence, these studies were unable to parse out the number of shots fired from the number of shots impacting the victim. Differentiating between these two categories provides a richer context of the interaction between suspect and victim producing the homicide. To better understand this disparity between enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides, I further disaggregate enjoined gang homicides to investigate whether these observed disparities are being experienced differently by the victim's gang or suspect's gang. Specifically, I investigate if a homicide involving a victim from an enjoined gang differs from a non-enjoined gang homicide, and if a homicide where the suspect is an enjoined gang member is distinguishable from a non-enjoined gang. Table 3.5 displays the results.

Table 3.5: Comparison of the Bullets Impacting the Victim of an Enjoined Gang and Non-enjoined Gang Homicide.

Victim's Gang	**Enjoined (N = 27)**		**Non-enjoined (N = 123)**		**Association & Significance**
	N	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Impacted Shots					**5.963***
Multiple	13	48.2%	89	72.4%	
One	14	51.9%	34	27.6%	
Suspect's Gang	**Enjoined (N = 31)**		**Non-enjoined (N = 122)**		
	N	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Impacted Shots					**8.091****
Multiple	14	45.2%	88	72.1%	
One	17	54.8%	34	27.9%	

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

Regardless of whether the suspect (8.091, P < 0.010) or victim (5.963, P < 0.050) of an enjoined homicide is subject to the CGI, the victim involved in an enjoined gang homicide is more likely to succumb to a single bullet wound than a victim from a non-enjoined gang, who is more likely to have multiple bullet wounds. As observed in Chapter 2, by inhibiting large groups from loitering in public, a CGI makes it more difficult for rivals to target the enjoined gang's

members. Additionally, a suspect from an enjoined gang may be less brazen and unwilling to risk a firefight with a rival gang, since a group of enjoined gang members are more likely to draw the attention of authorities. Therefore, it is possible that homicides involving enjoined gang members require a more planned approach with a deliberate target, in which the offender is likely to be more proximate to the victim, thereby requiring fewer bullets, than homicides between non-enjoined gang members (e.g., a drive-by).

Enjoined gang violence may also be impacted by a gang's group-level response to having a CGI placed on them. Chapter 2 illustrates that following enjoinment, the interconnectedness of a gang either disrupts or converges. It is likely that these divergent patterns, in response to a CGI, also produce a bifurcated pattern of violence. Table 3.6 breaks down enjoined gang homicides by differentiating events based upon whether a gang's member was the suspect or the victim.

Table 3.6: Total Number of Enjoined Gang Homicides.

Disrupted Gang	**Victim**	**Suspect**	**Combined[a]**
KAM	11	5	15
VNE	3	4	6
Eastlake	2	1	3
Lincoln Heights	4	3	7
Total	20	13	31
Converging Gang			
Big Hazard	3	5	7
White Fence	4	5	8
Clover	5	6	9
Total	12	16	24
Overall Total	32	29	55

[a] Takes into account if the homicide involved a victim and a suspect from the same gang as to not double count these events.

Enjoined gangs are also grouped by their initial response to a CGI, disruption or convergence. Converging gangs have a slightly greater frequency of perpetrating gang violence, possibly due to having a more organized structure, while disrupted gangs have a slightly greater

frequency of being victims, possibly from being more disorganized. Yet, when the data is collapsed to examine all enjoined gang homicides these two trends are masked. Also, the average enjoined gang is involved in approximately eight homicides, regardless of the gang's response to the CGI. While Table 3.3 suggests that CGIs have begun to shift the locality of enjoined gang homicides away from public places, this trend appears to be hampered by the diverging response of enjoined gangs to a CGI. It seems likely that enjoined gangs responding to a CGI by converging are probably less likely to be adhere to the CGIs proscriptions and more likely to be associating in public, where rivals have greater accessibility to them. Therefore, I expect that if a greater proportion of enjoined gang homicides involved disrupted gangs, statistical differences in locality would be witnessed between enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides. The aggregation of homicides involving gangs that are disrupted by a CGI or converge from a CGI, which I suspect is obscuring any observed disparities between the characteristics of where an enjoined gang and a non-enjoined gang takes place.

Supplementary Comparison of Enjoined Gang Homicides Before and After the Introduction of a CGI

An additional analysis was conducted to directly examine the influence that CGIs have on homicides involving only enjoined gang members. I extend the data examined in the analysis to include an additional ten years prior to first CGI, starting from January 16, 1993 (for more detail see Chapter 4). The most interesting findings are presented in Table 3.7. There are some significant changes in the nature of violence involving gangs following their enjoinment. First, after a CGI is placed upon a gang targeted with enjoinment, homicides are statistically less likely to occur outside (3.142, $P = 0.076$) or on the street (13.502, $P < 0.001$). Second, once a CGI is introduced it appears that homicides involving enjoined gang members are significantly less likely to involve multiple suspects (10.092, $P < 0.001$) and victims (3.781, $P < 0.050$).

Conversely, use of a *handgun*, *drive-by*, or *motivation*, does not statistically distinguish homicides before and after a gang's enjoinment.

Table 3.7: Incident Characteristics for Enjoined and Will be Enjoined Gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 48)		Will Be Enjoined Gang (N = 149)		Association & Significance
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Location					**13.502*** **
Street	23	47.9%	113	75.8%	
Other Public	9	18.8%	15	10.1%	
Residence	16	33.3%	21	14.1%	
Inside	19	39.6%	39	26.2%	**3.142†**
Outside	29	60.4%	110	73.8%	
Private Space	16	33.3%	36	23.8%	N.S.
Public Space	32	66.7%	115	76.2%	
Weapons					N.S.
Handgun	44	91.7%	126	83.4%	
Other	4	8.3%	25	16.6%	
Drive-By					N.S.
Yes	10	20.8%	47	31.1%	
No	38	79.2%	104	68.9%	
# of Participants					**10.092*** **
Multiple Suspects	17	35.4%	93	61.6%	
One Suspect	31	64.6%	58	38.4%	
Multiple Victims	9	18.8%	49	33.6%	**3.781***
One Victim	39	81.3%	97	66.4%	
Motivation					
Gang:					N.S.
Yes	25	52.1%	89	66.4%	
No	23	47.9%	45	33.6%	
Drug:					N.S.
Yes	7	14.6%	15	11.2%	
No	41	85.4%	119	88.8%	
Dispute:					N.S.
Yes	11	22.9%	13	9.7%	
No	37	77.1%	121	90.3%	
Domestic					N.S.
Yes	2	4.2%	3	2.2%	
No	46	95.8%	131	97.8%	
Other:					N.S.
Yes	3	6.3%	14	10.5%	
No	45	93.8%	120	89.6%	

† = p<.10, ***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

Overall, these findings are consistent with the observations from Chapter 2 that enjoined gang members are not loitering around outside or in noticeable groups. Inhibiting groups from loitering in public reduces the number of potential victims and/or suspects available for violent acts and there are also fewer opportunities for criminal involvement. These findings also corroborate the results presented in Table 3.3, suggesting that enjoined gang homicides have begun to resemble non-gang homicides. Specifically, that enjoined gang homicides are less likely to transpire in public or on the street, and instead are taking place in more private spaces like non-gang homicides. The involvement of multiple participants in enjoined gang homicides are also diminished following the establishment of a CGI. This pattern makes these enjoined gang homicides further resemble the intimate nature of non-gang homicides.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

In this chapter I first investigated the overall trends in gang violence for the decade following the initial enactment of a CGI in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area (i.e., January 16, 2003 to January, 13, 2013). While overall violence, both gang and non-gang, in the city of Los Angeles was decreasing during this decade, the change was gradual, eventually plateauing in 2009. While gang homicides rose in Hollenbeck from 2004 through 2007, the division experienced an overall decline in the number of homicides during the decade long study period, particularly in the prevalence of gang homicides, a trend similar to the city of Los Angeles. It is not clear as to what facilitated this drop in Hollenbeck's gang homicides after 2007. One possibility is that gang homicides were returning to the previous levels observed in 2003, regressing to the mean. Another possibility is that the accumulation of enjoined gangs in Hollenbeck could have contributed to this decline. As suggested by Tita et al. (2003), I speculate that law enforcement's use of a tailored response focusing on problematic gangs, in this case CGIs, were able to not only impact gang violence by enjoined gangs but also able to inhibit gang

violence among all gangs proximate to the CGI.

To better understand the relationship between CGIs and gang violence, I disaggregated gang homicides into enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides to examine how the enactment of CGIs in Hollenbeck influences the characteristics associated with these violent incidents. Before comparing the disaggregated homicides, it was necessary to discover the "ground truth" of what characteristics distinguish gang homicides from non-gang homicides in Hollenbeck. Consistent with previous research (Maxson et al., 1985; Curry & Spergel, 1988; Rosenfeld et al., 1999; Decker & Curry, 2002; Pizarro & McGloin, 2006), gang homicides are more likely to involve a handgun with the suspect firing multiple shots at the victim, more likely to take place outside, in public, on the street, are driven by gang-related (e.g., retaliation, defending turf, intra-gang conflict, etc.) motivations, and are statistically less likely to be involved in disputes that domestic/romantic in nature. Additionally, homicides involving non-enjoined gangs are indistinguishable from other gang homicides, with the same indicators differentiating them from non-gang homicides. Taken together with the earlier findings, this suggests that CGIs have the ability to reduce the amount of gang violence, by reducing the likelihood of motivated offenders and suitable targets from converging in space and time; however, they are unable to influence the distinctive features of non-enjoined gang homicides.

The other principal focus of this chapter was investigating the differences (or lack of) between enjoined gang, non-enjoined gang and non-gang homicides. In accordance with routine activities theory, I anticipated that the enactment of a CGI would disrupt the activity patterns of gang members, inhibiting them from loitering in public. This change in behavior should impact the characteristics associated with homicides involving enjoined gang members, either as the victim or the suspect. By discouraging enjoined gang members from associating together in

public, a CGI is altering where suitable targets (i.e., enjoined gang members) are victimized, moving them from public locations (e.g., street corner, park, recreation centers, etc.) to more private spaces (e.g., individual residences). Also, CGIs diminish the "street cohesiveness" of an enjoined gang, thereby restricting the gang's influence and diminishing the direction and cooperation of fellow gang members (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013). Therefore, I expected to find a diminishing disparity in the incident characteristics between enjoined gang and non-gang homicides, with these indicators not statistically differentiating between the two homicide types. Conversely, I suspected that the enactment of a CGI would be able to distinguish the attributes of enjoined gang homicides from non-enjoined gang homicides.

As expected, the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides and non-gang homicides do not statistically differ, except for the use of a handgun facilitating a homicide that involves an enjoined gang member. Both the number of shots fired and the presence of multiple suspects do not statistically differentiate enjoined gang homicides from non-gang homicides, possibly indicating that CGIs are influencing where and how homicides involving enjoined gang members transpire. It appears that enjoined gang homicides are as likely as non-gang homicides to occur indoors, in private spaces away from the street, involve a similar number of suspects, and use a limited number of bullets in the commission of incident. Also, non-gang homicides remain more likely than enjoined gang homicides to be motivated by a domestic/romantic dispute. These findings suggest that the enactment of a CGI is more likely to influence characteristics of the incident but is averse to altering the motivations driving the violence.

Unexpectedly, the comparisons between enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides produce a contrasting picture. Attributes of the incident, except for multiple bullets impacting the victim, do not significantly distinguish enjoined gang and non-enjoined gang homicides.

Enjoined gang homicides are also more likely to be prompted by gang-related motivations, while non-enjoined homicides have greater likelihood of having a variety of motivations. Yet, the supplementary analysis indicates that after the establishment of a CGI, violence involving an enjoined gang is statistically less likely to take place outside, on the street, and have fewer suspects and victims.

It could be argued that the lack of statistical differences between the incident characteristics of enjoined and non-enjoined gang homicides, presented in Table 3.4, illustrates the fact that CGIs have had no impact on enjoined gang homicides. Yet, I would argue that when the results from Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.7 are taken together, these findings suggest that CGIs have been able to influence certain aspects of enjoined gang homicides, particularly where the event transpires and the number of participants involved. The findings seem to indicate that these characteristics of enjoined gang homicides are transitioning from resembling non-enjoined gang homicides to resembling non-gang homicides. This shift in where enjoined gang homicides are taking place is supported by the expectations of routine activities theory. Specifically, that by altering the behavior of motivated offenders (i.e., enjoined gang members) and suitable targets (i.e., enjoined gang members) will impact the incident characteristics of gang homicides involving enjoined gang members.

Contrary to expectations, it seems that an individual's attachment to the gang remains strong even after the enactment of a CGI, with enjoined gang members still being influenced by gang-related matters (e.g., defending turf, retaliatory violence, etc.). As suggested by Klein (1971; 1995), this added attention by law enforcement might be impacting gang solidarity. Since enjoined gang members are inhibited from gathering publicly, enjoined gang members may feel a greater need to protect their space from encroachment and protect their gang's reputation,

increasing the proportion of gang motivated violence. Furthermore, Hennigan and Sloane (2013) indicate that CGIs do not diminish the gang from meeting in private. Therefore, it is possible that the CGI may actually contribute to an enjoined gang becoming more cohesive and resilient while the physical manifestation of an enjoined gang's strength (i.e., loitering together) is restrained.

There are several limitations to this study. First, the data used for this analysis is restricted to the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area of the LAPD. As discussed earlier, Hollenbeck is an ecologically distinct region, with discrete boundaries cloistering it from the rest of Los Angeles. As such, the influence of the CGIs in a more permeable region of Los Angeles may differ. Additionally, recent research by Hennigan and Sloane (2013) has indicated that the implementation of CGIs could vary between policing divisions, thereby affecting the influence a CGI has on the activity patterns of gang members. Further research across multiple policing divisions is needed to better understand how the physical environment and the enforcement strategies of local police impact the effectiveness of CGIs.

Another limitation is the restrictive sample of enjoined gang homicides ($N = 48$). Amidst the current reduction in overall levels of violence in Los Angeles, the reduction in gang homicides is extremely beneficial for community residents; however, there remain concerns of limited statistical power when comparing enjoined gang homicides to non-gang homicides. Indeed, it is possible that the results were influenced by these smaller sample sizes. However, significant results were observed and have meaningful interpretations, and produce a coherent story in the relationship between CGIs and gang violence. Future research should attempt to use larger samples that can provide more robust statistical power.

