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Title

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Permalink

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Journal

Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 22(1-2)

ISSN

0041-5715

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Publication Date

1994

DOI

10.5070/F7221-2016718

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WHICH WAY THE HORN OF AFRICA: DISINTEGRATION OR CONFEDERATION?

Daniel Kendie

Introduction

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan occupy an area of some 4 million square kilometers and have a combined population of over 80 million people, of which some 10 million have become refugees, war-displaced persons and drought victims.¹ By all accounts, the four neighboring countries are also among the least developed of the developing nations.² They also have to grapple with a series of destabilizing developments including disintegrative ethnicity, primordialism or nationalism, predicated upon demands for ethnic self-determination. Is this a new phenomenon peculiar to the Horn of Africa, or a world-wide trend?

In 1904, for instance, Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) confidently assured the citizens of Birmingham that the day of small nations was over. But sixteen years later, and contrary to his prediction, some 42 nations—most of whom were new and small—showed up in Geneva and joined the League of Nations. Seventy-two years later, however, some of these nations are disintegrating. One of them, Yugoslavia, for example, has become a metaphor for the collapse of a multi-ethnic state and for the "balkanization" of the Balkans. It is rapidly disintegrating into its small constituent nationalisms such as Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and promises to split even further into (still) smaller groups like Kosovo, Voivodina, and others, which in turn are demanding their own autonomy.

Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an imagined political community that is inherently limited. Many "old nations" once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by "sub"-nationalisms within their borders—nationalism which naturally dream of shedding their sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite plain: the end of the era of nationalism, so long prophesied, is not in sight. Indeed, nationness has become the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time. Nation, nationality, nationalism—all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze. In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre.³

If Anderson finds difficulty in defining nationalism, Clifford Geertz focuses on "developing" countries and argues that the central

problem for many people in these countries is that the primordial group is the unit with which they identify, through which their values and beliefs are transmitted and which, in a very real sense, makes life meaningful to them. At times, indeed, the primordial group is the terminal one, representing the major unit of socially legitimate and effective authority. Thus, primordial groups in developing countries may sometimes stand for "totalities of life."⁴ This observation may also be equally valid for the Western world. How else are we to explain the conflicts in Quebec, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Corsica, Brittany, or among the Basques (Euskadi), Walloons, and Flemings?

On the other hand, Eric Hobsbawm provides what could perhaps be described as an insightful and illuminating study. He maintains that no satisfactory criteria can be discovered as to which one of the many human collectivities should be utilized to understand ethnicity. Such criteria as languages and common territory, he says, are themselves fuzzy and ambiguous. They can change and shift in time. Development in the modern world economy generates vast population movements. As a result, it constantly undermines ethnic-linguistic homogeneity. Indeed, we could even add that since all aspects of cultural pluralism and transmission are constantly in a state of flux, the resultant effect is that each group and society itself continually evolves or changes. In the process, some groups are assimilated, others form, still others grow larger. Hobsbawm equally questions the utility of what is called "national consciousness" because the great majority of the masses, especially the workers and peasants are the last to be affected by it.⁵

In so far as there are no antagonistic contradictions dividing peasants or workers belonging to one ethnic group from workers and peasants of other ethnic groups, could we then say that "ethnicity" and "nationalism" are simply a pre-occupation of marginalized and alienated intellectuals who seek to use it as a political leverage to achieve power? If this is a valid argument, we could raise two questions: To what extent do the problems of resource allocation within the state interact with political, ideological and administrative problems and pass for ethnic conflicts? And to what extent would the co-optation of the alienated elite by the state promote stability and unity?

The majority of the nations of the world are ethnically heterogeneous. In fact, there are only a few ethnically and linguistically homogeneous states among the 170 of the world's political entities, and probably none that include anything like the totality of the "nation." Nevertheless, at a time when some twenty states that have become members of the United Nations have a population of less than 250,000, the argument that a territory is far too small to constitute a state can no longer be convincingly maintained. Such states—even much larger ones—of course, are not independent in any meaningful sense.

Politically and militarily they are helpless without outside protection as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Chad, Somalia, Djibouti, and others have shown. Economically, they are even more dependent. Few would-be state-builders in such territories hope to go it alone. It appears that they want to exchange dependence on a single state economy for dependence on a larger economic unit which can only limit sovereignty just so much.⁶

But why should anyone wish to set up such states, mostly by breaking up existing political units? The usual reason given by would-be state-builders is that the people of the territory have "constituted" a "nation" from the beginning of time, or that they are a "special" ethnic group with their own languages, culture, and history, or that they cannot live under the "domination" and "exploitation" of strangers. The right of self-determination, they argue, implies the establishment of states that coincide with nations.⁷ Invariably, they reinforce their arguments by referring to thinkers like John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who contend that ethnically homogeneous states are more likely to be democratic, stable, and viable than multi-ethnic states.

The fact that ethnic differences exist within a state cannot by itself be a sufficient reason for ethnic conflicts to occur. Historical memories may be more crucial than ethnic differences for the maintenance of peace and stability. Conflicts can consistently occur even in societies where no marked linguistic, religious or ethnic differences exist. In Somalia, for example, the great majority of the people speak one language called Somali and adhere to Sunni Islam.⁸ Yet, this "oneness" has neither prevented one of the bloodiest civil wars in contemporary Africa from occurring, nor the disintegration of that country from occurring. Former British Somaliland (Northern Somalia) is now the independent state of "Somaliland." In contrast, many multi-ethnic and multi-religious states like Singapore, Thailand, Switzerland, and Malaysia hold together. How can this be explained?

There have been many studies that claim to provide explanations of various phenomena connected with what is called primordialism, ethnicity, or nationalism. However, they have remained essentially descriptive or theoretical rather than explanatory.⁹ What are called ethnic or nationality conflicts may be fought under the banner of kinship, language or religion to give practical meaning to the "cause," but one wonders if resistance to political exclusion and economic marginalization is not in actual fact what masquerades as ethnicity, nation-ness, or nationalism—the more so, when it is being deliberately fostered by the elite as a means of advancing their political goals of power acquisition.

