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RADical interventions?

Comparing Baltimore neighborhood characteristics
in the age of public housing reduction

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Urban and Regional Planning

by

Maya Hylton Garza

2015

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

RADical interventions?
Comparing Baltimore neighborhood characteristics
in the age of public housing reduction

by

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Master of Urban and Regional Planning
University of California, Los Angeles, 2015
Professor Leobardo F. Estrada, Chair

Baltimore is in the process of reducing its public housing stock by 43% over the next two years through the RAD program. In order to determine if there is a difference in neighborhood characteristics, data including census data, crime data, and health data for the public housing sites selected for RAD were compared to public housing sites with no treatment. Using spatial and statistical analysis, I found little statistically significant differences between RAD sites and the comparison sites. This could be due to the geographic unit used—perhaps a smaller unit would have been more appropriate—or it could be because public housing developments are overwhelmingly concentrated in only a few areas of the city or in areas with similar

characteristics. One difference that was statistically significant was there were more children under the age of six with high blood lead levels for the comparison sites compared to RAD sites.

The thesis of Maya Hylton Garza is approved.

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University of California, Los Angeles

2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures	vii
I. Introduction	1
II. Statement of Problem	3
III. Literature Review	5
A. Racialized Space	5
B. Segregation in Baltimore	6
C. Public Housing in Baltimore	9
D. Concentrated Poverty	14
E. Critiques of the Federal Housing Program	17
F. Community Economic Development	20
G. Gentrification and Reinvestment	22
H. Neighborhood Quality	24
IV. Research Question and Methodology	24
A. BNIA-JFI Data	25
B. Blue Light Cameras	26
C. Crime and Arrest Data	27
V. Findings	28
A. Comparing RAD Sites with Comparison Sites Using BNIA-JFI Indicators	28
1. Generally	28
2. Census Demographics: Percent of Residents – Black/African American (Non-Hispanic)	34
3. Census Demographics: Racial Diversity Index	36
4. Census Demographics: Percent of Population 0-5 Years Old	38
5. Census Demographics: Percent of Households Living Below the Poverty Line	40
6. Census Demographics: Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line	43
7. Housing and Community Development: Percent of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure	45
8. Housing and Community Development: Percent of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned	47
9. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (Excluding Vacants)	50
10. Housing and Community Development: Percent of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City	52

11. Housing and Community Development: Affordability Index – Rent	56
12. Education and Youth: High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate	59
13. Children and Family Health: Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels	61
14. Children and Family Health: Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1000 residents)	61
15. Workforce and Economic Development: Unemployment Rate	64
16. Sustainability: Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Report per 1000 Residents	66
17. Sustainability: Percent of Area Covered by Trees	68
B. Comparing RAD Sites and Comparison Sites using Crime Data	70
1. Blue Light Cameras	71
2. Arrests and Property and Violent Crimes	71
VI. Conclusion	77
A. A Legacy of Oppression	77
B. Why High Blood Levels Matter	79
Appendix A. SPSS Statistics Report	82
Appendix B. SPSS Independent-Samples T-Test Report	86
References	100

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 1. RAD Sites	28
Table 2. Comparison Sites	29

Figures

Figure 1. 2014 Community Statistical Areas	31
Figure 2. RAD Sites	32
Figure 3. Comparison Sites	33
Figure 4. Census Demographics: Percent of Residents—Black/African American in 2010	35
Figure 5. Census Demographics: Racial Diversity Index	37
Figure 6. Census Demographics: Percent of Population, 0-5 years old	39
Figure 7. Census Demographics: Percent of Households Living Below the Poverty Line	42
Figure 8. Census Demographics: Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line	44
Figure 9. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure	46
Figure 10. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned	48
Figure 11. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations	51
Figure 12. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)	53
Figure 13. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)	54
Figure 14. Housing and Community Development: Affordability Index—Rent	58
Figure 15. Education and Youth: High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)	60
Figure 16. Children and Family Health: Percent of Children (0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)	62
Figure 17. Children and Family Health: Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1000 Residents)	63
Figure 18. Workforce and Economic Development: Unemployment Rate	65
Figure 19. Sustainability: Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1000 Residents	67
Figure 20. Sustainability: Percent of Area Covered by Trees	69
Figure 21. Blue Light Cameras	72
Figure 22. Blue Light Cameras—500 Foot Buffer	73
Figure 23. Hotspot Analysis: 2013 and 2014 Arrests	74
Figure 24. Hotspot Analysis: 2013 and 2014 Property Crimes	75
Figure 25. Hotspot Analysis: 2013 and 2014 Violent Crimes	76

I. Introduction

A little over a century ago a local Baltimore lawyer who had committed his life “to serv[ing] in the cause of political righteousness under those who had fought for the Confederacy,” and local politicians introduced the first segregation ordinance in Baltimore and the country (Pietila 41, 2010). While it was eventually found to be unconstitutional, Baltimore has remained a highly segregated city over the last century. The causes of Baltimore’s persisting segregation are, of course, numerous. The role the federal government has played in maintaining segregation in Baltimore and the nation is well-documented, but it is important to examine and acknowledge the role of local and state politicians and political parties, as well as the actions of local businessmen in ensuring the separation of the races. These actors, using the power of their offices, their understanding of the law, and their wealth, worked together within a white consensus to maintain segregation and keep Baltimore’s Black community subjugated (Power 1983; Pietila 2010; Hirsch 1998). Regardless of the contributing factors, what remains today is a highly segregated metropolitan area, where low-income Black communities with little economic or educational opportunity are concentrated within the city of Baltimore and middle- and upper-class white communities inhabit the suburban counties surrounding the city (Thompson v. HUD).

Like in other cities, Baltimore’s first housing projects were built in the areas where slums once stood. These public housing developments resulted in a net loss of housing when compared to what had been available. Over three decades, the public housing developments were placed in neighborhoods where there were already a high concentration of Black residents—largely in response to the fierce opposition faced when the city tried to place public housing in white neighborhoods (Samuels 2008). Attempts to address Baltimore’s enduring segregation as it

related to public housing locations culminated in a suit against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since then, many of the largest high-rise towers have been torn down and residents have been moved to other public housing sites in the city, into Section 8 housing in the city, or Section 8 housing in the surrounding metropolitan area (Samuels 2008; Jacobson 2007). In 2014, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) announced that it would be participating in HUD's Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program and selling 43% of its housing to private developers (Reutter 2014).

In this thesis, I will examine the interplay between neighborhood characteristics, Baltimore's history of segregation, and public housing. My research question is: Are the initial neighborhood characteristics for the sites selected for RAD intervention different from the sites not selected for intervention?

This research aims to explore and measure possible differences in neighborhood characteristics in a city struggling to address more than a century of oppression. Reductions in public housing are often accompanied with fears (or hopes) of gentrification and this research hopes to uncover possible differences in the communities that could point coming changes in the community.

While there has been some research on the impact of housing relocation programs for public housing residents, there is little on how relocated residents' former neighborhoods fare.

Additionally, there has also been little discussion about the quality of life of the residents that are not removed from these areas deemed to be of low opportunity. This research aims to fill that gap through an examination of different neighborhood characteristics. Not all residents are being moved out of these neighborhoods and it is important to examine possible markers of

neighborhood quality to set a bench-line of comparison as the City further reduces its public housing stock.

II. Statement of Problem

Attempts to remedy housing segregation in Baltimore have generally sought to remedy housing not by addressing or acknowledging the systems of oppression that were partners in the creation and maintenance of segregated communities, but by removing low-income Blacks from highly segregated parts of the city and moving them to higher-income white communities typically outside the city. Those tasked with addressing housing segregation have generally neglected asking Black residents how they would like reform to occur and, as remedies are implemented, offer little choice to residents beyond a participate/don't participate paradigm. This lack of direct involvement in determining the appropriate remedy leaves Black communities perpetually powerless and unconsulted while local, state, and federal agencies, lawyers, and politicians make wide-ranging decisions that impact the viability of Black communities in the long-run.

The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program currently being implemented in Baltimore allows for the Housing Authority of Baltimore (HABC) to sell public housing to private developers and for the housing to be converted to Section 8 housing. The profits for the sale are used to manage the remaining public housing units, while passing the responsibilities of decades of disinvestment and mismanagement by HABC to the private market. At the end of 2014, HABC began moving residents from their homes so that their units could be renovated. This program has been met with distrust by residents, but they also acknowledge that HABC has been a poor landlord and many of the units are in substantial disrepair (Reutter, 2014).

Much like other processes, the public housing residents were not notified that the City was planning on participating in the RAD program, rather they were told once the City's application had already been submitted and approved and the participating sites had already been determined (Reutter, 2014). Further, based on what little information was made available to the public, it is not clear what information influenced HABC as they determined which sites to be sold (Reutter, 2014).

Because at the end of the forty-year contract the developers will be able to convert the once-public housing units to market rate housing, this program is a more long-term and gradual attempt to address the concentration of public housing units. It seems likely that once the developers are no longer required to maintain the units as public housing units, they will be rented or sold at market rate to return great profit. In forty years, it seems likely that at least 43% of Baltimore's public housing units will be gone. Already HABC and the City have turned over responsibility of maintaining these units to the private market, effectively relinquishing its commitment to and responsibility for public housing and its residents.

Knowing that the RAD sites are likely destined for the private market raises the question of whether there is a difference between the sites that have been selected to be RAD sites versus the public housing units that will remain under the management of HABC. It could be that these different groups of housing are on different paths because one will eventually be entered into the private market while the other will remain public housing. Determining if at present there is a difference between the RAD sites and the comparison sites may help us predict what will happen

next in those communities and certainly over the next forty years help us understand what has changed.

III. Literature Review

Starting from a racialized spatial theory framework, the literature review will explore the history of segregation and public housing in Baltimore. There is next a discussion on the debate around concentrated poverty. Then, a review of the critiques and evaluations of the federal public housing program, returning in particular to how the federal housing programs have sought to deconcentrate poverty. Finally, there is a brief exploration of community economic development, gentrification, and neighborhood quality.

A. Racialized Space

Neely & Samura (2011) discuss race from a spacial perspective. They find that there are four shared characteristics of space and race, they are both (1) contested, (2) fluid and historical, (3) interactional and relational, and (4) defined by inequality and difference. Neely and Samura argue that by “[u]sing spatial frameworks, we can see space as one element of the creation and maintenance of social inequality. Space is also often a more tangible manifestation of systemic racial inequalities” (1940). They also emphasize that “[r]acial formation theory connects the ideological realm to the social and political realms, and it posits that these connections are on-going historical, political, and dialectical processes between materiality and culture” (1941).

B. Segregation in Baltimore

An examination of Baltimore's racial segregation, as well as its differences in neighborhood characteristics must necessarily start with an examination of Baltimore's history, with a focus on the city's political leanings and actors that had an outsized influence on housing practices. Baltimore's physical proximity to the rebelling southern states, as well as its historical role and political leanings during and after the Civil War is also important. While located below the Mason-Dixon line, Maryland did not secede from the Union. The city was, however, "best described as...[having] a Southern personality and a Northern economy" (Toomey 2011).

Baltimore was heavily influenced by the values embraced by Progressives, values which coincided with a master narrative of white supremacy that relied on a delineation of Blackness from whiteness (or sometimes the reverse) in order to justify the continuing oppression of Blacks. Progressivism influenced Baltimore in three key ways: through its focus on remedying Progressive-identified societal ills, its belief that governments should aid private businesses in development, and its willingness to work within the existing and expanding norms of segregation. Working within the existing and expanding norms around segregation included the federal government espousing the "neighborhood composition rule" for government housing projects, preventing the federal government from funding projects that would alter the racial composition of the community where the project was to be situated. While the color line certainly flexed and shifted to meet the needs of Blacks and whites, as well as the profit motives of developers and real estate agents, it ultimately held fast in its ultimate purpose to keep Blacks and whites separate (Hirsch 1998).

In Baltimore in the early years of the twentieth century segregation not only existed but also was increasing. While in 1905 whites and Blacks were allowed to eat together in public spaces, by 1907 most places were segregated. Between 1907 and 1910, segregation at parks, theaters, hotels, department stores, hospitals, and cemeteries increased. Additionally, Progressives also encouraged segregated suburbanization, linking the ills of society not just to slums but also to cities themselves. Roland Park, established in 1891 just north of Baltimore's then city limits embraced Progressive ideals around segregated suburbanization and sought to encourage people to live in "parklike residential communities to counter the ill effects of urban living." The local government further encouraged suburbanization by making the property tax rate in the newly annexed land about a quarter of the property tax rate in the rest of the city, creating a clear financial incentive to move to communities like Roland Park. Roland Park also utilized the planning principles of the Progressive Era, including restrictive covenants that controlled land use and resident behavior by mandating allowable lot sizes, minimum construction value for any home, and forbidding the construction of outhouses, cesspools, private stables, chickens, and livestock—strictly limiting uses to residential purposes more than a quarter century before municipal zoning was introduced. These restrictive covenants, like the ones used to later to prevent home sales to racial and racialized groups, were transferred from one owner to the next. By 1910, the restrictive covenants were utilized to prohibit nonservant Blacks from living in Roland Park, becoming one of the first communities to use restrictive covenants to prevent Blacks from being able to reside within a community. Three years later, Jewish people were also prevented from purchasing homes by the company that owned Roland Park. Unlike the restrictions placed on Black residents, the ban against Jewish people was unwritten and was never placed within any property deed. It was, however, strictly enforced for half a century. In

1919, Baltimore annexed part of the neighboring county, including Roland Park, expanding its borders and increasing its population (Pietila 2010).

