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Disciplining Empire: The Visita under the Spanish Hapsburgs, 1516-1700

By

Raphael Patrick Murillo

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Thomas Dandeleit, Chair

Professor Elena A. Schneider

Professor Christopher K. Ansell

Spring 2018

Disciplining Empire:
The Visita under the Spanish Hapsburgs, 1516-1700

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Abstract

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Thomas Dandeleit, Chair

Since the 1960s, the historiography of state-building in early modern Europe has been founded on theories emphasizing the coalescence of institutions around warfare, the commercial revolution, or the nexus of socio-religious identity and centralization described by the notion of “social discipline.” Within that framework, early modern Spain and its empire have long been perceived as exceptional, characterized by a fragmented legal and institutional order, declining power, and without the religious conflict or intellectual traditions of northern Europe that brought about either social discipline or a Foucauldian disciplinary state. In turn, the historiography of colonial Latin America, the Atlantic world, and Spain itself has offered the alternative suggestion that the centralizing state and its institutions were either non-essential as empires were diffusive, negotiated entities or did not exist in early modernity. Authority and the practice of administration, which protected elites, was founded on an economy of favor manifested in court politics or understood semiotically through symbols and rituals. Corruption and bureaucracy, in their modern, legal-rational connotations, ostensibly did not exist as categories because the public sphere of office holding was inseparable from elite interests, social relationships in the private sphere, and the patrimonial order.

This dissertation, which explores the emergence and development from 1516 to 1700 of the institution and practice of the *visita*, a term that described a vast range of inspections but most prominently the periodic audits of the conduct of royal officials in Spain’s empire, proposes an alternate view of the state-building process, centering it on the construction of the norms of bureaucracy and the regulation of the sinews of power that provided the framework for modern institutions. In particular, it examines the emergence of a tangible category of corruption through the state’s discipline of the nexus of official service and private interests.

That process is first described chronologically, focusing on the *visitas* to Naples, Sicily, and Milan. In the early to the mid-sixteenth century, the challenges of consolidating a vast, heterogeneous empire led the Hapsburgs to attempt a sweeping reform of the imperial administrative apparatus, which while not entirely realized, drove the process of constructing institutional norms and practices, a project for which the *visita* was deemed particularly apt. But this process of institutionalization was not coterminous with centralization or absolutism. Instead, local interests, with the ideological interest of the Crown, guided the *visita* to surveil and prosecute local officials, with its discipline undermining elite cohesion and patronage

networks. Consequently, the cycle of discipline transformed a range of conduct that that was formerly illegible and acceptable to the state and society into legible and unacceptable corruption. By the seventeenth century, resistance to the state's intervention in the visita turned from defenses founded on the language and symbols of the economy of favor to the logic of *raison d'état*. The visita itself, despite the weakness of the institutional environment, remained a potent and dynamic instrument of discipline, extending its attentions beyond administrative centers towards rural territories formerly beyond the imperial state's view and even being envisioned as a means of entirely overturning oligarchic dominance and curtailing the privileges and quasi-autonomy of rural nobles.

In the final chapter, the visita is re-evaluated through the lens of space, encompassing the literal territorial space of empire beyond Italy and its figurative institutional spaces. Against the fragmentation of empire, the visita, which itself was a counterpoint to that fragmentation, produced normative coherence and institutional regularity in a global empire through the broader development of the disciplinary state. At the same time, it emerged as a potent tool for regulating territories, resources, and peoples that laid the foundations for the Bourbons' reform projects in the eighteenth century and the modern regulatory state.

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NOTE ON TRANSLATION, ORTHOGRAPHY, ABBREVIATIONS, AND CURRENCY

Befitting its imperial character, the *visita* was a linguistically complex institution and it was particularly so in Italy. Though its juridical work was, until the late seventeenth century, almost exclusively conducted by officials who principally worked in Spanish and Latin, its use in the imperial context required that it also collect, produce, and review an extraordinary number of depositions and documents in Italian. Not surprisingly, secretaries and notaries often used “Italianized” or “Castilianized” terms while working in the other language but, introducing a source of ambiguity for historians and archivists, translated proper nouns. This dissertation, written in English, only further complicates these issues.

In the text, proper nouns, except those with standard English equivalents including the names of monarchs (e.g. Philip II, Hapsburg), places (e.g. Naples, Seville), and titles (e.g. marquis, duke), ordinarily retain their known or presumed language of origin. The names of institutions are often rendered in English when a translation is common or acceptable (e.g. Council of Italy or Chancery of Valladolid) or in the language of origin if a translation is unwieldy or uncommon (e.g. *Sommaria*, *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo). Some cases are less distinct. This is true of the *visita* itself, a term that does not have a standard translation. Sometimes inadequately rendered in English in this context as “visitation” or “visit,” I have used “*visita*” and its derived terms and the more accurate “inspection” as a translation or an occasional alternative term for variety.

The names of archives and archive sections have been abbreviated in the footnotes (e.g. AGS, VIT). The bibliography has the full names for these few abbreviations. Additionally, “leg.” is the standard abbreviation for “legajo,” a bundle of documents into which archival records are filed.

Translated passages preserve the original language and orthography in the corresponding footnotes to the extent it can be represented typographically. For grammatical clarity, modern accentuation has been added where it almost always did not exist. In a few limited cases, usually in instances of printed material, accentuation was used in the original document and that accentuation has been preserved. This is most evident when the accentuation diverges from modern norms. Passages quoted indirectly retain the orthography used by the source from which it is quoted.

Monetary units are preserved in the text in their original, sometimes ambiguous, units. The most common units are the *ducado* or ducat and the *escudo* and less frequently the *real* and *maravedí* throughout Spain’s empire and the *scudo*, *libra* (i.e. *lira*), and *sueldo* (i.e. *soldo*) in the particular context of Italy. The last two of these had a direct relationship even if the real value of coins fluctuated: throughout Italy, a *lira* was worth 20 *soldi*. Likewise, in Spain, an *escudo* was worth 16 *reales*. Values and exchange rates for other money within and between Spain and Italy fluctuated to varying degrees, with Neapolitan money declining in value relative to Castilian money over the course of the sixteenth century. This added to the ambiguity about the money to which a figure might refer especially when certain denominations were used, namely the *ducado* and *ducato* and the *escudo* and *scudo*. Around 1600, Castilian and Neapolitan money had the following values:

Castilian Money

1 maravedí = 1/375 ducado = 1/440 escudo

1 ducado \approx 1.19 ducati \approx 0.85 escudos \approx 0.92 scudi \approx 11.9 *carlini* \approx 7.1 lire

Neapolitan Money

1 *carlino* = 1/10 ducato = 1/13 scudo1 ducato \approx 0.84 ducados \approx 0.77 scudi \approx 0.72 escudos \approx 315 maravedís \approx 6 lire

Prices, wages, and revenues provide an important dimension for understanding the relative value of such currency. Though such sums would not have been reckoned in ducats, a liter of wine would have cost about 0.011 ducats, a liter of wheat would have cost 0.026 ducats, a kilogram of beef would have cost 0.066 ducats, and a kilogram of cheese would have cost 0.15 ducats in Naples around the year 1600. An unskilled Neapolitan laborer that year would have earned about 0.2 ducats per day and a mason would have earned 0.3 ducats per day. The staff of the *visitas* in Italy in 1606 earned as little as the equivalent of 0.3 ducats per day for guards, 1.6 ducats per day for a notary, two ducats per day for a secretary, and as much as ten Castilian ducats per day for the *visitador* himself. In 1616, the city of Naples's expenditures on its officials' salaries amounted to 4,716 ducats and its total revenue and expenditures amounted to 635,093 ducats and 682,369 ducats respectively. In 1600, the revenue of the Kingdom of Naples was approximately three million ducats.¹

¹ Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xiii-xv, 133-153; John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), appendix I; David Chambers and Brian Pullan, eds., *Venice: A Documentary History, 1450-1630* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 461; Giuseppe Coniglio, "La rivoluzione dei prezzi nella città di Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII," in *Atti della IX riunione scientifica della Società Italiana di Statistica* (Rome, 1952), 204-240; Mireille Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003), 100.

DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Lector,

Musa, cuius disciplina obsolescitur, aut clientela datoris ditissimi, quae esse adversissima ordini rationali dicitur, mihi fortasse defuit. Ita si aliquid ex dissertatione dignabitur, illud illis praestantibus, quibus gratias ago et eam dedico, attribuito: illi excellentissimo suasori, Thomas Dandelet, cuius cura perennis et consilium necessarium et amicitia comis laudem summam merent; lectori interno huius dissertationis, Elena Schneider, quae consilia fructuosissima librumque exemplar mihi praebuit; lectori externo huius dissertationis, Christopher Ansell, qui compagem sollertem huic dissertationi suggessit; illis doctoribus peritis, Margaret Chowning et Todd LaPorte, qui mihi omnimodo adfuerunt; facultati historiae Universitatis Californiensis Berkeleiensis, quae annum beneficium negotiumque opportunum mihi dedit; chartulariis hospitalissimis Archivi Generalis Septimancensis; illi admirabilissimae matri, Judy Murillo, quae onus perlongum meum transcribendi levavit quod me adiuvare volebat quasi evocatus esset; illi optimo patri, Robert Murillo, qui me hortatur ut elegantius scribam; et carissimae uxori meae, Aimee Murillo. Postremum, sicut scriptum est in Psalmis, confitebor Domino in toto corde meo: narrabo omnia mirabilia eius. Confident in Domino qui noverunt nomen eius quoniam non dereliquit quaerentes eum.

Raphael Murillo
Non. Maii MMXVIII A.D.

Reader,

If anything from this dissertation will be deemed worthy, attribute that to those outstanding people to whom I give thanks and to whom I dedicate it: to that most excellent adviser, Thomas Dandelet, whose continuous attention, indispensable advice, and gracious friendship deserve the highest praise; to my inside reader, Elena Schneider, who provided me with very fruitful advice and a model book; to my outside reader, Christopher Ansell, who suggested a clever framing for this dissertation; to those expert mentors, Margaret Chowning and Todd LaPorte, who aided me in all things; to the Department of History of the University of California, Berkeley, which granted me a generous stipend and opportune employment; to the exceedingly hospitable staff of the *Archivo General de Simancas*; to that most admirable mother, Judy Murillo, who lightened my tedious burden of transcribing because she was wishing to help me as if she were a veteran volunteering for duty; to that best father, Robert Murillo, who exhorts me in order that I might write more elegantly; and to my very beloved wife, Aimee Murillo.

Raphael Murillo
 May 7, 2018

INTRODUCTION

This is a wretched age we are coming to in which a minister is obliged neither by the duty of his office nor by the oaths he makes when he takes possession of it, nor by the honor and respect that all give to him, nor by the faith His Majesty puts in him, nor by his conscience, nor by being Christian, to put great care in doing that which he ought. [...] But I do not judge that this can not be fixed [...] and have discovered that one can remedy this. Not with new orders, nor extravagant laws, nor rigorous pragmatics, but by severely punishing anyone who has not observed the instructions of his office in order to make an example of him.¹

– Anonymous regent of the Council of Italy, circa 1628

“*APUD CHINENSES FERTUR FREQUENTES ESSE HAS OFFICIALIUM VISITATIONES...*”

Three months after I began my doctoral studies at Berkeley, Xi Jinping, the then incoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, heralded the activation of what would become the largest scale anti-corruption campaign in history in his November 2012 inaugural address. Largely executed under the auspices of the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection since 2013, the campaign has been propelled by twelve rounds of inspection of 277 Party organizations, sixteen provinces, and four central institutions leading to the punishment of nearly one and a half million officials.

Five years later, in anticipation of and subsequently reflecting upon his October 2017 retirement as Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Wang Qishan was credited with two notable articles in the *People’s Daily* that attested to the centrality of the commission within the Party. Its inspections, as Wang reckoned, were a “sword” of supervision that had “righted the ship of the Party and government.” But its work was still incomplete. Bemoaning the widespread “flabby” discipline and corruption of officials that they revealed, Wang declared that inspections would have to continue indefinitely and with greater rigor in order to correct the “formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance” that had estranged the Party from the masses by “root[ing] out political corruption and [breaking] up network[s] of economic corruption.”²

The continuation of the anti-corruption campaign, affirmed by the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and “Xi Jinping Thought,” towards the teleological arrival of a modern “New Era” without corruption is not without certain discordant qualities. For example, although the campaign is explicitly intended to impose political and ideological discipline in the Party, it is also a means of institutionalizing the rule of law and bureaucratic

¹ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. See chapter III for full citation and context.

² *Xinhua*, “China Focus: Top graft-buster vows enhanced discipline inspection,” July 17, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/17/c_136449873.htm (accessed November 25, 2017); David Bandurski, “Strong words from Wang Qishan,” *China Media Project*, November 7, 2017, <http://chinamediaproject.org/2017/11/07/strong-words-from-wang-qishan/> (accessed November 25, 2017) quoting and translating Wang Qishan, “Opening a new era, stepping out on a new path.” *People’s Daily*, November 7, 2017.

public service. Likewise, while the investigations carried out by the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection are increasingly governed independently under a series of reforming regulations, limits on practices like the extrajudicial process of *shuanggui* have only recently been curtailed because of resistance to its abuse within the Party while the committee's extensive purview is directly linked to Xi's personal authority. Moreover, while the campaign is understood to be broadly popular, the prosecution of corruption has nevertheless been correlated with a growing belief that officials and the government itself are corrupt. Finally, formerly licit albeit technically illegal customs associated with *guanxi*, social capital and networking, such as the exchange of gifts at holidays and banqueting at private clubs have been made functionally corrupt not through the emergence of bureaucracy or a modern legal order but through discipline.³ These incongruities, despite certain distinctive Chinese characteristics, are not at all unique. They also frame the nature of the making of the modern state through inspection and discipline.

For historians, the making of the modern state is seldom told through its association with the practices and institutions of inspection. To be sure, there has been a discourse in some fields regarding a late twentieth century "audit explosion," "audit society," "evaluative state," or "age of inspection" as a novel product of bureaucratic rationalization. Such notions have responded to the ahistorical sense that the audit and the inspection, the great technologies of private firms that produce rationality and control or reduce uncertainty, have seemingly become a ubiquitous program of modern governance recently.⁴ But that program is fundamentally a feature of the order through which the modern state has largely been understood to be constructed: the disciplinary order.

As it has been reckoned, the crisis and conflict of early modernity in Europe was displaced through the consolidation of order throughout northern Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that would become the modern state. That order was founded on a novel and systematic intervention of the state in society, instilling a rationalizing discipline upon and within the population.⁵ This extension of discipline was essentially bureaucratic in character. Indeed, for Max Weber, discipline was a through-line in history from

³ Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, "Presumed Guilty in China's War on Corruption, Targets Suffer Abuses," *The New York Times*, October 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/world/asia/the-new-victims-of-chinas-war-on-corruption.html?_r=0 (accessed November 25, 2017); Tania Branigan, "Politburo, army, casinos: China's corruption crackdown spreads," *The Observer*, February 14, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/14/china-corruption-crackdown-spreads-xi-jinping> (accessed November 25, 2017); Stephen Chen, "Ni Fake's downfall plays out in a moral maze in Chinese media," *South China Morning Post*, January 12, 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1403215/ni-fakes-downfall-plays-out-moral-maze-chinese-media> (accessed November 25, 2017); *Reuters*, "China aims to set up state anti-corruption unit next year," October 29, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-corruption/china-aims-to-set-up-state-anti-corruption-unit-next-year-idUSKBN1CY0DT> (accessed November 25, 2017); Chris Zhang, "Where is China's Corruption Crackdown?," *The Diplomat*, July 21, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/where-is-chinas-corruption-crackdown/> (accessed November 25, 2017); Hudson Lockett, "China anti-corruption campaign backfires," *Financial Times*, October 9, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/02f712b4-8ab8-11e6-8aa5-f79f5696c731?mhq5j=e1> (accessed November 25, 2017).

⁴ Michael Power, *The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-14; Patricia Day and Rudolf Klein, *Inspecting the Inspectorates* (London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1990).

⁵ Although inspection is seldom studied in its own right by historians, it is not at all incidental to this framework as visitations and army inspections are often exemplary of the emerging disciplinary order.

“the Pharaonic workshops,” “the Carthaginian-Roman plantation,” and “the slave plantation of colonial economies,” to its teleological form in the capitalist factory and the bureaucratic state. Thus by the nineteenth century, the old patrimonial order and its corruption was being supplanted by the rational and disciplined bureaucracy of modernity. Nearly a century after Weber’s death, the promise of “getting to Denmark,” in Francis Fukuyama’s turn of phrase, remains a persistent myth of modernity in which the triumph of bureaucracy and rationality extirpates the order of patrimonialism and corruption.⁶

This bureaucratic state that dominates the modern order is therefore understood to be essentially distinct from and antithetical to the patrimonial state of early modernity in the same way that that patrimonial order is understood to have resisted rationalization and bureaucratization. Indeed, the supposed examples *par excellence* of rational bureaucracy are those societies in which the revolutions and reforms of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries decisively dismantled patrimonialism.⁷

Surprisingly, it was within one of the most characteristically patrimonial states of Europe in which the disciplinary regime of inspection and control that is now so closely associated with rationalization and the modern state was already beginning to evolve centuries earlier and it first began to do so through the attempt to regulate corruption.

In the past century, the work of understanding, defining, and controlling corruption has been less than definitive. Indeed, its puzzling pervasiveness in the modern order has only complicated the task. Although Weber profoundly influenced the subsequent study of corruption, he had dealt with the subject only cursorily and principally in his work on bureaucracy. It was the later comparative study of development and democratization in the middle of the twentieth century that encouraged a distinct interest in corruption. During the 1950s and 1960s, studies of corruption in the disciplines of sociology, economics, and political science were animated by a novel functionalist approach to the subject that, in contrast to the alternative moralist approach of the era, suggested that corruption was a transitional feature of the process of development that perhaps even had beneficial outcomes. These early debates concentrated on the problem of defining corruption. By the late 1960s, a minimal definition that the field would subsequently converge upon had begun to emerge: “the misuse of public office for private gain.”⁸

A concurrent revision in the discipline of history would be similarly influential. Since the 1950s, historians of early modernity in particular have increasingly treated corruption as a multifunctional, flexible, and efficient phenomenon that was distinct from the conduct to which the societies and emergent bureaucracies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

⁶ Max Weber, “The Meaning of Discipline,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed., H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 261; Robert van Krieken, “Social Discipline and State Formation: Weber and Oestreich on the historical sociology of subjectivity,” *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 17, no. 1 (1990), 3-28; Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014).

⁷ James Anderson, ed., *The Rise of the Modern State* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1986).

⁸ Mark Jorgensen Farrales, “What is Corruption? A History of Corruption Studies and the Great Definitions Debate,” June 8, 2005, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1739962> (accessed December 30, 2017). See pages 16 and 25; Joseph Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 2 (June 1967), 417-27. See also Keith A. Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal Political Institution,” *Politics and Society* 36, no. 1 (March 2008), 35-59.

were adverse. Accusations and prosecutions of corruption were supposedly more political than ideological as practices were negotiated by local societies against absolutist authority. This understanding has been linked to an observed transition in the use of the word “corruption” during the eighteenth century as its meaning shifted away from an individual or societal debasement to the context of administration and public service. Britain in the 1780s therefore represents a distinctive landmark of the waning of “Old Corruption” and the making of modern norms of office in the prosecution of Charles Bembridge, an official of the paymaster general of the army who concealed the loss of £48,000, that is the foundation of malfeasance in common law as well as the infamous impeachment for corruption of Warren Hastings, the *de facto* Governor-General of India, by Edmund Burke.⁹ It has even been suggested that corruption was entirely devoid of meaning as a category before the ostensible emergence of the contemporary concepts of corruption and bureaucracy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹⁰

Although that revision has yet to be supplanted by historians, a major transition in the study of corruption in other disciplines began in the 1970s and accelerated during the 1990s in response to a disillusionment with the failures of controlling corruption and a developing understanding of its economic costs. That corresponded with the reframing of corruption as a critical policy issue in an institutional context with the emergence of novel anti-corruption programs and legislation at the national and international level. Corruption, as James Wolfensohn put it during his tenure as the president of the World Bank in 1996, had become a “cancer” that inhibited the development, investment, and economic growth that was expected of the international order.¹¹ Nevertheless, there is remarkably little evidence that new measures

⁹ Jeremy Horder, “R v Bembridge (1783),” in *Landmark Cases in Criminal Law*, eds. Philip Handler, Henry Mares, and Ian Williams (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 81-102; Colin Nicholls QC, Timothy Daniel, Alan Bacarese, John Hatchard, and James Maton, *Corruption and Misuse of a Public Office*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 154; W. D. Rubinstein, “The End of ‘Old Corruption’ in Britain 1780-1860,” *Past & Present* 101 (Nov. 1983), 55-86; Mark Knights, “Old Corruption: What British history can tell us about corruption today,” *Transparency International*, <http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/old-corruption-what-british-history-can-tell-us-about-corruption-today/> (accessed November 27, 2017).

¹⁰ This is the argument of Tamar Herzog, in particular Tamar Herzog, *Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650-1750)* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 154-60. See also Jacob van Klaveren, “Corruption as a Historical Phenomenon,” in *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, 3rd ed., ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 83-94 (originally published as “Die historische Erscheinung der Korruption, in ihrem Zusammenhang mit der Staats- und Gesellschaftsstruktur betrachtet,” *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 44, no. 4 (1957), 292-94, 306-21); James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Colin M. MacLachlan, *Spain’s Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Kenneth Andrien, “Corruption, Self-Interest, and the Political Culture of Eighteenth-Century Quito,” in *Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest: Political Values in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Richard K. Matthews (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1994), 270-96; Christoph Rosenmüller, “Corruption, Abuse, and Justice in the Iberian Empires,” in *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks*, ed. Christoph Rosenmüller (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017), 2-6; Ronald Kroeze, André Vitória, and G. Geltner, “Introduction: Debating Corruption and Anticorruption in History,” in *Anticorruption in History: From Antiquity to the Modern Era*, eds. Ronald Kroeze, André Vitória, and G. Geltner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Antonio Feros diverges from this revision, see Antonio Feros, “Corrupción y mecanismos de control en la Monarquía Hispánica: una revisión crítica,” *Tiempos Modernos* 35 (2017).

¹¹ Jorgensen Farrales, “What is Corruption? A History of Corruption Studies and the Great Definitions Debate.”

against corruption have had any significant impact on it. On the contrary, it may even have become more entrenched.¹²

That entrenchment is expected of certain societies. Even developed states and major economies have struggled to control corruption. For example, Italy, which is generally perceived to be an exception to the rule of the decline of corruption in modern states, has been a focus of attention after a series of recent scandals.¹³ In 2014, the “Mafia Capitale” scandal came to the public’s attention after the mayor of Rome, Ignazio Marino, notified authorities to financial irregularities in the city’s records. The city government under Marino’s predecessor, Gianni Alemanno, had awarded lucrative contracts to companies managed by a criminal syndicate – which embezzled the funds – to provide several public services including refugee centers. Alemanno has subsequently been investigated and indicted for his cooperation with Salvatore Buzzi and Massimo Carminati, the leaders of the syndicate, as well as for unrelated irregularities in campaign finance. In 2015, Marino himself was forced to resign after allegations that he had committed embezzlement and fraud although he was acquitted in the resulting case. Within a year, an internal audit uncovered yet another scandal reminiscent of the *Affittopoli* scandal of the mid-1990s in which hundreds of publicly owned apartments had been rented to associates of city officials for rents as low as ten euros a month.

The series of scandals led to the triumph of Virginia Raggi, a member of the anti-establishment *Movimento 5 Stelle* or Five Star Movement in the early mayoral elections that followed in June 2016 on her pledge to end corruption in the city. But Raggi would later be investigated for abuse of power for her appointment of Renato Marra as the director of the city’s tourism department. Renato’s brother Raffaele, a close aide to Raggi and the city’s housing commissioner under Alemanno, had been arrested the year prior for accepting bribes from a developer.¹⁴ In 2016, Piercamillo Davigo, a magistrate who rose to prominence after

¹² Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes, “Introduction,” in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes, eds., *Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State: Essays in Political Economy* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015), 3. It goes without saying, therefore, that corruption is not only exceedingly difficult to measure it is exceedingly difficult to measure the effectiveness of anti-corruption practices in the present day. This dissertation consequently eschews the question of whether or not the visita was successful, a question that is impossible to answer in any definitive form, in favor of the question of how corruption and the state were constructed. However, the evidence suggests that the visita was increasingly successful in investigating and prosecuting officials until the middle of the seventeenth century.

¹³ William D. Rubinstein and Patrick von Maravić, “Max Weber, bureaucracy, and corruption,” in Gjalte de Graaf, Patrick von Maravić, and Pieter Wagenaar, eds., *The Good Cause: Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption* (Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 2010), 27.

¹⁴ *Privacy Shield*, “Italy Country Commercial Guide: Corruption,” <https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Italy-9-Corruption> (accessed December 30, 2017); Megan Williams, “Mafia’s messy Rome dealings face ‘historic’ trial,” *Deutsche Welle*, May 11, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/mafias-messy-rome-dealings-face-historic-trial/a-18825284> (accessed December 30, 2017); Nick Squires, “Rome council workers accused of renting luxury flats to ‘friends’ for less than £10 per month,” *The Daily Telegraph*, February 2, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/12136186/Rome-council-workers-accused-of-renting-luxury-flats-to-friends-for-less-than-10-per-month.html> (accessed December 30, 2017); Feargus O’Sullivan, “Rome’s ‘Rentopolis’ Scandal: City-Owned Apartments for \$1 a Year,” *CityLab*, February 4, 2016, <https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/02/rome-rentopolis-apartment-scandal-affittopoli/459918/> (accessed December 30, 2017); Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Five Star Movement dealt blow as aide to mayor is arrested,” *The Guardian*, December 16, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/16/five-star-movement-blow-aide-rome-mayor-virginia-raggi-arrested> (accessed December 30, 2017).

his prosecutions of corruption in the 1990s, warned that corruption in the country had worsened.¹⁵

The human drama of scandals heightens the perception that corruption is endemic to Italy as it does in other countries. Indeed, the most widely used indices of corruption (for example, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index) are based on perception rather than on substantive metrics.

This methodological problem in measuring corruption belies a peculiar characteristic of corruption. There exists not only a spectrum of corrupt behaviors, there is also a spectrum of how those behaviors are perceived. "Corruption" is therefore often legal, licit, incentivized, or invisible. On one such extreme, certain classes of behavior that most observers would recognize as corrupt are not necessarily corrupt. This was the ironic case of Denmark, which was one of several developed countries where certain bribes (most commonly those paid in foreign countries) and "facilitation payments" were tax-deductible until 1998 and 2014 respectively. Likewise, the payment of bribes was essential to Siemens, one of the patrons of Transparency International, before it faced fines amounting to three and a half billion dollars while Airbus is currently being investigated for engaging in similar practices.¹⁶ At the other extreme, imbalanced concentrations of power, such as is the case in Singapore, are not necessarily recognized as corrupt in part because of the absence of more manifest forms of corruption like bribery.¹⁷ Far from being a static, clearly defined category of behaviors, corruption is a category of perceptions about those behaviors.

There is abundant reason, then, to doubt that the modern order is truly characterized by the eradication of corruption and patrimonialism through the emergence of the rational bureaucracy as anticipated by Weber or observed by Fukuyama. But it is an order in which conceptions of bureaucracy have emerged in response to and been bounded by norms associated with corruption.

Inverting the predominant historiographical critique of the notions of corruption, bureaucracy, and the state, this dissertation examines the construction of the norms and institutions that subsequently laid the foundations for the notional modern state. These were not, as has been supposed, the discursive products or the consequence of legal reform or revolution of the Northern European states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They were already being produced as a result of the disciplinary intervention of the state at the intersection of society and official service in Spain's empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In particular, they were being made through the discipline of inspection.

¹⁵ Aldo Cazzullo, "Davigo: 'I politici continuano a rubare, ma non si vergognano più,'" *Corriere della Sera*, April 21, 2016, http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_aprile_22/davigo-politici-continuano-rubare-ma-non-si-vergognano-piu-86ad1ea2-07f3-11e6-baf8-98a4d70964e5.shtml (accessed December 30, 2017).

¹⁶ Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller, "At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item," *The New York Times*, December 20, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html> (accessed December 30, 2017); Bruce Watson, "Siemens and the battle against bribery and corruption," *The Guardian*, September 18, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/siemens-solmssen-bribery-corruption> (accessed December 30, 2017); David Pegg and Rob Evans, "Airbus braces for a difficult landing after corruption allegations," *The Observer*, November 5, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/04/airbus-year-corporate-confessions-difficult-landing> (accessed December 30, 2017).

¹⁷ Rose-Ackerman and Lagunes, "Introduction," 4.

In writing the introduction to a seventeenth century manual for the jurisprudence of inspection in the Kingdom of Naples, an anonymous jurist saw fit to compare it to the frequent inspections of officials in China about which he had heard before immediately dismissing that comparison as “no concern to us.”¹⁸ His dismissiveness is characteristic of the history of inspections. Despite their importance to the state, there has been a dearth of historical attention to inspections, especially to those that disciplined officials.¹⁹

Reflecting the historiographical predominance of social institutions, inspection is particularly linked to the reckoned emergence of intensive regulation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Inspections, as an instrument of surveillance, are embedded in the Foucauldian notion of discipline. The emblematic structure of it, Jeremy Bentham’s “panopticon,” was of course described by its creator as an “inspection-house.” Inspection, although not necessarily as intrusive as the panopticon, definitively marked the expansion of the state’s institutional space. In Britain, for example, a regime of prison inspections was instituted in the late eighteenth century and the first Crown inspectors of schools were appointed a half century later.²⁰ Such practices established the foundations of the regulatory state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

But such inspection regimes were hardly entirely novel. Forms of inspection date to the earliest states, the most common of which were market inspections.²¹ Even inspections of prisons and schools or of forests and mines, which are notably associated with the modern state were, as this dissertation argues, bound to the normative project of the institutional inspections of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The earliest persistent and extensive institutional inspection was not modern nor was it European. Established during the Qin dynasty, the *yùshítái* or “Censorate” consolidated central authority, controlled official conduct, and cultivated Confucian values. Although inspections were less distinctively institutional in the Mediterranean and Europe before early modernity, audits were a common duty and certain offices intimated the intervention of institutional inspections. In the first century, for example, Trajan appointed *correctores*, commissioners that investigated local administrations and performed audits. But the functions of the *correctores* were quite expansive and the office, which represented a significant intervention of imperial authority, would subsequently

¹⁸ AGS, SSP, libro 45, f. 1 “Apud Chineses fertur frequentes esse has officialium visitationes, sed de his nihil ad nos, ac id solum erit spectandum in brevi huius materiae pertractationes ut sicuti visitationis iudicium de iure ortum habuit ita eius praxis iuribus confirmetur ex relatione eoru[m], quae amplissimi illi viri approbarunt, et a me audit in com[m]entarium meum rellata fuerunt.”

¹⁹ Most attention is given to contemporary inspections. See, for example, Sotiria Grek and Joakim Lindgren, eds., *Governing by Inspection* (New York: Routledge, 2015), which focuses on the post-war order even when describing a history of education inspections beginning in the late 1830s.

²⁰ Eric Stockdale, “A Short History of Prison Inspection in England,” *The British Journal of Criminology* 23, no. 3 (July 1983), 209-228; E. L. Edmonds, “Inspection of Schools,” *The Vocational Aspect of Education* 8, no. 16 (1956), 65-72.

²¹ Benjamin R. Foster, “Agoranomos and Muhtasib,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 13, no. 2 (April, 1970), 128-144. In the medieval period, market inspections were especially linked to Islamic governance. A twelfth century manual for these inspectors is available in English translation: Abd al-Rahmañ b. Nasr al-Shayzarī, *The Book of the Market Inspector: Nihāyat al-Rutba fī Talab al-Hisba (The Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of Hisba)*, trans. R. P. Buckley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

transform into the equivalent of a governor.²² Likewise, Charlemagne and his successors briefly relied on *missi dominici*, “envoys of the lord,” to carry out the practice of justice and ensure the loyalty of nobles beyond the court.²³

The first global golden age of inspection began in the fifteenth century, energized by the consolidation of power in the early modern state. In China, the Ming dynasty reinvigorated the Censorate and Joseon Korea imitated the institution.²⁴ In France, Charles VIII instituted the *chevauchées*, “horse rides,” of the *maîtres des requêtes* in 1493 prior to his invasion of Italy. These tours of inspections by judicial officials collected complaints in order to reform local officials but they declined in the late sixteenth century and disappeared after the middle of the seventeenth century as they were supplanted by the intendancies.²⁵

That was paralleled by the system of inspections that had developed in late medieval and early modern Spain. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, no fewer than six distinct practices of auditing official conduct emerged in the Crown of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. In Castile, these included the *pesquisa* and the *juicio de residencia*, the latter of which was first codified by the *Siete partidas* of Alfonso X in the 1250s and 1260s and was regularized throughout the fifteenth century. By the sixteenth century, the *residencia* had become a routine or automatic practice expected for offices, being associated in particular – although by no means exclusively – with the review of royal administrative and judicial offices executed at the local level including the *corregidores* and the three *adelantamientos* in Castile and León. Its practice reflected the *sindicato*, a review of judicial conduct at the communal level, which was a characteristic feature of thirteenth century Italy but was also incorporated into Civil Law and continued as a form of public justice into early modernity.²⁶ The Crown of Aragon’s comparable mechanisms were nearly as old. In the Principality of Catalonia, the *taula*, which in the sixteenth century became known as the *purga de taula*, was instituted in the 1283 *Corts* and carried out reviews of the triennial offices in the principality. In Valencia, the *inquisició*, which was very similar to the *residencia* in its initial formulation, was instituted in 1301. Not

²² Eric Guerber, “Les *correctores* dans la partie hellénophone de l’Empire romain du règne de Trajan à l’avènement de Dioclétien: étude prosopographique,” *Anatolia Antiqua* 5 (1997), 211-248.

²³ Karl Ferdinand Werner, “Missus – Marchio – Comes. Entre l’administration centrale et l’administration locale de l’Empire carolingien,” in *Histoire comparée de l’administration (IV^e-XVIII^e siècles). Actes du XIV^e colloque historique franco-allemand, Tours, 27 mars-1^{er} avril 1977, organisé en collaboration avec le Centre d’Études Supérieures de la Renaissance par l’Institut Historique Allemand de Paris*, eds. Werner Paravicini and Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1980), 191-239.

²⁴ The Ming Censorate is one of the few historical practices of inspection in this period other than the *visita* of which I am aware that has received detailed treatment. See Charles Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966). Hucker also describes the Censorate more generally.

²⁵ Michel Antoine, “Des Chevauchées aux Intendances: filiation réelle ou putative?,” *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de France* (1994), 35-65.

²⁶ Elena Quintana Orive, “Acerca de la recepción del Derecho Romano en las Partidas de Alfonso X el Sabio en materia de responsabilidad de los oficiales públicos en la Baja Edad Media: Precedentes romanos del ‘juicio de residencia,’” *Revue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquité* 59 (2012), 355-373; Massimo Vallerani, *Medieval Public Justice*, trans. Sarah Rubin Blanshei (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 182. The *residencia* remarkably survived until as late 1898 in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines as a means of auditing their governors general. See also Benjamín González Alonso, “El juicio de residencia en Castilla,” *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 48 (1978), 193-247; Laureano Rubio Pérez, *Visitas, juicios de residencia y poder concejil en la Provincia de León. Mecanismos de control en el marco del Régimen Señorial durante la Edad Moderna* (León: Universidad de León, 1998).

surprisingly, the *inquisición* merged with the *residencia* in the sixteenth century and subsequently adopted both the Castilian term and aspects of its practice.²⁷ In Aragon itself, a similar practice called the *enquesta* performed by *inquisidores* was first carried out in 1390 under John I and later transformed into a triennial audit in the *Cortes* of 1436. In the sixteenth century, the *enquesta* expanded in scope to include the officials of the *Audiencia* of Aragon and was conducted every other year.²⁸ But the most novel and extraordinary of the Spanish inspections was the Castilian *visita*.

The *visita* represented one of the culminations of the legal reforms of late medieval Castile, likely emerging in the 1370s as a modification of the parallel practice of the *pesquisa* under Henry II. Significant use, however, was not immediate, and the earliest surviving mention of the *visita* as a distinct practice dates only to 1480 in the *Recopilación de las leyes destes reynos hecha por mandado del Rey*.²⁹ Its first known use followed in 1484 with an inspection of the judges sitting on the Chancery of Ciudad Real. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the *visita* was extended across Spain as well as to Italy, the Canary Islands, the Americas, and the Philippines and nearly every institution within the empire.

Though the term “*visita*” referred to a variety of practices of inspection in early modern Spain, the form of the *visita* anticipated by the 1480 *Recopilación de las leyes*, the inspection of one or more governing institutions and its officials in a particular locality, had developed into a stable institution by the middle of the sixteenth century, the *visita general*. Unlike the *residencia*, the *visita*, which was an extremely expensive and laborious procedure, was periodic rather than regular and was often prompted by the receipt of petitions and complaints from localities.³⁰ Once the decision to commission a *visita* had been made, the Crown requested nominations for its *visitador*, the official who would carry out the inspection, from the relevant governing council. The *visitador* would in turn receive a commission and instructions, draw up a questionnaire according to which he would collect depositions as part of his inspection, and review any other materials relevant to his commission.

The *visita* began upon the arrival of the *visitador* and the formal presentation of his commission to, as circumstances allowed, the viceroy or governor in the presence of officials

²⁷ The initial legal framework required this to be undertaken for thirty days at the end of their terms, though those limits that were subsequently contracted and modified throughout the fourteenth century.

²⁸ Teresa Canet Aparisi, “Procedimientos de control de los oficiales regios en la Corona de Aragón: Consideraciones sobre su tipología y evolución en la época foral moderna,” *Estudis* 13 (1987), 131-139; Jesús Lalinde Abadía, *La institución virreinal en Cataluña (1471-1716)* (Barcelona: Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterráneos, 1964), 242-252; Fernando Vázquez-Portomeñe Seijas, *Los delitos contra la administración pública: teoría general* (Santiago de Compostela: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2003), 79-83.

²⁹ Carlos Garriga Acosta, “Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla. La ‘visita’ del Ordenamiento de Toledo (1480),” *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 61 (1991), 215-390; Juan Beneyto, *Historia de la administración española e hispanoamericana* (Madrid, 1958), 366. Beneyto placed the *visita* in conjunction with the proposed sending of *jueces de residencia* in the *cortes* of Toro, which were sent to Palencia in 1388 and Toro in 1409.

³⁰ Although the distinction between a *residencia* and a *visita particular*, which investigated a limited number of officials or even a single official, was relatively marginal to the point of confusion in some histories of the seventeenth century, the former was defined by its regular occurrence upon an official’s departure from office while the latter remained irregular in its occurrence. Indeed, this quality defined virtually all *visitas* that were not carried out by local institutions. Occasionally, a *visitador general* would also perform a *residencia* as a distinct component of his commission.

who were subject to his inspection. In the days that followed, a notice of the visita that solicited complaints was published throughout the jurisdiction. Thereafter, the visitador, who resided in and used for his work a palace in the city, observed and participated in tribunals with some precedence accorded to him. But the bulk of the work for the visitador and his staff – consisting of a secretary, often an accountant, and a varying number of locally appointed officials, commissioners, secretaries, and guards – was in reviewing records and in collecting depositions regarding the conduct of officials. These depositions came from individuals whom the visitador sought to question as well as from those who had made complaints and denunciations. This dissertation uniquely restores these complaints and depositions, which made visible the social dimension of administration, to their essential importance. These above all else indicated how relationships and behaviors were perceived within society and whether or not they were licit, whether or not they demanded redress, and thus whether or not they were corrupt.

The state then provided discipline in conjunction with this surveillance. As the visitador deemed necessary, further investigation would follow on any matters of interest. In correspondence with the Crown and in order to conduct his investigations with minimal hindrance, the visitador possessed considerable authority to suspend officials, arrest and torture potential witnesses, and provide for safe passage to those who might assist his investigations. These investigations ended when the visitador charged officials, collected their defenses, and organized the evidence from which his charges were drawn. Those materials were subsequently reviewed by a council or a *junta* in Spain, which determined the cases and the sentences resulting from the visita.

Although this dissertation represents the first extensive study of the institution of the visita in Anglo-American historiography, visitas have received more attention from European and Latin American scholars, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s. As late as the 1980s, the visita was principally understood through the traditional positivism that was once characteristic of institutional history before the field was all but extirpated. Accordingly, the visita, read through the charges against officials that it produced, essentially represented an absolutist means of control on corruption.³¹

During the 1980s and especially during the 1990s, the visita was initially revisited by a cohort of historians in Spain after Carlos Garriga Acosta including Manuel Rivero Rodríguez and Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño who studied and continue to study court politics. For them, the practice of governance, far from representing any absolutist control, was intrinsically linked to the politics of and the ideologies cultivated by elite factions who participated in the

³¹ See for example Pilar Arregui Zamorano, *La audiencia de México según los visitadores (siglos XVI y XVII)*, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1985); Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, “La Visita como institución indiana,” *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 3 (1946), 984-1025; Juan Pérez de Tudela y Bueso, “Sobre la Residencia contra la Visita. El caso del licenciado Monzón en el Nuevo Reino de Granada,” *Memoria del Segundo Congreso Venezolano de Historia* 2 (1975), 325-416; Ismael Sánchez Bella, “Los visitadores generales de Indias y el gobierno de los Virreyes,” *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 29 (1972), 79-101; Ismael Sánchez Bella, “Visitas a Indias (Siglos XVI y XVII),” *Academia Nacional de la Historia* (1975), 167-208; Ismael Sánchez Bella, “Visitas a la Audiencia de México (siglos XVI y XVII),” *Anuario de estudios Americanos* 32 (1975), 375-402; Ismael Sánchez Bella, “El juicio de Visita en Indias,” *Memoria del IV Congreso Internacional de Historia de Derecho Indiano* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1976), 579-625; Walter V. Scholes, *The Diego Ramirez Visita* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1946); Carlos Molin Argüello, “Visita y residencia en Indias,” in *III Congreso Internacional de Derecho Indiano* (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurídico, 1973), 423-421.

court life of the Spanish Crown. The study of institutions was largely displaced by a focus on strategies of power as well as the negotiation and distribution of status, reputation, and grace.³²

By the turn of the century, this interest in the *visita* had culminated in two closely related projects. Hitherto the most substantial work on the *visita* in Italy, Mireille Peytavin's *Visite et Gouvernement* uses the *visita* as a lens through which to understand the governance of Spanish Naples. Peytavin's conclusion suggests that the *visita* was a "permanent policy of negotiation" tasked with "furnish[ing] the [Crown's] Councils with information," including information for the recruitment of officials, and with reporting on the "style" and "rites" of institutions to provide for their reform.³³ This interest in semiotics, which reflected the contemporaneous "new institutionalism" and which remains of foremost influence in the historiography of early modern Spain and its empire, was notably expanded by Tamar Herzog in her study of Quito in *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación*. Rather than examine it as a means of control or its relationship with corruption, a concept she argues is an anachronistic reading of the relationship between officials and local society, Herzog proposed that the *visita* should be examined as principally communicative and symbolic. Within the predominant historiographical framework that understands empire as being diffusive, the *visita* represented a means through which the Crown demonstrated its authority – at incredible expense – through ritual and a practice of negotiation through which local elites protected their status and interests.³⁴

Although scholarly interest in early modern corruption has subsequently been reinvigorated, the semiotic framework that privileges ritual and symbol, emphasizes the irregular and negotiated nature of empire, and rejects the existence of the state, bureaucracy, and corruption remains pervasive. Indeed, it not only continues to predominate the particular historiography of the *visita*, it has become the dominant understanding of the Spanish Hapsburgs' empire. This dissertation, the first comprehensive history of the institution of the *visita* during Hapsburg rule, instead centers the *visita* at the foundations of the making of corruption, bureaucracy, and the modern state.

³² Carlos Garriga Acosta, "Génesis y formación histórica de las visitas a las chancillerías castellanas (1484-1554)" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Salamanca, 1989 (unpublished); Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2000); Garriga Acosta, "Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla. La 'visita' del Ordenamiento de Toledo (1480)"; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales: la visita del Estado de Milán (1678-1680)," *Annali di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea* 5 (1999), 123-241. Other works, of which there many, are noted throughout the main text.

³³ Mireille Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2003), 522-4.

³⁴ Tamar Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)* (Madrid: Fundación Hernando de Larramendi, 2000). Despite some recent work that uses the *visita* (e.g. *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks*, ed. Christoph Rosenmüller), Peytavin and Herzog's works on the *visita* represent the last novel interpretation of it and their projects were, not surprisingly, very closely related. Not only was their work contemporaneous – they indeed used the archives simultaneously – it was explicitly developed in a direct dialogue. Herzog subsequently expanded the conceptualization from *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación* to the administration of justice in early modernity in *Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650-1750)*. See chapter IV for conceptualizations and frameworks of empire.

More than two centuries before the prosecution of Charles Bembridge in Britain that ostensibly represents the coming of the modern order of corruption, the *visita* was in fact already beginning to construct legible conceptions of corruption, mold the intersection of officials' private and public lives, and expand the disciplinary capacity of the state to bind Spain's global empire through the production and regulation of modern institutional, legal, and cultural norms.

Although the *visita* had been imagined as a means for the Crown to institute reforms in the local administration of justice in the early sixteenth century, it was transformed over the course of the century into a novel instrument by which the state came to discipline itself. Indeed, by the middle of the sixteenth century, it was effectively understood by the Crown and its officials that this was the *visita*'s essential function, as perhaps most succinctly expressed in the epigraph to this introduction. For that regent of the Council of Italy it was punishment and not "extravagant new laws" which instilled in officials "the duty of [their] office."

But this inculcation of duty through discipline was by no means an absolutist control on empire. As the *visitas* came to be tasked with reviewing the conduct of and prosecuting officials, they were increasingly drawn into the societies that intersected with local administration, receiving and incorporating the complaints, petitions, and depositions of nobles, soldiers, merchants, women, vagabonds, servants, and the enslaved among others. It was this information shaped by the quotidian experience of administration and the corruption endemic to it that not only made it possible for the state to surveil its officials' social relationship, it also impelled that surveillance.

This local participation in the *visita* undermined old meanings of office holding and elite social networks and inculcated bureaucratic norms of conduct by activating the discipline of formerly invisible and licit conduct, in effect making them corrupt. As power shifted to the localities of the empire in the seventeenth century, the relationship between those societies and the *visita* further regularized expectations for official conduct as the *visita* was expected to intervene in the regulation of an expanding range of abuses that reflected particular social conditions. This dynamic of the local informing the imperial and of the social informing the state was essential to the construction of a distinctive institutional space: an empire of norms.

Against the fragmentation of empire, the *visita* produced normative coherence and institutional regularity across a global empire through the development of the disciplinary state. Indeed, the *visita* would broadly intervene in an expanding domain of institutional, social, and economic life, anticipating the state not only as the locus for bureaucratic discipline but also as the locus for intensive regulation, as it provided an incipient mechanism for rationalizing resources, populations, and territories through the practices of inspection.

This dissertation explores these themes in two parts. The first part, consisting of the first three chapters, examines the *visita* and its development in the context of the imperial relationship between Spain and Italy from 1516 to 1700, which while situated in the socio-institutional landscape of Spanish Italy and the Mediterranean, reflected the emerging use of the *visita* globally.

The first chapter, "Consolidating the Empire," which begins with the accession of the future emperor Charles V in 1516 and the inspection of the Kingdom of Naples undertaken by

Charles Leclerc in 1517, traces the early development of the practice of inspection and the institution of the visita until the conclusion of the series of visitas that began in 1559 in Milan, Sicily, and Naples. Far from being built by war, the imperial state in Spanish Italy emerged as a response to the challenge of consolidating the Hapsburg empire that required the collection of information and the promulgation of reforms to the diverse institutions of Spanish Italy through the visita. Accompanying discourses of good government, the visita increasingly took on a new function, disciplining officials. Initially, that disciplinary oversight was guided and constrained by the dominance of administrative elites in local societies and in the investigations of the visita. But it would expand considerably over the course of the second half of the sixteenth century.

The second chapter, “Social Discipline, State Discipline,” which deals with the six visitas in Italy of the 1580s and 1600s, investigates this emergent disciplinary function, in which the state disciplined itself through a social discipline that molded the intersection of public and private life. It was during this period that the visita came to represent one of the vital institutional features of empire, binding the Crown to its subjects for whom it represented an instrument of justice against abuse. As local acceptance of and participation in the visitas’ justice expanded and elite resistance and social cohesion weakened, the range of conduct that became functionally illicit and subject to discipline expanded.

The third chapter, “Crisis and the Construction of a New State,” which begins with the visitas of 1628 and concludes with the termination of the last Italian visitas in 1680, reframes the problem of “decline” in the historiography of Spain’s empire through the visita. Curiously, the visita was an exceptionally dynamic and effective institution throughout the seventeenth century. It was in this period that its most extensive investigations occurred and its most ambitious, albeit unsuccessful, projects to remake the social fabric of the state were undertaken. These visitas were therefore indicative of the extent to which imperial institutions had become embedded in the localities and the extent to which those localities participated in the project of empire. They also suggest the rejection of the symbolic order of reputation and favor that had hitherto been the principal source of local resistance, as the reason of state and the “substance” of administration emerged as the framework for empire.

The second part of this dissertation in the fourth chapter, “Empire of Inspection,” examines the visita in the spaces and institutions of empire beyond Italy. Was empire, as historians have supposed, essentially and intrinsically diffusive and negotiated? Or did the project of empire work in counterpoint to its diffusiveness? The visita, one of the essential institutions of Spain’s empire, indicates the latter. Within legal and social differentiation and against the strain of distance, empire was notionally expected to cultivate norms and systems of behavior as well as best practices. The foremost expression of that impulse was the visita. Indeed, the visita itself, though often understood to reflect the divergences of space and distance, was essentially regular throughout the empire. In the royal councils, the courts of the *audiencias* and chanceries, tribunals of the Inquisition, and the various forms of inspection carried out at the local level, the visita created the universalizing norms that were characteristic of the institutional space of empire. This task occurred concurrently with the deepening intervention of the state into its territories across the empire as the visita established the foundations for the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century and modern rationalization.

CHAPTER I
 CONSOLIDATING THE EMPIRE
 THE EARLY HAPSBURG INSPECTIONS AND VISITAS, 1516-1575

INTRODUCTION

Charles Tilly's turn of phrase that "war made the state, and the state made war" has, since the publication of *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* in 1975, become something of a maxim in institutional history.³⁵ But for the Spanish Hapsburgs, whose attentions and finances were so consumed by the Italian Wars from the moment of Charles I's ascension in 1516 in the midst of the War of the League of Cambrai until the conclusion of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in the third year of Philip II's reign in 1559, it was instead the administration of peace rather than war that truly cemented the development of the Hapsburg imperial state, most especially in Italy.³⁶ Throughout the sixteenth century, the long decline of feudal offices, the reform of government, the increasing prominence of a legally trained class of bureaucrats and the ideology of a "good government" founded on legal equity, and the concentration of power in tribunals and councils, most notably culminating in the creation of the Council of Italy in 1558, marked what H. G. Koenigsberger called the first attempt "since the Roman Empire" at "[constructing] a comprehensive organization for the administration" of previously independent states and "the contribution of the Spanish monarchy to political development of modern Europe."³⁷ In order to guide and reinforce this ambitious project of

³⁵ Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.

³⁶ The early modern concept of "peace," and "truces" in particular, has usually been understood as a means of consolidating for the resumption of war rather than an aim in itself. Cf. Paul C. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), viii-ix; Timothy Hampton, "The Slumber of War: Diplomacy, Tragedy, and the Aesthetics of the Truce in Early Modern Europe," in *Early Modern Diplomacy, Theatre and Soft Power: The Making of Peace*, ed. Nathalie Rivère de Carles (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 27-45. Unsurprisingly, then, the institutions of war-making have been one of the predominant objects of study and Tilly's model of state building through warfare is paralleled (or modified) in, for example, Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Philip T. Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "The Political Economy of Warfare and Taxation in Early Modern Europe," in John N. Drobak and John V. C. Nye, eds., *The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1997), 35; Hendrik Spruyt, "War, Trade, and State Formation," in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 214-215.

³⁷ H.G. Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 197; see also H.G. Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain* (London: Staples Press, 1951). Koenigsberger's original text has an implicit but strong emphasis on the first definite article in the phrase "the contribution of the Spanish monarchy." Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 97-100; Christopher Storrs, "Magistrates to Administrators, Composite Monarchy to Fiscal-Military Empire: Empire and Bureaucracy in the Spanish Monarchy, c. 1492-1825," in *Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 291-317; Enrique Villalba Pérez and Emilio Torné Valle, eds., *El nervio de la República: El oficio de escribano en el Siglo de*

reform and imperial consolidation, the Spanish Crown turned to its emerging administrative practices and institutions of inspection, especially the *visita*.

Fittingly, just as the formation and reformation of the administrative state through the middle of the sixteenth century represented an extraordinarily flexible and dynamic progression in the creation of a bureaucratic state, the process of institutionalizing the practice of inspection in the same period was characterized by marked and rapid transformations, especially in its form and function. Perhaps the most apparent and illustrative change was in its frequency of use. In the “laboratory of government”³⁸ that Spanish Italy represented, for example, the future emperor Charles initially employed the inspection in a purely *ad hoc* manner, sending a commissioner to produce a report on Naples in 1517 just after the settlement of the Treaty of Noyon on the counsel of his Flemish ministers, who were unfamiliar with Spanish and Italian practices. After an interlude of thirteen years, Charles V solidified the practice in his Italian domains by extending the distinctly Spanish institution of the *visita*. Thereafter, in just a twenty-five year span following the War of the League of Cognac, Charles and Philip II commissioned eight *visitas* for their Italian territories.³⁹

The deployment and subsequent development of the *visita* in Italy from the 1530s, which established a model for the introduction of that Spanish institution as an imperial instrument to the Americas, the Philippines, and in a limited way to the Low Countries, occurred in conjunction with the ongoing and accelerating institutionalization of the *visita* in Spain itself.⁴⁰ Following the first documented use of the *visita* in the Chancery of Ciudad Real in

Oro (Madrid: Calambur, 2010); Richard L. Kagan, *Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500-1700* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 25.

³⁸ Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 8-9, 33, and note 26 about the 1559 *visitas* being replicated in the Americas on p. 303: “Philip II may at times have used Spanish Italy as a ‘laboratory of government,’ testing policies and initiatives there before implementing them elsewhere” with reference to Aurelio Musi, “L’Italia nel sistema imperiale,” in Aurelio Musi, ed., *Nel Sistema imperiale: l’Italia spagnola* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1994), 61-2

³⁹ Giuseppe Coniglio, *Visitatori del Vicereame di Napoli*, vol. XXXVIII, “Documenti e Monografie” (Bari: Società di Storia Patria per la Puglia, 1974); Pietro Burgarella and Grazia Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia* (Rome: Archivio di Stato di Palermo, 1977); Ángel de la Plaza Bores and Ascención de la Plaza Santiago, *Visitas de Italia (siglos XVI y XVII)* (Valladolid: Archivo General de Simancas, 1982); Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, 48-9, 73.

⁴⁰ Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, 8-9, 33; Musi, “L’Italia nel sistema imperiale,” 61-2. This to some extent corresponds to the reckoned “second great expansion of the *visita*” in the middle decades of the sixteenth century. See Ignacio Ezquerro Revilla, “Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana: la *visita* de Diego de Córdoba (1553-1554),” in Manuel Rivero Rodríguez and Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariano, eds., *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-1558)* (Actas del Congreso Internacional, Madrid, 3-6 de julio de 2000) (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), 226 taking that argument from Carlos Garriga Acosta’s unpublished doctoral thesis. Christopher Storrs implies an earlier start date in “Magistrates to Administrators, Composite Monarchy to Fiscal-Military Empire: Empire and Bureaucracy in the Spanish Monarchy, c. 1492-1825,” 307 that there was a *visita* in the Americas in 1501 citing Adolfo Carrasco Martínez, *El poder de la sangre. Los Duques del Infantado, 1601-1841* (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2010), 346, but this is almost certainly in error, see Carlos Garriga Acosta, “La expansión de la *visita* castellana a Indias: presupuestos, alcance y significado,” in *XI Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho indiano. Buenos Aires, 4 al 9 de septiembre de 1995. Actas y estudios*, vol. 3 (Buenos Aires: Instituto de investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1997), 51-79 and José María Vallejo García-Hevia, *Juicio a un conquistador: Pedro de Alvarado, Su proceso de residencia en Guatemala (1536-1538)*, vol. 1 (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2008), 84, which indicates that the

1484, it later expanded to the Chancery of Valladolid in 1492 and the other Castilian audiencias in the sixteenth century as they were founded.⁴¹ After a hastening of the use of the visita in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the process of expanding the visita's use in the judicial institutions of the Crown of Castile had, in essence, been completed by the middle of the century. During the middle and late decades of the century, the audiencias of Seville and Galicia and the chanceries of Valladolid and Granada typically each underwent an inspection every ten years until the 1580s and 1590s.⁴² In conjunction with this increasingly frequent use, the late Trastámaras' and Hapsburgs' expanding use of the visita signaled a broadening domain for the practice of inspection in the midst of an incipient bureaucratization, with the visita being applied to a growing number of institutions and offices in the Crowns of Castile and Aragon. In the Crown of Aragon, the use of the royal visita began in the 1540s – including a visita in Sardinia in 1545 – and, at least in some cases, continued to have relatively regular use well into the seventeenth century.⁴³ Among its more remarkable and regular uses for the new state institutions was in the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which used it to inspect its tribunals beginning in 1528 in Valencia before an explosion in use during the 1560s.⁴⁴ This fluidity of form and function was essential for its expansion into the institutional life of the Spanish empire. As the visita was used to inspect an array of royal offices and institutions including the viceroys, councils, and provincial captains of justice as well as patrimonial resources like mines, forests, and salt, it could serve both as a regular practice for certain institutions, typically those handling fiscal matters, or as an extraordinary mission carefully managed by the Crown and its council.

The early modern development of the visita, which began under Isabel and Ferdinand but which was especially executed during the first six decades of Hapsburg rule, helped constitute a two-fold process of imperial consolidation. First, and most clearly in Spain itself, the extension of the visita largely followed the expansion and stabilization of the state and royal institutions of the late fifteenth century. In that political and institutional context, the dramatic rise of the visita through the middle of the sixteenth century has therefore been closely associated with the expansion and consolidation of royal authority and institutions preceding the institutional decline of the seventeenth century and, in this framing, the visita has generally been considered an instrument of royal “control,” a term that is not without ambiguity in the

residencia was expanded in 1501, in that case undertaken by Nicolás de Ovando, the governor of “Islas y Tierra Firme de la Mar Océana,” of his predecessor, Francisco de Bobadilla.

⁴¹ Garriga Acosta, “Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla. La ‘visita’ del Ordenamiento de Toledo (1480);” Richard Kagan, “Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500-1700),” *Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica* 2 (1978), 296-316; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 123-167.

⁴² Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 123-167.

⁴³ Eduardo González Hurtebise, *Guía histórico-descriptiva del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón en Barcelona* (Madrid, 1920), 164; Amparo Felipe Orts, “Las visitas de inspección. Un intento de solución a la crisis financiera de la ciudad de Valencia durante el siglo XVII,” *Estudis* 20 (1994), 143; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, 175. The triennial audits are in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Generalidad de Cataluña, Serie VG and G. See also chapter IV. Some of the records from the 1545 visita to Sardinia are preserved in AGS, EST, K, leg. 1706.

⁴⁴ See chapter IV; records from these visitas are in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Inquisición and have been extensively digitized in recent years. For these visitas, unlike most other types, the Portada de Archivos Españoles has summary entries for the tribunals indicating the years that these visitas took place.

early modern context.⁴⁵ Complementing this institutional approach, the early *visita* has also been an object of legal studies, which has linked institutionalization to the *visita*'s juridical content.⁴⁶ This connection can have certain perils. As it happened, the legal framework of the *visita* was effectively developed *post facto* and, as a result of the rapid evolution of the *visita* in the late Trastámara and early Hapsburg period, the legal framework and the practice of the *visita* were functionally decoupled.⁴⁷ What the *visita* certainly did provide in the early Hapsburg period was a means of providing oversight, reform, and order to a range of institutions, from universities and hospitals to audiencias and ultimately to the councils that administered the state.⁴⁸

Second, and most clearly illustrated outside the peninsula, the *visita* represented a means of consolidating the empire's territories, resources, peoples, and institutions especially where they varied from peninsular norms and where control was less assured. These provincial *visitas*, which largely began after the institution had already begun to rigidify in Spain certainly paralleled contemporaneous peninsular *visitas* but were also tailored according to the demands of and, increasingly, from the territories in which they occurred. This feature of the *visita* was perhaps most apparent in the Americas, where the practice first began in the 1540s, and subsequent *visitas* had a variety of forms including the archetypical *visitas* to the audiencias, which were modeled on *visitas* to audiencias in the peninsula but, probably due to the distances involved, were sometimes combined with the practice of the *residencia*; *visitas* to royal offices and governors, which reflected the relatively diffuse nature of the state in the Americas; *visitas* to resources and means of trade, which were vital to the Crown's revenues; and *visitas* to communities of *indios*, reflecting the norms of the Hapsburg socio-economic structures for the Americas and its paternalistic conceptions thereof.⁴⁹ In this imperial context, historians have increasingly begun to view the *visita* in two divergent, if not necessarily mutually exclusive, ways. First, within the process of institutionalization, the *visita* has been seen as a means of collecting information to pursue reforms.⁵⁰ Second, the *visita*, largely because of the *visitador*'s status, has, like the viceroy, been described as the symbolic representation of the Crown to the locality who carried out a kind of performative governance.⁵¹

In Italy, where existing institutions persisted with modifications under Hapsburg rule, the *visita* had a particularly unstable form until the 1550s as its – and the Hapsburgs' – relationship to those institutions matured in the development of Spanish Italy. Although Sicily had been part of the Crown of Aragon since the War of the Sicilian Vespers in the 1280s, it was

⁴⁵ Tamar Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)* (Madrid: Fundación Hernando de Larramendi, 2000), 4-69.

⁴⁶ Garriga Acosta, "Control y disciplina de los oficiales públicos en Castilla. La 'visita' del Ordenamiento de Toledo (1480)."

⁴⁷ Indeed, as illustrated by Garriga Acosta's account of the *visita*, even the earliest surviving record of this nature postdates the presumed origin of the practice. See chapter III for a discussion of a surviving anonymous and undated guidebook to the jurisprudence of the *visita* in Italy probably dating from the early seventeenth century.

⁴⁸ See chapter IV.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 521-4; Mireille Peytavin, "Government/Administration: The Italian Kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 355-382.

⁵¹ Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación*, 4-69; Sylvia Sellers-García, *Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire's Periphery* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

only during in the fifteenth century that the island was more typically ruled in personal union with the Kingdom of Aragon before forming part of Charles's inheritance from his grandfather Ferdinand II. Naples, although ruled by the House of Trastámara from 1442 to 1501, was only incorporated into the Spanish Crown after Ferdinand's armies seized Naples from Louis XII of France in the Italian War of 1499 to 1504. Milan, similarly contested throughout the Italian Wars, alternated between Sforza dukes and French kings since 1499 before Charles V acquired the duchy upon the death of the heirless Francesco Sforza in 1535.

These three territories were essential for Charles V and Philip II. Their fortresses, galleys, and soldiers provided bulwarks against France and later a supply route to Germany and the Netherlands in the north and against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. Sicilian grain fed the empire while Milanese and especially Neapolitan revenues financed its expenses. In the 1520s, Naples supplied nearly 42% of the emperor's ordinary income, although total *per capita* revenue remained rather low due to the entrenchment of the nobility. Within two decades, taxes from Naples underwent a nominal increase of 147%, surpassing the increase in the remainder of Charles's territories.⁵² The particular importance of Italy to Spain⁵³ was manifested in the Crown's remaking of Italian institutions and especially in the intense application of the *visita*. As the dynamic between the Crown and locality shifted and stabilized, the intended function of the *visita* was likewise transformed. In the 1530s, 1540s, and into the 1550s the *visitas* in Naples, Sicily, and Milan were intended to collect information for the purpose of studying the potential for and instituting reforms.

But information and reforms could not, without further action, fully consolidate or control the monarchy's territories. Such an undertaking required a disciplinary turn. As a tool of the prince's duty to cultivate good government, the *visita* engaged in the question of what that "good government" entailed for the populace. Though used in large part to ensure that the Crown's intended reforms were successfully implemented, its function of collecting information created a means for local officials and those outside the local administration to actively participate in the practice of governance. And, quite far from being the mere link between the locality and the Crown, the *visitadores* themselves helped to shape the meaning of

⁵² James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002), 102.

⁵³ For the recent historiography of Spanish Italy, see Thomas Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome, 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariano, *La república de las parentelas. El Estado de Milán en la monarquía de Carlos II* (Mantova: Arcari, 2002); Aurelio Musi, ed., *Alle origini di una nazione. Antispagnolismo e identità italiana* (Milan: Guerini, 2003); Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*; Giuseppe Galasso and Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, eds., *El reino de Nápoles y la monarquía de España. Entre agregación y conquista (1485-1535)* (Madrid: Real Academia de España en Roma, 2004); Michael J. Levin, *Agents of Empire: Spanish Ambassadors in Sixteenth-Century Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino, eds., *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Sabina de Cavi, *Architecture and Royal Presence: Domenico and Giulio Cesare Fontana in Spanish Naples (1592-1697)* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010); Gabriel Guarino, *Representing the King's Splendour: Communication and Reception of Symbolic Forms of Power in Viceregal Naples* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010); *Génova y la monarquía hispánica (1528-1713)*, coords. Manuel Herrero Sánchez, et al. (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2011); Cinzia Cremonini and Elena Riva, eds., *Il Seicento allo specchio. Le forme di potere nell'Italia spagnola: uomini, libri, strutture* (Rome: Bulzoni, 2011); Stefano D'Amico, *Spanish Milan: A City within the Empire, 1535-1706* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Céline Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown* (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2015).

“good government.” By the 1550s, then under the auspices of the Council of Italy, the Italian *visitas* were tasked not only with investigating the potential additional reforms and carrying out the reforms that the Crown had promulgated, but also, in a model for future *visitas*, disciplining local officials. But while it had begun its transformation into a disciplinary instrument, the early period of the Hapsburg *visita* in Italy was still unified by a concern for institutional and administrative reform on a scale that diminished considerably after the 1570s and was virtually, although not entirely, absent by the seventeenth century.

This chapter thus follows the development of the early Hapsburg *visita* in three parts. In the first part, it reconstructs what the earliest *visitas* in Italy constituted, linking the archival history of these *visitas* to the emergence of the administrative state promulgated by the Crown and to the shift from collecting information to implementing reforms to enforcing those reforms. The second part is an intellectual history of the *visita*, placing it in the milieu of debates about good government that was so closely linked to the implementation of imperial administration in Italy. Finally, the third part turns to the final consolidation of the Hapsburg reforms in the middle of the century and the series of *visitas* that began in 1559. These *visitas*, like their predecessors, were intended to implement or suggest reforms, but more importantly illustrate the developing links between the *visitadores* and the populace of Spanish Italy and their growing participation in transforming the mechanisms of the state and society from below and, in particular, shaping the *visita* into what would thereafter be a disciplinary process. In so doing, the *visita* revealed, as its documents continue to reveal, the social dynamics of Naples, Sicily, and Milan through their societies’ interactions with the Hapsburg state.

THE VISITA IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARCHIVE

A history of the institution of the *visita* is in no small sense also a history of the archive. The *visitas* of the first decades of the sixteenth century then very nearly precede history. While the Crown’s project of definitively preserving the continuously expanding amount of paperwork created by its administration followed the regularization of that administration it was only able to do so at a considerable delay. Indeed, efforts at regularizing record keeping at the local level were effectively spearheaded by the *visitas* of the early sixteenth century. That was perhaps best exemplified by the *visitas* to the Chancery of Valladolid, which in turn served as a model for institutional best practices but also by the efforts of Italian inspections to gather information and records from the Crown’s new territories.⁵⁴ Within Spain itself, although the Castilian monarchy had preserved a variety of important patrimonial documents in monasteries and castles, it was not until the middle of the sixteenth century that the Crown began the systematic archiving of documents produced by its legal and administrative institutions. Yet even after the establishment of the royal archive in Simancas in 1540 and despite the Crown’s repeated instructions to institutions like the nearby Chancery of Valladolid as well as its archivists’ strenuous efforts to expand the collection there, the process of collecting, incorporating, and preserving newly produced administrative documents in Simancas was still

⁵⁴ Diego de Córdoba, whose *visita* to Sicily in 1545 is described in this chapter, would later inspect the Real Audiencia y Chancillería in Valladolid in 1554. Among the reforms proposed by his *visita* in Valladolid was that the judgments produced by the court should be copied and then added together with the materials from the *proceso* rather than combining these in a single document.

very much incomplete by the late 1560s.⁵⁵ It was only in the early 1570s that juridical records produced by the Italian *visitas* regularly began to be deposited in the monarchy's archive – the records from the 1559 *visita* to Naples, for example, were deposited in this period – and the records from other *visitas* were hardly preserved more promptly.

As a result, exceedingly few documents from or related to any *visita* that was commissioned before the 1530s survive. Where records do survive for the *visitas* of the first decades of Hapsburg rule, they are in such disarray or so fragmentary that many of the most basic facts about them, including the names of the *visitadores*, the dates of the inspection, and even whether the *visita* was actually conducted, are dubious and have consequently and understandably led to certain confounding contradictions and errors in the histories that have referenced them.⁵⁶ Unsurprisingly, the four documented *visitas* that were conducted in Naples, Sicily, and Milan prior to the formation of the Council of Italy in the late 1550s and the later storage of the *visitas'* documents suffer from this same documentary gap and, at their best, represent a fairly irregular and limited assortment of documents. As the majority of the surviving documents from three of these *visitas* were initially channeled through the Council of State, which was formed in 1526, they are therefore currently contained in several *legajos* of the “Estado” section in Simancas.⁵⁷ With the exception of a single lengthy *libro* produced in conjunction with the 1530 *visita* to Naples, all of the known surviving material from the two earliest *visitas* to Naples is correspondence. For these two *visitas* as well as the preceding inspection that began in 1517, scarcely more than a bare chronology and prosopography is feasible for the historian and Mireille Peytavin's work on the subject represents the most comprehensive, if somewhat alternative, interpretation.⁵⁸ The records from a third *visita*, the first *visita* to Milan from the 1550s, suffer from some similar challenges but they begin to include some material from *procesos* and more extensive correspondence.⁵⁹ By contrast, the surviving archival records of the fourth *visita* of this earliest period, from the mid-1540s to Sicily, represent a relatively diverse selection of documents, some of which are unique among the records of *visitas*, many of which correspond to a portion of a single *legajo* in the “*Visitas de*

⁵⁵ Ángel de la Plaza Bores, *Archivo General de Simancas. Guía del investigador*, 4th ed. (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1992), 23-45.

⁵⁶ The documentary gap is particularly noticeable for the earliest *visitas* in Castile, in which even names are unknown and, due to certain oddities in the original materials as well as in the citation of it by historians, it is often unclear when exactly these took place (compare Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, 133 and Kagan, “Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500-1700),” 296). Disagreements are also clear in treatments of Italian *visitas*. For example, Giuseppe Coniglio described Pedro Pacheco as the first *visitador* to Naples (Coniglio, *Visitatori del Viceregno di Napoli*, 7) differing from Mireille Peytavin's later less conservative labeling that refers to the 1517 inspection of Naples as a *visita* (Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 48-54, 91). The labeling and dating for *visitas* to Sicily and Milan also has divergences, cf. Céline Dauverd, “Genoese and Catalans: Trade Diaspora in Early Modern Sicily,” *Mediterranean Studies* 15 (2006), 42. Rivero Rodríguez's *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia* is the most accurate in dating and labeling the early *visitas* in Naples, Sicily, and Milan.

⁵⁷ María Pilar Castro Martos, “El archivo del Consejo de Estado,” *Boletín de la ANABAD* 46, no. 1 (1996), 125.

⁵⁸ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 48-72.

⁵⁹ Federico Chabod, “Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500,” in *Studi storici in onore di Gioacchino Volpe*, vol. 1 (Florence: Sansoni, 1952), 95-194. Chabod's essay details the 1554 *visita* and the individuals who were connected to it in detail far beyond the summary version possible here and it remains one of the best studies of a single *visita*.

Italia” section in Simancas.⁶⁰ Additionally, some of its records, most notably a collection of *informazioni* are preserved in the Archivio di Stato di Palermo.⁶¹

While any history of the earliest visitas inevitably suffers considerably from the scarcity of their extant material, virtually the opposite is true of visitas from the middle of the century into the seventeenth century. Of the four visitas in Italy that occurred between 1559 and the mid-1560s, three – and especially the visita to Naples that began in 1559 – have relatively abundant records, most of which are in Simancas, while the records from the fourth, presumably due to its particular function, are better preserved in Palermo.⁶² Despite their parallels, the documents from these three visitas were collected and preserved in rather dissimilar ways. Most of the records relating to the visita to Milan in 1559, for example, were collected into a single volume. The records for the visita to Sicily in the same year were divided into several categories that, if later correspondence is indicative, were subsequently re-used by the follow-up visita to Sicily in 1562 and currently make up the bulk of one legajo. The visita to Naples, unlike its concurrent visitas, represented a considerable change in scope and in record keeping – its records in the “Visitas de Italia” section consist of twenty-seven legajos - establishing the model for both for half a century.

This change in the documentary record corresponds to a shift in the possibilities for studying the visita. Where limited facts can at best only intimate the nature of the earliest visitas, the later records vividly illustrate the range of interactions that the visitador had, the most vital of which was not the correspondence between the government and the visitador but those between him and the subjects of his investigation. It also reflects the manner in which the archive began to be harnessed by the developing bureaucracy as it used the records from previous visitas to create models for how to conduct subsequent visitas, to complete past investigations, and to ensure that the penalties assessed and the reforms carried out as a result of visitas had in fact been imposed.

FROM INSPECTION TO VISITA UNDER CHARLES V, 1517-1555

INAUGURATING THE PRACTICE OF INSPECTION IN NAPLES

In 1516, following his ascension to the crowns of Castile and Aragon, Charles I’s attentions were immediately turned to Italy, where he withdrew from the War of the League of Cambrai, confirmed his claim to Naples in the Treaty of Noyon, and, with the guidance of his Flemish ministers, set about the process of incorporating Naples into the Hapsburg state. The inauguration of this project, which ultimately culminated in an expansive reform of Neapolitan and Aragonese administration, was marked by the inspection of the kingdom by Charles Leclerc in 1517. For historians like Mireille Peytavin, Leclerc’s so-called visita, or more accurately his inspection, laid the foundation for the function of the visita in Naples and illustrated what has increasingly been seen as the visita’s most vital function: a means through which the Crown and the Council of Italy in particular would use visitas to provide information

⁶⁰ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-1, 152-2, 152-3, 152-4, and 152-4 bis.

⁶¹ Pietro Burgarella and Grazia Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 99. See Archivio di Stato di Palermo, Tribunale del Concistoro, b. 99.

⁶² Burgarella and Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 99-106.

about the local situation in order to introduce reforms and to organize local laws as well as to promote officials.⁶³ To that end, Leclerc's inspection was very consciously an attempt by Charles's new ministers, who were unfamiliar with Italian affairs, to inform themselves about the newly conquered territory.

But while it in a sense foreshadowed the subsequent use of the *visita* in Italy, the few surviving materials related to Leclerc's commission suggest that the first inspection in Naples essentially mirrored the demands as well as the practices of the formative years of Charles's court rather than those of the institution of the *visita*. On the guidance of Charles's counselor William de Croÿ, Lord of Chièvres, who had been invested with various privileges and titles in Naples during the previous year, instructions were drawn up for a review of the situation in Naples and a committee consisting of William de Croÿ, the future pope Adrian of Utrecht, and Jean Sauvage, Charles I's chancellor at the time, selected Charles Leclerc, the president of the Court of Accounts in Lille, to serve as commissioner and comptroller general for Naples.⁶⁴ After his arrival in Naples in 1517, Leclerc, partly using existing records including those produced by the *Regia Camera della Sommaria*, the fiscal court in Naples, drew up reports on the kingdom's finances, feudal holdings, fortifications, trials, parliamentary decisions, and ordinances dating from the middle of the fifteenth century. Briefly leaving Naples for Zaragoza in 1519, Leclerc supplied William de Croÿ with the reports he had produced to that point, but the Lord of Chièvres, believing them to be insufficient, had Leclerc return to Naples until he had produced his final report, the "État du royaume de Naples," in 1521.⁶⁵ Leclerc's report was comprehensive, ranging from a description of the territory's geography and natural resources, a compilation of the location of religious relics, a record of officials and their salaries, and proposals for reform. Though William was largely responsible for the creation and promulgation of the results inspection, Leclerc's reports apparently circulated within Charles's court and Mercurino Gattinara in particular seems to have relied on them while discussing Naples' finances when consulting the emperor in 1521.⁶⁶

If the major task entrusted to Leclerc was a response to the fact that Charles's ministers lacked current information to govern, the second component of his mission reflected an *ad hoc* response to the demands of quotidian royal administration. To an extent perhaps exceeding even that of the later *visitadores*, Leclerc enjoyed a royal prerogative to actively intervene in and guide the administration of the Kingdom of Naples. This considerable latitude extended even to the newly established Collateral Council, the highest juridical and administrative body in Naples, with Leclerc including himself in a list of regents serving on the council in his reports and apparently actively participating in its decisions. Beyond the formal institutions within the confines of the city of Naples, Leclerc's authority was still more pronounced, seemingly

⁶³ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 48-9, 52-4, 521-4.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 48; Aurelio Cernigliaro, "Giurisdizione baronale e prassi delle avocazioni nel Cinquecento napoletano," *Archivio Storico delle Province Napoletane* 104 (Naples, 1986), 177-241; Aurelio Cernigliaro, *Patria leges Privatae rationes: profili giuridico-istituzionali del Cinquecento napoletano* (Naples, 1988), 365-453.

⁶⁵ Tommaso Pedio, "Il Regno di Napoli ed il suo bilancio in una relazione del 1521," *Annali del Mezzogiorno* 8 (1968), 27-83; see British Museum, Everson ms. 1105; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 49-50.

⁶⁶ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 49; Giuseppe Galasso, *Mezzogiorno medievale e moderno* (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 137-197.

paralleling the French *chevauchée* of the *maîtres des requêtes*.⁶⁷ There, Leclerc personally administered justice, receiving disputes from the towns and complaints against feudal lords in the countryside, and even began policing against bandits. These actions, and particularly Leclerc's participation in the administration of criminal justice, were not especially well received because this was typically an exclusively Neapolitan domain.⁶⁸ These complaints about outside interference intimated a continuing current of resistance against the Crown's officials in Naples as well as in Sicily and Milan with which the later *visitadores* contended.

While the superficial similarities of Leclerc's inspection to contemporary *visitas* have led historians to position it as a direct antecedent of the *visita* in Italy, its institutional legacy is not quite as clear as might be expected. To be sure, as Peytavin has contended, the inspection was instrumental in the creation of a corpus of documents from Naples, an effort that paralleled the expanding scope of archives in Spain, that extended beyond temporary applications like that of Gattinara's by collecting and institutionalizing the laws and rules of the kingdom.⁶⁹ But William de Croÿ had a somewhat limited vision for Leclerc's mission seeing him more as an agent whose mission had a definite conclusion with the production of "État du royaume de Naples," with the result that it had virtually no lasting impact on the Spanish practice of inspection, even in Naples. The formal aspects of Leclerc's inspection were not reused and, in the correspondence from later *visitas* that deal with preceding inspections, there is not a single mention of Leclerc. Nevertheless, in so far as the Spanish Crown continued to seek out detailed information from its newest territories, the early *visitas*, in combination with particular commissions like Leclerc's, would continue to provide an unparalleled means of doing so at least until the 1560s.

The transience of Leclerc's inspection was soon to be replaced by the increasingly stable form of the *visita*, but only after events in Italy dictated its purpose. In the nine years after Leclerc had completed his inspection, the attention of the emperor had again turned to war and the other crises he faced in the early 1520s, which in Italy resulted in Charles V's armies capturing Milan, which was restored to the Sforzas, and later Francis I at the Battle of Pavia. The complete Hapsburg victory provoked an immediate response with the formation of the League of Cognac and another outbreak of war in 1526. When imperial forces sacked Rome in 1527, French forces together with Andrea Doria's fleet responded by besieging Naples. Before the siege collapsed upon Doria's return to Genoa and an outbreak of plague, the pro-French faction of nobles in Naples had begun to assist their allies. After peace was restored with the Treaty of Cambrai and the subsequent capture of Florence in 1530, Charles V had further enhanced his position in Italy. But in Naples, Charles was also left with the consequences of the rebellion of a portion of its nobility. To further integrate Naples in Charles's expanding empire, and especially to punish the rebellious nobles, Charles turned again to the practice of inspection: the first *visita* or, as early inspections like Mendoza's were frequently called, *visitación* in Italy as carried out by Íñigo López de Mendoza, the Bishop of Burgos, in 1530.

⁶⁷ See introduction; Antoine, "Des *chevauchées* aux *intendances*: Filiation réelle ou putative?," 35-65; D. Buisseret, "A Stage in the Development of the French *Intendants*: The Reign of Henri IV," *The Historical Journal* 9, no. 1 (1966), 27.

⁶⁸ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 49-53.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 50-53.

Like the inspection that preceded it, Mendoza's visita had a dual purpose, with its more exigent task of dealing with the consequences of noble rebellion again reflecting a transient need for the Crown in order to better consolidate its position after another victory in Italy. Due to the importance and extent of this mission and perhaps also due to the brief amount of time allotted to it, a committee consisting of Mendoza as well as Micer Juan Sunyer, the Vice-Chancellor of the Kingdom of Aragon, and Doctor Martín Román acted as "general comissioners" in dealing with the question of the Neapolitan nobility's conduct during the War of the League of Cognac.⁷⁰ This investigation of baronial affairs was unique among the visitas for a century and a half, as later visitas were both implicitly and expressly forbidden from the investigation of nobles who did not hold offices. But in some sense it represented a continuity with Leclerc's work in 1517 since it effectively involved a large-scale production of reports on the conditions in Naples, in particular reports on privileges and the value of territories and feudal holdings that were to be revoked and redistributed.⁷¹ The novel turn for the practice of inspection in Italy, which represented the transition towards the model of the visita, was Mendoza's second task: monitoring local officials as distinct from the active intervention in local administration that Leclerc had undertaken. In this task, the visita was not necessarily immediately succesful.

Indeed, when instructed to conduct an investigation in the conduct of local officials, López de Mendoza seems to have had insurmountable obstacles to the work he was expected to complete. In part, this was due to the fact that, unlike subsequent visitadores, Mendoza had special instructions to keep any investigation secret. But, as Mendoza believed, this was effectively impossible in Naples: "In the matter of the visitation of these institutions that your majesty instructs should be secret, I do not know that could be done because the people from here are not so faithful in these things as would be necessary [...]"⁷² This secrecy may have represented a reaction to the challenges faced by Charles Leclerc in 1517 when intervening in local administration but it also resulted from the comparatively expansive nature of Mendoza's task.⁷³ To obviate this difficulty, Mendoza, establishing what would become a precedent in the Italian visitas, recommended that certain officials be suspended from office in order to encourage their family members, freed from potential retaliation, to testify against them in relative safety.⁷⁴ Even this more extreme step was unsuccessful. Within a year, Mendoza had sought out almost one hundred testimonies, but they had not dared testify against the officials he was investigating.⁷⁵ This failure to discipline or even to properly investigate officials, of course, did not signify any approbation from the visitador for the state of affairs in Naples: "[I]n this city there is no justice at all and in the day just as at night, people commit murder in public

⁷⁰ AGS, EST, libro 58; AGS, EST, leg. 1006, ff. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13.

⁷¹ Ibid., especially AGS, EST, libro 58.

⁷² AGS, EST, leg. 1006, f. 6. May 21, 1530. "En lo dlla visitaçio destas audiencias q VM^a manda q sea secreta no se como se podrá hazer por ser la gente de acá no tan fiel en semejantes cosas como serrá menester[.]" Peytavin, *Visite et Gouvernement dans le Royaume de Naples*, 54.

⁷³ Peytavin, *Visite et Gouvernement dans le Royaume de Naples*, 54-5.

⁷⁴ AGS, EST, leg. 1006, f. 10. June 25, 1530.

⁷⁵ AGS, EST, leg. 1009, f. 62. January 17, 1531.

without punishment. The same disorder exists in the kingdom and the roads are full of thieves.”⁷⁶ But Mendoza would not be able to remedy this “disorder.”

By early 1531, Mendoza, having already completed most of the investigations and reports related to the rebellious nobles and the determination of the value of the territories in Naples, was becoming severely ill and consequently asked for license to return to Spain.⁷⁷ To follow up the inspection of the rebellious barons, Mendoza recommended that the viceroys of Naples in conjunction with members of the Collateral Council tour the countryside each three years to control the abuses of the barons there. The inspector hardly seems to have been especially optimistic about the Crown’s ability to administer the necessary “prompt medicine”⁷⁸ in Naples due to the continued absence of a viceroy at the time of Mendoza’s departure. While Mendoza had dealt with his principal mission, the task of reforming the behavior of members of the Collateral Council and the other institutions in Naples would have to await later intervention.

Mendoza’s visitation, like Leclerc’s inspection, while unfortunately poorly supported by extant documentation, suggests that the Crown, particularly in the imperial context, attempted to use its new tools of inspection to confirm its control over its territories by establishing the presence of a royal official who would respond to its needs in those precious moments of peace, whether that be through the collection of information to formulate a program for reform or an attempt to punish the factions that had opposed it.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE VISITA IN NAPLES, SICILY, AND MILAN

Since Mendoza’s visitation in Naples had limited and only partially fulfilled aims, it was only with Pedro Pacheco’s visita, conducted six years after his predecessor’s inspection, that a general framework for conducting visitas in Italy actually began to solidify. Pedro Pacheco de Villena, excluding perhaps Gaspar de Quiroga, was the most personally accomplished of the visitadores and his biography, reading like a *cursus honorum* for members of the court of Charles V, is a demonstration of the considerable esteem in which the individuals who served as visitadores during the early decades of Hapsburg rule, especially those to Naples, were held. Not coincidentally, like both his predecessor and his successor, Pedro Pacheco is also an illustration of the early Hapsburgs’ preferential appointment of members of the clergy to high offices and important missions, which included the visitas. A grandson of the Marquis of Villena, educated at Salamanca, and having served in the Roman Curia in the 1520s, Pacheco was appointed as Bishop of Mondoñedo in 1532 and subsequently had his diocese translated on several occasions after 1537. During this period in Spain, the emperor commissioned Pacheco as visitador for the first time. On that occasion, Pacheco inspected the royal audiencias and chanceries of Valladolid and Granada, an apparently positive experience that would later serve as a point of frustration for him in Naples. In the 1540s and 1550s, Pacheco returned to Italy while serving in Rome as Charles V’s agent to the pope and in 1553, Pacheco was named

⁷⁶ AGS, EST, leg. 1006, f. 16. August 1, 1530. “lo primero que en esta ciudad no ay Justicia ninguna y ansi de día como de noche se matan públicamente los hombres sin aver quien lo castigue también por el reyno ay la misma desorden y los caminos están llenos de ladrones que no ay nadie que baya seguro.”

⁷⁷ AGS, EST, leg. 1009, f. 53. January 3, 1531.

⁷⁸ AGS, EST, leg. 1008, f. 6. “Primeramente que ya su mag^t. sabe queste Reyno es de calidad que quanto las passiones son mayores tanto más requiere La medeçina presta[...].”

viceroy to Naples. Following the conclusion of his term in 1556, he was appointed Cardinal-Bishop for the Suburbicarian Diocese of Albano and, in the final year of his life, served as Cardinal Inquisitor in the Roman Inquisition.⁷⁹ His visita to Naples at once represented a logical step in a progression of office holding but also the great importance that the mission had for the emperor in that moment.

Like Mendoza and Leclerc, Pacheco had been commissioned to carry out a variety of disconnected assignments intended to consolidate and fortify the Crown's institutions in Naples. In this, the timing of the visita was hardly coincidental. 1536 was the year that Charles V returned from North Africa and held his court in Naples, with the emperor delivering instructions to his viceroy and re-establishing the office of Conservator of the Patrimony, which had been unused since 1507 at the same time a war over Milan was beginning to precipitate.⁸⁰ But above all else, Pacheco was tasked with the inspection of the Neapolitan institutions and the discipline of its officials.

Although Mendoza's correspondence with Charles V regarding the Collateral Council had anticipated the possibility that an investigation of Neapolitan officials' conduct might prove somewhat difficult, Pacheco's early correspondence with the emperor and the Council of State after arriving in Naples suggests that initial expectations were, if anything, optimistic. As was customary, Pacheco had been supplied with a standard interrogatory in order to structure his investigation, but Pacheco's apparently rigid adherence to it upon his arrival had proved frustrating and the visitador complained that several of the questions only wasted time. One question, for example, asked witnesses whether officials might have received gifts of food and drink despite the fact that these kinds of gifts had not actually been prohibited in Naples. Another question asked witness to make declarations about officials' patrimonies and current finances, but Pacheco supposed that the emperor was already sufficiently well supplied with this kind of information.⁸¹ This only compounded the visitador's belief that there had been rather unrealistic expectations for the visita's time frame: "[It's] true that this was not a matter for seven or eight months because in Valladolid, where one doesn't have to deal with the issues [that exist] here, one can't finish in ten months."⁸² But Pacheco's complaints of superfluity and misused time belied his own limits in dealing with the enormity of his task and his consistent inability to obtain the quality of information he had expected.

This lack of quality testimony was especially frustrating for Pacheco, as it effectively left him without the means to carry out his investigations to any meaningful conclusion, at least in the early months of the visita. Despite an alleged abundance of malfeasance, the testimonies the visitador collected were consistently based on rumors rather than verifiable facts, as "not a single witness gives a deposition from actual knowledge," and witnesses consequently proved to be utterly useless: "A great deal of time is also lost in examining witnesses only based on

⁷⁹ Coniglio, *Visitatori del Vicereame di Napoli*, 7; D. Miguel Salvá, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. XXIII (Madrid, 1853), 140-8; C. Eubel and G. von Gulik, *Hierarchi Catholica Medii Aevi*, vol. III (Münster, 1910), 184; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 58-60, 91.

