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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Degenerate Spaces:
The Coordination of Space in Nazi Germany

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Teresa Marie Walch

Committee in Charge:

Professor Frank Biess, Chair
Professor Gary Fields
Professor Deborah Hertz
Professor Nancy Kwak
Professor Patrick Patterson

2018

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Chair

University of California San Diego

2018

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Degenerate Spaces:
The Coordination of Space in Nazi Germany

by

Teresa Marie Walch

Doctor of Philosophy in History

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This dissertation examines how Nazi officials, bureaucrats, city planners, architects, and ordinary Germans envisioned and redesigned space (from entire cityscapes down to specific neighborhoods, streets, and buildings) to fit their worldviews between 1933 and 1945. I term this process the “coordination of space” and draw from human geography and urban theory to write a cultural history of space and a social history of spatial practices in Nazi Germany. Nazi interactions with space were directly influenced by the belief that Jews had “infected” Germany in the modern era and that “Judeo-Bolshevism” represented an existential threat to the German nation. Therefore, the regime confiscated, destroyed, or repurposed sites associated with *political bolshevism* and

cultural bolshevism. This destruction was followed by active construction which refashioned cityscapes to physically and symbolically align with Nazi ideology. In the public sphere, Nazi ideology proved unyielding. Authorities demanded visible conformity from “*Volksgenossen*” during public rituals and ceremonies.

Elsewhere, Nazi ideology was surprisingly flexible in practice. Instead of being physically altered, some spaces were *rhetorically coordinated*, or reexplained, to align with Nazi ideology. This was true in the case of modern architecture, which had a long afterlife in the Third Reich. Furthermore, the semipublic sphere evinced plasticity as well. “Racially fit” nonconformists (such as Communists, Socialists, and homosexuals) were able to maintain access to semipublic spaces, such as bars and cafes, if they outwardly conformed in the public sphere. The inclusion of these groups in the national community was increasingly predicated on the exclusion of German Jews. Indeed, only in the case of German Jews was Nazi ideology rigid at all times. In the end, Nazi efforts to coordinate and “Germanize” spaces could only be realized via the wholesale exclusion and eradication of Jews from Germany. In short, I maintain that Nazism should be understood as a spatial project that sought to make German *judenrein* (clean of Jews). These practiced methods of cleansing spaces were important antecedents to similar, more systematic measures, unleashed on Central and Eastern Europe during World War II and the Holocaust.

Introduction

Degenerate Germany

In 1933, National Socialists believed Germany stood at a precipice. To them, Communist armed insurrection seemed imminent. The sight of Communists protesting in front of the Reichstag, waving hammer and sickle flags, prompted them to conclude: “All that is needed is the final order from Moscow, and then civil war will rampage Germany, and the Jew will dictate.”¹ According to Nazi ideology, efforts of the “Jewish-controlled” organized working class to implement the “dictatorship of the proletariat” were simply the latest manifestation of Jews’ attempts to subjugate Germany, and the rest of the world, to their rule. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler regaled readers with his historical account of Jewish presence in Germany, writing that the first Jews had set foot on German lands with the incursion of the Romans but that Germany’s “enduring Jewification” (*Verjudung*) only began during the first era of German state building.² From then on, “the Jew” established ever tighter control over Germany’s finances, politics, and press. Antisemites were alarmed that Jews began presenting themselves as Germans and even more distressed that “the Volk” could no longer differentiate between German and Jew. According to Hitler, Jews were not, nor could they ever be, German. Hitler warned his readers of their “bloodsucking tyranny” and labeled Jews “leeches,” “parasites,” and “vampires” who fed off the German Volk.³

It is within this perceived context of a “jewified” Germany—a Germany allegedly saturated by Jewish influences—that we must consider the violence Nazis unleashed during their first year

¹ Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Schutzstaffel. Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, *Judentum, Freimauerei, Bolschewismus. Lichtbildvortrag*, vol. III: Der Bolschewismus, ein Werkzeug des Judentums (Berlin: Der Reichsführer SS, Der Chef des Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamtes, around 1938), 39. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

² Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 851-855 ed. (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1943), 338.

³ *Ibid.*, 334, 338-42, 358.

in power and their subsequent efforts to “Germanize” politics, art, culture, and the built environment. Historians have documented policies of coordination in the cultural, economic, and political life of the “Third Reich” but have not shown how these policies related to Nazi control of space.⁴ Physical destruction in 1933 was followed by purposeful construction, as architects, city planners, and state and municipal bureaucrats sought to redesign their physical and visible surroundings to conform to National Socialist worldviews. My dissertation examines this “coordination of space” in Nazi Germany, through which National Socialists sought to cleanse Germany and its cityscapes from Jewish influences, to shape the built environment to fit their ideological visions, and to use everyday spaces to unite Germans into the national community.

The main questions I seek to answer are: How did the Nazis effectively utilize space (both physically and symbolically) to gain and consolidate power? How did they employ space to unite people into and eliminate others from the national community? Where did these totalitarian attempts to control spaces succeed, and where did they reach their limits? I argue that the Nazis’ successful consolidation of power in the mid-1930s was predicated on their ability to bar their political opponents’ access to public spaces and on the coordination of cityscapes to reflect a unified vision of National Socialist ideology. This totalitarian reach had its limits, however, and these sites were also sites of profound conflict and contestation. Though few people were willing to breach the new norms of the Nazi-orchestrated public sphere, semipublic sites, such as cafes and pubs, eluded efforts at complete control. Despite closures, surveillance, and denunciations, Communists and Socialists criticized the regime in pubs, and homosexuals continued to meet in bars. Such “sites of transgression” were tolerated because conformity, not eradication, was the

⁴ The “Third Reich” (Third Empire) was a Nazi propaganda term used to present the Nazi regime as the legitimate successor of Germany’s first and second empires (the Holy Roman Empire and the German Empire from 1871–1918). To ease readability, I refrain from putting this term in quotation marks in the remainder of the text.

regime's aim for "*Volksgenossen*" (members of the racial community). Only Germany's Jews were barred any such path to participation in the national community, and the exclusion of Jews from public spaces, and eventually Germany itself, occurred with the enthusiasm or tacit acquiescence of their fellow countrymen. Through their interactions with their everyday surroundings, Germans transformed the national community from an "imagined community" into a living, breathing, entity, defined by who had a right to claims on German soil and who did not.⁵

As such, this dissertation constitutes an effort to write an integrated history of spaces—physical, symbolic, conceptual, visual, monumental, and vernacular—in Nazi Germany. This is a somewhat unorthodox historical account, situated at the intersection of cultural history, social history, and intellectual history. It engages visual and material culture and memory studies, and it draws liberally from urban theory and human geography. Crucially, such an endeavor requires a serious consideration of the ductile and political nature of space. In his 1974 opus, *The Production of Space*, French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre first articulated the idea of space as a "social construct." Lefebvre explored both the material and social aspects of space: each mode of production creates a physical space (to move capital quickly) and fosters social space (to differentiate and consolidate class identities) most conducive to perpetuating that mode of production.⁶ Subsequent scholarship utilizing Lefebvre focused almost exclusively on the material dimensions of the built environment within a Marxist framework, defining capitalism as the

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006).

⁶ Lefebvre conceptualized three different aspects of space. First, a *spatial practice* (perceived space) refers to physical space as dialectically produced by a society's mode of production and modified by daily interactions. Second, *representations of space* (conceived space) are conceptions of space as conceived by elites, such as technocrats, city planners, and architects. According to Lefebvre, representations of space are imbued with knowledge, and elites often utilize space to assert power and to impart explicit political messages and ideologies. Finally, *representational space* (lived space) connotes space as actually experienced and depicted by individuals. See Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 30-46.

driving factor of spatial changes while leaving the social dimension underexplored.⁷ These narratives effectively minimized the role of politics in space, relegating its importance secondary to capital.⁸ More recent studies pioneered by human geographers emphasize the multivalent nature of space, underscoring that spaces and our interactions with them are political.⁹ They argue that places are both “material and mental and cannot be reduced to either.”¹⁰ Our surroundings are neither static nor neutral but are rather imbued with meaning and often possess great symbolic capital which can motivate action, appropriation, and resistance.

In my examination of space in Nazi Germany, I seek to reinsert the ideological dimensions back into space. Although Germany was an increasingly successful capitalist state at the turn of the century, Nazi Germany took a decisive autarkic turn, and Germany did not become a mass consumer society until after World War II. Nazi Germany belonged to an earlier stage of modernist movements whose spatial planning dynamics cannot properly be understood within a purely Marxist framework.¹¹ While it is certainly important to consider the economic imperatives of urban reform, in Nazi Germany, it was neither class nor capital, but race, that constituted the organizing

⁷ Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁸ Doreen Massey first made this important critique of Harvey’s and Soja’s work, emphasizing the need to incorporate race and gender in our spatial analyses. See Doreen B. Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

⁹ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 38-41; Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). See also: Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: the Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Tim Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Paul C. Adams, Steven Holescher, and Karen E. Till, ed. *Textures of Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Tim Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 13.

¹¹ Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi planners did indeed institute urban reforms designed to facilitate movement (of capital and people) and to “sanitize” cities suffering from rapid urbanization and industrialization. For an excellent overview of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century international urban reforms, see Stephen Ward, *Planning the Twentieth-Century City: The Advanced Capitalist World* (Chichester: Wiley, 2002).

principle for society, and racial ideology often trumped rational economic decisions. Race, as the central element of Nazi ideology, radically transformed the built environment and spatial practices.

Unfortunately, the application of “space” in the historical discipline is still somewhat inchoate, its faculty too often hindered by definitional shortcomings or the indiscriminate application of theory which unnecessarily straightjackets, and sometimes distorts, the historical narrative. Therefore, several words on terminology are in order. I define a *place* as a physical site or structure, such as a building, street, square, park, or field. I define a *space* as that same structure, but with its accompanying symbolic, social, and political capital.¹² A place is empty and neutral, while a space is laden with memories, meanings, ideologies, and politics. It is through our interactions with places that we transform them into spaces with mutable meanings. Though diverging from human geographers’ definitions of space and place, I employ these definitions because they more closely correspond to Lefebvre’s definition of space as a social construct, and more importantly, because they better reflect how my historical actors referred to place and space.¹³ To them, a place (*Ort*) was static, while space (*Raum*) was something dynamic and pliable.

Crucially, it is also necessary from the outset to emphasize that space is both: (1) a category of analysis and (2) an operative concept and lived experience. As a category of analysis, space (and its accompanying theories) can help pose novel, interesting, and important questions, and it can illuminate important developments that are otherwise difficult to identify and articulate. The theories outlined above have greatly informed this study. Nevertheless, I strive to avoid theoretical jargon, because theory cannot be easily nor flawlessly transposed to any given historical context,

¹² Human geographers invert these definitions. They define space as abstract and place as something familiar and imbued with meaning and value. Space to them is movement, whereas place is “a pause in movement.” See Tuan, *Space and Place*, 5.

¹³ Tim Cresswell notes that human geography’s definition of “place” closely resembles Lefebvre’s definition of “social space.” See Cresswell, *Place*, 12.

and I do not wish to impose a theoretical framework on the historical evidence. Instead, I place greater emphasis on the role of space as an operative concept and lived experience. Spaces in Nazi Germany are my *object of study*. I seek to illuminate how Germans articulated their perceptions of space and to historicize how Nazi ideology refashioned space. My aim aligns with recent research on wartime planning that attempts to elucidate “the entanglements between the Nazis’ grand spatial plans and spatial practices ‘in place,’” which Giaccaria and Minca have termed “geographies of the Third Reich.”¹⁴ In this sense, I strive to write a cultural history of space and a social history of spatial practices in Nazi Germany.

Some recent studies in German history have enthusiastically responded to the mandate to investigate space as well as time, and German-language scholars have been particularly industrious in refining theoretical discussions of space.¹⁵ Historians of modern Europe and Germany have historicized spatial thinking regarding landscapes, nature, identity, and borders as evident in processes of modernization, territorialization, colonization, nationalization, and globalization.¹⁶ More importantly for this study, historians have shown how Nazi ideologies concerning “race and

¹⁴ Paolo Giaccaria, and Claudio Minca, ed. *Hitler's Geographies: The Spatialities of the Third Reich* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 1.

¹⁵ Karl Schlögel was one of the first scholars to front discussions of space in German historical studies. See Karl Schlögel, *In Räume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003). For additional theoretical considerations of space, see Jürgen Osterhammel, “Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Geopolitik, Geohistorie und historische Geographie,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 43, no. 3 (1998); Jörg Döring, and Tristan Thielmann, ed. *Spatial Turn: Das Raumparadigma in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2008); Barney Warf, and Santa Arias, ed. *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Jaimey Fisher, and Barbara Mennel, ed. *Spatial Turns: Space, Place, and Mobility in German Literary and Visual Culture*, vol. 75, *Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010); Stephan Günzel, *Raum: Eine Kulturwissenschaftliche Einführung*, Edition Kulturwissenschaft (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2017).

¹⁶ Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000); Charles S. Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality 1600-2000,” in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, ed. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape and the Making of Modern Germany* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ulrike Jureit, *Das Ordnen von Räumen: Territorium und Lebensraum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2012); Charles S. Maier, *Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).

space” propelled World War II and the Holocaust and have begun illuminating the roles of *space* and *place* in the extermination of European Jewry.¹⁷ Collectively, these studies have demonstrated how intimately Nazi racial, architectural, and spatial policies were intertwined, but they focus on camps, ghettos, and physical sites of extermination in the 1940s. The Holocaust was not predetermined in 1933. To understand how anti-Jewish persecution ended in genocide, we must examine Germany in the 1930s, for the calculated exclusion of Jews from space in their own homelands preceded ghettos and mass extermination.

In his interrogation of the Nazi worldview, Boaz Neumann analyzed Nazi ideology as it pertains to space, body, and language and considered the antithetical spatial categories befitting non-Jews and Jews, as encapsulated by the terms *Lebenswelt* (living space, stadium, and the “new German city”) as opposed to *Todeswelt* (extermination camp, camp, and the ghetto).¹⁸ Neumann was primarily interested in *understanding* Nazi ideology and not in explaining how it was implemented.¹⁹ Riccardo Bavaj also incorporated a spatial analysis into his historical survey of National Socialism. In the Nazis’ rise to and consolidation of power, he primarily emphasizes imaginative and metaphorical spaces where Nazis had “room” for maneuver. He explicitly discusses spatial theories when examining the *Autobahn* and Nazi spatial planning during wartime.²⁰ My study builds on these works but seeks to connect spatial ideologies and spatial practices. I examine how Nazi ideology, especially the concept of “*Blut und Boden*” (Blood and Soil), served as a dynamic organizing principle for life in Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Much like

¹⁷ Paul B. Jaskot, *The Architecture of Oppression: The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Anne Kelley Knowles, Tim Cole, and Alberto Giordano, ed. *Geographies of the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014); Giaccaria, *Hitler's Geographies*.

¹⁸ Boaz Neumann, *Die Weltanschauung des Nazismus: Raum - Körper - Sprache*, ed. José Brunner, trans. Markus Lemke, Schriftenreihe des Minerva Instituts für deutsche Geschichte (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2010).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁰ Riccardo Bavaj, *Der Nationalsozialismus: Entstehung, Aufstieg und Herrschaft*, ed. Manfred Görtemaker, Frank-Lothar Kroll, and Sönke Neitzel, vol. 7, *Deutsche Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin-Brandenburg: be.bra verlag GmbH, 2016).

Alon Confino has examined how Nazis imagined a “world without Jews”—obliterating them from time and nullifying Germany’s historical and theological debts to Jews—I maintain that Nazis also sought to eradicate Jews, and memories and influences of them, from space.²¹

In short, space matters in discussions of Nazi Germany because it mattered a great deal to Germans. Though wars have been fought over territory and natural resources for millennia, the cementing of national borders and the compulsive acquisition of overseas territories by European colonizers unnerved some Germans who believed they were falling behind in the colonial land grab. Industrialization, urbanization, and new information and transportation technologies contributed to a perceived acceleration of time and shrinking sense of space in fin de siècle Europe.²² These developments catalyzed a perception among Germans that they were suffering from *Raumverlust* (a “loss of space”). That Germany actually had to concede territory after World War I only exacerbated German anxieties and cultivated the perception that Germans were a “*Volk ohne Raum*” (nation without space).²³

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed an explosion of literature on “German space” as geographical concepts such as *Lebensraum* (living space) permeated public discourse in the Weimar Republic and, importantly for this study, shaped Nazi ideology. In his study *Political Geography*, geographer Friedrich Ratzel transposed Social Darwinism and the biological conception of *Lebensraum* into a geographical model where states, envisaged as living organisms, engaged in a struggle for land in which the strongest would prevail.²⁴ Drawing upon Ratzel, contemporary commentators began to conceive of foreign politics solely in terms of nations locked

²¹ Alon Confino, *A World without Jews: The Nazi Imagination from Persecution to Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

²² Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

²³ Jureit, *Das Ordnen von Räumen*, 22-27. This term came from Hans Grimm’s eponymously named 1926 novel *Volk ohne Raum*, which was widely read in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

²⁴ Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie* (Munich: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1897).

in a “battle for space.”²⁵ Nazi ideology was deeply shaped by such geographical theories, especially by those of Karl Haushofer, who expounded upon Ratzel’s political geography by helping to establish the field of geopolitics. Haushofer was a professor of geography at Munich’s Ludwig Maximilian University, instructor and mentor to Rudolf Hess. While Hess and Hitler were serving time for the failed coup attempt of 1923, Haushofer traveled to Landsberg Prison to tutor the two men in geopolitics.²⁶ Haushofer’s influence on Hitler’s worldviews is evidenced by the many core tenets of Nazi ideology which were inherently spatial and geographical in nature.²⁷ These racially infused ideologies incited Nazi firebrands and deeply shaped the thinking of German intellectuals, engineers, and city planners in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, ideas concerning *race* and *space*, specifically, demands for more territory for “Aryan” Germans, propelled World War II and the Holocaust, as historian Doris Bergen has succinctly stated.²⁸ Nazis aimed to clear Central and Eastern Europe of its Jewish and Slavic communities and “Germanize” the landscape for German settlers. This endeavor, as formulated in the *Generalplan Ost*, has been extensively discussed in recent literature.²⁹

Too often, however, Nazi spatial planning is examined solely with regards to German-occupied Central and Eastern Europe. Such studies focus on the intellectual contributions, and

²⁵ Jureit, *Das Ordnen von Räumen*, 26-27.

²⁶ Haushofer introduced them to his own works, to Friedrich Ratzel, as well as to works by an array of historians and intellectuals, including Heinrich von Treitschke, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Karl Marx, and Leopold von Ranke. See Holger H. Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer "Educated" Hitler and Hess* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 90.

²⁷ Dan Stone discusses the etymology behind some Nazi geographical terms. See Dan Stone, “Holocaust Spaces,” in *Hitler's Geographies: The Spatialities of the Third Reich*, ed. Paolo Giaccaria, and Claudio Minca (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 47.

²⁸ Doris L. Bergen, *The Holocaust: A Concise History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

²⁹ Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 179-222; Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 233-95; Catherine Epstein, “Germanization in the Warthegau: Germans, Jews and Poles and the Making of a “German” Gau,” in *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities Under National Socialism*, ed. Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann, and Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930-1945* (London: Routledge, 2013), 131-55. See also the entries by Jürgen Zimmerer, Gerhard Wolf, and Mark Bassin in Giaccaria, *Hitler's Geographies*.

culpability, of geography as a discipline and of individuals such as Friedrich Ratzel, Walter Christaller, Carl Schmitt, and Karl Haushofer. They privilege texts on foreign policy and planning over another body of work that centers on German internal affairs. My main contention is that Germany's plans for colonizing Europe were not created in an intellectual vacuum but rather that Nazi authorities grafted their own worldviews, contrived from homegrown experiences in Germany, onto an imagined malleable territory in the East. These authorities were motivated by a deep-seated belief that Jews were foreign bodies on German soil. Nazi plans to expel Jews from German soil were formulated, tested out, and implemented in Germany proper long before they were more systematically transplanted to German-occupied Europe in the 1940s. The confiscation of Communist and Jewish property in the mid-1930s, the segregation of Jews from non-Jews, and the redevelopment of city districts provided German officials with years of experience erasing unwanted memories, ideologies, and people from cityscapes. Within Germany proper, it was not the concept of "*Volk ohne Raum*" but the rallying cry of "Blood and Soil" which dictated spatial practices.

Blood and Soil ideology held that each racially defined body politic had its own intimate relation to a (rural) piece of land. Among all the nations of the earth, only the Jews possessed no such relation, for Jews allegedly had no roots. Hence, the theory maintained, Jews most often settled among foreign urban populations when allowed, which rendered cities inherently suspect in the Nazi worldview. Nazi ideology held that peasants constituted the heart and soul of the German nation but that the flight from countryside to city in the wake of industrialization had upset the natural order. Under the corrupting influence of the city, German peasants-turned-workers allowed themselves to be seduced by Jewish-Marxists who promised them freedom but instead

deceived them, exploiting them to pave the path for the tyranny of Jews.³⁰ A robust body of literature by authors such as Otto Böckel, Theodor Fritsch, and Richard Walther Darré touted such antisemitic theories, and these tracts were widely read by National Socialists.³¹

This antisemitic rhetoric of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew upon medieval and early modern traditions of dehumanizing Jews, equating them with animals and rodents to rationalize persecution.³² But in the late nineteenth century, an era saturated by pseudoscientific discussions of race, eugenics, and social hygiene and unsettled by nation-building and the saber-rattling of colonial aspirations, such invectives garnered unprecedented clout.³³ Antisemites excoriated the Enlightenment and its ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, denouncing the emancipation of Jews in German lands which had allowed them to penetrate, control, and contaminate all of Germany's "living spaces"—its politics, society, culture, as well as its landscapes and built environment. This notion of the "Jewification" of Germany became a potent force among antisemitic intellectuals at the turn of the century.³⁴ "It is either now or never

³⁰ For one such account, see Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Schutzstaffel. Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, *Judentum, Freimauerei, Bolschewismus*, III: Der Bolschewismus, ein Werkzeug des Judentums.

³¹ Otto Böckel, "Die Juden, die Könige unserer Zeit: Rede des Herrn Dr. Otto Böckel aus Marburg" (Marburg: Selbstverlag von Dr. Otto Böckel, 1887); Adolf Wahrmund, *Das Gesetz des Nomadenthums und die heutige Judenherrschaft* (Karlsruhe: H. Reuther's Verlag, 1887); Theodor Fritsch, *Antisemiten-Kathechismus: Eine Zusammenstellung des wichtigsten Materials zum Verständnis der Judenfrage*, 25 ed. (Leipzig: Verlag von Herm. Beyer, 1893); Theodor Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage: Eine Zusammenstellung des wichtigsten Materials zur Beurteilung des jüdischen Volkes*, 26 ed. (Hamburg: Hanseatische Druck- und Verlags-Anstalt, 1907); R. Walther Darré, *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden* (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1930); R. Walther Darré, *Blut und Boden: Ein Grundgedanke des Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1936); R. Walther Darré, *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse*, 9 ed. (Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1942).

³² Monika Urban, *Von Ratten, Schmeißfliegen und Heuschrecken: Judenfeindliche Tiersymbolisierungen und die postfaschistischen Grenzen des Sagbaren* (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014), 59-143; Jay Geller, *Bestiarium Judaicum: Unnatural Histories of the Jews* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018), 5-6, 29-56.

³³ Notions of race and blood as prerequisites for belonging were popular not only in Germany but across central and southern Europe. See Marius Turda, and Paul J. Weindling, ed. *"Blood and Homeland": Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900-1945* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).

³⁴ For three such accounts, see Theodor Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage: Die wichtigsten Tatsachen zur Beurteilung des jüdischen Volkes*, 32 ed. (Leipzig: Hammer-Verlag, 1933), 92-110; Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Sumpf: Querschnitte durch das 'Geistes'-Leben der November-Demokratie*, 2 ed. (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1939); Hermann Esser, *Die jüdische Weltpest*, 2 ed. (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eher Nachf., 1939).

that Germany is to be rescued from the Jewification,” Otto Böckel warned his audiences in speeches across the country.³⁵

These racial theories, steeped and matured in antisemitic circles at the turn of the century, were unleashed on German cityscapes and landscapes with brute force in early 1933. SA and SS men (members of the *Sturmabteilung* and the *Schutzstaffel*, Nazi paramilitary factions) and policemen raided and confiscated sites associated with the Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and closed many homosexual meeting places. Nazi Party (NSDAP) members destroyed Weimar-era memorials and vandalized Jewish shops and synagogues. In an astute report, Ulrich Thenen, a Berlin special correspondent for the Viennese Jewish newspaper *Die Stimme*, analyzed the developments and unpacked the semantics behind Nazi ordinances and press releases. Acknowledging that Jews were rarely cited as official targets of such attacks in these early months of 1933, Thenen noted how terms such as “cultural bolshevism” constituted a vague but collective charge that allowed Nazis to blame Jews for all manner of crime:

Einstein’s theory of relativity and mixed bathing, sexual journals and atheist movements, jazz music and the struggle against abortions, Mickey Mouse talismans and educational influences, Piscator’s productions and the flat roof of Bauhaus architecture, Chaplin films and expressionism, the death sentence and companionate marriage, etc. etc. are all branded as outgrowths of Jewish cultural bolshevism.³⁶

In addition to denouncing Communism and Socialism as controlled by Jews (political bolshevism), Nazis blamed Jews for everything they believed was morally decrepit in German society and culture (cultural bolshevism).

³⁵ Böckel, “Die Juden, die Könige unserer Zeit,” 15.

³⁶ “Berliner Brief. Von unserem Spezialkorrespondenten Dr. Ulrich Thenen,” *Die Stimme*, March 2, 1933. Thenen was presumably prompted, in part, to write his report in response to an article published in the antisemitic news organ *Der Angriff* from the previous day, which outlined Nazi efforts to root out “cultural bolshevism.” See “14 Jahre Kulturbolschewismus,” *Der Angriff*, March 1, 1933.

Though Nazis counted myriad “enemies”—Communists, Socialists, Marxists, Bolshevists, “November criminals”—in Nazi jargon, such terms were almost always pejoratives for Jews. Untangling ideologically charged rhetoric can be laborious, but to understand spatial practices during the Third Reich, it is critical to grasp the nuances of Nazi innuendo. National Socialists rarely employed the term *entartet* (degenerate) to describe spaces, but by referring to Weimar Germany as a *Sumpf* (swamp) and calling Jews *vermin*, *elements*, *parasites*, and a *plague*, Nazis implied that Germany was degenerate because Jews had infiltrated the country and brought with them moral decay. Not only had Jews yoked German peasants and seduced German workers, but Germany itself was sick, its cityscapes and landscapes corrupted by the influx of Jews and their “foreign” ideas. These ideas had infected German economics, culture, society, and politics. Nazis blamed Jews for wide-ranging phenomena: for the flat roofs of modern architecture, the politicization of German theater, the decay of German art, the commercialization of German film and literature, and even the fact that women wore pants.³⁷ In this struggle against “Jewish tyranny,” Hitler maintained that Germany was the lynchpin. If it failed to liberate itself from the “stranglehold” of Jews, the “bolshevization of Germany” would be mere prelude to Jewish dominion of the entire world.³⁸ Therefore, Nazis believed they were in a battle for the soul of the German nation itself. Before Germany could purport to wage a war to save Europe from Judeo-Bolshevism, it first had to liberate itself from its own “Jewification.”

In this sense, what Saul Friedländer has called “redemptive antisemitism” was indeed a central mobilizing force in Nazi ideology and practice from the beginning.³⁹ It was not, however,

³⁷ “14 Jahre Kulturbolschewismus,” *Der Angriff*, March 1, 1933; See also the photo of Marlene Dietrich wearing pants and a “man’s coat” because the “Jewish film pack in Hollywood wants to see titillating sensations”; *Der Angriff*, January 25, 1933.

³⁸ Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 703.

³⁹ Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, vol. 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 3.

implemented in any systematic or uniform manner. Nor was genocide the necessary outcome of Nazi efforts to make Germany *judenrein* (clean of Jews). The important task then becomes to examine how Nazis strove to implement these “spatial imaginations.” I seek to connect the intellectual and cultural with the social, to explain how, when, where, and in what ways Nazi ideology became praxis in everyday life via legislation, systematic measures, and individual actions. Indeed, it is my contention that it is precisely the examination of space that allows us to see *ideology in practice*. This implementation of ideology was not rigid or straightforward. Nor was it always implemented from the top-down. By looking at space, we can determine where Nazi ideology met resounding success and where it failed or adapted, and we can examine how Germans accommodated, abetted, or resisted the incursion of Nazi ideology into their everyday lives. In their interactions with their everyday surroundings, Germans defined, redefined, and actualized the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft*, a racial national community void of class distinctions. This community required visible conformity and was increasingly physically demarcated by who had access to public space and who did not.

Such considerations speak to a larger debate about the efficacy of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Recent studies have emphasized the success Nazis had at incorporating Germans into the national community.⁴⁰ These works properly problematized an immediate postwar historiography that over-emphasized terror and depicted an entire populace coerced into submission. My research expands on these studies but gauges how groups were included or excluded via building and spatial practices. Any Nazi success in unifying people in space succeeded in large part through the

⁴⁰ See Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent & Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003); Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008); Götz Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State*, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).

exclusion of others. Analyzing how ordinary citizens abetted or hindered such transformations provides one avenue to test the durability of the racial community itself. In Nazi Germany, there were certainly some clear enactors of such spatial strategies, including Nazi party members, city planners, architects, municipal and federal bureaucrats, and often, policemen. Victims of such coordination policies included: Jews, Communists, Socialists, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, and disabled persons. Between these two poles, however, existed degrees of resistance, struggle, coercion, and apathy, as well as consent and collaboration. Furthermore, victims of the regime might also indict other victim groups.

Michel de Certeau's theoretical conception of the dialectic nature of space—in which authorities constrain individuals' movements in space (through *strategies*), while individuals resist such control in their everyday movements in space (via *tactics*)—has enriched many historical studies, including my own, and has opened up new avenues of research.⁴¹ Nevertheless, if we simply graft the polar terms of *strategy* and *tactic* onto a given historical situation, we would focus exclusively on the top-down appropriation of space, or conversely, on resistance to that power. Neither perspective adequately accounts for the nature of spatial transformations in Nazi Germany, where the authority-subject divide was often porous. We need to be able to capture powerful overarching structures—in this case, Nazi ideology with race as its constitutive component—as well as its imperfect implementation via individual initiatives and everyday actions. In this process, individuals are not mere automatons but possess agency to resist and alter the overarching structures.⁴²

⁴¹ Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

⁴² A similar point is made by Gyan Prakash on the importance of examining how globalization and locality dialectically shape the modern city. The essays in his co-edited volume with Kevin Kruse “read the work of larger social forces in the relentless realm of the quotidian while also capturing its unpredictable, dynamic, and critical facets.” See Gyan Prakash, and Kevin Michael Kruse, ed. *The Spaces of the Modern City: Imaginaries, Politics, and Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 14. For studies on how other states have similarly attempted to wield power in the built environment but in an imperial setting, see: Jens Hanssen, *Fin De Siècle Beirut: The Making of an*

In 1930s Germany, notions of space—and of who could make claims and have access to spaces—were always present, sometimes exerting power with the heavy hand of technocrats and sometimes in more diffuse, but equally powerful, ways.⁴³ Capturing this dynamism requires us to move beyond simplistic authority-subject divides to analyze shades of perpetration, collaboration, conformity, resistance, and victimization. Therefore, I hope my study contributes to recent efforts to move beyond the consent versus coercion debate and to parse out the complex ways Germans positioned themselves with regards to the regime.⁴⁴

Though Berlin provides the main focal point for my inquiry, each chapter discusses similar developments in other parts of the country, some more explicitly so. The capital city is an ideal case study for my inquiries, however, because in Nazi imaginations, the city was indelibly entangled with everything against which Nazism juxtaposed itself—cosmopolitanism, internationalism, democracy, Communism, Socialism, capitalism, “Judeo-Bolshevism”—and therefore, was most in need of “coordination” and “cleansing.” Furthermore, recent studies have noted that much work still needs to be done to understand “where and how” National Socialists

Ottoman Provincial Capital (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005); Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Preeti Chopra, *A Joint Enterprise: Indian Elites and the Making of British Bombay* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). In her study of colonial Singapore, Brenda Yeoh successfully captures how the built environment was shaped by imperial policies and local opposition. See Brenda S. A. Yeoh, *Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁴³ This Foucauldian conception of a normative power can help us analyze power relations and the built environment in Nazi Germany. Foucault’s writings are permeated with reflections on how knowledge and power shape spaces. Foucault’s idea of a transformation of power from a juridico-political to a more widely dispersed power beginning in the eighteenth century directly impacted the distribution of space. Spaces became increasingly ordered and were designed to constrict humans’ behaviors within them. Foucault used the example of the military camp, which then served as a model for the design of other spaces intended to control bodies, including: schools, asylums, hospitals, prisons, working-class housing, and even cities. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 170-95. See also Jeremy W. Crampton, and Stuart Elden, ed. *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

⁴⁴ Nicholas Stargardt, “Beyond ‘Consent’ or ‘Terror’: Wartime Crises in Nazi Germany,” *History Workshop Journal* 72, no. 1 (2011); Martina Steber, and Bernhard Gotto, ed. *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Nathan Stoltzfus, *Hitler’s Compromises: Coercion and Consensus in Nazi Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

acquired and consolidated their power in Berlin and to uncover the inner workings of the city during the Third Reich.⁴⁵

Chapter 1 examines the Nazi assault on public spaces during their first months in power. Utilizing newspaper articles, propaganda accounts, Gestapo reports, and files from municipal authorities, I show how the regime successfully neutralized the meeting places of its political opponents and excluded them from public spaces. SA and SS men perpetrated violent acts of physical and symbolic destruction against sites associated with “political bolshevism” (Communist and Socialist party headquarters, presses, and trade union houses) and “cultural bolshevism” (art schools, homosexual meeting sites, pacifist and free-thinking organizations). This symbolic destruction aimed to erase traces of Germany’s past and present which contradicted National Socialist ideology. These measures powerfully heralded the advent of a new era by demarcating what was no longer acceptable. The latter half of the chapter analyzes the redesign of Berlin’s Bülowplatz (Bülow Square), site of the German Communist Party headquarters and a district home to many East European Orthodox Jews, into a commemorative square and memorial named after Horst Wessel, a celebrated Nazi martyr. This case study constituted the paradigmatic cleansing of a “Judeo-Bolshevist” site.

Chapter 2 considers the constructive efforts that paralleled, and succeeded the acts of destruction outlined in the first chapter. In countless public ceremonies and national holidays in 1933, Nazi authorities utilized the backdrop of cityscapes to orchestrate the Volksgemeinschaft, encouraging and pressuring Germans to visibly demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime by

⁴⁵ Christoph Kreutmüller, and Michael Wildt, “Berlin 1933-1945: Stadt & Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus,” in *Berlin: 1933-1945*, ed. Christoph Kreutmüller, and Michael Wildt (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2013), 7. Wolf Gruner writes that the everyday lives of Jews in Berlin similarly require further research. Wolf Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin 1933-1945. Eine Chronologie der Behördenmassnahmen in der Reichshauptstadt* (Berlin: Stiftung Topographie des Terrors, 2009), 11.

flying swastika flags and banners and decking their balconies and houses with greenery. From 1935 onward, German Jews were forbidden to partake in such nationalist demonstrations. During these celebrations in Berlin, the boulevards of Charlottenburger Chaussee and Unter den Linden played a central role, as Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels and other authorities invoked its symbolic capital to legitimize the new regime. Albert Speer's redesign of this same boulevard into the East-West-Axis, a grand memorial boulevard, cemented the Nazi regime's place as the natural successor of Germany's "First" and "Second" Empires. The chapter is based on files from Albert Speer's "General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital City" office as well as on newspaper articles, police and court records, diaries, and memoirs.

Chapter 3 discusses "everyday architecture" (stores, houses, and apartments) in Nazi Germany. Conservative architects felt emboldened after Hitler's rise to power, believing they would finally be able to institute sweeping reforms to redress errors of the past and restore order and unity to a chaotic built environment. Proponents of *Heimatschutz* architecture sought to preserve rural landscapes and ensure that new buildings did not disturb their natural surroundings. Much like Germans were to conform to the Volksgemeinschaft, so too were buildings supposed to seamlessly blend in with those around them. Therefore, traditional architects and their allies in preservation societies, endeavored to pass nationwide legislation to regulate building activities and to ensure that "*Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz*" (common good before self-good) would be the reigning principle in architecture as well. Despite the passage of such legislation in 1936, Third Reich architects did not distance themselves completely from Weimar modern architecture, which they despised for its supposed foreignness, internationalism, and individualism. Architecture journals and files from the Reich Ministry of Labor as well as other federal and municipal authorities show that decades-long debates between conservatives and more modern-inclined architects continued

after 1933. Instead of creating a unique German architectural style, architects rhetorically cleansed architecture of its foreign connotations and re-explained modernist concepts and materials—such as functionality, rationalization, glass, steel, cement, iron—to fit Nazi ideology.

Chapter 4 narrows the focus to pubs and cafes in Nazi Germany. In early 1933, SA men and police officers raided Communist and Socialist pubs and closed many of them temporarily and some of them permanently. They also closed several known gay and lesbian bars in Berlin and raided countless similar sites across Germany during the 1930s. Nevertheless, an examination of police reports and court records of individuals accused of breaching the “Treachery Act” or of violating Paragraph 175 reveals that pubs and cafes remained “sites of transgression” in Nazi Germany, eluding Gestapo and police attempts to control what was done and said in such places. Whereas the regime successfully politicized the public sphere, the semipublic sphere of *Gaststätten* resisted Nazification and accommodated some nonconformity. Authorities tolerated a certain amount of transgressive behavior from political dissidents and homosexuals in these spaces, provided they were productive members of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Such flexibility was not extended to German Jews. Within semipublic spaces such as pubs, the *Volksgemeinschaft* was truly shaped, for Germans made individual decisions about who did and did not belong to the German national community.

Chapter 5 brings “Jewish spaces” squarely into focus, outlining the various stages in which officials and ordinary citizens alike sought to make Germany proper *judenrein* from 1933 onward. I argue that this was a two-step process. First, Jews were segregated from non-Jews and increasingly banned from more and more public spaces, a process accompanied by the frenzied marking of “Aryan” and “Jewish” spaces. Second, Jewish spaces were targeted for violent destruction and erasure. From 1933 onward, the world of German Jews imploded and crashed

down around them. I seek to highlight this shrinking sense of space by focusing on ever smaller scales throughout the chapter (nation, city, and home) to examine how these processes of making spaces *judenrein* occurred at each level. In my attempts to write an “integrated” history, this chapter relies upon newspapers, archival documents (from federal & local authorities), public opinion reports from the Gestapo and the Social Democratic Party but places particular emphasis on survivor testimony to give voice to Jewish experiences of life in Germany between 1933 and 1945.⁴⁶

Two sources require additional critical commentary at the outset. In the final two chapters, I utilize, among other primary sources, public opinion reports and video testimonies of Holocaust survivors. Both sources present methodological challenges. First, the assemblers of the public opinion reports (the Social Democratic Party in exile and the Nazi police apparatus) harbored clear prejudices. Both sets of reports were collected with the express aim of shaping popular opinion in turn. Nevertheless, if we evince skepticism in the face of broad generalizations and do not ourselves make sweeping statements from silences or isolated events in these sources, public opinion reports provide a useful means to incorporate discussions of society at large.⁴⁷ Second, the lapse of time since the historical events in question and the narrative form of video testimonies sometimes provoke questions of accuracy and reliability. Nevertheless, utilizing the same approach outlined above, we can critically examine testimonies and fruitfully utilize them to provide incredibly important individual perspectives that counterbalance perpetrator documents.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Saul Friedländer, “An Integrated History of the Holocaust: Possibilities and Challenges,” in *Years of Persecution, Years of Extermination: Saul Friedländer and the Future of Holocaust Studies*, ed. Christian Wiese, and Paul Betts (London: Continuum, 2010).

⁴⁷ Peter Longerich, *Davon haben wir nichts gewusst! Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung 1933-1945* (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2006), 50-51.

⁴⁸ Annette Wieviorka, *The Era of the Witness*, trans. Jared Stark (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 130-31. Wieviorka underscores this point in her book, claiming that scholars simply need to be “memory critics” and apply the same rigorous approach to testimonies as they do to other primary sources.

For both sets of sources, I have tried to verify facts, dates, and historical developments with additional primary and secondary sources where possible.

If my dissertation succeeds in illuminating, in part, the halting but persistent manner in which Nazi ideology invaded German spaces, and describing how, in the process, it transformed who and what could make claims to German soil, then it will have achieved its purpose.

Chapter 1

Coordination: Bringing “Degenerate Spaces” into Line

Yes – Berlin was red to the bone. The city hall was red, the fat cats sat in all the offices, the hospitals Marxist-Jewish contaminated, most banks in Jewish hands, and the big newspapers just the same. Berlin had become a Dorado for Galician Jews and other elements who had, with assured instinct, caught whiff that they could once again thoroughly dupe the “German everyman.”¹

In the Nazi worldview, that was Berlin in the early 1930s. They conflated Communists and Jews and spoke of the “red plague” of Judeo-Bolshevism that had infected Germany. Cities had proven especially susceptible to this malady, and certain districts had sunk into veritable hotbeds of people who Nazis referred to as *elements*, *vermin*, and *contagions*. According to Nazi accounts, Jews not only controlled politics in the Weimar Republic, but their ideas had also permeated all German “living spaces”: its society and culture as well as its landscapes and built environment. Nazis spoke of the need to cleanse Berlin and “smoke out” the rats from the capital city.² When Hitler took the helm in 1933, Nazi authorities and the police targeted these “degenerate spaces” in what amounted to a spatial cleansing project to rid Berlin of Marxist, Communist, Socialist, and Jewish-Bolshevist influences. Any site branded as antithetical to the Nazi worldview was closed or confiscated. Under Hitler’s guidance, and with the police firmly behind the new regime, propaganda accounts declared Berlin once again “the world’s most pristine metropolis.”³

These notions of urban degeneracy permeated Nazi rhetoric on Berlin. Nazis despised the physical and cultural “outgrowths” of Weimar’s modernity that increasingly made themselves felt and seen in the public sphere.⁴ Traditional narratives of the public sphere tend to downplay just

¹ “Der Kampf um das rote Berlin,” *Die Fahne Hoch! Die braune Reihe*, no. 24 (1933): 5.

² Wilfred Bade, and Adolf Hitler, *Die S.A. erobert Berlin: ein Tatsachenbericht* (Munich: Verlag Knorr & Hirth, 1933), 259.

³ “Der Kampf um das rote Berlin,” in *Die Fahne Hoch! Die braune Reihe*, no. 24 (1933): 23-24.

⁴ The traditional narrative of the transformation of the public sphere recounts how middle-class Europeans successfully forged a critical public sphere in the late nineteenth century that helped them mediate between society and state. The standard account remains: Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

how radically subaltern groups transformed the public sphere, as women, the organized working class, Jews, and homosexuals began projecting their physical and symbolic presence into public spaces to make claims on the state.⁵ Much like salons and coffee houses had accommodated the middle class, pubs and cafes served as essential spaces of “social production” (and reproduction) that strengthened social ties amongst these groups and allowed them to organize and articulate political demands.⁶ Political organizations held mass demonstrations, often in provocative places, to challenge the bourgeois status quo and physically occupy the streets.⁷ Previously repressed individuals and associations even began making their mark through architecture, erecting or moving into grand institutes, clubhouses, trade union buildings, party headquarters, and synagogues.⁸

The public sphere in Germany became less autocratic and more democratic as it accommodated these groups in public spaces. Despite claims that Weimar had no “founding ritual” and therefore lacked popular appeal, recent research has even shown that the republican government successfully crafted democratic symbolism and employed methods of ritual-making in the public sphere to unify these disparate groups.⁹ Nonetheless, the heterogeneous public sphere

⁵ Eley also makes this critique. See Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 303-04.

⁶ Invoking Lefebvre, Dolores Hayden similarly stresses the importance of such spaces for social reproduction and notes that an easy means to curtail “the economic and political rights of groups has been to constrain social reproduction by limiting access to space.” See Dolores Hayden, *The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 22.

⁷ The organized working class did this very successfully. George Mosse notes that their marches on May Day were meant to provoke the middle classes and make claims on the bourgeois public sphere. See George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), 167.

⁸ See, e.g., Despina Stratigakos, *A Women's Berlin: Building the Modern City* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Saskia Coenen Snyder, *Building a Public Judaism: Synagogues and Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁹ Manuela Achilles, “Reforming the Reich: Democratic Symbols and Rituals in the Weimar Republic,” in *Weimar Republics/Weimar Subjects*, ed. Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and Kristin McGuire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010). Achilles argues against Detlev Peukert who claimed that the Weimar Republic lacked legitimacy, in part, because it had no foundational myth. See Detlev J. K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, trans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 6.

riled some conservatives who began to project a more militaristic nationalism onto German streets. The *Stahlhelm*, a post-World War I right-wing paramilitary organization, and later the SA, sought to dominate and conquer the public sphere through violence. They vandalized and destroyed visible symbols of their political enemies and often assaulted people as well.¹⁰ The NSDAP increasingly exploited the freedoms of the democratic public sphere for undemocratic ends, a development which culminated in its obliteration and coordination of oppositional spaces after Hitler was appointed chancellor in January 1933.

During its consolidation of power, the Nazi regime redefined who and what belonged in the public sphere. The regime banned its enemies from meeting in public spaces and coordinated spaces deemed “degenerate” or antithetical to Nazism. This spatial coordination entailed *physical* and *symbolic* measures as the regime destroyed, confiscated, and repurposed spaces associated with its opposition. These actions prevented oppositional groups from meeting and mobilizing against the Nazi regime, and they robbed them of symbolic capital from which they might draw continued inspiration and support. Though I discuss actions which occurred nationwide, the focus of this chapter is Berlin, which witnessed the main confrontation between National Socialists and Communists. The NSDAP first acquired power in central and southern Germany, but Berlin, the capital of the German nation, had long eluded Nazi control.

Although political opponents were the main targets in 1933, Nazi rhetoric about Berlin in general, and spaces associated with Communists and Socialists in particular, almost always had antisemitic undertones that were frequently made explicit. Reflecting on the Nazi takeover of power, author Wulf Bley called it momentous because it was when “the national revolution’s

¹⁰ Dirk Schumann, “Political Violence, Contested Public Space, and Reasserted Masculinity in Weimar Germany,” in *Weimar Publics/Weimar Subjects*, ed. Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and Kristin McGuire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 236-45.

decisive battle against everything in Germany that was sick began.”¹¹ The only way to cure Germany of its disease was to “obliterate the plague of Bolshevism from Germany,” he wrote.¹² To be sure, that is exactly what Nazis set out to do in 1933. Authorities undertook measures to cleanse, or “Germanize” spaces in Germany proper, long before they executed similar measures on massive territories in Central and Eastern Europe during World War II.

This chapter begins by providing some background information on historic perceptions concerning Jews and cities, and specifically on Berlin’s “Jewish district,” and then discusses how these perceptions informed the Nazi assault on “degenerate spaces” in 1933. SA and SS troops, aided by local police forces, targeted sites of “political bolshevism” and “cultural bolshevism”—sites associated with Communists, Socialists, or otherwise purported to have “Marxist” or “Bolshevist” connections—for closure, confiscation, or destruction. Often, the coordination of such sites prompted a total transformation of a space into its perceived symbolic antithesis. The latter half of the chapter analyzes the redesign of Berlin’s Bülowplatz as the paradigmatic cleansing of a “Judeo-Bolshevist” site and its transformation into a Nazi-appropriate space. Some of these spatial coordination efforts were planned and regulated from the top-down, but many actions, especially in winter and spring 1933, resulted from the wrath of young SA men drunk on power. None of these efforts would have been possible, however, without the assistance of knowledgeable local authorities. The redesign of Bülowplatz shows most clearly how Nazis and municipal and federal bureaucrats collaborated and began to successfully transform Nazi spatial ideologies into legislation and tangible spatial practices intended to unshackle Germany from its “Jewification.”

¹¹ Wulf Bley, *Das Jahr I: Rhythmus und Tatbestände des ersten Jahres nationalsozialistischer Staatsführung* (Berlin: Verlag der Reimar Hobbing, 1934), 83.

¹² *Ibid.*, 85.

Prologue: Jews and Cities, Jews in Berlin

Nazis were not alone in stigmatizing cities as Jewish-controlled. Antisemites across the European continent maintained that Jews held a special role in, or power over, European cities, especially Eastern European ones.¹³ Indeed, Jews did play seminal roles in cultural, political, and intellectual circles of many European metropolises.¹⁴ Antisemites viewed their prominence with suspicion, and notions of Jews' corrupting influence soon punctuated contemporary thought and literature at the turn of the century.¹⁵ Municipal authorities were mistrustful of Jewish residential districts and believed they required stringent regulation, a disposition which informed practices of ghettoization in Central and Eastern Europe during the Holocaust.¹⁶ Ghettoization in the 1940s may have been the end result, but cultural representations of Jews as "urban dwellers" had long informed antisemitism in Weimar and spatial practices in Nazi Germany.

Perhaps no other city has been subject to more scrutiny and observation, veneration and scorn, than was Berlin during the Weimar Republic. The writings of Franz Hessel, Walter Benjamin, Alfred Döblin, Christopher Isherwood, and Erich Kästner on everyday life in the city,

¹³ For example, in addition to exploiting antisemitism in Vienna, Karl Lueger referred to Budapest as "*Judapest*" to insinuate that it was controlled by Jews. See Richard J. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815-1914* (New York: Penguin Books, 2016), 479.

¹⁴ Steven Beller, *Vienna and the Jews, 1867-1938: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Steven Beller, ed. *Rethinking Vienna 1900*, Austrian and Habsburg Studies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001); Mary Gluck, *The Invisible Jewish Budapest: Metropolitan Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, ed. Steven E. Aschheim, Stanley G. Payne, Mary Louise Roberts, and David L. Sorkin, George L. Mosse Series in Modern European Cultural and Intellectual History (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2016). Contrasting negative portrayals of Jewish urbanity and exclusive notions of German national identity based on a sense of *Heimat*, Ofer Ashkenazi argues that some German Jews developed a positive and inclusive identity centered around themselves as city dwellers. See Ofer Ashkenazi, "The Non-Heimat Heimat: Jewish Filmmakers and German Nationality from Weimar to the GDR," *New German Critique* 42, no. 3 (2015).

¹⁵ Joachim Schlör, *Das Ich der Stadt: Debatten über Judentum und Urbanität, 1822-1938*, ed. Michael Brenner, and Stefan Rohrbacher, Jüdische Religion, Geschichte und Kultur (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005). In his impressive survey of this exact literature, Joachim Schlör historicizes the stereotype of the Jew as urban dweller.

¹⁶ Dan Michman, *The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos During the Holocaust*, trans. Lenn J. Schramm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). In his cultural history of ghettos, Dan Michman explores how sentiments regarding Jews, cities, and urbanization in Central and Eastern Europe informed practices of ghettoization during World War II. In particular, Michman discusses Peter-Heinz Seraphim's 1938 book *Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum*, which claimed that during urbanization, Jews congregated in specific city districts, forming a "city within a city" from which they slowly consolidated control over society.

though by no means exaltations, conjure a sense of awe and wonder even today.¹⁷ If Berlin's image was in flux at the beginning of the twentieth century, during the Weimar Republic, xenophobic writings on Berlin began injecting evermore vitriol into the cacophony.¹⁸ These works explicitly vilified the city and its perceived immorality. Wilhelm Stapel, a conservative journalist, wrote that provincial Germans opposed "the spirit of *this* metropolis" in which "too many Slavs and all too many altogether uninhibited East European Jews have been mixed into the population of Berlin."¹⁹ Such statements indicate that Berlin cannot be equated with the Weimar Republic itself, for many Germans detested Berlin and its internationalism.²⁰ The same conservative commentators who attacked Berlin's pluralism and cosmopolitanism were often vocal proponents of antisemitism.²¹

Hitler harbored similar sentiments for the capital city, blaming Jews for the dissolution of German society and national unity.²² Joseph Goebbels likewise repeatedly excoriated Berlin but said: "Berlin and its citizens have a worse reputation than they deserve. At fault are mostly those nomadic, rootless, international Jews, who have nothing more to do with Berlin than that they carry out their parasitic existence there at the cost of the hardworking, autochthonous [*bodenständig*] population."²³ In Weimar Germany, the belief that cities in general, and Berlin in particular, were controlled by Jews and infected by Jewish influences became a potent force in

¹⁷ See, for example: Franz Hessel, *Spazieren in Berlin* (Leipzig: H. Epstein Verlag, 1929); Walter Benjamin, "A Berlin Chronicle," in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 2007); Alfred Döblin, *Berlin Alexanderplatz: Die Geschichte vom Franz Biberkopf* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1929); Christopher Isherwood, *The Berlin Stories* (New York: New Directions, 2008); Erich Kästner, *Fabian: Die Geschichte eines Moralisten* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1931).

¹⁸ Peter Fritzsche, *Reading Berlin 1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 126.

¹⁹ Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, ed. *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 424.

²⁰ Eric Weitz's otherwise excellent study on Weimar Germany was too assured in its claim that "Weimar was Berlin, Berlin Weimar." See Eric Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 41. For a more extensive critique which claims "Weimar was Weimar," see Benjamin Ziemann, "Weimar was Weimar: Politics, Culture and the Emplotment of the German Republic," *German History* 28, no. 4 (2010).

²¹ Schlör, *Das Ich der Stadt*, 143.

²² Quoted in Wieland Giebel, ed. *Das braune Berlin: Adolf Hitlers "Kampf um die Reichshauptstadt"* (Berlin: Berlin Story Verlag, 2012), 106-07.

²³ Joseph Goebbels, *Kampf um Berlin: Der Anfang* (Munich: Verlag Frz. Eher Nachf., G.m.b.H., 1934), 27.

conservative intellectual circles, and it had direct consequences for Jews and others deemed “enemies of the state” after 1933.

Nazis reserved particular scorn for districts considered “redder” or more Jewish than others. A plethora of such areas existed in Berlin, including parts of Wedding, Moabit, Neukölln, Kreuzberg, the “Red Island” in Schöneberg, and the Wallstraße district in Charlottenburg.²⁴ Nazis especially detested the Scheunenviertel district and its Bülowplatz because of its association with both Communists and Jews. The Scheunenviertel was so named because the neighborhood was initially situated on the northern border of historic Berlin-Cölln, and it was where farmers erected their *Scheunen* (stalls) for straw and hay.²⁵ In the wake of urbanization and industrialization, the stalls disappeared, and by the mid-1800s the area had become a crowded residential district. Berlin served as an important conduit between east and west as more than two million Jews, fleeing pogroms and persecution, emigrated from Russia and Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1914. By the mid-1890s, Russian and Galician Jews had begun temporarily or indefinitely taking up residence in Berlin’s Scheunenviertel. When the Habsburg Empire dissolved and borders were reconfigured after World War I, many of these Jews were refused citizenship in newly established nation-states and were subjected to a precarious existence as “stateless” Jews.²⁶ The

²⁴ For more in-depth discussions of some of these districts, see Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Pamela E. Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies: The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Oliver Reschke, *Kampf um den Kiez: Der Aufstieg der NSDAP im Zentrum Berlins 1925-1933* (Berlin: trafo Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014).

²⁵ Horst Helas, *Die Grenadierstraße im Berliner Scheunenviertel: ein Ghetto mit offenen Toren* (Berlin: Hentrich und Hentrich, 2010), 12.²⁶ Tobias Brinkmann, “Jüdische Migranten aus Osteuropa in Berlin zwischen 1918 und 1929,” in *Berlin Transit: Jüdische Migranten aus Osteuropa in den 1920er Jahren* (Berlin: Wallstein Verlag and Jüdisches Museum, 2012), 85.

²⁶ Tobias Brinkmann, “Jüdische Migranten aus Osteuropa in Berlin zwischen 1918 und 1929,” in *Berlin Transit: Jüdische Migranten aus Osteuropa in den 1920er Jahren* (Berlin: Wallstein Verlag and Jüdisches Museum, 2012), 85.

Scheunenviertel's Jewish residents multiplied after World War I so that by 1925, Jews comprised over fifty-percent of the population in the area immediately surrounding Bülowplatz.²⁷

Nazis also despised this district for its associations with Communists. Following the murders of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in January 1919, workers had gathered on Bülowplatz for the start of a funeral procession for the revolutionaries who had died fighting during the previous months. More importantly, the Communist Party of Germany moved its headquarters to Bülowplatz in 1926. Previously, the KPD headquarters had been located in a back building of Rosenthaler Straße 38, a space which soon proved too small.²⁸ The move to the large building at Kleine Alexanderstraße 28 on a prominent square in Berlin was indicative of the Communist Party's growing symbolic and political capital in the city. Around this same time, the NSDAP and its paramilitary forces began making inroads into Berlin.

Thereafter, Bülowplatz became a flashpoint of clashes between the SA, the Red Front Fighters' League (*Roter Frontkämpferbund*, the Communist paramilitary faction), and the police. For example, after SA man Horst Wessel had been shot by a Communist in January 1930 and later died of his injuries, the Nazis led a funeral procession for him directly across Bülowplatz to the cemetery just north of the square where he was buried.²⁹ Communists disrupted the procession when it reached Bülowplatz by shouting and singing the International, and National Socialists claimed that they even tried to tip over Wessel's casket.³⁰ The most infamous incident occurred in August 1931 when several Communists, frustrated by police interventions and suppression, conspired to assassinate police officers Paul Anlauf and Franz Lenck. On August 9, the day of a

²⁷ Friedrich Paulsen, "Städtebauliches Schrifttum," *Städtebau* 28, no. 12 (December 1933): 575-576.

²⁸ Ronald Friedmann, *Die Zentrale: Geschichte des Berliner Karl-Liebknecht-Hauses* (Berlin: Dietz, 2011), 7-17. In July 1926, the Central Committee of the KPD purchased the Kleine Alexanderstraße 28 building and its property for 450,000 RM.

²⁹ It was the St. Mary and St. Nicholas Cemetery I, which still functions as a cemetery today.

³⁰ Daniel Siemens, *Horst Wessel: Tod und Erklärung eines Nationalsozialisten* (Munich: Siedler, 2009), 30.

referendum regarding the dissolution of the Prussian state parliament, Communists Heinz Neumann and Erich Mielke shot and killed the two officers on Bülowplatz. Mielke, later head of East Germany's secret police, fled to Moscow and did not return to Germany until 1945.³¹

As Anne-Christian Saß has noted, past and present depictions of the Scheunenviertel tend to stereotype the district, romanticizing or vilifying it, often distorting rather than reflecting reality.³² The Scheunenviertel was indeed a district beloved by East European Jewish migrants to Berlin, and with its many synagogues, Jewish organizations, signs in Yiddish and Hebrew, street markets, and men dressed in traditional clothing, the district did constitute something visibly distinct.³³ Yet, as Saß notes, many assimilated Jews and non-Jews also lived in the Scheunenviertel so that the district was a “complex space of communication and encounter.”³⁴ Despite its diversity, however, certain cultural representations coalesced around the Scheunenviertel as something visibly “other.” These representations had both positive and negative connotations.

Most Jews held favorable views of the district. For some, it was merely a place to shop, attend prayers, or mingle with others. Others exoticized it somewhat, viewing it as an exciting “tourist attraction,” a place to visit and enjoy the different sights, smells, and sounds of the district.³⁵ Writer and journalist Joseph Roth described the district in such a manner, recalling “a reek of onions, fish, fat, and fruit, of infants, mead, wash, and sewers. [...] Women and children clustered in front of fruit and vegetable stands. Hebrew letters on shop signs, nameplates over doors, and in shop windows, put an end to the comely roundness of European Antiqua type with

³¹ Friedmann, *Die Zentrale*, 51-55.

³² Anne-Christian Saß, “Das Scheunenviertel: Zur Urbanität eines Stadtquartiers,” in *Berlin Transit: Jüdische Migranten aus Osteuropa in den 1920er Jahren* (Berlin: Wallstein Verlag and Jüdisches Museum, 2012), 64.

³³ *Ibid.*, 62-63.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

³⁵ Helen Juravel, Interview 48340, Segment 111, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

its stiff, frozen, jagged seriousness.”³⁶ Morris Hellman fondly recalled the district, remembering that East European Jews knew they would feel “at home” there.³⁷ Yet not all Jews felt affinity for the district. More affluent, assimilated German Jews often viewed the Scheunenviertel with disdain, and once they had the means, relocated to Berlin’s southwestern suburbs, settling in Charlottenburg, Wilmersdorf, Schöneberg, Grunewald, and Nikolassee.

Nazis similarly wrote about the Scheunenviertel as something “other,” but in an explicitly hostile manner. A reporter from the antisemitic newspaper *Der Angriff* of Berlin’s NSDAP branch wrote that, in the Scheunenviertel, “one is struck by the scent of garlic which emanates from the apartments” and that “Germans” are repulsed by the district “while the Jewish elements feel especially at home due to the common convention here.” Furthermore, the reporter claimed it should be “no surprise that the Communist Party placed its headquarters in the district of Judaism and criminality. It moved into its Karl-Liebnecht-House and felt at home here among those who are at home here in the Jewish district, in the ghetto.” National Socialists casually conflated Communists, Jews, and criminals, and it was precisely this collective representation of the Scheunenviertel as a degenerate space—foreign, corrupt, and decrepit—which informed officials’ interventions and plans for the district after 1933. The reporter declared that Nazis intended to take an “iron broom” to the Scheunenviertel and finally “transform this area into a now unfamiliar condition of cleanliness and order” so the “Jewish parasites” would no longer be able “to deprive [them] of what is [their] own ancestral right on German soil, namely, the right to the street and the

³⁶ Quoted in Joseph Roth, *What I Saw: Reports from Berlin, 1920-1933*, trans. Michael Hofmann (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 45, 47.

³⁷ Morris Hellman, Interview 27185, Segment 25-26, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997. Morris Gruenberg, who grew up in the Scheunenviertel, spoke about the district in a similar manner. See Morris Gruenberg, Interview 42094, Segment 1-2, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

right to freedom in a German Volksgemeinschaft.”³⁸ Within three years, Nazi authorities would make good on that promise.

Coordinating Spaces of “Political Bolshevism”

Local Nazis and SA troops interpreted Hitler’s appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933 as a signal to take their “iron broom” to German cityscapes. With little regard for the rule of law, they vandalized, raided, and confiscated any site deemed a threat or as unfit for their new “Reich.” A frenetic energy drove these raids on spaces of “political bolshevism.” SA and SS men, Hitler Youth, and members of other Nazi organizations conducted some of these actions spontaneously. Others were systematically organized in coordination with local police officers. Between January and June 1933, the NSDAP consolidated its power by denying its political opponents access to public spaces and by obliterating any symbolic capital Communists, Socialists, and other oppositional groups once possessed in in the public sphere. These actions prevented political groups from organizing any effective resistance to the Nazi extirpation of German democracy.

