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Author

Griffiths, David N.

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MARITIME ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY IMPROVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

David N. Griffiths



ABSTRACT

This paper examines maritime aspects of confidence building and suggests potential applications in a Middle East context. It establishes that traditional theory and practice of confidence building tends to focus on the creation of ‘measures’ rather than on the process of transforming the nature of a security relationship from negative mistrust to positive cooperation. This approach provides a framework with which to consider past experience in maritime confidence building and lessons that it offers for the future

Examining regional arrangements and activities worldwide, the author considers the history of confidence building and the success that maritime agencies and organizations have had with such efforts. The paper then draws upon these lessons to identify some of the characteristics that make maritime CB a particularly useful tool. From this perspective the author is able to draw a number of possibilities for application in the Middle East. These involve interaction among maritime professionals, joint activities for mutual benefit, information sharing and other areas for practical cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

ALMOST ALL OF THE FUNDAMENTAL security issues in the Middle East are rooted firmly ashore. Nonetheless, there are maritime aspects to many of the questions. Furthermore, the maritime dimension of the region offers unique opportunities for enhancing overall trust, security and prosperity. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to examine the concept of maritime confidence building as it relates to arms control and security improvement and to suggest how that concept could be applied in the region.

This paper uses the worldwide experience of maritime confidence building as a framework for describing how issues of maritime security and cooperation have been addressed, not only

in the Middle East, but globally. This experience suggests that the traditional academic approach to analysing confidence building needs critical re-examination, especially if it the analysis is to be of practical use to those actually engaged in improving trust and security. The paper concludes with some personal thoughts on some prospects for maritime activities which could contribute to security improvement in the Middle East

The choice of the word “maritime” instead of “naval” is deliberate. Restricting discussion to purely “naval” issues would narrow its focus to the activities of warships and naval aviation. True security at sea is a much broader issue. It involves other official maritime agencies, armed

and unarmed, such as coast guard, police and customs, as well as air force units operating beyond the shoreline. In a broader sense however, security at sea also involves economic, environmental and humanitarian issues. A secure maritime environment is not just a place where navies can operate freely and without incident, it is also a

place where trade can move freely and safely, pollution is prevented or removed, criminal activity is controlled and human life can be saved in the event of maritime accidents. Maritime security is a cooperative endeavour, not only internally between agencies, but also externally between neighbours.

THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING CONCEPT

The Nature of Confidence Building

CONFIDENCE BUILDING IS AN ACTIVITY, undertaken honestly and in good faith, in which two or more parties seek to achieve a positive change in their security relationship¹. To view confidence building simply in terms of negotiating a collection of individual confidence building measures (CBMs) is to misunderstand its nature and to underestimate its potential.

Confidence building is not a Cold War arms control methodology invented in Europe in the 1970s. It is a human activity which has been going on around the world in many different forms for a long time.

Confidence building is sometimes described as “soft arms control” but again, that undervalues its potential. It has been said that “nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other”². In other words, attempting to assure security by maintaining large and expensive weapons inventories is not the problem - it is merely a *symptom* of the problem. If armament levels are genuinely maintained purely for defence and not for aggression, then the underlying problem, to which arms control is a partial solution, is a lack of mutual trust or confidence.

Another way of looking at confidence building is from the perspective of strategic analysis. In assessing any security relationship, even between the best of friends, the prudent analyst must consider two factors - capabilities and intentions. Arms control deals with the quantifiable technical issue of capabilities. Confidence building addresses the more difficult and subjective matter of intentions.

The long history of modern arms control, from the 1899 Hague Conference to the present, has shown that attempting to limit armaments without also nurturing mutual confidence becomes more a matter of bargaining for advantage than a means of reducing economically burdensome and potentially destabilizing armed rivalry. Fifty years before “confidence building” became a recognized concept, President Harding of the United States said in his invitation to the 1921-22 Washington Conference on limitation of naval armaments:

“It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application.”³

Harding’s “practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding” remains as good a working definition as any of what today would be called confidence building.

A “Transition View”

James Macintosh is a Canadian scholar who, after many years of studying confidence building, concluded that he and others have been mistaken in focussing on *measures* rather than on the *activity* of confidence building. He has proposed a “transformation view”, explaining that:

“...confidence building, according to the transformation view, is a distinct activity undertaken by policy makers with the minimum intention of improving some aspects of a traditional antagonistic security relationship through security policy coordination and cooperation...This restructured relationship redefines expectations

1 This definition is adapted from the ideas expressed by James Macintosh in “Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A transformation view”, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No.2, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996

2 Attributed to Salvador de Madariaga. Source undetermined.

3 Quoted in “Conference on the Limitation of Armament, held at Washington, November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922: Report of the Canadian Delegate” Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1922.

of normal behaviour among participating states”.⁴

He might have added that they may accomplish this on both a formal and official level (“Track One”) and informally on a “Track Two” level, at which academics and government officials, acting in their private capacities, can discuss issues on their intellectual rather than political merit.⁵

Traditional CBM Analysis

Most analysts group confidence-building measures (CBMs) into categories - either their own or someone else’s. Such lists of categories (or typologies) can be useful tools for understanding what has happened in the past. On the other hand, they can also cloud or constrain the vision of those who must take practical action in the present. Because CBM categories are encountered so often in the literature, the matter warrants critical examination by those who are engaged in the practical business of confidence building.

In his first study in 1985 Macintosh, like many others before and since, had focussed on *measures* rather than the *activity* of confidence building.⁶ Analysing the literature of the time, he concluded that all existing CBMs could be grouped into two or three categories - *information*, *constraint*, and possibly unilateral *declaratory* measures such as “non-use of force”.⁷ Twelve years later, he acknowledged this measure-oriented approach to be inadequate. In a 1996 critique of his earlier work, he acknowledged that “its centre-piece definition was of CBMs, not confidence building” and that “focussing on measures has encouraged analysts to overlook the need for process-oriented, activity-based accounts of confidence building”.⁸ He illustrated with the example of CBMs intended to create transparency.

