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Untimed: Transversal Subjects and Temporality in Shakespeare

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Drama

by

Samuel Kolodezh

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Bryan Reynolds, Chair
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DEDICATION

To

My parents,
Emil Kolodezh and Svetlana Vaks-Kolodezh
Who always question but never doubt

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2018 "Allo-Realism and Intensive-Extensive Shakespeares: Transversal Theater Company's *Macbeth*, *Romeo and Juliet*, and *Titus Andronicus*," with Bryan Reynolds, Eds. Peter Lichtenfels and Josy Miller, *Shakespeare and Realism: On the Politics of Style* (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickenson University Press, 2018): 81-108.

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CONFERENCE PAPERS

2018 "Vice and the Future: The Role and Character of Aaron in *Titus Andronicus*." Pacific Ancient and Modern Languages Association, Bellingham, WA.

2018 "'It's a kind of history': Déjà vu, Tinker-time, and the Potential of the Past in Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew," Shakespeare Association of America, Los Angeles, CA.

2017 "Hoodwinked: Celestial Bodies and Queer Vision *in Cymbeline*," Pacific Ancient and Modern Languages Association, Honolulu, Hawaii.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Untimed: Transversal Subjects and Temporality in Shakespeare

By

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Doctor of Philosophy in Drama

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In my dissertation, "Untimed: Transversal Subjects and Temporality in Shakespeare," I study how early modern concepts of identity such as blackness, virtuous femininity, and nomadic criminality, affected the sense and construction of temporality in Shakespeare's staged worlds. Drawing on both early modern and 20th century philosophies of time, subjectivity, and narrative, I examine historiographic literature of early modern England alongside Shakespeare's dramatic works such as *The Taming of the Shrew*, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Titus Andronicus, The Tempest*, and *Pericles*. The dissertation has three major goals: To infuse discussions of identity, subjectivity, and character in early modern scholarship with a sustained temporal dimension and methodology that can augment and supplement existing scholarship on identity, subjectivity, and character; 2. To address the vitalism of Shakespeare's scripts and performances put forward by Shakespeareans and early modernists who engage with process philosophies; and 3. To infuse discussions of vitalism and process with more political specificity. I find that early modern identities are often deployed in Shakespeare's work through character-modeling to construct, challenge, and complicate concepts of history, the present, and the future. In contrast to previous studies on identity, character, and narrative in Shakespeare, which focus primarily on the spatial

components of identity and subjectivity, I focus on the temporal components. I argue that understanding the connection between temporality and subjectivity (along with its extensions such as culture, politics, ideology, technology) is key to understanding the ways in which Shakespeare's works become self-engendering and the power of narrative performance extends beyond the confines of the stage by engaging audience's empathy and imagination. My project makes an intervention between character studies and temporality studies, ultimately posing character-subjects or subject-characters as poly- and multi-temporal units whose relationships generate temporalities.

Timely Introductions into Untimed Worlds

When is it Time?

All the world's a stage,

And all the men and women merely players.

They have their exits and their entrances,

And one man in his time plays many parts,

His acts being seven ages. At first the infant,

Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms;

Then the whining schoolboy, with his satchel

And shining morning face, creeping like a snail

Unwillingly to school; and then the lover,

Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad

Made to his mistress' eyebrow; then a soldier,

Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard,

Jealous in honour, sudden and quick in quarrel,

Seeking the bubble reputation

Even in the cannon's mouth; and then the justice,

In fair round belly with wood capon lined,

With eyes severe and bear of formal cut,

Full of wise saws and modern instances;

And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts

Into the lean and slippered pantaloon,

With spectacles on nose and pouch on side,

His youthful hose well saved, a world too wide
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice,
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history,
Is second childishness and mere oblivion,
Sans teeth, *sans* eyes, *sans* taste, *sans* everything. (*As You Like It* 2.7.140-167)

The materialist field is the field of common truths created in the immeasurability of production between the eternal and the *to-come*. And we are its actors. (Negri 182)

In Jaques famous *theatrum mundi* metaphor, the exits and entrances of roles and players have timing and duration. The schoolboy creeps, the young man sighs, and the soldier is sudden and quick. Objects, animals, ideas, emotions, and institutions have their entrances, exits, and speeds: nurses, satchels, beards, mistresses, ballads, cannons, and pants already populate Jaques brief description of one everyman's world with their own times. In this imagined cosmos, time is subjectively experienced by its various players and objectively organized somehow or by something into a line of disjunctions hop-scotching from one stage to another. Jaques does not concern himself with the issue of timing in the world he describes, but it is clear that times and worlds are intimately intertwined. Several questions arise from Jacques *theatrum mundi* metaphor: from where or when does the timing of entrance and exits come? What is the relationship between the multiplication of subjective temporalities and the objective time of the world stage crisscrossed by the macro- and microcosms beyond, adjacent, and transversal to it? What is the relationship between the players and their roles? What happens when someone or

something misses an entrance or an exit, goes too fast or too slow, enters at the right time but in the wrong role, plays multiple roles at the same time, or is generally untimed?

The answer to the organizing principle of the temporal plan of Shakespeare's *theatrum mundi* metaphor might be God, or more likely, as Michael Macrone points out, "God's point of view is left out of the thesis. In the humanistic regime, the spectator of this "theater of the world" became less and less divine and more and more human" (Macrone 83). One consequence of a more human *theatrum mundi* is that the worlds of the stage become immanent to the world of the spectators and vice versa. The drama that takes place on the world as stage is what Michael Witmore calls "the drama of immanence" in which the world emerges from the entrances and exits of players and objects interacting in a theatrical swarm of ever-changing meaning.

My second epigraph, which ends Antonio Negri's essay "*Kairos,*" speaks towards this type of immanence and begins to address the issues of timing in an immanent world that emerges out of a complex interaction of representational and real worlds, which can often be indistinguishable. Kairos, meaning proper timing, for Negri is the event of naming at the intersection of ontology and epistemology—of "the absolute singular occasion of naming being in the face of the void, anticipating and constructing on the edge of time" (Negri 142). Timing, for him, is itself a creative praxis of melding thought and action that constitutes an immanently materialist field of "common truths." Common truths, for Negri, do not mean generally agreed upon truisms. Instead, they constitute language as "a plane of association of monads of *Kairos*, the material fabric of forces of the common predication of the being of the world" (Negri 182). In other words, following the monadism of Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, the monads of *Kairos* are virtual predicates that actualize a truth when they are deployed: to enter becomes to enter in a particular time and place, with particular roles, and particular durations. The very acts

of doing, speaking, watching, and acting create truths as monads to be deployed and changed again in creation. This process occurs between the eternal, so far as the eternal is found in the monads of Kairos, which can "in their autonomous insistence" develop in every direction, and the "to-come," which constantly changes the eternal as it actualizes and creates the new. Eternal possibilities and faculties tend towards the anticipation of their future deployment, transforming at the points of their actualization and morphing with every choice and deed. To say that we are actors of this materialist field is then not to say that we are actors on a pre-existing stage but that we are actors who are constantly creating and recreating the stages between the eternal and the new. Timing our entrances, exits, and putting on our roles with timely precision composes the process through which stages emerge.

Negri's thoughts take shape within the context of his particular and often militant brand of autonomism, but they emerge out of the philosophies of Spinoza, Leibniz, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and a genealogy of immanence that precedes them from the Stoics to the American pragmatists. In fact, Negri's conception of *theatrum mundi* approximates the performative one espoused by Renaissance humanists and empiricists such as Thomas More, Michel de Montaigne, Juan Luis Vives, Francis Bacon, and Robert Burton.[1] William West argues that in contradistinction to the accepted meanings of *theatrum mundi* as a variously privileged relationship between seeing and acting and truth and falsity. He writes, "the theater metaphor can suggest that knowledge is neither a mere reflection of what is known nor a complete fabrication, but a performance or enactment that produces reality" (West 6). *Theatrum mundi* transforms into a metaphor of production in the Renaissance and Baroque periods.

[1] See William West's "Knowledge and Performance in the Early Modern Theatrum Mundi" for a discussion of early modern *theatrum mundi* metaphors pp.5-7.

Within the version of *theatrum mundi* espoused by Negri and supported by various early modern interlocutors, the world is performed by actors playing various roles and the performance of action is always a timed affair. Action must be timed between the eternal and the to-come in order to produce a textured reality that an actor can move through, touch, and feel. Yet, within Jaques' *theatrum mundi,* which is later elaborated on by Rosalind when she claims that "time travels in diverse paces with diverse persons," entrances are not actions in general (3.2.80-1). Types of roles and types of people have specific kinds of duration in particular successions that are often at least partially scripted. In other words, roles and players themselves are nodes, or singular monads of time (and space), that produce worlds through their interactions with other roles, players, things, and objects--all singularities themselves.

The proliferation of temporalities and their relationships to the production of worlds is the first central concern of this project. In each chapter, I begin from and return to the creative relationship among subjects, characters, and worlds and the role of temporality in their production. I argue that characters that emerged as aesthetic representations of their various discursive milieus act as polytemporal units that produce theatrical worlds with histories, futures, and presents through their engagement with other polytemporal units. As opposed to temporal forms and plots imposing various orders onto dramatic worlds, times and worlds immanently arrive from the entanglement of temporalities carried and enacted by characters, subjects, and objects.

Following Michel Foucault's theorization of discourse and technologies of the self, concerns of the subject that emerged out of Louis Althusser's critique of ideology, and the Nietzschean inflected post-structuralism that went on beyond distinctions of truth and lies towards a performative constructivism, new historicist and cultural materialist critics along with

the various scholars of critical race and gender theories in conversation with them, argued for the discursive formation of subjects and their asymmetrically reciprocal relations with discourses. Scholarship on subjects and their representations became political, and a throng of thick and thin descriptions of historical subjects proliferated for the purpose of understanding the ways in which flows of discourse and power shaped subjects and their cultural productions. Characters, however, fell to the wayside as hollow representations that channeled cultural and institutional forces at play, even as cultural materialists and new historicists such as Christy Desmet, Michael Bristol, and Alan Sinfield recognized the potency of character.[2]

If power and discourse produced subjects and shaped their cultural productions, then it follows that the characters of those productions emerged out of political subjects within discourse by way of the theatrical and dramatic performative mediums and in turn shaped subjects and their subjectivities—characters and their roles—through a process of folding exterior discourses into the creation of interior intensities: potentials, powers, agencies, and possibilities. If the *theatrum mundi*'s performative dimension and its productive relationship with timing is to be taken seriously, then it follows that the creative dynamic between characters and subjects has a temporal dimension that needs to be attended to—a task that has not been rigorously taken on as of yet.

In this project, I draw on the wealth of information and theorization that has been produced from the study of subjects and investigate the role of subjective temporalities contained in character representations that were and continue to be wielded for the production of dramatic worlds. For instance, Jaques' everyman has a temporal trajectory and we can imagine that it is inflected by his class, which gives him access to schooling and elevated administrative positions;

[2] See Desmet's *Reading Shakespeare's Characters: Rhetoric, Ethics, and Identity*, Bristol's "Recent Studies in Tudor and Stuart Drama, and Sinfield's *Faultlines: Cultural Materialisms and the Politics of Dissident Reading*.

he has a gender, which dictates the speed with which he acts in relation to war or love; he has a race, which shapes his imagined histories and future—a religion that shapes his relationship with providence and fortune. These temporal qualities and others not mentioned shape the character, his various roles, and the timing of those roles. When scripted into forcible performance with other characters emerging from subjects, the dynamic relations of polytemporal characters create play worlds with which individual and collective audiences engage and which they are shaped or discombobulated by. Characters, like their scripted worlds, become virtual forms, or containers, that are actualized and actualize by and in the immanent worlds they are a part of producing.