⁸⁰ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 60.

⁸¹ AGS, EST, leg. 1025, f. 19.

⁸² *Ibid.*, f. 43. "[Y]o en ninguna manera querría quedar acá si su M^t. fuesse servido pues no ay en q pudiesse servir q aviendo a todo me pondría y lo de aquí yo trabajare di abreviar lo lo [sic] mejor q yo pudiere aunq es verdad q no era materia esta pa siete ni ocho meses por q en Vall^{id} q no tiene q hazer con lo di aquí no pude acabar en diez meses Pero trabajare de averiguar lo más importante..."

public reputation, of which there is nothing except what they've heard said publicly. In this way, one could examine the entire kingdom [and find] that the officials are for the most part infamous and the people wicked, but when one presses them for the truth, one gets nothing that is of value."⁸³

A subsequent recommendation about the handling of commissioners to collect complaints in the kingdom only echoed this same frustration with the Neapolitans' testimonies. This lack of useful information compounded Pacheco's belief that the attentions of Neapolitans seemed to be focused on what were "venial sins" rather than more serious allegations.⁸⁴ In order to effectively punish its officials' wrongdoing, Naples' residents would have to be trained through the discipline provided by the visita.

On that subject of discipline, Pacheco was inclined to a certain severity that would later dim his reputation and reflected a certain mistrust between the visitador and the viceroy, Pedro Álvarez de Toledo, who continued to serve in that post until 1553, with Pacheco suggesting in his correspondence with the Comendador of León that final decisions regarding the punishments for officials who had extorted the towns of Naples should be decided in Spain rather than left to the viceroy whom the bishop did not trust to effectively carry out further investigation.⁸⁵ To that end, and otherwise faced with the unacceptable prospect of extending his visita up to at least three years, Pacheco proposed a permanent or at least regular inspection regime of "comissarios visitadores" to monitor the conduct of the kingdom's high officials.

Although they come in little more than an outline, Pacheco's recommendations undoubtedly represent one of the foundations for future visitas to Naples. The primary focus of these inspections, Pacheco reckoned, should be on selected offices most connected to the viceroy: the regents of the Collateral Council, the treasurer and his officials, the notary and his officials, the judges and officials of the *Sommaria* and the advisory council of the *Sacro Regio Consiglio*, the provincial preceptors, the officials of the *Dogana delle pecore* or the sheep customhouse in Apulia, the city's customhouse as well as the *sindicis*, the *justicier*, the attorneys and attorneys general, the advocate of the poor, the *mastridatti* of the tribunals, and the *castellanos*.⁸⁶ To a certain extent, the emperor shared Pacheco's view and, as was typical of the early visitas, combined the project of the visita with the reform of governance. In the instructions for the viceroy from Charles V written in conjunction with Pacheco's visita, several points seem to indicate the need for further vigilance suggested by Pacheco. Among them, the emperor expressed the need, as found by the visita, for regulating the conduct of provincial officials, including the governors, *auditores*, and captains, and that the prosecutor should prosecute any culpable officials with "all severity and rigor."⁸⁷ Other points essentially outline specific points of emphasis for the future visitadores. For example, the instructions point out the fact that officials and Naples were "accustomed... to receive presents," which impeded judges' necessary liberty and integrity. Another abuse to be monitored and corrected was more

⁸³ AGS, EST, leg. 1025, f. 19. "[...] [N]ingún testigo [¿]deposita[?] [sic] de vera sçiençia sino por fama pública" and "Pierdese tan bién mucho t^{po}. en examinar testigos solo de fama p^{ca} q no hay más delo que pú^{ca}mente oyen decir. y desta man^a se podría examinar todo el reyno. que los oficiales son Infamados por la mayor parte y la gente maligna q quando se aprieta a la verdad no se coge dellos cosa q importe."

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., f. 37. August 11, 1536.

⁸⁶ Ibid., f. 19.

⁸⁷ AGS, EST, leg. 1024, f. 46.

characteristic of the attentions of later *visitas* to Milan: concern over abuses in the lodging of soldiers that aggravated the emperor's subjects.⁸⁸ If these new instructions did not confirm Pacheco's vision for the perpetual *visita*, the *visitador's* concern about the local participation required to effectively carry out the *visita* highlighted perhaps its most essential quality. In the absence of continuously maintaining a direct agent for the purpose of monitoring the locality, the state necessarily relied particularly heavily on the participation, whether willingly or coerced, of its subjects to supply information about the conduct of its intermediate officials.

Unfortunately, much like the other early *visitas* to Italy, the results of Pacheco's *visita* are obscured by the loss of the documents it produced. At the very least, Pacheco had been in correspondence with Pirro Musefilo, an agent of the Duke of Florence, who indicated that Pacheco brought four carts of *processos* with him to Spain. Two years later, the viceroy published the punishments that had resulted from the *visita's* investigations.⁸⁹ While later administrative records seldom mention Pacheco's *visita*, its legacy did not, however, go entirely unnoticed. Even D. A. Parrino's late-seventeenth century chronicle, *Teatro eroico e politico*, includes a reference to Pacheco's *visita*, though in the section about his term as viceroy.⁹⁰ Parrino's text suggests that Pacheco's *visita* was not particularly well regarded in Naples since the reference to the *visita* occurs in a segment regarding the use of torture, harkening to the accusations leveled against the *visitador* by the Spanish humanist Juan de Valdés about Pacheco's excessively severe conduct dating from the early 1540s.

Most interpretations of Pacheco's *visita*, both in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and of later historians have suggested that it went wildly off course, with proceedings that were, as Manuel Rivero Rodríguez has supposed, of "dubious legality" and manipulated by "factional interests" due to the anonymity provided to individuals who made complaints. The resistance of the tribunals and the viceroy to the *visita* also provoked Charles V to revoke a law that made complaints against officials easier.⁹¹ This not uncommon interpretation among historians should be viewed with some skepticism towards its sources. Pacheco was not especially popular but this should not be unexpected. His critics and the subjects of the *visita* were being subjected to an unfamiliar, foreign judicial procedure for which resistance would be expected under even the best of circumstances, and his most outspoken and notable critic, Juan de Valdés, to whom this chapter will turn, had close ties to the viceroy as one of his appointed officials. For his part, though he was apparently later able to carry out various investigations, Pacheco was at least initially deeply skeptical about the reliability of witnesses. But ultimately, in what is suggestive about the dynamics of the relationship between the *visita*, the Crown, and the locality, the early

⁸⁸ AGS, EST, leg. 1024, f. 46.

⁸⁹ Coniglio, *Visitatori del Vicereame di Napoli*, 15-17; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 58; "Sedici lettere di Pirro Musefilo al Duca di Firenze," in "Documenti relativi al tempo e al governo di don Pietro di Toledo, viceré di Napoli dal 1532 al 1533," *Archivio Storico Italiano* 9 (1846).

⁹⁰ Domenico Antonio Parrino, *Teatro eroico e politico de' governi de' viceré del regno di Napoli*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Naples, 1730), 215. The first volume of the first edition was published in 1692.

⁹¹ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 77-8; Renata Pilati, *Officia principis. Politica e amministrazione a Napoli nel Cinquecento* (Naples: Jovene, 1994), 223-9; Carlos J. Hernando Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles en el siglo XVI. El virrey Pedro de Toledo* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1994), 275-303; Pier Luigi Rovito, *Respublica dei togati* (Naples: Jovene, 1981), 18-21. The notion that the *visita* represented factional interests is so ubiquitous in the literature about the subject that it is by now a self-perpetuating common knowledge although this is principally demonstrated qualitatively, often in the form of protestations from those inculpated by it.

visita was essentially a tool of the Crown. Whatever negative reactions the visita provoked meant relatively little to the emperor, especially considering the continuing esteem the emperor had for Pacheco leading to his appointment as viceroy in Naples.

Although the visita was established in Naples in the 1530s, its extension to Sicily pointed towards its gradual transformation from an instrument of the Crown into an instrument of the broader state that could be used by both the Crown to institute reforms and by the locality to correct various abuses. Despite its longer and certainly less unstable connection to the Spanish Crown, Sicily's first visita was commissioned only in 1545, the same year that a visita was commissioned to Sardinia. This delay was not for lack of desire on the part of the Sicilians. Preceded by several requests by the Parliament of Sicily from 1535, 1540, and 1545 to Charles V for judicial reforms, it was only this last request to which the emperor responded as the visita of 1545 also met the parliament's request for an independent inspection.⁹² As had been the case for his predecessors in Naples, Diego de Córdoba had been commissioned for a considerable variety of tasks and these only grew after his arrival in Sicily. At the same time he was to help install the emperor's reforms.

As the first visitador to Sicily, Diego de Córdoba, like Leclerc in Naples, seems to have been tasked with the collection of information about existing laws and privileges on behalf of Charles's court as well as information about the vitally important *Cruzada* tax in Sicily, and these documents comprise much of the surviving records from the visita in conjunction with the reforms that the Hapsburgs had begun to undertake in Sicily.⁹³ Additionally, in February 1546, apparently in response to a perceived Protestant threat, Diego de Córdoba assumed responsibility for the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Sicily, a task that occupied at least the next several months.⁹⁴ Finally, in January 1547, Córdoba believed he had finally achieved the task of investigating the kingdom's officials, a task that placed new demands on the inspectors' ability to collect and use information.

While the documentation corresponding to the entries in the *registro* of *cartas* from Diego de Córdoba's visita largely does not survive, the registry itself illustrates the sizable amount of paperwork generated by the visitas even at a relatively early date as well as certain trends in the visitadores' attentions. In the registro, a total of 166 entries, corresponding to particular individuals, institutions, and cities throughout Sicily, accounted for no less than 14,892 sheets of documentation in letters and books, including material produced in defenses (figure 1).⁹⁵ Although the document's method of categorization is not standardized, it does suggest a rather uneven distribution. For the headings in the registro containing legible numerical entries, the average is slightly under ninety-two sheets per entry, but this figure is dramatically skewed by a select group of cases as just 19% of the cases account for 85% of the written material. By contrast, the median from this set is twelve sheets and the mode a mere two sheets.

⁹² Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 78; Vittorio Sciuti Russi, *Astrea in Sicilia: Il Ministero togato nella Società siciliana dei secoli XVI e XVII* (Naples: Jovene, 1983), 55-6; Burgarella and Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 26-7 quotation of AGS, EST, leg. 1116 (November 6, 1545, November 10 and December 4, 1545), leg. 1117 (January 13 and 25, 1546), and leg. 643 (April 7, 1546).

⁹³ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-1, 152-2, 152-3.

⁹⁴ AGS, EST, leg. 1117, ff. 35 (March 26, 1546), 111.

⁹⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-2. Begins at f. 13.




Figure 1. Cumulative proportion of entries in the *registro* of the 1545 visita to Sicily.

Although conclusions drawn from the *registro* are necessarily speculative, it seems likely that this at least partly corresponded to the actual attention given to particular aspects of the visita. Of these groups, the greatest amount of paperwork was devoted to the *maestri razionali* or the chief auditors and accountants including the largest single entry of 818 sheets. Financial officials were another source of attention, with the *conservatore* or supervisor of the patrimony and the treasury accounting for the second largest single source of documents. The geographical distribution, while not in complete form, suggests some patterns that were qualitatively and quantitatively maintained by future visitas, with Sicily's urban centers dominating the visitador's attention. However, Messina seems relatively predominant compared to Palermo and Catania with regard to the number of distinct entries, though like later visitas, Syracuse is virtually absent. While this paperwork may not have necessarily reflected the results of the visita, particularly in the instructions given by Charles to the viceroy with regard to the punishment of officials, it signals the attention the visitas paid to certain positions as well as the resources mobilized in the defense against the charges the visitador made. This expanding volume of paperwork, surely at the limits of the bureaucratic as well as the archival turns in governance, represented a physical advance for both. Even still, this turn was in its early stages and would be stretched further by the visitas of the future, when a single case, including the produced defense, might generate thousands of folios of paperwork.

The correspondence from the visitador to Prince Philip and Charles V, however, suggested slightly different attentions. For example, Córdoba supposed he, with the aid of the

new viceroy Juan de Vega, had uncovered the malfeasance of the Great Court from the past twenty years, finding them “very guilty” of various briberies and extortions and of not having served with the appropriate *limpieza* or “cleanliness.”⁹⁶ These misdeeds, the visitador supposed, should be punished by suspension from office and exile.

Among the other officials punished, the *Straticò*, or head magistrate of the court of Messina, faced a particularly severe punishment of perpetual exile and a 30,000 ducat fine.⁹⁷ Between 1547 and 1550, the severity that Diego de Córdoba sought was reduced considerably as many officials were included in a general pardon. However, Charles V specifically excluded thirty-three individuals from the pardon on the basis of their particularly bad conduct and instructed Juan de Vega to punish these officials through the ordinary means of justice. Seven additional individuals and groups of officials were to be given reprimands in lieu of punishments. Particular attention was given to the kingdom’s financial officials, including its treasurer, for having committed “such ugly” crimes.⁹⁸

Although Diego de Córdoba’s records suggest that this may have been one of the most comprehensive early *visitas*, Philip did not necessarily share that sentiment, as he expressed some dissatisfaction with its conclusion and the conclusion of the subsequent *visita* to Sicily. It also was clearly detested by the viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga, who believed that the *visita* was being used to investigate and punish him and manipulated by factions opposed to him.⁹⁹ Within a decade, Gonzaga’s concern would move north, with him assuming the governorship of Milan and the subsequent expansion of the *visita* to Milan.

Having established the example of the *visita* in southern Italy, the expectation that the *visita* might also be transplanted to Milan began to grow in the early 1550s, though the expression of this expectation represented a dramatically different evolutionary possibility for the institution than what would transpire. Unlike Leclerc’s, Mendoza’s, Pacheco’s, or Córdoba’s *visitas*, the principal framework for the *visita* in Milan was not the Crown’s consolidation of the institutions of governance in peace but the control of financial expenditures during the war with France that had begun in 1551. Like Naples however, the *visita* in Milan had been preceded by earlier inspections in 1532, 1539, 1541, and 1545 that were intended to furnish information to the Crown.¹⁰⁰

Despite Charles V’s decision to plan an inspection in 1552,¹⁰¹ there was no *visita* to Milan until 1554 but it differed significantly in form from the earlier *visitas* in Naples and Sicily, being carried out by Francisco Pacheco, who bore the title of “juez y comissario de la *visita*,” and Bernardo de Bolea, who had been named to the Chancery of Aragon in 1553.¹⁰² Unlike the broad reach that was increasingly typical of the *visita* and would later be the definitive norm, the 1554 *visita* to Milan apparently dealt with only a handful of the governor’s officials who had

⁹⁶ AGS, EST, leg. 1118, f. 65. January 10, 1547.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 81. November 30, 1547.

⁹⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-2, ff. 2-9v, 34-37.

⁹⁹ Burgarella and Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 26-35; Sciuti Russi, *Astrea in Sicilia*, 58-60; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Mario Rizzo, “Finanza pubblica, impero e amministrazione nella Lombardia spagnola: le ‘*Visitas Generales*,” in Paolo Pissavino and Gianvittorio Signorotto, eds., *Lombardia Borromaica. Lombardia Spagnola, 1554-1559*, vol I. (Rome: Bulzoni, 1995), 309-11.

¹⁰¹ Chabod, “Usi e abusi nell’Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il ‘500,” 95.

¹⁰² ASG, EST, leg. 1207, f. 10.2.

been implicated in fraudulent spending during the war to that point, in part following the recommendations from Diego de Córdoba related to the conduct of Milan's governor, Ferrante Gonzaga when he was in Sicily.¹⁰³ Accordingly, the surviving documents from the visita are depositions and claims against Ferrante Gonzaga, Segismundo Fancino, and Alvaro de Sande and record the proceedings of the visita until early 1555. To pursue these further, the *visitadores* also carried out an investigation into military expenses, including those for fortifications and munitions.

As was true of other early *visitas*, Bernardo de Bolea and Francisco Pacheco apparently had some difficulty in gaining the confidence of the Milanese and the quality and quantity of testimonial information was sometimes lacking. Proof of Gonzaga's alleged corruption was particularly challenging to come by and the *visitadores* were forthcoming in their inability to conclusively prove specific instances of wrongdoing, of which there were thirty-five particular "imputaciones," because of the reluctance of individuals to testify despite the overwhelming public sentiment that Gonzaga was not an upright official, although some individuals did confess to certain involvement in corrupt dealings.¹⁰⁴ Despite these difficulties, the visita's officials were able, in their view, to substantiate a number of severe accusations against Segismundo Fancino and believed that he might be punished even beyond the expected pecuniary punishment for his malfeasance.¹⁰⁵ But, as guilty as they believed Fancino to be, he remained a means to the *visitadores*' principal goal of investigating Gonzaga. This, however, was not a success and Gonzaga was ultimately absolved of any allegations of wrongdoing with his acquittal immortalized in Leone Leoni's medal with the inscription "Tu ne cede malis" or "Do not yield to evil."¹⁰⁶ This was perhaps not surprising due to Charles V's presumed protection for Gonzaga although the suspension of the visita to Milan was criticized by those more close to Philip II who believed that the earlier *visitas* had been terminated before they had been able to produce results.¹⁰⁷

Whatever effect the 1554 visita had was apparently temporary or incomplete and its work was hardly noted in preparation for the next visita, which began within a few years. That visita's project was anticipated by Juan Duarte, who in 1559 ascended to a post on the Milanese *Magistrato*, which until 1563 oversaw the administration of all financial affairs in the duchy as a single body, and would later conduct a visita of the galleys in Naples.¹⁰⁸ Presumably in conjunction with that post, Duarte proposed a basic framework for the visita in Philip's state, a framework that, although it would only come to fruition 130 years later, attempted to considerably expand the aims of the institution and the manner in which it was carried. While the Crown had usually previously commissioned one *visitador* and a supporting staff for a range of tasks, Duarte believed, as had Pedro Pacheco, that this arrangement was deeply flawed and

¹⁰³ ASG, EST, leg. 1207, f. 1; AGS, EST, leg. 1208, f. 80; Chabod, "Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500," 119-20.

¹⁰⁴ AGS, EST, leg. 1207, f. 5.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 3, 10.2.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 3; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 78; Rizzo, "Finanza pubblica, impero e amministrazione nella Lombardia spagnola: le 'Vistas Generales,'" 311; Suzanne Boorsch, Michal Lewis, and R. E. Lewis, *The Engravings of Giorgio Ghisi* (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1985), 117.

¹⁰⁷ Chabod, "Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500," 184; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 79-80.

¹⁰⁸ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 92.

impractical. As a result, and in order that “these matters do not become infinite,” Duarte first sought to establish limits on what a visita to Milan ought to accomplish.¹⁰⁹ Conducting a full audit of Milan’s finances, for example, would be virtually impossible and Duarte reckoned that the most recent records, from the outbreak of the war, should be dealt with. Additionally, Duarte sought to change the structure of the visita itself. Instead of relying on a single visitador to handle audits, discipline, and the collection of information, Duarte proposed using four visitadores and between two and four secretaries. Half of the visitadores were to deal with auditing the army, including its salaries and the expenses for munitions and fortifications, while the other two were to audit the state of Milan. These visitadores were principally intended to review the treasury’s accounts and the amounts charged when collecting taxes, but were also tasked with reviewing any estates, benefices, titles, or concessions that might have disadvantaged the Crown’s revenues as well as eliminating any superfluous expenses. Duarte’s note also emphasized the quality of character and skill that the visitadores ought to have, lest unscrupulous officials in Milan manage to confound and delay their investigations.¹¹⁰

By 1559 then, the example of the preceding visita was virtually ignored by the next visitador, whose paperwork included a modified version of Duarte’s letter and its rather brief mention of Pacheco and Bolea and a reference to a visita that had been desired by the emperor in 1553 but which apparently had faced “difficulties and impediments” in its commission.¹¹¹ With that, no additional reference was made to the prior visita and the need for dealing with present matters subsumed the project. Thus, in the context of the other early visitas to Italy, the 1554 visita to Milan highlights the remarkably pervasive lack of continuity between the initial and subsequent inspections. To some extent, this was probably the consequence of the fact that the first visita to Milan was substantively different in its domain than subsequent visitas but also presumably reflects the fact that the Crown’s record keeping had not yet caught up with the accelerating innovations in administrative practice.

The flexibility and instability of the earliest visitas in Italy as late as the 1550s was, however, hardly a permanent feature. Its explicit function, which initially reflected a need to collect information, was shifting as the demands placed on it in Italy as well as from the Crown, and the understanding of the role of governance changed during the middle of the sixteenth century.

THE VISITA AND GOOD GOVERNMENT

If the early modern concept of good government was central for Renaissance political thought and especially for Italian political thought, the most accessible antithesis of the concept was – and to this day remains – southern Italy. Naples particularly served this negative function in Machiavelli’s *Discourses* as public affairs were, for him, “very easy to manage [...] in a State in

¹⁰⁹ AGS, EST, leg. 1198, f. 211. The letter is unfortunately undated though included in a legajo with material from 1551. It must have been written subsequently, however, because it clearly mentions Pacheco and Bolea, although it is unclear if it was written concurrently with that work or at some point subsequently. Manuel Rivero Rodríguez claimed that the letter dates from the 1570s but this is especially dubious because a version of it is among the records from Cueva’s visita as if it was intended to guide its work and neither version mentions his visita, which ended in the early 1560s.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 1, 83v-87v.

which the Masses are not corrupt” and good government relied on a duality between force and the law, where the latter depended on social equality. In Naples, among other examples of “the source of world-wide corruption,” “there has never arisen any republic... [for] where the material is so corrupt [that] laws do not suffice to keep it in hand, it is necessary to have, besides laws, a superior force, such as appertains to a monarch, who has such absolute and overwhelming power that he can restrain excesses due to ambition and the corrupt practices of the powerful.”¹¹² The corollary of Machiavelli’s assertions about Naples were reflected in the seventeenth century thought of the Neapolitan author Giulio Cesare Capaccio, who viewed Spanish administration as a model of the “reason of state” that ensured stability and limited abuses.¹¹³ By contrast, in mid-sixteenth century Sicily, where the place of Spanish administration was also central in Scipio di Castro’s *avvertimenti* to the Duke of Terranova, governor of Milan, and Marc Antonio Colonna, viceroy of Sicily, di Castro’s turn to abstract theory in *The Foundations of the State and the Qualities of the Prince* suggested, at least for Koenigsberger, a turn away from the importance of good government and even the practice of justice to mere expediency as the justification for the state.¹¹⁴

That tension between expediency and good government ran through the mid-sixteenth century political thought touching upon the visita. While the visita’s critics did not entirely turn to a view of governance like di Castro would, their concern about the practical implications of inspections reacted against the Crown’s paternalistic justification for the visita’s provision for “good government” and “the good administration of justice,” notions of which were ascendant in the Spanish court in the middle of the sixteenth century.¹¹⁵ At the same time, the visita’s purpose was itself in question with divergence over whether it would serve as an instrument for the Crown to install reforms in its role as the Platonic captain of the ship of state or, in the Machiavellian view of the *Discourses*, as the means of providing the force needed to discipline the corrupt.

Pacheco’s visita to Naples in 1536 provoked one of the earliest and most pronounced philosophical discussion on the subject of the visita due to a belief among those connected to Pedro de Toledo that it failed to fulfill the monarch’s duties to his subjects and to the principles of government. In the 1530s, one of the preeminent Spanish humanists, Juan de Valdés, occupied a position in the Neapolitan court as secretary to the viceroy Pedro de Toledo and as an overseer of fortifications and his works about the nature of government and empire were

¹¹² Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. Leslie J. Walker, ed. Bernard Crick (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 243-8; Antonio Calabria and John A. Marino, eds. and trans., *Good Government in Spanish Naples* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 1-8.

¹¹³ Giulio Cesare Capaccio, *Il Forastiero: Dialoghi* (Naples: Gio Domenico Roncagliolo, 1630), 561-73; John A. Marino, “The Foreigner and the Citizen: A Dialogue on Good Government in Spanish Naples,” in *Reason and Its Others: Italy, Spain, and the New World*, eds. David Castillo and Massimo Lollini (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006), 145-64; Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown*, 138.

¹¹⁴ Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 201-5. Scipio di Castro’s official life in Sicily happened to coincide with the 1559 visita there and he provided depositions to the visitador (see p. 32).

¹¹⁵ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 97-100; Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, *La edad de oro de los virreyes: El virreinato en la Monarquía Hispánica durante los siglos XVI y XVII* (Madrid: Akal, 2011), 100-1.

very much born out of that milieu.¹¹⁶ Unlike his late brother Alfonso de Valdés, Charles V's Latin secretary from 1526 to 1532, who suggested that the political function of the prince was one of *imitatio* through which subjects' behavior followed the example of the Christian prince, Juan de Valdés did not have an unambiguous concept of imitation between the emperor and his subjects.¹¹⁷ Perhaps due to his provincial experience, Juan de Valdés, as Steven Suppan has argued, instead suggested that a certain degree of political authority remained in the provinces rather than in the person of the emperor.¹¹⁸ This distinction is most famously evident in the correspondence between Juan de Valdés and Francisco de los Cobos from the late 1530s and early 1540s, which consists of seven letters, which Benedetto Croce included in his edition of Valdés's *Abecedario cristiano* and one letter from Cobos to Valdés described by D. A. Crews that touched on the actual practice of good government in conjunction with the administration of Naples.¹¹⁹ As it happened, the correspondence between Cobos and Valdés, from which the latter's political philosophy has been understood, was initiated by Cobos's request that Valdés supply his opinion about Pacheco's visita.

Valdés for his part provided a decidedly bad review, claiming that Pacheco did not receive advice from Neapolitan officials and replaced competent officials with incompetent ones, which had delayed the settlement of an estate related to Cobos's business in Naples. Worse, the apparent independence with which Pacheco acted and the manner in which the visitador attempted to eradicate the legal and cultural differences between the emperor's domains was a crucial failure in Valdés's view: "If he [i.e. Pacheco] had remembered that Naples is not Valladolid, he would not handle things the way he did. He also charges His Majesty, attributing too much rigor to him and even more."¹²⁰ Valdés's disdain for the visitador's ostensible misapplication of the juridical practices of Valladolid in Naples illustrated a broader view of good government in the empire, as Suppan summarizes: "For Valdés, maintaining good government requires respect, not only for legal institutions, but also for such cultural institutions as language and customs."¹²¹ As a result, though he had previously

¹¹⁶ Daniel A. Crews, "Valdés and the Comunero Revolt: An Essay on Spanish Civic Humanism," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 22 (1991), 245; Steven Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," *Mediterranean Studies* 4 (1994), 81-2.

¹¹⁷ Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 81-82; J. A. Fernández-Santamaría, *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1599* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 47; Hayward Keniston, *Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary of the Emperor Charles V* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), 144-7; John M. Headley, *The Emperor and His Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 90-4; Daniel A. Crews, "Juan de Valdés and Spanish Imperial Humanism," *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 2 (1985), 43-51.

¹¹⁸ Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 82.

¹¹⁹ Crews, "Valdés and the Comunero Revolt: An Essay on Spanish Civic Humanism," 233-52; Rivero Rodríguez, *La edad de oro de los virreyes: El virreinato en la Monarquía Hispánica durante los siglos XVI y XVII*, 90-1; Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 83.

¹²⁰ Juan de Valdés (as Giovanni de Valdés), "Lettere inedite di Juan de Valdés," *Alfabeto cristiano: diálogo con Giulia Gonzaga*, ed. and intro. Benedetto Croce (Bari: G. Laterza, 1938), 159 quoted in Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 84: "Si el se acordara que Napoles no es Valladolid no llevara las cosas por donde las llevó. Carga tambien sobre Su Magestad atribuyendole demassia da regurosidad y aun algo mas."

¹²¹ Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 84-5; Valdés, "Lettere inedite di Juan de Valdés," 159.

considered the visita suitable for maintaining the emperor's territories, Valdés began to express considerable doubts about its propriety and reckoned that the visita had been perverted from a religious purpose into an instrument of tyranny.¹²²

The proper correction for malfeasance was to maintain the practice of justice at a local level and Valdés also hoped that the emperor would therefore abandon the practice of the visita. Beyond enacting new laws and correcting administrative practices, Valdés supposed that the best remedy for disorder was for the emperor to select men who were just and trustworthy.¹²³ If Valdés's belief that the Crown could select virtuous and effective men to hold office appears idealistic, it belies the essential pragmatism of his philosophy of government. This was also, for example, the view of Juan de Vega, who supposed that good government was a rather simple matter upon finishing his term as viceroy in Sicily in his correspondence with Philip II: "There is no simpler thing than knowing whether someone who governs is good or bad, because the good gives good effects and the bad gives bad effects. And if he is good, he should be left to do what he sees fit, and if he is bad, he should be left to do nothing, if not removed and this is what it is to be king of Sicily and of the world."¹²⁴ If by nothing else, Pacheco's visita could be judged on the basis that its punishments had harmed the reputations of officials in Naples without regard for local privileges or practices. Due to their fear of the visita, officials were unable to carry out their duties and the business of administering the kingdom ground to a halt.¹²⁵

While Valdés's antipathy for the visita's tyranny reflected, among other things, his principled pragmatism about effective local administration, the visita could also be seen as an instrument for the locality to communicate its concerns about administration to the Crown. This latter possibility was particularly highlighted by Diego de Córdoba's 1545 visita to Sicily, in large part due to the preservation of a unique piece of correspondence supplied to the visitador during the course of his inspection, one of three "advertimientos" written by Jacobo d'Aversa, the abbot of San Gregorio, for the "benefit and conservation of the Kingdom of Sicily."¹²⁶ For the abbot, the visitador served as a, if not *the*, vital link to the organs of government and a channel through which to communicate the everyday concerns of the kingdom to the monarch. As a result, the abbot's advice spans a vast number of topics that touch upon every aspect of government, nearly all of which were very closely linked to Diego de Córdoba's investigations, interventions, and reforms while serving as visitador. While his principal concern was the preservation of Sicilian interests, this interest was tempered with a desire to preserve a certain royal and therefore Spanish prerogative, as the abbot, for example, called for Charles to appoint only Spanish viceroys for Sicily. But the viceroy's – and

¹²² Valdés, "Lettere inedite di Juan de Valdés," 160-4; Rivero Rodríguez, *La edad de oro de los virreyes*, 90-1.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 79 quoting BNM, Ms. 10300, 46-7. "No ay cosa tan facil de conocer como si el que gobierna es bueno o malo, porque el bueno da buenos frutos y el malo malos. Y que si es bueno se le ha de dejar hacer lo que le pareciere, y si es malo no se le ha de dejar hacer nada, sino quitalle y esto es ser rey de Sicilia y del mundo."

¹²⁵ Suppan, "Property and Propriety in the Political Writings of Juan de Valdés," 81-90; Rivero Rodríguez, *La edad de oro de los virreyes*, 90-1.

¹²⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-3, ff. 1-4. "Otro y tercero advertimiento y información dada por me don Jacobo de Aversa abate de San Gregorio a... don Diego de Córdoba visitador." January 1546.

presumably the visitador's – duty extended to ensuring that other Spaniards did not abuse their positions of power, in particular members of the army, especially in light of recent incidents of abuse that had sparked an array of grievances towards the army on the island. In a second link to the visita, the abbot expressed his concern regarding the use of the Cruzada and though he believed that it was justified by the need to provide for the “universal defense of the Christian religion,” the abbot seems to have tasked the visitador with ensuring its careful administration.¹²⁷ The relationship between the Holy Office of the Inquisition, in which Córdoba had intervened beginning in 1546, and the governance of Sicily was also of deep importance for the abbot, particularly with regard to the suspension of officials found guilty of religious crimes.

Yet another of the abbot's concerns tied to the visitador's mission was the effective provision of justice, as the abbot expressed his dismay at the fact that the slow pace with which trials were being heard had filled jails and stalled the administration of the kingdom. In conjunction with the judicial reforms that Córdoba was tasked with installing, the abbot suggested installing three judges for handling civil cases and three judges for handling criminal cases, switching these each year. Additionally, the abbot suggested creating three courts in the kingdom to handle civil and criminal cases in Messina for the Val Demone, a second in Syracuse for the Val di Noto, and a third in Palermo for the Val di Mazara, consisting of a president with three *letrados* to expedite cases reporting to the viceroy and council with reviews from a sindicador. This, presumably, would replace the Straticò of Messina, which the abbot believed had failed and necessitated the provision of a new order to provide justice. In the meantime, the practice of justice and especially the punishment of delinquents had fallen by the wayside while the captains responsible for handling crimes were committing a variety of abuses.

Underlying all the abbot's recommendations was a metaphor that harkened to Plato's description of the nature of the state: “your honor [i.e. Diego de Córdoba] knows and understands that kingdoms ought be governed according to the quality and disposition of the time and the *capitulos*, privileges, statutes, orders, constitutions, and laws tend to and ought to move, change, correct, and reform according to the times and the quality of the people and with this reason and foundation, His Majesty ought to regulate and govern his kingdoms like the good mariner and according to how the winds move the sails and uses his rudder to govern the ship.”¹²⁸ If the abbot did not explicitly describe a role for the visitador in his counsels, it is implicit in this metaphor. The role of the Crown was to actively provide for the administration of the kingdom, supplying laws and reforms to guide his subjects. But in order to do that in accordance with the best interests of the locality, the visitador would, acting as the monarch's representative in Sicily, collect information and suggestions and, as needed, provide remedies for abuses. In effect, the Abbott of San Gregorio's relationship with and advice to Diego de

¹²⁷ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-3, ff. 1-4.

¹²⁸ Ibid., ff. 2v-3. “Otro sepa V.S. como mucho mejor de me sape y entende q^e los reynos se deven gobernar segúnd la qualidad y disposiciones delos tiempos y los capítulos privilegios statutos ordines y consuetudines y leys se suelen y deven mudar alterar corregir y reformar segúnd los tiempos y qualidad delas psonas y con esta razón y fundamento su M^{ta}d ce se ha de regular en gobernar sus reynos como façe el buen marinero q^e segúnd los ventos muda las velas y usa de su timon pa gobierno dela nave.” For the development of the cultural cachet of that metaphor in southern Italy in the fifteenth century, see Francesco Storti, “*El buen marinero*”: *Psicología política e ideología monárquica al tempo di Ferdinando I d'Aragona re di Napoli* (Rome: Viella, 2014), 121-44.

Córdoba highlighted the principal function of the earliest *visitas*: a tool for Charles V to consolidate his empire.

As the *visita* transformed from that early sixteenth century function into a means of social regulation and discipline, its future role was, fittingly enough, described by the *visitador* most emblematic in that transformation, Gaspar de Quiroga.¹²⁹ The centerpiece of the documents produced by Gaspar de Quiroga's *visita* was the "Processus diversorum officialium," which, despite its somewhat uninspiring name, represented a true advance for the Italian *visita*. Consisting of two volumes and a total of over 1,200 folios, Quiroga collected over 600 depositions from the beginning of his inspection on November 26, 1559 through October 12, 1563. While the "Processus" in itself represents both a documentary and practical shift in the function of the *visita*, Quiroga himself expressed his task in what is unique among the *visitas'* records: a preface. Unsurprisingly for a man of his background, Quiroga's preface is a *tour de force* of his learning, constructing his vision for the *visita* without, except for one brief remark, commentary on a collage of quotations from classical texts and the Old Testament.

Quiroga's preface begins by explicitly teasing out the parallels between the present and antiquity, citing Book VIII of Quintus Curtius Rufus's *Historiarum Alexandri Magni Macedonis Libri Qui Supersunt*: "Alexander, thus freed from the greatest part of his present cares, turned his attention to avenging the wrongs of those who were being ruled greedily and insolently by his governors."¹³⁰ Alexander the Great, that emblematic model for princes, provided an example of turning from the demands of war to the principal concern of the state in peace: justice. So too had been the desire of Philip II, the victor of the late war against France: "Thus also our lord Philip, Catholic King of the Spains, having been freed from the Gallic War in the year 1559, turned his attention so that he might punish the injustices to his subjects that were introduced by his ministers."¹³¹ In this single description of the present, Quiroga's reference to his own *visita* makes his intentions quite explicit: his duty was to discipline officials who, while the King had been occupied by other matters, had acted unjustly.

From this thesis, Quiroga used most of the remainder of the preface to construct a story about the nature of officialdom and the state that justifies the necessity for discipline through the *visita*. Turning to the Old Testament, Quiroga's text suggests that ministers and particularly judges were an inherent feature of the state and Quiroga cites the command that Moses received from his father-in-law Jethro in Exodus 18:21-22: "Moreover, provide thou among all the people men of courage, fearing God, men dealing truly, hating covetousness: and appoint *such* over them *to be* rulers over thousands, rulers over hundreds, rulers over fifties, and rulers over tens. And let them judge the people at all seasons."¹³² The creation of officials was necessary, but it did not ensure good outcomes.

¹²⁹ For a relatively recent biography on Quiroga, see Henar Pizarro Llorente, *Un gran patrón en la corte de Felipe II: Don Gaspar de Quiroga* (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2004) which describes his *visita* on pages 107-122.

¹³⁰ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1. "Quintus Curtius *De Rebus Gestis Alex. Magni* lib. octavo sic ait: Ille, maxima praesentium curarum parte liberatus, convertit animum ad vindicandas iniurias eorum, quibus a praetoribus suis avare ac superbe imperabatur."

¹³¹ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1. "Sic etiam Philippus Hispaniarum Rex Catholicus dominus noster, bello gallico liberatus anno 1559, convertit animum ut iniurias subditos a Praetoribus illatas vindicaret."

¹³² This and the following translations of scripture are taken from *The 1599 Geneva Bible* (Dallas, GA: Tolle Lege Press, 2014), a version of the 1599 Geneva Bible with updated orthography but all of which are

The state, even before Moses had constructed it, needed to be vigilant when entrusting individuals with positions of authority. Despite best intentions, those who had been provided with examples of upright conduct by their superiors could still be perverted as the preface indicates in its citation of 1 Samuel 8:3: “And his sons walked not in [Samuel’s] ways, but turned aside after lucre, and took rewards, and perverted the judgment.”¹³³ For the visitador, the perversion of justice ultimately represented one of the greatest dangers for the people. To this end, Quiroga turned to Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita* Book XXIII for the negative example of Carthage: “The order of the judges was dominant in Carthage at that time, chiefly because they were judges in perpetuity. The property, reputation, and life of everyone were in their power. Whoever offended one of the [members of the] order [would] have all of them as enemies and there was no lack of prosecutor[s] among the hostile judges.”¹³⁴ Beyond the fear that an individual’s corruption might make them wicked and unfit to practice justice, the preface’s use of Livy suggests a more insidious possibility. The corrupt, particularly in the absence of controls, tended to form cliques that dominated the state, using it for their personal ends.

After this cautionary description of the systemic abuse of power, Quiroga’s preface turns to the effective practice of justice. Good government in Quiroga’s view did not simply require the absence of wrongdoing but an active accountability before the people and before God as exemplified by Samuel in 1 Samuel 12:1-4, which Quiroga incorrectly cited in the text as coming from 1 Kings 12:

Samuel then said unto all Israel, Behold, I have hearkened unto your voice in all that ye said unto me, and have appointed a King over you. Now therefore behold, *your* King walketh before you, and I am old and gray headed, and behold, my sons *are* with you: and I have walked before you from my childhood unto this day. Behold, here I am: bear record of me before the Lord and before his anointed. Whose ox have I taken? or whose ass have I taken? or whom have I done wrong to? or whom have I hurt? or of whose hand have I received any bribe, to blind mine eyes therewith, and I will restore it you? Then they said, Thou hast done us no wrong, nor hast hurt us, neither hast thou taken ought of any man’s hand.¹³⁵

modified to follow Quiroga’s quotations of the Vulgate, which often abbreviate the scriptures. The corresponding original text of Quiroga’s quotation of the Vulgate is provided in the footnotes. AGS, VIT, leg. 3. “Exod. Cap. XVIII. Provide autem de omni plebe viros potentes et timentes Deum, in quibus sit veritas, et qui oderint avaritiam, et constitue ex eis tribunos et centuriones et quinquagenarios et decanos, qui iudicent populum omni tempore.”

¹³³ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1. “Regii I Cap VIII de Samuele. Et non ambulaverunt filii illius in viis eius, sed declinaverunt post avaritiam, acceperuntque munera, et perverterunt iudicium.”

¹³⁴ Ibid. “Livy lib. XXXIII [...] Iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime quod iidem perpetui iudices erant. Res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum eius ordinis offendisset, omnes adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat.”

¹³⁵ Ibid. “Reg. I. Cap. XII. Dixit autem Samuel ad universum Israel, ecce audivi vocem vestram iuxta omnia quae locuti estis ad me, et constitui super vos regem et nunc rex graditur ante vos ego autem senui et incanui porro filii mei vobiscum sunt itaque conversatus coram vobis ab adolescentia mea usque ad hanc diem. Ecce praesto sum, loquimini de me coram domino et coram christo eius utrum bovem cuiusquam tulerim an asinum, si quempiam calumniatus sum, si oppressi aliquem, si de manu cuiusquam munus accepi. et contempnam illud hodie restituamque vobis et dixerunt. Non es calumniatus nos, neque oppressisti, neque tulisti de manu alicuius quippiam.”

Quiroga particularly emphasized the connection between the correct conduct of justice and the absence of corruption, as the preface cites Exodus 23:6-8: “Thou shalt not overthrow the right of the poor in his suit. Thou shalt keep thee far from a false matter, thou shalt not slay the innocent and the righteous: for I will not justify a wicked man. Thou shalt take no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous.”¹³⁶ Having established the proper conduct for officials, the visitador concluded his preface by turning to his own conduct in carrying out the investigation under the auspices of both Philip and God. First citing the Vulgate version of Psalm 25:9-10, the preface seems to call upon God to ensure that the visitador spurn corruption and violence: “Gather not my soul with the sinners, nor my life with the bloody men: In whose hand *is* wickedness, and their right hand is full of bribes.”¹³⁷ In the face of this injustice, the visitador’s task is a severe one, with the preface suggesting that he was called to bring the wicked low in its citation of Isaiah. First, a quotation of Isaiah 5:23 reiterates the vice that the visitador confronted and the divine punishment he brought: “Woe [unto them that are mighty to drink wine, and unto them that are strong to pour in strong drink:] Which justify the wicked for a reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him.”¹³⁸ Isaiah 1:23-26 concludes Quiroga’s scriptural citations and is perhaps the most fitting comparison between the visita and the biblical justification, ending with a masterful work of parallelism between Israel and the “*fidelissima città*” that was the subject of his inspection:

[Thy princes *are* rebellious, and companions of thieves]: every one loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards: they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the widow’s cause come before them. Therefore saith the Lord God of hosts, the Mighty one of Israel, Ah, I will ease me of mine adversaries, and avenge me of mine enemies. Then I will turn mine hand upon thee, and burn out thy dross, till it be pure, and take away all thy tin. And I will restore thy Judges as at the first, and thy counselors as at the beginning: afterward shalt thou be called a city of righteousness, *and* a faithful city.¹³⁹

If the misconduct of officials called for vengeance and punishment, the visitas of 1559 at least in part suggested that this was not something that needed to wait for God’s intervention. Ending with a citation of Charles V’s 1539 pragmatic that forbade corruption in Naples with the penalty of suspension or deprivation of office, the preface leads into the resumption of the practice of the visita in Naples but under a new king and in a new institutional environment.

¹³⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1. “Exod. Cap. XXIII. Non declinabis in iudicio pauperis. mendacium fugies insontem et iustum non occides quia aversor impium nec accipias munera quae excaecant etiam prudentes et subvertunt verba iustorum.”

¹³⁷ Ibid. “Psal. XXV. Ne perdas cum impiis animam meam, et cum viris sanguinum vitam meam; in quorum manibus iniquitates sunt, dextera eorum repleta est muneribus.” Translation is from Psalm 24:9-10 because of the Vulgate’s numbering of the Psalms.

¹³⁸ Ibid. “Isa. Cap. V. Vae qui iustificatis impium pro muneribus, et iustitiam iusti aufertis ab eo.”

¹³⁹ Ibid. “Isa. Cap. I. Omnes diligunt munera, sequuntur retributiones, pupillo non iudicant, et causa viduae non ingreditur ad illos. Propter hoc ait dominus Deus exercituum fortis Israel. Heu consolabor super hostibus meis et vindicabor de inimicis meis et convertam manum meam ad te, et excoquam ad purum scoriā tuam et auferam omne stagnum tuum et restituam iudices tuos ut fuerunt prius et consiliarios tuos sicut antiquitus. Post haec vocaberis civitas iusti, urbs fidelis.”

With the final consolidation of Hapsburg hegemony in Italy during the Italian War of 1551 and the resulting Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis alongside the declining economic importance of the Crown of Aragon, Philip II continued the process of refining the administration of the monarchy's Italian territories. The most apparent of these reforms was the establishment of the Council of Italy in the late 1550s. In Koenigsberg's treatment of the subject, no aspect of Spain's administration of Italy better represented its supposed promise or tragedy than the Council of Italy, which was "a revolutionary change in the conception of the role of the central government in an international empire" able to respond to and represent the locality but that was ultimately undermined by the "mediocrity and conservatism" of its members which made "a mockery of the good intentions of the king's most capable and loyal servants."¹⁴⁰

Yet for all its "revolutionary" possibility as an instrument of government, the Council of Italy was recognizably part of a continuing evolution of administration within the Spanish court. As its use of the conciliar system of governance developed throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Spanish monarchy occasionally responded to emerging – and at times urgent – needs for differentiation and specialization in its existing councils through the formation of new councils that ostensibly improved the Crown's decision making process.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, the Council of Aragon's existing responsibilities for Sicily and Naples as well as the administration of Milan were simply transferred to the new Council of Italy. The new division of conciliar competence notably also allowed the monarchy to circumvent the institutional constraints on membership in the Council of Aragon. In particular, although the Crown had increasingly favored Castilian rather than Catalan and Aragonese officials in Italy, the former were not permitted to serve on the Council of Aragon and the absence of such a restriction for the Council of Italy expanded and fortified Castilian dominance in the imperial administration. The move also served to benefit Italians, who although permitted to serve on the Council of Aragon, thereafter were to represent half of the regents of the council, with Sicily, Naples, and Milan each providing a native regent to it.¹⁴²

Despite this change in composition, the new council's formal structures and responsibilities nevertheless mirrored its predecessor's although the process of establishing these formal structures was both protracted and quite fluid. In fact, the creation of the council actually preceded the instructions that would more formally establish it when Philip named Diego de Vargas secretary for Italian affairs in 1556 and later named Diego Hurtado de Mendoza the president of the Italian regents in 1558. The instructions to the council provided in 1559 – subsequently refined in 1579 to task the council with the collection of information – confirmed its authority over territorial affairs, specifically in the supervision of "finance, trade, and customs" and the provision of "military and civil offices" as well as "privileges, titles, and

¹⁴⁰ Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 72; Leopold von Ranke, *Die Osmanen und die Spanische Monarchie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1877).

¹⁴¹ J. M. Batista i Roca, foreword to *The Practice of Empire*, 15-26; Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, 21-8; Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621*, 3-6.

¹⁴² Batista i Roca, foreword to *The Practice of Empire*, 21-3.

benefices” but most importantly, justice.¹⁴³ It was in that charge that the Council of Italy also gained the competence for managing subsequent visitas in Italy, the first series of which began in 1559.

Because of that competence, historians studying the governing councils and the visitas have typically understood the relationship between the visita and its corresponding council as entirely essential. In Peytavin’s formulation of the governance of Naples, for example, the Council of Italy continued to use the visita as Charles V and his ministers had, as a means of supplying information to carry out reforms and to promote local officials.¹⁴⁴ But the exact link between the Council of Italy – and the councils in general – and the institution of the visita has, at least through the first part of Philip II’s reign, been considerably exaggerated due to the prominent position that the councils had in the government of the Hapsburg monarchs of the sixteenth century. Even after the formation of the Council of Italy, for example, it was the direct correspondence between the monarch and the visitadores who conducted the visitas in 1559 that most closely corresponded to their actions in Milan, Sicily, and Naples.

Although much of these records has been lost or severely damaged by humidity in the intervening centuries, as is the unfortunate case for the book containing the correspondence related to the visita to Sicily, the intervention of Philip II is ever-present. In addition to directing attention to specific tasks, particularly ones for collecting accounts and financial documents as well as checks on the state of fortifications, the correspondence is also notable for the considerable constraints and pressures the Crown placed on the visita, requesting more regular communication from the visitadores, pressuring them to complete their tasks at a more rapid pace, and urging cooperation between the visitadores and the viceroys or governors. Moreover, the new governing councils, including the Council of Italy, were only one part of a suit of reforms undertaken by the Crown in relation to its territories during the mid-sixteenth century. The visitas of this period should thus be understood in relation to this general project of reform, for which it had been used as early as 1530 in Naples, rather than as a projection of the newly established Council of Italy’s interests. While the relationship between the Council of Italy and the visitas did institutionalize certain practices, both in the territories for which the Council had responsibility and in the way that visitas were conducted, this connection hardly circumscribed the functions of the visita. As the institution continued to evolve into a disciplinary instrument, the visitas of 1559, far from being a tool of the Council of Italy, responded to the vision of Philip II, the visitadores themselves and, to an extent even beyond the communication between Diego de Córdoba and the abbot of San Gregorio, the responses of those in the provinces.

To be sure, this evolution was not fully attained even after the creation of the Council of Italy. Of the three visitas that began in 1559, the visita to Milan carried out by Andrés de la Cueva y Bovadilla bore the greatest similarities to its Italian predecessors despite the fact that Cueva’s instructions and preceding correspondence clearly indicated that Philip II was interested in the visita’s potential to punish officials in Milan. Cueva’s mission, as before, was

¹⁴³ Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 61; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 64-5; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*; C. Giardina, *Il Supremo Consiglio d’Italia* (Palermo: Reale Accademia di Scienza, Lettere e Belle Arti, 1934).

¹⁴⁴ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 522-4; see also Jorge Ignacio Rubio Mañé, *El virreinato*, vol.1, *Orígenes y jurisdicciones, y dinámica social de los virreyes* (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, 1983), 85 and Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 82.

supplemented by the Crown's continuing interest in using the visita to collect information, in part to supplement the reforms to the composition of Milanese administration instituted in 1561,¹⁴⁵ but increasingly for the purpose of conducting audits. To that end, the visitador was accompanied by two "revisores de cuentas," auditors who were sometimes also labeled "visitadores."

These additional officials were vital for the regulation of financial discipline, which had not been maintained to the Crown's satisfaction, with reductions in sources of revenue, including sales of property that were 8 to 10% below the Crown's expected price.¹⁴⁶ In 1560, Philip intensified his concern regarding these interests and requested that special attention be given to the conservation of his patrimony especially due to the losses sustained by the treasury. Similar attention was requested for the state of the army salaries and the expenses for fortifications in the duchy, both of which were major financial liabilities given the immense potential for fraud. To remedy those losses, prevent future fraud, and to correct existing records that were perceived to have been marred by the particularly bad state of record keeping in Milan, much of the visita's energy was devoted to the comprehensive review of records and the production of lists of a financial nature including one of every official in Milan, one of their salaries, one of current benefices, and one account of Milan's revenue and expenditures from 1548 through 1559.¹⁴⁷

The visita would still deal with reforms, from Cueva's production of a report on the manner in which the duchy's administration dealt with the abuse of the distribution of water to his recommendation that the newly created post of auditor in the Magistrato be reserved for Spaniards, but its work would increasingly be directed to the correction of "bad customs" which "were never, or only with great difficulty lost."¹⁴⁸ This effort began almost immediately after the termination of Pacheco and Bolea's visita against Gonzaga and in 1555, when Gonzaga's replacement, the Duke of Alba, revived some of the anxieties that instigated that inspection when he expressed his concern about the practice of justice in Milan.¹⁴⁹ In September 1558, prior to Cueva's appointment as visitador, the newly installed governor of Milan, Gonzalo II Fernández de Córdoba, the Duke of Sessa, confirmed the Crown's developing view that a visita of the councils in Milan was "very necessary" and suggested that it take an expansive role later confirmed in the instructions to the visitador.¹⁵⁰ Calling Cueva's visita a "visitación," Philip II's instructions to Cueva suggest a link to the previous visita to Milan that began half a decade before Cueva's, but the subjects of the inspection now included officials handling the administration of justice and patrimony among other royal officials rather than the governor's officials.

¹⁴⁵ Chabod, "Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500," 192.

¹⁴⁶ AGS, SSP, libro 1155, ff. 9-9v, 13-14.

¹⁴⁷ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 68-80.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., f. 86v. "porque se dize que aun después se a perseverado en esta platica y que será difícil desaraigarla si no se haze demostración a causa que las malas costumbres nunca, o, con dificultad se pierden y las buenas se olvidan presto"

¹⁴⁹ Chabod, "Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500," 151-4 quoting letters from August 4, 1555, January 11, 1556, and February 14, 1556 in *Epistolario del III Duque de Alba*, vol. I (Madrid, 1952), pp. 195, 239, 245, 252, 256, 279, and 352-6; AGS, EST, leg. 1208, f. 20.

¹⁵⁰ AGS, EST, leg. 1209, f. 58. "Relación de los puntos de la carta que el Duque de Sessa escribió de su mano" September 9, 1558.

The visitador, with the assistance of the governor of Milan as it was hoped, would look into the “good administration of justice and governance of our revenue and patrimony” and to ensure the happiness of the monarch’s subjects to relieve Philip’s conscience.¹⁵¹ Particular attention was to be given to the esteem in which officials were held and whether they were sufficiently competent in their training and abilities. The handling of money, finances, and the royal patrimony was the second major target for investigation. Army paymasters, for example, were mentioned as a particular source of attention and officials in general were to be investigated regarding the receipt of salaries in excess of those established by Charles V as well as excessive charges for services and potential illicit connections to bankers. The results of the investigations were, as was the case for the future visitas to Italy, to be reduced into charges against officials, to which officials were granted an allotted period of time to respond with defenses, and these together with the information and depositions would be reviewed in Spain by a special committee.

In the meantime, for situations in which officials were likely to abuse their privilege and status, the visitador was granted the authority to temporarily – which in practice was actually an indefinite period of time until a sentence was given – suspend officials.¹⁵² However, this authority was largely consultative, since the visitador was only permitted to suspend officials in communication with Philip II and the oblique nature of official correspondence on the subject left a number of ambiguities that practically reduced the visitador’s authority over the highest officials in a given territory.¹⁵³

Given this intense focus on discipline in the instructions given to Cueva, it is hardly surprising that his records begin with depositions related to the conduct of officials. Yet, unlike the other visitas that began in 1559, the depositions in Cueva’s records are relatively few in number and often extremely sparse in detail despite the exceedingly lengthy interrogatories provided for each position. The total number of responses to these interrogatories is staggeringly low: merely fifty-four for all of the offices combined and many of these came from the same people. The number of denunciations – the distinction in name very accurately conveys the fact that these latter documents were more likely to include accusations against an individual than an ordinary deposition would even if their quality was more dubious as a result – added another forty-two.¹⁵⁴

As a result, apparently only twenty-two sentences, many of which were against the same individuals, resulted from the visita.¹⁵⁵ To be sure, there were quite a few limits on what was possible for the visita to Milan, principally because that visita began only in the spring of 1560, with Cueva travelling from Brussels to Milan in April, and had first been called on to speed up his work a year later and was later requested to finish his work quickly during the summer of 1561.¹⁵⁶ But this limited time frame, like the one that Pedro Pacheco had dealt with in Naples in 1536, was the least of the reasons for Cueva’s diminutive production. The preserved responses for the interrogatory for the Senate are the most illustrative of this challenge. The eight surviving depositions describe the interactions of the senators in generalities and few details

¹⁵¹ AGS, VIT, libro 288, f. 1.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, ff. 2-2v.

¹⁵³ See chapters II and III.

¹⁵⁴ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 18-66; various between ff. 99-193, etc.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, various between ff. 144-188.

¹⁵⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 1155, ff. 28, 47v-48v.

emerge about either potential misconduct or positive practices of governance, as Chabod summarized so lucidly: “Various witnesses, therefore, were blind and deaf, knew nothing, had not seen anything, had never listened to gossip and rumors [...] or they stuck to generalities, with cautious admissions and ‘hearsay.’”¹⁵⁷

Unsurprisingly, then, the few details about the senate that are not praise for the senators’ learning and skill suggest that they had rather close bonds to each other and frequently met amongst themselves for private matters, including a regular meeting at the house of the President of the Senate.¹⁵⁸ In fact, only one deposition in the section concerning the Senate contains anything approaching an accusation, with one witness, a mayor, implicating senator Baldassare Molina, and the vicar of justice, Fernando Bravo, in connection with improperly receiving a fine for a merchant’s confiscated goods that the witness in question had delivered. The resulting charge would continue to be dealt with until at least 1562 in Milan by one of Philip’s revisores in the duchy.¹⁵⁹ This paucity of detail in these depositions clearly coincides with the difficulties faced by the *visitadores* before the late 1550s and suggests that the tight bonds amongst the senators extended to the witnesses, who were largely attorneys whose cases were heard in the senate, and perhaps also meant that these witnesses were under some pressure not to reveal too much information.

This general lack of information was not unique to the Senate, as the investigation of the *Consiglio Secreto*, the advisory council to the governor, resulted in the collection of even more unspecific answers and even more effusive praise.¹⁶⁰ Likewise, the captains of justice, who are sometimes presumed to have borne the brunt of personal accusations in *visitas*, had a similar absence of negative testimony and, quite to the contrary of expectations, were recipients of still more praise. Of the major investigations carried out by interrogatories, the only one with anything approaching regular complaints concerned the *Magistrato* and its officials’ illicit personal receipt of revenue as “*onoranze*.”¹⁶¹ The *visita*’s investigation into the conduct of the former president of the *Magistrato*, Francesco Grassi, who had held a number of positions in Milan, including senator and interim chancellor and who would later be a cardinal, resulted in the restitution of the “*onoranze*” payments that the similarly influential postmaster Simon de Taxis had been compelled to give.¹⁶² Along with Grassi, three other individuals, Francisco Rotta, who himself had prominent ties to Grassi when serving as commissioner of munitions, Lactantio Balbo, and Vincencio Spinola, were the most notable targets of the investigation probably due to the financial nature of their alleged activities.¹⁶³ Balbo, for his part, was sentenced for falsifying cameral accounts and the litigation concerning this offense, as with Molina, continued for a number of years. This, at least ostensibly, was not a small burden for

¹⁵⁷ Chabod, “Usi e abusi nell’Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il ‘500,” 159. “Vari testi, dunque, eran ciechi e sordi, non sapevano nulla, non avevano veduto nulla, non avevano mai ascoltato chiacchiere e voci, ‘quia non curat nisi que sua sunt’, perché ‘io sono poco curioso di ricercar li fatti de altri’; o si mantenevano sulle generali, con ammissioni caute e per ‘sentito dire’.”

¹⁵⁸ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 21v-27.

¹⁵⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1155, f. 3; see also Chabod, “Usi e abusi nell’Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il ‘500,” 160.

¹⁶⁰ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 29-44v.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 50-60.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*; Chabod, “Usi e abusi nell’Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il ‘500,” 164-172.

¹⁶³ AGS, VIT, libro 288, ff. 144-188.

the implicated official, especially if the appeals continued for a number of years and if the nature of the crime allowed the visitador to confiscate his assets. By early 1562, Rotta, who had been sentenced with a 60,000 scudi fine, claimed to have spent over two thousand ducats in procuring a defense and had begun to petition the Crown so that he might use his confiscated income to pay his expenses.¹⁶⁴ With only marginal success in disciplining the most palpable and notorious financial crimes, a broader investigation of official conduct in Milan would have to await the next visita in Milan in the later reign of Philip II.

The project of reform that Cueva's visita was intended to bring about was also something of a disappointment for the Crown. Its most ambitious effort, the installation of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, was rejected but other reforms were more successful, including the division of the Magistrato into the *Magistrato Ordinario*, which oversaw finances, and the *Magistrato Straordinario*, which oversaw the Crown's patrimony among a variety of other tasks.¹⁶⁵

Cueva's visita to Milan was, in some sense, most closely paralleled by the contemporaneous visita to Sicily. Like the visita to Milan, in which the revisores de cuentas were of particular importance for the correction of financial records in the duchy, the Sicilian visita had two visitadores, Antonio Agustín¹⁶⁶ and Juan Rodríguez Mausino, who, despite holding the same title were expected to carry out separate investigations. Mausino was effectively the visita's revisor while Agustín conducted the investigation of officials. Both of them, however, were particularly entrusted with completing various tasks that were left unfinished from Diego de Córdoba's visita, especially including the implementation of reforms to the tribunals in Sicily to mirror those in Naples, the promulgation of new orders for the Consistorio, the collection of merchants' accounts, and the continued investigation of officials, several of whom had been implicated in the earlier visita.¹⁶⁷ But in this final task, Agustín's visita is of particular value. Due to the complete disappearance of earlier records from Naples and Sicily and the relative failure of the concurrent visita to Milan, the depositions collected by Agustín permit the earliest reconstruction of a visita's investigative network in Italy, paralleling, albeit on a larger scale, the earliest surviving deposition records from the visitas to the chancery in Valladolid from the 1530s and 1550s.

In its documents' current state of organization, which very likely reflects their organization from the early 1560s, the visita seems to have concentrated on a few principal investigations: that of the Marquis of Terranova, the Straticò of Messina and the judges in his court, the Great Court, the *Maestro Justicier*, the *proveedor* or supplier of the castles in Sicily,

¹⁶⁴ AGS, VIT, libro 288, f. 301. February 25, 1562; Chabod, "Usi e abusi nell'Amministrazione dello stato di Milano a mezzo il '500," 162.

¹⁶⁵ Stefano D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," in *A Companion to Late Medieval and Early Modern Milan: The Distinctive Features of an Italian State*, ed. Andrea Gamberini (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 57.

¹⁶⁶ Agustín was a Spanish humanist noted for his historical research regarding canon law. See M. H. Crawford, ed., *Antonio Agustín. Between Renaissance and Counter-Reform* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1993). His participation in the "Republic of Letters" on subjects including numismatics and epigraphy while conducting his visita is the subject of Joan Carbonell Manils, "Tristia Siciliensia: Antonii Augustini epistulae a Trinacria editae et ineditae (1559-1560)," in José María Maestre Maestre, Antonio Prieto, and Joaquín Pascual Barea, eds., *Humanismo y pervivencia del mundo clásico: Homenaje al profesor Antonio Prieto*, vol. IV.3 (Madrid: Alcañiz, 2009), 1361-1376.

¹⁶⁷ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 80; Pietro Lanza, *Considerazioni sulla Storia di Sicilia* (Palermo, 1836), 52.

and a variety of other officials. This final general section, from which ninety-five depositions including a few produced for the defenses of certain officials survive, was originally organized in further sections. Although occasional indications of the subject and a degree of foliation remain, the damage sustained by the legajo since its original organization means that the foliation unfortunately no longer corresponds to the original documents and some of the subjects are either unclear or mixed together. The specific investigations, with the exception of the records relating to the Marquis of Terranova, who was the constable of Sicily and a member of the Collateral Council in Naples, were likewise heavily based on depositions. These depositions that, along with the evidence gathered from archives and accounts, comprised Agustín's investigations were standard for the *visita* but with one apparent major departure from his colleague in Milan. Though the *visita*'s investigation, especially in its earliest stages, relied on a combination of denunciations and answers to set questions asked to individuals who held a position or were closely tied to it, the *visita* to Sicily quickly dispensed with these set questions and the evidentiary record follows very closely to the strands of information produced by early witnesses, even if that dynamic could lend itself to the *visita* becoming involved in personal feuds and claims that were, to a great extent, unverifiable.

That sort of weaving investigation is best illustrated by one of the major incidents that Agustín dealt with in his investigation of the Great Court concerning a breach of secrecy that threatened to undermine a case against one of Sicily's nobles. As Tommaso de Medici, later a judge of the Great Court during the *visita*, had been collecting evidence against the Conde d'Adernon, the count's former friend, Giovanni Gregorio di Letto, Baron of the Capo d'Arso, had supposedly uncovered a scheme to rescue the count from prosecution that he shared with Medici. Both Medici and the baron would then provide this information to the *visitador*. Allegedly, the Conde d'Adernon had been receiving secret information regarding the proceedings against him and from discussions in the *Regio Consiglio*, an advisory council to the viceroy equivalent to the Collateral Council, and, after meeting again with Tommaso de Medici and the Marquis of Licodia who held the post of Maestro Justicier, Letto pointed them in the direction of Scipio di Castro, of later fame for his political thought, who had supposedly uncovered the individuals involved in this breach of secrecy.

The *visitador*, following this information, then took a deposition from Scipio di Castro, who implicated Francesco Collo, then one of the judges of the Great Court, in the breach of secrecy while he had been serving as its prosecutor. Collo had also allegedly passed on information to Gaspar de Moncada and his accomplices in a case being heard by the court. Tellingly, Scipio di Castro suggested that Letto had some fears about this knowledge and that he would not share his knowledge of this incident to any Sicilian or even anyone residing in Sicily, but only to the viceroy and, presumably, the *visitador*. The *visitador*'s next witness was a soldier who served as a guard for the *Regio Consiglio*, who reported hearsay testimony about the discussion he heard between Letto and Scipio di Castro, with Letto mentioning to the latter how Gaspar de Moncada had brazenly told him that the viceroy's actions against him were of no concern because individuals in the council were surreptitiously feeding him information, testimony that was confirmed by a deposition from the Baron of the Capo d'Arso. No additional depositions attested to this breach, despite further investigations into and a deposition from Francesco Collo, who along with Tommaso de Medici and Giovanni

Platamone had been implicated in interfering in an inheritance case.¹⁶⁸ At that point, the investigation seems to have concluded without substantive evidence of wrongdoing.

Even if it was fruitless, the extent of this procedure vastly surpassed what was possible for Cueva and so many of the other early inspectors due to the paucity of information supplied to them. In contrast, the Crown's Sicilian subjects were comparatively quite eager to comply with Agustín's requests, no doubt indicating a greater familiarity with and acceptance of the institution of the *visita* after its recent use in 1545 and a willingness to use it to resolve local disputes. The number of depositions in the section relating to the Great Court alone, for example, is greater than half the total number collected in Milan in the same time frame: twenty-eight.¹⁶⁹ Beyond the individual stories of malfeasance, corruption, and injustice, this set of depositions is, with certain exceptions, exemplary of the manner in which and extent to which the early *visita* could piece together a broader picture of officials' lives and social world.

In so far as the *visita*'s surveillance could observe that social world under the guidance of the witnesses called before it, it was characterized by the predominance of individuals who either held office or were close to the sphere of the litigation handled by the Great Court. Represented as a network corresponding to the perceived public and private networks centered around the Great Court based on the information in the depositions, the visible net included 162 distinct individuals.¹⁷⁰ Because, albeit with certain exceptions, the *visitador*'s questions specifically invited witnesses to make declarations about specific interactions with officials, usually in which some malfeasance may have occurred, these 162 individuals are linked by 412 sets of edges representing either a single interaction or a set of interactions (figure 2).¹⁷¹ Not surprisingly, the resulting graph suggests that individuals were generally not particularly distant from other individuals even if there were no demonstrable connections between them, effectively a "small-world network" with a limited degree of information sharing between witnesses or individuals known by witnesses. Indeed, despite the acceptance of hearsay testimony in the depositions, the knowledge that witnesses had was generally quite focused on the actions closest to them suggesting that acts of malfeasance were not usually notorious or not especially important to witnesses who were not directly involved. Instead, the interactions that were clearly described in the depositions were usually either very close to the individual who was testifying, within the network's clusters, or very close to the core members of the network, which not surprisingly mostly consists of the members of the Great Court. That core consisted of several current and former judges, including Tommaso de Medici, Giovanni Platamone, Francesco Collo, Benedetto de Porcaris, Raymundo and Giovanni Battista Seminara, and Jacopo Garofalo, many of whom had previously or at the time of the

¹⁶⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-7, ff. 67-72. Depositions from Tommaso de Medici ("Thomas de Medicis"), Scipio di Castro ("Scipion de Castro"), Cesaro Gloricio, and Giovanni Gregorio di Letto ("Juan Gregorio de Letto").

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 67-138.

¹⁷⁰ In addition to representing named individuals, a smaller number of nodes also represent certain distinct groups of individuals (e.g. a testifying witness could not recall the names of two witnesses involved in an earlier case but who for all intents and purposes acted identically) or indistinctly stated individuals (e.g. the viceroy if the time frame described was unclear, a woman's son or brother, or the "third judge" who was hearing a case).

¹⁷¹ The nature of the depositions made further distinctions as to the nature of interactions inadvisable, often because it was simply not stated whether, for example, individuals had kinship or factional ties or if individuals worked together closely or more distantly as one might hope from well-cultivated data. As a fitting rule of thumb, it seems to be the case that those individuals with more ties tend to be more closely linked to the core whereas those with fewer ties had a weaker relationship to the group or individuals within it.

investigation held other posts in the Great Court. More broadly, the core also included the Marquis of Licodia, the Maestro Justicier, and two members of the extremely well connected Valdina family, who held a post in the Great Court.

The Valdina family had a unique role in that network. While the investigation of the Great Court and other institutions tended to rely on key individuals who were eager to contribute information and who were perhaps artificially prominent as a result, some individuals were clearly of particular centrality both within certain investigations and as net spanners, a description that applied well to Andrea Valdina, the Baron della Rocca, and his son Francesco Valdina, who at the time of the visita held the position of *Maestro Notario* of the Great Court.¹⁷² While the affairs of Sicilian institutions often appear to have a degree of separation from the attention of the Crown or the court, as evidenced by the marginal place of Philip II with respect to the Great Court, the Valdina family were witnesses in a number of cases brought to the visitador's attention for a variety of offices and had more cosmopolitan connections than other local elites, an example of the importance such families had to the process of integrating Sicilian elites within the empire.¹⁷³

Other than Francesco and Andrea Valdina, however, the prominence of an obvious, not necessarily cosmopolitan, core in the Great Court network suggested that the visita was most attentive to the immediate sphere around the major administrative institutions in the middle of the sixteenth century. It also indicates two distinctive features illustrative of the relationship between the Great Court and Sicilian society more generally. First, in a feature that remained stable into the seventeenth century, the key officials of the Great Court were, relative to the members of the Collateral Council, generally likely to maintain connections of note amongst themselves rather than into periphery of the Great Court's network, a periphery that was not all that far removed from the institution itself and one that had its own organization. Second, in a feature that was far less stable, these officials were rather closely tied, suggesting the existence of a relatively cohesive bureaucratic elite even if there were some obvious contentions within it.¹⁷⁴

Still, although Agustín's investigations were relatively deep for an early visita and almost certainly were among the broadest to that date either in Italy or in Spain, they were hardly comprehensive, often clustering around a few incidents of malfeasance even within the structures the visitador had imposed on the investigation. Indeed, the tendency for the visita to focus its attentions on such incidents indicated that the visita, far from being intended to simultaneously punish bad officials and reward good officials, was by the 1550s principally used (if not necessarily intended) to pursue the former as an instrument of the Crown's practice of justice.

While not every investigation produced as many witnesses as those connected to cases of intrigue and rivalry in the highest offices, the process of collecting information through modules or clusters of information was a common feature.

¹⁷² AGS, VIT, leg. 152-7, 152-8, 152-9.

¹⁷³ Francesco Benigno, "Integration and Conflict in Spanish Sicily," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 31-5.

¹⁷⁴ See also chapter II for a comparison with the Great Court circa 1606 and chapter IV for the apparent absence of the Great Court from the investigation into the Sicilian tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in the early seventeenth century.




Figure 2. Visualization of a selection of the Great Court's Network circa 1559.¹⁷⁵

When continuing earlier efforts to monitor military spending and fortifications, Agustín's attentions turned to the possible prosecution of officials of the castles in the Kingdom of Sicily, and especially in Palermo. In this, the visitador focused particularly heavily on Berenguer de Requesens, after a series of witnesses provided increasingly greater detail about the manner in which he provided positions for his servants and for his friends' servants that did not actually fulfill the duties of those positions. Requesens's wife, Melchiora, ostensibly played an active intermediary role in Berenguer's corruption primarily by managing the means of selling provisions to soldiers in the castle. Several soldiers accused her of secretly selling some of these provisions, particularly wine, outside the castle despite the fact they were intended for soldiers and avoided paying the taxes on them thus defrauding the King's hacienda. One soldier also bemoaned the poor quality of meat provided by a Muslim – by the name of "Arfau" – who had been contracted to provide meat to the soldiers by Requesens's wife, but he supposedly only sold the lowest quality meat and slaughtered an excessive number of cows, the meat of which

¹⁷⁵ Based on AGS, VIT, leg. 152-7. Green nodes represent individuals who provided depositions, yellow nodes represent individuals who were members of the Great Court who provided depositions, red nodes represent other members of the Great Court, and black nodes represent all other or unknown individuals. Nodes are sized by degree (i.e. number of connected edges, which represent known sets of interactions based on depositions).

he sold to the city, again defrauding the king.¹⁷⁶ Requesens's network of corruption and nepotism had, because of its breadth, revealed itself in bits and pieces to soldiers who otherwise were not aware of the full extent of either his or his beneficiaries' actions.

The urban context, traditionally the stronghold of the *visita*'s work, in which witnesses were exposed to glimpses of officials' lives was not the sole extent of the *visitador*'s attentions and, in an expansion of the *visita*, Agustín also dealt with complaints from outside Sicily's principal administrative cities regarding the effects of misadministration there. That towns should have had complaints against its officials was hardly new and official misconduct had indeed traditionally been subject to local prosecution through the *sindicato* established by Frederick II. In contrast, the *visita*, albeit in a limited way at such an early date, supplemented and began to supplant these existing local prosecutions by channeling complaints from those who would not otherwise have ties to powerful officials directly to the imperial government. To be sure, unlike those more prominent cases, Agustín collected only a few depositions and these seldom seem to have resulted in subsequent investigations.

This was partly a function of the *visitador*'s own focus, but it also represented the limits on his ability to collect information and on the ability and willingness of individuals to furnish evidence against officials. In one exemplary instance, the *visitador* took a lengthy deposition and complaint from a representative from Trapani, who had been selected for this purpose by the city's council. Due to the city's strategic importance at the Western tip of the island, Giovanni Sollima had proposed work on the city's fortifications under the supervision of the city's captain of arms, a project for which the city was obliged to provide 250,000 ducats over four years.¹⁷⁷ The new taxes naturally proved unpopular and the principal collector of them was then alleged to have become quite wealthy during that period of time. The presence of soldiers in the city was also deeply unpopular and the representative noted numerous complaints about their conduct that went unpunished, the misuse of excise taxes by the captain of arms to pay his soldiers, and the excessive jailing of and violence against citizens of the city. Rumors also appeared regarding the captain of arm's personal life, suggesting that he had produced children with a married woman.¹⁷⁸ Whether or not Agustín would have pursued further action against Sollima and Trapani's captain of arms with additional time is a matter of speculation, but it did represent an expanding domain for the *visita* as pushed for by the localities. While local complaints would not destroy Sollima, he was, however, apparently a target for having been absent from his office in the early and mid-1550s, and a number of witnesses produced by Sollima testified about his illness and treatment during that period.

The abrupt conclusion of Agustín and Mausino's *visita* in 1560 cut short these developing ties to local complaints and left its work to be completed in accordance with the Crown's plans to punish particular officials, especially those whose deficiencies were financial in nature. Agustín, for his part, was eager to have brought his work in Sicily to any kind of conclusion, seeing it as an unhappy exile from Rome that he paralleled with Cicero's exile to Thessalonica, and desperately made plans for his "rehabilitation" and appointment in the

¹⁷⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-9, ff. 152-169. Section entitled "Contra el Castellano de Palermo y otros del Reino." There are six depositions regarding Requesens' conduct.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., ff. 253-257v. Deposition entitled "Antonio de Vicencio, elegido por el consejo dela dicha ciudad [de Trapani] para dar relación."

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., ff. 253-257v.

Church, which would come in 1561.¹⁷⁹ Thus, despite its seemingly promising initial investigative work, Philip was notably unsatisfied with the visita's work and, in his view, the cases against officials had been left in a poor state. As a result, Philip would commission a third visita to Sicily in 1562, which the Crown determined would finally bring to completion the disciplinary work of Diego de Córdoba and his successors from the 1559 visita:

We gave the business of that to the reverend bishop Antonio Agustín, who then was of Alife and now of Lerida and to Don Juan Mausino, a gentleman of our house, who in virtue of their commission and instructions conducted the said inquisition and visita without proceeding to any execution of it in conformity with what had been ordered, the said don Juan returned with it, and having seen and examined it, with the consideration that is correct, various things have resulted from it, and in order to remedy these things it is necessary and correct for the aforementioned things and for this and for the one before conducted by Don Diego de Córdoba which remained imperfect... clarify these things and figure them out and put them in their rightful execution so that the good will be known and approved and the not so good punished according to their demerits... [and] it has seemed to us for the execution of that and to give order and redress in the institution of the tribunals that [these tribunals] should be reformed and made so that justice is better governed...¹⁸⁰

The continuation and hoped for completion of the 1559 visita to Sicily was entrusted to Marcello Pignone, the Marquis of Oriolo, whose instructions have a directness and specificity that was uncommon for visitas to Italy before the middle of the seventeenth century, specifically instructing the visitador to complete investigations and take summary action against various specified individuals for particular allegations. While Philip may have been disappointed in the visitas to Sicily in 1545 and 1559, both clearly produced at least some utility even if the investigations' depositions were not to the legal standard expected of them. First, the earlier visitas produced the grounds for continued investigations and established the expected punishments for certain behaviors. Giovanni Sollima, for example, who was by then a

¹⁷⁹ Carbonell Manils, "Tristia Siciliensia: Antonii Augustini epistulae a Trinacria editae et ineditae (1559-1560)," 1363. Perhaps the more apt parallel, had Agustín not found his task so depressing, would have been Cicero's quaestorship in Sicily, which later led to his prosecution of Gaius Verres, the governor of Sicily, for corruption and abuses on behalf of a deputation representing the island.

¹⁸⁰ AGS, SSP, libro 1154, f. 1. "La comisión que se dio al Marqués de Oriolo para ejecución de la visita". May 23, 1562. "dimos el assumpto dello al Reverendo obispo Antonio Agustín que entonces era de Alife y agora de Lérida, y a don Juan Mausino gentil hombre de n^{ra} casa, los quales en virtud de sus comisiones y Instrucciones hizieron la d^{ha} inquisición y visita, sin proçeder a execuçión alguna conforme a lo que les estava ordenado, y bolvió con ella el dicho don Juan, la cual haviéndose visto y examinado, con la consideraçión que conviene han resultado dellas diversas cosas, y por que para remedio dellas es necessario y conveniente por las causas arriba dichas y para que de esta y de la que antes hizo don diego de córdova, que quedo imperfecta, se saque el fruto, que se pretende, que aquellas se aclaren y averiguen y pongan en devida execuçión, para que los buenos sean conosciidos, y aprovados y los no tales conforme a sus deméritos, castigados y, las cosas y derechos a n^{ra} corte pertençientes cobradas y restauradas, nos ha paresçido para execuçión dello, y para dar orden y redreço en la instrucción de los tribunales, que en el d^{ho} Reyno se han de reformar, y hazer para que aquel sea mejor governado, la Justicia y cosas de n^{ra} hacienda y patrimonio bien regidas y administradas, y por esta via reduzir remediar y ordenar lo que al servicio de dios y nr^o, bien y conservaçión y aumento del dicho Reino."

maestro razionale or chief accountant, was noted for having been connected with several cases of misconduct since Diego de Córdoba's visita, especially in connection with fraud (his improper handling of money under false names, which was presumably and apparently unsuccessfully to avoid any implication about maintaining ties with merchants) among other alleged instances of malfeasance.¹⁸¹

Mateo Valdina, member of the powerful Valdina family and then Maestro Notario of the Great Court, Agostino Gisulfo, judge of the *maestri razionali* were also specifically noted as targets of the visita, the former for having carried out actions that were not within the rights of his office. Other targets were to be dealt with by means other than the visita. One accountant, for example, who was found to be "insufficient" in capacity by the earlier visita was to be deposed and replaced in consultation with the viceroy. Other officials were to be dealt with through the "ordinary" means of justice rather than by summary judgment. This included Phelipe la Rocca for "omissions, negligences, and other charges," although he was also to be given a public censure through the visita in order to serve as an example to others. Aloisio de Bologna, Antonio Statella, Ottavio Spinola, and Vincenzo Bonaiuto, who no longer held the offices for which they were being prosecuted, were to be charged again in the "ordinary" manner. Other individuals connected to the earlier investigation of the Great Court were also subject to ordinary justice and public censure, especially the prosecutors and attorneys. Francesco de Donato, holder of the writings in the office of the notary of the Great Court was to be suspended from office.¹⁸² Second, albeit of less importance, the chain of questioning, testimony, and review established the means for rewarding competent officials, especially in situations where a subsequent visita was intended to complete the work of an earlier inspection. In addition to providing for the completion of the earlier visita's discipline, d'Oriolo's instructions also contain one of the most complete list of officials who were deemed "good" as a result of a prior visita and suggests public recognition of an unclear type for five officials.

Although his mission was supposedly limited to the completion of earlier work – and Philip II would remind him of this fact – it did not prevent d'Oriolo's short visita, which lasted only until 1564, from sparking a certain degree of controversy, particularly due to the visitador's interest in pursuing an investigation into the connections between Sicilian officials and Genoese merchants that Agustín had already begun to hear rumors about, especially in connection to contraband networks.¹⁸³ From 1563, the Marquis began auditing Genoese merchants as part of his investigation into possible financial links between officials and the Genoese community and the inspector's rigorous discipline in the matter fell particularly hard on the Genoese community. After apparently jailing and torturing uncooperative merchants, the Genoese community called on the viceroy to maintain their extraterritorial privilege and exemption from the visita's investigations. The Marquis's suspension of a Genoese harbormaster, Ottavio Spinola, was similarly appealed to Philip II with Spinola claiming that in the absence of a skilled official in the position, commerce and notably the grain trade with Genoa would collapse.¹⁸⁴ Pressure from the Genoese and the fear of damaging the Crown's vital links with Genoa may have, at least in Céline Dauverd's treatment of the subject, prompted the

¹⁸¹ AGS, SSP, libro 1154, ff. 7-8v.

¹⁸² Ibid., ff. 5-20.

¹⁸³ AGS, VIT, leg. 152-9.

¹⁸⁴ Dauverd, "Genoese and Catalans: Trade Diaspora in Early Modern Sicily," 55.

Crown to hasten an end to d'Oriolo's mission as future *visitadores* were counseled to ensure a positive relationship with the foreign merchant community.¹⁸⁵

While the increasingly expansive aims of reforming and disciplining the territories of Milan and Sicily through the *visita* had encountered difficulties, either due to local resistance to the new practice or because of the lack of continuity, the same problems were not shared by the fourth inspection in Naples during the Hapsburg period: Gaspar de Quiroga's expansive and successful *visita*. That view was certainly shared by Philip II, under whom Quiroga had a meteoric rise after his *visita*. Immediately following the completion of his *visita*, Quiroga was named to the Council of Castile and the Council of the Inquisition and a few years later, conducted a *visita* of the Council of the *Cruzada*. In 1567, he joined the Council of Italy, initially serving as its president through 1568. In the early 1570s, Quiroga was named Bishop of Cuenca and, later, as Inquisitor General. By the middle of the decade, Quiroga had been appointed Chancellor of Castile and joined the Council of State. In the final years of the 1570s, he became archbishop of Toledo and subsequently a cardinal. Finally, from 1586 to 1594, Quiroga again served as President of the Council of Italy.¹⁸⁶ Quiroga's documentary record, far greater than that created by Cueva and both more expansive and better preserved than those from Agustín and Mausino, represented the new standard of record-creation and record-keeping for the Italian *visitas*, and this model was followed by the subsequent two series of *visitas* to Naples, Sicily, and Milan in the 1580s and 1600s. In addition to the limited correspondence preserved in the *Secretarías Provinciales* collection, Quiroga's records account for twenty-six legajos in the *Visitas de Italia* and another partial legajo in the same collection.

At least one summary legajo preserves the traditional reform component of the *visita* as, like his counterpart in Milan and his predecessors in Naples, Quiroga's *visita* was intended to propose reforms to the practice and style of governance and, accordingly, he produced a lengthy list of suggested reforms to administrative practices, including to the *Sommaria*, for which he had several dozen recommendations many of which were intended to complete two seemingly mutually exclusive aims: to limit its expenses and streamline its proceedings by, for example, cutting the number of scribes to nineteen or twenty, to work during both the morning and afternoon beginning ten days before Christmas and Easter to expedite hearings that would be delayed during the holidays, and to ensure that the archivist was present in the archive during the morning and afternoon so that officials could regularly access the archive, and limit venality for the position of accountant. Other recommendations included a suggestion for maintaining information security since the loss of accounts by individuals who had taken records home was notorious. Quiroga's recommendations for the Collateral Council followed this style, including a recommendation that sought to detach the practice of the appeals court of the *Sacro Regio Consiglio* (also known as the *Capuana* and *Santa Chiara*) and *Sommaria* from the Collateral Council since referring matters to it caused extensive delays and effectively ensured that all cases would be heard by the Collateral Council as well.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Dauverd, "Genoese and Catalans: Trade Diaspora in Early Modern Sicily," 59.

¹⁸⁶ Coniglio, *Visitatori del Viceregno di Napoli*, 18-20; Eubel and von Gulik, *Hierarchi Catholica Medii Aevi*, vol III, pp. 51, 190; Eubel and von Gulik, *Hierarchi Catholica Medii Aevi*, vol. IV, pp. 158, 269, 301; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 92.

¹⁸⁷ AGS, VIT, leg. 349.

Information security was also vital and the lack of a permanent office allowed individuals, particularly the viceroy's servants, to overhear the proceedings of the council and it was "the custom" to lose procesos after (or at least allegedly after) lower officials handed over the documents to regents and Quiroga recommended that this should only be done with the verification of a signature. In practical matters, Quiroga recommended more clear annotation of false witnesses.¹⁸⁸ But these recommendations were not simply the result of the visitador's observations of daily practice in Naples; they were the result of the information that was produced from complaints and, above all else, disciplinary proceedings.

These records of procesos against and defenses of various officials comprise the vast majority of the visita's paperwork. As in Sicily and Milan, Quiroga's investigations and the subsequent proceedings are organized according to office as the summary, charges, defenses, for members of the Collateral Council are contained in a section and the same is true for the Sommaria, the Sacro Regio Consiglio, the Vicaria, the Chancery, the Treasury, the mint, and various notary and customs offices.¹⁸⁹ The initial work that made these procesos possible were the investigations' depositions, which were collected in summary form in two lengthy volumes and, in contrast to the contemporary visitas, these depositions demonstrate a balance between responses that follow the interrogatories associated with each office and more specific questions. For example, thirty-one of the first forty-three testimonies in the "Processus diversorum officialium," an initial section mostly devoted to the investigation of the members of the Collateral Council and Chancery, are largely direct responses to the interrogatory corresponding to these officials.¹⁹⁰

The true fruit of Quiroga's disciplinary efforts was manifested in the staggering number of officials who were charged, certainly dwarfing the contemporary visitas in Italy and contemporary visitas in Spain and, in so far as it is possible to speculate, quite likely considerably more than the 1536 visita to Naples or the 1545 visita to Sicily. In total, 341 officials and a few groups of officials (notably the *razionali* of the Regia Zecca, the mint, who were charged as a group while each individual had an additional one to two charges) had 2706 charges made against them, representing an average of just under eight charges per individual (table 1).¹⁹¹ In a way that is largely impossible with earlier visitas, the grouping of officials illustrates the attentions of the visita, albeit with the caveat that the officials were usually listed under the heading of their most recent or relevant office rather than the position to which the charges actually pertained.

Absent accurate knowledge of each official's political inclinations, the distribution of charges raises some questions about historians' belief that the visitadores principally tended to pick up on or be influenced by political rivalries. For the most part, the average official subject to Quiroga's visita was not charged with an especially high number of charges and this feature is generally consistent both across and within the groups of officials, with a low amount of variance in the number of charges being the norm and when grouped in the manner used by Quiroga, by office, the number of charges increases close to linearly with the increase in

¹⁸⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 349.

¹⁸⁹ See AGS, VIT, legs. 4 to 16, 18 and 19.

¹⁹⁰ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1, ff. 1-104.

¹⁹¹ AGS, VIT, leg. 2.

number of officials.¹⁹² Outside the possibility that certain kin or political groups were equally represented across each of the major offices in Naples, this suggests that the visita was quite probably even-handed when charging individuals. There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule. The largest group of officials charged, for example, came from the Vicaria, with sixty of them being charged (about two-thirds of the eighty-eight non-soldier or jailer positions in the Vicaria), or 17.6% of the total. This group was overrepresented in the number of charges against it, with 668 charges, nearly a quarter of the total and an average of 11 per official, though eight of its officials were in the top 10% charged. The two next largest groups, with forty-two officials each, represented 12.3% of the total number of officials each. These were very slightly underrepresented in the number of charges against its officials, with 11.0% of the total number of charges for the Sommaria and 10.2% for members of the sheep customhouse. By contrast, the Chancery, which only accounted for 6.16% of the total number of officials charged made up 10.1% of the number of charges.

However, while this variance between groups initially seems quite large, it does not necessarily represent an unusual attention. Measuring Cohen's d as the difference between two means divided by the pooled standard deviation is a common measure of effect size and the statistician Jacob Cohen offered general guidelines for its interpretation, suggesting a large effect when $d = 0.8$ (47.4% of the group does not overlap with the control), a medium effect when $d = 0.5$ (33.0% of the group does not overlap), and a small effect when $d = 0.2$ (14.7% of the group does not overlap).¹⁹³ Using these guidelines, although the members of the Vicaria charged by Quiroga had a higher than expected number of charges with 40.3% more than the amount expected from a linear relationship,¹⁹⁴ Cohen's d , when compared to that group of officials whose charges are closest to the general population, the members of the sheep customhouse, indicates a small effect size of 0.262. The group with the largest increase (64.0%) over the expected number, the Chancery, has a Cohen's d of 0.368, still within the bounds of a small effect. In contrast to the Vicaria, the reason for the Chancery's low effect size is largely due to Quiroga's labeling, since the regents of the Chancery were, in conjunction with that position, regents of the Collateral Council¹⁹⁵ and three of those, Geronimo Albertino, Francisco Reverter (also Revertera), and Francesco Villano, were in the top 10% with regard to the number of charges against them.

