

UC Davis

UC Davis Previously Published Works

Title

Courtesy for Corpses: Erictho's Disturbing Decency in Lucan's Bellum Civile

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13r1035r>

Journal

Classical Journal, 118(3)

ISSN

0009-8353

Author

Cruz, Kathleen

Publication Date

2023-02-01

DOI

10.1353/tcj.2023.0002

Copyright Information

This work is made available under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Peer reviewed

*Courtesy for Corpses: Erictho's Disturbing Decency in Lucan's Bellum Civile**

Kathleen Cruz
University of California Davis

Citation: Cruz, K. *Courtesy for Corpses: Erictho's Disturbing Decency in Lucan's Bellum Civile.* *The Classical Journal* 118.3 (2023): 329-60.

Abstract: Erictho's reputation as a grotesque witch seeping with malevolent power has long captivated readers of Lucan's *Bellum Civile*. In this paper, I explore how the poem implicitly works against this reputation even while explicitly endorsing it. After first illustrating how her behavior in the narrative action contrasts with the original description of her character and abilities, I turn specifically to Erictho's considerate promise to lay the reanimated corpse in her necromancy to rest. By fulfilling this promise, Erictho spotlights unsettling conversations of agency and bodily autonomy in Lucan's poem: especially as her behavior contrasts with Lucan's own as he populates his epic with reanimated corpses of a different kind.

Anyone who were to encounter a blood-splattered figure prowling around human graves, biting at dead flesh and occasionally stealing organic material from humans both living and deceased, might very understandably wish to beat a hasty retreat. This is very likely not a person from whom we might expect a pleasant conversation but instead a physically and morally revolting creature we could do very well without. Thanks to her participation in such activities, the witch Erictho in the *Bellum Civile* has become a striking representative not only for the pestilent malevolence that seeps throughout (and out of) Lucan's poem but also the grotesque heights to which Latin literature can aspire.

Erictho's reputation as the goriest of them all has served her well. Readers of the poem have consistently identified the witch as one of the fundamental hinges upon which Lucan's epic

* I would like to thank Yelena Baraz, Malina Buturović, William Dingee, Denis Feeney, Andrew Feldherr, Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval, and Anna Uhlig for their insightful suggestions at various stages, as well as the two anonymous *CJ* referees for their perceptive comments. The text of the *Bellum Civile* is cited from Housman (orig. 1926), with reference to Shackleton Bailey (1988). All translations are my own.

turns, precisely because of her horrible presence. Jamie Masters exemplifies this nicely in his articulation of Erictho as Lucan's mirrored image. In his view:

the Erictho episode is tasteless, rhetorically overblown, revolting, sensational, macabre, [and] decadent and yet, at the same time, to denounce Erictho is to denounce Lucan; to come to terms with Erictho is to come to terms with Lucan; she has been the very emblem of the poem, a compact consummation of all that we hate or love about the poet. The litmus test.¹

On a less meta-textual level, the remarkably detailed imagery of corporeal gore that accompanies Erictho's introduction, coupled with her association with Sextus Pompey and the necromancy that she performs for his benefit, has branded her "a truly hellish creature, in a hellish context" whose influence over the poem reiterates its themes of perverted norms.² Martin Korenjak gets at something central to these extreme reactions with the laconic claim, "Erictho is different."³

Such responses to Erictho, her nature, and her function in the *Bellum Civile* take Lucan at his word: the poem introduces Erictho in Book 6 as an immoral and infinitely powerful witch, an abuser of graves and a savant of the most horrendously foul. There is good reason to embrace this vivid portrait, as the poem's language is extraordinarily detailed and deeply evocative. As these grotesque images tempt the reader to follow them through the genuinely wild ride that is Erictho's necromancy, however, we encounter a problem. While Lucan's explicit introduction certainly does set up Erictho to be a witch of both limitless power and very poor character, implicit details within the narrative scope of the epic disturb and ultimately work against this description. Throughout her interactions with both Sextus and the corpse that she reanimates, Erictho does not, in fact, display the boundless malevolent power that the reader is promised.

¹ Masters (1992): 179.

² Nadeau (2009): 36. See also Fauth (1975), Johnson (1987), Tesoriero (2004): 201-8, and Pypłacz (2016) for particularly vivid examples of this reading of Erictho. For Lucan's distaste of Sextus and its effect on Erictho's role, see Ahl (1974): 568 and (1976): 114, 130-3, Makowski (1977): 198-9, Martindale (1977): 375-9, Hardie (1993): 88-119, Tesoriero: (2002), Nadeau: (2009), Fratantuono (2012): 246, 262-3, and Santangelo (2015): 184-5.

³ Korenjak (1996): 21, orig. "Erictho ist anders."

Furthermore, this body-snatching sorceress shows herself at times to be markedly respectful to both of her interlocutors, living and deceased, in critically important ways. An undercurrent of often overlooked evaluations of Erictho – variously labeling the witch “charming,” “a...reassuring professional,” and a “reasonable” conversational partner – has signaled this disjointed picture.⁴ The Erictho we receive during the necromancy of Book 6 is not exactly the Erictho we are promised.

In order to appreciate how Lucan achieves this striking contrast as well as its greater implications for the *Bellum Civile*, I begin by considering the discrepancies that the poem creates between its descriptive treatment of the Thessalian witch and Erictho’s actual behavior upon meeting Sextus, especially in regard to her treatment of the reanimated corpse. Here, I both bring the aforementioned scholarly undercurrent that has observed Erictho’s at times pleasant behavior closer to the surface and expand upon it to construct a fuller portrait of Lucan’s witch. I then explore the important ways in which Erictho’s actions diverge from both the broader literary tradition and our understanding of established magical practices of necromancy. After identifying the uniqueness of Erictho’s behavior as necromancer, I revisit its traditionally productive juxtaposition with the relationship between Apollo and his priestess Phemonoe in Book 5; Erictho’s bizarrely considerate actions not only emphasize Apollo’s disturbing violence but thereby delineate the disconcerting dynamics between the human and non-human in Lucan’s poem. With these consequences for the poem’s inner world fleshed out, I conclude by considering the effects of these newly appreciated features of Erictho on the *Bellum Civile* as a historical epic and on Lucan as its narrator. To do so, I tackle previous gestures toward understanding Erictho’s necromantic raising of the dead as akin to zombification. Through

⁴ D. Ogden (2009): 197; Fratantuono (2012): 248. See further discussion in n. 6, 9, and 13.

careful consideration of the questions of autonomy and subjugation raised by the concept of the zombie, we can fully appreciate what it means for a supposedly vile witch to lay a reanimated corpse to rest within an epic teeming with corpses infinitely awakened by a narrator who cannot let them lie.

01. The Inverted Expectations of Erictho's Necromancy

After introducing Thessaly as the original site of “savage war” (*hac tellure feri mi-cuerunt semina Martis*, 6.395), Book 6 of the *Bellum Civile* proceeds with a lengthy delineation of the kinds of magic and its practitioners endemic to the region. A notable portion of this discussion is taken up by the narrator’s ponderous consideration of witchcraft’s power over the gods, as well as the reasoning behind its efficacy (6.443-99) – a point to which we will return below. It is following these striking observations of magical control over the divine sphere that attention turns to Erictho in particular. Lucan’s initial description of Erictho, her domain, and her activities is quite lengthy, nearly 80 lines, running from 6.507-69 and continuing at 573-89 after a brief reference to Sextus, her approaching client. We are told to expect a disturbing figure who hovers outside the border of social convention by dwelling in graveyards and neglecting to pray to the gods (6.510-11; 523-5) and who instead inhabits a land of death, over which she holds power. Erictho pleases (*grata*) the gods of Erebus (6.513), is associated with “Stygian houses” (*domos Stygias*, 6.514), and knows the secrets of Dis himself (6.514). She is physically repulsive and possesses a deathly complexion (*terribilis Stygio facies pallore grauat*, “her terrifying appearance is burdened by a Stygian paleness,” 6.517), which is appropriate considering that she spends the majority of her time tearing apart human remains in order to procure ingredients for her spell-craft (6.531-69). Importantly, too, her control over the gods above is unparalleled and

remarkably effective: *omne nefas superi prima iam uoce precantis /concedunt carmenque timent audire secundum* (“The gods above grant every evil she invokes at the sound of her voice, and they fear to hear a second incantation,” 6.527-8). In short, Erictho is “by far the worst of the worst” amongst her kind and wields powers “beyond what can be created in horror fiction.”⁵

With these descriptors, Lucan introduces Erictho as a selfish, socially-illiterate creature of limitless, malignant power. It initially appears that such qualities will also mark her documented behavior in Book 6, for the narrator remarks that her warm response to Sextus’ approach stems from his notice of her reputation (*in pia laetatur uulgato nomine famae*, “She, blasphemous, was pleased by the name of her reputation made common,” 6.604). Yet, with her very first words, Erictho displays an unexpected kind of moderation as she offers Sextus an honest evaluation of how successfully she can meet his needs.⁶ She first outlines the limitations placed on changing the fated trajectory of the world (6.605-15) and then explains what she can and is willing to do within those limitations: *sed si praenosceret casus/contentus, facilesque aditus multique patebunt/ad uerum* (“But if you are content to know of fate, many easy pathways to the truth will open up,” 6.615-7).⁷ Erictho presents no artifice to Sextus, and her strict clarity is worth emphasizing in the face of readers’ at times hyperbolic focus on her powerful magic. As we have already observed, the narrator’s notably drawn out introduction certainly sets up the reader to expect an “über-witch” possessing “exceptional dark powers.”⁸ Yet, this is precisely where Erictho behaves unexpectedly: for in a disorienting shift, one of the first acts we actually see this über-witch perform in the narrative proper is an acknowledgement of the limits of those

⁵ Johnson (1987): 21; Pillinger (2012): 68.