As the title of this project suggest, my second concern addresses the last question I posed earlier: What happens when someone or something misses an entrance or an exit, goes too fast or too slow, enters at the right time but in the wrong role, plays multiple roles at the same time, or is generally untimed? Throughout Shakespeare's plays, drama and the worlds that scaffold them unfold when characters are untimed: when lines of succession are interrupted, letters don't arrive, handkerchiefs are misplaced, potions are given to the wrong characters, characters die too early or too soon, pranks are pulled, lovers and friends are misrecognized, and characters and worlds are amorally transformed. The liveliness of action that sustains the enormous cultural production of Shakespeare across theatres, classrooms, journals, t-shirts, bobbleheads, gatekeepers, and remixers is dependent on untiming rather than timing.

In his "Revolution in the Event: The Problem of Kairos," Roland Boer takes to task the use of *Kairos*, well timed or critical time, by Western Marxists and theorists of "event" such as Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, Slavoj Zizek, Fredric Jameson, Alain Badiou, and Ernst Bloch who are all concerned with the creation of the new in the context of revolution. Through a deep etymology of the term *kairos*, Boer points out that *kairos* means both

the right time and the correct place as it pertains to property and hierarchy, at least within writings of Greek philosophers and their Christian respondents from whom the term is appropriated. Opportune time is linked more closely to the maintenance of order than the creation of the new. My goal here is not to enter into the technicalities of debate between *Kairos* and *akairos* but to point out the fraught history of the timely and gesture towards the necessity of the untimely in the creation of dramatic, political, and other worlds.

Untimely entrances and exits, shared and plural temporalities that untime singular temporal trajectories, and untimely strange characters, objects, and others that populate Shakespeare's scripts create timely moments, opportune transformations, and lively worlds that traverse temporalities of conceptual and subjective planes. More importantly the untimed and untimely both create and discombobulate race, gender, class, and other identities whose various temporalities facilitate the lively and often live worlds of Shakespeare's scripts and their performances. The interaction between micro identities (tinkers, servants, dogs, black subjects, and young unmarried women) and their temporalities situated in character-forms generate worlds through what I call "temporal affects" (déjà vu, synesthesia, futurity, and timelessness) and politics within them that exceeds their own bounds and speaks to their historical present as well as the historical presents within which they are performed.

In brief, my project examines character temporalities, the discursive rhizomes upon which they draw, the relationship between their temporalities, and the dramatic worlds that those relationships produce. I look at the temporal axis of character identities in conjunction with the subjectivities from which they emerge and represent, with attention to characters' untimings and the ways in which those untimings work to generate play worlds populated with lively subject-characters and character-subjects who are always discursively and ontologically in relation to the

audiences, actors, and others with and through whom they circulate. The main goals of my project are threefold: 1. To infuse discussions of identity and subjectivity in early modern scholarship with a sustained temporal dimension and methodology that can augment and supplement existing scholarship on identity and subjectivity; 2. To address the vitalism of Shakespeare's scripts and performances put forward by Shakespeareans and early modernists who engage with process philosophy; and 3. To infuse discussions of vitalism and process with more political specificity. If worlds are performed, immanent, and emergent, then attending to the characters and subjects within those worlds is important for understanding and engaging with the value of those worlds. Cruising between characterological and temporal approaches, I swerve between the temporality of characters and the character of temporalities to explore the temporal depths of play worlds and the effects that those depths yield.

In the rest of this introduction, I provide brief histories of scholarship on characters, subjects, and time, and trace their progress and relations. After these brief surveys, I address my methodological roots in Deleuze's philosophies of time and subsequent theoretical engagement with his model by theorists such as Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, Ronald Bogue, and Justin Mueller, to name a few. I conclude with short summaries of the chapters to follow and suggest a guide to approaching this project, its contributions, and its problems.

Transversal Power and the Eternal Return of Character

A clear line can be traced from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century character criticism to studies of subjects and objects that emerged out of the movements of new historicism and cultural materialism to the process-oriented turn towards emergent subjectivities found in transversal poetics, queer theory, and critical race studies, and finally to the beginnings of a renewed interest in the relationship between characters and subjects from which this study

begins. Once theoretical engagement with Shakespeare began to be accented by process-oriented philosophies and cognitive-neuroscience, the line between characters and subjects began to blur as a tendency towards ontological flattening took place. The character-subjects or subject-characters that have emerged are products of surfaces—materialist studies, histories, grammatical forms, neural processes, ideologies, and other forms of power—folding into each other to create a renewed interiority to characters divergent from the expanses of character that Romantic-era critics plumbed. Despite the clarity of the line, it is not an obvious one and threatens to trivialize the politics of subjectivity on one hand and produce flights of critical fantasy about the lives of characters on the other.

Before the study of characters was debunked by historicisms, it was a significant aspect of Shakespearean criticism for three hundred years. Paul Yachnin writes that both Margaret Cavendish and Samuel Jonson understood Shakespeare's characters to be "mimetic representations of imagined persons" (Yachnin 2). Samuel Jonson went so far as to say that Shakespeare's "Works may be considered as a Map of Life, a faithful Miniature of human Transactions" (Johnson 434). Shakespeare's characters were regarded as diagrams of life, especially in the case of Johnson who was writing in the age of dictionaries and encyclopedias, which began to catalogue the virtual potential of knowledge that could be actualized through a symbiosis between reader and text.[3]

Nineteenth-century critics such as William Hazlitt, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Charles Knight went on to imagine themselves as Shakespeare's characters and, even further, to argue that characters are real in the same way that ideas are real. Speaking of *Hamlet*, Hazlitt writes,

[3] Gilbert Simondon identifies the encyclopedia as an example of the first modern technology that harnessed the power of virtuality and could facilitate the mass production of goods. See Pascal Chabot's *The Philosophy of Simondon: Between Technology and Individuation* pp. 25, as well as *Du Mode D'existence des Objets Techniques*. pp. 94. On the productive conjunction between early modern theatre and encyclopedias, see William West's *Theatres and Encyclopedias in Early Modern Europe*.

> Hamlet is a name: his speeches and sayings but the idle coinage of the poet's brain. What then, are they not real? They are as real as our own thoughts. Their reality is in the reader's mind. It is we who are Hamlet. This play has a prophetic truth, which is above that of history. (Hazlitt 114-115)

Hazlitt makes the point that Hamlet as a character is real, if in the reader's mind, and that he takes up a kind of universal form. In the preface to his *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays* he claims that his own study is an elaboration of comments made by Alexander Pope and Karl Schlegel whom Hazlitt quotes at length. Pope says:

> His *characters* are so much nature herself, that it is a sort of injury to call them by so distant a name as copies of her. Those of other poets have a constant resemblance, which shows that they have received them from one another, and were but multipliers of the same image: each picture, like a mock rainbow, is but the reflection of a reflection. But every single character in Shakespeare is as much an individual as those in life itself; it is as impossible to find any two alike, and such as, from their relation or affinity in any respect, appear must to be twins, will, upon comparison, be found remarkably distinct. (qtd. in Hazlitt xi)

Hazlitt offers also offers Schelegel's praise of Shakesepeare's characters and his understanding of what Schlegel calls "passions:"

> If Shakespeare deserves our admiration for his characters, he is equally deserving of it for his exhibition of passion, taking this word in its widest signification, as including every mental condition, every tone, from indifference or familiar mirth to the wildest rage and despair. He gives us the history of minds; he lays open to us, in a single word, a whole series of preceding conditions. His passions do not at first stand displayed to us in all

> their height, as is the case with so many tragic poets, who, in the language of Lessing, are thorough masters of the legal style of love. He paints in a most inimitable manner, the gradual progress from the first origin. (qtd. in Hazlitt xiv)

Pope praises Shakespeare for the complexity of his characters and Schlegel praises Shakespeare for his character development. However, in their praise is also a gesture towards Shakespeare's characters standing out as more than characters—as parts of nature, emergent, and processual. Hazlitt, along with his predecessors, articulates Shakespeare's characters almost as their own singular entities.

In the beginning of 20th century A.C. Bradley praises the "lover" of Shakespeare against the pure critic and celebrates the necessity of a "vivid and intent imagination" coupled with a drive "to compare, to analyse, to dissect" in *Shakespearean Tragedy.* Bradley, in short, calls for a critical attention to character that somewhat departs from the subjective impulse of the Romantics but takes seriously, nevertheless, the imaginative impulse to identify with characters that would later become a part of psychoanalytic and reader-response criticism. For Bradley, characters become more formal than they are for Romantics as well as nodes through which he can dissect the somewhat mysterious relationship between a character and its actions.[4]

L.C. Knights dramatic question "How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?" (1933) and the rise of formalism, slowed the popularity of discussing characters in Shakespeare studies, though characters continued to be somewhat central to psychoanalytic approaches in Shakespeare studies and interest in character had bursts of reemergence with newfound access to early modern medical treatises on humoral theory. [5] L.C. Knights treatment of plays as "dramatic

[4] Nicholas Luke gives a longer reading of Bradley and traces his ideas through the works of Hegel, his dialectic method, and his tendency towards dissection and categorization in *Shakespearean Arrivals* pp. 14-18.
[5] The story of L.C Knights' piece is elaborated in detail by Cary DiPietro in *Shakespeare and Modernism*. Sigmund Freud, for instance, discusses Shakespeare's characters in *The Interpretation of Dreams* and psychoanalytic

poems" set the tone for Shakespeare criticism and the mid-20th century continued to move out from the interiority of character to the exteriority of form that diagrammed aesthetic mechanisms, then historicism, which traced the diachronic development of the work and its themes, and to new historicism and cultural materialism, which mapped genealogies of discourse that produced subjects and objects.

The history of new historicism and cultural materialism and their pitfalls have been thoroughly explored over the past twenty years.[6] Though many reactionary and progressive fields such new materialism, cognitive science criticism, thing studies, and an updated traditional historicism, to name a few, emerged as responses to new historicism and cultural materialism, the focus on the production, creation, and study of subjects and objects has persisted in various forms. A unique response to and affirmation of the focus on the subject--and a significant inspiration for this project-- is transversal poetics, developed by Bryan Reynolds and his various collaborators.

Transversal poetics was inaugurated in Reynolds' "The Devil's House, 'or worse': Transversal Power and Antitheatrical Discourse in Early Modern England," in which he introduced the concept of "transversal power," in part, as a corrective to Greenblatt's concept of power and the subject of new historicism and cultural materialism. Reynolds claims that "Greenblatt's argument takes for granted the existence of an integral self that can be lost. Greenblatt treats 'the self' as an exclusive, self-evident category" whereas Reynolds makes the case that "Like an infectious disease, identity becomings are an anti-rational, inspirational, contagion" ("The Devil's House 'or worse' 157). Greenblatt's conflation of power and ideology

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readings of Shakespeare proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s. The opening of the Huntington Library and the Folger Shakespeare Library, which gave scholars unprecedented access to early modern medical treatises led to John Draper's *The Humors and Shakespeare's Characters*.