The other members of the Collateral Council who were charged as a result of the visita, which Quiroga did not group together with these four regents, were also among the top 10%, namely Juan de Soto, Secretary of the Kingdom of Naples, and Alfonso (or Alonso) Sánchez, the former treasurer. This retrospective grouping of members of the Collateral Council very obviously had more than the expected number of charges and a Cohen's d of 2.05.

¹⁹² With an R^2 of 0.753.

¹⁹³ Jacob Cohen, *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1988).

¹⁹⁴ Which would be $y = 11.566x - 123.8$.

¹⁹⁵ There were generally three *reggenti di cancelleria* at a time who then made up the *Collaterale di Giustizia*, one section of the Collateral Council, and part of the *Collaterale di Spada*, which included other appointed members. Giovanni Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 282.

Table 1. Charges by labeled office from Quiroga's visita to Naples in 1559.

Office	Individuals Charged	Total Charges	Average Charges	Standard Deviation
Admiralty Court	11	23*	2.1	1.4
Bagliva	19	131	6.9	7.8
Chancery †	22	273	13	20.4
Scrivania	29	79	2.7	3.1
Sacro Regio Consiglio	32	297	9.3	9.8
Regia Zecca	34‡	133	3.9	8.2
Customs (Sheep)	42	275	6.5	14.4
Sommaria	42	297	7.1	6.8
Vicaria	60	668	11.1	20.2
Other Offices †	51	530	10.4	14.4
† REGENTS OF THE COLLATERAL COUNCIL, TREASURER, AND SECRETARY OF THE KINGDOM	6	303	50.5	26.8
TOTAL	341	2706	7.9	13.6

*Includes one charge that is a commendation of the individual in question.

†Four individuals whose primary title in AGS, VIT, leg. 2 was "regent of the Chancery," as well as the former treasurer of Naples and the secretary of Naples who were listed distinctly were members of the Collateral Council. Those four regents and, to a lesser extent, the treasurer were the principal subject of the first 150 folios of the "Processus."

‡ The *razionali* of the Zecca, all of whom had one or two charges, were charged individually as well as in a group which had forty-six charges. Because later visitas' records would at times list groups of officials (e.g. the holders of an office for a certain year) in addition to individuals who might have been in a group, this is best counted as a separate entry.

Quiroga's investigation of the Collateral Council, then, is vital to understanding the dynamics and purpose of the visita.

Following standard practice, the interrogatory for the Collateral Council initially consisted of thirty-four questions although three questions were subsequently added to obtain more specific information based on the implications that Quiroga had heard from some of his early witnesses. With its broad approach contrasting with Agustín's more focused investigations, a number of witnesses in Quiroga's visita had little of value to offer except rumors and speculation regarding the wealth and recent acquisitions of some of the regents of the Collateral Council. Those serving on the Collateral Council were also notably unwilling to offer an abundance of information, with one member oddly referring to its proceedings as

though he himself were not a participant in them and thus did not have direct knowledge.¹⁹⁶ Although most witnesses were comparatively more willing to implicate certain members of the Collateral Council, they were seldom unambiguously negative about them and usually offered at least some testimony about the quality of their audiences or their general aptitude that mitigated other allegations. The sample investigative network, necessitated by the profusion of depositions that Quiroga was able to collect, offers some additional differences at a holistic level.

Although the size of the networks surrounding the Collateral Council and the Great Court were similar, 191 and 162 individuals respectively, the structures of interaction linked to the Great Council were substantially different. Individuals had far fewer interactions on the whole, just 289 compared to 412, as Quiroga's witnesses and other people linked to the council predominantly interacted with the members of the council rather than with third parties. In part, that was likely because the activities that were most commonly observed did not readily lend themselves to shared pools of knowledge, but it also suggested that the interactions of note between the Collateral Council and its surrounding society occurred on an individual level rather than around alternate social groups, for example, large parties involved in litigation or factions even if those existed. This was true even though Albertino and Pignone were regents drawn from the urban nobility and who no doubt depended on familial or factional ties for political strength.¹⁹⁷ Even in the limited sphere close, at least relative to future investigations, to the administrative core, corrupt relationships existed on a level distinct from political relationships.

The centrality of malfeasance at the dyadic level was particularly true of the numerous answers suggesting that the regents were given to ill-advised asperity and to receiving gifts and donatives from particular clients or associates. For the most part, such testimony seems to have resulted from individuals' claims to have seen these two practices while they were being received in audiences with the regents and though the complaints were widespread, certain individuals – notably Albertino, Villano, Reverter, and the former treasurer – were more heavily implicated than others. Lorenzo Polo, whom witnesses claimed had refused presents, for example was held up as exemplary.

Beyond these primary observations, however, was the level of organization of the practice of corruption and reselling among members of the Collateral Council. This again was usually described on an individual basis, with one notable exception of a witness who suggested that Albertino, Villano, Reverter, and the former treasurer Sánchez were in fact actively colluding along with a certain baker and other merchants to resell gifts that the regents had effectively demanded from litigants whose cases were being heard in the Neapolitan courts.¹⁹⁸ A few witnesses also suggested associations between members of the Collateral Council and the Vicaria, complaints that figured more prominently in the investigation of members of the latter body.¹⁹⁹ But only a few witnesses in the initial collection of depositions based on the interrogatory were truly able to provide a more substantive means for the visitador to check on such complaints. For example, the testimony of Alonso de Quiroga, which deals with

¹⁹⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1, ff. 5-6, 36v-40.

¹⁹⁷ Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy," 283.

¹⁹⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1, ff. 58v-60, 70-4, 95-105.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 70-74, 102-5.




Figure 3. Visualization of a selection of the Collateral Council's Network circa 1559.²⁰⁰

particularly great breadth and specificity about the different regents of the Collateral Council and their practice of receiving gifts and especially livestock and poultry and even suggested that the visitador, should he desire more information, ask a certain “Alfonso Pollero” for more exact details about the manner in which the regents re-sold their gifts since Pollero’s “art” rather fittingly “[was] that of selling chickens.”²⁰¹ There is, however, reason to suspect that the claims of collusion between these central figures was not inaccurate, as the members of the Collateral Council and the Regents of the Chancery in particular were very closely tied to each other – even exceeding the cohesiveness of the ties from the same network in the early 1580s – pointing to the absence of certain broader social structures at its nexus with the peak of the Neapolitan administration described in the next chapter but also the limits of the investigation, which as in Sicily did not stray far from the center of official life.

What was most apparent, however, was that the process of disciplining officials’ misconduct seems to have very closely followed the direction of complaints that the visitador collected in his depositions. Indeed, unlike the other *visitas* that began in 1559, Quiroga’s records provide a unique means for reconstructing his investigations that suggests how the

²⁰⁰ Based on AGS, VIT, leg. 3. Blue nodes represent individuals who provided depositions, yellow nodes represent viceroys and other officials of interest, red nodes represent other members of the Council, and black nodes represent all other or unknown individuals. Nodes are sized by degree.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 70-74. “sabr  de sto alfonso pollero [...] porque es esta su arte de vender gallinas” on f. 71v.

visitador interpreted the depositions he obtained. The margins of the depositions collected by Quiroga, in contrast to those obtained by Agustín and Cueva, indicate the subject matter of the content, a style sometimes employed in other *visitas*' records to index the depositions with the charges against officials. However, the margins of the depositions collected by Quiroga are not necessarily used exclusively for this purpose and, in addition to highlighting individuals who were charged, also suggest links to subsequent witnesses. Quiroga's marginal notes are, in effect, the visitador's interpretation of the evidence provided and starkly depict the negative attention that the regents of the Collateral Council who were subsequently charged received.

Since these marginal notes lend themselves to quantification and illustrate a flow of information, and were in fact used for that purpose by similar records, this summary investigative network differs in three respects. First, more minor individuals who were part of the actual network effectively vanish. Second, it is possible to show the direction of information, pointing either to a later witness or to the subject of investigation. Third, because the notes were in some sense intended to be summed together as evidence supporting a charge, it points to the cumulative effect of information. Thus, on the one hand, certain witnesses, notably Pedro León (a Spanish doctor in law) followed by Francisco Pérez Luna (a Spanish *licenciado*), Antonio Funda (a Neapolitan attorney), Antonio Baratucio (a Neapolitan doctor in law), and Vincenzo Dana (a Neapolitan doctor in law) were the most important suppliers as measured by weighted out-degree, illustrating just how close to the sphere of administration the *visita* remained in the 1550s and 1560s as well as the relative prominence of Spaniards.

By the same token, the weighted in-degree intimates the extent to which the visitador believed officials were in fact implicated and Albertino's weighted in-degree of 78 is followed by Villano's at 64, Reverter at 31, the regents as a group at 23, Sánchez at 9, Pignone at 8, and the Marquis of Trevico at 4 with other individuals following. Quiroga's charges seem to have followed this distribution at a certain approximation. Albertino, for example, had 78 charges against him, Reverter had 60 charges, Villano had 38, and Pignone 8.²⁰²

Accordingly, given the abundance of allegations regarding gifts and personal style and the related prominence of these allegations in the visitador's annotations, such complaints were central to Quiroga's *visita*. In addition to figuring heavily in the charges against the regents, they were featured in the visitador's summary of issues requiring future attention, attention that would be given in the subsequent *visita* to Naples. Of the regents most heavily implicated by the allegations in the depositions, Albertino was clearly the most widely reviled and received criticism for his hard hand in audiences and Alonso de Quiroga reported that the word on the street was that he haughtily considered himself to be "king of this land."²⁰³ The visitador's summary of his investigation therefore highlights Albertino's style, describing how he gave insufficient time for holding audiences and all the while behaving in an "impatient" manner, "giving them [i.e. those attending] rebuffs and saying coarse words" so that he could instead attend to his own business.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Sánchez had 139 charges against him, most of which were presumably unrelated to this investigation.

²⁰³ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1, ff. 70-74.

²⁰⁴ AGS, VIT, leg. 4-1, f. 1. "Por el tiempo q fue Regente, muchas vezes dexó de dar audiencia à [sic] los negociantes en los tiempos y horas q la devidas, e quando dio la dicha audiencias se huvo muchas vezes dessabrida e Impatientemente con los dichos negociantes dándoles Rebuffos y diziéndoles ásperas palabras."

1. Geronimo Albertino, Regent of the Collateral Council
2. Francesco Villano, Regent of the C.C.
3. Francisco Reverter, Regent of the C.C.
4. Marcello Pignone, Regent of the C.C.
5. Alonso Sánchez, Treasurer
6. "Regents"
7. Pedro León
8. Francisco Pérez Luna
9. Antonio Funda
10. Antonio Baratucio
11. Vincenzo Dana
12. Alonso de Quiroga




Figure 4. Visualization of Quiroga's evidentiary network for the Collateral Council.²⁰⁵

Albertino's alleged corruption was similarly highlighted and the visitador, based on witnesses' testimonies, supposed that the regent received gifts estimated to be worth about 200 ducats a year in the form of poultry, pigs, cheeses, sweets, and some silver. Accusations about the work down on his property were also common and it was supposed that he had not in fact paid for the improvements done to it.

Villano's failings were remarkably similar to Albertino's but his gifts seem to suggest that in addition to Albertino's connection to interests in the agricultural hinterland, Villano presumably had ties to merchants, as he was accused of receiving olive oil, almonds, pepper, cinnamon, saffron, and gold. While Albertino and Villano were the most heavily implicated of the regents, even the Crown's preferred elites, which included Albertino but also Reverter, Patino (a chancery regent), and Pignone (who by the end of Quiroga's visita was carrying out his visita in Sicily), were hardly exempt from serious allegations or the possibility of punishment.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Based on AGS, VIT, leg. 3. Unlike prior graphs, the edges of this network are weighted and directional to show the number and direction of references from depositions pointing to individuals or groups. The nodes are sized and colored by in-degree.

²⁰⁶ Aurelio Musi, "The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 93; Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy," 283. Patino was ultimately found guilty on

Reverter in particular seems to have perfected the art of receiving gifts from his associates and in addition to the usual foodstuffs and spices, received fine silks and at least four horses – three of which had obviously implicating names – one from his fellow regent, Marcello Pignone, in exchange for an office, one from the Prince of Bisignano named “El Bisignano,” one from a litigant, the Marquis of Torremayor, called “Torremayor,” and one from the Queen of Poland, who had been visiting Naples, called “The Pole.”²⁰⁷ As with the other regents, Reverter’s mistreatment of various individuals was another common refrain and one doctor related a story that he heard from a certain friar who had been saying mass when a tardy Reverter entered the church and demanded that this friar restart the mass for his benefit. When he went to complain at the audiences of the regents, the servants of the regents turned him away, after which the distraught friar supposedly burst into tears and tore his shirt, an action that attracted the attention of the witness.²⁰⁸

While the visitador was inundated by complaints about corruption relating to gift giving, not all practices were so readily subject to negative attention. For all their complaints, very few witnesses questioned the qualifications of the regents and one regent who testified and who was not subject to further investigation even suggested that several of the other regents were more learned than he himself was.²⁰⁹ Another witness dismissed complaints about style on the grounds that people were always quick to complain about everything.²¹⁰ The visitador also showed restraint in dealing with certain allegations. Above all else, Quiroga seems to have fastidiously avoided complaints that suggested that the regents of the Collateral Council may have been subjected to undue influence from the viceroy’s – even the *former* viceroys’ – interference. This lack of intervention even included one case in which the regents illicitly supplied damaging information to the viceroy so that he would block some individual’s appointment to an office.²¹¹ Other witnesses suggested that Pedro de Toledo’s term as viceroy was characterized by a rather weak will in the Collateral Council and that the regents were likely to assist or vote in favor of individuals whom it was presumed were favored by the viceroy, a complaint that again went without notable attention.²¹²

The regularization of official conduct through the visita thus represented two factors. First, the public perception and repudiation of various practices in conjunction with observers’ willingness, even if for personal or political reasons, to report them corresponded to the kinds of practices that could be punished. Second, the desire of the visitador to pursue complaints corresponded directly to the kinds of practices that would be further investigated. The imbalance of charges related to the Collateral Council emphasizes these factors. The regents’ conduct in the audiences they held and their practice of receiving gifts were so easily observed and punished because they were not occluded dealings but rather visible. That was especially true for a position with the prestige, power, and visibility of membership in the Collateral Council that correspondingly invited public scrutiny. In turn, the increasing familiarity with the

31 counts and indications in the findings of the cases directly state that had Albertino not died he would have been found guilty of a number of charges. AGS, VIT, leg. 347.

²⁰⁷ The various summaries are in AGS, VIT, leg. 4-1, ff. 1-114.

²⁰⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 3-1, ff. 40-4.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 36v-40.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 27v-30.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 19v-22v.

²¹² *Ibid.*, ff. 45v-49v.

practice of inspection in Naples and the conditioning of prior attempts to regulate and discipline official behavior provided the means to restrict and punish what had formerly been a regular feature of public life and the sustained use of inspections would continue to expand the types of and amount of behavior that could be regulated. At the same time, the willingness of the *visitadores* to develop and limit the boundaries of acceptable public conduct – even at the expense of the viceroys and local elites – would likewise continue to grow.

CONCLUSION

The first sixty years of inspections in Italy represented the response of the Spanish monarchy to the problems of imperial administration. From Leclerc's mission of collecting documents after the confirmation of Charles I's rule in Naples to Duarte's mid-1570s *visita* of the Neapolitan galleys after the Battle of Lepanto, the monarchy dealt with the legacy of its conquests and the cementing of its dominance in Italy by attempting to consolidate and bring order to its revenues, expenses, and governing institutions. But as the immediate attentions of the monarchy turned away from those efforts from the middle of the century into the seventeenth century, the institution of the *visita* nevertheless remained and thrived. The project of centralization provided the means for local societies to participate in the business of administration and the function of justice in the Hapsburg state. But transforming that state into a truly rigorous self-disciplining state, which was certainly not the case even in Quiroga's *visita* in which less than 20% of its charges resulted in a finding of guilt,²¹³ would have to await the full extension of the state's surveillance and the incorporation not only of cohesive administrative cores but also of the societies that surrounded them in the late sixteenth century.

²¹³ AGS, VIT, leg. 347.

CHAPTER II
 SOCIAL DISCIPLINE, STATE DISCIPLINE
 THE VISITA IN ITS GOLDEN AGE, 1575-1621

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1960s, the concept of early modern “social discipline” – the interplay between the regularization of socio-religious identity in the European reformations on the one hand and political centralization on the other – has been a byword for the emergent modernity of northern Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²¹⁴ Despite a certain emphasis on the parallelism between the Protestant and Catholic reformations, the historiography of social discipline has typically leaned heavily on studies of the Reformed Church. One recent sociological study, for example, suggested that Calvinism, due to its intensive moral discipline, uniquely produced the conditions from which the modern bureaucratic state emerged as manifested *par excellence* in Brandenburg-Prussia and the Dutch Republic.²¹⁵ Even when omitting this confessional framework, conceptualizations of early modern discipline, due to the traditional attention to the links between the Enlightenment project and power, have predominantly been situated in the context of the northern European Enlightenment. Michel Foucault, for example, always distinguished the eighteenth century from the preceding centuries – “the eighteenth century invented [...] a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its

²¹⁴ Gerhard Oestreich, “Strukturprobleme des europäischen Absolutismus,” *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates* (Berlin, 1969), 179-97; Otto Hintze, “Calvinism and Raison d’Etat in Early Seventeenth-Century Brandenburg,” in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 88-154; Robert Bireley, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counterreformation: Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S. J., and the Formation of Imperial Policy* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Gerhard Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ernst Walter Zeeden and Peter Thaddäus Lang, eds, *Kirche und Visitation. Beiträge zur Erforschung des frühneuzeitlichen Visitationswesens in Europa* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984); Heinz Schilling, “Between the Territorial State and Urban Liberty: Lutheranism and Calvinism in the County of Lippe,” in R. Po-chia Hsia, ed., *The German People and the Reformation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 263-83; Wolfgang Reinhard, “Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State a Reassessment,” *The Catholic Historical Review* 75, no. 3 (Jul. 1989), 383-404; R. Po-Chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750* (London: Routledge, 1989); Heinz Schilling, “Confessionalization in the Empire: Religious and Societal Change in Germany between 1555-1620,” in *Religion, Political Culture and the Emergence of Early Modern Society*, ed. Heiko Oberman (New York: E. J. Brill, 1992), 205-47; Heinz Schilling, “Confessionalization: Historical and Scholarly Perspectives of a Comparative and Interdisciplinary Paradigm,” in *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555-1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, eds. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 21-35; Mack P. Holt, “Confessionalization beyond the Germanies: The Case of France,” in *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555-1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, eds. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 257-74; Ute Lotz-Heumann and Matthias Pohlig, “Confessionalization and Literature in the Empire, 1555–1700,” *Central European History* 40 (2007), 35-61. For an exception to the rule, see Irene Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Modern World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

²¹⁵ Philip S. Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), c.f. Gorski’s fourth chapter in particular; see also Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 2005) and Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

exercise *within* the social body, rather than *from above* it”²¹⁶ – particularly in *Discipline and Punish*, in which the new disciplinary technologies of the northern Enlightenment like Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon were emblematic of a new form of disciplinary power.²¹⁷ In subsequent lectures that formed the basis of *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault, by then moving away from disciplinary technology towards the generalized notions of “bio-power” and “governmentality,” traced the transformation of the “sovereignty over a territory” characteristic of the sixteenth century into the eighteenth century “regulation of a population,” which the state used to bolster its power.²¹⁸

Foucault’s distinction between sovereignty and regulation in *Security, Territory, Population*, which continues to inform the intellectual history of the Enlightenment, itself echoes the foundational history of social discipline, Gerhard Oestreich’s 1968 “Strukturprobleme des europäischen Absolutismus.” Social discipline, according to Oestreich, essentially developed out of a broad fifteenth and sixteenth century structural crisis compounded by the collapse of the moral order that was traditionally reinforced by the Church. The task of restoring order then fell upon municipal bureaucracies that began to police the cities and produce social norms, an unsystematic process that Oestreich labeled “social regulation,” which would transform into “social discipline” under the “enlightened absolutism” of the eighteenth century, as paraphrased by Norbert Finzsch:

Social regulation became social discipline in the moment when the territorial prince took over the authority of the cities and combined the new practice [i.e. social regulation] with a new theory: the late humanism or Neostoicism of Justus Lipsius, which on the one hand, aimed at the restoration of an aristocratic state and, on the other, tried to erect a new order that centered around a well-disciplined army as a model for the regulation of society as a whole. This army was no longer a *soldateska* but was disciplined by the stoic principles of *exercitium*, *ordo*, *coertio*, and *exempla*. Outside pressure no longer coerced this military body; rather, the army became an institution that developed the increasing ability to exert self-control.²¹⁹

Oestreich’s “social discipline” and Foucault’s “governmentality” essentially depend upon the creation of “technologies” of – or, less obtusely, texts about – power and discipline. But in pointing to the reflection of the developing relationship between discipline and power and the state in texts, Foucault and Oestreich elided its manifestation, failing not only to account for southern Europe but also for the manner in which the dual processes of regulation and discipline were not sequential but concurrent. Discipline was a natural development of the early modern society and state, responding to different challenges. In northern Europe,

²¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 39.

²¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).

²¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009).

²¹⁹ Norbert Finzsch, “Elias, Foucault, Oestreich: On a Historical Theory of Confinement,” in *Institutions of Confinement: Hospitals, Asylums, and Prisons in Western Europe and North America, 1500-1950*, eds. Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jütte (Washington: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11; Oestreich, “Strukturprobleme des europäischen Absolutismus,” *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates*, 179-97.

confessionalization produced modes of regulation and discipline that were not simply replicated but modified and even anticipated by the challenges of imperial consolidation in southern Europe, which required institutions to mold and respond to the demands of their subjects' societies.

Thus, at its apogee in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the *visita* had, out of its origins as a means of producing reforms in conjunction with consolidating new territories and unfamiliar institutions in the early sixteenth century, already become a coercive instrument of "social regulation" intended to produce and inculcate norms of behavior parallel to institutions more commonly associated with discipline like the Holy Office of the Inquisition or, in more recent studies, religious orders like the Society of Jesus.²²⁰

Yet even the newly expansive *visitas* of the 1550s had failed to expand the reach of the *visita* beyond the limited domains of the administrative elites who participated, with varying degrees of acceptance, in the practice of inspection. From the late sixteenth century, however, the *visita* was increasingly being converted into a transformative means of "social discipline" through which the localities of the empire – and its formerly unperceived inhabitants – regulated and mediated individual behavior according to moral, administrative, and legal norms together with the state even beyond the expectations of the Crown and certainly beyond the reluctant desires of the Crown's councilors, putting considerable pressure on elite cohesion and patronage networks. To these two features, the *visita* added a third, reflexive, function outside the framework of social discipline that transformed the very object of discipline: a means through which social regulation and discipline was directed at the emergent state itself.

This chapter pursues this connection between the *visita* and social discipline in four parts. The first part resumes the political and institutional history of the *visita* from the perspective of the Crown and the Council of Italy, describing the process of commissioning the *visitas* to Italy in the 1580s and 1600s and the growing reluctance of the Council of Italy to use *visitas* as an instrument of social and administrative regulation in contrast to the interests of the Crown and of local elites, who continued to call for the sustained use of the institution. The remaining three parts turn to Naples, Milan, and Sicily respectively from 1581 to 1612, exploring the investigations of the *visitadores* and the expanding ties between the imperial state and local social life beyond what had been possible for prior *visitas*. Whereas illicit behavior had gone undetected in the past due to suppression, acceptance of local privileges and the diffusion of authority, unfamiliarity with the institution of the *visita*, and an acceptance of corruption and abuse as intrinsic components of social life in early modernity, the *visitas* of the 1580s and 1600s tapped into broader social networks in Naples, Sicily, and Milan, illuminating previously

²²⁰ See, for example, Adriano Prosperi, *Tribunali della Coscienza. Inquisitori, confessori, missionari* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 551-99; Jean Delumeau, *Catholicism Between Luther and Voltaire: A New View of the Counter-Reformation*, trans. Jeremy Moiser (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977); Louis Châtellier, *The Europe of the Devout: The Catholic Reformation and the Formation of a New Society*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John W. O'Malley, "The Society of Jesus," in *Religious Orders of the Catholic Reformation: Essays in Honor of John C. Olin on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Richard L. DeMolen (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), 139-63; Wietse de Boer, *The Conquest of the Soul: Confession, Discipline and Public Order in Counter-Reformation Milan* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Jennifer D. Selwyn, *A Paradise Inhabited by Devils: The Jesuits' Civilizing Mission in Early Modern Naples* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). For the Inquisition, which had its own relationship with the *visita*, see chapter IV. For the general development of discipline in conjunction with public office, see Belén Marina Jalvo, *El régimen disciplinario de los funcionarios públicos (Fundamentos y regulación sustantiva)*, 3rd ed. (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2006), which briefly links it to the *visita* on pages 30-32.

accepted forms of behavior that were to be restricted, undermining existing notions of authority, and beginning to construct the norms characteristic of the modern state.

THE RELUCTANT REGULATORY STATE

By the latter half of the reign of Philip II, the *visita*, which had previously varied considerably between locations and over time, had begun to settle into the framework that would persist until the middle of the seventeenth century. After the Crown's expansion had, with the notable exception of Philip's acquisition of Portugal, largely ceased after the middle of the sixteenth century, the *visita*'s applications as a means of consolidating administration and establishing a flow of information similarly began to wane. The decades between the late 1570s and the death of Philip III in 1621 accordingly represent a period of institutional maturity and stability with fixed and predictable forms and functions.

But while the *visita*'s features became regularized during the sixteenth century, the general principles underlying the Crown's authority and obligation to model and correct the behavior of its officials through the *visita* continued to be contested. Indeed, the apparent stability of the institution on the surface belies an environment that was at the cusp of transformation, although the nature of that transformation was not necessarily immediately evident. On the one hand, the *visita*'s frequency of use reached its apex during this period, as its use within Spain decreased considerably as early as the 1580s and its use elsewhere generally decreased after the 1610s.²²¹

Yet at the same time, the *visitas*, and especially the Italian *visitas*, were characterized by a dramatic expansion in nearly every other respect. Pointing to their prominence in the administrative order, the new *visitadores*, who less frequently came from the ranks of the clergy, were granted higher salaries and had some of the longest terms of office.²²² Changes in record keeping were likewise significant. The records for the six Italian general *visitas* that occurred between 1581 and 1612 represented an incredible advance and, on average, undoubtedly represent the largest volume of materials kept from any of the *visitas* of the Hapsburg period. One such source was the correspondence from and about these *visitas*, which was preserved in greater detail than during prior *visitas* and is now contained in several legajos of the "Secretarías Provinciales" collection and, to a lesser extent, the "Secretaría de Estado" collection. But the expansion is even more evident in the "Visitas de Italia" collection in Simancas, which is principally comprised of the material from this period of inspections, including 368 legajos, of which an average bundle might contain very roughly 2,000 pages, of mostly juridical documents in addition to the majority of another eleven legajos of miscellaneous collected materials.²²³ The explosion in documents which that represented is difficult to understate. For example, even when excluding unfoliated documents, the surviving

²²¹ See chapter 4 and introduction to chapter 1; Kagan, "Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500-1700)"; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 123-167.

²²² Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 73-4, 99-101.

²²³ Coniglio, *Visitatori del Viceregno di Napoli*; Burgarella and Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*; de la Plaza Bores and de la Plaza Santiago, *Visitas de Italia (siglos XVI y XVII)*. See AGS, VIT, leg. 23-78 and 351-358 for Lope de Guzmán's *visita*, leg. 79-151 and 359-380 for Juan Beltrán de Guevara's, leg. 153-203 and 381-391 for Gregorio Bravo de Sotomayor's, leg. 204-266 and 392-398 for Ochoa de Luyando's, libros 289-328 and leg. 329-335 and 406-407 for Luis de Castilla's, and leg. 267-287 and 399-405 for Felipe de Haro's.

records from the 1582 visita to Sicily have no less than fifty-five times more material than the comparable records in Simancas for the 1545 and 1559 visitas combined. That likely corresponded with an increase in production of three to four times compared to the 1545 visita.²²⁴

While the utility of this demonstrable documentary and archival turn was not fully realized in its era, it began to be employed with growing frequency during the reign of Philip IV and allowed the Council of Italy, the *visitadores*, and the Crown's agents to access the records during the seventeenth century. The correspondence in particular represented a base of documents from which officials in Spain could seek to enforce fines, reconstruct juridical practice, and provide models for later visitas that were commissioned between the late 1620s and the 1680s.²²⁵

But the most dramatic and important change in scale was the extent to which officials were charged and subsequently punished. For example, the visita to Naples that began in December 1581 prosecuted nearly double the number of officials that Quiroga had, a number that continued to increase into the seventeenth century. As the limits of the imperial state's capacity to oversee the project of the visita expanded, so too did its societies' interest in participating in its function. Above all else, the growth of the visita relied upon a growing number of witnesses willing to participate in the collection of information. As the response to the visita grew, it drew the institution more deeply into the social worlds of Naples, Sicily, and Milan and so began to produce more restrictions on official conduct.

The anticipation and planning for the next set of visitas after those dating from the late 1550s and early 1560s began as early as the middle of the 1570s, roughly concurrent with the conclusion of the work in Spain regarding the preceding visitas. But the pressure to initiate a new set of visitas seemingly came less from the governing councils residing in Spain than it did from the percolation of complaints and petitions from the localities, a trend that continued through the seventeenth century.²²⁶ One of the earliest advocates for a new set of visitas, a

²²⁴ The 1582 visita's records presently contain *no less than* 55,000 folios, sheets, etc. in total and likely considerably more – certainly at least 60,000 – because many of the documents are unfoliated despite their length. While it is not a precise measurement of the total, the 1545 visita's *registro* recorded almost 15,000 folios, sheets, etc. By number of legajos, the 1559 (and 1545) visitas account for about 7% of the "Visitas de Italia" collection (29 legajos and libros), the visitas of the 1580s (175 legajos and libros) about 43%, the visitas of the 1600s (192 legajos) about 47%. Another eleven legajos date mostly from the latter two periods but are not exclusively from them.

²²⁵ See chapter III.

²²⁶ See also chapter III. Due to the limitations of the surviving documents, the 1570s seem to represent the beginning of this facet of the visita in Naples, but it clearly expanded elsewhere thereafter. Between 1627 and 1679, one visita was explicitly commissioned to respond to a local request, another was widely understood to have been prompted by local requests or support, a third was undertaken due to a report from a Milanese subject in Madrid, another was seemingly carried out in conjunction with local support, and the Crown considered, but ultimately rejected, the possibility of commissioning a visita that had been suggested for Milan. In the case of 1570s and early 1580s, the best study of the Council of Italy in the sixteenth century, Rivero Rodríguez's *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, indicates that Italian support seems to have predated the shift in the composition of the dominant court faction and subsequently informed the faction which came to power in the late 1570s and was predisposed to notions of equity, with the result that the visita was specifically understood as useful. Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 165-7. His case is perhaps somewhat exaggerated by a likely error in dating one document not cited from the mid to late 1550s to 1577 (see chapter I for its more likely context) but without severely undermining his argument, as it may perhaps have circulated subsequently. At any rate, this dynamic is exemplified with perhaps even greater clarity elsewhere in the Spanish empire (see chapter IV).

certain Francisco Daroca who would later be appointed to the Collateral Council, began, perhaps to his later peril, writing in 1575 about the urgent need for discipline in Naples because of the manner in which distance from the monarch created opportunities for abuse that would otherwise go without correction:

This Kingdom governed so far from the presence of Your Majesty, with such abominable customs hidden for such a long time without anyone, let alone those who were responsible for doing so, uncovering it [and] giving relation to Your Majesty of the great misery and ruin caused by the same people who were supposed to and are obliged to punish it and this has reached such an extreme that it is only with difficulty that it could be remedied let alone carried out here if not by Your Majesty sending, with haste, a visitador with the authority [...] that this such grave matter requires [...] and he would have great help in the Marquis of Mondéjar [i.e. the viceroy] and in others who could thus procure to give light to everything that is advisable, which is what was missing in the other visitas and is more necessary because of the great difficulty that there is in reaching the completion of the deeds and business of judges and more in this place where they join together and help [each other] to cover the truth.²²⁷

It was only in the late 1570s that similar views began to appear among the regents of the Council of Italy, most notably Mateo Vázquez de Leca, who used the question of the visita to mark out his opposition to Philip's secretary. But that support was informed by his reading of an Italian source, the *Apuntamientos del Doctor Antonio Rosso para poner remedio a los consejos y stados de Italia*, which had advocated using the visita to correct abuses and to reform the officials serving in Italy.²²⁸

Only in 1580 was the reluctance of the Council of Italy and other members of Philip's court towards commissioning visitas finally overcome, coincident with the downfall of those councilors most opposed to the practice.²²⁹ During the same year, the prospect of initiating a review of the governments of Italy was also enhanced by the relaxation of tensions in the Mediterranean as Philip arrived at a truce with the Ottomans.²³⁰ By 1581, an extensive series of visitas was commissioned, including inspections of the royal secretaries in Spain as well as a final commission to complete the ongoing visita of the Council of Italy that had begun in 1568,

²²⁷ Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, envío 80, caja 106, p. 537, 6-IX-1575 as quoted in Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 166: "Este Reyno governado tan lexos de la presencia de Vuestra Magestad, con costumbres tan abominables disimuladas de tanto tiempo sin que nadie y menos a quien le tocava el haverlo de hazer se aya condolido dando parte a Vuestra Magestad de tanta miseria y ruyna causado todo por los mesmos que devrian y estan obligados a castigarlo y segun el extremo a que todo esto ha llegado con dificultad se podra tratar acá de remedio y menos de executarlo sino es embiando Vuestra Magestad con brevedad un visitador con la auctoridad y partes que negocio tan grave requiere, el qual sin respecto faciat iudicium durissimam his qui presid, pues tendra tan buena ayuda en el marqués de Mondéjar y en otros que procurar así dar luz a todo lo que convienere que es lo que en las otras visitas ha faltado y mas necessario por la mucha dificultad que ay en llegar al cabo de hechos y tratos de jueces y mas en este lugar donde se aunan y ayudan tan de veras a cubrillos."

²²⁸ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 167; For Rosso's "apuntamientos," see British Library, Additional, 28399, 274-280.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 168-70.

²³⁰ Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 192; Roger Bigelow Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New*, vol. IV (New York: MacMillan, 1934), 154.

although the death of the visitador who had been entrusted with the task caused the inspections in Spain to be delayed by a year. At the same time, preparations began for the new visitas to Naples, Sicily and Milan.²³¹ The selected visitadores, Lope de Guzmán to Naples, Luis de Castilla to Milan, and Francisco de Vera to Sicily (who was replaced by Gregorio Bravo de Sotomayor when Vera refused his commission), were then supplied with the collected and recently archived documents produced by the visitas of 1559 along with any new orders and instructions in their commissions that indicated a more localized theoretical justification for the visita:

Philip, by the grace of God King of Spain, of the Two Sicilies, of Jerusalem, [etc.], the principal duty of princes including the upright administration of justice, the good government of his vassals, and the conservation of his patrimony; we have always had the [utmost] possible caution that each of these three things be in our kingdoms and lands [...] that by the lack of none of them should our subjects' calm and peace of living be disturbed, putting in the administration of these charges select people, found in all our kingdoms, not only of letters, goodness, and experience but still more of zeal in the service of God and the good of the Commonwealth, sending them at the expense of our hacienda from some territories to others [...] Still, for our greater satisfaction and considering too what our subjects receive seeing the particular account that there is in their good government, we have agreed (not without the universal and particular benefit of the Commonwealth) to inspect our officials [...]²³²

Twenty-two years later, planning for another series of visitas to Naples, Sicily, and Milan began early in the reign of Philip III, a process that again highlighted the indifferent relationship between the Council of Italy and its visitas. The new king, modeling himself after his late father, envisioned a continuation of the work that had been undertaken by the

²³¹ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 170.

²³² AGS, VIT, libro 323. April 2, 1581. "Don Phelippe por la gracia de Dios Rey de España, de las dos Siçilias, de Hierusalém, Archiduque de Austria, Duq de Milán, Borgoña, y Brabante, Conde de Habsburg, Flandes y Tyrol. Consistiendo el principal cargo de los Príncipes en la recta administración de la justicia, buen gobierno de sus vasallos, y conservación de su patrimonio; havemos siempre tenido el cuydado possible de q cada una destas tres cosas fuese en nr^{os} Reynos y señoríos tan particularmente mirada, q por falta de ninguna se perturbasse el quieto, y pacífico vivir de n^{os} súbditos poniendo en la administración de los cargos para esto destinados personas no solo de letras, bondad, y experiencia pero aun del zelo q' para servicio de Dios, y bien de la República se han hallado en todos n^{os} Reinos, enviándolos a costa de n^{ra} hacienda de unas partes a otras para q tanto mejor y sin respecto ni accepción de personas atiendan a servir en lo que a cada uno le obliga su cargo, y aunque con este cuydado y vigilancia particular q siempre se ha tenido pudiéramos sossegar el ánimo, teniendo por cierto que los oficiales, y ministros q han sido y son al pr^{te} en el nr^o estado de Milán havrán hecho su dever correspondiendo a su obligación, y a la confiança q' de ellos hizimos. Todavía para mayor satisfac^{on} nuestra y considerada también la q reciben n^{os} súbditos viendo la particular cuenta q se tiene con su buen gobierno, havemos acordado (no sin universal y particular beneficio de la República) de visitar los dichos n^{os} oficiales y ministros assi del dicho nr^o estado como del Exército, y otros qualesquiera, assi para q entendiendo el proceder y gobierno de cada uno en su offiçio se les de el premio, o castigo q mereçieren sus acciones y provea del remedio conviniente a nr^o serv^o como para q con esta demostración los oficiales q adelante sirvieren no solo hagan su dever cumpliendo con la obligación q tienen, pero aun merezcan ser gratificados y promovidos a mayores cargos como siempre se ha hecho con los q' lo han merecido. Por ende confiando quanto es razón de la bondad, letras, y integridad de vos el Venerable, fiel, y amado nr^o el Licenciado Don Luys de Castilla."

visitadores of the 1580s and, in early 1603, the Crown requested nominations from the Council of Italy for the visitadores who would undertake the next series of inspections. Though expressly imitating the past, the process of planning and managing the visitas under Philip III indicated that the institution, once so tied to central authority, was very much beginning a gradual process of provincialization in the seventeenth century.

To be sure, after being requested by the Crown to produce nominations for potential visitadores in early 1603, the Council of Italy provided a list that did little to suggest a great movement in that direction, as it included three members of the Chancery of Valladolid, two members of the Chancery of Granada, and one member of the *Contaduría Mayor* or audit board. But at least one regent of the Council of Italy immediately responded to the council's list by suggesting that though all the nominees seemed to be capable men, the visitadores should also be selected on the basis of their knowledge of the local language and familiarity with Italy. As the regent protested, neither Lope de Guzmán, the prior visitador to Naples, nor his secretary actually understood Italian, and so he recommended several individuals who might be better suited for the task along with Juan Beltrán de Guevara, a member of the Chancery of Valladolid included in the initial list who had apparently had some business with Italians and was known for being able to communicate with them.²³³ In the months that followed, the Crown nevertheless chose to select its visitadores for Italy out of the council's general list, although the most prestigious of the visitas, to Naples, was entrusted to Guevara.

After a delay of nearly three years, Guevara, by then Archbishop of Salerno and a member of the Council of Castile, was finally commissioned for the visita and provided with a quite substantial jurisdiction, granted the ability to intervene in criminal trials, with the ambiguous provision that these should be related to the visita, even in cases of capital crimes and the possibility of investigating materials that had preceded Guzmán's visita if they had not been handled by the earlier visitador.²³⁴ This scope paralleled the instructions given to the two other visitadores, Ochoa de Luyando to Sicily and Felipe de Haro to Milan, who had replaced the previously selected visitador to the duchy.

There were, however, certain limits placed on the inspectors' authority each of which indicated that the Crown was increasingly sensitive to local reactions, albeit primarily the reactions of its elites. In response to Guevara's inquiry about investigating the conduct of feudal lords and despite its own interest in monitoring the economic activity of its nobles, the Crown expressly forbade the visitador from actually using the juridical practices of the visita in such matters, a response that would figure prominently in the visita to Naples that began seventy-three years later.²³⁵ The Crown, quite likely influenced by the patronage politics of Philip III's *valido* or favorite, the Duke of Lerma, also noted, with even more gravity than Philip II, its concerns about the damage the visita might do to the reputation of its highest officials and thus forbade the visitador from suspending several officials or from confiscating their estates.²³⁶ Even

²³³ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. April 16, 1603. "Voto particular del Regente Lanz."

²³⁴ AGS, SSP, libro 12. March 25, 1606. Philip III to Guevara; AGS, SSP, libro 12. March 25, 1606. Philip III to Duque de Escalona; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 93.

²³⁵ Ibid. June 5, 1607 Philip III to Guevara; AGS, SSP, libro 12. August 29, 1609. Philip III to Guevara.

²³⁶ Ibid. June 5, 1607 Philip III to Guevara; AGS, SSP, libro 12. August 29, 1609. Philip III to Guevara. For the relative roles of Philip III and his *valido*, the Duke of Lerma, in governance and decision making, see Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621*, 1-11. Other historians have typically relegated Philip III to a marginal role in his own government but it is clear that with respect to the visitas of the 1600s that, although the Council of

when it granted the visitador the ability to “excuse” several officials in order to conduct investigations free of their intervention, the Crown reminded the visitador not to aggravate the officials and that this extraordinary practice should be for limited, fixed amounts of time and only when absolutely necessary.²³⁷ But while the Crown was explicitly ceding some of its authority in accordance with the interests of provincial elites, it did not entirely delegate that authority to the expected administrative body, the Council of Italy.

Instead, the lengthy process of commissioning the visitas in the reign of Philip III suggests that the institution of the visita, far from being an instrument principally employed by and responsible to the councils as historians have come to understand it, actually occupied a distinct and therefore rather variable position in the framework of the Crown’s government. By the seventeenth century it was commissioned by the monarch and his closest agents and the royal favorites, it consulted with the corresponding council, responded to the demands of the province, depended on the viceroy, and, in the case of the Italian visitas, was ultimately concluded by a committee or *junta* of notables drawn from the councils, usually from the councils of Italy, Castile, and State and typically the visitador himself, who determined the cases brought back from the provinces.

So if the instigating force behind these visitas represented some combination of the young monarch’s interest in modeling his father’s practice of good government and the Duke of Lerma’s interests in Italy, it very much did not represent any desire from the Council of Italy. In the most striking indication of this reluctance, in February 1603, as the Crown began consulting with the Council of Italy in conjunction with its desire to commission visitas, the council, even under the presidency of the Constable of Castile, Juan Fernández de Velasco y Tovar, who was one of visitadores’ most powerful and consistent allies in the court, very strongly advised against using the institution in a consultation that was subsequently filed among records for a visita that began in the late 1670s:

Nothing was held to be less advisable and little more dangerous or damaging than visitas generales on account of the length of time they last and the little fruit that can be taken from them. From experience, it can be seen that while they last, the liberty of justice ceases and the people who most fear them for their excesses are those who know best

Italy and, more speculatively, Lerma were more than willing to curtail the institution, the example of his father’s visitas was very much part of Philip III’s justification for commissioning a new series. For the long historiography treating Philip III, Lerma, and the government of the early seventeenth century see Manuel Danvila y Collado, *El poder civil en España*, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1885); Ciriaco Pérez Bustamante, *Felipe III: Semblanza de un monarca y perfiles de una privanza* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1950); Patrick Williams’s early revisionist accounts in Patrick Williams, “Philip III and the Restoration of Spanish Government, 1598-1603,” *English Historical Review* 88, no. 349 (Oct., 1973), 751-69 and Patrick Williams, “El reinado de Felipe III,” in *Historia general de España y América* vol. 8 (Madrid: Rialp, 1987); Antonio Feros Carrasco, “Política interior: El régimen de los validos” in *La crisis del siglo XVII*, vol. 6, *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1988); Henry Kamen, *Golden Age Spain* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities International Press, 1988); Antonio Feros Carrasco, “Lerma y Olivares: La práctica del valimiento en la primera mitad del seiscientos,” in *La España del Conde Duque de Olivares*, eds. John Elliott and Angel García Sanz (Valladolid: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Valladolid, 1990); John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Bernardo José García García, *La Pax Hispanica: Política exterior del Duque de Lerma* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996).

²³⁷ AGS, SSP, libro 12. April 9, 1607. Philip III to Guevara.

how to avoid and take guard that [their affairs] not be figured out and for the most part, those who suffer are those who are most confident in their good action.²³⁸

While the council then admitted that the passage of twenty years did provide at least some justification for more *visitas*, it strongly advised that they be definitely limited to no more than a year in length.²³⁹ What transpired in the *visitas* undertaken by Philip III, however, was hardly what the Council of Italy would have hoped or even within the limits established by the Crown's commission. If there had been a sense of exhaustion, the *visitas* that began in 1606 and 1607 were not at all short – Guevara's *visita* in particular lasted until 1612 – and the work they did was similarly extensive and once again at the limits of what was possible for the Spanish administrative apparatus. In yet another sign of the continuing growth of the *visita*, 388 officials in Naples were sentenced and the process of arriving at that massive final figure required the formation of not one but two *juntas*, the latter of which, formed in 1615, dealt with the 288 remaining cases that included an estimated 3,670 charges.²⁴⁰

The Council of Italy's line of opposition to the *visita* was hardly a novelty of the early seventeenth century and was, at least until the 1620s, as regularly its attitude towards the institution than not. Indeed, it was especially characteristic of the Council of Italy's attitude in the late 1570s, a mere three years prior to the beginning of the most expansive *visitas* to that date. The most vocal opposition was Philip II's secretary, Antonio Pérez, who related the opinion of the council about the supposedly "inadvisable" practice of the *visita* as the council was being reformed in 1578:

Regarding the *visita* of Italy, it was said and considered to be very inadvisable to have it pending for so long [...] and gave opportunity for more excesses and it seemed that a relation of their state should be requested so that His Majesty could later send for them to be completed. And it was noted that this business of the *visitas*, in the manner in which they are done is inadvisable, and instead when some minister exceeds [what he should do], His Majesty should later send [someone] to find out [what he did] and punish [him], which would be a great example for the satisfaction of justice so that ministers don't think the punishment of their excesses won't be handled until a *visita* and confide in being free in it with the forgetfulness [that comes from] a long [span of] time.²⁴¹

²³⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. February 5, 1603. Consulta from Council of Italy to Philip III. "represento el Con^o de Italia al S Rey D. Philipe 3^o que otra veys havia significado a su Mg^d que ninguna cosa se tenía por menos conveniente ni por más peligrosa y dañosa que Vissitas generales por el mucho tiempo que ocupan y el poco fructo que se saca dellas Viéndose por experiencia que mientras duran cessa La Libertad dela Justicia y que los que más las podría temer por sus excessos, son los que mejor se saben prevenir y cautelar para que no se averiguen y que por la mayor parte padezen los que Viven más confiados en su buen proceder."

²³⁹ Ibid. February 5, 1603. The Council of Italy to Philip III.

²⁴⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 235. June 21, 1616. The Junta of the *Visita* to Naples to Philip III.

²⁴¹ British Library, Additional, 28400, 76. *Resolución sobre los papeles de Dutinario y Francisco Hernández de Liébana* (1578) as quoted in Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 166: "Hablóse en la *Visita* de Italia y considerose por de mucho inconveniente estar tanto tiempo ha pendiente, y que no solo era ese camino de satisfacción pero de ocaasion para mas excessos y parescio se pidiera relación del estado della para que Su Magestad la mandasse luego acabar. Y apuntose que esto de las *Visitas* por el camino que se hazen no convernía, sino que quando algun ministro excediesse, Su Magestad lo mandasse luego averiguar y castigar, que seria de gran

The council's frustration with the visita's duration (and probably even more so its frustration with the length of time required to handle the cases since the materials from Quiroga's visita were finally resolved only in the 1570s and Luis de Castilla's visita to Milan from 1582 continued for an unprecedented six years that strained Philip II's patience) maintained a not entirely complementary relationship with the council's anxieties that the visita might actually be a fundamentally unjust practice that undermined the Crown's legitimacy. For even as Pérez and the council recommended using a kind of immediate and limited visita against those ministers most suspected of wrongdoing, that alternate logic of juridical practice was even more vulnerable to critique or at least caused more complaints. Indeed, perhaps the most exemplary and most ironic expression of that complaint was when Pérez himself was subjected to a visita in 1584, five years after his downfall and arrest:

For this, they invented the visita against him and against other secretaries [...]. This kind of trial is customary in the court of the King of Spain and in some of his kingdoms. A trial in which secret depositions taken for years and years are opened against the person they want to break. A trial in which a copy of the legal proceedings is not provided nor witnesses, just the charges, and may God help each person in his defense. A trial in which, for the most part, only enemies are examined and the bigger the enemy the better.²⁴²

The Council of Italy, though it theoretically maintained the greatest potential authority over the visitas relative to other councils that employed them, functionally served a largely consultative role in the practice of the visita. During the visitas themselves, for example, the Council of Italy provided certain instructions to the visitador, but these were typically clarifications about investigations and were usually a component of a dialogue about the visita in which the Crown and, at times, the Council of State also intervened. The council's function outside of the visita, which included the review of appeals and correspondence from Italy, also represented an extension of the communication between the locality and the central government produced by the visita. Indeed, many of the letters received by the Council of Italy that were subsequently acted on were the appeals of individuals who believed that the visitador's appointed officials or commissioners should recuse themselves or claims regarding privileges that the visita might have infringed on, especially if an individual's otherwise illicit behavior was exempted. But even this is easily overstated: during Guevara's visita in the period from 1606 and 1610, there were no more than a few dozen appeals seriously considered by the

ejemplo assi para la satisfacion de la Justicia como para que no pensasen los ministros que hasta la Visita no se tractaría del castigo de sus excessos y confiassen de librarse en ella con el olvido del largo tiempo que ay de una a otra y con cubiertas y negociaciones.”

²⁴² Antonio Pérez, *Relaciones y Cartas*, vol. 1, ed. Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro (Madrid: Turner, 1986), 123. “Para esto inventaron la Visita contra él y contra otros secretarios [...]. Esta manera de juicio se acostumbra en la Corte del rey de España y en algunos reinos suyos. Juicio que le tienen abierto a secretas deposiciones años y años contra el que quieren descomponer. Juicio en que no se da traslado de proceso ni testigos, sino sólo los cargos, y que Dios le ayude a cada uno en su descargo. Juicio en que por la mayor parte no se examinan sino los enemigos, y los mayores, mejor.”

council in contrast to the hundreds of cases handled by the visitador.²⁴³ The practice of the visita of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was therefore principally constituted by the relationship between the visitador and the locality, a locality that by then had been trained to transform the state through social discipline.

NAPLES

Even before the 1531 publication of Machiavelli's *Discourses*, Neapolitan society had been described according to the supposed dualistic relationship between a "privileged and parasite class" of aristocrats and the *popolo* in which access to civic power was stringently regulated by juridical distinctions while the countryside was typified by feudal domination.²⁴⁴ That notion would have a remarkably durable historiography. But more recent studies, including Gérard Delille's *Le maire et le prieur*,²⁴⁵ have pointed to far more complexity and variability. At the local level, social groups were typically constructed in divergent ways that elude generalization, while access to public office – even in the midst of a tightening of access – was characterized less by social status than by strategies of alliance and patronage at both the local and imperial levels, factional relationships, and, in the hinterland, the "concentration of the representation of interests of the community in the hands of feudal lords."²⁴⁶ Beginning in the sixteenth century, these intricacies of accessing territories and administrative posts in the cities were accompanied by the intervention of the Spanish Crown, which was inclined to grant ministerial posts in the central government to the *togati* or doctors of law, who were typically albeit by no means exclusively drawn from the mercantile or professional classes at the expense of the nobility.²⁴⁷ Accordingly, while the structures by which power was accessed by various groups in Naples are increasingly well understood, the quotidian relationships, strategies of alliance, and systems of clientelism in the urban and, as Giovanni Muto has put it, "extra-urban" worlds that constituted the social background of administration in the Kingdom of Naples is less fully developed. But those interactions were precisely where the visitas increasingly focused their attentions and were, far beyond what had been previously been undertaken, the sources that allowed the state to intervene in an expansive range of behaviors and relationships.

²⁴³ AGS, SSP, libro 301.

²⁴⁴ Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification," 274; Musi, "The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System," 91-97; Anna Maria Rao, "Nel settecento napoletano: la questione feudale," in *Cultura, intellettuali e circolazione delle idee nel '700*, ed. Renato Pasta (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1990), 51-106; Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *Identità sociali: La nobiltà napoletana nella prima età moderna* (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 1998), 9-58.

²⁴⁵ Gérard Delille, *Le maire et le prieur: Pouvoir central e pouvoir local en Méditerranée occidentale, XV-XVIII siècle* (Rome: École Française de Rome; Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2003).

²⁴⁶ Musi, "The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System," 96; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 216-7; Angelantonio Spagnoletti, *Principi italiani e Spagna nell'età barocca* (Milan: Mondadori, 1996).

²⁴⁷ Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification," 281-284; Raffaele Ajello, *Una società anomala: Il programma e la sconfitta della nobiltà napoletana in due memoriali cinquecenteschi* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane/Consorzio Editoriale Fridericiana, 1996), 24; Giovanni Muto, "La nobleza napolitana en el contexto de la Monarquía Hispánica: Algunos planteamientos," in *Las redes del imperio: Élités sociales en la articulación de la Monarquía Hispánica, 1492-1714*, ed. Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 135-171.

Although only seventeen years had elapsed between Quiroga's departure from Naples and Lope de Guzmán's arrival in the kingdom as visitador in the final weeks of 1581, the latter's visita represented a dramatic expansion of the visita's domain of surveillance in Naples that exceeded his predecessor's innovations in extending discipline. For though the development of the visita through the 1560s marked an expansion of the procedure and a turn to coercive discipline within the elite administrative cadre, Guzmán and his contemporary visitadores were keenly interested in a broader assortment of relationships, including patron-client, kinship, factional, and financial ties among other bonds that the Crown's local elites participated in and cultivated. This was especially true at the apex of local administration in what continued to be the most prominent of the visita's investigations, that of the Collateral Council.

That more comprehensive illumination of Neapolitan social networks and the landscape in which they were situated was founded in the dramatic increase in scale that Guzmán's visita represented compared to prior visitas. In the previous chapter, the networks re-constructed from the depositions of the visitas that began in 1559 suggested models of investigative practice for the visitas, either at or towards the beginnings of the visita's ability to put pressure on and interact with governing networks. Those were not, of course, "real" social networks nor even especially close approximations since the real networks were to varying degrees simultaneously obscured and evident to the visitador according to the testimony he received. In Milan, the visitador's pressure upon the governing network had amounted to little of value because Milanese elites were initially resilient against the imperial state's coercive force. But Sicily and Naples were more pliant, in large part because the participants in those visitas had been conditioned by prior experience. Nevertheless, a great deal of information remained hidden from the imperial state because the behaviors called out in depositions, based on what the witness knew and believed to be illicit, did not fully elucidate the connections that members of the local administration drew upon when engaging in conduct that contravened the emerging notions of good government.²⁴⁸ By the 1580s, however, all three territories were in the process of becoming more transparent under the state's scrutinizing attention.

Thus, out of its investigative work, the visitas of the 1580s and 1600s produced a more accurate reflection of the networks of good and especially of bad government in early modern Italian society: a nexus of malfeasance and office holding existing between what in contemporary theoretical parlance would be described as "dark networks" and legal or "bright" networks respectively.²⁴⁹ Guzmán's visita and his investigation of the Collateral Council in particular were illustrative of the growing extent to which the state was able to conduct surveillance of this nexus through the growing participation of witnesses. In that investigation, for example, the eighty depositions taken collectively named 301 distinct individuals and small

²⁴⁸ For these notions, see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragmentos de Monarquía. Trabajos de Historia política* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), 72-85.

²⁴⁹ Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* 13, no. 4 (Oct., 2003), 413-39; Jean Cartier-Bresson, "Corruption networks, transaction security and illegal social exchange," *Political Studies* 45 (1997), 463-76; Bonnie H. Erickson, "Secret societies and social structure," *Social Forces* 60 (1981), 188-210; *Networks and Networks: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, eds. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2001). Raab and Milward have several propositions regarding illegal or "dark" networks, suggesting that they must be especially flexible, usually require a territorial base in which the state is weak, and have weak institutionalization but strong reliance on coercion.

groups, a roughly 57% increase from Quiroga's investigation into the Collateral Council in 1559. Still more notably, the number of distinct sets of interactions between individuals that witnesses provided information for increased by roughly 90% to 549.²⁵⁰ Since patterns of information sharing did not demonstrably change since 1559, the increased scale was principally built on the widening composition of witnesses that the visita brought into its work. This was of the essence since it meant that depositions were not merely collected from the familiar collection of attorneys and officials based in the city of Naples as well as the regents themselves, but also from additional witnesses who were previously beyond the reach of the institution of the visita, notably individuals living outside the city of Naples, Neapolitan and Genoese merchants in the city, and in a departure from prior practice resulting from the complicated resolution of certain litigation, women. As a result, the visita gained access to an entirely new range of behaviors and suggested, to an extent previously unknown or illegible to the state, the channels through which society and corruption were organized.²⁵¹

To be sure, in many respects, Guzmán's investigation seems to have followed the norms of the visita of his day with natural evolutions from prior visitas, essentially further elaborating the ability of the state to regulate and reform within the administrative core. The standard interrogatory, which contained twenty-four questions in the portion for the Collateral Council (a consolidation of the longer interrogatory that Quiroga had used) and an additional unnumbered question, inquired about the frequency with which the council met, the conduct of its regents in granting audiences, the learning of the regents, the personal lives of the regents

²⁵⁰ Curiously, however, this increase in scale did not correspond to a transformation in the way that information about official conduct was structured. The information that witnesses were willing and able to provide in depositions continued to be limited to personal observations of official conduct in settings with a limited number of actors. As a result, many of the structural features of the network remain very similar to prior visitas. For example, while the average degree of the network or the average number of known connections between individuals correspondingly increased to 3.65, a 21% increase, this was roughly within the expected range for degree based on Quiroga's investigation and, in contrast to Sicily, was still considerably lower than the average degree from the network of the Great Court in 1559. Increases of still more modest amounts characterized the average path length, 3.48, and the clustering coefficient, .491, both of which represented increases of about only 8%. The assortative coefficient also remained similar, -0.229 compared to -0.214. One exception was modularity of the network, curiously, went up to .673, surpassing even that of the Great Court. The relative similarity between Guzmán's investigation and Quiroga's investigation suggests two features about the depositions collected by the visita. First, the general structure of individual depositions did not, on average, change significantly between 1559 and 1581. In effect, the information that witnesses were willing and able to provide relied on the same means of sharing information about official malfeasance and this continued to be limited to personal observations of behavior in settings with a limited number of actors. Second, the inclusion of depositions that followed prior answers to interrogatories in order to confirm facts did not generally add new detail about the individuals involved in a matter of dispute. In effect, although the additional collection of depositions about a particular instance of abuse served a legal purpose in confirming facts, the visitador would usually have been aware of the relevant information after the first or second witness tied to any such instance. Finally, it seems that the patterns of interaction related to malfeasance remained relatively stable, even when the net of investigation was cast wider with one exception,

²⁵¹ For legibility, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Scott's supposition that "the poor and marginal are often in the vanguard of innovations" (Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 429) is concerned principally with capital and the economy and contrasts with the expectation that regulation, for example, is coincident with the interests of elites. But outside that economic context, the innovation of the "marginal" (at least in the hierarchy of administration) when tied to regulatory or disciplinary processes could produce different ends.

with particular emphasis on the defects of gambling and holding banquets, friendships and animosities, breaches of secrecy, proper handling of office sales, and whether regents had compelled litigants to marry their relatives, among other questions.²⁵² With regard to the procedural question, one regent of the Collateral Council, Bastida de Muñatones, provided substantial detail about the norms of official business. On Mondays, the council would meet to review matters of governance, warrants, jurisdictional questions, letters from provincial governors and commissioners, and issues from the appeals court of the Sacro Regio Consiglio (also known as the Santa Chiara and the Capuana). On Tuesdays, the council would dispatch resolutions deliberated on Monday. On Wednesdays, the regents would deal with issues from the Vicaria, the high criminal tribunal, especially potential pardons. On Thursdays, the council would deal with the urgent or extraordinary business of government. On Fridays, the council would deal with issues of the Sommaria, the finance court, related to the royal patrimony and business related to feudal territories, giving accounts of this to the viceroy. On Saturday, the regents would sit in on the Vicaria in the morning. This would then be registered in books held in the chancery or communicated with the viceroy.²⁵³

The visita's reconnaissance of these kinds of administrative norms underpinned its broader project: the construction of a new kind of official behavior as the existing links between private and public life were restricted by public outcry and from the Crown's regulation. In this, Guzmán's inquiries resumed where Quiroga's had terminated, highlighting the corrupting influence and illegality of receiving gifts.²⁵⁴ The visitador's questions in the early 1580s regarding gifts produced a number of answers that essentially indicated that the supposedly idiosyncratic practice of gift giving in Naples, which did not necessarily presuppose a corrupt intent so much as it was a social obligation, had continued after Quiroga's visita although with some modifications. Certain witnesses, for example, seemed to suggest that the practice either ceased or at least was less apparent in the near recent past, with indications that this was due to the efforts of a former viceroy, Cardinal Granvelle, to extirpate the practice in the 1570s.²⁵⁵

Those who testified about its persistence illustrated an evolution in its scale. The types of gifts, for example, were generally more restrained with more emphasis on food products and fewer luxuries like jewelry or horses, as Reverter had been noted for receiving, indicating that the regents may have drawn more heavily on individuals of lower socio-economic status to produce gifts of obligation. However, the introduction of certain novel kinds of gifts may have undone the regents' efforts to remain entirely inconspicuous. In particular, the introduction of turkeys ("gallos de indias" or "gallinas de indias" as they were called in depositions written in Spanish) from the Americas sometime between the mid-1560s and 1581 in Naples, perhaps a late-comer in the novelty of such an animal, resulted in this becoming in that era a common or

²⁵² AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1.

²⁵³ Ibid., from f. 127v.

²⁵⁴ See chapter III for further discussion of the charges related to gifts. Rosenmüller, "Introduction," 4. For further analysis of this very recently published work, see introduction. See also Felicity Heal, *The Power of Gifts: Gift Exchange in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 180-206.

²⁵⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 4v-6. The witness, a member of the Collateral Council, indicated that the supposed abandonment of the practice of receiving gifts coincided with Cardinal Granvelle's term as viceroy, which seems a somewhat politically expedient remark given Granvelle's prominent position in the government of Philip II at the time.

at least very apparent illicit gift.²⁵⁶ While the *visita* never eradicated this practice in Italy, no doubt in part because the broader cultural practice surrounding gifts had an equivocal relationship with the pressure placed upon it in the more limited context of administrative norms,²⁵⁷ it had clearly been regulated to the degree that its use was transforming into a less extravagant, easily demonstrable, and readily punished offense.

Curiously, the first apparent change in the network of governance and the collection of testimonies was the prominence that the members of the Collateral Council had in the investigation of their own conduct. Thus, while a few members had provided depositions of little consequence for Quiroga, their depositions were one of the foundations of Guzmán's investigation. If the regents of the late 1550s were subtly accused of collusion, no such claims could be made for the Collateral Council of the late 1570s and early 1580s, the conduct of which was typified by the open animosity between two of its most senior members, Alonso Salazar and Salernitano, and between those two regents and one of the newest regents, Francisco Daroca. That hostility suggested that factional alliances, often considered predictors of political behavior, were essentially characterized by granularity, transience, and volatility.

Indeed, the disagreements between the three regents and between the other members of the council were so dire at the time of Guzmán's *visita* that the other members of the council, even within apparent factions, openly expressed dismay about the current state of affairs. One of Salernitano's former allies, the Marquis of Grottole and heir of the former treasurer Sánchez, spoke openly about the hostility between Daroca, Salazar, and Salernitano and the damage it caused to the "public good."²⁵⁸

While the "public good" may indeed have been damaged, so too was the elite cohesion that might have shielded the practices that the *visita* increasingly sought to discipline. One member of the council, Carlos della Tolfa, Count of San Valentino, who had joined it the same year as Sánchez, 1574, suggested that Sánchez and Salernitano had a public rupture sometime during the viceroyalty of Íñigo López de Mendoza y Mendoza, or as he was called by the witnesses, the Marquis of Mondéjar. Yet Tolfa's testimony was damaging to both parties, at once criticizing Sánchez's role in the administration of the Neapolitan banks and alerting the *visitador* to Salernitano's abuse and fraud in various activities as well as to a rumor that Salernitano "would give his soul to the devil in order to please the viceroy [...] [for] good or bad."²⁵⁹ Pedro Díaz Carrillo de Quesada, captain general of the artillery in Naples and one of the

²⁵⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 14v-19, 21v-27, 45-46, 54-58, et al. Turkeys are believed to have been introduced to Italy in the 1520s and allegedly no longer mentioned by European sources after the mid-sixteenth century once the novelty elapsed. R. D. Crawford, "Introduction to Europe and Diffusion of Domesticated Turkeys from the America [sic]," *Archivos de zootecnia* 41, no. 154 extra (1992), 311 citing Arlie William Schorger, *The Wild Turkey: Its History and Domestication* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966).

²⁵⁷ See also Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, *The Culture of Giving: Informal Support and Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 23-4; for foundational anthropological studies on the meaning of gift giving, see Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. W.D. Halls (New York: Norton, 1950); Annette B. Weiner, *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-while-giving* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Maurice Godelier, *The Enigma of the Gift* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

²⁵⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 1-2, 32-33.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 4v. "el Regte Salernitano daría el alma al diablo por complazer al Virrey, y q se transforma en la Voluntad de los Virreyes buena o mala[.]" No doubt this also represented a critique of the viceroy, who within four

military regents, was similarly willing to provide very damaging testimony against his fellow regents, including the deceased Reverter, whom he accused of using his position to augment his personal wealth, as well as both Salernitano and Salazar. The former of the two, according to the captain general, had, along with his wife, gained considerable wealth from “gifts that they [had] received and not through licit means,” an allegation followed by a description of one Alessandro Bruno, who had observed the “innumerable” gifts Salazar had received for Christmas.²⁶⁰

Salazar, Salernitano, and Daroca themselves would also provide lengthy depositions to the visitador. Daroca, the last of the three to provide a deposition albeit at the still early date of January 10, 1582, testified about the discord between Salazar and Salernitano although he claimed that he himself had not seen evidence of it and that they may in fact have resolved their differences in recent days. But he accused both, and particularly Salazar, of revealing secret proceedings and of receiving gifts. Salazar and his wife, along with the Marquis of Grottole, were also suggested to have maintained connections to merchants through which the former received jewelry, a set of the connections that were not necessarily so amicable as described.²⁶¹

Salazar’s strategy in his deposition differed considerably from his colleagues’, the exception which proved the rule of cohesion as a defense. Perhaps as part of his recent *rapprochement* with Salernitano, Salazar, rather than accusing his colleagues of wrongdoing, claimed that the regents of the Collateral Council had in fact conducted their business well, without impediment, quickly, and that no regents were given to passion or other malfeasant activities. Even his enemy, Daroca, had only received a gift after obtaining a license from the viceroy to do so.²⁶²

Perhaps even more unusual was Salernitano’s answer, which was less an attempt to obfuscate the investigation than it was an effort to excuse his conduct. Having served in the Kingdom’s highest offices since 1556, Salernitano openly admitted to receiving numerous gifts from “friends, colleagues, debtors, scribes, some officials, councilors, presidents” but defended this on the basis that they were mostly not involved in cases that he was hearing and that they were supposedly minor gifts anyway.²⁶³ His answers not only listed the types of gifts he had received but also the names of a few of the individuals who had provided them. Beyond their attempts to evade the visitador or excuse their illegal conduct, both Salazar and Salernitano, and indeed the rest of the regents, unwittingly provided new insight into a type of connection that was not previously considered in conjunction with corruption by the visitas: the Neapolitan banks.

At a certain level, the visita’s investigation into the connections between the banks and the regents of the Collateral Council is an indication of the extent to which the regents believed in their own propriety in combining private financial interests with public service and certainly the degree to which those private financial interests effected administration. Salazar’s

years would be embroiled in a crisis related to his collusion with the city’s government, essentially at Philip II’s behest, during the famine and revolt of 1585. Aurelio Musi, “Political History,” in *A Companion to Early Modern Naples*, ed. Tommaso Astarita (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 140-2.

²⁶⁰ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, f. 5. “los dhos Regentes han hecho las dhas grandes haziendas con donas y presentes q han recibido y por vías no lícitas”

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 19-32.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, ff. 10v-14.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, ff. 14v-18v.

deposition, for example, includes a tangential description of the most basic of banking concepts – namely the manner in which banks loaned out money that had been deposited – while claiming that he had never borrowed money from anyone or any bank that might have been a litigant in a case he was hearing. Seemingly unencumbered by fear of discipline, the regent freely named the various banks with which he had conducted his business. Salernitano, like his colleague, also provided a list of five banks, which were essentially fluid family partnerships, with which he had done business over the past decade.²⁶⁴ Those superficial revelations from the regents covered for the manifest regularity of bank failures and the considerable leverage that the regents of the Collateral Council possessed with regard to the handling of bank liquidations and other financial services. This proved to be another major source of volatility, particularly in the aftermath of the fiscal crises of the 1570s and the failure of the Crown’s proposed general deposit bank in the mid-1570s, which was resisted by the private Genoese banks in Naples.²⁶⁵ The relationship between Salazar and the Bank of Pontecorvo and Calamazza as well as the failure of the oldest private bank in Naples, the Bank of Ravaschiero, two years before the start of the visita with a loss of 300,000 ducats,²⁶⁶ represented a major source of complaints from witnesses because the regent was seen to have abused his power at the expense of clients who had suffered from bank failures.

Accordingly, several merchants were rather eager to provide information suggesting that Salazar had acted for the benefit of his allies at the Bank of Pontecorvo and Calamazza in financial disputes, sometimes leaving the disputes against them unheard or even appearing in their company when the bankers negotiated with clients. At least one doctor was concerned that the bank was on the verge of failure and the visita presumably provided an opportunity to put pressure on the bank to allow him to withdraw the deposit he had made or, failing that, at least punish the regent for failing to act properly as the legally responsible commissioner of the bank. In this unstable environment, Salazar’s position among the network of bankers was regarded as so dominant that even the former viceroy’s son was alleged to have recommended that one merchant go about soliciting Salazar’s favor rather than his father’s so that he would be allowed to withdraw money from the banks.²⁶⁷ This intersection between the banks and the visita illustrates the close ties between social regulation and social discipline in the visita. Whereas certain behaviors – the close personal and financial relationships between officials and their financiers in this context – had previously existed on a spectrum between acceptable and invisible, the strains of the particular financial and social environment together with the practice of inspection moved those behaviors into the spectrum of unacceptable and visible.

Alongside their complaints about the regents’ interference in the banks, the developing participation of Italian merchants in the visita, especially those whose trade was of a maritime

²⁶⁴ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 14v-18v.

²⁶⁵ Gaetano Sabatini, “Economy and Finance in Early Modern Naples,” in *A Companion to Early Modern Naples*, ed. Tommaso Astarita (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 97; Luigi De Rosa, “Banchi pubblici, banchi privati e monti di pietà a Napoli nei secc. XVI-XVIII,” in *Banchi pubblici, banchi private e monti di pietà nell’Europa preindustriale. Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici. Atti del convegno Genova, 1-6 ottobre 1990*, vol. 1 (Genoa: Società ligure di storia patria, 1991), 499-512.

²⁶⁶ Giovanni Brancaccio, *Nazione genovese: consoli e colonia nella Napoli moderna* (Naples: Guida, 2001), 83; Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, 68-70, 237-8. The Bank of Ravaschiero was founded in Naples in 1509 by Germano Ravaschiero, a Genoese banker.

²⁶⁷ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 85v-86.

nature, was also especially likely to bring the visitador's attention to the handling of trade and commerce by lower officials, whose behavior or whose appointment was attributed to the patronage and protection of members of the Collateral Council. As was true of bank failures, this was especially true of their complaints in the aftermath of crises, with one distinction: crisis could also obscure the mechanisms of patronage and provide potential cover for abuse, requiring the intervention of the imperial state to normalize that patronage as "abusive."

In Guzmán's visita, which preceded the 1585 revolt, the most recent such crisis in Naples had arisen in connection to public health and its administration. In the year before Guzmán's arrival, a severe influenza outbreak – indeed the first known influenza pandemic – had spread from the Ottoman Empire to Malta and Sicily before reaching Naples in August 1580.²⁶⁸ Coincidentally, the army of the Duke of Alba had won a decisive victory in Lisbon on behalf of Philip II in the War of the Portuguese Succession that same month and, over the course of the following year, the Italian soldiers who had served on the campaign returned to Naples.²⁶⁹ Their arrival naturally provoked fears of another "plague" and, in order to prevent a second outbreak, the soldiers were ordered to burn their clothes, which would be replaced at the expense of the Kingdom of Naples.

In Naples, as in Spain, the administration of public health, while not necessarily less effective than elsewhere, was principally conducted by means of ad hoc responses and appointments by the city itself and only had two permanently appointed deputies after a plague that ended in 1527.²⁷⁰ This loose structure provided certain extraordinary opportunities for malfeasance. The particular transaction involved in replacing the burnt clothes seems to have been the cause of some skepticism because Salazar, whose duties as regent included the oversight of officials responsible for guarding against the plague, entrusted the accounting to Giovanni Domenico de Medici, with whom Salazar was regarded to have maintained a healthy friendship, and the resulting records of the bank transactions for the purchase then mysteriously disappeared.²⁷¹ Medici was also apparently widely believed to have regularly confiscated merchants' wares while they were held in port or in "Purgatory" that he then passed on to his benefactor on the council, Salazar, who in turn gave them as gifts to his wife or sold them off.²⁷² At least one merchant, along with the customs official who had initially heard his complaint, testified to the latter in a case in which a Sicilian merchant had shipped three or four boxes of sugar worth about 250 ducats to Naples. But Medici confiscated the sugar and sold it,

²⁶⁸ Gerald F. Pyle, *The Diffusion of Influenza: Patterns and Paradigms* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 23-25. The manner in which this influenza – which some suggest should be called the "Spanish flu" rather than the 1918 outbreak of influenza – spread in Europe was very distinctive, following the trade of the Spanish western Mediterranean and up the peninsula from southern Italy rather than spreading from east to west.

²⁶⁹ Henry Kamen, *The Duke of Alba* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 148-54; Dauril Alden, *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 84-91; AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 33-34v.

²⁷⁰ David Gentilcore, "Tempi sì calamitosi: Epidemic Disease and Public Health," in *A Companion to Early Modern Naples*, ed. Tommaso Astarita (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 287; see also Carlo Cipolla, *Fighting the Plague in Seventeenth-Century Italy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981) and Aurelio Musi, "Medici e istituzioni a Napoli nell'età moderna," in *Sanità e società: Abruzzi, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, secoli XVII-XX*, ed. Paolo Frascani (Udine, 1990), 19-71.

²⁷¹ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 33-34v.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, ff. 34v-39.

an action that attracted little public attention or outcry due to the ongoing fear of disease.²⁷³ The potential for abuse in connection with the regent's responsibility for appointing officials for the containment of plagues, among other tasks, was correspondingly believed to be an important target for reform since at least one witness believed that affected individuals were ordinarily afraid of openly complaining about the regents' clients in a social environment where the regents were powerful in both private and public affairs.²⁷⁴ Even after the crisis subsided, however, the growing inclusion of merchants in the process of collecting depositions continued after Guzmán's visita and officials, including later members of the Collateral Council, were often tied by merchants to illegal involvement in trade, especially the grain trade.²⁷⁵

If connections to banking and trade represented a new frontier for the visita, the regents' connections to the Neapolitan hinterland represented a similarly new line of investigation and, parallel to its efforts to draw testimony from merchants, Guzmán's visita turned its attention, albeit briefly, to the connections between Salazar and his clients and relatives beyond the urban institutions, particularly in the territory around Aversa. Of central importance, or at least of importance to the eleven witnesses who testified about it, was the alleged connection between a certain Antonio Vallejo and Salazar, who, as rumor had it, was of some relation to Vallejo. One witness, a bailiff for the territory, claimed that the regent and his family stayed with Vallejo about twice a year for three to five days at a time.²⁷⁶ As it happened, Vallejo had also been managing part of Salazar's country estate and, most importantly, a flock of sheep numbering about 400 to 600 heads that had been causing considerable damage to the surrounding estates.²⁷⁷ Complaints about sheep were, of course, a regular feature of rural life: nobles frequently petitioned the Crown regarding the Spanish administration's grants to allow passage of sheep through their estates free from their tolls while, at the same time, the increasing amount of pasture relative to agricultural lands put pressure on food production resulting in more indirect yet more explosive reactions.²⁷⁸ But in the visita, complaints were instead directed against the local elite. Indeed, even if slightly indirectly, those complaints against its nobility and its ties with the capital's administration as witnesses also noted that Vallejo seemed to have been connected to the appointment of a new captain in the Prince of Stigliano's territory, since the captain was married to a relative of Vallejo's while Salazar and the prince were known to have been close friends.²⁷⁹

But these complaints required the technologies of enforcement provided by the imperial state. For despite the damage, few officials in the territory around Aversa were willing to pursue the matter out of fear of Salazar and, in one case, Vallejo threatened a bailiff who had

²⁷³ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 38v-39.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., ff. 39v-45.

²⁷⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 79, ff. 2-3.

²⁷⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 96-98.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., ff. 96-109.

²⁷⁸ John A. Marino, "The Rural World in Italy under Spanish Rule," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 412-413; John A. Marino, *Pastoral Economics in the Kingdom of Naples* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Silvio Zotta, "Agrarian Crisis and Feudal Politics in the Kingdom of Naples: The Doria at Melfi (1585-1615)," in *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, eds. and trans. Antonio Calabria and John A. Marino (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 127-203; Caroline Castiglione, *Patrons and Adversaries: Nobles and Villagers in Italian Politics, 1640-1760* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

²⁷⁹ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 96-103v.

impounded the sheep with the ultimatum that Salazar would have the offending bailiff sent to the galleys. Alongside his protection and patronage of Vallejo, Salazar had additional connections and influence that were less notable if no less apparent as the regent was also alleged to have been the regular recipient of fresh cheese and milk from the shepherds in the area as well as livestock, meat, and firewood.²⁸⁰ To be sure, the reach of the visita was not especially long, and its investigation of the Collateral Council extended only about fifteen kilometers from the center of Naples to the city of Aversa, which had been in decline as an urban center for several centuries although it remained and still remains an agricultural center.²⁸¹ While the ability of the visita to circumscribe the extent to which the regents of the Collateral Council drew from the countryside therefore may not have been complete, the visita also began to use commissioners to draw from the countryside at an unprecedented rate in Naples and, as part of the growth in the number of officials charged, Guzmán also charged members of the various provincial courts across Naples that marked a new direction.

This expansion of the visita into the life and justice of the hinterland continued during Guevara's visita that began in 1606. By the seventeenth century, the inclusion of cases that developed increasingly outside the familiar domain of urban institutions indicated that the visita had begun to create an alternate structure of justice in places where local institutions had a weak enforcement of the norms that had developed in imperial centers.

One such example was the visita's prosecution of an official who had been appointed as a commissioner by the Collateral Council to collect information regarding crimes outside Naples, an activity formerly ignored by the visita. Two years into his inspection, Guevara began an investigation into Leonardo de Nicolardis and his conduct while investigating murders and other lesser crimes. Rather than actually investigate allegations, however, the commissioner instead used his position to collect bribes from the alleged criminals throughout the country without, as such allegations tended to make particular note of, even collecting testimonies.²⁸² In particular, Nicolardis seems to have regularly used intermediaries to collect payments and to negotiate for larger payments than the individuals who were arrested were initially willing to pay. But Nicolardis seems to have made crucial errors in doing this because these intermediaries were unsatisfied with the amount that they had been paid in the settlements that Nicolardis agreed to. In another case, Nicolardis went to conduct an investigation into the behavior of a feudal lord but when asked to produce his commission, failed to do so, and then settled for a considerably lower fee than would have been expected. In other instances, Nicolardis failed to collect or falsified evidence in order to protect suspects either to extort them or to secure bribes of several hundred ducats.

But the ease with which he was able to secure bribes led to excesses that ultimately undermined his enterprise. One doctor who was arrested, for example, reached an agreement with Nicolardis to be freed for 300 ducats. But having easily received that payment, Nicolardis then began to insist that he paid an additional bribe, which thus required several intermediaries to become involved in order to handle the collection of money and subsequent payment,

²⁸⁰ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 96-109.

²⁸¹ Marino, "The Rural World in Italy under Spanish Rule," 423; Giuseppe Galasso, *L'altra Europa. Per un'antropologia storica del Mezzogiorno d'Italia* (Milan: Mondadori, 1982), 36-40; Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 276-7.

²⁸² AGS, VIT, leg. 105-2, 105-4.

effectively revealing the extent of the commissioner's corruption to observers, especially friends of the two priests who were most involved in physically handling the transaction. If aggrieved witnesses were insufficient, the visitador was also able to exert pressure on witnesses he believed were insufficiently cooperative, including Nicolardis's brother-in-law, whom the visitador imprisoned for over a month until the witness supplied evidence against his relative, including evidence that Nicolardis may even have acted without having received a commission for certain territories.²⁸³ This work pointed to the development of a more extended connection between the visita and the Neapolitan hinterland throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century.

In the city of Naples itself, the visita's investigations explored another connection that had previously had limited oversight: women and the administration of justice. Women were, of course, often parts of official life in the depositions collected by the visitas prior to the 1580s, though never as major actors and usually at the fringes of investigations. Agustín's investigation of the castles in Sicily, for example, suggested that the wife of the *castellano* played a kind of intermediary role in managing sources of illicit income. In Guzmán's visita, Salazar's wife, on the other hand, was held up as a "visible" demonstration of her husband's corruption as he was alleged to have improperly received or stolen the fine gifts that he gave to her. So while not entirely peripheral to the mechanisms of the visita, women generally served as a public demonstration and evidence of their husbands' misconduct. The second and by far the most commonly featured place of women, though, was as an individual – often known only by reference to her familial relationship as a daughter, relative, or servant – who was used in transactions between an official and some litigant who had sought the official's favor and was then compelled to marry the official's female relation. In effect, in the mechanisms understood by the state, women remained "subordinate" even if that did not accurately reflect social practice.²⁸⁴ Beginning in the 1580s, however, the visita increasingly sought out and received women's depositions. Indeed, in one specific case they were very much at the center of a complex complaint about Daroca's improper involvement in some litigation.

The first source of information, unusually for the structure of the visita's investigation, was a somewhat marginal figure within the context of the network observed by the visita, a certain Domitio Romano. Romano had previously received a complaint from Giovanni Battista Notarella, a bank official, against Victoria (or Vittoria) de Córdoba,²⁸⁵ a former courtesan, and

²⁸³ AGS, VIT, leg. 105-2, ff. 3-37.

²⁸⁴ Ian Maclean, *The Renaissance Notion of Woman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Lucia Ferrante, et al., eds. *Ragnatele di rapporti. Patronage e reti di relazioni nella storia delle donne* (Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier, 1988); Judith Brown and Robert Davis, eds., *Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy* (New York: Longman, 1998); Silvia Mantini, "Women's History in Italy: Cultural Itineraries and New Proposals in Current Historiographical Trends," *Journal of Women's History* 12, no. 2 (2000), 170-98; Sandra Cavallo, "What Did Women Transmit? Ownership and Control of Household Goods and Personal Effects in Early Modern Italy," in *Gender and Material Culture in Historical Perspective*, eds. Moira Donald and Linda Hurcombe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 38-53; Gianna Pomata, "Family and Gender," in *Early Modern Italy*, ed. John A. Marino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 68-86; Cornelia Dayton, "Rethinking Agency, Recovering Voices," *American Historical Review* 109 (June, 2004), 827-43; Elizabeth S. Cohen, "Evolving the History of Women in Early Modern Italy: Subordination and Agency," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 325-354.

²⁸⁵ Victoria's last name may indicate some familial relation to a prominent Spanish noble family in Naples though presumably not of direct, legitimate lineage.

one of her servants, Laura Basilece, accusing them of having robbed a chest containing seventy or eighty ducats and some gold. The case was subsequently referred to a judge of the Vicaria or the high criminal tribunal and the two women were detained before being released. The regent of the Vicaria handling the case told Romano that this was because Daroca, who at the time was a member of the appeals court of the Santa Chiara, had sent a servant to take the women to him. Daroca would then go on to assert his right to intervene in and take charge of the case, much to Notarella's displeasure. When providing his deposition, Notarella described the matter in considerably greater detail. Three years prior to the collection of his deposition, he had been living in Victoria de Córdoba's house along with Victoria's sister, Leonor, and when the two sisters departed for some period of time, Giovanni had remained in the house along with a third sister, Isabel, and Victoria's servant Laura, to whom he entrusted seventy ducats, a gold chain, and a shirt for safe keeping. When Victoria returned, she supposedly demanded that Laura produce the key to the chest and then allegedly stole the contents. When Daroca took over the case, it seems that the proceedings became shrouded in mystery and Notarella had ceased to hear information about it.²⁸⁶ The turning point of the investigation was, however, the visitador's collection of Victoria de Córdoba's deposition.

Córdoba's participation in the visita transformed what had, in effect, been a dispute about the lack of resolution of a case of theft into an investigation that, presumably because of Córdoba's access to individuals of means and status, began monitoring gender-power relations in official conduct. Following Notarella's testimony, the visitador began by inquiring about the facts of the litigation and Victoria denied the theft. While Córdoba and her sister were detained at the Vicaria, Daroca's servant arrived with a message apparently to the displeasure of the regent of the Vicaria, who complained about "the pestering of this Daroca" and the sisters returned home while her servant continued to be detained. Four or five days after Victoria returned home, Daroca summoned Córdoba to his home, where he began to question her about the case and then claimed that without his intervention, she and her servant would surely have been punished and asked for her to kiss his hands. Taking advantage of this position of power, Daroca then supposedly asked Victoria whether she was in love with anyone and whether she loved this person a great deal, to which she responded in the affirmative. Changing approach, Daroca asked whether anyone loved her sister, Leonor, and Victoria denied this but said she was interested in a Spanish military officer. After discovering that this officer had yet to deliver on any promises towards Leonor, Daroca insinuated that he himself might be interested and asked Victoria to present her sister to him. Victoria claimed that this would be impossible and her subsequent communications with Leonor indicated that Daroca had something of a reputation for making requests of that nature.

Disappointed, Daroca then occupied the house adjoining Córdoba's, apparently owned by two women who were alleged to have frequent meetings with the regent, and he regularly began sending messengers to instruct the sisters to leave their house. In fear, Victoria and Leonor went to plead with Daroca but achieved no settlement of the issue despite Daroca's continued abuse of the women. In this, Victoria's description differed somewhat from her sister's subsequent testimony since the former euphemistically noted that Leonor had been compelled to spend some time alone with Daroca while Leonor, who was only about sixteen years old at the time of the incident, explicitly indicated that Daroca, in keeping with his

²⁸⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 109v-113.

abhorrent reputation for such behavior, had extorted sex from her to forget the dispute with Notarella after he had previously indicated she would be obliged to return his initial favor of freeing the sisters.²⁸⁷ Even then, Daroca had the sisters jailed for a time to force them out of their house while also preventing the sisters from renting it out. Upon their return, Daroca then installed soldiers in the house while forcing Isabel, the older widowed sister, and her children out of the house.²⁸⁸ This case was clearly of significant importance to the visitador's investigation, resulting in a number of charges against Daroca but also in the considerable number of people and types of behavior it highlighted, with Victoria de Córdoba being one of the most central figures of the investigation.²⁸⁹ Córdoba's participation in the visita thus brought in an entirely new range of abuses and relationships that could be understood and regulated by the state in large part because of her access, as a courtesan, to a wide net of individuals.

In that same sense, the visita also represented a potential tool for the Neapolitan nobility, which had a number of grievances against the regents of the Collateral Council²⁹⁰ and Salernitano and Salazar in particular, to guard against the erosion of their political status relative to the Kingdom's non-noble administrative elite. In accordance with the well understood tendency for the Spanish Crown to limit the access of its nobility to appointed bodies like the Collateral Council and the access of magistrates to representative bodies like the *seggi*, the visita, insofar as sufficient tensions existed, thus served to control social distinctions and limit the power of magistrates to upset the equilibrium of the social order.²⁹¹ In this, the visita partially inverted the mechanisms of the state in Oestreich's conception of social discipline as the preservation of aristocratic order was not achieved through absolutism but rather through the negotiation of status at the local level against the reckoned excesses of non-noble elites.

This was keenly evident at the foundations of noble interests: property and family. In both respects, Salernitano was particularly despised for transgressing against the traditional order. For example, Salernitano was infamous for his quasi-legal occupation of an estate that belonged to the Prince of Bisignano for a number of years. Initially, the regent had contracted with one of the prince's agents to rent the estate for three thousand ducats although the exact details of the contract seem to have been worded – perhaps intentionally – in an obfuscatory

²⁸⁷ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 117-119. Leonor's testimony is structured in such a way that the succession of events is unclear (i.e. there is no reference to being jailed after this) but it seems that this is in reference to same period of time mentioned by Victoria, who indicated that they were jailed a second time.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 113v-123v.

²⁸⁹ AGS, VIT, leg. 31-2, ff. 81-150. By network measures, she ranks just behind the regents by degree and is approximately equal to the viceroys and the Bank of Ravaschiero by betweenness centrality.

²⁹⁰ This was complicated by their relative exclusion from the council and the Neapolitan nobility was known for petitioning the Crown for more substantial representation in the administration of the kingdom, including on the Collateral Council, but opportunities in Naples remained limited except through military service. Muto, "La nobleza napolitana en el contexto de la Monarquía Hispánica: Algunos planteamientos," 145-151.