⁶ Ogden (2009): 197 correctly notes that “as [Erictho] enters the action here she is revealed to be a competent and reassuring professional, charmingly flattered by Sextus’ approach”; see similar sentiments at Ogden (2001): 145.

⁷ See Pillinger (2012): 68-70 on Erictho’s limitations and innovations.

⁸ Dinter (2012): 72; “über-witch” is also employed by McClellan (2019): 158.

powers to one seeking them out.⁹ This is not at all to say that what Erictho claims she can accomplish is minimal or mundane, but an Erictho who both keeps to recognizable limits and honestly delineates them to others does not match the expectations raised by the narrative's introduction.¹⁰

After Erictho sets out these qualifications, she gathers and prepares the necessary materials to raise the corpse that she has chosen to provide Sextus the answers he seeks. Yet, as her ritual is described in lengthy detail, we find another moment of false advertising. After Erictho performs an initial spell to reanimate her dead informant, she finds her necromancy unsuccessful; the terrified shade still remains outside of the body, unwilling to re-enter it (6.695-723). Erictho's response is one of surprise: *miratur Erictho/has fatis licuisse moras* ("Erictho marveled that fate was permitted these delays," 6.725-6). To secure the ritual's success, the sorceress must perform a second incantation bursting with threats against divine powers (6.730-49).

The use of a second incantation with heightened threats in ritual magic is not without precedent: we find it both in other literary texts and as a necessary possibility in the magical papyri.¹¹ It is only remarkable here because Lucan primes the reader explicitly not to expect it. The narrator magnifies Erictho's power at 6.527-8 by claiming the gods grant the witch her

⁹ Fratantuono (2012): 247-8 also observes this dramatic juxtaposition, suggesting that in her "reasonable" and "almost [casual]" clarification, "the poet Erictho gently corrects the errant poet Lucan." Masters (1992): 208 offers a distinct but similarly aligned metapoetic reading of these lines as evoking Lucan's own limitations as a poet of history. My reading here does not work against this kind of interpretation. Rather, by focusing instead on how to read Erictho's correction specifically in respect to her interaction with Sextus, it simply offers a complementary one; this is something Masters seems, in fact, to desire, as he turns to the Lucan-centric reading after noting that Erictho's clarification has a "strange redundancy [sic]" and is "unnecessar[y]" in the action of the poem.

¹⁰ Contra Fratantuono (2012): 248, who interprets Erictho's admission as suggesting "witchcraft is essentially a powerless art" for being unable to alter *fata* and *fortuna*. Cf. Dinter (2012): 62-75 for a relatively recent close reading of the remarkable nature of Erictho's power in other respects.

¹¹ Tesoriero (2000): 223 discusses useful literary parallels at Hor. *Ep.* 5.77-82 and Apul. *Met.* 2.29 as well as several examples throughout the *PGM*. Pillinger (2012): 71-2 also tracks Erictho's need for repetition here alongside other Latin literary witches. Cf., Graf (1997): 222-8 for the use of coercion in ancient magic and, in particular, discussion of the relevant *PGM* IV.1035f. at p. 226.

demands at “the first sound of her voice” (*prima iam voce*), as they fear her use of a “second incantation” (*secundum carmen*). The need for a second incantation, however, is exactly what we find once Erictho actually begins to perform a ritual in the narrative time of the text. Erictho’s performance of necromantic magic pulls again on the threads we identified in her initial dialogue with Sextus regarding the reality of the limits of her magical powers; furthermore, it emphasizes once more the disjunction between Lucan’s initial description of the witch and what we find once she truly enters the scene.¹²

After the body has been reanimated successfully with the second incantation, Erictho returns to the behavior she displayed upon Sextus’ approach. She is once again upfront with her undead informant and indeed displays a certain unexpected “friendliness” and “urbanity.”¹³ In particular, Erictho bids the reanimated corpse give her the information she seeks (*‘dic’ inquit Thessala ‘magna, \ quod iubeo’*, 6.762-3) and makes him a promise in exchange (6.763-70):

nam uera locutum
 immunem toto mundi praestabimus aevo
 artibus Haemoniis: tali tua membra sepulchro,
 talibus exuram Stygio cum carmine siluis,
 ut nullos cantata magos exaudiat umbra.
 sit tanti uixisse iterum: nec uerba nec herbae
 audebunt longae somnum tibi soluere Lethes

¹² One might push back against this point by noting that Lucan explicitly says at 6.527 that it is the *superi*, “the upper gods,” who fear Erictho’s second incantation. In contrast, Erictho calls upon Underworld powers (*inferni*) throughout her necromancy, including the Eumenides (6.695), the river Styx (698), Persephone and Hecate (700), and Pluto (702). If we were to be particularly discerning, we might want to defend the narrator’s earlier claim by remarking that he only claimed that Erictho held such power over the *superi*, not the *inferni*. One could discuss how strictly Lucan uses the term *superi* to mark this difference, but that is an issue to be discussed on a different occasion. I would simply remark here that even if one were to argue that such a distinction exists, the narrative movement would still be the following: Erictho is presented as remarkably effective against certain divine powers, but, within the narrative action, she is shown to be less effective against other divine powers. We might also note the argument at Tesoriero (2000): 219 that “Erictho’s own imprecision is responsible for the inadequacy” of her first incantation, as she does not explicitly include that the spirit of the dead must enter its body. The question of how precise a spell must be in order to be effective cannot be explored here, but if one follows Tesoriero, we find another hole, albeit a different one, in Erictho’s persona as the all-powerful witch.

¹³ Korenjack (1996): 216: “Erictho bittet den cadaver, seine Weissagung zu verkünden. Ihr Umgang mit der Leiche ist dabei von ähnlicher Freundlichkeit und Kooperationsbereitschaft geprägt, wie sie schon das Gespräch zwischen ihr und Sextus gekkenzeichnet haben. Diese Urbanität...”

a me morte data.

For after you speak true, I will bestow upon you immunity to the Hæ-monian arts for the entire age of the world. I will burn your limbs on such a pyre, with such wood and Stygian chant, so that your shade, although having been called by song, will not hear any magician. Let this be the value of having lived again: neither incantations nor herbs will dare to dissolve the sleep of long Lethe from you once I have given you to death.

In her promise to the corpse, Erictho recognizes the abuse that she herself has conducted upon it in promising to protect the body from enduring such a fate a second time.¹⁴ Importantly, Lucan dedicates several lines to demonstrating that she keeps her promise. The book closes with a full description of the corpse's treatment with incantations and herbs (*carminibus magicis...herbisque*, 6.822) before it is finally burned and returned to the domain of death: *accensa iuuenem positum strue liquit Erictho/tandem passa mori* ("Erictho released the young man stretched out on the burning fire and finally allowed him to die," 6.826-7). Book 6 then ends with Erictho accompanying (*comes*) Sextus back to his father's camp (6.827-30). As dawn begins to color the sky, she also ensures that Sextus' steps remain safe (*tutos...gressus*, 6.829) throughout his return.¹⁵

With the narrative and its tensions laid out, let us step back to consider the episode as a whole. Two particular and connected observations may assist us in filling out our

¹⁴ Pillinger (2012): 73 comments that while this may seem to be "an uncharacteristically generous move" on Erictho's part, this action instead is her "attempt to stymie any later appropriation of her innovative poetics" of Latin witchcraft. This reading may indeed hold metapoetically, but it is worth noting that if this were Erictho's agenda, there would be no need to promise the corpse its final rest in exchange for its prophetic account. As we will see below, offering such a promise is relatively unique, and when brought into conversation with our further observations of Erictho's behavior, it should not be too readily dismissed.

¹⁵ McClellan (2019): 163-4 reads the episode's close as the moment where Erictho's "humanity is for the first time apparent," with the witch acting both in the role of mourner for the corpse and social companion for Sextus. Fratantuono (2012): 261-2 reads Erictho's accompaniment as permanent and a tainting of the Pompeian cause: "The great Pompey... will now have a degenerate son and a viciously gruesome corpse raider as a hag in his camp." The text does not confirm whether or not Erictho stays with the Pompeians after returning Sextus to the camp (she has previously shared that her plan is to make use of the bodies that will be left on the battlefield). The image of Erictho as a companion keeping "safe steps" suggests a considerate escort at odds with Fratantuono's reading, but we need not dismiss the potentially productive tension between these two personas. See Korenjak (1996) 239 for Vergilian parallels of accompaniment similar to that performed by Erictho here.

characterization of Erictho and her magical prowess. First, Erictho is not an all-powerful, impossibly potent witch in all respects. Instead, there are several moments – including her introductory promise to Sextus and her use of a second incantation to initiate her necromancy successfully – suggesting that Erictho is not exactly what Lucan promised. This inconsistency leads us to our second, more important point: Erictho is not the wholly malignant and socially inept figure sketched in the narrator’s introduction either. She offers Sextus unprompted honesty about the scope of her magical abilities and displays awareness of the concerns of the reanimated dead by promising and then granting the corpse eternal rest. These behaviors simply do not neatly align with Lucan’s original image of Erictho. There, she is vile in each and every respect, grotesque in the pleasure she wrings from the abuse of bodies and the flaunting of societal constraints. Simply put, her interaction with Sextus and the corpse is marked by a certain type of decency that appears completely at odds with her introduction.