Despite these limitations, this study takes the first steps at examining the role of CGIs at influencing gang violence, specifically gang homicides. While, previous research has indicated

that overall levels of violence and serious crime are reduced through the enactment of CGIs, it remains unclear how gang violence was impacted (Grogger, 2002; LACCGJ, 2004). While not immediate, these findings hint that CGIs are capable of shifting the activity patterns of gang members, thereby displacing gang violence from the streets and moving it into more private spaces. This shift may create a cascade effect reducing the local communities fear of crime and allowing positive social capital to develop which will further inhibit future acts of gang violence from occurring in public (Maxson, Hennigan & Sloane, 2005; Moule, Decker & Pyrooz, 2013).

The next chapter continues using the framework of routine activities theory, building upon this chapter's findings to further examine the spatial relationship between CGIs and gang violence, with the hope of ascertaining if gang violence is displaced by CGIs or if it remains fixed.

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CHAPTER 4: A Spatial Typology of Gang Violence: Do Civil Gang Injunctions Influence the Mobility Patterns of Gang Homicide?

INTRODUCTION

Expanding upon the previous two chapters, I investigate in this section the impact that CGIs have on the routine activities and mobility patterns of participants involved in a gang-related homicide. Findings from Chapter 2 indicate that CGIs are able to influence gang members' spatial patterns of association, disrupting where gang members are congregating. Routine activities theory postulates that for a criminal act to transpire, both a motivated offender and a suitable target must converge at the same place at the same time. If enjoined gang members are more likely to refrain from loitering in public spaces, then an enjoined gang's suitability as a target is diminished. This suggests that following the enjoinment of a gang with a CGI, there is an increase in the opportunity costs for a rival gang to direct violence towards this enjoined gang. In particular, gang violence that is targeting enjoined gang members would become more challenging and risky to complete since enjoined gang members are less likely to be congregating in public spaces. Discouraging enjoined gang members (i.e., motivated offenders) from congregating in their gang's turf, also, restricts the ability for these groups to coalesce and retaliate to violence directed at the gang. Alternatively, Klein (1971; 1995a; 1998) suggests that gangs receiving additional attention from law enforcement (i.e., CGIs) actually bolster the gang's notoriety in the neighborhood, which could result in additional attentions from rival gangs that are attempting to augment their own reputations through violence. Conversely, enjoined gangs may feel vulnerable from the enactment of a CGI and direct violence at rival gangs as a show of strength to preserve their influence in the neighborhood (Hughes & Short, 2005). Therefore, it could be expected that enjoined gang members are more likely to be involved in specific types of gang homicide.

Enjoined gangs are not selected randomly by criminal justice actors, but instead are targeted because these groups are more problematic with ongoing violent rivalries with proximate gangs. The seven enjoined gangs in Hollenbeck are no exception, having active feuds with rivals and serving as bridging points, holding the rivalry network of Hollenbeck's gangs together (see Figure A.1). In total, there are sixteen non-enjoined gangs, 52 percent of the entire rivalry network, who are rivals with the seven enjoined gangs. A non-enjoined gang that is a rival to an enjoined gang would witness first hand the restrictions placed upon an enjoined gang, particularly the non-association clause. I speculate that by being indirectly exposed to the CGI these non-enjoined rivals have modified their behavior, refraining from certain nuisance activities in public, in an attempt to not become the next gang enjoined with a CGI. Therefore, I surmise that enjoining a gang with a CGI could indirectly impact the activity patterns of non-enjoined rivals, by radiating outward from the enjoined gang to the enjoined gang's known rivals and then through these gangs to their known rivals. It is because of this embeddedness in Hollenbeck's rivalry network (see Figure A.1) that I anticipate a CGI is able to influence the mobility patterns of all participants (i.e., gang members) involved in a gang homicide, regardless of their enjoinment status. Therefore, I expect that following the introduction of CGIs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area that the mobility patterns of participants involved in a gang homicide will be affected, thereby producing a shift in the observed spatial typology for these events.

The rest of the chapter unfolds with a background on the development of the spatial typology of homicide created by Tita and Griffiths (2005) that I modify for this chapter's analyses. Then, I outline how I construct the spatial typology of gang homicide employed in this chapter. This section is followed by a discussion of how CGIs are expected to influence the

different spatial types of gang homicide and the geographic distribution of these events. Next, I describe the data and methodology used in this chapter. Specifically, I use 20 years of gang homicides, from January 16, 1993 to January 16, 2013, to compare the ten year time period prior to and post the introduction of CGIs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. After presenting findings from the analyses, I discuss the implications that CGIs have on impacting gang violence, along with new directions to investigate in the future.

Background on the Spatial Typology of Homicide

Tita and Griffiths' (2005) spatial typology of homicide was proposed as a response to a previously untested assertion by routine activities theory; that the exposure to victimization or the opportunity for offending is dependent upon the characteristics (i.e., sex, age, race, marital status) of the participants (both victims and suspects). Previous research has demonstrated that an individual's characteristics influence life's routine activities (Cohen, Kluegel & Land, 1981; Laub, 1997). For instance, individuals who are young and single, especially males, have a greater likelihood of frequenting recreational facilities and generally being away from their residences in the evening than married individuals (Hindelang, Gottfredson & Garofalo, 1978). Due to this population's patterns of public activity, there is an increased likelihood that the day-to-day activity patterns of these individuals will have greater exposure to crime, along with more opportunities to participate in criminal acts.

While routine activities theory suggests that individual characteristics have a direct impact on crime, Tita and Griffiths (2005) instead propose that this relationship actually has an intervening effect. That is, different demographic groups engage in different patterns of activity, affecting their exposure to criminal events as either a perpetrator or a victim. The principal mechanism explaining the link of how demographic characteristics impact criminal participation

is through the joint mobility pattern of both the victim and the suspect (Tita & Griffiths, 2005).

Drawing from the mobility triangle literature,[46] Tita and Griffiths' (2005) spatial typology distinguishes among five mutually exclusive joint mobility patterns determined by the suspects' and victims' journeys from their home(s) to the location of the incident. A recent study by Groff and McEwen (2006) utilizes mobility triangles to construct a distance-based spatial typology. While Groff and McEwen's (2006) analysis is more complex, converting categorical measures to continuous ones, their findings "yield remarkably similar results" to Tita and Griffiths' (2005) categorical spatial typology (Groff & McEwen, 2006; p. 233). The results from Groff and McEwen's (2006) study are also consistent with journey-to-crime studies indicating that the distance traveled by suspects in violent crimes is short, especially in homicides (Rand, 1986; Bullock, 1995; Rossmo, 1999). Particularly, Bullock (1995) finds that both participants of a homicide live in close proximity to the incident's location. Bullock's study is unique because it takes into account the distances between participants' residences, which are also very close. A third of the participants (32.8 percent) were living on the same block and 70 percent of individuals resided within two miles of each other. However, the journey-to-crime literature typically disregards the incident characteristics of a homicide, treating homicides as a "one-dimensional crime thereby ignoring the rich array of circumstance that can lead to lethal violence" (Tita & Griffiths, 2005; p. 279). Therefore, I use Tita and Griffiths' (2005) spatial typology of homicide to allow my analyses to incorporate both the incident and participant characteristics that guide the activity patterns of both victims and suspects.

[46] Originally, the term mobility triangle referred to a specific spatial configuration in which both participants resided in the same neighborhood and the incident took place somewhere outside the neighborhood. The definition has been adapted to be more general, incorporating all the spatial combinations of where the incident transpires and the residence(s) of the participants for a range of crime types (Boggs, 1965; Rand, 1986).

Constructing a Spatial Typology of Gang Homicide

Analyzing the mobility patterns of participants involved in a gang-related homicide provides another framework to investigate the relationship between CGIs and the changing homicide trends (see Figure 3.2) observed during this time period. Drawing from the antecedents in the mobility polygons literature, the spatial mobility of homicides examines crime though the distribution of the:

Location of Incident
Gang Turf of the Suspect
Gang Turf of the Victim

Unlike mobility triangles, which focus on absolute geographic distances, the spatial typology developed by Tita and Griffiths (2005) emphasizes the relative social distance traversed by individuals to the incident's location. Instead of using the "distance from" as the measure to capture the mobility of individuals to a crime scene, this spatial typology utilizes a "different from" metric (Tita & Griffiths, 2005). I accomplish this by identifying the gang turf where the homicide occurred along with the gang turf that corresponds to each participant's gang. Prior research utilizing this spatial typology (Tita & Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Tita, 2009) relied on a residence-based typology, in which both the suspect and victim's home addresses and the incident location were attached to an areal unit (i.e., the census tract) representing a corresponding neighborhood. For this study, I use a turf-based typology because CGIs are designed to disrupt the day-to-day activities of gang members, inhibiting their patterns of association in their gang's turf. Therefore, I expect that a CGI influences the mobility patterns of where enjoined gang members hangout and their exposure to violence, but not where they reside.

The synthesis of these places will allow for the creation of five mutually exclusive dichotomous variables, capturing a unique spatial typology (i.e., predatory, internal, intrusion, offense mobility, total mobility).

1. *Internal* homicides: [**{I, S, V}**]	The incident, suspect, and victim are within the same areal unit.
2. *Predatory* homicides: [**{I, V} S**]	Both the incident and the victim are within the same areal unit; the suspect resides outside of that unit.
3. *Intrusion* homicides: [**{I, S} V**]	The incident and the suspect are within the same areal unit; the victim resides outside of that unit.
4. *Offense mobility* homicides: [**{S, V} I**]	The suspect and the victim are within the same areal unit and the incident occurs elsewhere.
5. *Total mobility* homicides: [**{} I, S, V**]	The incident, suspect, and victim are located in three unique areal units.

The objectives in constructing this spatial typology of gang homicide is to better understand the nature of gang homicide and ascertain what specific variables determine statistically significant differences between and among the theorized types of homicide, and ascertain if the introduction of CGIs in Hollenbeck has influenced the mobility patterns of these types of gang homicide.

The Influence of CGIs on Spatial Types of Gang Homicide

While the focus of Tita and Griffiths' (2005) founding study was not on gang homicides, it was suggested that gang-motivated homicides in Pittsburgh, PA were statistically more likely to exhibit one of three patterns: predatory, intrusion or total mobility. Gang homicides that are predatory involve a victim whose residence is in the same areal unit as the location of where they were murdered, with the suspect having to travel from another areal unit. The converse of this type is an intrusion gang homicide, where the suspect resides in the same areal unit as the event's location and the victim commutes from a different areal unit. Total mobility gang homicides occur when the victim and suspect travel from unique areal units, converging at the event, located in a differing areal unit.

Predatory and intrusion gang homicides are consistent with classical theories of gang

member mobility (Thrasher, 1927; Yablonsky, 1962; Suttles, 1968). That is, gang members regularly defend their gang's claimed areas from outsiders intruding, or attack enemies in their rival's claimed turf (i.e., predatory). Moore, Vigil & Garcia (1983) indicate that certain gang members actually generate more violence, looking for opportunities to relive their peak experiences. This finding suggests that gang members with a greater propensity to violence are more likely to encounter one another other, outside of their respective territories, and participate in a violent altercation, producing a pattern of total mobility.

This chapter proposes that the introduction of CGIs into a community influences the routine activities of local gang members, thereby shifting the spatial typology of gang homicides to resemble another category (i.e., internal or offense mobility). Prior to the introduction of CGIs, I anticipate the spatial typology pattern to resemble the findings observed by Tita and Griffiths (2005). However, with the enactment of a CGI, I expect that the mobility patterns of participants, both suspects and victims, involved in a gang homicide will be impacted since the CGI influences gang members' patterns of association, as observed in Chapter 2.

CGIs and Suspect Mobility

In terms of an enjoined gang member being a suspect, I anticipate less activity around the CGI safety-zone due to the fact that enjoined gang members are not allowed to loiter together in public. Therefore, I expect that there will be fewer intrusion gang homicides since there should be fewer enjoined gang members congregating in public. By shifting their patterns of association and gathering in either a semi-public or private setting, enjoined gang members become less visible and more difficult to attack. However, since the CGI does not prohibit enjoined gang members from gathering outside of the enjoined region, there is no reason for a change to occur in the proportion of homicides corresponding to either a predatory or total mobility types.

CGIs and Victim Mobility

If enjoined gang members are victims, I would expect fewer predatory homicides to involve enjoined gang members, as these individuals are no longer hanging out in public, reducing their exposure to potential acts of violence. However, this reduction in the number of gang members congregating on the street would impact the proportion of intrusion or total mobility types, which are not facilitated by large groups of victims. It is also possible that the spatial patterns of violence will shift, making total mobility homicides the most prevalent type of gang homicide.

For instance, scholars have discussed how gang members typically partake in "missions" traveling into their rivals' turf (Fremon, 2008; Vigil, 2007). If a CGI reduces the loitering of gang members in public, relocating their socializing to either semi-public or private settings, then it becomes more difficult for offenders to target enjoined gangs. Past research (Tita, et al., 2005; Fremon, 2008) has indicated that gangs are adept at locating the set-space of their rivals. The absence of a gang's presence in its known hangouts could force gang homicides to become crimes of opportunity. Due to the CGI disrupting the routine activities of gang members, offenders may be unable to locate the victim and will end up postponing the violence until the victim reemerges in public. When the offender finally does attack, it could very likely take place at a location unclaimed by either gang (e.g., transit stop or outside of a business). Based upon this scenario, predatory and intrusion homicides abate leaving total mobility homicides as the only foreseeable mobility pattern.

DATA

The data used in this analysis are from all gang-related homicides[47] known to the LAPD

[47] A *member*-based designation is used in which the homicide is considered to be gang-related if either of the participants, victim or suspect, in the incident is a gang member.

(n = 520) in the Hollenbeck Policing Area from January 16, 1993 to January 16, 2013, a 20 year period.[48] Building upon the data gathered by Tita and colleagues (2003; 2005) for Operation Ceasefire, I gathered additional data from the individual homicide case files stored at the station, allowing me to limit the number homicides in the data with incomplete information. Each case file consists of a large binder detailing information about the incident, the participants, and the subsequent investigation. The wealth of information provided by each case allowed for the utilization of my own coding scheme based upon the events, without relying upon police classifications.[49]

As illustrated by previous research (Tita & Griffiths, 2005; Groff & McEwen, 2006; Griffiths & Tita, 2009), to construct a spatial typology of homicide requires complete geographic information on the location of the incident, the suspect's residence, and the victim's residence. If a homicide report lacks spatial information for any of these categories then the event must be excluded from the analyses. In the case of gang homicides, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Police are typically able to identify the suspected gang, but not always a specific individual. Griffiths and Tita (2009) developed a solution to maximize their sample size for their residence-based typology by utilizing the suspected gang's set-space as an alternative to removing cases when the suspect's home address is unavailable. Utilizing Griffiths and Tita's (2009) remedy, I employ a turf-based typology constructed by having spatial information on the location of the incident, the gang turf of the suspect, and the gang turf of the victim. A benefit of using a turf-based typology is that it aids in limiting the number of cases eliminated due to a lack of spatial information, since all of the territories for Hollenbeck's gangs are known. Yet, even with using a

[48] During the ten year period prior to Hollenbeck's first CGI the division experienced 340 homicides. In the latter period, when gangs were being enjoined, there the division experienced only 180 homicides.

