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The People's Drink: Beer, Bavaria, and the Remaking of Germany, 1933-1987

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Robert Shea Terrell

Committee in charge:

Professor Frank Biess, Chair
Professor Martha Lampland
Professor Patrick Patterson
Professor Jeremy Prestholdt
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Professor Paul Steege

2018

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University of California San Diego

2018

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*

Selections from chapter 5 will appear as: Robert Terrell, "'Lurvenbrow': Bavarian Beer Culture and Barstool Diplomacy, 1945-1964," in *Alcohol Flows Across Cultures: Drinking Cultures in Transnational and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Waltraud Ernst, forthcoming with Routledge in October 2018. Robert Terrell is the sole author of this forthcoming article.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The People's Drink: Beer, Bavaria, and the Remaking of Germany, 1933-1987

by

Robert Shea Terrell

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2018

Professor Frank Biess, Chair

Few commodities enjoy the global prestige of German, and especially Bavarian beer. Enshrined in the mythology of the 1516 Beer Purity Law, beer is remarkable even among other iconic German commodities like high performance automobiles for its apparent timelessness, its simultaneous simplicity and sophistication, and its ability to draw the attention of tourists, aspiring craftsmen, and businessmen the world over. People in German-speaking Europe have been drinking beer of one variety or another for

hundreds, and indeed thousands of years. From the 1930s to the 1980s, however, beer became far more than a consumption habit. “The People’s Drink” investigates many efforts—within and beyond Germany—to define both *the people* and what qualifies as *their drink*. The dissertation demonstrates how, in the tumultuous mid-twentieth century, beer became a cultural, political, and economic site of contesting, defining, legislating, embodying, performing, and representing the German nation.

Drawing on archival sources from ten archives in three countries, as well as trade journals, magazines, advertisements, and newspapers from around the world, what follows is a commodity history that weaves together National Socialism, the allied occupation, the West German Federal Republic, the Cold War, international trade, European integration, and the history of capitalism before and after “the boom.” While each chapter builds on specific scholarly literatures, the dissertation as a whole employs commodity history to speak to two main bodies of scholarship in modern German and European history. First, the history of the people’s drink spans a number of conventional periodizations, revealing not a “fragmented” or “shattered past,” but one characterized by remarkable adaptability and malleability in spite of—and often because of—the dramatic social and political shifts of German history. Second, following beer from the local to the regional, national, European, and global levels, this dissertation features a sliding geographical scale in a single story. The aspirations and limits of the Nazi dictatorship, the politics of scarcity and agriculture, the process of European integration, and even the global stereotype of the beer drinking German are part of the same transnational story of contesting and defining Germany and Germanness in the mid-twentieth century.

Introduction




Image 0.1: Which image of Germany should we use today? Source: *EG-Magazin: Politik-Wirtschaft-Kultur* no. 7/8 (July, 1987), 7.

In 1987 this image appeared in the West German *EG-Magazin*, a publication dedicated to keeping readers up to date with the goings-on of the European Community. In it, two journalists question what image of Germany they want to present that day: taken clockwise, the German Michael, the 19th century Prussian imperialist, the modern financier, the Nazi, or the beer wielding Bavarian. Each of these images is of course a stereotype with which no single German would fully identify. The real Germans in the image, the journalists, are apparently not a representative option and interestingly do not

seem thrilled about their choices. The German Michael, for unfamiliar readers, dates to the Renaissance and represents the decent but gullible German.¹ Portrayed here with uncharacteristic angel wings, he is perhaps no longer a credible option in the world wrought by a Germany that twice plunged the world into war and catastrophic violence. The other options are more readily legible: the military might of the imperialist, the formalized practices of finance, and the space-claiming salute of the Nazi militarist. But what of the beer-toting Bavarian? What does he represent, to whom, where, and why? Why would West Germans choose to present themselves this way? Does the Bavarian and his beer represent any sort of power or expansion as the other options—save for the angelic Michael—seem to do? Finally, how, in the first place, did a beer-wielding Bavarian ever come to stand alongside these other, perhaps more obvious figures as a representative option for the West German nation?

Before digging into the content of the Bavarian and his beer, the context of this image alone reveals a great deal about their significance. It appeared in a Germany that had recovered from complete destruction, survived the height of Cold War tensions, weathered shifts in global capitalism, and emerged as an institutionally stable, and politically and culturally pluralistic social welfare democracy over the course of thirty-eight years; notably longer, that is, than the previous two German regimes combined. And although the two Germanys were reunified just three short years after this image appeared, it proves conceptually misleading to assume that end. In 1987, the Federal

¹ He was most prominent in the mid and late 19th century as national movements and ultimately the Kaiser Reich critiqued the peculiarities and oddities of the Holy Roman Empire and all its residual “Michelei” or wimpiness. Still today, older Germans may say “sei kein Michel,” which effectively means “don’t be such a clown.” See, W. A. Coupe, “The German Cartoon and the Revolution of 1848” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9, no. 2 (Jan. 1967), 156; Michael Ermarth, “Hyphenation and Hyper-Americanization: Germans of the Wilhelmine Reich View German-Americans, 1890-1914,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 21, no. 2 (Winter 2002), 38.

Republic was an established and sovereign nation that had, over the course of close to four decades, sought to define itself in innumerable ways. Most famous among these perhaps are the ways in which it made sense of its own past. Indeed, by 1987 some of West Germany's most prominent intellectuals were embroiled in the "*Historikerstreit*" or "Historians Quarrel" which began when leftist philosopher Jürgen Habermas criticized conservative historians that sought to unburden German politics from the legacy of Nazism.² Beyond referencing their past—an identity inquiry rooted in a temporal comparison—West Germans also sought to define themselves spatially to their eastern counterpart, to their geopolitical platform, to their Western European neighbors, and to the United States.³ In *this* context of comparison and self-definition then, we should ask once again how a beer-wielding Bavarian became a representative option for the West German nation. How did West Germans make sense of themselves with respect to something as ostensibly insignificant as beer and as arguably unappealing as Bavaria? The southeastern region was the cradle of National Socialism, the most historically underdeveloped part of the country, and was, and remains, the most conventionally conservative German state.

To answer these sorts of questions, "The People's Drink: Beer, Bavaria, and the Remaking of Germany, 1933-1987" looks not only to the Federal Republic, but locates the origin of the story in the Third Reich. From the 1930s to the 1980s, a particularly Bavarian conception of beer became politically, socially, and symbolically important in

² Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 9-33; Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 188-94.

³ Sonja Levsen and Cornelius Torp, eds., *Wo liegt die Bundesrepublik: Vergleichende Perspektiven auf die westdeutsche Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 9-13.

the course of major contests over the fate of Germany. Dictatorship, world war, defeat and occupation, economic boom and bust, political and social stabilization, European integration, late modern globalization, and the Cold War all exerted crucial transformative pressures on how beer became symbolically and materially valuable. In spite of these many transitions, beer and beer consumption, which had long been part of everyday life, developed multiple important meanings both within and beyond Germany. The people's drink, or *Volksgetränk*, has been a longstanding moniker for beer in Germany and especially in Bavaria.⁴ In the present work it provides a useful concept: This is a story about constructions of, and conflicts over the meaning of *the people* and what qualifies as *their drink*. Whether the topic is Nazi teetotalism, the global proliferation of Oktoberfest celebrations, or complex legal battles to define the very name of the commodity itself, beer and beer consumption operated as a site of contesting, creating, imagining, protecting, and performing the German nation both from within and from without. The ways that beer was regulated, restricted, sold, celebrated, and consumed from the 1930s to the 1980s shaped the political and cultural meanings of the drink and elevated it to both a symbolic and material part of West Germany and West German identity.

Method and Historiography

Each chapter of this dissertation speaks to a number of specific literatures, debates, and historiographical trends. As a whole, however, “The People’s Drink” is

⁴ For example, Eduard Maria Schranka, *Ein Buch von Bier. Cerevisiologische Studien und Skizzen* Vol. 2 (Frankfurt a.O.: B. Waldmann's Verlag, 1886); Heinz Gaeßner, *Bier und bierartige Getränke im germanischen Kulturkreis* (Berlin: Gesellschaft für die Geschichte und Bibliographie des Brauwesens E.V. Institut für Gärungsgewerbe, 1941), 155.

primarily in dialogue with three main bodies of scholarship: commodity history (and the related fields of food and beer history), transnational history, and the ongoing debate about continuity and rupture in German history. The dissertation builds on work in commodity studies while demonstrating how the method can be fruitfully applied to questions of particular importance for German historians.

Commodity studies and commodity history emerged as fields in the 1980s and have since become both increasingly sophisticated and increasingly public. Perhaps no work captures this as well as Sven Beckert's 2015 *Empire of Cotton* which simultaneously reimagined the history of global capitalism while speaking to a broad public audience. The field itself emerged out of cultural critiques of rational choice theory in economics and prevailing social scientific theories of consumption dominated by Thorstein Veblen's "conspicuous consumption." Many of the early pioneers were cultural anthropologists like Mary Douglas and Arjun Appadurai who insisted that the meanings of goods are socially constructed and can be made legible.⁵ Historians and others had of course written about commodities, food, and even beer for a long time but until the advent of commodity studies as such, much of this literature focused on the history of technology, production, and labor. The French *Annales* tradition, for example, incorporated food into structural analyses. Such work gave practically no attention to everyday encounters with the material, however, and still less to how individuals constructed senses of self in relation to it. This blind spot remained through much of the

⁵ Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, *The World of Goods: Towards an Anthropology of Consumption* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

1970s primarily because of the overwhelming concern of social historians with the relationship between politics, labor, and production.

For cultural commentators, commodities greatly expanded conventional political economy by opening an analytic window onto consumption and demand.⁶ From the first theorization of commodities, commentators have insisted that demand must be understood culturally. It is not “a mysterious emanation of human needs, a mechanical response to social manipulation... or the narrowing down of a universal and vociferous desire for objects to whatever happens to be available.”⁷ Instead, demand is, “a socially regulated and generated impulse,” and more precisely, “the economic expression of the political logic of consumption.”⁸ *Political* here is meant in its loosest sense of contests and negotiations of power. The economic success of a commodity thus reflects many contests over the logic and meaning of consuming it. Part of the present story is therefore about conventional modes of shaping consumer norms and practices: regulation, expertise, advertising, and tradition.

⁶ Some of the first studies of this sort came from beyond academic history; from anthropologists and public historians. See for example, Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986); Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants, and Intoxicants* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). As commodity history has become increasingly mainstream, many studies have focused far beyond the cultural history of demand, using insights to shift debates ranging from empire, to the origins of consumer society, the “great divergence,” and globalization. See for example, Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J.H. Plumb, eds., *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-century England* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Jan de Vries, “The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,” *Journal of Economic History* 54, no. 2 (1994): 249-70; Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Marcy Norton, *Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures: A History of Tobacco and Chocolate in the Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Jeremy Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); for a more thorough overview, see Frank Trentmann, “Crossing Divides: Consumption and Globalization in History,” *Journal of Consumer Culture* 9, no. 2 (2009): 187-220.

⁷ Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things*, 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 32, 31.

Yet another part of the story is about how these structures relate to culture and identity. The construction of meanings for beer shaped consumption of and demand for beer. At the same time, they helped produce culture itself, that is, something *cultivated* and produced through choices of and identification with particular meanings of things. “The collective and repeated choice of one product meaning or another; and the collective and mutual perception and communication of these common consumer choices,” wrote Rainer Gries, leads to “the creation of communities, [and] even to processes of collectivization.”⁹ This was far from unique to beer. As Frank Trentmann recently argued, the great twentieth century “age of ideologies” was fundamentally characterized by the merger of politics and material life. Worldviews and ideologies, from fascism to communism to social welfare capitalism all “promised their supporters a better life and developed strategies to harness consumption to their particular ends.”¹⁰ Each national or even local manifestation of this political-material connection was unique and context specific. “The People’s Drink” focuses on how beer became a site of cultivating a particular type of Germanness *across* ideologies; how it transitioned from simply a part of everyday consumption to part of how many Germans and non-Germans understood Germanness and Germany over time, across political regimes and other major structural shifts from war to prosperity and everywhere in between.

The present story is located in contests over defining the people and what qualifies as their drink. Such arguments come from many, often conflicting places. From

⁹ Rainer Gries, “Cultures of Products and Political Cultures: Looking for Transfer Performances,” in *The Voice of the Consumer Citizen: A History of Market Research, Consumer Movements, and the Political Public Sphere*, ed. Kerstin Brückweh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 249; more broadly, Rainer Gries, *Produktkommunikation: Geschichte und Theorie* (Vienna: UTB Verlag, 2008).

¹⁰ Frank Trentmann, *Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First* (New York: Harper Collins, 2016), 274.

the 1930s to the 1980s, interest groups, politicians, industrialists, and consumers themselves projected onto beer the essential characteristics and values of a place; many places in fact, ranging from Munich to Bavaria to West Germany as a whole. In the Third Reich, brewers in Bavaria and southern Germany defended their industry and consumer base from efforts by Nazi public health and food management officials. In the post-war occupation, regional politicians found in beer a particularly good medium for articulating the failures of allied management and the need for sovereign control of western German recovery. From the 1950s to the 1980s beer gradually became an icon of social and economic recovery across the Federal Republic, an allegedly timeless national touchstone in the face of European integration, and a mark of the successes of West German capitalism in the Cold War. Beer became part of West German national iconography and identity in no small part as the result of the efforts of Germans themselves—and particularly Bavarians—to lay claim to it as emblematic of a larger practice, character, culture, and even place that they perceived to be threatened by competing influences and cultural values. Conflicts over beer tested the limits of the totalizing efforts of National Socialism, the top-down managerial approach of the American military government, and even the course of western European market integration. As a result of these and other conflicts, beer, and disproportionately Bavarian ideas about it, became a site for defining Germany and Germanness.

Employing the insights of commodity history has significant payout for a number of bodies of scholarship, most immediately the fields of food and beer history. In the case of food history, one of the primary epistemological problems has been reconciling

prescriptive sources like cookbooks and nutritional advice with how people actually eat.¹¹ Deeply researched social histories of food and histories of everyday life have perhaps done the best with reading against the grain of cookbooks, nutritional science, and ration structures but food often appears as only one small part, perhaps a chapter, of a larger analysis.¹² Within recent German historiography three major monographs in food history have appeared only in the last three years and many more are in the works.¹³ For many, food provides an insightful approach to modern German history because the nation was home to such dramatic scarcities, it fought a war of conquest for food-rich eastern Europe, and it was home to such divergent politics and cultures of consumption during the Cold War. While this expansion of food history in the German case has proven enormously fruitful, food historians have often focused on hunger, nutrition, and satiety, at the expense of thinking through how the material stuff itself is important to formations of culture and identity. In her excellent 2017 study of the biopolitics of food, Alice Weinreb most notably wrote that food and hunger are insightful subjects for Germany

¹¹ This commentary applies less, I should note, to works in food history deal less with consumption and culture than with the history of nutritional science or food production and distribution.

¹² See for example Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der Konsumgesellschaft: Mangelerfahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandshoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag, 1994); Paul Erker, *Ernährungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Bauern und Arbeiterschaft in Bayern, 1943-1953* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1990); Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and chapter one of Paul Steege, *Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin 1946-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹³ Gesine Gerhard, *Nazi Hunger Politics: A History of Food in the Third Reich* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015); Alice Weinreb, *Modern Hungers: Food and Power in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Corinna Treitel, *Eating Nature in Modern Germany: Food, Agriculture and Environment, c. 1870-2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). In 2016, a three-day seminar on “Food and Foodways in Central Europe” at the German Studies Association 40th annual conference brought together fifteen German studies food scholars currently working to expand the field yet further. Constant points of discussion revolved around upstreaming prescriptive sources and the question of balancing claims to food expertise, from the cooking housewife, to state sanctioned cookbooks, to the Ministry of Nutrition. While each member of the seminar had personal plans for publication, one forthcoming volume contains contributions by many of them. See, Heather R. Perry and Heather M. Benbow, eds., *Food and Modern Warfare in Germany’s Global Century* (in preparation for Palgrave for Winter 2018).

precisely because, “the country’s identity has... not been shaped by the production or consumption of a specific or charismatic foodstuff.”¹⁴ I beg to differ, and I propose that returning to the roots of commodity history will shed new light on how we can think through the cultural history of political and economic life. I do not propose to resolve the prescriptive problem of food history but rather to sidestep it by emphasizing a history of conflicts over the meanings of a consumable good. What follows is not a food history (although chapter two comes close), but I hope that it offers food historians insightful ways to think about expertise and the authority of claims to meaning that come not only from advertisers, nutritionists, or politicians, but from producers and consumers themselves.

As a commodity history and as a history of Germany, “the People’s Drink” likewise extends the growing field of beer history in several directions. Beer has recently emerged as a vibrant subject of study and like commodity and food history, beer history has become increasingly global. Early local studies succeeded in capturing the labor of production and the spaces of consumption, using beer as a window onto issues of labor, gender, and urban history.¹⁵ A number of studies in the last decade have focused on how the production and consumption of beer was nationalized in places ranging as far as South Africa and Japan while also demonstrating transnational influences of social norms

¹⁴ Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, 8.

¹⁵ For example, Richard Unger, *Beer in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Judith M. Bennett, *Ale, Beer, and Brewsters in England: Women’s Work in a Changing World, 1300-1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Ann B. Tlusty, *Bacchus and the Civic Order: The Culture of Drink in Early Modern Germany* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001); David Gutzke, *Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England, 1896-1960* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005).

and technical know-how.¹⁶ Yet more recently new interdisciplinary edited volumes on beer and alcohol appear roughly once a year. Most of these works seek to locate beer in contexts ranging from prehistoric Europe to modern rugby fan clubs in New Zealand, and from Irish pubs as sites of sociability to contextualizing the modern craft beer revolution.¹⁷ These volumes tend to span disciplines from business administration and economics to anthropology and geography, and above all demonstrate the extent to which beer has become an object of great interest in almost any time and place. In modern European history, a number of recent and forthcoming works incorporate important methodological insights from the history of empire, environmental history, and global history.¹⁸

Within this proliferation of new research on beer, Germany remains conspicuously underrepresented. Germans, to be clear, are everywhere. Scholars have stressed the importance of German brewers in developing the Lager and Pilsner beer styles that dominated global industrial beer and shaped markets as far as Calcutta; they have highlighted the role of German-speaking migrants in founding the pantheon of American industrial brewing; and they have pointed to the immediate and lingering

¹⁶ Anne Kelk Mager, *Beer, Sociability, and Masculinity in South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Jeffrey Alexander, *Brewed in Japan: The Evolution of the Japanese Brewing Industry* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).

¹⁷ Wulf Schieffenhövel and Helen Macbeth, eds., *Liquid Bread: Beer and Brewing in Cross Cultural Perspective* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Mark W. Patterson and Nancy Hoalst Pullen, eds., *The Geography of Beer: Regions, Environment, and Societies* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014); Ignazio Cabras, David Higgins, and David Preece, eds., *Brewing, Beer and Pubs: A Global Perspective* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Ignazio Cabras and David Higgins, eds., *The History of Beer and Brewing Industry* (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Waltraud Ernst, ed., *Alcohol Flows Across Cultures: Drinking in Transnational and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

¹⁸ Malcolm F. Purinton, "Good Hope for the Pilsner: Commerce, Culture, and the Consumption of the Pilsner Beer in British Southern Africa, c. 1870-1914" in Ernst, ed., *Alcohol Flows Across Cultures*; more broadly, see Purinton, "Empire in a Bottle: Commerce, Culture, and Consumption of the Pilsner Beer in the British Empire, 1870-1914" (PhD diss., Northeastern University, 2016); Jeffrey Pilcher, *How Beer Travelled the World*, manuscript in progress.

importance of German know-how in places as far flung as Qingdao, now home to China's top selling national beer Tsingtao.¹⁹ As for Germany itself, the scholarship is relatively limited, especially in English. Mikuláš Teich wrote what remains the standard bearer for 19th century German beer history. He offers excellent coverage of industry and technology and the story is markedly one of production. The closest the book comes to addressing the sorts of value production of interest here is in a relatively brief discussion of late 19th century abstinence campaigns.²⁰ Hasso Spode and others who have addressed these campaigns alongside the medical, scientific, and technological histories of alcohol, brewing, and fermentation, offer important insights but are far removed from consumer values and the politics of consumption and demand.²¹ How Germans got their beer and who moralized about it the loudest has thus gotten some attention, especially around the turn of the century. How Germans constructed meanings for the commodity and for themselves has gotten far less, especially after the First World War.²²

For the present project, the two most relevant works on beer in modern Germany are the dissertations of Birgit Speckle and Eva Göbel. Speckle's 2000, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern* highlights the importance of a series of conflicts around beer in Bavaria after

¹⁹ Jeffrey Pilcher, "'Tastes Like Horse Piss': Asian Encounters with European Beer," *Gastronomica* 16, no. 1 (Spring, 2016): 28-40; Sabina Groeneveld, "Far away at home in Qingdao, 1897-1914" *German Studies Review* 39, no. 1 (2016): 65-80.

²⁰ Mikuláš Teich, *Bier, Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 1800-1914: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Industrialisierungsgeschichte* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000).

²¹ For example, Hasso Spode, "Trinkkulturen in Europa," in *Die kulturelle Integration Europas*, ed. Johannes Weinand and Christiane Weinand, 361-91 (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2010); Jeffrey Pilcher, "National Beer in a Global Age: Technology, Taste, and Mobility, 1880-1914," *Quaderni Storici* 51, no. 1 (Apr., 2016), 51-70; Nancy Bodden, "Kraftwagen und Flaschenbier—Neue Herausforderungen für die Dortmunder Brauwirtschaft," in *Die 1920er Jahre. Dortmund zwischen Moderne und Krise*, ed. Karl-Peter and Günther Högl (Dortmund: Historischen Verein für Dortmund und die Grafschaft Mark, 2012).

²² There are some exceptions which we can only hope will develop into larger projects. One comes from an electronically published undergraduate research paper. See, Nadine Mallmann, "Kölsch—mehr als ein Getränk: Eine Biersorte als Medium regionaler Identitätskonstruktionen" (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2011); another, from a recent Master's thesis, see John Gillespie, "The People's Drink: The Politics of Beer in East Germany (1945-1971)," (M.A. Thesis, Middle Tennessee State University, 2017).

1945. Focusing on four such conflicts—the allied prohibition in the postwar period, the conflict over beer adulteration in the 1950s, the place of the Bavarian Beer Purity Law in the European Economic Community, and protests over beer garden hours of operation in 1995—Speckle convincingly shows a pattern in which legal actions sparked public outcry and industrial public relations campaigns. She contends that discursive arguments about the cultural meaning of beer operated as sites of articulating meaningful distinctions about tradition, quality, and community in Bavaria.²³ One limitation of Speckle’s work is that by beginning only in 1945, she misses the formative role of National Socialism in sparking many of the discourses she traces. Furthermore, her analysis is both overly discursive and geographically limited. In other words, she does not entirely consider the power of industrial and media discourses and how far they radiated both inward into the Bavarian heartland and outward into West Germany, western Europe, or around the world. As we will see in the later chapters of this dissertation, such claims to community, quality, and tradition not only informed an abstract idea of Bavarianness, they also shaped laws and policies that governed those who did not want them and informed cultural perceptions and practices ranging from rural Bavaria to California and Hong Kong.

Far more provocative analytically, Eva Göbel’s 2005, *Bayern in der modernen Konsumgesellschaft* offers one lengthy chapter on beer as well as others on cooking, Christmas markets, and clothing. The beer chapter draws heavily on Speckle but adds a discussion of Bavarian brewers at the turn of the twentieth century who sought to ensure legal protections on place of origin. More importantly, Göbel provides an analytic bridge

²³ Birgit Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern: Wertvorstellungen um Reinheit, Gemeinschaft und Tradition* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2001).

between the history of beer, and consumption generally, and the history of place-making on a sliding scale. She goes beyond consumption within an administrative area (*Konsum in der Region*) to consider also what she calls a *Konsumregion*, or, “a territorially limited order of goods, meanings, and trades, which is a focal point for self and foreign conceptions of identity, and gives consuming a specific regional meaning.” Writing against the homogenization thesis of globalization, she explains further that,

In spite of progressive universalization and standardization of goods and consumption styles and long-range trade relationships, producers, distributors, advertisers, politicians, and consumers alike—that is, suppliers of goods and their meanings— took it upon themselves to indicate consumer goods and practices as typically Bavarian.²⁴

In the case of beer, she argues, the formation of the Bavarian *Konsumregion* is fundamentally a “phenomenon of times of crisis” and often these crises are more diverse than the direct legal challenges Speckle suggests.²⁵

The present work builds on Speckle and Göbel in several ways. First, it extends Göbel’s emphasis on crises loosely defined. For example, chapter three demonstrates how beer became particularly meaningful in Bavarian and West German society precisely in the context of rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s because the brewing industry feared it would be left behind in the economic recovery. Perceived or potential crises, even in times of dramatic economic growth, are thus also important to

²⁴ Eva Göbel, *Bayern in der modernen Konsumgesellschaft: Regionalisierung der Konsumkultur im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Weißensee Verlag, 2005), 19. Göbel is not the only historian to have theorized the *Konsumregion*. Indeed, she and her graduate school colleague Manuel Schramm, alongside their doctoral adviser Hannes Siegrist collectively extended the concept to other regions, times, and places. See Manuel Schramm, *Konsum und regionale Identität in Sachsen, 1880-2000: Die Regionalisierung von Konsumgütern im Spannungsfeld von Nationalisierung und Globalisierung* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002); and Hannes Siegrist and Manuel Schramm, eds., *Regionalisierung europäischer Konsumkulturen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003).

²⁵ Göbel, *Bayern in der modernen Konsumgesellschaft*, 118-22.

constructing meaning around a commodity. Second, while Speckle and Göbel together span the twentieth century, I offer a necessary study of the Third Reich, a subject that is conspicuously absent in their works. For the present story the Third Reich is a crucial moment for galvanizing many of the political and industrial interests that come to dominate the production of cultural meaning around beer in the postwar period. Third, and most broadly, I wish to complicate how “territorially limited” we understand a *Konsumregion* to be. In the last three chapters we turn to some of the many ways that beer is given important meanings with relation to “self and foreign conceptions of identity” in West Germany more broadly but also even in the United States, England, and beyond. While Göbel smartly differentiates between a *Konsumregion* and *Konsum in der Region*, she reproduces a close relationship between the two simply by nature of her sources and scope. Following the single commodity of beer, “The People’s Drink” demonstrates how different “suppliers of goods and their meanings” in different political, economic, and cultural constellations from the local to the global also inform the history of beer and “conceptions of identity” across geographical scales. In other words, even as regards beer as a material good, this project extends Speckle and Göbel’s focus on Bavaria to include West Germany and takes the story even further. Indeed, “The People’s Drink” goes far beyond their work to investigate the national and global histories of Bavarian and German conceptions of beer production and consumption. Here, the *Konsumregion* is often quite severed from the geography of its origin and can operate and develop on national and global vectors, not only having national and global impact, but in fact *becoming* national and even global as we will see in the last two chapters.

If the single commodity method of this work offers insights for food and beer history, the shifting geographic focus suggests a second major body of scholarship concerned with scale. Taken all together this dissertation dedicates significant attention, often on more than one occasion, to Munich, Old or Upper Bavaria, Franconia, Southern and Northern Germany, Nazi Germany, Prussia, occupied Germany, the American and British Bizone, the Federal Republic of Germany, the European Economic Community, the United States, and the United Kingdom. International cameos span from Canada to Hong Kong, Belgium to New Delhi, and Israel to the Congo. This is a natural result of focusing on the biography of a commodity. Even with the most straight forward definition of a commodity—a thing intended for exchange—we are forced to consider just how far we care to follow it through its exchanges. It is thus an analytic, like labor, mobility, migration, or so many others, that historians have recently used to put to question naturalized geographic categories. Historian Rolf Petri recently suggested that we move beyond a history of European integration dependent on *dialectics* either of Europe and the nation-state, or of the nation-state and the region, and embrace a “trialectic” analysis of Europe, the nation, and the region.²⁶ We need not look beyond Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia today to see why this is a necessary shift for the history of Europe. I will refrain from trying to coin a word for it (like pentalectic), but the present

²⁶ Rolf Petri, “The Resurgence of the Region in the Context of European Integration: Recent Developments and Historical Perspective,” in *Gesellschaft in der europäischen Integration seit den 1950er Jahren: Migration – Konsum – Sozialpolitik – Repräsentationen*, ed. Arnd Bauerkämper and Hartmut Kaelble, 159-71 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012). For an example of the alternative, see, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Michael G. Mülle, and Stuart Woolf, eds., *Regional and National Identities in Europe in the XIXth and XXth Centuries* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998); and various chapters in Philipp Ther and Holm Sundhaussen, eds., *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*. (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2003).

study seeks to extend Petri's insight further to engage with geographical stories from the local to the global and demonstrate their causal impacts and cultural flows.

A full analysis of transnational or global historiography is beyond the scope here but it will be useful to pull together insights from a few relevant histories of Germany, especially from the rich historiography of the nineteenth century. The first thread comes from Sebastian Conrad's 2006 *Globalisation and the Nation* which used mobility and labor to demonstrate how globalization was not the outcome of nationalization or nation-building projects but that the two were co-constitutive. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the movement of peoples, both German and non-German encouraged the tightening of borders and pushed questions of citizenship and race to the forefront of national logics in Germany and beyond. "The invocation of national specificity," Conrad writes, "can be seen as a reaction to the reality of porous borders, to the growth in imports and exports... in other words, to the threatened loss of national characteristics."²⁷ We see a similar phenomenon in the present story as producers, advertisers, politicians, and consumers connected beer to the particulars of place in the face of threats ranging from prohibition to a market flooded by foreign competition. The present work extends Conrad's shift away from a "diachronic 'stages of development'" model and embraces his "synchronic 'staging of the world'" while also investigating different scales than his "world of nations": from specific cities to regions to western Europe.²⁸

While Sebastian Conrad sought to understand how the nation takes shape in global context, other German historians have asked how we understand the nation

²⁷ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* trans. Sorcha O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, orig. 2006), 337.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4, 17.

through the prism of the local or regional. In her now classic treatment of regional cultures of *Heimat*, Celia Applegate argued that the diversity of local and regional culture within Germany was itself the unifying principle of a “nation of provincials.”²⁹ Her ideas about unity in diversity work well regarding cultures of *Heimat*, but a little less well when we think through shifts in and conflicts of relative power and influence between regions in the nation-building process. In the nineteenth century, for example Prussians waged Germanizing campaigns against Poles in East Prussia, and the protestant north of Germany, headed by Prussia, systematically persecuted Catholics in the south of the nation in the *Kulturkampf*.³⁰ At stake in these and other conflicts, especially the struggles with Catholicism, was control of the representation of everyday life, events, temporality and the religious and social nature of Germany as a place.³¹ A parallel story emerges in the present work at both the regional and national level as Germans sought to navigate not only defeat and cold war division, but also nation-building in post-Prussian German-speaking Europe. As we will see in chapter four most explicitly, the staunchest supporters of the *Reinheitsgebot* (Beer Purity Law) in Old or Upper Bavaria used the law to transform consumption practices even within Bavaria, in the culturally contested northern areas of Franconia, as well as beyond Bavaria at the level of national law, political action,

²⁹ Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Regions are not exactly the same as the idea of *Heimat* but the notion of unity in plurality remains particularly powerful.

³⁰ Philipp Ther, “Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte: Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire,” and Helmut Walser Smith, “An Preußens Rändern oder: Die Welt, die dem Nationalismus verloren ging,” in *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt, 1871-1914*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, 129-48 and 149-69, respectively (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004); Michael Gross, *The War against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004).

³¹ Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser eds., *Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. 1-10.

and cultural values. By the 1970s, the law had become a national icon, prized by consumers nationwide. It is a story of how the provincial became, or worked to become, national.

At this point it is important to draw direct attention to the fact that this story hinges on the intense politicization of beer in what I call the “restrictive regimes” of the 1930s and 1940s. Understanding the Nazi period and the occupation together is an important contribution to much of the history of provincialism. For Celia Applegate, for example, negotiations between national and provincial politics and culture—the cornerstone of regionalism prior to 1933—came to a halt under the centralized and centralizing pressures of Nazi hypernationalism.³² Recent work on the history of regional senses of belonging suggests that this is not entirely accurate. Nazi efforts to Germanize Western Poland, for example, were in part driven by place-making strategies that resurrected regional referents of old West Prussia rather than the nationalized Nazi Reich.³³ Applegate remains correct, however, that Nazism bankrupted much of the cultural and political reservoir of German nationalism and that after 1945, “Germany was rebuilt from the regions outward and upward.”³⁴ As Jeremy DeWaal has argued in the case of Cologne Carnival, in the postwar decades local actors “reinvented” long-standing

³² Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials*, 226.

³³ Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann, “‘A Sense of *Heimat* Opened Up during the War.’ German Soldiers and *Heimat* Abroad,” and Gerhard Wolf, “Suitable Germans – Enforced Assimilation Policies in Danzig-West Prussia, 1939-1945,” in *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, ed. Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach, 112-47, and 213-34, respectively (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). The persistence of the region is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated in all of Europe than in Upper Silesia; see, Philipp Ther, “Der Zwang zur nationalen Eindeutigkeit und die Persistenz der Region: Oberschlesien im 20. Jahrhundert,” in *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen*, ed. Ther and Sundhaussen, 233-57.

³⁴ Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials*, 229.

local and regional traditions into usable sites of rooting culture and identity.³⁵ The *Reinheitsbegot* functions similarly as a tradition that was “reinvented” in the postwar decades. What DeWaal, Applegate, and others have in some ways overlooked however, is that postwar provincialism and Nazi hypernationalism were not antithetical. Industrial and cultural practices specific to Bavaria like strict adherence to the *Reinheitsgebot* or conceptualizations of beer as a popular foodstuff emerged out of centralized pressures and perceived crises in the 1930s and 1940s. It was only under the pressure of centralized food management in the Third Reich that the *Reinheitsgebot* was first transformed from an industry standard to a point of political contention. Debates around adulteration with sugar in the 1930s, for example, became the explicit legal grounds for similar debates in the 1950s, sometimes even made by the exact same people. Reading Applegate and others, we might assume in the conflict over beer in the Third Reich that the Reich wins, but it doesn’t. Neither does it lose. The story of how Bavarian conceptions of beer came to dominate national and even global thinking about German beer and Germanness hinges on the experiences of producers and consumers of beer in the “restrictive regimes” of the 1930s and 1940s. In other words, while much of the history of beer in West Germany was informed by longer chronologies such as the peculiarities of production and consumption in Bavaria or elsewhere, the utility invested in these chronologies and the particular form they took in the Federal Republic was fundamentally shaped by the experiences of National Socialism and postwar occupation.

³⁵ Jeremy DeWaal, “The Reinvention of Tradition: Form, Meaning, and Local Identity in Modern Cologne Carnival” *Central European History* 46 (2013), 495-532; idem., “The Turn to Local Communities in Early Post-War West Germany: The Case of Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, 1945-65” in *(Re)Constructing Communities in Europe, 1918-1968: Senses of Belonging Below, Beyond and Within the Nation-State*, ed. Stefan Couperus and Harm Kaal, 130-50 (New York and London: Routledge, 2016); DeWaal will provide fuller consideration in his manuscript in progress, “Redemptive Geographies: Democratization and Heimat in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1985.”

By bridging the history of National Socialism and the Federal Republic, this dissertation finally builds on a third—rather large—body of work concerned with the question of continuity and rupture in German history. In spite of notable challenges from many scholars, German history remains remarkably conventional in its periodization. Any survey of publications will reveal that German historians tend to focus on structural political change as the dominant indication of period: 1871-1918, 1918-1933, 1933-1945, 1945-1989/90, and so on. Once termed a “zero hour,” the year 1945 remains perhaps the most dramatic of all ruptures and in recent years two main trends have emerged for bridging it. The first has been to focus on the place of National Socialism in the postwar Germanys. Some of the first works in this vein were Marxist revisionism in the 1960s that put the Third Reich and the Federal Republic into the longer continuities of bourgeois capitalism in Germany.³⁶ More recent work, especially since the collapse of German communism, has historicized the many ways that Nazi social order, war, violence, and defeat shaped diverse aspects of the Federal Republic from gender norms to business practices, and from film production to the sciences of trauma and psychiatry. Taken all together, these works have bridged 1945 by focusing on content rooted in experiences and legacies of the twelve-year Reich and the German experience of fascism, war, and violence.³⁷ Historians of consumption too have demonstrated similar

³⁶ Wolfgang Abendroth, ed. *Faschismus und Kapitalismus: Theorien über die sozialen Ursprünge und die Funktion des Faschismus* (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967); see also Jane Caplan’s introduction to her edited collection of posthumous essays by Tim Mason: Timothy Mason, *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1-32; see also, Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 183-203.

³⁷ Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002); Elizabeth Heineman, *What Difference does a*

continuities. Uwe Spiekermann has recently shown, for example, how the science of Wehrmacht war rations provided the foundations of postwar packaged foods.³⁸ In all this work, German, and indeed European history after 1945 needs to be conceptualized as “postwar history”: analytically understood as shaped by the impact and legacies of Hitler’s Europe.³⁹ The present work continues this approach by insisting that experiences in the Third Reich were crucial to subsequent developments while also reviving an older notion that war and postwar scarcity in some ways make more analytic sense together than leaning on defeat and capitulation as a fundamental rupture *in need* of bridging.⁴⁰ From the perspective of beer production and consumption, the post-war allied occupation was less a liberation than an intensification of hostilities that had begun in the National Socialist era. The nature of the conflicts in the two periods differed but together they amounted to continuous and even intensifying pressure on beer production and consumption. The reactions to these “restrictive regimes,” which I detail in chapters one and two, echoed into the Federal Republic and around the world in many diverse ways, three of which are the focus of chapters three through five.

Insisting on the legacies of dictatorship and war have been one approach to bridging 1945. A second major effort at unmaking the caesura has been to think far

Husband Make: Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Frank Biess, *Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

³⁸ Uwe Spiekermann, “A Consumer Society Shaped by War: The German Experience, 1935-1955,” and more generally, Frank Trentmann, “The Lessons of War: Reordering the Public and Private Capacities and Dynamics of Consumption,” in *The Consumer on the Home Front: Second World War Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Hartmut Berghoff, Jan Logemann, and Felix Römer, 301-12, and 331-56, respectively (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

³⁹ Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller, eds., *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), esp., 1-12; see further, Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

⁴⁰ See for example, Martin Broszat et. al., eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* 3rd Edition (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990).

beyond those experiences. Again, some of the first to do this were Marxist historians who sought to place Nazism in a continuous social history of the German nation. A number of other thematic approaches to a *longue durée* German history were captured in Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer's seminal *Shattered Past*, and range from gender and domestic politics, to mobility and migration, to the history of German consumerism. The history of religion and politics from *Kulturkampf* to Christian Democracy, has additionally offered an alternative mode of understanding German and European history through longer continuities which, though shaped by National Socialism, war, and genocide, long pre- and postdated them.⁴¹ A downfall of this approach, in my estimation, is that far too little attention has been paid to precisely how National Socialism and war shaped these longer continuities. The stabilization of Christian Democracy after 1945, for example, is often presented as simply a safe and reasonable alternative to fanaticisms past and less as something intimately shaped by National Socialism itself.⁴²

A number of works in German historiography nonetheless provide useful models for combining these approaches. Catherine Epstein's collective biography of German communists in the twentieth century shows not only where East German leadership came from but also how personal and collective experiences during the war and the Nazi dictatorship intimately shaped the trajectory of German socialism and the nature of post-war East German communism.⁴³ Yet more relevant for the present study, Alice Weinreb's recent *Modern Hungers* demonstrates how Nazi statecraft and food politics

⁴¹ Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 73-76, 101; Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁴² This has begun to change quite recently. See James Chappel, *Catholic Modern: The Challenge of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

⁴³ Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), esp., 44-99.

directly shaped the emergence of the modern food system as a site of biopolitics and governmentality in the course of the twentieth century.⁴⁴ Like these works, and a number of others, the present story is an effort to show how long-standing traditions and practices that pre-dated National Socialism were influenced by the Third Reich and allied occupation to take on new and wide-ranging significance in subsequent decades.⁴⁵

As a commodity history, this contribution is relatively novel. In their studies of beer Speckle and Göbel avoid the Nazi period altogether. Speckle focuses on the postwar decades explicitly, while Göbel claims to cover the twentieth century but skips from the First World War to the postwar occupation. Other German commodity histories similarly reinforce the rupture of 1945. For example, Monika Sigmund has recently written an insightful comparative political history of coffee consumption in East and West Germany, but she too reifies the zero hour.⁴⁶ Perhaps the most relevant work in German historiography is Bernhard Rieger's account of the Nazi concept car, the Volkswagen, which became a national and global icon during and after the Cold War.⁴⁷ "The People's Drink" follows Rieger in showing how a single commodity can take on wildly divergent meanings that lead to its economic success while also informing cultural conceptions of Germany, but it insists that we focus on the processes of creating those meanings and how they help produce what we understand to be culture.⁴⁸ More to the point of

⁴⁴ Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, esp. 49-87.

⁴⁵ For yet another useful, but more focused model, see Monica Black, *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁴⁶ Monika Sigmund, *Genuss als Politikum: Kaffeekonsum in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015).

⁴⁷ Bernhard Rieger, *The People's Car: A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁴⁸ For a fuller description of the relationship between things and culture, see Douglas and Isherwood, *The World of Goods*, 38-47; and Wim M.J. van Binsbergen and Peter L. Geschiere, eds., *Commodification: Things, Agency, and Identities: (The Social Life of Things Revisited)* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005).

commodities and continuity, in Rieger's *The People's Car*, even while the roots of the story are in the Third Reich and the Volkswagen as a Nazi concept car, he does not argue that this past is causally important for the subsequent story of West German and global success. On the contrary, for Rieger the story actually hinges on obfuscating the Nazi past of the commodity.⁴⁹ For the present story, the Nazi era history of beer (and that of the postwar occupation) is in fact causally important in the longer story of Bavarian and German beer in the postwar decades. Beer itself, as we will see most explicitly in chapter three, helped make the Nazi past a public secret of West German everyday life.

Efforts to define and locate German beer, what it is and whose it is—that is, what “the people’s drink” actually means—allow us to reconsider the history of mid-century Germany as one of remarkable continuity and evolution in spite of intense political, social, and economic change. Producers and consumers of beer proved remarkably malleable and adaptable across and often regardless of dramatic and fundamental changes of state structure, politics, and culture. The central threads of commodity history, transnational history, and the question of continuity in Germany history are joined throughout this dissertation by more topic specific literatures and arguments. Each chapter in this dissertation contributes to a specific chronological or thematic literature: Economic life and consumption in the Third Reich; scarcity, occupation, and the politics of sovereignty in the postwar years; advertising, consumption, and gender in the economic boom; the histories of West German federalism and early European integration; and finally, the cultural history of the Cold War and the history of global trade before and after “the boom.”

⁴⁹ Rieger, *The People's Car*.

Structure and Chapter Summaries

“The People’s Drink” is divided into five chapters, comprising two parts. The two chronological chapters in **Part I**, “Restrictive Regimes,” contend that the strict regulation of beer in the Third Reich and the postwar allied occupation galvanized a network of brewing industrialists and politicians especially in public health and agriculture. These political and industrial interests were disproportionately located in Bavaria and southern Germany, a region with a peculiar legal and socio-economic history of beer production and consumption and marked more broadly by longstanding tensions with the German north. In both cases, Bavarians and southern Germans argued that Nazi and Allied regulations on beer were evidence of how far removed the two regimes were from the true nature and needs of the people.

Chapter one details how the Nazi regime exerted twofold pressure on the production and consumption of beer: first, in the form of a propaganda and consumption campaign in line with their eugenic aspirations and public health concerns about alcohol, and second in their management of nutrition and raw materials in the contexts of mobilization, war, and scarcity. **Chapter two** shows how the Allied Military Government likewise exerted pressure on beer and nutritional management in the extreme scarcity of the “hunger years,” by prohibiting brewing for civilian consumption in the hope of funneling all grain into bread production. In response, during both the Third Reich and the Allied occupation, Bavarian and western German agriculturalists, nutritionists, brewers, and politicians argued that beer was not only a cultural staple, but was also a proper foodstuff and a crucial component of nutritional and agricultural management.

Bavarian agriculturalists and politicians found in beer not only a hope for relief from scarcity but also a site for articulating a critique of the occupation authorities and anchoring demands for German political sovereignty. By the early 1950s, the production and consumption of beer were woven not only into the practices of food production but also into the political and economic structures of the new Federal Republic.

The three thematic chapters of **Part II**, “The Many Lives of Beer,” demonstrate how beer drinkers, brewers, and politicians in Germany and abroad contested and advocated beer as an integral part of West German identity. The chapters operate on three different methodological and geographical levels, each of which stresses how Bavarian interests came to disproportionately inform the history and meaning of beer in Germany. Bavarian brewers advocated most passionately for beer as a symbol of economic recovery and mass consumerism; Bavarian industrial and political interests likewise shepherded the relatively unknown Beer Purity Law (*Reinheitsgebot*) from a provincial peculiarity to a national conviction; and finally, a convoluted Bavarian imagery of beer and beer consumption was integral in rebranding Germany on the international stage.

Chapter three demonstrates how beer transformed from an illegal substance in the late 1940s to an 11 billion Mark industry by the mid 1960s, focusing not only on economic recovery but also on the culture of consumption. Bavarian and West German brewers navigated scarcity, participated in recasting bourgeois gender norms of consumption, and propagated an entire mode of consumption from designing advertisements and travel guides to commissioning sing-along songs for communal beer gardens. Next, **chapter four** provides a political economy of the 1516 *Reinheitsgebot* (or Beer Purity Law) between 1954 and 1975. Conflicts around the juridical authority,

cultural importance, and economic implications of the *Reinheitsgebot* at the Bavarian, West German, and western European levels reveal a convergence of industrial and political interests that elevated a Bavarian legal and cultural peculiarity to the level of national icon; a popular rallying point that delayed the forces of European market integration. **Chapter five** then follows exports of the Bavarian beer Löwenbräu to over a hundred countries where it shaped local consumer cultures while also functioning as an informal cultural ambassador. The jovial image of a Germany of beer drinkers came to stand in for the country itself in the political context of the Cold War as politicians in both the Federal Republic and the United States strove to present a new, safe, and firmly westernized image of West Germany. In the wake of the 1973 recession, shifts in global capital and the outsourcing of production disrupted Löwenbräu's carefully constructed claims to authenticity and hollowed out much of the cultural capital that underpinned its early market success. But while the beer brand collapsed, the national branding remained.

Finally, an **epilogue** offers conclusions and elaborates on the period from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. While major shifts in global capital and the rise of neoliberal regulation dominated much of economic life in this period, West German beer consumers continued to prize the *Reinheitsgebot* and insist on what made German beer uniquely German. In the last years of the Cold War, beer became so deeply embedded in West German political, economic, and cultural values that when the European Court of Justice forced open the West German import market in the name of free trade in 1987, cultural entrenchment fueled a widespread rejection of imported beers. This pervasive consumer resistance operated beyond any identifiable or achievable political, economic, or legal notions of success and signified the consolidation of a cultural regime that remains to this

day, making Germany perhaps the single most hostile beer market in the world. The epilogue closes with some reflections beyond the Bonn Republic including the East German history of beer, the process of reunification, and the current craft beer revolution in Germany.

Part I: Restrictive Regimes

Chapter 1:

The People's Drink in the Racial State, 1933-1945

As the Nazi dictatorship assumed and quickly consolidated political power, the country's emergence out of the Great Depression was one of the most important foundations for popular and industrial support.¹ In the case of the brewing industry, only a few months into the new regime, the regional Bavarian Brewers' Association (*Bayerischer Brauerbund*) boasted that they were, "one of the first Bavarian economic organizations" to join the "front of the New Germany," to fight for the recovery of the state and economy. They applauded the repression of rival political parties by the Nazi state (what they called "stabilization") as promising for the economic aspirations of the regime and the brewing sector. The way in which the regime "tackled" the deepest political problems of the time filled them with "a confident hope" that the economic goals of the state, "would usher in a new blooming for [their] local industry."² On the national level, after close to two years of economic growth, the president of the German Brewers' Association (*Deutscher Brauer-Bund*) likewise told members that he aimed to further "resuscitate" the brewing industry by capitalizing on the new disposable income of Germans put to work by Reich welfare projects.³

While German brewers at first understood economic recovery in the Third Reich to be a rising tide that would lift all boats, their product was one of a handful of

¹ Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 56-65; Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 99-134.

² Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Tätigkeitsbericht* April 1932 – June 1933. (München: Bidel Söhne, 1933), 1.

³ *Schlußwort zum Deutschen Brauertag 1934. Von. Dr. Ernst Röhm*, a publication of Der Deutsche Brauer-Bund, e.V. (Berlin: Buchdruckerei Gebrüder Unger, 1934), Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (henceforth BAB) R 3101/13957.

commodities that many Nazi ideologues believed undermined both individual and collective health, strength, and purity. As Adolf Hitler himself explained to the Hitler Youth in Nuremberg in 1936, “a new ideal of beauty is developing. No longer the corpulent beer-drinking-philistine (*Bierphilister*), but rather the fit and slender youth is the ideal of our time; standing on the earth with steady legs—healthy in his body and in his soul.”⁴ Beer consumption, for Hitler, was part of an outdated aesthetic, a culture incompatible with the new Germany. Beer, like alcohol generally, tobacco, and other intoxicants and stimulants (*Genußgifte*) was understood by many propagandists and public health officials as a threat to national health and strength.⁵ Speaking on alcohol more generally in 1938, Heinrich Himmler proclaimed that Germany needed the strength of every single German, “for the preservation of its racial and economic freedom. No German therefore has the right to weaken their body and spirit through alcohol abuse. They damage not only themselves but also their family and above all their Volk.”⁶ This sort of communitarian eugenic thinking was disseminated by the Ministry of Health, the Reich Food Office (*Reichsnährstand*), and the Reich Office for Alcohol Abuse (*Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch*), who together worked with intermediaries such as the Hitler Youth, the Women’s League, and the commerce arm of the propaganda

⁴ Speech from the “Parteitag der Ehre” in Nuremberg, Sept. 12, 1936. Quoted in *Die junge Gefolgschaft. Monatsschrift der Fränkischen Hitlerjugend*, no. 9 (Sept. 1936).

⁵ Norman Ohler has recently argued that while this may have been true in peacetime, in the context of war the Wehrmacht and many state leaders including Hitler became dependent on drugs, particularly methamphetamine. See Norman Ohler, *Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany*, trans. Shaun Whiteside (St. Ives: Penguin Books, 2017). The book has been critically reviewed by professional historians and is most sweeping in its claims about the peacetime Reich. Ohler’s treatment of the war is somewhat more rigorous and does fit with a number of other recent publications that have stressed the war as a watershed moment in policies and practices regarding drugs and other stimulants. See for example, Nicole Petrick-Felber, *Kriegswichtiger Genuss: Tabak und Kaffee im “Dritten Reich”* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015); and Edward Westerman, “Stone Cold Killers or Drunk with Murder: Alcohol and Atrocity in the Holocaust,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 30 (Spring 2016): 1-19.

⁶ Quoted in “Der Feind der Volksgesundheit” *Nationalsozialistische Parteikorrespondenz* Jan. 13, 1938, BAB NS 5/VI 4875.

apparatus, the Ad Council (*Werberat*). While the Reich opted not to prohibit beer and alcohol generally, this network of institutions worked to shift consumer understandings of the substances and the individual, national, and racial stakes of consuming them. They sought, in the words of historian Jonathan Wiesen, to “align commercial morality and *völkisch* morality.”⁷

The brewing industry, which had initially seen the Reich as merely an opportunity for growth, found itself on the defensive in a state that worked to undermine beer consumption. Their response was complex and is best considered with respect to both production and consumption. Throughout the Reich, on the one hand, the brewers generally adapted to many centralized pressures that worked to curtail consumption by women and youth, and voiced no reticence towards more draconian measures targeting alcoholics. As long as beer consumption continued to increase hand in glove with economic recovery, which it did, the industry was content to quietly promote its own understanding of beer. If the Reich labeled beer a *Volksgift* or *Genußgift* (respectively, a people’s or national poison, or a poison of indulgence), brewers insisted it was instead the *Volksgetränk* (people’s drink). In the realm of consumption, in other words, brewers were primarily concerned with their bottom line and only openly opposed efforts that sought to question beer as the People’s Drink in the cultural sphere. They took issue, as we will see, not with curbing women’s consumption or forcibly sterilizing alcoholics, but rather with claims that contradicted their conviction that beer was nutritious, economical, and vital to social life.

⁷ S. Jonathan Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace: Commerce and Consumption in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 61.

In the realm of production, the brewing industry was more vocal in its opposition to pressures from the Nazi state. Most notably, as the Reich prepared for war, the architect of food planning in the Four Year Plan, Herbert Backe worked to optimize food logistics and sought to alter production standards for beer in 1938. His proposal met with outright intransigence in Bavaria and southern Germany more broadly. Leveraging claims to potential consumer unrest, Southern brewers sought, and found, allies in provincial politics and nutritional science that effectively opposed Backe's efforts to bring beer production in line with his wartime food mobilization program. While the brewing industry remained tied to the distribution structures of the militarized state, they navigated that contingency while holding tightly to their production standards.

What are we to make of this history? That the brewing industry perpetuated pre-1933 cultures of production and consumption might be generously read as an example of what Martin Broszat termed *Resistenz*, a disruption or "limiting" of centralized initiatives simply through the perpetuation and resilience of pre-Nazi practices and institutions.⁸ And to be sure, Nazi aspirations for a totalized state remained unfulfilled. The brewing industry perpetuated pre-1933 cultures of production and consumption at times to the chagrin of officials in food management, public health, and propaganda. This was not, however, entirely subversive. Although the industrial position was in effect oppositional, it came from a place of industrial interest and even perhaps genuine concern for German consumers.⁹ Brewers who argued for the popular importance of beer as a foodstuff or

⁸ Martin Broszat, "Resistenz and Resistance," in *Nazism*, ed. Neil Gregor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 241-2; more fully, Martin Broszat "Resistenz und Widerstand: Eine Zwischenbilanz des Forschungsprojekts," in *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* 4, ed. Martin Broszat et. al. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981), 691-709.

⁹ Business historians have spilt much ink on characterizing the nature of the Nazi economy. Most recently they have been concerned with the room for maneuver (*Handlungsspielraum*) that businessmen had in the Reich. What is unique about the story of beer in this is first that it was not a major business sector like iron

threatened consumer unrest in the face of changes to production standards sought to convince relevant officials that beer could and should actually be a part of the popular welfare concerns of National Socialism. In other words, while brewers primarily worked to ensure their own economic interests, they also tended to take seriously that National Socialism was out for the best interests of the Volk and saw their “People’s Drink” as a potentially crucial part of that project. In the Third Reich beer became a site of conflict between two different conceptions of the people and what they should be consuming.

Beer and the Nazi “Biological Revolution”

It would be hard to argue that National Socialism had any one collective view of beer and alcohol. We know that Nazism built its fervor in Germany’s bars and beer halls, that some party leaders like Reinhard Heydrich were notorious drinkers, and that alcohol became a part of war rations and the fuel of genocidal killers both German and collaborator. Still, for many party leaders, alcohol was part of an unhealthy lifestyle unbecoming the new German vision. Hitler, Goebbels, and other party leaders abstained from alcohol and tobacco and pursued a vegetarian lifestyle. Changing the diet and patterns of human consumption was foremost among Hitler’s ambitions, a cause he knew would have to wait until after the war, but one that was, as he told Goebbels, “far more important than anything I can do in my lifetime.”¹⁰ In the case of alcohol, such a

and steel or heavy machinery, which have understandably gotten the lion’s share of historical attention, and second that in fact, brewers seem to have had their finger on what the Regime itself considered its Achilles’ heel: consumer conduct. See for example, Peter Hayes, “Corporate Freedom of Action in Nazi Germany,” *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 45 (Fall 2009): 29-42; Jochen Streb, “Das Nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftssystem: Indirekter Sozialismus, gelenkte Marktwirtschaft oder vergezogene Kriegswirtschaft?” in *Der Staat und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Berliner Republik*, ed. Werner Plumpe and Joachim Scholtyseck (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012), 61-84; and Matt Bera, *Lobbying Hitler: Industrial Associations between Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016).

¹⁰ Qtd. in Robert N. Proctor, *The Nazi War on Cancer* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 139.

sentiment was not limited to the leadership. Already in March 1926 the official paper of the Nazi Party, the *Völkischer Beobachter* (VB) expressed hostility towards alcohol claiming that rooting out alcohol and alcoholism were part of “an unquestionable and undeniable moral national calling.”¹¹ It followed from the eugenic and communitarian thought at the heart of Nazi ideology that drugs and stimulants of any kind should be avoided for the sake of national and racial health.¹² In general, on the homefront and in public, the Reich maintained a broad opposition to beer, alcohol, and other stimulants and intoxicants (*Genußgifte*) that allegedly undermined national and racial health in the name of hedonistic individualism. In the face of war, however, the inverse was true with alcohol joining war rations as a crucial part of the day-to-day labor of mass murder, and homefront consumption of tobacco in the late stages of the war functioning as compensation for civilian morale in the face of bombardment.¹³

Medical discourses around alcohol and its numerous social dangers were a crucial platform for articulating and justifying the “moral obligation” behind state interventions in civic life.¹⁴ Many professional journals were quick to focus on alcohol poisoning and the inhibition of both motor skills and morality. According to one report, alcohol caused more than 60% of all automobile accidents and according to another it encouraged illegitimate sexual contact that threatened the core of Nazi bio-ethics, the nuclear family.

¹¹ Qtd. in Jonathan Lewy, “A Sober Reich? Alcohol and Tobacco Use in Nazi Germany,” *Substance Use & Misuse* 41, no. 8 (2006): 1181.

¹² This, in contrast to Ohler’s suggestion to the contrary that a “doping mentality spread into every corner of the Reich,” see Ohler, *Blitzed*, 39.

¹³ Westerman, “Stone Cold Killers or Drunk with Murder”; Nicole Petrick-Felber, “Deprivation and Indulgence: Nazi Policy on the Consumption of Tobacco,” in *The Consumer on the Home Front: Second World War Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Hartmut Berghoff, Jan Logemann, and Felix Römer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 93-118, esp. 108-10; more generally, Petrick-Felber, *Kriegswichtiger Genuss*.