²⁹¹ Giovanni Muto, "Gestione politica e controllo sociale nella Napoli spagnola," in *Le città capitale*, ed. Cesare De Seta (Rome: Laterza, 1985), 67-94; Giuliana Vitale, "La nobiltà di seggio a Napoli nel basso medioevo: Aspetti della dinamica interna," *Archivio per le Province Napoletane* (1988), 151-69; Giovanni Muto, "Problemi di statificazione nobiliare nell'Italia spagnola," in *Dimenticare Croce? Studi e orientamenti di storia del Mezzogiorno*, ed. Elvira Ciosi and Aurelio Musi (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1991), 73-111; Delille, *Le maire et le prieur*; Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy," 251-297.

manner since the term of the lease, the yearly rent, and the obligation of the parties to pay for damages virtually immediately became a matter of dispute to the extent that Philip II ordered the former viceroy, Íñigo López de Mendoza y Mendoza, to order Salernitano not to mistreat the prince, who was ill. Since that did not produce a resolution, litigation followed involving a large number of attorneys, who were then able to supply information to the visitador about the dispute, in order to force the regent to pay the money for the property that he had effectively seized.²⁹² But the noble disgust for Salernitano also extended to his apparent abuse of his position, through which he used his influence to force certain individuals to marry his relatives in exchange for titles of nobility, which, since they were so freely given to non-nobles and to people who would subsequently be beholden to Salernitano, were obviously not particularly well regarded by the Neapolitan nobility especially when noble access to power in urban institutions was waning.²⁹³

If that mobilization of noble mistrust indicates a certain degree of coalescence of class and factional interests against categories of behavior or, less charitably, particular members of the Collateral Council, that would belie the structures according to which the visita operated in Naples and which, in retrospect, it reveals. Although social histories of early modern Naples point to the pervasiveness of factional alliances as the essential manner in which power was structured and accessed and perhaps rightly so in many of its institutions, the Collateral Council, the “summit of the institutional hierarchy of the Kingdom of Naples” as Giovanni Muto called it,²⁹⁴ offers one counterpoint to the factional model.

The expansive network centered around the Collateral Council of the 1580s that the visita sought out *does not* seem to indicate the existence of strong factional groupings extending through it and is instead characterized by the following traits suggesting an alternative social structure. First, in part because of the nature of the investigation, the administrative elite and the regents of the Collateral Council in particular, as might be expected, were generally well connected while the vast majority of the individuals in the network were very poorly connected, that is to say that like many real networks, the Collateral Council’s network followed a “power-law degree distribution.” Second, in contrast to contemporary Sicily, the network was characterized by a high degree of mixing wherein those elites were strongly connected to peripheral individuals. In other words, the network was “disassortative.” Finally, those elites were part of a “rich club,” or were well connected to each other, though as illustrated earlier, not necessarily consistently amicably but certainly not entirely fragmented. These three traits indicate that the Neapolitan governing network, or at least the apex of it, was what might be termed an “oligarchical network,”²⁹⁵ which in this context signifies that the work of administration or of malfeasance within it was centered around a very small but closely connected group of individuals, the regents, who were the most important channels through which an otherwise disorganized group of often peripheral individuals interacted with power.

²⁹² AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1, ff. 2v-10.

²⁹³ Ibid., ff. 39v-45, 49-50, 51v-54, et al.

²⁹⁴ Muto, “Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy,” 282.

²⁹⁵ Christopher Ansell, Renata Bichir, and Shi Zhou, “Who Says Networks, Says Oligarchy? Oligarchies as ‘Rich Club’ Networks,” *Connections* 35, no. 2 (2015), 20-32. For data, see the subsequent section on Sicily when all four governing networks are compared.

1. Juan de Zúñiga y Requesens, Viceroy
2. Íñigo López de Mendoza y Mendoza, Viceroy
3. Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, Viceroy and President of the Council of Italy
4. Francisco Daroca, Regent of the Chancery and Collateral Council
5. Alfonso de Salazar, Regent of the Chancery and CC
6. Tommaso Salernitano, Regent of the Chancery and CC
7. Alonso Sánchez, Regent CC
8. Carlos della Tolfa, Regent CC
9. Pedro Díaz Carrillo de Quesada, Regent CC
10. Prince of Bisignano
11. Salazar's wife, Isabel
12. Antonio Vallejo
13. Giovanni Domenico de Medici
14. Bank of Ravaschiero
15. Bank of Pontecorvo and Calamazza
16. Victoria Córdoba
17. Leonor Córdoba
18. Giovanni Francesco Gatto, merchant
19. Giovanni Angelo Fasolo, merchant
20. Christoforo Grimaldo, merchant
21. Paulo Dosso, merchant




Figure 5. Visualization of a selection of the Collateral Council's network circa 1582.²⁹⁶

By contrast, organized factions beneath that apex were of seemingly marginal importance to or invisible in the quotidian conduct of clientelism and governance, at least insofar as the state could perceive it. That may well have been the Spanish Crown's hope, as of the thirty-seven regents of the Chancery who were appointed between 1561 and 1648 and who by virtue of that position were the only regents of the Collateral Council who were tasked with the administration of justice, only six were Neapolitan patricians *di seggio* while twenty-four were Spanish.²⁹⁷ It was these men, the Crown hoped, who could be trusted to run the Kingdom of Naples without being subverted by local factional interests. While that particular goal may have obtained, it certainly did not mitigate the pervasive practice of clientelism in the abundant individual relationships that characterized the intersection between administration and society. Policing those non-factional and extra-institutional activities and relationships therefore required a more extensive intervention on the part of the state to provide the means through which the grievances of individuals from certain politically marginalized, if not necessarily socially peripheral, classes like merchants and nobles could affect the norms of bureaucracy and, by extension, their social context. Accordingly, the visita of the late-sixteenth and early-

²⁹⁶ Based on AGS, VIT, leg. 31-1. Blue nodes represent individuals who provided depositions, yellow nodes represent viceroys and other officials of interest, red nodes represent other members of the Council, and black nodes represent all other or unknown individuals. Nodes are sized by degree.

²⁹⁷ Muto, "Noble Presence and Stratification in the Territories of Spanish Italy," 283.

seventeenth centuries represented an increasingly efficient instrument for both the locality and the Crown for regulating the members of the administrative elite.

While the individual incidents and cases that were so emblematic of the late-sixteenth century *visita*'s increasingly broad intervention into the locality could not have possibly represented a sustained or singular challenge to those norms in themselves, together they signified a new form of assessment of those norms in connection to administrative behavior and a new location for that assessment: the state. As before, then, final mediation came in the form of the discipline meted out by the state. Initially, the immediacy of discipline continued to be a matter of discussion in the correspondence between Guzmán and Philip II from the beginning of the *visitador*'s investigations in 1582 to 1584. In the summer of 1582, Guzmán had already begun to take action against Salazar but Philip II requested additional evidence of Salazar's wrongdoing beyond his own suspicions about the regent's sudden accumulation of wealth before providing the *visitador* permission to suspend an official of such "preeminence and rank."²⁹⁸ Philip II similarly held back permission to suspend Daroca in 1583, though the *visitador* was ultimately able to suspend the regents with the participation of the viceroy in the summer of 1583.²⁹⁹ Despite that initial caution, however, Guzmán's charges fell especially hard against four members of the Collateral Council, and to a lesser extent, the highest officials in the other principal courts of the Kingdom. Bastida de Muñatones, Secretary of the Kingdom, whose investigation was conducted and filed separately following the precedent of Quiroga's *visita* was given 48 charges.

In 1586, Philip II commissioned a secret *visita* against Muñatones to further pursue the initial work conducted by Guzmán but also as a result of allegations that the secretary had been at the center of controversy in riots that had broken out in Naples.³⁰⁰ The regents of the Chancery were still more heavily charged. Salernitano had 79 charges against him while Salazar and Daroca had a truly staggering number of charges leveled against them, among the greatest from any *visita* in Italy, let alone the one they were subject to: 160 and 170 respectively.³⁰¹

This was not surprising considering the extent to which the regents had been implicated in the *visita*'s investigations and the three were very much at the center of the investigative network.³⁰² The final results of the *visita* showed the extent to which the institution had come to embody its role as a disciplinary instrument, a fact perhaps best demonstrated beyond the confines of the investigation into the Collateral Council.

For the first time in its history in Italy, the *visita* would have charged the vast majority of office holders from the period. Above the provincial and local levels, the royal administration that was subject to the *visita* would have had approximately 380 officials in the seventeenth century.³⁰³ Including only officials from comparable offices, Guzmán charged the equivalent of 86% of that figure and that represented only slightly more than half of the total number of officials his *visita* charged. The *visita* had become truly comprehensive in its practice of surveillance and discipline.

²⁹⁸ AGS, SSP, libro 11. August 21, 1582. Philip II to Guzmán.

²⁹⁹ Ibid. June 28 and September 10, 1583. Philip II to Guzmán.

³⁰⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 387.

³⁰¹ AGS, VIT, leg. 24-2, ff. 599-615.

³⁰² By degree, Salazar ranks first with 76 followed by Salernitano at 65 and Daroca at 49.

³⁰³ 383 are numbered in Rosario Villari, *La rivolta antispagnola a Napoli: Le origini 1585-1647* (Naples: Laterza, 1967), 22-23.

Table 2. Charges by labeled office from Guzmán's visita to Naples in 1581, part 1.³⁰⁴

Office	Title	Number of Officials	Number of Charges	Average Number of Charges	Standard Deviation
Collateral Council		4	457	114	60.1
Chancery	Warrant Scr.	6	71	11.8	15.1
	Registro Scr.	6	7	1.17	0.41
	Chancellors	4	29	7.25	5.74
	Seal	1	21	21	N/A
	Other Scr.	8	49	6.13	7.72
	ALL	25	177	7.08	9.59
Sacro Regio Consiglio (Santa Chiara) (Capuana)	President, Councilors, and Secretary	19	546	28.7	37.9
	Mastrodatti	12	79	6.58	3.80
	Scribes	13	55	4.23	6.15
	ALL	44	680	15.5	27.4
Sommaria	Lugarteniente, President, et al.	8	370	46.3	45.3
	Razionali, et al.	41	256	6.24	8.31
	ALL	49	626	12.8	24.1
Vicaria	Regents	5	39	7.8	6.61
	Judges	10	95	9.5	8.57
	Civil Mastr.	14	153	10.9	10.2
	Subactuaries	33	80	2.42	1.93
	Mastr. Scr.	26	43	1.65	1.04
	Subac. Scr.	8	12	1.5	1.07
	Crim. Mastr.	12	66	5.5	3.15
	Mastr. Scr.	50	146	2.92	3.05
	Jailers	11	43	3.91	2.81
	Others	17	71	4.18	4.64
	ALL	186	748	4.02	5.07
Treasury		15	163	10.8	12.0
Scrivania		8	64	8	13.1
SUBTOTAL		331	2,915	8.81	

³⁰⁴ AGS, VIT, leg. 24-2, ff. 599-615. There seems to be a counting error in the document or in my review that I was unable to locate even after several attempts so that the number of officials is lower (622 compared to 629) than given in this chart.

Table 3. Charges by labeled office from Guzmán's visita to Naples in 1581, part 2.³⁰⁵

Office	Title	Number of Officials	Number of Charges	Average Number of Charges	Standard Deviation
Zecca della Giustizia	Judges and "In General"	3	178	59.3	23.5
	Razionali	19	48	2.52	2.09
	All	22	226	10.3	21.3
Audiencia for Spaniards		6	14	2.33	1.51
Admiralty Court		7	90	12.9	16.4
Customs Houses, Various		21	271	12.9	10.5
Percettori		19	668	35.2	54.5
Provincial Courts		37	348	9.41	12.2
Sheep Customs House		49	467	9.53	18.7
Galleys		75	288	3.84	12.5
Other		62	308	4.97	7.89
SUBTOTAL		298	2,680	8.99	
TOTAL		629	5,595	8.90	20.1

To be sure, Guzmán was, like his predecessors, also entrusted with the aim of providing reforms to the tribunals in Naples and one such reform, described in an anonymous list of "advertencias" amusingly considered the difficulties of instituting laws in the imperial context, as it apparently was not also similarly presupposed that laws for Naples should be written in a common language, namely Latin, so that speakers of Italian and Spanish alike could refer to the documents without doubts about the vocabulary or phrasing.³⁰⁶ But that same correspondence revealed that the bulk of the reforms resulting from the visita were in fact directly related to the review of conduct and the punishment that followed:

Before everything, it should be presupposed that the only chapters of reform that go in the said dispatch are those that resulted from the corresponding charges against officials and the resolution that has been taken against them, judging their fault and at the same time providing for the future against the inconveniences that resulted from [those faults] and [the visitador] has left and referred the truthful and principal reforms that come from the depositions of the witnesses [when asked] the ordinary question [about reforms].³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ See previous footnote.

³⁰⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 387.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. "Ante todas cosas se ha de presuponer que los capítulos de reformación q en el dho despacho van, solamente son los que han resultado de los mismos cargos de los oficiales, y de la resolución que se ha tomado en ellos, juzgando las culpas, y juntamte pbeyendo para adelante a los inconvenientes que resultavan dellas y ha dexado el Sor. Don Lope de referir la verdadera y principal reformación que es la que nace de deposiciones de los Testigos hechas sobre la pregunta ordinaria que se les suele hacer."

The necessity of discipline, even within the broader project of reform, was thus confirmed. The reforms implemented by the state that reinforced new behavioral norms were directly derived from the punishment of behaviors that had, in the course of interaction between Neapolitan society and the *visita*, become unacceptable.

MILAN

As had become the norm for the *visita*, its practice in Milan in the 1580s and 1600s, although increasingly similar to the *visitas* to Naples and Sicily, continued to maintain certain eccentricities arising from the relative novelty of the institution in conjunction with Milan's geographic and social distinctiveness. The sixteenth century in Milan was characterized by a broad social transformation in which the duchy's traditional land-owning nobility was overtaken by a patriciate based principally on office holding. Outside the city, the emerging social and economic organization of the countryside itself proved to be dynamic force.³⁰⁸ By the late sixteenth century, the administration of the kingdom had consolidated, though, because of the developing strategic importance of the duchy, with considerably more local privileges and autonomy than Naples.³⁰⁹ That strategic importance was evidenced both by the place of Milan and its court within Italian diplomacy and in the growing number of troops stationed there: from a *tercio* of Lombardy with its 3,000 infantry and local forces in 1559 to some 20,000 soldiers from the 1570s.³¹⁰ While the Milanese context thus created distinct social conflicts and reactions to the *visita*, its presence nevertheless began to fill a similar function in the developing connection between the Spanish state and local society in obligating the former to intervene

³⁰⁸ Federico Del Tredici, "Nobility in Lombardy between the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age," in *A Companion to Late Medieval and Early Modern Milan: The Distinctive Features of an Italian State*, ed. Andrea Gamberini (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 477-498; Gianvittorio Signorotto, "Lo Stato di Milano in età spagnola. Aggiornamenti e prospettive di ricerca," in *La Lombardia spagnola: nuovi indirizzi di ricerca*, eds. Elena Brambilla and Giovanni Muto (Milan: Unicopli, 1997), 11-27; Cinzia Cremonini, "The Congregazione dello Stato between renewed local fervor and unitary tension (1590-1706)," in *Growing in the Shadow of an Empire: How Spanish Colonialism Affected Economic Development in Europe and in the World (XVIth-XVIIIth cc.)*, eds. Giuseppe De Luca and Gaetano Sabatini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2012), 361-376; Vittorio Beonio Brocchieri, *Piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo. Famiglie e mestieri nel Ducato di Milano in età spagnola* (Milan: Unicopli, 2000); Emanuele C. Colombo, *Giochi di luoghi. Il territorio Lombardo nel Seicento* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008).

³⁰⁹ Domenico Sella, "Spanish Rule in Milan in the Sixteenth Century: Old and New Perspectives," in *Italian Renaissance Studies in Arizona*, eds. Jean R. Brink, Pier Raimondo Baldini (River Forest, Il.: Rosary College: 1989), 204; D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 58-9.

³¹⁰ D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 58-9; Mario Rizzo, "Non solo Guerra. Risorse e organizzazione della strategia asburgica in Lombardia durante la seconda metà del Cinquecento," in *Guerra y sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica. Política, estrategia y cultura en la Europa moderna (1500-1700)*, vol. 1, eds. Enrique García Hernán and Davide Maffi (Madrid: Laberinto, CSIC and Fundación Mapfre, 2006), 230; Cesare Mozzarelli, "Nella Milano dei re cattolici. Considerazioni su uomini, cultura e istituzioni tra Cinque e Seicento," in *Lombardia borromaica, Lombardia spagnola, 1554-1659*, vol. 1, eds. Paolo Pissavino, Gianvittorio Signorotto (Rome: Bulzoni 1995), 425; Mario Rizzo, "'Rivoluzione dei consumi', 'state building' e 'rivoluzione militare'. La domanda e l'offerta di servizi strategici nella Lombardia spagnola, 1535-1659," in *Tra vecchi e nuovi equilibri, Domanda e offerta di servizi in Italia in età moderna e contemporanea*, eds. Iginia Lopane and Ezio Ritrovato (Bari, 2007), 454; Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42-69.

against newly perceived forms of misconduct, many of which were highlighted by the changing social landscape.³¹¹

This distinctiveness of the *visita* in Milan is immediately apparent in its records, particularly in their substantial increase. While the *visita* beginning in 1559 produced one single libro that survives, the *visita* conducted by Luis de Castilla beginning in 1581 produced forty-nine legajos and libros. Likewise, both Castilla and Felipe de Haro, whose *visita* began in 1607, were, unlike their colleagues in southern Italy still intent upon proposing reforms, especially in conjunction with establishing best practices for local institutions and, in particular, developing Milan's position in the mercantilist system of the Spanish empire.³¹² For example, Castilla's nearly fifty recommendations for the mint suggest restrictions on the admissibility of foreign coinage, a warning against devaluing the coinage by mixing metals, a prohibition on the entry of foreigners into the mint, and a stipulation that accounts be taken each month, among other suggestions. The *visitador* also offered improvements to the customs houses, the provision of wine, and nineteen recommendations about the administration of salt, which sought to fix prices and forbid the purchase of salt from Venice, an interest resumed by Haro, who collected a discourse about salt fittingly entitled "Discurso fatto sopra il sale."³¹³

But the largest expansion of the *visita*'s role was again in its disciplinary function. Whereas in the late 1550s and early 1560s, Cueva had only been able to draw upon a few depositions that produced little of value for his investigations, Castilla's work was comparatively exhaustive.³¹⁴ The surviving materials indicate that at least 245 officials were charged by the *visitador*, but some of the volumes of charges are no longer extant, and a more accurate assessment based on individuals' prosecution rates, which was around 30% for those 245 officials, would suggest that Castilla likely charged around 360 officials in Milan.³¹⁵ This rather low prosecution rate, which indicated that the linkage between formal punishment and the disciplinary process was not entirely settled in the late sixteenth century, itself points to two distinctive features of Castilla's *visita*.

First, unlike the concurrent *visitas* to Naples and Sicily, Castilla's *visita* to Milan was rather prolonged.³¹⁶ Indeed, in the extensive correspondence between Luis de Castilla and

³¹¹ Cf. Mario Rizzo, "Dinamiche istituzionali, risorse di governo ed equilibri di potere nelle 'visitas generales' lombarde (1580-1620)," in *Fonti ecclesiastiche per la storia sociale e religiosa d'Europa: XV-XVIII secolo*, eds. Cecilia Nubola and Angelo Turchini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 277-315. Rizzo argued that the Crown did not wish to disturb its relationship with the Milanese patriciate and that the *visitas* ultimately allowed it to show its benevolence by making their discipline less severe.

³¹² Rizzo, "Finanza pubblica, impero e amministrazione nella Lombardia spagnola. Le 'visitas generales,'" 327.

³¹³ AGS, SSP, leg. 1903; AGS, VIT, leg. 268-2.

³¹⁴ AGS, VIT, libros 289-328 and leg. 329-335 and 406-407. If it was impossible to construct an investigative network for Cueva's *visita* because none existed, Castilla's records are functionally impossible to use because of their abundance. The depositions for the Senate alone, for example, account for 2,212 folios, or nearly twenty times the length related to the Collateral Council in Naples.

³¹⁵ AGS, SSP, libro 995; AGS, VIT, libros 319; 320; 321. Since contemporary prosecution rates are often calculated on the basis of whether or not an individual was convicted of the most serious crime, a distinction that is not as quantifiable for the sixteenth century as it is in contemporary criminal justice, the rate is calculated on whether or not an individual was convicted on any charge.

³¹⁶ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 188. Cf. Ugo Petronio, *Il Senato di Milano* (Rome: Giuffrè, 1972), 175-180 who believed that the *visita* (and its length) was a disaster that derived from internal conflict in Milan and which fed into its work.

Philip II, it was clear by 1585 that Castilla had a rather more extensive plan for the visita than had been anticipated by the Crown. In December 1587, for example, Philip had clearly become rather frustrated with the duration of the visita to Milan and, reminding the visitador of the numerous times he had previously instructed him over the last two years to bring the visita to its conclusion, finally ordered its cessation within four months due to the fact that visita was entering its seventh year, an unprecedented duration for the institution with the exception of the halting visita to the Council of Italy.³¹⁷ While this excess obviously made Castilla's visita more comprehensive, it ironically reduced the likelihood that malfeasance would be punished, not merely because the memory and importance of illicit conduct had faded but also because the *junta* that eventually resolved the cases would allow personal conduct charges to lapse upon the death an official, which advanced age and illness were likely to bring on more rapidly than hoped.

There were, however, exceptions. Financial crimes that defrauded the royal patrimony did not lapse and, in theory, the heirs of the official would be required to pay any assessed fines or restitution. These kinds of crimes were also usually more easily proven because of discrepancies in financial accounts whereas, as demonstrated for officials whose position was less closely tied to records of that nature, the quality and quantity of information received from others' observations was essential to charges related to other forms of conduct. The accumulation of these factors is manifest in the fines and punishments assessed for Castilla's visita. Second, although most of the institutions of the Milanese administration had several individuals who were punished as a result of the visita, some offices were extremely unlikely to correspond to punishment and this was particularly true of one of the offices most distinctly associated with the visitas to Milan: military officers.

Although a general visita had never previously dealt with military officers in significant numbers as such work had previously concentrated on individuals responsible for supplying or maintaining fortifications, the more considerable army presence in Milan in the late sixteenth century, by then numbering about 20,000 soldiers, created a novel situation for the visita, the duchy's financial administration, and the society of the Milanese countryside.³¹⁸ Above all else, the relationship between the visita and the army in Castilla's visita illustrates that the presence of soldiers and officers in large numbers represented a major disruption for the society of Milan and particularly in towns and villages outside the city of Milan in which they procured lodging, which resulted in an array of possible abuses, the most common of which was the improper handling of payments for billeting.

Other abuses of the locality were nevertheless abundant. One captain of the infantry, for example, was accused of having marched into a town square and then proceeding to violently beat the populace with sticks – a remarkably common type of abuse – in order to drive them out of the *piazza*. Another army officer was accused of illicitly loaning out weapons. One particularly abusive captain apparently excused a homicide committed by one of his soldiers. Yet the defense of his own men was not entirely at the forefront of his concerns, as he also

³¹⁷ AGS, SSP, libro 11. December 10, 1587. Philip II to Castilla. See chapter 4.

³¹⁸ Mario Rizzo, "Militari e civili nello Stato di Milano durante la seconda metà del Cinquecento. In tema di alloggiamenti militari," *Clio* 4 (1987), 563-596; Mario Rizzo, "Finanza pubblica, impero e amministrazione nella Lombardia spagnola. Le 'visitas generales'," 303-361; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, *Milán y el legado de Felipe II Gobernadores y corte provincial en la Lombardía de los Austrias* (Madrid: Sociedad estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001).

apparently set up a scheme in which injured or ill soldiers were not admitted to a hospital and he then defrauded them of their salaries. Yet another official was found to have illegally taken a Morisco as a slave and having paid his servants as if they had enlisted in the army.³¹⁹ None of these abuses nor very many of the dozens of army officers who were charged by Castilla were punished.³²⁰

The reasons for this are unclear but a number of possibilities seem likely. Because the vast majority of these abuses would have occurred outside the usual domain of the visita in the urban context, they would likely have been collected by a commissioner hired by the visitador and the evidence collected by such agents in other visitas is of quite obviously inferior quality to that collected by the visitador and noted by his personal secretary. Although the countryside could be a driving force in instigating complaints,³²¹ this made it considerably more difficult to affect a conclusion to an investigation. Second, a rather large number of these officials were captains of the Spanish infantry, which is to say that because of the well-known biases of the Spanish court and the obvious importance that military officers had in the midst of the ongoing war in the Low Countries, it is less likely that these officers would be condemned for their conduct. Third, their crimes could not be dealt with easily due to the considerable length of the visita, which meant that these officials would likely be stationed in areas where evidence or fines would be difficult to collect even if they had managed to overcome the poor prospects of survival. The social response to the presence of soldiers had turned from general complaints, the likes of which had been previously expressed in a more general sense by the abbot of San Gregorio, to using the visita's disciplinary potential even if the government in Spain was not yet entirely willing or able to meet its subjects' grievances.

On the other hand, some officials who were charged were virtually guaranteed to receive a fine especially in an office tied to the military presence in Milan: officials responsible for distributing salaries. Of those, one official in particular was especially heavily punished: Diego Garcia de Pradilla, the general overseer, whose fine accounted for roughly a third of the total of the fines assessed. With 118 charges against him, Pradilla's conduct very obviously shows the close correspondence between account books and the ultimate result of the visita for him: numerous instances of excessive payments or increasing salaries without having received instructions to do so, allowing individuals who did not fulfill their obligations to be paid, maintaining places in account books for individuals who were deceased, using illicit coinage for certain payments, not maintaining proper account books for expenses for munitions and construction, and all this – and more – backed by twenty-two folios of itemized damages to the Crown's fisc.³²²

This was a clear expression of the visita as means of auditing officials and the correspondence between documentary evidence and punishment, which was simultaneously easier to establish and also of considerable importance to the Crown especially in a strategic center like Milan. Financial crimes could, however, have some ties to observed behavior.

³¹⁹ AGS, VIT, libro 319; 320.

³²⁰ AGS, SSP, libro 995.

³²¹ Mario Bendiscioli, "Politica, amministrazione e religione nell'età dei Borromei," in *L'Età della Riforma cattolica (1559-1630)*, vol. 10, *Storia di Milano* (Milan: Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la storia di Milano, 1957), 100-1.

³²² AGS, VIT, leg. 319.

Table 4. Punishments by labeled office from Castilla's visita to Milan in 1581.³²³

Office	Number of Officials Punished	Total Primary Fines (<i>escudos</i>)	Average Primary Fine	Standard Deviation of Fines	Number of Restitution Payments	Number of Suspensions and Prohibitions
Secret Council	9	3,164	352	351	1	1
Senate	13	2,640	203	471	2	1
Magistrato Ordinario	2	3,400	1,700	2,263	0	0
Magistrato Straordinario ³²⁴	2	0	0	0	2	0
Permanent Prosecutors	2	8	8	6	1	0
Other Justice Officials	21	1,063*	53	116	4	2
Treasury	3	2,574*	858	723	1	2
Paymaster's Office	42	50,618	1,205	4,890	1	19
Military	13	16,284	1,252	2,139	0	0
TOTAL	107	79,955	747	3,187	12	25

The general treasurer of Milan, for example, was similarly accused of mishandling money, including among other things, a charge that he falsified his accounts in order to clear his debts and 440 incidents in which the treasurer illegally used intermediaries to handle money as well as eight cases of “extortion.” The final charge against him was in some ways the most exemplary: “He has procured to impede what has been asked in the course of this visita [...] so that the truth is neither said nor discovered, which is a thing that is a bad example and very contrary to what should be done by any principal minister and to what is asked of the public service and of what His Majesty orders.”³²⁵

The result of this intensity of interest in financial malfeasance in military affairs and irregularities in fiscal administration was manifest in the ultimate result of the visita. Officials from the *Magistrato Ordinario*, which oversaw the state budget, taxes, currency, and provisioning expenses for the military, the paymaster's office that oversaw the army's finances, and officers in the army itself received the highest average fines followed by the treasury's

³²³ AGS, SSP, libro 995. Additional (i.e. non-primary) fines raised the total fines to 83,568 escudos. Figures with an asterisk indicate that at least one included fine was approximated because it was denominated in “suelos,” “libras,” or “escudos de oro” rather than the usual “escudos.”

³²⁴ The Magistrato Straordinario administered the royal patrimony, regulated the sale of grain and was entrusted with restricting contraband, and dealt with the administration of fines and confiscations of estates. D'Amico, “Spanish Milan, 1535-1706,” 53.

³²⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 319. “Ha procurado impedir lo que ha podido, el curso desta visita y las justicia haciendo algunas prevençiones para que ni se dýxese ni supiese la verdad, cosa de mal exemplo y muy contraria alo que deve pretender, qualquier ministro prinçipal, y alo que pide el útil público, y su Magestad manda y ordena.”

officials. Likewise, officials from the paymaster's office received nineteen out of the twenty-five suspensions and office holding resulting from the visita.

The strategic ties between Milan and the empire had an additional expression in the visita's investigation into the imperial postal service. One of the several offices dealt with in nearly all the Italian visitas beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century was that of postmaster, a post that was especially important for the Spanish administration in Milan because mail intended for much of Italy, including Rome, Venice, Genoa, and Naples flowed through Milan. This service had been entrusted to the Tasso family, which had developed the mail routes in Lombardy to Venice and to Rome in the late thirteenth century and subsequently to other European cities before being entrusted with the Hapsburg mail service in the sixteenth century.³²⁶

This powerful intersection between familial patrimony and the early modern administrative state established the groundwork for a truly singular phenomenon. While the relationship between elites and gender was becoming incorporated into the visitas to Naples, the concurrent visita to Milan prosecuted an official who *was* a woman. For in the early seventeenth century, the power and influence of the Tassis family was such that after the death of the Milanese postmaster Ruggero Tassis in 1588, the post was inherited by his widow, Lucina Cattaneo Tassis, who had the distinction of being the only woman to hold an official post in the Hapsburg empire. Perhaps as remarkable is the relatively unremarkable, albeit illustrative, nature of the visitador's investigation, in which scarce attention was given to its most unusual feature. Haro's charges instead reflected a number of ordinary complaints about the speed and cost of the mail service as well as allegations that certain officials had been paid an insufficient quantity and included the production of a report of the postmaster's account books. Lucina's defense appealed to her office's records and noted that delivery was not always a certainty due to "flooding, bad horses, [and] the whims of princes."³²⁷ Delays might also occur because, according to the instructions for the post, deliveries of ordinary mail to Rome, Genoa, and Venice were only handled weekly and only once a month to Spain.³²⁸ Underpinning the administration of justice and the collection of revenues, the bonds of empire relied on information and these too began to require the careful control of the visita.

But although the visita to Milan focused particularly on the bonds between the duchy and empire, it hardly ignored complaints that were purely local in nature. In that context, perhaps among the most curious and revealing investigations from the visitas to Milan was Felipe de Haro's review of the conduct of a certain Francesco Cid, which touched upon the relationship between the hinterland and the officials appointed to oversee them, the pervasiveness and inertia of corruption among those officials, and, due to the rather strange

³²⁶ Wolfgang Behringer, *Thurn und Taxis, Die Geschichte ihrer Post und ihrer Unternehmen* (Munich: Piper, 1990); Luis Felipe López Jurado, *Prefilatelia de Mrcia: Historia postal del Reino de Murcia desde 1569 hasta 1861* (Murcia: Editora Regional de Murcia, 2006); Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 298-9. Behringer's argument is more expansive than this administrative significance for the postal service, suggesting that the postal service, once it allowed non-official communication, transformed the social sphere. See also Filippo De Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

³²⁷ AGS, VIT, 268-4, f. 1v. "che portano coloro molti impedimenti de fiumi, mali cavalli, arbitrio de Prencipi, [...] & molti altri mali incontri"

³²⁸ AGS, VIT, leg. 268-4 and 401.

way in which the case was compiled and detailed, the quotidian nature of official interactions and the manner in which the visita carried out its inspections. In the 1580s, Francesco Cid had been among the numerous individuals charged by Luis de Castilla. In particular, Castilla reviewed Cid's service as treasurer and accountant for the army, an office through which he was determined to have committed financial fraud. For this, he was fined 1,085 escudos in addition to some more minor fines, some of which curiously depended on the payment of another official.³²⁹ While the penalties resulting from Castilla's visita were being assessed in Spain in the late 1580s and early 1590s, Cid was apparently able to secure an appointment from the governor of Milan, Carlo d'Aragona Tagliavia, Duke of Terranova, as a commissioner dealing with grain for the city of Alessandria and the surrounding territories.

This post, due to the considerable powers granted to it provided ample opportunity for officials like Cid to abuse the inhabitants in the duchy's countryside, though the visita afforded smaller communities and cities like Alessandria, which are increasingly understood to have used the duchy's institutions effectively in its economic relationship with the capital, to contest the conduct of the duchy's officials.³³⁰ As testified to by a certain doctor of law, Cid provided an order in 1591 for his delegates to go to the country estate maintained by the witness, where they proceeded to "unjustly" arrest him before taking him to a jail in Alessandria, where they extorted daily payments for two and a half months. Finally, the witness's father paid one of Cid's lieutenants ninety-six ducats resulting in his release. Other documents obtained by the visitador described a pattern of similar incidents stretching from 1589 to 1591.³³¹ Unlike many cases of this nature, and perhaps due to the fact that one of the alleged victims was a doctor, the visitador considered it among the various abuses committed by Cid worthy of pursuing despite the fact that they had occurred eighteen years before he began his investigation into Cid's conduct.

At this point in the investigation, Haro then sent for one of the chancellors of the *Magistrato Straordinario*, one of the two financial courts in the duchy introduced during the reign of Philip after the 1559 visita, to supply additional documents related to Cid's conduct as commissioner, which were then supplied in parts. The visitador also took a deposition from the chancellor, Gaspar Antonio Bosco, who was and had been directly responsible for collecting the juridical proceedings that resulted from Cid's work. In yet another peculiarly *nonchalant* deposition provided by a potentially implicated official, Bosco claimed that the number of these proceedings was "infinite," a supposition that belied the fact that he, by his own admission, had essentially paid very little attention to the proceedings even though they were stored in his own home.

As the investigation continued into 1610, the visitador sent one of his officials to collect a document from Dominico Salvatico, who had worked closely with Cid, that seemed to indicate a potentially illicit financial transaction between the two for 15,871 ducats. In January 1610, the visitador requested additional documents and in late February he sent two officials to collect depositions from Olivier Panizzone, one of Cid's lieutenants or sub-delegates, since he,

³²⁹ AGS, SSP, libro 995.

³³⁰ Elites in Alessandria, for example, effectively carved out a space for free trade with Genoa using the duchy's institutional framework, see Angelo Torre, "Il Contado di Alessandria: prime approssimazioni e problemi di metodo per la lettura di un'istituzione di antico regime," in Gelsomina Spione and Angelo Torre, eds., *Uno spazio storico. Committenze, istituzioni e luoghi nel Piemonte meridionale* (Turin: UTET libreria, 2007), 201-211.

³³¹ AGS, VIT, leg. 281-20.

having been bedridden with gout for six months, was unable to come to the visitador to supply his deposition according to the normal practice of the visita. Panizzone was asked about the condition of the proceedings, which were noted for being written in a style that was not in common use. The deposition taken by the visita, itself written in an especially odd style, then provides a narration of the visitador's officials and Panizzone reviewing numerous papers that the witness had stored at his bedside for unknown reasons. Returning the next day, the officials asked Olivier if they could take the legajos with them, which he consented to – since they “didn't matter” to him – but was unable to supply secure cases for their transport at that point in time. The officials then asked why the records were so unimportant, to which he answered that there was a statute of limitations of a year for dealing with the cases contained in them and in so far as he was concerned, they “could be sold to the fishmongers.”³³² Having found the documents of concern, the visitador concluded the case while also drawing on a variety of other testimonies and documents, which were not preserved, related to Cid's conduct. This resulted in several charges that are preserved as part of Cid's defense.³³³ Ultimately, Cid faced forty-five charges regarding his career stretching back to the 1590s. So began the second phase of the juridical practice of the visita, the defense that completed the materials to be reviewed in Spain.

While the investigation into Cid's conduct was founded on the ability of the visitador to draw local grievances into the emerging framework of bureaucratic conduct, Cid's defenses, which are quite representative of the genre, responded to the visita through the assertion of a traditional notion of authority that blended legal interpretations, appeals to local and personal privilege, and defenses of reputation and social status to call on the Crown's protection of justice.³³⁴ The first type of typical defense was essentially legalistic, relying on the invocation of privileges, the phrasing of commissions, or attempting to introduce doubt about interpretations relating to the corresponding laws or orders to which a charge implicitly referred. For example, among the charges added by the visitador was a claim that Cid, who had held an office serving the *veedor general* or general overseer since September 1602 for a salary of twenty-five escudos a month, defrauded the Crown because he received the salary despite the fact he neither resided in nor fulfilled the office.

Cid's defense of this proceeded in three parts. First, in a quintessential feature of such claims, the defense suggests that the visitador's charge failed to refer to any particular order. Second, his defense suggests that Cid had no legal obligation to fulfill the office if the person for whom he was substituting, his father, did not serve the term. Cid's argument, in a strategy mirrored by others, does not even attempt a factual refutation of the visitador's charge but rather continues with this particular line of reasoning by describing his father's appointment by the governor of Milan and his supposedly punctual service.³³⁵ Cid's defense against charge forty-three, which incorporates the allegations against Cid serving in his capacity as *questore* or commissioner dealing with grain in 1590, 1593, 1595 and 1596 in Alessandria and its hinterland, is similar. In the first part of the charge, the visitador had included the various illicit imprisonments through which Cid apparently not only collected bribes but also absconded

³³² AGS, VIT, leg. 281-20. “Porque no ymportan las d^{has} escrituras [...] Porque yo he hecho ya lo que havia de hazer y pasado el año en casos de esfojos [sic] no se puede proceder más y son escrituras que se pueden vender a los que venden pescado.” This, of course, would be to wrap the fish in paper as was formerly customary.

³³³ AGS, VIT, leg. 283-16; 283-17; 287-1.

³³⁴ See also Burgarella and Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 63-5.

³³⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 287-1.

with grain. The second part of the charge detailed an incident in which Cid dealt with a man outside of Alessandria and tricked him into coming at night to a certain location where he had hidden several soldiers, who then assaulted and killed several of the people carrying grain. Cid's defense to this allegation was to claim that the penalty for removing grain as contraband was death so these thieves' fate was already sealed in his eyes. Furthermore, the only remedy to prevent widespread hunger in Milan, which was indeed a serious problem in the 1580s and 1590s as famine struck while the city's population continued to grow, was to "use strategies and tricks" to catch and punish those who were engaged in the illegal trade.³³⁶

In addition to his defenses to particular charges, Francesco Cid also had a lengthier general defense produced on his behalf entitled "Advertencias en los cargos del veedor general Francesco Cid." This broader document represents the second, and at times related, major approach of defenses, which was effectively a defense of and appeal to the individual's character, prior service, and the service of one's family³³⁷ which corresponded with references to the treatises of the postglossators and laws:

Even though through the particular defenses, [...] the visita is amply satisfied, and it is not necessary to note other warnings: Still so that the lords of the junta understand in summary, how honorably the general overseer has occupied his entire life in the royal service, following in the footsteps of the general treasurer Nicolás Cid his father, from which the nullity of the speculation on which the charges are founded can be argued, it has seemed necessary to advise the following. First, that the general overseer is a person of great virtue, cleanliness,³³⁸ and Christen-ness [...] Second, that he is the son of Nicolás Cid, who was His Majesty's general treasurer in the state of Milan, who served the emperor Charles of glorious memory for forty-five years, and this Crown, in posts and particular commisions [...] in which he consumed his entire patrimony: and having been able to save a great estate licitly, he died so poor that it was necessary that his son should sell part of his wife's dowry to pay his debts [...] [his] demonstration of fidelity was greatly welcomed: giving with this and with many other deeds and services a true and singular signal of it and of his cleanliness, [that] it was known that the emperor [could] say that all his revenue ministers could look to Nicolás Cid as a model [*espejar*], and in this way he did not have charges against him in any of the visitas or audits in his time: and in imitation of his father, the general overseer, his son, followed in his footsteps in rectitude, goodness, and value [...]³³⁹

³³⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 287-1; D'Amico, *Spanish Milan: A City within the Empire, 1535-1706*, 13. In 1590, the population of Milan reached 130,000 "despite a series of famines in the second half of [the 1580s]" and the major famine of the early 1590s had a similarly minimal impact due to strong migration.

³³⁷ For similar issues related to lawsuits about status and the use of rhetoric appealing to privileges, reputation, etc. in Castile, see Michael J. Crawford, *The Fight for Status and Privilege in Late Medieval and Early Modern Castile, 1465-1598* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014).

³³⁸ Presumably in the sense of "clean hands" (i.e. not corrupted by bribes) but given the context of the surrounding attributes perhaps also responding to the ethos of "limpieza" in the Spanish sense if not so much in "limpieza de sangre" than in the limpieza associated with honor, see María Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

³³⁹ AGS, VIT, leg. 287-1. "AUNQUE por los descargos particulares, que se presentan en respuesta de los cargos, se satisfaze cumplidamente à la Visita, y que no sea menester apuntar otras advertencias: Todavía paraqué en compendio entiendan los Señores de la junta, cuan honradamente el Veedor general ha ocupado toda su vida en

This argument continues on for several folios with particular attention to Cid's belief that the visitador had employed one of his personal enemies, thus nullifying several charges according to the legal opinions cited by Cid's attorney. While the logic of the defenses was essentially the same throughout the Spanish empire, this particular style of defense for the charges brought by the visita that interpolated the defense with legal citations was especially characteristic of Milan. In conjunction with this, and nearly uniquely among the records from the visitas not only in Italy but also those in Spain and the Americas, it was relatively common for this style of Milanese defense to be put into print and quite lengthy volumes of print at that rather than in manuscript. The Milanese response to the visita, which merged the heterogeneous legal fabric and powerful, if conservative, legal culture of the duchy³⁴⁰ with a print culture that had begun to

el Real servicio, siguiendo en ello las pisadas del Tesorero general Nicolás Cid su padre, de donde se podrá argüir a la nulidad de las conjeturas en que se fundan los cargos, ha parecido necesario advertir lo siguiente. Primero, que el Veedor general es persona de mucha virtud, *limpieza*, y Cristiandad, y lo ha sido (como es notorio) desde su mocedad, por donde cesan las presunciones contrarias de los cargos por la ley *Non omnes, §. à barbaris. ff. de remilit.c.semel malus, de reg.iur.in 6. & optimè infert textus in l.si cui crimen. § usdem. ff. de accusationibus*. Segundo, que es hijo de Nicolás Cid, Tesorero general que fue de su Majestad en el Estado de Milán, que sirvió cuarenta y cinco años al Emperador Don Carlos de gloriosa memoria, y à esta Corona, en cargos y comisiones particulares, y de mucha confianza, hallándose en todas las jornadas de su tiempo, en que consumió todo su patrimonio: y pudiendo haber ahorrado mucha hacienda lícitamente, murió tan pobre, que fue menester que su hijo vendiese parte del dote de su mujer, para pagar sus deudas, pues el Tesorero no solamente no quiso los provechos y derechos permitidos à otros Tesoreros, pero tampoco quiso catorce mil ducados que le presentó Pablo Doria vecino de Génova, por reconocimiento del provecho que elavía recibido de algunas gruesas sumas de dineros queavía tenido por orden de su Majestad, en su poder mucho tiempo, para los gastos de la guerra de Córcega, y pagamentos de la gente de guerra, que se entretenía en Cerdeña y en las galeras, haciéndose cargo en sus cuentas de todos estos provechos en beneficio de su Majestad: y habiéndose tomado cuentas del dinero queavía entrado en su poder, y remitidosele de España y de otras diversas partes, para cosas extraordinarias y secretas del servicio de su Majestad, le hicieron cargo de ciento y setenta y tres mil ducados, menos de lo que efectivamenteavía recibido, y pudiéndolo disimular, no lo hizo, sino que advirtió de ello à la Contaduría mayor de su Majestad; y como no se halló otra claridad de ello, porque procedía este dinero de partidos y resultas, y trabacuentas de otras Provincias, se le agradeció mucho esta de mostración de su fidelidad: dando con esta y con otras muchas acciones y servicios verdadera y singular señal de ella, y *de su limpieza*, la cual siendo conocida del Emperador sabía decir, que todos sus ministros de hacienda se podrían espejar en Nicolás Cid, y así no tuvo cargo alguno en todas las visitas y revisiones de cuentas de su tiempo: y por imitar à su padre, el Veedor general su hijo siguió sus pisadas en la rectitud, bondad, y valor, *cui similis praesumitur, glos.in l.quod si nolit, §.mancipia, ff.a, ff.aedilit.edicto, Alciatus de oraesumpt.reg.1.praes. 48.num.1. & Menochius praes. 58.num.1.&1*. Tercero, que por la satisfacción que se tuvo del Veedor, siendo mozo de veinte años, se le encargó el mismo oficio de Tesorero general, que tuvo el dicho su padre, (2) al tiempo de su muerte, y aviándole servido con la integridad, que es notoria, algunos años, y siendo ocupado en otros cargos, y comisiones particulares y de confianza, y últimamente en el de Veedor general ha dado tal satisfacción y cuenta de su persona, por el curso de cuarenta y cinco años continuos, que su Majestad ahora ha sido servido de honrarle con otras mercedes, y de ampliar su oficio de Veedor general en Don Nicolás Cid su hijo, *quia patri non est, neque erit dissimilis, l.cum unus, in princ. ff.alimen.&cibar.leg. Caccialupus in l.admonendi, num. 257. ff.iureiur.& doctissimè Simancas Catholicarum instit.tit. 50.de praesumpt.num.10*.

³⁴⁰ Although Milan had been closely linked to absolutist legal thought in the fifteenth century, this legal regime ultimately failed and was given over to preference for local statutes and customary law while the Senate was essentially empowered to act extra-legally. Jane Black, *Absolutism in Renaissance Milan: Plenitude of Power under the Visconti and the Sforza 1329-1535* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jane Black, "The Politics of Law," in *A Companion to Late Medieval and Early Modern Milan: The Distinctive Features of an Italian State*, ed. Andrea Gamberini (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 432-452; Roy Garré, "The Dynamics of Law Formation in Italian Legal Science during the Early Modern Period: the Function of Custom," in *Empowering Interactions. Political Cultures and the*

subsume the private correspondence and manuscripts that otherwise typified Spanish administration thus facilitated a relatively public discourse concerning the relationship between discipline and authority.

That was especially evident in the symbolic exchanges between the visitador and the highest officials in Milan, particularly its senators, which played upon notions of reputation, social order, *imitatio*, the good administration of justice, and authority in the visitador's justifications for the visita and local reactions to it. But what was particularly at issue was whether the emerging bonds of surveillance between the imperial state and its local societies could justifiably disrupt a notional traditional order in which high officials served in accordance with their rank and the privileges that rank accorded in order to cultivate new bureaucratic behaviors. Indeed, in contrast to those model behaviors, the Senate was notoriously jealous of the power and status that had been devolved to it and with which it acted to protect the politically dominant patriciate class and act on behalf of familial and personal interests. After the unsuccessful effort to discipline the Senate in the 1559 visita and following Philip II's 1581 chastisement of the Senate for its "extravagant use of" its "arbitrary powers" through which it acted "without regard to laws, statutes or the Constitutions,"³⁴¹ Castilla wrote a letter of several pages describing his actions and exhorting the senators to embrace discipline during his visita in the 1580s:

After I was about to come to Milan from Spain, I transmitted in Italy that I truly believed nothing to be in the old way, which so that I not permit that the dignity of your order, in accordance with its exceptionally great height and rank, be stained by all the blowing put forth from popular hatred or by base dishonors, I wished that anything disclosed from hatred and the venom of malice spewed from a most foul mouth be sequestered. For I was realizing that the senatorial authority, connected entirely together with the public advantage, cannot be broken nor slightly diminished without division being called up into and at the same time attacking the tranquility, peace, civic prosperity, and safety of the entire commonwealth [...]³⁴²

That appeal to the "dignity" of the senate and its connection to the "tranquility" and "peace" of the duchy was not lost on the logic that guided so much of the Crown's restraint in dealing with

Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900, ed. Wim Blockmans, André Holenstein, and Jon Mathieu (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 91-7.

³⁴¹ "Si usa da voi tanto assolutamente l'arbitrio nelle sentenze e civili, e criminali, che assolvete, e condannate senza guardare leggi, statuti, nè costituzioni dello Stato," quoted in Black, "The Politics of Law," 451 and Petronio, *Il Senato di Milano*, 142. Annamaria Monti, "Représentation et réalité de la Justice: l'État de Milan aux XVI^e-XVII^e siècles," in *Réalités et représentations de la justice dans l'Europe des XVI^e-XVII^e siècles*, eds. Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, et al. (Nancy: Université de Lorraine, 2012), 153-171.

³⁴² AGS, VIT, leg. 333-4. "Postquam ex Hispania, venturus Mediolanum, in Italiam transmisi, antiquius sane nihil habui, quam ut ordinis vestri dignitatem, quasi in edito, ac praecelso quodam loco flatibus omnibus expositam popularis invidiae, mordaci non sinerem obtrectatione lacerari, nec turpibus ullis maculis aspergi, si reconditum aliquis in eam odium patefacere, & ore virus impurissimo vomere malevolentiae voluisset. Intelligebam enim auctoritatem Senatoriam, cum communi utilitate coniunctissimam, frangi non posse, nec minimum imminui, quin otium, pax, & salus ciuim in magnum discrimen vocaretur, & simul reipublicae totius oppugnaretur incolumitas, cum ea non minus magistratuum amplitudine, quam Imperii videatur, & seueritate contineri."

Milan in the late sixteenth century, particularly in its deference to local privilege and the elites who were protected by it as the Crown's military dependence grew, but it did not necessarily obviate efforts of producing bureaucratic norms within the duchy on behalf of local interests. Again attempting to reassure the senators of his own good practice and assuage fears that he, in deference to the prestige of their office, examined witnesses with respect to their reputations and his own esteem for the senators, Castilla's introduction continued:

For in examining the business of the Senate, and weighing it with careful consideration, I was unwilling to use hastily gathered witnesses, but I instead arranged (so much as the matter was able to bear it) to make sealed documents with them, in order that the same right and an unimpeded space for defense be available. Because, in truth, according to the opinion of everyone, I trusted that much was different, and, [...] I diligently did whatever I could, [...] I immediately spurned the informers [who were infamous] and I dismissed them at a distance, and I decided that the concealed truth of the matter not be sought out from those who, having been brought up in lies and fraud, were always accustomed to lie.³⁴³

In this delicate balance between a social order founded on reputation and the reform of administrative norms, Castilla concluded with a formulation in which the latter could be built on the former, calling on the senators to accept his charges on behalf of posterity and their own immortal reputation:

Because if you now wish that the wounds of past matters should not be covered up by make up but instead entirely cured, that is not to be feared, [...] indeed in truth that is to be hoped for, so that when the commonwealth is renewed by your counsels, posterity, as if from future ages at the same time as from the fatherland, will give immortal thanks to you, the meritorious.³⁴⁴

Following Castilla's example, Haro commissioned a similar printed version of his charges against the senate. As it did for the earlier visita, the senate produced a public response, 170 pages in length, preceded by its own preface that detailed its objections to the new disciplinary order, principally by raising doubts about the intent of the visitador in contrast to their own "earnest" service:

³⁴³AGS, VIT, leg. 333-4. "Nam in gestis Senatus excutiendis, & attenta consideratione examinandis, uti testibus nolui collectitiis, sed constitui potius (quantum res ipsae ferre possent) obsignatis tabellis secum agere, ut latius ei, atque liberior campus pateret defensionis. Quod vero ad existimationem singulorum credidi multum interesse, & efflagitatione quadam tacita cupide vos animaduerti postulare, feci mehercule quam potui diligenter, & pessimum, ac infame genus hominum, falsis se se? criminationibus pascentium, longissime statim a me repuli, delatores, & sycophantas procul amandavi, latentem arbitratu rerum veritatem non esse ab illis exquirendam, qui in fraudibus, & mendaciis educati, semper mentiri consueverunt."

³⁴⁴Ibid. "Quod si vulnera praeteritorum negotiorum non fuco quodam illinire, sed omnino velitis nunc sanare, verendum non erit, ne refricata recudescant, aut eorum contagio serpat longius, imo vero sirmissime sperandum, ut cum vestris fuerit consiliis instaurate respublica, posteritas vobis, quasi de seculis futuris, & de patria simul benemeritis, gratias agat immortales."

What will be the intention of [the visitador] in undertaking the office of inspector, what purity of spirit will be cultivated by it, what will be thought regarding our order, how many will be brought before it[?] [S]urely the things done by it during the entire period of five years [should be] sufficient, yet suitably it happens, and even wisely it is brought about by [the visitador], that everything is plainly understood from the preface of the censures which in the last months have been released against us, when in fact the censures themselves in number and in words seem to intensely beset us, this announcement [...] seems to blunt its sharpness and entirely pulls out all the thorns. And indeed insofar as it pertains to us, we acknowledge the weight of the office, we understand, and always consider the faithfulness, vigilance, diligence, for which reason our office has been attended to by us in eagerness. So then we gave service earnestly, so much as the weakness of human strength produces, that we do everything quickly, properly, and justly, and that, by us, the changes of the prince in administering justice should not come forth without support [...]³⁴⁵

Still more doubt, the Senate believed, could arise from the fact that the esteem in which the Crown held the visitador after his work had been completed might depend on his ability to turn his inspection into tangible revenue as it lamented, “For the other party, anxiety is inseparable from the office of inspection, and a certain concern being searched for, and objections increasing from every direction. The example of the preceding visita was pressing [on you] that a smaller fine not be produced.”³⁴⁶

In these stylized and formal responses to the visita, local elites stressed the disruption that the visita introduced into the social order, conceptions of authority, and, perhaps above all else, the daily routines of governance. In so far as the Crown increasingly relied upon local elites and considered the need to maintain their status an essential part of its geopolitical strategy, it was hardly without merit as a defense and the socio-political landscape it influenced would continue to prove of interest to the visitas of the seventeenth century.³⁴⁷ At this symbolic level, a supposedly unified elite – the members of which were in fact quite eager to aid the

³⁴⁵ AGS, VIT, leg. 279-6c. “QUÆ fuerit mens Perill. D.V. in suscipiendo munere Visitationis, qui candor animi in eo exercendo, quid senserit de ordine nostro, quanti apud eam fuerit, satis profecto testabantur integri quinquennii res ab ea gestae; opportune tamen accidit, atque adeo prudenter a D.V. factus est, ut haec omnia plane intelligeremus ex praefatione Animadversionum, quas superioribus mensibus ad nos misit; cum enim animadversiones ipsae numero et verbis valde nos urgere viderentur, haec declaratio, et quasi protestatio quedam in illas influens, visa est ipsarum aciem retundere, et omnem prorsus aculeum euellere. Et quidem quod ad nos pertinet, agnouimus gravitatem officii, intelleximus, ac semper considerauimus qua fide, vigilantia, diligentia, quo studio munus nostrum obeundum nobis foret; nunquam ex mente et cogitatione excidit, omnium oculos in ordinem nostrum conversos, et quod caput est, Deum ipsum opt. max., operum nostrorum spectatorem esse et iudicem [...] Proinde operam enixe dedimus, quantum humanarum virium fert imbecillitas, ut cuncta mature, recte, ac iuste ageremus; utque; a nobis, vices Principis in administranda iustitia sustinentibus nihil prodiret, quod non eodem modo Potentissimus ipse Rex noster facturus videri posset.

³⁴⁶ AGS, VIT, leg. 279-6c. “Ex alia parte, inseparabilis est ab officio Visitationis anxietas, et sollicitudo quaedam in perquirendis, et undique cumulandis obiectionibus. Praecedentis visitationis urgebat exemplum, ne in hac minus multa gesta viderentur.”

³⁴⁷ Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragments de Monarquía. Trabajos de Historia política*, 185-237; Angelantonio Spagnoletti, “Italiani in Spagna, spagnoli in Italia: movimenti di popolazione,” in *Spagna e Italia in Età moderna: storiografie a confronto*, eds. Francisco Chacón, et al. (Rome: Viella, 2009), 20. See chapter III for the later development of the visita in Milan.

visitador *individually* – intended to protect local meanings of office holding and their own interests by attacking the legitimacy of the visitador’s investigations and personal conduct in order to resist both individual discipline and the institutionalizing pressure of the imperial state that had arisen even as the Crown may have hoped otherwise.

But in the 1580s and 1600s, that resistance was most intensely expressed by a somewhat different collection of elites: the governors and viceroys of Spanish Italy. In Milan, for example, the Count of Fuentes, Pedro Henriques de Acevedo, who governed Milan from 1600 until his death in 1610 was particularly mistrustful of Haro. In July 1607, the count, writing to the Commendador of León, complained that not only was he unable to give assistance to Haro but the visitador had supposedly broken off all communication with the governor, which the governor perceived as a prelude to investigations and actions taken against him as well as an erosion of his authority.³⁴⁸ In December 1608, the governor again sent a complaint not only about his earlier fears but also about how, since then, “not only had he seen things not improve but each day they are in a worse state.” In the governor’s view, the visitador was wasting time by doing nothing with the papers and records he had collected and produced, thus allowing grievances to continue, and suggesting that Haro was merely in Milan to purchase clothes that he then shipped to Seville.³⁴⁹ Though these accusations against Haro amounted to nothing, they evinced the language of disputes through which the conflicts regarding delineations between the official privilege of the governors and viceroys and that of the visitadores were brought to the Crown for resolution.³⁵⁰

SICILY

In that respect, the most notorious of the visitas in Italy of the 1580s and 1600s took place in Sicily. As in Milan, the visitas to Sicily were often contentious and the strained relations between the visitador and the viceroys of Sicily were a constant feature of the two visitas that were commissioned for the island in the 1580s and the 1600s. Of these, the most famous conflict was between the visitador Bravo y Sotomayor and the viceroy Marcantonio Colonna.

In the late sixteenth century, one of the most formidable forces of integration between Sicily and the empire were marriages and kinship alliances, which were so pronounced that the Colonna’s secretary believed the Sicilian nobility to be thoroughly hispanized.³⁵¹ One of the consequences of this was manifested in the political strategies of the viceroys, who regularly attempted to consolidate their position in Sicily by using their connections to prominent families in Sicily or found themselves undermined by the strong connections between Sicily and the elites in the Spanish court. Colonna was no exception. On the one hand, his term was characterized by his efforts to construct a faction, especially within the major governing institutions like the Great Court and the Patrimonial Tribunal, that would support him and his reform projects and establish alliances in Madrid as well. On the other hand, he was

³⁴⁸ AGS, EST, leg. 1296, f. 72. July 6, 1607. The Count of Fuentes to Commendador of León.

³⁴⁹ AGS, EST, leg. 1297, f. 52. December 1608. The Count of Fuentes.

³⁵⁰ This was a regular feature of the visitas and the ones that arose most violently during Juan de Palafox’s visita in Mexico are described in Alejandro Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico* (London: Routledge, 2004), 51, 119, 169, etc.

³⁵¹ Benigno, “Integration and Conflict in Spanish Sicily,” 31 citing Pedro de Cisneros, *Relación de las cosas del reyno de Sicilia*, ed. Vittorio Sciuti Russi (Naples: Jovene, 1990), 4-10.

increasingly besieged as a result of the conflict that arose between him and the members of the tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, which had deep ties not only in Sicily but also favor in the court, notably with the Inquisitor General, Quiroga. It would also collaborate with the incoming visitador, Bravo.³⁵²

At least as early as 1584, the usual concerns expressed by the governors and viceroys in Italy during visitas was evident in the correspondence from Colonna to Juan de Idiáquez y Olazábal, who at the time was serving on the Council of War and as secretary of the Council of State. Despite the supposed honor with which he treated the visitador, Colonna complained that the visitador, at least as rumor had it, was beginning to inquire into matters of the viceroy's government and particularly in the graces he had provided.³⁵³ The conflict between the two however, was only one of a number of issues at that point, as the political situation in Philip's courts had a fluctuating support for the visitas. In January 1584, Cardinal Granvelle, the president of the Council of Italy, supplied Bravo with clarification on how the visitador was to go about handling his investigation but his recommendations seemed to limit the Sicilian visita in contrast to concurrent investigations in Naples and Milan. Among other things, for example, the cardinal cautioned Bravo not to employ the example of Naples in dealing with Sicily's tribunals, a note that presumably constrained the visitador's investigations into the hinterland because it had the effect of limiting the officials he could employ since Sicily was perceived as not having the same geographic and demographic challenges that the visita in Naples had.³⁵⁴ The cardinal, referencing Paul's Second Letter to the Corinthians, also urged the visitador to take his time in getting to know people "so as not to select the demons who are transfigured into angels of light."³⁵⁵

But Granvelle's positions, let alone his own position of influence within the court, were not particularly stable. In June 1584, almost in complete contradiction with his earlier advice to Bravo, the cardinal indicated that it would be appropriate to use "scoundrels" to investigate the crimes of officials. Likewise, and especially revealing about the prejudices of the Spanish elite, Bravo was urged that he should not even confide in Spaniards who lived in Sicily because they had been "Sicilianized" and were therefore no better than the natives.³⁵⁶ A month later, the correspondence between the two began to focus on the relations between the inspector and the viceroy, presumably following the viceroy's complaint and, in the usual style of the visita in Italy, Granvelle ordered that "in no way" should the visitador inspect the viceroy, "which is the first point that is entrusted to the visitadores." But Granvelle's influence in the court had begun to wane. Even as he reiterated his instructions, Quiroga and the Council of the Inquisition had begun to consult about Colonna's conduct using information provided by the Sicilian tribunal, which they directed. Bravo had, virtually in concert with the Inquisition, become suspicious of

³⁵² Benigno, "Integration and Conflict in Spanish Sicily," 31-5; Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, "Corte y 'Poderes provinciales': el virrey Colonna y el conflicto con los Inquisidores de Sicilia," *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna* 14 (1993), 73-101; Vittorio Sciuti Russi, "Inquisición, política y justicia en la Sicilia de Felipe II," in *Felipe II (1527-1598). Europa y la monarquía católica*, ed. José Martínez Millán, tomo 3 (Madrid: Parteluz, 1998), 387-411. See also Nicoletta Bazzano, *Marco Antonio Colonna* (Rome: Salerno, 2003).

³⁵³ AGS, EST, leg. 1154, f. 112. April 24, 1584. Colonna to Juan de Idiáquez y Olazábal.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 249. January 13, 1584. Cardinal Granvelle to Bravo.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.* "Por no escoger los demonios que se transfiguran en ángeles de luz."

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

the viceroy's conduct and continued to intervene in investigations, including of the viceroy's secretary who was disciplined for corruption, that included Colonna's conduct.³⁵⁷

But the cause of Colonna's subsequent downfall remains relatively unclear, as does the connection between it and Bravo's visita. For Koenigsberger, Colonna's downfall was the result of Sicilian factionalism and "one of those feuds of jealousy, murder and revenge so common in the Italy of the sixteenth century [...] concentrated in a personal struggle, that engulfed the viceroy in a Websterian tragedy."³⁵⁸ More likely is Manuel Rivero Rodríguez's understanding that suggests that the ascendancy of Colonna's enemies in Madrid and the very "plausible" case, highlighted by the viceroy's secretary, of Colonna's malfeasance involving the mishandling of 200,000 ducats.³⁵⁹ Ironically, that "mishandling" may have had its roots in the Crown's strategies to obviate Sicilian opposition to its fiscal strategies. Faced with the scandal of money traced to him by the secretary and Philip's disgust with Colonna's treatment of that Spanish secretary, Colonna's fate had thus largely been sealed by the summer of 1584 even without the active participation of the visitador.³⁶⁰ By August, the viceroy had been ordered to return to Spain to give an account of his conduct, a journey on which the viceroy died.³⁶¹

The visita and, more accurately, its informers did not fail to exploit Colonna's political collapse as many of the viceroy's closest allies, who also happened to occupy prominent positions subject to the visita's jurisdiction, were then subjected to particularly intense scrutiny, including the Straticò of Messina, Pompeo Colonna, a relative of Marcantonio's. Giovanni Francesco Rao, an *avvocato* of the Great Court at the time and another of Marcantonio's allies, was also investigated at some length, much to Rao's displeasure.³⁶² Thus, if there was any unambiguous connection between the visita and the Colonna scandal it was that the instability of the local political order caused by the latter had effectively allowed for the mechanism of inspection to thrive.

The legacy of Bravo's visita to Sicily was pronounced in two respects. First, the tension between the visitador and the viceroy that had come about in the 1580s was manifested again in Luyando's visita to Sicily in the 1600s with equal animosity and similarly appealed to the court for resolution and played upon notions of the dispensation of royal favor.³⁶³ Second, in the social context, the Great Court and particularly Rao were again subject to an especially rigorous investigation in part because of the strong and quasi-illicit connections between its members and the viceroy.

³⁵⁷ Rivero Rodríguez, "Corte y 'Poderes provinciales': el virrey Colonna y el conflicto con los Inquisidores de Sicilia," 94-97.

³⁵⁸ Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 188.

³⁵⁹ Rivero Rodríguez, "Corte y 'Poderes provinciales': el virrey Colonna y el conflicto con los Inquisidores de Sicilia," 95-97; AGS, VIT, leg. 158, ff. 220-6.

³⁶⁰ See Thomas Dandeleit's forthcoming and future works on the Colonna and Sicily.

³⁶¹ AGS, EST, leg. 1154; 1155.

³⁶² Koenigsberger, *The Practice of Empire*, 188 referring to AGS, EST, leg. 1155. See AGS, VIT, leg. 153 and 167 for the investigations into Rao and Pompeo Colonna.

³⁶³ For the reckoned centrality of such issues in the "equilibrium between court and kingdom" in the Sicilian context, see Rivero Rodríguez, "Corte y 'Poderes provinciales': el virrey Colonna y el conflicto con los Inquisidores de Sicilia," 100; See also Cañeque, *The King's Living Image*, 157-183; Antonio Feros, "Clientelismo y poder monárquico en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII," *Relaciones* 73 (1998), 15-49; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales: la visita del Estado de Milán (1678-1680)," 123-241.

In 1606, the year that Luyando arrived, the Duke of Feria Lorenzo IV Suárez de Figueroa y Córdoba, then the viceroy, had expressed his frustration with the visitador to the Council of State about the visitador's investigations into his secretaries, which was permitted by his commission. Unsurprisingly, it was that very investigation in the 1580s that put particular pressure on Colonna. By then these disputes were so familiar to the Council of State that the Count of Chinchón, in his vote, noted that "these encounters between visitadores and viceroys are not new" and voted to remit the details of the matter to the Council of Italy.³⁶⁴ Most of the other regents of the Council of State with the exception of the Count of Olivares, a former viceroy of Sicily, provided similar votes and the Constable of Castile, formerly the governor of Milan and President of the Council of Italy, voted that the investigation was surely permissible.³⁶⁵ The protection of the visitador established the precedent for the remaining years of the visita even as tensions accelerated considerably after the Duke of Escalona arrived as viceroy in 1607.

The immediate precipitation of conflict between Luyando and Duke of Escalona was principally of a jurisdictional quality albeit with two complicating factors resulting from Luyando's use of a certain Vespasiano Spalletta, whom he granted protection, safe transit, and immunity from arrest and prosecution so that Spalletta would come to Sicily from Malta. The first complication was the purpose for which the visitador intended to use Spalletta, namely an investigation about the connections that the Great Court had maintained with the Sicilian nobility. In particular, the visitador hoped to employ Spalletta in order to procure testimonies regarding the conduct of Francesco Gafuri, a wealthy noble, in his relationship with the Great Court after receiving information about this potential connection in a deposition given by Garcia Mastrillo, a commissioner of the court.³⁶⁶ But this caused a second complication as Spalletta's notoriety that necessitated this safe passage (to say nothing of the particular reason for it) potentially jeopardized the reputation of the viceroy and the Great Court for providing justice. Spalletta had been wanted for an extraordinary number of crimes including at least six rapes,³⁶⁷ two violent break-ins, at least six murders including one involving an especially shocking demonstration of violence, an attempted murder, and various lesser crimes and he had therefore fled Sicily. Despite the safe passage he had been granted, the viceroy had Spalletta arrested, put on trial before the Great Court, and subsequently executed.³⁶⁸

The resulting fallout of the jurisdictional dispute arising from the viceroy's order to contravene the visitador's grant of safe passage fell along two lines. In Sicily, the visitador investigated the conduct of the Great Court, which exhibited a tendency to execute the viceroy's orders regardless of their ambiguous legality, in relation to the affair while the viceroy

³⁶⁴ AGS, EST, leg. 1162, f. 131. Parecer sobre la carta del Duque de Feria de 14 de Septiembre. "El Conde de Chinchón, que no son nuevos los enquentros entre Visitadores y Virreyes."

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., f. 183; AGS, EST, leg. 1163, f. 183; Burgarella and Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 59-60.

³⁶⁷ The term "nefando" was often used to describe sodomy but the description of the alleged incidents, despite being "unspeakable," clearly suggests that Spalletta had allegedly raped several women and the word "nefando" was used especially in the context of when Spalletta was accused of having raped virgin women and violently deprived them of that state. The prohibition on providing immunity to a "nefandario" presumably had a range of crimes that were included implicitly.

³⁶⁸ AGS, EST, leg. 1162, f. 186.

continued to put pressure on the Great Court to punish Spalletta.³⁶⁹ At the same time, the viceroy and visitador opened extensive communications with the councils in Spain, with the viceroy principally appealing to the Council of State and the visitador to the Council of Italy. The Duke of Escalona's argument centered on a claim that the visitador did not have the authority to grant immunity to someone accused of unspeakable sexual crimes and that the viceroy's authority would be diminished if the visitador could be permitted to carry out investigations in the manner he had: "This was a very pernicious example and contrary to many of the pragmatics of this kingdom in particular against that of the sex criminals [*nefandarios*] [...] published by the King our lord Philip II in which it was prohibited for the viceroys, presidents, and captains general and any other ministers to give safe passage or immunity to them for even half an hour."³⁷⁰ As if to confirm his virtuous conduct and secure the Crown's favor, the viceroy, in a defense of his conduct, wrote that in protecting this order against using a nefandario he had "practiced justice" and thus received the "general applause of the entire Kingdom" whereas the visitador had supposedly been embarrassed by his lack of caution and, critically, lost reputation from his failure.³⁷¹

By May, Escalona was openly calling Luyando "ignorant and incautious" in his correspondence with Philip III after the visitador had brought attention to certain precedents that would have permitted his actions and hoped that the Crown would punish its agent.³⁷² This was not the only issue for which Escalona felt pressure as he had been voted a donative by the Sicilian parliament that the Crown very promptly forbade him to receive.³⁷³ Despite the viceroy's confidence in his virtuous conduct, the matter did not subside. Later in 1608, the visitador sent a number of allegations against the Duke of Escalona, to which the viceroy was obliged to respond and contain rounds of wild allegations against each other. Among the complaints was Luyando's belief that the viceroy had actively impeded his investigations and been incautious in distributing the visitador's salary. This claim, Escalona asserted, was "entirely imagined by the visitador" because if he had actually wanted to impede the visita, he would have tortured the visitador's secretary or put "him on a boat back to Spain like his conduct has merited."³⁷⁴ If the visitador had not received his salary, it was only because of the dire fiscal straits in Sicily – apparently the irony of simultaneously requesting a donative of 60,000 ducats was lost on Escalona – and, in conclusion, the visitador was procuring testimonies from infamous people.³⁷⁵

Such wild accusations were not reserved for the viceroy. The visitador had apparently alleged that the current crop failures were God's punishment for the viceroy's conduct. In combating that claim and attempting to establish his own rectitude, the viceroy sent a letter

³⁶⁹ AGS, VIT, leg. 227-4.

³⁷⁰ AGS, EST, leg. 1163, f. 183. "este era un exemplo muy pernicioso y contra muchas premáticas de este Reyno y en particular contra la de los nefandarios que con tanto acuerdo mando publicar [...] Philippe. 2, en lo que prohibió a los virreyes, Presidentes y Capitanes Generales y a qualesquier ministros dar guidaticos a nefandarios ni por media hora[.]"

³⁷¹ AGS, EST, leg. 1163, f. 183. "se hizo la justicia con general aplauso de todo el Reyno[.]"

³⁷² AGS, EST, leg. 1162, f. 159.

³⁷³ AGS, EST, leg. 1163, f. 183.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 184. "Esto todo es imaginación del visitador porque si el Marqs. pretendiera poner estorvo a la visita ubiera procedido a tortura contra su Secretario por la fuga de Boca de Fuoco, o, ubiera puesto al visitador en una barca y embiándole a Espania como a merezido su proceder[.]"

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 112.

describing his various successes in Sicily including the reform of money, efforts to reduce the number of firearms, and the distribution of grain before a turn to the ongoing conflict between himself and the visitador: “the abominable vice of *nefando* is so common in this kingdom that for our sins, one could expect some fire or punishment from heaven, but God has been served in having sent the Marquis [of Villena, i.e. the Duke of Escalona] a stake [at which] to burn Spalletta, protected by the visitador.”³⁷⁶ Escalona’s assault continued by alleging that the visitador’s actions proceeded only because of the favor that the Constable of Castile, President of the Council of Italy, had for Luyando and the animosity he had for Escalona.³⁷⁷

As news of the dispute reached Spain, the response of the Crown suggested considerable displeasure with the conflict and, though Escalona did not meet Colonna’s fate, the Crown granted Luyando considerable power with which to carry out his investigations and punish the members of the Great Court who had effectively sided with the viceroy:

Illustrious Duke, [... I have] learned about the imprisonment of and enforcement of justice against the person of Vespasiano Spalletta [...] in spite of the fact that he had been granted protection in my name by Don Ochoa de Luyando, my visitador general in this Kingdom, and the differences that there have been in this have displeased me because much of what has happened could have been used as an excuse by both parties, and hoping for better justification [... and] so that everything is understood by the root in what has happened, I have resolved that the said visitador proceed against President Rao for the fault that he had in not having alerted the Marquis of Geraci [i.e. Giovanni Ventimiglia, President of the Kingdom] that the protection that was given to Spalletta not be given because there is a pragmatic that prohibits it [...] and likewise proceed against the judges who intervened in the determination of the case against Spalletta and charge them for all the faults that result against them from this case [...]³⁷⁸

Despite this, the final chapter of the dispute continued into 1609, when Gabriel Pacheco, a relative of the viceroy’s wrote to the Comendador Mayor de León and to the Duke of Lerma with a volley of accusations against Luyando. Apparently, Gabriel Pacheco had discovered the

³⁷⁶ AGS, EST, leg. 1163, f. 185. “El Abominable vicio de nefando se frequentava tanto en este Reyno por nuestros pecados que se podía esperar algún incendio o castigo del cielo pero ha sido Dios servido de que con aver mandado hazer el Marq^s. un brasero y quemar a Spalleta guiado por el visitador y con procederse con gran rigor contra los indiciados sea remediado a lo menos en lo público.”

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 187.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 188. November 29, 1607. Philip III to Marquis of Villena. “Ill Duq primo mi Virrey Lugarte^{te} Y Capⁿ Gen^l, Por vras Cartas del 28. y 30. de Mayo, y por los papeles que con ellas se han recibido se ha entendido la prisión y Justicia hecha en persona de Vespasiano Spelletta y muy en particular las causas y motivos quede huvo para ello, no obstante que havia sido llamado mediante guidatico en mi nombre por Don Ochoa de Luyando mi visitador general en este Rey^o. y las diferencias que en esto ha habido, de lo cual me hà desplacido, pues mucho de lo que ay à pasado se pudiera haver escusado de ambas partes [...] p^a. mayor Justifica^{on} de causa de tanta consideración que se entienda de raíz todo lo que en ello huviere passado, hè resuelto que el dicho visitador proceda contra el Pres^{te} Rao por la culpa que tuvo en no haver advertido al Marq^s. de Hierache que no diesse el guidatico que dio al dicho Spelletta pues havia Pragmatica que lo prohibía como después lo dijo contra el que dio el Visitador y le haga cargo de ello y de lo demás que se le avisa, y le haga salir de Palermo si le pareciere para mejor averiguar la verdad, y que assí mis^o. proceda contra los juezes que intervinieron en la determinación de la dicha causa contra Espolleta y les haga cargo de todas las culpas que contra ellos resultan de esta causa[.]”

private correspondence between the visitador and Quintana Dueñas, a regent of the Council of Italy, which he summarized to Lerma in an attempt to discredit the visitador and the Council of Italy's decisions favoring him. In one letter, for example, Luyando apparently apologized for the harsh tone of a letter that reflected his frustrations and requested that it not be read before the Council of Italy:

“The letters which I most especially want not to be read in council are two, one which I wrote dated 10 May in which I complain very heavily about the Marquis's disturbances which could seem too heavy and written with too much disgust and in any case with zeal and would seem to be impassioned and less modest. Certainly, sir, I appear so bored and rushed and sometimes so pressured that I can be forgiven [...]” [Pacheco's note:] Very clearly understood in these words is the authority that the visitador has with the person to whom he writes.³⁷⁹

Another letter included in Pacheco's note indicated that the visitador was deeply disillusioned with the thankless task he had been given and hoped to leave Sicily in the spring of 1609, a sentiment confirmed in a letter written by Luyando in April 1609 when he described how tired he was of remaining in Sicily.

But if there was any threat to Luyando's reputation, it was perhaps not entirely undone nor did it particularly matter whether or not it had been lost as his visita would lead to the successful prosecution of twice as many officials as the preceding visita in Sicily.³⁸⁰ It was that work, carried out despite and at a level distinct from the debates of jurisdiction, reputation, and royal favor, that was central to the developing institution of the visita.

The extent of development was particularly evident in the final investigation that Luyando carried out prior to the return and respite he sought carried out upon the petition of two nobles against two members of the Great Court.³⁸¹

Few of the investigations conducted by a visita are as revealing of its increasingly broad scope and ability to interact with a range of individuals from across the social spectrum, one broader even than was evident in Guzmán's visita to Naples, than Luyando's investigation into that case, which centered on the conduct of Giacomo Scaglione, the prosecutor in Palermo, Giovanni Francesco Rao, and others in their handling of an investigation related to the murder of Giovanni Carreto, Count of Racalmuto. The visitador's investigation, conducted separately from his other investigations into the conduct of various offices, in part because it did not occur concurrently with them, was largely at the behest of two Sicilian nobles near the conclusion of

³⁷⁹ AGS, EST, leg. 1886, f. 199. “Las cartas que más particularmente quiero que no se lean en el consejo son dos. Una que escribí fha a 10 de Mayo en que me quejo muy cargadamente de los disturbos que me hace el Marqs esta podrá parecer más pesada y escrita con disgusto demasiado y acaso es con celo y parecerá pasión, y menos modestia. Cierta señor que yo me veo tan aburrido y apurado y algunas veces tan apretado que se me puede perdonar si se destempla alguna vez el instrumento. (bien claro se conoce en estas palabras la autoridad que el Visitador tiene con la persona a quien las escribe)”

³⁸⁰ Burgarella and Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 61. Luyando's fate is somewhat unclear, Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 106 indicates that he had the decisive vote in the *junta* resolving his visita so he was presumably held in some esteem but it is unknown whether he advanced subsequently.

³⁸¹ AGS, EST, leg. 1886, ff. 199, 210.

the visita in late March 1609.³⁸² In so doing, Luyando's work displayed the capacity for and willingness of the state to intervene at the formerly unperceived points of interconnection between four social and institutional domains: the sphere of urban administrative institutions, the hinterland, which as illustrated earlier was increasingly monitored by the visita, elite society, which in this case included noble and administrative factions in both urban and rural settings, and, most unusually, marginal communities.³⁸³

The visitador's subsequent investigation was unusually lengthy for any particular case, tracing a long chain of interactions at virtually every level of Sicilian society beginning with a deposition from Juan de Zuñiga, a Spaniard who ran the Vicaria's jail. Based on the information he received from the barons, the visitador inquired about what Zuñiga knew in relation to a certain Francesco Embrogno, a witness who was instrumental in the case against Gaspar Loperto, Baron of Somatino, who was being charged with the murder of the Count of Racalmuto. Embrogno had, while jailed, apparently confessed to the murder in the service of the Count of Galeano and Pietro Migliaccio, a relative of the current Straticò.

The visitador then attempted to verify this information at some length. Captain Pedro Varagona, for example, was called to attest to Zuñiga's character and had mostly nothing but praise and testified about his marriage to a well-known courtesan who brought considerable wealth to Zuñiga. Gabriel Gregorio de Madrigal, who served as Zuñiga's superior provided additional information, testifying that it was common for Zuñiga to speak with prisoners, including Embrogno and a fellow Calabrian, and that he was unaware of any attempt on the part of the barons of Somatino or Siculiana to bribe Zuñiga in order to introduce doubt regarding Embrogno's official testimony. Yet another witness, a commissioner of the Great Court whom the visitador had imprisoned, supplied information about two witnesses who might know about the prosecutor's conversations in relation to the case and it seemed that Scaglione had at one point expanded his investigation by sending a commissioner to Naples. A second witness, Nicolao Matranga, testified to knowing a few details about Embrogno, who had originally lived in Calabria, and some people who had been in contact with Embrogno in

³⁸² AGS, VIT, leg. 258-1. Depositions begin on f. 4 and continue to f. 188. The following description of the investigation summarizes these depositions.

³⁸³ The latter group, which here is principally represented by a vagrant, namely Embrogno, is typically treated in historiography through analysis of institutions for poor relief and representations of poverty and vagrancy as well as in the relationship between violence (or crime more generally), vagrancy and poverty, and the state's control of it. Accordingly, the intervention in the state in an issue of crime and social regulation related to marginal populations, but used to regulate the instruments of social control and elite groups outside of protections beyond litigation – e.g. Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987) – is extremely unusual. For the question of social control and marginal groups, including vagrants, see for example A. L. Beier, *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560-1640* (London: Methuen, 1985); Robert Jütte, *Poverty and Deviance in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Julius R. Ruff, *Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Spanish Italy has been perceived as particularly “backwards” or, more charitably, decentralized in its administration of poor relief, principally based on ad hoc responses to crises, see David Gentilcore, “‘Cradle of Saints and Useful Institutions’: Health Care and Poor Relief in Naples,” in *Health Care and Poor Relief in Counter-Reformation Europe*, eds. Ole Peter Grell, Andrew Cunningham, Jon Arrizabalaga (London: Routledge, 1999), 132-147, although the early modern Spanish state clearly had an impulse to intervene in rural life especially in the control of brigandage, see Marino, “The Rural World in Italy under Spanish Rule,” 405-6, which in studies of the eighteenth century has been linked to the early pressures of social control.

the interior of the island who Scaglione had sought in connection with the murder. Two of these individuals, Nicolao Chioli and Giuseppi Parisi, had been asked by an individual whom the witness was unable to identify to provide information about Embrogno that they in fact did not know, at which point a priest offered them money in exchange for the false testimony, which the witness criticized: “Open your eyes, those are coins with which you have bought hell.”³⁸⁴

As doubts about Scaglione’s conduct in the case mounted, the visitador went to interview the key witness himself, Francesco Embrogno, who was then imprisoned in the Vicaria within about ten days of opening the investigation. Embrogno provided a lengthy deposition relating to his time in jail since 1608 while describing at great length the quotidian circumstances that, to his misfortune, brought him into a capital dispute between factions of Sicilian barons and at the center of the question of the how the administration of justice was carried out by the Great Court. A vagrant from Paola in Calabria, Embrogno had at some point in September 1607 traveled to Palermo before staying with a cousin of his on the island between October 1607 and January 1608. It seems that this stay, given Embrogno’s lack of means, was something of a drain on his cousin, who continuously urged Embrogno to take a job as a servant. This established Embrogno’s first connection with the incident since he managed to acquire a position in Somatino’s house in January.

But Embrogno’s service was rather short lived since the baron’s household was robbed and the recently hired Embrogno, suspected of having taken part in the robbery, was dismissed. Unable to find another job, Embrogno eventually arrived in a place identified as the “Casa de los Griegos,” where he worked together with a few Sicilians and a Florentine in odd jobs. Sometime in the summer of 1608, Embrogno acquired a large number of pears from one of these friends who had been unable to sell them in Messina along with some clothing from another friend before departing for Palermo with the hopes of selling his pears and then catching a ship sailing to France. After arriving in Palermo, Embrogno pawned off a variety of items he had in his possession so that he could finance the trip and purchase food for it.

But Embrogno faced another challenge since he was refused passage on several of the ships and it was only with his recollection that he had a letter intended for a friar in his possession and his good fortune in finding a soldier who had been a servant for that friar that he was able to secure the favor of being permitted on a ship. Unfortunately for Embrogno, at this same time, the prosecutor in Palermo had gone to the ships in search of individuals with any connection to this friar and, when asked whether he was a servant, Embrogno refused to deny it for fear of the consequences of confessing that he was not in fact serving in this capacity after having gained passage on those grounds. At that point, Embrogno was brought before the Great Court in the matter of the murder of the count of Racalmuto and particularly before Scaglione and Rao, who was already under heavy scrutiny due to his involvement in the Spalletta affair among other matters. Pressured by Scaglione to confess to the murder, Embrogno at first only went so far as to say that he happened to know where the conspirators to murder the count had met but upon returning a second day, Scaglione railroaded Embrogno into fully confessing by suggesting that the Duke of Escalona would look favorably upon him for doing so. But, in his testimony to the visitador, Embrogno claimed that had not been involved

³⁸⁴ AGS, VIT, leg. 258-1, f. 8. “que abriesen los ojos que aquellos eran dineros con que se compraba el infierno.”

at all and only ever heard of the murder from a third party. Upon confessing to Scaglione, however, he was jailed in the Vicaria while the prosecutor continued his investigation, which included a coach ride to the site of the murder where Scaglione suggested the location of the murder to the impressionable witness and Embrogno continued to agree to the various details divulged to him. Again, the visitador called a variety of witnesses, including Embrogno's associates from the "Casa de los Griegos" as well as a physician familiar with the area who testified to confirm aspects of Embrogno's deposition.

With that, the visitador's investigation began to turn into a criminal investigation that at once paralleled the complaints of the Neapolitan nobility regarding the Collateral Council while further expanding the visita's intervention into the dual public and private components of noble social relationships. Witnesses familiar with the nobles, for example, testified to the friendship between Pietro Migliaccio and Racalmuto, including Gaspar Russo, who had met with Migliaccio and his father who were apparently quite shaken by the death of Racalmuto. One of Racalmuto's former servants also noted his familiarity with Migliaccio, who was a frequent visitor to Racalmuto's palace and believed that it would have been impossible for Migliaccio to have participated in the murder because the individuals he saw fleeing from the scene of the crime were considerably taller than Migliaccio and, at any rate, he thought Migliaccio would have been unable to use a pistol at the time due to an illness that caused him to have sores on his hands. The physician who had treated Migliaccio confirmed this, adding that in his state at around the time of the murder it was difficult for him even to remove his hat let alone pull a trigger. The visitador then turned to various servants of the Prince of Butera, whom Migliaccio was visiting prior to the murder, the time at which they believed Migliaccio had left. Migliaccio himself testified that he left to visit the Count of Racalmuto at about a half hour into the night and when he arrived at the house of the count at about 1:30, Rao and the members of the Great Court were already there. Ottavio Marotta, a *procurador fiscal* of the Great Court who himself was under investigation, added still more damning evidence: he had heard Embrogno's original testimony, which contradicted the known facts of the case.

Similar depositions from the commissioner of the bank of the Great Court suggested that Rao and Scaglione may have been coaching Embrogno to provide the evidence they sought. The visitador then attempted to uncover the murderer for which he found evidence from the monks around Monreale, who were disturbed in the middle of the night by a rooster that started crowing, which made the monks fear that they were being burglarized. Instead of a thief, the monks found two *forastieri* or outsiders³⁸⁵ – neither of whom resembled Migliaccio – dressed in black who the monks believed were the murderers and who indeed confessed to having committed the murder.

Beyond merely resolving a dispute between Sicilian notables about the resolution of a murder trial, the affair ultimately implicated the Great Court by placing two of its members, who were known enemies of the Baron of Somatino, within a chain of private interactions that simultaneously manipulated their social world and impinged upon their public duties. This

³⁸⁵ As an example of emerging surveillance and social control of this population, Naples began requiring individuals and institutions who housed *forastieri* to report their presence in 1638. Gentilcore, "'Cradle of Saints and Useful Institutions': Health Care and Poor Relief in Naples," 146. *Forasteros* in the Americas were also subjected to controls and belonging to this class in part took the form of resistance by *indios* to colonial rule. Ann M. Wightman, *Indigenous Migration and Social Change: The Forasteros of Cuzco, 1570-1720* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).

broad collection of information, beyond the traditional scope of the *visita*, manifestly asserted the visitador's potential authority. When witnesses were unwilling to supply pertinent information, the hand of the state coerced them, including through the use of imprisonment or torture.

But more fundamentally, the state's provision of justice and discipline, formerly assigned to the Great Court and its officials at a local level, was itself being fully incorporated into a newly expansive disciplinary regime that worked to construct a cohesive juridical territory under the state, which included interventions into marginal society that regulated forms of social control that had been co-opted by elite factional interests.³⁸⁶

Thus, while the resolution of a murder case was an unusual investigation for a visitador to carry out, it was not unique in its demonstration of the *visita*'s potent ability to activate channels of social surveillance by assimilating personal disputes into the institutionalization of official conduct carried out by the legal and bureaucratic instruments of the state. Together with the various other cases developed against members and officials of the Great Court, Luyando's *visita* produced one of the most detailed and broad investigations of any of the bodies of government in Spanish Italy. The series of investigations carried out by Luyando, which ranged from the judges targeted for misconduct in the Spalletta and Embrogno affairs to the conduct of its commissioners and delegates in the Sicilian provinces to its archival administrators, considerably broadened the reach of the state within the existing social fabric of Sicily of the early seventeenth century, where witnesses were, for the most part, eager to supply the visitador with information about a broad range of behaviors from bribery to embezzlement to nepotism to the abuse of judicial discretion and jurisdiction.

