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Poverty and Prejudice Before Genocide*

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Abstract

Genocides rank among the darkest episodes in our history. What drives prejudice against targeted outgroups in the lead-up to mass killings? We theorize the role played by democratization, ethnoreligious threat perceptions, and economic discontent in generating antiminority hatred. We assess these factors' predictive strength using a new 22,000-person survey of Islamophobia in Myanmar, fielded shortly before the 2017 ethnic cleansing of the country's Muslim Rohingya population. Integrating survey responses with administrative data, events data, and geodata, we document a robust association between poverty and anti-Muslim attitudes among members of Myanmar's Buddhist majority. The relationship holds ecologically and by individual. Further tests point to scapegoating rather than resource competition as the most likely mechanism. Other commonly cited drivers of intolerance receive little empirical support. By leveraging a critical contemporary case, our paper sheds light on the material foundations of polarized social preferences in settings at high risk of intergroup violence.

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Genocides rank among the darkest episodes in our history. Infamous examples include the Holocaust, the slaughter of Rwandan Tutsis in 1994, Idi Amin's expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972, and the death marches of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915. The deliberate destruction of national or ethnic groups represents an ongoing threat. Between 1989 and 2013, there were at least 674 incidents of one-sided violence worldwide in which populations were victimized due to their ethnoreligious affiliation (Fjelde et al. 2021). "Ethnic cleansing, a staple of geopolitical crises in the 1990s, is making a comeback," according to Freedom House.[1] United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres recently issued a statement lamenting "a backdrop of atrocity crimes being committed at a scale and ferocity not seen in years."[2]

But genocide does not appear from nowhere. It is the culmination of a process involving the dehumanization, denigration, and "othering" of an ethnic outgroup by a large segment of a country's population (Stanton 2004). "Discrimination and prejudice provide the thread that ties together the long history of religious and ethnic cleansing," according to Bell-Fialkoff (1993, 120). The crystallization of intense negative sentiments creates the permission structure within which violent persecution can take place. What, then, are the sources of prejudice against targeted communities in the lead-up to mass killings?

So far, quantitative social science has provided few convincing answers. Regimes on the brink of orchestrating genocidal violence seldom allow information to be gathered on social attitudes, particularly regarding minorities at risk (Green and Seher 2003, 523). Attempts to assemble such data retrospectively—for example, by interviewing people after episodes of ethnic violence have broken out—are vulnerable to recall and survivor bias. Where state institutions are weak, well-measured predictors of prejudice may be in short supply. As a consequence, we lack a generalized understanding of the drivers of popular prejudice toward oppressed minorities in advance of some of humanity's most egregious collective acts.

This paper puts forward theoretical conjectures for why intense antiminority hatred forms, and then assesses their predictive power leveraging unique data from Myanmar, a crucial contemporary case.[3] We offer the first systematic study of Islamophobia in the two years prior to a 2017 campaign by the Burmese military, the Tatmadaw, to purge the country of its Muslim Rohingya population. Muslims have long been marginalized in Burmese society. But the 2017 onslaught, subsequently labeled a "textbook example

[1]Freedom House, "As Global Democracy Retreats, Ethnic Cleansing Is on the Rise," February 25, 2019, bit.ly/35bRb1Q.

[2]Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, "Statement by the UN Secretary-General at the 2018 General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention of Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity," June 25, 2018, bit.ly/3uqsgQL.

[3]The country's name is disputed. This essay uses both names interchangeably.

of ethnic cleansing" (by the U.N.) and a "genocide" (by the U.S. government), was unprecedented in its brutality and scope.[4] Between 6,700 and 43,000 Rohingya were killed.[5] Up to 700,000 more were forcibly displaced to neighboring countries.[6] The military's actions took place two years after Myanmar's democratization, at a time when anti-Muslim resentment was surging.[7]

Building on existing research, we distinguish three classes of explanations for what stokes animosity against ethnoreligious minorities. The first centers on political competition in young democracies. We expect regions that have more closely fought elections, that are "old-regime" military strongholds, and that undergo a more contested democratic transition to see greater antipathy toward ethnic minorities. A second set of determinants concerns perceived ethnic threats locally—induced by group demography, past intergroup violence, and the dense presence of ethnic entrepreneurs. Lastly, we consider three salient causes of economic discontent: poverty, unemployment, and inequality.

We introduce newly released data from a ∼22,000-person face-to-face survey of social attitudes in Myanmar, fielded countrywide between 2015 and 2017 under the supervision of one of this paper's authors. The survey posed detailed questions to respondents regarding their opinions about various ethnic and religious groups, including Muslims. To our knowledge, it is the only Myanmar-based representative survey to have done so. Our focus is on Buddhists, who make up 88–90 percent of the country's population. We collect and code predictor variables—measured at the township level and based on administrative data, newspaper reports, and geodata—corresponding to each of the hypothesized causes of antiminority prejudice just outlined.

For the primary analysis, we characterize (i) the bivariate association between each predictor variable and anti-Muslim prejudice, (ii) the same associations adjusting for respondents' education level, and (iii) the associations after controlling for all other township predictors. The results paint a clear picture. There is no consistent evidence that the dynamics of democratic competition and local ethnic threat forecast antiminority animus. Instead, economic grievances—above all, township-level poverty rates—are highly correlated with negative sentiments toward Muslims. Depending on the covariate set used, a shift from the wealthiest township in Myanmar to the poorest one is associated with a 14.5 to 24.6 percentage point rise

[4]United Nations, "U.N. Human Rights Chief Points to 'Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing' in Myanmar," September 11, 2017, bit.ly/3JZzlhp.

[5]Laignee Barron, "More Than 43,000 Rohingya Parents May Be Missing," *Time*, March 8, 2018, bit.ly/3llhlqY.

[6]UNHCR, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained," July 13, 2022, bit.ly/42gSyoz.

[7]For 2016, Polity IV gave Myanmar a score of 8 (where -10 is fully autocratic and +10 is fully democratic), equal to that of the United States and South Korea.

in the probability that a Buddhist respondent reports wholly intolerant responses to a battery of survey questions about accepting Muslims in different social roles.

We probe the findings' robustness. A sensitivity curve analysis shows that the poverty/Islamophobia relationship remains after accounting for regional fixed effects and "pre-treatment" covariates capturing potential confounds. Subgroup tests indicate that reverse causality and population sorting are unlikely to explain the patterns we observe. We further document a robust link between income and prejudice at the *individual* level, addressing problems of ecological inference in the township analysis (Freedman 1999). We emphasize that the research is not designed to isolate causal effects. Without the randomized assignment of income, further threats to unbiased estimation cannot be ruled out. But the weight of evidence suggests that adverse economic conditions may have causally exacerbated prejudice against Muslims at a critical turning point in Myanmar's history.

What about mechanisms? Economic discontent could worsen intergroup relations through material channels—majorities shunning minorities to reduce competition for scarce resources—or scapegoating (blaming innocents). Extensions show that township poverty levels do not reliably predict attitudes toward Christians, meaning that minorities are not ostracized indiscriminately as a pure materialist model would imply. Additionally, the strength of the association between poverty and anti-Muslim prejudice is no larger—and may even be smaller—for townships with more Muslims, running counter to what we would expect if localized struggles over jobs and state benefits were the mediator. Taking stock, economic vulnerability appears to activate taste-based discrimination against "foreigners," a label applied repeatedly and inaccurately to Muslims of Indian descent by Myanmar state authorities and extremist Buddhist preachers. We term this phenomenon internal xenophobia.

This paper adds to our knowledge of how economic conditions connect to social cohesion in ethnically fragmented states. The hypothesis that poverty provides fertile ground for intergroup bias is not new. For example, Marx (2004, 160) argued in *Capital* that property owners in the United States harnessed racism to divide workers and keep wages low. But the empirical evidence to date is surprisingly mixed. Historians attribute the rise of interwar antisemitism to the Great Depression, yet it was a relatively prosperous lower middle class that provided primary backing for German Nazism in the 1930s (Evans 2005). Low-income countries are more prone to ethnic civil conflict, perhaps because struggling economies create labor pools from which insurgents can recruit fighters cheaply (Sambanis 2001). However, Blair et al. (2013) find that poverty is associated with reduced popular support for extremist militant organizations promoting exclusionary agendas in Pakistan. While several papers study participation in genocidal violence

(Yanagizawa-Drott 2014) as well as its long-run economic impacts (Charnysh and Finkel 2017), none has sought to quantify the relationship between poverty and antiminority attitudes using individual-level survey data collected immediately before a genocide.[8]

The null statistical relationship between political competition and prejudice sounds a note of cautious optimism, given claims that democracy opens the door to ethnic nationalism (Snyder 2000). Myanmar has been held up as a paradigmatic case of transitional elites exploiting ethnic and religious divides for political gain (Holliday 2008). But we uncover little evidence of a link between more tightly fought elections and expressions of Islamophobia at the township level.

Social science has embraced causal empiricism over the past decade (Samii 2016). By contrast, we contribute to renewed interest in descriptive inference (e.g., Chetty et al. 2020). There are two benefits to transparently presenting non-causally identified associations using novel observational data, our central purpose here. One is to sift through multiple potential causes of prejudice, singling out those that future studies can investigate more finely with stronger designs. Another is to generate policy-relevant learning. The nexus between poverty and prejudice we see in Myanmar spotlights declining economic circumstances as a warning signal of ethnic conflict to come (Hamburg 2010). More than that, a growing body of trials demonstrates the efficacy of micro-level interventions for reducing enmity between ascriptive social groups (e.g., Mousa 2020; Lowe 2021; Broockman and Kalla 2016). To suppress ethnic conflict in the real world, though, practitioners need to know where to situate proven interventions—decisions that must often be taken without rich data on social preferences. Pinning down readily observable correlates of prejudice is thus an important task.

Theoretical expectations

Where and why should we expect antiminority prejudice to materialize? We now elaborate three families of explanations, drawing from literatures in political science, sociology, economics, and social psychology. From the outset, we underscore that the following reasons for prejudice are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.

Democratization and electoral competition

Minimally, democracy is a procedure for aggregating individual preferences in large populations and peacefully adjudicating disputes between individuals and groups (Przeworski 1999). Yet an influential school

[8]Closest to our paper is Kunovich and Hodson (2002) who study ingroup preferences prior to the ethnic civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, though without fine-grained data on attitudes toward specific social groups.

of thought holds that democratic transitions, and the electoral competition they give rise to, can inflame communal tensions. There are several variants.

Political campaigns routinely involve demonizing ethnic groups as part of an elite strategy to solidify ingroup support (Wodak 2015). In Nigeria, for example, parties "use hate speech for negative mobilization of ethnic and religious groups during elections" (Ezeibe 2021, 920). During the 2014 election in Indonesia, presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto "portrayed ethnic Chinese elites as assistants of a foreign conspiracy to rob Indonesia of its natural resources" (Mietzner 2020, 6). These tactics can become self-reinforcing, as political factions within ethnic communities ratchet up the extremism of their rhetoric to project themselves as the most zealous representative of their group's interests (Stewart and McGauvran 2020). Parties and candidates have the strongest motives to deploy campaign tools of "last resort" to sway close races. Therefore, boosting coethnic support by calling attention to the dangers posed by outgroups should be most prevalent in electorally competitive environments, where anticipated margins of victory are tightest.

Contested democratic transitions—operationalized as protests for regime change—also run the risk of stimulating intergroup hate (Beissinger 2002). On the one hand, pro-democracy demonstrations can forge positive feelings among participants, who experience "pleasure in agency" (Wood 2003; Aytaç and Stokes 2019). On the other hand, where regime transition is liable to affect the ethnic balance of power, protests can serve as a visceral signal that new constitutional arrangements will have ethnic winners and losers. Sato (2021, 25) finds that anti-incumbent protests "trigger emotional reactions" among onlookers, increasing affective polarization. A ten-country survey in the Middle East concludes that "the aftermath of the Arab Spring protests only reinforced the prejudices ... minority groups face."[9] Contentious democratization episodes might, then, deepen acrimony between ethnic groups in divided contexts.

A third claim relates to old-regime military forces. While juntas usually present themselves as protectors of national unity, few are ethnically neutral. Personnel-wise, they tend to be ethnically unrepresentative (Harkness 2018); they are more likely to engage in human rights abuses than other regime types, and regularly carry out programs of ethnic "narrowing" (Poe et al. 1999; Nordlinger 1977). As Horowitz (2000, 443) writes, "the military can become a hotbed for ethnic resentment and an instrument for the advancement of ethnic claims to power." Regions where the military is institutionally strong and socially embedded may thus see greater popular hatred toward ethnic groups traditionally shut out from its ranks,

[9] A. Kadir Yildirim and Meredith McCain, "The Aftermath of the Arab Spring Protests: What a Public Opinion Survey Tells Us," *Baker Institute*, March 21, 2019. bit.ly/3Xl8LG1.

compared to regions where the military's presence is small.

Ethnic threat

A separate class of arguments is anchored in threat perceptions whose origins lie beyond formal politics. Ethnic demography is the most prominent. Blalock (1967) posited that the greater the size of a minority population locally, the more intense will be dominant group members' impressions of the social, political, and economic threat it poses. Hardening ethnic boundaries reflect a "safety in numbers" response, on this account, leading to diminished support for integration, increased antiminority discrimination, and growing intolerance. Enos (2016) finds backing for the hypothesis in local turnout responses to public housing demolitions in Chicago, whereas Kasara (2013) provides evidence against it in Kenya, where diversity is linked to greater intergroup tolerance.

The minority share of the local population might proxy for a bundle of perceived threats in the majority's eyes. Yet, legacies of intergroup violence are arguably a more direct contributor to heightened communal strain. Ethnic violence tends to recur: localities that have experienced riots in the past are more likely to experience them in future (van Noort and Goyal 2022). As such, an incident of ethnic conflict can quickly set off an ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993). Defensive and offensive actions become impossible to distinguish, and pre-emptive attacks by one side incite reciprocal fear and rapid escalation (Kaufman 1996, 112). We would therefore expect outgroup prejudice to go hand-in-hand with spiraling distrust following ethnic conflict in an area.

Threats can also be fomented or concocted by ethnic entrepreneurs in civil society. Brass (2011) unearths an "institutionalized riot system" in Aligarh, India, where "fire tenders" prepare, activate, and spread blame for communal riots, producing Hindi-Muslim violence as if it were "street theater." Provocateurs can frame disputes in terms of ethnic cleavages. Their organizations can fund extremist foot soldiers and party workers (Bazzi et al. 2020). Accordingly, places with more majority-group elites who have the status and ideological disposition to act in these roles should be more susceptible to antiminority prejudice.

Economic discontent

Finally, a majority group's economic anxieties might engender intolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Existing explanations break down into two streams: prejudice as a device for reducing resource competition, and scapegoating.