¹⁴ The same was true far beyond alcohol. See for example, Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

In cases of substance abuse and chronic alcoholism, the state made corporeal interventions in the name of public health. The public health apparatus of the regime categorized alcoholism as a hereditary disease of the ever-opaque “antisocial” population—a biological defect with social manifestations. Alongside the mentally ill, the physically deformed, the epileptic, the blind, and many others, alcoholics were subject to forced sterilization according to the July 1933 “Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring.” Some 350,000 individuals were forcibly sterilized in the twelve years of the Third Reich, 95% of them before 1939. Alcoholism was an issue of “social hygiene” very early on and was the fourth most common ground for sterilization. In some communities it was particularly common. In Hamburg, for example, of 1,364 “biologically defective” persons sterilized by 1935, 561 of them (or 41%) were listed as severe alcoholics.¹⁵

Beyond such violent measures, the state also mobilized its culture industry against commonplace alcohol consumption. The business of targeting popular consumption fell primarily to the Ministry of Health and the Reich Office for Alcohol Abuse (*Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch*, henceforth RgA). The latter targeted alcohol as well as tobacco and saw its work against the two as nothing less than the “will of the Führer.”¹⁶ The organization had twelve stated goals ranging from abstinence for youth and pregnant women to the managing of advertisements for alcohol and tobacco in conjunction with the Advertising Council, or *Werberat*.¹⁷ It promoted the construction and operation of

¹⁵ Lewy, “A Sober Reich?,” 1186.

¹⁶ May 7, 1938 speech by Gauamtsleiter Dr. med. Erich Bruns, “Die Arbeit gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch. Grundsätze und Organisation,” delivered at the Hauptamt für Volksgesundheit der NSDAP, BAB R 36/1358.

¹⁷ For more on the Werberat, see Pamela E. Swett, *Selling under the Swastika: Advertising and Commercial Culture in Nazi Germany* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013).

alcohol free restaurants as paragons of “healthy national nourishment,” and it targeted drunk driving and overconsumption as threats to public wellness. The organization oversaw the funneling of no less than a third of tax revenue from alcohol and tobacco sales into housing developments for “genetically healthy, child-rich families,” and it pursued the production of alcohol-free beverages at reasonable prices. In broad strokes, it promoted “popular consciousness for the entire nation concerning the dangers of alcohol and tobacco for the Volk and the race.”¹⁸ The RgA also took over publication of *Auf der Wacht*, a prohibitionist newspaper dating to the late 19th century, and worked in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior, the Health Ministry, the Reich’s Health Press, and the Economics Groups for the Brewing and Restaurant Industries to produce fliers, pamphlets, posters, and books for popular circulation. One of the most common themes in such publications was generating broad social consciousness about the dangers of alcohol consumption for public health, social life, nutrition, and work safety.¹⁹

Most of these fliers, books, and pamphlets towed the line of Nazi communitarian anti-liberalism by stressing that beer and alcohol consumption should be thought of as acts with communal repercussions and thus worthy of communal scrutiny. As in other spheres, public accountability was thus one of the main avenues for the dissemination of Nazi values and the encouragement of participation in communal projects.²⁰ Fittingly, much of the anti-alcohol campaign was decidedly communitarian. For example, ubiquitous fliers and oversized posters reminded potential drunk drivers that their actions

¹⁸ Bruns, “Die Arbeit gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch.”

¹⁹ On the latter, see for example, Ferdinand Goebel, *Schulungsheft der Reichsbahn-Zentralstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch* (Berlin, Dahlem: Reichsgesundheitsverlag, 1940).

²⁰ Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich*, 54, 81.

hurt their friends, family, and above all their Volk.²¹ The basis for communal involvement was the premise that consumption was about personal shortcomings that threatened the national body. In a well reviewed 1934 abstinence book, for example, Erich Rättsch dedicated some thirty pages to the question: Why do people drink? Omitting personal preference and cultural practice, Rättsch explained that drinking was little more than a symptom of psychological or social degeneracy.²² In this sense, the physical act of consuming alcohol was hardly a consumer *choice* at all but rather a symptom of socio-biological weakness—a lapse in communal responsibility at best and a sign of biological degeneracy at worst. In these sorts of publications, individual choices and cultural preferences were often omitted in favor of moral, physical, and social degeneracy.

Beyond reframing alcohol as a danger to communal safety and health, Nazi ideologues also worked to reframe the cultures of consumption that influenced individual choice. Several demographics received special attention. Women and youth were two such groups, the targeting of which demonstrates how the regime sought to actually influence individual consumer choice and align it with state ideology in spheres beyond alcohol abuse and overconsumption. The targeting of women and youth reflected Nazi social values such as traditional gender roles, the nuclear family, racial protectionism, and the exaltation of youth.

The propaganda directed at women tended to target them not as individual and autonomous consumers but as social auxiliaries—as wives and mothers, managers of the

²¹ “Alkohol-Merkblatt für Kraftfahrzeugführer,” 1934 bulletin by *Auf der Wacht*, BAB R 1501/116423.

²² Erich Rättsch, *Gefährliche Freiheit? Der Rausch als Regulierendes Prinzip* (Berlin: Kurt Elsner Verlag, 1934), Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (henceforth BayHStA) Bayer. Brauerbund 415. For reception see, Review of Idem., in *Forschungen zur Alkoholfrage: Alcohol studies. Études sur la question de l'alcool* 43 (1935): 81.

home, or guardians of the future. German companies and advertisers in the Third Reich actively targeted the consuming power of women, acknowledging the importance of managing the information that consuming women brought to their buying and homemaking.²³ The discourse of public health also fed into this broader culture of targeting consumer knowledge and shaping consumer activity, and in this case, was explicitly about the role of women in making a healthy National Socialist family.

According to Dr. Erich Bruns, a woman having a drink should be understood not as an individual in action but as a faltering piece of the nation and its future. As he put it,

When women drink, one can almost always determine it the result of defects in constitution... It is an old and deeply rooted view among the Volk that a woman drinking is “especially dangerous” and “reprehensible” ... In all circles today it is equally unfeminine and contrary to all good practices when a woman gets drunk and even begins to drink. A “tipsy” woman is no comrade (*Kamerad*) and no partner for a health-minded man. This view, anchored in popular sentiment, is now invested with full legitimacy by the genetic knowledge of our times.²⁴

The female relationship to alcohol, as far as the public health apparatus was concerned, was one of reprehensibility and shortcomings in moral constitution—a position no doubt anchored in the Party critique of the “New Woman” of the Weimar Republic. Beyond notions of alcohol abuse or overindulgence, here a tipsy (*beschwipste*) woman appears unworthy of a partnership with the modern German man; so says both tradition and modern science according to Bruns. This is a prime example of how, “the Nazis hoped to tame the excesses of consumer capitalism by legislating a market sensibility that spoke both to older norms of public decency and to the new demands of the racial state.”²⁵

²³ Swett, *Selling under the Swastika*, 136-184.

²⁴ Bruns, “Die Arbeit gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch.”

²⁵ Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace*, 61.

For many in the Nazi state then, women were potential wives and mothers and the stakes of female alcohol consumption in the Third Reich were nothing less than the fate of the race. The state mobilized its organizational structure and media production to circulate this message and encourage women's awareness and vigilance. A 1935 book published by the National Socialist Women's League stressed the special alertness and concerns that women should have about the dangers of alcohol. *Volksgift und Frauenpflicht* (*Poison of the Nation/People and Women's Duty*) was addressed to wives and mothers as well as workingwomen that "feel themselves bound and committed to their Volk in spiritual motherhood."²⁶ It detailed alcohol's effects on long-term genetic strength, fertility, pregnancy, and child growth. Employing scientific discourses, it explained that laboratory testing had recently shown children of alcohol consuming parents were smaller, weaker, and performed worse in school. Similar claims came from social policy oriented publications such as the journal *Soziale Praxis*, which claimed that alcohol damaged genetic material, increased the frequency of abortions seven-fold, and the likelihood of death in the first year of life by as much as 40%.²⁷ While prohibitionists had for decades given special attention to women and children, the Third Reich brought the weight of modern media and communication to align the discourse of alcohol in a mass consumer society with the foundations of racial ideology. Publications such as *Volksgift und Frauenpflicht* stressed that Alcohol was a danger to national strength and that it was the duty of women as managers of the household to change their purchasing decisions and steer straight the family's consumption for the sake of the Volk. This and

²⁶ Gertrud Kaetzel, *Volksgift und Frauenpflicht*. Hrsg. v.d. Obersten Leitung der Parteiorganisation, N.S.-Frauenshaft, (Berlin, 1935), 3. BAB NS 5/VI 4868.

²⁷ Helene Wessel, "Warum Kampf gegen Alkoholmißbrauch?" *Soziale Praxis. Zentralblatt für Sozialpolitik und Wohlfahrtspflege*, Oct. 3, 1935, 1146-1156. BAB NS 5/VI 4868.

similar books argued that health conscious German women should reassess consumption habits in their households and have their families drink more juice.²⁸

The youth were also a particularly important arena in which the anti-alcohol Nazis sought to align racial and commercial morality. As mentioned, Hitler made a point of denouncing the older aesthetic of the “beer-drinking-philistine” in a 1936 address to the Hitler Youth.²⁹ In the Third Reich, the vibrant and healthy youth were the symbol for—and in fact the literal future of—the new Germany. It was they who were meant to strengthen the genetic makeup of the Volk, and it was they that were to fight the war, win it, and consolidate the 1000-year Reich. Generational conflict was broadly indicative of the Nazi critique of a bourgeois sedentary lifestyle and the decadence of Germany in the face of perceived internal and external threats. Beyond the metaphor, Hitler claimed in 1938 that he expected from the current party leadership “that they speak the word of temperance, condemn all abuses in the strongest terms, and especially that they admonish our youth again and again that the future of our people does not need a generation of drinkers but a generation of fighters.”³⁰

The metaphor of generational conflict lent itself well to combining military and public health propaganda, especially in the context of war. The image, “Two Men—Two Worldviews” (Image 1.1) is as much a depiction of motion and action as anything else. The unhealthy and older beer-drinker (perhaps a “corpulent beer-drinking-Philistine”)

²⁸ Kaetzel, *Volksgift und Frauenpflicht*. The regime often either sidestepped the realities of scarcity or proposed novel methods of addressing them. Perhaps dancing around the real unavailability of juice in many areas, the book concluded by detailing how to make juices at home with nothing but a household colander and a little German initiative. In a further example, in 1938 the *Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch* and the Ministry of the Interior endorsed the production and sale of Milchsekt, an unappetizing alcohol free carbonated milk beverage. See Pressemitteilung June 10, 1938. BAB R 36/1358.

²⁹ Speech from the “Parteitag der Ehre” in Nuremberg, Sept. 12, 1936. Quoted in *Die junge Gefolgschaft. Monatsschrift der Fränkischen Hitlerjugend* 9 (Sept. 1936).

³⁰ Qtd. in Bruns, “Die Arbeit gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch.”




Image 1.1: Two Men – Two Worldviews. Source: *Reine Luft* 21, 1939.

stares left, or to the West, and wallows in its decadence while the young healthy man heads purposefully to the right—the East—set to change the world in the Nazi image. This image stresses not only the Nazi infatuation with health, youth, strength, and action, but also that the Nazi regime in fact acknowledged there was a second “worldview” here too; there were people who perhaps did not merit the draconian arm of the regime reserved for chronic alcoholics but were nonetheless resistant to the “biological revolution” and unwilling to revolutionize their lives and habits.

Like public health and women's organizations, the Hitler Youth pursued both tangible measures against alcohol and subtler cultural propaganda regarding consumer choice. In the spirit of youth abstinence, the Hitler Youth launched a 1939 campaign targeting alcohol and tobacco consumption. The initiative collected public abstinence endorsements from world-class athletes like Gerhard Stöck, the 1936 Olympic gold medalist in the javelin throw and encouraged denunciations for intoxication and underage drinking to the Security Service (SD) of the SS. The SD found this campaign was moderately successful, most notably in the northeast, in Pomerania and East Prussia, with some minor increases in arrests for drunkenness.³¹ In addition, popular publications for the Hitler Youth stressed abstinence and encouraged children as consumers to make smart choices. They should drink other beverages like the alcohol-free Sinalco and especially milk. The latter was, as one promotion put it, "the only foodstuff that contains all the nutrients in the correct amounts and ratios necessary for the constitution, conservation, and performance of the youthful organism."³²

In sum, as the Reich climbed out of the Great Depression, many in the regime sought to pair their biological revolution with economic recovery to form racial-communal consumer values. The economy of the Nazi dictatorship, and thus a large portion of its political legitimacy, depended on increased consumption.³³ At the same time, many feared the sort of overindulgence anchored in the alleged hyper-individualism

³¹ Heinz Boberach, ed., *Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS, 1938-1945* Vol. 1 (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), 112, 272.

³² Sinalco ads appear consistently in publications for the HJ, especially during the war years. This milk promotion comes from the back inside-cover of *Die junge Gefolgschaft. Monatsschrift der Fränkischen Hitlerjugend* 8 (August 1936).

³³ Gesine Gerhard, *Nazi Hunger Politics: A History of Food in the Third Reich* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 19-46; Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, 49-66; more generally, Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, 135-65.

of the Weimar Republic. Consumption in the Reich was meant to “serve a higher purpose, namely the enrichment of the Volk during its struggle for global and racial dominance. In this respect, goods and services had a national, even moral, rationale.”³⁴ Still, the Nazi dictatorship was never entirely total and we ought not expect that a *völkisch* consumer morality was either. Discourses and practices of production and consumption that pre-dated 1933 remained potent for companies and consumers alike in a state that had embraced mass consumption and a free market ethos as part of its legitimization.³⁵

Tensions in the Peace: Industry, Consumption, and Cultures in Conflict

In spite of propaganda and social programs—and much to the chagrin of teetotaling biological revolutionaries—beer and alcohol consumption in the Third Reich steadily increased in peacetime. In fiscal year 1933/34, the Reich had consumed 33.9 million hectoliters of beer, or 52 liters per person. In the last full fiscal year before the border expansions and war of 1938/39, the Reich consumed 43.3 million hectoliters, or 63.7 liters per person. This increase of more than 20% should have been, according to the RgA, a serious concern for all politicians of public health (*Gesundheitspolitiker*).³⁶ As propaganda and public health advocates waged a cultural war against consumption unbecoming racial comrades, there is little evidence that consumers put much stock in such efforts.³⁷ In part this was because economic recovery brought increased purchasing

³⁴ Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace*, 36.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 116.

³⁶ Dec. 12, 1938 Press release of the RgA, BAB R 36/1358.

³⁷ This was not entirely unique. Tobacco consumption, which faced similar campaigns in consumer morality also increased around 20% from 1930 to 1937, see Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace*, 171-175.

power and consumption was returning to longer-scale patterns of consumerism.³⁸ Because Nazi economists had fused their thinking to the free market, public health officials could not prohibit beer and alcohol and in fact, mass leisure and mass consumption were touted by many in the regime as evidence of political success. Between the free market ethos and the dreams of a *völkisch* morality, there was space for industrial continuities in advertising and public relations, and cultural continuities in popular understanding of commodities and consumption. This cultural grey space—that of the second worldview in “Two Men—Two Worldviews”—was an active interface for the public health and propaganda initiatives of the Reich and the German and especially Bavarian brewing industries. Subtler than the campaigns targeting women and youth, public health officials also targeted the populist sentiments around beer as a nutrient rich foodstuff, and a people’s drink deeply embedded in the historical-cultural landscape of everyday life. The brewing industry, led by Bavarian and southern German interests, fought these campaigns by mobilizing trade journals and brewing scientists to confirm their own beliefs about the historical and cultural significance of beer as a popular foodstuff.

Before getting into the cultural conflicts over beer, it is illuminating to consider why the Third Reich simply did not issue a full prohibition. There are at least three explanations. First, and most simply, the brewing industry was socially and economically important to the state. Each year the Reich brought in over a quarter of a billion RM in

³⁸ Indeed, beer consumption had been lower in the Weimar Republic, especially around the hyperinflation and Great Depression, than it had been in earlier boom cycles in the German economy such as the period before the First World War.

tax revenue from beer sales.³⁹ In the first year of Nazi rule Germans spent four billion RM on alcohol, 65 RM per capita, or a whopping 9% of the national income, and throughout the Reich, per capita spending remained steady and even increased alongside increased per capita consumption. Furthermore, the brewing industry directly employed over 100,000 workers in 1933 and hundreds of thousands more depended on the industry in related sectors including agriculture, restaurants, bars, hotels, logistics, and packaging.⁴⁰ The concerns of the regime to maintain an employed and materially satisfied population, especially during the war, may have simply made prohibition impractical.

Second, Reich leadership was acutely aware of the practical and symbolic lessons to be taken from foreign experiments in prohibition. The organizational publications of the German and Bavarian brewing industries repeatedly stressed the undesirable repercussions of American and Finnish prohibition, both of which kicked off unsavory subcultures and lawless black markets.⁴¹ The regime agreed that alcohol consumption would continue regardless of prohibition and that, in moderation of course, it could be tolerated as part of post-work social life and relaxation in Germany. Even the Division Leader of the Central Office for National Health, Dr. Bruns argued that while alcohol was the enemy of national health, the party should acknowledge that people were capable of indulging responsibly in celebration or after work. The Party, Bruns claimed, should seek to educate the people that intoxication and over-consumption were “unworthy of racial

³⁹ “Biersteuererträge in den letzten zehn Rechnungsjahren,” *Das Bier in Zahlen* (Berlin: Institut für Gärungsgewerbe, 1937), 14.

⁴⁰ Alexander Elster, *Das Konto des Alkohols in der deutschen Volkswirtschaft* (Berlin: Neuland Verlag, 1935); Gerhart Feuerstein, *Rauschgiftbekämpfung – ein wichtiges Interessengebiet der Gemeindeverwaltung*. (Berlin: Auf der Wacht Verlag, 1936), 8. Lewy, “A Sober Reich?,” 1182.

⁴¹ For example, “New York nach der Prohibition” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 39, p. 10; “Was hat die Prohibition gekostet?” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 46, p. 2-3; “Der beendigte Bierkrieg in U.S.A.” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 47, p. 6-7; “Nach dem Fall der Prohibition” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 52, p. 1-2.

comrades” (*Volksgenossen*) but that “there can, and should be no discussion of a general propaganda of total abstinence or of a full drying out (*Trockenlegung*) of Germany” on par with the American experience.⁴² More symbolically, top-down prohibition in the United States provided a foil for making claims about the importance of freedom as a constituent part of Germanness. Leading eugenicist, architect of Nazi racial science, and professor of Racial Hygiene at the University of Berlin, Dr. Fritz Lenz had advocated and overseen the sterilization of alcoholics and the cultural mission of youth and female abstinence. While he thought both were the “will of the Führer,” he maintained that the lessons learned in America were “unlikely to recommend a complete ban on alcoholic beverages. The Teuton (*Germane*) needs freedom as the air of life. He is not a human sheep (*Herdenmensch*) on which one can impose a lifestyle down to the last detail. . . . The freedom of the individual must not be restricted further than is absolutely necessary for the welfare of the nation as a whole.”⁴³ Lenz’s last statement here simultaneously testifies to the spaces beyond the National Socialist totalizing project and the tightrope between *völkisch* morality and free market ethos. Even within the eugenic value system of the Reich, the individual could still behave (and drink) as they pleased, even as ideologues hoped they would align their racial and consumer values.⁴⁴

Following from there, a third reason the Nazis never prohibited alcohol may be that in spite of the regime’s open hostility to alcohol and beer it understood that drinking

⁴² Erich Bruns “Die Alkohol. ‘Der Feind der Volksgesundheit’” *Nationalsozialistische Parteikorrespondenz* 10, Jan. 13, 1938.

⁴³ See the printed version of Lenz’s Oct. 23, 1933 address: Fritz Lenz “Die Alkoholfrage in ihrer Bedeutung für die Rassenhygiene” *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung zur Alkoholfrage* 8, (Berlin-Dahlem: Verlag “Auf der Wacht”, 1934).

⁴⁴ Moritz Föllmer, *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin: Self and Society from Weimar to the Wall* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), esp. 105-31. While Föllmer omits a full discussion of consumption and consumerism in the Nazi Period, they provide a major site of his investigation of individuality and modernity in Weimar and postwar Berlin.

was culturally important. This is perhaps most notably the case as regards Bavaria. In the case of Oktoberfest, Hitler proclaimed very early on that the celebration was “sacred” to Munich and ordered that it not be fundamentally changed.⁴⁵ And indeed, the festival was celebrated as usual from 1933 to 1938 with only minor structural changes before it was suspended during the war. The first of these was to strip the celebration of its sister-festival, the Central Agricultural Festival and fold it into the Reich Food Office Exhibition (*Reichsnährstand-Ausstellung*) thus reflecting the centralization of food administration. Second, the regime outlawed the attendance of Jews as guests or as merchants in accordance with anti-Semitic legislation. And finally, they recommenced the horseraces that had been part of the festival from 1811 to 1913. They also made more subtle changes. The conventional blue and white flag of Bavaria and the yellow and black flag of Munich were gradually replaced by swastika banners and by 1937 the regional and municipal flags were only allowed indoors.⁴⁶

Prohibition was thus un-German and bad for Germany: it would lose the Reich over a quarter of a billion RM in tax revenue, devastate an important jobs sector, foster a black market, and violate the allegedly inherent freedoms of the Teutonic people and the apparent sacrality of regional practice. Instead of such a head on approach, a great deal of the state effort to curb beer consumption in Germany, especially in southern Germany, was dedicated to naming and categorizing. The public health apparatus of the Reich rejected popular conventions that beer could be a medical aid (*Heilmittel* or *Medicament*) or a foodstuff (*Nahrungsmittel*) and instead viewed it as a luxury, a poison of indulgence,

⁴⁵ Qtd. in Tobias Lill, “Braune Wiesn: Wie Hitler das Oktoberfest stahl” *Der Spiegel—Online* Sept. 25, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/braune-wiesn-wie-hitler-das-oktoberfest-stahl-a-947923.html>.

⁴⁶ Florian Dering and Ursula Eymold. *Das Oktoberfest, 1810-2010* (Munich: Süddeutsche Zeitung Edition Verlag, 2010), 168-175.

or a national poison (*Genussmittel*, *Genussgift*, or *Volksgift*).⁴⁷ The Ministry of Health and the propaganda machinery of the Reich sought to undermine positive cultural understandings of beer with popularized scientific discourse, much as they had for issues of mental and physical disability. They targeted subtle cultural conventions such as thinking of beer as liquid bread (*fließiges Brot*) or as a People's Drink (*Volksgetränk*). Some commentators even branded the latter a clever marketing strategy developed by the Jews allegedly at the helm of the brewing industry to seduce ethnic Germans into their own biological destruction.⁴⁸ One of the stated goals of the RgA in its collaboration with the Advertising Council was the “prohibition of advertisements for alcoholic drinks... as allegedly health-promoting or preventative of illness.”⁴⁹ Many Germans maintained that beer was an important part of their daily lives, nutrition, and identity, and continued to drink beer because of its longstanding reputation as healthy, nutritional, and populist.⁵⁰ The shift had deep roots to excavate; even early Nazi publications celebrated the ethnic German roots of beer (Image 1.2) but by 1939, making such claims in advertising was made illegal.

Such efforts to curb popular conceptions of beer as healthy by regulating advertising were not a mere policy abstraction from the food purity ideology of Hitler, Himmler, or Goebbels. They were instead part of the guiding ethos of Nazi nutritional

⁴⁷ For more on these classifications, see Hermann Fahrenkrug, “Alcohol and the State in Nazi Germany, 1933-1945,” in *Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History*, ed. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 315-334, here 317.

⁴⁸ See for example, Dr. Walter Fillies, “‘Krawattenverträge’ – eine zeitgemäße Erinnerung Judas Schuldkonto in unserem Gewerbe” *Mineralwasser-Industrie und Biergroßhandel*. Nr. 9 (June 1943).

⁴⁹ Qtd in Bruns, “Die Arbeit gegen den Alkoholmissbrauch.”

⁵⁰ See for example, Eduard Maria Schranka. *Ein Buch vom Bier. Cerevisiologische Studien und Skizzen 2* Vols. (Frankfurt a.d. Oder: B. Waldmann Verlag, 1886); Carl Michel, *Geschichte des Bieres von der ältesten Zeit bis zum Jahre 1900* (Augsburg: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Gebrüder Reichel, 1901); and for a postwar summary of beer and its medical history, Wilhelm Stepp. *Bier, wie es der Arzt sieht: Altes und Neues vom Bier* (München: Verlag Carl Gerber, 1954).



Image 1.2: Beer has been the national drink of the Germans since primitive Germanic times! Source: *Der Angriff* Mar. 3, 1933.

science: Good nutrition should not only be wholesome and unprocessed but should also be economical.⁵¹ In late 1933, for example, Dr. Paul Schmidt of the Hygienic Institute at the University of Halle published an article, “On the Question of the Salubriousness of Beer” in *German Medical Weekly*. Subsequently picked up for popular dissemination in

⁵¹ Proctor, *The Nazi War on Cancer*, 125-6.

early 1934 by the RgA rag, *Auf der Wacht*, the article exemplifies how the line between medical science and the state in Nazi Germany vanished almost immediately. In a medical journal, Schmidt advocated raising taxes on beers above 4% alcohol by volume (ABV) because they were an “unjustifiable waste of national wealth and simultaneously damaging to health.”⁵² Pointing precisely to an overlapping racial and economic morality, *Auf der Wacht* drew special attention to Schmidt’s digestible nugget that the nutritional value of an 80 Pfennig liter of beer could be met with a 10 Pfennig loaf of bread.⁵³ The argument continued that whatever nutritional value beer had, it did not make economical or *völkisch* sense and thus the drink could not live up to its many monikers. Real bread, so the argument ran, made more sense than liquid bread, and thus the drink could be considered neither nutritionally nor socio-economically worthy of being a drink of the people.

This re-categorization of beer as a cultural product through scientific discourse stood in direct opposition to how deeply beer was rooted in German and especially Bavarian society. The image “Two Men—Two Worldviews” already suggested that Nazi public health advocates were concerned that the heel-dragging drinking masses were slowing down their biological revolution. Further, the Party seems to have been sensitive to some degree to the popular esteem of beer. After all, Hitler had declared the Munich Oktoberfest “sacred.” In other words, national and regional consumption habits and expectations remained in spite of official claims to be crafting a homogenous *Volksgemeinschaft*, or People’s Community. Beer sat at the intersection of economic

⁵² Paul Schmidt “Zur Alkoholfrage der Bekömmlichkeit von Bier” *Deutsche Medizinischen Wochenschrift* 46 (1933), qtd. in “Vom ‘flüssigen Brot’ und vom täglichen ‘mäßigen’ Trinken” *Auf der Wacht* 1/2 (Jan.-Feb. 1934): 7.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

coordination, populist mobilization, and *völkisch* morality. In the context of war, as we will see, this tenuous position became explicitly contested. While the Reich remained at peace, however, anti-beer factions were content to wage cultural battles for the subtleties of consumer choice, and the brewing industry, for its part, remained largely contented to benefit off new consumer purchasing power and increased consumption and wage a subtler campaign for the cultural and historical conception of beer.

The brewing industry, as we saw in the opening of this chapter, was initially hopeful about the new regime. The Bavarian Brewers Association voiced its optimism that Hitler could stabilize failed economic policies from the Papen, Brüning, and Schleicher governments.⁵⁴ Their support was mirrored across Germany. In the late summer of 1933, the publicity division of the German Brewers Association sent a letter to Goebbels' Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and to the German Agricultural Council in Berlin requesting the "publication of an official press release on the position of the Reich's Chancellor Adolf Hitler regarding the enjoyment of alcoholic beverages." They hoped that such a proclamation would help fend off prohibitionist movements that had been using the public health ideology of the new regime to ramp up their assault on the brewing industry. It was their hope that a public press release on the Führer's attitude towards "alcoholic beverages and consumer freedom" would bring "absolute clarity" to those that had misunderstood his support.⁵⁵ Such a statement was never released and we have seen some of the ways that the regime in fact brought increased centralized pressure and racialized morality to older prohibitionist discourses.

⁵⁴ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Tätigkeitsbericht 1932-1933* (München: Bidel Söhne, 1933), 1.

⁵⁵ Aug. 9, 1933 letter from the Propaganda Division of the German Brewers' Union to the German Agricultural Council, and Aug. 7, 1933 to the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, BAB R8073/19.

From autumn 1934 to spring 1935 voluntary trade organizations like the Brewers' Associations were required to join Business Groups (*Wirtschaftsgruppen*) which liaised between the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs and individual organizations and firms. The Business Group for Breweries and Malthouses (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei und Mälzerei*, henceforth *Wirtschaftsgruppe*) was formed in early 1935, headed by the president of the former Brewers' Association, Dr. Ernst Röhm (no relation to his name-fellow, the recently purged leader of the SA). The *Wirtschaftsgruppe* was in practice much the same as its organizational forebears, focusing on relevant issues of industry and economy. At the same time, a completely new organization, the Central Association of the German Brewing Industry (*Hauptvereinigung der Deutschen Brauwirtschaft*, henceforth *Hauptvereinigung*) was founded in the Third Reich to align brewing raw materials with the centralizing drives of agricultural and nutritional management in the Reich. It was a subsidiary of the *Reichsnährstand* or Reich Food Office, which had been founded in 1933. The *Hauptvereinigung* became a near constant rival to the positions of *Wirtschaftsgruppe* and repeatedly followed the agricultural and nutritional designs of the *Reichsnährstand* regardless of their implications for historic policies, practices, and norms of the brewing sector. That the two were in conflict until the end of the Reich undermines the American wartime assessment, re-presented in recent historical work, that “there was not a single agricultural product that was not rigidly controlled by some section of the [*Reichsnährstand*].”⁵⁶

The hopes of the brewing industry that economic growth would benefit from unencumbered consumer choice did not last long and soon the industry began to insist on

⁵⁶ Qtd. in Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, 50; see also Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, 186-97.

its own social, economic, and cultural importance. Scientists like Paul Schmidt, Wolfgang Kitzing, and Franz Wirz had already denounced beer consumption for its nutritional and moral-economic disservice to the Volk. And while the brewing industry remained optimistic about the general economic growth of the past year, it began to defend its product as a populist and socio-economically significant commodity, and one with important regional peculiarities. In 1934 the German Brewing Association held its annual meeting in Munich; the last before its official reconstitution as the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*. In his closing speech, Röhm spoke at length about how crucial small and mid-sized enterprises were to the German and especially Bavarian industry. Breweries served their local communities by creating jobs, accounting for much of rural tax revenue, and providing for communal interaction and sociability. Röhm—himself a Bavarian from Bad Reichenhall—insisted upon regional peculiarity and applauded the choice to host the event in Munich because of the decisive role the city and the state played in the national industry. As much as beer may have been a national drink, he argued, it was most certainly a Bavarian one. Bavaria accounted for more than half of all German breweries and about a third of all beer sales in the Reich. As a result, Bavaria felt industry hardships and successes more deeply than the Reich as a whole. In the case of tax legislation, he offered, Bavaria was a consumer litmus test because Bavarians drank almost three times as much beer per person than the national average and thus felt tax and price increases more acutely.⁵⁷ While all of Germany was slowly climbing out of the tax and price spiraling of the Great Depression there was much work to be done to fully bring

⁵⁷ *Schlußwort zum Deutschen Brauertag 1934.*

the brewing industry into the fold of market recovery.⁵⁸ He even went so far as to note that solidifying the small and mid-sized breweries—most common in Bavaria—worked in the service of anti-Bolshevism and “de-proletarianizing” Germany while fostering communitarian sociability in an affordable glass of beer.⁵⁹ Beer production and consumption, Röhm argued, were not only part of German, and particularly Bavarian life, but were also completely compatible with the anti-Bolshevik collectivism of the Reich. More concretely, beer was part of socio-economic life and crucial to employment and sociability, more so in Bavaria than anywhere else.

By quantitative measure, Bavaria was indeed vastly different from the rest of the Reich. Not only did Bavaria produce and consume more beer than the rest of Germany, it also produced and consumed it in decentralized and even rural ways. In 1933 Bavaria had more than twice as many full-scale breweries than second-place Prussia (2397 and 1085, respectively) and more than half of the national total (4504).⁶⁰ Four years into NS-Regime, Bavaria had almost 2800 breweries that produced more than 20 hectoliters of beer per year, a number that nearly doubled the 1506 found in the rest of the Reich. These Bavarian breweries put out more than 12 million hectoliters in 1936, dwarfing the combined output of Baden and Württemberg with the second highest production at 3.6 million.⁶¹ But perhaps most dramatic, and testament to Bavaria’s rural social structure, is the comparison of beer producers with a yearly output of less than 20 hectoliters. This

⁵⁸ Indeed the brewing industry had followed larger economic trends in the depression. For example the average dividend nationwide dropped from 11.2% in 1928/9 to 4.9% in 1930/1 and by the beginning of 1933 was rising slower than rates in comparable industries. See “Das Braugewerbe Krisentüchtig” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 3, Jan. 20, 1933, 6.

⁵⁹ *Schlußwort zum Deutschen Brauertag 1934*.

⁶⁰ “Standort der deutschen Brauereien nach der gewerblichen Betriebszählung 1933,” *Das Bier in Zahlen*, 18-19.

⁶¹ “Verteilung der Brauereien auf Süd- und Norddeutschland im Rechnungsjahr 1936/37” *Mitteilung der Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei und Mälzerei* 6 (1939), 143.

was an almost purely Bavarian phenomenon and such producers were considered homebrewers by the brewing industry and by provincial and national tax laws. The Freistaat was home to 35,650 registered brewers putting out less than 20 hl per year compared to only 4,271 in the rest of Germany combined.⁶² This may in part help explain how Bavarians also managed to consume so much more beer at a time when the majority of the drink was still not bottled and sold in centrally located groceries. In Bavaria the *average* per capita consumption of beer in 1935/36 was 157.8 liters per person per year. Württemberg ranked second with shy of two-thirds of Bavarian consumption at 98.5 liters and other regions including Hessen, Baden, Rhineland, and Westphalia hovered between 50 and 60 liters per person per year.⁶³

Beyond the quantitative markers of Bavarian difference in production and consumption, German and especially Bavarian trade publications also stressed the cultural and historical importance of beer, providing a cultural episteme for industrial consciousness in the Nazi era. It is here that the brewing industry, particularly in Bavaria, worked to buttress an alternative cultural value system around beer. Trade journals often dedicated half of their edition to a feature story about a particular time and place central to German and Bavarian brewing history. Some features would stress a brewery, like the Hofbräuhaus or Weisse's Bräuhaus in Munich. Such stories regularly spanned ten to fifteen pages covering the history of the buildings and the brewers, the accommodations made for technological advancement, and the social role the breweries played from employment to sociability.⁶⁴ The spaces appear as cultural emblems; readers are even

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ "Bierverbrauch im Rechnungsjahr 1935/36" *Mitteilung der Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei* 4. (1937), 98-9.

⁶⁴ See for example, Hannes Schmid, "Das k. Hofbräuhaus München," *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 45, Nov. 10, 1933; M. Teichmann, "Das Weiße Bräuhaus, München. G. Schneider & Sohn," *Der Bayerische*

told who painted the interiors of the iconic beer halls and who designed the open-air beer gardens. The Hofbräuhaus was the subject of entire edition of the trade journal that stressed a divergent political-industrial nexus around beer. The Hofbräuhaus, it should be remembered, had been owned and operated by Bavarian royalty and subsequently by the Bavarian state since 1589. The tangible product of beer and the social and cultural richness of the place were presented as inseparable. Indeed, the article opened: “Munich and its Hofbräuhaus have, over the course of time, become a singular concept (*Begriff*).”⁶⁵ This was no small claim in the city that National Socialist propaganda had long called “the capital of the movement.”

By mobilizing their trade publication in the praise of Bavaria, Munich, and countless other smaller Bavarian locales and personalities the Bavarian brewing industry promoted a distinct, peculiar value system around beer that undermined the post-1933 policy line toward the place of beer in German society. Other features in the trade press focused on more obscure Bavarian places and less common icons of the industry. The globally dominant hop-producing region of the Hallertau and its capital city Mainburg received lengthy treatment, for example, along with the southern town of Kempten and the entire administrative region of the Oberpfalz.⁶⁶ By the time of publication for this latter article, the administrative district of Oberpfalz no longer existed (it had been subsumed into Gau Bayreuth) but we read nonetheless that “Oberpfalz is old Bavarian beer-country” built around the Roman city of Regensburg, the “ancient homeland of

Bierbrauer 51, Dec. 22, 1933; and Franz X., “Wiedereröffnung der Pschorrbräu-Bierhallen in München,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 22, May 29, 1936.

⁶⁵ Schmid, “Das k. Hofbräuhaus München.”

⁶⁶ Fr. X. Ragl, “Mainburg, das Herz der Hallertau, seine Brauereien und sein Hopfenbau,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 40, Oct. 6, 1933; Fr. X. Ragl, “Braugeschichtliches aus Kempten,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 47, Nov. 20, 1942.

beer,” with established brewing history back to 1000 CE. Oberpfalz was the first German region with community brewing houses, we learn, and was thus crucial in decentering cloister and noble brewing control and providing the foundation of public sociability.⁶⁷ Yet other feature articles focused on the “pioneers” of Bavarian brewing and even on “famous barrels,” behemoth and artisanally produced kegs from the 17th and 18th century that could hold up to 200,000 liters of beer.⁶⁸ Readers in the Catholic beer-drinking south could learn about how Starkbier emerged as a style as a result of Bavarian and Vatican cooperation regarding drinking beer during Lent.⁶⁹ Taken altogether the trade journals were producing something resembling a counter narrative of German history; one in which beer sits at the intersection of local and religious life, at the heart of early liberal challenges to noble power, at the core of Bavarian industry and sociability, and all the while in a region that technically no longer existed in the Nazi administration.

In addition to emphasizing the provincial iconography and history of beer in Bavaria, the brewing trade organization also countered a number of anti-beer claims made in the Third Reich, most notably its attack on beer as “liquid bread”—a source of both nutritional value and economical living. In May 1936, Dr. Franz Wirz, a physician and member of the Expert’s Forum for Public Health (*Sachverständigenbeirat für Volksgesundheit*), argued in the *Berliner Tageblatt* that among other changes required of

⁶⁷ Dr. Fr. X. Wagner, “Die Oberpfalz, ein altes bayerisches Bierland,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 26, June 26, 1936, 1-11.

⁶⁸ “Aus der Geschichte berühmter Fässer,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 16, Apr. 17, 1942, 2-4.

⁶⁹ Fr. X. Ragl, “Bayerische Braumeister-Pioniere,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* 49, Dec. 4, 1942, 1-7. One “pioneer” discussed at length was the friar Barnabas Still of the order of Saint Francis of Paola. In the early 17th century, the Vatican had issued tighter regulations on solid food during periods of fasting. This, we learn, inspired Barnabas Still to brew the Paulaner Salvator, a double bock beer with unusually high alcohol and caloric content to be drunk in lieu of eating solid food. This beer has remained the flagship of the Paulaner Brewery to this day and has given rise to more than 100 varieties of “-ator” beers, some of the strongest and nutritionally substantive of all German beers. They are brewed seasonally each year for lent and drunk as literal liquid bread, especially in the predominantly Catholic south of Germany.

national nutrition such as a high protein diet, preferably of a “purified” nature such as vegetarianism, the German people also needed to abandon beer and the notion that it was a foodstuff.⁷⁰ Within a week this claim had garnered attention in Bavaria. The chairman of the Munich-based Gabriel and Joseph Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Leistbräu A.G. wrote to the regional branch of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* arguing that beer, “used to be and remains to this day a foodstuff for large segments of the population; in Bavaria more than anywhere else.”⁷¹ The Bavarian branch of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* readily agreed with the objection and forwarded the letter to Berlin stressing the claim to Bavarian uniqueness and requesting that Dr. Wirz explain his animosity towards the enjoyment of beer (*Biergenuss*)—a formulation that blurred the line of necessity and luxury.⁷² The propaganda division of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* in Berlin responded that Dr. Wirz’s response would come slowly but lamented in the meantime that while Bavarian traditions may run deep, “to take up the issue of beer as a *Volksnahrungsmittel* for all of Germany is unfortunately hopeless because according to the Ministry of the Interior, the highest authority responsible for these issues, beer can be considered a nutritious luxury but cannot be considered a food.”⁷³ For Bavarian brewers this response was hardly convincing, not least because of their firm conviction that beer was rooted in the nutritional and cultural practices of the German people and thus ought to be prized in a regime that claimed to work in the service of that same Volk.

⁷⁰ Franz Wirz, “Was sollen wir essen?” *Berliner Tagblatt* 238, May 20, 1936.

⁷¹ May 25, 1936, letter from Gabriel u. Jos. Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Leistbräu A.G. to the Bayer. Brauerbund, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

⁷² May 26, 1936, letter from the Bavarian Regional Group to the Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei in Berlin, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

⁷³ June 2, 1936, letter from the propaganda division of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei to the Bavarian Regional Group, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

In his response Wirz towed the line of the Reich public health initiatives by skirting the issue of cultural peculiarities and consumer preference and stressing that Bavarians drink more beer—and eat more radishes, he added—not because of a peculiar regional culture but because they otherwise lack access to healthy goods. Fixing this and other regional scarcities, he claimed, was the very goal of Nazi diet reform and agricultural centralization. Leaning on much the same logic as Schmidt three years earlier, Wirz stressed that alcohol itself was unhealthy and that whatever nutritional value beer had—for clearly it had some—it could be made up elsewhere. The regime sought to increase consumption of whole-grain bread, for example, and as this happened “a decline in beer consumption will inevitably take place.” If the brewing industry really wanted what was best for the Volk, Wirz suggested, it might be best served by allowing all grain to go towards bread and to turn to the “production of non-alcoholic beverages, especially good, natural, and cheap fruit juices.”⁷⁴ Here was the Nazi regime of value in miniature: Beer lacked economic and *völkisch* practicality, it wasted bread grains thus undermining more appropriate forms of consumption, and through top-down reforms of the agricultural system and the industrial capacities of the brewing industry, progress could be made towards completing the biological revolution.⁷⁵

The *Wirtschaftsgruppe* in Berlin forwarded Wirz’s response back to Bavaria adding that, “his remarks are hardly likely to find our unqualified applause.”⁷⁶ The Berlin and Bavarian offices of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* preferred to drop the issue but the Spaten-

⁷⁴ June 26, 1936, letter from Franz Wirz to the *Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei* in Berlin, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

⁷⁵ On the ideological significance of bread, see, Uwe Spiekermann, “Vollkorn für die Führer: zur Geschichte der Vollkornbrotspolitik im ‘Dritten Reich’,” *1999: Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts* 16 (2001): 91-128; and more generally, Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, 60, 67.

⁷⁶ July 3, 1936, letter from the propaganda division of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei* to the Bavarian Regional Group, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

Franziskaner-Leistbräu preferred to not “let the matter rest.” The brewery asked that the *Hauptvereinigung* continue to press the issue in Berlin.⁷⁷ Because the *Hauptvereinigung* was a new construct meant to align brewing raw materials with designs of agricultural centralization, they ignored the request. For now, the issue fizzled out. The Bavarian industry would continue to fight for its peculiarities, however, and at times even enlisted the support of Bavarian politicians to fight against the *Hauptvereinigung* in Berlin and the larger designs of the regime such as the centralization of agriculture and food management for the purposes of waging war.

In Defense of the People’s Drink: Regimes in Conflict in the Context of War

The Third Reich was, from the beginning, concerned with satisfying the material needs of the German people. This became yet more important in preparation for and in the waging of war not least because of the lingering memories of nutritional scarcity and popular discontent in the First World War. It was in this spirit that the food planning division of the Four Year Plan sought to optimize caloric intake. At the head of food planning was Herbert Backe, the state secretary to (and successor of) Food Minister Richard Walther Darré. In 1938, in an effort to increase bread production, Backe limited the quantity of barley allocated for the brewing industry to 1 million metric tons per year. While this was not a particularly Spartan allocation—previous years had required just over this quantity—the limitation on barley allocations posed a problem because as the barley content of beer decreases, so too does the strength and nutritional value of the

⁷⁷ See *Ibid.*; July 7, 1936, letter from Bavarian Regional Group to the Gabriel u. Jos. Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Leistbräu A.G. München; and July 10, 1936 letter from Gabriel u. Jos. Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Leistbräu A.G. München to the Bavarian Regional Group, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 416.

beer. In an effort to remedy the expected decrease in strength and caloric content, the *Hauptvereinigung* sought to square the circle with a brewing shortcut. The addition of raw sugar to the brewing process could chemically replace the sugars extracted from barley. In an effort to keep beer strong and flavorful, the *Hauptvereinigung* proposed the addition of sugar to account for Backe's reform and the Regime quickly approved and promoted the motion.

For the Bavarian industry the sugar issue was an immediate and a substantial problem because the addition of sugar violated the Bavarian *Reinheitsgebot*, or Beer Purity Law, which regulated the permissible ingredients in beer and had been in effect in Bavaria since 1516. The provincial and national histories of the law are taken up elsewhere in this dissertation, but for the purposes here, it is worth noting that it only expanded beyond Bavaria at the turn of the twentieth century with a looser version becoming national law in 1906 and the stricter Bavarian version remaining in effect in Bavaria and its southern neighbors Baden and Württemberg.⁷⁸ Adherence to the law often cracked under the pressure of material scarcity and Bavaria was the only state to hold to the standards under the weight of the Great Depression. In 1938, Bavarian and southern German responses to the sugar issue turned the relatively straightforward management of food and nutrition into a battle in the cultural and industrial sphere. Bavarian brewers and their allies turned the provincial culture and practices of an industry into a broader issue of political, social, and scientific discourse precisely at the intersection of the eugenic, nationalist, and centralizing drives of the Nazi Regime. And in spite of the dictatorial

⁷⁸ Chapter four of this dissertation features the most in depth discussion of the *Reinheitsgebot*, but most relevant here, see, "Gesetz wegen Änderung des Brausteuerergesetzes," *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* 98 (1906), 622-31, esp., Section 1; and "Gesetz über den Eintritt der Freistaaten Bayern und Baden in die Biersteuergemeinschaft. Vom 24. Juni 1919," *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* 121 (1919), Section 2, Paragraph 2, 136.

nature of the Nazi state, the brewers and their allies actually managed to win many of these contests between 1938 and 1943 by leveraging a discourse of domestic unrest.

A month after Backe issued his order limiting barley allocations, the chairman of the *Hauptvereinigung*, J. Immendorf of Cologne held a confidential meeting with the leadership of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* and a number of chairmen from major German breweries to discuss the implications of the proposal. A North-South divide emerged immediately thanks in part to Röhm, who was the first voice of opposition. He clarified that speaking as a brewery chairman (rather than as head of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*—that is, as a Bavarian rather than a German), that the *Reinheitsgebot* should “in any case be upheld in the strictest form in South Germany.” North German brewers tended to side with the *Hauptvereinigung*—South Germans with Röhm and the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*—but everyone was clear on the issue of caloric value and the concern that nutrition and agriculture were facing important shifts in the mobilization for war.⁷⁹ What the Southern Germans wanted to stress, was not only their regional production standards, but also just how relevant they were to concerns about public opinion. In the words of one brewery owner from the Bavarian city of Ingolstadt (the birthplace of the *Reinheitsgebot*):

...it is necessary for political reasons to satisfy consumer desire and thereby avoid unrest in the consuming public. But if sugar is used [in brewing], great unrest among the population will undoubtedly develop—at least in the southern German population—as they would *defend themselves against “sugar water” by any means.*⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See further Gerhard, *Nazi Hunger Politics*, 65-84.

⁸⁰ “Niederschrift über Besprechung vom 10.II.1938 in den Diensträumen der Hauptvereinigung, Berlin,” BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 586. Emphasis added.

For Southern German brewers, Backe's reform not only challenged their traditions, it also threatened to backfire on his goal of minimizing the potential unrest caused by caloric scarcity. Berliners, Dortmunders, and Kölners argued that there would be no taste difference but representatives from Karlsruhe in Baden, and from Stuttgart and Blaubeuren in Württemberg agreed with the Bavarians that the populace would begin talking about "sugar water," that it might become unruly, and that "purity minded consumers" would switch to wine, ultimately costing everyone a lot of money.⁸¹ These were not anti-Nazis but in defending their business interests they took issue with policies that stemmed from the heart of mobilizing the racial state. Their arguments were still directed at mobilization but were informed by both a critique of the rationale behind Nazi economic policy and an insistence on the intransigence of regional difference. No decision was made at the meeting, and Immendorf closed it stressing strict confidentiality. But for Röhm, patience and further discourse were not enough.

In the subsequent days and weeks, Röhm assured a political alliance with Ludwig Siebert, the Bavarian Minister President and State Minister of Economics. He conveyed the concerns raised at the meeting, and Siebert began to advocate politically. The latter was a loyal servant of the Party and Reich. He had been in Bavarian politics since 1908 and joined the Nazi Party in 1931 while serving as the mayor of Lindau, thus becoming the first NSDAP mayor in Bavaria. He went on to become one of the most prominent of Bavarian politicians, serving as State Minister of Economics and State Chancellor in the Third Reich. In the last two weeks of February 1938 he appealed on several occasions to the Reich Ministry of Food, the Chairman of the *Hauptvereinigung* in Berlin, and to

⁸¹ Ibid.

Backe himself all at the request of Röhm and the Bavarian division of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*. He explained at length his commitment to war readiness and stressed that his primary concern was about regional industry and consumer culture. He expressed uncertainty about “what effects a shaking of the *Reinheitsgebot* may have” if the addition of sugar became policy. He noted that it would take time and money for the numerous small and mid-sized breweries in Bavaria to restructure their production to abide the law. But more importantly, Siebert also wanted to stress the specific expectations of Bavarian “consumer desire.” Bavarians, he wrote, would be more agreeable with “quantitative restrictions on beer consumption than with such a fundamental change in the production method.”⁸² Röhm had made precisely this case in the meeting a few weeks earlier.⁸³ He referenced reports that other regions of southern Germany may also resist the change, especially Baden and Württemberg, which had also honored the law since the turn of the 20th century. Bavarian brewers, Siebert went on, had “held steadfastly [to the law] for over 400 years, even in the most difficult of times” (again, a formulation Röhm had used a few weeks prior) and the law, which had “overriding importance for the brewing industry in Bavaria” was primarily responsible for the reputation of Bavarian beer in Germany and abroad. Bavarian consumers would not drink the new sugar-beer and consumers outside of Bavaria would no-longer pay higher prices for it. The industry, he warned, could deteriorate overnight resulting in a recession that would hit Bavarian urban- and brewing centers in Munich, Nuremberg, Würzburg, and Kulmbach especially hard.⁸⁴

⁸² Feb. 23, 1938, letter from Siebert to the chairmen of the Hauptvereinigung, BAB. R 3101/13958.

⁸³ “Niederschrift über Besprechung vom 10.II.1938.”

⁸⁴ Feb. 15, 1938, letter from Siebert to the chairmen of the Hauptvereinigung.

By the beginning of March, about a week before the German annexation of Austria that marked the beginning of the Nazi conquest of Europe, Backe's Reich Ministry of Food responded that southern Germany could continue to follow its legal and cultural traditions. As Siebert explained to Röhm, the Ministry of Food did not want to move forward until they were certain there would be no unrest amongst the populace, the brewing industry, and the agricultural sector in Bavaria.⁸⁵ The 1938 campaign was successful and the sugar proposal of the *Hauptvereinigung* remained only a suggestion throughout the war. In spite of at least two more attempts, the Reich never changed the ruling on the validity of the *Reinheitsgebot* in Bavaria.⁸⁶ As the barley supply decreased in the course of the war, the Bavarian industry held to their production standards even as less barley made for weaker brews, and the threat of unrest proved sufficient to give pause to demands for adulteration with sugar. Throughout the war the Food Ministry reduced beer strength a number of times without industrial resistance but failed repeatedly to keep strength up by altering production standards and adding sugar.

This victory hardly signified *carte blanche* for the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*. The regime continued to rail against drinking and enacted a number of concrete changes. In April 1939, for example, Hermann Göring issued a decree with a list of prohibitions for members of the Luftwaffe. Among others were specifications against drinking with the infamous "boot" glass (*Stiefeltrinken*), serving alcohol to soldiers that are already drunk, and ostensibly minor restrictions on when and where soldiers can smoke and drink which, when taken together, amount to a veritable public and private prohibition among

⁸⁵ Mar. 3, 1938, letter from Siebert to Röhm, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587.

⁸⁶ See Röhm's summary of the conflict in his July 12, 1943 letter to the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior, BayHStA. Bayer. Brauerbund 582.

airmen.⁸⁷ Likewise in October 1939 a police decree allowed, under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, that the police could ban individuals from entering establishments that served alcohol. Which individuals fell under this decree seems to have been up to the discretion of the police but it was written primarily against chronic alcoholics and drunkards (*Trunkendbold*). The decree allowed a renewable one-year ban, a small fine, and even up to two months in prison.⁸⁸

Neither of these issues stirred any response from the brewing industry and its allies. Indeed, in these sorts of measures and those regarding drunk driving and consumption by children and pregnant women, the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* seemed to embrace the moral project of the Reich. Their critical response was reserved for moves against the standards of production and at times against the cultural values of drinking, especially male public consumption. Even then, it was not always successful. For example, in March 1939 Robert Ley, the leader of the German Labor Front (DAF) prohibited the consumption of beer in corporate cafeterias (*Baukantinen*). He also called for a proposal for weaker or non-alcoholic beverage options that could supplant beer in the sphere of nutrition. In response, Röhm wrote to Ley that, “I am of course fully aware that it may not have been your intention to take away the place of beer in German national life (*Volksleben*)—as it has been the German people’s drink (*Volksgetränk*) for more than two millennia.” He requested that Ley follow up “as soon as possible with experts” in the food and beverage sector before considering any proposals to replace beer.⁸⁹ It is not

⁸⁷ “Gegen Alkohol- und Nikotinmißbrauch. Anordnung in der Luftwaffe,” *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* 96/97, Apr. 6/7, 1939.

⁸⁸ “Polizeiverordnung über das Wirtshausverbot,” *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 215, Oct. 31, 1939.

⁸⁹ Mar. 24, 1939, letter from Röhm to Ley, on “Alkoholmissbrauch und Bierbezüge von Kantinen,” BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 415.

clear that Ley took this advice to heart, the order regarding *Baukantinen* seems to have stood, and as we know, beer was not supplanted by a nutritional alternative and remained embattled.

If Ley had contacted experts in the food and beverage sector he would have found conflicting opinions that split along the fault line of how differently the public health politicians and the industry evaluated beer. Nazi science had its advocates, some of whom we have already met—Paul Schmidt, Franz Wirz, and Erich Bruns—but so too did the brewing industry. Röhm was a figure of some repute in the brewing and food science sectors. After the sugar issue was settled the first time in 1938 the director of the brewing science institute in Weihenstephan, outside Munich, wrote to Röhm with great praise. Weihenstephan holds the reputation as the longest continually operating brewery in the world (dating to 1040) and has since become a dominant brewing and food science institute in Germany. The author praised Röhm as a “selfless leader” and said his swaying of Siebert and the preservation of the *Reinheitsgebot* “lifted a great weight from [his] heart,” and ensured that the “concept of real (*echtes*) beer” was not discredited and even removed from vocabulary itself.⁹⁰ Such would be the experts that Ley might have followed up with. Röhm himself also engaged in direct debate a number of times. In March 1939, for example, he wrote to Dr. Erich Bruns, the head of the RgA, to complain about a “sensationalist” article published in *Auf der Wacht* that correlated increasing beer consumption with decreasing public health. The correlation, he complained, was obviously not to “the issue of the consumption of alcoholic drinks itself, but instead is exclusively grounded in alcohol abuse.”⁹¹

⁹⁰ Mar. 9, 1938 letter to Ernst Röhm, signature illegible, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587.

⁹¹ Mar. 12, 1939 letter from Röhm to Bruns, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 415.

Beyond spinning correlations, the Reich had a battery of food scientists, nutritionists, and *völkisch* economists to back its hostility towards alcohol and substantiate the critique of beer's nutritional value. By the early 1940s the nutritionist Wolfgang Kitzing claimed that the name "liquid bread" was the product of a capitalist brewing industry run rampant—nothing more than a clever hyper-capitalist marketing scheme.⁹² State institutions like the Labor Front (DAF) and the Central Office for Volk's Health continued to release books and pamphlets like *The Facts of the Alcohol Question*. This 1940 book broadcasted the personal and public health risks of alcohol from throat and liver damage, heart disease, and chronic alcoholism to more "social" issues like poor sexual performance, prostitution, mental disease, and suicide. The tropes are now familiar. It branded beer "un-German in name and in nature" and again hammered the Nazi moral economy of nutrition: barley and hops use land that could better serve the wartime agricultural sector; the 250 grams of barley in each liter of beer might just as well make 300 grams of bread. "There is not one test above reproach," the book proclaimed, "that proves that alcohol is a valuable food substance. The main error [in the belief] is that the amounts of alcohol required for it to be considered an energy source bring with them adverse effects."⁹³ Such claims would be the target of several brewing and food scientists who worked closely with Röhm, the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*, Siebert, and other politicians in defense of beer.

At the core of the scientific dispute was the fact that Nazi nutritionists and public health officials conducted and referred to science, sanctioned and supported by the state,

⁹² Proctor, *The Nazi War on Cancer*, 153.

⁹³ *Tatsachen zur Alkoholfrage. Wissenschaftlich-praktische Unterlagen Schulungs- und Vortragmaterial*. A publication of the Propaganda Amt der Deutschen Arbeitsfront u. Hauptamt für Volksgesundheit der NSDAP (Berlin-Dahlem: Reichsgesundheitsverlag, 1940).

which viewed beer and alcohol more generally in a nutritional vacuum. In some cases Nazi food scientists failed to fully engage the chemistry of brewing and preferred to think about static and isolated nutritional value. For example, in a 1940 attempt to critique beer as a foodstuff, Dr. Ferdinand Goebel claimed that the fermentation process decreased the caloric value of the carbohydrates in barley. As he wrote, “Fermentation is a process of decomposition, and its products must be seen, purely calorimetrically (measured according to the heat of their combustion), as being of lesser value. The myth of alcohol as a full-fledged food is thereby definitively refuted.”⁹⁴ The logic seems simple enough. And indeed, when Dr. Nowak, the brewing scientist for the Paulanerbräu-Salvatorbrauerei und Thomasbräu A.G. in Munich, complained to the *Wirtschaftsgruppe*, he agreed that fermentation decreased the carbohydrate value of the barley. He critiqued however that Goebel had not considered the value of the fat, protein, and alcohol produced through fermentation. He claimed that if one considered the case of ersatz coffee, which was made from malted barley and heavily supported by the Nazi state in wartime, the product had a similar ingredient list to beer but lost caloric value through roasting without fermenting.⁹⁵ In truth, he argued, by gram, the caloric value of alcohol was more nutritious than protein or carbohydrate, coming in just behind fat. Alcohol, that

⁹⁴ Ferdinand Goebel, *30 Experimente zur Alkohol- und Tabakfrage*. (Berlin-Dahlem: Reichsgesundheitsverlag, 1940), 3.