“...more information about - and greater exposure to - the military forces of dangerous neighbours will not necessarily improve security relations as conventional thinking implies. Indeed, relations may worsen as added

information feeds existing misperceptions and fears, particularly if normal weapons acquisition cycles yield forces of increased military capability and ambiguous character....The key to understanding confidence building and how it works is not the role played by increased information or enhanced transparency *per se*. This is only part of the story. Instead it seems that *successful* confidence building must somehow be associated with and facilitate a basic shift in security thinking in influential circles ... then agreement to share increasingly detailed and sensitive military information can occur and *reinforce* changes in threat perception”.⁹

Nonetheless, Macintosh updated and retained his typology of CBM categories because “...the typology approach remains useful despite some methodological problems because it organizes a wide range of CBMs in a very accessible form according to their functional character.”¹⁰ Recognizing the need for flexibility however, he added that “... we may wish to add fundamentally new types of measures to this collection as our experience in this new dimension of activity grows. For the present, a “place-holder” category - “non-traditional measures” - could be added to the existing structure to underline the need to think more creatively about this possibility”. It is to Macintosh’s “non-traditional” challenge that this paper now turns.

Problems With the Conventional Wisdom

This author’s personal experience with maritime CBMs in three different parts of the world has resulted in dissatisfaction with one assumption underlying virtually all CBM typologies. Because the requirement for confidence building arises from the existence of a non-cooperative security relationship, existing typologies tend to focus on the unsatisfactory present without acknowledging a positive future. Even in Macintosh’s revised categories for example, the list begins with basic information exchange and ends with a restrictive body of “constraint” measures. Certainly there is nothing wrong with mutually agreed constraint and limitations. But to end the list at that point is to halt the journey before reaching the destination.

4 Macintosh, “Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A transformation view”, op.cit., p.vii

5 For a more complete discussion of the concept, see John W. McDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane (eds), “Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy”, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, Washington, 1987.


6 Macintosh, “Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective”, op.cit.

7 Macintosh, “Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A transformation view” op.cit., p. 10

8 Macintosh, *ibid.*, p.5

9 Macintosh, *ibid.*, pp.25-26

10 Macintosh, *ibid.*, p. 52

**Figure 1**

A mature and stable relationship cannot stop at “constraint”. The desirable end-state is the normal, cooperative, non-hostile relationship that should exist between good neighbours. It is that positive step which is lacking in most existing theoretical typologies, and yet which is so often evident in the aspirations of those actually engaged in practical confidence building. A cooperative effort to address a mutual problem may not be defined as a CBM in traditional typologies, but it certainly contributes to the transformation of a security relationship.

Many psychologists argue that to achieve a change in human behaviour, one must focus on the positive future goal rather than dwelling exclusively on the negative past. The activity of confidence building is no exception. If confidence building aims to change a human relationship, and if activities (or CBMs) *must* be put into categories, then a positive category addressing “normality” should be a candidate for Macintosh’s “non-traditional” heading.

A better approach for the practical confidence builder however, as Macintosh has suggested, may be to avoid the focus on measures entirely and deal with activities. As one simple example, some analysts have debated into what CBM category the INCSEA arrangements which will be described in Part 2 should fall. Are they a “communication”

measure, a “constraint” measure, both, or something else? Such discussions may be of academic interest, but they do nothing for the practical mariner who must negotiate or implement the arrangement.

Useful as they may be, terms like “Track One” and “Track Two” also need to be approached with caution because once they enter common use they can create an assumption that *every* activity or initiative has to be placed under one heading or the other. This two-track concept has worked well in Asia and reflects what is often described as “the Asian Way”. In other cultural contexts however, such a clear distinction may not be entirely appropriate. One example will be noted in Part 4.

Another trap awaiting the unwary is the meaning of words. Thinking can be limited or distorted by the choice of words used to express the thoughts. Confidence building theory is no exception. Consider two examples. In the English language, the word “measure” has subtle negative nuances of confrontation and legality. One adopts a “measure” to address a problem. One does not use the word “measure” to describe a mutual activity with a friend or colleague. Another example is the word “constraint”. In the English language, definitions of “constraint” include words like “compulsion” or “restriction”. Surely in a genuine confidence building process, in keeping with the

British Oxford Concise Dictionary and American College Dictionary, a better choice of words would be “restraint”, which has the more voluntary sense of “self-control”, “moderation” or “prudence” In addition, words may have even more nuances when they are translated into other languages. The practical confidence builder must therefore take care to avoid unquestioning reliance on traditional terminology.

A Typology for Practical Confidence Builders

The purpose of this paper is to address practical applications in the present rather than theoretical analysis of the past. A working typology for practical confidence builders is therefore proposed, based on Macintosh’s, but expressed in terms of actions instead of products. The concept of “steps” replaces the word “measures” because it implies forward movement toward a goal. “Constraint” has been replaced by “restraint” for reasons already

described. Finally, a new category - “cooperation” - has been added. This acknowledges what is happening in practice, as will be described in Part 2; for example in Asia-Pacific as Steps II and III of the ARF Concept, in Latin America with the Declaration of Santiago, in the Euro-Atlantic region where it is well established and in the Middle East, both in the context of the peace process and in normal participation in international activities.

A final caution about the use of words involves the phrase “confidence building” itself. It is important to remember that it now carries a certain amount of historical baggage. Confidence building is a means to an end, not an end in itself. “Confidence building in order to build confidence” is a circular definition. Practical confidence builders should not become so focussed on the idea of being part of a process that they lose sight of the real aim - a security relationship based on trust instead of arms.