The Nazi regime drew on a long tradition of repressing progressive forces and Socialist politics that dated back to the nineteenth century. During the 1848 revolution and Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws, German police forces developed a penchant for repressing progressive movements. Circumstances in the immediate aftermath of World War I strengthened their anti-left orientation when former military officers commanded new police battalions staffed by soldiers and Free Corps troops.³⁹ Many of the same troops had, at the behest of Chancellor (and later President) Friedrich Ebert and Minister of Defense Gustav Noske, violently quelled revolutionary unrest in the winter

³⁸ “Das Ghetto von Berlin,” *Der Angriff*, January 25, 1933.

³⁹ Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 271.

of 1918–19. When the Treaty of Versailles mandated that the German military be reduced to 100,000 men, entire divisions of soldiers moved into the security police.⁴⁰ The Weimar Republic witnessed additional police clashes with revolutionary groups from the left and right, most notably during the “Beer Hall Putsch” in November 1923 when the NSDAP unsuccessfully tried to incite a coup, which was quelled by police officers in Munich.⁴¹

In the mid-1920s, the police instituted some progressive reforms, especially in Berlin under the influence of Bernhard Weiß, who had been appointed head of the Berlin criminal police in 1925, and in 1927, vice president of the entire police force in Berlin.⁴² Weiß and Albert Grzesinski, an SPD member and two-time chief of police, sought to firmly position the police as a bulwark of Weimar’s democracy and against National Socialists.⁴³ Their efforts to democratize the police were severely compromised during the *Preußenschlag* of 1932, when Chancellor Franz von Papen invoked Article 48 to dismiss the entire Prussian state government and subjugated all of Prussia to direct federal rule. All Social Democrats were purged from the police, and Weiß and Grzesinski were immediately arrested and not released until they agreed to renounce their positions.⁴⁴

Thereafter, police forces took more vigorous actions against Communists, especially in early 1933. On February 15, 1933, Magnus von Levetzow was appointed chief of police in Berlin. Unlike some of his predecessors, Levetzow openly disparaged the democratic state and actively sought to dismantle it. Born in 1871, Levetzow served as an officer in the Imperial German Navy,

⁴⁰ Maria Hausleitner, “Die Polizei in der Weimarer Republik,” in *Ordnung und Vernichtung: Die Polizei im NS-Staat*, ed. Münster Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei, Florian Dierl, Mariana Hausleitner, Martin Hölzl, and Andreas Mix (Dresden: Sandstein Verlag, 2011), 18.

⁴¹ Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 193-94. Four police officers and fourteen putschists were killed in the clash.

⁴² Hausleitner, “Die Polizei in der Weimarer Republik,” 20-23.

⁴³ Jens Dobler, “Die Berliner Kriminalpolizei in der Weimarer Republik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Dezernate gegen die Eigentumskriminalität,” in *Großstadtkriminalität: Berliner Kriminalpolizei und Verbrechensbekämpfung 1930 bis 1950*, ed. Jens Dobler (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2013), 26.

⁴⁴ Hausleitner, “Die Polizei in der Weimarer Republik,” 26.

commanding the battle cruiser “Moltke” during World War I. After the war, Levetzow supported right-wing forces who sought to overthrow the Weimar Republic during the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and then collaborated with right-wing associations who endeavored to reinstate the monarchy. This work brought him closer to the NSDAP. Levetzow officially joined the party and even became an elected Nazi member of parliament in July 1932.⁴⁵

In a speech shortly after taking office as Berlin’s chief of police in February 1933, Levetzow clearly articulated his commitment to the Nazi Party and its principles. He promised the police would work for “calm and order, cleanliness, for chastity and morality” under his command. “On this site of hallowed ancient Prussian tradition, on this soil, on the consecrated site of the city of Berlin, I will not tolerate any poisonous plants of Asiatic provenance, I will not allow them to bring unrest among a sober-minded population,” Levetzow vowed. Referring to something of “Asiatic provenance” was contemporary Nazi parlance for Jews. Levetzow called upon his fellow officers and authorities in Berlin to assist him in rooting out these “murderous vermin.” From now on, he said, it was incumbent upon policemen to “clear the path” for the “national awakening” underway.⁴⁶

As Prussian interior minister since the end of January 1933, Hermann Göring controlled the state’s police forces, and in mid-February he directed the police in Prussia to assist Nazis and to desist from any further investigations into Nazi activities. Shortly thereafter, on February 22, Göring fashioned an auxiliary police force made up of SA and SS men to assist the political police in its repression of Communists and Socialists.⁴⁷ SA and SS men began accompanying police

⁴⁵ He later served as head of the Department of Operations under Reinhard Scheer’s Staff of the High Seas Armed Forces. When the Maritime Warfare Command was established in August 1918, Levetzow was appointed chief of staff and was instrumental in the planned – but aborted – final suicidal naval assault against England in October 1918, which instigated the Kiel Mutiny. *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 14 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 391-92.

⁴⁶ “Pg. Levetzow vor den Berliner Polizeibeamten,” *Der Angriff*, February 24, 1933.

⁴⁷ Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 318.

officers in conducting searches and making arrests, and SA men often independently raided sites without fear of legal ramification.

The regime issued two decrees in February 1933 to legally buttress their campaigns against its political and ideological opponents. First, the February 4 “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the German People” allowed the police to ban public marches and gatherings in Prussia if they were deemed a threat to public safety. It authorized the search and seizure of spaces used for political purposes and permitted the police to ban uniforms and political clothing.⁴⁸ Second, the February 28 “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State,” issued the day after the Reichstag burst into flames, sanctioned the arrest of Communist functionaries, and the closure of all Communist Party houses, schools, clubs, presses, libraries, and pubs. This emergency decree remained in place for the duration of Nazi rule and served as the basis for all the police’s extrajudicial actions between 1933 and 1945.⁴⁹ Thousands of Communist functionaries and party members were arrested in the next few days and beat up and tortured in prisons, cellars, and SA homes and pubs.⁵⁰

The wave of arrests was accompanied by an all-out assault on Communist spaces. Communist gatherings, both in public and in private, were forbidden altogether.⁵¹ The police conducted house searches and closed Communist Party offices as well as some Social Democratic ones across Germany.⁵² Communist sports clubs were dissolved, their offices confiscated, and they

⁴⁸ See “Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutze des deutschen Volkes. Vom 4. Februar 1933,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, I, 35-40; “Kommunistische Umzüge in Berlin verboten,” “Auch SPD-Kundgebungen verboten,” and “Kommunistische Demonstrationen aufgelöst,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 2, 1933; “Es regnet Verbote,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 3, 1933.

⁴⁹ Peter Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler*, trans. Jeremy Noakes, and Lesley Sharpe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 208.

⁵⁰ Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 335. Evans places the number of arrests at 10,000 within two weeks of the Reichstag Fire.

⁵¹ “Die Polizeiaktion in Berlin,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 2, 1933; “Einheitliches Vorgehen gegen die KPD. im Reich,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 2, 1933.

⁵² “Aktion gegen die KPD,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 3, 1933.

were banned from using gymnasiums and playing fields.⁵³ Communist and Socialist groups were kicked out of youth centers and youth hostels, which were in the future to host only national-oriented groups that strengthened the Volksgemeinschaft.⁵⁴

Under the pretense of searching for “illegal publications,” the police also searched the offices of the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith, an organization founded by assimilated German Jews in the late nineteenth-century to combat rising antisemitism.⁵⁵ After the search, the association emphasized that it was a patriotic German organization with absolutely no ties to Communists.⁵⁶ The association’s offices in Frankfurt am Main and in Erfurt, as well as several private homes, had been searched in a similar manner. In its newspaper, the Central Association lamented that “unskilled” reporting had led the public to believe that Communist materials had been unearthed. In fact, the police had only found a few anti-Nazi pamphlets from 1930.⁵⁷ The association criticized *Der Angriff*’s reporting, which claimed the police had discovered a “plethora of the cruelest baiting material against the National Socialist liberation movement” which supposedly proved “that this Asiatic association on German soil is nothing but a Communist aid organization.”⁵⁸ Here the newspaper indicted the Central Association as a “Judeo-Bolshevist” organization and articulated the claim that it was a foreign body on German soil.

The destruction of Communist and Socialist symbols and memorials often accompanied the raids of such sites. In Chemnitz, a red flag was retrieved from the building of the Social Democratic newspaper *Volksstimme* and replaced by a swastika flag. The red flag was burned

⁵³ BArch R 58/333, R 58/521, R 58/694.

⁵⁴ “Freigegebene Jugendheime,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 5, 1933; “Keine sozialistischen Vereine in Jugendherbergen,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 5, 1933.

⁵⁵ “Haussuchung im Centralverein,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 3, 1933.

⁵⁶ “Erklärung des Central-Vereins,” *C.V. Zeitung*, March 2, 1933.

⁵⁷ “Die Durchsuchung des Centralvereins,” *C.V. Zeitung*, March 9, 1933.

⁵⁸ “Haussuchung im CV. Jüdische Hilfsorganisation der KPD. ausgehoben,” *Der Angriff*, March 2, 1933.

shortly thereafter on a nearby public square.⁵⁹ In Trier, local Nazis occupied Karl Marx's birth house and hung a swastika flag on it, and they burned three red flags on the street in front of the building. The house was later used by the NSDAP and the *Nationalblatt*, a National Socialist newspaper.⁶⁰ Memorials for Weimar politicians, such as Friedrich Ebert, Matthias Erzberger, and Walther Rathenau were destroyed across Germany.⁶¹

Cemeteries where prominent Communists were buried were put under increased surveillance, and authorities made efforts to erase traces of revolutionary fighters.⁶² A memorial in Park Cemetery in Berlin-Lichtenberg, which commemorated the Spartacists who had been shot and killed there by government troops in March 1919, was removed by order of the district mayor in April 1933.⁶³ In Leipzig, stone cutters removed all inscriptions from gravestones that indicated the deceased had died in the "liberation struggle of the proletariat" as well as Soviet stars, hammers and sickles, and other Communist symbols.⁶⁴ Due repeated efforts of Communists to place flowers on Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg's graves and to hold commemorative services, the memorial for them in the Berlin-Friedrichsfelde cemetery was eventually dismantled.⁶⁵

In February and March 1933, the police, SA, and SS mainly targeted Communist spaces (and those of suspected affiliates), but they soon turned their attention to Socialist sites and trade unions as well. The police searched the publishing house of the Social Democratic newspaper

⁵⁹ "Rote Fahnen wwrden feierlich verbrannt," *Hamburger Tageblatt*, March 7, 1933. Communist and Social Democratic flags were also burned on the Market Square in Osnabrück, where it was reported that black-white-red flags had previously been set on fire (presumably during the 1918-19 revolution).

⁶⁰ BArch R 58/2242, Bl. 15.

⁶¹ "Kleine Nachrichten," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 9, 1933; "Die Ebertbüste im Berliner Rathaus entfernt," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, April 18, 1933; "Ein Ebert-Denkmal wird abgetragen," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, May 4, 1933.

⁶² "Aus Berlin und Umgegend," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 19, 1933.

⁶³ "Entfernung eines Hetzdenkmals," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, April 11, 1933.

⁶⁴ BArch R 58/3220, Abschrift aus 'Neuer Vorwärts,' Karlsbad, Nr. 44 vom 15. April 1934 and "Rat der Stadt Leipzig" an das Polizeipräsidium, June 27, 1934.

⁶⁵ BArch R 58/3664, Bl. 173, "Tagesbericht" vom Polizeipräsident, Staatspolizeistelle für den Landespolizeibezirk Berlin, 16. Januar 1935, Nr. 192 für die Zeit vom 15. Januar 1935, 12 Uhr, bis zum 16. Januar 1935.

Vorwärts and the House of the German Metal Workers' Union in early March 1933.⁶⁶ Several days later, auxiliary police forces searched the main building of the Free Trade Unions in Berlin and confiscated papers, weapons, and arrested three people.⁶⁷ Additional searches and occupations of trade union buildings occurred in Bochum, Osnabrück, and Lübeck, while the *Reichsbanner* (the SPD-affiliated paramilitary group) was banned in the city of Braunschweig and in the entire state of Bavaria.⁶⁸

The General Federation of German Trade Unions (ADGB) seemed especially caught off-guard by the developments in March 1933. Theodor Leipart, chairman of the ADGB, initially sought to cooperate with Hitler. Thus, board members were quite shocked when reports of attacks on trade union buildings began to overwhelm the central office. Hermann Schlimme, Leipart's personal secretary and a member of the managing board, sent a letter to Göring on March 8, 1933, informing him of attacks. "Dear Minister!" the letter began in earnest before recounting attacks on Prussian trade unions.⁶⁹ In a series of letters, Schlimme implored Göring, Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, and Chief of the Prussian Political Police (and later head of the Gestapo) Rudolf Diels to uphold the NSDAP's promises to the foreign press that the government was utilizing every means to ensure "discipline, peace, and order." By March 25, 1933, the police, SS, and SA had occupied or confiscated trade union administration buildings and offices in at least forty-five German cities in a violent manner. Referring to the offices in Leipzig, Schlimme said that if they had been engulfed by a fire, they would not be in worse shape.⁷⁰ Despite the photographic evidence

⁶⁶ "Neue Haussuchung im 'Vorwärts'-Gebäude," *B.Z. am Mittag*, March 4, 1933; "Das 'Vorwärts'-Gebäude und die Räume Metallarbeiter-Verbandes durchsucht," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 4, 1933.

⁶⁷ BArch R 58/3026, report from March 9, 1933.

⁶⁸ "Reichsbanner-Verbot in Bayern und Braunschweig," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 12, 1933.

⁶⁹ BArch R 58/80, Bl. 1-5.

⁷⁰ BArch R 58/80, Bl. 8-14, Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund an Herrn Vizkanzler v. Papen. Buildings and offices were reported occupied in: Aachen, Annaberg, Auerbach, Bautzen, Bitterfeld, Bremen, Breslau, Bunzlau, Braunschweig, Castrop-Rauxel, Cleve, Dresden, Duisburg, Döbeln, Freiburg/Br., Goch, Gelsenkirchen, Hamborn, Kassel, Leipzig, Ludwigshafen, Meissen, Nürnberg, Olbernhau, Osnabrück, Oberhausen, Plauen, Pirmasens,

Schlimme proffered, Göring's office responded that his accounts were "extremely exaggerated" and constituted "atrocious propaganda."⁷¹

It was not until May 2, 1933, one day after the highly orchestrated National Day of Labor, that mass confiscations of trade unions began. On that day, the police occupied all independent trade union buildings, unions were nationalized, and their property and finances confiscated. A week later, the attorney general in Berlin approved the seizure of all Social Democratic Party property, including that of its affiliated newspapers and of the *Reichsbanner*.⁷² Their buildings and offices were occupied, searched, and sealed. The government justified the confiscations based on fabricated accusations of embezzlement against SPD functionaries and cited the Reichstag Fire Decree, which permitted confiscations of property, to further validate the takeovers.⁷³

Several laws and decrees passed in 1933 addressed the confiscation of Communist, Socialist, and Jewish property. Mayor of Berlin Heinrich Sahn declared at the end of April that municipally-owned properties, buildings, and rooms would no longer be rented or leased to "mosaic" (Jewish) persons or organizations or to groups "whose political, economic, or cultural activities are based on a Marxist worldview."⁷⁴ Two additional laws legalized the confiscation of properties. The first law was issued on May 26 and was the only measure which legitimated expropriations of Communist property.⁷⁵ The government passed a second law on July 14, which authorized the seizure of Social Democratic property and of any other organization deemed

Reutlingen, Rosenheim, Sagan, Schneidemühl, Schönebeck, Wernigerode, Wuppertal, Wurzen, Zittau, Zwickau, Zweibrücken. Furthermore, trade union buildings had been confiscated in the following cities: Goslar, Kiel, Königsberg, Lössen, Liegnitz und Oberndorf.

⁷¹ BArch R 58/80, Bl. 36-38, Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund an Herrn Reichsminister Göring.

⁷² BArch R 58/3324.

⁷³ "Beschlagnahme des gesamten SPD-Vermögens," *Berliner Morgenpost*, May 11, 1933.

⁷⁴ "Keine städtischen Räume für marxistische und jüdische Vereinigungen mehr," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, April 29, 1933.

⁷⁵ Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich*, trans. John W. Hiden (New York: Longman, 1981), 84-85. This was the law for the "Confiscation of Communist Property."

“Marxist” or an “enemy of the state.” Authorities later used these laws to justify the first confiscations of Jewish property.⁷⁶ At the end of June 1933, Interior Minister Frick invoked the Reichstag Fire Decree to ban the Social Democratic Party altogether, and 3,000 SPD members were immediately arrested and beaten up in prisons and concentration camps.⁷⁷

The *Vorwärts* building was searched one last time, and its rooms were then closed and sealed. Authorities were to be on alert for Social Democrats fleeing across the border.⁷⁸ Bank accounts and safety deposit boxes of top functionaries were locked.⁷⁹ The properties previously occupied by the *Vorwärts* publishing house and press were officially transferred to the Prussian state in August 1933.⁸⁰ These buildings were weighted with symbolic capital. Spartacist fighters had occupied the *Vorwärts* building during early 1919 when governmental forces violently routed them out in an incident that became known as the “January Uprising.”⁸¹ The *Vorwärts* building later passed to individual entrepreneurs and craftsmen. It also housed an office for the Nazi welfare initiative “Strength Through Joy” as well as a Berlin branch of the German Labor Front (DAF), the Nazi trade union organization which replaced the dissolved unions. A local newspaper celebrated the fact that the former “site that had poisoned the people” and “contaminated” all of Germany had been transformed into site that benefitted the Volk and German workers.⁸²

⁷⁶ Ibid., 91. This was the law for the “Confiscation of Property from Enemies of the Volk and State.”

⁷⁷ Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 359.

⁷⁸ BArch R 58/3131, Bl. 136-138.

⁷⁹ BArch R 58/3324, Bl. 218.

⁸⁰ “Grundstücke, Verlagsgebäude, Druckerei und Verlag des ‘Vorwärts’ vom Preußischen Staat enteignet,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, August 12, 1933. These properties were located at Lindenstraße 2-4 and Alte Jakobstraße 148-155.

⁸¹ Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 180, 210-16. Mark Jones notes that this episode, along with the murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht a few days later, marked a turning point in the escalation and legitimization of violence in post-World War I Germany, for the Social Democratic government condoned these acts of extrajudicial violence. Like the collective cultural imaginations regarding *franc-tireurs* had inspired extraordinary violence against Belgian civilians at the beginning of World War I, Jones claims that similar notions had coalesced around Luxemburg and Liebknecht and the belief that German society would unravel should the revolutionaries prevail.

⁸² “Rote Hochburg der Lindenstraße wurde Arbeiterbetreuungsstätte,” in *Kreuzberg*, January 14, 1938. Seen in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Museum Archive.

When the July 1933 “Law Against the Formation of Parties” officially banned all political parties but the NSDAP, the political opposition had already been rendered ineffective.⁸³ The police had worked in tandem with SS and SA men to raid and confiscate Socialist and Communist properties, and to ban oppositional political groups from gathering in public and private spaces altogether. By the end of summer 1933, street fights with Communists seemed a distant memory.

Coordinating Spaces of “Cultural Bolshevism”

Spaces of political opposition were not the only targets in 1933. As they consolidated their power, Nazis also targeted sites of “cultural bolshevism.” Geographer and diplomat Friedrich Leyden, like many of his contemporaries, blamed the adulteration of German culture on the incursion of foreign influences. In his 1933 article “Berlin as an Example of a City without Roots,” Leyden wrote: “Here, where the truly indigenous [*bodenständig*] retreats completely into the background, where all cultural activities are mere superficial outgrowths [*Teilerscheinungen*], those without a *Heimat* and without roots will dictate the exterior character.” This situation would be rectified, Leyden said, only when people again recognized the importance of reestablishing their bonds with soil and nature.⁸⁴ Leyden was insinuating that any culture that existed in Berlin resulted from itinerants who resided in the city and that until the bond between people and soil was reestablished, there could be no true, native culture.⁸⁵ Authorities more radical than Leyden

⁸³ “Gesetz gegen die Neubildung von Parteien. Vom 14. Juli 1933,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, I, 479.

⁸⁴ Friedrich Leyden, “Berlin als Beispiel einer wurzellosen Großstadt,” *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 10 (1933): 188.

⁸⁵ See Nikolaus Creutzberg, “Friedrich Leyden: Ein deutscher Geograph,” *Die Erde: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin* 2 (1950/51): 343. Leyden’s words are testament to the prevalence of such racial geographic thinking in the early 1930s. Born as Friedrich Levy to a Jewish family in 1891, he later Germanized his name to Leyden as he ascended Germany’s academic and diplomatic ranks. Leyden was released from his position in the Foreign Office shortly after the Nazis came to power. Leyden moved to the Netherlands and remained there until he was deported to Theresienstadt, where he died in 1944.

mobilized such rhetoric to coordinate numerous cultural spaces, organizations, and institutes in early 1933, intent to root out these cultural “outgrowths.”

The first such assault occurred during the Carnival season at the end of February 1933. Berliners, though lacking historic Carnival traditions like their Catholic neighbors to the east and south, still marked the occasion with wild parties. Artists in the School of the Museum of Applied Arts in Berlin hosted the renowned “*Dachkahn*” festival, a yearly Carnival ball. Sebastian Haffner attended this festival in 1933 and later recounted the evening in his memoir. He described the festival as a “love tombola” where one found a dance partner and spent the evening chatting, cuddling, kissing, and dancing. Not long after Haffner arrived at the party that evening, a rumor rapidly spread around the hall that the police were in the building. When Haffner inquired as to why, a young man replied, “Work it out for yourself. There are people who don’t like this sort of thing.” A sense of panic set in, Haffner remembered: “There were loud screams. All of a sudden we all looked pale as ghosts. It made a very theatrical effect.” Haffner and his dance partner made their way through the crowd and eventually ascertained that the police had indeed arrived. After Haffner asked somewhat cheekily whether they really had to leave, an SS man replied, “You have *permission* to leave.”⁸⁶

Der Angriff reported on the raid of the *Dachkahn* festival in an article entitled “When Jews celebrate Carnival...” It explicitly blamed Jews for the “immoral” carnival atmosphere and said the police had broken up the festival due to “shocking activities taking place in the corridors and artist studios that made a mockery of every sort of decency and manners.” Furthermore, it claimed that “at least 80 to 90 percent of the ‘festival participants’ were, as it is common at similar events, Jews and friends of Jews, who, when it comes to morality and good conventions, are one and the

⁸⁶ Sebastian Haffner, *Defying Hitler: A Memoir* (London: Phoenix, 2003), 93-97. Haffner said he had encountered an SS man for the first time.

same.”⁸⁷ When the school’s rental contract for its instructional rooms and studios in Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8 expired at the end of March 1933, the contract was not renewed. The newly established Gestapo moved onto the premises the next month.⁸⁸ From April 1933 onward, this building served as the Gestapo’s main headquarters. A site that had once promoted artistic exploration and hosted carefree dance evenings transformed into the command center of political repression and torture for the entire German Reich.

In a somewhat more measured report, the *B.Z. am Mittag* said that the *Dachkahn* raid was just one of several measures in the police’s campaign “against the outgrowth [*Auswüchse*] in theaters, cabarets, certain clubs and associations.” In the future, the police would use all means available to guarantee law and order, and according to the courts, upholding “public security” included the maintenance of “public morality.” From then on, police vowed to maintain a stronger presence in cabarets. Shows would be scrutinized for material that was immoral or critical of the regime.⁸⁹ Shortly thereafter, the police closed fourteen “night locales” known as places frequented by homosexuals.⁹⁰ Referring to the “purification campaign” underway in Berlin’s restaurant and pub scene, one author commented, “Berlin is being cleansed, cleansed with determined thoroughness, swept with an iron broom, purged of all the ‘glorious’ Marxist postwar era’s scum.”⁹¹ The closure of these spaces associated with sexual immorality were part of the regime’s

⁸⁷ “Wenn Juden Fasching feiern...” *Der Angriff*, February 27, 1933. I chose to translate the colloquial phrase “die sich in Bezug auf Moral und gute Sitten die Hände reichen können” as “who, when it comes to morality and good conventions, are one and the same.”

⁸⁸ “Das Geheime Staatspolizei in Preußen,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 28, 1933. For more background information on this exchange and the Gestapo premises in general, see Erika Bucholtz, “Die Zentralen des nationalsozialistischen SS- und Polizeistaats: Gebäudenutzung und Bauplanung in Berlin 1933-1945,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 52, no. 12 (2004): 1108-14.

⁸⁹ “Der Polizeikampf für öffentliche Sittlichkeit,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, February 27, 1933.

⁹⁰ “14 Nachtlokale geschlossen,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 5, 1933

⁹¹ “Berlins Visitenkarte wird wieder sauber,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, August 16, 1933.

initial assault on degenerate spaces. I analyze the regime's more sustained campaign on cafes and pubs in Chapter 4.

The Nazis' determination to root out sites of cultural bolshevism extended to institutes of sexual research and reform.⁹² The most well-known raid of such sites was that of Magnus Hirschfeld's Institute of Sex Research. Hirschfeld's institute, established in 1919, promoted research into sexuality, provided counseling for patients and educational programs for visitors, and increasingly worked for political reform and the decriminalization of homosexuality. Hirschfeld was abroad on a speaking tour when the institute was searched twice on May 6, 1933. In the morning, approximately 100 members of the German Student Union stormed into the institute, poured out inkwells onto the carpets, and carted off hundreds of books, as well as paintings and diagrams.⁹³ Only Adelheid Schulz, an employee of the institute since 1928, was present during the raid, and sought in vain to prevent the students from vandalizing the rooms.⁹⁴ That afternoon, SA men filled another two trucks with books and manuscripts and carted them off. The books were later driven to Opernplatz (Opera Square) where they were burned along with thousands of others confiscated in the "Campaign Against the Un-German Spirit."⁹⁵ This campaign, carried out by the German Student Union, sought to "cleanse" German literature of everything that was "un-German" and asserted that Jews were their "most dangerous antagonist."⁹⁶ The students had stolen a bronze

⁹² BArch R 58/776, Der Preussische Minister des Innern an die Herrn Regierungspräsidenten und das Geheime Staatspolizeiamt in Berlin, May 17, 1933. Organizations which promoted birth control and supported sexual health were dissolved and had their property confiscated. Such organizations included: the Prussian branch of the "Reich Association for Birth Control and Sexual Hygiene," the Prussian branch of the "Association for Sexual Reform," the "Society for Sexual Reform," the "League for the Protection of Working Mothers and Social Family Hygiene," and the "Association of Worker Societies for Birth Control."

⁹³ *Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitlerterror. Faksimilie-Nachdruck der Originalausgabe von 1933* (Frankfurt am Main: Röderberg-Verlag, 1978), 151-52.

⁹⁴ Archives of the Magnus-Hirschfeld-Gesellschaft e.V., coll. Adelheid Schulz, Gespräch Frau Schulz – Tonband-Abschriften. She later took photos to document the damage.

⁹⁵ Hans-Wolfgang Strätz, "Die studentische 'Aktion wider den undeutschen Geist' im Frühjahr 1933," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 16, no. 4 (1968).

⁹⁶ Volker Dahm, *Das jüdische Buch im Dritten Reich*, 2 ed. (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1993), 17.

bust of Magnus Hirschfeld which reappeared during the book burning. The head had been decapitated from the remainder of the bust and was paraded on a stake to Opernplatz along with the books.⁹⁷ *Der Angriff* reported that same day that the institute had been “a singular breeding ground of filth and mess, as the house searches have now clearly shown.”⁹⁸ The supposed filth of cultural bolshevist sites was a common leitmotif in Nazi commentary at the time.

Thereafter, Hirschfeld’s institute was seized, the renters and tenants evicted, and the properties handed over to the city and state.⁹⁹ In the following years, the buildings housed all manner of Nazi-affiliated organizations, most notably: the Federation of German Anti-Communist Associations (*Antikomintern*) and its “Nibelungen” publishing company, the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question, the Institute for the Study of Free Masons, the German Society and Reich Consortium for the Control of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, the Reich Committee for Volk Health Services, and the Public Health Office of the Administrative District Niederbarnim.¹⁰⁰ Anti-Jewish, anti-Communist, and promoting racialized notions of health and public hygiene, the buildings’ new tenants epitomized, in Nazi minds, everything which Hirschfeld’s institute was not. The properties had been coordinated for explicitly Nazi purposes.

The police, SA, and SS also targeted spaces of artists accused of promoting cultural bolshevism. Thus, the “artists’ colony” in Berlin-Wilmersdorf was subject to a raid by criminal police and SA men in March 1933, due to the “intellectual Communists” who lived there.¹⁰¹ German-Jewish journalist Kurt Tucholsky’s apartment was among those searched.¹⁰² The police

⁹⁷ *Braunbuch*, 152-54.

⁹⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 154.

⁹⁹ Manfred Herzer, “Plünderung und Raub des Instituts für Sexualwissenschaft,” *Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung* 22, no. 2 (2009): 159-60. One property (In den Zelten 9a) fell to the Prussian state, while the city of Berlin received the other (Beethovenstraße 3).

¹⁰⁰ I consulted Berlin address books to ascertain who was utilizing the buildings. See *Berliner Adreßbuch* (Berlin: Scherl) for the years 1934–1943.

¹⁰¹ “Razzia in der Künstlerkolonie,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 16, 1933.

¹⁰² “Die große Razzia in der Künstlerkolonie am Breitenbachplatz,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 16, 1933.

arrested fourteen people during the raid.¹⁰³ *Der Angriff* declared that the campaign had ensured that “one of Berlin’s worst pestilential buboes had been punctured.” At the end of the day, SA men gathered on Laubenheimer Platz to burn the Communist flags they had confiscated during the search.¹⁰⁴

The police and SA carried out dozens of similar raids in colonies, housing blocks, and municipal offices over the course of the year to search for and confiscate weapons as well as Communist, Socialist, or “Marxist” propaganda, books, and flags.¹⁰⁵ Many of these items were later placed in the newly created “Revolution Museum” that was established by SA men in May 1933 in Jüdenstraße 50, a building that had previously served as a branch office for the NSDAP. Next door to the museum was the former home of Horst Wessel. A contemporary guidebook to Nazi sites in Berlin noted that the nearby “Jüdenhof” (Jewish Courtyard) had been the former dwelling place of Jews in Berlin. The SA division led by Horst Wessel sometimes used the courtyard for roll calls. The museum displayed “pamphlets, Communist blackmail letters, newspapers, uniforms, flags, insignia, weapons of all types” as well as photos and the large Soviet star which had been dismantled from the memorial at Liebknecht’s and Luxemburg’s graves in Berlin-Friedrichsfelde.¹⁰⁶

Finally, pacifist organizations were also attacked under the rubric of cultural bolshevism. The police closed and sealed the houses and offices of the League Against Imperialism, the German Freethinker’s League, and the German Peace Society in mid-March.¹⁰⁷ A local SA group occupied and confiscated the Anti-War Museum and hoisted a swastika flag upon it. They

¹⁰³ “Razzia in der Künstlerkolonie,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 16, 1933.

¹⁰⁴ “Große Razzia am Laubenheimer Platz,” *Der Angriff*, March 15, 1933.

¹⁰⁵ See BArch R 58/2004.

¹⁰⁶ J. K. von Engelbrechten, und Hans Volz, *Wir wandern durch das nationalsozialistische Berlin: Ein Führer durch die Gedenkstätten des Kampfes um die Reichshauptstadt* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1937), 59, 81-82.

¹⁰⁷ BArch 58/3026, reports from March 16 and March 18, 1933. See also: “Haussuchung bei der Kulturgemeinschaft der Freidenker,” in *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 6, 1933.

converted it to an SA home and renamed it “Richard Fiedler House.”¹⁰⁸ Fiedler was a German inventor who is credited with devising the modern flamethrower, which was widely used during World War I and World War II.¹⁰⁹ Here again, Nazis sought to transform a building they loathed into its exact opposite, and *Der Angriff* documented its cleansing and coordination: “With open collars, shovels and brooms in their hands, [the SA men] set to work. The rolling shutters screech, sunlight pours into the room. A fresh draft of air streams through the house. Another wind will blow here now.” The SA pledged that their “purge” of the house would erase all traces of “the work of Mister Friedrich, the Jew Lewin and their friends.”¹¹⁰ The building remained an SA house until it was later torn down in 1936 to make way for the expansion of Berlin’s Old City Hall.¹¹¹

By the end of 1933, the Nazis and the police had successfully coordinated sites of political and cultural bolshevism. They had barred Communists and Socialists from public spaces, which severely limited their ability to mobilize. Furthermore, they had closed or confiscated spaces of political dissent and cultural nonconformity, symbolically transforming many of these sites into their (perceived) exact opposites, visible evidence of the NSDAP’s successful consolidation of power. The most powerful statement of the Nazi accession to power, however, was the redesign of Bülowplatz into Horst-Wessel-Platz, so we turn now to analyze what its transformation meant for the Nazi regime and German society in the early 1930s.

Targeting Bülowplatz in Early 1933

As outlined above, Nazis despised Bülowplatz because of its associations with Communists and Jews, viewing it as the embodiment of “Judeo-Bolshevism.” They referred to the

¹⁰⁸ von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 81.

¹⁰⁹ Chris McNab, *The Flamethrower* (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 8-9.

¹¹⁰ “Vom Anti-Kriegsmuseum zum SA.-Heim,” *Der Angriff*, March 25, 1933.

¹¹¹ von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 81.

Karl-Liebknecht-House as the “Jewish, Communist headquarters” and spoke of the “crooked-nosed faces” of the men who worked inside it.¹¹² As the SA grew in numbers and strength in the early 1930s, they became more willing to publicly assert their presence in Berlin.¹¹³ On 22 January 1933, a week before Hitler was named chancellor, local SA men gathered on Bülowplatz and then walked the short distance to the cemetery where they unveiled a new gravestone for Horst Wessel. Communists were outraged and called for a counter-demonstration the same day, but the chief of police prohibited it, saying that it would endanger public safety. Communists were forbidden to enter any of the inner-city districts during the demonstration.¹¹⁴

The police took enormous measures to ensure that the demonstration would run peacefully and to prevent clashes between SA troops and the Red Front Fighters’ League. They cordoned off nearby subway stations, erected barriers in nearby streets, and had three armored cars at the ready to quell any disruptions. They had occupied the Karl-Liebknecht-House earlier in the day and made all Communists vacate the premises. Residents in the area were forbidden to have their windows open or stand on their balconies during the demonstration.¹¹⁵ The police barred Communists from entering the city’s inner districts altogether.¹¹⁶ There were some small clashes and disruptions, but overall, Nazis deemed the Horst-Wessel-celebration a success. Approximately

¹¹² Bade, *Die S.A. erobert*, 248. Reflecting later on the Nazis’ triumph in Berlin, Goebbels similarly spoke of the “vermin on Bülowplatz” and the “Jews in the Karl-Liebknecht-House.” Goebbels, *Kampf um Berlin*, 30, 32, 75.

¹¹³ The NSDAP acquired 2.6% of the votes in the federal elections in May 1928 and increased its share rather steadily from then on. In September 1930, it received 18.3% of the votes; in July 1932, 37.3%; November 1932 a short drop to 33.1% of total votes. See Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. P.S. Falla and R.J. Park (New York: Routledge, 2005), 225..

¹¹⁴ “Verbot der nationalsozialistischen Sonntagsdemonstration am Bülowplatz?” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 21, 1933.

¹¹⁵ “Die nationalsozialistische Horst-Wessel-Feier,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 23, 1933.

¹¹⁶ “Verbot der nationalsozialistischen Sonntagsdemonstration am Bülowplatz?,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 21, 1933.

16,000 people, including Hitler, participated.¹¹⁷ In his diary, Goebbels said the event amounted to a “terrible loss of prestige for the KPD. Bülowplatz belongs to us.”¹¹⁸

Communists held a large demonstration on January 25, 1933 to counter the SA march three days before.¹¹⁹ From various sites in Berlin, Communists marched toward Bülowplatz where they met and passed in front of Ernst Thälmann and other Communist leaders in a procession that lasted several hours.¹²⁰ This was the last Communist demonstration of such strength. Five days later, Hitler was named chancellor and thereafter, Bülowplatz and the Karl-Liebknecht-House came under intense observation along with all other Communist sites across the country. Immediately on February 2, the police searched the Karl-Liebknecht-House.¹²¹ The police again briefly occupied and searched the building four days later.¹²² A Communist-affiliated sports club hoped to hold a demonstration on Bülowplatz in mid-February, but the chief of police prohibited it, emphasizing that such an event would endanger public safety.¹²³

Throughout the month of February, the police conducted several more searches of the Karl-Liebknecht-House, and Nazis held further provocative events on Bülowplatz. On February 19, SA and SS troop bands gave an open-air concert on Bülowplatz. The police had searched the house earlier that day, and a special police squadron ensured the musicians’ safety.¹²⁴ The police searched

¹¹⁷ “Die nationalsozialistische Horst-Wessel-Feier,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 23, 1933.

¹¹⁸ Joseph Goebbels, and Angela Hermann, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Elke Fröhlich, vol. I:2/III (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2006), 113. Entry from January 23, 1933.

¹¹⁹ “Polizeiliche Sicherung für die kommunistische Bülowplatz-Demonstration,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 25, 1933.

¹²⁰ “Der Massenaufmarsch der KPD in Berlin,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, January 26, 1933.

¹²¹ “Die Durchsuchung des Karl-Liebknecht-Hauses,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 2, 1933; “Die Durchsuchungen im Karl-Liebknecht-Haus und anderen kommunistischen Geschäftsstellen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 3, 1933.

¹²² Friedmann, *Die Zentrale*, 84-85.

¹²³ The sports club was the Kampfgemeinschaft für Rote Sporteinheit, see *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 11, 1933.

¹²⁴ “Nationalsozialistische Platzkonzerte,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 20, 1933. They also held concerts on Pappelplatz, Belle-Alliance-Platz, and on Lausitzer Platz. The latter two squares were in the heart of “red” neighborhoods with especially strong, politically-organized workers’ communities, so the concerts were most certainly designed as provocations. For excellent studies of these neighborhoods and the clashes between Communists and National Socialists within them, see Reschke, *Kampf um den Kiez*, 220-320, 414-67.

the bookstores of the Revolutionary Union Opposition (the Communist Party's trade union) and the Karl-Liebknecht-House and confiscated extensive material the next day.¹²⁵ SA men held another rally on February 21 on Bülowplatz. Whereas "the faces of the Jewish Volk-defilers grinned from the Karl-Liebknecht-House just a few weeks ago, by yesterday this haunting had disappeared," *Der Angriff* declared. In his speech during the rally, Bernhard Fischer commented on this perceptible transformation and expressed his hope that "soon the spirit still hiding behind the banners will also be exterminated from Germany."¹²⁶

Because Nazi Party officials and the police believed that Communists were using the Karl-Liebknecht-House to plan an uprising, the building was repeatedly searched and ultimately confiscated.¹²⁷ The Reichstag Fire Decree permitted the final and complete takeover of the building. The Karl-Liebknecht-House and everything inside it officially fell to the Prussian state on March 8, 1933. That same day, in ceremonial fashion, SA, SS, and *Stahlhelm* members hung a swastika flag and the old imperial war flag on the building as a "symbol of the revived national spirit of the German people."¹²⁸ Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorff, leader of the Berlin SA, gave a speech saying that the house would be used from then on to fight the "plague of Bolshevism."¹²⁹ Indeed, the building was first given to the political police and its newly founded department for the "Fight against Bolshevism." Several weeks later, this police division moved into the recently

¹²⁵ BArch R 58/3026, report from February 20, 1933.

¹²⁶ "Wieder SA. auf dem Bülowplatz," *Der Angriff*, February 21, 1933.

¹²⁷ "Karl-Liebknecht-Haus geschlossen," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 25, 1933. Police searched the building again on February 24, 1933. During this search, the police claimed to have found a cache of inflammatory materials as well as secret catacombs through which Communists escaped. Friedmann chalks this up to propaganda, noting that the supposed "catacombs" were merely the beer cellar. See Friedmann, *Die Zentrale*, 86-90.

¹²⁸ "Karl Liebknecht-Haus zur Verfügung der politischen Polizei," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 9, 1933; see also: "SA. und politische Polizei im Karl-Liebknecht-Haus," *Der Angriff*, March 9, 1933.

¹²⁹ "Flaggenparade am Karl-Liebknecht-Haus," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 9, 1933.

established Gestapo headquarters in Prinz-Albrecht-Straße, and the SA used the Karl-Liebnecht-House as a site to temporarily intern and torture its opponents in spring and summer 1933.¹³⁰

Following the official takeover at the beginning of March, the house was immediately renamed “Horst-Wessel-House,” and provisional signs appeared on Bülowplatz indicating that the name of the square was now “Horst-Wessel-Platz.”¹³¹ Chief of Police Magnus von Levetzow officially approved the name change a short time later.¹³² After confiscating and renaming the building, it was reported that the life-sized statue of Karl Marx found in the building would be melted down and remolded into busts of Hitler and Hindenburg.¹³³ The SA’s newly founded “Revolution Museum” acquired the swastika flag that had been hung over the building as well as the first temporary street sign that signified the building’s name change.¹³⁴

Jews in the Scheunenviertel had already experienced considerable, and often violent, persecution in the Weimar era, most notably during the pogrom of November 1923.¹³⁵ The persecution in this district certainly intensified, however, after the Nazis assumed power. The SA conducted a raid of the Scheunenviertel in early March 1933, arresting and interning Jews in makeshift concentration camps.¹³⁶ Ostensibly to search for illegal printed materials and weapons, the political police conducted another raid in the Scheunenviertel on April 4, 1933, just a few days after the NSDAP’s April 1 boycott of Jewish shops. Approximately 450-500 policemen took part

¹³⁰ Friedmann, *Die Zentrale*, 107-09.

¹³¹ “Aus Berlin und Umgegend. Noch keine amtliche Umbenennung Berliner Straßennamen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 18, 1933; “Aus Berlin und Umgegend. Reichskanzlerplatz wird Hitlerplatz,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 20, 1933.

¹³² “Aus Berlin und Umgegend,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 20, 1933; “Platzumbenennung,” *Amtsblatt der Stadt Berlin* 74, no. 24, (June 11, 1933): 561.

¹³³ “Horst-Wessel-Haus statt Karl-Liebnecht-Haus,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 10, 1933.

¹³⁴ von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 93-94.

¹³⁵ Rainer Zilkenat, “Der Pogrom am 5. und 6. November 1923,” in *Das Scheunenviertel: Spuren eines verlorenen Berlin*, ed. Verein Stiftung Scheunenviertel (Berlin: Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, 1996), 95-101.

¹³⁶ Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 54.

in the raid.¹³⁷ Motorcycle squads and trucks cordoned off the streets, and police took up positions on the buildings' roofs and entrances. Though they found few weapons, they confiscated two trucks-worth of "illegal literature." Thirty people without papers were taken to the police headquarters.¹³⁸ Additional raids of the Scheunenviertel followed throughout the spring and summer 1933, as the police claimed they were either looking for weapons or illegal materials or that they were seeking to crack down on theft and confiscate stolen items. Most raids resulted in arrests of residents.¹³⁹

To many observers, the raids in the Scheunenviertel and on the Karl-Liebkecht-House signified the National Socialists' crackdown on crime and their ultimate victory over Communists and the true capture of power in the capital city, and therefore, in the country itself. One contemporary expressed the significance of the victory in Berlin in the following words: "the acquisition of the capital city had not only local importance, but rather, it was of decisive importance for the entire fate of our fatherland."¹⁴⁰ In fact, the significance of the takeover of Berlin, and specifically of the "Karl-Liebkecht-House" was so widespread, that it even became the subject of a game that some young children across Germany played when they dressed up as SA troops and Communists, much like children play "cops and robbers." Children in Munich had collected money to buy materials themselves to erect this game in the courtyard of their apartment building. They stormed a makeshift Karl-Liebkecht-House, arrested "Communists" and interned them in a "concentration camp" they had erected.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ "Berlin im Zeichen des Boycotts" *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 1, 1933; "Polizeirazzia in Berlin," *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 4, 1933. See also Horst Helas, "Die Razzia am 4. April 1933," in *Das Scheunenviertel: Spuren eines verlorenen Berlin*, ed. Verein Stiftung Scheunenviertel (Berlin: Haude & Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, 1996), 135-36.

¹³⁸ "Razzia in der Grenadierstraße," *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 5, 1933.

¹³⁹ "Razzia im Scheunenviertel," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, May 20, 1933; "Wieder Razzia in der Grenadierstraße," *Berliner Morgenpost*, May 31, 1933; "Große Razzia gegen Fahrraddiebstahl im Scheunenviertel," *Berliner Morgenpost*, June 10, 1933; "Großrazzia in Berlin-Mitte," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, August 30, 1933.

¹⁴⁰ Ernst Ziemann, *Adolf Hitler gewinnt Berlin* (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1937), 16.

¹⁴¹ "Das neue Spiel: SA räumt Liebkechtthaus," *Illustrierter Beobachter* 8, no. 15 (1933).

Bülowplatz to Horst-Wessel-Platz: An Early Case of “*Entjudung*” in Berlin-Mitte

After their chaotic first few months in power and after Nazi Party functionaries had reshuffled city administrations and stacked them with loyal party members and allies, city officials turned their attention to pressing municipal tasks. Ranked among their top priorities was the redevelopment of dilapidated city blocks.¹⁴² During rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, city planners hastily erected tenement housing to accommodate the masses of workers flocking to cities. This led to crowded city centers and poor living conditions, which German city planners sought to ameliorate in the 1920s by building housing settlements on the outskirts of cities, much in-line with contemporary, international city planning schemes. City centers were largely neglected, however, and the economic crisis of 1929 ground all building plans to a halt. In 1933, municipal and state authorities pumped money into urban renewal plans to rehabilitate German city centers. Urban renewal plans under the Nazi regime took two main forms: either complete demolition and reconstruction of overcrowded apartment blocks or *Entkernung* (the selective destruction of crowded city blocks, which allowed authorities to preserve historically important buildings and facades).¹⁴³

The office in charge of approving specific urban renewal plans was the Reich Ministry of Labor (*Reichsarbeitsministerium*). In a letter to the Reich minister of finances in January 1934, the Reich minister of labor expounded upon the need to develop a comprehensive plan for redeveloping slum areas: “In the airless, crowded rooms of rear buildings and tenement housing, which often only possess a very narrow, dirty corner as a courtyard, the people have lost all

¹⁴² For a more in-depth look at redevelopment policies, see Ursula von Petz, “Urban renewal under National Socialism: practical policy and political objectives in Hitler's Germany,” *Planning Perspectives* 5, no. 2 (1990).

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 185.

connection with the soil and nature.” He emphasized that these districts were breeding grounds for prostitution, Communism, and professional criminals. Unless they completely transformed these districts from the bottom up, the minister said any efforts “to educate the people in these districts to be useful and reliable national comrades and citizens” would be doomed to failure and that “even the best human material [*Menschenmaterial*] would suffer not only bodily harm but would also mentally and morally decay after a short time.”¹⁴⁴ The Reich Ministry of Labor had been allocated approximately 10,000,000 Reichsmark (RM) for redevelopment projects. Considering the tasks they faced, this sum of money would not suffice. The costs of several subsequent urban renewal projects in various German cities certainly seem to verify their claim: Cologne (5,436,000 RM), Frankfurt (4,035,643 RM), and Braunschweig (2,121,700 RM).¹⁴⁵ Therefore, the officials decided to divide the funds and focus on smaller projects that could be undertaken immediately.¹⁴⁶

One of the first projects proposed was the block of apartments behind the Volksbühne (People’s Theater), because city officials planned to redesign Horst-Wessel-Platz into a representative square for demonstrations and memorial celebrations. This neighborhood had already been subject to redevelopment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. First, the Karl-Wilhelm-Straße, today’s Karl-Liebknecht-Straße, was built through central Berlin in several phases from 1877 through the 1890s.¹⁴⁷ In a later extension of this project, city officials

¹⁴⁴ BArch R 2/19382, Der Reichsarbeitsminister an den Herrn Reichsminister der Finanzen, January 20, 1934.

¹⁴⁵ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wohnungswesen, *Altstadtsanierung mit Reichshilfe, 1934-1938: eine Untersuchung auf Grund amtlichen Materials* (Berlin: E. Wasmuth, 1940), 60.

¹⁴⁶ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 31-32, “Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung vom 15./16. November 1933 im Reichsarbeitsministerium mit dem Ausschuss der Reichswohnungskonferenz über 1. Altstadtsanierung.”

¹⁴⁷ For a more in-depth look at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Straße project, see Dieter Radicke, “Stadterneuerung in Berlin 1871 bis 1914. Kaiser-Wilhelm-Straße und Scheunenviertel,” in *Stadt-Umbau: Die planmäßige Erneuerung europäischer Großstädte zwischen Wiener Kongreß und Weimarer Republik*, ed. Gerhard Fehl und Juan Rodriguez-Lores (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995); Harald Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das neue Berlin! Geschichte der Stadterneuerung seit 1871* (Berlin: Transit, 1987), 19-34. For more information on city planning in the Imperial era in general, see Harald Bodenschatz, “Citybuilding and Altstadterneuerung in der Kaiserzeit. Beispiel Berlin,” in *Stadt-Umbau: Die planmäßige Erneuerung europäischer Großstädte zwischen Wiener Kongreß und Weimarer Republik*, ed. Gerhard Fehl und Juan Rodriguez-Lores (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995).

demolished the blocks that comprised the heart of the Scheunenviertel and built the Volksbühne (“People’s Theater”) on the cleared space.¹⁴⁸ The post-1933 reconstruction projects for Bülowplatz completed these earlier plans.

State Commissioner Julius Lippert and Mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*) Heinrich Sahn were especially enthusiastic in pursuing this project. Göring had appointed Lippert to the post of State Commissioner in the wake of the March 1933 elections. Born in Basel in 1895, Lippert volunteered for service in World War I and later received a doctorate in political science before becoming a journalist. As State Commissioner, Lippert’s primary task was to implement a political and racial “purge” (*Säuberung*) of Berlin’s municipalities. From 1927 to 1931, Lippert had served as Goebbels’ right-hand man as chief editor of *Der Angriff*. From November 1929 until his appointment as State Commissioner, Lippert also served as an elected member of the NSDAP in Berlin’s local parliament.¹⁴⁹ Lippert was an avowed antisemite since his childhood, which he proudly recounted in his memoir published in 1942. In his memoirs he gave homage to Otto Böckel, whom he called “the first modern-day caller in the fight against the Jewish world plague on German soil.”¹⁵⁰ Böckel spoke of the “Jewish question” as a “racial issue” and condemned the “Jewification of German ground and soil.”¹⁵¹ Hailing from Marburg, Böckel blamed Jews for the plight of Hessian peasants, eventually earning him the nickname of “the Hessian peasant king.” Böckel was first to transform antisemitism into a political platform and eventually made his way into the Reichstag as a representative for his district. Böckel’s works deeply influenced Lippert as a young man, as did those of Houston Stuart Chamberlain, Theodor Fritsch, and the antisemitic

¹⁴⁸ Bodenschatz, Bodenschatz, *Platz frei*, 31-34.

¹⁴⁹ Christoph Kreutzmüller, and Michael Wildt, “‘Ein radikaler Bürger’: Julius Lippert - Chefredakteur des ‘Angriff’ und Staatskommissar zur besonderen Verwendung in Berlin,” in *Berlin im Nationalsozialismus: Politik und Gesellschaft 1933-1945*, ed. Rüdiger Hachtmann, Thomas Schaarschmidt and Winfried Süß, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 19-25.

¹⁵⁰ Julius Lippert, *Im Strom der Zeit: Erlebnisse und Eindrücke* (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1942), 25.

¹⁵¹ Böckel, “Die Juden, die Könige unserer Zeit.”

publication *Der Hammer*.¹⁵² Lippert used his authority as State Commissioner to enact antisemitic legislation and policies in Berlin.

Sahm was from an older generation, and not an NSDAP member, but he was no less willing to carry out his duties under the new regime. Born in Anklam in 1877, Sahm studied law and political science (*Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft*) and served in various city governments across Germany and as head of the German civil administration (*Kommunalreferent*) in Warsaw during World War I. In 1919, he was elected mayor of Danzig and remained there to promote German interests, serving as the Senate President, even after it was officially excised from the German Reich in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁵³ Although an independent, Sahm enjoyed the support of the German National People's Party (DNVP), which helped him get elected as mayor of Berlin in 1931.¹⁵⁴ He spearheaded a committee to help get Hindenburg reelected as president in 1932 and therefore enjoyed some protection as a confidant of Hindenburg's after the Nazis came to power. For this reason, Sahm was one of only eight (out of fifty-one) mayors from Germany's major cities who was not immediately replaced.¹⁵⁵ Lippert's position was created, therefore, so he could advocate for the NSDAP within Berlin's city government without upsetting Hindenburg by firing Sahm. Lippert quickly built up his position to resemble that of a mayor's. Tensions between Lippert and Sahm grew so that Sahm was eventually released from his post in December 1935, and Lippert later acquired both titles, that of Mayor and of State Commissioner of the Reich Capital City Berlin. Despite Lippert's and Sahm's antagonistic working relationship, between 1933 and

¹⁵² Lippert, *Im Strom der Zeit*, 25-27.

¹⁵³ *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 22 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 353-54.

¹⁵⁴ Christoph Kreutzmüller, "Verfassung und Verwaltung der Hauptstadt," in *Berlin 1933-1945*, ed. Christoph Kreutzmüller, and Michael Wildt (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2013), 53.

¹⁵⁵ Kreutzmüller, "Ein radikaler Bürger," 25-26.

1935, their cooperation on the redevelopment project in central Berlin was critical for its completion.¹⁵⁶

The proposed project concerned the block of seventeen properties between Lothringer Straße (N), Linienstraße (S), Mulack Straße (W), and Weydingerstraße (E). City officials lamented that although middle-class Germans used to inhabit this block, it had turned into a slum area at the turn of the century when the “Jewish element emerged.”¹⁵⁷ They called this area a “ghetto” in which the “poorest of the poor” lived, including many Polish, Austrian, and Turkish Jews. An estimated forty percent of the 598 tenants in the block were Jews. Furthermore, most of the craftsmen and salesmen in the block were Jews, and Jews owned one-third of the shops in Linienstraße.¹⁵⁸ By clearing out this block, authorities intended to clear out the last remnants of the Scheunenviertel.¹⁵⁹ They said they simply could not tolerate the presence of a “Jewish apartment block” so close to the square meant to honor Horst Wessel.¹⁶⁰ From the beginning, city officials faced two main impediments in implementing this racially-driven redevelopment project in Berlin: (1) eminent domain, or the compulsory acquisition of the properties requiring redevelopment, and (2) financing the projects.¹⁶¹ Solving these two (self-made) problems required

¹⁵⁶ In his diary, Goebbels frequently references clashes between Lippert and Sahn. Goebbels himself had many rifts with Lippert during his time at *Der Angriff*, which eventually prompted Goebbels to fire Lippert in December 1931. Goebbels welcomed Lippert’s appointment as State Commissioner, however, and seems to have advised him from time to time. Sahn was eventually driven from office in 1935 and then appointed foreign ambassador to Norway in 1937.

¹⁵⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 9-10, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

¹⁵⁸ LAB A Rep. 009, Nr. 288, “Denkschrift über die Sanierung der Linienstraße und Lothringer Straße in Berlin-Mitte,” February 1934.

¹⁵⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 7, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

¹⁶⁰ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 4, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

¹⁶¹ Countless architects grappled with these problems in journal articles in the early 1930s. See Karl Köster, “Wohnrecht und Altstadtsanierung” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 68, no. 8 (February 21, 1934): 147-148; K.W. Bock, “Zur Finanzierung der Altstadtsanierung” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 68, no. 8 (February 21, 1934): 148; Alexander Schwab, “Die Kostenfrage” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 68, no. 8 (February 21, 1934): 149-152; “Über die Sanierungsprobleme der Reichshauptstadt” *Baugilde* 16, no. 19 (October 10, 1934): 703; Reinhold Niemeyer, “Wo bleibt das Gesetz über die Gesundung der Altstädte?” *Städtebau* 29, no. 2 (February 1934): 89-92; “Altstadtgesundung – Zielsetzung, Finanzierung und Rechtsordnung für Altstadt- und Wohnungsgesundungen” *Städtebau* 29, no. 4 (April 1934): 193; Heinz Potthoff, “Der Enteignungspreis bei der Altstadt-Sanierung” *Städtebau* 29, no. 5 (May 1934): 255-256.

a lot of creative thinking and very determined bureaucrats to transform Nazi ideology into legislation.

In a meeting on February 8, 1934, the city officials in attendance agreed not to await legal measures, but rather to act while they worked on drafting a new nationwide law for eminent domain. From their perspective, the current law's biggest shortcoming was that it required the contractor to compensate owners not just for the sale value of the property but rather for the "full value," which was a "subjective value" that accounted for potential profits that could be made from the property. Furthermore, the compensation had to be made in cash, not in kind (via property or land). These stipulations would cause heavy burdens on the city if it wished to carry out all its urban renewal plans. Therefore, city officials pressed for a new nationwide law that would make it easier to confiscate properties for urban renewal.¹⁶²

In the meantime, they decided to seek the help of the sanitary police and the municipal building inspectorate (*Baupolizei*) and said they would use any relevant ordinances to evict residents. For example, they believed that building inspectors might be able to intervene if there were issues that endangered public safety or that disturbed the "peace and order" in the area.¹⁶³ Another idea included changing the building lines and drawing new lines for the courtyards, thereby allowing them to intervene with existing building ordinances. After they had confiscated the buildings, they could then return the lines to their original positions. After mentioning this possibility, however, City Planning Director Kühn immediately noted that he preferred not to proceed this way, because proceeding in such a manner would make him "almost more circumsised than the Jews who inhabit the property," he said, revealing his antisemitic

¹⁶² See LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 3, 12, "Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934."

¹⁶³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 11, "Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934."

prejudices.¹⁶⁴ District Mayor Wilhelm Lach of Berlin-Mitte asked whether they might be able to force people to leave if someone should contract a contagious disease, such as tuberculosis, diphtheria, or dysentery. Medical Officer of Health Klein said that would be an easy solution.¹⁶⁵ Finally, at a later meeting, officials discussed blocking the toilet facilities to create problems and convince property owners to sell. They decided against this course of action though because any damage to the apartments could eventually cause problems for them later. In this meeting, city officials deliberated on how to mobilize bureaucratic processes for city planning that was explicitly antisemitic in nature.¹⁶⁶

From the beginning, officials knew that proceeding in such a manner would be difficult, because the block was not in such a poor state that it warranted redevelopment. Several bureaucrats, such as District Mayor Lach, asked why the Fischerkiez district was not chosen, as it was much more urgently in need of redevelopment. Others responded by again emphasizing the square's symbolic importance and noted that this decision is "the wish of the high and highest positions," and that Lippert himself "stands very strongly behind it."¹⁶⁷ This tactic was one that many people used in advocating for the redesign. They invoked those higher up, whether that be Sahm, Lippert, or Hitler himself, employing a tactic which Ian Kershaw has termed, "working towards the Führer."¹⁶⁸ In fact, Hitler had voiced his support for the project. After several requests, Lippert finally secured a meeting with Hitler on March 29, 1934 to discuss the city redevelopment and building projects in Berlin. Hitler critiqued the initial plan for Horst-Wessel-Platz, saying that he did not agree with technical layout of the square and said that the space in front of the

¹⁶⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 13, "Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934."

¹⁶⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 17, "Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934."

¹⁶⁶ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 36-38, "Protokoll über die Sitzung vom 2. März 1934 im Zimmer von Herrn Vizepräsidenten Kühn."

¹⁶⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 4-5, "Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934."

¹⁶⁸ Ian Kershaw, "'Working Towards the Führer': Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship," *Contemporary European History* 2, no. 2 (1993).

Volksbühne should remain open. Hitler then asked where the Karl-Liebkecht-House stood on the square and decided that the memorial for Horst Wessel should be placed on the eastern side (in front of the former Karl-Liebkecht-House), and the memorial for the police officers would be on the western side of the square. According to Lippert, Hitler had promised his “energetic backing” for urban renewal projects in Berlin.¹⁶⁹

Although they had the support of multiple local and federal authorities, Lippert and Sahn still did not have the rights to intervene, because the block simply did not meet the necessary qualifications for redevelopment (such as overcrowding, dilapidated apartments, or overbuilding in an area). The corner properties of Linienstraße 14 and Linienstraße 30 had been renovated as recently as 1925, so they were excluded from the project altogether.¹⁷⁰ The remaining properties had been built in the mid- to late-1800s.¹⁷¹ Though officials claimed that the apartments were excessively crowded, in reality, the occupancy of the apartments did not even exceed the average occupancy for the entire Reich. In addition, the proposed plans were much more expensive than most other redevelopment projects in other cities.¹⁷² Though some of the buildings in the block had problems with toilet facilities and with vermin, mold, and mildew, a direct intervention would only be possible in individual cases.¹⁷³ According to procedure, the building inspectors examined each property individually, and only a few apartments required changes. It was impossible to warrant demolition of the entire block.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ LAB, A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 82-83.

¹⁷⁰ LAB A Rep. 009, Nr. 288, “Denkschrift über die Sanierung der Linienstraße und Lothringer Straße in Berlin-Mitte,” February 1934.

¹⁷¹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 7, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

¹⁷² BArch R 2/19390, “Vermerk über die Besprechung vom 4. Mai im Reichsministerium.”

¹⁷³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 8, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

¹⁷⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 36-38, “Protokoll über die Sitzung vom 2. März 1934 im Zimmer von Herrn Vizepräsidenten Kühn.”

Despite the legal impediments, officials barreled ahead with the project. They held the ceremonial groundbreaking for the memorial on Horst-Wessel-Platz on March 12, 1934. It was well attended by the SA, SS, and Hitler Youth, as well as police, the NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cell Organization), the BVG (Berlin Public Transportation Company), Horst Wessel's mother and sister, and many other Berliners. Sahn, Lippert, and Propaganda Minister Goebbels all attended and gave speeches. In his speech, Goebbels noted that Bülowplatz had represented to Nazis "the embodiment of Communist antagonism" and that "the fight for a German Berlin was fought out over the dominance of this square." He continued, "In this neighborhood that surrounds us, the most difficult battle for the regeneration of the German Reich was carried out. Here our comrades stood, face-to-face with death evening after evening [...] Here they wrested enemy land, piece for piece from the opponent."¹⁷⁵ Goebbels used the occasion to reinforce the symbolic importance of the square in the Nazis' rise to and consolidation of power. The redesigned square would stand as testament to the NSDAP's victory in Berlin.