If ethnicity is not biological or genetic, but something created that becomes a matter of identity over time, the following crucial

questions could also be raised: Can society produce leaders who transcend narrow affinities and personal gains, who build bridges, not erect fences, and who promote peaceful interaction and social justice by addressing the inequities that fuel the conflict? In other words, is it possible to promote social justice by meeting basic human needs and opportunities for social and economic betterment, irrespective of ethnic identity? What lesson could be learned from states that have been able to live together despite internal ethnic differences, and which have given all ethnic groups a role in running a country and offer incentives for cooperation?

The Forces of Disintegration in the Horn of Africa

There are two major sources of disintegration in the sub-region: 1) external and 2) internal.

External Forces. There is the tendency of nations of the sub-region to avoid direct intervention in the internal conflicts of one of their neighbors, but to arm and aid various internal parties in order to overthrow an existing regime. In the recent past, this was done either to promote the vested interests of the major world powers, or to advance the goals of one of the regional powers of the Middle East. Such actions have contributed to the observed rise in ethnic conflicts and separatism, and rekindled mutual suspicion and hatred. Today, however, with the lessening of the direct hegemony of the global powers in the Horn of Africa, the sub-region seems to be at the mercy of Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Iraq, or Egypt. Is it, therefore, destined to continue to be a battlefield for Arab-Israeli confrontation, or of Shi'ite/Sunni hostilities!

There are also the numerous inter-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa whose continued existence has only accelerated the disintegrative process at the national level. The nature of the conflicts and their consequences are too well-known to need a recitation here.¹⁰ Suffice it to say that in just 28 years, Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, fought five major wars and twelve minor ones, only to create more problems without solving the old ones.

The pressures that Sudan and Ethiopia brought upon each other could also hardly be described as generating the spirit of good neighborliness. When funds and scarce resources are diverted from urgent development needs into armaments, and when neighboring countries devote their energies and finances to ruin each other, the result can only be tragic, exacting a staggering toll in human life, destroying property, triggering large-scale displacement of peoples, and considerably retarding their growth and development efforts.

Internal Forces. On the other hand, the internal forces of disintegration can be identified as the following:

1. Groups demanding complete independent sovereignty from the nation into which they were placed. Examples would be Eritrea¹¹ and Northern Somalia¹².

2. Groups with legitimate grievances to whose demands successive regimes lent deaf ears, and who are now busy debating the advantages of separatism against those of participation; e. g., Southern Sudan, Kordufan, the Oromos, Tigrai, the Afars of Djibouti, and others.

3. There are situations where state and ethnic boundaries do not coincide and where ethnic kin inhabit different sovereign states. An ethnic conflict in one state has implications in other states where ethnic kin are located. If a group that is divided by state boundaries has a common language, religion, and culture, it can be said that it is united by stronger ethnic ties. The ethnic links that cut across state boundaries provide a tempting opportunity for outsiders. The temptation lies in the fact that a situation exists that can be exacerbated easily, i. e., a minimal intervention thus produces a proportionately greater effect. If an outside party has some reason to become involved, the prospect of a relatively "cheap" intervention will suggest cost-benefit calculations in favor of such action. Issas, Afars, Ben Amir, Ogaden Somalis, and others could be mentioned in this context.¹³

In the case of Eritrea, it should be noted that the Ethio-Eritrean problem is not an ethnic but a political problem. In fact, political mythology aside, in the 1940s and 1950s, the majority of the Eritrean people wanted unity with Ethiopia. To be sure, in the British supervised elections of 1952, it was the Unionist Party—a party which campaigned not for autonomy, not for federation or independence, but for unconditional union with Ethiopia that won 32 of the 67 seats of the National Assembly, as opposed to 18 for the Independence Front, 15 for the Muslim League of the Western Province, 1 for the National Party and 1 for the Independent Muslim League. Moreover, Unionist strength was revealed on April 29, 1952, when the National Assembly chose for its President the Secretary General of the Unionist Party, Tedla Bairu, by an overwhelming vote of 49 to 11.¹⁴ However, in subsequent years, the faith and confidence of the Eritrean people in Ethiopia was shattered when Haile Selassie's government abrogated Eritrea's United Nations sponsored federal status, suppressed political parties, banned the trade union movement, and reduced the region to a mere province of Ethiopia. Even after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974, the conflict could have been resolved if common sense and sanity had prevailed, but by and large, it failed. A number of reasons can be suggested for the failure.

First, there is the lack of dialogue and political interaction between Eritrean and Ethiopian intellectuals and their inability to articulate their differences and provide a common framework for action. In this respect, it could be said that some political cultures are essentially intolerant. They prescribe rigid modes of behavior and provide no room for differences. Individuals are expected to submit to the established taboos, totems, prejudices and irrational fixations. Since one has no independent beliefs, one does not also think of society's demands as an infringement on one's natural rights or lawful liberties. Inversely, if one were to attain consciousness and introduce new ideas, the individual could be constantly harassed and persecuted. Why? Because the new ideas will disrupt established feeling and thinking. Yet, it is such individuals who help change society. Their absence has often meant social stagnation.

The Ethiopian society of today is marked by, among other things, conflicts between and among the elite. If, for example, the individual happens to be an Amhara who sympathizes with some of the deep feelings of alienation—real or imagined—of the Oromos, Eritreans, or Muslims, he may readily be branded "traitor." If he is an Eritrean who has difficulty in accepting the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) version of Eritrean history, his scholarship may be seriously questioned, even if he is a university professor with a Ph. D. in the history of Northeast Africa. If he is an Oromo who refuses to share the prejudices and irrational fixations of other Oromos about the Amharas and Tigreans, his ethnic credentials may be placed in doubt. In such a situation, analysis is often slanted to pander to a fixed truth, and a conclusion cannot be cross-examined and verified through open inquiry. It seems that reason alone cannot determine political convictions. Emotions, passions, and blind beliefs are equally important in forming opinions. Yet, it is those individuals who question the passions, who see issues on their merits rather than the sponsors, and who refuse to assert things to be true merely because they conform to an established prejudice or to some theoretical fad, who can make a difference. They are the bridges that link a society and who can serve as a barometer of its sanity.

