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Women at Berkeley, the First Hundred Years

Part 4

The Sixties and Seventies

Catherine Gallagher

Chapter Eleven

Sexual and Political Rebellion in the Sixties

“Agitators on other campuses take their lead from activities which occur at Berkeley,” wrote FBI director J. Edgar Hoover in 1966, alluding to the Free Speech Movement of 1964 as the original model of on-campus student civil disobedience. By 1966, to be sure, the escalation of the Vietnam War and expansion of the military draft were sparking campus rebellions across the country quite independently of anything that had happened at Berkeley two years earlier. Moreover, Berkeley students had learned their tactics from black students in the Jim-Crow Southern states, whose early sixties sit-ins to end racial segregation were the acknowledged inspiration for all Northern campus activists. But Hoover was right to point to Berkeley students’ originality in rebelling against their own university. This essay will examine the reasons for that novelty while explaining its connections to the changing roles of women in the student body.

The story of sixties student activism in Berkeley can be told as a series of protest movements with overlapping but also shifting emphases—Civil Rights (1962-4); Free Speech Movement (1964); Anti-War Movement (1965-72); Third World Liberation Strike (1968-9)—toward the end of which Women’s Liberation emerged. It’s generally acknowledged that women played important parts in all of the political battles of the sixties, and this essay will examine their contributions. Unlike the standard accounts, though, it will also show how they were partly shaped and propelled by gender and sexual rebellions that were components of student activism throughout the decade. In the fifties, women students had remained limited by sexual prohibitions and strict standards of respectability that were translated into rules for their behavior on and around campus. It was up to the women of the sixties to overthrow those impediments to their personal freedom in what became known as the sexual revolution. This essay will trace the campaign for greater freedom of sexual expression and autonomy for women, showing its intersections, parallels, and collisions with other branches of the sixties movements.

Part I: Before the FSM

Sexual Liberation and Free Speech

It’s well known that the Free Speech Movement was closely tied to earlier political protests but less often noticed that Berkeley students first tested UC’s revised limitations on their free expression by seizing on a sexual issue. The early elements of sexual rebellion in that first protest would eventually bring greater changes for women students than for men. In the spring of 1960, an assistant professor of Biology at the University of Illinois, Leo Koch, had written a letter to the student newspaper, commenting on a campus scandal about “petting parties”: “A mutually satisfactory sexual experience would eliminate the need for many hours of frustrating petting and lead to much happier marriages” (quoted in Van Houten, 74). There was an immediate public outcry against this endorsement of “free love” (i.e. premarital sex) on a college campus, and the University of Illinois fired Koch, prompting a

wider, nationwide controversy that melded the over-heated issues of student sexuality, academic freedom, and taboos against public discussions of sex.

Koch was a UC alumnus, and the brouhaha over his firing quickly migrated to Berkeley when the Executive Committee of the ASUC, in a purposeful violation of UC's rule against taking stands on "outside issues", passed a resolution condemning "the actions of the University of Illinois for this firing" and strongly urging "that Professor Koch be reinstated" (Seaborg, 430). Chancellor Seaborg, recognizing that the ASUC's executive committee action was intended to test the university's rules, directed the students to reverse their decision, which they refused to do, and the stand-off was widely debated in the press. The *Daily Cal* editorials supported the students on the grounds of free speech and de-emphasized the sexual issue as incidental to the conflict. In contrast, the commercial press foregrounded the "free love" aspect, in both sensational and satirical modes, and ignored the students' explanation that they were defending Koch's right to endorse premarital sex, not endorsing it themselves.

1960 could be seen as a national tipping point for the debate over sexual expression and censorship. In 1959, a U. S. Court of Appeals Judge had ruled that several literary works previously banned as obscene could be published on the grounds they had "redeeming social or literary value" ("Grove Press"). The case grabbed headlines across the country and opened the way for the first U. S. editions of such modern novels as D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and Henry Miller's *Tropic of Cancer*. Moreover, since the publication of the Kinsey Reports in 1948 and 1952 had shown the large discrepancy that existed between Americans' espoused sexual morality and their behavior, taboos on sexual topics had increasingly come to seem hypocritical. In the context of the liberalizing culture, the argument made by lawyers for the University of Illinois that Koch's words were "offensive and repugnant, contrary to commonly accepted standards of morality" (quoted in Seaborg, 441) probably did not reflect the views of most students at the secular universities.

Thus, although in the vanguard of public opinion, ASUC's position was not outlandish; the high-profile censorship cases in the news had already made a strong link between free speech generally and sexual *expression*. The press coverage of the Berkeley controversy, though, stressed that Koch recommended a change in student sexual *behavior*, and the ASUC advocates of free speech were not prepared to defend the substance of his recommendation. They tried to keep the focus on the issue of free speech by staying neutral on Koch's ideas while championing his right to express them. But since Koch's opinions about how students should behave was the fillip that drove newspaper coverage, the free-speech argument was drowned out. The conflict ended when an ASUC executive committee of a more conservative stripe was elected the next semester and reversed the original resolution. They too, however, declined to comment on the value of Koch's advice and merely noted that the original resolution had violated UC regulations by taking a stand on an off-campus issue.

The topic of student sexuality, it seems, overwhelmed the issue of free speech, revealing a pattern that repeated itself during the decade: sexual politics and the new left were twins that could

neither be separated nor fully reconciled. Although student activists could not avoid the issues of sexuality and gender relations, they were often hesitant to include them. From the defenders of Koch at the decade's outset to the of women's liberationists at its end, those who stressed sexual politics often found themselves either just ignored or accused of trivializing the movement by creating merely frivolous—even laughable—distractions from “serious” political purposes. Noticing this continuing tension can help us to understand why it took so long for new left activists to recognize gender-specific discrimination as a legitimate issue.

The campaign for franker sexual expression on campus, though, did not immediately go away after the Koch case. The 1959 U. S. Court of Appeals hadn't done away with obscenity laws, although it had carved out important and enticingly vague exemptions for works with “redeeming social or literary value.” It thus inspired writers in the cultural vanguard—including Berkeley students—to test the limits. In the spring of 1961, the editor of the *California Pelican*, Don Wegars, caused a national stir and was almost expelled for publishing a cartoon that showed an American flag with the Soviet hammer-and-sickle in place of one of the stars; it was captioned, “Run it up yer ol' wazoo” (Carroll, Martin). The cartoon may have alluded to the student demonstrations at the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings the previous May, but the hubbub it set off in the press centered on the possibly obscene meanings of the caption's neologism, “wazoo”. Wegars was suspended for a semester, and the OED still attributes the first use of the term “wazoo” to that issue of the *Pelican*.

Far from bringing student publications into line, though, the administration's punishment of



1 Wendy Martin, editor of *Occident* in 1961

Wegars stimulated a competitive drive for notoriety, according to Wendy Martin ('62), who was then editing *Occident* and is now a professor of English at the Claremont Graduate University. She recalls, “wanting to publish something in the literary magazine that would be even more provocative than the *Pelican*'s cartoon” (Martin). For the fall of 1961, she deliberately sought some transgressive, attention-getting content, which she received and published in the form of a short fictional piece featuring inter-racial fellatio. Martin remembers being bitterly disappointed when the story failed to cause a scandal or draw university censorship. One can imagine, though, that the administration was not eager to attract more attention to its rebellious student publications, especially if the question of

“redeeming literary value” might be at stake.


The students who made these links between erotic expression and free speech had various motives—satirical, political, and literary—but they all registered long-term changes in the culture that had already begun by 1960. By the end of the decade, Koch's advocacy of “mutually satisfactory” premarital sex as a healthy alternative to endless foreplay would be seen as completely uncontroversial. The rebels at the beginning of the sixties were still early in the process of creating a general consensus that sexual liberation and freedom of expression were related aspects of personal autonomy. The

changes, though, did not come automatically, and their meaning, especially in women's lives, would be redefined several times throughout the decade. Moreover, the students would continue to cast the university as an impediment to both political and sexual change, and the administration often played that role with gusto. The two issues of sexual freedom and free speech were an unstable compound, but they would develop along interwoven paths as complaints against the university mounted.

Dormitory Discontents and the Sexual Double Standard

In the middle of the decade, the question of sexual freedom was subtly broached by women students in the dormitories, who lived under stricter rules than the men. It's one of the ironies of Berkeley's history that major improvements in student facilities and services set the stage for rebellion. For the first time in its history, the university in the early sixties used public funds to build large dormitories for housing both men and women while also helping to finance a new student union complex—complete with a ballroom, lounges, meeting rooms, cafeterias, and offices for student government. Four sets of high-rise residence halls for undergraduates of both sexes were raised in the four years between 1960 and 1964. When the FSM erupted, therefore, students had learned to expect university facilities for their use on campus and affordable housing nearby. Those were things that other American universities had provided for decades, but at Berkeley they were new, and they altered student life. The change was especially dramatic for women because, as we've documented in previous essays, housing for them had always been scarce, forcing many to commute from home. Two of the buildings in each of the four new dormitory complexes were for women. Pictured here are the namesakes for the first two high-rise women's buildings—former Dean of Women Mary Blossom Davies and Alice Deutsch—posing with a model of Unit One, which opened in 1961. As the dormitories opened in the early years of the decade, the percentage of women in the student body climbed out of its postwar lows in the 30%-range to around 42%, where it stayed during the sixties and seventies.

The new student spaces certainly had a democratizing and liberalizing effect on the campus.



2 1959 dedication of the new dorms, which would open in 1961.

They created the conditions for organizing student groups that could challenge the dominance of fraternities and sororities, which had controlled both student governments and extra-curricular activities in the postwar years (Kerr, 105-109). Moreover, the new student facilities opened at the very time when the Greek-letter houses were becoming politically problematic because they practiced racial and religious exclusion. Indeed, in 1959, California Attorney General (and soon to be Governor) Edmund Brown ruled that “the university can in no way officially recognize groups which practice discrimination”, and the general counsel for the Regents recommended “a wall of separation between the

university and the fraternity and sorority system” (Kerr, 383). Although eventually the Greek-letter houses agreed to sign non-discrimination pledges in the mid-sixties, by that time their reputation for bias had caused a steep slide in their popularity.

In contrast, several of the student groups recruiting dormitory residents were also trying to draw attention to broader issues of social justice. Organizations like SLATE (a left-leaning group that backed a slate of candidates for each ASUC election) offered an organized progressive political campus agenda but also found themselves constantly brushing up against the UC rules, as we saw in the Koch case. Despite the limitations, the dormitories helped shift the center of political gravity away from the Greek-letter houses toward more open spaces, like the large dining commons near the student union, where currents of thought from inside and outside mixed informally on the edge of campus. Across Bancroft Way, the YMCA and YWCA continued their traditional roles of sponsoring forums for political organizing and recruitment still forbidden on university property. In short, the left-leaning student organizations found larger residential constituencies and centers of activity.

While these new facilities created the spaces for students to congregate, they simultaneously limited the kinds of activity allowed; groups could not, for example, advocate, plan, or raise money for off-campus causes or campaigns. Restricted use of the buildings thus became a source of grievance in itself. When Clark Kerr became President of UC statewide in 1958, he modified the rules against political activity somewhat, but they were still more restrictive than those at most universities. Indeed,



3 The Student Union shortly after its opening in 1961

students at both Stanford and San Francisco State had greater latitude in using campus venues for political purposes than Berkeley students had (Stadtman, 442-3). Moreover, some of the new facilities actually encroached on areas that were not under university control earlier. When the student union was built and Sproul Plaza created, the space south of Sather Gate, where students had earlier promoted their causes, was lost. Political activity was displaced south and confined to a narrow band of pavement between Bancroft Way and the plaza (Finacom). That strip of land would become the flash-point that ignited the FSM.