In a seminal essay, Bates (1983, 152) conceived of ethnic groups as, "in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization."

Models in this vein depict intergroup animosity as a weapon in a distributive game (Fearon 1999; Posner 2004). Suppose society possesses a finite stock of goods and economic opportunities. Who gets access to those resources is decided by majority vote. Political coalitions form to maximize allocations received by ingroup members, while nonmembers are shut out from pork. The question arises: on what basis should membership of the winning coalition be defined? Inherited identity markers such as race, ethnicity, or creed are the "go to" option. As relatively permanent, unchanging characteristics of individuals and groups, they limit future entry by outsiders. Because they are easily visible, voters and political elites gravitate toward them, facilitating political coordination (Chandra 2007). Crucially, under the diminishing marginal utility of income, poverty should increase minority exclusion, since the stakes are higher for poorer groups and individuals (a fixed slice of pie is worth more to someone who is poor than someone who is rich). Unemployment and inequality may have comparable effects. On this perspective, antiminority aversion is a cultural script deployed by majorities to maintain their privileged economic position.

Psychological factors might also explain the relationship between economic grievances and prejudice. Chief among them is scapegoating: a latent preference for discrimination that switches on when members of the majority group experience hardship or harm. In an experiment in Slovakia, Bauer et al. (2021) had dominant-group members watch someone of their own ethnic background destroy the earned income of a third member of the same ethnic group. When given the choice, however, those observers disproportionately punished individuals belonging to the minority Roma community for the wrongdoing—despite knowing that no Roma were culpable. Similarly, Bursztyn et al. (2022) show that intolerant individuals treat economic crises as both a rationale and an opportunity to heap hate on minorities.[10] The resulting expectation is that antiminority attitudes will spike amid adverse material conditions—not as a by-product of a scheme to secure benefits, but out of a "taste" to blame other sections of society for the poor economic situation.

Islamophobia in Myanmar

Myanmar is a country of 55 million people located between Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand. Most Burmese practice Theravada Buddhism, a doctrinally conservative religion rooted in monkly authority and an originalist interpretation of the *Pāli* canon (Keyes 2016). Muslims make up at least 4 percent of the

[10]There are connections to social identity theory, which argues that people accrue esteem either by emphasizing identities that confer higher status, or by elevating the status of their ethnic group over outgroups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). One corollary is that, while wealthier members of an ethnic group may gain esteem by dint of their economic status, poorer ethnic-group members will be more invested in securing higher status for their ethnic group (vis-à-vis other groups), leading them to express greater prejudice.

population. Religion overlaps with ethnicity to a significant extent.[11] Burma was subject to British rule prior to 1948, experiencing Japanese invasion and occupation during World War II. The Burmese economy was classed as low-income until 2015, when it achieved lower-middle income status.[12] In 2018, at the end of our study period, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita stood at $6,802, placing it 131st out of 191 countries globally.[13]

Historically, Burma's Buddhist and Islamic communities have been at loggerheads. Many Muslims came to Burma from India as laborers during colonialism. The Great Depression launched a wave of nativist backlash. Collapsing rice prices and land dispossession in the Irrawaddy delta led to rural rebellion and a "virulent anti-Indian mood" (Brown 2005, 49). In Rangoon, riots between Indian dockworkers and Burman laborers erupted in 1930, while violence directed specifically at Muslims swept through Burmese towns in 1938 (Chakravarti 1971). Muslims came to be branded as "foreigners," whatever their true ancestry. This stereotype persists, with many Buddhists raising "issues of *naing-ngan-tha* (citizenship) and *taing-yin-tha* (indigenous or national identity)" with respect to Muslims at times of conflict (Kyaw 2015, 50). Exclusion is state-sponsored. Successive governments have denied Muslims key citizenship rights (Brett and Hlaing 2020). Muslims belonging to the Rohingya ethnic group in Rakhine State have been marked out for harshest treatment, with the Burmese state referring to them as "illegal Bengali immigrants," terminology that has entered everyday discourse (Cheesman 2017). Military operations in Rakhine provoked exoduses of refugees to Bangladesh at several points beginning in the 1970s—although significant repatriation took place in the intervening years (Chan 2005; Rahman 2010). Deadly communal violence broke out elsewhere in the country, including in Mandalay, Yangon, Bago, and Pyay in 1997, and in Sittwe and Taungoo in 2001.

With the military's political dominance entrenched, Burma has long resembled a garrison state "com-

[11]Ethnic Burmans (officially "Bamar"), who largely reside in Myanmar's central administrative divisions, are almost all Buddhists. So too are the majority of ethnic Rakhine, Mon, and Shan living in the states around the country's border. Meanwhile, the "mosaic" of Muslim communities includes so-called Indian Muslims, Rohingyas in northern Rakhine, Pashu (descendants of Malay Muslims) in the Tenasserim peninsula, and Panthay (Muslims of Chinese origin) (Crouch 2016, 15–17). The state recognizes Muslims who happen to be Bamar and Kaman as citizens, but "little distinction is made between them [and other Muslims] during times of conflict" (Al-Adawy 2013, 52–53). Additionally, those of mixed racial heritage, Muslim *kala-kapya*, "have been subject to increasingly racist discrimination" since the 1990s (Kyaw 2015, 355).

[12]Oxford Business Group, "Rising Incomes in Myanmar Contribute to Expanding Middle Class," N.D., bit.ly/3IGGnIC.

[13]Statistics Times, "List of Countries by Projected GDP Per Capita," bit.ly/3EG7IK0. Data are from the IMF's October 2017 projections.

pulsively concerned about constructed 'existential' threats to itself" (Biswas 2020, 159). There were three sets of democratic elections in the decade and a half after independence. The army seized control in 1962 (Callahan 2003). It oversaw the implementation of a socialist policy agenda and anemic economic growth. In 1988, a replacement coup by the State Law and Order Restoration Council resulted in a clampdown on a major pro-democratic uprising. Polls held in 1990 gave a landslide victory to Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD).[14] But the military rejected the election outcome. Transition attempts stalled until 2007. *Bhikkhu* (monk)-led protests under the banner of the "Saffron Revolution" were heavily repressed, but helped push the regime to adopt a new power-sharing constitution. The NLD boycotted national elections in 2010, yet participated in—and decisively won—those held in 2015.

Buddhist nationalism was in the ascendancy throughout this period. At base, its mission is to "protect" Buddhism against amorphous Islamic threats (Frydenlund 2021). Two social movements—the 969 Movement then MaBaTha—were spearheaded by ultra-nationalist monks (U Wirathu being the most visible internationally). After communal clashes in Rakhine State in 2012, and then in Meiktila in March 2013, anti-Muslim riots spilled across towns in central and eastern Burma, claiming dozens of lives.

As Islamophobia reached a high watermark, the Tatmadaw undertook a genocide against Rohingya Muslims in August 2017.[15] "Clearance operations" in northern Rakhine were triggered by attacks on state security posts by a Rohingya insurgent organization, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Reports quickly surfaced of the military engaging in mass killings, beatings, and rape of civilians in retaliation. Villages were burned en masse.[16] Rohingya crossed into Bangladesh to take shelter in Cox's Bazar. Aung San Suu Kyi, then State Counselor (equivalent to prime minister) and the winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, not only declined to exert pressure on the military to cease its campaign, she publicly defended its actions at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Her move attracted international condemnation, but wide public approval and supportive demonstrations at home. A timeline of events is given in Online Appendix Figure S2.

Our contention is that understanding the attempted ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya requires understanding the ubiquitous anti-Muslim feelings that enabled it in Burma at large. We later speculate on

[14]Aung San Suu Kyi is the daughter of Aung San, regarded as the Father of the Nation for his pivotal role in the independence struggle.

[15]This marked a dramatic escalation—and, in important respects, a continuation—of a crackdown that had occurred in Rakhine between October 2016 and January 2017.

[16]Wa Lone, Kyaw Soe Oo, and Simon Lew, "Special Report: How Myanmar Forces Burned, Looted and Killed in a Remote Village," *Reuters*, February 8, 2018, reut.rs/2ERM4SC.

whether the genocide would have occurred in the absence of such conducive public sentiment.

Methods

We now describe the construction of the analysis dataset and the statistical approach.

Survey. A central contribution of our paper is to introduce a survey of 21,879 Buddhist adults, rolled out across Myanmar between July 2015 and February 2017.[17] The survey, titled the State of Social Harmony in Myanmar, was funded by the United Nations Office for Project Services and run by the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH, a Yangon-based think tank). One of this paper's authors managed the technical design and implementation of the survey, including the training of professional enumerators, the supervision of all fieldwork, and the digitization and cleaning of the data.[18]

The survey was administered face-to-face in Burmese and lasted approximately 90 minutes. It was conducted in 163 (out of 330) townships nationwide, mapped in Figure 1.[19] Fieldwork was not conducted in three (out of 14) provinces—Rakhine State, Kachin State and Tanintharyi Region—owing to security concerns. Collectively, these three regions contain 12 percent of Myanmar's population. Leaving out Rakhine merits special mention since it was the site of the Tatmadaw's anti-Rohingya offensive in 2017. It had been home to at least half of Myanmar's Muslim population at the time the survey was performed. Note, our study's focus is on elucidating prejudice among Buddhists in the country as a whole. Moreover, qualitative evidence from Rakhine underlines the centrality of the same factors we identify as key for prejudice in the rest of Myanmar (see below). Therefore, Rakhine's omission should not significantly impact our conclusions.[20]

The strategy for getting a representative sample of respondents was multistaged. First, within each of the 11 states/regions (the top-level units) to be surveyed, approximately half of the townships (the second-tier units) were purposively selected for data collection so as to capture the geographical, social,

[17] The original survey collected 29,950 responses but we drop surveys provided by non-Buddhists for this paper.

[18] The conduct of the survey fully accords with the "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" adopted by the American Political Science Association in 2020. See Online Appendix Section J for further discussion.

[19] Townships sit one rung above villages/urban wards on the administrative ladder; they are conduits for most development spending, and are coterminous with constituencies for the lower house of the Myanmar parliament.

[20] We validate the representativeness of the survey by comparing the average attributes of townships included in the survey against the average attributes of *all* Myanmar townships. Online Appendix Table S3 indicates that sampled townships are somewhat closer to Yangon, somewhat more likely to have seen a protest between 2010 and 2015, and somewhat more urban than the universe of townships. The magnitudes of the differences are not large, however, and overall the sample looks notably similar on most dimensions.



Figure 1: This figure maps average township levels of anti-Muslim prejudice among Buddhist respondents to the CDNH survey. "NA" indicates townships in which no surveys were conduced.

and economic diversity of that state/region. To make their choices, project managers relied on the 2014 Census, and on local informants with intimate knowledge about the religious and ethnic demography of each township.[21]

Next, within chosen townships, an average of 10 to 20 wards or village tracts were selected at random from the full township list. These became the primary sampling units (PSUs). In several townships, officials prevented data collectors from operating. Other townships were inaccessible due to geographical constraints (e.g., flooded roads) or because of conflict. Where it was feasible and safe to do so, enumerators invited individuals from those areas to travel elsewhere to complete interviews. Where this proved impossible, those PSUs were discarded and fresh PSUs were redrawn at random from the initial sampling frame of townships.

Finally, enumerators randomly selected households where interviews were to be carried out using interval sampling (they stopped at every fifth or tenth door, depending on the region). Only household members older than 18 were eligible to answer the survey. One household member was chosen using a random number generator on the enumerator's phone. The characteristics of the final sample, along with other summary statistics, are displayed in Online Appendix Table S1.

[21]It was important not to rely solely on the 2014 Population and Housing Census in making these judgement calls since its enumeration of ethnicity was known to be untrustworthy (see Callahan 2017).

Outcomes. After eliciting individuals' demographics, the survey instrument posed seven questions to respondents about their attitudes toward members of the country's Muslim community.[22] The seven questions are adapted from the Bogardus (1933) social distance scale. They measure individuals' self-reported levels of comfort with having outgroup members occupy hypothetical social roles of varying degrees of social proximity to the respondent. The questions were worded as follows:

1. Could you accept a Muslim as your spouse? ***[The most proximate social role]***
2. Could you accept a Muslim as your in-law?
3. Could you accept a Muslim as your neighbor?
4. Could you accept a Muslim as your superior?
5. Could you accept a Muslim as your colleague?
6. Could you accept a Muslim as your employee?
7. Do you think that Muslims would choose the course of action as loyal citizens in the event of a major political, economic or social crisis in Myanmar? ***[The most distant social role]***[23]

For questions 1 to 6 in this list, the given response options were, "All the time (i), most of the time (ii), sometimes (iii), or never (iv)"; for question 7, the response options were, "definitely (i), mostly (ii), somewhat (iii), or no (iv)." We use three indexes to integrate responses to the seven questions. Each index yields an overall score of anti-Muslim prejudice at the individual-respondent level, with higher values indicating greater prejudice:

- *All* anti-Muslim prejudice. This variable takes one if an individual answered (iii) or (iv)—that is, a negative attitude, on balance—to all of the social-role questions to which they provided a response, and zero otherwise. The measure permits us to evaluate the extensive margin of extreme prejudice.

- *Average* anti-Muslim prejudice. We recode the response options to each of the seven questions as: 0 ("all the time"/"definitely"), $0.3\dot{3}$ ("most of the time"/"mostly"), $0.6\dot{6}$ ("sometimes"/"somewhat"), and 1 ("never"/"no"). The index then takes the mean of those values across the seven items, ignoring missing responses.

[22] The same set questions were asked about other religions too—data we make use of later.

[23] The wording for the final question differs from the rest. Many Muslims, depending on their ethnic background, are denied citizenship under discriminatory Burmese law. Accordingly, responses to the possible question, "Could you accept a Muslim as a citizen," would have been hard to interpret. A "never" response may simply have captured the binding legal reality that Muslims could never occupy that role, rather than a personal attitude.

- *Bogardus* score. This is constructed by first coding whether an individual offered a negative attitude—i.e., gave response option (iii) or (iv)—about a Muslim for each of the seven social roles. Next, the score takes the rank of first social role, ordered from 1 to 7 (corresponding to the question order above), for which the individual offered a negative attitude. For example, an individual who reports that they would be willing to accept a Muslim as a neighbor "most of the time," but would "never" accept a Muslim as a spouse or in-law, would receive a score of 3. Last, we rescale the score from zero to one.

