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The Hopi Traditionalist Movement

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INTRODUCTION

In 1946, an elderly and respected member of the Bluebird clan and spokesman for the *kikmongwi* (village chief) of Shungopavi village announced in a meeting that, in the early days of his training and instruction as a religious leader, he was told that when a gourd of ashes fell from the sky, he was to tell certain teachings, traditions, and prophecies that had been previously secret. Leaders of other clans mentioned the same instructions. They agreed that the "gourd of ashes" specified in their oral traditions could be nothing else but the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Other meetings followed this one, in 1947, 1948, and 1949, and a social movement was in the making. The movement's leaders issued a series of manifestos, position statements, and petitions beginning in 1949 and continuing into the late 1980s. Its leaders and participants called themselves "Hopi Traditionalists," or simply "Traditionalists."

From 1948 through the 1980s, the Traditionalists functioned as a coalition of Hopi leaders from several villages, plus a varying number of Hopi activists and sympathizers. Although Hopi Traditionalists are still active today, the movement has largely lost its coalition of leaders and is disappearing through institutionaliza-

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tion. The behavior of the movement's participants and its sociopolitical character have resulted in its being designated a *faction* and even a *party,* but I think *party* and *faction* are less appropriate than *movement.* Although the movement's history reflects strong goal-orientation toward very concrete political issues, there are also some messianic and millennial aspects in the movement's ideology.

Leadership was rooted in Hopi political forms—i.e., ritual leaders and village chiefs—but it was by no means restricted to it. The movement followed a long period in which many of the social and economic conditions associated with other revitalization, messianic, or millenialist movements affected the Hopi: directed culture contact; superordinate-subordinate political relationships; absolute and relative deprivation; ecological disaster; depopulation; shrinkage of land base; religious repression. As is often the case with such movements, the Traditionalist movement arose and formed its character shortly after a promise of better material conditions had gone unfulfilled and during a period in which Hopi communicative skills in English, as well as the possibilities for extensive communication, had greatly increased. The movement extended the Hopi "factional field" to include the rest of the world and, in so doing, created a new political path that is the obverse of the intrusion of Euro-Americans into Hopi life.

PROPOSITIONS

What follows is a summary of the Hopi Traditionalists as a social movement within the context of Hopi culture and sociopolitical history, and an analysis of it within a comparative framework. In summarizing the Hopi Traditionalist movement, I will make several points concerning the ethnographic conceptualization of the role of culture and cultural change in peoples' lives; about modernity and modernization; and about the role of ideology in mediating political and economic conditions of history and collective cultural consciousness. In analyzing the Hopi Traditionalist movement within a comparative framework, I offer some tentative conclusions concerning the role of culture and culturally derived ideology in the politics of indigenous peoples.

The Ethnography of Culture and Cultural Change

I propose that Hopi society should not be regarded as a "traditional" society where people "slavishly follow strict rules," as opposed to a "modern" society.[1] Rather, what the Hopi mean when they say *traditional* or *traditionalist* reflects a distinct political ideology that is not opposed to modernity but is part of it. In embracing this proposition, I am in accord with Renato Rosaldo, who has pointed out that ethnographers long embraced a fiction of the "ethnographic present," in which indigenous societies were portrayed automatically as "traditional" and "timeless."[2] The other side of this fiction was the ethnographic assumption that societies that were "in contact" would be rent asunder or would collapse under the strain of acculturative pressures. As Bruner has pointed out, acculturation studies were the result of following a story that was popular at the time—the story of the American dream and the conquest of the frontier.[3] The fact that a particular society might value and legitimate several creative political stories, none of which privileged either acculturation or slavish adherence to strict rules, posed a dilemma, because culture as a creative resource was simply not part of this once-dominant ethnographic paradigm.[4] The Traditionalist story does not necessarily accord with the standard ethnographic portrait of Hopi tradition, but neither can it simply be explained away or trivialized by resorting to the idea of maladjustment due to acculturation.[5]

I also embrace Ann Swidler's[6] and Peter Worsley's view of culture as a set of resources that are used "selectively and situationally, according to their utility, rather than absolute borderlines marking one culture off from another";[7] as a "'tool kit' of habits, skills, styles, . . . symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve [and, I would say, even create] different kinds of problems . . . (and) to construct strategies of action," especially in "unsettled cultural periods";[8] and as lending significance to human experience "by selecting from and organizing it."[9]

Colonialism—whether the classic kind or the internal sort that forms American Indians' political context—certainly engenders unsettled cultural periods for those who are subject to it. In many of the pre-1970 ethnographic portraits of indigenous societies—especially during the period of the dominance of the acculturation paradigm in American Indian studies of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s—political leadership roles, institutions, and ideologies were

often discussed in terms of their quaint, archaic nature, that is, as an outmoded excrescence of a "previous stage" of sociocultural evolution.[10] Political ideologies that were nationalistic or that attempted to relativize the political importance of a colonial power by empowering indigenous culture with political significance were often regarded by ethnographers as deviating from custom and thus were dismissed as aberrations.

The Culture and the Politics of Indigenous Peoples

But to ignore the politicization of culture is a mistake. Culture almost invariably becomes politicized when competing interest groups interpret the same cultural ideology in seemingly contradictory fashions. The intrusion of colonial powers into the lives of indigenous peoples nearly always causes competing interest groups to arise, even if they were not there before, because politically hegemonic powers are put into place to make the indigenous population disregard its own culture, past, and destiny and conform to the colonial power's agenda and goals. If competing groups already exist within the society, competition is exacerbated and receives new organizational rubrics.

Hopi Traditionalists comprise a political interest group that has developed a political "story" by selecting items out of Hopi cultural ideology and out of Hopi history and prehistory. The process of selection is political because it reflects efforts to deny and subvert the domination imposed by the intrusive colonial power—the United States—and also reflects an effort to enlist members of U.S. society in support of certain Hopi goals.[11]

Modernity and Modernization

It has been said more than once—and by Hopi themselves—that the Hopi are the most conservative, the most traditional tribe in the United States. But what does that really mean? Hopi Traditionalism is an ideology that is constantly being constructed, created, recreated, and negotiated. But so is modernization.

I propose that Hopi Traditionalism is a modern, and modernist, phenomenon. By that I mean that it is juxtaposed against "progressivism," which also has its roots in the modern era, ideologically rather than culturally. Individuals who are traditionalist in some respects are progressivist in others. Traditionalism and progressivism are revealed in the ideology of political factional-

ism, in the internal social organization of the Hopi polity, and in political ideological strategies for dealing with historical conditions and events. Modernization or, more accurately, modernism embeds a set of agendas, states of being, moral orders, ideologies, and assumptions, as well as styles, methods, and techniques. This set of agendas has its critique, which is equally a part of the modernization process: opposition to progress and its politically hegemonic agenda.[12] These two salient, juxtaposed hallmarks of modernization characterize Hopi history in the twentieth century as much as they do the history of the Western world but in different, and distinctly Hopi, ways.

In a purely descriptive sense, modernization constitutes social change in a particular society that tends toward increasingly greater dependency on industrially manufactured goods, services, and energy from distant areas; toward loss of political, economic, social, and cultural autonomy; and toward increased use of cash instead of barter and socially determined reciprocity. But modernism[13] is more than just everything that is happening now and everything that is not old fashioned. Modernizers value punctuality, objectivity, hard work, discipline, fair competition, success, standardization, predictability, future orientation, saving for a rainy day. Many modernizers' goals, values, and methods are contained in the concept of progress: "a sense of moral satisfaction with certain evolutionary trends."[14] Modernizers value "rationalization of the ways social life is organized and social activities performed," and "the pragmatic use of fact and logic in the achievement of various identified goals."[15] "The technical state of mind is secular," wrote sociologist Wilbert Moore (1979), "having scant patience with Fate, Divine Will, . . . tradition, the wise teachings of the founding fathers, or the shared but unexamined wisdom which 'everybody knows.'" Thus modernization is more than just a certain kind of change. It is planned and implemented according to a set of goals and an ideology of values.

The Modernity of Tradition

Modernity is supposed to supersede tradition, because traditionalists in general are supposedly frozen in time, their outlook hardened into a lifeless quiescence, and therefore they are easily outdistanced by the march of progress. In one of the few analyses that directly challenged modernist assumptions during their

heyday, Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolf summarized some of the heuristic contrasts between modernity and tradition as follows:

> "Modernity" assumes that local ties and parochial perspectives give way to universal commitments and cosmopolitan attitudes; that the truths of utility, calculation, and science take precedence over those of the emotions, the sacred, and the non-rational; that the individual rather than the group be the primary unit of society and politics; . . . that mastery rather than fatalism orient attitudes toward the material and human environment; that identity be chosen and achieved, not ascribed and affirmed; that work be separated from family, residence, and community in bureaucratic organizations.[16]

But they also pointed out that this dichotomy is false for several reasons, among them: (1) modernity does not necessary supersede tradition; and (2) tradition can, and often does, grow and attain increased ideological power along with progress, becoming entwined with it.

Tradition: The "Other" Modernity

Although they were speaking of India, the Rudolfs's point is well taken: Tradition may be more than merely a holdover from the past; it may also be deliberately constructed and reconstructed as a critique of modernism. In this sense, tradition constitutes part of the "other" modernity: the modernity of challenge, criticism, dissent, and exceptionalism; it is anything but mere conservatism.[17]

Thus there are two modernities: The first exalts that which it defines as individualistic; industrially technological; factually technical; rationally secular; and cosmopolitan. The second lauds that which it defines as collective and communal; handcrafted and natural; intuitive and fatalistic; prophesied and paradoxical; local and parochial. Ideological traditionalisms of all kinds are aspects and products of modernization. Traditionalism provides an ideological and cultural concomitant and critique to modernist progressivism but is as equally a part of the modernization process as modernism itself.

The Hopi provide an example of this dichotomy. Hopi Traditionalists want to maintain an anchor in the past in order to preserve a distinctly Hopi cultural perspective from which to

critique the political hegemony of modernization. Traditionalism and progressivism among the Hopi have resulted from their differential interpretations of their history and culture, and they represent two broad metaphors rather than actual behavior patterns. The actual behavioral patterns are to be seen in the daily patterns of social and political relations and activities; the economic constraints and reactions to them; the seizing of opportunity and the coping with unpredictability that history brings; and the changing material conditions of a society engaged by the periphery of a whimsical world system.

I will approach the Hopi Traditionalist movement through an understanding of "traditionalism" as a process of modernization and through the activities of the Hopi Traditionalists interpreted as a social movement within the flow of political economic history.[18] While Hopi progressivism would make an equally worthwhile focus of discussion, space constraints prevent such a discussion here.