Baltimore had three separate housing markets—one for whites, one for Blacks, and one for Jewish people. Local newspapers had separate real estate advertising sections based on race. If a house in a previously all-white neighborhood was sold to a Black family, then the other homes for sale in that area would only be advertised in the “Colored Homes” section. Baltimore’s three separate housing markets were preyed upon by people, called blockbusters, who sought to exploit the limited housing opportunities for Black residents (Pietila 2010). While the housing market stayed virtually the same between 1930 and 1960, the Black population more than doubled from 142,000 to 326,000 during the same time period (Power 1983). Some, like those referred to as the “Forty Thieves” sought to turn a quick profit through blockbusting, while others argued that blockbusting was a civil rights tool. However, those that claimed a civil rights agenda in their work would often make such claims when accused of violating the law and taking advantage of buyers and sellers. Those same blockbusters also made massive fortunes off the backs of white residents willing to sell for cheap and Blacks desperate for access to adequate housing (Pietila 2010).

Some Baltimore blockbusters were little more than slumlords who had made significant profits off renting substandard housing to war workers in a city that was bursting at its seams. During WWII, some property owners had converted bathrooms to sleeping spaces, ripping out bathtubs and toilets, and forcing tenants to use outhouses. These slumlords had illegally subdivided their units and oftentimes their property had many other code violations, including defective electrical

wiring and flimsy partitions. However, with the end of the war, the City was no longer willing to look the other way when faced with dangerous and unsanitary housing conditions. These slumlords knew the cost of bringing their properties up to code would be expensive so they sought to sell those properties off to others so the new owners would have to bear the costs of the continuing neglect. It was through this process that slumlords became blockbusters. They knew that Blacks would pay handsomely for substandard housing because their housing market was so constrained. Selling to Blacks would allow for blockbusters to get their highest profit possible off the sale of a property that many whites would be unwilling to purchase (Pietila 2010).

Apartment complex owners also similarly responded when desegregation began in their neighborhoods. At the first sign of integration, all white tenants would be evicted, rents would be increased, and changed from monthly payments to weekly payments. Apartment complex owners would then only rent to Blacks. This process was followed so strictly by apartment complex owners, that in 1962 there were no integrated apartment complexes in the city (Pietila 2010).

C. Public Housing in Baltimore

In 1937, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) was created and three years later the first public housing project, Poe Homes, opened. Built on land that had once been slums, Poe Homes was quickly followed by Latrobe, McCulloh, and Douglass Homes (Jacobson 2007). By 1945, twelve public housing projects had been created and they were strictly segregated—six sites were available to Black residents and six sites were available to white residents. In 1950, Baltimore approved and implemented the first urban renewal project in the country. From 1950-

1964 over 25,000 people were displaced, 90 percent of whom were Black. Ultimately the number of housing units available for Black occupancy did not fully replace the number of units that had been torn down (Samuels 2008).

By the early 1990s, HABC oversaw almost 19,000 public housing units. A report by the Abell Foundation found that from 1992 to 2007, HABC's occupied inventory dropped by 42 percent (16,525 units to 9,625) (Jacobson 2007). The drop in occupied inventory during that time period was related to the national practice of tearing down high-rise public housing and replacing them with low-rise, lower density HOPE VI (Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere) projects. HOPE VI projects were mixed-income and mixed-tenure developments created in 1992 to address the problem of "severely distressed" public housing units (National Housing Law Project 2002). There are currently five HOPE VI sites in Baltimore, all of which were created at the site of older, denser public housing that had been torn down and had resulted in a net loss of public housing units in the city.

Thompson v. HUD follows in the *Gautreaux* line of cases where public housing residents have sued the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for intentional concentration of the poor. *Thompson* consisted of a plaintiff class of 14,000 African American families who were current, former, or future tenants within Baltimore City public housing development. Filed in 1995, a decade later the court found that HUD had violated the Fair Housing Act by concentrating poor Black public housing residents within the city rather than taking a regional approach to building and providing public housing opportunities. As part of a partial consent decree, HUD agreed to start immediately moving public housing residents out of the poorest

parts of the city to high opportunity areas in the surrounding counties. In 2012, seven years after that finding, the court approved a settlement which required HUD to continue its Baltimore Housing Mobility Program and create incentives for private developers to build more affordable housing developments. The Housing Mobility Program provides vouchers which are “specifically targeted to housing units in neighborhood where less than 10 percent of the residents are in poverty, less than 30 percent of the residents are minority, and less than five percent of all housing units are public housing or in HUD-assisted housing complexes.” As of a 2009 report, 1,500 families have moved through the program (Engdahl 2009). As part of the settlement for the suit, restrictions were placed on where the federal government could invest in development and rehabilitation. In order to further the goals of desegregation and creating fair housing opportunities, federal funding for affordable housing in census tracts not designated as communities of opportunity—96 percent of the census tracts within Baltimore—was discouraged unless there was evidence of further public and private investments, including the development of market rate units.

The remedy agreed to in *Thompson v. HUD* requires the creation of an Affordable Housing Desegregation Plan by HUD. For federally funded housing developments, HUD agreed to create “9000 housing opportunities in Communities of Opportunity at a rate of 900 per year for ten years” (Proposed Remedial Order 12). Communities of Opportunity are defined as those census tracts identified as being high or very high opportunity areas as defined by John Powell in his expert testimony (Proposed Remedial Order 1, Written Direct Testimony of John Powell). The remedy includes “discourag[ing] the investment of federal resources for rental housing construction and rehabilitation in minority or poverty impacted areas, unless the project is part of

a coordinated, market-driven revitalization undertaking” (Proposed Remedial Order 7-8). Such developments also require “public and private investments...in schools, market rate housing, and non-housing neighborhood improvements,” “[m]eaningful opportunities for educational and economic advancement,” and “[d]evelopment of market rate units in the same census tract where the proposed development will be located has occurred on such a scale that the market rate units will significantly reduce the poverty rate in the area” (Proposed Remedial Order 8). It additionally prohibits HUD from awarding grant money for development “unless at least half of the...funds requested...are used to develop public or assisted housing communities in Communities of Opportunity” (Proposed Remedial Order 11). The remedy also prohibits HUD from approving any demolishing or redevelopment of public and assisted housing without one-for-one replacement but only in Communities of Opportunity (Proposed Remedial Order 11).

In the written testimony of John A. Powell, his use of spatial analysis to create a suggested remedy focuses on delineating low-income Black communities as “low opportunity” as compared to white neighborhoods (which are interchangeably defined as “integrated neighborhoods”) which are “high opportunity” (Written Direct Testimony of John Powell). Powell thus sites opportunity within the built environment—it lives in some places and not others—and suggests that low-income Black Baltimore residents should be moved from their low opportunity communities to high opportunity ones in the suburbs.

By defining communities by their presence of opportunity, Powell erases the systems that have created disparate opportunities for Blacks, making the built environment a repository for centuries of discrimination. By focusing only on the symptoms of oppression made visible in the

built environment and easily measured by academics, powell removes from the necessary remedial acts addressing the enduring systems of racial inequality. Instead, the remedy to a wide range of discriminatory acts, reduced by the court to simply segregation, is a woefully simplistic and mechanically implemented desegregation process. Powell rightly notes the harmful effects of segregation, but falsely relies on the correlational presence of different variables of his Opportunity Index to attribute casual benefits in removing low-income Blacks from low-opportunity to high-opportunity areas. He argues that by simply moving low-income Blacks from low-opportunity areas to high-opportunity areas, they will have access to more opportunity and therefore have better lives (Written Direct Testimony of john powell). There is, however, no examination on what the impact is on the people left behind in those low-opportunity areas.

Another program, Section 8, has both been in high demand and highly mismanaged. From 1992 to 2007, Section 8 vouchers increased 49 percent, to over 11,000 (Jacobson 2007). Presently, Section 8 vouchers are in high demand in Baltimore. At the end of October 2014, a nine-day online only sign-up period for the Section 8 waitlist opened up and nearly 74,000 people applied. Because of such high demand, HABC is presently conducting a lottery where only 25,000 of the 74,000 applicants will actually end up on the waitlist for Section 8. Of the 25,000 people on the list only 6,000 to 9,000 applicants over the next five years will actually receive a voucher and be housed through the program (Wenger 2014).

The federal government has been highly critical of how HABC has managed their Section 8 funds. Between 1998 and 2002, the federal government reclaim \$117 million in unspent money and in 2001 called HABC “barely functional” (Jacobson 29, 2007). The federal government also

found that HABC overpaid some landlords, while not paying others at all. In 2004, the federal government found that Baltimore had over 4,000 unused vouchers available and a waiting list of more than 15,000 applicants (Jacobson 2007).

Baltimore is also participating in the federal government's most recent program, Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD). Baltimore will convert 4,583 units (43 percent of its total public housing stock) from public ownership to Section 8 housing subsidy. By selling its housing stock to private developers, HABC will get a minimum 20 percent of developer's fee, while developers will get to take advantage of low-income tax credits. On the list for conversion include some of the HOPE VI projects built in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Reutter 2014). Some are concerned that RAD will further reduce the number of public housing units in the city. There are currently about 10,500 units (Reutter 2014).

D. Concentrated Poverty

Danziger and Gottschalk (1987) define concentrated poverty as neighborhoods in which more than 40% of the population lives below the federal poverty line. Goetz (2003) also observes that concentrated poverty has been determined by measuring behavioral patterns like drug use, violent crime, higher dropout rates, and out-of-wedlock childbirth, and low labor force participation. Concentrated poverty is observed in terms of neighborhood effects on individuals and community-scale impacts (Goetz 2003). Ellen and Turner (1997) identify the six ways concentrated poverty creates neighborhood effects on individuals: (1) difference in quality of neighborhood services, (2) socialization of young people by adults, (3) peer influence, (4) social networks, (5) exposure to crime and violence, and (6) physical distance from employment and

education opportunities. Goetz (2003) examines the spatial concentration of public and assisted housing and finds a concentration of units in central cities, a concentration by racial make-up of neighborhoods (“[n]ationally, 37% of public housing is located in neighborhoods that are more than 80% minority, compared with only 21% that are low-minority neighborhoods” (36)), concentration by neighborhood income (“[d]espite the strong patterns of concentration by race, the evidence all indicates that subsidized housing is even more highly concentrated by income. Nationally, 53.6% of public housing is located in census tracts in which more than 30% of the population is below the federal poverty level, while only 7.5% is located in low-poverty neighborhoods” (36-37)), concentration by neighborhood housing stock characteristics, and segregation within public and subsidized housing. Goetz (2003) also discusses the effects of concentrated public housing finding both direct and indirect effects that concentrated public housing does result in socioeconomic changes in neighborhoods. Goetz, however, also notes that there is not universal support for the causal link between the siting of public housing and the subsequent concentration of poverty.

In a discussion of the limits of dispersing poverty by dispersing subsidized housing, Goetz (2003) finds several reasons why mobility programs like Gautreaux and MTO will not have a large impact on concentrated poverty. Goetz argues that reasons include the limits of tenant-based assistance, creaming, scale, the limits of unit-based dispersal approaches, the limits of involuntary dispersal, political limitations, and the communities left behind. Among the political limitations noted by Goetz, he emphasizes the discussion by some scholars that “[f]orced dispersal program, furthermore, ‘imply a view of valid community as white over Black and solidifies an already entrenched racial hierarchy’ (Rubinowitz 1992; Tein 1992)” (248). He

further notes that in the context of historical programs like the Urban Renewal Program and neighborhood clearance for highway construction, “deconcentration is simply part of a history of forced migrations for people of color and the poor, and represents a coercive use of state authority not imposed on other populations” (248-49).

Goetz also discusses the communities left behind, distinguishing between HOPE VI programs and other programs by noting that only HOPE VI seeks to improve the conditions in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. He also notes that HOPE VI, unlike some of the other programs is involuntary. Goetz argues that voluntary programs like MTO will actually leave the neighborhood worse off because “[d]ispersal in all likelihood intensifies the concentration of disadvantage in the communities left behind...[and] intensify the individual and community-level problems associated with concentrated poverty” (249). Goetz notes that HOPE VI has been shown to improve the micro-neighborhoods surrounding the site, but also cautions that “if the program is too successful at generating positive spillover benefits, it may result in neighborhood gentrification, displacement, and transformation. Successful dispersal policy, as distinguished from gentrification policy, must strike a balance between a scale of change so small that it fails to generate reductions on social pathologies on the one hand, and so large that it results in total gentrification and dislocation of the poor, on the other” (250).