⁹⁵ Much could be said about the case of Malzkaffee in the Third Reich. Here, it is worth noting the contradiction not only of the state support for a stimulant in the era of public health obsession, but also that because it had many of the same ingredients as beer, the two commodities often came in direct conflict. This dispute is one such example. In another, the industrial organization of Malzkaffee producers wrote extensively in an effort to undermine the nutritional science underpinning the “ancient fairytale” of the nutritional value of beer. A number of documents point to the malt coffee industry metaphorically throwing beer under the bus and taking advantage of the anti-alcohol culture of the Third Reich in order to secure more raw resources and to ultimately insure greater market expansion. See for example, Apr. 8, 1938 Rundschreiben Nr. 21/38 der Fachgruppe Kaffee-Ersatz-Industrie der Wirtschaftsgruppe Lebensmittelindustrie, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 415; “Entwicklung und Steuerung des Bierverbrauchs in Deutschland,” *Auf der Wacht* 1, 1938, 10-16.

is, the product of decreasing the caloric value of barley, is in fact “from a calorimetric standpoint the most valuable part of the beer. Therefore the myth of alcohol as a full-fledged food is hardly definitively refuted, rather it is confirmed to be just the opposite.”⁹⁶ The letter was forward to Röhlm, who sent it to Berlin, and was sent from there to the brewing science institutes in Weihenstephan and Berlin where brewing scientists wholeheartedly agreed with Nowak. They denounced the quality of the Goebel’s scientific work and its political purpose as nothing more than a story meant to scare; a “tale of the bogeyman!” (*Kinderschreck*)⁹⁷

While this explicit challenge chipped at the foundations of Nazi food science in 1941, the Third Reich was opening their disastrous two-front war. The intensification of the war effort pushed the issue of resource management and the question of sugar back into the spotlight. The ensuing conflicts demonstrated not only how established Bavarian intransigence had become but also how concerned the National Socialist state had become about consumer unrest. In the winter of 1941/42, the *Hauptvereinigung* attempted to expand the practice of adding sugar and sent out an industry-wide memo encouraging it—that they did not demand it is already indicative. Four days after the announcement, the administrative board of the Bavarian regional branch of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* contacted all Bavarian breweries to clarify that legally, sugar was allowed and encouraged but it could not be mandated without changing the conditions of beer tax laws and they could thus continue with business as usual.⁹⁸ Acknowledging the

⁹⁶ Jan. 1, 1941, letter from Novak to Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei und Mälzerei, BayHStA. Bayer. Brauerbund 415.

⁹⁷ H. Haehn to the Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei und Mälzerei, qtd. in Jan. 1, 1941, letter from Nowak to the same office, BayHStA. Bayer. Brauerbund 415.

⁹⁸ Dec. 27, 1941, letter from the managing directors of the Bavarian Regional Group to the membership, BAB R 2/24316.

truth of this, the Reich Finance Ministry asked the regional Finance Ministers of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg for their support at the regional level. The Bavarian Minister responded that he could not support the measure in good conscience because Bavarian brewers would hold tight to the Purity Law no matter what. If at a later date, he continued, the regime wanted to further shift production towards weaker beer for the sake of grain allocation, it would have to still be done within the confines of the *Reinheitsgebot*.⁹⁹ The sugar issue had become old hat: it was pushed and resisted a number of times and by 1942, state ministers conducted it on their own accord. The importance of cultural traditions and the danger of public backlash was always the subtext. In January 1942, an official of the Propaganda Ministry even took up the discourse of public backlash when advising the Food Ministry. “From a psychological point of view,” he wrote, any introduction of this new beer should be done “without any fuss” and with reasonable price cuts for the sake of “consumers that will undoubtedly recognize the decrease in quality.”¹⁰⁰ By 1943, the Bavarian State Food Office (*Landesernährungsamt Bayern*) established official channels through which it would redirect sugar allocations for the brewing industry (which were handled at the Reich level) to the regional production of lemonade and other beverages; a testament to the general scarcity of beverage options in the rural state.¹⁰¹

These sustained conflicts over provincial production and consumption practices and over the cultural and scientific meaning of beer challenged the thinking of Nazi nutritionists and public health officials at the core of the biological revolution while also

⁹⁹ Jan. 16, 1942, letter from Bavarian Finance Minister to Reich Finance Minister, BAB. R 2/24316.

¹⁰⁰ Jan. 15, 1942, letter from Alfred-Ingemar Berndt to the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, BAB R 2/24316.

¹⁰¹ See for example, Feb. 4, 1943 letter from Deininger to Herbert Backe, BAB R2/24316.

testing the integrity of Nazi economists and their dreams of a *völkisch* consumer morality. As the war became increasingly total, many of these campaigns lost their importance. Economic controls tightened, supply and demand collapsed, and the consumerist utopia was postponed into an indefinite postwar period.¹⁰² The anti-sugar campaign in Southern Germany held strong through the end of the war but materials became so scarce, and taxes so high, that production and consumption largely collapsed in 1944 and 1945. Furthermore, many breweries were converted for the purposes of civil defense. Breweries, especially larger urban ones like the Munich Spaten Brewery were home to large fire protection systems often with independent water and power sources.¹⁰³ By the spring of 1943, Luftwaffe civil defense and the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* in Berlin exerted pressure to convert as many breweries as possible. Such demands were hard to make mandatory, however, and the Bavarian brewers claimed that while they supported the war effort, fire water supply should be taken case-by-case and they would prefer to keep conversions down, “especially due to the already palpable consequences of the increased air attacks for breweries and the beer supply.”¹⁰⁴ These types of arguments intimated that popular support for the Reich, the appearance of consumer freedom, and the very health of the people were at stake in state efforts to control and restrict the Bavarian brewing industry. Beer, the industry seemed to suggest, held greater sway over popular morale than bombs.

¹⁰² Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace*, 227.

¹⁰³ July 3, 1942 letter from Luftschutzleiter and Polizeipräsidenten München to Luftgaukommando VII, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 645.

¹⁰⁴ Mar. 22, 1943 letter from Proebst to the Berlin office of the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* Brauerei und Mälzerei, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 645.

As the economy collapsed and the bombs fell in greater density industrial rhetoric that ostensibly served the interest of the people likely had the opposite effect. While most Bavarian brewers and their allies held to their convictions through to the end, for some, the physical devastation of Germany in the late stage of the war undermined their insistence on regional differences in production and consumption. The enormous tolls of the war and scarcity had gotten so bad in 1945 that some Bavarian brewers began to lose faith and questioned the utility of industrial reluctance. In February 1945, one disgruntled brewer in Memmingen wrote to Röhm going so far as to reject the strict Bavarian adherence to the *Reinheitsgebot*:

The workers in factories, meadows, fields, and forest want to have something, anything, to quench their thirst... What mistakes have we made in Bavaria in this war with the ban on sugar use? ... And why? Because a couple uptight conservatives reject any innovation. I'm an old brewer and even I cannot understand that... In other conditions things might be different; but for the present time the order of the day is for German brewers to make enough thirst-quenching beverages available for the people.¹⁰⁵

To be sure, the politics of nutrition and managing scarcity became a central concern for brewers and political leaders alike after German capitulation. This is the subject of the next chapter and one that would bring beer into the mainstream of German politics. But here, it is important to note that what is in question is not the *Reinheitsgebot*, for “in other conditions things might be different.” Instead, the issue was that if brewers truly imagined themselves patriotic Germans, they might have better given up their peculiar vision of the People’s Drink to simply give the people something to drink.

¹⁰⁵ Feb. 8, 1945, letter from Hugo Bilgram (self identified as an old *ausgedienter Brauer*, later says *Bürger- und Engelbräu A.G.* in Memmingen) to Röhm, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 582.

Conclusion

At the 1935 Oktoberfest visitors could buy a newsprint program for 15 pfennigs. On the cover the Münchner Kindl (Munich Child), the centerpiece of the city coat of arms, rode a horse-drawn wagon of beer barrels in a parade through the city while enormous swastika flags flew from buildings in the background (Image 1.3). Inside, visitors could read about the festival, the featured breweries, and the city. The program




Image 1.3: Oktoberfest-Zeitung. Source: Rudi Scheidler's *Münchener Oktoberfest-Zeitung*, September 1935.

additionally featured a number of humor sections and in one such section titled, “Beer Tastes Better When You’re Laughing,” visitors found the following exchange:

‘You really should quit smoking.’
‘I’m too old for that.’
‘One is never too old.’
‘Oh good, then I’ll wait another ten years.’¹⁰⁶

Visitors could laugh about the healthy and youthful virtues of the Reich while drinking their own *Maß* in a city Hitler himself had called the “Capital of the Movement.” The publication combined the iconography of Munich with that of National Socialism, but on the ground it seems that longer traditions, values, and cultures remained important or even primary as swastika banners flew overhead.

The people who drank and laughed at this program would have been some of the same that denounced their neighbors, profited off the persecution of the European Jewry, fought for the Nazi worldview, and, ultimately, even perpetrated genocide. Beer drinking thrived under the Nazi regime because abstinence campaigns failed to change consumer preference, because the regime feared the economic and social repercussions of prohibition, and perhaps because somewhere between respecting regional difference and catering to material satisfaction, beer was social lubrication keeping larger gears turning towards larger catastrophic ends. Indeed, Hitler himself admitted his dreams of nutritional reform would have to wait until after the war. But ongoing passion and demand for beer during the Nazi regime also points to some of the spaces beyond Nazi hegemony in which longer continuities and cultures persisted in the Reich and fought for their continued existence. To be sure, consumer demand did not simply exist. It was shaped by longer continuities and practices and supported by the brewing industry,

¹⁰⁶ *Rudi Scheidler's Münchener Oktoberfest-Zeitung* (Sept. 1935).

brewing and food scientists, and local and regional politicians. Bavarian and southern German brewers and their allies were able to consolidate a value system around beer that could resist, in some small way, the totalizing drive of the Nazi state while also benefitting from the free market ethos and early economic growth of the Reich.

The consolidation of industrial, provincial, political, and scientific interests around beer in the Third Reich embodies what Arjun Appadurai called a “regime of value”—a networks of value-makers that works to exert control over the meanings of things.¹⁰⁷ In the Third Reich two “regimes of value” came into conflict: the militaristic and *völkisch* valuation on the one hand and the provincial and allegedly populist on the other. The nature of the conflict was not Resistance of the sort we might hope to find any story of the Third Reich, but it was a conflict over the cultural values of defining German consumption habits and thus the very nature of the German nation. At the core of the new eugenic bio-political regime were memories of hunger in the First World War and Great Depression and an ideological connection between agricultural space and fantasies of a healthful race. The regime promoted healthy consumption, waged a war to provide food for its people (racially understood), and mobilized hunger and starvation as a mode of genocidal violence. Beer may not have been a site of resistance, but the conflicts around it capture some of the complexities of truly revolutionizing the social norms of an entire country. If we see in these conflicts a tension between different versions of Germany and German cultural values, then we can also see in them part of the foundation for a new Germany.

¹⁰⁷ Arjun Appadurai, ed. *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3-63.

The consolidation of interests around beer in the Third Reich marks the starting point for a paradigm shift in the broader culture and political economy of Germany. Politicians like Siebert, who had been high functionaries in the genocidal regime, did not make the transition into the postwar occupation. Still, the disputes he and others waged around sugar and the *Reinheitsgebot* remained the legal precedent for similar conflicts as late as the 1960s, as we will see in chapter four. The brewing industry, upon its reconstitution in the late 1940s, had significant continuities in organization and personnel across 1945. Most notably, Röhm ran the Bavarian regional trade organization until his death in 1955, a subject discussed in part in chapter three. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the brewing industry and brewing and food scientists mobilized, and were mobilized by new political allies. We turn now to the context of defeat, occupation, scarcity, and an uncertain political future, to see how beer became enmeshed in the politics of food and agriculture and in criticisms of allied occupation.

Chapter 2:

Liquid Bread: Beer, Caloric Scarcity, and Bavarian Agriculture, 1945-1952

“We ask that our government earnestly and with all clarity make [our] mood absolutely clear to the occupying powers; make [them] understand that the patience of the poor German people is now nearly exhausted and that they are achieving the opposite of what they say and want by strengthening Communism. It is unfortunately so! Beer has long been a “Bavarian Reserve Right” that the Bavarians would have never given up—otherwise they would never have gone with the Prussians! This much is certain! Nobody dared to touch this Reserve Right and now we have sunken so deep and become the poorest and most unfortunate people in the world! What a sad reputation! This damn, hated Hitler has brought us as far.”¹

“Deficiencies have arisen from the fact that there is a misunderstanding about the importance of the Bavarian brewing industry for our food system, for industry and handicraft, for our financial system, for our exports, and for the general political situation.”²

The first of these two quotes from 1947 came from a woman in the Lower Bavarian town of Straubing who, as a war widow, had been left managing the Karmeliten Brewery Karl Sturm. This passage is an excerpt from one of a number of extended and impassioned letters she wrote to the Bavarian Minister President Hans Ehard concerning the Allied prohibition of beer brewing since 1945 and the crucial importance of beer in Bavaria. Beer functions here to strengthen a critique of the Allied occupation, to distance Bavarians from both Prussia and Hitler, to demonstrate the necessity of Bavarian politicians as intermediaries between the demands of the Bavarian people and the

¹ Dec. 2, 1947 letter from Lina von Gaehler to Hans Ehard. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (henceforth BayHStA) StK 14541.

² Oct. 17, 1947 letter from Dr. Heidinger to the Office of Military Government in Bavaria (OMGB), Wochenbericht für die Zeit vom 10. bis 17. Oktober 1947. BayHStA StK 14541.

occupation authorities, and all the while seeks to leverage the communist threat into favorable policy. The second quote is typical of many grievances filed by local officials against the American Military Government (MG) and its “misunderstanding” of the alleged importance of the brewing industry for Bavarian economic, agricultural, and nutritional recovery. Implicit in the critique is an argument for Bavarian self-rule. It is not a coincidence that both letters are from late 1947, a period when nutritional recovery programs of the MG had undoubtedly failed, the Western Allies were moving away from their punitive designs on Germany, and Soviet and American tensions were mounting. In the context of the post-war hunger years, beer became important because it touched the legacies of National Socialism and the Soviet threat, as the first epigraph suggests. Most importantly, beer also sat on the fault line of political legitimacy; it became a site of opening critiques of allied mismanagement and articulating the need for western German sovereignty.

As we saw in the last chapter, the centralized pressures on beer in the Third Reich politicized a southern provincial tradition of production on the national level. In the years following the war, beer production, as well as consumption, were politicized under pressure of a new restrictive regime that sought to curb beer yet more drastically than even National Socialism. In 1945 the allied occupation authorities enacted *Brauverbote/Sudverbote*, brewing bans, which prohibited the production of full strength beer for civilian consumption. In Bavaria, this decree was felt acutely by consumers who were accustomed to drinking beer more regularly than many other Germans, as well as by agricultural producers and agrarian politicians who found themselves heading the new western German breadbasket in Bavaria. The agricultural and nutritional stability of the

region, they argued, was in part dependent on brewing and drinking beer. On the one hand the byproducts of brewing could be used to enrich animal feed, while on the other beer was promoted as an important foodstuff in its own right. Brewers and agrarian politicians argued that the *Brauverbot* in Bavaria produced a series of unintended consequences that exacerbated much of the caloric scarcity it originally sought to address. As the western allies shifted towards rebuilding western Germany in 1947 and 1948, Bavarian agrarian politicians used beer not only to address some of the material hardships of the postwar years but also to assert their political and managerial expertise vis-à-vis the occupation authorities. By 1949, Bavarian agrarian politics came to dominate the politics of beer production and consumption and by the early 1950s Bavarian agrarian and brewing industrial interests came to shape West German tax law, laws regarding the production of beer, and the allocation of valuable byproducts of brewing beer.

Beginning in the summer of 1945, there was no political entity called Germany. For those in positions of political power in the early postwar years, the order of the day was merely subsisting as new structures of governance were developed in accordance with the shifting motives of the Allied occupation forces. Local and regional politicians found themselves managing daily subsistence and scarcity as intermediaries between the people, the Military Government, and new western German political structures including the Bizonal Administration in Frankfurt and eventually the government of the Federal Republic in Bonn. These politicians, from rural leaders to mayors and heads of powerful professional and labor organizations like the Bavarian Farmers' Association (BBV) found themselves in positions of importance and relative power and over time found that beer

was a particularly well-suited medium through which to assert their criticisms of the occupation authorities. The arguments they made against the *Brauverbot* reflected a reality that beer production and consumption were in fact capable of alleviating some of the hunger experienced by Germans after the war. At the same time, formulating that argument in the language of calories, self-sufficiency, and recovery was also a way for brewing industrialists and agrarian politicians to speak the language of the occupier, to pitch their criticisms to the concerns of the occupation authorities, and to leverage managerial competence into political authority.

The rationale for the prohibition was to improve caloric intake by diverting all available grain into bread production. Bavarian brewers, farmers, and politicians, who found themselves in the new western German breadbasket, argued that the very premise that beer was antithetical to optimal nutritional management was simply wrong. On the ground level, caloric scarcity was often managed individually by turning to the black market, foraging, and gardening.³ From the American perspective, beer was a luxury of consumer desire and ranked quite low on the list of priorities. In Bavaria, however, beer sat smack in between desire and necessity. It was part of an intricately woven agro-nutritional fabric that ranged from milk and dairy production to the grain economy. Because of the crucial role Bavarians assigned to beer in managing nutrition and agricultural productivity, these prevailing discourses shaped the emerging agricultural politics of the new Bavarian and West German governments. By the end of the 1940s, western Germans beyond Bavaria, in Hamburg for example, and those in positions of

³ See for example, Paul Erker, *Ernährungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Bauern und Arbeiterschaft in Bayern, 1943-1953* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1990); Paul Steege, *Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. 18-63; Malte Zierenberg, *Berlin's Black Market, 1939-1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

new political authority like the first federal Minister of Finance acknowledged that stabilizing the food supply meant kowtowing to Bavarian agriculture and that, in part, meant catering to the complex role of beer production and consumption in the agricultural and caloric structures of Bavaria and the new West Germany. Echoing strategies from the Nazi period, Bavarian brewers, agriculturalists, and politicians once again used beer to articulate their proximity to “the people” and to criticize the regimes that restricted it.

The Brewing Ban and the Bavarian Breadbasket

In February 1945 as the Western Allies prepared for their final push into Germany, the U.S. Army declared that there would be a brewing ban in the regions under its control. It formalized the ban in defeated Germany on June 4, 1945 when it prohibited breweries to “manufacture beer for civilians until further notice.”⁴ In Bavaria, the U.S. military ordered the closure of all but seven breweries, each in a different administrative region of the state, tasked with providing for the beer demands of the American occupation forces. Bavaria and the American occupation were not unique in this. Each of the four occupation powers enacted these *Brauverbote/Sudverbote*, in an effort to optimize caloric intake and funnel all available grains into bread production. Throughout the next three years the brewing bans were repeatedly lifted, altered, and re-declared, in part because of German efforts to repeal them. The initial ban, which was a complete prohibition, was loosened relatively early to allow the brewing of “thin beer” (*Dünnbier*) with less than 1% alcohol by volume (ABV) but the prohibition was not completely lifted

⁴ Paragraph 1d, Supply and Transportation Bulletin, Nr 3, Hq. 3rd U.S. Army, National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD (henceforth NARA) RG 260 390/51/17/2-3 Box 716.

until September 15, 1948 when the Military Government approved the recommendation of the Bizonal Administration for Nutrition, Agriculture, and Forestry in Frankfurt.⁵ The *Brauverbot* was a unilateral top-down intervention motivated by the hope that such an action would be sufficient for chipping away at the disastrous food scarcity of defeated Germany. The prohibition of beer, then, was in some ways quite similar to the rationing of food and other allied efforts to assert managerial control over postwar Germany. In this period of absolute defeat, hunger, and moral and political depravity, beer became an important site of conflict between Allied efforts to manage scarcity and Bavarian and German efforts to reform and reject them.

While the *Brauverbot* by the American forces in Bavaria was not unique, what was unique was the extreme agricultural and managerial pressure put on Bavaria to provide for the caloric needs of millions of expelled ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe as well for other regions of western Germany. Before 1945, Bavaria was almost entirely self-sufficient in food production, even running regular surpluses that it shipped to other German states. The state was especially crucial to the German dairy market and on average exported 30% of the butter it produced and 55% of the cheese. Before 1945, Bavaria produced between 90 and 95% of the total food needed for its prewar 7 million residents.⁶ Even taking the physical destruction of war into consideration, Bavaria was likely able to continue providing sufficient food for its residents after 1945 had the population remained stable. In 1945, however, between 12 and 14 million ethnic Germans from Soviet occupied Eastern Europe rushed into the former Germany. Because

⁵ For legislative history, see Birgit Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern: Wertvorstellungen um Reinheit, Gemeinschaft und Tradition* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2001), 37-40.

⁶ "Facts for your Forums," no. 3, Nov. 19, 1948, A Publication of the Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division. NARA RG 260 390/46/18-22/5-1 Box 143.

of its position on the Southeast border, Bavaria absorbed many of these expellees; almost two of the roughly eight million bound for the Western Zones of Occupation. As a result the population of Bavaria itself increased by almost 30% between 1939 and 1950 in spite of war losses—compared to an average 16% population increase in the same period in the combined Eastern and Western zones.⁷ Providing food for the 9.2 million residents of Bavaria, up from 7 million, was “a real struggle,” and one that the Military Government did not entirely know how to combat.⁸

Things were made yet worse for Bavaria as relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union deteriorated. According to the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Zone was set to transfer food, coal, timber, and other basic essentials to the Western Zones in return for a share of the dismantled heavy industries in the west. Western deliveries began in early 1946 but when the Soviets did not reciprocate many Germans in the western zones faced greater scarcity in basic necessities from food to heating. In May 1946, American Military Governor Lucius Clay stopped the transfer of industrial supplies from the Ruhr to the Soviet Zone and by the end of 1946 the American and British Zones reached an agreement to form the “Bizone”—an administrative district comprising the two zones. In the Bizonal Fusion Agreement, the American and British authorities claimed it was an effort to honor economic unity as agreed in Potsdam and that the French and Soviets were welcome at any time. In reality it was a further step towards the division of East and West. On the ground what it meant was that the British and

⁷ Franz Bauer, “Aufnahme und Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge und Vertriebenen: Das Beispiel Bayern, 1945-1950,” in *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1995), 201; and Wacław Długoborski, *Zweiter Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel. Achsenmächte und besetzte Länder*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981), 119.

⁸ “Facts for your Forums,” no. 3, Nov. 19, 1948.

American authorities would work with German representatives elected to an Economic Council by the state parliaments that would, among other things, ease resource management and food production and circulation.⁹

While Bavaria had been almost self-sufficient before 1945, Germany more broadly was a different issue and Bavaria was uniquely positioned to become the new breadbasket of the western zones. As Bavarian Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Joseph Baumgartner explained, almost half of Germany's national annual grain requirements before 1945, some 12 million tons, came from parts of eastern Germany now controlled by the Soviet Union.¹⁰ When Stalin funneled grain production in those regions to the east, Bavaria felt the pressure perhaps more than any other administrative district. It accounted for close to 30 percent of the land under Western control and was more than one and a half times the size of second-place Lower Saxony.¹¹ Add to this that Bavaria was one of the only *Länder* to retain virtually unaltered borders after 1945 (although it did lose the Rhenish Palatinate in 1946), and it was much more streamlined from an administrative point of view than, for example again, Lower Saxony, which was only created as an administrative unit in 1946. As Baumgartner put it, of all German

⁹ See “Bizonal Fusion Agreement” and the various amendments to it in, United States Department of State, *Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*. (Department of State, 1950), 450-481, esp., 450 and 466-7. In February 1947 former American President Herbert Hoover endorsed the Bizone as being of “great profit” to the food economy of the two zones but remained concerned about the food supply in the remaining winter, which was the harshest, he said, of the last 25 years. Speech held by President Hoover in Stuttgart on Feb 11, 1947, NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 9.

¹⁰ “Rede des bayer. Staatsministers für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten Dr. Joseph Baumgartner anlässlich des 2. Gründungstages des Bayer. Bauernverbandes in Passau am 7. September 1947,” (Manz A.-G. 1947), BayHStA NL Ehard 1310.

¹¹ “Statistische Vergleiche von Bayern mit anderen deutschen Ländern,” in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Bayern, 1947*, printed by the Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamt. (Munich: C. Gerber), 351; and Dirk Götschmann, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Bayerns. 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2010), 450.

lands, Bavaria was unique in being “really a state” at this point.¹² Because of its administrative integrity, size, and fertility, Bavaria was tasked with shipping vast quantities of food to other western zones, primarily grains, cattle, and potatoes.

The Bizone had a rough start, especially in Bavaria where and galvanized political resentments around food. According to Baumgartner in September of 1947, “Since the merger with the British zone, our food situation has grown worse from month to month, and if this is to be continued we are actually facing a catastrophe in the field of meat-, fat-, potato-, and vegetable-supply.” Bread rations in Bavaria were reduced by 20% in the late summer and autumn of 1947; calculations in the fat supply were “completely smashed” by poor pasturing in the extraordinarily dry summer; and the potato supply for the three Western zones was facing the “worst catastrophe of all times.” Bavaria itself was positioned to have no potatoes left by Christmas, let alone enough for exports to other zones. For context, in the last seven months of 1945 Bavaria had shipped 27,700 tons of potatoes to North Rhine-Westphalia in the British Zone; in 1946 they shipped 61,000 tons. By September 1947, there was a 2.3 million ton potato deficit, and deliveries to North Rhine-Westphalia had dwindled to only 1000 tons in the first five months of 1947.¹³ For Baumgartner, all of this was *not* a product of war destruction, per se, but was rather a product of the occupation, the emerging East-West division, and general agricultural and political mismanagement. “The super abundance of the German eastern districts is no longer at our disposal,” he reiterated, and given present shortages, “we

¹² Sept. 5, 1947, “Report about an extraordinary Session of the Senior-Council of the Bavarian Landtag,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 9.

¹³ For Baumgartner, see “Report about an extraordinary Session of the Senior-Council of the Bavarian Landtag,” September 5, 1947. NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 9; potato export statistics, see, “Bayerns Lieferungen in die britische Zone,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 9.

must demand, that all food produced in Bavaria, remain in Bavaria.” Baumgartner, who would later become head of the state separatist Bavaria Party, claimed that the MG was clearly mismanaging Bavarian and German agriculture and lamented that offers for food aid from the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia were rejected by the Americans. In line with the first epigraph above, the critique here was that emerging East-West tensions were exacerbating the poor management of German nutrition and agriculture. The conservative Bavarian claimed that Allied mismanagement actually fed mounting fears of Soviet Communism. As he put it, with a flair for the dramatic, “either we must get help or Bolshevism and nihilism will rise and destroy the last remains of European culture.”¹⁴

Just as food and scarcity had clear political dimensions, so too did they have dramatic socio-economic importance. From a social historical perspective, the context of food scarcity meant a shift in social class hierarchy. As historian Paul Erker argues, postwar Bavarian social classes became “*marktbedingt*”, or conditioned by the market, meaning that those with the ability to produce food, withhold deliveries, and contest prices became a crucial and distinct social group in a new supply-based structure of social classes (*Versorgungsklasse*).¹⁵ Bavaria was home to more self-sufficient farmers than any other administrative district and they thus became political actors whose participation in food supply became crucial to governmental legitimacy.¹⁶ In late 1947, for example, a

¹⁴ “Report about an extraordinary Session of the Senior-Council of the Bavarian Landtag,” September 5, 1947, NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 9.

¹⁵ Written in the final years of the Cold War, Erker’s text is a model of West German *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* in that his analysis rejects a Marxist notion of class, borrowing the *marktbedingten Versorgungsklassen* from Max Weber. See Erker, *Ernährungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft*. 12.

¹⁶ Bavaria was first in sheer number and second by percentage of population. In September 1947 Bavaria had 2.25 million that were at least partially self-sufficient (1.7 of that was fully self-sufficient) which amounted to just over 24% of the state population. Lower Saxony in the British Zone boasted 1.9 million at least partially self-sufficient individuals (1.2 fully self-sufficient), which amounted to almost 29%. However, a higher percentage of the Bavarian population at this time was new expellees from Eastern Europe than was the case in Lower Saxony, which made pressures on suppliers seem significantly greater

number of farmers decided to withhold potato deliveries to the cities in a show of disapproval of how the Military Government and the new Bavarian regime over-relied on their productivity. It was an action, as Baumgartner saw it, which although understandable from afar would have drastic consequences for the Bavarian people and the Bavaria state. As he put it,

Farmers, you have never yet left the Bavarian people in a bind; one could always count on you to resolve emergencies when needed. Such is the case now! Therefore we are convinced that you should not seal yourselves from the reputation of the Bavarian government. Think of the old and sick people in the cities, think of the children, and think of the working population in the city – those that need their daily bread every day!¹⁷

The mention of “daily bread” regarding an issue of potato deliveries was perhaps meant to tug at the religious inclinations of Bavarian farmers. But it also reaffirms that people were so dependent on bread and grain for their sustenance that it had become synonymous with food generally. The notion that Bavarian farmers could “seal” (*verschließen*) themselves off from the Bavarian government, leaving the Bavarian people high and dry speaks to just how far food, farming, and agriculture had been politicized in the postwar period. Moreover, the plea from the Bavarian Minister of Food and Agriculture shows just how intimately the legitimacy of the local and regional government was connected to the production and availability of food.

The dramatic transition in socio-economic power structures meant that the political dynamics of food and scarcity were not only issues of occupation administration

and unprecedented. See, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Bayern, 1947*, 360. On the subject of hoarding, which was widely suspected and feared, in the spring and early summer of 1946 field teams conducted searches of Bavarian farms. Preliminary reports from over 500 farms indicated very small-scale hoarding and confirmed that most farmers were honestly reporting and delivering their crops. Weekly Report, Military Government for Land Bayern, no. 55, May 23 – May 30, 1946, NARA RG 260 390/41/11/4-5 Box 523.

¹⁷ Nov. 28, 1947, Announcement of Joseph Baumgartner and Fridolin Rothermel to the Bavarian farmers, BayHStA NL Ehard 1310.

but were also politically important at the local level. At the core of the discourse was the conviction that the abundance of Bavarian land was not being reaped by Bavarians. The city of Ansbach and its environs, for example, had been a center of unrest since the “hunger winter” of 1946/47 when the food supply dwindled, the refugee population swelled, and anti-American resentment peaked.¹⁸ Each time the Military Government or the Bizonal administration put more demands on Bavarian productivity and cut Bavarian rations, tensions rose. In early 1948, for example, a new series of cuts reduced rations to a level that was, as the mayor of Ansbach put it, “too little to live [on] but too large to starve.”¹⁹ As a result, the first few months of 1948 saw a series of labor strikes involving more than a million workers in economic, educational, and government sectors sweep across central Bavaria from Regensburg and Ansbach all the way to Coburg. According to one group in Amberg in January, their strike had “the goal of destroying the regime” that had demanded food while failing to deliver adequate machinery, equipment, and textiles. In response to these demonstrations, the president of the Bavarian State Police advised Minister President Ehard and his cabinet to stress to the Bizonal and Allied administration that, “Bavaria cannot be treated as only a supply-state.”²⁰ Minister Baumgartner, who had been fighting this very battle for more than a year, had resigned only a month earlier citing his inability to serve Bavarians in a system that had reduced the German states to execution agencies (*Ausführungsorgane*) of centralized Bizonal

¹⁸ Hans Woller, *Gesellschaft und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone. Die Region Ansbach und Fürth* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986), 256-264.

¹⁹ Qtd in *ibid.*, 292.

²⁰ Jan. 23, 1948 letter from Baron von Godin to Hans Ehard, Willi Anker Müller, and Captain Williams, BayHStA NL Ehard 1311; for more on this incident, see “Bayerns Arbeiter streiken – über eine Million Werktätige folgen dem Ruf ihrer Gewerkschaften” *Frankenpost* Nr. 7, Jan. 24, 1948, 1.

designs.²¹ After five months of these demonstrations, his successor Alois Schlögl also criticized the high quotas placed on Bavaria claiming that, “one doesn’t make a nutritional policy [with such plans]. One only embitters the farmers, and deceives themselves and the consumers.” Indeed, only a month later the Bizonal office in Frankfurt admitted that it had placed impossibly high quotas on Bavaria.²² Tensions over food mismanagement and reliance to the Bavarian breadbasket thus connected regional legitimacy to broader western German political structures.

Repeated efforts made by the occupation and Bizonal authorities to manage material and caloric scarcity backfired in Bavaria where the unprecedented demands on food production, and resistance to them, became intimately tied to Bavarian political legitimacy. Even within Bavaria, as we saw with Baumgartner’s plea to the withholding farmers, the context of scarcity had so deeply politicized food that food producers were elevated to the top of the postwar *Versorgungsklasse*. So how does beer fit in? Like so many other administrative efforts to control and manage the scarcity, the *Brauverbot* had numerous unforeseen consequences on Bavarian nutrition and agricultural productivity. And just as food production became deeply politicized in the context of scarcity so too did the production and consumption of beer. Without beer to drink, farmers turned to drinking the milk they produced rather than delivering it to market, an unexpected and unprecedented phenomenon that deeply exacerbated the already weak dairy and fat economy. In addition to the implications of not having beer to drink, Bavarian agrarian

²¹ See the extended correspondence between Baumgartner, Ehard, and OMGB Director Walter Muller in BayHStA NL Ehard 1310; and Reinhard Heydenreuther, “Office of Military Government for Bavaria,” in *OMGUS-Handbuch. Die amerikanische Militärregierung in Deutschland, 1945-1949*, ed. Christoph Weisz, (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 264.

²² “Rede des Herrn Staatsministers Dr. Alois Schlögl am 12.5.1948 im Bayerischen Landtag,” BayHStA NL Ehard 1311; for timeline, see, Woller, *Gesellschaft und Politik*, 292-295.

politicians also argued that the absence of the byproducts from beer production like spent brewer's grain also weakened the quality of animal feed and fertilizer and damaged agricultural productivity at a much deeper level. Industrial, agricultural, and political interests crystallized around a conviction that beer production and consumption played a complex and crucial role in the agro-nutritional system of Bavarian and western German caloric recovery. The *Brauverbot* as a political intervention politicized beer to such an extent that it became a site of critiquing Allied control, shaping German sovereignty, and cementing the place of Bavaria as the West German breadbasket.

Liquid Bread, Milk, and the Question of Managerial Competence

At the level of American-Bavarian interactions, the conflicts around the brewing ban were always about resource management. Bavarian administrators, brewers, farmers, and others took a number of different angles in their efforts to repeal the ban. Nonetheless, the American response almost always came back negative based on material scarcity and Bavaria's seeming inability to meet the demands of being the new western German breadbasket. We have seen already that Bavarian politicians, most notably Joseph Baumgartner had taken issue with the very premise of Bavaria playing a role in the food self-sufficiency of the Bizone. In that context, disputes around the *Brauverbot* became an opportunity for Bavarians to exert their agro-political and nutritional knowledge and to critique American and Allied authority over Bavarian and German self-sufficiency and self-rule.

One of the earliest arguments Bavarian politicians made against the *Brauverbot* was that it upset the caloric value and cultural conception of beer as a foodstuff. Almost

immediately after the war, Bavarians began to make claims to the cultural and nutritional necessity of beer. One of the earliest such claims came from Ernst Rattenhuber, the initial director, as of May 9, 1945, of what was then called the Bavarian Office for Nutrition and Agriculture and later became the State Ministry. In July, he wrote to the Military Government about the special role of beer for Bavaria, claiming that in Bavarian nutrition standards, “bread and beer belong together, more so than in any other German state. The Bavarian people,” he claimed, “would gladly renounce a little bread if it meant receiving beer as compensation.”²³ Though perhaps motioning towards cultural and consumer preference with this last claim, Rattenhuber stressed that even from a strictly nutritional point of view, beer had long been thought of as a necessary foodstuff in Bavaria rather than a luxury; a fact that earned it the moniker *flüßiges Brot*, or liquid bread.²⁴

The notion of beer as a daily foodstuff and its quantitative properties as such became a subject much confusion between the Bavarian and Occupation authorities. At the crux of the issue was a difference in terminology. In the United States, a beer termed “3%” referred to a beer with a 3% alcohol by volume (ABV). In Germany, the percentage attached to beer historically referred to the *Stammwürze*, or original wort—the prefermented sugary broth created by boiling grain in the making of beer and whisky. A 3% *Stammwürze* in Germany would roughly correspond in the American system to 0.6% ABV.²⁵ At the time of Rattenhuber’s letter, the only beer available under the *Brauverbot*

²³ July 23, 1945, Ernst Rattenhuber, “Zur Frage der bayerischen Bierversorgung,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 7.

²⁴ The term is a very old one and while beer has been a bread substitute dating back perhaps millennia to ancient Egypt, the German terms is rooted in the strong Catholic presence in Southern Germany generally and Bavaria specifically. In times of fasting, monks were still allowed to drink beer, which led to the production of increasingly strong (and thus calorically rich) beers in times of fasting. This is also why *Starkbierzeit* in Catholic Germany happens simultaneously with Lent.

²⁵ Aug. 10, 1945, “Memorandum on the Brewing Industry in Germany,” NARA, RG 260 390/51/17/2-3. Box 716.

was “thin beer” (*Dünnbier*) regulated to 1.7%. But what the American Forces conceived of as a limit on barley usage and alcohol content was for the Bavarians also much more. There were real caloric problems with the *Dünnbier* because a decrease in wort strength means a decrease in calories. A liter of beer with a 12% *Stammwürze* typical of peacetime Bavarian brew contained roughly 500 calories (this would be comparable to a liter of beer with about 5% ABV). However, a liter of 1.7% *Stammwürze* beer, which was typical of Bavarian brews under the Occupation regulation, contained only about 70 calories.

For Rattenhuber and others, postwar beer regulated to a *Stammwürze* of 1.7% was no longer *fließiges Brot* at all and was in fact, “little more than a thirst quencher.” Without beer as a nutritional option “the farmer and his employees drink more and more milk with the result that the delivery of milk to the dairy farms and accordingly the butter production have a strong retrograde tendency.”²⁶ And logically so. In contrast to the 70 calories to be had from a liter of 1.7% *Stammwürze* beer, milk with a typical fat content of 3.4% delivered more than 600 calories.²⁷ As a result, Rattenhuber claimed, milk deliveries statewide were set to drop by at least 30% if the prohibition of beer brewing continued. Indeed, already in July 1945 the delivery of raw milk to a dairy farm in the town of Moosburg, outside Munich, dropped dramatically from 32,000 liters a day to only 18,000.²⁸ Rattenhuber’s argument about the milk making up for the caloric absence of beer fell on deaf ears or was dismissed. And he was not alone. Access to legitimate “liquid bread” increasingly became an important part of claims to rural stability,

²⁶ Rattenhuber, “Zur Frage der bayerischen Bierversorgung.”

²⁷ June 23, 1948, letter from Schlögl to Ehard, BayHStA, NL Ehard 1347.

²⁸ Rattenhuber, “Zur Frage der bayerischen Bierversorgung.”

agricultural productivity, and caloric recovery—the latter ironically being precisely the original grounds for the Allied *Brauverbot*.

Milk took on increased significance not just because of its caloric value but also because of its liquid value. Infrastructural shortcomings and limited access to alternative beverages ultimately proved important to Bavarian agricultural productivity. Clean drinking water remained a luxury for many Bavarians in the late 1940s and the conditions of the postwar from infrastructure damage to water source contamination exacerbated the situation. As early as August 1945 the interim mayor of the Middle Franconian administrative seat of Ansbach, Hans Schregle, noted like Rattenhuber that beer in Bavaria was a basic nutriment rather than a luxury, that it was a part of agricultural wages, and that in the absence of the fuel required to boil water free of typhoid, “the people of Bavaria must have *something* to drink.”²⁹ Between 1945 and 1948 a series of typhus outbreaks attributed to contaminated water claimed the lives of more than 100 people and infected many more in Bavaria.³⁰ Some areas like Landkreis Sulzbach-Rosenberg near Ansbach had been so dependent on water from outside sources that between 1947 and 1949 the community was in an official state of emergency. Laundry could not be done for months at a time and some people could only bathe every two to three weeks.³¹ Throughout the late 1940s, the fear of waterborne diseases and the absence of other sources of sanitary liquid (wine, juice, etc.), led many rural Bavarians into a binary decision between consuming the milk bound for distribution or the calorically

²⁹ Aug. 22, 1945, letter from Hans Schregle to the Office of MG, Ansbach, NARA RG 260 390/47/34/1 Box 7.

³⁰ Dec. 22, 1950, Bay. Landesamt für Wasserversorgung, “Die ungenügende Wasserversorgung der bayerischen Gemeinden ein empfindlicher Engpass für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und eine gesundheitliche Gefahr,” BayHStA MELF 428.

³¹ Oct. 22, 1949, “Bericht über die katastrophale Lage der Wasserversorgung im Landkreis Sulzbach-Rosenberg,” BayHStA MELF 428.

weak *Dünnbier*.³² Agricultural laborers could not understand the prohibition from either a caloric or liquid standpoint and, in Schregle's 1945 assessment, may have even been moving towards "revolutionary tendencies" as a result.³³ Critiquing Allied management by threatening revolutionary action became a common refrain of political critiques of the *Brauerverbot*; as we saw also in the first epigraph.

Urban politicians also made the point that Bavarians needed their liquid bread. Mayor of Munich Karl Scharnagel had already condemned the prohibition in July 1945 when he had received letters from not only the people of Munich but also the director of the Spaten-Franziskaner Brewery. As Scharnagel put it to the MG, "beer is for us in Munich, as in the entire Bavarian region, more than a refreshment. Beer has always been part of nutrition [and] ...especially in the scarcity, beer is practically a necessity for our population."³⁴ Taking this claim a step further, one leading official in a brewing industry trade organization complained that Bavaria was more crippled by the ban than other *Länder* precisely because beer has so long been integrated into the social, economic, and nutritional structures of the state.³⁵

The production of beer became a part of agricultural politics broadly because of its relationship to milk in rural Bavaria. For example the first formal meeting of the Bavarian Farmer's Association in the spring of 1946 stressed the relationship between milk and beer. One special meeting of their Nutrition Policy Committee was even titled "Beer or Milk"—a name that stressed the severity of the need for drinks in rural areas and

³² See the letters from Rattenhuber, Scharnagel, Schregle, as well as "Halbmonatsbericht über die Landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse im Landkreis Aichach, June 21 to July 6, 1945," Staatsarchiv München (henceforth StAM), LwA 719.

³³ Aug. 22, 1945, Schregle to MG-Ansbach.

³⁴ July 16, 1945, letter from Scharnagel to OMGB, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 695.

³⁵ Jan. 4, 1946 letter from Heidinger to Wirtschaftsgruppe Brauerei, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 695.

the consumer choice that had been bifurcated by Allied policy. The Committee explained how this worked on the small scale:

Assuming that instead of beer, the farmer drinks milk, he would drink 5 liters of milk a day during the harvest time. If one assumes a work force of 120 farmers per community (*Gemeinde*), this would mean that each day 600 liters of milk will be needed. In a circle of forty communities, this would amount to 24,000 liters of milk that would be extracted from the delivery per day.³⁶

Expanding this out to encompass the more than two million Bavarians working in rural agriculture was left implicit at this meeting—likely because some had better access to alternatives than others. But even if we expand the estimate to half the farming population, 1.2 million, the calculation would amount to more than 5 million liters of milk lost *per day* as a result of the brewing ban.

In following these many discussions what we see is the extent to which tacit knowledge of local managers and the practical needs of the Bavarian food economy were taken seriously by the occupation authorities. We also see a clash between two different understandings of beer and how it matters. The concerns of Rattenhuber, Schregle, the Bavarian Farmers' Association, and many others percolated into the ranks of the Military Government but as they did so, references to local peculiarities like the relationship between milk and beer or the unavailability of alternatives were generally ignored. For the occupation authorities, bread was key to the nutritional policy and thus beer remained out of the question. It was understood to be an unnecessary drain on the already tight grain economy. Bavarian officials like Dr. Fritz Höchtl, a lawyer in the employ of the Bavarian Brewers' Association, received letters from small rural brewers, such as the

³⁶ July 15, 1946, "Aktennotiz. Betr. Sitzung des ernährungspolitischen Ausschusses des Bayerischen Bauernverbandes," BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 695.

Gutsbrauerei Greiner in Tann, near the Austrian border, explaining that 80% of their customers were agricultural workers and surely they could not be expected to bring in the harvest without beer!³⁷ Small newspapers in and even beyond Bavaria reported on the Bavarian Farmers' Association's decree for all of Germany: "without beer—no milk!"³⁸ And when the Military Government again enacted a full prohibition in the early summer of 1947 restricting the production of even 1.7% *Dünnbier*, there were more than 40 popular demonstrations across Bavaria all producing petitions against the prohibition. In spite of this, the Allied authorities maintained the primacy of bread production. The disconnect between local and Allied conceptions of beer and its role in agricultural stability were rooted in divergent systems of value around beer, food, and scarcity.

While that remains true in a general sense, brewers and agriculturalists were not *completely* ignored and the fate of more successful petitions brings into focus what changing the policy would even entail. Fully a year and a half after Rattenhuber and Schregle had written their initial letters in 1945, the Chief Food and Agriculture Officer for the administration of Bavaria, Colonel George R. Quarles wrote to the Economics Division of the Military Government, forwarding a pro-brewing memorandum he had received and claiming that,

This office views the complete suspension of beer production with grave misgivings. It is believed that the absence of beer as a drink among the farm population (which consumes the bulk of the beer produced) will inevitably lead to serious reduction in the amount of milk delivered to market and will further jeopardize an already precarious fat supply.³⁹

³⁷ June 18, 1947, letter from brewmaster of Gutsbrauerei Greiner Tann to Dr. Fritz Höchtel, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 695.

³⁸ See for example, "Brauerbot und Milchverbrauch" *Die Brauwelt*, June 19, 1947; "Bier her oder – kein Milch!" *Rhein-Ruhr-Zeitung*, Feb, 17, 1948; "Heil! – Bayerisch Milch" *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, Feb 18, 1948.

³⁹ Dec. 5, 1946, letter from Quarles to OMGUS Economics Division, Food and Agriculture Branch, NARA RG 260/390/46/24/3, Box 294.

But in spite of his “grave misgivings,” Quarles’ argument was largely ignored by his superiors and by Murray Van Wagoner, the Military Governor of Bavaria. Beer, from the perspective of managing an entire nutritional system, could easily and understandably slip through the cracks. Quarles’ effort came on the eve of the founding of the Bizone. The Military Government was well aware of the shortages that followed, chalking them up to the unseasonably cold winter of 1946/47 and a weak harvest season. Those scarcities, and the overwhelmingly large project of managing the entirety of a defeated country may in part explain why Quarles’ went unheard. The power differential between those with local knowledge and those with the ability to implement change from above elucidates the questions of power and sovereignty that came to shape Bavarian and western German agricultural policy. The Military Government as a whole was perhaps unable to understand all the facets and unforeseen consequences of their management of the German and especially Bavarian agricultural sectors. For the one Bavarian brewing trade organization, the *Bayerischer Brauwirtschaftsverband*, the “real coherence” of criticisms of the *Brauverbot* were simply not getting the attention of an “office competent for decision.”⁴⁰

But what would an “office competent for decision” look like? Arguments for the importance of beer existed and had real teeth at all levels of Bavarian politics already in the winter 1946/47 but they were, time and time again, rejected or more often ignored by the Occupation government. Why? When Military Governor Lucius Clay was confronted in the spring of 1948, he explained that because Bizonal Germany was the second largest

⁴⁰ Dec. 5, 1946, “Denkschrift des Bayerischer Brauwirtschaftsverbands,” NARA RG 260/390/46/24/3, Box 294.

importer of food in the world—and at a moment of global grain scarcity to boot—there could be no serious consideration of diverting grain into brewing until Bavaria and the Bizone were self-sufficient, meeting quotas, and feeding themselves.⁴¹ The Military Government, Clay, or perhaps even the U.S. Congress remained unconvinced by Bavarian arguments that beer might help revive the agricultural productivity of Bavaria and the Bizone; which was the goal of the prohibition in the first place. Politicians in Bavaria took this as an affront. As one Social Democrat in the Munich city parliament suggested in 1948, either American policy was backed by the same interests that pursued Prohibition in the U.S. or it simply demonstrated “a very stark lack of understanding.”⁴² This latter is probably closer to the mark. Lucius Clay argued that given the caloric hardship and grain scarcity, it would “be *extremely difficult* to explain the brewing of beer from barley in the Bizonal area.”⁴³ This ostensibly simple claim suggests Clay’s assumption that beer and beer brewing are integrated into the social, political, economic, and cultural fabrics—that is, invested with the same values and uses—in Bavaria as in the United States. For Bavarian brewers, agriculturalists, and politicians, the need for brewing beer was anything *but* “extremely difficult to explain.” As far as they were concerned, they had been explaining it for years. Moving beyond the brewing ban thus depended on the development of increasingly sovereign German political management and the emergence of Bavarian leaders that incorporated the importance of beer into their political programs. American officials were simply not able to see the cultural significance of beer in Bavaria and may have also been shaped by a lingering culture of

⁴¹ Mar. 3, 1948, letter from Lucius Clay to Van Wagoner, NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

⁴² “Biersteuer und Prohibition” *Münchener Merkur* Sept. 22, 1948, cited in Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern*, 57.

⁴³ Mar. 3, 1948, letter from Lucius Clay to Van Wagoner, NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

prohibitionism.⁴⁴ They considered beer a material good stripped of its local cultural value, merely the sum of ingredients they believed could be better used elsewhere. For advocates of beer production, it therefore became important to have Bavarians and Germans who understood the drink's crucial role in positions of power and in offices "competent for decision."

Agricultural Politics and the Question of Demand from Occupation to Federal Republic

In the early summer of 1947 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) changed tact from the strategy that had dominated the occupation since 1945. The earlier approach, embodied in the infamous JCS directive 1067, was to make no efforts to rehabilitate or maintain the German economy. But in July 1947 a new directive, JCS 1779, came into effect in part due to pressure on President Truman from U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and his conviction that national security depended on the economic recovery of Europe. By this time, German nutritional recovery was spiraling out of control due to high quotas placed on Bavarian agriculture, an influx of ethnic German expellees, and the unusually harsh winter of 1946/47. The transition towards economic recovery marked by JCS 1779, also created fertile ground for German-led agricultural recovery. As we have seen, the American approach to managing Bavarian agriculture colored how the occupation authorities received Bavarian protestations of the brewing ban. Bavarian trade, agricultural, and political leaders concerned with nutritional recovery already largely agreed on the need for beer and fought for it as much against the

⁴⁴ See for example, Lisa Jacobson, "Beer goes to War: The Politics of Beer Promotion and Production in the Second World War," *Food, Culture & Society* 12, no. 3 (2009): 275-312.

Occupation as within emerging German political structures like the Bizone. In the course of 1947-1949, beer became increasingly embedded in the politics and economics of agriculture in Bavaria and West Germany because of the complex role its production and consumption allegedly played in nutrition and agricultural productivity. Its position between agriculture and nutrition was also compounded in this period by larger transitions towards economic recovery, from the 1948 currency reform to the subsequent wave of tax reforms.

The milk-beer relationship discussed earlier was only the tip of the proverbial iceberg in Bavarian conversations about beer and agricultural productivity. Just as contested was an extensive discussion of brewing byproducts as fertilizers and ingredients in feed for livestock. In addition to stressing the milk connection, Ernst Rattenhuber's July 1945 letter also explained that, "in brewing beer, valuable waste products are obtained, namely malt residue and spent brewers grain. These waste products increase milk production to a remarkable extent. For instance, 1 kilogram of dry malt residue produces about 2 liters of milk-value (*Milchwert*)."⁴⁵ The scientific credibility of this claim was not made clear and perhaps for that reason, or perhaps because the importance seemed so small (measurements of single kilograms and two liters at a time in the face of postwar scarcity), the Military Government did not follow up the claim. In December 1946 when the Chief Food and Agriculture Officer George Quarles, wrote to Van Wagoner about his "grave misgivings" regarding the negative impact of the brewing ban on milk production, even he left out claims regarding the importance of brewing byproducts as agricultural supplements. Such claims had featured

⁴⁵ Rattenhuber, "Zur Frage der bayerischen Bierversorgung."

just as prominently in the memorandum that informed his opinion, which explained that the byproducts of brewing, “produce more calories in the form of meat and fat than a direct use of barley for bread.”⁴⁶

While the byproduct issue had been present since 1945 it did not reach the highest levels of the Military Government until the end of 1947. The first comprehensive and united front in support of beer brewing reached Van Wagoner in December 1947. A dozen trade associations in farming, malting, brewing, transporting, and retailing submitted a single petition. The document stressed concerns about German economic self-sufficiency and re-stabilization pointing out brewing as “a key trade of our country,” accounting for some 250 million Marks in beverage taxes and a quarter of a million livelihoods worth of jobs. They even went so far as to claim, likely hyperbolically, that the “shutting down of Bavarian breweries would result in consequences worse and more intensive than the dismantling [of western German industries] ordered by the Military Government.”⁴⁷ Beyond speaking to the new American interest in German economic recovery marked by JCS 1779, the document reflected the emerging Cold War spheres by making a political argument about “radical minds” and popular resentment towards the brewing ban. Perhaps the most important point the petition made, however, concerned the food crisis. It made the same arguments we can now recognize—a lack of alternatives, farm consumption, damage to the milk economy—but also insisted that, “if the farmer gets no malt husks, they will fodder barley. It is scientifically proved that the byproducts

⁴⁶ Memorandum attached to Dec. 5, 1946 letter from Quarles to OMGB Economics Division, Food and Agriculture Branch, NARA RG 260/390/46/24/3, Box 294.

⁴⁷ Dec. 10, 1947 letter to Van Wagoner signed by various associations, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 695; Apr. 3, 1947 letter from Landesgewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten to OMGB; and Dec. 5, 1946 Memorandum of the Brauwirtschaftsverband. NARA RG 260/390/46/24/3, Box 294.

of brewing are of the same fodder-value for the cows as original barley.”⁴⁸ When Van Wagoner took the issue to Lucius Clay two days later, he advocated for the production of beer—as he would again in a few months—but only the economic and political points were stressed; the agricultural importance of brewing byproducts was left out.⁴⁹ It is not clear if this was because the Americans were unconvinced, or because they were in fact incapable of being convinced, but the episode highlighted, once again, a tension between Bavarian and American understandings of managerial competence. Van Wagoner and the American MG were more sensitive to socio-economic tensions and the threat of political radicalism than to local mobilizations for agricultural recovery. This is understandable given the context: Van Wagoner had to wait for a response from Clay because at the time the latter was attending the Council of Foreign Ministers which failed once again to settle the “German Question” and led to increasing hostility between East and West, culminating in the London Conference and Soviet withdrawal from the Allied Control Council. Food management and scarcity had been central preoccupations of the Allies in 1945, but by 1947, they had been eclipsed by other, seemingly more pressing concerns. In the process, local management and expertise fell through the cracks.

Between the grand events overshadowing the everyday processes of recovery, the agricultural value of beer was of ongoing importance to Bavarian politicians, farmers, and nutritionists and they used it to bolster a critique of Allied mismanagement. Studies conducted at the Technical University in Munich and at Weihenstephan, the famed brewing and agricultural school outside Munich, developed increasingly convincing scientific reports on how to best optimize the caloric value of barley. Many of these

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Dec 12, 1947 letter from Van Wagoner to Clay, NARA RG 260/390/46/24/3, Box 294.

reports were based on research that was initially conducted during the Third Reich.⁵⁰ The conclusion was simple: brewing, rather than baking made the best use of barley. Citing these studies, Schlögl wrote to the Military Government early in 1948. He chastised Van Wagoner and the entire regime for allowing the brewing ban to continue, as it was, he claimed, a hangover from the destructive Morgenthau Plan and JCS 1067. He went on that food self-sufficiency and available beverages could only “be resolved when the *cause* [of the scarcities] is removed.”⁵¹ The *Brauverbot*, he suggested, was such a cause. By this time, food imports to Bavaria were very low and rations, except in fat and milk were regularly being met. Indeed, between January and March 1948, Bavaria had imported only 897 tons of barley.⁵² Taking the example of 20,000 tons of barley—a sum Bavaria could readily produce itself—Schlögl explained that it could be used to produce some 53 billion calories when baked into bread. When brewed into beer—even the “thin beer” of the Occupation—it would produce almost 58 billion calories, some 15 billion of which had been hitherto ignored by the occupation government in the form of brewing byproducts, “not for humans,” which could be used for livestock feed. He argued that when baking bread is the priority, the grain could only be used just once; when brewing beer, it had an afterlife. Not only was beer a drink that could relieve the loss of milk

⁵⁰ See for example Joh. Paproth, “Ernährungswirtschaftliche Ausnützung der vollkörnigen Sommergerste über Brauerei, Gerstenmüllerei, Schweinemast und Kaffeeersatzbereitung. Ein ernährungswirtschaftlicher Vergleich,” and idem., “Die Verwertung der vollkörnigen Sommergersten für die Volksernährung,” reproduced in BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 404. These were in part based on research conducted in the 1930s and early 1940s that Paproth himself had been involved with. See for example, the 1937 manuscript by H. Fink, K. Göpp, Fischer, H. Lüers, E. Röhm, and J. Paproth, “Ernährungswirtschaftliche Ausnützung der Gerste bei der Bierbereitung” and E. Röhm’s 1941, “Politische und ernährungswirtschaftliche Wertung des Bieres und der bei der Verbrauung der Gerste anfallenden Nebenerzeugnisse,” both in BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 585.

⁵¹ Mar. 2, 1948, letter from Schlögl to Van Wagoner, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 696.

