Title
Religious Diversity and the Role of Religious Behaviors on Asian American Political Participation

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Publication Date
2022

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Religious Diversity and the Role of Religious Behaviors on Asian American Political Participation

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Evangel Deepthi Penumaka

2022

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Religious Diversity and the Role of Religious Behaviors on Asian American Political Participation

by

Evangel Deepthi Penumaka
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2022
Professor Lorrie Frasure Yokley, Co-Chair
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Scholars studying religion and politics have largely focused on how participatory religious behaviors—such as frequent church attendance—are important for political participation. This has been established not just for traditionally white, Christian populations, but for Black Americans and Latinos. Religious institutions have historically served as a central support system for Asian American immigrants. Asian Americans, however, practice a diversity of faiths, including non-Judeo-Christian faiths where frequent worship attendance is not a condition for high religiosity and instead, devotional behaviors are also important religious practices—which then may also provide a path to political participation. However, there are few studies examining the extent to which the religion-to-politics pathway extends to non-Christian religious traditions. This dissertation seeks to examine how external and internal religious behaviors serve as a resource for political participation among Asian Americans and across religious traditions for Asian American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. Across four sets of surveys, I find that external religious behaviors are consistently associated with non-voting political participation across religions, and may provide resources such as a salient political identity for political participation. This latter resource, however, is particularly important for places of worship that are primarily composed of Asian American immigrants, further centering the institutional importance of places of worship for immigrants in the U.S. I also find that internal religiosity is a predictor of civic engagement among Hindu Asian

Americans and suggest that the role of internal and external religiosity may be conditioned by the socioeconomic status of immigrants. My findings have implications for the role that religion plays not just for resource acquisition but on the role of religious and ethnic identity across generations. This project contributes to our understanding of religion and politics, and the institutions beyond traditional actors like political parties that play an important role in Asian Americans political behavior.

The dissertation of Evangel Deepthi Penumaka is approved.

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Natalie Remi Masuoka, Committee Co-Chair

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University of California, Los Angeles

2022

For my family, who have always believed in me

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful for everything that I've learned and the skills I've developed through my Ph.D. program. There are numerous people to thank for this. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee members: Matt Barretto, Janelle Wong, Natalie Masuoka, and Lorrie Frasure. This dissertation could not have developed fully without each of their guidance on my research ideas, from grad seminar papers, which have been pivotal to bringing my dissertation together, to developing my dissertation prospectus. A special thank you to my co-chairs Natalie and Lorrie for their mentorship over the past years. I am grateful for their time and guidance in accommodating my schedule, their patience as I sent along drafts when I could, and their encouragement to keep moving forward and to push for the timelines I set for myself to complete the program.

I would like to also acknowledge the field of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics at UCLA broadly. There isn't a better place to pursue research centering race and ethnicity in politics than at UCLA. The encouragement and the way REP champions one another is something I valued very much and kept me moving forward each year. I am also grateful for spaces like the Political Psychology Lab and the Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration Lab to present ongoing research and gain valuable feedback. I am thankful for the support of Political Psychology Fellowship Funds, the APSA Minority Fellowship Program, and UCLA graduate studies for funding throughout the program.

I'm deeply grateful for the people I've crossed paths with during my time at UCLA. Thank you to Tye Rush, Ashley Blum, Vivien Leung, Christine Slaughter, Izul de la Vega, and Angie Gutierrez both for their valuable feedback over the years on various projects and for their friendship. Grad school was better with all of you. Thank you to Joy Wilke for spending weekends on zoom holding each other accountable to write our dissertation. To Jenn Joines and Ana Oaxaca, I couldn't imagine having gotten through this experience without either of you from our first year as we navigated the ups and downs of grad school. Thank you specially for all the encouragement, planning, and coffee shop writing sessions in the hardest last months.

Over the past two years I've worked full-time while finishing my dissertation at night. To my DFP community, I am so thankful to have co-workers who were beyond encouraging and supportive at every stage of the past two years.

To all my family here and in India, thank you for your constant support. To my closest friends, my Newark crew, and Kim and Shirine, I'm so grateful to have you in my life wholeheartedly for all the challenges life threw my way during this time. To my sister Hannah, thank you for your patience with me through all the challenges of the past few years, and for encouraging me to keep what was important in sight.

This process challenged my resilience in every way. The core motivation that kept me going are my dad and my mom. They came to the U.S. to pursue a better education for all of us, and for that, I knew I had to persevere. Dad, thank you for your love, constant encouragement, and willingness to drop everything to be there for me. Mom, our lives are not the same without you but you're a part of it nonetheless as my role model and my guiding light. Thinking of the sacrifices you made for our family and to pursue your own education kept me going the last few months. I hope I made you both proud.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Scholars have theorized a variety of ways through which religion influences civic and political engagement. Religious institutions are important for providing a place to develop civic skills, gain information about issues and candidates, and recruit members to volunteer (Verba Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988; Putnam, 2000). Focusing on church attendance as the main dimension of religiosity in the religion-to-politics pathway, scholars find that church attendance has a positive influence on activities like volunteering (Wuthnow, 1991; Greeley, 1997) and on political participation (Hougland and Christeson, 1983; Martinson and Wilkening, 1987; Harris, 1994; Driskell, Embry, and Lyon, 2008). There is variation in theorizing what the measure of church attendance specifically captures. Some view it as measuring the civic skill acquisition that comes with being a church member (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). The measure may also capture other factors that come with being part of a religious organization, such as the messages churchgoers are exposed to, or the strength of belief systems displayed through one's frequency of church attendance (Tate, 1991; Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012).

Other scholars emphasize a so-called 'God gap' in the study of religion and politics between American voters, where more secular and less religious voters tend to be Democrats, and voters who are more religious—by attending worship services regularly, reading the Bible, and observing daily prayer—tend to have more conservative cultural attitudes and are more likely to support the Republican Party (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Layman, 1997; Layman, 2001). New research by Margolis (2018) suggests that the 'religion-to-politics' arrow can also be observed in reverse where, instead, partisan identities inform religious decisions and responses to religion being used in politics (Margolis, 2018). Notably, this finding differs for

African Americans who are strongly Democratic despite high levels of religiosity (Layman, 2001, Harris, 1994; Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Margolis, 2018). This is driven by the close relationship of the black church with liberation theology and the central role the church played in the civil rights movement (Harris, 1994; Calhoun-Brown, 2000; Tate, 1991).

Researchers examining how religion can promote political mobilization and political participation have extended the literature on white Christians to racial and ethnic minority groups. The church for African Americans, for example, can influence political participation in various ways: it provides organizational and psychological resources for individual and collective action, supports social movements and activities such as voter registration drives, and promotes political mobilization through its informal social networks (Harris, 1994; McKenzie, 2004; Tate, 1991). Scholars have also found religion to be a positive, mobilizing resource for Latinos however scholars have grappled with which aspects of religion matter the most—from religiosity and beliefs to religious behavior, the latter of which is traditionally measured by one's frequency of church attendance. While some scholars argue that Latino political participation increases with the frequency of church attendance (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001), others find that church attendance actually drives down participation (Lee, Pachon, and Barreto, 2002). In contrast, involvement in other church-based activities consistently increases political participation across various modes of political participation for Latinos, particularly for non-electoral forms of participation (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012).

The studies on Asian American religions emphasize the importance of places of worship in supporting ethnic communities. Historically immigrant communities, particularly Asian American Christians, relied on religious institutions to deliver a range of social services, maintain cultural traditions and, most importantly, serve as a support system (Min, 1992; Yang and Ebaugh, 2001). Scholars studying Asian American political participation have found that dimensions of religiosity, such as the frequency of religious attendance and mosque involvement, are associated with political participation (Lien, 2004; Wong et al., 2011; Dana, Barreto and Oskooii, 2011). A full understanding of the extent to which religion may lead to political participation however should consider other dimensions of religiosity beyond worship attendance particularly across religious traditions (Fukuyama, 1961; Wilcox, 1986;

Wilcox, 1990; Wald, 1992; Harris, 1994).

This is important when considering how Asian Americans have contributed to the rise of non-Abrahamic faiths practiced in the U.S. (Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths, 2012), which comes with important distinctions between religious practices between Christian—which the literature has predominantly focused on—and non-Christians. Non-Christian faiths, for example, do not emphasize weekly worship attendance in order to be religiously devout. Secondly, the commonly used measure of religious attendance may not fully capture the mechanisms that are important parts of going to a place of worship particularly for immigrant communities, such as forming and maintaining social connections (Iwamura et al., 2014). These activities may range from social activities or participating in small worship groups or classes where members are able to develop friendships and heighten opportunities to discuss current events and be recruited to participate civically (McKenzie, 2004; Putnam, 2000; Putnam and Campbell, 2012). At the same time, Asian Americans Hindus, and Buddhists also participate in other forms of private religious behaviors such as observing rituals or puja at home (Iwamura et al., 2014). Few studies however have quantitatively examined dimensions of religiosity past worship attendance or compared the extent to which both public and private religious behaviors may influence political participation among Asian Americans. I seek to answer which aspects of religious behavior predict civic and political participation among Asian Americans and, specifically, how this varies among Asian Americans by religious traditions. Secondly, however, for religious traditions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, where going to one's temple is just one form of religious practice, personal religious practices may also have a salient effect on civic and political engagement.

I propose a model of religious behavior that encompasses both participatory and devotional religious behavior. The importance of religious behavior in places of worship could be as the literature in political science hypothesizes and finds (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995): that these are important institutional places where civic skills are developed and transferred over to politics. However, I argue an understanding of places of worship as a place to develop civic skills for politics does not fully capture the variety of different resources that can be acquired. Religion in the U.S. is important for immigrants due to the

community they have access to. Even among non-Christian religions where individuals may not seek out weekly worship, they are likely still part of their ethnoreligious community, and are advantaged in having an established in-group identity. Although Hindus and Buddhists may not attend their temple weekly, there are annual religious and cultural events that take place throughout the year that may provide important opportunities to interaction with one's religious community. These social ties provide important opportunities, then, where Asian Americans can be socialized into U.S. politics and exchange information, particularly in the absence of outreach by political parties and campaigns, and suggest that non-Christian immigrants could also have the same access to the resources that come with participatory religious behaviors as seen with Christian traditions. Next, when considering the role of private religious behaviors on political participation, I follow the established framework in the literature that private practices of religion provide psychological resources such as fostering ta cognitive connection to participate civically (Layman, 2001; Harris, 1994; Loveland et al., 2005).

While I do not focus on other dimensions of religiosity such as religious beliefs, measures of personal behaviors are likely reflective of and capture the way in which religion provides a psychological resource for engagement—of believing in the divine and the consequences that come from human relations (Kellstedt et al., 1996; Harris, 1994). As Layman (2011) describes, religious beliefs, such as how important religion is, indicate a commitment to one's religion as well the preference to take part in religious behaviors, such as attending temple or practicing privately, and it could be presumed that religious belief precedes religious behaviors. This dissertation however seeks to provide a starting point by establishing the extent to which *both* external and internal religious behaviors can influence political participation for a critically understudied group in both the religion-to-politics literature and in political science more broadly. In the remainder of the chapter, I review the existing religion-and-politics literature, before providing an outline of the dissertation and the main findings of each chapter.

1.1 Literature Review

This dissertation aligns with literature from political science, sociology and ethnic studies, and the sociology of religion. I will first provide an overview of the traditional theories on religion and political behavior. I will then address the theoretical frameworks and findings of scholars in sociology and Asian-American studies before lastly examining the literature on both public and private dimensions of religiosity.

Approaches to Religion and Political Behavior

Historically scholars have emphasized the importance of religious affiliation—of differences between specific denominations—as a predictor of political attitudes and partisan politics. This theoretical framework conceptualizes religion as a social group phenomenon, where religious tradition is closely linked to other factors such as region or ethnicity and race. The earliest studies proposed an ethnoreligious model of religious affiliation driving political behavior with Protestants (outside of the South) supporting the Republican party, and Catholics and Jewish people largely supporting the Democratic party (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Kleppner, 1987; McCormick, 1979). Since then there have been shifts within denominations such as mainline Protestants drifting away from the Republican party, suggesting that there are other religious factors that may predict partisanship—differences in religious commitment, for example (Layman, 2001). However, some denominational cleavages still persist today: evangelical Protestants are more likely to support the Republican party while Catholics, Jews, African American Protestants, and those who are secular are loyal to the Democratic party (Guth and Green, 1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Layman, 2001).

Belonging to specific denominations may be influential due to the psychological aspects that come with being part of an in-group and being around those with similar characteristics, such as the same religious beliefs and worldviews (Tajfel et al., 1979; Turner et al., 1987). More broadly considering the important of religious membership, many studies in studies in the sociology of religion examine the role of religious social networks and how connected people are to their religious community.

Being part of these networks serves to reinforce and heighten the salience one's beliefs (Putnam and Campbell, 2012), be exposed to political ideas and beliefs, and be more likely to adopt these beliefs because these conversations take place among a group that already has shared values (Putnam and Campbell, 2012). This type of exposure can include the following: political information and cues informally from other churchgoers, and formally from religious leaders who preach from the pulpit or otherwise encourage political mobilization (Layman, 2011). Both can lead to the development of different attitudes which are important for the collective group. Numerous studies have examined the extent to which churches are politicized in such a way, where there are opportunities to directly communicate political messages through sermons and indirectly associate a specific political culture with religious teachings and values (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988; Wald, Owen and Hill, 1990; Guth et al., 1998). However, this is largely dependent on the clergy being driven by their own personal beliefs and the extent to which they see it as an appropriate component of their religious calling to take an active role in intertwining politics and civic life (Djupe and Gilbert, 2003). Scholars however generally emphasize denominational differences in the extent to which churches are politicized. Mainline protestant denominations, for example, take a more active view on issues of social and economic justice, while evangelical denominations seek to strictly adhere to religious doctrines (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1990; Guth et al., 1997).

The most prominent aspect of religion that scholars have focused on is religious behavior and how, in general, religious behavior mobilizes political action. Some scholars make a distinction between public religious expression, such as attending church, and private devotional acts, such as praying and reading the Bible (Jelen, 1989). Most studies however focus on public religious expression and measure religious behavior through the frequency of worship attendance. The positive relationship between church attendance and voter turnout may be due to a variety of reasons, such as regular attendance giving church members a sense of civic obligation, thus leading to regular political participation (Hougland and Christeson, 1983; Martinson and Wilkening, 1987). In addition to this psychological component, church-goers are exposed to opportunities to be recruited into civic and political activity by other church members (Djupe and Grant, 2001).

Church membership also provides more direct resources. Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) resource model of participation examines how civic skills—such as writing a letter or organizing a meeting—can be developed in nonpolitical institutions such as churches. They find that these church-based skills promote political participation, particularly in non-electoral politics (Verba et al., 1995). One component of their argument does, however, center on denomination: they find that African American Protestants are more likely to participate in these types of civic activities at their church in comparison to whites or Latinos (Verba et al., 1995). They argue that Protestant churches have more opportunities for the development of civic skills in contrast to the Catholic Church's hierarchical structure, which may limit members from being as involved in activities where they can gain these civic skills (Verba et al., 1995).

In addition to the frequency of church attendance, some studies have found that devotional behaviors also have an influence on political engagement. Individuals who frequently pray and perceive religion as important in their lives have more conservative stances on political issues and are more likely to support the Republican party and its candidates (Guth and Green, 1993; Cook, Jelen and Wilcox, 2019; Layman, 2001). Other studies have focused on whether devotional behaviors are associated with increased political behavior. Harris (1994), for example, argues that religion provides two types of resources: 1) organizational resources and 2) psychological resource, where external membership provides formal settings like regularly scheduled meetings and social interactions to supply resources favorable for political participation, while internal religiosity provides cognitive and emotional resources. Harris (1994) finds that both internal religiosity and church activism are positive and significantly associated with communal collective action. Other studies also provide evidence that both dimensions of religious behaviors are important to consider. Lam (2002), for example, finds that frequency of prayer and frequency of reading the Bible are both associated with participating in voluntary organizations. Clark (1998) finds internal religiosity—measured through the frequency of prayer, frequency of reading the Bible weekly, and the number of times a person watches religious programs on TV—is positively associated with voting. Taken together, the literature provides a framework for the role of both external and internal

religious behaviors on political participation.

Examinations of Black, Latino, and Asian American Religiosity

Scholars studying political participation among racial and ethnic groups also recognize the importance of religion, however, they further conceptualize membership at church as a group-based resource. This is particularly evidence in the Black church, where membership provides a central place to pool resources such as time, and learn about political matters that are important for the in-group, all with the goal of reducing the costs of political participation (Tate, 1991). This political mobilization is conditioned on high issue salience, however, and confined to political churches—churches where members recalled hearing political announcements at churches. Research on the relationship between religion and political participation among Latinos generally shows a positive association between religion and politics, with variation in the measures of religiosity used. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) emphasize how Latinos have lower participation rates in other types of organizations in contrast to white Americans, further centering the church as a primary source of civic engagement and civic skill development for Latinos. Djupe and Neiheisel's (2012) study on religion and political participation among Latinos offers an argument on measurement that religious attendance alone does not fully capture why places of worship are important for political participation. Through a set of precise measures capturing involvement in church networks and activities outside of worship, they find that external religious behaviors are associated with non-electoral forms of participation (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012)

Asian Americans practice a diversity of faiths, with significant variation between and sometimes within national original groups. Chinese Americans for example may practice Christianity and Buddhism, or claim no religion, while Indian Americans and Filipino Americans are predominantly Hindu and Catholic, respectively (Min and Kim, 2002). The research on Asian American religiosity in the U.S. largely centers on the institutional role that places of worship have on communal life for new immigrants and for preserving ethnic identity. New immigrants seek places where cultural traditions, language use, cultural educational classes for children, and other needs are desired to be met, and places of worship provide a central place to do so with one's ethnic community (Min, 1992; Bankston and Zhou, 1996;

Kurien, 2002).

The emphasis on the connection between ethnicity and religiosity, however, may vary based on the institutional context of a place of worship. Jeung (2005) finds that mainline pan-ethnic churches are more likely to use sermons to address group empowerment, and actively encourage membership to organize around political issues while ethnic places of worship focused more on strengthening one's spiritual connection (Jeung, 2005). Wong's (2018) recent research however also suggests that places of worship may not be as politicized, where evangelical ministers were not likely to speak directly on issues. These types of political discussions are more likely to take place in small groups and informal discussions however (Wong, 2018), and further suggest that places of worship are important for this informal learning and interaction that takes place.

An important factor in examining the role of places of worship for Asian Americans is the way in which non-Christian religions start to take on more congregational forms of religious practice, such as having organized lay leadership, developing clergy roles, implementing Sunday school programs, and small lay groups (Chafetz and Ebaugh, 2000; Stroope, 2011; Gupta, 2003; Iwamura and Spikard, 2003). This creates two different paths to consider however. Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim immigrants are more likely to participate more often in these types of congregation-organized activities, largely due to the want for community (Min and Kim, 2022), which suggests that there are ample opportunities to gain the various resources that are conducive to political participation. At the same time, Buddhists and Hindus have much lower participation rates in weekly worship compared to Christian immigrants, and spend considerable time observing private religious rituals (Gupta, 2003). This type of religious observance includes having a small home shrine to practice rites and rituals (Gupta, 2003). Religious observances at home typically involve having a small shrine with images of a few deities or religious figures (Gupta, 2003). Even when taking into account then how there may be commonality across religions in terms of the relationship between external behavior and political participation, Therefore, even with the changes described above in non-Christian religions taking on congregational forms of religious behavior, it is essential to not leave out the distinct ways Buddhists and Hindus practice their religion

individually.

1.2 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation examines the application of the religion-to-politics pathway among Asian Americans and seeks to extend the traditional literature to non-Judeo-Christian religions. In my second chapter, I use both the 2008 and 2016 National Asian American Survey to examine the extent to which traditional theories on external religious behaviors, such as frequency of worship attendance, are associated with political participation among Asian Americans, and variation by religion among Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu Asian Americans. I also utilize a measure of religious activity outside of worship to better capture the socialization and resource acquisition that comes from religious membership. I find that religious activity is a predictor of non-voting participation for Asian Americans, and is consistent across religions. In this chapter, I show that there is a commonality across religions in the importance of a place of worship. I also show that measures of external religious behaviors past worship attendance better capture why places of worship are important sites for political participation compared to religious attendance, and also take into account ways non-Christian religions may interact with their place of worship—where frequent weekly worship is not a condition for being religiously devout.

Chapter three provides a closer examination of why places of worship matter. The 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey provides unique measures both on the degree of political similarity at places of worship and on the immigrant composition of a place of worship. I find that increased political similarity at a place of worship is associated with increases in non-voting participation. I also show that this political identity is a predictor of non-voting participation for Asian Americans who attend places of worship that are composed primarily of immigrants, suggesting that places of worship are particularly important for Asian American immigrants in bringing awareness to shared political beliefs and making these political values more salient for political participation. The findings also suggest that as Asian Americans incorporate into the U.S., other in-group identities, like racial identity

become more of the mobilizing factor for political participation.

Lastly, in chapter four I provide a unique look at the ways at the extent to which internal, devotional religious behaviors also are important for Asian Americans using the Pew Research Center 2012 Asian-American Survey. I find that worship attendance is predictive of Buddhist and Christian civic engagement, while internal religiosity is predictive of civic engagement among Hindus. These different paths may be due to the role that places of worship have to provide a variety of resources and remove barriers to participation, particularly among groups with lower socioeconomic status.

Taken together, this dissertation sheds light on understudied populations in political science by extending the literature on religious behaviors to Asian Americans and to non-Judeo-Christian populations. The project gives insight into the types of resources that can be acquired by group membership for both Christians and non-Christians and shows that devotional acts and the religious beliefs non-Christians hold require further study to fully understand the mobilizing role that religion provides to Asian Americans. This dissertation also has implications for the intersecting role of identities for Asian Americans—religious identity, racial identity, and political identity—and how the salience of these identities may vary by generation. As Asian Americans continue to grow in political power and representation in the U.S., it will be important to better understand the mobilizing factors for Asian American political behavior.

