Resource Paper

Political Trajectories of Asian Americans: Bringing Religion In

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Abstract

Analyses of the 2016 election focused a great deal on the "White Evangelical vote," signaling the important intersection of race and religion. But not all Evangelicals are White nor does Christianity encompass all American religion. The Asian American community brings these two social dimensions into broader perspective. We argue that Asian American religious communities encounter two major political parties with different cultural schemas: the White Christian ideal of American society on the right and Multicultural Liberalism, a racially and religiously pluralistic vision of America, on the left. Using data from the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) 2017 we illustrate the 2016 presidential candidate choice and party affiliations of Asian American voters and nonvoters disaggregated by religious identity. We suggest that the Republican Party's candidate and thinly veiled White Christian nationalism likely alienated a potential non–White Christian base. Similarly, most Asian American Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs voted for Clinton despite great proportions of all groups identifying as political independents. Political practitioners will find important considerations when evaluating coalition building given the patterns we show here. We offer suggestions on how to frame the considerations of religious Asian Americans under our current racialized and religionized political culture.

Introduction

The racialized nature of America's political culture has long been taken for granted. Religion has also been given its due in studies of modern American politics, particularly with the ascension of the sec-

ond Bush presidency in the early 2000s, and informed observers have always taken note of its power (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Smidt et al., 2009). But in the wake of Donald Trump's election in 2016 it became impossible to ignore the intersection of race and religion on America's political culture—specifically, conservative Christianity and White America. Despite the growing scholarly literature on how race and religion connections structure our political culture, these conversations have typically excluded Asian Americans and the religious diversity they bring into the conversation. In this resource paper we look at patterns of religion and politics among Asian Americans in the 2016 presidential election and consider how religion among Asian Americans may play a significant role the 2020 election and beyond. Disaggregating the Asian American electorate by religion reveals considerable diversity in voting patterns. Moreover, we find considerable differences between religious groups over party identification. Our exploration of these patterns will prove useful to political strategists in examining the complex role of religion beyond the White Christian frame that dominates the field—particularly among the racial-ethnic group that has the lowest voter turnout among all Americans.

White Christian Nationalism and the 2016 Election of Donald Trump

The surprise candidacy of Donald Trump, propelled to victory first in the Republican primaries and then the general election, confronted us with the scale of religion's influence in our political system where more than 70 percent of White Evangelicals supported his candidacy. Trump's charisma was the product of his ability to leverage many different streams of broad populist disaffection, stemming from economic insecurity in a rapidly globalizing economy, White resentment in an increasingly diverse United States, and exasperation with an entrenched political elite that was perceived to be out of touch with many Americans, among others.

Perhaps the most notable stream from which the Trump campaign drew, and continues to draw, strength is a social force that scholars have identified as "Christian Nationalism" (Whitehead et al., 2018), or "White Christian Patriarchalism" (Park and Davidson, 2017)[1] a potent confluence of racial, religious, and political ideologies that centers White, conservative Christianity as the normative vision of America. This unifying vision of America unites not only a majority of White Evangelicals but strong proportions of White Mainline Protestants and

White Catholics under a common banner that claims the United States as a Christian nation whose identity and heritage was threatened in recent decades but has found a strong protector in the Trump presidency. Indeed, the Trump administration's movement of Christian Nationalist ideology to the center of American politics is perhaps its most singular cultural achievement.

This racialized religious force dominating the political landscape raises numerous questions for other ethnoreligious groups that make up the United States. It stands in stark contrast to an alternative ideology of American identity that we identify as *multicultural liberalism*—a pluralistic vision of American identity along lines that include race and religion (ibid.). Here, we focus on the implications of this atmosphere for Asian Americans and the varied religious-political groups they inhabit. Already undertheorized and understudied as political entities, Asian American religious groups present unique challenges to our collective understanding of the intersection of race, religion, and politics at a crucial juncture in our national history. We discuss how the poles of American political culture as exemplified in Christian Nationalism on the right and multicultural liberalism on the left can act as "push" and "pull" forces for the political inclinations of various Asian American religious groups.

