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US Foreign Policy Consequences: The 1947 National Security Act in the Context of Central  
America

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Masters of Arts in  
Chicana and Chicano Studies

by

Iris Milagro Ramirez

2020

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## ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

US Foreign Policy Consequences: The 1947 National Security Act in the Context of Central  
America

by

Iris Ramirez

Master of Arts in Chicana and Chicano Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2020

Professor Leisy J. Abrego, Chair

This thesis analyzes the 1947 National Security Act, a Truman enacted policy that restructured and reorganized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), & the National Security Act (NSC) as key organization concerned with U.S. national security, intelligence, and foreign policy. To do so, I employ an archival approach, reviewing and analyzing mid-twentieth century documents collected from both the National Archive and Records Administration (NARA) offices located in Washington DC and Maryland. Drawing on memos, meeting minutes, and other official U.S. government documents pertaining to the 1947 National Security Act and Central America, I discuss the instrumental role the National Security Act played in developing U.S. foreign policies, as well as procedures for U.S. intervention in Central America. Ultimately, I argue that the Truman administration developed a U.S. foreign policy apparatus that initiated decades-long criminalization Central Americans.

The thesis of Iris Ramirez is approved.

Karina Alma

Fernando Torres-Gil

Leisy J. Abrego, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2020

## **DEDICATION**

To the members of my family that are no longer with us. This work is deeply rooted in my love for you.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In 2016, I came across *Sacrificing Families: Navigating Laws, Labor, and Love Across Borders*. I attribute my pursuit of graduate studies to this foundational piece, which exposed me to the possibilities of shedding light to the very conversations held within my humble abode. I would like to thank Leisy Abrego for the inspiration her book instilled in me and for the tremendous support she has offered me as my advisor. In addition, I would like to thank the rest of my MA thesis committee members, Karina Alma and Fernando Torres-Gil. Through their intellectual and professional guidance, this thesis was made possible. A huge thank you to my cohort members, Joana Chavez and Kevin Cruz, who supported me and kept me grounded throughout this tremendous journey. Thanks to my colegas (Will Sanchez, Rosario Majano, Estefania Castaneda Perez, Daisy Vasquez Vera, Sophia Angeles, LeighAnna Hidalgo, Rocio Rivera-Murillo, Carla Martinez, Erika Cabrera, and Stephanie Temix) for the laughter, tears, and frustrations we shared while pursuing our wildest dreams. Much appreciation for my greatest cheerleader and best friend of 12 years, Jossy, who answered late night phone calls, came to my aid at dire moments, and offered me endless patience during moments in which I could not offer it to myself. My greatest thanks go to the fearless *cachimbonas* that raised me; my mother, Esperanza, and my sister, Cinthia. Everything I do, I do for them.



## **Introduction**

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”

### **- The Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947**

On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service initiated a surprise military strike against Pearl Harbor’s naval base located in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. Shaken by “the 1941 Pearl Harbor disaster,” as well as World War II’s nearing end, then-U.S. president Roosevelt called for a coordinated national intelligence program that would ensure the U.S. would be equipped to counter any future breaches to national intelligence and security. Under Roosevelt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were instructed to study the problem of national security and intelligence, with the goal of drafting recommendations that would be referred to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Although the Roosevelt administration called for the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority, it was not until the Truman administration took office that the authority evolved.

During the Second Red Scare (1947 – 1960), fear of the spread of communism, specifically from Asian and European governments, gripped the Western hemisphere. Responding to Roosevelt's call for enhanced national security and intelligence, as well as the

nation's concern at large, the Truman administration made it a mission to prevent the spread of communism abroad, proposing what we know today as "The Truman Doctrine." Introduced on March 12, 1947, and passed the following year, on July 4, 1948, the Truman Doctrine was a U.S. policy that aimed to contain Soviet geopolitical expansion during the Cold War. As part of Truman's promise to develop economic and military measures to address and contain the spread of communism around the world, a series of 1947 policies were implemented across the U.S. nation. These policies were informed by four major stated goals: 1) preservation of U.S. national security, 2) promotion of world peace and a secure global environment, 3) balance of power among nations, and 4) collaborations with international allies. Crucial to these new policies of containment was U.S. presence in foreign nations and interactions between U.S. and foreign government agents. Truman believed "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."<sup>1</sup>

One decisive policy established under the Truman Doctrine was the National Security Act of 1947. On September 18, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act, which "mandated a reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. government."<sup>2</sup> This 1947 enactment established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Committee (NSC) while reorganizing the previously established Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as key organizations concerned with national intelligence and security. Since the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, these agencies have centrally informed presidential administrations on key foreign policy decisions (Zegart 1999), including intervention, militarization, and engagements with regions abroad.

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<sup>1</sup> The Truman Doctrine, Office of the Historian; Milestones: 1945 – 1952.

<sup>2</sup> The Truman Doctrine (1947), government documents.

Scholars have meticulously documented how U.S. foreign and domestic policy enactments in Central America during the 1980s propagated civil war and displaced people, forcing migration from the Isthmus and into the U.S. (Coutin 2003; Abrego 2014; Oliva-Alvarado, Estrada, & Hernandez 2017). Further, Oliva-Alvarado, Estrada, and Hernandez posit, “Historically, raising the specter or possibility of communism would always provide an immediate justification for forcible U.S. intervention and international nation-state violence (7).” However, we know less about the U.S. policy context leading up to and making intervention possible in the 1980s. One largely underexamined yet instrumental framework in the development of U.S. foreign policy, national intelligence, and security during the second half of the twentieth century is the 1947 National Security Act. Throughout this thesis, I will discuss the context and events that prompted the Truman administration to propose the 1947 National Security Act. The National Security Act established structures concerned with foreign and domestic policies, which enhanced national security and subsequent U.S. intervention in foreign nations and geopolitical locations. The establishment and restructuring of government agencies concerned with U.S. foreign and domestic policy, in addition to enforced national security at a time when "fear of terrorist threats" dominated national discourse raises questions regarding how migrant groups arriving in the latter half of the 20th century, like Central Americans, would be perceived and received in the United States. What was the national and international political context in which these new policies of containment<sup>3</sup>, Wherein restrictive immigration policies reinforced national security and intelligence, came to be? How has U.S. foreign policy directly impacted migration patterns from Central America to the U.S. since as early as the 1940s?

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<sup>3</sup> Here, "policies of containment" refers to the Truman doctrine and National Security Act, both new projects dedicated to reinforcing national security and intelligence

Which government agents and actors informed and implemented these crucial foreign policies, and why?

Employing an archival methodological approach, in this thesis, I review and analyze documents on the Truman administration, the 1947 National Security Act, and Central America. I then trace the historic establishment of crucial government agencies concerned with U.S. foreign policy and national security, including three major government branches: The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Committee (NSC). In addition to these major organizations, I also discuss cabinet-level agencies and above top-level agencies developed, established, and reformed through the National Security Act. These cabinet-level and above-level agencies, such as the National Security Resource Board, were crucial additions to the JCS, CIA, and NSC because they also informed U.S. foreign policy, national intelligence, and security after the National Security Act's enactment. In an effort to draw connections between the establishment of these key agencies and U.S. intervention in Central America during the latter portion of the twentieth century, I will also discuss how oligarchic rule in Central America prompted national rebellions in the mid-twentieth century, which in turn further prompted the U.S. government to identify and intervene in Central America. Doing so illuminates the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the region. Finally, I demonstrate how presidential rhetoric has historically informed domestic and foreign policy while disavowing the national and transnational implications for Central American migrants and their families.

My analysis of the archives I collected is based on Foucauldian theories of governmentalities<sup>4</sup> (Foucault 1991; Inda 2008), as well as Shannon Speed's theory of multicultural neoliberalism (Speed 2017). Theories of governmentalities explore the attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies that shape government agencies concerned with restriction and control, while theories of neoliberal multiculturalism discuss settler-colonial strategies of elimination and erasure that displace people from their homes and impose structural brutality onto migrants based on inequalities of gender, race, class, and nationality. In addition to drawing on these theories to highlight the racialized discourse that criminalizes and problematizes Central American migrants and families, I propose *repudiated*<sup>5</sup> *governmentalities* as a framework that explores how government ideologies target, racialize, and problematize certain migrant groups as a strategy for rationalizing restrictive domestic and foreign policy enactments, often under the guise of "halting terrorist threats." In addition, the problematization of particular migrant groups also allows for the justification of other outcomes, such as intervention in third world and foreign regions.

Thus, I maintain that U.S. presence in Central America during the twentieth century, specifically, starting in the 1940s and through the 1980s, was a reactionary response to the 1940s Cold War era hysteria.<sup>6</sup> Discussing the historical denial of political asylum and other forms of protected status to Central American migrants, this thesis highlights the consequences of hastily enacted U.S. domestic and foreign immigration policies. I describe this as a hasty process to capture the reactionary responses to "fear of terrorist threats," which I further posit are responses

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<sup>4</sup> Coined by the 20th-century French philosopher Michel Foucault, governmentality is an expression that combines the terms government and rationality. Government, in this sense, refers to conduct, or activity meant to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of people.

<sup>5</sup> Repudiated means to refuse to accept especially, to reject as unauthorized or as having no binding force

<sup>6</sup> Cold War-era hysteria, also known as "the second red scare," refers to hysteria over the perceived threat posed by Communists in the U.S. during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, which intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s (provide citation if this is not your term).

rooted in nationalist American ideologies (Ngai 2004), as well as in anti-immigrant, which catalyzed to reinforce anti-Central American sentiment in the latter portion of the twentieth century. American ideologies are what Ngai Nai describes as a twentieth-century process that shaped ideas and practices about citizenship, race, and state authority, primarily based on the constructed understanding of illegal migration as the central problem in U.S. immigration policy. To conceptualize the American ideologies that informed perceptions of geopolitical regions and nations abroad, I utilize the term "terrorist threats" alongside the decades-long perception of Central Americans as communist and, therefore, "threats" to U.S. national security and intelligence.

This study also draws on Zegart's (1999) scrutinization of U.S. agencies responsible for enforcing national security and the authors ensuing assertion regarding how each agency was shaped by the incentives, interests, and capabilities of political actors authorized to inform domestic and foreign U.S. policy. However, Zegart's proposed solution, which calls for government reform does not suffice because it reinforces an essentialist and, therefore, nationalistic solution beneficial only to those recognized by the nation-state. Due to nationalistic and essentialist American ideologies, "illegal immigrants," and members of third world minority nations are not recognized by the nation-state.

An analysis of the National Security Act emphasizes how U.S. foreign policies and arising U.S. intervention in Central America, played a pivotal role in furthering the production of illegality in the U.S. as shown for example, in the major changes in U.S. immigration laws since 1965. Production of illegality as a field of study traces how immigration policies, coupled with the criminalization and racialization of particular migrant groups across space and time, produce notions of illegality. According to production of illegality scholars (De Genova 2002, Coutin

2003, Menjívar & Kanstroom 2013), since 1965, U.S. immigration policies have restricted migrant groups, creating notions of “legal” migration from across the globe. However, I argue that the National Security Act established a U.S. foreign policy apparatus that depends on the racialization and criminalization of certain migrant groups predating 1965. Finally, throughout this thesis, I often refer to the consequences of U.S. foreign policy as conscious or unconscious, intended or unintended, noting the intentionality of government actors responsible for proposing and informing U.S. foreign policies. I do so to highlight intentionality, while simultaneously drawing attention to the structural levels of power accountable for the consequences of U.S. intervention and foreign policy. While putting the pieces together myself, I often noted the experimental nature of U.S. foreign policy, which further prompted my understanding of the events taking place throughout the twentieth century, such as wars, presidential elections, and uprisings.

## Methods

In the summer of 2018, I conducted archival research at both the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) sites in Washington, DC and Maryland. My search was driven by a desire to uncover the incentives and interests of political actors authorized to inform and enact restrictive U.S. foreign policies. During the initial stages of my study, I attempted to locate digitized files on the 1947 National Security Act and Central America. To ensure the preservation of documents, archives stored at NARA dating back 50 years or more should be digitized and uploaded to the national online catalog.<sup>7</sup> However, I was astonished to find that despite being 70 years old or older, these files had yet to be published and made accessible to the public. Upon arriving at the archives, I discovered handwritten additions scattered across the corners of each document. The scribbles indicated that the document had been approved for release by the U.S. government in the early 2000s. This meant that for nearly 50 years, these documents were kept from the public, researchers, and experts seeking information on the Cold War eras domestic and foreign policy enactments, and specifically, concerning Central America.

When I learned that archives on the National Security Act and those prevalent to Central America had not been digitized, I became curious as to why. Within the context of Central American history and representation, which is hardly discussed in mainstream U.S. curriculum, the lack of digitized materials arose suspicion. Besides, upon discovering that "fear of terrorist threats" had served as the main rationale for implementing the National Security Act, the classification of these documents, in which government strategies and procedures were concealed, furthered that suspicion. I interpret the classification of these documents as another strategy of elimination and erasure. The timeframe in which these documents were concealed

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.archives.gov/preservation>; See "Preservation and Conservation Strategies"



(roughly estimated between 1940 – 2001) coincide with pivotal historical events, such as wars, presidential elections, restrictive immigration policy enactments, growing U.S. presence in foreign nations, geopolitical locations, and regions abroad, and steady rising migration patterns between Central America and the U.S. What would it have meant for the general public to have access to materials that trace the establishment of the National Security Act? Why were they concealed? What do they reveal about the U.S. government structure and procedures for enacting domestic and foreign policy?