[49] For more details about how this process was accomplished, see Chapter 3.

turf-based typology the absence of any one of these spatial measures does reduce the total sample size (n = 493). There are 328 spatially complete homicides in the pre-CGI period and 165 spatially complete homicides in the post-CGI period.

MEASURES

Participant Characteristics

Coding of the participant attributes is restricted to the victim and the primary murder suspect. Although bias may be introduced by focusing only on the primary suspect, there is usually much more complete information about this individual, while an incident involving multiple suspects has more missing data. Thus, by restricting the sample, I allow for a more appropriate comparison between homicide categories (Maxson et al., 1985).

The presence of a CGI is expected to substantially influence homicide patterns, by intervening in gang members' daily activity patterns. For both participants, victim and suspect, I create two dichotomous variables. *Enjoined* (1 = yes and 0 = no) is used to account for a gang having an active CGI enacted upon them. An additional variable *will be enjoined* (1 = yes and 0 = no) is used to capture gangs that did not have a CGI placed on them at the time of the incident, but will have an enjoined status in the future.

Teasing apart the relationship between the involved participants, I examine the relationship between the gang affiliations of each member, creating four mutually exclusive dichotomous variables. The investigation of Hollenbeck's gangs has provided a rich history documenting the enduring, intergenerational feuds between gangs, which has aided in this categorization process (Moore, 1991; Tita el al., 2003; Fremon, 2008; Vigil, 2008). Additional sources such as detailed gang intelligence maintained by Gang Impact Team (GIT) officers and through surveying gang detectives, homicide detectives, and GIT officers, were also used. *Rival* (1 = yes and 0 = no) indicates that the both participants involved in a homicide are members

from gangs that have an active rivalry with ongoing hostilities. Events that involve participants from separate gangs without ongoing hostilities present are designated as *non-rival* (1 = yes and 0 = no). A homicide occurring where both the victim and suspect are affiliated with the same gang is considered to be *intra-gang* (1 = yes and 0 = no) event. The final category, *none* (1 = yes and 0 = no) involves one participant, either suspect or victim, who does not affiliate with any known gang.

Incident Characteristics

I anticipate that the location of where a homicide transpires will significantly differ for each spatial type of homicide. For instance, I expect that internal gang homicides, where both the suspect and victim are from the same gang and where the incident takes place within their gang's claimed turf, will be less likely to occur outside in public. Conversely, prior research (Tita & Griffiths, 2005) suggests that other types of homicide (e.g., predatory, intrusion or total mobility) are more likely to transpire outside in open, public areas. *Street* (1 = yes and 0 = no) is able capture any homicide that transpires in an urban space on and around public streets (i.e., sidewalks, street corners, parking lots, etc.). Gang homicides have also been described as violent acts involving *multiple suspects* (1 = multiple individuals and 0 = a singular individual) and *multiple victims* (1 = multiple individuals and 0 = a singular individual).

The last set of characteristics I include in this investigation are four dichotomous spatial indicators. I anticipate that each of these geographic characteristics would influence the type of homicide. *Gang turf* (1 = yes and 0 = no) indicates if a homicide occurred within one of the participant's gang's claimed territory or outside of those boundaries. Focusing the spatial lense, I include g*ang set-space* (1 = yes and 0 = no) to capture if a homicide occurs in proximity (i.e., within 100 feet) to either participant's gang's set-space. Research (Venkatesh, 1996; Popkin,

Gwiasda, Olson, & Rosenbaum, 2000; Holloway & McNulty, 2003; Griffiths & Tita, 2009) has also suggested that public housing communities are hotbeds of violence, therefore I include *public housing* (1 = yes and 0 = no) as a measure to account for the influence of these disadvantaged areas. Additionally, all of the public housing communities within Hollenbeck have a well-documented history of gang presence and violence (Fremon, 2008; Vigil, 2007).

Analytic Strategy

I employ ArcGIS 10.2 to geocode each homicide's location and map the gang territories for all of Hollenbeck's active gangs. Traditionally, this typology has utilized the census tract as the areal unit of analysis to represent a neighborhood (Tita & Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Tita, 2009). The census tract is regularly used in neighborhood-level studies because it is able to discern distinct boundaries, indicating the presence of different "communities." However, this metric does a poor job in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. While the block group level does a slightly better job of taking into account the built environment, this areal unit still fails to be ecologically meaningful. Both of these areal units fail to account for major features of the built environment (i.e., major interstates and railways), which dissect through several "communities." Recently, social scientists have developed meaningful measures that more accurately capture neighborhoods within a research site (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Hipp & Boessen, 2013). As Hipp (2007) demonstrates, the "best" areal unit of analysis must be consistent with the issue being examined. Ascertaining an appropriate unit of analysis remains one of the most challenging aspects of studying gang ecologies (Tita, et al., 2005). Additionally, Tita and colleagues (2005; p. 276) suggest that an areal unit allowing for a "much finer resolution in locating gangs is likely to be more appropriate in ecological studies of gang activities." Therefore, the decision to use a turf-based spatial typology provides an ecologically

meaningful areal unit, and corresponds with the local landscape, responding to features of both the social and built environment. Research has shown that gang territories are generally restricted to tertiary streets, or "T-Communities," and are bounded by active transportation corridors (Grannis, 2009). Thus, gang turfs are able to account for the neighbor/gang-networks, which are established within and restricted to these local spaces.

Each of the three spatial locations (i.e., suspect's turf, victim's turf, incident location) is spatially linked to a unique gang turf, creating a new geographic identifier. Participants, either suspects or victims, who were not affiliated to a particular gang, had their permanent residence geocoded and spatially linked to the encapsulating gang turf. Gang homicides where the incident intersects multiple gang turfs (i.e., being situated at an intersection) are identified with all of the gang turfs that are directly adjacent. The synthesis of these geographic identifiers for the three spatial areas (i.e., the location of the incident, the gang turf of the suspect, and the gang turf of the victim) allow for the creation of five mutually exclusive dichotomous variables, capturing a unique spatial typology (i.e., predatory, internal, intrusion, offense mobility, total mobility).

I use a logistic regression to examine the characteristics that distinguish differences among, and between each spatial type of gang homicide. Multinomial logistic regressions will also be employed to consecutively ascertain how each homicide type differs from the other four homicide types. Next, I assess if the accumulation of CGIs has influenced the mobility patterns of participants involved in gang homicides by using chi-square tests on 2x2 contingency tables to compare each spatial type from pre-CGI period to the post-CGI period.

The standard logit regression used to examine the spatial typology of gang homicide is presented in Equation 4.1. For the model to be properly identified I include only three of the four mutually exclusive measures of gang relationship, with *none* serving as the omitted category.

$$ln[Pr(Y_i = 1)/\ Pr(Y_i = 0)] = \beta + X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + X_3\beta_3 + \varepsilon \quad (4.1)$$

where: *Yi* = 1 if a homicide of type*; otherwise 0,*
X_1= vector of the *participant characteristics* for each event,
X_2 = vector of the *gang relationship* for each event,
X_3 = vector of the *incident characteristics* for each event.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.1 displays the participant and incident characteristics from the data. Due to the nature of Hollenbeck's gangs being predominantly composed of males that are Latino, thus gang-related violence is concentrated among these demographics, as such I do not include these characteristics of the participants in the analyses, but I will briefly discuss them here to describe my sample. The average age of a victim is just over 25 years old. Victims are overwhelmingly male (95 percent) and Latino (95 percent). Suspects are slightly younger with an average age just under 23 years old. Like victims, suspects are and also overwhelmingly male (97 percent) and Latino (96 percent).

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Participant and Incident Characteristics for Gang Homicides (N=493).

Participant Characteristics	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Victim				
Age (N = 490)	25.133	9.665	1	77
Male	0.951	0.215	0	1
Latino	0.947	0.224	0	1
Suspect				
Age (N = 395)	22.734	6.398	12	53
Male	0.986	0.118	0	1
Latino	0.968	0.178	0	1
Enjoinment Status				
Victim Will Be Enjoined	0.164	0.371	0	1
Victim Enjoined	0.061	0.239	0	1
Suspect Will Be Enjoined	0.229	0.421	0	1
Suspect Enjoined	0.071	0.257	0	1
Gang Relationship				
Rival	0.462	0.499	0	1
Non-rival	0.126	0.332	0	1
Intra-gang	0.108	0.310	0	1
None	0.304	0.461	0	1

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Participant and Incident Characteristics for Gang Homicides (N=493).

Incident Characteristics	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Street Location	0.706	0.456	0	1
Multiple Suspects	0.505	0.500	0	1
Multiple Victims	0.254	0.436	0	1
Spatial Indicators				
Gang Turf	0.850	0.358	0	1
Gang Set-space	0.101	0.302	0	1
CGI Safety-Zone	0.535	0.499	0	1
Public Housing	0.116	0.320	0	1

Gang violence occurs regularly between rivals (46 percent) with intra-gang (11 percent) and non-rival (13 percent) confrontations being infrequent events, which is consistent with recent gang research (Papachristos, Hureau, & Braga, 2013). Gang homicides involving individuals unaffiliated with a gang represent approximately a third of the sample (30 percent). This finding is also consistent with prior gang research (Decker & Curry, 2002) indicating that gang violence does not strictly occur between gang members.

In general, violence involving enjoined gang members is less prevalent than I would have expected, especially given the fact that the membership of the enjoined gangs comprises 47 percent of Hollenbeck's entire gang population.[50] Prior to being enjoined, gang members targeted with a CGI who are victims of a gang homicide are only involved in 16 percent of the incidents, with suspects being involved in 23 percent. Following the CGI being established, only six percent of gang homicides involve an enjoined victim. A similar drop is observed with suspects of enjoined gangs only being involved in seven percent of incidents.

Gang homicides are most likely to occur outside on the street (71 percent). Half of all gang homicides involve more than one suspect. Multiple victims occur in a fourth of all gang

[50] Hollenbeck's gang population is based upon the official records maintained by the Cal-Gang statewide database. If a gang member refrains from having contact with a law enforcement officer over a five year period then that individual is expunged from this gang list. While the Cal-Gang database likely produces an overestimation of the gang population, there is no other systematic documentation of gang members in Los Angeles, let alone in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. See also Cal-Gang (2014) for more information.

homicides. While, gang homicides are more likely to transpire in one of the participants' claimed turfs (85 percent), they infrequently happen in the gang's set-space (10 percent). Also, just over half (54 percent) of the gang homicides take place within a CGI safety-zone. Lastly, the vast majority of gang homicides occur outside of public housing communities (88 percent).

The frequency distributions of the gang homicides within each category of the spatial typology are presented in Table 4.2. While each of the types are represented within the data, two of the categories, internal (twelve percent) and offense mobility (four percent), are less frequent in occurrence than the other three categories (i.e., predatory, intrusion, and total mobility). Both participants involved in either an internal or an offense mobility homicides are likely to be fellow gang members or one non-gang member living within the other participant's gang's turf, and tend to be intra-gang conflicts. Therefore, the lower frequency of internal and offense mobility gang homicides is expected by the traditional nature of gang violence being directed outward from the gang to rival groups (Papachristos, Hureau, & Braga, 2013).

Table 4.2: Distribution of Gang Member Homicides in Hollenbeck within the Spatial Typology Categories

	Internal	Predatory	Intrusion	Offense Mobility	Total Mobility
Homicide %	12.4	30.4	24.5	3.9	28.8
n = 493	61	150	121	19	142

Predatory (30 percent) and intrusion (25 percent) gang homicides have fairly similar levels of occurrence and represent the typical phenomenon of gang violence. Predatory homicides correspond to the suspect traveling to victim's turf and attacking, while intrusion homicides are consistent with gang members successfully defending themselves from an attacker, who then becomes the victim. Total mobility gang homicides (29 percent) are when two gang members encounter each other, outside of each other's claimed turf. These incidents may

result from more personal motivations, where the suspect is stalking the victim than concerned with the gang's collective intentions.

The results for each of the spatial types are discussed below and presented in a series of five tables. The first column of each table displays the logistic regression for a particular type of gang homicide. The subsequent columns display the results of the multinomial logistic regressions presenting the pair-wise comparisons between a particular type of gang homicide and the remaining four types. To maintain readability of the results I only report the statistically significant results for the multinomial logistic regressions.

Internal Gang Homicides

By definition of this spatial typology, internal gang homicides involve a suspect and a victim from the same gang and the violent incident must transpire within the gang turf of both participants. Table 4.3 indicates that internal gang homicides are distinguished from all other types only by the characteristics of the participants. The limited mobility of this spatial type appears to reduce the importance of the incident's characteristics, which do not differentiate this incident from all others.

In particular, internal gang homicides are statistically more likely to result from intra-gang conflicts (2.840, $P < 0.001$). This relationship is particularly robust when compared to all other type of gang homicides, except offense mobility. Conversely, internal gang homicides are also statistically less likely to result from confrontations between rival gang members (-2.916, $P < 0.001$). In contrast, both predatory and intrusion gang homicides are statistically more likely to involve rival gang members than internal incidents. When comparing internal incidents to all other gang homicides, a non-rival relationship perfectly predicts "failure" (i.e., none of the

Table 4.3: Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates for Internal Gang Homicides.