[6] See, for instance, Claire Colebrook's *New Literary Histories: New Historicism and Contemporary Criticism* as well as Jurgen Pieters's *Moments of Negotiation: The New Historicism of Stephen Greenblatt*.

requires a singular human-subject that utilizes power in order to shape itself. His theory tweaks Foucault's concept of power, which is multiple, diverse, and shapes a somewhat non-agential subject. Reynolds's transversal power rests between Greenblatt's power-seeking subject and Foucault's power-shaped subject by allowing for power to be at least partially non-discursive. Perhaps the clearest example of Reynolds's departure from Greenblatt is his focus on "or worse" rather than "anti." "Or worse" extends identity through subjunctivity and imagination beyond identity into pure difference of the accelerating and unknown. According to Reynolds, transversal power is,

> Any force, whether physical, material, ideological, aesthetic, emotional, conceptual, etc., that precipitates and drives deviations—transversal movements—from the norms and encodings of subjective and official territories. Reconfigurations of thought, emotion, and experience occur when subjectivity transgresses the parameters maintaining subjective territory. By extension, the surrounding organizational structures may also undergo reconfiguration. Transversal power is a catalyst for such transformations. (*Transversal Subjects from Montaigne to Deleuze after Derrida* 287)

The main difference between Foucault's power and Reynolds's transversal power is that transversal power is a catalyst of transformation through intentional or unintentional deviance within a relationship rather than a performance of a relationship. An important point for the concept of transversal power is that it is not limited to discourse and hence productively deviates from subjective power itself. Transversal power, then, allows for self-fashioning, and thus a somewhat independent and agential human-subject, without reintroducing a ground (ideological power) which reduces agency to a dialectic (self-other).[7]

[7] Transversal power draws on but differs from Guattari's concept of transversality, which is much closer to its mathematical origins: transversality as a cutting across horizontal and vertical lines of organization.

In the articulation of the transversal subject there is a clear attempt to work between the impulses of subjective intensity (however multiple those subjectivities are) and a quasi-objective extension. Reynolds' main push to shift the discourse around the subject is through "subjective territory," a term he coins "as a corrective to the idea of subjectivity as wholly individual, hermetic or static" (Devils House 146). Subjective territory "schematizes personal conceptualization in spatial terms" and "is related to Kant's argument that it is our intuited knowledge of ourselves (as mental beings) as objects to ourselves within space and time that allows for both internal and external experience" and is combined with Henri Lefebvre's notion of space, for whom it is a "mental, physical, and social determinant that is primary to personal experience" (Devils House 146). In other words, there is a singular subject that shapes her own experience while navigating through conceptual and physical spaces controlled with varying degrees by "state-machinery" (institutions) that attempt to control subject formation and movement both implicitly and explicitly. In order to create a subjective territory, Reynolds implicitly follows a mechanism of folding exteriority that produces interiority that then produces exteriority in a dynamic feedback-loop inspired primarily by Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari. Reynolds relies on a similar spatial model to articulate conceptual territory, "the realm of possible thought" for a person or group, and transversal territory, "the non-subjectified region of one's conceptual territory" or otherwise a space that is unconstrained by institutions governing conceptual or physical movement through space and time (*Transversal Subjects* 136). Within the disorientation in a chaotic field of subjectivities prismatically mediated through each other's fracturings and patchings, a reorientation of the subject and her subjectivities can occur. "Dissident mobilizations can occur" that escape the constraints of one's own and other's subjective territories (*Transversal Subjects* 287).

Reynolds and his collaborators unveil an agglomeration of terms, which I will not engage with here, but transversal power and the three territories outlined offer insight into two important mechanics of transversal poetics: to emphasize the dynamic and fluid becomings of subjects and to resuscitate, maintain, and explain agency in a complex field of exterior variables perpetually in flux. By doing so, transversal poetics opens the door to a more nuanced approach to subjectivity in performance and literature and also offers a route towards exploring the becomings of characters within play worlds as well as the unpredictable and infectious effects they have on subjects exterior to them—ones explored adjacently by process philosophy-oriented scholars working in Shakespeare studies such as Phillip Davis, Michael Witmore, Richard Allen Shoaf, Simon Palfrey, and Nicholas Luke.

While there is room for attention to temporalities and their complexities within both Reynolds' spatially-dominant transversal poetics and the event-dominated approaches of the other process-oriented theorists mentioned, temporality and time are not explicitly addressed or attended to with sustained attention within these frameworks. In Reynolds' first book, *Becoming Criminal*: *Transversal Performance and Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England*, Reynolds elides a discussion of time with a brief example of the subjects almost instantaneous cognizance of space and time, "first in space, next in time, and then together in almost instantaneous succession" through an example of Reynolds' own work, "(I am writing in my home office, at 11:24pm, yet I'm not sure of the exact date)" (*Becoming Criminal* 11). Even time is spatial, within a process-oriented Bergson-inspired framework, according to Reynolds so far as he is actually concerned with being aware of a *measurement* of time: clock time and calendar date. Both are quotidian abstractions of time according to Bergson, and are products of a practical mental process which "substitutes for the continuous the discontinuous, for mobility

stability, for the tendency in process it substitutes fixed points which mark a direction of change and tendency" (*The Creative Mind* 221). Yet there is an intersubjective and inter-objective process of selection from a multiplicity of temporalities from which these spatializations of time arise.

One response, then, to Reynolds' eschewal of temporality and time is that his work is ultimately concerned with the dynamic mutability of spaces in time that follows from his grounding of territories in a Kantian conception of space and time. Another response is that an attention to time might lend more specificity to the mechanics of transversality as well as to the effects of negotiating chaotic temporalities on "dissident mobilizations" (*Transversal Subjects* 287). To forget when one is, to not be able to properly anticipate speed, or to form one's own temporal community adjacent to or opposed to a dominant view of temporality raises significant problems for navigating subjectivities. Institutions attempt to govern understandings of temporality with similar zeal as they protect or expand spatial borders—physical or conceptual. They attempt to discipline histories as well as possibilities for the future, and perhaps most obviously, they govern when tasks are to be complete, whether the timing of those charges are based on clock time, seasonal time, biological time, or any other metric of measurement.

Much like Reynolds' transversal poetics, other process-philosophy approaches that draw on Whitehead, Bergson, Spinoza, and Leibniz treat problems of temporality implicitly rather than explicitly. Michael Witmore, for instance, argues that "the metaphysics of a Shakespeare play is immanent to its performance" in which "actions are the foundation of a theatrical metaphysics" (*Shakespearean Metaphysics* 7-8). He recognizes Shakespeare as a playwright of a metaphysics of immanence that "implies a certain skepticism about our ability to locate punctually all of the powers of an individual body or actor within the actor, as if they were a sort

of metaphysical luggage that could be carried from one place to the next" (*Shakespearean Metaphysics* 12-13). Whereas Reynolds focuses on the emergence of subjects and the subjectivities transversal to them, Witmore focuses on the emergence of the theatrical event, the world it produces, and the characters that populate that world, as well as the various problems that an immanent metaphysics of theatre that Shakespeare's texts raise.

Philip Davis approaches Shakespeare's works through process philosophies—ones that prioritize becoming over being-- by way of Hazlitt, Montaigne, and the language of evolution in order to explore the ways in which "Shakespeare's drama is indeed an original text or background script for the creation of life;" he recognizes "in the plays a genuine mental template for evolutionary creation, a linguistic equivalent of the structuring work of DNA. For, like DNA, the original text hidden within the workings of Shakespeare is a text not so much to be read or explained as to be active in life-form" (Davis 1). For him, as for Witmore, Shakespeare's scripts are virtual diagrams that exceed narrative or material text. Simon Palfrey takes a similar approach in his *Shakespeare's Possible Worlds*, in which he deploys the monistic philosophy of Liebniz in order to examine the ways in which individual elements he calls "formactions," a portmanteau of form and action. Examples of formactions include cues, spectators, scenes, and any other elements of a play that produce play worlds, play life, and events through their manifold combinations. Allen Shoaf's *Lucretius and Shakespeare on the Nature of Things* also readily adds to the list of works dealing with Shakespeare's worlds, though he approaches the topic through the materialist philosophy and poetry of Lucretius.

Witmore, Lewis, Palfrey, and Shoaf are all concerned with the ways in which Shakespeare's works are productive and inspire the effects of transversal power that Reynolds identifies in antitheatricalists' inability to fully express the power of theater as well as their need

to rely on phrases such as "or worse." Whether attending to actions, language, theatrical elements, or material, the authors all grapple with ways of discussing theatre's, and specifically Shakespeare's theatre's, capacity to produce something vital, if not alive.

Process-oriented approaches to Shakespeare as well as adjacent process-oriented fields such as posthumanism, eco-criticism, and cognitive neuroscience as applied to literature and drama, have reinvigorated an interest in characters and the process by which they become something more than symbols, expressions of ideology, or words. The long-standing interest in subjectivity has returned to 19th-century characterological concerns with a difference. The kind of ontological flattening that can come with process-oriented approaches has begun to blur the distinction between characters and subjects in interesting and often productive ways, and while character criticism has not taken off as an independent field, it has returned implicitly through cognitive studies and explicitly in bursts of dedicated studies over the past decade, as Edward Pechter notes in his 2014 "Character Criticism, the Cognitive Turn, and the Problem of Shakespeare Studies."

The most recent study to provocatively frolic with the line between subject and character is *Shakespearean Arrivals*: *The Birth of Character* by Nicholas Luke, which arrived in 2018. In it, Luke argues that Shakespeare's tragic characters "arrive as subjects" through Shakespeare's staging of "the radical intrusion of the new" (Luke 5). A subject, for him, is not "an individual or a settled substance but a diffused dramatic process of arriving" (Luke 6). In other words, rejecting a common-sense notion of character, Luke makes the case for both subjects and characters as emergent and processual: "characters *become* something more than a role or a mouth piece for cultural and ideological discourses" (Luke 6).

Luke is careful to point out that the audience is still an important part of the process so far as subjectivity is neither located in the character, actor, or audience, but rather the arrival of a subject is an event for the audience for whom "characters may arrive as subjects unexpectedly, almost unprepared for, but they need not arrive at all and, even when they do, they may also fade, retreat or flicker uncertainly (Luke 9). In short, Luke is interested in the question of how characters are produced and become processes that are interactive and that audiences engage with—how characters become more than representations or masks.

Drawing heavily on Alain Badiou's theory of event as well as Bruno Latour's concepts of quasi-subjects and -objects, Luke argues that circumstances within plays such as Desdemona's love for Othello or Romeo's meeting of Juliet, are events that drive the production of character that may, at least briefly, be "given a reality that circulates elusively between the drama, its events, its characters and its spectators. They arrive not as Hegel's absolute spirit but as relative subjects, subjects to drama" (19). The difference between Luke's project and one like Yachnin and Slight's is that Luke is ultimately concerned with how a character produces something "new" each time rather than the general collaborative nature of how a character comes to life between actors, directors, spectators, and other elements of theatre.

To make his case, Luke reverses A.C Bradley's position that action comes from character and argues that action produces characters with depth that circulate as subjects. He also relies heavily on process philosophy, following process-oriented criticism by scholars such as Reynolds, Witmore, Shoaf, Davis, and Palfrey. For him events are the "metaphysical building blocks" of theatre and out of which theatrical persons emerge (Luke 20).