That expansion is evident even in the context of Guzmán's extensive investigation of the Collateral Council, which produced evidence of a network of at least 301 individuals with 549 sets of interactions. By contrast, Luyando's investigation of the Great Court, even excluding the Embrogno affairs and depositions taken by officials in Luyando's service, revealed at least 481 individuals and 963 distinct sets of interactions. In the context of Sicily and the Great Court, these figures represent increases between two and a half and three times the corresponding figures from Agustín's *visita* in 1559. Like the inspections of the Collateral Council, the core of Luyando's investigation of the Great Court's judges focused primarily on the relationships through which gifts and favors were exchanged in tandem with official functions, information that primarily emerged out of the familiar urban core where certain individuals had an abundance of connections that sometimes also appeared in secondary investigations.

Even this relatively familiar part of Luyando's *visita* expanded considerably compared to prior *visitas*. The information received by Luyando, for example, indicated several connections that demonstrated how individuals co-opted the structures of the state, with various witnesses providing details about the extent to which the viceroys had been taking an increasingly central position in mediating the relationships between members of the Great Court and about the rise and fall of the "tyrannical" coalition that Rao had attempted to create within the court that

³⁸⁶ For a version of the ideological transition permitting this in conjunction with absolutism in Italy, see Judith A. Hook, "Justice, Authority and the Creation of the Ancien Régime in Italy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (1984), 71-89.

ostensibly gave him unimpeded powers of prosecution.³⁸⁷ The expanded detail of this core was perhaps partially the result of Luyando's considerable familiarity with it due to his personal involvement in the Spalletta affair, an incident that resulted in Luyando appearing in his own investigation. Indeed, Luyando's further investigation into the pieces of information regarding illicit activity within the core was the very reason that the Spalletta affair occurred. Like Guzmán, Luyando was also able to bring in a variety of witnesses who had previously been less apparent to the state.

But in addition to these factors, the *visita* had also subverted the apparent resistance to it. Beneath the formidable symbolic layer of institutional resistance led by the viceroys in conjunction with the Great Court, the *visita*'s disciplinary and surveillance mechanisms had effectively encouraged otherwise competing private factions and interests within the Sicilian administration to collaborate with the imperial state. Indeed, the most important recipients of the discipline of Luyando's inspection of the Great Court – including Rao, Marotta, Trabuco, Vito Sicomo the *abogado fiscal*, Scagliano, and Vincenzo Boton, a procurador fiscal – were ironically among the most eager individuals to supply the *visitador* with evidence.

The importance of this lack of elite cohesion was born out quantitatively as well. In contrast to Naples, where the networks surveilled by Quiroga and Guzmán were notably disassortative (with coefficients of -0.214 and -0.229 respectively) indicating more connections between the regents and peripheral individuals as the principal structure of malfeasance, Luyando's *visita* found a relatively assortative network (-0.109), in which individuals were relatively more tied to individuals with a similar number of interactions. Yet well-connected individuals were not necessarily well connected amongst themselves. In contrast to the Collateral Council and even the Great Court of the late 1550s and early 1560s, there was a noticeably lower degree of organization close to the institution (see figure 8 for rich-club coefficient comparison). This was extremely unusual since cohesion would have been easily observed even when the institution resisted the *visita*, as exemplified by Milan in 1559, where witnesses noted the close interactions between senators even if they declined to describe the consequences of those interactions. By contrast, the officials of the Great Court not only had relatively poor connections to the broader network upon which they might have drawn strength but also within its core, a condition of fragmentation that, while not necessarily indicative of factional strength or divergence, certainly did not redound to elite cohesion in Sicily.

The elites of Sicilian administration had lost control within their network relative to the imperial state. The effect of this was pronounced, for while most aspects of elite behavior and relationships had remained stable, the pull of the state's surveillance had clearly grown in strength while the pull of local elites had stagnated or decreased due to fragmentation since the mid-sixteenth century. By the 1600s, it was effectively untenable, even for members who might have belonged to similar interest groups, to collude in order to suppress the observations made by witnesses who were increasingly able to identify behaviors that the state found unacceptable or, with time, identify behaviors that the state *would* find unacceptable.

³⁸⁷ AGS, VIT, leg. 227-4 is a particularly strong indication of the tremendous leverage the viceroy had in the management of the Great Court; AGS, VIT, leg. 219-1, f. 43v. Rao was accused of aligning with Vincenzo Boton and other friends to prosecute “*personas virtuosas*” in a “*forma de tiranía*.”




Figure 6. Visualization of the Great Court's network circa 1606 to 1609.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁸ Based on AGS, VIT, legajos 218-2; 219-1; 224-3; 227-4; 233-2, 233-3; 236-1; 250-2, 250-12; 262-10, 262-15, 262-23; and 393-5. The color of the edge signifies the source legajo. Nodes are sized by degree while node color indicates the following: red, officials of the Great Court found guilty by the junta of the visita (e.g. Crapanzano); pink, officials of the Great Court found guilty who also testified (e.g. Rao); orange, officials of the Great Court (e.g. D'Orlando); yellow, officials of the Great Court who also testified (e.g. Zappia); green, a witness (e.g. Capua); purple, viceroys (e.g. Duke of Feria); dark blue, Philip III; light blue, the visitador Ochoa de Luyando; black, other individuals.

1. Philip III
2. Viceroy (*unspecified*)
3. Duke of Fera, Viceroy
4. Duke of Escalona, Viceroy
5. Ochoa de Luyando, Visitador
6. Vespasiano Spalletta
7. Giovanni Francesco Rao, President of the Great Court
8. Giuseppe Trabuco, Judge of the GC
9. Giacomo Scaglione, Judge of the GC
10. Vincenzo Boton, Prosecutor of the GC
11. Vito Sicomo, Prosecutor of the GC
12. Ottavio Marotta, Prosecutor of the GC
13. Pietro Valdina, Baron della Rocca, *Maestro Notario* GC




Figure 7. Visualization of the core of the Great Court's network circa 1606 to 1609.³⁸⁹

As a result, the social networks and coalitions that officials had previously cultivated for personal ends or derived political power had become a liability as they were increasingly transparent and were readily understood by witnesses as some of the most useful evidence of malfeasance that could be supplied to the visitador. This was similarly true as Luyando's visita drew from branches of that network that supplied information from outside the core that further curtailed the private domains of local elites. The expansion of the visita outside of the urban institutions, which is apparent in the outer modules of the Great Court's network that centered on its commissioners and delegates, illustrated the extent to which the oversight provided by the visita was transforming according to local demands to enforce new types of behavior.

That was also evinced in the ultimate production of Luyando's visita, a list of 151 officials who were found guilty of at least some kind of malfeasance – with varying remedies and, in some cases, no remedy since the crime was not considered to merit a punishment – or whose case was remitted to ordinary justice. Within this larger group, 141 officials' crimes were actionable within the juridical practice of the visita. In contrast to the usual lists of individuals charged by the visita, the largest type of individuals who were disciplined were the various captains of arms and justice across the island with thirty-two officials while the largest single office was the Great Court, with nineteen officials. For all his efforts in investigating the

³⁸⁹ Based on AGS, VIT, 219-1; 224-3; 227-4. See previous note.

Table 5. Network properties for the Collateral Council and Great Court.

Network	Great Court 1559	Collateral Council 1559	Collateral Council 1581	Great Court 1606
Density	0.032	0.016	0.012	0.008
Number of Nodes	162	191	301	481
Number of Ties	411	289	549	963
Average Degree	5.07	3.03	3.65	4.00
Maximal Degree	35	56	76	115
Average Path Length	3.41	3.22	3.48	4.24
Clustering Coefficient	0.674	0.453	0.491	0.363
Assortative Coefficient	-0.047	-0.214	-0.229	-0.109




Figure 8. Rich-club coefficient as function of degree for Collateral Council and Great Court.

conduct of the Great Court, Luyando and the junta of the visita were relatively unsuccessful in producing definitive disciplinary action against its members.

While fifteen members of the Great Court were found culpable of crimes that merited further action, the group as a whole had a very low prosecution rate for charges, with a large number of charges resulting in the determination that the official in question, while guilty, did merit punishment and a similarly large percent of charges being passed over due to the death of the official. The result was a total fine of 5,865 escudos with one judge, Giuseppe Trabuco, being suspended from holding any related office for three years. But from the perspective of the whole visita, Luyando was remarkably successful in enforcing discipline. Total fines amounted to over 100,000 escudos and, of the total charges against individuals who were found guilty over 56% - or at least 1,175 of the 2,078 charges - resulted in further disciplinary action by the junta, a considerably higher rate of success than in Milan in the 1580s. Indeed, while the highest

Sicilian offices, with the notable exception of the two *strategoti* of Messina who were permanently suspended from office and fined more than 7,600 escudos each, were able to escape particularly severe punishment, the *visita* had begun to make demonstrable strides into the hinterland.³⁹⁰ This continued the move of Castilla's *visita* to Milan, but unlike the earlier *visita* that intimated a shift in local demands and responses not matched by the government in Spain, Luyando's investigations were backed by an intensification of force.

Of the thirty-two captains of arms and of justice, all but one received some sort of penalty – the remaining captain's crimes were remitted to ordinary justice – and fourteen received suspensions of at least two years while several of those were permanently suspended. The crimes for which they were punished could have considerable variation that presumably represented a popular disgust with the official that then created categories of illicit behavior that could be regulated. One captain was apparently noted for having conducted his investigations into meat consumption with unsatisfactory proceedings, for which he was fined due to his failure to meet the documentary demands of the increasingly bureaucratic state. One charge against him, for example, indicated that the captain had fined twelve people who ate beef that they had marinated, which was prohibited, but he did so without any documented record of his investigation. Similarly, he had fined seven people for failing to declare the quantity of meat they had sold without writing any accounts himself.³⁹¹

Other captains employed their office almost as a cover for their own crimes. One delegate in Catania allegedly plotted against a silversmith in the city and thus accused the smith of having stolen a certain individual's silver, for which he imprisoned the silversmith for twenty days. During that period of time, the delegate confiscated and stole six pounds of unworked silver and various worked items.³⁹² Another captain, in addition to doubling his own salary, was accused of having committed highway robbery. In contrast, Carlo de Terminis, another captain, had effectively transformed his position into an opportunity for the pervasive but relatively low scale collection of bribes and extortions, of which the *visitador's* charges included a few dozen examples ranging from releasing someone he had arrested for 100 escudos to demanding payments and food from various villages when he did not have the right to do so to threatening individuals with the possibility of military service and receiving a small quantity of money to be released from that obligation.³⁹³

In some cases, the captains approached this with a certain strategy, as was the case of García de Avila y Mendoza, the *castellano* of Trapani and captain of arms, who supposedly targeted men who were known to be relatively rich for service so that he could extort larger sums of money. Terminis's and Avila y Mendoza's corruption was essentially the norm for the other individuals who held the position, taking advantage of the relatively weak institutions and social fabric of the hinterland for personal gain. In certain instances, these captains literally abused those institutions, including one captain who, without any appropriate commission, allegedly appeared in a territory where the officials had not fined anyone for the excessive slaughter of cows for several years, and tricked them into paying him twenty-five escudos and eight *reales* each. Another captain used his position to offer protection to illicit gambling houses

³⁹⁰ AGS, SSP, libros 688 and 689.

³⁹¹ AGS, SSP, libro 688, ff. 18v-19.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, ff. 23-24.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, ff. 19-20v.

Table 6. Charges against culpable officials in Luyando's visita to Sicily in 1606.

Office	Number of Culpable Officials	Number of Charges	Average Number of Charges	Standard Deviation
Great Court	19	291	15.3	17.3
Patrimonial Court	10	262	26.2	17.9
Tabla Palermo	13	22 ^a	1.69	0.94
Jurados	23	304	13.2	7.79
Viceportulanos	10	51	5.1	2.28
Captains of Arms and Justice	32	559	17.5	20.8
Galley	8	74	9.25	6.45
Syndicate	4	42	10.5	6.19
Other ^b	32	484	15.1	24.6
TOTAL	151	2089	13.8	17.7

^a Only twenty-two charges were listed, though it seems likely that the actual number was higher.

^b The listed figures come from the entries from thirty-one officials. Only the punishment is known for the remaining official.

Table 7. Charges resulting in discipline in Luyando's visita to Sicily in 1606.

Office	Number of Charges Resulting in Discipline	Percentage of Charges Resulting in Discipline	Average Number of Charges Resulting in Discipline	Standard Deviation
Great Court	91	31.3%	4.79	7.00
Patrimonial Court	132	50.4%	13.2	10.1
Tabla Palermo	22	100%	1.69	0.94
Jurados	192	63.2%	8.35	5.65
Viceportulanos	44	86.2%	4.4	2.27
Captains of Arms and Justice	411 ^a	74.5%	12.8	16.4
Galley	26	35.1%	3.71	1.98
Syndicate	21	50%	5.25	4.03
Other ^b	236	48.8%	7.61	9.86
TOTAL	1,175	56.2%	7.78	10.2

^a The number of charges for which one captain was found guilty is unclear.

^b The listed figures come from the entries from thirty-one officials. Only the punishment is known for the remaining official.

Table 8. Punishments resulting from Luyando's visita to Sicily in 1606.

Office	Total Fines (escudos)	Average Fine	Standard Deviation	Prohibitions and Suspensions
Great Court	5,865	309	334	1
Patrimonial Court	17,176	1,718	1,490	0
Tabla Palermo	3,200	246	66.0	0
Jurados	13,301	578	448	4
Viceportulanos	1,150	115	33.7	0
Captains of Arms and Justice	22,555	705	820	14
Galleys	1,250	179	80.9	0
Syndicate	650	163	229	1
Other	35,500	1,268	2,000	9
TOTAL	101,647 ^a	673	1,120	29

^aThe author's arithmetic produced a result that was 900 escudos lower than this total.

(a type of corruption that past *visitadores* had difficulty proving) that paid him off and sold a license to "some French" for fifty ducats to run a kind of game that was apparently considered to be particularly "detrimental and damaging."³⁹⁴

The *visitador's* inclusion of these "French" was not coincidental. At the same time the range of inspection reached into the hinterland it also sought to monitor and control the trade that thrived in the open Mediterranean world. Pietro Bruno, yet another captain of justice, was cited for leaving the gates of the port open, which facilitated – or at least potentially facilitated – illicit shipments of grain.³⁹⁵ Likewise, a *viceportulano*, as part of a broad crackdown on the excessive number of firearms in Sicily, was cited for having exported weapons and went so far as to order some of his officials to accompany some Calabrians who were smuggling fifty guns and two bags of gunpowder to Naples in the night.³⁹⁶ Gaspar Velázquez, a captain who was deprived of office permanently, was found guilty of releasing various people from jail, including some for a small bribe, including some people who were accused of illegally taking cheese to sell outside of Sicily.³⁹⁷ Likewise, several cashiers, in addition to using the Crown's money as credit for personal transactions, sold money to French merchants while other officials were also found guilty of having sold wheat at excessively low prices, extorting wheat from estates, or having consigned wheat in advance without making allowances for possible shortfalls.³⁹⁸ This regulation of the Crown's patrimony also extended to an attempt to control the function of slavery, particularly with regard to the galleys. Several officials for the galleys were, for example,

³⁹⁴ AGS, SSP, libro 688, ff. 35-37.

³⁹⁵ AGS, SSP, libro 689, ff. 17v-18.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 21v-22v.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 25-32.

³⁹⁸ AGS, SSP, libro 688, ff. 70-72.

punished for having sold the slaves consigned to them, having used the Crown's slaves for personal service, or having lacked appropriate diligence in ensuring that they did not escape.³⁹⁹

But even if the visita's extension of discipline into the hinterland in some sense surpassed its discipline of the traditional administrative core, it did not entirely abandon its ability to pressure that core. While the conclusion of Luyando's investigation of Rao's conduct leaves several questions because the summary of punishments, for reasons that are unclear, does not account for all the charges against the president of the Great Court, two charges are enumerated in the text as having been dealt with while a variety of other charges were taken from the visita to be dealt with by a special commission given to two regents of the Council of Italy. Of the two that resulted in punishment, one charge dealt with the charging of rents in such a way that led to losses for the Crown, for which he was fined, though the exact nature of the practice was left unclear due to the summary form of the charge. More detail, however, was given to Rao's conduct as a member of the Great Court. In particular, the visita's discipline turned to the manner in which Rao participated in the suspension of Giuseppe Trabuco, a judge of the Great Court. Rao was found to have acted without sufficient information about Trabuco's conduct and throughout the proceedings was believed to have not given sufficient attention to the level of justification required by the case and instead acting according to his own interests. To that end, he persuaded two of the other judges of the great court that it was his right, along with the president of the patrimony, to attend to the matter despite their misgivings. He also used his influence to actively shape the manner in which cases were heard and dealt with and increased the salaries of various officials contrary to orders.⁴⁰⁰ If this indicates an attention to modeling court styles, it also very much put pressure on Rao's continued ability to leverage his connections and influence in the broader politics of Sicily and, at least in theory, in the specific setting of the administration of justice. In so doing, the visita's efforts to restrict elite social connections while, where possible, reducing expenses, thus expanded to constricting local sources of authority. Indeed, this was particularly true as the visitadores began to enforce limits on spending for the entries of the viceroys.⁴⁰¹ Even as the visita began to exhibit a tendency towards provincialization by attending to the demands of the locality, it began to assault the links between symbolic authority and social status that historians have increasingly envisioned as the essence of Spanish governance.

CONCLUSION

By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the visita had fully evolved into a disciplinary institution in which norms of conduct were mediated between local societies and the state. Over the course of the period, the regularity of visitas effectively initiated a feedback loop that encouraged broader segments of local societies to participate in and legitimize the state's disciplinary process. This manifestly created a linkage between the ad hoc regulation and coercion imposed by the state and a discipline that emerged from within society – from the

³⁹⁹ AGS, SSP, libro 688, ff. 4v-9v.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., ff. 1-2v.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., f. 85. For more on these symbolic processions see Cañeque, *The King's Living Image* and Alejandra B. Osorio, "La entrada del virrey y el ejercicio de poder en la Lima del siglo XVII," *Historia Mexicana* 55, no. 3 (2006), 767-831.

aristocracy to vagabonds, from doctors of law and medicine to slaves and servants, and both men and women – that drove further regulation. In so doing, the visita began to institutionalize notions of bureaucratic conduct by causing the state, despite the reluctance of the Crown's councils and the hostility of its governors and viceroys, to regulate an increasing range of behaviors that were formerly permissible while preserving the traditional façade of authority and social status in the localities. But the stability of this system – and the empire itself – was under increasing external pressure in the seventeenth century. In the crises of the seventeenth century, the visita would be mobilized to meet an expanding set of demands even as the state's ability to maintain the institution reached a breaking point.

CHAPTER III
 CRISIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW STATE
 THE LATE HAPSBURG VISITA, 1621-1700

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970s, the historiography of early modern Spain has oft reexamined what is one of its most persistent and vexing subjects, the “decline” of Spain. The pervasive notion of decadence under the later Hapsburgs owes, as Christopher Storrs among others have related, a particular debt to sixteenth and seventeenth century reports of Spanish weakness from its own *arbitristas* and foreign observers. That was only compounded by the apparent contrast between Hapsburg Spain and the emergent Enlightenment, a contrast discouraged neither by the legacy of the eighteenth-century Bourbon reforms nor by the Bourbons themselves.⁴⁰² While contemporary revisionist historians have done much to complicate the traditional narrative of Spanish decline or, as it fits within the broader history of Europe, the Spanish exception, the notion of decline still deeply pervades the historiography of early modernity because its simplicity and elegance seems to confirm assumptions about state-building and diplomacy during and after the “Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” the restructuring of the European and global economies and societies from the “Crisis” to industrialization, and the cultural transformations of the Enlightenment.⁴⁰³ Even as new studies and approaches point to a

⁴⁰² Christopher Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy: 1665-1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-12.

⁴⁰³ In lieu of citing those three extensive historiographies, see the following for the development of the corresponding historiography regarding Spain itself, initially in response to the “Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” but with later works of cultural and intellectual history: J. H. Elliott, “The Decline of Spain,” *Past and Present* 20 (1961); John Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964); Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*; J. H. Elliott, “Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth Century Spain,” *Past and Present* 74 (1977), Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” *Past and Present* 81 (Nov., 1978); J. G. Casey, *The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Carla Rahn Phillips, *Ciudad Real, 1500-1700: Growth, Crisis, and Readjustment in the Spanish Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Henry Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665-1700* (London: Longman, 1980); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, “La crise intérieure de la Monarchie des Habsbourgs espagnols sous Carlos II,” in J. A. H. Bots and A. G. Weiler, eds., *The Peace of Nijmegen 1676-78/79. La paix de Nimègue* (Amsterdam, 1980); Jonathan Israel, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” *Past and Present* 91 (1981); Ángel García Sanz, *Desarrollo y crisis del Antiguo Régimen en Castilla la Vieja: Economía y sociedad en tierras de Segovia de 1500 a 1814*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Akal, 1986); J. H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Juan Antonio Sánchez Belén, “Arbitrismo y reforma monetaria en tiempos de Carlos II,” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, serie IV, *Historia Moderna* 5 (1992); I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, eds., *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth Century Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); I. A. A. Thompson, “Patronato real e integración política en las ciudades castellanas bajo los Austrias,” in José Igancio Fortea Pérez, ed., *Imágenes de la Diversidad. El mundo urbano en la Corona de Castilla (S. XVI-XVIII)* (Santander, 1997); Luis Antonio Ribot García, “Carlos II: el centenario olvidado,” *Studia Histórica. Historia Moderna* 20 (1999), 19-44; Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “Del centro a la periferia: La economía española bajo Carlos II,” *Studia Histórica. Historia Moderna* 20 (1999); Juan E. Gelabert, “The King’s Expenses: The Asientos of Philip III and Philip IV of Spain,” in *Crises, Revolutions, and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830*, eds. W. M. Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and Richard J. Bonney (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), 233-59; Eva Velasco Moreno, *La Real Academia de la Historia en el siglo*

measure of historiographic revitalization for Spain and its empire, most notably in the history of the Atlantic world, one Spanish “exception” nevertheless remains entrenched, its institutions.

Indeed, in a peculiar irony, the revisionists – with some exceptions – have not merely confirmed the exceptionality of Spanish institutions but increasingly point to those institutions, which are understood to have traded political and economic stability for fragmentation and resistance, as the very source of Spanish decline.⁴⁰⁴ Outside of the Castilian context that has typically informed this understanding, the intransigence of the decline thesis, both economic and institutional, is similarly pervasive in the historiography of Spanish Italy, often situated around the revolts in Naples and Sicily in 1647, a landmark of Italian historiography.⁴⁰⁵

XVIII: *una institución de sociabilidad* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000); Jorge Cañizares Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); Francisco José Aranda Pérez, ed., *La declinación de la monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII* (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-la Mancha, 2004); Helen Rawlings, *The Debate on the Decline of Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); Amanda Wunder, *Baroque Seville: Sacred Art in a Century of Crisis* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2017). A relatively recent summary of the historiography of the European “Crisis” can be found in J. H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) though new efforts, such as Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), are periodic. The distinct historiography of Latin America has traditionally tended to suggest broadly similar conclusions although with less emphasis on a seventeenth century inflection as opposed to that century’s contrast with the better studied economic, social, and political transformations of the eighteenth century. See chapter IV for the nexus between the visita, “decline,” and the Americas.

⁴⁰⁴ See, for example, Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth, *Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt, Taxes, and Default in the Age of Philip II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 243-280; Regina Grafe, “Spain is Not Different: What Spanish History Can Tell Us about State-Building and Economic Integration in Early Modern Europe,” *Perspectives on Europe* (Autumn 2015), 13; Regina Grafe, “Was There a Market for Institutions in Early Modern European Trade?” in G. Christ, S. Burkhardt and R. Zaugg, eds., *Union in Separation – Diasporic Groups in the Eastern Mediterranean (1100-1800)* (Rome: Viella, 2015), 593-612; Regina Grafe, “Polycentric States: The Spanish Reigns and the ‘Failures’ of Mercantilism” in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind, eds., *Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 241-262; Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, “Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal Constraints and Financial Development in the Early Modern Hispanic World” in D’Maris Coffman, et al., eds., *Questioning Credible Commitment. Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 188-227; Regina Grafe, *Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Ruth MacKay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Helen Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); J. B. Owens, *“By My Absolute Royal Authority”: Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning of the First Global Age* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005). Drelichman and Voth upended the belief that Philip II’s defaults on Genoese loans in the sixteenth century were indicative of a structural weakness, but concluded that the Crown’s failure to regularize and centralize fiscal institutions ultimately led to its decline in the seventeenth century. Regina Grafe’s extensive work on early modern Spanish institutions and economies – including a summary of her work incisively titled “Spain is Not Different” – attacks the teleology of the nation-state and any belief that the heavy hand of Hapsburg tyranny stalled Spanish development, arguing instead that within Spain, “jurisdictional fragmentation created political stability at the price of economic disintegration.” Ruth MacKay’s *The Limits of Royal Authority* purports that local opposition and resistance to the Crown – particularly in the form of resistance to military recruitment – prospered in mid-seventeenth century Spain because of political beliefs that legitimized that opposition and because the Crown lacked the centralized administrative apparatus to curtail it.

⁴⁰⁵ Benedetto Croce, *Storia del Regno di Napoli* (Bari: Laterza, 1966); Villari, *La rivolta antispagnola a Napoli*; Giuseppe Galasso, *Napoli spagnola dopo Masaniello. Politica, cultura, società* (Florence: Sansoni, 1982);

The visita represents a particular paradox in understanding the state of institutions in Spain's empire in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, it could appear almost emblematic of the supposed turbulence of the seventeenth century and the fragility of the Hapsburgs' institutions, dramatically decreasing in frequency and regularity after the early decades of the century in Spain and then throughout its empire. In the 1640s – the momentous decade of crisis for the Spanish monarchy – the visita very directly pointed to the limitations of the state, with a visita to Naples, which had been intended to help resolve the Crown's fiscal crisis, escaping the ascendant French navy in the Mediterranean only to be brought to an untimely end by Masaniello's revolt. In 1680, the Crown's insecurities about noble contentment, largely brought on by the recent memory of revolt of Messina, would bring an early end to the final visitas in Italy.

But if those failures intimated a fragile state, the visita also very much indicated the transformational momentum of bureaucratization and institutionalization albeit increasingly driven less by the Crown itself than by the periphery. Accordingly, the visitas of the seventeenth century were remarkably durable, with the disciplinary work that had come to characterize the institution in the sixteenth century continuing to expand in volume through the 1630s and even, in the case of Sicily, as late as the 1650s. Perhaps more surprisingly, the visitas in Italy from the mid-century onward – even under the severe fiscal, political, and social strains of the environment in which they operated – represented not merely an institutional persistence or resilience but dynamism. As power shifted to the peripheries in the seventeenth century, the relationship between local societies and the visita continued to regularize and normalize expectations for official conduct while increasingly restructuring the imperial state itself, pressing the visita – and therefore the state – to intervene in the codes of conduct that typified the hinterland, apply pressure on the practice of venality and the emergence of kinship

Luis Antonio Ribot García, "La Hacienda real de Sicilia en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII. (Notas para un estudio de los balances del Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid)," *Cuadernos de investigación histórica* 2 (1978), 401-42; Luis Antonio Ribot García, *La revuelta antiespañola de Mesina: causas y antecedentes (1591-1674)* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1982); Roberto Mantelli, *Il pubblico impiego nell'economia del Regno di Napoli: Retribuzioni, reclutamento e ricambio sociale nell'epoca spagnuola (secc. XVI-XVII)* (Naples: Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, 1986); Aurelio Musi, *La rivolta di Masaniello nella scene politica barocca* (Naples: Guida, 1989); Calabria and Marino, eds. and trans., *Good Government in Spanish Naples*; Luis Antonio Ribot García, "Milán, Plaza de Armas de la Monarquía," *Investigaciones Históricas* 10 (1990), 203-38; Antonio Calabria, *The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Time of Spanish Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Mario Rizzo, "Centro spagnolo e periferia Lombarda nell'impero asburgico tra Cinque e Settecento," *Rivista Storica Italiana* 104 (1992), 315-48; Gianvittorio Signorotto, ed., *L'Italia degli Austriaci: Monarchia cattolica e domini italiani nei secoli XVI e XVII* (Mantova: Edizioni Centro Federico Odorici, 1993); Luis Antonio Ribot García, "Las provincias italianas y la defensa de la Monarquía," in Aurelio Musi, ed., *Nel sistema imperial. L'Italia spagnola* (Naples, 1994), 67-92; Francesco Benigno, *Specchi della rivoluzione: Conflitto e identità politica nell'Europa moderna* (Rome: Donzelli, 1999); Aurelio Musi, *L'Italia dei viceré: Integrazione e resistenza nel sistema imperiale spagnolo* (Cava de' Tirreni: Avagliano, 2000); Luis Antoni Ribot García, *La Monarquía de España y la Guerra de Mesina (1674-1678)* (Madrid: ACTAS, 2002); Bengino, "Integration and Conflict in Spanish Sicily"; Giorgio Dell'Oro, *Il regio economato: Il controllo statale sul clero nella Lombardia asburgica e nei domini sabaudi* (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007); Isabel Enciso Alonso-Muñumer, *Nobleza, poder y mecenazgo en tiempos de Felipe III: Nápoles y el Conde de Lemos* (Madrid: ACTAS, 2007); Silvana D'Alessio, *Masaniello. La sua vita e il mito in Europe* (Rome: Salerno, 2007); Rosario Villari, *Un sogno di libertà. Napoli nel declino di un impero 1585-1648* (Milan: Mondadori, 2012).

oligarchies, and bring the hitherto autonomous nobility under the imperial state's direct administration of justice.

If the *visitas* of the seventeenth century illustrate an institutional dynamism operating within the constraints that ordinarily indicate the weakness of the state, it similarly suggests a counterpoint to the developing historiographic critique of early modern institutions that portrays the concurrent "invention of a state" as a teleological fiction. That approach, which negates the existence of the early modern state, supposes that the formal institutions and bureaucracies that might otherwise be understood as features of it should instead be read through their symbols, ceremonies, and rituals to understand the distribution and negotiation of authority within local societies and between the ruler and his subjects. This has been especially pervasive among studies of the Spanish empire from the view that the *ancien régime's* officials operated not according to any administrative logic but within a continuum of ritual and negotiation to maintain the social order to Alejandro Cañeque's study of the imagery of viceregal power that contrasted with any "notion of a centralizing state" that was "literally inconceivable" in the seventeenth century.⁴⁰⁶ While the *visitas* were certainly imbued with a variety of symbols and rituals of authority, this hardly indicated the absence of a state but on the contrary pointed to the ongoing coalescence of an institutional layer within the state ranging from the ceremonies of precedence in local tribunals to the law of administration itself. Indeed, in the seventeenth century, the *visita* had been and would continue to be instrumental in cultivating the norms of conduct associated with the modern state by delegitimizing specific classes of behavior that were understood, through the ongoing practice of discipline, to contravene the interests of the public good. Moreover, it was hardly the case that early modern governance was somehow inseparable from or inconceivable without its symbolic qualities. By the end of the seventeenth century, the work of the *visita* illustrated that the state was seen less in terms of its symbolic value or authority, which was viewed with a certain cynicism by the

⁴⁰⁶ Cañeque, *The King's Living Image*, 7-16. For the sources underlying Cañeque's critique see Dietrich Gerhard, *Old Europe: A Study of Continuity, 1000-1800* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 2-3; Bartolomé Clavero, *Tantas personas como estados: Por una antropología política de la historia europea* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1986), 53-105; Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988), 58-89; Antonio M. Hespanha, *Vísperas del Leviatán. Instituciones y poder político (Portugal, siglo XVII)*, trans. F. J. Bouza Álvarez (Madrid: Taurus Humanidades, 1989), 19-37; Quentin Skinner, "The State" in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, eds. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 90-131; Bartolomé Clavero, *Razón de Estado, razón de individuo, razón de historia* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991), 39-45; Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación*. Inspection, of course, is usually understood to perform the opposite function of Herzog's rites and practices. Meyer and Rowan, for example, proposed that institutionalized organizations, which even in the absence of a state would include the early modern *bureaux* and courts, typically attempt to "ceremonialize" and "minimize" inspections because their evaluations lower morale, undermine legitimacy, indicate a lack of good faith, and damage the "ceremonial aspects of organization," all of which correspond to the formal complaints about the relationship between the *visita* and the locality. Ritualization, therefore, is initially produced by the organization rather than by the regulator. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 2 (Sep. 1977), 358-9. Approaches focusing on semiotics and images, though less predisposed against notions of the state, are also prevalent in the study of Spanish Italy, see Carmelo Lisón Tolosana, *La imagen del rey: Monarquía, realeza y poder ritual en la Casa de los Austrias* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1991); Diana Carrió-Invernizzi, *El gobierno de las imágenes: ceremonial y mecenazgo en la Italia española de la segunda mitad del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2008); Guarino, *Representing the king's splendour*.

late-seventeenth century after having been the essential point of institutional contestation in the sixteenth century, towards a logic of the “substance” of administration.

To those ends, this chapter describes the final decades of Hapsburg governance in Italy through the *visita*: from its apex in the 1620s and the culmination of the Spanish empire’s disciplinary-administrative order to the fiscal and social crises of the mid-century and beyond into the 1680s. In those moments, the *visita*, as one of the Crown’s foremost institutions, did mark out the empire’s triumphs and failures. But, more essentially, it pointed to the persistent process of institutionalization in administration that, while less visible than the rituals or vicissitudes that historians have typically used to characterize the nature of the Spanish state in the seventeenth century, were the substance of the rules, norms, and ultimately, incipient bureaucratic culture from which the modern state emerged.⁴⁰⁷

CONTINUITY IN THE CRESTING VISITA, 1628-1634

Unlike the *visitas* that began in 1606 and 1607, which were ultimately more substantial than a restrained Council of Italy had desired at the time, the next set of *visitas*, begun in 1628, quite consciously were expected to represent a new height for the institution in Italy. The timing of those *visitas*, illustrative of the growing coincidence between the fortunes of war and the Crown’s institutional energies in the seventeenth century, happened to fall after Spain’s *annus mirabilis* in 1625, during which Spanish armies won several decisive victories against Dutch and English forces from Brazil to the Netherlands.⁴⁰⁸ Victory, at least in the moment, allowed the Crown to turn its attentions inward as the unusually ardent support of the Council of Italy in response to reports and complaints from Italy, which indicated that “these years of wars” had created an environment in which fraud was unmonitored, created the momentum required to begin a new round of *visitas* in 1626, the year after Spain’s triumphs.⁴⁰⁹ Not coincidentally, those two years also corresponded with the proposal of the Count-Duke of Olivares’s ambitious imperial defense system, the “Union of Arms.”⁴¹⁰ Even if the Crown’s wars continued indefinitely despite Olivares’s hope of attaining peace by 1627, it nevertheless began to plan its newest *visitas* as Quiroga had described them in relation to the Peace of Cateau-

⁴⁰⁷ This description of the elements of institutionalization corresponds to W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), see in particular pp. 54-57 that describes “regulative” (“rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities”), “normative” (a “prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension” in social life), and “cultural-cognitive” (“shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made”) elements, which derives from Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” *American Sociological Review* 48 (Apr., 1983), 147-160. DiMaggio and Powell labeled their elements “coercive,” “normative,” and “mimetic.”

⁴⁰⁸ Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King: The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 28-30, 161-192. In the 1630s, the propaganda of the battle paintings commissioned for the *Salón de Reinos* representing those triumphs was rather more defensive in nature.

⁴⁰⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Copy of Council of Italy’s consulta from October 7, 1626.

⁴¹⁰ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, ch. 5; J. H. Elliott, *Spain and Its World, 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 123-128; J. H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge, 1984); J. H. Elliott, José F. de La Peña, and Fernando Negrodo, eds., *Memoriales y cartas del Conde Duque de Olivares* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Europa Hispánica and Marcial Pons, 2013); Curiously, the domestic crises in Spain of 1627 – including the illness of Philip IV – did little to stall the *visitas*.

Cambrésis in 1559, a tool that required the Crown to turn its attentions from the conduct of war towards the work of reinforcing the social and financial sinews of the state.

As had become routine, the Crown's plans for the renewal of the visita in Italy were made definite with the nomination of the individuals who would carry out these most prestigious, extensive, and expensive visitas. Indeed, the nominations and subsequent commissions directly denoted the culmination of three very closely related institutional trends.

First, and most obviously, the officials who were ultimately commissioned to carry out the Crown's inspections would be the most-well remunerated of the *visitadores* in Italy, with salaries ranging from ten to twelve ducats per day in addition to stipends of up to 6,000 ducats to defray expenses. That salary alone represented a nominal increase of between fifty-six and eighty-eight percent over the daily salaries of the *visitadores* in the late 1550s. The Crown's increased investment in personnel was even more strongly suggested by the increases in the salaries for the visita's secretaries and accountants who were, at least in Sicily, each paid ninety ducats a month, a nominal increase of 181% over the salaries for similar positions in the late 1550s.⁴¹¹ Yet that dramatic increase was still less than the Council of Italy of the 1620s desired, as it proposed including additional officials in order to ensure the completion of audits in Naples, though the Crown rejected that extra expense.⁴¹²

Second, the nominations and ultimate selections illustrated the tendency of the Crown to select as its *visitadores* officials who had already attained posts in Spanish *audiencias*, chanceries, and councils. Of the seven nominations, Francisco Antonio de Alarcón y Covarrubias, who was selected to conduct the visita to Naples, had the most extensive and illustrious career in the Crown's service prior to 1628. A member of the Order of Santiago, Alarcón had served in several local Church offices and as a magistrate for the Chancery of Valladolid, a judge in the Chancery of Granada, had already carried out a "particular" visita against the disgraced Duke of Osuna and four councilors of the Neapolitan appeals court, and had attained a post on the Council of the Indies. At the time of his appointment to serve as *visitador*, Alarcón had also been named to the Council of Castile. Diego de Riaño y Gamboa, the *visitador* to Sicily, had held similar positions in the Church, served as a criminal prosecutor for the Chancery of Valladolid, and by 1628 was, like Alarcón, a judge in the Chancery of Granada and named to the Council of Castile. Mateo de Cerecedo, the initial *visitador* for Milan, was a judge in the Chancery of Valladolid. The remaining candidates, among whom was a future inspector of the army in Milan in the 1630s, included an inquisitor in the Holy Office's Toledo tribunal, another judge in the Chancery of Granada, and two judges from the Chancery of Valladolid, one of whom had also been a governor of the Principality of Asturias.⁴¹³

Finally, the jurisdiction of the visitas remained as ample as it had been since the second half of the sixteenth century. Alongside its ordinary tasks, for example, the Crown also employed the visitas with the oversight of universities in order to regulate the proliferation of

⁴¹¹ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 99-101.

⁴¹² AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Council of Italy, consulta from February 19, 1627.

⁴¹³ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Copy of the Council of Italy's consulta from November 6, 1626; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 87-98; Ismael García Ramila, *Don Diego de Riaño y Gamboa, insigne burgalés y hombre de Estado* (Burgos: *Boletín de la Institución Fernán González* nos. 137-144, 1956-1958); Kagan, *Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile*; Janine Fayard, *Les membres du Conseil de Castille à l'époque moderne (1621-1746)* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1979).

degrees that were perceived to be diluting the quality of the empire's "professional" class.⁴¹⁴ Thus, Alarcón, in addition to the usual review of nearly every royal official in Naples as well as the viceroy's officials and even the territories of the Prince of Bisignano with the familiar intent of punishing corruption for the Crown's "service and the good administration of those tribunals and offices and officials and the public good" was also instructed to annul illegitimate law and medical degrees.⁴¹⁵

But even that extensive jurisdiction was very nearly modified to grant the *visitadores* even greater purview in the 1620s. The Council of Italy gave some consideration for granting the *visitadores* additional authority to punish low-level officials. Such a change, it was thought, would help to ensure that officials not avoid the punishments that were meted out. It would also have helped reduce the burden on the *juntas* that were formed to resolve the *visita*'s cases upon its completion.⁴¹⁶

That burden on the *visitas*' *juntas* was particularly heavy after the completion of the *visitas* of 1628. In March 1633, when the *visitas* to Naples and Sicily had been concluded for roughly a year, the *junta* had already begun to proceed in earnest, or so it reported. After working "extraordinary hours," the *junta* reported that "the cases of seventy-two ministers in Naples have been viewed, ten have been deprived of office and suspended, and the fines amount to 20,741 escudos. From the *visita* to Sicily, the cases of twenty-eight ministers have been viewed, twenty-one of which have been deprived of office and suspended, and the fines amount to 39,271 escudos."⁴¹⁷ This extraordinary work would be extremely expensive, as the *junta* spuriously complained that they were receiving insufficient compensation in contrast to the *junta* that reviewed the "past *visitas*" of Guevara in Naples, which was "very short" and dealt

⁴¹⁴ AGS, SSP, leg. 233. Letter from Philip IV to Alarcón. November 21, 1628; Kagan, *Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile: 1500-1700*.

⁴¹⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Commission of Francisco Antonio de Alarcón. April 14, 1628. "Lo que convenga a nuestro servicio y a la buena administración de los dichos tribunales y oficios y oficiales y bien público"; AGS, SSP, libro 14; AGS, SSP, leg. 233. Letter from Philip IV to Alarcón. November 21, 1628.

⁴¹⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 235. "Algunas cosas que se podrán advertir o declarar en la comisión de la *visita*"; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 81-87. The problems of the sea of paperwork associated with early modern administration is well described in Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, and the work of the councils in Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, *El consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602: Patronazgo y clientelismo en el gobierno de las finanzas reales durante el siglo XVI* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1996); Ernesto Schäfer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias. Su historia, organización y labor administrativa hasta la terminación de la Casa de Austria*, vols. 1 and 2 (Seville, 1935-47); I. A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620* (London: Athlone, 1976); Jon Arrieta Alberdi, *El consejo supremo de la corona de Aragón (1494-1707)* (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1994).

⁴¹⁷ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. *Junta* of the *visitas* to Naples and Sicily, consulta from March 10, 1633. "Las *visitas* delos Reynos de Nápoles, y Sicilia que han hecho Don Francisco Antonio de Alarcón del Cons.º Real de Castilla, y Don Diego de Riaño y Gamboa Oydor dela Chancillería de Granada, se van determinando por los Juezes que V.M.^d fue servido de nombrar por decreto de 30 de Março 1632, y en ellas se ha trabajado hasta aquí con tanto cuydado, y vigilancia que si bien los Ministros que intervienen en ellas tienen otras muchas ocupaciones del servicio de V.Mag.^d atienden à esta à horas extraordinarias sin reparar en circunstancia ninguna de incomodidad. Todo lo qual se haze muy suave con el beneficio que se va siguiendo dello à la Real hazienda, y al exemplo público; pues en el dho tiempo se han visto de la *visita* de Nápoles las causas de setenta y dos Ministros, diez están privados y suspendidos de officio, y las condenaciones pecuniarias montan veynte mil setecientos y quarenta y un escudos. De la *visita* de Sicilia se han visto las causas de veynte y ocho Ministros, los veynte y uno estan privados y suspendidos de officios, y montan las condenaciones pecuniarias treynta y nueve mil ducientos y setenta y un escudos[.]"

with “very few ministers,” and of Luyando in Sicily, which “did not have more than 105 officials who were inspected,” a conclusion that was presumably a rather useful misreading of the volumes of condemnations that Luyando’s visita produced.⁴¹⁸ But the junta was not entirely unjustified in requesting some consideration as its estimates suggested that the 1628 visitas in Naples and Sicily were in fact by far the most expansive to that date. In the case of Naples, a supplementary visita, conducted by Alonso de la Carrera beginning in 1634, was initiated to complete portions of the work that had been left pending from Alarcón’s visita with regard to the financial court. That same year, the Crown commissioned an inspection of the army in Milan that supplemented the ongoing visita general in the duchy. Meanwhile, in Spain, the juntas resolving the visitas required a fairly long period of time to resolve the charges that resulted from them, with the junta handling Sicily meeting from 1632 to 1639 and the junta for Naples lasting until 1643, even though the visitas to Naples and Sicily only lasted three and four years respectively.⁴¹⁹ But that was not surprising considering that those visitas brought charges against over 700 officials in Naples and over 500 officials in Sicily.⁴²⁰

On the other hand, these same cresting visitas began to demonstrate, both in retrospect and contemporaneously, the crises of the Spanish empire in the seventeenth century. That was especially true in Milan, where the supplementary visita in 1634, intended to instill discipline in military finance and administration was essentially a response to Crown’s increasing dissatisfaction not only with rampant financial abuse but also with the army’s general performance.⁴²¹ In 1631, at the end of a particularly intense period of conflict, reports about the army’s lack of supplies and logistical resources – ranging from a dearth of hay, horses, and carts to the need for a bridge over the Po – helped prompt a rigorous review of the situation in the duchy.⁴²² By 1633, the Crown had begun attributing its lack of success in its wars to the disorders in the administration of finance and accordingly intended to use the visita to punish these ministers for its lost reputation, though the resulting visita did little to address the nobles who were excused from review by the Crown.⁴²³ The beginnings of the crisis were still more

⁴¹⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Junta of the visitas to Naples and Sicily, consulta from March 10, 1633. “Las vissitas passadas fueron muy cortas porque la de Nap.^s que hizo Don Juan Beltrán de Guevara el año de 1606 fue de muy poco número de ministros, y la de Sicilia que hizo el mismo año Don Ochoa de Luyando no tuvo más de ciento y cinco vissitados[.]” The vague reference to Guevara’s visita suggests that no consolidated record of charges had been produced for it – and, indeed, none exists today in Simancas – while the specific number associated with Luyando’s seems to indicate that the junta had been made aware of the first volume of judgments that is now AGS, SSP, libro 688, which has 101 entries but was unaware of the second volume, AGS, SSP, libero 689, and also ignored the fact that these were lists of individuals who had been punished rather than a list of all the charges.

⁴¹⁹ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 117.

⁴²⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Junta of the visitas to Naples and Sicily, consulta from March 10, 1633.

⁴²¹ AGS, EST, leg. 3340, f. 139. November 11, 1633; Domenico Sella, “Sotto il dominio della Spagna,” in Domenico Sella and Carlo Capra, *Il Ducato di Milano dal 1535 al 1796* (Turin: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1984), 9-16.

⁴²² AGS, EST, leg. 3340, f. 176. April 28, 1631.

⁴²³ AGS, EST, leg. 3340, f. 153. January 20, 1633. “El descredito de mis armas en las guerras ultimas de Italia y en las de Flandes de diez años a esta parte causado dela desorden conq procedieron los ministro[s] a quien tocaba así el gobierno dellas como la administración dela hazienda, me ha lastimado de manera q después achá he estado pensando en el remedio juzgando por obligación precisa tratar de sastifazer ala reputación perdida y no menos bolver por el valor de mis soldados no siendo inferior al conq en tiempos pasados ganaron mis exércitos [...]

apparent in the preceding visita general. 1628, as circumstances would have it, was particularly unfortunate timing for beginning a visita to Milan, as the duchy was the center of Spain's involvement in the War of the Mantuan Succession from 1628 to 1631 while it simultaneously suffered from its disastrous "Great Plague" beginning in the fall of 1629. By 1631, an estimated 46% of the population of the city had succumbed to the plague.⁴²⁴ While the subsequent loss of the testimonies and information collected by the visita to Milan obscure the connections between that catastrophe and the visita, the effect can be partly inferred to the extent that the visitador himself perished. Presumably as a result, when the visita's work was resumed and completed by Andrés de Rueda Rico, Cerecedo's replacement, a substantially lower number of officials were charged than in prior visitas. The absence of the Milanese records was mirrored by the destruction of the juridical records from Naples and Sicily which, as Peytavin surmised, occurred during the revolts of 1648 in Palermo and Naples.⁴²⁵

The loss of the visita's juridical records beginning in the 1620s coincided with major transitions that impacted the connection between the visitas and the evolving early modern Spanish archive. While the materials produced by the visitas beginning in 1628 were subsequently either destroyed or lost, the same type of materials from Italian visitas in the 1630s, 1640s, and 1650s were likewise disordered by the turbulence of the 1640s or simply not preserved. Only in the late 1670s were these records again preserved to any extent at all but this was uneven, in substantially less detail and volume, and with the loss of the organization that had previously characterized the records. Nevertheless, the administrative records and correspondence from the visitas from the 1620s through the 1680s were preserved in far better and more extensive conditions than the records from the visitas of the sixteenth century, grouped almost exclusively in the Secretarías Provinciales collection.⁴²⁶

This restructuring served two purposes. First, and quite practically, the preserved records typically included extensive notes on the resolution of the cases brought by the visitadores and the punishments assessed by the juntas. These materials, alongside the resultant reforms, were reviewed and referred to the visitadores' jurisdiction, establishing a documentary continuity that attempted to ameliorate the deficiencies in actually carrying out the discipline that arose from the gaps between the visitas. Thus, in preparation for Riaño y Gamboa's visita, the Crown ordered the archivist at Simancas to grant one of its licenciados, who would later serve as the secretary of the visita's junta, free access to the documents from Ochoa de Luyando's visita in order to produce copies of relevant materials.⁴²⁷ The practical consequences of that type of review was made clear in the instructions to Alarcón that noted that the visitador should execute the proclamations resulting from Guzmán's and Guevara's visitas regardless of

tanta gloria a mi corona si losq han governado y gobiernan mis armas y la hazienda obraran como yo debia esperar y siendo este punto tan indispensable"; EST 3340 f. 140.

⁴²⁴ Domenico Sella, "Premesse demografiche ai censimenti austriaci," in *Storia di Milano* vol. 12 (Milan: Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la storia di Milano, 1959); J. N. Hays, *Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 103; Cipolla, *Fighting the Plague in Seventeenth Century Italy*; Giovanna Tonelli, "The Economy in the 16th and 17th Centuries," in *A Companion to Late Medieval and Early Modern Milan: The Distinctive Features of an Italian State*, ed. Andrea Gamberini (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 156.

⁴²⁵ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 40; Giovanni Zarrilli, "Le visite di Francesco Alarcón e Danese Casati nel Regno di Napoli," *Samnium* 38 (1965), 128-66.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁷ AGS, SSP, libro 691, f. 1v. Philip IV to the Archivero de Simancas. March 1, 1628.

other intervening instructions.⁴²⁸ That retrospective review of the *visitas*' records by the *juntas*, *visitadores*, and the Crown would demand increased attention over the course of the seventeenth century.

The regularized, functional use of the files was complemented by their use as a means of legitimizing and establishing a symbolic continuity for the *visita* in the changing institutional landscape of the seventeenth century. This project of manufacturing a documentary continuity was most brilliantly illustrated by the production of new guidebooks for the *visitadores*. Among these was the only surviving jurisprudence manual for the *visitas* to Italy, *De Iudicio Visitationis*, an anonymous volume produced sometime in the seventeenth century – and perhaps written with the specific purpose of being employed by the *visitas* of 1628.⁴²⁹ Its seventeen chapters detailed the legal opinions that ostensibly framed – or, as its author supposed, were the very font of – the practice of the *visita* in Italy and particularly in Naples. These included the individuals to whom the process of the *visita* extended, how the *visitador* should deal with deceased officials, how to handle promotions and suspensions, the types of punishments to be meted out, the nature of restitutions, special attention to the pragmatics for Naples, and how to deal with substitute officials and family members.⁴³⁰ While the more sophisticated defenses produced by officials' attorneys had always responded to an existing but diffuse collection of jurisprudence related to the *visita* treating similar questions of law, *De Iudicio Visitationis* was unusual in actually collecting and describing that jurisprudence in detail, especially for an audience that was hardly unfamiliar with its conclusions. For example, Article 5, “de qua culpa sindicentur officiales,” follows the general principle “moreover [charges are brought] against officials [in] this process of the *visita* just as in an ordinary *sindico* concerning fraud, in extensive fault and minor fault[.] [O]n the other hand, [...] the most slight fault is by no means [to be included] even if it is done in a civil process”⁴³¹ leading to specific detail from citations about what, for example, “the most slight fault” might entail. Similarly, *De Iudicio Visitationis*

⁴²⁸ AGS, SSP, libro 14. April 14, 1628.

⁴²⁹ See Introduction. AGS, SSP, 45, f. 1. The very brief remarks about inspection in China indicate it was quite possibly written after the publication of Matteo Ricci's reports on China. For the place of Asia in similar European self-fashioning, see Donald F. Lach, *The Century of Discovery*, vol. 1, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). See also Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 201. While *De Iudicio Visitationis* is unattributed and undated, the production of manuals was very much a seventeenth century project with other known manuals including the 1696 *Práctica de visitas* by P. Pérez Landero Otañez y Castro for *visitas* in Peru and the 1627 *Speculum visitationis secularis* by G. Berart y Gassol for *visitas* in Catalonia.

⁴³⁰ AGS, SSP, 45. “De origine iudicii visitationis et eius specialibus”; “Adquos extendatur iudicium visitationis”; “Quomodo contra mortuos procedi sit”; “De promotione et suspensione inquisiti pendent hoc iudicio”; “De qua culpa sindicentur officiales”; “Quales probationes requirantur contra officiales”; “Que sint poenae civiles vel criminales in iudicio visitationis”; “An sequi possit condemnationem ad restitutionem rei, seu interesse prestationem in hoc iudicio”; “Cui applicanda vel restituenda sint turpiter ab officiali accepta”; “In turpitudine dantis versetur in aliquibus casibus”; “Quaedam circa pragmaticam neapolitanam sub titulo de munerio officiali”; “De contractibus iudicium”; “Quomodo officialis teneatur pro delictis substituti et familiarium”; “In exactor tributorum teneatur fisco ad interesse ob moram et eius heres ad penam”; “Ad quod interesse teneatur Procurator q-saris ob culpam levem”; “In procurator fiscalis dicatur prorgicatur in quodam casu”; “De fide iusoribus”.

⁴³¹ AGS, SSP, libro 45, f. 40. “Proceditur autem contra officiales in hoc iudicio visitationis sicuti et in sindicatu ordinario de dolo, lata culpa, et levi culpa, nam de levissima culpa nequaquam tenentur etiam si ageretur civiliter.”

established that the standard of proof required for convictions of criminal offenses in the visita was equal to the standard of ordinary criminal convictions.

But this kind of orderly jurisprudential scholarship belied the fact that *De Iudicio Visitationis* was less a description of how the visita developed out of a legal framework or even a prescription of how it ought to employ that framework than it was a retroactive justification of extant practices that had developed over the course of over a century in Italy and longer still in Spain. The opening of the manual, an imagined origin of the visita, rejects a genealogy of the institution in favor of understanding the visita through the “perpetual font of civil and canon law” that provided for good government:

It is related that this extraordinary process of inspecting perpetual office holders and tribunals was introduced by the most powerful Catholic King, Don Ferdinand, due to its likeness to another similar process which survives from then in the Kingdom of Aragon and is corroborated by the kingdom’s laws, which are called “fueros”: but, my opinion, in so far as it produces something like the truth, is that that most prudent, immovable, and wonderful king, [who] became famous in peace and in war, drew [the process] out by the design of the nobles and of the most learned men whose service he used to employ [for] the public advantage of the entire commonwealth from the perpetual font of civil and canon law, [a font] from which flow the most beautiful laws, by which the most distinguished kingdoms of Spain are governed and flourish. Hence, not only here but also in Italy, the most excellent jurists rightly make use of these [laws] [...] and their sentences are customarily drawn out from the precepts of jurisprudence and from the principles of the holy canons.⁴³²

Accordingly, the law was enshrined as the mythical foundation and framework for both the state as a whole and the visita in particular. Legitimacy for the visitas in the past and, more importantly, the future in *De Iudicio Visitationis* came not from the historical evolution of the institution – as the title of its introduction suggests – but from an invented, immemorial legalism.⁴³³

That idealism was not, however, what most characterized the visitas of the late 1620s, which above all else were marked by a continuation, even an intensification, of the evolving state self-discipline that had typified the visita since the middle of the sixteenth century. This seventeenth century impulse to ensure good administration through the practice of discipline

⁴³² AGS, SSP, libro 45, f. 1. “Memorie produtum est extraordinarium hoc iudicium Visitandi officiales perpetuos, et tribunalia introductum fuisse a potentissimo don Ferdinando Rege Catholico ad similitudinem alterius similis iudicii quod extunc viget in Regno Aragonum legibus Regni, quas foros appellant corroboratum: sed, quantum mea fert opinio verissimilius est prudentissimum illum Regem, qui pace, et bello mirum immodum claruit, id eum consilio procerum, et doctissimorum virorum, quorum opera utebatur, ad publicam universae Rei publicae utilitatem ex perennibus iuris civilis, et canonici fontibus exhausisse, ex quibus etiam manarunt pulcherrimae leges, quibus Hispaniae amplissima regna moderantur, et florent. Hinc merito praestantissimi Jurisconsulti usu rerum, et doctrina insignes, qui ad huius modi processui iudicandos tum hic tum in Italia confectos a Regia Traiestate delegantur uota et sententias suas deducere consueuerunt a preceptis Jurisprudentiae et sacrorum canonum decretis.

⁴³³ See Paul Dresch and Hannah Skoda, eds. *Legalism: Anthropology and History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Igor Gräzin, “Law is Myth,” *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 18, no. 23 (Mar., 2005), 23-51.

rather than through “extravagant laws” was expressed by one of the members of the Council of Italy, whose letter to Francisco de Alarcón on behalf of his inspection of Naples that was the epigraph to the introduction to this dissertation is perhaps the most evocative description of the visita’s purpose. After beginning with a highly charged reflection on the state of affairs in Naples where the regent indicated that although he always suspected that things were worse than what he “understood from the few papers” that had “reached [his] hands,” he declared he was now utterly “disillusioned” by a new report that indicated to him that “everything was going to perdition.” The treatment of the Crown’s revenue was particularly “worthy of crying.” The solution was the visita and, ultimately, its discipline:

This is a wretched age we are coming to in which a minister is obliged neither by the duty of his office nor by the oaths he makes when he takes possession of it, nor by the honor and respect that all give to him, nor by the faith His Majesty puts in him, nor by his conscience, nor by being Christian, to put great care in doing that which he ought. The world is lost, my señor Don Francisco. But I do not judge that this can not be fixed [...] and have discovered that one can remedy this. Not with new orders, nor extravagant laws, nor rigorous pragmatics, but by severely punishing anyone who has not observed the instructions of his office in order to make an example of him.⁴³⁴

⁴³⁴ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. “Muy reconocido, estoy a la m^d y honra que V. m. haze a mis buenos desseos que tengo de servir a V. Mag^d. en mi off^o. Por lo cual beso a V. m. mil vezes las manos. Lo que puedo decir es q haze 30 años q doy vozes sobre los puntos q di a v. m. en mi papel y aun con más particularidad en los memoriales y audiencias q he tenido con sus Mag^des P^e y hijos y lo mesmo con sus Ministros Superiores en estos y en los pasados tiempos. Representándolo en Cons^o siempre q he tenido ocasión para ello. Pero vengo aser voto singular y assí desechado y desestimado de los demás quando no de todos, no habiendo podido lograr mi Intento. Por lo qual sospeche siempre q havia aver más de lo q imaginaba y podía entender de los pocos papeles q han llegado a mis manos. Pero jamás me persuadiera que ya que en la sustancia iba en perdición todo, en la forma no hubiera siquiera, alguna aparente para que el que lo mirase de lexos conubiese algún cuydado en la administración y defensa de la Real haz^{da}. [...] habiendo visto lo q V. m. [...] con carta de 8 de Agosto de este presente año y el papel q V. m. escribió a aquel Ministro, y su respuesta, he acabado de entender, y desengañarme: pues veo con cuan poco amor y menos temor tratan la Real haz^{da}. Digno todo de llorar, viéndola en el estado q la han puesto y a lo q la han reducido. Pues otro cuydado no veo que destruyrta y dexar q los Ministros q la manejan, así de los menores como de los medianos, cadexan yr rio abajo por el descuydo de los mayores y plegue a dios no sea cuydado. Porque ver q cosa tan necesaria, y tan importante, y tan forzosa como tener un libro para notar en él y poner por memoria y orden todos los pleytos Fiscales en q es Su Mag^d actor para que por él se puedan yr despachando, y cobrando lo que a su Mag^d. deven, y lo que le tienen usurpado; no tenerle y confessar q jamás le ha habido. No llega a mi entendimiento qual sea el fin. Si no querer que cada uno robe lo q quisiere y pudiere y Su Mag^d. se quede con solo el título de Rey. Miserable siglo es el que alcançamos, en quanto a este particular que ni la oblig^{on}. del off^o, ni el Juram^{to}. que haze quando toma possession del, ni la honrra que le dan todos, y el respeto q le tienen, ni la confianza q Su Mag^d haze del tal Ministro le obligue, ni la consiencia, ni el ser cristiano à poner mucho cuydado en hazer el dever. El mundo esta perdido mi s^{or} d. fran^{co}. Pero no juzgo q lo esté tanto que no se pueda remediar. Como algunos grandes ministros lo imposibilitan que estos les miro con grande atension. Que yo me hallo con ánimo siendo un cuytado de poner remedio y eficaz. No con nuevas órdenes ni con extravagantes leyes, ni rigurosas Pragmáticas; sino castigando exemplar y severamente al que no guarda las instrucciones de su off^o. Que todo como V. m. mejor lo sabe y viese está bien dispuesto y prevenido el daño y la perdición esta que nadie viese castigo en el malo ni el que haze mal su off^o. Antes las más veces estos se hallan más favorecidos y estimados de quien les debia mandar ahorcar [ahorcar]. Y assi se halientan todos à obrar para sí solos y convertir el off^o. en su aprovecham^{to}. Y que su Mag^d. y Sus vassallos lo vengan a pagar todo. Que si vieran al su señor cuydadoso y attento a que todos aprovechasen el aprovecham^{to}. de la haz^{da} Real; ni se hallará en tan miserable estado ni dexera [dejara] el otro q las leyes q tenían y se habían hecho para este Intento, no se observavan: aunq las guardavan en los libros.”

A TYPOLOGY OF THE VISITA'S CHARGES

The “severe punishment” of the new *visitas* was especially keenly felt. Following the unprecedented number of officials who were charged in Naples and Sicily, the *visitas* continued to produce a growing volume of discipline. In the case of Sicily, 163 officials were punished, or about a third of the officials who had been charged. Although that in itself was not a dramatic growth compared to Luyando’s *visita* to Sicily – the total fines resulting from Riaño y Gamboa’s *visita* actually decreased to be under two-thirds that of his predecessor’s 80,000 escudo sum – it was linked to a transformation in the nature of the punishments used by the state. While Luyando’s *visita* only resulted in twenty-nine suspensions or prohibitions on office holding, Riaño y Gamboa’s *visita* led to seventy-two.⁴³⁵ In Naples, punishments were becoming especially severe for a range of abuses. In one ordinary case, an official who made illegal mercantile exchanges was, in addition to being fined 400 ducats, suspended from office for three years. But the most severe punishments were reserved for charges related to maintaining records and not executing the tasks resulting from those records. One official who was negligent in handling charges over the course of fourteen years was fined 6,000 ducats and prohibited from holding office in perpetuity. A scribe who made or forged false statements in a murder case and who conspired to free an individual held on suspicion of murder was banned from holding any secretarial office in perpetuity and exiled from the city of Naples (or anywhere within a sixty-mile radius of the city) for eight years.⁴³⁶

In Milan, Andrés de Rueda Rico’s *visita*, which resumed the work of his deceased predecessor beginning in the early 1630s, produced another disciplinary transformation. On the one hand, its output was clearly diminished in relation to the other Italian *visitas* with only 1506 charges against 120 officials, a not entirely surprising consequence of the death of the initial *visitador* who had carried out much of the investigation and the fact that the more than decimated Milan of the early 1630s was hardly conducive to the institutional stability that would seem to support the *visita*. On the other hand, what Rueda Rico’s *visita* lost in quantity, it surprisingly gained in quality. Seventy-six of those 120 officials were found guilty of at least one count, or over 63% of the total. Of the charges that were not remitted to another means of justice, nearly 43% resulted in a finding of guilt.⁴³⁷

But beyond indicating the continuing evolution in the rigor of the *visita*’s discipline, Rueda Rico’s *visita* and its somewhat reduced volume of charges at the institution’s apex has one uniquely interesting value: it permits the creation of the first quantitative typology of the *visita*’s charges, which were at the essence of the state’s construction of socio-legal categories of malfeasance that it could surveil and discipline. In the past, the work of creating such a typology has been considered infeasible, with the result that the *visita*’s disciplinary function has been mistakenly marginalized. One historian, for example, suggested that while a typology might be possible, the charges resulting from the *visitas* were “extremely numerous,” “at the limit of legibility,” “curiously enigmatic,” “without hierarchy [of seriousness],” and ostensibly given

⁴³⁵ AGS, SSP, libro 691.

⁴³⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 232. Reports from the junta from April 24, 1634 and February 6, 1635.

⁴³⁷ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905. An alternate source (AGS, SSP, libro 996) gives only 113 officials who were charged and only sixty-eight (60.2% of the total) who were found guilty but the percentage of charges resulting in a finding of guilt remained at nearly 43%.

over to “whimsical” and spurious charges about personal deviance.⁴³⁸ To be sure, the manner in which charges were constructed by the *visitadores* appears rather circumlocutory from a modern perspective and more often than not lacks the apparent order and logic of contemporary legal proceedings, in which charges are typically organized by severity. But the lists of charges were not totally without logic. Charges were, for example, usually internally grouped together based on the general matter of dispute. Thus, an officer’s various instances of committing fraud while billeted or all the charges related to a judge’s handling of some litigation might be grouped together. As a result, it was not uncommon for the punishment (or lack thereof) for one charge to be remitted to a subsequent related charge and then be meted out for what could be a lengthy list of charges, individual charges, as well as a general punishment given to an individual. Likewise, charges rarely if ever made reference to relevant laws, ordinances, or classes of offenses but instead provided a summary description of an official’s behavior with varying degrees of detail and length. Unlike the Inquisition, then, the *visitas* never – with one indication of an exception in 1680 – produced an inventory in which offenses were cataloged and classified. But because the *visita* was an extraordinary process, that descriptive quality was legally essential as it ensured that officials were able to provide adequate defenses during a process that was otherwise obfuscated.⁴³⁹ In associating actions with their consequences, those same descriptions also provided for the possibility of redress in restitution or in a subsequent civil suit, or for mandated reform either on an individual basis or at the institutional layer. This was particularly common for individuals who were very heavily charged by the *visita* and whose behavior was at times described with a particularly severe style.

Moreover, although the *visita* could produce a few personal or political and sometimes entirely unique charges - charges that were even more than usually given over to intricate description – that should not be understood as the norm, as Peytavin took them, but as exceptional offenses that were ultimately marginalized during the process of consolidating what the state understood as malfeasance. In Rueda Rico’s *visita*, one Milanese senator was, for example, accused of something akin to *lèse-majesté* for statements he supposedly made in 1634 when various senators and ministers were discussing the victory of the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand at the Battle of Nördlingen during the Thirty Years’ War. According to the description in the charge, some of these officials expressed the belief that the battle, while a fortuitous event, would have been even more decisive and beneficial had it occurred a year earlier or at the beginning of the war. The senator in question, however, rather than signaling his agreement with those views as would befit a minister of the king instead “gave a contrary sentiment and gave signs of a spirit of rather less fondness towards the royal Crown, responding that ‘it was better that it happened as it did because had it happened another way, the mischief of the Spanish would have turned the world upside down.’” Such opinions, the *visitador* noted, were “words [that should be] foreign to a vassal and minister [of] His Majesty.”⁴⁴⁰ Though that

⁴³⁸ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 21-22.

⁴³⁹ Officials who were charged, for example, could seek clarification about a charge (see, for example, AGS, VIT, libro 320) and frequently defended themselves on the basis that a charge was insufficiently specific and did not reference a particular action. Defenses (or at least sufficient time to produce them) were required for the *junta* to determine a case.

⁴⁴⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-50. “Que hallándose el Senador en el Duomo de Milán el día dela fiesta de San Carlos del año de 1634 discurriéndose entre algunos ministros de Su Mg.^d de los buenos successos de Alemania, y victoria que tuvo el Ser.^{mo} S. Cardenal Infante Don Fernando en Norlinghen, diziendo, q si huviera sucedido esta

was certainly to be treated with some gravity in court life – nearly contemporaneously, the Count-Duke of Olivares had been the subject of severe polemical attacks for ruining Spain through his “mistaken policies” during the Mantuan War⁴⁴¹ – the evidentiary requirements of the *visita* limited the intrusion of the political domain. Ultimately, the senator was absolved of the charge for lack of proof. Indeed, it was generally rare for these extraordinary charges to result in a substantial judgment against the official in question.

That was true even in instances where an individual was also heavily charged and heavily disciplined for more ordinary offenses. The Milanese *sindico fiscal*, who had the greatest number of charges against him resulting from Rueda Rico’s *visita* – 178 – and was found guilty of some 40% of those coincidentally had several unusual charges made against him. Charge 104 was an accusation that the *sindico* had conspired with a potential witness to the *visita* in order to obstruct its investigation by having him claim that the *sindico* had only committed some minor offenses, namely receiving gifts for Christmas, but done nothing else. Charges 154 and 156 dealt with the relationship between the *sindico* and a Milanese senator, charging the former with conspiring with the senator to obtain secret information about ongoing litigation and exerting pressure on the president of the senate to entrust some business to another senator who was known to be favorable to his personal interests. The *sindico* was absolved of both these charges. On the other hand, in part because of the way the case was handled, other unusual offenses did result in some penalties. He was, for example, found guilty of using his network of connections to ask a cardinal to grant one of his sons a place in the College of Borromeo at the University of Pavia, which the *visitador* indicated would have been very difficult for a man of the *sindico*’s status without the use of “most powerful means.”⁴⁴²

That did not, however, result in a serious fine. Together with other charges, he was fined a relatively small sum – 100 ducats – for this offense. That same dichotomy between actual status and expected status ordinarily accessible through the office was explicitly the subject of yet another charge for which the *sindico* was found guilty, charge 146. That charge indicated the salary and emoluments that the *sindico* had access to, which the *visitador* supposed would have allowed him to maintain just one servant, as he had done in the past. But after holding the office, he began to live with “such ostentation and showiness,” maintain four male servants and two female servants, spending large sums of money for food and clothes, renting a house for 1,500 escudos a year, purchasing a Flemish tapestry for one of its halls, and having various other luxuries for himself and his children that would have been impossible without “the extortions, exactions, barratry, and other illicit means contained in the previous charges” nor did he exercise his office except on the condition of receiving donatives or money.⁴⁴³ The 1628 *visita* to Naples provided an even more evocative example of the minimal

victoria un año antes, o al principio de los movimientos dela guerra, huviera sido de grande consecuencia; el mismo senador Bottinon, que se halló presente a tal discurso, en lugar de mostrar señales de correspondencia, siendo, como era ministro de Su Mag.^d, mostro sentimiento contrario, y dio señales de ánimo poco bien affecto ala Real Corona, replicando, que havia sido mejor haver succedido assí porque de ottra manera la diabolería de los españoles huviera rebuelto el mundo lo de baxo arriba. Palabras ajenas de un vassallo, y ministro beneficiado de Su Mag.^d, como lo es el dho Senador Bottinon.”

⁴⁴¹ Brown and Elliott, *A Palace for a King*, 162.

⁴⁴² AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-178.

⁴⁴³ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-178. “todo lo qual fue impossible q hiziesse, sino con las extorsiones, concussions, baratterías, y ottros modos ilícitos, contenidos en los antecedentes cargos, con que vino en común predicam^{to} no

punishments these kinds of personal offenses resulted in. One prosecutor, who was otherwise heavily punished for providing safe passage to criminals, was found guilty in relation to a scandal in which he kept a woman in his home. This merely resulted in a reprimand. Another official found guilty of a similar offense was given a small fine on the condition that he would marry the woman in question.

These unusual charges stood in stark contrast to the overall project of the visita, from which retroactive categories can be drawn according to the features of the offense described within the charges. Those groups of charges, which were predominant, instead suggest an ethos of rationalization borne out of the service of the Crown and the duties of its subjects to model proper bureaucratic conduct.

From a random sample of 305 charges⁴⁴⁴ taken from Rueda Rico's visita, several common groupings emerge (Table 9). About a fifth of the charges (19.4% of the total) are miscellaneous charges, which include the types of unusual and personal charges described above (3.3% of the total) and more mundane charges that were simply less common in his visita as well as any charges that were unclear or otherwise not easily identifiable (approximately 10%). The remaining 80.6% of charges can be grouped into fourteen categories with five or more charges, of which four categories are especially common, accounting for slightly under 10% of the total to slightly more than 14% of the total number of charges. In decreasing order of frequency, these types were receiving donatives and gifts, which accounted for 43 of the 305 charges (14.1%), bribery, of which there were 42 charges (13.8%), a range of abuses of discretion, which typified 39 charges (12.8%), and billeting fraud, which accounted for 29 charges (9.51%). Other common categories included extortion, which had significant overlap with bribery (6.89%), negligence and improper accounting (6.89%), embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, deposits, or bail money (6.56%), receipt of excess or illegal payments and salaries (4.26%), and improper court and administrative style (3.28%). Less common, though still repeated offenses included the falsification of evidence, destruction of records, and false reports (2.62%), violence and abuses while billeting (2.30%), and failure to execute an office (1.64%). These figures include a small degree of overlap, with fifteen of the 305 charges falling into two categories particularly between bribery and extortion which could have a fine line of distinction.

The most common charge, the receipt of donatives and gifts, is also generally among the clearest and a type of charge that had been in common parlance since the visitas of 1559.

solo de que no despachava negocio, scritt.^{ra}, o causa sin donativos, o dinero[.]” Apparently, his desire to commit extortion was such that it could not be entirely conveyed without the emphatic use of several synonyms.

⁴⁴⁴ Even though Rueda Rico's visita was less substantial, the length and number of the charges is still a considerable obstacle and sampling the charges was very much a practical necessity. In circumstances that would not have required qualitative interpretation, the sample would provide results with a confidence interval of 5 (or a margin of error of $\pm 5\%$) with 95% confidence. Given the nature of sample sizes, similarly small samples could have been used for any visita for which all the charges were available but the records for Rueda Rico's visita are unique in providing the entire volume of charges together with the results of judgment. Moreover, because this analysis requires substantial interpretation well outside the bounds of, for example, modern polling, the reduced volume has the added benefit that the sample size corresponds with roughly one-fifth of the total charges, an intuitively useful check on the methodology used that would not have been possible for more extensive visitas. As a further indication of fit, because findings of guilt *do not* require interpretation, the actual percentage of charges resulting in a finding of guilt falls within the margin of error of the results from the sample. All charges taken from AGS, SSP, leg. 1905.

Table 9. Types of charges from Rueda Rico's visita to Milan.

Type of Charge	Percent of Total	Charges	Guilty Charges	Percent Guilty
Donatives and Gifts	14.1%	43*	20	46.5%
Bribery	13.8%	42*	19	45.2%
Abuse of Discretion	12.8%	39*	5	12.8%
Billeting Fraud	9.51%	29	15	51.7%
Extortion	6.89%	21*	11	52.4%
Improper Accounting and Negligence	6.89%	21*	9	42.9%
Embezzlement and Misappropriation	6.56%	20*	3	15.0%
Excess or Illegal Payments	4.26%	13*	4	30.8%
Personal or Unusual Offenses	3.30%	11	5	45.5%
Improper Style	3.28%	10*	1	10.0%
Falsifying or Destroying Records	2.62%	8	4	50.0%
Billeting Abuses	2.30%	7	7	100%
Failure to Execute Office	1.64%	5	3	60.0%
Miscellaneous or Unclear	16.1%	49	18	36.7%
ALL CHARGES		305	120	39.2%

*Includes at least one charge that is also in another category.

In those visitas, particularly in Naples, the questionnaire explicitly requested and received evidence pertaining to such gifts and witnesses increasingly supplied evidence that demonstrated the range of gifts that could be given to patrons and which were typically expected by office holders. The straightforward quality of the charge, well attested to and understood by the 1630s could be expressed with some simplicity by the visitador, especially if it was part of a chain of charges related to a particular relationship that had come under scrutiny: “That at the beginning of the year 1625 and from the said business, you received from the same regulators a gift of two cheeses worth about 100 *libras*.”⁴⁴⁵ As it happened, the senator was absolved of this charge though it was marked as being “a la reforma,” that is to say, an offense that the junta determining the case believed should result in additional consideration by the Council of Italy in recommending the production or reiteration of rules for officials by the Crown.

⁴⁴⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-181. “Que al principio del año 1625 y dela dha impresa recibiese de los mismos Reguladores un regalo de dos quesos de valor de cien libras in circa.”

These common and, as the unusual charge of conspiracy against the Milanese *sindico* indicates, less serious charges were therefore not surprisingly above the average prosecution rate of all charges. Of the forty-three charges, twenty resulted in guilty findings, or 46.5%. If gift giving was a routine feature of early modern office holding, it was also legible as an illicit practice that was harmful to the public good. To that end, it was one that could also be effectively regulated and disciplined even if the *visita* may not have entirely extirpated the practice in part because it could occur at such an informal level and because the fines associated with it were unlikely to be sufficiently retributive to dissuade the behavior. But more broadly, the institutional forces that made gift giving illicit in some circumstances competed with cultural norms where the generosity of appropriate and attuned exchanges and gifts was an expected means of supporting and strengthening relationships, especially prominently in the sphere of diplomacy.⁴⁴⁶ But the roots of modern bureaucratic rationalization, in which such exchanges are highly controlled although similarly not extirpated, and the state's intervention into traditional social relationships were beginning to be established with relative effectiveness in the *visita*'s prosecution.

Somewhat less straightforward, although similar to and almost as common as the receipt of donatives, were charges of bribery, which made up 13.8% of the total. Although functionally similar to donatives, these charges indicated that a gift or payment was directly connected to a specific alteration of an official's behavior rather than as an indirect gift associated with a broader patronage connection. Indeed, indicative of that similarity, these charges often explicitly used the term "donative," as was the case of the general treasurer of Milan, who was charged with receiving oats in exchange for credit, cheeses from a business for certain favors, and wine for a similar purpose.⁴⁴⁷ A simple charge of this nature, which was intended to be resolved in conjunction with other charges, might read: "That not only did he receive from the prisoner the aforementioned things in the two preceding charges but [also] received gifts in that same way from the disputants in the said case [...] so that he would help them and determine the case."⁴⁴⁸ Another more specific charge of that kind used similar language: "It having been sent in the proof taken of the company of the Duke of Parma in Pavia in 1624 to a soldier named Giovanni Battista Antinate that he should rejoin within a month, the said soldier asked that the time be extended and even though this was for the *veedor* to do, Moreno did it by means of a donative of wine worth ten escudos writing that the deadline be extended by a month."⁴⁴⁹ Although such cases seem to involve rather straightforward bribery – the latter also seems to suggest that the official acted beyond his jurisdiction – there were several cases where the bribe may have been something of an extortion and about a third of the charges categorized as extortion have some ambiguity about the nature of the exchange.

⁴⁴⁶ Diana Carrió-Invernizzi, "Gift and Diplomacy in Seventeenth-Century Spanish Italy," *The Historical Journal* 51, no. 4 (2008), 881-899; Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France*.

⁴⁴⁷ AGS, SSP, libro 996, ff. 80-86.

⁴⁴⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-65. "Que no solam^{te} rrescivió del reo las cosas susodichas en los dos cargos antedentes pero rrescivió ansimis^o delos actores querellantes en dicha causa rregalos de valor de 25^d porq les ajudase y determinase la causa quanto antes."

⁴⁴⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-12 "Item habiéndose mandado en la muestra, que se tomó a la compañía del Duque de Parma en Pavia año 1624 a un soldado q se llamava Ju^o Bauta Antiñate que devesse remontar dentro de un mes, el dho soldado le pidió q le prorogasse el tiempo, y aunque esto tocava al veedor, lo hizo el dho Moreno mediante un donativo de vino de valor de diez escudos, escribiendo que se le prorogava por un mes el término."

Extortion, which represented 6.89% of the total number of charges, seems to have been slightly less common in Milan than, for example, in Sicily but most typically involved an individual who was arrested or jailed and then threatened with prosecution, the often unspecified legality of which introduces ambiguity as to whether the action was bribery or extortion, with the official in question receiving some quantity of money – often through a third party – before releasing the prisoner without continued investigation. In particularly clear cases, the visitador explicitly described the imprisonment as illegal, as was the case when a citizen of Cremona presented orders from a higher magistrate for his immediate release that did not require the payment of any bail or deposit but he was nevertheless held for thirty-four days and was released only after paying the official who had jailed him twenty *reales de ocho* and a half a *ducaton*.⁴⁵⁰ Perhaps due to their similarities, both types of charges had similar characteristics. A plurality of the charges of bribery and extortion, 59.5% and 28.6% respectively, were against officials serving the local podestà or the podestà himself, indicating – in accordance with the example of Sicily - that this was somewhat more common outside the principal administrative centers of Spanish Italy. Like donatives, both offenses also had a high rate of prosecution, 45.2% for bribery and 52.4% for extortion.

The third most common charge, abuse of discretion (12.8% of the total), was typified primarily by the performance of tasks not within the purview of an official or the abuse of authority. Such charges indicated an attempt by the visita to regularize jurisdictions, alleviate the abuses that could arise from granting broad authority to the Crown's officials, and restrict the authority of elites. Thus, this category represents a fairly wide agglomeration of activities that were generally characterized by an excessive deviation from established procedures or expectations ranging from arbitrary judgments and actions to brazenly overstepping the orders and jurisdictional limits of an office.

In one curious instance involving the visita itself, it was alleged that a Milanese senator, while he was acting as minister for the visita, used that position to ensure that he would personally handle the city of Pavia's tax collection, despite the fact that this had been entrusted to a different minister. At the same time, the senator seemingly arbitrarily enforced the collection of payments for what the visitador called "particular interests," suggesting that he was unduly harsh towards some individuals and excessively lenient towards others.⁴⁵¹ Perhaps not entirely surprisingly, this effort to erode the unofficial authority of elites was not particularly successful (a mere 12.8% prosecution rate), presumably in part because its charges fell especially heavily on Milanese senators (56% of the charges) who were generally insulated from the effects of discipline due to their preeminent status. Indeed, one of those few cases that did result in punishment involved a senator's abuses that were believed to have damaged ecclesiastical independence, suggesting a certain calculus of deference to the interests of aggrieved institutions and authorities, especially one as influential as the Church, in contrast to more marginal private interests.⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-109.

⁴⁵¹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-77. "Que siendo Ministro dela Visita y orador dela ciudad de Pavia por sus fines, y particulares intereses, procuro q la cobranza del mensual de dha provincia, la qual tocava a dho Marengo comissario de aquella Impresa, se hiciesse por Ministro dela Visita, usando rigor con algunos en el pag.^{do} y con otros defiriéndole conforme le parecía pervirtiendo en esto el orden, y causando a muchos particulares graves daños por el rigor conque se procedió contra ellos."

⁴⁵² AGS, SSP, leg. 1905-50.

The final of the four major sources of charges resulting from the *visita* was, as previously described with regard to Castilla's *visita* to Milan, one typical to the Milanese context, charges related to the process of billeting soldiers in the countryside. Within this larger category, there were two divergent issues that resulted in charges. The first, and by far more common charge – albeit a rather dry charge that was correspondingly expressed in a very repetitive format – was that of billeting fraud (9.51% of the total). In those charges, officers were accused of defrauding the Crown and its vassals by improperly taking money dispersed for the purpose of billeting, for example, by taking money for a greater number of soldiers than were in fact billeted or for a longer period of time or by taking money while being stationed in a location other than the intended post.⁴⁵³

Strict fiscal controls associated with this category of corruption resulted, as noted in the second chapter, in a particularly high rate of prosecution, with 51.7% of the charges resulting in a finding of guilt. Alongside that financial fraud, the *visita* also dealt with the abuses that occurred while soldiers were billeted, though it did this rather indirectly by punishing the individual who was ostensibly responsible for resolving disputes and ensuring good military discipline rather than the soldiers who had committed the abuses leading to the charges. This category accounted for a smaller percentage of the total (2.3%) but, in a marked divergence from earlier *visitas*, had an extremely high prosecution rate in the 1630s. All seven charges of this nature in the sample resulted in a finding of guilt.

Notably, both of these types of charges were, at least in Rueda Rico's *visita*, almost without exception directed at Italian officers and the charge, always written in Italian, provided a specific description of the time and location of the posting, the quantity of money involved if it was a charge of billeting fraud, and the exact nature of the offense. The most significant difference was that the majority of the charges regarding abuse were directed at a single officer, the Marquis of Leverano, Antonio del Fuso, a *maestro de campo* of the Italian infantry, whose offenses are illustrative of the range of the behaviors that could be incorporated into a small number of charges. At one point, the marquis was stationed in Alexandria and provided with a house where eight soldiers might stay. Problems arose when, in addition to these eight, the marquis stationed an additional twenty soldiers. Upset, the woman who owned the house then brought a certain noble to act as an intermediary with the marquis and to ask him to station fewer soldiers because of the expense it incurred.

This did not sit well with the marquis, who then angrily demanded food lest he throw the noble who came to parlay with him out the window. But the noble somehow settled the marquis down despite his somewhat acerbic response to Leverano's threat and the two settled on a method for paying the property owner. On the final day of his stay, however, things turned for the worse as the marquis demanded that the community pay him 8 *dineros* per day lest he beat them with sticks, giving rise to complaints that wherever the *maestro de campo* stayed, they had to give him a donative to ensure that he and his soldiers behaved themselves. This behavior continued on. In one case, soldiers ordered a very ill woman to rise from bed. Her husband, apparently not assisting her quickly enough, was subjected to a beating. When he

⁴⁵³ See also Fernando Cortés Cortés, *Alojamientos de soldados en la Extremadura del siglo XVII* (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 1996) and Porfirio Sanz Camañes, "El peso de la milicia. 'Alojamiento foral' y conflicto de jurisdicciones en la frontera catalano-aragonesa durante la Guerra de Cataluña (1640-1652)," *Revista de Historia Moderna* 22 (2004), 173-207.

went to complain to the maestro de campo about the incident, he was instead instructed to pay the soldiers who were stationed in his home. Another case involved soldiers who demanded sweet wine and bread from a certain woman who was unable to find the wine they wanted and prepared a different meal for them. This apparently angered the soldiers, who then – in a surprisingly common form of violence – defenestrated her and then destroyed all the dining ware, which they threw at her husband. Seeking restitution, the couple went to the maestro de campo, who merely provided them with a place to stay the night.⁴⁵⁴ Given the especially high degree of violence as well as the associated expenses with the army, the increased disciplinary pressure presumably provided a means for stabilizing the relationship between the countryside, which was most affected by these offenses, and the Crown.

Administrative offences, although less frequent (depending on the nature of the offense, between 6.89% and 1.64% of the total), were nevertheless a major feature of Rueda Rico's visita and of the visitas in general, stretching to the work of the earliest visitas in their concern for regularizing the production, storage, and distribution of information and the performance of offices. Alongside the very serious charge of failing to maintain secrecy for which punishments were typically quite severe, failing to properly maintain the paperwork through which the state ran was a routine failure with which the visita dealt. This might include, for example, charges where the intent of an official was believed to be intentionally malfeasant, as it was in the case of Angelo María Tradasi, an adjustor serving in the chancery whom the visitador accused of maliciously losing the books containing confessions and records of fines and apparently other notes that he was responsible for registering and depositing because there was an issue of personal interest to him contained in those books.⁴⁵⁵

At other times, no intent was ascribed to the actions except a lack of caution or negligence. The same official, whom a second charge clarifies was intended to keep a registry of balances related to cases of confiscations, fines, notifications, and open inheritances apparently left many of these unrecorded for fifteen years even though he was required to perform this duty "daily." Even the cases where the official recorded an entry were done poorly, failing to note, for example, when money was to be collected.⁴⁵⁶ This could have serious consequences for imperial administration. The general treasurer was similarly accused of failing to maintain monthly accounts and reviewing them with the Magistrado Ordinario, with the result that the state of the treasury in Milan was indiscernible. Other periodic duties that the treasurer was required to perform were similarly neglected, including the presentation of military accounts each six months. Moreover, the order of the treasury administration was poorly maintained, as the treasurer was accused of allowing his officials to be absent.⁴⁵⁷ The high rates of prosecution for these offenses (between 42.9% and 60%), which are in dramatic contrast to charges regarding "style"⁴⁵⁸ (a mere 10%), clearly indicate the direction in which institutionalization was transformational. The visita pushed the state's governing bodies towards the "rational" practices of accounting, record-keeping, personally performing the tasks associated with

⁴⁵⁴ AGS, SSP, libro 996, ff. 87v-113.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 66.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 87v-113.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 80-86.

⁴⁵⁸ For example, the order of taking stating opinions or taking votes.

offices, and maintaining confidentiality which were clearly prioritized over rituals of deliberation, voting, and personal conduct in audiences.

Finally, two broad categories of financial malfeasance, accounting for a combined 10.8% of the total, indicate some of the most traditional interests of the visita, the cultivation of fiscal discipline and the recovery of embezzled funds, as well as an effort to ensure that officials were not using their positions for personal enrichment at the expense of private individuals. The latter group of charges included limiting officials' abilities to collect fees beyond legally established limits and restoring money, which had been taken in a deposit or in the posting of bail, that an official had failed to return. Oddly, the inspection had relatively little success in prosecuting these offenses, although this was perhaps artificially low because six of the charges – out of thirty-three – were remitted to local justice or were reserved for civil litigation. Although the aggregation of these financial crimes obscures certain distinctions, it is evident that despite the Crown's hopes of minimizing losses caused by graft and embezzlement, the damage those offenses caused was somewhat illusory because they were either relatively rare in daily administration or had diminished in frequency since the sixteenth century when controls like the visita were relatively novel.

Taken together, these categories emphasize the growing power of the state to intervene in a wide range of behaviors both in its administrative centers and increasingly, in response to the fiscal and social pressures generated by it, in the countryside. The latter was particularly evident by the middle of the seventeenth century. For example, in Milan, billeting fraud and abuses, some of the most effectively prosecuted offenses by the 1630s, were malfeasant practices that occurred exclusively outside the urban confines but that the imperial state was increasingly able to provide redress for over the course of fifty years since its first appearance during Castilla's visita in the 1580s. A similar logic, though disconnected from the strains of the Hapsburgs' wars, weighed upon Diego de Riaño's visita in Sicily, where the pressure of urban official practices was increasingly understood to be injurious to the countryside and subsequently resisted by means of the visita, prompting the question of the extent to which local towns were obligated to support commissioners and other urban officials who, for all intents and purposes, used the countryside to provide extra-legal remuneration.⁴⁵⁹

This pressure was especially felt with regard to the captains of arms, to whom Riaño together with the viceroy and the Great Court devoted considerable attention in 1630, where what was effectively the Sicilian imperial administration considered a better means of monitoring local officials than a process which had been instituted, though not effectively carried out, in 1591.⁴⁶⁰ Reform, it was hoped, would provide a means of governance that would be less burdensome to the Crown's vassals while adequately fulfilling the function of "clean[ing] the countryside of thieves."⁴⁶¹ The balance between those aims was to be met through discipline of these positions, something that had already become a major part of the visita in the 1600s. The surveillance in the countryside was mirrored in the visita's continuing monitoring of the Crown's bureaucracies, ensuring the regularization of records and the performance of tasks that were essential to the administration of finance and justice.