Asian Americans and American Political Culture

Following the reelection of Barack Obama in 2012 the GOP undertook an extensive postelection review that culminated in the creation of a 100-page report called the "Growth and Opportunity Project." Acknowledging the changing landscape of the American electorate the report recommends a dramatic pivot in the party's strategy for future elections—one that included intense outreach to groups that have historically been Democratic mainstays, such as women, as well as racial and ethnic minorities. Asian and Pacific Islander Americans warranted their own section as "Demographic Partners" in this plan, with the GOP noting the importance of "inclusive" messaging built on tolerance and respect (Barbour et al., 2013).

The presidential campaign of Donald Trump was a sharp turn away from the trajectory outlined in the "Growth and Opportunity Project," doubling down on White identity politics intermixed with conservative Christian cultural ideologies. Candidate Trump made liberal use of combative, xenophobic language, painting the United States as a country under siege and at risk of losing connection to what once made

it great—implicitly understood to be eras of White Christian social and political supremacy. It was a pointed repudiation of party voices who had advocated for the GOP to change its monotone and monocultural image. In the season leading up to the 2020 presidential election, the Republican Party is understood to stand for a vision of White, (conservative) Christian America.

By Barack Obama's emergence as the Democratic candidate for 2008 Asian Americans as a voting bloc had already been in the midst of a multidecade slide leftward (Khalid, 2015; Masuoka et al., 2018). In 1992 a majority of Asian Americans identified as Republican. By Obama's reelection, they supported him in numbers only outdone by Black Americans, 73-21 over Mitt Romney according to exit polls (Voeten, 2012). Exit polls from 2016 suggested Asian American support for Clinton over Trump reached similar heights (Wang, 2017), while our own calculations from the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) of 2017 shows Clinton capturing 63 percent of Asian American voters compared to 30 percent for Trump. It is possible that exit polls overestimate Asian American democratic voting, accounting for the difference in results between exit polls and survey data. Disaggregating Asian Americans by ethnicity reveals some variation in voting patterns in 2016, but still large majorities in every category voted for Clinton over Trump (Masuoka et al., 2018; Wang, 2017).

The Republican Party's brazen embrace of White Christian identity politics left little room for a rightward move among Asian Americans of any religious tradition. But this intersection of race, religion, and politics going forward from 2016 to 2020 and beyond has profound implications for the political engagement of Asian Americans.

Between the Priestly and Prophetic: Incorporating Religion into Asian American Politics

For many Americans, the influence of religion in American politics is a decidedly White Christian endeavor (Yukich and Edgell, 2020). And some may recall the Christian underpinnings of the civil rights movement and acknowledge that politics matters a great deal to African American Christians as well. From the vantage point of White-centric research, religion has largely galvanized social conservatives to effectively promote and advocate for a Republican agenda since the 1970s (Hertzke et al., 2018). Scholars have noted that the influence of White, conservative Christians or White Evangelicals in politics whether in voting or in political leadership has created a tight mapping

of conservative politics and Christian religious affiliation (namely Evangelical Christianity) (Putnam and Campbell 2010). This has led to the now "broadly" accepted argument that religious affiliation choices are driven by political interests rather than the earlier view that religious narratives are far more encompassing and therefore drive political interests (e.g., Hout and Fischer, 2014; Margolis, 2020).

The linkage of politics and Christianity is based in a sociological understanding of the two main forms of religion described by Max Weber (1922). Religion can serve in a priestly capacity to support and amplify the interests of the state or the dominant group in society, and religion can also act in prophetic ways that defend the interests of oppressed and minority groups. For many White Christians, conservative politics agrees with the priestly understanding of religion as they hold the dominant position in society. And at least since the election of Carter we see greater evidence that the GOP is perceived by more and more White Christians (Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic) as representing their interests in maintaining social dominance (Hertzke et al., 2018). Thus, we should not be surprised that Christian Nationalism encapsulates the politico-cultural underpinnings of the current manifestation of the Republican Party (Whitehead et al., 2018).

By contrast, the historically Black Church tradition often represents the largest faction of American Christianity advocating the prophetic function of religion in society (see Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990). While Christianity was foisted onto African slaves in the plantation South, it soon became a tool of liberation through the Civil War (Johnson, 2015). But after the war some had imagined equality extended in the houses of worship dominated by White Christian brothers and sisters. Instead they found repeated denigration and segregation. In response, Black Christians formed their own communities and networks such that the Black Church has become an institutional mainstay for most African Americans today. Given the historical social oppression that gave birth to this community, political deliberation and activism as resistance efforts against White supremacy have been a natural extension of the life of Black Christian communities (DuBois, 1904; Paris, 1998). This prophetic approach to religion was most notable in the civil rights era and continues to this day (Morris, 1984). Prophetic political activism clearly challenges the racist status quo of American society and is the spiritual center of the democratic establishment in contemporary politics. This arguably is the focal point of the multicultural liberalism we see ad-

vocated in the Democratic Party and it is one that is more religiously inclusive given its focus on social justice and civic egalitarianism.