	Logit	*Multinomial Logit*			
Characteristics	Internal Versus ALL	Predatory Versus Internal	Intrusion Versus Internal	Offense Mobility Versus Internal	Total Mobility Versus Internal
Participant					
Enjoinment Status					
Victim					
Will Be Enjoined	-0.555 (0.873)				
Enjoined	-0.166 (0.902)				
Suspect					
Will Be Enjoined	**1.132 (0.561)***	-1.640 (0.646)*			
Enjoined	0.176 (0.726)				
Gang Relationship					
Rival	**-2.916 (0.767)*****	3.039 (0.779)***	2.602 (0.784)***		2.632 (0.812)***
Non-rival	----	15.162 (0.472)***	15.229 (0.428)***		15.699 (0.513)***
Intra-gang	**2.840 (0.462)*****	-4.119 (0.850)***	-20.614 (0.592)***		-20.265 (0.639)***
Incident					
Street Location	-0.337 (0.410)		0.927 (0.460)*		1.384 (0.484)**
Multiple Suspects	-0.505 (0.425)				
Multiple Victims	-0.567 (0.490)				
Spatial Indicators					
Gang Turf	----	-13.802 (0.744)***	-13.671 (0.761)***	-18.846 (1.289)***	-16.833 (0.485)***
Gang Set-space	-0.202 (0.629)				
CGI Safety-Zone	-0.719 (0.446)			1.734 (0.857)*	
Public Housing	-0.773 (0.628)	1.778 (0.650)**			
Constant	-0.778 (0.418)	13.406 (0.799)***	13.033 (0.772)***	14.712 (0.816)***	15.680 (0.438)***
Observations (*n*)	371	485	485	485	485
Pseudo R-Squared	0.45	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33

Note: Data in table represent the logit coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

internal gang homicides involve participants that are non-rivals). Again, this relationship is particularly strong when compared to all other type of gang homicides, except offense mobility, indicating that predatory, intrusion and total mobility gang homicides are statistically more likely to involve confrontations between non-rival gang members. Also, internal type incidents are more likely to involve a suspect that will become enjoined (1.132, $P < 0.050$) with a CGI, this relationship is especially strong when compared to predatory gang homicides.

Not surprisingly, when comparing internal incidents to all other types of gang homicide, gang turf perfectly predicts "failure" (i.e., none of the internal gang homicides transpire outside of the participant's gang's claimed area). This explains why the coefficients for gang turf in the multinomial logits for predatory, intrusion, offense mobility and total mobility indicate that these types of gang homicide are statistically less likely to take place in the gang turf of either participant. Unexpectedly, internal gang homicides are not statistically more likely than all other categories to occur within public housing. Prior research by Griffiths and Tita (2009) indicates that public housing communities are hotbeds of violence, predominantly involving local residents. For this sample, it does not appear that gang violence remains contained within the confines of public housing communities.

To illustrate these findings, I identified an example that represents a typical internal homicide observed in the data. This incident involves a conflict between intra-gang members from Lincoln Heights.

> June 2005: Upon leaving a nightclub, the victim (male, Latino, 28 years old) with a female friend entered his parked car. The victim then called his brother, the suspect (male, Latino, 32), who rendezvoused with the victim, and entered the vehicle. Shortly after driving away, the brothers got into an argument. After the car was parked, the argument escalated with the suspect removing the victim's handgun from his waistband and shooting him repeatedly. Before fleeing from the scene the suspect told the female friend who witnessed the crime to not say anything. After several interviews, the witness described the entire incident. The case was solved, however, the District Attorney refused to file the case.

Both participants were members from the same gang. The lack of mobility is indicated by the incident transpiring within Lincoln Heights' territory. Lastly, the homicide also preceded the enjoinment of Lincoln Heights.

Predatory Gang Homicides

The predatory spatial configuration is the most prevalent (n = 150) type of gang homicide. Unlike internal gang homicides, Table 4.4 shows that predatory incidents are distinguishable from all other types of gang homicide by both characteristics of the participants and incident. First, the victims involved with predatory gang homicide are more likely to be enjoined with a CGI in the future (0.952, $P < 0.010$), particularly when compared with intrusion incidents. In contrast, the suspects of predatory incidents are less likely to be from a gang that is targeted with a CGI and will be enjoined in the future (-0.844, $P < 0.050$), while suspects involved in internal and intrusion gang homicides have a greater statistical probability of being from a gang that is enjoined at the time of the incident.

Predatory gang homicides are also statistically more likely to result from confrontations between inter-gang rivals (0.677, $P < 0.010$). This relationship is particularly strong when compared to internal homicides. The definition predatory gang homicides require the suspect and the victim to be from different gangs, therefore, it is not surprising that these incidents have a greater likelihood of not involving participants from the same gang (-2.435, $P < 0.001$). While intrusion incidents are even less likely than predatory incidents to be intra-gang related, both internal and offense mobility incidents are more likely than predatory gang homicides to involve fellow gang members. Also, internal, offense mobility, and total mobility incidents are statistically less likely than predatory gang homicides to involve non-rival gang members.

Predatory events have a greater likelihood of taking place inside away from public streets (-0.617, $P < 0.050$) relative to all other spatial types, but in particular when compared to intrusion

Table 4.4: Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates for Predatory Gang Homicides.

	Logit	*Multinomial Logit*			
Characteristics	Predatory Versus ALL	Internal Versus Predatory	Intrusion Versus Predatory	Offense Mobility Versus Predatory	Total Mobility Versus Predatory
Participant					
Enjoinment Status					
Victim					
Will Be Enjoined	**0.952 (0.341)****		-1.332 (0.413)***		
Enjoined	0.006 (0.551)				
Suspect					
Will Be Enjoined	**-0.844 (0.332)***	1.640 (0.646)*	1.176 (0.374)**		
Enjoined	-0.303 (0.483)				
Gang Relationship					
Rival	**0.677 (0.263)****	-3.039 (0.850)***			
Non-rival	-0.034 (0.424)	-15.162 (0.469)***		-14.684 (0.796)***	-16.146 (0.855)***
Intra-gang	**-2.435 (0.764)*****	4.119 (0.850)***	-16.495 (0.776)***	6.585 (1.518)***	
Incident					
Street Location	**-0.617 (0.253)***		0.604 (0.296)*		1.060 (0.353)**
Multiple Suspects	**0.515 (0.234)***				
Multiple Victims	-0.058 (0.245)				
Spatial Indicators					
Gang Turf	**2.213 (0.559)*****	13.802 (0.702)***		-5.044 (1.430)***	-3.031 (0.571)***
Gang Set-space	0.031 (0.358)				
CGI Safety-Zone	0.027 (0.275)				
Public Housing	**0.874 (0.333)****	-1.778 (0.650)**			-1.085 (0.483)*
Constant	**-2.943 (0.641)*****	-13.406 (0.755)***			-1.085 (0.667)***
Observations (*n*)	485	485	485	485	485
Pseudo R-Squared	0.18	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33

Note: Data in table represent the logit coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

and total mobility gang homicides. Connected to this is the fact that predatory gang homicides also have a greater likelihood of transpiring in a cloistered public housing development (0.874, $P < 0.010$). Compared to all other spatial configurations, predatory incidents are more likely to involve multiple suspects (0.515, $P < 0.050$). Again, not surprising based upon a predatory gang homicide's definition, these incident are likely to transpire within the gang turf of the suspect (2.213, $P < 0.001$). When comparing predatory incidents to other spatial types, internal gang homicides have an even greater likelihood of occurring in the turf of either participant, while both offense and total mobility are likely to occur elsewhere, away from the gang turf of either participant.

The case narrative of a modal predatory gang homicide is presented below, highlighting the distinguishing characteristics of these types of events. The incident involves gang members from Opal Street and VNE.

> May 1994: The victim (male, Latino, 19) and a friend (male, Latino) were entering the victim's car in the Wyvernwood Public Housing development when a vehicle approached the location. The suspect (male, Latino, 19) leaned out of the approaching car and fired an AK-47 assault weapon, killing the victim and wounding his friend. The suspect and his accomplice sped off, fleeing the scene. The attack was in retaliation for an earlier confrontation between these rival gangs. The suspect was later arrested.

The very nature of a predatory gang homicide involves a hostile suspect entering into the turf of the victim to attack a rival gang member. These events are also thought of as being more purposeful since predatory gang homicides take place away from public streets. Also, this spatial type of gang homicide has a greater likelihood of transpiring in difficult to navigate public housing complexes, further suggesting that these attacks are probably more deliberate and intentional. As seen in this case narrative, it is not uncommon for the stereotypical "drive-by" shooting to be used, which tend to be more violent in nature and involve firearms. As with any "drive-by," multiple suspects are required, further distinguishing a predatory gang homicide.

Intrusion Gang Homicides

Intrusion events are only distinguished from all other spatial categories of gang homicide by the enjoinment status of the participants and where the incident takes place (see Table 4.5). Interestingly, the enjoinment status for intrusion gang homicides is the exact opposite of predatory incidents. That is, the victims involved in an intrusion incident are less likely to be enjoined by a CGI in the future (-1.054, $P < 0.010$), particularly when compared with predatory gang homicides. Suspects of intrusion incidents have a greater likelihood of being from a gang that will be enjoined in the future (0.897, $P < 0.010$), while suspects involved in a predatory or total mobility gang homicide have a greater statistical probability of being from a non-enjoined gang. When comparing intrusion incidents to all other gang homicides, an intra-gang relationship perfectly predicts "failure" (i.e., none of the intrusion gang homicides involve participants that are fellow gang members). This relationship is robust when compared to internal, predatory and offense mobility gang homicides, which are statistically more likely to involve confrontations between intra-gang gang members.

The only incident characteristic that distinguishes intrusion gang homicides from all other spatial categories of gang homicide is that intrusion gang homicides are more likely to take place within the gang turf of one of the participants (2.306, $P <0.001$). This relationship is particularly strong when compared to offense mobility and total mobility incidents. Conversely, internal gang homicides are more likely than intrusion incidents to transpire in the gang turf of either participant.

Results from the multinomial logits indicate several differences between the pairwise comparisons. Internal, predatory, and offense mobility events are statistically more likely to be related to an intra-gang conflict than an intrusion incident. Also, internal and offense mobility spatial types are less likely to involve non-rival gang members than intrusion events.

Table 4.5: Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates for Intrusion Gang Homicides.

	Logit	*Multinomial Logit*			
Characteristics	Intrusion Versus ALL	Internal Versus Intrusion	Predatory Versus Intrusion	Offense Mobility Versus Intrusion	Total Mobility Versus Intrusion
Participant					
Enjoinment Status					
Victim					
Will Be Enjoined	**-1.054 (0.371)****		1.332 (0.413)***		
Enjoined	-0.889 (0.713)				
Suspect					
Will Be Enjoined	**0.897 (0.311)****		-1.176 (0.374)**		-0.835 (0.416)*
Enjoined	0.944 (0.498)			-2.802 (1.109)*	
Gang Relationship					
Rival	0.028 (0.280)	-2.602 (0.784)***			
Non-rival	0.126 (0.396)	-15.229 (0.426)***		-14.751 (0.770)***	
Intra-gang	----	20.614 (0.774)***	16.495 (0.955)***	23.080 (1.475)***	
Incident					
Street Location	0.315 (0.266)	-0.927 (0.460)*	-0.603 (0.296)*	-1.911 (0.674)**	
Multiple Suspects	-0.213 (0.245)				
Multiple Victims	0.057 (0.261)				
Spatial Indicators					
Gang Turf	**2.306 (0.617)*****	13.671 (0.723)***		-5.175 (1.477)***	-3.162 (0.639)***
Gang Set-space	0.511 (0.353)				
CGI Safety-Zone	0.077 (0.292)				
Public Housing	-0.162 (0.387)				
Constant	**-3.434 (0.672)*****	-13.033 (0.734)***			2.647 (0.695)***
Observations (*n*)	432	485	485	485	485
Pseudo R-Squared	0.10	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33

Note: Data in table represent the logit coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

An incident characteristic that distinguishes intrusion events from the other spatial configurations is where the homicide occurs. Internal and offense mobility incidents have a greater likelihood to occur in spaces, away from public streets.

To illustrate the nature of an intrusion gang homicide, the narrative below highlights a modal event. This incident involves a conflict between two rival gangs Sentinel Boys and KAM.

> June 2002: The victim (male, Latino, 19 years old) was driving a stolen car with a fellow gang member when they drove into KAM territory. As they approached a group of KAM gang members, two suspects (male, Latino) identified the individuals in the car as rivals from Sentinel Boys. The two suspects (male, Latino) produced handguns and opened fire, killing the victim and wounding the friend.

As indicated by this case, the suspect in an intrusion gang homicide is generally the intended target; however, the suspect is in a better position to respond to the violence directed upon them by the assailant, the actual victim. That is, the intrusion suspect waits for the victim to become a suitable target before engaging in an open conflict. Even when the victim enters an unfriendly neighborhood without the intention of an attack, the outcome may be less than favorable for the encroaching gang member.

Total Mobility Gang Homicides

Total mobility events represent the most interesting and spontaneous type of gang violence. These are events that involve participants who encounter each other outside of either of their gangs' claimed turf, transpiring in gang neutral locations. Table 4.6 shows that total mobility gang homicides are more likely to occur between non-rival gang members (0.833, $P < 0.413$), particularly when compared to internal and offense mobility gang homicides. Also, an intra-gang relationship perfectly predicts "failure" (i.e., none of the total mobility gang homicides involve participants that are fellow gang members) when comparing total mobility

Table 4.6: Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates for Total Mobility Gang Homicides.

	Logit	*Multinomial Logit*			
Characteristics	Total Mobility Versus ALL	Internal Versus Total Mobility	Predatory Versus Total Mobility	Intrusion Versus Total Mobility	Offense Mobility Versus Total Mobility
Participant					
Enjoinment Status					
Victim					
Will Be Enjoined	0.118 (0.382)				
Enjoined	0.959 (0.609)				
Suspect					
Will Be Enjoined	-0.301 (0.360)			0.835 (0.416)*	
Enjoined	-0.519 (0.622)				
Gang Relationship					
Rival	0.088 (0.298)	-2.632 (0.812)***			
Non-rival	**0.833 (0.413)***	-15.699 (0.512)***			-15.222 (0.652)***
Intra-gang	----	20.265 (0.645)***	16.146 (0.901)***		22.732 (1.379)***
Incident					
Street Location	**0.922 (0.321)****	-1.384 (0.484)**	-1.060 (0.353)**		-2.368 (0.665)***
Multiple Suspects	-0.343 (0.257)				
Multiple Victims	0.156 (0.271)				
Spatial Indicators					
Gang Turf	**-2.796 (0.375)*****	16.833 (0.423)***	3.031 (0.571)***	3.162 (0.639)***	
Gang Set-space	-0.596 (0.445)				
CGI Safety-Zone	-0.025 (0.318)				
Public Housing	-0.794 (0.464)		1.085 (0.483)*		
Constant	**0.991 (0.447)***	-15.680 (0.363)***	-2.274 (0.667)***	-2.647 (0.695)***	
Observations	432	485	485	485	485
Pseudo R-Squared	0.23	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33

Note: Data in table represent the logit coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

events to all other spatial types. In contrast, internal, predatory and offense mobility types are more likely to involve confrontations between intra-gang gang members.