THE MARITIME CONFIDENCE BUILDING EXPERIENCE

The Heritage

MOST LITERATURE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING assumes that the idea began in the mid-1970s with the introduction of the term “confidence building measure” (CBM) during East-West arms control negotiations in a continental European context. That is not true. Confidence building is an activity which is not only much older, but also includes many maritime examples. One of the earliest examples of a maritime confidence-building measure preceded one of the earliest arms control treaties which, incidentally, dealt exclusively with naval issues. The War of 1812 had resulted in a proliferation of warships on the Great Lakes which straddle the national boundaries of Canada and the United States in the heart of North America. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement sought to assure mutual security by limiting their number. The exchange of notes constituting the Agreement was preceded, in August 1816, by a mutually announced freeze on naval construction and an exchange of lists of naval forces maintained by each side. Today, this would be described as constraint and information-exchange CBMs. During the subsequent 180 years, the letter of this Agreement has long since grown obsolete, but the spirit of transparency continues to

be respected. Obviously the provision limiting both sides to vessels “not exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon”¹¹ has long since been exceeded, but the principle of dialogue has not. Although Canada and the United States are now close allies and friends, the Agreement has been invoked by Canada as recently as the early 1960’s, when the United States considered deploying ship- or submarine-launched ballistic missiles on the Great Lakes.¹²

Treaties which contain what would now be called CBMs were created in Latin America in the early- and mid-twentieth century. The 1902 “Pactos de Mayo” (May Agreements) between Argentina and Chile contained elements which would today be described as information-exchange CBMs. The Pactos de Mayo later served as a model for similar treaties in Europe in the 1920s.¹³ Similarly, the

11 Text of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1817, in Gilbert Norman Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1952, Appendix I.

12 Barry O’Neill, *Rush-Bagot and the Upkeep of Arms Treaties*, *Arms Control Today* Volume 21, No. 7, September 1991, p 22.

13 Both mentioned briefly in James Macintosh “Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective” *Arms Control and Disarmament Studies*, No.1, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1985, pp 17-18. See also

1923 “General Treaty of Peace and Amity” established a system of confidence building information exchange in Central America.¹⁴

Today, maritime confidence building takes many different forms around the world, depending on the particular circumstances and cultures involved in each relationship or region. Maritime confidence building does not follow any single universal pattern, and not all approaches are universally applicable. Nonetheless, the overall maritime experience in confidence building offers many useful lessons which will be discussed in Part 3.

Structural Naval Arms Control

Except during the period between 1918 and 1939, naval arms control efforts have been limited when compared to those addressing land and airborne forces. There are two major reasons for this. First is the problem of asymmetries. Some nations have extensive maritime interests because of their geography, economy or history. Others are primarily continental or land-oriented. These differing interests can make it difficult to reach agreement on mutually acceptable naval limitations. The second reason is that navies have roles other than war-fighting. In the international arena they are diplomatic instruments in a way that armies and air forces are not. In times of peace, warships represent a people’s technology, skills and values abroad. They are *de facto* mobile embassies when making port calls. “Moreover”, in the words of Dr Peter Jones, “warships have peacetime roles which most categories of land-based equipment do not. Tanks and artillery pieces, for example, do not participate in the land-based equivalents of Search and Rescue missions or fisheries patrol. This is not to say that the army does not have peacetime roles. But most of the major categories of army equipment which might be subject to limitation in traditional arms control negotiations are not associated with these roles the way ships of many classes are in the maritime

environment”.¹⁵ In times of tension, warships become useful crisis management tools. The diversion of an operational warship away from its routine duties toward the scene of a problem sends a diplomatic message of concern or resolve. Once it arrives in the theatre of operations, its stationing and employment can send diplomatic signals of varying seriousness. As one analyst has said, there is a very great difference between a squadron of warships cruising just beyond the limit of a 12-mile territorial sea and a division of tanks beginning to manoeuvre within 12 miles of a land border.¹⁶ For these reasons, and because of characteristics of maritime dialogue which will be discussed later, confidence building at sea has generally been far more productive than structural naval arms control.¹⁷

Prevention of Incidents at Sea

Arguably the best example of a contemporary CBM, maritime or otherwise, is the concept of agreements for the prevention of incidents at sea (“INCSEA”). In 1972, the heads of the US and Soviet navies signed an agreement on “Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas” (this wording was carefully chosen to exclude submarines). Since then, “INCSEA” has become one of the most enduring and resilient of all confidence building measures. From its bi-polar Cold War origins, the concept has been adapted and adopted wherever there is a will to transform interaction at sea from confrontation to cooperation. During the past twenty-five years, this agreement has been honoured even during periods of considerable diplomatic tension. Perhaps more significantly, the annual consultations called for in the agreement continued even during major disputes. Following the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the US froze much normal government-to-government dialogue in protest. Nonetheless, annual INCSEA consultations continued. Despite occasional postponements and

Commander Pedro L. de la Fuente, *Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional Stability*, US Naval War College Review, Winter 1997 p.50.

14 Macintosh has identified land-oriented examples in Europe which go back even earlier. For a comprehensive survey of examples preceding the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 see James Macintosh “Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective” op. cit. pp 16-25.

15 Peter Jones, “The Future of Naval Arms Control (Including Confidence Building Measures” in *Maritime Forces in Global Security*, Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon, eds., Halifax, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1994, p. 100.

16 Prof. Michael Pugh in a lecture to the Maritime Dimensions of Peacekeeping course at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, Canada on 2 August 1995.

17 For further discussion of naval arms control see the books by Hill and Lacy listed in the bibliography and Peter Haydon’s “Arms Control and Disarmament at Sea: What Are the Prospects?” in Elizabeth Mann Borgese, Norton Ginsberg and Joseph R. Morgan eds., *Ocean Yearbook 9*, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press 1991, pp 266-293.

curtailment of the usual social activities, this channel of communication could stay open because it was a practical, non-political arrangement dealing simply with safety and the removal of ambiguity. INCSEA did not prevent incidents from happening, but the agreement provided an effective mechanism to keep them from escalating out of proportion.¹⁸

The successful experience of the US and USSR led others to negotiate similar agreements (see Figure 2). There were slight changes in wording from the US model, but the main features remained identical. Ironically, as the Cold War thawed, bilateral INCSEAs with Russia continued to be negotiated. There are several reasons. In some cases the work was already underway. In others, political uncertainty made establishing navy-to-navy relationships even more prudent. Most significantly however, the mandatory annual consultations called for in all such agreements provide an invaluable non-political opening to explore other avenues of cooperation. As mutual confidence increased and incidents declined, the concept of 'staff talks' developed, adding a series of informal discussions on matters of mutual interest following the formal consultations. The INCSEA concept has also provided a model for several Dangerous Military Activities Agreements (DMAA) which address sea, land and air forces, and areas other than the high seas.