A common thread which weaves through the concern for explicating the "something more" of Shakespeare's texts for these various process- and event- oriented Shakespeare scholars

is thinking "the new." The production of the new is a fundamentally temporal concern and one that Gilles Deleuze takes up considerably throughout his oeuvre and especially in *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze is interested in articulating the ways in which the new in all its forms—conceptual, material, linguistic, experiential, and political—functions in an immanent system in which a local production of the new located within individuated material context creates a change in a universal form and vice versa in a dynamic process of creation across material and conceptual planes. He is interested in the dynamic between the virtual and the actual, conceived of as the interdependent difference between becoming and being and between facility and execution.

Within the study of Shakespeare's scripts, for instance, this means that there is a tripartite feedback loop among characters, worlds, and the scripts-as-diagrams from which they emerge. Temporality is a significant dimension in that process so far as the dynamic interplay between the past, present, and future across material and conceptual planes is what significantly facilitates the creation of the new. Within Shakespeare scholarship and scholarship of early modern texts in general, the temporal dimension of analysis is precariously missing in process-oriented approaches while process is often missing in temporal approaches. One exception, perhaps, is Jeffrey J. Cohen's *Medieval Identity Machines*, which does not directly treat early modern plays. Otherwise, scholarship on time tends to shy away from process-oriented approaches and discussions of subjectivity. Where we can see an anomaly within this trend to shy away from process-oriented approaches to time is in queer approaches to history such as Carla Freccero's *Queer/Early/Modern* or Madhavi Manon and Jonathan Goldberg's "Queering History."

Reynolds' transversal poetics comes closest to addressing the productive and dynamic relationship between plays, characters, subjects, and the sociopolitical realities of power. The

reaction of "or worse" is a record of transversal power's potential, and the "new" and "something more" that process-oriented scholars explicate in various forms are attempts at diagraming the transversal power of Shakespeare's theater to create subjects and characters beyond what they are. An important and as of yet missing component to that diagraming is an explication is the interplay between how the temporal axes of identities shaped character-forms that produce temporalities which facilitate the creation of "new" and emergent play worlds that in turn shaped and continue to shape subjectivities transversal to subjects.

The Folding of Time

The study of time and temporality in literature, and especially Shakespeare studies, has shifted back to the study of forms of times and the ways in which the wealth of information about material culture folds into those forms to produce temporalities and thoughts about time. As Sarah Lewis aptly remarks, theories of time "seem to be moving away from the concept of time as the *subject* of academic enquiry, toward a consideration of time as an inherent aspect of the *form* of Shakespeare studies itself" (Lewis 247). As time studies has developed, it has followed a similar trajectory as the study of characters and subjects—moving from the universal to the particular and then transforming into studies of the dynamic interactions between universals, particulars, and their emergent products.

Several scholars have taken on the task of outlining the theoretical history of time studies in Shakespeare. Most recently, Lewis outlined the state of the field of temporal studies in criticism of Shakespeare's dramatic works in her article, "Shakespeare, Time, and Theory" in 2014. Similarly, scholars have outlined the theoretical trajectory of time studies in critical theory at large from Russian Formalism to Object Oriented Ontology. Nevertheless, I would like to

briefly retrace their steps and consider new works that have been produced in the past four years in order to arrive again at where my project has already begun.

Following Jonathan Gil Harris and his work in both "Untimely Mediations" and *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare*, Lewis reintroduces studies of Shakespeare and time in three waves. The first wave of temporal criticism emerged out of structuralist considerations of the 1960s and 1970s and was concerned with themes and structures of Time "with a capital T," as Harris calls it. These studies were largely concerned with the aesthetic patterns found in Shakespeare's and other early modern works and the meanings of those patterns: time as a destroyer, time as a creator, time as a revealer of truth, and so on. Inga-Stina Ewbank perhaps gives the most succinct description of scholars' concern with time in this period as "what time does to man" in her 1964 article "The Triumph of Time" in which Time has a bevy of universal structures that man is universally affected by. This period included works by scholars such as Tom Driver, Thomas Tanselle, Irwin Smith, David Kaula, Harold Toliver, and Inga-Stina Ewbank.[8] Following a host of articles in the 1960s, a series of monographs on Time were published in the 1970s, which strove to define "temporal consciousness" of early modern England and defined the field of temporal studies within early modern scholarship. These works included: Frederick Turner's *Shakesepeare and the Nature of Time*: *moral and philosophical themes in some plays and poems by William Shakespeare*, Richard Quinones' *The Renaissance Discovery of Time*, Douglas Peterson's *Time, Tide and Tempest: A Study of Shakespeare's Romances*, Wylie Sypher's *The Ethic of Time: structures of experience in Shakespeare*, and G.F.

[8] See Driver's "The Shakespearean Clock: Time and the Vision of Reality in *Romeo and Juliet* and *The Tempest*," Tanselle's "Time in *Romeo and Juliet*," Smith's "Dramatic Time Versus Clock Time in Shakespeare," Kaula's "Time and the Timeless in Everyman and Dr. Faustus," Toliver's "Shakespeare and the Abyss of Time," and Ewbank's "The Triumph of Time."

Waller's *The Strong Necessity of Time: the philosophy of time in Shakespeare and Elizabethan literature.*

These works were characterized by their apolitical treatment of time, but as Lewis notes, by 1973 Arthur Bell already recognized that time schemes are gendered in his article "Time and Convention in *Antony and Cleopatra.*" By 1984, Patricia Parker considered the constructs and politics of time in her "Dilation and Delay: Renaissance Matrices." Lewis suggests that Parker's essay signified a clear shift in temporal studies even as temporal studies were ignored in favor of new historicist and cultural materialist concerns of power and its spatial distribution. She writes that Parker "recognizes that time is culturally constructed and that time means differently for different types of people in the early modern period" (Lewis 249). Parker, nevertheless, was concerned with time's *meaning*, even if the ways in which time could mean began to fragment and proliferate across subjects for her.

In the 1980s and 1990s a series of studies were published that politicized time and continued exploring the ways in which time meant for particular subjects; scholars investigated temporality and the ways in which temporalities subjectified subjects and participated in the circulation of power. In other words, temporalities began to be studied as modes of production that circulated within sociohistorically particular discursive fields, whether they were philosophical (Agnes Heller's *The Time is out of joint: Shakespeare as a Philosopher of History*), social (Michael Bristol's *Big-Time Shakespeare*), or Theological (John Spencer Hill's *Infinity, faith, and time: Christian humanism and Renaissance Literature*).

At the same time, temporality and time emerged as central concerns in a variety of fields that fall under the umbrella of "critical theory" that were responding to and engaging with Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, including psychoanalysis, postmodernism, post-

structuralism, Marxisms, post-colonialism, and post-humanism. They sheer magnitude of "posts-" that emerged between the 1960s and 1990s speak to the importance of time to these various fields. Congruently, in cross sections of technology studies and history, a series of studies such as Otto Mayr's *Authority, liberty, & automatic machinery in early modern Europe,* David Landes' *Revolution in time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World,* and Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum's *The Ordering of the Hour: Clocks and modern temporal orders* offered a host of studies around the histories, politics, and philosophies of the invention of clocks. In the new millennium, temporal concerns of critical theory began to bleed into Shakespeare studies and infuse new life for temporal studies within the field while histories of technology also spawned studies such as Adam Cohen's *Shakespeare and Technology: Dramatizing Early Modern Technological Revolutions* and *Technology and the Early Modern Self* and Jessica Wolfe's *Humanism, Machinery, and Renaissance Literature* that were concerned with, amongst other topics, the measurement of time and its various tools.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, studies of temporality made a resurgence in Shakespeare studies and were guided by a few major concerns that stemmed from an engagement with a diverse set of methodologies that compliment my own interests in the temporal productions by and of characters: How did time shape ideas about and practices of early modern selves?[9] How was time experienced by early modern theatre audiences?[10] How do multiple human and nonhuman temporalities co-exist and persist and what are the implications of multiplicity for studies of time?[11] What are and how do we discover alternate temporalities

[9] See, for instance, Amy Boesky's "Giving Time to Women: The Eternising Project in Early Modern England," and David Wood's *Time, Narrative, and Emotion in Early Modern England*.
[10] See, for instance, Mathew Wagner's *Shakespeare, Theatre, Time*.
[11] See Jonathan Gil Harris's *Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare* and Julian Yates's *Error, Misuse, Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance*.

within and through early modern texts and objects?[12] These are by no means all of the concerns that have emerged. Thinking about time has permeated studies of hospitality, messianism, childhood, ecology, and methodology, to name a few, but the concerns I mentioned offer the general trajectory that temporal studies took in the first decade of the twenty-first century.[13] There was a shift from a consideration of what time meant to an appraisal of what affects and effects time produced and the implications of those productions on definitions of subjects and objects.

Most recently, however, a new direction has emerged in temporal studies of early modern texts and Shakespeare's works that moves along a similar trajectory as the one I suggested in the development of studies of subjectivity and character. J.K. Barret's monograph *Untold Futures* and Lauren Shohet's *Temporality, Genre, and Experience in the Age of Shakespeare: Forms of Time*, probe how texts and forms produce temporalities, as opposed to how temporalities produce affects and effects within texts and performances.

J.K Barret's *Untold Futures* turns towards forms of literary *techne* such as syntax, grammar, narrative, rhyme, meter, and promises, amongst other microforms, in order to recover sixteenth- and seventeenth-century "assorted perspectives on past, present, and future by attending to an artistic generativity and experimentation" that produces temporalities and temporal consciousnesses through these artistic experimentations with form (Barret 3). Barret especially focuses on the way in which these techniques and forms are utilized to produce futures

[12] See Freccero's *Queer/Early/Modern*.

[13] See, for instance, David Goldstein and Julia Lupton's *Hospitality, Ethics, and Exchange*, Daniel Keegan's "Performing Prophecy: More Life on the Shakespearean Scene," the plethora of valuable works that came out of the Shakespeare Association of America's panels on time and temporality in 2017 (Time-Reckoning in Early Modern England) and 2018 (Alternative Times and Possible Futures), and various presentist approaches such as those by Terence Hawkes and Hugh Grady's *Presentist Shakespeares*, Hugh Grady and Cary DiPietro's *Shakespeare and the Urgency of Now: Criticism and Theory in the 21st Century*, Ryan Kiernan's *Shakespeare's Universality: Here's Fine Revolution*, Tina Skouen's *The Value of Time in Early Modern English Literature*, and Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds' *The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies* volumes I and II.

and divergent ways of thinking the future that veer from the singular vectors of apocalyptic ends and predictable patterns or messianic deferrals. She shares a theoretical concern with Nicholas Luke as well as with the contributors in Shohet's edited collection. They are all engaged with productively combining microstructures and macrostructures in such a way that they can attend to the productive relationship between the continuity of formal structures and the disjunctive specificity of sociohistorically-located events. In Barret's case, she examines how historically located formal elements of grammar actively produce ways of thinking about the future and its history. She places emphasis on literary techne as a means of ideational production, yet implicit in her discussions is a feedback-loop between how literature shaped temporal consciousness and how temporal consciousness shaped literature.

In a similar trajectory as *Untold Futures*, the recent collection, *Temporality, Genre, and Experience in the Age of Shakespeare*: *Forms of Time*, edited by Lauren Shohet, approaches the reciprocal relationship between forms and temporalities through a wide range of methodological approaches. The goal of the collection, according to Shohet, is to bring together "the large-scale view of time characteristic of archetypal criticism with the vast archives of minute historical detail that recent work has opened to us"—to examine the different and differentiating temporalizations of representation (Shohet 11). The overarching approach to form in this collection intimates the problems of how to understand the interplay between abstract forms, whether they be genres or characters, how those forms are actualized and performed in time, and how those assorted temporal and material performances of forms change the forms themselves.