⁵² Apr. 30, 1948, “Cumulative Quarterly Report Covering Period 1 Jan. – 31 Mar. 1948,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

through farm consumption, cows fed fodder enriched with brewing byproducts produced more milk and, as with other livestock, grew faster for slaughter.⁵³ For Schlögl, and many Bavarians, making liquid bread, and reaping its rich byproducts, had become part of the preconditions of agricultural and western German stability.

While the issue was only passingly mentioned to Lucius Clay and did not become immediately important among occupation officials, it did become increasingly important in the formation of Bavarian and Bizonal politics. As Bavaria became increasingly central to agricultural production in the Bizone through 1947 and 1948, Bavarian and Bizonal authorities began to harmonize their efforts to repeal the brewing ban. While the brewing ban had been the target of minor criticism in the British Zone, especially in Hamburg, it was not nearly as contentious as in Bavaria. This was primarily due to how tightly agriculturalists, politicians, and brewers in the new bread basket had associated beer with agricultural and caloric recovery. Within the Bizone, they had both allies and more importantly institutional pathways, limited as they were, for policy change. Bavarian agriculturalists and brewers, alongside their counterparts in Hamburg, advocated for a flexible ration card that could be exchanged either for beer or bread. In early 1948 the plan was formally proposed, first by Bavarian politicians, and later by leaders in the Bizone. It fell to the Bavarians to convince the other West German leaders to endorse the program. For example, the Mayor of Munich, Karl Scharnagel, who as we saw had been advocating for the caloric value of beer as early as 1945, wrote to Hans Schlange-Schöningen, the Director for Nutrition, Agriculture, and Forestry in the Administrative Council of the Bizonal Administration in Frankfurt in April 1948.

⁵³ Mar. 2, 1948, Schlögl to Van Wagoner.

Scharnagel addressed the many food concerns unique to Munich and Bavaria in the emerging Bizonal structure. In the case of beer, he prefaced his pitch of the beer-bread ration card by writing, “I know that the importance of this matter [the availability of beer] has not the found necessary understanding beyond Bavaria and is most often ridiculed and laughed at. In reality however when beer possesses a certain quality, it is actually a foodstuff, most notably for our laboring people.”⁵⁴ Schlange-Schöningen and others in the Bizonal administration were sympathetic to the argument that beer filled a vital niche in rural consumption and promoted the ration card; an early form of consumer choice that did not upset the Military Government’s emphasis on bread production and consumption.

The key to making the program politically viable was that it was not only pitched as a way to get more beer, but as a way of improving the food situation in Bavaria and western Germany generally. In May 1948 fliers were produced in Munich and Hamburg that spread the word around the Bizone that beer played a crucial role in the food economy. A small booklet offered a simple explanation and equation (Image 2.1) and inside, it explained that by sacrificing only a small “sugar-cube sized” portion of bread (another source claims it was 6 grams) per week, consumers could also reap more calories from dairy and meat sources. On the back cover, it concluded that the relationship was win-win-win:

Agriculture again obtains its largest and crisis-proof customers for barley and hops [i.e. breweries] and it gets from breweries the rich feed for an intensification of the dairy industry, an increase in the bread economy, and an abundance of pig fattening with a

⁵⁴ April 8, 1948, letter from Karl Scharnagel to Hans Schlange-Schöningen, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (henceforth BAK), Z 6/I 123.

corresponding gain in protein and fat. Beer is a boon to the food- and national economy.⁵⁵

In July, the flexible ration program became a reality, introducing new ration cards with coupons that could be redeemed *either* for 50 grams of bread *or* 1.5 liters of 1.7% thin beer.⁵⁶ Germans in the Bizone were given a choice as consumers as to how they preferred



Image 2.1: Beer mitigates the drink emergency. Source: Flier attached to May 11, 1948 correspondence between the Brewers Association of the British Zone in Hamburg and the Bavarian Brewers Association. BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 423

⁵⁵ Flier “Bier lindert die Getränke-Not...” attached to May 11, 1948 correspondence between the Brewers Association of the British Zone in Hamburg and the Bavarian Brewers Association, BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 423.

⁵⁶ July 15, 1948, “Ministerial Resolution A/II 1-329/48,” sent by Schlögl to Food Offices A and B. BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 696.

to get their calories, a transition that helped signal a larger shift towards a consumer society where consumption could once again be based on enjoyment.⁵⁷ This consumer choice could be motivated by, among other things, personal preference, necessity of beverages, or perhaps the consumer morality suggested in this flier, that drinking beer was good for everyone and should be embraced as a widely beneficial people's drink.

The ration coupons were a cultural and political manifestation of agricultural arguments about the importance of beer to Bavarian and German nutritional and economic recovery. They were introduced alongside other, much larger structural changes. As these fliers went out, the western zones of Germany were undergoing a currency reform that dramatically influenced the beer economy. The currency reform in the summer of 1948 had mainstreaming effect on discourses of beer as liquid bread and of the importance of the brewing industry for agricultural productivity.

In the process of currency reform, Ludwig Erhard, the director of economics in the Bizone lifted many of the restrictions on price and production placed on economic goods by the occupation and the Third Reich. he did not, however, lift the brewing ban or the strict tax policies placed on beer and as a result the milk-beer crisis worsened even as the rest of the economy began to grow.

In the summer of 1948 people had yet another reason to drink more milk than the weak occupation beer: taxes. Over the past fifteen years, taxes on beer were repeatedly

⁵⁷ Michael Wildt, "Plurality of Taste: Food and Consumption in West Germany during the 1950s" *History Journal Workshop* 39, no. 1 (1995): 24-26; and Arne Andersen, "Mentalitätenwechsel und ökologische Konsequenzen des Konsumismus: Die Durchsetzung der Konsumgesellschaft in den fünfziger Jahren" in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte: Zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des Konsums (18. bis 20. Jahrhundert)*, ed. Hannes Siegrist, Hartmut Kaelble, and Jürgen Kocka, (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1997): 763-792. Robert Stephens has traced a particular strand of this development in a continuum of consumption and enjoyment from the rationing economy to the heroine epidemic in the 1970s. See Robert Stephens, *Germans on Drugs: The Complications of Modernization in Hamburg* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007).

raised first by the wartime Reich and later by the Allies as a way of enforcing beer strength. After the introduction of the Deutsche Mark, surplus money and buying power generated by inflationary means of war finance disappeared and the consumer had to pinch Pfennigs.⁵⁸ As they became more conservative in their purchasing decisions, demand for affordable high-quality beer rose and occupation-strength ersatz beer was rendered unsalable. Indeed, in the period between the currency reform and the return of full-strength beer, Bavarian sales dropped between 90 and 95 percent.⁵⁹ After the currency reform, as one Bavarian official put it, “the impossible prices will nearly prevent beer sales,” and once again, “much beer will be replaced with milk.”⁶⁰ The beer-milk issue thus became an explicitly economic concern due to lingering tax burdens.

The Marshall Plan goal of increasing consumption and economic growth required making beer more attractive to western Germans with their new Deutsche Marks. In August 1948 an economic advisory committee set up in the Bizone to oversee the beer industry stressed that beer with such a high price would never be bought while the alcohol content and nutritional value were so low.⁶¹ Under advisement of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, the Farmers’ Association, and many others, the Administration of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry in the United Economic Area advocated to the occupation authorities an increase from 1.7% original wort strength to 8%. On September

⁵⁸ For more on surplus purchasing power in the occupation and the hopes of the Currency Reform for establishing a meaningful price structure, see Michael L. Hughes, *Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 29; and Dirk Götschmann, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Bayerns. 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2010), 408-413.

⁵⁹ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1948*, 10.

⁶⁰ Memorandum marked only, “received July 21, 1948,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

⁶¹ Aug. 2, 1948, signed Hans Podeyn, Director of the VELF, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 696.

15, 1948 MG Regulation 12-303.4 approved the request thereby lifting the *Brauverbot*.⁶² It was currency reform and the hopes of economic growth that finally lifted the brewing ban but the logic of the policy change was rooted in a strongly Bavarian argument about the relationship between beer and agricultural productivity. Purging tax legislation itself would take time and ongoing difficulties and shortages in the agricultural sector would repeatedly limit the production stronger beer for at least another year.

From the perspective of agricultural productivity there were still myriad problems even as conditions generally improved. For instance, around Munich, the lack of sufficient brewing byproducts combined in the summer of 1948 with unusual dryness, cattle did not eat well, milk production went down, breeding decreased as slaughter quotas remained high, and the manure-based fertilizer supply dwindled; a downward spiral for the milk-beer-byproduct triangle.⁶³ Nonetheless, by November 1948 milk *production* was recorded as up across Bavaria but *collections and deliveries* were still very low as a result of rural consumption and black marketeering. Minister Schlögl intervened to implement stricter regulations and oversight on milk collection—measures he saw as only a temporary stopgap.⁶⁴ In terms of the food supply generally, by the beginning of 1949, the Military Government of Bavaria reported that for the sixth consecutive month Bavarian consumers were getting 1800 calories per day which included 800 grams of ration-free potatoes and an estimated 300 more calories per day

⁶² See for example, Sept. 22, 1948, “Niederschrift über die 8. Sitzung des Beirats des Bayerischen Brauerbundes,” BayHStA Bayer Brauerbund 696.

⁶³ See for example the cases of Hochschloß Pähl and Achselschwang, both outside Munich; Report from July 3, 1948, by R. Graf von Spreiti'sche Gutsverwaltung, Bayerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (henceforth BWA) F009-386.

⁶⁴ Nov. 5, 1948, “Monthly Report for Bipartite Control Office for Oct. 1948,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

from fruits and vegetables. Milk and fat, however, remained as the sole unmet rations and were in fact reduced due to problems in collecting products from farmers.⁶⁵

This was a problem that Bavarian agro-politicians, namely Minister Schlögl, had seen coming. In June 1948, amidst talks about repealing the brewing ban, Ehard and Schlögl also discussed what problems would linger. Schlögl explained to Ehard that the lifting of the prohibition and the currency reform alone would not be enough to fix the rural problem. Fully 80 percent of beer demand came from rural farmers and, “with the price of beer at 72 Pfg per liter and a milk price of 24 Pfg per liter, it is obvious that the farmer, in the face of this huge price gap will choose milk instead of beer, which means milk consumption in agricultural areas will increase tremendously in the future.” Schlögl added that in 1947, the average milk price had not increased from 1945; the beer price, however, had close to doubled in the same period due to heavy taxation designed to enforce the brewing ban. He noted the caloric comparison between milk and weak beer but claimed also that even the lifting of the ban would not make beer, of any strength, economically viable. In spite of all this, he maintained, agriculture *needed* beer both for drinking and for brewing byproducts: “an increase in beer consumption seems necessary and can only be achieved by lowering excessive tax.”⁶⁶ In short, the lifting of the prohibition and the currency reform alone would not be enough to fix the rural consumption problem—there needed to be tax reform. A few weeks earlier, the French Zone of occupation was added to the Bizone, forming the so-called Trizone, and with the

⁶⁵ Jan. 5, 1949, “Monthly Report for Bipartite Control Office for Dec. 1948,” NARA RG 260 390/47/34/2-3 Box 15.

⁶⁶ June 23, 1948, letter from Schlögl to Ehard, BayHStA NL Ehard 1347; see also July 2, 1948, letter from Schlögl to Verwaltung für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes in Frankfurt, BayHStA MELF 1334.

currency reform, western Germany was consolidating into what would become the Federal Republic. Beer was no longer about agriculture and subsistence but was instead part of political and taxation reform in the emerging western Germany. Bigger now than just Bavaria or the Bizone, this was a question of the shape of the economy and agricultural sectors of the new West German state.

After the ban was lifted grain scarcity and quality continued to be a problem throughout 1948 and 1949, which made consistently producing strong and high-quality beer difficult. At the same time, the brewing industry worked with political leaders to make the product affordable. Grain supply stabilized in early summer of 1949 and by autumn, Bavarians were happy to have access to full strength 12-15% wort strength beer for the return of Oktoberfest which had not been celebrated since before the war.⁶⁷

Financially, wheels began turning in the early summer of 1949, just in the wake of the May 23 founding of the West German Federal Republic. The Bavarian Brewers Association exerted pressure on Ehard and the Bavarian *Landtag* to reduce beer taxes to prewar levels and in October of 1949 the first annual meeting of the newly formed German Brewers Association met, tellingly in Munich, to formulate a strategy for convincing the new Federal Minister of Finance (and founding member of the Bavarian CSU) Fritz Schäffer to dramatically lower the beer tax.⁶⁸ Schäffer sought to move on the decrease but things were delayed because he wanted to reach an agreement on consumer prices. At the time, taxes on beer were paid by the producers who then adjusted their prices to assure the desired profit margins. As a result, locking in consumer prices

⁶⁷ The first beer of such strength was consumed in large quantities at Oktoberfest in 1949, but growth was rapid: 500 hectoliters were produced in September 1949, versus 7000 September 1950, see Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1950*, back cover.

⁶⁸ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1949*, 20.

required complex negotiations between producers, distributors, and retailers. In the months that followed this was negotiated, harmonized across interest- and state lines, passed through the Bundestag, and ultimately approved by the Allied High Commission on August 1, 1950.⁶⁹ The taxes were tiered, with state variations as well as higher taxes for stronger beers, but in short, the reform halved the tax rate on beer. In the estimation of the Bavarian Brewers Association, this legislation was a windfall that “created a sound basis for the comeback of the German brewing industry.”⁷⁰

The 1950 tax legislation, like the flexible ration card, reflects the extent to which Bavarian cultural and agricultural interests could influence West German policy. While the 1950 law lowered taxes it did little to regulate production standards or harmonize taxes to accommodate the greater industrial capital of the western and northern German regions that could produce more in large-scale breweries. This in turn threatened to displace the Bavarian market share in Germany and the world as the industry in Bavaria was much more decentralized, boasting far more small-scale breweries than other German states. This and other issues were taken up in the more extensive 1952 Beer Tax Law (*Biersteuergesetz*). Foremost among those issues were production standards; and it was here that the Bavarian *Reinheitsgebot* was codified as national law. The details of this are taken up in subsequent chapters and it suffices here to stress that what emerged out of the Occupation was a West German state that privileged Bavarian agriculture and internalized a Bavarian-driven agricultural politics in which beer production played an important role. The point is not to suggest that advocating for beer was somehow the central goal of Bavarian agriculture or politics or of the (Bavarian dominated) agrarian

⁶⁹ *Geschäftsbericht 1950*, 11-15.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

politics of the Federal Republic. More subtly, beer was integrated into agricultural politics in Bavaria as a result of the scarcity of the immediate postwar period and the competing allied and German claims to managerial competence.

Conclusion

Bavarian agriculture became increasingly important in the postwar period alongside larger developments in the nutritional management and politico-economic history of occupied Germany: industrial dismantling, revising JCS directive 1067, and escalating tensions between East and West from the distribution of food to the currency reform and the emergence of a sovereign West German state. From 1945 to the early 1950s beer production and consumption became tied up with the agricultural politics of Bavaria and—because the state had become the new western breadbasket—the entire Federal Republic. Beer was not somehow *the* reference point for agricultural management in the Federal Republic but it had undeniably become a part of it and a part that was largely driven by Bavarian interests. It was, after all, Bavarians that had advocated for the beer-bread ration card as well as argued that West German tax reform was necessary for the recovery of the brewing and associated agricultural industries.

By the mid 1950s, the Bavarian brewing industry had become disproportionately powerful in the complex network needed to increase Bavarian and thus West German agricultural productivity. It was simply par for the course. In 1954, for example, a conference of the Federal and State Ministers of Agriculture took place, tellingly, in Munich. Brewing was discussed only briefly with regards to the importance of byproducts for quality livestock feed. But Minister Schlögl also made it known that the

Bavarian Brewers Association had been pressuring him to increase high quality barley production, an issue he had already taken up with the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council) and Federal Finance Minister Schäffer. In response, Heinrich Lübke, the new Federal Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of Konrad Adenauer and the future Federal President, replied that he quite simply would not stand in the way. As he explained to Schlögl, “the influence of the brewer is certainly stronger in Munich than in Bonn.”⁷¹ The conditions of prohibition and scarcity became a site for endowing beer with a special role in feeding Germans. By the time West Germany was stabilizing as a sovereign state, Bavaria’s brewers had come to hold notable political power in the breadbasket of the new Federal Republic.

Taken together with the preceding chapter, both the Nazi and occupation governments restricted, albeit in different ways, the production and consumption of beer. Regardless of the differences, however, their intervention was perceived by Bavarian brewers, agriculturalists, and politicians as a challenge or threat to traditions, practices, and conditions peculiar to Bavaria and southern Germany. The pressures put on the production and consumption of beer in the restrictive regimes were historically unprecedented and, in both cases, the governments were met with opposition. Advocates for the production and consumption of beer argued that the respective regimes were too far removed from the people they claimed to govern. The “regimes of value” for beer in both the Nazi and occupation governments clashed with an emerging rival anchored most strongly in Bavaria. By the early 1950s, as we have seen, advocates for the production and consumption of beer, those who for a number of reasons argued it was a public

⁷¹ “Protokoll der Agrarministerkonferenz in München am 30 Sept. 1954,” BayHStA MELF 1342.

staple, a people's drink, had risen from a position of opposition to positions of relative power.

Part II: The Many Lives of Beer

Chapter 3:

Industrial Recovery and the Culture of Consumption in the Miracle Years

In 1968, a cover story by the influential West German weekly *Der Spiegel* boasted that West German annual beer expenditures for the year were set to surpass eleven billion Marks. The drink had become the single most popular beverage in the Federal Republic with one in four West Germans drinking beer every day and per capita consumption displacing milk from its historic top spot.¹ In prior decades such a trajectory was far from certain. The anti-alcohol propaganda of the Third Reich, the soaring taxation and sinking quality of beer during the war, the allied prohibition during the occupation, and lingering material scarcity all meant that making beer the national people's drink by the end of the 1960s was no small feat. It involved constructing and reconstructing modes of consumption, sociability, and togetherness appropriate for a young democratic society working through the legacies of dictatorship and war. According to one official from the brewing industry, deliberate meaning-making through advertising and public relations had turned beer into a "drink of conviviality and sociability" in the emergent democracy, "a drink for young and old, for man and woman, and for everyone."² Tracing out how the industry itself recovered and worked to embed their product in everyday consumption and larger structures of West German recovery, this chapter shows just how subtly changes in material life went hand-in-glove with a broader politics of the past. The recovery of the brewing industry and the dramatic

¹ "Der Deutschen liebster Saft," *Der Spiegel* no. 33, (1968), 34.

² "Zehn Jahre Deutsche Bier-Gemeinschaftswerbung," speech by Theobald Simon delivered at the Internationaler Bierwerbe-Kongress held in Munich, September 4-6, 1963, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (henceforth BayHStA) Bayer. Brauerbund 443.

increase of beer consumption illuminates piecemeal and complex transitions in West Germany. Making beer the West German people's drink involved rebuilding industry and consumerism on shaky foundations between scarcity and plenty and between dictatorship and democracy.

The German historian Hasso Spode has argued that pleasurable intoxicants from alcohol to tobacco, or *Genußgifte*, which were objects of moralizing, critique, and prohibition across Europe and the United States from the late nineteenth century through the Second World War, became after 1945, "emissaries of freedom and prosperity: whiskey and cigarettes mutated into symbols of good living and worldliness."³ In spirit, Spode has it right in the case of beer in West Germany: the return of beer to the emerging West German marketplace did symbolize to many prosperity and good (or at least stable) living. A shift clearly occurred in consumer mentalities, away from managing scarcity and towards managing plenty. There are, however, a number of notable qualifications to be made regarding Spode's relatively positivist read of an opening market. First, on the production side, the brewing industry, like so many other sections of West Germany retained personnel and organizational structures from the Nazi period. Many of these had also predated Nazism, but their presence in the Federal Republic represents yet another example of how West German stability was built on older managerial competencies preserved by a selective politics of memory.⁴ Second, in terms of consumption, analysis of advertisements and social historical documents about who drank, where, and why,

³ Hasso Spode, "Trinkkulturen in Europa: Strukturen, Transfers, Verflechtung," in *Die kulturelle Integration Europas*, ed. Johannes and Christiane Weinand (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 380.

⁴ Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past* trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

suggest that the rapid growth of beer in West Germany depended on reviving public male sociability and private female domesticity. This meant that beer was part of a much larger process of political and economic stabilization predicated on the construction of a male producer-citizen and a female consumer-citizen.⁵ This recasting of conservative paternalism in the new social market economy was further complicated by the fact that public consumption remained politically ambiguous. Advertisements and public relations work that stressed a pleasure-oriented mode of consumption buttressed the central role of economic growth in West German political stability. At the same time, this work made beer consumption, as a behavior, part of a communal identity of Germanness; good for the West German state and redemptive for those who lived in it.

Resurrecting the Industry in the Years of Scarcity, 1946-1953

As of capitulation in 1945, trade organizations like the *Wirtschaftsgruppe* and Brewers' Associations alike were outlawed by the occupation authorities. In early 1946, however, then Bavarian Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard tasked Dr. Karl Arthur Lange with reconstituting the former Bavarian Brewers' Association. Other regional brewing organizations, namely in Hesse and Württemberg existed as informal associations between select companies and related trade organizations that were often led by a single large brewery. In May 1946, the Bavarian Brewers' Association was the first regional brewing organization to be formally established. The nation-wide German

⁵ Mark E. Spicka, "Gender, Political Discourse, and the CDU/CSU Vision of the Economic Miracle, 1949-1957" *German Studies Review* 25, no. 2 (May, 2002): 305-332; Erica Carter, *How German is She? Post-War West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Alice Weinreb, *Modern Hungers: Food and Power in Twentieth Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Frank Trentmann, *Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First* (New York: Harper Collins, 2016), 308-10.

Brewers' Association was not reconstituted until 1949; a testament to the provincial and provisional designs of western Germany in the occupation years. In Bavaria, Erhard was looking forward to the development of economic opportunities but was also looking to develop a body that could deal directly with the industrial repercussions of allied prohibition.⁶ His agent of choice, Lange, was the director of the Löwenbräu Brewery in Munich and had served as the first Bavarian Minister of Economics in the cabinet of Fritz Schäffer from May to September 1945. Far from a simple coincidence of interests between Bavarian brewing and regional politics, this personnel overlap is an indication of the long history of political and industrial imbrication in Bavarian brewing. This was a relationship that the industry was forced to engage with in the context of denazification.

Many of the leaders of the Bavarian and West German brewing industry in the Third Reich were absolved of wrongdoing by the postwar tribunals and their exoneration goes hand in hand with the formation of an early narrative of industrial reticence towards the Nazi economy. Industrial reluctance was minimal in reality and revolved in large part around the adulteration of beer with sugar in the context of nutritional management. After 1945, however, representatives of the brewing industry claimed a much larger critique of the Nazi economy, especially at war. As was the case for many heavy industrialists, the tribunals became a place to begin a re-narration; to formulate a past upon which a new future could be built.⁷

In mid-1947 the first trials began for brewing industrialists who were implicated in the Nazi state: members of national and regional Chambers of Commerce,

⁶ March 13, 1946 report on the first meeting of the Bayerischer Brauerbund. BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 339b.

⁷ See for example, S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 67-79, 94-98.

representatives to the Labor Front, and the director of the national level Business Group. In each case, the defendants, all acquitted, in part owed their fate to Karl Proebst, a leader in the brewing industry dating back to 1919 that had been deemed “fully politically unencumbered” in 1945 and placed on the Munich city council and a Bavarian provincial advisory committee. As an established and confirmed participant in post-1945 political management, Proebst became an important advocate in these trials. In August 1947 he wrote to the military tribunal on behalf of Wilhelm Schülein who had been in charge of the Franconia Chamber of Commerce in the Bavarian regional Business Group and had been imprisoned in Regensburg. According to Proebst, Schülein was, “no supporter of National Socialist economic policy” and “voiced the sharpest resistance (*Widerstand*) against the closing of breweries and the conversion to armaments” during the war. He was, Proebst testified to the tribunal, no Nazi functionary; “on the contrary, he often expressed criticism quite frankly and clearly, especially of the economic policy of National Socialism, [and] he always showed himself to be a supporter of a free economy.” The argument discursively distanced a free market ethos from a Nazi command economy while also critiquing the conversion of brewing assets for purposes of war. But beyond testifying to Schülein himself, Proebst also took the opportunity to speak for the entire Bavarian and German brewing industry and paint industrial management in the Third Reich as anachronistic to longer industrial continuities:

I should like to point out that unlike other Business Groups, the Business Group Brewery and Malt House, and of course its Bavarian District Group, did not have any powers whatsoever to control the *Hauptvereinigung der deutschen Brauwirtschaft* (which was an organization of the *Reichsnährstand*). The Business Group Brewery and Malt House simply represented the interests and

representation of the brewing and malting industries in the same way as the German Brewers' Association in earlier times.⁸

While it is true that new organizations like the *Hauptvereinigung* produced industrial management problems within the brewing sector, the clear-cut distinction here marks an important distancing of the brewing industry in its historical form from a separate Nazi effort to control it.

Building on this industrial continuity, Proebst also advocated for the particular traditions and convictions of Bavarian and Munich brewers. In September he wrote to Spruchkammer X on behalf of Walter Pschorr of the Pschorr Brewery in Munich. In 1935 Pschorr was appointed to represent the social interests of the brewing industry within the German Labor Front (DAF). According to Proebst, “the DAF must have seen very early that he was not a man of their spiritual convictions so they essentially ‘sidelined’ (*kaltgestellt*) him.” Pschorr kept the position until the end of the war but allegedly turned his attentions away from the DAF and towards the more defiant Business Group because he “did not in any way identify with the opinions of the German Labor Front.” Indeed, Proebst argued to the tribunal, Pschorr was “the spawn (*Sproß*) of an old Munich brewing family in the typical Munich and Bavarian style, who, as is well known, hated and were repulsed by all ‘alignments’ and ‘coordinations’ (*Ausrichtungen*’ und *‘Gleichschaltungen*’) of National Socialism.”⁹ Munich and Bavaria were the heart of National Socialism and beer halls were a favored space for National Socialist events, especially before 1933. But for occupation authorities who at the time understood Nazism as a criminal organization rather than an all-encompassing totalizing project, drawing

⁸ Aug. 6, 1947 letter from Karl Proebst to Spruchkammer X, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 14.

⁹ Sept. 17, 1947 letter from Karl Proebst to Spruchkammer X, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 14.

emphasis to industrial reticence as “well known” distanced the entire industry from the Nazi regime. Proebst used the trial as an opportunity for re-narrating the recent past by linking this industrial functionary in the DAF with an ethereal but fundamental opposition between National Socialism and so-called old brewing families of Munich and Bavaria.

Ultimately, Schülein, Pschorr, and others were cleared by the tribunals and went on to shape the success of the post-war Bavarian brewing industry. Pschorr was a long time active member in administrative functions for the Brewers’ Association. He was also director of the Pschorr Brewery, which merged to form the still-successful Hacker-Pschorr in 1972. Schülein went on to become the director of the Grüner Brewery until his death in 1957, by which time he had built it into what is still perhaps the most successful brewery in the Nuremberg-Furth-Erlangen urban cluster.

The most notable individual on trial was Dr. Ernst Röhm, who had been the single most powerful member of the industry in the Third Reich, the former director of the Reich level Business Group for Breweries and Malthouses in Berlin. Röhm was cleared by a tribunal in August 1947, once again with the endorsement of Karl Proebst, and by 1949 he became the head of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association. His rehabilitation became a cornerstone in the narrative of Bavarian industrial reticence. As the group announced to their membership in 1949: “With the appointment of Röhm—a longtime leader of the German and Bavarian brewing industry—a man has once again been called to service who has greatly contributed in the past decades to the preservation of the structure of the industry, and who, it is hoped, can bring the industry a better future out of our fateful times.” Röhm was, and continued to be, presented as part of a “proud and

glorious” history of “politico-economic skill and farsightedness” in the industrial reticence to National Socialism.¹⁰ Indeed, upon his death in June 1955, the trade organization praised his nearly three decades of service in the progress of the Bavarian and German industries. Severing the history of brewing from the history of National Socialism, the trade organization exclaimed that, “his merits for the German brewing industry in the years from 1935 to 1945 will remain unforgotten!” The mythology of Röhm only intensified in subsequent years. On the 5th anniversary of his death, another Bavarian trade publication praised him for single-handedly “steering the ship through dark times without any consideration of his own fate.”¹¹

Unraveling the industrial imbrications of brewing and National Socialism was far from the only difficulty facing the brewing sector in the late 1940s. As many leaders in the Bavarian brewing industry were gradually exonerated in 1947 and 1948, the newly reconstituted Bavarian Brewers’ Association was struggling to navigate the Allied prohibition that all but stopped the industry in its tracks. In these years, the Bavarian and western German brewing industries were constant and important allies of the push to repeal the *Brauverbot*. They pursued this as individual brewers but also, and more effectively, through trade organizations. While politicians, nutritionists, and agriculturalists argued for the utility of producing and consuming beer it was the brewing industry that seemingly had the most to lose and felt the most hamstrung by the conditions of defeat and occupation.

¹⁰ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht* 1949, 3-6. Röhm’s trial is mentioned briefly in an Aug. 1, 1947 letter from Karl Proebst to Ernst Röhm, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 14.

¹¹ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1954/55 und 1955/56*, 3; and, “Zum 5.Todestag von Dr. Ernst Röhm,” *Der Brauer und Mälzer* 13, no. 11, Jun. 15 1960, p. 12.

The responses of the brewing sector to the prohibition ranged from seeking alternatives to brewing, to challenging the very authority of the Allied ban. Some brewers considered alternatives to brewing like converting breweries into juice factories in order to protect their financial livelihood. But not only was there insufficient fruit for such ventures, especially in Bavaria, the factory conversion process also required more money than most breweries could scrape together, especially under the prohibition.¹² Alternatively, responding to demands from below, Bavarian and western German brewers also targeted and helped generate early consumer choice. As we saw in the last chapter, they promoted the nutritional value of beer and its boon to nutritional recovery, an approach that spoke to contemporary political and agricultural agendas and culminated in new ration cards worth *either* 50 grams of bread *or* 1.5 liters of 1.7% “thin beer.”¹³

The currency reform and the lifting of the *Brauerverbot*, both in 1948, and the reform of heavy Nazi and occupation tax policies in 1950 did much to make beer a salable commodity but lingering scarcities in the agricultural sector also stood in the way of the recovery of the brewing sector. The German hop industry, by far the largest in the world at the time, had been shifted towards an almost exclusively export market in the occupation period and restructuring for domestic production required time. Yet more pressing, the barley needed to increase original wort strength (*Stammwürzgehalt*), alcohol content, nutritional content, and overall quality of salable beer felt the impact of war and occupation grain management into the early 1950s. Indeed, in mid-1949 the Bavarian

¹² Unsigned June 1947 memo, “Existenzsorgen der Brauereien,” BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 575.

¹³ July 15, 1948 Ministerial Resolution A/II 1-329/48, from Schlögl to Food Offices A and B, BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 696.

trade organization proclaimed that the problem of barley supply was the “central problem not only of the Bavarian- but also of the entire German brewing industry.”¹⁴

The problem of agriculture is perhaps best captured in the quantitative and geographical changes in German barley production from 1939 to 1949. In 1939 the Reich as a whole produced summer barley on 1,251,387 hectares, some 630,000 of which were in parts of Germany that would become Poland and the German Democratic Republic, leaving roughly 600,000 of the 1939 total in the future Federal Republic and 330,000 in Bavaria. In 1949, however, Bavaria had only 190,000 hectares and West Germany in total only 366,000—a sizeable decrease owing much to occupation agricultural policies that favored wheat production.¹⁵ Under aggressive agricultural development policies headed by Bavarian Minister of Nutrition, Agriculture, and Forestry, Alois Schlögl, summer barley acreage increased in Bavaria almost 40 percent in the two years from 1949 to 1951 and by 1954 it had reached 339,100 hectares, a figure surpassing the 1939 total for the region. The West German total likewise increased from 366,000 to 505,000 between 1949 and 1951 and also surpassed its 1939 mark in 1953.¹⁶ The advocacy of regional politicians like Schlögl, which were crucially informed by Bavarian brewing

¹⁴ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1949*, 9.

¹⁵ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1949*, 20.

¹⁶ Schlögl's reforms involved increasing the size of both small and large holding farms, shrinking mid-size farms, ramping up agricultural research at food science institutes in order to strengthen seed stocks, and, perhaps most importantly, subsidizing agricultural mechanization. In 1950, there were 0.6 tractors per 100 ha, by 1955 it was 3.8, and by 1960, the year in which mechanized labor overtook animal labor in Bavaria, there were 7.1 tractors per 100 ha. See, Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, 27; and *Geschäftsbericht 1953/54*, 24; Alois Schlögl “Bayerns Landwirtschaft im Aufbau,” in *Bayern: Wirtschaft in Wort und Bild*, ed. Josef Oesterle (München: Graphische Betriebe GmbH, 1954), 9-16; Götschmann, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Bayerns*, 558-72; and Paul Erker, *Ernährungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Bauern und Arbeiterschaft in Bayern, 1943-1953* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1990), 405-10.

interests, moved West German politicians in Bonn to cater agricultural policies in favor of the *Freistaat*.

By 1954, Schlögl had successfully pitched increasing barley production in Bonn and the Bavarian Brewer's Association was confident to announce to its membership that the quality of raw ingredients was higher than it had been in more than a decade and that all barley demands would be met. They underscored the occasion, claiming that 1954 marked "a transition of the former seller's market into a real buyer's market."¹⁷ And to be sure, the next year, beer consumption in West Germany broadly had returned to prewar levels with an average of 56 liters per person while in Bavaria the significantly higher 130 liters per person remained just shy of prewar consumption rates.¹⁸ The importance of barley to beer production is hard to overstate. Not only was it necessary in quantity to drive up the quality, nutritional, and alcoholic content, but it was also popularly understood as the lifeblood of beer, manifesting in one of the drinks common sobriquets at the time: *Gerstensaft*, or barley-juice.

The conditions of scarcity and defeat had a lasting impact on the trajectory of the Bavarian and West German brewing industries. The flexible beer-bread ration card project in 1948 had been a joint venture between Bavarian and other western German brewing organizations, most notably in Hamburg. But until 1949 Bavaria had the only brewing trade organization worth the name and the beer-bread ration card was an almost unique moment of broader German cooperation in an otherwise disastrous occupation experience. As the Bavarian organization put it, the chaotic economic conditions of 1945-1949, "lead to a certain weariness... The spirit of solidarity suffered severely under the

¹⁷ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1953/54*, 16.

¹⁸ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1954/55 und 1955/56*, 5.

demoralizing influences of the post-war period, and many believed it was better to elbow through economic struggle rather than to close ranks and struggle shoulder-to-shoulder for the common goals of the trade.” But while ideals of community had been “threatened by the murky high tides of our time, we are confident that with the growing consolidation of our economy, self-awareness will return. That is our wish and our hope.”¹⁹ Whether from “weariness” or not, communal industrial self-awareness was to become a pillar of industrial recovery.

Communal Approaches to a New Market

The prevailing industrial tensions of the occupation years and the lingering agricultural scarcities that carried into the mid 1950s combined with an increasing American presence in European markets to produce a general sense among West German brewers that they were starting on a back foot in the new Federal Republic. Seeking industrial solidarity and communal benefit, the brewing trade organizations pursued communal advertising campaigns that marketed “beer” as a type of commodity regardless of brand. Efforts at communal benefit developed simultaneously in Bavaria and West Germany more broadly, which is somewhat ironic and a testament to the ongoing tensions of centralization and provincialism in the industry. For both the Bavarian and West German trade organizations, it was of the utmost importance that beer found its way into the popular consciousness of modern consumers that were facing an ostensibly overwhelming world of goods. Drawing on American advertising strategies and the latest in market research, the Bavarian and West German trade organizations formed communal

¹⁹ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1949*, 3.

advertising organizations in the early 1950s that reflected tensions between Bavaria and West Germany but that also provided the cornerstone of economic growth and came to shape the culture of consumption in subsequent decades.

Communal advertisements for beer began sporadically in 1950 and by 1951 West German brewers acknowledged that, “after a year of communal advertising for beer, it is time to take into account the fact that advertising cannot be based exclusively on advertisements that appear only periodically and then disappear.” Instead, in 1951 the efforts at communal advertising incorporated the idea of market saturation promoted by the Munich-based ad man Carl Gabler, who argued that, “only through continuous advertising can something stay in the consciousness of the public.”²⁰ In this spirit, the West German trade organization proposed a number of initiatives ranging from posters to ads in magazines and newspapers. By far the most important and well-funded program was for sheet metal prints that could endure outdoor conditions for extended periods of time. Both print ads and the metal signs centered on the “Blue Medallion”—a blue oval with the word “beer” written in yellow and accompanied by a frosty glass of beer. There were many variations on the theme that included slogans like “fresh beer” (Image 3.1) or “cold beer” but often it was just the word “beer” and the simple logo. The thinking behind the logo was “to be at least equal to the best advertisement in the beverage industry, namely the well-known, well-designed Coca-Cola cap.” They praised both the bright red color and the pressed three dimensionality of the famous logo, the vaulted form of which “radiated a high degree of credibility and taste” that would be missing were the logo printed on flat sheet metal. Their design thus took a cue from Coca-Cola to adopt

²⁰ “Die Biergemeinschaftswerbung 1951” memo dated only 1951, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 441.



Image 3.1: The Blue Medallion. Source: "Werbepplan für das Geschäftsjahr 1954/55" in Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (henceforth ACSP) NL Zwicknagl, Max - 15.

bright colors, to keep the design simple, to press the metal signs, and to incorporate three dimensionality in print versions. As they told the membership, “we are not at all ashamed to admit that American advertising has not only inspired us, but has also, to a certain extent, created a route to be followed given the existing competition between beer and non-alcoholic beverages.” In the Blue Medallion, “communal advertising for beer found its basic trademark,” an icon that remained its central pillar into the 1960s.²¹

²¹ Memo dated only 1951, “Die Biergemeinschaftswerbung 1951,” BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 441.

The communal advertising campaigns of the brewing industry combined an American and West German approach as well as drew on peculiar continuities in the history of German advertising. The embrace of advertising in general and American-inspired advertising like that of Coca-Cola specifically was consistent with a larger shift in the early Federal Republic.²² The embrace of market saturation was taken from a Munich ad man, though it was of course common in the U.S. as well. For the Blue Medallion, market saturation was key: the 1951 proposal planned to plaster West Germany with upwards of 300,000 of these signs, paid for with a communal budget of 900,000 DM, generated by collecting 10 Pfennigs per hectoliter from member breweries.²³ Communal advertising was a relatively unique development, informed by the dramatic instability and harsh business conditions of the postwar years, and designed to foster shared success. The approach had its roots in the 1920s and had been pursued with some success in the Third Reich. In the postwar period, however, only one advertising agency offered the service, and the efforts of the brewing industry were also uncommon in that they were in-house.²⁴ While it became its own legal entity, the communal advertising arm of the brewing industry did not seek professional marketing help until well into the 1960s.

At the same time that the German Brewers' Association was sketching its communal advertising plans, so too was its Bavarian counterpart. The latter wanted advertising for beer that would be exclusive to Bavaria—a testament to the perception of

²² Pamela E. Swett, S. Jonathan Wiesen, and Jonathan R. Zatlin, "Introduction" in *Selling Modernity: Advertising in Twentieth-Century Germany* ed, idem. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 11-12.

²³"Die Biergemeinschaftswerbung 1951."

²⁴ Dirk Schindelbeck, "'Ansbach Uralt' und 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft': Zur Kulturgeschichte der Werbeagentur in Deutschland am Beispiel von Hanns W. Brose (1899-1971)," *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte/ Journal of Business History* 40, no. 4 (1995): 235-252.

regional difference. Apparently, plastering Blue Medallions was not considered an adequate strategy for the Bavarian market. The Bavarian proposal for 1951 centered on a series of press events, roughly one per month, that would cover issues like technological developments in the malting and bottling sectors, brewery histories, the history of the *Reinheitsgebot* in Bavaria, and the health benefits of beer. The events were initially proposed to keep public attention on beer during the seasonal sales dip in winter months between Oktoberfest and Starkbierzeit, which corresponded roughly with Lent in early spring.²⁵ This was a fully Bavarian approach. Not only was the *Reinheitsgebot* not yet codified nationally (a product of the 1952 Beer Tax Law), but the very chronology of the campaign was based on two Bavarian, or at least primarily southern German events rooted in southern Catholicism and Bavarian political and cultural history.

In the first few months of 1951 the German Brewers' Association and representatives of the state level trade organizations met repeatedly in Bonn to hammer out a deal on communal advertising. The Bavarians made things difficult. Bavaria was home to more breweries than any other state by far and these breweries were on average significantly smaller than most of their West German counterparts. The industry was less centralized and consumption rates per capita were significantly higher.²⁶ Therefore, Bavarian needs were different. This argument resonated with leaders in the Baden-Württemberg trade organization who threatened to pull out as well, seeing themselves more aligned in culture and industry composition to southern neighbors than with

²⁵ Oct. 3, 1950, letter from Seeberger to the Presidium and Director Pfülf, BayHStA Bayer.Brauerbund 1338.

²⁶ "Anzahl der Brauereien auf der Welt, stand 1950," Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, 124; "Bierausstoß in den einzelnen Bundesländern während der letzten 3 Sudjahre," in *ibid.*, 118; "Zahl der tätigen Hausbrauer in Bayern nach Hauptzollamtsbezirken im Rechnungsjahr 1953/54," Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1953/54*, 133.

northern Germany. For their part, the brewers of North Rhine-Westphalia, the second most productive but also significantly more centralized brewing region in West Germany, claimed that they too would only join if Bavaria did so on even financial footing regardless of regional industrial and cultural differences.²⁷ Ultimately, the Bavarian organization was determined not to be the cause of a further jeopardized and hostile industrial culture and decided to take part in the West German communal advertisements as well as form a separate Bavarian counterpart. But separate was still not enough. Bavarians demanded that, “it is imperative to pay more attention to the Bavarian mentality” as the German Brewers’ Association formed its Advertising and Publicity Department (*Werbe- und Propagandaabteilung*) in 1951—which went on to become a separate legal entity called the *Bierwerbe* G.m.b.H. in 1953.²⁸ In order to pacify Bavarian concerns, the German Brewers’ Association offered the position of head of the *Bierwerbe*, to Willy Hübsch, a brewer from the city of Augsburg and head of the Swabian district office of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association. Simultaneously, to insure further attention be paid to the “Bavarian mentality” the Bavarian Brewers’ Association formally established their own communal advertising organization, the *Bayerischer Bierwerbeverein*, that would design ads unique to Bavaria.

The publicity campaigns of the *Bierwerbe* and the *Bayerischer Bierwerbeverein* involved print communal advertising as well as press events, radio, and television promotion. In the 1950s, however, it was printed advertising that got the lion’s share of the attention and resources of both organizations. While the West German *Bierwerbe*

²⁷ Apr. 4, 1951, letter from Dr. Richard Biergans to the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1338.

²⁸ Jan. 1, 1951, Notes on the 12th meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1338.

produced ads for beer broadly, the Bavarian counterpart stressed that there was something inherently Bavarian about drinking beer. To compliment the Blue Medallion on the national level, the cutting edge of the Bavarian communal advertisements in the 1950s and early 1960s was the tagline, “In Bayern trinkt man Bier,”—in Bavaria one drinks beer. The Munich graphic artist Max Bletschacher designed the first ads in this vein in September 1952. More than pleased with the design, the trade organization produced 60,000 posters (Image 3.2), which they sent to Bavarian breweries for internal



Image 3.2: In Bavaria you drink beer. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, insert.

décor and public promotion. The aesthetics of this particular ad echo political posters of decades past. The fist in the air and the blue and white Bavarian flag would most certainly have been read to celebrate more than just beer: In 1950 the separatist Bavaria Party won 17.9% of the state parliament and by 1954 it became part of a ruling coalition in Bavaria with the SPD and the FDP, thereby keeping the once and future dominant CSU out of power for three years. What is striking about this ad campaign is that the statement itself is both an imperative to visitors and a conceptual association of a place and the nature of being there. In other applications, this association became quite literal. Beginning in the last days of March 1953 travelers arriving at the Munich Central Train Station were greeted by a banner two meters high and thirty meters long painted in the Bavarian blue and white and reading simply, “In Bayern trinkt man Bier.”²⁹ Bookended by the annual Starkbierzeit in late March and the closing of the annual Oktoberfest, the banner hung in the train station for six months of high traffic tourism and travel into the city from the Bavarian countryside and from West Germany more broadly.

The tensions between the Bavarian and West German brewing industries ran parallel to those between the Bavarian and West German states but both trade organizations agreed that communal advertising was a particularly useful means of both recovering from the industrial disaster of the *Brauverbot* and post-war scarcity, and for navigating the rapidly growing economy of the early 1950s. As one article in the trade press *Deutsche Brauwirtschaft* argued to readers, the communal advertising plans were the best strategy for garnering the attention of the increasingly powerful and overwhelmed modern consumer. The author cited an increase in the standard of living

²⁹ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, 75.

and an expanded supply and diversity of consumer goods that dwarfed the available choices of the previous generation. The truth of the “economic miracle,” the author argued, is that “the consumer alone decides. In a free market economy, the consumer is completely free with regard to their purchases... but their decisions are capable of being influenced. It is not only traditional, inherited, acquired, community related (*volksgebunden*), or seasonal influences, but just as much influences from fashion and advertising.” Communal advertising, he went on, was designed to work with brand advertising but on a deeper level of consumer consciousness. In the apparently overwhelming—or potentially overwhelming—1950s world of goods, communal advertising was designed to shape consumer culture: “to get people interested in the good as a whole... People want beer instead of cigarettes,” and if after that they want a particular brand, the motive comes from elsewhere.³⁰ So in spite of tensions between the national and provincial industries, increasing consumer attention and demand became the driving force of industrial recovery, and one that was intimately related to the political stabilization of West Germany.

Beer and Consumer Mentalities

Economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s had an undeniable impact on consumer mentalities. The hardships of the Hunger Years had encouraged and rewarded saving and frugality, and indeed this mindset around consumption dated back to at least as early as the First World War.³¹ But from 1950 to 1965 the cost of living index in West Germany

³⁰ Dr. Th. Simon. “Werbung für Bier – ein notwendiges Übel oder eine zwingende Notwendigkeit?” *Deutsche Brauwirtschaft* no. 12, June 9, 1953, 169-171.

³¹ Michael Wildt, “Plurality of Taste: Food and Consumption in West Germany during the 1950s” *History Journal Workshop* 39, no. 1 (1995): 24-26; and Arne Andersen, “Mentalitätenwechsel und ökologische

increased 38.5 percent while the average wages for industrial workers increased 237 percent.³² As a result, the mentality of scarcity in the mid to late 1950s was displaced, or at least augmented by a new consumption regime. The social and political function of consumption took on new meanings. As several historians have shown in the case of women as consumer citizens, consumption became a social duty and an individual obligation to economic prosperity and political stability.³³ More generally, however, consumption came to take on a much more pleasurable and individualistic dynamic. The 1950s saw rapid demand increases for *Genußmittel*—literally pleasure items like chocolate, tobacco, and spices—that could be consumed explicitly for pleasure, rather than to satisfy any nutritional or subsistence needs. Consuming such items predated the availability of more dramatic commodities like televisions or automobiles and was conceived of by many “as something akin to a fundamental right” built into the logic of mass consumption as an integral part of modernization. Indeed, it was a younger generation raised in opulence and reared with the conviction that consumption should be pleasurable which later fueled increased drug use in the 1960s.³⁴

Beer provides a particularly useful way of engaging these shifts in consumer mentality because of its conceptual fluidity. First of all, the rapid growth of beer consumption in the 1950s fits the *Genußmittel* narrative. It was part of making of a

Konsequenzen des Konsumismus: Die Durchsetzung der Konsumgesellschaft in den fünfziger Jahren,” in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte: Zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des Konsums (18. bis 20. Jahrhundert)*, ed. Hannes Siegrist, Hartmut Kaelble, and Jürgen Kocka (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1997), 763-92.

³² Andersen, “Mentalitätenwechsel und ökologische Konsequenzen des Konsumismus,” 766.

³³ Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*; and Carter, *How German is She?*

³⁴ Robert Stephens, *Germans on Drugs: The Complications of Modernization in Hamburg* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 48-9; on bourgeois and youth culture, Trentmann, *Empire of Things*, 311.

pleasure-based consumption mentality years before the conventional markers—such as televisions and automobiles—were widely available. Foregrounded by memories of war and hunger, beer increasingly celebrated the equation of consumption and pleasure. Second, beer was not—or at least not only—a *Genußmittel* meant solely for pleasure, but was rather a central foodstuff. The embrace of beer was part of the “Fresswelle” or eating wave that swept over West Germany and which Alice Weinreb has argued made traditions and practices of home cooking—and the re-making of material home life—a part of constructing new postwar identities between past and present.³⁵ Third and finally, beer did not entirely fit into many of the established cultural landscapes of the 1950s and early 1960s. It was not bourgeois “high culture,” nor was it part of the “mass culture” so often criticized in the first two postwar decades as damaging, degenerate, or foreign. And neither was it a particularly “modern” consumer good like the automobile.³⁶

So what *was* beer? According to Michael Wildt, by 1954 it became the dominant “‘luxury’ expenditure” surpassing tobacco; a shift he chalks up to changes in taste.³⁷ But as we have seen, such growth surely had as much to do with the availability of raw materials, the rehabilitation of industry leaders, and the rolling back of legal and tax restrictions. Indeed, even before beer surpassed tobacco, a market research report found that 90% of West Germans identified as “beer drinkers”—a statistic that suggests a

³⁵ Alice Weinreb, “The Tastes of Home: Cooking the Lost Heimat in West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s,” *German Studies Review* 34, no. 2 (May 2011): 345-364.

³⁶ Kaspar Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy: Youth, Americanization, and the Irresistible Rise of Popular Culture,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 430-4; and Bernhard Rieger, *The People’s Car: A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 123-87; Gregor M. Rinn, “Das Automobil als nationales Identifikationssymbol: Zur politischen Bedeutungsprägung des Kraftfahrzeugs in Modernitätskonzeptionen des ‘Dritten Reich’ und der Bundesrepublik,” (PhD diss., Humboldt University of Berlin, 2008), 123-37.

³⁷ Wildt, “Plurality of Tastes,” 28.

deeper imbrication of beer in West German consumer society than changes in taste alone can explain.³⁸ Beer was produced in rapidly increasing quantities in the 1950s but was also marketed, sold, and consumed in accordance with a celebration of a traditional discourse rooted in agrarian productivity, communal practice, pleasurable consumption, and conservative bourgeois gender norms; what Frank Trentmann called a “conservative restoration.”³⁹ Beer was a quotidian mass consumer good with deep if provincial historical roots in the new West Germany. Wanting, buying, and enjoying beer came to be part of producing 1950s West German economic and cultural normalcy. And it happened with great intensity. Between 1945 and 1964 beer sales outpaced increases in real income by a third.⁴⁰ Beer became a pillar of everyday consumption in no small part because of the efforts of the Bavarian and West German trade organizations to keep it in public consciousness.

A whole series of communal advertisements testifies to the consumer scarcity mentality of the early 1950s. Comprising six different poster and plaque designs (Image 3.3), the goal of these images “was not to comprise a sweeping advertisement for beer, but rather to bring awareness to the meaning of beer and its byproducts for human and animal nutrition.”⁴¹ Building on discourses first popularized in the occupation period, these ads spanned everything from the increases in agricultural productivity afforded by beer byproducts to the nutritional benefits of brewers’ yeast, and the vitamin and protein content of beer and brewing byproducts. These ads made explicit comparisons between

³⁸ “Die Einstellung der Verbraucher zum Bierkonsum,” Gesellschaft für Konsum Forschung (henceforth GfK) S 1953 013-1.

³⁹ Trentmann, *Empire of Things*, 309.

⁴⁰ “Bier: Sieg der Flasche,” *Der Spiegel* October 21, 1964, 54.

⁴¹ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, 74.



Image 3.3: Composite image. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, inserts.

say, the caloric value of beer, beef, bread, fish, butter, and eggs, or the protein content of brewers' yeast in similar comparisons. They point also to the increased productivity of milk cows reared on feed enriched with spent brewers' grain; a discourse produced in the context of defeat and scarcity. These ads were clearly designed to attract consumer interest in beer for very practical nutritional and agricultural reasons. A legacy of the hunger years in general, and the struggle against the *Brauerverbot* in particular, these ads sought to capitalize on the predominant consumer "scarcity mentality" of the early 1950s.

It is hardly surprising then that these ads were sidelined by 1954: the year that beer production returned to prewar levels, that unemployment had decreased by half since 1948, and that output across industries had tripled in the same span.⁴²

The next battery of communal advertisements instead reflected different consumer mentalities rooted in economic growth, bourgeois gender norms, and the



Image 3.4: The wanderer in the desert. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1953/4*, insert.

⁴² Unemployment and output statistics from Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 89.

simple pleasures of drinking a beer long before the emergence of mass consumerism, conventionally understood. The single longest running communal advertisement in the Federal Republic, for example, was called “the wanderer in the desert.” (Image 3.4) It premiered in 1953 and ran until 1967. It would be hard to imagine a starker juxtaposition to the first generation of ads, and the image here is dripping with metaphor and allusion. On one level, for consumers well versed in the struggles of scarcity, the desert as a metaphor smacks of the war and postwar scarcity years, the beer floating in the sky heralds a reprieve; a vision perhaps not yet entirely realized. Consuming beer—or given the prohibition, even *producing* beer—was about reprieve and simple pleasure. On a deeper symbolic level, the wanderer may well have been read as the emasculated men of the Third Reich and occupation returning to a Germany only beginning to climb out of material hardship, seeking the simplicity of work, private life, and material security.⁴³ At the same time, the ad echoes imagery surrounding the Afrika Korps in general and German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in particular, an iconography immortalized most notably in the 1951 British film, *The Desert Fox*. The film, which was commercially successful in Great Britain and West Germany, worked to whitewash Rommel’s ideological convictions, and by extension those of the entire Wehrmacht.⁴⁴ Finally, the image makes perhaps the most sense taken alongside another popular ad from the time in which a smiling, and perhaps sweating glass of beer is proclaimed so refreshing that even the promise of one makes the experience of thirst enjoyable. (Image 3.5) Men, after all,

⁴³ For the role of work, simplistic traditions, and privatization in the reconstruction of male subjectivities in the Federal Republic, see Frank Biess, “Men of Reconstruction – The Reconstruction of Men: Returning POWS in East and West Germany, 1945-1955,” in *Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2002), 348-51.

⁴⁴ Patrick Major, “‘Our Friend Rommel’: The *Wehrmacht* as ‘Worthy Enemy’ in Postwar British Popular Culture,” *German History* 26, no. 4 (2008): 520-535.

were doing the vast majority of the labor of economic recovery and the availability of beer at the end of a long day made the toil of reconstruction bearable, worthwhile, and even enjoyable. Originally launched at the request of brewers in Bavaria and North



Image 3.5: Beer makes thirst enjoyable. Source: Postcard in a series by the Bierwerbe G.m.b.H. Author's collection.

Rhine-Westphalia—that is, West Germany's most important agricultural and industrial states—the ad became the foundation of a ten-minute film shown to theatergoers across the Republic in 1958, and by 1960 was “on every tongue.”⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1958/59 und 1959/60*, 89.

The wanderer in the desert was part of a flood of similar ads in the mid 1950s that equated beer consumption with reprieve and simple pleasure. Such ads displayed beer as part of a fun loving and pleasurable form of consumption to be enjoyed after work, in the home, and in public recreational settings. One print ad featured a blonde woman in a bathing suit. (Image 3.6) Sexuality certainly sells, but it is also worth note here that the woman herself represented a radical departure from the late 1940s iconic “woman of the rubble,” and even the milkmaid portrayed in the earlier communal advertisements. Another ad depicted an iconic beach town and read simply, “summer... sun... cool beer.”



Image 3.6: Cool beer. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1953/4*, insert.

All of these ads featured a frosty glass of beer based on the Blue Medallion and conveyed quite clearly an association between beer and pleasure whether sexual, psychological, or quotidian. In other ads, like a special poster made for Carnival, the glasses of beer were anthropomorphized, dancing and kissing, smiling, and licking their lips. (Image 3.7) The take away is simple: Drinking beer was no longer meant to help manage scarcity, but rather to help manage opulence. It became a part of the calculus of consumer life; part of the processes by which people have enough freedom of choice to act on desire and pleasure. Finally, the leisure and sexuality of a beach trip, the reprieve of a post-work beer, and the enjoyment of beer at a Carnival celebration embedded the commodity in new forms of sociability. That thirst became enjoyable under the promise of beer implies



Image 3.7: Carnival beers. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1953/4*, insert.

for industrial and agricultural workers not only a solidarity of labor but also a respectable sociability to be found on breaks and after work. Beyond just men, one ad in the mid 1950s simply proclaimed that beer creates sociability, featuring male and female anthropomorphized beer glasses kissing each other. (Image 3.8)



Image 3.8: Beer fosters sociability. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1953/4*, insert.

The social history of beer consumption in the early 1950s bears out many of these readings. In public settings, men reported drinking more than twice as much as women. These men were largely agricultural and industrial laborers, who were close to three times more likely to drink during their work breaks and after work than their white collar counterparts. Working class men disproportionately listed as their reason for drinking beer that the drink was incomparably refreshing and thirst quenching. Regionally, Bavarians

of all stripes drank more than those in any other federal state. It was the only state where more than 50 percent of the population self-identified as “regular beer drinkers.” North Rhine-Westphalia was just above 40 percent and the rest were 35 percent or lower. Some of this might be explained by the fact that Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia had the largest populations of agricultural and industrial laborers, respectively, and also due to that differences of regional consumption. In Baden-Württemberg, for instance, people drank more wine, while in Hamburg they drank more schnapps. Nonetheless fully 89.5 percent of the West German population identified as “beer drinkers” with 38% “regular” and just over 50% “occasional” consumers.⁴⁶ The same survey found that communal advertisements, especially the Blue Medallion and the woman in the bathing suit, had a positive influence on consumers and that the ads were more readily recognizable than brand specific ads.⁴⁷ While the direct influence of any single advertisement is hard to gauge, it seems clear that these ads at least captured important shifts in how West Germans were thinking about consumption in the context of early stabilization and economic growth. The brewing industry, for its part, was clear in attributing much of their rapid success to the communal advertisements. In 1957, the president of the German Brewers’ Association largely credited surpassing prewar production levels by a third to the successes of the communal advertising campaigns.⁴⁸

Public and Private Consumption in the Era of Conservative Modernization

⁴⁶ “Die Einstellung der Verbraucher zum Bierkonsum,” GfK S 1953 013-1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 118-9, 127.