There remains the difficulty of finding a non-imperial legitimacy formula, i. e., one that could successfully integrate the country with a developmentalist rather than a preservationist policy. But the ability to incorporate dissent and to centralize it through legitimation was not there. Moreover, the conflict also became an extension of the conflicts in the Middle East and those of the major world powers. In the absence of a common framework of discourse, both sides, therefore, resorted to history to prove their points of view. While one side searched for an answer to an existing problem in the distant past, the other side dismissed the past and insisted on an immediate solution to the conflict.

In the process, to borrow the words of Bernard Lewis, "history has been menaced by an attitude which regards the past as another region to be 'liberated' by assault, and scholarship as another industry ripe for nationalization."¹⁵

For the rest of Ethiopia, however, the cause of instability in the country had much to do with undue concentration of wealth and power at the center and lack of development opportunities at the periphery. Given a committed leadership that encourages much greater social mobility that takes adequate measures to rectify regional disparities in the allocation of development funds, and that has some political vision, Ethiopia could have evolved into a stable and prosperous country. But unfortunately, because of the political bankruptcy of its elite, an elite that failed to live up to its historical mission, Ethiopia fell into the hands of leaders who could not make the country's present different from its past, and who left it in many ways worse than they found it.

There is also the present regime in Addis Ababa which calls itself a provisional government, but whose actions and inactions contradict the role it fancies to play. For instance, the right of national self-determination to the point of separation has been enshrined in its political declaration and guarantees the right of secession from Ethiopia. This policy has resulted in escalating demands for ethnic self-determination. Furthermore, perhaps to facilitate the task of secession, administrative boundaries are to be redrawn to "reflect" linguistic groupings.¹⁶ Such an arrangement allocates sixty per cent of Ethiopia to the Oromos and Somalis even when their combined population is less than one third of Ethiopia's total population. The fundamental absurdity of such a policy is that it fails to recognize the existence of millions of Ethiopians who are products of mixed marriages, and who identify only with Ethiopia. Are they to be stateless? Ironic as it sounds, the Italian colonial administration, too, had issued a similar map in 1937 consisting of five regions, namely: Eritrea, Amhara, Galla-Sidamo, Harrar, and Somali. The Italian objective was to weaken the resistance movement by intensifying ethnic differences. Since it was, however, found unworkable, the policy was abandoned.

The present regime wants to detach, for example, the provinces of Humera and Wolkait from Gondar and incorporate them into Tigrai. The very same desire was also advanced as early as 1975 by the TPLF, which claimed one-fourth of the area of Gondar as Tigraean territory.

Gondar has a total population of 30 million, of which 185,000, i. e., a mere 5% speak Tigrigna. But if the map is to be redrawn on linguistic grounds, then it stands to reason that the boundary between Tigrai and Eritrea, for instance, is an imaginary boundary. The Tigreans, Afars, and Sahos never believe that they are moving into a different culture and society when they cross the border. Hence, if the

map is to be redrawn on linguistic basis, it would make more sense to incorporate the Eritrean provinces of Hamassien, Seraie, and Akele Guzaie to Tigrai than should be the case with Wolkait and Humera that have never been part of Tigrai. It would also make more sense to incorporate the Sahos and Afars of Eritrea with those in Tigrai because they are the same people and speak the same language.

But as far as Humera and Wolkait are concerned, we should note that historically, the Tekezie river provided the boundary between Gondar and Tigrai. In fact, as late as 1847, Mansfield Parkyns observed that while [Gondar] extends from the river Tekezie to the frontiers of Sennar [in the Sudan], the name Tigre is now applied to the whole country east of the Tekezie.¹⁷ Parkyns also identifies Semien, Wogera, Wolkait, and Tsegede as being governed by Ras Gebre, Chief of Semien,¹⁸ and subsequently by his son, Haile Mariam who died in 1826, and then by his illustrious grandson, Ras Woube (c.1800-1867),¹⁹ who extended his rule in 1832 into Tigrai, Hamassien, Seraie, Keren, and the Semhar province of Massawa.

Similarly, writing in 1868, Plowden confirms what Parkyns asserts. He maintains that the principal sub-divisions of Tigrai consisted of Hamassien, Seraie, Akele Guzaie, Agame, Shire, Adi Abo, Tembien, Enderta, Waggirat, and Shilawa.²⁰ Nowhere does he mention Wolkait or Humera as being part of Tigrai. On the contrary, he confirms that Semien, Wogera, Wolkait, Kola Wogera, and the others were all administered by Ras Woube of Semien.²¹ He also observes that Wolkait was governed, before Woube, by his father, Haile Mariam Gebre.

Under Emperors Tewodros, Yohannes, and Menelik, the provinces had always remained parts of Gondar. Under Haile Selassie, such prominent individuals as Ayalew Birru (Semien), Ayane Chekol (Armachiho), Birre Zegeye (Armachiho), Amoraw Woubneh Tesemma (Armachiho), Adane Makonnen (Tsegede), Mesfin Redda (Wolkait) governed these places.

Even in the 1937 Italian map of Africa Orientale Italiana of 1935, provinces like Wolkait, Tsegede, Tselemt, Semien, and Wogera all remained part of the Amhara region in which Gondar was placed.

It appears that the regime wants to annex these provinces to Tigrai for two objectives. First, to create for Tigrai a link with the Sudan, for strategic reasons. The second is economic. Setit Humera contains one of the best alluvial soils in the whole of Ethiopia. In the 1960s and 1970s, sesame, corn, cotton, oil seeds, pulses, millet, and sorghum were extensively produced on excellent soil. The province had become the second largest cotton producing area in Ethiopia next to the Awash Valley. The labor force had also increased from 13,000 in 1964 to 300,000 in 1972, and some 5000 tractors were needed for farming

purposes. Agricultural production was so successful that for every \$1.00 invested, the value of increase in crop production was \$5.00. Average annual earnings in foreign exchange alone had reached some \$350 million. Experts had also estimated that with the building of dams and shifting into irrigated agriculture, production could be tripled. These facts explain why the TPLF wants to annex the region to Tigrai.