Over four days, I identified and scanned 1,230 original and repurposed mid-twentieth century documents relating to Central America and the National Security Act of 1947. Amongst these scans were primary material on Central America and U.S. government and actors' communications—including memos, briefs, and other supplementary government documents. I treat these documents as "undesigned records" (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918–1920); meaning, that while these documents were not designed for research purposes, they can still be drawn on to trace the structuring of what I refer to as a U.S. foreign policy apparatus. By analyzing these documents, I aim to identify the incentives and rationales for U.S. intervention and foreign policy enactments in Central America, starting in the 1940s and up until the 1980s.

To answer the proposed research questions, only a fraction (312 of 1,230 files) were analyzed and discussed throughout this thesis. The importance of files selected for analysis was measured based on date (1940-1960s) and relevance to the National Security Act and Central America. Although files were originally stored in the order in which they were categorized and labeled, I reorganized the files into four personalized boxes that addressed the major themes of this paper (i.e. The National Security Act, records relating to Central America, and government correspondences amongst both U.S. and Central American governments.) My personal archive

was organized as follows: 1) “CIA Select Files,” 2) “Correspondences Relating to Central America,” 3) “Records Relating to Central America 1957 – 59,” and 4) “Security Defense.”

## **Theoretical Frameworks**

### **Governmentalities**

First developed by French philosopher Michel Foucault in the 1980s, governmentality (the semantic linking of government (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (mentalite”), conceptualizes the mentalities, rationalities, and techniques through which subjects are governed (Lemke 2002). Foucault’s use of government as an institution can be described as referring “generally to a conduct of conduct – to the more or less calculated and systematic ways of thinking and acting to propose to shape, regulate, or manage the conduct of individuals and populations towards specific goals or ends (Rose 199a; Dean 1999).” Building on Foucault, scholars of governmentality have produced important studies on a broad range of subjects, including crime and control (O’ Malley 1992; Rose 2000b), globalization (Ong 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2006), and colonialism (Kalpagam 2002; Scott 2006). One crucial analytical theme explored by scholars of governmentality involves the political rationalities (or mentalities) of government. For instance, Anthropologist Jonathan Inda’s work examines the relationship between knowledge, power, and subsequent government practices after the 1965 Immigration Act, expanding on government constructions and imagined notions of “illegal immigration”<sup>8</sup> as a problem to be corrected. According to Inda, by following this line of thinking, governments produce programmatic aspects of governing “illegal immigration,” as seen through restrictive immigration laws, such as Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold-the-Line, in addition to technologies that manage “illegal immigration,” such as border surveillance.

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<sup>8</sup> Terms such as “illegal immigrant, illegal immigration, and illegal alien” are placed in quotation marks to emphasize how these notions are constructed and imagined.

Governmentality is a concept that serves to analyze and criticize historic neoliberal practices (Lemke 2000), and as such, can be applied to analyses regarding historic government responses to migration. Inda proposes three analytical themes: 1) mentalities of the government that are inherently problem-oriented political rationalities; 2) programs of the government in which the government is brought to existence programmatically; and 3) the technologies of government that form mechanisms through which authorities seek to shape and instrumentalize human conduct. This study draws on Inda's analytical themes to examine the role officials, and authorities hold in problematizing "illegal aliens" to construct racialized discourse and programs that contain restriction, exclusion, and punity.<sup>9</sup> In the logic of governmentalities, constructed notions of "illegal aliens" serve to inform government authorities, who enact immigration policies designed to restrict, exclude, and punish migrants. As I will demonstrate, drawing on theories of governmentality emphasizes ideologies, sentiments, and beliefs developed across space and time, which in turn shape restrictive immigration policy during the mid-twentieth century, shortly after the passage of the National Security Act. Repudiated governmentalities as a theoretical framework draws heavily on Foucault and Inda's governmentalities to conceptualize government responses, noting that these responses may be inherently racialized. Yet, the proposed framework differs in that it calls for a consideration of the forces accountable for the consequences of racialized government responses to ethnic, migrant groups.

### **Multicultural Neoliberalism**

Immersed in identity politics, politics of difference, and politics of recognition, multiculturalism as a political philosophy focuses on which societies respond to cultural and religious differences. Authors like Charles Hale (Hale 2005) have questioned the legitimacy of

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<sup>9</sup> Punitive describes inflicting a punishment. In the logic of governmentalities, punity refers to how government operations, like borders and immigration policies, punish migrants.

multiculturalism as an appropriate means for addressing diversity and immigration integration, "warning us of overinvestment in limited cultural rights at the expense of socioeconomic inequality (Speed 2017)." Coining the term neoliberal multiculturalism, Hale suggests that neoliberal multiculturalism affords limited rights that serve to keep people focused on the possibility of qualifying for state-sponsored rights instead of engaging in struggles for more just systems of governance. Alternatively, other scholars (García 2005; Hernandez, Paz, and Sierra 2004; Park and Richards 2007; Postero 2006; Sieder 2002; Speed 2005; Speed and Sierra 2005) address the dangers of relying on the state for the liberation of communities of color. Others, like Melamed (2006), Speed (2017), Abrego & Villalpando (forthcoming), posit that what we understand as multicultural neoliberalism's failures are, in actuality, the successes of neoliberalism because "neoliberal multiculturalism and multicriminalism serve to render migrants as individuals as failures and criminals for not "working hard" to avoid migration (3)." One such scholar, Shannon Speed, builds on Hale's analysis, proposing multicultural neoliberalism as a theoretical framework that reveals how structural violence is entrenched within settler colonial structures of Indigenous dispossession and elimination (Speed 2017).

Like Foucault, Shannon Speed's *Incarcerated Stories* aims to address the systems of power underpinning neoliberalism. Exploring the various levels of systemic violence Indigenous women migrants from Mexico and Central America experience while migrating Northward, anthropologist Shannon Speed asserts that "The myriad forms of violence they suffer are neither random nor products of chance. Rather, they reflect the structural brutality of inequalities of gender, race, class, and nationality, linked to neoliberal logics in which market forces define social relations" (1). According to Speed's analysis, structural conditions that impart violence onto Indigenous women migrants are a result of settler-colonial processes that function

differently across space and time and work to employ racialized and gendered ideologies. Of several arguments Speed makes, I draw on two: 1) settler colonial structures and neoliberal dynamics produce the vulnerability of Indigenous women migrants, rendering them subject to multiple forms of violence and 2) the U.S. is "multicriminal" because it created, yet denied violations to national and international rights. Analyzing Central American diaspora through the lens of Speed's assertion and considering the 1947 National Security Act provides compelling connections between enforced state violence targets, problematization, and criminalization of Central American migrants across space and time.

Additionally, I draw on Speed's theoretical framework, as well as critique of draconian immigration laws and policies. According to Speed, immigration laws and policies are designed to "impede on terrorism." In my work, I assert that "fear of terrorism" served as a rationale for establishing foreign policy enactments, despite the consequences it imposed onto Central Americans. By drawing on Speed's multicultural neoliberalism, I explore how settler colonial structures and neoliberal dynamics position Central American migrants as vulnerable subjects. Speed's multicultural neoliberalism lens brings into view the repudiation of governments and social actors who participated in the production of violence and impunity.

In an effort not to re-invisibilize indigenous women, I would like to note that mestizo, ladino, and elite Central Americans are also displacing and eliminating indigenous and black Central Americans. Thus, it is important to note that repudiated governmentalities also extend to address the role Central American governments played in imposing settler colonial strategies of elimination and erasure onto indigenous and black Central Americans.

### **American Ideologies**

The historical works of Mae M. Ngai contribute to gaps in immigration from 1924 to 1985. Drawing on the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, Ngai addresses the emergence of "illegal immigration" to analyze ensuing policy enactments further informed by notions of "illegal immigration." The Johnson-Reed Act was the first comprehensive restriction law that established numerical limits on immigration and constructed racial hierarchies of difference amongst immigrants. Examining law and policy across at three levels: 1) legislative and political discourses of restriction, 2) judicial decisions that sought to square competing demands of sovereignty and rights, and 3) the everyday meaning and consequence of the law, as produced by the state, and with respects to migrant interactions, Ngai posits that restrictive immigration policies were informed by 20th-century American ideas and practices on citizenship, race, and the nation-state (Ngai 2004). Further, as a result of American ideologies that inform restrictive immigration policies, immigrants are made "impossible subjects," a person who cannot and should not be solved. As such, interactions, negotiations, and conflicts between migrants, the nation, and the state are integral to defining and redefining the nation. This study draws on Ngai's crucial statements regarding restrictive immigration policies and constructing a new regime in the nation's immigration policy.

Ngai's assertion regarding how twentieth-century ideologies shaped ideas and practices about citizenship, race, and state authority can be applied to an analysis of the National Security Act's enactment. Drawing on Ngai, this paper will discuss the American ideologies that inform the production of illegality and, ultimately, the racialization of Central American migrants and their families. Ngai conceptualizes how American ideas shape and conceptualize notions of "difference," and in doing so, restrict access to citizenship for migrants arriving from across the globe. Given anti-communist fears, Central American migrants and families, despite valid claims

for political asylum, have historically been denied access to citizenship. In this paper, I extend the logic of Ngai's analysis to make connections between American ideologies, the denial of citizenship status, and the criminalization of Central American families.

## **Rising U.S. interests in Central America**

While U.S. intervention in Central American has been prevalent since the early nineteenth century, the National Security Act redesigned rationales and subsequent procedures for intervening abroad after its passage in 1947. In the years following the National Security Act's establishment, interests in Central America grew profoundly. In the midst of the post-Cold War era (1947 – 1991) and after centuries of oligarchic rule in Central America (1880-1970 ), a series of U.S. informed neoliberal reform policies were spread across Central America. According to Abrego and Villalpando (Forthcoming), neoliberal multiculturalism in Central America assumed enhanced tolerance, respect, and representation. In addition, while these reform efforts purportedly aimed to uplift Central America's economy by democratizing each nation, not every country benefited from the changes (Edwards 2009). Regions of Central America most impacted by war, militarization, and subsequent socioeconomic strain mobilized against their respective governments (Wade 2015). In response to wide-scale repression, leftist activists started various uprisings across the nation during the 1960s. Due to fear of communism, leading U.S. and Central American political figures joined militarized forces. Through acts of state and transnational violence, binational governments aimed to silence mobilized Central American civilians seeking to obtain equity across the Isthmus.

For instance, in 1954, former U.S. President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to overthrow Guatemala's democratically elected President Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán (Holland 2004). A decade later, in 1965, the CIA issued Green Berets and other counterinsurgency advisors to aid the authoritarian government in repressing left-wing movements. In 1981, the U.S. responded to "Operation Ceniza," a Guatemalan Army launch informed by the growing Marxist guerilla movement. The Reagan administration then approved a \$2 billion covert CIA program in



Guatemala, a \$19.5 million shipment of military helicopters, and \$3.2 million military jeeps and trucks to the Guatemalan army. By the mid-1980s, 150,000 civilians were killed in the war, with 250,000 refugees fleeing to Mexico (Schirmer 1998). Tracing U.S. intervention in Guatemala and specifically shortly after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, which established the CIA, emphasizes U.S. intervention's implications under the National Security Act.

In El Salvador, the U.S. supported rightwing death squads in the name of fighting communism. In the 1960s, President Eisenhower, fearing a leftist turn, withheld recognition of a military-civilian junta (Berryman 2013). In the 1980s, a civil war raged on, in which the military-led government and the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) collided. The Reagan administration, under its Cold War containment policy, provided military assistance to the Salvadoran government. In 1984, the Reagan administration approved 3% of asylum applications, further denying allegations of human rights violations in El Salvador and Guatemala, while simultaneously constructing categories of “economic” migrants (Coutin 2011). In doing so, the Reagan administration made it possible to deny any responsibility in designing the circumstances that enabled migration from Central America, further positioning Central American migrants as "impossible subjects" (Ngai 2004).

U.S. intervention in Honduras started as early as 1911 (an era often referred to as the Banana Wars), when American entrepreneur Samuel Zemurray conspired with recently overthrown Honduran President, Manuel Bonilla and U.S. General Lee Christmas to launch a coup against President Miguel Davila (Bucheli 2008). After being elected as President in 1912, Bonilla further colluded with U.S. corporations by offering concessions that grant natural resources and tax incentives to American companies, such as Vaccaro Bros. and Co. (now Dole Food Company) and United Fruit Company (now Chiquita Brands International (Cruz, Hamilton

& Jack 2012). Later, in 1980, the Reagan administration stationed thousands of troops in Honduras, which trained the Contra rightwing rebels in their guerilla war against Nicaragua's Sandinistas (Lafeber 1984). The events that transpired in Central America's northern region highlight U.S. responses to civil discourse, which typically include military intervention in Central America, as well as hastily enacted and restrictive immigration policies. In this case, the U.S. further rationalized restrictive foreign policy enactments based on fear of "terrorist" and "communist" threats.

### **U.S. Rising Interests in Central America: 1920s – 1940s**

From 1920 to 1940, regions of Central America -- such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica – had been identified as rich agricultural sites. As a result, U.S. and Central American authorities began to discuss the process of integrating Central America's economy. After the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, the U.S. began to deeply reflect on interactions with regions abroad, prompting procedures and measures for intervening abroad. Starting in the 1950s and extending well into the 1980s, U.S. intervention in Central America grew profoundly as a result of U.S. interests in Central America's economy, as well as desires to halt "communist behaviors."