⁴⁸ See the speech by Director H. Pfülf, “Wo stehen wir?” delivered at the fourth annual Deutschen Brauertag held in Munich, Sept. 28, 1957, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 339a. The Bavarian Brewers’ Association also boasted to their membership that their own communal advertising was delivering and well worth the additional money paid. See, Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1953/54*, 65-66.

Creating a centralized, stable, and democratically mandated West German state in the 1950s was largely built on economic success. As several historians have shown, the “economic miracle” and the “social market economy” were political rallying points, and indeed political commodities before they were a reflection of concrete reality.⁴⁹ The communal advertising campaigns of the brewing industry in the Adenauer/Erhard years (1949-1964) were likewise deeply political. They participated in the conservative modernization and recasting of bourgeois gender norms while boasting the simple pleasures of market stabilization.⁵⁰ Beer sales in this period soared. From 1950 to 1956 West German beer consumption per capita doubled, from 35.6 to 72.3 liters, and had tripled by 1960 to 94.7 liters per person, per year. By 1964 West Germans had quadrupled their beer consumption, drinking an average 122.4 liters. This figure amounts to a liter of beer every three days and includes men, women, children, and the abstinent.⁵¹ In Bavaria, the figure was substantially higher. In 1964 Bavarians were consuming just above 200 liters per person, per year. By the mid 1960s, then, beer had undoubtedly become the West German people’s drink. In 1964, the postwar prohibition had been overturned only 15 years earlier, and beer production had surpassed prewar levels only 10 years earlier. Drinking beer had become a collectively West German experience. It was

⁴⁹ Mark E. Spicka, *Selling the Economic Miracle: Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); and S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale: Consumer Displays and Advertising in Postwar West Germany,” in *Consuming Germany in the Cold War*, ed. David F. Crew (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2003), 151-178.

⁵⁰ The years from 1956 to 1960 have been described as a shift from Adenauerism to Erhardism – that is, from the rhetoric of “no experiments” to a dominant politico-economic policy featuring radical openness as well as soft state intervention to insure socially inclusive growth. This may be true but across the Adenauer and Erhard eras, 1949-1964, there was nonetheless a continuity of recasting bourgeois values, especially concerning gender for the purposes here, which went hand in hand with economic and political stabilization. For consideration of similar processes see, Volker R. Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany,” in *The Miracle Years*, ed. Schissler, 326-40.

⁵¹ “Bier: Sieg der Flasche.”

thus in some ways an example of early cultural democratization in that it cracked the traditional class hierarchies of high and low culture, *Kultur* and kitsch, in German society.⁵² And yet if it was democratic, in the sense of its broad popular reach, it was far from progressive. The rapid growth of beer consumption depended on the recasting of conservative bourgeois norms and a complicated politics of the past.

The Adenauer/Erhard years were generally characterized by political conservatism (best captured by Adenauer's 1957 campaign slogan, "no experiments") and soft state intervention in the economy to ensure socially inclusive growth (Erhard's "social market economy"). Within this, as Robert Moeller argued, the politics of gender and the family were designed with an eye to the Nazi past, to "protect" women and motherhood from the reach of the modern state. This paternalism in effect turned conceptions of women's needs into limits on women's rights.⁵³ At the same time, political stability in West Germany was dependent on economic growth and as the main spender in the household economy, the housewife was the driver of domestic consumption forming the backbone of what Erica Carter called, a "consumer-based model of citizenship."⁵⁴ Indeed, across western Europe and the United States, "the consumer was the lynchpin of the conservative restoration."⁵⁵ Already in 1953 West German women were disposing of 73% of expendable household income versus 27% by men, a trend that continued into the 1960s.⁵⁶ Women were readily made aware of their

⁵² Maase, "Establishing Cultural Democracy."

⁵³ Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 5; see also, Hanna Schissler, "'Normalization' as Project: Some Thoughts on Gender Relations in West Germany during the 1950s," in *The Miracle Years*, ed. idem, 359-375.

⁵⁴ Carter, *How German is She?*, 7.

⁵⁵ Trentmann, *Empire of Things*, 309.

⁵⁶ "Die Bedarfsstruktur im Käufermarkt," August 1953 survey by the GfK, p. 21, qtd. in Heinz Pritzl, "Die absatzwirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Verpackung für Bier" (PhD diss., Hochschule für Wirtschafts- und

new responsibilities for domestic stability and growth. As one article in the women's magazine *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau* put it, "'The economy' is not a process that takes place far away... We are all a part of the economy, because we are all consumers... More than [DM] 100 billion passed through a woman's hand in the year 1959."⁵⁷ West German women thus played a crucial role in economic and political recovery in the Federal Republic because of their role as consumers.

Consuming women were not purely economic agents but because of the nexus of economy and political stability in the Federal Republic they were, as Alice Weinreb has recently argued, part of a new biopolitical order, inscribed as consumer citizens in a new form of statecraft.⁵⁸ In the 1950s and 1960s the conservative modernization of the West German kitchen was constitutive of the shifting role of women as well as their emergence as crucial consumer-citizens. The same year that advertisements featuring nutrition gave way to those featuring reprieve and pleasure, Federal Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard proclaimed "the year of the consumer" bringing the first significant policy efforts to increase consumption by ramping up production and driving down prices. In the course of 1953, Erhard's flagship project was refrigerator production and by the end of the year, sales increased by 40%. This development was part and parcel of an emerging consumer Cold War between the two Germanys, and the American and Soviet spheres generally, captured most explicitly in the 1959 Nixon-Khrushchev "Kitchen Debate."⁵⁹ On the ground in West Germany, this shift in ordo-liberal market regulation fed the gendered

Sozialwissenschaften Nürnberg, 1956), 33-5; H. Zumidden, "Mehr Haushaltsgeld durch Einkaufs-Disziplin," *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau* 6, no. 12 (Dec. 1959), 14.

⁵⁷ "Die Milliarden der Hausfrau," *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau* 7, no. 9 (Sept. 1960), 22-3.

⁵⁸ Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*.

⁵⁹ In the East German case, see Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) and Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*, 164-195.

politics of consumption. A 1955 campaign for washing machines similar to the refrigerator campaign, read simply, “Erhard helps the housewife.”⁶⁰

Private firms and women’s magazines followed suit. In the finance sector, for example, this took the form of the *Bayerischer Hausfrauen-Spiegel*, a monthly publication put out by the Bavarian Sparkasse bank featuring everything from detailed price fluctuations of basic foodstuffs, to recipes of the month, to tips for managing their Sparkasse savings account. Women’s magazines featured articles differentiating between vacuum cleaner models so that housewives could make the best purchase for their own home.⁶¹ Vacuum cleaners, however, were tools that made keeping things tidy easier, whereas refrigerators, the topic of similar articles were “no longer a luxury” by 1958.⁶² In women’s fashion magazines like *Madame*, readers were told they could have “more free time with a contemporary kitchen,” and offered advertisements for a number of companies that could install one.⁶³ By 1961, more than 60 percent of homes in the greater Nuremberg-Furth urban cluster in central Bavaria had refrigerators, making it by far the most common household appliance. For context, around 40 percent had televisions and record players, around 35 percent had automobiles and washing machines, and only 22 percent had telephones.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Jan Logemann, *Trams or Tailfins?: Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 41-2.

⁶¹ H.W., “Der Staubsauger im Dienste des Haushalts,” *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau* 5, no. 9 (Sept. 1958), 8-9; In the course of economic recovery, vacuum cleaners became crucial household items. Compare that article with, “Über den Gebrauchswert von Staubsaugern,” *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau* 7, no. 2 (Feb. 1960), 12-8.

⁶² Ursula Höpfl, “Auf die Reihenfolge kommt es an!” *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, 5, no. 11 (Nov. 1958), 10-16, esp. 11.

⁶³ The quote comes from an ad for the appliance manufacturer Juno, see *Madame* (June 1957), 109; see other similar ads throughout *Madame*, as well as Heinz Bohnenkamp, “Physik im Haushalt – Technik im Haushalt” *Madame* (June 1957), 120-4, 128-48.

⁶⁴ “Beurteilung von Brauereien und Biermarken im Raum Nürnberg,” GfK S 1961 014, tbl 51.

The technologization of domestic space in general and the rapid proliferation of refrigerators in particular influenced what products were appealing and how they could be consumed privately. Regarding beer, increased sales of bottled beer in the 1950s and 1960s squared the circle of rapid increases in domestic consumption. On the eve of the First World War, for example, bottled beer accounted for only 8 percent of all beer sold, while barreled beer made up the remaining 92 percent. This increased slightly in the Weimar Republic to about 24 percent in bottles at the start of the Great Depression. By the outbreak of World War Two, the ratio was roughly one-third to two-thirds, bottles to barrels. In 1951 bottled beer first outsold barreled in Bavaria 52 to 48 percent and only six years later, in 1957, bottled beer accounted for 67 percent of all beer sold, barreled beer only a third.⁶⁵ By the early 1960s, bottled beer accounted for 75 percent of all West German beer sold.⁶⁶ What this meant was that the private sphere came to stand alongside the public house and brewery as a major site of beer consumption. Beer was increasingly drunk with meals in the home, and in front of radios and televisions. Domestic magazines and beer ads featured advice on how to pair beer with meals, what glassware to use, and other tips for incorporating beer into the West German nuclear family lifestyle.

The brewing industry became acutely aware of the growing importance of women as consumers already in the mid 1950s. By the summer of 1955, the Bavarian Brewers' Association was in sustained contact with women's organizations. Members of such groups took tours of Bavarian breweries. Women more broadly were targeted by special communal advertisements in popular women's publications including *Madame*,

⁶⁵ "Flaschenbier : Fassbier – in Prozenten vom Gesamtausstoss," Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1956/57 und 1957/58*, 166.

⁶⁶ "Bier: Sieg der Flasche."

Nachrichten für die Hausfrau and *Frauenwelt*. The “wanderer in the desert” was thus joined by a second central thread, the “woman with the blouse.” This latter had two variants featuring women with different types of beer and different colored blouses.⁶⁷ The purpose was not to use female sexuality to up the pleasure factor but rather to attract women as purchasers. The Bavarian industry also made sure that it was well represented at exhibitions for housewives with various advertising campaigns, informational booths, and an exhibit on Munich breweries.⁶⁸ Such exhibitions provided a crucial site not only for informing the knowledge base of consumers but also for selling the political importance of consuming itself. Even if women, like other early West Germans, could not actually afford many of the things they saw at exhibitions, they largely bought into the political platform of miraculous prosperity.⁶⁹ In this way, consuming goods and consuming a paternalist political discourse were inherently linked. In the case of beer, however, most women certainly *could* afford the commodity.

If women were buying most of the beer, they were not regularly drinking it, or at least not as much as their male counterparts. According to a nationwide survey in 1964, 47 percent of men drank beer regularly, 45 percent occasionally, and only 8 percent never. By contrast, only 14 percent of women reported drinking beer regularly, 55 percent occasionally, and fully 31 percent never.⁷⁰ And while men enjoyed drinking in public settings more than women by a factor of three, private consumption had become king. In Munich, 91 percent of the population reported drinking beer in their home and 71 percent reported that they made a habit of always keeping a supply of bottled beer in their

⁶⁷ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1956/57 und 1957/58*, 87-88.

⁶⁸ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1954/55 und 1955/56*, 64.

⁶⁹ Spicka, *Selling the Economic Miracle*; Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale,” 156.

⁷⁰ “Einstellung zum Bierverbrauch,” GfK S 1964 058, tbl 1g.

homes. Numbers for the Lower Franconian city of Würzburg were similar.⁷¹ Bavarians, more so than any other West Germans, bought their bottled beer by the case. Nationally, only 26% of West Germans reported buying by the case. The southwestern region of Baden-Württemberg was above average with 33% buying by the case but Bavaria threw the curve with just shy of 50% of all bottled beer sold by the case. By comparison, in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Bremen, only 16% of bottled beer sales were by the case.⁷² In the two southern regions, as well as in less populated areas generally, grocery stores were less common, and beer was most frequently acquired through home delivery services.⁷³ Regardless of how the beer was bought or with what frequency, across the Federal Republic, more than 50% of respondents claimed that the man of the house decided which type of beer to buy while only 20% claimed that a wife or mother made the decision, regardless of the fact that these women by far did the actual purchasing.⁷⁴ The ultimate result of these increases in private consumption was that from 1953 to 1964 an average middle-class family of four nearly tripled their monthly monetary expenditures on beer.⁷⁵

Simple pleasure and social engagement were the two dominant responses West Germans identified as their reason for drinking. Asked why they preferred to drink at home 64% claimed it was cozier (*gemütlicher*) and 75% that it was more comfortable and

⁷¹ “Trinkgewohnheiten der Münchner Stadtbevölkerung und Markenbilder ausgewählter Brauereien,” GfK S 1964 029, tbl 2 and 3; “Untersuchung über Trinkgewohnheiten für Bier und Image für ausgewählte Brauereien bei der Stadtbevölkerung Würzburgs,” GfK S 1964 031, tbl 2, 19, 22, and 33.

⁷² “Einstellung zum Bierverbrauch,” tbl 22b.

⁷³ Ibid., tbl 60.

⁷⁴ Ibid., tbl 18. In Munich the statistics were even more skewed, with 73 percent of respondents granting consumer choice to men and only 12 percent naming women. “Trinkgewohnheiten der Münchner Stadtbevölkerung,” tbl 45.

⁷⁵ “Der westdeutsche Getränkemarkt,” GfK S 1962 046, tbl 17 in both the original study and in the appendix extending the data to 1964.

convenient (*bequem*). The former, that drinking beer at home was cozier, was listed as the single most important reason for drinking at home, more important even than that it was significantly cheaper. Respondents overwhelmingly identified beer as the ideal drink for family meals, intimate celebrations, and nights in with friends.⁷⁶ Private beer consumption in was thus part of the foundations of the nuclear family from domestic sociability to the recasting of bourgeois paternalism.

Publicly too, beer drinking was part of new forms of sociability in the Federal Republic. In 1964 West German men drank beer in public settings more than three times as often as women.⁷⁷ Communal advertisements that displayed the value of beer in fostering sociability and rewarding the labor of reconstruction align with trends in public consumption. Urban industrial regions in general, and North Rhine-Westphalia in particular, had the highest rates of public consumption in pubs, factory canteens, and restaurants. West Germans broadly considered beer the drink of social life *par excellence*, ranking it far above wine, coffee, or tea. And while private consumption had the advantage of being cheaper, cozier, and more convenient, West Germans overwhelmingly agreed that public consumption was more entertaining or social (*unterhaltsamer*).⁷⁸

Just as the nationwide *Bierwerbe* and the Bavarian *Bierwerbeverein* oversaw the production of exhibits, advertising, homemaking tips and tricks, and other sorts of information about beer for private consumption, so too did they work to shape the culture of public beer consumption in a number of ways. We have already seen some of the ways

⁷⁶ “Einstellung zum Bierverbrauch,” tbl 30 and 31.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, tbl 13g.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, tbl 30 and 31.

that beer was presented as the cure-all of a long day. Beyond print media, the trade organizations also worked to shape the experience of public consumption. They did public outreach to establishments with advice on glassware and proper serving and got increasingly involved in shaping the sensory experience of public drinking. In the early 1950s, for example, the Bavarian Brewers' Association helped choose and produce the music that would be featured at Oktoberfest celebrations.⁷⁹ In the mid 1950s the *Bierwerbe* and Bavarian *Bierwerbeverein* began searching for and accepting submissions for songs they could produce for circulation at festivals and at drinking establishments. Their decisions regarding the songs as well as the content of the songs themselves demonstrate a number of important points not only about making consumption pleasurable, but also about minimizing provincialism in consumer culture, and making beer consumption communal and even national.

One of the first song submissions came in April 1955 when Dr. Gerhardt Seiffert, a literature scholar from Fallersleben in Lower Saxony wrote to the Bavarian *Bierwerbeverein*. Seiffert was a scholar of the poet August Heinrich Hoffmann, most famous for penning the *Deutschlandlied*, or German national anthem. Three months before writing his famous lyrics in August 1841, Seiffert claimed that Hoffmann wrote another song, the final stanza of which read:

God bless our mountains and crops!
This we ask and pray.
If barley and hops are well tended,
Beer will stay good and cheap.
And God bless the land of Bavaria,
Where they've made the best beer!

⁷⁹ See early 1950s correspondence in BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1340.

The *Bierwerbeverein* did not opt to develop this stanza into a commercial song but the discourse around it demonstrates that already the trade organization, and at least this one intellectual, was interested in embellishing the role of beer in West Germany and Bavaria.⁸⁰ This is particularly interesting because Hoffmann's more famous *Deutschlandlied* had, only three years earlier, been adopted by the Federal Republic as its national anthem, stripped of the first two stanzas that were laden with expansionist and nationalist language. Finding in Hoffmann's own work a potential alternative anthem that stressed crops and beer rather than German hegemony in Central Europe is particularly telling of other efforts to make beer an innocuous part of the new West Germany such as connecting it physically and symbolically to the land through agriculture and provincial claims like *In Bayern trinkt Man Bier*. Indeed, by this point, the *Bierwerbeverein* may have already moved beyond celebrating beer as an exclusively agricultural commodity and was eyeing the national stage.

Communal advertisements had grown out of a concern that the West German and Bavarian industries had become too internally hostile to succeed in the economic boom. The rampant success of the brewing industry in the 1950s and early 1960s suggested to many brewers that their communal approach to a volatile market was a success. In his speech on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the *Bierwerbe*, its president Dr. Theobald Simon insisted that communal advertisements deserved much of the credit for a West German production increase from 26.4 million hectoliters in 1952 to 61 million in 1962.⁸¹ And that rising tide, it seems, also massaged away much of the provincial

⁸⁰ April 1, 1955, letter from Gerhardt Seiffert to the Bavarian Brewers' Association, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1340.

⁸¹ Theobald Simon, "Zehn Jahre Deutsche Bier-Gemeinschaftswerbung."

industrial anxiety that had motivated the foundation of a separate Bavarian counterpart. In 1962 the Bavarian *Bierwerbeverein* was thus dissolved and its capital incorporated into the West German *Bierwerbe*. While no explicit mention of it was made, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 also likely stabilized an explicit national distinctiveness of West Germany. Discourses of consumer difference within the Federal Republic remained to be sure, but economic successes papered over them as a point of potential money lost. Examples of popular songs reflect some of how this papering over was an active project of public relations.

The songs that the brewing industry supported were those that provided “a valuable contribution to the design of a sales-favorable atmosphere.”⁸² Part of that project was explicitly avoiding highlighting cultural difference. In 1964, for example, a composer from a small town in central Bavaria wrote to the Bavarian Brewers’ Association promoting his hymn, “Sauf Bruder, sauf” (swig, brother, swig). The lyrics, composed in the Bavarian dialect and featuring a yodeling refrain, focused on a distinctly provincial culture with local, agricultural, and Catholic references. They critiqued affluence and the troubles of modern life, culminating in the claim that with a liter (*Maß*) in each hand, one could happily embrace death. The director of the Bavarian trade organization refused to advocate for the song to the *Bierwerbe*. In his response, he wrote that the dominant position of beer in the West German beverage market had everything to do with it being “regarded as a national drink.” It had “long ceased to be the drink of lower classes,” and the distinctly Bavarian flair of the song, “is in no way in harmony with the target approach of our advertisements. Moreover, we do not believe that the

⁸² February 11, 1963, letter from Werner Schladenhaufen to the membership of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1340.

diction of the song would be well received throughout Germany.”⁸³ By 1964 then, the same organization that insisted on paying special attention to the “Bavarian mentality” now understood national success to be its central path to economic growth so much so that it silenced articulations of provincial difference.

If the message and aesthetic of “Sauf Bruder, sauf” was alienating or divisive, other songs were successfully supported by the brewing industry because of their message of unification and beer as a core part of Germanness. In the autumn of 1964, the song, “Wir gründen eine Bier-Partei” (We’re founding a Beer Party) was written and recorded by the Bavarian group *Hugo und seine Stammtischbrüder* (Hugo and his Drinking Buddies [Image 3.9]).⁸⁴ The Bavarian trade organization circulated it to their membership in September of that year to play at Oktoberfest celebrations and promoted it at a November press ball. It was the “hymn of the evening” as the newspaper *Die Welt am Sonntag* put it, and records of it were given to attending members of the press. The lyrics went:

Refrain:

Prost! Prost! Prost!

We’re founding a Beer Party, Beer Party, Beer Party

We’re founding a Beer Party, and count me in.

The SPD votes for Willy [Brandt], yeah, yeah, yeah,

The FPD for Erich [Mende], yeah, yeah, yeah

The CDU votes for Ludwig [Erhard], yeah, yeah, yeah

But when I go to the polls, I choose my local pub.

(Refrain)

With us there is no quarrel and struggle, no, no, no,

⁸³ See correspondence between Werner Schladenhaufen and Carl Jung in July and August 1964, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1340.

⁸⁴ *Stammtisch* means “regular’s table” and colloquially signifies an informal gathering dedicated to light conversation and socializing, usually over bountiful alcohol consumption. “Drinking Buddies” takes a few liberties with the German “*Stammtischbrüder*” but captures well the spirit of camaraderie that the term entails.

We have no time for ceremonial honors, no, no, no,
And nor for state visits, no, no, no,
For those we'll just send a case of German beer,
(Refrain)

Today we're paying the founding dues, yeah, yeah, yeah,
And if we all do it, yeah, yeah, yeah,
And if we're very generous, yeah, yeah, yeah,
Our party will build breweries everywhere.⁸⁵
(Refrain)

The lyrics are fairly straightforward and explicit that beer consumption was a shared experience of German life. The lyrics actually say that beer consumption stands beyond the divisive realms of politics. No matter where one fell politically, beer consumption was a shared national pleasure. It is perhaps more important than politics and even a cure-



Image 3.9: Hugo and his Drinking Buddies. Source: Record sleeve for the single releases of “Wir gründen eine Bier-Partei,” and “Das Flaschenkind.” Digital Image by author, reproduced from open source YouTube video.

⁸⁵ See correspondence between September and November 1964, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1340.

all for international diplomacy. The song also captures the stabilization of West Germany in a nutshell: consume more, vote for your party but more so for increased consumption, and feed the expansion of the consumer economy by buying in in daily practice.

Digging a little deeper, the song also suggests some of the complications of creating a stable consumerist nation in the wake of Nazi dictatorship. The song itself borrowed composition from March and Foxtrot music and was adorned with repetitive chanting of “Prost!” or “Cheers!” The aesthetic appealed to older Germans and smacked of the marches and chants of their youth.⁸⁶ In 1964, rock’n’roll was taking the world by storm; it was the same year the Beatles “invaded” the United States. “Wir gründen eine Bier-Partei” was not competition with rock’n’roll and the new youth culture; it was an alternative. Hard working men and women—but mostly men—who drank in public spaces could now associate beer with a shared national culture that was outwardly apolitical but also deeply communitarian, drawing on an aesthetic which sounded a lot like that of an earlier Party. National Socialism had also built its base in the beerhalls and taverns arguing for what was inherent to Germans. The last stanza of the song even conveys the hope that the new party can expand “*überall*”; an echo of “*Deutschland über alles*” which, whether intentional or not, would hardly have been lost on middle aged Germans.

The same year the song was released, *Der Spiegel* published a lengthy piece about beer production and consumption focusing on the rapid proliferation of bottled beer and how it had expanded beer consumption both in public and private. It opened with an epigraph from none other than Otto von Bismarck who decreed, “We Germans can

⁸⁶ The song can be heard at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xfl4Pq9j71o>

scarcely kill more time than when drinking beer.” The article announced that West Germans should celebrate, especially given that it was an Olympic year, that they had just broken a world record—in beer drinking per capita. Embellishing the apparent truism about beer and “we Germans,” the author tapped market and motivation psychologist Ernest Dichter who offered, “you can be proud of beer; with beer, you don’t have anything to apologize for.”⁸⁷ As it happened, the immediately preceding article in this issue of *Der Spiegel* detailed a meeting of international historians who had convened in Berlin to discuss what we now called the Fischer Controversy, the first major and majorly public historical controversy over German culpability in the First World War.⁸⁸ Moreover, by 1964, the Auschwitz Trial for SS guards in Frankfurt was at its midway point. Just as Germans drank their beer and supported their new “beer party,” and just as Bismarck and Dichter told readers “we Germans” have nothing to apologize for, it was becoming clear that a lot of Germans may actually have *a lot* to apologize for. The juxtaposition of the popular consumer experience of recovery and the place of the past highlights many of the tensions and contradictions that plagued the West German transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Conclusions

In the shift from scarcity to opulence in the Adenauer/Erhard years, the Bavarian and West German brewing industries worked to increase consumption in part by participating in the conservative modernization and cultural democratization of the Federal Republic. An industry that began the postwar period weary of itself and

⁸⁷ “Bier: Sieg der Flasche.”

⁸⁸ “War der Kriegsausbruch nur ein Betriebsunfall?” *Der Spiegel* 18, no. 43, Oct. 21, 1964, 50-53.

provincial differences in consumer culture shifted in the boom years towards trying to mitigate the celebration of regional difference in the name of a new nationally German market of beer drinkers. At the same time, the apolitical façade of quotidian pleasures was deeply entwined not only with a “conservative restoration” and the stabilization of center-right gender norms and political culture but also with the conspicuous absence of public assessment of Germans’ own Nazi pasts in the 1950s and 1960s. The brewing industry undoubtedly succeeded in securing its place in what they feared would become a new and crowded West German world of goods. And yet, this triumph of West German capitalist consumerism was not without its social shortcomings. It depended in no small part on the recasting of conservative paternalism and a mass consumerism that celebrated the departure from scarcity on the one hand while massaging away the rough edges of the Nazi dictatorship on the other.

The Federal Republic found political stability and legitimation in economic growth. Beer became part of creating a unified national culture of consumerism through a conviction that the drink of “we Germans” trumped political oppositions. Differences in regional and local consumer cultures no doubt remained, but *beer*, stripped of brand and local consumer culture became indicative of a new culture of Germany and Germanness where differences in politics and provincialism played a secondary role to the economic miracle as the defining cultural trope of the new West German nation. There is at least one major part of this story, however, which requires more extensive consideration. If what we have seen here is the making of a new sort of German national culture, that is only half of “the people’s drink” (the people), and what qualifies as their drink is just as important. The next chapter offers a parallel history to the present one but transitions

towards thinking about how West Germans came to understand beer as a particular type of commodity.

Chapter 4:

The Incoherence of a National Icon: A Political Economy of the *Reinheitsgebot*,

1954—1975



Image 4.1: *Reinheitsgebot* placard. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, insert between pages 72 and 73.

To this day visitors to breweries in Bavaria are greeted by a version of this placard commemorating the Purity Law for Beer Production, or *Reinheitsgebot*. (Image 4.1) Most of the placards are embellished with blue ink to draw out the royal colors of the Wittelsbach Dynasty, which consolidated control of present-day Bavaria and beyond beginning in the twelfth century. Across the top it proclaims that the Law, dating to 1516, provides the foundation for the global reputation of Bavarian beer. On the left is the

original Middle High German text and on the right the modern High German transliteration. In the middle it assures readers that the law remains unchanged in application to this day. The thinking behind the placards, as Carlo Proebst of the Bavarian Brewers' Association explained to the membership of the trade organization, was that,

Bavarian brewers can be proud of the fact that they mastered the technical difficulties brought about by wartime restrictions on raw materials. They remained true and held firmly and steadfastly to their centuries-long tradition—the heritage (*Erbe*) of their fathers and their victorious safeguard (*Palladium*)—the 450-year-old Bavarian *Reinheitsgebot*.¹

This passage drips with historical references, only the most obvious being the “heritage of their fathers” and a “centuries-long tradition,” but also featuring an obscure reference to Greek antiquity—Palladium, a Latinized reference to the Greek goddess Pallas or Athena and colloquially used for something that provides protection. And yet, in spite of all this historical reference, the placard itself, was designed to fill an “absence” in popular consciousness around the *Reinheitsgebot*. According to the trade organization, the *Reinheitsgebot* had never, in its more than four-hundred-year history, been displayed for popular awareness.²

For Bavarian brewers, the early 1950s were a period of great instability. Full strength beer had been made legal only in September 1948. The Federal Republic was founded in May 1949. Lingering tax burdens from the Third Reich were reformed in 1950 and again in 1952. Material scarcities kept beer production below prewar levels until 1953-4 when larger centralized breweries in the German northwest began to outpace Bavarian productivity. The idea for these plaques came in the middle of this maelstrom,

¹ “Das bayerische Reinheitsgebot in der Bierherstellung,” *Mitteilung des Bayer. Brauerbund* 12 Dec. 23, 1950, Bayerisches Hauptsatsarchiv (henceforth BayHStA) Bayer. Brauerbund 1352.

² Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1951/52 und 1952/53*, 72-4.

in the autumn of 1949, some six months after the founding of the Federal Republic but before the passing of a unified national beer production and taxation law. They were first distributed a year after the 1952 Beer Tax Law, which codified a qualified version of the *Reinheitsgebot* as national law, and a year before the Bavarian state kicked off a West German conflict rooted in the ambiguities of the 1952 legislation. The *Reinheitsgebot* in this context thus sits at the intersection economic recovery, centralized tax legislation, popular consumer consciousness, and the untested waters of West German federalism and market integration. The 16th century law itself was neither cause nor catalyst for these processes but the legal, cultural, economic, and political tasks to which Bavarian brewers put it and the meanings they gave to it expose the convergence of capital and political interests rooted in a discourse of tradition. This chapters offer a history of moments at which the *Reinheitsgebot* became important in West Germany and why. While the meanings attached to the law were multiple depending on place and contextual interests, the law became a site of negotiating past and present, tradition and progress, and for articulating the cultural values of Germans and West Germany.

For at least the past two decades, historians of Germany have demonstrated that renarrating and imparting new meanings to the past was a crucial part of postwar reconstruction in the Federal Republic.³ Recently, Jeremy De Waal has questioned the national homogeneity of this process arguing for a “broad localist turn” across West

³ See for example, Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002); Elizabeth Heineman, *What Difference does a Husband Make: Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Frank Biess, *Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Germany in which “the reinvention of tradition” depended on the renarrations of local actors from Cologne to the Hanseatic states as they rebuilt and reconceived their own “shattered life narratives.” The Cologne Carnival gradually became a celebration of a reinvented democratic tradition while in the Hanseatic states, local residents worked to reimagine and restore their communities not as they had historically—as nodes of German naval and global power—but as cosmopolitan littorals and peaceful intermediaries between Germany and the world.⁴ In the case of the *Reinheitsgebot*, we see not only that regional traditions—like local urban ones—could be similarly reinvented, but also that such a process could be initiated as a markedly capitalist project, a mode of generating a regional consumer self-awareness located first in Bavaria and later in West Germany broadly, but rooted in an explicitly pre-national, and indeed non-national symbol. It would only become a national symbol in the face of European market integration due the perceived threat integration posed to the interests of brewers and their political allies.

This political economy of the *Reinheitsgebot* primarily focuses on two conflicts over the law that together spanned from 1954 to 1975. An initial overview from the early modern proclamation of the law to the early 1950s offers historical background and demonstrates some of the central-provincial tensions around the law already before the Federal Republic. This preliminary section suggests that the long history of the *Reinheitsgebot* was itself fragmented and controversial and that by the early years of the

⁴ Jeremy De Waal, “The Turn to Local Communities in Early Post-War West Germany: The Case of Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, 1945-65” in *(Re)Constructing Communities in Europe, 1918-1968: Senses of Belonging Below, Beyond and Within the Nation-State*, ed. Stefan Couperus and Harm Kaal (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 130-50; idem., “The Reinvention of Tradition: Form, Meaning, and Local Identity in Modern Cologne Carnival” *Central European History* 46, no. 3 (2013): 495-532.

Federal Republic it came to reflect provincial differences and divergent capital strategies in the Bavarian and West German brewing sectors. The next two sections deal with conflicts around the juridical authority, cultural importance, and economic implications of the *Reinheitsgebot* at the West German and western European levels respectively. The meanings of the law are neither simple nor universal and these conflicts reveal a convergence of capital and political interests while also demonstrating that the emergence of beer—and a particular kind of “pure beer”—as a cultural icon and political symbol of the Federal Republic hinged on the perceived threats of market integration. The coherence of the story is not a timeless tradition or a legal entrenchment of the *Reinheitsgebot* itself; that story is in fact incoherent and contradictory, a legal history that was embattled and contentious through and through. Instead, the same national-provincial conflicts around beer that dated from the founding of the German nation, that festered in the Weimar Republic, and that crystalized in the Third Reich, continued to inform West German federalism until the early 1970s when across the board, the *Reinheitsgebot* became a national icon in the service of political and capital interests. What provincial differences in beer production and consumption lingered—and do to this day—became secondary to a unified national sentiment around “pure beer” anchored in the *Reinheitsgebot*.

How German was the *Reinheitsgebot*? A brief history to 1954

In 1516, the Bavarian Dukes Wilhelm IV and Ludwig X decreed a law regulating the permissible ingredients in beer. Rooted in a 1487 predecessor limited to the city of Munich, the law was decreed in the Kingdom of Bavaria as an effort to limit competition

for grain in the production of beer and bread. Henceforth the former would use barley, the latter wheat. According to the law, beer in Bavaria could only contain water, hops, and malted barley. Exceptions were strictly controlled. For example, between 1520 and 1798, Weissbier continued to be produced in the Kingdom in spite of being wheat-based because it met the fancy of several members of the Bavarian Wittelsbach dynasty. For these two and a half centuries production of wheat beer remained the exclusive right of the Wittelsbach dynasty, providing a significant source of state revenue and even political authority.⁵

When Germany was unified under Prussian control in 1871 Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg retained sovereign provincial legislation on beer and spirit production and taxation. Such “Reserve Rights,” were not formally part of the 1871 constitution but were federalist measures, which aimed to appease provincial concerns and decenter Prussian management. They ranged more broadly from the operation of free harbors in the Hanseatic states, to the retention of semiautonomous military control of provincial armies by the heads of Saxony, Württemberg, and Bavaria. In the case of beer, Bavarian brewers held to their 1516 brewing law, and in 1899 Baden formally adopted the law as well. As a corrective to any narrative of the law as part of a *national* story then, it should be noted that it did not even expand beyond Bavaria until 1899.⁶ In 1906 a number of important

⁵ Karl Gattinger, *Bier und Landesherrschaft: Das Weißbiermonopol der Wittelsbacher unter Maximilian I. von Bayern* (Munich: Karl M. Lipp Verlag, 2007). On the Weissbier, as the style declined in the 18th century, the Wittelsbach’s opened the market. Nonetheless by 1812 only two breweries in Bavaria were making the style. The Wittelsbach’s sold their own brewery in 1856 to Georg Schneider who, along with his descendants stuck with the style and ultimately grew it into one of the most successful Weissbier breweries in the world, G. Schneider & Sohn.

⁶ The Reserve Rights and their federalist implications remain an understudied area in the historiography of Imperial Germany. Indeed, the federalist and constitutional histories of Imperial Germany more broadly remain often only begrudgingly acknowledged by historians interested in Prussian power, authoritarianism, or “social imperialism.” For a relevant overview, see Allan Mitchell, “‘A Real Foreign Country’: Bavarian Particularism in Imperial Germany, 1870-1918,” *Francia* 7 (1979): 587-96; more generally, George G.

things happened. First, yeast, which had long been present in beer brewing but was only recently isolated, was formally added to the ingredient list in Bavaria and Baden. Second, Württemberg joined Bavaria and Baden in their strict adherence to the four-ingredient law for all beer, thereby forming a large southern German bloc. Third, and perhaps most consequentially for the national story, a qualified version of the law became national. Henceforth there were German and Bavarian/South German versions.

The distinction between the national and southern versions of the law requires a brief aside into the taxonomies of beer and brewing, which will also prove useful background for understanding postwar disputes and developments. The two main classifications of beer are lagers and ales. These two classes correspond to bottom- and top-fermenting yeasts, respectively, and to the correlated period, speed, and method of fermentation. The vast majority of German beer is lager beer and indeed the word Lager is even the German word for store, storage, or camp. The name reflects that the style emerged in German-speaking Bavaria in the 1500s, the product of new types of yeast which current scientific research suggests may have come to Europe via the Americas; a potentially rich subject for further inquiry in the Columbian Exchange.⁷ The style spread

Windell, "The Bismarckian Empire as a Federal State, 1866-1880: A Chronicle of Failure," *Central European History* 2, no. 4 (Dec. 1969): 291-311; and Richard Dietrich, "Foederalismus, Unitarismus oder Hegemonialstaat?" and Walter Peter Fuchs, "Bundesstaaten und Reich: Der Bundesrat," in *Zur Problematik "Preussen und das Reich"* ed. Oswald Hauser (Böhlau, 1984); more recently, Dieter Grimm, "Was the German Empire a Sovereign State?" in *Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates and New Perspectives*, ed. Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); finally, see the current work of Gavin Wiens, "The common man knows nothing of an imperial authority': Prussian and non-Prussian Perceptions of the Imperial German Army, 1871-1918" (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2018).

⁷ Lager beers are relatively new. Humans were fermenting grain into beer in ancient Babylonia and likely much earlier. Almost without exception these beers would have been technically ales. Genome scientists have recently speculated that lager yeast had its origins in South America. Little research has discussed how this happened and it's difficult to imagine how one would find a microorganism in the archive but this is clearly a topic deserving of further research. See Diego Libkind, et. al. "Microbe domestication and the identification of the wild genetic stock of lager-brewing yeast," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 108, no. 35 (2011): 14539-44.

quickly throughout the German and Habsburg Lands, and was globalized in the 19th century thanks in large part to European imperialism in places ranging from British South Africa to German Qingdao.⁸ The meaning of the German “Lagerbier” refers to the fact that bottom fermenting yeasts work much slower and in order for them to work, the beer must be stored, or “lagered” in English, in cool places for an extended period of time below 40 degrees Fahrenheit (traditionally the basements of monasteries). Top-fermenting yeasts, on the other hand, have a higher heat and alcohol tolerance, which means they often make stronger beers that are fermented faster. This classification of beers are known as ales, a technical category that includes beers often considered distinct styles such as porters and stouts. Although there are some noteworthy exceptions in Germany such as Weissbier/Hefeweizen, Kölsch, Altbier, and Berliner Weiße, which are all top-fermented ales, these sorts of beers have historically been more ubiquitous in the British Isles, the British Empire, and the United States.⁹

These distinctions formed the fault line of regional and national divergence in 1906. The Act to Amend the Brewing Tax Law (*Gesetz wegen Änderung des Brausteuergesetzes*) specified that bottom-fermenting lager beers could have only malted barley, hops, yeast, and water; which was true to the Bavarian original and applied nation-wide. It also specified, however, that top-fermented ales could contain malts from other grains, technically pure cane, beet, invert, and starch sugar, as well as glucose and

⁸ On the globalization of Pilsner beer and Lager beer more generally, see Malcolm Purinton, “Empire in a Bottle: Commerce, Culture, and Consumption of the Pilsner Beer in the British Empire, 1870-1914” (PhD diss., Northeastern University, 2016); and Jeffrey Pilcher, “‘Tastes Like Horse Piss’: Asian Encounters with European Beer,” *Gastronomica* 16, no. 1 (Spring, 2016): 28-40.

⁹ On the long history of ales in Britain, especially regarding the gendered transition of brewing labor, see Judith M. Bennett, *Ale, Beer, and Brewsters in England: Women’s Work in a Changing World, 1300-1600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

colorants derived from these sugars.¹⁰ In Bavaria and Southern Germany, however, brewers adhered to the former provisions guaranteed by their 1871 Reserve Rights and applied the strict four-ingredient law to all beer regardless of yeast and fermentation. So in short, in Bavaria and Southern Germany, all beer regardless of type was required to adhere to the four-ingredient list, while in Germany more broadly, top-fermented ales could contain a series of additional ingredients. Once again the great ironic exception to this in the south was Weißbier, white beer, or what north Germans called Hefeweizen, literally yeast-wheat.

In the 20th century much of the history of law has been tied up with tax policy. Indeed, attentive readers may have noticed that we have yet to name the law. This is because until 1918 it was called, somewhat prosaically, the *Surrogatverbot* (surrogate prohibition). It was only termed *Reinheitsgebot*, or Purity Law, by Bavarian State Parliamentarian Hans Rauch in March 1918 in a heated debate over taxation.¹¹ The very language of beer *purity* then, is in many ways a strictly twentieth century invention. In the Weimar Republic, harmonizing tax law became a pet-project of the Finance Ministry, who enlisted willing members of the German brewing industry to help create a national tax code for beer. Regulations on taxation were not, however, regulations on production standards and the southern German states only joined the so-called *Biersteuergemeinschaft* in 1919 on the condition that they could keep their stricter version of the law.¹² Two laws in March and June of that year brought Württemberg,

¹⁰ “Gesetz wegen Änderung des Brausteuergesetzes,” *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* 98 (1906), 622-31, esp., Section 1.

¹¹ Horst Dornbusch and Karl-Ullrich Heyse, “Reinheitsgebot,” in *The Oxford Companion to Beer*, ed. Garrett Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 692-3.

¹² “Gesetz über den Eintritt der Freistaaten Bayern und Baden in die Biersteuergemeinschaft. Vom 24. Juni 1919.” *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* 121 (1919), Section 2, Paragraph 2, 136. For background on tax reform as distinct from productions standards, see, Mikuláš Teich, “Biertrinker, Brauereiunternehmer und Staat: Deutschland 1800-1914,” in *Europäische Konsumgeschichte: Zur Gesellschaft- und Kulturgeschichte des*

Bavaria, and Baden into the national tax code signaling the dissolution of provincial sovereignty on taxation but not on production standards.¹³ Indeed, qualitative markers like production standards, quality, and alcohol preference provided an avenue for provincial critique of centralization in the Weimar Republic. In 1922, for example, the rural Catholic daily *Bavarian Fatherland* railed against the presence of northern influence in the south lamenting that, “the Prussian rotgut is here.”¹⁴ Provincial production standards and cultural opposition changed little throughout the Republic and what legislation there was, namely from 1923 to 1925, remained focused on harmonizing taxation in the face hyperinflation rather than targeting production standards.¹⁵ This discrepancy between nationalized taxation and provincial production, was rooted most concretely in 1906 and 1919 and came to shape the history of beer for the next century.

The north-south division in the production of beer became politicized during the Third Reich, as we saw in chapter one, especially in the context of war as centralized pressure from Berlin sought to adulterate beer production with the addition of sugar. The three southern regions of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg effectively opposed this effort through the end of the war. While Reich taxation skyrocketed and alcohol strength decreased, production standards remained. With the postwar prohibition of production for

Konsums (18. bis 20. Jahrhundert), ed. Hannes Siegrist, Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Kocka (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1997), 672-3.

¹³ Helmut Klaus, *Der Dualismus Preußen versus Reich in der Weimarer Republik in Politik und Verwaltung* (Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Godesberg GmbH, 2006), 196-8.

¹⁴ See for example, “Der preussische Fusel ist da,” *Das Bayerische Vaterland* no. 294, Dec. 22, 1922.

¹⁵ For more on the legal history of production standards and taxation from 1871 to 1938, see, Franz X. Ragl, “Altbayern, das Ursprungsland und der Hort des Reinheitsgebotes,” *Der Bayerische Bierbrauer* no. 5, Jan. 31, 1941, 1-18; Hans Nawiasky, “Rechtsgutachten über die Tragweite des bayerischen Vorbehalts beim Eintritt in die Biersteuergemeinschaft zu erstatten” and idem., “Rechtgutachten über die verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit des Verbotes, außerhalb Bayerns zulässigerweise unter Zuckerverwendung hergestelltes Bier in Bayern in Verkehr zu bringen,” *BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund* 587; Klaus, *Der Dualismus Preußen*, 196-8.

civilian consumption, production standards were rendered a practical non-issue. After the currency reform and the lifting of the *Brauverbot* in 1948, however, the issue resurfaced again in the early 1950s. Thanks in large part to the pressures of Bavarian agrarian interests in the early 1950s, the West German Beer Tax Law formally codified the *Reinheitsgebot* as national law in 1952. Still, and this is a key development for the present chapter, it was a formulation that echoed earlier tensions between national and provincial standards and practices, and in fact made them yet more complicated.

The two most relevant sections of the 1952 Beer Tax Law, those that would become the point of contention in the 1950s, were §§ 9 and 10. In the former case, Paragraphs 1 and 2 specified the ingredients that could be included in beer brewed with bottom and top fermenting yeasts, respectively, and mirrored much of the 1919 provisions. Bottom-fermenting lager beer was limited nationally to the four-ingredient list while top-fermenting ale beer was permitted the use of other grain malts as well as the use of cane, beet, and invert sugar as well as coloring agents derived from sugar and starch sugar.¹⁶ Beyond production standards, however, the 1952 law also crucially regulated what could be put in circulation on the market under the label of “Bier.” It specified that beverages could only be called beer (either by itself or in compound form, i.e. Starkbier, Altbier, etc.) or sold with “pictographic representations that conjure an appearance of being beer” (*die den Anschein erwecken*), if they met the production standards in § 9. Furthermore, beverages that had been augmented beyond the four core ingredients could only be brought in circulation when the addition of sugar or other

¹⁶ *Biersteuergesetz in der Fassung vom 14. März 1952 mit Durchführungsbestimmungen zum Biersteuergesetz (BierStDB) in der Fassung vom 14. März 1952* (Nuremberg: Brauwelt Verlag Hans Carl, 1952), Section 9, Para. 1-2.

permitted additives allowed in the minutia of § 9 were “presented in a form recognizable to the consumer.”¹⁷ These regulations created trade barriers based on production standards. The problem was that this operated not only on the level of trade between West Germany and other countries, but also between Bavaria and other West German *Länder* due to the history of provincial productions standards. This would become the fulcrum on which national and international disputes about beer would be argued, first by brewers with financial interests at stake, second by their political allies, and third by consumers themselves who squared the circle of making the *Reinheitsgebot* a piece of popular cultural discourse at both the regional and national level.

To demonstrate how the *Reinheitsgebot* functioned between producers, political allies, and consumers, we must acknowledge that from its inception until the early 1950s, even though the law no doubt influenced what was available and thus what people drank, it was not something most Germans or even Bavarians were actually aware of. In spite of the lengthy history of the law, very few people beyond brewers, select politicians, and financial agents actually knew what it said. In some ways this is not entirely surprising: even highly self-aware consumers in the present age of localism and ethical consumption can hardly claim to understand all the regulations that inform the products they routinely purchase and consume. But as we have also seen, the very language of “beer purity” was not even used in legal and political debates until 1918. In the 1950s, the *Reinheitsgebot* underwent an important change in that it became part of public relations and communal advertising. Here too, it was marked by a tension between the Bavarian and West German industries. In the former the law was the alpha and omega of beer while in the latter it

¹⁷ Ibid., Section 10, Para. 1.

scarcely made an appearance, with brewers preferring to emphasize either the ancient roots of beer in German-speaking Europe or the more recent industrialization and modernization of the brewing industry itself.

As we saw in the opening discussion of the *Reinheitsgebotstafeln* in the early 1950s, the Bavarian trade organization boasted that the law was the primary reason for the good reputation of Bavarian beer. While it regulated production and thus informed what the product was, this was not popularly understood. The very concept of “pure beer” had only been in circulation for some three decades. To promote it, the organization produced thousands of plaques, created by the Augsburg graphic designer Hermann Müller that juxtaposed the original wording (of the *Surrogatverbot*) and the modern transliteration, all under a timeless heading of the *Reinheitsgebot*. They were sent to members of the trade organization to be hung in every brewery and in many restaurants and inns throughout Bavaria. With these placards, the Bavarian brewing industry collectively sought to “reinvent tradition” rooted in an early modern legal peculiarity. The plaque celebrated the regional origin of the law, with the headline reading, “The purity law for the production of beer dates back to the year 1516 and is the source of the global reputation of Bavarian beer.” The Bavarian brewing industry boasted to beer drinkers that their beer was anchored in the early modern period and glossed over taxation reform in 1906/19 as well as even the coining of the name in 1918. The claim on the plaque that the *Reinheitsgebot* remained “unchanged in application to this day” was, as we have seen, not entirely true. And while there *is* a provincial history here, making it part of popular consciousness and fledgling consumerism was a markedly industrial

mobilization; an effort to tie consumption in the present to regional capital interests with the language of tradition and a valuation centered on “purity.”

Beyond Bavaria, making beer a conscious part of German history and tradition was also a West German national industrial project in the 1950s, but importantly, this was *not* about the *Reinheitsgebot*. The Law—which the Bavarians claimed was the root of their global reputation—was notably absent in claims by West German brewers who similarly pointed to tradition and history but preferred to stress either the ancient nature of German beer drinking or the modern wonders of industrialized production. Consider, for example, a short 1953 booklet published by the German Brewers’ Association, *On the Drink of the Ancient Germanics*. It begins with Bronze Age, pre-Christian Germanic civilization, drawing on archaeological evidence to stress that beer was always part and parcel of sedentary agricultural society in German-speaking Europe; a truth only most famously immortalized in the Roman senator and historian Tacitus’ *Germania*. Drawing something of a straight line from Tacitus to the Federal Republic, the booklet closed with the Blue Medallion logo described in chapter three and the claim that the ancient knowledge passed down from “our ancestors” was now finally realized in the high quality modern beer of today; “the people’s drink for millennia.” This booklet opts not to mention the *Reinheitsgebot* by name at all, claiming only in passing that after the Thirty Years War, “a new increase [of beer production] resulted from the introduction of bottom-fermenting brewing methods in Bavaria, which soon conquered the world.”¹⁸

A second booklet produced by the German Brewers’ Association, also in 1953, similarly played up conquering the world, but stressed instead the importance of modern

¹⁸ Deutscher Brauerbund, *Vom Trank der alten Germanen* (Duisberg: Carl Lange Verlag, 1953), 14-5.

industrial production. *Beer: From the Stalk to the Glass* detailed the history and significance of beer from nutrition and the industrialization of production to the uses of byproducts and taxation. The *Reinheitsgebot* itself receives very little attention, mentioned only once in reference to the 1516 and 1906 Bavarian and German adoptions. The section in which it appears explains the difference between top- and bottom-fermenting beers but does not detail how the law actually relates to them nationally or provincially. On the one hand, the booklet reflects far more the scarcity mentality discussed in the previous chapter with multiple pages dedicated to the agricultural byproducts and nutritional qualities of beer. On the other, it establishes a globalized significance of German beer as a means by which Germans could understand themselves in the world. Less than ten years after “*Deutschland über Alles*” was taken out of speech patterns, the book proclaimed “German beer in every Country in the World” with a map, Germany in the middle, radiating beer around a world unmarked by Cold War spheres, empires, or borders whatsoever. (Image 4.2) The booklet draws significant attention to the industrialization of beer production, with six black and white photographs, the only photos included, featuring the shiny inside of modern breweries. For the West German trade organization, what mattered was building on ancient tradition and, “the interaction of science and practice” that allowed German beer to conquer the world.¹⁹

In sum, the German Brewers’ Association downplayed the significance of the 1516 and 1906/19 laws, stressing instead that beer had long roots in German history but that the industrialization of production was the turning point of beer’s importance in the modern era. The Bavarian Brewers’ Association, on the other hand, stressed that while

¹⁹ Deutscher Brauerbund, *Das Bier: vom Halm bis zum Glase* (Duisberg: Carl Lange Verlag, 1953), 3.




Image 4.2: German beer in every land the world over. Source: Deutscher Brauerbund, *Das Bier: vom Halm bis zum Glase* (Duisberg: Carl Lange Verlag, 1953), 19.

this may be true, it was the *Reinheitsgebot*, deeply anchored in Bavarian history that accounted for the importance of beer as a people's drink. In popular conceptions, even in the Bavarian case, the law remained virtually unknown beyond relatively closed circles in the early 1950s. It had become national law once again in 1952, and as the West German beer market integrated and consumption increased in the "miracle years," economic growth pushed the question of provincial and national standards into the political and cultural spotlight.

As we will see in what follows, from the 1950s to the 1970s the *Reinheitsgebot* operated as a lever of economic influence in bounded political geographies and in the process transitioned from a marker of difference into a point of commonality. Two major

conflicts in the processes of West German and West European market integration demonstrate the transition. In the first, the tensions between Bavarian and West German versions of the law came to a head as “Old Bavarian” (*Altbayerisch*) brewers and politicians worked to cudgel consumer preferences and economic exchanges in the long culturally contested regions of Franconia. In the second, Bavarian industrial and political interests monkey-wrenched international negotiations in the process of European integration, mobilizing broad political support for the *Reinheitsgebot* as an informal trade barrier to cheaper foreign products; a process that both popularized and nationalized a simplified version the law as a *national* icon. Even then, the Bavarian and West German versions existed side-by-side but as the national trade organization got onboard, the differences were papered over in political and popular discourse.

The *Süßbierstreit*: The Paradox of Bavarian Power, 1954-1962

The 1952 Beer Tax Law, as the name suggests, was primarily designed with an eye towards taxation. Ironing out the details of how its clauses on production standards would affect the pre-existing markets and practices of the beer economy was a process initiated by Bavarian brewers that were worried about their market share—and with good reason. In fiscal year 1950/1 Bavarian breweries had a West German market share of 37.3 percent, in 1953/4 that share dropped to 34 percent.²⁰ The rapid production of beer in significantly larger breweries, especially in North-Rhine Westphalia, dwarfed the capacities of the decentralized industry in Bavaria and presented a distinct challenge to Bavarian brewers in the West German market. As a result, Bavarian brewers with

²⁰ “Das Bier-Politikum” *Der Spiegel* 9, no. 2 (1955), 13-14.

national and even global aspirations were particularly sensitive to the economic threats posed by their larger West German competitors, especially on their home turf. In the 1950s they enlisted political allies and kicked off a “conflict over sweet beer” (*Süßbierstreit*) being brought over the Bavarian border from neighboring states and consumed primarily in the culturally contested northern regions of Bavaria called Franconia. The conflict revolved around industrial and political interests in Munich and Old Bavaria (*Altbayern* as it was called in publications at the time but generally a reference to politicians and brewers in the administrative district of *Oberbayern*) exerting political, cultural, and economic control over Franconia, a process that brought into question the regional and national Purity Laws and even the very nature of West German federalism.

In May of 1953, Dr. Bernhard Bergdolt of the Executive Board of the Munich Löwenbräu Brewery wrote to Dr. Ernst Röhm, the head of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, to complain about beers entering Bavaria from neighboring Hesse that did not conform to the Bavarian version of the *Reinheitsgebot*.²¹ Each month, close to half a million liters of beer brewed with the addition of sugar were entering Bavaria and being consumed, primarily in the northern areas of Franconia, and especially in the city of Würzburg. Franconia was—and is—a culturally contested part of Bavaria. It only became part of the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1803 (along with Eastern Swabia) and it retained cultural peculiarities in dialect, denomination, and cuisine. As testament to the geographical, cultural, and administrative divisions, for example, in the Third Reich, large sections of Franconia and Swabia were managed as *Reichsgaue* distinct from Old

²¹ May 9, 1953 letter from Bernhard Bergdolt to Ernst Röhm, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587.

Bavaria. Formalized as part of the Free State of Bavaria in the 1946 state constitution, part of the Federal Republic in 1949, and part of a sovereign West Germany only in 1955, provincial divisions were perhaps the norm. Importantly, the 1953 complaint was made not by breweries *in* Franconia or Würzburg, but rather by the Munich and *Altbayerisch* Löwenbräu brewery, one of the largest in Bavaria with an eye to expansion in a market historically dominated by a provincial and local brewing industry and consumer culture.

Bavarian brewers had fought battles over sugar before, most recently in the Third Reich, as discussed in chapter one, and this time around, as then, they quickly looked to make powerful political allies. In the last year of his life, Dr. Ernst Röhm, who had led the brewing industry during the Nazi dictatorship, once again led the charge of Bavarian brewers. The continuities from the Third Reich were explicit. In January 1954, a meeting of representatives from the Bavarian Brewers' Association and the Bavarian Finance Ministry poured over a dossier of 29 documents from the Nazi period regarding the production of beer and Bavarian political opposition to adulteration with sugar between 1938 and 1943. In reviving this issue, Röhm and the Bavarian Brewers' Association leaned on Dr. Richard Ringelmann, who had worked in the Bavarian Finance Ministry from 1919 to 1946 when he was dismissed for his membership in the NSDAP. In spite of his dismissal his expertise earned him a position as state secretary to the Finance Ministry in the cabinet of Bavarian Minister President Hans Ehard from 1950 to 1954. In the Third Reich, he had played a key role in resisting efforts by the Ministry of Food to adulterate beer in Bavaria with sugar and now, in 1954, he decided to uphold his convictions and bring in the power of the state government as much as possible.²²

²² Jan. 12, 1954, Notes on a meeting in the Bavarian Finance Ministry, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587.

By March of 1954, at Ringelmann's urging, the Bavarian State Minister of Finance Friedrich Zietsch wrote to his federal counterpart Fritz Schäffer in support of Bergdolt's argument that beers cannot be sold in Bavaria that do not conform to the Bavarian version of the Purity Law and the Beer Tax Law.²³ Crucial to his dissent was a legal assessment by Dr. Hans Nawiasky, a law professor in Munich who had helped draft the Bavarian and West German constitutions in 1946 and 1949 and who had just the year before been awarded the West German Order of Merit (*Verdienstorden der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*). Nawiasky's assessment and subsequent addendums argued quite clearly that precedents from the early modern period and especially from the 1919 and 1923/5 proceedings that preserved the Bavarian "Reserve Right" regarding beer standards had been implicitly codified as national law with the signing of the 1949 Basic Law, and explicitly so with the 1952 Beer Tax Law. In sum, "neither bottom- nor top-fermenting beer which has been adulterated with sugar may be produced *or sold* in Bavaria."²⁴ A week later, the second ranking official in the Bavarian Brewers' Association Werner Schladenhaufen, who would shortly take over from Röhm, announced the argument to the membership stressing that the *Reinheitsgebot* regarded not just production standards but also sales in Bavaria. What had begun as a single brewery's financial argument about market share in 1953 became, in a year's time, a common value of the state trade organization.²⁵ From there, it became the foundation of an informal trade barrier within the Federal Republic.

²³ Mar. 19, 1954, letter from Friedrich Zietsch to Fritz Schäffer, BayHStA MInn 108423.