In a complicated dynamic, which historians call a revolution of rising expectations, giving the students what they'd been requesting for decades prepared the way for rebellion.

Anger against the curtailment of political speech rose with the dorms, and women residents were additionally irritated by the surveillance and regulation of their private lives. Those were the conditions that thrust sexuality and gender disparity into the foreground. Imagining itself to be *in loco parentis* (in the place of parents) vis-à-vis its students, the university thought it had a duty to supervise their behavior. As one university administrator later regretfully recalled, "While the new residence halls were attractive, they had many rules and regulations that restricted the freedom of students who lived there", (Van Houten and Barrett, 27). And the women's dorms were the most restrictive places of all. Some vestiges of early-twentieth-century regulations surviving in the new dorms applied to both men and women, like the "parietal" rules forbidding members of the opposite sex from straying from the common rooms (where visitors were received) to the residents' rooms. But women were additionally

required to “sign out” when leaving the premises at night and sign back in by specific hours (midnight on weeknights and 2:00 a.m. on weekends), or be locked out. The rules were ostensibly made by the Associated Women Students, the organization that had represented women before they became full members of the ASUC in 1923. The AWS had not disbanded in the early twenties when it merged into the ASUC, though; instead it had continued a separate existence in which one of its main functions was to make rules—mainly by rubber-stamping the Deans’ rules—about how undergraduate women should conduct themselves. The idea had carried over from earlier eras that women students needed to safeguard their collective reputation by making and enforcing a code of sexual behavior.

When dormitory residents objected to the restrictions in the sixties, Dean of Student Housing Ruth Donnelly could therefore deny responsibility, insisting in 1966 that the university had never imposed different rules on women: “These rules have been made by the women students and are now made by the women” (Donnelly, 91). The AWS, though, was not really a representative organization by the 1960s; it tended to be controlled by the sororities, whose ideas of proper behavior came to seem petty and outdated. Dorm women, for example, were not allowed to wear pants to dinner in the early sixties; then the Dean of Women relented and said they were allowed but only at meals where the students served themselves cafeteria-style. Thus, at the majority of dinners, they were still required to wear stockings, high-heeled shoes, and dresses. In the spring of 1964 (before the FSM), the *Daily Cal* reported that Davidson Hall residents planned a boycott of the Sunday meal, complaining that the dress code interfered with their ability to work continuously in the library, to take courses with late-afternoon laboratory requirements, or attend evening courses (“There’s Unrest in the Dorms Again”). The dress code, they claimed, hindered their academic work and distorted their priorities, but it was also just the most obvious symbol of the university’s attempt to control women residents’ lives minutely. Perhaps when such rigid enforcement of class and gender norms was practiced in private sororities, where group conformity was an accepted principle, they might have been regarded as self-imposed and therefore, even if annoying and old-fashioned, tolerable. However, when applied to women who never chose to submit themselves to their peers’ control in such matters, they seemed intrusive and dictatorial.

Moreover, when unequal rules were instituted in the dormitory context, where large numbers of men and women lived close together in clusters of buildings, which shared some common social spaces, they appeared downright discriminatory. The stringent sign-out and curfew rules, which were aimed at controlling the women’s private lives, became the most deeply resented restrictions. Why should the men be free from curfews if the women had to sign back in by midnight? The lockout rules were an obvious instance of the sexual double-standard, in which women’s extramarital sexual activity was judged much more negatively than men’s. The double standard was evaporating in the mid-1960s, but the dormitories required women to prove they were not spending the night elsewhere by getting back to the dorm in time for the curfew, which served as a form of reputational certification. Even in the first years of the 1960s, the women rebelled against the university’s double standard by their “yearly exodus from the halls into less restrictive living environments”, which “left the high-rise dorms devoid of upper-class leadership and put additional students into the community without significant ties to the campus” (Van Houten and Barrett, 27). Paradoxically, by the middle of the decade, Dean Donnelly had to admit that a higher percentage of women lived outside of approved housing in

apartments than ever before, a situation she blamed on their “permissive” parents’ willingness “to sign their residence cards if they are under 21. They weren’t so willing to before” (Donnelly, 100).

The university was clearly lagging behind the general culture’s willingness to acknowledge that women students should be entitled to as much freedom as men. Rather than simply opting out of university housing, some residents stayed and continued to organize for gender parity. By the spring of 1964, before the FSM, they had convinced the ASUC to ask for revised rules, allowing each living unit to make its own visitation policy. In response, Dean Towle explained that the students couldn’t govern themselves in this very delicate matter because the university had “an obligation to the student himself, his parents, and society at large to leave no doubt as to what kind of social standards and cultural values it endorses” (quoted in Morrow, 39). Towle concisely stated the *in loco parentis* position: the university enforced the sexual values not of some individual parents but of social authority in general. Not imposing the standards would give students the false impression that they don’t—or shouldn’t—exist.

After the FSM, as the university slowly backed away from its *in loco parentis* dormitory policy, student efforts resulted in a few adjustments regarding who could visit student rooms and for what length of time. However, it wasn’t until 1968, after years of friction with the university housing administration, that the residents of each dormitory were allowed to determine the guidelines democratically. They immediately ended the discriminatory curfews and greatly liberalized the visitation policies. Toward the end of the decade, moreover, the first co-educational residence opened for upper-class undergraduates and graduate students, in which men and women lived on alternate floors. By that time, students were finding ways of obtaining contraception and premarital sex was losing its stigma. For most of the turbulent years of the 1960s, though, dormitory life forced hundreds of UC women to face the daily reality of sexual discrimination, an experience that prompted some to fight for the rights their male peers already enjoyed. Most upper-division women students, though, simply moved out of campus housing. As we’ve seen in earlier essays, there had always been more women than men living at home and commuting to campus, but in the sixties more women lived independently in the Berkeley community.

The struggle for gender equality in the dorms hastened several other important changes. It increased women’s awareness of sexual inequality and allowed for the articulation of an important new principle: that sexual autonomy was an essential component of women’s empowerment. Later in this essay, we’ll take a closer look at other routes through which that insight spread on campus post-FSM. The slow collapse of the special rules for women’s residences demolished the last vestiges of official sexual segregation in UC’s administrative structure. With the ending of the parietal and curfew rules, the separate Dean of Women’s positions and the AWS lost their rationale; thus, several institutions originally put in place to raise the status and improve the living conditions of women students fell into obsolescence as the decade went on. The student body became more sexually integrated, and many male and female extracurricular activities also began to merge; even the notoriously rowdy masculine preserve of the men’s football rooting section was penetrated by women in the mid-1960s.

That shift intensified what was already a strong feeling of generational identity and peer-group solidarity among the students: women and men were henceforth to be considered equally competent to

manage their own private lives. While consolidating the generational group, though, the shift ruptured lines of continuity that had linked generations of women. Perhaps every generation imagines itself to be revolutionary, but sixties women truly were unique in this one regard: they publicly and collectively sought sexual self-determination. No matter what their personal, individual choices were, they refused as a group to remain subject to separate norms. Although there had always been women who broke the rules, no previous generation had made it a matter of explicit principle that separate regulations would not be tolerated. Because that aim seemed to repudiate many of the standards of behavior on which their mothers and grandmothers had prided themselves, generational tension between women increased. In her oral histories, for example, Dean Ruth Donnelly uses tactful language when judging the conduct of sixties women, but her disapproval is nonetheless palpable. The turmoil in the dorms was just one manifestation of that pivotal change in women's lives, which often seems too private to make it into the history books. For women's history, though, it's hard to overestimate the transformative significance of this turning point.

Berkeley's "Second Culture", Civil Rights, and Gender

In the first half of the sixties, the university administration seemed unwilling to acknowledge that its student body was changing, even though many of the changes were caused by the university itself: students were more independent of campus culture. Exodus from the dorms was only on cause; another was the California Master Plan for Higher Education, which was signed into law in 1960 and called for an expansion of all three tiers of public post-secondary education: four-year Community Colleges, which were to be open to any high-school graduate; the State Universities, which would accept those in the top third of their classes; and University of California campuses, which drew from the top 12½%. Although it created a pyramidal structure, transfers between the tiers were to be facilitated; a student could move from a community or state college to a UC campus without losing credits. Since Berkeley's enrollment was capped at 27,500 and its graduate population was rapidly increasing, the plan had the effect of decreasing the proportion of lower-division students.

The overall student population was thus getting older and more sophisticated; undergraduates came to Berkeley after one or two years of college elsewhere, and they viewed themselves as adults. Apartment dwellers were the majority in the sixties, so to understand the history of UC in those years, we need to get a sense of the larger context they inhabited, which historian Verne Stadtman has called "Berkeley's second culture". "Its members", he explains, "attended classes on the campus and used its facilities for study and recreation. But they were beyond the reach of campus tradition and student government" (p.430). They were alienated, he admits, "but alienated by choice." Above all, they "resented the invasion of their private lives by University authorities" (Stadtman, 430). The university administration nevertheless clung to its *in loco parentis* policies and increased the students' antipathy by forbidding the use of the campus for political advocacy.

The culture in which most of the students lived, though, was being rapidly politicized. In the early 1960s, Berkeley went through a dramatic transformation into a left-liberal polity; the City Council had a majority of liberal democrats for the first time in decades, partly owing to the racial

diversification of the postwar period. They soon embarked on initiatives to outlaw housing discrimination and integrate the public schools. Both changes prompted opposition, so the city experienced a local struggle over civil rights, which attracted student interest and participation (Wollenberg, 126-34). Student and community activism almost completely merged in 1963-4, during an even bolder, multi-city campaign to force Bay Area businesses to hire black people. That campaign was launched by a coalition of community and student groups, and it differed from the earlier civil rights protests by introducing the tactic of nonviolent civil disobedience, borrowed from Southern Black students.

The coalition, called the Ad Hoc Committee to End Racial Discrimination, was typical of



4 Tracy Sims, with SLATE leader Mike Meyerson, announcing the agreement between the Hotel Owners' Association and the Ad Hoc

Berkeley's second culture, and its charismatic leader was a recent Berkeley High School graduate named Tracy Sims. She had joined the W.E.B. DuBois Club as a teen-ager. Although Sims was not a UC Berkeley student (she started at SF State like many black high-school graduates), her energy and eloquence put her at the forefront of the Bay Area's aggregated student movement in the spring of 1964, a time when various campus, religious, and community groups had joined forces. Sims became the spokesperson for the large regional coalition, which set up picket-lines around the Sheraton-Palace Hotel to protest the discriminatory employment practices of the hotel industry. The protests culminated in a mass demonstration and sit-in, where approximately 1,500 people (mainly college students) occupied the lobby and 167 were arrested. As a result of the sit-in, Sims and her team were able to negotiate a pact with the hotel-owners association, which agreed to hire Black people in higher paying jobs with

greater visibility.

Later that spring, the coalition used the same tactics to win a negotiated deal for more Black employees at the auto dealerships. At the age of nineteen, Sims had become the main spokesperson for the largest and most successful civil rights campaigns in Bay Area history. For those opposed to the protests, her age and sex became a sign of the movement's illegitimacy; one *San Francisco Chronicle* columnist asked how "responsible Negro leaders" could "allow themselves to be represented by an eighteen-year-old girl in the full flush of adolescent arrogance" (quoted in Freeman, 78). But for the many young women she inspired to join the movement, including numerous Cal undergraduates like the writer of this essay, Sims embodied its youthful vitality and openness to female leadership. She heralded change in both the racial and gender hierarchies.