Not all INCSEAs are bilateral and not all involve Russia (see Figure 2). There have also been moves toward regional and even global INCSEA arrangements. At the moment however, a universal agreement is unlikely and may even be counterproductive. Much of the value of INCSEA lies in the fact that it addresses specific problems and creates politically approved, direct navy-to-navy, sailor-to-sailor linkages. There is much advantage in dealing with regional problems regionally, taking care to make the provisions of regional arrangements generally compatible with those elsewhere. Circumstances in Middle East are, for example, quite different from those in the Western Pacific or Latin America. There are many reasons for the success of the INCSEA concept. These have been described in detail by David Winkler¹⁹, but can be summarized as follows:

Mutual Interest

1. No one benefits from damage, injury or loss of human life. Equally important, mutual reassurance and removal of ambiguity prevents operational mistakes or misunderstandings from turning into unwanted political crises.

Simplicity

2. Instead of trying to introduce controversial constraints on operations, INCSEA simply reinforces and complements established international arrangements such as the International Code of Signals and Collision Avoidance Regulations. Simplicity also means that it is easier to disseminate and teach the procedures.

Professionalism

3. The contents of INCSEAs are negotiated by sailors and naval aviators, not by diplomats. Political leaders authorize the negotiations and approve the results, but the details are "sailor-made"²⁰. Virtually all delegates to annual consultations are sailors or naval aviators, therefore discussion tends to be professional, frank and non-political. Diplomats and lawyers may attend as advisors, but the Heads of Delegation are naval.

Preparation

4. If an incident occurs, details are provided well before the consultations so that surprises are avoided and the other side has time to investigate. Often the matter can be resolved even before the meeting.

Hospitality

5. The Soviet Union established two important traditions in 1971.
 - (i) The principle that the host pays all costs from the moment that the other delegation arrives. This simplifies administration for the visitors and contributes to a cordial atmosphere.

18 See David N. Griffiths, "Catalyst for Confidence: 25 Years of INCSEA" Maritime Affairs Newsletter, Winter 1998. Available on the internet at www.naval.ca/article/griffiths/incseabydavidgriffiths.html.

19 David F. Winkler, "US-Soviet Maritime Confidence-Building Measures", in Jill R. Junnola, ed., *Maritime Confidence Building in Regions of Tension*, Washington, The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1996. Winkler has also provided interesting insights into the human factors in the success

of negotiations; see "Conflict on the High Seas", *Foreign Service Journal*, September 1996, pp 44-49, and "When Russia Invaded Disneyland", *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1997, pp 77-81.

20 Bahktiyar Tuzmukamedov, "Sailor-Made Confidence-Building Measures", in Jozef Goldblat, ed., *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence*. New York, United Nations, 1992, pp.69-77.

INCSEA AND SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS

INCSEAs between the USSR / Russia and:

- United States (1972)
- United Kingdom (1986)
- Canada (1989)
- Germany (1989)
- France (1989)
- Italy (1989)
- Netherlands (1990)
- Norway (1990)
- Spain (1990)
- Greece (1991)
- Japan (1993)
- Republic of Korea (1994)
- Turkey - discussions reportedly ongoing as of 1998
- Portugal discussions reportedly ongoing as of 1998

Other INCSEA or Similar Maritime Safety Arrangements

- Germany & Poland - INCSEA (1990)
- Middle East - "Guidelines for Operating Procedures for Maritime Cooperation and Conduct in the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the Sea" (1994). [awaiting endorsement by the ACRS Working Group]
- US and China - "Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (1998)

Other Maritime Initiatives

- Swedish Multilateral UN proposal - submitted to the UN in 1989 but not developed further.
- Western Pacific Naval Symposium - INCSEA draft introduced in 1996 had evolved by 1999 into a draft "Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea". Bilateral sub-regional Track 2 discussions are also continuing.
- India-Pakistan - INCSEA reportedly considered in 1991 but not pursued.
- Greece-Turkey - "Guidelines For the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace" (1988)

Dangerous Military Activities Agreements (DMAA)

- US/USSR (1990)
- Canada/USSR (1991)
- Greece/Russia (1993)
- China/Russia (1993)

Figure 2

(ii) Touring and social activities to foster a mutual understanding. The importance of this aspect should not be underestimated.

public, and therefore diplomatic crises need not prevent the dialogue from occurring.

Discretion

INCSEAs are politically approved, but they are navy-to-navy arrangements. They therefore avoid the disadvantages inherent in a diplomatic treaty. An incident can be addressed as a professional matter rather than as a treaty violation. Furthermore the non-political focus on privately discussed safety issues avoids either side having to posture in

Verifiability and Accountability

An INCSEA provides a means of holding commanders at sea accountable for their actions. Incidents at sea, by their very nature, are very visible. Photographs, videotapes, charts and logs can be produced at the annual review to allow the offending side to take appropriate action. Knowing that senior officers must go through this evolution annually has a tempering effect on those at sea. This is reassuring to both sides.

Regional Approaches to Maritime Confidence Building

The Middle East

1993, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group invited Canada to serve as facilitator for maritime confidence building in the region. Two activities were chosen as starting points. The first was cooperative maritime search and rescue. The other was consideration of an INCSEA arrangement. Dr Peter Jones has written an informed history of ACRS maritime confidence building between 1993 and 1995, so the story need not be repeated here.²¹ It is worth mentioning however that, despite the difficulties facing the Peace Process after 1995, ACRS achievements in maritime confidence building to date are seen as a positive example in other parts of the world. For example, the process and considerations which went into producing the Middle East “Guidelines for Operating Procedures” have resonated and generated interest among maritime professionals elsewhere. And although it may be coincidence, the preamble of the 1998 maritime safety agreement between the United States and China contains wording very similar to the Middle East document which acknowledges that “a spirit of good faith, mutual respect, common values and traditions are shared by professional mariners”. In maritime confidence building, the Middle East has already made a contribution to the global experience.