²⁴ Mar. 3, 1954 Hans Nawiasky, "Rechtgutachten über die Tragweite des bayerischen Vorbehalts beim Eintritt in die Biersteuergemeinschaft zu erstatten." See also his follow-up letter to the Bavarian Brewers' Association, dated March 14, 1954, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587. Emphasis added.

²⁵ Mar. 22, 1954, letter from Werner Schladenhaufen to the Membership, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 587.

Under pressure by the Bavarian trade organization and the State Finance Ministry, the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior headed by Wilhelm Hoegner issued a complete distribution ban (*Vertriebsverbot*) on beer produced with the addition of sugar in July 1954.²⁶ This formally kicked off the “conflict over sweet beer,” which took on many names in political disputes and press coverage but was most often called the *Süßbierstreit*, the *Süßbierkrieg*, and the *Zuckerbierstreit*: the sweet beer conflict, the sweet beer war, the sugar beer conflict. From the level of the Federal Republic, this conflict should be understood as a dispute about West German market integration and the tensions of federalism and regional authority. From the Bavarian standpoint, however, it is important to keep in mind that this was also a struggle over the centralization of Bavarian authority in Munich and “Old Bavaria.” The political and economic interests of the Bavarian state and brewing industry sought to bring the culturally reticent region of Franconia in line. To be sure, at the level of everyday life most West Germans could read about the dispute in newspapers and formulate opinions about free trade, but few beyond Franconia and Swabia actually had much at stake. In these regions, the *Süßbierstreit* meant that centralized capital and political interests were explicitly limiting consumer choice and working out the requisite legal details post hoc.

From August to October 1954 the *Süßbierstreit* received generous treatment in the press throughout Bavaria and West Germany that set much of the discursive tone for subsequent coverage and industry debate. The Munich-based *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) produced some of the most popular and controversial reports, which had extensive

²⁶ See the various correspondences between MInn, MFin, Bayer. Brauerbund, leading up to Jul. 8, 1954, “Bekanntmachung des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums des Innern, Überwachung des Verkehrs mit Lebensmitteln; hier Inverkehrbringen von Bieren, die unter Verwendung von Zucker bereitet sind,” all in BayHStA MInn 108423; see also, *Bayer. Staatsanzeiger* Nr. 29, July 17, 1954.

circulation and were also picked up in smaller newspapers throughout West Germany. The paper made no bones about how small of a threat the issue was to consumers, stressing instead that this was about fair trade legislation and regional culture. The beer in question—brewed with sugar and being sent into Bavaria—accounted for only 0.14% of the total beer produced in the Federal Republic. The SZ stressed however that there was historical provincialism to consider and that because “sugar beer” was cheaper to produce it offered an unfair market advantage, regardless of the quantities in question.²⁷ As the almost nonexistent economic factors became clearer, public discourse in newspapers tended to become more dramatized and made more of historical provincial tensions. Indeed, in late August the subject was taken up in the satire column “Das Streiflicht.” Readers of the weekend edition were greeted: “Finally Bavaria has a war to which it is well suited: The Beer War, and it is even against the ‘Prussians’!” Stressing again the miniscule quantities, the article continued, “one wants to say it is a nonissue. But what a nonissue! It violates the holiest Bavarian sentiments. We are enraged by those above that are trying to break our *Reinheitsgebot*! The battle cry of the native brewers echoes throughout all of Old Bavaria.”²⁸ In spite of its satirical tone, this article captured the reality that brewers were working to rally Bavarian populism. “Those above” or “them up there” (*die da oben*) was on the one hand a phrase commonly used in the 1950s to advocate for the “common people” in juxtaposition to bourgeois high culture and German *Kultur*.²⁹ At the same time, “them up there” also points to West German geography and

²⁷ “Der unerwünschte Zucker im Bier,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Aug. 17, 1954, 7.

²⁸ “Das Streiflicht,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Aug. 21/22, 1954, 1.

²⁹ Kaspar Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy: Youth, Americanization, and the Irresistible Rise of Popular Culture,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 428-9.

Bavarian opposition to north Germany in general and the phantoms of the no longer extant Prussia in particular.³⁰ The issue was discussed in trade publications and national newspapers of all stripes. On the Bavarian side the conflict looked like a challenge to the “magna carta of the Bavarian brewer,” while on the north German side it looked like “beer separatism.”³¹ Indeed, many claimed the debate was about more than just beer, noting regional difference and even “honor” in articles dripping with the rhetoric of war and historic north-south tensions.³² By the time the dispute came up for legal process, the provincial question was already pronounced in public discourse: and it was a provincialism of *Altbayern* against the north—and a north often reduced to the nonexistent Prussia—while Franconians, rarely present in the coverage, were simply caught in the middle.³³

In early September 1954 the Bavarian Supreme Court of Appeals (*Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht*) ruled in favor of Hoegner’s distribution ban.³⁴ In spite of legal appeals from individual brewers and state trade organizations in West Berlin and Hesse, the Federal Constitutional Court denied further review. In the North Rhine-Westphalian

³⁰ More work remains to be done on the cultural and political distancing from Prussia in the Federal Republic but see for example, Eberhard Straub, *Eine kleine Geschichte Preußens* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 2001), 10; and Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, “A Mastered Past?: Prussia in Postwar German Memory” *German History* 22, no. 4 (2004), 505-35.

³¹ “Streit um gesüßtes Bier,” *Deutsche Brauwirtschaft* 63, no. 18, Aug. 31, 1954, 316-7.

³² “Es geht um unsere Bier-Ehre,” *Abendzeitung*, Aug. 17, 1954, 2; “Bierkrieg Berlin-Bayern,” *Abendzeitung*, Aug. 20, 1954; “Im Bierkrieg geht’s um mehr als ein Zuckerl,” *Münchener Merkur*, Aug. 26, 1954; “Bierkrieg mit Bayern,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Aug. 14, 1954; “Bierkrieg zwischen Nord und Süd,” *Der Tag*, Aug. 20, 1954; “Bierkrieg mit Bayern,” *Der Kurier*, Aug. 20, 1954; “Bayern führt ‘heißen’ Krieg gegen Bierlimonade,” *Die Welt*, Aug. 28, 1954.

³³ In northern Franconian newspapers, the issue received very little coverage at first and was treated a bit more neutrally. One might even read a sense of passiveness and even powerlessness. See for example, “Kleiner Vorgriff auf mögliche Entscheidung,” *Main Post*, Sept. 8, 1954.

³⁴ “Beschluss des Verwaltungsgerichtshofs vom 9.9.1954,” sent to Hoegner from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof on Sept 13, 1954, BayHStA MInn 108423. The case was argued by Reinhard und Hans Freiherr von Godin and Heinz Paulus and conducted on behalf of the Wirtschaftsverband Berliner Brauereien, the Schultheiß Brauerei in Berlin, the Hessischer Brauerbund, the Union-Brauerei Fulda, against the Free State of Bavaria.

capital city of Düsseldorf, the issue was dramatically branded as Bavarian separatism by proxy.³⁵ In Bavaria, a slew of articles in the *SZ* boasted victory and further declared that the age-old *Reinheitsgebot* had to remain in force. In Nuremberg, the newspapers blasted the cultural practices of the “Prussians” demanding, perhaps contradictorily given that this was the largest of Franconian cities, that Franconian brewing standards should be Bavarian brewing standards.³⁶ On the ground in Franconia, many nonetheless remained unconvinced by all the traditionalist legal and political discourse. In the estimation of one beer retailer in Würzburg, the transport provisions of the Purity Law were “conceptions of trade from the 15th century that seem like a bad joke in the era of the free market economy.”³⁷ The rhetoric of the free market here remained a staple in subsequent years of debate. The issue of the law was complex and both sides seemed to have a kernel of truth. The *Reinheitsgebot* functioned as an informal trade barrier (informal because beers brewed in accordance with the Bavarian version of the law were still welcome there) in a supposedly integrated market. At the same time, it did in fact preserve a baseline of fair competition within Bavaria because it prevented non-law-abiding beers with lower production costs from underselling their Bavarian counterparts beholden to the provincial law.

From 1954 to 1958 the Bavarian Brewers’ Association and the Bavarian state government worked to police the sale of beer brewed with the addition of sugar on a

³⁵ “Malzbierkrieg zwischen Nord und Süd – Blauweiser Separatismus erstrebt bei sich das Biermonopol,” *Der Fortschritt*, Oct. 21, 1954.

³⁶ “In Preußen süßt man den Gerstensaft,” *Fränkische Tagespost*, Sept. 21, 1954.

³⁷ “Der bittere Kampf ums süße Bier,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 15, 1954, 6; for claims of victory, see for example, “Eine Wichtige Entscheidung im Bierkrieg,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 22, 1954, 6; “Reinheitsprinzip fürs bayerische Bier,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 25/26, 1954; “Bayern gewinnt die erste Runde im Bierstreit,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nov. 19, 1954, 9; “Eine Runde für das Reinheitsgebot,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nov. 20/21, 1954, 13.

number of occasions.³⁸ In 1956, for example, the Bavarian courts decreed that according to BierStG §10 Nr. 1, beer not brewed in accordance with the strict Bavarian law could not be sold in Bavaria, where the 1919 precedent still held jurisdiction.³⁹ Two years later, Hofbräuhaus Nicolay A.G. in Hanau, Hesse, on the border of Lower Franconia, was taken to court for selling Malzbier (literally malt beer, but in fact more like a near-alcohol-free soda with a malted barley base). It was bottom-fermented and brewed with the addition of sugar. But instead of labeling it Malzbier, they had been calling it “Nährtrank/Nährtrunk” and “Malztrunk” (nourishing- and malt beverage).⁴⁰ Taken before the Federal Court of Justice in late 1958, the Second Criminal Court ruled in January 1959 that the drink could still be sold in Bavaria because as long as the term “Bier” (as in Malzbier) did not appear on the label it was not subject to the 1952 *Biersteuergesetz* and the *Reinheitsgebot*.⁴¹

The 1958/9 ruling on the meaning of the word “-bier” and the juridical and geographical bounds of the Bavarian and West German Purity Laws should have ended the *Süßbierstreit*. In part, it did: for something to be called “beer” and be sold in Bavaria, it needed to be brewed in accordance with the stricter Bavarian Purity Law. The *Altbayerisch* industrial and political interests had won. Still, this was not enough for the Bavarian Brewers’ Association because it left open the possibility that consumer demand for the so-called *Süßbier* in Franconia and beyond could be met under a name other than

³⁸ “Berliner Zuckerbier in Bayern verboten,” *Abendzeitung*, Mar. 29, 1955, 2; May 23, 1956, “Urteil des Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts,” Bundesarchiv Koblenz (henceforth BAK), B 126/23409.

³⁹ “Gesüßtes Bier darf nicht nach Bayern,” *Abendzeitung*, May 24, 1956; “Der Süßbierkrieg geht weiter,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 4, 1956, 8.

⁴⁰ “Weitere Runde im Süßbierstreit,” *Gastwirt und Hotelier*, June 5, 1958,

⁴¹ W. Zipfel, “Bier und doch kein Bier, aber ‘kein Bier’ ist doch Bier,” *Der Brauer und Mälzer* 13, no. 19 (Oct. 15, 1960), 3-6; see further, Birgit Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern: Wertvorstellungen um Reinheit, Gemeinschaft und Tradition* (Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2001), 70-1.

“-bier.” While the conflict of the next few years did not technically concern the *Reinheitsgebot*, because it was not technically about beer, it nonetheless demonstrates just how far Bavarian brewers would go to corral Bavarian consumers. The most important development in the debates from 1960 to 1962—and this would become important in subsequent years as well—was mobilizing the notion of consumer protection, a rapidly emerging sphere at the nexus of consumption, business interests, and political power.⁴²

As of the 1958/9 rulings, Bavarian brewers began to worry that beverages could still be sold in Bavaria that were malt-based and even fermented as long as they made no claim to be “beer.” Rather than purging their recipes of sugar or other additives, many companies used this an opportunity to forge new markets. The brewing industry was concerned that they were doing so by capitalizing on the reputation of beer. For example, in 1958 the then-three-year-old drink *Henninger Karamell Kraftbier* produced by the Henninger Brewery in Frankfurt stripped the “-bier” from its name and simplified to Karamalz. It went on to become one of the most popular non-alcoholic beverages in West Germany. In 1959, the Bavarian Brewers’ Association made the interesting charge that Karamalz was attempting to conjure the appearance (*ein Anschein erwecken*) of being beer. In November 1959 Schladenhaufen wrote to Director Knies in the Ministry of the Interior. He sent complete schematic diagrams detailing the sizes, shapes, angles, proportions, neck lengths, and types of glass typical of bottles used for Bier, Malzbier, water, and other beverages arguing that Karamalz was intentionally using a bottle that too closely resembled a beer bottle. He also sent copies of their advertising and argued that

⁴² Matthew Hilton, “Consumers and the State since the Second World War” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 611, no. 1 (May 2007): 66-81.

the use of a foaming pint glass too closely resembled the image everyone associated with beer, thanks to the brewing industry's communal advertising program.⁴³ The issue, mundane as it was, revolved around a concern that malt beverage companies had sidestepped the 1958/9 rulings by simply removing the "-bier" from their labels but keeping all other details the same.

On May 9, 1960 the Bavarian Brewers' Association prompted the Bavarian state government to further consider an explicit law on the circulation of beverages in Bavaria. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of their proposed law forbade the circulation of fermented beverages in Bavaria that did not meet the provisions of beer production and sale for those drinks made in Bavaria.⁴⁴ At the urging of the Brewers' Association, Franz Elsen of the CSU formally introduced the Beer Transport Law in Bavaria (*Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Bier*) in the early summer of 1960. Elsen was a CSU politician who had held multiple legislative positions and was at the time also Director of the Bavarian State Bank. From 1960 to 1962 the CSU-dominated Bavarian parliament and committee of state ministers considered the proposition in a series of special advisory committees and in meetings with Bavarian consumer organizations. The Bavarian brewers believed that they would need to get the current Minister of the Interior Alfons Goppel onboard and they petitioned him accordingly with claims to having the support of Bavarian consumers.⁴⁵ Behind such claims the president of the Brewers' Association marshaled no evidence and in fact, some Bavarians in Franconia were clearly happy to consume the beverages in question.

⁴³ Nov. 20, 1959 letter from Werner Schladenhaufen to Knies, with attachments, BayHStA MInn 108427.

⁴⁴ Details of the proposed law described in Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1960/61 and 1961/62*, 39-47.

⁴⁵ Jul. 13, 1960, letter from Schladenhaufen to Goppel, BayHStA MInn 108421.

Debates around the law proposal in the early 1960s brought the rhetoric of consumer protection firmly into political discourse. The law was reviewed in a series of multi-party special committees featuring a who's who of Bavarian politics including the instigator of the initial 1954 *Vertriebsverbot* Wilhelm Hoegner as well as the iconic Bavarian Franz Josef Strauss who was serving as the chairman of the CSU. Drawing on a 1927 food law (*Lebensmittelgesetz*) these special committees agreed that the beverages in question qualified as “falsified” (*verfälscht*) in accordance with §4 Nr. 2. The term was ambiguous even in the original law but mattered here in that it allowed a way of resisting the sale of *Nährtrunk* under the banner of consumer protection. The *Reinheitsgebot* became the stuff of political action in these discussions. The committees argued that 450 years of tradition embodied in the *Reinheitsgebot* had informed consumer expectations (*Verbrauchererwartungen*) and habits, especially and even uniquely in Bavaria, and thus consumers needed to be protected.⁴⁶

This discourse of consumer protection had legs outside Old Bavaria too and could be utilized just as freely in opposition to the law proposal. Since 1959, the Lower Franconian capital city of Würzburg had become home to the Action Group of *Nährtrunk* Distributors in Bavaria (*Aktionsgemeinschaft der Nährtrunkverleger in Bayern*), a special interest group with centers in Würzburg, Hof, Coburg, and Nuremberg, and founded to lobby for “beverage freedom.” Under the leadership of Würzburg importer Alfons Schubert, the group petitioned the Bavarian Parliament and Bavarian representatives to the Federal Parliament in October 1962 to reject the “superfluous” restriction on

⁴⁶ “Bericht des Wirtschaftsausschusses und des Rechts- und Verfassungsausschusses,” May 24, 1962, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1355; see also, Oct. 19, 1962 letter from Peschel and Sedlmayr to the Representatives of the Bavarian Parliament, Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (henceforth ACSP) NL Elsen, Franz: 6.7.14.

consumer freedom—a limitation on the decades long availability of *Nährtrunk*. In a four-page pamphlet distributed to parliamentarians, a fictional elderly woman tells her children: “Once upon a time there was a state parliament. One day it proclaimed to its unsuspecting voters: ‘we can determine what beverages are allowed to be placed on the table in Bavaria.’ The citizens living beyond the white-blue border shook their heads anxiously at this parliamentary campaign. But just like that, there was no more freedom of beverage choice in Bavaria.”⁴⁷ This special interest group had many supporters, including the regional chairman of the FDP in Middle Franconia, Klaus Dehler. As he put it in 1962, the law was “patronizing to the consumer” in that it undermined the ability of Franconians and indeed all Bavarians to drink what they want, when they want.⁴⁸

On October 23, 1962, the law was passed in the Bavarian Landtag with a narrow majority and was set to go into effect January 1, 1963. The law was never ratified however because the new Minister President as of December 1962, Alfons Goppel, felt that certain terms undermined other established legislation regarding foodstuffs and the enforceability of the law.⁴⁹ More than a dozen legal assessments were conducted by officials from all over West Germany from 1960 to 1965. Practically every political body and industrial interest group commissioned their own, and assessments were largely divided depending on whether the legal team privileged the 1927 *Lebensmittelgesetz* or the 1949 Basic Law. Goppel’s suspicions were confirmed to his satisfaction in a 1965 assessment that sided with the latter arguing traffic in food and stimulants was the

⁴⁷“Süßbierhändler fordern Getränkefreiheit,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Oct. 2, 1962, 17.

⁴⁸“Landtag billigte Süßbierverbot – Verfassungsklage droht,” Oct. 24, 1962, cutout marked only *Tagblatt*, ACSP, NL Elsen, Franz: 6.7.14.

⁴⁹ March 14, 1963, Press release 42/63 of the Bayerische Staatskanzlei, attached to a Mar. 25, 1963 letter from E. Sedlmayr to Senatpräsident Josef Singer, BayHStA Bayer. Senat 3246.

jurisdiction of the federal government according to the West German Basic Law.⁵⁰ In private, supporters of the law might have seen this coming. Goppel had voiced his concerns about the proposal already in 1960 when he was Bavarian Interior Minister.⁵¹ Publicly however, leaders of the Bavarian Brewers' Association who had driven the proposal and campaign for the law were devastated by Goppel's decision in 1965. The president of the Association, Werner Schladenhaufen expressed his shock and sense of betrayal by claiming that the Minister President had "stabbed us in the backs" (*ist uns... in den Rücken gefallen*).⁵² This formulation, dating to at least 1919, had most famously been used by leading National Socialists and propagandists to critique the German home front in general and national republicans in particular for betraying the German military in the First World War. For Schladenhaufen, Goppel seems to have committed first order treason against Bavaria.

The *Süßbierstreit* and the spinoff law proposal of the early 1960s are emblematic of the paradoxical nature of Bavarian power in the early Federal Republic. As *Der Spiegel* wrote of Bavaria more broadly, the state had developed a "Janus face" over the course of centuries: "external struggles against every form of centralization; but from within, centralism at any price."⁵³ Two of the main grounds of the debate and court proceedings were the meaning of the term "beer" and the alleged expectations of

⁵⁰ Jan. 14, 1965, Dr. P. Lerche, "Gutachtliche Stellungnahme zur Frage der Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Gesetzesbeschlusses des Bayerischen Landtags vom 23.10.1962 betr. Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Bier," esp. 56-7, BayHStA Bayer. Senat 3246.

⁵¹ Aug. 29, 1960 "Streng vertraulich, Auszug aus dem Protocol des Ministerrats vom 12.7.1960 Nr. 21," BayHStA MInn 108421.

⁵² "Ein 'Handvoll Chemie' in den Sudhäusern?," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 15, 1965; "Ende des Süßbierkrieges?," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Jan. 28, 1965, 6.

⁵³ "Bundesländer – Bayern. Mir san mir," *Der Spiegel*, Jan. 8, 1964, 30-42, here 34.

Bavarian consumers.⁵⁴ Behind these legal arguments was a conflict about the tensions of Bavarian and West German authority and tradition on the one hand, and Old Bavarian and Franconian authority and tradition on the other. Indeed, in discussions of the 1962 law proposal, it was commonplace for Bavarian politicians in Munich to argue that the law most benefitted Franconian brewers who were hit the hardest by the sale of “falsified” beer because it was their local market that was most contested.⁵⁵ Never mind the miniscule quantities in question, what Franconian consumers wanted, or the fact that there was little to no industrial and political support in Franconia for any of the import bans pursued in Munich from 1954 to 1962. Indeed, as we have seen there was even a Franconian trade and political organization oriented explicitly against the import bans.

From 1954 to 1962, a market protectionist conflict initiated by a single Munich brewery percolated into the Bavarian state government and became an issue of West German market integration. The conflict crystallized and even legislated a dominant regional culture of beer (down to the very use of the word) that could be enforced in historically and culturally contested regions like Franconia.⁵⁶ This example of what Sven Beckert called “capitalism in action”⁵⁷ hinged on popularizing a previously little-known law and a language of beer purity. So confused were many Bavarians consumers that even as they read about the conflicts, they confessed ignorance of what “sweet beer”

⁵⁴ “Die höchstrichterliche Entscheidung im Süßbierstreit,” *Deutsche Brauwirtschaft* 18, Aug. 28, 1956, 242-3.

⁵⁵ Report by the Business- and Law and Constitutional Committees, May 24, 1962, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1355.

⁵⁶ Birgit Speckle noted three layers to the *Süßbierstreit*: the opposition of Bavaria and the North/Prussia, the popularization of the *Reinheitsgebot* as Bavarian tradition through broad newspaper coverage, and the Bavarian/West German economic and political conflict. She has missed, however, the continuities in personnel, rhetoric, and legal precedent dating from the Third Reich and earlier. Yet more importantly, for the purposes here, she reproduces much of the *Altbayerisch* discourse by letting Franconia slip through analytic cracks.

⁵⁷ Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), xv.

actually was.⁵⁸ Indeed, as late as 1962, 34% of the Bavarian population firmly believed that the *Reinheitsgebot* actually *allowed* sugar in beer, some 45% knew without question that it was *not* allowed, and a final 21% had no conviction either way.⁵⁹ The conflict over “sweet beer” and “pure beer” was certainly not reflective of any consolidated or homogenous consumer demand. Nor was it just a site of inventing or “reinventing” tradition; it was also a site of working out the *temporal and spatial authority of tradition*: Franconia, in spite of being part of a federated republic, was to be governed in the economic and cultural spheres first and foremost by political and capital interests in Munich, not in Bonn, and certainly not in Würzburg.⁶⁰

The political economic utility of the *Reinheitsgebot* in the course of the *Süßbierstreit* aligned *Altbayerisch* capital interests with the centralizing initiatives of the dominant Bavarian political party, the CSU.⁶¹ Indeed, the CSU-dominated state parliament actually passed the law in 1962 only to have it vetoed in what the brewing industry termed a “stab in the back.” Still, just how far this alignment of capital and political interests would go remained an open question. At the height of campaigning for the 1960-62 law proposal, the head of a Franconian opposition organization wrote to the delegates of the Bavarian Parliament asking precisely this question. Pointing to the newly

⁵⁸ “Verbraucher kennen sich nicht aus” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Oct. 19, 1962, 12.

⁵⁹ “Zum Reinheitsgebot bei Bier: Die Einstellung der Bevölkerung in Bayern Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativ-Umfrage.” This survey was commissioned by the Bavarian Brewers’ Association from the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach. It was conducted in 1962 but published in 1964. BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1355.

⁶⁰ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1958/60*, 142-3; Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1960-62*, 124-5.

⁶¹ This development ran parallel to the work of the CSU in the 1950s and 1960s to construct an integral Bavarian political identity, a sort of umbrella for Bavarian sub-regional peculiarities, which has been the basis of their hegemony in Bavarian politics to this day. See, Graham Ford, “Constructing a Regional Identity: The Christian Social Union and Bavaria’s Common Heritage, 1949-1962,” *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 3 (Aug. 2007): 277-297.

signed Treaty of Rome, which guaranteed the economic integration of the six western European signatory countries, he asked, seemingly rhetorically, would the CSU fight this too? Embellishing further, “Is the idea of Europe to collapse so soon on account of the beer trade?”⁶² In the next decade, the spirit of the inquiry would become far less preposterous than it at first seems.

“Since Time Immemorial”: European Integration and the German *Reinheitsgebot*

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and set the goal of a common market for the six signatory countries: West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy. Building off the earlier European Coal and Steel Community, the EEC most immediately affected heavy industry. Agriculture was the first sector affected by the Treaty that had repercussions for beer production and the brewing industry. In the early 1960s Bavarian and West German brewers concerned themselves with the issue because as demand for beer had increased in the course of the economic boom, so too did the demand for barley. From 1950 to 1963, national beer production increased from 18 to 67 million hectoliters bringing a parallel increase in brewers’ demand for barley from 480,000 to 1.7 million tons. This escalation was difficult to meet with domestic production alone and West German brewers increasingly relied on imported barley and barley malt. Again from 1950 to 1963, barley imports increased from 33,000 to 700,000 tons, with an even higher spike in 1961 when a poor harvest pushed brewers to rely on imports for the majority of their needs for the first time ever. At the same time, Southern Germany and especially

⁶² July 3, 1960, letter from Alfons Schubert to members of the Landtag, BayHStA Minn 108421.

Franconia were extremely productive barley producing regions and farmers there increasingly wanted to sell their high-quality product for higher international prices. This all amounted to increasing domestic demand and decreasing domestic supply. In response, the Bavarian state government repeatedly petitioned the Bundestag to subsidize domestic sales of Bavarian barley. European integration complicated this and presented problems that the Bavarian government and relevant trade organizations like the Working Group for the Promotion of Quality Barley Production, and the Central Association of the German Grain, Feed, and Fertilizer Trades were not entirely sure how handle. Most adopted a wait-and-see approach, apparently comforted by the repeated petitions and by Bavarian State Minister of Agriculture Alois Hundhammer's ministerial commitment "to secure the highest level of Bavarian brewing barley production by means of agricultural policy measures in the EEC."⁶³ As long as beer remained stable, agricultural policies could remain a work in progress on the national and European level.

At the same time that the Treaty of Rome was shaking up agricultural politics, the national brewing trade organizations of the six member-states of the EEC were founding the Working Community of Common Market Brewers (*Communauté de Travail des Brasseurs du Marché Commun*, or C.B.M.C.) with its administrative seat in Amsterdam. The C.B.M.C. had the two-fold goal of first opening discourse between the brewing industries of the member states regarding their common industrial problems in the EEC, and second of increasing their shared industrial interests to the EEC as it worked to

⁶³ "Qualitätsgetreideerzeugung aus der Sicht des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten," speech delivered at the Sept. 25, 1963 nordschwabische Braugerstenschau in Donauwörth, attached to a Sept. 20, 1963 letter from Ruhwandl to Hundhammer, BayHStA MELF 916.

integrate markets.⁶⁴ The C.B.M.C. had some limited success weighing in on agricultural issues related to the brewing industry. It was consulted in the early 1960s, for example, when the West German state made a recommendation to the European Commission about the shape of a common market for hops. The proposal itself was relatively basic, covering quality classifications, place of origin, tax and subsidies, preferential treatment for member states, and restrictions against non-member market competition, especially against eastern European countries, namely Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In 1964, Hundhammer successfully led the Federal Republic to make a similar proposal regarding the use of only high-quality barley for brewing: a policy that favored both brewers and farmers in Bavaria and West Germany.⁶⁵

In these sorts of agricultural interventions, the C.B.M.C. functioned as one of many advisory trade bodies,⁶⁶ and their efforts were driven by the desire to inform whatever shape harmonization would take when the EEC turned towards foodstuffs and consumer goods. Already in the early 1960s, almost a decade before they would be asked for their advisory opinion, the C.B.M.C. began discussing the problems and possibilities that faced integrating beer. At the core of the negotiations was an argument about cultural differences, not only regarding national legislations but also concerning the very definition and authenticity of beer as a product. In April 1960 Pierre Falcimaigne, the head of the French national brewing trade organization, the *Union Générale Nationale des Syndicats de la Brasserie Française*, issued a report on the potential problems facing

⁶⁴ Mar. 6, 1959 letter from Paul Cools to Sicco L. Manholt, Historical Archives of the European Union (henceforth HAEU) BAC-009-1967_0027.

⁶⁵ Dec. 11, 1964, letter from Kemperink to the head of the European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture, HAEU BAC-009-1967_0027.

⁶⁶ See the many efforts of the German Brewers' Association and other special interest groups to influence EEC agricultural policy and taxation in the so called "Kennedy Round" transition towards multilateral tariff and trade agreements in BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1437.

the integration of the brewing industries and markets of the six member-states. It indicated “enormous differences” between the industries: “on one extreme, complete freedom in Belgium and on the other the strictest adherence to the *Reinheitsgebot* in Bavaria.”⁶⁷ That he acknowledged the difference between West German and Bavarian stringency foreshadows the course of the coming conflict at the national level, but international cultural differences were at the heart of the early negotiations. In April 1962, for example, the German delegates to the C.B.M.C. proposed that the *Reinheitsgebot* ought to be adopted by all member nations, arguing that it had scientific, economic, and psychological benefits which all countries could enjoy. The beer the law ensured was, after all, “natural,” and West German consumers were happy to be free from the fear of additives. Falcimaigne challenged the German representative arguing that unmalted produce was also natural, and thus the *Reinheitsgebot* prohibition of unmalted produce actually had nothing to do with making a “natural product.” Consumers had nothing to fear, argued another French representative; indeed, “a beer is not unpure because it is produced in part with rice.” The comment triggered a gestalt shift that the German delegation was not willing to accept. One demanded, “psychology can be different in different countries.” Another West German representative flipped the oddity of priorities, asking why European brewers put so much importance on the addition of raw produce. Members of the other delegations reacted demanding that it was the Germans, not they, who put too much emphasis on their own practices. This early

⁶⁷ Falcimaigne’s April 20, 1960 report cited in Nov. 28, 1960, “Zusammenfassung der ersten Versammlung der Kommission Gesetzgebungen – C.B.M.C.,” held October 27, 1960 in Luxemburg, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1382.

attempt at negotiation ended without any progress being made towards the problem of integration.⁶⁸

Progress in negotiations started—and ended—in the next few years as representatives of the West German delegation began to make concessions towards a standard law of brewing in the European Economic Community. Put simply, the Germans would agree to allow raw produce within qualitative and quantitative limits but were less flexible on the issue of sugar. They agreed to the types of sugar already allowed in top-fermenting beer in the 1952 *Biersteuergesetz*, but argued stringently against the many types of sugar allowed in other national laws, especially the practical non-regulation of brewing in Belgium. Here, it was the other members who were willing to compromise.⁶⁹ As these negotiations were underway from 1960 to 1964, the leadership of the Bavarian Brewers' Association kept a close eye. When they read the summary of the 1964 compromises, leaders in the trade organization scrawled frantic commentary, more than once abandoning words in favor of making enormous red exclamation points in the margins of the documents.⁷⁰ The domestic provincial divisions around brewing law in West Germany began to rear their head in 1964 and the Bavarian Brewers' Association henceforth became actively involved in the negotiations of the C.B.M.C.

At the end of 1964 the head of the Bavarian Brewers' Association, Werner Schladenhaufen was likely already in a bad mood because of losing, as he was, the battle for the Bavarian beverage law discussed above. In this context he wrote to his counterpart

⁶⁸ Apr. 12, 1962, "Zusammenfassung der zweiten Tagung der Kommission Gesetzgebung – C.B.M.C.," held in Frankfurt on Jan. 23, 1962, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1382.

⁶⁹ Ibid., and, Jan. 10, 1964 "Kurzbericht über die dritte Sitzung der Kommission Gesetzgebung – C.B.M.C.," held in Milan, Nov. 21, 1963; Jun 1, 1964, "Kurzbericht über die vierte Sitzung des Legislativ Ausschusses der C.B.M.C.," held in Rome, May 11, 1964, all in BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1382.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

in the West German organization, Richard Biergans, responding to the unfolding compromises. Bavarians, Schladenhaufen reported, had received the news “with surprise and consternation.”⁷¹ The Bavarian Brewers’ Association had held a special meeting of the executive committee and formally rejected the compromises. The trade organization as a whole, he wrote, “holds firmly to the *Reinheitsgebot* without compromise and without restrictions.” Schladenhaufen demanded that Biergans address the legal tensions between regional, national, and EEC laws at an emergency assembly of the national delegation. Until such a delegation could be assembled to discuss international policy in as much detail as domestic policy, Schladenhaufen declared that the Bavarians renounced all confidence in the negotiations of the C.B.M.C.⁷²

When the delegation met in Munich in April 1965 the Bavarians found allies and opposition within the Federal Republic that revealed a North-South division and brought the C.B.M.C. negotiations to a grinding halt. The regional trade organizations of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, and Rhineland Palatinate stood firmly on the side of the unconditional retention of the *Reinheitsgebot*, while those of North Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hamburg, West Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Saarland were all willing to accept negotiations about its future.⁷³ For those unfamiliar with the geography of West Germany, this division amounted to an almost perfect split between the northern and southern halves of the country with the outlier of the Saarland. The Saar had only been fully integrated into the Federal Republic eight years earlier and remained

⁷¹ Nov. 16, 1964, letter from Werner Schladenhaufen to the German Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1382.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ May 4, 1965 Circular P 14/B 16/65 on the “Harmonisierung der Gesetzgebung für Bier in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,” BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 1382.

home to a strong Francophile cultural influence including brewing according to more liberal French brewing standards until 1956. Interestingly, in spite of a relatively clear geographical line this division also had internal inconsistencies over adherence to the Bavarian or the West German versions of the *Reinheitsgebot*; making this a particularly incoherent political division especially in the case of Hesse, which only a few years earlier had found itself in opposition to Bavarian in the *Süßbierstreit*. In any event, this national split stalled international negotiations because at the core of the C.B.M.C. statutes was a unanimity clause which specified that no decisions or proposals could be formally accepted at the international level without the full agreement of the respective national organizations. In such a scenario, national industries could and should approach the issue as a national political problem and contact national authorities as they saw fit.⁷⁴ The dispute by the Bavarians and their Southern German allies stalled the work of the C.B.M.C., which had to this point been a serious and productive labor of international economic negotiation and compromise. As a result, when the European Commission finally asked the C.B.M.C. for its recommendation in 1969, the latter had nothing to offer. Bavarian intransigence effectively dispensed with the guiding hope of the collective since 1959 that the brewing trade organizations could define the terms of their own integration. The opposition took harmonizing European brewing regulations out of the hands of the C.B.M.C. and into the realm of national politics, a place where their complaints would find important allies and resonate with many other political concerns of the day from agriculture to consumer politics.

⁷⁴ See Article 10 of the Statutes of the *Communauté de Travail des Brasseurs du Marché Commun*, HAEU BAC-009-1967_0027.

The integration of brewing standards became a mainstream issue in West German industrial and political circles when, in 1969, the Council of Ministers of the EEC made a resolution to harmonize regulations relating to foodstuffs in general, and beer in particular in June 1970. The 1970 proposal had been worked over in European Commission working groups earlier that year attended by representatives of the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health Affairs, a number of West German brewing trade organizations, and the now fragmented front of the C.B.M.C. The proposal sought to lift non-tariff barriers including the classifications of beer styles, the standardization of alcoholic content, bottling standards, and of course, the question of permissible ingredients. At the heart of the ensuing dispute around the 1970 harmonization proposal was a Directive that all member states allow 30% (by weight) of the total ingredients in beer to be unprocessed grain and to allow the inclusion of small quantities of chemicals such as ascorbic acid, tannins, and proteolytic enzymes. As a Directive, if adopted, the proposal would be legally binding but would be implemented and enforced by the individual member states who would report to the European Community Standing Committee on Foodstuffs.

On the surface, adopting the 1970 EEC Proposal, which effectively repealed the *Reinheitsgebot*, should have been a simple choice. The Purity Law was after all a non-tariff trade barrier and the Federal Republic had signed an international agreement to pursue free trade. Nonetheless, broad opposition to the harmonization proposal emerged in the Federal Republic in the early 1970s, the highpoint of what contemporaries and historians alike have termed the “European Beer War.”⁷⁵ Repeal may have seemed

⁷⁵ Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern*, 95-156.

simple but in the course of a few short years, “free trade arguments were completely submerged beneath a kaleidoscopic convergence of pressure to retain the *Reinheitsgebot*.”⁷⁶ Industrial and especially Bavarian interests quickly consolidated legislative backing that allowed opposition to a relatively simple market integration measure to percolate through the halls of West German politics and popular culture alike. For British political scientist Simon Bulmer, the “kaleidoscopic convergence of pressure” was largely legislative and political, involving diverse interests from agriculture, economics, and public health. And it certainly was that in part. Other commentators like Birgit Speckle and Eva Göbel place more emphasis on how the conflict also popularized the *Reinheitsgebot* as a national symbol. That popularization, however, was not the cultural byproduct of political intransigence: the latter was rather the culmination of the former.⁷⁷ The question of harmonizing beer legislation in the European Economic Community is almost unique among all such integration efforts in the Federal Republic in that it became a broadly public concern, a movement informed by special interest groups, dispersed through mass mediation, and garnering broad public support and mobilization. The brewing industry and its allies not only succeeding, as Bulmer rightly notes, in convincing “the Federal Government that their views represented a ‘vital national

⁷⁶ Simon Bulmer, *The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making in West Germany* (London: Routledge Revivals, 2016, orig. 1986), 305.

⁷⁷ This, in contrast to a number of previous interpretations. For Speckle, the *Reinheitsgebot* was popularized beyond Bavaria only beginning in 1975, that is, *after* the resolution regarding the 1970 harmonization proposal. This conviction is a result of the fact that her sources on the subject are basically limited to the advertising campaigns of the brewing industry. See Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern*, 130-48, esp. 133. Eva Göbel, who only spends one chapter on beer, draws heavily on Speckle and thus reproduces this general sense. See Eva Göbel, *Bayern in der modernen Konsumgesellschaft: Regionalisierung der Konsumkultur im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Weißensee Verlag, 2005), 108-114.

interest' which required the use of veto powers in the Council,"⁷⁸ they also succeeding in making the *Reinheitsgebot* and the language of beer purity a national *cause célèbre*.

In the early 1970s law making in the European Community flowed from proposals by the European Commission to ratification by the European Council, both in Brussels. Voting decisions in the Council were advised by, and often determined by appointed national representatives to the European Parliament as well as relevant bodies in the national governments of the member states. In turn, the recommendations of national governments were of course subject to differences in national governmental structures, party politics, lobbyists, interest groups, cultural convictions, and regional and national policy interests and needs. In West Germany this was messy indeed and there existed no single body responsible for determining West German European policy.⁷⁹ In the case of the Commission's 1970 beer harmonization proposal, as it traveled to the sphere of West German national politics, it was brought into three main spheres of political interest and debate: agriculture, economics, and public health. It was also subjected to the intense lobbying of Bavarian and West German brewing trade organizations and a new brewing special interest group based in Düsseldorf. This latter brought broad public awareness to the issue, popularizing "pure beer" in opposition to "chemical beer," a discourse that tapped into consumer protectionism. These efforts dovetailed with consumer-oriented publications such as popular magazines and newspapers to garner broad West German support. In the first few years of the 1970s, industrial and political interests converged with a broad popular movement around

⁷⁸ Bulmer, *The Domestic Structure*, 323.

⁷⁹ This is in fact the subject of Bulmer's book—beer is only one example he offers. See Bulmer, *The Domestic Structure*; and Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, *The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

consumer protectionism and public health on the one hand and the discourses of tradition and beer purity on the other. This capital-political-popular nexus not only undermined and resisted the harmonization of beer and brewing, it also broadly disseminated the *Reinheitsgebot* and “pure beer” in West German culture and consumer consciousness.

In the realm of state politics, the EC proposal was taken up most notably by federal ministries and advisory committees in the Bundestag and Bundesrat composed of parliamentarians and representatives of industry and special interests. The scrutiny of the Bundesrat was particularly important in shaping the subsequent discourse and is notable because it combined industrial interests, the interests of the *Länder* including of course Bavaria, and the options of the Federal Government. In the first committee to discuss the proposal, the Bundesrat Agriculture Committee, the discourse focused on how changes in brewing standards would upset cultivation patterns in West Germany and have nutritional and tax repercussions for producers and consumers. A switch to unmalted produce in beer brewing would mean a decrease in domestic demand for barley and would spell increased farm production of other grains. Wheat was already in surplus in the Federal Republic and any further increase would mean either wasted grains or increased taxes for subsidization.⁸⁰ Bavarian interests were behind many such claims. After all, Bavaria had been the breadbasket of the Federal Republic since its inception (see chapter 2) and the specialists who contributed to the Bundesrat Agriculture Committee were thus disproportionately Bavarian, coming from the Bavarian Farmers’ Association and the brewing and food science institute at Weihenstephan, outside Munich.⁸¹ The Bavarian-led Agriculture Committee ultimately issued a report rejecting the EC proposal, and this

⁸⁰ See the publications by the Bundesrat, BR-Drucks 405/70, July 21, 1970.

⁸¹ Bulmer, *The Domestic Structure*, 319-20.

rejection became the baseline in subsequent political discourse and special interest committees.

If the agricultural experts were right, a shift in agriculture away from barley production would hit the malting industry, which provided a bridge between agricultural and economic opposition to the proposal. The main opposition in economic circles, however, stemmed from the fact that major international breweries threatened to displace the smaller decentralized brewing structure of the Federal Republic, and especially of Bavaria. Because the Bavarian industry was the most decentralized, it was once again Bavarian interests that were primarily represented in the Federation of German Small- and Mid-Sized Brewers (*Bundesverband Deutscher Mittelstandsbrauereien*, or BDM), which came to influence much of the economic policy agenda. The BDM represented a relatively small total share of beer production, but a majority of actual breweries, which made it the mouthpiece of hundreds of small businesses. When officials from the BDM engaged in economic arguments in the Bundesrat and with the Federal Minister of Economics, they consistently argued that their membership across the Federal Republic would be hit the hardest by the EC proposal because it was they who were most ill-suited to weather the storm or compete in a race to the bottom with major international competition.⁸² For example, in 1970 the Federal Republic was home to 1,815 breweries, Bavaria was home to 1,247 of them, respectively producing an average of 479,000 and 194,000 hectoliters per brewery. By comparison, Great Britain, which was in the process of negotiating their entry to the European Community, was home to a mere 177 breweries in 1970 but they produced an average of 3,120,000 hectoliters.⁸³ This was a production

⁸² Ibid., 306-10.

⁸³ Deutscher Brauer-Bund e.V., *13. Statistischer Bericht: 1977* (Bonn: 1977), 38, 166.

structure with much more centralized capital and lower operating costs that would allow British breweries, and other centralized European breweries, to undersell their West German counterparts.

Alongside agricultural and economic arguments, public health and consumer protection became key sectors for opposing the EC Proposal and for enshrining the *Reinheitsgebot* in popular consciousness. Much of this discourse was gendered: many West German women were aware of the dangers that food adulteration and chemical additives posed to consumers. Women's magazines had begun dealing with these topics in the late 1950s and early 1960s, telling readers about food scandals and new laws such as the 1958 Food Law (*Lebensmittelgesetz*). Women were advised to stay vigilant and up to date on the latest regarding food purity.⁸⁴ The BDM and both the Bavarian and West German Brewers' Associations argued that the *Reinheitsgebot* formed the foundation of consumer expectations, demand, and need for protection. On the level of formal political activity it was the Federal Ministry of Health that led the charge to reject the EC Proposal in the European Council, building opposition on the recommendation of the Agriculture Committee of the Bundesrat and the consumer-centered claims of Bavarian and West German brewers.

Federal Minister of Health Käthe Strobel and her efforts to protect the consuming housewife became the cutting edge of the formal political opposition to the EC Proposal. Strobel had been a representative to the European Parliament from 1958 to 1967 at which

⁸⁴ "Hausfrauen haben gelernt!" *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, Mar. 1959, 4; Herbert Hackl, "Wie uns die Werbung verführt," *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, Sept. 1959, 2-3; Ursula Höpfl, "Neue Fasern – Neue Stoffe," *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, Mar. 1960, 12-5; "Der Verbraucher will wissen, was er kauft," *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, May, 1962, 19-20; Luise Haselmayr, "Die Hausfrau und die EWG" *Nachrichten für die Hausfrau*, Sept. 1962, 4-5.

time she became Minister of Health under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and later under the new Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt until 1972.⁸⁵ Strobel's gender and social politics were dominated by a memory of war and the rubble years, which she personally experienced as a young mother and wife of a soldier turned POW. In the 1950s, for example, she argued that whatever "society" still existed in the late-war and immediate postwar years was largely the result of women's labor, not only in doing "men's work" but also precisely in those tasks traditionally gendered female, feeding and clothing, for example. For Strobel the "social and moral recognition" of women as domestic laborers was a particularly important "demand for equality." The goal was not to deny women access to the public sphere but rather to acknowledge that the long time socialist goal of higher wages for male laborers, important though it was, had erased the crucial private labor of women. Public life was a right but not an obligation for women, Strobel thought, and more needed to be done to honor, respect, and aid their private lives and labor. This was certainly not an unreasonable position for someone so acutely aware of the late war and postwar experience and the inherent gendering even of progressive social democratic politics.⁸⁶ And yet, her championing of consumer protection for the modern housewife also fit hand-in-glove with the conservative paternalism and recasting of bourgeois domesticity in the Adenauer/Erhard years.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ During this time there was a series of ministerial reorganization. In 1969 the Ministry of Health was joined with the Ministry for Family and Youth, to create the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health (today the Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth).

⁸⁶ Hanna Schissler, "Social Democratic Gender Policies, the Working-Class Milieu, and the Culture of Domesticity in West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s," in *Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990*, ed. David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 511-2.

⁸⁷ See chapter 3 and, for example, and Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood*; Alice Weinreb, *Modern Hungers*.

The way in which Strobel got involved in the conflicts around beer, and the form that her political discourse took in the late 1960s and early 1970s, mirror these tensions in her social politics. She advocated for legal action that would more directly touch the everyday lives of housewives: strict oversight on beer and other foodstuffs, more clarity and honesty in beer advertising, and better product education to aid informed decision-making.⁸⁸ On the issue of the Purity Law, she was unwavering: “For us, the question is not contentious. We are one hundred percent for the retention of the German *Reinheitsgebot* for beer. There can be no beer imported which does not conform to this purity law!”⁸⁹ Having been a representative to the European Parliament, Strobel was deeply aware for the politics of integration and was critical that the EEC was not working in the service of West German consumers. In her efforts to uphold the *Reinheitsgebot*, she tapped into her own politics of acknowledging and supporting women’s domestic labor while also mobilizing the foundations of conservative paternalism around the consuming housewife rooted in the Adenauer/Erhard years. Even as a champion of consumer protection and drawing on scientific discourse in nutritional science and public health, her position was that the state needed to intervene to protect the sovereignty of the consuming housewife. She argued that the *Reinheitsgebot* insured that consumers knew what was in beer. Without the law, she claimed, the housewife could unknowingly

⁸⁸ In public health policy Strobel cut her teeth on tobacco in the late 1960s during a transition in public health education and outreach that shifted away from factual bombardment and towards informing consumers and intervening to create structures for behavioral change. Bringing in marketing experts, making non-smoking clubs, and releasing target advertising for youth, Ströbel claimed that for her strategy to work, “it needs to be cool not to smoke.” This experience seems to have been formative for how she navigated the issue of the *Reinheitsgebot*. See, Christian Sammer, “Die ‘Modernisierung’ der Gesundheitsaufklärung in beiden deutschen Staaten zwischen 1949 und 1975: Das Beispiel Rauchen” *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 50 no. 3 (2015): 274-6.

⁸⁹ *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* 4 no. 1 (1971), 6; see also, Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1968/69 – 1969/70*, 89.

expose her family to uncertain, unpure, and unhealthy substances. Already in the late summer of 1969, Strobel was doing television campaigns alongside the Bavarian Brewers' Association promoting the *Reinheitsgebot* as a staple of public health and a crucial piece of her approach to the public health politics of European integration.⁹⁰

(Image 4.3)



Image 4.3: Federal Minister Strobel tests pure Bavarian beer at a televised promotional event for the *Reinheitsgebot* with the Bavarian Brewers' Association in the summer of 1969. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1968/69 – 1969/70*, insert between pp. 80 and 81.

⁹⁰ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1968/69 – 1969/70*, 89.

Brewers themselves were also a crucial piece of the puzzle of opposition to the EC Proposal. The German Brewers' Association had remained conspicuously silent during the *Süßbierstreit*, earning them the criticism of Bavarian brewers like Ernst Röhm who had fought for decades to balance the national and provincial tensions of German brewing.⁹¹ In the case of European integration, they were much more involved, first in international negotiations of the C.B.M.C., and later in opposition to it, spurred on by Bavarian and southern German interests. Much of their work straddled the formally political and the popular spheres. For example, in 1970 and 1971 the German Brewers' Association put on a public exhibition about the *Reinheitsgebot* at the Bavarian state house (*Landesvertretung*) in the federal capital of Bonn. The exhibition was frequented by both the public and federal representatives to the Bundesrat and Bundestag looking to educate themselves regarding the new piece of proposed legislation. The exhibition claimed that the *Reinheitsgebot* had been in effect in Germany since 1906, which is only a partial truth. The presence of political notables like Strobel were covered in the press and made note of in brewing trade journals and popular publications.

One of the most significant things the German Brewers' Association did in the early 1970s was issue a report in October 1970 that became the base of political action in the coming half a decade. It was distributed to all levels of political engagement: federal and state ministers, federal and state parliamentarians, German representatives in Brussels, special interest groups, and allied industry organizations in agriculture, brewing, malting, packaging, and logistics. In it they stressed that West Germany

⁹¹ For example, December 27, 1954 letter from Hans Pfülf to Ernst Röhm; and December 31, 1954 letter from Ernst Röhm to Rudolf Luedtke, BayHStA Bayer. Brauerbund 593. See also, Speckle, *Streit ums Bier in Bayern*, 91.

accounted for 65% of the beer produced in the EEC, 63% of the beer consumed, and 81% of the total breweries.⁹² These numbers made plain that West Germans should rightly be concerned with beer in European integration and they were cited and circulated in political argument for years to come. These numbers and much of the qualitative language from the report was crucial in subsequent political discourse, for example in both the Bundesrat Agricultural Committee deliberations and in Minister Strobel's publicity campaigns.⁹³ The report also allowed brewers to more convincingly argue in the name of consumers: "in the name of the consumers, the German brewing industry is legitimized in turning its attention towards the harmonization plans of the EEC."⁹⁴ The report marshaled evidence from chemical studies of beer composition conducted at the Technical School in Munich and from legal assessments of EEC agreements as well as more subjective sources on consumer expectations and taste profiles of beer. The report claimed that the additives permitted in the EEC Proposal "decidedly worsened the quality and character of the beer"—as if such claims could be made objectively. At the level of public health, the report crucially blended regional history into national, arguing that for 450 years the *Reinheitsgebot* had protected German consumers from being unknowingly subjected to beers of lesser quality. This exaggeration of more than four centuries made the alternative all the more terrifying: Without the Purity Law, consumers would be exposed to beers that were damaging to their health (*gesundheitsschädlich*), citing cases

⁹² "Zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften für Bier im Gemeinsamen Markt" Oct. 1970 report by the German Brewers' Association, BAK B 189/10312.

⁹³ "Niederschrift über die 292. Sitzung des Agrarausschusses des Bundesrates am 11. Sept. 1970," BAK B 189/10310; "Ansprache von Frau Minister Käte Strobel zur Stimmkartenübergabe des Aktionskomitees 'Reines Bier' am 23. März 1971 in Bonn," BAK B 189/10312.

⁹⁴ "Zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften für Bier im Gemeinsamen Markt."

of consumer illness in the USA and Canada due to the sale of less regulated, over produced, industrial beers.⁹⁵

Formal participation by the West German Brewers' Association was important for the involvement of key special interest groups because it signaled that this was to be a national industrial-political campaign with a consumerist-bent. In 1970 a new special interest group called the Action Committee for Pure Beer (*Aktionskomitee reines Bier*, henceforth ArB) was founded in Düsseldorf; the capital of North Rhine-Westphalia where newspapers had lambasted "Bavarian separatism" in the *Süßbierstreit*. The ArB was short-lived because in 1974 the German Brewers' Association founded the German Institute for Pure Beer (*Deutsches Institut für Reines Bier*), which created a platform for sustained contact between brewing interests and legislators in the West German Parliament. The latter became the policy arm of the brewing industry from the late 1970s to today. But the ArB, though short-lived, was crucial in making beer and the *Reinheitsgebot* and the very concept of "pure beer" an explicitly and broadly popular political issue, leveraging consumer interests into policy-making.

The primary objective of the ArB was to push the issue of "beer purity" and the alleged threats posed by European integration into the political consciousness of West German beer drinkers and mobilize their direct political action. In 1971, their most successful action involved the circulation of ballots for consumers to fill in voicing their support for "pure beer." These ballots (Image 4.4) appeared in a number of magazines and were circulated in grocery stores, bars, and other places beer drinkers could be found. The German and Bavarian Brewers' Associations advocated to their membership that

⁹⁵ Ibid.



Image 4.4: Voting ballot. Source: *Bayerische Bier Illustrierte* Vol 4. Nr. 1 (1971), 15.

individual breweries should also share and collect these ballots in their local circles of producers and consumers. The ballot proclaims, “Our beer must remain pure! Vote for pure beer!” On the left is the yes vote, which mentions the *Reinheitsgebot* by name and lists the four ingredients. Never mind that this was only actually the law in certain parts of West Germany and only regarding certain types of beers. On the right, the no vote is presented as a *reductio ad absurdum*, explaining to voters that such a vote supported the inclusion of “chemical additives: ascorbic acid, tannins, sulfur dioxide, and proteolytic enzymes.” The ballots could be found in popular magazines to be cut out and mailed in. But the ArB also set up voting boxes all over the Federal Republic and made an event of getting out the vote. (Image 4.5) In this image, from the Lower Franconian town of Bad

Neustadt a.d. Saale, the town mayor and local representatives to the state and federal parliaments showed up to build up the spectacle. This small town, some 20 kilometers from the Hessen border was directly in the crossfire of the *Süßbierstreit* only a few years earlier. All in all, in West Germany in 1971, the ArB circulated 750,000 ballots, a half a million fliers, and 26,000 posters, which were hung in breweries and around towns, in order to generate popular resistance towards what they and others had begun calling *Chemiebier*, or chemical beer and advocating for “pure beer.”

The rhetoric of “chemical beer” and thinking of the Beer Purity Law as a food and consumer protection law had real political power at the federal level. The ArB had been



Image 4.5: ArB ballot box in Bad Neustadt a.d. Saale. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1970/71*, insert between pp. 80 and 81.

in contact with Minister Strobel since at least late 1970, when they wrote to her: “our pure beer is in danger!” They asked for her written support to legitimize their organization and that she begin consolidating allies in relevant federal ministries, in the

federal parliament, and in the European Commission in Brussels.⁹⁶ In March of 1971 she held an event with representatives of the ArB in the federal capital of Bonn where she spoke on the issue of beer purity and consumer protection. She thanked the young organization for all their hard work and expressed how overwhelmed she was by the more than 200,000 “yes” ballots she had received to date. It was a wave of popular support she could not easily ignore.⁹⁷

Popular mobilization and the cultural dissemination of the *Reinheitsgebot* was not limited to ballots and cannot be fully measured quantitatively. It is thus worth looking at the way popular culture also spread opposition to the EC Proposal. Once again, this began in Bavaria. Beginning in the late 1960s, Bavarian consumers who ordered cases of beer delivered to their homes—the most common way of buying beer in Bavaria—began receiving a complimentary magazine called *Bavarian Beer Illustrated*. The magazine itself epitomized a great deal of its time and place. In the domestic sphere, as we saw in the last chapter, women were doing most of the beer purchasing, and men most of the beer drinking. The magazine included homemaking tips, political essays, and even puzzles and jokes for children. Second to domestic tips, the most frequent topic in the magazine was the threat of foreign “chemical beer,” first from the U.S. and EEC countries and, by the early 1970s almost uniquely the latter. One early article alerted consumers to mass produced beers—“robot bock and computer pils”—that may be coming their way should American and EEC beers be allowed into the West German and

⁹⁶ Nov. 12, 1970, letter from the Aktionskomitee Reines Bier to Federal Minister Käthe Ströbel, BAK B 189/10312.

⁹⁷ Mar. 23, 1971, Speech by Kathe Ströbel at the submission of the voting cards by the Aktionkomitee Reines Bier, BAK B 189/10312.

Bavarian markets.⁹⁸ Another, which railed against European brewing harmonization, featured a paradigmatic Bavarian man guarding his *Maß* from bottles of imposing European “unity beer.” Looking at the bottles anxiously, the man proclaims “without me!” (*ohne mich!*).⁹⁹ (Image 4.6) The phrase echoed the cautious introspection of the “Ohne Mich Movement,” which rejected West German contributions to West European defense and armament from 1945 until at least the mid-1950s.¹⁰⁰



Image 4.6: Without me! Source: *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* Nr. 4 (1969), 12.

Other articles in the magazine made yet more of consumer opposition and the explicit importance of the *Reinheitsgebot* following the formal proposal of the EC. In the

⁹⁸ “Robotor-Bock—Computer-Pils und was sonst noch auf Sie zukommen könnte,” *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* no. 1 (1969), 12-3.

⁹⁹ “Wünschen Sie uniformes Einheitsbier?” *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* no. 4 (1969), 11-12.