One abiding worry with survey measures of prejudice is social desirability bias. We do not believe this to be a major problem for our study. A recent meta-analysis uncovers "nearly no evidence of sensitivity bias in measures of prejudice" among published articles that used direct and indirect approaches to gauging such bias (Blair et al. 2020, 1298). Overt resentment toward religious outgroups is pervasive in Myanmar. In qualitative interviews with 78 residents across six Burmese cities in 2015, Schissler et al. (2017, 385) found "the narrative of Muslims as a threat" to be "established." The enumerators recruited for the survey were overwhelmingly non-Muslim, and in almost no case did a Muslim enumerator interview a non-Muslim respondent. Still, we control for individual-level education levels in most analyses, on the presumption that better-educated individuals will be more hesitant to offer up discriminatory attitudes. Even if responses do reflect some degree of social desirability bias, we deem that to be of interest in itself, insofar as it picks up respondents' beliefs about what attitudes can acceptably be articulated in their communities.

Predictors. For the key explanatory variables, we merge township-level data from myriad sources, as detailed in Online Appendix Table S2. Briefly, administrative data are drawn from the censuses of 1921, 1983, and 2014, the World Bank, the Union Election Commission, and the General Administration Department (GAD).[24] We employ publicly available geo- and nightlights data to measure topography, and to generate proxies for local economic inequality. Events counts, based on newspaper reports, come from ACLED and Buschmann (2018). Precise variables are further described in the results section.

Statistical analysis. The main empirical analysis addresses the correlates of anti-Muslim prejudice. We measure the relationship between each predictor and our three anti-Muslim prejudice indexes using OLS regressions of the following form:

[24]The GAD is the backbone of the military administration. Its data suffer from potential flaws and a lack of transparency. While acknowledging these imperfections, Jap and Courtin (2023, 10) suggest that "the estimated population proportion [of ethnoreligious groups in the GAD reports] remains a useful approximation of the ethnic landscape."

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \times Predictor_{t,j} + \Big[X_i^{'}\gamma + W_{t,-j}^{'}\delta + \Big] e_i \tag{1}$$

where Y denotes an outcome for individual i in township t, α is the estimated constant, *Predictor* is the jth predictor variable (whose values are the same within townships), and β is the estimated association between the predictor and the outcome. $X_i^{'}$ is a vector of dummy variables for an individual's education level, included in some models. $W_{t,-j}^{'}$ is a vector of all *other* township predictor variables, again included in some models. e is the idiosyncratic error term. Analyses are performed on the individual-level dataset. Standard errors are clustered by township, which is the unit at which explanatory variables are measured.

Results

Ecological correlates of anti-Muslim prejudice. In this section we ask whether township-level factors predict prejudice against a targeted minority outgroup in the manner suggested by theory. The findings are presented in Figure 2. It reports point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from 57 separate regressions of anti-Muslim attitudes on nine township-level characteristics and various controls.

Mostly, the results do not conform to predictions derived from theories of regime transition and political competition. Muslims have long been assailed by the Tatmadaw. We see that Buddhist respondents in townships with an army, navy, or airforce headquarters express somewhat greater prejudice toward Muslims than those in townships without such a headquarters—to the tune of 2 percentage points for all three indexes in the bivariate and education-adjusted models (Figure 2, Panel Aii). But the estimated relationships are statistically insignificant at conventional levels and near-zero when including other township predictors. Prior research indicates that candidates in safer, noncompetitive seats will be relatively less likely to lean on socially polarizing campaign tactics that aggravate intergroup tensions. We find that, by itself, a greater margin of victory in a township's 2015 Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) election is negatively associated with local Islamophobia, in line with expectations (Panel Aiii).[25] Yet the significance and sign of the relationship is fragile, altering substantially with the addition of controls. A similar story obtains when looking at the incidence of a major demonstration, protest march, or labour strike in the township between 2011 and 2015 (Panel Ai). Initially, the coefficients on the protest dummy are negatively signed across indexes—the opposite of what theory would have us believe—and statistically significant. But partialing out the individual-education and other township regressors yields precisely estimated null relationships.

[25]The margin of victory is the percentage-point gap between the vote shares received by the winning and runner-up candidates in the constituency.



Figure 2: Ecological correlates of anti-Muslim attitudes among Buddhist respondents. The unit of analysis is the survey respondent. Predictor variables, shown in the panel subheadings, are measured at the township level. Point estimates are from OLS regressions employing various control sets, as indicated in the plot legend. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered by township. Statistical significance is shown next to the point estimates: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$. Fully tabulated results are provided in Online Appendix Section L.1.

Ethnic threat arguments also do not fare well in describing where prejudice concentrates geographically. Out of the 27 coefficients displayed in Figure 2, Panel B, only two are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level: those for the number of Buddhist *Monks per 100* persons variable (as ethnic entrepreneurs, monks have been prime civil society instigators of Buddhist nationalism) and the *Average* responses outcome.[26] Meanwhile, the proportion of Muslims in the township, as well as recent histories of local interreligious violence, are unrelated to Islamophobia regardless of the specification employed.[27] It is also noteworthy that the three predictors tested across Figure 2, Panel B generally show a negative association with prejudice, whereas conventional wisdom ties heightened ethnic threat perceptions to more hostile attitudes.

Conversely, variables related to economic discontent have much more predictive power. Across all codings of the outcome, and for all three predictors, we observe positive and statistically significant bivariate relationships between local economic stress factors and intolerant attitudes held by Buddhist respondents toward Muslims (Figure 2, Panel C). In the unadjusted models, moving from the bottom to the top of the list of townships in terms of a composite poverty score is associated with an 18–26 percentage point increase in prejudice (Panel Ci); a 10 percentage point increase in a township's unemployment rate corresponds to a 3–6 percentage point rise in prejudice (Panel Cii); and a zero-to-one shift in the gini coefficient of nightlights inequality in the township predicts 11–16 percentage points more prejudice (Panel Ciii).[28] The magnitudes of those estimated associations shrink after controlling for education and the set of other predictors. Still, the poverty index remains measurably predictive of prejudice in all specifications, making it stand apart from the eight other factors evaluated in Figure 2. Prima facie, the results support the notion that local economic hardship is related to popular intolerance against a heavily marginalized religious group.

The importance of economics resonates with qualitative anecdotes. "Uncertainty regarding the shared benefits of economic development is certainly fueling conflict between religious groups," according to Walton and Hayward (2014, 46). The fact that "many Muslims are owners of small- and medium-sized businesses ... may locally give the impression that they still dominate the economy, meaning they have often been

[26]To be sure, the number of Buddhist monks per capita is an imperfect measure of the strength of Buddhist nationalist organization locally, since we cannot tell how many of those monks are politically active. Nonetheless, we judge it to be the best proxy available.

[27]Violence is a binary variable for whether any religious violence in the township was reported by ACLED as having occurred between January 2010 and July 2015.

[28]Online Appendix Figure S4, Panels A–C present scatter plots indicating that the functional form relationships appear linear and are not the result of outliers.

targeted in periods of economic hardship" (Foxeus 2019, 10). The 969 Movement began as a boycott of Muslim enterprises; "Yangon's market stalls were decorated with 969 stickers, indicating to [Buddhist] customers that the vendors were Buddhists" and that they should buy from them (Frydenlund 2018, 293). In Rakhine itself, which was not surveyed and is Myanmar's "least developed state, with a poverty rate of 78 percent, compared to the 37.5 percent national average ... widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities ... have exacerbated the cleavage between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya."[29]

Reverse causality and population sorting. Why do adverse economic conditions strongly predict anti-Muslim bias in Myanmar? We begin by considering leading non-causal explanations for the relationship.

It is possible that the causal arrow points in the opposite direction to the one we have assumed: communal disharmony increases poverty rather than the other way around. Plausibly, local economic prosperity relies on individuals' willingness to engage in joint production and trade across ethnic-group lines—so intergroup distrust might erode growth by inhibiting profitable economic interactions (cf Hjort 2014). A testable implication follows: if antiminority prejudice undermines economic activity, the association between poverty and prejudice should be strongest in townships with larger shares of Muslims. (Antiminority prejudice will presumably be economically consequential only in areas where minority-group members are present.) We test this conjecture in Figure 3, Panels i and ii, which show correlations between the local poverty index and anti-Muslim prejudice for four subgroups: townships with a below- and above-median fraction of Muslims, as recorded in 1921 and 2019 separately.[30] As it turns out, the correlation between poverty and anti-Muslim prejudice prevails in almost all partitions of the data, and the subgroup effects are not statitically distinguishable from one another. If anything, the results in Panel ii suggest that the poverty/prejudice association is *weaker* in townships with more Muslims. Tentatively, we interpret this as evidence against the claim that reverse causality drives the economic findings of Figure 2.

Population sorting could also be responsible for the economic results. Conceivably, wealthier, better

[29]Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, "What Forces are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 2020, on.cfr.org/3lAypcN (last updated). On the connection between underdevelopment, prejudice, and conflict in Rakhine, see also Thawnghmung (2016). In Online Appendix Figure S7 and Table S4 we show, respectively, that (a) ethnic Rakhine interviewed elsewhere in Myanmar (whome we presume to be largely economic internal migrants) express the greatest prejudice toward Muslims of any ethnic group in the country; and (b) the negative correlation between income and prejudice obtains for Rakhine Buddhists too.

[30]We check heterogeneity using historical data on religious demography to ensure that endogenous population sorting does not bias our inferences.



Figure 3: Correlations between the township-level poverty index and anti-Muslim attitudes among Buddhist respondents, for various townships subgroups. The unit of analysis is the survey respondent. Point estimates are from OLS regressions employing various control sets, as indicated in the plot legend. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered by township. Statistical significance is shown next to the point estimates: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$. Fully tabulated results are provided in Online Appendix Section L.2.

resourced households move out of townships where religious prejudice runs deep—preferring peaceful, inclusive environments to violent, intolerant ones. Such population flows would induce a positive correlation between local poverty and prejudice, even though economic circumstances did nothing to increase hostility toward Muslims for any one individual. In the subgroup analyses shown in Figure 3, Panel iii, however, we find that the main result exists in townships that experienced both higher and lower levels of internal migration, per the 2014 census. Given that the poverty/prejudice relationship does not vary appreciably according to local population mobility, and that it is strongest in places that have experienced the least mobility, changes in wealth composition across townships achieved via household relocation are unlikely to be behind the findings.

Omitted variables bias. Unmeasured variables could jointly determine both townships' prejudice rates and poverty levels. We evaluate the sensitivity of the relationship to the inclusion of an array of township measures standing in for potential confounds: urbanness, population size, geography, political preferences, and historical group settlement. To avoid arbitrary modeling choices, and to gauge the strength of each factor's influence, we use specification curve analysis (Simonsohn et al. 2020). Importantly, we focus on variables measured "pre-treatment" to the extent possible. This matters because the inclusion of controls that are themselves affected by the independent variable of interest can produce mediator or collider bias (the "bad control" problem).[31]

Figure 4 displays the specification curve plot. The estimates depicted in the top panel are from 6,144 regressions: one for each possible combination of specification choices indicated by the vertically aligned black ticks in the bottom plots. There are four conclusions from the multiverse analysis. First, the relationship is very robust; 96 percent of models in the curve yield estimates that are statistically significant at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level, and 99.5 percent at the $\alpha = 0.1$ level. Second, lager-magnitude effects are seen on the extensive margin of extreme prejudice, for the *All* outcome measure. Third, the control that stands out as most influential in attenuating the size of the estimated relationship is a township's urbanness in the 1983 census. Marginalizing over all estimates in the curve, Online Appendix Figure S6 finds that the inclusion of the urbanness variable diminishes the average estimated association by 3.5 percentage points (from 0.200 to 0.166). Fourth, the addition of state/region fixed effects increases the magnitude of the estimated associations more than any other specification choice. Although we may have overlooked other confounds, this holistic assessment of robustness is reassuring.

[31]This is a limitation of the Figure 2 models that adjust for "all other predictors," since those predictors may be caused *by* one another.



Figure 4: Specification curve analysis assessing the robustness of the correlation between the township-level poverty index and three measures of anti-Muslim prejudice. The top panel shows the associations, with 95 percent confidence intervals, ordered by coefficient magnitude. Blue marks out coefficient estimates that are significant at the 95 percent level; red denotes those that are not. Bottom panels indicate (via black ticks) the outcome as well as the set of control variables specified in each vertically-aligned model. The contributions of each choice are quantified in Online Appendix Figure S6.

Household income and anti-Muslim prejudice. While the previous results show that prejudice is robustly correlated with poverty at the *township* level, the relationship is ecological. That leads us to conduct a more stringent test, evaluating the connection between poverty and prejudice for individuals. Survey respondents were offered four binned response-options to report their monthly household earnings.[32] For simplicity, we treat the original ordinal measure as continuous and examine its association with the three prejudice indexes (which, recall, are computed for every survey respondent).[33] The unconditional models in Table 1, Column 1, show that higher incomes are negatively associated with anti-Muslim prejudice ($p < 0.001$, in all instances). We obtain estimates of a very similar order to the bivariate associations between township-level poverty and prejudice presented earlier. Moving from the bottom income bin to the top one corresponds to a 26, 15, and 19 percentage point reduction on the *All*, *Average*, and *Bogardus* prejudice indexes, respectively.

The individual-level relationship holds up under more restrictive specifications: the inclusion of binary indicators for individuals' gender, age-group, education, ethnicity, profession, and source of income categories (Table 1, Column 2), the inclusion of those individual covariates plus township-level controls (Column 3), and a saturated model stratifying on all unique combinations of individual covariate values (Column 5). Moreover, the results persist when township-level fixed effects are added. Even when holding the poverty level of the surrounding township constant, higher individual income is associated with less prejudice (Column 4). Lastly, the most demanding specification (Column 6) compares individuals who are identical on all individual covariates and who live in the same township; there, too, the correlation remains. We cannot be certain that causal effects underlie all the observational variation in prejudice; more nuanced selection patterns are imaginable. Nevertheless, the results from Table 1 further raise our confidence that the income/prejudice linkage may be causal.

Mechanisms. We offered contrasting reasons why, in principle, adverse economic conditions could bring about prejudice among majorities: curbing access to a fixed-size pie, or scapegoating. To help parse them, we highlight three observable implications of the materialist model in its pure form. If it is correct, the magnitude of the poverty/prejudice relationship will be greatest in places where minority populations are densest. A resource competition account would further entail that more economic hardship will generate

[32]The options were: (1) Between 1 and 100,000 kyats; (2) Between 100,001 and 300,000 kyats; (3) Between 300,001 and 500,000 kyats; and (4) More than 500,000 kyats.

[33]In Online Appendix Figure S1 we plot the raw averages of the outcomes across the four binned income categories. We find that the decrease in prejudice appears clearly linear in income for all three measures, supporting our treatment of it as continuous.