CHAPTER 2

External Religiosity as a Common Resource Across Religions

2.1 Introduction

One of the most prominent theories in the religion-to-politics pathway examines how religious membership provides a variety of resources that influences civic and political engagement. This literature focuses specifically on *external* forms of religious participation and public displays of religious commitment, such as the frequency of attending church and participation in small bible study groups. Places of worship then provide an important place where participation in religious activities leads to crucial resource acquisition. Through organizing and attending events, and socializing with one another, members gain civic skills and information about issues and candidates which can lead to political engagement, in addition to being directly recruited into social, civic, and political causes (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988; Putnam, 2000).

This model is generally applicable across race and ethnicity. For Black Americans, in particular, the Black church plays a central role in reducing the costs associated with political participation, as well as directly and intentionally raising the salience of issues and providing political cues on issues that are important to their community (Tate, 1991; Calhoun-Brown, 1996). Scholars find that political participation is associated with religious attendance and religious activities among Latinos (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001; Lee, Pachon and Baretto, 2002; Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012).

Much less is known about the extent to which similar pathways to political behavior

are apparent among Asian Americans across religions. Places of worship are also historically important sites for Asian Americans. First generation Asian Americans, particularly Asian American Christians, rely on their religious institutions to deliver a range of social services, maintain cultural traditions and—most importantly—serve as a supportive community as they incorporate into the U.S. (Min, 1992; Yang and Ebaugh, 2001). The research suggests that Asian American places of worship similarly provide opportunities for the same resource acquisition. Wong (2018) for example finds that while Asian American evangelicals may not receive political appeals directly from their religious leader, small group activities provide a space for informal political discussions. Secondly, scholars who have quantitatively examined the role of religion as a predictor of Asian American political behavior find that certain dimensions of religiosity, such as religious attendance and mosque involvement, influence political participation (Lien, 2004; Dana, Barreto and Oskooii, 2011).

The frequency of religious attendance is the most common measure to capture the broad characteristics of places of worship that are conducive to political engagement. A full understanding of the extent to which religion may lead to political participation among Asian Americans should consider, however, how religious behavior beyond worship attendance may capture the relationship between external religiosity and political participation (Fukuyama, 1961; Wilcox, 1986, 1990; Harris, 1994). This measure of religious attendance may not fully capture the mechanisms that are important parts of going to a place of worship, however, such as forming and maintaining social connections, which can be particularly consequential for immigrant communities (Iwamura et al., 2014). These activities may range from social activities to participation in small worship classes where members are able to develop friendships, build trust, heighten opportunities to discuss current events, and increase opportunities to be recruited to participate civically (McKenzie, 2004; Putnam, 2000; Putnam and Campbell, 2012). Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) show that these additional measures of religious activity outside of worship are more salient predictors of political participation.

Secondly, it is important to consider the extent to which the relationship between frequency religious attendance and political participation extends outside of Christianity and Abrahamic faiths. Asian Americans are a unique group to examine this: a plurality

of Asian Americans practice Christianity, however, the majority are non-Christians (Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths, 2012). An important component of these faiths, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, is that weekly worship attendance is not a common indicator of high religious commitment—in contrast to Christians (Iwamura et al., 2014). While some temples do take on more congregational forms of worship in the U.S., temples provide important places for religious practices that may not necessarily require formal worship such as observing rituals or celebrating religious and ethnic festival—such as Diwali for Hindus and the Lunar New Year among Buddhists (Iwamura et al., 2014).

The theoretical and empirical purpose of this chapter then is not only to establish the extent to which external religious behaviors provide a pathway to political participation among Asian Americans but to extend the literature to account for the experiences of religious traditions past Christianity. I use the 2008 and 2016 National Asian American survey to measure external religious behaviors in two ways: 1) the traditional measure of the frequency of religious attendance and 2) a measure of participating in activity outside of worship and prayer. I also consider how resource acquisition that comes from one's external religious behaviors may vary among Asian Americans Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. I show that there is a commonality among religions, in that Asian Americans similarly have a pathway to be civically and politically engaged through involvement with their place of worship across religious traditions. My findings also display that measures past religious attendance may be better suited to capture the different ways that belonging to a religious community influences political participation, in a way that is inclusive and captures the mechanisms of religions that do not prioritize frequent religious attendance but do not lack in opportunities for members to develop strong social ties to their religious community. This chapter also suggests, however, that it is important to consider the ways in which Christian traditions are advantaged in the U.S., how frequently they have access to resources for political engagement, and how the church may be advantaged in providing more direct links to civic participation.

2.2 Civic Engagement through Religious Institutions

The resources gained from institutional involvement at a place of worship can range from psychological resources that indirectly motivate political participation, to direct opportunities to engage civically. For example, regular church attendance is related to perceptions of political efficacy and may influence participation in activities, such as voting, that are seen as part of one's civic duty (Martinson and Wilkening 1987). Churches also provide opportunities to gain specific political information and cues, both informally from other churchgoers, and formally from religious leaders who preach from the pulpit or otherwise encourage political participation for certain issues or candidates (Layman, 2011). Both can lead to the development of attitudes and political interests. Numerous studies have examined the extent to which churches are politicized in such a way: if there are opportunities to directly communicate political messages through sermons, and indirectly associate a specific political culture and value system with religious teachings and values (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988; Wald, Owen and Hill, 1990; Guth et al., 1998). However, this is largely dependent on the clergy being driven by their own personal beliefs and the extent to which they see it as appropriate to take an active role in intertwining politics and civic life (Djupe and Gilbert, 2003). This can differ based on denomination where mainline protestant denominations are more likely to take an active view regarding social and economic justice, while evangelical denominations, in contrast, seek to focus more strictly on religious doctrines (Wald, Owen and Hill, 1990; Guth et al., 1997).

Religious membership and involvement can also lead to skill acquisition. Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) resource model of participation examines how civic skills—such as writing a letter or organizing a meeting—can be developed in nonpolitical institutions such as churches. They find that these church-based skills promote political participation specifically for non-electoral politics (Verba et al., 1995). One component of their argument centers on denomination: they find that African American Protestants are more likely to participate in these types of civic activities at their church in comparison to whites or Latinos (Verba et al., 1995). They argue that Protestant churches have more opportunities for the development

of civic skills in contrast to the Catholic Church's hierarchical structure, which may limit members from being as involved in activities to gain these civic skills (Verba et al., 1995).

Scholars of race and ethnicity and political participation also recognize the importance of religion on political participation, however, they further conceptualize membership at church as a group-based resource. Membership in the Black church provides a central place where resources such as time and money are pooled together, and where church members can learn about current political matters—all of which serve to reduce the costs of political participation (Tate, 1991). This political engagement however is more likely to take place when there is high issue salience and group political mobilization at a place of worship (Tate, 1991). Here the political learning is direct and intentional in order for group members to learn about policies and issues important to their community. Similarly, Calhoun-Brown (1996) finds that the direct influence of African American churches is largely confined to politicized churches—such churches where members recalled hearing political announcements at churches. This is similar to research mentioned previously by Djupe and Gilbert (2003), where the extent to which a church is political depends on how politically active a minister chooses to be.

McKenzie (2004) argues that direct political mobilization is less important compared to the informal conversations among churchgoers that take place. He argues that these conversations serve as a motivator among religiously devout African Americans not only because church members gain information on a regular basis but because they gain this information in a setting where conformity to civic norms can be enforced. McKenzie (2004) utilizes the 1993-1994 National Black Elections Politics Study which provides a measurement of whether respondents have discussed political matters at a church or place of worship. While limited in its measurement as to the different types of political discussions that could occur or the frequency of discussions, McKenzie (2004) finds that informal political discussions at African American churches have a significant, positive association with voting behavior and non-voting activism. In contrast, clergy messaging is only salient for non-voting participation.

Research on the relationship between religion and political participation among Latinos

generally shows a positive association between religion and politics, with some variation in the measures of religiosity used to capture this relationship. In contrast to Verba et al.'s (1995) argument that the Catholic Church limits civic skill development for Latinos, Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) find that Latino Catholics are more likely than Latino Protestants to vote in congressional and school board elections (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Rather than the organizational structure of a certain denomination influencing this variation, they argue that some churches are more effective in making, and also more likely to make, political appeals to their members (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). The authors also consider how white Americans are part of a variety of different associations while Latinos have lower participation rates in these organizations—almost half that for each association except for church participation (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Therefore, Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) argue that the church is a primary source of civic engagement and civic skill development for Latinos.

Other scholars, however, emphasize that church attendance may not fully capture the different types of resource acquisition that take place. While agreeing that religion can influence political participation Driskell, Embry and Lyon (2008), for example, question the extent to which church attendance accurately captures the organizational aspects of religion that can influence political participation. They examine several different measures, ranging from religious beliefs, church attendance, and an index of activities outside of worship such as singing in the choir (Driskell, Embry and Lyon, 2008). They find that participating in church activities, past church attendance, has a positive, significant effect on political participation, while on the other hand church attendance is not a significant predictor (Driskell, Embry and Lyon, 2008). The authors consider several reasons for this negative relationship: that this suggests an economy of time where the more someone is involved in a religious tradition, the less time they have for other activities such as politics, or alternatively, that evangelical denominations withdraw from collective action due to Biblical teachings on personal salvation of individuals (Driskell, Embry and Lyon, 2008). Ultimately, however, they call for future research to include more comprehensive measures of church participation rather than solely focusing on church attendance (Driskell, Embry and Lyon, 2008).

Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) make a similar argument. Drawing on Lee, Pachon and Barreto's (2002) research that church attendance is not a sufficient condition to influence Latino political participation, Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) argue that religious behavior is captured only by measures of religious identification and church attendance alone, such as in Jones-Correa and Leal's (2011) research, does not sufficiently capture the mobilizing effects of civic skills on political participation (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012). Instead, they call for more precise measures that directly measure involvement in church networks and activities, as outside of worship is where the opportunities for skill development and mobilization are most likely located (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012). In contrast to Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) and in line with Verba et al. (1995), they find that among Latinos, church involvement is more important for non-electoral forms of participation rather than for explicitly political activities such as voting (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012). Specifically, the authors argue that while other dimensions of religiosity, such as internal religiosity, may matter for political behavior, the most influential effect comes from involvement in church networks, as participation in leadership positions at church and involvement in small groups at churches boosts political participation consistently among whites and Latinos (Djupe and Neiheisel, 2012). Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) make an important contribution to the literature by aiming to more closely identify which aspects of religiosity—particularly which aspects of religious behaviors—influence civic and political participation.

The arguments of the previous scholars align with literature in the sociology of religion that strongly emphasizes the social role of religion (Durkheim, [1912] 2001) and the importance of religious social networks. One particular branch focuses on religious social embeddedness—that is, how connected people are to their religious community or congregation—and is frequently measured as how many friends people have at their church (Stroope, 2012). Scholars find that increased embedded in one's religious community leads to a range of different outcomes: these congregational-based social relations help retain those who converted (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980), influence personal health (Krause, 2006), give life a sense of religious meaning (Krause, 2008), and enhance subjective well-being (Putnam and Lim, 2010).

Putnam and Campbell (2012) in particular find that religious social networks are the most powerful predictor of all their measures of civic engagement, from volunteering for secular causes to working on a community project. Their measurement of religious social networks is an index consisting of the number of close friends in their congregation, participation in small groups in their congregation, and the frequency of discussing religion with family and friends (Putnam and Campbell, 2012). Essentially, sitting alone in the pews does not by itself lead to gaining the resources that come from being part of a religious community—it is when one forms social networks within their religious community that the resources they can acquire are enhanced (Lim and Putnam, 2010).

This literature provides a helpful framework to address why external religious behaviors are important for civic engagement. Particularly for immigrants, religious communities provide an important place to learn both formally about institutions in the U.S. and informally about issues and current events and place into context issues and opinions that they may encounter through other settings such as the workplace or in the news. The studies described then lend evidence to hypothesize that being active within one's religious community may also be conducive to increasing civic engagement among Asian Americans.

2.3 Theoretical Framework: Asian American Religious Institutions

Research on Asian American religiosity in the U.S. has explored the institutional role that places of worship have on communal life for new immigrants, particularly in helping maintain ethnic identity. This can be done in two ways: by providing members with social networks with other co-ethnics, and by helping members preserve their cultural traditions (Iwamura and Spickard, 2013). This is a common theme among individual studies of national-origin groups. Min (1992), for example, finds that Korean immigrant churches deliver a range of functions, from providing social services to maintaining cultural traditions through Korean language use during service and cultural education classes. Studying Vietnamese students, Bankston and Zhou (1996) find that religious participation influences ethnic identification

more so than family or individual characteristics. Even among traditions where regular temple attendance is not emphasized, such as Hinduism, immigrants develop group forms of worship with other co-ethnics due to the need for community (Kurien, 1998; Kurien, 2002).

Importantly, as religious members become closer to their co-ethnic community, religious organizations may also facilitate greater integration into the wider American society. Stephen Klineberg (2004) finds that Asian churchgoers were significant more likely than non-church attendees to think of themselves as equally Asian and American, and more prepared to identify their political affiliation as Democrat or Republican compared to non-church goers (Klineberg, 2004). At the same time, Asian American churchgoers are also not breaking ties with their ethnic community: churchgoers were also more likely to have participated in a co-ethnic organization (Klineberg, 2004).

When considering the extent to which Asian Americans have opportunities to be a member in a place of worship that is intentionally politicized, studies suggest that this varies based on the denomination. Jeung (2005) finds, for example, that among ethnic-specific Asian congregations, worship is primarily reserved for more intellectual and reverent connections to God (Jeung, 2005). In contrast, mainline pan-ethnic Asian American churches are more likely to use sermons to emphasize messages of group empowerment, in addition to actively encouraging members to organize around political issues and becoming involved in issues such as immigration, community issues, and minority rights (Jeung ,2005). Although Jeung (2005) argues that evangelical pan-ethnic churches are less likely to preach about group empowerment, evangelical ministers do address societal issues such as homelessness, abortion, and gay rights in their sermons. Wong's (2018) recent research on evangelical Asian Americans however suggests that they may not be as politicized as found in Jeung's (2005) research: evangelical ministers rarely spoke directly on political issues. Instead, political information is largely conveyed through informal discussions outside of worship, such as in small-group Bible study, and mostly in the form of providing informational cues (Wong, 2018). This however displays the importance of the institutions for providing the space for informal social interactions and discussions with others who have similar moral views and beliefs.

Beyond qualitative and ethnographic research, however, scholars have also quantitatively studied the role of religion on political participation for Asian Americans. Lien (2004) finds using the 2001 Pilot Asian American Political Survey (PNAPPS), that religiosity—measured as attending religious services every week—is associated with citizenship acquisition, voting participation, and having a more conservative political ideology. Ecklund and Park (2007) provide an examination of the association between religious behavior and volunteerism among Asian Americans across religious traditions with more comprehensive measures of religiosity. They utilize the traditional measure of religious attendance but also include participation aside from worship and religious volunteering. They find that both Catholic and Protestant Asian Americans volunteer more than the non-religious, and that Asian American Buddhists and Hindus volunteer less than those with no religious affiliation (Ecklund and Park, 2007). The authors consider how Asian Americans facing a double-minority status as both non-Protestant and nonwhites may limit their ability to connect with American volunteer organizations (Ecklund and Park, 2007).

An examination of National Asian American Survey by it's principal investigators find that increased religious attendance is associated with participation in secular civic organizations for Asian Americans who participate in non-Western (Buddhist, Hindu) religious traditions (Wong et al., 2011). Wong (et al., 2011) however also find that this difference in religious tradition does not extend to political participation: they find that Asian Americans who belong to a religious organization are more likely to turnout to vote, contribute to a campaign, protest, or work with others to solve a community problem compared to Asian Americans who do not. They also find that those who are involved in religious activities tend to be more involved with political and secular civic activities, suggesting that this pathway exists for Asian Americans across religious traditions—that religious organizations can provide resources, such as skills, for political and civic participation (Wong et al., 2011).

The literature has addressed the ways in which external religion, and particularly religious institutions, are a core source of support for Asian Americans. Immigrants seek out these institutions to be close to those who are from the same religious and ethnic background, where they can speak their native language and relate to each other as they go through the

process of incorporation into U.S. society. This access to social and community networks may then provide the same resources that the literature has found, from civic skill building to exchanges of political information both formally and informally. One limitation of the literature however is that quantitative studies of group religious behaviors have largely focused on measures of worship attendance. However, it is likely that the activities outside of worship attendance are where this resource acquisition most likely takes place, as people interact with each other.

My theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of non-attendance religious behavior in the pathway between religiosity and political participation. I emphasize religious behaviors in contrast to other dimensions of religiosity such as religious beliefs due for several reasons. It is important to recognize the multidimensionality of religion. However, as Layman (2011) describes, religious beliefs, such as how important religion is, indicate a commitment to one's religion as well the preference to take part in religious behaviors, such as attending temple or practicing privately. Here I am presuming then, that religious beliefs precede religious behavior in my quantitative analysis.

The importance of external religious behavior could be as the literature in political science hypothesizes and finds (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995): that these are important institutional places where civic skills are developed and transferred over to politics. However, I argue that this does not fully capture the variety of different resources that can be acquired. As the literature review on Asian Americans has described, religion in the U.S. is important for immigrants due to the community they have access to. Even among non-Christian religions where individuals may not seek out weekly worship, they are likely still part of their ethnoreligious community. Ethno-religious groups are also advantaged in linking their religiosity to their ethnicity because their religious values and rituals are intertwined with ethnic customs and traditions (Min and Kim, 2002). This is particularly evident in forms of religious practice such as observing festivals that are both religiously and culturally connected. For example, 81% of Asian American Buddhists attend Lunar New Year celebrations, in addition to other communal events throughout the calendar year such as Bon Odori practiced among Japanese American Buddhists (Iwamura et al., 2014). Many

of these festivals are celebrated at temple-sponsored events (Iwamura et al., 2014) which provide additional opportunities to form and strengthen religious and ethnic social ties.

This suggests that non-Christians could also have the same access to the resources that come with participatory religious behaviors as seen with Christian traditions. These social ties provide important opportunities than where Asian Americans can be socialized into U.S. politics and exchange information, particularly in the absence of outreach by political parties and campaigns. Non-attendance group religious behavior such as social gatherings after worship provides the opportunities to do so. However, the resources could also be more direct. Following the religious social network literature, such as Putnam and Campbell (2010) who argue that not sitting alone in the pews is important, religious social friendships will increase the likelihood to participate in the civic arena. However, at the same time, it is important to consider how religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism worship do not center on weekly communal worship, and the level of institutional involvement among non-Christians is likely to be much lower than in comparison to Christians.

I hypothesize that non-attendance external religious behaviors—measured by participation in religious activity outside of worship—will be positively related to non-voting forms of civic and political engagement for Asian Americans, in comparison to religious attendance. Secondly, both forms of external religious behaviors are likely to be more predictive of the political participation of Asian American Christians than for Asian American Hindus and Buddhists

2.4 Data and Methods

I use the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) and the pre-election 2016 NAAS to examine the association between external religiosity and political behavior. The 2008 survey includes a total of 5,159 adult Asian American respondents from telephone interviews that took place from August 18, 2008, to October 29, 2008. It was provided in eight languages and yielded large sample sizes for the six largest national origin groups in the U.S.: Chinese, Asian Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, and Japanese. The sample is weighted to

reflect the demographics of these groups in the U.S. based on gender, nativity, citizenship status, and educational attainment. It is also weighted to reflect the proportion of the six national-origin groups within each state. The 2016 survey was fielded from August to October 2016 and includes a total of 4787 respondents. The 2016 survey includes samples of Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders, who were not included in the 2008 survey. I restrict my analysis to the six largest national groups in the 2016 data to maintain comparability between the 2008 and 2016 samples. I use both surveys to examine political participation among all Asian American respondents of the six largest national origin groups. Due to limited sample sizes when comparing religious traditions in the 2016 NAAS, I restrict my analysis of diverse religious traditions to the 2008 NAAS[1]. Additionally, based on sample sizes in the 2008 NAAS, this analysis is restricted to Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus and leaves out analysis of other non-Abrahamic faiths such as Sikhs and Jains who also have distinct external and internal ways of practicing one's religion [2]. The sample sizes for each religious tradition in the 2008 NAAS are 754 Buddhists, 1858 Christians, 837 Hindus. Christians are a plurality of the sample at 47%, while 14% of Asian-Americans are Hindus and Buddhists.

My main independent variables that measure external religious behavior are religious activity and frequency of religious attendance. The measure of religious activity is based on the following question: "Other than attending services or prayer, do you take part in any activity with people at your place of worship?" I acknowledge that this measure is limited in serving as a full measure for the theoretical constructs discussed in the literature review, particularly that of religious social embeddedness. However, the NAAS is one of few surveys that offer a way to capture religious involvement outside of religious attendance that importantly offers a sizable sample of Asian Americans. I, therefore, use this as a starting point to establish if theories on external religiosity extend to Asian Americans. The second variable of external religiosity is religious attendance, which measures how frequently

[1]I follow Pew Research Center's methodology to group self-identified denominational types into the Protestant category

[2]The 2008 sample has 70 Sikhs and 91 respondents who were classified as "other"

respondents attend worship and includes the following levels of attendance: never, hardly ever, only a few times a year, a few times a month, almost every week, and at least every week. Both variables are moderately correlated, at 0.52 in the 2008 NAAS and 0.51 in the 2016 NAAS.