Goetz (2003) critiques of concentrated poverty includes the belief that it rarely deals with actual causes, but instead symptoms of concentrated poverty that ultimately leads to a conclusion that “[t]here are simply too many poor people,” (251) which he states then leads some policy makers from the idea “that too many poor people are a problem for their neighborhoods to concluding

that the poor themselves are a problem” (251). He argues that deconcentration has also been used to justify and encourage activists and other local governments away from community developments that focus on the housing stock and residents of poor neighborhoods.

Steinburg (2010) argues that the theory of concentrated poverty is deeply flawed, “namely, that concentrated poverty can be severed from its root causes and projected as the focal point of social policy” (219). He also asserts that policy makers and academics emphasizing the concentrated poverty theory have “fallen in...[a] trap...positing that reified ‘city’ or aspects of urban ecology as the cause of ‘urban ills,’ rather than a political economy that engenders deep and persistent inequalities” (219). He cautions individuals to “be savvy about the political uses of the theory of concentrated poverty, which is invoked wherever the poor occupy valuable real estate that is coveted by developers, and which is part of the neoliberal agenda of reclaiming urban space that was earlier relinquished to the nation’s racial and class pariahs” (222).

Diamond (2012) argues that there are three major conceptual problems with deconstruction. The first is that it breaks up existing communities without any consultations of the people residing within the neighborhood. The second is that it emphasizes economic integration without addressing the underlying economic and social structural issues. Finally, he argues that it is structured to serve the interests of businesses and middle income white homebuyers.

E. Critiques of the Federal Housing Program

Ladd and Ludwig’s (1997) preliminary analysis of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program in Baltimore found that MTO’s restriction on Section 8 vouchers only being used in census tracts

with low poverty rates meant that the educational opportunities offered at schools in those census tracts were better compared to schools located in Baltimore.

A critique by the National Housing Law Project (2002) of the national HOPE VI program focused on the imprecise use of “severely distressed” public housing as the threshold for intervention. It also noted that the program was reducing the overall supply of public housing at a time when demand for affordable housing was not being met. The study was also critical of the lack of meaningful participation available for current public housing residents throughout the development process. Finally, the study was critical of the number of public housing residents who ended up in HOPE VI units, finding that overall less than 12 percent of residents got to return to the public housing site after it was rebuilt as a HOPE VI project. Nearly half (49 percent) were transferred to other public housing sites and many residents were “lost” and stopped receiving housing assistance altogether.

Castells (2010) used a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate whether there had been any positive spillover effects on the property values of housing surrounding three of Baltimore’s HOPE VI developments. The author found only one site (Broadway Overlook) that showed any convincing evidence of positive spillover effects. The author noted that Broadway Overlook was integrated into the surrounding neighborhood and had a more diverse mix of mixed-income and mixed-tenure units than the other sites. Broadway Overlook was also located in a neighborhood that was “less distressed and more stable” than the other sites (84).

Bair and Fitzgerald (2005) found that proximity to HOPE VI development increased the property value of surrounding homes. Zielenbach (2003) did a study on economic change in HOPE VI neighborhoods and looked at 8 HOPE VI developments across the country. He found that HOPE VI neighborhoods in the early 1990s were worse off than other high-poverty communities in terms of poverty level, education level, housing market, and crime rates. A decade later, HOPE VI neighborhoods were doing better in absolute and relative terms.

A public policy class at the Johns Hopkins University conducted a preliminary study of HOPE VI developments in 2002. They examined spillover effects on the physical environment, economic activity, social environment, school quality, crime, and image. Because only two of the sites were fully constructed, they were only able to make preliminary evaluations from the data they had. For one site (Pleasant View Gardens), there was some evidence of new investment in the area, while the other (The Townes at the Terraces) there was an increase in the median income and median sales prices of residential property in the area.

A study on the Gautreaux Housing Program found that on average placement neighborhood were whiter, had fewer incidents of crime, and were more affluent than the communities of origin. Fifteen years later, Gautreaux participants were generally living in areas as affluent as their placement neighborhoods, experienced slightly more crime, and were living in neighborhoods that were more diverse than their placement neighborhoods. The study concluded that the Gautreaux program had a long-term impact on the neighborhood quality of the participants (Keels et al. 2005).

Crump (2002) critiques the current discussion of urban poverty because it focuses on the social pathology of the poor, that is then magnified by the spatial concentration of poverty. He believes that “such ideas are based on a conceptually inadequate view of urban space which leads to simplistic spatial solutions to what are complex social and spatial problems” (582). He critiques the use of “concentrated poverty” as a means for academics and policymakers to operate within an ahistorical and deracialized framework that allows for them to cast their responsibility for creating the situation aside, while allowing for the poor to be demonized. He also worries that by using simplified spatial metaphors for a complex, multifaceted problem, there has been theoretical slippage.

Chapple and Goetz (2011) further critique the focus on what they call “spatial justice.” They argue that the emphasis on equality of opportunity alone means that non-economic qualities are ignored and the full needs of the population being moved are not met. Chapple and Goetz talk about the dispersal policy of the federal housing program, which has been implemented through Gautreaux, Moving to Opportunity, and the HOPE VI program. They state that no research has shown a significant positive effect on economic opportunity for participants, nor has relocation built social capital. However, research has shown participants have an increased sense of safety. They argue that the focus on spatial solutions is flawed because it does not acknowledge the benefits of living within urban areas, while also distracting from the real problem: the “lack of federal initiatives and funding to address issues of poverty, inequality, and insecurity” (471).

F. Community Economic Development

Boothroyd and Davis (1993) identify three approaches to community economic development. The first focuses on growth promotion through growth in jobs, income, or business activity. In this approach, businesses work with community institutions to become more effective in order to attract more investment and to be more competitive in larger markets. The second focuses on structural change. Rather than focusing on growth, there is a focus on improving the quality of the economy. The third focuses on communalization by attempting to address how wealth is used and distributed in order to strengthen community.

Working within a community economic development framework is important because, as Shaffer, Deller, and Marcouiller (2006) point out, historically community development and economic development have been engaged in separately (60). Shaffer, Deller, and Marcouiller (2006) define community economic development as “when people in a community analyze the economic conditions of that community, determine its economic needs and unfulfilled opportunities, decide what can and should be done to improve the economic conditions in that community, and then move to achieve agreed-upon economic goals and objectives” (61). Unlike Boothroyd and Davis (1993), Shaffer, Deller, and Marcouiller (2006) believe that successful community economic development must equally engage the economic and noneconomic forces, rather than emphasizing one approach. They create the star of community economic development, with space being the body of the star and 5 nodes consisting of markets, decision making, resources, society/culture, and rules/institutions making up the 5 points of the star (Shaffer, Deller, and Marcouiller 2006). Those 5 nodes consist of economic and noneconomic forces that the authors believe must be addressed together in order to effectively engage in community economic development (Shaffer, Deller, and Marcouiller 2006).

In discussing community economic development, Troutt (2000) argues that the assumptions made in Tiebart's model of local government do not accurately capture the experiences of those individuals living within inner city ghettos, which he calls antimarkets. Unlike middle-class suburbs, these antimarkets are intentionally unstable, and encompass the multiple ways its residents are marginalized. He asserts that residents "simply seek economic survival, rather than economic stability" (430). Further, he argues the siting of undesirable land uses within the city, among other actions, have allowed for the creation of these middle-class communities far away from the negative externalities of the city. In order to effectively address this system through community economic development it must eradicate the "discriminatory barriers to social and economic stability on the one hand and facilitat[e] community economic growth and planning on the other" (433).

Cummings (2001) critiques the community economic development model, arguing that it fails on several fronts, including poverty alleviation, coordinated political responses to systemic economic disadvantage, structural reform, and broad-based racial and ethnic coalitions. He is also critical of market-based community economic development work as an ill-fitting tool for antipoverty advocacy because it "fail[s] to address larger economic and political forces" (407). He envisions community economic development work as engaging legal advocacy and grassroots organizing together to create broad-based and racially integrated coalitions seeking justice and reform for workers.

G. Gentrification and Reinvestment

Hackworth (2002) argues that there can be two different definitions of gentrification, the classic definition focusing on direct displacement of the working class, while he asserts that gentrification as “the production of urban space for progressively more affluent users” better captures the changes in occupation of residential and non-residential spaces alike, as well as acknowledges that displacement is often not immediate (815, 839).

Increasing federal and local government involvement have also expanded the presence of gentrification. Local government, because of its reliance on tax revenue, seeks to increase property value through gentrification. Local governments have also encouraged gentrification through in-fill redevelopment of public housing developments, rent-controlled apartments, and SROs (Hackworth 2002).

Reinvestment can be measured through building alterations, renovations, and new construction, while disinvestment can be measured in demolitions. Gains or losses in rent and income correspond closely to whether the area overall saw reinvestment or disinvestment. Other measures of disinvestment are vacancy and tax delinquency, as determined through tax-arrears data. Reinvestment can be measured through various kinds of expenditures including new construction, housing alterations, and sales data, including sales prices and volumes. High levels of exchanges (determined by multiplying aggregate sales volume by average sales price) generally show high levels of investment (Hackworth 2001).

Wyly and Hammel (2004) found intensified discrimination and exclusion in gentrified neighborhoods in a study of 23 large cities in the 1990s. They found that applicants for single-

family loans were disproportionately high-income, single white males and minority homebuyers in neighborhoods that were gentrified were more likely to be denied a loan. In Baltimore, Black residents were 2.33 times more likely to be excluded than an identically qualified white applicant, Hispanic applicants were 1.37 times more likely to be denied, and Asian applicants were 2.36 times more likely to be denied.

H. Neighborhood Quality

Can (1990), Greenberg (1999), and Kain and Quigley (1970) have found that high or stable property values, low rates of out-migration of residents, high household incomes, racial cohesion, and high-quality public service can typically be found in “high quality” neighborhoods. Ding and Knaap (2003) found that property values increase through investment in new housing, but decrease when the number of business establishments increase. Ding and Knaap (2002) find that it is unclear what the relationship between government housing programs and neighborhood quality is, but they argue that since they found that property values increase through investment in new housing, any investment, including governmental programs for affordable or subsidized housing would increase property values.

IV. Research Question and Methodology

My research question is: Are the neighborhood characteristics for the sites selected for RAD intervention different from the sites not selected for intervention?

I will answer this question by comparing the 21 public housing sites selected for RAD with the remaining 24 public housing sites that will continue to be owned by HABC. I used two data

sources: *Vital Signs 12*, a report from the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute (BNIA-JFI) and the City of Baltimore. For more than a decade, the BNIA-JFI has been releasing their *Vital Signs* reports, which uses various indicators to measure quality of life within Baltimore neighborhoods. I examined data released in the *Vital Signs 12* report, which measures over 150 indicators for each of Baltimore 55 Community Statistical Areas (CSAs). BNIA-JFI groups its indicators into eight categories: Census Demographics, Housing and Community Development, Crime and Safety, Education and Youth, Children and Family Health, Arts and Culture, Workforce and Economic Development, and Sustainability. CSAs are the geographic level at which BNIA-JFI provides its data. CSAs are “clusters of Census Tracts that correspond to Baltimore’s neighborhood boundaries” (BNIA-JFI, 6). I also examined the placement of blue light cameras, arrest data, and crime report data released by the Baltimore Police Department for the years 2013 and 2014.

A. BNIA-JFI Data

I used CSA and water shapefiles from OpenBaltimore. I got Baltimore public housing data, including XY data and total number of units, from the National Housing Preservation Database. I used that list to match with the list created by HABC of the properties selected to be sold through the RAD program. I used XY data to plot Phase 1 and Phase 2 RAD housing and used the remaining properties identified as being owned by HABC as the comparison sites. I did not include any public housing scattered sites, which are single rowhouses maintained by the City as public housing units. Using the CSA shapefile, I then joined the BNIA-JFI data from a spreadsheet to the CSA shapefile and then also ran a spatial join for the RAD site points and the comparison site points. The spatial join allowed me to link the BNIA-JFI data to the RAD and

comparison site points of each CSA that fell within its boundaries. I then exported the joined data and used SPSS to conduct an analysis of the data. I also added all of the data associated with each CSA in order to allow for a comparison between RAD sites, comparison sites, and the city in general. Within SPSS, I created 2 new variables. One identified each site as a RAD site, a comparison site, or a general CSA and the other differentiated between all of the sites (RAD and comparison) and the general CSAs. For each variable I conducted a frequency analysis. I also ran an independent-sample t-test to see if there was an overall statistically significant difference in the variables between the two groups of sites. After examining about 20 different indicators and finding very little statistically significant difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites through t-tests (see discussion of findings below), I went back and analyzed all 150 variables to see if I had missed any key differences. I found four additional variables that did have statistically significant differences, but not in the most recent year.