Part II: Gender in the FSM

The Free Speech Movement, which began and ended in the fall of '64, grew out of the springtime civil rights protests (Freeman, 1997, *passim*). Many of the FSM's participants fought their first skirmishes for social change at those demonstrations, committed their first acts of nonviolent civil disobedience there, and won their first political battles through those tactics. They had gained a strong sense of their own power and responsibility for making social change. Moreover, some of those protestors (most famously, Mario Savio) had been so deeply impressed by their experiences that they answered the national call of the organizers of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to undertake the far more dangerous work of Black voter registration attempts in Mississippi, where they had gained a visceral knowledge of how important it was to end racial injustice throughout the country. So when the university administration suddenly barred political advocacy by students on the strip of land at the intersection of Bancroft and Telegraph, a free speech zone used by students of all political stripes, the shock reverberated throughout the student body but was most strongly resented by the civil rights activists, who were renewing the spring's momentum. Moreover, they were the students best prepared to put into practice the lessons learned in the previous six months.

There were, nevertheless, differences among the students about applying those lessons, and this section will look at the women leaders of the FSM, asking how they differed from the men as the free-speech battle unfolded. We'll examine the gendered division of labor in the FSM leadership as well as the women's individual contributions. And we'll reflect on why they've tended to be obscured and get a new angle on the FSM by using their experience as the window.

The night after learning that they had lost their free-speech zone, representatives from all of the campus's student organizations met and formed a united front, choosing Jackie Goldberg to be their primary spokesperson. Goldberg (who would later serve as a California State Assemblywoman as well as member of the L.A. School Board and City Council) was a senior, active throughout her college career in SLATE and Women for Peace; and she was a veteran of the spring civil-rights demonstrations. The administration had consulted no student organizations when it issued its ban, not even the ASUC. The newly appointed Dean of Students, Katherine Towle, merely sent each group a letter announcing the *fait accompli*. The leaders of organizations across the political spectrum thus felt betrayed and humiliated, and thus they came together for the first time. As Goldberg explained decades later, "Groups that would shout at each other from card tables at Bancroft and Telegraph were suddenly potential allies. Only the University administration could have accomplished that" Goldberg, J. 2002, 107). After a debate lasting for hours, Goldberg stepped into the leadership partly because, although on the left, she had a reputation for being able to build consensus. It didn't hurt that she belonged to a sorority, albeit one of the few that allowed Jewish members (Goldberg, J., 2002, 107-8).

Goldberg had many advantages as a leader in the earliest phase of the crisis. She'd completed



5 Jackie Goldberg addresses the crowd in Sproul Plaza, photo Ron Enfield

three years at Berkeley, knew the students in the other organizations, and had a firm base of support. Moreover, she knew and was known by people in the administration. Just the year before, she and Dean Towle had crafted a successful strategy for convincing the sororities to sign a pledge promising not to discriminate on racial or religious grounds. She was able to reach the dean by telephone on the afternoon of the announcement, learning that Towle was personally opposed to the ban but had been outvoted and believed the decision was irreversible. Over the next few weeks under Goldberg's leadership, the students sent a petition to the administration, which was ignored, and then took increasingly defiant and confrontational actions, setting up tables deeper into campus territory, collecting hundreds of names on further petitions, and arriving at deans' offices with large delegations of students demanding free speech, but the administration remained obstinate (Cohen, 84-5). Goldberg, soon accompanied by Savio and others, continued to parley with Towle, but the dean produced only a weak concession: putting the tables

back but still not allowing political advocacy (Cohen, 106-7). Rejecting the offer, the student leaders decided they should only speak to the highest administration officials, Chancellor Strong and President Kerr (Cohen, 109-10).

As the rallies and public displays of defiance progressed, Savio's extraordinary talents as an orator emerged, and he became the de facto spokesperson and charismatic leader of the movement, eclipsing Goldberg. Thus, by October 1, when the administration committed the outrage of calling the police to arrest Jack Weinberg, leader of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) chapter, for setting up a table in front of Sproul Hall, the center of power inside the FSM seems to have been already shifting away from Goldberg. It continued to shift as the administration kept blundering; calling the police onto campus undercut the administration's claim to be protecting the university from outside interference and handed the more militant members of the FSM, who had the greatest contempt for the administration, a public relations victory. The spontaneous sit-in of over a thousand students, forming around the police car and keeping it immobile for two days, was a turning point for the movement. The roof of the car was the platform from which the students exercised their first-amendment rights and articulated their demands. Savio served as the master of ceremonies, and the central aim of the movement became the abolition of all special UC regulations on political speech and activity, rather than just the restoration of the *status quo ante*.

In many ways, Jackie Goldberg's ideas and tactics evolved along with those of the majority. For example, several hours into that action, she and Savio took a large contingent—around 500 students—into Sproul Hall. When Goldberg made her way to Towle's office, and the police threatened to arrest her, she declared that if she couldn't get into the Dean's office, then no one would be allowed to get out. The students following her promptly sat down; it was thus under Goldberg's leadership that the


first Sproul Hall sit-in took place. The stalemate over the dean's office was broken that evening when a group of faculty members promised to press Clark Kerr to negotiate; in exchange the students left the building and returned to the sit-in surrounding the police car, which continued through the night, the next day, and into the night of October 2, when hundreds of policemen assembled on campus in a threatening show of force (Cohen, 106-7).

Thus, while the student negotiators from the united front were negotiating with Kerr, there was real danger of violence against the demonstrators, which evoked very different responses from the two leaders. It made Goldberg anxious to reach a deal; a polite negotiator, she took a more conciliatory tone in the talks with the UC president than did Savio, who later described himself as belligerent (Cohen, 1994, 112). Kerr widened the gap between the two leaders by talking mainly to Goldberg and calling her by her first name; she was, after all, still the official spokesperson. Savio, on the other hand, contemptuously issued demands and at first would brook no compromise, even though the university's position had obviously softened since the day before, when they refused to negotiate. Largely through Goldberg's efforts, a pact was finally reached to end the immediate crisis: the university would try to deed the free speech zone to the city, the other issues in dispute would be referred to university committees, allowing the continuation of negotiations, and no charges would be brought against Weinstein. In return, the students would peacefully disperse, and the police would leave campus. Although Savio helped disperse the students later that night, he always privately believed that the "Pact of October 2nd" was a sell-out, for which he blamed Jackie Goldberg.

The pact did, however, bring the students time to reorganize, recruit, and officially turn themselves into the Free Speech Movement; the reorganization, however, gave Savio the opportunity to "purge" Goldberg (Goldberg, J., 2002, 109). The new organization kept the united front in the form of a large executive committee, but it concentrated the leadership in a much smaller executive committee of nine people. When it came time to select that group, Savio argued vehemently against Goldberg on the grounds that she had been too conciliatory as a negotiator. Although not immediately dropped, she found herself consigned to the second tier of leadership within weeks. She stayed active on the Executive Committee and later described the hard work involved: "We were able to write, publish, and distribute ten to twenty thousand leaflets within hours. We communicated regularly with the press, with other campuses, with elected officials, and with an enormous Berkeley campus. We fed people at mass rallies and at long meetings. We were able to speak to living groups, apartment dwellers, and commuters at a variety of venues" (Goldberg, J., 2002, 109). At the final, climactic crisis of the movement in early December, after negotiations had broken down and the university had made further blunders, she was one of those arrested in the second occupation of Sproul Hall. But she was no longer in the inner circle or on the negotiating team.

Jackie Goldberg's sidelining was emblematic of the shift away from UC's old-guard student leadership and toward the new-left activists. The old guard, based in the campus culture of approved living groups and sometimes cozy with the administration, was viewed with suspicion by the new-left leaders, who were based in Berkeley's "second culture" and connected with community activists (Cohen, 1994, 124-6; Stadtman, 430-31). Before the FSM, the distinction was evident even inside

leftwing student organizations like SLATE, where it also seemed aligned with a gender divide. According to Goldberg, more militant SLATE members routinely used “the old apartment dwellers tactic” of dragging out debate over particularly controversial proposals “until the women in the dorms and other living groups had to go home for curfew” before votes were taken (Goldberg, 106). SLATE women living inside the paternalistic university rules were assumed to be moderates who would vote against radical motions, and their more militant peers used the university regulations to marginalize them. To be sure, not all apartment dwellers were male just as not all SLATE moderates were women, but the stereotypes of the hardline radical man and the flexible moderate female informed the way the students perceived each other. Thus, the gendered assumption that had given Goldberg the leadership in the first place (that she wouldn’t be too militant because she lived inside the campus women’s culture) probably also stoked Savio’s distrust.



6 Jackie Goldberg arrested at the Sproul Hall sit-in

Robert Cohen, Savio’s biographer, describes the episode’s consequences for women in the movement: “While not explicitly sexist, the displacing of Goldberg by Savio . . . was a setback for gender equity.” The movement, he explains, had other prominent women in its leadership, but it was undoubtedly “male-dominated—so much so that . . . women had difficulty making themselves heard in FSM Executive Committee Meetings” (Cohen, 1994, 448, N.17). Suzanne Goldberg (no relation to Jackie), the first graduate-student delegate to the FSM and a member of the Steering Committee (who would later become Savio’s wife), recalled “Frequently I would state a position in meetings that would be ignored, only to be restated later by Jack Weinberg or Mario. Then they would be taken seriously. Yes, sexism existed in the FSM” (Goldberg, S. 559). Even Bettina Aptheker, at the top of the FSM

hierarchy, recalled that Savio often had to intervene on her behalf before she could get the floor at meetings (Cohen, 1994, 558).

In the next phase of the semester-long battle, when the leadership began negotiating with members of the administration and faculty as agreed in the Pact of October 2nd, the earlier gender pattern began to be repeated between Savio, who was impatient and rude, and the primary woman leader, now Bettina Aptheker, who was calm and polite. Kenneth Stamp, a professor of History, described the contrast: “Savio was always sitting on the edge of his chair . . . ready to jump up and leave if things didn’t go his way,” though “he never did go actually” Aptheker “got along best with the committee” and even “sort of apologized for Savio’s behavior” (quoted in Cohen, 1994, 140-141). Stamp attributed the difference to Aptheker’s upbringing in an old-left family, where she’d been taught political discipline. The daughter of a well-known Communist Party leader, she was certainly used to the political hotseat, and her family’s old-left brand was at that point dedicated to coalition

politics and taking the long view of social progress. Savio, on the other hand, was a newcomer to politics, and (again quoting Stamp) an “undisciplined free spirit” (Cohen, 1994, 141).



7 Suzanne Goldberg, Bettina Aptheker, and Mario Savio in discussions with the Committee on Campus Political Activity

The contrast no doubt partly stemmed from the difference between old-left training and new-left spontaneity, but it's also highly probable that Aptheker and Goldberg played the conciliatory roles in the negotiations because they'd been raised female and had been expected to develop emotional understanding and tamp down personal confrontations. Moreover, Aptheker's politics had no angry edge of generational rebellion; her activism was instead a family inheritance. The women's political roles were thus in some ways stereotypically female, but they were nonetheless effective; they made negotiations possible, which then allowed the FSM to elaborate and articulate its position. If Jackie Goldberg's accomplishments

went unappreciated because she was suspected of trying to make a dishonorable peace, Aptheker's influence has also often been undervalued, partly because the progress made in the negotiations was not enough to settle the dispute. The administration's position did soften during the talks, and it made a proposal that seemed promising to some observers: the students would be allowed to advocate on campus as long as they did not promote illegal activities (i.e., civil disobedience). That limitation was unacceptable to the FSM's leadership, but the administration had retreated a step from its original ban on all political advocacy by the time the negotiations broke down.