The Role of Ideology in Mediating Political and Economic Conditions: Social Movements

For the Hopi, Traditionalism was a social movement. A social movement is a group of people who (1) look to certain leaders to direct activities and set the pace; (2) profess a distinct ideology; (3) do things together as a group that express the movement's "groupness"; and (4) share a vision about how the world should and will be and a conviction in the authenticity of that vision. A social movement attempts to mobilize and utilize collective action to advocate or accomplish something. The movement's efforts inevitably place it in a contrasting position to the majority of society and to people who occupy positions of leadership in the society, or at least in some segments of the society. Opposition to the movement arises when either the leadership or the society at large is forced to take a position favoring or opposing the movement. A salient characteristic of all social movements is that they rely to a large extent on the support of a significantly large, but amorphously defined, group of people. Individuals may drop into or out of a movement, but the movement must be able to count on its ability to mobilize supporters at crucial times or else face eventual extinction.[19]

Social movements have generally been classified in terms of their other-worldly character, and, indeed, Hopi Traditionalism

fits many of these characterizations. The Hopi Traditionalist movement was *nativistic* because it attempted to revive or perpetuate certain selected aspects of its culture[20] and *millennial* because it sought to bring on a "new age" promised in mythic ideology by rejecting the ideology of the ruling authority and some of the dominant values and philosophy of that authority—in this case Euro-American culture—as well as its economic and political domination.[21] It was *revitalistic*[22] because it sought to establish a more satisfying culture while espousing specific goals that demanded critical evaluation by other Hopi. There are elements of *relative deprivation* in the movement, since at least one of the manifestos clearly expressed resentment against Americans who are "very rich," and Hopi who are "still licking the bones and crumbs that fall to us from your tables" and are, relative to the Americans, deprived of land, material comfort, money, and political power. But in emphasizing collective resistance, consensual dissent, and political opposition for their own sake, it was *transformative*[23] because it withdrew energy from routines of the larger society—Hopi as well as U.S.—so as to bring about an anticipated change in society; because it viewed the process of change as cataclysmic; and because it anticipated an eventual reversal of the dominant status of U.S. society and the subordinated status of Hopi society.

HOPI SOCIOPOLITICAL HISTORY AND CULTURE

The Hopi are predominantly matrilineal. Land use, political and religious leadership, and marriage rules are integrated through a structure of exogamic matriclans cross-cut by ceremonial sodalities. Within each village, any number of clans may be represented, and there may be anywhere from one to twelve sodalities. Each sodality has its own religious ceremony, owned by a particular clan, that it is supposed to perform at a certain time of the year.

Because clans own ceremonies, ceremonial ranking also reflects clan ranking. Clans that own ceremonies also own the right to furnish a male chief for the sodality that performs that ceremony. These clans are regarded as high-ranking ones. Individuals who fill roles in specific ceremonies according to their clan obligations were regarded as high-ranking individuals above and beyond their clan ranking.[24] In Jerrold Levy's words, the system of social stratification was "a translation of economic reality into

the realm of the sacred."[25] Although the concepts of hierarchy and ranking are embedded in the fundamental belief structure of traditional Hopi, it must be emphasized that, in comparative perspective, the Hopi would hardly be described by most observers as having a class-stratified society. No politically or economically powerful clans or priesthoods can develop, because there is no way for any group or individual to accumulate or monopolize surplus or power. The Hopi system of social stratification "worked to manage scarcity" rather than abundance.[26]

By the time the United States formally extended jurisdiction into the Hopi area in 1868, several smallpox epidemics and famines had reduced the Hopi population to probably less than 2,400.[27] Politically, the Hopi were divided among six village-based entities, each with its own village chief, council, war chief, and warrior sodality. All villages were on one of three mesas except for one village (Moenkopi) that was in the process of being established as a "daughter village" of Orayvi, some thirty-five miles distant from it. Other daughter villages on other mesas had been established in the eighteenth century, including Tewa village, founded by immigrants from Rio Grande pueblos. The villages shared a fundamental similarity not only in culture but also in political structure. Each primary or "mother" village—Walpi, Shungopavi, Mishongnovi, and Orayvi—had a *kikmongwi*, or village chief. Two daughter villages, Shipaulovi, founded in the 1700s, and Moenkopi, founded in the nineteenth century, had them, too. Thus, at the beginning of the American period, there were six *kikmongwis*. Villages have increased in number from seven to twelve in the last 150 years, with populations at Polacca and Keams Canyon also constituting important settlements; the population has grown threefold to just over nine thousand. Each has either a *kikmongwi* or an elected governor, except for the three villages on First Mesa, which share one *kikmongwi*.

THE RISE OF THE TRADITIONALISTS

Who Are the Traditionalists?

The Traditionalists have been characterized in the writings of objective scholars as the focal points and generators of gossip;[28] as "deluded fools," "trouble-makers," and "hypocrites";[29] as a "political party" and a "movement";[30] as a "faction";[31] and as a

"formal cooperative organization" among the "conservative groups" of the Hopi.[32] They have also been portrayed as an admirable group of men of "stubborn courage, . . . resisting the pressures of the environment so as to uphold 'Hopi way' and to await the return of Pahana (Bahana)," in the same way that the early Calvinists pursued "worldly signs of *certitudo salutis*, which according to Max Weber, is 'the origin of all psychological drives of a purely religious character'";[33] and as a leftover legacy of the "hostiles" of 1906.[34] A Hopi word for them is *aiyave*, "nonconformists,"[35] but sometimes they referred to themselves as *hopivitsukani*, "living the Hopi way," and contrasted themselves with the progressives, whom they called *"pahanvinaquti,"* "white," or *"pensilhoyam,"* little pencil people.[36] With no real organization, headquarters, budget, or consistent and systematic campaign within a well-defined political arena, they can hardly be called a party. They were definitely a faction, but that label hardly defines them; the movement itself is factionalized, and there are factions within Hopi society and within particular villages that have little to do with the Traditionalists.[37]

Over the years, individuals dropped into the movement and out, back in again, and back out. Leadership has included Christian Hopi with college educations as well as monolingual villagers who rarely have been farther than one hundred miles from home. Not only could nonranked individuals hold forth long and forcefully in the Traditionalists' meetings, but also, according to one prominent Traditionalist who held no high politico-religious office, "anybody can bring this message out" to the non-Hopi world. After 1960, two of the most prominent and vocal bringers of the Traditionalist message were women, and their prominence represented something of a departure, although not completely so.[38]

The movement tended to rely on clusters of individuals in each village who were related through lineal and affinal ties, but the movement also had adherents who were drawn into it by sodality-group ties and economic commonalities. Many individuals joined with the Traditionals on an issue-by-issue basis, and this behavior is what gives them the character of a movement more than of a political party.

Leaders

There is some difficulty in fitting the movement leadership into standard sociological categories such as "traditional," "charis-

matic," or "bureaucratic." Some of the movement's leaders were traditional in the religious sense; they held important politico-religious offices such as membership in the Wuwuchim, One-Horn and Two-Horn societies; Snake Chief; Antelope Chief; Kachina Chief, and so forth. The movement had the varying support of some *kikmongwis* and of some religious society leaders, but, for the most part, the *kikmongwis'* real involvement was limited to putting their signatures on letters and manifestos. The movement operated independently of the traditional Hopi politico-religious system, dovetailing with it only on occasions on which the movement's leaders thought they could count on the religious leaders' support, or when the movement took up a cause that the religious leaders knew would enhance their secular influence. By the 1960s, the focus and impetus of the movement had begun to shift: "[Y]ounger leaders . . . were working desperately at forging some sort of formal cooperative organization among the conservative groups themselves."[39] The Traditionalists, while looking to the heads of religious ceremonies and clans for approval of their activities and sanctioning them as the only legitimate indigenous political authority, were an eclectically composed group. Many religious leaders did not espouse Traditionalism, although most of the *kikmongwis* gave it tacit approval.

Thus the movement's leadership was not really an example of "traditional leadership" in the sense that Max Weber meant the term.[40] Although "belief in the prescriptive order of things" and in tradition by heredity supported by religious rituals characterized the movement's ideology, the movement effectively removed leadership from its traditional bounds by injecting ideological commitment as its defining variable. Many holders of traditional politico-religious offices in the movement's stronghold villages had nothing to do with the movement.

Nor were leaders the "charismatic leaders" that one expects to find leading social movements in the sense that Weber used the term.[41] The charismatic leader is treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. "By using the word 'charisma' (the gift of grace), Weber emphasizes the inspirational, revelatory nature of this kind of authority. The followers of the charismatic leader show 'complete personal devotion' to him. His authority is based on a 'sign or proof, originally a miracle.'"[42] Having no tradition of charisma or individualistic shamanism, Hopi people ideally value just the opposite characteristics, that is, persons who are *pas i*

unangwaitaqua—meek, of pure heart, well behaved, modest. Someone who was "charismatic" would be labeled *ka-hopi*, bad or *kwiivi*, a snobbish braggart, a know-it-all, or *pas himuniqai naami wuuwantaqa*—one who thinks much of himself; conceited; a big shot.[43] The more the movement's leaders gravitated toward charisma, the more critical the Hopi became of them;[44] the more well-known they became outside Hopiland, the more they were pushed by Euro-American cultural patterns to assume charismatic roles. Probably the best description of Traditionalist leadership would blend some degree of traditional and charismatic characteristics with a negotiated definition of *leadership* arising from the Hopi's political economic history as well as from Hopi culture.