Because both participants are traveling away from their gang's turf and converging in space at another location, by definition, total mobility incidents do not take place in either gang's territory (-2.796, $P < 0.001$). In contrast, internal, predatory and intrusion gang homicides are statistically more likely than total mobility events to occur in the gang territory of either participant. Total mobility events are also more likely to take place on the street (0.922, $P < 0.010$), especially when compared to internal, predatory and offense mobility spatial types.

A modal case narrative of a total mobility event is presented below to illustrate some of the distinguishing features to this particular spatial configuration of gang homicide. This incident involves a confrontation between two non-rival gangs Glassell Park Locos and ELA 13 Dukes.

> June 2004: The victim (male, Latino, 26) a member of the Glassell Park Locos was eating inside a Popeye's Chicken with his brother (male, Latino) and friend (male, Latino). The suspect (male, Latino, 18) from ELA 13 Dukes approached the restaurant and flashed hand signs at the group. The victim observed this and exited the building and approached the suspect. After a brief interaction, the suspect produced a handgun and fired one shot into the victim's chest. The suspect fled the location and the victim was transported to USC Medical Center, where he succumbed to his wounds. The suspect was later apprehended. The case is closed by arrest.

This example highlights the distinctly mobile nature of this spatial type, with the suspect and victim converging in space and time, outside in a public space, and away from the gang turf of either participant. Prior to the social interaction facilitating the event, these participants had never been in contact with each other before, and where non-rival gang members whose gangs are geographically separate. Glassell Park Locos claim turf in the LAPD's Northeast Community Policing Area, directly north of Arroyo Seco and the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. The incident escalates from when the suspect flashed his gang's hand signs, and the victim felt it necessary to respond to his challenge. The altercation deteriorates further once the victim approached the suspect, finally becoming lethal when the suspect produces a handgun.

Offense Mobility Gang Homicides

The final spatial type of gang homicide observed in the data, offense mobility incidents are also the least common spatial type (n = 19). This is probably because of their odd structure, with both the victim and suspect belonging to the same gang, yet the incident takes place somewhere outside of their gang's claimed turf. Tita and Griffiths (2005) suggest that these incidents could, in fact, be a variation of an internal gang homicide. That is, the relationship between the participants of an offense mobility gang homicide resembles that of an internal gang homicide, however, it appears that the suspect coaxes the victim to travel to or meet at another location where the homicide transpires.

Table 4.7 shows the characteristics that distinguish offense mobility events from all other spatial types of gang homicide primarily revolving around the incident. However, compared to all other types of gang homicide, offense mobility spatial types are more likely to involve fellow gang members (4.559, $P < 0.001$). This relationship is particularly robust when compared with, predatory, intrusion, and total mobility types. Also, a non-rival relationship perfectly predicts "failure" (i.e., none of the offense mobility gang homicides involve participants that are non-rival gang members) when comparing offense mobility events to all other spatial types. In contrast, predatory, intrusion, and total mobility types have a greater likelihood than offense mobility gang homicides of involving confrontations between non-rival gang members.

Offense mobility gang homicides are less likely to occur on the street (-1.396, $P < 0.050$) than all other gang homicides, especially when compared with intrusion and total mobility incidents. Lastly, offense mobility gang homicides are slightly more likely to occur within a CGI safety-zone (1.423, $P = 0.071$) than all other spatial types. Conversely, internal gang homicides are statistically less likely than offense mobility events to take place within a CGI safety-zone. Since, CGI safety-zones are generally tailored to a gang's claimed area, extending slightly,

Table 4.7: Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates for Offense Mobility Gang Homicides.

	Logit	*Multinomial Logit*			
Characteristics	Offense Mobility Versus ALL	Internal Versus Offense Mobility	Predatory Versus Offense Mobility	Intrusion Versus Offense Mobility	Total Mobility Versus Offense Mobility
Participant					
Enjoinment Status					
Victim					
Will Be Enjoined	-1.226 (1.243)				
Enjoined	0.176 (1.126)				
Suspect					
Will Be Enjoined	0.399 (0.816)				
Enjoined	-1.581 (1.085)			2.802 (1.109)*	
Gang Relationship					
Rival	-1.619 (1.167)				
Non-rival	----		14.684 (0.810)***	14.751 (0.785)***	15.222 (0.670)***
Intra-gang	**4.559 (1.335)*** **		-6.585 (1.518)***	-23.080 (1.378)***	-22.732 (1.371)***
Incident					
Street Location	**-1.396 (0.626)***			1.911 (0.674)**	2.368 (0.665)***
Multiple Suspects	0.547 (0.564)				
Multiple Victims	-0.106 (0.732)				
Spatial Indicators					
Gang Turf	**-3.964 (1.203)*** **	18.846 (1.258)***	5.044 (1.430)***	5.175 (1.477)***	
Gang Set-space	-0.041 (1.369)				
CGI Safety-Zone	**1.423 (0.789)†**	-1.733 (0.857)*			
Public Housing	-0.297 (1.362)				
Constant	-1.791 (1.001)	-14.712 (0.776)***			
Observations (*n*)	426	485	485	485	485
Pseudo R-Squared	0.48	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33

Note: Data in table represent the logit coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

† = p<.10, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001

this finding could further support the notion that offense mobility are variations of internal gang homicides, with the participants encountering each other outside of their gang's turf, but not too far away. Yet, there is need for prudence when generalizing offense mobility events due to the limited number of only 19 cases producing this typology with over 20 years of gang homicide data.

An example that depicts a modal offense mobility gang homicide is featured below. This incident involves an intra-gang conflict between Toonerville gang members.[51]

> January 2009: The victim (female, White, 25 years old) was sitting in her car waiting for a friend (female, White, 30 years old) at a street corner where both Lincoln Heights and Clover's turf overlap. The vehicle was approached by the suspect (male, Latino, 23 years old) and upon entering the vehicle shot the victim multiple times and expired at the scene. The suspect then fled the location. At the time of the incident, the Toonerville gang was under electronic surveillance documenting the planning of the murder by the two suspects. This incident was in response to the victim providing a written statement to police detectives about a case involving her boyfriend, who had recently been arrested and sentenced to 50 years in prison.

This homicide highlights the fact that the victim was lured away from the safety of her home and her gang's claimed turf to an unfamiliar location where the event transpires. The police surveillance conducted on the Toonerville gang at the time of event provides a detailed chronicle, with comprehensive cell phone transcripts that fully document the planning, undertaking, and resolution of the event. The mobility of this type of incident forces the participants to deviate from their routine activities, being coaxed away from a gang's claimed area, with the intention of masking the true motive and internal nature of the murder.

A brief summary of overall findings are displayed in Table 4.8, detailing both the characteristics distinguishing each spatial category of gang homicide from the other residual types and enumerating the pairwise comparison between the two spatial types.

[51] Toonerville's claimed turf is located in the LAPD's Northeast Community Policing Area, just north of the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area.

Table 4.8: Differentiating Characteristics for the Spatial Typology of Gang Homicides

Characteristics Distinguishing Spatial Type from All Others		Pairwise Comparison Between Spatial Types	
Internal	• Suspect likely to be enjoined in the future • Greater likelihood to be intra-gang in nature • Uncommon to involve rivals	**Predatory:**	suspect no CGI, rival and non-rivals involved, intra-gang unlikely, less common to occur in a gang's turf
		Intrusion:	rival and non-rivals involved, intra-gang unlikely, less common to occur in a gang's turf
		Offense Mobility:	less common to occur in a gang's turf, likely to transpire in CGI safety-zone
		Total Mobility:	rival and non-rivals involved, intra-gang unlikely, less common to occur in a gang's turf, likely to transpire on the street
Predatory	• Suspect non-enjoined gang member • Victim likely to be enjoined in the future • Greater likelihood to involve rival gangs • Uncommon to be intra-gang in nature • Less likely to transpire on the street • Multiple suspect present • Likely to occur in victim's claimed turf	**Internal:**	suspect will have CGI, rival and non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, greater likelihood of occurring in a gang's turf
		Intrusion:	non-enjoined victim, suspect will have CGI, intra-gang unlikely, likely to transpire on the street
		Offense Mobility:	non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, occurs outside of a gang's turf
		Total Mobility:	non-rivals unlikely, likely to transpire on the street, occurs outside of a gang's turf**,** more likely to transpire outside of public housing
Intrusion	• Suspect likely to be enjoined in the future • Victim non-enjoined gang member • Likely to occur in suspect's claimed turf	**Internal:**	rival and non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, unlikely to transpire on the street, common to occur in a gang's turf
		Predatory:	suspect no CGI, victim will have CGI, intra-gang likely, transpires on the street
		Offense Mobility:	suspect non-enjoined, non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, unlikely to transpire on the street, occurs outside of a gang's turf
		Total Mobility:	suspect will not have CGI, occurs outside of a gang's turf
Offense Mobility[a]	• Greater likelihood to be intra-gang in nature • Less likely to transpire on the street • Uncommon to occur in a gang's turf • Slightly more likely to occur in a CGI safety-zone	**Internal:**	unlikely to transpire in a CGI safety-zone, common to occur in a gang's turf
		Predatory:	non0rivla common, intra-gang unlikely, transpires in a gang's turf
		Intrusion:	suspect non-enjoined, non-rivals likely, intra-gang uncommon, likely to transpire on the street, occurs inside of a gang's turf
		Total Mobility:	non-rivals likely, intra-gang uncommon, likely to transpire on the street
Total Mobility	• Greater likelihood to involve non-rival gangs • More likely to transpire on the street	**Internal:**	rival and non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, unlikely to transpire on the street, common to occur in a gang's turf
		Predatory:	intra-gang common, unlikely to transpire on the street, common to occur in a gang's turf
		Intrusion:	victim non-enjoined, common to occur in a gang's turf
		Offense Mobility:	non-rivals unlikely, intra-gang common, unlikely to transpire on the street

Note: Non-significant estimates in the multinomial logistic models signify that the categories are similar, relating to a particular independent variable. Therefore, results are reported only when types significantly differ.

[a] The results in offense mobility (n = 19) category should be regarded prudently due to the lack of observations.

The Influence of CGIs on the Spatial Typology of Gang Homicides

Previous research (Tita & Griffiths, 2005) using a "distance from" spatial typology of homicide indicates that gang-motivated homicides are more likely to exhibit one of three patterns: predatory, intrusion or total mobility. This trend is mirrored in the current dataset and displayed in Table 4.9. Prior to the establishment of CGIs in the region, the majority of gang homicides fell into one of these three types, with predatory gang homicides representing the most frequent category. Following the emergence of CGIs, it was expected that due to a CGI's ability to influence gang members' patterns of association the mobility patterns of participants, both suspects and victims, involved in a gang homicide would be affected. To ascertain the influence that CGIs have on each spatial type of gang homicide, the two time periods, pre/post CGIs, are compared using a chi-square test of independence.

Table 4.9: Comparison of Gang Homicides Pre-CGI and Post-CGI by Spatial Category.

	Pre N =328		Post N =165		Association & Significance
	N	%	N	%	
Internal	33	10.1	28	17.0	**4.833***
Predatory	109	33.2	41	24.9	**3.645†**
Intrusion	78	23.8	43	26.1	N.S.
Offense Mobility	11	3.4	8	4.9	N.S.
Total Mobility	97	29.6	45	27.3	N.S.

† = p<.10, ***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = p<.001

In the post-CGI period there is a statistical increase in the proportion of internal gang homicides, a percentage increase of 70 percent, and a statistical decline in the proportion of predatory gang homicides, a percentage decline of 25 percent. Overall, these results are consistent with the findings from Chapter 2 indicating that the mobility of enjoined gang members is more likely to be restricted to within their gang's turf, but dislodged from their gang's set-space. Therefore, it is not surprising that violence within a gang's turf increases after

CGIs are introduced into the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area. Furthermore, the decrease in predatory gang homicides is consistent with a CGI's ability to discourage enjoined gang members from associating publicly with fellow gang members around their gang's known set-space. Removing enjoined gang members from these public areas limits the opportunities for enjoined gang members to be targeted by a rival gang, reducing their exposure to being a victim of gang violence. The decline in predatory gang homicides, which are characterized by taking place in private spaces, corroborates with the results from Chapter 3, indicating that enjoined gang homicides are less likely to transpire on the street, suggesting that enjoined gang members are moving their activities into more private locations.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

The principal objective of this chapter was to examine the mobility patterns of participants involved in gang homicides to better understand the characteristics that shape these events, and to investigate the relationship a CGI has with the spatial characteristics of gang homicides. By using a spatial typology of gang homicide, constructed from the mobility patterns of victims and suspects involved in these lethally violent events, I look at how the presence of CGIs influence the spatial types of gang homicide. Routine activities theory provides the framework to understand how CGIs alter gang members' behavior, reducing the opportunities for gang violence, thereby shifting the distribution observed in the spatial types of gang homicide.

Building upon Tita and Griffiths' (2005) foremost study developing the spatial typology of homicide, this study narrows its focus to only examining gang homicides. Using this "distance from" spatial typology allows for a more extensive examination of how the participant characteristics (e.g., enjoinment status, gang relationship) and incident characteristics (e.g., location, number of participants, spatial indicators) contribute to the mobility patterns of victims

and suspects leading them to these homicidal events. The distribution of spatial types of gang homicide mirrors the overall patterns of homicide observed by Tita and Griffiths (2005). In particular, offense mobility gang homicides, where the victim and suspect are from the same gang, yet travel away from their gang's turf to where the event transpires, remains the most infrequent spatial configuration. Conversely, gang homicides are fairly evenly distributed across the predatory, intrusion, and total mobility categories.