When the committee disbanded, Aptheker cautioned the FSM steering committee not to resume direct action immediately, explaining that they shouldn't appear to be acting without sufficient proximate cause. She proved right when an attempted sit-in failed because the momentum had flagged. After the aborted sit-in, she again advised that they wait and watch for some new blunder by the administration, which she thought might come soon and serve as a justification for more demonstrations. Within a week she was proved right again when the deans attempted to submit four students, including Jackie Goldberg and Mario Savio, to new disciplinary action. The arbitrariness and spitefulness of the punishment brought the FSM hundreds of new adherents, attracted many faculty members to their side, and drew a crowd of six thousand to a Sproul Plaza rally on December 2, which ended in the arrest of hundreds. It was one of the largest acts of civil disobedience in American history and made national headlines; the vindictive roughness of the police was especially noted in the press. Even Aptheker couldn't have imagined how well her strategy would work.

To top it all off, a week later, when President Kerr suspended classes and held a massive



8 Savio's arrest at the Greek Theatre

meeting in the Greek Theater to address the crisis, it was Aptheker who heightened the appeal of Savio's dramatic attempt to speak to the crowd. He had suggested leaping up onto the platform at the end of the meeting (with a supporter to run interference) and grabbing the microphone, but Aptheker explained that such a sudden action would look so aggressive that it might lose them the sympathy they'd been gaining. She suggested he walk slowly and peacefully toward the platform and let his supporters in the crowd call for him to take the podium, which he did. But before he could speak, two policemen attacked and dragged him away.

Fifteen thousand people watched the unprovoked assault on a man peacefully approaching the microphone while reporters from all over the country snapped photos. No more graphic enactment of the suppression of free speech could have been devised. The crowd reacted with loud boos, chants, and a furious rush of students onto the stage. Kerr, who was too shocked even to begin taming the chaos, retreated. Ten thousand people then marched to Sproul Plaza to hold yet another rally (Cohen, 1994, 212-13). The performance was Savio's but the choreography was Aptheker's.

In the wake of those events, the Academic Senate met and voted 824-115 that "the content of speech or advocacy should not be restricted by the University" (quoted in Cohen, 1994, 215). The vote was such a decisive faculty endorsement of the FSM's position that the administration could no longer oppose it, and UC Berkeley became a campus where political speech in public spaces was regulated only by the first amendment of the US Constitution. As Robert Cohen notes in a recent essay posted on this website, the numerous key roles played by women in the FSM have not been fully understood and appreciated partly because writers prefer to tell the story from the standpoint of the heroic protagonist, Savio (Cohen, 2021). Cohen's article is a concise guide to the most visible women FSM leaders. It helps us not only to understand Berkeley women's history but also to see the gendered dialectic inside the student movement that changed Berkeley fundamentally. The success of the semester-long campaign—especially the sympathy it eventually won from the faculty—relied on patient negotiations and open dialogue as well as confrontations and mass mobilizations.


Part III: After the FSM

After the success of the FSM, students by no means let up on their criticism of the university and their demands for change. The university had not, after all, entirely given up its restrictions on the behavior students, especially women students, and new campaigns were yet to be mounted on that issue. After the FSM, activist students' views of the university became even more censorious than they had been before, the problems they saw were more various, and the solutions they proposed ran the gamut from the relatively attainable to the impossible. This section will trace the trajectories of three kinds of student activism, with special relevance to women, that dominated the second half of the sixties.

Gender in the Anti-War Movement

Women had been leaders in the peace and disarmament movements during the early sixties. Women's Strike for Peace, the largest national women's peace organization, held marches, fielded political candidates, and lobbied incessantly for the nuclear test-ban treaty that was finally passed in 1963. Campus Women for Peace was affiliated with the national organization, and its most prominent member, Jackie Goldberg, was a leader in the FSM. The threatened war that mobilized women's organizations in the early sixties, though, was a future nuclear conflagration that might annihilate everyone on the planet. It didn't seem to menace men more than women; in fact, its indiscriminate carnage put nuclear war at the apex of murderousness against civilians. It would massacre men, women, and children indifferently, doing away with the distinctions between warriors and civilians, fighting front and home front. It's little wonder, then, that so many women joined the cause of nuclear disarmament, which accorded with their traditional roles as peacemakers and protectors of their families' futures.


But as the campus peace movement transformed into the anti-Vietnam war movement, its gender markings changed. The issue of how best to protect American civilians was sidelined as activists confronted the realities of a present-tense war, with a growing daily toll of casualties among



9 Campus Women for Peace were active in the FSM

American men and Vietnamese civilians. Young men, both soldiers and draftees, were the most centrally concerned Americans, and perhaps inevitably the movement came to revolve around them. To be sure, the older women's peace organizations did not disappear; indeed, they were often highly effective. A former draftee recalled being set upon by a crowd of middle-aged women at the Oakland induction center in 1968: "One woman with her dead son's picture around her neck grabbed my ankles as I went up the steps and begged me not to give my life for the evil war. 'Go to Canada,' she urged. . . The five minutes or so in that crowd seemed like a lifetime. More thought was prompted in my young mind than ever before" (May).

The mothers of soldiers and draft-aged men adjusted and found new rhetorical footholds in the movement, but college-aged women found it harder to define a role. The first mammoth anti-Vietnam war event at Berkeley—a marathon teach-in—was held on May 21-22, 1965, toward the end of the academic year that had started with the FSM. It took place outdoors and lasted an entire week-end, featured dozens of entertainers and speakers, and attracted audiences of up to 15 thousand. The coalition of student and ad-hoc faculty organizations that organized it had asked for a large chunk of campus property—the site of the future lower Sproul Plaza, then a softball field—for the weekend-long event, and the university easily granted permission (Rorabaugh, 91-2). Thus, the difference made by the FSM in creating an open campus was vividly demonstrated.



However, there were no women among the forty speakers at the Viet Nam Day Teach-In, and neither the women of the FSM nor those of the earlier peace movement seem to have been leaders in the planning (Aptheker, 180). Jackie Goldberg recalled the rapt attention of the thousands of undergraduates in attendance, and she mentions having been a “marshal”, but she doesn’t indicate that she played a major role in the organizing (Goldberg, J., 1999). Nor did women become prominent after the teach-in. Although present in large numbers at all anti-war demonstrations and meetings, they didn’t establish themselves as leaders. One reason for their low profile might have been the tactics of the male leadership that came to be dominant for a few years in Berkeley. The Vietnam Day Committee, founded during the teach-in by Jerry Rubin (recently arrived from New York) and mathematics professor Stephen Smale, organized off-campus demonstrations and civil disobedience to disrupt the war effort: attempting to stop troop trains and obstructing the entrance to the Oakland induction center. As the war escalated, their activities became riskier and more provocative in attempts to attract as much press coverage as possible, and some women objected to their departures from the nonviolent standards of earlier movements. Bettina Aptheker, for example, recalled a 1966 episode in which the VDC leaders had refused to ask the Berkeley police for a street demonstration permit, even though their past requests had been routinely granted, purposely inviting police violence. The police came down heavily on a Berkeley high school student:

Thin, red-haired, and freckled, he was bleeding profusely from a head wound. We carried him into a nearby bookstore. Someone called an ambulance. . . . This experience moved me greatly. I knew the violence was unnecessary. Both weary and wary of Jerry Rubin’s tactics to provide the media with an “event”, I drifted away from the campus antiwar protests. Instead, I put my energies into building the national mobilizations against the war” (Aptheker, 193).

Aptheker went on to help found the national Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, which successfully coordinated annual student strikes against the war.

The participation of women was also played down by the local newspapers and most local authorities. The press sought sensational confrontations, and conservative politicians, especially in

Oakland, were eager to depict anti-war activists as riotous draft-dodgers, so they focused on the most militant men and ignored women activists. On one occasion, even campus authorities fell into the pattern. In October of 1966, when the VDC protested the war effort on campus by surrounding a navy recruiting table with an impromptu sit-in, the administration asked the police to arrest just six well-known activists, all male and mostly not students. Karen Lieberman Wald, a leader of the Students for a Democratic Society who had been among the action's planners, shouted at the departing police, "You ****ing male supremacists, arrest me, too! (Rorabaugh, 109). The outburst expresses the frustration many women probably felt in being considered too insignificant for detention.

Historian W. J. Rorabaugh notes that the macho self-presentation of the militant anti-war activists might also have arisen from their need to counter the accusation of cowardice attached to their refusal of military service. As their tactics became increasingly confrontational and they battled the police more frequently, however, they lost UC student followers of both sexes; by the fall of 1967, when a week-long succession of sit-ins to stop the draft at the Oakland induction center ended in a riot, there were only 15 Cal students among the 317 arrested (Rorabaugh, 117-118). For different reasons, the more moderate campus anti-war protestors also focused on male students, especially when changes to the draft law threatened many with the loss of their student deferments. In the spring of 1968, a new group called Campus Draft Opposition held a "Vietnam Commencement" ceremony in lower Sproul Plaza, where 866 graduating seniors, one third of the men in the class, pledged not to allow themselves to be drafted into the war. A crowd of some 8,000 spectators attended, so the all-male ceremony was the largest anti-war event on campus since the 1965 teach-in.

A convergence of various circumstances thus gendered the anti-war movement male, and many



10 Jo Freeman

women who were active in the cause were relegated to subordinate status. As historians have noted, women who experienced such marginalization eventually felt the need to form organizations that would focus specifically on the problems they faced. Alumna and FSM veteran Jo Freeman, for example, organized a women's caucus at the 1967 National Conference for a New Politics (held in Chicago), the group that launched the California Peace and Freedom Party. When the caucus members attempted to present their ideas on the last day of the conference, though, they were prevented by the chairman, who exclaimed, "We have more important issues to talk about here than women's problems!" Freeman responded by founding the first feminist

newsletter of the sixties, *Voice of the Women's Liberation Movement* (Hall, 58-62). In 1967-68, according to Freeman, clusters of women who were active in New Left causes began forming women's liberation groups in reaction to the sexism of their male peers (Freeman, 1973, 801-2).

Sexual Liberation After the FSM

It's often said that the FSM ended the *in loco parentis* rationale for the university's regulation of student political behavior. However, when it came to other arguably parental functions—providing health services, counseling, and advising—the students in the late sixties asked for more, not less, university involvement. Even the majority lived off campus, they pressed the administration to increase the resources that went into undergraduate services. Post-FSM students seemed to want slightly incompatible things: that the university 1) stop interfering in their lives, and 2) start helping to solve more of their problems. In some cases, like academic counseling and advising, the university easily agreed to augment its efforts; in others, though, it resisted student demands, and those became new areas of student activism.

Both sides of the new student activism are apparent in a campaign for sexual liberation that began shortly after the FSM and ran parallel to the efforts to end women's dormitory restrictions. The issue of student sexuality was an obvious subtext in the dormitory agitations, but it was discreetly blended into the general call for personal autonomy. Emboldened by the FSM's success, though, a far more explicit campaign for sexual liberation, often overlooked by historians of the period, began with the founding of the Campus Sexual Freedom Forum in 1965. It lasted only a few years, but the CSFF was the first campus organization anywhere to formulate the principle that the university should make all forms of contraception, including the Pill, available to its students. As historian Kelly Morrow has shown, they were the first of the country's "sexual liberation activists" who offered students a new framework for understanding their sexual and emotional relationships grounded in the principle of equality" (Morrow, iii). Their ideas were later taken up by coalitions of students and physicians at universities across the country. Berkeley's Sexual Freedom Forum thus took an initial step toward a demand that would become central to the women's movement: the concept of reproductive rights.