Table 1: This table reports the estimated association between individual-level income and anti-Muslim prejudice among Buddhist respondents using OLS regression. Income, measured on a four point scale, is treated as a continuous regressor. *Linear* specifications incorporate control variables in a linear, additive manner. *Saturated* specifications include indicators for each unique combination of covariate values. *Fixed effects* (FE) specifications include indicators for each township. Individual-level controls are: gender, age-bin, highest level of education, ethnicity, profession, and income source. Township-level covariates are: 1921 Hindu and Muslim population shares, 1983 population size and urbanness, elevation, distance to Yangon, terrain ruggedness, and a border-township dummy variable. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$. Fully tabulated results are provided in Online Appendix Section L.3.

Individual covariates:	None	Linear	Linear	Linear	Saturated	Saturated
Township covariates:	None	None	Linear	FE	None	Saturated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A—Outcome:	**All**					
Income level (1-4)	-0.087***	-0.060***	-0.058***	-0.053***	-0.054***	-0.053***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
N	20,695	20,620	20,515	20,620	20,695	20,695
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.25	0.76
Panel B—Outcome:	**Average**					
Income level (1-4)	-0.050***	-0.032***	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.030***	-0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
N	20,695	20,620	20,515	20,620	20,695	20,695
R^2	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.27	0.78
Panel C—Outcome:	**Bogardus**					
Income level (1-4)	-0.063***	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.039***	-0.041***	-0.042***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
N	20,695	20,620	20,515	20,620	20,695	20,695
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.25	0.75

greater hostility toward *all* minorities, and not just one group in particular. Also, animosity should be directed first and foremost against minorities in employment-related roles, which would bring them into economic competition with majorities.

Taking up these implications in turn, we note that earlier evidence already contradicts the first of them. The association seen between poverty and prejudice was similar or smaller in townships containing more (versus fewer) Muslims (Figure 3, Panels i and ii). Second, we examine the economic correlates of attitudes toward other, non-Muslim minorities. The survey instrument recorded opinions about Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, and Indians using the same seven-question module described above; thus, we can construct parallel prejudice measures. Figure 5 reports the association between the three township-level economic predictor variables and intolerance toward these other identity groups (controlling for individuals' education). Row 1 serves as a placebo check: Buddhists voice minimal prejudice against adherents of their own religion (Panel D), and ingroup attitudes do not consistently vary as a function of township-level economic conditions (Panels A–C). In Panel D, Muslims (in Row 2) emerge as by far the most disliked group on average (mean disfavor on the *All* outcome is 10 percentage points higher than for any other minority).[34] Row 4 considers prejudice against Christians who, with 6 percent of the population, constitute Burma's second largest religious community. Row 4, Panel D shows that Christians are held in higher regard than Muslims and Hindus. Yet, crucially, the association between anti-Christian sentiment and poverty, unemployment, and inequality is substantially weaker and noisier (Row 4, Panels A–C).[35] Rather than discriminating against minorities in an undifferentiated manner, therefore—what we would expect under instrumentalist, "color-blind" exclusion—poorer Buddhists respondents selectively target enmity toward particular ethnoreligious groups.

Third, we break down the anti-Muslim prejudice indexes into their seven original components, and estimate the economic correlates of each. In terms of theory, the results given in Online Appendix Figure S3 prove ambiguous. Buddhists are less opposed, on average, to Muslims holding occupational roles (Panel D), even though those roles raise the specter of employment competition. That said, higher poverty and unemployment are more predictive of ill-will toward Muslims holding occupational roles (Panels A–C). We believe this ambiguity is due to ceiling effects, however. Raw data plotted in Online Appendix Figures S4 and S5 show the close-to-universal rejection of Muslims as spouses, in-laws, and (to a lesser extent)

[34]Note, Figure 5, Row 2, Panels A–C reproduce the education-adjusted results for anti-Muslim prejudice from Figure 2, Panel C, to facilitate comparison.

[35]Of the nine regression coefficients in Figure 5, Row 4, all are smaller than the corresponding estimates for Muslims in Row 2, with only two statistically significant at the 95 percent level.



Figure 5: Economic correlates of prejudice toward various minorities among Buddhist respondents. The unit of analysis is the survey respondent. Predictor variables, shown in the panel subheadings, are measured at the township level. Point estimates are from OLS regressions that include binary indicators for individual respondents' education level. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered by township. Statistical significance is shown next to the point estimates: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$. Fully tabulated results are provided in Online Appendix Section L.4.

citizens.

Taken together, the additional evidence we have brought to bear on mechanisms provides a poor fit with the materialist account, leading us to view scapegoating as the more likely channel.

Figure 5 brings up a final interpretation point. Overall favorability toward Hindus exceeds that toward Muslims (Row 3, Panel D).[36] But poor economic conditions predict anti-Hindu sentiment much as they do for Muslims (Row 3, Panels A–C). The same goes for Indians (Row 5, Panels A–C). The reason, we surmise, is that, Hindus are considered—along with Muslims—to be "Indians," given the national lineage of most people professing these faiths in Myanmar. Anti-Islamic feelings are thus a manifestation of internal xenophobia. Economic vulnerability induces the majority to regard Muslims as "strangers in their own land."[37]

External validity. Does the association between income and prejudice generalize? In Figure 6, we combine cross-national data on logged GDP per capita with microdata on religious intolerance, from 186 country-rounds of the World Values Survey. In particular, the figure's vertical axis presents the mean rates at which survey respondents state they would not wish to have a "neighbor of a different religion." Expressed religious intolerance covaries with a country's economic well-being to a striking degree; the relationship seen within Myanmar is not anomalous, therefore. The population-weighted regression coefficient implies that a seven-fold increase in a country's GDP per capita—from 6 to 8 on the logarithmic scale, equivalent to moving from Rwanda to Morocco—is associated with a 13.4 percentage point decrease in the proportion of survey respondents reporting an intolerant attitude. Still, Myanmar is an outlier in Figure 6; is it a relatively poor country with high interreligious group prejudice, but falls well above the regression line. Indeed, in 2020 it furnished the highest share of respondents opposed to non-coreligionist neighbors (73 percent) ever recorded in the World Values Survey. This attests to the unique importance of the Burmese case.[38]

[36]This may be because of the theological proximity of Hinduism and Buddhism. Both faiths are polytheistic and Buddhism grew out of Hinduism in the fifth century BCE.

[37]This is unusual in Asia's politics. Xenophobic politicking is rare and "populists work *within* rather than *against* existing categories of peoplehood" for the most part (Pepinsky 2020, 549, emphasis in original).

[38]For comparison, the proportion of Buddhists who would not accept a Muslim as a neighbor is 78 percent in the CDNH survey.



Figure 6: Scatter plot showing the relationship between religious intolerance and GDP per capita globally. The unit of analysis is a country/round of the World Values Survey, meaning that countries surveyed in multiple waves appear more than once. Only countries with a population of at least one million people (as of 2020), appear in the plot. Points are scaled by a country's 2020 population size. The weighted least squares regression line weights observations by countries' 2020 population size.

Discussion

Genocide—the forced removal or murder of unwanted identity groups—has been called "a problem from hell" (Power 2013). The danger it poses is real and present. According to Lang (2016, 193), "[g]enocide is now more easily imagined, planned, and implemented than ever before." Relying on a vast data collection effort carried out shortly before a campaign by the Myanmar state to exterminate and expel the Muslim Rohingya people, we find that economic discontent—and especially poverty—is robustly associated with anti-Muslim attitudes among Burma's Buddhist population. The association is large in magnitude; it exists geographically and by individual; and its predictive power far outstrips that of other commonly cited causes of intergroup animus. Scapegoating, rather than resource competition, provides the explanation that best aligns with the results. Majority-group members confronting economic hardship lash out against historically vilified minorities. In Myanmar, the principal targets are communities cast as foreigners—both by successive governments and civil society actors fixated on "saving Buddhism" (Turner 2014). We believe the findings improve our understanding of how severe antiminority sentiment takes shape prior to mass atrocity events.

The estimated relationship between poverty and prejudice withstands key sensitivity tests. Yet, we are the first to acknowledge the limitations of any observational analysis of the kind performed here. In our view, readers should treat the paper's evidence as suggestive of a causal connection. Even if the relationship is not itself causal, our descriptive inference has produced a "stubborn fact" in need of explanation. A critical next step will be to bolster the findings' causal credibility through randomized experimentation. Knowing whether, say, infusions of cash, multifaceted graduation programs, or universal basic income work to diminish prejudice among program recipients would be germane for policymakers and practitioners, and speak to the overlooked impacts of these financial instruments on social integration (Banerjee et al. 2019).

Was the torrent of hatred directed at Muslims a decisive contributor to the military's anti-Rohingya campaign of 2017—which took place solely in Rakhine State at the behest of generals—or was it incidental? Recall, the Tatmadaw maintained extensive de facto and de jure political control throughout the transitional period (2011–2021). It operated autonomously of civilian oversight and with near-impunity. Although we can only speculate, informed observers have commented on the significance of the domestic context for the military's behavior. Lee (2021, 195) is explicit: the "Tatmadaw actions against the Rohingya took place with the support of the government and popular opinion. Had either the government or the public taken a different view about the merits of the 2017 'clearance operation' its scale and brutality would likely have been considerably diminished." The military actively cultivated prejudice on social media

platforms, suggesting it viewed the climate of public opinion as important. An activist testifying before the U.S. Congress as early as September 2013 "linked the problem [of growing anti-Muslim sentiment] to decades of state-sponsored discrimination against Muslims ... 'The building blocks of genocide are in place,' he said."[39] In short, there is broad agreement that the exceptionally high levels of Islamophobia seen across Myanmar in the mid-2010s gave a "green light to finish the genocide," to borrow Stanton's (2004, 216) phrase. Teasing apart what drives popular prejudice may be essential for understanding state terror.

[39]Kate Linthicum, "Myanmar violence between Buddhists, Muslims threatens reforms," *LA Times*, October 27, 2013.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

"Poverty and Prejudice Before Genocide"

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A Summary statistics

Table S1: Summary statistics for raw analysis variables.

Measure	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.	Histogram
Outcomes: Anti-Muslim prejudice (individual-level)							
All	20,709	0.73	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Average	20,709	0.83	0.23	0.00	0.92	1.00	
Bogardus	20,709	0.82	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Outcomes: Anti-Hindu prejudice (individual-level)							
All	20,703	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Average	20,703	0.72	0.25	0.00	0.76	1.00	
Bogardus	20,703	0.72	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Outcomes: Anti-Christian prejudice (individual-level)							
All	20,812	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Average	20,812	0.64	0.26	0.00	0.67	1.00	
Bogardus	20,812	0.62	0.40	0.00	0.71	1.00	
Outcomes: Anti-Buddhist prejudice (individual-level)							
All	21,127	0.05	0.23	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Average	21,127	0.21	0.22	0.00	0.14	1.00	
Bogardus	21,127	0.10	0.25	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Outcomes: Anti-Indian prejudice (individual-level)							
All	20,686	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Average	20,686	0.76	0.24	0.00	0.81	1.00	
Bogardus	20,686	0.75	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Predictors: Democratization and political competition (township-level)							
Any protest	21,879	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Military HQ	21,879	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Margin of victory	21,879	0.31	0.21	0.00	0.28	0.80	
Predictors: Ethnic threat (township-level)							
Muslim prop.	21,879	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.47	
Monks per 100	21,865	0.61	0.37	0.01	0.52	2.86	
Any religious violence	21,774	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Predictors: Economic discontent (township-level)							
Poverty index	21,879	0.63	0.16	0.00	0.67	0.94	
Unemployment rate	21,879	0.18	0.06	0.07	0.17	0.38	
Nightlights gini	21,774	0.74	0.25	0.00	0.81	1.00	
Economic predictors (individual-level)							
HH income: 1-100,000 kyats	21,858	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	
HH income: 100,001-300,000 kyats	21,858	0.42	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	
HH income: 300,001-500,000 kyats	21,858	0.11	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00	
HH income: >500,000 kyats	21,858	0.06	0.23	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Controls (township-level)							
NLD seat prop. 1990	21,879	0.76	0.38	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Urban prop. 1983	21,879	0.30	0.27	0.03	0.19	1.00	

Table S1: (*continued*) Summary statistics.

Measure	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.	Histogram
Total pop. 1983	21,879	142597.82	80943.42	4066.00	120638.00	320377.00	
Hindu prop. 1921	21,774	0.05	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.37	
Muslim prop. 1921	21,774	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.18	
Border township	21,774	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Elevation	21,774	373.41	451.42	4.00	115.00	1422.00	
Dist. to Yangoon	21,774	363.39	238.57	1.10	337.61	999.35	
Ruggedness	21,774	8.76	7.21	1.13	6.92	30.48	
Recent migrants prop.	21,879	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.26	
Controls (individual-level)							
Female	21,879	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: 18-27	21,859	0.25	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: 28-37	21,859	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: 38-47	21,859	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: 48-57	21,859	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: 58-67	21,859	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Age: >67	21,859	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: Primary	21,876	0.14	0.35	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: Middle	21,876	0.24	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: High	21,876	0.29	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: Graduate	21,876	0.28	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: Post-graduate	21,876	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Education: Other	21,876	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Bamar	21,838	0.57	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Chin	21,838	0.02	0.12	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Mon	21,838	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Kachin	21,838	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Kayah	21,838	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Kayin	21,838	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Rakhine	21,838	0.02	0.13	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Shan	21,838	0.22	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Mixed	21,838	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Ethnicity: Non-TYT	21,838	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Dependent, unemployed	21,877	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Day laborer	21,877	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Farmer	21,877	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Salaried employee	21,877	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Shopkeeper	21,877	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Profession: Trader	21,877	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Agriculture	21,867	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Day labor	21,867	0.22	0.41	0.00	0.00	1.00	

Table S1: (*continued*) Summary statistics.

Measure	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.	Histogram
Income from: Retired	21,867	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Service provider	21,867	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Shop owner	21,867	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Staff	21,867	0.18	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Income from: Trader	21,867	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00	1.00	

B Variables description

Table S2: Variables description and sources.