THE SOCIOPOLITICAL ROOTS OF HOPI TRADITIONALISM: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY IN CULTURE AND IN COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

A political economic historical approach assumes that a particular history of a particular group of people such as the Hopi is connected with a larger set of economic, political, social, and cultural processes—understanding, of course, that any attempt to draw rigid cultural boundaries around any group of people is of dubious analytical utility. This approach also attempts to "see a constant interplay between experience and meaning in a context in which both experience and meaning are shaped by inequality and domination,"[45] with regard to indigenous populations in a colonial or neocolonial context. A political economic historical approach thus pays special attention to the advantage gained by a dominant society when it places its members in positions of economic control, such as the roles of traders, wholesalers, purchasers of art, contractors of labor, or negotiators of leases for extraction of raw materials; this approach also focuses on the efforts made by a subordinated society to resist that dominance. A large part of the dominance comes from the assistance that the state political sector gives, even if indirectly, to a private economic sector.[46]

This attention to politics and economics attempts to connect culture and ideology in all sectors of life to relations of power and domination in accordance with some fundamental assumptions about culture. Culture is collective, creative, and creating, mean-

ing that it operates autonomously from politics, economics, and society but always affects, and is affected by, these aspects of experience. Culture is not just ideological but also material in this approach and permeates the material aspects of life by giving them meaning. Culture is what humans create as they make traditions, develop strategies, hammer out new social relationships and roles, manipulate old ones, embrace technological and material items, and collectively create historical conditions or adapt to them. Thus, although culture operates autonomously, it cannot be understood in isolation from politics, economics, and history.[47]

Even though careful attention to dominant-subordinate relationships characterizes this approach, it does not assume that unequal structures last forever. The challenge to subordinated groups is to turn their situations around to their advantage or to render such situations neutral in terms of pursuit of their own goals. Oddly enough, the dominant group may assist in the weakening of its own position by seeking to impose "a particular way of seeing and being, to colonize their consciousness with the signs and practices, the axioms and aesthetics, of an alien culture."[48] In so doing, the superordinate society opens the possibility of some members of the dominated group becoming skilled cultural brokers; or developing skills to outmaneuver the dominators in their own social field; or turning the imposed economic institutions and rules to their own advantage. In the historical process of a dominated group emerging from domination, culture "intervenes"[49] by providing familiar bases for expressing what might be an altered, yet familiar, group consciousness.

The Hopi Traditionalist movement is an example of just this process. It is, then, to the political economic history of Hopi people and Euro-Americans—out of which emerged Hopi Traditionalism as well as Hopi progressivism—that we now turn.

Events of 1906

The sociopolitical roots of Traditionalism lie in the Orayvi Civil War of 1906, recently covered in admirable detail by Peter Whiteley and Jerrold Levy.[50] This series of events really began in 1891, when Loololma, Orayvi's village chief, seems to have felt himself pressured into accepting part of the government's assimilation policy after the government gave him and three other Hopi leaders an all-expenses-paid train trip to Washington, D.C. He returned to a

climate of intense hostility and accusations that he had capitulated and become "friendly" with the U.S. government.[51] The Orayvi Civil War did not culminate until 1909, and it was intensely political; occasionally dramatic and sensational; but rarely violent. On 7–8 September 1906, the "hostile" faction's leaders proposed a pushing contest between the two factions on the outskirts of the village.[52] The "friendlies" eventually won and pushed the "hostiles" out of Orayvi.[53] The hostiles left and founded Hotevilla. The men were arrested and imprisoned, and the children were dragged to the boarding school in Keams Canyon, where they remained for five years. One group of hostiles returned to Orayvi under pressure from the U.S. government in October 1906 but left again in 1909 and founded Bacavi.

The result was three villages—Hotevilla, Orayvi, and Bacavi—being formed from the population of one. Eventually, three more villages, Kykotsmovi, Lower Moenkopi, and Upper Moenkopi, also split off from Orayvi. The consequences were (1) shifts in the political balance and a playing out of political rivalries; (2) destruction of most, but not all, of Third Mesa's ceremonial order, and a consequent loosening of the ceremonial bonds binding men together; (3) consolidation of the U.S. government's power and authority over people's children; (4) establishment of myth and prophecy as idioms for political ideology, activity, and legitimacy, and for cultural ideology; and (5) redefinition of the *kikmongwis'* role in terms of strengthening their positions as secular leaders.[54]

1906–1934

But Traditionalism's roots also lie in the political economic history immediately following the events of 1906. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Hopi were still nearly entirely economically self-sufficient but were plagued by the fourth or fifth smallpox epidemic in less than fifty years, as well as by alternating drought and torrential rains and heavy snowpack. A booming wool market between 1860 and 1919 encouraged Navajo and Hopi alike to increase their sheep herds, but traders found the Navajo to be a much better source of large amounts of wool and thus concentrated their efforts among them, rather than among Hopi.

Various zealots, aided by the U.S. government, tried to impose a kind of cultural and religious homogeneity beginning in 1887,

when agents imposed school attendance. From 1915 through 1925, missionaries and Indian agents collaborated on various occasions to impose cultural and religious hegemony for assimilative purposes in a last-ditch effort to draw the Hopi into an arbitrary and ethnocentric version of U.S. national culture. Coincident with these impositions, several major ceremonies were abandoned at Orayvi and Bacavi.

The Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian New Deal

The 1930s and 1940s saw a reorganization of Hopi culture and society on many levels. The Indian Reorganization Act, enacted by Congress in 1934, implemented what Rebecca Robbins calls a "prevailing system of colonial governance"[55] but also granted the Hopi some relief from domination. More importantly, it provided an issue—the tribal council—which some Hopi worked into an ideology of resistance. As the source of all fundamental historical developments in Indian affairs in the recent past,[56] the "Indian New Deal" altered the means, but not fundamentally the end, of U.S. Indian policy: acculturation and some degree of assimilation.[57]

The act intended to "reorganize" Indians on two levels: economically, according to a cooperative and corporate model; and politically, with a government for which the secretary of the interior would provide checks and balances. Its inspiration was the method of "indirect rule" pioneered by Lord Lugard in India and used by British colonial officials in Africa, particularly Nigeria.[58] The Bureau of Indian Affairs scheduled a vote on the IRA in 1935, and Oliver La Farge hammered out a "Hopi constitution" in 1936, which was also put to a vote. Both were interpreted as "yes" votes,[59] and a tribal council was set up with proportional representation from all villages. Representatives were to be certified by the appropriate *kikmongwi;* or, for villages without *kikmongwis* (two in 1936), the representatives were to be elected. Two *kikmongwis,* however—those from Hotevilla and Orayvi—rejected the idea of a tribal council and refused to send any representatives to it.

Following the "yes" vote on the IRA and adoption of the Hopi constitution, the BIA divided the Hopi and surrounding Navajo reservations into twenty grazing districts in 1936[60] and assigned all but three of them completely to Navajo. Creating the grazing districts was part of the IRA's "conservation directive." Although commissioner of Indian affairs John Collier regarded the conser-

vation directive as having "a firmer support than any other of the Act's provisions" from Indians,[61] this aspect of the IRA had resulted in just the opposite of one of the IRA's intentions for the Hopi. Following their approval of the act, the Hopi had less land, not more, and also fewer livestock. The Soil Conservation Service, later the Soil and Moisture Conservation Service, increased the number of wells with windmills and livestock tanks to twenty-six between 1934 and 1937, but the BIA simultaneously had tried to implement an unpopular permitting process and some stock reduction.[62] Thus the promise of liberalism and self-determination was offered with one hand and taken away with the other.

Land and Stock Reduction

In 1943, the Hopi agency was given exclusive jurisdiction only over District 6, with the Western Navajo agency in Tuba City having exclusive jurisdiction over District 3, and, at first, the village of Moenkopi; later, Moenkopi was transferred to Hopi agency jurisdiction. The administrative action effectively diminished the Hopi land base to boundaries that the Hopi considered unacceptable. District 6 consisted of 624,064 acres of grazing land; created in 1937, this district supposedly reflected the land actually grazed by Hopi-owned livestock. Hopi people probably had consistent, beneficial use of around 750,000 acres at this time. They saw the remaining 1.8 million acres of the 1882 Executive Order Reservation as having been given to the Navajo.

Drought struck in 1943, and the BIA ordered an "emergency reduction" of 24 percent of Hopi livestock in 1944, leaving the Hopi with 1,000 cattle, 1,200 horses, 1,000 goats, and 12,627 sheep. Beginning in 1946, the agency embarked on a long-range plan that revolved around range improvement and livestock management. Although the need for range improvement and conservation was very real, the silting up of Lake Mead behind Boulder Dam may have been one factor in the government's determination to check erosion and runoff.[63] The 24 percent livestock reduction hit the three mesas unevenly, because Third Mesa was far more dependent on livestock. Owners there collectively sustained a 44 percent reduction, while Second Mesa's reduction was 22 percent and First Mesa's 20 percent.[64] Weaving with domestic wool was especially important at Hotevilla and Bacavi; men traded and sold weavings to other villages and to New Mexico pueblos.[65] Wool was also an important cash commodity; one sheep yielded ten

pounds of wool selling at $.30 per pound. One out of two ewes produced one lamb a year, selling for $8–$9 each.[66] Thus, reductions must have hit some families at Third Mesa particularly hard.

The Human Condition

The overall human condition among the Hopi was not good. Average family income was $439.82; per capita income was $118.22—about half that for the Navajo.[67] Of 654 families, 365 had incomes of less than $300 a year. Sources of income were agriculture (actually livestock sales)-22 percent; wages-36 percent; sales of arts, crafts, native products-3 percent; unearned income-1 percent. Nearly 50 percent of the children were malnourished; infant mortality was 180/1,000; and maternal mortality took its toll: 11.7 percent of birthing women died in the process as compared to 2.7 percent for the U.S. in 1943.[68]

The Tribal Council

The Hopi Tribal Council held regular, perfunctory meetings at which little business was conducted until 1942, when it ceased to have a quorum. In 1944, the BIA withdrew recognition of it and it disbanded altogether.[69] The collapse of the tribal council has been attributed to the "non-occidental rationality" of intravillage and intervillage politics and rivalries, pervasive gossip, fear of witchcraft, and factionalism.[70] But there was more to it than that. Some Hopi thought a tribal council was *ka-anta*, simply too far from Hopi tradition. It was also the fact that cooperation with the Indian New Deal had gotten the Hopi nowhere. Virtually the entire deck of policy cards had been reshuffled between 1910 and 1935, with punishment and repression being replaced with "sweet words of promise." Then, after 1943, the promises had been withdrawn, and a new deck had been dealt. From forced acculturation and assimilation, the bureau had jumped to cultural pluralism and bilateralism; by 1946, it was moving back to assimilation.

THE TERMINATION/"REHABILITATION" DECADE: 1950–1960

FDR's death and Truman's ascendancy to the presidency forced John Collier out of the BIA by the end of 1945.[71] The federal

government decided to stop bothering about the "Indian problem" and to stop trying to listen to any Indian leaders at all. The Hoover Commission, chaired by former president Herbert Hoover, proposed steps "to integrate the Indians into the rest of the population as the best solution to 'the Indian problem.'" Assimilation was to be the dominant goal of public policy. The new plan represented a return to the past, an abandonment of bilateralism, and it proceeded without Indian cooperation. In the words of sociologist Stephen Cornell, "It was a lousy plan .... [I]n an effort to relieve itself once and for all of the financial and moral burden of Indian affairs, the federal government reasserted full control of Indian lives and fortunes and fit them into its plan."[72] The plan was called "termination" because federal services to Indians, federal trusteeship over Indians and their resources, reservations, and tribes eventually would be "terminated." Those tribes that were not slated for immediate termination were to undergo "rehabilitation" in preparation for termination.