The dependent variables are two measures of political activity. The first variable measures the likelihood of voting in the 2008 and 2016 elections as binary variables of being absolutely certain to vote and not likely to vote. Vote likelihood is modeled as a logistic regression. The question on vote likelihood was asked only of respondents who were: 1) already registered to vote or 2) were planning on registering to vote before the election. The 2008 index includes seven different non-voting acts: discussing politics, working to solve a community problem, working for a candidate, donating, contacting their representative, discussing politics online, and attending protests. The 2016 survey includes: discussing politics, donating, contacting their representative, working to solve a community problem, attending protests, signing a petition, and attending a public meeting. Both non-voting indexes measure the count of how non-voting activities a respondent has participated in. The 2008 index has an α score of 0.57 and the 2016 an α score of 0.71. The dependent variable is a count variable and is modeled using negative binomial regressions[3].

Lastly, all regression models include controls for the following variables: age, gender, income, education, marital status, foreign-born status, party identification, political interest, and national origin (with Chinese Asian-Americans as the reference group). I also control for being Protestant given the extant literature theorizing that denominational differences between Christian traditions may influence resource acquisition, particularly that Protestant denominations have an organizational structure that allows for more opportunities to engage in skill-gaining activities compared to the more hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church (Verba et al., 1995). Before presenting my main findings, I will offer some descriptive statistics of interest among Asian-Americans using both surveys.

[3]The distribution of the non-voting scale does not meet the assumptions of a Poisson regression.

2.5 Descriptive Statistics on Religiosity Variables

As described above, the two main dependent variables of interest are vote likelihood and non-voting participation. In 2008, respondents were 44% likely to vote and in 2016, 69% likely to vote. In the 2008 NAAS, there are some similar patterns by religion: Buddhist and Christian Asian-Americans were 47% and 49% likely to vote. respectively. Hindu Asian-Americans in contrast were 76% likely to vote. For non-voting, on average respondents participate in at least one type of non-voting act in both survey years. Table 1 displays the average participation rates for each individual non-voting item in the 2008 and 2016 NAAS, while table 2 displays average participation by religious tradition for the 2008 NAAS. The least resource-intensive act—discussing politics—is the most commonly participated in across surveys and religious traditions. The remaining activities show less of a clear pattern where Asian Americans are more likely to participate in less resource-heavy acts. For example, contacting a representative make take less time than working to solve a community problem, but Asian Americans rarely participate in this compared to about a fifth who have worked with other community members to solve an issue. Hindu Americans are also the most likely to participate in this, with almost a third indicating so, in contrast to 18% of Buddhists.

Table 2.1: Participation in Individual Non-Voting Items

Survey	%
NAAS 2008	
Discuss Politics	68
Solve Community Problem	21
Donate	12
Discuss Politics Online	12
Contact Representative	9
Protest	4
Work for Political Candidate	4
NAAS 2016	
Discuss Politics	69
Solve Community Problem	27
Sign a Petition	25
Attend a Public Meeting	17
Donate	17
Contact Representative	12
Protest	8

Table 2.2: Participation in Individual Non-Voting Items by Religion

%	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Discuss Politics	61	68	73
Solve Community Problem	18	23	29
Donate	13	14	12
Discuss Politics Online	5	14	11
Contact Representative	6	10	13
Protest	6	5	4
Work for Political Candidate	3	4	3

National Asian American Survey 2008, weighted

For my main analysis, I focus on examining the non-voting items broadly to examine how religious behaviors influence participation in an increased amount of acts. First, I am interested in establishing what relationship, if any, exists between religion and non-voting behavior. I also focus on this more broadly because of how places of worship are likely to mobilize people to participate in non-voting activities. As I show in my interview analysis,

some places of worship may be heavily politicized and have more explicit asks of its members to engage in volunteering or local community problems, while others may encourage non-voting participation less explicitly, such as through informal political discussions. However, to also take into consideration the varying levels of resources required for these activities, I also present a section examining the relationship between external religiosity and each individual item in the non-voting scale.

Next, I examine the main independent variables of interest. In both surveys, the plurality of Asian-Americans never attends religious worship (30% in the 2008 NAAS, and 32% in the 2016 NAAS). About a quarter of Asian-Americans attend at least once weekly (25% in the 2008 NAAS) or almost weekly (25% in the 2016 NAAS). The differences in religious behavior is seen more clearly by religion. Asian-American Christians are the most frequent attenders of worship, with 46% attending more than weekly. The plurality of Asian-American Buddhists, in contrast, are more likely to attend a few times a year at about 40%, while Hindus typically attend worship a few times a month. As described in the literature review, this reflects the distinct ways that Christians and non-Christians practice their religion, with weekly worship attendance being the dominant practice among Christians. However, this is not to diminish the importance of the religious community for Buddhists and Hindus, and the resources that may be acquired by being a part of this community and developing social networks through it.

Turning to the second independent variable, 32% of Asian Americans in the 2008 NAAS and 37% in 2016 participated in activities outside of worship. When considering differences by religion, 24% of Buddhists, 50% of Christians, and 36% of Hindus participate in activities outside of worship. Similar to the frequency of religious attendance, I find a similar pattern in that Christians are advantaged in having more weekly opportunities to congregate with their religious community and are more likely to take part in these activities to have fellowship with fellow church-goers past worship attendance. For Buddhists, in contrast, the average interaction with one's community may involve more activities and social interactions during annual festivals such as the Lunar New Year, rather than on a week-by-week basis.

Table 3 displays percentages of religious activity by levels of religious frequency among

all Asian-Americans. Both surveys show a similar pattern in that the frequency of participating in activities at their place of worship increases as religious attendance increases. For example, 63% percent of Asian-Americans in the 2008 NAAS who attend their place of worship at least once weekly partake in activities past worship, compared to 39% among those who attend their place of worship a few times a month. Looking across religious traditions also in Table 3 shows the same pattern: participation in an activity outside of worship increases with more frequent attendance. This is what we might expect: frequent attendance keeps people aware of the various activities that might be taking place at any given week. Drawing on the religious social embeddedness literature, we can also expect that people who attend frequently are embedded within their place of worship's social network, and are also likely to take part in these different activities because they are taking part in them with their friends and community.

Table 2.3: Participation in Activity Outside of Worship by Levels of Religious Attendance

	Religious Attendance					
%	Never	Hardly	Few Yearly	Few Monthly	Almost Weekly	Weekly +
NAAS 2008						
Active	1	16	27	39	53	63
Not Active	99	84	73	61	47	37
NAAS 2016						
Active	0	5	17	34	49	65
Not Active	100	95	83	66	51	35
Buddhist						
Active	3	8	22	46	59	71
Not Active	97	92	78	54	41	29
Christian						
Active	6	21	28	42	54	63
Not Active	94	79	72	58	46	37
Hindu						
Active	11	20	33	34	46	59
Not Active	89	80	67	66	54	41

National Asian American Survey 2008, weighted

Lastly, I examine religious behavior across key demographics to determine if there are distinct differences in factors such as income and education. I create a separate religious behavior variable that combines religious attendance and religious activity into four categories from lowest to highest behavior. This first splits religious attendance into two groups of low attendance and high attendance, and then groups by level of religious activity to create four levels: low-frequency attendees who are not active at their place of worship, low-frequency attendees who are active, high-frequency attendees who are not active, and high-frequency attendees who are active. Percentages are displayed in Table 4 for martial and foreign-born status, income, education, and ethnicity. The majority of Asian Americans across the four levels of religious behaviors are married, foreign-born, and college educated. More active respondents —for both low worship attenders and high worship attenders —are slightly more likely to hold a college degree. The majority also have income levels above $50,000 across levels of religious behavior. There is some variation in religious behavior by national origin: low behavior Asian-Americas are more likely to be Chinese while the plurality of high attendees are Filipino. This is likely reflective of the distribution of religions practiced by Asian Americans by ethnicity: Chinese-Americans are split between Buddhism, and Christianity, or do not identify with a religion, while Filipino-Americans are predominantly Catholic, which indicates more importance on frequent church attendance (Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths, 2012).

Table 2.4: Demographics by Level of Religious Behavior, NAAS 2008

%	Level of Religious Behavior			
	Low Attender	Low Attend + Active	High Attend	High Attend + Active
Married	76	71	77	78
Foreign Born	79	74	89	81
Income Below $50k	25	17	25	22
Income $50k-$100k	57	63	57	57
Income $100k+	18	20	17	21
Some college or less	45	39	43	36
College degree or more	55	61	57	64
Chinese	45	18	12	16
Indian	14	34	25	17
Filipino	9	19	31	33
Japanese	13	12	3	6
Korean	7	4	16	19
Vietnamese	12	14	13	9
N	2502	260	1129	1268

National Asian American Survey 2008, weighted

The 2016 NAAS, displayed in table 5, shows a similar pattern by national origin, where the lowest levels of behavior—low attenders with no activity outside of worship—are more likely to be Chinese out of the six national origin groups. A majority of Indian Americans do not attend their place of worship frequently but do take part in activities outside of prayer, which may be reflective of the various cultural classes and events offered by Hindu temples. The plurality of respondents across levels of religious behavior have incomes between $50k-$100k and the majority are college educated. The most frequent attenders of a place of worship however have relatively higher levels of incomes $100k and above, compared to the other three religious behavior types. Lastly, while low attendees who are active at their place of worship are a small group, they are more likely to be U.S. born in comparison to the strong majority of foreign-born Asian-Americans, particularly for both levels of high attenders.

Table 2.5: Demographics by Level of Religious Behavior, NAAS 2016

	Level of Religious Behavior			
%	Low Attender	Low Attend + Active	High Attend	High Attend + Active
Married	55	61	59	66
Foreign Born	75	54	88	81
Income Below $50k	32	21	25	23
Income $50k-$100k	42	41	47	44
Income $100k+	27	38	18	27
Some high school or less	26	21	35	23
College degree or more	74	79	65	77
Chinese	45	8	10	11
Indian	17	53	26	27
Filipino	11	9	31	28
Japanese	8	16	3	7
Korean	5	2	17	19
Vietnamese	13	12	14	8
N	2319	178	1088	1268

National Asian American Survey 2016, weighted

Lastly, I examine marital status, nativity, income, and educational attainment for Buddhists, Christians and Hindus in the 2008 NAAS in Table 6. Buddhists have a lower proportion of foreign-born among those who are low attenders but are active at their place of worship, in comparison to the overwhelming majority of foreign-born Asians across other levels. The most notable contrast with the other two religious traditions is that the majority of Buddhists have lower levels of educational attainment. Christians have a more noticeable difference looking at nativity status: high attenders for both Asians who are active at their place of worship and those who are not active are predominantly foreign-born by 20 percentage points in comparison to low attenders. By education, Christians are somewhat split. At the lowest level, Christians who have low rates of church attendance and do not take part in an activity outside of worship are high school educated or have completed some college, while Christians who have high attendance and are also active at their place of worship are majority foreign-born (63%). Lastly, Hindus stand out for being almost exclusively foreign-born,

married, with high levels of both education and income across religious behaviors. There are some limitations however, in this analysis of Hindu populations given the intertwined nature of ethnicity and religion, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of religion and the effects of ethnicity and being Indian.

Table 2.6: Demographics by Level of Religious Behavior Across Religions

%	Low Attender	Low Attend + Active	High Attend	High Attend + Active
Buddhists				
Married	75	78	87	83
Foreign Born	80	65	93	70
Income Below $50k	33	29	30	20
Income $50k-$100k	56	61	56	65
Income $100k+	11	11	15	15
Some college or less	64	64	63	54
College degree or more	36	36	37	46
Christians				
Married	64	60	73	75
Foreign Born	60	62	86	80
Income Below $50k	20	16	30	25
Income $50k-$100k	61	69	55	55
Income $100k+	20	15	15	21
Some college or less	51	42	47	36
College degree or more	49	58	53	64
Hindus				
Married	80	82	90	89
Foreign Born	94	94	96	94
Income Below $50k	6	5	7	14
Income $50k-$100k	63	59	68	59
Income $100k+	31	36	26	26
Some college or less	7	8	21	24
College degree or more	93	92	79	76

National Asian American Survey 2008, weighted

Asian Americans on average are generally well resourced when looking at SES, the traditional resources linked to political participation. However, dis-aggregating by religious tradition reveals an important difference in income and education levels among Buddhists—the

plurality of which are Vietnamese Americans—compared to Christians and Hindus, the latter of which have the highest incomes and educational attainment. Given that the majority of Asian Americans are first-generation immigrants, places of worship may hold more importance for Buddhists and Christians to mitigate barriers to political incorporation. Secondly, for Christians, the proportion of first-generation immigrants increased by at least 20 percentage points comparing low attenders to high attenders, suggesting that places of worship provide a level of community that is of high importance to immigrants and can be a place to foster trust and build social capital.

2.6 Findings: Political Participation Among Asian Americans

Next, I present my regression analysis examining the relationship between religiosity and political participation. Table 7 displays a negative binomial model on non-voting participation and Table 8 displays a logistic regression on models on vote likelihood for both the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections. In both surveys, religious activity is a statistically significant predictor of non-voting participation. In contrast, religious attendance is not a predictor of non-voting participation. For the likelihood of voting, religious activity is only statistically significant in the 2008 model. Religious attendance is negatively associated with vote likelihood in 2008 and 2016, however, the results are not statistically significant.

Table 2.7: Negative Binomial Model on Non-Voting Political Participation

	NAAS 08	NAAS 16
Intercept	−0.91 (0.09)***	−0.50 (0.12)***
Main independent variables		
Religious Activity	0.33 (0.03)***	0.35 (0.05)***
Religious Attendance	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Socio-demographic variables		
Women	−0.09 (0.03)***	−0.21 (0.04)***
Age	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)**
Income	0.04 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.01)***
Education	0.14 (0.01)***	0.32 (0.04)***
Married	−0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Foreign born	−0.23 (0.04)***	−0.20 (0.05)***
Party ID, political interest, and denomination		
Democrat	0.15 (0.03)***	0.16 (0.04)***
Republican	0.12 (0.04)**	0.19 (0.05)***
Political Interest	0.26 (0.01)***	0.12 (0.02)***
Protestant	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)
Ethnicity		
Asian Indian	−0.07 (0.04)	0.20 (0.07)**
Filipino	−0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.07)
Japanese	−0.20 (0.05)***	−0.01 (0.08)
Korean	−0.14 (0.05)**	−0.14 (0.08)
Vietnamese	−0.02 (0.05)	0.33 (0.07)***
AIC	13630.20	6761.81
BIC	13753.88	6869.56
Log Likelihood	−6796.10	−3361.90
Deviance	4655.61	2384.90
Num. obs.	4961	2145

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008, 2016

Table 2.8: Logistic Regression on Voting Likelihood

	NAAS 08	NAAS 16
Intercept	-2.97 (0.24)***	-2.52 (0.33)***
Main independent variables		
Religious Activity	0.30 (0.08)***	0.05 (0.14)
Religious Attendance	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)
Socio-demographic variables		
Women	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.11)
Age	0.04 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***
Income	0.09 (0.02)***	-0.00 (0.04)
Education	0.17 (0.03)***	0.54 (0.09)***
Married	0.05 (0.09)	0.47 (0.12)***
Foreign born	-1.59 (0.13)***	-0.38 (0.16)*
Party ID, political interest, and denomination		
Democrat	0.63 (0.07)***	0.82 (0.12)***
Republican	0.79 (0.10)***	0.46 (0.16)**
Political Interest	0.46 (0.03)***	0.38 (0.06)***
Protestant	0.19 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.16)
Ethnicity		
Asian Indian	0.61 (0.10)***	0.29 (0.20)
Filipino	0.06 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.19)
Japanese	-0.82 (0.13)***	-0.17 (0.23)
Korean	0.12 (0.12)	0.14 (0.20)
Vietnamese	1.10 (0.12)***	0.78 (0.19)***
AIC	5843.31	2234.67
BIC	5960.48	2335.55
Log Likelihood	-2903.65	-1099.33
Deviance	5807.31	2198.67
Num. obs.	4961	2007

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008, 2016

For ease of interpreting the coefficient, I calculate and visualize changes in the predicted number of non-voting acts that respondents participate in for the two independent variables of interest. Figure 1 displays the change for both the 2008 and 2016 models, moving religious activity from not being active to being active, and religious attendance from never attending to attending weekly, with 95% confidence intervals. Being religious active leads to a 0.43 increase (95% CI: [0.35, 0.52]) in the 2008 model and 0.56 increase (95% CI: [0.40, 0.71]) increase in the 2016 model in the number of non-voting actions engaged in.

Figure 2.1: Marginal Effect on Non-Voting Participation



Next in Figure 2, I visualize the changes in predicted probability on vote likelihood. In the 2008 model, those who are religiously active are 62% likely to vote, a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of voting compared to those who are not religiously active at their place of worship (95% CI: [4%, 11%]). While not statistically significant, higher religious attendance leads to decreased voter participation—a 1 point decrease (from 56%) in 2008 and a 2 point decrease in 2016 (from 73%), comparing those who attend service at least twice a week to those who never attend.

Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect on Vote Likelihood



Broadly, these findings align with the extant literature that external religiosity and involvement with one's place of worship provide a pathway to being civically engaged. Specifically, this is consistent with Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1995) argument that this type of resource is particularly important for non-electoral participation, in that non-electoral participation requires more resources to participate, in comparison to voting. Voting is a type of political activity that is primarily driven by political interest, while non-electoral acts depend on both political interest and resources such as time, income, and civic skills (Verba et al., 1995). At the same time, the association between religious activity and non-voting also presents a contrast to the more common finding in the extant literature that religious attendance captures the components of external religiosity that influence political engagement, from psychological motivation to more direct mobilization by fellow church-goers.

Instead, my results align with scholars such as Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) where measures outside of worship attendance are better able to capture the path between membership in a religious organization and political participation. This lends evidence to the theories that emphasize the importance of informal interactions with one's religious social network.

It also brings to question what the measure of religious attendance captures. Turning back to some of the early explanations of the relationship between church attendance and voter turnout, scholars have argued this gives members a sense of civic obligation (Hougland and Christenson, 1983; Martinson and Wilkening, 1987). It could be a function of both individual psychological motivation and religious messaging which emphasize these types of commitments to society. It's also important to consider then what the measure of religious attendance captures across the different religions practiced among Asian Americans, given the variation in regular worship attendance, and secondly whether this is an adequate way to capture the influence of external religiosity on political participation for non-Christian religions. This psychological engagement may be an important resource for lower SES immigrants—as the 2008 NAAS has slightly lower proportions of those who have college degrees or higher in comparison to the 2016 NAAS when considering the significant association of religious activity on voting in the 2008 survey but not 2016. Additionally, the differing results on the association between religious attendance and vote likelihood from the traditional literature may be influenced by the fact that both samples are largely foreign born, and even when naturalized Asian Americans still face barriers to political incorporation, such as language access at the voting booth and even lack of outreach by political parties. Ultimately, both surveys however provide evidence that there is a positive and significant association between religious communities and political behavior for Asian Americans.

Before turning to my analysis across religious traditions, I present a closer examination of my main findings. One of my central research questions is to study the association of religious activity with non-voting political participation broadly. This drove the methodological decision to examine the count of non-voting activities that Asian Americans participate in, on average, rather than each individual activity. However, to answer whether religious activity does have varying associations with different types of political participation, I present individual, logistic regressions for each item in the civic engagement index.

In figure 3, I visualize the regression coefficients for religious activity and attendance on each individual non-voting activity using the 2008 NAAS (full models are displayed in the appendix). The main purpose of this visualization is to highlight that across the

board, religious activity is associated with a statistically significant increase for each non-voting political activity. In comparison, the frequency of religious attendance is generally not statistically significant and several of the coefficients are negative. The political acts that are negatively associated include discussing politics and discussing politics online, with the latter being statistically significant. The other two acts that are negatively associated with religious attendance are donating and working for a candidate, both of which are resource intensive in different ways, though both are not statistically significant.

Figure 2.3: Regression Coefficients for Religious Behavior Variables on Individual Non-Voting Items, NAAS 2008



Next, I visualize the coefficients for each individual non-voting activity from the 2016 NAAS in figure 4. Religious activity is positively associated and statistically significant for each non-voting item, save for donating. Again, in comparison, religious attendance has no statistically significant effect and is negatively associated with several non-voting acts, including signing a petition and contacting a representative. As discussed above, the most prominent theory in the literature for this pattern of a decrease in political participation as

religious frequency increases is the lack of time. A second theory that is more specific to Asian Americans is the type of place of worship attended, and differences in worship styles, social cultures, and issues prioritized, such as one where people may refrain from discussing politics, for example, particularly driven by their religious teachings. This does not diminish the importance of the social context of a place of worship, however. While the relationship between religious attendance and political participation needs to be further examined, the finding I highlight is that religious activity continues to show a strong association with non-voting political participation even across each individual item from the civic engagement scale in both surveys used.

Figure 2.4: Regression Coefficients for Religious Behavior Variables on Individual Non-Voting Items, NAAS 2016



Lastly, I test the relationship between religious frequency and religious activity. As the descriptive statistics show, levels of religious activity generally increase with the frequency of attendance. Do the resources that come from being active within a religious network depend on how often one attends services at their place of worship? How does this compare

to someone who attends services often but does not participate in one's religious network after services? To examine this, I present an additional negative binomial regression model shown in Table 9 on non-voting participation where I interact religious activity and religious attendance. For ease of interpretation, I visualize an interaction graph in figure 5 showing the expected number of non-voting acts participated in as religious attendance increases, based on whether one is active beyond attendance at their place of worship or not active.