Variable	Data source(s)	Description
Prejudice outcomes (individual-level)		
• All	Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH), Social Harmony Survey, 2015–2017.	This indexed outcome is based on seven questions probing respondents' attitudes toward Muslims/Hindus/Christians/Buddhists/Indians occupying different private and professional social roles. The questions were asked separately for each social role, and are as follows: "Could you accept a [Muslim/Hindu/Christian/Buddhist/Indian] as your": (a) spouse; (b) mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, daughter-in-law or son-in-law; (c) neighbor; (d) superior; (e) work colleague; (f) employee. For those questions, the response options were: "all the time [i], most of the time [ii], sometimes [iii], or never [iv]." Additionally, the survey asked—in what we label question (g)—"Do you agree that [Muslims/Hindus/Christians/Buddhists/Indians] would choose the course of action as loyal citizens in the event of a major political, economic or social crisis in Myanmar?" The response options for this last question were: "definitely [i], mostly [ii], somewhat [iii], or no [iv]." The *All* index outcome takes a value of one if the respondent provided responses iii or iv to all seven questions just listed about the given identity group—that is, questions (a) through (g)—and zero otherwise.
• Average	CDNH Social Harmony Survey, 2015-2017.	We recode the response options to each of the seven questions described in the previous cell as as: 0 ("all the time"/"definitely"), 0.333 ("most of the time"/"mostly"), 0.666 ("sometimes"/"somewhat"), and 1 ("never"/"no"). The index then takes the mean of those values across the seven items, ignoring missing responses.
• Bogardus	CDNH Social Harmony Survey, 2015-2017.	This variable takes a higher value (more prejudiced) if a respondent is only willing to accept a Muslim/Hindu/Christian/Buddhist/Indian in a more distant social role, and a lower value (less prejudiced) if a respondent is willing to accept a Muslim/Hindu/Christian/Buddhist/Indian in a more proximate social role. In the list of seven questions described above, social roles are ordered from most proximate to most distant. We assign each ordered social role an integer value as follows: (a, spouse, thus most proximate) = 0, (b) = 1, (c) = 2, (d) = 3, (e) = 4, (f) = 5, (g, citizen, most distant) = 6. For each of the seven questions, we code a binary variable that takes one if the respondent provided response iii or iv to the question (i.e., a negative attitude), zero if they provided response i or ii (i.e., a positive attitude), and missing otherwise. The score then takes the integer value (0 to 6) of the first social role for which the individual offered a positive attitude. If the individual offered no positive attitude for any social role, the score takes a value of 7. Finally, to simplify interpretation, we rescale the score, dividing by seven, such that it takes a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of one.
Correlates (township-level)		
• Protest	Myanmar Protest Event Dataset 1.2, from A. Buschmann (2018): "Introducing the Myanmar Protest Event Dataset: Motivation, Methodology, and Research Prospects," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 37(2), 125—142; bit.ly/3woeijO.	This is a binary variable for whether a "protest" took place between February 4, 2011 and December 31, 2014. The primary data source was *The Irrawady*, a leading English-language newspaper. Protests were taken to include "visible forms of assembly" including demonstrations, protest marches, and labor strikes.
• Margin of victory	Election results from Open Development Myanmar; bit.ly/3PPkCb0.	We compute the margin of victory—the percentage point lead of the winning candidate over the runner up—for the 2015 House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) elections. Note, Pyithu Hluttaw constituency boundaries follow the township boundaries.

Table S2: (*continued*) Variables description and sources.

Variable	Data source(s)	Description
• Military HQ	Defence Service Museum, Naypyidaw; the information was collected from the museum by one of the authors in 2018.	This is a binary variable indicating the presence of at least one military headquarters (for Army, Navy, or Air Force) within the township.
• Muslim prop.	2019 General Administration Department (GAD) Township Reports; bit.ly/3QjPEsX. The reports were scaped, translated, and merged by the authors.	This varaible is the proportion of the township population that identifies as Muslim. The quality of the GAD data has been questioned as the GAD does not publish its methodology for gathering population data. Researchers have expressed doubts about the level of bureaucratic capabilities within the department; some suspect that aspects of the data are distorted due to political considerations. Our belief, based on fieldwork and past interactions with GAD officials, is that the degree of such distortion is likely minimal for religious demographic data. We partially validate this by correlating the 1921 British census measure of township Muslim population share with the GAD 2019 measure, and find them to be highly correlated ($r = 0.52$).
• Monks per 100	2019 General Administration Department Township Reports; bit.ly/3QjPEsX. The reports were scaped, translated, and merged together by the authors. 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census; bit.ly/3Ph3LO9.	This variable is the number of Buddhist monks per 100 people in the township. Note, the same data disclaimers apply as for the *Muslim prop.* variable just discussed.
• Religious violence	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ALCED) Project dataset; bit.ly/3zKCbDi. Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), Myanmar Township Boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	We filter the list of ACLED events for Myanmar according to the following criteria: (1) *event_type* is "Explosions/Remote violence," "Violence against civilians," "Battles," "Protests," or "Riots"; (2) *actor1, assoc_actor_1, actor2, assoc_actor_2* or *notes* contains a religion-related keyword ("[Mm]uslim," "[Rr]ohingya," "Kaman," "[mM]osque," "[Qq]uran," "OIC," "Bangladesh," "Bengali," "Rakhine [cC]risis," "Protect Rakhine," "Islamic," "[Mm]adrasa," "interfaith," "Protection of Nationality and Religion," "Protection of Nation and Religion," "Protection of Race and Religion," "Arakan Liberation Army," "[Rr]ace and [rR]eligion [Pp]rotection [lL]aw," "Network of Arakan Nationals," "Rakhine Women Network," "Arakan National Party," "ANP," "Myanmar Nationalist Network," "nationalists," "Myanmar National Congress," "race and religion," "All Myanmar Federation of Sangha Union," "Ma Ba Tha," "MSF," "Doctors Without Borders," "Rakhine Advisory Commission," "Rakhine State Advisory Commission," "Rakhine State Commission," "Pamaukkha," "Pamaukha," "Wirathu," "ethnic Rakhine," "INGO," "[Cc]itizenship [Ll]aw," "969," "ICRC," "Special Rapporteur," or "ARSA"); and (3) *event_date* falls within the studied date range, January 1, 2010 to July 15, 2015 (the latter date being the start date of the CDNH Social Harmony Survey). We then assign events to townships using the events' latitude and longitude coordinates given in the ACLED dataset and the MIMU township shapefiles. Finally, we generate a binary variable that take one if any religious violence occured in the township (under the criteria just described) and zero otherwise.
• Poverty index	Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Program dataset; bit.ly/3BXSXl7.	This township index was generated by the World Bank, and incorporated in the MIMU dataset. The index aggregates information on household characteristics—housing structures, water and sanitation, household assets, and household demographics—from the 2014 census using principal component analysis. Characteristics to be included in the index were selected based on a study of what best predicted household-level poverty in the Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment Survey in Myanmar, 2009-10. For further details, see bit.ly/3zTr6zX. The original index is a township wealth index. We invert the index (multiplying by -1) to make it a poverty index, where higher values mean the township is poorer. We then scale the index so that its minimum value takes zero and its maximum value takes one.

Table S2: (*continued*) Variables description and sources.

Variable	Data source(s)	Description
• Unemployment rate	2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census; bit.ly/3Ph3LO9.	Computed from Table E-2 of the 2014 census. We define the unemployment rate as one minus the proportion of the population over 10 years old that is either (i) employed, (ii) a full time student, (iii) retired, or (iv) ill/disabled. Note, the 2014 census was the first that had been conducted in over 30 years. Costs were borne by western donors and it was supervised by the United Nations Population Fund. The data are widely regarded as reliable.
• Nightlights gini	Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS); bit.ly/3CG3lhV. WorldPop 100m Grid Population Estimates dataset; bit.ly/3PD6p0R. Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), Myanmar Township Boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	We use VIIRS nighttime lights data for the year 2015 to calculate the gini coefficient of luminosity inequality between grid cells within a township. We employ the method introduced and validated in N. Weidmann and G. Theunissen (2021): "Estimating Local Inequality from Nighttime Lights," *Remote Sensing* 13(22). Specifically, we calculate a gini inequality among $500m^2$ cells located within township boundaries. This inequality calculation compares logged light emissions from each cell, weighted by the population of the cell. The population estimates come from the WorldPop 100m grid population estimates for Myanmar in 2015.
• Urban prop. 1983	Department of Population, 1983 Census Reports; bit.ly/3CunIhV. The original reports were scraped and digitized by the authors.	The proportion of the township that was classed as living in an urban area in the 1983 census.
• Hindu prop. 1921	Census of India 1921, Volume X, Burma; bit.ly/3QBXUEg. Digitized by Feyaad Allie and the authors.	Proportion of 1921 population that was Hindu. Provincial Table II ("Population of Townships, etc., Classified by Religion") provides the total population, broken down by religion, for each 1921 township. Digitized maps of the 1921 township boundaries do not exist, and boundaries have changed significantly in the intervening years. Therefore, we identified the latitude/longitude coordinates for the titular town of each 1921 township (these names have either not changed, or changes were simple to trace using publicly available online sources). We then identified the centroid coordinates for each modern township. Using these coordinate sets, we assigned 1921 religion data to each modern township by identifying the geospatially nearest historical township.
• Muslim prop. 1921	Census of India 1921, Volume X, Burma; bit.ly/3QBXUEg. Digitized by Feyaad Ali and the authors.	Proportion of 1921 population that was Muslim. We used the same data matching procedure as for *Hindu prop. 1921*.
• Internal migrant prop.	2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census, Thematic Report on Migration and Urbanization; bit.ly/3zPYvLP.	We use the 2014 census to calculate the share of the township population composed of recent migrants to the township (i.e., moved to the township five years before the census).
• NLD seat prop. 1990	Burma Press Summaries; bit.ly/3R3TPJ4 and bit.ly/3QKqsM6. Digitized by the authors.	Proportion of township seats won by the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 elections (for a constituent assembly). The quality of reporting for the elections is uneven: for some seats, only the party of the winning candidate is available. This means that we are unable to compute average NLD vote shares for all townships and instead rely on NLD's township seat share. Importantly, constituencies were nested within township borders, were single-member, and were named after the township in which they were located. Further, townships at that time contained between one and three constituencies. Most township boundaries have remained unchanged since 1990. For cases where townships borders have changed—generally by splitting—we use a variety of online sources to trace the split and then assign duplicate data for both split townships. Note, while multiparty elections were held in 1990, the military ultimately refused to recognize the results.
• Border township	Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), Myanmar Township Boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	This is a binary variable, computed using GIS, and takes one if a township border is within 2kms of Myanmar's international border, and zero otherwise.

Table S2: (*continued*) Variables description and sources.

Variable	Data source(s)	Description
• Elevation	Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM-GL3) Global 90m topography data; bit.ly/3T93kZv.	We used SRTM-GL3 to calculate the median elevation of all 90m square cells contained within each township.
• Dist. to Yangoon	Myanmar Information Management Unit, Myanmar Township boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	Distance from the township centroid to the center of Yangon, calculated using GIS.
• Terrain ruggedness	Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM-GL3) Global 90m topography data; bit.ly/3T93kZv. Myanmar Information Management Unit, Myanmar Township boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	The measure captures the extent of elevation difference between neighboring cells of a Digital Elevation Model (a representation of the earth's bare topographic surface). We use the SRTM-GL3 data for Myanmar to calculate the mean Topographic Ruggedness Index (TRI) for 90m cells within townships. The TRI is computed by taking the root-mean-squared difference in elevation between a cell and the eight surrounding cells. This index method was introduced in S. Riley, S. DeGloria and R. Elliot (1999): "A Terrain Ruggedness Index that Quantifies Topographic Heterogeneity," *Intermountain Journal of Sciences* 5(1–4), pp. 23–7.
Correlates (individual-level)		
• Female	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A binary variable taking one for respondents identifying as female and zero otherwise.
• Age	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A set of six binary variables denoting the following age-range categories: 18–27; 28–37; 38–47; 48–57; 58–67; >67.
• Education	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A set of six binary variables denoting the following categories for respondents' highest level of educational attainment: Primary school; Middle school; High school; University graduate; University post-graduate; Other.
• Ethnicity	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A set of ten binary variables denoting the following ethnic categories for individual respondents: Bamar, Chin, Mon, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, Shan, Mixed, and Non-Taingyintar.
• Profession	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A set of six binary variables denoting the following professional categorizations: Dependents, Day labourers, Farmers, Salaried employees, Shop-keepers, and Traders.
• Income source	CDNH Social Harmony survey, 2015-2017.	A set of seven binary variables denoting the primary source of income for the household: Agriculture, Day labor, Retired, Service provider, Shop owner, Staff, Trader.
Fixed effects		
• State/region fixed effects	Myanmar Information Management Unit, Myanmar Township boundaries (Admin3); bit.ly/3Cl1qyZ.	Binary variables for the state/region within which a township is contained.
Cross-national variables		
• Prop. of WVS respondents unwilling to have a neighbor of a different religion	World Values Survey, various rounds; we use the micro-data compiled and cleaned for the paper: G. Nellis (2022): "Election Cycles and Global Religious Intolerance," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 120(1), e2213198120; bit.ly/3LgC4H8. World Bank Population data; bit.ly/3mM65nW.	In various country/rounds, the World Values Survey has posed the question: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Option to select:] People of a different religion." We first code a variable that takes one if the respondents selected that option, and zero if they did not. Individuals who do not profess a religion are not considered. We then take the mean of the recoded varaible by country/round. We drop countries whose population is fewer than one million people in 2020 according to the World Bank. We end up with data from 191 country/rounds covering 91 distinct countries between the years 1995 and 2022.
• Log GDP per capita	United Nations Statistics Division; bit.ly/3ze9Pm8	We use the UN dataset of GDP per capita at current prices. Taiwan does not appear in this dataset.

C Comparing surveyed townships to all townships

Table S3: Benchmarking sampled townships agains the all townships, using township-level data for which we possess complete information.

Attribute	Average value in all townships	Average value in surveyed townships
Margin of victory 2015 [0-1]	0.32	0.34
Any protest [0/1]	0.19	0.25
Unemployment rate [0-1]	0.18	0.18
Military HQ [0/1]	0.16	0.16
Muslim prop. 1921 [0-1]	0.04	0.04
Distance to Yangon [kms]	421.70	331.58
Border township [0/1]	0.16	0.11
Nightlights gini [0-1]	0.72	0.71
Urban prop. 1983 [0-1]	0.24	0.31

D Raw relationship between anti-Muslim prejudice and individual income



Figure S1: This figure plots the mean prejudice scores across levels of household income. Vertical bars show 95 percent confidence intervals based on the standard error of the esimate.

E Timeline



Figure S2: Timeline of key events in Myanmar from 2008 to 2021.

F Correlation between economics and individual components



Figure S3: Correlations between township- and individual-level predictors and anti-Muslim attitudes among Buddhist respondents. The red shaded area indicates employment-related outcome questions. The unit of analysis is the survey respondent. Point estimates are from OLS regressions, using different control sets, as indicated in the plot legend. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors—clustered by township in Panels A and B, and not clustered in Panel C. Statistical significance is shown next to the point estimates: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Fully tabulated results are provided in Online Appendix Section L.5.

G Scatter plots of the relationship between poverty and anti-Muslim prejudice



Figure S4: This figure shows the bivariate scatter plot between the Poverty index and anti-Muslim prejudice, both for the indexed outcomes (Panels A–C) and for the individual index components (Panels D–J). Regression lines for each plot are shown in red. The size of the circles in the plots corresponds to the number of observations.