The archives I identified included meetings minutes, correspondences between government officials, and memos where discussions held amongst government agents. In addition to U.S. government interest in Central America during the 1940s, these archives revealed rationales for establishing and reforming government agencies concerned with U.S. foreign policy, national intelligence, and security. Drawing on these materials, I traced documents where government actors were selected to serve newly established positions under the National Security Act. Crucial to my findings included the role Cold War anxieties played in

rationalizing strategies for reimagining and establishing U.S. government agencies. Additional measures included discourse surrounding U.S. trade interests in Central America during the 1940s, highlighting a major stage of U.S. presence in Central America, as well as U.S. and Central American government conspiracies. Finally, it is important to note the classified nature of the archives I reviewed, which illuminate significant discussions surrounding U.S. foreign policy enactments throughout the twentieth century yet were kept from the public for nearly 60 years. By exploring these exclusive documents, there are possibilities in unraveling U.S. government interests in establishing a U.S. foreign policy apparatus that targets certain migrant groups deemed as "threats" to U.S. national security and intelligence.

In the archive labeled "Correspondences Relating to Central America," I found a total of 31 letters and memoranda disseminated throughout U.S. War Departments during the 1940s. These letters and memoranda trace discussions surrounding U.S. trade interests in Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Further, correspondences amongst U.S. government and Central American personnel and administration reveals colluding between each government starting as early as the 1920s. In the passages that follow, I will discuss each letter correspondence. To make sense of and discuss the documents found in this archive, I reinterpret the content of each letter, concluding with an analysis of the material.

At the time of the correspondence I reviewed, U.S. interest in Central America focused on agriculture, railways, and gold. On September 26, 1941, Lieutenant Colonel of Field Artillery, J.S. Winslow, addressed Lieutenant Colonel Frederick D. Sharp, a member of the Global Strike Command (GSC) in a letter entitled "Subject: Information on Honduras." Expressing interests in obtaining up-to-date maps on the United Fruit Company, the Tela Railway, and Trujillo Railroads in Honduras, Lieutenant Colonel Winslow mentions "maps available to in this office

[Field Artillery] do not show recent changes in these railway systems..."<sup>10</sup> thus, Winslow inquires: "Has the Ulua branch been made part of the Tela Railway? How many miles of main line, how many miles of branch line, and how many miles of yard track and siding this railway have in service at the end of 1940?"<sup>11</sup> With regard to the Trujillo Railway, "Is there a line from Corocito to the vicinity of Cabo Camaron still in use? If so, what is the length? How many miles of main line, how many miles of branch line, and how many miles of yard track and siding did this railway have in service at the end of 1940?"<sup>12</sup>

Situated in the U.S. Department of State, the Management Information Systems (MIS) defines major information systems as an information system that requires special management attention because of its importance to an agency mission; its high development, operating, or maintenance costs; or its significant role in the administration of agency programs, finances, property, or other resources. On March 22, 1943, Wilson L. Townsend, Lieutenant Colonel of the Global Strike Command (GSC), sent a letter entitled "Information on World Oil Facilities" to the MIS office located in New York. According to Lt. Col. Townsend, "The information as to Latin America is being forwarded by countries to this office and has proven to be of great value."<sup>13</sup> At the time, changes were being made in the facilities, bringing "the Foreign Operations Committee's attention," further prompting up-to-date information from the MIS New York office. If we call, significant to the National Security Act's enactment included national intelligence development, as seen through additionally established "above cabinet-level"

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<sup>10</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Subject: Information on Honduras

<sup>11</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Subject: Information on Honduras

<sup>12</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Subject: Information on Honduras

<sup>13</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Information on World Facilities

committees. While the MIS office had already been established before the National Security Act's enactment, amidst war-eras and conversations surrounding enhanced economic integration abroad, this office was encouraged to collect intelligence information abroad.

On June 21, Lieutenant Colonel S. R. Carswell, G.S.C. from the War Department, received updates regarding the United Fruit Company operations in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. According to the author, Levi G. Brown, Colonel of the U.S. Army, as of 1943, "The United Fruit Company has operations in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador."<sup>14</sup> Addressing each region's location, the letter also reveals specific U.S. interactions with each region addressed above (i.e., Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador) during the 1940s. In December of 1940, Honduras division gave Captain F.M. June, a member of the naval attaché, detailed maps on the Honduran cities of Cortes, Tela, La Lima, and Progreso (not included in the archives).

In another response by C.B. Moore, Colonel and General Staff of the State Liaison Branch, additional information on Honduras is provided, including a map that is not shared in the archive. From Col. Moore's response, it is revealed that information is needed regarding "undeveloped mineral and petroleum deposits," which may be obtained through the New York MIS office and Honduras Rosario Colg Mining Co., West East Opoteca Mines Co., Antigua Gold, and Copper Co. America and Honduras Mining Co., United States Continental Mines Co., Antigua Gold, and Copper Co, Central American Petroleum Co., and the Honduras Petroleum Co. In addition, C.B. Moore identified a significant employer of Honduran labor within the Chicle Co. in Honduras. In terms of railroads, during the 1940s, the Trujillo Railroad Co., a United Fruit subsidiary, had abandoned 32.70 miles of line, calling to the attention of U.S.

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<sup>14</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Information on World Facilities

entities interested in opportunities for economic integration abroad, as well as U.S. profitable gain.

In addition to U.S. interests in Central American agriculture, the letters also reveal U.S. interests in Honduran history and culture. In another letter sent to A.C. of S., G-2 (War Department) on June 20, 1941, reference is made to a separate document from April 24, 1941 (not included in the archive) regarding an expedition from the Museum of the American Indian located in Washington, DC to Honduras. According to the document, expeditions to Honduras on behalf of the U.S. government and led by Theodore A. Morde were made several times throughout the twentieth century. According to the document, exhibitions to Honduras between the years 1925-26, 1933 – 34 (respectively) were made possible through an additional executive order from the then-Honduran President, Dr. Tiburcio Carias. The third Honduran Expedition (1933 – 34) was organized to continue the explorations and studies of the first and second expeditions to Honduras (1925 – 26), which explored the New York Museum of the American Indian, as well as the National Museum of Honduras. Through these exhibitions, the U.S. government was able to "report on archeological sites observed by Mr. Morde [acting Special Agent on behalf of the War Department, Military Intelligence division]. It is believed that he is completing map memoranda for inclusion of Teguegalpa Sheet, millionth map series, American Geographical society."<sup>15</sup>

During the third exhibition to Honduras, taken place from 1933 – 1944, Morde had learned that in the Mosquitia Territory, sparsely settled Niskito and Mayagna<sup>16</sup> people catered to two or three small plantations of beans and upland rice, typically "...operated by Germans who

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<sup>15</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Facilities in Honduras

<sup>16</sup> The archives I reviewed identified the Mayagna as the Sumu Indians, a derogatory and colonial naming these groups refuse.

have settled on the Patuca River for several years.”<sup>17</sup> The author adds that “The [Mayagna] people are hunters. Number possible 2500 total population. Make dependable river crews and pack bearers. Are very friendly to Americans but are violently antagonistic to Hondurans who they refer to a ‘Espanoles’ or ‘ladinas.’”<sup>18</sup> If we recall, in its final form, the National Security Act's enactment was largely informed by war-era interactions with nations such as Germany and Japan. As seen throughout the sections above, the trend of drawing on war-era interactions to rationalize U.S. foreign policy and engagements abroad continues to draw on what I refer to as "war-era hysteria," infusing assumptions regarding "fear of terrorist threats" to rationalize restrictive policies.

It is also significant to note that U.S. entities were not solely responsible for intervening abroad. As was the case with Honduran exhibitions, Central American governing entities were also complicit in U.S. intervention, often prompting engagements with the U.S. under the guise of enhancing Latin American nations economically and politically. In a memorandum enclosed to Colonel W.W. Cox, Chief of American Intelligence Service, collusions amongst El Salvador and Florida delegates are revealed. Mr. James Glover, Head of All-American Cables (El Salvador), had planned to arrive in San Salvador, El Salvador on February 13, 1944. While in Miami, he interviewed with Major Guillermo Moscoso, claiming the following: “ El Salvador and other Latin American countries are under the impression that Regular Army officers have been removed from their missions as Military Attaches because the Latin American countries are no longer considered of military importance, and the while the American Legatins in many countries are being raised to Embassies, the Military Attached have been recalled.” According to

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<sup>17</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Facilities in Honduras

<sup>18</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Facilities in Honduras

Glover, the lack of U.S. investment in Central America had offended the pride of the army in these countries. Similar to Eisenhower's interactions with Latin American delegates, Mr. James Glover's interactions with Latin American officials revealed Latin American perceptions of the U.S. that allude to a sense of disregard from the U.S.

Like Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala had been identified by U.S. entities as sites for obtaining intelligence beneficial to the development of U.S. intelligence. On July 14, 1941, Ralph C. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel, and General Staff Member received a letter entitled "Subject: Information on Guatemala and El Salvador." In this letter, Lieutenant Colonel Smith addresses the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Ninth Corps Area, Precinct of San Francisco, California. According to Smith, Ohio State University professor, Dr. D. W. McBride, had provided an extensive study on the natural resources climate of Guatemala. Smith adds that a similar study had been conducted in El Salvador a year prior, recommending that the assistant chief of staff draw on Dr. McBride's material for the purpose of the War Department's confidential use. Similar to the Honduras expeditions that took place from 1923 – 1944, as well as the MIS office's efforts to obtain intelligence information on Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala's rich agriculture landscape was largely sought by the U.S. government, prompting U.S. investigations in Central America's Northern region.

While the archives I reviewed point to particular interests in the Northern region of Central America (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), a brief mention of Costa Rica is made. On May 1, 1941, another letter entitled "Survey of Costa Rica" and authored by A.R. Harris, Lieutenant Colonel, member of the General Staff, and Chief Liaison Branch, request information from Colonel Levi Brown in New Orleans "for the use in connection with survey of Costa Rica which is in the course of preparation, it is desired you obtain the following



information regarding the United Fruit Company's new banana project on the west coast of that country."<sup>19</sup> In his request, Lieutenant Colonel Harris attempts to obtain information on the location, area, transportation and communication facilities, utilities, number of employees (classified as to Americans and non-Americans), and the operations manager's name at the office's earliest convenience. Another letter pertaining to Costa Rica, entitled "Subject: Gold Mining in Costa Rica," is authored by A.R. Harris, Lieutenant Colonel, member of the General Staff, and Chief Liaison Branch. Lieutenant Colonel A.R. Harris requests that Colonel Frederick D. Sharp in New York City provide a survey of Costa Rican gold mining activities "for the use in connection with the survey of Costa Rica now in preparation, information is desired about gold mining activities."<sup>20</sup> Thus, while Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador had been identified as regions significant to the U.S., given their agriculture value, the U.S. also identified Costa Rica as a significant region due to its proximity to Gold Mines.

The U.S. post-World War II multiculturalist agenda served as a rationale for expanding U.S. transnational capital development (Abrego & Villalpando forthcoming). Further, when U.S. corporate interests in Central America are threatened, the United States intervenes to maintain the status quo. The first collection of archives I reviewed reveals U.S. interests in Central America throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century (starting as early as 1920), as seen through numerous correspondences amongst U.S. government office, such as the MIS, Field Artillery, and other offices located across the U.S. nation, and in some cases, in Central America. Although literature points to U.S. intervention most prevalent throughout the 1960s–1980s, the archives I reviewed reveal U.S. interests in Central America starting as the 1940s. Literature situated in the 1980s

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<sup>19</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Survey on Costa Rica

<sup>20</sup> Archive box #3: Correspondences Relating to Central America, Document entitled: Survey on Costa Rica

understands U.S. interest in third-world, foreign, and geopolitical locations across the globe – like Central America, -- as an “aiding process,” wherein presidential administrations rationalized U.S. intervention in Central America as a means to “resist communist behaviors abroad.” My findings, however, suggest that interests in Central America expand beyond “interests in aid,” and rather, trade interests useful for U.S. profitable gain. In the years that followed the National Security Act’s enactment, Central American geopolitical locations, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were perceived as a communist nation and subsequently, a threat to the U.S., resulting in the reinforcement of borders, enhanced restrictive immigration policy, and subsequently, the exclusion of Central American migrants and families. In the logic of the production of illegality, the nuances that determine U.S. interests in Central America shift from control to crime.

### **Establishing the Central Intelligence Agency in the "name of National Security and Intelligence."**

On April 8, 1947, a lecture was held at the National War College, the third-oldest Army post still active and located at Roosevelt Hall on Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. At the meeting, U.S. Congress and Military Departments (i.e., State, Army, and Navy) gathered to discuss changes to war and intelligence operations under the newly established National Security Act. The lecture was proctored by General Marshall, an American soldier and statesman that first served the United States Army and later, as Chief of Staff for both presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. After the passage of the National Security Act, Marshall transitioned to Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. According to Marshall, "... prior to entering the war, we had little more than what a military attaché could learn at a dinner, more or

less over the coffee cups,"<sup>21</sup> meaning that national security was poorly equipped and interdepartmental in character. As previously mentioned, the Red Scare had gripped the Western hemisphere, resulting in a national call for enhanced national security, intelligence, and foreign policy, and further promoting the development of "a National Intelligence Authority." Thus, the U.S. President, other high officials, and staff required national intelligence to "assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war, and for the advancement of broad national policy."<sup>22</sup>

According to the details discussed at the lecture, the National Intelligence Authority would consist of four voting members, including the Secretary of state, War and Navy, and the President's personal representative, the Chief of Staff, fleet admiral Leahy, and a final, fifth, non-voting member, the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence authority was directed to plan, develop, and coordinate all federal foreign intelligence activities, so as to "assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security."<sup>23</sup> With the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority also came the creation of new positions, such as the Director of Central Intelligence. Sidney Q. Souers, previous deputy and director of naval intelligence and the rear admiral, was selected for the position due to his leadership during World War II. While Souers was recognized for his leadership in World War II, he had no history of prior training or experience as a policy and decision-maker, prompting questions regarding how U.S. governments disseminate crucial roles, such as those responsible for informing and producing foreign policies.