Some might counter at least part of this reading by pointing out that Lucan is clear about his dislike of Sextus, whose behavior following Pompey’s death will not live up to his father’s prestige and cause.¹⁶ This is certainly true. For Lucan, Sextus is undeserving of his father (*Magno proles indigna parente*, “offspring unworthy of having Magnus as a parent,” 6.420), a future exile and failed pirate (*cui mox Scyllaeis exul grassatus in undis /polluit aequoreos Siculus pirata triumphos*, “whose maritime triumphs the Sicilian pirate, having advanced as an exile in Scylla’s waves, soon polluted,” 6.421-2). With Lucan’s clear detestation in mind, one might argue that Sextus’ role as instigator of this interaction casts an unavoidably negative pall over any seemingly positive behavior Erictho may perform. Acknowledging the poem’s negative judgement of Sextus does not invalidate the behavior that we have been tracking, however, but

¹⁶ See n. 2.

instead guides us as to how we might situate it within the narrative. Lucan does not present Erictho as some kind of moral exemplar of social decency in a properly functioning world. Rather, she performs considerate behavior in a way that remains at odds with both the original framing of her character and her conversational partners. As a result, Erictho's thoughtfulness is dramatically misplaced, and the witch presents herself as an encapsulation of the horrific inversion of the Roman sphere as Lucan imagines it. The only true decency from powerful people or entities in the *Bellum Civile* comes from figures of Erictho's sort, and it is bestowed upon those of Sextus' character – as well as reanimated corpses.

Now that we have broadly delineated this disjunctive portrait, we will use it to better understand a key portion of the Erictho episode: the behavior of the reanimated corpse and the manner with which Erictho treats it. In order to fully appreciate the consequences of both Erictho's disjointed portrayal and her unexpected care for her living-dead informant, we must first situate her behavior within the greater literary and magical tradition and then within the epic on the whole. By doing so, we will not only focus our gaze on Erictho's relative uniqueness as a necromancer of a certain kind but also appreciate the way the poem itself marks her choice to address the fears of her chosen corpse as an interaction of rare significance. Only then will the disturbing consequences of Erictho's actions in and for the *Bellum Civile* come into stark relief.

02. Appeasing the Dead: Necromantic Promises Pre- and Post-Erictho

The “fully and gloriously developed form” of corpse reanimation we find in the *Bellum Civile* is in some ways a first of its kind, although it notably develops previous literary scenes of

interaction between the living and dead.¹⁷ Here I am primarily interested in Erictho's promise to the corpse that she will return it to death upon receiving its assistance. Literary scenes of necromancy or prophetic interaction with the dead can, but need not always, include a promise of reward for the corpse or ghost. Erictho's oath is therefore not generically required but speaks to her unique characterization within Lucan's epic.

A precedent for offering the dead some kind of reward in return for their cooperation is established in *Odyssey* 10. When providing guidance on how to communicate with the shades, Circe instructs Odysseus to swear that he will perform further sacrifices to the dead upon his return to Ithaca (10.521-5), which Odysseus does when beginning his ritual at 11.29-33. Odysseus is not, however, reanimating deceased bodies but speaking to shades, and there is no suggestion here that the use he makes of the dead creates the kind of physical or psychological torment we read of in the case of Erictho's corpse (and which we will address in greater detail below). The promise for future sacrifice is also spoken when Odysseus begins his rites and thus before the shades arrive; this stands in contrast to the scene in *Bellum Civile* 6, where Erictho makes her promise directly to her source.

Before Lucan's Erictho, this Odyssean scene is the only extant previous literary example of, if not necromancy technically speaking, interactions between the living and the deceased for the purpose of gaining information wherein some kind of reward or exchange is promised in return for access to the prophetic dead.¹⁸ Similar scenes, such as the evocation of Darius in

¹⁷ Ogden (2001): 202; see 206-16 for a longer discussion of the *Bellum Civile*'s precedents. Although I am focused on literary depictions of necromancy, it is also worth gesturing to broader evidence – or the lack thereof – of the practice prior to Lucan's poem. Johnston (2005): 287-92 sees little to no evidence for necromancy proper in archaic and classical Greece, whereas Faraone (2005) argues that necromancy was more popular in certain periods than our sources suggest due to the need to “go underground” in later ones. Cf. also Graf (1997): 190-204 for connections between Erictho's practices and other evidence for magical ritual, both literary and material.

¹⁸ See Ogden (2009): 179-82 for Circe as the first necromantic witch in Greco-Roman literature and Ogden (2001): 163-90 for shared techniques for necromancy. For an opposing view, wherein the ritual Odysseus performs should not be considered a proper necromancy but instead a rite of a different kind, cf. Johnston (2005): 288 and Edmonds

Aeschylus' *Persians*, the rejuvenation of Aeson at 7.159-293 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and the necromancy of Laius in Seneca's *Oedipus* (530-658), lack any positive incentive for the underworld powers or the dead.¹⁹ We do find *defixiones* (curse tablets) that promise to "free from restlessness" those ghosts they address, although this is not a prerequisite for magical success.²⁰ After Lucan, Tiresias and Manto's necromancy of Laius in Book 4 of Statius' *Thebaid* contains the more established threats toward the shades (4.500-35), but Tiresias also closes his opening gambit with a promise for reward similar to that which Erichtho grants (4.619-20; 622-24):

confer uultum et satiare litanti
 sanguine....
 tunc ego et optata uetitam transmittere Lethen
 puppe dabo placidumque pia tellure reponam
 et Stygiis mandabo deis.

Speak with us face to face and satiate yourself on this offered blood... Then I will grant it that you may cross Lethe, previously forbidden, on a desired ship, restore you in peace to pious earth, and send you to the Stygian gods.

That only the *Thebaid* includes a clear reward of eternal, protected rest for the summoned deceased suggests that Statius is adopting Lucan's innovation, despite the difference that Tiresias is drawing up a shade rather than reanimating a physical corpse.

(2019): 222-3. See Johnston (2005) 290 for how later versions of this tale may have included Odysseus' performance of a fuller necromantic ritual. We should note that historiography offers some stronger evidence for a reciprocal relationship when attempting to access the knowledge of the deceased; cf. Hdt. 5.92, wherein Melissa refuses to offer information about a desired "deposit" (παρακαταθήκη) until Periander acknowledges her corpse with proper funerary rites. Melissa's refusal to share knowledge until her corpse receives proper ritual mourning, however, is different in kind; here, the dead demands a reward, whereas in Erichtho's case the reward is included as part of the initial pitch from the living. See Johnston (2005): 284-5 for discussion of this "type" of oracle narrative, wherein the dead must be appeased by the living.

¹⁹ Atossa and the chorus recognize the power of the gods and provide offerings to the divine but promise nothing to Darius' shade (619-80), although he does claim to accept (ἔδεξάμην, 685) said offerings. Medea's rejuvenation of Aeson at Ov. *Met.* 7.159-351 has similar qualities compared to necromantic rites but contains only the traditional threats, found in the magical papyri, toward the gods and natural forces as well as general appeasing prayers. The necromancy scene in Seneca's *Oedipus* (530-658) contains no promise or reward for Laius but rather describes Tiresias' broad use of incantations (*decantat*, 562) which either "pleases" or "compels" the shades (*aut placat leues/aut cogit umbras*, 562-3).

²⁰ Cf. Riess (2012): 179-82 for earlier, Greek types and Gager (1999): 12, 18-20, and 118 for a more general summary of *defixiones* that includes Greek and Roman examples.

We can also better appreciate Erictho's relative individuality in her interaction with the dead when we compare it with the story of Thelyphron in Apuleius' later *Metamorphoses*.²¹ In Book 2, Thelyphron is prompted to recount his tale to explain his disfigured face. He then shares that he was originally stationed to guard a corpse overnight against the machinations of witches, who often steal human parts for their designs, as Erictho is said to do. When the corpse is found mutilated in the morning, despite Thelyphron's watch, the victim is reanimated so that he may answer the townspeople's questions. The corpse begs to be returned to death, and the *propheta* who raised it offers threats in response: "*Quin refers*" ait "*populo singula tuaeque mortis illuminas arcana? An non putas deuotionibus meis posse Diras inuocari, posse tibi membra lassa torqueri?*" ('Will you not answer,' he said, 'everything to the people and make clear the hidden circumstances of your death? Or do you not believe that the Furies can be invoked by my chanting, and your weary limbs twisted?', 2.29.4). The corpse immediately complies, and the story ends; we do not hear whether or in what manner the corpse is returned to its deceased state.

In this episode of the *Metamorphoses*, the narrative (and Thelyphron as storyteller) is not primarily concerned with the final state of the corpse, which may explain certain absences. This contrast suggests, however, that Lucan's narrative voice is interested in the full process, and the poem therefore explicates in precise detail a mechanism that could have been suppressed. Similarly, the *propheta* of the *Metamorphoses* decides successfully to prompt the corpse to speak through threats alone and thereby acts in an opposing manner to Erictho, who secures her

²¹ Apuleius also includes a scene of corpse reanimation in Book 1 as part of the story of Socrates and Aristomenes; the resurrection aspect of that story, however, includes little detail of the magical method, with both threats and promises of rewards missing.

corpse's cooperation through a negotiation that promises reward.²² When compared to our other literary necromancers, then, Erictho comes out as the most considerate to her interlocutor.

Now that we have established Erictho's behavior as a distinct aspect of her character rather than the result of generic demand, we can return to the *Bellum Civile*. We will first further our understanding of how Erictho's actions during her necromancy are framed in the epic more broadly and then turn to the wide-ranging consequences, both narrative and metapoetic, raised by Erictho's strikingly considerate treatment of her weary dead.