H Violin plot of anti-Muslim prejudice measures



Figure S5: Violin plot depicting the raw distributions of the anti-Muslim prejudice measures, both for the indxed outcomes (Panels A–C) and for the individual index components (Panels D–J). The vertical red lines represent the variable means.

I Quantifying the influence of specification choices



Figure S6: This figure quantifies the influence of the various analytical choices shown in Figure 4. It plots the difference between the average of the coefficients for all models in the specification curve *with* the variable included, minus the average of the coefficients for all models in the specification curve *without* the variable included. The resulting differences are ordered from largest to smallest in magnitude.

J Ethical considerations

The survey was undertaken by the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH), which was set up as "an independent non-governmental organization with the objective of enhancing social harmonization, peaceful coexistence and mitigation of violence in Myanmar through research, training in civic education including other peace related issues, promotion of awareness raising activities, and the management of an Early Warning Early Response System."[1] CDNH's research has thus addressed sensitive topics in the Myanmar context. The safety and wellbeing of participants has been at the forefront of the Center's research activities. In the case of the Social Harmony Survey–which we rely on in this paper—the questionnaire, sampling procedures, interviewing techniques, and data management protocols were designed to minimize the risks of harm to the survey respondents.

Consent. Verbal informed consent was elicited. Enumerators first introduced the CDNH organization, described the purpose of the survey, and spelled out the other key stakeholders in the project. A full description of the various survey modules was also provided up-front to make respondents aware of the complete scope of the questionnaire. Prior to the start of the survey, respondents were invited to ask the surveyor any questions they wished. The respondent could then decide whether he/she wish to consent to participate in the survey, and were required to give oral consent explicitly. Written informed consent was deemed inappropriate because paper records of participation in the survey may have placed subjects at risk. Respondents could refuse to answer any questions and were free to withdraw from the interview at any time.

Anonymity. Respondents' answers were provided anonymously; no names, addresses, or other identifiers were gathered. The questionnaires were numbered at the end of each day of data collection rather than before or immediately after the interview to prevent potential identification of respondents ex post. Demographic information was gathered in a manner that was sufficiently imprecise (e.g., the use of age bins rather than specific ages) to preclude later deductive disclosure.

Data security. Filled paper questionnaires were sent from the field locations to the CDNH office in Yangon in sealed bags using professional courier companies or the office car. After data entry was completed, the questionnaires were kept at CDNH premises in a secured storage space. Original questionnaires were destroyed following digitization.

Research permissions. The paper's author who oversaw data collection did not have any academic institutional affiliation at the time the survey was conducted—the idea for this paper was conceived much later—and CDNH is not an academic institution; thus, no academic Institutional Review Board (IRB) had jurisdiction over the project. Additionally, between 2010 and 2016, the State of Myanmar did not a functioning national-level IRB. (In 2016, the new government sought to create one but because the Social Harmony Survey had started almost two years earlier, approval through the new institution was not required.)

Given the absence of an official IRB in Myanmar, CDNH requested permission to carry out the Social Harmony Survey from the Ministry Of Home Affairs (MOHA). MOHA asked for several amendments to the research plan (regarding travel in some conflict-afflicted areas), then granted its permission for the study. Following approval, MOHA informed the General Administration Department (GAD) in each sampled township. Upon starting work in each township, the survey team formally approached the township's GAD office, provided administrators once again with the ministry's approval letters, and gave a complete description of the project.

[1] United Nations, "Project Evaluation of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony funded by the Peacebuilding Fund," 2017, bit.ly/40UULES.

Compliance with APSA's "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research." The survey research is in full alignment with the APSA guidance for the ethical conduct of human subjects research. Subjects' autonomy and wellbeing was respected at all times (Principle 1). The research team carefully reflected on the ethical issues at stake and saw itself has having primary responsibility for addressing those (Principle 2). Surveyors made it very clear to subjects that the choice to participate was a free one and approached interviews cognizant of possible power differentials (Principle 4). Participants engaged in a full informed consent process and were free to exit the study at any moment and for any reason (Principle 5). No deception was employed (Principle 6). The research team judged that the survey would pose very little risk of harm to subjects—the questions asked related to topics of everyday discussion in Myanmar; the issues, while sensitive, were addressed in sufficiently general terms so as to make it unlikely that the survey would induce trauma among subjects; as described, lengths were taken to guard against breaches of subject confidentiality and no identifiers were collected (Principles 7, 8, and 9). The study focused solely on attitudinal measurement and did not make interventions into ongoing political processes—although it does enable us to understand those processes better, meaning that broader social benefits were expected from the research (Principle 10). As noted, the survey was carried out strictly in accordance with local laws and regulations, and with the consent of local authorities (Principle 11).[2]

[2]APSA's statement of principles is available at: bit.ly/3K1v2DB.

K Results for respondents identifying as Rakhine



Figure S7: This figure plots the mean prejudice scores across ethnic groups recorded in the survey.

Table S4: This table reports the estimated association between individual-level income and anti-Muslim prejudice among Buddhist ethnic Rakhine respondents using OLS regression. Income, measured on a four point scale, is treated as a continuous regressor. *Linear* specifications incorporate control variables in a linear, additive manner. Individual-level controls are: gender, age-bin, highest level of education, ethnicity, profession, and income source. Township-level covariates are: 1921 Hindu and Muslim population shares, 1983 population size and urbanness, elevation, distance to Yangon, terrain ruggedness, and a border-township dummy variable. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Individual covariates:	None	Linear	Linear
Township covariates:	None	None	Linear
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A—Outcome: All			
Income level (1-4)	-0.086**	-0.071*	-0.058
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.038)
N	373	373	367
R^2	0.04	0.12	0.18
Panel B—Outcome: Average			
Income level (1-4)	-0.055***	-0.029*	-0.021
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)
N	373	373	367
R^2	0.06	0.14	0.27
Panel C—Outcome: Bogardus			
Income level (1-4)	-0.063***	-0.038*	-0.031
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
N	373	373	367
R^2	0.04	0.11	0.18

L Full tabulated results for figures and tables

L.1 Full results for Figure 2

Table S5: Panel A: Democratization and political competition

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.759	0.715	0.507	0.851	0.829	0.714	0.846	0.817	0.656
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.061)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.051)
Margin of victory (0-1)	-0.105	-0.057	0.038	-0.074	-0.047	0.026	-0.075	-0.042	0.029
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Education: Middle		-0.139	-0.125		-0.078	-0.068		-0.096	-0.086
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.090	0.081		0.059	0.052		0.057	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.184	0.165		0.091	0.078		0.113	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.107	0.091		0.051	0.040		0.067	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.040	0.033		0.018	0.013		0.021	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.002	0.024	0.030	0.005	0.032	0.043	0.002	0.021	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

Table S6: Panel A: Democratization and political competition

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.723	0.692	0.507	0.824	0.810	0.714	0.819	0.799	0.656
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.061)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.051)
Military HQ (0/1)	0.023	0.022	0.004	0.020	0.020	0.006	0.021	0.020	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Education: Middle		-0.143	-0.125		-0.081	-0.068		-0.099	-0.086
		(0.020)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.093	0.081		0.062	0.052		0.060	0.050
		(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.188	0.165		0.095	0.078		0.117	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.111	0.091		0.055	0.040		0.071	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.041	0.033		0.019	0.013		0.022	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.000	0.024	0.030	0.001	0.031	0.043	0.001	0.020	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

Table S7: Panel A: Democratization and political competition

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.743	0.707	0.507	0.840	0.824	0.714	0.835	0.811	0.656
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.061)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.051)
Any protest (0/1)	-0.062	-0.041	0.006	-0.048	-0.036	-0.008	-0.045	-0.031	0.005
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Education: Middle		-0.138	-0.125		-0.077	-0.068		-0.095	-0.086
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.087	0.081		0.057	0.052		0.055	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.182	0.165		0.090	0.078		0.112	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.106	0.091		0.050	0.040		0.067	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.040	0.033		0.018	0.013		0.021	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.004	0.025	0.030	0.009	0.035	0.043	0.004	0.022	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

Table S8: Panel B: Ethnic threat

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.734	0.704	0.507	0.832	0.818	0.714	0.829	0.810	0.656
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.061)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.051)
Any religious violence (0/1)	-0.049	-0.046	-0.040	-0.028	-0.027	-0.021	-0.041	-0.040	-0.037
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Education: Middle		-0.143	-0.125		-0.081	-0.068		-0.099	-0.086
		(0.020)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.092	0.081		0.061	0.052		0.059	0.050
		(0.016)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.185	0.165		0.093	0.078		0.114	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.111	0.091		0.055	0.040		0.070	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.040	0.033		0.018	0.013		0.021	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20604	20601	20587	20604	20601	20587	20604	20601	20587
R2	0.002	0.025	0.030	0.002	0.032	0.043	0.002	0.022	0.028
Num.Clusters	161	161	160	161	161	160	161	161	160

Table S9: Panel B: Ethnic threat

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.757	0.718	0.507	0.857	0.838	0.714	0.844	0.818	0.656
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.051)
Monks per 100 (0-100)	-0.050	-0.034	0.015	-0.048	-0.039	-0.012	-0.035	-0.024	0.010
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Education: Middle		-0.141	-0.125		-0.078	-0.068		-0.097	-0.086
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.090	0.081		0.059	0.052		0.058	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.184	0.165		0.090	0.078		0.113	0.099
		(0.018)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.107	0.091		0.051	0.040		0.068	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.040	0.033		0.018	0.013		0.021	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20695	20692	20587	20695	20692	20587	20695	20692	20587
R2	0.002	0.024	0.030	0.006	0.034	0.043	0.002	0.020	0.028
Num.Clusters	161	161	160	161	161	160	161	161	160

Table S10: Panel B: Ethnic threat

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.736	0.704	0.507	0.834	0.819	0.714	0.828	0.807	0.656
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.061)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.051)
Muslim prop. (0-1)	-0.379	-0.275	0.175	-0.253	-0.197	0.168	-0.217	-0.149	0.217
	(0.244)	(0.188)	(0.171)	(0.180)	(0.138)	(0.101)	(0.179)	(0.140)	(0.129)
Education: Middle		-0.142	-0.125		-0.080	-0.068		-0.098	-0.086
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.092	0.081		0.061	0.052		0.059	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.011)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.186	0.165		0.094	0.078		0.116	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.111	0.091		0.054	0.040		0.070	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.041	0.033		0.019	0.013		0.022	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.001	0.024	0.030	0.002	0.031	0.043	0.001	0.020	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

Table S11: Panel C: Economic discontent

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.635	0.626	0.507	0.768	0.766	0.714	0.754	0.748	0.656
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.051)
Unemployment rate (0-1)	0.509	0.397	0.224	0.333	0.268	0.080	0.382	0.309	0.183
	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.146)	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.108)
Education: Middle		-0.139	-0.125		-0.078	-0.068		-0.096	-0.086
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.086	0.081		0.057	0.052		0.055	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.181	0.165		0.090	0.078		0.111	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.104	0.091		0.050	0.040		0.065	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.040	0.033		0.018	0.013		0.021	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.006)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.005	0.026	0.030	0.008	0.035	0.043	0.005	0.023	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

Table S12: Panel C: Economic discontent

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.608	0.615	0.507	0.745	0.753	0.714	0.740	0.745	0.656
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.051)
Nightlights gini (0-1)	0.158	0.112	0.046	0.111	0.085	0.020	0.110	0.080	0.025
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Education: Middle		-0.127	-0.125		-0.069	-0.068		-0.087	-0.086
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.085	0.081		0.056	0.052		0.054	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.176	0.165		0.086	0.078		0.108	0.099
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.100	0.091		0.047	0.040		0.063	0.055
		(0.017)	(0.016)		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.038	0.033		0.016	0.013		0.020	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Poverty index (0-1)			0.154			0.114			0.127
			(0.066)			(0.038)			(0.050)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Num.Obs.	20604	20601	20587	20604	20601	20587	20604	20601	20587
R2	0.008	0.027	0.030	0.015	0.038	0.043	0.007	0.023	0.028
Num.Clusters	161	161	160	161	161	160	161	161	160

Table S13: Panel C: Economic discontent

	(a) All	(a) All	(a) All	(b) Average	(b) Average	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.561	0.581	0.507	0.713	0.727	0.714	0.704	0.717	0.656
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.051)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.261	0.188	0.154	0.181	0.140	0.114	0.188	0.139	0.127
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.066)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.050)
Education: Middle		-0.129	-0.125		-0.070	-0.068		-0.088	-0.086
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.082	0.081		0.053	0.052		0.051	0.050
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.169	0.165		0.081	0.078		0.103	0.099
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.094	0.091		0.042	0.040		0.058	0.055
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Education: Other		0.035	0.033		0.015	0.013		0.018	0.016
		(0.010)	(0.009)		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.008			0.005
			(0.024)			(0.013)			(0.019)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.004			0.006			0.006
			(0.017)			(0.008)			(0.012)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.026			0.029
			(0.044)			(0.022)			(0.034)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.175			0.168			0.217
			(0.171)			(0.101)			(0.129)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.015			-0.012			0.010
			(0.022)			(0.014)			(0.019)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.040			-0.021			-0.037
			(0.030)			(0.018)			(0.025)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.224			0.080			0.183
			(0.146)			(0.073)			(0.108)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.046			0.020			0.025
			(0.045)			(0.023)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587	20709	20706	20587
R2	0.009	0.028	0.030	0.017	0.040	0.043	0.009	0.025	0.028
Num.Clusters	162	162	160	162	162	160	162	162	160

L.2 Full results for Figure 3

Table S14: i. Muslim prop. 1921

	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All
Intercept	0.636	0.610	0.485	0.536	0.580	0.491
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.103)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.074)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.158	0.156	0.178	0.293	0.180	0.267
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.112)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.115)
Education: Middle		-0.079	-0.070		-0.161	-0.159
		(0.027)	(0.028)		(0.023)	(0.024)
Education: High		0.043	0.049		0.108	0.107
		(0.025)	(0.025)		(0.017)	(0.018)
Education: Graduate		0.149	0.141		0.176	0.173
		(0.027)	(0.025)		(0.020)	(0.021)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.086	0.082		0.096	0.091
		(0.030)	(0.029)		(0.019)	(0.019)
Education: Other		0.031	0.028		0.037	0.034
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Any protest (0/1)			0.006			-0.010
			(0.046)			(0.028)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.012			0.004
			(0.024)			(0.022)
Margin of victory (0-1)			-0.012			0.070
			(0.069)			(0.060)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			-0.319			0.154
			(0.929)			(0.173)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.071			0.004
			(0.100)			(0.023)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.088			-0.007
			(0.057)			(0.029)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.137			0.291
			(0.202)			(0.210)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.090			-0.056
			(0.056)			(0.084)
Num.Obs.	8879	8876	8876	11725	11725	11711
R2	0.002	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.042	0.043
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	71	71	71	90	90	89