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<sup>21</sup> Archive Box #2: Select CIA Files, document labeled "Special Meeting in front of Congress at the National War College."

<sup>22</sup> Archive Box #2: Select CIA Files, document labeled "Special Meeting in front of Congress at the National War College."

<sup>23</sup> Archive Box #2: Select CIA Files, document labeled "Special Meeting in front of Congress at the National War College."

According to Amy B. Zegart, “while the National Security Act was established under the guise of enhancing national security, intelligence, and foreign policy, it was stymied by the self-interests of bureaucrats (5).” Drawing on Zegart’s assertion, I further posit that the self-interests of bureaucrats can be seen through the appointment of military personnel to newly established policy and decision-making positions developed under the National Security Act.

In an effort to address the failures of U.S. foreign policy enactments, Amy B. Zegart claims that “when it comes to selecting, shaping, and implementing U.S. foreign policy, the devil often lies in the details of agency design (2).” Drawing on several crucial historical events, such as the establishment of the 1947 National Security Act, Zegart explores the faulty shaping and design of the JSC, CIA, and NSC. Further, by critiquing previous frameworks utilized to examine U.S. governments, such as capture theory<sup>24</sup> and new institutional models<sup>25</sup>, the author proposes a new modified institutional approach that allows further investigation of each government agency's initial design. According to Zegart, "When the initial NSC system could not produce useful policy advice for the President when the Joint Chiefs could not conduct well-coordinated military maneuvers or offer an integrated military perspective when an organization named Central Intelligence Agency could not provide centralized intelligence, we know things are not as they should be" (225). This assertion highlights how U.S. national security agencies are established under the guide of serving national interests. In reality, and rather, they are shaped by the everchanging interests of bureaucrats, presidents, and legislators, and rarely with consideration to external factors, such as implications for the third world and foreign nations.

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<sup>24</sup> Regulatory capture theory discusses the corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group.

<sup>25</sup> Institutional model theory generalizes a large portion of first-order model theory to an arbitrary logical system.

Additional initiatives under the National Intelligence Authority included the further establishment of an intelligence advisory board. The intelligence advisory board was responsible for providing formal machinery and advising the Director of Central Intelligence. Indicating problems associated with the reorganization of national intelligence, newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, Souers, called for a reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group that would establish interdependent coordinating and planning staff comprising of representatives of the state, war, and navy department, and air forces; all of which were designated under the administrative control of the Director of Intelligence. This staff developed programs and plans for adoption by the national intelligence authority while working alongside the government.

Foucault's 1970 critique of U.S. juridical models recognized the mode of power in war and struggle as opposed to law and consensus. Addressing new additions to the National Intelligence Authority that would include staff positions, as informed by Souers recommendations, Marshall encouraged members of the Board consider, discuss, and adapt plans or procedures that would bind the State, War, and Navy departments at the level of the national intelligence authority, as opposed from the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In doing so, the U.S. aimed to enhance national intelligence by incorporating political and economic intelligence developed by the state departments, as well as intelligence developed by other agencies of the government, as opposed to military intelligence alone. I bring Foucault's critique of government in conversation with Souers and Marshall's proposal to illuminate how governments are designed along intersections of power, war, and struggle often proposed under the guise of serving national interests.

Further, by placing Zegart's proposed theoretical framework in conversation with theories of governmentalities, this study problematizes Zegart's call for government agency

reform. Given Inda's Foucauldian analysis, ideologies shape government responses to migration and further inform policy and legislation that directly impacts migrants. Placing Foucault's theory of governmentalities alongside Zegart's proposed new modified institutional approach raises crucial questions about the role of race and anti-immigrant sentiments in establishing and shaping a U.S. foreign policy apparatus that directly targets Central American migrants and families.

Souers' recommendations went on to further develop and establish the National Intelligence Authority, with particular consideration to the JCS, and in the process, informed various facets of national intelligence and security. Prior to this reorganization, the JCS, mainly consisting of war department personnel, was responsible for intelligence investigations abroad. However, this reorganization also called for additional positions, several of which were appointed to war personnel. Thus, despite attempting to move from military intelligence alone, how these appointments were disseminated across War, Army, and Navy department personnel, reinforced and solidified an inherent relationship amongst national intelligence and warfare, making it possible for U.S. military forces to intervene abroad. While intervention had taken place in Central American throughout the early 1900s (Abrego & Villalpando, Forthcoming), how the National Security Act reorganized and established new government agencies concerned with foreign policy altered approaches to intervening abroad during the latter half of the twentieth century. Ultimately, the National Security Act altered approaches to intervening abroad in the second half of the twentieth century, but this time, with "evidence" that rationalized these interventions. Further, by drawing on war era interactions with regions abroad to reinforce national fears, the National Security Act rationalized U.S. presence in countries perceived as potential threats to the U.S.

According to Marshall, after material collected by national intelligence were studied and evaluated, “certain gaps in the over-all picture become readily apparent.”<sup>26</sup> Drawing on the “defects” of national intelligence prior to the National Security Act, government officials, like Marshall argued for a centralized intelligence agency intent upon completing the national intelligence picture. Thus, through the National Security Act, agencies reorganized and established under the National Security Act, such as the CIA, JCS, and NSC were afforded the power to send out collection directives and request further material “to fill these gaps,” and in doing so, given authority to coordinate all foreign intelligence. Importantly, with this centralization of power, when “certain situations” arise, the President would be able to call for the war department to provide military and air picture, the navy department provides naval potentialities and capabilities, and the state department covers political, economic, and sociological pictures. According to Marshall: “Nowhere was there such an estimate before Pearl Harbor. Each department would, of necessity, present an estimate slanted to its own particular field. Now, it falls to the central intelligence group to present this over-all picture in a balanced, national intelligence estimate, including all pertinent data. From this the president and appropriate officials can draw a well-rounded picture on which to base their politics.”<sup>27</sup> The reorganization of the government agencies such as the JCS, CIA, and NSC was largely informed by American ideologies surrounding war-era hysteria, resulting in the dissemination of power across government agents and actors, and specifically, war departments.

One of the main roles assigned to the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) included operations. Operations were responsible for one of the major projects of the office of operations,

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<sup>26</sup> Archive Box #2: Select CIA Files, document labeled "Special Meeting in front of Congress at the National War College."

<sup>27</sup> Archive Box #2: Select CIA Files, document labeled "Special Meeting in front of Congress at the National War College."

which involved the exploitation of American businesses, scientific, educational, and religious organizations with connections abroad, and traveling abroad, with the goal of obtaining foreign intelligence information. As discussed throughout this thesis, part of the National Security Act's purpose was to create measures for obtaining intelligence abroad, particularly at a time when the industry was booming. However, in the archival documents, mention of economic interests and foreign aid pales in comparison to the presumed primary focus of the National Security (i.e., national security, intelligence, and foreign policy). Further, amidst conversations surrounding the National Security Act's enactment, existing conversations regarding U.S. intervention in Central America were already in the works. As I will demonstrate in the following passages, U.S. interests in Central America's economic integration had been prevalent since as early as the 1940s. Placing these interests in conversation with the National Security Act's efforts to enhance foreign aid and boost the economies of "underdeveloped countries" prompts consideration of additional incentives for enhanced national security, intelligence, foreign policy, and subsequent U.S. intervention abroad. What would it have meant for U.S. profitable gain to simultaneously enhance economic integration in Central America, instigate migration, and deny protected status to Central American migrants arriving at U.S. ports of entry?

Prior to the National Security Act, all intelligence was directed by the President, resulting in an array of investigations abroad and mismanagement of materials collected. Such was the case with President Roosevelt, who directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undergo intelligence investigations amidst World War II. When this particular lecture took place in 1947, as the National Security Act was still being discussed and had yet to be implemented, the nation had been shaken by breaches to intelligence by the Soviet Union. If we recall, crucial to Truman's containment policies were addressing national fears by enhancing relations abroad, as well as



strengthening military capacities. This move helped to rationalize the need for intervention abroad.

The select CIA files I reviewed provided insights on which government agents and actors were selected to develop government agencies concerned with foreign policy. In addition, memos discussed the national and international political context in which the establishment, reorganization, and structuring of government agencies occurred. Some major changes include the establishment of a Central Intelligence Group (CIG), as well as positions, such as the Central Intelligence Liaison and Director of Central Intelligence. Important to my analysis is an understanding of who was selected to serve the U.S. nation through these roles. Those selected to serve, such as Souers and Marshall, despite serving military forces during war eras, I argue, were not equipped to inform foreign policies.

### **The 1947 National Security Act: “The Unification Act”**

After the summer of 1945, in which Japan surrendered to the U.S., Congress and military services were encouraged to investigate national security. The purpose of this investigation was to analyze and prompt military organizations that had fought and won the war to preserve the “best features” and “defects” presented during the war. “Best features” were defined as 1) enhanced national security to ensure no breach of intelligence, 2) solidified procedures and sites for U.S. national intelligence agencies for the purpose of obtaining information on regions abroad, and 3) entangled structures, coupled with increased budgets for U.S. military departments. Through these procedures, the U.S. government also aimed to address “defects” in war and intelligence procedures, as seen through prior historical events, such as “the 1945 Pearl Harbor disaster.”

In addition to war-era engagements with Japan (i.e., Pearl Harbor), interactions with Germany throughout World War II also informed significant components of the National Security Act's design. Between 1946 and 1991, tensions arose between the United States and the Soviet Union<sup>28</sup>, prompting a call for enhanced national intelligence and security. Drawing on these fears, agencies like the National Security Resource Board and National Security Council were implemented in order to inform the integration of U.S. domestic, foreign, and military policies.

The Truman administration argued that through the National Security Act, restructuring, reorganizing, and establishing government agencies concerned with national security would “provide a system of national-security best suited to our present-day needs.”<sup>29</sup> Today, agencies established and designed under the National Security Act continue to inform U.S. foreign policies. Importantly, these agencies, at a national, state, and cabinet-level were designed based on prior events with nations abroad, determining measures for interacting, intervening, and colluding with regions and governments abroad. Understanding the structure and use of each agency and organization, as restructured and/or established under the National Security Act, is crucial to understanding the (intended or unintended consequences) of U.S. intervention in Central America throughout the twentieth century and specifically, during the 1980s.

The National Security Act was arguably one of the most significant U.S. foreign policy apparatuses to be established (Zegart 1999). Fortunately, this meant that the original documents had been repurposed and safely stowed away in an archival box labeled “security defense.” In some cases, the archives I reviewed distinguished authors of official documents, letters, and

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<sup>28</sup>, officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was a federal socialist state in Northern Eurasia that existed from 1922 to 1991. Nominally a union of multiple national Soviet republics, in practice, its Government and economy were highly centralized until its final years.

<sup>29</sup> The Truman Doctrine (1947), government documents.

correspondences. In other cases, however, the documents I reviewed were ambiguous and did not identify the authors. Such was the case of the initial draft of the National Security Act I obtained. In the section that follows, I provide a breakdown of government agencies established and/or reformed under the National Security Act, noting the purpose of each.

When designing the National Security Act, U.S. government actors and officials emphasized the significance of considering war-era "successes and failures," as well as interactions with geopolitical regions and nations abroad during World War II. The copy of the National Security Act's proposal that I reviewed, dated February 16, 1949, and entitled "Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947," outlined the unification bill's purpose and structure, introducing the National Security Act as follows:

"Ultimate victory in modern warfare demands not only the close coordination and judicious employment of all elements of the military service, but also requires the full application of all the economic political, intellectual and moral power of the nation. The speed and devastation with which modern war may initially strike makes it mandatory from the viewpoint of mere survival that our country devise and maintain a broad, all-inclusive plan for national security."<sup>30</sup>

With power relations and national security in mind, the National Security Act underwent two years of extensive hearings and deliberations by Congressional committees, coupled with supportive investigations by military departments. In its final form, provisions of the act included: 1) an establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relation to national security by creating cabinet-level certain deliverable bodies, namely the National Security Council and the National Security Relations

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<sup>30</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: "Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947."

Board, 2) three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy, Air Force by separating the Air Force from the Navy and thereby providing autonomy in administrative matters for the three services, 3) authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but never through merger by establishing the cabinet post of Secretary of Defense, and 4) effective strategies of direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control, as well as their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces by legalizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and specifying that the Joint Chief of Staff “shall establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.”

Central to the goal of this paper is an understanding of the rationales utilized by governing powers to reorganize and establish government agencies concerned with national security, intelligence, and foreign policy. Here, we learn that the National Security Act established and reorganized government agencies by developing a central line from the President of the United States to the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Army. Under the National Security Act, U.S. national security, intelligence, and U.S. foreign policies became intrinsically linked with war departments, further positioning the reorder and reorganization of government agencies concerned with foreign policy alongside twentieth-century American ideologies largely informed by war-era hysteria.