03. *Bodily Violation and its "Reward" in Bellum Civile 5 and 6*

Although Erictho's unexpected decency is striking throughout Book 6, Lucan's poem draws greater attention to this behavior and its social dynamics by preceding it with an episode of what we might consider terrible indecency. Here I refer to Apollo's possession of the Pythia Phemonoe in Book 5, the episode with which Erictho's necromancy has traditionally and profitably been paired as parallel attempts to gain divine/supernatural knowledge of human affairs. Scholars have generally read these encounters as mirrors of one another, or, more specifically, they have read Erictho's necromancy as the dark mirror of the Pythia's prophecy: the information which Erictho draws is significant, whereas that which Phemonoe channels is trite, and lower forces thrive while those above wither.²³ Following these threads, the two

²² The necromancy at Hld. *Aeth.* 6.14-5 similarly includes no reward for the corpse's cooperation. Looking outside the literary tradition, promises for cooperation are relatively rare, although not nonexistent. Johnston (1999): 78 n. 128 cites a 4th/3rd c. BCE curse tablet from Olbia and another "late curse tablet" as promising a reward or protection in exchange for necromantic knowledge; besides these tablets, her final example of this phenomenon is, interestingly, Erictho in *Bellum Civile* 6.

²³ Cf. Ahl (1976): 130-1, Makowski (1977), O'Higgins (1988), Hardie (1992): 108-9, Masters (1992): 91-205, Day (2012): 93-105, and Pypłacz (2015): 15-57 and (2016): 41-5. See O'Higgins and Masters especially for the added layer of reading Lucan's vatic identity through these episodes.

episodes represent an inner crucible wherein the disturbances of Lucan's text play out, and proper divine order is distorted and dismantled by *nefas*.

The discrepancies in Erictho's persona that we have so far tracked complicate this picture, however. We should expect the Pythia's power, although fading, to present a positive and sanctified manner by which to gain information in contrast to an Erictho whose boundless malevolence marks her as a blight on society's periphery, but this neat picture is not what Lucan presents. In fact, just as Lucan prepares us to expect unlimited malignance in Erictho but ultimately fails to deliver fully, so too does the narrative at Delphi in Book 5 reverse the expectations for which the poem primes the reader; instead of the comfortably familiar procurement of divine knowledge, we must contend with the violently potent, irreconcilable horror that Apollo unleashes, in graphic detail, on his priestess. Considering the episode at Delphi with special attention to Apollo's treatment of Phemonoe's mind and body – in comparison to that which Erictho offers to the reanimated corpse – draws out a disturbing role reversal played over the course of these two books. To appreciate this, let us consider the dynamics of Phemonoe's encounter with Apollo before bringing that interaction into conversation with Erictho and her undead informant.

As Appius prepares to open up the Delphic oracle for his personal gain in Book 5, so too must Lucan, as he comments that it has been closed for many years (5.69).²⁴ Just before the action instigated by Appius' arrival properly begins, the narrator homes in on how the priestesses have reacted to Apollo's silence (5.114- 20):

nec uoce negata
Cirrhaeae maerent uates, templique fruuntur
iustitio. nam, siqua deus sub pectora uenit,
numinis aut poena est mors inmaturo recepti

²⁴ For Lucan's claim of the oracle as defunct as historically accurate, see Parke and Wormell: (1956): 1.283-4, 2.243, 2.597. For rebuttals, see Ahl (1976): 122-3 and Masters (1992): 107, 137.

aut pretium; quippe stimulo fluctuque furoris
 conpages humana labat, pulsusque deorum
 concutiunt fragiles animas.

The priestesses of Delphi did not lament the denial of the prophetic voice and enjoyed the cessation of the temple's activities. For if the god entered up into their breast, an early death was either the punishment or the reward for having received the divine power: especially since the human frame falls from the blow and wave of fury, and the strikes of the gods violently shake fragile souls.

This description foregrounds the coming bodily experience of the priestess as she is "invaded by Apollo," as well as what exactly is at risk if and when she is compelled to open herself up to prophecy.²⁵ Her death comes "early" due to the "fury" of the god's power, and yet that death itself is figured potentially as a "prize." As Pamela Barrett notes, "Lucan implies that the experience would be so horrifying for the inspired one that death would be a welcomed release."²⁶ From the beginning, the entrance of Apollo's numen, his divine power, into the Pythia is prefigured as a painful assault and violation, and this foregrounded knowledge seeps into our reaction to Appius' demand that it occur.

As he reaches the site of the oracle, Appius abruptly removes the current priestess, Pemonoe, from her peaceful sojourn at the Castalian spring (5.125) to force her (*cogit*, 5.127) to enter the temple and provide him the prophecy he desires. In response to these demands, Pemonoe attempts to convince him that the oracle is no longer functioning by providing four different reasons for its current silence (5.130-40). Unlike Erictho, who may calmly and confidently offer a blunt assessment of her powers at Sextus' approach, the much more vulnerable Pemonoe immediately turns to subterfuge in the face of her overwhelming fear and

²⁵ Hardie (1992): 108. Masters (1992): 144 also notes the attention paid to the idea of "breaking in" here, both in respect to Pemonoe's body and the temple.

²⁶ Barratt (1979): 42.

terror, as repeatedly emphasized in Lucan's description.²⁷ Phe-monoe herself is a "fearful seer" (*pavidam...vatem*, 5.124), "afraid" but forced to approach the god over a threshold that is itself "terrifying" (*metuens; limine terrifico*, 5.128), and she labors to dissuade Appius from his goal by passing on her fear to him (*absterrere*, "to frighten off," 5.129). In the end, however, it is this very fear that betrays Phe-monoe: *uirginei patuere doli, fecitque negatis/numinibus metus ipse fidem* ("The young woman's deceit was clear, and although she denied the divine power, her very fear itself gave proof," 5.141-2). Her final attempts to avoid Appius' demands by giving a false performance of divine ecstasy also fall short of convincing her visitor (5.146-57), and Appius makes clear that punishment awaits Phe-monoe should she do anything other than what she is told (*dabis, impia, poenas*, "You, impious one, will pay the penalty," 5.158).

Lucan's descriptions of Phe-monoe and her protests dramatically assert her utter panic at the prospect of fulfilling her role as Apollo's oracle, and Appius' response to her reluctance provides an interesting contrast to Erictho's commands in Book 6.²⁸ There, as noted above, Erictho does make good use of threats, but she directs them against the gods and powers of the

²⁷ One might argue that Phe-monoe's deceit here should be considered more negatively, reflecting adversely on her own character just as Erictho's forthrightness reflects well on her own. Based on the difference in agency between Phe-monoe and Erictho in each scenario and following Masters' observations of the shared descriptions of Phe-monoe and the corpse cited at n. 34, however, Phe-monoe seems better understood as standing in parallel with the corpse and in contrast to the witch in this context. Erictho can be honest because she holds substantial power, whereas Phe-monoe must lie since she does not. She is Apollo's tool just as the corpse is Erictho's, and both are deeply concerned with the physical consequences of acting as such. Following this, while Phe-monoe does choose to attempt to deceive Appius, she takes such a decision because of the already disturbed relationship set up by Apollo's violence. From the start of the episode, Phe-monoe's reasons for her deceit are made abundantly clear, and the amount of time Lucan spends describing both her initial debilitating fear and the horrendous torment she suffers upon being forced to fulfill her role, as described in what follows, suggests she is a cog in the machine of this general social inversion rather than one of its instigators. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for prompting this clarification.

²⁸ She is therefore not simply "uninterested in helping the antiquarian Appius," as put by Ahl (1974): 568. Similarly, Lucan's attention to her emotional state argues against a humorous reading of the scene, such as that of Makowski (1977): 194, who sees the exchange as "[becoming] a ludicrous one when Phe-monoe simulates ecstatic communion with Apollo (and a bad job she does of it) in order to deceive Appius, who finally puts a stop to the nonsense by threatening her with death." Some have noted Lucan's characterization of the Pythia's attempts as deceitful (cf. Barratt (1979): 45-6), and one might read this in favor of one of the two options above. However, this language of desperate deceit does not disqualify her fear and bodily abuse but rather is their logical outcome.

underworld to gain access to a (deceased) human interlocutor who can satisfy her needs; once she has procured this access, Erichtho offers the mortal corpse positive incentives for cooperation. Appius, in contrast, weaponizes his rebukes and threatening demands against a human agent whom he believes he must dominate in order to gain access to divine powers above. Appius makes no use of positive incentives, in great part, perhaps, because there are none that he can offer Phemonoe. Her complacency demands her death.

“Terrorized” by Appius’ abuse (*conterrita*, 5.161), the priestess finally bows to his will and “accepts the divine power into her unaccustomed breast” (*insueto concepit pectore numen*, 5.163). Although more specific insight into the access to knowledge that this grants the Pythia will follow, Lucan begins his description with a lengthy record of her physical torment (5.165-77):

tandemque potitus
 pectore Cirrhaeo non umquam plenior artus
 Phoebados inrupit Paeon mentemque priorem
 expulit atque hominem toto sibi cedere iussit
 pectore. bacchatur demens aliena per antrum
 colla ferens, uittasque dei Phoebeaque sarta
 erectis discussa comis per inania templi
 ancipiti ceruice rotat spargitque uaganti
 obstantis tripodas magnoque exaestuat igne
 iratum te, Phoebae, ferens. nec uerbere solo
 uteris et stimulis flammisque in uiscera mergis:
 accipit et frenos, nec tantum prodere uati
 quantum scire licet.

Paeon Apollo finally took control of the priestess’ breast and broke into her limbs more fully than ever before. He forced out her earlier consciousness and ordered her human body to cede its breast to him entirely. Demented, she raved wildly through the cave bearing this foreign servitude and, shaking the bands of the god and her Phoebean garlands from her bristled hair with her wavering neck, she whirled through the inner parts of the temple and scattered the tripods she met in her wandering path. She burned up, bearing the great fire of your anger, Phoebus. And you did not only make use of the goad and whips and thrust flames into her

organs; she bore the curb as well, and the priestess was not permitted to share as much as she knew.