The Indian Claims Commission

Congress established the Indian Claims Commission to act as a separate tribunal with special rules that processed claims for monetary compensation pressed by Indian groups and tribes. Remarks in the Congressional Record reflect some legislators' thinking that disbursement of claims monies would aid the termination process by either enabling tribes to finance all their own programs or by providing individuals with sufficient capital and investment funds to make them economically self-sufficient. Settlement of claims would encourage the "progress of the Indians who desire to be rehabilitated at the white man's level in the white man's economy," remarked one congressmen.[73] The commission decided that it did not have the authority to return land, although it could declare that Indian title to particular tracts had never been extinguished.

TRADITIONALIST ACTIVITIES

The Hopi were not idle while the agency was implementing its plan. In fact, men who had not been involved in the tribal council started developing policy that ran directly counter to the agency's plan. They included three *kikmongwis*, half a dozen secret society

chiefs, and the organizer of a short-lived "progressive" Moenkopi Council. They were committed to anything but "voting behavior" and "majority rule," acculturation, and political economic subordination. They opposed the Hoover Commission and its suggestions. They were the Traditionalists.

Letter to the President, 1949

The first public "position paper" issued by the Traditionalists was a four-page letter to "The President, The White House, Washington, D.C.," datelined "Hopi Indian Empire, Oraibi, Arizona, March 28, 1949."[74] It set down the Traditionalists' story and was signed by what looked like a *Who's Who* of ceremonial leadership: the Shungopavi and Mishongnovi village chiefs; nineteen religious leaders from those villages; one from Shipaulovi; and four interpreters. These included the Blue Flute society chief from Shungopavi; the Antelope society chief from Shungopavi; the Snake society chief from Shungopavi; the Kwan society chief from Shungopavi; the Ahl society chief from Hotevilla; and the Hotevilla village chief.

"We, the hereditary Hopi Chieftains of the Hopi Pueblos of Hotevilla, Shungopovy, and Mushongnovi humbly request a word with you," it began. The letter continued with a spate of demands and accusations, directly addressing five specific policy issues: the Hopi land title; mineral leasing; the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act; the Indian Claims Commission; and the Hoover Commission's recommendations to "turn American Indians into full tax-paying citizens." Rejecting the Hoover Commission's recommendation, the letter also declared, "Neither will we lease any part of our land for oil development at this time. This land is not for leasing or for sale. This is our sacred soil . . . . The boundaries of our Empire were established permanently and was (sic) written upon Stone Tablets which are still with us . . . . We have already laid claim to this whole western hemisphere long before Columbus' great, great grandmother was born." The letter ended with a stinging indictment: "Now we cannot understand why since its establishment, the government of the United States has taken over everything we owned either by force, bribery, trickery, and sometimes by reckless killing, making himself very rich, and after all these years of neglect . . . we the Indians are still licking on the bones and crumbs that fall to us from your tables."

The Navaho-Hopi Rehabilitation Act

Because neither the Hopi nor the Navajo were regarded as "ready" for termination, both tribes were slated for "rehabilitation." The Traditionalists also asked that the Navaho-Hopi Rehabilitation Act not be implemented. But it was implemented. The act reflected renewed emphasis on assimilation as the dominant goal of U.S. Indian policy. In response to the deteriorating economic situation brought on by population growth, drought, overgrazing, and stock reduction, "the act authorized money for programs designed to lure industry to the reservations and to relocate Indian families to urban areas." Thus it had two distinct approaches: It returned to an individualist orientation, sending Indians to cities to join U.S. economic and social structures and also 'echoed' the IRA's emphasis on community survival but in a new way: the emphasis was now on bringing industry to the reservation, that is, on simply jobs, not on tribal enterprise. Thus, "even in reservation development, the individual was again the focus."[75]

The act's most far-reaching impact lay in the study of coal mining and marketing feasibility that was commissioned by the BIA to the University of Arizona.[76] It was mineral exploitation that the Traditionalists would most successfully criticize.

The Council's Revival

The Traditionalists' manifestos and the fact that three *kikmongwis* (and possibly a fourth from Shipaulovi) would block almost anything the government tried to do in the way of economic development—coupled with the known opposition of Lower Moenkopi's and Orayvi's *kikmongwis* to almost everything—presented the BIA with a dilemma. The BIA solved it by pushing the tribal council back into operation. An intraoffice BIA memorandum of 1950 summarized three urgent reasons for reviving the council: (1) so that it could accept the Navaho-Hopi Rehabilitation Act (which it did, although the act's administration remained 100 percent in the hands of the Bureau of Indian Affairs); (2) so that it could hire a lawyer to submit a Hopi claim to the Indian Claims Commission (which it did); and (3) so that it could approve mineral leases (which it did not do for another decade).[77] Luckily for the BIA, enough Hopi supported the council's revival to make it viable, if not unanimously acceptable.

TRADITIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN THE "REHABILITATION" DECADE

In 1950, the council finally achieved a legal quorum when First Mesa's *kikmongwi* agreed to certify representatives. From that point on, the Traditionalists' ideology included opposition to the council and its actions. For the following five years, the council and the Traditionalist coalition functioned alongside each other as competitive but complementary representatives of the Hopi people. The council hired an attorney who promised to get back as much of the 1882 reservation as he could, in addition to getting monetary compensation for land lost, through the Indian Claims Commission. In 1951, he submitted a claim to the commission on behalf of the Hopi.

The Traditionalists supported a counter-claim from Shungopavi that requested return of the Hopi's entire aboriginal land boundaries, rather than money. Filed as Docket 210, it was thrown out of court. When the council's attorney pushed a piece of legislation through Congress in 1957 that would settle the Hopi-Navajo land question, the Traditionalists opposed it because it included a severe compromise of not only the Hopi's claimed land boundaries but also those of the 1882 reservation. Thus, when the council supported PL 93-531, the Navajo and Hopi Indian Settlement Act of 1974, to relocate the Navajo and recover use of half the 1882 reservation, the Traditionalists opposed that, too.[78]

One of the Traditionalists' most dramatic and immediately effective actions came in February 1955 in a meeting with BIA personnel at Hotevilla. The topic was livestock permits. Throughout the meeting, the Traditionalists charged that the government had developed the permit system to help the Navajo get at Hopi land and resources. A prominent Traditionalist declared that he would stand on his traditional way of life and graze his livestock accordingly. He walked up to the BIA personnel and handed them his permit. Out of fifty-two men at the meeting, thirty-four turned in their permits, representing 1,096 active sheep units, i.e., 1,096 active sheep. The BIA threatened legal action.[79] But the resistance stuck: By 1962, the permit system had been abandoned, not to be reinstituted until 1980, this time with regulations developed by Hopi tribal members.[80]

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Traditionalists held meetings at the drop of a press release. They could be seen hurrying between mesas and villages in cars or pickups, delivering mes-

sages of meeting dates and places to key persons. Meetings were most often held in people's homes in Shungopavi, Mishongnovi, or Hotevilla. Occasionally, they would be held outside or in a kiva. Meetings were always conducted in the Hopi language. Starting in 1964, a number of Iroquois and their Native American supporters from other tribes, who traveled the continent annually in a "Unity Caravan" for the next five years, joined the Traditionalists in their meetings and provided additional contacts and channels for them. Wallace "Mad Bear" Anderson, a Tuscarora from the Six Nations Confederacy in New York State and Canada, led the caravan. At least one Hopi Traditionalist accompanied the caravan on portions of these trips.

Further Traditionalist Activities

1964: The Oil Lawsuits

The council signed a series of oil leases in 1960 and 1961 that ultimately brought $3 million in royalties into the tribe's treasury, $1 million of which went to their claims attorney in back fees. In November 1964, in U.S. District Court in Phoenix, five Traditionalists, including one *kikmongwi,* filed a complaint against the eleven oil and gas operators and the tribal council asking for "injunction from any further exploration or extraction of minerals or petroleum products from lands located within the confines of the reservation of the Hopi Tribe of Arizona," on behalf of the villages of Mishongnovi, Shipaulovi, Orayvi, Shungopavi, and Hotevilla. But a federal circuit judge ruled in favor of the council and the oil companies, denied the injunction, and dismissed the case in December, ruling that the "Hopi Traditionalists cannot interfere with the action of the Hopi Tribal Council."[81]

1971: The Coal Lawsuit

In 1966, the council signed a lease giving Peabody Coal Company the right to strip-mine another twenty-five thousand acres of Black Mesa in the Joint Use Area of the Hopi Reservation, a territory shared by Navajo and Hopi. The leases brought royalty revenues starting at $500,000 a year and reaching $6 million a year by the late 1980s, permitting the council to eventually establish a tribal administration employing nearly five hundred people. Contributing 65 percent of the tribe's revenues, Peabody's royal-

ties were absolutely crucial to the tribe's administrative operations and its employees.[82]

In May 1971, Pawnee attorney John Echohawk of the Native American Rights Fund filed a complaint on behalf of Traditionalists and five *kikmongwis,* listing altogether sixty-two Hopi plaintiffs and naming Peabody Coal Company and secretary of interior Rogers Morton as defendants. The Hopi plaintiffs included the *kikmongwis* of Mishongnovi, Shungopavi, and Lower Moenkopi, as well as First Mesa's *kikmongwi,* representing Walpi, Sichomovi, Hano-Tewa, and Polacca. The Traditionalists had scored a major victory in getting the political leaders of five villages to file the lawsuit.

The suit alleged that the secretary of the interior's approval of the lease was unlawful because it "was in excess of the Secretary's statutory jurisdiction and authority and without the observance of procedures required by law." It also alleged that the mining "violates the most sacred elements of traditional Hopi religion, culture and way of life." The lawsuit included "Exhibit A," a statement to this effect drawn up by four *kikmongwis,* Hotevilla's snake chief, and two interpreters. "The land is sacred," said the statement in part, "and if the land is abused, the sacredness of Hopi life will disappear and all other life as well."[83]

Beyond the religious and jurisdictional issues, the suit alleged that the Hopi Tribal Council did not have the power or authority to approve the lease because the Hopi constitution authorized the council only to "*prevent* the lease of Hopi lands." Although dismissed on a technicality, the lawsuit brought a number of issues, including environmental ones, into Hopi political discourse.