Though they had broken ground, Lippert and Sahn still did not have the approval of the building inspectorate or the Reich Ministry of labor to tear down the apartment block behind the square. Therefore, Lippert, Sahn, and other municipal and state bureaucrats met again in May 1934 to devise a solution.¹⁷⁶ During the meeting, Undersecretary Scholz from the Prussian Ministry of Economy and Employment asked if it might be possible to consider this project outside the framework of other redevelopment projects and if "special funds" could be provided that would not be contingent on the redevelopment stipulations. The representative in attendance from the

¹⁷⁵ "Umgestaltung des Horst Wessel-Platzes," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 13, 1934. See also "Umgestaltung des Horst Wessel-Platzes: Der feierliche erste Spatenstich," *Der Angriff*, March 13, 1934.

¹⁷⁶ Representatives from the following offices were present: Reich Ministry of Labor, City Administration, Reich Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of Economy and Labor, City Office for Settlement and Housing Issues, City Planning Office for Berlin, and the office for the State Commissioner.

Finance Ministry responded that may be a possibility.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, the ministry eventually provided an 800,000 RM subsidy for the project from a special fund designed to create employment opportunities, and not from the national budget, as was usually the case for urban renewal plans.¹⁷⁸ From then on, the project was no longer referred to as an urban renewal project but was rather officially designated the “Redesign of the Surroundings of Horst-Wessel-Platz.”¹⁷⁹ Thus, officials succeeded in solving the financial problem of redevelopment.

Nevertheless, they had not resolved the eminent domain issue. The city already owned two of the fifteen properties in the block, and the owners of seven other buildings had agreed to sell. The remaining property owners had thus far refused to sell at prices the city was willing to pay. Many of these buildings were owned by Jews, including one owned by the Jewish Community of Berlin itself, a fact which further infuriated the bureaucrats.¹⁸⁰ By August 1934, Sahm and Lippert were determined to push the project along by any means possible. In a meeting with Mayor Marezky, City Planning Director Kühn, and Senior Municipal Officer Müller, Lippert reemphasized that he wanted the demolition of the buildings to begin as soon as possible. Doing so, he said, would also encourage the other property owners to quickly conclude contracts with the city under “reasonable conditions.” Müller noted that the resettlement of the tenants had already begun but that it would still take some time. The tenants of the two city-owned buildings were informed on August 10, 1934 that they were expected to move out immediately so demolition of those properties could start at the beginning of October.¹⁸¹ In fact, demolition of the buildings

¹⁷⁷ BArch R 2/19390, “Vermerk über die Besprechung vom 4. Mai im Reichsministerium.”

¹⁷⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 43, Schreiben an Staatssekretär Reinhardt.

¹⁷⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 42, Der Oberbürgermeister an den Herrn Staatskommissar in der Hauptstadt, May 12, 1934.

¹⁸⁰ The Jewish Community of Berlin owned the property located at Linienstr. 19/Lothringer Str. 105.

¹⁸¹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 64, Vermerk über eine Besprechung bei Herrn Bürgermeister, Dr. Marezky on August 11, 1934.

began already in late September 1934.¹⁸² On September 25, Reich Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick unveiled the memorial on Horst-Wessel-Platz dedicated to all policemen who were killed or wounded while on duty, especially to Paul Anlauf and Franz Lenck, who had been killed on the square by Communists in 1931.¹⁸³

Determined to resolve the eminent domain issue, Sahn wrote to the Reich Ministry of Economy in early August 1934 to ask that it approve the compulsory acquisition of the remaining properties.¹⁸⁴ The Ministry of Economy approved the acquisitions, invoking several older laws regarding the Eminent Domain of Property.¹⁸⁵ The decision cited Paragraphs 1 & 2 of the Law Regarding the Expropriation of Property from 1874, which permitted the compulsory acquisition of property only for reasons of public welfare and required the contractor to fully compensate the affected property owners.¹⁸⁶ The Ministry of Economy also invoked Article 2 from the Housing Act of 1918 (in its updated version from May 29, 1931), which legalized the confiscation of property for the urban renewal of residential areas and housing blocks.¹⁸⁷ It seems city officials were emboldened by the minister's decision, because they then requested that the compulsory acquisition of all the properties be approved. City Planning Director Kühn, on behalf of Sahn, wrote again to the Ministry of Economy, noting that they had at first only requested the

¹⁸² LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 88.

¹⁸³ von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 94.

¹⁸⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 79, Der Oberbürgermeister an das Preußische Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit in Berlin, August 3, 1934. During this time, Hjalmar Schacht replaced Kurt Schmitt as Reich Economy Minister (officially on August 3, 1934).

¹⁸⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 83.

¹⁸⁶ See "Gesetz über die Enteignung von Grundeigentum," in *Preußische Gesetzsammlung* 1874, 221.

¹⁸⁷ See "Gesetz zur Abänderung des Preußischen Wohnungsgesetzes vom 28. März 1918," in *Preußische Gesetzsammlung* 1931, 74. It was also this law that granted the Minister for People's Welfare (Volkswohlfahrt) the authority to approve confiscations. The Prussian Ministry for People's Welfare was founded in 1919 and dissolved during the Preußenschlag of 1932. See Gerhard Schulze, ed. *Die Protokolle des Preußischen Staatsministeriums, 1817-1934/38*, vol. 11/1: 14. November 1918 bis 31. März 1925 (Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 2002), III, 19-20. Thereafter, the Prussian economy minister oversaw the execution of this law, which was valid until the end of 1935 and extended until December 31, 1937. See "Enteignung für die Gesundung von Wohnvierteln," *Baugilde* 18, no. 2 (January 15, 1936): 43.

expropriation of six of the fifteen properties because they assumed that the acquisition of the properties and the removal of tenants would proceed without problem. Kühn noted that in the meantime, issues had arisen with the tenants of the other nine properties, so that the expropriation of these properties was necessary as well to clear out the buildings in time for their projected deadline of October 1, 1934.¹⁸⁸ The economy minister did indeed approve the expropriations.¹⁸⁹

By the end of November 1934, the city had acquired all but three of the properties, and most of the residents had been cleared out.¹⁹⁰ The city successfully concluded purchase agreements with ten of the property owners, and only the remaining three properties required officials to formally expropriate them.¹⁹¹ The Housing Welfare Society (*Wohnungsfürsorgegesellschaft*) oversaw the construction project and incurred many of the associated costs.¹⁹² Its construction of 158 new apartments and ten stores on the site was completed in 1936.¹⁹³ The costs to purchase the buildings and compensate tenants for moving costs totaled 637,000 RM while the cost to demolish and reconstruct the buildings totaled 1,450,000 RM.¹⁹⁴

The completed reconstruction of Horst-Wessel-Platz comprised several elements: the newly redesigned Horst-Wessel-House, two memorials that flanked the Volksbühne—the memorial for police officers Anlauf and Lenck on the left and a memorial for the “Murdered of the Movement of the Inner City” on the right¹⁹⁵—newly built apartment blocks, most importantly,

¹⁸⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 87.

¹⁸⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 92-93, October 4, 1934, Der Reichswirtschaftsminister und Preußische Minister für Wirtschaft und Arbeit an den Herrn Polizeipräsidenten in Berlin.

¹⁹⁰ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 1190, November 29, 1934, Der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Berlin an den Herrn Staatskommissar der Hauptstadt Berlin.

¹⁹¹ International Housing Association, *Slum Clearance* (Stuttgart: Verlag Julius Hoffmann, 1935), 18. See also Bodenschatz, *Platz frei*, 51.

¹⁹² LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 1190, Der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Berlin an den Herrn Staatskommissar der Hauptstadt Berlin, November 29, 1934.

¹⁹³ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wohnungswesen, *Altstadtsanierung*, 33-34.

¹⁹⁴ “Lehren aus der Altstadtsanierung,” *Baugilde* 18, no. 7 (March 5, 1936): 213.

¹⁹⁵ This memorial was dedicated on November 29, 1936 to Horst Wessel and five other SA men who had been killed in the inner city. See von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 94.

the one behind the Volksbühne, dozens of planted poplar and linden trees, and an aerial bomb memorial.¹⁹⁶ The reconstruction of the former Karl-Liebknecht-House into Horst-Wessel-House, which cost 370,000 RM, had begun on February 1, 1935, and by November of the same year, the project was finished. A newspaper article reported that the house had been “thoroughly cleansed” from “the last Communist memories” and transformed into a tribute for Horst Wessel.¹⁹⁷ The building was infused with symbolism, inside and out, for the party and the SA. Inside, there was a hall of honor for Wessel with a relief of his profile.¹⁹⁸ There were also photos of marching SA troops and of Hitler. Prussian Minister President Hermann Göring attended the building’s dedication ceremony and handed the building over to the Prussian Financial Administration (specifically, to the Land Registry Office).¹⁹⁹

City bureaucrats resolved to ensure that the square was “cleansed” of Jews as well. Antisemitism had permeated their discussions on where to resettle the tenants. Though they considered allowing non-Jewish tenants to relocate to new settlements on the outskirts of Berlin, under no circumstances would they extend this offer to Jews.²⁰⁰ In a meeting, Kühn remarked that those in attendance laughed out loud at the mere thought that Jews would be “rewarded” with a house in a settlement. Here again, the explicit belief that Jews were unfit for such living conditions and undeserving of a spot in a new housing settlement on German soil was made explicit early on in the Nazi regime, long before settlement planning schemes were developed for occupied East European territory. Medical Officer of Health Klein asked if it was yet possible to expel the East

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 89.

¹⁹⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, newspaper article: “Vom Scheunenviertel zum Horst-Wessel-Platz.”

¹⁹⁸ von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 94.

¹⁹⁹ Keibel, “Das Horst Wessel-Haus in Berlin” *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* 55, no. 50 (December 11, 1935): 991.

²⁰⁰ LAB A Rep. 009, Nr. 288, “Denkschrift über die Sanierung der Linienstraße und Lothringer Straße in Berlin-Mitte,” February 1934.

European Jews without German citizenship from the country altogether, but Dr. Schorr from district Berlin-Mitte responded that it was still unclear what exactly could be ordained.²⁰¹

They recognized, however, that most tenants—Jews and non-Jews—did not wish to move far from their current residence, so they accepted that they would have to allow them to relocate to apartments in the surrounding neighborhood.²⁰² The housing office in Berlin-Mitte reported that there were 220 free apartments available in the district, and because they only needed to find accommodations for 198 “rental parties,” they did foresee any trouble relocating in Berlin-Mitte or in the southern part of Prenzlauer Berg.²⁰³ The new apartments were given “primarily to fighters of the National Socialist uprising.”²⁰⁴ Officials refused to allow Jews to resettle in the new apartments behind the Volksbühne, and indeed, Berlin’s address books from 1936 and 1937 reveal that none of the former Jewish tenants had moved back into the refurbished apartments.²⁰⁵ Thus, the redesign of Bülowplatz constituted the first tangible case of *Entjudung* (“de-Jewification”) under the Nazi regime.

One of the Jewish families that was relocated was that of Josef and Toni Luster and their four children. They had owned and lived in the property of Linienstraße 18/Lothringer Straße 106. Josef Luster was a stateless Jew who had been born in Nadvorna (then a town in Galicia; present-day Nadvirna, Ukraine) in 1886 but moved to Berlin in the early 1900s. Since 1910, Luster had operated a lemonade and mineral water factory in Berlin, first in Lothringer Str. 8 and later in the

²⁰¹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, “Stenographischer Bericht,” 16-17.

²⁰² LAB A Rep. 009, Nr. 288, “Denkschrift über die Sanierung der Linienstraße und Lothringer Straße in Berlin-Mitte,” February 1934.

²⁰³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 413, Bl. 14, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung am 8. Februar 1934.”

²⁰⁴ Quoted in Jochen Lethaus, “Geschichte der GSW Gemeinnützige Siedlungs- und Wohnungsbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, 1924-1948,” in *Wohnhäuser und Wohnviertel in Berlin: Die GSW im Dienste Berlins und ihrer Mieter, 1924-1999*, ed. Hans Jörg Duvigneau (Berlin: Edition StadtBauKunst, 1999), 20.

²⁰⁵ *Berliner Adreßbuch: für das Jahr 1936* (Berlin: Scherl, 1936); *Berliner Adreßbuch: für das Jahr 1937* (Berlin: Scherl, 1937).

building he purchased at Lothringer Str. 106.²⁰⁶ The family kept a kosher home and celebrated Shabbat and all Jewish holidays.²⁰⁷ After being forced out of their Linienstraße home, the Luster family relocated to Weißenburger Straße 29 (today's Kollwitzstraße) in Prenzlauer Berg, where Luster's factory was located.²⁰⁸ Luster was also a *gabbai* in the synagogue in Rykestraße, which was located on the site behind his factory.²⁰⁹ Luster's business operated until Luster was forced to close it in December 1938.²¹⁰ All four children emigrated from Germany, later settling in Israel. Bernhard Luster, the youngest son, was the last child to leave, departing Germany after the traditional Passover Seder in 1939.²¹¹ Josef and Toni remained in Berlin until they were deported to Auschwitz in March 1943.²¹²

In total, the square's transformation took approximately two and a half years. Serious discussions began in January and February 1934, and most of the changes were completed by November 1936. During the dedication ceremony for the "Murdered of the Movement of the Inner City" in November 1936, Lippert called the day the "completion and coronation" of a project begun two years ago on the same spot. Back then, he said, the square had been "a veritable desert, framed by ghastly slums, vacant lots, barracks, and all sorts of junk" and that in terms of city planning and "racial hygiene," the district was "characteristic of the spirit for Berlin before 1933." Now that the project had been completed, Lippert said Berliners could "proudly call it a jewel in what used to be the so notoriously sick so-called Scheunenviertel."²¹³ Ironically, at the heart of the

²⁰⁶ LAB A Rep. 342-02, Nr. 38155, Bl. 3.

²⁰⁷ "Dov Laor's Life Story," personal collection of Tomer Laor.

²⁰⁸ *Berliner Adreßbuch: für das Jahr 1937* (Berlin: Scherl, 1937), 1684.

²⁰⁹ Hermann Simon, *Die Synagoge Rykestraße (1904-2004)* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich and Stiftung Neue Synagoge Berlin/Centrum Judaicum, 2004), 40.

²¹⁰ LAB A Rep. 342-02, Nr. 38155, Bl. 4.

²¹¹ In Israel, Bernhard changed his name to Dov Laor. "Dov Laor's Life Story," personal collection of Tomer Laor.

²¹² Bundesarchiv, *Memorial Book: Victims of the Persecution of Jews under the National Socialist Tyranny in Germany 1933-1945*, last updated on October 7, 2016.

²¹³ LAB A Rep. 001-02, Nr. 483, Bl. 19-21.

square remained a building designed by a Jew. During the entire project, the fact that the Volksbühne had been designed by Oskar Kaufmann, a Hungarian Jew who had also designed the Kroll Opera House and several other notable theaters throughout Germany, went unspoken.²¹⁴

At its core, the redesign of Bülowplatz is a story of how authorities learned to transform a set of ideologies into bureaucratic practices. The project was not dictated from the top-down but rather required the active participation of countless individuals from the federal and local levels who contributed to the planning and decision-making process. Nazi Party members, especially SA and SS troops, provided the impetus by carrying out raids and the initial renaming of the square. Municipal authorities, especially State Commissioner Julius Lippert and Mayor Heinrich Sahn, conducted the arduous task of transforming racist ideology into concrete action. At times, they were unsure of how to proceed but charged ahead regardless, citing any relevant laws and ordinances that would lend the project a glimmer of legitimacy. In the end, authorities at the federal level—the Employment Ministry, Finance Ministry, Interior Ministry, and the Economy Ministry—rubberstamped the project with the requisite funding and legal solutions.

Conclusion

Nazi authorities set out to cleanse and coordinate sites of “Judeo-Bolshevism” across Germany in early 1933. They targeted sites associated with Communists, Socialists, pacifists, homosexuals, sexual reformers, and dissident artists, often confiscating their property and transforming them into their symbolic opposites. Reporting on these raids and confiscations reveals that Nazis held Jews responsible for the presence of these “degenerate” political and cultural sites and organizations. These actions reversed decades of progress from these subaltern

²¹⁴ I have only seen mention of this fact in a 1939 article in an architecture journal. See “Berliner Architektur unter jüdischem Einfluß,” *Die Bauzeitung* 49, no. 36 (1939): 187-190.

groups who were now banned from the public sphere. Depriving oppositional groups of these spaces made it difficult for them to mobilize against the regime. In Chapter 2, we examine how the regime envisioned and refashioned the public sphere in the wake of this destruction.

The redesign of Bülowplatz is the paradigmatic example of the regime's coordination of "Judeo-Bolshevist" spaces. Although this area had already been subject to redevelopment in the Weimar era, with the Nazi accession to power, redevelopment schemes became evermore ideologically and racially tinged. The Nazi regime provided more room for maneuver when officials sought to subvert or rewrite laws to legitimate racially-driven redevelopment schemes. As authorities repeatedly made clear, other city blocks in Berlin required redevelopment more urgently, but bureaucrats chose the block behind the Volksbühne because of its associations with Communists and Jews. By endeavoring to evict Jews from the district, municipal authorities (with the help of the state) laid the bureaucratic foundation for later mass evictions and expulsions of German Jews. The case of Bülowplatz shows that German bureaucrats' building plans and the forced eviction of Jews from their homes were inherently intertwined ventures since the earliest years of the Nazi regime, proceedings which set a dangerous precedent for later measures enacted against Jews in Germany and across Europe.

Chapter 2

Orchestration: German Cityscapes as Facades of Unity

Despite Hitler's appointment as chancellor, the NSDAP's prospects for long-term success looked slim to its political adversaries who believed Hitler's government would quickly collapse upon itself. Therefore, the regime made great efforts to win over the masses, or at least give the impression that the population stood firmly behind it. In early April 1933, Hitler emphasized the need to acquire additional adherents in a speech in front of several thousand SA men in Berlin, declaring, "We have conquered power in Germany, now it's essential to win over the German Volk and to incorporate them into this power, and to merge the millions of our creative people from all classes into this community, a struggle that is necessary so that from 600,000 we will grow to 6 and 8 and 10 million men. Because here too we know that whatever rests, rusts, whatever stands still, goes backward."¹

The NSDAP endeavored to win the hearts of German workers through well-studied efforts to lower unemployment, beautify workplaces, and offer perks and leisure activities via the "Strength Through Joy" initiative.² Less examined was the incorporation of Germans into the Volksgemeinschaft via the invitation, and sometimes coercion, to participate in public and ritual displays of loyalty. To be sure, several excellent cultural histories have utilized Walter Benjamin's theory of the aestheticization of politics to explore aesthetics, politics, and fascism in conjunction.³ These studies have illuminated how fascist regimes won supporters by reinfusing spectacle, myths,

¹ "Die Macht haben wir erobert – nun gilt es das deutsche Volk zu gewinnen!", *Der Angriff*, April 10, 1933.

² Shelley Baranowski, *Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

³ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 2007). Benjamin claimed that in the modern era, the role of art had radically transformed. No longer unique, authentic, nor serving as ritual objects, mechanically produced artworks (such as the lithograph, audio recordings, and film) possessed none of the traits which had formerly lent art its intrinsic value. Audiences lost the ability to critique and reverted to passive observers, seeking enjoyment, and art became subservient to a politics whose aim was to dazzle, seduce, and mold. In Benjamin's Marxist interpretation, fascist politics reinfused art with ritual and sought to distract workers from efforts to throw off the shackles of capitalist-imposed dominion.

rituals, and ceremonies into modern political life.⁴ Yet few have explicitly examined the role urban spaces themselves played in this process, and those who have privilege monumental spaces, such as the NSDAP rally grounds in Nuremberg and the party buildings in Munich.⁵ Yet everyday urban spaces were equally important in Nazism's politicization of everyday life, where visual culture performed productive, ideological work to create a new national community. An examination of visual culture here is revealing because it is a central vehicle for articulating and defining changing notions of what constitutes the nation.⁶ In this chapter, I combine everyday spaces with the monumental and strive to broaden cultural histories of fascism by linking Nazi cultural representations to spatial practices.⁷

Before 1933, the *Volksgemeinschaft* was nothing but an imagined community in the minds of Nazi adherents, but these ritualistic practices, utilizing the city as stage, helped bring the national community into being, at least on the surface. During the Third Reich, Germans were expected to visibly demonstrate their belonging to the new national community by participating in public ceremonies and by flagging and decorating their homes on national holidays. Nazi authorities

⁴ Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*; Günter Berghaus, ed. *Fascism and Theater: Comparative Studies on the Aesthetics and Politics of Performance in Europe, 1925-1945* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996); Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, trans. Keith Botsford (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*, Studies on the History of Society and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Wenke Nitz, *Führer und Duce: Politische Machtinszenierungen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland und im faschistischen Italien*, ed. Christof Dipper, Oliver Janz, Sven Reichardt, Wolfgang Schieder, Petra Terhoeven, *Italien in der Moderne* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2013).

⁵ Kathleen James-Chakraborty, *German Architecture for a Mass Audience* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Sharon Macdonald, "Words in Stone?: Agency and Identity in a Nazi Landscape," *Journal of Material Culture* 11, no. 1-2 (2006); Joshua Hagen, and Robert Ostergren, "Spectacle, Architecture and Place at the Nuremberg Party Rallies: Projecting a Nazi Vision of Past, Present and Future," *Cultural Geographies* 13, no. 2 (2006); Joshua Hagen, "Architecture, Symbolism, and Function: the Nazi Party's 'Forum of the Movement,'" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28, no. 3 (2010).

⁶ Deborah Ascher Barnstone, and Thomas O. Haakenson, "Introduction: Why Visual Culture Matters," in *Representations of German Identity*, ed. Deborah Ascher Barnstone, and Thomas O. Haakenson, *German Visual Culture* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 2.

⁷ Though not explicitly analyzing urban spatial practices, Andrew Stuart Bergerson's fascinating study on Hildesheim also examines how ideology penetrated everyday life. See Andrew Stuart Bergerson, *Ordinary Germans in Extraordinary Times: The Nazi Revolution in Hildesheim* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

loudly trumpeted these visible displays of support as evidence that the population stood firmly behind them. The tone of reporting on such occasions was as significant as the displays themselves, for as Falasca-Zamponi has argued, authority relies on discourse and narratives, which both depict power as well as produce it.⁸ This phenomenon functions much like a self-fulfilling prophecy in which “public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments.”⁹ Before Nazis had definitively consolidated power, they successfully constructed the narrative, in visual culture and newspapers, that they had. Newspapers both published appeals for participation and subsequently reported in great detail on the extent of participation. This dialectic habituated Germans to new social norms and reinforced the expectation of participation.

In staging these rituals and ceremonies, Nazis often utilized spaces with symbolic capital to help legitimate their own rule.¹⁰ Such spaces were layered with historic meaning, invoking symbols, rituals, and language familiar to Germans, who were invited to participate in the restaging of a glorious German past, now extended into the future through Hitler’s regime. Berlin’s main boulevard of Unter den Linden was chief among these sites. Albert Speer’s expansion of this boulevard into the East-West-Axis as a memorial for the Second Reich solidified the boulevard’s place in the pantheon of Nazi memory politics. Nazi authorities sought to depict their “Third Reich” as the natural successor of Germany’s First and Second Empires. To do so, Nazis imbibed,

⁸ Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle*, 3-4. In outlining her arguments on power, representation, and discourse, Falasca-Zamponi draws from the work of Louis Marin who argues that power in fact only exists through representation. See Louis Marin, “The Narrative Trap: The Conquest of Power,” in *Ideological Representation and Power in Social Relations*, ed. Mike Gane (London: Routledge, 1989).

⁹ Robert K. Merton, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” *The Antioch Review* 8, no. 2 (1948): 195.

¹⁰ Brian Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 4. In his examination of memory and architecture in Berlin, Ladd refers to buildings as “repositories of memory.” Indeed, Nazis sought to invoke the memories imbued in certain spaces to legitimate their rule.

in reverent showmanship, from the deep well of meaning proffered by Germany's historic built environment, mobilizing it to legitimate their regime.

Almost immediately in 1933, Nazism began to dictate one's movements and outward displays of identity in public space. As outlined in Chapter 1, Nazi authorities banned Socialist and Communist symbols, flags, and clothing and barred opponents from public spaces. By calling upon Germans to participate in national celebrations, Nazis were inviting them back into the public sphere, but on their own terms. Outward conformity granted one access to the public sphere. In this understanding, the public sphere reverted to its acclamatory function of pre-modern times and largely served as a sounding board for Nazi ideology.¹¹ Yet these practices did not always position regime against citizen. Certainly, there were many enthusiasts for the regime and its politics. But participation in public rituals did not necessarily imply consent. Nor did it mean all Germans fully bought into the *Volksgemeinschaft*, for coercion and resistance accompanied enthusiasm. Nonetheless, widespread participation in Nazi rituals reified the national community, transposing it from Nazi imaginations onto German streets as a dynamic, effective community. Wittingly or not, Germans were "there at the making" of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.¹² The privilege of participation was granted to all but those who could not, by their prescribed nature, belong to the racial community.

¹¹ Jürgen Habermas refers to this as "representative publicness" in which the supreme ruler's appearances in public are meant to demonstrate his authority, and the people's role is merely to affirm it. See Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 5-14. Peter Longerich conceives of the Nazi public sphere in such a manner. See Longerich, *Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!*, 24.

¹² I liberally borrow E.P. Thompson's concept here. The working class "made itself as much as it was made." So too did Germans contribute to the making of the *Volksgemeinschaft* as much as it was imposed upon them from without. See E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 194.

Practicing and Perfecting Orchestration

During his tenure as *Gauleiter* (regional branch leader) of Berlin, Goebbels emboldened Germans to display “courage of conviction” (*Bekennermut*) by flying swastika flags and wearing party insignia. The cityscape served as a canvas upon which Goebbels could stage the new national community by inviting and later demanding that Germans show support for the new regime by flying flags, by decorating their houses, apartments, and balconies with greenery, and by participating in national festivals and ceremonies. Several events in 1933 provided Goebbels, Nazi adherents, and everyday Germans with opportunities to practice and refine this visible display of belonging. These efforts culminated in the NSDAP’s cooption of the formerly Socialist holiday on May 1 as a “Day of National Labor” when the Volksgemeinschaft was made visible in landscapes and cityscapes across the Reich. An examination of the spatial practices implemented during these events reveals how the Nazi regime utilized symbolic ritual-making to manufacture community in the public sphere. Its success would have been impossible without the approval of Hindenburg and other German conservatives who condoned the Nazi exploitation of national symbols. Because the regime simultaneously erased and outlawed tangible traces of the opposition from cityscapes, the orgy of Nazi regalia went unopposed so that the visual orchestration of the Volksgemeinschaft indeed became “real in [its] consequences.”¹³

In Germany’s incipient existence, Berlin’s main boulevard of Unter den Linden played a seminal role in staging the German nation. The boulevard began as a simple road that led from the main palace in central Berlin to the Tiergarten, the royal hunting grounds directly outside the city wall, but it was soon laden with more symbolic import. The road was extended to Charlottenburg

¹³ To outline his theory of the “self-fulfilling prophecy,” Robert K. Merton drew inspiration from the “Thomas theorem” (developed by W.I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas) which proclaimed that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Quoted in Robert K. Merton, “The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect,” *Social Forces* 74, no. 2 (1995): 380.

after a summer palace was built there at the end of the eighteenth century, and a gate was erected where the road met the city walls as an entry and tax collection point. The present-day Brandenburg Gate was built there in 1791 and received its distinctive quadriga sculpture two years later. Napoleon rode victoriously through the gate after French troops defeated Prussia in October 1806. To humiliate the Prussian king, Napoleon ordered that the quadriga be whisked away to Paris, and seven years of French occupation followed. After Prussian troops defeated France in the 1813 Battle of Leipzig, they retrieved the monument from the French capital and returned it to Berlin.¹⁴

Thereafter, the boulevard witnessed countless parades and military marches throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. German troops marched through the gate after defeating Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1871 so that by the early twentieth century, Charlottenburger Chaussee and Unter den Linden constituted Germany's national boulevard *sui generis*. It was along its path that Germans bid farewell to deceased royalty as their caskets were transported to the mausoleum of Charlottenburg Palace, and it was there that some German civilians gathered to share news about war's outbreak in July and August 1914.¹⁵ In the heat of the July Crisis, Berliners pushed onto the streets, mulling on Unter den Linden, Friedrichstraße, and Potsdamer Platz. Restaurants and cafes were abuzz with rumors and news.¹⁶ It was during these intense days that Kaiser Wilhelm II delivered his famous address from the palace to civilians crowded onto the square and boulevard below, saying he no longer recognized political parties but only "German brothers."¹⁷ It is this moment and the beginning of World War I that some historians

¹⁴ Werner Durth, and Günter Behnisch, *Berlin Pariser Platz: Neubau der Akademie der Künste* (Berlin: jovis Verlag GmbH and Akademie der Künste, Berlin, 2005), 35, 37-39.

¹⁵ See "Verbot der Umzüge Unter den Linden," *Berliner Morgenpost*, July 29, 1914; "Die Ankunft des Kaisers in Berlin," *Berliner Morgenpost*, August 1, 1914.

¹⁶ "Die Weltstadt in der Schicksalsstunde," *Berliner Morgenpost*, August 2, 1914.

¹⁷ "Eine neue Kundgebung des Kaisers," *Berliner Morgenpost*, August 1, 1914.

pin as the true birth of the Volksgemeinschaft.¹⁸ The symbolic weight of these memories permeated the boulevard in the early twentieth century.¹⁹

To Nazis and their sympathizers, the image of SA and SS troops victoriously marching through the Brandenburg Gate marked the end of the Weimar interlude and the return to a nationally-minded body politic. Nazis drew from this boulevard's historic past to orchestrate the Volksgemeinschaft and legitimate its rule in stone. Such efforts began immediately after Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933 when *Der Angriff* demanded: "Flags out!" It announced that the entire SA and SS would host a torchlight parade that evening that commenced at seven o'clock on Großer Stern, the square in the center of Tiergarten, and continued through the Brandenburg Gate onto Unter den Linden and then turned into the government district in Wilhelmstraße.²⁰ Acutely aware of this site's symbolic capital, *Der Angriff* declared, "Once again German men are streaming through the mighty pillars of the gate — men who will lead our enslaved Germany once again to freedom and honor" and celebrated it as "[t]he first happy day that the German people experienced since 1918."²¹ German collective memory was seared by the year 1918 when Germany suffered defeat in World War I, which sparked a revolution, the toppling of the monarchy, and the end of the German Empire. Nazis vowed to restore German honor, which they believed had been sacrificed by the Socialists who had agreed to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

Estimates on the numbers of marchers varied wildly, from a mere 20,000 to an inflated 700,000. Nazi newspapers were always keen to exaggerate the size of crowds, so it is important to question critically the figures they reported. Previous mass events, such as when approximately

¹⁸ Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*, 3-82; Michael Wildt, *Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft and the dynamics of racial exclusion: violence against Jews in provincial Germany, 1919-1939*, trans. Bernard Heise (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 15-20; Steber, *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany*, 8.

¹⁹ *Der Angriff* published an article on the history of the Brandenburg Gate in September 1933. See "Das Brandenburger Tor," *Der Angriff*, September 27, 1933.

²⁰ "Deutsches Berlin!" *Der Angriff*, January 30, 1933.

²¹ "Endlich ist es erreicht!" *Der Angriff*, January 31, 1933.

500,000 Berliners took to the streets in June 1922 for Walther Rathenau's funeral, brings even the most exaggerated figures into perspective.²² Nevertheless, the sight of SA, SS, and *Stahlhelm* troops marching down Unter den Linden under the watch of Hindenburg, who looked down upon the troops from his balcony, certainly left an impression on contemporary observers. Many Germans, Nazi sympathizers or not, were eager to witness the event.²³

After the torchlight parade that night, an SA division from Berlin-Charlottenburg marched back home to its district. The men purposefully headed toward Wallstraße, the heart of a small proletarian borough in the otherwise bourgeois district of Charlottenburg. When they reached Wallstraße, Communist residents confronted them, a brawl ensued, and shots were fired. An SA man, Hans Maikowski, and a police officer, Josef Zauritz, were killed.²⁴ In the commotion it was unclear who had fired the fatal shots. Although fifty-four Communists were put on trial between October 1933 and January 1934, the court found no convincing evidence to identify the actual perpetrator. That did not stop it from handing out prison sentences to several of the Communists, some for ten years. This show trial was most likely an elaborate cover up because several SA witnesses had already told the Gestapo that an SA man, Alfred Buske, had pulled the trigger.²⁵

Not one to dwell on the details of such events, Goebbels seized the moment to organize an elaborate publicity stunt that stylized Maikowski as a martyr of the movement and Communists as supreme disrupters of law and order. On February 5, Maikowski and Zauritz received an elaborate state funeral in the Berlin Cathedral, something only President Friedrich Ebert and Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously received. This event served as the Nazis' second great

²² Shulamit Volkov, *Walther Rathenau: Weimar's Fallen Statesman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 208. In his book on Rathenau, Harry Graf Kessler recorded that more than a million Berliners took part. See Harry Kessler, *Walther Rathenau: His Life and Work* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), 359.

²³ Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 310-11.

²⁴ "Zwei Todesopfer der nächtlichen Schießerei," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 1, 1933.

²⁵ Jay W. Baird, *To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 97-99.

staging of their newfound power in Berlin. The chief of police banned a joint demonstration of the Social Democrats and the Iron Front in the Lustgarten scheduled for that day.²⁶ Instead, the Lustgarten and square in front of the palace filled with thousands of people who publicly mourned the deaths of the two men.²⁷

On the day of the funeral, flags had been lowered to half-mast on many public buildings. SA men from Brandenburg, *Stahlhelm* members, and National Socialist youth associations marched to the service. Goebbels and Göring attended, and Hitler even appeared in an SA uniform. Inside the cathedral, the pastor spoke of the martyrdom of the two men. Maikowski's casket had been draped with a swastika flag.²⁸ Thereafter, Maikowski's casket was accompanied by the masses along Unter den Linden to Invalidenfriedhof, the cemetery where his body was interred directly next to Manfred von Richthofen's, the infamous "Red Baron" fighter pilot from World War I.²⁹

In the next month, SA troops conducted torchlight parades and raised swastika flags on buildings across the nation to project their newfound power. Such actions became especially pronounced in the prelude to the national elections on March 5, 1933.³⁰ At the same time, Nazi authorities endeavored to enact legislation to undergird this new symbolism. At the beginning of March, Wilhelm Frick successfully lifted a ban, in effect since 1929, on waving flags out of Reich-owned apartments.³¹ While flags of nationalist associations were permitted, the new legislation strictly forbade anyone from displaying Communist or Marxist flags on such buildings.³² The

²⁶ At that time, the chief of police was Kurt Melcher, a member of the German People's Party (DVP), who was replaced by Magnus von Levetzow approximately one week later. "Es regnet Verbote," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 3, 1933.

²⁷ "Hunderttausende im Lustgarten und in den Straßen zum Friedhof," *Der Angriff*, February 6, 1933.

²⁸ "Trauerfeier für die Opfer der Wallstraße," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 7, 1933.

²⁹ "Hunderttausende im Lustgarten und in den Straßen zum Friedhof," *Der Angriff*, February 6, 1933.

³⁰ See, e.g.: "Sturmflaggen über Hamburg und Altona," *Hamburger Tageblatt*, February 27, 1933; "SA-Marsch durch Berlin," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 4, 1933; "SA-Fackelzüge durch Berlin," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 5, 1933.

³¹ BArch R 43-II/129, Bl. 7, 9-11.

³² "Preußische Verordnung über das öffentliche Flaggen," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 3, 1933.

Prussian State Ministry further regulated the issue by decreeing that all state and municipal buildings, public schools, and state-owned apartments were only to display the Prussian state colors of black and white.³³

Though the NSDAP failed to achieve an outright majority in the election, receiving only 43.9 percent of the vote, the Nazis nevertheless claimed that a large majority had voted for them, and propaganda accounts proclaimed the end of the “inglorious epoch” of the Weimar Republic.³⁴ Following the election, black-white-red and swastika flags appeared on Berlin’s city hall, the district courthouse in Moabit, the police headquarters on Alexanderplatz, and on the university building.³⁵ When a Center Party parliamentary representative from Cologne wrote to Göring, protesting that most Germans do not support the raising of swastika flags on public buildings, Göring publicly humiliated him in the newspapers, writing, “The overwhelming majority of the German population avowed themselves on March 5 to the swastika flag. A disappearing small fraction of the German population voted for the Center Party. I am responsible for ensuring that the will of the majority of the German Volk is respected and not the wishes of a group that has apparently not understood the signs of the times.”³⁶ Despite Göring’s misrepresentation of the facts regarding the electoral results, his reference to widespread visible support, which was indeed difficult to dispute, allowed him to bully such dissident politicians.

Shortly thereafter, Nazi authorities, with Hindenburg’s backing, successfully rewrote the flag ordinances to officially replace the national flag of the Weimar Republic (black-red-gold) with the old Reich flag (black-white-red) and the swastika flag. The Volk Memorial Day (*Volkstrauertag*) on March 12, 1933 was a pivotal turning point. The German War Graves

³³ “Der neue Flaggen-Erlass für Preußen,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 8, 1933.

³⁴ “Aufbruch der Nation,” *Die Fahne Hoch! Die braune Reihe*, no. 1 (1933): 22.

³⁵ “Flaggen-Hissung auf den Berliner öffentlichen Gebäuden,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 8, 1933.

³⁶ “Die Flaggen-Hissung,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 9, 1933.

Commission established Volk Memorial Day in 1919 as an annual commemoration day for Germany's fallen soldiers in World War I. By showing deference to Hindenburg and indulging his nationalist sentiments, Nazi authorities used the event to test the boundaries of the symbolic status quo.

On March 10, Hitler released a decree that entreated all federal buildings to hoist the black-white-red flag on Volk Memorial Day to honor the fallen soldiers.³⁷ Göring immediately complied, permitting all Prussian state buildings to fly the old Reich flag next to the black-white Prussian flag that day. On Volk Memorial Day, all of Berlin was decked out in black, white, and red. Federal, state, and municipal buildings waved flags at half-mast, and many privately-owned buildings, including movie theaters, and the large department stores of "Israel and "Wertheim" (both Jewish-owned) were similarly decorated.³⁸ Chief of Police Magnus von Levetzow took part in the ceremonious raising of a black-white-red flag on the police headquarters in Berlin.³⁹ The occasion notwithstanding, the sight of the old imperial standard on the facade of an institution tasked with defending the Republic was certainly telling of the political transformation afoot.

The State Opera House on Unter den Linden hosted the main ceremony, and people crowded onto the square in front of the opera house and along Unter den Linden to participate. Hindenburg arrived at the opera house shortly before noon that day, dressed in his field marshal uniform, and was greeted by members of the German War Graves Commission and government officials. Hitler wore a suit and top hat and had pinned an Iron Cross to his lapel.⁴⁰ After the ceremony in the opera house, the ministers exited onto Unter den Linden and walked across the boulevard to the Reich memorial. Hindenburg inspected SA troops along the way. "What a

³⁷ "Die Fahnen am Volkstrauer-Tag," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 11, 1933.

³⁸ "Volkstrauertag," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 13, 1933.

³⁹ "Flaggenhissung auf dem Polizeipräsidium," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 13, 1933.

⁴⁰ "Der Volkstrauertag in Berlin," *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 14, 1933.

triumph!” remarked Goebbels after the event, aware that such moments granted the Nazis a great deal of legitimacy.⁴¹

That night, Hitler announced on the radio that the swastika flag and the black-white-red flag were henceforth the new national flags. Hindenburg had authorized the change and revealed his sentiments on the matter in correspondence with Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg, first and second heads of the *Stahlhelm*, in mid-March. Seldte and Duesterberg had sent a letter to Hindenburg on behalf of the *Stahlhelm* and requested that the black-white-red flag be reinstated as Reich flag in the name of the two million men who died in World War I. “In truth,” they wrote, “the black-white-red flag, the symbol of the Bismarckian Reich, never left the heart of the Volk. Throughout all the seas and among the millions of Germans abroad today, it is, as ever, the official flag of the Reich. On this matter, all Germans will most likely agree.”⁴² Hindenburg responded a few days later, thanked the men for their letter and remarked that he completely concurred that the old Reich flag was “still dear to the heart of the German people” and informed them he had passed their letter on to Hitler.⁴³

Hindenburg’s willingness to inspect SA troops on Volk Memorial Day and his approval of the flag change greatly augmented the NSDAP’s reputation and authority. These were not shallow gestures but rather were critical for the Nazis’ consolidation of power. Hindenburg’s brand of conservative nationalism, bathed in a nostalgic longing for an imagined pre-1918 unified Germany, was shared by many others who had at first been hesitant to welcome Hitler’s ascent to power. Hindenburg’s endorsement in these matters eased the transition from skeptic to supporter. Nazi authorities were mindful of the significance of Hindenburg’s patronage. Goebbels dined with

⁴¹ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:2/III, 145-46.

⁴² BArch R 43-II/129, Bl. 67.

⁴³ BArch R 43-II/129, Bl. 68.

Hitler immediately after Hindenburg signed the flag declaration and reflecting upon the news, remarked, “Fantastic prestige achievement. Almost inconceivable. The flag of the German revolution!”⁴⁴ Such comments are pertinent reminders that Nazi hegemony was far from certain in mid-March 1933, and in the fraught political moment, such symbolic victories were vital political victories.

Hindenburg’s decree on the matter, widely distributed in newspapers, claimed that the new national flags “unite the glorious past of the German Empire with the powerful rebirth of the German nation. Together, they should embody the power of the state and the inner unification of all national forces of the German Volk!”⁴⁵ Hitler’s radio broadcast that night underscored this point, claiming that the “marriage” of the old and new flags made manifest the success of their national revolution.⁴⁶ Although the NSDAP had failed to capture an absolute majority in national elections just one week prior, Hitler was already declaring the victory of the Nazi revolution and creating symbolic “facts on the ground” to support his claim. The elevation of the swastika flag as a national flag and the simultaneous ban on Socialist and Communist flags created the illusion that political opposition had disappeared overnight. By demanding flagging and participation in torchlight marches and parades, cityscapes and landscapes were used as visual surfaces to stage consent and uniformity.

On March 14, 1933, Goebbels was officially appointed minister of propaganda, and he plunged into planning for the “Day of Potsdam” on March 21, the official opening of the newly elected Reichstag. Nazi authorities selected this date because it was on that day, sixty-two years prior, that Bismarck had opened Germany’s imperial parliament after German unification in

⁴⁴ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:2/III, 144.

⁴⁵ BArch R 43-II/129, Bl. 45.

⁴⁶ “Kundgebungen des Reichspräsidenten und des Reichskanzlers,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 14, 1933.

1871.⁴⁷ Frick declared the Day of Potsdam (a Tuesday) a workday commensurate with a Sunday schedule, wherein only essential services were to be performed. Classes were cancelled in all Prussian schools and universities, and German soldiers received a vacation day.⁴⁸ Loudspeakers were erected on public squares throughout Berlin so that citizens who did not own radios could gather and hear the broadcast.⁴⁹ Goebbels again encouraged Germans to participate in the festivities and to hoist flags on their homes “and thereby profess [their] commitment to the rebirth of the German nation!”⁵⁰ The *Berliner Morgenpost* reported that black-white-red flags and swastika flags flew from public buildings, stores, houses, and balconies “as has seldom been seen before.”⁵¹

That evening, after the festivities in Potsdam, various nationalist and Nazi associations held another torchlight parade down Unter den Linden, repeating the route they had trod several times since January 30.⁵² Many historic buildings lining the boulevard were ceremoniously illuminated. Newspapers reported that up to 80,000 people took part in the march, and Pariser Platz in front of the Brandenburg Gate was packed with thousands more who awaited the spectacle. As the torch-wielding men approached the square, music blared out, and spotlights suddenly illuminated the quadriga on top of the Brandenburg Gate. The dramatic sight prompted a chorus of “Heils” from the masses.⁵³

In early April, a new federal law declared that, henceforth, May 1 would be celebrated as a “National Day of Labor.” Governments in both imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic had repressed Socialist demonstrations on the first of May and refused to recognize it as an official

⁴⁷ Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 350.

⁴⁸ “Der Tag von Potsdam,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 19, 1933.

⁴⁹ “Die Feierlichkeiten in Berlin und Potsdam,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 21, 1933.

⁵⁰ “Aufruf an das deutsche Volk,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, March 20, 1933.

⁵¹ “Die Feiern in Berlin,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 22, 1933.

⁵² “Polizei-Alarm,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, March 20, 1933.

⁵³ “Der Fackelzug der Achtzigtausend,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 22, 1933.

holiday. In fulfilling this long-held wish of the organized working-class, and appropriating the day as a national holiday, Nazis sought to rally support among German workers for the new regime. The Socialist holiday had often devolved into long-winded, educational lectures and speeches.⁵⁴ Rebirthed as a national holiday, however, the new May Day was a spectacle meant to win over the working-class masses, or at least to lend the impression that it had. The day was to prove once and for all that National Socialism had defeated Marxism and that the German people stood firmly behind the new regime. In his plans for the holiday, Goebbels instrumentalized Berlin and its visible surfaces to orchestrate this consent.

In his public appeal to the German Volk, Goebbels demanded cooperation in the day's festivities, writing, "Men and women! We are calling upon you in city and country!":

Deck your houses and the streets of the cities and villages with fresh green and with the flags of the Reich! The pennant of the national rising should flutter on all trucks and cars! No train and no street car will drive through Germany that is not decorated with flowers and green! The flags of the Reich will be ceremoniously raised on factory towers and office buildings! No child will be without a black-white-red or swastika pennant! Public buildings, train stations, post and telegraph offices will arise in fresh greens!⁵⁵

The greenery was meant to symbolize the worker's "bond with the earth."⁵⁶ Infusing the cityscape with flowers, wreaths, and garlands was a symbolic attempt to re-establish urban workers' supposedly natural bond to German soil and the countryside, which according to nationalist "Blood and Soil" accounts, had been severed in previous decades of urbanization and industrialization.

Vegetation motifs became a central element of Nazi ceremonies and holidays, and florists provided expert advice on how to achieve the best aesthetic effect, emphasizing that people "understand the different phenomena of our environment in allegory, and that therefore all design

⁵⁴ Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 182.

⁵⁵ "Aufruf zum 1. Mai," *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 25, 1933.

⁵⁶ "Der 1. Mai," *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 9, 1933.

has the purpose of making racially conditioned experience comprehensible in the symbol and allegory.”⁵⁷ The correct symbolic representation of the Volksgemeinschaft, then, would help cultivate a stronger racial community. “Just as peasant blood is the eternal source of healthy Volk blood, so too is the noble, ethnic peasant culture the source of all healthy and natural Volk culture,” wrote one set of guidelines for festival decorations. Festivals were to transform those in attendance into a true community, joined by blood, volition, and fate. Though ideas could persuade, only “the folk-like, festive form wins over the hearts.”⁵⁸ With proper festival decorations and staging, propaganda authorities sought to transform everyday spaces into monumental spaces with powerful transformative affect. The Prussian minister for agriculture, preserves, and forestry advised foresters to help procure the necessary foliage and to provide it to authorities free of charge. The Reich Railway Company offered gratis transportation of the greenery.⁵⁹

All aspects of the day were designed to symbolize the unification of German civilians, especially workers. During the day, people were asked to perform the Volksgemeinschaft. Flagging and greenery were visible expression of this unity and loyalty. Some workers traveled from villages and towns across Germany to participate in the capital’s festivities. Such coming-together was replicated on a smaller scale in Berlin itself, where citizens gathered on one of thirteen meeting sites in Berlin’s various districts. From there, they marched together in long columns to south-central Berlin, where they met on Tempelhof Field for the day’s main event. Authorities intended for such marches and processions to be community-forming affairs. The march routes on May 1 constituted a clear metaphor to the unification of the German nation. Just as Germans

⁵⁷ Franz Kolbrand, *Der Grün- und Blumenschmuck: Brauchtum, Festgestaltung und Festschmuck* (Berlin: Reichsnährstand Verlags-Ges. m.b.H., 1937), 7. See also: Kurt Garmatz, *Blumenbinderei und Grünschmuck: Handbuch für Blumenbinder und Gärtner* (Leipzig: Offizin Poeschel & Trepte, 1939).

⁵⁸ Kolbrand, *Der Grün- und Blumenschmuck*, 102.

⁵⁹ “Letzte Vorbereitungen zum National-Feiertag der Arbeit,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 27, 1933.

marched from distal urban sites to Tempelhof Field, so too was the German nation unifying behind Hitler's regime.

The celebration on Tempelhof that evening was the day's crowning event. Albert Speer had designed the field for the ceremony. It was one of his first propaganda projects for the NSDAP.⁶⁰ Speer used an enormous swastika banner framed by two black-white-red banners, along with spotlights, to create a temporary monumental space. Speer remembers that Hitler was pleased with the results, but Goebbels took the credit for himself.⁶¹ It was only later, after Speer duplicated many of the same design elements from Tempelhof Field in the Nuremberg party rallies, that Hitler became enamored with Speer's work. With an impressive number of attendees—reportedly more than one million—Goebbels could indeed proclaim a great success. Nonetheless, many workers and trade unionists had been coerced to appear.⁶²

The day before the holiday, a Gestapo report warned that Communists intended to disrupt the festivities with demonstrations and by raising Communist flags on difficult-to-reach sites such as factories and church towers.⁶³ Despite their concerns, the Gestapo reported that nothing had disrupted the Tempelhof rally and that Hitler had been safely transported to the event and back. Some red flags and Communist graffiti had been spotted, and several Communist flyers were collected and destroyed. A further one-hundred Communists attempted to hold a demonstration in Berlin-Friedrichshain but promptly dispersed when the police appeared and arrested one of the main agitators.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 26.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶² Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, 357.

⁶³ BArch R 43-II/1193, Bl. 75.

⁶⁴ BArch R 58/3131, Bl. 41, 43.

The *Berliner Morgenpost*'s self-assured account summarized the symbolic importance of the first National Day of Labor:

Note from a history book in the year 2000: 'The German Volk, disunited and torn, came together in the spring of 1933 in the community of fate. After the initial hesitation of broad circles that even the Day of Potsdam did not quite completely overcome, in the course of the next few weeks, days even, the united volition paved its path with elemental force and crowned the work of reconciliation in the largest march of all times, on Monday, the First of May.'

All corners of the city—north, south, east, and west— were decked out in flags and greenery, and everywhere citizens cheered from their balconies to the people marching below, the newspaper declared.⁶⁵ Here the reporter most explicitly highlighted the propagandistic link between the city's visible uniformity and the population's inner conformity.

Indeed, authorities carefully observed the degrees of decoration in various districts as a legitimate barometer of popular opinion. The *Berliner Illustrierte* reported: "Everywhere was the same image, in Wedding and in the West, in Neukölln and in Moabit, in Schöneberg and on Alexanderplatz. Never was it so magnificent and so uniform." In the next breath, however, the article acknowledged that there were fewer flags in Berlin's eastern and northern districts (home to traditional working-class neighborhoods), where "a silent, stubborn enemy sought to protest the dictate and the triumph of the hour through their silent, unadorned windows." The newspaper predicted that in one year, even these houses would partake in the fervor and excitement of the new era.⁶⁶ In this way, newspapers singled out districts which had failed to rise to the occasion and created the expectation that they would do so in the future.

In early 1933, Nazi authorities in Prussia, and increasingly across the Reich, used their muscle to turn ideology into legislation, aided and abetted by other conservatives. They played

⁶⁵ "Wie Berlin den Ersten Mai feierte," *Berliner Morgenpost*, May 2, 1933.

⁶⁶ LAB A Rep. 001-02, Nr. 1809, "Wie Berlin den 1. Mai feierte...," *Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung*.

upon nationalist sentiments to carry out a “revolution” that was as symbolic as it was political. Increasing calls and demands to visibly show support for the Nazi regime in a series of events—Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, the state funeral for Hans Maikowski, the elections of March 5, Volk Memorial Day, the Day of Potsdam, and the National Day of Labor—helped legitimate the NSDAP and make the Volksgemeinschaft a visible entity in cityscapes across the German Reich.

East-West-Axis: Legitimizing the Third Reich in Stone

Cityscapes provided more than backdrops for the Nazi aestheticization of politics. It was the symbolic weight proffered by several monumental sites that infused these practices with meaning and helped make them successful. Nazi monumental architecture was meant to have a transformative effect, to unify Germans into a true national community. Two of the most important monumental sites in Nazi Germany were Königsplatz and the Nazi Party buildings in Munich, designed by Paul Ludwig Troost, and the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg, designed by Albert Speer. Architecture critic Wilhelm Lotz passionately expounded upon such monumental sites as spaces of encounter, emphasizing their transformative effect, for he argued that it was in such spaces that individuals unified into a true community which “created a monument out of its own spirit.” Nonetheless, Lotz maintained that ordinary streets and public squares, transformed by the presence of “people, symbols, and flags” can also become “spaces of the community.” Lotz’s description of cityscapes as “grand spaces of experience” accurately describes the roles Goebbels and Speer assigned to such sites when they sought to remake cityscapes, via festive decorations, into monumental spaces for demonstrating and strengthening the community.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ BArch R 4606/3765, Bl. 208-210, Wilhelm Lotz, “Nationalsozialistischer Städtebau.”

In all these ritualistic affairs in the public sphere, one boulevard played a central role: Berlin's Unter den Linden, redesigned and incorporated into Albert Speer's grand boulevard, the "East-West-Axis." Volumes have been written on architecture in Berlin and on Albert Speer and his massive redesign plans, mostly unrealized, to transform Berlin into the "*Welthauptstadt Germania*" (World Capital Germania).⁶⁸ Less has been written about the projects Speer completed before war's outbreak and on how his efforts helped legitimate Nazi rule. I maintain that the redesign of this boulevard into a memorial for the German Empire cemented Nazi Germany's place in the imperial canon of Berlin's urban fabric and provided a prime staging ground for orchestrating consent via the Volk's public acclamation of their Führer.

As noted above, Hitler and the Nazis were cognizant of the symbolic importance of this boulevard. They utilized the central stretch between the Brandenburg Gate and the Neue Wache in countless marches, ceremonies, and demonstrations during their first few months in power.

⁶⁸ General studies of Nazi monumental architecture in Berlin have largely revolved around style and have asked whether "Nazi monumentalism" existed. Alex Scobie draws parallels between ancient Roman architecture and Nazi state buildings, while Joachim Petsch rejects the neoclassicism thesis. Wolfgang Sonne shows that Nazi monumental architecture mirrored contemporaneous state building in neoclassicism. See Alex Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture: The Impact of Classical Antiquity* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990); Joachim Petsch, "Vielfalt oder Uniformität?: Architektur im Nationalsozialismus," in *Traditionsanspruch und Traditionsbruch: Die deutsche Kunst und ihre diktatorischen Sachwalter*, ed. Georg Bollenbeck, and Thomas La Presti (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), 139; Wolfgang Sonne, *Representing the State: Capital City Planning in the Early Twentieth Century* (Munich: Prestel, 2003); Wolfgang Sonne, "Specific Intentions-General Realities: On the Relation Between Urban Forms and Political Aspirations in Berlin During the Twentieth Century," *Planning Perspectives* 19, no. 3 (2004). For studies on Albert Speer and his architectural plans for Berlin and other cities, see: Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies, and Josef Henke, ed. *Hitlers Städte: Baupolitik im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1978); Lars Olof Larsson, *Die Neugestaltung der Reichshauptstadt: Albert Speers Generalbebauungsplan für Berlin* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1978); Joachim Fest, *Speer: The Final Verdict*, trans. Ewald Osers, and Alexandra Dring (London: Phoenix Press, 2001); Susanne Willems, *Der entsiedelte Jude: Albert Speers Wohnungsmarktpolitik für den Berliner Hauptstadtbau* (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 2002); Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2003); Matthias Donath, *Architektur in Berlin 1933-1945: ein Stadtführer* (Berlin: Lukas, 2004); Alexander Kropp, *Die politische Bedeutung der NS-Repräsentationsarchitektur: Die Neugestaltungspläne Albert Speers für den Umbau Berlins zur 'Welthauptstadt Germania' 1936-1942/43*, Deutsche Hochschuledition (Neuried: Ars una Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005); Jochen Thies, *Hitler's Plans for Global Domination: Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims*, trans. Ian Cooke and Mary-Beth Friedrich (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Martin Kitchen, *Speer: Hitler's Architect* (New Haven: Yale University, 2015); Sebastian Tesch, *Hitlers Architekten: Albert Speer*, ed. Winfried Nerdinger, and Raphael Rosenberg, *Hitlers Architekten* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2016); Magnus Brechtken, *Albert Speer: Eine deutsche Karriere* (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 2017).

Authorities believed that the boulevard no longer constituted a worthy form for such events, however. Already in April 1933, the *B.Z. am Mittag* bemoaned the state of Charlottenburger Chaussee, the stretch of the boulevard extending west from the Brandenburg Gate, writing: “The Charlottenburger Chaussee, Berlin’s most important arterial road to the west, has become an eyesore on the road network of the Reich capital.” Not built for the age of automobiles, increased traffic quickly congested the boulevard and wore down the pavement. A lack of funds, a chronic problem for Weimar building authorities, meant that the road fell into disrepair. Plans to ameliorate some of these problems went unrealized.⁶⁹

Though no building plans had yet been implemented, the boulevard was ceremoniously decorated with flags and banners during the 1936 Olympics, for it was the main avenue from Berlin’s city center to the sporting grounds in Berlin’s western outskirts. During his tenure as State Commissioner—and from 1936 onward, as Mayor and City President—Julius Lippert devoted considerable attention to urban planning in Berlin.⁷⁰ Despite progress in some instances, Hitler was frustrated by the slow pace and lack of coordination between projects and authorities. Lippert repeatedly failed to realize Hitler’s wish for a 120-meter-wide boulevard that surpassed in size the Parisian Champs-Élysées. Lippert apparently believed Hitler’s plans cut too deep into Berlin’s urban fabric, and he and was not keen to have the city shoulder the exorbitant costs.⁷¹

Meanwhile, Hitler had developed a close working relationship with Albert Speer, whose overhaul of Nuremberg’s Nazi Party rally grounds and other architectural projects for the party had won him Hitler’s respect. Hitler eventually confided in Speer, “There’s nothing to be done with the Berlin city government. From now on you make the plans.”⁷² Hitler was confident in

⁶⁹ “Was wird mit der Charlottenburger Chaussee,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 5, 1933.

⁷⁰ *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, 14, 660.

⁷¹ Fest, *Speer*, 62-63. Fest maintains that Lippert repeatedly exploited bureaucratic processes to thwart Hitler’s plans.

⁷² Quoted in Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 74.

Speer's abilities, and on January 30, 1937, he appointed Speer as General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital. This appointment granted Speer unchecked power to carry out sweeping reconstruction plans in Berlin and made him accountable only to Hitler. Persistent conflicts between Speer and Lippert in this realm led to the latter's release in 1940.⁷³

In addition to executing Hitler's monumental visions, Speer desired to restore order to the havoc that rapid industrialization and urbanization had wreaked on Berlin. Therefore, his plans included modern traffic solutions, copious social housing blocks, and the introduction of green spaces into the urban fabric. Speer believed it was incumbent upon him to account for such social and economic necessities, but he claimed Hitler was "indifferent to the social dimension."⁷⁴ Speer's basic plan for Berlin consisted of two monumental boulevards—a "North-South-Axis" and an "East-West-Axis"—that met in central Berlin. The East-West-Axis would expand Berlin's historic Unter den Linden, while the North-South-Axis was to showcase the power and glory of the Third Reich. Hitler, who considered himself an amateur architect, had drafted a plan for the North-South-Axis himself in the 1920s.⁷⁵ Five concentric rings would intersect the boulevards to facilitate traffic through the growing metropolis. Speer hoped to decongest the city center by building tall office buildings along the main axes. He expected to complete these ambitious plans by 1950.⁷⁶ In many ways, Speer's plan epitomized modern urban planning, but despite the goals Speer shared with other modern planners, his designs were deeply infused with ideological aims specific to the Nazi regime.

⁷³ *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, 14, 660.

⁷⁴ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 79.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁷⁶ BArch R 4606/3765, "Wirkliche und Wahre Hauptstadt des Deutschen Reiches," *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz*, no. 22 (January 27, 1938).

Accordingly, one of the first projects Speer announced after his appointment was the redesign of the East-West-Axis, which commenced in 1937. Though plans for the North-South-Axis consumed Hitler's thoughts and much of the General Building Inspectorate's activities, Speer was determined to give Unter den Linden a modern facelift to maintain the "festive entrance road" of the Prussian capital.⁷⁷ Speer and his associates capitalized on this historic legacy. In a 1937 radio interview, Building Officer Stephan noted that the boulevard showcased "the old representative center of the imperial capital, the street Unter den Linden and the Brandenburg Gate, which for centuries witnessed not only Berlin's but rather German, yes, European history, and remains until today the real feature of the Reich capital for foreign visitors."⁷⁸ Because Unter den Linden and the Charlottenburger Chaussee constituted the basic skeleton of the East-West-Axis, it proved a relatively easy first undertaking. The extension of the boulevard to the east was postponed for the time being, because the most natural route via Kaiser-Wilhelm-Straße and on past Horst-Wessel-Platz would require massive demolitions, including that of the newly built Horst-Wessel-House.⁷⁹ Speer's office drafted alternative plans, but none of them were executed before the war.

The route of the new East-West-Axis ran along Unter den Linden, through the Brandenburg Gate and the Tiergarten, past the palace in Charlottenburg, on to Adolf-Hitler-Platz, and ended along Döberitzer Heerstrasse in the West.⁸⁰ Though work started already in 1937, the ceremonious commencement of Speer's undertaking was held on June 14, 1938, when fifteen building projects began simultaneously. Runder Platz, the projected intersection of the North-South-Axis with

⁷⁷ BArch R 4606/3765, "Die Ost-West-Achse," April 14, 1939.

⁷⁸ BArch R4606/613, Bl. 18-24, Rundfunkreportage über die Ost-West-Achse.

⁷⁹ Larsson, *Die Neugestaltung der Reichshauptstadt*, 62.

⁸⁰ BArch R 4606/613, Rundfunkreportage with Oberbaurat Stephan und Stadtbaudirektor Langer über die Ost-West-Achse.