Asian and Latinos do not neatly fit into the Black–White prophetic/priestly frame in the study of religion and politics. Over the past 15 years some researchers have sought to make their social models more inclusive of racial difference, and almost all position Asian and Latino Americans between Whites and Blacks along a racialized socioeconomic hierarchy that revises the Black–White model. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva termed this the racial trichotomy with Whites at the top, "Honorary Whites" in the middle and "Collective Blacks" at the bottom (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). Bonilla-Silva disaggregated Asians by ethnic group and Latinos by skin tone such that the non-White categories could not ostensibly be labeled using conventional racial categories. Redrawing the racial hierarchy to include non-Black minorities suggests a reconsideration of the association between race and the priestly/prophetic distinctions of religion as well.

While the racial trichotomy makes visible the socioeconomic position of Asian and Latino Americans, their political interests are less clear. We noted the Asian American shift away from the Republican Party over the course of several decades. This would seem unlikely for a group that generally exhibits considerably higher standing in terms of socio-economic status. Political interests are often motivated by economic interests especially where socioeconomic standing is racialized. Racialized stratification could predict political preference, but we do not see this as the case for Asian Americans. Indeed we can infer that adherence to the perception of Asian Americans as model minorities would galvanize more of them to the GOP (Wu 2014). But this must be weighed against the racialized religious nationalism of that party's current ideology.

The "religious factor" (Lenski, 1961) provides us with a number of new possibilities when we consider the case of Asian American religions. In similar fashion to other research on the leftward drift of Asian Americans, the right-leaning Asian American Christians of the early 2000s have now become more moderate in their political preferences (Lien 2004). In the following, we offer a preliminary mapping of Asian American religions to the major political parties.

Political Futures of Asian American Religions

Asian Americans are, among all American racial groups, the most religiously diverse as seen in Figure 1 using data from the CMPS (2017)

Figure 1. Asian American Religious Affiliation, 2017



Data: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survery 2017; All values weighted; N=3,039

(see also Funk et al., 2012). This is largely due to the Asian groups immigrating to the United States; with the exception of Filipinos, Asian immigrants originate from countries where Christianity is not the dominant or most popular religion. While South Korea is often presumed to be a Christian majority, less than 30 percent of the population identifies as such (Park and Vaughan, 2018). In the case of mainland China and Japan, "no religion" is the dominant label used when asked about religious preference. By contrast, Hispanic immigrants are by and large Christian, and Catholic specifically, in orientation (Smith, 2002). Still, research on religion among today's immigrants shows a pro-Christian migration even among Asian immigrants who constitute the majority (59 percent) of all Asian Americans. That is, Asian Christians are disproportionally represented among immigrants from Asia relative to the sending nation's religious makeup (Connor 2012).

The plurality of Asian Americans are Christian—roughly 46 percent—although this is significantly lower than the 75 percent of all Americans who identify as Christians of some kind. Within this plurality we see that Asian American Christianity's denominational af-

filiations do not mirror White American Christianity. White Catholics and Mainline Protestants each comprise a little more than a quarter of all White Christians. Among Asian American Christians slightly more than half are Catholic and about 31 percent are Mainline Protestant. In contrast, Asian American Christians are less likely to be Evangelical (20 percent of Asian American Christians) than White Christians (41 percent of American Christians).

The next largest "religious" group of Asian Americans are the religiously nonaffiliated, who constitute more than a quarter of all Asian Americans—slightly more than the American public at large. Nonaffiliation refers to a wide agglomeration of those who: (1) eschew the word "religion" but remain informed by practices and beliefs that might be interpreted as religious; (2) are no longer religious in any institutional sense; and (3) ardently identify as having no religious beliefs. Among Asian Americans, this large category may hold a variety of ways in which spiritual belief and practice may have important consequences for political and civic behavior but as yet have not been examined empirically (Jeung et al., 2019). Buddhists (10 percent), Hindus (12 percent), Muslims (3 percent), and Sikhs (less than 1 percent) are the most prominent of the non-Christian religious groups among Asian Americans. This diverse religious profile suggests that the effectiveness of political strategies deploying Christianity as an in-group signal will be dampened among Asian Americans (Yi and Phillips 2019).