It seems that for the people of Gondar to give up these provinces would be like committing economic suicide. In a series of letters addressed to Meles Zenawi, President of the Provisional Government, many individuals have strongly protested what they call "ill-advised" and "misguided" action, which will lead to increased bloodshed. Dagneu Wolde Selassie, former Ambassador to Yemen, former Governor of Gondar Province and great great grandson of Ras Woube, and Fentaye Asegu, a businessman, are among them.²²

In the Amharic daily, *Addis Zemen* of Ghinbot 15, 1964/May 23, 1992, the regime admits of the vehement and widespread opposition of the public to the new administrative map of the regions and, as a result, of its desire to revoke the new boundary setup. However, the concerted TPLF/EPLF military campaigns in Northern Gondar, the arbitrary arrests, the killing of innocent women, children and old men, and the mass displacement of the population proves otherwise. The objective is to change the demographic composition of the provinces in question in time in order to facilitate future settlement from Eritrea and Tigrai. To that end, a series of coercive proclamations have been issued ordering the people of Armachiho, Tsegede, Tselemt, and Wolkait to take future instructions and administrative guidance from Mekele, capital of Tigrai, rather than from the city of Gondar.²³

The policy of the present regime has ominous implications for Ethiopia's security, and could also have dire consequences for peace and stability in the area. An ethnic fuse has been lit, and is spiralling out of control. A wave of unrest and insecurity prevails in Bale, Arsi, Southern Shoa, Sidamo, Keffa, Wollega, and Gondar. Some 150 innocent people, for example, have been murdered in Bedeno, Harrar Province, of which two-thirds were Amharas. Renewed ethnic fighting is also going on in Eastern Ethiopia that has paralyzed even relief operations. The Nuer vs. Anuak, Issa vs. Oromo, Oromia Islamia vs. Amharas and Tigreans, Oromos vs. Harraris, Afars vs. Issas, Muslim Fundamentalists against Christians, and so on.²⁴ In effect, the reservoir of shared values and experiences, of common goodwill and interdependency are dissipating to the point where the complete disintegration of Ethiopia has become a frightening prospect. Indeed, since ethnic identities are being state-sponsored at the expense of class identities, the regime has created the conditions for the complete break-up of Ethiopia. Whether this is being done by design or otherwise is

immaterial. But the fact of the matter is that Ethiopia is disintegrating—a disintegration which is also going to take others down with it, because Ethiopia's break-up is not going to take place within the confines of a sealed territorial container. The politically active forces in the area which seriously believe that they can benefit from the destruction of Ethiopia are lifting a huge stone only to drop it on themselves.

Eritrea has become independent. But what does political independence promise it? The amelioration of the economic conditions of the population, which require incredible resources, is a necessary component of domestic political legitimacy. Most donor governments are giving priority, and rightly so, to their own domestic problems. Eritrea has few natural resources. It will not be self-sufficient in food at least for a decade. Some 75% of the population depends on international food and aid.²⁵ Its agriculture has been devastated by drought. There is a grave shortage of oxen. The forty public sector factories are standing idle and run at only one third of their capacity.

Over twenty percent of Eritrea's population is internally displaced. In Asmara alone some fifty thousand youth are unemployed. There are also some one million Eritrean refugees who are yet to be repatriated and rehabilitated, for which the country needs substantial foreign assistance. Much of the infrastructure was damaged by the war. The government estimates that at least \$2.5 billion would be needed to rebuild the roads, modernize agriculture and revive small industries. So far, however, only \$100 million has been pledged for the next three years.²⁶

Moreover, there is also the problem of ethnicity and conflicts with the opposition parties. The EPLF is accused of doing everything in its power to suppress and to liquidate any form of opposition, of embarking upon an extensive scheme of exterminating all Eritrean political organizations in the western lowlands and of arbitrarily decreeing laws and implementing them without the consent of the people.²⁷

Witnessing the ascendance to power of the essentially Christian-dominated EPLF, the Arab countries are once again providing aid to the Muslim-dominated ELF in order to help it prevail over its adversary, the EPLF. Indeed, since Saudi Arabia considers Eritrea to be part of its security perimeter, it is taken aback in the face of a Christian-dominated EPLF, which has also established official relations with Israel. As if that was not enough, when Issaias Afewerki, the Eritrean President, went to Israel in February 1993 for a health check-up, the Saudis were deeply offended.²⁸

More ominous for Eritrea is the emergence of the Mujaheddeen of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which declared war on the government in September 1993. The Mujaheddeen has been engaged in fierce battle

with the forces of the EPLF. To be sure, some twenty-five thousand Eritrean soldiers have been demobilized. Most being Muslims, most of them have naturally joined the ranks of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. On 16 December 1993 the Mujaheddeen attacked western Eritrea with the help of volunteers from Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Pakistan.²⁹

The incident may be just a footnote to the evolving drama, but certainly the beginning of independent Eritrea's tragedy. Issaias Afewerki protested and appealed for a rational discourse, but in vain. It would be erroneous to assume that radical Muslims or Pan Arabists will compromise with an EPLF-led Eritrean government, and still less, permit it to have normal relations with Ethiopia, Israel, or the United States. They did not invest so much in the "Arabism of Eritrea" merely to settle for a non-Arab, and a non-Muslim secular entity.

Although there are many imponderables, various probable scenarios could be elicited from the current situation: unable to withstand all internal and external pressures, Eritrea may simply disintegrate; neighboring Sudan may claim and annex the eastern lowlands; and the entire Red Sea coast of Eritrea could be annexed by the Afar Democratic Union which has gone on record and declared its intention to unite all the Afar-inhabited regions of the area.

By invoking the current regime's declaration on the right of secession, the Ogaden could declare its independence tomorrow, and establish either an independent state or join the Somali Republic.³⁰ The Issas could do likewise. In fact, since their Zeila Congress of 1960, they have been dreaming of establishing an Issa state composed of southern Djibouti, the Dire Dawa and Gurgura provinces of Ethiopia, and the Issa provinces of northern Somaliland.³¹

Furthermore, the Afars may proceed and create an Afar state consisting of northern Djibouti, northeastern Ethiopia, and the entire Red Sea coast of Eritrea from Massawa to Assab. Let it be said that with the creation of an Afar and an Issa state, Eritrea and the present Republic of Djibouti would cease to exist altogether. Similarly, the Oromos, Wolayittas, Gurages, Harraris, Sidama, Amharas, Gumuz, etc. may follow suit.