Table 2.9: Non-Voting Participation: Interaction Between Activity and Attendance

	NAAS 08	NAAS 16
Intercept	-0.91 $(0.09)^{***}$	-0.49 $(0.12)^{***}$
Main independent variables		
Religious Activity	0.33 $(0.07)^{***}$	0.27 $(0.13)^{*}$
Religious Attendance	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Relig.Act * Relig.Attend	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Socio-demographic variables		
Women	-0.09 $(0.03)^{***}$	-0.21 $(0.04)^{***}$
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 $(0.00)^{**}$
Income	0.04 $(0.01)^{***}$	0.08 $(0.01)^{***}$
Education	0.14 $(0.01)^{***}$	0.32 $(0.04)^{***}$
Married	-0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)
Foreign born	-0.23 $(0.04)^{***}$	-0.20 $(0.05)^{***}$
Party ID, political interest, and denomination		
Democrat	0.15 $(0.03)^{***}$	0.16 $(0.04)^{***}$
Republican	0.12 $(0.04)^{**}$	0.19 $(0.05)^{***}$
Political Interest	0.26 $(0.01)^{***}$	0.12 $(0.02)^{***}$
Protestant	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)
Ethnicity		
Asian Indian	-0.07 (0.04)	0.20 $(0.07)^{**}$
Filipino	-0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.07)
Japanese	-0.20 $(0.05)^{***}$	-0.00 (0.08)
Korean	-0.14 $(0.05)^{**}$	-0.14 (0.08)
Vietnamese	-0.02 (0.05)	0.34 $(0.07)^{***}$
AIC	13632.20	6763.33
BIC	13762.39	6876.75
Log Likelihood	-6796.10	-3361.66
Deviance	4655.61	2386.00
Num. obs.	4961	2145

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008, 2016

Figure 2.5: Interaction of Religious Activity and Religious Attendance on Non-Voting



The 2008 model displays no interactive effect between religious attendance and religious activity. Rather, I find a slight downward slope for both levels of religious activity as religious attendance increases. Looking at the 2016 NAAS, I find slightly differing results for the relationship between religious attendance and activity. Here, the graph displays a slightly stronger interactive effect. The expected value of non-voting participation increases across levels of religious attendance for those who are religiously active. In both surveys, the marginal effects from min to max of religious attendance for both categories of religious activity however are not statistically significant. The main findings I focus on is that across levels of religious attendance, Asian Americans who are active at their place of worship are expected to have higher levels of non-voting political participation, in comparison to Asian Americans who attend religious services but do not take part in religious activities. Using the 2008 survey, Asian Americans who are the highest attenders see a 0.40 (95% CI: [0.31, 0.52])increase in the expected value of non-voting participation compared to the highest attendees who are not active. In the 2016 NAAS, the marginal effect here between the highest attendees who are active and the highest attendees who are not active is a 0.61 increase (95%

CI: [0.40, 0.83]) in non-voting acts. Some of the negative relationships displayed may be a function of not having enough time to devote to activities outside their religious community. The 2008 sample in particular is more representative of married Asian-Americans and foreign-born Asian-Americans, which could also influence where families—especially those with children —spend their time, as well as awareness and interest in seeking out different forms of participation. However, participation in one's religious social network may also work to mitigate the lower levels of political participation that we see among those who are not active. As described in the theoretical framework, this could include social pressure and also being more likely to participate in, for example, solving a community problem when doing so with friends from one's religious community. The importance then lies in the social aspect of external religiosity. In the following section, I examine the relationship between external religiosity and political participation by religious tradition.

2.7 Findings: Political Participation By Religion

To address whether the relationship between external religiosity and political participation is present across religious traditions, I next present the same models on non-voting and vote likelihood using the 2008 NAAS with separate models for Asian American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus each. While the models are not directly comparable to each other, the results allow me to examine if external religiosity continues to have a positive association with political participation across religious traditions. Table 10 displays the regression results of external religiosity on non-voting participation for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus respectively.

Table 2.10: Negative Binomial Model on Non-Voting Political Participation

	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Intercept	-1.56 (0.26)***	-0.71 (0.15)***	-1.08 (0.21)***
Main independent variables			
Religious Activity	0.36 (0.08)***	0.30 (0.04)***	0.34 (0.06)***
Religious Attendance	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.01)*	0.00 (0.02)
Socio-demographic variables			
Women	-0.18 (0.07)*	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.06)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.02)*
Education	0.20 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.04)**
Married	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.08)
Foreign born	0.04 (0.10)	-0.22 (0.06)***	-0.09 (0.11)
Party ID and political interest			
Democrat	0.20 (0.08)*	0.13 (0.05)**	0.02 (0.06)
Republican	0.24 (0.09)**	0.10 (0.05)*	0.07 (0.11)
Political Interest	0.26 (0.04)***	0.22 (0.02)***	0.34 (0.03)***
AIC	1949.24	5236.68	2459.58
BIC	2009.35	5308.50	2521.04
Log Likelihood	-961.62	-2605.34	-1216.79
Deviance	722.11	1764.28	782.86
Num. obs.	753	1854	835

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Similar to my main findings, here religious activity is the more salient variable of the two measures of external religiosity: religious activity is positively associated with non-voting participation for all three religious traditions. While religious attendance is not a significant predictor among Hindus and Buddhists, among Asian American Christians increased religious attendance predicts decreased non-voting political participation. Figure 6 displays the change in the predicted counts for the two main independent variables. By religion, I find a 0.41 (95% CI: [0.21,0. 60]) increase in the number of non-voting acts participated in among Buddhists, a 0.39 increase (95% CI: [0.29, 0.49]) among Christians and a 0.52 (95% CI: [0.35, 0.71]) increase among Hindus moving from min to max of on religious activity. Asian American Christians who are the highest church attenders see a 0.23 (95% CI: [-0.45, -0.3]) decrease in the number of non-voting acts participated in.

Figure 2.6: Marginal Effect on Non-Voting Behavior by Religion



Next, I examine the association between external religiosity and vote likelihood by religion, displayed in Table 11, with Figure 7 visualizing the marginal changes in predicted probability. Here religious activity only predicts vote likelihood among Christians. Christians who are religiously active are 65% likely to vote, a 7% (95% CI: [3%, 12%]) increase in the predicted probability compared to those who are not religiously active. In comparison, the marginal change in predicted probability is not significant among Buddhists and Hindus. Differently for religious attendance on vote likelihood, I find the change in predicted probability significant for Buddhists only: Buddhists are 66% likely to vote, showing a 16% (95% CI: [1%, 31%]) increase in vote likelihood, compared to those who never attend at 49%.

Table 2.11: Logistic Regression on Vote Likelihood in 2008

	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Intercept	-2.89 (0.63)***	-1.99 (0.39)***	-1.80 (0.62)**
Main independent variables			
Religious Activity	0.24 (0.21)	0.31 (0.11)**	0.28 (0.18)
Religious Attendance	0.14 (0.07)*	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)
Socio-demographic variables			
Women	0.09 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.10)*	-0.18 (0.16)
Age	0.02 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.01)***
Income	0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.03)*	0.08 (0.05)
Education	0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.09)
Married	0.38 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.13)	0.34 (0.24)
Foreign born	-0.67 (0.28)*	-1.39 (0.20)***	-1.68 (0.38)***
Party ID and political interest			
Democrat	0.58 (0.19)**	0.32 (0.12)**	1.03 (0.17)***
Republican	1.14 (0.22)***	0.96 (0.14)***	0.40 (0.33)
Political Interest	0.52 (0.10)***	0.37 (0.06)***	0.42 (0.08)***
AIC	930.68	2244.82	963.44
BIC	986.17	2311.12	1020.17
Log Likelihood	-453.34	-1110.41	-469.72
Deviance	906.68	2220.82	939.44
Num. obs.	753	1854	835

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Figure 2.7: Marginal Effect on Vote Likelihood by Religion



The findings display a general level of consistency across religious traditions when examining the association between religious activity and non-voting participation. The resource acquisition that comes from involvement with a religious institution, outside of worship, is a common characteristic across religious traditions for non-electoral participation. The negative relationship between religious attendance and non-voting political behavior among Christians stands out. In addition to the function of time, as discussed in the previous section, another explanation may consider what the measure is capturing. It could be that religious attendance captures more of the messaging received within worship through sermons. Jeung (2005) has emphasized how some Asian American places of worship center sermons on one's spirituality rather than encouraging a social justice type of messaging, which may discourage interest in entering the political arena. Additionally, as the descriptive statistics show, Christians who only attend have a slightly higher proportion of those who are foreign born, compared to those who attend and are also active. While the religious community is an important source of institutional support for Asian American Christians, a

culmination of time, interest, and lack of awareness may influence lower levels of non-voting activities that have varying levels of resources and time.

The results of external religiosity on vote likelihood present a less consistent picture. Taking into the context the previous results among the full sample, I find that religious activity is a predictor of vote likelihood. Once disaggregated, the relationship is only apparent among Asian American Christians. These findings illustrate the complexity of the relationship between external religiosity and the specific political act of voting. There are diverging findings in the literature where some find that being religiously involved at a place of worship is associated with voting, while others such as VSB (1995) find it unrelated. Given that religious activity is a predictor of both voting and non-voting participation among Christians, it could be that for Christians the measure of religious activity better captures the resource acquisition that takes place at church—from more direct recruitment to the psychological resources of civic duty, in contrast to religious worship attendance.

For Buddhists, as worship at a temple does not often typically involve characteristics such as sermon messaging that are in Christian worship, I consider how the positive association among Buddhists may be due to psychological motivation to be politically involved. While religious attendance is not similarly significant among Buddhists for non-voting forms of participation, one can consider there may be a more direct psychological link between civic duty and voting, in contrast to non-voting forms of participation which vary in terms of how demanding and time consuming they are. This psychological link of civic duty may be particularly important looking at the descriptive statistics of Buddhists who only attend their place of worship and are not otherwise active: they have the highest proportion of being foreign-born, and the majority have lower levels of educational attainment and are more likely to have lower levels of income as well. Despite Buddhists not holding the traditional predictors of political participation, resources like religion may serve as a psychological motivation to be civically engaged.

Next, I present findings for each individual non-voting activity and the interaction between religious activity and religious attendance for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. Figure 8 displays the coefficients for external religiosity from each individual model of dif-

ferent types of non-voting activities. The main purpose of this visualization is to see that for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus the variable of religious activity, in comparison to religious attendance, has positive and statistically significant associations for many of the different non-voting activities. Similar to the previous section, religious attendance is not associated with any increase in any of the individual activities. This further suggests that religious activities, rather than attendance, provides the environment the opportunities for the resource acquisition that is conducive for political participation.

Figure 2.8: Regression Coefficients for Individual Non-Voting Acts by Religion



Lastly, Table 12 displays the regression results of interacting religious activity and religious attendance separately for Asian-American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. The coefficient for the interaction, while not significant, is positively associated with non-voting participation among Buddhists and Hindus, and negatively associated with Christians. Figure 9 visualizes the interactive effects of each religious tradition. Buddhists and Hindus who are active at their place of worship see an increase in non-voting participation as religious attendance increases. In comparison, it is only among Christians that participation in

non-voting activities decreases as religious attendance increases, for both levels of religious activity. In thinking distinctly about the Christian faith, scholars have emphasized how the individualistic nature of Christian teachings particularly for the evangelical traditions may decrease interest in engaging in politics. Frequent church attendance may signify more exposure to sermons and messaging on this theme and the idea that participation in politics takes away from living a worldly and spiritual life—which may then influence decreased participation. The decrease in non-voting participation among Christians from the min to max of religious attendance is not statistically significant. The findings however suggest that being religiously active provides some level of resource and can mitigate lower levels of participation we may expect from Asian Americans, whether it be social capital or direct mobilization, and that this is present across religions—as Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians who are religiously active are predicted to have higher levels of non-voting participation compared to those who are not.

Table 2.12: Non-Voting Participation: Interaction Between Activity and Attendance

	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Intercept	−1.54 (0.27)***	−0.73 (0.15)***	−1.06 (0.22)***
Main independent variables			
Religious Activity	0.32 (0.16)*	0.36 (0.12)**	0.28 (0.13)*
Religious Attendance	0.01 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)
Relig.Act * Relig.Attend	0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Socio-demographic variables			
Women	−0.18 (0.07)*	−0.09 (0.04)*	−0.09 (0.06)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.02)*
Education	0.20 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.04)**
Married	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.14 (0.09)
Foreign born	0.04 (0.10)	−0.23 (0.06)***	−0.09 (0.11)
Party ID and political interest			
Democrat	0.20 (0.08)*	0.13 (0.05)**	0.02 (0.06)
Republican	0.24 (0.09)**	0.10 (0.05)*	0.07 (0.11)
Political Interest	0.25 (0.04)***	0.22 (0.02)***	0.34 (0.03)***
AIC	1951.15	5238.40	2461.32
BIC	2015.89	5315.75	2527.51
Log Likelihood	−961.58	−2605.20	−1216.66
Deviance	722.02	1764.01	782.60
Num. obs.	753	1854	835

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Figure 2.9: Interaction on Religious Behaviors by Religion



2.8 Discussion

The aim of this chapter is to establish the link between external religiosity and political participation among Asian Americans. The National Asian American Survey is advantageous for its measures of external religiosity, including a unique measure of religious activity that captures resource acquisition outside of worship attendance. This variable of religious activity is typically not asked on surveys, in comparison to the common use of religious attendance as the main quantitative variable measuring religion's resource acquisition. In general, the scholarship on religious involvement shows a positive association with various types of political participation for whites, African Americans, and Latinos. This chapter extends the literature to show similar patterns: that external religiosity provides a pathway to Asian American political participation as well. More specifically, however, religious

activity—in comparison to the traditionally used measure of religious attendance—better captures the resources acquired through religion. This is important for two reasons. As Djupe and Neiheisel (2012) call for, it is necessary to develop and use more precise measures to disentangle the black box of which specific aspects of external religiosity influence political participation. Secondly, the measure is inclusive of other religions, in that it can better capture the resource acquisition that can take place within a place of worship for non-Christian traditions, where frequent religious attendance is often not the central way to be highly religious and devout.

In terms of both methods and theory, I aim to use this chapter as a starting point to consider the extent to which traditional measures used to study white, Christian populations extend to a group diverse in both religious traditions and in ethnicity. My findings contribute to the literature on Asian American political behavior more broadly by showing that Asian Americans who are active at their place of worship are predicted to have increased levels of engagement in non-voting political activities. This speaks to the importance of religious communities for immigrant populations in providing a variety of resources for political incorporation. Additionally, for Asian-Americans, it may be an important resource to mitigate lower levels of political participation, as well as provide an external source to fill in the lack of mobilization that political parties and organizations engage in to mobilize the Asian American vote.

This chapter however is not without limitations. The measure of religious activity, for example, may not fully capture the ways in which Hindus and Buddhists practice their faith, from differences in religious beliefs to individual practices, though I present a brief examination on the latter in chapter four. Specifically for Hindus as well, as the majority of Hindus are Indian these findings do not disentangle the intertwined nature of the religion and ethnicity. An additional limitation is that the measure of religious activity does not tell us how frequently people engage with their religious community past worship, nor does it shed as on the specific types of resources outside of activity that influence political participation. As the literature shows, there are many different possibilities, from direct recruitment to more informal information acquisition that may influence political engagement. It is likely that

this varies by place of worship and by the characteristics of its members. However, I cannot make any causal claims about the direction of religious activity and political participation with the survey data. Generally, however, this chapter establishes that external religious behaviors are an important predictor of participation among Asian Americans and that there is commonality across religions where places of worship provide a trusted community to gain access to a variety of resources that can influence political participation.

2.9 Additional Tables and Figures

Table 2.13: Logistic Regression on Disaggregated Civic Engagement Items, NAAS 2008

	Discuss Politics	Comm. Problem	Donate	Discuss Online	Contact Rep.	Protest	Work For Candidate
Intercept	-0.67^{**}	-3.22^{***}	-6.45^{***}	-2.98^{***}	-5.77^{***}	-4.66^{***}	-6.58^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.59)
Relig. Activity	0.48^{***}	0.89^{***}	0.61^{***}	0.48^{***}	0.57^{***}	0.66^{***}	0.79^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Relig. Attendance	-0.04	0.02	-0.02	-0.10^{**}	0.03	0.05	-0.07
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Women	-0.08	-0.22^{**}	-0.11	-0.44^{***}	-0.19	-0.12	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Age	-0.02^{***}	-0.00	0.03^{***}	-0.02^{***}	0.01	0.01^{*}	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.12^{***}	0.05^{*}	0.17^{***}	0.06	0.12^{***}	0.02	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Education	0.21^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.41^{***}	-0.04	0.33^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Married	0.07	0.06	-0.09	-0.29^{*}	0.02	-0.17	-0.26
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Foreign born	-0.57^{***}	-0.33^{**}	-0.54^{***}	-0.50^{**}	-0.45^{**}	-0.34	-0.57^{*}
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Democrat	0.49^{***}	-0.03	0.62^{***}	0.16	0.11	0.37^{*}	0.62^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Republican	0.56^{***}	-0.18	0.47^{***}	0.02	0.11	0.32	0.27
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.23)
Political Interest	0.75^{***}	0.37^{***}	0.44^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.46^{***}	0.53^{***}	0.52^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Protestant	0.13	0.07	0.01	0.27	0.24	-0.01	-0.16
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Asian Indian	-0.47^{***}	0.15	0.09	-0.10	0.02	-0.80^{***}	0.22
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Filipino	-0.51^{***}	-0.16	0.15	0.09	0.25	-0.62^{*}	0.34
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.30)
Japanese	-0.43^{**}	-0.49^{**}	-0.24	-0.94^{***}	-0.09	-0.86^{**}	-0.08
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Korean	-0.39^{**}	-0.47^{**}	-0.13	0.39^{*}	-0.57^{**}	-1.05^{***}	-0.17
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.34)
Vietnamese	-0.49^{***}	0.11	0.09	-0.25	0.02	0.50^{*}	0.64^{*}
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.32)
AIC	5213.61	4767.68	3471.96	3144.75	2984.59	1784.91	1480.59
BIC	5330.78	4884.85	3589.13	3261.92	3101.75	1902.07	1597.76
Log Likelihood	-2588.81	-2365.84	-1717.98	-1554.38	-1474.29	-874.45	-722.30
Deviance	5177.61	4731.68	3435.96	3108.75	2948.59	1748.91	1444.59
Num. obs.	4961	4961	4961	4961	4961	4961	4961

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Table 2.14: Logistic Regression on Disaggregated Civic Engagement Items, NAAS 2016

	Discuss Politics	Comm. Problem	Donate	Discuss Online	Contact Rep.	Protest	Work For Candidate
Intercept	−0.46	−2.80***	−5.89***	−2.22***	−4.40***	−2.05***	−3.59***
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.50)	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.42)
Relig. Activity	0.55***	0.89***	0.32	0.65***	0.72***	0.55*	0.65***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.15)
Relig. Attendance	−0.00	0.05	−0.03	−0.05	−0.05	0.03	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Women	−0.39***	−0.56***	−0.19	−0.22*	−0.37*	−0.56**	−0.32*
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.13)
Age	−0.01***	−0.01*	0.01**	−0.01***	−0.00	−0.01*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Income	0.22***	0.10**	0.22***	0.13***	0.12**	0.01	0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Education	0.40***	0.57***	0.84***	0.50***	0.60***	0.19	0.47***
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Married	−0.01	0.00	0.05	0.10	−0.00	−0.03	0.43**
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.15)
Foreign born	−0.17	−0.29	−0.32	−0.53***	−0.57**	−0.32	−0.25
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Democrat	0.32**	0.12	0.61***	0.31*	0.20	0.21	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Republican	0.41**	0.16	0.51**	0.30	0.47*	0.42	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Political Interest	0.16**	0.17**	0.39***	0.20***	0.47***	0.13	0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Protestant	0.19	0.14	0.10	−0.10	−0.16	−0.27	−0.16
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.19)
Asian Indian	0.41*	0.91***	0.10	0.11	0.16	−0.58	0.57*
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.24)
Filipino	−0.13	0.46*	0.00	−0.06	0.17	−0.61	0.22
	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.25)
Japanese	0.06	0.36	−0.31	−0.35	0.23	−0.51	−0.11
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.27)
Korean	−0.38*	−0.02	−0.99***	0.26	−0.25	−0.88*	0.03
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.26)
Vietnamese	0.72***	0.21	0.13	0.81***	0.12	0.65*	0.72**
	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.24)
AIC	2468.45	2125.98	1619.34	2110.33	1421.74	1089.18	1830.14
BIC	2570.53	2228.05	1721.42	2212.41	1523.81	1191.25	1932.21
Log Likelihood	−1216.23	−1044.99	−791.67	−1037.17	−692.87	−526.59	−897.07
Deviance	2432.45	2089.98	1583.34	2074.33	1385.74	1053.18	1794.14
Num. obs.	2145	2145	2145	2145	2145	2145	2145

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2016

Table 2.15: Disaggregated Civic Engagement Items Among Buddhists, NAAS 2008

	Discuss Politics	Comm. Problem	Donate	Discuss Online	Contact Rep.	Protest	Work For Candidate
Intercept	-2.90^{***}	-4.01^{***}	-6.19^{***}	-3.65^{**}	-5.47^{***}	-7.84^{***}	-7.85^{***}
	(0.66)	(0.81)	(1.01)	(1.26)	(1.13)	(1.42)	(1.66)
Relig. Activity	0.06	1.41^{***}	0.34	1.36^{**}	0.70^{*}	0.80^{*}	0.43
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.46)
Relig. Attendance	0.04	0.02	0.16	-0.52^{**}	0.00	0.33^{**}	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Women	-0.32	-0.53^{*}	-0.44	-0.63	0.06	-0.18	0.27
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.40)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.03^{**}	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Income	0.07	-0.05	0.08	0.06	-0.04	-0.14	0.21
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Education	0.40^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.31^{**}	0.22	0.63^{***}	0.33^{*}	0.36
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Married	-0.00	0.18	0.12	-0.31	-0.38	0.41	0.25
	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.57)
Foreign born	0.12	0.47	-0.67^{*}	0.54	0.05	0.81	0.04
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.55)	(0.42)	(0.55)	(0.53)
Democrat	0.54^{**}	-0.26	0.74^{*}	0.16	0.02	0.62	1.12^{*}
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.49)
Republican	0.76^{***}	-0.37	0.80^{*}	-0.85	0.02	1.14^{**}	1.14^{*}
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.55)
Political Interest	0.74^{***}	0.35^{**}	0.37^{**}	0.50^{*}	0.57^{***}	0.33	0.22
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.22)
AIC	854.87	656.48	490.50	280.10	353.13	339.43	243.80
BIC	910.36	711.96	545.99	335.59	408.62	394.92	299.29
Log Likelihood	-415.44	-316.24	-233.25	-128.05	-164.56	-157.72	-109.90
Deviance	830.87	632.48	466.50	256.10	329.13	315.43	219.80
Num. obs.	753	753	753	753	753	753	753