⁴⁵⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1288. Letter from Riaño to Philip IV. April 9, 1629.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid. March 7, 1630.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid. Voto del Doctor Pedro de Neyla. December 15, 1630. "Limpiar la campaña de ladrones."

Beyond that geographical dimension, however, the categories of charges suggest that malfeasance that directly harmed the public or was associated with what would today be described as “capture” were, if not necessarily the most severely punished offenses, perhaps the most easily intelligible as being contrary to the norm that officials served the public rather than personal interests. Thus, gift-giving, bribery, and extortion, which were hardly the principal concerns of the visita in the early decades of the sixteenth century, all were subjected to large numbers of charges and were correspondingly prosecuted to great effect. Those prosecutions were not ad hoc punishments in response to scurrilous allegations against individuals who had lost political favor but consistent features and indications of an emergent legal-administrative order. What had been quasi-legitimate and largely invisible conduct of ambiguous legality was being definitively transformed into a comprehensible set of illegal, visible, and illegitimate categories of behavior.

THE VISITA IN THE ERA OF CRISIS AND THE REVOLT OF MASANIELLO, 1635-1674

If the visitas to Milan in the 1620s and 1630s intimated that the Crown was not entirely able to depend on the old – as Aurelio Musi conceived of it – “imperial system”⁴⁶² of strategic and economic interdependence that had emerged in the aftermath of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, the visitas’ attempts to reconfigure that order during the Thirty Years’ War through the 1640s confirmed a sense of institutional crisis. This was particularly evident in Spanish Italy. Milan, always the logistical “keystone of the kingdom” in Geoffrey Parker’s words, became a still more major source of manpower for the army in Olivares’s “Union of Arms” while the Crown also increasingly depended on its own territories in Italy to serve as its army’s officers.⁴⁶³ In Naples, where the Collateral Council noted the complete deterioration of the kingdom’s defensive network, the threat of a pro-French noble conspiracy prompted the viceroy to order the conscription of 30,000 men.⁴⁶⁴ That corresponded with a general shift of defense, and in turn, financial obligations to the Crown’s Italian territories while Castile was embroiled in war with France and revolts in Portugal and Catalonia.⁴⁶⁵

That shift could only further upset the deteriorating socio-economic equilibrium in Naples upon which the Crown had come to depend. The kingdom, which already provided the Crown’s second-highest tax revenues in the seventeenth century was taking on additional fiscal burdens due to Castile’s economic crisis.⁴⁶⁶ By mid-century, the Neapolitan fisc was in complete disarray. State expenses, of which 56% went towards public debt in 1626, rose from 1.35 million

⁴⁶² Musi, *L’Italia dei viceré*.

⁴⁶³ Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659*; Musi, “The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System,” 85; Claudio Donati, “The Profession of Arms and the Nobility in Spanish Italy,” in *Spain in Italy*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 313.

⁴⁶⁴ Archivo di Stato, Naples, *Notamenti del Collaterale*, XXIII (March 19 and 20, 1640) quoted in Rosario Villari, “The Neapolitan Financial Crisis of the 1630s and 1640s,” in *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, ed. and trans. Antonio Calabria and John A. Marino (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 249; Archivo di Stato, Naples, *Notamenti del Collaterale*, XXXVI (November 19, 1640) quoted in Rosario Villari, “The Neapolitan Financial Crisis of the 1630s and 1640s,” 253.

⁴⁶⁵ Davide Maffi, “Il potere delle armi. La monarchia spagnola e i suoi eserciti (1635-1700): una rivisitazione del mito della decadenza,” *Rivista Storica Italiana* 118 (2006), 405-6.

⁴⁶⁶ Musi, “The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System,” 86.

ducats per year in the 1550s to some 7.8 million ducats per year in 1638.⁴⁶⁷ The strain of military demands and debt service together with the monopolization of the financial market in Naples resulted in a severe financial crisis during which declining revenues put pressure on the government to increase taxation, with predictable effects on the populace's contentment. Concurrently, the dramatic increase in sales of noble titles during the seventeenth century helped to bolster a burgeoning urban and rural nobility – the latter of which was mounting a “feudal offensive” against the communes with increasing violence in the 1640s – that was not unwilling to demand major concessions from the Crown ranging from the granting of offices to exemptions from taxation to, as frustrated Spanish bureaucrats put it, exemption “from the authority of the government of the viceroys.”⁴⁶⁸

The potential fiscal and, to a lesser extent, institutional consequences of the developing situation in Naples was not lost on the Crown. In 1643, by then aware of the financial crisis, the Count of Monterrey together with the Crown began to plan a hoped-for remedy. To that end, yet another *visita* to Naples – less than a decade removed from Carrera's *visita* of the Sommaria – would be commissioned to review the conduct of four financial ministers and, most importantly, perform an audit of the kingdom's finances with the intent of rationalizing them and reducing formerly secret expenses for the Crown's benefit.⁴⁶⁹ However, the delicacy of the socio-political climate almost immediately made it a challenge to actually execute that *visita*. Initially to be performed by the lieutenant of the Sommaria, the Crown's plan was first stalled by that potential *visitador*'s hesitation about being the first Italian, to say nothing of the first Neapolitan, to be entrusted with conducting a *visita* since that might have invited unwanted tensions, no doubt a particularly worrisome possibility in the 1640s.⁴⁷⁰ The next proposed individual, Martín Gaspar Nieto, was similarly reluctant. He excused himself by citing the fact that such limited work – the inspection of just four or five ministers – could be given over to numerous individuals and with the added excuse that he had been serving away from Spain for far too long, with the result that his estate in Spain had been nearly ruined and that he had been unable to produce an heir to secure the line of succession in his parents' house.⁴⁷¹ Finally, the commission was given to Juan Ponce de León y Chacón, an experienced and esteemed minister who was a member of the Council of the Orders and of the Order of Calatrava.

The *visita* that he carried out was emblematic of the fragility of the state. After its inauspicious planning, the *visita* itself almost immediately turned for the worse. Travelling in

⁴⁶⁷ Calabria, *The Cost of Empire*, 78-89. Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino, “Introduction,” in *Spain in Italy*, eds. Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 15.

⁴⁶⁸ Rosario Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, trans. James Newell (Padstow, Cornwall: Polity, 1993), 119, 140-142; Biblioteca della Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, MS XXIII, B. 8 cited in Rosario Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 255; Rosario Villari, *Un sogno di libertà*. See also Giuseppe Galasso, *Economia e società nella Calabria del Cinquecento* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1975) and Giuseppe Galasso, *Dal comune medievale all'Unità. Linee di storia meridionale* (Bari: Laterza, 1969).

⁴⁶⁹ Alain Hugon, *La insurrección de Nápoles, 1647-1648: la construcción del acontecimiento* (Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014), 181; AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Council of Italy's consulta from November 22, 1643; cf. H. G. Koenigsberger, review of *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, by Mireille Peytavin, *The English Historical Review* 120, no. 485 (Feb. 2005), 223. The review mistakenly suggested that the “visitation was notable for its absence and for its failure to warn the relevant Spanish councils of the explosive situation in those countries [i.e. Naples and Sicily in 1647]”.

⁴⁷⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Council of Italy's consulta from April 7, 1644.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.* Council of Italy's consulta from April 15, 1644; Letter from Nieto from April 13, 1644.

the winter, Chacón arrived in Naples in December 1644 and the following February submitted a report detailing what had been a fraught and very nearly a disastrous trip there. Chacón's first hindrance was an apparent collapse in the chain of communication within Spain itself since he, after arriving by land in Valencia to embark for Naples in October, was informed that the orders instructing the Duke of Tursis and Marquis of Monteaigre to provide passage had yet to arrive. Lest he waste additional time, Chacón went on to Alicante, where he chartered an English ship along with a Genoese ship to provide additional security, leaving on October 30. *En route*, the ships were battered by storms and ran a considerable risk of encountering the French fleet that was returning from action in the Mediterranean. That risk was considered so grave that the visitador's ships, rather than proceeding to Naples, took shelter in Liorna. From there, he travelled by land to Naples arriving in the city on December 21, a trip about which the visitador could not help to complain since he believed such travel was far too risky for an official whose three children were all younger than five years old. Once again, despite Chacón's review of some orders that had arrived recently, the work of the visita was delayed on account of Christmas only to start in earnest in January.⁴⁷² That work, however, was markedly different from his predecessors'.

Chacón's principal observations – and certainly a significant part of his daily work until his premature departure two years later – were far less concerned with the disciplinary tasks that had been the visita's principal task since the 1550s and were, to an extent, the ostensible justification for his commission and more with attempting to rectify the still deteriorating situation in Naples. But that function had a fundamental incongruity that the visitador's reports belied. On the one hand, Chacón's visita was the very embodiment of the “fiscalization”⁴⁷³ of the existing imperial system and that indeed characterized much of his work in Naples, which included, for example, the shipment of all the grain from the province of Foggia to Spanish forces in Catalonia even on the eve of the revolt in Naples.⁴⁷⁴

But at the same time, the visitador intimated a mentality of political economy in which the Crown's power was understood to emerge out of its populace, and particularly its economic vitality, and it was in that framework that Chacón very nearly approached one of the principal sources of the crisis in Spain's empire. Accordingly, the visitador reckoned that “the greatest damage and harm” in Naples were the loans worth – in his accounting – 18,952,330 ducats which ultimately resulted in the imposition of new taxes to provide for debt servicing. These taxes, as Chacón supposed, resulted in several negative outcomes. First, the value of the gabels on items like oil and grain, although not especially high, nevertheless represented about a third of the sale value of such items. That effectively made the production of foodstuffs unprofitable in Naples and so prompted cultivation to move elsewhere in Italy or, “worse,” to the Ottoman Empire. Second, the taxes to pay off debts would result in the loss of capital from Naples. Third, because the Crown was limited in its ordinary income, through which it might pay off its

⁴⁷² AGS, SSP, leg. 230. Letter from Chacón to Philip IV. February 10, 1645.

⁴⁷³ The neologism “fiscalization” seems an appropriate term to describe the Crown's policies to the mid-seventeenth century as defined by James J. Rice and Michael J. Prince: “Fiscalization refers to periods when financial concerns, especially considerations of expenditure restraint and deficit reduction, dominate deliberations on setting public policy priorities and contemplating social reforms.” James J. Rice and Michael J. Prince, *Changing Politics of Canadian Social Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 143.

⁴⁷⁴ Hugon, *La insurrección de Nápoles, 1647-1648*, 183; Camillo Tutini and Mario Verde, *Racconto della sollevazione di Napoli acceduta nell'anno MDCXLVII*, ed. Pietro Messina (Rome: Istituto Storico, 1997), 498.

expenses, it had to rely on new taxes like the gabels that gave rise to certain “vexations.” Ultimately, Chacón feared that, although he considered Naples to be exceedingly fertile and abundant, such taxes would result in the depopulation of the countryside and an abandonment of agriculture while a relief from taxes and the heavy hand of the state would make the country more profitable in the long-term. To that end, Chacón provided several ideas that would reduce the damage to Naples. One such idea, which attempted to limit the financial losses associated with venality, was a proposal to ensure that office sales were for the real value rather than the reduced price that was often secured in familial ties in Naples. Perhaps somewhat more realistic was Chacón’s proposal to abandon the practice of local billeting in favor of stationing troops in fixed fortifications until they could be sent to their ultimate destination, a recommendation that the Council of Italy received favorably. Correspondingly, the inspector called for a review of billeting charges in order to find any possible way to shift expenses away from small towns.⁴⁷⁵ These two suggestions, although not self-evidently linked to Chacón’s premises, addressed the broader socioeconomic concern of the pressure that fiscalization placed on the countryside and reaffirmed the Council of Italy’s anxiety that the financial pressure of Naples’s military build-up had fallen with particular prejudice against the increasingly enfeebled rural communes due to the manner in which billeting expenses were distributed.⁴⁷⁶

Unsurprisingly, the limited *visita* that Chacón had been intended to carry out was somewhat expanded by local anxieties so as to include a number of officials who were very much not its initial targets. Legally, of course, that could not have been unexpected since Chacón had been granted the title of “visitador general,” although the Council of Italy would later retroactively use some rather contorted logic to claim that such a title itself was irrelevant.⁴⁷⁷ The objects of the *visita*’s disciplinary attention, while diminished in contrast with former inspections were nevertheless numerous. By the time of its conclusion in 1647, the visitador had charged sixty-seven officials, which included the intended subjects of the inspection as well as numerous financial ministers, most of whom were charged with a failure to observe the orders of their office or with financial fraud. That total, one speculates, would have been rather greater had the *visita* been able to continue into 1648. So, too, would its potency, since the conclusion of the inspection meant that a large number of cases involved charges that were very much incomplete and were therefore either remitted to local justice or dismissed for lack of proof when the junta resolving the cases finally met from 1651 through 1654. The unanticipated gap in time prior to the resolution of cases also meant that several cases lapsed due to the deaths of the officials in question.

Despite those limitations, roughly a third of the known charges resulted in a finding of guilt and the total of the assessed fines, which were collected until at least 1670 amounted to over 104,000 ducats. The results of the *visita* were surprising in at least one other way. Of the sixty-seven officials who were charged, about thirty-two – the labels for a few are incomplete – were ministers from the provincial courts, a dramatic change in the proportions that had been the norm in prior *visitas* and a further illustration of the expansion of the institution and the attentions of the imperial state into the hinterland. Indeed, the charges against them were

⁴⁷⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 230. Letter from Chacón to Philip IV. February 10, 1645.

⁴⁷⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Council of Italy’s consulta from November, 22, 1643.

⁴⁷⁷ AGS, SSP leg. 1946, f. 147. Council of Italy’s consulta from July 5, 1680.

particularly skewed towards two ongoing crises in the hinterland. First, the visita attempted to corral violence and banditry, with several charges citing officials for improperly granting licenses to possess weapons. Second, the visita attempted to alleviate the financial pressures on the communes by charging officials who had improperly charged the towns for various expenses or had caused other “aggravations.”⁴⁷⁸ While that work pointed to an incipient state involvement in the ongoing tensions of re-feudalization in rural southern Italy, it did so alongside its inability to appreciate the more immediate urban crisis precipitated by fiscalization that would bring Chacón’s visita to its untimely conclusion, the Revolt of Masaniello in 1647.

Paradoxically, the apparent and ultimately unresolved weaknesses of the imperial system evinced by Chacón’s visita to Naples prior to the revolts of 1647 did not have a corollary in the second of the “crisis” visitas, that of Sicily in 1651.⁴⁷⁹ Although the visita there very explicitly developed as a reaction to the revolt in Sicily, it instead pointed to the persistence and resilience of the old institutional order in which the visita was again understood to be one of the empire’s core institutions. Indeed, with two notable exceptions, the most remarkable feature of the visita to Sicily was that it was very much unremarkable. The first exception was its somewhat halting beginning which again, by coincidence, illustrated something of the fragility of the early modern state but also how the Crown turned to its familiar institutions to restore the bonds between Spain and the empire. Upon the request of representatives from the city of Palermo, which had been the epicenter of the revolt in Sicily, planning for a visita to Sicily began as early as February 1648 with the intent of punishing ministers who had been serving on the patrimonial tribunal prior to the revolt. Attentive to the instability of the situation, the Crown and the Council of Italy deliberated about the jurisdiction it should grant the visitador and the potential repercussions of sending a Spaniard to Sicily to carry out the function. By May, the Crown had selected its visitador, an inquisitor in the tribunal of Seville, Alonso Vivero, ironically paying particular attention to Vivero’s age and health, which were believed to be especially suitable for carrying out the commission with the urgency required by the situation.⁴⁸⁰

That urgency meant that the commission Vivero was to carry out was quite unstable. By September, upon requests by Cardinal Tribulcio to expand the visita’s jurisdiction, Vivero was granted the title of “visitador general” in order to enhance his authority though his jurisdiction remained set.⁴⁸¹ A month later, the Council of Italy nearly expanded Vivero’s commission so as to include an inspection of the Sicilian galleys since a visita to the fleet had been disrupted the previous year, though it ultimately rejected this as unsuitable.⁴⁸² Their efforts were in vain because Vivero, despite his reputed health, died on the voyage to Sicily in early 1649. Once again, the Council of Italy returned to the matter of the visita to Sicily in August 1649, but this time it recommended a visita general that mirrored earlier visitas. To carry this commission out, the Crown named Esteban de Cervantes, a judge in the Chancery of Granada, but he

⁴⁷⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 230.

⁴⁷⁹ Sciuti Russi, *Astrea in Sicilia*, 207-8; Burgarella and Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 81-3.

⁴⁸⁰ AGS, SSP leg 1295. Council of Italy’s consulta from May 7, 1648.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.* September 5, 1648.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.* October 3, 1648.

turned down the nomination due to his health.⁴⁸³ By that point the urgency for the visita had diminished somewhat, with one of the regents of the Council of Italy noting that the condition in Sicily had improved considerably since 1648.⁴⁸⁴ Nevertheless, there remained a strong demand for a visita within Sicily as at least one petition to the king from Palermo stressed the importance of sending a visitador of intelligence “in order to extinguish at once the bad abuses that have been introduced and to establish in everything a legal and just form.”⁴⁸⁵ Thus, in 1650, the question of the Sicilian visita was finally resolved with the selection of Alonso Flores de Valdés as visitador.⁴⁸⁶

The second exception was the momentum of bureaucratization that characterized the visita even in the immediate aftermath of the crisis of the 1640s and certainly well into the period of the ostensible decline of Spain’s institutions. For this, once again, was a true general visita and the effect of that broad jurisdiction was noticeable since Valdés’s visita would be the most extensive of all the visitas to Sicily, charging 674 officials.⁴⁸⁷ In general, these cases signaled a return to the traditional work of the visita. Several officials were targeted for the gifts they received as a function of holding office, which in one instance ranged from a gold chain to cheese to honey, oil, and olives, to a slave. Likewise, officials were fined for illegally charging for services they were intended to provide as part of their office, including the production of depositions.⁴⁸⁸ Another official was fined – although only for fifty ducats – for having struck and then placing under house arrest the mother of a man who had been murdered after she asked that the individuals responsible for the crime be brought to justice.⁴⁸⁹

One case, which was notable for that individual’s later interactions with the visita, was that of one Doctor Diego Ioppulo, who at the time was the prosecutor of the Great Court. Several charges related to Ioppulo’s relationship with an individual whose estate was supposed to be confiscated after committing *lèse-majesté*. Another dealt with Ioppulo’s use of “illicit means” and his personal authority to purchase a territory for less than half its value. Still another related to his failure to pay taxes. And, of course, there was the usual collection of gifts, in Ioppulo’s case, honey and pasta.⁴⁹⁰ Ultimately, at least 300 officials were punished.⁴⁹¹ But if it could still discipline an increasing number of officials into the 1650s, the mechanisms that the state employed were under increasing strain when it attempted to do so. The massive caseload

⁴⁸³ AGS, SSP leg 1295. Council of Italy’s consulta from July 24, 1649 and August 17, 1649

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. July 24, 1649 and August 17, 1649

⁴⁸⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. Letter to Philip IV sent from October 14, 1650 “me obligan a representar a V.Mg.^d la importancia de que con este ministro venga persona de toda inteligencia y satisfacción que reconozca muy por menor el estado que tienen así para las resultas que se sacaren, como para estinguir de una vez los malos abusos que se allaren introducidos, y establecer en todo una legal, y ajustada forma para que las cosas pertençientes al manejo de la hazienda caminen con la quenta y raçón q conviene.”

⁴⁸⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295 consultas from July 6, October 29, and November 3, 1650.

⁴⁸⁷ AGS, SSP, libro 696; AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Report of junta from September 20, 1672.

⁴⁸⁸ AGS, SSP, libro 696, ff. 1-3, 14v.

⁴⁸⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1295. Report of junta from December 5, 1658.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid. November 24, 1657.

⁴⁹¹ Unfortunately, record keeping for the fines from the visita was slightly haphazard but the number of officials who were punished was probably at least 300. One list of fines, for example, has 321 entries that are not explicitly repeated. A more detailed list based on the reports of the junta numbers at least 192 distinct officials, although it has numerous apparent gaps and is presented in text rather than list form. An additional ten cases were handled by the visitador himself.

from Valdés's visita, which took four years to generate, took seventeen years of work in Spain for the junta, which met until 1672, to resolve. In the meantime, the visitas themselves would be dormant.

THE LOCAL TURN AND THE FINAL ITALIAN VISITAS, 1675-1682

During that period of dormancy, the Crown's attentions were diverted away from institution building as the strains of the crisis of the 1640s gave way to a series of devastating defeats. Having concluded the Eighty Years' War with the recognition of *de jure* Dutch independence in the Peace of Münster, the Crown confirmed French and English victories across Europe and in the Caribbean through the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 and the Treaties of Madrid in 1667 and 1670. Its faltering twenty-eight-year struggle to recover Portugal was brought to an end by the desperation of the War of Devolution, in which Louis XIV's total conquest of the Spanish Netherlands was prevented only by the formation of the Triple Alliance and the resultant leniency of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Any hope of reversing Bourbon encroachments into the Hapsburgs' Burgundian inheritance was dashed by Spain's entry in the Franco-Dutch War in 1673, which instead led to the final loss of Franche Comté and still more territory in Flanders and Hainaut. Spanish Italy, which had incomparably withstood invasion during the Franco-Spanish War, was again threatened by French intervention in the 1670s, particularly in Sicily, where the rebellion of Messina brought four years of conflict.

The ascension of Charles II to the throne upon Philip IV's death in 1665 represented its own challenges. Charles's inability to govern in his own right led to the formation of a series of governments with divergent policies. In the mid-1670s, the regency and government of Charles's mother, Mariana, and her favorites was succeeded by a government led by Charles's half-brother, Juan José, who had theretofore led the opposition to the regency. A measure of stability – if not necessarily success – was attained only in the 1680s under the premiership of the Duke of Medinaceli. By then, however, it was increasingly clear that Charles would not produce an heir and that the looming question of succession would have to be determined by other means. Not surprisingly, then, the final decades of Hapsburg rule in Spain evinced a growing sense – particularly among foreign observers and ambassadors – that their empire was fading away.⁴⁹²

The fading of the Hapsburg empire was, at least cursorily, mirrored by the visita itself. After over a century of regular use, the last half of the seventeenth century was characterized by a dramatic decline in the visita's frequency mirroring the declining use of the visita elsewhere, particularly in Spain itself, since the beginning of the century. In Milan, about forty-four years elapsed between the visitas of the 1630s and the subsequent visita, which began in 1678.⁴⁹³ In

⁴⁹² Storrs, *The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy*, 1-5; John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (London: Longman, 1999); José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, "Razón de Estado y geoestrategia en la política italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los Presidios (1677-81)," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 173 (1976), 297-358.

⁴⁹³ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales: la visita del Estado de Milán (1678-1680)," 123-241. Signorotto and D'Amico have supposed that the lack of visitas represented a "privileged relationship" since the Crown had to rely on a self-sufficient and amenable Milan to secure its position

Naples, about thirty-two years elapsed since Chacón's visita had ended or, according to the Council of Italy's logic, fifty-one years since the start of Alarcón's. Only Sicily fell within the average timeframe for the start of a new visita. From an institutional perspective, that decline, as Peytavin has suggested, indicated the waning of the conciliar system through which the visita was administered with a moment of revitalization in the later decades of Hapsburg rule.⁴⁹⁴ But, perhaps more precisely, it suggested that the Crown's interest in the business of local administration had, over the course of forty years, been displaced by the exigencies of war and fiscalization with the consequence that the judicial, financial, and military administration of the provinces was increasingly handed over to local elites.⁴⁹⁵

Nevertheless, it was clear that even in the midst of that declining intervention in local affairs, the Crown had by no means entirely dismissed the use of the visita in Italy nor the visita's potent ability to monitor and discipline its officials' conduct and relationships. Despite the continuing fragility of the institutional environment and the limitations on the Crown's power, the institution of the visita did not simply recede in the late 1670s and early 1680s. Within those constraints, the visita instead emerged as a dynamic and innovative institution that underlined the reconfiguration of the Hapsburg empire. Indeed, for the first time in Italy, the Crown drew its *visitadores* not from Spain but from Italy itself, even appointing Italians, Danese Casati and Francesco Moles, to conduct inspections of Naples and Milan respectively. The form of the visita was similarly open to innovation with the visita in Milan finally adopting a suggestion from the 1550s to conduct the inspection by committee. But most significantly, the visita confronted the nature of the Hapsburg state itself and provided for the reconstruction of the state by providing for expansive reforms and affirming or even widening the disciplinary substance that bound the empire.

At the end of its hiatus in the 1670s, indications of the return of the visita began as a response to the business of state that had, undoubtedly, halted the prior use of the visita. The first of these was a 1675 visita to the commanders of the navy in the Mediterranean stationed in Naples who had seen action in combatting the French fleet supporting the rebellion of the city of Messina after a patrician revolt in 1674 expelled Spanish officials. Indeed, the immediate events leading to the visita was the defeat of Spanish efforts – for which its commanders gave numerous excuses including the quality of their ships and the best, risky efforts undertaken – to prevent the French fleet from reinforcing Messina. In late February, the Council of Italy named three potential *visitadores*, all of whom had offices in Italy and, foreshadowing the return of the visita general to Italy, were all called upon within three to four years to serve as inspectors in Naples and Sicily. These three were Pedro Valero, a regent of the Collateral Council, Félix de

in Italy during the Thirty Years' War. Gianvittorio Signorotto, *Milano Spagnola. Guerra, istituzioni, uomini di governo, 1635-1660* (Milano: Sansoni, 1996), 303 and D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 60.

⁴⁹⁴ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 117-8.

⁴⁹⁵ D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 60-7; Claudio Donati, "Ordinamenti militari e guerre nella Lombardia spagnola tra metà Cinquecento e fine Seicento," in *L'Italia delle cento città. Dalla dominazione spagnola all'unità nazionale*, eds. Maria Luisa Cicalese and Aurelio Musi (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2005), 142; Maffi, "Il potere delle armi. La monarchia spagnola e i suoi eserciti (1635-1700)"; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Corte y provincia en la Monarquía Católica: la corte de Madrid y el Estado de Milán, 1660-1700," in Elena Brambilla and Giovanni Muto, eds., *La Lombardia spagnola* (Milan: Unicopli, 1997), 335-6; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Españoles y Lombardos en el gobierno del estado de Milán en tiempos de Federico Borromeo," *Studia Borromaica* 17 (2003), 323.

Ubago, a member of the ecclesiastical court of the Apostolic Tribunal of the Roman Rota, and Danese Casati, a Milanese senator. Within about a month of the news of the defeat that led to the inspection, Pedro Valero was duly appointed as the visitador to the fleet in Sicily.⁴⁹⁶

But this was the mere prelude to the final series of visitas in Italy. In December 1675, the Crown, in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of Mariana de Austria's regency and as a symbol of Charles II's legitimacy and authority, ordered the President of the Council of Italy to begin planning for the full resumption of the visita in Italy in observation of the supposed tradition of his father, Philip IV, and grandfather, Philip III, who had ostensibly carried out visitas at the beginning of their reigns. Actually carrying those visitas out, however, would have to wait until the consolidation of a stable ministry led by Juan José de Austria, who had been the principal figure in opposition during the regency, in 1677 and the conclusion of the revolt of Messina.⁴⁹⁷

Despite its proximity to the instability that had occupied so much of the Crown's attentions in the 1670s, by far the most familiar of the new visitas was the visita to Sicily. Originally entrusted to Félix de Ubago, the visita was considerably delayed due to Ubago's illness and death in Rome in early 1679 before being undertaken by Pedro Valero Díaz. Valero's abbreviated visita, which lasted until 1681, produced the most complete inventory of work since the 1540s. That inventory of correspondence and materials signified a dramatic transformation in the extent to which the records of administration and the visita were themselves being regularized in the late seventeenth century. While the visita's records had previously been more often than not typified by a lack of clarity or sense of organization, the inventory of Valero's visita was a radically different document, with the most important matter from the correspondence being presented first, a *processo* and other materials related to the case against Diego Ioppulo, president of the Great Court. Following that, the visitador indicated six groups of juridical processes that had largely been completed, including one involving Ioppulo, as well as some against the *diputados* of Palermo, the *protomedico*, and a few against various officials from the Val di Noto, including the *maestro jurado*, the *sindicador*, and the *preceptor*. Finally, the inventory indicated the forty-five cases that had yet to be substantially completed, for which the visitador provided a brief summary of the individual and charges of interest, notably indicating the development of at least an informal typology of cases by the 1680s.

In contrast to the charges from Milan in the late 1620s and 1630s, these cases were dominated by just a single type of offense, extortion, which typified twenty-one of the forty-five individuals. The other offenses described included "bad administration," various failures to fulfill certain obligations of an office or exceeding the limits, constitutions, or ordinances of an office, and denying individuals the opportunity to use the justice system. Less common offenses included associating with a certain "public delinquent" and two instances of adultery. Alongside

⁴⁹⁶ AGS, SSP, leg. 237.

⁴⁹⁷ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 131-2; AGS, SSP, leg. 229; Charles II to the Count of Peñaranda. December 2, 1675. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño rightly notes that this "tradition" was invented, although one wonders whether Charles *personally* saw fit to carry out the visitas. See also Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, *La república de las parentelas. El estado de Milán en la monarquía de Carlos II.*

these were a few alleged instances of fraud, of which one was given particular attention: 3,000 ducats worth of misappropriation related to the provision of munitions.⁴⁹⁸

While the *visita* continued to cultivate these norms of public office, it was beginning to be met by a new resistance to the traditional symbolic order in which Spanish and Italian institutions had operated throughout Hapsburg rule. That tension had become increasingly evident in the response to redistribution of royal favor and privilege in the preceding decades. One incident, the correspondence about which was later included among the *visita*'s papers, was particularly illustrative of the reassertion of local particularity within the empire. In the 1660s, the *jurados* of Messina, a city that had always maintained a distinct status in the imperial system prior to its revolt, began to style themselves as “ambassadors” and “senators.” This symbolic transformation was particularly aggravating to the viceroy, the Count of Ayala, who believed that the new titles represented a grave attack on the limits of “obedience and respect” within which the Crown’s subjects were expected to behave. Indeed, those titles were of an especially “bad sound” because they inverted the expected hierarchy by implying a preeminence associated with free monarchies and republics.⁴⁹⁹ For the viceroy, always the symbolic center of authority in the provinces, that novel privilege was a particularly grave threat to the traditional order as well as to his personal reputation.⁵⁰⁰ When his complaint to Philip IV went without response, the viceroy repeatedly sent notice of his frustrations with Messina’s “excesses,” noted his efforts to resist them, and bemoaned the fact that the Crown continued to grant the city’s officials with favorable dispatches and to treat them with “largesse” while at the same time completely ignoring the viceroy.⁵⁰¹ While the peculiar relationship between Messina and the Crown would in particular be disrupted prior to the resumption of the *visita* in Sicily, it suggested a broader resistance in Sicily to the symbolic *status quo*.

However, that resistance, while largely situated in the realm of rituals and symbols, instead indicated the adoption of an alternate institutional mentality in which those symbols were understood as being distinct from and not entirely complementary to the work of governance. To be sure, Sicilian officials had often put up the most substantive resistance to the *visita* well before the 1680s. But unlike Córdoba’s *visita* in the 1540s, Bravo’s *visita* in the 1580s, or Luyando’s *visita* in the 1600s, Valero Díaz’s conflict was not with the viceroy in conjunction with his Sicilian allies but with one Sicilian official in particular, the president of the Great

⁴⁹⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 1288. “Inventario de todos los procesos e informaciones recibidas por el tribunal dela real visita del reino de Sicilia.”

⁴⁹⁹ AGS, SSP leg 1289. Letter from the Count of Ayala to Philip IV. May 20, 1662. The viceroy describes the “los límites de la obediencia y del respeto” and the “mal sonido” of the terms among other things in a rather lengthy and very highly charged letter.

⁵⁰⁰ Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image*; Guarino, *Representing the king’s splendour*; María del Pilar Mesa Coronado, “El Virreinato de Sicilia en la Monarquía Hispánica: Las instituciones de gobierno (1665-1675),” *Estudios Humanísticos. Historia* 12 (2013), 170.

⁵⁰¹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. Letter from the Count of Ayala to Philip IV, July 5, 1662. “Aunque repetidamente he dado quenta a VMg^d en todos los ordinarios y por todas la vías extraordinarias de los excesos que ha obrado el Senado de Mecina y delos medios que se han aplicado para hazer alguna resistencia a ellos no he podido conseguir respuesta de mis cartas ignorando el motivo q^l obliga atenerme en esta suspensión; quando el senado consigue los despachos Tan favorables que nunca pudo llegar su deseo, apensar en ellos, con que corre al principio con tanta violencia, que para que VMg.^d se halle con la noticia del silencio que se obserba con migo, y dela largueza con que se trata al senado, he juzgado ser de mi obligación embiar persona que ponga en las R^s manos de VMg^d. esta carta, y aunque espero que VMg^d. se servirá de oyrle y el podrá ynformar delo que ha pasado.”

Court, Diego Ioppulo, and his allies in the other Sicilian tribunals. Superficially, the dispute between Ioppulo and Valero was virtually identical to any number of disputes in early modern institutional life, dealing with the question of positioning chairs according to the legal-symbolic precedence of officials while the Great Court was in session.

This dispute began almost immediately upon Valero's arrival in Sicily when, as was customary, the visitador planned on observing the conduct of the major tribunals. Despite receiving correspondence instructing him to do otherwise, Valero sent word of his intentions to sit in on the Great Court to its president and a *protonotario* immediately prior to his visit. Upon entering the tribunal's hall, Valero found that the president's seat, which was at the head of the hall, was vacant while Ioppulo, who signaled for the visitador to sit at the right side of the table, sat at the left side of the table. Unsatisfied with this arrangement, which he believed did not conform to the Crown's orders, the visitador had the tribunal, which was by then filled with lawyers and litigants, emptied in order to privately discuss the matter. Unaware of any such orders, Ioppulo brought in one of the protonotario's officials to resolve the situation. In the meantime, the visitador sat on the right side of the table, leaving the head of the table empty, claiming that the dispute was of little personal importance but that his pursuit of the issue was in establishing the consistent "use and observance" of the Crown's orders.

From that point, the visita was entangled in a strenuous debate over how to understand the precedents of prior visitas, models of other territories, specific orders from the Crown, and, in particular, the existence of a legal treatise that provided for exact instructions. For Ioppulo and his allies, the introduction of ambiguity and nuance into these various sources – even when that nuance was invented – represented the means of establishing an alternate ritual order. That began as soon as records brought in from the office of the protonotario provided a certain room for interpretation when they indicated that the precedent in Naples was to have the president and visitador sit jointly at the head of the table whereas in Sicily it was the custom not to leave the president's seat empty.⁵⁰²

But the most essential source and the center of the dispute was a legal treatise written by Pietro Corsetto, an esteemed legal mind who held high office in Sicily and therefore observed several visitas. According to Valero, Corsetto's text⁵⁰³ indicated two different procedures for seating arrangements. When the visitador entered to intervene in particular cases, the seat of the president was pulled aside and the visitador and president sat next to each other at the head of the table. But for the observations of tribunals associated with the visita itself, the visitador was to be given the preeminent position.⁵⁰⁴ If this represented a relatively clear standard, the group of Sicilian officials who had disputed the visitador's privilege was entirely unwilling to concede it, claiming that they were unable to find the passage of Corsetto that the visitador had cited. Indeed, as Pietro Guerrero, the president of the *Consistorio*, complained in a letter to the

⁵⁰² AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. "Respuesta del regente visitador al papel del presidente de la Gran Corte." February 17, 1680.

⁵⁰³ The correspondence does not make it clear which treatise is being referred to but Corsetto wrote numerous treatises in the seventeenth century that are known today including one discourse in Italian from 1634 that was translated into Spanish. Pietro's son also wrote at least one work in Italian. Giuseppe Maria Mira, *Bibliografia siciliana; ovvero, gran dizionario bibliografico delle opera edite e inedite, antiche e modern di autori siciliani o di argomento siciliano stampate...*, vol. 1 (Palermo: G. B. Gaudiano, 1875), 262-4.

⁵⁰⁴ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. "Papel que dio al [...] conde de Santisteban, el visitador general Pedro Valero." February 15, 1680.

viceroy, the text the visitador cited was in “old and rustic Sicilian vulgate” while the Corsetto family – of which there were at least three jurists - was “very learned” and therefore wrote in Latin, suggesting that the text was a forgery.⁵⁰⁵ But this was not at all conclusive as the visitador responded by pointing out that Corsetto’s works had been improperly cited in subsequent treatises but that he had found the relevant passage in a new, more accurate, edition. Moreover, Valero suggested that Guerrero and Ioppulo’s arguments were made in bad faith since their evidence came from Corsetto’s Latin texts while it was known that Corsetto by no means wrote exclusively in Latin but also rather wrote numerous manuscripts in “the Sicilian language” and in Spanish.⁵⁰⁶

But beyond that, Valero emphasized the contrast between the regularity of the rituals that had typified Spanish imperial institutions since the 1530s and the exceptional, unnatural, and absurd symbolic order that the Sicilians expected to create in its place. Explicitly drawing on the legal origins and foundations of the visita in Italy as manifest evidence for the logic of his position, Valero noted that the visitador ought not be subject to provincial presidents since the position of the visitador had been a “minister of higher dignity, honors, and preeminence” since the 1536 pragmatic issued by Charles V for the visita undertaken by the Bishop of Mondoñedo, Pedro Pacheco.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, the visitador suggested that Sicily should follow the example of Naples, which was in concordance with the vulgate material from Corsetto and where, in order to “avoid much absurdity,” the visitador was rightly seated in the president’s position. That “absurdity” was evident in Guerrero’s contorted conception of personal and official authority, which supposed that the dignity of the president was always in the person who held that office but that there was another dignity in the vacant chair at the head of the table itself which was to represent the presidential dignity. If the authority of the office of the president was the head of the tribunal, Valero dismissed Guerrero’s solution as contrary to nature: “it is certain that forcing two heads on one body is a monstrous thing.”⁵⁰⁸

But the final resolution did not look back so much to the legal treatises, the precedent of the sixteenth century, or even to the logic of the symbols as it did to the very question of how symbols, dignity, and authority should be understood to relate to the substance and practice of administration. Throughout early 1680, the presidents of the patrimonial court, the consistory, and the Great Court as well as the visitador wrote at considerable length about the matter of the visitador’s seating. As a result, there was a considerable delay in carrying out the visits to the tribunals, which the visitador insisted on doing in accordance with the commission that he had been provided which instructed him to intervene in the Sicilian councils and tribunals. Prompt and decisive resolution was needed to finally resolve the dispute and to allow the visitador to sit at the head of the Great Court, at least in Valero’s view. It was this delay that led to its most evocative exchange. For Guerrero, the dispute could be concluded in still more simple fashion than determining which seat the visitador should take because the seating was one ritual within a broader ceremony. But that ceremony need not be done at all because, as Guerrero put it,

⁵⁰⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. “Consulta de Pedro Guerrero [...] al Señor Virrey.” February 16, 1680.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid. “Respuesta del regente visitador al papel del presidente del Consistorio.” February 20, 1680.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid. “Y como quiera que se haya de considerar esto, es cierto, que forzar dos cabezas en un cuerpo, se tiene por cosa monstruosa.”

sitting in on the tribunals was “a job more of authority than of substance.”⁵⁰⁹ Legitimacy and authority came not from the proper arrangement of seats or even from the order of symbols and court rituals that the state had employed since the sixteenth century, it came – or at least it ostensibly did – from a new logic of substance.

In response, Valero pointed to the most elementary corollary of that authority of substance. The arrangement of chairs need not be accepted for his sake nor even according to the various forms of evidence he had drawn from in the past. What mattered was that Valero had been instructed to carry out a task by the king and that implicit acceptance of orders was what made it substantial: “I say that this job is of substance, and of the greatest importance to the service of His Majesty because he entrusted me with it.”⁵¹⁰

If there was any doubt about that conclusion, however, the visita was well-endowed with the capacity to ensure that it was nevertheless carried out. While Ioppulo and his allies attempted to delegitimize the visita as something given over to extravagant rituals, the Crown and Valero were in communication as Ioppulo’s position as president of the Great Court rapidly crumbled under the increased disciplinary attention the visita represented as several cases mounted against the president. In late February 1680, the Crown sent a dispatch to Valero noting that Ioppulo was indeed “generally detested” but was also advanced in age and a minister of “first degree,” and thus asked the visitador to provide special reports on Ioppulo’s conduct in both his work and his private life in order to push Ioppulo along into retirement. The visitador’s report in April noted that not only was it certain that the president was generally abhorred but that this had been a mark of disgrace for the Crown for over thirty years, pointing to a dispatch from 1649 when Ioppulo was noted for behaving improperly in using his office to persecute his personal enemies and was continuously at odds with his fellow judges.

By that point in his own investigations, Valero had arrived at twenty-five charges against the embattled president but believed that further investigation would require the Crown to provide him the license to force Ioppulo together with his son and relatives to leave Palermo in order to allow the visitador to receive denunciations and complaints with more freedom. This also raised the question of how to end Ioppulo’s career. Accordingly, Valero believed that from the perspective of the law of the visita, a suspension would be more “regular” but that compelling him to retire would seem to be an indication of the Crown’s “clemency and magnanimity.”⁵¹¹ But Valero would be granted the full exercise of the power that he had been accorded as visitador: Ioppulo, a former regent of the Council of Italy, was suspended.⁵¹² Further work would, however, be impossible before the conclusion of the visita.

⁵⁰⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. “Respuesta del regente visitador al papel del presidente del Consistorio.” February 20, 1680. “que no ha hecho reflexión el Press^{te}. Don Pedro Guerrero quando dice que dela dilación en resolver este punto no resulta incombeniente ala Visita porque el ir a los Tribunales es una diligencia más de autoridad que de sustancia.”

⁵¹⁰ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. “Respuesta del regente visitador al papel del presidente del Consistorio.” February 20, 1680. “Yo digo, que esta diligencia es de sustancia, y grandísima importancia al servicio de su Majestad pues me lo encarga y ordena así repetidamente tanto en la comisión principal publicada en presencia de [...] todos los ministros, como en la instrucción particular, donde hay este capítulo expreso.”

⁵¹¹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1289. Letter from Pedro Valero to Charles II, April 20, 1680.

⁵¹² Sciuti Russi, *Astrea in Sicilia*, 252, see note 131; Burgarella and Fallico, *L’archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia*, 84-6.

While Sicily demonstrated an element of resistance to the Crown's reinvigorated intervention in local administration, the resumption of the *visita* in Milan was driven by the confluence of local interests and the efforts of the new government in Madrid to reform the duchy. By the 1670s, the exceptionally long gap between *visitas* had put particular pressure on the state to provide relief through the *visita*. At least once, in 1645, the Council of State along with the governor of Milan seems to have considered the possibility of commissioning a *visita* of some type in view of a suggestion by a Capuchin friar from Lombardy who relayed his views about the "calamitous" state of affairs in the duchy which he believed required a *visita* to rectify. The matter was ultimately deferred to the view that there was insufficient cause in the midst of the wars being fought.⁵¹³

Again in the 1660s, the Crown was apparently aware of the need to provide some resolution to the ongoing "disturbances" and "calamity" in Milan brought about by "a war of so many years," but this task was entrusted to its governors and focused especially on the "grave weight" of extracting revenues from the Milanese that resulted in "so much damage to the public cause."⁵¹⁴ Over the course of the middle of the century, meanwhile, an oligarchic faction of Milanese families, led by Bartolomeo Arese and with the support of the Spanish Crown, began consolidating political control within the duchy with a wide net of patronage that included the feudal aristocrats, "sectors of the urban patriciates, Spanish families with Lombard roots, and groups of wealthy financiers, bond-holders and tax farmers."⁵¹⁵ In 1674, however, Bartolomeo Arese's death introduced considerable instability. Venality, for example, became particularly prevalent after 1673 with even some of the highest offices of the state being sold. At the same time, the weakness of Arese's heir, Carlo Borromeo Arese, was challenged by the reorganized interests of families that had previously been marginalized by the Arese faction. Those interests found support in the incoming government of Juan José de Austria.⁵¹⁶

Thus, after the withdrawal of French forces from Messina in 1678, the initial impetus for a *visita* in Milan – one of the most well studied *visitas* thanks to the work of Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño – began with the formation the "junta for the relief and preservation of the vassals of the State of Milan and the remedy of the abuses and damages to the public interest."⁵¹⁷ That junta, comprised of various ministers including a former viceroy and counsellors from the councils of Castile, Hacienda, and Italy, including the Duke of Alba, was most influenced by Antonio de Joan y Centelles, the Marquis of Centellas. Trained as a lawyer, Centellas had served on the *Sommaria* in Naples and as Grand Chancellor in Milan before being appointed as the prosecutor for the Council of Italy. Under Centellas's direction, the junta heard extensively

⁵¹³ AGS, EST, leg. 3360, f. 356. Council of State's consulta from December 5, 1545; AGS, EST, leg. 3360, f. 357. Letter from Fray Francisco de Bexeben to Pedro de Arce, September 23, 1545; AGS, EST, leg. 3361, f. 253. Council of State's consulta from February 22, 1646.

⁵¹⁴ AGS, SSP leg 1906, f. 24.

⁵¹⁵ D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 63-4; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "The State of Milan and the Spanish Monarchy," in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion 1500-1700*, eds., Thomas James Dandeleit and John A. Marino (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 127.

⁵¹⁶ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "The State of Milan and the Spanish Monarchy," 130; Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Corte y provincia en la Monarquía Católica," 340-1; D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 65-6.

⁵¹⁷ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 124-6. In Spanish, the junta was called the "Junta para el alivio y conservación de los vasallos del Estado de Milán y remedio de los abusos y daños a la conveniencia pública."

from a somewhat marginal Milanese official who was residing in Madrid, Cosme Forno Zermelli. Zermelli's alarming reports described at length the dominance of the remnants of the Arese faction and their role in providing for the dramatic growth in venality in the duchy, both of which called for the prompt provision of reform.⁵¹⁸ Beyond just his testimony to the junta, Zermelli's depiction of the situation in Milan was preserved in graphic fashion in a series of tables and a visualization of the Arese network. His initial report, later modified for the use of the *visita*, would take on the unwieldy but descriptive title: "Relation of all the people who are found in the four supreme tribunals of justice, which are governing the politics in the state of Milan in civil and criminal cases and the royal revenue, with the tree of kinship, which existed between those ministers (which are differentiated with numbers) [...] marking with this symbol + the questors and supernumerary attorneys who have purchased their offices since 1674."⁵¹⁹

That document, which was the blueprint for the work of the junta and the *visitas* that followed, represented a clear indication of the administrative regularization that the *visita* was expected to provide by the late seventeenth century. In each table, ministers were evaluated – usually negatively – according to their qualifications, skills, and traits with annotations as to whether they had purchased their office and where they fit within the Arese faction. Thus, for example, the president of the Milanese Senate was deemed to be "cold and without resolve" with the result that all the other senators considered themselves to be presidents and justice was not adequately performed. Several of the senators were noted to be rather aged with elaboration ranging from "always was very just" and "[of] good inclination" to "very self-interested," "malevolent," "extremely lazy," and "only good for their [personal] business." Those officials most closely aligned with the Arese faction or the practice of venality were often noted as being quite young, insufficiently educated, and well-connected even outside Milan. The revenue official Pedro Casado, who was later one of the principal target of the *visita*'s investigations, was "intelligent but self-interested."⁵²⁰

Finally, on a large folded sheet, Zermelli depicted the structure of the Arese faction as a "tree of ministers" that had been founded "in order to perpetuate and preserve [the Arese] house in the dominion of [Milan] to exclude other meritorious subjects."⁵²¹ Several dozen individuals were accordingly grouped by a range of ties ranging from close familial bonds to employment and patron-client relationships to friendship, with the resulting branches extending to ten degrees – although presumably rather fewer degrees in reality – of

⁵¹⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvaríño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 125-6.

⁵¹⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 303. "Relación de todas las personas, que se hallan en los cuatro tribunales supremos de justicia, que están gobernando lo político en el estado de Milán en las causas civiles y criminales, y la Real Hacienda con el Árbol del Parentesco, que tienen entre los dichos ministros (que se distinguen con los números) para conservarles entre ellos en las nóminas que se hacen a Su Majestad, cuando se deben proveer nuevos sujetos en las vacantes, anotándose con esta señal + a los cuestores y fiscales supernumerarios, que han comprado los puestos desde el año 1674 a esta parte." Regrettably, these enormously evocative documents cannot be reproduced here.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.* "Frio y sin resolución, que causa que todos los Senadores se riputan por Presid^{tes}, que causa que la Justicia no tiene sù lugar." "[S]iempre fue muy Justo." "[H]a sido muy interesado." "[B]uena inclinación." "Maligno." "Floxissimo." "Son Parientes solo buenos por sus negoçios." "Inteligente pero interessadissimo."

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, f. 305. "Este Arbol de Ministros fue su primer fundador el conde Bartolome Ares Presidente del Senado de Milan para perpetuar y conservar su casa en el Dominio de aquel estado para excluir los demás sujetos benemeritos de los puestos, y de presente se alla aumentado, y se conserva debaxo de la cierta y segura proteccion del Regente Don Luis Carillo."

separation.⁵²² Ultimately this collection of factional and personal interests represented a perversion of the ideals of office holding and was intended to assist the “quick remedy for the preservation of the royal revenue and of [the Crown’s] poor vassals.”⁵²³

In response to Zermelli’s reports, the junta’s *consulta* from May 17, 1678 and the resolution taken on it by the Crown through Juan José de Austria, provided for that remedy by means of a *visita*. But this *visita* was unlike any that preceded it, for the *visita* would be conducted by a junta comprised of Vicente Calatayud y Toledo, the Grand Chancellor of Milan, Giovanni Battista del Pozzo, a Milanese senator whom Zermelli had described favorably, and Francesco Moles, president of the Sommaria in Naples, along with Cesare Visconti who served as the *visita*’s prosecutor and, ultimately, Zermelli’s brother as its accountant.⁵²⁴

This innovation introduced a certain degree of confusion as to how to proceed, particularly with regard to communication, certainly not helped by the fact that Moles was delayed in arriving due to having traveled across the Adriatic and then hindered by winter travel from Venice to Milan. Through 1678 and 1679, the junta also dealt with the confusion of how its dispatches were channeled and, in an attempt to make its work more efficacious, proposed several innovations, including modeling procedures after the Milanese Senate, where individual senators were referred particular cases, and a request to be granted permission to conclude its own cases for more minor officials.⁵²⁵ In 1680, however, the elevation of the Duke of Medinaceli to the post of prime minister at the height of the two juntas’ frustrations about their inability to dismantle the Arese faction precipitated the collapse and dissolution of the junta in Milan and the installation of two new *visitas* there, a *visita* of the army carried out by Vicente Calatayud y Toledo and the *visita* general, as part of broader transfer of posts to non-Castilian officials in the late seventeenth century, to Francesco Moles.⁵²⁶ That, in conjunction with the events of 1680s in Naples and Moles’s appointment as regent of the Council of Italy, resulted in the *visita* to Milan being among the least successful of the Italian inspections. Indeed, before assuming his post on the Council of Italy, Moles’s work was essentially limited to concluding the junta’s pending cases.

But before its collapse, the *visitas*’ cases, guided by Zermelli’s reports, and its reform projects had comprised some of the *visita*’s most ambitious efforts in Italy since the introduction of the institution in the 1530s. Guided by a rhetoric that strongly condemned the corruption of the 1660s and 1670s, the junta aimed at nothing less than the transformation of Milanese society, politics, and administration.⁵²⁷ Indeed, those efforts were considered to be of such gravity that the Crown replaced its governor in Milan, the Prince of Ligne, whose

⁵²² AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 305. One senator, for example, was the brother-in-law of a nephew of a brother-in-law of a brother-in-law of a brother-in-law of a cousin of a brother-in-law of a first cousin of a nephew of Arese.

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, f. 304. “[P]or todo lo qual necessiteria de lo Supremo, y pronto remedio, por la conservaçion de la Real hacienda, y de aquellos pobres Vassallos.”

⁵²⁴ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, “Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales,” 133-7

⁵²⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 68. Letter from the junta. May 31, 1678; AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 120. Letter from the junta. April 27, 1679; AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 124. Letter from the junta. May 31, 1679.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 78. Letter from the junta March 9, 1680; AGS, SSP leg 1946, f. 146. Letter from the junta March 29, 1680; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, “Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales,” 215-223.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 242. Letter from Charles II to the Duke of Alba. August 30, 1678; AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 124. Letter from the Junta del Alivio. May 31, 1679; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, “Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales,” 139-140 with reference to AHN, Estado, leg. 1935. Letter from the Junta del Alivio. May 17, 1678.

presence had stalled the visita in its early days, with the Count of Melgar, who was a close ally of the members of the junta and eagerly collaborated with them.⁵²⁸ If it had succeeded, its disciplinary function, which while largely limited to sixteen principal investigations, would have directly attacked the elaborate system of patronage that had consolidated in Milan since Rueda Rico's visita in the 1630s and remade the relationship between the Crown and its elites. While it was ultimately unable to achieve that, it did point to the Crown's hope of reforming its local elites' management of the imperial system, a hope that brought unusually severe discipline.

That aim was best exemplified by the punishment of Francesco Velarde, an official whose investigation not among the sixteen major cases. Velarde was entrusted with maintaining the cipher in Milan, one of the essential posts in the chain of communication. Despite a defense that appealed to the "reason of dominion and of state" as legitimate cause for contravening orders and laws, Velarde received no exculpation from that state.⁵²⁹ As punishment for his role in an extensive scheme of fraud based around forging signatures and sending fake mail that suggested endemic abuse of this type, Velarde was not only banned from holding any office in any Crown territory for perpetuity, he was sentenced to five years in jail, an unprecedented penalty.⁵³⁰ In contrast to the visitas since the 1550s, the junta's limited – albeit severe – discipline had been subsumed by its broader project of reform.

To that end, the junta was expected to execute an unusually extensive list of financial reforms, audits, and investigations, including a review of all sales of feudal grants since 1635,⁵³¹ an investigation into the royal mint, an audit of business contracts, and an extensive review of military expenses, particularly fortifications in order to "restore the commerce and arts in the city and state."⁵³² Because of its connection with the junta for relief, the visita collected and reviewed proposals for fiscal and political reforms, including one proposal – entitled "A just, easy, and still necessary *arbitrio* that soon and not only without complaint from the vassals of the state of Milan if not with their general satisfaction can produce for the benefit of His Majesty within one year and even sooner one million *reales* of eight" – that called for the elimination of the Magistrado Extraordinario because it had ceased to be a useful institution for collecting fines and instead, ostensibly, damaged the social fabric of the duchy.⁵³³ But because

⁵²⁸ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 144-7.

⁵²⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 206. "Memorial impreso de D. Agustin Diego de Torres..." quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 190. "los Principes, y Gobernadores de Provincias muchas vezes se arriman más a la razón del Dominio, y de Estado, que a la estrechez de la ordinaria común, aunque parezca contra las órdenes[...]" Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño supposes a distinction between the juridical idea of "good government" held by the visita and the "good government" of administration and reason of state that could be used to justify malfeasant activity which rightly points directly to a conception of a "state" but overstates the visita's representation of the juridical notion of "good government" in this case. Indeed, the severity of the punishment for this offense in particular illustrates that discipline could be founded in the reason of state, according to which fraud of this nature, which was not legible as contravening social norms, was impermissible.

⁵³⁰ AGS, SSP leg. 1946, f. 170. Council of Italy to Charles II. November 28, 1681; AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 225. Letter from the Junta. May 20, 1679. Cf. Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 188-91.

⁵³¹ Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 155; AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 10.

⁵³² AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 244. "Puntos que contiene un papel que se puso en las reales manos de Su Majestad tocantes al Alivio del estado de Milan"; AGS, SSP leg. 1946, f. 90 Letter from the junta of visita. March 5, 1679.

⁵³³ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 323.

of the expenses associated with the army in the duchy, which by the late seventeenth century was regarded as perhaps the finest of Spain's armies, were not substantially decreased despite its increasing Italianization, the junta's work in inspecting military finances was of foremost importance.⁵³⁴ The review of fortifications, led by Vicente Calatayud y Toledo, deemed the state of fortifications to be poor and recommended that all work on fortifications in the past fifteen years be inspected with the possibility of obliging the contractors who performed the shoddy or fraudulent work to fulfill their obligations. The Grand Chancellor also criticized the construction of a new palace, already at the expense of over one million *libras*, due to the fact that the work was always deemed necessary because there were no controls on limiting the judgment of governors and the engineers they employed in judging such things as "necessary."⁵³⁵ The junta of the visita to Milan and its successors thus represented a revival of the use of the visita that had been anticipated for the duchy in the early 1550s, one that combined an expansive review of finances, the reform of administration, and discipline, but with the novel hope of using these to renew the Crown and alter Milan's social fabric.

Despite their modifications to carry out reforms, their failure to do so, and their ultimate interruption by the new Medinaceli government, which looked less favorably on the aims that had initially driven them, the Milanese visitas did not in themselves indicate the weakening of the institution in Italy. For even as Moles's inspection sputtered to its conclusion in 1680, the visita general's jurisdiction was actually upheld and expanded after it had been subjected to a review by the Crown's councils when Moles's position in the order of ritual governance provoked, as in Sicily, a debate about the visita's precedence and authority. Unlike Sicily, however, where the impasse had arisen due to a divergence in the rhetoric of symbols and substance as a means of protecting local authority, the question of precedence in Milan arose from the fact that there was no particularly strong precedent for resolving whether Francesco Moles, the visitador general, or Vicente Calatayud y Toledo, the military visitador, had preeminence.⁵³⁶ In August, then, the debate of ordering the two officials during their appearances in "tribunals and public acts" had been referred to the Council of Italy and then to the Council of State, with their allies in court representing arguments on their behalf. The Council of Italy, which heard the matter first, reacted unwaveringly, not only supposing that Moles had precedence – due to their interpretation of instructions from prior visitas and because he had by that time been named a regent of the council – but also recommending that the two visitas be united under Moles's jurisdiction.⁵³⁷

The question was then referred to the Council of State, where the matter provoked considerably more controversy. One party led by the Duke of Osuna, who had been the governor of Milan in the early 1670s, and Melchor de Navarra, an enemy of the late Juan José de Austria, took a firm line against Moles. To them, the rank of the officials subject to the visita

⁵³⁴ D'Amico, "Spanish Milan, 1535-1706," 60-65; Maffi, "Il potere delle armi. La monarchia spagnola e i suoi eserciti (1635-1700)," 418-34; Christopher Storrs, "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665-1700) Part One," *War in History* 4 (1997), 371-77; Christopher Storrs, "The Army of Lombardy and the Resilience of Spanish Power in Italy in the Reign of Carlos II (1665-1700) Part Two," *War in History* 5 (1998), 1-22.

⁵³⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 1947, f. 19. Letter from the junta of visita. October 9, 1678.

⁵³⁶ AGS, EST, leg. 3398, f. 72 Council of State's consulta from August 22, 1680. The matter had initially arisen in 1679. See AGS, SSP leg. 1946, f. 120. Letter from the junta de visita. April 27, 1679.

⁵³⁷ AGS, EST, leg. 3398, f. 72 Council of State's consulta from August 22, 1680.

was of the essence and, as a result, the military inspection should be upheld as superior. Navarra's logic was still more inimical, supposing that Moles's position in Naples was inferior to Calatayud's in Milan and that his new status as a regent of the Council of Italy was wholly irrelevant. Granting Moles authority over military matters was therefore neither "just nor decent." The other half of the Council of State, led by the Constable of Castile, suggested a seemingly practical alternative: simply instruct the governor of Milan to avoid having occasions in which both *visitadores* were present.⁵³⁸ But the Medinaceli government resolved otherwise. While the governor would be instructed to avoid having both *visitadores* present at any occasion, the Crown, in order to have both *visitas* conclude at the same time, granted Moles full jurisdiction over the military *visita*. Even in failure, the *visita* maintained its preeminence over the politics and symbolic order of reputation.

The most ambitious of the final Italian *visitas*, the inspection in Naples from 1679 to 1681, and the one that directly led to the termination of the *visitas* in Italy did, however, have a Milanese connection. That inspection, as always the most prestigious, was entrusted to Danese Casati, a distinguished member of the Milanese urban patriciate who had served in the senate for nine years prior to being appointed as *visitador* and who would be appointed as a regent of the Council of Italy in conjunction with his *visita*.⁵³⁹ While the circulation of officials within the empire via the *visita* had always typified the institution and had even been modified to include intra-Italian circulation by the mid-1670s, Casati's appointment was of unique consequence. Whereas the Neapolitan feudal nobility had traditionally enjoyed autonomy within their domains, their Milanese counterparts were stringently constrained by the intervention of the senate in the administration of justice.⁵⁴⁰ Casati's *visita*, essentially modeled after Milanese norms, dramatically expanded the Spanish institution, which for the first time in nearly 150 years would put the nobility and – for the first time ever – its administration of feudal territories under the *visita*'s – and thus also the imperial state's – direct jurisdiction.

Although the *visita* in Naples had ironically been commissioned in part because of the requests of its nobility, Casati began to demonstrate a strong inclination for increasing his authority in order to carry out investigations of their conduct as early as the summer of 1679. Thus, his exchanges sought particular clarification from the Council of Italy about the extent of his authority as enumerated in the instructions he had been provided with in his commission. Within those instructions, which did not differ substantially from the instructions that had been given to the *visitadores* since the 1550s, Casati had inferred a connection between two instructions that could provide the *visita* with unprecedented legal prerogative. The first, numbered sixty-four, indicated that the information taken during the *visita* should result in charges against the "people and officials" suspected of wrongdoing in accordance with the *visitador*'s commission. The second, numbered forty-eight, ordered the *visitador* to take information on the manner in which feudal lords made use of their lands and, in particular, any

⁵³⁸ AGS, EST, leg. 3398, f. 72 Council of State's consulta from August 22, 1680. "[N]i justo ni decente."

⁵³⁹ Agostino Borromeo, "Casati, Danese," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* vol. 21 (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1978), 18-20; Salvo Mastellone, *Francesco d'Andrea, politico e giurista (1648-1698): L'ascesa del ceto civile* (Florence: Casa Editrice Leo S. Olschki, 1969); Álvarez-Ossorio Alvaríño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 223-4.

⁵⁴⁰ Cesare Mozzarelli, "Strutture sociali e formazioni statuali a Milano e Napoli tra '500 e '700," *Società e storia* 3 (1978), 431-63. See also Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid (BNM), Ms. 6780, f. 1 ss. *Una breve y sumaria relación de como se administra Justicia en el Estado de Milan...*

abuses of *università*, the institutionally recognized center of habitation characteristic of feudal territories.⁵⁴¹ These two directives, as Casati indicated, could allow the visitador to investigate reports of baronial abuse on feudal territories, potentially as an ordinary function of the visita resulting in formal charges or, alternatively, as a practice in conjunction with local authorities and tribunals.⁵⁴² As a result, alongside his other investigations, which included a relatively substantial investigation into the conduct of the Collateral Council, Casati had begun to collect complaints to form charges against the Neapolitan aristocracy.

From 1679 until its premature conclusion in 1681, the visita therefore not only sought to reinforce the established discipline of officials but to remake the social fabric of the kingdom. In so doing, Casati organized charges and cases against seventy barons, which were preserved by the Council of Italy individually and in a summary version.⁵⁴³ Unlike the regular charges against officials, these cases and charges – at least in the form they were left in 1681 – were explicitly derived from the complaints filed by interested parties, often by communities, *sindicós*, groups of residents or individual residents, and members of the clergy, which were presented to the visitador by means of a denunciation or by written correspondence. Including nobles from across the kingdom, the charges illustrate the extremes to which the nobility had theretofore subverted the practice of justice, trampled on the communes, and normalized abuses and excesses on feudal lands.

At one extreme, then, the charges indicated the routinization of extraordinary violence and capriciousness in the countryside of which there was no shortage of examples. The baron of San Martino, for example, was accused of having an individual who had presented complaints about him to the viceroy murdered while also imprisoning that man's pregnant wife. The baron of Montebello, the noble most associated with egregious violence in the visita, was implicated in numerous murders, including of a clergyman who was found shot in the head after sleeping in his presence, and in a plot to murder a rival noble who had spurned a request to free one of the baron's vassals from jail. Such behavior was not necessarily without structure, though. The Duke of Marzano was known to have directly imprisoned individuals who had refused to comply with his requests but was also inclined to use more indirect methods such as employing third parties to beat those who resisted his attempts at extortion including some mill operators, an inn owner, and a butcher upon whom he had imposed price restrictions.⁵⁴⁴

One category of violence was particularly exceptional in the extent to which its excesses could produce a reaction that demanded the intervention of the visita and the state: violence in connection with marriage, family, and gender. In some cases, that was complemented by the dimension of class, as was the case when the Prince of Bisignano was alleged to have “broke[n] the head” of a member of the urban patriciate who refused to marry one of his wife's servants after she had been raped. In an unrelated incident, the prince attempted to force a marquis to abandon his claims to an estate by arresting him and forcing him to march barefoot and without

⁵⁴¹ Muto, “Noble Presence and Stratification,” 264-5.

⁵⁴² This question is related at considerable length and with a large volume of correspondence in AGS, SSP, leg. 227 and 228. See, for example, AGS, SSP, leg. 227. The Council of Italy's consulta from September 1, 1679, which relates Danese Casati's letter from August 4, 1679.

⁵⁴³ For the summary version, see AGS, SSP, leg. 227. “Relación de los cavos que se han dado en la Real Visita General del Reino de Nápoles contra diversos Barones del Reino y sus ministros.” 9 pieces.

⁵⁴⁴ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. “Relación de los cavos que se han dado en la Real Visita General del Reino Nápoles contra diversos Barones del Reino y sus ministros.”

a hat for six miles before extending that pressure by torturing his mother and sisters by removing their fingernails. The Baron of Montebello, against whom there were nineteen complaints from a clergyman and another individual, was exemplary of the relationship between the new disciplinary attention of the visita under Casati and this category of violence. In one episode, a certain Romeo had come to a town under the baron's jurisdiction to marry a woman who lived there. For unclear reasons, the baron then gave orders to kill those who were at the wedding but was thwarted when word of his plans leaked and the party fled beyond the reach of the baron's power. That incident was hardly unique. A similar case transpired when a new groom was ordered to be killed because of some apparent display of disfavor, seemingly shown by the bride's father to the baron. The baron used this as an opportunity to take the new bride from her home to the countryside, where his agents raped her. One of her sisters, who suffered a similar fate, committed suicide. In yet another case, the baron had a man killed because he refused to marry a woman the baron had "already violated." The baron simultaneously gave orders for the father of this violated woman to be killed but, perhaps in a common theme, the father fled with his other daughters. Apparently adapting to his previous failure to murder a wedding party, the baron gathered a posse to find the family and then had the daughters brought back to him.⁵⁴⁵

At the other extreme was the endemic erosion of communal independence and the abuses that characterized it. Attacks on the administration of justice were especially prevalent. The same Duke of Marzano was thus known to have imposed a variety of fines for otherwise ordinary behaviors, interfered in lawsuits both with violence and by employing doctors of the law who would always vote in his favor. When Casati's visita began investigating such abuses, the duke hid the publication of the proclamation of the visita in order to prevent anyone from complaining to the visitador. Likewise, the Prince of Aculi personally maintained a jail – which was obligated to be in a town – in his castle while failing to preserve an archive to conserve juridical records. These corresponded to a broader usurpation of local privileges, rights, and incomes that essentially extorted the residents of feudal domains. Accordingly, one baron was noted for having restricted the planting of crops while another prohibited the sale of wine before its time, a time which came after he himself had flooded the market with wine. Still another baron personally selected a town's chancellor, a position that was legally required to be elected, with the result that its financial records were left disordered and filled with false information. These infringements could extend to more simple extortions that relied on the nearly unquestioned authority of the barons. The Prince of Bisignano, against whom there were thirty-two charges, thus employed a variety of schemes to defraud towns, including one scam in which he had unsolicited pork delivered to various residences and then demanded that the residents pay for both the value of the pork and an additional fee.⁵⁴⁶

In effect, Casati, as a quasi-independent bureaucrat, had unilaterally carried the discipline of the visita to its logical conclusion. The state could, on behalf of its subjects, assault the legal heterogeneity and protections characteristic of early modernity in order to enforce and cultivate social norms. But that disruption of the socio-political equilibrium through the visita, an institution that had theretofore possessed neither the Crown's support nor the

⁵⁴⁵ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. "Relación de los cavos que se han dado en la Real Visita General del Reino Nápoles contra diversos Barones del Reino y sus ministros."

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

juridical competence to intervene in baronial affairs during Hapsburg rule, was not accepted graciously.

Because the Crown had initially given Casati ample ability to carry out this work, the reaction of the barons waited until the spring of 1680. In the midst of his investigation into Giacomo Capeche Galeota, the Duke of Sant'Angelo a Fasanello and a regent of the Collateral Council, the visitador had planned to issue orders for the duke as well as several of his relatives, notably including the Duke of Montasardo and the Duke of the Regina, to leave the city of Naples so that Casati could take depositions without interference. After various delays, including celebrations for Charles II's marriage to Marie Louise of Orléans, the orders were finally issued at the beginning of Lent. Two days later, several dozen nobles met at the monastery of San Domenico Maggiore to discuss the visitador's actions against the three dukes. Under this pretext, the nobility also came upon the grounds with which to challenge the investigations against their conduct. To that end, the nobles appointed three representatives to the viceroy of Naples, the Marquis of Los Vélez, who agreed to discuss their requests with Casati after reminding them that they themselves, and the Duke of Montasardo in particular, had requested the visita. When Casati's response was not what they had hoped for, some 200 nobles met to strategize a new response. After rejecting a more radical proposal, a group of nobles signed a brief describing their discontentment to the viceroy and sent a letter, signed by ninety nobles, to the Crown that rejected the visita's new jurisdiction as a novelty without juridical foundation and called for the recapitulation of orders given to Guevara that prevented him from investigating the Neapolitan nobility in 1607.⁵⁴⁷

That letter brought decisive reaction. In late April, the Crown instructed Casati to cease his investigations into the administration of feudal domains and that any denunciations about the barons should be referred to the viceroy. Furthermore, the visita would terminate entirely within six months.⁵⁴⁸ But this sudden shift in policy extended beyond juridical consideration and, indeed, beyond Medinaceli's strategy of drawing loyalty from the empire's nobility. It belied apprehension. In its relation to the Crown of events in Naples dating from April 17, five days before the Council of State found that Casati had acted imprudently and ten days before the orders to terminate the visita were issued, the Council of Italy noted and forwarded reminders to the Crown from the viceroy and the Collateral Council that emphasized the delicate economic situation in Italy and Europe and, of course, the recent "accidents" that had transpired during the Revolt of Messina.

That disaster, during which a popular revolt in the city had been defeated and subsequently absorbed by a noble rebellion against Charles II in favor of Louis XIV, provided a direct contrast to the revolts of 1647. Three decades after Masaniello's revolt, the Crown had ascertained that the roots of those earlier events lay in the rural conflict between feudal lords and their vassals. While failing to punish baronial abuse could cause violence, that hatred would

⁵⁴⁷ AGS, SSP, libros 16-17; in particular libro 17, ff. 35-50; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 224-8; Galasso, *Napoli spagnola dopo Masaniello*, 250-3; Mastellone, *Francesco d'Andrea, politico e giurista 1648-1698*, 80-3; Coniglio, *Visitatori del Vicereame di Napoli*, 88-90; Zarrilli, "Le visite di Francesco Alarcón e Danese Casati nel Regno di Napoli," 128-66.

⁵⁴⁸ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 147. Council of Italy's consulta to Charles II and response. July 5, 1680; AGS, Estado, leg. 3307, f. 79.

be directed at the nobles themselves, not at the Crown.⁵⁴⁹ The risk of expanding the visita's jurisdiction to include the nobles, whose loyalty was so important, was, in effect, too great.

The Council of Italy continued to support Casati despite this correspondence. Even as it relayed the arguments of the barons and the concerns of the Collateral Council and the Marquis de Los Vélez, the Council of Italy argued that the Crown possessed a "supreme" and "absolute" dominion and sovereignty to practice and give laws in order to secure the "upright administration of justice" for all its subjects and could therefore employ the visita against the barons who possessed a mere "useful dominion."⁵⁵⁰ By July, the Council of Italy, in response to Casati's letters, began to advise the Crown to reinforce the visita which had been substantially weakened by the Crown's removal of support in April. Recalling the four year visita that Alarcón had conducted and the limited amount of work that Chacón had been able to carry out, the Council recommended that the Crown order Casati to proceed for more than six months unless the Crown found that restriction absolutely necessary. The Duke of Alba's vote was still more supportive, calling on the Crown to give all necessary time to allow Casati to "produce the good effects" expected of the visitas. But those calls had come too late. The Medinaceli government not only reiterated its orders to complete the visita in Naples within six months, it ordered the termination of the visitas in Sicily and Milan as well.⁵⁵¹

CONCLUSION

Thus ended the visita in Italy. To extend Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño's metaphor, if the final visitas to Italy had been the captains of the project of reform and restoration in the late 1670s, then the ship of that new state was wrecked.⁵⁵² Accordingly, it seemed – in large part because the historical pattern of the visitas' commissions meant the next set would have begun only after the approaching crisis of succession – that the traditional local order had definitively triumphed. The termination of the visitas effectively protected its elites from the Crown's rigorous administration of justice and, symbolically, those elites could increasingly deploy a sophisticated resistance to the institution built upon a developing legal scholarship that followed the end of the last Italian visitas. For example, one of the ministers who had been

⁵⁴⁹ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Relation of Council of Italy to Charles II. April 17, 1680. Copied in AGS, SSP, libro 17, ff. 35-58v. "mande se haga reflexión muy particular no olvidando el estado en que se halla el Reyno después de los accidentes dela Guerra de Sicilia y falta de comercio y penuria padecida de tres años a esta parte ni la disposición de toda la Italia y el universal estado dela Europa"; "las reboluciones del año de 1647 se ocasionaron mas por el odio interno que tienen contra los Patronos que por ningún otro desafecto a VMag^d"; "Que se represente assí mismo a VMag^d la fineza y fidelidad de aquellos Barones en qualquiera coyuntura del Real Servicio" (AGS, SSP, libro 17, ff. 40-42). The original letter from Marquis of Los Vélez in AGS, SSP, leg. 227 is dated March 26 and while the parallel to 1647 came from the Collateral Council, the reference to Messina and the current economic state was the viceroy's.

⁵⁵⁰ AGS, SSP, libro 17, ff. 52v-53. Relation of Council of Italy to Charles II. April 17, 1680. "Dominio absoluto y soberano de VMag^d a poder dar la ley que fuere servido en orden ala mas recta administración de Justicia a todos sus vassallos de qualquier grado" and "pues mantiene VMag^d siempre el directo Dominio con la Supprema auctoridad de poder exercerle en los casos que fuese necesario contra el Barón que solo tiene el Dominio útil"

⁵⁵¹ AGS, SSP, leg. 1946, f. 147. Council of Italy's consulta to Charles II and response. July 5, 1680; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 228-9.

⁵⁵² Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, "Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales," 229.

especially pressed by the visita in Milan, Pedro Casado de Acevedo y Rosales, published his influential defenses in 1681 and thereafter continued to serve as one of the Crown's ministers until attaining the post of senator. His defenses were mirrored by Girolamo Calà's 1683 *Dissertationes variae de magistratibus et eorum visitatione*, which argued not only that the visita did not possess jurisdiction over the barons, its jurisdiction over the Collateral Council should be considerably limited according to the norms of the local institution of the *sindicato*. Other such works continued until the early 1700s. Those arguments were never tested, at least not in Italy. After Charles II's death in 1700 and the resolution of the War of Spanish Succession that gave Spain's Italian territories to Savoy and the Austrian Hapsburgs, the institution of the visita in Italy was dismantled after the city of Naples petitioned for its abolition from the Emperor Charles VI in 1718.⁵⁵³

But the discipline that the visita cultivated may have been more resilient than its disappearance and subsequent rejection in Italy suggested. Five months after Casati's departure from Naples, the Council of Italy's August 1681 review of the material Casati had collected regarding the barons shocked them – it described the offenses in them as “appalling,” “terrible,” and “horrible” – and advised the Crown to pursue the correction of baronial abuses through the practice of law and justice at least under its viceroy if not by means of a visita.⁵⁵⁴ Elsewhere in Spain's empire, the framework of empire and administration that the visita had helped to cultivate, even in the weak institutional environment of the seventeenth century, proved robust. In Spain and especially in the Americas, therefore, the particular value of the visita was not lost on the Bourbons, for whom the visita remained an important part of a suite of institutions and practices that drew both from the Hapsburg past and French models of governance through which the Crown would continue to monitor, discipline, and reform its domains throughout the eighteenth century. The visita had indeed already heralded the state's expansion in each of those capacities, from the disciplinary work that reached its height in the late 1620s and early 1630s through the institution's parallel use as a means of reforming the Crown's fiscal apparatus and combating the crisis of the 1640s until its – failed – attempt to remake Italian society and politics in the late 1670s.

In particular, even as the Spanish Hapsburgs faded, the notional legitimacy of empire – and the future bureaucratic state – as a means of organizing human society continued to draw on the need to control, correct, and reform the excesses that arose from the concentration of power and the influence of personal interests. That function was even evident in Naples at the twilight of Charles II's reign in the late 1690s, when the Palatine Academy organized by the Duke of Medinaceli – or, more precisely, the heir of the by then deceased prime minister who had brought an end to the Italian *visitas* – met to discuss the nature of empire, explicitly reflecting on Rome and, implicitly, on their own relationship with empire. For one of the academy's scholars, Gregorio Caloprese, empire and the regime of discipline it could provide was the most suitable response to the dualism of men's virtues and vices, which “constrained [them] to create a person above them, with authority to make laws and to impose penalties and

⁵⁵³ Rovito, *Respublica dei togati: giuristi e società nella Napoli del Seicento*, vol. 1, 88-97; Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, “Juan José de Austria y los ministros provinciales,” 234-5. Naturally, Calà was a brother of a regent of the Collateral Council.

⁵⁵⁴ AGS, SSP, leg. 227. Council of Italy's consulta to Charles II from August 17, 1681. “execrables,” “atroces,” “horribles.”

prizes with the goal of obligating everyone to act within the boundaries of honesty and justice. It is this which constitutes the nature of empires.”⁵⁵⁵ That was also what had constituted the substance of the visita.

⁵⁵⁵ BNM, mss. 9110. *Raccolta di varie lezioni accademiche sopra diverse materie recitate nell'accademia dell'Ecc.mo Signore Duca di Medinaceli et Vicere et Capitan Generale nel Regno di Napoli*. Gregorio Caoprese, “Dell’origine degli Imperii,” fol. 48r quoted and translated in Thomas Dandele, “Imperial Anxiety, the Roman Mirror, and the Neapolitan Academy of the Duke of Medinaceli, 1696-1701,” in *Representing Imperial Rivalry in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, eds. Barbara Fuchs and Emily Wissbourd (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 154. See note 37 on page 159: “sono stati costretti a costituire persona sopra di loro, con autorita di far leggi, e d’impor pene e premi al fine di obbligare tutti a trattenersi tra limiti della giustizi e dell’onestà: ch’è quello che costituisce la natura degl’Imperi.” See also Michele Rak, ed. *Lezioni dell’Accademia di Palazzo del duca di Medinaceli: Napoli 1698-1701* (Naples: Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, 2005).

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRE OF INSPECTION
THE VISITA AND THE MAKING OF AN IMPERIAL SPACE

INTRODUCTION

God our Lord knows how necessary it is [that officers be upright] in distant lands, where there is no precedent of letters, from where it can be learned just how little it matters that laws govern us if the knowledge and use of [those laws] is adulterated. You know well, Your Highness, that the subjects who are sent to the Indies are of the lowest status and without any experience and because their predecessors were of the same quality, they find no one from whom to learn, but they do find those from whom to imitate in crookedness[.] [A]nd thus, even though they may once have been very upright and very learned, it is only with the utmost difficulty that they can be placed on the path that we ought to follow.⁵⁵⁶

For Pedro Medina Rico, the visitador whose inspection of the tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Mexico City prompted contemplation on the difficulty of ensuring that officials take “the path that we ought to follow” in 1661, corruption, in both its particular sense of malfeasance and its broader connotation of debasement, was a peculiar and perhaps even systemic challenge of empire. For although the institutions that made up that empire were entrusted with the duty of enforcing and inculcating social and religious discipline, they themselves were subjected to the degrading influence of the spaces in which they existed. Distance was particularly pernicious. Beyond the seat of empire, where learning and virtue were cultivated, even the law could be contorted.

The ostensibly deleterious effects of the spatial configuration of empire have also been keenly observed by historians.⁵⁵⁷ While the pejorative associations with distance have lapsed since the early twentieth century, the relationship between it, or more broadly space, and empire has subsequently become an essential subject of historical inquiry. In that, the challenge of centralization, control, and order in the imperial context has been amongst the most venerable observations.⁵⁵⁸ Distance and local difference, it has been supposed, shaped the very

⁵⁵⁶ Pedro Medina Rico, Letter to the Inquisitor General from November 1, 1661 quoted in José Toribio Medina, *Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición en México* (Santiago de Chile: Elzeviriana, 1905), 265. “que bien sabe Dios, nuestro señor, declaraba [inserted by Toribio Medina], cuanto es menester que lo sean en partes tan distantes y á [sic] donde no hay ejemplar de letras á donde se pueda aprender, que poco importa que las leyes nos gobiernen si la inteligencia y uso de ellas está adulterada. Bien sabe V.A. que los sujetos que se invian [sic] á Indias son los menores y sin ejercicio alguno, y como sus antecesores fueron de la misma calidad, no hallan de quien aprender, pero hallan á quien imitar en inteligencias torcidas, y así, aún siendo muy Buenos y muy doctos, con suma dificultad se ponen en el camino que debemos seguir.”

⁵⁵⁷ Rebecca Earle, *The Body of the Conquistador: Food, Race and the Colonial Experience in Spanish America, 1492-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*. Cf. Henry Charles Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922), vii.

⁵⁵⁸ Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, 47-75. See also Kenneth Banks, *Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 5, 12-13; Sellers-García, *Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery*, 1-19.

composition of the early modern state.⁵⁵⁹ Spain's empire has accordingly been understood as a "composite state" and "composite monarchy," notions that contrasted the bonding power of centralizing institutions with local resistance to them, the effect of which was the persistence of local institutions.⁵⁶⁰

That problem has been transformed in the historiography of the Atlantic world, a historiography that reflects not only the internal heterogeneity of European states or movement within empires but also the interplay, exchange, and "entanglement" between empires in the spaces of an expansively conceived Atlantic, most notably at frontiers and borderlands.⁵⁶¹ These spaces, characterized by dynamic political, social, cultural, and economic forces, not only limited centralizing institutions but have compelled a reconceptualization of the nature of empire itself to the extent that empire *did not* represent a centralizing force but rather worked in and through the differentiation and fragmentation of spaces.⁵⁶²

In the particular case of Spain's empire, the notion of a "composite monarchy" has been complemented, if not supplanted, by formulations of an "imperial system" or "polycentric monarchy," both of which reframe the questions of centralization and the differentiation built on spaces into a kind of imperial network, usually with a dynamic net of territories, cities, social

⁵⁵⁹ Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1974), 51; 69-75.

⁵⁶⁰ Koengisberger's article was presented twice in 1975 before its publication in Peter R. Gleichmann, Johan Goudsblom, and Hermann Korte, eds., *Human Figurations: Essays for Norbert Elias* (Amsterdam: Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, 1977) and H. G. Koenigsberger, "Monarchies and Parliaments in Early Modern Europe: *Dominium Regale* or *Dominium Politicum et Regale*," *Theory and Society* 5, no. 2 (Mar., 1978), 191-217; J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present* 137 (Nov., 1992), 48-71; see also Conrad Russell, "Composite Monarchies in Early Modern Europe: The British and Irish Example," in Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History* (London: Routledge, 1995), 133-146; Harald Gustafsson, "The Conglomerate State: A Reflection on State Formation in Early Modern Europe," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 23 (1998), 189-213. The concept itself dates back to early modernity such as in the work of Juan de Solórzano Pereira, a jurist and oidor in Lima, who Elliott cited.

⁵⁶¹ Peggy K. Liss and Franklin Knight, eds., *Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991); Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slavery in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (June, 1999), 814-841; Ida Altman, *Transatlantic Ties in the Spanish Empire: Brihuega, Spain, and Puebla, Mexico, 1560-1620* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Ann Laura Stoler, "On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty," *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006), 125-46; Eliga Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June, 2007), 764-86; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderlands Historiographies in New Clothes?," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June, 2007), 787-799; Wim Klooster, "Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800," in Bernard Bailyn and Patricia Denault, eds., *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 141-80; Linda Rupert, *Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Douglas Catterall and Jodi Campbell, *Women in Port: Gendering Communities, Economies, and Social Networks in Atlantic Port Cities, 1500-1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Brian DeLay, ed., *North American Borderlands* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Ernesto Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada's Transimperial Greater Caribbean World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

⁵⁶² Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2, 31-2.

groups, and individuals as its contributing (or resistant) actors.⁵⁶³ For the framework of “polycentric monarchy” in particular, politics represented the essence of empire and those politics were not organized hierarchically but were instead concentrated in various spaces, especially cities, throughout the empire in a flexible structure that produced longevity and stability because it allowed the participants in the imperial project to preserve and enhance their status. This approach has given special attention to the economy of favor, ceremonies and rituals, and the negotiation of power and authority as the manifestation of a polycentric politics with the space of the city taking on the qualities of the court.⁵⁶⁴ One of the most potent systems in this political structure was the law. Because of its porous qualities and its ideological connotations about the Crown’s provision of justice and clemency, the law represented an essential means of negotiating status, establishing notional pacts between local social groups and the monarchy, participating in empire, and, ultimately, configuring empire as an irregular space.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ Musi, “The Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Imperial System,” 85; Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, and Gaetano Sabatini, eds., *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

⁵⁶⁴ See chapters II and III for the descriptions of these court spaces in Herzog, Cañeque, et al.; Alejandra B. Osorio, “Courtly Ceremonies and a Cultural Urban Geography of Power in the Spanish Empire,” in Leonard von Morzé, ed., *Cities and the Circulation of Culture in the Atlantic World: From the Early Modern to Modernism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 37-72; Alejandra B. Osorio, “The King in Lima: Simulacra, Ritual, and Rule in Seventeenth-Century Peru,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 84, no. 3 (Aug., 2004), 447-474; Richard Kagan, *Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493-1793* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

⁵⁶⁵ Brian P. Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Woodrow Borah, *Justice by Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico and the Legal Aides of the Half-Real* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Owens, “By My Absolute Royal Authority”; Renzo Honores, “Colonial Legal Polyphony: Caciques and the Construction of Legal Arguments in the Andes, 1550-1640,” (Working Paper No. 10-11, International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1825 at Harvard University, 2010); Jovita Baber, “Empire, Indians and the Negotiation of Status of City in Tlaxcala 1521-1550,” in Ethelia Ruiz Medrano and Susan Kellogg, eds., *Negotiation with Domination: New Spain’s Indian Pueblos Confront the Spanish State* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2010), 19-44; Lauren Benton, “Possessing Empire: Iberian Claims and Interpolity Law,” in Saliha Bellmessous, ed., *Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19-40; Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow, “Empires and Protection: Making Interpolity Law in the Early Modern World,” *Journal of Global History* 12, no. 1 (Feb., 2017), 74-92; Owensby, for his part, looked beyond the cities *per se* and to the means by which indigenous societies and identities were transformed by, reacted to, and incorporated aspects of the colonial order, in particular the law. While largely beyond the scope of this chapter, the existing literature touching upon the spatial dimensions of colonial Latin America has traditionally emphasized the role of identity formation and cultural transformation in cities as well as the relationship between the economy and society outside cities as well as the changes from indigenous spatial relationships to those of the colonial order. See François Chevalier, *La formation des grands domaines au Mexique (terre et société aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles)* (Paris: Institute de Ethnologie, 1952); Jorge Hardoy, “Urban Scales and Functions in Spanish America toward the year 1600: First Conclusions,” *Latin American Research Review* 5, no. 3 (Autumn, 1970); P. J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial: mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982); Ángel Rama, *La ciudad letrada* (Hanover: Ediciones del Norte, 1984); Bernardo García Martínez, *Los pueblos de la sierra: El Poder y el espacio entre los indios del norte de Puebla hasta 1700* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1987); Steve Stern, “Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean,” *The American Historical Review* 93, no. 4 (Oct., 1988), 829-872; James Lockhart, *The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Barbara Mundy, *The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the*

While Medina Rico's lament illustrated the condition of empire that is now, albeit without his deprecatory sentiment, imbued in contemporary historiography, the visitador also intimated a divergent notion of empire that was less irregular in character. The counterpoint to the differentiation of distance were institutions more generally and the visita in particular. Despite the apparently distinctive contexts in which it was applied and the challenges of distance, the visita retained its essential qualities, working to construct the universalizing norms of the state's institutions ubiquitously.