Potsdamer Straße, hosted the day's main event. The area was decked out with swastika flags and gold ribbons. The windows and roofs of nearby buildings were crowded with spectators. Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, and Speer all attended. Several officials gave speeches, including Goebbels, who stated that Hitler's resolve "to reshape the chaos of Berlin and to transform this haphazard sea of houses into a city worthy of the greatness of our Volk, the rank of our nation, and the historical significance of our times" had been constant since the beginning.⁸¹

Speer's main technical changes to the westward boulevard included: (1) leveling the road and broadening it to fifty meters, (2) decreasing the number of intersections and nonuniform trees, and (3) outfitting it with modern, aesthetically pleasing street lights.⁸² Commensurate with the regime's regard for nature, healthy trees that stood in the path of construction had been removed from along the boulevard and replanted in Hermann-Göring-Straße and in the Jungfernheide. Additional trees were also planted in the Tiergarten to compensate for other lost trees.⁸³ Beyond these adjustments, there were several important symbolic transformations along the boulevard. The square in front of the Technical University in Charlottenburg, originally built between 1878 and 1884, was redesigned as a parade ground, the building's monumental facade easily integrated into Speer's grand boulevard.⁸⁴

The most symbolic transformation of the boulevard, however, was the transformation of Großer Stern, the square at the heart of the Tiergarten, into a "Forum of the Second Reich."⁸⁵ At the heart of the transformation was the transfer of the Victory Column (*Siegessäule*) from Königsplatz to Großer Stern. The Victory Column had been erected in 1873 on Königsplatz in

⁸¹ BArch R 43-II/1182, Bl. 18-24, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, Nr. 968, June 14, 1938.

⁸² Larsson, *Die Neugestaltung der Reichshauptstadt*, 56-57.

⁸³ "Ost-West-Achse für den Geburtstag bereit," *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 19, 1939.

⁸⁴ Larsson, *Die Neugestaltung der Reichshauptstadt*, 58.

⁸⁵ BArch R 4606/567, Bl. 129, "Großer Stern wird Ehrenplatz des Zweiten Reiches," *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro G.m.b.H.*, June 3, 1938.

front of the Reichstag as a memorial commemorating Germany's victories against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1871) in the so-called "Wars of Unification." Joseph Roth wrote that the Victory Column had become largely neglected by the early 1920s, relegated to "a little knickknack of German history." An attempted explosion of the memorial in March 1921 briefly reignited Berliners' interest in the monument, and the Victory Column garnered new relevance as a symbol of imperial Germany.⁸⁶

In Speer's redesign for Berlin, however, Königsplatz was to cap the northern end of the North-South-Axis, and the "Great Hall" (*Große Halle*) would be built on the square adjacent to the Reichstag. This structure, loosely modeled after Rome's Pantheon, was designed to be the world's largest building and would be able to seat up to 180,000 people.⁸⁷ It would dwarf the Victory Column and dilute its significance as symbol of the Second Reich.⁸⁸ Therefore, Speer decided to transfer the Victory Column to the East-West-Axis, where it would sit at the center of the expanded Großer Stern.

Responses to the memorial's move and new placement were mixed. Some Germans were enthusiastic while others believed the transfer besmirched the memory of the Second Reich. Oskar Neumann wrote a poem entitled "Our Victory Column 1938!" that expressed his excitement at seeing the Victoria "fly" through the air. The first and second-to-last verses read:

Much grandeur I have experienced in life,
But that our Victory Column goes on a journey,
That I would not have thought possible!
[...]
On Großer Stern you will newly arise,
There you will see many more grand things,
That Adolf Hitler accomplished!⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Roth, *What I Saw*, 179.

⁸⁷ Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics*, 359-60.

⁸⁸ BArch R 4606/1404, Bl. 58-59, Pressenotiz.

⁸⁹ BArch R 4606/1404, Bl. 24-25.

Others were less enthusiastic. One man was downright incensed upon hearing the news. “Some time ago I heard a rumor that the Victory Column in Berlin will be dismantled and moved to another site. I considered this news an April Fool’s joke,” he wrote. When he realized that this plan would indeed be carried out, he felt compelled to write a letter of displeasure to Berlin’s city administration, saying that in his view, “no one has the right” to move this “emblem of a great and glorious epoch of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his greatest statesmen, the Fürst Bismarck.”⁹⁰ His letter was forwarded to Speer’s office, which wrote back to him, informing him that the Victory Column would not be dismantled but simply moved to “another site, where it will be much more effective and visible in the framework of the redesign of Berlin.”⁹¹

Despite such objections, Speer’s office carried on with the plan. At the beginning of May 1938, visits to the Victory Column were stopped, and a few weeks later, the monument was fenced in. The dismantling of the monument began in May 1938. The square base of the memorial was removed first along with the four bronze reliefs. Thereafter, the Victoria sculpture and the column were taken down and transported in pieces to the new site. Once Königsplatz stood completely free, the reconstruction of the Victory Column at Großer Stern was scheduled for the end of July.⁹² Some 500 people—workers, employers, and SA men, as well as important guests such as Speer, Lippert, and Chief of Police Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf—gathered on February 27, 1939 around the Victory Column for the *Richtefest*, a German traditional ceremony for the inauguration of a new construction. The monument was decked out with flags. After the ceremony, the workers were invited to an evening of speeches, music, and merriment in the Kroll Opera House and dined on a traditional meal of pork knuckle. Prussian Finance Minister Johannes Popitz gave a short speech

⁹⁰ BArch R 4606/1404, Bl. 15, Letter from Valentin v. Bismarck to the Stadtverwaltung, April 19, 1938.

⁹¹ BArch R 4606/1404, Letter to Valentin v. Bismarck, May 24, 1938.

⁹² BArch R 4606/1404, Bl. 32, “Abbruch der Siegessäule beginnt,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, May 26, 1938.

in which he emphasized the importance of Großer Stern as a memorial site for the Second Reich and thanked the workers, “who did their duty day and night, in rain and frost, and sometimes at dizzying heights.”⁹³

With its transfer, the Victory Column was heightened almost six and a half meters by an added drum column, making the entire monument approximately sixty-nine meters in height.⁹⁴ Hitler himself had sketched the design for this change.⁹⁵ Großer Stern had been expanded from eighty to two-hundred meters in diameter, and the surrounding traffic lane measured thirty-two meters wide. To allow people to safely access the monument without having to pass over the wide traffic lanes, Speer designed underground tunnels from the Tiergarten to the central square. These tunnels, accessed by four gate houses, remain the means of accessing the monument until today.⁹⁶ The prominent monuments of Otto von Bismarck, Helmuth von Moltke, and Albrecht von Roon that surrounded the Victory Column on Königsplatz, along with the dozens of memorials in the former Victory Alley that led to Königsplatz, were transferred to the Tiergarten area surrounding the Victory Column. Recognizing that such constructions were important relics from the Second Empire, contemporaries believed they were “obligated to preserve these monuments for the future. It does not matter that the value of the individual monuments is highly debated today.”⁹⁷ Despite their conflicted feelings on the meaning and artistic quality of such memorials, city bureaucrats felt obligated to honor them.

The face of the Victoria sculpture was purposefully pointed to the west, for “it was there that the decisive victories of the Second Reich were battled” and the wreath in Victoria’s hand

⁹³ BArch R 4606/3765, Pressenotiz.

⁹⁴ BArch R 4606/567, Bl. 112, *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz*, no. 85 (April 10, 1938).

⁹⁵ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 139.

⁹⁶ BArch R 4606/3765, “Die Ost-West-Achse,” April 14, 1939; BArch R 4606/1404, Veröffentlichung in der Fachpresse.

⁹⁷ BArch R 4606/567, Bl. 129, “Großer Stern wird Ehrenplatz des Zweiten Reiches,” *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro G.m.b.H.*, June 3, 1938.

“stretches in the direction from which victorious German troops ceremoniously marched four times [into the city] through the Brandenburg Gate.” In this manner, the sculpture greeted visitors as they entered the capital city.⁹⁸ Indeed, Hitler later planned to rename Adolf-Hitler-Square after Mussolini and to build a grand train station to the west of it. This station would be the terminus for all foreign dignitaries who would then be driven down the East-West-Axis to the government district in central Berlin.⁹⁹ This grand boulevard was meant to impress upon its visitors the power and prestige of the Third Reich, rooted in a long history of German military might.

Again and again, city officials invoked the memory of imperial Germany’s celebrated troops. Their memory loomed large in the planned redesign of the Brandenburg Gate as well. Hitler wanted commemorative plaques to be placed on the Brandenburg Gate to memorialize Germany’s troops who had marched through the famous landmark.¹⁰⁰ Speer sent the inscriptions to the army to verify that they had the correct information.¹⁰¹ The inscriptions would list the names divisions returning from the Wars of Liberation in 1814, the Second Schleswig War in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. A few curious historical distortions and omissions appear in the final texts. First, whereas the defeated countries of the 1864 and 1871 wars are listed—Denmark and France, respectively—the plaque for the Austro-Prussian War would list the troops who had returned from “the victorious war of 1866,” concealing that Austria was the defeated entity. As Germany had recently annexed Austria, such an inclusion would have been a painful reminder of this “war between brothers.” Second, the plaque commemorating divisions from World War I read that they had returned “*undefeated*, after four years of struggle

⁹⁸ BArch R 4606/3765, “Die Ost-West-Achse,” April 14, 1939.

⁹⁹ Larsson, *Die Neugestaltung der Reichshauptstadt*, 60-61.

¹⁰⁰ BArch R 4606/1403, Letter to the Chef der Wehrmachtsadjutantur des Führers, Herrn Oberst Schmudt, September 13, 1940.

¹⁰¹ BArch R 4606/1403, Letter to Herr Oberst Schmudt, Chef der Wehrmachtsadjutantur, September 13, 1940.

against 25 nations.”¹⁰² Of course, this assertion was a complete distortion of facts. Finally, two Nazi-era plaques sought to explicitly situate the NSDAP and its paramilitary forces in this longer German memorial culture. These plaques read: “On January 30, 1933, the day of the accession of power through the Führer and Reich Chancellor, Berliner SA and SS, members of NSDAP organizations, and national associations passed through the Brandenburg Gate” and, “On June 6, 1939, after participating in Spain’s War of Liberation, the German Legion ‘Condor’ marched through the Brandenburg Gate.”¹⁰³ Hitler, Speer, and the army sought to alter history through fabrications and omissions to cement the NSDAP’s place within Germany’s military tradition.

The first seven-kilometer stretch of the East-West-Axis between the Brandenburg Gate and Adolf-Hitler-Platz was completed on time for Hitler’s fiftieth birthday. The day was declared a one-time national holiday so that all Germans could celebrate their Führer.¹⁰⁴ Goebbels repeated his familiar refrain to Berliners, calling upon them to pull out their flags and decorate their houses.¹⁰⁵ The *Berliner Morgenpost* wrote that “the festive dress can hardly be described. All of Berlin is wrapped in the bright red of the flags and banners, and long, golden ribbons flutter down from the flagpoles. The billowing sea of flags stretch into the most distant suburbs, and everywhere one sees garlands and banners, pictures of the Führer and countless other expressions of love, devotion, and adoration for the Führer.”¹⁰⁶ Even the working-class districts of Neukölln, Wedding, and Lichtenberg demonstrated their affection in this manner. Not only were the grand festival streets decorated, but even residents with no windows to the street hung flags and garland out windows in the deep courtyards of apartment buildings.¹⁰⁷ Goebbels was pleased: “Berlin has

¹⁰² Emphasis added.

¹⁰³ BArch R4606/1403, Letter from the Chefadjutant der Wehrmacht beim Führer to Oberbaurat Stephan, October 12, 1940.

¹⁰⁴ “20. April 1939: Nationaler Feiertag für Großdeutschland,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 18, 1939.

¹⁰⁵ “Dr. Goebbels: Schmückt Eure Häuser und Straßen!” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 16, 1939.

¹⁰⁶ “Mit dem Führer über die Ost-West-Achse,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

¹⁰⁷ “Kreuz und quer durch die Feststadt,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

become a true festival city. Never before has the people been so happy and so cheerful as in these days.”¹⁰⁸

Goebbels had called upon all Berliners to gather along the East-West-Axis on the evening of April 19, 1939 to greet Hitler when the boulevard would be ceremoniously inaugurated and opened to traffic. The entire route was packed with spectators who excitedly awaited Hitler’s passing. The atmosphere of a “*Volksfest*” apparently reigned, with vendors selling seltzer water and sausages.¹⁰⁹ At nine o’clock that evening, Hitler was driven to Hindenburgplatz in front of the Brandenburg Gate.¹¹⁰ Speer, Lippert, Prussian Finance Minister Popitz, additional state and city officials, and workers who had carried out the construction awaited Hitler’s arrival.¹¹¹ Speer recounted the event in his memoirs:

From the distance came cheers, swelling as Hitler’s motorcade approached and becoming a steady roar. Hitler’s car stopped right in front of me; he got out and greeted me by shaking hands, while responding to the welcome of the dignitaries merely by raising his arm briefly. Portable movie cameras began filming the scene from close up, while Hitler expectantly took up a position six feet away from me. I took a deep breath, then spoke these exact words: ‘*Mein Führer*, I herewith report the completion of the East-West axis. May the work speak for itself!’¹¹²

Thereafter, Hitler and Speer embarked on an inaugural drive along the boulevard, from Hindenburgplatz to Adolf-Hitler-Platz and back, followed by a motorcade of the other officials in attendance.¹¹³ As Hitler’s car drove through the Brandenburg Gate, the festival illumination ignited at once in dramatic fashion.¹¹⁴ Spotlights illuminated the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory

¹⁰⁸ Joseph Goebbels, and Jana Richter, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Elke Fröhlich, vol. I:6 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1998), 321-22.

¹⁰⁹ “An der Ost-West-Achse,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

¹¹⁰ “Das Programm für den Geburtstag des Führers,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 16, 1939.

¹¹¹ “Mit dem Führer über die Ost-West-Achse,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

¹¹² Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 148.

¹¹³ BArch R 4606/1219, Bl. 21.

¹¹⁴ “Mit dem Führer über die Ost-West-Achse,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

Column, and a Bengal lights lit up the edges of the Tiergarten with a green glow. The new streetlights along the route contributed to the boulevard's unified, monumental visage.¹¹⁵

On Großer Stern, soldiers from the 1864, 1866, and 1870–71 “Wars of Unification” had assembled to greet the passing Führer.¹¹⁶ Speer had explicitly requested that disabled soldiers from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 receive seats for the occasion.¹¹⁷ All along the route, Hitler allegedly met cheers from the crowds. Commenting on the event, Goebbels wrote, “Drive along the East-West-Axis. A triumphal procession. 2 million people in attendance. A jubilation without comparison. The street lay in a brilliant fairytale-like light. And an atmosphere like never before. The Führer radiating with joy.”¹¹⁸ Speer's reflections on the event were a bit more tempered, noting that it must have required “an energetic effort by the Propaganda Ministry to bring this crowd here; but the applause seemed to me genuine.”¹¹⁹ After the drive, the invited guests convened in the Reich Chancellery for dinner and further celebrations.

The military parade the next day marked the birthday celebration's crowning event. The entire stretch of road had been blocked off to traffic and festively outfitted with flags, banners, and decorative columns topped with the Reich eagle. Bismarckstraße and Kaiserdamm, which comprise a western section of the boulevard, were deemed “the streets of the German *Gaue*” and decked out with flags from all of Germany's districts.¹²⁰ Shortly before eleven o'clock, Hitler was driven along the boulevard to the Technical University in Charlottenburg. There, a special viewing tribune had been erected from which Hitler inspected the marching troops, flanked by the top military commanders: Air Force Supreme Commander Hermann Göring, Navy Grand Admiral

¹¹⁵ “An der Ost-West-Achse,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 20, 1939.

¹¹⁶ “Das Programm für den Geburtstag des Führers,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 16, 1939.

¹¹⁷ BArch R 4606/1219, Bl. 17.

¹¹⁸ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:6, 321-22.

¹¹⁹ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 148.

¹²⁰ “Ost-Westachse zeigt ihren Festschmuck,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 18, 1939.

Erich Raeder, Army Commander in Chief Walther von Brauchitsch, and Chief of the Armed Forces High Command Wilhelm Keitel.¹²¹ The military parade lasted over four hours, as divisions from the air force, navy, and army marched along the boulevard.¹²² It was an impressive show of force for the remilitarizing country. Indeed, Goebbels called it a “brilliant image of German power and strength. Our heaviest artillery is shown for the first time.”¹²³ Commenting on the show, the *Völkischer Beobachter* noted that many spectators found the image of troops marching past the Victory Column especially moving:

There stands [the Victory Column] today—the embodied tradition of a glorious German military tradition and heroism of the past century, surrounded by the guardians of the Second German Reich, Moltke, Bismarck, and Roon—a site worthy of them, in the middle of the gray army of proud, young, armed men of a unified, strong, and powerful Greater German Reich. The barrels, the iron witnesses of German arms glory and of the feats of arms of the fathers, shone brightly down to the troops in parade formation and to troops marching by to the parade square. They speak their own language to soldiers’ hearts!¹²⁴

As they rounded the boulevard around the Victory Column, the marching troops were reminded of the troops who had fought before them in the name of the German nation.

Though officials had often utilized Unter den Linden and the Charlottenburg Chaussee as a staging ground for demonstrating power and orchestrating the Volksgemeinschaft, the April 1939 military parade outstripped them all. As the *Völkischer Beobachter* remarked: “Often the German Volk has had the opportunity to show its love to their leader, which fills every heart for the savior and unifier of Germany. But never before has the event been such an impressive manifestation of loyalty and unity as on Adolf Hitler’s 50th birthday. The entire Volk appeared to congratulate him.”¹²⁵

¹²¹ “Die größte deutsche Parade,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 21, 1939.

¹²² “Größte Parade der deutschen Wehrmacht,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 21, 1939.

¹²³ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:6, 323. Entry from April 21, 1939.

¹²⁴ “Die größte deutsche Parade,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 21, 1939.

¹²⁵ “Die Nation feierte den Geburtstag des Führers,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 21, 1939.

Goebbels was absolutely delighted at the sight. “Storms of applause. The Führer is being celebrated by the Volk as a mortal man has never before been celebrated,” he wrote in his diary. He commented on the enthusiastic frenzy he witnessed, writing, “I have never seen our Volk like this.”¹²⁶ Despite Goebbels enthusiasm, Speer’s recounting of the event suggests that it took some effort to compel the crowds onto the streets that day. Speer noted that a “drooping morale” had reigned throughout 1939, which “was evident in the necessity to organize cheering crowds where two years earlier Hitler had been able to count on spontaneity.”¹²⁷ Germans were aware that the celebrations of April 1939 meant they were mobilizing for war, a fact they viewed with some trepidation.¹²⁸

Indeed, less than five months later, Germany was embroiled in war, but its rapid victories rallied support for the regime. A little more than a year after the grand, militaristic parade on Hitler’s birthday, German troops marched victorious into Paris in June 1940. Upon Hitler’s return to Berlin, Goebbels again organized a grand celebration, this time, within a matter of hours. On the morning of July 6, 1940, Goebbels published an announcement in the morning newspapers to the Berlin population, announcing that Hitler would return Berlin at three o’clock in the afternoon: “Within a few short hours our city must be a singular sea of flags. Decorate and garland all of Berlin, most importantly the streets through which the Führer will pass.” All sectors of the economy—except for grocery stores and industries essential for war—were to close at noon and to prepare to greet Hitler in a ceremonial fashion. No one was to stay home, Goebbels wrote.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:6, 323.

¹²⁷ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 158.

¹²⁸ Ian Kershaw, *The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 142-43.

¹²⁹ “Aufruf des Berliner Gauleiters,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, July 6, 1940.

The transformation in such a short amount of time was indeed impressive, but by then, citizens were well-versed in quickly decorating for such events, and they quickly transformed the city “into a sea of flags, flowers, and garlands.”¹³⁰ Commenting on the transformation, Goebbels wrote, “My call brought Berlin into motion within one hour.”¹³¹ Much like they had on Hitler’s birthday a year before, many people scoped out spots early, lugging chairs and stools to camp out on curbs for Hitler’s arrival. Garland stretched across the streets, and flags and banners waved out windows.¹³² By early afternoon, Wilhelmplatz and the streets leading from the Anhalter Train Station to the Reich Chancellery building were packed with people.¹³³ A carpet of flowers covered the streets. When Hitler arrived in Berlin, throngs of people greeted him. Hitler was apparently moved to tears, and Goebbels recorded, “The storm of exultation of an entirely happy Volk is indescribable. The Führer drives only over flowers. Our Volk, our wonderful Volk!”¹³⁴ Ian Kershaw maintains that the period of rapid German victories during the *Blitzkrieg* campaign, especially the conquest of France in June 1940, marked the peak of Hitler’s popularity amongst the German population.¹³⁵ Thus, the enthusiasm upon Hitler’s return to Berlin was most likely genuine.

Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that a certain vapidness had begun to permeate these affairs. One German Jew who had emigrated commented on this development. He claimed Germans were disillusioned by Hitler’s rush to war and that they were concerned about family members on the front: “Not even the success of the German military in summer 1940 aroused much enthusiasm. One flagged the houses because the Reich propaganda minister had ordered it.

¹³⁰ “Des Führers Heimkehr – Festtag Berlins!” *Berliner Morgenpost*, July 7, 1940.

¹³¹ Josef Goebbels, and Jana Richter, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Elke Fröhlich, vol. I:8 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1998), 209.

¹³² “Des Führers Heimkehr – Festtag Berlins!” *Berliner Morgenpost*, July 7, 1940.

¹³³ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:8, 209.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 209-10.

¹³⁵ Kershaw, *The ‘Hitler Myth’*, 151-68.

The inner conviction was lacking.”¹³⁶ Whether individuals flagged out of enthusiasm or compulsion is generally impossible to determine, but we should not assume that outward conformity necessarily indicated inner conviction.

For the regime, however, the matter of conviction was virtually immaterial. Most important for the regime (as for all dictatorships) in achieving its aims was that the population outwardly *appeared* to give its consent.¹³⁷ As long as Germans conformed in the public sphere and kept up the appearance of standing united behind the Hitler and Nazi Party policies, reporters and propagandists such as Goebbels could shape the narrative as they liked. Indeed, the Nazi regime proved incredibly successful at coordinating the public sphere to present an image of conformity. Should people dissent, SA members and police officers were willing to apply force and compel their cooperation.

Popular Participation in Transforming the Public Sphere & Orchestrating the Volksgemeinschaft

The visible demonstration of the Volksgemeinschaft stemmed from the NSDAP’s need to legitimate its own rule, but it was also a collaborative endeavor. Enthusiastic supporters actively participated in transforming the public sphere to fit Nazi visions by flagging and hanging up banners and greenery and by renaming streets and establishing memorials. Yet Nazi party members and authorities were willing to coerce civilians when necessary. In the public sphere, Nazi ideology proved unyielding. The regime demanded visible conformity, and one’s inclusion in the national community was predicated on these visual displays of loyalty. Nonconformity in

¹³⁶ Andrea Löw, ed. *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland*, vol. 3: Deutsches Reich und Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, September 1939-September 1941 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), 352.

¹³⁷ Longerich emphasizes this point regarding inner conviction. See Longerich, *Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!*, 52.

the public sphere was often penalized. When critics capitulated and joined in flagging and decorating, sometimes under force, the Volksgemeinschaft was realized in practice.

In early 1933, many people enthusiastically heeded Goebbels' pronouncements, flagging and decorating their streets with fervor. Waldemar Brust grew up in Koppenstraße in eastern Berlin, a street that he remembers as hotly contested between Nazis and Communists. Each faction had a pub in this street, but in the Weimar era, only party flags from the SPD and KPD could be seen fluttering from apartment windows. After Hitler was named chancellor, Brust was shocked that many of his neighbors began flying swastika flags, some of them simply sewing "a white circle with a swastika on top of their red flags." When Brust asked one of his neighbors about his change of heart, the man responded that he had been jobless for five years and that the "unemployment support was not enough to live or die." After the Nazis came to power, he again found work as a carpenter and said, "I could care less if I built furniture, munition boxes, or caskets. The main thing is that on the weekend, I can once again place honest-earned money on the table for my wife."¹³⁸ Indeed, Nazis won over many former opponents by putting them back to work.

Flag makers stumbled into great fortune, and some greeted the Nazis, perhaps with similar ambivalence, but grateful for wages. One flag maker in Berlin-Kreuzberg had previously produced hammer and sickle flags, but after the Nazis came to power, he simply switched to producing swastika flags.¹³⁹ Factories could not keep up with the population's demand for flags in March 1933. One owner of a flag factory in Berlin reported being inundated with order forms as well as letters of complaint from Germans throughout the Reich, angry at the long wait periods to receive their orders. "We cannot help it," he wrote, because they could not obtain the necessary materials on time. Therefore, they resorted to "taking black-red-gold flags from storage – some of which

¹³⁸ Waldemar Brust, "Jugend im Nationalsozialismus," Tagebuch- und Erinnerungsarchiv Berlin e.V. (TEA).

¹³⁹ Egon Guttman, Interview 35204, Segment 10, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

had had already been ordered but not picked up – and separating the three pieces, replacing the gold stripe with white cloth and thereby creating black-white-red flags.” Factories reported millions of Reichsmarks in profits, records which they had not seen since war’s outbreak in 1914 and its conclusion in 1918, when the flag had last been changed.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, the enthusiasm seemed to have no bounds, and party officials were stunned at the explosion of kitsch that invaded the public sphere. Germans began to place Hitler’s photo and Nazi insignia on buttons, ties, pens, stockings, cups and glasses, cakes, and trinkets of all sorts. Nazi officials declared a battle on kitsch and tasked the *Deutscher Werkbund* (German Association of Craftsmen) with eliminating such abuse of the national symbols and educating Germans on simple living.¹⁴¹ The regime proclaimed a zero-tolerance policy for any misuse of NSDAP symbols, stating that the future health of the nation demanded that the national revolution not “be overgrown with patriotic kitsch.”¹⁴² The May 1933 “Law for the Protection of National Symbols” sought to regulate the issue, forbidding any use of national symbols—including not only the swastika, but also national colors, portraits of party leaders, and the Horst-Wessel-Song—that was intended to debase them.¹⁴³

Another way Germans actively transformed the public sphere was via street renamings and establishing new monuments. The Reich Chancellery was inundated with letters from Germans in towns large and small across the Reich, requesting to rename streets, squares, bridges, and schools after Hitler and other top Nazi officials. Often, it was the main square or a prominent boulevard

¹⁴⁰ “Ausverkauf in Fahnen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 17, 1933.

¹⁴¹ Paul Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 31-34.

¹⁴² “Gegen patriotischen Kitsch,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 7, 1933.

¹⁴³ “Schutz der nationalen Symbole,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, May 20, 1933. For the law, see “Gesetz zum Schutze der nationalen Symbole. Vom 19. Mai 1933,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, I, 285-86.

extending from the train station that received Hitler's name.¹⁴⁴ Germans planted oak and linden trees in Hitler's name. Hitler's Reich Chancellery office even granted permission to christen several boats and ships with Hitler's name. Yet, when one man requested to name his bakery and another man his pub after Hitler, both requests were denied, as were requests to name shoes after Hitler, to have silverware created with Hitler's face on it, and to have small busts of Hitler mass-produced, all rejections in accordance with the growing fight against kitsch.¹⁴⁵

The regime quickly realized that this euphoric onslaught had incited resentment among some Germans who believed that historic street names should remain in place. After Nuremberg's Main Square was famously renamed Adolf-Hitler-Platz, the German Völkisch Freedom Movement wrote to Hitler, saying that "a piece of historical memory" had been lost, victim to the whims of the present moment. This echoed the folly of "the Jewish-Marxist revolt of 1918," they said, and they requested that the square receive its historic name once again. Chief of the Reich Chancellery Hans Lammers responded to the group, writing that he regretted to inform them that the decision could not be revoked because Hitler had approved the name change before he later outlined his wish that historic names remain in place.¹⁴⁶

This opinion that Nazis were repeating the same mistakes as revolutionaries in 1918–19 was widely shared by many, and Hitler was sympathetic to such claims. As seen by Hitler's deference to Hindenburg on Volk Memorial Day and on the Day of Potsdam, he was conscious of the need to respect Germany's past and to place the Nazi Party and his own regime within this lineage. Therefore, following the renaming frenzy in March 1933, Hitler released an official

¹⁴⁴ BArch R 43-II/979. For example, Plauen's wish to rename its city park and the former "Breite Strasse" after Hitler was granted in March 1933. Around the same time, Löbau similarly succeeded in renaming streets and squares after Hitler, Göring, and Seldte.

¹⁴⁵ BArch R 43-II/976.

¹⁴⁶ BArch R 43-II/979. For more examples of renamings of squares, streets, bridges, schools, fountains, settlements, towers, bells, and trees in later years, see: BArch R 43-II/981, BArch R 43-II/982.

statement that outlined guidelines on renamings and memorialization. He thanked everyone for honoring him in such a manner but requested that in the future officials refrain from altering historic names. “We cannot repeat the mistakes of the 1918 putschists,” Hitler declared. Although he considered it a matter of “duty to remove the names of November criminals from our public streets and squares” and to return them to their historic names, in the future, only newly built sites were to be named after important Nazis.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, authorities took efforts to rectify the purported neglect of nationalist memorials during the Weimar Republic and cultivated a mythical memory culture, expediently drawing upon anything of use from Germany’s past. Imperial Germany loomed large, as did the “spirit of 1914” and heroes from World War I, followed by SA men who had died for the “movement.” Monuments of former German emperors were refurbished and placed in prominent places.¹⁴⁸ The cityscape played a vital role in this regard. Nazis had, in effect, erased all visible traces of the hated “November regime” from the built environment and filled the gaps with Nazi-oriented memory politics that presented Hitler and the Nazi Party as successors to the likes of Frederick the Great and Bismarck.¹⁴⁹ Many streets, squares, and buildings were named after SA men and Hitler Youth who had been killed by Communists. Horst Wessel stood at the center of this NSDAP memorial culture. In October 1933, the hospital room in which Horst Wessel died

¹⁴⁷ BArch R 43-II/976, newspaper article, “Hitler zu den Umbenennungen von Straßen,” *Steglitzer Anzeiger*, April 27, 1933.

¹⁴⁸ For two examples, see “Die Denkmäler Neuköllns,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 31, 1933; “Neues aus Berlin,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 21, 1933. Workers even reaffixed emperor-style crowns to the Reich eagles in the wrought-iron design of the Weidendammer bridge in central Berlin. See “Wieder Kaiserkrone auf dem Reichsadler,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 17, 1933.

¹⁴⁹ For example, in a ceremony on the Bismarck tower in Berlin-Köpenick, the German Student Union, the same group which raided Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Science and organized the book burnings, said their celebration was a commitment to the German Reich, founded by Bismarck and resurrected by the “national movement.” See “Bismarck-Feier der Berliner Studentenschaft und der nationalen Verbände auf den Müggelbergen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, April 3, 1933.

was turned over to the public as a pilgrimage site. The hospital itself had been renamed “Horst-Wessel-Hospital,” and the city district of Friedrichshain was renamed “Horst-Wessel-City.”¹⁵⁰

Despite the palpable enthusiasm, not everyone was pleased with the inundation of nationalist symbols into the public sphere, and some refused to participate. For many Germans, these were unsettling times, and they had to navigate changing societal norms and expectations. When Ingrid Benada’s mother sent her to a bakery one morning near their home in Erfurt to buy rolls, she entered the bakery and said, “*Guten Tag!*” The woman angrily retorted, “Heil Hitler, you mean.” Holding back tears, Benada quickly bought her four rolls, mumbled “*Auf Wiedersehen*” and ran back home. She asked her mother, “Why do we both – you and I – say ‘*Guten Tag*’ and ‘*Auf Wiedersehen*’ and not ‘Heil Hitler’ like the others?” Her mother replied that those greetings simply “sound better, don’t you think?” A day later, SA men marched through their street, and all their neighbors hung out swastika flags. Only Benada’s family did not. Such small instances of defiance did not go unnoticed. While they were eating breakfast, two men in brown uniforms knocked at their door and demanded that they hang up a flag. Benada’s mother refused. They returned and threatened her. After they left, the landlady implored her mother, “In God’s name, hang up a flag! Think of your daughter! What will happen to her!” Her mother immediately left the house to go and buy some paper flags to hang out their window. “The SA did not come again,” Benada remembered.¹⁵¹ While many Germans enthusiastically embraced the Nazis, SA men pressured detractors to conform, and Goebbels’ appeals for visible support transformed into demands of conformity.

¹⁵⁰ “Gedenkfeier für Horst Wessel,” *Der Angriff*, October 7, 1933.

¹⁵¹ TEA, Ingrid Benada, “Ich war sechs,” in *Fünzig nach Null: Erinnerung und Gedanken zum 50. Jahrestag von Kriegsende und Befreiung* (Berlin: Bürgerverein Berolina e.V., 1995), 15-16.

Authorities closely observed these theatrics to gauge public opinion. For example, on the Day of National Labor in May 1934, the Gestapo commissioned reports on the degree of decoration in Berlin's city districts. Undercover police officers roamed the neighborhoods and reported their observations. The officers assigned to the district of Horst-Wessel-City reported on dissent expressed via conspicuous clothing: Communist-style caps or bright red scarves, ties, and sweaters. Furthermore, only a small crowd gathered on the streets to hear Hitler's speech via the loudspeakers and even they exhibited scant enthusiasm at its conclusion. The observers concluded that the "festiveness in Horst Wesselstadt can be described as mediocre."¹⁵² Officers wrote similar reports for Berlin's other city districts. Dissent was limited to such symbolic protest: distribution of flyers, graffiti on streets, windows, and house fronts, and shouts of the Communist slogan, "Red Front."¹⁵³ Most of the culprits of these actions could not be apprehended.

Belonging to the Volksgemeinschaft required discernible support in the public sphere, and there were consequences for breaching these norms. Perpetrating symbolic acts of resistance, such as disrespecting or tearing down swastika flags, common during Weimar street battles, was now indictable. For example, when Erich Schulz ripped down a swastika flag from a Nazi pub in Berlin-Pankow in 1933, he was arrested and sentenced to seven months in prison. His sentence is indicative of how serious the courts regarded offenses: Schulz received four months for tearing down the flag and only three months for threatening to kill the barkeeper.¹⁵⁴ With the passage of the Treachery Act in 1934, disrespecting NSDAP symbols, including the flag, was a criminal offense.

¹⁵² BArch R 58/3452, Bl. 118.

¹⁵³ BArch R 58/3452. Other creative methods of defiance included affixing messages to balloons and floating wooden cutouts of stars, painted red, down the Spree River.

¹⁵⁴ "Die abgerissene Hakenkreuz-Fahne," in *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 28, 1933.

During court proceedings, investigators often asked defendants and their friends and neighbors about the defendant's flagging habits, which sometimes served as a mitigating factor in determining one's punishment. For example, after a man tore down a swastika flag hanging out an apartment window in Hamburg in 1937, he blamed it on his drunken stupor. He admitted to tearing down the flag but said he had no idea why he did it, because he had been raised well by his parents "according to German customs" and had never sympathized with Communists. In subsequent Gestapo interrogations and in his court trial, authorities scrutinized the defendant's public flagging habits and questioned him about how long he had owned a swastika flag. The investigation concluded that he had "until now always flagged with a swastika flag, which he hung down from the balcony without a flagpole." His past flagging habits mitigated his punishment, but he still received a fine of 80 RM for treating the swastika flag "like a worthless piece of paper."¹⁵⁵

In addition to properly flying flags, Germans were supposed to salute passing swastika flags, an action which affirmed one's loyalty to the regime.¹⁵⁶ In February 1934, the Reich Interior Ministry tried to "clear up doubts" regarding one's obligation to salute the flag in public. It declared it mandatory for SA members to salute army flags, the swastika flag, and flags of all NSDAP organizations when they were carried in a march. Furthermore, the guidelines stated: "It corresponds to the essence of a true Volksgemeinschaft in the National Socialist state and the joyful commitment to it, that the remainder of the population also adapt its behavior to these instructions." Henceforth, each "German *Volksgenosse*" was to consider it a "natural duty of honor" to salute the swastika and black-white-red flags at rallies and when they are carried in

¹⁵⁵ STAH 213-11_06591/38.

¹⁵⁶ Tilman Allert, *The Hitler Salute: On the Meaning of a Gesture*, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008).

marches.¹⁵⁷ Refusing to salute in such situations often had consequences. When a student failed to salute a passing swastika flag in an SA march in Charlottenburg in March 1934, an SA man punched him in the face.¹⁵⁸

The policing of the public sphere by SA men and the Gestapo ensured that most Germans complied with Nazi demands to visibly conform. Despite some acts of symbolic resistance, there was no overt resistance, in part because the Nazi coordination of the public sphere had been so complete and prevented oppositional groups from mobilizing. In the end, Germans' enthusiastic or reluctant participation in flagging, saluting, and decorating helped transform the public sphere into a space for performing the Volksgemeinschaft. Not everyone was entitled to participate, however, and in the end, such actions helped to define the boundaries of who and what could belong to the national community.

Excluding German Jews from Nation-Making in the Public Sphere

Many German Jews joined the nationalistic fervor in 1933, either out of conviction or as a measure of protection, by hanging the Reich flag or swastika flag on their homes and businesses. For example, Willy Cohn displayed a black-white-red banner on his home in Breslau in May 1933 ("so they don't demolish it") and wore his Iron Cross, commenting that "perhaps it is a good thing as a Jew to make a show of this right now."¹⁵⁹ Some National Socialists and other Germans took offense at these actions, and legislation and individual actions perpetrated against Jews in the next

¹⁵⁷ BArch R 1501/5315, Pressenotiz, February 11, 1934, "Zur Beseitigung von Zweifeln, die in der Öffentlichkeit über den Fahnengruß bestehen..."

¹⁵⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21638, Bl. 56.

¹⁵⁹ Willy Cohn, and Norbert Conrads, *No Justice in Germany: The Breslau Diaries, 1933-1941*, trans. Kronenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 8.

few years would bar Jews from such participation. Indeed, these moments of nation-making in the public sphere even became dangerous for German Jews.

Nazis interpreted the visible unity engendered by mass flagging as an inherently anti-Jewish act itself, something in which Jews could not participate. They blamed Jews for the national disunity of Weimar and said Jews opposed German nationalism, as illustrated by an antisemitic cartoon which depicted two caricatured Jews standing on a balcony, looking at flags fluttering from windows, with the caption: “Division is our existence. Unity is our downfall.”¹⁶⁰ In January 1935, the chief of police in Berlin wrote that official regulation was needed regarding Jews and swastika flags, because Jews incited popular anger when they flew the swastika flag on holidays or “for purely commercial reasons.” Throngs of people assembled in front of such places and did not leave until the flag was removed, willingly or by force.¹⁶¹ One such event occurred in Recklinghausen during the “shooting festival” (*Schützenfest*) in June 1935 when a department store owned by a Jewish proprietor hung two large swastika flags down its facade. The local branch of the NSDAP demanded that the proprietor remove the flags, but he resisted until the police stepped in.¹⁶²

A clause in the September 1935 Nuremberg Laws sought to decisively regulate this issue. It declared the swastika flag the sole flag of the German Reich and commanded all federal and state buildings to only fly the swastika flag in the future. German civilians were expected to follow suit.¹⁶³ The law officially banned Jews from displaying either the Reich flag or the swastika flag.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ “Die Tarnung,” *Der Stürmer* 13, no. 46 (1935).

¹⁶¹ Report for November and December 1934, quoted in Otto Dov Kulka, and Eberhard Jäckel, ed. *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports on Popular Opinion in Germany, 1933-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 73.

¹⁶² BArch R 58/6401, Bl. 4, An 1, Betr.: Hissen der Reichsflagge durch Juden, June 26, 1935.

¹⁶³ BArch R 1501/5315, Pressenotiz.

¹⁶⁴ Paragraph 4 of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor forbade Jews from displaying the national flag (swastika flag) and colors (black, white, and red); “Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre. Vom 15. September 1935,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1935, I, 1147.

This thorny issue persisted, however, because some non-Jewish Germans with Jewish relatives in their households continued to fly the national flags, angering their nationalist-minded neighbors. One man, a so-called “*Mischling*” of the first degree (defined as a person with one Jewish parent) was brought to court because he flew the swastika flag although his Jewish mother lived with him. He explained to the Gestapo that it was important to him as a “*Mischling* of the Aryan side” who was a member of the DAF and the National Socialist People’s Welfare (the Nazi social welfare organization) and who had a German wife and a “purely Aryan son” to be able to display the swastika flag.¹⁶⁵ Court proceedings also began against another man in 1939 who displayed the swastika flag although his Jewish mother-in-law lived with him and his wife. On February 27, 1939 he wrote to the police to inform them that his mother-in-law had committed suicide and asked if “the matter was therefore settled and if [he] could again display the flag.”¹⁶⁶ Shortly thereafter the Gestapo wrote to the attorney general of the district court, informing him that the mother-in-law of the accused had taken her life by jumping out a window and that the matter was therefore settled. The man was “again authorized to hoist the swastika flag.”¹⁶⁷

Beginning in 1937, Jews were also banned from greeting with the Hitler salute. Therefore, getting caught up in a Nazi parade constituted an acute dilemma for German Jews. When Nazis marched by with swastika flags, all bystanders were expected to stop and salute the flag, and if one failed to salute the flag, “people around you got very huffy,” H. Henry Sinason recalls. If they revealed they were Jewish in that moment, however, the situation could prove even more perilous. When they saw such a parade approaching, many Jews “would duck into a doorway or [...] something and try not to be there and watch the parade, because it was a very difficult thing to do”

¹⁶⁵ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 114513.

¹⁶⁶ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 2798, Bl. 10.

¹⁶⁷ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 2798, Bl. 11.

Sinason said.¹⁶⁸ In April 1937, evidently tired of the unending decorating and flagging, a German-Jewish woman saw workers hanging greens and flags for the upcoming National Day of Labor in Berlin and remarked, “Every year this nonsense, these red rags.” An SS man standing nearby heard her comments and reported her to the police. The woman was apparently unintimidated. The police report noted that she remained “extremely cheeky” after her arrest and repeated her remarks several more times.¹⁶⁹

Sometimes such markers of differences were less dangerous but still had insidious effect. When Gerda Bandman was a young girl, she attended her best friend’s birthday party, which led to an incident she described as “the beginning and the end of it.” Toward the end of the party, as it was getting dark, the birthday girl’s mother said she had a surprise for everyone. She brought out a box of paper lanterns with different designs and distributed one to each girl. The birthday girl and another friend received lanterns with swastikas on them, while another couple girls, who Bandman believes were Catholic, received black-white-red lanterns. Bandman and her cousins, who were all Jews, were handed multicolored lanterns. “So she straightaway made a vast difference in us, between us, right?” Bandman reflected decades later. When she went home and told her parents what happened, they tried to console her. After that incident, however, she said, “I didn’t speak to them. They didn’t speak to me anymore. So that’s how I noticed my first experience of antisemitism.”¹⁷⁰

Jewish exclusion became more severe as Speer’s monumental plans for Berlin progressed. Speer’s intention to level buildings made the housing crisis even more acute, and he would need

¹⁶⁸ H. Henry Sinason, Interview 15686, Segment 34-35, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996. From 1937 onward, Jews were forbidden to give the Hitler salute. Rose Ruschin also recounts this dilemma of German Jews when caught up in Nazi marches. See Rose Ruschin, Interview 54288, Segment 17, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, Sarah and Chaim Neuberger Holocaust Education Centre, 1987.

¹⁶⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21622, Bl. 397-398.

¹⁷⁰ Gerda Bandman, Interview 29564, Segment 16-19, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

to provide alternative housing for the displaced residents. Eventually, Speer suggested that Jews be evicted from their apartments so that he could resettle non-Jewish Germans into the vacated apartments. The Propaganda Ministry was particularly interested in clearing the East-West-Axis of its Jewish residents, estimating that 1,800 windows along the boulevard were “occupied by Jews.” District Propaganda Leader Wächter emphasized that it was “absolutely necessary to house Aryan renters in Jewish property along the East-West-Axis” and that they should also make plans to clear the area near the future North-South-Axis of Jews as well.¹⁷¹ Much like apartments behind Horst-Wessel-Platz had been cleared of Jews three years before, the East-West-Axis too was deemed an honored site which should not be denigrated by the presence of Jews.

Under the Nazi regime, there certainly were small breaches of the visibly-orchestrated public sphere. The Gestapo continuously reported on anti-Nazi graffiti, the appearance of red clothing and red poppies, and the ripping down of flags. Such actions were certainly not void of meaning, but Germans’ actions were increasingly shaped, and constrained, by the new norms of the public sphere. Pressure to conform was exerted upon them from multiple directions—from legislation, police and the courts, and their neighbors. It was by fulfilling and grappling with new Nazi norms that Germans helped actively shape urban spaces to reflect Nazi ideologies. The repeated visible orchestration of the Volksgemeinschaft required the participation of all sectors of German society, but this participation was increasingly predicated on the visible exclusion of German Jews. This exclusion was at first sporadic and uneven, driven by individual actions against Jews. It was not at all clear to many Jews in 1933, especially those who were German nationalists and had fought for the German army in World War I, that they would be banned from expressing their national identity with the wider public during national ceremonies. Later, the exclusion of

¹⁷¹ BArch R 4606/158, Note from Dr. Fränk, May 23, 1939.

Jews from public, semipublic, and finally private spaces would become more thoroughgoing and systematic, a topic we return to in Chapters 4 and 5.

Conclusion

In its consolidation of power, the Nazi regime utilized cityscapes—monuments, buildings, streets, facades, windows, and balconies—to manifest its authority. Nazi officials were conscious of the symbolic capital of Germany's nationalist past and monumental spaces and how they could be mobilized to legitimate the new regime and win the hearts of German citizens. Many Germans enthusiastically took part in visibly professing their loyalty to the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, coercion was a salient component of Nazi efforts to coordinate the public sphere. Because nonconformity in this realm often was indictable, even those who initially resisted the NSDAP's rapid coordination and orchestration of the public sphere soon succumbed to the pressure to conform. On occasion after occasion—festivals, parades, days of mourning—authorities demanded that Germans outwardly project their devotion. Demands to decorate, the actual presence of widespread flags and greenery, and the subsequent, and at times hyperbolic, reporting on levels of decoration constituted a mutually reinforcing cycle that appeared to obliterate dissent and that generated the NSDAP's very basis of and claims to legitimacy.

Because the orchestration of consent was, at times, a coercive endeavor, it is virtually impossible to ascertain the actual level of popular support for the NSDAP by merely examining the public sphere. Nevertheless, even if visible support did not always constitute actual support for the regime, this does not mean there were no consequences. Because in displaying swastika flags and marching in rallies, ordinary Germans contributed, willingly or unwillingly, to the image of a German Volk united behind the Nazi regime. This image obscured dissent and advanced the

rigidification of the Volksgemeinschaft because German Jews were gradually banned from such public displays of belonging and demarcated as outsiders.

Chapter 3

Negotiation: “Germanizing” Everyday Architecture

For in no other way can man’s love for his native soil and for his fatherland be awakened than that he feels inwardly raised and connected with this soil. And the only way he can feel fused with the soil of the *Heimat* is if a small patch of this soil belongs to him, upon which he can build his house and plant his garden.¹

This quotation described the Nazi-propagated ideal housing scheme. Each German family should own a home in the countryside with easy access to sun and fresh air. This “new home” was to be the antithesis of crowded apartment blocks, which possessed no sense of *Heimat* due to ever-changing tenets and “constant noise, unrest, conflict, and strife.” National Socialists accused “Marxist Judaism” of promoting such living conditions and claimed that this type of dwelling “always renders one homeless, fatherland-less, sexually permissive, and international in the most unpleasant sense.” A single-family home with a garden, on the other hand, would fill one with a sense of pride, purpose, and accomplishment. One would deeply love such a home and if necessary, “defend it to the last breath against all powers of destruction.”²

Third Reich architects viewed the built environment as the mirror image of society, and they were dismayed at the landscapes and cityscapes they saw in 1933. Conservative architects believed that the Middle Ages had created Germany’s most ideal and most “German” architecture, a form and style which had instinctively harmonized with nature. The Industrial Era abruptly extinguished this tradition, as industrialists and capitalists quickly built factories to promote rapid production and hastily erected *Mietskasernen* (tenement housing) to accommodate their workers. They eschewed all regard for nature, beauty, and most egregiously, any concern for the tenants. Architecture and building practices further deteriorated in the Weimar Republic, for which Nazis

¹ BArch R 3901/21007, “Haus und Heim: Die große Ausstellung der Münchener Hausfrauen-Organisation,” special supplement to the *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 1, 1933.

² Ibid. The *Völkischer Beobachter* article was written about the “new home” in the context of a housing exhibition put on by Munich’s Housewife Organization.

blamed liberalism, Bolshevism, internationalism, and greedy Jewish entrepreneurs. Conservative architects believed that cityscapes at the end of the Weimar era reflected nothing but utter chaos.³ To Nazi ideologues, the image of a fragmented built environment paralleled their visions of a diseased society lacking unity.⁴ Nazis promised to coordinate and restore order to all aspects of society, including architecture and the built environment.⁵

To combat the foreign influences that had corrupted Germany's landscapes, conservative architects vowed to anchor German architecture firmly back in German soil. For them, the Nazi revolution had "finally cleared the path for the true architecture that was rooted to the soil [*bodenständig*] and emanated from the German being, which until now, had been overgrown and suffocated by the outgrowths of oriental aberrations."⁶ In cultivating a *bodenständig* architectural style, architects sought to reestablish the bond between Germans and nature. They pledged to overcome the individualistic impulses of the liberal Weimar era and to develop an architecture that would unify Germans again in a community-centered whole. Every new structure should promote this aim. Just as individuals were to "willingly integrate themselves into the organism of the community," so too were buildings to be arranged so that they "fit into the cityscape as members serving the collective thought without at all compromising or destroying its beauty."⁷ National Socialism claimed it would restore "the German Volk to its true essence" and make it "aware of

³ For five such accounts, see BARch R 4002/98, Bl. 143-144, "Zur Gestaltung des vielgeschossigen Wohnhauses"; BARch R 2/9204, Bl. 5, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister an die Regierungen der Länder und den Herrn Reichskommissar für das Saarland, December 17, 1936; Hans Rottmayer, "Der neue Weg der Baukunst," *Baugilde* 15, no. 8 (1933): 367-373; Paul Schmitthenner, *Die Baukunst im neuen Reich* (Munich: Georg D. W. Callwey Verlag, 1934), 3-16; Paul Schultze-Naumburg, *Die Kunst der Deutschen: Ihr Wesen und ihre Werke* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1934), 110.

⁴ Herbert Hoffmann, *Neue Villen und Kleinhäuser* (Stuttgart: Julius Hoffmann Verlag, 1939), 10.

⁵ "Siedlung am Dreipfehl in Berlin," *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 69, no. 28 (July 10, 1935): 551-52.

⁶ Quoted in Peter Hahn, and Christian Wolsdorff, ed. *Bauhaus Berlin: Auflösung Dessau 1932, Schließung Berlin 1933, Bauhäusler und Drittes Reich, Eine Dokumentation* (Berlin: Kunstverlag Weingarten, 1985), 125. Originally printed as Guido Görres, "Deutsche Architektur? Eine Stimme aus den Kreisen junger Architekten," *Der Angriff*, April 5, 1933.

⁷ Rudolf Stein, "Stadtbildpflege: Eine Voraussetzung für Heimatgefühl in der Grossstadt," *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 23, no. 3 (March 1939): 95-96.

historical tradition and of rootedness in blood and soil.”⁸ Accordingly, between 1933 and 1945, architects attempted to “Germanize” the built environment by firmly rooting everyday architecture back in the German nation and by reestablishing the link between architecture and the German terrain on which it stood.

As architects attempted to redress perceived errors of the past, however, they never delineated a specific architectural style. Even Albert Speer stated that there was “no such thing as a style of the Third Reich” and that Hitler “realized full well that an autobahn restaurant or a Hitler Youth home in the country should not look like an urban building. Nor would it ever have occurred to him to build a factory in his public-display style; in fact, he could become enthusiastic over an industrial building in glass and steel.”⁹ Indeed, studies of National Socialist architecture have shown that no monolithic Nazi architectural style existed between 1933 and 1945.¹⁰ Nonetheless, scholars too often caricature Nazi architecture into three simple divisions: state and party buildings in neoclassicism, factories in modern styles, and houses in traditional wooden styles.¹¹ But these straightforward divides are much too neat. Modern concepts, styles, and building materials appeared even in “everyday architecture” of stores, houses, and apartments during the Third Reich. Therefore, instead of delineating what constituted “the style” of Nazi everyday architecture, I explore here the motivations for the diverse architectural practices in the Third Reich. I challenge

⁸ Max Jung, “‘Kultur im Heim’: Ausstellung der N.S.-Kulturgemeinde,” *Baugilde* 17, no. 7 (April 10, 1935): 235.

⁹ Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 142.

¹⁰ Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Lisa Pine, *Hitler's 'National Community': Society and Culture in Nazi Germany* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007), 211; Petsch, “Vielfalt oder Uniformität?,” 134.

¹¹ Petsch, “Vielfalt oder Uniformität?,” 135-38; Peter Adam, *Art of the Third Reich* (New York: H.N. Abrams, 1992); Gerhard Fehl, “Die Moderne unterm Hakenkreuz: Ein Versuch, die Rolle funktionalistischer Architektur im Dritten Reich zu klären,” in *Faschistische Architekturen: Planen und Bauen in Europa, 1930 bis 1945*, ed. Frank Hartmut (Hamburg: Christians, 1985), 103.

the rigidity of the vernacular ideal-type and explore how contemporaries explained continuities in architectural policies from Weimar to Nazi Germany.¹²

Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 examined how officials sought to “cleanse” and coordinate entire cityscapes, this chapter explicitly examines architecture and the ways in which it too was brought into line under the new regime. Much like the urban spaces explored in the first two chapters, architecture itself is malleable and, as a result, can be imbued with specific meanings and ideologies. Although there was no monolithic Nazi architectural ideology, ideas still played a central role in Nazi building practices. Namely, conservative architects believed the built environment in 1933 was the visible manifestation of a fragmented society corrupted by Weimar individualism. Just as society needed to be united in the *Volksgemeinschaft*, so too must architects and city planners coordinate the built environment into a unified whole. Sometimes this coordination entailed the physical alteration of buildings. More often, however, architects *rhetorically* coordinated architectural elements to align with Nazi ideology. Third Reich architects may have harangued Weimar modernism, but they were not anti-modernist. Instead, they opposed modernism because of its associations with Weimar. Therefore, they could retain features of modern styles—functionality, internationalism, and the use of glass, steel, cement, iron and flat roofs—by rhetorically coordinating or “Germanizing” them. This ideological coordination disassociated buildings from Weimar modernism and renegotiated, or reexplained, their meanings to fit Nazi ideology.

¹² Anke Blümm recognizes that exceptions always challenged the vernacular rule but still maintains that modern architectural styles were slowly abandoned. See Anke Blümm, *“Entartete Baukunst”?: zum Umgang mit dem Neuen Bauen 1933-1945* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2013). Matthias Donath acknowledges that traditional and modern elements could be found in all building areas, but his study focuses primarily on monumental and functional buildings in Berlin. See Donath, *Architektur in Berlin*, 21.

“Die Steinwüste” and Foreign Spirits: Architectural Developments and Debates in Modern Germany

The Prussian Civil Code from 1794 guaranteed a general building freedom for individuals, granting them autonomy in construction.¹³ Consequently, swift development during rapid industrialization and urbanization and ever greater intrusions into Germany’s natural landscapes ensued in the second half of the nineteenth century. This unregulated development spurred a mounting backlash, especially among the educated middle class, who decried the ill effects of modernization and encroachments on the countryside. As outlined in Chapter 1, the *Großstadt* (large city) became an object of particular scorn, ridiculed as the “incinerator of a Volk which only spares the slags and scum.”¹⁴ Individuals harboring such sentiments longed to return to a mythologized past via architectural forms of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which supposedly harmonized best with the natural landscape. Other detractors praised medieval architecture as the paragon of German architecture.¹⁵

Such yearnings were not German-specific but were shared by numerous commentators in industrializing countries. In England, William Morris and John Ruskin promoted artisanry in the “Arts and Crafts Movement” as the antidote to the perceived corrosive effects of industrialization and commodification. The movement inspired numerous architects, including Ebenezer Howard, who applied its values to the built environment. Howard’s “Garden City Movement” envisioned the development of smaller cities with a maximum of 35,000 residents in the countryside, surrounded by agricultural fields. Similar anxieties about American cities mobilized the “City

¹³ Birgitta Ringbeck, “Architektur und Städtebau unter dem Einfluß der Heimatschutzbewegung,” in *Antimodernismus und Reform: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Heimatbewegung*, ed. Edeltraud Klueting (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 220.

¹⁴ BArch R 4606/350, “3. Vorschlag.”

¹⁵ Werner Durth, and Roland May, “Schinkel's Order: Rationalist Tendencies in German Architecture,” *Architectural Design* 77, no. 5 (2007): 45; Andreas Knaut, “Ernst Rudorff und die Anfänge der deutschen Heimatbewegung,” in *Antimodernismus und Reform: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Heimatbewegung*, ed. Edeltraud Klueting (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 27.

Beautiful” movement in the United States and inspired Frank Lloyd Wright’s “Broadacre City” plan to relocate individuals from crowded city centers to privately-owned homes, each on its own one-acre plot of land in the countryside.¹⁶

In Germany, however, the movement acquired a nationalist bent whose protagonists believed that German identity itself was at stake.¹⁷ A leading figure in the nascent German *Heimatschutz* (homeland protection) movement was Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, who alleged that peasant culture formed the heart and soul of German society and that rapid economic modernization threatened to obliterate it.¹⁸ In this narrative, industrialization had severed Germans’ natural bond to the soil when peasants fled villages en masse for factory jobs in cities. Riehl inspired a whole generation of activists, most notably Ernst Rudorff, who first penned the word “Heimatschutz” in 1897 to advocate for the preservation of Germany’s natural landscapes. Rudorff and his followers aspired to transform the values of the Heimatschutz movement into a tangible program for reform.¹⁹ Eventually, they succeeded in securing two so-called “Disfigurement Laws” in Prussia.²⁰ The first law, passed in 1902, regulated advertisements in rural areas while the second, passed in 1907, allowed authorities to prohibit constructions if they believed the alterations “disfigured” their surroundings.²¹ Steeped in the ideals of German Romanticism, Heimatschutz adherents promoted a vaguely defined “ideal ethos” (*ideale Gesinnung*) in opposition to the “materialistic ethos” of the modern era.²²

¹⁶ For more information on these architects and theories, see Robert Fishman, “Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier,” in *Readings in Planning Theory*, ed. Susan S. Fainstein, and James DeFilippis (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2016).

¹⁷ Knaut, “Ernst Rudorff,” 20.

¹⁸ Ringbeck, “Architektur und Städtebau,” 218.

¹⁹ Knaut, “Ernst Rudorff,” 24-25.

²⁰ I translated “Verunstaltungsgesetze” as “Disfigurement Laws.” The German name of the 1902 law and its 1907 extension was: “Gesetz gegen die Verunstaltung landschaftlich hervorragender Gegenden.”

²¹ Ringbeck, “Architektur und Städtebau,” 220.

²² Knaut, “Ernst Rudorff,” 26, 28.

An official Heimatschutz Association was established in 1904 with several aims: to preserve monuments and vernacular architectural styles, to safeguard scenic landscapes and native vegetation, and to promote regional art and customs.²³ Architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg was its first president, and under his purview in the subsequent decades, the association focused primarily on historic and architectural preservation.²⁴ Its members emphasized the need to build architecture that was tied to the landscape (*landschaftsgebunden*) and integrated into the surrounding environments (built and natural).²⁵ This resolve to mold the built environment into a unified whole served as a leitmotif for conservative architects throughout the next several decades and ultimately, into the Nazi era. As proponents of Heimatschutz multiplied across Germany, they exalted the cultivation of one's ties to German landscapes and nature and framed the strengthening of such ties as a "national duty."²⁶

Despite their disdain for the ills of the modern moment, most proponents of Heimatschutz did not naively promote a return to a mythologized past. On the contrary, many of them, including Paul Schultze-Naumburg, emphasized the need to harness technology for their own aims and to devise modern solutions to solve contemporary problems. The Deutscher Werkbund, established in 1907, more straightforwardly sought to marry craftsmanship and technology. Its team of architects, engineers, and artists wanted to revolutionize and rationalize design.²⁷ Initially, Heimatschutz members saw the Werkbund as a potential ally in their efforts to develop a functional architectural style. The two groups diverged when the former doubled down on its traditionalism and the latter championed industrial design and international collaboration and competition.²⁸

²³ Ibid., 42.

²⁴ Ibid., 48.

²⁵ Ibid., 35.

²⁶ Ibid., 26.

²⁷ Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects*, 25.

²⁸ Marie-Luise Buchinger, "Die Heimatschutzbewegung und ihre Architektur," in *Zeitenspiegelung: Zur Bedeutung von Traditionen in Kunst und Kunstwissenschaft*, ed. Peter K. Klein, and Regine Prange (Berlin: Reimer, 1998), 247.

The chasm between Heimatschutz and Werkbund proponents—increasingly seen as a divide between “traditionalists” and “modernists”—soon deepened because of World War I. The carnage of modern warfare and the destruction wreaked on European landscapes galvanized the Heimatschutz movement in its mission to preserve German landscapes and traditions. The “Stuttgart School,” whose proteges included Paul Schmitthenner and Paul Bonatz, was most vocal in advocating the traditional Heimatschutz-style architecture.²⁹ Regional disparities aside, this style was characterized by its emphasis on craftsmanship, its use of wood as primary building material, and its promotion of the gabled roof. In contrast, modernist architects such as Bruno Taut, Walter Gropius, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Erich Mendelsohn helped cultivate the “International Style.” Explicitly anti-local, anti-ornamentation, and anti-historicist, this style embodied its maxim that “form follows function.” This design philosophy received new adherents in 1919 when Gropius founded the State Bauhaus school in Weimar, where students could study all aspects the new modern style.³⁰

Although the two schools clashed on many practical, theoretical, and political points, the most bitter conflict centered on roof design. The so-called “roof war” (*Dächerkrieg*) best exemplified the divide. Conservatives endorsed pitched roofs as the true “German” form while modernists promoted economical flat roofs. The debate materialized itself on a narrow street in Berlin’s Zehlendorf district in the late 1920s. Bruno Taut, Hugo Häring, and Otto Salvisberg had designed and built a flat-roofed housing settlement, named Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Thereafter, Heinrich Tessenow designed a housing complex with pitched roofs directly across the street. Though the architects themselves had engaged in a serious and rather comradely competition to

²⁹ The Stuttgart School centered around the architecture department of Stuttgart’s Technical University.