The Pythia burns from the inside out as both her mind and body are scorched by Apollo's power. The detailed account of this painful process not only emphasizes the utter erasure of Phemonoe's personal self (*mentemque priorem expulit*) but also how deeply Apollo enters and possesses her (*in uiscera pergis*) in a manner even more violent than what is customary (*non umquam plenior...inrupit Paeon*). It is certainly true that Lucan's language shares descriptors with earlier literary depictions of mental frenzy and prophecy, including that of Dido at *Aeneid* 4 (esp. 300-1) and the Sibyl in Book 6 (esp. 77-80), as well as of descriptions of Cassandra's possession in both Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (esp. 1066) and that of Seneca (esp. 724).²⁹ Phemonoe's torment, however, surpasses these earlier examples both in respect to the length of its telling (thirty-five lines in total for the description of possession compared to ten in *Aeneid* 6, for example) as well as its repeated emphasis on the direct and singularly destructive force responsible for this unwilling suffering. Consider in particular the steady repetition of Apollonian references through *Phoebados*, *Paeon*, *Phoebea*, and *Phoebe* over thirteen lines which, along with the direct address at line 673, emphasizes the god's agency over that of his priestess. This lengthy description, importantly, also follows the episode's dilatory opening where, as we have seen, the Pythia's deeply fearful and unwilling protests cannot help but color what follows.³⁰

After this experience and with a "mournful wailing" (*maestus...ululatus*, 5.192), Phemonoe briefly shares Appius' fate in three lines (5.194-6) and then falls silent. Lucan's narration of the Pythia's experience might now have ended; Appius has received his desired information, and this might have allowed the narrator to transition to the description of his

²⁹ See Barratt (1979): 24 and 56 for discussion of specific parallels.

³⁰ See O'Higgins: (1988), Masters (1992): 144, Sharrock (2002), and Lovatt (2013): 146-7 for discussion of how that violence, including rape, is evoked in this scene and others like it.

insignificant death. Instead, we read of Phemonoe's further torment as she bursts from the temple, trapped in the effects of the god's grip (5.209-11, esp. *perstat rabies and superest deus*).

The account of her frantic movements records a frenzy between fear and pain (5.211-8):

illa feroces
torquet adhuc oculos totoque uagantia caelo
lumina, nunc uoltu pauido, nunc torua minaci;
stat numquam facies; rubor igneus inficit ora
liuentisque genas; nec, qui solet esse timenti,
terribilis sed pallor inest; nec fessa quiescunt
corda, sed, ut tumidus Boreae post flamina pontus
rauca gemit, sic muta leuant suspiria uatem.

She twists around, eyes wild and wandering over the entirety of the sky. Now her face is fearful, now she is savage with a menacing look; never does her expression stay still. A flaming blush dyes her face and bruised cheeks, and she does not display the usual pallor for one afraid but rather a paleness that itself inspires fear. Her weary heart does not settle, but, as the swollen sea groans after hoarse Boreal blasts, so does silent gasping support the seer.

Phemonoe thereafter does finally fall and attempt to recollect herself (5.219-24), but with Lucan's earlier description in mind, we know that only death awaits her.³¹ Like Appius, Apollo similarly abandons his battered priestess, a violated, burnt-out husk left behind by the men who have abused her. We can now consider how the descriptions of Phemonoe in Book 5 and Erictho in Book 6 might complement each other. Both Phemonoe and Erictho begin in a similar position; they are women with access to power and knowledge which men desire to activate for their own benefit. Differences arise, however, as Phemonoe is the vulnerable tool of another with divine knowledge (Apollo), while Erictho her-self is the self-sufficient procurer of supernatural knowledge. Apollo interacts with Phemonoe as an instrument to be utilized and cast aside; he

³¹ I agree with Bayet: (1946) and Dick (1965 = Dick (1962): 140-55) that the Pythia perishes after her possession. The description of her fall as *cadit* (5.224) also signals the movement as presaging this conclusion. *Contra* Barratt (1979): 68-9, 72 who seems to read this as merely fainting and O'Higgins (1988): 213, who believes Phemonoe leaves the scene "barely alive," having suffered but "escaped worse." I do not see the reasoning for doubting the narrator's earlier explanation of the consequences of divine possession or for being suspicious of the validity of Phemonoe's terror. Bayet and Dick also both make a good argument for the larger thematic resonances of having the Pythia die after this encounter.

horrifically violates her body and mind and leaves them irreparably damaged. Erictho does reanimate the corpse without its consent (which is impossible to procure beforehand), but upon doing so, she explicitly promises it safe, eternal sleep in exchange for its aid.³² Apollo kills his priestess, whose terror indicates a transparent desire to live; Erictho releases her corpse in clear accord with its wish to truly die.³³

The pairing, then, of the episodes at Delphi in Book 5 and Thessaly in Book 6 does not simply offer up a contrast between a proper, divine method of knowledge collection and a shameful, disgusting avenue of hellish intervention. Nor, with this framework established, does it suggest the “supplanting” of Apollo and his domain before the more effective power of witchy Erictho.³⁴ In fact, despite Lucan’s introduction of Delphi as defunct, his description of Apollo’s entrance not only demonstrates the fierce power at his disposal but also how precisely he utilizes that power. The efficacy of the god’s influence only grows in the reader’s mind upon observing Erictho’s own potent but demonstrably not unlimited power in Book 6.

The framing of these two episodes now allows us to address the narrative inquiry into the balance of power between divine and magical spheres articulated early on in Book 6. There, while introducing Thessalian witchcraft, the narrative voice ponders (6.492-99):

quis labor hic superis cantus herbasque sequendi
 spernendique timor? cuius commercia pacti
 obstrictos habuere deos? parere necesse est,
 an iuuat? ignota tantum pietate merentur,
 an tacitis ualuere minis? hoc iuris in omnis
 est illis superos, an habent haec carmina certum
 imperiosa deum, qui mundum cogere quidquid
 cogitur ipse potest?

³² See Korenjak (1996): 216 on this comparison and its relation to the results of the two prophetic acts.

³³ Hardie (1992): 108 notes the shared endings of death in these two scenes. Masters (1992): 192-3 observes descriptive and behavioral similarities between Phemonoe and the corpse that make this distinction even more striking.

³⁴ Cf. Henderson (1987): 152.

Why do the gods labor to heed chants and herbs and fear to scorn them? What contractual agreement has held the gods bound? Do they need to obey, or does it please them? Do the witches deserve such a great thing on account of unknown piety, or do they effect it with silent threats? Do they possess this power over all the gods, or do these tyrannical incantations keep a certain god in their grip: one who can compel the world in whatever way he himself is compelled?

The narrator clearly lays out a hierarchy of power that privileges the influence of witches over that of the gods and indeed imagines a supernatural sphere of divine subservience. While the narrative voice cannot fully understand why and how this is so – as the multitude of questions suggests – the fact that the gods themselves are at the command of these sorceresses does not seem to be in doubt. Even where Lucan wonders if the witches hold their power through less forceful means, such as his questioning in line 495 of whether obeying sorcerers pleases the gods (*an iuvat*) or whether witches gain their power through some kind of underground worship (*ignota...pietate*), such moments do not detract from the power of magic-users over the gods. In the latter case, the witches still begin the process of some kind of reciprocal exchange, and in the former, their will has effectively aligned with or supplanted that of the gods; if a magician's demands please the gods enough for those divine forces to grant them, one is prompted to ask what difference between the two remains.

As demonstrated in our previous delineation of Apollo's fierce power as compared with Erictho's, this picture is easily fractured despite its seemingly authoritative endorsement. While this passage seems to recognize divine agency as either equivalent or indeed subservient to those versed in the magical arts, both Apollo and Erictho are shown to be active and independent wielders of inhuman power. Furthermore, Apollo's shrine is introduced as defunct before his undeniable, caustic influence devours the Pythia's body. Similarly, witches are here introduced as all-powerful in comparison. Yet Erictho is the one who does not entirely satisfy her terrible reputation of omnipotent magical success: in particular, it takes her two attempts to channel

godly power to her own ends. With this parallel inversion in mind, we can appreciate how the outburst performed by Lucan's narrator at 6.492-9 works identically to his claims of Delphi's abandonment at 5.69. In both cases, the narrator's authoritative set-up is inverted by the narrative action of the text: Erictho clearly exercises some command over the gods in the service of magical ritual, but this power is not unlimited, and while divine powers may generally lack potency in Lucan, Apollo remains ready to assert his own violent presence under select conditions.

The very real difference, then, between gods like Apollo and outsiders like Erictho cannot fully be one of power despite the narrator's own focus on this axis of difference. In practice, as we have seen, the distinction is instead one of social behavior. The true disturbance in the *Bellum Civile* as understood through Books 5 and 6 is that it is only in the horrifying but bizarrely decent figure of the witch Erictho that one can find considerate treatment while attempting to make sense of the abounding madness in which one is encircled. In sum, the pairing of these scenes presents the world of the *Bellum Civile* as inverted in much more disturbing ways than often considered: a world where regularly worshipped gods are violators of human integrity and lack any care for their victims while grave-stalking necromancers treat their clients, both living and dead, with remarkable openness, honesty, and care. It is with the consequences of that discomfiting truth that we must now contend.

04. Laying the Corpse to Rest: Erictho and the Bellum Civile

So far, we have unpacked several ways in which Erictho's behavior during her necromancy has a distinct character of its own and contributes to a disturbing framework of cosmic power when contrasted with Apollo's treatment of Phemonoe in *Bellum Civile* 5. In

doing so, we have considered how the actions Erictho performs reveal the epic's larger divine and supernatural sphere. In closing, I would now like to explore the consequences of Erictho's necromantic act and related questions of bodily autonomy in the context of Lucan's own narrative persona. We began our investigation with Masters' claim that "to come to terms with Erictho is to come to terms with Lucan," and we are now ready to do so.