Within its polycentric agglomeration of lands, cities, and peoples, Spain's empire functioned not through the reflection of distance but through the regularization of institutional space: the aggregation of tasks, practices and systems that comprise an area of institutional life within, in this case, the state. Accordingly, the state's formal institutions carried out a variety of functions such as the regulation of the economy and the discipline of society especially within the localities of the empire.⁵⁶⁶ Naturally, these institutions were themselves influenced by the environments in which they operated and were thus the object of inspections to inculcate the discipline and virtue that would otherwise ostensibly wane in distant lands.⁵⁶⁷ Ironically, that discipline was closely associated with the collection of local knowledge by the state. Extending from those governing bodies were the familiar suite of nominally jurisdictionally divided institutions associated with certain categories of the state's functions, for example, the provision of justice from the municipal level to the audiencias and chanceries to the Crown's councils or within the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

And both above those layers and within them was what Medina Rico described as "the precedent of letters," the "knowledge and use" of the law, and "learn[ing]" and "imitat[ion]": empire as a universalizing locus of norms and mimetic forces, in effect, empire as

Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Kris Lane, *Quito 1599: City and Colony in Transition* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002); Jay Kinsbruner, *The Colonial Spanish-American City: Urban Life in the Age of Atlantic Capitalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); John Tutino, *Making A New World: Founding Capitalism in the Bajío and Spanish America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

⁵⁶⁶ Unfortunately, "institutional space" can be an ill-defined term that has considerably different meanings depending on the discipline in which its use occurs. It can mean the physical spaces occupied or used by formal institutions, such as the buildings in which a school or hospital operate, or even spaces in which informal institutions are situated like a home. Ironically, the visita did deal with that kind of institutional space as will be illustrated later. It carries here the definition above, with the state standing in for a set of organizations. See John Mohr and Francesca Guerra-Pearson, "The Duality of Niche and Form: The Differentiation of Institutional Space in New York City, 1888-1917." *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* 31 (Dec., 2010), 321-368.

⁵⁶⁷ This quality of distinctiveness has been particularly privileged due to the nature of the study of history, with institutions increasingly serving as mirrors of or lenses to view a history conditioned by familiar spatial and social configurations rather than an object of study in itself. The first wave of new institutionalism was perhaps particularly suggestive of this approach, with Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony"; Lynne Zucker, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence," *American Journal of Sociology* 42 (Oct., 1977), 726-43; John W. Meyer and Richard Scott, *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); DiMaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields"; Lynne Zucker, "Institutional Theories of Organizations," *Annual Review of Sociology* 13 (1987), 443-64, among others that particularly emphasized the embeddedness of organizations within social structures, a notion that historians have usually applied at the local level. Herzog cited these studies as theoretical grounding for her view that ritual was at the essence of the visita, which she looked at from the perspective of a single city. Subsequent studies increasingly pointed to the inverse quality of institutionalization, how organizations affect social structures.

institutionalization.⁵⁶⁸ Accordingly, the Hapsburg empire was not so much imagined as pursuing the centralization, consolidation, or regularization of the heterogeneous and polycentric legal and social orders. Rather, it was notionally expected to cultivate norms and systems of behavior as well as best practices which were expected of its subjects and servants.

That dimension was naturally shaped from below as well as from afar but it also was transformative in itself, beginning the process of undoing the irregularity and lack of control that had characterized the Hapsburgs' empire. Its foremost expression was the *visita* itself together with the empire's practices of inspection, many of which similarly bore that name. These dramatically expanded the state's institutional space, providing a framework for reforming the empire's institutions, societies, and economy in a proto-regulatory state.

For in addition to constructing norms of official conduct, which was the principal object of the *visita* in its major institutions, the novel practices of inspection were also at the forefront of molding the institutional practices and space associated with imperial administration. They were, among other things, tasked with regulating commerce and migration, inspecting ships and combating contraband, imposing censorship, providing regulations and discipline for hospitals, universities, and fiscal institutions, harnessing the resources and industry of the Crown's territories, including its forests, controlling its social and economic institutions, including those linked to the *república de indios*, and collecting information, most evocatively in mapping projects.

Far from being limited by space, the *visita* worked to construct a regular, coherent space⁵⁶⁹ and did so concurrently with its extension of the domain of the state deeper into its territories and across its empire, in the Crowns of Castile and Aragon in Spain, in Italy, in the Canary Islands, in the Americas, and in the Philippines.⁵⁷⁰ The *visita* was nearly coterminous with the global empire it bound together and within it lay the regularizing, consolidating, and reforming impulse of the eighteenth century during which it retained that function.

Was it also an aspect of "legibility," the reductive simplification, categorization, and organization carried out in conjunction with an "imperial or hegemonic planning" of the state

⁵⁶⁸ As opposed to centralizing. This is a reconfiguration of the notional "world polity" in institutional theory and applies it to the somewhat more specific space of empire, which possessed similarly globally universalizing qualities in early modernity but at any rate was universalizing over its constituent parts. See John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Studies of the Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 109-37; George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1987); John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on international institutionalization* (London: Routledge, 1998). See also, in a sense, Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 163-168 though Cooper positions the dichotomy between a "trading network" empire and a "moral unit" of empire as well as the idea of a "middle power" in Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, *Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), which sees this as a uniquely British phenomenon though it is evident in the normative work of Spain's empire, among other "origins."

⁵⁶⁹ Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005); Paul Stock, "History and the Uses of Space," in Paul Stock, ed., *The Uses of Space in Early Modern History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1-18; Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada's Transimperial Greater Caribbean World*, see introduction in particular.

⁵⁷⁰ It was not, as noted in chapter II, applied in the Portuguese empire with the exception of *visitas* of the tribunals of the Inquisition that are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present work.

described by James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State*?⁵⁷¹ The first three chapters and this chapter's treatment of the spaces of administration and justice suggest that the visita was indeed essential to the construction of a practicable category of corruption or malfeasance that was legible to or understood by the state. But that was not only determined by the state. Corruption only became corrupt through the participation and influence of the localities on the visita's investigations.

This chapter turns to that same question in the empire outside Italy, structured by the three "principal dut[ies] of princes."⁵⁷² First, the "good government of his vassals," which in the sixteenth century was situated in the emerging administrative state directed by the Crown and its councils, which were the objects of efforts to reform the style of administration as well as attempts to punish individuals who had become synonymous with bad government. While the visita did indeed pursue those functions, it also represented the apex of the creation of official norms, the regulation of corruption, and compelled the response of the court to interests and conditions in the empire that lay beyond it. Second, "the upright administration of justice," situated in the empire's audiencias and *chancillerías*, municipal and local officials of justice, and the tribunals of the Holy Office of the Inquisition. The object of reforms to create a universal style of justice, the visita carried out the discipline of malfeasance and corruption that typified its work in Spanish Italy and worked to even the disjunctures between localities and institutions, putting pressure on the malfeasance that arose from the networks of localities and empires while reformulating norms through that work. Finally, the "conservation of his patrimony," where the visitas investigated, understood, and regulated the numerous institutions and spaces below the highest echelons of governance and *plus ultra*. These inspections, though possessing a legible fiscal, patrimonial, or paternalistic logic, came to represent a confluence of imperial and local interests and demands that compelled the expansion of the state's institutional space in response to the challenges of managing territories, resources, and peoples, providing the state with its sight.

THE COUNCILS AND "THE GOOD GOVERNMENT OF HIS VASSALS"

In the 1950 introduction to Koenigsberger's *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain*, Josep Maria Batista i Roca argued that the Spanish Crown's councils, the "organization of the central administration," represented "the clearest manifestation of the heterogeneous character of the monarchy and its states."⁵⁷³ Almost sixty years later, the position of the councils in the historiography has been almost inverted. From the perspective of empire rather than the court, the councils are instead viewed as the manifestation of a "metropole" situated apart from the locality.⁵⁷⁴ That was a configuration that the visitas of the councils themselves attempted to

⁵⁷¹ Scott, *Seeing Like a State*. See page 6: "I stress the word 'imperialism' here because I am emphatically not making a blanket case against either bureaucratic planning or high-modernist ideology. I am, however, making a case against an imperial or hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local knowledge and know-how."

⁵⁷² See chapter II. AGS, VIT, libro 323. April 2, 1581. Commission of Luis de Castilla.

⁵⁷³ Batista i Roca, "Foreword," 15.

⁵⁷⁴ In the case of Italy, see Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples* and Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*. This is almost ubiquitous in histories of colonial Latin America.

create, regulating the bonds between the councils and the localities to provide for a common good governance.

Like the empire they administered, the councils represented a novel introduction of the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The first council, the *Real y Supremo Consejo de Castilla* or the Council of Castile, was a creation of the fourteenth century. The corresponding council for Aragon, the *Consejo de Aragón* was instituted in 1494. That was preceded by the *Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisición* in 1488 and followed by the *Consejo de las Órdenes*, which administered the military orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara. The 1520s represented a substantial period of growth as well as refinement of the existing councils. The *Consejo Supremo de Hacienda* or the Council of Finance modeled after the administration of the Low Countries was instituted in 1523 though it did not have orders governing it until late in the reign of Philip II. The *Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias* or the Council of the Indies was instituted separately from the Council of Castile in 1524 and in 1526, the *Consejo de Estado* or the Council of State was separated from the councils of Castile and Aragon. In 1534, the existing councils administering the *cruzada* taxes and offerings began operating as the combined *Consejo de Cruzada*. The councils of Italy, Portugal, and Flanders and Burgundy were formed in 1556, 1582, and 1588 respectively.⁵⁷⁵ In turn, between the middle of the sixteenth century and the decline in the councils' importance in the seventeenth century, the visita was called upon to reform and discipline the councils in order to provide for the good government of empire.

The visitas of the councils occupy a distinctive historical position. In part because of the numerous irregularities associated with them and in part because early modern institutions have long been viewed through the lens of court politics, several – albeit not all of them – have been understood as essentially political processes emerging from the court. That view is hardly a new one: it was also Antonio Pérez's denunciation of the visita against him in the 1580s.⁵⁷⁶

These inspections were idiosyncratic in another curious way: there were very few of them and they were largely concentrated in roughly six decades spanning the final years of Charles V's reign and the first decade of Philip III's reign. But peculiar as they were, they also pointed to the emergence of a new institutionalizing aspect of governance in which the attempts to install a regular style of conciliar governance was linked to the regulation of territories and the discipline of the ties between those territories and the councils themselves, in effect a common "good government."⁵⁷⁷

This was particularly apparent in the visita of the Council of Italy in the late sixteenth century. That visita was one of several that had been commissioned to inspect various secretaries and officials of the councils of Castile, Finance, Cruzada, the Indies, the Order, and State in the period between 1553 to 1609. In the 1550s, the visita of the officials of justice in the court and the Council of Castile signified the ascendance of the Crown's patronage of justice.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ Manuel Mariano Martín Galán, "La administración central de la monarquía hispánica en la época de los Austria," in *El patrimonio documental: Fuentes documentales y archivos*, eds., María de la Almodena Serrano Mota and Mariano García Ruipérez (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1999), 30-41. The *Cámara de Castilla* was separated from the Council of Castile in 1588.

⁵⁷⁶ See chapter II; Gustav Ungerer, *La defensa de Antonio Pérez contra los cargos que se le imputaron en el proceso de visita (1584)* (Zaragoza: Diputación Provincial, Institución Fernando el Católico, 1980).

⁵⁷⁷ Ezquerria Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 214.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 251-320.

By the 1560s, the rise of the *letrados* associated with the practice of that justice was personified in the jurist Diego de Espinosa, whose dominance in the court of Philip II between 1564 and 1567 eclipsed the factional politics that had hitherto characterized it. Espinosa himself held positions on the Council of State, Council of Castile, and the Council of the Inquisition and, by the mid-1560s was a dominant figure in the governance of Italy. The juntas tasked with reviewing the juridical processes resulting from the Italian *visitas* of 1559, for example, were packed with Espinosa's associates, notably including Juan Rodríguez Figueroa, a regent of the Council of Italy, president of the Council of Castile, president of the Council of Orders, and the *visitador* of the Council of Finance.

Yet another of Espinosa's allies was Gaspar de Quiroga, the former *visitador* to Naples, who was appointed as interim president of the Council of Italy in 1567 and it was Espinosa's and Quiroga's intervention in and attempts to consolidate administration of Italy that directly led to the *visita* of the Council of the Italy in 1568 that continued, with disruptions, into the early 1580s.⁵⁷⁹

Prior to Quiroga's presidency, the Council of Italy had been characterized by its deference to local institutions and elites as well as to the viceroys. Quiroga, by contrast, began centralizing the governance of Sicily, Naples, and Milan in the Council of Italy and, especially, in its president.⁵⁸⁰ Not surprisingly, this new administration hardly redounded to Quiroga's popularity. One Milanese regent of the council complained about Quiroga's style, suggesting that he effectively ruled the council personally, limiting deliberations and differences. He had also named Scipión Cutinario as a regent despite the fact that neither the other regents of the council nor the viceroy of Naples had supported his appointment. The most radical change, however, was in limiting the powers of the secretary of the Council of Italy, through whom its business had previously been channeled.⁵⁸¹

Within a year, Quiroga's efforts were supplemented by investigations into the conduct of the secretary of the council and its regents, beginning the work of the subsequent *visita*. The Grand Chancellor of Milan, Andrés Ponce de León, was ordered to begin collecting evidence around Lombardy, particularly against the secretary of the council, Vargas. Similar instructions were drawn up for Juan de Quintanilla, an inquisitor, to investigate the council itself.⁵⁸²

In 1568, the same year that Juan de Ovando's famous *visita* of the Council of the Indies began, the Crown commissioned a *visita* of the Council of Italy under Francisco Hernández de

⁵⁷⁹ The following is based on Rivero Rodríguez's *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, which incorporates a study of it, and AGS, CCA, leg. 2797, which has the juridical records from the *visita* and some correspondence related to it.

⁵⁸⁰ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 97-100; Henar Pizarro Llorente, "La Visita al reino de Nápoles de 1559: El enfrentamiento entre Gaspar de Quiroga y Juan de Soto," in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Virgilio Pinto Crespo, and José Martínez Millán, *Política, religión e Inquisición en la España Moderna: homenaje a Joaquín Pérez Villanueva* (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1996), 567-586, see 582.

⁵⁸¹ AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "Primer Rollo," ff. 207-210, 216-217v, 362-365v (the latter is a deposition from Quiroga from May 29, 1572), etc.; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 100.

⁵⁸² AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "2º rollo 'primero quaderno de Milán'" and "3º rollo 'segundo quaderno de Milán'"; Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 110. Quintanilla, for his part, would later be named *visitador* to the tribunal of the Inquisition in Sicily and was granted extensive power to assist the *visita* of the Council in both Sicily and Naples.

Liébana.⁵⁸³ Liébana's commission granted him considerable latitude to conduct investigations of every member and official of the Council of Italy, principally working from the depositions and documents that had been collected by Ponce de León and Quintanilla during the previous year. These pointed to the malfeasance of the council's secretary, whose network of connections within Italy were particularly suspicious.⁵⁸⁴ It also extended more broadly into an investigation about the manner in which the council operated. As a result, by 1569, the investigation turned to Quiroga, largely because of the complaints that the members of the council had made against him.⁵⁸⁵ But Liébana's work slowed considerably and ceased entirely after 1572, due in part to the renewed military attentions in Italy in the early 1570s with the formation of the Holy League and the interruptions to governance resulting from the deaths of the viceroys of Naples and Sicily and the governor of Milan in 1570 and 1571 as well as the conclusion of Quiroga's interim presidency of the Council of Italy. When the work of the visita was resumed four years later, it, with the intervention of Philip II and Mateo Vázquez, focused its attentions particularly on the discipline of Vargas despite Liébana's belief that the investigation lacked evidence.⁵⁸⁶

When Vargas died, Liébana's authority to reform the council through the visita grew considerably, culminating in a program of reforms in 1577 that further centralized the administration of Italy in the council and court. Among those recommendations was the restructuring of the archival records of the Council of Italy. That accompanied a regularization of the structure of the council's work, in which all members concerned themselves with Italy in general and granting the president of the council more substantial powers to provide order in discussion, voting, and planning the deliberations of the council, and the creation of a new post, *conservador general*, that assisted the treasury in Italian affairs and supervising the provincial fiscal institutions. The most consequential results, however, concerned regulations for the Council of Italy and its officials. Accordingly, these officials were prohibited from maintaining individual correspondence with the viceroys and other ministers in Italy, receiving gifts or money, giving assurances of providing offices, or from having their servants serve as agents for those in the Italian territories. In conjunction with centralizing administration, the visita's reforms led to the further codification of malfeasant practices and established the highest

⁵⁸³ The visita accompanied Antonio Pérez's rise as the secretary of state for Italy. By 1568, Liébana was an esteemed servant of the Crown and a known associate of Espinosa. After his education in Salamanca in the 1540s, Liébana had risen through the chanceries of Granada and Valladolid as a prosecutor and subsequently held the post of prosecutor of the Council of the Indies. He subsequently joined the council outright and, under Espinosa's patronage, was appointed to the Council of Castile. In the 1560s, as an extension of that service, he served on the juntas of the visitas for Sicily and Naples. See Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 108-110.

⁵⁸⁴ One amusing deposition, for example, was taken from the Milanese sculpture Pompeo Leoni, the son of the master sculpture Leone Leoni, in 1576 and attested to the extravagant value associated with the façade of Vargas's residence. AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "Primer Rollo," f. 525. Another was from the ambassador to Genoa, describing a box of diamonds that may have been shipped for Vargas. AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "Primer Rollo," ff., 418-418v.

⁵⁸⁵ AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "Primer Rollo," ff. 154v-185, 216-217v., 362-372. This was based largely on testimony from Juan de Soto, who had previously been targeted by Quiroga's visita in Naples with some seventy-seven charges against him (AGS, VIT, leg. 2, ff. 368-379). Not surprisingly, and given the feelings of other members of the council about Quiroga's dominance, Soto complained heavily about the president of the council, portraying him as despotic, ignorant, and incompetent. See also Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 112-113 and Pizarro Llorente, "La Visita al reino de Nápoles de 1559."

⁵⁸⁶ Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 119, 134.

officials and regents as agents acting in the public service rather than for private or personal interests.⁵⁸⁷

After 1577, the *visita* of the Council of Italy again went dormant only to be reactivated a final time in the 1580s to work in conjunction with the *visitas* in Italy. This represented a final effort to provide for the discipline of the regents of the council, using the *visitas* in Italy itself to carry out additional investigations. It was not particularly effective. While the new *visitador* of the council, Tomás de Salazar, expected several dozens of individuals to provide depositions, the *visitadores* in Sicily and Naples could only collect a handful due to the strain it presented for their own work and because of the fact that the material in question was by then so old that a large number of individuals connected to it were already deceased.⁵⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the attempt to restrict ties between officials in Italy and in Spain that was expressed in the *visita* of the Council of Italy suggested that that administration required insulation from the potential for corruption that emerged from the territories under the councils' jurisdiction.

That was notably manifested thirty years after Liébana's reforms during the *visita* of the secretary of the Council of State, Pedro Franqueza, and his officials between 1607 and 1609.⁵⁸⁹ Unlike the *visita* of the Council of Italy, the *visita* against Franqueza demonstrated the dramatic disciplinary potential of inspections to disrupt patronage and malfeasance at the highest levels of government, leading to the downfall of one of the Crown's principal ministers and implicating Philip III's *valido*, Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, the Duke of Lerma.

That connection between Franqueza and the Duke of Lerma was very much indispensable to the *visita*. In 1563, at the age of sixteen, Franqueza arrived at the court of Philip II and in subsequent years held a variety of positions, including notary offices for the Crown of Aragon. He purchased an office as *regidor* in Madrid, and, in 1590, was appointed secretary for Valencia. It was that position from which Franqueza's subsequent career flourished, as his own term coincided with the future Duke of Lerma's term as viceroy in Valencia. Lerma's *validimiento* after Philip II's death in 1598 caused Franqueza's meteoric rise in the court. Within four years, Franqueza had obtained the positions of secretary of the *Corts* of Catalonia; secretary of state for Italy; conservador general of the Crown's patrimony in Italy and Aragon; secretary of the Council of Castile, Council of the Inquisition, and the junta of finance of Spain and Portugal; personal secretary for the queen; and substitute secretary for the Council of State. By 1603, Franqueza had been ennobled as the Count of Villalonga.

Those positions provided Franqueza a number of opportunities for personal enrichment, most notably in the possibility of intervening in Italian affairs where the count used his position to sell offices and secure bribes from petitioners. But they also provoked not a small amount of jealousy in the court. As the faction that favored conciliar governance, which

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., 157-161.

⁵⁸⁸ AGS, CCA, leg. 2797. "Volumen 4^o" See ff. 509-585. Letters from Lope de Guzmán to Philip II on June 23, 1582 and September 4, 1582. The former, f. 584 describes "la dilación que a ávido desde el principio delas causas hasta oy" because the potential witnesses had died and "y las que he essaminado dizen no se acuerdan de nada." Rivero Rodríguez, *Felipe II y el gobierno de Italia*, 187-8.

⁵⁸⁹ This *visita* has been studied in greatest detail by Josep M. Torras i Ribé. See Josep M. Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614): un proceso político en la monarquía hispánica de los Austrias," *Pedralbes* 17 (1997), 153-189. The records for the *visita* are largely in AGS, CCA, leg. 2796. See also Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 129-130, 173-181, 186; Rosenmüller, "Corruption, Abuse, and Justice in the Iberian Empires," 4.

included the queen, Diego de Mardones, the Countess of Lemos, and the Duke of Uceda, attempted to undermine the Duke of Lerma's *valimiento*, Franqueza appeared to be the most vulnerable of Lerma's allies.⁵⁹⁰ Their opportunity arrived in December 1606, when Lerma's "Junta del Desempeño," which was to find new sources of revenue and of which Franqueza was a principal member, had failed. At that time, one of Franqueza's allies, Alonso Ramírez de Prado, who had worked closely with the junta, was arrested on suspicion of corruption. Despite his efforts to impede that investigation, Franqueza himself was arrested in January 1607 on the orders of the Duke of Lerma.⁵⁹¹

Franqueza's downfall and the resulting visita carried out by Fernando Carrillo became a *cause célèbre* against the Lerma faction and corruption. As news of his arrest circulated, popular acclamation celebrated the occasion. One song celebrated impoverishment over the possession of Franqueza's vast wealth and satirical poems reflected similar sentiments about the count's avarice.⁵⁹² Lerma, of course, escaped his client's fate, since he played a vital role in the visita and was able to sequester and control Franqueza's records, which presumably contained compromising information regarding the duke.⁵⁹³ The drama of case, which was noted for various irregularities, rose still further when the count went mad during his imprisonment, a situation which the visita was compelled to investigate at considerable length to determine whether Franqueza's madness was fictitious, records that are in themselves fascinating depictions of the observation of mental illness.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹⁰ Jean-Marc Pelorson, "Para una reinterpretación de la junta de desempeño (1603-1606) a la luz de la 'visita' de Alonso Ramírez de Prado y de Don Pedro Franqueza, Conde de Villalonga," in *Actas del IV Symposium de Historia de la Administración* (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, 1983), 613-27; Williams, "Philip III and the Restoration of Spanish Government, 1598-1601," 751-769; Francesco Benigno, *La sombra del rey: validos y lucha política en la España del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Grupo Anaya Comercial, 1994), 74; Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614)," 158-9.

⁵⁹¹ Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614)," 157; Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621*, 158.

⁵⁹² Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614)," 163-4 quoting BNM, Ms. 17502, f. 4 "los muchachos cantan por las calles: más quiero mi pobreza, que la hacienda de Franqueza" and BNM, Ms. 17502, f. 6 Fragmento de la "Canción a Ramírez de Prado y al Conde de Villalonga" "Por la avaricia torpe de Franqueza, / entraron en la cárcel en un día, / el tu, el vos, la merced, la señoría. / El pobre está contento, / y el rico con menor atrevimiento, / el duque está adorado, el Rey temido, / la gente alegre, el reino agradecido."

⁵⁹³ Ibid., 160; Pelorson, "Para una reinterpretación de la junta de desempeño (1603-1606) a la luz de la 'visita' de Alonso Ramírez de Prado y de Don Pedro Franqueza, Conde de Villalonga," 620.

⁵⁹⁴ On August 4, Franqueza suddenly "began to do and say things of a crazy person," a state that was complicated by his "fury" and "dementia" (AGS, CCA, leg. 2796, f. 364). The visitador had several individuals provide testimony, including two doctors among whom was the king's family doctor, the jailer, and a priest. The general indications described by the witnesses were Franqueza's claims that he had communication with phantasms, spirits, and demons and uttered some blasphemies. More specific episodes included Franqueza singing and dancing while partially nude and claiming to be "the best singer in the world." He also claimed to be a great fighter and listed off prizes he supposedly won. When the fury had subsided, a doctor began to visit and feed him. Later he apparently declared that God "was not just nor God of truth" and described how Peter had the fury of a "Sicilian horse" in the Garden of Gethsemane but later "dirtied his pants" when he denied knowing Jesus. One of the two doctors described another incident when the count leapt out of bed and called the people attending him "traitors who have come to kill" him only to be calmed when he was assured a doctor was present. He then began conversing in Latin with the doctor and was pleased that the doctor knew Latin ("optimas vir scis loqui latinè, multi medici sunt, qui non sciunt loqui latinè") and denied having a family after which the jailer ordered the count to stop speaking in Latin. After an examination, the physician determined that the count was suffering from a genuine "mania" or "fury" of a kind of "melancholy without fever that deprived him of judgment." The royal

When Franqueza's illness subsided, the visita's work produced some four hundred seventy-four charges against him. As organized by the visitador, about 200 of these charges were various bribes accepted by Franqueza from "all types of people" from "business men" to "sovereign princes" for a sum of nearly 600,000 ducats.⁵⁹⁵ Another 130 reflected the agreements between Franqueza and business men selling bonds and rents. Eighty more, which the visitador indicated were the most serious, reflected Franqueza's character and his intervention in the work of government, which was co-opted for personal interests. Included within these various groups were Franqueza's illegal sales of offices, fraudulent (or at least malfeasant) provision of salaries to petitioners, notably in Naples, and manipulation of records, many of which were carried out in his intervention in the governance of Italy. Franqueza was ultimately prohibited from holding office, jailed until his death in 1614, and fined a total of 1,406,059 ducats.⁵⁹⁶

To be sure, Franqueza's downfall was political but it also represented the capacity of the visita to discipline the Crown's highest officials, destroying Franqueza but also serving, as the chronicler Luis Cabrera de Córdoba expressed it, as an example to the Crown's ministers: "these imprisonments have caused great amazement in the court, because they were of three prominent ministers], and other ministers have thus been left in fear, and all will ensure that they perform their duties as they are obligated[.]"⁵⁹⁷ It also served to provide a "public example," relieving the Crown and the commonwealth, who were reduced to poverty, of the oppression of bad ministers.⁵⁹⁸ While the disciplinary intervention of the visitas into the

family's doctor described how the count claimed to have been accompanied by two demons and later a third demon with authority over the other two, for which reason the doctor put holy water and said a "some words of exorcism." The count's confessor described similar events but equivocated on the question of whether he was suffering from genuine madness. At first, he believed it was genuine because of the count's lack of sleep, lack of appetite, and various blasphemous declarations and that "only" were said by "crazy people." He later had doubts due to his failure to recognize individuals, including the visitador and while recounting an encounter in the deposition found that he began to be more sure of the fact that the count's illness was feigned although ultimately left with some doubt. The same confessor later provided a deposition to the Inquisition regarding any blasphemies he had heard and an incident when the count, upon hearing mass, burst into tears and made a declaration and protest and an oath that if he was not telling the truth that he should be taken into hell and suffer the curses of Sodom and Gomorrah. Eventually, the count's illness, whether real or feigned, passed and the work of the investigation continued.

⁵⁹⁵ This was roughly equivalent to 6.25% of the Crown's nominal annual revenue at the end of the sixteenth century.

⁵⁹⁶ AGS, CCA, leg. 2796 and 2796 bis; Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614): un proceso político en la monarquía hispánica de los Austrias," 180-2.

⁵⁹⁷ Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la Corte de España desde 1559 hasta 1614* (Madrid: J. Martín Alegría, 1857), 297. "estas prisiones han causado mucha admiración en la corte, por ser tres personas de quien se hacía mucho caso en ella, y así han quedado con temor otros ministros, y todos procurarán hacer sus oficios como tienen obligación, y hecharán de ver que S.M. tiene cuenta como cumplen con sus oficios"; Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614): un proceso político en la monarquía hispánica de los Austrias," 162.

⁵⁹⁸ See AGS, CCA, leg. 2796, f. 1 in which the visitador cited the "public scandal" ("público escandalo") in which Franqueza exercised his offices and the excesses obligated the Crown to give a "public example" ("exemplo público") and Torras i Ribé, "La 'visita' contra Pedro Franquesa (1607-1614)," 162-3 quoting Gabriel de Peralta, "Comiença un memorial de cosas suçedidas en España y a sus gentes" (BNM, ms. 4072, f. 138v.) "Este año de 1607 començó mui notable por la mudança y caída de privados que començó a verse en nuestra España, con notables prisiones mereçidas por sus malos tratos, usurpando el patrimonio y hazienda real, y oprimiendo a la república, de suerte que un ymperio tan grande como el de España y una monarchía de lso reyes della tan grand

councils thus policed the conduct of officials who had offended the Crown's "good government" of its vassals, the *visitas* of the councils also possessed the capacity to expand the interests of that government.

Such was the case of Juan de Ovando's *visita* of the Council of the Indies in 1567 commissioned in the aftermath of the political crisis of the conspiracy of the *encomenderos* (or of the Marquis of the Valle de Oaxaca) that hinted at the potential overthrow of the Crown's sovereignty in New Spain. Over the next four years, Ovando's *visita*, the work of which was complemented by the *Junta Magna*, sent questionnaires soliciting information from the localities about the conduct of the Council of the Indies as well as the handling of virtually every aspect of governance:

And especially say and declare what you know [about the provision of ecclesiastical offices and benefices] Also, [...] in matters about viceroys, presidents, audiencias, judges, governors, and other duties, and offices, and officials in the administration of justice. Also, in the matter of the offices and officials of fiscal administration. Also, in the matter of the offices and officials of general captains, admirals, overseers of captains of armadas and fleets. Also, in the matter of entrances, new populations, and new discoveries. Also, in the matter of navigation. Also, in the matter of favors and rewards.⁵⁹⁹

Those responses informed Ovando's subsequent project of reform, which essentially tied imperial governance to the task of mediating local and diffusive information. One crucial feature of that was consolidation of the law and Ovando accordingly produced the so-called *código ovandino*, the first parts of the consolidated legal framework for Spain's empire in the Americas that was, with continuing work over the next century, ultimately codified in the 1680 *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias*.⁶⁰⁰ His reforms also established the continuing intervention of the state in the ordering of knowledge as instituted in the establishment of an official chronicler, the *cronista mayor de Indias*, and the collection of the *Relaciones geográficas de las Indias* from 1579, in which the local officials responded – in divergent ways – to the state's attempt to collect information about its territories, peoples, and economies.⁶⁰¹

equal nunca se bió en los siglos pasados ni presents, llegó a estar tan neçesitada a causa destos avarientos privados, que desde el mismo rey Filipo terçero hasta el más mínimo jornalero, todos eran un retablo de neçesidades y trabajos [...]"

⁵⁹⁹ "(...) y especialmente digan e declaren lo que saben y les parece cerca de lo susodicho en materia de provisiones de obispados, dignidades, prevendas, y otros beneficios y oficios eclesiásticos, e cerca de las personas proveidas, e de la dotrina de los yndios. Yten, en materia de provisiones, virreyes, presidentes, Audiencias, oidores, gobernadores, y de los otros cargos, y oficios y oficiales de administración de justicia. Yten, en materia de los oficios y oficiales de administración de la Real Hacienda. Yten, en materia de los oficios y oficiales, de capitanes generales, almirantes, thenientes de capitanes de armadas, y de flotas de mar e tierra. Yten, en materia de entradas, y nuevas poblaciones, y nuevos descubrimientos. Yten, en materia de navegación. Yten, en materia de Mercedes y gratificaciones" as quoted in Rafael Diego Fernández, "La visita al consejo de Indias de Juan de Ovando y la Nueva España," *Revista chilena de historia del derecho* 22 (2010), 450.

⁶⁰⁰ Diego Fernández, "La visita al consejo de Indias de Juan de Ovando y la Nueva España," 445-7.

⁶⁰¹ Stafford Poole, *Juan de Ovando: Governing the Spanish Empire in the Reign of Felipe II* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 141; Antonio Barrera, "Empire and Knowledge: Reporting from the New World," *Colonial Latin American Review* 15, no. 1 (June, 2006), 49; Diego Fernández, "La visita al consejo de

Though distinctive and in many ways rather limited, the *visitas* of the councils of Italy, State, and the Indies illustrate the emergence of a normative quality embedded in empire. Good government – and thus the councils – on the one hand required an engagement with empire that mediated local knowledge, but it also required discipline and regulation to insulate administration from the corrupting bonds of empire. The purpose of the *visita*, then, was to ensure the equilibrium between those positions and intervene with reforms or punishments to restore it. That was even more essential to the *visitas* of the institutions of justice.

COURTS, TRIBUNALS, AND “THE UPRIGHT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE”

In the mid-sixteenth century, as the young Philip was being prepared for the throne, the prince’s court was held up as a reflection of the ideology that the practice and protection of justice and the arts of peace were essential to the function of monarchy. The prominence of those trained in law and theology, humanists, physicians, and, artists alongside nobles and those skilled in arms served, according to Calvete de Estrella’s 1552 description of Philip’s court, as an example “that other nations understand that today in Spain not only does military valor and the art of war flourish, but also letters and liberal arts and crafts.”⁶⁰² The corresponding logic that it was one of the “principle duty of princes” to uphold the “upright administration of justice” that was at the core of commissions for the *visitas* in Italy was mirrored in the instructions left by the Hapsburg monarchs for their heirs.⁶⁰³ It was also an expectation that justified empire, as the Crown’s practice of justice was “an example of righteousness unto the whole world.”⁶⁰⁴ The *visita* would be the zenith of the Crown’s efforts to ensure that the practice of the law and the institutions associated with it reflected that rectitude.

Indias de Juan de Ovando y la Nueva España,” 446-7; Arndt Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire: Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge*, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), chapter IV.

⁶⁰² Juan Cristóbal Calvete de Estrella, *El felicísimo viaje del muy alto y muy poderoso Príncipe Don Felipe*, vol. 1 (Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1930), 14-15. “y aunque era muy grande el estado y pujança de la real casa del Príncipe con tanto acompañamiento de Grandes, Señores y Caballeros, no era de menor consideración y estima ver los señalados varones que en su corte y servicio venían, tan excelentes cada uno en su facultad cuanto en el mundo se pudieran hallar: no hablo de los militares, pues nunca Príncipe los sacó de su reino más principales y señalados que ellos, sino de algunos caballeros y personas por su ingenio, letras y habilidad celebrados de que quiero hacer aquí alguna mención.” Calvete de Estrella then described various philosophers, theologians, jurists, physicians, a musician, a painter, et al. “y otros muchos que dejo de escribir, porque la excelencia éstos basta para que las otras naciones entiendan que no solo florecen hoy día en España la milicia y valor en las armas, mas también las letras y artes liberales y mecánicas.”

⁶⁰³ AGS, VIT, libro 323. “Consistiendo el principal cargo de los Príncipes en la recta administración de la justicia [...]” See chapter II for full citation of the *visitador*’s commission. For instructions, see, for example, Gil González Dávila, *Monarquía de España. Historia de la vida y hechos del ínclito monarca, amado y santo D. Felipe Tercero*, vol. 3 (Madrid: Don Bartholomé Ulloa, 1771), 29 and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Felipe Segundo, Rey de España. Á Don Felipe IV, su nieto esclarecido, nuestro señor*, vol. 4 (Madrid: Impresores de Cámara de S. M., 1877), 318 for the chroniclers’ text of Philip II’s death bed instructions to Philip III about the necessity of protecting justice.

⁶⁰⁴ Bancroft Library, MSS UCB 143 v. 180, ff. 273-354v. *Diálogo sobre el decreto que salió con los Ginoveses*. See ff. 351-351v. “[P]or cierto que el Rey de España católico y christiano estando en Castilla y en su corte donde se hace Justicia y se profesa dar exemplo a todo el mundo de rectitud [...]” In this case, the practice of justice ostensibly demanded that the Crown not default on its debts to its Genoese bankers in 1575.

In the late fifteenth century and over the course of the sixteenth century, the work of these processes in the regulation of the institutions of justice along with their work of executing justice at the local level was supplemented or supplanted by the *visita*, a universalizing institution across the empire that created, as it did in Italy, notions of justice and office holding.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The practice of justice and the law in Spain and its empire has figured as prominently in contemporary historiography as it did in the chronicles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Less commonly have the formal institutions of the “empire of law” or “justice,” as several historians have phrased it, actually been viewed as the cohesive framework for that empire. Instead, the institutional cornerstones of the Crown’s commitment to those ends, its *audiencias* and chanceries, have been treated as discrete extensions of the societies in which they were situated, providing a reflection of them in their negotiation with the Crown for the provision of justice and favor and a means of securing elite dominance within them.⁶⁰⁵

Yet in conjunction with the ideology that promoted justice in the court, the sixteenth century was characterized by a systemic change to the state’s administration of it, particularly above the municipal level,⁶⁰⁶ which, in the period between 1480 and 1526, had been refined from a late medieval itinerant institution into a system of territorial tribunals, *audiencias*, the decisions of which could be appealed to *chancillerías*, with its apex in the *Consejo Real de Castilla* or Council of Castile, which heard cases of special importance.⁶⁰⁷ In the Crown of Castile, the most important of those courts, the chanceries, served not only as appellate tribunals but also possessed various competencies in governance, ranging from hearing complaints regarding local magistrates to the provision of licenses.

This consolidation and expansion of the courts was the model for the Hapsburgs’ empire. In Spanish Italy, the courts were the subject of reform throughout the sixteenth century even if local distinctions in their organization and privileges persisted. The Castilian system was more closely approximated in the Crown of Aragon, where four *audiencias* beneath the Council of Aragon were either created or substantially reformed in accordance with the model in Castile during the reigns of Ferdinand II and Charles V. In Navarre, although part of the Crown of Castile, the task was fulfilled, together with administrative and legislative duties, by the reformed Council of Navarre in Pamplona. In the Americas and later in the Philippines, the

⁶⁰⁵ See, for example, Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación*; Ezquerro Revilla, “Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana,” 199-320; Christoph Rosenmüller, ed., *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017).

⁶⁰⁶ The Crown also provided for local justice through their *corregidores*, governors, and *alcaldes mayores* of the *adelantamientos*. The latter was a medieval institution that by early modernity, when there were one each in León, Burgos, and Palencia, was functionally the same as a *corregidor*. José Luis de las Heras Santos, “La organización de la justicia real ordinaria en la Corona de Castilla durante la Edad Moderna,” *Estudis* 22 (1996), 126-133 in this question and 105-140 for a general overview.

⁶⁰⁷ The original itinerant royal *audiencia*, founded in 1371 and named a chancery in 1390, was given its permanent seat in Valladolid in 1442. In 1480, an initially itinerant *audiencia* was founded in Galicia while the territorial jurisdiction of the chancery in Valladolid was contracted after the creation of a chancery in Ciudad Real in 1494, which was moved to Granada in 1505. Further refinement occurred in 1525 and 1526 when *audiencias* were established in Seville and the Canary Islands respectively, although the competence of these was limited to the provision of justice.

implementation of the Castilian system of audiencias and chanceries began in earnest in the 1520s, expanding, dividing, and, at times, contracting in conjunction with the conquest and developing control of territory. Together with their administration of justice, these American audiencias, overseen by the Council of the Indies, shared substantially in the task of governance with the viceroys and governors.

The importance and novelty of the Crown's new institutions of justice created a correspondingly important and novel institutional need to ensure "the good administration of justice" in a coherent juridical space. As the Crown needed to provide the reforms and laws that governed its tribunals it also sought a means by which to discipline them, a discipline that reflected the emerging style and practices of the audiencias and, increasingly, the erosion of the disjunctures between local norms and the empire of law.

That task was fulfilled through the dramatic expansion of the visita under the Hapsburgs. Accordingly, in the thirty-two years before the ascension of Charles I in 1516, there had been a total of eight visitas in two of the three extant tribunals in the Crown of Castile: four visitas to the Chancery of Valladolid, the first of which began in 1492, three to the Chancery of Ciudad Real, the first of which began in 1484, and a fourth to that chancery after it was moved to Granada. During Charles's forty-year reign, there were seventeen visitas to seven out of twelve tribunals, including the first in the Americas in 1543. During Philip II's forty-two-year reign, there were thirty-six visitas to fourteen out of sixteen⁶⁰⁸ tribunals.

That was also true of the Crown of Aragon and, as in Castile, the reign of Charles V marked the expansion and refinement of both the audiencias and the visita throughout Aragon. Beginning in 1542, there were four royal visitas in Aragon, eight in Valencia, and eleven in Catalonia, the last of which began in 1684, 1637, and 1678 respectively. Despite its relatively late introduction, the visita's oversight became a central fixture of Aragonese administration in its own right, as a replacement and agglomeration of existing practices of inspection, and in the new forms of regular inspection that were subsequently instituted in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.⁶⁰⁹

Many of the earliest of the visitas, while tasked with reviewing the conduct of officials serving in positions on the audiencias and tribunals that was subsequently emblematic of their work, were especially oriented towards providing for their governance and structure.⁶¹⁰ The first visita to the Council of Navarre in the 1520s was thus tasked with finding "things that were

⁶⁰⁸ Excluding Chile, which only existed between 1565 and 1575 before its revival in 1605.

⁶⁰⁹ Inaugurated by the inspections of Fernando de Loazes in 1542 and Hernán Pérez in 1553, the visita in Aragon, similar to the Italian practice, provided for the audit of the conduct of royal officials, municipal offices, and, in particular, officials of the royal audiencias. By the turn of the century, regular visitas were instituted in parts of the Crown of Aragon as an expansion of the institution. In 1590, for example, the Catalan *Corts* instituted a regular visita in order to inspect royal officials not subject to the *purga de taula*, a form of review that dated to the thirteenth century, every six years. Valencia followed suit in 1604. Canet Aparisi, "Procedimientos de control de los oficiales regios en la Corona de Aragón," 140-145; Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 175, 179-181. The offices included in these visitas were the Real Cancillería, the Real Audiencia, the Real Tesorería, the Gobernación general de Cataluña; the Bailía General; the Maestre Racional; the Correo Mayor del Principado; the judges of the veguerías; the procuradores reales and local bailes; los procuradores and judges of the Real Patrimonio; the Capitán general and the Gobernador de los condados del Rosselló y la Cerdanya; the Ceca; the Baile de las Aguas and the Guarda del Puerto de Barcelona; and the alguaciles, notarios, porteros, vegueres, comisarios and carceleros reales.

⁶¹⁰ Mireille Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 33.

advisable [...] for the good governance of justice,” implementing the structure and orders that accompanied the reform of the council in 1525 coincident with the visita. These changes ranged from structural, like conducting the council’s business through the person of the president and for the physical location of the council to be maintained in Pamplona, to procedural, ensuring that judges were not lawyers in litigation being heard and that the oldest pending litigation be heard first.⁶¹¹ These reforms culminated in the collected body of laws associated with the governance of the various audiencias and chanceries, with laws, which for example regulated payment or restricted the ability of officials to receive food or drink from litigants, being attributed to the visitas from which they originated.⁶¹²

That the visita was seen as the instrument that could bring institutional stability and pacify the tumult associated with the new challenges of administration and governance was, however, demonstrated no better than in the retrospective account of the first visita to the Canary Islands in José de Viera y Clavijo’s 1773 *Noticias de la historia general de las Islas de Canaria*:

But at that moment, it was seen that the novelty of this institution [i.e. the Audiencia], although favorable, did not cease to be a novelty; and they already sought to preserve the advantages that can undo reform. The governor and the *regidores* of the Canaries did not delay in disputing with the Audiencia [...] To cut the root of these disagreements, the King sent the *licenciado* Francisco Ruiz Melgarejo as *juez visitador* with a commission given in Madrid on December 22 [1529]. Melgarejo brought peace [...] and later, on February 24 [1531] the visitador instituted those celebrated ordinances, so advised in the *Leyes de la Recopilación*.⁶¹³

This reforming impulse was paralleled in the first visita of the Audiencia of Mexico and also the first in the Americas, which began in 1544 under Tello de Sandoval. Although the Audiencia and Chancery of Mexico had existed since 1527, its early history, not unlike other

⁶¹¹ AGS, CCA, leg. 2763. Charles V’s instructions for the visita of Navarre. December 14, 1523. “[P]or quanto los rreyes hemos de tener gran cuidado por la administración dela Justicia por la quenta que a dios nro señor hemos de dar pues nos encomendó la Just^a en la tierra [...] mandamos al licenciado Valdez,” who was to find “cossas que combenise q veer rremediar para la buena governación dela justicia[.]”

⁶¹² For these specific examples, see *Novísima recopilación de las leyes de España* (Madrid, 1805), 449. *Titulo XIX De los Oficiales de las Chancillerías y Audiencias, y sus derechos, leyes IV, V, VI, et al.* Law VI, “Prohibicion de recibir los Relatores y otros Oficiales de las Audiencias cosas de comer ni beber ni otra alguna de los litigantes” was attributed to the empress after Pedro Pacheco’s visita of the chanceries in 1534 and to Charles’s ordinances from 1554. See also *Recopilación de las ordenanzas de la Real Audiencia y Chancillería de Su Majestad que reside en la villa de Valladolid* (Valladolid, 1765); *Ordenanzas de la Real Audiencia y Chancillería de Granada* (Granada, 1601 republished 1997).

⁶¹³ José de Viera y Clavijo, *Historia de Canarias*, vol. 3, ed. Manuel de Paz Sánchez (Santa Cruz de Tenerife: Ediciones Idea, 2016), 156-7. “Pero al punto se echó de ver que la novedad de este establecimiento, aunque favorable, no dejaba de ser novedad; y ya se interesan en sostener las ventajas que les puede quitar la reforma. El gobernador y los regidores de Canaria no tardaron en disputar con la Audiencia, que había ido a juzgar las disputas y los disputadores. [...] Para cortar de raíz estas disensiones envió el rey al licenciado Francisco Ruiz Melgarejo, en calidad de juez visitador, con comisión dada en Madrid a 22 de diciembre [1529]. Melgarejo trajo la paz; si no es que este beneficio se debió más bien a la arrebatada muerte de Bernardo del Nero, pues después de ella hizo el visitador en 24 de febrero [1531] aquellas célebres ordenanzas, tan recomendadas en las Leyes de la Recopilación.”

audiencias in the Americas, was neither continuous nor especially stable due to the evolving nature of the Spanish colonial presence. In 1530, the depleted and unpopular first audiencia was extinguished and replaced by a second audiencia, although the latter had very limited modifications to the ordinances that governed it. Half a decade later, in 1535, the creation of the viceroyalty of New Spain transferred much of the audiencia's administrative jurisdiction to the viceroy.

During the three years of his visita, Tello de Sandoval accordingly provided a number of recommendations to Prince Philip regarding modifications for the governance of the audiencia. These included increasing the number of *oidores* or judges from four to six, the creation of a "Sala de Alcaldes del Crimen" comprised of two members, the creation of a local system of visitas in which two oidores would conduct visitas outside the city of Mexico, and allowing the audiencia to act with greater independence relative to the viceroy by providing him with only a simple vote in the litigation it heard. The visita also had one uniquely important task associated with it: the promulgation of the New Laws of the Indies that were intended to strictly regulate the *encomienda* as part of the Crown's paternalistic protection of indigenous peoples.⁶¹⁴

The centrality of reform in the colonial setting continued into the next visita in Mexico, commissioned in 1562 and carried out by Jerónimo de Valderrama. Three years earlier, in 1559 Philip II had restructured the administration of finance in the Americas, directing it from the Council of the Indies to the Council of Finance as a means of strengthening the Crown's finances in the aftermath of its bankruptcy that year. This, as some historians have argued, was an essential part of, if not the principal reason for, the subsequent visita in Mexico. Indications exist that the Council of Finance likely intervened in the selection of the visitador, who was its *contador mayor*, over opposition from the Council of the Indies, which nominally administered the visitas. Subsequently, the visitador and the Council of Finance maintained correspondence during the visita despite the fact that it was under the Council of the Indies' jurisdiction.⁶¹⁵

However, in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the most exemplary and prestigious of the visitas that consolidated the juridical regime in Spain and the institutional order of its empire, concentrated on the inspection of two institutions: the chanceries of Valladolid and Granada. Between 1484 and 1589, these two bodies were subject to twenty-three inspections.⁶¹⁶ At the apex of the judiciary, the chanceries represented a crucial juncture in the careers of the Crown's letrados, as officials would be promoted through the audiencias into them, circulate within them or into the Chancery of Valladolid, and then either die, retire, or be promoted into one of the Crown's councils.⁶¹⁷ Accordingly, historians have regarded these

⁶¹⁴ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 14-17, 68-74; Ismael Sánchez Bella, "Ordenanzas del Visitador de la Nueva España, Tello de Sandoval, para la administración de justicia," *Historia* 8 (Santiago de Chile, 1969), 489-561; Sánchez Bella, "Visitas a la Audiencia de México (siglos XVI y XVII)," 375-402.

⁶¹⁵ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 64-75.

⁶¹⁶ The Chancery of Granada was originally located in Ciudad Real before 1505. Kagan, "Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500-1700)," 296-316; Inés Gómez González, *La justicia, el gobierno y sus hacedores. La Real Chancillería de Granada en el Antiguo Régimen* (Granada: Comares, 2003).

⁶¹⁷ Heras Santos, "La organización de la justicia real ordinaria en la Corona de Castilla durante la Edad Moderna," 117-125 citing AHN, Consejos, libros 707, 732, and 739 to give percentage breakdowns of subsequent careers of officials in the chanceries and audiencias in Spain. 21% of judges in the Chancery of Valladolid went on to the councils, 21% had an internal promotion, and 33% died or retired. In the Chancery of Granada, 18% went to the councils, 18% had an internal promotion, 12% went to Valladolid, and 26% died or retired. Judges on the audiencias typically either were promoted to a chancery or died or retired.

as exemplar institutions for the empire, suggesting that the visita was an instrument through which the rules and style associated with the Chancery of Valladolid could be modeled and copied in institutions throughout the empire.⁶¹⁸

Indeed, the visita, which as previously illustrated could act as an important step on the *cursus honorum* in the service of the monarchy, was also characterized by certain patterns of circulation within the empire. By the seventeenth century, the visitadores themselves were often drawn from members of the chanceries to perform them prior to a promotion or, in the Americas, were circulated between the audiencias. Prior to the development of that pattern, the centrality of the chanceries corresponded with the prestige of its inspectors. The cadre of visitadores to the Chancery of Valladolid included some of the Crown's most accomplished officials, among whom were two familiar figures: Pedro Pacheco, whose visitas in Valladolid and Granada in 1534 immediately preceded and informed his visita to Naples in 1536 and Diego de Córdoba, whose visita in Valladolid in 1550 began two years after the end of his visita in Sicily.

Diego de Córdoba was himself illustrative of the circulation that was characteristic of the visita and the universalizing potential across institutional spaces that it possessed. Prior to carrying out his inspections, Diego de Córdoba had attained a certain degree of notoriety in the 1530s as rector of the University of Salamanca. In the 1540s, his prominence rose particularly quickly when, in 1544, he was tasked with carrying out a visita of the University of Valladolid, a commission carried out with such success that it attracted the attention and patronage of Fernando de Valdés, the president of the Council of Castile, and the emperor, resulting in the commission to carry out the first visita of Sicily. After travelling to Brussels to provide personal reports to the emperor and Prince Philip about his work in Sicily upon its suspension in 1548, Córdoba was commissioned to carry out the visita of the Chancery of Valladolid in 1550, a task which began in earnest on October 10 of that year and continued until its conclusion nearly two years later on June 10, 1552. The next year, as an extension of the project of the visitas in the audiencias and in response to pressure within the court since the beginning of the decade for the extension of the visita as a culmination of the project of ensuring the good administration of justice, Córdoba was commissioned by Philip to carry out the first visita of the Consejo Real and its officials.⁶¹⁹

In the decade before the transformation of the visita in Italy, Córdoba's visita in Valladolid, which is among the most well preserved of the Castilian visitas, was similarly illustrative of a transformative institutional era. His visita was at once characterized by the reform following the expansion of the judiciary and the foundations from which a subsequent emphasis on discipline was emerging.

On the one hand, although his visita produced some of the most important reforms for the Chancery of Valladolid, the visitador himself was reluctant to commit himself to the fullest disciplinary capacity of the visita, an opinion he expressed in his letter to the emperor upon the

⁶¹⁸ Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 1-207, see 511 in particular for summary of this argument and emphasis on copying rules from the Chancery of Valladolid. Peytavin associated this process particularly with the management of the councils, though this seems unlikely given their ambiguous relationship with the visitas and the patterns associated with the discipline emerging from the visitas.

⁶¹⁹ Ezquerro Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 228, 235-7; Diego de Córdoba to Charles V on June 10, 1552; Pietro Burgarella and Grazia Fallico, *L'archivio dei Visitatori Generali di Sicilia* (Rome: Archivio di Stato di Palermo, 1977), 26-35.

conclusion of his work in which he dismissed the framework for the more expansive institution that was by that time being counseled in the court, particularly in the court of Charles's successor:

[Because] ten years pass from one visita to the next and since there are more than 400 officials and having to inquire in this way into their excesses as well as what would be advisable for the good government of the audiencia and the execution of justice, it [is thought] advisable [for the visita to last] more time and for the visitador to travel throughout the district of the audiencia, which in Valladolid one can neither know or discover the truth, and that the remedy of the damage that one finds be brief[.] [But] when one comes to review one visita, there [would] already [be] a need to [conduct] another [visita] and those who were investigated [would either be] dead or provided with excellent positions and what was advisable to provide in the time of [that] visita [would] subsequently [be] inadvisable with the changing of the times and customs.⁶²⁰

Despite his inspection's relative brevity, Córdoba was able to carry out a fairly extensive investigation into the conduct of the officials of the chancery that pointed to a maturity in the developing institution of the visita. Indeed, it was his visita that brought about one of the major innovations in its juridical practice, namely that the visitador could present charges both against individual officials and groups of officials for general malfeasance in an office. It was also the first time that the president of the chancery was subjected to personal investigation.⁶²¹ Moreover, although the punishments ultimately meted out were marginal, the scope of oversight expanded with ninety-two out of the estimated four hundred officials potentially subject to the visita being charged as a result of it, a number that likely represented an increase of a few dozen relative to preceding visitas and which increased to 105 in subsequent inspections.⁶²² In that expansion of oversight, Diego de Córdoba's visita pointed towards the

⁶²⁰ Córdoba began by summarizing the views of those who believed the visitas should not be conducted with such haste, which he believed was more for "form" than effect, so the tense and voice has been modified in translation to reflect the visitador's own negative sentiment about the practicality and utility of extending visitas. "La visita de la real audi[enci]a de Val[lado]l[i]d se a fecho según q. V. Mt. fue s[e]ruido mandármela. Lo q. della resulta embío en relación y para cumplirse con lo q. se deue al seruy[ci]o de Dios y de V. Mt. Y conuenía a la buena administración de Just[ici]a estas visitas no se auían de hazer tan de tropel q. según se hazen es más por forma q. no por descargo de la real conçiencia de V. Mt. q pasando de una visita a otra diez años y siendo los off[icia]les más de quatroçientos y auíéndose de ynquirir así de los excessos dellos como de lo q. conuernía al buen gouierno de la audi[enci]a y execuçión de just[ici]a arya menester más tiempo y q. [e]l visitador andvuese por todo el distrito de la audy[enci]a q. en Vall[adoli]d ni se puede saber ni descubrir verdad y q. [e]l remedio del daño q. se descubriese fuese breue q. quando se viene a ber una bisita ya ay neçesidad de hazer otra y los visitados son muertos o p[ro]ueidos en auentajados lugares y lo q. couenía en el discurso de la visita p[ro]ueirse después con la mudança de t[iem]po y costumbres no conuiene." AGS, Estado, leg. 89, f. 137. Diego de Córdoba to Charles V. June 10, 1552 as quoted in Ezquerria Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana: la visita de Diego de Córdoba (1553-1554)," 237.

⁶²¹ Ezquerria Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 237-8 citing Carlos Garriga Acosta, "Génesis y formación histórica de las visitas a las chancillerías castellanas (1484-1554)," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Salamanca, 1989, II, 999-1005.

⁶²² AGS, CCA, leg. 2713, 2714, and 2715. Unfortunately, with the exception of one organized and foliated book for Diego de Córdoba's visita (leg. 2714), charges are extremely disordered. Although some of the oidores were reprimanded for their conduct and even reprimanded for their efforts to impede Córdoba's investigation, they

institution's future, which was in the inculcation of norms and practices rather than in the production of them, despite the limits of that project in the 1550s.

The expansion of discipline in the *visitas* of the Chancery of Valladolid was hardly unique, though the close connection between them and the court obscures the extent to which discipline could emerge from local demands and the rapid escalation of oversight in the imperial context. While the first *visitas* to the Audiencia and Chancery of Mexico followed the pattern of Italy in the first half of the sixteenth century, in which the *visita* was directed with the concurrent aims of realizing reforms and carrying out disciplinary oversight, it was the latter aim that was the initial source of the *visita*, with the Crown acting upon Hernán Cortés's 1543 petition for action against the viceroy Antonio de Mendoza. Ironically, although the receipt of such petitions and complaints would continue to serve as an impetus for *visitas* in the Americas, neither Cortés nor the Council of the Indies initially sought to extend that institution, which was explicitly considered inappropriate for the purpose of discipline, preferring instead the *residencia* so as to permit the members of the *audiencia* to perform work without excessive disruption unless they were substantively culpable of some offense. What followed instead was the first *visita* in the Americas, beginning upon Tello de Sandoval's arrival in Mexico City in 1544.

Although Sandoval's investigations amounted to little of lasting consequence, Valderrama's *visita* that followed proved considerably more rigorous and initially led to the suspension of two of the *audiencia*'s *oidores* who were sent back to Spain as soon as the *audiencia* had its full complement of judges. These two *oidores* were subsequently sentenced (although that sentence was later commuted) by the Council of the Indies to twelve years of suspension from any office related to justice and a fine of 1730 ducats along with a smaller secondary fine and ten years of suspension from any office related to justice respectively for receiving gifts and bribes.⁶²³ A third *oidor* was sentenced to three and a half years of suspension together with a small fine. The remaining two *oidores*, largely absolved of their charges, paid nominal fines.⁶²⁴

By the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the extension not only of reform but also of discipline over the *audiencias* and the administration of justice through the *visita* was complete. To what end did that discipline serve?

It in part, of course, reinforced the reforms that had typified the institution for much of the sixteenth century in the construction of a style of justice. Indeed, this particular aspect of the *visita* has been a traditional focus of historiographical attention. Viewing the *visita* as an instrument through which the Crown might control local officials, charges formulated by and the sentences resulting from the *visitas* have been read by prior generations of historians as the imposition of a normative ideology of justice from the metropolis.

received no additional punishments upon the final determination of the Royal Council while only a handful of lower-ranking officials received any fines. Still fewer were suspended or removed from office. Ezquerria Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 246-7. Further detail about these charges, which were largely related to the "style" of administering justice for higher ranking officials and fraud and more tangible malfeasance for lower ranking officials, is provided later.

⁶²³ The precise nature of the charges against them are detailed later.

⁶²⁴ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 79-80. One such case is described later.

To an extent, that was indeed essential to the work of inspection, especially with regard to the visita's inculcation of a common style associated with the good administration of justice. Throughout Spain's empire, the mis-practice of justice was especially associated with procedural defects, immoderate conduct, irregularities in record keeping, delays in hearing and voting on litigation, failures to carry out sentences, the often-fraught relationships between the members of the audiencias, particularly between the oidores and the presidents of the audiencias, abusive conduct towards litigants, and negligence in fulfilling official duties. Such violations, as Ignacio Ezquerro Revilla put it, indicated an effort to fortify the obligation of officials to participate in the "empire of justice" by administering it effectively and equitably.⁶²⁵

The norms associated with that empire, linked to the visitas' reforms, were the ubiquitous objects of discipline from Valladolid to Manila. The visitas to Valladolid carried out by Juan de Córdoba in 1540 and Diego de Córdoba in 1550 were models of the particular attention given to negligence, including the failure of officials to perform visitas within their jurisdiction, procedural failures, the style of hearing and voting on litigation, and the relationships between officials of the chancery as well as relationships between officials and litigants.⁶²⁶ In Juan de Córdoba's visita, one oidor, Arteaga, had seven charges against him which included failing to record his votes, mistreating litigants, and demonstrating excessive interest in certain cases. Another oidor, Juan de Figueroa, was given over to defending his opinions to excess both before and after having voted in litigation, mistreating litigants, and allowing unnecessary conversation in court.⁶²⁷

That model extended to every audiencia. For example, Ramírez Fariña's visita of the Audiencia of Seville in 1623 charged the oidores and president for exceeding their jurisdiction, allowing individuals other than judges to be present for the votes on litigation, not registering votes, and failing to carry out inspections of jails.⁶²⁸ In Santo Domingo, some of the only charges that the oidor Alonso de Cereceda was found guilty of in Alonso Hurtado's visita that began in 1630 were related to his absences.⁶²⁹ In Mexico, all the visitas from Tello de Sandoval in 1544 to Pedro de Gálvez, who completed Juan de Palafox's visita in 1650, charged oidores for similar failures: absences, irregularities in voting, failures to carry out inspections of the territories under the audiencia's jurisdiction, and failing to carry out punishments.⁶³⁰ Finally, in Manila, the visita of Francisco de Rojas y Oñate in 1631 led to the censure of oidores for mistreating

⁶²⁵ Ezquerro Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 238-9.

⁶²⁶ See AGS, CCA, leg. 2714, "cuadernillo" from Diego de Córdoba's visita, f. 32v.; AGS, CCA, leg. 2713, charges resulting from the visita of Juan de Córdoba.

⁶²⁷ AGS, CCA, leg. 2717. Charges resulting from the visita of Juan de Córdoba. Figueroa was "muy amigo de defender su opinión." Neither, it is worth noting, resulted in substantial discipline, with Figueroa performing a visita of the Council of the Indies in 1542 and later serving as president of the Council of Castile.

⁶²⁸ AGS, CCA, leg. 2807 "Cargos generales Regente y oidores"; José Antonio Pérez Juan, "La visita de Ramírez Fariña a la Audiencia de Sevilla (1623-1632)," *Historia, Instituciones, Documentos* 29 (2002), 372-6.

⁶²⁹ Marc Eagle, "Portraits of Bad Officials: Malfeasance in *Visita* Sentences from Seventeenth-Century Santo Domingo," in Christoph Rosenmüller, ed., *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017), 87-103, esp. 87.

⁶³⁰ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 111-160.

lower-ranking officials in the audiencia and a fine for prosecutors who failed to enforce royal *cédulas*.⁶³¹

The audiencias' ubiquitous failure to carry out local *visitas* or other forms of review was a particularly common frustration for the *visitadores* because those *visitas* were themselves essential to the administration of justice. Among their other tasks, the audiencias were obligated to carry out a considerable range of these *visitas*, including inspections of local officers, juridical records, and jails in the city in which the audiencia was located. That latter task, which was a weekly obligation, was frequently neglected. When it was carried out, it was often with vexation to the prisoners and an opportunity for corruption.⁶³² In the Americas, local *visitas* and *residencias* theoretically offered native peoples an opportunity to challenge labor or settlement requirements or to mitigate abuses, though they hardly exemplified the equitable provision of justice.⁶³³ Diego de Landeras's complaint in his *visita* of the Audiencia of Mexico that "the provinces are full of criminals who cause great grievances, since many territories are far from [the seat of audiencia], thus many cry out for these *visitas*," was a common refrain.⁶³⁴

The ultimate purpose of these procedural and stylistic charges was the creation of a universal standard for justice, as described by Briviesca de Muñatones in the charges resulting from his *visita* of the Audiencia of Lima in 1560, in which he levied seventy-two charges against the *oidores* for failing to carry out "correct justice," which was maintained by conducting it "impartially," with free conscience, "in secret," in "consensus," and with expedience.⁶³⁵

That notion of justice extended into the *visitas*' indirect management of social control and discipline as administered by the audiencias. For example, as part of its obligations, the Audiencia of Mexico was obligated to monitor travel between Spain and New Spain and ensure that married men did not leave their wives in Spain. In such cases, it was nominally supposed to require the man in question to return to Spain immediately to bring his wife with him or, alternatively, require him to carry this out within two years. Likewise, the audiencias in the Americas were obligated to maintain records of people who did so along with a description of the purpose of their journeys, the duration of their stay, and whether they were required to return. Foreigners, who were generally excluded from the Americas, were to be deported and their possessions confiscated. These duties were quickly neglected by the audiencia, prompting a reiteration of corresponding instructions in 1551, and the attention of Valderrama's *visita*, from which resulted findings of guilt against the *oidores* in the latter two matters, in particular

⁶³¹ AGI, Filipinas, leg. 21, R. 11, N. 64. Autos del Consejo de Indias, sobre la *visita* realizada por el licenciado Francisco de Rojas y Oñate, oidor de la Audiencia de México, a la de la ciudad de Manila. December 2, 1637.

⁶³² AGS, CCA, leg. 2713, charges resulting from the *visita* of Juan de Córdoba; France V. Scholes and Eleanor B. Adams, eds., *Cartas del Licenciado Valderrama y otros documentos sobre su visita al gobierno de Nueva España* (Mexico City: José Porrúa e Hijos, 1961), 371.

⁶³³ Steve Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640*, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 114-119.

⁶³⁴ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 136. "están las provincias llenas de delincuentes y se haven grandes agravios, por estar muchas tierras distantes de este lugar, así claman muchos por estas *visitas*."

⁶³⁵ Segio Angeli, "¿Buenos e rectos jueces?: La *visita* a la Audiencia de Lima por el licenciado Briviesca de Muñatones, 1560-1563," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas – Anuario de Historia de América Latina* 50, no. 1 (Dec., 2013), 17.

one oidor who was fined for protecting a French privateer.⁶³⁶ Though empire may in practice have been characterized by such “entanglements,” the normative imperial project was inseparable from the extirpation of those entanglements.

More recent histories, however, have been considerably more skeptical of the visita’s role as a means of directly controlling official conduct. This is particularly true with regard to corruption, the prosecution of which became more intense over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Looking through the lens of local societies, the “new institutionalist” histories have doubted that a notion of corruption existed, asserting instead that conduct that might be described as malfeasance hardly represented a deviation from local or imperial norms and was in fact imbued in the conception of holding office. Instead, as described in the previous chapter, the visitas have increasingly been viewed as a ritual in which the Crown demonstrated both its authority and its clemency.⁶³⁷

To be sure, the visitas of the audiencias did represent a locus for the contestation of authority. This was especially true, as Sergio Angeli astutely observed, in the seventeenth century when they sometimes (and almost without exaggeration) resembled “battlefields.”⁶³⁸

In the Americas, resistance in the form of *pasquines*, posters often of libelous content, brought disputes into a public discourse and, as might be expected, such posters appeared with regularity during visitas, notably during the tumultuous visitas of the Audiencia of Mexico and the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition in Mexico during the 1640s. They would again appear during the visita of Juan de Cornejo during his visita of the Audiencia of Santa Fe in 1659, when a libelous and threatening paper was posted on the visitador’s door that suggested that the only person who merited the visita’s punishments was one of the officials it employed and intimating violence against the person of the visitador. When the audiencia commenced an investigation into who the author of the libel was, conflict between the visitador and the president of the audiencia, who was linked to the production of the *pasquín*, quickly escalated as the visitador suspended the president. Thereafter, the president had Cornejo deprived of the papers of his commission only to be arrested himself.⁶³⁹

Cornejo’s visita had a fraught legacy, but that was hardly due to its failure to assert royal authority. Rather, it was deemed to have been too expensive and with insufficient disciplinary effect, as the President of the Council of the Indies indicated in his instructions to the Viceroy of Peru:

The visita in Santa Fe conducted by Don Juan Cornejo has had the same end as other visitas: excessive cost to the Royal Hacienda, no improvement in the ministers, disagreement between the people living there, divided with some in favor of the visitador and others of those being investigated [...] My opinion is to not send visitadores

⁶³⁶ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 143-7.

⁶³⁷ Eagle, “Portraits of Bad Officials: Malfeasance in *Visita* Sentences from Seventeenth-Century Santo Domingo,” 102-3.

⁶³⁸ Angeli, “¿Buenos e rectos jueces?: La visita a la Audiencia de Lima por el licenciado Briviesca de Muñatones, 1560-1563,” 13.

⁶³⁹ Natalia Silva Prada, “Pasquines contra visitadores reales: opinion pública en las ciudades hispanoamericanas de los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII,” in *Opinión pública y espacio urbano en la edad moderna*, dirs., Antonio Castillo Gómez and James S. Amelang, ed. Carmen Serrano Sánchez (Gijón: Ediciones Trea, 2010), 389-392.

to tribunals, instead inspecting particular ministers [because] the cost would be less and less time would be spent in its execution...⁶⁴⁰

Even then, Cornejo's visita can hardly be read as a complete failure despite the resistance to it, as he was promoted to a post on the Chancery of Valladolid and almost immediately commissioned to carry out a visita of the Audiencia of Lima, which continued until 1666.

The conflict of Cornejo's visita was mirrored with still more intensity in the visita of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo in 1630 by Alonso Hurtado, leading to one of the strangest investigations carried out in a visita. After his arrival in Santo Domingo, the visitador and the president of the audiencia, Gabriel Chávez, quickly fell out after the latter was suspended from office within twelve days. One morning, the house in which the visitador was staying was discovered to be covered in "filth" with a lingering odor and an "inflammatory libel" posted on the walls and doors of the house. As in Santa Fe, local officials immediately began an investigation of this incident and collected various testimonies which the visitador himself amassed in his own investigation. Among the curious key points of attention was the composition of the "filth," with one witness suggesting that it was human excrement mixed with mud so that the composite could stay on the walls, although there was some doubt whether it might also have originated from a dog. Further work stalled when Chávez threatened an *oidor* if the investigation continued. The visitador, who attributed the act to the president's coachman, was soon the target of Chávez's violence as the president ordered soldiers to capture the visitador in his house. Although he attempted to escape through a window with the help of a slave, he was trapped in a courtyard and beaten while the president allegedly called for the visitador's death, a fate he was spared in favor of being placed in prison.⁶⁴¹ The fallout was such that another visitador, the prosecutor from the Audiencia of Manila, had to be commissioned to complete Hurtado's work in the mid-1630s.

The oft-cited quotation of the Marquis of Montesclaros, Viceroy of New Spain, that the visita was like a "whirlwind" that blew around discontent against local officials was not without merit,⁶⁴² but the disputes and resistance it provoked were less a consequence of a ritual undermining of the autonomous authority of local elites than they were the direct result of the disciplinary intrusion of the visita. Pressured by the Crown's interests in upholding justice and the public's dissatisfaction with the conduct and character of local officials, the visita threatened

⁶⁴⁰ "La Visita que hizo en Santa Fe don Juan Cornejo ha tenido el mismo fin que otras Visitas: excesiva costa de la Real Hacienda, ninguna enmienda en los ministros, cisma entre los mismos naturales, dividiéndose unos en favor del Visitador y otros, de los visitados... Mi dictamen no es de enviar Visitadores de Tribunales, sino de visitar ministros en particular, según la fama que hubiere de sus procedimientos, pues estropeando uno o dos que lo merezcan, se hará mayor escarmiento y aviso para todos los demás. La costa será menor y el tiempo que se gastare en la ejecución, más breve; conforme a este dictamen que yo tengo, me irá siempre avisando V.E. de los sujetos con individualidad y con reserva." As quoted in G. Lohmann Villena, *El Conde de Lemos, Virrey del Perú* (Madrid: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1946), 405 and in Ismael Sánchez Bella, "Eficacia de la visita en Indias," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 50 (1980), 385.

⁶⁴¹ AGI, Escribanía 33B, piece 9 "Autos sobre haber ensuciado las puertas", ff. 1-13; Escribanía 33A, piece 5a.

⁶⁴² For just one of at least four examples of which I know that use or make reference to this quotation, see H. G. Koenigsberger, review of *Visite et Gouvernement dans la Royaume de Naples (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)* by Mireille Peytavin, 223.

to regulate and dismantle the nexus of private interest and official service and reform the meaning of office holding.

Thus, prior to the posting of the pasquín on Cornejo's door, the president of the audiencia, Dionisio Pérez Manrique, had been under investigation for his absences from Santa Fe at the expense of the Crown's fisc, for his connections to other oidores, and for providing insufficient public audiences.⁶⁴³ Likewise, Chávez's death spared him from the subsequent discipline of the visitas in Santo Domingo, but his resistance was an attempt to stave off an investigation into his conduct, which included defrauding the Crown's fisc and illicitly confiscating property and imprisoning individuals, with information supplied by his colleagues and the residents of the city. That his heirs were subsequently obligated to pay restitution to the Crown was an indication that the judgment of his conduct would likely have been severe.⁶⁴⁴

Beneath the appearance and style of justice, the relationships, conduct, and character of officials in the empire of justice were increasingly subjected to review. Punishment of officials therefore also depended on the participation of the localities and it was from those settings from which new norms of office holding emerged. Although structurally more limited than the visitas in Italy, even the visitas of the audiencias demonstrated a capacity to push the domain of state oversight outside the administrative core into the cities in which they were situated, from which most charges that were not procedural in nature resulted, and into the territories that surrounded them. Even Diego de Córdoba, who reckoned that a full review of the territory under the jurisdiction of the Chancery of the Valladolid would consume too much time, had the attentions of his visita directed into the countryside beyond Valladolid itself, receiving 353 complaints about the conduct of the *alguaciles de campo* from fifty villages and towns with populations ranging from four to 800 *vezinos* within a radius of just under thirty miles from the Palacio de los Viveros, the seat of the chancery (figure 9).

In these cities and localities, the intrusion of private interests into the administration of justice effectively, if not necessarily by name, became corruption. Even in the Chancery of Valladolid, where procedural charges against officials remained predominant into the 1590s, charges conflated the failure to adhere to laws with deficiencies of character that suggested an inability to effectively or equitably provide justice. Accordingly, even unfounded rumor could be sufficient to be disqualifying in the views of the visitador and those with whom officials interacted. One *relator* had "the custom of bowling and playing chess ordinarily about which there has been much gossip" about the damage indulging in such pastimes might have on the handling of cases.⁶⁴⁵ Likewise, a certain prosecutor, whose purpose was the "extirpation of the vices and public sins of the commonwealth and to live with all modesty and honesty" had instead proceeded carelessly and lived with "such liberty" and scandal that he was widely reputed to be dishonest.⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴³ Silva Prada, "Pasquines contra visitadores reales," 392.

⁶⁴⁴ AGI, Escribanía 33B, piezas 11, 18, 20.

⁶⁴⁵ AGS, CCA, leg. 2717. Charges resulting from the visita against the *licenciado* Pérez. Dated 1591 "a tenido costumbre de jugar a los bolos y axedrez de ordin^o de qye avido mucha murmuración."

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid. Charges resulting from the visita against Gregorio [López] de Tovar. Dated 1591. Charge 3. While his job was "a procurar la extirpación de los vicios y pecados públicos de la república y a vivir con toda modestia y honestidad" he instead had "procedido con tanta libertad." In charge 2 he was noted for acting "con notable descuido y floxedad."




Figure 9. Concentrations of testimonies regarding *alguaciles de campo* outside Valladolid.⁶⁴⁷

This was especially true of his apparently infamous friendship with a married woman named Ana Maria, an association that brought particular scandal when the two traveled together in the same carriage, which was particularly malfeasant not merely because it was scandalous in itself but because it allowed litigants to gain the prosecutor's favor by means of Ana Maria.⁶⁴⁸

The most severe punishments, then, were typically the result of the possibility of partiality or abuses that could be attested to by litigants or individuals within the patronage or mercantile networks linked to the audiencias. The most pernicious form of these, reflecting the form of corruption that was especially endemic in Italy and the most common source of charges from visitas there, were the illicit receipt of gifts and bribes. Alonso de Zurita, an oidor who was suspended for three and a half years as a result of Valderrama's visita in Mexico, received the bulk of his punishment for three such cases. The first was for receiving a loan of 1,000 pesos from a litigant who had a case before the audiencia about the death of an enslaved person in his possession. The second and third cases involved the relationship between the oidor, his wife,

⁶⁴⁷ Green represents less than ten testimonies, blue represents between ten and nineteen, and black represents more than twenty. The only example, Simancas, had twenty-seven. The towns to the south of Valladolid and near the Duero to the east are particularly well represented but there does not seem to be any significant correlation between response and distance, population, or the predominance of nobles or clergy.

⁶⁴⁸ AGS, CCA, leg. 2717. Charges resulting from the visita against Gregorio [López] de Tovar. Dated 1591. Charge 5.

and López de Quesada. Quesada was provided with mercury by the oidor's wife, for which the oidor was paid in the silver extracted from the mine. Quesada also gave the two various gifts, including gold, wheat, pigs, and chickens. Not surprisingly, Quesada also had litigation pending in the audiencia during these exchanges.⁶⁴⁹

Likewise, the visita of Ramírez Fariña to the Audiencia of Seville in 1623 produced a number of charges against one particular oidor who was alleged to have received a number of bribes. The gravity of the charges caused the Council of Castile to commission a second investigation which in turn provided still more evidence of those activities.⁶⁵⁰ Similar accusations were also made against Juan Parra de Meneses, an oidor charged in Alonso Hurtado's visita of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo in the 1630s, who was accused of soliciting a variety of gifts in exchange for his favorable intervention in litigation and thus built up a substantial patronage network in the city, the result of which was a three-year suspension and a fine of 500 ducats.⁶⁵¹

While malfeasance that affected conduct within an office was the most severely punished, the visita also provided oversight of conduct beyond the domain of the practice of justice itself, in particular the connections between officials and their participation and intervention in economic endeavors and the society in which they were situated. While this was by no means unknown in Italy, it was especially acute in connection to the Atlantic and Pacific worlds, where the context of the audiencia and commercial ties gave rise to novel types of behaviors that the visita, in turn, attempted to regulate either directly as malfeasant (or at least contrary to the idealized norms for the character of officials) or indirectly by controlling the duties of officials entrusted with upholding the social and economic norms of empire.

This was characteristic of nearly every type of official who administered justice, even beyond the audiencias. In 1555, for example, Francisco de la Trinidad was commissioned to carry out a visita of corregidores, *alcaldes*, judges, *regidores*, and other officials in the local administration of justice in much of the southeastern provinces of the Crown of Castile, especially in Murcia and the "Provincia de Castilla" of La Mancha as far north as Madrid. Alongside procedural failures appeared a wide variety of malfeasance, often at the juncture between justice and regulations on economic life. Accordingly, the regidores of Cartagena were noted for manipulating the market for meat and illicitly providing licenses to fishermen to sell their fish to *forasteros* in exchange for gifts of fish.⁶⁵²

In the audiencias, Ramírez Fariña's investigations in Seville found that the oidor Sancho Hurtado had essentially participated in contraband commercial exchanges, using third parties whom he protected through his position despite not possessing licenses to ship wheat and oil to Portugal and receive a cargo of wine from a ship. Given his participation in commerce, the oidor's mercantile connections were extensive and he regularly intervened on their behalf in exchange for various gifts. For these activities, the oidor was fined three thousand ducats, suspended and prohibited from holding any judiciary position, and prohibited from going

⁶⁴⁹ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 167.

⁶⁵⁰ AGS, CCA, leg. 2805, piece 8a, ff. 2-10v.; see also Pérez Juan, "La visita de Ramírez Fariña a la Audiencia de Sevilla (1623-1632)," 370-371.

⁶⁵¹ Eagle, "Portraits of Bad Officials: Malfeasance in *Visita* Sentences from Seventeenth-Century Santo Domingo," 93-4.

⁶⁵² AGS, CCA, leg. 2763 "Relación sumaria delo q [...] resulta de la informació q fray fran^{co} de la trinidad [...] hizo en la visita genl." See section on Cartagena.

within twenty leagues of either the court or the city Seville.⁶⁵³ Cornejo's visita to Lima produced similar charges against two oidores for having made commercial arrangements which involved sending large sums of money to Panama.⁶⁵⁴

But there was ironically perhaps no better example of that discipline than against a visitador, Francisco de Rojas y Oñate, an oidor in Mexico who carried out the conclusions to earlier visitas of the Audiencia of Manila in 1631 and the Audiencia of Guadalajara in 1638, which were left incomplete due to the deaths of the visitadores. In his 1639 visita of the Audiencia of Mexico, Juan de Palafox y Mendoza formulated a considerable number of charges against Rojas y Oñate, several of which resulted from his period of service in Manila. Accordingly, after his nomination in 1628 he was accused of trying to make prohibited contracts with merchants in the Philippines. Beyond the violation of official norms, Rojas y Oñate was accused of a range of violations of restrictions on commerce. When he sailed to the Philippines in 1631, he was alleged to have permitted others to illicitly send silver in the hold of the ship. Upon his return, again in violation of ordinances that restricted the groups of individuals who could participate in commercial activity, Rojas y Oñate shipped jewelry to the Americas.⁶⁵⁵

The visitas of the audiencias, mirroring the institution in Italy, thus represented a comprehensive vision of a coherent imperial space that was regularized by the institutionalizing force of the procedures associated with the good administration of justice. Institutionalization was certainly initially driven by the Crown, but it was at the local level where a conception of "upright" justice that extended beyond court style that could be subject to discipline was developing.

That development might also be suggested by the fact that although the visitas, like the chanceries and audiencias that they monitored, continue to be associated with the ascendancy of the letrado ideology of equity and justice in the mid-sixteenth century and a subsequent decline in the seventeenth century,⁶⁵⁶ the attentions of the visita had actually shifted from the peninsula to the empire that lay beyond it in that time.

In the Crown of Castile, there were at least 114 visitas of tribunals prior to 1700 not including the visitas which resumed earlier work. Of the 106 that began after 1516, fifty-six occurred in the sixteenth century, essentially representing two new visitas every three years. Contrary to the prevailing belief in the historiography, a misunderstanding resulting from the difficulties and limitations associated with cataloging visitas and the lack of a prior attempt at a complete catalog (tables 10, 11, 12),⁶⁵⁷ that rate declined only slightly in the seventeenth

⁶⁵³ AGS, CCA, leg. 2807. Charges 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17 22 against Sancho Hurtado.

⁶⁵⁴ AGI, Escribanía, leg. 569B. "Memorial de cargos que resultan contra los oidores."

⁶⁵⁵ Arregui Zamorano, *La Audiencia de México según los visitadores*, 226. Pilar Arregui Zamorano's summary of the charge about contraband silver highlights the amusing nature with which so many of the visitas charges were written: "Palafox, como nota pintoresca, explica que fue tal la cantidad de plata embarcada, que hizo inclinar a la nao hacia el lado en que estaba situada."

⁶⁵⁶ Kagan, "Pleitos y poder real. La Chancillería de Valladolid (1500-1700)" seems to have been the first with this view and local studies have subscribed to it because the visitas can appear infrequent when removed from the imperial context. There does still seem to be a drop-off in Charles II's reign, but no earlier.

⁶⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the one that follows is still at best an incomplete and approximate attempt, though it is surprisingly the first one that includes every audiencia. It principally, though not exclusively, draws from the local or incomplete general catalogs in Kagan for Valladolid; Garriga Acosta for Ciudad Real and Valladolid; Peytavin for Valladolid, Granada, Galicia, Seville, and Navarre; Sánchez Bella for Santo Domingo, Mexico, Guatemala,

century. There was still on average a visita every other year. Making up for the relative decline in focus on the Chanceries of Valladolid and Granada that had been the cornerstone of the state and its institutional order were the formerly peripheral audiencias that were being incorporated more fully into them: those in the Canary Islands, Santo Domingo, Panama, Guatemala, Manila, Santa Fe de Bogotá, and Charcas. The dynamism of regulating justice and corruption had taken an imperial turn.

Panama, Lima, Santa Fe, Charcas, and Quito; Gloria Tejada Gonzalez's catalog of the Archivo General de Simancas's Camara de Castilla section, series 10, "Visitas," for Valladolid, Granada, Galicia, Seville, Navarre, and the Canary Islands; María Dolores Álamo Martell, "El Visitador Lorenzo Santos de San Pedro y la Real Audiencia de Canarias," *Anuario de Estudios Atlánticos* 57 (2011), 252-3 for the Canary Islands; José de Viera y Clavijo, *Historia de Canarias* for the Canary Islands; and Horacio Cabezas Carcache, *Gobernantes de Guatemala, Siglo XVII* (Guatemala, 2016) for Guatemala. I used the *Portal de Archivos Españoles* to fill in gaps as well as to find visitas in Guadalajara and the Philippines. I have relatively more doubt with regard to Panama, Guadalajara, Guatemala, and Santo Domingo due to the limited historiography, which in the latter two cases seems to conflate particular visitas, which were essentially residencias, and visitas generales. Where possible, especially in Simancas, I viewed the surviving legajos.

Dating the visitas is at best an approximation. Kagan's dating, which was used by Peytavin, employed an unusual methodology – the publication of the *leyes de visita* rather than when they actually took place – and has been normalized in the cases where a more reliable date existed or I was able to find one myself. In other cases, the years in catalogs are within a few years of the beginning of a visita.

Table 10. Dates of visitas to chanceries, etc. in the peninsular Crown of Castile.⁶⁵⁸

	Pre-1516	Charles V	Philip II	Philip III	Philip IV	Charles II
Valladolid 1371	1492, 1503, 1508, 1515	1525, 1534, 1540, 1550	1566, 1577, 1589		1624, 1662	1684
Granada 1505 <i>Ciudad Real</i> 1494	1484, 1490, 1501, 1513	1522, 1534, 1542, 1549	1559, 1563, 1577, 1589	1619	1628, 1661	1666
Galicia 1480		1543, 1552	1566, 1593	1613	1635	1668
Seville 1525		1525, 1551	1566, 1579, 1590	1609	1623, 1647	
Canary Islands 1526		1530, 1548	1562, 1585, 1593	1607	1635, ?, 1658, 1663	1667, 1680
Navarre <i>Reformed in</i> 1525		1525, 1536, 1542, 1550	1569, 1580	1618		1678

⁶⁵⁸ “?” Indicates an unknown year.

Table 11. Dates of visitas to the audiencias in the Viceroyalty of New Spain.⁶⁵⁹

	Charles V	Philip II	Philip III	Philip IV	Charles II
Santo Domingo 1526		1570, 1594	1602	1630, 1635	
Mexico 1527	1543	1562, 1583	1606 (1608)	1625, 1639 (1650)	
Panama 1564 <i>1538-1543</i>		1585, 1594?	1614	1632, 1645, 1658	
Guatemala 1570 <i>1543-1563</i>		1563, 1587, 1594		1621	1670, 1678 (1682), 1690, 1699
Guadalajara 1548				1635 (1638)	
Manila 1583				1621 (1631)	

⁶⁵⁹ “?” Indicates an uncertain year. Years in parantheses indicate a resumption or continuation of a preceding visita.

Table 12. Dates of visitas to the audiencias in the Viceroyalty of Peru.⁶⁶⁰

	Philip II	Philip III	Philip IV	Charles II
Lima 1543	1559, 1578, 1591	(1602)	1625 (1632) (1635), 1662	(1675)
Santa Fe de Bogotá 1548	1568, 1578 (1582)	1602 (1604) (1607)	1630, 1657	1692
Charcas 1559	1570, 1582, 1590, 1596	1609	1639, 1647, 1662	
Quito 1563	1587, 1592		1625	1679
Chile 1605 <i>1565-1575</i>				<i>None Known</i>
Buenos Aires 1661-1671				<i>None Known</i>

⁶⁶⁰ Years in parantheses indicate a resumption or continuation of a preceding visita.

INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE

Despite the attention of popular histories that owe much to the “Black Legend,” the historiography of the Holy Office of the Inquisition has, particularly since the mid-1970s, been the object of dramatic revision that complicates any serious study of the Inquisition, not least one as brief as this. Initial efforts that emphasized marginal groups, legal history, quantification, and the ties between the tribunals and local societies that described it as a unifying state – albeit not always “Spanish” – institution were later challenged and supplanted by paradigms of confessionalization, reformation, and the centrality of “heretics” or those who subverted the norms associated with the institution. The transformation of cultural concepts and norms associated with it continues to be a productive line of inquiry, especially in connection with the Americas. As a whole, that historiography has produced a depiction of an institution that was not an especially repressive or violent instrument of ideological control and it has increasingly dealt with quotidian religious practice in addition to marginal or repressed groups. But above all else, the Inquisition has continued to be connected to its local context, responsive to local tensions, subject to political and jurisdictional disputes, and a means of social advancement.⁶⁶¹

That connection was not lost on the Crown and, beginning in the late fifteenth century, the *visita* was, in addition to visitations carried out by the tribunals, applied to ensure the practice of justice by the Inquisition despite the “crookedness” that was perceived to emerge from its local and colonial context.