³⁰ For an excellent and concise description of architecture in Weimar Germany, see Weitz, *Weimar Germany*, 169-206. For a more in-depth discussion of the Bauhaus, see Frank Whitford, *Bauhaus* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1984).

craft the best roof, the press ignited the debate. Reports pitted conservatives against modernists in existential pursuit of the correct form and posed questions about the health of German culture and society.³¹ Architectural debates were becoming evermore laden with political and ideological meaning.

A chief proponent of such ideological charges, Paul Schultze-Naumburg began vociferously promoting racial theories of architecture, arguing that modern architects exhibited “racial” or “moral” defects.³² His writings, along with those of other antimodernists, are replete with commentary on the *Geister*, *Gefühle*, and *Sinne* (spirits, feelings, and meanings) that architecture was meant to embody. Buildings and places were regarded as the physical manifestations of specific people and ideas. Conservative architects continually denounced *fremd*, *heimatfremd*, *landfremd* or *unvölkisch* (various words for “foreign” and “un-folk like”) architecture and buildings for which a thorough *Reinigung* (purification) was required. They believed chaotic cityscapes and modern architecture stemmed from foreign people and ideas which had infiltrated Germany during the late imperial era and the Weimar Republic.

These architects equated their aversion to modernist architecture with the degeneracy of the Weimar Republic itself. For example, German architect Gerdy Troost (and wife of architect Paul Ludwig Troost) claimed that the derailment of German architecture during the Weimar era was simply a reflection of society: “Racially apathetic, un-*völkisch*, antisocial, lacking any deeper connection to the community, under the spell of money and machine, bossed around by Jews, and driven ever deeper into disaster—that was Germany of liberalism and Marxism. Its architecture

³¹ Christian Welzbacher, *Die Staatsarchitektur der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2006), 108. For contemporary reports, see: “Dächer als Rebellen,” *Berliner Tageblatt*, September 9, 1928; “Die hinkende Straße,” *Welt-Spiegel*, September 9, 1928. For Tessenow’s position on the matter, see “Der Zehlendorfer Dächerkrieg,” *Deutsche Bauhütte* 32 (1928): 213.

³² Paul Schultze-Naumburg, *Kunst und Rasse* (Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1935), 136.

could be no different!”³³ Here again we see the conflation of Jews with capitalists, liberals, and Marxists but now in the realm of architecture. Some chastised modernism as “architectural bolshevism” (*Baubolschewismus*) and vowed to eradicate perceived Jewish influences from architecture and the built environment.³⁴

The antisemitism in some critiques was even more explicit, for many conservatives associated Jews with modern architecture in general and the Bauhaus school in particular. A 1932 diatribe against the Bauhaus in the *Völkischer Beobachter* declared that it was “completely inconsequential whether Gropius is a Jew or not” because the “Volk perceives the new building style as so foreign that it speaks of a Palestine-style. And that is completely justified. For these smooth, flat human garages and housing constructions in our German landscape constitute an outright mockery of all natural bonds with the soil.”³⁵ Accordingly, Jews were blamed for the popularity of the flat roof. Another critic claimed Jews possessed no creative capabilities and were merely capable of imitation or destruction. Their works were denigrated as “foreign” (*fremdländisch*), “alien” (*fremdrassisch*), and “oriental.”³⁶ In particular, Erich Mendelsohn’s buildings were condemned for giving Berlin “an entirely foreign face” and his Wertheim department store—topped with a roof that “looks like the insatiable mouth of a Moloch”—as the embodiment of the worst impulses of “the Jewish business life in the system era.”³⁷ Friedrich Imholz claimed that “the Jewish spirit” continued to “haunt” German architecture in the 1930s and

³³ Gerdy Troost, *Das Bauen im neuen Reich* (Bayreuth: Gauverlag Bayerische Ostmark GmbH, 1938), 9.

³⁴ See, e.g., “Der Weg der Deutschen Baukunst. Nach einem Vortrag von Professor Dr.-Ing. E. h. Schmitthenner,” in *Die Bauzeitung* 46, no. 17, (June 15, 1936): 225.

³⁵ Quoted in: Hahn, *Bauhaus Berlin*, 52. Originally printed in Rudolf Paulsen, “Kulturbolschewistische Attacken,” *Völkischer Beobachter*, March 30, 1932.

³⁶ “Berliner Architektur unter jüdischem Einfluss,” in *Die Bauzeitung* 49, no. 36 (1939): 189. Georg Heinrich Friedrich Hitzig’s works, including Berlin’s Stock Exchange, the old Reichsbank, and the Technical University, were labeled “poor imitations and a mashup of classical architectural styles.” Similarly, Alfred Messel’s Pergamon Museum was deemed more “oriental than classical” and his Wertheim department store “foreign” (“*fremdländisch und fremdrassisch*”).

³⁷ “Berliner Architektur unter jüdischem Einfluss,” *Die Bauzeitung* 49, no. 36 (1939): 189-190.

that German architecture would only be restored to its former glory when this spirit had been “exterminat[ed] and destroy[ed] root and branch.”³⁸ Indeed, conservative architects set out to eradicate these “foreign spirits” after 1933 so that they could longer pervert and weaken the German Volk.

In sum, both the modernist and traditional styles had grappled seriously with the perceived ills of modern cities, and both had endeavored to rationalize and streamline construction and devise solutions for the modern world.³⁹ Nevertheless, they provided radically different answers to fundamental questions about who could practice architecture, with which materials, and in which styles. At the heart of the debate was the definition of modernity itself and Germany’s place within it. Weimar architecture, appraised as a barometer for the health of society, was deemed chaotic, foreign, and individualistic. It was symptomatic of a degenerate society. To remedy these problems, Third Reich architects aimed to Germanize the built environment by implementing a “German” style supposedly defined by being *bodenständig* or *bodengebunden*, by being rooted or bound to German soil. This style was to emanate organically from an *anständige, deutsche Baugesinnung*, or a proper, German building ethos. These concepts were the ideologically charged but imprecise terms that roused conservative architects’ efforts to reform everyday architecture in the early twentieth century. These terms remained ill-defined, however, and were never clearly implemented via legislation. In the end, Third Reich architects succeeded much less in physically altering everyday architecture than in rhetorically coordinating it.

³⁸ Friedrich Imholz, “Judentum und Baukunst,” *Der Stürmer* 16, no. 2 (1938).

³⁹ Durth, “Schinkel’s Order.”

Attempts to Coordinate Architecture via Legislation

During the Nazi assault on sites of cultural bolshevism in spring 1933, the Bauhaus also found itself in the political crossfire. Police officers raided its building in Berlin-Steglitz on April 11, ostensibly to search for Communist propaganda material.⁴⁰ They conducted a thorough search of the building and locked and sealed it thereafter. In the succeeding months, the artists fought to have the school reopened. Mies van der Rohe obtained a personal meeting with Alfred Rosenberg during which he emphasized that the Bauhaus “has nothing to do with politics.” Rosenberg replied, “You know the Bauhaus is supported by forces that are fighting our forces. It is one army against another, only in the spiritual field.”⁴¹ Nonetheless, the Gestapo eventually granted the school permission to reopen in July 1933, provided that it, among other things, fire Ludwig Hilberseimer and Wassili Kandinsky and have their lesson plans approved by the Prussian minister of culture. The faculty had decided the previous day, however, that it would officially close the school.⁴²

Although some modernists and Bauhaus students seamlessly advanced their careers after 1933, traditionalists continued to vilify anyone who enthusiastically promoted modernist designs.⁴³ The Nazi accession to power had electrified the Heimatschutz movement and its conservative architects, who wanted to implement sweeping changes. They resolved to overcome

⁴⁰ The officers were most likely sent at the behest of Dessau’s attorney general, who was investigating Dessau’s former mayor, Fritz Hesse. Hahn, *Bauhaus Berlin*, 127.

⁴¹ Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, “The End of the Bauhaus,” in *Student Publications of the School of Design* 3.3 (1953), 16-18. Seen in Bauhausarchiv, Mappe 86.

⁴² Hahn, *Bauhaus Berlin*, 142-43.

⁴³ Walter Gropius initially remained in Germany, only moving to England in fall 1934 for financial reasons but traveled between the two countries during the next two years. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe also remained in Germany and even secured some commissions, moving later to the United States due to lack of recognition. Other Bauhaus students had lucrative careers in Nazi Germany, many going into industrial design. For information on Bauhaus architects during the Third Reich, see Winfried Nerdinger, “Bauhaus Architecture in the Third Reich,” in *Bauhaus Culture: From Weimar to the Cold War*, ed. Kathleen James-Chakraborty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Peter Hahn, “Wege der Bauhäusler in Reich und Exil,” in *Bauhaus-Moderne im Nationalsozialismus: Zwischen Anbiederung und Verfolgung*, ed. Winfried Nerdinger (Munich: Prestal-Verlag, 1993).

rampant individualism and its chaotic building practices, to subjugate the “I” to the “we.”⁴⁴ They slandered Weimar building practices for adhering to the principle of “*I bau, wie i mog!*” (“I build as I like!”) and declared that “*Gemeinsinn vor Eigennutz*” (“community before self”) would be the slogan of the new era. Architects vowed to restore the unity missing during the Weimar era by harmonizing buildings with their surroundings and envisioned the built environment as an organic whole meant to unify Germans in the national community.⁴⁵ To enforce these values, Heimatschutz proponents and conservative architects campaigned for the passage of nationwide legislation regarding architectural style; however, their efforts were stymied by disagreements—among NSDAP elites, building authorities, and architects themselves—regarding the “proper” forms for everyday architecture.

In the early 1930s, three architectural associations competed for prominence: the Deutscher Werkbund, the Association of German Architects (BDA), and later, the Militant League of German Architecture and Engineers (KDAI).⁴⁶ The Werkbund and the BDA were purged and coordinated soon after Hitler’s appointment as chancellor.⁴⁷ Under Paul Schultze-Naumburg’s purview, the KDAI championed efforts to cleanse German architecture of foreign influences. All three organizations, the Werkbund, BDA, and KDAI, were eventually subsumed under the Reich Chamber of Culture.⁴⁸ Founded in September 1933 within Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry, the Reich Chamber of Culture was tasked with purging all branches of the arts to ensure that only

⁴⁴ “Kunst und Gemeinschaft – Zwei Aufsätze zu der gleichen Frage,” *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 18, no. 3 (March 1934): 118.

⁴⁵ “Die rechte Baugesinnung,” *Beilage zum Baumeister, Monatshefte für Baukultur und Baupraxis* 34, no. 3 (March 1936): 45.

⁴⁶ The KDAI was the architectural branch of Alfred Rosenberg’s Militant League for German Culture (KfdK).

⁴⁷ Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany*, 173-74.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 183.

“racially-pure” Germans practiced.⁴⁹ Jews, Communists, and Social Democrats were thus barred from the architectural profession. The subsequent Architects’ Law of 1934 specified that only registered members of the Reich Chamber of Culture would be allowed to continue their artistic careers in Germany.⁵⁰ Important to note, however, is that one’s architectural predilections were secondary, if not irrelevant, in obtaining membership. As Barbara Miller Lane has remarked, restricting access to the architectural profession, ostensibly to elevate German architecture, was nothing less than a ruse to kick Jews out. The Reich Chamber of Culture never actually dictated a uniform German architectural style to be followed.⁵¹

In his speech inaugurating the Reich Chamber of Culture, Josef Goebbels claimed that “the worst offense of artistically creative individuals in the previous era was that they no longer stood in organic relation to the Volk and therefore lost the root which provided them with daily nourishment.”⁵² Goebbels proclaimed that Germany’s national art would achieve international acclaim only if it were once again “firmly and inextricably rooted in the native soil of its own Volk.”⁵³ Despite this proclamation that German art should be rooted in German soil, Goebbels provided no further stipulations. Indeed, no official party platform on architecture existed, even at the elite level. Most notably, Alfred Rosenberg supported traditional German styles, while Goebbels endorsed some modern forms. Goebbels was particularly averse to traditionalist architects who he believed did not adequately display Nazism’s modernism. For example, awestruck after visiting an Italian exhibition on the early years of Fascism, Goebbels jotted in his

⁴⁹ Robert Brady, “The National Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer) (1937),” in *The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich*, ed. Brandon Taylor and Wilfried van der Will (Winchester: The Winchester Press, 1990), 80.

⁵⁰ Petsch, “Vielfalt oder Uniformität?,” 135.

⁵¹ Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany*, 184.

⁵² “Die deutsche Kultur vor neuem Anfang: Aus der Rede von Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels anlässlich der Einsetzung der Reichskulturkammer,” *Baugilde* 15, no. 22 (November 25, 1933): 1061.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1063.

diary: “Fascism is modern and connected to the Volk [*volksverbunden*]. There we should learn something. Especially the Schul[t]ze-Naumburgs,” referring to the conservatism of Paul Schultze-Naumburg and architects like him.⁵⁴ Goebbels vowed not to let “reactionaries” control the development of architecture in their struggle against “cultural bolshevism.”⁵⁵

Hitler himself frankly acknowledged this tension between tradition and modernity. In a speech during the 1934 Nazi Party Rally for the Congress of Culture (*Kulturtagung*), Hitler criticized backward-looking architects who advocated a complete return to tradition. Instead of preoccupying themselves with past styles, Hitler encouraged Germans to cultivate a true German art within themselves. Hitler warned of two dangers to Nazi culture: artists who believed Germany must create a completely new style and could not use any elements from the past and those who only promoted the use of traditional methods and elements. He cautioned against romanticizing the past and remarked that “alleged gothic internalization fits poorly in the age of steel and iron, glass and cement.”⁵⁶ Beyond this, Hitler gave no concrete instructions regarding what forms everyday architecture should take, so it was within these vague outlines that Third Reich architects negotiated new forms between tradition and modernity.

Despite the reality of these tensions, the existing historiography often asserts that traditional styles reigned in everyday architecture and that public support for modern architecture disappeared from debates by 1935.⁵⁷ But vigorous debates continued among architects well beyond 1933, with tradespeople dividing into two main camps. On one side stood professionals yearning for nationwide legislation to advance “authentic” German architecture, including Heimatschutz

⁵⁴ Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher*, I:2/III, 197. Entry from June 4, 1933.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 206. Entry from June 14, 1933.

⁵⁶ “Auszug aus der Rede des Führers auf der Kulturtagung in Nürnberg,” *Der Baumeister* 32, no. 10 (October 1934): 325-327.

⁵⁷ Anke Blümm claims that by 1935, support for modern styles had disappeared from the architectural journals as architects promoted traditional designs or some “combination of tradition and modernity.” See Blümm, “*Entartete Baukunst*”, 350.

associations, building inspectors, the Reich Ministry of Labor, and builders and contractors. In the other camp stood many individual architects, the BDA, the economy minister, and members of advertising agencies, who all chafed at the mounting restrictions on their trades.⁵⁸ Most individuals and institutions concurred, however, that more transparent guidelines were needed, for the existing laws were too numerous and convoluted—in 1932, building across Germany was regulated by 150 state building laws and over 2,000 additional local ordinances.⁵⁹

Therefore, Heimatschutz proponents promoted nationwide legislation to centralize these building laws and practices in Germany, a goal which had thus far eluded them. The Nazi accession to power reinvigorated their efforts. The debate positioned architects against building authorities, liberal freedoms against centralized regulation. Building authorities despised individually-commissioned and haphazard building practices, while freelance architects resisted further regulation and believed that Heimatschutz proponents and building inspectors stifled their creative abilities.⁶⁰ In his 1934 book, Werner Lindner, German architect and since 1914 president of the Heimatschutz Association, outlined the movement's goals under the new regime.⁶¹ Lindner wrote that Heimatschutz seeks to “decontaminate the soil and to prepare it anew to create space for natural developments.”⁶² Its goal was the “responsible preservation and fashioning of the German *Lebensraum* as an expression and source of power for our *Volkstum*.” These efforts would require architects to build from a proper “ethos” (*Gesinnung*), which Heimatschutz proponents said must

⁵⁸ Ibid., 81.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 76.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 77.

⁶¹ In 1933, the Heimatschutz Association was reconstituted as the Reichsfachstelle Heimatschutz in the “Reichsbund Volkstum und Heimat.”

⁶² Werner Lindner, *Der Heimatschutz im neuen Reich* (Leipzig: Verlag E. A. Seemann, 1934), 13.

be forged by more construction laws.⁶³ Indeed, as Anke Blümm has noted, additional building legislation was promoted after 1933 as a panacea to these perceived ills.⁶⁴

From the start, however, efforts to further regulate and coordinate building practices were hampered by two things. First, spheres of responsibility were unclear, and administrative infighting often exacerbated this situation. In a fevered exchange of letters between 1933–36, various authorities sought to carve out their zones of influence and bolster their prerogatives. Second, the subjective and ambiguous language of proposed legislation made it difficult to interpret and implement the building laws. During the first few years of the regime, the Fourth Division of the Reich Ministry of Labor (RAM) was the federal authority tasked with overseeing construction and building inspection matters across the country.⁶⁵ Its office was inundated with letters from advocates and opponents of nationwide building legislation.

The first attempts to reform building laws and regulations began at the state and municipal levels, where local authorities often issued guidelines and ordinances for architects and building inspectors to follow. These efforts were often riddled with ambiguous proclamations. In early 1935, for example, Mayor Karl Strölin of Stuttgart and the city's building authorities released ten "building commandments" which reminded locals that they were "not alone" and that they must take their neighbors and the landscape into consideration. The guidelines encouraged "simple and unadorned" designs which would help with the "beautification of the cityscape."⁶⁶ The city of

⁶³ Ibid., 73.

⁶⁴ Blümm, "Entartete Baukunst", 81.

⁶⁵ For more background on the RAM's role in building matters, see Karl Christian Führer, "Wohnungsbaupolitische Konzepte des Reichsarbeitsministeriums," in *Das Reichsarbeitsministerium im Nationalsozialismus: Verwaltung, Politik, Verbrechen*, ed. Alexander Nützenandel (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2017). For an overview of construction and housing policies, and the infighting of ministries in Nazi Germany, see Tilman Harlander, *Zwischen Heimstätte und Wohnmaschine: Wohnungsbau und Wohnungspolitik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1995).

⁶⁶ "Die Zehn Baugebote der Stadtverwaltung Stuttgart," *Beilage zum Baumeister, Monatshefte für Baukultur und Baupraxis* 33, no. 2 (February 1935): B20-B21.

Frankfurt am Main released an almost identical set of guidelines, reminding individuals that “urban development is the symbol of the Volksgemeinschaft and the most enduring monument of an era.” The builder is “bound to the collective” and required to “consider his surroundings.”⁶⁷

At the state level, Bavarian State Interior Minister Adolf Wagner issued an ordinance in November 1935 entitled “Cleanliness and Beauty in Town and Country.” The decree provided architectural guidelines as well as general comments on the “order and cleanliness on public streets, paths, and squares.” New buildings were to comply with the “character of the soil and the landscape,” and public spaces were to remain free of loud advertisements. Building inspectors were given broad authority to exercise control.⁶⁸ The RAM was upset that Wagner had issued the ordinance without permission and inquired whether he had received permission from another Reich authority.⁶⁹ Wagner claimed that the decree served merely as a reminder of the “exact execution of existing regulations” and that he did not think it necessary to obtain approval from Reich authorities.⁷⁰ The RAM was unimpressed, protested that the ordinance did more than merely reiterate protocol, but declined to pass the matter on for further review in order to maintain good relations between the two offices. Wagner was warned to consult the RAM in the future.⁷¹

Bavarian authorities enthusiastically implemented the new ordinance. In practice, it encroached most stringently on advertising practices, which were sometimes decried as evidence

⁶⁷ “Zwölf Leitsätze für das Bauen in Frankfurt am Main,” *Beilage zum Baumeister, Monatshefte für Baukultur und Baupraxis* 33, no. 2 (February 1935): B21-B22; “Städtebauliche Leitsätze,” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 69, no. 39 (September 25, 1935): 783.

⁶⁸ “Eine bayerische Verordnung über Sauberkeit und Schönheit in Stadt und Land,” *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* 55 (1935): 962-963.

⁶⁹ BArch R 3901/21494, Dr. Heilmann, Oberregierungsrat im Reichs- und Preuß. Arbeitsministerium an Herrn Ministerialrat Dr. Jakob, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, January 6, 1936.

⁷⁰ BArch R 3901/21494, Ministerialrat Dr. Jakob im Staatsministerium des Innern an Herrn Oberregierungsrat Dr. Heilmann, Reichs- u. Preuss. Arbeitsministerium, January 23, 1936.

⁷¹ BArch R 3901/21494, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister an Herrn Min. Rat Dr. Jacob, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, January 30, 1936.

of the “infestation of our Volk with the liberal-Jewish spirit.”⁷² The crackdown on advertising prompted outrage from economic authorities and advertising agencies who lamented, “Thanks to the countless and diverse building ordinances, local statutes, and community bylaws, it is now possible for every mayor and community leader to ban any outdoor advertising that displeases him.”⁷³ In subsequent correspondence, the Propaganda Ministry repeatedly defended the interests of its Ad Council of the German Economy and the economy minister, while the RAM increasingly positioned itself on the side of the Bavarian Interior Ministry and Heimatschutz proponents.⁷⁴ The RAM was frustrated when it heard that the Propaganda Ministry had directly contacted the Bavarian interior minister on the matter, its authority again compromised.⁷⁵ The minister of labor wrote to Goebbels’ office to say that the Bavarian matter was firmly under his control and reminded Goebbels that “complaints about building inspection measures in the realm of outdoor advertising” are the RAM’s responsibility.⁷⁶ This infighting between state and federal authorities, all with divergent agendas, made it near impossible to uniformly regulate construction across the country.

In addition to these bureaucratic conflicts, the second major problem that stalled legislation was continued disagreement about the wording of a nationwide law. For example, after reading a draft of the law, Prussian Finance Minister Popitz expressed concerns about the term “beauty standard” (*schönheitliche Anforderung*) and requested that it be omitted. He believed that

⁷² “Über Aussenreklame,” *Baugilde* 16, no. 13 (July 10, 1934): 457.

⁷³ BArch R 3901/21494, Plakat-Verband an den Herrn Reichs- und Preussischen Wirtschaftsminister, February 20, 1936. They stressed that curbing advertisements would have deleterious effects on the German economy and that it endangered the livelihood of “countless specialized workers, such as painters, stencil makers, printers, lithographers, [and] toolmakers.”

⁷⁴ For more background on the Ad Council, see Pamela E. Swett, *Selling under the Swastika: Advertising and Commercial Culture in Nazi Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

⁷⁵ BArch R 3901/20073, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister, “Vermerk,” September 23, 1936.

⁷⁶ BArch R 3901/20073, Schnellbrief, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister an den Herrn Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, September 23, 1936.

this wording would “lead to the most diverse interpretations in practice” because there exists no “objective means to measure” such a stipulation. Popitz suggested replacing the objectionable phrase with a sentence that simply said buildings should fit neatly into their surroundings. Furthermore, he expressed reservations with the word “flawlessly” (*einwandfrei*).⁷⁷ At a subsequent meeting, authorities contemplated replacing the word “flawlessly” with “organically.”⁷⁸ These disagreements and varied suggestions of equally ambiguous terms illustrate the incoherence that plagued their efforts to reform the nation’s building laws.

Questions about the nationwide building law even reached Albert Speer in August 1936, shortly before Hitler appointed him General Building Inspector.⁷⁹ The drafters asked Speer to lend his thoughts on the law, whereupon Speer expressed some doubt that the law would fundamentally improve the “building ethos” in Germany. Speer noted that several previous attempts for reform had been unsuccessful and said that should authorities pursue a nationwide law, “it must be so fundamental as to ensure success.” Speer proposed several immediate changes to the law and concluded with harsh criticism of building inspectorates, writing that they were not at all fit “to recognize the principles required by the building design ordinance, and therefore even less fit to implement them.”⁸⁰ From the beginning, Speer thus aligned himself with individual architects and against building inspectors and the restrictions they imposed on the profession.

Following all these debates, the final nationwide “Decree Regarding Building Design” was

⁷⁷ BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 77, Der Preußische Finanzminister and den Herrn Reichs- und Preußischen Arbeitsminister, May 21, 1936.

⁷⁸ BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 79, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister, Vermerk, June 16, 1936.

⁷⁹ BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 84, Persönliches Schreiben des ORR. Büge an Herrn Architekt Speer, July 8, 1936.

⁸⁰ BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 90-91, Albert Speer an Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. Krohn, August 6, 1936. The changes he suggested included: appointing an expert to each state president (*Regierungspräsident*) to oversee the implementation of the law, replacing building inspectors with professionals if necessary, creating an advisory board composed of freelance and public architects in each governmental district, and at a later date, establishing central building authorities should in each state to oversee all construction projects.

released on November 10, 1936. The first clause of the law directly addressed the issue of harmony:

Physical structures and changes are to be executed so that they are an expression of proper design [*Ausdruck anständiger Baugesinnung*] and educated workmanship and so that they fit in perfectly with the environment [*sich der Umgebung einwandfrei einfügen*]. Consideration must be given to the character of the intended design of the townscape, streetscape, or landscape as well as to monuments and notable natural features.⁸¹

Heimatschutz proponents celebrated the law as a fulfillment of their efforts to protect German landscapes and cityscapes from “disfigurement.” The drafters had high hopes that such nationwide legislation would resolve conflicts between federal and local authorities. Their accolades proved premature, for the insufficiencies of the problematic vocabulary enshrined in the law soon became apparent. The RAM issued a decree the next month to further elucidate murky terms such as “proper building ethos” and to better delineate how the ordinance should be implemented. This document explained that the law was designed to cultivate “a harmonious overall picture that exuded community spirit and professional skill.” Therefore, if a building fit perfectly into its surroundings and followed the guidelines stipulated in the law, “then the ordinance’s requirement for proper building ethos must be regarded as fulfilled.”⁸² The RAM reexplained its ambiguity with even more ambiguity.

The weaknesses of the national law ensured that such uncertainties and infighting between authorities persisted into Speer’s tenure as General Building Inspector. After he was appointed to this position in January 1937, Speer sought to centralize building practices more firmly under his control. He wrote to the RAM in May 1937 to assert his ultimate authority in Berlin, emphasizing

⁸¹ “Verordnung über Baugestaltung. Vom 10. November 1936,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1936, I, 938.

⁸² BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 246-247, “Verordnung über Baugestaltung,” special issue of the *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* 57, no. 7 (1937).

that he was the chief authority in all urban planning matters.⁸³ Speer sent a copy of this letter to Julius Lippert's office and requested that he exclude any offices from development plans should they hinder progress. Furthermore, Speer requested that Lippert immediately inform him if any other office ("such as the Reich Ministry of Labor, the Reich Office for Spatial Planning, etc.") should seek anything more than an advisory role in Berlin's redevelopment plans.⁸⁴

Though Speer had greatly centralized power under his control, he notably issued no further guidelines about the design of everyday architecture. This silence left architects to debate amongst themselves the best interpretation of the 1936 law. In a June 1937 issue of the architectural journal *Bauamt und Gemeindebau*, Hellmut Delius reflected upon the phrase "proper building ethos" and noted that although architects often used the term "proper" (*anständig* can also be translated as modest, respectable, or decent), it possessed no unanimously agreed upon value or meaning within the profession. Neither did the popular term "disfigurement" (*Verunstaltung*) possess a clear definition. Delius outright acknowledged that architects and building officials were widely ignorant of the requisite design principles and regulations, or in disagreement about them, and that this uncertainty was what precluded any fundamental improvement in the realm of the built environment.⁸⁵

Although the Heimatschutz-supported legislation certainly hampered outdoor advertising after 1933, it is much less clear how it affected architecture. Conservative architects' hopes to overcome Weimar individualism and totally redesign the built environment were hampered by the divergent views of federal and local authorities and the vague language of the legislation. The rest

⁸³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 646, Speer an das Reichsarbeitsministerium z.H.d. Herrn Staatssekretär Krohn, May 18, 1937.

⁸⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 646, Speer an den Herrn Stadtpräsidenten und Oberbürgermeister der Reichshauptstadt Berlin, May 19, 1937.

⁸⁵ BArch R 3901/21495, Bl. 279-281, "Abschrift," Hellmut Delius, "Baugestaltung des Staates," *Bauamt und Gemeindebau* 19, no. 12 (June 4, 1937).

of this chapter examines how architects grappled with these terms and utilized the flexibility of the laws and the imprecise vocabulary to reexplain, or rhetorically coordinate, denigrated modern elements from the Weimar era for use in the Third Reich.

“Nazifying” Functional Buildings: Accommodating Modernist Features in Non-Monumental Architecture

While it is indisputable that conservative arguments dominated architectural discussions during the Third Reich, modern forms and building materials persisted not only in functional buildings—such as factories, stores, offices, and train stations—intended to showcase Germany’s technological advancements but also in housing. Indeed, these modernist exceptions to the traditional architecture rule constituted much more than “trace elements” of modernism in housing.⁸⁶ Because conservative architects had so vehemently denounced modern architecture in the 1920s and early 1930s, their continued use of modern styles and building materials in the Third Reich necessitated a great deal of rhetorical gymnastics. Therefore, I examine here the *ideas* that influenced policies of coordination in everyday architecture under the Nazi regime. I argue that Third Reich architects could employ modernist elements and concepts—technology, objectivity, and internationalism—as well as modern building materials such as glass, iron, and steel, by disassociating them from their past meanings and associations with Weimar’s modernism and rhetorically coordinating them to fit Nazi visions.

From the Nazi viewpoint, imperial and Weimar-era architecture was indelibly intertwined with the new technologies developed at the turn of the century. Conservative architects loathed the mass-produced forms of building materials, architecture, and furnishings that modern architects

⁸⁶ Nerdinger, “Bauhaus Architecture in the Third Reich,” 147. Nerdinger claims that “modern details” in residential buildings constituted only “trace elements” within the “overwhelming bulk of conservative reactionary buildings.”

had developed using these technologies in the Weimar era. Notably, though, in their campaign for a return to craftsmanship and tradition, conservative architects did not reject the use of technology itself. Technology was not to blame for its own abuse during Weimar, they said. Rather, at fault was a “new technical mentality” that had served “a liberal economy and dominated humanity and the *Volkstum* instead of serving them.”⁸⁷ Because technology had been “mastered” in the meantime and was “no longer an enemy or a false god,” many Third Reich architects sought to find a balance between tradition and modernity, between craftsmanship and technology.⁸⁸ What was so unfortunate about the *Neues Bauen* movement, then, was not its use of technology but that “it [had become] fashionable! Fashion is the enemy of all depth.” The Nazi movement, on the other hand, “was intended to have great depth.”⁸⁹ Some architects claimed that the mentality behind a design was far more important than the materials used to build it. What was more important, was how these materials were “brought together and made to sound” (*zum Klingen gebracht*).⁹⁰ If past architecture had been guided by a materialism lacking in spirit, Third Reich architects determined to rectify this not by creating a single style but rather by reifying German spirit into built form.⁹¹

A second hallmark of modernist architecture that outlasted Weimar was the notion of objectivity, or *Sachlichkeit*. Eschewing excessive ornamentation, architects of the New Objectivity (*Neue Sachlichkeit*) movement had championed simple designs with unadorned facades. Conservative architects claimed that these modern architects had simply abused the term and took the concept of objectivity too far. Their mistake had been making a “theory of style” that deemed

⁸⁷ Schmitthenner, *Die Baukunst*, 4-5.

⁸⁸ Alfons Leitl, “Deutsche Baukunst: Rückblick und Ausblick zur Jahreswende 1933/34,” *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 18, no. 1 (January 1934): 40.

⁸⁹ “Gedanken zur neuen Künstlerischen Form,” *Beilage zum Baumeister, Monatshefte für Baukultur und Baupraxis* 32, no. 1 (January 1934): B1.

⁹⁰ “Die Leonberger Bausparkasse,” *Moderne Bauformen* 35 (November 1936): 694.

⁹¹ “Gedanken zur neuen Künstlerischen Form,” *Beilage zum Baumeister, Monatshefte für Baukultur und Baupraxis* 32, no. 1 (January 1934): B2.

functionality “more important than the needs of the family.”⁹² To rectify this error and turn “living machines” (*Wohnmaschine*) back into homes, Third Reich architects promised to return to what they called a “true objectivity.”⁹³ There had been no need to “discover a new objectivity through the machine and engineering” because the craftsman’s timeless objectivity could help architects navigate the modern era.⁹⁴ Alfons Leitl’s prediction in January 1934 that the *Neues Bauen* would persist and develop into “a mixture of Schmitthenner and Mies van der Rohe”—a combination of traditional and modern—proved a rather accurate assessment in practice.⁹⁵

The continuity of functional forms in “functional buildings”—such as factories, stores, offices, and restaurants—proved quite uncontroversial, yet architects still felt the need to voice their tempered justifications. Many architects in Nazi Germany accepted their industrial forms and the continued use of glass, steel, and iron as a matter of utility.⁹⁶ Some architects went a step further by providing further explanations that firmly legitimated these modern designs for use in Nazi Germany. Gerdy Troost made one of the clearest statements to this effect. She argued that, because factories now serve the community, they are no longer “foreign bodies” but rather a “spirit from the spirit of the Volk” (*Geist vom Geiste des Volkes*).⁹⁷ She thus exonerated factories of their past negative associations and instead touted them as befitting, even expressive of, Nazi Germany.

⁹² Matthias Schmitz, and German Library of Information, *A Nation Builds: Contemporary German Architecture* (New York: German Library of Information, 1940), 97.

⁹³ Alfons Leitl, “Deutsche Baukunst: Rückblick und Ausblick zur Jahreswende 1933/34,” *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 18, no. 1 (January 1934): 40.

⁹⁴ Schmitthenner, *Die Baukunst*, 13. Fritz August Breuhaus took a similar position. See Fritz August Breuhaus, “Die ‘Neue Sachlichkeit,’” *Innendekoration* 44, no. 6 (1933): 197.

⁹⁵ Alfons Leitl, “Deutsche Baukunst: Rückblick und Ausblick zur Jahreswende 1933/34,” in *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 18, no. 1 (January 1934): 40. Indeed, in promoting such arguments, architects could look to a more tempered “bourgeois modernism” as promoted by some architects at the turn of the century. See Maiken Umbach, and Bernd Hüppauf, ed. *Vernacular Modernism: Heimat, Globalization, and the Built Environment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

⁹⁶ Schmitz, *A Nation Builds*, 133.

⁹⁷ Troost, *Das Bauen*, 80.

Although their forms remained unchanged, architects could employ modern materials and designs in factories if they were professed to emanate from the Volk.

A second example of the regime's attempts to reexplain industrial design for the Nazi era comes from the Beauty of Labor initiative. Beginning in 1934, Albert Speer led the "Beauty of Labor" organization, which utilized glass facades and uncluttered, expansive work halls to infuse worksites with natural light and fresh air.⁹⁸ Green spaces outside, where one might spend his break, as well as plants and greenery inside would help connect the workers to nature even while in the factories. Paul Betts has aptly referred to these efforts as "domesticating industrial modernism" by which Weimar's functionalism was "overlain with a veneer of *gemütlichkeit*" and rendered acceptable for use in Nazi Germany.⁹⁹

Modern building materials remained popular in the construction of stores as well, where they were lauded for their practicality, their hygienic properties, and their perceived cleanliness and orderliness. For example, Gustav Hassenpflug, known for incorporating glass and steel into his interior designs, received praise for his redesign of two sales outlets for a cloth factory in Berlin. One critic wrote that Hassenpflug's liberal incorporation of steel tubing into the design of shelves for rolls of fabric ensured all the materials would be visible and easy to access for cleaning. His design for the sales outlet showed "that steel tubing, when sensibly employed, has its place as a modern material in modern design, especially when it is not unilaterally used for everything."¹⁰⁰ Many butcher shops were similarly commended for their use of glass and steel, deemed "practical" and "hygienic" for such food goods stores.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Albert Speer, *"Schönheit der Arbeit": Fragen der Betriebsgestaltung* (Berlin-Friedenau: Verlag F. Mittelbach, 1935).

⁹⁹ Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects*, 40-41.

¹⁰⁰ "Zwei Geschäftseinrichtungen," *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 32, no. 4 (April 1937): 123-124.

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., "Läden und Ladenumbauten in Basel," *Der Baumeister* 34, no. 6 (June 1936): 206. For a similar discussion of practical needs and hygiene in the design of butcher shops, see "Ueber Neu-Anlage von Fleischereibetrieben," *Deutsche Bauhütte* 37 (1933): 114.

Architects also maintained that modern materials conveyed that one was forward-thinking and that such materials were especially appropriate for use in urban architecture. While Third Reich architects believed that functional architecture in the suburbs and countryside should be curbed, they did not think that this aim should be completely reversed in a process, “by which one — no less erroneously — would transport the village into the city.”¹⁰² Similarly, the builders of a new Savings Bank in Munich intended for it “to earn the full esteem and confidence of the population” through its design alone. When entering the bank, customers should not “sense an old-fashioned, backward, and narrow-minded spirit” but rather encounter a modern (“*in der Zeit stehenden*”) building.¹⁰³

Finally, architects might promote modern styles and materials precisely for their international and worldly associations. Herbert Hoffmann, editor of the architecture journal *Moderne Bauformen*, was frustrated by German architects’ determination to build all inns, restaurants and pubs in the styles of traditional farmhouse parlors (*Bauernstuben*) and beer taverns. To counter this tradition, he presented images of a wine parlor in Tessin, a New York vaudeville-restaurant, and Berlin’s Olympic Village to demonstrate the diverse options available when designing inns and restaurants. While architects should certainly avoid designs that attempt to “imitate extravagance,” they should also refrain from the traditional farmhouse style, in which so many people were determined to build.¹⁰⁴

Although conservative architects had despised Weimar’s brand of internationalism, architects in Nazi Germany certainly did not categorically rebuff international exchange. In fact,

¹⁰² Bernhard Pfau, “Düsseldorf – Geschäftshaus, Läden, Wohnhäuser und Möbel,” *Moderne Bauformen* 35 (July 1936): 389.

¹⁰³ “Neue Sparkassen-Zweigstellen der Städtischen Sparkasse München,” *Der Baumeister* 34, no. 12 (December 1936): 415.

¹⁰⁴ “Gaststätten,” *Moderne Bauformen* 38 (December 1939): 569.

Third Reich architectural journals were replete with articles showcasing buildings from abroad, especially those in Scandinavian countries, whose Nordic peoples were considered Germans' racial relatives—but also from such places as the United States, Italy, Hungary, Switzerland, Romania, Turkey, and Poland.¹⁰⁵ The journals fostered this architectural cooperation and exchange of ideas even during wartime. For example, at the beginning of *Moderne Bauformen*'s October 1939 issue, the editor and publishers inserted a note stating, in English, that the journal “has been a means of interchange of thought and of collaboration between countries for thirty years.” They stated that they hoped to continue this exchange during wartime: “We beg readers in neutral countries to remain true to our periodical, and thus help to maintain the connection between the countries on a cultural basis.”¹⁰⁶ Several years into the war, the journal reemphasized its mission to continue facilitating international exchange and collaboratively developing the best building methods during wartime.¹⁰⁷

Overall, the use of modern building materials and styles continued seamlessly after 1933 in functional buildings such as factories, stores, and restaurants, where these features were sometimes presented as self-evident for a modernizing society which had mastered technology. At other times, architects felt more compelled to rhetorically reexplain the materials for use in functional buildings during Third Reich, often by emphasizing their hygienic properties and

¹⁰⁵ Several recent studies have begun to examine Nazi Germany's international collaborations in the realm of architecture more closely. See David Kuchenbuch, “Architecture and Urban Planning as Social Engineering: Selective Transfers between Germany and Sweden in the 1930s and 1940s,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 1 (2016); Jörn Düwel, and Niels Gutschow, *Baukunst und Nationalsozialismus. Demonstration von Macht in Europa, 1940-1943: Die Ausstellung Neue Deutsche Baukunst von Rudolf Wolters* (Berlin: DOM publishers, 2015), 194-251.

¹⁰⁶ *Moderne Bauformen* 38 (October 1939). Editor Herbert Hoffmann defended the *Moderne Bauformen*'s articles on foreign architecture again in August 1942, stating that “cultural exchange has been a matter of course for centuries; we do not want to miss out on it even during the war.” See “Vier Holländische Landhäuser,” *Moderne Bauformen* 41 (August 1942): 265.

¹⁰⁷ “Der Herausgeber an die Leser im Reich und im Ausland,” *Moderne Bauformen* 42 (January 1943): 1-2.

practicality for a forward-thinking Nazi regime. Yet such straightforward implementation would not prove quite as simple in the realm of housing.

Vernacular Housing? Negotiating the Divide Between Tradition and Modernism

A 1934 article in *Innendekoration* featured one of the most eclectic homes depicted in an architectural journal during the Nazi era: the so-called “House Schminke” in Löbau, designed by Hans Scharoun.¹⁰⁸ Painted white and prominently featuring glass and steel, the house had a flat roof and a triangular-shaped, asymmetric design with undulating, unadorned facades. Curt Elwenspoek acknowledged that, while this house might at first evoke the “boldest dreams” of Le Corbusier or Mies van der Rohe, this “initial surprise disappears immediately.” Scharoun’s clean lines, Elwenspoek claimed, sought not “sterile objectivity” but rather “light, cleanliness, contentment, [and] cheerfulness.” Moreover, the extension of the house into the garden and the family-focused interior design indicated that a “very German mind” had created the house, for Scharoun was, in any case, a “solidly German, Nordic architect.” Nonetheless, the home’s unapologetic modernism prompted Elwenspoek to leave his commentary open-ended: “A German house in a German landscape? Is this house compellingly designed from inside out – or might the indisputably high quality, at times ravishing, configuration of the interior design have permitted a different, a ‘more German’ exterior design?” He left these questions open for debate.¹⁰⁹

Because Blood and Soil ideologies had indeed greatly influenced Nazi housing policies, such provocative designs like Scharoun’s eventually became the exception. In the late 1930s, the use of technology, international styles, and elements such as glass, steel, and iron proved more difficult to justify in housing construction than in that of functional buildings. To reconnect

¹⁰⁸ Scharoun later designed the famed Berlin Philharmonic concert hall in the 1960s.

¹⁰⁹ Curt Elwenspoek, “Neues deutsches Baugesühl?” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 3 (1934): 81.

German workers with nature, Third Reich architects hoped to move them to single-family housing settlements on the outskirts of cities. Above all, architects emphasized the need to design *bodenständig* houses that *organically* emanated from their landscapes and, as a result, seamlessly linked the interior spaces to their external environments. Whereas houses had previously been designed to protect inhabitants from outside dangers—such as cold, storms, and plunderers—those problems had been largely overcome in the modern era with heating systems, more durable designs and materials, and police forces. Therefore, architects claimed that the time had come to reintegrate man into nature.¹¹⁰ They aimed to design homes that would exude this “need for nature and feeling for nature.”¹¹¹ Despite the existence of this ideal housing type, home architecture provoked significant tensions and contradictions in the Third Reich. Although contemporary architecture journals overwhelmingly depicted vernacular-style homes with pitched roofs, modern elements persisted even in single-family housing. Thus, instead of completely diverging from the Weimar-era housing schemes they abhorred, Third Reich architects found ways to renegotiate and “Germanize” select modernist elements to align with Nazi visions.

Architects pursued different strategies for reintegrating housing and nature and often declared that the question of style was immaterial in achieving this goal. Fritz August Breuhaus declared that all styles, including traditional and modern, could achieve “classic forms” as well as “faddish, degenerate, and misunderstood malfunctions.” No matter the style, a house should strive for “refined simplicity.”¹¹² Indeed, most architects championed simple designs and emphasized the need to build “objective,” “unadorned,” and “functional” homes to meet the needs of modern

¹¹⁰ W. F. “Haus von früher, Haus von jetzt,” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 6 (1934): 211. For a similar account, see Alfred Vietze, “Landhaus und Landschaft,” *Innendekoration* 46, no. 1 (1935): 9.

¹¹¹ Lois Welzen Bacher, “Haus in der Landschaft,” *Moderne Bauformen* 36 (1937): 240.

¹¹² Quoted in Cornelius Witt, “Verjüngung eines Hauses: Villenumbau in Varese durch Fritz August Breuhaus,” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 3 (1934): 76.

families. To justify their use of modern elements in German houses, architects sometimes invoked functionalist arguments that were curiously similar to the tenets of Weimar modernism. Houses should ensure ample sun and fresh air and to provide “uncluttered space” for German families. At the same time, utility should not trump tradition. Architects claimed that the new German home was distinct “from the more starkly theoretical version of the modern house” due to its ability to combine modern solutions and traditional “features which the wisdom of the race has discovered to be of permanent value.”¹¹³ Third Reich architects further emphasized that functionality was only harmful if employed “in the service of false purposes and views of life.”¹¹⁴ Architects could thus retain rational designs simply by claiming that the German race deemed them essential or by combining them with select traditional elements, such as the gabled roof.¹¹⁵ These ideological reexplanations of functionality in housing mirrored the arguments that had taken place in the realm of industrial design.

Sometimes, though, even this compulsory nod to tradition could be excused, especially when architects claimed that non-traditionalist designs suited their natural surroundings. That is to say, some architects promoted unabashed modernist designs as the best form to reestablish the bond between man and nature in a given landscape. For example, a modern house built overlooking the Attersee in Austria’s scenic Salzkammergut region was commended for its unification of nature and interior spaces. According to an article in *Innendekoration*, the house’s “pure skeleton construction made possible the continuous ribbon window, which everywhere allows the natural

¹¹³ Schmitz, *A Nation Builds*, 89. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁴ Michel Wilhelm, “Die strenge Linie,” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 9 (1934): 286. For a similar view on simple designs, see “Schlichtes Einfamilienhaus,” *Innendekoration* 49, no. 4 (1938): 138.

¹¹⁵ Schmitz, *A Nation Builds*, 89.

scenery to come into the rooms.” A glance out the carefully placed windows allowed one to view equal parts sea, mountain, and sky.¹¹⁶

Some architects went a step further by boldly promoting modern, white, cubic styles as the ideal form for majestic landscapes. For instance, Alfred Vietze praised Bernhard Pfau’s design of a modern house at the base of the Eifel mountain range in western Germany, writing that “[t]he ancient, abraded mountain would itself give the cube the right to exist if it had not already been sufficiently justified from within.”¹¹⁷ Similarly, Emanuel Josef Margold praised a house on Lake Schwielow near Potsdam and claimed that it was precisely the “cubic-clear form” of the home that ensured its successful integration into its surroundings. The home’s horizontal lines harmonized with those of the natural landscape while its vertical lines “formed a characterful contrast to the soft forms of the forest, the shoreline, and the slopes of the land.”¹¹⁸ Third Reich architects utilized the rhetoric of the Heimatschutz movement to discuss how homes harmonized with their surrounding natural landscapes, but they often referred to wildly different styles than conservative architects initially had in mind. Nonetheless, cubic homes might “stand magnificently” in certain landscapes but appear as a “foreign body” in other others. In each case, architects concluded that the style of a home should be “appropriate to its soil.”¹¹⁹ What, exactly, constituted an architecture that befit its soil in any given landscape, however, was left open to interpretation.

Indeed, contemporaries praised vastly different designs for their “rootedness to the soil.” In its January 1935 issue, the *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* featured two homes, one

¹¹⁶ “Ein Haus am Attersee,” *Innendekoration* 47, no. 9 (1936): 286. For additional examples of designs commended for their commingling of modern forms and natural landscapes, see: “Lasst Sonne herein,” *Innendekoration* 49, no. 11 (1938): 363; Herbert Hoffmann, “Ein Ferienhaus bei Zell am See und ein Gebirgsgasthaus,” *Moderne Bauformen* 34 (1935): 265-272; G.[uido] H.[arbers], “Werkstatt und Wohnung einer Photographin,” *Der Baumeister* 33, no. 9 (September 1935): 316; Herbert Hoffmann, “Wohnhäuser und Ferienhäuser auf dem Lande – Acht Arbeiten von C. A. Bembé, München,” *Moderne Bauformen* 34 (May 1935): 278.

¹¹⁷ Alfred Vietze, “Innenraum und Aussenarchitektur,” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 12 (1934): 378.

¹¹⁸ “Das weisse Haus am Schwielow-See,” *Innendekoration* 47, no. 6 (1936): 205-206.

¹¹⁹ “Das Haus in der Landschaft,” *Innendekoration* 45, no. 5 (1934): 177.

modern-looking and one more traditional. The modernist design utilized glass, cement, and iron, and the journal asserted that the “the technical congruity” on display emerged “from spiritual roots.” Although the home might make an “industrial” impression, the journal emphasized that it was entirely the work of “careful craftsmanship.” The interior furnishings featured German wood, and “even the steel window frames were created from a resident [*ansässig*] locksmith.”¹²⁰ Thus, the use of German artisans and native materials meant that the house was, indeed, German. The second home featured in the issue was more traditional-looking and built entirely of wood. Though this home might strike readers as more organically connected to its surroundings, the article stressed that the modern-looking home did “not appear any less rooted to the soil.”¹²¹ This article lays bare the flexibility of Nazi ideology in the realm of housing, for a few rhetorical flourishes legitimated the modernist house as a fitting, indigenous design.

Alternatively, architects often justified modern elements in country and vacation homes built for urbanites as befitting the cosmopolitan nature of their occupants. While vacation homes for city-dwellers in the low areas of the Alps constituted a welcome boost to local economies, their designs that met “urban housing needs” could potentially deface the natural landscape.¹²² Often times, however, locals preferred this sort of disfigurement over city-dwellers’ attempts to imitate vernacular styles, which sometimes irritated the locals. Therefore, architects concluded that a city-dweller’s country home will always exhibit something urban.¹²³ To underscore this assessment, several architectural journals and books praised the simple, yet skilled design of a weekend home fashioned by Fritz August Breuhaus on Wannsee, a lake on the outskirts of Berlin. Philipp

¹²⁰ “Das Haus eines Arztes,” *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 19, no. 1 (January 1935): 21-22.

¹²¹ “Ein Unterkunftshaus auf der Schwäbischen Alb,” *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 19, no. 1 (January 1935): 29.

¹²² “Einfamilienhäuser im Gebirge, auf dem Lande und in der Stadt,” *Der Baumeister* 35, no. 2 (February 1937): 49, 51.

¹²³ “Das Eigenwohnhaus eines Architekten,” *Der Baumeister* 32, no. 3 (March 1934): 153.

Vockerat remarked on the structure's original, modern design, noting that "the principle of the simplest housing of a summer rural settlement of the most modest type is depicted here in its most elegant expression." Breuhaus was praised for achieving a clear sense of practicality and functionality without succumbing to "dry pedantry" or "puritan exaggerations."¹²⁴ The functional design of his home in the countryside was praised as an appropriate weekend retreat for an urbanite. Ultimately, some architects concluded that one may offend locals both by mirroring local housing styles or by completely disregarding it. Therefore, each architect should simply "decide for himself" what is best.¹²⁵ This conclusion sounds markedly similar to the Weimar epithet, "*I build as I like!*" and is indicative of Nazi architectural ideology's great flexibility in practice.

Even flat roofs, the most visible and denigrated symbol of Weimar's modern architecture, could be reexplained for use in Nazi Germany. In support of flat roofs, architect Albert Hauschildt asked, "if we have new building materials and construction possibilities, why then should we with force build in a medieval style? Should a car speak to us in a village as if a ghost from another world?" He further justified the use of a flat roof on his own house by arguing that it suits the north German landscape.¹²⁶ Many architects echoed these sentiments and were irritated when southern German architectural styles appeared in northern Germany.¹²⁷ In a manner almost identical to Hauschildt's, Hellmut Weber defended his use of a flat roof in his design of a single-family home in Stuttgart-Sillenbusch. For the sake of future city building, Weber said it was incumbent upon craftsmen to develop a proper cubic form with a flat roof and claimed that this roof design suited

¹²⁴ Philip Vockerat, "Ein neues Wochenendhaus am Wannsee," *Innendekoration* 44, no. 8 (1933): 278-281. Herbert Hoffmann made similar comments on this house. See Herbert Hoffmann, *Ferienhäuser für Garten, Gebirge und See* (Stuttgart: Julius Hoffmann Verlag, 1937), 38. A home on Groß Glienicke, another lake on the outskirts of Berlin, was similarly praised for its functional design that met the needs of city-dwellers on their weekend outings. See Heinrich Ritter, "Ein Wochenendhaus am Glienicker See," *Innendekoration* 46, no. 8 (1935): 265; "Landhaus in Gross-Glienicke," *Der Baumeister* 34, no. 8 (1936): 264-265.

¹²⁵ "Wohn- und Ferienhäuser aus Bayern, Tirol und der Schweiz," *Moderne Bauformen* 33 (June 1934): 298.

¹²⁶ "Das Eigenwohnhaus eines Architekten," *Der Baumeister* 32, no. 3 (March 1934): 152.

¹²⁷ See, e.g., "Norddeutsche Baumeister," *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 23, no. 1 (1939): 1.

the home's location on a hillside. Clearly aware that some readers would disapprove of his roof choice, Weber then provided multiple reasons to justify his selection of a flat roof. Perhaps that is even why he felt compelled to declare that the flat roof itself served "as expression of a new community spirit." Weber concluded that an "unbiased assessor" should refrain from posing the question of "pitched roof or flat roof?" Instead, Weber invoked Werner Linder's book on Heimatschutz to posit the supposedly more appropriate question, "Where does the pitched roof belong?"¹²⁸ In declaring that the flat roof reflected the "new community spirit," Weber employed Nazi rhetoric but for entirely different ends than conservative architects.

This type of rhetorical justification is perhaps best exemplified in Alfons Leitl's description of a single-family home designed by Hans Schumacher on the Rhine River. As explained above, German architects regarded the flat roof as a particularly offensive manifestation of Weimar Germany's internationalism, for they associated this feature of modernism with Communists, Bolsheviks, and Jews. Nonetheless, Leitl praised this specific home precisely for its "German flat roof," which he claimed always existed when "a German architect, responsibly and with talent, practically and rationally builds a flat roof for a German owner, in a German landscape (on the Rhine!) with German materials." For emphasis, he concluded, "It can, therefore, only be a German flat roof." Leitl stressed that the architect did not allow himself to succumb to Romanticism but rather had successfully integrated his home into its natural and built environment, surrounded by previously built homes with flat roofs. Leitl concluded that modern, in this sense, then becomes "the pursuit of what is appropriate for each case: in the arrangement and creation of space and in the selection of building materials. The appropriate was in this case, for example, a flat roof."¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Hellmut Weber, "Einfamilienhaus in Stuttgart-Sillenbusch," *Innendekoration* 45, no. 9 (1934): 288. See also Lindner, *Der Heimatschutz*, 52-53.

¹²⁹ Alfons Leitl, "Ein Wohnhaus am Rhein," *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 21, no. 3 (March 1937): 93.

In simply calling the flat roof “German,” contemporary architects like Leitl unproblematically coordinated even the most maligned modernist element for use in Nazi Germany. This example is particularly striking because it comes from the *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau*, one of Nazi Germany’s more conservative architectural journals.

Practical considerations also played a role in the Nazi vindication of modernist architecture during the Four Year Plan from 1936 onward.¹³⁰ The plan demanded the stockpiling of certain raw materials to prepare Germany for war and greatly curtailed the quantity of iron, steel, and wood available for construction. These materials were to be replaced with stone, brick, concrete, and reinforced concrete.¹³¹ Light metals such as aluminum, lauded for its aesthetic and hygienic properties, were to replace heavy metals such as copper, nickel, and brass.¹³² Authorities promoted glass because it could be easily domestically produced.¹³³ A decree from June 1937 allowed building inspectors to deny building permits if they squandered raw materials.¹³⁴ Architects were told that “any uneconomical use of wood is to be avoided.”¹³⁵ Leitl directly addressed this issue in his praise for Schumacher’s flat-roofed design, suggesting it might be time to “free the flat-inclined or flat roof from the silly quarrel of aesthetic doctrines” so that architects can find the best means of “building roofs with the least use of wood.”¹³⁶ Whereas architects previously needed to explain how their use of modern designs differed from those of Weimar modernism, the Four Year Plan made the search for economical designs a national project. From the end of 1936 onward, architects

¹³⁰ For more details on efforts to identify and promote alternative building materials, see BArch R 3901/20065, BArch R 3901/21420, BArch R 3901/21424, BArch R 3901/21425, BArch R 3901/21427, BArch R 3901/21428, BArch R 3901/21429, BArch R 3901/21430.

¹³¹ BArch R 3901/21420, Bl. 176-177, “Richtlinien über die Einsparung von Baustoffen.”

¹³² “Leichtmetall im Bauwesen,” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 71, no. 34 (August 25, 1937): B 703-B 706.

¹³³ “Flach- und Hohlglas als Baustoffe,” in *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 71, no. 34 (August 25, 1937): B 706-B 709.

¹³⁴ “Verordnung über baupolizeiliche Maßnahmen zur Einsparung von Baustoffen. Vom 30. Juni 1937,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1937, I, 728.

¹³⁵ “Ersparnisse an Bauholz und Baukosten,” *Deutsche Bauzeitung* 71, no. 27 (July 7, 1937): B 513.

¹³⁶ Alfons Leitl, “Ein Wohnhaus am Rhein,” in *Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau* 21, no. 3 (March 1937): 93-94.

who continued to crown simple homes with extravagant gabled roofs were charged with squandering precious raw materials.

Attempting to build a flat roof was not unproblematic, however, for disagreements between authorities and numerous, sometimes conflicting, guidelines plagued the process. In November 1937, the Reich and Prussian minister of labor wrote to Göring regarding the Four Year Plan and complained that the conflicting guidelines were unsustainable.¹³⁷ Furthermore, Heimatschutz considerations of traditional, regional architecture had deeply influenced local opinions, so that rural authorities and architects resisted such modernizing measures. Some building inspectors continued to privilege proper “building ethos” over the need to conserve raw materials.¹³⁸ For example, Victor Klemperer had hoped to utilize a flat roof on his new home in Dölzchen, but building inspectors demanded that he construct a much more expensive “German gable.”¹³⁹

Some local authorities had attempted to pass outright bans on flat roofs. This occurred in Berlin when the city’s district mayors banded together to request that flat roofs be prohibited in Berlin’s suburbs, especially Zehlendorf, where architects had implemented diverse housing designs in the early twentieth century.¹⁴⁰ When Albert Speer became building inspector, however, he chafed at precisely these types of restrictions. Instead, he advocated for the individual rights of architects and sought to reverse some effects of the bureaucratic jungle. Especially in Berlin, Speer centralized his control and curtailed the authority of the building inspectorate, who he believed

¹³⁷ BArch R 3901/21430, Bl. 002, Der Reichs- und Preußische Arbeitsminister an Herrn Min. Präs. Gen. Oberst Göring, November 18, 1937.

¹³⁸ In a letter to the Reich minister of labor, the Prussian finance minister addressed this very point, writing that, in rural areas, efforts to conserve wood “are often interpreted as a hindrance to the year-long efforts of building inspectors for local building styles.” See BArch R 3901/21425, Bl. 118-121, Der Preussische Finanzminister an den Herrn Reichsarbeitsminister, July 10, 1939.

¹³⁹ Victor Klemperer, *I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years, 1933-1941*, trans. Martin Chalmers (New York: Random House, 1998), 64, 77.

¹⁴⁰ LAB A Rep. 010-02, Nr. 15208, Die Vorsitzenden der Bezirksämter an den Herrn Oberbürgermeister Berlin, January 5, 1934.

regulated building too stringently. Speer expressed concerns that construction was becoming *too* uniform. In a meeting with other building officials, Speer expressed his wish for a “more mixed picture” instead of a roofline in which all gables faced the street front.¹⁴¹ He wanted the image of the settlement to be as “diverse as possible” and to grant architects some “room for maneuver.”¹⁴² Thereafter, Speer endeavored to grant sixty to seventy architects “certain freedoms” from any oversight by building inspectors in constructing single-family homes in Berlin’s suburbs, especially in Zehlendorf.¹⁴³ Speer underscored his trust in these select architects to create “proper constructions” (*anständige Bauten*) and said they should be judged not based on their blueprints but only on completed buildings.¹⁴⁴ The pre-approved architects were not to be scrutinized by building inspectors “regarding the aesthetic form of their designs.”¹⁴⁵

Indeed, due in part to Speer’s views, more outright practical considerations dominated in Germany’s wartime planning schemes for postwar housing construction. By the late 1930s, conservative architects’ dreams of providing each German family with its own home on a rural piece of land had been quashed. In 1938, Herbert Hoffmann, editor of *Moderne Bauformen*, wrote, “We had to reconcile ourselves long ago to the fact that, due to mere spatial policy concerns, not every city-dweller can be provided with a single-family home with a garden in the suburbs. Therefore, the large apartment block has, rightly so, been given more and more attention lately.”¹⁴⁶ The Four Year Plan and wartime concerns had drastically changed architectural and urban

¹⁴¹ BArch R 4606/1006, File note from Dr. Fränk, May 22, 1941.

¹⁴² BArch R 4606/1006, Entwurf (Betrifft: Rechtswirksamkeit von Massenaufbauplänen), May 26, 1941 and “Niederschrift über die Besprechung vom 22. Mai 1941.”

¹⁴³ BArch R 4606/1006, File note from Dr. Fränk, May 22, 1941.

¹⁴⁴ BArch R 4606/1006, Stephan to Speer, notes from a meeting regarding the “Abschaffung der Massenaufbaupläne,” November 25, 1941.

¹⁴⁵ BArch R 4606/1006, draft regarding “Wohngebiete mit Einzelhausbebauung” to the Oberbürgermeister of the Reich City Berlin and the Oberpräsidenten, December 8, 1941.

¹⁴⁶ H[erbert] H[offmann], “Ernst Listner, Stuttgart – Wohnhausbauten in München, Stuttgart und Ulm,” *Moderne Bauformen* 37 (1938): 485.

planning considerations. The November 1940 “Decree for the Preparation of German Housing after the War” further cemented these changes in policy, acknowledging that postwar housing solutions would involve not only single-family homes and settlements, but also apartment blocks. It stressed the need for further standardization of building parts and designs, as well as the rationalization of production.¹⁴⁷ The decree also established the position of the Reich Commissar for Social Housing (Robert Ley, leader of the DAF), who was directly responsible to Hitler. Under Ley’s direction, the German Academy for Housing drew up plans for postwar social housing schemes, devised guidelines, models, and blueprints, and standardized designs.¹⁴⁸ Speer concurred with Ley that “under no circumstances should multi-story buildings be prevented and that indeed, they can be viewed favorably in terms of population policy so long as one does not adhere to the previous form of the old apartments and rental blocks.”¹⁴⁹

Housing authorities were conscious of previous critiques of rationalization, however, and were keen to differentiate themselves from their Weimar counterparts as a result. Though planners proudly acknowledged that social housing schemes were largely “a German invention, just as Germany was the first country to demonstrate that efficient low-cost housing could be good architecture as well,” they were referring not to the modernist Weimar settlements. Instead, they harkened much further back to Augsburg’s Fuggerei housing complex from the sixteenth century, the world’s oldest social housing project. The problem with Weimar’s plans was that they had often made “a theory of style – materials and function determine form – more important than the needs of the family.” In Nazi Germany, the goal was “to build modern, efficient low cost housing,

¹⁴⁷ “Erlaß zur Vorbereitung des deutschen Wohnungsbaues nach dem Krieg. Vom 15. November 1940,” *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1940 I, 1495-1498.