The U.S. drew on World War II operations as an example of the effects of uncoordinated efforts, “where misdirection of manpower and supplies and lack of cohesion in planning led to the dissipation of our strength.”<sup>31</sup> Misdirection, according to the National Security Act, was prevalent amongst slow and costly mobilization, limited intelligence of the designs and

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<sup>31</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: “Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947.”

capacities of enemies, incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, and prodigal use of resources. Thus, the National Security Act was formed to meet the demand of an appropriate intelligence organization to serve both military and civilian agencies of security, resulting in the creation of cabinet level agencies such as the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Resources Board, coupled with a National Military Establishment.

Drawing on national outcry, agencies like the National Security Resource Board and National Security Council were implemented in order to inform the integration of U.S. domestic, foreign, and military policies. Composed of the President, the Secretary of state, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, the National Security Council was designed to serve as a civilian advisory board. General Lucius Dubignon Clay, a former senior officer of the United States Army who was known for his administration of occupied Germany after World War II, noted how these changes were informed by “the Berlin situation,” a Cold War conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States that took place from 1958 – 1962.<sup>32</sup> The Berlin Crisis began in 1958 when the Eisenhower administration formulated Berlin contingency plans that would inform U.S. policy towards Berlin and West Germany moving forward. With consideration of military and economic power, the National Security Council would assess the objectives, commitments, and risks of foreign policies. According to Molina, as a result of the first World War and Red Scare, "The U.S. government perpetuated fear of immigrants by developing programs... which targeted immigrants as radicals, subversives, and communists... (20)." When enacting the National Security Act, U.S. rationale drew on interactions with particular ethnic and

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<sup>32</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: “Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947.”

racial groups throughout the twentieth century and specifically during the war eras. In doing so, the U.S. furthered what Historian Natalia Molina refers to as the immigration regime by developing U.S. immigration policies that would (consciously or unconsciously) impact how differing migrant groups would be perceived and received by the U.S. across space and time. For example, when the National Security Act drew on war era interactions with Japan and Germany, the same infrastructures they had designed to combat “fear of terrorist” threats were then utilized in later eras to combat migration from other regions across the globe.

Prior to the National Security Act, and specifically under the Roosevelt administration, the JCS was made responsible for intelligence investigations abroad. Under the National Security Act, however, JCS duties were transferred to the newly established Central Intelligence Agency. Directed by the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency was designed to advise the National Security Council, and other agencies of the Government concerned with national security. Significant to CIA duties was the timely and adequate intelligence concerning political intentions and military capabilities of other nations. According to the National Security Act, the establishment of the CIA "fulfills a long-felt need to have available at one source and in properly evaluated form with regard to the general aspects of national security, the uncorrelated information formerly contained in the files of numerous intelligence units in various government agencies."<sup>33</sup> The National Security Act, while enacted under the guise of securing the U.S. nation-state, was also instrumental in determining procedures for obtaining foreign intelligence abroad, as well as measures for foreign aid and assistance.

The National Security Resource Board was designed to parallel in the economic and domestic fields the National Security Council in the politico-military and foreign fields.

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<sup>33</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: “Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947.”

Consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Labor. Importantly, the National Security Resource Board would advise the President and the National Security Council on "the economic potential in manpower, material and facilities and our readiness to mobilize the nation rapidly for war."<sup>34</sup> This information, according to the Truman administration, would provide a realistic basis upon which to determine acceptable "commitments and risks in the formulation of foreign policy."<sup>35</sup> The National Security Resources Board was deemed crucial to the security of the U.S. nation moving forward because "it is designed to prevent the chaotic conditions which permeated all phases of our domestic activity, including the military, in mobilizing for World War II."<sup>36</sup> In addition to being a source of information regarding the potentiality of the national economy in terms of natural and productive resources, the Board in time of peace maintained plans for directing and reconciling the military and civilian mobilization of the nation and allocating material and facilities among them. Further, working with the Council of Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Board was assumed to be useful in guiding and coordinating the conflicting demands of foreign aid and defense burdens.

The National Security Act was enacted under the guise of serving national interests by increasing national security, intelligence, and foreign policy. However, in the later sections of the policy proposal, economic and foreign aid (central rationales for U.S. intervening in Central America throughout the twentieth century) are included as additional components of the National Security Act. Additionally, although established under the Truman administration, the National Security Act served to ensuing presidential administrations responsible for U.S. intervention in

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<sup>34</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: "Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947."

<sup>35</sup> Archive box 1: Security Defense, document labeled: "Developing Under the National Security Act of 1947."

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Central America, such as the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations. Reagan and Eisenhower's incentives, however, were more heavily based on fears of "terrorist threats" abroad.

When developing the policies that would determine U.S. intervention during the latter half of the twentieth-century, U.S. government actors and agents drew on war-era hysteria to rationalize restrictive immigration policies, and in doing so, simultaneously reinforced preconceived notions of migrant groups arriving from regions abroad perceived as "terrorist threats."

### **Evoking the Memory of Harry S. Truman**

Truman is perceived as the most important President on foreign policy (Edwards 2009). In addition to the 1947 National Security Act, Truman was highly recognized and praised for establishing the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Funds (Wade 2015). Inspired by Truman's "successes" and dedication to U.S. foreign policy, presidential administrations, such as the Eisenhower, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush administration borrowed from Truman's rhetoric when rationalizing U.S. intervention in other nations throughout their individual terms.

In the archive entitled "Records Relating to Central America," I also found files that indicate how U.S. foreign policy was informed, specifically as it pertained to Latin American and U.S. relations during the 1950s. The presidential administration, following the Truman administration, the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961), was widely recognized for evoking the memory of Truman (Edwards 2009). During his presidency, Eisenhower drew heavily on the newly established National Security Act and the National Security Council to set policies during the Cold War (Rabe, 2017). Eisenhower's interests, heavily placed on Latin American policy, stemmed from efforts to diminish communism in Latin America. In addition to establishing Latin



American policy, Eisenhower funded anti-communist Latin American leaders and politicians and participated in the overthrow of popularly elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz. As part of Eisenhower's efforts to address foreign policy and international relations, he sought information on Latin America. Instrumental in informing U.S. foreign policies during the mid-twentieth century was Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, an American educational administrator and younger brother President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Dwight Eisenhower loved and respected his brother, Milton, perceiving him as "the most highly qualified main in the United States to be president,"<sup>37</sup> with the President himself being no exception to this belief. Interestingly, Eisenhower presents another example of the positioning and appointment of crucial foreign policy decision-makers with a history of a military enrollment. Prior to his role alongside his brother, Milton Eisenhower graduated from the military academy at West Point and was later positioned at Fort Houston in San Antonio, Texas. His proximity to Mexico in this newfound position resulted in a romanticizing view of Latin America (Rabe, 2017).

Exhibitions and other field assignments to Latin America throughout the twentieth century were rooted in agricultural interests. This archive revealed additional U.S. interests in Latin America expanded beyond agriculture, including interests in social development, up-to-grade U.S. activities affecting Latin America, stable trade relations, and modified attitude toward dictators. It is important to note that the events discussed in the section that follows proceeds the National 1947 Security Act, taking place throughout the 1950s and with the aforementioned procedures established under the National Security Act set in place.

On December 27, 1958, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower wrote a follow-up report to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1953, Dr. Eisenhower had compiled a report that "emphasized the

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<sup>37</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: "Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America."

vital importance of Latin America and the United States to each other; suggested the principles those continental conditions which have a direct bearing upon United State policies and programs, and recommended a number of actions which I believed would be helpful in binding the American republics into a cooperative enterprise directed towards the foals of peace, freedom, and rising levels of human well-being."<sup>38</sup> From September of 1956 to May 1957, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower met with distinguished leaders of twenty republics in Latin America, where "the Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives, unanimously recommended to the Chiefs of State ways in which the Organization of American States might broaden the scope of its activities for the benefit of the peoples of this hemisphere."<sup>39</sup> Later, in July of 1958, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower and the Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and President of the Export Bank, the Managing Director of the Development Loan Fund, and a physician from Johns Hopkins University made a visit to the five republics (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) of Central America and Panama. Major figures, organizations, and agencies Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower met with included Federal and international agencies "whose policies and programs have significant bearing on this conversation with you [the president],"<sup>40</sup> the U.S. president and members of the U.S. presidents' cabinet, the National Security Planning Board, the Board of Directors of Export-Import Bank, the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development the Managing Director and other officials of the Development Loan Fund, and heads of some of the U.S. industrial enterprises with activities in Latin America.

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<sup>38</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: "Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America."

<sup>39</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: "Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America."

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In his letter, Dr. Eisenhower also revealed that a number of recommendations provided in the preliminary report from 1953 had yet to be addressed by the U.S. government. Adding to the 1953 report, Dr. Eisenhower urges “the nations of Latin America and the United States re-examine their attitudes and policies towards one another and constantly seek to strengthen their economic, political, and cultural relations, to their mutual benefit.”<sup>41</sup> Importantly, Dr. Eisenhower recognized Latin America as a continental area in ferment, with increasing productivity and population, as well as “a high degree of illiteracy, poverty, and dependence on one-commodity economies with consequent wide fluctuations in income still characterize most of this vast area.”<sup>42</sup>

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower continues by expressing how “the people generally, including the most humble of them, now know that low standards of living are neither universal or inevitable, and they are therefore impatiently insistent that remedial actions be taken. It is perhaps natural for them to look primarily to the United States of assistance.”<sup>43</sup> From this assistance, he claims, “neither the people nor their leaders” seek grant assistance, and rather, public and private credit, stable relations, stable prices of raw commodities, technical assistance designed to hasten overall development primarily through education, health, and agricultural and industrial productivity. In order to meet these goals, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower emphasizes a “need for understanding” amongst Latin American and U.S. governments and peoples, cooperation from the Western hemisphere, and most importantly, “... in ways that enable Latin America to achieve its aspirations without requiring an excessive drain upon the over-taxed resources of the United States – there must first be an understanding amongst them.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

<sup>42</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

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<sup>44</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

Unfortunately, Dr. Eisenhower reveals that “misunderstandings seem to me to be even more serious than they were in 1953,”<sup>45</sup> further relaying that these problems on behalf of the United States are a result of lack of knowledge, despite “wanting to be good neighbors.” In this context, Dr. Eisenhower refers to the Good Neighbor Policy, Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933 foreign policy doctrine designed to improve relations with Latin America and reaction to the exploitative dollar diplomacy of the early 1900s. The Good Neighbor policy encouraged interaction between the United States and Latin America as equals. According to Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, “our people generally do not truly comprehend the problems and aspirations of our neighbors, and sometimes take actions which are detrimental to the good relationships we wish to foster... and may have favored actions different from those that were taken in the area of trade relations if they had been in possession of all relevant facts.”<sup>46</sup> When Eisenhower first presented recommendations in his 1953 report, measures were taken by the United States Information Agency, the State Department, private businesses with branches in Latin America, and mass media. However, he claims the “the problem grows. In Latin America, misunderstandings of our policies, programs, and attitudes are pervasive, and are impediments to the development of more fruitful cooperation.”<sup>47</sup> Since Eisenhower's 1958 report, emotions in Latin American had only been heightened. Based on conversations with Latin American leaders, entrepreneurs, and scholars, Eisenhower had learned that Latin Americans believed the U.S. economic capacity to be “..essentially unlimited” and that the U.S. was “doing much more for other areas of the world than we are for Latin America. This leads them to conclude that their failure to obtain credit in the desired volume is either sheer perversity or discrimination on our part.”<sup>48</sup> Latin Americans,

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<sup>45</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

<sup>46</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

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<sup>48</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

according to Dr. Eisenhower, also believed the U.S. would fix prices to the detriment of Latin America, with the common understanding being: “We must sell to you at prices you are willing to pay, and we must buy from you at prices you dictate.”<sup>49</sup>

Articulating these responses from Latin American officials and communities, Dr. Eisenhower questions how these false ideas in Latin America circulated, resulting in “one of the most vexing problems in Latin America,” meaning, “the excessive dependence upon the export of agricultural products and minerals, whose prices are subject to sharp fluctuations in world markets, whereas the price of industrial commodities they buy are more rigid.”<sup>50</sup> Further, Eisenhower posits this “distortion of facts, a false impression is now held by certain misinformed individuals and is also being cleverly fostered by communist agitators.”<sup>51</sup> After addressing Latin America's concerns, Dr. Eisenhower recommends that the U.S. develop a plan for international relations (i.e., intervention) with Latin America, claiming: “Despite our adherence to a policy of non-intervention, we are charged with supporting Latin American dictators in the face of a strong trend toward freedom and democratic government.” Here, we see another example of a U.S. entity informing protocols and procedures for U.S. intervention based on what is assumed to be careful research. Dr. Eisenhower, as we recall, carries a history of military background and little to no background in policy and decision making. In addition, his interest was largely informed by his brother, President Eisenhower's political agenda, as well as his own romanticized view of Latin America. Although he spent several months investigating Latin America, his perspective was also guided by U.S. interests, as well as interactions with other government agents and officials, typically under the guise of U.S. economic gain.

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<sup>49</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

<sup>50</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

<sup>51</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

In Dr. Eisenhower's analysis, major fields in need of restructuring within U.S. governments and for the purpose of enhancing U.S. and Latin American relations include: the need for understanding, credit, social development, regional common markets, price stabilization, technical cooperation, up-to grade U.S. activities affecting Latin America, stable trade relations, and modified attitude toward dictators. Specific recommendations from the 1953 report are outlined below.