¹⁰⁰ The movement continued at least until the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the same year the Federal Republic joined NATO. Michael Geyer argues that anti-militarism including but not limited to the *Ohne-Mich-Bewegung* derived not only from a fear of past destruction, but also from opposition to subverting West German power to Western Europe and NATO, and even opposition to legitimacy of the Federal Republic itself. See, Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons,” in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 376-408.

late summer of 1970 as the issue was first being discussed in the state and federal government, the magazine published a piece, “On the *Reinheitsgebot*,” that claimed that when drinking Bavarian beer, the consumer has “absolute certainty of its pure and unadulterated production.” But now, with the EEC proposal, foreign brewers may get the opportunity to import beers with “rice, maize, sorghum, millet, potato starch, and manioc roots in addition to a number of chemical additives.” But to what end? As the Bavarian readership learned,

The advantage is not for the consumers, the brewers, nor the malters, nor the German farmers, and not for the workers in these industries. The only advantage would be for foreign breweries... It cannot be the purpose and goal of the EEC to suppress what is tried and tested, because something new is profitable. It cannot be the purpose of the EEC to replace the variety of beer types in German lands with a unity swill (*Einheitsgesöff*) of undefined origin and composition.¹⁰¹

The strong images with the article showed a foreign brewer aimlessly dumping bags of various unwelcomed ingredients into his boiling mash, the hammer of European regulations descending on consumers protected by the *Reinheitsgebot* (Image 4.7), and a responsible consumer vehemently rejecting any potential European “unity swill.”¹⁰² (Image 4.8) It was the consumer who would bring to life the industry’s market protectionism through their insistence on “pure beer.”

By the beginning of 1971, *Bavarian Beer Illustrated* had fully ramped up its discourse and imagery of consumer opposition and linked it to concrete political opposition by leading West German politicians. On the opening page readers found an image of consumers at the barricades, apparently all men, armed with scythes and

¹⁰¹ “Um das Reinheitsgebot,” *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* no. 4 (1970), 10.

¹⁰² Ibid.




Image 4.7: The regulatory hammer of the EEC comes down on consumers protected by the *Reinheitsgebot*. Source: *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* Nr. 4 (1970), 10.



Image 4.8: Consumer refusal. Source: *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* Nr. 4 (1970), 10.

pitchforks, a “*Reinheitsgebot*” banner in the background, and a larger one in the middle proclaiming, “We demand pure beer.” (Image 4.9) Such riots never actually occurred but the image captures the idea that pure beer is worth political action, perhaps only slightly



Image 4.9: Protesters at the barricades demand pure beer. Source: *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* Nr. 1 (1971), inside front cover.

exaggerated here by taking up arms and taking to the streets. Articles in the same issue featured West German political notables like Käthe Stobel and former Federal Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture Hermann Höcherl. The latter, and his successor Josef Ertl, were unrelenting champions for the *Reinheitsgebot*. In formal political circles their opposition took the form of agricultural and nutritional policy as was their charge, but in popular discourse both of the men argued against the addition of chemical additives in

public forums in the name of pure beer, consumer protection, and mobilization. Höcherl for example appeared in a late 1970 television public service announcement in which he spoke to West German consumers about the various chemicals that were included in unpure foreign beers. Speaking directly into the camera, a glass of German beer in front of him, he explained the ten laboratory vials surrounding him containing various dangerous and risky ingredients not permitted in the *Reinheitsgebot*. He concluded that, “for me, beer adulterated with chemicals is an abomination!”¹⁰³

Alongside magazines and television segments, we can also look to the communal advertisements discussed at length in the previous chapter, which by the early 1970s were the defining image of a product with annual sales north of 11 billion Deutsche Marks. As we saw, in the 1960s communal advertisements were catering to an older generation whose consumption was informed by the legacies of scarcity. The advertisements were ostensibly apolitical even as their content and meaning were deeply rooted in the paternalism of the “miracle years.” In 1971, however, the leading communal advertisement of the West German *Bierwerbe* positioned “pure beer” as fundamentally German. (Image 4.10) It boasts the purity of German beer, brewed without chemical additives, flavoring agents, or artificial colors. In no unclear terms it reads, “*Since time immemorial*, Germany’s brewers brew beer according to the *Reinheitsgebot*. From hops, malt, yeast, and water. And nothing else. So it is, and so it will remain.” This ad appeared in more than 150 regional and national newspapers that reached an estimated two-thirds of West German households. It was also the basis of television ads that reached over 16.5

¹⁰³ *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte* no. 1 (1971), 14.



Image 4.10: Germany’s pure source. Source: Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1971/71*, insert between pp. 80 and 81.

million West German homes. The *Bierwerbe* estimated that all combined this ad campaign reached upwards of 97 percent of the West German population above 14 years of age.¹⁰⁴

“Since time immemorial” is a bold claim indeed, considering that the law had been continuously in effect for less than two decades. The *Reinheitsgebot* had only really been national law since 1952 and embattled at that. Indeed, the final act of the *Süßbierstreit* only closed in 1965; that is, just as the Bavarian trade organization derailed the *compromises* of the national trade organization in the C.B.M.C. The claim of timelessness seeks to energize a collective past that never was. It was not an “invention of tradition,” but was rather a “reinvention of tradition”—an appropriation of regional

¹⁰⁴ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V. *Geschäftsbericht 1971/72*, 77-9.

peculiarity into an ahistorical national touchstone.¹⁰⁵ To some critical observers, the play was legible as little more than a business strategy. In 1971, *Der Spiegel* made plain how German brewers had disguised capital interest as consumer protection. “The ‘struggle for pure beer,’ which the Brewers’ Association allegedly wants to fight ‘for the protection of consumers,’” the article claimed, “still quite informally serves the interests of the beer makers; as even a few industry representatives concede. German beer drinkers have already reached their consumption limit and the industry is frightened by the competition from foreign beer producers that have hitherto been hampered on the German market by the purity clause.”¹⁰⁶

The West German delegates to the European Council repeatedly stalled or vetoed the Proposal spurred on, as they were, by the recommendations of the Bundesrat and Bundestag, the leading charge of Käthe Strobel and the Ministry of Health, and the wave of industrial and popular opposition. By 1973, and a few versions of the Proposal later, the process had stalled out completely. Further amendments were made in the Council but by 1975 the plan was officially withdrawn because the West Germans were completely unwilling to compromise on their newfound commitment to beer purity. The fight for the *Reinheitsgebot* was over—for now. On the one hand the opposition in West Germany was remarkably unified. Indeed, the EC Proposal never became a partisan issue in the parliament and free trade rhetoric was largely absent in legislative discussions. The big three politicians, Strobel, Höcherl, and Ertl, all hailed from different political parties and there was similar agreement and cooperation across party lines more generally.

¹⁰⁵ Jeremy de Waal, “The Reinvention of Tradition: Form, Meaning, and Local Identity in Modern Cologne Carnival” *Central European History* 46 (2013); 519-30.

¹⁰⁶ “Bier/ Reinheitsgebot – Leer und pappig,” *Der Spiegel* 15, 1971, 49.

Although the EC proposal was not formally introduced until after the 1969 federal election, the issue of upholding the *Reinheitsgebot* in the EC was discussed at least briefly before it meaning that it was discussed by both Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) and Social-Liberal Coalition (SPD-FDP) governments. In the Bundestag and Bundesrat deliberations around the proposal in the course of late 1970 and early 1971, representatives of the Bavarian CSU were certainly the most vocal in their opposition of the proposal but no single party representative spoke in favor of it. Across the political spectrum, the proposal was “unanimously rejected in the Federal Republic.”¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, the opposition and the icon remained fractured, heterogeneous, and regional. It is interesting to note that Strobel, Höcherl, and Ertl, though all from different parties, all also hailed from Bavaria. Moreover, as we have seen the opposition was sparked by Bavarian industrial interests and their critique of the open-mindedness of their West German counterparts. Thus while rejecting the EC harmonization proposal crossed party and state lines, it was undoubtedly spearheaded by Bavarian politicians and industrial interests. The popular mobilization largely driven along by the ArB in Düsseldorf, broad marketing campaigns, popular magazines, and television spots played an enormously important role in popularizing opposition and making the *Reinheitsgebot* a national cause. At the early stages, however, it was the Bavarian Brewers’ Association that shut down the negotiations of the C.B.M.C., and in formal politics it was Bavarian agrarian politicians, the Bavarian dominated Federation of German Small- and Mid-Sized Brewers, and the German Brewers’ Association that most successfully petitioned members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat. It was Federal Ministers of Bavarian origin

¹⁰⁷ Bulmer, 317.

that became the public face of opposition and the most powerful voices of opposition in the European Council.

The West German and western European brewing industries were first brought into conversation by the integration of agricultural markets in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Anticipating the integration of brewing and beer taxation and trade legislation, the national trade organization of the major western European countries formed an international consortium to collectively discuss the possibility of harmonizing brewing standards. These efforts, which involved an eventual if reluctant West German compromise on the *Reinheitsgebot*, ground to a halt on Bavarian intransigence. Joined by non-Bavarian special interest groups, the Bavarian Brewers' Association and other trade organizations won over their West German colleagues, petitioned Federal and European politicians, and mobilized hundreds of thousands of West German consumers in opposition to a revision or rescission of the *Reinheitsgebot*. Privately, Bavarian brewers remained antagonistic to the looser West German version of the law while in public the distinctions became largely irrelevant. The political and cultural discourses of pure beer, consumer protection, public health, and tradition carried the day and eventually shaped the ink-and-paper political and economic policies of the Federal Republic and the European Community. West German brewers, lead by a strong Bavarian contingent, instrumentalized the *Reinheitsgebot* for the purposes of market protection and in the process embedded the law and the concept of pure beer in West German cultural and political life.

Conclusion:

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the *Reinheitsgebot* operated as a lever of political and capital interests. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the law helped *Altbayerisch* politicians and industrialists assume economic and cultural positions of power in Franconia. By targeting interstate trade, they targeted cultures of consumption that they considered opposed to values, laws, practices, and economic interests centered in Old Bavaria at the expense of the West German open market. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the law helped similar national political and industrial interests fuse beer consumption to consumer protection and agro-economic conservatism in the course of European integration. The broad front of opposition to European beer harmonization that spread across West Germany, spawned first and foremost by Bavarian interests, shaped the norms and politics of consumption and the consumer on the national level. Political and economic collaboration informed both the cultural values of West German consumers and the broader politicization of individuals *as* consumers—a process by no means unique to West Germany.¹⁰⁸ The particular flavor of consumer politicization in this case was nonetheless distinctly German. At the most basic level, arguing over “consumer expectations” and “consumer protection” are nothing if not an effort to articulate and regulate what economic practices are and are not welcome in the Federal Republic. More specifically, provincial-national tensions in German brewing dating to at least the 19th century took new forms in the 1950s and 1960s and were ultimately

¹⁰⁸ See for example, Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton (eds), *The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America*. (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Frank Trentmann, “Knowing Consumers – Histories, Identities, Practices: An Introduction,” in *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power, and Identity in the Modern World*, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2006); and idem., “The Modern Genealogy of the Consumer: Meanings, Identities, and Political Synapses,” in *Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives: Historical Trajectories, Transnational Exchanges*, ed. John Brewer and Frank Trentmann (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2006); Kerstin Brückweh, ed., *The Voice of the Citizen Consumer: A History of Market Research, Consumer Movements, and the Political Public Sphere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

eclipsed by the perceived threat of European market integration. Regional peculiarity became national, at least discursively. Bavarian provincial intransigence proved its broad and flexible political utility, producing in part the cultural and political convictions of *Germans* in the Federal Republic. Indeed, until 1987, for reasons addressed in the epilogue, the *Reinheitsgebot* remained an informal trade barrier to European market integration. Even after that it remained the cultural standard for German consumers, making the German beer market particularly hostile to “unpure” beers.

Chapter 5:

‘Lurvenbrow’: Bavarian Beer, Barstool Diplomacy, and the Global Imaginary

“The annual Oktoberfest at the Palace Hotel in Kowloon, one of the thumpiest down-to-earth good times of the year in Hong Kong, gets underway on Friday night, the 14th, for two weeks of nightly singing, dancing, beer and wine gedrinken, German food zu essen, and alles zusammen good time haben. ...The King’s Lodge in the cellar of the hotel is normally a relaxed and reasonably quiet place. But for two weeks every October, the flowing of the beer in Munich sets off a gemütlich reaction in Hong Kong and the King’s Lodge becomes a Munich Hofbrau Haus with an air of merriment that is rarely, if ever, seen in Hong Kong. ...There will be Lowenbrau beer on draught this time – more than 100 barrels.”¹

This promotion for the 1966 Hong Kong Oktoberfest appeared in the socialite informational brochure *What’s Doing in Hong Kong*. As much as it tells readers where they can find the festival and what they can do there, it also tells them how it will be done: as a thumpingly down-to-earth good time full of merriment, singing, dancing, eating, and drinking that shatters the typical tranquility of the restaurant, the hotel, and the entire city of Hong Kong. The promotion lapses into broken German seemingly without thinking, suggesting that perhaps readers may understand broken German or at least find themselves believing as much when the beer starts flowing. The presence of Löwenbräu beer injects authenticity into the experience, an almost natural outgrowth of the Munich counterpart, and the result of an unexplained “gemütlich reaction.”² The promotion goes on to explain the nuances of communal drinking practices with glass boots and gallon pots and what to do “if you suddenly find yourself a part of one of these

¹ “Time again for Oktoberfest at the Palace,” *What’s Doing in Hong Kong*, Oct. 1966, Bayerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (henceforth BWA) F 002-8901.

² Gemütlich roughly translates as cozy but the word goes beyond physical coziness to include social acceptance and friendliness. It is a coziness of mind, body, and social environment.

drink-arounds.”³ Festivalgoers be warned: the “gemutlich reaction” may well sweep you up, but fear not and embrace it armed with the foreknowledge of how to adapt to proper Oktoberfest drinking culture.

Visitors to and residents of Hong Kong could learn to navigate the apparently constitutive merriment of a German drinking experience, but there is important slippage here between the Hong Kong festival and anything that can be considered German. Newspaper coverage of the event explained the Oktoberfest festivities as “a tribute in food to the sportsmanship of the German hunter. . . . The Oktoberfest, for the Teuton in the woodlands of Bavaria, heralds the start of the hunting season in the autumnal hiatus before the snows of winter and hibernation drive game into their special lairs.”⁴ This magical Bavarian woodland seems to convolute themes of 19th century Romanticism; Bavarians are not Teutons, no matter how you slice it and Oktoberfest is far more than a celebration of hunting and season change.⁵ “Drink-arounds” are and were entirely less common in Munich and Germany broadly than the promotion suggests and the German language itself is borderline nonsensical in spelling (*gemutlich*) and bastardized verbiage (*gedrungen* and *gehaben*). So, what is German here, what is Bavarian, and what is mere stereotype? Moreover, what is at stake in thinking through the tangles and convolutions of this ostensibly authentic German experience?

This specific image of Germanness around the world in the second half of the twentieth century was produced in large part by the Bavarian brewing industry—most

³ “Time again for Oktoberfest at the Palace,” *What’s Doing in Hong Kong*.

⁴ “Dining Out with Alberto da Cruz,” *The China Mail*, Oct. 19, 1966.

⁵ Oktoberfest derives from the 1810 marriage celebration of Crown Prince Ludwig I and Princess Therese of Saxe-Hildburghausen and solidified into a popular celebration, horse race, and agricultural show in the course of the 19th century.

notably the Munich brewery Löwenbräu—and their global allies and partners including importers, distributors, and marketers. On the one hand it is a product of a straightforward history of global capitalism: seeking markets, defining markets, shaping product image, expanding product placement, and protecting the exclusivity of the product. At the same time, however, the idea of a Germany of beer drinkers and the notion that somehow the drinking masses of the world could approximate a true German experience by drinking the highest quality product in the most authentic setting was not a natural or timeless reality. A commodity—in this case beer—is not merely the sum of its parts or a quantification of the labor that goes into producing it. What follows demonstrates the profound ways in which people in diverse political, legal, and economic contexts shaped the cultural value of Löwenbräu beer. The chapter thus follows the flow of beer as much as information about beer from the standards of production to the modes of consumption. In the process of shaping the legal and cultural scaffolding that would ensure sales, tastemakers from producers to advertisers and from consumers to heads of state, produced meanings about the product and its consumption that took on larger significance for global re-imaginings of Germany in the wake of National Socialism, in the shifting geopolitical terrain of the Cold War, and in the restructuring of global capital in the 1970s and beyond.

In the early and mid 1950s, an ad in London newspapers boasted that after a wartime hiatus, “Löwenbräu is back!” A “stein” of the brew was a “really potent reminder that the world’s best beer since 1383 is still brewed at Munich.”⁶ In much of Great Britain in the 1950s, the legacy of Nazi aggression remained potent. Some even

⁶ Löwenbräu ad, *The Evening Standard*, June 12, 1952; and *The Times*, June 26, 1957.

considered the nascent power of Germany an equal threat to that posed by the Soviet Union.⁷ This ad, however, reminded consumers that Germany—and even Munich, a city the Nazis had called the “capital of the movement”—was more than Nazism, indeed it was the centuries-long home of the “world’s best beer.” It went on cheekily, “If you can pronounce Löwenbräu* you’ll pronounce it the finest beer you’ve ever tasted.” An asterisk further down explained: “repeat ‘Lurvenbrow’ ten times. If you still find it difficult, look for Löwenbräu on the wine list or behind your favorite bar.”⁸ The net effect of the ad is to present the beer as an introduction to (or reminder of) a different Germany that was home to a past everyone could enjoy and appreciate. As global consumption of Löwenbräu and Bavarian beer generally increased, the drink became a way of communicating about and understanding Germany and Germans. The way the Munich brewery structured its postwar recovery and built its market depended on growing exports and it quickly became the most exported, consumed, and iconic West German beer around the world. The brewery built its economic success on ideas of quality and authenticity that stressed its Bavarian origin. In many places, especially the U.K. and the U.S., a “gemütlich” mode of consumption was globalized alongside the beer. Selling a culture of consumption as much as a singular product, Löwenbräu came to inform how people around the world perceived West Germany broadly. Into the late 1960s, this history depended on the brewery’s claims to authenticity in production and place of origin. Beginning in the recession of the 1970s, Löwenbräu’s choice to outsource production severed the relationship between beer and place allowing for the brand to

⁷ See for example, Spencer Mawby, *Containing Germany: Britain and the Arming of the Federal Republic* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 197.

⁸ Löwenbräu ad, *The Evening Standard* and *The Times*.

become a global beer—perhaps the first ever—but also spelled the collapse of a drink that depended on the reputation of Bavarian production. Even as the brand collapsed, the global imaginary of a West Germany of Bavarian beer drinkers largely remained.

Beginnings: From War to Reviving the Export Market in the 1950s

Beginning in the Second World War and into the postwar occupation, export statistics for Bavarian beers plummeted to zero in large part because of Allied import restrictions and the naval blockade from 1939 to 1945. In addition, in 1942, the Nazi Regime started sizing up the potential of converting breweries towards the purposes of war. For the most part, this involved converting factory safety systems meant for industrial fires to the purpose of civil defense in combatting fires caused by Allied bombing. Finally, in the course of 1943-1945 many of Bavaria's largest breweries were destroyed in Allied bombing raids. On the night of March 9, 1943, for example, the eastern half of the Spaten Brewery containing the lager house, bottling plant, and barrel cooper was destroyed. After being converted to war purposes including fire protection, the brewery was hit again in October 1943, April, July, October, November, December 1944, and finally in January and February of 1945. Due to conversion to military purposes and bombing damage, the production of beer stopped completely for the final months of 1944 and most of early 1945.⁹ Similarly the Löwenbräu brewery began to sustain massive damage from air raids in 1944. By April 1945 the six-hectare brewery on Nymphenburg Street in Munich had been reduced to a “rubble heap.”¹⁰

⁹ Wolfgang Behringer, *Die Spaten-Brauerei, 1397-1997: Die Geschichte eines Münchner Unternehmens vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich and Zurich: Piper Verlag GmbH, 1997), 326-334.

¹⁰ Wolfgang Behringer, *Löwenbräu: Von den Anfang des Münchner Brauwesens bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1991), 249-51.

By the end of the war every Munich brewery had sustained heavy damage and faced extensive reconstruction that lasted well into the Federal Republic. As late as 1954 the fermentation cellar, office building, and refrigeration house at Löwenbräu, although all operable, were still in need of reconstruction. The malting house remained largely destroyed and the brewery had been outsourcing its barley malt for almost the entire past decade. Only after nine years was all the rubble finally cleared but the brewery still presented as a shamble. Plaster and roofing repairs were “not immediately urgent, but necessary, however, in the interests of the reputation of the brewery.” This reputation, it is important to note, was consciously focused on exports. As a 1954 technical report admitted, “The bottom line for a brewery is and remains the quality of their products and the degree of popularity among the consuming public. In this regard it may be said that the quality of export beers is very good... On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the lager beers [for local consumption] are not on the same level.” Löwenbräu was in many ways never a popular hit in Munich or elsewhere in West Germany; a fact that the brewery struggled with for decades.¹¹ The capital success of Löwenbräu in the postwar decades was instead dependent on a conscious choice by brewery leadership to focus their reconstruction on exports almost immediately after the war.¹²

As we have seen, brewing for civilian consumption was heavily restricted in the occupation and breweries were further limited by severe material scarcities into the

¹¹ The brewery was one of the largest in Munich and was thus successful and profitable. However, local sales were well below those of their local competitors and market research reports showed that the brand was held in the lowest esteem by Munich drinkers. We will return to the question of Löwenbräu and Munich beer drinkers at the end of this chapter.

¹² See Löwenbräu A.G., *Geschäftsbericht 1944/45*; and “Technischer Bericht für die Aufsichtsratssitzung vom 22.12.1954” BWA F002-917. While their export efforts were not unique, they were unmatched and began remarkably early. The Munich brewery Spaten, for example, began making periodic export deals in the spring of 1947 but its export growth was far below that of Löwenbräu; Behringer, *Die Spaten-Brauerei*, 345-6.

1950s. The Löwenbräu brewery was one of the first to restart production in 1945, as it was one of the seven Bavarian breweries tasked with supplying full-strength beer to American soldiers in the occupation period. In the first 12 months after restarting brewing in June 1945, however, Löwenbräu had produced less than in a single good month in the Third Reich and earlier, in part due to war damage and material hardships, and in part due to the American prohibition on civilian consumption. None of the beer produced went abroad except a relatively small amount (about 5% of the total output), which was sold on dining cars of the *Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits*, a Paris-based international overnight train service.¹³ In 1947 Löwenbräu got its first major export deal with Hans Holterbosch Inc. in New York City which places it among the earliest consumer goods to be produced for export following a shift in Western Allied strategy away from punitive control of the German economy to nourishing German economic productivity. The deal of \$700,000 for 12 monthly deliveries of 20,000 cases was a radical quantity given the terrible scarcity of the postwar years. As testament to that it was a condition of the deal, signed off on by Lucius Clay himself, that Holterbosch had to supply the barley for production.¹⁴ This barley clause was quite standard and before the American deal could be fulfilled the first postwar shipment of export beer from Munich and Bavaria was sent to Zurich in April 1948, brewed with barley delivered from Switzerland months earlier. It was Löwenbräu beer, delivered to Munich Central Train Station on a ceremonial horse-drawn wagon, complete with a Trachten-clad crew.¹⁵ The American deal indicates however that Löwenbräu was well positioned to capitalize on the emerging “paradigm of

¹³ Export statistics June 1, 1945 – Sept. 30, 1945; and Oct. 1, 1945 – Sept. 30, 1946, BWA F002-495.

¹⁴ “Bavarian Beer Coming. U.S. to Get 20,000 Cases a Month, Gen. Clay Discloses” *New York Times*, Aug. 4, 1947, 25.

¹⁵ Wolfram Selig, *Chronik der Stadt München, 1945-1948* (Munich: Stadtarchiv, 1980), 358.

the trade-state” espoused by Economics Minister and later Chancellor Ludwig Erhard; a willful rejection of great power politics in favor of market globalization.¹⁶ While much of West German export strategy across business sectors targeted Western Europe, particularly in the context of market integration after the late 1950s, Löwenbräu followed a number of less common trade pathways.¹⁷

The story of Hans Holterbosch is in many ways emblematic of one of the primary modes of Löwenbräu’s explosive global growth: a longer history of German exports and the consumer demand of the German diaspora. Holterbosch himself was born in Düsseldorf and migrated to New York in the mid-1920s to escape the hyperinflation in Germany. He eventually opened a German restaurant and sports club in Yorkville on the Upper East Side of Manhattan; originally a haven for East-Central European immigrants from Habsburg Europe but dominated by German immigrants since the 1880s. He rose to distinction in the German community ultimately working with New York City mayor James Walker to welcome notable German visitors including athletes and scientists in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When American prohibition was lifted in 1933, German migrants in the U.S. wanted German beer and the German breweries wanted a piece of the American market. Löwenbräu had not been available in the U.S. for almost 20 years—since before World War One—and few people beyond (and even within) the German community were familiar with it.¹⁸ Holterbosch, who had never worked in

¹⁶ Reinhard Neebe, *Weichenstellung für die Globalisierung: Deutsche Weltmarktpolitik, Europa und Amerika in der Ära Ludwig Erhard* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), 18.

¹⁷ Werner Abelshauser, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945* (Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2004), 258-62; Löwenbräu was not unique in this, however. Volkswagen was similarly distinct for its concentration on, and rapid growth in the American market. See Bernhard Rieger, *The People’s Car: A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 188-232.

¹⁸ This is because of the notably regional and local nature of the German beer market and the fact that most Germans in New York were not from Bavaria or Munich.

importing, got the contract through personal connections from his soccer club and between 1933 and 1939 worked “to make the name and the taste well known.”¹⁹ He generated interest among distributors and retailers by exhibiting the beer at expos like the 1937 Westchester Food and Beverage Show, where his stall included placards and material objects from the Munich brewery. Business grew along the northeastern U.S. primarily through sales to German restaurants and as late as June 1940 Holterbosch boasted that his was the only available supply of any German beer, “still available in this country 10 months after the outbreak of the European War.”²⁰ The British blockade completely ended imports in 1940 and by 1945 the Munich brewery had been significantly damaged by Allied bombing. Holterbosch made the deal in 1947 through negotiations overseen by the Military Government, but for a variety of practical reasons on both sides of the Atlantic, imports did not begin in earnest until 1949. Less than ten years later, the New York importer had increased imports from 100,000 gallons a year to 1.3 million, which amounted to more than half of the German beer (and almost a third of all the European beer) imported to the United States in the late 1950s.²¹

This trend of reopening older export channels, but more importantly of tapping German diasporic demand is a central trend in explaining the initial success of Löwenbräu in the export market. For example, in Alberta, Canada the first German club, Club Edelweiss which dated to 1906, had shut its doors from 1939 to 1953. From 1955 to 1958 a second club, the Phoenix Club, was founded and took it upon itself in conjunction

¹⁹ “One Way to Get a Big Beer Franchise is to Play Soccer” *The New York Times*, June 1, 1957, 21.

²⁰ Behringer, *Löwenbräu*, 247.

²¹ “One Way to Get a Big Beer Franchise.”

with Club Edelweiss to bring Oktoberfest to Edmonton in 1958.²² The tightknit German community continued to circulate a German language newspaper, the *Edmonton Nachrichten*. In anticipation of the event, the paper reported that, “those who have been away from Germany for years want very much to simply feel the taste of German beer on the tongue once again.”²³ Isolated as an enemy population during the war and only re-entering communal life in the mid-1950s, this resurgence of the German community was apparently highly anticipated. At the 1958 Edmonton Oktoberfest a “flood of visitors” (*Besucherstrom*) more than doubled the event capacity. They came for the Munich beer to heal their homesickness, for the “real Munich Weisswursts” and the “real Munich atmosphere,” painstakingly designed by local German artists. The availability of real Munich Löwenbräu beer was, by all accounts, crucial for the authenticity of the experience.²⁴

Another important trend in opening the export market to Bavarian and German beer, and especially to Löwenbräu, was a circle of diplomats and international elites as well as American, British, and French military forces around the world. In the mid 1950s the global geography of Löwenbräu exports expanded dramatically in collaboration with geopolitical developments. In 1955, for example, the beer became available in the Belgian Congo, just on the heels of new colonial reform programs to “emancipate” Congolese elites through proof of “civil merit.” The advertisements targeted colonial agents and new Congolese elites, promising to deliver the highest quality beer available

²² This information taken from the website of the German Canadian Cultural Association in Edmonton. <http://gcca.ca/history/>

²³ “Oktoberfest mit deutschem Bier,” *Edmonton Nachrichten*, found as a clipping without a date in BWA F002-8916. Given context, it was likely from late October, 1958.

²⁴ “Überschäumendes Oktoberfest in Edmonton,” *Edmonton Nachrichten*, November 6, 1958.

the world over.²⁵ About a year later, on the eve of the Suez Crisis, the British and American Embassies in Tel Aviv thanked the Munich brewery in advance for meeting their larger orders in preparation for their embassy Christmas parties. Importers in Baghdad and Aden—that is, on the other side of Suez—continued to make the beer available to embassies and clubs even after the Suez Crisis but had to dramatically increase shipping rates to account for the lingering Canal closures.²⁶ Around the globe, importers in Pusan and Seoul that serviced the demand of American G.I.s stationed in South Korea since the Korean War advocated for a more direct trade relationship with Munich in 1956 to cut out price hikes charged by their middleman in Japan; a longtime importer in Yokohama, Hans Haenschel & Co., who had been bringing the beer into Japan since the early 1930s.²⁷ The beer was shipped to exclusive circles around the world sometimes to places where drinking alcohol was not the norm or not even legal. The beer was sold, for example, in Pakistan, Iran, and most of the Levant and North Africa but was mostly consumed in embassies, consulates, and elite homes and clubs. In all these markets importers held power over the flow of the commodity and sometimes sought to leverage that. In 1958, for example, the New Delhi based Lavena Trading Corporation argued for a higher commission on sales while also wanting to sell beer to diplomats for reduced prices, which they claimed was common practice. In sum, Löwenbräu beer traveled with the American military, followed the contours of decolonization, populated the halls of embassies around the world, and stayed in the spaces of lingering colonial

²⁵ See for example Löwenbräu ads in *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, July 20 and 21, 1955.

²⁶ Oct. 22, 1956 letter from U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to Löwenbräu in Munich; letter from British Embassy in Tel Aviv to Löwenbräu in Munich; Feb. 27, 1957 letter from Joseph N. Loka (Baghdad) to Löwenbräu Munich; Apr. 16, 1957 letter from S.E. Delbourgo Import & Export (Aden) to Löwenbräu Munich, BWA F 002-364.

²⁷ See correspondence from Aug. to Sept. 1956 between Tradeship Ltd. Pusan & Seoul and Löwenbräu Munich, BWA F 002-364.

influence and neocolonial interest. In 1958, the brewery even contacted Wasel Gabriel Bespolka, the General Service Officer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem to see if peacekeeping in the Middle East might benefit from the highest quality beer in the world, already exported to more than 80 countries worldwide.²⁸ While quantities to these countries were low, the expansive export geography fed the marketing claims to quality and global status that became staples of Löwenbräu's global image.

Alongside catering to the German diaspora and capitalizing on international developments, a third and final way that Löwenbräu and other Bavarian breweries tapped into major markets was by more broadly targeting new consumer opulence in radically booming economies such as those in England and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Löwenbräu and other Bavarian and German breweries, most notably Würzburger and Beck's, actively targeted such wealth centers. In the U.K. for example, Löwenbräu wanted a foothold in London of course, but also eyed major industrial and trade centers like Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, and Edinburgh. In the United States, Löwenbräu established three main centers of distribution: one in New York that could cater to the Eastern seaboard, one jointly based in Detroit and Chicago, and one based in Los Angeles. In each case Löwenbräu worked with their international distribution team to target new opulence and gain a practical knowledge of the difference between regional markets, especially when it came to import competition such as that from Würzburger (northern Bavarian), Beck's (North German), Heineken (Dutch), and Tubourg and Carlsberg (both Danish). Similarly, other global hubs emerged in Hong Kong and Tokyo

²⁸ Feb. 1958 letter from Lavena Trading Corporation, New Delhi, to Löwenbräu Munich; letter marked only 1958 from Löwenbräu Munich to W.G. Bespolka of UNTSO, BWA F 002-366.

from the late 1960s to the 1980s. We began this chapter with the Hong Kong Oktoberfest and similar events such as the 1967 "Bavaria Festival" at the Yokohama Country and Athletic Club were soon followed by the opening of permanent German themed restaurants in Japan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Löwenbräu thus rode (and in part made) both the well-worn and the newly emerging pathways of growth in a shifting terrain of global capital.²⁹

A “delocalizing effect”: Bavarian Brewers and the Political Economy of Taste

At the same time that Bavarian breweries like Löwenbräu were reopening and expanding their export networks, they were also working very diligently to ensure that their product would remain unique in the global market. Individual breweries and the Bavarian Brewers’ Association had the most at stake in the success of their product and fought hard to protect it very early in the period of postwar economic growth. Officials at the Löwenbräu brewery and their partners in Bavaria actively policed the image of their product in an effort to hold on to and expand their global market share. The sorts of knowledge, expertise, and claims *about* the commodity that they exercised did much to shape the cultural and economic values attached to it. Demand “is a socially regulated and generated impulse, not an artifact of individual whims or needs” and thus to understand the life of a high demand commodity, it is crucial to interrogate the production of cultural value—to study the value makers, the so-called “experts,” and

²⁹ In many ways this is true of Löwenbräu as a luxury for elite and foreign consumption in Asia. As Jeffrey Pilcher has demonstrated in China, Japan, and India, local beer producers began to target German brewing traditions for nationalized mass consumption already in the 1950s and 1960s. Jeffrey Pilcher, “‘Tastes Like Horse Piss’: Asian Encounters with European Beer,” *Gastronomica: The Journal of Critical Food Studies* 16 no. 1 (Spring, 2016): 34.

those with capital interests at stake who inform the potential horizons of meaning.³⁰ In Munich this meant actively policing the image and language of the product in an effort to hold on to and expand the global market share. In pursuing capital growth, Löwenbräu and their local Munich and Bavarian partners worked to preserve and indeed construct some of the cultural values like “quality” and “authenticity” that generate demand in the political economy of taste. The following legal battles to protect the exclusivity of claims to being Bavarian beer are important foundation for the history of Löwenbräu and Bavarian beer as global icons.

Throughout the 1950s the Bavarian Brewers’ Association and its industrial allies responded to complaints from Löwenbräu and other breweries with dreams of export success to engage in a number of national and international legal battles in the name of preserving the exclusivity of Bavarian beer. In January 1952, a representative of the Löwenbräu brewery complained to Carlo Proebst, a legal counsel of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, about an export brewery based in the northern German city Hamburg called the *Bavaria-und-St.-Pauli-Brauerei*. The Hamburg brewery had been exporting a beer called, in English, “Bavaria Beer,” that the Löwenbräu representative felt was a “conscious attempt to mislead consumers.” He argued that this fell under Section Sixteen of the Law Against Unfair Competition, which dealt with product descriptions and labelling.³¹ The initial determination was that the Hamburg brewery violated no laws because the spirit of its label meant “in the Bavarian style.” The Löwenbräu brewery remained unsatisfied, however, and maintained that there is in fact a

³⁰ Arjun Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 32.

³¹ Jan. 11, 1952 letter to Carlo Proebst, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (henceforth BayHStA) Brauerbund 1453.

difference between beer “in the Bavarian style” and beer made in Bavaria due to the stricter interpretation of the *Reinheitsgebot* in Bavaria—“and only in Bavaria.” Unless the Hamburg brewery was matching Bavarian standards, which they were not, the original critique stood. The future president of the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, Dr. Werner Schladenhaufen, took the logic further and accused the Hamburg brewery of attempting to develop an appearance or pretense (*Anschein*) of being Bavarian and thus misleading consumers.³²

The issue slowly simmered until 1956 when Löwenbräu encouraged the Union of Bavarian Export Breweries—an allied organization of the Brewers’ Association—to enlist the services of patent lawyers in Berlin and Munich. The ensuing legal entanglement lasted for years, and in some respects decades. At stake, the lawyers argued to the German Patent Office, was “a delocalizing effect” (*entlokalisierende Wirkung*) on the very word “Bavaria.” As precedent for this phenomenon, the team offered the case of Pilsner beer. The beer was first crafted by a Bavarian in the employ of a Czech-run Habsburg brewery in the town of Plzeň/Pilsen in 1842. Its astronomical rise to global prominence was driven in part by the work of North German brewers in places like Qingdao as well as British imperialists, notably in South Africa.³³ In the late nineteenth century, the German court ruled that “Pilsner beer” had become a style all its own, devoid of geographical peculiarity. This, much to the chagrin and capital loss of the Pilsner Urquell Brewery in the Bohemian Lands of the Habsburg Empire. Speaking to this precise issue, the Bavarian legal team claimed that even within West Germany the

³² Jun. 10, 1953 letter to Carlo Proebst, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

³³ Malcolm F. Purinton, “Empire in a Bottle: Commerce, Culture, and Consumption of the Pilsner Beer in the British Empire, 1870-1914” (PhD diss., Northeastern University, 2016); and Jeffrey Pilcher, *How Beer Traveled the World* (in preparation).

English word “Bavaria” would immediately conjure the German state of Bayern.

According to the patent lawyers, “Bavarian beer,” as a *type* of beer, could thus not be as transferrable as “Pilsner beer” had been in previous decades. Both terms—Bavarian beer and Pilsner beer—indicated a product from a place but in the case of Bavarian beer, they argued, the product and the place could not be separated because of the stricter provincial adherence to the *Reinheitsgebot*.³⁴

There were, in fact, legal concerns about how the law in different regions of West Germany mattered for the production of beer intended for export. Beyond the domestic distinctions discussed in the previous chapter, brewers in Bavaria were also beholden to the law for export beer where other states of the Federal Republic were not. This was not a simple legal dispute with economic ramifications, however, but rather a legal argument that just barely hid the pressures of capital interest and market share protectionism. Correspondence between the lawyers, the Munich and Hamburg breweries, the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, and the Union of Bavarian Export Breweries debated the semantics and symbols at play. Löwenbräu argued that “Bayerisch,” “Bayern,” “Bavaria,” “Bavarian,” and the Hamburg proposal for the nonsensical “Bavariana” all meant the same thing and threatened the same delocalizing effect.³⁵ Letters went back and forth over the subtleties of the Hamburg bottle labels, even featuring sustained debate about where to make typographic spaces on the labels to ensure that the beer could not be mistaken as being *from* Bavaria. This was considered in such depth that one letter complained that if a consumer looked at the bottle from one particular angle, the

³⁴ April 9, 1956 letter from Walter Meissner and Herbert Tischer to the German Patent Office, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

³⁵ March 8, 1957 letter from Löwenbräu to the Bavarian Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

excessive space between “Bavaria” and “St. Pauli” might lead them astray.³⁶ The Hamburg *Bavaria-und-St.-Pauli-Brauerei* ultimately admitted that their beer was being sold as “Imported German Bavarian Beer” in Florida but that this was the fault of their local distributor who had since changed his labels to read “Beer Imported from Hamburg, Germany.”³⁷

The Hamburg brewery was not unique in this and the stakes were high, or so Bavarian breweries claimed. In April 1957 as the Hamburg debate was reaching a fever pitch, the Löwenbräu brewery exacerbated tensions, writing to the Bavarian Brewers’ Association about the Dutch Brouwerij-Bavaria-Lieshout. Complaining to the patent lawyers in Berlin and Munich, the Löwenbräu brewery noted that the Dutch brewery had been overcharging for their beer in Tripoli, literally capitalizing on the Bavarian reputation.³⁸ The Hamburg brewery had likewise been accused of overcharging in Lebanon. Under pressure of these concerns the lawyers conducted an international study of how these non-Bavarian “Bavaria beers” were being sold in more than twenty countries world-wide including England, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Denmark, Haiti, Iraq, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Nigeria, Peru, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, Japan, Venezuela, Libya, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.³⁹

Ad hoc solutions satisfied the various parties, but the larger debates continued and are on-going. In 1959, the Hamburg brewery made changes to their bottle labels all of which were worked out in a dizzyingly mundane discussion of spacing and typography.

³⁶ Dec. 15, 1959 letter from Meissner and Tischer to the Union of Bavarian Export Breweries, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

³⁷ Dec. 12, 1958, Circular 54/58-59 of the Union of Bavarian Export Breweries, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

³⁸ April 12, 1957 letter to Bavarian Brewers’ Association, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

³⁹ See letters from April 4, May 2, and May 13, 1957, BayHStA Brauerbund 1453.

Within West Germany, legal claims to “Bavaria” or “Bavarian” beer largely fizzled out because despite the lawyers’ argument that West Germans recognized “Bavaria” to mean “Bayern,” the word “Bavaria” means nothing in German. More importantly, the dispute was always ultimately about global perception. Nowhere was this more important than in the United States, which was by far the dominant market for Bavarian, German, and all export beers in the 1950s and 1960s. Moving to clamp down on wording, the Union of Bavarian Export Breweries filed a US federal trademark registration for “Genuine Bavarian Beer,” which was accepted in 1960 by the Bavarian Brewers’ Association. Further disputes in the 1960s brought trademarks on “Bayrisch Bier” and “Bayerisches Bier” in 1968, and “Reinheitsgebot seit 1516 Bayerisches Bier” in 1985. As recently as 2011 the Bavarian Brewers’ Association engaged in legal action with the Dutch Bavaria Brewery in the European Court of Justice.

At every stage in the early disputes, Löwenbräu kicked off and exacerbated tensions around proprietary claims to being *from* Bavaria and *being* Bavarian. This was not ever just about “Bavarian beer” as a product from a place. It was, and remains, about global capital interests. These Bavarian brewers and trade organizations were actively policing the exclusivity of their product in hopes of avoiding a Pilsner-like “delocalizing effect.” In the process they sharply limited who could make truth claims about the nature of the commodity. At the top of the knowledge network were the Bavarian brewers themselves. This exclusivity of the commodity played out in its global reach as well, and the distributors and marketers of Bavarian beers like Löwenbräu came to have a profound global cultural impact as beer sales soared.

“A magnificent advertisement”—From Quality to Authenticity

The baseline of Löwenbräu’s global image was a claim to tradition and quality. British, American, and Japanese ads in the 1950s, for example, promoted the drink as “the world’s best beer.” This approach was generally motivated by the need to overcome the exceptionally high price point of the product. In almost every sector of the global market, the beer cost more than most domestic and other import beers, even other Bavarian beers and global premium brands like Heineken and Tubourg. The high price reflected high logistics costs but also the brewery’s insistence on the beer as a luxury. The Kent, UK based importer and distributor Fremlins Ltd., and their London based marketing agency McLaughlin Ltd., centered their advertising energies on isolating “circles receptive to a luxury beer.”⁴⁰ The head of the London agency, J.C. McLaughlin, worked tirelessly to establish niche demand in luxury hotels and bars, but confessed that sales were dipping in the early 1950s.⁴¹ This effort in the UK to sell the beer as a luxury was mirrored in the United States where one advertisement in Chicago featured a man stopped at customs, giving up smuggled jewels but begging to keep his Löwenbräu.⁴² Japanese ads likewise promoted it as “the world famous beer from Munich.” Advertisements in popular magazines and newspapers in the US and the UK played up the beer being more like Champagne than conventional beer, drawing attention to the green bottle, the gold foil top, and the high price point.⁴³ This remained a staple of global marketing for Löwenbräu and eventually even became an emulative marketing strategy

⁴⁰ Apr. 27, 1954 letter from Dudley Mozley to Löwenbräu, BWA F 002-384.

⁴¹ Oct. 27, 1953 letter from J.C. McLaughlin to Dudley Mozley, BWA F 002-384.

⁴² Löwenbräu ad, *Chicago Tribune*, May 8, 1956, A7.

⁴³ See ads ranging from the mid 1950s to mid 1960s in BWA F 002-8902.

for brewing upstarts.⁴⁴ The expense was used as a mark of quality even as late as the 1970s. An ad targeted at Austrian restaurant and bar owners, for example, defiantly touted the expense: “Löwenbräu is expensive. But also good. Beer aficionados in 149 countries know that. Restaurateurs in 149 countries profit on that.”⁴⁵ These consistent claims to quality were joined over time by a crucial innovation towards marketing the authenticity of the beer and the mode of its consumption.

In most markets growth was slow but claims to expense and connoisseurship generally assuaged the high price point as long as consumers remained convinced that the claims to exclusivity were true. But the global market, and especially the vibrant American market, was flooded with imitations that boasted their own luxury, and even began to encroach on the authenticity of the product. In 1955 for example, American brewing giant Anheuser-Busch launched their “Busch Bavarian” which was branded with a snowy mountain scene complete with buildings in the Bavarian alpine architectural style. Today, the beer is known simply as Busch, in part to satisfy Bavarian trademarks, but is still branded with snowy mountains in spite of hailing from St. Louis, Missouri. The Cincinnati brewery “Wunderbräu” was likewise branding itself in the German image. On its six-pack cartons, which featured lions and a coat of arms reminiscent of Munich iconography, it even claimed in German that you won’t find one better: “Ein besseres findest du nicht.”

⁴⁴ The Indian brewery Sand Pipers, for example, “increased consumption ten-fold in the mid-1990s by replacing brown bottles with green, wrapping gold foil over the stopper, and adopting the slogan ‘champagne of beers.’” Pilcher, “‘Tastes like Horse Piss,’” 37.

⁴⁵ Ad from 1970 presented as an unmarked clipping in BWA F 002-8895. A note in the file claims similar ads were run in trade publications including *Österreichisches Gastgewerbe Zeitung*, *Gastwirt*, *Hotelier*, *Cafetier*, and *Lebensmittelhändler*.

To Löwenbräu's local importers and distributors in the United States, these sorts of products presented a direct challenge. In the case of Wunderbräu, for example, it was first brought to the attention of the Munich brewery by the head of Detroit-based importer Premium Beer Sales, Felix Faber, who encountered it while on vacation in Florida. As he explained to two of the Munich brewery heads, "The entire promotional advertising used for Wunderbräu is calculated to deceive the public into thinking that it is an *authentic* German beer. And it is a miserable imitation!" He estimated the aroma and taste of the beer as dismal, incapable of competing even with a good American beer. But in bars and restaurants the beer was often listed as an import. The brewery, he claimed, was "*capitalizing on the merit and esteem* which good German imported beer enjoys." The beer could not even claim a German heritage. Faber argued that the claim on the cans that the beer was "now brewed in Cincinnati... by its original Braumeister" wrongly implied the beer was once brewed in Germany, which it was not.⁴⁶

There was very little the Munich brewery could do about this sort of issue directly. In the case of Wunderbräu, the beer actually never made any claims to being Bavarian, and Faber's concern was that it was pretending to be *German*. Ideas about German beer abroad became intricately tied to Bavarian traditions, imagery, stereotypes, and of course, capital interest.⁴⁷ This convolution of things Bavarian and things German ultimately fed into the making of a Bavarian stereotype of West Germany, but in order for this to happen, Löwenbräu beer had to first become more than a luxury. It had to

⁴⁶ Feb 21, 1955 and Mar. 1 1955 letters from Felix Faber to Karl Messner and Josef Kuglstatler; and Mar. 14, 1955 letter from Messner and Kuglstatler to Faber, BWA F 002-405. Italic emphasis added. Underlined emphasis in original.

⁴⁷ Eva Göbel argues that Bavarian consumer culture more generally came to disproportionately shape global perceptions of Germany. See Göbel, *Bayern in der modernen Konsumgesellschaft*, 251-70, 333-52.

become an ambassador of Germanness, a metonym for West Germany itself. Far from an intentional national rebranding, the process arose out of the desire of Löwenbräu and its global partners to sell more beer. They sought, in short, to overcome the claims of competitors like Busch Bavarian and Wunderbräu by selling the most authentic beer in the most authentic experience. Unlike the versatility of “Pilsner beer” the authenticity of Bavarian beer was inherently tied to the place. It was thus also tied to mythologies and stereotypes about the place and beginning in the 1960s the commodity and the mode of consumption became intimately related.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Löwenbräu and their partners in major boom markets like the United Kingdom and United States, as well as in smaller markets like Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong, shifted towards selling not only the “highest quality beer” but also the most authentic experience of consumption. In 1958 Dudley Mozely of Fremfins Ltd. attended the World’s Fair in Brussels where he visited the Löwenbräu Beer Hall, adorned with traditional décor and even featuring a large roaring lion, a staple of the Löwenbräu tent at the Munich Oktoberfest. The brewery had been promoting the 3500-person establishment to their clients around the world from Fremfins itself to their distributor New Delhi.⁴⁸ When Mozely returned to England, he wrote to Munich that, “the whole ‘set up’ is a magnificent advertisement, and although it must certainly have cost a lot of money to finance the Hall, you seemed to be taking a lot of money judging by how crowded it was with visitors.” After conveying his impression of the experience, he concluded that, “if a cellar could be procured in London about half the size it might also be a good advertisement.”⁴⁹

⁴⁸ May 13, 1958 letter from Löwenbräu to Lavina Trading Corporation, New Delhi, BWA F 002-366.

⁴⁹ July 8, 1958 letter from Dudley Mozely to F. Kugelstatter, BWA F 002-385.

Mozely was not alone in his thinking. Already in 1957, the Los Angeles based Wisdom Import Sales Co. was working with local notables in Monterey, California to develop the Monterey Bay Oktoberfest. The festival was first thrown in 1956 by G.I.s at the Fort Ord Soldier's Club. It was a relatively small gathering and the beer was likely a San Francisco knockoff called Wunder Beer.⁵⁰ The next year, local businessman and community notable Tinsley C. Fry chaired a committee to expand the event and worked with Wisdom Import Sales to get the Munich Löwenbräu brewery involved. Fry wanted to stage an authentic Oktoberfest celebration complete with draft Löwenbräu beer, décor, Bavarian Trachten outfits, and glassware. He even invited the Mayor of Munich to attend the 1957 Monterey Oktoberfest, but the latter does not seem to have abided.⁵¹ The festival turned a small profit and became a regular event growing each year for the next few decades. Similarly, in 1961 the Detroit importer Felix Faber enlisted the help of the Munich brewery in remodeling a German restaurant in Detroit. The owner of Krager's Restaurant, Frank Krager, wanted to remodel to "make a 'true Bräuhaus' of his restaurant." Krager was considering renaming the restaurant after Löwenbräu and requested that the Munich brewery send sample luncheon and dinner menus, postcards, pictures of the interior and exterior of their Munich location, samples of their glassware, and pictures of the uniforms worn by their waiters and waitresses.⁵² Even in Belgium, the popularity of the 1958 World's Fair exhibition generated local demand for the style of

⁵⁰ This had been the standard of German beer drinking in the area for decades. See, Tim Thomas, *The Abalone King of Monterey: "Pop" Ernest Doelter, Pioneering Japanese Fishermen & the Culinary Classic that Saved an Industry* (Charleston: American Palate/The History Press, 2014).

⁵¹ Aug 2, 1957 letter from Tinsley Fry to Löwenbräu, BWA F 002-651.

⁵² Dec. 21, 1961 letter from Faber to Kugelstatter, BWA F 200-411.

consumption and by the early 1960s restaurateurs and hoteliers in Belgium were working to capture and capitalize on the authentic sensory experience of proper consumption.⁵³

The result of these developments was tremendous. For example, in 1965, British beer drinkers consumed about 10,000 gallons of Löwenbräu beer. In 1967, only two years later, they were drinking more than 100,000 gallons—a ten-fold increase. This jump owed almost everything to JC McLaughlin who, in collaboration with Löwenbräu in Munich and with local capital investors, opened ten establishments across Britain. According to a piece in the London newspaper *The Sun*, these were “authentic German beer ‘kellers’ [where]... for six shillings a pint for Lowenbrau draught or bottled, keller customers get a real German night out with accordionist, plenty of rousing song and waitresses in traditional German dress.”⁵⁴ The first of these establishments was the Löwenbräu Beer Keller, which opened in 1965 in Soho, and was advertised: “Travel to ‘Old Bavaria’ without leaving London!”⁵⁵ JC McLaughlin had held the Löwenbräu marketing contract since 1952 but it was not until this transition towards selling an authentic experience of drinking in Bavaria and Germany that sales in Britain soared, capitalizing on the newfound opulence of the English youth.⁵⁶ (Image 5.1)

Throughout these transitions there was a deeply convoluted understanding of what was Bavarian and what was German. Indeed, as we saw in the epigraph from Hong Kong there was a deep confusion about near everything except the gaiety of a “German” drink-

⁵³ “Munich et son ‘Oktoberfest’,” *le C.H.R. – Organe officiel de la Confédération Nationale des Unions Professionnelles des Cafetiers, Hôteliers et Restaurateurs de Belgique*, Nov. 3, 1961.

⁵⁴ “The Toast is ‘prosit’,” *The Sun*, Dec. 11, 1967.

⁵⁵ Egon Larsen, “Münchner Bierkeller in Soho. Lederhosen aus dem Kostümverleih,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Aug. 19, 1965, 3.

⁵⁶ See for example, William Osgerby, *Youth in Britain since 1945* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).



Image 5.1: British youth in Manchester waiting outside the Löwenbräu Beer Keller, 1969. Source: BWA F 2/8534.

around. In the London *Daily Express*, which boasted a circulation above 4 million, readers were taken through a night out at an “authentic German beer-cellar in Aldwych.” Our narrator is taken out by an old drinking friend who promises, “a new and diverting view of the British drinking classes.” Inside the “keller,” English, Scots, and Irish were singing the World War One song “‘Waltzing Matilda’ at the tops of their voices and thumping beer mugs on the table top.” They were greeted with a “Guten Abend” from the accordion player and then given Löwenbräu beer “imported from Bavaria, [and] the dearest in Britain.” Stronger than British beer, the Löwenbräu “put you in a great trim for a sing-and-shout session.” The waitresses wore “folklore dresses that squeeze their bosoms up” and at least one song in twenty was in German to keep up the “echt Deutsche stimmung [sic]”—genuine German mood or atmosphere. Other songs included American

classics, British war songs, folk songs of Wales and Scotland, and the theme songs of West Ham FC “immediately followed” by that of Tottenham Hotspur. “By 10 o’clock the ‘stimmung’ [sic] was at its height. Eyes glazed, beer mugs thumped the boards” and our narrator had had enough. He stumbled home, leaving his friend to continue his “sing-and-shout session,” and concluded that he could “see the point of the bierkeller [sic]... Singing and shouting appeal to all.” The experience departed from other London establishments that encouraged quiet, passive, and even lethargic drinking. This “authentic German Bierkeller” and the approximation of a convoluted stereotype that it encouraged, did apparently offer a “new and diverting view of the British drinking classes.” It levelled national difference, transcended football rivalries, and cut across social classes, provided one could afford the six-shilling beers. It seemed to fill a niche in London culture where singing and *Stimmung* were all that mattered. It was “German” but also somehow British. Indeed, the author closed by joking that by next year American tourists in Britain would be told, “Now the next call on our schedule is a visit to a typical British bierkeller [sic].”⁵⁷

Unbeknownst to the author, and perhaps also to JC McLaughlin, many Americans would have already been familiar with this experience if they had ever visited Monterey Oktoberfest, Krager’s Restaurant, or any of the many other examples from across the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this period Oktoberfests hit in Hong Kong, Australia, Gibraltar, and across Canada beginning in the late 1950s and exploding in the late 1960s. Likewise, the 1967 Yokohama “Bavaria Festival,” the opening of several new “German” beer bars in Tokyo between 1965 and 1973, and a “Frankfurter

⁵⁷ Peter Chambers, “Booming Now in Britain – The German Style ‘Pub’: Shout as you Drink!” *Daily Express*, Dec. 11, 1967.

und Bier” tent at the 1971 Tokyo Bazaar complete with young Japanese women in dirndls all signaled the globalization of a stereotyped Bavarian mode of consumption made all the more authentic by the availability of Löwenbräu beer and material details down to coasters and signs. The stakes of this experience, however, went far beyond what many in the business of beer sales could fathom. Not only was this a good way to make money, it also came to shape the conception of West Germany itself at a time of great global instability.

“A most objectionable and ill-timed resurrection of the Nazi image”—Cold War Success on display at the 1964 World’s Fair

The 1964 New York World’s Fair exposed how Löwenbräu beer came to stand at the center of an international contention over the politics of memory and the representation of Germany more broadly. It was, in short, an issue of how far the sort of authenticity built around Löwenbräu and Bavarian beer should stand in for the real Germany and its real recent past. In the build-up to the Fair, the West German state pulled out of official participation. As a member of the Bureau of International Expositions, West Germany took issue with the Fair for violating principles hammered out at the 1928 Paris Convention involving the high rates for participation and the long duration of the planned fair. However, while the state would not officially participate, they supported the participation of corporate representatives, one of which, perhaps the biggest of which, was Löwenbräu. In now familiar fashion, the brewery and their New York distributor Holterbosch oversaw the contracts for and construction of a half-million-dollar beer garden, complete with all the appropriate Munich flair.

When the West German state made it known that it would not participate in the World's Fair, voices of dissent emerged in the United States arguing that this absence would be an injustice to post-war successes. In the summer of 1962 the president of the New York World's Fair Corporation Robert Moses enlisted the help of former High Commissioner of Germany John J. McCloy to help convince West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the Fair was "an unparalleled opportunity for Germany to demonstrate to the American people all that has been achieved since the War."⁵⁸ Making explicit the Cold War utility of participation, McCloy wrote to Adenauer in August 1962 that,

There has never been a fully adequate representation in the United States of the progress and strength of the growth of West Germany since the war and I believe the times almost demand it now both for economic and, more importantly, political reasons. The constitutional and cultural progress is, to my mind, comparable with the economic progress and too few people here sense the advances which have been made in the former fields... Other countries are making their preparations (notably the Soviet Union) and I would very much like to see the German Exhibit made truly representative of the full achievements of the country.⁵⁹

Convinced by the argument but determined to honor the organizational critique of the Fair itself, Adenauer reiterated that the state would not formally participate. But he also endorsed an ad hoc committee to support the participation of German industries.⁶⁰

Over the course of the next year, participation of German companies was ironed out and preparations were made for the expansive Löwenbräu pavilion. While Moses,

⁵⁸ June 13, 1962 letter from Robert Moses to John J. McCloy, New York Public Library (henceforth NYPL), New York World's Fair, 1964-65, Box 271.

⁵⁹ McCloy to Konrad Adenauer, qtd in Aug. 27, 1962 letter from Gates Davison to Scholten, NYPL, New York World's Fair, 1964-65, Box 271.

⁶⁰ Aug. 30, 1962 letter from Adenauer to McCloy; and Sept 12, 1962 letter from Edwin Hartrich to Davison, NYPL New York World's Fair, 1964-65, Box 271; "Bonn will shun New York's Fair," *The New York Times International Edition*. Dec. 21, 1962.