The goal of my project is to tangle with the complexity of the feedback-loops between virtual forms and actual temporalities. The forms that I attend to, however, are representations of identities such as tinkers, servants, black villains, and virtuous daughters and the temporalities

are temporal affects such as déjà vu, intersubjective confusion in friendship, apocalyptic futurity, and unbound virtue that discombobulate singularly subjective experiences. The interaction between forms and temporalities illustrates both the continuity and the disjunction of understanding early modern temporality from our own time and opens up to the paradox of performing, or forming to completion, when ends and beginnings are partially arbitrary articulations.

Gilles Deleuze's *Theatrum Mundi*: A Few Notes on Methodology

My approach throughout the next four chapters is inflected by Deleuze's theorization of time as it weaves through semiotics, ontology, subjectivity, and socio-political contexts.[14] When Laura Cull first published *Deleuze and Performance* (2009) and *Theatres of Immanence: Deleuze and the Ethics of Performance* (2013), she inaugurated the extensive use of the philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari within performance and theatre studies. Since then, the works of Deleuze and Guattari have been diversely utilized and applied within the fields, but Deleuze's work on time has received little to no attention within Shakespeare studies. Witmore, for instance, avoided working with Deleuze's philosophy, arguing that it is not easily suited for Shakespeare because, "particularly in the later collaborative work with Guattari, Deleuze's philosophy leads him to embrace a distinctly post-human conception of the body, a body that exists 'without organs' and so is dispersed into a world of intensity flows and their various 'territorializations'" (Witmore 13). Some of the developments I have discussed in Shakespeare criticism, however, have opened a door to thinking through theatre as a body-without-organs and a dispersed intensity of flows. For my project in particular, Deleuze's thought offers a way to

[14] My interpretation of Deleuze's work is accented by the work of William James (*Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide*; *Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide*; and *Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and Guide*), Brian Massumi (*A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari*), and Brent Adkins (*Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus: A Critical Introduction and Guide*).

think of characters as not subjects, humans, or mere representations, but as poly- and multi-temporal assemblages that produce intricate worlds. Characters exist somewhere in-between all three.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze crafts his own *theatrum mundi* metaphor in order to explain the distinctions he makes between the stoic concepts of *Chronos* and *Aion* (concepts I elaborate in Chapter 3). Deleuze constructs his *theatrum mundi* over the course of several "series" or chapters, but I would like to quote two passages at length here. The first passage is from the "Twenty-First Series of the Event" in which Deleuze writes:

> The actor is not like a god, but is rather like an "anti-god" (*contre-dieu*). God and actor are opposed in their readings of time. What men grasp as past and future, God lives in its eternal present. The God is Chronos: the divine present in its entirety, whereas past and future are dimensions relative to a particular segment of the circle which leaves the rest outside. The actor's present, on the contrary, is the most narrow, the most contracted, the most instantaneous, and the most punctual. It is the point on a straight line which divides the line endlessly, and is itself divided into past-future. The actor belongs to the Aion: instead of the most profound, the most fully present, the present which spreads and comprehends the future and the past, an unlimited past-future rises up here reflected in an empty present, which has no more thickness than the mirror. The actor or actress represents, but what he or she represents is always still in the future and already in the past, whereas his or her representation is impassible and divided, unfolded without being ruptured, neither acting nor being acted upon. (*Logic of Sense* 150).

Three threads emerge in this long passage: two forms of time (Chronos and Aion), actors, and representation. Chronos is the eternal present insofar as it contains all presents without selecting

any one. For instance, if we take King Lear for an example, the time of Chronos would contain King Lear's present, the present of his daughters, his clothes, his land, his subjects, the weather and environs, and so on *ad infinitum*. For Deleuze, everything has a present and that present contracts all of the past and future. Lear has a present that contains a particular past and future, as do his clothes and the environments he inhabits. The time of the Aion is opposed to this type of infinite present because it is the time of selection. When an actor acts, she, he, they, or it selects a particular present and acts. In acting, that past and future of that present change to never be the self-same again. When Lear refuses to give Cordelia a part of his kingdom, his entire past and future relations are inflected with that choice. The selection of the present is a comprehension, a re-thinking, re-articulation, and re-presentation of the past and future. The selection itself is then a representation of an empty present that is empty in so far as it does not act or become acted upon because it is a representation of differentiation always in relation to a particular past and future.

Yet Lear is not the only actor making a selection. His daughters act, as do their husbands, Lear's clothes act, as does the weather. The world is populated with actors constantly acting, selecting, and representing. Agency of action in this case becomes dispersed and it becomes difficult to discern what the value of such a model is when it leads to a kind of strong determinism that could easily trail back to an author or a God of selection while avoiding the twists and turns of an immanent temporality. Deleuze anticipates this objection and includes a third present that belongs to the Aion in his "Twenty-Third Series of the Aion":

> This present of the Aion representing the instant is not at all like the vast and deep present of Chronos: it is the present without thickness, the present of the actor, dancer, or mime—the pure perverse "moment." It is the present of the pure operation, not of the

> incorporation. It is not the present of subversion or actualization, but that of counter-actualization, which keeps the former from overturning the latter, and the latter from being confused with the former, and which comes to duplicate the lining (*redouble la doublure*). (*Logic of Sense* 168)

Counter-actualization is the articulation of the actor by the actor: the redoubling of the double, which grants a limited-agency and value to action. We can imagine an actor playing Lear telling Edgar "Thou art the thing itself" and choosing to deliver it with a particular timbre and duration, with particular moments, embedded in a particular context. In the delivery, the actor is forever changing the past of all deliveries before her and the future after her as she plays out the role of Lear. Her delivery is always relational. In her delivery she not only plays the role of Lear but redoubles the role within herself such that she becomes worthy of playing out the role of Lear, whether that be through her relation to other characters, to other actors, to the director, to events in her own life, or the newspaper she read that morning. When she selects Lear's defeat, it is in relation to an intensifying or weakening of her own defeat, happiness, comfort, etc. as well as Lear's defeat, happiness, comfort, etc. In other words, her acting as a selection of a present that is in an asymmetrical relation with a particular past and future is singularly redoubled, selected, and represented in her own selection. She makes sense of the role and represents herself in the representation of Lear. Counter-actualization then gives a limited agency and value to action insofar as presents remain singular even as they are always in relation to all other pasts, presents and futures.

In my explications of these two passages, I have psychologized Deleuze's philosophy of time, but the point for Deleuze is that the process applies to humans and non-humans alike. Time and temporality are not contained in anything nor are they special containers for anything as they

are for Kant. They are themselves produced. The kind of ever-expanding processual relation of everything to everything in Deleuze's philosophy is the reason that Witmore eschews Deleuze while relying on other process philosophers in his *Shakespearean Metaphysics*. However, Deleuze's post-human bent, especially in his philosophy of time, is precisely why I think Deleuze's philosophy of time is important to consider in thinking of how Shakespeare's plays perform and how they are, have been, and will be performed in a variety of specific sociohistorical contexts.

Shakespeare's scripts and stages are populated by objects, ideologies, actors, characters, roles, magical beings, and impossible paradoxes, all of which are temporally productive and interact and circulate in a network that extends beyond the circulation of singular play worlds. Deleuze's *theatrum mundi* and his philosophy of time resonate throughout this project because they offer a way to carefully examine the ways in which singularities-- whether they be subjects, objects, or otherwise—create temporal forms that produce worlds, which in turn shape singularities. The philosophy of time briefly outlined offers a way to think time and temporality as both productive and immanent. Two significant conclusions can be drawn from Deleuze's mechanic: 1. singularities (such as actors) make their own times through processes (such as temporal immanence or asymmetry between past, present, and future), and 2. temporalities are always interdependent.

Deleuze's philosophy of time weaves through my project and shapes the problems I attempt to address in understanding the relationships between subjects, characters, worlds, and their performances. I also draw on theorists who engage with Deleuze's philosophy of time and supplement and augment it to address shared concerns from different approaches. For instance, in Chapter 1, I engage with Paulo Virno's work on déjà vu and its relationship to history; in

Chapter 2, I put Deleuze's ideas about the present in conversation with Jacque Derrida's theorization of the gift as the present; in Chapter 3 I put Deleuze's ideas about fabulation, naming, and the future in dialogue with Negri's concept of *Kairos;* and in Chapter 4 I examine Deleuze's concept of the virtual in conjunction with Juan Luis Vives' ideas of chastity and knowledge. Each new concept inflects Deleuze's concepts, as do my own readings of Shakespeare's plays and the early modern discourses. Throughout the chapters, however, I return to the central question about how subjects produce character forms that produce temporal forms, which develop into play worlds and inflect subjects.

The Stories To-Come

A project about time and Shakespeare becomes overburdened with examples quickly. The framework of process and temporal immanence can readily be applied to any of Shakespeare's plays. However, I have chosen to work with plays that offer responses to particular questions such as how are temporalities produced and valued between humans and non-humans and how do plays with imagined pasts produce futures? I have also chosen plays that often receive less critical attention and raise cogent questions in the study of Shakespeare's plays and time. Finally, I have chosen plays that have characters that raise interesting questions of temporality in relation to race, gender, and class. My project is limited in scope to the plays I have chosen and limited in its broad conclusions because I am interested in the specificities of the plays' mechanics, but I hope that the questions I raise are provocative and can be developed and explored in the future in the context of other dramatic works. Each chapter takes on a different dimension of time: past, present, future, and timelessness, but these are artificial separations that allow for the exploration of specific questions rather than clear divisions.

In Chapter One I take up the issue of what Deleuze calls the "pure past" and its potentials for performance and politics through the conjunction of *déjà vu* and history in *The Taming of the Shrew*. Through the figure of the tinker, I argue, Shakespeare explores one avenue of how pasts are created, represented, and manipulated to create alternate worlds in both negative and affirmative ways. I begin by examining a history of early modern discourse about tinkers and outline representations of tinkers and their uncanny similarity to the figure of the nomad that Deleuze and Guattari introduce in their *Thousand Plateaus*. After a case study on the function of the tinker in Thomas Dekker's *The Wonderful Year*, I specifically look at the ways in which pasts are created through performance and the interactions between different types of pasts within the play, especially as they pertain to Christopher Sly and Kate. I argue that the figure of the tinker is used in Shakespeare to develop alternate histories and pasts that are dynamic and changeable. I focus on Shakespeare's tinker, Christopher Sly, in *Taming of the Shrew* in order to analyze the relation between nomadic time and the time of the state. Ultimately, I argue that the nomadic time is captured and deployed by both the Lord and Petruccio, in order to change and discipline the time of Sly and Kate. However, Sly, and to some degree Kate, are able to escape complete temporal discipline and the déjà vu that their torturers try to instill. History remains open as "a kind of history" rather than a definite one—acting as a site of potential rather than a representation of the past.