B. Blue Light Cameras

Baltimore has over 600 blue light cameras scattered throughout the city. Blue light cameras are closed circuit cameras monitored continuously by the Baltimore Police Department. They are called blue light cameras because of the blue light that is typically mounted above the camera. The locations of the blue light cameras were provided by the Baltimore Police Department using XY data. I used the XY data to map the location of the cameras. To count the number of blue light cameras within each CSA, I used a spatial join. The spatial join linked the physical location of each camera to the CSA that it was located and counted the total number of cameras per CSA. I exported that count to SPSS to do an analysis of the data, similar to the analysis of the data for the BNIA-JFI variables.

Blue light cameras have a range of about 200 feet, but a study by the DOJ and the Urban Institute (La Vigne, 2011) showed that the cameras had a statistically significant effect on crime at both 500 feet and 1000 feet. To see if there was a difference in the number of sites that were within a distance of the camera that might impact behavior, I created a buffer of 500 feet. Using the buffer I then did a spatial join between the RAD sites and the comparison sites in order to do a count. The spatial join allowed me to count the number of RAD sites and comparison sites that fell within the 500-foot buffer by determining whether the physical location of each site fell within the buffer area.

C. Crime and Arrest Data

Using data provided by the Baltimore Police Department, I examined all incidents of crime as well as arrests in Baltimore in 2013 and 2014. Because there were over 65,000 incidents of crime in 2013 and 2014, I decided to map property crime and violent crime separately. Within property crimes, I included arson, auto theft, burglary, and larceny. Within violent crimes, I included assault, homicide, rape, robbery, and shooting. I plotted the data in GIS using the XY coordinates. There were 262 incidents of crime that had no XY data. There were almost 58,000 arrests in 2013 and 2014, of those arrests 4,944 had no XY data. I then did a spatial join between the crime and arrest data and the CSA shapefiles. After doing the count, I joined an excel sheet with CSA name and population data in order to normalize the data per 1000 residents. I classified the data using quantiles.

I also did a hot spot analysis for property crimes, violent crimes, and arrests. Hot spot analysis is used to determine whether clusters of data are significant. For crime data, hot spots, or the red areas, are places where the concentration of crime is statistically significant. Cold spots, or blue areas, are places where the lack of crime is statistically significant. I did a spatial join between the data and a fishnet I had created. The grid cell size of the fishnet was 516x516, which I got by creating a minimum bounding rectangle around the city and dividing the shorter side by 100. I then ran the Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord G^*). For the Conceptualization of Spatial Relationships I used Fixed Distance Band and for the Distance Method I used Euclidean Distance. For the Distance Band I used 730 ($\text{SQRT}((516*516)+(516*516))= 729.7$, which I rounded up to 730). I used the Z-score values to determine the class values for visualization, where 90% significant ≥ 1.645 , 95% significant ≥ 1.960 , 99% significant ≥ 2.576 , and 99.9% significant ≥ 3.291 and 99.99% significant ≥ 6.16 .

V. Findings

A. Comparing RAD Sites with Comparison Sites Using BNIA-JFI Indicators

This section will first discuss the results broadly and then discuss in some detail each variable, comparing RAD sites with the comparison sites, and, when relevant, comparing to the city overall.

1. Generally

Table 1. RAD Sites

Property Name	Total Units	CSA
ALLENDALE	164	Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton
ARBOR OAKS APARTMENTS	212	Chinquapin Park/Belvedere

BEL PARK TOWERS	274	Pimlico/Arlington/Hilltop
BERNARD E MASON APARTMENTS	223	Dickeyville/Franklinton
CHASE HOUSE	189	Midtown
ELLERSLIE APARTMENTS	125	Greater Govans
GOVANS MANOR	199	Greater Govans
HERITAGE CROSSING	75	Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market
HOLLINS HOUSE	130	Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market
LAKEVIEW TOWERS	305	Penn North/Reservoir Hill
MCCULLOH HOMES EXT	394	Upton/Druid Heights
MONUMENT EAST	187	Oldtown/Middle East
PLEASANT VIEW GARDENS	311	Oldtown/Middle East
PRIMROSE PLACE	125	Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton
ROSEMONT	203	Greater Rosemont
SOMERSET COURT EXT	60	Oldtown/Middle East
TERRACE SENIOR BUILDING	88	Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market
THE BRENTWOOD	150	Greater Charles Village/Barclay
TOWNES AT THE TERRACES	203	Downtown/Seton Hill
WEST TWENTY	357	Greater Charles Village/Barclay
WYMAN HOUSE	168	Greater Charles Village/Barclay

There are twenty-one RAD sites, ranging in size from 60 units to 394 units. The average number of units is 197. While there are fifty-five CSAs, RAD sites exist in only thirteen:

Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton, Chinquapin Park/Belvedere, Dickeyville/Franklinton, Downtown/Seton Hill, Greater Charles Village/Barclay, Greater Govans, Greater Rosemont, Midtown, Oldtown/Middle East, Penn North/Reservoir Hill, Pimlico/Arlington/Hilltop, Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market, and Upton/Druid Heights.

Table 2. Comparison Sites

Property Name	Total Units	CSA
ALBEMARLE SQUARE - PHASE 3	130	Harbor East/Little Italy
BARCLAY PHASE 1	53	Midway/Coldstream
BROOKLYN HOMES	500	Brooklyn/Curtis Bay/Hawkins Point
CHERRY HILL HOMES	1281	Cherry Hill
DOUGLASS HOMES	393	Oldtown/Middle East

GILMOR HOMES	587	Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park
HILLSIDE PARK	30	Beechfield/Ten Hills/West Hills
HOMES FOR ARUNDEL	51	Midtown
LATROBE HOMES	701	Oldtown/Middle East
MCCULLOH HOMES EXT	556	Upton/Druid Heights
MIDTOWN APARTMENTS	35	Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park
MONASTERY GARDENS	12	Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton
MONTPELIER	13	The Waverlies
O`DONNELL HEIGHTS	304	Southeastern
PERKINS HOMES	688	Harbor East/Little Italy
POE HOMES	298	Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market
RESERVOIR HILL	40	Penn North/Reservoir Hill
ROSEMONT / DUKELAND	136	Greater Rosemont
SHARP LEADENHALL	23	Inner Harbor/Federal Hill
ST AMBROSE	30	Cedonia/Frankford
STRICKER STREET	25	Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park
UPTOWN APARTMENTS	37	Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park
WEST HILLS SQUARE	12	Beechfield/Ten Hills/West Hills
WESTPORT HOMES	340	Westport/Mount Winans/Lakeland

There are twenty-four comparison sites, ranging from 12 units to 1281 units. The average number of units is 261. The comparison sites can be found in eighteen CSAs:

Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton, Beachfield/Ten Hills/West Hills, Brooklyn/Curtis Bay/Hawkins Point, Cedonia/Frankford, Cherry Hill, Great Rosemont, Harbor East/Little Italy, Inner Harbor/Federal Hill, Midtown, Midway/Coldstream, Oldtown/Middle East, Penn North/Reservoir Hill, Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market, Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park, Southeastern, The Waverlies, Upton/Druid Heights, and Westpoint/Mount Winans/Lakeland.

There are seven CSAs where there are both RAD sites and comparison sites:


Allendale/Irvington/S. Hilton, Greater Rosemont, Midtown, Oldtown/Middle East, Penn North/Reservoir Hill, Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market, and Upton/Druid Heights.

Figure 1. 2014 Community Statistical Areas




Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute

Figure 2. RAD Sites



Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute

Figure 3. Comparison Sites



Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute

There are thirty-one CSAs that contain neither RAD sites nor comparison sites. They include Fells Point, Highlandtown, Washington Village/Pigtown, Belair-Edison, Lauraville, and Greater Roland Park/Poplar Hill.

2. Census Demographics: Percent of Residents — Black/African American (Non-Hispanic)


For RAD sites, the average Black population in 2010 was 75.2% and the median was 88.2%. The lowest percentage was 32% and the highest was 97%. Almost a quarter of sites (5 out of 21; Chase Homes, The Brentwood, Wyman House, West Twenty, and the Townes at the Terraces) were located in areas where the population was less than 40% Black. Every other site except for Arbor Oaks Apartment (69% Black) was in a CSA that was over 80% Black.

For the comparison sites, the average Black population was 75.3% and the median was 85.5%. The lowest percentage of Blacks was 11.5% and the highest was 96.6%. One-sixth of the sites (4 out of 24; Sharp Leadenhall, O'Donnell Heights, Homes for Arundel, and Brooklyn Homes) are in CSAs with a Black population of less than 40%. Nearly 30% of the sites are in a CSA with a Black population of between 40% and 60% and slightly more than half (55%) of the sites are in CSAs with a Black population of more than 80%.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent Black population in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percentage of Black people in RAD sites ($M=75.2\%$, $SD=23.9$) and comparison sites ($M=75.3\%$, $SD=25.5$); $t(43)=-$

CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 4. Percent of Residents -- Black/African-American in 2010



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; 2010 U.S. Census

.017, $p = .987$. These results suggest that in terms of percentage of Black population, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites.

Overall in Baltimore, the Black population is 63.8%, lower than the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. This points to the narrative of the enduring nature of segregation in Baltimore that is discussed above, where the historical siting of public housing to conform with the color line continues to impact the racial makeup of communities in the present day.

3. Census Demographics: Racial Diversity Index


BNIA-JFI defines their Racial Diversity Index (RDI) as “the percent chance that two people picked at random within an area will be of a different race/ethnicity...[t]he higher the value, the more racially and ethnically diverse an area” (BNIA-JFI, 15). It uses data from the 2010 census.

For RAD sites, the average RDI score was 33.3 and the median was 22.9. The lowest RDI score was 7.6 and the highest was 68.8. Almost a third of the sites (6 out of 21, Rosemont, Bel Park Towers, McCullough Homes, Eilerslie Apartments, and Govans Manor) had an RDI of less than 20, almost half (47.6%) had an RDI score of between 20 and 50, and almost a quarter (23.8%, Chase Homes, The Brentwood, Wyman House, West Twenty, and Townes at the Terraces) had RDI scores above 50. The Brentwood, Wyman House, and West Twenty are all also located within the same CSA—Greater Charles Village/Barclay.

For the comparison sites, the average RDI was slightly lower compared to RAD sites at 31.6 and a slightly higher median compared to RAD sites of 26.9%. The lowest RDI score was 7.3% and

CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 5. Racial Diversity Index



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; 2010 U.S. Census

the highest was 73.4. One-quarter of the sites (Stricker Street, Midtown Apartment, Uptown Apartment, Gilmor Homes, Rosemont/Dukeland, and Barclay) have RDI scores of less than 10, with 4 sites in the same CSA, Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park. More than a third (37.5%) of the sites have a RDI score of less than 20, another 37.5% have RDI scores of between 20 and 40. One-quarter of the sites (Perkins Homes, Homes for Arundel, Westport Homes, Brooklyn Homes, and O'Donnell Heights) have RDI scores of more than 60.


An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the RDI in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in RDI in RAD sites ($M=33.3\%$, $SD=20.9$) and comparison sites ($M=31.6\%$, $SD=22.2$); $t(43)=-.261$, $p = .796$. These results suggest that in terms of racial diversity, there is no significant difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall in Baltimore, the RDI scores is 54.5%, higher than the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. This indicates that public housing residents overall live in more segregated, less racially diverse areas of the city compared to other residents.

4. Census Demographics: Percent of Population 0-5 years old

For RAD sites, the average percent of the population that was 0-5 years old in 2010 was 6.4% and the median was 7.2%. The lowest percent of 0-5 years old was 2.4% and the maximum was 9.2%. Nearly a quarter of the sites (5/21; Chase House, The Brentwood, Wyman House, West Twenty, and Townes at the Terraces) had less than 5% of its population under the age of 5. Slightly less than half of the sites (10 out of 21) had between 6% and 7.5% of its population under 5. Almost 30% of the sites (6 out of 21) had between 7.8% and 9.2% of its population under the age of 5. Half of those sites were located in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA.

CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 6. Percent of Population, 0-5 years old



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; 2010 U.S. Census

For comparison sites, the average percent of the population that was 0-5 years old was higher than the RAD sites at 7.5% and the median was also higher than RAD sites at 7.5%. The lowest percent of 0-5 years old was 2.4% and the highest was 11.4%. Two sites (8.3%) had less than 5% of its population under the age of 5. Half of the sites had between 6% and 7.5% of its population under the age of 5. Almost 42% of the sites had more than 7.5% of its population under the age of 5. Brooklyn Homes and Cherry Hill Homes were both in CSAs where more than 10% of its population was under the age of 5.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of the population between the ages of 0 and 5 in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percentage of children between the ages of 0 and 5 in RAD sites ($M=6.4\%$, $SD=2$) and comparison sites ($M=7.5\%$, $SD=1.7$); $t(43)=-1.94$, $p = .059$. While the results are not statistically significant, the comparison sites have a slightly higher average population of youth under the age of 5. Overall, the percent of the population between the ages of 0 and 5 in Baltimore is 6.6%, nearly identical to the RAD sites average, but lower than the comparison sites average by nearly a percentage point. The comparison sites are located in CSAs that seem to attract more families with very young children than RAD sites and the city on average.

5. Census Demographics: Percent of Households Living Below the Poverty Line

For RAD sites, the average percentage of households living below the poverty line in 2012 was 28.7% and the median was 22.6%. The lowest percent of households living below the poverty line was 9.4% and the highest was 49.5%. Nearly 10% of the sites are in areas with a very low


percent (less than 10%) of households living below the poverty line. 43% of the sites are in CSAs where less than 20% of the households are living below the poverty line. One-third of the sites (Heritage Crossing, Terrace Senior Building, Hollins House, Somerset Court, Monument East, Pleasant View Gardens, and McCullough Homes) are in areas with the highest percent of households living below the poverty line (45-50%). Three sites (Heritage Crossing, Terrace Senior Building, and Hollins House) are located in the Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market CSA and three sites (Somerset Court, Monument East, and Pleasant View Gardens) are in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA).

For the comparison sites, the average percent of households living below the poverty line was slightly higher than the RAD sites at 29.4% and a higher median compared to RAD sites at 27.6%. The lowest percent of households living below the poverty line was slightly lower than RAD sites at 8.29% and the highest was equal to the highest for RAD sites at 49.5%. One-eighth of the sites (West Hills Square, Hillside Park, and Homes for Arundel) were in CSAs where less than 10% of the population was living below the poverty line. One-third of the sites were 20% or less below the poverty line, lower than the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. Almost 60% (58.33%) of the sites were in CSAs that had a rate of between 20 and 45% of the households living below the poverty line. 4 sites, or one-sixth of the sites (Poe Homes, Latrobe Homes, Douglass Homes, and McCullough Homes) are located in CSAs where between 45-50% of the households are living below the poverty line.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of households living below the poverty line in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the

CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 7. Percent of Households Living Below the Poverty Line



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; 2010 U.S. Census

the percent of households living below the poverty line in RAD sites ($M=28.7\%$, $SD=14.6$) and comparison sites ($M=29.4\%$, $SD=13.4$); $t(43)=-.173$, $p = .863$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of households living below the poverty line, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall in Baltimore, 18.8% of the households are living below the poverty line. While there is no statistically significant difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites, there is a difference between CSAs where public housing is sited and the city in general. As mentioned in the examination of other variables and in the literature review, this difference is part the indelible nature of Baltimore's history of segregation, one that is still clearly seen in the present day.


6. Census Demographics: Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line

For RAD sites, the average percent of children living below the poverty line in 2012 was 45.6% and the median was 40%. The lowest percent of children living below the poverty line was 13% and the highest was 71.9%. Almost 10% (9.5% or 2 out of 21 sites, Arbor Oaks and Chase House) were in CSAs with less than 20% of the children living below the poverty line. Almost half (10 sites) had between 25% and 50% of its children living below the poverty line, and about 29% (6 sites) had more than 70% of its children living below the poverty line. All six sites were located in either Oldtown/Middle East CSA or Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market CSA.

For the comparison sites, the average percent of children living below the poverty line was virtually identical (45.8%) to the percent of children living below the poverty line in RAD sites (45.6%). The lowest percent of children living below the poverty line was 15.1% and the highest was 71.9%. One-sixth of the sites (4 out of 24, West Hill Squares, Hillside Park, Homes for

CENSUS DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 8. Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; 2010 U.S. Census

Arundel, and Sharp Leadenhall) that are in CSAs where less than 20% of the children live below the poverty line. More than a third (37.5%, 9 sites) have between 25 and 50% of its children living below the poverty line. More than one-fifth (20.8%, 5 out of 24 sites, Douglass Homes, Latrobe Homes, Albemarle Square, Perkins Homes, and Poe Homes) are in CSAs where more than 70% of its children live below the poverty line. One-sixth of those sites are located in either Oldtown/Middle East CSA or Harbor East/Little Italy CSA.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of children living below the poverty line in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the the percent of children living below the poverty line in RAD sites ($M=45.6\%$, $SD=19.9$) and comparison sites ($M=45.8\%$, $SD=18.8$); $t(43)=-.031$, $p = .975$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of children living below the poverty line, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. However, for the city of Baltimore overall 33.4% of its children are living below the poverty line, lower than the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. Again, there is a difference in the concentration of poverty in the CSAs where public housing is also concentrated compared to the city overall. In this case, in the city overall there are far fewer children living in poverty than in CSAs where there is public housing.


7. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage

Foreclosure

For RAD sites, the average percentage of properties under mortgage foreclosure in 2012 was 1.6% and the median was 1.5%. The lowest percentage is .3% and the highest is 3.47%. There is

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 9. Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Baltimore City Circuit Court

one site (Bernard Mason Apartment) with a foreclosure rate of less than 1% (.3%). There is one site (Townes at the Terrace) with a foreclosure rate of more than 2% (3.4%).

For the comparison sites, the average percentage of properties under mortgage foreclosure was slightly lower at 1.4% and a median of 1.4%. The lowest is .61% and the highest is 2.4%. There are five sites, or 20.8% of sites, with a foreclosure rate of less than 1% and one site with a foreclosure rate of 2.4%.


An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of properties under mortgage foreclosure in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of properties under mortgage foreclosure in RAD sites ($M=1.6\%$, $SD=.5$) and comparison sites ($M=1.4\%$, $SD=.5$); $t(43)=1.511$, $p = .138$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of properties under mortgage foreclosure, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. The foreclosure rate for the city overall is 1.4%. While the foreclosure rate for comparison sites is virtually identical to the rate for the city overall, CSAs where there are RAD sites have been impacted slightly more by the foreclosure crisis than the city overall.

8. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned

For RAD sites the average percent of vacant and abandoned residential properties in 2012 was 14.2% and the median was 8.6%. The range is from .67% to 37.3%. Slightly more than half (11 sites out of 21) are located in areas where less than 10% of the residential properties are vacant and abandoned. Arbor Oaks is in an area where less than 1% of the properties are vacant and

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 10. Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute;
Baltimore City Department of Housing

abandoned. Almost 20% (four sites) are in areas where more than 30% of the residential properties are vacant and abandoned. Three of those properties (Somerset Court, Monument East, and Pleasant View Gardens) are in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA.

For the comparison sites, the average is 14.3%, very close to the RAD average of 14.2%. The range is between .4 and 37.3%. One-sixth of the sites have rates below 1%. Slightly more than half (13 sites out of 24) are below 10%, while almost 30% (7 sites) are in CSAs where the residential vacancy and abandonment rate is above 30%. Four of those sites are in the Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park CSA and two are in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of residential properties that are vacant and abandoned in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of residential properties that are vacant and abandoned in RAD sites ($M=14.2\%$, $SD=12.1$) and comparison sites ($M=14.4\%$, $SD=14.2$); $t(43)=-.048$, $p = .962$. These results suggest that in terms of percent residential properties that are vacant and abandoned, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. The overall rate for residential properties that are vacant and abandoned in Baltimore is 8%, lower than the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. The percent of vacant and abandoned properties is higher for CSAs where there are also public housing sites than in the city overall and is very much part of the narrative of disadvantage and differentials in investment that is framed by Baltimore's history of segregation and oppression.

9. Housing and Community Development: Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (excluding vacants)


For RAD sites, the average percent of residential properties with housing violations in 2012 was 8.8% and the median was 7.7%. The range is from 1.6% to 21.1%. Nearly 30% (6 sites) are in CSAs with less than 5% of the residential properties have housing violations. Almost a quarter (5) of the sites are in areas where more than 10% of the residential properties have housing violations and three of those sites (Heritage Crossing, Terrace Senior Building, and Hollins House) are in the Poppleton/the Terraces/Hollins Market CSA.

For the comparison sites, the average percentage of residential properties with housing violations was 7.7% and a median was 6.1%, lower than the areas with RAD sites. The minimum was .96% and the maximum was 21.1%. Slightly more than 40% (10 sites) are in CSAs where less than 5% of the residential properties have housing violations. Almost 30% (7 sites) are in areas where more than 10% of the properties have housing violations and four of those sites (Stricker Street, Midtown Apartments, Uptown Apartments, and Gilmor Homes) are located within the Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park CSA.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of residential properties with housing violations in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of residential properties with housing violations in RAD sites ($M=8.8\%$, $SD=6.4$) and comparison sites ($M=7.7\%$, $SD=6.4$); $t(43)=.574$, $p = .569$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of residential properties with housing violations, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall, Baltimore's rate of residential properties

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 11. Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute;
 Baltimore City Department of Housing

with housing violations is 4.7%, lower than both the RAD sites average and the comparison sites average. Higher rates of housing violations in CSAs with public housing could speak to a few things: an owner's inability to afford to fix whatever triggered the violation, an owner's unwillingness to fix whatever triggered the violation (eg. slumlords), or the City specifically targeting particular neighborhoods by sending out housing inspectors to find violations.


10. Housing and Community Development: Percent of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City

For RAD sites in 2011, the average percentage of vacant properties owned by Baltimore City was 29.7% and the median was 39.7%. The lowest percentage of vacant properties owned by the City was 0% and the highest was 55%. Nearly 10% of the sites were located in CSAs where there were no vacant properties owned by the City. Almost 30% of the sites were located in CSAs where less than 10% of the vacant properties were owned by the City. 43% of the sites were in CSAs where more than 40% of the vacant properties were owned by the City. Slightly less than 20% of the sites are in CSAs where more than half of the vacant properties were owned by the City.

For RAD sites in 2012, the average percentage of vacant properties owned by the City was slightly lower at 27.9% and the median was 34.9%. The lowest percentage of vacant properties owned by the City was 0% and the highest was 55.4%. Only one site (4.8% of the sites) was in a CSA where there were no vacant properties owned by the City. Increasing from 2011, 38% of the sites were located in CSAs where less than 10% of the vacant properties were owned by the City. Dropping from 2011, almost 29% of the sites were in CSAs where more than 40% of the

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 12. Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)




Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute;
Baltimore City Department of Housing

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 13. Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Baltimore City Department of Housing

vacant properties were owned by the City. Staying at the same rate as 2011, slightly less than 20% of the sites are in CSAs were more than half of the vacant properties were owned by the City.

For comparison sites in 2011, the average percentage of vacant properties owned by Baltimore City was much lower than RAD sites at 19.1% and the median was 14.8%. The lowest percentage of vacant properties owned by the City was 0% and the highest was 52.4%. Only one site was in a CSA where there were no vacant properties owned by the City, but nearly half of the sites were located in CSAs where less than 10% of the vacant properties were owned by the City. 16.6% of the sites were located in CSAs where the City owned more than 40% of the vacant properties. Less than 9% of the sites were in CSAs where the City owned more than half of the vacant properties and both of those sites were in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA.

For comparison sites in 2012, the average percentage of vacant properties owned by Baltimore City was lower than the comparison site average in 2011 and lower than the rate for RAD sites in 2012 at 18.4%. The median was 10.7%. The lowest percentage was 1.4% and the highest was 55.4%. There were no sites where there were no vacant properties owned by the City, but like in 2011 nearly half of the sites were located in CSAs where less than 10% of the vacant properties were owned by the City. Maintaining the same rate as 2011, 16.6% of the sites were located in CSAs where the City owned more than 40% of the vacant properties. Less than 9% of the sites were in CSAs where the City owned more than half of the vacant properties and both of those sites were in the Oldtown/Middle East CSA.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of vacant properties owned by the City in 2011 in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of vacant properties owned by the City in RAD sites (M=29.7%, SD=19.8) and comparison sites (M=19.1%, SD=16.7); $t(43)=1.944$, $p = .058$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of vacant properties owned by the City, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of vacant properties owned by the City in 2012 in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of vacant properties owned by the City in RAD sites (M=27.9%, SD=20.4) and comparison sites (M=18.4%, SD=17.7); $t(43)=1.663$, $p = .104$. These results suggest that in terms of percent of vacant properties owned by the City, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites.

Overall the rate of vacant properties owned by Baltimore in 2011 was 19.7% and 2012 in 18.6%. In both years the CSAs where there were RAD sites had more vacant properties owned by the City than the rate for the city overall.

11. Housing and Community Development: Affordability Index – Rent

BNIA-JFI's affordability housing index measures the "percentage of households that pay more the 30% of their total household income on rent and related expenses" in 2012 (BNIA-JFI, 45).