Asia-Pacific

There is considerable potential for maritime dispute in Asia-Pacific. This is particularly true in South East Asia which, with its archipelagic states and globally important sea lanes, has a significant maritime aspect to its regional stability and security. Maritime confidence building in the region is active and well established. It occurs both on official Track One and on informal Track Two levels. The primary Track One framework is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which has a total of 21 members, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Russia and the United States, as well as the Asian nations. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) brings heads of navies

together on a regular basis, and intersessional workshops are held at a working level. The idea of a regional INCSEA has been the subject of considerable discussion in the WPNS and has evolved into a “Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea” (CUES)²². In addition, there are several bilateral arrangements in the region and Track Two discussions continue on other arrangements. Other Track Two activities include a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) which, among other things, addresses maritime confidence building and cooperation. A Northeast Asia Cooperative Dialogue (NEACD) provides a forum for high level discussion regarding that region, and a Canadian-funded South China Sea Informal Working Group (SCSIWG) addresses issues related to the disputed Spratly Islands²³. In 1995, the ARF endorsed a Concept Paper which defines a regional approach to achieving security, peace and prosperity. It has been summarized this way:

“The approach shall be evolutionary, taking place in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. The ARF process is now at Stage I, and shall continue to discuss means of implementing confidence building. Stage II, particularly where the subject matter overlap, can proceed in tandem with Stage I. Discussions will continue regarding the incorporation of elaboration of approaches to conflicts, as an eventual goal, into the ARF process.”²⁴

The Concept Paper includes two Annexes listing CBMs; one for the immediate future and another for medium- and long-term consideration. These include such ideas as dialogue on security perceptions, exchange of defence publications, participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register, links between military academies and staff colleges, senior officer seminars, response to environmental or natural disaster, establishing information data bases, and cooperation in common problems such as search and rescue, drug smuggling or piracy. Both lists also include

21 Dr Peter Jones, “Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in the Middle East”, in Peter T. Haydon, ed., *Naval Confidence-Building in the Middle East*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No.2, Halifax, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996.

22 Report of the 8th WPNS Symposium Workshop, 30th June-3rd July 1999.

23 Xavier Furtado, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters: Strengthening the Role of Track II Security Mechanisms in the South China Sea” CANCEPS Paper Number 19, Toronto, February 1999.

24 Chairman's Statement at the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995. The text and Concept Paper have been published on the Internet at the ARF website, maintained by the Government of Australia at www.dfat.gov/arf/arf2.html.

peacekeeping as a CBM. That is a theme to which we will return in Part 4 of this paper.

Indian Ocean

Most confidence-building in South Asia has been focused on land, although maritime boundaries have been a subject of discussion between India and both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The value of an INCSEA has been recognized and the idea was discussed between India and Pakistan in 1991. As far as can be determined however, no further progress has been made.²⁵ The aftershock of India's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 may change all that.

Latin America

The approach to maritime confidence building in Latin America is quite different from that in either Asia or the Middle East. As described earlier, confidence building has a long history in the region, pre-dating the CBM concept by 70 years. There are, of course, bilateral activities, such as Argentina-Chile and Argentina-Brazil arrangements.²⁶ On a multilateral level, senior naval officers from the Organization of American States (OAS), including Canada and the United States, participate in an Inter-American Naval Cooperation (IANC) forum. A loose association of naval colleges also exists called the Naval War Colleges of the Americas. Periodic Inter-American War Games are played at various war colleges throughout the hemisphere. At sea, a series of naval exercises called UNITAS has been conducted annually since 1960. In the early years, before some nations were prepared to conduct exercises with others, the United States Navy would send a ship or formation around South America, conducting bilateral exercises with each nation in turn. This permitted each to build a basic capability for interoperability in anticipation of the time when the political climate would allow it to be practised. In 1995, the OAS issued the "Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures". This document constitutes an action plan which includes potential maritime initiatives. Interestingly, although the Declaration evolved from specific regional

25 Rear Admiral K.R. Menon, (Ret'd), "Maritime Confidence-Building in South Asia", in Jill R. Junolla, ed., *op.cit.*, pp75-85.

26 Commander Pedro L. de la Fuente, *Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional Stability*, *op. cit.* Information on confidence building in Latin America (and elsewhere) is also available on the Henry L. Stimson Center website at www.stimson.org.

interests and perspectives, many of the activities proposed are similar to those suggested for Asia-Pacific in the ARF Concept Paper, including information exchange, advance notice of exercises and dialogue on defence policies and doctrines.²⁷

The Caribbean

Confidence-building in the Caribbean addresses non-traditional and non-military security concerns. The island states do not suffer from antagonistic relationships. Indeed, they "have already attained the type of security relations that confidence-building is intended to promote".²⁸ The security problems facing them now involve things like drug traffic and its associated crime problems, economic vulnerability and natural and environmental hazards.^{29,29} Confidence within the region is therefore being enhanced through active cooperation. This includes a ten-member Regional Security System, OAS-coordinated work on disaster mitigation and response, coastal zone management, and climate change preparedness. In the military sphere, countries are participating in initiatives ranging from the UN Register of Conventional Weapons and the OAS inventory of confidence measures to the "Tradewinds" series of exercises.³⁰

This unique experience with "confidence expanding"³¹ provides a model which may well be useful elsewhere.

Euro-Atlantic

The Euro-Atlantic region too illustrates the value of routine cooperation as a mechanism for confidence-building and dispute management. Nations which were bitter enemies fifty years ago are now joined in alliance through NATO and the WEU and have achieved mutual trust through

27 OAS Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Adopted at the fourth plenary session held on November 10, 1995. The text has been published on the Internet by the Canadian government at www.dfaite-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/santiag1.htm.