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Table 2.16: Disaggregated Civic Engagement Items Among Christians, NAAS 2008

	Discuss Politics	Comm. Problem	Donate	Discuss Online	Contact Rep.	Protest	Work For Candidate
Intercept	−0.13	−2.97***	−6.25***	−2.64***	−4.76***	−3.45***	−6.28***
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.58)	(0.53)	(0.59)	(0.77)	(1.00)
Relig. Activity	0.42***	0.71***	0.70***	0.49**	0.53**	0.42	0.86**
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.30)
Relig. Attendance	−0.08	0.02	−0.13*	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Women	0.12	−0.07	−0.19	−0.38*	−0.39*	−0.48*	−0.34
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.27)
Age	−0.02***	−0.01	0.03***	−0.03***	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.08*	0.03	0.21***	0.01	0.10*	0.07	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Education	0.28***	0.33***	0.30***	0.36***	0.40***	−0.28**	0.29*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Married	0.24	0.13	−0.18	0.06	−0.03	−0.19	−0.77*
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.31)
Foreign born	−1.11***	−0.48**	−0.41*	−0.15	−0.49*	0.30	−0.35
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Democrat	0.49***	−0.04	0.62***	0.16	−0.06	0.10	0.38
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.31)
Republican	0.35*	−0.03	0.37*	0.02	0.15	0.31	0.19
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Political Interest	0.67***	0.28***	0.38***	0.36***	0.37***	0.45***	0.32*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)
AIC	1949.06	1849.08	1395.56	1297.47	1262.62	799.80	537.81
BIC	2015.36	1915.38	1461.86	1363.77	1328.92	866.11	604.11
Log Likelihood	−962.53	−912.54	−685.78	−636.74	−619.31	−387.90	−256.90
Deviance	1925.06	1825.08	1371.56	1273.47	1238.62	775.80	513.81
Num. obs.	1854	1854	1854	1854	1854	1854	1854

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

Table 2.17: Disaggregated Civic Engagement Items Among Hindus, NAAS 2008

	Discuss Politics	Comm. Problem	Donate	Discuss Online	Contact Rep.	Protest	Work For Candidate
Intercept	−0.99	−3.23***	−7.58***	−4.01***	−5.53***	−6.01***	−7.43***
	(0.73)	(0.62)	(0.93)	(0.84)	(0.85)	(1.63)	(1.57)
Relig. Activity	0.79***	0.94***	0.57**	0.35	0.64**	1.32**	0.84*
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.51)	(0.37)
Relig. Attendance	−0.10	0.09	−0.01	−0.02	0.07	0.02	−0.11
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Women	−0.10	−0.54**	0.23	−0.56*	−0.00	0.16	0.04
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.46)	(0.37)
Age	−0.02*	−0.01	0.03***	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	0.13*	0.06	0.13*	0.08	0.15*	−0.08	−0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Education	0.11	0.20*	0.36*	0.24	0.29*	−0.24	0.52
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.28)
Married	−0.43	−0.38	−0.19	−0.61	0.14	0.10	−0.06
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.71)	(0.54)
Foreign born	−0.51	0.47	0.04	−0.80*	−0.73	−0.01	−0.88
	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.85)	(0.64)
Democrat	0.41*	−0.20	−0.01	0.04	−0.07	0.33	0.16
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.46)	(0.37)
Republican	0.56	−0.36	0.18	0.44	0.29	−15.76	0.47
	(0.44)	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(1381.22)	(0.61)
Political Interest	1.06***	0.52***	0.66***	0.65***	0.53***	1.14***	0.74***
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.20)
AIC	766.15	967.20	687.85	611.55	663.28	196.81	303.72
BIC	822.88	1023.93	744.58	668.28	720.01	253.54	360.45
Log Likelihood	−371.07	−471.60	−331.92	−293.78	−319.64	−86.41	−139.86
Deviance	742.15	943.20	663.85	587.55	639.28	172.81	279.72
Num. obs.	835	835	835	835	835	835	835

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: National Asian American Survey 2008

CHAPTER 3

Political Resource Acquisition Through Places of Worship

The previous chapter explored the various ways religion intersects with political behavior and how external religious behaviors such as frequent worship attendance and activity beyond prayer are associated with increased non-voting political participation. More broadly, however, even before considering the link between religious behavior and political participation, places of worship offer an important institution, to have access to a range of resources. This is particularly important for immigrants. In addition to gaining community networks, places of worship are among the few spaces which allow immigrant communities to preserve ethnic and cultural ties. Much of the literature examining the institutional importance of places of worship for immigrant communities strongly emphasizes a link between identity preservation and formation in these institutions. Jeung (2004) notes in his ethnographies studying Asian American churches that a common pattern, particularly for pan-ethnic Asian American churches, is that churches are a central site for church-goers to feel like they belong, which encourages group empowerment.

There is some empirical evidence linking identity-formation to the composition of a place of worship. Reese and Brown (1995) argue that this is tied to the types of messages received at church, as they find that civic awareness messages tend to increase levels of racial identity among African American churchgoers while being exposed to political activities at one's place of worship does not impact this sense of identity. More recently, Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) finds that ethnic stimuli through church attendance with co-ethnics are associated with group identity formation among Latinos.

Other research by Chan and Phoenix (2020) finds that for Asian Americans, ethnic stimuli is not a factor in comparison to political homogeneity at a place of worship. Here political similarities function as a social identity in a comparable way to racial identity, in that interactions with fellow members bring awareness of shared political beliefs, and as these interactions take place in a social context that is characterized by trustworthy relationships, people are more likely to internalize these values, beliefs, and commitments which has been shown to promote self-reflection and the internalization of values, beliefs and commitments that constitute identity and a positive self-concept (Colby and Damon, 1995; Tajfel et al., 1979). In this chapter, I extend these findings to Asian Americans by religious tradition, and by a unique measure of immigrant composition at a place of worship. Scholars have examined the central role religions play in the U.S. in one providing Asian American immigrants a range of services and, importantly, a trusted community (Min, 1992; Jeung, 2005). While racial homogeneity may not be salient for political participation, one could expect that the resources gained within a trusted religious network varies by generation, in that political similarity is more of a learning mechanism for newer immigrants.

I test this using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). I find that political similarity is a predictor across religions for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus, and for Asians who attend places of worship that are either mostly immigrants, or multi-generational. For Asians attending places of worship that are predominantly U.S.-born, non-religious predictors such as linked fate, in contrast, are associated with increased non-voting. My findings align with literature that emphasizes the importance of institutions such as places of worship for immigrant communities and provide more insight into the types of resources that are gained from religious group membership. My findings however also suggest that these resources gained vary based on generational status. The findings on immigrant status at a place of worship however are largely representative of Christians who attend their place of worship frequently. More research is needed on the ways religion provides resources for non-Christians past group membership and the following chapter provides a starting point to empirically explore the relationship between private religious practices, which are central to Buddhist and Hindu traditions, and political participation.

3.1 Social Context, Group Consciousness, and Political Cohesion

A central theory on group-based resources for racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. stems from Dawson (1994) who examines the extent to which African Americans sense that their individual well-being is linked to their racial group and thereby forms a foundation for political unity. Dawson (1994) formulates this as the black utility heuristic where, so long as race is a determining factor for the lives and well-being of Blacks, it is rational to use racial group cues to aid with political decision-making and political activities. While there are important differences to note in extending this theoretical framework to other ethnic and racial minority groups in the U.S., including the lack of generational and shared unequal treatment, scholars have found evidence that linked fate can mobilize Latinos and Asian Americans.

Scholars extending this framework have established a strong link between linked fate and political participation among Latinos (Masuoka, 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016). Research on Asian Americans and group identity has found similar results, in that there exists a level of shared linked fate for Asian Americans, both towards members of their own ethnic group and towards Asian Americans as a whole (Wong, Lien and Conway, 2005). When considering the mechanisms, however, for how racial consciousness develops, several scholars emphasize the importance of group-oriented social and contextual factors for the process of group identity formation. This ranges from the language spoken in the home to the ethnic composition of the neighborhood and assimilation into the U.S., all of which have varying impacts (Ethier and Deaux, 1990; Phinney et al., 2001; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Wilcox-Archuleta, 2018). For example, Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) find that Latinos who are the second generation or beyond have lower levels of individual-level linked fate compared to Latino immigrants, suggesting that ethnic attachments weaken as immigrants adapt to American society, while experienced discrimination is less of a contributing factor to linked fate.

Early studies on Asian American linked fate similarly finds the necessity for linked fate to be activated (Junn and Masuoka, 2008). Masuoka (2006) argues that for Asian Americans,

pan-ethnic identity formation is predicated on experience. Asian Americans develop a sense of shared fate towards other Asian Americans through social interaction or life experiences, such as being an active participant in pan-ethnic politics or experiencing discrimination, rather than perceived discrimination (Masuoka, 2006). More recent data however finds that both perceived and experienced discrimination are predictors of linked fate not just for Latinos, but for Asian-Americans and African Americans as well, giving evidence that linked fate is a resource that can evolve over time and can be heightened by the extent to which sociopolitical environments make race and ethnicity a salient identity (Sanchez, Masuoka and, Abrams 2019; Lu and Jones, 2019). The anti-immigrant, anti-Latino, and anti-Asian rhetoric utilized by former president Trump's campaign is the most prominent example of how political environments can activate and amplify a sense of racial group consciousness for both Asian Americans and Latinos (Gutierrez et al., 2019; Le, Arora and Stout, 2020).

Alongside life experiences, social contexts that provide increased interactions with co-ethnics, such as ethnic festivals, are important sites for reinforcing a connection to the larger collective group (Alba, 1992; June and Masuoka, 2008). For example, Bledsoe et al. (1995) find that racial solidarity is stronger among Blacks who live in predominantly Black neighborhoods. In addition to neighborhood contexts, places of worship may provide an important site for racial and ethnic minorities to reinforce group solidarity, however, relatively few studies have empirically examined places of worship as one of the social contexts that can influence identity formation. Reese and Brown (1995) examine identity formation among African American churchgoers through the messaging received at churches such as civic awareness messages. These types of messages tend to be community-focused and emphasize a link to one's racial group and the recognition of power imbalances between racial groups (Reese and Brown, 1995). They find that civic awareness messages tend to increase levels of racial identity among African Americans while being exposed to political activities at one's place of worship does not impact this sense of identity (Reese and Brown, 1995).

More recently, Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) provides a unique examination of the influence of social interaction and ethnic stimuli on identity formation among Latinos in three ways. His main argument comes from the social identity approach of both social identity theory

and self-categorization theory. These theories hold that group members form in-group attachments to social categories through the realization of similarities with other individuals, based on the differences that stem from out-groups (Turner et al. 1987). This categorization influences one's self-concept whereas at the intergroup level, one's social identity is defined as the aspects of an individual's self-image that come from the social categories they belong to. Along with the social category also comes the emotional benefits of this group membership (Tajfel et al., 1979). Essentially as a social category, such as ethnicity, becomes more salient, individuals are more likely to adopt this in-group identity because it allows individuals to foster positive self-images and secure self-concepts (Tajfel et al., 1979). This can take place even when someone belongs to a group with relatively low status, in relation to other groups, in various ways such as focusing on dimensions that are more positive for the in-group or engaging in actions that attempt to change the current social hierarchy (Tajfel et al., 1979; Turner et al. 1987).

Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) extends the psychological frameworks stemming from the social identity approach by arguing that group members are more likely to identify with the group when that group is made salient and accessible. He examines three local environments that may make one's ethnicity more salient: ethnic density measured by the proportion of ethnic residents in one's neighborhood, ethnic saturation measured by opportunities for exposure to ethnic cues, and ethnic social interaction where individuals engage with ethnic members in a variety of formal and informal ways—the latter of which examines the frequency of church attendance with co-ethnics. He finds that all three ethnic stimuli are all associated with stronger feelings of group identity in comparison to those who are in contexts with lower ethnic stimuli, establishing the importance of environments past immediate neighborhood composition on identity formation (Wilcox-Archuleta, 2018).

Similar to the scholarship on African American religiosity, Asian American religious membership can be conceptualized as a group-based resource that may influence political participation due to the institutional space they provide for Asian Americans to build community networks. Wong, Lien and Conway (2005), for example, find that resources such as Asian pan-ethnic group consciousness and membership in an Asian American organiza-

tion are associated with increased political participation. While they contend that religious organizations may not be as important for political mobilization for Asian Americans in comparison to African Americans and Latinos, they clarify that the church could potentially be a powerful group-based resource for Asian Americans, with the growing number of Asian American Christian churches in the U.S. (Wong et al. , 2005).

However, rather than providing direct resources for political participation as traditionally theorized by many scholars studying the role of the church, the research on Asian American religion in the U.S. largely centers on the role places of worship have on communal life. These institutions have been particularly important in providing a place for immigrants to adapt to their new communities. Min (1992) finds that Korean immigrant churches deliver four important functions: 1) the church provides fellowship, 2) maintains cultural traditions through activities such as Korean language use during service as well as cultural education, 3) supports immigrant incorporation by providing social services for new immigrants and 4) provides social status by offering opportunities for leadership roles.

Research on Asian American religions has also explored how places of worship provide a central space where multiple identities are accepted, and foster a sense of belonging and social connectedness. Russell Jeung's (2005) work, for example, considers how Chinese and Japanese American congregations provide a place for the second generation where people can practice their faith as both Asians and Americans (Jeung, 2005). The importance of having a place where these multiple identities are accepted is reflected not just for church-goers, but in the experiences of the ministers as well. In his interviews, Jeung (2005) finds that several ministers not only felt that Caucasians treated them differently but that they felt a level of discomfort going to a non-Chinese or non-Japanese church (Jeung, 2005).

Jeung's (2004) ethnography of Grace Community Covenant Church, an evangelical church in the Silicon Valley, a pan-ethnic church designed for second and third-generation Asian Americans, provides a more detailed portrait of the sense of social connectedness that Asian Americans can gain from a pan-ethnic place of worship. Jeung argues that pan-ethnic churches and their creation of a new institutional space not only meet its members' needs for acceptance, belonging, and expression of their own values and beliefs, but that

pan-ethnic churches arise in response to the need for a new organizational space among the religious institutional landscape. Both its members and the pastor describe feeling marginalized within Asian or Caucasian-dominated organizations: not feeling Asian enough in immigrant communities, while feeling pressured by a Caucasian-dominated community to blend in (Jeung, 2004). American institutions broadly overlook Asian Americans and are not tailored to meet their needs (Jeung, 2004). One of Jeung's interviewees revealed a need "'to be among people...who understand what I've gone through. That experience of sometimes being an outsider, of not fitting'" (Jeung, 2004, p. 300). Additionally, the church not only affirms their identity and the racial issues they face due to their positioning in the U.S, and also addresses Asian American issues in relation to one's Christianity through the messages used by pastors in sermons (Jeung, 2004). In contrast to cultural activities used by ethnic-specific churches, pan-ethnic churches are more likely to directly use sermons to emphasize messages of group empowerment, in addition to actively encouraging members to organize around political issues and become involved in issues such as immigration, community issues, and minority rights (Jeung, 2005).

Ethnic-specific immigrant Asian congregations also focus on providing a space for Asians who feel marginalized and occasionally discriminated against by the wider society, to feel comfortable and safe but in different ways (Jeung, 2005). Although worship time is reserved for more intellectual and reverent connections to God, ethnic churches organize many cultural and social activities celebrating their ethnic ties—thereby providing opportunities for ethnic stimuli as theorized by Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) to become more salient and accessible. Despite some variations in how ethnic churches and pan-ethnic churches can activate group identity, scholars studying Asian American religions have established the importance of places of worship in providing a community to support one's background, whether it be for new immigrants or for second generations trying to find their place in American society.

In addition to group identity activated in places of worship, some studies have considered the extent to which political cohesion in churches may also provide an environment that is conducive to political participation. There are competing theories however on the direction in which political agreement is associated with political participation. Those who argue

political disagreement—rather than similarity—is necessary for increased activity contend that being exposed to heterogeneous viewpoints indirectly facilitates learning about politics, to then influences participation (McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard, 2003). However, others in this same line of work suggest that political disagreement may make people less likely to participate by ultimately leaving people with ambivalent views on issues (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn, 2004).

In the same way that differing points of view may lead to indirect political learnings, being in a politically similar environment may make existing political views more salient or could drive increased opportunities for recruitment in activity. Individuals may be more likely to participate in politics if their social environment aligns with their political beliefs, in that they increase their opportunities to be recruited or encouraged to participate in politics (Leighley, 1990). Political similarity may serve as a resource to consolidate and strengthen political views (Mutz, 2006; Price, Cappella, and Nir, 2002; Lee, Kwak, and Campbell, 2015), and group norms may be specially reinforced when these are frequent interactions with trusted social networks (McPherson et al.,2001). Lee, Kwak, and Campbell (2015) find that a combination of agreement and dissent are connected to having stronger political convictions and motivation to take political action. An important part of their framework for how individuals are persuaded into reinforcing common beliefs with those in their community focuses on collective identity (Lee, Kwak, and Campbell, 2015). When encountering political disagreement, members who are part of a strong in-group may feel that the group's attitudes are more relevant compared to viewpoints that are less familiar (Mansbridge, 1983; Lee, Kwak, and Campbell, 2015).

Chan and Phoenix (2020) extend this literature by providing a unique exploration of political homogeneity as a particular social identity that can be fostered within churches for Asian Americans. At the center of their argument is the social capital gained from belonging to religious institutions, however, they question whether this resource is rooted in racial homogeneity—where frequent interactions with others of their own race at church foster racial group consciousness (Chan and Phoenix, 2020). Instead, churches provide an important site for bonding social capital which is cultivated from a social identity that is grounded in

ideology: in politically similar environments, Asian Americans can gain awareness of their own political orientations and develop mutually responsive relationships based on shared political beliefs and commonality in values, which then propels political participation (Chan and Phoenix, 2020). Chan and Phoenix (2020) argue however that this identity is distinct from racial group consciousness in that there is no perceived sense of lower status in the U.S.'s racial hierarchy attached to this identity (Chan and Phoenix, 2020). However, the importance of this identity is similar to the theoretical framework of group consciousness in that these shared values can activate people to take up political action (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin, 1980). They find that a church's racial composition is less salient for increased political participation among Asian Americans, while perceptions of shared ideological views foster both voting and non-voting participation for Asian Americans (Chan and Phoenix, 2020). Chan and Phoenix (2020) make a significant contribution on the importance of the social and political context of a place of worship for Asian Americans. Using the same dataset, I extend their theoretical framework by examining the extent to which this relationship varies both 1)across religions, and how 2)across the immigrant status of a place of worship.

3.2 Hypotheses

As described by Chan and Phoenix (2020), political similarity can serve as a social group identity to make political beliefs and shared values salient, and to become engaged in politics. As places of worship provide important institutional sites for the development of social capital and trust, Asian Americans will be more likely to adopt these beliefs and be receptive to political recruitment because of the sense of trust and in-group identity that is already apparent. I aim to extend the findings from Chan and Phoenix (2020) by considering how political resources may vary based on religion and the immigrant status of a place of worship. As I described in the previous chapter, places of worship among Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus are conducive to increased political participation. Here I seek to examine the specific resources gained through religious membership. Places of worship provide opportunities to socially interact—, particularly after worship or attending the temple to observe rituals—and

take part in informal political discussions and gain awareness of similar political views with other members. I hypothesize then that political similarity at places of worship will be predictors of non-voting participation across religions.

Secondly, the literature has established how places of worship are important institutions for first-generation immigrants to seek out a community, establish contacts, find jobs, and incorporate into American life. The resources that come with political homogeneity then are likely to be more salient at places of worship that are majority immigrant or have a mix of immigrants and U.S-born members, in that political similarity is a learning-based resource that serves to incorporate Asian Americans into political action. This is also more likely to be a resource for political participation in comparison to other group-based resources like linked fate. In contrast, second generation U.S. born Asian Americans have varying life experiences, particularly in how much awareness they already perceive about their racial positionality in the U.S. Therefore, political similarity at places of worship that are majority-U.S. born is not likely to be a predictor of increased non-voting participation, while other resources such as linked fate will be more predictive for political participation.

3.3 Data and Methods

I use the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) to examine my hypotheses. The CMPS was fielded online between December 3, 2016, and February 15, 2017, and yielded a total of 10, 145 adults, among which are 3,006 Asian American respondents. The survey included large samples of registered voters as well as adult samples of non-registered voters: among Asian Americans, 1503 are registered to vote and 1,503 are unregistered to vote. The survey was available in multiple languages, including Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese. Including its accessibility by language, the CMPS is unique in its large sample size of Asian Americans, its inclusion of voters and non-voters, and the availability of questions related to place of worship composition.

My dependent variable focuses on non-voting participation. I create a variable that indicates the number of non-voting acts participated in during the last twelve months: dis-

cussing politics with friends and family, working for a candidate, political party, or other campaign organization, donating money to a campaign, contacting an elected representative, working with others to solve a problem affecting one's city or neighborhood, attending a meeting to discuss issues facing the community, discussing politics online, signing a petition, and attending a protest. The average number of acts participated in is 2 and the scale has a strong alpha score: $\alpha = 0.74$. I focus on non-voting as my previous chapter provides evidence that the resource acquisition that takes place through religious membership is not conducive to voting participation. I model this through a negative binomial regression model.