For RAD sites, the average percentage of renters spending more than 30% of their income on rent was 54.4% and the median was 53.5%. The minimum is 46.2% and the maximum is 66.6%. Almost 20% (4 sites) of the sites were in areas where less than half of the renters pay more than 30% of their income on rent. Over 70% (15 sites) of the sites were in areas with between 50 and 60% of the renters pay more than 30% of their income on rent. Only one site, Rosemont, was in an area where two-thirds of the residents spend more than 30% of their income on rent.

For the comparison sites, slightly more residents dedicated more than 30% of their income to rent. The average was 55.2% and the median was 57%. The minimum is 43.4% and the maximum is 75%. One-third of the sites were located in areas with less than half of the residents spent more than 30% of their income on rent. Slightly more than half (54%) of the sites were in areas where between 50 and 60% of the residents spend more than 30% of their income on rent. One-eighth (12.5%) of the sites were in areas where more than 60% of the residents spend more than 30% of their income on rent. One site, Barclay, was in an area where three-quarters of the residents spend more than 30% of their income on rent.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of renters spending more than 30% of their income on rent in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the percent of renters spending more than 30% of their income on rent in RAD sites ($M=53.5\%$, $SD=8.5$) and comparison sites ($M=55.2\%$, $SD=7.14$); $t(43)=-.860$, $p = .392$. These results suggest that in terms of renters spending more than 30% of their income on rent, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall in Baltimore 53.2% of its

HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Figure 14. Affordability Index -- Rent



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; U.S. Census

residents spend more than 30% of their income on rent, which is slightly lower than the rate for RAD sites or comparison sites.

12. Education and Youth: High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate


For RAD sites in 2012, the average high school dropout/withdrawal rate was 3.78% and the median was 3.9%. The minimum high school dropout/withdrawal rate was 0% and the highest was 6%. Almost a quarter of the sites had a dropout rate of under 3%. Over 40% of the sites were in CSAs where the dropout rate was over 4%.

For comparison sites, the average high school dropout/withdrawal rate was 4.7% and the median was 4.5%. The minimum high school dropout/withdrawal rate was 2.7% and the maximum was 9.9%. Only one site (4.2% of the sites) was in a CSA where the dropout rate was under 3%. Two-thirds of the sites were in CSAs where the dropout rate was over 4%. One-eighth of the sites were in CSAs where the dropout rate was 7% or more.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare high school dropout/withdrawal rate in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the high school dropout/withdrawal rate in RAD sites ($M=3.78\%$, $SD=1.47$) and comparison sites ($M=4.7\%$, $SD=1.63$); $t(43)=-1.987$, $p = .053$. These results suggest that in terms of the high school dropout/withdrawal rate, there was no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall, the dropout rate in Baltimore is 4.1%, which is lower than the dropout rate for the comparison sites only.

EDUCATION & YOUTH

Figure 15. High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Baltimore City Public Schools

13. Children and Family Health: Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels

For RAD sites in 2012, the average percent of children under the age of 6 with elevated blood lead levels was .25% and median was 0%. The minimum is 0% and the maximum is 5.3%. 95% of the sites (20 out of 21) are in areas with no incidence of children having elevated blood lead levels. One site, Rosemont, is in a CSA (Greater Rosemont) where 5.3% of the children have elevated blood lead levels.


For comparison sites, the average was 1.7% and the median was 0%. The minimum is 0% and the maximum is 7.4%. 75% of the sites (18 out of 24) are located in areas where there are no children with elevated blood lead levels. Of the six sites where children do have elevated blood lead levels, four of the sites are in the Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park CSA.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of children under the age of 6 with elevated blood lead levels in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was a significant difference in the percent of children under the age of 6 with elevated blood lead levels in RAD sites ($M=.25\%$, $SD=1.16$) and comparison sites ($M=1.71\%$, $SD=3.05$); $t(30.231)=-2.166$, $p = .038$. These results suggest that in terms of the percent of children under the age of 6 with elevated blood lead levels, there is a difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall the rate of children with elevated blood lead levels in Baltimore was 1.2%, which was higher than the RAD sites average, but lower than the comparison sites average.

14. Children and Family Health: Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1000 residents)

CHILDREN & FAMILY HEALTH

Figure 16. Percent of Children (0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)




Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Maryland Department of the Environment, Lead Poisoning Prevention Program

CHILDREN & FAMILY HEALTH

Figure 17. Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1000 Residents)



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute;
Johns Hopkins University, Center for Livable Future

For RAD sites the average density of fast food outlets was 2.83 per 1000 residents and the median was 2.1 outlets per 1000 residents. The minimum was .2 outlets per 1000 and the maximum was 22.5 outlets per 1000 residents. One-third of the sites are located in CSAs where there are fewer than 1 outlet per 1000 residents and there is one site, Townes at the Terraces located in the Downtown/Seton Hall CSA, where there are 22.3 outlets per 1000 residents.


For the comparison sites, the average density of fast food outlets is 1.7 outlets per 1000 residents and the median was 1 per 1000 residents. The minimum is .3 outlets per 1000 residents and the maximum is 4.2 outlets per 1000 residents. Slightly more than one-third (37.5%) of the sites are in CSAs where the density is less than 1 fast food outlet per 1000 residents. One site, Sharp Leadenhall in the Inner Harbor/Federal Hill CSA, has slightly more than 4 outlets per 1000 residents.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the density of fast food outlets per 1000 residents in RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in density of fast food outlets in RAD sites ($M=2.8$, $SD=4.6$) and comparison sites ($M=1.66$, $SD=1.16$); $t(43)=1.192$, $p = .240$. These results suggest that in terms of density of fast food outlets per 1000 residents, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. In the city overall, there are 1.4 fast food outlets per 1000 residents, which is lower than the average for both the RAD sites and the comparison sites.

15. Workforce and Economic Development: Unemployment Rate

WORKFORCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Figure 18. Unemployment Rate



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; U.S. Census

For RAD sites, the average unemployment rate was 16.55% and the median was 16.6%. The minimum is 4.9% and the maximum is 29.9%. Nearly one-quarter (23.8%) of the sites are in CSAs where the unemployment rate is less than 7%, with three of the sites (The Brentwood, Wyman House, and West Twenty) in the Greater Charles Village/Barclay CSA. One-third of the sites are CSAs where the unemployment rate is between 9 and 10%. 43% of the sites are in CSAs where the unemployment rate is above 12%.


For the comparison sites, the average unemployment rate is slightly higher at 18.3% and the median was 18.25%. The minimum unemployment rate is 6.1% and the maximum is the same for RAD sites at 29.9%. Only one-twelfth of the sites are in CSAs where the unemployment rate is below 7%. One-sixth of the sites have an unemployment rate of between 9 and 10%. Half of the sites have an unemployment rate of more than 12%.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the unemployment rate of RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference unemployment rates in RAD sites (M=16.55%, SD=6.12) and comparison sites (M=18.3%, SD=5.81); $t(43)=-.984$, $p = .331$. These results suggest that in terms of the unemployment rate, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. The overall unemployment rate for the city is 9.8%, which is significantly lower than the average unemployment rates for both the RAD sites and the comparison sites.

16. Sustainability: Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1000 Residents

SUSTAINABILITY

Figure 19. Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1000 Residents



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Baltimore CitiStat

For RAD sites in 2012, the average rate of dirty streets and alleys reports per 1000 residents was 69.3 and the median was 62.4. The lowest rate of reports per 1000 residents was 7.6 and the highest was 127.5. Less than 10% of the reports were less than 40 reports per 1000 residents. One third of the reports per 1000 residents were between 47 and 50. Nearly a quarter of the reports were more than 100 per 1000 residents.


For the comparison sites, the average rate of dirty streets and alleys reports per 1000 residents was 82.34 and the median was 54.4. The lowest rate of reports per 1000 residents was 7.2 and the highest was 205.5. One third of the reports were less than 40 reports per 1000 residents. One-sixth of the reports were between 47 and 50 reports per 1000 residents. One-third of the reports were more than 100 per 1000 residents. Of those reports, 4 of the sites (Gilmor Homes, Uptown Apartments, Midtown Apartments, and Stricker Street) were in the Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park CSA where the rate of reports was 205.5 reports per 1000 residents.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the rate of reports for dirty streets and alleys per 1000 residents for RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the rate of reports for RAD sites ($M=69.3$, $SD=32.48$) and comparison sites ($M=82.34$, $SD=66.88$); $t(34.211)=-.848$, $p = .402$. These results suggest that in terms of rate of reports for dirty streets and alleys, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. The overall rate of reports for the city was 70.5 reports per 1000 residents, which is virtually the same as the RAD sites average, but lower than the comparison sites average.

17. Sustainability: Percent of Area Covered by Trees

SUSTAINABILITY

Figure 20. Percent of Area Covered by Trees



Data divided into quintiles.

Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute;
University of Vermont Spatial Analysis Lab

For RAD sites in 2007, the average percent of area covered by trees was 24.2% and the median was 23.1%. The lowest tree coverage percentage was 6.7% and the highest was 72.1%. Nearly 20% of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is less than 10%. Almost a quarter of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is between 10% and 20%. Slightly more than half of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is between 20% and 50%. One site, Bernard E. Mason Apartments is in a CSA (Dickeyville/Franklinton CSA) where the tree coverage is over 70%.

For comparison sites, the average percent of area covered by trees was 19.35% and the median was 15.4%. The lowest tree coverage percentage was 5% and the highest was 48.1%. One quarter of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is less than 10%. More than 45% of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is between 10% and 20%. Almost 30% of the sites are in CSAs where the tree coverage is between 20% and 50%.

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the percent of area covered by trees for RAD sites and comparison sites. There was not a significant difference in the tree coverage for RAD sites ($M=24.2\%$, $SD=15.18$) and comparison sites ($M=19.35\%$, $SD=12.53$); $t(43)=1.175$, $p = .246$. These results suggest that in terms of tree coverage, there is no difference between RAD sites and the comparison sites. Overall, the percent of area covered by trees in Baltimore is 27.4%, which is nearly the same as the RAD sites average, but greater than the comparison sites average.

B. Comparing RAD Sites and Comparison Sites using Crime Data

1. Blue Light Cameras


A map of the blue light cameras in Baltimore shows that there are blue light cameras in more than half (31/55) of the CSAs. Of the CSAs that do have blue light cameras, slightly more than half have less than ten cameras, seven CSAs (23%) have more than thirty cameras. All seven of the CSAs have at least one RAD or comparison site within it and five of the sites have more than one. Five of the RAD sites (23.8%) and four of the comparison sites (16.67%) are in CSAs where there are no blue light cameras.

An examination of the 500 foot buffer reveals that some of the blue light cameras cover the RAD and comparison sites. Nine RAD sites (43%) and ten comparison sites (42%) fall within the buffer. While the percent of RAD sites and comparison sites is nearly equal, it should be noted that far fewer RAD units (2195) are within the buffer zone as compared to the comparison sites (4469 units).

2. Arrests and Property and Violent Crime


Using the hot spot analysis to examine 2013 and 2014 arrests, about ten RAD sites (47.6%) are within areas that have statistically significant numbers of arrests. About thirteen sites (54.2%) of the comparison sites are in areas with statistically significant numbers of arrests. Using the hot spot analysis to examine 2013 and 2014 property crime, ten RAD sites (47.6%) and nine comparison sites (37.5%) are in areas that have statistically significant incidents of property crime. Using hot spot analysis to examine 2013 and 2014 violent crime, about sixteen RAD sites (76.2%) and about 17 comparison sites (70.8%) are in areas with statistically significant incidents of violent crime.

Figure 21. Blue Light Cameras



Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance -
Jacob France Institute; Baltimore Police Department


Figure 22. Blue Light Cameras -- 500 Foot Buffer



Source: Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance - Jacob France Institute; Baltimore Police Department

HOT SPOT ANALYSIS


Figure 23. 2013 & 2014 Arrests



Source: Baltimore Police Department, OpenBaltimore

HOT SPOT ANALYSIS


Figure 24. 2013 & 2014 Property Crimes



Source: Baltimore Police Department, OpenBaltimore

HOT SPOT ANALYSIS

Figure 25. 2013 & 2014 Violent Crimes



Source: Baltimore Police Department, OpenBaltimore

VI. Conclusion

A. A Legacy of Oppression

An examination of various indicators and crime statistics reveals that on the whole, the differences between RAD sites and the comparison sites are not statistically significant. This could be reflective of how concentrated public house sites are. Four pairs of RAD and comparison sites are located very close to each other and overall, most of the sites are concentrated in the central, and oldest, part of the city. Additionally, the use of Community Statistical Areas (CSAs), rather than a smaller geographical unit like census tracts may have erased or reduced some of the differences between the two groups. What is clear is that the neighborhoods surrounding these sites are far different from the city overall. Compared to the city overall, public housing sites are in CSAs where there is a higher concentration of Black residents, a lower racial diversity, a greater percentage of households and children living below the poverty line, a greater percentage of vacant and abandoned residential properties, a greater percentage of residential properties with housing violations, and more vacant properties owned by the City. These communities are overwhelmingly Black and poor compared to the city as a whole. The current state of these communities is directly tied to the historical narrative of a city once enamored of segregation, but is now encumbered by its past.