In Chapter Two I turn to the function of the present in *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. In Lance's famous speech with Crab, objects, animals, and humans become confused as they are performed, and the confusion that emerges stems primarily from a confusion of presents. Yet what breaks through the confusion and reassigns a value to various temporalities is the Aristotelian synesthetic friendship between Lance and Crab. This discussion of friendship and

proper time of succession, action, and duration pervades the play. I suggest that Shakespeare provides a model to deal with the problems of more-than-one temporality that I ground in an immanent approach to temporalities and which offers a mechanic for the valuation of time. This mechanic becomes important not only for the relational concept of friendship but also for the consequences played out for Sylvia, Julia, Proteus, and Valentine that arise from an adherence to proper time that does not attend to the creative production of alternate times. While Lance and Crab create a temporality through the process of their desire, Proteus attempts to find a procrustean solution to fit his desire into a temporality that he attempts to transcend.

Chapter three explores the creation of new futures, timing, and untiming in *Titus Andronicus*. Upon Aaron's first arrival on the stage, he announces his desire to rise above fortune along with Tamora, and three quarters of the play, he achieves his goals through controlling narratives of blackness, timing his actions, evaluating successions of events as if they are clearly laid out below him. Yet, when his baby arrives, he is untimed and forced back into a chaotic time in which the future is uncertain. Aaron creates a future for his child and becomes both the epistemic and ontological ground for it—literally becoming part of the stage. The question this chapter seeks to answer is the questions of how race and futurity work together in *Titus* Andronicus—how the temporal negotiation of early modern blackness creates a future world. Beginning from the silent arrival of Aaron and the opening question of inheritance and rule that is ultimately answered by the birth of Aaron's baby, *Titus Andronicus* asks its audiences to consider who the people to come are and how will or won't they be scripted by the people that came before them.

Finally, Chapter Four investigates the relationship between virtue and the virtual by placing together women's conduct manuals by Juan Luis Vives and Shakespeare's *Pericles* and

The Tempest. In his *Education of a Christian Woman*, Vives discussion of the virtue of chastity places contradictory demands on woman that effectively call for women to not be of the world. They are called to practice the contradictions of chastity. In both *Pericles* and *The Tempest*, in which chastity figures as a central characteristic of both Miranda and Marina, the two women are scripted to exist in a form of imagined timelessness as potential for the future: Prospero's potential for his own brave new world and Pericles' potential for subjectivity. In *The Tempest*, Prospero positions himself as the transcendent author, though his power is based on a model of horizontal time-binding in which he exacts compliance from Ariel and Caliban based on singular moments of promise and exchange that are extended out as contract. Miranda is vertically time-bound to Prospero according to the father-daughter, creator-art relation he imposes on her. Yet, Miranda's desire in relation to both Caliban and Ferdinand exceeds those bounds and is captured as potential for the future by Prospero through an enforcement of her chastity. In *Pericles*, chastity becomes the central lever of Marina's survival and her almost magical ability to escape bounds placed on her. She is horizontally time-bound to her chastity, which she repeats, generating potential through the repetition of her virtues. She becomes a transcendent figure who, in the end, is revealed to contain the potential for Pericles' family and empire—literally making Pericles human again. In both plays, the two women are differently made to operate outside the temporal schemes of the play as a quasi-transcendent potential that necessarily remains immanent in order to guarantee a future.

These four chapters treat disparate topics. However, they are united in their concerns with the productivity of temporality and their attention to the role that temporality plays in understanding the relationship between characters and subjects through the nuances of representations of identity around gender, race, and class. This study also offers unique readings

of the plays and works it engages as well as critical studies of plays that have historically received less attention. It is my hope that the observations and arguments made throughout this project can provide useful avenues for approaching performance and dramaturgy with an attention to the way that temporality and time travel across history and sociopolitical contexts. I also hope that it contributes to both time studies and characterological studies within the discourse of Shakespeare and can be productively put into conversations with studies of alternate and queer temporalities.

"It's a kind of history": Déjà vu, Tinker-time, and the Virtuality of the Past in Shakespeare's *The Taming of the Shrew*

At the end of the second Induction in Shakespeare's *The Taming of the Shrew*, Sly is told that he is about to watch "a kind of history." The Lord spectacularizes both memory and history for Sly to trick and re-inscribe him into a social milieu with fixed geographic, temporal, and social boundaries—to temporarily make him a lord instead of a vagabond. History with a capital "H" becomes evidently deployed as a tool of the state in order to regulate and control behavior. A parallel process occurs during Petruccio's "taming" of Kate that also depends on, among other techniques, the manipulation of time, and the reconfiguration of Kate's temporality. Moreover, further parallels emerge between Sly and Kate so far as both are resistant to a disciplinary kind of history: Sly in his creative lineage and Kate in her refusal to smoothly perform her duties of familial productivity and succession.

The type of spectacularization of temporality in both the cases of Sly and Kate can be productively thought in the terms through which Paulo Virno defines déjà vu, which I will address in depth later in this chapter. For him, déjà vu arises "when the *possible-present* is exchanged for a *real*-past" (ch. 1, sec 4, Virno). That is, it arises when the capacity to do (to remember, to make history) is confused with the already done (the remembered and historical) and the present seems to be a remembered repetition of the past—a spectacularized past rather than a historicizing one. Drawing on the forces of historicization and the theatrical disarticulation of memory, the Lord attempts to make Sly believe that he is and always was indeed the noble that he boasted to be in order to avoid his bar-tab. Petruccio, more subtly, wrests away the connection between Kate's words and their effects, trapping her in an endless loop in which the faculty of language—the capacity to speak—is alienated from speaking, making meaning

arbitrary and subject to Petruccio's control. The demand put upon Kate and Sly by their respective manipulators is to re-member a social position by reassembling their various desires for food, sleep, love, and things into an acceptable subjective territory—one within which they can move through a stable history defined along a line of proper time rather than along alternative histories that arise from unpredictable and untamed conditions.

While scholars have drawn parallels between Sly and Kate along lines of education, husbandry, and transformation, less attended to has been the treatment of time in the play and the importance of Sly's role of tinker in relation to thinking temporality. Specifically, his role draws on a discursive tradition of tinkers in early modern English pamphlets and plays that treats them as figures of "nomadic," as Deleuze and Guattari use the term, potential. The tinker's temporality, or tinker-time, becomes a kind of model through which to understand how both Sly and Kate are able to find alternative ways of acting and becoming when their capacities for historicizing are interrupted and refashioned by outside forces.

In this chapter, I begin by articulating characteristics of tinkers in early modern pamphlets and analyze their relationship to circulation and the capacity to historicize. Specifically, I pursue the connections between performing the past and facilitating events exterior to state formations. Drawing on Virno's concept of déjà vu, I then examine the ways in which those tropes function in relation to history in Thomas Dekker's *A Wonderful Year* and in relation to mnemistic processes in Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*. I am specifically interested in tinkers as characters and their relationship to crafting-history through performance rather than as historical figures that provide evidence for the status of criminalized poor in early modern England. Taking my cue from Reynolds' circulation of transversal power through the theatre, I attend to the temporal means of production of that understanding of transversal power.

Tinkering with Exteriority

Tinkers, who were often itinerant metal workers—mending kitchen utensils and acting as early modern handymen—appear in early modern English discourse as figures of surliness, musicality, drunkenness, deception, idleness, and vagrancy. Lumped in with criminal professionals, tinkers were condemned as vagrants under the same statutes as rogues, jugglers, and other itinerants whose geographical and linguistic nomadism—wandering around the country and allegedly speaking the criminal cant-- threatened to disturb emerging surveillance techniques and economic territorial boundaries. Historically, tinkers were considered to be, like peddlers, semi-unskilled workers unaffiliated with guilds who were part of the class of people affected by successive enclosure laws and who arose as proto-capitalistic entrepreneurs in competition with emerging licensed vendors.

William Carroll and A.L. Beier both demonstrate that tinkers were distinguished from other vagrant professions by the quasi-legitimate status of their occupation that was also practiced by sedentary craftsmen with proprietary ties to their community. John Bunyan, the protestant preacher, and his father, for instance, are perhaps early modern England's most famous tinkers ("Introductory Note" 3). Beier writes that some tinkers "served apprenticeships and were working in their meanderings," citing reports of a Dorset Man and a Hampshire bellows-maker who both apprenticed and performed licensed work as tinkers (*Masterless Men* 90-1). These tinkers did not speak in cant, necessarily belong to criminal culture, or rove the English countryside. Nevertheless, tinkers, as well as other semi-skilled professionals were disliked by authorities because they disrupted local economies when they showed up, formed

occupational networks, and disturbed social orders with their drunkenness and disorderly behavior.[15]

As literary characters, however, tinkers are figures that balance precariously on the edge between civility and criminality—both licensed professionals and itinerant vagrants-- circulating through conceptual and physical spaces as agents with the capacity to destabilize and create opportunity in both. The line between history and discourse is a precarious one in the case of tinkers. Most information about tinkers prior to the 19th century, when they became more significantly associated with Irish and Scottish gypsies, comes from literary sources, statutes, and minor court cases.[16]

Though Linda Woodbridge warns that "rogue literature ought to be inadmissible as historical evidence of social conditions in the real world" and that associations between tinkers and a criminal underworld are to be understood entirely as fiction, Beier cites reports suggesting that tinkers, as they appear in literature, at least resembled real tinkers and certainly captured how they were viewed in the popular imagination (Woodbridge 11). More strongly, Reynolds makes the case that there was an apparent criminal underworld that mediated and was mediated by depictions of criminality in the early modern public theatre and in early modern popular culture. The circulation of tinkers in early modern discourse at least partially shaped and was shaped by concepts of tinker-ness.

Reynolds' main claim in *Becoming Criminal* is that an "amalgamated criminal culture, consisting of a diverse population with much racial, ethnic, and etiological ambiguity, was united by its own aesthetic, ideology, language, and lifestyle. In effect, this criminal culture constituted a sub-nation that illegitimately occupied material and conceptual space within the English

[15] For more on the history of tinkers, see A.L Beier's *Masterless Men* p. 91.
[16] For a history of how tinkers became associated with gypsies see Mary Burke's *Tinkers: Synge and the Cultural History of the Irish Traveller*.

nation" (1). If such a sub-nation did exist, tinkers would have occupied the margins between nation and sub-nation as both disruptive vagrants and licensed workers. In literature and drama, they function as such in-between figures marked by their often-outlandish capacity to invent and circulate stories as songs or deviant credentials that discombobulate official narratives. Tinkers' mediatory capacity as imagined subjects and between imagined criminal and official communities positions them as figures of exteriority. That is, they tend to eschew any sort of horizontal or vertical power structures, instead, functioning primarily as figures of transversality that remix horizontal and vertical binds to their momentary advantage. They share their transversal tendencies with other criminals, but it is perhaps their failure as criminals or their existence on the margins between criminal and official cultures, that makes them transversal to both—figuring as characters of faculty, and virtuosity in the performance of idleness.

In works such as *The Wonderful Year*, *The Overburian Characters*, and *The Tinker of Turvey*, in which tinkers receive significant attention and description, tinkers share a series of common traits: they are introduced or introduce themselves with a list of places they have been and things they have done, play music, share stories, idle in taverns, and are loosely associated with criminal culture. Maybe the most interesting aspect of early modern descriptions of tinkers is their introductory CV, which acts as a list of historical potential rather than a traditional genealogy or history. They are defined through their capacities to follow the sometimes-deviant trajectories of their desires and to produce new and occasionally fantastical forms of subjectivity rather than identities clearly delineated by place, family, education, religion, or other formal institutions. The histories they offer are less temporal and more geographical. Each story is a place they have passed through and a deed they have accomplished as proof of their skill, whether that be mending, drinking, or conning.