Opposition to Public Utilities

In 1966, the Traditionalists added another plank to their platform: rejection of public utilities, i.e., telephone, electricity, water, and sewer lines. They insisted that these must be rejected collectively, not on an individual basis, and could not be installed without approval of the *kikmongwi.* Eventually, two of the four *kikmongwis* (Mishongnovi and Shungopavi) retreated from this position under pressure from their villagers; continuing to live in a backwoods, nineteenth-century lifestyle did not appeal to many Hopi. But at Hotevilla, a sufficient number of people felt strongly enough to confront workers who came to install power poles and

water lines in 1966 and again in 1968. The antipower faction won: The machines and men retreated with their pipes and poles, amidst much publicity, and two Traditionalist leaders appeared on Steve Allen's television talk show in June 1968 to present the situation in media terms. Five more confrontations occurred between 1974 and 1992, with the last one ending in defeat for the Traditionalists and the possibility that they might go to tribal court over the matter.

Just exactly why the Traditionalists decided to focus on the water lines and power poles is worth pondering. Certainly the action and the ideology behind it were consistent with the Traditionalists' dissent, opposition, and exceptionalism to routine, conformity, and "things *ka-hopi.*" But they did not oppose automobiles, wage labor, money, machine-made clothes, propane stoves and refrigerators, or even television sets, as long as they ran off car batteries and not from electric sockets. Their rejection of electricity was symbolic of their vehemence against dependence.

The United Nations and Other International Forums

Meeting in March 1959 in Hotevilla, the Traditionals asserted that prophecy told them they must "knock four times" for entrance to the "House of Mica" and, if entrance were refused, dire consequences would follow, generally in the form of natural disasters. In 1971, one Navajo and three Hopi traveled to Stockholm for an environmental conference sponsored by the United Nations. They traveled on passports, bound in buckskin, issued by the "Hopi Independent Nation," thereby testing the international acceptance of their claims to sovereignty. Sweden honored the passports, and the only difficulty they encountered was from U.S. immigration officials in New York, who at first refused them readmittance. They were released after a few hours, however, after officials realized the absurdity of trying to deport American Indians back to their country of origin! Subsequently, other Traditionalists made trips to Europe and back on Hopi passports.

Ostensibly, the Traditionalists' "last" knock on the United Nations' door took place in 1981,[84] but, on 21 September 1982, ten very elderly Hopi from Hotevilla sent a message to the United Nations General Assembly that "now is the most critical period in humanity's existence since the destruction of a previous world," admonishing humankind to "return quickly to a spiritual way of life." In September 1986, six elderly Hopi from the "Traditional

Community of Hotevilla Village" of the "Sovereign Hopi Independent Nation" went to Geneva and successfully petitioned the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations through EAFORD (Elimination of All Forms of Social Discrimination), a nongovernmental organization with consultative status, for investigation of grievances. And on 11 December 1992, Thomas Banyacya, virtually synonymous with the Traditionalists in the eyes of many followers of indigenous politics, addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in celebrating the "Year of Indigenous Peoples." While he spoke, hurricane-force winds and torrential rains buffeted the building, and the East and Hudson rivers rose and flooded the waterfront.

Other significant actions also stand out in the movement's history. In 1965, Traditionalists had the Hopi religion declared a "peace religion" and secured conscientious objector and ministerial deferments for young men initiated into ceremonial duties. Traditionalists held meetings with U.S. Forest Service officials in 1978 and 1979 to make an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to stop additional development of ski slopes on the San Francisco Peaks, sacred territory to both Hopi and Navajo and home of the Katsinas (ancestor spirits) that bring rain. They also spearheaded unsuccessful efforts to repeal the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974. At Second Mesa between 1967 and 1984, protests delayed a HUD housing subdivision on land that Traditionalists said was sacred; three diehards finally burned some plastic water pipes as a symbolic act.[85] On 26 February 1986, Traditionalists from Mishongnovi, including the One-Horn, Soyal, Snake, and Maraw secret society chiefs, declared the nonexistence of Mishongnovi's *kikmongwi,* who had joined the council in 1974, and declared representatives to the tribal council invalid.[86]

In the decade of the 1980s, the movement's adherents dwindled to handfuls in Orayvi, Shungopavi, Mishongnovi, and Hotevilla. By the 1990s, activities had become limited to public appearances by a few individuals and to manifestos and protests that have become increasingly metaphorical and symbolic. Shungopavi still maintains its Traditionalist-inspired boycott of the tribal council, as do Hotevilla and Lower Moenkopi. Only one protest—against the council's short-term lease of a gravel pit for road work on Shungopavi's sacred snake-gathering grounds in 1989—has raised general sympathy and support in recent years.

WHAT DID THE TRADITIONALISTS ACCOMPLISH?

The various petitions to the United Nations were generally well received in the international movement for the rights of indigenous minorities, although few Hopi knew about them. The effort to stop the ski slope development paralleled an equally strong effort by the tribal council and was an unusual case of Traditionalists and council not opposing each other. The lawsuit against Peabody initially caused consternation, but, although unsuccessful, its effects were far-reaching.

But the Traditionalists' call for repeal of the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974, PL 93-531, initiated widespread confusion. The act called for relocation of about 12,000 Navajo from 900,000 acres of the 1882 reservation. In 1956, Traditionalists had complained bitterly at one of the "meetings of religious people" against the government's complacency about Navajo encroachment, and, in 1958, one Traditionalist had told an audience of students in Northridge, California, that "the Navajo overrun our land, and the Indian Bureau lets them do this."[87] Opposition to PL 93-531, then, seemed to signal the Traditionalists' apparent reversal of their stance. This reversal was interpreted as a baffling lack of support for an action that would return at least some of the Hopi's claimed aboriginal land boundaries. Yet the Traditionalists were the first to offer conciliation to the Navajo in the land dispute; although not well understood at the time, their conciliatory stance established a precedent for later efforts at accommodation by the tribal council.[88]

Toward Institutionalization

A.F.C. Wallace noted that a movement ceases to be a "movement" when it either gains such success that it becomes the establishment or it suffers so many failures that its participants and leaders became discouraged and disband.[89] The Traditionalists are not the establishment quite yet, but they have rooted the tradition of dissent and opposition so firmly in Hopi politics that the "traditionalist-progressivist" debate may well shift to the tribal council's chambers and to the halls of tribal government in general in the near future.

The Traditionalist movement called for sovereignty; embraced Hopi traditions, customs, symbols, and religion; and called for resistance to acculturation at a crucial point in Hopi history, when

contradictions and reversals in U.S. policy had created an irrational political economic structure. The movement affirmed a vision of Hopi traditions, customs, society, culture, and religion as superior to those of Anglo-America. This may not seem unique, but the movement's method was innovative: It recruited loyalties on the basis of ideological commitment to Hopi traditions and customs rather than on the basis of membership in a particular clan, religious society, or village. To some extent, the movement offered a source of dignity and pride to people, especially at Third Mesa, who were growing old in poverty and had just had an important source of their livelihood—livestock—cut by 44 percent and their land base reduced as well. The movement praised the *kikmongwis* and, for a few years in the 1940s, provided the only collective voice of the Hopi people and their leaders.

The movement also undoubtedly strengthened the secular political power of the *kikmongwis*. The Hopi tribal constitution reserves ultimate control of the council to the *kikmongwis*. Even though a number of observers have predicted that it was just a matter of time before one village after another would abandon the traditional system, draw up a village constitution, and separate the political system from the religious, this has not happened. The *kikmongwis* might well exercise their legal power and either refuse to certify representatives or reshape the aims and activities of the council in the image of the Traditionalists' strategy. Alternately, the Traditionalists themselves have begun to enter tribal politics independently of the *kikmongwis*. Twice since 1975, a faction of Traditionals has supported a particular candidate for tribal chairman, and three different individuals have run for the office of chairman on a "Traditionalist" platform.

The Traditionalist movement was indeed a legacy of the "friendly-hostile" metaphor of the 1906 split, but it extended the metaphor beyond Third Mesa, opening it to all Hopi and, along with the council, redirecting the criticism and bitterness of the experience into a new kind of Hopi nationalism. The movement was as much a movement toward the secularization, modernization, and democratization of Hopi politics as the council was, and perhaps in some sense even more so, since, in the words of one prominent Traditionalist who held no high politico-religious office, "anybody can bring this message out."

The movement promoted discussion of important issues such as the claims case; strip-mining; and legal strategies with regard to land boundaries, even though not accomplishing resolution in

their favor. While the movement may appear to have been factionalizing, it actually achieved, for two decades, a rare degree of unity. It tried to subsume the factions that split villages under two large, overarching rubrics and to replace some of the more local issues with more global ones. Thus it provided a vehicle for political socialization by seeming to eschew "progress," maintaining the tradition of freedom of dissent, and legitimating discussion of issues originating outside Hopi society by providing what appeared to be a very Hopi and very non-Euro-American forum for doing so. It complemented the tribal council even while opposing it and enhanced a kind of political process that was as modernized as that of the council.

In extending the Hopi "factional field" to include the rest of the world, the movement created a new political path that is the obverse of the United States government's intrusion into Hopi life and its creation of the Hopi Tribal Council, which extended the U.S. political arena irrevocably into Hopi life. Traditionalists brought Hopi issues well beyond the parameters of Hopi life. The prime movers have generated much sympathy for themselves in the field of international human rights and, ironically, in the U.S. domestic political arena, for support of the Hopi Tribal Council in its struggle with the Navajo.

The Traditionalists drew symbols from the well-spring of Hopi culture, but they filled these symbols with meanings that, in themselves, became symbolic and political. They addressed very worldly, concrete issues such as legal representation; relationships with government bodies such as the Indian Claims Commission and the BIA; the origin and derivation of political authority from the indigenous politico-religious structure as opposed to government bureaucrats; and strategies for regaining Hopi land. Opposition to the council, the claims case, the council's attorney, and any compromise of Hopi's claim to their aboriginal land boundaries in turn acquired the status of symbols signifying Hopi sovereignty and tradition.

ANALYSIS: POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY AND MODERN SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

Two different strategies contrast rhetorically and ideologically with each other within the progressivist-traditionalist framework of Hopi politics:

Strategy 1 (Progressivist)

- Enhance the Hopi socioeconomic nexus to nearby and distant urban centers to ensure local control within the U.S. political framework.
- Utilize the resources of Hopi land and people in an economic exchange that will take the best possible advantage of this nexus but will not compromise local control.
- Encourage those federal programs that will provide employment and/or social and human services to increase the economic possibilities and deal with urban-type problems for Hopi who choose a lifestyle based on wage-labor.
- Increase the economic possibilities and deal with urban-type problems for Hopi who choose a lifestyle based on wage-labor.
- Facilitate this social and economic enhancement and participation by utilizing the political and administrative advantages provided by an elected, government-sanctioned tribal council.