While local reporters and academics have explored other facets of inequality like police brutality (Puente, 2014), inequality of life and educational outcomes (Alexander, 2014), and racial conflict (Fenton, 2015; George & Puente, 2015; Rodricks, 2015; Reutter), following the murder of Freddie Gray and the subsequent protests, Baltimore's inequality was laid bare before the entire

nation. The assault of Mr. Gray was centered in the Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park and Upton/Druid Heights CSAs in West Baltimore. As mapped and discussed by the *Baltimore Sun* and the *New York Times* (Harris, 2015; Stolberg, 2015), much of the subsequent violence was located in West Baltimore and Downtown. The *New York Times* notes that the residents in these areas experienced low life expectancy and high poverty. Other reflections have called to task how the federal government carries out urban policy (Mufson and Eilperin, 2015). In particular, the *Washington Post* explored an attempt more than two decades ago to address the poverty and other poor conditions of Sandtown-Winchester through an investment of \$130 million. Former Baltimore mayor Kurt L. Schmoke and developer James Rouse worked together believing that to transform the community they first needed to create affordable housing. They ultimately wanted to address inequalities faced by the community in terms of education, health, employment, and crime. While a significant amount of money was spent, Sandtown-Winchester has not make the change Schmoke, Rouse, and others had hoped. Critics and residents point to the lack of jobs for residents and the ever-present drug trade as what has primarily stood in the way of the transformation of Sandtown (Rosenwald and Fletcher, 2015). Stephanie DeLuca, a Johns Hopkins University sociologist argued that “[h]aving a well-maintained home doesn’t get at the larger issues that prevent self sufficiency....The labor markets and drug markets really destabilized Sandtown” (Rosenwald and Fletcher, 2015). Diane Bell McKoy, a former aide to Schmoke went further stating “[w]e were naïve. We meant well, and we mean well, but I don’t think we have taken time to dig deeply enough to find answers. In many cases, people have to be connected to their own ability to change their lives. That kind of work calls for a longer-term solutions than we are prepared to deal with in our political cycles” (Rosenwald and Fletcher, 2015).

The Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park CSA has the most number of comparison sites within its boundaries—four—of any CSA in the city. There are two CSAs, Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market and Oldtown/Middle East that have five RAD and comparison sites in total within their boundaries. In Poppleton/The Terraces/Hollins Market, four of the sites are RAD and in Oldtown/Middle East three sites are RAD. Indeed, no CSA in the city besides Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park has more than two comparison sites within its boundaries. This concentration of public housing and its residents is certainly part of the narrative of why that community looks the way it does now. It also speaks to a level of intentionality of the creation of the current conditions that is missed by the media coverage. Much of the conversation of how inequality has occurred in Baltimore skips pasts the intentional acts of the state to segregate and oppress Black residents and like the *Washington Post* article, focuses on recent failures in investments to point to the intractable nature of poverty (Rosenwald and Fletcher, 2015). The article also pushes some of the blame onto the residents—noting their participation in the sale of illegal drugs and other criminal behavior, as a contributing factor as to why the community has not turned itself around. While \$130 million is a large amount of money to invest in one community, it is unlikely that it is equal to the cost of more than a century’s worth of disinvestment and disinterest by the City and the state.

B. Why High Blood Lead Levels Matter

As I mentioned, for RAD sites and the comparison sites there were almost no indicators that were statistically significant. The one indicator that had a statistically significant difference was the percent of children (aged 0-6) with elevated blood lead levels. The comparison sites were in

CSAs with a higher rate of children (aged 0-6) with elevated blood lead levels. Children in Baltimore get high blood lead levels through ingesting paint that contains lead in their homes. High blood lead levels in children is concerning because “even minute amounts of lead can harm still-developing brains and nervous systems of young children, leading to learning and behavioral problems” (Wheeler, September 2014). Use of lead paint was banned in Baltimore in 1950 and yet there are still homes in Baltimore that have not been fully remediated as to remove all the lead paint in the homes. In 2013, Baltimore was found to account for “60% of the more serious lead poisoning cases and roughly half of the lower-level cases” (Wheeler, September 2013). This is due to the high quantity of older rental homes in the city as compared to the rest of the state (Wheeler, September 2013). Because there is a cost to remediation, owners of slum housing in the city often do not fully remediate and nearly “half of the children who live in these houses had levels of lead in their blood well above that considered safe by the Centers of Disease Control” (Epstein, 2013). There is a state law that requires that all rental housing units built before the 1950s be registered and remediated, but early in 2015 state auditors found that the Maryland Department of the Environment failed in its oversight duties. A report from 2014 was similarly critical (Wheeler, January 2015). Negligent property owners include the Housing Authority of Baltimore City. In 2013 HABC paid \$11.3 million to six former child tenants that had been poisoned inside public housing. While the judgments were handed down in 2007, it took more than six years for the plaintiffs to receive the money from the City (Wheeler, August 2013). Housing Commissioner Paul Graziano said that in order to pay the judgment, HABC had to “dip[] into funds it receives to operate public housing and subsidize rents for low-income families in private housing” (Wheeler and Calvert, August 2013).

In 2011 a class-action lawsuit was filed at the Johns Hopkins-affiliated Kennedy Krieger Institute that accused the medical institute of knowingly exposing poor black children to lead poisoning in the 1990s as part of a study on lead paint poisoning (Williams 2011). Troublingly, the researchers knowingly encouraged families to move in homes where there was lead paint present, collected blood from the children to test blood lead levels, but did not notify families if the children developed elevated blood lead levels and did not provide any type of medical treatment (Williams 2011). In *Lead Wars: The Politics of Science and the Fate of America's Children* by Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, the authors focus on the study itself noting that they chose two lead abatement methods that had already been determined to be ineffective (Epstein 2013). Epstein, in her discussion of the book in the *New York Review of Books* finds it “possible to imagine how these men could not effectively resist the momentum of government indifference to the poor, pervasive racial prejudice, and careless decision making that influenced government policymaking throughout the lead-poisoning crisis” (2013). In a national study from the late 1970’s, Black children were found to be six times more likely to have elevated blood lead levels than white children (Epstein 2013). A plan created by HUD in the 1990s to remake lead from all houses over fifteen years would have cost \$33 billion. Facing opposition from the lead industry, realtors, landlords, and insurance companies the plan was dropped and the federal government has spent less than \$2 billion on lead abatement—a problem that to this day overwhelmingly impacts black children living in urban centers (Epstein 2013).

Statistics

Kind of Site			Percent of Residents - Black/African-American (2010)	Racial Diversity Index (2010)	Percent of Population 0-5 years old (2010)	Percent of Family Households Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure (2012)
CSA	N	Valid	55	55	55	55	55	55
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		61.792	36.423	6.777	19.582	32.826	1.380
	Median		75.773	36.236	6.930	17.702	32.417	1.388
	Std. Deviation		33.3166	22.1890	1.7481	11.8092	17.8686	.6301
	Minimum		2.7	7.3	2.4	1.0	2.4	.3
	Maximum		96.7	77.8	11.4	49.5	71.9	3.4
RAD	N	Valid	21	21	21	21	21	21
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		75.195	33.300	6.419	28.686	45.581	1.586
	Median		88.200	22.900	7.200	22.600	39.300	1.500
	Std. Deviation		23.8826	20.9390	2.0173	14.5547	19.8796	.5489
	Minimum		32.1	7.6	2.4	9.4	13.0	.3
	Maximum		96.6	68.8	9.2	49.5	71.9	3.4
Comparison Site	N	Valid	24	24	24	24	24	24
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		75.321	31.617	7.492	29.408	45.762	1.358
	Median		85.550	26.900	7.500	27.600	49.300	1.400
	Std. Deviation		25.4915	22.1986	1.6909	13.4073	18.8395	.4605
	Minimum		11.5	7.3	2.4	8.3	15.1	.6
	Maximum		96.6	73.4	11.4	49.5	71.9	2.4

Statistics

Kind of Site			Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned (2012)	Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (Excluding Vacants) (2012)	Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)	Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)	Affordability Index - Rent (2008-2012)	Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2010)
CSA	N	Valid	55	55	55	55	55	55
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		7.674	4.774	11.229	10.74528754	53.497	72.746
	Median		3.866	2.638	4.310	4.385964912	53.844	71.875
	Std. Deviation		10.1413	5.2509	15.3063	15.01569634	8.4651	9.8956
	Minimum		.1	.3	.0	.0000000000	34.2	51.2
	Maximum		37.3	23.2	55.0	55.43071161	75.0	100.0
RAD	N	Valid	21	21	21	21	21	21
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		14.162	8.810	29.695	27.89523810	54.405	67.595
	Median		8.600	7.700	39.700	34.90000000	53.500	67.300
	Std. Deviation		12.0546	6.4048	19.8226	20.48381010	4.8985	4.1920
	Minimum		.7	1.6	.0	.0000000000	46.2	55.5
	Maximum		37.3	21.1	55.0	55.40000000	66.6	73.8
Comparison Site	N	Valid	24	24	24	24	24	24
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		14.350	7.712	19.067	18.43750000	55.200	68.796
	Median		6.850	6.100	14.750	10.70000000	57.000	68.300
	Std. Deviation		14.2050	6.3958	16.8604	17.66966973	7.1410	8.6085
	Minimum		.4	1.0	.0	1.400000000	43.4	58.8
	Maximum		37.3	21.1	52.4	55.40000000	75.0	88.9

Statistics

Kind of Site			Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2011)	Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2012)	High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2010)	High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2011)	High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)	Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2010)
CSA	N	Valid	55	55	55	55	55	55
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		67.300	72.019	3.872	3.925	4.031	86.647
	Median		65.990	70.160	3.937	3.738	3.646	85.900
	Std. Deviation		10.3964	10.7844	1.3592	1.5862	2.4857	3.9397
	Minimum		47.6	46.2	.0	1.2	.0	78.4
	Maximum		97.6	100.0	8.1	8.1	10.9	97.1
RAD	N	Valid	21	21	21	21	21	21
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		63.881	69.243	4.267	4.138	3.776	86.719
	Median		63.000	69.000	3.900	4.200	3.900	87.200
	Std. Deviation		6.9744	10.8211	.8163	1.2843	1.4663	2.2616
	Minimum		49.1	46.2	2.7	1.3	.0	79.3
	Maximum		77.8	90.3	5.7	5.8	6.0	89.3
Comparison Site	N	Valid	24	24	24	24	24	24
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		58.963	68.850	4.438	4.692	4.700	84.858
	Median		60.550	67.050	4.300	4.350	4.500	84.650
	Std. Deviation		7.4991	6.8451	1.3755	1.7310	1.6302	3.5753
	Minimum		47.6	55.0	2.0	1.9	2.7	79.3
	Maximum		72.0	83.3	6.6	7.7	9.9	92.7

Statistics

Kind of Site			Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2011)	Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2012)	Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2010)	Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2011)	Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)	Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1,000 Residents) (2011)
CSA	N	Valid	55	55	55	55	55	55
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		87.636	86.784	.813	.647	.680	1.678
	Median		87.800	86.200	.000	.000	.000	.900
	Std. Deviation		3.8773	3.8450	2.0102	1.5866	1.7856	3.0105
	Minimum		79.6	80.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
	Maximum		96.2	95.3	7.5	6.9	7.4	22.3
RAD	N	Valid	21	21	21	21	21	21
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		88.324	85.529	.048	.224	.252	2.829
	Median		89.300	84.800	.000	.000	.000	2.100
	Std. Deviation		3.7728	3.2513	.2182	.7456	1.1566	4.6393
	Minimum		80.7	80.0	.0	.0	.0	.2
	Maximum		94.2	93.4	1.0	3.1	5.3	22.3
Comparison Site	N	Valid	24	24	24	24	24	24
		Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mean		86.129	85.225	1.446	.296	1.708	1.663
	Median		86.300	84.900	.000	.000	.000	1.000
	Std. Deviation		3.9097	3.3063	2.7857	1.1555	3.0524	1.1571
	Minimum		79.6	80.9	.0	.0	.0	.3
	Maximum		92.3	93.4	6.9	5.5	7.4	4.2