While Tita and Griffiths (2005) stress the importance of incident characteristics at distinguishing between the different types of gang homicide, the restricted focus of this sample to only gang homicides includes two unique participant characteristics, enjoinment status and gang relationship, which aided in distinguishing between these spatial configurations. Yet, particular features of the incident, such as whether the incident transpires outside on a public street, the presence of multiple suspects or victims, and the spatial proximity to a gang's turf align with what routine activities theory would anticipate. Internal incidents, which are the least mobile types of gang homicide, are statistically more likely to be intra-gang conflicts, and less likely to involve rival gang members. Predatory gang homicides are typically confrontations between rival gang members that occur away from public streets but remain inside the gang turf of the victim, and involve multiple suspects. This pattern indicates that a prepared suspect initiates the conflict by seeking out the victim, thereby prompting a predatory gang homicide. Interestingly, the suspects of these spatial types are more likely to be a non-enjoined gang member while the victim is from a gang that will be enjoined in the future. The opposite of a predatory incident is an intrusion gang homicide, which is typically defensive in nature with the intended victims protecting themselves. Intrusion incidents also have a greater likelihood of transpiring in the gang turf of the victim. The mobility trends observed for predatory and

intrusion gang homicides correspond with classical theories describing the activity patterns of gang members (Thrasher, 1927; Yablonsky, 1962; Suttles, 1968). That is, gang members residing within their gang's territory and defending it from intruders, or attacking their rivals within their own turf. Also, the enjoinment status of the suspects and victims are the exact opposite of predatory incidents. Offense mobility gang homicides are intra-gang conflicts that are generally deceptive, with some degree of planning by the suspect to lure the victim away from their gang's territory. Total mobility gang homicides appear to be confrontations between non-rival gang members, with both participants residing apart from each other and their activity patterns converging in space away from either gang's turf (e.g., attending a party, or going to business). These events tend to escalate from interpersonal disputes between the participants that turn into a homicide when the suspect produces a handgun. Studies on gang territoriality in Los Angeles (Moore, et al., 1983) indicate that non-resident gang members actually generate more violence suggesting that these gang members are more likely to be involved in total mobility events. Thus, total mobility gang homicides generally involve a suspect who has both more mobility and a greater propensity to engage in violence.

Interestingly, a gang member's enjoinment status was only statistically important for participants that would be enjoined by a CGI in the future. However, being enjoined was unable to distinguish between any types of homicide. Gangs targeted with a CGI are problematic groups that regularly intimidate local residents and engage in violent acts (Thomas et al., 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that members from gangs that will be enjoined are more likely to be participating in predatory gang homicides. However, based on the results from Chapter 2, that enjoined gang members constrain their everyday activities to their gang's claimed turf, I also would have expected that gang homicides involving enjoined gang members are more likely to

distinguish predatory events, where the victim is attacked within his gang's turf, or intrusion events, where the suspect defends himself within his gang's turf. It appears that the mobility patterns of participants involved in a gang homicide with an enjoined gang member are not discernibly different from an event with non-enjoined gang members, which is explicated in Chapter 3. This lack of distinguishability may be due to the relatively uncommon nature of homicide. Gang violence and homicides are not a daily part of a gang member's routine activities, but instead are relatively abrupt incidents. According to Klein (1995b; p. 231) "gang violence does cycle; it ebbs and flows in response to something" with most of a gang member's time consisting of hanging around, socializing, drinking and more hanging around (Klein, 1995a). In fact, during the peak years of violent crime (1992-1993) in Hollenbeck, on average, a gang homicide took place every nine days, while today (2012), on average, a gang homicide occurs every thirty days.

Previous research by Griffiths and Tita (2009) determined that the insular nature of public housing projects socially isolates tenants producing hotbeds of violence, however, public housing does not attract violence from nonlocal offenders or generate violence in adjacent communities. Therefore, I would have expected that internal gang homicides would be more prevalent in these cloistered spaces. Instead public housing communities experienced only a limited amount of gang homicides (12 percent), and they were statistically more likely to distinguish predatory gang homicides from all other spatial configurations. This diverging finding from Griffiths and Tita's (2009) study could be due to the nature of Hollenbeck's public housing communities being less socially and racially divisive than the public housing communities previously studied in South Central Los Angeles. Also, the gang composition within these communities could be impacting the findings from this chapter. That is, the gang

presence in the four public communities within Hollenbeck varies, with two communities each being controlled by a sole gang, one community shared by two gangs, and one community which was demolished, reconstructed, and repopulated presently having only three gangs that claim turf within this housing community. Future research should investigate how these unique communities compare with the previous housing projects examined by Griffiths and Tita (2009).

The extant literature has established that gang activity is typically confined to sub-areas or the set-space within a gang's turf, and that these set-space locations clearly serve "as a crime attractor and generator" (Tita & Ridgeway, 2007, p.232). Surprisingly, proximity to a gang's set-space does not differentiate between any of the spatial types, with only a few gang homicides (10 percent) actually taking place around these areas. Two possible explanations could explain this observation. First, gang set-space occupies locations that are within the interior of a gang's turf, thereby being more difficult for rivals to approach unnoticed. Therefore, it would be more likely that gang violence would be constrained to a gang's territorial borders as proposed by Brantingham and colleagues (2012). Second, it is possible that the LAPD gang detectives have misidentified the set-space locations. This seems unlikely, since it was not uncommon (20 percent) for gang members to be stopped and field identified in these micro-locales within their turf (see Chapter 2 descriptive statistics). Thus, it seems likely that the former explanation is more appropriate; however, future research should continue to investigate the role that these micro locales play in facilitating gang violence.

After constructing the spatial typology of gang homicide and investigating the characteristics distinguishing each of the five categories, I examined if the introduction of CGIs into the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area influenced the routine activities of gang members, thereby impacting their mobility patterns and shifting the distribution of spatial types.

I predicted that CGIs would affect the most common types of gang homicide (i.e., predatory, intrusion, and total mobility) and shift their distributions. After the establishment of CGIs in Hollenbeck, there was a statistical increase in the proportion of internal gang homicides and a decline in the proportion of predatory gang homicides. These findings are consistent with findings from the earlier chapters, that CGIs dislodge gang members from hanging out around their gang's set-space; however, they continue to maintain their routine activities within their gang's turf. Additionally, Chapter 3 indicates that enjoined gang members have begun shifting their activities away from the street and to less public spaces. Taken as a whole, these findings seem to suggest that the accruing impact of CGIs in the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area have begun to restrict the mobility patterns of participants involved in a gang homicide.

This chapter adapted Tita and Griffiths (2005) spatial typology of homicide to focus solely on gang-related events, uncovering the characteristics which influence the mobility patterns of participants associated with these incidents, with the goal of better understanding how CGIs have impacted the spatial indicators of gang violence. Gang violence remains a complex process, and these findings suggest that CGIs seem to be influencing the mobility patterns of gang members. Chapter 2 illustrates that the introduction of CGIs has an immediate impact on the patterns of association of enjoined gang members, and dissipates gang violence in the short-run (see Chapter 3). While, it is still uncertain how well this reduction of violence will hold up in the long-term, at the very least the findings suggest that the initial shock produced from the introduction of a CGI is able to alter gang members' routine activities, which may be just enough of a foothold to deter opportunities that facilitate gang violence to manifest. It is important that future research examining CGIs continues to investigate the long-term impacts of these indefinite court orders.

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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions, Policy Implications, & Future Directions

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation uses the framework of routine activities theory to investigate how a situational crime prevention strategy disrupts the activity patterns of gangs, thereby impacting their criminal opportunities. Specifically, I examine how the introduction and enforcement of civil gang injunctions (CGIs) intervene in the routine activities of a gang and its members, affecting criminal opportunities and patterns of gang violence. I investigate the relationship of CGIs and gang activity by addressing three principal questions:

1) How do CGIs influence a gang's patterns of association?

2) *How do CGIs influence the characteristics of gang violence?*

3) *How have CGIs influenced the mobility patterns of participants involved in gang-related homicides?*

To answer these questions I analyze official law enforcement data, manually gathered from the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Chapter 2 relies upon field identification (FI) cards collected by police, from 2001 through 2012 that involve gang members. Along with providing relational information about individuals observed associating together, an FI card provides information about the demographic characteristics of all of the individuals involved in a stop, incident characteristics, and details about the officers involved in the encounter. I divide my analyses into two parts: 1) examining an enjoined gang's patterns of association approximately two years before and approximately two years after the introduction of a CGI and 2) comparing enjoined and non-enjoined gangs during the same time period. The analytic methods used to examine the data include chi-square tests of independence on 2x2 and 2xN contingency tables along with standard t-tests to compare both event- and individual-level characteristics. To investigate how CGIs impact a gang's patterns of

association as a whole, I use a case study approach allowing me to qualitatively compare the structure of each gang's social network. Empirical evidence suggests that CGIs have the ability to disrupt both the social and spatial patterns of association among gang members. At the group-level, the influence of a CGI varies between gangs with diverging patterns being observed in the data. Gangs that were better connected and more structured prior to being enjoined had their social ties disrupted, indicating that gang members' patterns of association were being inhibited. In contrast, loosely tied gangs responded to the introduction of a CGI by coalescing and giving rise to a more interconnected and structured gang.

For Chapters 3 and 4, I use data culled directly from the homicide case files stored at the Hollenbeck police station. Chapter 3 uses all homicides known to the LAPD from the ten year period following the enactment of the division's first CGI, comparing the incident characteristics of three types of disaggregated homicide: enjoined, non-enjoined, and non-gang. Chi-square tests of independence on 2x2 and 2xN contingency tables along with standard t-tests are again used to compare between each type of disaggregated homicide. It is observed that the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides are not statistically dissimilar from either non-gang or non-enjoined gang homicides. While this could suggest that CGIs are not impacting the characteristics of enjoined gang homicides, I instead speculate that the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides are in a state of transition between non-gang homicides and non-enjoined gang homicides. Given more time I predict enjoined gang homicides will begin to more closely resemble non-gang events. I base this premise upon the direct comparisons of gang homicides involving an enjoined gang, before and after a CGI is placed upon them (see Table 3.8). Results indicate a statistical decline in the prevalence of enjoined gang homicides taking place in public and on the street. There are also reductions in the number of suspects and victims

that participate in an enjoined gang homicide.

Chapter 4 builds upon the previous chapters, narrowing its focus to investigate the impact that CGIs have on both the mobility patterns of participants only involved in gang-related homicides. The data used in this chapter are expanded upon to include the ten year period prior to the introduction of CGIs, allowing for the analysis of twenty years of gang homicide. I construct a spatial typology of gang homicide using a gang's claimed turf, providing a finer resolution of gang activity, which is able to account for the social, natural, and built environments that gang members traverse through. I first employ logistic and multinomial logistic regressions to determine the characteristics that distinguish one type of gang homicide from all others and amongst the four other spatial types. After distinguishing the characteristics that differentiate each type of gang homicide, I use chi-square tests on 2x2 contingency tables comparing each spatial type from the pre-CGI period to the post-CGI period, to ascertain the influence CGIs have had on the distribution of the different spatial configurations of gang homicide. While being enjoined did not distinguish any specific type of homicide, the findings from this chapter did reinforce the complex nature of gang violence, indicating that the mobility patterns for participants of gang homicides have become altered following the introduction of CGIs in Hollenbeck. Specifically, there was a reduction in the prevalence of predatory gang homicides and an increase in the prevalence of internal gang homicides. These findings support earlier results from Chapter 2 and 3, suggesting that gang violence remains prevalent within a gang's turf, however, these violent events are being displaced from public streets into private spaces, out of community's view.

The rest of this chapter discusses this dissertation's major findings and contributions in the field of gang research and criminal justice policy. Specifically, the ability of situational crime

prevention tools, like a CGI, to disrupt the activity patterns of gang members, thereby impacting enjoined gang members' exposure to criminal opportunities and their patterns of violence. Next, I consider the implications of this study's findings on the ongoing use of CGIs as an anti-gang strategy and suggest possible refinements, which should lessen neighborhood resistance and increase community buy-in. In closing, I present additional research questions that have been prompted from composing this dissertation.

DISCUSSION OF CONTRIBUTIONS & PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

This dissertation represents the first gang-centric study of CGIs, focusing on how CGIs influence the activity patterns, both violent and non-violent, of gangs and their membership. By utilizing a unique dataset, FI cards, I am able to examine changes in behavior at the individual- and group-level of both enjoined and non-enjoined gangs. The manual collection of homicide case files allows me to parse out gang violence that directly involves enjoined gangs. Focusing specifically on gang violence removes the assumption of previous studies that all violence being commissioned within a CGI safety-zone is gang-related and involves enjoined gang members.

The conceptual framework used to justify the use and success of CGIs is founded upon Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory, that an increase in both social and physical disorder in a neighborhood will increase that community's vulnerability to the proliferation of crime (LACDA, 1996; Allan, 2004; Thomas, Riordan & Shiner, 2009; Shiner, 2009). Previous studies investigating CGIs have utilized social disorganization theory (Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2005) broken-windows theory (O'Deanne & Morreale, 2011), deterrence theory (Grogger, 2002; LACCGJ, 2004), and social identity theory (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013) to better understand the effectiveness of this anti-gang strategy. This dissertation diverges from the theoretical underpinnings of the extant literature, instead being guided by the framework of routine activities theory, which provides a novel perspective on a CGI's ability to impact gang

members' associations with each other and their mobility patterns, affecting gang members' opportunities for gang violence.

CGIs & Gang Member's Patterns of Association

To investigate the relationship between CGIs and gang members' patterns of association, I divide the analyses into two parts; 1) examining gang members' patterns of association approximately two years prior to and two years following the placement of a CGI on a targeted gang, and 2) contrasting the patterns of association between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members in a subsequent time period. The findings indicate that the enactment of a CGI impacts enjoined gang members, influencing their routine activities in the short-run. Specifically, enjoined gang members are less likely to be associating in public spaces, observed hanging-out around their gang's set-space, or being involved in a pedestrian stop. Also, the average group size of enjoined gang members associating together in public statistically decreases. Enjoined gang members have fewer encounters with police, further suggesting that a CGI is inhibiting these individuals from publicly representing their gang or associating with fellow gang members. While these findings are anticipated from the CGI rhetoric (Thomas et al., 2009), they are also consistent with recent research by Hennigan & Sloane (2013) indicating that compared to non-enjoined gang members, enjoined gang members spend less time in public together facilitating a reduction in the "street cohesion" of the gang.

CGIs & A Gang's Patterns of Association

Gangs, however, are more than the sum of their members. Research has shown that the process of being part of a gang facilitates members to engage in antisocial behaviors (Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith & Tobin, 2003). Therefore, to investigate how CGIs impact a gang's patterns of association, I use social network analysis to identify if any

changes are observed to the structure of an enjoined gang's social network. Examining the gang as a whole greatly limits the sample size, seven enjoined gangs and twenty-four non-enjoined gangs, limiting any meaningful statistical analysis. Therefore, I use a case study approach, looking again at gang members' patterns of association approximately two years before and after the introduction of a CGI, and comparing the patterns of association between enjoined and non-enjoined gang members in the same time period, to qualitatively describe any observable trends produced by the CGI. I discovered two diverging patterns exhibited by enjoined gangs. Gangs whose social networks were more connected and structured prior to being enjoined experienced a disruption in the ties among gang members. Conversely, gangs that were loosely tied together, lacking a prominently structured component before being enjoined, responded to the CGI by coalescing and forming a more interconnected and structured group. Of the seven enjoined gangs, four experienced disruption while the other three coalesced.