1. U.S. leadership urges the Organization of American States (OAS) to prioritize effective programming efforts to develop among the Government and people of the American Republics that genuine understanding on which fruitful cooperative action must be based.
2. Each of the twenty-one governments is urged to assume a large measure of responsibility for promoting the relevant understanding within its own country, to be facilitated by the U.S. State Department.
3. Information facilities of the State Department are increased, that the State Department cooperate continuously with the United States National Commission for Latin American Affairs and that special efforts be made to induce the mass media of the United States to maintain competent correspondents in Latin America and to carry a steady flow of news and interpretive material from all twenty republics.
4. Leadership, student, and other exchanges of persons be encouraged by every means.
5. Activities of the United States Information Agency in Latin America be increased.
6. Projected Inter-American development institution subsequently discussed herein, be so organized and staffed as to assist the American Republics in developing planning, in the assignment of priorities, and in the preparations of loan projects, and that the United States International Cooperation Administration assists in the financing of this section of the development agency through technical cooperation funds.
7. That the proposed interstate-American development institution exercises leadership in this field; that it promotes more specific planning by America in the utilization of existing credit facilities that it has broad responsibility for achieving greater understanding and coordination in the whole field of loans to the Republics of Latin America.

8. The United States lending institutions, with the help of IBRD, if possible, inform the Republics of Latin America that they stand ready, as a cooperative group, to consider the extension of sound, well-timed loans in support of practical development plans sympathetically, and that they will meet jointly with delegations from each applicant country to determine how credit resources may best be employed to help that nation proceed effectively with its economic program.
9. The United States proceed as rapidly as possible to cooperate with leaders of Latin American Republics in creating an Inter-American bank. Such a new institution should coordinate its operations closely with those of the World Bank, United States lending agencies at the end that the total flow of development capital into Latin American may be increased.
10. After careful preparation through appropriate channels, the United States participate with five republics of Central America, and Panama, if possible, in a regional conference, either at a Ministerial or technical level, to stimulate public and private lending institution, and private and industrial enterprises, to take a positive approach in helping Central America and Panama at the end that new industries, guaranteed free access to the entire market of the participating countries, would be established; that every effort we made to have this development serve as a model for all of Latin America; and that such steps as may be deemed appropriate be taken to encourage the northern group of the South American countries, and the southern group of South American countries, to consider the creation of a common regional market in those areas.
11. The United States, if requested to do so, cooperate to the extent of furnishing such information as laws and regulations permit to assist the producing countries in enforcing agreed-upon marketing quotas.
12. The United States, when requested by producing nations, participate in single-commodity study groups, giving every possible technical assistance, but always making clear that our participation in no way implies subsequent cooperation in plans the producing nations might develop to stabilize prices.
13. Technical cooperation program for Latin America be under the direct supervision of the Ambassador in each country, with the Assistant of Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs be given authority under the general guidance of the Under Secretary of State for

Economic Affairs, to coordinate the technical cooperation programs in Latin American nations with the diplomatic, social, cultural and other activities over which he has cognizance.

14. Establish a council on Inter-American Affairs, whose task would be to advise with the Secretary of State on all matters of hemispheric importance, bringing to him creative ideas for strengthening relations, and constantly emphasizing by its very existence and public statements the important which the Government and people of the United States attach to good partnership among the American republics.
15. Following along the suggestion of Vice President Nixon regarding having an “abrazo” for democratic leaders, and a formal handshake for dictators. Trivial as it may sound, I recommend that it be our official policy in relations with Latin American leaders and nations.
16. Refrain from granting special recognition to a Latin American dictator, regardless of the temporary advantage that might seem to promise by such an act.

To conclude the letter, Eisenhower draws on a 1958 expedition to Panama, Central America, and Puerto Rico. From this 9,300-mile journey, Dr. Eisenhower and his associates engaged with 1,200 leaders of Government, industry, agriculture, labor, commerce, finance, education, health, and social and cultural institutions. Through these encounters, 11,000 pages and suggestions were gathered from the aforementioned leaders. This information, mostly consisting of detail specific needs for credit or technical assistance and "therefore should be handled through normal governmental channels," was then provided to the Department of State. Dr. Eisenhower also indicates U.S. governmental assumptions regarding "unfriendly incidents," but was pleased to find "calmly and rationally, to accomplish precisely what we set out to do: to gain a new perspective of the problems, progress, attitudes, and aspirations of the nations visited, as a basis for determining whether new approaches in our policies and programs might strengthen relations among us."<sup>52</sup> Ultimately, Eisenhower and his associates were grateful for the

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<sup>52</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”



many courtesies afforded to them by the American Republics and their governments, “which certainly would not have provided any comfort to communists and other who constantly seek to drive a wedge between us and our friends.”<sup>53</sup>

For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on Dr. Eisenhower's eleventh and twelfth recommendations. These particular recommendations urge the U.S. to take notice of Central America in order to "provide foreign aid" and to "integrate Central America's economy." It is important to note that Dr. Eisenhower's exhibitions take place shortly after the establishment of the 1947 National Security Act, pointing to U.S. measures for enhancing intelligence by engaging with regions abroad. Further, Eisenhower's administration was the first to evoke the memory of the Truman administration, drawing heavily on the establishment of the National Security Act's and the National Security Council to inform U.S. national security, intelligence, and foreign policy in the 1950s. Unique to Eisenhower's administration, however, is the prevalent interest in international relations with Latin America (broadly) and Central American (specifically). Here, it is important to address Foucault's assertions regarding government responses to resistance, as well as their interest in economic prosperity (Foucault 1980, pp. 195-6). Under the Truman administration, The National Security Act addressed interactions with nations abroad that were perceived as "terrorist threats to national security," such as Germany and Japan. Under Eisenhower's administration and given civil discourses across Latin America during the 1950s, intervention in Latin American, I argue, was informed by notions of "fear of terrorist threats" and as determined by Cold-War hysteria rooted in additional fears of communism.

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<sup>53</sup> Archive Box #3: Document labeled: “Dr. Milton Eisenhower on Latin America.”

A central critique of neoliberalism focuses on the assumption that neoliberal multiculturalism affords limited rights that serve to keep people focused on the possibility of qualifying for state-sponsored rights, as opposed to engaging in struggles for more just systems of governance. Eisenhower's recommendations were largely informed by what Shannon Speed refers to as the "United States model." According to Speed, "Extending well beyond an understanding that there are different (all settler-imposed) national languages and distinct legal systems, the ideological enters when the default assumption is that the United States is a well-functioning democracy in which law, order, and tolerance reign, while Latin American is characterized by corruption, illegality, and poorly functioning or weak democracy."

Eisenhower's recommendations exemplified the assumptions made by U.S. forces when intervening in Central America as early as the 1950s. Although Eisenhower's recommendations assumed Latin Americas (broadly) and Central America's (specifically) economic conditions would be positively influenced by mirroring a U.S. model, this assumption failed, proving the U.S. model to be an insufficient and dysfunctional system when implemented abroad.

Further, it important to note the economical components of the National Security Act, especially given that U.S. interests in Central America during the twentieth century center on economic integration. In Speed's critique of multicultural neoliberalism, she claims: "Often posited as the inevitable spread of neoliberal democracy on a U.S. model (at times with an evolutionist flavor of development toward the highest state of being, one naturally epitomized by the United States), these processes seemed to offer at least some increase in political stability, rights, and accountability that are frequently discussed under the umbrella of recognition and rights regimes. (3)" If we recall, when the U.S. model was implemented in Central America during the 1960s, economic conditions did not improve, and rather, plummeted, resulting in

enhanced poverty and violence that prompted migration from Central America to the U.S. In addition, when the U.S. government worked with Central America's governance to develop an economic integration model, it was done so under the assumption that pursuing a U.S. model would enhance opportunities for Central Americas overall wellbeing. It is clear now that these stated U.S. goals never panned out in the region. On the contrary, the development of economic measures in Central America, however, did not enhance opportunities for Central Americans, and rather, increased poverty and violence. As a result, Central American families sought to escape these conditions, opting to abandon their homes and loves ones by migrating to the U.S., and obtaining a steady flow of income (Abrego 2014). In doing so, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus prompted multiple forms of violence that placed Central Americans as vulnerable.

The Eisenhower administrations' efforts to intervene in Central America for the purpose of economic integration, yet lack of accountability for the consequences of U.S. foreign policy, speaks to historical U.S. disavowal. Repudiated governmentalities as a theoretical framework is most useful when applied to the historical and political events that transpired in Central America in the 1960s, as well as at U.S. ports of entry during the 1980s. As demonstrated in the archives I reviewed, the U.S. government suggested developing relations with Latin America (broadly) and Central American (specifically), even going as far as addressing any responsibility they had to Latin America and Central America moving forward. However, when Central American migrant families sought refuge at U.S. ports of entry during the 1980s, after the turmoil of U.S. intervention took place in the 1960s, they were not received with open arms by the U.S. With the logic of multiculturalism neoliberalism and settler colonialism in mind, U.S. interest in Central America proved to be purely based on profitable and without regard for human lives, followed

by a complete disregard for their involvement in developing the circumstances that prompted migration from Central America to the U.S. during the 1960s and throughout the 1980s.

In Foucault's conceptualization of governmentalities, he also discusses neoliberalism's dedicated to "sustainable development." Placing Speed's assertion regarding U.S. models alongside Foucault's conceptualization of governmentalities, I posit that the National Security Act's efforts to increase economic development served as a state apparatus rooted in governmentalities. Meaning, that through the National Security Act, the U.S. was able to develop and implement U.S. models in regions abroad for the purpose of U.S. profitable gain. Further, according to Abrego and Villalpando's (Forthcoming), analysis of the U.S. postwar era and the emerging antiracist U.S. agenda, this era of racial liberalism sought to mask racialized inequalities through the use of market-driven inequalities and the promise of national belonging. As a result, the U.S. produced white heteronormative modes of belonging. This antiracist agenda was then weaponized to justify (and rationalize) U.S. intervention in Central America, further resulting in the criminalization and exploitation of Central Americans.

### **Central America's Economic Integration, 1957 – 59**

As discussed in prior sections of this thesis, U.S. foreign policy as it pertains to Latin America (broadly) and Central America (specifically) was largely informed by trade interests and for the purpose of U.S. profitable gain. The materials I reviewed furthered this understanding, pointing to entangled conversations regarding U.S. foreign policy, intervention, and colluding with Central American regions and governments, as well as rationales for investing in Northern Latin American regions.

During the 1951 fourth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America, an agency of the United Nations, the delegations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,

and Nicaragua, submitted a resolution in which they expressed the interests of their Governments “in the development of agricultural and industrial production and of transportation systems in their respective countries, with the goal of promoting the integration of their economies and the expansion of markets by the exchange of their products, the coordination their development programs, and the establishment of enterprises in which all or some of these countries have an interest.”<sup>54</sup>

Adopted in 1951, the resolution prompted the Governments of Central America to send their delegates to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, where they created the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee. This committee was designed to undertake a program “for the gradual and progressive integration of the Central American economies on the basis of cooperation and reciprocity among the five Governments.”<sup>55</sup> In 1952, a secretariat report served the committee as a basic document for the adoption of the program, stressing that an integration program was warranted by the existence of national economies resting upon narrow economic foundations and by the desirability of attempting to direct the development of these countries in such a way that there be created as wide a market as possible with a minimum duplication of activities."

In 1952, the Ministers of Economy of the five Central American Republics met for the first time to discuss the complete economic integration of the Isthmus as an ideal objective, commenting on the difficulty of achieving in practice and within a reasonable period of time. In fact, the Ministers of Economy of the five Central American Republics predicted that complete economic integration would involve parallel political and administrative integration, falling outside of the Ministers' mandate. According to the Ministers, complete economic integration would also require a total customs union, the free movement of commodities, people and capital

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<sup>54</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

<sup>55</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

throughout the region, a joint administration for customs, ports and some forms of transport, standardization of many aspects of fiscal, banking, monetary and customs legislation and even unified currency and credit policy. Realistically addressing the situation, the Ministers undertook a program which provided for gradual and progressive integration. No immediate provision was made for a customs union responsible for the pooling of fiscal, administrative, banking, or other services. Rather, uniformity for policy specific sectors and legislation was envisaged.

With regard to the economy, attention was focused particularly on integration in industrial fields. The committee worked on the assumption that the prospect for industrial growth would be more favorable under conditions of long-term planning and specialization by areas. The Ministers of Economy of the five Central American Republics argued this industrial growth would not be possible if the five nations were not to implement their own industrial development program independent of others and without consideration to the advantage of having access to the whole or a major part of Central American market, rather than the only small domestic outlets. Thus, an industrial integration plan was worked out with the objective of obtaining the rationalization and specialization of then-existing industries, as well as promotion of activities and a program of cooperation among the Five Republics.

At the fourth session, held in February of 1957, a draft agreement on a “regime” for Central American integration industries was prepared and approved by the Secretariat. This approved draft was referred to the governments in countries concerned for ratification and for consulting public opinion. The purpose of the “regime” was to establish new industries, as well as specialization of existing industries within the framework of Central American economic integration, to be carried out “on the basis of reciprocity and equity,” so that each of the Central

American countries may progressively attain economic benefits.”<sup>56</sup> By 1958, the proposed agreement had defined an integration industry encompassed by principles concerning sites and reciprocity, capital formation, competition, tax, and other fiscal privileges and obligations of each enterprise.