If this is what seems to be in store for Ethiopia, what about Somalia? In so far as it is one of the least developed countries of Africa, it shares Ethiopia's structural deformities. But beyond that, it has its own particular problems.

Ever since the 1960 *coup d'état* by northern military officers, former British Somaliland has fostered deep resentment against Mogadishu on account of being politically marginalized and economically peripheralized.³² Mogadishu will never accept this thesis. To be sure, over the last three decades, the south had the lion's share of

development funds and representation in the critical organs of the state machinery. To this deep feeling of alienation was added Siad Barre's orgy of killings and military excesses which devastated the north. As a consequence, the north has declared itself the Republic of Somaliland.

Muhammed Haji, writing from Riyadh, expresses this with some feeling: the argument that Somaliland is not viable either politically or economically fails to convince. In the history of the two countries, the south never supported the north. In fact, the opposite was true during the thirty years of the "ill-fated union." The leading foreign exchange earner of Somali is livestock, and that is exported by Somaliland. Bananas are supposed to be the second foreign exchange earner, but in actual fact, it is the remittances of expatriates working in the Gulf, 85% of whom are from the north, that is the second foreign exchange earner. The north and the south were two nations before the Europeans came.³³ Moreover, if what is left of the Somali Republic were to follow the Ethiopian example, this may give way to a series of clan-based states like the Mejeretein, which is led by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Hawiye, Darod, Merehan, Digil, Rahanwin, and so on. In the fighting between rival clans, in the Mogadishu area alone, more than twenty thousand people have been killed or injured says the United Nations.³⁴

The Sudan, too, is a troubled and inchoate state where the attempt to achieve national integration continues to be a serious problem. In this respect, the question finds ready expression in the distinction between the North and the South. As Richard Gray explains:

The decisive, distinguishing factor between North and South seems to be a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is conferred by birth. Completely isolated from the North until little more than a century ago, embittered by decades of subsequent hostility, and administered separately until the threshold of independence, the Southerner feels himself to be an African, while the ruling Northerner is proud of his Arab connection.³⁵

The two regions fought bloody wars from 1956-1972. But after sixteen years of civil war, the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972 was signed by the two sides. The South was granted regional autonomy, a regional people's assembly, and a high executive council that made the head of the council the vice-president of the Republic of the Sudan.

However, when the northern provinces were reorganized in 1980, the South lost a portion of its territory. The Southerners say that this was a violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Furthermore, oil

has been discovered in the South in commercial quantities. But since refining and processing capacity is located in the North, it has not contributed to the peace of the country.

Racial conflicts, religious differences, and other factors that caused instability in the first place, were never completely arrested. They have resurfaced. The situation has also been exacerbated by Khartoum's attempt to impose on non-Muslims Koranic *Sha'aria* laws, and punishment in accordance with *hudud*, which provides for amputation of limbs for crime and stoning to death for such offenses as adultery. If Khartoum insists on *Sha'aria*, the struggle for autonomy in the South may well graduate into a struggle for complete independence for Southern Sudan, with all its implications for Kordufan, Darfur, the Bejas, and Hadendawas of the Red Sea. In fact, a splinter group from the Sudan People's Liberation Army is already in shape to fight for Southern independence. Moreover, the Sudan's attempt to promote political objectives outside its borders by non-democratic means and its policy of allowing known terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate on its soil are increasingly isolating it. Such a misguided policy can only accelerate the process of internal disintegration.

The Question of Viability

If the forces of disintegration succeed, the existing four countries of the Horn of Africa may give way to one hundred and one others. Whether they will be viable or not will largely be determined by such questions as the existence of exploitable natural resources, population size and density, agriculture, political leadership, ability to borrow from abroad, literacy, cost of energy, level of urbanization, and so on. Indeed, economists suggest that minimum requirements for economic viability in developing countries include a population size of at least 10 to 15 million people,³⁶ a reasonably low population rate, and vast improvements in agriculture before or accompanying early industrialization,³⁷ increased availability of health services for more and more people, increased savings—in short, capturing the industrial revolution and building vast political, economic and social institutions just to survive in a rapidly changing world. To say that none of them would be viable would only be to state the obvious. After all, the thirty-six least developed countries, or the Fourth World—most of whom are in Africa—far from developing are actually stagnating or declining. They are requiring more and more importation of food merely to feed the population. In the process, they use wealth that could otherwise have been spent on development. They are also seeking outright charity. In 1981, the EEC agreed to establish for LDCs an aid target reaching 0.15% of GNP. If a fifth world were now to emerge out of

the disintegration of some of these least developed countries, it will not bring with it the millennium. It can only help to increase poverty. Hence, as Harold Laski once remarked, "no geographical boundaries, however drawn, can possibly give territorial autonomy to each group of persons claiming distinctive characteristics, nor on economic grounds would such separation be desirable."³⁸

If civil and religious wars are to be avoided, and if foreign interference in the affairs of the peoples of the sub-region is to diminish, the territorial integrity of the countries of the sub-region would have to be maintained, but their administrative, economic and political structures would have to be made responsive to development needs and requirements, to the hopes and aspirations of their peoples, and to the creation a much greater social mobility.

Toward Federalism

Despite the claims of the champions of "ethnicity" and "secession," in the case of Ethiopia, for example, one could argue that as a result of migrations, interactions, conquests, trade, intermarriage, etc. the diverse peoples of that country have created a geographic and cultural unit.³⁹ One might even argue that the concept of "ethnicity" has little meaning as a guide to the grouping of peoples in Ethiopia.⁴⁰ In fact, there have never been periods in history when wars were fought in Ethiopia on ethnic basis. The fact that people professed different religions, or spoke different languages, has never been a serious barrier to living together. To look at Ethiopia's problems as strictly ethnic would, therefore, be to miss the point. As Clapham pertinently observes, political exclusion and marginalization does in fact provide a better guide than ethnicity to the incidence of insurgency.⁴¹ Moreover, the inspiring "cause" in Ethiopian history has never been ethnicity, but regionalism—regionalism based on history, economic, and particularly local forms of life which gave pride of place and regional ethos. The solution to the problem, therefore, lies in retaining the principles of regional autonomy, not in proposing ethnic autonomy. We should note that one hundred years ago, Oromos were not Oromos but Gugi, Arsi, or Boran. Forty years ago, Eritreans were not Eritreans, but Hamassien, Seraie, or Akele Guzaie. Similarly, the Amharas were Gonderes or Gojames first before considering themselves as Amharas.