28 James Macintosh and Ivelaw Griffith, *Confidence Building: Managing Caribbean Security Concerns*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, October 1996, p. 1.

29 Cesar Gaviria, Remarks by the Secretary-General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria, at the First High Level Meeting on Special Security Concerns of the Small Caribbean Island States, San Salvador, El Salvador, February 25, 1998. Published on the OAS website at <http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/SG/225carbe.htm>.

30 Cesar Gaviria, Remarks ...

31 The term is introduced in James Macintosh and Ivelaw Griffith, *Confidence Building: Managing Caribbean Security Concerns*.

working together. That process is now extending to former Warsaw Pact rivals through the Partnership for Peace program. Contemporary bilateral antagonisms and disagreements are better managed because the disputants are linked within a broader mutual security relationship. The problems between Turkey and Greece have been moderated by their mutual membership within NATO for example. A recent and unexpected example involved the 1995 dispute between Canada and Spain over fishing rights on the Grand Banks. Both sides deployed warships to support their national positions, public and political passions ran high and there was considerable concern on both sides of the Atlantic about escalation. Despite the tension

however, the Spanish and Canadian Admirals were able to speak regularly and directly by telephone because of established personal and communication links which both enjoyed through their common security relationship. Both sides could remain confident that any escalation would be clearly politically approved, and not the result of misunderstanding or misjudgement at sea. Even the relationship between Canada and the United States is not without disputes over fisheries and territorial boundaries. Nonetheless, it is now ninety years since Canada's primary security threat was the United States and today's close cooperative relationship allows such disputes to be managed peacefully.

SOME LESSONS FROM MARITIME CONFIDENCE BUILDING

Characteristics of Maritime Dialogue

EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT MARITIME confidence building enjoys certain advantages which can make it a valuable element of a broader confidence building dialogue. Arguably there are six factors.

The first is the influence of the sea upon those who earn their living on it. The sea does not discriminate, and the common experiences of life at sea tend to create a common bond between professional mariners. Also, it is the nature of war at sea that the targets of attack are platforms, not individuals. The history of sea warfare is full of ferocious fights being followed by strenuous efforts to rescue survivors. Of course this "band of brothers" tradition can be overstated and, as with everything, there are exceptions. Nonetheless, it is a solid foundation upon which to build a relationship of understanding and trust.

Second, the diplomatic role of navies mentioned earlier has resulted in a well established and relatively universal tradition of behaviour, custom and courtesy within which foreign warships and their crews can interact easily. This unique cultural environment provides a body of precedent and an atmosphere which is conducive to dialogue, even among antagonistic navies.

Third, there is a longstanding history and tradition of international consultation on seafaring matters. Concepts of international maritime law have roots in European and Mediterranean culture dating to the 17th Century and earlier. Hugo

Grotius wrote his famous treatise "*De Mare Liberum*" (Freedom of the Seas) in 1609. The first International Code of Signals was published in 1857³² and the ancestors of today's Collision Avoidance Regulations date back to 1863.³³ Even INCSEA has an ancient precedent with an "*Agreement ... as to the behaviour at sea of English and Flemish ships*" signed in the year 1297.³⁴ The requirement to share seas and waterways safely is independent of political or other rivalries. Face-to-face cooperation among mariners has well established precedent.

The fourth factor is the nature of routine naval operations. A description by Jill Junnola deserves quoting at length.

"Navies of neighbouring states as well as blue water navies are far more likely to cross paths than land armies or air forces. Navies take pride in their right of free passage, although geographical constraints in some regions can narrow significantly the freedom of movement in territorial waters. Naval exercises provide opportunities for close observation, but at close quarters, one country's exercises can be viewed with alarm by another. Crowded sea trade routes and increased competition over maritime resources can provide additional sources of tension at sea. The utility of maritime confidence-building measures

32 "International Code of Signals" Ottawa, Transport Canada, 1994 p xviii

33 A.N. Cockcroft & J.N.F. Lameijer, "A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules" London, Stanford, 1982, p.15.

34 R.G. Marsden, "Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea", Volume I, pp 46-48, Naval Records Society, London, 1915.

(CBMs) rests, in large part, on the need to maintain maritime safety and to avoid incidents at sea. The frequency and proximity of naval interaction provides a sound basis for maritime CBMs because navies in frequent contact are more likely to establish a basic level of cooperation and understanding, even in the absence of official arrangements.”³⁵

Fifth, because most disputes tend to be focussed on issues ashore, the maritime dimensions of the disagreement are often secondary security considerations.³⁶ This means that in some cases, the maritime dimension of an antagonistic relationship may provide a relatively non-controversial common ground as a starting point for dialogue. This factor, along with considerations of mutual safety, humanitarian or economic interests, makes maritime confidence building a very useful beginning for establishing the first links of trust between armed forces in an otherwise confrontational relationship.

Finally, maritime economic interests are rarely the concern of one nation in isolation. Migrating fish, for example, do not recognize the jurisdictional lines which humans draw on charts. Resources on and under the seabed may be located beyond any single national jurisdiction, or in areas where jurisdiction is disputed. In addition, maritime issues are no longer solely the concern of coastal states. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea affirms that even land-locked states have a right of access to and from the sea, to own and operate ships and to enjoy equal treatment in maritime ports.³⁷ The Convention also defines the resources on the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as being “the common heritage of mankind”, in other words of all states, both coastal and land-locked.³⁸ Some maritime aspects of confidence building may therefore be applicable to those not traditionally thought of as having maritime interests.