The importance of the tinker to thinking through temporality comes into view when we consider that, at least on a superficial level, early modern tinkers share the traits that Deleuze and Guattari use to identify nomads defined by temporal markers of speed rather than spatial ones of movement: metallurgy, itinerancy, music, and affect. Tinkers are musical metal workers that travel without clear destinations and are described at once as choleric, deceptive, and unproductively productive. Like nomads, they tend towards exteriority and the production of events rather than interiority and a reproduction of accepted thought. The central point of "nomadism" and the "war-machine" are to think what is exterior to the state, or to organization, whether official or unofficial: the government or the criminal syndicate.

Deleuze and Guattari use the concepts to articulate how change can occur despite the tendency of groups, no matter how chaotic, creative, spontaneous, or new, to organize around hierarchical lines. The occurrence of change, for them, is a form of becomings that infuses vitality into deceptively static ideas, histories, forms, and matters. Two key points about the concepts that they make, and which I want to focus on here in relation to tinkers, are that nomadic history is a geography and that nomads and their war machines function through intensity rather than extension: differential and durational changes of relations (condensation as a product of changes in pressure) rather than incremental and segmented ones (turning up the heat in a room). They interact with their environs without dominating them or imposing order upon them. Instead they become alongside their environs.

In "Nomadology, The War Machine" Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of the war machine as a way to think exteriority to the state as an affirmative tendency away from striation and hierarchy rather than an opposition to a state imagined as a conspiratorial conglomerate. Existing exterior to the state, the nomad war machine tends towards

destratification, transversality, and becoming—emerging from creative assemblages rather than established patterns of thought. Though the relationship between war and the state is their central object of analysis, the war machine is not bound to war—it deterritorializes any hierarchies, whether they be in games, music, science, or labor, to name a few examples that Deleuze and Guattari discuss. In other words, the social formations defined as exterior to the state can vary significantly in terms of structure (bands, packs, secret societies, criminal organizations, terrorist groups) and in terms of the components that they engage with (economic, military, technical, scientific, philosophical, poetic).

The state and the war machine are originary as abstract poles between which state and nomad assemblages form. However, the war machine was invented by nomads exterior to the state by definition. From the linkage between nomads and the war machine, Deleuze and Guattari establish that the war machine has three aspects: "a spatiogeographic aspect, an arithmetic or algebraic aspect, and an affective aspect" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 380). There is a spatial movement, a regrouping of singularities into multiplicities, and the production of intensity. Thinking through these three aspects, they articulate a difference between migrants and nomads through a distinction between movement and speed, or intensity and extension.

This distinction becomes especially important when considering the circuit-like movements between towns associated with tinkers, who were criminalized in part because they were seen as speeders rather than movers. The nomad speeds, while the migrant moves:

> The nomad is not the same as the migrant; for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen, or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual necessity; in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory. (*A Thousand Plateaus* 380)

The result of the speed of the nomad is that space is never taken up, or otherwise distributed, parceled out, or enclosed. The relationship of the nomad to the space, instead, arises from conditions that are exterior to the nomad (geography, resources, social and ecological events) instead of from conditions interior to the migrant (laws, boundaries, checkpoints, currency, passports).

This type of exterior velocity associated with nomadism is found in the character description of a tinker in *The Overburian Characters*, in which the tinker's movement, humoral intensity, musical capacity, and metallurgy all align with Deleuze and Guattari's nomadism:

> A tinker is a moveable: for hee hath no abiding place; by his motion hee gathers heate, thence his cholericke nature. He seems to be very devoute, for his life is a continuall Pilgrimage, and sometimes in humilitie goes barefoote, therein making necessitie a virtue. His house is as ancient as *Tubal-Caines*, and so is a runagate by antiquity: yet he proves himself a Galiant, for he carries all his wealth on his backe; or a Philosopher, for he beares all his substance about him. From his Art was Musicke first invented, and therfore is hee always furnisht with a song; to which his hammer keeping tune, proves that he was the first found of the Kettle-drumme. Note that where the best Ale is, there stands his musick most upon crotchets. The companion of his travels is some foule sunne-burnt queane, that since the terrible Statute recanted Gypsisme, and is turned Pedleresse. So marches he all over England with his bag and baggage. His conversation is unreproveable; for he is ever mending. Hee observes truly the Statutes, and therefore hee had rather steale then begge, in which he is unremoveably constant in spight of whips or imprisonment: and so strong an enemie to idleness, that in mending one hole, he had rather make three then want worke; and when he hath done, he throwes the Wallet of his

> faults behind him. Hee imbraceth naturally auncient customes, conversing in open fields, and lowly Cottages. If he visit Cities or Townes, tis but to deale upon the imperfections of our weaker vesselles. His tongue is very voluble, which with Canting proves him a *Linguist*. He is entertain'd in every place, but enters no further then the dore, to avoid suspicion. Some would take him to be a Coward; but believe it, he is a Ladde of mettle, his valour is commonly three or foure yeards long, fastned to a pike in the end for flying off. He is very provident, for he will fight but with one at once, and then also he had rather submit then bee counted obstinate. To conclude, if he scape Tiburne and Banbury, he dyes a begger. (Overbury 34-5)[17]

The descriptions of the tinker as "moveable," "on a continuall Pilgrimage," "marches all over England," as on who "throwes the Wallet of his faults," "conversing in open fields and lowly cottages," all suggest a figure of velocity rather than movement in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari define it. He is already exterior to the state due to his perpetual motion, disruption of traders and households, and his frustration of law enforcement.

The humoral diagnosis also casts the figure of the tinker Cocke describes as one of intensity whose movement generates a choleric affect. The point here is not the satiric diagnosis, but rather that there is an association established between placeless movement, heat, and anger that puts Cocke's tinker in relation with speed and affect rather than movement or feeling. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish velocity from movement by claiming that "movement is extensive; speed is intensive" (*Thousand Plateaus* 381). Movement requires a going from place to place that assumes a topography pre-defined through law and architecture. It also requires a body to be singularly defined: a singular and inscribed body moving from cartographic point to cartographic point. Speed, on the other hand, does not require movement or singular bodies.

[17] "A Tinker" was added in the sixth edition (1615) (Paylor, xxi-xxii.n3 and 123)

Instead, it springs up as a relation between assemblages of parts and is always in the midst of a heterogeneous process: the nomad may slow to a standstill but never arrives at any destination. Deleuze and Guattari mention that one can travel without movement following non-geographical paths such as spiritual voyages which are "effected without relative movement, but in intensity, in one place: these are part of nomadism" (381). The movement of Cocke's tinker produces heat without arriving anywhere. Within an early modern humoral cosmology, this puts the tinker into position of excess and imbalance-- generating disturbance in perpetuity.

The tinker's work, also, does not produce results. Rather, he creates more opportunities for "mending" by boring more holes into the pots and pans that he is supposed to fix. Beier writes that "Having a tinker do a job was, again, rather like a bribe to go away" (*Masterless Men* 90). This type of "work" is not captured by the state and generally evades record as well as regulation. Deleuze and Guattari write that "For there to be work, there must be capture of activity by the State apparatus, and semiotization of writing" (*Thousand Plateaus* 401).[18] Alphonso Lingis elaborates that along with a spatial capture, work also requires a temporal one. Work "extends, circumscribes, and delimits a zone of time. The future is articulated as a field of possibilities, the past as a field of resources retained in the know-how and skills" (*Dangerous Emotions* 119). The tinker is both productive and unproductive because the work that is done is not in the interest of accomplishing a set task, but in the interest of producing an affect that is emergent but not circumscribed or extended-- a qualitative change that shifts relations (the tinker earns more money, becomes surly, breaks out in song, steals) and generally figures out the best ways to occupy a space. Each of these events are singularities rather than repeated patterns—

[18] We can find echoes of their sentiments in Giorgio Agamben as well as Virno in their treatment of virtuosity and biopolitics. On work, virtuosity, and excess in relation to Agamben and Virno, see especially Julia Lupton's "Animal Husbands in *The Taming of the Shrew"* found in *Thinking with Shakespeare*. There she explores the entanglement of human, animal, object resources—arguing for their productive potential.

gesturing towards the hesitation that both Cocke and Thomas Harman have about casting the tinker as worker or vagrant.[19]

Finally, in Cocke's description, the lineage of his occupations and of his dwelling, which is a non-place, also point to the tinker's nomadism. His dwelling is "as ancient as *Tubal-Caines*" who was a descendant of Cain and reputed to be the first blacksmith and whose step-brother, Jubal-Cain, was supposed to be the father of those who played musical instruments (Overbury 123). The tinker's imagined lineage of blacksmiths and music-makers is reinforced by Cocke's assertion that "From his Art was Musicke first invented, and therefore is hee alwaies furnisht with a song." Music and tinkers are synonymous and, more interestingly, the tinker's music is deviant itself. Cocke continues, "Note that where the best Ale is, there stands his musick most upon crotchets," punning on the double meaning of "crotchet" as both a quarter note and a perverse belief or thought alongside the potential malapropism between crotchet and crutch. Belief and thought here are deviant and co-emergent with music and smithing, which, like the useless production of heat, are perpetually becoming and mobilizing. The tinker thinks not through the proper or from a singular image, but rather through deviation and exterior conditions that govern his tinking, drinking, and thinking.

Much as we saw that the tinker does not work but enters into a relationship with the space to produce emergent affects, both metallurgy and music require a continuous development of form and variability of matter. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> If metallurgy has an essential relation with music, it is by virtue not only of the sounds of the forge but also of the tendency within both arts to bring into its own, beyond separate forms, a continuous development of form, and beyond variable matters, a continuous variation of matter: a widened chromaticism sustains both music and metallurgy: the

[19] See Carroll on Harman 161

> musical smith was the first "transformer." In short, what metal and metallurgy bring to light is a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that doubtless exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable, dissociated by the hylomorphic model. Metallurgy is the consciousness or thought of the matter-flow, and metal the correlate of this consciousness. (*A Thousand Plateaus* 411).

Both music and metallurgy arise from relations, in so far as music is created through the resonance between one note and another, and metals are excavated and shaped by following the lines of a mountain and by the trifold relations between metal as matter, heat, and cold. The connections between music, metal, and the exterior conditions that govern their transformations independent of each other speak to the material vitalism discussed, which is merely a different way of conceptualizing matter. That is, matter becomes transformable and more difficult to commodify—not following a clear path of development or easily becoming enclosed. While the tinker is certainly not the miner who follows veins of metal through mountains as he sings a tune to the beat of the hammer, the tinker follows markets, taverns, and households from one unmended pot to another, tinking out songs as products of her exterior conditions.

Two main points emerge in the analogy established between nomads and tinkers. First, as a consequence of his nomadism, the tinker has a formal relationship with history. That is, his history is a history of faculties or potentials that historicize rather than make history. As we will see in the next section, the tinker's genealogy is a list of capacities to do rather than a list of specific things already done. Second, the tinker does not belong to either the striated space of the state nor the smooth space of the pure nomad. Instead, the tinker inhabits the holey space of the miner or blacksmith, which tunnels underneath both the space of official and deviant territories. If the blacksmith follows line of metal underground to mine ingots and produce them into

weapons, the tinker bores into kitchen utensils and is able to penetrate into homes and towns as well as criminal and vagabond societies.