The process of bantustanization to which the country is presently subjected and the attempt to make territorial boundaries follow ethnic lines are nothing but a recipe for increased disaster. Ethiopia is a country where natural resources are not evenly distributed. The Afar region, for instance, has rock salt, potash deposits along with

geothermal energy, cobalt, chromium, nickel, and the huge commercial farms of the Awash Valley that produce cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, and a variety of fruits and vegetables. The Ogaden region has natural gas, petroleum, hydro-electricity, and the potentially irrigable huge lands of the Wabi Shebelle and the Juba basins. The Oromo region produces coffee, tea, several types of grains, livestock products, cement, gold, platinum, mica, coal, iron, as well as a variety of other products. If the existing arrangement were to prevail, those regions with favorable resource endowments would develop faster and eventually dominate the weaker regions. To compartmentalize such a country on a linguistic basis would, therefore, be a costly mistake. It will impede the optimum harnessing of human and non-human resources. It will be a serious barrier to factor mobility. It will also foster parochial relationships and slow down the development of rational and efficient forms of political and economic administration. One should draw the necessary conclusions from the Yugoslav experience. Hence, it may be better to go back to the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Ethiopia as they existed prior to 1974-1975 (see map). Admittedly, some changes and modifications can be made here and there on economic and administrative grounds. But by and large, it would be advisable to make the provinces ethnically heterogeneous rather than homogeneous.⁴² Ethiopia itself is a heterogeneous country. It consists of some sixty-three language groups. The provinces can only reflect this reality. Similarly, the natural resources of the country do not belong to this or that ethnic group, but to the 50 million Ethiopians.

A joint Ethio-Eritrean Ministerial consultative meeting which took place in Asmara on September 22-27, 1993 reached agreement on a wide range of issues: economic, social, agricultural, energy, environment, monetary and financial, technical and scientific, security, defense, and foreign affairs. These mutual interests are to be pursued through joint projects and ventures to promote the gradual evolution of the two economies and societies into a higher level of integration. Agreement was also reached whereby Ethiopians and Eritreans are allowed to move freely in both countries without entry and exit visas, and to reside in each other's country for an unlimited period of time.⁴³ The government also proposed a confederal relationship with Ethiopia.⁴⁴

In a recent interview with the Kuwait newspaper, *Al-Watan*, Issaias Afewerki also disowned the Arabism of his country, dismissed the idea of Eritrea joining the Arab League as quite "strange," and reiterated the fact that there is no difference between Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁴⁵ If there are no differences between Ethiopians and Eritreans, and rightly so, if the aim of the leaders is indeed to promote a higher

Ethiopian Provinces
(as they existed prior to 1974)



level of integration between the two economies and societies, why then dismantle existing arrangements? Why disintegrate what has already been integrated? Instead of proposing a confederation, why not settle for a federation? For this reason, conditions should be such that the idea of restoring Eritrea's former federal status should be earnestly contested, vigorously debated, and defended with equal talent and energy. But the question is: does such a condition exist? Does Ethiopian nationalism have an opportunity for political action in today's Eritrea? In any event, the same federal status would have to be extended to Tigrai, Shoa, Gondar, Wollega, Sidamo, Harrar, etc. in order to make Ethiopia a federal republic. Such a move will go a long way to restore the historically decentralized governmental and economic structure in which the provinces enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the imperial center and functioned in the form of a federation.⁴⁶

With regard to Somalia, we could also say the following: many in Northern Somaliland feel that their region's future must lie in close association with Djibouti and Ethiopia rather than with southern and central Somalia.⁴⁷ There is some merit to this argument. The economy of Hargeisa and Berbera is more oriented towards Jigiga and Dire Dawa in Ethiopia than towards Mogadishu which is some 1,800 km. away from Berbera. However, it would be more practical for the northern and southern regions of the Somali Republic to form a federation. As we shall see shortly, such an arrangement will not exclude contacts with Djibouti and Ethiopia. On the contrary, it will open the door for increased cooperation and interaction between Somalia and its neighbors. In fact, former President Abderahman, who contends that Somaliland is here to stay, recently pointed out that all the countries of the Horn—Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and [Sudan] could establish economic cooperation and work together in many fields.

With regard to Djibouti, we could say the the situation in that country has been aggravated by the destabilization of Ethiopia and Somalia. Nevertheless, the essence of the conflict remains the historic rivalry between the Afars and Issas. The once influential Afars feel that they have become an underdog in their own country. In fact, since 1976, when Ali Aref lost power, the prominence of the Afars has declined considerably. Their demands for political pluralism are not, therefore, without some merit. In any event, the taking of speedy measures to address their grievances, coupled with the stabilization of Somalia and Ethiopia, will, no doubt, help restore peace in Djibouti.

Finally, there is the Sudan. If that country were to be a secular state and reorganize its administrative structure on a federal basis and grant the south and the other regions such a status, the Sudan could also become a stable country. Stability and a policy of good neighborliness will create favorable conditions for sub-regional cooperation.