McCloy, and Adenauer agreed not to let the opportunity of re-presenting Germany to the world slip away, others became concerned what the representation would actually look like. Edwin Hartrich, who had been a correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Wall Street Journal* in Germany in the late 1940s felt compelled to intervene by his personal experience in the country. He conveyed his concerns to West German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard in the spring of 1963. He praised the architect of the “economic miracle” and the “almost fifteen years of unprecedented economic, social and political recovery, during which time Germany resumed her place and prestige in the Western family of nations.” The Berlin Wall had gone up only two years earlier and West Germany remained the only internationally recognized German state. Perhaps because of these pressures, Hartrich lamented that unless the West German state officially participated, “the outward ‘face’ of Germany in a World’s Fair that will be visited by 80 million people of all nations, races, and political creeds” would be “just beer and sauerkraut!”⁶¹ Concerns of this partial and apparently politically irrelevant representation may have also motivated American President John F. Kennedy to urge Adenauer’s reconsideration when they met in Bonn in late June 1963.⁶²

Others were concerned, however, that the partial representation was incomplete in the wrong ways and was perhaps entirely *too* political. The former Governor of New York, Charles Poletti, was a World War II veteran and the Vice President for International Exhibits at the New York World’s Fair. At an Overseas Press Club luncheon in July 1963 Poletti critiqued West German industrialists for—among other

⁶¹ Mar. 26, 1963 letter from Hartrich to Ludwig Erhard, NYPL, New York World’s Fair, 1964-65, Box 271.

⁶² “Germany Restudies World’s Fair Role,” *New York Times*, June 27, 1963, 12; “Neue Hoffnungen auf eine Teilnahme Westdeutschlands” *Sonntagsblatt Staats-Zeitung und Herold*, June 30, 1963; and July 12, 1963 letter from Hartrich to Jameson Parker, NYPL, New York World’s Fair, 1964-65, Box 271.

things—using the Fair as an opportunity to “erase an image here of a Nazi Germany.” This claim drew the immediate critique of the German-American Chamber of Commerce (GACC), an institution whose very *raison d'être* was to protect and advance the capital interests of German companies. In that capacity the GACC became folded into the hierarchies of tastemakers as it came to the defense of capital interests and cultural representation. Gordon Michler of the GACC lambasted Poletti for various other critiques he had made of German industry, but on the issue of the Nazi image he avoided arguing it was untrue. Instead, he stressed the heightened importance of Germany in on-going Cold War tensions: “At this particular time, the German government and public are giving our country the staunchest possible support in the defense of Western democracy.” He highlighted the public embrace of Kennedy in West Germany and the continued promises of now-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to honor West Germany’s NATO commitments. Whether for these political reasons and their aversion to picking the scabs of old animosity, or because Michler was tasked with supporting German business interests, he characterized Poletti’s claim as “a most objectionable and ill-timed resurrection of the Nazi image.” Michler associated Nazism with lawlessness and pointed up the steadfast adherence of West Germany to the World’s Fair Paris Agreement as evidence of just how far Germany has “thrown off Naziism [sic] or Nazi methods.”⁶³

The New York World’s Fair ran from April to October of 1964 and 1965. Instead of being located next to the pavilion of participating countries, the Löwenbräu Gardens stood smack between the Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors exhibitions and less than 300 meters from the iconic Unisphere at the center of the grounds. Not only was it thus

⁶³ July 22, 1963 letter from Gordon H. Milcher to Charles Poletti, NYPL, New York World’s Fair, 1964-65, Box 271.

part of a high traffic path, it also drew visitors from across the park with a horse-drawn wagon featuring barrels of beer and a Trachten-clad crew that would circle the Fairgrounds at regular intervals. Once inside, the space was constructed as a “replica of an open-air cafe in a village square,” complete with Bavarian Alpine architecture designed by Munich architect Rupert Augustin, wooden benches, and material details down to the flags, coasters, and glassware. Eleven of the waitresses in the Löwenbräu Gardens were titled nobility—countesses and baronesses—flown from Munich to serve beer at the “Bavarian hamlet.” For the women it was a chance to experience New York on the ground. For Holterbosch and Löwenbräu, the women were preferable to professional waitresses because instead of wanting to make money, they would “make good ambassadors for Germany.”⁶⁴

Beer, the women who served it, and the entire experience of the “Bavarian hamlet,” complete with horse-drawn wagons, certainly comprised a particularly clear-cut ambassadorship. The duration of the New York World’s Fair overlaps almost entirely with the 1963-65 Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials. If those were not on the tongues of visitors, perhaps fairgoers in New York were keen to discuss Hannah Arendt’s recent 1963 report in *The New Yorker* on “Eichmann in Jerusalem.” In that piece Arendt had famously articulated the “banality of evil” in modern Germany’s bureaucratic mass murder of the European Jewry. The mid-1960s were no doubt marked by a series of public encounters with the Nazi past. Charles Poletti may have overstated his case that industrialists at the World’s Fair were working to erase an image of Nazi Germany, but not by much. Already at the 1958 World’s Fair in Brussels, West German architects had consciously

⁶⁴ Walter Carlson, “Noble Frauleins tend Bar at Fair” *New York Times* May 21, 1964, 45.

suppressed the Nazi past in designing their pavilion.⁶⁵ Moreover, other West Germans from industrialists to politicians and cultural commentators *were* consciously using the commercial successes of Volkswagen to suppress the Nazi past and German strength with an eye to diplomacy and relations with the United States.⁶⁶ Both Volkswagen and Löwenbräu became ambassadors of West German recovery and capitalist vitality. Volkswagen revived the prestige of German engineering and technical prowess (always as a junior partner to the U.S.) in part through its adaptability to many cultural milieus from suburbia to the counterculture. Löwenbräu was unique for a number of reasons. First of all, it was not so easily adaptable; indeed, its success as a commodity depended on the authenticity of the experience of consumption. Second, beer was not a high-tech commodity; the success of Löwenbräu depended on its deep historical roots and claims to the timelessness of its production and consumption. The “Bavarian hamlet” was no doubt as far away as an imagined Germany could get from the technical, high modern efficiency of engineering, tanks, Blitzkrieg, trains, and bureaucratic killers.

The conception of a Germany of beer drinkers or a Germany that is home to the best beer in the world was not a natural or timeless reality. Likewise the notion that consuming the highest “quality” beer in the world in the most “authentic” setting could somehow approximate Germanness was similarly constructed. This phenomenon says a great deal about how commodities and consumption shape the individual encounter with the foreign and help domesticate the world, reducing it to purchases, bites, and gulps.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Greg Castillo, “Making a Spectacle of Restraint: The Deutschland Pavilion at the 1958 Brussels Exposition,” in *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 97-119.

⁶⁶ See for example, Rieger, *The People’s Car*, 222-228.

⁶⁷ Löwenbräu beer was of course not alone in this, cf. Rieger, *The People’s Car*; more broadly, see Jeremy Prestholdt, *Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), esp. 8.

By considering how claims to the authenticity of a product and the mode of its consumption come to stand in for geographical and historical realities demonstrates just how diversely “the political economy of taste” functioned at the global-local nexus from Midwest marketers concerned with Ohio imitations to heads of West German and American nations arguing about the Cold War utility of western capitalism.

“A beer that does not meet Munich tastes”—Löwenbräu, the Beer; Munich, the city

In 1963 Löwenbräu commissioned a study of beer drinkers in Munich from the Society for Consumer Research (*Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung*, GfK), Germany’s largest and oldest market research organization, based in Nuremberg. Founded in 1934, the GfK embodied much of the postwar expansion in marketing and market research in that it sought to translate complex consumer motivations into valuable business insights in a progressively complex buyer’s market.⁶⁸ The brewery paid 20,000 DM in hopes of gaining insight into the Munich consumer base, a market that in spite of their expansive global growth had remained elusive.⁶⁹ The GfK focused not only on the taste of the beer but also perceptions of Löwenbräu compared to those of their local competitors.⁷⁰ In contrast to its global image as the champagne-of-beers and the lubricant of an authentically German boisterousness, respondents in Munich associated Löwenbräu with

⁶⁸ For a treatment of the early history of the GfK, see S. Jonathan Wiesen, *Creating the Nazi Marketplace: Commerce and Consumption in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 153-90; for more on the history of marketing and market research, see Hartmut Berghoff, Philip Scranton, and Uwe Spiekermann, eds., *The Rise of Marketing and Market Research* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. 1-26; and for a parallel story of advertising in modern consumer societies, see Pamela E. Swett, S. Jonathan Wiesen, and Jonathan R. Zatlín, eds., *Selling Modernity: Advertising in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), esp. 6-17.

⁶⁹ Budgetary information in “Kommentar zum Etat-Plan 1963/64 – Stand 6. Dez. 1963,” BWA F 002-6878.

⁷⁰ “Trinkergewohnheiten der Münchner Stadtbevölkerung und Markenbilder ausgewählter Brauereien” Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (henceforth GfK) S 1964 029, 5-6.

lower class workers and foreigners.⁷¹ This association seems to have been the collateral damage of building post-war growth on exports. Real Münchner knew Löwenbräu as the beer that tourists asked for and the beer of the city's working class. Residents of the bourgeois city viewed it first and foremost as an export beer that "does not meet Munich tastes."⁷²

What this study offers most clearly is a view from Munich of Löwenbräu and other Munich and Bavarian beers. It found that Munich consumers believed Löwenbräu had done more to shape the Munich beer market than any other brewery from Munich, Bavaria, or West Germany. But the same consumers were also divided about what that meant, agreeing only that Löwenbräu is "endowed with specific image accents." The change it had wrought, in other words, was not necessarily good. The brewery ranked low in consumer assessments of style-specific beers (Lagerbier, Märzen, Starkbier, etc.) and was ranked last of the "big seven" Munich breweries in assessments of overall quality. Greater Munich harbored "considerable 'animosity' against Löwenbräu," with three out of five respondents claiming that of the big seven, Löwenbräu was most frequently the subject of popular criticism—though no clear reason for this was given.⁷³ In contrast to its champagne-of-beers global image, respondents in Munich associated Löwenbräu with the lower classes, claiming that typical consumers of the beer were "peddlers," "laborers," and "foreigners." In contrast, respondents claimed that "typical consumers" of the Munich rival Paulaner-Thomas Brewery were often "conservatives", "lawyers", "older beer drinkers," and generally those more socially distinguished than

⁷¹ Ibid., 30.

⁷² Ibid., 34.

⁷³ Ibid., 22-23, 27-28, 29.

peddlers and laborers.⁷⁴ The GfK proposed that the negative view of Löwenbräu might stem simply from trends in popular taste, and indeed it was occasionally described as more watery and bitter than other Munich beers. They argued more forcefully, however, that it was because the brewery had focused so heavily on exports, often being described as an export brewery first. Paradoxically, when asked which of the big seven were “typical Munich breweries,” respondents most frequently named Löwenbräu and Hofbräu—with the caveat that the former was named for its value as an export lager and the both were “typical” only in as much as they represented Munich beer around the world.⁷⁵

The very beer that had become the standard-bearer, most prized, most purchased, and most symbolic of Bavarian and indeed West German beers around the world was, back home in Munich considered the least notable, the least consumed, the least authentic of Munich and Bavarian beers. Still, even in Munich it had an aura of success. Almost half of all respondents answered Löwenbräu when asked which beer they *believed* was consumed the most, dwarfing the less than 20 percent garnered by second place Paulaner Thomas. In reality, or so respondents answered, Löwenbräu was the preference of only 13 percent of Munich beer drinkers and consumed most frequently by only nine percent. Furthermore, even though there was a general perception that Löwenbräu was the most consumed beer in Munich, when asked for their least favorite brewery, a whopping 45 percent named Löwenbräu. This is perhaps the most dramatic statistic in the report; this 45 percent dwarfed second place Hacker with only five percent of respondents voting it

⁷⁴ Ibid., 30.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 34.

their least favorite.⁷⁶ Finally, when asked who they thought most consumed the beer, 32 percent believed Löwenbräu was the choice of foreigners; a group that also dominated perceptions of Hofbräu, perhaps testament to the already burgeoning reputation of the latter as a tourist attraction in the old city. More dramatic still, respondents considered Löwenbräu the undoubted beer of choice for the working class, garnering 42 percent of the vote, with Hofbräu in second with only 14 percent.⁷⁷ In sum, Löwenbräu seems to have been one of the least esteemed beers in Munich, an object of criticism, and a symbol of foreigners and the working classes—groups most certainly on the margins of the bourgeois city.

Beyond these statistics regarding Löwenbräu, in the mid 1960s Munich was in the midst of a major push to revise their legacy as the cradle of National Socialism. We have seen already how the Bavarian image played geopolitically at the New York World's Fair. Around the same time, CSU politicians teamed up with the West German Olympic committee to present Munich as a candidate to host the 1972 Olympic Games, selling the city and rural environs as a romantic alpine wonderland, a kind of German paradise.⁷⁸ When the Munich team pitched the city to the International Olympic Committee they included a promotional film, *Munich: A Cities Applies*, which stressed not only the scenic beauty and rich bourgeois culture, but also the “generously endowed Fräuleins, and fun-loving atmosphere (Oktoberfest!).”⁷⁹ Domestically, this imagery had been consolidating already for years, as we saw in chapter four with respect to Bavarian place-making

⁷⁶ Ibid., *Tabellenteil*, tbl 3, 4, 7, 13, 18, 22.

⁷⁷ Ibid., tbl 38.

⁷⁸ David Clay Large, *Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012), 30-40.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 48.

strategies around the *Reinheitsgebot*. Going into the now infamous 1972 Olympic games, beer was becoming an increasingly important cultural marker of Bavaria and Munich both domestically and internationally—part of a city that straddled the technical prowess of BMW and Siemens and the alpine wonderland of cultural vitality and tradition. Politically Bavaria and Munich of the early 1970s were “Janus-faced,” provincial and conservative, but still a global capital with heart (*Weltstadt mit Herz*), an art center and a place of freedom and generosity.⁸⁰ A 1972 promotional film by the Munich Tourism Bureau stressed the city as a crossroads of tradition and modernity and featured the baroque architecture of the city, children in Lederhosen, and mugs upon mugs of beer. The drink had become bound up in efforts to rebrand the city and indeed the country. The ad serves to open the 1999 documentary *One Day in September*, and even in this film, the imagery serves as a friendly and welcoming juxtaposition, an optimistic foil, to the tragedy of the 1972 Olympic Games.

The brewing industry, for its part, strove to make the most of Munich’s global moment in 1972. For most of the Bavarian brewing industry, 1972 was a high point of production and consumption. The 1972 Oktoberfest opened less than two weeks after the closing ceremony of the ’72 Games and flooded the city with more than six million visitors. The industry sponsored “Bavarian Olympic Sports” at the Oktoberfest including bowling, beer barrel tossing, card playing, drinking, and of course Fingerhakeln, the Bavarian and Austrian tug-of-war played by locking index fingers across the table often through a small strap.⁸¹ Food prices in the beer tents were increased more than 30 percent

⁸⁰ Nina Gockerell, *Das Bayerbild in der literarischen und “wissenschaftlichen” Wertung durch fünf Jahrhunderte: Volkskundliche Überlegungen über die Konstanten und Varianten des Auto- und Heterostereotyps eines deutschen Stammes* (Munich: Kommissionsbuchhandlung R. Wölfl, 1974), 303.

⁸¹ “Bayerische Olympische Sportarten,” *Bayerische Bier-Illustrierte*, no. 4 (1972), 12-13.

over 1971, and in the same period beer prices rose from DM 2.40 to DM 3.40 per liter. In sum the 1972 Oktoberfest netted the festival and the local economy some 110 million DM. But as the Hamburg newspaper *Die Zeit* put it, “for the Munich beer brewer, the festival is the best global advertisement... For the reputation of Munich, the Oktoberfest is priceless.”⁸²

Löwenbräu had built their global success on exaggerating a simplistic Bavarian culture of consumption. Seen from beyond Germany, Löwenbräu beer and the stereotyped mode of consumption that spread around the world with it were closely associated with the city of Munich. Bavarian beer had indeed become part of public relations in Munich, Bavaria, and West Germany in the context of the 1972 Olympics. Seen from within Munich, however, Löwenbräu beer in particular was tremendously unpopular and carried a negative connotation among consumers. Even though beer was important for both domestic and foreign conceptions of the new Germany, the disconnect between them demonstrates just how far the global imaginary of Munich, Bavaria, and West Germany was from its real counterparts. When recession hit in the 1970s, the Bavarian brewing industry took blows across the board, but no single brewery was hit quite as hard as Löwenbräu. West German and Bavarian beer markets stagnated and consumers became more conservative in their drink choices, significantly limiting their consumption for the first time since the end of the Second World War.⁸³ At the same time, the global recession put pressure on Löwenbräu to outsource production. Concerns over its place of origin became virtually irrelevant overnight, except to German

⁸² Hermann Bößenecker, “Oktoberfest: Fingerhakeln um Bierpreise” *Die Zeit*, Sept. 22, 1972.

⁸³ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht, 1972/73*, 32-38; Behringer, *Die Spaten-Brauerei*, 360-361.

competitors who sought to maintain the authenticity connoted by geographical specificity.

Conclusion: Recession, Consolidation, and Place

Between 1971 and 1974, a series of structural ruptures shook the foundations of postwar western capitalist democracies. The end of fixed- and turn to floating exchange rates, and the first Oil Crisis, however, only overshadowed a longer process of deindustrialization which had begun already in the 1950s with the turn from Fordist production in the west to dependence on cheaper manufactured goods from emerging East Asian economies.⁸⁴ At the level of states, major shifts in economic thought and policy culminated in neoliberal political victories in Western Europe in the early 1980s. At the level of everyday consumption, however, even as the price of food and nonfuel commodities increased, and consumption slowed, the 1970s and 1980s were not in fact a major rupture.⁸⁵ West German beer production, for example, continued to grow, albeit at a slower clip than the preceding decades. Where the shifts of the post-boom era were most strongly felt regarding beer is in the consolidation the brewing industry through mergers and production outsourcing. The story of Löwenbräu is noteworthy because its business choices in the 1970s cleaved apart the cultural and economic value it had worked so hard to fuse together.

⁸⁴ Konrad H. Jarausch, *Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 620-2.

⁸⁵ Frank Trentmann, "Unstoppable: The Resilience and Renewal of Consumption after the Boom," *Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom*, ed. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Lutz Raphael, and Thomas Schlemmer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH, 2016), 293-308; while some Europeans squandered savings and increasingly bought on credit, West Germans rarely did either and while consumption rates slowed, they nonetheless continued to grow see, Frank Trentmann, *Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First* (New York: Harper Collins, 2016), 418-21.

In 1974 Löwenbräu made licensing agreements in the United States and England for local companies to brew their beer. In the U.K. the agreement was with the Ind Coope & Sons brewery of Burton-on-Trent, part of the Allied Breweries conglomerate in London. In the United States the contract went to Miller Brewing of Milwaukee, part of the Philip Morris Corporation since 1969. This transition marked a watershed in those who shaped the political economy of taste around Löwenbräu and other Bavarian beers. For example, the New York importer Hans Holterbosch was Löwenbräu's longtime importer for the Eastern United States and had been perhaps their single greatest global partner for the past four decades. When Löwenbräu made its licensing agreement with Miller, Holterbosch and their distributor in Florida, Universal Brands, sued the Munich brewery, Miller, and Philip Morris for breach of contract and violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in an antitrust suit in the New York Supreme Court. More than anything Holterbosch and Universal knew the deal would gut their business and sought to access what levers of power remained to them.

The court ruled against Holterbosch and Universal in what they called "a rather unusual antitrust case," and this decision marked the beginning of Löwenbräu's delocalization. The dissenting judge in the case, Gerald Bard Tjoflat, cited precedents from the 1960s and concerns expressed even then about the "marked and steady trend toward economic concentration" in the beer industry.⁸⁶ The fact that "Miller is the fifth largest brewer in the United States" and that "Lowenbrau is the largest importer of beer into the United States," he argued, may be an "unhealthy concentration of the beer market

⁸⁶ *United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.* 384 U.S. 546 (1966) cited in Tjoflat's dissent. See *Universal Brands, Inc., etc., Plaintiff-appellant-cross Appellee, v. Philip Morris Inc., Etc, Defendant-appellee, Lowenbrau-Munchen Aktiengesellschaft, Etc., defendant-appellee-cross Appellant*, 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1977) *Justia US Law*, accessed Sept. 4, 2016, <http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/546/30/204878/>.

as a whole.”⁸⁷ But the court had spoken, Holterbosch was out of the Löwenbräu story, and by 1977 the import of Löwenbräu beer from Munich to the United States had stopped completely. By this time all demand in the United States was being met by Miller-produced Löwenbräu from Milwaukee. From 1977 to 1983 the brewery closed similar deals in Nicaragua, Australia, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Ecuador, Panama, Hong Kong, Greece, Japan, Canada, and Portugal.⁸⁸ Financially, the company stood behind this move. With domestic consumption increases at the national (but not Bavarian) level in West Germany, as well as continued and increased exports to neighboring countries like Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and France, the volume of beer produced at the Munich brewery remained virtually the same from 1973 to 1986. In the same period, however, more Löwenbräu beer was being produced outside Munich than in it.⁸⁹

While sales in the U.S. and other markets initially increased, national conflicts over the politics of the global market erupted around the world beginning in the late 1970s. For example in 1978 Nigeria cancelled all imports under the banner of self-sufficiency, and in 1980 Greece froze price increases, which decreased the profits of West German and Bavarian brewers.⁹⁰ Even American brewing giant Anheuser-Busch sought to protect their national market, protesting to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in 1978 that Miller was trying to “mislead or deceive consumers into thinking [Löwenbräu] is still an imported beer, or that it is brewed according to the original German formula.”⁹¹ And this sort of concern went both ways; one report claimed that

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Behringer, *Löwenbräu*, 280-1.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 282.

⁹⁰ On the case of Nigeria, see, “German Brewers Looking to U.S. Market” *The New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1979, 29; on Greece, see Löwenbräu *Geschäftsbericht 1985-86*, 7-9.

⁹¹ “F.T.C. Opens an Inquiry on Löwenbräu Formula” *The New York Times*, Jul. 23, 1978, 21.

Miller's agenda from the very beginning was to combat Anheuser-Busch's Michelob brand, which was often mistaken as an import.⁹² The logic of the arguments smacks of those Felix Faber leveled at the Cincinnati Wunderbräu two decades earlier but here, the actors were bigger, the brands stronger, and the financial stakes higher—a testament to the consolidation of the global brewing industry in this period.

Those who had once made successful claims to be in the know about things authentic argued that the quality and authenticity of Löwenbräu would suffer under the licensing agreement. As Hans Holterbosch's son and business partner Dieter Holterbosch put it, "While the Germans used high-quality hops, Miller's just made a cheaper beer." Even the Löwenbräu brewery in Munich was skeptical of the quality, with export manager Johann Daniel Gerstein telling German reporters, "There is no need to be ashamed" of the financial decision, but "whether we actually like [the beer] or not, that's another question."⁹³ When Löwenbräu made the deal that undermined the credibility of the product's quality, they signaled the end of the beer's global stature; a void that would be filled most immediately by Dutch competitor Heineken. Not only did the Dutch brewery manage to outpace the entirety of the West German export economy by 1978, what beer was still coming out of West Germany was coming from beyond Bavaria, most notably from Beck's in the northern city of Bremen.⁹⁴ Within West Germany this shift was drastic. Between 1960 and 1973, Bavarian exports by volume increased by an average of 8.6 percent per year compared to less than 5 percent growth for the rest of

⁹² "Lowenbrau of U.S. in Test" *Chicago Tribune*, May 20, 1976, C11; see also, "Miller's Lowenbrau Is Target of Complaint by Anheuser-Busch" *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov 11, 1977, 22.

⁹³ Barbara Smit, *The Heineken Story: The Remarkably Refreshing Tale of the Beer that Conquered the World* (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2014), 297.

⁹⁴ On average in the late 1970s, the Dutch total output of beer was only one sixth of West Germany's and yet the Netherlands exported 83 million gallons in 1978, compared to West Germany's 73 million. "German Brewers Looking to U.S. Market" *The New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1979, 29.

West Germany. In 1974, Bavarian exports increased by only 1 percent, and the rest of West Germany by over 7 percent; a general trend that continued for decades.⁹⁵

Qualitatively, Bavaria no longer held the market on German authenticity. In 1979 the North German Beck's Brewery ran an ad in the United States that asked, "Are you drinking a well-known German beer that isn't really German? ... Read the label ... Beck's: the only leading German beer that's really made in Germany."⁹⁶

The association of beer quality and Germany, and just how far it had evolved in the course of recent decades, was far from lost on keen observers. In 1976, Regina Krummel, a Jewish-American professor (now emeritus professor) of English at Queens College (CUNY) published her poetic reflections on an ad in a liberal intellectual Jewish journal promoting tourism to Israel. Her poem, "Stop off for a Beer in Germany" relayed the promises of the advertisement that she would receive kosher food on a German airline, to which she retorted should could also be certain of making it out of Germany "still clothed in my Jewish flesh." At long last, she jests, "I can be Jewish and feel German at once/ An ideal devoutly deserved/ By Jews on a pilgrimage to Israel." German tourist commodities, clocks, sweaters, and music testified that "they didn't mean that silly propaganda/ About genocide for Jews." And above all, "It's the beer that's special about Germany/ And the Jew can have it now with kosher food minus/ The incinerated flesh of the inept six million/ Who came without invitation." If the memory of those murdered by Nazi Germany weren't enough to make the prospect unappealing, Krummel suggests that the increasing Israeli expansion in the Middle East in the still recent 1967 Six Day War

⁹⁵ Export statistics 1950-1974 in Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht, 1973/74 – 1974/75*, 175.

⁹⁶ "The Titans of Beer Head to Head: A Battle full of Foam and Fury" *The New York Times*, Apr. 29, 1979, E20.

and 1973 Yom Kippur War was the final nail in the coffin. She wrote, “After the Beer and the Jew-blessed flesh of beasts/ I can beat my breast in Israel/ Where bizarre behavior of Jews is sanctioned and condoned.”⁹⁷ Given her hostility to the whole premise of the adventure, it seems unlikely that Krummel took such a trip. The poem is a critique of so many things, perhaps most important here, it highlights the relatively rapid process by which beer and other consumer goods managed to undo the popular memory of German atrocities.⁹⁸ As Löwenbräu’s global market fell apart, their work in this cultural sphere remained.

Shifts in capitalism in the late modern globalization of the 1970s and onward had a number of notable consequences for conceptions of Germany and German beer. First of all, the outsourcing of Löwenbräu deterritorialized claims to its authentic German and Bavarian roots. By 1980, Löwenbräu was not even listed in the top ten imports (or domestics) worth drinking in the greater New York area, a hotspot of conspicuous and diverse beer consumption, and the former global capital of imported Löwenbräu.⁹⁹ Nonetheless Miller persisted in trying to promote the brand, but now as an explicitly global, that is, non-national beer. In 1985, the advertising giant J. Walter Thompson won the 20-million-dollar account in a stiff competition by stressing the global qualities of Löwenbräu.¹⁰⁰ Far from a product whose origin needed to be debated and protected, as had been the case in the 1950s, J. Walter Thompson’s brand manager for the account claimed, “Lowenbrau is the only world class beer brewed in the major beer-drinking

⁹⁷ “Regina P. Krummel, “Stop off in Germany for a Beer,” *The English Journal* 65, no. 5 (May, 1976), 51.

⁹⁸ See also Rieger, *The People’s Car*.

⁹⁹ “Foreign Beer Taps a New Thirst for More Flavor” *The New York Times*, Jul. 2, 1980, C1/C14; for more on the resurgence of the import market in this period, see “Hot Hops: Foreign Beers from (A)egean to (Z)yywiec, a Glossary of Beer” *The New York Times*, Sep 2, 1979, F1.

¹⁰⁰ “Thompson wins Beer Account” *The New York Times*, Jul 5, 1985, D4.

countries of the world... [and] our advertising campaign highlights this unique status.” Beginning with ads on “Miami Vice” in November 1985, the TV, print, and radio campaign centered on the theme, “The World Calls for Lowenbrau.” As the Miller product director explained, “Lowenbrau is more than just a German beer; more than just an American beer. Lowenbrau is an international beer; and its heritage is at least the equal of any other beer in the world.”¹⁰¹ Such campaigns were built on an assumption that consumption *a la* mass culture of the boom years would transition into the fragmenting post-mass culture of the 1980s.¹⁰²

In spite of all the efforts to claim the beer as global, Löwenbräu *was* and *is* a German beer, a Bavarian beer, and a Munich beer. In spite of not being a very popular beer in Munich, the Löwenbräu brewery and the entire Bavarian brewing industry had fought to make the Munich and Bavarian home of the beer legally protected, a type of product unique to Bavaria itself. And while clearly the Löwenbräu brewery still exists in Munich, how do we explain what happened to the brand in the 1970s and 1980s? When Alfred Heineken was asked about Löwenbräu’s licensing agreements in the early 1970s, he sneered, “I mean, can you believe anybody could be so damn stupid?”¹⁰³ Heineken, unlike so many national flagship breweries around the world, managed to survive the capital consolidation of the brewing industry—in part by driving it. Today it owns more than 100 breweries in almost 70 countries, making it the third largest brewing company in the world. But almost every other major international beer in the world—Stella Artois, Beck’s, Hoegaarden, Labatt, the Budweiser, Busch, Miller, and Coors families, Pilsner

¹⁰¹ “Lowenbrau stresses global appeal,” *Afro-American*, Nov 16, 1985, 6.

¹⁰² Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* 3rd Edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co., 2012), 123-7.

¹⁰³ Smit, *The Heineken Story*, 192-3.

Urquell, Peroni, Amstel, Carlsberg, Boddingtons, Sapporo, Singha, and Guinness to name only a few of the most famous—is currently owned by a conglomerate or holding company and produced in a multitude of cost cutting breweries around the world. Löwenbräu was perhaps just one of the first brewing giants to be swept into late modern globalization, what the judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat had called a “marked and steady trend toward economic concentration” since the 1960s.¹⁰⁴ This delocalizing consolidation had a national counterpart in the Federal Republic too: from 1960 to 1988 the number of breweries in West Germany declined from 2,218 to 1,168 (in Bavaria it fell from 1,566 to 778) while the total output of the West German industry in the same period almost doubled from just over five hundred million liters to just shy of a billion.¹⁰⁵

On the global level, Löwenbräu, perhaps more so than any other beer in the world in until the 1970s had created for itself a global aura of authenticity which linked the product, the place, and the mode of consumption. We have since seen similar phenomena more recently, for example with the Irish Pub.¹⁰⁶ Löwenbräu’s success, which was both significantly earlier and noteworthy in the conceptual transition it marked from militarist to jovial, was dependent on the concentric reputations of Munich, Bavaria, and West Germany as the perceived center of beer history and culture—a reality that global consumers could imagine and approximate. The authenticity of the experience of drinking in Monterey, London, or Hong Kong, of being swept up in the “gemutlich reaction” stood in for the experience of journeying to Munich. But when the Löwenbräu

¹⁰⁴ Universal Brands, Inc., v. Philip Morris Inc.

¹⁰⁵ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Daten und Fakten der bayerischen Brauwirtschaft 1988/89*, tbl 3 & 4.

¹⁰⁶ Cliona O’Carroll, “‘Cold Beer, Warm Hearts’: Community, Belonging and Desire in Irish Pubs in Berlin,” in *Drinking Cultures: Alcohol and Identity*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005), 43-64.

brewery severed the only connection between the actual place and their global consumer base, they not only isolated themselves from potential capital growth but also relegated their product to a delocalized cut-corners beer abroad, and a less than well-respected beer associated with foreigners and laborers at home. The GfK report had argued that image is everything, but globally much of the image of Löwenbräu was always dependent on the beer being an import, being the original, a product of timeless high quality, artfully crafted, and romanticized into a new conception of Germany itself. Löwenbräu's global era was over, and soon too would be Lurvenbrow's. The Beer Kellers in London closed doors in the 1970s and Canadian, American, and Australian Oktoberfests were overrun with national beers. Claims to authenticity in the case of Löwenbräu consumption were fundamentally claims to similitude of place. The structural shifts marked most conventionally by the 1973 Oil Crisis and the subsequent reconfiguration of global capital not only brought "social developments of revolutionary proportions,"¹⁰⁷ they also had the power to hollow out place-based concepts of authenticity in the global imaginary. So while post-boom shifts deterritorialized place-based conceptions of authenticity, the idea of drinking German beer *in* Germany simultaneously and inversely became increasingly important.

The story of Löwenbräu from the boom to the bust is the story of a cultural ambassador whose legacy outlasted its livelihood. How the beer was sold, marketed, coveted, protected, and imbued with meanings in part explains how beer and Bavaria came to inform global conceptions of West Germany and render it distinct from its militaristic predecessor and legible as a western capitalist Cold War success story. As the

¹⁰⁷ Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 12-18.

global economy of Löwenbräu itself was restructured after 1973, the authenticity of consumption turned inward, increasingly exclusive to Munich and Bavaria alone. A 1985 *New York Times* article by Erfurt-born German journalist John Dornberg touted the lore of Munich drinking culture, the wide diversity of beer styles and “distinctive” brewery differences known only to “local connoisseurs.” This was a unique place, a place to visit and learn rather than a place to approximate. The resurgence of the local in this case was a consequence of late modern globalization. Dornberg praised the food that matched the beer: “a whole array of specialties,” including masses of pig knuckles, sauerkraut, pretzels, and the “delicacy” of Weisswursts that are unique to Munich and Bavaria. Perhaps most intriguing to his American readers, Dornberg reported that “the Bavarians consider beer their national beverage, but at the same time they do not view it as a drink, rather a liquid bread—a food.” Matching this anthropological curiosity, Dornberg ended with a simple statement of apparent fact: “To think of Bavaria without beer or Munich without its enormous beer halls and cellars is almost to not think of Bavaria and Munich at all.”¹⁰⁸ The “gemutlich reaction” continued to ripple around the world but its heyday was over. What remained was the city itself, a place you had to visit, not approximate; a city imagined through beer and gaiety more than Nazis and fanaticism—beer halls more than the Beer Hall Putsch.

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Selections from chapter 5 will appear as: Robert Terrell, “‘Lurvenbrow’: Bavarian Beer Culture and Barstool Diplomacy, 1945-1964,” in *Alcohol Flows Across Cultures: Drinking Cultures in Transnational and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Waltraud

¹⁰⁸ John Dornberg, “In Bavaria, Beer is Both Food and Drink,” *The New York Times*, Mar 3, 1985, XX6.

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Epilogue:

The ECJ and the German Cultural Regime of Beer

A Cultural Regime

On July 15, 1987, the West German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker received a letter from one Andreas Z., which began: “Much has been written about the *Reinheitsgebot* lately.” Indeed, recent press coverage of the Purity Law had focused on European Court of Justice Case 178/84, or *Commission v. Germany*, which lifted the *Reinheitsgebot* as an informal trade barrier to the free movement of goods in the European Community. Much had also been written, Andreas went on, regarding a number of recent food scandals, chemical additive concerns, and cases of food poisoning tied to “unpure” beer in the United States and Canada. Clearly, he claimed, Germans need to be watching out for their health as consumers, the age-old *Reinheitsgebot* had formally made that all the easier. Of Weizsäcker Andreas demanded to know: “What do you actually have to say to the fact that foreign beer, not brewed in accordance with the *Reinheitsgebot* and produced with the addition of chemical additives, will be imported into Germany?” In the broader context of public health, the foreign beer represented a threat: “Would it not be better if the people in the countries that do not observe the *Reinheitsgebot* drank their own beer and were not allowed to send it to us?”¹

In the summer of 1987, Andreas Z. was eleven years old, a fifth-grade student at the Willibald-Gluck-Gymnasium in the Upper Palatinate region of Bavaria. His letter is written on stationary whimsically decorated with cartoon kittens and today lives

¹ July 15, 1987 letter from Andreas Z. to Weizsäcker, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (henceforth BAK) B 122/36039.

sandwiched between official government correspondence in the West German Federal Archive in Coblenz. When Dr. Pieper in the office of President Weizsäcker wrote back a week later, he dodged the demanding questions, explaining that according to the ECJ, West Germany was now obligated to unconditionally open its market to members of the European Community (EC). But while EC member states could now send beer to West Germany which was not brewed in accordance with the *Reinheitsgebot*, “the consumer still has the choice which beers with which additives he chooses to drink.”² The market may have been flung open, in other words, but German consumers did not have to like it.

This was a curious exchange. Likely young Andreas was not a frequent beer drinker; it is possible he never even drank a beer. Moreover, it proves hard to imagine a rural fifth grade student spending their free time staying current on food poisoning, chemical additives, and the goings-on of the European Court of Justice. The immediate cause for this exchange was that Andreas’ father was a brewery employee in the Upper Palatinate. The ECJ ruling had led many in the brewing industry to fear that cheaper beers would flood the West German market, displace West German beer, and hollow out a vibrant industry and source of employment. Andreas himself admitted that because of his father, the subject was “very much discussed in our home.”³ At the same time, a more complex explanation for the exchange is that beer in general and the *Reinheitsgebot* in particular had become a national icon in West Germany and that challenging the juridical authority of the law read as a challenge to West German sovereignty, cultural practice, and perhaps even identity. This is a story that goes far beyond young Andreas. We have seen throughout this dissertation some of the many ways in which Germans gradually

² July 22, 1987 letter from Dr. Pieper to Andreas Z, BAK B 122/36039.

³ July 15, 1987, Andreas Z. to Weizäcker.

embraced a particular conception of beer not only as a part of their daily practices but as part of their larger cultural and political lives. The battles for the fate of Germany, from Third Reich to cold war to European integration played out in something as simple as beer. Producers and consumers of beer responded to them, capitalized on them, and indeed shaped them. These conflicts over beer show the production and consumption of a whole system of values around the place called Germany.

One of the central threads in this dissertation has been the history of regulating and legislating market access and consumer morality and knowledge. As we saw in the first two chapters, the restrictive regimes of National Socialism and the Military Government catalyzed multifaceted industrial, political, scientific, and cultural responses insisting on the importance of beer beyond being a mere fermented alcoholic beverage. Such insistence underwrote the growing popularity and peculiarity of the beer that Bavarians and Germans drank versus that of the rest of the world. Indeed, if the first two chapters detailed a history of brewers and their allies operating from a position of relative political weakness, the subsequent three chapters highlighted the extent to which they operated with more institutional, economic, and cultural power. Legal and marketing campaigns to protect the exclusivity of the product and its market spanned from targeting a near nonexistent consumer habit in Franconia to global jockeying with northern German, Dutch, and American rivals. The interests of the brewing industry and agrarian politicians drove, or at least played a major role in each effort to legislate, regulate, and limit market access and consumer behavior, and within that, Bavarian brewers and politicians played a significant role. That is the story we have seen. But the recession of the 1970s and the subsequent triumph of neoliberalism in the west presented another

important challenge in the history of regulating the politics, economics, and culture of beer production and consumption, especially when seen from the level of European integration.

Up until the 1970s, harmonizing market standards on goods and services in the integrating European market was carried out on a case-by-case basis. In the case of beer, as we saw in chapter four, the West German rejection of the harmonization proposal in the early 1970s meant that national production standards reigned supreme and it was the role of the national-state to protect their consumers. By the early 1980s, European market integration had abandoned harmonization, or at least added to it the principle of mutual recognition. A more neoliberal, post-boom approach, mutual recognition held that in the event that there was no specific Community-wide regulation, each member state was obliged to accept goods and services from other member states as long as they were produced and marketed according to the legal standards of their country of origin. In this context, it was the neoliberal consumer who would shape the market through generating (or not generating) demand for a product, rather than the state shaping the market through regulating supply.⁴ This was the rationale for the ECJ case, opened in 1983, which ultimately overturned the *Reinheitsgebot* as an informal trade barrier.

German brewers, politicians, lawyers, brewing scientists and others responded as we might expect to the case, repeating the patterns we've seen by touting the *German* history of the Purity Law and its public health benefits. Bavarians were once again the most vocal with legal and nutritional assessments coming out of Weihenstephan, and the old fighters dating to the *Süßbierstreit* such as Herman Höcherl and Joseph Ertl taking up

⁴ Christoph Hermann, "Neoliberalism in the European Union" *Studies in Political Economy* 79 no. 1 (2007): 61-90, esp. 69-73.

key roles in both discourse and policy meetings. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a strong advocate of European integration, even wrote to the President of the European Commission Gaston Thorn that “the Federal Government, in agreement with the German Parliament, the Federal Council, and the German public attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of the Purity Law,” and asked that Thorn, “work to ensure that the infringing process is immediately terminated.”⁵ While Thorn acknowledged the concern, he could do no such thing and added that, “the Commission must ensure that the beer of other member states receives the same opportunities as German beer.”⁶ The final decision came down the ECJ. Legal experts predicted already in late 1983, and West German politicians finally confirmed in late 1984, that the ECJ would likely rule to open the West German market under the banner of mutual recognition and market integration.⁷ When it did, as Dr. Pieper explained to Andreas, EC member states could send beer to West Germany that was not brewed in accordance with the *Reinheitsgebot*, but German consumers did not have to like it. And they didn’t.

By the time it was overturned in 1987, the *Reinheitsgebot* had become so embedded in the cultural fabric of West German consumer consciousness that it remained the norm of production and consumption. In 1989, on the eve of the *Wende*, 95% of West Germans responded that in spite of the 1987 ruling, the *Reinheitsgebot* continued to be “the guarantee of quality and taste for our beer.” A similar number (91 percent) demanded that beer should only be brewed according to the law in spite of the ruling.⁸ To

⁵ May 20, 1983 letter from Helmut Kohl to Gaston E. Thorn, BAK 189/30450.

⁶ July 8, 1983 letter from Gaston E. Thorn to Helmut Kohl, BAK B 189/30450.

⁷ “Mitteilung der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, re: Vertragsverletzungsverfahren wegen des Reinheitsgebotes für Bier,” no date, but makes reference to an EC Commission circular dated Aug. 25, 1983, BAK B 189/30450; see also a memo on the November 25, 1984 press conference by EC Commissioner Karl-Heinz Narjes, BAK B 189/36039.

⁸ Bayerischer Brauerbund e.V., *Geschäftsbericht 1988/89*, 64.

this day, the German beer market remains a difficult market to crack, not because foreign beers are not allowed, but because they are unwelcome. According to one recent survey, 85% of German beer drinkers believe the *Reinheitsgebot* should be honored, and many German brewers seem to agree.⁹ Newer, smaller, craft brewing establishments tend to see the law as a good framework but in effect recognize it as a market protectionist and advertising ploy by industrial brewing. In many ways, it is that—or was. What it *is* now, is a deeply rooted cultural value. As President of the German Parliament Dr. Norbert Lammert put it on the occasion of the proclaimed 500th anniversary of the “German” Purity Law in 2016, “Beer is not only a foodstuff, and it is more than a luxury; it is a cultural asset (*Kulturgut*)—and that being the case has to do with the myths of the *Reinheitsgebot*.”¹⁰ He may not have known just how right he was. As of a few years ago, even Anheuser Busch-InBev, the single largest and most capital-heavy industrial brewing power in the world, which owns the major German brewery Beck’s, had no public plans to expand their German market-share.¹¹ It is simply too hostile a market to enter, thanks to the history of beer as a “cultural asset.” The cultural regime of German beer, “the people’s drink”—which defines both *the people* and what counts as *their drink*—was produced in the course of the mid-twentieth century and continues to exist to this day in spite of the disappearance of some of the crucial political, economic, and social challenges that provided its original scaffolding.

⁹ Kate Connolly, “Medieval beer purity law has Germany’s craft brewers over a barrel,” *The Guardian*, April 18, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/germany-reinheitsgebot-beer-purity-law-klosterbrauerei-neuzelle>.

¹⁰ Norbert Lammert, “Von der besonderen Qualität deutscher Braukunst,” in *500 Jahre Reinheitsgebot—Das Buch zum Jubiläum* (Frankfurt: Deutscher Fachverlag GmbH, 2016), 10-2, here 10.

¹¹ Madeline Chambers, “Glass half empty for Germany’s proud beer industry,” *Reuters*, April 18, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-beer/glass-half-empty-for-germanys-proud-beer-industry-idUSBREA3H07A20140418>.

Beyond the Bonn Republic

In West Germany, *German* beer had been promoted, sold, legislated, and internalized as essentially and fundamentally “pure beer.” The East German story of beer, absent in the preceding pages, followed a remarkably parallel but also wildly different trajectory than the story we have seen here. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), state planners and producers of beer also spoke of it as “the People’s Drink” but it was a markedly different people, and a markedly different drink. Throughout the entire history of the GDR, beer production increased steadily, and economic planners devoted significant attention to rationalizing production and industrial organization. Culturally, beer played a similar role as we saw in chapter three in that it “fostered a sense of cultural unity,” but the state also used it to remind the people of the worker’s state “that the planned economy had their best interests in mind.”¹² From the 1950s to the 1970s, the ruling Socialist Unity Party responded to consumer demands, while also working through conflicts over how to make beer compatible with the rationalized economy and socialist consumption. The beer itself was quite different than what we have seen in the west. The areas that became East Germany had already abandoned the *Reinheitsgebot* in 1938 after Herbert Backe’s sugar adulteration proposal, discussed in chapter one. The East German state itself also formally rejected the law in 1949 and all mention of it disappeared from

¹² John Gillespie, “The People’s Drink: The Politics of Beer in East Germany (1945-1971),” (MA thesis, Middle Tennessee State University, 2017), 30-1.

GDR government documents as economic planners worked to optimize resources through massive adulteration efforts.¹³

When the Berlin Wall came down, former East German industries, breweries included, were rapidly privatized much to the detriment of East German workers and certainly to that of former East German goods.¹⁴ As regards beer, the German Brewers' Association and individual West German breweries quickly targeted both the consumer base of the former GDR and the beer producers, especially the vast majority that did not brew according to the *Reinheitsgebot*. Already in December 1989, the Hamburg Holsten Brewery shipped some 700,000 liters of beer to the eastern city of Dresden. In the words of Munich brewery owner and president of the German Brewers' Association, Dieter Soltmann, other West German brewers "looked covetously at the map of the GDR" as "a brilliant beer market." West German brewers toured the east, carrying with them free samples and paraphernalia in hopes of building their reputations among consumers. When they returned, they brought with them "true horror stories" of beer adulterated with cow bile to provide bitterness absent sufficient hops. They also reported, "shuddering," that sugar cane was also regularly used. That sugar cane was conceived of as more cringe-worthy than cow bile is only comprehensible in the wake of the *Süßbierstreit*.¹⁵

The few East German breweries that had produced export beer for the Federal Republic

¹³ Ibid., 80-1; see also, Hans-J. Manger and Peter Lietz, *Die Brau- und Malzindustrie in Deutschland-Ost zwischen 1945 und 1989: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Brau- und Malzindustrie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: VLB Berlin, 2016), 446.

¹⁴ Patricia J. Smith, "The Illusory Economic Miracle: Assessing Eastern Germany's Economic Transition," in *After the Wall: Eastern Germany since 1989*, ed. idem (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 109-42, esp. 111-2; more recently, see Rainer Land, "East Germany 1989-2010: A Fragmented Development," in *United Germany: Debating Processes and Prospects*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 104-18, esp. 109-13; and Holger Wolf, "German Economic Unification Twenty Years Later," in *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification*, ed. Jeffrey J. Anderson and Eric Langenbacher (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 321-30, esp. 322-4.

¹⁵ "Galle statt Hopfen," *Der Spiegel*, March 19, 1990, 148-9.

according to the *Reinheitsgebot* were particularly prized because they were already known brands in the West. Radeberger Exportbrauerei, Köstritzer Schwarzbierbrauerei, and Mecklenburgische Brauerei Lübz for example had all sold beer in the Federal Republic and were bought out in 1990 and 1991 by West German breweries Binding, Bitburger, and Holsten. Beyond privatization by western German companies, the vast majority of beer production from the former GDR, some two thirds, simply stopped after 1990 because it did not meet the production standards of the 1952 Beer Tax Law which codified the *Reinheitsgebot* in the Bonn Republic. The remainder, a handful of former East German beers, took their own run at the new reunified German social market economy, most notably Berliner Pilsner and Wernesgrüner, both of which were ultimately acquired by brewery holding groups based in the former west in the early 2000s.¹⁶

More fruitful research can certainly be done on the fate of East German beer producers and consumers in the new Berlin Republic. What is clear, however, is that after reunification, the culture of “pure beer” remained vibrant even as the law underwent yet further legal changes. In 1993 and 2005 the Provisional Beer Law reworked a number of key restrictions in the production of beer, especially as regards the less common top-fermented brew. The discourse of the Purity Law nonetheless remained culturally and

¹⁶ Berliner Pilsner remains a staple of beer consumption in Berlin and has succeeded in capturing the vibrancy of the new capital. Its marketing campaigns in the early 1990s were harpooned by *Der Spiegel* for sounding like something from a “Prussian barracks.” In 2003 it was acquired by Radeberger Group, a former East German company, bought by Binding, a subsidiary of the Dr. Oetker food conglomerate in 2002, and since then based in Frankfurt. Their more recent “Berlin, du bist so wunderbar” campaign, complete with its own electronic theme music, has succeeded in capturing the city’s high modernist moment as the Weimar capital, its leisurely café culture, and its current reputation as home to a booming nightlife. Wernesgrüner was acquired by Bitburg Brewery Group in 2002. For more on Wernesgrüner’s early hardships and successes, see, “Flüssige Währung,” *Der Spiegel*, June 29, 1992, 121-3. On Berliner Pilsner’s early ads, see, “Kosmos der Gefühle,” *Der Spiegel*, April 13, 1992.

economically significant and tied to pride of place. Not only did Bavarian beer receive a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) from the EU, but the *Reinheitsgebot* remained a staple of local marketing.¹⁷ Brewers in Germany, Bavaria, and Munich, respectively boasted on their bottles and merchandise that their product was brewed in accordance with the German Purity Law (with no date), the 1516 Bavarian Purity Law, or the 1487 Munich Purity Law.

The most recent turn in the history of beer has been the craft brewing revolution, which has been rapidly spanning the globe since U.S. President Jimmy Carter legalized home brewing in 1978. So much of craft beer's success, built as it has been on the India Pale Ale (IPA), is mirrored in Germany. But the influence is not unidirectional: in the U.S. today, a traditional but uncommon German sour style called Gose has quickly become a craft brewing staple. In Germany, as in the U.S., bitter IPAs have nonetheless gotten the lion's share of the attention from producers, consumers, media, and critics. These top-fermented ales can easily be brewed in accordance with the *Reinheitsgebot*, and especially since the 1993 and 2005 Provisional Beer Laws undid many regulations on top-fermented brews. While German craft brewers overload on hops, they are also giving makeovers to other traditional German styles from Helles to Doppelbock. What they are not often doing, is making coffee porters, milk stouts, fruit saisons, New England Style

¹⁷ There is not sufficient space here to fully treat the history of EU geographical indications, but the bulk of the scholarship agrees that however well-intentioned they may be, the more regulated the geographical indication the greater financial benefit to the controlled good. See for example, Brian Ilbery and Moya Kneafsey, "Registering Regional Specialty Food and Drink Products in the United Kingdom: The Case of PDOs and PGIs," *Area* 32 no. 3 (Sept. 2000): 317-25; Michaela DeSoucey, "Gastronomicalism: Food Traditions and Authenticity Politics in the European Union," *American Sociological Review* 75 no. 3 (June 2010): 432-55; Oana C. Deselnicu, et. al., "A Meta-Analysis of Geographical Indication Food Valuation Studies: What Drives the Premium for Origin-Based Labels?" *Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics* 38 no. 2 (Aug. 2013): 204-19; and Fabio Parasecoli, *Knowing Where It Comes From: Labeling Traditional Foods to Compete in a Global Market* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2017).

IPAs, or any other beers that include ingredients beyond the four-ingredient list. The innovative Bavarian craft brewer Camba just recently pulled its coffee porter from the market after food safety officials claimed that calling it beer was “consumer deception.” Others find workarounds, most notably by calling their fruit and spice beers “*Malzgetränke*” (malt drinks) rather than beer.¹⁸ This legal loophole was, as we have seen, created by the *Süßbierstreit* in the 1950s and early 1960s and rooted yet further in conflicts around sugar malt substitution in the National Socialist period. As in the 1950s, when one Franconian lambasted “conceptions of trade from the 15th century that seem like a bad joke in the era of the free market economy,” craft brewers today argue that while the Purity Law is romantic, and even a good foundation, it is more than anything market protectionism on the part of industrial brewers resting on their laurels.¹⁹

Some large German brewers are leaning into these recent developments. The Bitburger spinoff Craftwerk and the Paulaner limited release “Braumeister” series clearly aim to capture consumer interest in the new and the artisanal. But the German craft revolution goes on, aided in no small part by the presence of American allies. In 2016, the year of the 500th anniversary of the Bavarian *Reinheitsgebot*, San Diego brewery Stone opened the first American craft outpost in Europe, in the Mariendorf neighborhood of the German capital. In spite of a flurry of media and industrial skepticism about the opening, the brewery has been successful, especially in the culturally pluralist Berlin. As one 59-year-old electrician put it, “I have to admit I was skeptical at first about American beer. You hear only negative things about the big brewers there. But this is good stuff. I

¹⁸ Patrick Costello, “In Germany, creative craft beer brewers face off against medieval purity law,” *PRI*, April 27, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/germany-creative-craft-brewers-face-against-medieval-purity-law>.

¹⁹ “Der bittere Kampf ums süße Bier,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Sept. 15, 1954, 6.

don't know if Germans will take to it, though. They think their beer is the best in the world.”²⁰ Craft beer is happening, but it is not an American monopoly. In 2017, 82 new breweries opened in Germany, as many as had been opened in the previous eight years.²¹ Unlike in the United States, and most everywhere else where opposition to craft brewing is purely cultural, rooted in discourses of taste and the fussiness of the product, in Germany it is noteworthy that opposition is rooted in the nexus of cultural, industrial, legal, and political peculiarities that developed over the course of the twentieth century.

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To return to the image which opened this dissertation, readers will recall the two journalists who, in 1987, puzzled over which image of Germany they ought to use. It may prove useful to think through this image once again. First, it is interesting to note that the appearance of the journalists is not particularly German; perhaps more stereotypically Mediterranean. But the flexibility of whether the journalists are Germans or not only bolsters the argument here that ideas of Germanness are constructed both from within and from without. It is now clear, I hope, some of the ways that the beer and the stereotypical Bavarian who wielded it became part of the pantheon or reservoir of German iconography. In the moment of 1987, just as the ECJ was forcing open the West German market to foreign beer, spatial referents to Bavaria may have been particularly potent. Today, there are other figures in the pantheon, Angela Merkel perhaps, as the moderate

²⁰ Qtd. in Erik Kirschbaum, “California beer maker has the last laugh in his German brewery,” *Los Angeles Times*, Aug. 8, 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-germany-california-beer-20170808-story.html>; for pre-opening coverage, see for example, Torsten Landsberg, “Brauerei in Mariendorf—Craftbeer brauen ist Leidenschaft,” *Berliner Zeitung*, Dec. 14, 2015, <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/brauerei-in-mariendorf-craftbeer-brauen-ist-leidenschaft-23363538>; The Stone Berlin website has also archived the press around the brewery opening, <http://www.stonebrewing.eu/about/press>.

²¹ “Craft beer drives surge in new German breweries,” *The Local*, February 26, 2018, <https://www.thelocal.de/20180226/more-diversity-german-breweries-on-the-up-and-up>.

but stable German reluctantly taking the lead in a Europe that Germany twice failed to conquer. When Merkel proclaimed, reflecting on Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election, that Europe had to take their fate into their own hands, she stood in a beer hall in Bavaria, addressing the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), her relations with which have come under strain of late. But commentators were quick to point out that Germany remains deeply entwined with British and American political fates and “were Merkel to signal a German pivot away from the U.S., she would hardly choose a Bavarian beer party as the venue.”²² That may be true. Beer may no longer be an active site of political conflict; or at least, it may be a site for Merkel to cater to CSU conservatism in Bavaria but not to redirect geopolitics. Beer certainly still functions as a political prop, perhaps best evinced by the 2017 parliamentary election posters of Munich SPD candidate Florian Post, which featured him as “*your* Bundestag representative” sitting in a beer garden holding his *Maß*, speaking with his constituents—a socialist marking his populist Bavarian sympathies in a region dominated by the CSU.

Beyond the beer, the face of Bavaria has also been changing. Perhaps no single politician is more representative of that than Edmund Stoiber, who was Bavarian Prime Minister from 1993 to 2007 and is often credited with transforming the state into one of the wealthiest in Germany, a center of high tech, media, engineering, and finance. He too struggled with the imagery of the traditional Bavarian and his beer. In his New Year’s address in January 1998, after traveling through South America and Japan, Stoiber noted that “Bavaria can be proud of its good reputation in the world. I was occasionally confronted with the cliché that Bavaria might just be equated with roast pork, beer, and

²² Matthew Karnitschnig, “What Angela Merkel meant at the Munich beer hall,” *Politico* May 28, 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/article/what-angela-merkel-meant-at-the-munich-beer-hall/>.

Lederhosen. But that is now increasingly taking a backseat. More and more, Bavaria is becoming known as a high-tech center.”²³ But Stoiber also catered to Bavarian brewers and their traditionalist ethos. Addressing brewers themselves, he declared, “Economic success is only part of what distinguishes Bavaria. Bavarian lifestyle and zest for life have also become trademarks. Beer as a Bavarian national drink (*Nationalgetränk*) is indispensable. And our beer is not only a national drink; it has long since become, so to say, an international drink, and one with an unmistakable primordial Bavarian (*urbayerischem*) character!”²⁴

What Stoiber spoke over is that National Socialism too was incubated in Bavaria and built fervor in the beer halls of Munich, a city Hitler deemed “the capital of the movement.” It is a twist of irony and a product of enormously contingent developments detailed in part in this dissertation that silenced this history and allowed Bavaria to become a cultural alternative to the radicalism it once embodied and produced. The discursive timelessness of the Beer Purity Law, the simple living of rural life in the German breadbasket, the explicitly non-modern, simple-pleasure oriented conservatism, and non-threatening expansion of German capitalism and consumerism have been at the heart of this story. From the Nazi era to the eve of the *Wende*, the People’s Drink was part of many conflicts over, and efforts to define the fate of Germany and the German people. What role it has to play in defining the Germany of today and tomorrow remains an open question.

²³ Jan. 9, 1998 speech by Dr. Edmund Stoiber, Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (henceforth ACSP) PS I Stoiber RS 1998: 0109.

²⁴ Sept. 14, 2000 speech by Dr. Edmund Stoiber, ACSP PS I Stoiber RS 2000: 0914.

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