The provocative interpretive consequences of reading Erictho and her necromancy as a reflection of Lucan and his poetic project have been well established, and the associations between the two are unavoidable.³⁵ The ramifications of this relationship have often had a great range, as Erictho's actions within the text – pre-dominately interpreted, as we have seen, as malevolent, disgusting, and even evil – rebound back on Lucan as another creative agent vivifying horrible and foul events. The understanding that we have established of Erictho as a figure not only of some social decency but even of significantly humane action, especially when compared to Apollo, do not necessarily move counter to such readings, but they do raise an alternative interpretive thread. I now examine what this alternative reading means for Lucan and his own poetic work if Erictho herself is not as horrible as she originally seems. To do so, let us assess the significance of Erictho's unique performance of necromancy and the full dynamics at play between the witch and her resurrected corpse. We shall then consider the consequences of her actions against those of Lucan and what it means for Erictho to be, at least in one significant way, not Lucan's double but his opposite.

In order to appreciate this unexpected contrast, we must begin by returning to the earlier observation that Erictho's necromancy is in certain ways the first of its kind. Scholars have long noted that Lucan's portrayal of Erictho's magical practice is unique in making use of the

³⁵ See n. 23, esp. O'Higgins (1988) and Masters (1992): 179-215.

sustained reanimation of a physical corpse: her treatment of the corpse is not necessarily expected or traditional. This observation of primacy in particular leads one to ask why the *Bellum Civile* might benefit from narrating a necromancy through reanimation rather than through, for example, the use of mantic skulls or the evocation of shades. A traditional answer to this question may point to Lucan's greater interest in narrative intensity or to the broader idea of Neronian literature as intrigued by the treatment of physical bodies, especially those handled with violence.³⁶ I would like to offer a different kind of response, however, by drawing on our previous analysis of contrasting behaviors: namely, both Erictho's relative distinctness in offering a reward of protection to her corpse and the immense distance that we have outlined between that reward and Phemonoe's treatment at the hands of Apollo. What unites these two observations is a central focus on agency over one's own body and the way in which such bodily integrity is deeply tied to that of the mind.

Lucan makes it very clear that the spirit belonging to the dead body in *Bellum Civile* 6 does not want to be reanimated, and the shade's reluctance requires Erictho to offer a second incantation (*secundum carmen*) against expectations. Here we focus more specifically on why exactly such an incantation is required. After Erictho performs her initial ritual (6.720-5):

aspicit astantem proiecti corporis umbram,
 exanimis artus inuisaque claustra timentem
 carceris antiqui. pauet ire in pectus apertum
 uisceraque et ruptas letali uolnere fibras.
 a miser, extremum cui mortis munus inique
 eripitur, non posse mori.

She saw the shade standing beside the strewn body, fearful of its life-less limbs and the hated confinements of its former prison. It paled at the idea of entering the chest, gaping open, the organs and entrails torn apart from the deadly wound. Oh

³⁶ Cf. Most (1992) for an especially evocative exploration of literary violence in the Neronian period. See Martindale (1980) for the question of novelty in this episode and why a necromancy of some kind might suit Lucan's project.

pitiful one, for whom the final reward of death is torn away unfairly: to be unable to die.

The shade's reluctance to rejoin its body is given a deeply physical explanation. First and primarily, the body itself is a site of confinement and imprisonment. Secondly, this body in particular has been robbed of its structure and instead lies torn open with gruesome wounds. The idea of rejoining with such a body – not only a fleshy prison but such a battered and open one – terrifies the spirit. When Erictho then forces the shade into that body, she is not simply reanimating a dead object. Instead, with full awareness, she is rejecting the shade's potential autonomy and, by forcing it back into a ruined body, she is subjecting it to both a psychologically and physically damaging experience.³⁷ The description of the victim's body after Erictho's renewed threat emphasizes this point. Although the corpse's blood is warmed and spread through its cold limbs (*caluit cruor...et in uenas extremaquae membra cucurrit*, 6.750-1), its movements are stilted as it is prompted to obey the witch's commands (*tenduntur nerui...terraque repulsum est/erectumque semel*, "its nerves stretched out... all at once it was thrust up from the earth and stood up-right," 6.755-7). As Aline Estèves aptly describes, the corpse's physicality is akin to "a roughly animated puppet;" the shade's reinsertion into its body is not a welcoming return, but a discomfiting entrapment.³⁸

³⁷ Tesoriero (2000): 220 also points to Lucan's narrative interjection at 6.724-5 as marking the shade's predicament as an object of sympathy for the reader.

³⁸ Estèves (2020) :287; orig. "un pantin grossièrement animé." See also 286-8 for a detailed analysis of this and other aspects of the corpse's body upon reanimation. See McClellan: (2019): 159-60 for further comment on the treatment of the body pre-reanimation; Tesoriero (2004): 191-2, including n. 29, suggests that this "grotesque mockery of genuine life" means Erictho has broken her promise at 6.660 (*iam noua, iam uera reddetur uita figura*, "Now a new, true kind of life will be returned"), showing a limitation in her powers. I am hesitant to assume that Erictho's definition of "true life" matches a reader's own (especially considering that her own, living appearance is decidedly corpse-like, cf. 6.515-17 and Tesoriero (2000): 115 for comment) or that enchanting a corpse to be able to hold a conversation does not fit that definition. It seems to me, rather, that the narrator's hyperbolic introduction to Erictho and Thessalian witches (as discussed above) may set up the reader to expect a different kind of life than that which necromancy is able to bestow.

To fully appreciate the consequences of these details, let us consider certain corporeal questions that have been asked predominantly in modern zombie studies. There is a lengthy tradition equating Erictho's reanimated corpse with a zombie, most recently by Estèves, who suggests that Lucan's description of the revived, puppet-like corpse's physicality upon reanimation evokes the living-dead popularly so-called.³⁹ Beyond this broad connection, however, we can think more deeply about what a potential shared thread between Lucan's necromantic reanimation and zombification could tell us about both this interaction and Lucan's epic on the whole. In particular, I am interested in how scholars of zombie narratives have unpacked the centrality of concerns related to identity and agency in such tales. These articulations of what exactly can be at stake when one reanimates certain kinds of dead bodies can assist us in better understanding the conflicts introduced when Erictho performs her necromancy on a clearly unwilling corpse, and how we might respond to it.

The concept of a zombie has come to mean many different things to many different people, especially from the early 20th century on due to wide-ranging influences in popular media (both literary and, later, cinematic).⁴⁰ While modern iterations of the zombie in the popular consciousness tend to emphasize fears related to infection, the penetrability of the body, and loss of individuality in the face of a hive-mind,⁴¹ I am instead interested in an earlier conception of the zombie – in particular, in 19th and 20th century Haiti – and in narratives

³⁹ Estèves (2020): 286, 288 classifies the corpse as a zombie as part of a larger discussion of Lucan's interest, as well as that of Latin epic more generally, in bodies and limbs that are both living and dead. McClellan (2019): 158-69 offers another recent example of the label's use. He also generally evokes the term by sub-titling his discussion of the Erictho episode "Re-Animator," calling to mind H. P. Lovecraft's influential zombie tale, "Herbert West – Reanimator" (1922). This is not a recent association, however; see "zombie" as the favored term for the reanimated corpse in Johnson (1987): 23- 32. Identifying the corpse as a zombie is also common even in more casual references to the episode; cf. Braund and Raschke (2002): 77 and Joseph (2017): 119 for examples.

⁴⁰ Cf. Lauro (2015) for the many different uses and identities which the zombie has taken on in in the realms of history, politics, artistic media, and elsewhere.

⁴¹ Cf. Wald (2017), Schweitzer (2018), and McDonald and Johnson (2021).

written about or in response to it: as “an allegory for slavery” which “symbolizes either the thread of a return to slavery or a nightmare in which servitude extends into the afterlife.”⁴² In this context, the very real threat of zombification embodies “an idea of subjugated agency,” wherein “the body is reduced to an object, stripped of its subject status” as it fulfills the demands of another.⁴³ The zombie thus represents the fear that, even in death, one’s body can never rest or escape from societal structures of dominance, subjugation, or enslavement.⁴⁴ For those whose bodies are treated as mechanical tools for profit during life, there is a special kind of horror that such abuse may continue in death through the manipulation of the body as labor-machine.

Certain zombie narratives that evoke these associations related to the limits (or lack thereof) of a body’s ability to labor also reveal something of interest for our purposes. Importantly, zombification of this kind is not necessarily permanent. According to certain accounts, both anthropological and literary/cinematic, something critical occurs when a zombie consumes salt. Here, I am particularly interested in the zombie’s reaction. Upon tasting salt, the zombie immediately comes to understand its undead status: in other words, the zombie realizes that it is, in fact, a zombie, whereas beforehand its consciousness was repressed in its forced labor. Yet, contrary to what contemporary depictions of the zombie might prime us to expect, the awakened creature does not go on some sort of horrendous rampage. Instead, the zombie aims to reach the place where the dead may rest; it wants to return to its grave. So goes a tale told in William Seabrook’s influential work, *The Magic Island* (1968/1929: 102-3):

[A]s the zombies tasted the salt, they knew they were dead and made a dreadful outcry and rose and turned their faces toward the mountain. No one dared stop them, for they were corpses walking in the sunlight, and they themselves and

⁴² Lauro (2015): 109. See Lauro (2015): 108-46 for how this concept has changed over time in Haiti.

⁴³ Lauro (2015): 7.

⁴⁴ Cf. Kordas (2011) and, for a more sustained treatment, Lauro (2015). Lauro (2015) in particular makes the case that the estrangement between the “modern zombie” – so popular in American and European cinema – and its Haitian precursor has led to the zombie’s identity as “not just a myth about slavery, but a ‘slave metaphor’: usurped, colonized, and altered to represent the struggles of a distinctly different culture” (p. 17).

everyone else knew they were corpses...and as they approached the graveyard, they began to shuffle faster and rushed among the graves, and each before his own empty grave began clawing at the stones and earth to enter it again...