These findings are in accordance with Maxson and colleagues (2003; 2005) warning that CGIs have the potential to increase or decrease the cohesiveness of a gang. Recent research has suggested that the implementation of a CGI has "an impact on the strength of identification with the gang" with weakly affiliated enjoined gang members being less likely to participate in gang-related activities (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013; p. 32). This explanation could be observed in these findings, with enjoined gangs whose members have a stronger group identity than individual identity and are more resilient to the CGI, impeding the desired effects of inhibiting enjoined gang members' patterns of association and disrupting the gang's ability to collectively act. Instead, when a gang is enjoined whose members strongly identify with the group, they treat the CGI as an outside attack to their gang's identity and respond by solidifying the ties amongst fellow members, thereby strengthening the group as a whole (Hennigan & Sloane, 2013).

Next, I compared the social networks of the seven enjoined gangs to the twenty-four non-enjoined gangs. Both groups varied substantially in their reported network characteristics (e.g., mean degree, isolates, size of larges component, and the number of components with more than three nodes), however, when these measures were averaged both groups resembled each other. Generally, both groups' members are weakly tied together, having only one principal component that is connected by a handful of key gang members. Also, approximately half of either group's network is composed of isolates. The striking similarities between enjoined and non-enjoined gangs' network structures in this subsequent time period suggests that a CGI exerts an initial shock to the enjoined gang, witnessed in the pre/post sample; however, over time, the group behavior of the enjoined gang adapts to the CGI with enjoined gang members' patterns of association returning to resemble non-enjoined gang members. This finding seems to indicate that the CGI is only able to significantly impact the gang for a limited period of time.

Police Enforcement of CGIs

While the FI data permit an unparalleled examination of how CGIs influence a street gang's patterns of association, it is possible that the enjoinment of gang is actually affecting how law enforcement are policing an enjoined gang, specifically affecting their propensity to complete an FI. Due to the extensive levels of discretion that police have in interacting with civilians makes studying their behaviors extremely challenging endeavor. That being said, there were several measures included in these analyses (i.e., type of police unit, time of occurrence, and the number of documented FIs), which could provide more insight into the relationship between CGIs and the enforcement patterns of police. All of the measures used to ascertain if law enforcement actively target enjoined gangs are unable to statistically capture any significant changes in police behavior, either in the pre/post sample or between enjoined and non-enjoined

gang members. Overall, these findings, along with the observed impact that CGIs have on enjoined gang members' patterns of association, suggest that employing CGIs has not altered the police's patterns of enforcement.

The Significance of CGIs Non-significant Impact on Enjoined Gang Homicides

CGIs are able to influence the patterns of association among enjoined gang members affecting their routine activities, specifically discouraging enjoined gang members from associating together in public, thereby altering where suitable targets (i.e., enjoined gang members) are victimized, moving these events from public locations (e.g., street corner, park, recreation centers, etc.) to more private spaces (e.g., individual residences). Thus, I expect that this change in behavior would influence the incident characteristics (e.g., location, weapons used, multiple participants, motive, etc.) associated with homicides involving enjoined gang members, diminishing the disparity between enjoined gang homicides and non-gang homicides, with the indicators of the incident not statistically differentiating between these two types of homicide. Conversely, the incident characteristics of an enjoined gang homicide should be distinguishable from a non-enjoined gang homicide. The comparison between enjoined gang and non-gang homicides indicates that the incident characteristics (except for handgun use and motive) do not statistically differentiate between these two types of homicide. However, the comparison between enjoined gang homicides and non-enjoined gang homicides also indicates that the incident characteristics (except for shots impacting and motive) do not statistically differentiate between these two types of gang homicide. While it could be argued that the lack of statistical differences between the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides and non-enjoined gang homicides indicates that CGIs have little meaningful influence on the nature of gang homicide. However, I would argue that when the findings presented in Tables, 3.3, 3.4, and

3.7 are examined together, these results instead suggest that the incident characteristics of enjoined gang homicides are transitioning and beginning to resemble non-gang homicides. That is, enjoined gang homicides are shifting from transpiring outside in public spaces on the street and are now beginning to occur more frequently in private spaces and inside of residences. Also, enjoined gang homicides are beginning to resemble non-gang homicides by becoming more intimate events between two participants, a suspect and a victim. This transition in which enjoined gang homicides are occurring is supported by the expectations of routine activities theory. Thus, a CGI manipulates the patterns of behavior for motivated offenders (i.e., enjoined gang members) and suitable targets (i.e., enjoined gang members) influencing the incident characteristics of an enjoined gang homicide.

CGIs & The Mobility Patterns of Gang Homicide Participants

A CGI's ability to influence gang members' activity patterns should also affect their mobility patterns, shifting the spatial typology of gang homicide's distribution. Therefore, I predicted that CGIs would influence the prevalence of gang homicide's most common types (i.e., predatory, intrusion, and total mobility). In the post-CGI period there is a statistical increase in the proportion of internal gang homicides and a statistical decline in the proportion of predatory gang homicides. These findings corroborate earlier results from Chapter 2, that the mobility of enjoined gang members is more likely to be restricted to within their gang's turf, but displaced from the gang's set-space. Also, it is not surprising then that after CGIs are introduced in Hollenbeck, an increase in the occurrences of internal gang homicides is observed, which are events characterized by the limited mobility of both the suspect and the victim. Furthermore, the reduction in predatory gang homicides is also consistent with a CGI's ability to discourage enjoined gang members from associating with fellow gang members in public and around their

gang's set-space. Limiting enjoined gang members' ability to loiter in public limits the opportunities for enjoined gang members to be targeted by a rival gang, lowering their exposure of be being victims of gang violence. Lastly, the reduction in predatory gang homicides, which are characterized by taking place in private spaces and away from the streets, corroborates the findings from Chapter 3, that enjoined gang homicides are infrequently transpiring on the street, suggesting that enjoined gang members have begun to move their activities into more private locations.

OVERALL LIMITATIONS

The contributions and findings from this study help to advance gang research and the field of criminology as a whole; yet, this study takes place within a certain context that may not be generalizable to other locations or time periods. While the specific limitations for the data used in the analyses are discussed in each particular chapter, there remain a couple broader concerns and limitations that are discussed below.

First, the research site for this study is geographically limited to only one of the LAPD's twenty-one Divisions. Even though there are advantages to using the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area (see Chapter 1), by concentrating on only this singular Division of the LAPD may limit the overall generalizability of this study. A recent study by Hennigan and Sloane (2013) examined three CGIs across two Community Policing Areas in the LAPD, Hollenbeck and Northeast, comparing how each Division implemented a CGI. Their study revealed that the implementation of CGIs significantly varies between the LAPD's Divisions, with Hollenbeck's implementation of a CGI corresponding to reductions in the amount of gang violence observed in a neighborhood encapsulated by a CGI safety-zone. Hennigan and Sloane's (2013) study substantiates the results from my current examination of CGIs in Hollenbeck,

suggesting that my findings could be generalized to other areas where CGIs have been "successfully" implemented.

The second broader concern is the nature of the gangs in Hollenbeck. Klein and Maxson (2006) would consider these gangs to be "traditional" with strong territorial dispositions and intergenerational linkages. Also, these gangs are demographically homogenous, predominantly being from Mexican-American descent. Since, CGIs are designed to be "effective" on territorial gangs, it seems unrealistic that a CGI would be placed on a gang that does not claim or hangout within a demarcated area. Therefore, it seems likely that "traditional" gangs would be targeted with a CGI, allowing for this study's findings to be generalizable to other enjoined gangs. Yet, the homogenous demographics of Hollenbeck's gangs may limit the generalizability of the findings, since gang ethnicity tends to produce variations in the organizational character of a group (Skolnick, 1988; Moore, 1990; Taylor, 1990; Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991). Replicating the methodology used for this current study and applying it to other communities with enjoined gangs with differing ethnic compositions can be easily accomplished, thereby, providing a systemic approach which can produce comparable results, a neglected aspect of gang research (Klein, 2005). Future research projects should consider examining enjoined gangs with varying ethnic compositions.

Another concern for this study is that CGIs are typically not the only strategy employed in neighborhoods with chronic gang activity. Therefore, it is possible that an interactive effect takes place, which in not being captured in the current analyses. For instance, the city of Los Angeles implemented the Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) program in 2008, launching it in twelve neighborhoods throughout the city, two of which are in Hollenbeck. GRYD partners the LAPD with local community service providers that host an array of services (cognitive

behavioral therapy, parent training, gang and violence prevention) to target youth at risk of joining a gang, (Dunworth, Hayeslip, Lyons & Denver, 2010). While a recent evaluation of the GRYD program indicates that a decrease in gang-related crimes occurred in GRYD safety-zones, a further analysis of the city's crime trends indicated that gang-related crimes had been declining prior to the establishment of the GRYD program, suggesting that other factors besides GRYD contributed to the changing patterns of gang activity (Dunworth, Hayeslip & Denver, 2011).

Since this study does not take place in vacuum, it is impossible to control such a dynamic environment. That being said, I believe that the current study is able to overcome these concerns by the considerable time-periods used in the various datasets, 12 years of FI data and 20 years of homicide case files. By acknowledging the complexities of studying street gangs and the myriad ways they are policed, researchers should be cautious in their interpretation of results and develop new techniques to collect data and examine these phenomena.

This study also takes place during an overall decline in crime and violence within the city of Los Angeles, which is experiencing its lowest crime rate in the last 50 years (Levitt, 2004; Wallman & Blumstein, 2006; Zimring, 2007; Rubin & Winton, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Lin, 2011; Rubin 2012). Klein (1995b) attests that the nature of gang activity and violence is cyclical, being seasonal,[52] epochal,[53] and local.[54] According to Klein (1995b; p. 231), "gang violence does cycle; it ebbs and flows in response to something." Therefore, it is possible that either the declining crime-rate, which criminologists remain befuddled by, or the cyclicality of gang violence is contributing to the findings discovered by this study, limiting the generalizability of

[52] "Historically, gang activity would normally peak during the summer months in Eastern cities - Chicago, Boston, New York... Yet, in Los Angeles, gang activity was lower in the summer" (Klein, 1995b; p. 222).

[53] "Within any given city, and in separate areas in larger cities with widespread gang presence, gang activity seems often to move in cycles of as much as five and ten years" (Klein, 1995b; p.223).

these findings to major urban centers that are experiencing analogous crime patterns as the city of Los Angeles.

Finally, Hollenbeck has its own history, which has contributed the development of local communities and the street gangs that proliferated within the area. Understanding the background of how gangs developed in Hollenbeck is necessary if the results from this study are to be generalized to other areas enjoined with CGIs. It is important for researchers to be aware of the historical context to the social processes being studied since the field of criminology routinely assumes "that there is a fixed and ahistorical relationship between them [characteristics] and crime which is independent of time and culture" (Young, 2011; p. 113).

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The results from this study have important policy implications for the rationale and use of a CGI as a permanent situational crime prevention strategy. Findings from Chapter 2 indicate that a CGI is able to influence the patterns of association, both at the individual- and gang-level, at least within the first two years. This shock is best articulated by Father Greg Boyle, a veteran gang interventionist, "I mean, eight minutes after one was filed here on the Eastside, I had kids in my office saying, 'Get me a job'" (Fremon, 2003; p. 1). While the patterns of association among individual gang members suggest that CGIs are inhibiting gang members from loitering outside and associating with one another in public, as a group enjoined gangs do not always respond as predicted by the logic of a CGI. It appears that a CGI either disrupts the social ties of members or encourages member's social ties to coalesce. Regardless, of how a gang responds to the CGI, there does appear to be an initial shock to the enjoined gang producing one of these two outcomes. While additional research is required to better anticipate and understand how an

[54] "In addition to city-specific cycles, there are sub-area and neighborhood cycles" (Klein, 1995b; p. 223).

enjoined gang will be affected by a CGI, it is clear that in the wake of a CGI a new pattern of associations among an enjoined gang is established in the short-run. Over some period of time, with the exact duration still unknown, the overall influence of a CGI appears to either wane or diffuses to neighboring rivals because the patterns of association of enjoined gang members are beginning to return to patterns resembling non-enjoined gang members.

In relation to influencing gang violence, it appears that while CGIs are able to dislodge gang members from their gang's set-space, the CGI actually constrains the mobility of enjoined gang members, reducing the likelihood that enjoined gang members are found outside of their claimed turf. As a result, there is an increase in the proportion of internal gang homicides and a decrease in the proportion of predatory gang homicides following the introduction of CGIs into the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area.

Furthermore, this study complements Beckett and Herbert's research (2010) examining the affects of legal hybridity, combining civil and criminal law, as a tool of urban social control by law enforcement. The use of legal hybridity, such as a CGI, increases the authority and discretion of police, while limiting individual's civil liberties and due process rights, along with inflating the criminal justice system through ensnaring noncriminal actors. It is the inclusion of legal behaviors that are proscribed by CGIs as illegal violations, most notably prohibiting gang members from associating together in public, which infringe upon an individual's first amendment's protection of freedom of assembly (Stewart, 1998). There has also been contention on the permanence of CGIs and the inadequacies in the criminal justice system for enjoined gang members that desist from the gang to be able to remove themselves from the CGI (Crawford, 2009; Lopez-Aguado, 2013).

The findings from this study suggest that CGIs are able to impact the associating patterns

of gang members only in the short-run. Thus, it seems reasonable that the indefinite nature of a CGI could be curtailed from forever to an abbreviated time period (e.g., five or ten years), thereby reducing the infringement against an enjoined gang member's civil liberties. After the time period has elapsed, the prosecuting attorney could request a renewal of the CGI if the enjoined gang is still active and posing a threat to their local community. Also, at this time, non-active enjoined gang members could have their names expunged from the CGI. A tempering of the CGI mechanism in this manner would be able to address problematic gang activity in a neighborhood without disengaging local community residents from buying into this form of urban social control (Branson-Potts, 2013).