Table S15: i. Muslim prop. 1921

	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average
Intercept	0.729	0.714	0.689	0.704	0.736	0.737
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.067)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.046)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.163	0.162	0.179	0.188	0.125	0.122
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.061)
Education: Middle		-0.048	-0.042		-0.086	-0.084
		(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Education: High		0.022	0.023		0.077	0.076
		(0.016)	(0.014)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Education: Graduate		0.082	0.075		0.079	0.078
		(0.013)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.043	0.039		0.043	0.041
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.010)	(0.009)
Education: Other		0.020	0.018		0.011	0.010
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Any protest (0/1)			-0.011			-0.014
			(0.020)			(0.017)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.010			0.005
			(0.014)			(0.011)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.011			0.019
			(0.039)			(0.032)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			-0.027			0.113
			(0.577)			(0.094)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.001			-0.017
			(0.046)			(0.015)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.065			0.003
			(0.032)			(0.015)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			-0.011			0.093
			(0.102)			(0.111)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.029			-0.012
			(0.030)			(0.045)
Num.Obs.	8879	8876	8876	11725	11725	11711
R2	0.007	0.019	0.031	0.024	0.059	0.060
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	71	71	71	90	90	89

Table S16: i. Muslim prop. 1921

	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus
Intercept	0.761	0.742	0.626	0.684	0.717	0.648
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.090)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.057)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.108	0.107	0.161	0.214	0.138	0.211
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.086)
Education: Middle		-0.053	-0.046		-0.111	-0.109
		(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.019)	(0.018)
Education: High		0.018	0.023		0.075	0.074
		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.013)	(0.014)
Education: Graduate		0.095	0.088		0.104	0.102
		(0.020)	(0.019)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.057	0.053		0.057	0.053
		(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Other		0.019	0.017		0.016	0.014
		(0.012)	(0.011)		(0.009)	(0.008)
Any protest (0/1)			0.002			-0.012
			(0.030)			(0.022)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.012			0.008
			(0.019)			(0.016)
Margin of victory (0-1)			-0.005			0.060
			(0.051)			(0.044)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.168			0.175
			(0.748)			(0.116)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.064			-0.003
			(0.071)			(0.018)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.084			-0.001
			(0.044)			(0.023)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.115			0.212
			(0.164)			(0.148)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.053			-0.045
			(0.035)			(0.063)
Num.Obs.	8879	8876	8876	11725	11725	11711
R2	0.002	0.009	0.020	0.015	0.039	0.041
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	71	71	71	90	90	89

Table S17: ii. Muslim prop. 2019

	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All
Intercept	0.496	0.513	0.408	0.591	0.620	0.601
	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.083)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.084)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.363	0.303	0.310	0.204	0.109	0.030
	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.085)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.090)
Education: Middle		-0.094	-0.092		-0.151	-0.146
		(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.024)	(0.024)
Education: High		0.045	0.054		0.110	0.104
		(0.023)	(0.024)		(0.019)	(0.020)
Education: Graduate		0.140	0.137		0.188	0.181
		(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.062	0.061		0.114	0.108
		(0.027)	(0.028)		(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: Other		0.026	0.026		0.041	0.037
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Any protest (0/1)			0.027			0.006
			(0.049)			(0.027)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.032			-0.003
			(0.022)			(0.026)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.030			-0.029
			(0.060)			(0.060)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			-9.480			0.188
			(6.607)			(0.200)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.034			0.025
			(0.060)			(0.024)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.085			-0.030
			(0.058)			(0.029)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.218			0.006
			(0.204)			(0.229)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.065			0.074
			(0.046)			(0.060)
Num.Obs.	8528	8527	8527	12181	12179	12060
R2	0.013	0.024	0.033	0.006	0.031	0.032
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	81	81	81	81	81	79

Table S18: ii. Muslim prop. 2019

	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average
Intercept	0.681	0.695	0.684	0.726	0.745	0.752
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.050)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.230	0.201	0.218	0.156	0.101	0.046
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.050)
Education: Middle		-0.037	-0.036		-0.093	-0.088
		(0.014)	(0.015)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: High		0.033	0.035		0.067	0.064
		(0.014)	(0.012)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Education: Graduate		0.063	0.057		0.090	0.087
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.017	0.016		0.056	0.053
		(0.010)	(0.011)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Other		0.005	0.005		0.020	0.018
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.008)
Any protest (0/1)			-0.013			-0.007
			(0.021)			(0.015)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.020			0.002
			(0.013)			(0.013)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.038			0.000
			(0.033)			(0.031)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			-4.988			0.135
			(3.330)			(0.103)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			-0.011			-0.008
			(0.025)			(0.015)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.060			-0.006
			(0.036)			(0.014)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.015			-0.018
			(0.095)			(0.117)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.005			0.047
			(0.029)			(0.031)
Num.Obs.	8528	8527	8527	12181	12179	12060
R2	0.019	0.032	0.045	0.013	0.046	0.047
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	81	81	81	81	81	79

Table S19: ii. Muslim prop. 2019

	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus
Intercept	0.666	0.677	0.587	0.719	0.739	0.727
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.067)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.072)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.244	0.210	0.235	0.161	0.095	0.058
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.069)
Education: Middle		-0.052	-0.050		-0.111	-0.108
		(0.020)	(0.021)		(0.019)	(0.018)
Education: High		0.022	0.028		0.073	0.069
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.016)	(0.017)
Education: Graduate		0.077	0.073		0.118	0.113
		(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.027	0.026		0.076	0.071
		(0.018)	(0.019)		(0.015)	(0.014)
Education: Other		0.006	0.006		0.025	0.021
		(0.010)	(0.011)		(0.010)	(0.010)
Any protest (0/1)			0.010			0.004
			(0.037)			(0.021)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.028			0.000
			(0.016)			(0.020)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.045			-0.023
			(0.045)			(0.052)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			-5.584			0.207
			(4.898)			(0.143)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.025			0.012
			(0.044)			(0.021)
Any religious violence (0/1)			-0.079			-0.020
			(0.048)			(0.023)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.188			-0.030
			(0.153)			(0.175)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			0.032			0.043
			(0.031)			(0.041)
Num.Obs.	8528	8527	8527	12181	12179	12060
R2	0.011	0.019	0.033	0.007	0.030	0.031
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	81	81	81	81	81	79

Table S20: iii. Internal migrant prop. 2014

	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All	Panel A: All
Intercept	0.479	0.503	0.446	0.554	0.572	0.499
	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.073)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.352	0.306	0.392	0.294	0.203	0.103
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.133)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.092)
Education: Middle		-0.082	-0.082		-0.149	-0.142
		(0.032)	(0.033)		(0.022)	(0.023)
Education: High		0.108	0.105		0.062	0.070
		(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.019)	(0.022)
Education: Graduate		0.159	0.158		0.170	0.167
		(0.025)	(0.024)		(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.061	0.059		0.109	0.106
		(0.025)	(0.025)		(0.022)	(0.021)
Education: Other		0.017	0.015		0.044	0.040
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.014)	(0.013)
Any protest (0/1)			-0.014			0.021
			(0.027)			(0.034)
Military HQ (0/1)			-0.014			0.008
			(0.025)			(0.021)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.047			0.021
			(0.052)			(0.050)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.141			0.159
			(0.257)			(0.214)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.021			0.039
			(0.017)			(0.050)
Any religious violence (0/1)			0.028			-0.091
			(0.024)			(0.040)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.064			0.223
			(0.197)			(0.193)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			-0.055			0.090
			(0.042)			(0.053)
Num.Obs.	8447	8447	8447	12262	12259	12140
R2	0.005	0.024	0.025	0.015	0.033	0.040
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	70	70	70	92	92	90

Table S21: iii. Internal migrant prop. 2014

	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average	Panel B: Average
Intercept	0.599	0.617	0.630	0.713	0.727	0.704
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.045)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.322	0.292	0.276	0.197	0.148	0.109
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.050)
Education: Middle		-0.059	-0.059		-0.073	-0.069
		(0.016)	(0.017)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: High		0.070	0.069		0.041	0.044
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.075	0.075		0.084	0.080
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.035	0.035		0.045	0.042
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.010)
Education: Other		0.007	0.007		0.019	0.016
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.008)
Any protest (0/1)			-0.019			0.005
			(0.017)			(0.017)
Military HQ (0/1)			0.002			0.006
			(0.013)			(0.011)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.031			0.022
			(0.030)			(0.024)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.180			0.139
			(0.174)			(0.118)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			-0.002			0.004
			(0.011)			(0.030)
Any religious violence (0/1)			0.014			-0.049
			(0.013)			(0.027)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.004			0.053
			(0.097)			(0.102)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			-0.014			0.040
			(0.027)			(0.029)
Num.Obs.	8447	8447	8447	12262	12259	12140
R2	0.015	0.040	0.041	0.025	0.046	0.052
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	70	70	70	92	92	90

Table S22: iii. Internal migrant prop. 2014

	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus	Panel C: Bogardus
Intercept	0.630	0.649	0.612	0.701	0.711	0.643
	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.060)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.275	0.241	0.303	0.207	0.150	0.085
	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.068)
Education: Middle		-0.060	-0.059		-0.099	-0.095
		(0.024)	(0.025)		(0.016)	(0.017)
Education: High		0.074	0.071		0.035	0.042
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.016)	(0.017)
Education: Graduate		0.095	0.094		0.104	0.101
		(0.018)	(0.019)		(0.015)	(0.016)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.034	0.032		0.069	0.066
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.015)	(0.014)
Education: Other		0.005	0.003		0.025	0.021
		(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.010)	(0.009)
Any protest (0/1)			-0.016			0.019
			(0.023)			(0.024)
Military HQ (0/1)			-0.001			0.005
			(0.020)			(0.016)
Margin of victory (0-1)			0.035			0.018
			(0.042)			(0.037)
Muslim prop. (0-1)			0.274			0.195
			(0.235)			(0.160)
Monks per 100 (0-100)			0.013			0.032
			(0.013)			(0.040)
Any religious violence (0/1)			0.018			-0.077
			(0.017)			(0.034)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			-0.030			0.234
			(0.140)			(0.145)
Nightlights gini (0-1)			-0.030			0.055
			(0.030)			(0.036)
Num.Obs.	8447	8447	8447	12262	12259	12140
R2	0.005	0.023	0.024	0.014	0.028	0.038
Subgroup	Below median	Below median	Below median	Above median	Above median	Above median
Num.Clusters	70	70	70	92	92	90

L.3 Full results for Table 1

Table S23: Panel A—Outcome: All

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.886	0.801	0.869			
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.039)			
Income level (1-4)	-0.087	-0.060	-0.058	-0.053	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Female		0.060	0.062	0.062		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)		
Age Group: 28-37		0.020	0.018	0.013		
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)		
Age Group: 38-47		-0.016	-0.016	-0.008		
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Age Group: 48-57		-0.001	-0.003	0.000		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Age Group: 58-67		-0.004	-0.003	-0.002		
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)		
Age Group: 68+		-0.009	-0.009	-0.006		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)		
Education: Middle		-0.105	-0.098	-0.078		
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)		
Education: High		0.043	0.042	0.057		
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)		
Education: Graduate		0.135	0.129	0.124		
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)		
Education: Post-Graduate		0.074	0.067	0.059		
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)		
Education: Other		0.029	0.027	0.020		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)		
Ethnicity: Chin		0.034	0.046	0.008		
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.060)		
Ethnicity: Mon		0.047	0.064	0.105		
		(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)		
Ethnicity: Kachin		-0.071	-0.078	-0.112		
		(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.090)		
Ethnicity: Kayah		0.029	0.013	-0.004		
		(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.021)		
Ethnicity: Kayin		0.000	0.014	0.021		
		(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.016)		
Ethnicity: Rakhine		0.109	0.131	0.062		
		(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)		
Ethnicity: Shan		0.015	-0.006	-0.002		
		(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.015)		
Ethnicity: Mixed		0.010	0.000	0.002		
		(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.050)		
Ethnicity: Non-TYT		-0.145	-0.137	-0.137		
		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)		
Profession: Day laborer		0.003	0.003	0.000		
		(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)		
Profession: Farmer		-0.031	-0.031	-0.022		
		(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)		
Profession: Salaried employee		-0.034	-0.034	-0.023		
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)		
Profession: Shopkeeper		0.009	0.007	0.002		
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)		
Profession: Trader		-0.018	-0.021	-0.034		
		(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)		
Income from: Day labor		-0.014	-0.017	-0.012		
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)		
Income from: Retired		0.003	0.004	0.001		
		(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)		
Income from: Service provider		-0.016	-0.014	-0.007		
		(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)		
Income from: Shop owner		-0.021	-0.017	-0.018		
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)		
Income from: Staff		0.013	0.018	0.014		
		(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)		
Income from: Trader		-0.035	-0.032	-0.023		
		(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)		
Hindu pct. 1921			0.092			
			(0.122)			
Muslim pct. 1921			-0.374			
			(0.275)			
Urban pct. 1983			-0.055			
			(0.033)			
Total pop. 1983			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Border township			0.056			
			(0.024)			
Elevation			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Distance to Yangoon			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Ruggedness			-0.006			
			(0.002)			
Num.Obs.	20695	20620	20515	20620	20695	20695
R2	0.028	0.051	0.055	0.088	0.247	0.757
Township covariates:	None	None	Linear	FE	None	Saturated
Individual covariates:	None	Linear	Linear	Linear	Saturated	Saturated
Num.Clusters	162	162	161	162	162	162

