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**Author**

Dickason, Olive Patricia

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and will serve as an excellent source for further research. The book itself is one resource that scholars in the future can use to present a balanced treatment of Spanish-Osage relations.

*Willard H. Rollings*  
*The Newberry Library*

**When Freedom Is Lost: The Dark Side of the Relationship between Government and the Fort Hope Band.** By Paul Driben and Robert S. Trudeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983. xii + 131 pp. Illus. \$15.00 Cloth. \$5.95 Paper.

The economic situation of Canada's Amerindians is a living testimony to the truth of the adage that the problems we don't solve stay with us. Ever since Europeans came to stay in Canada, they have been bedevilled by what has been consistently referred to as the Amerindian "problem." Quite apart from the argument that can be made as to whose "problem" it has actually been through the centuries, the Canadian situation has been an unusual one for at least one reason: In the generally dreary record of Amerindian-European relations in the Americas, it comes off comparatively well. Sadly enough, that does not make it a record about which to boast.

From its beginning in the sixteenth century, to the end of the colonial wars in the nineteenth century, the relationship between Amerindian and European in Canada was one of interdependence. This was expressed in the give-and-take of the fur trade and in the use of Amerindians as guerrillas in the colonial wars. Euro-Canadians experienced their greatest dependency on Amerindian expertise and cooperation at the beginning of colonization, when settlers were least familiar with the skills needed for survival in a rigorous climate and when both trade and colonial wars were escalating. This dependence quickly diminished, particularly when the wars ended, but cooperation remained a necessity of the trade. Although Euro-Canadians were not always tolerant of Amerindian ways, which they vigorously (even aggressively) sought to replace with their own, their dealings were marked with fewer of the overt antagonisms and little of the active hostility so characteristic of the U.S. frontier. In fact, to many observers looking in from the outside, the Canadian government

appeared—and continues to appear—benevolent and the Amerindians quiescent. So where is the problem? Why the publication of such a book as *When Freedom is Lost*?

This work documents the federal government's unrelieved record of failure in four Ojibwe villages in northern Ontario when it attempted to implement the economic aspects of its 1969 White Paper. The villages all belong to the Fort Hope Band: Fort Hope itself, Webequie, Lansdowne House and Nibinamic (Summer Beaver). The people had coalesced into these settlements (or, in the case of Summer Beaver, had broken away from an earlier one) after they had lost their aboriginal self-reliance, subtly at first through the erosions of the fur trade and then dramatically as both trade and game declined. It was an experience which they generally shared with other northern aboriginal peoples. The immediate government solution was to stave off starvation by means of welfare and later to prepare a new economic base by sponsoring business initiatives coordinated with job re-training and make-work projects. But despite much effort and considerable spending, northern Amerindians, once culturally self-confident with a subsistence base that provided amply for their needs, are now living on the margins of Canadian society. Northern Amerindians are resentful of government interference in their lives yet fearful of losing government programs upon which they have become almost totally dependent. Lansdowne House presents a particularly vivid illustration of a society in disarray: the village strewn with debris, windows broken, drinking in public and violence on the prowl. Bringing in police from outside temporarily restores order but does nothing to reorient the community. A cry for help to the Prime Minister elicits a form letter in reply and tensions coalesce again for the next eruption. The government's good intentions are not enough for it to escape the snares of its own bureaucratic paternalism; the willingness of the people to cooperate in government programs is an insufficient counterweight to their lack of control over their own destinies.

New labels or even new projects do not in themselves transform old attitudes. What the government did, according to Driben and Trudeau, was to continue old assimilationist policies under the guise of new initiatives. In seeking to remedy the social and economic ills which were pinpointed in the Hawthorne Report of 1966, the government responded with its White Paper,

proposing the dismantling of the Indian Act and the absorption of Amerindian affairs into general administration. No longer would Amerindians be the responsibility of the federal government but of the provinces, just like other Canadians. The process would be eased by the allocation of substantial federal funds for Amerindian economic development. U.S. students of Amerindian affairs will recognize the similarity of this program to the termination policy outlined in Congress's 1953 Concurrent Resolution 108. In both countries the proposals aroused storms of criticism. Canadian Amerindian leaders coast to coast objected with almost one voice: As they saw it, they were being called upon to purchase economic opportunity at the price of their identity. Claiming that this was a misunderstanding of its purpose, the federal government nevertheless bowed to the pressure by retaining its existent administrative apparatus for Amerindian affairs. But the need for economic initiatives remained. In proceeding with this plan of action, the government did two things which Driben and Trudeau see as programmed for defeat: It called in other departments to participate, thus splitting responsibility, and it failed to consult adequately with the people who were being affected. As a result programs worked at cross-purposes, business initiatives that were promising on paper failed with monotonous frequency and the people who were supposed to be heading for economic independence instead became mired in government dependency.

The authors look no further than the shortcomings of federal policies for their explanation of this situation. Questions do present themselves, however. Since the authors confine themselves to four villages for their study, it is legitimate to ask how they fit into the national picture. Has the government ever scored a success, somewhere, somehow? Are there any successful private local enterprises against which to evaluate government-sponsored ones? Are there any northern Amerindian communities that can be called successful or at least can give an indication that they might become so? The authors do not attack government support in itself so much as its administration: what is needed, they say, is much more consultation with the people, not to mention more coordination and better monitoring of programs. But would that be going far enough? Perhaps there is more to the situation than mis-directed and ill-coordinated government initiatives; the great Canadian past-time of Ottawa

bashing may be more useful in providing psychological satisfaction than in pointing the way toward solutions.

That federal authorities themselves have been troubled about the state of affairs is indicated by the public enquiries—in Canada they are called Royal Commissions—that have examined various aspects of the situation and have produced some searching reports. The best known is probably Thomas Berger's *Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland*, and the most recent and perhaps the most important is Keith Penner's *Indian Self-Government in Canada*. Ottawa has shown indications of taking the last report seriously enough to consider implementing it. Changes are in the wind as new attitudes emerge. Perhaps "the people" have been right all along; perhaps they really are suffering from too many good intentions, coupled with a dogmatic insistence on conformity, both culturally and in economic practice; perhaps they should be allowed to rediscover for themselves their old self-reliant ways within their own territorial governments. In theory, at least, such a course has the potential of allowing Amerindians at long last to become active and self-respecting contributors to the national mosaic in which Canadians officially take so much pride. In other words the consultation urged by Driben and Trudeau should be pushed much further, to allow "the people" the right of self-determination, which includes the right to create their own variety of administration within the framework of Canada's new constitution, should they so choose.

The book's introductory historical sketch would have benefited from a focus on battles in which the northern Ojibwe claimed the laurels. When British settlers began to move into southern Ontario toward the end of the eighteenth century, they found Mississauga and Saulteaux well established in what had once been Iroquois territory. Such observations apart, this is a well-documented report within the limits the authors have set for themselves. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the function of limits is to circumscribe and that is exactly what they do here.

Olive Patricia Dickason  
University of Alberta

**The Shawnee Prophet.** By R. David Edmunds. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 272 pp. \$16.95 Cloth.