Strategy 2 (Traditionalist)

- Enhance the nexus of nearby and distant urban centers to certain Hopi ideological perspectives in order to ensure outside support for promoting local control outside of the U.S. political framework.
- Oppose involvement in political and economic structures that do not have their roots in Hopi culture and tradition, including the Hopi Tribal Council.
- Encourage and pursue traditional economic, social, and religious activities that enhance local adaptiveness and are minimally dependent on a political or socioeconomic nexus.
- Encourage and support local adaptations by giving political allegiance only to the traditional Hopi sociopolitical units, such as village, clan, and sodality, that perpetuate Hopi religious ceremonies and the village as the social basis for Hopi life.

In many ways, pursuit of these two strategies reflects "choosing the best things" from Hopi and Euro-American life advocated by Hopi who affirm neither progressivism nor traditionalism.[90] Various elements of the two strategies can be mixed and matched; their associated ideological components can then be called for under any particular set of conditions. The two strategies have evolved in the context of recent changes in the social, political, and economic conditions of Hopi life. They evolved at roughly the

same time, although Strategy 1 obviously came first; Strategy 2 is an "opposition" strategy and is a reaction to Strategy 1. Despite the assertion by proponents of both strategies that their conceptions of proper Hopi life can never be reconciled, the mutual coexistence of two loosely defined groups associated with each strategy suggests that there is some mutual accommodation. It is not difficult to see that Strategy 1 derives from the effects of BIA policy, the establishment of the tribal council, and the general acculturative influences of ninety years of non-Indian jurisdiction and the steady growth of a nonlocalized economy. Strategy 2 and the activities, ideology, and mythic process associated with it, also derive from these same effects and influences.

THE TRADITIONALISTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Parallels with the Iroquois

Gail Landsman's observations on the Ganienkeh Mohawk are partially applicable to the Hopi Traditionalists.[91] The Ganienkeh Mohawk were younger Indians who, amidst some amount of violence and conflict, invaded and occupied a small area of a public park in New York State that is within the boundaries of claimed Mohawk territory. Although the violence in the situation has no parallel at Hopi, the Mohawk's ideology does. They contextualized the issues symbolically in a vision of sovereignty; in their commitment to the traditional political order of the Iroquois League, of which the Mohawk are one of six member nations; and in their rejection of the elective system, U.S. hegemony, and certain kinds of materialism. Like the Hotevilla Traditionalists, they refused electricity. They embraced the vision of the Two-Row Wampum Belt, signifying a "treaty made with the Dutch in the 1600s. The two parallel rows of purple beads on the wampum belt represent the two nations or ways of life travelling along the same river.... One nation or way of life has the canoe and the other a ship or vessel. In the canoe is the Indian with his own land, government, language, and spiritual beliefs and ceremonies. In the other vessel is the white man and his culture. The treaty specified that the Indian in his canoe and the white man in his vessel are to travel side by side in peace and harmony; they are never to legislate over one another nor to impose the other's religion. If an Indian chooses to go into the

vessel of the white man, he must give up the way of the canoe and vice versa."[92]

The meaning of the symbols is clear, but the meaning itself has become a symbol: "Traveling side by side" means a kind of community integrity and cultural equality that, in itself, symbolizes political and economic independence, despite the fact that communities and individuals are so entwined with each other all over the world that true separateness is undoubtedly impossible and undesirable.

Landsman sees this interpretation of meaning into symbol as a kind of dialectical situation in which there is short-term variation in symbol construction and long-term continuity in symbol use.[93] The group's values and beliefs, tied as they were to "meanings which are both culturally and historically derived," resulted in Ganienkeh's objectifying its culture, which amounted to an "invention" of tradition.[94] Because traditional culture is "continually reinvented and negotiated in the present," Ganienkeh's traditionalism operated as a symbol whose content and meaning—rituals, dress styles, etc.—constituted yet another symbol, on another level, of the community integrity and cultural equality that, in turn, symbolizes political and economic independence.[95]

In the case of the Hopi Traditionalists, the primary symbols were not a river with a ship and a canoe but, rather, two parallel paths, the white path and the Hopi path. A line drawing of these paths was carved into the face of a large sandstone rock near Orayvi by a Hopi chronicler in the late 1890s; by the 1960s, Traditionalists were using representations of the drawing as an aide in presenting their ideology.[96] The symbolic complex was equally mythic, and the meanings of the symbols equally newly invented.[97]

CONCLUSION: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE

The Hopi offer a case of resisting various aspects of modernization, whether rightly or wrongly, for a diversity of reasons, while strongly embracing others. The political economic needs of the metropolis have undeniably generated cultural changes among the Hopi, which Traditionalists did not resist any more successfully than progressivists. But that is not the point. Changes may be of two sorts: A change might fundamentally reorganize the cul-

tural or institutional order, or it might be considered sufficiently secondary and therefore acceptable, so that the cultural definitions of the society can be "stretched," so to speak, in order to accommodate it.[98] The Hopi have stretched various cultural traditions to accommodate modernity to tradition and tradition to modernity. Traditional and progressive factions have persisted and intertwined with one another in a constant redefinition and strengthening of Hopi social identity.

Although previous ethnographic approaches to the study of indigenous peoples often conceptualized such societies as either frozen in a timeless web of precontact institutions or caught in the throes of acculturation, there is no reason to expect the Hopi or any other indigenous society to aspire to Western definitions of modernity or models for achieving a modern lifestyle. Incorporation of tradition with modernity has prevented Hopi society from becoming prey to intransigently opposed political factions or parties that must thoroughly defeat one other in order to maintain viability, or from being torn apart by religious schisms that tore apart European communities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Hopi incorporated traditionalism as a defining characteristic of modern Hopi life, suffusing traditionalism with widespread social, cultural, and political significance that retained strong opposition to foreign influences and conformity to imposed institutions.

The Traditionalists attempted to subvert what they saw as an intolerably shallow and self-deceiving social and cultural order based on acceptance of Euro-American technological "mass culture"; they tried to push Hopi cultural ideology back into myth and prophecy and away from purely secular concerns by so carefully analyzing them that they promoted the Hopi's interest in them. Thus, while appearing to be thinking locally, the Traditionalists were acting globally. The Hopi's pursuit of pragmatic goals became all that much more attractive to non-Indian legislators, planners, bureaucrats, and researchers who might publicly fear and secretly wish that the Hopi might never become "modern." The ideological opposition of traditionalism and progressivism constitutes, for Hopi, a uniquely Hopi way of knowing how change works. This way of knowing change is dialogic, placing the brakes on rapid and wholesale acculturation and on any kind of wide-eyed idealism on the part of the Hopi about "good times ahead" or "prosperity just around the corner" (traditionalism); on the other hand, it also embraces the possibility that

better times might actually be in sight (progressivism). The constant pessimism and nay-saying of the Traditionalists warned that white people might indeed come bearing gifts but that they might also con the Hopi out of their own land or take away more than they would give. Yet to completely resist Americans could spell disaster and would not be in the Hopi's best interests. Traditionalism thus became almost a fail-safe mechanism, predicting disaster if Americanism did not work and also offering the possibility of a cultural retreat to make up for modern American culture's deficiencies. As one Hopi woman who was raised a strict Mennonite once remarked to me, "We are all traditionalists out here."

Thus, Traditionalism, with its ideology stressing fate, tradition, myth, prophecy, interpretation, and the wise teachings of founding ancestors, constitutes part of the "other" modernity: the modernity of challenge, criticism, dissent, and exceptionalism, resting on apparently impossible goal attainment.

While so many Hopi lived in grinding poverty, the Traditionalist movement provided an alternative interpretation of life for those Hopi who had no economic alternatives. Embracing ceremonialism, even if not participating in it fully, and rejecting materialist ideology provided, for those in poverty, a degree of dignity that could not be acquired through material possessions. Now that virtually all Hopi can aspire to a modicum of material comfort and now that the Hopi economy is irrevocably integrated into the core-periphery relationships defined by the American metropolis, traditionalism might be expected to become more narrowly focused on the expressive, symbolic, intellectual, and social aspects of Hopi life. In other words, the nature of Hopi culture will change as the material conditions from which it is constructed change. Many indigenous communities might be expected to develop a similar approach: acquiescence to the economic and political system of the intrusive dominant European-derived culture on the one hand and, on the other, phrased as traditionalism, an ideology of independence of, and scorn for, the intruders and their system.

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NOTES

1. Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 41.
2. Ibid.
3. Edward M. Bruner, "Ethnography as Narrative" in *The Anthropology of Experience*, ed. Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Bruner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 152.
4. See also Richard O. Clemmer, "Truth, Duty, and the Revitalization of Anthropologists," in *Reinventing Anthropology*, ed. Dell H. Hymes (New York: Random House, 1972), 213–47.
5. See, for example, Laura Thompson, *The Hopi Crisis: A Report to Administrators* (N.P., processed ms., 1945 [?]), 89, and also Thompson's *Culture in Crisis: A Study of the Hopi Indians* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), 187. Anthropologist Thompson, studying culture change and acculturation in the Hopi villages in the 1940s, failed to anticipate the development of the Traditionalists and saw only two alternatives for the Hopi: a return to precontact customs and institutions or a further spread of what she labeled "social breakdown." Her mimeographed report has neither place nor date but was probably done in 1945. Thompson worked for the BIA under Collier and later married him. The report furnished the basis for most of Thompson's book, *Culture in Crisis*.
6. Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 273–86.
7. Peter Worsley, *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984), 249.
8. Swidler, "Culture in Action," 273.
9. Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth*, 26.
10. The idea was basically this: Although American Indian culture had many fine qualities, it was basically doomed to be engulfed by Anglo-American civilization. In the words of one ethnologist, "Whatever may be the faults or foibles of the Pueblo, or of the Indian in general, whatever his aspirations, his incongruities, his strength, or his weakness, as a type of man he is destined to disappear under the irresistible influences of a mightier race. His social life become enfeebled by attempts to put into practice half-understood conventionalities borrowed from the white man. The Indian will live, but his existence will come to be a memory in place of a reality" (Arthur J. Fynn, *The American Indian as a Product of Environment, with Special Reference to the Pueblos* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1907, 258–61]). Another ethnographer, Jesse Walter Fewkes, referred to the Hopi in an 1891 letter as "the most primitive aborigines of the United States" (Edwin L. Wade and Lea S. McChesney, *America's Great Lost Expedition: The Thomas Keam Collection of Hopi Pottery from the Second Hemenway Expedition,*

1890–1894 [Phoenix, AZ: The Heard Museum, 1980], 8–9) and averred, "Hopi aboriginal life is fast fading into the past . . . . [T]he time for gathering ethnological data is limited" (Fewkes, "Minor Hopi Festivals," *American Anthropologist* 4, new series [1902]: 510). Of course, nothing could have been further from the truth.