The CSFF's most general purposes were to break the taboo on discussing sex in public and to educate students on all aspects of sexuality. It sponsored panels and set up a table for the distribution of information "to help combat the widespread ignorance on homosexuality, VD and its prevention, abortion, birth control, sex laws, etc., caused by cultural taboos [on] these subjects, and to give people the information to make intelligent decisions" (quoted in Morrow, 85).



11 Photo of Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin

It invited openly gay and lesbian activists to speak on campus, including Berkeley alumnae Del Martin ('43) and Phyllis Lyon ('46), who decades later became the first same-sex couple to marry legally in California. When CSSF invited them to speak on campus, they were the leaders of the Bay Area's first lesbian organization, Daughters of Bilitis (Gordon).

Although the CSFF was by no means an exclusively women's group, one of its most active members, Holly Tannen, maintained that sexual education and liberation were especially crucial for the emancipation of women:

We were working to build a society in which individuals would feel free to engage in open, honest relationships with each other. More inhibiting than outside pressure is the inside pressure: feelings of guilt and shame; an internalized double standard whereby any woman who'll have sex with you is a whore, therefore an object, thus not worthy of respect as a human being (Tannen, quoted in Morrow, 86).

Tannen argued that sexual suppression caused feelings of shame and dehumanization that spawned a culture of "pornography and topless night clubs" ("Students: The Free-Sex Movement"), and the organization supported the campaign for the revocation of the special restrictions in women students' dorms. One pamphlet, "The Second-Class Sex", accused the administration of consigning women to "second-class status" through curfews and sign-out rules. The university, it claimed, treated "women as children because of their sex" and thereby violated their civil rights (quoted in Morrow, 93). The CSFF pamphlet combined FSM and Civil Rights Movement rhetoric, applying both to the cause of women's right to equal treatment.

In an even more important breakthrough, they campaigned for the student health service to make birth control available. They first broached the issue by sending out a questionnaire to universities across the country asking about their policies regarding contraception. The questionnaire misleadingly implied that Berkeley was about to make some innovation in that regard, and the press picked up the rumor. The administration, finding itself slipping into a new scandal, immediately issued public denials and disciplined the student who had sent out the questionnaire. But the incident nevertheless raised questions about the health service's complete refusal to provide any medical treatment, counseling, or even information on sexual and reproductive issues.

The administration held a private discussion among the student-services directors on the reasons for such a total embargo. According to historian Kelly Morrow, some of the directors thought student services should at least provide birth-control information, but the head of student health, Dr. Henry Bruym, maintained that "good medical practice" required them to refuse all "premarital" advising, exams, or contraceptive prescriptions. He insisted that such issues should be handled exclusively by "the doctor who will be caring for the family, thus providing a continuity of medical care" (quoted in Morrow, 75). Bruym had argued the previous year in a Daily Cal interview that undergraduate women would probably not use contraceptives even if they had them: "In the back of her mind, the girl usually thinks 'if I get caught we can get married and everything will be all right'" (Cramer). The doctor's assumption—that sexually active "girls" were really aiming to get married quickly and form a family—was not only insulting but also remarkably anachronistic in the mid-sixties. It indicates how great the cultural gap had grown between women students and those the university paid to care for them.

In 1966, the CSFF agitated the issue of birth control more purposely, this time giving the student body an opportunity to clearly state that they wanted the student health service to enter the modern age and help make their sex lives safer. CSFF mounted a referendum on the issue, and the student body voted overwhelmingly in favor of a proposal that the university provide at low cost “prescriptions and devices for the purpose of birth control to women students who are 18 years of age or older, or married”. The referendum also instructed “the health service to establish an open policy that sex and contraceptive information, advice and referral service be given any student who requests it” (quoted in Morrow, 90). The students thus clarified that they wanted more than just the abolition of outdated rules; they wanted the university to take action that signaled its willingness accommodate their values and needs.

The proposal went unmet by the university until the following decade when, as Morrow notes, “legislation, court cases, and college curricula across the United States had begun to align with many of sexual liberation activists’ beliefs and programs” (Morrow, 250). The CSFF, which dissolved soon after 1966, failed to build momentum on the issue after the referendum at Berkeley. Holly Tannen (who later received a graduate degree in Folklore and became a traditional ballad singer and songwriter) indicated that the group may have begun to lose its appeal to some women students when it held parties where, she complained, “all the old degrading games go on” (quoted in Morrow, 97).

Later in the decade, it would become even clearer that sexual liberation was a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for women’s liberation. Ironically, the rapid changes in sexual mores, which originally held the promise of putting men and women on an equal footing, seemed merely to disinhibit some prominent men on the new left. Reports of their sexually demeaning and predatory behavior alienated many women activists, but they also spotlighted the issue of women’s continuing inequality, which the movement had left obscure.

Even though a confused, distorted, and male-dominated version of “sexual freedom” appeared in the late sixties, the CSFF had nevertheless played an important progressive and feminist role in 1965-66. It had taken the sexual revolution at Berkeley far beyond its pre-FSM state, succeeding in publicizing the connections among women’s control over their reproductive lives, gender equality, and sexual liberation. It had also used the combined force of those objectives to expose the university’s failure to recognize and remedy women students’ problems, and it would serve as a model for the reform of other campus’ health services.

Educational Democracy after the FSM

FSM's leaders routinely complained about the impersonality and "irrelevance" of Berkeley's undergraduate education and promised that if they were successful they would go on to create a more democratic academic culture, in which students would have more of a say in designing courses and majors.

In the wake of the FSM, numerous student-led educational efforts were launched to compensate for gaps in the curriculum: the massive Vietnam teach-in and the CSFF's birth control information campaign are examples of such student-controlled educational projects. Another example, which signaled a growing feminist awareness among students, was the



12 Laura X in 1992

founding of the Women's History Research Center in 1968 by Social Sciences major Laura Murra ('71), who used the name Laura X. She was motivated to collect and microfilm material documenting the contemporary women's movement by hearing a Berkeley history professor express doubt that there was enough historical material on women to fill a one-term course. To guarantee that the current movement would not lack an archive and encourage women's historiography—dubbed herstory—the WHRC collected periodicals, newspaper and magazines stories, pamphlets, songs, leaflets, fiction, poetry, and graphics, in addition to research papers and theses. In the early seventies, they joined the national effort to launch women's studies courses by publishing directories of films, tape recordings, art works, course reading lists, and bibliographies ("Women's History Research Center").

The university also began encouraging students to plan new courses: departments added undergraduates and graduate students to course committees, and the Academic Senate created "Student Initiated Courses", proposed by undergraduates, who recruited faculty to serve as official instructors. The courses were then submitted to a Senate committee to be approved for credit. Usually such courses attracted little attention and proceeded smoothly, but in 1968 a course initiated by the Afro-American Students' Union became the source of a controversy that led, through a chain of events far too long and convoluted to be outlined here, to one of the most tumultuous episodes in campus history (Taylor, 257; Rorabaugh, 83-86). A coalition of students, united under the banner of the Third World Liberation Front, called a strike aimed at forcing the administration to set up a new college of ethnic studies departments, controlled by its students. Since those demands could not be met without the university abandoning its educational authority, the TWLF strike was unresolvable. And yet, after months of commotion, negotiations finally accomplished something important. When the dust settled in 1969, a new educational entity had been established: the Ethnic Studies Department, with programs in African American, Asian American, Chicano, and Native American Studies. The TWLF tested the limits of the principle of educational democracy, but it did not squelch the impulse. Ethnic Studies was the

first but not the last department at Berkeley to owe its existence to student initiative, and it was the model for the various “Studies” programs and departments that followed, including Women’s Studies.

Several women leaders emerged into the political scene during the TWLF strike. One was Vicci Wong, a cofounder of the national Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA), the group that originated and spread the term and concept of Asian American. Wong came to Berkeley from



13 AAPA Members at an anti-war rally in SF, 1968 *Archive*

Salinas when she was 17, and was invited by graduate students to help create a new kind of political group, one that would forge a common identity for Asians of all kinds. That new identity provided the basis for her activity in the Third World Liberation Front in the following year 1969. As this photo from her archives shows, the students of the AAPA were spirited participants in the anti-war protests of the period. Vicci

Wong remained an activist and became a writer and reporter in the Bay Area (Hossaini; “Mountain”).

Betty Nobue Kano emigrated from Japan with her family at the age of 3 and arrived at Berkeley as a graduate student in Fine Arts in the mid-sixties. She participated in both the FSM and the TWLF, and later credited those experiences with giving her a sense of social responsibility and a readiness to organize others to change their lives. For example, in the eighties, when she attended a women artists’ conference and saw only four Asians represented out of 800, she founded the Asian American Women Artists Association (AAWAA) to represent their interests. She became a well-known artist and art teacher at SF State, and continued to be an active community organizer in the Bay Area throughout her career (“Betty Nobue Kano”; “Mountain”).



14 LaNada Means Boyer War Jack on Alcatraz

LaNada Boyer War Jack came to UC Berkeley in 1968, when Native American students were extremely rare. She had been raised on the Shoshone Bannock Tribes’ reservation in Idaho before being relocated to San Francisco in 1965 by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In SF’s Mission District, she encountered the pan-Indian movement and the organizations that helped her apply to Cal. Once at Berkeley, she recruited other Native American students to apply and, as they arrived, formed the Native American Student Organization

(Terry). As the chair of that organization, she joined the TWLF strike and helped found the Native-American program inside Ethnic Studies. While still an undergraduate, in the fall of 1969, she became one of the organizers of the Native American Occupation of Alcatraz, an 18-month action that brought international attention to the plight of America's native communities and led to major changes in federal policy (Boyer; Winton). Her role at Alcatraz made her a national figure and a life-long spokeswoman for Native Americans. She finished her bachelor's degree after the occupation and went on to study law and Political Science (Boyer; Winton).

Conclusion

Undergraduate gender relations had certainly changed fundamentally by the end of the decade, and the university administration was still struggling to keep up with the pace of social transformation. Given its starting point at the beginning of the decade, we could say that it had made substantial progress by the end: the unequal treatment of men and women in university housing was gone, as were the last remnants of gender-segregation in the Dean of Students offices. Of course, without a Dean of Women was also no one in charge of the special needs or requests of women students, many of which went unmet. Reproductive health services were still lacking, and when the ASUC tried to establish cooperative day-care centers for students with young children, the administration undercut the effort. Nevertheless, the very fact that the fact that the deans had gone from arguing over dinner dress to day-care facilities is an indication of progress.

The processes that would lead to the most dramatic changes in the status of women in all sectors of the campus community, though, had barely begun in the last years of the sixties, and they would not become a part of the institutional framework until the late 1970s. Those changes required the active campaigning of academic women, both graduate students and faculty. The next chapter outlines their revolt, which forced the demographic shifts of the late twentieth century.

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Chapter Twelve

1970s: Academic Women Reverse their Declining Fortunes

In 1969, women comprised a smaller share of the faculty (3.6%) than they had in 1929 (8.3%); as we explained in an earlier essay, they had been steadily losing ground since 1940. Then suddenly, at that low-point, they began a concerted effort to reverse the decline. A new organization called the Women's Faculty Group devised a plan that would bring about deep and lasting changes to the university as a whole, not just to faculty women. Beginning as an attempt to assess and improve the status of academic women, their efforts caused major reforms. UC altered its personnel policies in hiring and promoting faculty, research, and administrative staff; improvements were made in graduate-student selection, fellowship support, employment, and departmental cultures; and the relation between the university and the state and federal governments also changed. The Women's Faculty Group motivated the legal and procedural methods that would alter the faculty's gender proportions from 3.6% female in 1969 to 34.4% fifty years later. The consequences for the university's culture continue to ramify.