Emphasized as the most significant component of Central American economic integration included a trade policy that would promote free trade in regional commodities. To meet this requirement, the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee worked on a project to establish a free-trade zone on the basis of a special multilateral treaty. A group of experts appointed by the meeting Committee prepared a draft treaty which was considered at the fourth meeting of the committee. The Ministers approved the draft treaty and undertook to secure the approval of their respective governments to the treaty itself and to Annex, which listed the goods proposed for free trade. This treaty aimed to create a ten-year free-trade zone applied to the bulk of the trade between the five countries, each of which encompassed three major themes: 1) goods that were completely free, 2) those paying no customs duties but subject to possible quantitative import or export restrictions, and 3) those of which there will be a progressive reduction in customs duties.

The Central American program was similar to the European Common Market plan, both of which aimed to promote economic integration, although differing in approach. The purpose of integration in Central America was limited and entirely economic, while the European nations' economic integration was motivated by politics. "The problem in creating an economic unit in a highly developed area such as Europe are principally institutional and financial. In Central America, and under-developed region, the task of achieving integration will move forward with

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<sup>56</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Economic Integration of Central America

more fundamental one of attaining economic development.” Plans for Central America obtained support from leaders in every field of economic activity, drawing attention from neighboring countries such as Mexico, which at the time, adhered to the regional market. From this, the Ministers claimed: “Thus, through the economic processes of the Twentieth Century, the dreams of the founders of our countries for a unified Central America may be accomplished.”<sup>57</sup>

One particular unauthored file dated July 23, 1958, provides an outline regarding "U.S. Support for Market Integration in Latin America." The outline is broken down into five sections:

1. Present Status for Integration Plans in Latin America
2. Potential Benefits from Economic Integration
3. Requirements for Successful Market Integration
4. How Can the U.S. be Helpful?
5. Should the U.S. take the Initiative in Forming New Groups.

The outline provides four conclusions and recommendations: 1) The U.S. should affirm on every appropriate occasion that it should welcome the formation in Latin America of customs unions and free trade areas, 2) The U.S. should continue to be prepared in specific cases to support waivers in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<sup>58</sup> or adjustments of its bilateral agreements with the Latin American countries concerned in order to accommodate particular preferential agreements which do not meet the GATT criteria for customs unions or free trade areas but what would promote the most efficient allocation of Latin American resources and the improvement of standard living in Latin America, 3) The U.S. should consider how institutions such as the ICA, the Export Bank, and the Development Loan Fund could contribute to sound regional projects related to market integrations, and 4) Within the U.S.

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<sup>57</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Economic Integration of Central America

<sup>58</sup> The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a legal agreement between many countries, whose overall purpose was to promote international trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs or quotas.



Government there should be an intensive study of the Central American treaties for free trade and economic integration, recently signed at Tegucigalpa, to determine whether and to what extent the United States should support the market integration and development program the five Central American republics (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). In the light of such a study, consideration was centered on (a) the possibility of offering Central Americans technical assistance in developing a customs union, and b) means of extending financial assistance to it.

While several recommendations provide intel on U.S. trade interests, I will focus on the fourth and final recommendation. Several ensuing presidential administrations, such as the Eisenhower and Reagan administration, drew on Truman's discourse when rationalizing their individual commitments to U.S. foreign policy (Edwards 2009). The documents I reviewed in this archive take place during Eisenhower's presidency, further emphasizing the role of the National Security Act and the Truman administration played in developing a U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The Eisenhower administration drew on the National Security Act to develop Latin American and Central American policy, emphasizing the significance of U.S. profitable gain. Here, it is important to note that the OAS has been historicized as an effort to assist Central American countries, subsequently adding to my exploration of the intentions or goals versus proclaimed intentions or goals of both U.S. and Central American governments. Within the logic of repudiated governmentalities, the historized efforts of U.S. governments to assist Central American governments reminds us that the U.S. played a significant role in propagating the circumstances that prompted mass migration from Central America to the U.S.

Elaboration of a multilateral plan (referred to as “The Proposed Latin American Regional Network”) to establish a regional market for all Latin American began in November 1956 when

The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (known as ECLAC)<sup>59</sup> requested the ECLA Secretariat to define the characteristics of the regional market, study its possibilities and submit recommendations to the Trade Committee on basic principles and procedures for the establishment pursuant to the resolution of the Trade Committee.

Later, at the 1957 Economic Conference of the Organization for American Countries (OAC)<sup>60</sup>, the United States voted in favor of “the advisability of establishing, gradually and progressively, in multilateral and competitive form, a Latin American regional market.” At this meeting, it was also determined that Raymond Mikesell from the University of Oregon would serve with a working group of experts to underline the United States interests in the proposed Latin American regional market. Similar to other government entities, such as Dr. Eisenhower, Dr. McBride, and Mr. James Grover, Raymond Mikesell was selected to inform U.S. foreign policy, although, in this case, with particular regard to Latin America (broadly) and Central America (specifically). It is significant to note these trends, wherein intellectuals are selected to inform U.S. foreign policies, often under the guise of enhancing national security, economic integration, and overall, U.S. profitable gain. Unlike the first Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Sidney Souers, Dr. Eisenhower, Dr. McBride, and Mr. James Grover, I imagine, held knowledge on policy and decision making. However, their appointment to these crucial decision-making positions raises questions regarding why particular individuals were selected to advise the president and government actors on key foreign policy decisions? Without ample connections to Latin America and Central America, the advice these government entities provided

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<sup>59</sup> The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, known as ECLAC, UNECLAC or in Spanish and Portuguese CEPAL, is a United Nations regional commission to encourage economic cooperation.

<sup>60</sup> The Organization of American States is the world's oldest regional organization. The Organization was established in order to achieve among its member states—as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter—"an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence."

(consciously or unconsciously) shaped the lives of Latin American and Central Americans in the years that followed.

Outlining the significance of potential benefits from economic integration, the file mentions “the economic benefits of market integration are those which may arise from”: 1) the extension of competition throughout the wider market; 2) economic scale in production; 3) increased investment. As part of this project to economically integrate Latin America, national trade barriers within market areas were removed because “relatively inefficient producers who have heretofore been sheltered meet increased competition from relatively efficient producers abroad. The least efficient producers are forced out of business, and the more efficient expand. As this process continues, the average efficiency of the production throughout the area increases.”<sup>61</sup> According to U.S. government agents involved in developing the outline, the U.S. is able to benefit from the economic integration of Latin America when natural barriers to trade (such as poor transportation) are low and artificial barriers (i.e., tariffs) are high, when capital and labor are mobile and can be easily shifted from marginal uses to more productive activities, “where business is booming, where there is full employment, where businessmen are self-reliant and alert to new opportunities – in short, where it is generally reorganized and accepted that competition and mobility are beneficial while protection and immobility lead to economic stagnation.”<sup>62</sup> Further, unit costs of production are down as the volume of output increases. Efficient, low-cost production in these industries required a fairly large market—in many cases, a market larger than that available within the borders of any one country, “especially if that country is not large and if its inhabitants are poor.”<sup>63</sup> With industrialization in mind, the U.S.

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<sup>61</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

<sup>62</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

<sup>63</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

contended that through economic integration, Latin America would become an “external economy” for the U.S.

As discussed in the previous section, Central America’s Northern region had been identified as a rich site for agriculture and gold. According to the outline, products and by-products of some industries “may become the raw materials of others; common use may be made of public utilities, such as railways and power plants; and in other ways, the presence of new industry may lead to lower costs of production in others nearby.”<sup>64</sup> In this logic, economies of the social scale, such as that of Latin America and Central America’s, could be realized through market integration in industrialized (or industrializing) economies. Additionally, Latin America was considered a prime location for “external economies,” because “a regional market would include a large number of potential customers and that it could by restrictions on imports from outside and by arbitrarily channeling investment from the market area) place these customers at the disposition of investors in industrial plants.”<sup>65</sup> However, some Latin American markets asserted that market integration would soon be followed by private investment and industrialization, while other Latin American markets asserted that markets must be industrialized in order to absorb a growing population in productive activity. Latin Americans associated with the latter further posited that massive investments (largely of public funds from outside) must be made, and that market integration is a logical complement to Latin American industrialization because doing so would enable public funds.

As part of requirements for successful market integration, the U.S. argued that there would first be a need for “really free flow of goods, capital, and labor internally.”<sup>66</sup> Meaning, that

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<sup>64</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

<sup>65</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

<sup>66</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Elaboration of a multilateral plan.

benefits of integration would come from the competition in wider markets and from economies of scale. With this in mind, the U.S. further posited that: 1) potential benefits would be realized only if competition is allowed to take place over the widest possible range of commodities and if enterprise is allowed to respond to competition by utilizing capital and labor most efficiently, 2) There should be no undue increase in barriers to trade between consumers in Latin America and suppliers outside it, 3) There must be an adequate supply of capital, and 4) there must be public investment in transportation facilities.

The U.S. positioned itself readily in support of Latin American integration during the 1950s. As part of their efforts to support Latin America, the U.S. offered support and participation in studies of market integration in Latin America. As part of this process, the U.S. placed the Executive Secretary of ECLA to appoint one of the foremost U.S. experts on Latin American integration, Professor Raymond Mikesell, to a working group of experts studying Latin American integration. Further, the U.S. was encouraged to dramatize its interest in economic development in Latin America by studying specific Latin American plans and determining whether one or more of them appeared sound in order to determine U.S. readiness to cooperate in making Latin American integration possible. However, the U.S. cautioned that any plan "should offer some prospect of economic viability as a true common market or free trade area – i.e., it should have a definite schedule for the abolition of internal trade barriers on all of nearly all commodities; it should not envision an increase in the incidence or increase in the incidence of its trade barriers against the rest of the world; it should cover one contiguous area of reasonable size, and governments participating in it should realize the importance of harmonizing their domestic policies and of prompting competitive trade-in market areas."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

Of seven Central American countries, five (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) were identified as significant to this U.S. economic integration initiative. At the 1957 Economic Conference of the Organization for American Countries (OAC), U.S. government actors and agents claimed, "it would seem the U.S. should first investigate the possibility of supporting existing plans of indigenous Latin American origin. The 5-nation Central American Plan might be supported – perhaps after being modified so as to merit support."<sup>68</sup> With this mind, U.S. government agents and actors were encouraged to take the initiative in persuading Latin American countries to attempt market integration, and in doing so, "the U.S. will become liable for the success of any such plan."<sup>69</sup> For this reason, the U.S. recommends two things; 1) the plan should be economically sound – i.e., it should meet GATT criteria, and 2) the U.S. should be prepared – for the reasons cited above – to advance extensive financial support. Drawing on U.S. rationales for economic integration in Latin America, I argue that given that each Latin American and Central American region's social, political, and economic conditions differentiate, U.S. foreign policy cannot be applied broadly to the entirety of the region without (consciously or unconsciously) instigating a form of inequitable compromise and/or consequence for Latin American and Central American citizens. Here, U.S. government officials have developed an all-encompassing rationale for U.S. intervention in Central America, as it pertains to economic value, and with consideration to Latin America, broadly.

Included at the end of the outline was another document entitled "Central America's Economic Integration and Its Common Market." Released on October 1, 1957, by Gonzalo J. Facio, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the U.S., this document discussed the economic integration

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<sup>68</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

<sup>69</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

of Central American regions such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. According to Facio, after these regions obtained independence from Spain in 1821 and became the Federal Republic of Central America, "a Constitution very similar to that of the United States was adopted by the Federal Republic."<sup>70</sup> Unfortunately, the constitution did not wield national unity, resulting in the Federation grew weaker, eventually breaking into five distinct regions. "Notwithstanding, the reunification of the Central American Republics has remained an ideal, a romantic dream that many times inflames the imagination of poets, and to which politicians of the Isthmus feel obliged at the least to pay lip service."<sup>71</sup> Since the breaking of the Federation, attempts had been made to force the five Republics into the Federation. However, such political and or military movements failed because "the people of Central America have not felt a real need for a new union."<sup>72</sup> In the perspective of the U.S., these occurrences felt like a consequence that comes with the demands of a growing economy.

Like most U.S. government actors, Facio argued that the people of Central America – as the people of nearly all under-developed areas— "had awakened to the potentialities of life in the mid-Twentieth Century."<sup>73</sup> According to Facio, learning more about the more abundant life of the people in the industrial societies (such as the U.S.) had prompted Central Americans to seek improved social conditions, educational facilities, health services, and the comforts of modern living. However, Facio also claimed that Central Americans were also aware that economic development was limited by geographic conditions, the smallness of its markets, unequal distribution of the population, and by its low income. As a result, the Governments of the five Central American Republics discussed (i.e., Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica)

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<sup>70</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

<sup>71</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

<sup>72</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

<sup>73</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957

were impelled to search for means to overcome these obstacles. With this in mind, the U.S. proposed The Program of Economic Integration and Reciprocity as a means to “best answer to the demands of the people for a higher standard of living.”<sup>74</sup>

According to Villalpando and Abrego, “U.S. domestic economic policies intersected with questions of national security and foreign offers to placate and discipline citizens and constituents of the Global South into their proper place: as flexible, docile, and productive members of a global capitalist society (4).” Great contradictions arise when we question U.S. trade interests in Central America during the 1950s, shortly after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. While the National Security Act aimed to enhance national security and in doing so, address “terrorist threats,” this policy also made it possible for U.S. forces to enter foreign nations and geopolitical locations, with the goal of extracting resources, market, and ultimately, trade from the very regions the U.S. perceived as “terrorist” or in the case of Central America, “communist threats.” Here it is useful to recall Speed’s argument that the U.S. is “multicritical”: “Extending well beyond an understanding that there are different (all settler-imposed) national languages and distinct legal systems, the ideological enters when the default assumption is that the United States is a well-functioning democracy in which law, order, and tolerance reign, while Latin America is characterized by corruption, illegality, and poorly functioning or weak democracy” (6). Within this logic, while the U.S. assumed intervention in Central America would prompt economic prosperity, in reality, it assumed American ideologies would be applicable to Latin America. However, as previously mentioned, not only did U.S. presence, as well as U.S. informed structures, falter the Northern region in particular, this presence reinforced widespread poverty and ensuing migration to the U.S. Importantly, as Speed

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<sup>74</sup> Archive box #4: Records Relating to Central America, document entitled: Ministers Meeting 1957



posits, the U.S. government is unwilling to hold itself accountable for the violations of national and international laws and rights (5). The archives I reviewed further highlight active U.S. presence in Central America, as informed by global capitalist gain most beneficial to the U.S. during the 1950s.