The centrality of the local setting for the tribunals was underscored by its visitations, the *visitas de distrito* influenced by pastoral *visitas*. These functionally served to reinforce the Inquisition’s authority and as a means of social control over the localities through the provision of religious correction, notably in the direct discipline of minor offenses, and inspection of its

⁶⁶¹ Among many others, see: Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965); Haim Beinart, ed., *Records of the Trials of the Spanish Inquisition in Ciudad Real, 1483-1485*, 4 vols. (Jerusalem: Israel National Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974); Bartolomé Bennassar, “L’inquisition espagnole au service de l’Etat,” *L’Histoire* 15, no. 9 (Sep., 1979), 35-46; Gustav Henningsen, *The Witches’ Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish Inquisition* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1980); Virgilio Pinto Crespo, *Inquisición y control ideológico en la España del siglo XVI* (Madrid: Taurus, 1983); José Antonio Escudero López, ed., *Perfiles jurídicos de la inquisición española* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1986); Stephen Haliczer, ed., *Inquisition and Society in Early Modern Europe* (Totowa: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987); Solange Alberro, *Inquisición y sociedad en México, 1571-1700* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988); Bartolomé Bennassar and Lucile Bennassar, *Les chrétiens d’Allah. L’histoire extraordinaire des renégats, XVIe-XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Perrin, 1989); Jean-Pierre Dedieu, *L’Administration de la foi: l’Inquisition de Tolède, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1989); William Monter, *Frontiers of Heresy: The Spanish Inquisition from the Basque Lands to Sicily* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benzion Netanyahu, *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain* (New York: Random House, 1995); Francisco Bethencourt, *La Inquisición en la época moderna: España, Portugal, Italia, siglos XV-XIX* (Madrid: Akal, 1997); Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions*; Stuart B. Schwartz, *All Can Be Saved: Religious Tolerance and Salvation in the Iberian Atlantic World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico*; Martin Austin Nesvig, *Ideology and Inquisition: The World of the Censors in Early Mexico* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). In 2011, Dedieu called the field, in so far as it did not respond to Italian historiography or look to one of a few approaches, “ruined” (see Jean-Pierre Dedieu, “The Spanish Inquisition. Current Research in Perspective,” in *A Dieci anni dall’apertura dell’Archivio della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede: Storia e archivi dell’Inquisizione, Rome, 21-23 Février 2008* (Rome: Scienza e Lettera Editore Commerciale, 2011), 51-69) though the 2000s were a rich decade for the intervention of Latin Americanists. Silverblatt’s study of the Inquisition in colonial Peru as an engine of modernity is particularly suggestive.

officials serving within them. This practice, not undertaken by the Roman Inquisition, essentially represented an extension of the territorial state into the “peripheries” of the Spanish and Portuguese empires beyond the tribunal. In the case of Spain, it had been instituted by the Holy Office’s instructions from 1498 and two years later, the Inquisitor General re-iterated this end when he ordered that inquisitors visit any areas in which investigations had not taken place, with the effect that the institution should have an itinerant character. This began, despite opposition from the inquisitors themselves, in the early sixteenth century. In 1517, the practice was modified such that the inquisitors would, under normal conditions, take turns to visit their territory every four months with codified penalties (namely, a year without pay) imposed on inquisitors who failed to carry out this duty. In the 1560s, further modifications to the practice regulated the principal aims of these tours. First, the visitations would publish the “Edict of Faith,” the intent of which was to compel the faithful to confess to any wrongdoing. Second, the visitations provided for the oversight and discipline of local Inquisition officials, the commissioners and familiars. Third, the inquisitor was to collect information about penitents, ensuring their continued good conduct and the completion of any punishments.⁶⁶²

The activities of these visitas reflected the particular situation of the tribunal. In the northern tribunals in Spain, the Atlantic and the French and Portuguese borders framed the work of social control. For the tribunal in Galicia, visitas were directed to controlling the Atlantic ports and the spread of Protestantism as well as the circulation of individuals from Portugal. For the tribunal in Calahorra, later Logroño, Protestantism was a similarly critical threat to be monitored as was witchcraft, most famously in the early seventeenth century when a witch hunt spilled into its Navarrese jurisdiction from southern France. To the south, monitoring *moriscos* was more essential. In Toledo, the visitas dealt with the population that had been expelled from Granada while in Valencia, the areas that were most visited were those with the highest concentration of moriscos.⁶⁶³

Curiously, these visitations had all but ceased by the 1640s, due in part to logistical inconveniences, local opposition, and the tribunals’ insolvency. At the same time, much of its work had been subsumed by the Church’s visitas. But even in the sixteenth century, tribunals regularly failed to perform their duties and orders subsequently reduced their obligations. By the middle of the century, they were only expected to carry out the visitations annually, though they nevertheless were expected to perform other supplementary tasks, including inspections of ships and libraries as part of the Inquisition’s censorial function. In Valladolid, visitations had been suspended entirely by 1650 and it had been one of the last tribunals to conduct visitations

⁶⁶² Bethencourt, *La Inquisición en la época moderna: España, Portugal, Italia, siglos XV-XIX*, 268-279; María del Carmen Sáenz Berceo, “La visita en el tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Valladolid (1600-1650),” *Revista de la Inquisición* 7 (1998), 334-5. Bethencourt described the visitations particularly well and rightly links them to the expanding domain of the state in the reproduction of values as the essential question rather than their ineffectiveness, though he perceived it as a “top-down” mechanism for normative creation.

⁶⁶³ Bethencourt, *La Inquisición en la época moderna: España, Portugal, Italia, siglos XV-XIX*, 273; Ricardo García Cárcel, *Orígenes de la Inquisición española. El tribunal de Valencia, 1478-1530* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1976), 188; Jaime Contreras, *El Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Galicia (poder, sociedad, cultura)* (Madrid: Akal, 1982), 476; Iñaki Reguera Acedo, *La Inquisición Española en el País Vasco (El tribunal de Calahorra, 1513-1570)* (San Sebastián: Txertoa, 1984), 64-8; Jean-Pierre Dedieu, “Les inquisiteurs de Tolède et la visite du district,” *Mèlanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 13 (1977), 235-56.

with any kind of frequency into the 1640s, even if it only performed them once every two to eight years.⁶⁶⁴

As the tribunals extended the domain of the state in the localities, the expanding system of tribunals itself required discipline to cultivate a standardized administration of justice. Indeed, as was the case with the audiencias, the expansion of the institution of the visita seems to have closely followed the establishment of the tribunals in Spain, with the first visita to a tribunal taking place in the late fifteenth century, likely before 1490. The 1498 instructions for the Inquisition, which instituted local visitas, also provided a permanent system for a cyclical inspection of the tribunals, with Francisco de Simancas serving as an inspector in 1500, Alonso Rodríguez serving circa 1509 for the then separate Inquisition of Castile, and Juan Moris serving circa 1514.

By the early sixteenth century, the visitas of the tribunals were increasingly carried out irregularly with individual tribunals being inspected by inquisitors from other tribunals appointed by special commission, in effect putting the practice in line with the broader institution.⁶⁶⁵ By the middle of the century, the visitas to the Holy Office of the Inquisition's twenty-one tribunals were commissioned from within the institution by the General Inquisitor and the Council of the Supreme and General Inquisition generally in response to complaints about a local tribunal and its work was carried out using the same procedures of investigation typical of the institution of the visita in gathering testimony about the conduct of the tribunals' officers and performing an audit of all the tribunal's records. These visitas continued with significant frequency until the latter decades of the seventeenth century, when the importance and activity of the tribunals diminished considerably and as the control of them by the Supreme Council of the Inquisition became more effective.⁶⁶⁶

Unfortunately, the chronological and geographical tendencies of these visitas are even more difficult to ascertain than those of the audiencias. Despite the large number of inspections that were commissioned to inspect the tribunals of the Inquisition, surprisingly few records of its work survive. As cataloged, the collection of Inquisition records in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* contains substantive juridical materials related to the investigations carried out by only about seventy of these visitas, the earliest of which are from the 1520s. Of these, the greatest number occurred in the 1560s, a decade in which there were at least twelve visitas, probably in conjunction with the reform to the Inquisition in its instructions from 1561. In contrast to the visitations, the decades with the second greatest frequency were the 1630s and 1640s, when there were at least eight visitas each decade (table 13).⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁴ Sáenz Berceo, "La visita en el tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Valladolid (1600-1650)," 335-343, 364. In one amusing set of postponements the Council of the Inquisition had received notice of an alleged outbreak of witchcraft in León in 1612 and, in 1613, requested that the tribunal of Valladolid dispatch an inquisitor to conduct a visita. The tribunal, in turn, responded that there was no such problem and that a visita was unnecessary. Later that year, the council's request for a visitation was met with equivocation about which inquisitor would have to carry the task out and a notice of the inconvenience of having to perform the task due to the abundant cases and its conflicts with the Chancery of Valladolid. The council once again acquiesced to a delay.

⁶⁶⁵ Henry Charles Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1906), 227-230; Bethencourt, *La Inquisición en la época moderna: España, Portugal, Italia, siglos XV-XIX*, 243-248.

⁶⁶⁶ Sáenz Berceo, "La visita en el tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Valladolid (1600-1650)," 374.

⁶⁶⁷ N.B. The start dates from the catalog record are not necessarily accurate, in one case (Logroño) giving 1610 when the visita must have begun somewhat later (1619 is most likely) based on the documents from it.

Table 13. Dates of cataloged visitas to tribunals of the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

	Charles V	Philip II	Philip III	Philip IV	Charles II
Seville 1482		1589		1643	
Zaragoza 1482		1567, 1595			
Valencia 1482	1528	1554, 1566, 1567			
Barcelona 1484		1560, 1567, 1575, 1586			1667
Córdoba 1485	1544	1577, 1589, 1596		1631, 1642, 1646	
Toledo 1485		1561, 1591		1627, 1639, 1647	
Llerena 1485		1565, 1585	1619	1623, 1633, 1639	1696
Valladolid 1488		1560, 1561, 1567		1639	
Murcia 1488		1563			
Mallorca 1488		1569			
Cuenca 1489		1559			
Las Palmas 1505		1574, 1582, 1597		1631	
Logroño <i>Calahorra 1512</i>			1610	1652	
Sicily 1513		1575	1610	1633	
Sardinia 1513		1596	1613, 1620	1640, 1640, 1664	1696
Granada 1526	1545	1572	1603, 1614	1641	
Santiago 1574		1596	1599, 1602, 1611		
Lima 1569		1583		1624	
Mexico 1569				1645, 1654	
Cartagena de Indias 1610				1630, 1650	

However, there are regular indications that there were considerably more *visitas* than these seventy. For example, although only three *visitas* to the tribunal in Sicily have substantive surviving records, the earliest of which date to the 1570s, an account of the work of previous *visitas* there written in the 1610s describes no fewer than six prior *visitas* beginning in the 1520s. Nevertheless, the distribution of known *visitas* points to the role of the Holy Office and the *visitas* of it as an imperial rather than strictly peninsular institution, as each of the twenty-one tribunals was inspected and records survive for seven *visitas* to the tribunal in Sardinia, three to the tribunal in Sicily, four to the tribunal in the Canary Islands, and two to each of the tribunals in Mexico City, Lima, and Cartagena de Indias.

As Medina Rico's letter that opened this chapter suggests, the foremost purpose of the *visitas* to the tribunals by the middle of the sixteenth century, corresponding to the reason for their commission, was instilling discipline in the local tribunals that had been decried as abusive or corrupt. Indeed, the *visita* he carried out of the tribunal in Mexico beginning in 1654 – as well as that of his predecessor that began in 1645 – was emblematic of the manner in which institutional oversight and discipline was focused at the nexus of institutions and society in the localities. From the 1590s through the 1630s, the Inquisition in Mexico had been characterized by the decline of its work, a decline which continued through the seventeenth century, its prestige, and its income, which it drew from fines and confiscations. That decline was suddenly and dramatically interrupted by a campaign against “crypto-Jews” in a period of broader political and social disruption in New Spain in the 1640s. That disruption had in large part been activated by the *visita* of the Audiencia of Mexico beginning in 1640 as carried out by the Bishop of Puebla, Juan de Palafox y Mendoza.⁶⁶⁸

In 1642, while serving in that role and at least ostensibly in fulfillment of the Crown's orders, Palafox arrested the viceroy, the Duke of Escalona, after the bishop had accused the viceroy of supporting the revolt of Portugal against the Hapsburg monarchy that had begun at the end of 1640.⁶⁶⁹ During the political crisis that targeted the Portuguese presence in New Spain that he himself had helped inflame, Palafox was installed as the interim Archbishop of Mexico and, upon the arrest of the Duke of Escalona, as the interim viceroy, a position he hoped to hold more permanently in order to pursue an extensive program of reform. Palafox's campaign against the Portuguese, which coincided with a broader decay of socio-cultural cohesion, also merged – not without Palafox's intervention – with an invigorated and extensive campaign against the crypto-Jews, who had been linked to a specter of conspiracy and insurrection in the Americas since the 1630s and were the target of the Holy Office in general in the 1640s and 1650s.⁶⁷⁰ Along with the tribunal in Mexico, the tribunals of Toledo and Cuenca

⁶⁶⁸ Alberro, *Inquisición y sociedad en México*; Richard E. Greenleaf, “The Great *Visitas* of the Mexican Holy Office,” *The Americas* 44, no. 4 (Apr., 1988), 400-401; Nesvig, *Ideology and Inquisition*, 137-173.

⁶⁶⁹ The allegation was largely founded on the Duke of Escalona's marital link to the Duke of Braganza, who was acclaimed as King of Portugal as a result of the revolt.

⁶⁷⁰ Luis González Obregón, *Rebeliones indígenas y precursores de la independencia mexicana en los siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII*, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Ediciones Fuente Cultural, 1952), 214-6; Jonathan I. Israel, *Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610-70* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 205; Alberro, *Inquisición y sociedad en México*, 543; Stanley M. Hordes, “The Inquisition as Economic and Political Agent: The Campaign of the Mexican Holy Office against the Crypto-Jews in the Mid-Seventeenth Century,” *The Americas* 39 (1982), 23-38; Seymour B. Liebman, “The Great Conspiracy in New Spain,” *The Americas* 30, no. 1 (Jul., 1973), 13-81; Greenleaf, “The Great *Visitas* of the Mexican Holy Office,” 401-410.

were the sites of intense prosecutions of Portuguese New Christians.⁶⁷¹ Throughout the 1640s, the tribunal, whose work in Mexico had all but ceased in the 1630s, prosecuted 212 cases of Judaizing, conducted several *autos de fé*, and confiscated a reported 554,299 pesos, a figure that was underreported by as much as an order of magnitude.⁶⁷²

As early as 1643, reports of the inquisitors' embezzlement of these confiscations began to reach Madrid and, in 1645, the Council of the Inquisition commissioned a visita to be carried out by the new archbishop of Mexico, Juan de Mañozca, whose cousin Juan Saenz de Mañozca had been serving as an inquisitor in the tribunal since 1642. The cousins, together with their allies in the audiencia in Mexico, were eager carry out investigations to discipline the officers of the tribunal – and indeed the visita removed two inquisitors from the tribunal, but the visita's work was complicated by the instability that Palafox was wont to foment. The bishop, who had already antagonized the tribunal through his interventions in the early 1640s, provoked open hostility by pursuing a controversial campaign against the Jesuits, who were closely associated with the Inquisition and who were likewise supported by Juan de Mañozca and the new viceroy, the Count of Salvatierra. In turn, the tribunal began openly meddling in the bishop's jurisdiction and arresting his supporters, forcing Palafox to flee Puebla for fear of arrest in 1647. To alleviate pressure on the tribunal from the visita, at least one of the inquisitors supplied the bishop, whose protests and efforts to plead for a new visita were left without response, with provocative declarations about the Mañozcas' alleged statements. By 1649, the ongoing political violence had forced the Crown to recall Palafox, who had failed to secure definitive papal support for his cause, while Juan de Mañozca resigned as visitador. Two years later, the fallout from the Palafox controversy and the preliminary work from Mañozca's visita compelled the Council of the Inquisition to commission a second visita to be carried out by Pedro Medina Rico.⁶⁷³

While the tensions in the viceroyalty that caused the Council of the Inquisition to commission Medina Rico's visita have certainly attracted more attention than his inspection itself, the latter, a model of the regularity that had come to characterize the visita, were indicative of the manner in which empire worked as a steady, normative force on the localities based principally on the standards produced externally. Accordingly, the visitas' investigative attentions were typically focused by the regularizing attentions described in a standard questionnaire, which for visitas of the Inquisition consisted of forty-nine questions. These dealt with a range of issues, calling on witnesses to provide information about whether officials fulfilled the required schedule for work, whether there was any conflict between the officials, whether they had accepted bribes in cases or for providing services such as certificates of *limpieza de sangre*, whether they had associated with those who were subject to the Inquisition's discipline, whether they had preserved secrecy in their proceedings, and, especially important for these inspections, whether they followed procedures correctly.⁶⁷⁴ In

⁶⁷¹ Helen Rawlings, *The Spanish Inquisition* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 18.

⁶⁷² Greenleaf, "The Great Visitas of the Mexican Holy Office," 402.

⁶⁷³ Toribio Medina, *Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición en México*, 215-236; Greenleaf, "The Great Visitas of the Mexican Holy Office," 401-410.

⁶⁷⁴ Luis Alberto Anaya Hernández and Francisco Fajardo Spínola, "Las visitas de inspección a la Inquisición de Canarias. Siglo XVI," *VIII Coloquio de Historia Canario-Americana* (1988), vol. 2 (Las Palmas: Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, 1991), 775-802.

conjunction with that, the visitador and his staff examined the tribunals' records, a task of particular importance for Medina Rico's visita, which reviewed eighteen years of records.

Like the visitas of the audiencias, adherence of local institutions to the norms of justice and the instructions that governed them were central to Medina Rico's work. One such review found deficiencies in well over 100 *probanzas* of *limpieza de sangre* for the tribunals' officials – contrary to norms, these were conducted after the grant of a title and lacked information about grandparents' lineage – and required these officials, often from aristocratic families, to vacate their titles. The effect was a far more rigorous but quite unpopular enforcement of standards that was particularly resented by colonial elites.⁶⁷⁵

Special attention was given to the tribunal's trial records. Among a wide range of failures, the visita charged the tribunal's officials with failures to substantiate charges and denunciations prior to arresting suspects, failures to note denunciations in trial records, failures to indict suspects prior to their arrest, and failures to properly record over 3,000 testimonies in 179 cases (177 of which were in cases of crypto-Jews). Finally, 104 cases tried by the tribunal were found to have continued indefinitely, forty-nine trials had no record of a definitive vote, and 106 cases had no recorded final sentence. This endemic malfeasance was associated with the interests of the tribunals' officials, as the estates they had confiscated had not been itemized nor stored in the archive intended to hold these records.⁶⁷⁶

The financial malfeasance obfuscated by the tribunal's records would guide the remainder of the Medina Rico's visita. Over the course of the next seven years, Medina Rico continued to carry out an audit of the Inquisition's finances, leading him to suspect that the tribunal had largely concealed the value of its confiscations during the 1640s. His estimate, in contrast to the reported figure of 559,299 pesos was closer to 700,000 pesos and that the tribunal's auto de fé in 1649 resulted in the additional confiscation of approximately 3,000,000 pesos.⁶⁷⁷

As was the case with the audiencias, externally driven institutionalization was not, however, the extent of the visita's connection with the Holy Office of the Inquisition. While the audit of the Mexican tribunal's records was essential to Medina Rico's visita, the visitas of the Inquisition's tribunals could also heavily employ witnesses who guided its work towards particular differences that emerged from the tribunals' local setting. In the tribunal for the Canary Islands, which was the subject of three visitas in the late sixteenth century, this surveillance of the intersection between the tribunal and local society was of growing centrality. The 1574 visita to its tribunal collected 114 depositions, including testimonies from seven officials of the tribunal, fifteen individuals jailed by it, eighteen members of the clergy, and twenty officials or members of the administrative elite in Las Palmas. Nearly two decades later, the visita collected over twice as many depositions, 241, including depositions from nineteen tribunal officials along with thirteen individuals jailed by the tribunals, twenty-five members of the clergy, and forty-one members of the administrative core. Such figures have suggested a central link between the visita and individuals connected to local power and authority and its discipline linked to the demands of that social group. In the inspection that began in 1574,

⁶⁷⁵ Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, 194-5.

⁶⁷⁶ Greenleaf, "The Great Visitas of the Mexican Holy Office," 410-20.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 419; Helen Phipps, "Notes on Medina Rico's Visita de Hacienda to the Inquisition of Mexico," in *Todd Memorial Volumes*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), 79-89.

about forty percent of the witnesses, excluding individuals who were jailed, were members of one of these spheres. By 1592, that figure increased to 43%.⁶⁷⁸ But that belies the considerable increase in scale in two decades, which like the *visitas* in Italy, drew more broadly upon the society with which the administrative core interacted.

This tendency was particularly evident in the 1610 *visita* to Sicily, a *visita* that accumulated testimonies from 324 witnesses, in which the links between the tribunal and the socio-political centers of power in Sicily were substantially less obvious. Only 17% of the witnesses for that *visita* were among the tribunal's officials with a small number of individuals holding positions in the Church. Annotations also indicate that twenty-eight individuals who provided testimony were doctors, two were *licenciados*, and forty-three individuals had a prefix of "don" or "doña." The connections between the tribunal and civil institutions were similarly unclear.⁶⁷⁹ To be sure, the Sicilian tribunal was closely tied to elite society in Sicily, as it represented one of the principal sources of integration between Sicilian and Spanish elites with officials of the Great Court and the Consistory in Sicily regularly being named *consultores* of the tribunal.⁶⁸⁰ The institution was similarly central to the political life of the island, as it was closely linked to the downfall of one of its viceroys and, just a few years before the 1610 *visita*, had been tied to a conflict with the Great Court over a jurisdictional dispute that had been central to one of the investigations of Ochoa de Luyando's *visita* general that began in 1606.⁶⁸¹ But there is reason to suggest that discipline emerged less out of the Inquisition's ties with elites than from other sources. Of the 324 witnesses in the 1610 *visita*, merely seven appeared anywhere in the network associated with the preceding inspection of the Great Court, one of the institutions most closely linked to the Inquisition, none of whom were judges of the Great Court.

Their participation illustrated the expanding ability of the state to monitor and collect information, putting pressure on a broader range of behavior than was immediately connected to audits of records or the depositions of elites.

The success of the *visitas* of the Inquisition's tribunals largely resulted from the reforms that they instituted, reforms that stabilized institutions that were particularly susceptible to the pressures on the tribunals from the local context. That stabilizing response to local tension was exemplified by the tribunal in Logroño, which had administered the only witch-hunt in Spain with over 5,000 accused witches beginning in 1609 and where the Council of the Inquisition commissioned a special territorial visitation in 1611 under Alonso Salazar to better control the situation. Salazar's notices about the numerous procedural discrepancies to the council in turn resulted in a *visita* of the tribunal that gave particular attention to those correcting problems.⁶⁸²

In Sicily, the *visitas* of the tribunals in the sixteenth century were closely associated with establishing an equilibrium between the institution and popular acceptance, one which faltered because of entrenched resistance and hostility to its presence. According to the records

⁶⁷⁸ Anaya Hernández and Fajardo Spínola, "Las visitas de inspección a la Inquisición de Canarias," 779-780.

⁶⁷⁹ AHN, Inquisición, leg. 1752, exp. 1, ff. 7-11v. "Memorial y Reportorio de los tsº, que están esaminados en este quaderno de la Vissita."

⁶⁸⁰ Benigno, "Integration and Conflict in Spanish Sicily," 31-5; Rivero Rodríguez, "Corte y 'Poderes provinciales,'" 73-101; Sciuti Russi, "Inquisición, política y justicia en la Sicilia de Felipe II," 387-411.

⁶⁸¹ AGS, VIT, 219, ff. 39v-48; AGS, SSP, libro 688, see e.g., f. 51.

⁶⁸² AHN, Inquisición, leg. 1684, exp. 3; see also Gustav Henningsen, *The Witches' Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish Inquisition (1609-1614)* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1980).

from the 1610 visita undertaken by Lorenzo Florez, the first visita to Sicily, as was typical, fulfilled the function of copying the instructions for the tribunal in 1525. The records from the second visita, which began in 1543, provided little information about its accomplishments. But they seemed to indicate a reform of the institution in that the limitations on the tribunal's jurisdiction that been imposed since the 1530s were revoked and its jurisdiction expanded to include all cases against its officials, familiars, and ministers, regardless of the viceroy's instructions.⁶⁸³

This expansion of its jurisdiction proved to be substantially unpopular. Within three years, another visita to the tribunal had begun but it was jeopardized by the tumult that broke out against the tribunal when the visitador published the edict of faith. At the monastery of San Domenico in Palermo, rioters stole all the tribunal's *sambenitos* (penitential garments) which had yet to be found in 1610 and burned the tribunal's records. Elsewhere, its bailiff was beaten and left for dead after attempting to arrest individuals suspected of heresy. The visitador himself was an object of this escalating violence as he and his servants were nearly killed after his residence was the target of arson. His safety was only assured by the intervention of a baroness, whose service was returned by several privileges on her behalf and the continued favor of the Holy Office.⁶⁸⁴ In the 1570s, two successive visitas in 1572 and 1575 worked to assure that this violence would not occur again. The first, according to Florez, was noted for "providing many things for the good direction of the Holy Office and its ministers." The second was similarly noted for having "provided many necessary things" to ensure tranquility and the successful administration of the tribunal.⁶⁸⁵

Controlling the intervention of the tribunals in local society and limiting the resistance of elites to the norms of empire was similarly an object of the visitas to the tribunal in Las Palmas, where the interconnected nature of Atlantic empire in commerce and contraband rather than local privileges proved to be the source of disjuncture between the Holy Office, the empire's institutional regime, and the society it was tasked with disciplining. Throughout the 1580s and 1590s, commercial links between Spain and the Canary Islands were frequently disrupted by French, English, and Dutch piracy and smuggling. On the one hand, this represented a threat to the islands, especially since it established a trade for captives taken from them or from ships travelling between them. On the other hand, it was an opportunity for its elites who maintained inter-imperial connections.

Even the Crown, although not without ambivalence and dramatic shifts in attitude, recognized the importance of maintaining commercial relations beyond the empire, a commerce that it sometimes protected and sometimes attempted to suppress. In the isolated Canary Islands, English and Dutch merchants provided an essential exchange of food products, wine, salt, and silver for fish, cloth, and materials for ship construction. The presence and role of merchants permeated the society of the islands, including the officials of the tribunal who were intended to restrict them. Among those was one of its prosecutors, Joseph de Armas, who was alleged to have maintained correspondence with an English resident in the Canaries, Juan

⁶⁸³ AHN, Inquisición, leg. 1752, exp. 1, f. 13.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 13v. This visita was concurrent with Diego de Córdoba's visita in Sicily and his intervention in the tribunal. Lea described this tumult but there is some confusion about its date, as he suggested that it occurred in the 1530s. Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, 23-4.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 13-13v.

Gache. Gache, for his part, claimed extensive services on behalf of the Spanish administration, supposedly including having saved the mayor of Santa Cruz de Tenerife from French pirates and compelling his brother to convince Francis Drake to stop an attack on the islands. Gache's "entangled" role notwithstanding, the presence of foreigners was viewed by the *visitadores* as an existential threat both to the norms expected of empire and to the territorial control that those norms safeguarded.

The *visita*, then, was viewed as instrumental in reinvigorating the flagging efforts to control commerce in the empire. Its efforts to control commercial traffic in the early and mid-1590s led to a series of arrests of merchants whose provenance was falsified, including English merchants who claimed to be Scottish and Dutch merchants who presented forged documents from neutral territories, along with the impounding of their ships and cargos. For as foreign protestants, these merchants were subject to the Inquisition and, according to the *visitador*, some 185 merchants had been arrested by 1593.⁶⁸⁶ This was met with little enthusiasm on the part of local residents, notably elites who depended upon commerce. Those elites, including some officials, sent petitions to support the master of one of the captured vessels, Jacob Marsen, or protested the arrest of other merchants due to their dependence on the trade. The *visitador* found this abhorrent, for it demonstrated, in his eyes, the lack of respect that local elites had for the Inquisition and indicated their favor for foreigners. Such, he believed, was the way of things in "these parts," bemoaning the fact that this attack on the tribunal "will be the door through which enemies will enter to capture this fortress."⁶⁸⁷

Yet the Crown ultimately heeded economic necessity and the petitions of the locality over the complaints of the *visitador*. Although it had explicitly granted the *visitador* the authority to proceed against merchants with falsified documents, it subsequently retracted that authority in 1594 and only granted him authority in cases in which those individuals committed crimes under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, leaving other matters to the governor. This was not as grave a defeat for the *visita*'s legacy as it otherwise suggested.

But the greatest accomplishments of the *visitas* of the tribunals of the Inquisition were associated less with directly controlling the behavior of its inquisitors and more with the creation of professionalizing associations and especially with the inculcation of financial discipline that had the effect of normalizing the activity of the tribunals and its officials during the seventeenth century. In Mexico, where Medina Rico's *visita* ultimately resulted in minimal fines and punishments, the reforms resulting from his inspection were far more successful in reinforcing discipline and creating the means for which officials could be instructed in proper practice. The first and in some sense more institutionally prominent of these reforms was the creation of a confraternity for the tribunal's officers, an institution that was typical of other tribunals. More important was that the *visita* forced a shift in the tribunal's financial practices, as the funds that had been dubiously accumulated in the 1640s were, through Medina Rico's work, subsequently invested while additional revenue began to come principally from bequests and these investments rather than through the confiscation of estates in trials.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁶ Anaya Hernández and Fajardo Spínola, "Las visitas de inspección a la Inquisición de Canarias. Siglo XVI," 787-791.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 792. "será puerta por donde los enemigos se entrarán a rendir esta fortaleza"

⁶⁸⁸ Phipps, "Notes on Medina Rico's *Visita de Hacienda* to the Inquisition of Mexico," 89; Greenleaf, "The Great *Visitas* of the Mexican Holy Office," 419; Richard E. Greenleaf, "The Inquisition Brotherhood: *Cofradía de San Pedro Martir* of Colonial Mexico," *The Americas* 40 (1983), 171-207.

The reforms resulting from Medina Rico's visita was paralleled in the visitas to the tribunal of Las Palmas in the late sixteenth century. The first visitador to the tribunal in Las Palmas indicated to the Council of the Inquisition that the tribunal that was subject to his inspection was an Inquisition in name alone as it lacked the capacity to perform any of its duties due to its lack of income, officials, or a permanent office. Indeed, in the 1580s, the space it occupied was so inadequate that the tribunal's vital functions were continuously compromised. Its jails were located directly underneath the tribunals' principal halls, allowing prisoners to hear the proceedings, and were not adequately separated, allowing the prisoners to communicate amongst themselves. The conditions of the prisons themselves were dire, though there was some solace in that the tribunal almost never employed torture. At the time of the inspection, there had been only one known use of torture in the previous six years and it required the inquisitor to use an improvised tool from the garden. Meanwhile, the tribunal's documents and confiscated items were stored in a small room with windows at street level, which compromised its security. Although the visitador recommended that bars be installed to safeguard the room and the documents inside, the suggestion was ignored for lack of funds. That destitution was so great that the same visitador's recommendation for maintaining a locked chest to hold its funds was thought almost unnecessary.

Although the salary of one of the two inquisitors was paid for through the benefice for one of the canons in Las Palmas that the Holy Office had been conceded, the remainder of the tribunal's salaries had to be met through other means. Because of the tribunal's insufficient and irregular caseload, the visitadores suggested a variety of means to provide financial stability, including acquiring another benefice or, given the location of the tribunal, the acquisition of a license from the Crown for the tribunal to go into the business of slavery, with export and sales of as many as 300 enslaved peoples. Neither of these were needed. Although de la Cueva's confiscations of ships and merchandise had been halted by local resistance by 1597, they had produced an impressive sum of 423,137 *reales*. The funds gave the tribunal enough liquidity to make profitable investments, which combined with reductions to expenses in offices and salaries, was the foundation for the tribunal's finances for the remainder of the seventeenth century, a century in which there was only one visita.⁶⁸⁹

Ensuring the discipline of the Holy Office and the stability of its local tribunals accordingly combined the inculcation of norms of conduct associated with other judicial institutions and the control of finances at which the visita was particularly adept. That financial discipline was the basis for the final means by which the visita expanded the domain of the state.

⁶⁸⁹ Anaya Hernández and Fajardo Spínola, "Las visitas de inspección a la Inquisición de Canarias. Siglo XVI," 781-782. 793-797. Its offices were then in a house let out by Juan Cervantes, who had been sent to Mexico in 1571 to assist in the creation of the tribunal there, with the rent going towards orphans' dowries. The house was later purchased outright by the tribunal in 1652 and was used with other nearby structures.

Although the *visitas* of the audiencias, tribunals, and councils have traditionally attracted the most intense historical attention, the discipline of those bodies constituted only one aspect of the *visita*'s role in the construction of Spain's empire. Its regulation of official norms in the creation of a modern state was complemented by a vast system of inspections, administered by the Crown itself, its councils, and by its local institutions that sought to control the financial structures of empire and provide for the governance of the Crown's personal patrimony. While based on patrimonial interests and paternalistic protection, these inspections, which reached into virtually every domain of institutional, social, and economic life, suggested a fundamental potential to remake them through the state. In the broader institutional space of empire, the flexible and dynamic – although hardly always successful – practice of the *visita* took on a variety of forms that, even when molded by the formal and jurisdictional distinctions that characterized the early modern legal order, pointed to an expansive and intrusive role for the state in the construction of the norms and categories beyond the sphere of official life that made up empire. The *visita* was therefore not merely an extension of the Crown's patronage of justice. In its broader sense, it constituted a novel expansion of institutional space that anticipated the state as the locus for regulation and provided the incipient mechanism for rationalizing resources, populations, and territories in the sixteenth century.

That expansion, of which the *visita* was at the *avant garde*, was distinct from Scott's notion of legibility, in which the domain of the state essentially represented an imposition by the state in areas that did not substantively depart from its fiscal role. Though that role was essential in the *visita*, inspections also fundamentally depended on the agglomeration of local practices, interests, and knowledge, which shaped the nature of the state's domain. That domain and the practices associated with it were made universal across the empire.

In the strictest sense, the consolidation of the norms and controls of fiscal administration was an apparent early locus for the intervention of the state and its institutions, led by inspections that were carried out in internal audits and, by the sixteenth century, the secondary oversight of the *visitas*. Despite the fact that fiscal administration was as, if not more so, emblematic of the heterogeneity of the early modern state as the administration of justice, those audits and *visitas* represented a rigorous institutionalization of normative practices as a layer built upon local practice. In Sicily, a framework for internal financial audits had developed in the fourteenth century, but municipal resistance to the Crown's central administration was confirmed in privileges that exempted Palermo, Messina, and Catania from external audits. In the case of Palermo, the fluctuating structure of audits led by the city's treasurer, *maestro razionale* or chief accountant, and the *razionale* or auditor were only obligated to provide internally produced reports to the viceroy. Despite these exemptions, the sixteenth century history of fiscal control was characterized by the expansion of state oversight through the inculcation of standardized practices internally and coordination with the external supervision of the Crown's patrimony and revenue provided by the *visitas* in Italy. From 1573, reforms enacted by the viceroys and the municipal governments fixed the roles of municipal officers, made double-entry book keeping with a ledger compulsory, and granted the *maestro razionale* the task – which was in fact carried out by his assistants with actual accounting expertise – of

auditing these records annually together with the records for other municipal offices, including those responsible for administering taxes and food provisioning. In turn, the *visitas* provided a second level of auditing over the municipal administration as the records produced by it were reviewed by the *visitador* and his staff.⁶⁹⁰

That second level of auditing could be particularly potent, as was the case of the Crown's intervention in municipal finances in Valencia, where *visitas* of royal officials were complemented by the task of inspecting municipal officials, including the extensive series of *visitas* that began in 1623 and continued until 1698. These were conducted with the particular purpose of controlling municipal finances beginning in response to their disastrous condition that later led to the bankruptcy of the *Taula de Canvis* in the 1630s. Though the *visitas* could not prevent that bankruptcy, they did provide for the means to prosecute officials for the frauds that had directly contributed to the *Taula's* insolvency, including the falsification of its crediting records.⁶⁹¹

The *visita* also existed as an internal control at the local level, as was the case of the *visita del General*, a form of *visita* established in the Catalan Corts that met in 1599 at the beginning of Philip III's reign,⁶⁹² and was intended to "reprimand the excesses and disorders" committed by the officials of the *Diputació del Generalitat* – a body that, among other duties, collected taxes in Catalonia for the Corts – at the beginning of the triennial terms of the incoming officials as conducted by a committee of nine *visitadores*. Although the novelty of the institution presented particular problems, in part because of its conflicts with the established institutional landscape of the principality and in part because the *visita* was conducted through those same institutions rather than through the Crown's commission, it retained its potency. During the third *visita del General*, for example, a number of debates about the legality of the *visita's* processes occupied much of the attention of the *visitadores* and after several delegations from the deputies, the resolution of a dispute on three points of jurisdiction and competence before the royal *audiencia*, and negotiations between members of several of the Catalan institutions, the *visita* was confirmed to maintain relatively broad powers of investigation and discipline, at least within the confines of the exercise of office.⁶⁹³

Though the *Diputació del Generalitat* and the *visitas* of it were distinctively Catalan, the consolidation of financial oversight with the practice of regular *visitas* was a ubiquitous feature of empire. In the Americas, for example, financial administration was carried out by numerous *cajas reales*, which were first established in areas with significant populations or those of economic or military interest after conquest until nearly 150 had been established. Initially under the direct management of the Council of the Indies, the *cajas* later developed into a hierarchical system in which minor *cajas* that maintained deficits received subventions from the major *cajas*, usually in the principal cities or economic centers of the Americas, that regularly had surplus funds. Until the early seventeenth century, the auditing of the *cajas* was conducted by the *audiencias*, which received annual balances from the *cajas*, with territorial jurisdiction along with other controls including *pesquisas* and *visitas*. In 1605, the creation of the three

⁶⁹⁰ Geltrude Macrì, "The Supervision of the city financial administration. The audit in Palermo under the Spanish Monarchy," *Comptabilités* [En ligne] 3 (2012), 3-5.

⁶⁹¹ Felipo Orts, "Las visitas de inspección," 143-166.

⁶⁹² The only time the Corts met in his reign.

⁶⁹³ Ricard Torra Prat, "El juego de las instituciones. Políticas de la Visita del General de Catalunya durante la primera mitad del siglo XII," *Tiempos modernos* 32 (2016), 252-260.

tribunales de cuentas in Mexico, Lima, and Santa Fe result in a system in which, with the exception of certain cajas in the Caribbean, cajas were audited by a *contador mayor* from the tribunals who performed an annual visita. Accounts were further revised by the tribunal before being sent to the *Contaduría Mayor* of the Council of the Indies.⁶⁹⁴ The visitas also afforded opportunities to reform the cajas and the tribunales de cuentas, collecting papers and orders and providing information about the state of affairs in conjunction with anticipated structural changes such as the appointment of a new position.⁶⁹⁵

In conjunction with such inspections, the Crown also used the visitas and in some cases commissioned particular visitas to control the production of money. Thus, in Italy, the visitas often undertook investigations of mint officials to ensure their adherence to the norms expected of them. But the most dramatic of these visitas was in the royal mint of Potosí. In the seventeenth century, declining silver production and economic instability in the Andes led to the debasement of coinage, and growing complaints from merchants, notably Genoese merchants, prompted two inspections in the 1630s and 1640s, though neither completed their work. In 1647, Nestares Marín, president of the Audiencia of Charcas and visitador of the mint, began a thorough investigation that, along with the economic decline of the region, dealt a death blow to the systemic fraud that had been protected by elites and merchants in the city. Upon the testimony of the enslaved Africans employed in the mint, the substitute royal assayer was executed for receiving bribes and permitting debasement of coins with his stamp of approval while others who resisted the visitador's work were hanged.⁶⁹⁶

That the state would undertake the discipline of finance is hardly surprising. Yet within that primary, legible function of auditing the Crown's revenue and patrimony were junctures with domains that began to considerably expand the function of the visita and the interest of the state.

Such was the case of the visitas of the army and fleets. In Milan, the auditing of finances in conjunction with administration of the Crown's wars had been connected to the work of the visita since the 1550s, subsuming audits of the state's finances that had been undertaken since the early 1540s. In Naples, a visita of the galleys in 1574 in the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto provided a form of auditing that was replicated in subsequent visitas to Naples and Sicily, noting everything from officers' use of the Crown's galley slaves for personal purposes and the use of ships to carry merchandise to complaints about the poor quality of clothing and

⁶⁹⁴ Ismael Sánchez Bella, *La organización financiera de las Indias* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1968), 59-69.

⁶⁹⁵ For example, AGI, Lima, leg. 280 and in particular "Puntos de la consulta de la Junta de 26 de Julio de 1662 que se remiten al consejo."

⁶⁹⁶ Kris Lane, "From Corrupt to Criminal: Reflections on the Great Potosí Mint Fraud of 1649," in Christoph Ronsemüller, *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017), 56; Arturo Giráldez, "Falsificación monetaria en el siglo XVII: Un memorial de 1650," *eHumanista* 6 (2006), 153-183; Olivier Caporossi, "La falsificación de moneda en la América Hispana a mediados del siglo XVII: Entre reformación administrativa y represión judicial," *Anuario Americanista Europeo* 4-5 (2006-7), 65-82; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "La falsificación de moneda de plata peruana a mediados del siglo XVII," in *Homenaje a don Ramón Carande*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1963), 143-155. See also Peter Bakewell, *Silver and Entrepreneurship in Seventeenth-Century Potosí: The Life and Times of Antonio López de Quiroga* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988); Margarita Suárez Espinosa, "La 'crisis del siglo XVII' en la region andina," in *Formación y apogeo del sistema colonial (siglos XVI-XVII)*, vol. 2, *Historia de América Andina*, Manuel Burga (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 1999), 289-317.

expenses in provisioning hardtack.⁶⁹⁷ In the mid-1590s, the *visita* was even extended to the Low Countries to audit the spending of the Army of Flanders.⁶⁹⁸ Beyond collecting records, the primary purpose of these *visitas* was to prosecute fraud in the financial administration of the army and navy and correspondingly resulted in what were sometimes substantial fines against officials.

But, beginning in the 1580s, they also began to take on new functions. The *visitas* to Milan, as previously described, began to receive complaints regarding abusive army officers in the 1580s and, though this did not result in the punishment of such officers at that moment, the complaints of localities subsequently led to the punishment of officials who failed to maintain discipline by the 1630s.⁶⁹⁹ By the end of the seventeenth century, the *visita* was at least in one case expanded with the explicit function of providing a disciplinary process against commanders who had been defeated in battle.⁷⁰⁰ The fleets returning from the Americas were subject to even more comprehensive inspections, including their conduct, with heavy punishments for illicitly allowing passage to various individuals, notably Portuguese passengers, failing to record cargo, and failing to maintain discipline at sea, for example, by allowing sailors and passengers to gamble at night, which they did at considerable risk to the ship by using lit candles (a behavior which was attributed to the fact that the official in question did not inspect ships and crews as he was obligated).⁷⁰¹

That remaking of the *visita*'s function in the fiscal domain was typical. One of the critical secondary obligations of the *cajas*, for example, was the inspection of ships or *visitas de navíos*, which was carried out by the *Casa de Contratación* and other institutions in Spain. Developing in 1510, the framework of these inspections was principally fiscal, serving as controls on contraband and the evasion of duties.⁷⁰² But, because ports and ships coincided with diverse state interests, the purpose of these inspections was considerably more diffuse. In fact, for ships departing from Seville, there were multiple *visitas* of ships that were undertaken by officials from the *Casa de Contratación* as well as by the *almirantazgo* and the tribunal of the Inquisition beginning in the 1570s, which included ensuring the seaworthiness and armament of ships, providing quarantines, controlling migration, and limiting the spread of printed material and manuscripts.⁷⁰³ To be sure, the inspections carried out by the *Casa de Contratación* were notoriously ineffective. In one instance, one of its inspectors was reputed to have been illiterate,

⁶⁹⁷ AGS, EST, leg.1069, ff. 15, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 90, 93, 102, 122, 187, see also legs. 1076 and 1078 and AGS, VIT, leg. 124; AGS, SSP, leg. 235 “Resulta de la visita de Nápoles del año de 1588”; AGS, VIT, leg. 238, which contains the records of Luyando’s *visita* of the galleys in Sicily is an especially rich source with audits of number of slaves, with various categories, from 1583 to 1600 and deaths, charges against officials, and instructions to “clean the sea” of corsairs, limit blending Spanish and Italian soldiers, provide for the discipline on board ship, which included ensuring that sailors did not blaspheme God, etc.

⁶⁹⁸ AGS, CMC 3e, leg. 947.

⁶⁹⁹ See chapters II and III. Castilla’s *visita*, in which abuse was completely unpunished, contrasts with Rueda Rico’s *visita* where the officer in charge was, while not exactly *severely* punished, found guilty of such counts and fined several hundred ducats.

⁷⁰⁰ See chapter III; AGS, SSP, leg. 237.

⁷⁰¹ AGI, Escribanía 1151A, f. 190. “visita e residencia a Pedro Meléndez Marqués general de las fragatas.”

⁷⁰² María del Carmen Mena García, *Sevilla y las Flotas de Indias: la Gran Armada de Castilla del Oro (1513-1514)* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), 361.

⁷⁰³ *Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias*, 5th ed., vol. 1 (Madrid: Boix, 1841), 68-77. “Titulo treinta y cinco. De la visita de navíos en estos reinos, y en las Indias, y de los guardas mayores y otros.”

a notable inconvenience in a task that was based around checking and documenting manifests. Other *visitadores* and officials were considerably underpaid and corruption – most frequently in the form of a meal provided by ship owners – was endemic. Even in the best of circumstances, the *visitadores* were generally limited in their ability to check cargo against registries and devoted more attention to ensuring that slaves,⁷⁰⁴ priests, and monks were not aboard and the *visitas* could be circumvented by ship owners, with the result that ships often left port overweight.⁷⁰⁵ In turn, the *cajas*, *almirantazgo*, the Casa de Contratación, and tribunals were themselves subject to *visitas* and reforms, though not necessarily with uniform or lasting effect either upon the institutions or on trade.⁷⁰⁶ The extension of the *visita* from the domain of finance to the regulation of the spaces of ports and ships was a manifestly imperial project – an attack, albeit a generally unsuccessful one, on the “entangledness” of the empire’s Atlantic context.

The unique spaces of the Hapsburg empire in the Americas and in the Philippines provided another domain in which the Crown deemed the *visita* especially valuable, the *república de indios*. Including the *visitas de tierra* or *visitas de indios*, a task that in itself entailed several functions, the Crown and its *audiencias* used a variety of *visitas* that constructed and regulated the fabric of the empire’s societies, not surprisingly with particular attention to the vital nexus of colonial indigenous social structures and economic systems. For example, the *visitas de indios* which, despite having quite idiosyncratic practices, are rich sources of demographic data and ethnographic information about land use, collected that information about the number of tributaries and the distribution of indigenous lands with a demonstrably utilitarian intent: fixing the revenue to be collected from indigenous leaders.⁷⁰⁷

Accordingly, these *visitas* have traditionally been associated with the transformation of local society and its spatial configuration by the colonial state. That is particularly true of one of the landmarks of colonial Latin American history, Francisco de Toledo’s five-year *visita* of the Viceroyalty of Peru after his arrival as viceroy in 1569. In it, the crisis of the early colonial order in the viceroyalty was stabilized through the construction of new labor systems, settlement

⁷⁰⁴ This was one of the major investigative interests of Andrés de León Garabito, an *oidor* of the Audiencia of Chile and *visitador* of the *caja real* in Buenos Aires, who noted the lack of regulation in Buenos Aires as slaves were easily brought into the port from Brazil and Angola. His *visita* almost ended disastrously when the Genoese ship he had embarked on in Rio de Janeiro was attacked by English pirates off the Azores and after a desperate struggle, the *visitador* was captured and stripped of most of his belongings, despite his pleas that the records were without value. AGI, Escribanía, leg. 903A.

⁷⁰⁵ Auke P. Jacobs, “Funcionarios con las manos en la masa. La Casa de la Contratación durante el reinado de Carlos V,” in *La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias*, eds. Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003), 375-400; Francisco Javier Díaz González, “Las competencias inspectoras y judiciales de la Casa de la Contratación hasta el reinado de Felipe II,” *Estudios de Historia Social y Económica de América* 14 (1997), 59-73.

⁷⁰⁶ Fernand Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, vol. 3, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 208.

⁷⁰⁷ María Rostworowski Tovar de Diez Canseco, “*Visitas de Indios en el siglo XVI*,” *Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-brésilien* 7 (Actes du colloque sur la littérature et l’histoire du Pérou) (1966), 85-92; Carlos Zanolli, “‘*Visitas de la tierra*,’ de su historia europea al terreno en América. Chucuito, Jujuy y Traija (siglos XVI y XVII),” *Revista Historia y Justicia* 3 (Oct., 2014), 140-165. See also Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government: On the History of the World and the Incas Up to 1615*, ed. and trans. Roland Hamilton (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009). Gumán Poma’s text deals with ecclesiastical visitations at length as well as the state’s *visitas* (including Toledo’s).

patterns, and social structures that ordered the space of empire in the service of economic and paternalistic religious interests. Jane Mangan, for example, read the *reducciones* (resettlements) and the intensified *mita* (the Hispanized Incan labor draft) resulting from Toledo's visita as a means of "expanding Crown control over indigenous labor, tribute collection, and social and religious control" that organized the viceroyalty's economy and societies around silver mining in Potosí.⁷⁰⁸

Despite the instrumental use of these visitas for historians, they remain rather poorly understood. Although they certainly represented the imposition of the abstract fiscal legibility of the state,⁷⁰⁹ that was complicated by the fact that such work was characterized by the confluence of divergent aims all the while being bound by local context. In particular, the the work of collecting information about population and revenue was curiously tied to the obligation of the audiencias and visitadores to provide remedy to indios who had been mistreated by, depending on the jurisdiction, *encomenderos*, *corregidores*, *caciques*, and "other powerful people," mistreatment that was associated with their incorporation into the economic sphere.⁷¹⁰

The conflict inherent in such goals was manifest in the visita undertaken by Fernando de la Riva Agueros, an oidor of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, of eight encomiendas in Cumaná in 1686. The primary purpose, of course, was the determination of the "increase" in revenue owed to the Crown. Accordingly, the state acted to protect the Crown's revenue by limiting disruptions to labor and, by extension, worked on behalf of elite interests. Thus, the visitador was tasked with restoring indios who had fled from the jurisdiction of encomenderos to nearby Capuchin missions. But at the same time, the visita was excused from carrying out that task if it could determine that flight to the missions had been a reaction to "mistreatment." For at the same time, the visitador was investigating encomenderos for various abuses and failures to fulfill obligations associated with their paternalistic responsibility. These included failing to employ *doctrineros* who knew the local language and could provide adequate religious instruction, attempts to suppress testimony through promises of gifts, not paying individuals for personal services often in the home, removing indios from their *naturaleza* to the city to work in construction, and violence or excessive labor that resulted in several individuals' deaths, among other charges. The contradictory resolution was to charge the encomenderos for these offenses while also obliging the missions to no longer accept those indios who had fled because further flight would result in the *pueblos* being excused from paying their yearly tribute.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁸ Jane E. Mangan, *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 36-7; Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest*, 51-113.

⁷⁰⁹ Miguel Malagón Pinzón, "Las visitas indianas, una forma de control de la administración pública en el estado absolutista," *Universitas. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas* 108 (2004), 821-38; Beatriz Bixio, Constanza González Navarro, Romina Granada, and Valeria Iarza, *Visita a las encomiendas de indios de Córdoba. 1692-1693*.

Transcripción y estudios sobre la visita de Antonio Martines Luxan de Vargas, 2 vols. (Córdoba, Argentina: Centro de Estudios Históricos "Prof. Carlos S.A. Segreti" and Editorial Brujas, 2016). Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 11-14. There is an alternative view that they were a "ritual" that constructed a colonial legibility of the category of "indio," see Jorge Armando Guevara Gil and Frank L. Salomón, "La Visita personal de indios: ritual político y creación del 'indio' en los Andes coloniales," *Cuadernos de Investigación* 1 (1996), 6-48. The fact that it was a "ritual" or had ritualistic elements does not seem to lend itself to the potency to create that kind of legibility.

⁷¹⁰ For the relationship between "protection," imperial law, and the expansion of the state see chapter four of Benton and Ford, *Rage for Order*.

⁷¹¹ AGI, Escribanía, leg. 739A, see ff. 29-36v. for the question of the missions.

Not surprisingly, monitoring and disciplining abuses in the context of colonial labor structures was less than efficacious. Indeed, one study of five such visitas indicated that 98% of responding indios had no complaints about their treatment.⁷¹² Other studies point to endemic corruption among local officials who carried out the visitas, resulting in minimal oversight or even complicity from the Crown, which received substantial fines from visitas to indigo workshops.⁷¹³ That was when it was provided at all. In Peru, several visitas had been commissioned to inspect mines in the late seventeenth century, but when the Council of Indies investigated the matter in 1706 while reviewing the records from a residencia of the Audiencia of Lima, it was discovered that the audiencia had entirely abandoned the duty of carrying out these visitas for some time.⁷¹⁴ Ultimately, these visitas were at the limits of the state's capacity to examine its territories, peoples, and resources in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

On the other hand, Toledo's visita illustrated that the state could in some cases effectively implement inspections at the nexus of colonial society and economy. But that was not because it or Toledo's subsequent reforms represented an imposed form of control. Rather, recent scholarship suggests that they incorporated existing structures and local ethnographic knowledge, preserving and reframing elements of indigenous society and culture in the process. The visita did not so much remake the colonial space as it incorporated that into the institutional space of empire.⁷¹⁵

Inspections of economic spaces outside the Americas were also potentially fraught. The visitas to Milan had dealt with the local administration of water and salt with relatively minimal complications, but the visitas that regulated salt in Spain were themselves subject to the discipline of visitas carried out by commission of the Crown. This corresponded to an intensification of the state's interest in such resources. In 1559, in conjunction with the visita of the Chancery of Granada, and again in 1574, the Crown's efforts to extract additional revenue from the sale of salt, a monopoly derived from its legal ownership dating back to the fourteenth century and the further consolidation of them during the sixteenth century, led it to commission visitas of the *salinas* in Granada and later throughout the entire Crown of Castile continuing into 1577.⁷¹⁶ In consolidating the oversight of the Crown's patrimony, the corresponding arm of discipline in the visita served an essential role.

This was evident in the case of the Careaga family, who held the post of administrator of the salinas in the Kingdom of Granada – which was then distributed through substitution

⁷¹² Zanolli, "‘Visitas de la tierra,’ de su historia europea al terrreno en América," 161.

⁷¹³ Murdo J. MacLeod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 186-190.

⁷¹⁴ AGI, Lima, leg. 474.

⁷¹⁵ Jeremy Ravi Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

⁷¹⁶ Valeriano Sánchez Ramos, "Las regalías del reino de Granada tras la repoblación de Felipe II," *Chronica Nova* 24 (1997), 262; Cristóbal Espejo, "La renta de Salinas hasta la muerte de Felipe II," *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos* 39 (1918), 42; Carmen María Cremades Griñán, *Borbones, hacienda y súbditos en el siglo XVIII* (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1993), 79-81. Visitas of salinas continued into the eighteenth century, as illustrated by a visita of them in Aragon in 1709 during the War of Spanish Succession and another in 1722; see Emilio Benedicto Gimeno and José Antonio Mateos, *La minería aragonesa en la cordillera ibérica durante los siglos XVI y XVII: Evolución económica, control político y conflicto social* (Zaragoza: University of Zaragoza, 2013), 105-6; Juan de la Ripa, *Práctica de la administración y cobranza de las rentas reales y visita de los ministros que se ocupan en ellas*, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1795), 2.

within their family – and whose work came under scrutiny in the late 1570s as part of a visita carried out by Valladares Sarmiento, an oidor of the Chancery of Granada. But though it increased the Crown's control of its territories, it also reflected the interests of the localities.

What resulted from Sarmiento's investigation was a considerable review of the cases that the Careagas had handled in their post, with numerous complaints from the localities paving the way for oversight both of the administration of salt but also of the officials who had been entrusted with that task. The Careagas, for their part, were responsible for ensuring the control of the process through which salt was collected and sold, ensuring that revenues were collected on behalf of the monarchy and regulating the price of salt for the "public good," bringing charges against those who had defrauded the Crown in the sale of salt, particularly those who had imported contraband salt from outside the kingdom which was "harmful to the commonwealth."⁷¹⁷ That layer of regulating territory and resources through routine inspection was supplemented by Sarmiento's investigation, which pointed to improper processes that facilitated malfeasance, including poor record keeping of fines collected by the administrator which were to be applied to the Crown's judicial institutions but instead handled personally and presumably embezzled as well as irregular and abusive investigations in the localities. At the same time, Sarmiento put pressure on the practices that had been used by the Careagas in their own visitas, charging them with negligence that resulted in the dirtying of the salinas, thus jeopardizing the quality of the salt itself.⁷¹⁸ This was one of the clearest embodiments of the dual processes that the visita engaged in. The visita extended the territorial reach of the state, in this case over its resources to secure the Crown's revenues and to ensure the public good, while regulating the instruments through which that could be attained.

Curiously, it was in the same space as the opening example of Scott's *Seeing Like a State*, forestry policy, where the visita was a particularly dynamic proto-regulatory instrument, with territorialization driven by military demands depending on locally derived expertise. From the middle of the sixteenth century, the Spanish Crown began developing one of the earliest and most extensive centralized forestry bureaucracies prior to the eighteenth century. Subsequent improvements in control and exploitation, which were characteristic of Bourbon administration, proved to be the foundation from which Spain established an effective naval construction program in the eighteenth century.⁷¹⁹ That administration owed much to the Hapsburgs' forestry inspections.

Those inspections, which occupy a conspicuous place in John T. Wing's exceptional study of the Spanish Crown's administration of forests, essentially took two forms. First, certain work was essentially prompted by the need for the Crown to have sufficient information about the availability of resources, a project that went hand in hand with new types of record production, particularly in the form of maps. Thus, for example, the Crown's plans for ship construction in the late sixteenth century, prompted an inspection of the Catalan coast to gather information about the supply of timber, leading to the assessment that the area was on

⁷¹⁷ AGS, CCA, leg. 2728.

⁷¹⁸ AGS, CCA, legs. 2728 and 2730.

⁷¹⁹ John T. Wing, *Roots of Empire: Forests and State Power in Early Modern Spain, c. 1500-1750* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 6-7, 24-28. This account largely follows his. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 11-22; John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 315; Hamish Graham, "For the Needs of the Royal Navy: State Interventions in the Communal Woodlands of the Landes during the Eighteenth Century," *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History* 35 (2007), 135-148.

the verge of deforestation. After the Armada's failure, the Crown commissioned another effort to reconnoiter forests and produce a report on the viability for providing timber for new ships, including the means by which the timber could reach its intended destinations with maps of roads, rivers, and terrain designed to facilitate extraction.⁷²⁰

The second, more routine, type were inspections that regulated and controlled the use of the forests. Since the middle of the sixteenth century, this work was carried out by forest superintendents, who collected depositions from towns nearby forests, with the purpose of restricting illicit use but, perhaps more essentially, ensuring that localities had complied with the Crown's orders to plant new trees. Accordingly, the visita took on its characteristic form: not only did it supply information but it also ensured the compliance of officials at the local level by means of discipline, in this case directed less at the inculcation of norms than in ensuring the regulation of a territory and its environmental features to harness the potential power therein.

Early orders in 1547 and later in 1548 stipulated that judges inspect the work of the corregidores entrusted with forestry policy and in the 1570s new orders coincided with the appointment of a superintendent for planting and conserving trees, which facilitated more regular inspections.⁷²¹

But it was in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when this work began to reach maturity. In the 1590s, a new superintendent of forests and plantations, Hernando de la Riva Herrera, noted in his inspections that planting quotas were regularly unmet and in 1594 asked for counsel from his predecessor, Cristóbal de Barros. Barros had attempted only limited reform within his post, making irregular inspections because of the "impossibility" of inspecting every forest, only negotiated with towns for modest replantation goals rather than imposing hefty fines, and had worked at personal expense, although he urged Riva Herrera to inspect a wide range of forests from the French to the Portuguese border and to fine officials who did not fulfill obligations with regard to the forests. By 1598, the strains on the system that Barros and Riva Herrera had noted were noted by the Crown, and the position that had jurisdiction across the entirety of northern Spain was divided into five territories beginning in 1598.⁷²²

The new superintendents, faced with the completion of major construction projects, had marked success. Agustín de Ojeda, formerly a fleet commander and superintendent of ship construction in Vizcaya, assumed his forestry post in the late 1590s and his inspections, which revealed considerable deforestation in the region, were followed by a replanting program of 467,036 trees in the thirteen-year period before 1615. His work in Galicia in the 1610s was also successful. By the early 1600s, the Crown also began to ensure the regularity of forest inspections, requiring the superintendent serving in Guipúzcoa to perform two inspections of every town within two leagues of any navigable body each year, with set fines for local officials who failed to plant trees as specified during the inspections in addition to other tasks, expansive tasks which hardly went without local resistance and subsequent discipline.⁷²³

⁷²⁰ Wing, *Roots of Empire*, 77-84.

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁷²² *Ibid.*, 128-130; David Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665: Reconstruction and Defeat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 74-5, 103-5.

⁷²³ Goodman, *Spanish Naval Power*, 103-5; Wing, *Roots of Empire*, 132-6; María Isabel Vicente Maroto, "Agustín de Ojeda y la construcción de navíos a finales del siglo XVI," in María Isabel Vicente Maroto and Mariano Esteban Piñeiro, eds., *La ciencia y el mar* (Valladolid: Sever-Cuesta, 2006), 316-8; Ricardo Gómez Rivero, "La

By 1650, the local experience of the superintendents together with the experience of locally generated policies, such as one plan for dividing municipal forests created by a priest in Rentería, culminated in the formulation of the Crown's forestry policy that lasted until the reign of Ferdinand VI, Toribio Pérez de Bustamante's *Instrucción*. Itself initially only a local regulation, the *Instrucción* provided localities with sophisticated information – even more than Colbert's later legislation in France that did not limit planting chestnut trees – about planting and maintenance, including guidance for the timing of clearing underbrush to mitigate fires, instructions for planting certain shrubs and bushes to prevent grazing, and provisions against wind damage of saplings. It also obligated compliance both through the benefits of trees for municipalities, acorns and firewood could be collected when trees reached maturity, while providing punishment for those who cut trees without a license. In the 1670s and the 1690s additional royal orders intensified inspections, particularly in Galicia, with reforms to the work of the inspections themselves, which were to collect and provide more testimonies from the localities and information about the geography of the forests. They were also granted additional disciplinary powers over individuals who cut or burned trees.⁷²⁴

While the control of resources represented one novel domain for inspection that laid the foundations of state regulation, the Crown's paternalistic protection of the “public good” through its considerable economic patronage of certain formal institutions represented a parallel sphere in which the state was increasingly obligated to intervene. In fact, these institutions – monasteries,⁷²⁵ hospitals, and universities – were among the earliest subjects of the Crown's inspections as the authority for their oversight was partially incorporated by the state.

Such was the case of the hospital of San Lázaro in Granada, where the Crown, acting in service to God and to the poor, commissioned one of numerous *visitas* to the hospitals under its patronage. There, the *visita* was an attempt to cultivate norms associated with that service based upon information about the poor state of affairs during the absence of the hospital's overseer, where the “meals, lunches, and snacks” served were disordered and there was a lack of shelter and offerings for the poor.⁷²⁶ These *visitas*, not surprisingly, also provided for fiscal oversight, an attention that was reflected by pastoral visitations of hospitals, for example, the

superintendencia de construcción naval y fomento forestal en Guipúzcoa, 1598-1611,” *Anuario de historia del derecho español* 56 (1986), 591-636.

⁷²⁴ Wing, *Roots of Empire: Forests and State Power in Early Modern Spain*, 142-3, 160-3; Peter Sahlins, *Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).

⁷²⁵ Fernando Andrés Robres, Rafael Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, and Eugenio Ciscar Pallarés, eds., Fray Tomás Gómez, *En reino extraño: Relación de la visita del Real Monasterio de Valldigna, autobiografía, vida cotidiana y lucha política en la España de Carlos II* (Valencia: Universitat de València, 2008).

⁷²⁶ AGS, Patronato Eclesiástico, leg. 318, f. 1 *Visita del Hospital Real de Granada* cited and quoted in Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 154-5. “Yo e sido Informado que en la administracion y gobierno de la Casa y ospital de San Lazaro [...] que es de mi patronazgo Real no ay la Orden cuenta y razon que conviene y que el mayor del no vive dentro del dicho ospital [...] y que ay muchas desordenes comidas almuerzos y meriendas y que no se tiene con el abrigo charidad y reglao de los pobres [...] por esto como por otras causas y haver muchos años que no se Visite el dicho ospital es muy necessario se Visite y porque a mi como a patron que soy del y por lo que toca al servicio de Dios y mio amparo de los dichos pobres y buen recaudo de su hacienda incumbre remediar lo sobredicho.”

hospitals of Santiago de Compostela.⁷²⁷ The empire's universities were even more closely associated with the visitas, as the task of providing for their "good governance" was entrusted to particular and regular visitas as well as, in some cases, the visitas generales.⁷²⁸

In that setting, inspections had actually preceded the visitas commissioned by the Crown by a century. In the fifteenth century, the statutes governing the University of Valladolid were established, reformed, and controlled by the papacy with the pope in Avignon, Benedict XIII, under whom there were two investigations as to whether the university's statutes were being followed with particular attention to their finances in 1417 and 1418.⁷²⁹ By the sixteenth century, the work of reforming and governing the universities in Spain had fallen on the Spanish Crown.

Inspections of the universities could, like so many other visitas, be established as a routine function of local governance to carry out financial audits. This, for example, was the manner in which visitas to the University of Santiago had initially been established in its constitution, with a canon performing the task annually. But where local disagreements fomented or a more intensive intervention was required, the visitas of the universities invoked the patronage of the monarchy in carrying out inspections.

In 1503, Isabel commissioned Juan de Arias to perform a visita of the University of Valladolid in order to ensure that fees and duties were not being levied unfairly, the result of which was the production of a fixed table of fees that graduates paid which was later modified in the 1540s.⁷³⁰ At the University of Salamanca, the visita was used extensively in the first decades of the sixteenth century, with one in 1512 followed by a visita carried out by Pedro Pacheco and Alonso Mexía in 1529 following the irregular election of a rector, a visita in 1538 carried out by Juan de Córdoba, and a fourth in 1550, although the completion of the latter visita was interrupted by the Council of Trent.⁷³¹ By 1566, appeals from the University of Santiago, which was previously the subject to internal audits, led to royal visitas carried out by the Audiencia of Galicia, which provided discipline and the opportunity to review the university's constitutions, putting the university in line with similar practices at the universities of Salamanca, Valladolid, and Alcalá de Henares. Thereafter, visitas were carried out on a triennial basis.⁷³²

This combination of the Crown's intervention and oversight of the universities had consequences both for the institution of the visita and for the work of the universities themselves. As the Crown turned to *letrados* to inspect the universities, that post became an initial step on a *cursus honorum* that in several cases led to a subsequent commission to carry

⁷²⁷ Kimberly Lynn, *Between Court and Confessional: The Politics of Spanish Inquisitors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 80-1; José García Oro and María José Portela Silva, *Las reformas hospitalarias del Renacimiento en la Corona de Castilla: Del Gran Hospital de Santiago a los hospitales generales* (Santiago de Compostela: Editorial del Eco Franciscano, 2005), 54-71, 83-86, 229-30.

⁷²⁸ AGS, CRC, leg. 115-8, f. 1.

⁷²⁹ Margarita Torremocha Hernández, "Visitas para el gobierno de la Universidad de Valladolid a comienzos de la Edad Moderna (1503-1545)," *Investigaciones Históricas* 18 (1998), 29.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷³¹ Ezquerria Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 211-3; Margarita Torremocha Hernández and María Ángeles Sobaler Seco, eds., *Compendio de los felices progresos de la Universidad de Salamanca de Juan Curiel (1717)* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2012), 89.

⁷³² José García Oro and María José Portela Silva, *Visitas a la Universidad de Alcalá en vida del Cardenal Cisneros* (Madrid: Editorial Cisneros, 1996); Peytavin, *Visite et gouvernement dans le royaume de Naples*, 155-6.

out more prestigious *visitas*. In the 1560s, just before his more famous *visita* of the Council of the Indies, Juan de Ovando carried out a *visita* of the University of Alcalá de Henares.⁷³³ Likewise, Diego de Córdoba's *visita* of the University of Valladolid in 1544 was integral to his subsequent commissions to perform *visitas* in Sicily, the Chancery of Valladolid, and the Council of Castile.

Just as Córdoba's *visita* to the chancery marked a turning point in the relationship between the *visita* and the *audiencias*, his *visita* to the University of Valladolid was illustrative of the work that the *visitas* to the universities could perform. In large part, that *visita* was a response to complaints about the university's notary, who was accused of charging abusive fees and receiving gratuities that were not owed to him as well as failing to perform certain expected functions. But in conjunction with this investigation, Diego de Córdoba set about reforming the statutes pertaining to the notary and the collection of fees, in part because the notary based his legal defense on the ambiguities that existed in prior statutes. After the equivocation of the faculty, which first accepted and then protested Córdoba's revised statutes, the Royal Council and Charles V definitively approved them in May 1545.⁷³⁴ Concurrently, Córdoba set out to reform the grammar curriculum at the university, which was organized around three courses, altering the regulations for them established in 1541. So successful was Córdoba's curricular reform that it remained the basis for the instruction of grammar at the university for nearly 230 years.⁷³⁵

The combination of discipline and reform in the universities proved extraordinarily flexible. In a *visita* to the University of Salamanca in the 1590s, where discipline was a principal object, the *visitador* charged various notaries connected to the university, including the officials of the *maestrescuela*, a post for ecclesiastical instruction. One such official, Andrés Nieto, was charged with bribery, improper record keeping in criminal cases, and having caused so "many vexations and annoyances to students as well as to other ministers of the *maestrescuela*" that "many no longer come to this university and others have abandoned their studies and gone to study in Valladolid or elsewhere."⁷³⁶ As a result, he was deprived of office in perpetuity and sentenced to six years of exile from Salamanca, the first three of which were to be spent on the galleys, as well as a fine of 10,000 maravedís, about twenty-six ducats, to be applied to the hospital and the *visita*'s expenses. An *alguacil*, charged with similar offenses of mistreating students and stealing their effects, was sentenced to three years of suspension.

On the other hand, in the 1660s, Juan Cornejo's *visita* to Lima also included a *visita* of the university, the *Real y Pontificia Universidad de San Marcos*, that had been founded there in the sixteenth century, and principally attempted to reform the university. Beginning in 1665, Cornejo's *visita* produced several reforms to the university in an attempt to correct serious problems that had been noted in other universities throughout the empire and were perceived

⁷³³ Poole, *Juan de Ovando*, 190.

⁷³⁴ Ezquerro Revilla, "Rehabilitación de la justicia cortesana," 224-5; Torremocha Hernández, "Visitas para el gobierno de la Universidad de Valladolid a comienzos de la Edad Moderna," 29-43, esp. 34-35.

⁷³⁵ Torremocha Hernández, "Visitas para el gobierno de la Universidad de Valladolid a comienzos de la Edad Moderna," 36.

⁷³⁶ AGS, CRC, leg. 115-8-9-3, ff. 1-7. "Cargos que Resultan contra Andrés Nieto." See f. 1 for quotation. "hecho muchas Vejaciones y molestias a los estudiantes assi como los otros ministros del Maestrescuela de que asido causa que muchos no vengan a esta Universidad y que otros ayan dejado sus estudios y ydose a estudiar a Valladolid y otras partes."

to have diluted the quality of education, particularly because of the close connection between the social and educational spheres. Thus, Cornejo's visita regulated various internal forms of corruption and restructured elements of the process through which degrees were granted. The latter was principally done through a simplification of the voting process that led to the approval of a candidate, which formerly granted individuals of various status within and outside the university a varying number of votes ranging between two and eight votes for students to twenty-four for faculty members with a doctorate degree, a system that was easily abused and allowed students to determine how certain individuals had voted. Cornejo's new voting structure reduced the number of allocated votes considerably and particularly simplified the variance that existed in the lower tiers, reducing all students to one vote. It also prohibited holders of bachelor's degrees from voting and limited the number of students who could vote with up to ten from each religious order and only the ten most advanced students. Beyond that, several restrictions were placed on both students and on their connections to the city during the examination period. Banqueting during the examination period was forbidden and individuals with votes were similarly forbidden from visiting with students. Additionally, an expansive restriction was placed on individuals, including members of the clergy, servants, and slaves, from entering the university on the day of voting, as their conduct, which included openly brandishing weapons in front of voters and soliciting their votes, was a notorious feature of university life.⁷³⁷

CONCLUSION

From the Council of Italy in Madrid to the University of San Marcos in Lima, the project of the visita and of empire were intertwined. Institutions were the essence of the state, providing for the governance, justice, and finance associated with the Crown, and, increasingly, a range of other functions into which those domains extended. The expansion of the state within and across the empire required regulation, a function that the visita fulfilled both as a means of control and as a means of creating dynamic but regularizing norms that incorporated the localities and local institutions of empire into an imperial space.

In the context of the evolving proto-regulatory state, the visita continued to be employed even as its utility as a means of disciplining the councils, the audiencias, and the tribunals of the Inquisition receded into the past during the eighteenth century. Those institutions, the great innovations of the Trastámara and Hapsburg states, persisted but the focus of the Bourbons was, by comparison, intensely fiscal. The visita, which had incorporated that fiscal legibility since the sixteenth century, thus became principally – though not exclusively – associated with that rather than with the discipline characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1765, nearly two centuries after Ovando's visita of the Council of the Indies and Toledo's visita of Peru, José de Gálvez's visita of New Spain increased fiscal oversight in local government, instituted the enormously profitable tobacco monopoly, rationalized taxation, supported the growing mining industry, assisted in the reorganization of the army, reformed the missions in Baja California, and commissioned Serra's and Portolá's expeditions and occupations of Alta California. After his return to Spain in the 1770s, Gálvez's preminent influence in the administration of the Americas was intertwined with the

⁷³⁷ AGI, Escribanía, leg. 570A, pieces 2 and 3.

transformative Bourbon reforms until his death in 1787. But like the Hapsburgs' *visitas*, even that work was never exclusively fiscal and it expanded the state's intervention in parallel domains in conjunction with local response.⁷³⁸ Its effects also certainly resounded beyond the project of fiscalization.

It was in that developing rationalization of finances, patrimony, and patronage where the Hapsburg *visita* had one other, albeit much more subtle, enduring legacy not expected of it. In addition to the records collected by or left by the *visitas*, it was the *visitas* themselves that compelled and regularized the storage of juridical records in Spain and its empire, records that continue to inform historians' understanding of Spain's empire.⁷³⁹

But from 1624 to 1630, the *visita* played an even more direct role in shaping the Crown's records. At that moment prior to the attempt to remake the empire in the Union of Arms, the Crown extended the *visita*, under Francisco de Hoyos and, after Francisco's death, his son Antonio, over its archive in Simancas. As might be expected, the work of Francisco and Antonio dealt largely with controlling expenses, especially those associated with copying and distributing records as well as salaries, and the various costs of maintaining the Castle of Simancas. It was also concerned with reforming the structure of the records themselves. In effect the state, in order to make its paperwork legible, needed to construct norms for their management and for their preservation. Hoyos's questionnaire thus began, after two introductory questions, with questions about whether the archivists had collected records securely and diligently, inventoried records, maintained the order of records (especially those of "State, Patrimony, and Royal Patronage"), and continued copying records related to grants from the popes, instructions and orders for royal chapels, the foundation of the Inquisition, the discovery of the Americas, the reforms of monasteries, the incorporation of the Kingdom of Navarre, the papal investitures and privileges for Naples, Sicily, and Milan, the instructions to viceroys and ambassadors, etc.⁷⁴⁰

The *visita* of Francisco and Antonio de Hoyos was essential to the archive, most enduringly in its work of producing inventories. Despite their abundant inadequacies for subsequent archivists and historians, their inventories began the process of systematically incorporating the records under the state's purview. In fact, the inventories of State and Patrimony were still regarded as essentially useful into the twentieth century, perhaps because the Crown's particular interest in those subjects aligned with that of modern interests. But even when they were believed to be much less useful, they have been difficult to improve upon. One

⁷³⁸ Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 231-345; Patricia H. Marks, *Deconstructing Legitimacy: Viceroy, Merchants, and the Military in Late Colonial Peru* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Margaret Chowning, *Rebellious Nuns: The Troubles History of a Mexican Convent, 1752-1862* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); David J. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Susan Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, Planters, and Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); Jeremy Baskes, *Indians, Merchants, and Markets: A Reinterpretation of the Repartimiento and Spanish-Indian Economic Relations in Colonial Oaxaca, 1750-1821* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); David Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Nancy M. Farriss, *Crown and Clergy in Colonial Mexico, 1759-1821: The Crisis of Ecclesiastical Privilege* (London: Athlone, 1968).

⁷³⁹ See chapter I.

⁷⁴⁰ AHN, EST, leg. 8609, f. 10ff.

of those, the inventory of the collection that first guided this dissertation, *Visitas de Italia*, was only superseded in 1980.⁷⁴¹

⁷⁴¹ de la Plaza Bores, *Archivo General de Simancas. Guía del investigador*, 49-50. There was another visita of the archive in the 1850s, see de la Plaza Bores, *Archivo General de Simancas. Guía del investigador*, 48, 93; de la Plaza Bores and de la Plaza Santiago, *Visitas de Italia*, 5-6.

CONCLUSION

The institution of the *visita* that continued to serve the Bourbons in the project of reforming and remaking the state in the eighteenth century hardly resembled the one that had emerged from the suite of patrimonial institutions that the Hapsburgs had inherited nearly two centuries before. But it was aptly suited for that task. Indeed, it had in its transformation into an institution of discipline and regulation under the Hapsburgs already been making the modern state and the norms associated with it.

That had begun with the consolidation of the administrative structures of the vast Hapsburg empire. From the late fifteenth century into the sixteenth century, the *visita* principally provided the Spanish Crown a means of reforming its institutions and particularly those through which the Crown provided for the administration of justice. Having been used to generate legislation that governed the chanceries and audiencias of Castile since the 1480s, the utility of the practice of inspection as an instrument through which the Crown could reform its empire beyond Castile was not lost on the future emperor Charles and his counsellors. Expanded to the reformed Council of Navarre in 1525, the newly instituted Audiencia of the Canary Islands in 1530, and the emerging audiencias of the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru in the middle of the century, the *visita* was instrumental in establishing these new institutions and shaping the regulations that governed them. That role was of immediate interest in Charles's domains in Italy and their distinctive legal, institutional, and social contexts. Thus, in the inspection of Naples by Charles Leclerc in 1517, the *visitas* of Naples by López de Mendoza in 1530 and Pedro Pacheco in 1536, and the *visita* of Sicily by Diego de Córdoba in 1545, the Crown commissioned its inspectors to collect information and, it was hoped, provide coherence in the governance of empire.

But the *visita* would not merely be an instrument of reform. One of several practices of inspection that emerged between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries in Castile and Aragon, the *visita* was distinctive in that its legal construction provided for it to act as an extraordinary means of reviewing officials' conduct. Though that review had primarily been employed to promulgate reforms into the sixteenth century, the juridical implications of that work were becoming apparent by the 1530s.

There were, however, initial limits. Pedro Pacheco's *visita* to Naples in 1536, for example, carried out the first investigations and prosecutions of officials in the kingdom but was unable to affect any lasting conclusions to that work. In particular, the *visitador* was frustrated by his inability to gather depositions that provided substantive testimony about official conduct. And he, like future *visitadores*, also faced considerable resistance both from local elites and from the viceroy. Although the first *visita* to Sicily under Diego de Córdoba attained a degree of success, the first *visita* in Milan, conducted by Bernardo de Bolea and Francisco Pacheco against Ferrante Gonzaga, in 1554 was perhaps even less efficacious in acquiring evidence of financial malfeasance against the governor.

The middle of the sixteenth century was thus a critical moment for the *visita* and the making of corruption through its practice of discipline. On the one hand, the *visita* had hitherto been unsuccessful in concluding investigations into official conduct and was met with considerable skepticism from elites who understood its disciplinary potential to intervene in the localities and to regulate patrimonial meanings of office holding to be, in the words of the

humanist Juan de Valdés, a form of tyranny. That logic of resistance to its imposition would only be displaced in the seventeenth century. On the other hand, as the notion of “good government” became the dominant ideological force in the court of Philip II, the *visita* came to represent a means of inculcating the norms associated with it into the fabric of empire.

It was therefore increasingly understood that disciplining officials, rather than producing legislation and reforms, would be the essential function of the *visita*. That had, to some extent, been intimated by the inspection of the Chancery of Valladolid conducted by Diego de Córdoba in 1550. But it was the series of *visitas* in Italy beginning in 1559 that definitively represented this moment of transformation.

Naturally, because the discipline of norms of conduct in the *visita* essentially depended upon the locality’s acceptance of the institution and social perceptions of official conduct, it was not necessarily immediately successful. For example, the *visita* to Milan failed to conclude all but a few investigations due in part to the dominance of elites in the duchy against whom the witnesses summoned by the *visitador* were indisposed to provide testimony. By contrast, although the *visita* to Sicily ended prematurely, it was demonstrably more successful in acquiring substantive depositions that reflected the repudiation of certain forms of conduct by officials.

However, it was Gaspar de Quiroga’s *visita* to Naples that most demonstrated the remarkable potential of the *visita* in surveilling and prosecuting the behaviors that were becoming corrupt. Duly fulfilling the expectations of the preface to the depositions he had collected, which drew upon the example of antiquity and the scriptures as justification for the punishment of officials’ abuses, Quiroga’s *visita* collected hundreds of depositions and charged 341 officials, of whom at least 174 were subsequently found guilty of one or more charges. To be sure, Quiroga’s work represented only an initial disciplinary intervention of the *visita* into society. Drawing largely from the official and administrative class in Naples for his depositions, a feature highlighted by the marginal notations corresponding to the *visitador*’s attentions, his *visita*’s charges placed particular emphasis on official style, especially in the manner of granting audiences, and the practice of gift giving. Nevertheless, the depositions and charges that followed indicated an incipient attention to regulating the intersection of officials’ private interest and public service, in effect, corruption.

In the subsequent decades the connections between the *visita* and local societies manifestly deepened. In Naples in the 1580s, Lope de Guzmán’s *visita*, which reflected calls for an inspection from the kingdom, dramatically expanded his predecessors’ work. Whereas Quiroga’s investigations had looked to attorneys and officials to provide information about gift giving and official style, Guzmán drew and called upon segments of society that had hitherto been invisible or marginal to the *visita* and to the imperial state. Most notably in his investigations of the Collateral Council, Guzmán was supplied with information from residents of towns outside the city of Naples, merchants, women, and local nobles. These witnesses focused the *visitador*’s attention beyond the practice of gift giving to the connections between officials and the administration of trade and ports, the banks, patronage networks, the urban and rural nobility, and the abuse of women in the administration of justice. As a result, their depositions, which attacked the interests and relationships that had been associated with holding office, illustrated the structures of corruption in Neapolitan society.

Far from belonging to the factions that were characteristic of the politics within the Kingdom of Naples, the members of the Collateral Council at the apex of Neapolitan administration instead organized a network of patronage around themselves that provided an otherwise disorganized group of individuals access to power. Regulating these non-factional and extra-institutional relationships and activities was only possible through the incorporation of the grievances of the politically marginalized classes of the locality who in turn expanded the range of behaviors and relationships that could be perceived by the state and be made illegitimate.

This transformation of the state's discipline was similarly apparent in Sicily. Like Guzmán in Naples, Ochoa de Luyando's *visita* in the 1600s significantly extended the surveillance of the state, in particular into the Sicilian hinterland. Connections between officials and the society of the estates and towns of the interior of the island as well as to trading networks beyond it were becoming subject to discipline corresponding to the denunciations that the *visitador* received and the subsequent investigations carried out by the *visitador* and his staff. This was apparent in the investigation of the Great Court's handling of the murder of Giovanni Carreto, which particularly displayed the capacity for and willingness of the state to intervene at the formerly unperceived points of interconnection between four social and institutional domains: the sphere of urban administrative institutions, the hinterland, elite society in both urban and rural settings, and marginal communities including in one case an itinerant individual by the name of Francesco Embrogno.

So too was it evident in the expanding intervention of the *visita* against captains of justice, who often used their offices to extort agricultural communities as well as conduct illicit trade in Sicily's port cities. These captains were subject to the intensification of the *visita*'s discipline, facing not only fines but rigorous suspensions and prohibitions on office holding. As was the case in Naples, the depositions collected by Luyando reveal much about the structures of Sicilian society. In contrast to Naples, where the regents of the Collateral Council provided organization for a patronage network, cohesion among elites in Sicily was weak. By the 1600s, it was effectively untenable, even for members who might have belonged to similar interest groups, to collude in order to suppress the observations made by witnesses who were increasingly able to identify behaviors that the state found unacceptable or, with time, identify behaviors that the state *would* find unacceptable. As a result, the social networks and coalitions that officials had previously cultivated for personal ends or derived political power had become a liability as they were increasingly transparent and were readily understood by witnesses as some of the most useful evidence of malfeasance that could be supplied to the *visitador*.

In Milan, the *visita* was similarly transformed by its context into a more rigorous review of official conduct. Concurrent with a shift of attention to the hinterland and smaller towns beyond the city of Milan, the *visita* was used to monitor fraud in the army and was, by the 1580s, called upon by residents of the duchy's towns to discipline army officers who had committed abuses while billeting.

In contrast to the supposed decline of the Crown's institutions during the seventeenth century, the intensification of the *visita* continued throughout the century. While the frequency of *visitas* in the chanceries and *audiencias* in Spain diminished, the frequency of *visitas* throughout the empire, especially in relatively peripheral administrative centers, was not substantially lower in the seventeenth century and certainly not lower until the final decades of the century. Italy in particular demonstrated the continued strength of the *visita*. In Naples and Sicily, the number of officials prosecuted as a result of *visitas* expanded into the 1630s and the

1650s respectively. In Milan, the rate of successful prosecutions increased markedly despite the interruption of the *visita* that had begun in 1628 due to the death of the *visitador* in the midst of the city's "Great Plague." The regularization of the *visita* by the late 1620s and early 1630s also demonstrates the range of official behaviors that had come to be perceived as corrupt and therefore subject to regulation including gift giving, bribery, abuse of discretion, extortion, financial fraud and embezzlement, billeting abuses, and irregularities in accounting and record keeping among others.

Even in the midst of the crises of the 1640s, the *visita* was a dynamic institution that strengthened the framework of empire. In Naples, the Crown commissioned a *visita* that, like its financial inspections, would investigate financial ministers and reduce the expenses that had put a considerable fiscal load on the kingdom in the years prior to the Revolt of Masaniello. But even then, the *visita* continued to be drawn into the hinterland, carrying out one of the most substantive inspections of provincial tribunals as well as attempting to provide means to reduce the banditry, violence, and financial pressures endemic to the countryside and communes throughout Naples. After the revolt in Sicily in 1647, the city of Palermo petitioned the Crown to commission a *visita*. Delayed for various reasons until 1650, the resulting *visita* charged some 674 officials, demonstrating the embeddedness of imperial institutions in Italy as well as the further expansion of the disciplinary state within it.

But the final *visitas* in Italy were perhaps the clearest manifestation of the transformation of the state through the *visita*. In large part, this represented the transformation of the local into the imperial. Demonstrating the more complete incorporation of Italians into the imperial system, the Crown commissioned for the first time *visitadores* who were officials in Italy, two of whom were Italian, to carry out *visitas*. The *visitas* carried out in Milan were likewise inextricably linked to the local context, representing an attempt to reform the fabric of the duchy by undermining the dominance of the familial patronage and venality upon the guidance of the Milanese official Cosme Forno Zermelli. In Naples, the *visita* of the Milanese senator Danese Casati for the first time attempted to bring the Neapolitan barons under the jurisdiction of the *visita* and the state in response to the profusion of denunciations that he had received regarding abuses committed by the barons on their estates and against the communes. Though these innovations would not ultimately succeed, they suggested the extent to which the state and the norms associated with it had expanded through the *visita*.

While the *visita* was undoubtedly a substantive institution that, in its disciplinary turn, established the foundations of the modern state in Spain's empire, its project of transforming society and the state was no less evident in the *visita*'s place in the realms of discourse and ritual. Valdés's criticism of Pedro Pacheco's 1536 *visita* to Naples established what would become the essential intellectual framework for opposing it at least until the end of the seventeenth century. For Valdés, the good government of empire was drawn out from selecting virtuous officials who could securely administer it while demonstrating respect for local institutions, laws, and customs. By contrast, the *visita* not only stalled administration, it was a tyrannical intervention of empire into the locality. This was echoed throughout the empire. In Milan, for example, local elites consistently appealed to reputation, favor, and privilege in order to blunt the *visita*'s discipline and the *visitadores* would, in dialogue with that logic, attempt to justify their prosecutions as salutary to the public good and to the future reputation of officials who participated in and accepted its discipline. Elsewhere, as in Santo Domingo and Santa Fe de Bogotá, demonstrations of force and violence would be used to attempt to blunt the

discipline of elite notions of office holding that had been undermined by the intervention of the *visita* against the patronage and corruption that typified administration at the local level. But the currency of that framework had diminished significantly by the late seventeenth century. In Sicily, disputes about the *visita* and its rituals called upon a new logic of “substance” as opposed to the obsolescent “authority” of symbols. In Milan, officials appealed to the “reason of state,” not reputation, as justification for their conduct.

Meanwhile, the substance of that state, while diffusive and negotiated, was being remade through the *visita*. In counterpoint to those qualities, it introduced discipline and rationalization in institutions throughout the empire, constructing universalizing norms that once reflected the Crown’s interests in good government, justice, and fiscalization while responding to local conditions and knowledge. In the councils, which were particularly subject to inspection in the sixteenth century after their institution, the *visitas* restricted patronage connections between ministers and the empire while at the same time consolidating the structure of administration and employing new technologies, including surveys, to understand and manage empire. In the *audiencias* and chanceries and in the tribunals of the Holy Office of the Inquisition throughout Spain’s empire, the *visita* functioned as it had in Italy, constructing norms for official behavior that surveilled and regulated the relationships and activities of officials as a reflection of local complaints, putting pressure on the acceptance of bribes and gifts and the involvement of officials in mercantile networks. In the tribunals of the Holy Office, it attempted to control abuses and the proliferation of offices and to create financial discipline and stability for the tribunals. The conduct of officials was thus being bureaucratized throughout the empire in the regular application of inspection across it.

Beyond those institutions, the *visita* also established the future role of the disciplined bureaucratic state. Intervening in financial administration, universities, hospitals, the archive, trade, the army, *salinas*, forests, workshops, mines, and the labor organization of *indios* in the Americas, the *visita* inculcated – if not necessarily with comprehensive success – new means of organizing and understanding the state corresponding to a dramatic expansion of its institutional space. This was evident in *visitas* including Francisco de Toledo’s inspection of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the resultant institution of the *reducciones* and the intensification of the *mita*, the coordination of audits and new standards for financial record-keeping in Sicily, and the forestry inspections in northern Spain that collected information about and produced guidelines for the management of forests. The *visita* accordingly anticipated the state’s regulation and rationalization of its resources, populations, and territories on a global scale but that was not without the accumulation of experience, knowledge, and contributions that were local.

In the *visita*, the Crown thus had an instrument to reform and consolidate its institutions, rationalize its state, and, crucially, discipline its officials to adhere to the norms of service and corruption that would frame the bureaucratic order characteristic of modernity. But it was also an instrument through which empire itself was disciplined, as the systems, regulations, and norms that the *visita* constructed fundamentally reflected the participation of localities in the *visita* and the imperial project it supported.

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