Figure 2 shows the presidential voting patterns of Asian American religious groups in 2016 according to CMPS 2017 data. Asian Americans overall strongly preferred Clinton to Trump. However, that support was not evenly distributed across all groups. Asian American religious minorities, including the irreligious, were far more likely than Asian Americans overall to choose Clinton over Trump. What gives Clinton a much less dramatic edge overall is the mixed response of Asian American Christians; far fewer voted for Clinton resulting in much narrower margins among Protestants, and Catholics even broke for Trump. Trump's performance among Asian Americans was thus largely built on the back of Asian American Christian voters, both in absolute and relative numbers (Wong, 2018). Understanding this Christian/non-Christian split among Asian American religious groups in the 2016 presidential vote is key to understanding how Asian Americans relate to the racial-religious contours of contemporary American political culture, and how they may fit into its future.

Figure 2. Asian American 2016 Presidential Vote by Religious Affiliation



Data: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey 2017; All values weighted; N=1,428

Asian American Christians

Table 1 shows more granular data about the 2016 political inclinations of Asian Americans by religious affiliation, including presidential voting choice and candidate preference, as well as party identification. Proportions are also shown for White Americans, disaggregated by religious affiliation, to provide relevant comparison groups. The data show that Asian Americans are most likely to identify, in descending order, as Democrat (40 percent), Independent (33 percent), and Republican (22 percent). These patterns do not hold when disaggregating Asian Americans by religion. Asian American Republicans are most represented among Christian groups: about one-fourth to one-third of Asian American Evangelical and Mainline Protestants and Catholics in 2016 identified as Republican. Asian American Evangelicals were the least likely to identify as Democrat (26 percent), whereas their Mainline counterparts were the most likely of all Asian American Christian groups to do so (42 percent).

These proportions are marked differently from White Christians, as Asian American Christians of every stripe are more likely to identify as Democrat and less likely to identify as Republican than their White counterparts. Asian American Evangelical Democratic affiliation is more than twice as large as White Evangelicals (12 percent), and the gap in Republican identification is large as well (53 percent among Whites to 33 percent among Asians). And among White Catholics about 40 percent affiliate as Republican, slightly more than their Asian American counterparts as well. Despite these leanings there remain significant percentages of Asian American Christians who identify as Republican or Independent, exhibiting a political heterogeneity much different than the reputation of Asian Americans as Democratic stalwarts (Wong and Iwamura 2007).

Based on this initial outlook, Republican strategists may have a sizeable base of support from a substantive minority of Asian American Christians; no group shows a proportion as high as White Evangelicals (53 percent identifying as Republican), but this is further evidence to the claim that Republican and Evangelical identities are more synonymous than any other political-religious pairing. For Democrats, operatives are missing an important opportunity here as well: a larger fraction of all Asian American Christian religious traditions affiliate as Democrat compared to White Christians.