Conclusion: Some Possibilities For Cooperation

Very few scholars have cared to study the physical, cultural and economic links of the countries of the Horn of Africa. In fact, the accent has always been on what divides them rather than on what unites them. The four countries operate as separate states, but they are also very interdependent. In physical characteristics such as climate, soils, and rivers, they are essentially complementary. They also share similar ethnological characteristics and cultural fusion. Common population groups also straddle their common boundaries and spill over across international frontiers.⁴⁸

While Ethiopia functions, for example, as a natural hinterland for Somalia and Djibouti, Somalia and Djibouti, in turn, are Ethiopia's natural outlets to the sea.⁴⁹ Moreover, the harnessing of common rivers like the Blue Nile, the Awash, the Wabi Shebelle, and the Juba—rivers that originate in Ethiopia but which are crucial for the livelihood of the peoples of the sub-region in terms of food production, nomadic grazing, irrigated agriculture, settlement of nomads, afforestation schemes, electricity production and the like, require cooperation of the four countries.⁵⁰

Similarly, there is the Blue Nile River which provides 85% of the water needs of both Egypt and the Sudan. The hydro-electric potential of the river has been estimated at 172 billion hydro kilowatts. Ethiopia's development plans call for building four dams to retain enough water from the 3.8 billion cubic meters of water which annually flows out to the Sudan and Egypt, and to develop one million acres of land through irrigation and to settle four million farmers.⁵¹ Because of the excess hydro electricity that can be generated, export to the Sudan should be feasible. The sharing of water, the construction of roads for trade and communication purposes, and other areas of development require close cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia. The Red Sea is also another area which provides new opportunities for cooperation. The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) is to start the construction of railway lines connecting Addis Ababa with Khartoum and a road between Gedaref (Sudan) and Doka (Ethiopia).⁵² Likewise, areas for cooperation between Somalia and the Sudan, between Djibouti and Somalia, and between the Sudan and Djibouti could be undertaken.

The East African Economic Community is often cited as a case to prove that economic cooperation and integration would not work in Africa. But what is conveniently overlooked and forgotten is that the Community failed not because it was African but because it was

conceived, manned, and run by the British in the interest of Britain. The benefits of cooperation were not also fairly distributed, but largely favored Kenya. Uganda and Tanganyika (Tanzania) became raw material producers and suppliers to a rapidly industrializing Kenya. The countries of the Horn of Africa can benefit from the experiences of the East African Economic Community, in the sense that they should avoid the mistakes. The idea of cooperation and integration must originate from them. The projects must have a direct bearing on their growth and development efforts. They should also play a part in financing the projects. If external aid were to be required, the sources of aid should be diversified. The execution of the projects should involve, to a substantial extent, local technicians and experts. Moreover, the less developed in the group should be granted extensive advantages in accordance with the principle that "backward" members should be favored at the beginning in order to achieve a balance thereafter. In this way, these countries can assist in carrying out the economic programs of the PTA.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹[At the time of writing,] Ethiopia alone has 7.4 million drought victims. There are also 2 million refugees from Somalia scattered throughout the Horn of Africa.

²The criteria established by the United Nations to determine such a status include: very low per capita GDP, a low rate of economic growth; embryonic health services; very short life expectancy; literacy rate of less than 20% for the population over 15 years of age; low educational opportunities; shortage of clean drinking water; dependence on one or two export crops; and manufacturing representing less than 10% of GDP.

³Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: The Theford Press, 1983), pp. 12-13.

⁴Clifford Geertz (ed.), "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Societies in the States," in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 152-157.

Hakan Wiberg, for instance, does not define what ethnicity is. He just states that if two different types of conflicts co-exist, the ethnic conflict takes the upper hand over class conflict. See I. M. Lewis (ed.), *Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa* (London: Ithaca Press, 1982).

⁵Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 5-13.

⁶Eric Hobsbawm, "Grand Illusions: The Perils of the New Nationalism," *The Nation*, Vol. 253, No. 15, November 4, 1992.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Most Muslims in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. They accept the first four Caliphs, i. e., Abubeker as-Siddiq, Omar ibn al-Khattab, Osman, and Ali as the rightful successors of the Prophet. On the other hand, Shi'ite Muslims recognize only Ali, Muhammed's cousin and son-in-law

as the legitimate successor to the Prophet. They reject the other caliphs as well as Sunni legal and political institutions.

⁹See, for example, Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. Result of a Symposium held at the University of Bergen, 23rd to 26th February 1967 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969).

¹⁰For an up-to-date, but brief, analysis of the Ethio-Somali conflicts, see Daniel Kendie, "Promoting Peace in the Horn of Africa Through Development Cooperation," in *Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Horn of Africa: Contemporary Economics, Politics, and Culture in the Horn of Africa* (The City College of the City University of New York, 1988).

¹¹For an objective study that provides the historical background, see G. Kennedy Trevaskis, *Eritrea: A Colony in Transition 1941-52* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). Eritrea was never known for the unity of its people. The land itself impedes contact and cooperation among the population. Eritreans do not share a common language, religion, race, or culture. Moreover, neither the Italians nor the British promoted anything resembling Eritrean nationalism. The group identity of being "Eritrean" is primarily derived from being administered as a separate entity in the past. In recent years, it is said that the brutalization of the inhabitants of the territory by the Ethiopian army has forged a strong unity among the people where little had existed before. Does this imply then that because the unifying element had been the common enemy, i. e., the Ethiopian army with its brutal methods, that once it is removed, necessary as it had been, Eritrea will split into its constituent parts?

¹²Peace and stability in the Somali Republic has always been a function of maintaining the balance between a complex system of clan alliances. For the North, see I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somalis of the Horn of Africa* (London and New York: Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1961); *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longmans, 1980).

¹³Astri Suharke & Lela Garner Noble, *Ethnic Conflicts in International Relations* (Praeger, 1977), pp. 4-6.

¹⁴Sylvia and Richard Pankhurst, *Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Last Phase of the Reunion Struggle, 1941-1952* (Woodford Green, Essex: Lalibela House, 1953), p. 281.

¹⁵Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), p. 63.

¹⁶*The Christian Science Monitor*, February 3, 1992.

¹⁷Mansfield Parkyns, *Life in Abyssinia: Being Notes Collected During Three Years' Residence and Travels in that Country* (New York, 1856), pp. 97-100.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 96.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 163.

²⁰T. C. Plowden, *Travels in Abyssinia and the Galla Country With an Account of a Mission to Ras Ali in 1848* (London, 1868), p. 39.

²¹*Loc. Cit.*

²²Copies of the letters are in possession of the author of this article. These provinces could not be claimed on ethnic grounds because out of a total population of 3 million (1984 census), 86.7% of the population of Gondar was Amhara, and only 5.7% was Tigrigna-speaking. The fact that 170,000 Gondarians speak Tigrigna does not make them Tigreans or Eritreans. (*Hidar* 11, 1984 E. C. corresponds to November 20, 1991. *Hidar* is the third month of the Ethiopian Calendar Year. Editor.)