My primary independent variable to measure political similarity is the survey measure asking respondents how similar are their political views with most of the people in their church. As displayed in Table 1, forty-nine% of Asian Americans view their place of worship as similar (net "somewhat" and "very") while half say their place of worship is not similar (net "not very" and "not at all"). While the wording uses 'church' rather than 'house of worship' or 'temple', the latter of which are more commonly used for non-Christians, there are no missing responses among Buddhist and Hindu respondents, indicating that non-Christian respondents likely had their respective site of worship in mind, regardless of terminology. I also include frequency of religious attendance with the following scale: never, hardly ever, only a few times a year, a few times a month, almost every week, and at least every week. A majority of Asian Americans (60%) never attend or attend at relatively low rates (net never, hardly ever, and a few times a year) while 27% attend either almost weekly or weekly. Place of worship political similarity and frequency of religious attendance have a low correlation at 0.41.

The frequency of religious attendance across Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus reflects the differences in religious practice, as described in the previous chapter. Christianity centers weekly worship attendance as a primary way to practice and this is reflected in the high rates of Asian American Christians—45%—who attend church almost weekly or at least weekly. This is in contrast to only about 27% of Buddhists, and 16% of Hindus, and displays the advantage Christians have in having opportunities for consistent interactions with one's

religious community. Asian American Christians also display differences in political homogeneity compared to Buddhists and Hindus. Sixty-two percent of Asian American Christians describe their church as having similar political views to their own. Hindus are somewhat split as a simple majority say their place of worship is politically similar. A majority of Buddhists at 54% in contrast do not find political homogeneity for their places of worship. Asian American Christians have institutional advantages in the resources acquisition that comes with membership at a place of worship.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics on Religious Variables by Religious Tradition

%	**Topline**	**Buddhist**	**Christian**	**Hindu**
Political Similarity				
Very similar	10	4	14	9
Somewhat similar	39	42	48	42
Not very similar	28	27	28	33
Not similar at all	23	27	10	16
Religious Attendance				
Never	19	20	8	10
Hardly ever	20	32	18	16
Few / yr	21	34	15	36
Few / month	12	9	13	22
Almost weekly	10	2	15	9
Weekly	17	2	30	7
N	3006	331	1188	344

CMPS 2016, weighted

Next, my examination of linked fate is based on Dawson's (1994) construction of the measure: "Do you think what generally happens to [Asian-American] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? I combine the "no" respondents with the second question asked of those who responded "yes": "will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much" asked to those who responded "yes" to the initial question. The majority of Asian Americans (59% (net) indicate they have a sense of linked fate towards other Asian Americans, while 41% indicate they do not feel connected to other Asin Americans. Among those that do, a plurality indicates "some" level of linked fate at 41%, while only about 11%

feel the strongest sense of connection.

To answer my hypotheses on variation by religion and by place of worship composition, I provide separate regression models first by religious identification for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. The total sample sizes for each group are 333 Buddhists, 1188 Christians, and 344 Hindus. Second, I provide separate regression models by immigrant composition for the three following types: mostly immigrants, mostly U.S. born, or a mix of both immigrant and U.S. born members. The CMPS provides a unique question asking Asian American respondents: "Are most of the people at your place of worship or religious gatherings immigrants or U.S. born?". This includes a n of 272 for majority-immigrant places of worship, 462 for majority-U.S. born, and 447 for a mix of both. The plurality of Asian Americans (37%) attend places of worship with a mix of both immigrants and people who were born in the U.S., 29% report their place of worship is mostly U.S. born, and 24% indicate their place of worship is mostly immigrants (focusing on completed responses).

These three types of places of worship have comparable rates of political homogeneity. About 65% of immigrant places of worship are politically similar, compared to 59% in second generation places of worship, and 68% in places of worship that are a mix of both. There are distinct differences by religious attendance however. About 40% of Asians who attend immigrant places of worship and 39% who attend mixed-status places of worship attend almost weekly or weekly. Asians who attend U.S.-born places of worship have much higher rates of weekly attendance at 59%. Importantly, Asians who attend mostly U.S.-born places of worship are largely Christians (86%). Christians also make up a plurality of immigrant-dominated places of worship at 46% and places of worship that are a mix of both (48%). Hindus make up about a third of Asians who attend predominantly immigrant places of worship, or ones with a mix of both. The individual regression analysis I later present provides a more nuanced analysis of the types of resources available through place of worship membership, however I acknowledge that these findings are more representative of Christian Asian Americans who are frequent church attenders, which does not fully capture relevant pathways for Buddhists and Hindus.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics on Religious Variables by Immigrant Composition

%	Mostly Immigrants	Mostly U.S born	Mix of both
Political Similarity			
Very similar	14	17	13
Somewhat similar	51	42	55
Not very similar	26	33	23
Not similar at all	9	7	9
Religious Attendance			
Few / yr	36	24	41
Few / month	23	16	20
Almost weekly	14	22	15
Weekly	26	37	24
Religion			
Buddhist	13	4	15
Christian	46	86	48
Hindu	31	8	29
Other	9	2	8
N	272	462	447

CMPS 2016, weighted

As the sample sizes by religion (for Buddhists and Hindus) and place of worship composition are small, I do not control for variations in national-origin, however, I include standard controls for the following: gender, age, income, education, marital status, foreign-born status, and politically-relevant variables including partisan identification and political interest.

3.4 Findings on Non-Voting Participation

I first present my findings on non-voting political participation across religious tradition. Table 3 displays three negative binomial models for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus each. Political similarity is a predictor of non-voting across the three religions traditions. For ease of interpretation, Figure 1 presents predicted counts for each level of political similarity, from min to max. I find a 0.69 increase among Buddhists, a 0.51 increase among Christians, and a 0.71 increase among Hindus in the expected counts of non-voting participation as political

similarity increases.

Table 3.3: Regression Models on Non-Voting Participation

	Buddst	Christian	Hindu
Intercept	-1.62 (0.45)***	-1.00 (0.23)***	-1.99 (0.52)***
Political Similarity	0.14 (0.06)*	0.09 (0.03)**	0.11 (0.05)*
Religious Attendance	0.08 (0.04)*	0.01 (0.02)	0.09 (0.03)**
Linked Fate	0.16 (0.05)**	0.09 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.04)**
Women	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.09)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)*
Income	0.03 (0.02)*	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Education	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Married	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.05)**	-0.04 (0.12)
Foreign Born	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.20 (0.10)
Democrat	0.18 (0.11)	0.11 (0.06)	0.22 (0.10)*
Republican	-0.09 (0.15)	0.04 (0.06)	0.15 (0.14)
Political Interest	0.43 (0.07)***	0.47 (0.03)***	0.40 (0.07)***
AIC	1006.51	3624.19	1159.55
BIC	1058.55	3693.56	1211.64
Log Likelihood	-489.26	-1798.10	-565.78
Deviance	319.72	1073.55	318.80
Num. obs.	304	1048	305

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Collaborative Multi-racial Post-Election Survey 2016

Figure 3.1: Predicted Counts Among Asian Americans Christians on Non-Voting Participation



Next I report findings on non-voting participation across place of worship composition displayed in Table 4. I find some varying associations between my main independent variables of interest and non-voting participation. Political similarity is a positive and significant predictor for places of worship that are composed primarily of immigrants, and for places of worship that are mixed between foreign-born and U.S.-born Asian Americans. In terms

of non-religious variables, linked fate is statistically significant for Asians who attend multi-generation places of worship and places of worship that are primarily U.S. born.

Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression on Non-Voting Participation

	Mostly Immigrants	Mostly U.S. Born	Both
Intercept	−1.28 (0.53)*	−0.10 (0.37)	−1.91 (0.44)***
Political Similarity	0.20 (0.07)**	−0.00 (0.05)	0.12 (0.05)**
Religious Attendance	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Linked Fate	0.02 (0.05)	0.07 (0.03)*	0.14 (0.03)***
Women	−0.02 (0.10)	−0.00 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.08)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)*
Income	0.04 (0.02)*	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*
Education	−0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Married	−0.16 (0.12)	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.14 (0.08)
Democrat	0.09 (0.12)	0.07 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)
Republican	0.07 (0.14)	−0.00 (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)
Political Interest	0.44 (0.08)***	0.43 (0.05)***	0.44 (0.06)***
AIC	977.54	1624.57	1455.12
BIC	1023.48	1677.34	1506.97
Log Likelihood	−475.77	−799.28	−714.56
Deviance	268.00	447.66	416.06
Num. obs.	253	428	399

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Collaborative Multi-racial Post-Election Survey 2016

Figure 2 displays the change in predicted counts of non-voting participation by degree of political similarity. Among immigrant places of worship, political similarity is associated with a 1.31 increase in the number of non-voting acts participated in. I find a 0.78 increase in the counts of acts participated in among Asian Americans who attend places of worship that are multi-generation. Linked fate serves as a comparable resource: an increase of 0.72 in the predicted number of non-voting activities participated in for Asians who attend multi-generation places of worship. I find a similar pattern for linked fate where Asians attending places of worship that are mostly U.S. born see a 0.42 increase in the number of acts participated in from min to max.

Figure 3.2: Association Between Political Similarity and Non-Voting by Immigrant Composition



My findings show that places of worship provide a space for political learnings and that this political identity formed within a trusted community is important for participation across religions. Additionally, political similarity is salient for people who go to places of worship that are predominantly made up of immigrants or have a mix of both immigrants and those who are U.S. born, suggesting that political similarity may function more as a learning and political incorporation based resource to become engaged in U.S. society and politics. The findings on linked fate further suggest that the resources acquired through places of worship vary based on immigrant incorporation into the U.S. I find linked fate is not a significant predictor for participation among those who attend immigrant-dominated places of worship, but is associated with non-voting participation for Asian Americans who attend places of worship that are predominantly U.S. born or of mixed status. This aligns with the literature

on linked fate for Asian Americans that the formation of group identity for Asian Americans is likely activated both by social interactions and life experiences as Masuok (2006) argues, and additionally my findings suggest that group-based resources such as racial identity take precedence for second generation Asian Americans over resources gained through membership in a religious community. As Jeung (2005) finds, second generation places of worship also place further emphasis on racial identity and the positionality of Asian-Americans in the U.S, which may serve as another way that group consciousness is amplified for second generation Asian Americans in a way that is not yet salient for the first generation.

3.5 Discussion

My findings extend the literature on the importance of religious institutions for Asian Americans. My previous chapter using the National Asian American Surveys established that external religiosity—attending and being part of a religious community—is associated with non-voting participation. While I cannot make any causal claims, particularly as there is an issue of self-selection in the extent to which people are going out of their way to attend a specific place of worship, this chapter sheds some light on the specific mechanism for political participation through religious group membership. Shared in-group religious identity creates a level of trust that is further amplified by opportunities to learn about the political beliefs and values of the in-group. One of the ways this learning could take place is through informal discussions at a place of worship on a salient issue. While the measure does not give as much insight into factors such as the content of these political discussions, the findings here also align with the previous chapter in that this learning is likely taking place outside of worship through social interactions with one's religious network, rather than messaging received through sermons—particularly as the latter is not a common part of worship format for Buddhists and Hindus. My findings also display a more complex relationship between the composition of places of worship and the extent to which this political identity is activated or salient for political participation which suggests that place-of-worship-resources are more important for immigrant populations.

A central limitation of this data however is the findings on immigrant-composition are largely representative of Christian Asian Americans who attend church frequently. It could be expected that Buddhists specifically may display the same variation in place-of-worship resources by generation, particularly given the historical role of Buddhist temples for the first waves of Chinese and Japanese immigrants compared to their current role in the community. This may also vary by national origin with Vietnamese Buddhists being part of the 1970s wave of immigration to the U.S. compared to established generations of Chinese and Japanese generations in the U.S. Data limitations and small sample sizes however prevent a more nuanced analysis between immigrant composition and religious traditions.

Another limitation is on the ways in which places of worship differ by generation. On the one hand, these findings align with the literature on Asian American churches that there are important differences between immigrant places of worship and ones specifically catered towards meeting the needs of the second generation as well and providing a place where they feel like they can belong. In the same way that there are differences in resource-to-mobilization by generation, there may also be differences in identity formation by generation. Jeung's research (2005) shows there are distinct ways in how second generation and first generation activate and make salient racial identity, at a place of worship from intentional conversations in the former to focus on cultural traditions and events for the latter. There are also denominational differences between Evangelical churches and mainline Christian churches in the extent to which they maintain ethnic ties, with the former focusing on familial patterns and the social networks of its Asian American members, and mainline ministers emphasizing the racialized and historical experiences of Asian Americans (Jeung, 2005). There is also variation in terms of religious switching and conversion, which is more common among U.S. born Asian Americans in comparison to foreign born Asian Americans. These factors could all lead to different pathways in identity formation, and which identities—whether racial or political—are prioritized. More specific measures in surveys are needed to capture the specific content of both informal and formal learnings at places of worship by generation and religious tradition and how this may impact both identity formation and political participation.

CHAPTER 4

Beyond the Pews: The Role of Both External and Internal Religious Behaviors

In the previous chapters, I addressed the traditional theoretical framework between religion and political behavior, with a focus on public forms of religious behavior. I argued that the social component of religion is an important resource in the relationship between religion and political behavior that is consistent across religious traditions. These social networks are of particular importance for immigrant groups such as Asian Americans in providing a few of the areas where they can be mobilized into civic and political participation. In particular, I show that one way this can occur is by being embedded into a politically similar religious community. These resources can be acquired even when these social gatherings occur with less frequency, such as for religions like Buddhism and Hinduism where weekly worship attendance is not the predominant marker of being religiously devout within one's religious tradition. The social component of religiosity, however, may not be the only path to civic and political participation, particularly for Asian Americans practicing non-Christian religions like Buddhism and Hinduism, where there are other ways past religious attendance—such as ritual, individual practices—that denote strong religious devotion. I question: to what extent do private religious behaviors influence political and civic participation, independent from external forms of religious behavior?

A few scholars within the religion and political participation literature have examined the association of both external and internal religiosity with various forms of civic participation. External religiosity encompasses public forms of religious behaviors such as attending bible study and church attendance, while internal religiosity captures private forms of religious behaviors such as praying, reading the bible, and other devotional acts. Harris (1994),

argues that religion provides both the organizational resources and the psychological resources to influence political participation in different ways. While social interactions and membership at a place of worship provide skill-based resources —much like Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's (1995) argument on civic skills —as well as opportunities to organize, Harris (1994) also argues that religious motivation can provide a cognitive link to personal and group efficacy, which can then motivate political action. Harris (1994) measures internal motivation through the following variables: frequency of prayer, feelings of closeness to God, and considering oneself a strong member of one's denomination. Other studies with similar theoretical frameworks also operationalize private religiosity by examining religious importance and frequency of prayer (Lam, 2002), or the frequency of prayer, reading the Bible every week and watching religious programs on TV (Clark, 1998).

These studies all find that internal religiosity is associated with forms of civic participation to varying degrees. Harris (1994), for example, finds that both internal religiosity and church activism are associated with collective action, such as forming new groups to address community problems. Loveland (et al. , 2005) find that the frequency of prayer is associated with participation in support groups and social service groups, while Lam (2002) finds that the frequency of prayer, the frequency of religious reading, and public religious participation all have a positive effect on volunteering. These studies provide evidence that internal religiosity provides another path to political engagement. Harris's (1994) finding particularly challenges scholars who argue that religious commitment leads to decreased political and civic participation. Secondly, the findings suggest that internal religiosity may be particularly relevant to types of activities that tap into the needs of others. There are few extensions of this literature however past a predominantly white, Christian population, and little known how this may vary among other populations. Asian Americans provide an interesting case study to examine the extent to which these theoretical frameworks extend to diverse populations, given both the variety of private and public religious practices observed by non-Christians. Secondly, external religious behaviors are not the dominant practice or mark of high religiosity among the non-Christian religions practiced by Asian Americans. Private, meditative, and reflective practices provide other ways to be religiously devout and

therefore may serve as another pathway to influence political or civic engagement.

To examine these two components of religiosity I use the Pew Research Center's 2012 Asian-American Survey, a unique data set offering a range of questions on religion and religious behavior. I continue to find evidence for a positive relationship between external religiosity and civic participation. However, I find a more complex association for internal religiosity, particularly across religious traditions where internal religiosity is significant only for Hindu Americans, while external religiosity predicts increased civic engagement among Buddhists and Christians. These findings mirror previous chapters in that external religiosity may be of greater importance to groups with lower socioeconomic status. It also may speak to the organizational structure of places of worship, and differences in the services provided by churches and temples for Christians and Buddhists, compared to Hindus that help with incorporation into the U.S. Some limitations of my chapter however are the measure of internal religiosity lacks insight into the frequency of individual practices and the intersection between religious beliefs and religious behaviors. Future work should consider inclusive and diverse measures of the ways that Buddhists and Hindus partake in practicing their religion in private, individual ways to better understand the psychological link between religion and political participation.

4.1 Internal Religiosity and Political Participation

The most prominent aspect of religion that scholars have focused on is religious behavior and how religious behavior mobilizes political action. Scholars make a distinction between public religious expression, such as attending church, and private devotional acts, such as praying and reading the Bible (Welch and Leege,1988; Jelen, 1991). Most studies however have focused solely on public religious expression, and primarily measure religious behavior through the frequency of worship attendance, and have established the importance of church attendance as a resource for political beliefs participation among Christians (Hougland and Christeson, 1983; Martinson and Wilkening, 1987; Djupe and Grant, 2001; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Extensions of this literature have found that devotional behaviors also

have an influence on political beliefs and political engagement. Individuals who frequently pray and perceive religion as important in their lives tend to have more conservative stances on political issues and are more likely to support the Republican party and its candidates (Guth and Green, 1993; Cook, Jelen and Wilcox, 1992; Layman, 2001). Beyond the political beliefs people hold, private individual acts may also reinforce religious values, which then motivate involvement in civic and community activities (Lam, 2002). The salience of religion is also used as an indicator of commitment to religion and the inclination to engage in religious practices, such as frequent praying (Layman, 2001). These different ways to practice one's faith both publicly and privately have sometimes been operationalized through a measure of religious commitment that combines frequency of worship attendance, personal prayer, and religious salience (Keestedt et al.,1996).

Among the scholars who take this multidimensional approach to religion and politics, Harris (1994) provides a strong theoretical framework to examine how both internal religiosity and external religiosity provide a path to participation. Harris (1994) argues that religion provides both organizational resources and psychological resources to influence political participation. He draws on Wald's (1987) conceptualization of three types of religiously based resources: organization, social interaction, and motivation. The organization of churches itself of formal membership, central headquarters, regularly scheduled meetings, and the social interactions that come with church membership provides resources favorable to collective action (Wald, 1987; Harris, 1994). Secondly, religious motivation serves as a cognitive resource that nurtures personal and group efficacy, which can encourage political activism (Harris, 1994). Cognitive resources can also be further heightened and impact political beliefs when political issues are framed in mortal terms—such as abortion rights, for example (Wald, 1987).

Harris (1994) tests his hypotheses by examining the influence of internal religiosity, church activism, and church attendance first on voting participation. His scale of internal religiosity includes: frequency of prayer, feelings of closeness to God, and considering oneself a strong member of one's denomination, while the scale of church activism includes: membership in a church group that solves problems, and being active in church organizations

(Harris ,1994) [1]. He finds that internal religiosity and church activism have no effect on the frequency of voting while church attendance is positively associated with voting (Harris, 1994). Internal religiosity and church activism, however, are positively and significantly associated with communal collective action (working with others to solve community problems and involvement with forming new groups to solve community problems), while church attendance is negatively associated with collective action behavior (Harris, 1994). Lastly, using path analysis he finds that internal religiosity promotes internal political efficacy and political interest (Harris, 1994).

Harris's (1994) finding that high internal religiosity influences community organizing challenges other studies which argue that strong religious commitment erodes incentives to participate politically, in addition to findings by other scholars that being highly religious is associated with decreased political participation, particularly among African-Americans (Reed, 1986). Rather, Harris suggests that this dimension of religiosity provides individuals with the moral incentives to participate. Lastly, he emphasizes the differences in the influence of religiosity between white and Black Christians, where the impact of internal religiosity is greater for whites (Harris, 1994). Harris (1994) considers how morally defined individual issues, such as abortion, may stimulate collective action efforts more strongly for religious whites. For African Americans, instead, group identity and group consciousness are more important factors for political participation (Harris, 1994).

Other studies also provide evidence that both dimensions of religious behaviors are significant to civic participation. Lam (2002) operationalizes private devotion using religious importance, frequency of prayer, and frequency of religious reading and finds that the two latter variables have positive effects on participating in voluntary organizations. She also finds that public religious participation continues to be influential: being involved in a religious organization and serving on the committee of a religious organization also have a positive effect on voluntary participation, suggesting that both forms of religious behaviors provide pathways to civic engagement.

[1] Harris (1994) notes that while these religious constructs are closely related, the correlations are moderate.

Using the American National Election Study of 1992, Clark (1998) similarly tests the influence of both internal and external religiosity among white and African American respondents. He measures internal religiosity with a summed index using the following variables: frequency of prayer, frequency of Bible reading each week, and the number of times a person watches religious programs on TV (Clark, 1998). The index of external religiosity includes church membership, whether a person participates in a religious organization outside of their place of worship, and whether they attend church on a weekly or near-weekly basis (Clark, 1998). Clark (1998) argues that this measure of the level of involvement in church activities provides a more rounded view of organizational involvement than can be attained by just measuring the frequency of worship attendance [2]. Similarly to Harris (1994), Clark (1998) finds that both dimensions of religiosity are conditioned by race and income and vary across modes of political participation: internal religiosity is only positively associated with voting among white voters, while external religiosity has a positive and statistically significant relationship with communal activity among both blacks and whites (Clark, 1998).