Another policy recommendation prompted by these findings is the discontinued use of multi-gang CGIs. The multi-gang CGIs appear to be the current direction that the Los Angeles City Attorney is moving toward. This is not unexpected given the tedious nature of producing these documents, consuming precious departmental resources of the city/district/state attorney's office (Branson-Potts, 2013; LACA, 2014). Yet, there are several issues that arise with the use of multi-gang CGIs. First, these multi-gang CGIs are not as geographically tailored as a CGI that targets only one gang because there are now multiple gang territories that need to be encapsulated by a multi-gang CGI's safety-zone. Maxson and colleagues (2005) caution the overextension of CGI boundaries, including areas where the enjoined gang activity is less frequent, which may backfire on law enforcement's suppression activities. The two diverging patterns observed in Hollenbeck's multi-gang CGI support this argument (see Figures 2.12 & 2.13). Second, it is highly unlikely that rival gang members will be observed loitering together in public. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to include multiple gangs on a singular CGI. Third, there are complex social relationships in existence between rival gangs, which could interact

with a multi-gang CGI influencing the enjoined gangs' behavior, including their patterns of association, producing outcomes that are unanticipated (see Figures 2.12 & 2.13). Overall, there is still so much unknown about the inner workings of a CGI to recommend the continued use of multi-gang CGIs.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The findings from this dissertation have prompted a new set of research questions that merit attention within the criminological and gang literatures. Before discussing these prospective avenues of research, it would be valuable to replicate the current study in other regions, both within the city of Los Angeles and in other urban areas that utilize CGIs. Conducting such studies would help in ascertaining if the results learned from this dissertation are only applicable to the Hollenbeck Community Policing Area or if they have greater generalizability.

While this dissertation is the first study to investigate how CGIs impact both individual- and gang-level patterns of association, it is just a first start. The time windows investigated, approximately two years, are in the short-run when you consider that CGIs are indefinite. Future research needs to look at the long-term impacts that CGIs have on gang members' patterns of association. Given the longitudinal nature of the FI data available in this study, 2001 to 2012, I plan on continuing to analyze changes in patterns of association every two years. Thus, the two oldest enjoined gangs by a CGI in Hollenbeck (i.e., KAM and VNE) have an additional three time windows, allowing for a total eight years after being enjoined to examine the changes in both these gangs and their members' patterns of association. Investigating these long-term consequences will also allow for a better understanding of how vigorous this intervention truly is at affecting changes in gang behavior.

Another avenue of research that needs to be investigated further is if CGIs are influencing the behavior of enjoined gangs' rivals, which represent the majority of Hollenbeck's non-enjoined gangs, 16 of 24, documented in Hollenbeck's gang rivalry network (see Figure A.1). FI data allows one to explicitly look at the patterns of association of both individual gang members and the gang as a group to better understand how these gangs respond to a rival's enjoinment. It is also possible to then trace these changes in each gang's social network over time to determine if patterns emerge. Conversely, it would be worthwhile to also investigate the patterns of association for Hollenbeck's remaining eight gangs, which are cloistered from being directly linked to an enjoined gang, to provide a reference group that is completely devoid of the CGI intervention.

The results from Chapter 2 indicate that enjoined gang members are more likely than non-enjoined gang members to be observed within their gang's claimed territory. It is possible that this finding suggests that the mobility of enjoined gang members has been diminished by the presence of a CGI, presuming that enjoined gang members still reside within their gang's claimed turf. Previous research (Moore, Vigil, & Garcia, 1983) in Hollenbeck and East Los Angeles attests that many of a gang's members are unlikely to reside in their gang's claimed area and are instead "commuting to turf" (Klein, 1995a; p. 224). Thus, it is possible that the CGI is influencing the mobility patterns of enjoined gang members, but also it is possible that the CGI is producing residential displacement from the community. Again, the nature of the FI data allows for the both of these phenomena to be investigated more completely.

The final inquiry that developed from this dissertation's findings is to continue investigating the CGI mechanism to better understand how CGIs influence crime. Previous research examining the effectiveness of CGIs has focused on a direct relationship between CGIs

and overall serious crime (Grogger, 2002; O'Deanne &Morreale, 2011) or residents' perceptions of crime (Maxson et al., 2005). While it is reasonable to believe that a CGI is able to directly reduce overall crime or alleviate neighborhood perceptions of crime and disorder, I would contend that these outcomes used to measure the success of a CGI are actually ancillary. A CGI's primary definition and goal is to disrupt the patterns of public association of enjoined gang members, impeding the group's cohesiveness, thereby restraining them from engaging in antisocial behaviors which disrupt the neighborhood (Klein, 1995a; Thomas et al., 2009).

Instead, I suggest that a CGI directly influences a gang's patterns of association and indirectly affects gang crime and the perceptions of neighborhood residents, as represented by the path model in Figure 5.1. Arc A illustrates the relationship between CGIs and crime proposed by previous studies. I suggest that future research should consider the path of Arc B and C; with Arc B being the direct effect a CGI has on the socialization patterns of a gang and Arc C represents the indirect influence a CGI has on gang crime or the perceptions of neighborhood residents.



Figure 5.1: Path Model of a Civil Gang Injunctions Relationship to a Gang's Patterns of Association and Crime / Perceptions of Crime.

Examining the influence that gang interventions, like CGIs, have on gang behavior is always challenging. Yet, utilizing unique relational data (e.g., FI cards) allows for innovative approaches (e.g., social network analysis, structural equation modeling) to be used in assessing

the effectiveness of this social control tool in suppressing gang activity. By better understanding how gang interventions are impacting gang behavior in regions where gang-related violence and crime is receding may illuminate successful approaches that could aid agencies in other urban areas (e.g., Detroit, Chicago, and New Orleans) that remain plagued with gang violence.

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APPENDIX



Figure A.1: The Rivalry Network of 31 Active Street Gangs Residing in Hollenbeck.[55]

[55] A line connecting two nodes (i.e., gangs) indicates a negative tie (i.e., rivalry) is present.

Table A.1: Participant Characteristics for Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Gang (N = 181)		Non-gang (N = 72)		Association & Significance[a]
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Victim's Latino Male					**22.586*** **
Yes	166	91.7%	49	68.1%	
No	15	8.3%	23	31.9%	
Victim's Average Age	26		32		**3.538*** **
Victim's Criminal History					**11.264** **
Yes	128	70.7%	36	50.0%	
No	32	17.7%	26	36.1%	
Unknown	21	11.6%	10	13.9%	
Suspect's Latino Male					**10.669*** **
Yes	166	95.4%	51	82.3%	
No	8	4.6%	11	17.7%	
Victim's Average Age	25		33		**5.557*** **
Victim's Criminal History					**37.361*** **
Yes	101	55.8%	19	26.4%	
No	7	3.9%	20	27.8%	
Unknown	73	40.3%	33	45.8%	
Victim- Suspect Relationship					
Intimate					**19.543*** **
Yes	4	2.3%	11	18.6%	
No	170	97.7%	48	81.4%	
Family					**28.418*** **
Yes	3	1.7%	13	22.0%	
No	171	98.3%	46	78.0%	
Acquaintance					**21.474*** **
Yes	116	66.7%	19	32.2%	
No	58	33.3%	40	67.8%	
Strangers					N.S.
Yes	51	29.3%	16	27.1%	
No	123	70.7%	43	72.9%	
Unknown					**14.243*** **
Yes	7	3.9%	13	18.1%	
No	174	96.1%	59	81.9%	

[a]Comparisons report chi-squares except for all dichotomous measures. Since the variables for suspect and victim's age are continuous an appropriate t-statistic is reported.
***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = P<.001

Table A.2: Incident Characteristics for Non-enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Non-enjoined Gang (N = 127)		Non-gang (N = 66)		Association & Significance
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Location					**9.615****
Street	76	59.8%	24	36.4%	
Other Public	19	15.0%	15	22.7%	
Residence	32	25.2%	27	40.9%	
Inside	30	45.5%	93	73.2%	**6.840****
Outside	36	54.6%	34	26.8%	
Private Space	32	25.2%	27	40.9%	**5.052***
Public Space	95	74.8%	39	50.1%	
Time of Day					N.S.
Day	46	36.2%	23	34.9%	
Night	81	63.8%	43	65.2%	
Day of Week					N.S.
Weekday	74	58.3%	44	66.7%	
Weekend	53	41.7%	22	33.3%	
Season					N.S.
Winter	28	22.1%	14	21.2%	
Spring	43	33.9%	15	22.7%	
Summer	27	21.3%	20	30.3%	
Fall	29	22.8%	17	25.8%	
Weapons					**37.601*****
Handgun	115	90.6%	34	51.5%	
Other	12	9.5%	32	48.5%	
Shots Fired					**5.449***
Multiple	105	86.8%	26	70.3%	
One Shot	16	13.2%	11	29.7%	
Shots Impacted					**6.872****
Multiple	87	71.9%	18	46.7%	
One Shot	34	28.1%	19	51.4%	
Drive-By					N.S.
Yes	23	19.3%	4	12.5%	
No	96	80.7%	28	87.5%	
# of Participants					
Multiple Suspects	50	39.4%	13	19.7%	**7.645****
One Suspect	77	60.6%	53	80.3%	
Multiple Victims	97	76.4%	50	75.8%	N.S.
One Victim	30	23.6%	16	24.2%	

Table A.2: Incident Characteristics for Non-enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Non-enjoined Gang (N = 127)		Non-gang (N = 66)		Association & Significance
	N	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Motivation					
Gang:					
Yes	43	33.9%	--	--	**28.752*** **
No	84	66.1%	66	100.0%	
Drug:					
Yes	11	8.7%	9	13.6%	N.S.
No	116	91.3%	57	86.4%	
Dispute:					
Yes	36	28.4%	20	30.3%	N.S.
No	91	71.7%	46	69.7%	
Domestic					
Yes	5	3.9%	17	25.8%	**20.475*** **
No	122	96.1%	49	74.2%	
Other:					
Yes	24	18.9%	15	22.7%	N.S.
No	103	81.1%	51	77.3%	

***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = P<.001

Table A.3: Participant Characteristics for Non-enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Non-enjoined Gang (N = 132)		Non-gang (N = 72)		Association & Significance[a]
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Victim's Latino Male					**20.403*** **
Yes	10	7.6%	23	31.9%	
No	122	92.4%	49	68.1%	
Victim's Average Age	27		32		**2.673** **
Victim's Criminal History					
Yes	96	72.7%	36	50.0%	**11.167** **
No	23	17.4%	26	36.1%	
Unknown	13	9.9%	10	13.9%	
Suspect's Latino Male					**7.128** **
Yes	119	94.4%	51	82.3%	
No	7	5.6%	11	17.7%	
Suspect's Average Age	25		33		**5.179*** **
Suspect's Criminal History					**28.274*** **
Yes	72	54.6%	19	26.4%	
No	6	4.6%	20	27.8%	
Unknown	54	40.9%	33	45.9%	
Victim-Suspect Relationship					
Intimate					**15.045*** **
Yes	3	2.4%	11	18.6%	
No	122	97.6%	48	81.4%	
Family					**22.351*** **
Yes	2	1.6%	13	22.0%	
No	123	98.4%	46	78.0%	
Acquaintance					**14.662*** **
Yes	78	62.4%	19	32.2%	
No	47	37.6%	40	67.8%	
Strangers					N.S.
Yes	42	33.6%	16	27.1%	
No	83	66.4%	43	72.9%	
Unknown					**8.568** **
Yes	7	5.3%	13	18.1%	
No	125	94.7%	59	81.9%	

[a]Comparisons report chi-squares except for all dichotomous measures. Since the variables for suspect and victim's age are continuous an appropriate t-statistic is reported.
***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = P<.001

Table A.4: Participant Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 49)		Non-gang (N = 72)		Association & Significance[a]
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Victim's Latino Male					**7.748****
Yes	44	89.8%	49	68.1%	
No	5	10.2%	23	31.9%	
Victim's Average Age	24		32		**3.359*****
Victim's Criminal History					N.S.
Yes	32	65.3%	36	50.0%	
No	9	18.4%	26	36.1%	
Unknown	8	16.3%	10	13.9%	
Suspect's Latino Male					**6.825****
Yes	47	97.9%	51	82.3%	
No	1	2.1%	11	17.7%	
Suspect's Average Age	24		33		**3.444*****
Suspect's Criminal History					**19.371*****
Yes	29	59.2%	19	26.4%	
No	1	2.0%	20	27.8%	
Unknown	19	38.8%	33	45.8%	
Victim-Suspect Relationship					
Intimate					**5.719***
Yes	1	2.0%	11	15.3%	
No	48	98.0%	61	84.7%	
Family					**7.309****
Yes	1	2.0%	13	18.1%	
No	48	98.0%	59	81.9%	
Acquaintance					**30.631*****
Yes	38	77.6%	19	26.4%	
No	11	22.5%	53	73.6%	
Strangers					N.S.
Yes	9	18.4%	16	22.2%	
No	40	81.6%	56	77.8%	
Unknown					**9.912****
Yes	--	--	13	18.1%	
No	49	100.0%	59	81.9%	

[a]Comparisons report chi-squares except for all dichotomous measures. Since the variables for suspect and victim's age are continuous an appropriate t-statistic is reported.
***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = P<.001

Table A.5: Participant Characteristics for Enjoined Gang and Non-enjoined Gang Homicides.

	Enjoined Gang (N = 49)		Non-enjoined Gang (N = 132)		Association & Significance[a]
Characteristics	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	
Victim's Latino Male					N.S.
Yes	44	89.8%	122	92.4%	
No	5	10.2%	10	7.6%	
Victim's Average Age	24		27		**2.137***
Victim's Criminal History					N.S.
Yes	32	65.3%	96	72.7%	
No	9	18.4%	23	17.4%	
Unknown	8	16.3%	13	9.9%	
Suspect's Latino Male					N.S.
Yes	47	97.9%	119	94.4%	
No	1	2.1%	7	5.6%	
Suspect's Average Age	24		25		N.S
Suspect's Criminal History					N.S.
Yes	29	59.2%	72	54.6%	
No	1	2.0%	6	4.6%	
Unknown	19	38.8%	54	40.9%	
Victim-Suspect Relationship					
Intimate					N.S.
Yes	1	2.0%	3	2.3%	
No	48	98.0%	129	97.7%	
Family					N.S.
Yes	1	2.0%	2	1.5%	
No	48	98.0%	130	98.5%	
Acquaintance					**5.291***
Yes	48	98.0%	130	98.5%	
No	38	77.6%	78	59.1%	
Strangers					N.S.
Yes	9	18.4%	42	31.8%	
No	40	81.6%	90	68.2%	
Unknown					N.S.
Yes	--	--	7	5.3%	
No	49	100.0%	125	94.7%	

[a]Comparisons report chi-squares except for all dichotomous measures. Since the variables for suspect and victim's age are continuous an appropriate t-statistic is reported.
***** = p<.05, ****** = p<.01, ******* = P<.001