To be sure, faculty women were not the only people advocating gender change on campus. Graduate students were beginning to form women's caucuses, which worked to insure equitable admissions standards, fellowship, and teaching awards, while also lobbying for courses in which women's accomplishments, experiences, obstacles, and social roles would be examined. Their efforts would change the curriculum, put pressure on individual departments to hire more women faculty, create entirely new sub-fields in several disciplines, and stimulate interdisciplinary research and teaching. Several essays on our website document the activities of that younger generation of aspiring academic women.

The women's movement of the seventies, though, was comprised of more than one generation; nationally as well as locally, it was a partnership of established professionals and younger people, who had only recently graduated from college (Freeman, 796-8). This essay will concentrate on the older, established academics who worked to bring change both inside the institution's official channels and outside, through the proliferating networks of feminist organizations. They had arrived in academia under the old dispensation of routine sexual discrimination, so they understood how difficult it would be to extirpate. From our historical perch, it may look as though the change was inevitable. But they

were at the bottom of a long decline when they determined to reverse it, the way up did not look easy, and they nevertheless built the steps that the rest of us climbed.

Phase I: Planning to Raise the Status of Academic Women

The Women's Faculty Group, which took its name from its meeting place in the Women's Faculty Club, included various kinds of academic women: researchers, lecturers, and even some advanced graduate students, as well as a few women among the professorial ranks. It was founded at the beginning of 1969, as the offshoot of a group that had been meeting since the spring of 1968. Two of its founding members—Statistician Elizabeth Scott and Law Professor Herma Hill Kay—were among those invited by the UC President's office to meet and discuss remedies for the nation's "urban crisis", a topic that President Charles Hitch had proposed as a university-wide research project after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination and the ensuing civil unrest in the spring of 1968. The dozen women who met that summer were interested in tackling the problem of inequality through public education, and their discussion turned specifically to the educational handicaps of women and girls. The group had an impressively wide range of non-ladder-ranked researchers and lecturers in fields related to public policy: higher-education planning, bio-chemistry and medicine, and industrial relations. Their train of thought about educational reform soon encountered the question of why there were so few faculty women at Berkeley and such low numbers of women in the academic graduate programs. In order to answer those questions as well as to bring pressure on the university to increase women's participation, they formed a separate group, the Women's Faculty Group. The WFG thus began by investigating the problems of a disadvantaged racial minority and soon discovered that the group to which they belonged was also hindered by bias (Golbeck, 5-15).

Their trajectory was common in the late 1960s; women working on civil-rights issues noticed that they were seldom recognized as people who also suffered from discrimination. For example, the main national women's coalitions—the National Organization for Women and the Women's Equity Action League—had formed in 1966 and 67 to counter the refusal by federal officials to protect the employment rights of women under the Equal Employment Opportunity Plan (Freeman, 798-9). The national organizations would eventually become involved in the Berkeley effort, so a brief sketch of their emergence can help us to understand the local story. Many of the national leaders had been included in JFK's 1961 President's Commission on the Status of Women, which put out a report (*American Women*, 1963) showing how many rights and opportunities women still lacked; their report especially focused on legal and economic handicaps. However, even after discrimination in women's employment became an official civil rights issue, with the 1964 addition of the category "sex" to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, there was still reluctance on the part of most federal agencies to enforce the rules for women. In 1967, an additional Executive Order, 1375, was signed, which made federal contractors, including universities, more accountable to federal anti-bias rules than they had been previously. The Order specifically forbade "federal contractors" from practicing bias (including sexual bias) in hiring, and it mandated that they "adopt and implement 'affirmative action programs' to promote attainment of equal employment objectives" (Kay and Green, 1063). One of the national women's organizations—Women's Equity Action League—began using the new Order in 1970 to file

complaints with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare against numerous universities, few of which by that point had taken any affirmative action plans to insure gender equity in hiring. In 1971—a year after members of Berkeley’s Women’s Faculty Group had released a study of the campus’s hiring record—WEAL filed a complaint against both the UC system as a whole and the California State University System.

In 1968, the women who would make up Berkeley’s Women’s Faculty Group could see that academic women were seldom hired in regular faculty positions, but they had no overview of the history of academic women’s employment on campus. In an earlier essay we explained the causes of the steady shrinkage of the proportion of women on the faculty during the 1950s and 60s. While it was occurring, however, no one called attention to the decrease (Page-Medrich, 16-24). And the first mention of the systematic exclusion of women from the faculty seems to have been made in the context of the postwar academic labor shortage, rather than in any concern about discrimination. In 1958, the Letters & Sciences Dean asked departments whether, when facing recruiting problems, they might “consider hiring qualified women if no men were available” (Seaborg, 282). Bio-Chemistry and Zoology both indicated that they wouldn’t, but even more revelatory is the phrasing of the question: not “will you hire well-qualified women?” but “if no men are available, would you consider hiring well qualified women?” The question assumed that men will, of course, be preferred over women, and that departments need not even consider women applicants if hireable men have applied. Bias against women wasn’t hidden; it just so deeply ingrained that it went without saying. Nor was the very low percentage of women on the faculty entirely unknown. When in 1959 Professor Catherine Landreth, then in Home Economics, suggested to Chancellor Seaborg that “the role of women in the university” be systematically studied, because the issues “must be faced up to in the near future”, nothing was done (Seaborg, 283). When in 1960, the Chancellor responded to a questionnaire on the “nation’s intellectual force”, he easily laid his hands on the statistical information: “Women on the Berkeley faculty. . . accounted for 3.4 percent of the professors, 6.1 percent of the associate professors, 5.5 percent of the assistant professors, and 5.4 percent of the instructors—for an overall total of 4.7 percent women” (Seaborg, 385). But the numbers didn’t seem unusual or surprising enough to merit any comment.

Thus, when the Women's Faculty Group began examining the history of gender imbalances in academic training and employment, they were almost starting from scratch. Despite the enormity of the research task, though, they were from the outset committed to mobilizing for change in addition to discovering the roots of the problem. In the summer of 1968, when the women were still meeting to discuss the urban crisis, law professor Herma Hill Kay argued vehemently that they should transform themselves from a mere study group into a "pressure group" that could influence campus policy on women. The WFG was the incarnation of that idea. Kay also noted that the Academic Senate could be a vehicle to give their efforts official sanction and greater reach. Since she was serving at the time on the Academic Senate's Policy Committee, she volunteered to ask for the creation of a Senate subcommittee on the status of academic women. The strategy of action was thus two-pronged. Forming the WFG would give them the opportunity to invite more women into the organization, especially women in the professorial ranks, who could work within the Senate while also coordinating with other women's advocates (Golbeck, 11-12). Working within the Senate would give them campus-wide contacts and resources as well as the standing and procedural mechanisms to change policies and practices.

Herma Hill Kay would go on to become one of the nation's leading scholars on women's employment discrimination, co-authoring works with Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the topic, and she would remain at the forefront of campus anti-bias activism throughout her 50-year Berkeley career. At the beginning of 1969, she played the crucial role of overseeing the establishment of the Academic Senate's subcommittee to report on the status of academic women, thereby also creating a dual-organizational framework, comprised of a women's pressure group (the WFG) and a cadre of ladder faculty working within the Senate. The structure for action was thus her brainchild as well as her institutional invention. Kay recruited anthropologist Elizabeth Colson to chair the Senate subcommittee (Colson, 183), and the appointments of statistics professor Elizabeth Scott (the other full professor on the original urban-crisis panel) and psycholinguist Susan Ervin-Tripp (then in the Rhetoric Department) completed the female majority on the Senate subcommittee.



3 Herma Hill Kay

Phase II: Researching and Reporting the Status of Academic Women

Herma Hill Kay thus first conceived of the organizational structure for bringing major changes to the lives of women at Berkeley, and the team assembled at the nexus of the institutional juncture she created had just the right combination of talents and dedication to actualize its potential. The key actors in the next phase of the campaign, which included the researching, writing, and release of the subcommittee's report, were its women members: Colson, Scott, and Ervin-Tripp. The subcommittee also included two men, Sociology Professor Herbert Blumer and Law Professor Frank Newman, but, as

Chair Colson later reported, the men left the main work—the collection of data, its analysis, and the writing of the report—to the women, aided by a few advanced graduate students in Sociology (Colson, 184; Golbeck, 212-213). Two of the graduate students also make substantial contributions to the report: Lucy Sells, who had wide knowledge of research in the field because her thesis was on a similar topic, and Arlie Hochschild, who served on the board of the WFG (Golbeck, 212). True to the original plan, the subcommittee women continued to rely on the WFG’s growing network of academic women for advice and information. The dual structure also insured that the three members on the Senate subcommittee would understand and represent the viewpoints of the vast majority of academic women on campus, who were not eligible for Senate membership.

The Women’s Faculty Group began its work as the Policy Committee was making its appointments, and Statistics Professor Elizabeth Scott had already taken the lead in gathering data from all of the academic departments by the time the subcommittee convened in May (Golbeck, 214). Once the women were working under the auspices of the Academic Senate, though, their task became easier. The very fact that a Subcommittee on the Status of Academic Women had been appointed signaled that the routinely different treatment of female job candidates was becoming an officially recognized problem rather than a given. Announcing the appointment of the subcommittee—and using information already gleaned by the WFG—the Policy Committee was the first to state the obvious fact, in the spring of 1969, that women were under-represented in academic life: “It is surprising that so few women—only 15 at the present time—achieve the rank of full professor at Berkeley. A relatively small number of women are enrolled in graduate schools on this campus and elsewhere” (quoted in Golbeck, 213). The Academic Senate is the central organ of faculty governance, and since academic hiring and promotions are primarily controlled by the faculty at the departmental level, the Senate’s initiation of an investigation into women’s exclusion was a sign that it was willing to take responsibility for its own gender imbalance. Soon after the subcommittee started its work, moreover, it discovered another indication that the Senate was taking an independent interest in the problem: the Budget Committee (the Senate’s top review body for faculty hiring and promotions) had already started a study of women’s advancement through the professorial ranks, which was sent to new subcommittee (Golbeck, 215).

The Senate auspices no doubt also encouraged the university administration to help uncover information about the problem. Administrative offices in every corner of the campus shared their records and sometimes prepared reports for the subcommittee. And the Chancellor’s office conducted its own survey on the topic in the summer of 1969, when Vice Chancellor William Bouwsma asked all deans, directors, and department chairs for their views on “the advantages and disadvantages of having women colleagues and their suggestions on how to improve the status of academic women” (quoted in Golbeck, 216). The carefully non-judgmental language (“advantages and disadvantages of having women colleagues”) seems almost offensive now, but at the time it probably made its readers feel free to air the negative stereotypes that needed refuting. The memo also encouraged full disclosure of the reasons for relegating women to non-ladder-ranked jobs: “departments no doubt have their reasons. It is in the interests of the academic community that these should be made explicit so that they can be subject to examination and the test of research” (quoted Golbeck, 216). But the memo also made the

university's interest in improving the lot of academic women clear, remarking that the small proportion of women faculty could be "an indication of the poor training which Berkeley and other major universities are providing for women students" (Golbeck, 216). Either universities were not training women well or they were denying well-trained women sufficient career opportunities. Since they were both the producers of the academic workforce and its employers, the universities could not escape their responsibility for letting a significant proportion of it decline.