These studies have predominantly focused on assessing the extent to which internal and external religiosity are independently associated with modes of civic and political participation. Loveland (et al. , 2005) also test the extent to which both dimensions of religious behavior interact with each other. They first find that frequency of prayer, being a member of a religious organization, and serving on the committee of a religious organization increases the likelihood of belonging to a higher number of secular voluntary associations (Loveland et al., 2005). Secondly, when interacting frequency of prayer and religious membership, they find that secular civic involvement increases with active participation in a religious organization (Loveland et al., 2005). This study adds nuance to the pathway between internal religiosity and the civic arena. Specifically, Loveland (et al. 2005) find that frequency of prayer is associated with participation in groups that focus on meeting the needs of individuals directly, such as support groups or social service groups, but is not associated with

[2]Similar to Harris (1994), Clark (1998) finds moderate correlations between the measures of internal and external religiosity (correlation coefficients between 0.3 – 0.45) suggesting that the variables are measuring different dimensions of religiosity.

membership in political organizations. Loveland's (et al. 2005) findings suggest that both internal and external religiosity are important to consider, however internal religious behavior such as prayer may operate more indirectly than external religiosity by promoting cognitive connections to the needs of others. This may then motivate participants to engage in both the civic and political realm (Loveland et al., 2005).

4.2 Applications Beyond Christians

The literature on religious behaviors provides evidence that internal religiosity also merits consideration when examining the relationship between religiosity and political and civic participation. However, to what extent might this framework apply to non-Christian religious traditions? Among the quantitative studies of Asian American religions, few scholars have empirically examined the role of internal religious behaviors on political and civic participation. As the past chapters have explored, studies on religiosity have focused heavily on congregation-based organizing and on the importance of religious institutions for developing social capital. Secondly, this literature has largely focused on white, Christian populations. This extends past disciplines, where, for example, studies in sociology on progressive activism and large-scale social movement activism have also focused primarily on movements that have been made up of Christian and Jewish populations, while there is still little known about activism in Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim communities in the U.S. (Yukich, 2017). Although including other ways that members of religious traditions interact with their religious community —such as through the measure of religious activity in the previous chapters —is one extension of the literature, there are also limitations to these measures that are important to acknowledge. Yukich(2017) provides a strong critique of the literature in this aspect in questioning whether 1) members of these religious traditions are simply not involved in religious activism, or 2) whether they're less likely to be involved in the type of activism that has predominantly been recognized by the literature.

A central part of Yukich's (2017) critique is the need to look beyond congregations and congregation-based organizing, as congregations play a less central role in these religious

traditions. One pathway for this extension is by looking for religious activism in spaces that may be less public or less collective, given the differences in beliefs, practices, and organizations forms across religions (Yukich, 2017). While her critique is primarily of the literature studying progressive religious activism, her arguments can also be applied to the religion and political behavior literature in political science where there have been few extensions past Judeo-Christian populations and religious behaviors.

For example, the theoretical foundation used traditionally by scholars such as Layman (2001) and others draws strongly on the role of religious beliefs, and how religion can mobilize participation by providing divine guidance and a moral code to follow (Wald, 1987; Wilcox, 1986). Focusing on the variations between religious beliefs among Asian Americans is an important gap in the literature, however, there are theoretical limitations with the measures commonly used in existing surveys. For one, characteristics of religious beliefs are not common across all religious traditions. For example, the idea of a personal god is not a part of most Buddhist traditions, therefore Buddhists have a very different understanding of transcendence and divine guidance in contrast to Christianity (Yukich, 2017, Lichterman, 2013). The traditional measures of religious commitment and the strength of religious beliefs in political science are often captured through the importance of religion, where higher levels of religious importance indicate higher levels of religiosity. Iwamura et al. (2014) however draw attention to this in their critique of the Pew Research Center's 2012 Asian American survey: when using this measure, only 27% of Buddhists claim that religion is very important in their lives. This metric may then lead to the conclusion that Buddhists are not very religious. Iwamura et al. (2014) point to other measures that can better capture how Buddhists practice their religion —from the use of home altars to attendance at temple-sponsored Lunar New Year celebrations. This is reflected similarly among Asian American Hindus who report engaging in religious practices such as astrology and fasting, and the majority of whom have an in-home shrine to carry out devotional activities (Iwamura et al.,2014). Iwamura et al. (2014) argue that it is necessary to reconsider what it meant to be religious past the dominant Christian narrative when studying the strength of religious commitment among Asian Americans.

In addressing the ways to inclusively define religious practices, Yukich (2017) similarly argues that it is necessary to theorize more broadly about the differences between religious practices, and the need to look past congregation-based organization. Different patterns of religious practices —either collective or individual —may be enacted at particular times or places, or "'lived'" throughout the day. Despite not falling into the structure of traditional Judeo-Christian religious practices, this type of lived religion may still shape the motivations for engaging in religious activism (Yukich, 2017). Buddhists and Hindus may engage in social change efforts and be guided by religiously progressive values through mindful living and decision-making in their everyday interactions (Yukich, 2017). One such example is an older, highly educated, first-generation Indian immigrant who engages in her community in multiple ways —such as through volunteering for charitable organizations and educating others about Hinduism —and identifies as Hindu but does not regularly attend or belong to a Hindu temple (Yukich, 2017). This form of "lived religion" resembles what Kurien (2002) finds among most American Hindus who often practice their religion outside of organized communities and congregations. Again, while Yukich (2017) is focusing her critique and findings specifically on progressive religious activism, I draw on this framework for how religious practices—beyond congregations for Buddhists and Hindus—provides an important place where the cognitive motivation for civic participation can occur.

One such behavioral practice among Buddhists and Hindus is that of observing rituals and ceremonies at a designated home temple or shrine. Mazumdar and Mazumdar (2003) provide a theoretical framework for why the presence of shrines is an important religious practice that should not be neglected in the study of Asian American religions, and how the examination of altars and shrines in private spaces extends the literature in important ways, first, by shifting the focus from visible, congregational aspects of religion to focusing on the private, personal, and not so visible aspects of religion and religiosity (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2003). Secondly, the focus on altars brings attention to home-based religion, everyday family practices, and other rituals that can be carried out without the assistance and involvement of clergy or religious leaders (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2003). Mazumdar and Mazumdar (2003) focus their study of family shrines on their use among Hindu immi-

grants. In a typical Hindu immigrant home, the pooja area is a sacred space where there is a permanent altar, and rituals are practiced on a daily basis (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2003). The types of rituals performed range from daily individualized rituals to periodic, congregational rituals that are performed similarly to rituals at the temple. This can include anointing the deities, decorating the altar with fresh flowers, offering prasadam (food such as fruits and nuts), lighting incense, reciting the names of the deities, or reading from a sacred book (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2003).

These rituals create a feeling of holiness and allow those who observe these behaviors a way to express their religiosity outside of the temple (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2003). This then may provide a similar pathway to what Yukich (2017) suggests, in how religious practices are engaged in different places or "lived" throughout the day, and contribute to the psychological motivations to engage in political or civic participation. The concept of merit-making in Buddhism provides another example of engaging in religion in different types of spaces and mediums. Merit is produced through moral behavior and ritual actions, from contributing your time and donating, to taking care of other people (Truitt, 2021), where it is not just through rituals and ceremonies that observers can cultivate merit, but can do so through actions in one's daily life (Chen, 2002). Altogether, these good deeds accumulate in a spiritual merit bank and are meant to offset negative karma. These types of everyday practices, ritual observances, and the meaning that people attach to them may then influence a desire to create social change (Yukich, 2017) and contribute to collective well-being (Truitt, 2021).

Both sets of literature provide a framework for how both external and internal religious practices may influence political and civic participation. Despite differences in religious traditions, places of worship are an important institutional source of resources. Even among non-Christian religions where individuals may not seek out the ritual of going to the temple weekly, they have other opportunities to engage with their community and develop ties with other immigrants in their communities. While Hindus and Buddhists may be structurally at a disadvantage due to less frequent linkages with their place of worship, they are advantaged in how their religious values and rituals are intertwined with ethnic customs and traditions

(Min and Kim, 2002). This is particularly evident in forms of religious practice such as observing festivals that are both religiously and culturally connected. For example, 81% of Asian American Buddhists attend Lunar New Year celebrations, in addition to other community events throughout the calendar year such as Bon Odori practiced among Japanese American Buddhists (Iwamura et al. ,2014). Many of these festivals are celebrated at temple-sponsored events (Iwamura et al., 2014) which provide additional opportunities for past religious worship attendance to form and strengthen religious and ethnic social ties among a trusted social network—, particularly in comparison to other social groups Asian-American Buddhists or Hindus may be a part of. As my previous chapters have explored, religious social ties and social gatherings provide important opportunities where Asian Americans can be socialized into U.S. politics and exchange information, especially in the absence of outreach by political parties and campaigns.

Secondly, I seek to incorporate individually based religious behaviors in my examination of religiosity among Asian Americans through home-based observances of rituals. In terms of private religious behaviors, I follow the established framework in the literature that private practices of religion provide psychological resources such as fostering the cognitive connection to participate civically and contribute to society (Layman, 2001; Harris, 1994; Loveland et al., 2005). This dimension of religiosity is likely more important for more civically engaged activities rather than direct political activities, such as voting, and likely to be predictive for Hindus and Buddhists, compared to Christians, of increased civic participation. I hypothesize then that external religious behavior will be positively related to voting and civic participation, while internal religious behavior will be positively related to civic participation only. Secondly, external religious behavior will be more likely to be predictive of Asian American Christian political participation compared to Buddhists and Hindus, while internal religious behaviors are more likely to be predictive of Buddhist and Hindu civic engagement compared to Christians.

4.3 Data and Methods

I use the Pew Research Center's 2012 Asian-American Survey to examine my research questions. The survey has adequate sample sizes across three main religions practiced among Asian Americans: Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism. The survey has a total sample size of 3,511 Asian Americans with 526 Buddhists, 1,599 Christians (net Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and mainline Protestant), and 333 Hindus. The survey was a telephone-based survey and was conducted between January - March 2012. It was offered in multiple languages and is nationally representative of Asian adults in the U.S.

My independent variable to capture external religious behavior is the frequency of religious attendance. The dataset includes a measure to capture the practice of private, devotional acts in addition to the traditional measure of religious attendance: the presence of a shrine or temple in one's home as a proxy for internal religiosity. While the variable does not capture the frequency with which respondents engage in rituals or prayer at home, this variable provides one of the few measures indicating the ways that Buddhists and Hindus practice their religion that do not rely on traditional, congregation-based religious behaviors. I provide disaggregated models by religious tradition across Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians where I incorporate the presence of home temples for Buddhists and Hindus, and the frequency of prayer for Christians as my main independent variables, the latter of which is a more relevant measure of how Christians engage in private, devotional acts.

My main dependent variables examine political and civic participation through 1) self-reported vote in the 2008 presidential election and 2) working with others in the neighborhood to solve a community problem [3]. The models also control for standard demographics including gender, age, income, education, foreign-born status, marital status, party identification, and national origin. All the models in the following sections are logistic regressions. Before I present my main findings, I provide descriptive statistics on the independent and dependent

[3]Full question wording for working to solve a community problem: "In the past 12 months, have you worked with other people from your neighborhood to fix a problem or improve a condition in your community or elsewhere, or haven't you done this?"

variables used in my regression analysis.

Among Asian-Americans who are citizens and were eligible to vote at the time of the 2008 presidential election, 72% report voting in the election. When looking by religion, electoral participation is relatively consistent: 68% of Buddhists, 74% of Christians, and 71% of Hindus who were eligible reported voting in the 2008 election. In contrast to voting behavior, Asian-Americans have lower rates of civic participation. Forty-four percent of Asian-Americans have participated in solving a community problem. For this measure of civic engagement, similarly to voting, Christian Asian-Americans have the highest participation at 49%, compared to 43% among Hindus and 39% among Buddhists.

The Pew survey provides some insight into the ways people get connected to this specific form of civic engagement by asking whether respondents worked with others on a community problem through a religious organization or a non-religious community group. Among all Asian-Americans, 49% report doing so through a civic group, while 31% report doing so through both religious and non-religious organizations. Buddhists and Hindus show similar patterns to each other. Fifty-six percent of Buddhists who have worked to solve a community problem did so through a civic or community organization, while 30% did so through both types of organizations, and 11% report doing so through a religious group. Similarly, 55% of Hindus have participated in this form of civic organization through a community group, while 29% have done so through both religious and non-religious groups, and 12% participate in this through a house of worship. Christians, on the other hand, are relatively split among all three: 38% have participated through both types of groups, 34% through just a civic organization, and 25% through a place of worship. This reflects what much of the literature has found on the advantages Christians, and Asian American Christians, have organizationally compared to relatively newer Buddhist and Hindu communities in the U.S., such as having more organizational ties to engage and mobilize civically.

Next, I provide descriptive statistics for my main independent variables. Table 1 displays percentages for the frequency of religious attendance among all Asian Americans and by religious denomination. As past chapters have shown, Asian Americans display varying patterns in their frequency of attending a religious place of worship. Twenty-two percent

attend once a week, while an equal 22% report attending only a few times a year. Few Asian Americans attend their place of worship more than once a week: only 10% do so. When comparing across religious traditions, Asian American Christians display higher rates of church attendance: 40% attend weekly and 20% attend more than once a week. Buddhists and Hindus show many different patterns in their participation in external religious behaviors. Only, 12% of Buddhists and one in five Hindus attend weekly and more than once a week. In comparison, Buddhists and Hindus are more likely to attend with less frequency a few times a year, at 33% and 38%, respectively, as well as a few times a month at 19% and 28%, respectively. As described in the literature, this reflects variation in Judeo-Christian and non-Judeo-Christian religious practices and what types of practices are more common in one religious tradition compared to the other. At the same time, this measure aligns with expectations of how Buddhist and Hindus interact with their place of worship—by coming to the temple for annual cultural festival celebrations. I argue that these interactions still provide important resources and opportunities for social interaction and learning among immigrant communities, even if it takes place less often for Asian American Buddhists and Hindus in comparison to Asian American Christians.

Table 4.1: Religious Behaviors Practiced by Asian Americans Across Religions

%	All	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Religious Attendance				
Never	16	17	3	4
Seldom	18	20	9	11
Few/yr	22	33	14	38
Few/month	13	19	12	28
Weekly	22	9	40	15
Weekly+	10	3	20	4
Other Religious Practices				
Home Temple	29	57	21	78
Weekly Prayer	54	44	80	66
Weekly Meditation	34	27	46	44
Fasting	29	26	36	41

Pew Research Center 2012 Asian-American Survey, weighted

Next, I examine several variables that capture different ways that Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus engage with their religion in independent, devotional ways, such as whether respondents have a shrine or temple for prayer in their homes. As described in the literature review, this is a dedicated space within Buddhist and Hindu homes to observe rituals, offerings, and other devotional activities. Fifty percent of Buddhists and 78% of Hindus have a dedicated space in their home for these types of activities. The measure is limited in that it does not capture any frequency with which respondents do engage in these activities at home. However, it captures the private ways many Buddhists and Hindus engage in religious practices, particularly as Buddhists and Hindus participate in other types of religious behaviors with varying levels of frequency.

Prayer, for example, is a common, private religious practice in the Christian tradition. The measure of weekly prayer compares those who pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, and once a week to those who pray a few times a month, seldom or never. Asian American Christians are highly engaged in this practice: 80% of Christians pray at least once weekly or more. While a majority of Hindus (66%), Buddhists are less likely to engage in this practice at 44%. The last two variables of meditation as a form of religious practice and fasting during holy times show relatively similar patterns, in that Buddhists are less likely to participate in their forms of behavior, compared to Christians and Hindus. Less than a third of Buddhists meditate weekly (26%) or fast (29%). While participation is relatively low among Christians for both behaviors, Christians are more likely to meditate (46%) than fast (36%). Hindus show similar rates of participation in both: 44% engage in a weekly meditation and 41% fast during holy times. The variation across each variable displays the challenge of finding one common measure of internal religious behaviors across all three religions. However, Buddhists and Hindus display the most common pattern in the private observance of rituals in a dedicated space at home across the four variables.

Next, I display descriptive statistics for relevant demographic variables for every three religious groups, displayed in Table 2. Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus have varying levels of socioeconomic status. Hindus are at an advantage in terms of having higher SES—they are predominantly college educated (85%), and the majority have incomes above $100,000

(53%). Christians have slightly more variation in both income and educational attainment: a majority (61%) have incomes$50,000 and above, while a simple majority have had some college education or less. Buddhist Asian Americans have the lowest levels of SES as a majority (66%) have some college education or less, and a 52% have incomes below $50,000.

Table 4.2: Demographics of Respondents Among All Asian Americans and by Religion

%	All	Buddhist	Christian	Hindu
Married	61	59	62	78
Foreign Born	76	79	73	96
Income Below $50k	39	52	41	17
Income $50k - $100k	25	26	27	29
Income $100k+	36	22	32	53
Some college or less	46	66	51	15
College degree or more	54	34	49	85

Pew Research Center 2012 Asian-American Survey, weighted

Given variation by ethnicity in practicing Buddhism and Christianity, I also provide cross-tabulations by ethnicity for these two religions. Table 3 shows descriptive among Asian Buddhists[4], with distinct patterns by foreign-born status, lower-income levels, and educational attainment. Japanese Buddhists are predominantly U.S.-born (54%), while Chinese and Vietnamese Buddhists are almost exclusively foreign-born, at 89% and 91% respectively—reflecting the distinct migration patterns of these two groups and the long-standing presence of Japanese and Japanese-Buddhists have had in the U.S. Among the three ethnic groups, Vietnamese Buddhists have the lowest levels of SES across income and education: the majority are lower-income (61%) and have some college education or less (82%). Chinese Buddhists are also slightly disadvantaged in terms of SES: a plurality are of lower income levels (47%), and 66% have some college education or less. In contrast, the majority of Japanese Buddhists (68%) have college degrees or higher education and are relatively evenly distributed by income.

[4]Asian-Buddhists are largely Chinese, Japanese or Vietnamese (unweighted n of 101, 128, and 233, respectively. Groups with n less than 50 are not displayed

Table 4.3: Demographics Among Asian Buddhists

%	All	Chinese	Japanese	Vietnamese
Married	59	63	63	63
Foreign Born	79	89	46	91
Income Below $50k	52	47	31	61
Income $50k - $100k	26	27	39	22
Income $100k+	22	26	30	16
Some college or less	66	66	46	82
College degree or more	34	34	54	18

Pew Research Center 2012 Asian-American Survey, weighted

Next, Table 4 displays the same demographics among Asian Christians[5]. The majority of Asian Christians are married and were born outside of the U.S. Japanese Christians stand out from the other groups: only 35% of Japanese Christians are foreign-born. Additionally, only a simple majority (51%) are married, compared to the 10-point increase and higher in marital status across the other ethnicity. Asian-Christians display more variation in terms of income, with no strong trend towards lower-income or higher-income, save for Koreans and Vietnamese. The majority of Koreans (56%) and Vietnamese (54%) are of lower-income status. A majority of Indians, Chinese, Filipino, and Korean Christians have college degrees or higher.A majority of Japanese Christians hold some college education or less at 56% while Vietnamese Christians predominantly have lower levels of educational attainment at 80%. ‘

[5]Unweighted sample n: 94 Asian Indians, 230 Chinese, 451 Filipinos, 192 Japanese, 388 Koreans, 194 Vietnamese, and 50 who are "Other", the last of which are not shown.

Table 4.4: Demographics Among Asian Christians

%	All	Asian Indian	Chinese	Filipino	Japanese	Korean	Vietnamese
Married	62	63	65	59	51	61	67
Foreign Born	73	73	75	76	35	84	79
Income Below $50k	41	31	27	40	31	56	54
Income $50k - $100k	27	26	30	29	28	18	23
Income $100k+	32	43	43	31	41	26	22
Some college or less	51	37	36	47	56	48	80
College degree or more	49	63	64	53	44	52	20

Pew Research Center 2012 Asian-American Survey, weighted

The differences in socioeconomic status are reflective of the varying ways Asian Americans have immigrated to the U.S., where for example the higher levels of SES among Hindus are reflective of the selection process specifically for highly skilled and educated immigrants. The variation in income and educational attainment among Buddhists and Christians suggests that places of worship may be particularly important for acquiring non-SES forms of resources for political mobilization. The following section examines the extent to which religiosity can provide adequate resources for political and civic participation.

4.4 Findings: Political and Civic Participation

First I present the results of my regression analysis among all Asian Americans. Table 5 displays logistic regressions results for two religiosity variables on the dependent variables of political and civic participation. Religious attendance has a positive and significant association with vote likelihood in the 2008 presidential election. Looking next at civic participation, I find that the frequency of religion has a positive and statistically significant association with working to solve a community problem while having a place for prayer in one's home is positive but not statistically significant. For ease of interpretation, I present the marginal changes in predicted probability in Figure 1. for vote likelihood, and Figure 2 for civic engagement participation. The marginal effect of religious attendance on vote likelihood is a 7 percentage point increase (95% CI: [01%, 13%]), from a predicted probability of 71% among

those who never attend to 78% among those with the highest attendance. I find a larger increase in the marginal effect of religious attendance on the predicted probability of working to solve a community problem: an increase of 26 percentage points (95% CI: [20%, 31%]), from 32% among those who never attend to 58% among those with the highest attendance.

Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Model on Political and Civic Participation

	Vote 2008	Civic Participation
Intercept	-2.23 (0.28)***	-1.66 (0.21)***
Main independent variables		
Religious Attendance	0.08 (0.03)*	0.21 (0.02)***
Home Temple	0.01 (0.13)	0.13 (0.09)
Socio-demographic variables		
Women	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.07)
Age	0.03 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.07 (0.02)***	0.03 (0.01)*
Education	0.27 (0.03)***	0.18 (0.02)***
Foreign Born	-0.79 (0.13)***	-0.50 (0.10)***
Married	0.07 (0.11)	0.23 (0.08)**
Democrat	0.95 (0.11)***	0.02 (0.08)
Republican	0.79 (0.13)***	0.28 (0.10)**
Ethnicity		
Asian Indian	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.12)
Filipino	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.12)
Japanese	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.29 (0.13)*
Korean	-0.60 (0.16)***	-0.27 (0.13)*
Vietnamese	0.58 (0.18)**	0.28 (0.13)*
AIC	2648.18	4589.66
BIC	2741.13	4688.18
Log Likelihood	-1308.09	-2278.83
Deviance	2616.18	4557.66
Num. obs.	2464	3490

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Pew 2012 Asian-American Survey

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect on Vote Likelihood



Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect on Civic Engagement



The measure of internal religiosity is not predictive of either vote likelihood or civic

participation, while religious attendance has a positive and significant association with vote likelihood and civic participation. The finding on religious attendance and the importance of external religiosity align with the established literature and my previous two chapters. The significant association of external religiosity, rather than internal religiosity, with civic participation, highlights the organizational importance of places of worship, particularly for immigrant populations like Asian Americans to be incorporated into civic activity. Religious participation in these external environments provides both the psychological resources to motivate participation—which is likely to be important for activities such as voting and mobilizing a sense of civic duty to participate in voting —while also providing organizational skills and opportunities to be recruited into activity—which is likely to be important for civic participation. Religious attendance, itself, is not a perfect measure, for all the various reasons discussed in the previous chapter. However, in lieu of a measure to fully capture religious social embeddedness or external religious activity outside of worship attendance, the positive relationship of religious attendance on civic participation is likely to capture the organizational importance of a place of worship—from skill acquisition or the psychological motivation to become civically engaged, particularly if one's religious social network is already heavily embedded in these activities. Across all religions, places of worship offer a central place where people can interact with each other and pass on valuable information. While Buddhists and Hindus may attend a house of worship less frequently than Christians, having a place to gather is still a central, organizational component that exists across religions.

To more closely examine the relationship between my main independent variables and religious denomination, I examine the influence of external and internal religiosity separately for Asian-American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus. Table 6 presents logistic regression models for my independent variables on vote likelihood (with all controls mentioned in the previous model, save for national origin). Neither external nor internal religiosity is associated with a statistically significant relationship across religious traditions.

Table 4.6: Logistic Regression by Religion on Vote Likelihood

	Buddhists	Christians	Hindus
Intercept	−1.75 (0.75)*	−1.80 (0.42)***	−1.72 (2.02)
Main independent variables			
Religious Attendance	0.10 (0.11)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.27 (0.20)
Home Temple	0.17 (0.27)		0.81 (0.53)
Frequency of Prayer		0.05 (0.19)	
Socio-demographic variables			
Women	0.23 (0.26)	−0.29 (0.14)*	−0.72 (0.45)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.02)***
Income	−0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.03)***	−0.14 (0.12)
Education	0.25 (0.08)**	0.16 (0.04)***	0.28 (0.25)
Foreign Born	−0.16 (0.32)	−0.85 (0.17)***	−1.87 (0.91)*
Married	0.43 (0.28)	0.01 (0.15)	0.19 (0.62)
Democrat	0.90 (0.29)**	0.94 (0.17)***	0.49 (0.43)
Republican	0.75 (0.35)*	0.87 (0.17)***	−0.31 (0.86)
AIC	413.12	1321.04	176.38
BIC	455.90	1377.21	210.21
Log Likelihood	−195.56	−649.52	−77.19
Deviance	391.12	1299.04	154.38
Num. obs.	361	1219	160

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Pew 2012 Asian-American Survey

Next, Table 7 presents logistic regression models examining the association between religiosity and civic participation by religion. Here I find varying patterns for the influence of external and internal religiosity across the three religious traditions. Among Buddhists and Christians of the two measures of religiosity, only external religiosity is positive and statistically significant on civic engagement. In contrast, among Hindus, the presence of a home temple is a statistically significant predictor of civic engagement while religious attendance is not a significant predictor of civic engagement.

Table 4.7: Logistic Regression by Religion on Solving a Community Problem

	Buddhists	Christians	Hindus
Intercept	-1.89 (0.55)***	-1.49 (0.30)***	-2.42 (1.02)*
Main independent variables			
Religious Attendance	0.28 (0.08)***	0.19 (0.04)***	0.17 (0.11)
Home Temple	0.19 (0.21)		0.89 (0.32)**
Frequency of Prayer		0.06 (0.15)	
Socio-demographic variables			
Women	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.60 (0.25)*
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Income	-0.07 (0.04)	0.05 (0.02)*	0.07 (0.06)
Education	0.34 (0.06)***	0.13 (0.03)***	0.05 (0.12)
Foreign Born	0.18 (0.25)	-0.41 (0.13)**	-0.33 (0.63)
Married	0.41 (0.22)	0.21 (0.12)	0.21 (0.31)
Democrat	0.09 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.57 (0.25)*
Republican	-0.28 (0.27)	0.31 (0.13)*	-0.22 (0.50)
AIC	669.51	2135.63	446.65
BIC	716.39	2194.68	488.50
Log Likelihood	-323.76	-1056.81	-212.32
Deviance	647.51	2113.63	424.65
Num. obs.	524	1586	332

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Pew 2012 Asian-American Survey

For ease of interpretation, Figure 3 visualizes the marginal changes in predicted probabilities for each independent variable across religions. Buddhists with the most frequent religious attendance see a 33 percentage point increase (95% CI: [16%, 50%]) in the predicted probability of working to solve a community problem, from 28% to 61%. Among Christians, I find a 22 percentage point increase (95% CI: [11%, 31%]) in predicted probability from mix to max of religious attendance —from 34% among Christians who never attend to 56% among Christians who attend the most frequently. Lastly, Hindus are the one religious group where internal religiosity —is statistically significant on civic participation. I find a 21 percentage point increase (95% CI: [08%, 32%]) in predicted probability. Hindus who do not have dedicated space in their home to observe rituals and prayer are 28% likely to participate civically, while those who do are 49% likely to participate civically.

Figure 4.3: Marginal change on indep variables, subset by religion



I find valuable insights into how the relationship between religiosity and civic participation varies when disaggregating my main findings by religious tradition. The significance of the frequency of religious attendance among Christians aligns with long-standing literature on the central role churches play in civic mobilization. The null finding on the frequency of prayer suggests however that for Asian American Christians the mobilization is likely due to the social capital that comes from being part of a religious community rather than psychological motivation through private, devotional acts. This does not diminish the role that religious values and religious motivation play in politics, however, these types of psychological motivations may be more applicable for examining the influence of religious beliefs on political attitudes —particularly conservative Christian beliefs in the U.S. as Layman (2001) and Margolis (2018) have demonstrated.

I also find opposite patterns among Buddhists and Hindus as to which measure of religiosity is salient for civic participation. Frequency of attendance has a significant association with community engagement among Buddhists rather than internal religiosity. Internal religiosity is a salient predictor of community engagement for Hindus, rather than religious

attendance. This variation in religious behaviors may be influenced by the differences in resources among Buddhist and Hindu populations, where the latter are largely advantaged by higher levels of SES—income and education. One explanation then for why external religiosity is more salient compared to internal religiosity among Buddhists may be anchored 1) to the role resource acquisition plays, 2) that this is particularly important for immigrant populations with low SES, and 3) that temples provide a central place for Buddhists to acquire a range of resources that could motivate political participation. My previous descriptive statistics displayed how Chinese and Vietnamese Buddhist populations are more likely to be foreign-born and have lower levels of income and educational attainment. Secondly, Buddhists are slightly more advantaged by having developed long-standing organizational ties through the founding of Buddhist churches by older generations of Buddhist-Americans, while the Hindu population in contrast is relatively newer to the U.S. and is still developing strong religious, and organizational roots. Additionally, for Hindus the literature suggests that the daily lives and everyday religious practices are much more individual, rather than collective, suggesting the resources through religious motivations to enact social change may be more important than acquiring resources to participate civically, particularly given the higher levels of SES among Asian American Hindus (Kurien, 2002; Yukich, 2017).

To better understand the relationship between internal religiosity and civic participation among Hindus, I further explore the resources provided by religiosity. Asian-American Hindus in general are relatively unique in attending religious services at different temples rather than the sample temple consistently—either occasionally or regularly: fifty-four percent report doing so. While Asian-American Catholics have the most comparable rates of doing so (50%), attending religious services at several different temples or churches is relatively uncommon for Buddhists and mainline Protestants, at 39% and 38%, respectively (Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths, 2012). Pew asked a follow-up question of respondents who do attend services at different houses of worship to determine whether people are attending different services of the same religion, or going to a different religious tradition altogether. Attendance here could vary by people choosing to attend different Hindu temples, perhaps based on convenience, location, schedule, or other factors. Alternatively,

attending other religious traditions could suggest access to other types of resources, such as a larger circle of religious social networks that could then motivate participation, potentially to a greater extent than the resources provided by internal religiosity. Here, Hindus are also the most likely to report going to services of a faith tradition that is different from their primary religious identification. Thirty percent of Hindus report attending worship at a religious tradition other than their own. This contrasts with about 19% of Protestants, 23% of Catholics, 21% of Buddhists, and 19% of Asian-Americans in general (Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths, 2012). I also find varying results when looking at rates of attending a different religious tradition across the two levels of internal religiosity. Of those without a home temple, 15% attend the place of worship of a different religion. Among Hindus who do have a home temple, about double attend the worship of a different religion at 34%. Table 8 presents the last regression table among Hindus which includes a control for interfaith worship. I find that a significant association between internal religiosity and civic participation persists, even when controlling for other external resources for participation that Hindus have available.

Table 4.8: Logistic Regression Model on Civic Participation

	Asian American Hindus
Intercept	−3.73 (1.55)*
Main independent variables	
Religious Attendance	0.08 (0.20)
Home Temple	1.10 (0.46)*
Interfaith Worship	0.44 (0.32)
Socio-demographic vars	
Women	0.75 (0.33)*
Age	0.00 (0.01)
Income	0.06 (0.08)
Education	0.27 (0.17)
Foreign Born	−0.18 (0.81)
Married	0.44 (0.43)
Democrat	−0.76 (0.33)*
Republican	−0.01 (0.60)
AIC	271.37
BIC	310.65
Log Likelihood	−123.69
Deviance	247.37
Num. obs.	195

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Source: Pew 2012 Asian-American Survey

For ease of interpretation, Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of the three independent variables from this new model on civic participation among Hindus. Controlling for interfaith worship and religious attendance, I find a 25 percentage point (95% CI: [14%, 42%]) increase in civic participation for internal religiosity from 25% among those without a home temple to 51% among those with.

Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect Among Hindus



These findings show that the internal, religious values that Hindus hold is more predictive of civic participation, in comparison to external religious networks. As discussed previously, one of the most significant demographic differences between Asian-American Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians is that of socioeconomic status. This is not to suggest that religious values and morals do not motivate political participation among Buddhists and Christians, but that external religious resources may provide a more salient pathway to the political and civic realm among populations that have lower resources for political participation more broadly.

4.5 Discussion

Across the three chapters, the National Asian American Survey, the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, and the 2012 Pew Asian-American Survey are all advantageous in offering empirical tests of different dimensions of religiosity, particularly in capturing the unique ways Asian Americans people practice their religion past religious attendance at a place of worship. Taken together, the findings in this chapter provide more evidence to suggest that external religiosity is important for civic and non-voting engagement among Asian Americans. My overarching argument is that the organizational and social role of religious communities is particularly important for immigrant populations who have less traditional resources to be drawn into civic and political participation and face barriers to participation, such as language access. In chapter three, I provide some evidence to show that political resources acquired through external religiosity are predictors of non-voting participation for Asian Americans who attend places of worship that are predominantly composed of immigrants, which gives some evidence that places of worship provide an important site for political learnings for immigrants.

This chapter provides some additional nuance to my overarching findings on the role of external religiosity. Here, I find differing paths across religions, where external religiosity is predictive of Asian American Buddhist and Christian civic participation. The lower levels of socioeconomic status suggest that external religiosity may be important, then, not just for immigrant political incorporation but for removing some of the barriers to civic engagement, such as, for example, opportunities to be directly recruited into participation through organization membership. In this chapter, I also extend my study of religious behavior to the individual, private ways Hindus and Buddhists practice their religion. The distinction again between Hindus and Buddhists is the levels of socioeconomic status, and the significant finding of internal religiosity for Hindu civic engagement suggests that this functions as psychological motivation and is particularly salient for groups with higher levels of resources.

My findings also show the importance of examining these diverse populations individually. Asian American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus all practice their religions in

unique, distinct ways and display different patterns as to what components of religiosity are important for mobilization. While the organizing role of religion and the institutional context of a place of worship in the U.S. for immigrant populations can be a central source of community and resources, the current literature is limited in developing more specific theories and quantitative measures for how non-Christian, ethnoreligious communities understand their religion, the meaning they attach to religious practices, and how they carry out these practices in their day to day lives.

While I provide some evidence in this chapter that internal religiosity is an important component in the pathway to civic and political participation, there are significant limitations in fully examining the linkages between individual forms of religious practice and civic participation. A central limitation is the inability to measure the extent to which lived religion, as Yukich (2017) suggests, may provide an important arena where this cognitive connection to political and civic duty occurs, and the ways in which Asian-American Buddhists and Hindus carry this out. There are other forms of collective religious practices that were not included in the Pew survey, such as communal events practiced by Buddhists, including memorial rituals and rituals to honor ancestors, as well as acts such as merit-making, or additional measures capturing the meaning that religiously devout Asian-Americans attach to these sorts of actions, all of which would provide more insight into Asian American Buddhist and Hindu religiosity (Iwamura et al., 2014). Future studies of these diverse populations will benefit from more specific empirical measurements of how Asian Americans practice and live their religion, both collectively and individually.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

5.1 Overview

The primary research goals for this dissertation are to extend the traditional literature on the religion-to-political-behavior pathway in two ways: 1) by examining its application to Asian Americans, and 2) by examining its application past non-Judeo-Christian populations of which the longstanding theories are based on. Broadly, I show that both external and internal religious behaviors have a role in the pathway to political participation among Asian Americans. In chapter two, using the 2008 and 2016 National Asian American Surveys, I examine the role of external religiosity with two measures: the traditional measure of religious attendance, and a unique measure of religious activity to capture involvement in activities outside of prayer or worship. I argued that the latter better captures the core arena where resources for political participation are acquired by being part of a religious network, from direct recruitment to informal political cues learned. I find that both religious attendance and religious activity are not predictors of voting participation. Secondly, I find that religious activity is a predictor of non-voting participation. This finding on the association between religious activity and non-voting participation holds across religions for Asian American Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus.

In chapter three, I use the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey to further extend my examination of external religiosity. My findings that higher degrees of political similarity are associated with non-voting participation —across religions for Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus —complement chapter two by providing more insight into specifically how places of worship are beneficial for political participation. Both chapter two

and chapter three show that places of worship are an important institution across religions, and are particularly so for Asian immigrants who seek out places of worship for community and then have opportunities within these trusted social networks to learn and reinforce their political values with that of the in-group at their place of worship. Lastly, in chapter four I use the Pew Research Center 2012 Asian American survey to provide a unique examination of the extent to which private, internal religious behaviors are conducive to political participation. My findings in chapter four bolster my overarching examination of religious behaviors in two ways. Consistent with my previous chapters, I find that religious behaviors are more important for non-voting participation. I also find variation in the extent to which external and internal religiosity is associated with civic participation across religions. Internal religiosity is a predictor of civic participation for Asian American Hindus only, while external religiosity is a predictor for both Asian American Buddhists and Christians. Here, I suggest that the resources that come from external religiosity and belonging to religious social networks are particularly important for groups with lower SES, while internal religiosity may be more of a mobilizing factor for groups with higher SES.

Non-voting participation can vary in the time and resources required, however, my findings suggest that external and internal religiosity could potentially reduce burdens, such as time spent on learning which issues and candidates align with one's political views, or also serve to reduce barriers, such as through direct recruitment into civic engagement and community issues.

5.2 Limitations

This dissertation sought to empirically examine the relationship between religious behaviors and political behaviors among Asian Americans. However, my studies contain several limitations. The central limitation in my research in examining the religious behaviors of different religions is the lack of a full range of measures that capture the unique religious behaviors that each religious tradition prioritizes. The frequency of church attendance is a long-standing measure and while I show that places of worship are important in the pathway

to political participation using a measure of religious attendance, the measure does not fully capture the ways in which Buddhists and Hindus interact with their religious communities. Future work and surveys could examine both how and the frequency with which Buddhists and Hindus hold ties with their religious social network, such as how often they attend cultural activities at their temple, or the extent to which they are embedded in their religious community. For the latter, the survey measures available are limited in being able to examine how often people spend time with religious groups, as well as the types of discussions that take place which are conducive to political engagement. Lastly, more broadly for Buddhists and Hindus, their ethnicity is largely intertwined with their religion. Future work can better disentangle which these identities may be more of the driving factor for political engagement, or empirically examine the extent to which these identities intersect, particularly with Buddhists and Hindus being both ethnic and religious minorities in the U.S. Some of the existing work by Jeung (2005) also suggests that Asian American Christians vary in the extent to which they prioritize their religious identity over their ethnic identity, and this distinction may be more relevant in coming years as an Asian American identity becomes more politicized.

Some of the above limitations also can apply to chapter three. While the measure of political similarity is unique, particularly in the study of Asian American political behavior, the measures give less insight into how the context in religious communities may then influence political participation, such as whether sermons and messaging are intentionally political or is this takes places in more informal way—and if it is the latter, the frequency, and content of these informal learnings. Secondly, the smaller sample sizes on the immigrant composition of a place of worship and smaller sizes of Buddhists and Hindus prevented an examination of how the association between political similarity may vary by religion and by national origin as well. One could expect that there may be varying associations given the different immigration patterns between Japanese and Chinese Buddhists immigrants who have developed community roots compared to newer Vietnamese-Buddhists and Asian Indian Hindus. Lastly, in chapter four the survey measures available do not allow for a full examination of internal religious behaviors, and the frequency with which people partake

in these devotional acts. While I suggest that lived religion is an important driver of engagement for Hindus, there is an absence of the specific ways that Buddhists and Hindus practice this in their daily lives. A measure of merit-making for example may provide a closer look at the extent to which there is a link between psychological motivation and civic engagement. The focus on religious behaviors however also leaves out an understanding of the religious beliefs of Buddhists and Hindus and how this intersects with their distinction between individual religious practices. More inclusive measures of religious behaviors and a focus on differences in religious beliefs are necessary to have a complete picture of the relationship between religiosity and political participation for Asian Americans.

5.3 Contribution and Implications

My project contributes to understandings of the religion-to-political-participation pathway and to the understanding of Asian American political behavior. In chapters two and three, my findings on religious activity provide a better understanding of the importance of religious communities for Asian Americans across religions and also provide nuance to the literature on the mechanisms for why places of worship are important. First, I show that religious activity better captures the resources acquired through being part of a religious community in comparison to religious attendance. I find this consistently across two surveys in the 2008 and 2016 National Asian American Survey. I also find that the salience of religious activity on non-voting participation is consistent across religions. This extends our understanding of the role that religious institutions play in political participation and that there is a commonality across religions in the U.S. for being a central institution to foster civic engagement and political participation. At the same time, the measure of religious activity also provides a more inclusive way to capture the ways that Buddhists and Hindus interact with their religious social networks. While I use the measure of religious attendance throughout the remaining chapters, my central finding from chapter two is that when more inclusive measures of external religiosity are available, activities outside of worship are consistent predictors of participation compared to religious attendance.

In chapter three, I further extend the findings from chapter two by providing more insight into how places of worship can serve to mobilize their members. Chapter three provides an empirical examination of the extent to which political similarity can serve as a social identity—across Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus—which then creates political interest to engage in activities that are beneficial for the group. This chapter not only suggests that political similarity serves as a resource across religions, but that there are variations in how important this resource is by generation. Asian American immigrants may lean on this social identity as more of a learning mechanism and to further reinforce already existing political views, while for second generations and older, other factors such as racially-based group consciousness serve as the more salient factor to act politically in favor of the in-group. This not only extends the religion-to-politics literature but provides a more detailed understanding of the social identities that can be developed through religious membership, and how this is conditioned by incorporation into the U.S. across generations.

Lastly, chapter four extends the religion-to-politics literature by providing an empirical examination of the extent to which both external and internal behaviors contribute to political participation and civic engagement, with a unique measure to understand how internal religiosity functions for non-Christans. Consistent with the literature, I show that external religiosity acts in similar ways for non-Christians in being a mobilizing factor for civic participation, rather than for electoral participation—the distinction here being that non-voting electoral participation varies in the time and resources needed and religious communities can serve as a way to remove those challenges. I also show diverging pathways in the extent to which internal religiosity is salient for political participation—in being salient for Hindu civic participation, but not for Buddhists—which further suggests that external religiosity may fill a gap for lower socioeconomic groups, while internal religiosity serves as a psychological resource otherwise. The significant association between internal religiosity and civic participation brings attention to the meaning that Hindus and people who are religious attach to the private acts and rituals they practice as a source of psychological motivation to participate civically, and shows that the study of religious behaviors is not complete without considering distinct practices outside of a Western, Christian lens.

Broadly, my project shows that places of worship and religion can serve as a mobilizing agents, particularly in lieu of traditional institutions like political parties historically to actively mobilize Asian Americans. This is particularly important for Asian American immigrants in serving as a central community to aid with incorporation into the U.S. While the role of religion may play less of a central role for second generation Asian Americans when considering other ways political interest is activated, there is also a complex relationship between religious and ethnic identities for Buddhist, Hindus, and Christians where places of worship may continue to be important for second generation Asian Americans in navigating these multiple identities. As Asian Americans continue to make advances in voter turnout in the coming years, we need more inclusion of this diverse population in surveys, and more expansive and inclusive measures of religious practices, identities, and life experiences in order to expand our knowledge and understanding of Asian American political behavior.

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