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., BArch R 4002/100.

¹⁴⁹ BArch R 4002/28, Bl. 54, Der Reichsminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (Speer) an den Reichwohnungskommissar Reichsleiter Dr. Ley, November 24, 1944.

using all the technical inventions which have simplified modern building and modern living without, however, losing the homelike quality of the traditional German dwelling.”¹⁵⁰ The new Nazi version of the apartment block was to “bring the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft to visible expression and to amplify and strengthen it.”¹⁵¹ In this conception, the “missing connection with the soil is to be counterbalanced by the construction of wide-opening windows, alcoves, and in the upper stories, by outdoor seating and reclining areas on balconies or rooftop gardens.”¹⁵² Apartment blocks with five or more stories were not to receive pitched roofs.¹⁵³ Thus, the flat roof itself—the very symbol of Weimar architectural degenerateness—could be transformed into a rooftop garden, where city-dwellers could reconnect to nature and soil.

Conclusion

Nazi perceptions of a chaotic built environment allegedly rendered visible everything they despised: Weimar individualism, Marxism, liberalism, capitalism, Jewish influence. In their ideological rhetoric, Third Reich architects vowed to cleanse architecture of its “foreign” influences and construct buildings that were *bodenständig*. Everyday buildings in the new regime should be built from a proper ethos and should harmonize with their natural and built environments. The strategy for accomplishing this goal, however, was never explicitly articulated, and building authorities often contradicted one another in their attempts to enforce this vision. Furthermore, inconsistencies existed between Nazi rhetoric and architectural reality, between ideology and praxis. There was no absolute rupture in architectural design in 1933.¹⁵⁴ Although

¹⁵⁰ Schmitz, *A Nation Builds*, 97.

¹⁵¹ BArch R 4002/98, Bl. 145, “Zur Gestaltung des vielgeschossigen Wohnhauses.”

¹⁵² BArch R 4002/98, Bl. 146, “Zur Gestaltung des vielgeschossigen Wohnhauses.”

¹⁵³ BArch R 4002/98, Bl. 157, “Zur Gestaltung des vielgeschossigen Wohnhauses.”

¹⁵⁴ Gerhard Fehl stresses the continuities of modernism in Weimar, Nazi Germany, and into the 1950s during postwar reconstruction. Modern building practices did not lie latent during the Nazi era, only to be revived again after the war.

Third Reich architects claimed a sharp break from the past and promoted what they saw as an alternative modern architecture to the one designed in Weimar, the styles often differed in rhetoric only. Weimar architecture's modernist features persisted in everyday buildings. These contradictions needed to be coordinated and explained for Nazi purposes. Unlike the physical and symbolic transformations of oppositional spaces and the public sphere analyzed in Chapters 1 and 2, which were unyielding, the coordination of everyday architecture revealed that Nazi ideology could be flexible in practice. In this realm, rhetorical coordination often sufficed.

The findings in this chapter encourage us to revisit two important aspects of Nazism. The first concerns ideology. The persistence of modernist elements in architecture in Nazi Germany might lead us to one of the following conclusions: *either* that the Nazis had no coherent architectural policy for non-monumental buildings *or* that they had a defined architectural policy but were ideologically flexible or unable to fully realize their visions. I believe the answer is to be found in a combination of these two conclusions. There was no definitive architectural policy for everyday architecture, but at least initially, most voices promoted a traditional style. But even here, architects were not ideologically rigid. These inconsistencies suggest that it was not always the architects who accommodated the regime, but that the regime could, at times, also accommodate multiple styles as well as to pragmatically respond to contingent constraints and circumstances. Ideology in this instance was both crucial to Nazi legitimacy and practice as well as flexible and amendable when needed.¹⁵⁵ With the right rhetorical reexplanation, any modern element could be said to emanate from German soil and thereby be “Germanized.”

See Fehl, “Die Moderne,” 39. For design continuities in Weimar, Nazi Germany, and the Federal Republic, see Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects*.

¹⁵⁵ This supports Robert Paxton's claim that fascist ideology could still be “simultaneously proclaimed as central, yet amended or violated as expedient.” See Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 219.

The second key aspect of Nazism to revisit concerns its place in modernity, or at least contemporary architects' views of their role in the modern world.¹⁵⁶ *Modernism* was the self-critical response to modernity and the radical changes it catalyzed. Accordingly, architectural modernism was an attempt to remedy the modern ills of the built environment. Third Reich architects were likewise *modernists* who proactively devised solutions to solve problems of the modern world.¹⁵⁷ Third Reich architects and city planners were self-assured protagonists who confidently employed technology and modern building materials to demonstrate that they were not “backward-looking” and that they too could meet modern needs and desires.¹⁵⁸ As long as they claimed to build from a “German spirit,” technology and modern building materials represented no inherent threat.

¹⁵⁶ For a recent review of the arguments and debates surrounding Nazism and modernity, see Mark Roseman, “National Socialism and the End of Modernity,” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011).

¹⁵⁷ Clearly, Nazis were not modernizers who conformed to the standard definition of modernization in which political liberalization was assumed to parallel economic development, and any study that depicts Nazis as modernizers must grapple with the central nature of the regime’s racism. Fritzsche encourages us to keep both Nazis’ technocratic nature and their racism central to our studies. He notes, “The Nazis were neither mere social-welfare innovators nor simply obsessed racial fanatics; rather, they were committed to an ambitious program of racial reclamation in which they drew liberally on the premises of modern social planning.” See Peter Fritzsche, “Nazi Modern,” *Modernism/Modernity* 3, no. 1 (1996): 5-7, 9. For additional studies that further analyze technology, technical planning, and Nazi racial aims in conjunction, see: Eric Katz, ed. *Death by Design: Science, Technology, and Engineering in Nazi Germany* (New York: Pearson, 2006).

¹⁵⁸ I refrain from calling the Nazis’ vision of modernism “reactionary,” because as Thomas Rohkrämer pointedly notes, reactionaries who champion technology only appear contradictory if we presume that “technology is normally accepted by liberals, democrats or socialists and rejected by reactionaries.” See Thomas Rohkrämer, “Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism: Technocratic Tendencies in Germany, 1890-1945,” *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 1 (1999): 31.

Chapter 4

Transgression: Demarcating the Volksgemeinschaft in Pubs, Cafes, and Restaurants

Gaststätten are focal points of community life and a reflection of cultural development. Extending far beyond the realm of economics, they are interrelated with the functioning of the Volksgemeinschaft and the political system. Forces emanate from the community life in *Gaststätten* and become effective in political events. Utterances about daily events, often passionately expressed at the guests' table and which prove to be lasting, are reflected in the appearance and operation of the *Gaststätte* as either cultural progress or decay. The catering industry is, therefore, an operative sphere of political and cultural forces. That applies to the *Gasthaus* and its rooms. That applies to the proprietor and his assistants. That applies, not least, to the guest and his morals.¹

Hermann Esser, State Secretary of Tourism, wrote these words in the forward to a book entitled *Cultural History of the Gaststätte*. Esser was a co-founder of the German Workers' Party in 1919, the political predecessor to the NSDAP, and served as the *Völkischer Beobachter's* first editor. Due to his combative personality and many personal scandals, Esser later fell out of favor with many high-ranking Nazi functionaries and was suspended from the NSDAP in 1935 after assaulting an adolescent girl. Thereafter, Hitler gave him the honorary position of State Secretary of Tourism within the Reich Propaganda Ministry.² Esser's own moral shortcomings did not prevent him from expounding upon morality within *Gaststätten*—pubs, restaurants, and bars. He wrote that the nation's "political decay" prior to 1933 had "asserted itself in a degeneration of the catering industry." Bars and restaurants became the gluttonous retreat of Germans who wished to drink away their sorrows. Therefore, Esser maintained that the "influence of the individual" had replaced the "ties of community life" in Weimar's *Gaststätten*.³

Contrary to Esser's alarming image of spaces of communal corrosion, *Gaststätten* had in fact served critical community-building functions in the Weimar Republic. Bars and cafes helped

¹ Friedrich Rauers, *Kulturgeschichte der Gaststätte*, ed. Alfred Ringer, vol. 1, Schriftenreihe der Hermann Esser Forschungsgemeinschaft für Fremdenverkehr (Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1942), VII.

² Robert S. Wistrich, *Who's Who in Nazi Germany*, 3 ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 55.

³ Rauers, *Kulturgeschichte*, 1, VII.

cultivate the oft-celebrated political and cultural modernity of the post-World War I era, fostering mass political movements and abetting sexual emancipation. Each Communist and Social Democratic association, paramilitary faction, and trade union had its own designated pub where it met to discuss politics, count union dues, draft propaganda material, or seek refuge after street fights. Nazis imitated workers' associations by establishing their own pubs. Thereafter, these political pubs witnessed the brunt of the street violence in the late 1920s and early 1930s.⁴ At the same time, dance halls and bars in Berlin inspired a flourishing nightlife, drawing visitors from near and far. Such venues were generally tolerant to sexual minorities, many even catering specifically to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transvestite patrons.⁵ Access to these semipublic spaces helped create and reinforce the burgeoning identities of sexual minorities.⁶ Because these forms of communal life starkly contrasted Nazi politics and morals, they were among the first places National Socialists targeted, confiscated, and coordinated in 1933. From then on, the regime reconceptualized *Gaststätten* as sites to strengthen relations between *Volksgenossen*.

Unlike the successful orchestration of the public sphere and the visible posturing required of Germans therein, as outlined in Chapter 2, the semipublic spaces of *Gaststätten* proved more impervious to Nazi propaganda and norms. Two things hampered the regime's efforts to politicize pubs and cafes. First, the historic use of these spaces by subaltern groups constituted a strong thread of continuity that was not broken during the Nazi era. Second, and related, the regime's vision for *Gaststätten* was at odds with its reception and implementation by ordinary Germans who

⁴ Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists*; Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies*; Reschke, *Kampf um den Kiez*.

⁵ In this chapter, I employ the terms that contemporary "sexual minorities" used themselves to label their sexual identities and orientations.

⁶ David James Prickett, "Defining Identity via Homosexual Spaces: Locating the Male Homosexual in Weimar Berlin," *Women in German Yearbook* 21 (2005); Robert Beachy, *Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Laurie Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic: German Homosexual Emancipation and the Rise of the Nazis* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2015).

often resisted the politicization of these spaces.⁷ To be sure, pubs were no longer hubs for mass political mobilization and active resistance. Nor did they allow the continuation of a self-confident homosexual public life as had emerged in Weimar. Nevertheless, below the unified facade of the Nazi public sphere, the semipublic spaces of *Gaststätten* accommodated a whole host of illicit activities that bucked the regime's attempts to mold Germans into a homogenous, virtuous, and loyal *Volksgemeinschaft*.

Moments of transgression throw ideology's relation to space and place into sharp relief, because they provoke responses from authorities who are forced to stipulate, or redefine, what is accepted practice in a given place and time.⁸ The discourse surrounding transgression often stresses that offenders acted "out of place" and demarcates them as deviants from the rest of the population.⁹ I maintain, however, that this discourse also often works in the opposite direction to temper infractions and underscore one's belonging to the wider community. Like festivities, rituals, and newspaper accounts of them had delimited behavior in the public sphere, so too did the responses of police and court authorities to transgression refashion normality in the Nazi semipublic sphere. Breaches of Nazi norms in the public sphere were harshly rebuked because the regime was primarily concerned with *outward conformity*. In the semipublic sphere of *Gaststätten*, on the other hand, German authorities were more willing to overlook transgressive acts. Within the confines of pub walls, former Communists, Socialists, and otherwise disgruntled civilians

⁷ Henri Lefebvre's and Michel de Certeau's theories on the power dynamics integral to space and spatial practices are instructive here. *Representations of space* (Lefebvre) and *strategies* (de Certeau)—the intended uses of space as promoted by authorities such as government officials, city planners, architects—often bear little resemblance to how these representations are received by ordinary users. These users often challenge official representations via their own spatial practices or *tactics* (de Certeau), their interactions with and appropriation of these spaces. See Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*; Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

⁸ Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place*, 9, 18-21. Cresswell draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu here regarding "doxa" but explicitly links the notion of normalized social orders to *place* and expands our view beyond class distinctions to examine how issues such as gender, race, and sexuality play a role in the construction of "deviance."

⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

voiced their anger and discontent.¹⁰ Furthermore, despite persecution, gay men and women continued to frequent and socialize in cafes and pubs.¹¹ Although the regime often passed harsh sentences for disobedience, at other times, it relented and accommodated the behavior of working-class dissidents and homosexuals who were otherwise outwardly productive members of the Volksgemeinschaft. Ideology in the semipublic sphere of cafes and pubs proved, as in the case of modern architecture, flexible and amenable in practice.

Utilizing local police reports, court records, and survivor testimonies, I examine Gaststätten as semipublic spaces where the Volksgemeinschaft was truly forged. Within them, the boundaries of the community stretched for some but broke for others. Indeed, Nazi ideology in Gaststätten was rigid only for German Jews. The new normality of pubs and cafes in Nazi Germany accommodated “racially fit” transgressors but excluded German Jews altogether. Transgressive acts demarcate the insider from the outsider in a process by which the core community is defined by its “margin.”¹² Thus, the inclusion of political dissidents and homosexuals in the Volksgemeinschaft was reinforced vis-à-vis the exclusion of German Jews. Although Communists and homosexuals could maintain and carve out spaces for themselves within this liminal space, sometimes with great risk, Jews found such sites increasingly unwelcoming, even threatening, and

¹⁰ Histories of the German working class have alternatively emphasized resistance or nonconformity, claimed workers retreated to the private sphere, or discussed the assorted reasons many organized workers shed previous political allegiances and consented to the Nazi regime. See Alf Lüdtke, “What Happened to the ‘Fiery Red Glow’?: Workers’ Experiences and German Fascism,” in *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, ed. Alf Lüdtke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Tim Mason, “The Workers’ Opposition in Nazi Germany,” *History Workshop* 11 (1981); Detlev J. K. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*, trans. Richard Deveson (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1987).

¹¹ Most research on the lives of sexual minorities under National Socialism focuses on their persecution, especially that of homosexual men. See Claudia Schoppmann, *Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1991); Günter Grau, ed. *Homosexualität in der NS-Zeit: Dokumente einer Diskriminierung und Verfolgung* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993); Alexander Zinn, “Das Glück kam immer zu mir”: *Rudolf Brazda - das Überleben eines Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2011); Insa Eschebach, ed. *Homophobie und Devianz: Weibliche und männliche Homosexualität im Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012).

¹² Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place*, 149.

their room for maneuver within them progressively restricted. In semipublic spaces such as Gaststätten—beyond the direct gaze of the regime, where citizens had more room for maneuver than in the public sphere, and where disobedience was often tolerated and condoned—the boundary between insider and outsider was most damningly drawn. Ordinary Germans and authorities alike made individual decisions about who was entitled to those spaces. In this chapter, I first outline the social and political functions of Gaststätten in modern Germany and then discuss the NSDAP’s attempts to politicize them to foster bonds between *Volksgenossen*. These efforts were sometimes thwarted by SA and SS men themselves and more often directly challenged by political opponents and homosexuals. The exclusion of Jews and eradication of Jewish influences constituted the one common denominator of spatial practices in Gaststätten.

Gaststätten in Modern German History: Crucibles for Weimar’s Modernity

In the era of modern mass politics and culture, German pubs were indispensable. More than just sites of consumption, pubs strengthened social bonds and networks. *Stammtische* (regulars’ tables) lent loyal patrons social prestige. As a lively public sphere emerged in nineteenth-century Germany, cafes and pubs accommodated newly minted associations in separate meeting rooms. These rooms were generally semi-private spaces, cordoned off from the rest of the patrons. Such arrangements were mutually beneficial, assuring clubs a meeting space and proprietors steady clientele and income. As populations multiplied, urbanization quickened, and consumption increased, the German catering industry exploded and diversified. Working-class pubs dotted the cityscape, providing workers respite from their cramped living quarters and constituted lively neighborhood gathering sites.¹³ Pubs abetted the emerging working-class

¹³ For more information on the emergence of such establishments, see: Ines Kaufmann, “Zur Entwicklung der Kneipe im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in *Kneipenkultur: Untersuchungen rund um die Theke*, ed. Gudrun Schwibbe (Münster:

movement, but following two assassination attempts on Emperor Wilhelm I's life in 1878, the political police cracked down on Social Democratic fraternization in pubs.¹⁴ Yet Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws in the 1870s and 1880s only heightened the importance of pubs for the organized working class in imperial Germany. Continued repression during the Weimar Republic cemented the role of pubs as spaces of political mobilization. Workers might be fired for expressing affinity with Communists in the factory, but neighborhood pubs offered them protection to freely voice their opinions.¹⁵

Workers were not the only subaltern group to benefit from the specific culture and freedoms engendered in these sites of leisure. Other locales constituted important social centers for sexual minorities, offering them provisional access to the semipublic sphere where they might forge friendships and partnerships and mobilize to overturn discriminatory legislation. These establishments—many scattered along Kurfürstendamm in western Berlin and the streets emanating from the Gedächtniskirche, Wittenbergplatz, and Nollendorfplatz—often catered to a broad section of middle- and upper-class visitors but many began openly accommodating gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transvestite patrons.¹⁶ Despite repression under the German criminal code's infamous Paragraph 175, which criminalized bestiality as well as “unnatural fornication” between

Waxmann, 1998), 23-27; James Roberts, “Wirtshaus und Politik in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung,” in *Sozialgeschichte der Freizeit: Untersuchungen zum Wandel der Alltagskultur in Deutschland*, ed. Gerhard Huck (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1980).

¹⁴ Jens Dobler, *Zwischen Duldungspolitik und Verbrechensbekämpfung: Homosexuellenverfolgung durch die Berliner Polizei von 1848 bis 1933*, ed. Peter Nitschke, Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Polizeigeschichte e.V. (Frankfurt: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2008), 367. For a close reading of such surveillance and police reports on working-class bars in Hamburg in the late imperial era, see: Richard J. Evans, *Kneipengespräche im Kaiserreich: die Stimmungsberichte der Hamburger politischen Polizei 1892-1914* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1989).

¹⁵ Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies*, 97, 99.

¹⁶ Travel guidebooks advertised these sites of nighttime entertainment. See Curt Moreck, *Führer durch das “lasterhafte” Berlin* (Leipzig: Verlag moderner Stadtführer, 1981), 9; Eugen Szatmari, *Was nicht im Baedeker steht: Berlin*, vol. 1, *Was nicht im ‘Baedeker’ steht* (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1927), 1, 139-56; Roger Salaridonne, *Hauptstädte des Lasters: Eine Reportage aus den Vergnügungsvierteln der Weltstädte* (Berlin: Auffenberg-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 1931), 88-110.

men, Berlin became a hub for sexual minorities.¹⁷ But cities across the country—including Hamburg, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Weimar, Essen, Karlsruhe, Braunschweig, Stuttgart, Dresden, and Mannheim-Ludwigshafen—also offered bars and dance evenings and hosted harvest festivals, Christmas parties, New Year’s Eve festivities, and Easter balls for homosexual patrons. Such locales served important educational and political functions as well. By the beginning of 1933, the Association for Human Rights (BfM), which fought to overturn Paragraph 175, had local branches in seventeen German cities and an additional one in Zurich.¹⁸ Each BfM branch convened at its own designated pub or cafe. Just as Communist and Socialists conducted business in pubs, so too did the Berlin BfM branch meet regularly in the Magic Flute’s second floor “Florida Hall” to discuss business matters, make decisions on member applications, and hold elections for its board of directors.¹⁹ The Magic Flute also regularly hosted educational lectures.²⁰

Not everyone loved the politically emancipated and sexually uninhibited culture of Weimar’s Gaststätten. Joseph Goebbels disparagingly wrote of western Berlin’s cafes, bars, and cabarets where “the spirit of the asphalt democracy is piled high.” He viewed this district as the embodied antithesis of Nazism and concluded that it was “not the true Berlin.” The true Berlin, he wrote, was slowly awakening to “the Judas who is selling our people for thirty pieces of silver.” This Berlin, Goebbels vowed, would soon “demolish the abodes of corruption all around the

¹⁷ Beachy, *Gay Berlin*, xv. According to Beachy, this legislation was one of four vectors of German history that created an especially propitious climate for the consolidation of homosexual identities in Berlin. The other three vectors included: extensive research into sexual identities (chiefly, via Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Sciences), active political movements that sought to overturn Paragraph 175, and a “relatively free press” in which dozens of gay and lesbian journals and erotic novels proliferated.

¹⁸ “Adressen-Verzeichniss einzelner Ortsgruppen des B.f.M. E.V.,” *Blätter für Menschenrecht* 10-11, no. 12/1 (December 1932-January 1933).

¹⁹ See, e.g., *Blätter für Menschenrecht* 9 (January 1931): 10.

²⁰ For example, in 1929, Dr. Abraham, an employee of Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Sciences gave a lecture entitled: “Is homosexuality a vice?” See “Achtung! Vortrag,” *Liebende Frauen* 4, no. 12 (1929).

Gedächtniskirche; it will transform them and give them over to a risen people.”²¹ At the time of this prediction in 1928, Goebbels was just two years into his tenure as *Gauleiter*, and the NSDAP was still a fledgling party in the Reich capital. To enact his vision for western Berlin, Goebbels would first have to help the NSDAP succeed in Berlin. To gain a foothold in the city, SA troops imitated Communists by establishing SA pubs in friendly neighborhoods and then endeavoring to overtake Berlin district-by-district. Nazis remembered these pubs as bulwarks “in the battle zone” and as second homes where they spent much of their free time drinking and playing music and cards.²² SA men also planned marches, propaganda actions, and attacks against Communists from inside the pubs and returned to them after scuffles with Communists to recuperate. Political pubs were sites of violent altercations between Nazis and Communists throughout the country, and these attacks increased in the early 1930s.

As semipublic spaces, *Gaststätten* had provided alternative avenues for subaltern groups to enter public life and to negotiate their position vis-à-vis the state rather than via the bourgeois public sphere. Unlike their middle-class counterparts, Communists, Socialists, and sexual minorities did not enjoy unfettered access to the public sphere. Therefore, the visibility and inclusion of these groups in society at large can be viewed as a barometer for the vitality of Weimar’s democracy. The admission of such individuals was provisional and almost always entailed compromises. Authorities were all too willing to curtail this access where possible. For example, when political violence became acute in 1931, Reich President Hindenburg invoked constitutional Article 48 to issue a decree which allowed authorities to ban meetings, political symbols, uniforms, posters, and propaganda, especially in places which were said to incite

²¹ Quoted in Kaes, *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*, 561-62.

²² von Engelbrechten, *Wir wandern*, 19.

violence.²³ These measures overwhelmingly targeted Communists and their spaces, especially pubs.²⁴

Homosexuals' access to the public sphere was likewise conditional. Although authorities tolerated some homosexual establishments, they did so largely because they made homosexuality less visible in public spaces—such as train station platforms, public restrooms, and dark park corners—which the police associated with less reputable individuals.²⁵ These establishments also facilitated easier control and supervision, not just of homosexuals, but also of extortionists, which police deemed the greater threat.²⁶ Police, and their Nazi accomplices, utilized these practiced measures of policing and repression to banish these groups from the public sphere in 1933. They outlawed Communist and Socialist symbols and ripped homosexual publications from newsstands, rendering these groups virtually invisible. Nevertheless, the transgressive culture of the semipublic sphere in Germany's *Gaststätten* experienced a diluted, but still vibrant, afterlife in Nazi Germany.

Bringing *Gaststätten* into Line and Politicizing Pubs for “*Volksgenossen*”

Nazis targeted Communist and Socialist pubs with brute force in 1933 to quash their political opponents, and police forces raided many bars, targeting homosexuals and seeking to root out practices they deemed immoral. These measures ensured that Communists, Socialists, and homosexuals would no longer be able to use *Gaststätten* as sites to politically mobilize against the

²³ “Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Bekämpfung politischer Ausschreitungen. Vom 28. März 1931,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1931, I, 79-81.

²⁴ The police kept tabs on Communist, Socialist, National Socialist, and trade union meeting pubs throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, and they regularly updated lists of such pubs. They kept an especially close eye on Communist-affiliated pubs. See LAB A Pr. Br. 030, Nr. 21623. For a full list of KPD pubs in Berlin, see the same file, Bl. 348-353.

²⁵ Laurie Marhoefer refers to these types of compromises as the “Weimar settlement on sexual politics” in which any steps toward equality for homosexuals during Weimar “were contingent on the renunciation by homosexuals and transvestites of an assertive public presence.” See Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic*, 8.

²⁶ Dobler, *Zwischen Duldungspolitik und Verbrechensbekämpfung*, 364-65.

regime. Legislation passed between 1933 and 1935 further curtailed these individuals' room for maneuver. Nazi authorities strove to refashion Gaststätten as sites to celebrate national holidays, to listen to the Führer's speeches, and to mollify and reward the population. They endeavored to coordinate and politicize pubs and cafes for their own purposes, but they faced challenges and resistance from various fronts.

In the weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor, armed SA and SS men stormed Communist pubs, smashed windows and furniture, and threatened and harassed guests.²⁷ Several violent incidents even resulted in deaths. For example, on February 5, 1933, patrons inside a small Communist pub in Berlin were playing cards when at least sixteen SS men stormed in shortly before midnight. The SS men smashed the front windows, destroyed furniture, and fired a few warning shots. When the barkeeper tried to flee into the kitchen, she was shot in the stomach and died of her wounds.²⁸ Thereafter, a local newspaper declared that "politics on the street seem to want to adopt forms which we have never experienced."²⁹ Further violence in pubs resulted in additional casualties throughout the month of February.³⁰

²⁷ For two examples, see: "Wieder eine unruhige Nacht in Berlin," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 2, 1933; "NSDAP-Angehörige stören eine kommunistische Filmveranstaltung," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 4, 1933.

²⁸ "K.P.D.-Wirtin in Schöneberg ermordet," *B.Z. am Mittag*, February 6, 1933; "Ueberfall auf ein kommunistisches Lokal," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 6, 1933.

²⁹ "Nun auch schon Handgranaten – Anschlag auf ein NSDAP.-Lokal," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 10, 1933; "Handgranaten-Anschlag auf ein NSDAP-Lokal," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 11, 1933. See also: BArch R 58/3026, Bl. 18.

³⁰ Shootings on the night of February 22, 1933 left two people dead and three badly injured. See: "Eine Nacht schwerer politischer Zusammenstöße," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 22, 1933; "Zwei Tote in Spandau," *B.Z. am Mittag*, February 22, 1933; "In Berlin: 3 Tote, 3 Schwerverletzte," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 23, 1933. On February 24, 1933, two SA men attacked a KPD pub in Malmöerstrasse 15, see: BArch R 58/3026, Report on Political Clashes from February 24, 1933. On February 26, 1933, two pubs (in Matternstraße 12 and 14) were attacked, leaving two people injured: "Wieder KPD-Wirtin angeschossen. Schüsse auf Lokale," *B.Z. am Mittag*, February 27, 1933; "Wieder drei Todesopfer. Nächtliche Ueberfälle," *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 28, 1933; "Feuerüberfall auf Nationalsozialisten," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 27, 1933.

The attacks and subsequent arrests were not unilateral in February 1933. Communists and Socialists also perpetrated attacks against some Nazi pubs.³¹ In addition, police officers apprehended Nazi as well as Communist and Socialist perpetrators and handed them over to the political department in Berlin's police headquarters. Officers even searched several SA pubs in the wake of attacks.³² By mid-February, however, when Göring made SA and SS troops auxiliary police officers, punitive measures only targeted the Left.

Legislation passed in early 1933 assisted authorities in their crackdown on Communist pubs. Already on February 3, seventeen pubs known as regular meeting sites of the Revolutionary Union Opposition were searched for illegal materials and weapons.³³ Paragraph 23 of the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the German People, passed the next day, addressed the specific rooms, spaces, and premises (*Räumlichkeiten*) where individuals gathered for political purposes. This paragraph granted the police wide authority to shut down any site where it believed political groups were planning or promoting violent acts or criminal activities—much like authorities had targeted Communist spaces during Weimar.³⁴ In the following weeks, police officers closed several more pubs accused of inciting political agitation or violence.³⁵ This paragraph and its utilization indicates that the regime was acutely aware that particular spaces,

³¹ See, e.g., “Ueberfall auf ein NSDAP-Lokal in Mariendorf,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 9, 1933.

³² Following violent incidents, the police searched the respective locales of those involved for weapons, often turning up significant caches. A search of an NSDAP-Lokal in Wilmersdorf (Augustastrasse 16) uncovered eleven pistols, and police found three pistols and two revolvers in the NSDAP pubs in Neue Bahnhofstrasse in Lichtenberg, “Politische Schießereien,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 9, 1933.

³³ BArch R 58/3294a, Bl. 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 43, 44.

³⁴ “Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutze des Deutschen Volkes. Vom 4. Februar 1933,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, I, 35-40. See also: “Neue Verordnung heute in Kraft. Ueber Presse und Versammlungen. Lokale können geschlossen werden,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, February 6, 1933. If these establishments sold alcohol, their permission to operate could be revoked for up to one year. Businesses themselves could also be shut down for up to one year.

³⁵ See, for example: “Gummknüppel-Lokal geschlossen,” *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, morning edition, February 4, 1933; “K.P.D.-Lokal geschlossen,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, February 12, 1933; “Kommunistisches Parteilokal geschlossen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 15, 1933; BArch R 58/3026, Bl. 32; BArch R 58/3026, February 20, 1933; “Kundgebung des Sozialistischen Kulturbundes aufgelöst,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 27, 1933. For a direct invocation of Paragraph 23, see “Kommunistisches Parteilokal geschlossen,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 20, 1933.

especially pubs, were crucial for political mobilization, and it was keen to prevent them from being used for such purposes.

The “Reichstag Fire Decree” intensified the Nazi assault on these spaces when Göring ordered the search and seizure of Communist pubs.³⁶ The political police executed an immediate campaign against them during the night of February 28 to March 1, searching and closing all pubs where Communist associations officially met as well as many pubs simply patronized by Communists.³⁷ Policemen confiscated weapons, election posters, Communist and Socialist flags, and various “illegal materials” (such as political pamphlets and newspapers).³⁸ SA and SS troops assisted the police in its raids and arrests of thousands of Communists across the country, whom they tortured in prisons, cellars, SA pubs, and in makeshift concentration camps.

Amidst rapidly shifting circumstances, Communist functionaries scrambled to buttress local networks and devise new defensive tactics and guidelines. Faced with the assault on their pubs, they demanded that all factory and street cells immediately change the pub location of their regular meetings, acknowledging that the times when Communist groups could freely congregate in pubs close to their homes or worksites “must be brought to an end.”³⁹ All Communist gatherings in “closed spaces” had been officially outlawed.⁴⁰ These actions constituted the end of a political era for Communists who were thereafter deprived of these crucial semipublic spaces of political mobilization. Nazis had thrown a wrench into their modus operandi of over fifty years. By the end of March 1933, this two-pronged approach—of arresting party functionaries and banning

³⁶ BArch R 43-II/1193, Bl. 33-37, “Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die Ministerbesprechung vom 28. Februar 1933, vorm. 11 Uhr.”

³⁷ “200 Sistierte. Bei Schließung des K. P. D.-Lokale,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, March 1, 1933.

³⁸ “Die neue Notverordnung,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 1, 1933.

³⁹ BArch R 43-II/1193, Bl. 43-50.

⁴⁰ “Einheitliches Vorgehen gegen die KPD. im Reich,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 2, 1933.

Communist meetings in public spaces—effectively robbed Communists from any real hope of mounting a full-scale, successful resistance movement against the NSDAP.

Nevertheless, working-class pubs did not simply disappear, though many proprietors whose establishments had been closed in the wake of the Reichstag fire made efforts at self-coordination to appease officials in attempt to get their pubs reopened. These individuals inundated Berlin’s local police stations and the political police with letters. Some surprised owners demanded clarification while others directly acknowledged their previous links to Communists but claimed to have since distanced themselves from political groups and pled for clemency. Barkeepers cited the diverse social and political makeups of their neighborhoods and claimed to welcome guests from all political backgrounds, even—or especially—NSDAP members, they emphasized.⁴¹ They stressed the “bourgeois” nature of their guests or remarked that they enjoyed a favorable reputation in the neighborhood.⁴² Many underscored their German nationalism and referenced past army service.⁴³ Some pub owners went to even greater lengths by submitting applications to join the Nazi Party to demonstrate their commitment to the new regime.⁴⁴

Police districts approached the matter rather ambivalently. Some officers were moved by the proprietors’ petitions, but others were unyielding. In his letter, Erich Arndt explained that he had been a front soldier in World War I, was released as an invalid due to war injuries, and that he had run his establishment in eastern Berlin since October 1919 without making any trouble. Though the police acknowledged the economic harm they were causing Arndt, they feared he still

⁴¹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 534. Hermann Jerasch emphatically stated that the pub he ran for the past twenty-two years was never “a so-called Communist meeting pub” and stated that people from all political parties patronized his pub.

⁴² See e.g., LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 450-451, Bl. 459, Bl. 499, Bl. 515-516.

⁴³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 500-502. Gustav Löffler wrote that he had been “fatherland-national oriented” his entire life and that he was a “German man to his core.” He said that his restaurant was “pure, bourgeois, and politically neutral” and was frequented by people of all political backgrounds.

⁴⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 469-470.

had close relations to the Communist Party because his patrons were “almost exclusively Communists.” They concluded that only the sale of the pub was appropriate, “or even better, the radical transformation to a *Sturmlokal* of the NSDAP.”⁴⁵ Such permanent closures were the exception, however, because the police granted most petitioners permission to reopen their pubs. In each case, the owner’s promise to never again tolerate the presence of Communists and proof that they had taken active steps in this direction were most decisive. Even many pubs officially registered as Communist pubs could reopen.⁴⁶ The political police in Berlin warned barkeepers to be on the lookout for Communists who tried to reestablish regular meetings in new pubs.⁴⁷

Efforts to coordinate pubs did not stop at these external appearances however, for the regime passed further legislation that policed what was done and said in them. On March 21, 1933, the government released the Malicious Practices Decree, which outlawed any abuse of NSDAP symbols or uniforms and severely curtailed free speech, rendering any counterfactual critique intended to undermine the regime (or accused of doing so) punishable by law.⁴⁸ This initial decree was buttressed by the Treachery Act of December 1934, which criminalized virtually any critique of the regime, including statements not provably false.⁴⁹ This law found wide application during twelve years of Nazi rule.⁵⁰ The prosecution of such offenses occurred in the newly established

⁴⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 539-541.

⁴⁶ For example, one pub in Herrfurthstraße had previously hosted both a Communist “cell” (*Zelle*) and a “defense squadron” (*Schutzstaffel*) of the KPD. Although these groups only abandoned the pub at a late date, the police eventually allowed the pub to reopen. In this case, it sufficed that a couple non-political associations which also met there requested that the police lift the ban. The police also cited the tough economic circumstances for the barkeeper and his promises to no longer tolerate subversive groups as reasons to let the pub reopen. LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 462, 464, 472. For a similar case, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21623, Bl. 513-516.

⁴⁷ “Warnung an die Gastwirte,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 9, 1933.

⁴⁸ “Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Abwehr heimtückischer Angriffe gegen die Regierung der nationalen Erhebung. Vom 21. März 1933,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, I, 135.

⁴⁹ Nikolaus Wachsmann, *Hitler’s Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 114. The official name of the law was: “Law against Treacherous Attacks on State and Party and for the Protection of Party Uniforms.”

⁵⁰ For more information on the law and its application, see Bernward Dörner, “*Heimtücke*”: *das Gesetz als Waffe: Kontrolle, Abschreckung und Verfolgung in Deutschland 1933-1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998).

special courts (*Sondergerichte*).⁵¹ In these political courts, Nazi judges, or those sympathetic to the regime, passed swift verdicts, and defendants possessed no right to appeal.

While the political police had rapidly moved against Communist pubs in Berlin, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, under Hermann Göring, issued legislation in February 1933 that targeted Weimar's more salacious establishments in the name of public morality. New guidelines stipulated that dance activities would be subject to greater scrutiny and surveillance and that such events were not to "be abused" to encourage immorality. Under no circumstances would minors be allowed entrance. Nor should hosts allow those to enter whose behavior and dress defy public notions of decorum and decency. If a bar was suspected of promoting immoral behavior, it would be refused a license or have its license revoked.⁵² The regime demanded that pub owners transform their pubs into upstanding, National Socialist-minded establishments and that they also help police control activities therein. Just as it expected proprietors of working-class pubs to reform, so too did the regime expect barkeepers in these places to be its eyes and ears.

One month later, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the regime closed more than a dozen homosexual bars. Many well-known gay and lesbian locales were closed—including Dorian Gray, Kleist-Kasino, Monokelbar, Silhouette, and the Nürnberger Diele—and three other establishments had their curfews set back.⁵³ A couple weeks later, a further seventeen establishments were

⁵¹ "Die drei neuen Verordnungen. Schutz vor heimtückischen Angriffen," *B.Z. am Mittag*, March 22, 1933.

⁵² "Neue Richtlinien für Tanzlustbarkeiten," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, February 3, 1933. At the end of February, Göring's office released another decree, further demarcating Prussia's stricter stance on these establishments. It declared that suspect pubs would be subject to greater surveillance, that proprietors would be banned from employing women if female employees were used to entice customers in a sexual manner, and that a pub's license could be revoked altogether if it was proven to promote immoral practices. See "Second Directive of the Prussian Minister of the Interior" from February 23, 1933, quoted in Günter Grau, *Hidden Holocaust? Gay and Lesbian Persecution in Germany, 1933-45*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Cassel, 1995), 27-29.

⁵³ The entire list of closed bars included: Luisen-Casino, Zauberflöte, Dorian Gray, Hollandais, Kleist-Kasino, Nürnberger Diele, Internationale Diele, Monokelbar, Geisha, Mali und Igel, Cafe Hohenzollern, Silhouette, and Mikado. The bars whose curfew was set to earlier include: De-De, Verona-Diele, and Cafe Turmhaus. See "Mehrere Gast- und Schankstätten geschlossen," *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, March 4, 1933.

affected by these measures.⁵⁴ To justify the closures, the police cited Paragraph 22 of the “Gaststätten Law,” which, among other things, authorized the closure of pubs if they promoted “gluttony, gambling, the exchange of stolen goods, dishonest trade, or immorality” or if they facilitated “the abuse of inexperienced, lighthearted, weak-willed persons.”⁵⁵ Of course, such phrasing could be broadly interpreted. By April, Göring had authorized police to independently revoke the licenses of “dubious establishments.”⁵⁶

Despite the initial assault on these sites, Nazi repression of homosexual bars in 1933 was much less systematic than it was of political pubs. Depictions of homosexual life in Nazi Germany emphasize the police’s crackdown on gay bars in Berlin where the repression was indeed severe. Nonetheless, the several dozen bars closed in Berlin were a mere fraction of the at least one-hundred total homosexual locales in the city.⁵⁷ Moreover, some establishments that had been ordered to clean up their act had apparently implemented specious changes meant to deceive authorities, decorating their bars in black, white, and red and displaying swastika flags but without actually reforming.⁵⁸

Homosexual life was not uniformly repressed across the Reich because the regime had no uniform policy on homosexuality in 1933. In Hamburg, for example, where the police were more

⁵⁴ Five of the establishments were temporarily closed: Bürgerkasino, Kaffee Fritz, Adonis-Diele, Cosi Corner, and Heideblum (Monte-Casino). The other twelve had their closing time set back to 10:00pm: Turmhaus, Terlicher, Fortuna, Zur alten Post, Rückerklause, City-Bar, Eidexe, Olala, De De, Laterne, Woo Doo, Kaffee Bärwald. See “Schließung von Schankbetrieben,” *Lichterfelder Lokal Anzeiger*, March 17, 1933; “Schließung von Schankbetrieben,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, March 17, 1933.

⁵⁵ See Paragraphs 2, 12, and 22 in “Gaststättengesetz. Vom 28. April 1930,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1930, I, 146-51.

⁵⁶ “Gegen zweifelhafte Gaststätten. Konzessions-Entziehung durch die Polizei,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 19, 1933.

⁵⁷ Robert Beachy has recorded at least eighty to one-hundred such homosexual establishments in existence in Berlin at the end of the Weimar Republic. Mel Gordon has placed that number much higher. He describes fifty such establishments in detail but concludes that this number probably constituted “between five and ten per cent of all the known known erotic or night-time establishments in Weimar Berlin.” That would amount to a number between 500 and 1,000 establishments. But not all 500-1,000 existed for the entire time period of 1918-1933, and not all were explicitly “homosexual locales,” so I have kept my estimate on the conservative end. See Beachy, *Gay Berlin*, 244; Mel Gordon, *Voluptuous Panic: The Erotic World of Weimar Berlin* (Venice, CA: Feral House, 2000), 218.

⁵⁸ “Berlins Visitenkarte wird wieder sauber – Die Reinigungsaktion der Polizei im Schank- und Gaststättengewerbe der Reichshauptstadt,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, August 16, 1933.

sympathetic to the homosexual community, homosexual bars were not closed until 1936.⁵⁹ Only after the “Röhm Putsch” in 1934 did the NSDAP transform its initial lenient stance on homosexuality into an explicitly hostile position. With one swoop, the party claimed to have rooted out both radical SA troops and the immorality (i.e. homosexuality) in their midst. Amendments to Paragraph 175 in 1935 made any lewd act between men punishable by law. This was broadly interpreted and included also interactions with no physical contact, such as mutual masturbation or simple displays of affection between men. Male prostitution and sexual relations with minors were prosecuted even more harshly.⁶⁰ Material evidence of sexual intercourse was no longer required for indictment.⁶¹ Between 1933 and 1945, approximately 50,000 men were sentenced by the courts under Paragraph 175 and served time in prison or concentration camps.⁶²

At the same time the regime was neutralizing these oppositional spaces, it also sought to Nazify pubs, in line with the destructive and constructive measures outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Gaststätten were to fulfill ideological aims. Hermann Esser declared that the Gaststätten industry was to lend “space to the strong cultural and social political impulses that emanate from National Socialism” and demanded that the relations “between the barkeeper and his loyal patrons be those that align with the fundamental idea of the Volksgemeinschaft among German people.”⁶³ Ideologically, Gaststätten were to help strengthen the Volksgemeinschaft. The “Dammtor Palace”

⁵⁹ Bernhard Rosenkranz, and Gottfried Lorenz, *Hamburg auf anderen Wegen: Die Geschichte des schwulen Lebens in der Hansestadt*, 2 ed. (Hamburg: Lambda, 2006), 16, 39. Chief of the Morality Police (*Sittenpolizei*) Rudolf Förster worked closely with the local BfM group and combatted the conflation of homosexuals and criminals.

⁶⁰ Susanne Zur Nieden, “Der homosexuelle Staatsfeind: Zur Radikalisierung eines Feindbildes im NS,” in *Homophobie und Devianz: Weibliche und männliche Homosexualität im Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Insa Eschebach (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012), 32.

⁶¹ Jennifer V. Evans, “Bahnhof Boys: Policing Male Prostitution in Post-Nazi Berlin,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 12, no. 4 (2003): 613.

⁶² Günter Grau in Lutz van Dijk, *Einsam war ich nie: Schwule unter dem Hakenkreuz 1933-1945* (Berlin: Querverlag GmbH, 2003), 150. Approximately sixty-percent of the estimated 6,000 gay men who were interned in concentration camps died during their incarceration

⁶³ Rauers, *Kulturgeschichte*, 1, VIII.

in Hamburg was touted as one such establishment: “a pure German entertainment venue.” The large beer hall was decked with swastika flags and red-white-black flags. An SA band entertained guests with military marches and folk songs. The place welcomed “German families” and intended to provide “harmless, German cheerfulness.”⁶⁴

Gaststätten featured prominently in several of the regime’s propaganda initiatives. First, they hosted festivities during national holidays. For example, while businesses and factories closed on the Day of National Labor in May 1933, the regime allowed Gaststätten to remain open so that civilians could celebrate.⁶⁵ All pub owners were notified that they were expected to decorate their establishments accordingly with Reich flags and fresh greens.⁶⁶ The closing time for bars that night was extended to five o’clock in the morning so that people could continue their merrymaking late into the night.⁶⁷ Second, pub owners were routinely asked to broadcast political speeches from Hitler and other regime members so that Germans who did not own radios could listen. Finally, Gaststätten abetted the “one-pot Sunday” campaign of the National Socialist People’s Welfare organization (NSV).⁶⁸ This initiative encouraged Germans to prepare simple one-pot meals costing fifty pfennigs or less every first Sunday of the month and to contribute their savings to the Winter Aid welfare program.⁶⁹ Restaurants had to participate as well, preparing simple meals to serve to customers at a low price and donating a portion of their profits to the NSV.⁷⁰ In this way,

⁶⁴ “Hakenkreuzfahnen am Dammtorbahnhof. Norddeutschlands größtes NS-Bierhaus eröffnet,” *Hamburger Tageblatt*, February 13, 1933.

⁶⁵ “Offene Gaststätten am 1. Mai,” *B.Z. am Mittag*, April 26, 1933.

⁶⁶ “Die größte Festversammlung, die jemals stattfand,” *Lichterfelder Lokal-Anzeiger*, April 27, 1933.

⁶⁷ “Polizeistunde: 5 Uhr!,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 30, 1933.

⁶⁸ Thomas Peter Petersen, *Gastwirte im Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939* (Bad Kleinen: Selbstverlag, 1997), 95.

⁶⁹ Evans, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939*, 487.

⁷⁰ Petersen, *Gastwirte im Nationalsozialismus*, 95, 98. Restaurants were divided into three classes and served meals priced accordingly. Simple establishments charged 60 pfennigs per meal, reserving 10 pfennigs from each for the Winter Aid. Nicer restaurants (such as those in hotels and railway dining cars) charged 1 RM per meal, while high-end restaurants maintained regular prices. Each was required to allocate 50 pfennigs per meal to the Winter Aid. Alternatively, restaurants could offer a corresponding number of free meals to needy patrons. As Petersen notes, however, this alternative was rescinded in 1938 so that the Winter Aid would receive the maximum donations.

Gaststätten directly abetted the regime's ideological agenda by forging bonds among Germans who collectively sacrificed for the greater good.⁷¹

Despite the important ideological tasks pubs and restaurants were supposed to fulfill, reigning in Gaststätten under National Socialism proved difficult, and efforts to do so encountered critical challenges from the start. The implementation of the regime's vision looked different in practice, and even stalwart National Socialists proved unreliable. For example, SA and SS men and NSDAP members believed Nazi victory had entitled them to behave as they wished in such spaces. If their inappropriate behavior caused them to be refused service, they grew belligerent and instigated fights with barkeepers, civilian guests, policemen, and even one another.⁷² When the police were called to restore order, SA and SS troops often refused to comply and tried to assert their authority over local policemen.⁷³ These men continued to behave in such spaces as they had during Weimar and were slow to adjust to the new circumstances in which the NSDAP had prevailed, the police unequivocally supported the regime, and political opposition in such sites had ceased to exist.

Furthermore, Nazis themselves routinely violated the Treachery Act in pubs, especially SS men who served as guards in concentration camps. Although these men were forbidden to openly discuss what occurred in concentration camps, a night of robust drinking often weakened their inhibitions and prompted them to share stories about their efforts to reform "Jews and Marxists."⁷⁴

⁷¹ Norbert Frei, *Der Führerstaat: Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft, 1933 bis 1945* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2013), 112.

⁷² For example, when six SS men, two wearing their uniforms, entered a pub in Berlin-Charlottenburg in February 1934, the pub owner reminded them that they were forbidden to enter the pub in uniform after one o'clock in the morning. The men responded by pushing him aside and accosting guests. When the bar owner continued to demand that they leave, the SS men pushed him up against the bar and threw punches at him. See LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21638, Bl. 32.

⁷³ For examples of conflicts between SA men and police officers, see: LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21638, Bl. 3, 6.

⁷⁴ Karl Billinger, *Fatherland* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), 98. Sometimes, reckless guards brought the camp to the pub, as happened when inebriated camp guards placed anarchist Erich Mühsam in a fur pelt and took him to a

Stories and rumors about camps continued to be shared in taverns throughout the 1930s. When a former SS guard of the concentration camp in Dachau was accused in June 1939 of spreading information about the camp, he defended himself by claiming that he had only recounted what was “universally known among the Dachau population and can be heard in every tavern.”⁷⁵ This matter-of-fact statement indicates that such transgressive behavior was commonplace in pubs and that the man clearly did not expect to be punished for it.

The regime may have successfully prevented Communists, Socialists, and homosexuals from utilizing pubs for political purposes, but its efforts to more tightly control behavior within them proved difficult, for pubs had long provided cover for transgressive behavior, and these cultures of *Gaststätten* did not dissipate in 1933. In its efforts to politicize pubs, the regime could not even rely on its own SA and SS men to exhibit the requisite decorum. Disgruntled and nonconformist Germans furthered tested the room for maneuver within the confines of these semipublic spaces, and it is to several of these groups we now turn.

Persistence of Working-Class Pub Culture

Despite the regime’s efforts to enlist *Gaststätten* to help them consolidate the *Volksgemeinschaft*, these sites were anything but fertile ground for such a task. Communists and Socialists most emphatically resisted the politicization of pubs, and attempts to Nazify these semipublic spaces often provoked critique and resistance from their proprietors and patrons. Citizens might dutifully conform and follow protocol in the public sphere by flagging during

nearby locale in Brandenburg “for the amusement of the drunken patrons.” See Kreszentia Mühsam, *Der Leidensweg Erich Mühsams* (Berlin: Harald-Kater-Verlag, 1994), 37.

⁷⁵ Quoted in Christian Goeschel, and Nikolaus Wachsmann, ed. *The Nazi Concentration Camps, 1933-1939* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 327-28. For similar examples of people spreading news of concentration camps in pubs, see: Staatsarchiv München (StAM), StAnw. 1234, Nr. 7462, Nr. 8973, Nr. 7787, and Nr. 3937.

national holidays, but the semipublic spaces of pubs proved more difficult to coordinate. Pubs had long been a refuge for German workers, not just during the Weimar Republic, but also under the more oppressive imperial regime that preceded it. Under the Nazi state, German workers continued to utilize these spaces much as they had before. They freely voiced their opinions, criticized the regime and its policies, and expressed loyalty to Socialism and Communism. These violations of the Treachery Act, and the responses of police officers and the courts to them, delimited what was acceptable behavior within these spaces during the Third Reich.

The Social Democratic Party (Sopade) in exile regarded pubs as particularly important sites to gauge public opinion. A Sopade report from February 1937 stated that anyone who spent time in Berlin's pubs "must conclude that there are hardly any longer supporters of the Nazi regime. It has become difficult to distance oneself from the general curses; one stands out if he doesn't curse."⁷⁶ Two months later, another report confirmed that Berliners freely complained about the costs of living and party shenanigans in pubs and that they persisted even in front of Nazi patrons. When Nazis attempted to defend the regime, they often became the brunt of the jokes. The report noted that NSDAP members rarely involved the police in such matters and that it was "even more seldom that the police then arrest someone."⁷⁷ Of course, the exiled Socialists were keen to emphasize such anti-Nazi sentiments, and their assertion that the Nazis enjoyed no support is certainly an exaggeration.

Nonetheless, police and court documents from Berlin and Hamburg confirm the observation that plenty of pub-goers continued to criticize the regime and express past-held

⁷⁶ *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade), 1934-1940*, vol. 4, 1937 (Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 139.

⁷⁷ *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 460.

political sentiments within the confines of tavern walls.⁷⁸ It is important to approach these sources with some skepticism, for most reports resulted from denunciations, and quotations in these reports were generally recounted secondhand. To verify the account, the police generally questioned the accused. The drafters used carefully worded language to indicate what the accused supposedly said and at times, expressed doubt about an accuser's account or motivations. Most people in these files were accused of violating the Treachery Act, and the sheer numbers of them indicate that the norms of working-class pub cultures were not particularly amenable to reform.

Several means of politicizing these spaces included: hanging swastika flags and photos of Hitler and other NSDAP members on the walls, instituting the Hitler salute as a standard greeting, and broadcasting political speeches within pubs. These changes often provoked critiques and resistance. When one taxi driver entered a pub near Potsdamer Platz and saw portraits of Hitler, Göring, and of Hindenburg hanging on the wall, he declared, "You're all bastards." Pointing specifically to Hitler's photo, he said, "You're the biggest thug!"⁷⁹ Many patrons resisted the use of the Hitler salute in pubs, some declaring, "I don't know the Hitler salute in a pub" and that it was "inappropriate" to enter and take leave in such a manner.⁸⁰ Patrons routinely disrupted speeches broadcast in pubs. Listening to one of Hitler's speeches in a pub in Hamburg, one man referred to it as "nonsense and phrase mongering" and then called another guest a "Nazi pig" and punched him in the face after he was warned to watch his mouth.⁸¹

⁷⁸ These reports are somewhat fragmentary, as not all files from the Polizeipräsidium were bequeathed to the Landesarchiv Berlin. Nevertheless, they constitute an ample and significant trove of documents for those hoping to examine politics "on the ground" during the Third Reich. 299 files from the Polizeipräsidium Berlin are still housed in the "Sonderarchiv Moskau." For more information on the files in Moscow, see: Kai von Jena, and Wilhelm Lenz, "Die deutschen Bestände im Sonderarchiv in Moskau," *Der Archivar* 45, no. 3 (1992): 461; Rudolf Knaack, and Rita Stumper, ed. *Polizeipräsidium Berlin: Politische Angelegenheiten 1809-1945. Sachthematisches Inventar* (Berlin: Landesarchiv Berlin, 2007), xxxiii.

⁷⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21620, Bl. 253.

⁸⁰ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21621, Bl. 229-230. For another account of a refusal to greet with the Hitler salute, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21617, Bl. 35.

⁸¹ STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 05782/36.

A similar incident from a pub in Berlin-Wilmersdorf in September 1935 is especially illustrative of the tension between Nazi norms and practice in such spaces. Guests of the pub accused two women of behaving inappropriately during a broadcasting of Hitler's speech. Despite warnings from the other patrons, the women persisted. They remained seated during the singing of the Horst-Wessel-Song and threw a glass of beer into the face of a longtime party member who again tried to lecture them. According to the police report on the incident, the other guests were "incensed about the behavior of the two women" and aghast "that such a thing could still occur in public today."⁸² As this example shows, some Germans supported the politicization of pubs, but others openly challenged the Nazification of such spaces. Often, when threatened or warned of the consequences of their actions, these people responded not by tempering but rather by doubling down on their remarks and becoming even more belligerent.⁸³

Many patrons more explicitly expressed their anti-Nazi, even pro-Communist, sentiments in pubs. Some responded to the Hitler salute by instead shouting "Heil Moscow" or "Red Front" (the former greeting of the Red Front Fighters' League).⁸⁴ Others sang the International and additional Communist songs in pubs.⁸⁵ For example, two men ignored a barkeeper in Berlin-Kreuzberg as she implored them to stop singing such songs in her pub. The men refrained only when the barkeeper's husband, who was also tending the bar, went to fetch the police. Thereafter,

⁸² LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21617, Bl. 271.

⁸³ For additional examples of people who faced potential consequences with obstinance or indifference see: LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 617; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21636, Bl. 20-21. LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21622, Bl. 251-253.

⁸⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21616, Bl. 288; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 21619, Bl. 37; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21620, Bl. 16.

⁸⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21621, Bl. 133.

the men promptly chucked their beer glasses at the husband.⁸⁶ These individuals refused to comply with the new norms expected of them in these spaces.

Astonishingly, some pubs even appeared to still be run or primarily patronized by Communists, and the culture of Communist pubs continued most unadulterated in these spaces. One group of Communists had disguised itself as a sport club and regularly met in a locale where one member said they had no reason to fear.⁸⁷ Similarly, a barkeeper of another pub threatened to throw out a customer who called Stalin the “biggest criminal in the world there ever was” if he uttered another word about the Soviet premier.⁸⁸ The continued existence of pubs run by or catering to Communists constituted the regime’s biggest failure to coordinate pubs for ideological ends.

When seeking to understand the new normality being fashioned in such spaces, it is crucial to examine how witnesses and authorities handled these acts of transgression. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess, in detail, the penalties for such cases and to determine how the punishments changed over time. However, the police and court reports do suggest several general patterns regarding the reactions of witness and authorities. First, the files indicate that there was even more transgressive behavior occurring than was recorded because many denouncers countenanced several critical comments before finally deciding to report the offender to the police.⁸⁹ Second, the files suggest that authorities’ decisions to prosecute were quite arbitrary, and several mitigating factors existed: an individual’s level of inebriation, his welfare status, and the extent of the disturbance. If one had been extremely intoxicated and did not attract great attention through his actions, and if he had a permanent residence and steady employment, he was more

⁸⁶ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 515. For similar cases of people professing their Communist or Socialist affiliations or sympathies, see: LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 521; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21617, Bl. 91; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21617, Bl. 93.

⁸⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 621.

⁸⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 691.

⁸⁹ “And at that, my patience reached its limits,” said one denouncer after listening to a list of insults against Hitler. See: STAH, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 05331/39.

likely to evade imprisonment or serious punishment. Here it is clear that long-standing, historical conceptions of the “typical criminal” which centered on itinerants and beggars remained influential.⁹⁰ These trends suggest that authorities were most concerned with *outward conformity*. If one was otherwise a productive member of the national community and did not cause a great disturbance in the public sphere, authorities were more willing to excuse his transgressive behavior in the semipublic sphere.

The case of one offender in Hamburg clearly exhibits these proclivities. This man was arrested in September 1935 after he had made critical remarks during Hitler’s speech and punched another patron of the pub in the face. The transgressor was very intoxicated at the time of his arrest and later claimed not to remember the events due to his drunkenness. During the court proceedings, several people testified that he was a reliable, National Socialist-minded person. In the end, the courts sentenced him more stringently for causing a public disturbance than it did for injuring the other man.⁹¹ In its written justification of the sentence, the court practically explained away the man’s behavior as the reaction of a businessman who “probably at one time became upset about some measure of the National Socialist movement” and thereafter inappropriately expressed his frustration “under the influence of copious alcohol.”⁹² It excused his behavior as a reasonable, drunken, expression of displeasure against the regime’s economic policies, revealing again the flexibility of Nazi ideology in practice.

Repeated violations of the Treachery Act in Gaststätten indicate that men and women resisted the Nazi politicization of these semipublic spaces. None of the actions or remarks outlined

⁹⁰ Richard J. Evans, “Social Outsiders in German History from the Sixteenth Century to 1933,” in *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany*, ed. Robert Gellately, and Nathan Stoltzfus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁹¹ The accused had to cover the costs of the trial and received a mere 30 RM fine for “insults and bodily injury” and a 60 RM fine for being a “public nuisance.”

⁹² STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 05782/36. For additional examples of inebriation as a mitigating factor, see: LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21618, Bl. 377; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 21619, Bl. 262.

here amount to any serious resistance to the regime and its policies, but many were clear acts of defiance. In this regard, pubs played a similar role to factories as conceived of by Alf Lüdtke's notion of the "culture of the workshop" as an important milieu where workers still felt they had some degree of control and could exhibit what he terms *Eigensinn*.⁹³ There existed a "culture of pubs" and prescribed norms for such spaces that outlasted the political rupture of 1933.⁹⁴ These semipublic spaces were provisionally open to the wider public, but only if new guests proscribed to the local rules, which could be unique to any given pub. These spaces more successfully resisted cooption by Nazi ideologues. Even when people were denounced for committing acts of transgression within them, police and court authorities were willing, at times, to pardon them if the offender was otherwise a productive member of society. Indeed, these responses to transgression served to underscore one's belonging to the national community. In working-class pubs, Nazi ideology bent to accommodate men and women who committed acts of transgression.

Tolerating Spaces of "Similarly Dispositioned" Men and Women: Homosexual Locales

Reflecting on his life during the Third Reich, one homosexual man remarked that he "did not have any difficulties making acquaintances" because there continued to be "confidential meeting places in Berlin. A young, today unimaginably wild [*ausgelassen*] life under these conditions."⁹⁵ This comment contradicts the prevailing literature on homosexuals in Nazi Germany, which fixates on the persecution of homosexuals and Nazi efforts to "eliminate

⁹³ Lüdtke, "What Happened to the 'Fiery Red Glow'?", 220-21.

⁹⁴ Michael Haben termed this a "public space of the pub" (*Kneipenöffentlichkeit*), and Pamela Swett further explores the milieus of Berlin's political pubs in the late 1920s and early 1930s. See Michael Haben, "Die waren so unter sich: über Kneipen, Vereine und Politik in Berlin Kreuzberg," in *Kreuzberger Mischung: Die innerstädtische Verflechtung von Architektur, Kultur und Gewerbe*, ed. Karl-Heinz Fiebig, Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, and Eberhard Knödler-Bunte (Berlin: Ästhetik und Kommunikation, 1984), 246; Swett, *Neighbors and Enemies*, 32.

⁹⁵ Quoted in van Dijk, *Einsam war ich nie*, 47.

homosexuality from the public sphere.”⁹⁶ Little is known about homosexuals’ public and private lives in Germany between 1933 and 1945.⁹⁷ In the early twentieth century, specific neighborhoods, streets, and bars became popular meeting sites for homosexuals. Train stations, public bathrooms, parks, and swimming pools were common cruising sites of male prostitutes. These spaces constituted a “homosexual topography” in German cityscapes.⁹⁸ This topography constituted a strong thread of continuity from Weimar to Nazi Germany, and bars played a key role. Though the role of Gaststätten as active centers of political organization was indisputably quashed in 1933, bars remained important centers of socialization for sexual minorities long into the Third Reich.