Table S24: Panel B—Outcome: Average

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.920	0.860	0.915			
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.022)			
Income level (1-4)	-0.050	-0.032	-0.030	-0.027	-0.030	-0.032
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female		0.046	0.047	0.046		
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)		
Age Group: 28-37		0.012	0.010	0.008		
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)		
Age Group: 38-47		-0.013	-0.012	-0.007		
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Age Group: 48-57		-0.003	-0.004	-0.003		
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)		
Age Group: 58-67		-0.001	-0.001	0.000		
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Age Group: 68+		-0.003	-0.003	-0.001		
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Education: Middle		-0.057	-0.052	-0.040		
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)		
Education: High		0.027	0.025	0.033		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Education: Graduate		0.064	0.058	0.055		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)		
Education: Post-Graduate		0.033	0.028	0.023		
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)		
Education: Other		0.012	0.010	0.006		
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)		
Ethnicity: Chin		0.027	0.024	0.001		
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.037)		
Ethnicity: Mon		0.026	0.034	0.068		
		(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.014)		
Ethnicity: Kachin		-0.033	-0.039	-0.065		
		(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.054)		
Ethnicity: Kayah		0.005	-0.012	-0.028		
		(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)		
Ethnicity: Kayin		0.006	0.007	0.014		
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)		
Ethnicity: Rakhine		0.067	0.079	0.038		
		(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.022)		
Ethnicity: Shan		0.005	-0.007	-0.005		
		(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)		
Ethnicity: Mixed		0.009	0.007	0.008		
		(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)		
Ethnicity: Non-TYT		-0.102	-0.095	-0.094		
		(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)		
Profession: Day laborer		0.006	0.005	0.003		
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)		
Profession: Farmer		0.001	-0.001	0.002		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)		
Profession: Salaried employee		-0.014	-0.014	-0.009		
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)		
Profession: Shopkeeper		0.009	0.008	0.007		
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)		
Profession: Trader		0.007	0.004	-0.002		
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Income from: Day labor		-0.004	-0.004	-0.005		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)		
Income from: Retired		-0.030	-0.027	-0.034		
		(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Income from: Service provider		-0.012	-0.008	-0.007		
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)		
Income from: Shop owner		-0.015	-0.012	-0.016		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Income from: Staff		0.003	0.007	0.002		
		(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)		
Income from: Trader		-0.028	-0.024	-0.022		
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)		
Hindu pct. 1921			0.019			
			(0.072)			
Muslim pct. 1921			-0.190			
			(0.164)			
Urban pct. 1983			-0.046			
			(0.019)			
Total pop. 1983			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Border township			0.014			
			(0.015)			
Elevation			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Distance to Yangoon			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Ruggedness			-0.002			
			(0.001)			
Num.Obs.	20695	20620	20515	20620	20695	20695
R2	0.035	0.071	0.077	0.117	0.268	0.776
Township covariates:	None	None	Linear	FE	None	Saturated
Individual covariates:	None	Linear	Linear	Linear	Saturated	Saturated
Num.Clusters	162	162	161	162	162	162

Table S25: Panel C—Outcome: Bogardus

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.938	0.881	0.933			
	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.029)			
Income level (1-4)	-0.063	-0.045	-0.044	-0.039	-0.041	-0.042
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Female		0.049	0.050	0.049		
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)		
Age Group: 28-37		0.020	0.019	0.012		
		(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)		
Age Group: 38-47		-0.009	-0.009	-0.002		
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)		
Age Group: 48-57		0.002	0.001	0.002		
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)		
Age Group: 58-67		0.004	0.005	0.006		
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Age Group: 68+		-0.008	-0.007	-0.005		
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)		
Education: Middle		-0.070	-0.065	-0.049		
		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)		
Education: High		0.020	0.019	0.033		
		(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)		
Education: Graduate		0.077	0.072	0.069		
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)		
Education: Post-Graduate		0.042	0.037	0.031		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Education: Other		0.013	0.011	0.006		
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		
Ethnicity: Chin		0.042	0.051	0.016		
		(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.042)		
Ethnicity: Mon		0.031	0.042	0.073		
		(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)		
Ethnicity: Kachin		-0.066	-0.068	-0.103		
		(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.074)		
Ethnicity: Kayah		0.028	0.015	0.005		
		(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)		
Ethnicity: Kayin		0.005	0.012	0.019		
		(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.011)		
Ethnicity: Rakhine		0.071	0.087	0.032		
		(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.021)		
Ethnicity: Shan		0.012	-0.001	0.003		
		(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)		
Ethnicity: Mixed		0.012	0.006	0.005		
		(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.039)		
Ethnicity: Non-TYT		-0.093	-0.088	-0.087		
		(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)		
Profession: Day laborer		-0.004	-0.004	-0.008		
		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Profession: Farmer		-0.022	-0.022	-0.017		
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)		
Profession: Salaried employee		-0.026	-0.026	-0.018		
		(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)		
Profession: Shopkeeper		0.007	0.005	0.002		
		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Profession: Trader		0.004	0.002	-0.009		
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)		
Income from: Day labor		-0.007	-0.008	-0.008		
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)		
Income from: Retired		-0.019	-0.018	-0.021		
		(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)		
Income from: Service provider		-0.011	-0.010	-0.006		
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)		
Income from: Shop owner		-0.021	-0.018	-0.021		
		(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)		
Income from: Staff		0.007	0.010	0.006		
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)		
Income from: Trader		-0.029	-0.027	-0.021		
		(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)		
Hindu pct. 1921			0.039			
			(0.091)			
Muslim pct. 1921			-0.238			
			(0.204)			
Urban pct. 1983			-0.037			
			(0.025)			
Total pop. 1983			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Border township			0.035			
			(0.019)			
Elevation			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Distance to Yangoon			0.000			
			(0.000)			
Ruggedness			-0.004			
			(0.001)			
Num.Obs.	20695	20620	20515	20620	20695	20695
R2	0.028	0.049	0.052	0.091	0.247	0.755
Township covariates:	None	None	Linear	FE	None	Saturated
Individual covariates:	None	Linear	Linear	Linear	Saturated	Saturated
Num.Clusters	162	162	161	162	162	162

L.4 Full results for Figure 5

Table S26: Buddhist respondents' prejudice toward: 1. Buddhists

	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.073	0.218	0.120	0.049	0.174	0.084	0.063	0.202	0.109
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Poverty index (0-1)	-0.017	-0.001	-0.023						
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.029)						
Education: Middle	-0.001	-0.008	0.001	0.001	-0.005	0.004	0.000	-0.006	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Education: High	0.027	0.038	0.037	0.025	0.034	0.034	0.026	0.037	0.036
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate	0.002	0.010	0.014	-0.001	0.005	0.010	0.000	0.008	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate	-0.018	-0.010	-0.015	-0.021	-0.014	-0.020	-0.019	-0.013	-0.017
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Education: Other	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)				0.071	0.247	0.124			
				(0.083)	(0.109)	(0.102)			
Nightlights gini (0-1)							-0.001	0.023	-0.004
							(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Num.Obs.	21124	21124	21124	21124	21124	21124	21019	21019	21019
R2	0.004	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.012	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.005
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162	161	161	161

Table S27: Buddhist respondents' prejudice toward: 2. Muslims

	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.581	0.727	0.717	0.626	0.766	0.748	0.615	0.753	0.745
	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.188	0.140	0.139						
	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.029)						
Education: Middle	-0.129	-0.070	-0.088	-0.139	-0.078	-0.096	-0.127	-0.069	-0.087
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Education: High	0.082	0.053	0.051	0.086	0.057	0.055	0.085	0.056	0.054
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Education: Graduate	0.169	0.081	0.103	0.181	0.090	0.111	0.176	0.086	0.108
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate	0.094	0.042	0.058	0.104	0.050	0.065	0.100	0.047	0.063
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Education: Other	0.035	0.015	0.018	0.040	0.018	0.021	0.038	0.016	0.020
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)				0.397	0.268	0.309			
				(0.117)	(0.070)	(0.088)			
Nightlights gini (0-1)							0.112	0.085	0.080
							(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	20706	20706	20706	20706	20706	20706	20601	20601	20601
R2	0.028	0.040	0.025	0.026	0.035	0.023	0.027	0.038	0.023
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162	161	161	161

Table S28: Buddhist respondents' prejudice toward: 3. Hindus

	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.463	0.624	0.614	0.551	0.687	0.679	0.511	0.661	0.651
	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.197	0.155	0.156						
	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.038)						
Education: Middle	-0.153	-0.081	-0.121	-0.167	-0.092	-0.132	-0.153	-0.081	-0.120
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Education: High	0.177	0.108	0.123	0.186	0.114	0.129	0.182	0.112	0.127
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Education: Graduate	0.185	0.087	0.128	0.201	0.099	0.140	0.193	0.093	0.134
	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Education: Post-Graduate	0.076	0.039	0.057	0.091	0.050	0.069	0.085	0.046	0.064
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Education: Other	0.020	0.011	0.018	0.026	0.015	0.022	0.023	0.012	0.020
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)				0.186	0.180	0.172			
				(0.117)	(0.070)	(0.090)			
Nightlights gini (0-1)							0.101	0.081	0.081
							(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Num.Obs.	20701	20701	20701	20701	20701	20701	20596	20596	20596
R2	0.047	0.065	0.043	0.044	0.056	0.040	0.045	0.060	0.041
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162	161	161	161

Table S29: Buddhist respondents' prejudice toward: 4. Christians

	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.391	0.558	0.526	0.439	0.613	0.576	0.434	0.596	0.573
	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.111	0.121	0.119						
	(0.072)	(0.048)	(0.067)						
Education: Middle	-0.158	-0.093	-0.136	-0.165	-0.102	-0.144	-0.164	-0.098	-0.143
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Education: High	0.147	0.093	0.104	0.151	0.099	0.109	0.152	0.098	0.110
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Education: Graduate	0.156	0.081	0.117	0.165	0.092	0.126	0.162	0.087	0.123
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Education: Post-Graduate	0.045	0.033	0.043	0.053	0.043	0.052	0.052	0.039	0.050
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Education: Other	0.002	0.010	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.013	0.004	0.012	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Unemployment rate (0-1)				0.114	0.113	0.133			
				(0.165)	(0.100)	(0.155)			
Nightlights gini (0-1)							0.037	0.053	0.039
							(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Num.Obs.	20809	20809	20809	20809	20809	20809	20704	20704	20704
R2	0.038	0.053	0.035	0.037	0.048	0.033	0.038	0.051	0.034
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162	161	161	161

Table S30: Buddhist respondents' prejudice toward: 5. Indians

	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus	(a) All	(b) Average	(c) Bogardus
Intercept	0.476	0.658	0.628	0.557	0.714	0.690	0.521	0.689	0.665
	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.218	0.151	0.174						
	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.032)						
Education: Middle	-0.126	-0.072	-0.095	-0.141	-0.081	-0.106	-0.125	-0.070	-0.094
	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Education: High	0.119	0.077	0.085	0.127	0.082	0.091	0.124	0.080	0.089
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Education: Graduate	0.166	0.075	0.110	0.182	0.086	0.122	0.174	0.081	0.116
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Education: Post-Graduate	0.087	0.041	0.054	0.101	0.051	0.065	0.095	0.046	0.060
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Education: Other	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.025	0.012	0.014	0.022	0.009	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Unemployment rate (0-1)				0.295	0.204	0.253			
				(0.112)	(0.067)	(0.090)			
Nightlights gini (0-1)							0.123	0.085	0.097
							(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.022)
Num.Obs.	20684	20684	20684	20684	20684	20684	20579	20579	20579
R2	0.032	0.048	0.031	0.028	0.040	0.027	0.030	0.044	0.029
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162	161	161	161

L.5 Full results for Figure S3

Table S31: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 1. Spouse

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.874	0.874	0.884	0.882	0.953	0.949
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.065	0.059				
	(0.018)	(0.018)				
Education: Middle		-0.014		-0.017		-0.008
		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Education: High		0.009		0.010		0.001
		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.010)
Education: Graduate		0.016		0.019		0.007
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.016		0.019		0.012
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Other		0.010		0.011		0.009
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.172	0.162		
			(0.059)	(0.059)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.021	-0.020
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	19114	19112	19114	19112	19100	19098
R2	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.006
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S32: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 2. In-law

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.878	0.874	0.898	0.891	0.956	0.948
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.064	0.057				
	(0.021)	(0.019)				
Education: Middle		-0.026		-0.030		-0.021
		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Education: High		-0.004		-0.003		-0.013
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Graduate		0.017		0.021		0.008
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.020		0.024		0.017
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.010)
Education: Other		0.010		0.012		0.009
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.117	0.106		
			(0.059)	(0.059)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.020	-0.020
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	19018	19016	19018	19016	19004	19002
R2	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.006	0.007
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S33: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 3. Neighbor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.641	0.667	0.697	0.700	0.901	0.859
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.225	0.167				
	(0.031)	(0.029)				
Education: Middle		-0.101		-0.110		-0.089
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Education: High		0.079		0.083		0.061
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Education: Graduate		0.096		0.105		0.079
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.047		0.056		0.041
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.010)
Education: Other		0.012		0.017		0.011
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.483	0.391		
			(0.104)	(0.090)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.064	-0.047
					(0.005)	(0.004)
Num.Obs.	18952	18949	18952	18949	18941	18938
R2	0.015	0.040	0.009	0.038	0.031	0.047
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S34: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 4. Superior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.666	0.689	0.751	0.750	0.944	0.898
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.250	0.191				
	(0.032)	(0.029)				
Education: Middle		-0.096		-0.108		-0.086
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.012)
Education: High		0.074		0.080		0.057
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.115		0.129		0.100
		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.059		0.071		0.053
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Other		0.021		0.026		0.020
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.412	0.315		
			(0.105)	(0.089)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.065	-0.048
					(0.005)	(0.004)
Num.Obs.	18448	18445	18448	18445	18435	18432
R2	0.020	0.048	0.008	0.041	0.036	0.054
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S35: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 5. Colleague

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.578	0.613	0.664	0.670	0.893	0.839
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.276	0.201				
	(0.037)	(0.035)				
Education: Middle		-0.117		-0.129		-0.106
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Education: High		0.104		0.110		0.084
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Education: Graduate		0.133		0.147		0.116
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.061		0.073		0.055
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.011)
Education: Other		0.016		0.021		0.015
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.498	0.376		
			(0.109)	(0.092)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.076	-0.054
					(0.006)	(0.005)
Num.Obs.	18658	18656	18658	18656	18644	18642
R2	0.022	0.062	0.010	0.056	0.043	0.070
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S36: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 6. Employee

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.592	0.625	0.676	0.682	0.913	0.863
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.283	0.212				
	(0.035)	(0.031)				
Education: Middle		-0.107		-0.119		-0.095
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Education: High		0.103		0.109		0.083
		(0.015)		(0.014)		(0.015)
Education: Graduate		0.135		0.149		0.116
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.012)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.056		0.068		0.049
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.012)
Education: Other		0.020		0.026		0.019
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.528	0.414		
			(0.115)	(0.096)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.077	-0.056
					(0.005)	(0.005)
Num.Obs.	18643	18641	18643	18641	18630	18628
R2	0.022	0.060	0.011	0.054	0.044	0.068
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table S37: Anti-Muslim prejudice toward: 7. Citizen

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.765	0.774	0.803	0.801	0.899	0.883
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Poverty index (0-1)	0.111	0.088				
	(0.027)	(0.026)				
Education: Middle		-0.023		-0.029		-0.016
		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Education: High		0.031		0.034		0.019
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.012)
Education: Graduate		0.069		0.075		0.057
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.011)
Education: Post-Graduate		0.032		0.038		0.027
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Education: Other		0.016		0.018		0.015
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)
Unemployment rate (0-1)			0.183	0.146		
			(0.090)	(0.086)		
Income level (1-4)					-0.034	-0.029
					(0.005)	(0.005)
Num.Obs.	16189	16187	16189	16187	16178	16176
R2	0.004	0.010	0.002	0.008	0.011	0.014
Num.Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162