Lessons from INCSEA

It is a characteristic of constructive arms control and confidence building dialogue that once people begin to interact on a personal level, the process

tends to gain unexpected momentum very quickly. An excellent example is the INCSEA experience. The author recalls participating in the first Canada-Russia naval “exercise” off Halifax in 1994. The International Code of Signals, amplified by INCSEA signals and procedures, was used to attempt rudimentary coordination. Even before the ships had turned homeward, junior Canadian officers and seamen were enthusiastically working on ways to “do it better next time”. During the Canada-Russia INCSEA consultations in Moscow later that year, the formal review was quickly and cheerfully dispensed with, and the delegations moved on to “Staff Talks” during which each side briefed the other on matters of mutual professional interest, interrupted only by a visit to ships of the Baltic Fleet. INCSEA, or any activity which engages former adversaries or rivals in working together, is a powerful catalyst for confidence.

On a more official level, once progress is being made in confidence building, the parties begin to share a common desire to place less emphasis on avoidance, prevention or constraint and more on coordination and cooperation. Again, INCSEA provides examples. Nations which have negotiated INCSEAs with Russia after the Cold War have not necessarily done so because there were incidents. It was simply a convenient excuse to institute some form of regular dialogue. Discussions over the title of the Middle East text seriously considered deleting any reference to “prevention of incidents”. In the end, the phrase was retained, but subordinated to the positive purpose of providing “Guidelines for Operating Procedures”. Elsewhere, contemporary discussions tend to favour positive reference to safety rather than negative reference to avoiding or preventing problems. The most recent example is the United States-China agreement for “...Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety”.

These two examples of how practical confidence building quickly tends to accentuate the positive and downplay the negative, reinforce the argument made earlier, that the CBM spectrum needs to include active cooperation.

35 Bill R. Junnola, ed., *Maritime Confidence Building in Regions of Tension*, Washington, The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1996, p.ix

36 There are exceptions of course. The jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea are one example of an almost purely maritime problem. See David N. Griffiths “Ready, ...um, Ready?”, *Maritime Affairs Newsletter*, September 1996, pp.11-12.

37 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Part X

38 *ibid.*, Article 136

SOME PROPOSALS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, demonstrates that although progress in formal CBMs may be adversely effected by fluctuations in the political climate, the *endeavour* of building confidence may, can and should continue, as long as the desire exists to create a positive transformation in a security relationship. The activities need not be called CBMs, indeed to do so may be to politicize them unnecessarily. That is the reason why the suggestions offered here are described in terms of results-oriented activities rather than end-products of negotiation.

There are many activities, formal or not, which can contribute to mutual reassurance and a resulting improvement in mutual security and prosperity. The concrete examples which follow are not intended to be a comprehensive list, nor do they represent all of the categories and steps described in Figure 1. They are simply the personal thoughts of a practical ex-sailor with some practical experience in the matter.

All of these possibilities could be appropriate and achievable in the short term. The frequent references to Canada are a function of the nationality and experience of the author, the fact that Canada has undertaken a commitment to facilitate the building of maritime confidence and the fact that agencies such as the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian Hydrographic Service already have experience in the region with various bilateral, multilateral and international marine activities.

Some Suggestions

A Historical Compendium

The last Track One maritime activity of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group took place in 1995. It would be unfortunate if the experience and achievements were simply lost or forgotten. It might be timely to produce an authoritative compendium of all the decision and working documents from the maritime process during the period between 1993 and 1995. Canada should be able to do this, having served as facilitator or "mentor" for the maritime activities.

Senior Officers' Dialogue

The regional survey in Part 2 illustrated that dialogue between senior officers is an integral part of virtually all confidence building approaches.

There are many activities which can increase understanding between junior officers who will become the naval commanders of the future, but opportunities for the *present* leaders to better understand each other are, if anything, even more important. There is a precedent for the Middle East in the successful 1994 Senior Maritime Officers' Symposium in Halifax. Although it was an ACRS-sanctioned event, it could equally well have been an academic seminar hosted by Dalhousie University. A review of the presentations which were made at the time indicates several common themes for future discussion. Although formal meetings in an official context may be diplomatically inappropriate from time to time, there should be no unsurmountable barrier to an extra-regional university or institute inviting senior maritime officers, in a private capacity, to come to exchange views on regional maritime issues.

Staff Colleges

A staff college is an academic as well as a military institution. In that spirit, consideration could be given to academic dialogue between them, either on an official basis or at an informal level. The author was a student at the Canadian Forces College in 1989 when, for the first time, the Soviet Naval Attaché came to lecture on the Soviet Union's perceptions of naval strategy. It was a memorable day, and the opportunity to exchange ideas both formally and over lunch did much to dispel mutual misunderstanding among the senior officers of the future. This, incidentally, is a good example of how a straightforward initiative could have been unnecessarily complicated by trying to define it rigidly as either Track One or Track Two. If it would be helpful, an extra-regional staff college such as the Canadian Forces College in Toronto could draw on its experience in the Naval War Colleges of the Americas and facilitate the beginning of such a project.

Maritime Information Exchange

In the Middle East there are many potential uses for an effective electronic means of exchanging maritime information. In the short term, it may simply involve the preliminary confidence building step of making basic data available to other network participants in much the same way as websites and e-mail are used on the public Internet. In the medium term however, it could become a resource for cooperative activities ranging from search and rescue, to pollution response or fisheries

management. In the long term, it could provide a basis for improving security cooperation in activities such as law enforcement or countering terrorism. One means of achieving this is suggested by a system which Canada uses to link all its government departments which have maritime interests. The Canadian Maritime Network (CANMARNET) is based on commercially available software and has both classified and unclassified sections. Such a program would be readily adaptable to the Middle East situation and perhaps the existing ACRS communication network could provide the hardware.

Search and Rescue

An efficient cooperative maritime search and rescue arrangement is in everyone's interest. A major maritime disaster such as a ferry sinking may be beyond the capability of any one party to address alone, and political disagreement should never hamper the saving of innocent lives. In 1997 a successful Maritime Safety Colloquium for participants from across the Middle East and North Africa was hosted by the Canadian Coast Guard. The event was entirely independent of the peace process, but still provided an opportunity for mutual understanding and discussion of mutual interests. A second was held at the Canadian Coast Guard College in 1998 and the third in Aqaba, Jordan in 1999.³⁹ Hopefully this forum will continue to flourish annually.