Thus, by the summer of 1969, the Academic Senate and the university administration had joined the WFG's efforts to look for the roots of the deterioration of women's academic participation and to find remedies. The official administrative cooperation, moreover, confirmed WFG's sense that their strategy was working effectively. The plan continued to produce results throughout the academic year 1969-70 and into the summer of 1970, when the subcommittee's report was released. The very extent of the participation, though, required constant coordination and the ability to oversee the collection of data and its quick analysis, for the subcommittee was slated to finish its report early in 1970.

Statistics Professor Elizabeth Scott emerged during this phase as the single most crucial member of the subcommittee and its co-chair. We briefly profiled Scott's graduate career in an earlier essay, which dealt with her WWII work. In the late 1960s, she was chairing the Department of Statistics, had been on the urban crisis panel, and was an enthusiastic founder of the WFG when she was appointed to the subcommittee. She assumed the leadership role and became the subcommittee's co-chair both because Chair Elizabeth Colson needed to be away from Berkeley for much of 1969-70, and because her talent and professional experience prepared her for the urgent tasks of shaping the research questions as well as processing and analyzing the data that could provide reliable evidence about the roots and extent of the women academics' problems. Scott would continue to be fascinated by some of the statistical issues she encountered in the study would devote many years to . . . She also



4 Elizabeth Scott

proved to be an adept and persistent publicist.

Scott's task was huge, conceptually complex, and unprecedented. The report was to be the first historical overview of women's roles in teaching and research at Berkeley, going back to the beginning of the 1920s. It couldn't be only a snapshot of the current state of academic women, for that would not reveal the dynamic processes in play. Getting the historical information was time-consuming, but the results were galvanizing. For example, when Scott received the information on women from the Budget Committee in the summer of 1969, she immediately discovered the soon-to-be scandalous fact that out of 1,721 full time tenure ladder faculty, only 60, or 3.4% were women. Access to the historical percentages allowed her to see the drastic decline in women's share of the faculty over the past thirty years, from 9.3 in 1939. Ladder-faculty women, she realized, were in danger of becoming extinct. With

characteristic efficiency, Scott then quickly disseminated the information she'd uncovered and even used it to recruit participation in the study. While still in the initial stages of collecting data, she had the subcommittee send a letter to all the women academic professionals at Berkeley (the 60 Senate faculty, 233 lower level teaching faculty, and 234 researchers), which began with the 3.4% statistic and the explanation of its historical significance. The statistical slide illustrated the seriousness of the problem: women's academic status had sunk to a thirty-year low. That framing created a sense of urgency, motivating the women to fill out and return the enclosed questionnaires. It also helped spread the word throughout the campus about the severe erosion of women's status at Berkeley and the existence of the subcommittee's work (Golbeck, 212-221).

Thus, the subcommittee's means of gathering information expanded awareness about academic gender inequality, which in turn raised the level of curiosity about the impending release of its report. And yet, while framing the status of academic women as problematic at the outset, the subcommittee presented itself as committed to a dispassionate appraisal of the problem. Its official status, reliance on university data, surveys, and historical contextual analyses, all of those features projected the image of a trustworthy, discrete, and objective panel.

When the *Report of the Subcommittee on the Status of Academic Women on the Berkeley Campus*, was released in June 1970, it also fit that profile: momentous in its findings, while solidly evidence-based, reasonable, even conciliatory in its tone, and moderate in its recommendations. The mode of its release immediately set it apart from routine Senate reports, which go through a lengthy process of vetting and commentary by various individual committees before they're presented to the full faculty. But interest was already so heightened that copies were sent to the entire Academic Senate even before its recommendations were discussed by the Policy Committee, which nevertheless prefaced it with a short endorsement: "the most detailed and thoughtful study of the status of women on the Berkeley campus that has ever been prepared." The Committee also explained that it was being distributed "in the hope that it will serve as the basis for sustained discussions next year by the Berkeley Division and in the hope that it may serve to stimulate similar studies on other campuses" (*Report*, np).

Even more remarkably, the UCB administration held a press conference to publicize the *Report*, at which Elizabeth Scott, Elizabeth Colson, and Sanford Kadish (Chair of the Senate Policy Committee) presented the findings and answered questions from the local newspapers. Chancellor Heyns's administration thus signaled its goodwill by publicizing it, although the local press received it as a critical assessment of the university: "No Equality for Women on Faculty" the *Oakland Tribune* reported; and the San Francisco *Examiner* article concluded that "The University of California is not using the talents of the women it helps to train" (quoted in *Golbeck*, 249). Nevertheless, by framing the problem as one that they were already tackling, the administration tried to put itself on the right side of the issue. The press conference was held even before the Academic Senate saw the *Report*. In short, both the Academic Senate and the administration began signaling their support for the *Report's* findings, if not for all of its recommendations, the moment it was finished.

Looking at the *Report* (posted on our website [here](#)), we can see why it garnered such quick support before its official approval. Sixty-eight of its seventy-eight pages are taken up with appendices, at the back of the document, summarizing numerous sub-reports and various kinds of evidence, often in statistical tables. There the conditions, expectations, and handicaps faced by women in all stages and aspects of their professional lives are analyzed, described, and compared to those encountered by men: their graduate training, their unequal treatment on the academic job market, their consignment to untenured jobs, their restriction by nepotism rules, their slower advancement through professorial ranks, their low status on Academic Senate committees, their non-appointments to administrative posts. And yet despite all of these objective impediments, the statistical evidence also showed surprisingly similar levels of scholarly accomplishment and publication between comparable men and women. Thus, the commonly held views that women drop out of post-graduate degree programs or produce less than men as faculty members were refuted by the evidence. There were, as well, the depressing tables showing how much conditions had worsened for Berkeley's academic women, how much support and power they had lost over the previous thirty years. Not only had progress not been made, but regress had become the norm.

Although providing the evidentiary basis of the report, the fifteen separate appendices that comprise those last sixty-eight pages were not synthesized into a continuous presentation. Consequently, some of their potential, cumulative reproving power was dissipated. The *Report's* general conclusions were given in a more cohesive, five-page "Background" section sandwiched between the recommendations, which came at the beginning, and the appendices. Although firmly asserting that the "hard facts" fully justify "the fears of academic women that they will be denied equal opportunities and recognition" (*Report*, 5), the "Background" section also insisted that the *Report* not be read as an indictment of past treatment, but as a harbinger of change: "It is a waste of time to raise cries of prejudice and to attempt to cite this department or that department or research unit as guilty of it, though. . . we have collected evidence relevant to such situations." The sly hint that one can assign guilt by reading the evidence is followed immediately by an affirmative prescription: "address . . . the positive changes necessary to ensure the increased employment of women and the recognition of academic and professional contributions" (*Report*, 9-10). The opening parts of the *Report* are optimistic and meritocratic; they assume that the problems can be solved by leveling the university's academic playing field, even though it had been radically tipped against women for over a hundred years: "We are not recommending that the University should lower its standards, but rather that it should broaden its vision" (*Report*, 10). The only hint of penalties for not hiring women seems to have come from outside of the institution, when federal regulations are briefly mentioned that require the university to take "positive action to correct discriminatory practice, as evidenced by differential rates of employment" (*Report*, 5). This announcement that the low percentage of women on the faculty automatically requires some affirmative action "to forestall possible federal intervention" implied that merely implementing the report's recommendations would suffice. This, we'll soon see, was an unrealistic forecast.

The “Background” section of the *Report* was drafted by Elizabeth Colson, who later recalled that the subcommittee’s rhetoric was purposely nonthreatening: “We didn’t want to antagonize people.



5 Elizabeth Colson

We were trying to be very polite, but at the same time point out how the university was failing. At that point, we thought it might be a little bit better to deal with them as though they were rational creatures” (Colson, 187). The conciliatory tone was a deliberate rhetorical choice, but Colson and the other committee members also held their meritocratic beliefs sincerely: “What we were asking for was the right to compete” (Colson, 190), and thus they attempted to demonstrate that putting women at a disadvantage in graduate training and hiring “didn’t fit with other standards that the university said that it was concerned about, such as intellectual standards, merit, et cetera” (Colson, 185).

The three pages of recommendations that open the *Report*, moreover, are also consistently and optimistically meritocratic. Some of them recommend remedies that now seem self-evident: women must be reviewed for promotions regularly; faculty jobs must be advertised, and women candidates considered on their merits; women should be appointed to important Senate committees; quotas shouldn’t be used to limit women’s graduate-school admittance; fellowships should be awarded on merit without regard to women’s marital status; and nepotism rules should be eliminated. Other recommendations indicate the more intractable and still current problems stemming from women’s larger share of family responsibilities: maternity leave; part-time faculty appointments; support for childcare centers. Only one seems to give women any kind of preferential treatment to compensate for the history of discrimination: creating a pool of FTE for new women faculty, which could be used especially in departments with few women faculty but many women graduate students, such as Psychology. More typical of the proposals for increasing women’s hires, though, is simply encouragement for departments to strive for a number of women on the faculty proportional to the women trained in the field. The recommendations aim to remove the most obvious barriers that prevented women’s employment and advancement, to give moral support for hiring women, and to help them to pursue academic careers. But there aren’t any suggestions about penalizing departments that don’t change their ways, or even monitoring their efforts. A request to establish a permanent Senate committee on the Status of Women alone points to the need for a watchdog, albeit one without teeth. The tone the *Report* as a whole is consistently conciliatory, encouraging, and collegial. It assumes that the members of the Academic Senate are ready to upgrade and expand women’s academic participation voluntarily.

Phase III: Implementing the Report’s Recommendations and Seeking Federal Intervention

The first year following the *Report*’s release saw some administrative action on the recommendations, both from the UCB Chancellor’s and the UC President’s offices. Consideration by

the whole Academic Senate was slower because the report came early in the summer, and it needed to wend its way through various committees before a full Senate discussion. By the time Senate voted on the Report in April of 1971, though, the ground had shifted under the university's feet, and the conditions for cooperation between the women in Women's Faculty Group and the administration were somewhat less stable. First, California economy went into recession, and UC was hit by steep budget cuts, which restricted new hiring and limited the institution's ability to implement some of the *Report's* recommendations. Second, a national organization, Women's Equity Action League (WEAL), began filing complaints with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare against universities using the federal Executive Orders. And third, some members of Berkeley's Women's Faculty Group became impatient with what they saw as the slow pace of UC action and filed a civil rights complaint against the university with HEW. Thus, in the spring of 1971, the women in the WFG who wished to sign on to the HEW complaint formed yet another organization, the League of Academic Women (LAW), whereas others continued their efforts inside the university channels. The WFG persisted as a clearing house, while different paths were pursued, the "inside" route and the "government" route, as Susan Ervin-Tripp later described them (Ervin-Tripp 1995, 3). We'll trace the course of events in the years after the *Report's* release by following the paths taken by its three women authors: Colson, Scott, and Ervin-Tripp.

Elizabeth Colson, the most senior of the three, adhered to the "inside" track and quickly moved deeper into the university hierarchy by an appointment to the Senate's Budget Committee after the *Report's* release. Colson's career as an anthropologist had trained her to understand social dynamics and the difficulties of integrating new groups into existing power hierarchies; her belief in the efficacy of fair play was by no means naïve. She knew it would be necessary both to make new rules and to monitor their implementation, so she became the first woman ever to serve on the powerful Budget Committee, which oversees academic personnel cases. She then became its first female Chair, later recalling, "I've integrated more committees than I wish to remember—I used to think of it as a process, something like that of a birdwatcher. You kept very quiet until they got used to your being there, and then you could move" (Colson, 190). Birdwatching is a good metaphor for Budget Committee work as well because from that vantage point, she could also "look right across the campus, and look right across the individual's record from the beginning of that person's arrival on campus . . . in comparison with what was happening to other people." Colson also insured that the Budget Committee would continue to do audits of the records of all kinds of academic women, including researchers. As she later recalled, the BC was the best place to discover women who were being undervalued or not regularly reviewed for advancement: "somebody who was in the lectureship position perhaps [who] should be considered for a regular faculty position" (Colson 197).