To understand how homosexuals maintained access to these semipublic spaces, it is important to look at how homosexuality was policed between 1933 and 1945. At first, local criminal police departments were tasked with policing homosexuality.⁹⁹ During this time, the level of anti-homosexual repression across the country varied greatly. Heinrich Himmler’s appointment as Chief of German Police in 1936 allowed him to centralize and more systematically implement his anti-homosexual policies. Shortly thereafter, criminal police forces across Germany were federalized after Prussia’s criminal investigation office became the Reich Criminal Investigation

⁹⁶ Stefan Micheler, “Homophobic Propaganda and the Denunciation of Same-Sex-Desiring Men under National Socialism,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 11, no. 1/2 (2002): 95-96. Burkhard Jellonnek’s 1990 study of Pfalz, Würzburg, and Düsseldorf is a notable exception. He argues that homosexuals were never completely driven from the public sphere under the Nazi regime. See Burkhard Jellonnek, *Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz: Die Verfolgung von Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich* (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1990), 279. Several other local studies further confirm Jellonnek’s conclusion. See Cornelia Limpricht, Jürgen Müller, and Nina Oxenius, ed. “*Verführte Männer: Das Leben der Kölner Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich* (Köln: Kölner Volksblatt Verlag, 1991); Carola Gerlach, “Außerdem habe ich dort mit meinem Freund getanzt,” in *Wegen der zu erwartenden hohen Strafe: Homosexuellenverfolgung in Berlin 1933-1945*, ed. Andreas and Gabriele Roßbach Pretzel (Berlin: Verlag rosa Winkel).

⁹⁷ Detailed social histories of homosexual life commence again only for the postwar era. See, e.g., Evans, “Bahnhof Boys.”; Jennifer V. Evans, *Life among the Ruins: Cityscape and Sexuality in Cold War Berlin* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁹⁸ Prickett, “Defining Identity via Homosexual Spaces.”

⁹⁹ Dobler, “Die Berliner Kriminalpolizei im Nationalsozialismus,” 35. In Berlin, the “homosexual department” of the criminal police had existed since 1885 and oversaw the arrest of individuals suspected of breaching Paragraph 175. In 1935, the homosexual department was moved to the Gestapo, where it remained until 1940.

Department (RKPA).¹⁰⁰ Its fifteen branches dispersed throughout Germany conducted the work of the RKPA's newly established "Reich Office for the Combating of Homosexuality and Abortion," cataloging information on local homosexuals and reporting back to the central authorities. The RKPA and the Gestapo were both subsumed under the Reich Main Security Office in 1939.¹⁰¹ Despite this increasing centralization, the prosecution of homosexuals remained largely dictated by local contingencies and circumstances.¹⁰² The police interrogated individuals they suspected of violating Paragraph 175, and because they hoped to ensnare further homosexuals, the interrogations were exhaustive.¹⁰³ These reports from the criminal police, Gestapo, and state courts offer great detail on homosexual topographies in Nazi Germany.

The knowledge of these topographies allowed homosexual men to maintain networks and establish contacts after 1933. In Berlin, a main hub for these encounters was Kurfürstendamm and the areas surrounding the Gedächtniskirche and Wittenbergplatz.¹⁰⁴ In central and eastern Berlin, Friedrichstraße, Alexanderplatz, and the Tiergarten remained common sites to meet sexual partners or male prostitutes (especially those for lower-paying clients).¹⁰⁵ Train stations and public restrooms were popular haunts of male prostitutes in all major cities.¹⁰⁶ Men often simply struck up conversations with one another in these places. Some male prostitutes casually asked for a cigarette light, which investigators claimed was a discreet way to identify oneself to potential

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 36.

¹⁰¹ Grau, *Hidden Holocaust?*, 103-04.

¹⁰² Jellonnek, *Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 328-32.

¹⁰³ Grau in van Dijk, *Einsam war ich nie*, 146-48. As Günter Grau notes, such files generally "reduce the complexity of the circumstances" when they employ the language of the perpetrator. Nevertheless, very few contemporary accounts of homosexuals exist, so these files constitute perhaps the most extensive source base for analyzing homosexuals' everyday lives during the Third Reich.

¹⁰⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 890.

¹⁰⁵ Weka, *Stätten der Berliner Prostitution* (Berlin: Aufferberg Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 1930), 66, 74, 92.

¹⁰⁶ In Cologne, for example, popular meeting sites included train stations, parks, swimming pools, and public bathrooms, especially those on Ruldolfplatz, Hansaring, Neumarkt, near the Hohenzollernbrücke, and at the train station. See Jürgen Müller, and Helge Schneberger, "Schwules Leben in Köln," in *Verführte Männer: Das Leben der Kölner Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich*, ed. Cornelia Limpricht, Jürgen Müller, and Nina Oxenius (Köln: Kölner Volksblatt Verlag, 1991), 15.

clients.¹⁰⁷ After the initial encounter, some men hastened to public restrooms, movie theaters, deserted alleyways, or entrance corridors of nearby apartment buildings for sex.¹⁰⁸ Others sought secluded sites in nature. In Berlin, many sought out the Tiergarten and Grunewald to exchange sexual favors.¹⁰⁹

Men were not always so bold, however, and often after striking up a conversation on the street, one often invited the other for a glass of beer or a cup of coffee in a nearby pub or cafe. Conversations over drinks allowed the men to determine what each party wanted from the other. From there, they might leave together or schedule a meeting for a later date. In this sense, virtually any cafe or pub constituted a casual way station between the initial encounter and potential sexual activities. Indeed, as in Weimar, several popular bars and cafes not exclusively associated with homosexuals were often mentioned as sites of homosexual encounters because the hustle and bustle within them lent a degree of anonymity to their patrons.¹¹⁰

Beyond these establishments, however, the police repeatedly referred to a plethora of additional bars as “homosexual locales,” “dubious locales,” and “locales patronized by homosexuals.”¹¹¹ In Hamburg, these bars remained open after 1933, and some even outlasted raids by the RKPA in the summer of 1936.¹¹² Most of them were scattered throughout four districts in

¹⁰⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 104.

¹⁰⁸ See file for Rudolf S. regarding the public restroom at the Gesundbrunnen train station in LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 90. For additional examples, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 86; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 52, Nr. 825.

¹⁰⁹ For examples of Tiergarten, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 26, Nr. 95, Nr. 104, Nr. 156. For Grunewald, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 33, Nr. 133, Nr. 165, Nr. 812, Nr. 833, Nr. 903.

¹¹⁰ Such establishments often mentioned in the police files were: Cafe Wien, Cafe Kranzler, and Cafe Trumpf (all in western Berlin), the Aschinger restaurants (in Joachimsthalerstraße, Friedrichstraße, and on Moritzplatz), and Moka Efti (in Friedrichstraße). For files on Moka Efti, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 149; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 90, LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 787, LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 189.

¹¹¹ They referred to such sites as “*homosexuelle Verkehrslokale*,” “*zweifelhafte Lokale*,” or “*Lokale wo Homosexuelle verkehren*.” See LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 61, LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 90, LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 94.

¹¹² Rosenkranz, *Hamburg auf anderen Wegen*, 25. Rosenkranz and Lorenz write that the following establishments remained open after 1933 and that at least five of them most likely remained open past 1936: the Theaterklausen, Monte Carlo, Ambassadeur, Simpli-Tanzbar, Wallschänke Zum Deutschen Michel, Versuchsschuppen, Tuskulum, Miele,

Hamburg: St. Georg, the Old City, the New City, and St. Pauli.¹¹³ Several bars in Hamburg were mentioned in court files as homosexual establishments or places where male prostitutes sought clients as late as 1941.¹¹⁴ Most of Cologne's homosexual bars were shut down in 1933, but some individuals had followed their bartenders to new establishments. The Stony Pot was a homosexual establishment that remained open during the Third Reich, while additional pubs became known to the police as places patronized by homosexuals.¹¹⁵

These places, known by word-of-mouth, often facilitated the initial meeting point for homosexuals. For example, after being arrested in the summer of 1936, one man admitted to meeting his sexual partners in diverse locales in Hamburg, including: Schwarzes Meer, Deutsche Porterstuben, Tuskulum, Gemütliche Klause, and Stadtkasino. He was sentenced to one year and nine months in prison but was instead taken into "protective custody" and sent to the concentration camp in Fuhlsbüttel.¹¹⁶ Other men arrested in Hamburg mentioned making contacts with partners in the same or similar establishments.¹¹⁷ Sometimes such locales became the site of illicit sexual activities themselves when men utilized the restrooms or hallways for sex.¹¹⁸

The police kept tabs on such establishments and periodically conducted raids of them to apprehend homosexuals, though such raids often proved unsuccessful in the long term. For example, SS men and Gestapo detectives raided several bars in Berlin and apprehended

Zu den 3 Sternen, and Stadtcasino. Additional homosexual locales included Minulla, Nordmann, Indische Bar, and Rosenboom. See STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 01108/38, Nr. 3495/42.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹⁴ STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 5537/42 and Nr. 2753/42. These bars included: Anker, Grenzhäus, Loreley, Monte Carlo, Minulla, and Nordmann.

¹¹⁵ Müller, "Schwules Leben in Köln," 16-17. These locales included: Zur Eule, Urbans Gaststätten am Ring, Rochlus, and Zur Rübe.

¹¹⁶ STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 10159/36.

¹¹⁷ See STAHL, 213-11 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht – Strafsachen (1908-1998), Nr. 08373/36; Nr. 08659/36; Nr. 08414/36. For a similar account of such bars in Berlin, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 156.

¹¹⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 942; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 90.

homosexual men.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, at least two of the bars remained homosexual meeting sites.¹²⁰ For example, the “Weinmeisterklausen” frequently surfaced during later interrogations. After his arrest in April 1937, one man told the Gestapo that he was “sexually normally dispositioned” but that he frequented “shady pubs” when he was drunk, including the Weinmeisterklausen. He claimed male prostitutes often approached him there and persuaded him to bring them back to his apartment.¹²¹ Additional bars mentioned as “homosexual locales” included Groschenkeller, Sportklausen, the Quick Bar, San Franzisko, Mexiko-Bar, and Doktorlein.¹²² The persistence of the term “homosexual locales” in police and court files, and the recurrent raids in the 1930s and 1940s indicate that such establishments were simply a reality during the Nazi regime.

From frequent visits, Georg Schmidt knew that Doktorlein was mainly patronized by homosexuals, but he claimed to visit the pub not to meet a sexual partner but merely to converse with “similarly dispositioned” men.¹²³ When a soldier in uniform appeared one night in 1939, however—something highly unusual for such an establishment—Schmidt bought the soldier a beer and struck up a conversation with him. At closing time, they left together and stopped at a public restroom on Vinetaplatz to relieve themselves. It was then that the soldier exposed himself. Schmidt claimed they both touched one another’s genitals before the soldier abruptly turned and left, only to return a short time later with another man to apprehend Schmidt and bring him to the nearest police station. During his interrogation, Schmidt requested a mild punishment in light of

¹¹⁹ “Round-up in Berlin,” Report by a member of the ‘Adolf Hitler’ SS Bodyguard Regiment, March 11, 1935, quoted in Grau, *Hidden Holocaust?*, 51-53. For the original German edition, see Grau, *Homosexualität in der NS-Zeit*, 79-81.

¹²⁰ “Die Insel” was raided again in 1937. See LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 137.

¹²¹ LAB A Pr. Br. 030-02-05, Nr. 89. The “Weinmeisterklausen” was also mentioned in two additional Stapo reports, one from July 1937 (LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 833) and one from September 1938 (LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 939).

¹²² For Groschenkeller, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 51. For Sportklausen, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 191. For the Quick Bar, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 197. For Doktorlein, see LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 819; See LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-95, Nr. 939.

¹²³ Schmidt’s name has been anonymized.

his “unfortunate predisposition,” the great amount of liquor he had consumed, and especially because of the soldier’s “provocative” actions. An officer closed the file noting that Schmidt had made a “trustworthy impression” during his interrogation and that the soldier was in any case just as guilty.¹²⁴ Schmidt’s release is quite astonishing because he had admitted to sexual contact. The police officer was apparently moved to release him because Schmidt claimed he had not actively sought sex, was quite drunk, and because he appeared “trustworthy.”

Because lesbians were not criminalized under Paragraph 175, they are often excluded from historical accounts of those persecuted by the Nazi regime.¹²⁵ Nazis ideologues held that gay men posed a greater threat to the Volksgemeinschaft because gay men shirked their duty to produce Aryan children. Nazis deemed lesbianism a temporary phenomenon that could be cured and did not hinder a woman’s ability to fulfill her duties as wife and mother. The lack of legislation notwithstanding, lesbians did not evade persecution from the police, who also raided and closed several lesbian bars in 1933. Lesbians could be arbitrarily arrested or apprehended for petty crimes wherein their sexuality was used against them in legal proceedings.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, lesbians had a bit more flexibility in carving out meeting spaces in public than gay men.

Several lesbian-affiliated bars and clubs survived or were opened during the Nazi regime, and some lesbian clubs disguised themselves as sport associations or social clubs, which provided them some cover to meet in public. Like homosexual bars, the continued existence of sites that accommodated lesbians largely depended on the responses of other Germans and officials. For

¹²⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 819.

¹²⁵ Claudia Schoppmann’s work is a notable exception, Schoppmann, *Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität*; Claudia Schoppmann, *Days of Masquerade: Life Stories of Lesbians During the Third Reich*, trans. Allison Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). See also: Gabriele Dennert, Christiane Leidinger, and Franziska Raucht, ed. *In Bewegung bleiben: 100 Jahre Politik, Kultur und Geschichte von Lesben* (Berlin: Querverlag, 2007).

¹²⁶ For a detailed look at how lesbians were treated by the law, see Jens Dobler, “Unzucht und Kuppelei: Lesbenverfolgung im Nationalsozialismus,” in *Homophobie und Devianz: Weibliche und männliche Homosexualität im Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Insa Eschebach (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012).

example, “Pauli” in Berlin-Wedding consisted of two rooms—a front room that looked like a normal pub, frequented by men who smoked and drank, and a back room where lesbians congregated. “The room was absolutely packed,” remembered one lesbian, who also said that the “men in front tolerated it all” and were “very charming to us.”¹²⁷ Though the regime counted on barkeepers and patrons to report when Gaststätten were used for “immoral” purposes, the male patrons of Pauli did not denounce the lesbians.

Police officers tried to keep tabs on lesbian groups, but they failed to eradicate lesbianism from these semipublic spaces. Instead, their observations highlighted associations in their minds between Jewish women and lesbians. For example, when an investigator from the criminal police spied on a ball of the lesbian sport club “The Funny Nine” in January 1936, which was attended by approximately 300 people, he wrote: “It has secretly been conveyed that every four weeks, transvestites, homosexuals, and abnormal women, comprised of both Aryans and Jews supposedly meet together and dance.”¹²⁸ A similar report from the next month summarized the supposed dangers posed by such events: homosexual men might mingle among the lesbians and establish contact with one another, lesbians might seduce innocent girls and wives from affluent backgrounds, and “Aryans” might socialize with Jews.¹²⁹ Although the officer deemed these events “damaging to the state” and the club was officially dissolved in 1936, the club hosted balls until at least 1940. The criminal police continued to observe these events and even conducted at least one raid, but unlike for homosexual men, no legislation authorized it to arrest and convict women for lesbianism. The women simply tried to evade the police by moving their activities to

¹²⁷ Quoted in Schoppmann, *Days of Masquerade*, 50.

¹²⁸ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 106, Note from January 29, 1936. “The Funny Nine” convened regularly in the “Residence Festival Halls” in Landsberger Straße. This was one of the establishments that the criminal police had searched, but not shut down, in March 1935.

¹²⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 106, Report from February 17, 1936.

new locations.¹³⁰ The last report on the club from April 1940 noted that its “spring ball” had elicited no reason to intervene: “Besides caresses exchanged here and there, hidden at the tables, and which also occurred while dancing, nothing out of the ordinary was observed.”¹³¹ This was one of the only reports not to mention the presence of Jews.

In considering the reactions from police officers, lawyers, and judges to homosexuals, it is important to remember that these were men with diverse backgrounds who made decisions based on the evidence presented. Mitigating factors existed for violations of Paragraph 175 just as they had for those of the Treachery Act. Nazi Party members, first time offenders, and young men in their early twenties were often judged less harshly. If one did not admit his guilt and evidence could not be furnished, he was usually released or received a light sentence.¹³² The nature and frequency of offenses also played a role. The courts were particularly exacting with cases of male prostitution, blackmail, and cases involving sexual activities with minors (defined as individuals under the age of twenty-one).¹³³ The latter practice corresponded with Himmler’s belief that homosexuality was infectious, and that Germany’s youth was particularly vulnerable. Thus, it was important to control and contain homosexuality’s influence, and the existence of homosexual locales did not necessarily threaten, and may have even assisted, the realization of this policy of containment. Other *Volksossen* could simply avoid such sites.

¹³⁰ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 106, Vermerk from March 27, 1937. During these years, the club met in “Old Vienna” in Landsberger Straße and in the “Concordia Festival Halls” in Andreasstraße. It hosted a New Years’ ball, a bock beer festival, and an Easter ball.

¹³¹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030-02-05, Nr. 106, Report from April 22, 1940.

¹³² Grau in van Dijk, *Einsam war ich nie*, 151-53.

¹³³ Dobler, *Zwischen Duldungspolitik und Verbrechensbekämpfung*, 347-48. These were traditional priorities of Germany’s criminal police. During the Weimar Republic, the criminal police had two main focus areas: (1) protecting children and adolescents, (2) reducing extortion and blackmail. Although politics had radically transformed in 1933, the criminal police’s priorities were more entrenched. Only when homosexuality overlapped with extortion or involved minors was the prosecution and punishment especially stringent.

Indeed, containment and avoidance of such “immoral” sites were common practices in Germany, established during the imperial era when authorities began issuing lists of *Gaststätten* that soldiers were prohibited to enter. The first list was issued in 1870, and each German city had its own list by 1892. In the beginning, the list singled out pubs where female prostitutes sought clients. Later iterations of the lists included politically suspect establishments that catered to Socialists and otherwise “shady” pubs. Homosexual bars were included for the first time in 1895.¹³⁴ These lists continued to be released by various authorities after 1933. The SA was especially preoccupied with such establishments and released lists of pubs forbidden to SA men.¹³⁵ Berlin’s police headquarters published a list of banned establishments for police officers, Nazi Party members, German Labor Front members, and uniformed soldiers.¹³⁶ In Hamburg, these establishments were visibly marked with signs at the entrance to indicate that soldiers, police officers, and NSDAP members were forbidden to enter.¹³⁷ Although the lists did not provide explanations for the bans, several of the establishments were known homosexual locales.¹³⁸

If the regime had merely deemed these establishments “dangerous places” to be avoided, it certainly possessed the power and the will to permanently close them, as it had violently done with many sites in 1933.¹³⁹ Unlike some other spaces associated with political and cultural bolshevism, the regime had no uniform policy for homosexual locales. It closed some bars in 1933,

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 367-72.

¹³⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 244-03, Nr. 212, Nr. 1052.

¹³⁶ LAB C Rep. 375-01-13, Nr. 1058 A. 04.

¹³⁷ STAH, 430-74, Polizeipräsidium Harburg-Wilhelmsburg, Nr. IV 50.69. In Hamburg, these lists were issued through 1944. A memo from July 1938 informed NSDAP members that they were forbidden from entering forty-one establishments in Hamburg, either in uniform or in civilian clothing. The list included the Stadtkasino and several other homosexual locales. STAH, 242-2/1, Frauenstrafanstalt Fuhlsbüttel, Nr. 13.

¹³⁸ For example, Berlin’s list from 1941 named ninety-five places, including: San Franzisko, Mexiko-Bar, and the Weinmeisterklaus. See LAB C Rep. 375-01-13, Nr. 1058 A. 04. Similarly, Hamburg’s 1940 list of sixty-one establishments included: Treffpunkt, Zum Anker, and Grenzhaus. See STAH, 430-74, Polizeipräsidium Harburg-Wilhelmsburg, Nr. IV 50.69. The lists from 1941 and 1942 banned fifty-six and fifty-three establishments, respectively. Minulla and Grenzhaus were included in both.

¹³⁹ Gerlach, “Außerdem habe ich dort mit meinem Freund getanzt,” 311. Carola Gerlach concludes that security officials deemed these establishments “dangerous places” and were keen to keep people away from them.

some much later, and others not at all. Allowing some establishments patronized by sexual minorities to remain open may have helped police officers better observe and apprehend homosexuals, but this was not a particularly effective means of ensnaring men who violated Paragraph 175. Most arrests resulted from denunciations and not from the observation and raids of locales.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, because most homosexual men did not have their own apartments but rather subleased or shared accommodations, most apprehended men had been denounced by their neighbors.¹⁴¹ Therefore, public encounters sometimes provided more cover for homosexuals than afforded by their own private quarters.

I maintain that authorities allowed homosexuals to meet in Gaststätten because it helped restrict these individuals to a somewhat isolated semipublic sphere and meant they were less likely to seek partners in the public sphere at large. Nazi criminal police departments, like their Weimar predecessors, were most committed to keeping homosexuality out of the public sphere.¹⁴² Authorities pursued traditional policies of containment, issuing bans on certain Gaststätten for those individuals it deemed “worth protecting” from the scourge of homosexuality.¹⁴³ In Nazi Germany, those deemed worthy of protection broadened beyond minors and soldiers to include party members and members of the “racial elite.” This desire to keep homosexuality out of these ranks is most likely why the death penalty was only ever officially ordained for SS men and police officers who engaged in homosexual activity.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Micheler, “Homophobic Propaganda,” 125-26. Micheler utilizes evidence from Hamburg to make this claim.

¹⁴¹ Rosenkranz, *Hamburg auf anderen Wegen*, 43-44.

¹⁴² Marhoefer makes this claim about the priorities of the Weimar Republic regarding homosexuality. See Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic*, 198.

¹⁴³ Dobler, *Zwischen Duldungspolitik und Verbrechensbekämpfung*, 372.

¹⁴⁴ Geoffrey J. Giles, “The Denial of Homosexuality: Same-Sex Incidents in Himmler's SS and Police,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 11, no. 1/2 (2002): 265-73. Hitler released this decree, most likely at Himmler's urging, in November 1941. The death penalty for such cases was rarely issued.

Authorities preferred that homosexual men fraternize amongst themselves in Gaststätten instead of seeking partners in parks, train stations, and public restrooms—spaces associated with male prostitutes and blackmailers who the police deemed greater threats than homosexuals. Seeking the company of other men was not a crime. Only the homosexual act itself was incriminating. If they abstained from same-sex encounters and outwardly conformed by maintaining steady employment and a residence and not seeking sex in the public sphere, homosexuals could participate in the Volksgemeinschaft.¹⁴⁵

Drawing the Line: Jews and Gaststätten

Although nationwide legislation sought to regulate the behavior of political opponents and homosexuals, repeated acts of transgression prompted authorities to renegotiate Nazi ideology and underscore the inclusion of these transgressors within the Volksgemeinschaft. The exclusion of Jews from Gaststätten worked in the opposite direction. The ideological claim that Jews were de facto outsiders and enemies of the racial community, propagated by Nazi discourse and enforced via spatial practices by local Nazis and proprietors, eventually elicited legislation that reinforced the exclusion of German Jews from the Volksgemeinschaft. The dominant discourse and repeated spatial practices created a new normality for German Jews in the semipublic spaces of Gaststätten. For German Jews, it was not an act of transgression that jeopardized their right to these spaces, but rather their mere presence itself became the transgression. The redefinition of inclusion for some transgressing Germans was increasingly drawn vis-à-vis the exclusion of German Jews.

In her history of the Holocaust, Doris Bergen recounts the story of one German Jew in a restaurant in 1933, as remembered by a waiter. A group of rambunctious, drunk Nazis gave the

¹⁴⁵ Grau, *Hidden Holocaust?*, 6. Günter Grau reminds us that we cannot equate Himmler's language of eradication with the actual practice of persecution. There was no "final solution" for homosexuals.

waiter a note reading “Get out, you Jewish swine” to hand to a Jewish lawyer sitting at a nearby table. After reading it, the lawyer became enraged and yelled at the Nazis, “I am a veteran of the World War. I risked my life for this country.” Silence reigned for a few moments until the Nazis began harassing him further. No one stood up for the lawyer. He paid and left and thereafter decided to emigrate from Germany. Bergen astutely notes that in early 1933, there would have been few, if any, consequences for someone who spoke up on behalf of a Jewish customer.¹⁴⁶

Indeed, there existed no legislation to punish an individual for such an action. But these everyday incidents, repeated over time, determined whether ordinary Germans would countenance this rendition of the Nazification of space. We have seen above that ordinary Germans had more room for maneuver in the semipublic spaces of *Gaststätten* than they had in the orchestrated public sphere where conformity was demanded of them. Their ability to renegotiate Nazi ideology to include nonconformists in the semipublic sphere suggests they might have also been able to refashion ideology on behalf of Jews in these spaces. Instead, the dynamics of ideology in practice worked here in a different direction to exclude Jews. Unlike with homosexuals and political dissidents, it was not the mitigating voices of court and police authorities who shaped the narrative, but rather the visceral antisemitism of local Nazis and news organs which possessed the loudest voices and were willing to enact their ideology with force. As such, the semipublic sphere of *Gaststätten* constituted a critical arena in the segregation of Jews from non-Jews.

As they lost their jobs and experienced increasing persecution in the public sphere, cafes were one place of refuge and retreat for many German Jews. *ʿIzah Goldentsyayg* remembers that her father became depressed because he could no longer work and “had nothing to do.” Thus, he regularly visited *Cafe Kranzler* in Berlin, where he would meet “several intellectuals” and spend

¹⁴⁶ As quoted and recounted in Bergen, *The Holocaust*, 67-68.

time conversing.¹⁴⁷ Gerhard Moss similarly remembers that his parents used to take him every Sunday to drink coffee someplace until they arrived one day and encountered a “Jews are undesired here” sign on a cafe. It was a “shock” for the family. They decided to seek out a different place but realized that every cafe exhibited this sign.¹⁴⁸

Beginning in 1935, local Nazi branches had begun pressuring proprietors to exhibit these signs reading “Jews undesired.” Some Gaststätten owners initially resisted but agreed to display the signs after being threatened with boycotts and social ostracism.¹⁴⁹ For example, when a Jewish customer of a restaurant in Kassel confronted the hostess about the “Jews unwanted here” sign on display, she apologized profusely and told him that she had been forced to display the sign and implored him to stay.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, on the day a “Jews undesired” sign appeared on an restaurant in Hamburg, the Italian owner accommodated Ingeborg Studniczka’s family, whose father was Jewish, by reserving a table for them in a back room.¹⁵¹ The fears of proprietors in resisting these measures were not always unfounded. For example, an owner of a large restaurant in Mannheim who refused to ban his Jewish customers was eventually arrested.¹⁵²

German Jews responded in various ways to these developments. After a “Jews unwanted” sign appeared on her parents’ favorite dancing club, Ruth Tschuhjesch’s parents went a few more times until a “Jews forbidden” sign appeared. Then they ceased going altogether.¹⁵³ Quite a few

¹⁴⁷ Izah Goldentsyayg, Interview 46006, Segment 53, 65, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998. Helen Juravel, Interview 48340, Segment 111, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹⁴⁸ Gerhard Moss, Interview 36017, Segment 16-17, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

¹⁴⁹ *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade), 1934-1940*, vol. 2, 1935 (Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 534, 1038; *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade), 1934-1940*, vol. 3, 1936 (Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 33.

¹⁵⁰ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 814. For similar reports, see: *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 25; *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 947.

¹⁵¹ Ingeborg Studniczka, Interview 25008, Segment 21, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁵² *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1032.

¹⁵³ Ruth Tschuhjesch, Interview 16132, Segment 8, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

Jews rather nonchalantly simply disregarded the bans and continued going.¹⁵⁴ They tried to “dress differently” or “behave inconspicuously” to go unnoticed.¹⁵⁵ Some, on the other hand, very intentionally continued going, enjoying the thrill of transgression, remembering it as “a game for us to play.”¹⁵⁶ But many Jews immediately stopped going to such places, either out of fear or defiance. When Irmgard Hoffmann tried to go to a nice garden restaurant in Berlin with a non-Jewish friend, she encountered a sign reading, “Jews and dogs are forbidden to enter.” Irmgard’s friend implored her to ignore the sign, but she responded that there was no way she would enter. “Like dogs, we [were] not people,” she said.¹⁵⁷

In response to these increasing exclusions, some Jews established new cafes and restaurants for themselves, and the government supported this development initially as a means to segregate Jews from non-Jews. The only stipulation was that they had to mark themselves as Jewish establishments.¹⁵⁸ From the regime’s perspective, allowing Jews to establish their own restaurants provided several advantages: the opportunity to “further force Jews into a ghetto” by separating Jews from non-Jews (“German-blooded”), to keep them from entering “German” establishments, and to better conduct surveillance of Jews.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, efforts to segregate Jews from non-Jews in the realm of *Gaststätten* were very effective. A *Sopade* report in 1936 remarked that the attitude amongst Jews was “unusually depressed and pessimistic” and that Jews were “freely pulling back

¹⁵⁴ Morris Gruenberg, Interview 42094, Segment 11, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998; Fred Glaser, Interview 23486, Segment 18-19, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁵⁵ Alfred Batzdorff, Interview 52996, Segment 29-31, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, JFCS Holocaust Center, 1994.

¹⁵⁶ Heinz Langer, Interview 41932, Segment 44-45, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹⁵⁷ Irmgard Hoffmann, Interview 10032, Segment 47-48, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

¹⁵⁸ *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 976; *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 1572. Cafe Bavaria in Berlin-Schöneberg was one such cafe, marked with a sign “Jüdische Gaststätte” above the door and in its display window. See *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 942.

¹⁵⁹ Schreiben des RFSS/Chef der Deutschen Polizei im RuPrMdI (S.-PP (II B) Nr. 2265/36.), i. V. gez. Heydrich, an StdF in München, Braunes Haus, vom 1. 2. 1937 (Abschrift), quoted in Wolf Gruner, ed. *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933-1945*, vol. 1: Deutsches Reich, 1933-1937 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008), 635.

into a ghetto.” They only patronized Jewish restaurants and pubs and left their homes only when necessary.¹⁶⁰ The antisemitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*, published by Julius Streicher, praised these developments, which it said provided “for the independent existence of Jews and have spared our *Volksgenossen* from having to share a table with those of a foreign race.” It admonished establishments who continued to welcome Jews.¹⁶¹

Although Jews were increasingly banned from *Gaststätten*, non-Jews continued to patronize Jewish-owned establishments, which irked Nazis tremendously. They endeavored to “educate” Germans in these matters. Like the military bans, *Der Stürmer* periodically released its own lists of pubs, cafes, and restaurants that its readers should avoid. It stressed that Germans should only patronize establishments where they “can really feel comfortable” and that a plethora of establishments in Berlin, therefore, were simply “out of the question” for National Socialists.¹⁶² Though they did not elucidate further, the lists included cafes and bars known as homosexual locales as well as establishments owned by Jews.¹⁶³

Gaststätten on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm were a favorite target of such campaigns. *Der Stürmer* lamented that the boulevard’s many Jewish-owned coffee houses and restaurants were often unrecognizable as such and that Nazis from out of town often patronized them unknowingly “in uniform (!)” For example, the *Zigeunerkeller* and *Kaffee Wien* (dubbed the “Jewish Eldorado of Kurfürstendamm”) were at the heart of one of the newspaper’s antisemitic campaigns. *Kaffee Wien* was said to lend one “the feeling that he still lives in 1932 or that he were suddenly magically transported to Tel Aviv.” Everywhere one looked Jews were speaking Hebrew and reading Jewish

¹⁶⁰ *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 28.

¹⁶¹ “Kölner Brief,” *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 30 (1937). For more information on Streicher and his newspaper, see Daniel Roos, *Julius Streicher und “Der Stürmer”: 1923-1945* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2014).

¹⁶² “Achtung! Berliner Nationalsozialisten, Meidet diese Lokale!,” *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 17 (1937).

¹⁶³ “Nationalsozialisten! Meidet diese Lokale!,” in *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 27 (1937).

newspapers. The adjacent Zigeunerkeller was often frequented by “German guests” and sometimes even by party members in uniform. The newspaper issued a strongly worded warning that any party member from Berlin who continued to patronize this establishment would “be excluded from the movement” and called for the formation of its own nightly patrol that would ensure its order was abided.¹⁶⁴ One year later, *Der Stürmer* announced to its readers that the two establishments had been sold to a “German” owner and that NSDAP members were free to visit them again.¹⁶⁵

One day, sometime after these restrictions had taken hold in Görlitz and Jews could no longer patronize Gaststätten, Ernst Reich’s father said to him, “Oh, how I would like to drink a beer.” Therefore, he and his father traveled to the nearby village of Leschwitz where no one knew them. They entered a small village tavern, sat down at a table in a back corner, and his father ordered a beer. Suddenly, a man sitting at the bar turned around and yelled, “Hey barkeeper! Don’t you know you’re serving a Jew?” The barkeeper took the glass of beer back from his father, who had received it only moments before, and yelled, “Get out, you vermin!” The other men laughed and egged him on. Before they could leave, the barkeeper made Ernst’s father pay for the beer that he was not allowed to drink.¹⁶⁶

Cafes and restaurants had allowed Jews to maintain a sense of normalcy in uncertain times and provided them limited access to the public sphere. As the signs multiplied indicating their presence was undesired, some individuals resisted the new normality being fashioned and visited these Gaststätten regardless. When Jews were then called out by other patrons, it was especially humiliating, and consequential, for them. The mere act of entering a pub or cafe became an act of

¹⁶⁴ Spaziergang in den Westen der Reichshauptstadt. Stimmungsbilder von Kurfürstendamm,” in *Der Stürmer* 37, no. 37 (1936).

¹⁶⁵ “Nachrichten aus der Reichshauptstadt,” in *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 50 (1937). This announcement of sale was a customary practice of the newspaper following the “Aryanization” of Jewish-owned establishments.

¹⁶⁶ Ernst Reich, Interview 29134, Segment 43-45, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

transgression. In those moments, it was not the regime working against citizen, but neighbor against neighbor. The exclusion of Jews from the semipublic sphere of Gaststätten further shattered Jews' notion of normalcy and proved especially devastating because they became evermore isolated.

Conclusion

National Socialists successfully wrested control of the streets from their political opponents in 1933 and produced an image of a unified, loyal Volksgemeinschaft in the public sphere, but this victory appeared less total in the semipublic spaces of Gaststätten. Communists and Socialists did not successfully organize any mass resistance from behind their beer glasses, and homosexuals and human rights groups of the Weimar era most certainly could not politically mobilize against Paragraph 175 as they had in the 1920s and early 1930s. What this chapter does reveal, however, is that pubs and cafes were less permeable for politicization and coordination than the public sphere at large. A regime obsessed with outward conformity in the public sphere tolerated certain transgressive behaviors within the semi-hermetic spaces of pubs. Police and court authorities were willing at times to excuse the transgressive behavior of some nonconformists who were otherwise productive members of the national community.

The elasticity of Nazi ideology in this realm worked in favor of political dissidents and homosexuals—who were still “racial” members of the community despite their nonconformity—but against German Jews, who were increasingly excluded from access to pubs and cafes from 1933 onward. Unlike top-down measures that regulated the behavior of political opponents and homosexuals in pubs, anti-Jewish policies in Gaststätten were driven from the bottom-up by local Nazis and individual proprietors. Although some restaurant owners tried to resist these

developments initially, individual antisemitic measures and practices, repeated daily on a massive scale, refashioned normality in Gaststätten. Access to the semipublic spaces of cafes and pubs, where transgressive behavior from some individuals was often tolerated, served as a litmus test for who could and could not belong to the Volksgemeinschaft. In the liminal spaces of pubs, out of the regime's direct gaze, ordinary citizens and authorities alike perpetrated actions that included some Germans but excluded others. The inclusion of some transgressing Germans was underscored by the exclusion of German Jews, whose difference was visibly marked in the public sphere, then in the semipublic sphere, and finally, in the private sphere.

Chapter 5

Elimination: Making the *Altreich* “judenrein”

“Enemy in the Country!” blared *Der Stürmer* in June 1935. Much more dangerous than the discernible enemy, impressed the antisemitic newspaper upon its readers, was the invisible resident enemy who crept like a “lion in sheep’s clothing” and “the plague in the dark”—“namely, the Jew!”¹ Although Nazis claimed to have liberated the German nation from the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism” by incapacitating the Communist and Socialist parties and returning German workers to the nationalist fold, they became increasingly paranoid that theirs had only been a superficial victory as long as this “invisible enemy” still hid among them. Therefore, National Socialists, municipal and federal bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens alike led a tireless campaign to identify Jews and clearly redraw the boundary between “Jew” and “German.” Whereas previous chapters have indicated where Jews were affected by Nazi efforts to coordinate and control space, this chapter shifts the focus squarely onto Jews and “Jewish spaces.” Although subject to much persecution, other victims of the regime were able to maintain some degree of access to public spaces. Those who were “racially fit” were encouraged, and pressured, to shed previous identities and join the *Volksgemeinschaft*, even if that meant they only reluctantly straddled the border of conformity. Jews had no such option.

Because the perpetrator’s definition of what constituted a “Jewish space” was most often determinative, those are the definitions I employ in this chapter. Therefore, a Jewish space refers to all places National Socialists associated with Jews: buildings of Jewish religious communities (synagogues, religious schools, Jewish hospitals, retirement homes, and cemeteries) as well as more secular places (apartments and houses inhabited by Jews and businesses they owned) and

¹ “Feind im Lande,” *Der Stürmer* 13, no. 24 (1935).

neighborhoods or streets where higher concentrations of Jews lived. Such spaces might be visibly “Jewish,” distinguished by a synagogue, kosher bakeries and restaurants, Hebrew or Yiddish writing on stores, Jewish symbols such as the Star of David, and traditionally dressed Jewish men and women. Other “Jewish spaces” were not perceptible as such.² Many assimilated German Jews lived amicably in suburbs and smaller towns where they often did not stand out from their non-Jewish neighbors. Nazis saw both populations, orthodox and assimilated, as problematic, but for different reasons. First, they despised the conspicuous, East European Jews who constituted, in their eyes, something visibly foreign. Second, the less visible, assimilated German Jews vexed Nazi ideologues and bureaucrats who became obsessed in the late 1930s and early 1940s with identifying, marking, and excluding these “hidden” Jews from public spaces, and eventually private spaces, in Germany.

Although Nazis wanted to drive Jews from Germany, initially, they were not at all sure how to condemn Jews to this “social death” and rally other *Volksgenossen* to assist them in this endeavor.³ Much like some of the efforts to coordinate and redesign spaces explored in previous chapters, there were no straightforward policies to solve the “Jewish problem.” The process of making the *Altreich* (Germany within its pre-1938 borders) *judenrein*, or “clean of Jews,” happened in a more piecemeal manner, radicalized by individual measures from below and legislation from above.⁴ Much of these efforts concerned how people utilized space and defined who had access to it. In this chapter, I illuminate how the cultural belief of Jews as “resident

² There has been much research on Jewish spaces in recent years. See, e.g., Julia Brauch, Anna Lipphardt, and Alexandra Nocke, ed. *Jewish Topographies: Visions of Space, Traditions of Place, Heritage, Culture and Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Alina Gromova, Felix Heinert, Sebastian Voigt, ed. *Jewish and Non-Jewish Spaces in the Urban Context* (Berlin: Neofelis Verlag GmbH, 2015); Simone Lässig, and Miriam Rürup, ed. *Space & Spatiality in Modern German-Jewish History, New German Historical Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017).

³ Marion Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁴ “*Altreich*” literally means “Old Empire.”

enemies” informed everyday spatial practices that redefined Germany as a place in which Jews did not belong.

Two parallel processes contributed to the exclusion and erasure of German Jews from their homeland between 1933 and 1945. First, Jewish spaces were vandalized and targeted for violent destruction. Images of *Kristallnacht* are paradigmatic of the violent physical destruction wrought on Jewish spaces under the Nazi regime. Robert Bevan has called the nationwide November 1938 pogroms a “proto-genocidal episode” in Nazi campaigns of “cultural cleansing” and “enforced forgetting.”⁵ Though Bevan is right to highlight *Kristallnacht* as the most violent act of property destruction against Jews, it was one of many that preceded and succeeded it. Jewish spaces were targeted with increasing violence from the very first moments of 1933. Second, German Jews were segregated from their non-Jewish neighbors and then systematically excluded from public spaces altogether. Because the difference between Jew and non-Jew was rarely self-evident, it had to be made manifest. To reinstate this boundary, “German spaces” and “Jewish spaces” were marked with increasing intensity after 1933. The marking of spaces and violence were mutually reinforcing.

In this chapter, I examine the process of making Germany *judenrein* as it occurred on various levels: nation, city, and home—increasingly smaller scales which correspond to Germans Jews’ shrinking sense of space in Nazi Germany. From 1933 onward, the world of German Jews imploded as they became increasingly isolated in their homeland. It is crucial to examine the legal measures and everyday actions perpetrated against Jews that led to their alienation and exclusion from space in their own homeland in 1930s Germany, because these efforts constructed and concretized the boundary between Jews and non-Jews and made genocide conceivable. Though I

⁵ Robert Bevan, *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), 8.

include many voices from survivor testimonies, I repeatedly return to the testimony of Alfred Jachmann to illuminate this shrinking sense of space as experienced by one man.⁶

Nation

Alfred Jachmann's family had lived in Arnswalde for generations.⁷ A small town of about 12,000 inhabitants in the Prussian province of Pomerania, Arnswalde's Jewish community numbered roughly sixty-five people. Alfred was born in 1927 and grew up in a traditional Jewish family that kept kosher and attended Shabbat services in the synagogue. He described his childhood as "completely normal." His family, including his father Leopold, his mother Selma, and his older sister Gerda, lived amicably amongst their non-Jewish neighbors. The Jachmanns invited non-Jewish friends to their home for Jewish holidays, especially Chanukah, and they in turn helped family friends decorate their Christmas trees.⁸ It was this casualness with which many Jews and non-Jews interacted that unnerved National Socialists. Jews were Germans, and non-Jews largely accepted them as such. For many Germans, Nazi assertions that Jewish influences had infected the German nation and that Jews sought to subjugate Germany to their "foreign" rule took no small leap of logic.

To achieve their goal of making Germany *judenrein*, Nazis would have to turn neighbor against neighbor and convince the population that Jews were, in fact, foreign, rendering the label "German Jew" itself anathema. This "othering" process is an intrinsic antecedent to genocide, a process through which a certain group, once included, is transformed into a menacing "other" that

⁶ Minka Pradelski interviewed Jachmann on March 15, 1996 in Frankfurt, Germany as part of the Shoah Visual History Foundation's effort to collect and preserve testimonies from Holocaust survivors.

⁷ Today, Arnswalde is Choszczno, Poland.

⁸ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 3-4, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

must be eradicated.⁹ Antisemitism had certainly become a political force to be reckoned with in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but German Jews' "otherness" was far from a foregone conclusion in 1933. Jews were no longer separated from non-Jews by physical boundaries, as they had been when confined to ghettos in many medieval European cities. Emancipation in 1812 in Prussia made the boundary between Jews and non-Jews porous, and thereafter, German Jews robustly contributed to all aspects of public life.¹⁰ Many German Jews further eroded the divide by assimilating into German society, serving in the military, and some even converting to Christianity. In the modern era, the boundary would have to be redrawn and rationally justified.¹¹ Thus, National Socialists rallied experts—legal scholars, scientists, criminologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists—to essentialize the difference between Germans and Jews and to purge Germany's past and present of its debts to Jews.¹² This campaign was not limited to the academic realm. Most importantly, reconstructing the boundary between "German" and "Jew" was a spatial project relentlessly pursued until Germany was free of Jews.

The first nationwide efforts to make Germany *judenrein* and to separate Jews from non-Jews were advanced by legislative measures from above and individual actions from below. Via immediate legislation passed in 1933, the regime quickly sought to exclude Jews from leading roles in Germany's politics, society, and culture, and thereby begin reversing the effects of "Jewification" in these realms and restore them to "true Germans." In April, Jews were banned

⁹ Alexander Laban Hinton, ed. *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 6.

¹⁰ Emancipation spread to Jews in all German lands with the ratification of the German Empire's constitution in 1871 following German unification.

¹¹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 57.

¹² Bettina Arnold, "Justifying Genocide: Archaeology and the Construction of Difference," in *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Gretchen E. Schafft, "Scientific Racism in Service of the Reich: German Anthropologists in the Nazi Era," in *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*; Confino, *A World without Jews*.

from civil service and from entering law school while Jewish enrollment in schools and universities was capped at one and a half percent. Jewish editors and journalists lost their jobs as German presses and newspapers were purged. By summer 1933, all political parties but the NSDAP had been banned, precluding Jews from any further political roles in Germany. The establishment of the Reich Chamber of Culture in September 1933, with its racial qualifications, effectively nullified Jewish roles in German theater, art, film, music, and architecture. Despite this immediate legislation, most antisemitic campaigns between 1933 and 1938 were initiated “from below” by NSDAP members and SA troops.

The SA championed Nazi efforts to “educate” the German population about the dangers posed by Jews. The SA led the nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses on April 1, 1933 and compelled other non-Jews to stop patronizing Jewish stores by threatening shoppers, photographing people shopping in Jewish stores, and publishing lists of their names.¹³ The SA and NSDAP also used literature to convert Germans to their rabid form of antisemitism, and from 1933 onward, a barrage of antisemitic propaganda inundated Germans’ everyday surroundings. Nazis tacked antisemitic propaganda to the news columns that dotted street corners, a form of propaganda impossible to avoid, recounted Minna Nathan, because such columns were so prevalent that even without a subscription, one “could not help being involved in the propaganda.”¹⁴ Furthermore, thousands of so-called “*Stürmer* cases” were hastily erected in towns across the Reich. These wooden cases exhibited Julius Streicher’s extremely antisemitic weekly news organ, *Der Stürmer*, and could be found on public squares, close to town halls or train stations, and even in schools and factories. Sometimes they were placed in more provocative sites, like in front of the synagogue in

¹³ For examples in Baden and Pfalz, see *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 922-924.

¹⁴ Minna Nathan, Interview 38040, Segment 48-50, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

Beuthen, Upper Silesia.¹⁵ In Arnswalde, a *Stürmer* case stood within one-hundred meters of the Jachmann home.¹⁶

The placement of *Stürmer* cases in public spaces, often encouraged and always permitted by local authorities, were symbolic acts that heralded new politics and norms in towns and cities across the Reich. The unveiling of a new case was often occasion for a large celebration in which local SA members, Hitler Youth, and often the whole town took part. *Der Stürmer* published sensationalist antisemitic stories and caricatures of Jews, and sometimes the display cases themselves were decorated with painted or carved antisemitic caricatures. One antisemitic enthusiast displayed Heinrich von Treitschke's famous phrase "the Jews are our misfortune" in the rear window of his car, for which he received praise from *Der Stürmer*: "To him, the work of *enlightenment* is a matter of the heart."¹⁷ Indeed, with their bombardment of antisemitic propaganda, Nazis were attempting nothing less than to actualize a National Socialist counter-Enlightenment to dismantle modern ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality.

Though it is difficult to gauge the general population's direct responses to such propaganda, the Gestapo reported that the ubiquity of *Der Stürmer* throughout German cities incited "aggressive" antisemitism.¹⁸ Indeed, such propaganda encouraged assaults on Jewish spaces, and here too it was the SA and local antisemites who perpetrated the first attacks. SA men marched through Jewish neighborhoods in early 1933 chanting antisemitic slogans—such as "When Jewish blood spurts from the knife, then everything will be good again." Paroles of SA troops and Hitler Youth decorated the back ends of trucks with antisemitic slogans and drove

¹⁵ *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 52 (1937).

¹⁶ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 12, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁷ *Der Stürmer* 13, no. 18 (1935). Emphasis added.

¹⁸ Wildt, *Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft*, 177.

through residential neighborhoods.¹⁹ Many Jews remember such actions as their first encounter with antisemitism.²⁰ Indeed, German Jews were shocked to suddenly encounter these unapologetic manifestations of antisemitism in their everyday lives.

As Michael Wildt has shown, anti-Jewish violence was historically more acute in smaller towns and in the countryside where Jews were more conspicuous, and this was true after 1933 as well.²¹ Although German Jews overwhelmingly lived in larger cities, in 1933, twenty-four percent of the total German Jewish population (120,054 Jews) lived in towns with less than 50,000 people, and 77,168 of those lived in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants.²² In these places, the first targets of such vandalism were Jewish spaces that were visible as such, especially cemeteries and synagogues. A mere three days after Hitler's appointment as chancellor, unknown perpetrators vandalized a Jewish cemetery in Großen-Linden bei Gießen (in central Hesse) by knocking over some headstones.²³ Jewish homes and stores were targeted as well. Perpetrators graffitied houses and threw stones through the windows of Jewish homes and apartments.²⁴ This destruction marred these sites, signaling that they constituted something "other" in the German landscape, and the vandalization and destruction of Jewish spaces intensified in the next few years, with varying degrees of physical and symbolic violence.

Antisemitic violence grew again in early 1935 and reached a crescendo by that same spring and summer.²⁵ This surge of violence likely resulted from renewed agitation in the party, the

¹⁹ "Ohne Jud nochmal so gut" and "Deutsche, wehrt euch. Kauft nicht bei Juden."

²⁰ Miriam Weiss, Interview 1265, Segment 9-10, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995; Ruth Solinger, Interview 18508, Segment 29-39, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

²¹ Wildt, *Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft*.

²² Gruner, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 1, 177.

²³ "Friedhofsschändung!" *C.V. Zeitung*, February 2, 1933.

²⁴ "Terror in Gersfeld," *C.V. Zeitung*, February 9, 1933; "Blutiger Terror in Viersen und Eisleben," *C.V. Zeitung*, February 16, 1933. Erich Heymann, Interview 7953, Segment 5, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

²⁵ Wildt, *Hitler's Volksgemeinschaft*, 137-41. Wildt recounts an incident that began in Gelnhausen in January 1935.

bitterness of SA troops from the purge of its ranks the previous year, the increased Jew-baiting of Nazi newspapers, and talk of new anti-Jewish decrees.²⁶ A pogrom-like atmosphere permeated the Reich for several months as antisemites targeted synagogues, cemeteries, and Jewish shops and homes. In a severe affront to the Jewish community in Wilhelmshaven, someone nailed a pig's head to the main door of the synagogue and a pig's tail and a pig's vulva to the handles of additional doors.²⁷ Jewish stores in Cologne, Düsseldorf, Wuppertal, and Gladbach-Rheidt were vandalized, and doors, walls, and sidewalks were "besmirched in the vilest manner."²⁸ Jewish homes in approximately thirty east Prussian towns were covered with posters and slogans written in oil paint.²⁹ In the Hessian town of Gladenbach, three Jewish homes were completely ruined as people stormed the houses and "turned on the water taps, or ripped out the pipes, so that the houses were totally destroyed by the water."³⁰ This type of violence, which rendered a space unusable, was markedly different than previous stone-throwing and graffiti. It aimed not merely to intimidate but to terrorize, expel, and assert claims about the place of Jews in Germany. This radicalizing violence would be reprised on multiple scales between 1933 and 1945.

Until 1936, these violent outbursts and inclinations of local Nazis were somewhat tempered by the government and its "authoritarian-conservative tendencies."³¹ This was a tenuous dynamic, however, and the absence of a clear, nationwide, anti-Jewish policy led to permanent tensions. Police officers, local authorities, NSDAP functionaries, SA and SS men, and government officials often clashed on anti-Jewish measures. Economic and foreign policy considerations further

²⁶ Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, 137.

²⁷ Stapostelle Government District Aurich, Report for July 1935, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 140.

²⁸ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 804-805.

²⁹ Schreiben des CV Berlin, ungz., an den RuPrMdI vom 24.7.1935, quoted in Gruner, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 1, 456.

³⁰ District Governor Wiesbaden, Report for August 1935, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 149-50.

³¹ Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, 115.

muddled efforts to establish any unified, coherent position. After his appointment as minister for economics in 1934, Hjalmar Schacht largely tried to reign in the boycott measures and antisemitic actions across the Reich. Schacht was primarily concerned with mitigating adverse effects on international trade and the German economy from widespread anti-Jewish measures.³² Martin Bormann, Reich Leader of the NSDAP, had circulated a statement to all NSDAP regional branch leaders as early as September 12, 1933 demanding that local decrees and individual actions against Jews cease and stating that in future, all measures against Jews required the “express permission of the Reich leaders.”³³ Such efforts were in vain, however, because communities continued to formulate their own policies and positions.

In seeking to curb antisemitic violence and individual actions, policemen often found themselves in the awkward position of appearing to be against the NSDAP’s antisemitic platform. Throughout 1935, police and local authorities pleaded for the government to release a nationwide policy regarding Jews, emphasizing that its reticence to do so only made the state appear weak.³⁴ Much to the relief of these local authorities, Hitler outlined the regime’s official position toward Jews during the September 1935 Nuremberg Party Rally when he announced the so-called “Nuremberg Laws.” These consisted of two distinct laws. The “Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor” prohibited sexual relations between “Aryan” Germans and Jews and barred Jewish households from employing non-Jewish maids and nannies who were under forty-five years of age. The “Reich Citizenship Law” stripped German Jews of their German citizenship, legally defining a Jew as someone who had at least three Jewish grandparents. Shortly after

³² David Cesarani, *Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933-49* (London: Macmillan, 2016), 85-88.

³³ Rundschreiben des StfF/Stabsleiter, gez. M. Bormann, München, an alle NSDAP-Gauleitungen vom 12.9.1933 (Abschrift), quoted in Gruner, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 1, 242.

³⁴ Stapostelle Government District Cologne, Report for June 1935, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 133.

proclaiming these laws, Hitler again called upon the party to desist from enacting anti-Jewish initiatives of its own accord.³⁵ Despite this command, the persecution of Jews continued mostly unabated. A September 1935 Sopade report noted that the “methods of Jewish persecution did not change through the Nuremberg Laws, arbitrariness reigns as before and individual actions are still a daily occurrence.”³⁶ Jews received a slight reprieve during the 1936 winter and summer Olympics held in Germany. The regime ordered towns and cities to remove especially offensive antisemitic signs and to refrain from displaying *Der Stürmer*. David Cesarani deemed these measures merely “cosmetic,” because Nazi functionaries continued to acquire greater authority, pushing their antisemitic agenda, and the persecution of Jews continued in rural areas almost unabated.³⁷

The absolute exclusion of Jews from towns also began in rural areas before similar measures in larger cities. Many municipalities actively sought to force Jews to leave by simply banning the sale of property to them or forbidding them to move to town.³⁸ Countless other municipalities erected signs at the town entrances declaring that “Jews are undesired” or that “Jews live in this place at their own risk.”³⁹ Police permitted residents of Pirmasens, Odenwald, and the Rheingau in southwestern Germany to display such signs and even punished anyone who damaged them.⁴⁰ After driving all its Jewish residents out, the town of Käfertal proudly erected signs to declare itself free of Jews.⁴¹ One by one, additional towns across Germany began to similarly

³⁵ Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, 143.

³⁶ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1027.

³⁷ Cesarani, *Final Solution*, 116.

³⁸ The August 1935 Sopade report noted that the towns of Bergzabern, Edenkoben, Schotten, Höheinöd, Breunigweiler and others had taken those measures. See *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 921.

³⁹ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1030, 1044; *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 34.

⁴⁰ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1030.

⁴¹ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1027.

announce that they were *judenfrei* (free of Jews).⁴² Roth, a town near Nuremberg, had once been home to sixty-seven Jews. The final three Jews left Roth on New Year's Eve in 1935, and that same evening, the NSDAP local branch leader called all the townspeople to gather on Adolf-Hitler-Square where he announced the "joyous news" that their town was free of Jews.⁴³

Popular opinion reports on the effects of these anti-Jewish actions on the population at large were at times contradictory. Early on, however, most opinion reports concluded that these actions, largely led by SA, had little to no effect on the population. Following an uptick in persecution in the summer of 1935, most reports concluded that Germans paid little attention to them and did not actively participate in acts of persecution.⁴⁴ It was just a "fanatical SS- and SA-clique."⁴⁵ However, by January 1936, the overall tone of the reports had shifted significantly and concluded that the existence of a "Jewish question" is generally accepted and that antisemitism had "taken root in broad circles of the population."⁴⁶

It was around this same time that Alfred Jachmann said that the greater part of Arnswalde's population "suddenly showed a different face." Children began to taunt him and his sister Gerda on the street, and he was forced to sit in the back of his classroom by himself. Friends and acquaintances retreated from his family, and people stopped speaking with them. Even people "who did not necessarily have anything against Jews" became afraid and told their children, "Please don't play with the Jachmanns. They're Jews. We'll have trouble." Jachmann was fully aware that many of his neighbors were not antisemitic. Nevertheless, their decisions to stop interacting with his family alienated the Jachmanns and abetted their segregation.⁴⁷

⁴² *Der Stürmer* enjoyed reporting on such events. See, e.g.: "Rienburg ist judenfrei," *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 41 (1937); "Sudensberg ist judenfrei," *Der Stürmer* 16, no. 22 (1938); "Wir sind judenfrei!," *Der Stürmer*, no. 51 (1938).

⁴³ "Roth bei Nürnberg judenfrei," *Der Stürmer* 13, no. 35 (1935).

⁴⁴ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 813.

⁴⁵ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 925.

⁴⁶ *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 22-26.

⁴⁷ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 8-10, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

What had formerly been mundane, everyday interactions were now politicized and even dangerous. Many Jews clearly remember when friends and neighbors stopped greeting them on the streets. Even if they continued friendships in private, they stopped greeting one another in public spaces, and this segregation in the public sphere, imposed from without and within, had severe consequences.⁴⁸ At first only symbolically distinguished from their non-Jewish neighbors during national rituals in the public sphere, Jews were slowly banned from the public sphere altogether.

Actions against Jews escalated further in 1937 and 1938. The Jachmanns had swastikas graffitied on their home, and by 1937 they had to put boards up on the inside of their windows at night to prevent stones from flying in and injuring them.⁴⁹ In other places, the violence grew to new proportions. Someone detonated a bomb in front of a Jewish home in Böchingen. The explosion shattered twenty windows of the home and nearby houses.⁵⁰ Bertha Nussbaum's home in Rhina, a tiny village in central Germany, was repeatedly vandalized so that by autumn 1938, their house eventually no longer had any windows or a door, so she and her husband fled to the larger city of Frankfurt.⁵¹ The Nussbaums were some of many thousands of German Jews who, due to intense antisemitism in rural areas in the mid-1930s, migrated to larger cities.

In June 1934, the Gestapo office in Berlin estimated that "some 100,000 Jews have emigrated from Germany, and another 100,000 have probably migrated from the smaller towns to the cities in the German Reich, so that here too a precise statistical picture is not possible."⁵² A Sopade report from August 1936 stated that 98,000 Jews had emigrated from Germany since the

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 941; Löw, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 3, 352.

⁴⁹ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segments 11-12, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

⁵⁰ District Governor Palatinate, Report for April 1938, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 297.

⁵¹ Bertha Nussbaum, Interview 10317, Segment 15-16, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

⁵² Gestapa Berlin, "Situation Report on the Activities of the Jews and Their Organizations around the World and in Germany," June 17, 1934, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 50.

beginning of 1933, dropping the total number of German Jews from 517,000 to 405,000. It continued: “Because the terror rages worse in the provinces than in the large cities, in addition to emigration, an internal migration into the larger cities has begun, above all to Berlin. Because of that, the number of Jews living in the province has greatly decreased.”⁵³ Widespread violence in rural areas sent German Jews fleeing from smaller towns and villages scattered throughout the nation to Germany’s larger cities, especially Berlin. This phase constituted the first stage in the implosion of Jewish life in Nazi Germany and the first constrictions on Jews’ access to German *Lebensraum*. The Jachmann family remained put in Arnswalde for the time being.

City

Jews hoped to find some protection and a degree of anonymity in the Reich capital, and it was this very anonymity that caused Nazi authorities much consternation. The antisemitic propaganda film *The Eternal Jew* sought to educate Germans on the art of Jewish concealment. The film depicted images of poor, bearded orthodox Jews in Poland, compared them to rats who had infested the world, and claimed that these men embodied the true character of “the Jew.” If one shaved these men and put them in Western-style clothing, as the film did, they still appeared somewhat awkward in their new attire. Berlin Jews, on the other hand, had mastered the art of assimilation, the film claimed. One could no longer detect that their immediate ancestors hailed from “the ghetto.” Berliner Jews externally mimicked and deceived their “guest Volk,” which began to believe Jews were Germans. “Therein lies the enormous danger,” claimed the film, “for these assimilated Jews remain at all times a foreign body in the organism of its guest Volk, however much they may appear externally akin.”⁵⁴

⁵³ *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 979.

⁵⁴ *Der ewige Jude*, directed by Fritz Hippler (USA: International Historic Films, 2004), DVD.

Nazi authorities had celebrated the exclusion of Jews from German politics, culture, civil service, and press, and they applauded each new town that proclaimed itself *judenfrei* and sent Jews fleeing from the countryside. But they became more and more paranoid about assimilated German Jews, often urban dwellers, who seamlessly blended in with the “Aryan” population and were much more difficult to identify. It was this “enemy” which Nazis sought to expose and banish through evermore intrusive measures. Narrowing the focus to Berlin allows us to see how efforts to make Germany *judenrein* were conceived and implemented on a smaller scale, at the level of the city. The indiscernibility of many Berlin Jews lent Nazi plans for segregation a fevered sense of urgency.

Despite the hopes of many Jews of finding refuge in the Reich capital, Berlin was not immune to antisemitic outbursts, for Nazism had also hit it with a vengeance. As outlined in Chapter 1, Nazis stigmatized cities as Jewish-controlled, and their assaults on Communist and Socialist spaces were also permeated with antisemitism. Moreover, explicit “Jewish spaces” were targeted in early 1933 as well, and authorities had taken first steps to exclude Jews from public spaces. By spring 1933, for example, Jewish organizations in Berlin could no longer rent or lease city buildings or property, and current leases were to be terminated as soon as possible.⁵⁵ Furthermore, conspicuous Jewish urban spaces, such as synagogues, cemeteries, and neighborhoods with East European orthodox Jews who dressed in traditional garb, made easy targets for antisemites.⁵⁶ Gestapo reports from Berlin in 1933 repeatedly mentioned violence

⁵⁵ Noted in Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 62.

⁵⁶ Avraham Barkai, “Exclusion and Persecution: 1933-1938,” in *German-Jewish History in Modern Times*, ed. Michael A. Meyer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 198. East European Jews were attacked in Berlin, Munich, as well as in cities in Westphalia and the Rhineland.

against Jews, often from SA troops who patrolled the streets of Jewish neighborhoods and entered cafes, beating up “Jewish-looking” patrons.⁵⁷

In the succeeding years, National Socialists led a tireless campaign to identify Jews and clearly redraw the boundary between “German” and “Jew” in Berlin’s cityscape. This differentiation required the physical segregation of Jews from non-Jews. Like acts of vandalism, initial restrictions against Jews were often mandated “from below,” driven in many cases by the SA and ordinary citizens, and often condoned and legitimated through municipal ordinances before nationwide laws were enacted.⁵⁸ The outward conformity discussed in Chapter 2, at first seemingly innocuous, assumed a more sinister significance in the realm of anti-Jewish persecution and directly contributed to the alienation of German Jews.