11. See William Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History, and Political Economy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 26. Roseberry refers here to Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) and to Williams's *Marxism and Literature* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).

12. Matei Calinescu, *Faces of Modernity: Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 41, 65–68.

13. I use *modernization* to denote the process, and *modernism* to denote the ideological progressivist doctrine espousing it. I use *modernity* to denote the general situation in which modernist progressivism and its critique, in this case traditionalism, coexist.

14. Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), 37.

15. Wilbert Moore, *World Modernization* (New York: Elsevier, 1979),1.

16. Lloyd Rudolf and Suzanne Rudolf, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 3–4.

17. Perhaps the best-known example of "culture as critique" is to be found in the Surrealists. Surrealist writers and artists of the 1920s articulated and translated this aspect of the "second" modernity into the most pronounced and intensive artistic, literary, social, cultural, and political critique of the modernist era. Claiming inspiration from cosmic forces, they produced forms of critical artistic and social expression that nearly overcame the industrial, standardized expressive motifs epitomizing progress and almost became more widely accepted as hallmarks of modernism than the supposedly dominant themes of modernism itself. See George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). For additional discussion of culture as critique, see James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

18. I use *political economic history* in the sense that Eric R. Wolf uses it in his *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 6; in the way that Peter Worsley uses the approach in *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and in the way that William Roseberry defines it in his excellent book of reviews, *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History, and Political Economy*, 13.

19. My synoptic definition is drawn from a synthesis of data and perspectives found in Ralph Linton, "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist* 45 (1943): 230–40; Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Pantheon, 1954); Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist* 58 (1956):264–81; Silvia Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action*, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement 2 (The Hague: Mouton, 1962); David F. Aberle, *The Peyote Religion among the Navaho*, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology 42 (New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1966), 318–20; Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound*, 2d aug. ed. (New York: Schocken, 1968); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (New York: Norton, 1959); and Joseph Jorgensen, *The Sun Dance Religion: Power for the Powerless* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

20. Linton, "Nativistic Movements."

21. For comparisons, see Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound*, xi–xii, 32–44, 243–56; and Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action*.

22. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements."

23. Aberle, *Peyote Religion*, 318–20.

24. Richard B. Brandt, *Hopi Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 23–24.

25. Levy explains in *Orayvi Revisited: Social Stratification in an "Egalitarian" Society* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1992), 3, 8, 53-54, 156, that "a restricted resource base required that Hopi society structure itself on an inequitable distribution of land" and that this Hopi "system of social stratification" was "nothing more than a translation of economic reality into the realm of the sacred," with different lineages within a clan "defining the order of succession to the control of clan property." This system of social stratification "worked to manage scarcity" rather than abundance and to restrict some individuals to fewer economic resources than others. Levy found "an almost perfect correlation" between the importance and number of ceremonies controlled by a particular clan and the quality of land it controlled. "The system of clan ranking by ceremonies," he concluded, "is nothing more than a translation of economic reality into the realm of the sacred, serving to sanctify the exalted position of a limited number of clans." The ceremonial system, then, with high-ranking lineages owning or performing important rituals, validated the economic inequalities. Deteriorating ecological conditions and insufficient economic alternatives exacerbated rivalries that already existed.

26. Levy, *Orayvi Revisited*, 53–54.

27. Frederick J. Dockstader, *Hopi History, 1859-1940, Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 9, *Southwest*, ed. Alfonso Ortiz (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1979), 524–25; Marc Simmons, *History of the Pueblos Since 1821, Handbook*, vol. 9, 206–23.

28. Bruce Cox, "What Is Hopi Gossip About? Information Management and Hopi Factions," *Man* 5 (1970): 88–98.

29. Armin Geertz, "Prophets and Fools: The Rhetoric of Hopi Indian Eschatology," *European Review of Native American Studies* 1 (1987): 33–46.

30. Peter M. Whiteley, *Deliberate Acts* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988): 224–36.

31. Shuichi Nagata, "Political Socialization of the Hopi Traditional Faction: A Contribution to the Theory of Culture Change," *Journal of the Steward Anthropological Society* 11 (1979): 111–37.

32. Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), 417.

33. Nagata, "Dan Kochongva's Message: Myth, Ideology and Political Action among the Contemporary Hopi" in *The Yearbook of Symbolic Anthropology*, ed. Erik Schwimmer (London: Hurst, 1978), 81; H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 277–78.

34. Mischa Titiev, "Review of *The Great Resistance*, George Yamada, ed.," *American Anthropologist* 60 (1958): 620–21.

35. Nagata, *Modern Transformations of Moenkopi Pueblo* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 93; Cox, "Hopi Gossip."

36. Nagata, *Modern Transformations*, 93.

37. It is axiomatic that factionalism among the Hopi long predates the American era, but space limitations prevent a full exploration of the topic here. Factionalism and rivalry for leadership are evident in the context of Spanish missionizing at the Hopi towns in the 1600s. In the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, Hopi killed all five resident missionaries, but, upon hearing that a Franciscan missionary had reopened the mission at the Zuni village of Halona in 1699, Awatovi's residents who were sympathetic to Christianity or to the Spanish remodeled the gutted church and missionary quarters there. When the missionary visited Awatovi in May 1699, he found a small, makeshift church. Returning with another missionary perhaps in October or November 1700, he baptized a lot of people, said a mass, and preached. But leaders of other Hopi villages asserted a position at odds with that of Awatovi's Christians. In the last days of 1700 or the beginning of 1701, Hopi from all the other villages attacked Awatovi, burned it, killed nearly all the men, and distributed some of the surviving women and children among the other Hopi villages. See John Otis Brew, "The History of Awatovi," and "Excavations of Franciscan Awatovi," in *Franciscan Awatovi*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol. 36, ed. Ross Gordon Montgomery; Watson Smith; and John Otis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1949), 1–43, 47–99; Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, 192–93; and Edward P. Dozier, *Hano: A Tewa Indian Community in Arizona* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 13–14.

There seems little doubt that Awatovi represented some degree of pro-Christian and pro-Spanish factionalism arrayed against the rest of the Hopi and that other Hopi destroyed Awatovi and its eight hundred inhabitants because they were religious, cultural, social, and political traitors. Scott Rushforth and Steadman Upham, in *A Hopi Social History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 105, 106, 226, have confirmed the consequence of Awatovi's destruction as its reason and cause: "a powerful symbol of cultural conservatism and a motivating force for cultural persistence." The retaliatory move would seem to have put an end to Hopi factionalism for 150 years. See also the account by Hopi oral historian Edmund Nequatewa in *Truth of a Hopi*, Museum Bulletin 8 (Flagstaff, AZ: Museum of Northern Arizona, 1946), 36, and E. Charles Adams,"Passive Resistance: Hopi Responses to Spanish Contact and Conquest" in *Columbian Consequences, Volume 1: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives on the Spanish Borderlands West*, ed. David Hurst Thomas (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 77–91.

38. The Traditionalist message falls into the category of intellectual property. Traditionalist activity was directly political. Intellectual property—oral histories, legends, myths, philosophies, interpretations, and the like—were produced by men, but, in theory, it was women who held them "in trust" in the same way that they held in trust the clan land, clan totem, seed corn, and ceremonial paraphernalia. Prior to the 1960s, direct political activity was squarely in men's sphere, but women were not totally uninvolved; for example, Jerrold Levy (*Orayvi*, 104) found rivalry among several women for the role of clan mother of the Bear clan in the events leading to the split of 1906. He also found evidence that "high-status women were trying to produce heirs" by shortening birth spacing.

39. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, 417.

40. For discussion of Weber's notion of "traditional leadership," see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1974).

41. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 248–49.
42. Worsley, *Trumpet*, 278–81.
43. Brandt, *Hopi Ethics*, 125–36.
44. Geertz, "Prophets and Fools."
45. Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories*, 49.
46. Worsley, *The Three Worlds*, 39.
47. I base this synopsis of culture on Swidler, "Culture in Action;" Worsley, *The Three Worlds*, 249; and Roseberry, *Anthropologies and Histories*, 26.
48. John Comoroff and Jean Comoroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 235.
49. Ibid., 176.
50. Whiteley, *Deliberate Acts;* Levy, *Orayvi Revisited.*
51. In Washington, Loololma was persuaded to agree to establishment of a Mennonite mission and school near Oraibi and not to oppose government schooling for Oraibi's children. However, it is unclear which of these two issues angered his opponents or whether it was simply the trip itself that provided the issue. Levy (*Orayvi*, 92) suggests that Loololma was not really a friendly Hopi but rather was simply trying to stall the government with vague promises. There is, in fact, no evidence that, until the mid-1890s, Oraibi had any substantial faction of "friendlies," but, clearly, friendly dealings with the U.S. government had become a talking point and an issue for Loololma's rivals.
52. See Mischa Titiev, *Old Oraibi: A Study of the Hopi Indians of Third Mesa*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University 22: 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1944), 86, and Edmund Nequatewa, *Truth of a Hopi*, 131, for discussions of the dating of the events.
53. As already noted, the details of the split have been covered by other authors and will not be repeated here. Relevant for my argument is that the split resulted at least partially from efforts by low-ranking individuals to manipulate their leaders and dismantle the system of economic inequalities. Levy (*Orayvi Revisited*, 95–103) found that "members of high- and middle-rank clans were friendly and those of low-rank clans were hostile significantly more often than would be expected by chance," although a few individual members of the Spider and Eagle clans were exceptions.

But other factors were also at work. Two U.S. government policies placed enormous pressures on the Hopi to conform or suffer the consequences. One was schooling; the other was the allotment policy.

In 1890, presidential authority was granted for surveying the Hopi Reservation preliminary to making allotments (*Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1890], xlvii). The allotments were on the desert floor, below the mesas, where the Hopi had their fields. Despite some tradition of individual usufruct, the Hopi interpreted these moves as hostile acts, and they were right: Had allotment gone ahead, most of Hopi land would have been opened to homesteading by non-Hopi. In 1891, the government sent a party of surveyors to survey the reservation. All village chiefs opposed the scheme (Titiev, *Old Oraibi*, 76). But the surveyors returned in 1894. Men from Oraibi pulled up the surveyors' markers and openly threatened to burn the school at Keam's ranch (Spicer, *Cycles*, 203).