The panoramic view was not the only advantage of working on the Budget Committee. When a report from another Academic Senate committee is sent to that BC for action or comment, the task of drafting a statement is assigned to the one member among the nine who is most knowledgeable about the topic. Thus, the Budget Committee's lengthy memos commenting on the *Report* in February and March of 1971, although signed by the Chair, were no doubt the work of Colson. In that guise, she

both validated the subcommittee's work and helped plan the ways in which its recommendations would be implemented. Acknowledging the discriminatory effect of the nepotism rule, the BC called for its revision or abolition. Moreover, in one of its memos, the Committee went even further than the *Report* by suggesting that the imbalance in hiring tenure-track faculty could be corrected by temporarily instituting preferential hiring favoring women (Golbeck, 304). Mainly, though, the Budget Committee echoed the *Report's* recommendations on tenure-track hiring, job advertising, and anti-discriminatory candidate reviewing, and it strongly stressed that changes had to be made at the level of departments and colleges (Golbeck, 302-305).

Shortly after the Budget Committee memos were written, the university's Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs made a momentous announcement to all deans and department chairs: they would need to "demonstrate that for every new appointment proposed an adequate search has been made for possible women appointees" and that such searches had reviewed "women currently holding non-ladder appointments on the Berkeley campus" (Raleigh). These may seem like obvious requirements, unless we remember that academic hiring was usually done at the time without even announcing the job openings, let alone advertising them. When departments had faculty positions to fill in 1970, they could simply ask distinguished scholars in the field at other universities to send them the names and dossiers of their most talented students or younger colleagues. Getting the best jobs thus depended on working closely with nationally influential professors—practically all male—at a handful of schools. Of course, the favorite students and close collaborators of most male professors were young men. The Vice Chancellor's memo was thus saying something revolutionary: from that time forward deans and department chairs proposing new candidates for appointments would need to describe their searches, demonstrating that they'd reached out to qualified women. The memo was, of course, only a beginning, and hiring procedures would need to be elaborated and revised many times over the years, but it was the earliest example of "affirmative action" (which only later came to be thought of as preferential treatment) in academic hiring at Berkeley. It was designed to replace the old-boys' network with the open, nation-wide academic job market that we take for granted today. The requirements to advertise openings nationally, seek women and minority applicants, and keep records of the demographic information and reasons for deselection of all applicants would follow.

The Budget Committee memos were not the sole cause of that announcement from the Vice Chancellor's office. There had been continuing lobbying by the WFG, and rumors that a national organization might soon file a complaint with the HEW were circulating. Moreover, an earlier memo in February from the system-wide President Charles Hitch to the Chancellors had called attention to *de facto* discrimination, which put "a rather large proportion of women members of the faculty . . . in non-ladder positions". Hitch asked campuses "to take care to make certain that all cases are considered strictly on their merits" (Hitch). The Berkeley memo, though, placed much more responsibility on the hiring units to take specific actions, conforming to the Budget Committee's emphasis. Because the administration was seeking campus consensus, it's likely that they gave considerable weight to the Budget Committee's views, shaped by Colson. Campus women benefitted greatly from her willingness to guide the direction of an existing organization by working within it.

Although her work on the Budget Committee was confidential and couldn't be discussed with other women in the WFG, Colson continued to belong to that group and, like others working in regular university channels, benefitted from its wide range of perspectives. In the year after the *Report's* release, two new permanent committees on the status of academic women were established, one by the Senate and the other by the administration, both of which were largely staffed from the WFG's membership. The sheer number of the people officially appointed to investigate and report annually on the issues had increased considerably (Ervin-Tripp, 1995, 3).

And yet the WFG not only continued its incessant lobbying for more official cooperation at Berkeley, but also increased its outreach to other universities and national organizations. Elizabeth Scott, who earlier took the lead in gathering and analyzing the data for the subcommittee, played a key role in extending the effort beyond Berkeley. She began by disseminating the *Report* throughout the country, giving other academic women a model for how to proceed. During 1970-71, she saw to it that thousands of copies of the *Report* were printed as handy pamphlets (known as the "blue book") and mailed around the country (Golbeck). They were sent to politicians, journalists, professional associations, learned societies, and foundations, as well as women's groups and individual academics, and the response was enthusiastic. Legislation on the topic was introduced in the California State Assembly, the California Education Department revised its guidelines, and various California legislators became active in the cause of affirmative action. Portions of the *Report* were read into the U. S. Congressional Record.

Scott's outreach efforts were also motivated by her intellectual curiosity about the mathematical, statistical, and other methodological questions arising from such complex social and economic issues. By contacting individual researchers at other universities and through professional associations, like the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Statistical Association, she formed networks of people who were collecting more information. She hoped to improve the methods for analyzing it and build a solid base of evidence for policy decisions. In the years from 1972-4, she conducted groundbreaking studies of salary disparities in higher education for the Carnegie Commission and Council on Higher Education, thereby becoming a nationally recognized expert on the topic. One of them showed that similar achievements led to significantly lower salaries for women than for men, and the discrepancies diverged as the careers lengthened. Another study showed the gap between the number of women actually on the faculty and the number that would have been expected given the availability of women in the pools of PhDs in different fields (Ervin-Tripp, 1995, 3). In 1974, she began working under the auspices of the American Association of University Professors to develop a "Kit" for universities that would allow them to do self-evaluations of the gender and racial equity of their salaries. Published in 1977, it allowed them to flag "personnel for whom there is apparent salary inequity" and achieve equal pay for substantively equal work (Golbeck, 501-505).

Scott's career in the 1970s shows a remarkable level of integration between her professional intellectual pursuits and her ability to advance the cause of academic gender equity nationwide. It also

shows an ambition to have a broad impact in academia by helping universities and other professional institutions diagnose and solve their own problems. She greatly extended the reach of the “inside” route.



6 Susan Ervin-Tripp

Susan Ervin-Tripp was the only one of the three authors of the report who took what she later called the “government” path to gender equity. When several members of the Women’s Faculty Group filed a civil rights complaint with the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1971, they did so as members of a separate group—the League of Academic Women—which also included many graduate students. Its members, Ervin-Tripp later recalled, were impatient with the administration’s tactic of relying on departments and colleges to reform their own hiring practices. Their complaint drew attention to the absence of penalties that we noted in the *Report’s* recommendations, and it assumed that if under the threat of the suspension of federal contracts, the university would be more aggressive about penalizing departments and colleges that did not hire women. Although the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs’ memo in March of 1971 implied that new hires would not be made unless they had resulted from non-discriminatory searches, it didn’t describe criteria for such searches, mechanisms for monitoring them, or standards for progress in recruiting women, so it seemed too little too late. Ervin-Tripp felt as early as November, 1970, that additional pressure needed to be exerted from the outside. She wrote a message to campus women explaining that UC was included among the institutions against which the Women’s Equity Action League had already filed complaints and asking them to send any helpful information they might have to the leader of WEAL, Bernice Sandler, if they wanted “a stronger affirmative action program sooner” (Ervin-Tripp, 1970).

Although HEW’s intervention may have motivated the university’s production of affirmative action plans for both non-academic and academic employees, it also set up a series of stand-offs between the agency and the university, which seemed to delay progress. The stalemates resulted partly from the fact that in 1970-71, HEW had only recently been given the job of enforcing the Executive Order relevant to higher education, and they had had neither experience nor guidelines for doing so. It wasn’t until October of 1972 that their “Higher Education Guidelines” were issued, and consequently their positions in the negotiations with the university were often halting and inconsistent (Kay & Green, 1064-65). HEW also did not understand the university’s reluctance to turn over academic personnel files containing confidential letters; they suspected the adherence to confidentiality was merely a screen for hiding bias. For its part, the university, still smarting from the damage to its reputation done by the Loyalty-Oath fiasco, wanted to protect its employees from political interference and argued that if HEW could force them to turn over information on individuals, then so could other governmental bodies with more dubious motives. It took months to resolve these issues that had little to do with affirmative action, to which the university kept stating its principled adherence. The result was

frustration on the part of the women who were waiting to see the finished HEW guidelines and a university affirmative action plan.


Indeed, the League of Academic Women began taking an alternate route to justice in February of 1972, when it filed a lawsuit against the university with the U. S. District Court in San Francisco, for “Injunctive and Declaratory Relief” under the Civil Rights Act. The lawsuit ultimately became entangled with the HEW’s investigation of the campus, which continued to be adversarial after the new guidelines were issued; the university wasn’t declared “compliant” until 1975. The lawsuit was then dismissed. We should note that the lawsuit differed from the other remedies pursued in that it sought not just non-discrimination in the present and future but also redress for past wrongs in the form of “back-pay” for the plaintiffs (League of Academic Women). It thus introduced a recriminatory element into the effort that, although justified, made a striking contrast with the original attitude of collegiality adopted by the subcommittee’s *Report*. It was a frank expression of the anger that many women felt after decades of exploitation.

Ervin-Tripp always held that it was the combination of inside and outside pressures that resulted in effective affirmative action at Berkeley, and she energetically pursued both channels. In addition to co-authoring the *Report*, she chaired the Senate’s *Committee on the Status of Academic Women*, monitoring searches, investigating complaints, and advising on various drafts of affirmative action plans. Moreover, she mentored young women who were recruited to the faculty, held lunches at which they could meet and discuss their difficulties, even wrote a guide to help assistant professors navigate their way to tenure. She arranged meetings between assistant professors and members of the Budget Committee so that they could better understand the review process (Colson, 192). She also worked alongside the trade union AFSCME to combat sex discrimination in non-academic university jobs. (Ervin-Tripp, 2016, 53-55).

Conclusion

Looking back at the struggle for women’s inclusion on the faculty, it seems clear that the most effective changes were rooted in the recommendations of the subcommittee’s report. The basic requirements of fair employment practices—the end of the nepotism rule, the demand that jobs be publicly advertised, that women applicants be considered on their merits, that departments undertake and report on efforts to recruit qualified women and minorities, and that women faculty be given maternity leave—were all crucial. The affirmative action that mattered was the enforcement of those rules, and their result can be seen in the following graph.

UC Berkeley Faculty Headcount by Gender, AY 1979-80—2020-21*



Source: UCB Faculty Personnel Records, AY1979-80—2020-21. *2020-21 is preliminary, as of September 1, 2020. 2

7 1979-2020 yearly percentages of the Berkeley faculty by gender

In 1969, women were at 3.6% of the faculty, and in every decade since, their share has grown between 5% and 7%, with the exception of the decade 2009-2019, which fell slightly short. When we take into consideration the slow turnover in academic jobs and the shift in faculty positions from fields like social sciences and humanities, where women PhDs are relatively plentiful, to engineering and technology, this gradual but steady increase in the percentage of women on the faculty seems progress worth celebrating. The fact that keeping the playing field level through consistent oversight of has worked for women at universities across the country shouldn't surprise us after examining their history: they had always been the overeducated reserve army of the underemployed in academia.

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5 Chart showing 1979-2020 yearly percentages of the Berkeley faculty by gender. From the Office for Faculty Equity and Inclusion. This chart, ending in 2020, has been updated with a new chart, including fall 2021 statistics. https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/faculty_profile_over_time_fall_2021.pdf.