Operational Safety

Naval and other armed forces should be able to operate safely in the same area, free from concern about potential misunderstanding and able to use at least a rudimentary mechanism for cooperation in the event of a safety, humanitarian or environmental situation. The "INCSEA" discussions within ACRS produced a good working document - the "Guidelines for Operating Procedures". It is operationally useable, but has never been officially endorsed. It would cost nothing diplomatically for Middle East navies, coast guards and maritime police to carry the draft document aboard vessels and aircraft and to train commanders and crews in its use. Even without formal ratification or public announcements, such a step would contribute to mutual confidence, the enhancement of security and assurance of safety.

Coastal Zone Management

Coastal zone management is an issue which is receiving increasing attention worldwide. It encompasses a wide range of maritime interests including cooperation in hydrography, and issues which transcend boundaries and zones of jurisdiction such as environmental protection and response, cooperative fisheries management and meteorological and oceanographic cooperation. In Atlantic Canada and the northeastern United States for example, the "coastal zone encompasses a multitude of activities and the management of its resources overlaps several jurisdictions; therefore intergovernmental cooperation is essential for coastal zone management. Another necessity is access to appropriate information."⁴⁰ This statement applies equally well to the Middle East. Sub-regional arrangements already exist in the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Organizations such as the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Hydrographic Service and the Bedford Institute of Oceanography have experience with bilateral projects in the Middle East, therefore the nucleus for a facilitated cooperative regional approach already exists. A series of region-wide workshops on coastal zone management would be an excellent start to a long-term process which would have considerable potential for mutual benefit.

Marine Transport

During the 1997 Maritime Safety Colloquium, Coast Guard officers from the United States and Canada explained how those two nations have evolved a closely coordinated system of Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), especially on the Pacific coast, allowing merchant mariners to navigate safely and efficiently back and forth across the international maritime boundaries.⁴¹ From a security perspective this also has advantages in effective surveillance and monitoring of activity in coastal waters. There are lessons from that experience which are directly applicable to the Middle East. The Canadian Coast Guard has been involved in a number of bilateral VTS activities in the region and could facilitate discussions on exchange of ideas and cooperation.

39 David N. Griffiths, ed., "Maritime Safety Colloquium 1997, May 20-28 1997, Proceedings" and "Maritime Safety Colloquium 1998, August 24-28 1998 Proceedings", Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canadian Coast Guard, 1997 & 1998 respectively.

40 From the Internet homepage of the Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee (ACZISC) at <http://is.dal.ca/~mbutler/aczisc>

41 See David N. Griffiths, Maritime Safety Colloquium 1997 Proceedings, op.cit.

Cooperative Enforcement

This topic is raised in the full awareness that it may be controversial. Nonetheless, the purpose of the Workshop for which this paper was prepared was to consider “security improvement” and besides, the author is a practitioner, not a diplomat. Activities such as terrorism and smuggling by sea are often identified by regional authorities as matters which can undermine mutual security. If official dialogue is not practicable, then an academic workshop among knowledgeable officials in a personal capacity could discuss potential options for subsequent official consideration.

Maritime Environmental and Diving Medicine

Medicine not only has its humanitarian aspects, but also operational relevance to activities such as search and rescue or environmental response, and even such security-related activities as cooperative sea mine countermeasures. Dialogue on such topics provides an opportunity for naval doctors, divers and others to better understand and address matters of mutual interest. During informal discussion some years ago, Canada was asked to look into hosting such an event, possibly through the resources of the Institute of Environmental Medicine in Toronto and concluded that it would be feasible and useful.

Maritime Peacekeeping Training

The best means of establishing confidence at sea is to work together. In the early stages of an improving relationship, this can be difficult for technical as well as political reasons. Nonetheless, many soldiers will be familiar with the satisfying experience of working with their counterparts from rival nations while peacekeeping together elsewhere in the world. The same applies to sailors. There have been multinational naval components to several peacekeeping missions. Cambodia was a particularly good example, but there are others.⁴² Fortunately there is no need to wait for a real mission before benefiting from maritime peacekeeping experience. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia conducts an annual course on the maritime dimension of peacekeeping. As a matter of policy, at least one third of the participants are non-Canadian and the curriculum includes a planning exercise which continues throughout the two-week period. This

means that the course provides an excellent opportunity to practice multinational naval planning at an operational level, independent of any political or alliance framework.⁴³ In addition to the in-house course, to which officer from the Middle East are routinely invited, the Centre is capable of taking a transportable one-week maritime package, complete with simultaneous translation capability, anywhere in the world. That includes the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

MARITIME CONFIDENCE BUILDING IS A diverse worldwide endeavour with deep historic roots. For very good reasons there are many regional variations in approach, but equally there are many commonalities and applicable lessons upon which each region can draw, and to which each region can contribute. This paper has described, in very general terms, both the variety and similarity of experience in the hope of contributing to a better understanding of its nature and utility.

Confidence building theory has not kept pace with the evolution of practical experience, certainly not in the maritime context. Traditional measures-oriented theory and terminology which originated in other contexts have lessons to teach and may be useful in the Middle East. Nonetheless, they should be approached critically so that clear and original thinking is not inhibited. To assist in examining the issues without preconceptions, a non-traditional classification of confidence building activities has been suggested.

It is said that every journey is taken one step at a time. In the Middle East, the first steps on the path to mutual confidence and improved security at sea have been positive and constructive. There are many more ahead. The thoughts in this paper are offered in the hope that they may be useful in navigating that path which leads toward the ultimate goal of a secure and peaceful Middle East —*inshallah*.

42 David N. Griffiths “The Influence of Seapower Upon Peacekeeping”, Maritime Security Working Papers No.3, Halifax, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, May 1996

43 Details of the Centre’s program can be found on its website at www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca. For a description of the maritime course and maritime peacekeeping training generally see David N. Griffiths and Douglas S. Thomas “Canadian Navy Trains to Keep the Peace”, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1997

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