Looking still more at the party affiliation figures a similar per-

Table 1. Asian American 2016 Presidential Voting and Political Party Preference

	2016 Presidential Vote						Political Party Preference			
	Voted Clinton [2,5]	Preferred Clinton [1,4]	Preferred Clinton, did not vote or not registered [3,6]	**Voted Trump** [2,5]	Preferred Trump [1,4]	Preferred Trump, did not vote or not registered [3,6]	Democrat [1,4]	Republican [1,4]	Independent [1,4]	Other [1,4]
Asian Americans										
All Asian Americans	**63.3%**	*60.3%*	*58.1%*	**29.8%**	*22.9%*	*18.0%*	*39.6%*	*21.9%*	*33.3%*	*5.3%*
Evangelical Protestant	**48.2%**	44.7%	43.0%	**42.5%**	39.2%	37.5%	26.3%	32.6%	34.5%	6.5%
Mainline Protestant	**50.4%**	56.0%	62.0%	**41.1%**	26.8%	11.5%	41.7%	27.7%	25.2%	5.5%
Catholic	**46.4%**	54.9%	63.4%	**50.7%**	33.2%	15.9%	38.8%	35.9%	23.7%	1.7%
Muslim	**92.8%**	82.8%	79.3%	**5.4%**	6.8%	7.3%	61.1%	6.8%	27.7%	4.4%
Hindu	**84.9%**	73.3%	69.7%	**11.0%**	6.8%	16.8%	46.0%	15.5%	33.6%	5.0%
Buddhist	**56.5%**	61.4%	64.7%	**21.3%**	16.0%	12.5%	51.2%	13.7%	29.0%	6.1%
Other Religion	**96.1%**	75.7%	57.8%	**1.1%**	3.6%	5.9%	43.9%	3.8%	19.8%	12.6%
None/Atheist/Agnostic	**84.2%**	62.9%	46.8%	**11.1%**	15.9%	19.6%	34.2%	12.5%	46.4%	6.9%
White Americans										
All White Americans	**37.2%**	*34.0%*	*27.3%*	**56.8%**	*51.9%*	*41.5%*	*27.1%*	*32.6%*	*33.3%*	*7.0%*
Evangelical Protestant	**16.3%**	13.9%	6.6%	**78.4%**	75.2%	65.4%	11.5%	53.0%	30.7%	4.8%
Mainline Protestant	**35.0%**	35.0%	35.0%	**59.4%**	54.0%	43.0%	25.1%	33.2%	35.3%	6.4%
Catholic	**32.8%**	31.7%	27.3%	**64.2%**	60.2%	44.9%	25.8%	39.6%	32.7%	2.0%
Other Religion	**47.2%**	46.1%	43.7%	**30.1%**	30.4%	31.2%	47.3%	20.1%	21.3%	11.3%
None/Atheist/Agnostic	**63.5%**	46.5%	26.5%	**29.3%**	31.1%	33.2%	36.6%	13.1%	36.9%	13.4%

Data: Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey 2017; all values weighted.

[1] All Asian American respondents N= 3,309.

[2] Asian American voters N=1,428.

[3] Asian American nonvoters N=1,611.

[4] All White American respondents N=1,159.

[5] White American voters N=733.

[6] White American nonvoters N=426.

centage of Asian Americans identify as political independents (about 33 percent). This share of the Asian American electorate sits between Republican (22 percent) and Democratic bases (40 percent). Among Asian American Evangelicals the share of independents (35 percent) is higher than Democrats (26 percent); this is the only instance among religious Asian Americans in which this ratio occurs. For Asian American Mainline Protestants and Catholics, independents capture a smaller percentage than either of the main parties. This suggests that there is a sizeable group of Asian American Christians across all major branches that could be wooed by either party. Democrats have the most to gain among Asian American Evangelical independents, while Republicans could make significant inroads with Asian American Mainline Protestant and Catholic independents.

And indeed that is what we see when we turn attention to the voting patterns. News reports have repeatedly pointed out the low voter turnout among Asian Americans (Frey, 2017). This is due in part to little outreach from either party to these different communities comprising this demographic. Assuming that party members vote for the party's candidate, we see that the vote exceeded party affiliation as much as 32 percent. This suggests two possible explanations: First, that is, independents may have been significantly influential in determining the voting patterns within religious groups. Second, this may indicate substantial divergence in turnout by party identification. One, or both, may be true. In the 2016 election the vote tilted toward Clinton in every Christian category with the surprising exception of Asian American Catholics: while 36 percent of Asian American Catholics are Republican, 51 percent of Asian American Catholic voters cast their vote to Trump. Similarly surprising, while Asian American Evangelicals had the second highest Republican affiliation rate only 41 percent of the voting base selected Trump, and while they have the lowest Democratic Party affiliation of all religious Asian Americans, the larger share, 48 percent, went to Clinton in 2016.

Political Trajectories of Asian American Minority Religions

In contrast to the political heterogeneity of Asian American Christians, Asian American Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs,[2] and Hindus exhibit strong preferences for the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. According to the CMPS 2017 61 percent of Asian American Muslims and 51 percent of Asian American Buddhists identify as Democrats, while only 7 percent and 14 percent identify as Republican, respectively.