In such narratives, those trapped in an undead status do not necessarily desire violent revenge or that others take on their accursed state.⁴⁵ Rather, they want to die and thereby be released from this state of subjugation.

The zombie's overwhelming wish to return to the earth once it has been made aware of its condition suggests a certain response to one's own status as an undead entity subjugated to the will of another. To be forced into the state of the living- dead – to have one's personal agency and bodily autonomy obliterated by a single process – is horrifying. As we see in *The Magic Island*, the zombies' reaction to restored awareness is to make "a dreadful outcry," a poignant release of emotion, and they are so desperate to return to their graves that they "claw at the stones" in their way.

I would like to bring this process to bear first on Erictho's necromancy and then on the *Bellum Civile* on the whole. My contention is not that the prophetic corpse should be categorized as a zombie per se. The fallen soldier that Erictho reanimates through necromancy is not a zombie of the kind delineated above, and this is worth emphasizing to avoid diluting the cultural specificity of each case. I am suggesting, however, that how the behavior of Erictho's corpse aligns with that of the zombie helps us to appreciate that the *Bellum Civile* raises similar concerns about the relationship between bodily and mental integrity and autonomy. Lucan's

⁴⁵ For similar narratives regarding this use of salt, cf. G. W. Hutter's "Salt is Not for Slaves" (1931) and August Derleth's "The House in the Magnolias" (1932). It is worth noting that even such earlier narratives do not always include an entirely peaceful retreat to the grave. "The House in the Magnolias," for example, includes one zombie named Matilda who is prompted to kill the one who controlled the household zombies before joining the others by tasting salt and laying herself to rest. Later narratives may explore this use of salt but also include heightened violence upon the zombie's awakening, such as in Frankétienne's *Dézaî* (1975). See Lauro (2015): 78-84; 131-4 on situating these narratives in their historical-cultural context and Ackermann and Gauthier (1991): 481 for a list of further accounts of the effect of tasting salt on a zombie.

description of the shade's terror at being forced back into its body and Erictho's overriding of that fear – which Erictho has explicitly observed – identifies necromantic reanimation as a method of turning the human body into a tool in a way similar to zombification.

In a literary and cultural tradition where “dying is fundamentally an active rather than a passive process,” the consequences this holds for the (in)significance of one's demise are especially disturbing.⁴⁶ Such a process grows more affecting, too, if we activate the philosophical dilemma suggested by Lucan's description of the shade's body as its “former prison” (*carcer antiquus*) at 6.722.⁴⁷ The idea of the body as the prison of the soul has a long philosophical history, often articulated with significant ramifications.⁴⁸ Seneca offers a useful example in Letter 65 of his *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*. There, he asserts (65.16.5-9; 21.1-3):

Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est; premente illo urguetur, in vinclis est, nisi accessit philosophia et illum respirare rerum naturae spectaculo iussit et a terrenis ad divina dimisit. Haec libertas eius est, haec evagatio...

Maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim mei corporis, quod equidem non aliter aspicio quam vinclum aliquod libertati meae circumdatum.

For this body is the weight and punishment of the soul. As the body presses down, the soul is oppressed and in chains, unless philosophy draws near and commands it to recover its breath by looking upon the nature of things, and it releases the soul from earthly affairs to divine ones. This is its freedom, this its opportunity to wander...I am greater and was born to greater things than being the property of my body, which I consider to be nothing else than some binding wound around my freedom.

As Seneca vividly describes it, the body is indeed a prison to which the soul is violently bound and which prohibits the soul from certain desirable and deeply freeing experiences. If we keep Seneca's description of the soul as the *mancipium* of the body active when considering Lucan's own allusion to this idea, then the forced reentry of the shade into its bloodied, broken body

⁴⁶ Edwards (2007): 5.

⁴⁷ Noted by Tesoriero (2000): 219-20.

⁴⁸ Cf., Plt. *Phd.* 82d-83b for one influential example.

assumes a further upsetting dimension. On this view, reuniting the shade with its corpse, and thereby reanimating it, introduces a twofold process of subjugation: the soul's re-subjection to the body and, thereafter, the subjugation of both to the necromancer.

It is no surprise, then, that like the zombies we have considered, the reanimated corpse desires only to be freed from its instrumental role: to be dead, properly, and to escape these interwoven layers of control. Similar to certain zombie narratives, however, Erictho's necromancy evokes the horrific idea that, in the world of the *Bellum Civile*, death does not necessarily offer absolute protection for an individual seeking the potential benefits of a final separation between body and spirit. Instead, one's trajectory can be reversed, and different forms of bondage can be newly forged or reinstated.

It is this complex web of consequences that makes Erictho's initial promise to grant the corpse a true death and her subsequent fulfillment of that promise such an important one for Lucan's text. One way to think about historical epic is as a kind of reanimation of the dead on a grand scale. Through poetic writing, the dead become tools which can impact the living, and, importantly, poets can reanimate the historical dead and use them for their own poetic purposes while entirely bypassing the agency of the deceased. Such a potential reading need not always apply, but the embodied framework of Erictho's necromancy and the disturbing dynamics by which it is performed suggests this possibility. Following such a reading, the *Bellum Civile* is a literary necromancy on an epic scale.

Interestingly, Dolores O'Higgins briefly gestures at this possibility during her larger analysis of Lucan and Erictho as mirroring *vates*. Commenting on the possibility that the historical Lucan possessed knowledge of necromantic magic, she notes, "If this is so, the resemblance between himself and [Erictho] is extraordinary. As a *vates*, he revived figures from

the civil wars to address his contemporaries, using *carmina* in both senses of the word: as spells and as poems.”⁴⁹ While Lucan’s potential knowledge of necromancy could add an interesting dimension to this question, its historical reality is not necessary to appreciate the ways in which his poem embodies an eerily similar process to that administered by Erictho. Through the poetic reanimation of the (primarily Roman) dead, Lucan repeatedly strives to manipulate those bodies to ask and answer questions about the events of the civil war that plague his mind.⁵⁰ In doing so, however, he is not only “tainted” and irrevocably entangled in the nefas represented both by the necromancy and the civil war during which it is performed, as Masters has powerfully demonstrated.⁵¹ For alongside this broader act, Lucan is specifically forcing personhood back into dead, wounded, mutilated bodies for his own designs: just as Erictho does when she begins her necromancy. Appreciating this relationship offers an alternative lens through which an epic teeming with mass death becomes equally guilty of subverting the agency of each individual that contributes to it. For all his claims that Caesar shall be haunted by the Pharsalian dead whom he refuses to bury – and who will seep into and permeate the natural world around him (7.794-824) – Lucan therefore finds himself in a disturbingly similar spot.⁵²

With all this in mind, Erictho’s promise that she will grant the corpse eternal rest is incredibly significant. Whereas Apollo’s taking of Phemonoe’s life is identified powerfully as a violent theft, Erictho here grants the corpse its death as the key to its freedom. She is offering a

⁴⁹ O’Higgins (1988): 223; see similar sentiments at 219 and, in particular, comments on 7.209-13 at n. 32. Cf. Martindale (1980): 371-3 and Masters (1992): 210-2, including n. 65-7, for the possibility of Lucan possessing magical knowledge. Finiello (2005): 178-81 also addresses Erictho and Lucan’s mirrored *carmina*. Her emphasis, however, is on the assimilation of Erictho to Lucan as poet rather than of Lucan to Erictho as necromancer.

⁵⁰ This point is also made forcefully by McClellan (2018): 63-66, (2019): 158-69, and (2020): 229-42 in his socio-political reading of the necromancy scene. For McClellan, the cadaver whom Erictho raises is a metaphor for the “post-Republican wasteland” and “world of horror and servility” ((2018) 65) that has followed Caesar’s victory; like the corpse, the Roman state is a semi-alive, semi-dead corpse lumbering along.

⁵¹ Masters (1992): 209-15.

⁵² See Dinter (2012): 119-54 on the epic’s broader and thematic use of repetition, including Erictho’s place as one of the only two characters (along with Caesar) able to step outside of the poem’s repetitive cycle.

real and strikingly rare opportunity to escape this cycle of reanimation without consent: a fate which the narrator of the *Bellum Civile* shows no interest in granting his own subjects.⁵³ By both making this promise and fulfilling it within the narrative action of Book 6, Erictho becomes not only the sole figure to demonstrate an awareness of the horror of this practice but also the only one to offer a single soul a way to escape it.⁵⁴ The disturbing decency that Erictho shows as necromancer in the *Bellum Civile* is thus not simply an amusing quirk of personality, but rather it leads to a distressing unveiling – for those both living and dead – of what is to come of their bodies in the world as Lucan commands it.

⁵³ This general characteristic of the *Bellum Civile* also comes into sharper focus at striking moments. One may here think of the description of Pompey's burial at 8.712-822, where the poem's narrator appears quite concerned with laying the slain general's body to its final rest. There, Pompey's headless trunk is cremated, and its ashes are buried. We can leave aside the fact that Pompey's head remains in the possession of the Egyptian court. Caesar does say the head should be buried and Pompey's remains should be collected and properly honored (9.1089-93), but Lucan's text does not confirm that such actions are taken. Leaving aside, too, the narrator's dissatisfaction with this burial in terms that evoke Caesar's wish in Book 5 (8.795-805; 5.668-71), Pompey's spirit does not depart from the mortal plane but instead enters the breast (*pectus*) of Brutus and mind (*mens*) of Cato (9.17-8). Pompey is not truly laid to rest, nor does he escape the terrible conflict that caused his death; rather, his spirit re-enters it. Lucan's narrator thereby subverts even those attempts at a final rest that it might itself bestow. See McClellan (2019): 164-7 for relevant parallels between Erictho's corpse and Pompey's dying and thereafter dead body. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pressing on this point.