54. Other consequences also resulted: a freeing of men's time from ceremonial pursuits and a reallocation of it to craft work (especially silversmithing and weaving), off-reservation wage labor, and various entrepreneurial pursuits; the changing of two productive springs from clan-owned to community-shared resources; the abolition of inequities in access to better quality land; and changes in the land tenure system from communal to individual ownership.

55. Rebecca Robbins, "Self-Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and Future of American Indian Governance," in *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization and Resistance*, ed. M. Annette Jaimes (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 87–122.

56. Kenneth Philp, "Fifty Years Later: The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 in Historical Perspective" in *Indian Self-Rule: Fifty Years under the Indian Reorganization Act*, ed. Kenneth Philp (Sun Valley, ID: Institute of the American West, 1983), 9.

57. For additional perspectives along this line, see Stephen I. Cornell, *The Return of the Native* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 95; Rupert Costo, "The Indian New Deal 1928–1945" in Philp, *Indian Self-Rule*, 10–14; and Lawrence Kelly, "The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality" *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (1975): 291–312.

58. Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920–1954* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), 74–75.

59. For discussion of the Hopi IRA votes, see Richard O. Clemmer, "Hopis, Western Shoshones, and Southern Utes: Three Different Responses to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 10 (1986): 15–40.

60. Floyd Pollock, *A Navajo Confrontation and Crisis* (Tsaile, AZ: Navajo Community College Press, 1984), 85.

61. John Collier, *From Every Zenith* (Denver, CO: Sage Books, 1963), 176.

62. Charles H. Stephens, "The Origin and History of the Hopi-Navajo Boundary Dispute in Northern Arizona" (M.Sc. thesis, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 1961), 168.

63. Richard White has argued this thesis eloquently in his chapter on the Navajo in *The Roots of Dependency* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 212–314.

64. Thompson, *Hopi Crisis*, 118.

65. Oliver La Farge, "Running Narrative of the Organization of the Hopi Tribe of Indians" (typescript in Humanities Research Center, University of Texas, Austin), 14. (La Farge did the *Narrative* for Collier while he was living in the Hopi villages in the summer of 1936. It was placed in BIA files but not released as a public document until 1950.) La Farge mentions the fact that men at Hotevilla and Bacavi were especially dependent on the wool for weaving sashes, wedding robes, and mantas for trade to other Hopi villages and to the Rio Grande Pueblo, as well as for sale to trading posts.

66. Brandt, *Hopi Ethics*, 22.

67. U.S. Congress, hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "Rehabilitation of Navajo and Hopi Indians,"80th Cong., 2d sess., 29 March–29 April 1948, 532.

68. Thompson, *Hopi Crisis*, 101–106.

69. D'Arcy McNickle, memorandum of 23 September 1944, to Mr. Joe Jennings, National Archives, Bureau of Indian Affairs File 00-1938-Hopi-054.

70. Brandt, *Hopi Ethics*, 35.

71. Donald L. Parman, *The Navajos and the New Deal* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 289.

72. Cornell, *Return of the Native*, 122.

73. *Congressional Record* 92, "Indian Claims Commission," Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Cong., 2d sess. (1946), 5312–17.

74. My copy is a reduced photocopy of the original, supplied to me by one of the signatories.

75. Cornell, *Return of the Native*, 123.

76. George Kiersch, *Mineral Resources, Navajo-Hopi Indian Reservations, Arizona-Utah, Volume I: Metalliferous Minerals and Mineral Fuels.* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1956).

77. D'Arcy McNickle, memorandum of 6 September 1950 to Dillon Myer, commissioner of Indian affairs, National Archives Bureau of Indian Affairs File 15785-1938-Hopi-054.

78. Congress enacted this piece of legislation supposedly to settle what is commonly called the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute. For history and background, see Jerry Kammer, *The Second Long Walk: The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980); Catherine Feher Elston, *Children of Sacred Ground* (Flagstaff, AZ: Northland Press, 1988); and Emily Benedek, *The Wind Won't Know Me: A History of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute* (New York: Knopf, 1992). For discussion of legal and policy aspects, see Hollis Whitson, "A Policy Review of the Federal Government's Relocation of Navajo Indians under PL 93-531 and PL 96-305," *Arizona Law Review* 27 (1985): 371–414. Rationales and testimony for the original law can be found in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Hearing on Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, July, 1974*, 93d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). Legal recognition of the Hopi's right to half the 1882 reservation, 98 percent of which was occupied by Navajo at the time, occurred through a lawsuit, *Healing v. Jones*, in 1962. The opinion of the court, a "Chronological Account of the Hopi-Navajo Controversy," "Findings of Fact," and "Conclusions of Law" can be found in U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Hearing on Partition of the Surface Rights of Navajo-Hopi Indian Land, March 7, 1973*, 93d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office), 205–433. For perspectives on Navajo relocation, see Thayer Scudder et al., *No Place to Go: Effects of Compulsory Relocation on Navajos* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human issues, 1982) and David F. Aberle, "The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute and Navajo Relocation," in *Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement: Policy, Practice, and Theory*, ed. Michael M. Cernea and Scott Guggenheim (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 153–200.

79. Stephens, *Hopi-Navajo Boundary Dispute*, 187–88.

80. "Notice To All Hopis, Hopi Range Management Plan and Hopi Range Code," *Qua' Toqti*, 4 September 1980.

81. U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix, "Judgment Dismissing Action," *Starlie Lomayaktewa et al. vs. Kerr-McGee Oil Industry, Inc., . . . Aztec Oil & Gas Co., El Paso Natural Gas Products Co., Gulf Oil Corp., . . . Texaco, Inc., and the Tribal Council . . . of the Hopi Tribe*, 5 April 1965.

82. Robert Robinson, *Black Mesa-Kayenta Mine Socio-economic Analysis and Final Technical Report* (Denver, CO: U.S. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation

and Enforcement, Western Field Operations, 1988); U.S. Department of the Interior, *Proposed Permit Application, Black Mesa-Kayenta Mine, Navajo and Hopi Indian Reservations, Arizona, Draft Environmental Impact Statement* (Denver, CO: Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 1989), IV-75. Not only were Hopi and Navajo selling coal, but they also were losing prehistoric sites classed by archaeologists as Anasazi and undoubtedly occupied by Hopi *hisatsinom*, ancestral people. For background on the political, economic, and cultural issues, see Richard O. Clemmer, "Black Mesa and the Hopi," in *Native Americans and Energy Development*, ed. Joseph G. Jorgensen (Cambridge, MA: Anthropology Resource Center, 1978), 17–34; Clemmer, "Nationales Opfergebiet: Die Energieentwicklung auf dem Colorado Plateau und ihre wirtschaftlichen, okologischen und kulturellen Folgen für die indianische Bevolkerung" in *Tod unter Dem kurzen Regenbogen: Das Colorado Plateau als heiliges Land-Indianische Traditionen, Energieentwicklung und Neue Physik*, ed. Stefan Dompke (Munich, Germany: Trikont-Dianus, 1982), 66–112; and Clemmer, "Effects of the Energy Economy on Pueblo Peoples" in *Native Americans and Energy Development* 2, ed. Joseph Jorgensen (Boston: Anthropology Resource Center and the Seventh Generation Fund, 1985), 79–115. For summaries of the prehistoric data, see Shirley Powell, F.E. Smiley, and George J. Gumerman, eds., *Prehistoric Culture Change on the Colorado Plateaus: 10,000 Years on Black Mesa, Arizona* (Carbondale, IL: Center for Archaeological Investigations, Southern Illinois University, 1986); S. Powell, ed., *Excavations on Black Mesa, 1971–1976: A Descriptive Report* (Carbondale, IL: Center for Archaeological Investigations, Southern Illinois University, 1984); and the *Descriptive Reports* of excavations on Black Mesa for 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 (Carbondale, IL: Center for Archaeological Investigations, Southern Illinois University), ed. F.E. Smiley, R.W. Layhe, D. Nichols, A. L. Klesert, and others.

83. *Plaintiffs' Brief, Starlie Lomayaktewa and 61 Other Hopis v. Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and Peabody Coal Company.*

84. Alexander Buschenreiter, *Unser Ende ist Euer Untergang: Die Botschaft der Hopi und anderer US-Indianer an die Welt* (Dusseldorf, Germany: Goldmann/Econ Verlag, 1983), 209.

85. John E. Loftin, *Religion and Hopi Life in the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 109.

86. The council ignored the declaration.

87. Margo Paige, "Indian Tells Plight: 'We Can't Live Like the White,'" *Los Angeles Citizen-News*, 14 November 1958.

88. These efforts came as part of a mediation ordered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1991. The mediation collapsed in 1993, but, as of June 1994, renewed efforts at accommodation were in the offing. For "on-the-ground" reports and annual updates on the land dispute since 1984, see reports of the Panel (later the Committee) on the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute of the American Anthropological Association in the *Anthropology Newsletter* 25:7 (1984): 5, 20; 26:8 (1985): 1,13; 17:9 (1986): 1,15; 28:8 (1987): 1,12; 32 :2 (1990): 1,31–33; 31:2 (1991): 1,22–24; 35:3 (1993): 1, 6–7.

89. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements."

90. Emory Sekaquaptewa, "Preserving the Good Things in Hopi Life" in *Plural Society in the Southwest*, ed. Edward Spicer and Raymond Thompson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press), 239–60.

91. Gail Landsman, *Sovereignty and Symbol: Indian-White Conflict at Ganienkeh* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988).

92. Ibid., 63.
93. Ibid., 105–106.
94. For examples and case studies of how traditions are created, often masking or denying particular social and economic relations as much as reflecting them, see E.J. Hobsbawm and O.T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1983).
95. Landsman, *Sovereignty and Symbol*, 176, 90–91.
96. This drawing is reproduced in Rudolf Kaiser, *Die Stimme des Grossen Geistes: Prophezeiungen und Endzeiterwartungen der Hopi-Indianer* (Munich, Germany: Kosel, 1989), 37. Armin Geertz, in *The Invention of Prophecy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), p. 257, speculates that this petroglyph or another like it may date from the pre-1848 Spanish period.
97. Further comparisons might be drawn between the Hopi Traditionalists and other Native American social movements that have elements of traditionalism and also oppose what have been called the "corrosive" effects of Euro-American versions of progress and modernity. Examples include the American Indian Movement, the Western Shoshone Traditionalists, and the various Lakota groups attempting to reestablish stewardship and control over the Black Hills.
98. Duane Champagne, *American Indian Societies: Strategies and Conditions of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival, 1989),9.