While not majorities, the largest pluralities of Asian American Hindus (46 percent), smaller religious minorities ("All other religious groups") (44 percent), and those with no stated religious affiliation (34 percent) also identified as Democrats. Similar to many Asian American Christians, affiliation as a political independent was the second most popular choice among these religious minority groups (28 percent for Asian American Muslims, 29 percent of Buddhists, 34 percent of Hindus, 20 percent of other religious groups, and 46 percent of Nones/Atheists/Agnostics). Understandably then, the overwhelming vote for Clinton among these religious minority groups came from a combination of Democratic Party affiliates and nearly all political independents.

Reaching the Multireligious Electorate of Asian America

With less than two months remaining this campaign season, any recommendations would likely apply to 2022 and 2024 runs, but we offer these reflections for a path forward that is essentially more inclusive of these newer constituencies who are likely to grow further still in the third decade of the 2000s. One shared problem between both parties is lack of outreach. Neither party has made extensive efforts to reach Asian Americans. This is evident practically by the lack of translation of party media; ads and signage are almost never available or visible in languages other than English and Spanish. More pointedly we note too an absence of creative signaling that captures issues and frameworks that matter to religious Asian Americans.

For the Republicans, White Christian nationalism is a major hurdle to Asian American outreach, particularly for religious minorities and the irreligious is a nonstarter. However, the specific emphases on their core values of promoting family formation, traditionalism, and religious liberty could well translate to Asian American Christians and to Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh communities. Reimagining the ideology of White Christian nationalism into a religiously inclusive nonracially inflected one could go a long way in recruiting Asian Americans. Invoking a priestly ethos with this kind of pivot could present a substantive change without altering the general position of the party's platform. The GOP could conceivably imagine an ideological signal that foregrounds values that are shared by believers of all backgrounds.

For Democrats, one might gather that outreach has been ongoing within religious Asian America given the seeming stronger voter turnout for Clinton in 2016. But this is not the case. Rather, we believe that

the alienating racial and religious-specific signaling of the Republicans pushes most Asian Americans, even most Christians (with the exception of Catholics), to vote Democrat in a two-party system without viable alternatives. But unlike Republicans, their fundamental ideology of Multicultural Liberalism has an immediate draw for those facing social and political exclusion. The democratic ideology is welcoming of all who advocate inclusion and tolerance. But surprisingly we see little evidence that the Democrats have tried to do more than gestural signaling with respect to religious inclusion. Democrats face an important question with regard to their ideology: What is the achievable end of inclusion? Inclusion into political participation of vulnerable and oppressed groups is a laudable endeavor in a liberal democracy but it is less clear whether "inclusion for inclusion's sake" is sufficient without a material or cultural value akin to the GOP's emphasis on religious liberty. The danger for Democrats among the Asian American electorate is taking for granted their support, especially when that support is decidedly more muddled among Asian American Christians; understanding how the intersection of race and religion reveals different patterns of Democratic support should provide signposts for Asian American political outreach and engagement going into the 2020s.

In addition, the prophetic ethos of the Democrats finds its roots in African American Christianity. How will this translate into faith communities outside of that heritage? To be sure, the theme of liberation from oppression is evident across all religious belief systems but we have no evidence that Democrats understand how this theme is discursively explicated in different religious traditions. Democrats could reflect on the specific meanings of social inclusion and social justice from the major religious communities that form Asian America. In so doing, they too might woo political independents with a robust messaging that extends beyond gestural or symbolic inclusion.

Religion continues to play an important role in understanding American politics, and Asian Americans stand apart as a uniquely diverse population of religious groups who are classified within the same racial minority label. Scholars and strategists would do well to pay attention to the religious factor in Asian American politics as the population continues to grow. Future research should compare the ways religion matters to different Asian American groups and how that interfaces with contemporary political participation. As this knowledge base grows, political operatives may find much potential in adding to their party's numbers in the decades to come.

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Notes

1. For the remainder of this essay we use the term "Christian Nationalism" instead of "White Christian Patriarchalism." This choice should not be interpreted as a muffling of the racialized and gendered themes inherent in these concepts. Rather, "Christian Nationalism" has become the accepted nomenclature, and we use this article to highlight the importance of attending to the racial intersections that ought to accompany this concept.
2. Sikh Americans play an important part in the racialization of religious Asian Americans, but due to their small population we are unable to produce any disaggregated findings of their voting behavior using the CMPS or other datasets.

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