## **Conclusion**

When the Truman administration addressed Roosevelt's call for a National Authority, they developed a U.S. foreign policy apparatus that would inform ensuing presidential administrations on key foreign policy and national intelligence decisions throughout the twentieth century. While this new National Authority was designed to enhance national security and intelligence in response to engagements with foreign regions during war eras, policies enacted under the Truman Doctrine, such as the National Security Act, went on to inform procedures for intervention in foreign regions like Latin American throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Here, I would like to note that although migration was not explicitly discussed in the archives I reviewed, the National Security Act's enactment in 1947 altered the perception and subsequent responses to migrant groups arriving at U.S. ports of entry during the second half of the twentieth century. A central rationale for establishing the National Security Act was rooted in "fears of terrorist threats." Drawing on war-era experiences with regions abroad, such as Japan and Germany, the National Security Act reinforced anti-immigrant American ideologies. Thus, whether consciously or unconsciously, how these new structures evolved directly impacted Latin American socioeconomic and migratory circumstances.

My study focuses on the Northern region of Central America. These countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) share a common history of U.S. intervention throughout the

20<sup>th</sup> century. How U.S. government agencies were reformed during the 1950s Cold War era and the events that transpired in Central America during the 1980s demonstrate the influence the National Security Act had on U.S. presence in Central America. In addition to Truman's discourse, which argued for the need to enhance national security, rising U.S. trade interests in Central America resulted in a series of reform policy enactments there. In congruence with U.S. interests in Central America, civil discourses in each region that resulted from the violence U.S. intervention cultivates in Central America prompted U.S. notions of Central Americans as "communist threats."

From 1980 to 1993, Ronald Reagan invoked the memory of Truman's U.S. foreign policy apparatus, as well as notions of Central Americans as threats to the U.S. when addressing president Carter's concerns regarding foreign support of Central American leftist guerrilla forces<sup>75</sup>. In 1981, when the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) retaliated against the Salvadoran military, the U.S. Department of State issued a "White Paper"<sup>76</sup> stating that Cuba and other Communist countries had informed political unification, military direction, and arming of the Salvadoran insurgents. As a result, Reagan removed economic assistance to Nicaragua, accusing the region of civilians of supporting Salvadoran rebel forces. In the years that followed, wherein revolt reaped Central American regions, Reagan supported "Contras," counterrevolutionaries consisting primarily of ex-Nicaraguan National Guard members.

Ultimately, Reagan's initiatives to intervene in Central America resulted in vast national devastation, economic disparity, and countless Central American deaths. Thus, although the Reagan administration was perceived as the presidential administration most responsible for the


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<sup>75</sup> Office of the Historian: Milestones: 1980 – 1988, Document entitled: "Central America, 1981–1993."

<sup>76</sup> White papers are policy documents produced by the Government that set out their proposals for future legislation. White Papers are often published as Command Papers and may include a draft version of a Bill that is being planned.

turmoil in Central America during the 1980s, this study reveals the foundations that informed Reagan's efforts to intervene in Central America, as well as his response to Central American migrants arriving at U.S. ports of entry in search of refuge from U.S. propagated violence throughout the region. Importantly, the trend of twentieth-century presidential administrations drawing on one another across space and time to target ethnic-racial groups across space and time can be seen through each administration's initiative following the National Security Act's enactment in 1947.

Throughout this thesis, I employed an archival methodological approach to explore the national and international political contexts that prompted the Truman administration to implement projects of containment during the mid-twentieth century. In addition, I explored the (intended/unintended) migratory implications of restrictive immigration policies enacted during the mid-twentieth century, with particular consideration to Central America. Then, I identified which government agencies, entities, and actors informed and implemented crucial foreign policies, noting their reasons for doing so. To further analyze the content of each archival document, I applied three major theoretical frameworks: Foucault's governmentalities, Speed's multicultural neoliberalism, and Ngai's American ideologies. Foucault and Inda's notion of governmentalities was most useful in conceptualizing the mentalities surrounding structural violence, pointing to the design of systems of governance and their commitment to surveillance, punity, and punishment. Ngai's American ideologies supported notions of governmentality by framing the interactions, negotiations, and conflicts between migrants, the nation, and the state that, in turn, develop restrictive immigration policies. Shannon Speed's multicultural neoliberal examined the systems of power underpinning neoliberalism, illuminating how structural violence works as part of a settler colonial strategy of elimination and erasure.



In placing these frameworks in conversations with one another, I developed repudiated governmentalities in hopes of further building on the relationships between governance, restriction, punity, and disavowal, particularly as it pertains to Central America's history with U.S. intervention.

The archives I reviewed provided insights on the structuring of the National Security Act while highlighting discussions surrounding its implementation. In understanding the various facets of each government branch, this study meets its goal of addressing the entities responsible for U.S. foreign and domestic policy enactments since the 1950s. Government agencies preoccupied with domestic and foreign policy, as well as national security, were shaped and established under the guise of serving "national interests," and as informed by twentieth-century war eras. However, in reality, by establishing each agency, the Truman administration's foreign

policy apparatus waged political warfare on foreign nations for the benefit of sustaining the U.S. global power, and ultimately, white supremacist values rooted in trade and profit. With economic prosperity heavily in mind, the implementation of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus was done so with little regard to the migratory implications of U.S. intervention abroad. In addition, power and internal conflicts shaped each government agency, and in doing so, repurposed them time and time again. Further exploring the shaping of each government agency and inconsistency addresses implications for the historically subjected third world, foreign nations, and geopolitical regions, such as Central America.

The archives I reviewed and reorganized into the "security defense" box provide valuable insights into the incentives and rationales for enacting the National Security Act. In addition, this particular collection of archives demonstrate how the National Security Act reorganized and established government agencies crucial to advising U.S. foreign policies after the passage of the National Security Act in 1947 and throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. From the National Security Act's proposal, we learn that the policy design was largely informed by what I refer to as "war-era hysteria," that is, the fears, attitudes, and behaviors spread across the Western Hemisphere during war-eras informed policy moving forward. My project focuses on the mid-twentieth century, an era wherein war developed perceptions of particular migrant groups, such as Asians and Europeans, as fear of terrorist threats. In the years that followed, and specifically during the 1980s, Central Americans were also perceived as communist and subsequent terrorist threats. At the same time, due to widespread poverty and violence in their regions of origin, Central American migrants sought refuge in the U.S. Unfortunately, mainstream notions that assumed Central American migrants as threats to the U.S. resulted in large-scale denial of political asylum, as well as additional restrictive immigration policy enactments. Thus, I posit

their experiences were shaped in part by prior migrant groups' arrivals in the U.S. Those groups were perceived as terrorist threats and addressed by the U.S. government in similar (dehumanizing) ways, emphasizing Molina's analysis regarding the use of racial scripts across space and time. My contribution, however, also addresses the significant role presidential administrations play in furthering restrictive immigration policies by drawing on racial scripts to rationalize immigration policy enactments.

A few significant findings arise from archival analysis on the National Security Act, the history of U.S. intervention in Central America, and foreign policies enacted by twentieth-century presidential administrations. While the National Security Act established government agencies under the guise of serving national interests, they were shaped and subsequently obstructed by the personal interests of government agents, making them inherently "flawed by design (Zegart 2009)." This obstruction, I argue, was prevalent when discussing the agents selected to serve crucial roles established under the National Security Act, such as the first Director of Central Intelligence. Building on this assertion, I contend that each government agency was intentionally flawed by design because they were shaped by American capitalist ideologies and interests, anti-communist fears, anti-immigrant and specifically, anti-Central American sentiments. U.S. intervention and foreign policy in Central America serves as a strategic tool that ensures control and trade for the purpose of U.S. profitable gain. When compared to the rest of Latin America, Central America is a relatively small area of land. Thus, by dollarizing, militarizing, and subsequently controlling these nations, the U.S. ensured their global power and subsequent profitable gain.

The establishment of the National Security Act in 1947 enhanced opportunities for U.S. intervention in Central America, which I argue despite being "lawful" to the U.S. government,

violated human rights and Central American sovereignty. In addition, by denying access to political asylum to Central American families seeking refuge in the U.S., Central American migrants are unable to obtain work authorization. Thus, migration is strategically weaponized as a form of surplus labor for U.S. profitable gain. Further, administrative "self-interests" informed and constructed U.S. foreign policies that directly impacted decades-long migration patterns from Central America to the U.S. Following along Speed's assertion; I argue that U.S. forces fail to hold themselves accountable to their investments in neoliberal projects, as seen through efforts to expand opportunities for economic gain in Central America.

A few recommendations can be made. First, attention should be drawn to systematic, racialized, institutionalized structures that are strategic in caging human lives within concentrated centers. Second, the U.S. should be held accountable for their neoliberal, imperial intervention, and disavowed behaviors. In doing so, we call attention to the "illegal immigrant," "anti-immigrant," and "anti-citizen" notions that have historically informed, racialized, and problematized migrant experiences. For generations, U.S. and transnational societies have relied on immigration reform efforts that have categorized migrants according to "good" immigrant and "bad" immigrant binaries, and in doing so, dismiss the root of the problem: racialized, economic-driven, disavowed, governments and governmentalities.

### **Areas for Future Study**

Aiming to further understand the reasons and incentives for developing U.S. foreign policies during the mid-twentieth century, this paper explored the behaviors, attitudes, perceptions, and reactions from U.S. government figures amidst war-era hysteria. To do so, I focused on the historical components crucial to understanding Central American migration throughout the twentieth century, and specifically, during the 1980s, after the National Security

Act had established policies and procedures for intervening abroad. However, additional questions arise when drawing parallels to the contemporary immigration debate, wherein Central American migrants and families continue to be subjected to restrictive immigration policies largely informed, produced, and enacted based on anti-immigrant and Central American sentiment.

Similar to how Truman, Reagan, and Eisenhower administration had done so in the twentieth-century, the current presidential administration has also reinforced notions of Central Americans as threats and, in doing so, rationalized restrictive immigration policies in the contemporary. In November of 2017, a new wave of Central American migrant exodus' (commonly referred to as *caravans* in mainstream media) began arriving at the U.S. southern border, seeking refuge from widespread insecurity. Within weeks, the Trump administration began to hastily enact a series of unlawful and restrictive immigration policies that have effectively closed off borders to Central American asylum-seekers. Though previously permitted to await asylum decisions within the U.S., Central American migrants and their families are now being placed in detention facilities, parents are being separated from their children, and all are increasingly blocked outside U.S. ports of entry. The Trump administration's vigorous work to amend already restrictive immigration policies has left thousands of vulnerable Central Americans without shelter or sustenance in squalid conditions along Mexico's northern border. While current events have reignited the national immigration debate, my research demonstrates that these strategies are not unique. Despite media coverage's framing of these policies as novel approaches, I argue that Central American migrants have been subjected to a decades-long strategy of elimination and erasure that is largely informed by race and value.



By tracing twentieth-century immigration policy, decades-long migration patterns from Central America to the U.S. to further analyze the consequences of restrictive immigration policy, this study holds the potential to expose U.S. disavowal.<sup>77</sup> Addressing U.S. disavowal reveals the entangled contradictions of U.S. intervention in Central America, ensuing migration from Central America to the U.S., and decades-long denial of protected status to Central American migrants arriving at U.S. ports of entry in search of refuge.

While I argue that Central American migrants have been targets subjugated by restrictive immigration policies in the U.S., I do not intend to reinforce victimhood, disavowal, and erasure. Similar to Shannon Speed, I aim to explore the structures of power underpinning settler colonialism. Despite restrictive immigration policies that have created tremulous circumstances for Central American migrants, these migrants and families continue to navigate and resist systemic inequities. Through collective memory, Central Americans continue to call attention to the human rights violations imposed onto them and their families, emphasizing the role the U.S. played in developing systematic inequities then and now. By addressing the development of U.S. foreign policy in the 1940s, prior to the initial surge of migration from Central America to the U.S. during the 1980s, this work aims to contribute to efforts determined to hold the U.S. accountable for their role in developing inequalities in Central America.

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<sup>77</sup> Disavowal is defined as the denial of any responsibility or support for something. I utilize the term U.S. disavowal to highlight the U.S. government's refusal of taking ownership of their role in constructing the circumstances in Central American that have prompted decades-long circular migration patterns from the Isthmus.

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