²³*Addis Zemen*, *Ghinbot* 15, 1984/May 23, 1992. See also the letter to Amnesty International from the Washington branch of the Gondar Development and Cooperation Organization, June 15, 1992.

²⁴See "Ethiopia: Post-War Inertia," *Africa Confidential*, 25 October 1991, 32, no. 15.

²⁵*African Research Bulletin*, May 1st-31st 1993, Vol. 30, No. 5. See also *Africa Confidential*, 30 April 1993, 34, no. 9.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷The ELF (RC) has accused EPLF of kidnapping two of its Executive Committee members, Tekle Birhan Gebre Tsadik and Wolde Mariam Bahlubi in Kassala. In April 1992, Samuel Georgio, a critic of Issaias Afewerki, Secretary General of EPLF, was killed by a silencer in Addis Ababa. See *Africa Confidential*, 33, no. 10 (1992). The Eritrean Liberation Front Unified Organization, backed by Arab states, is engaged in military confrontation with EPLF: so is Mujaheddeen of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (See *Arab News*, 31 May 1992). Eritrean critics of EPLF accuse the leadership of waging a war of extermination against the forces of ELF and the Afars, and of illegally banning and excluding other political forces (*Arab News*, 15 April 1992). But even more significant is the reaction of the Ben Amir, the Saho, and the Afar. The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union (ARDU) demands total autonomy for the Afars of Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also advocates armed struggle against EPLF. Fighting continues in the mountains of Royalu, Bidu, Datka, as well as in Baada and Thio. ARDU accuses EPLF of violating the human rights of the Afars of the Red Sea and of trying to Eritreanize them by force. It also denounces EPLF for the scorched earth policy it follows to liquidate Afar resistance and of restricting the traditional movements into the Afar provinces of Ethiopia. See *Africa Confidential*, 26 July 1991, 32, no. 21. See also "Press Release," Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Spokesman Mahamada Ahmed Gues, Washington, D. C., 5/5/92.

²⁸*African Research Bulletin*, 1-28 Feb. 1993, 31, no. 2.

²⁹*The New York Times*, 2 Jan. 1994. See also *Foreign Broadcasts International Service* AFR-93-181, 21 September 1993. Issaias Afewerki's broadcast on 31 December 1993 recognizes the dangers posed Islamic fundamentalism. See *Africa Confidential*, 7 January 1994.

³⁰The area allocated to the Somalis in the Ogaden by the transitional government in Addis Ababa is more than what the movement which calls itself the "Western Somali

Liberation Front," could have hoped for. Even southern Bale and eastern Sidamo are included in it.

³¹See Richard Adolff and Virginia Thompson, *Djibouti and the Horn of Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

³²For the circumstances that culminated in the unity of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland to create the former Somali Republic, see I. M. Lewis, *The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965).

³³See the letter to the Editor, *Arab News*, July 1, 1992, p. 8.

³⁴The carnage in Somalia has taken a terrible toll in lives and property. See *African Research Bulletin*, 28, no. 12 (16 Dec. 1991-15 Jan. 1992).

³⁵Richard Gray, in his "Introduction" to Joseph Oduho and William Deng's *The Problem of Southern Sudan* (London, 1963), pp. 1-2. See also Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London and New York, 1968).

³⁶Joseph Spengler, "Democratic Political Systems as Vehicles for Economic Development," in Monte Palmes and Larry Stern (eds.), *Political Developments in Changing Societies* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), pp. 107-108.

³⁷If the rate of population growth is, say, 2.9% per year, the rate of economic growth has to be at least 2.9% merely to keep even on a per capita base. See Paul Bairoch, *The Economic Development of the Third World* (Rf. by Lady Cynthia Postam, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), p. 203. See also Gunnar Myrdal, *Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Economics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 107.

³⁸Harold Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1951), p. 593.

³⁹Donald Levine, *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 40-86.

⁴⁰Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in Ethiopia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).

⁴¹Christopher Clapham, "The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Survival*, Sept./Oct. 1990, Vol. XXXII, No. 5.

⁴²Elite control is called centralization. On the other hand, local control is usually labeled as decentralization. There can be active public and private institutions, with a weak central direction. There can also be central co-ordination of policy, but on in which responsibilities are widely dispersed. There can also be central direction with little or no dispersion of responsibilities. See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N. Y.: Double Day, 1960), pp. 91-92.

⁴³*The Ethiopian Herald*, 28 September 1993; *Ibid.*, October 10, 1993. See also *African Research Bulletin*, September 1st-30th, 1993, Vol. 30, No. 9.

⁴⁴*Africa Confidential*, 30 April 1993.

⁴⁵*Arab News*, 27 October 1993.

⁴⁶Daniel Kendie, "Ethiopia: Towards a Federal Republic," *Medrek*, Publication of an Association of Ethiopians and Ethiopianists, East Lansing, MI, Number 3, February 1991, pp. 2-10.

⁴⁷See *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 31, No. 25, Dec. 21, 1990.

⁴⁸Assefa Mehretu, "The Choice Between Cooperation and Confrontation in the Horn of Africa," *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1982.

⁴⁹Mesfin Wolde Mariam, *The Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary Dispute* (Addis Ababa: Berhannena Selam Printing Press, 1964), p. 65.

⁵⁰Daniel Kendie, "Prospects for Promoting Peace in the Horn of Africa Through Development Cooperation" (United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), New York, 1986). The study proposes, among other things, the construction of two multi-purpose dams on the Juba and the Wabi Shebelle rivers; electricity transmission lines from Dire Dawa to Djibouti, and from Gode to Mogadishu; upgrading the Dire Dawa-Djibouti and Dire Dawa-Jigiga-Berbera and the Negele-Mogadishu and the Jigiga-Mogadishu roads; establishment of integrated regional development projects; the construction of an 800 kilometer long Shilabo-Addis Ababa and 170 kilometer long Shilabo-Mogadishu gas/oil pipeline.

⁵¹*Ethiopia: Liberation Silver Jubilee, 1941-1966* (Ministry of Information, Berhannena Selam, Addis Ababa, 1966).

⁵²*African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 16, 1991-January 15, 1992.