Statistics

Kind of Site			Unemployment Rate (2008-2012)	Total Number of Businesses (2012)	Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1,000 Residents (2012)	Percent of Area Covered by Trees (2007)
CSA	N	Valid	55	55	55	55
		Missing	0	0	0	0
	Mean		14.585	370.655	70.865	25.326
	Median		13.883	253.000	47.700	22.941
	Std. Deviation		6.6454	410.3203	58.9238	16.7234
	Minimum		4.0	32.0	6.9	3.2
	Maximum		29.9	2923.0	225.5	72.1
RAD	N	Valid	21	21	21	21
		Missing	0	0	0	0
	Mean		16.552	511.048	69.300	24.210
	Median		16.600	304.000	62.400	23.100
	Std. Deviation		6.1245	630.5136	32.4793	15.1805
	Minimum		4.9	32.0	7.6	6.7
	Maximum		29.9	2923.0	127.5	72.1
Comparison Site	N	Valid	24	24	24	24
		Missing	0	0	0	0
	Mean		18.304	336.542	82.342	19.354
	Median		18.250	251.000	54.350	15.400
	Std. Deviation		5.8148	223.5483	66.8816	12.5304
	Minimum		6.1	100.0	7.2	5.0
	Maximum		29.9	1079.0	205.5	48.1

Group Statistics

	Kind of Site	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Percent of Residents - Black/African-American (2010)	RAD	21	75.195	23.8826	5.2116
	Comparison Site	24	75.321	25.4915	5.2034
Racial Diversity Index (2010)	RAD	21	33.300	20.9390	4.5693
	Comparison Site	24	31.617	22.1986	4.5313
Percent of Population 0-5 years old (2010)	RAD	21	6.419	2.0173	.4402
	Comparison Site	24	7.492	1.6909	.3451
Percent of Family Households Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	RAD	21	28.686	14.5547	3.1761
	Comparison Site	24	29.408	13.4073	2.7367
Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	RAD	21	45.581	19.8796	4.3381
	Comparison Site	24	45.762	18.8395	3.8456
Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure (2012)	RAD	21	1.586	.5489	.1198
	Comparison Site	24	1.358	.4605	.0940
Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned (2012)	RAD	21	14.162	12.0546	2.6305
	Comparison Site	24	14.350	14.2050	2.8996
Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (Excluding Vacants) (2012)	RAD	21	8.810	6.4048	1.3976
	Comparison Site	24	7.712	6.3958	1.3055
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)	RAD	21	29.695	19.8226	4.3257
	Comparison Site	24	19.067	16.8604	3.4416

Group Statistics

	Kind of Site	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)	RAD	21	27.89523810	20.48381010	4.469933824
	Comparison Site	24	18.43750000	17.66966973	3.606806230
Affordability Index - Rent (2008-2012)	RAD	21	54.405	4.8985	1.0689
	Comparison Site	24	55.200	7.1410	1.4577
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2010)	RAD	21	67.595	4.1920	.9148
	Comparison Site	24	68.796	8.6085	1.7572
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2011)	RAD	21	63.881	6.9744	1.5219
	Comparison Site	24	58.962	7.4991	1.5308
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2012)	RAD	21	69.243	10.8211	2.3614
	Comparison Site	24	68.850	6.8451	1.3972
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2010)	RAD	21	4.267	.8163	.1781
	Comparison Site	24	4.437	1.3755	.2808
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2011)	RAD	21	4.138	1.2843	.2803
	Comparison Site	24	4.692	1.7310	.3533
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)	RAD	21	3.776	1.4663	.3200
	Comparison Site	24	4.700	1.6302	.3328
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2010)	RAD	21	86.719	2.2616	.4935
	Comparison Site	24	84.858	3.5753	.7298
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2011)	RAD	21	88.324	3.7728	.8233
	Comparison Site	24	86.129	3.9097	.7981

Group Statistics

	Kind of Site	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2012)	RAD	21	85.529	3.2513	.7095
	Comparison Site	24	85.225	3.3063	.6749
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2010)	RAD	21	.048	.2182	.0476
	Comparison Site	24	1.446	2.7857	.5686
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2011)	RAD	21	.224	.7456	.1627
	Comparison Site	24	.296	1.1555	.2359
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)	RAD	21	.252	1.1566	.2524
	Comparison Site	24	1.708	3.0524	.6231
Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1,000 Residents) (2011)	RAD	21	2.829	4.6393	1.0124
	Comparison Site	24	1.662	1.1571	.2362
Unemployment Rate (2008-2012)	RAD	21	16.552	6.1245	1.3365
	Comparison Site	24	18.304	5.8148	1.1869
Total Number of Businesses (2012)	RAD	21	511.048	630.5136	137.5893
	Comparison Site	24	336.542	223.5483	45.6316
Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1,000 Residents (2012)	RAD	21	69.300	32.4793	7.0876
	Comparison Site	24	82.342	66.8816	13.6522
Percent of Area Covered by Trees (2007)	RAD	21	24.210	15.1805	3.3127
	Comparison Site	24	19.354	12.5304	2.5578

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Percent of Residents - Black/African-American (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.002	.965	-.017	43	.987	-.1256
	Equal variances not assumed			-.017	42.781	.986	-.1256
Racial Diversity Index (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.112	.740	.261	43	.796	1.6833
	Equal variances not assumed			.262	42.738	.795	1.6833
Percent of Population 0-5 years old (2010)	Equal variances assumed	2.287	.138	-1.940	43	.059	-1.0726
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.917	39.249	.062	-1.0726
Percent of Family Households Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	.518	.475	-.173	43	.863	-.7226
	Equal variances not assumed			-.172	41.048	.864	-.7226
Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	.277	.602	-.031	43	.975	-.1815
	Equal variances not assumed			-.031	41.499	.975	-.1815
Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.235	.630	1.511	43	.138	.2274
	Equal variances not assumed			1.493	39.271	.143	.2274

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
Percent of Residents - Black/African-American (2010)	Equal variances assumed	7.3973	-15.0437	14.7925
	Equal variances not assumed	7.3645	-14.9798	14.7286
Racial Diversity Index (2010)	Equal variances assumed	6.4608	-11.3461	14.7127
	Equal variances not assumed	6.4351	-11.2966	14.6633
Percent of Population 0-5 years old (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.5528	-2.1874	.0421
	Equal variances not assumed	.5594	-2.2039	.0586
Percent of Family Households Living Below the Poverty Line (2008- 2012)	Equal variances assumed	4.1692	-9.1305	7.6853
	Equal variances not assumed	4.1925	-9.1893	7.7441
Percent of Children Living Below the Poverty Line (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	5.7760	-11.8300	11.4669
	Equal variances not assumed	5.7972	-11.8850	11.5219
Percentage of Properties Under Mortgage Foreclosure (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.1505	-.0761	.5308
	Equal variances not assumed	.1523	-.0805	.5353

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned (2012)	Equal variances assumed	2.305	.136	-.048	43	.962	-.1881
	Equal variances not assumed			-.048	42.968	.962	-.1881
Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (Excluding Vacants) (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.174	.678	.574	43	.569	1.0970
	Equal variances not assumed			.574	42.195	.569	1.0970
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)	Equal variances assumed	2.870	.097	1.944	43	.058	10.6286
	Equal variances not assumed			1.923	39.553	.062	10.6286
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)	Equal variances assumed	1.864	.179	1.663	43	.104	9.457738095
	Equal variances not assumed			1.647	39.837	.107	9.457738095
Affordability Index - Rent (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	2.699	.108	-.429	43	.670	-.7952
	Equal variances not assumed			-.440	40.815	.662	-.7952
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2010)	Equal variances assumed	7.244	.010	-.581	43	.564	-1.2006
	Equal variances not assumed			-.606	34.262	.548	-1.2006

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
Percentage of Residential Properties that are Vacant and Abandoned (2012)	Equal variances assumed	3.9587	-8.1715	7.7954
	Equal variances not assumed	3.9150	-8.0836	7.7074
Percentage of Residential Properties with Housing Violations (Excluding Vacants) (2012)	Equal variances assumed	1.9124	-2.7596	4.9537
	Equal variances not assumed	1.9125	-2.7621	4.9562
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2011)	Equal variances assumed	5.4676	-.3978	21.6549
	Equal variances not assumed	5.5277	-.5474	21.8045
Percentage of Vacant Properties Owned by Baltimore City (2012)	Equal variances assumed	5.686421902	-2.01002460	20.92550079
	Equal variances not assumed	5.743636441	-2.15206295	21.06753914
Affordability Index - Rent (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	1.8525	-4.5312	2.9407
	Equal variances not assumed	1.8076	-4.4462	2.8558
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2010)	Equal variances assumed	2.0661	-5.3673	2.9661
	Equal variances not assumed	1.9810	-5.2254	2.8242

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.502	.482	2.267	43	.028	4.9185
	Equal variances not assumed			2.279	42.824	.028	4.9185
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2012)	Equal variances assumed	3.766	.059	.147	43	.883	.3929
	Equal variances not assumed			.143	32.945	.887	.3929
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2010)	Equal variances assumed	5.486	.024	-.497	43	.622	-.1708
	Equal variances not assumed			-.514	38.136	.610	-.1708
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2011)	Equal variances assumed	3.600	.065	-1.203	43	.235	-.5536
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.227	41.949	.227	-.5536
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.034	.855	-1.987	43	.053	-.9238
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.001	42.960	.052	-.9238
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2010)	Equal variances assumed	8.405	.006	2.051	43	.046	1.8607
	Equal variances not assumed			2.112	39.376	.041	1.8607

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2011)	Equal variances assumed	2.1693	.5437	9.2932
	Equal variances not assumed	2.1586	.5647	9.2722
Percentage of 5th Grade Students Passing MSA Math (2012)	Equal variances assumed	2.6647	-4.9810	5.7667
	Equal variances not assumed	2.7438	-5.1898	5.9755
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.3436	-.8637	.5220
	Equal variances not assumed	.3325	-.8439	.5022
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.4600	-1.4813	.3741
	Equal variances not assumed	.4510	-1.4638	.3566
High School Dropout/Withdrawal Rate (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.4650	-1.8615	.0139
	Equal variances not assumed	.4616	-1.8548	.0072
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.9071	.0313	3.6901
	Equal variances not assumed	.8810	.0793	3.6422

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.289	.594	1.909	43	.063	2.1946
	Equal variances not assumed			1.914	42.565	.062	2.1946
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.163	.689	.310	43	.758	.3036
	Equal variances not assumed			.310	42.389	.758	.3036
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2010)	Equal variances assumed	34.489	.000	-2.291	43	.027	-1.3982
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.450	23.322	.022	-1.3982
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.290	.593	-.244	43	.808	-.0720
	Equal variances not assumed			-.251	39.747	.803	-.0720
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)	Equal variances assumed	26.553	.000	-2.058	43	.046	-1.4560
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.166	30.231	.038	-1.4560
Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1,000 Residents) (2011)	Equal variances assumed	2.257	.140	1.192	43	.240	1.1661
	Equal variances not assumed			1.122	22.179	.274	1.1661

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2011)	Equal variances assumed	1.1494	-.1233	4.5126
	Equal variances not assumed	1.1466	-.1184	4.5077
Percent of Births Delivered at Term (37-42 Weeks) (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.9803	-1.6735	2.2806
	Equal variances not assumed	.9792	-1.6720	2.2792
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2010)	Equal variances assumed	.6104	-2.6292	-.1672
	Equal variances not assumed	.5706	-2.5777	-.2187
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.2947	-.6664	.5223
	Equal variances not assumed	.2865	-.6513	.5072
Percent of Children (aged 0-6) with Elevated Blood Lead Levels (2012)	Equal variances assumed	.7075	-2.8827	-.0292
	Equal variances not assumed	.6722	-2.8284	-.0835
Fast Food Outlet Density (per 1,000 Residents) (2011)	Equal variances assumed	.9787	-.8076	3.1397
	Equal variances not assumed	1.0396	-.9888	3.3210

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Unemployment Rate (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	.006	.941	-.984	43	.331	-1.7518
	Equal variances not assumed			-.980	41.527	.333	-1.7518
Total Number of Businesses (2012)	Equal variances assumed	5.223	.027	1.269	43	.211	174.5060
	Equal variances not assumed			1.204	24.385	.240	174.5060
Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1,000 Residents (2012)	Equal variances assumed	10.583	.002	-.813	43	.421	-13.0417
	Equal variances not assumed			-.848	34.211	.402	-13.0417
Percent of Area Covered by Trees (2007)	Equal variances assumed	.354	.555	1.175	43	.246	4.8554
	Equal variances not assumed			1.160	38.925	.253	4.8554

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
Unemployment Rate (2008-2012)	Equal variances assumed	1.7811	-5.3438	1.8402
	Equal variances not assumed	1.7875	-5.3602	1.8567
Total Number of Businesses (2012)	Equal variances assumed	137.4630	-102.7145	451.7264
	Equal variances not assumed	144.9589	-124.4246	473.4365
Rate of Dirty Streets and Alleys Reports per 1,000 Residents (2012)	Equal variances assumed	16.0448	-45.3990	19.3157
	Equal variances not assumed	15.3823	-44.2951	18.2118
Percent of Area Covered by Trees (2007)	Equal variances assumed	4.1314	-3.4764	13.1871
	Equal variances not assumed	4.1852	-3.6105	13.3212

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