Individual proprietors began displaying “Jews undesired” signs in cafes, pubs, restaurants, and stores. Cities across Germany reinforced individual actions by passing municipal ordinances that banned Jews from attending operas and going to theaters and movie theaters.⁵⁹ They prohibited Jews from using libraries and from and selling their goods at weekly markets.⁶⁰ In several neighborhoods in Berlin, Jews were banned from sitting on benches or permitted to sit only on yellow-painted ones.⁶¹ Party and local officials vigorously pursued the segregation of public swimming pools, as they feared the mixing of German and Jewish bodies and the “contamination” of the former by the latter.⁶² This prohibition was especially disappointing for young German Jews. Most Jewish children stopped visiting public pools after anti-Jewish signs were displayed or swam

⁵⁷ BArch R 58/3026, Gestapo reports from March 10 and March 16, 1933.

⁵⁸ For an in-depth look at how local and municipal bans and ordinances influenced national policies, see Wolf Gruner, “Die NS-Judenverfolgung und die Kommunen. Zur wechselseitigen Dynamisierung von zentraler und lokaler Politik 1933-1941,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 48, no. 1 (2000).

⁵⁹ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 921. See also: *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 926, 1027; *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 22.

⁶⁰ *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 921, 928, 1937-1039; *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 22, 1653.

⁶¹ Benches were first marked in Prenzlauer Berg and Wilmersdorf in August 1937 and later in additional Berlin districts where Jews lived in summer 1938. See Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 96-97, 108.

⁶² Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, 122.

in a river instead.⁶³ Harold Blitzer refused to be deterred. He often snuck into the pools but remembers having to keep his naked body covered when showering before jumping into the pool because he could not reveal to others that he was circumcised.⁶⁴

As introduced in Chapter 4, Jews responded in varying ways to “Jews unwanted” signs, some initially ignoring them, while others immediately stopped patronizing such establishments. There are two things that seemed to influence Jews’ reactions to such measures. First, Jews who could “pass” as “Aryan” were more willing to continue going to theaters and movie houses. It was more difficult for Jews with a “typical Jewish appearance” to do likewise. German Jews had deeply internalized antisemitic tropes about what it meant to “look Jewish.” When commenting on their own appearance or that of family members and friends, they often described typical “Jewish characteristics” as depicted by antisemitic organs: “black hair, hooked nose, [and] deep-set eyes.”⁶⁵ Though the persecution of Jews was indeed becoming acute, such comments reveal that a certain amount of self-policing dictated Jewish life in the mid-1930s. Before there were official, legally-sanctioned ordinances banning Jews from certain places, many Jews heeded the individual, ad hoc measures. When asked if establishments had any means to identify Jews, Alfred Batzdorff responded that even before legislation had been passed, “many people just didn’t go if the sign was there.”⁶⁶

Second, assimilated families who identified as “German first and Jewish second” were slower to adjust to the rapidly changing climate. H. Henry Sinason’s father, who had served four years on the Western Front in World War I, responded to the news of Jewish arrests saying, “Pay

⁶³ Lucie Elenberg, Interview 52781, Segment 45, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 2012.

⁶⁴ Harold Blitzer, Interview 20609, Segment 34, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

⁶⁵ Siegmund Sollander, Interview 31137, Segment 10, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

⁶⁶ Alfred Batzdorff, Interview 52996, Segment 31, JFCS Holocaust Center, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1994.

no attention to that. They're rounding up illegal Poles and Russian Jews that came to Germany; they have no business here anyway." Sinason said his father "simply could not fathom that this right of being a German citizen was slowly being taken away from him."⁶⁷

Regardless of the motive—whether proprietors were antisemitic or feared ostracism and economic consequences from Nazis—the appearance of countless “Jews undesired” signs across the nation helped radically segregate German society, because Jews eventually stayed away, despite some reassurances that they were welcome. Many Jews responded to the restrictions by seeking refuge in the alternative spaces that Jewish communities and Zionist organizations provided.⁶⁸ Jewish artists, actors, and musicians were excluded from the newly formed Reich Chamber of Culture and therefore could not perform on German stages, so they formed the Jewish Cultural Federation (*Kulturbund*) and organized their own concerts and shows. Scholars debate the legacy of the Federation, some suggesting that it furthered the “cultural ghettoization” of German Jews while convincing them that life in Nazi Germany was tolerable.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, the projects of emancipation and assimilation, confidently pursued by many German Jews in the previous two centuries, were regressing at lightspeed. As their access to physical spaces rapidly declined, many educated, middle-class Jews sought internal exile in private spaces, which they

⁶⁷ H. Henry Sinason, Interview 15686, Segment 27, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996. For similar sentiments, see: Gerda Bandman, Interview 29564, Segment 22, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997; Hans Winterfeldt, Interview 34331, Segment 64, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997; Heinz Sandelowski, Interview 5767, Segment 17, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995; Helen Juravel, Interview 48340, Segment 37-38, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998; Ilse Salten, Interview 13373, Segment 9, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996; Irene Gregory, Interview 22728, Segment 17-18, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996; Siegmund Sollander, Interview 31137, Segment 10, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

⁶⁸ For an in-depth article on these alternative Jewish spaces, see Jacob Borut, “Struggle for Spaces: Where Could Jews Spend Free Time in Nazi Germany?,” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 56 (2011).

⁶⁹ See Michael Brenner, “Jewish Culture in a Modern Ghetto: Theater and Scholarship among the Jews of Nazi Germany,” in *Jewish Life in Nazi Germany: Dilemmas and Responses*, ed. Francis R. Nicosia, and David Scrase (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 173.

still could control and shape in meaningful ways.⁷⁰ Synagogues and Jewish community houses, Jewish sports clubs, and *hachsharot* (Zionist agricultural training farms) became vital sites of refuge and Jewish community-building.

Yet the mere exclusion of Jews from public spaces did not content antisemites, for as Omer Bartov writes, the more “Jew-free” Germany became, the more “the specter of Jewish presence seemed to haunt people’s imagination.”⁷¹ National Socialists were obsessed with invisible Jews “hiding” among them. Articles in *Der Stürmer* wrote that some people, like animals, are able to escape being preyed upon through camouflage and that “Jews are masters of this skill.”⁷² *Der Stürmer* made it a personal mission to reveal all the ways in which Jews, especially Jewish businesses, sought to “camouflage” themselves. It regularly published lists of Jewish-owned stores across the country and responded to subscribers’ individual inquiries regarding the racial background of specific shop owners in their communities. The paper condemned Jewish businesses for displaying nationalist books or photos in their shop windows.

Another way to allay people’s fears of the camouflaged enemy was the frenzied marking of places as either “German” or “Jewish.” To the chagrin of many committed Nazis, there was no law requiring Jews to mark their businesses as such.⁷³ Therefore, amidst the upheaval of summer 1935, local SA men and Hitler Youth in Berlin took matters into their own hands. Agitation first broke out in the districts of Pankow and Spandau in June, and in July, Jewish shops in Berlin-Mitte were pasted with antisemitic posters, and Jews were attacked on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ See Guy Miron, “‘Lately, Almost Constantly, Everything Seems Small to Me’: The Lived Space of German Jews under the Nazi Regime,” *Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society* 20, no. 1 (2013).

⁷¹ Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,” *The American Historical Review* 103, no. 3 (1998): 779.

⁷² “Die Tarnung,” *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 39 (1937).

⁷³ “Kennzeichnet die deutschen Geschäfte!,” *Der Stürmer* 15, no. 26 (1937).

⁷⁴ Wolf Gruner, “Die Berliner und die NS-Judenverfolgung: Eine mikrohistorische Studie individueller Handlungen und sozialer Beziehungen,” in *Berlin im Nationalsozialismus: Politik und Gesellschaft 1933-1945*, ed. Rüdiger Hachtmann, Thomas Schaarschmidt and Winfried Süß (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 60-61.

Individuals broke the windows of Jewish shops or covered them with antisemitic slogans in red oil paint.⁷⁵ Jewish-owned ice cream shops became the central focus of these attacks in Berlin. It is unclear as to why they were targeted, but it could be because they were popular summer haunts of young Jews. Gerhard Papelbaum's family owned three such shops. In the fall and winter, they were delicatessens that sold meat and poultry, but each year around Passover, the Papelbaums converted the shops into ice cream parlors for the spring and summer. Members of Jewish youth organizations (such as *Habonim*, *Bar Kochba*, and *Kadima*) gathered at one of the Papelbaum's ice cream parlors every summer. One day, approximately twenty men came and beat up all the Jewish youth who were eating ice cream.⁷⁶ Another Jewish-owned ice cream parlor in Hohenzollerndamm received even more unwanted attention. The sidewalk in front of the shop and its windows were covered with slogans reading, "Moscow Jew! We're warning you!" and "Foreign Jew!" The local police reported that 4-5,000 people had gathered in front of the shop on July 15. Three days later, the demonstrations had not ebbed.⁷⁷

Clashes with the rioters caused the local police great consternation, as they had difficulties curbing the excesses of these summer months. Agitators accused the police of protecting Jews.⁷⁸ Amidst the upheaval in July 1935, Magnus von Levetzow was relieved of his position as Berlin's chief of police and replaced by Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorff, the SA leader in Berlin. Thereafter, police efforts to end the actions proved nearly "impossible" because the agitators claimed their behavior was condoned by the new chief of police himself.⁷⁹ Local police blamed the Hitler Youth

⁷⁵ LAB, A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21640, Bl. 601.

⁷⁶ Gerhard Papelbaum, Interview 25968, Segment 3-5, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

⁷⁷ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21617, Bl. 197-198, 201.

⁷⁸ German authorities had previously protected Jewish minorities from the wrath of the population at large. For example, the Prussian Army occupied the town of Konitz in 1900 to protect Jews from a pogrom that broke out after accusations of a ritual murder. See Helmut Walser Smith, *The Butcher's Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a German Town* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 18.

⁷⁹ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21638, Bl. 119.

for the riots, because they ceaselessly sold copies of *Der Stürmer*, held rallies, and chanted anti-Jewish slogans.⁸⁰ The agitators demanded that the Jewish businessmen shut down their shops or face the consequences. Many of them closed their shops, whereupon the shop windows were plastered with boycott notices and copies of *Der Stürmer*.⁸¹

Because they failed to achieve legislation for the marking of Jewish businesses, local NSDAP branches began encouraging and pressuring local German businesses to post signs in their windows reading “German Store,” “Aryan,” or “Member of the DAF” (the German Labor Front, the National Socialist trade union). By September 1935, this trend had already taken Berlin by storm.⁸² Furthermore, Jews were explicitly forbidden to use the word “German” in their business names and to display signs suggesting their stores were “German.”⁸³ Hans Saenger’s father had owned dozens of hat shops called “English Club.” During World War I, his shops were vandalized because people thought they were English-owned, so he changed the name to “German Hat Distributor.” After 1933, Nazis vandalized his shops because he dared to call it German, so he was eventually forced to name his business simply “The Hat Distributor.”⁸⁴ In 1938, the government issued a decree that threatened prison sentences for any German citizen who assisted Jews in camouflaging their businesses as “German.”⁸⁵

Two months later, the government released the Third Decree of the Reich Citizenship Law, which stipulated which businesses counted as Jewish. It also announced that all Jewish businesses would be registered in an index and that they might have to visibly mark themselves as Jewish at

⁸⁰ Gruner, “Berlin im Nationalsozialismus,” 61-62.

⁸¹ Stapostelle Police District Berlin, Report for July 1935, quoted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 138.

⁸² *Sopade*, vol. 2, 1935, 1041.

⁸³ *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 22.

⁸⁴ Hanns Saenger, Interview 7337, Segment 18-19, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

⁸⁵ “Verordnung gegen die Unterstützung der Tarnung jüdischer Gewerbebetriebe. Vom 22. April 1938,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1938, I, 404.

some point in the future.⁸⁶ Only two days later, Jewish businesses owners in Berlin had to paint their names with twenty-centimeter high letters in white paint on the front of their establishments. This marking of Jewish spaces and violent outbursts were mutually reinforcing because such marking made the vandalization and destruction of previously inconspicuous, assimilated Jewish spaces possible.

Indeed, immediately after these proprietors were forced to mark their shops, a mini pogrom broke out across Berlin in mid-June 1938. The worst incidents occurred during the weekend of June 17-18, 1938 when bands of Nazis smeared Jewish shops with red paint, writing the word “Jew” and drawing antisemitic caricatures and the Star of David. Mobs of people “who seemed to enjoy the proceedings thoroughly” reportedly followed the painters. A report from the American Embassy concluded that “the present anti-Jewish campaign outstrips in thoroughness anything of the kind since early 1933” and that it was much greater than the havoc wreaked in the summer of 1935.⁸⁷

Young men vandalized and plundered Jewish-owned shops near Alexanderplatz. One participant had planned to see a movie that evening when he encountered a large group of young men who asked if he wanted to join them to “aggravate the Jews.” He accompanied them, he said, because he wanted to “take part in the protest against the Jews.” Approximately forty of them marched through streets in the Scheunenviertel and marked Jewish stores with paint. In Oranienburger Straße they broke some windows of the New Synagogue. They continued these escapades until the early hours of the morning, smashing in more windows, and even stealing some merchandise from one store. The police arrested some of the perpetrators, and several were

⁸⁶ “Dritte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz. Vom 14. Juni 1938,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1938, I, 627-628.

⁸⁷ Quoted in John Mendelsohn, and Donald S. Detwiler, ed. *The Holocaust: Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes*, vol. 1: Legalizing the Holocaust, The Early Phase, 1933-1939 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 139-43.

convicted for disrupting the “public peace” and received prison sentences between two and eight months.⁸⁸ One of the young men questioned said that the cause of the riot had been a rumor that a Hitler Youth member had been mistreated by a Jewish storeowner.⁸⁹

Margot Braun’s family owned a shop and lived in the eastern Berlin district of Biesdorf, and she remembers these events vividly, referring to them as an “early Kristallnacht.”⁹⁰ Using red paint, men covered the sidewalk and windows of her family’s store with slogans that read “Jews leave.” Later that night, the mob returned in uniform and carrying torches. They “practically broke the door down” as they forced their way into the apartment, marched Margot and her family outside, and paraded them up and down the street for about an hour until the police arrived and took them away. At the police station, the officers told her family they should leave as soon as possible and asked, “Don’t you have a place you can go? Because you can’t go back home again.” They left for the city center and moved into her uncle’s apartment. It was only later that Margot found out that a neighbor had called the police for them that night, perhaps saving their lives.⁹¹ Confronting the SA men directly on the streets may have been perilous, but the neighbor found a means to assist Margot’s family. The police also showed some compassion, though measured, by imploring the Braun family to seek other accommodations.

To be sure, the non-Jews who witnessed the vandalization expressed no small amount of disapproval. On the morning of June 18, approximately sixty people had gathered in front of a business on Frankfurter Allee and discussed the destruction. One man commented that he saw the

⁸⁸ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 114400. For a few more reports of the damage from these days in June 1938, see LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 2799.

⁸⁹ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 114400.

⁹⁰ In her testimony, Margot Braun mentioned that her family lived in a suburb on the “Eastern outskirts” of Berlin. The Berlin address book for 1938 confirms that they lived at Königstraße 38 in Biesdorf, registered under her father’s name, Philipp Feibusch. See *Berliner Adreßbuch: für das Jahr 1936* (Berlin: Scherl, 1938).

⁹¹ Margot Braun, Interview 52180, Segments 28-31, 33, JFCS Holocaust Center, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

perpetrator, who had worn NSDAP insignia, but remarked that perhaps the man had worn the insignia unjustly.⁹² Standing in front of a Jewish rug store in Charlottenburg, a woman commented that it was vulgar to write such things and that the perpetrators should return and “wash it off with their noses.”⁹³ Finally, another man turned to a crowd standing in front of a vandalized smoked-foods store in Berliner Straße and asked, “Do you think that’s right? It is and will remain a disgrace. In the war, the English and French described us as pigs, and now one has to accept that they were right.”⁹⁴ The first man did not think Nazis capable of such acts and refused to believe what he had seen with his own eyes. The woman expressed outright disgust, but her condemnation was limited to the perpetrators and did not necessarily extend into compassion for the victims. The second man’s harsh critique, however, implicated the German population as a whole and suggests that he was deeply disturbed by the recent antisemitic violence. It seems the regime did not want the incidents widely publicized because the police arrested one man for taking photos of the damage and confiscated his film.⁹⁵ These events were mere prelude to the events of November 1938, which brought violence, destruction, and debris literally crashing down into the everyday lives of Germans.

Interlude: Kristallnacht

The magnitude of destruction during Kristallnacht cannot be comprehended by examining it at just one scale. It was precisely the ubiquity of the destruction—in villages, towns, and cities across the Reich—that made its violence something quantitatively and qualitatively different than anything that had preceded it. Such destruction was certainly not unknown to twentieth-century

⁹² LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21619, Bl. 158

⁹³ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21619, Bl. 167.

⁹⁴ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21619, Bl. 171.

⁹⁵ LAB A Pr. Br. Rep. 030, Nr. 21619, Bl. 175.

Europe, but its execution during a time of peace was unprecedented. Then again, Nazis believed they were engaged in war with their “resident enemy,” and indeed, it is only with this alleged battle in mind that we can understand the pogroms of November 1938.

By autumn 1938, dozens of synagogues had already been destroyed or slated for demolition. Hitler himself had ordered the demolition of the main synagogue in Munich in June 1938, and a parking lot was erected on the site.⁹⁶ Thousands of people attended the razing of Nuremberg’s main synagogue in August 1938, where Julius Streicher led the ceremony. They planned to erect an antisemitic museum on the site.⁹⁷ This symbolic transformation was commonplace for such spaces, and mirrors similar transformations outlined in Chapter 1. A pogrom-like atmosphere reigned in southern and southwestern Germany in September and October 1938, when residents set synagogues on fire, destroyed Jewish shops and homes, and in some places in Franconia and Württemberg, forced Jews “to leave their residences immediately, taking with them only the barest essentials.”⁹⁸ All these acts were eclipsed, however, by the events of the next month.

At the end of October 1938, Germany deported 14,000 Polish Jews, dropping them at the Polish border where they were refused admittance and had to languish for several weeks until Poland eventually permitted them entry. Seeking revenge for his family’s suffering at the border, Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish-German Jew studying in Paris, went to the German Embassy and shot diplomat Ernst vom Rath.⁹⁹ The Nazi press construed this event as an act of war. Goebbels declared that Grynszpan “was the representative of Jewry. The German vom Rath was the

⁹⁶ Richard Bauer, and Michael Brenner, ed. *Jüdisches München: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006), 174.

⁹⁷ See SD Main Office II 1, Extracts from the Daily Information of I 12, August 4, 1938, Berlin, August 5, 1938. See also District Governor Upper and Central Franconia, Report for August 1938. Both reprinted in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 322-23.

⁹⁸ SD Main Office II 112, Report for October 1938, quoted in *ibid.*, 334.

⁹⁹ Cesarani, *Final Solution*, 181-82.

representative of the German people. Thus in Paris Jewry has fired on the German people. The German government will answer legally but harshly.”¹⁰⁰ Thereafter, party leaders planned a brutal retaliation against all of Germany’s Jews. SA troops, Hitler Youth, NSDAP party members, and German civilians were invited during the night of November 9-10, 1938 to release their rage against Jews.

The physical destruction wrought in towns and cities across the country was wanton.¹⁰¹ Thousands of Jewish shops were ransacked and subsequently looted. Synagogues were set on fire, and men slashed, trampled, and urinated on Torah scrolls.¹⁰² The fire from the synagogue in Beuthen took three days to extinguish on its own, as firefighters let it burn to the ground, only ensuring it did not spread to adjacent buildings. This was common practice across the Reich. Twelve Jewish men were murdered in Beuthen during the pogrom. Three of them were killed inside the synagogue itself, hung with belts from SA uniforms.¹⁰³

Alfred Jachmann was asleep at home that night when the fire alarm sounded around eleven o’clock in Arnswalde. Shortly thereafter, his family realized that the synagogue, which stood approximately 300 meters from their home, was up in flames. Initially, they did not suspect arson nor anticipate the extent of the pogrom. When uniformed men appeared at their front door to arrest his father Leopold, however, Alfred understood that the antisemitic campaign had assumed a new form. All thirty-eight Jewish men in Arnswalde were arrested and sent to concentration camps.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939, 280. These words were originally published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on November 12, 1938.

¹⁰¹ At the end of November 1938, the Joint Distribution Council compiled one of the most detailed reports on the extent of the damage across Germany. It is reprinted in Susanne Heim, ed. *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland, 1933-1945*, vol. 2: Deutsches Reich, 1938-August 1939 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2009), 516-26.

¹⁰² Ilse Sheiman, Interview 25944, Segment 51-52, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997; Leopold Gruenfeld, Interview 46659, Segment 81-82, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998; Morris Gruenberg, Interview 42094, Segment 16, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹⁰³ *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade), 1934-1940*, vol. 5, 1938 (Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 1198-1199.

Leopold landed in Sachsenhausen, a camp on the outskirts of Berlin. Alfred, Selma, and Gerda were told to leave Arnswalde within three days, so they packed up a few suitcases and headed for Berlin and moved in with his aunt in the district of Schöneberg. Jachmann's family had lived in and around Arnswalde for generations. They were now being forced to leave. "We did not go voluntarily," Jachmann emphasized.¹⁰⁴

Though there was certainly significant plundering, the nature and extent of the demolition suggest that the November pogroms were largely about destruction for destruction's sake, and those who led it did not primarily seek financial or material reward. In fact, at least 174 people were arrested for looting.¹⁰⁵ The federal government did demand that Jews pay a fine of one billion RM for damages, so it was primarily interested that loot fall in an orderly manner to the state itself. Nevertheless, such mass property destruction indicates that the perpetrators sought to inflict maximum physical damage on Jewish spaces across the Reich. One Jewish survivor remembers seeing furniture and a piano crash onto the street and said it sounded like a bomb when it hit.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, Horace Hecht watched grandfather clocks smash to the ground, thrown down from a jewelry store in Berlin. Reflecting on this episode later, he commented, "I saw these Nazis going up on the second floor and taking grandfather clocks. They didn't steal them. They threw them out the window. It didn't make any sense, right?"¹⁰⁷ Indeed, many "ordinary Germans" themselves, even if they agreed with the premise of the pogrom, expressed displeasure at the extensive destruction, especially at a time when materials were scarce and when Germans were supposed to

¹⁰⁴ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 13-15, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁰⁵ BArch R 58/9053, November 11, 1938, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei an den Herrn Ministerpräsidenten Generalfeldmarschal Göring, Betr.: Aktion gegen die Juden. For some individual cases of arrest, see: LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 118731; LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 118727; LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 118723; LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 118722.

¹⁰⁶ Morris Gruenberg, Interview 42094, Segment 15-16, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹⁰⁷ Horace Hecht, Interview 17900, Segment 21, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

be resourceful, saving according to the Four Year Plan.¹⁰⁸ One post-pogrom opinion report noted that such comments were “made so often that it was impossible to list the names of the people in question” who had uttered them.¹⁰⁹

Synagogues not completely destroyed during the November pogrom were later dynamited and razed. These included synagogues in Breslau, Hannover, and Vienna, as well as in many other cities across German territory.¹¹⁰ The explosion from dynamiting the remains of the synagogue walls in Gleiwitz was so strong that a chunk of flying stone severely injured a passerby, and the windows of nearby houses were shattered by the blast. From the remains of the synagogue in Hindenburg, Hitler Youth members carted off four tons of metal, iron, and copper to a nearby smelting works to be melted down.¹¹¹ Some synagogues survived destruction in November because they had been previously confiscated or sold, because they were too close to residential buildings and spared burning, or due to some other twist of fate. Many of these were repurposed as storage facilities. Some surviving synagogues later served as collection and transit camps for Jews to be deported to ghettos and extermination camps in Eastern Europe. Others not completely demolished were further damaged in allied bombings or completely dismantled after the war.¹¹² Very few were rebuilt.

¹⁰⁸ See Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*. CD, Doc. 2590, Berlin 18.1.1939, NSDAP Hauptschulungsamt, Berichtsauszüge aus den Berichten zur weltanschaulichen Lage und den Tätigkeitsberichten an das Hauptschulungsamt, *Bericht des Ortsgruppenleiters Eilenburg-Nord, Kreis Delitzsch*.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, CD, Doc. 2620.

¹¹⁰ “Memorandum des Joint vom 30. November 1938 über die Folgen des Pogroms in verschiedenen Städten sowie in jüdischen Umschulungslagern und in KZs,” quoted in Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 517-18.

¹¹¹ *Sopade*, vol. 5, 1938, 1342.

¹¹² In Nordstetten bei Horb, an innkeeper bought the synagogue and tore it down; *Sopade*, vol. 4, 1937, 944. The synagogue in Hamburg was not completely destroyed during the November pogrom, so it was later blown up with dynamite; Hanna Greenbaum, Interview 9227, Segment 21, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995. Adda Gerstel said that a synagogue in Breslau was also dynamited; Adda Gerstel, Interview 52166, Segment 50, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, JFCS Holocaust Center, 1999.

As the process of making Germany *judenrein* accelerated at a rapid pace, evermore traces of Jews were erased. In total, approximately 1,200 synagogues were destroyed under Nazi rule.¹¹³ Goebbels emphatically expressed his desired course of action regarding synagogues immediately following Kristallnacht, stating that all damaged synagogues should be completely dismantled and that Jews should be made to pay for it. He thought the sites could be transformed into playgrounds or have other buildings erected upon them.¹¹⁴ Jewish cemeteries were sold or closed, and in some, the gravestones crushed to rock. Monuments associated with Jews were dismantled.¹¹⁵ Cities across Germany had also renamed streets associated with Jews. Local authorities had mandated renamings haphazardly in the mid-1930s, but on August 2, 1938, the Reich interior minister released a nationwide decree demanding that all streets named after Jews, or after “*Mischling*” of the first degree, be renamed.¹¹⁶

Accounts of Kristallnacht generally depict it as a singular episode of heinous violence that shocked Jews and non-Jews alike. Indeed, it was unique in its scale. As I have tried to emphasize throughout this dissertation, however, violence was perpetrated against Jewish spaces from 1933 onward. Thus, Kristallnacht was a climax of Nazi-perpetrated physical and symbolic destruction wrought on sites associated with Jews. Marianne Elselly summed up this development well, saying, “I mean, there were signs all the time. There were these swastikas dobbed on [the] front of shop

¹¹³ Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 415. The editor made this estimation from a 1970s study by Adolf Diamant. See Adolf Diamant, *Zerstörte Synagogen vom November 1938: Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Frankfurt a.M.: Selbstverlag, 1978).

¹¹⁴ Stenographische Niederschrift... eines Teils der Besprechung unter dem Vorsitz von Feldmarschall Göring im RLM vom 12.11.1938, quoted in Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 415.

¹¹⁵ For example, city officials dismantled a monument of German composer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, grandson of Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelsohn; *Sopade*, vol. 3, 1936, 1653.

¹¹⁶ STAH 135-1 I-IV_7811, “‘Judenstraßen’ verschwinden,” in *Hamburger Tageblatt*, August 3, 1938. Berlin alone had fifty such streets, thirty of which had been renamed by that time, with the rest to follow; Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 110. In Frankfurt, a few of the renamed streets included: Dominikanerplatz (previously Börneplatz), Parseval-Straße (previously Georg-Speyer-Straße), and Nothnagelstraße (previously Herxheimerstraße). See Rachel Heuberger, and Helga Krohn, ed. *Hinaus aus dem Ghetto ... Juden in Frankfurt am Main, 1800-1950* (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 1988), 176. In Leipzig, most streets associated with Jews were renamed by 1935. See Gina Klank, and Gernot Griebisch, *Lexikon: Leipziger Straßennamen* (Leipzig: Verlag im Wissenschaftszentrum Leipzig, 1995).

windows the whole time long. People would wash it off. Or the window panes were smashed, and people would replace it. And this went on, and on, and on. But when Kristallnacht came, it all happened together, all in one go.”¹¹⁷

What is critically significant, however, is the fact that most sites destroyed before November 1938 were only tangentially—to greater and lesser degrees—associated with Jews, and they were primarily “Jewish spaces” from a Nazi perspective. Synagogues, on the other hand, were incontrovertibly “Jewish spaces.” They may have been German-Jewish spaces, but they were Jewish nonetheless. Jewish communities had erected monumental synagogues in German cityscapes at the turn of the century. After finally achieving emancipation and acquiring the opportunity to fully participate in German society, these buildings effused a measured confidence that Jews had finally “made it” in Germany.¹¹⁸ Their widespread destruction in November 1938 was an unequivocal statement that Judaism was undeserving of a public presence in Germany’s *Lebensraum*.

Home

Although Jewish homes had been vandalized since 1933, they still offered a space of refuge for many Jews, a private realm of relative comfort and safety amidst a rapidly deteriorating situation. Following increasing restrictions, H. Henry Sinason remembered that his family threw him “a bit of a party at home” for his bar mitzvah in 1938 “because Jews were not allowed to go to restaurants anymore.” His aunts and mother had cooked and baked for everyone, and he fondly recalled it as a “nice day.”¹¹⁹ This precarious sense of domestic calm and security was shattered

¹¹⁷ Marianne Elsley, Interview 42860, Segment 50, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹¹⁸ Coenen Snyder, *Building a Public Judaism*.

¹¹⁹ H. Henry Sinason, Interview 15686, Segment 38, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

by the November 1938 pogroms. Although the most famous images from the night depict burning synagogues and the broken glass of Jewish stores, Jewish homes were also prime targets of Nazi rage. As Jewish men were rounded up and sent to concentration camps, the mobs ransacked their homes with sledgehammers and axes.¹²⁰ They shattered dishes and mirrors and threw furniture out apartment windows.¹²¹ They used knives to slice open mattresses and feather-downed pillows and bedding, sending feathers fluttering throughout the streets.¹²² That night, men had used their rifle butts to smash in the doors of Curt Pollack's home and tore up the entire place searching for his father, who they thought was hiding somewhere in the home. "It was a very traumatic experience and something I'll never forget," Pollack said.¹²³ Notions that Jewish homes were "a place of safe retreat" evaporated during this night.¹²⁴ Thereafter, the regime passed evermore measures that touched Jews not just in the public sphere, but now penetrated the private sphere, marking their spaces, and their bodies, with ever increasing intensity.

Whereas individual actions and local ordinances had previously prompted most anti-Jewish persecution and legislation, after November 1938, nationwide guidelines and legislation determined the fates of German Jews. In a meeting on November 12, 1938, two days after the pogroms, Göring, Goebbels, and Heydrich mulled over the future of Jews in Germany. They discussed ways to completely remove Jews from public life and force their emigration. They contemplated banning Jews from schools, trains and public transportation, hospitals, and even from German forests. Heydrich suggested introducing some sort of badge to mark Jews. All these measures eventually came to pass during the next few years. They were chiefly concerned,

¹²⁰ Milton Kaufman, Interview 27113, Segment 17, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

¹²¹ H. Henry Sinason, Interview 15686, Segment 46-47, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996; Margot Block, Interview 43393, Segment 39-41, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1998.

¹²² Ruth Solinger, Interview 18508, Segment 29-30, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹²³ Curt Pollack, Interview 24188, Segment 6, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹²⁴ Tim Cole, *Holocaust Landscapes* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., 2016), 13.

however, with determining the future living situation of German Jews. Heydrich explicitly stated that he did not wish to create ghettos for Jews in Germany, because he believed they would become centers of crime. If Jews still lived amongst the population, they could more easily be observed.¹²⁵ At the beginning of 1938, there were approximately 370,000 Jews still in Germany. By the end of the year, that number had reduced to 320,000.¹²⁶

Since the mid-1930s, authorities had contemplated how to segregate the living quarters of Jews from non-Jews, and Jews were slowly forced out of public housing quarters in Berlin.¹²⁷ In September 1938, representatives from Speer's office and the Reich Ministry of Justice discussed how they might lift renters' protections for all Jews and free up apartments.¹²⁸ One month later, Speer requested that the Reich Ministry of Economy assist him in his plans for the mass evictions of Jews from their apartments.¹²⁹ In the immediate wake of the November pogroms, however, the regime prioritized the Aryanization of Jewish businesses over that of private property. In an interview shortly after the pogroms, Goebbels referred to Kurfürstendamm and Friedrichstraße and lamented, "It is impossible that in a National Socialist state centered on antisemitism that Jewish stores occupy entire streets. These stores will be gradually transferred into Aryan ownership."¹³⁰ The *Völkischer Beobachter* similarly lamented that Jews still owned 185,009 pieces of property in Berlin.¹³¹

¹²⁵ Quoted in Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 432-33.

¹²⁶ SD Main Office II 1, Report for 1938, in Kulka, *The Jews in the Secret Nazi Reports*, 426.

¹²⁷ LAB A Rep. 009, Nr. 250.

¹²⁸ Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 291-93.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 299-300.

¹³⁰ BArch NS 22/569, "Reinliche Scheidung zwischen Juden und Deutschen: Dr. Goebbels sprach mit einem Reuter-Vertreter," *Völkischer Beobachter*, November 16, 1938.

¹³¹ "Deutsches Grundeigentum muß judenfrei werden: Die Juden verfügen über 5,5 Milliarden Vermögenswerte im Berliner Grundbesitz," *Völkischer Beobachter*, November 20, 1938.

Laws passed in November and December 1938 forced Jews to sell their businesses for minimal profit.¹³² Approximately eighty percent of the businesses were simply dissolved and did not reopen.¹³³ These closures left empty spaces in the cityscape, and in their testimonies, some witnesses remember seeing shops boarded up or covered with cardboard. Jose Uffer visited Berlin shortly after the pogrom and recalls, “We went to the Jewish section, and I saw the stores with two-by-fours nailed up, closed, windows broken, the Jewish section. Grenadierstrasse. How I remember, I will never forget.”¹³⁴ Grenadierstrasse, the heart of the Scheunenviertel, had become a ghost town.¹³⁵

At the end of December 1938, Göring released a new set of anti-Jewish decrees, and authorities were encouraged in individual cases to start amassing Jews in separate residential buildings.¹³⁶ The government passed the “Law Regarding Rental Agreements with Jews” at the end of April 1939, which lifted renters’ protections for Jews and required them to move from buildings owned by “Aryans” and seek accommodation in apartments owned by Jews. Jewish renters could be forced to take them in.¹³⁷ It was this law that finally assisted Speer in his plans to evict thousands of Jews from their homes during his monumental redesign of Berlin. As he razed entire city blocks, Speer’s office compensated displaced “Aryans” with evacuated Jewish

¹³² On November 12, 1938 the government passed a decree that barred Jews from serving in business roles. The 3 December “Decree on the Utilization of Jewish Property” forced Jews to sell businesses and properties for minimal or no profit to non-Jews; Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 120. For more information, see Christoph Kreutzmüller, *Final Sale in Berlin: The Destruction of Jewish Commercial Activity, 1930-1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); Martin Dean, *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 84-131.

¹³³ Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 120.

¹³⁴ Jose Uffer, Interview 52806, Segment 28-29, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, JFCS Holocaust Center, 2011.

¹³⁵ Lisa Slater, a German woman, also remembers seeing stores covered with “either cardboard or just plywood” with “little signs that they had moved or so.” Lisa Slater, Interview 13814, Segment 39, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996. Kitty Lovett also remembers seeing wooden barricades on the stores so that “nobody could go in or out.” Kitty Lovett, Interview 16960, Segment 11, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹³⁶ Richtlinien (geheim) des Beauftragten für den Vierjahresplan, gez. Göring, Ministerpräsident Generalfeldmarschall, vom 28.12.1938, quoted in Heim, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 2, 583-84.

¹³⁷ Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 125.

apartments.¹³⁸ Authorities endeavored to remove Jews from the “better living districts” in Berlin and to make them *judenrein*.¹³⁹ Thus, Jews were informed in May 1939 that they should not relocate to Berlin’s western suburbs.¹⁴⁰ Shortly thereafter, mass evictions of Jews from these areas began, clearly indicating that authorities no longer hesitated to appropriate Jewish property as they had in the case of Bülowplatz a few years prior.

The apartment of Alfred Jachmann’s aunt in Berlin-Schöneberg was located in the “Bavarian Quarter,” one of the districts declared *judenrein*. Thus, Alfred and his family—including his father who was released from Sachsenhausen in July 1939—were forced to move into a so-called “Jew house” (*Judenhaus*).¹⁴¹ These Jew houses were generally located in buildings owned by Jews. Multiple families were forced to share one apartment.¹⁴² The Jachmann family moved into a Jew house in Holzmarktstraße in central Berlin. Alfred explained that in each apartment, which generally had six or seven rooms, ten to twelve Jewish families were “penned up.” His family had one room to themselves and shared the kitchen with the other Jewish families. Alfred described the housing situation as “terrible.” Compared to what came after that, he called the Jew house “princely” but said one needed to remember “we came from a normal house. No millionaires, but formerly sensible middle class, where everything had its place, and everyone had his space.” In comparison to his family home in Arnswalde, Jachmann said the situation in Holzmarktstraße was “very, very depressing.”¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Willems, *Der entsiedelte Jude*.

¹³⁹ *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade), 1934-1940*, vol. 6, 1939 (Salzhausen: Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, 1980), 915.

¹⁴⁰ Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 127.

¹⁴¹ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 16-17, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁴² To this date, there has been no systematic research published on *Judenhäuser*, though a few localized studies do exist. See Marlis Buchholz, *Die hannoverschen Judenhäuser: Zur Situation der Juden in der Zeit der Ghettoisierung und Verfolgung, 1941 bis 1945* (Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, 1987); Karin Gut, “...wir mußten ja ins Judenhaus, in ein kleines Loch”: *Bornstraße 22, Ein Erinnerungsbuch* (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz Verlag, 2001).

¹⁴³ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 26-27, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

Jew houses constituted a crucial step in what Avraham Barkai has called the creation of a “ghetto without walls” in Germany, wherein Jews were increasingly isolated from their non-Jewish neighbors. At first, local housing offices oversaw the relocation of Jews, but later, specially created Jewish housing offices were appointed to carry out these measures. The consolidation of Jews into Jew houses proceeded gradually until September and October 1941 when all remaining Jews in non-Jewish-owned houses were forced to relocate.¹⁴⁴

At the end of 1939, approximately 202,400 Jews remained in the *Altreich*. The first deportations of Jews began in early 1940 from Stettin and Schneidemühl to eastern Poland.¹⁴⁵ A second wave of deportations occurred in October 1940, when approximately 6,000 Jews were deported from southwest Germany (Baden and the surrounding area) to the Gurs concentration camp in France.¹⁴⁶ In March 1941, there were still approximately 60-70,000 Jews living in Berlin, which Goebbels and Hitler said was intolerable for the capital of the National Socialist Empire. Though Hitler had not yet decided “that Berlin must immediately be made Jew-free,” Goebbels was convinced “that an appropriate evacuation recommendation would certainly find the approval of the Führer.”¹⁴⁷ So plans for the evacuation of Jews from Berlin accelerated.

The regime multiplied restrictions on Jews and hoped to force them to emigrate. At the same time, the government made it increasingly difficult and then impossible for Jews to leave Germany. They forced Jews to pay a debilitating “flight tax” and forbade transfers of money from

¹⁴⁴ Barkai, “In a Ghetto Without Walls,” 343-46. Konrad Kwiet notes that ghettos for Jews were deemed unnecessary in the *Altreich*, because the goal was to force Jews to emigrate as quickly as possible, and Jew houses helped to enforce the “complete isolation and de-personalization, concentration, and control of the Jews.” See Konrad Kwiet, “Without Neighbors: Daily Living in *Judenhäuser*,” in *Jewish Life in Nazi Germany: Dilemmas and Responses*, ed. Francis R. Nicosia, and David Scrase (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 118.

¹⁴⁵ Barkai, “The Final Chapter,” 361-62. For a description of the deportations from Stettin, see Löw, *Die Verfolgung*, vol. 3, 177.

¹⁴⁶ Barkai, “The Final Chapter,” 363; Beate Meyer, *A Fatal Balancing Act: The Dilemma of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, 1939-1945*, trans. William Templer (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 69-72.

¹⁴⁷ BArch NS 18/1134, Berlin, March 21, 1941, Betrifft: Evakuierung der Juden aus Berlin.

Germany.¹⁴⁸ In his testimony, Irving Lesh summed up this desperate predicament of Jews at the time, saying, “We didn’t know how to get out, like you have a mouse in a trap. You can’t get out. And nobody opens the trap. It was impossible to get out. And people think the Jews wanted to stay there [...] nobody wanted to stay there because it was impossible to live.”¹⁴⁹

The regime’s efforts to mark Jews acquired ever more sinister forms. Not only did Jews have to begin wearing the yellow star in September 1941, but several months later, they also had to mark their residences with stars. Heydrich explained that it was necessary to mark Jewish residences because “the Jews use every opportunity to further camouflage.” Not only did private homes need to be marked, but also children’s homes, retirement homes, hospitals, and the offices of the Reich Association of Jews in Germany and of the Jewish Religious Association were required to similarly identify themselves. The Reich Association of German Jews was tasked with carrying out the operation. It commissioned the Nova Printing Press in Berlin to print 50,000 six-pointed stars.¹⁵⁰ By mid-April 1942, the Nova Press had delivered 50,406 stars to the Reich Association, which then distributed them to its district offices and those of the Jewish Religious Association in states and cities across the Reich (including Danzig and Vienna). Berlin alone required 19,716 labels. It can, therefore, be assumed that Jews still lived in over 19,000 Berlin apartments in 1942.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Dean, *Robbing the Jews*, 56-58.

¹⁴⁹ Irving Lesh, Interview 25735, Segment 33, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

¹⁵⁰ Maren Krüger, “Das ‘Israelitische Familienblatt’ und die Nova-Druckerei,” in *Juden in Kreuzberg: Fundstücke, Fragmente, Erinnerungen*, ed. Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt e.V. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1991), 363-65. This press had previously been named “Printing Press Lessmann” and had printed the *Israelitische Familienblatt*, a newspaper for a largely orthodox Jewish audience, until all Jewish newspapers were banned after the November 1938 pogroms. The press was “Aryanized,” and the Nova company purchased it in January 1939. Thereafter, the Nova Press printed the *Jüdische Nachrichtenblatt*, at the behest of the Propaganda Ministry, whose main purpose was to inform the Jewish population about new laws and restrictions

¹⁵¹ See BArch R 8150/19, Nova-Druckerei an die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, March 27, 1942; Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland an das Reichsministerium des Innern, Reichssicherheitshauptamt, April 15, 1942. The Reich Association originally requested that the press print the stars in black ink on white adhesive paper. Because the Nova Press did not have the necessary adhesive paper, however, they suggested printing the stars on

With the marking of their apartments, Jews were thereby stripped of all semblance of anonymity and safety with which their homes had once provided them. Elaine Siegel remembers that authorities could at any time locate where Jews lived because of this star next to their doorbell.¹⁵² Hilda Kahan similarly remarked that the star “made you the prey for every other tenant in the building who didn’t like you, because now he had black on white that that was a Jew [...] It made it also harder for people who tried to hide their star. So they were caught many times that way, and then they were sent right away to the concentration camp.”¹⁵³ The Jachmanns had periodically received food packages from acquaintances in Arnswalde who would send them without a return address. Once their apartment was marked as “Jewish” by the star, however, it was no longer possible for them to continue receiving such packages.¹⁵⁴

On October 18, 1941 the government banned emigration for Jews from Germany and Nazi-controlled Europe altogether. Christopher Browning cites this decision, among other developments in the summer and autumn of 1941, as evidence that the regime had changed from a policy of emigration to extermination for European Jewry.¹⁵⁵ That same month, mass deportation of Jews from Germany to ghettos and extermination camps in the East began. Thereafter, deportations of Jews from Berlin continued regularly for the next year and a half. In the meantime, Alfred Jachmann’s school was closed in 1941, and he worked for a time in a Jewish retirement home until he joined the ranks of Jewish forced laborers, including his father, in the German Weapons and Munition Factory (*Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabrik*). Selma and Gerda were forced laborers for the Siemens company. Alfred and Leopold had to travel daily from central Berlin to the

“wood-pulp, smooth, white printing paper,” of which they had plenty on hand. The adhesive material would then have to be applied by the individual recipients.

¹⁵² Elaine Siegel, Interview 25283, Segment 78, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1997.

¹⁵³ Hilda Kahan, Interview 4398, Segment 51-52, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1995.

¹⁵⁴ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 27-28, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁵⁵ Christopher Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 370-73.

munitions factory in the northwestern district of Berlin-Borsigwalde. At the end of the working day, the men were forced to wait sometimes up to two hours on the train platform because although the passing trains may have been empty, but Jews could only utilize the few train cars reserved for dogs and bicycles.

Alfred and his family remained in Berlin until February 27, 1943, when they were rounded up with most other remaining Jews in the city during the so-called “*Fabrikation*.” Early that morning, Alfred left home and said goodbye to Selma and Gerda. “I never saw my sister and my mother again,” he said. He then traveled to the munitions factory in Borsigwalde where he was suddenly rounded up with the other forced laborers and taken to the burned-out synagogue in Levetzowstraße in the Berlin district of Moabit, which authorities had transformed into a collection and transit camp for Berlin’s Jews. They remained there for a few hours until they were transported the short distance to the train station in Putlitzstraße, where they were loaded into train cars and transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau.¹⁵⁶ By early summer 1943, after the last large group of 300 Jews had been deported to Auschwitz, Berlin was declared *judenrein*.¹⁵⁷ In fact, Berlin was not actually “Jew free” at this time. A few thousand Jews had begun a perilous life underground. The other remaining Jews, protected for the time being by their “mixed marriages” or their status as “*Mischlinge*,” were ordered to stop wearing their stars so that Goebbels could keep up the illusion that his city was, in fact, Jew-free.¹⁵⁸

With the evictions and deportations of Jews, housing was freed up for “Aryan” Germans. Often, Jewish homes, like some Jewish neighborhoods, have distinctive visible markers that indicate Jews live there and mark them as distinctive “Jewish spaces.” They might contain Jewish

¹⁵⁶ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 32-35, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

¹⁵⁷ Gruner, *Judenverfolgung in Berlin*, 164.

¹⁵⁸ Gad Beck, Interview 22791, Segment 76, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996.

books, Jewish pieces of art, and religious objects—perhaps chanukiah, Shabbat candlesticks, Seder plates, and kiddush cups. By the time Jews emigrated or were deported, many of these things had been confiscated, hidden, or sold, and were no longer remaining in Jewish apartments, and from November 1941 onward, anything that remained after Jews emigrated or were deported automatically fell to the state.¹⁵⁹ Thereafter, former Jewish apartments in Berlin fell under the purview of Speer’s office, and such apartments could only be re-rented with its approval.¹⁶⁰

Generally, immediately after the Gestapo had deported the Jewish residents, they sealed the apartments with an adhesive strip and handed the key, in a sealed envelope, over to the building caretaker, who was forbidden to enter the apartment without permission from Speer’s office or the police. Building caretakers could, in the case of fire or broken pipes, break the seal and enter the apartment, but they were to notify the police immediately. Any furniture, appliances, and artworks that remained became property of the state, which could approve the sale of the furniture and appliances to other entities or individuals. The city of Berlin also bought up some of these items. In such cases, the chief finance president (*Oberfinanzpräsident*) was also allowed to enter the apartment in question. In each case, the individual would have to retrieve the key from the building caretaker.

Otto and Selma Danziger were deported to Riga on January 13, 1942, whereupon the city of Berlin purchased several valuable items from their apartment in Berlin-Friedenau. When someone stole some of these items—a Persian rug, a Meissen porcelain sculpture, a marble bust, two Gobelin armchairs, and additional furniture and porcelain dishes—from the apartment, the mayor asked the criminal police to investigate.¹⁶¹ Incidents of theft were prevalent in former

¹⁵⁹ “Elfte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz. Vom 25. November 1941,” *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1941, I, 722-724.

¹⁶⁰ LAB, A Pr. Br. Rep. 057, Nr. 461.

¹⁶¹ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 41831.

Jewish apartments.¹⁶² One furniture retailer, who was hired by the chief finance president to collect and clear out the furniture from evacuated Jewish apartments, said that something was almost always missing upon his arrival.¹⁶³

Speer's office kept meticulous records on apartments which had been "cleared out" and the dates they would be free to rent.¹⁶⁴ Speer gave some of the apartments to his employees in the General Building Inspector's Office.¹⁶⁵ Other apartments were given to people whose homes had been destroyed by Allied bombing.¹⁶⁶ In the remaining cases, interested buyers jumped at the chance to purchase the evacuated apartments and acquire better housing accommodations.

Richard Baumann remembers that his stepmother succeeded in securing his family a spacious three-room apartment in 1943. She had also obtained nice furniture at a low price. Richard and his stepmother were overjoyed, but he remembers that his father did not share in their excitement and seemed troubled, saying that the apartment and furniture had once belonged to Jews. As Richard explored the new apartment, he noticed small "cases" attached to the passageways between rooms that contained "tiny paper rolls with strange, unreadable texts." Richard had noticed mezuzahs that many religious Jews affix not only to their exterior doorframes but also to all interior doors and passageways. His father explained to him that these were Jewish "good luck talismans." They disturbed Richard though, so he decided to remove them. His father forbade him, saying, "One respects the feelings of others." But slowly, one by one, Richard succeeded in dislodging all the small mezuzahs and discarding them. When his father found out, he was livid. He was sure it would bring them misfortune and remarked, "It's shameful for our

¹⁶² For additional examples, see LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 53768, Nr. 39262, Nr. 48273.

¹⁶³ LAB A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 39262, Bl. 6-7.

¹⁶⁴ See BArch R 4606/3444, BArch R 4606/3445, BArch R 4606/3446, BArch R 4606/3447.

¹⁶⁵ BArch R 4606/4860, Note presented to Vice President Claheis, July 7, 1941.

¹⁶⁶ See BArch R 4606/655, Speer to Claheis, January 21, 1941.

family!” Such actions ensured that efforts to make Germany *judenrein*—by excluding Jews from German spaces and erasing visible traces of them—were executed even on the most minute of scales.

At the time, Richard was only twelve or thirteen years old, and thus, probably too young to really understand the developments which had given his family a chance at upward mobility. As a child, what he heard was the following: “The Jews were being settled in a concentrated area far away in order to keep them under control. Their childlike attitudes made them a danger to the German Reich during wartime. Besides, in this way there were many free apartments for bombed out ‘Aryan Germans.’”¹⁶⁷ Richard’s stepmother had no qualms about taking advantage of the opportunity to acquire a nice apartment and furniture. His father, on the other hand, did so only reluctantly and with a clear sense of guilt.

Conclusion

The project of making Germany *judenrein* has great import for our understanding of the Holocaust. First, the segregation of German Jews and their gradual but radical exclusion from their homeland were crucial antecedents to the Holocaust. Segregation did not, of course, make the Holocaust inevitable, but the processes of excluding Jews from public and private spaces in Germany and of marking Jewish versus “German” spaces helped reinstate the boundary between Jew and non-Jew and construct the difference necessary to imagine genocide. In the process, the very diverse identities of German Jews were reduced to one moniker, that of “Jew,” and therefore, not German, something fundamentally “other.” German Jews’ attainment of unfettered access to German society and public spaces, long endeavored and finally achieved at the end of the

¹⁶⁷ Baumann’s name has been anonymized. He wrote down his recollections of his childhood in Berlin, which are now held at the Deutsches Tagebucharchiv (DTA) 240/1.

nineteenth century, was swiftly undone. Twelve years of Nazi rule had rapidly restricted and isolated Jews, who first fled rural areas for larger cities and whose movements became evermore restricted until they were deported from Germany altogether.

Second, this process of isolation was accompanied by the destruction and erasure of Jewish spaces, which began in the very first moments of 1933. It first targeted Jews in rural areas and smaller towns but soon intensified in German cities as well. Propaganda against “Judeo-Bolshevism” may have increased during the war, as the *Wehrmacht* truly became “Hitler’s army.”¹⁶⁸ Yet this propaganda had informed the regime’s efforts to make Germany *judenrein* and its spatial practices since the early 1930s. Nazis had long endeavored to obliterate Jews and traces of them from Germany’s landscapes.

Finally, ideology alone is not sufficient to understand the destruction of German Jewry. Blatant antisemitism on behalf of Nazi party members, SA troops, and ordinary Germans was the driving force behind the radical measures of exclusion, but to understand why they were successful, we need to look at ideology in practice—specifically, at the small and gradual, yet radical changes in spatial practices that helped redefine who was German and who not. This “othering” of German Jews required a great deal of effort, and the breakdown of civil society had a lot to do with how Germans interacted with their surroundings and with one another in public spaces. These interactions were political, and regardless of the intentions behind them, they had consequences. After 1933, Nazi ideology infused and transformed entire towns, neighborhoods, and homes. In the process, it redefined the German homeland, or German *Lebensraum*, as a place in which Jews did not, and could not, belong.

¹⁶⁸ Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

This “othering” process is intrinsic to genocide.¹⁶⁹ During his interview, Alfred Jachmann was asked if his family ever considered emigrating. “Yeah, that is the tragedy,” he immediately responded and explained: “What I said at the beginning is to be understood as such. My family that lived in Pomerania—not only in Arnswalde [but] in Falkenburg, in Reetz, in Neuwedell, as all these places around were named, and that we got to know as children—they were *rooted* [*verwurzelt*] there and could not even imagine that such a thing might occur that would rob them of their *Heimat*.”¹⁷⁰ The Jachmanns were traditional Jews who kept kosher and celebrated Jewish holidays. They were also patriotic Germans. The Jachmann family saw nothing incompatible between these two identities. Their disbelief and inability to imagine that they might be stripped of their German citizenship and of all rights in their homeland prevented them from anticipating the course of events, Alfred said. The ground had shifted underneath them. Several years of Nazi rule had been enough for authorities to successfully transform the very definition of who could be German. Nazi efforts to root some Germans to German soil—in whatever guise that took between 1933 and 1945—only succeeded by uprooting others. From his immediate and extended family, Alfred was the only person to survive.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Laban Hinton, *Annihilating Difference*, 6.

¹⁷⁰ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 17-19, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996. Emphasis added.

¹⁷¹ Alfred Jachmann, Interview 12118, Segment 69-70, *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, 1996. Upon arriving at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Jachmann was assigned to conduct forced labor for I.G. Farben at Auschwitz III (Monowitz). In January 1945, he was sent on a death march in the direction of Gleiwitz. He eventually escaped and was officially liberated soon thereafter and received medical treatment from the Russian army.

Conclusion

As a young child living in Wiesbaden in the early twentieth century, Julius Lippert met a Jewish refugee from Russia. Lippert struck up a conversation with this man about Russian politics. The man was angry that the Russian nobility was exploiting the peasants. During the conversation, the man mentioned that he was Jewish, whereupon Lippert immediately interrupted him. Lippert told him he need not concern himself with Russian politics if he was a Jew, implying that he was not really Russian but a guest of the country. The man cursed Lippert, called him an antisemite, and stormed off. Writing his memoir in 1942, Lippert stated: “One will be surprised at the answer I gave the Jew. In this day and age, it is self-evident, but thirty years ago, it was highly unusual that one made a distinction between a Jew and a non-Jew.” In the intervening three decades, however, Lippert said that the importance of the “Jewish question” had prevailed and had become an “object of daily life struggle.”¹

I have endeavored to illuminate precisely this process by which Nazi racial ideology became, if not self-evident, certainly the primary organizing principle in the Third Reich. I contend that space played a primary role in this transformation for two reasons. First, the cultural belief, or *representation of space*, which held that Jews had invaded, infected, and conquered Germany in the modern era impelled the regime’s drive to “cleanse” the nation and make it *judenrein*. Second, this cultural belief informed myriad *spatial practices* that physically, symbolically, and rhetorically coordinated spaces to fit Nazi visions. This coordination of space was relentless for all Germans in the public sphere where the regime demanded visible conformity. In other spaces, however, Nazi ideology proved amenable in practice. Only for German Jews was Nazi ideology rigid in all spaces.

¹ Lippert, *Im Strom der Zeit*, 20-22.

Indeed, I argue that it was only the antisemitism at the core of Nazi ideology that lent these diverse spatial practices coherence. Once Jews had been banned from the architectural profession, it became easier for conservative architects and bureaucrats to coordinate modern architecture; previously associated with Jews and internationalism, Nazis could reexplain it for their own purposes. Furthermore, a regime increasingly consumed with its battle against “resident enemies” was more willing to condone transgressions from *Volksgenossen* in the semipublic sphere. The intense vilification of German Jews served to underscore the inclusion of these “racially fit” nonconformists. Although the regime initially targeted sites of political bolshevism and cultural bolshevism (sites therefore only indirectly associated with Jews), explicit Jewish spaces became the prime targets of violence and coordination from at least 1935 onward. The radicalization of violence was initially perpetrated from below by SA men, NSDAP party members, and local authorities before the regime decisively took on this mantle of eliminating Jews, and physical traces of them, from Germany after November 1938. After the regime had obviated the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism” within its own borders, it claimed it must liberate the rest of the world. National Socialism required “permanent revolution” to survive, a perpetual state of radicalization inherent to all fascist regimes which often leads them to undertake wars of conquest and territorial expansion.²

By the time Germany invaded Poland in 1939, it had already dispossessed Jews of German citizenship, driven them from most professions, banned them from many public spaces, expropriated Jewish commercial property, vandalized and destroyed innumerable Jewish spaces, lifted renters’ protections for Jews, and begun evicting and amassing the remaining German Jews in Jew houses. World War II and the Holocaust cannot be understood without this pre-history that

² Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 170.

refashioned Germany as a space in which Jews could not belong. German authorities utilized these practiced methods to more systematically execute spatial cleansing in annexed and German-occupied territories during the war. Just as German villages and cities were consecutively declared *judenfrei* in the mid-1930s, so too were cities and entire regions in Eastern Europe pronounced “cleansed” of Jews in the 1940s.³ For example, by the time German authorities met in Wannsee in January 1942 to organize the annihilation of European Jewry, the entire territory of Estonia had already been declared *judenfrei*.⁴ By war’s end in Europe in May 1945, approximately six million Jews had been killed, and entire Jewish villages across Central Europe had quite literally been wiped off the map.

After 1945, the Allied powers sought to reverse the Nazification of space. They required all Nazi and militaristic monuments to be dismantled.⁵ Streets were once again renamed and swastikas chiseled off building facades.⁶ Mass destruction due to Allied bombing meant that many German cities had to be rebuilt from the ground-up. Traditionalists advocated historical reconstruction, while modernists strove to implement totalizing plans. Both bracketed the Nazi era as an anomaly of German history and refrained from thematizing it in the urban landscape.⁷ The erasure of Jewish spaces even continued into the postwar era as the remains of synagogues were repurposed or razed.⁸

³ See, e.g., Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution*, 401-03.

⁴ Mark Roseman, *The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution: A Reconsideration* (New York: Picador, 2002), 162.

⁵ “Militaristische und nationalsozialistische Denkmäler müssen entfernt werden,” *Die Neue Zeitung*, May 17, 1946; “Stadt Berlin,” *Die Neue Zeitung*, December 2, 1946.

⁶ Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, *Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Legacy of the Third Reich* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 79-84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁸ Michael Meng, *Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

The lives of ordinary Germans in the immediate postwar year were largely consumed with the struggle to survive the coming winter in the face of food shortages.⁹ Consequently, memorialization and national narratives of suffering in West Germany during the first few postwar decades focused on fallen soldiers, POWs, German expellees, bombing victims, and “victims of denazification.”¹⁰ Although denazification measures were more thoroughgoing in East Germany, the state’s foundational myth that its citizens had been victims of fascism delayed a deeper reckoning with the Nazi past until after German reunification. Several high-profile Nazi trials and the student movement of the 1960s sparked more critical engagement with the Nazi era, but these discussions only hit the public with force in the late 1980s and 1990s.¹¹

After reunification, the government, individual organizations and companies, and the public at large began to intensely grapple with the legacy of the Third Reich, and the urban landscape has played a key role in Germany’s efforts to come to terms with its past. Monuments and memorial plaques dot Berlin and educate passing pedestrians on events that transpired at the sites, and thousands of “stumbling blocks” throughout German cities indicate the last freely chosen residence of many German Jews. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe was unveiled in 2005, just a stone’s throw away from the Reichstag building.¹² National memorials for other

⁹ Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 338. Bessel claims that the shock and violence of 1945—the end of the war and the immediate postwar months—disillusioned Germans of Nazi ideology and transformed them into pacifists who longed for a sense of “normalcy.”

¹⁰ Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Neil Gregor, *Haunted City: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

¹¹ For an excellent and concise analysis of postwar memory politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Wulf Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The Legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, ed. Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

¹² For more on the history of this memorial, see Peter Carrier, *Holocaust Monuments and National Memorial Cultures in France and Germany Since 1989: The Origins and Political Function of the Vél' d'Hiv' in Paris and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 99-153; Karen E. Till, *The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 161-90.

persecuted groups—homosexuals, Sinti and Roma, and euthanasia victims—have been completed in the past decade. Germany has indeed taken incredible steps in the last three decades to critically examine its history and educate students and the public alike. Germany’s reckoning with its past is often, with justification, touted by critical commentators from the international community as a paragon to be followed.¹³

The success story of German democratization notwithstanding, the Federal Republic of Germany is still grappling with the “aftermaths” of the history outlined in this dissertation.¹⁴ If Nazism was, as I have argued, a spatial project that sought to make Germany *judenrein*, cleansing it of Jews and Jewish influences, then Germany’s efforts to overcome its Nazi past should be gauged, at least in part, by how successfully it reverses this process and reintegrates Jews back into German spaces. To be sure, Jewish communities are once again growing and thriving in Germany, strengthened in the 1990s by the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, besides a few prominent synagogues, Jews still constitute no significant *visible* presence in German cityscapes. Many synagogues are hidden in courtyards, and Jewish communal life is largely carried out in the semipublic and private spheres. German police officers or paid security professionals stand guard in front of synagogues and Jewish community centers. Less formal Jewish events, like those of student groups, are generally spread by word of mouth or private social media groups and held in rented spaces whose addresses are not publicized and sometimes only shared after one’s identity has been verified. Very rarely are Hebrew letters or Jewish symbols visible in the cityscape, and when they are, they regularly provoke antisemitic attacks.

¹³ Such assertions most recently surfaced in the debate surrounding the legacy of Civil War monuments in the United States in the summer of 2017.

¹⁴ Frank Biess, and Robert Moeller, ed. *Histories of the Aftermath* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).

When viewed through this lens, it becomes clear that the anti-Jewish spatial practices envisioned and carried out in the 1930s deeply cut into the urban fabric and continue to leave their mark until this day. The new normality fashioned in postwar Germany's public sphere has slowly but surely embraced diverse political and social groups once again. Yet the limited access of German Jews to the public sphere today demarcates the outer limits of Germany's ability overcome its Nazi past.

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