⁵⁴ This action takes on even further significance when we consider that Erictho has chosen a Pharsalian corpse, paradoxically available before the battle has even been fought (6.619-23; 716-7); see O'Higgins: (1988) 218-9, Dinter (2012): 73, and Fratantuono (2012): 249-50. One might observe that Lucan's narration of this interaction has the potential to negate Erictho's deed, for Lucan's poem will continually raise the dead that she has settled. In this case, however, Erictho still labors to fulfill her promise and is only thwarted by Lucan's own necromantic design.

Works Cited

- Ackermann, H.-W. and J. Gauthier. 2001. "The Ways and Nature of the Zombi." *The Journal of American Folklore* 104.414: 466-94.
- Ahl, F. 1974. "The Shadows of a Divine Presence in the *Pharsalia*." *Hermes* 102.4: 566-90.
- . 1976. *Lucan: An Introduction*. Ithaca, NY.
- Barratt, P. 1979. *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis Liber V: A Commentary*. Amsterdam.
- Bayet, J. 1946. "La Mort de la Pythie: Lucain, Plutarque et la chronique Delphique." In

- Mélanges dédiés a la mémoire de Félix Grat*, edited by É.-A. van Moé, et al., pp. 53-76.
Paris.
- Braund, S. M. and W. Raschke. 2002. "Satiric Grotesques in Public and Private: Juvenal, Dr. Frankenstein, Raymond Chandler, and Absolutely Fabulous." *G&R* 49.1: 62-84.
- Day, H. 2013. *Lucan and the Sublime: Power, Representation, and Aesthetic Experience*.
Cambridge/New York.
- Dick, B. F. 1962. *The Role of Manticism in Lucan's Epic Technique*. Ph.D. Diss. Fordham University.
- . 1965. "The Role of the Oracle in Lucan's *de Bello Civili*." *Hermes* 93.4: 460-6.
- Dinter, M. T. 2012. *Anatomizing Civil War: Studies in Lucan's Epic Technique*. Ann Arbor, MI.
- Edmonds, R. G. 2019. *Drawing Down the Moon: Magic in the Ancient Greco-Roman World*.
Princeton, NJ/Oxford.
- Edwards, C. 2007. *Death in Ancient Rome*. New Haven, CT.
- Estèves, A. 2020. *Poétique de l'horreur dans l'épopée et l'historiographie latines*. Bordeaux.
- Faraone, C. 2005. "Necromancy Goes Underground: The Disguise of Skull- and Corpse-Divination in the *Paris Magical Papyri* (PGM IV 1928-2144)." In *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination*, edited by S. I. Johnston and P. T. Stuck pp. 255-82. Leiden.
- Fauth, W. 1975. *Die Bedeutung der Nekromantie-Szene in Lucans Pharsalia*. *RM* 118.3: 325-44.
- Finiello, C. 2005. "Der Bürgerkrieg: Reine Männersache? Keine Männersache! Erictho und die Frauengestalten im *Bellum Civile* Lucans." In *Lucan im 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by C. Walde, pp. 155-85. Munich.

- Fratantuono, L. 2012. *Madness Triumphant: A Reading of Lucan's Pharsalia*. Lanham, MA.
- Gager, J. G. 1999. *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World*. Oxford/New York.
- Graf, F. 1997. *Magic in the Ancient World*. Trans. Franklin Philip. Cambridge, MA.
- Hardie, P. 1993. *The Epic Successors of Virgil*. Cambridge/New York.
- Henderson, J. 1987. "Lucan/the Word at War." *Ramus* 16.1-2: 122-64.
- Hill, D. E., ed. 1983. *P. Papini Stati Thebaidos libri XII*. Leiden.
- Housman, A. E. 1958 (orig. 1926). *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis Libri Decem*. Oxford.
- Johnson, W. R. 1987. *Momentary Monsters: Lucan and His Heroes*. Ithaca, NY.
- Johnston, S. I. 1999. *Restless Dead: Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley, CA.
- . 2005. "Delphi and the Dead." In *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination*, edited by S. I. Johnston and P. T. Stuck, pp. 283-306. Leiden.
- Joseph, T. A. 2017. "Pharsalia as Rome's 'Day of Doom' in Lucan." *AJP* 138: 107-41.
- Kordas, A. 2011. "New South, New Immigrants, New Women, New Zombies: The Historical Development of the Zombie in American Popular Culture." In *Race, Oppression, and the Zombie*, edited by C. M. Moreman and C. J. Rushton, pp. 15-30. Jefferson, NC.
- Korenjak, M. 1996. *Die Ericthoszene in Lukans Pharsalia*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Lovatt, H. 2013. *The Epic Gaze: Vision, Gender, and Narrative in Ancient Epic*. Cambridge/New York.
- Lauro, S. J. 2015. *The Transatlantic Zombie*. New Brunswick, NJ.
- Makowski, J. F. 1977. "Oracula Mortis in the *Pharsalia*." *CP* 72.3: 193-202.
- Martindale, C. A. 1977. "Three Notes on Lucan VI." *Mnemosyne* 30.4: 375-87.
- . 1980. "Lucan's Nekyia." In *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History Vol. II*, edited

- by C. Deroux, pp. 367-77. Brussels.
- Masters, J. 1992. *Poetry and Civil War in Lucan's Bellum Civile*. Cambridge/New York.
- McClellan, A. M. 2018. "The Politics of Revivification in Lucan's *Bellum Civile* and Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*." In *Frankenstein and its Classics: The Modern Prometheus from Antiquity to Science Fiction*, edited by J. Weiner, B. Eldon Stevens, and B. M. Rogers, pp. 59-75. London/New York.
- . 2019. *Abused Bodies in Roman Epic*. Cambridge/New York.
- . 2020. "Lucan's Neronian Res Publica Restituta." In *Lucan's Imperial World: The Bellum Civile in its Contemporary Contexts*, edited by L. Zientek and M. Thorne, pp. 229-46. London/New York.
- McDonald, K. and W. Johnson. 2021. "De-Composmolitanism: Zombie Horror as Apocalypse." In *Contemporary Gothic and Horror Film: Transnational Perspectives*, pp. 127-50. New York.
- Most, G. W. 1992. "*Disiecti membra poetae*: The Rhetoric of Dismemberment in Neronian Poetry." In *Innovations of Antiquity*, edited by R. Hexter and D. Selden, pp. 391-419. New York.
- Murray, G., ed. 1960 (orig. 1955). *Aeschyli tragoediae*, 2nd Edition. Oxford.
- Nadeau, Y. 2009. "Sextus Pompeius Celaeno, Vergil, Lucan, Hell, and Marcus Antonius Salmoneus." *Latomus* 68.1: 35-42.
- Ogden, D. 2001. *Greek and Roman Necromancy*. Princeton, NJ.
- . 2009. *Magic, Witchcraft and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman Worlds. A Sourcebook*. 2nd ed. Oxford/New York.
- O'Higgins, D. 1988. "Lucan as *Vates*." *CA* 7.2: 208-26.
- Parke, H. W. and D. E. Wormell. 1956. *The Delphic Oracle*. Oxford.

- Pillinger, E. 2012. “‘And the gods dread to hear another poem’: The Repetitive Poetics of Witchcraft from Virgil to Lucan.” *MD* 68: 39-79.
- Pypłacz, J. 2015. *When Legends Come Alive: A Reading of Lucan’s Pharsalia*. Kraków.
- . “2016. The Appropriate Goddess: The Role of Erichtho in Lucan’s *Pharsalia*.” *Scripta Classica* 13: 41-50.
- Reynolds, L. D., ed. 1965. *L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, Vols. 1–2. Oxford.
- Riess, W. 2012. *Performing Interpersonal Violence: Court, Curse, and Comedy in Fourth-Century BCE Athens*. Berlin/Boston.
- Rushton, C. J. and C. M. Moreman. 2011. “Race, Colonialism, and the Evolution of the ‘Zombie’.” In *Race, Oppression, and the Zombie*, edited by C. M. Moreman and C. J. Rushton, pp. 1-14. Jefferson, NC.
- Santangelo, F. 2015. “Testing Boundaries: Divination and Prophecy in Lucan.” *G&R* 62.2: 177-88.
- Schweitzer, D. 2018. *Going Viral: Zombies, Viruses, and the End of the World*. New Brunswick, NJ.
- Seabrook, W. 1968 (orig. 1929). *The Magic Island*. New York.
- Shackleton Bailey, D. R. 1988. *M. Annaei Lucani de Bello Civili Libri X*. Stuttgart.
- Sharrock, A. 2002. “An A-musing Tale: Gender, Genre, and Ovid’s Battles with Inspiration in the *Metamorphoses*.” In *Cultivating the Muse*, edited by E. Spentzou and D. Fowler, pp. 207-28. Oxford/New York.
- Tesoriero, C. A. 2000. “A Commentary on Lucan *Bellum Civile* 6.333-830.” Ph.D. Diss. The University of Sydney.
- . 2002. “*Magno proles indigna parente*: The Role of Sextus Pompeius in Lucan’s *Bellum*

- Civile.*” In *Sextus Pompeius*, edited by A. Powell and K. Welch, pp. 229-47. London.
- . 2004. “The Middle of Lucan.” In *Middles in Latin Poetry*, edited by S. Kyriakidis and F. de Martino, pp. 183-215. Bari.
- Wald, P. 2017. “Viral Cultures: Microbes and Politics in the Cold War.” In *Zombie Theory: A Reader*, edited by S. J. Lauro, pp. 33-62. Minneapolis, MN.
- Zimmerman, M., ed. 2012. *Apulei Metamorphoseon Libri XI*. Oxford.
- Zwierlein, O., ed. 1986. *L. Annaei Senecae Tragoediae*. Oxford.