The tinker is a kind of musical smith that acts as a "transformer" of relations, easily moving between cities and towns and ever-mending both pots and his own language. The parallels between Cocke's satirical description of a tinker and Deleuze and Guattari's description of a nomad are superficial, but they also offer insight into the potential function of a tinker character as one that disturbs or challenges established systems of thinking, narrativizing, and doing. He is a figure that is exterior to both an imagined criminal community and an imagined state community, deterritorializng both as he marches "all over England with his bag and baggage." This type of deterritorialization actually disrupts territorial boundaries just as it opposes a proper cultural memory that supports those boundaries, whether physical, ideational, emotional, or institutional.

Geographies, Historical Lists, and Plague Time

Though tinkers are exterior to and disruptive of boundaries, they nevertheless possess a kind of history. Tinkers arrive with a lineage. For instance, in the *Tinker of Turvey* Trotter the tinker announces himself with a "tinck, tinck, tinck, tinck, tinck" and offers a type of history:

> Many a countrey have I bestrided, many a towne trotted over, in many a durty faire bin drunk, many a tinker's trull have I bum-fidled, and left the knave her walking mate, snoring on an alebench. Many a paire of greasie cards have I toss'd over at trump, by a toasting sea-cole fire from morning to night; my curre at my feet, my drab by my side; and shall I not now bee admitted to gabble in tincker's rhetoricke,(*Tara-ring-tinck*?). (Halliwell,B2)

In *The Wonderfull Yeare*, Dekker offers an enumeration of his "devout" tinker:

> No, this was a deuout Tinker, he did honor God *Pan*: a Musicall Tinker, that vpon his kettle-drum could play any Countrey dance you cald for, and vpon Holly-dayes had earned money by it, when no Fidler could be heard of. Hee was onely feared when he stalked through some townes where Bees were, for he struck so sweetely on the bottome of his Copper instrument, that he would emptie whole Hiues, and lead the swarmes after him only by the sound. (Dekker)

In *The Taming of the Shrew* Christopher Sly defends himself from the hostess's accusation, "The slys are no rogues. Look in the Chronicles—we came in with Richard Conqueror, therefore *paucaus palabras*, let the world slide" (Induction 1. 3-5). In the second induction, he questions his newly acquired fortune, "Am I not Christopher Sly—old Sly's son of Burton Heath, by birth a pedlar, by education a cardmaker, by transmutation a bearherd, and now by present profession a tinker?" (Induction 2. 15-20).

Both in the *Tinker of Turvey* and in *The Wonderfull Yeare*, the kind of histories that the tinkers are introduced with are lists of activities that are placeless and sometimes fantastical. Unlike a history or a genealogy that maps out a lineage of people and events, the tinkers' lists are somewhat arbitrary and have the potential to continue on forever. They have a baroque quality that makes tinkers appear to be a collection of faculties and events rather than a clear identity or role. The listing of events gestures towards the tinker's lack of classification, whether that lack of classification is due to a lack of knowledge about vagrants or the tinker's unique status as in-between deviancy and non-deviancy. The tinker's list engages the imagination and facilitates a resonance between the various events to engage a historicizing process through a remixing of the various faculties offered. In other words, the lists themselves have a kind of velocity that compels an assembly of history rather than an authority of history.

Christopher Sly seems to be an exception. He attempts to tie himself to a clear lineage of Richard the Conqueror, as well as to his father, Burton Heath, and his list is almost a type of curriculum vitae of tenuously official and accepted professions. However, as Carroll writes, the list of professions that Sly offers follows a "low arc" and is also somewhat traceable to the enclosure of public lands (Carol 163). In other words, his history remains one of vagrancy and as a relation that is exterior to the state. He appropriates and misuses facts to create historical malapropisms that raise questions rather than offer answers.

This history differs from the type of history that enforces clear narratives. Instead, it is a becoming of history, which though unverifiable and unrecorded nevertheless gives tinker characters the power of the past in potentia. Deleuze and Guattari write that "It is true that nomads have no history: they only have a geography," insofar as history is a product of the state and requires coding and inscription (*Thousand Plateaus* 393). It is not that nomads have no history, it is that their history is not sedentary. It does not establish fixed structures—architectural or ideational—that obliterate the exploration and tracing of geographical lines in favor of establishing control over a territory. Instead, it is a history of becoming itself. Brian Massumi summarizes the distinction between sedentary history and nomadic history as a difference between the history of becoming and the becoming of history:

> History is inseparably, ontogenetically different from becoming. But if feedback from the dimension of the emerged re-conditions the conditions of emergence, then it also has to be recognized that conditions of emergence change. Emergence emerges. Change changes. If history has a becoming from which it is inseparably, ontogenetically different, then conversely becoming has a history. (Massumi 9)

Massumi's elegant if quirky explanation gestures towards the idea that history is both a system of measure as a marker of time (history) and in a continual flux (history as geography) as it interacts with the flux of materiality that it measures and vice versa. His banal aphorism that "change changes" leads not only to conclusions about the instability of perspectival experience but more drastically to the idea that being can never be shared or stable.

The tinker's lists do not mark historical time. They list a series of events that coexist and serve as a simultaneous series of both potentials and characteristics that the tinker can re-mix at any time to his advantage. For instance, the tinker of Turvey has been to many a fair, many a town, and played with many a pair of greasy cards. Rather than translating the series of events into a succession, such that the tinker hails from such and such place and has such and such profession, the events continue as a multiplicity and as a past potential. They are never fixed and are potentially modified by each successive event. They speak to the tinker's capacity to do in general rather than to work towards and from an intended locus.

The tinker's history is always becoming. Becoming is elaborated diversely throughout Deleuze's oeuvre, but the connective thread throughout is that becoming describes the production of difference. Rather than the more traditional understanding of becoming in which there is a change that occurs between a starting point and an end point (we can think here Deleuze and Guattari's description of migratory movement or a view of a history that begins and ends and within which can be traced a transformation), Deleuze conceptualizes becoming as the change or difference among variable parts (the combination of fictional accounts of and historical facts about criminality constitute a variable "becoming-criminal").

We can see the relationships between history, geography, and becoming play out in Dekker's *The Wonderful Year*, in which the tinker is able to continue productively speeding

through space and time despite the incursion of plague time and the end of history. In *The Wonderful Year,* a sometimes whimsical chronicling of 1603, the year of Elizabeth I's death and one of the worst plagues to hit London, Dekker recounts a story of a "devout" tinker that saves a suburban bar from a plagued corpse. The tinker, as a nomadic figure, facilitates the production of time in a story in which time has stopped. Action occurs at the horizon of the end of history in so far as the plague signals the breaking down of established codes such as lineage, property, law, custom, and tradition through which history is made. Dekker begins the story with a tapster whose bar is possibly about to become plagued:

> The Host has bene a made Greeke, (mary he could now speake nothing but English,) a goodly fat Burger he was, with a belly Arching out like a Beere-barrell, which made his legges (that were thicke & short, like two piles driuen vnder *London*-bridge) to stadle halfe as wide as the toppe of Powles, which vpon my knowledge hath bene burnt twice or thrise. A leatherne pouch hung at his side, that opened and shut with a Snap-hance, and was indeed a flaske for gun-powder when King *Henry* went to *Bulloigne*. An antiuqary might haue pickt rare matter out of his Nose, but that it was worme-eaten (yet that proued it to be an auncient Nose). (Dekker)

The tapster is rhetorically tied to London, the history of England, and the antiquarian. Dekker is of course mocking the tapster, but the jibes articulate a character who is historical: ancient and rooted in the continuity of London and England. Indeed, he comically embodies a deep-rooted history. His legs are like the pylons of the London bridge, his nose is ancient, and he has a flask from Bulloigne.

However, once the Londoner arrives and drops dead at the bar, time stops for the tapster and he becomes quarantined—the whole town both sympathizing and rising up against him:

> At length the Towne was raised, the Countrey came downe vpon him, and yet not vpon him neither, for after they vnderstood the Tragedie, euery man gaue ground, knowing my pursie Alecunner could not follow them: what is to be done in this strange Allarum? The whole village is in daunger to liye at the mercy of God, and shall be bound to curse none, but him for it: they should do well therefore, to set fire on his house, before the Plague scape out of it…(Dekker)

The townsfolk decide to offer a reward of forty shillings to anyone willing to move the body, but even currency ceases to function regularly once the plague arrives and the people self-impose a quarantine:

> This was proclaimed, but none durst appeare to vndertake the dreadfull execution: the loued money well, mary the plague hanging ouer any mans head that should meddle with it in that sort, they all vowed to dye beggers before it should be Chronicled they kild themselues for forty shillings: and in that braue resolution, euery one with bagge & baggage marcht home, baricadoing their doors & windows with firbushes, ferne, and bundels of straw to keepe out pestilence at the staues end. (Dekker)

Discussing the plague and the city in London, Ian Munro suggests that "in plague time London ceases to exist" (Munro 177). The same can be said of Dekker's town, in which all circulation: physical, economic, narrative, and temporal becomes subsumed by the arrival of the plague.

Munro goes on to argue that "The rhetoric of the city and the rhetoric of the plague merge, due to their overlapping themes: circulation, uncontrollability, and inexplicable growth. With this merging, the idea of the city, the city as understood through its literature or its bodies, cannot be separated from the idea of the plague" (Munro 191). History is dissolved during plague time, and the plague ends controlled circulation, initiating a series of events and lines of flight

that undermine organization of any kind—creating a flat time in which anyone can come out on top, as perhaps most directly portrayed in Ben Jonson's *The Alchemist*. Plague time is an infectious time itself, which marks a point at which historical continuity ends in so far as it becomes subsumed by plague. The host must give up his bar and perhaps his life, no one will come near him, and his London legs and King Henry flask go down with him. In plague time, only the plague repeats, producing more of the same.

Nevertheless, the tinker arrives to the town seemingly immune to the physical, social, temporal, and spatial effects of the plague. Though Dekker's tinker is "devout," he fits each of the tropes of tinkers already discussed. He is nomadic, "At last a Tinker came sounding through the Towne, mine Hosts house being the auncient watring place where he did vse to cast Anchor," passing through locations but never arriving. He is musical, "he did honor God *Pan*: a Musicall Tinker, that vpon his kettle-drum could play any Countrey dance you cald for;" he is associated with bars, stopping at this particular one; and he is able to manipulate circumstances in unique ways—almost mystically, in this case: "Hee was only feared when he stalked through some townes where Bees were, for he struck so sweetely on the bottome of his Copper instrument, that he would emptie whole Hiues, and leade the swarmes after him only by the sound." With his music, he is able to tame bees—magically reorganizing chains of communication and opening up new human-non-human alliances.

The tinker, oblivious to what has happened, sits down to drink, and when told to "goe and see if hee knew him [the Londoner], cries out that "he feares no plagues." He is offered a single crown to move the body, but negotiates for ten shillings, and the townspeople happily agree, thinking they have saved the town and thirty shillings. The tinker takes the body, and upon robbing the Londoner of his clothes, discovers seven pounds in the Londoner's pocket and cries

out to the townspeople, “Haue yee any more Londoners to bury, hew downe a downe dery, haue ye any more Londners to bury,” but the townspeople runaway, “the hobbinols running away from him, as if he had beene the dead Citizens ghost, & he marching away from them in all the hast he could, with the song still in his mouth.”

The potential and the effects of the plague can be readily made sense of, but the cause, origin, order, and locus are all mobile, engendering what Munro describes as “a buzzing swarm.” The outcome, at least in Dekker’s *The Wonderful Year* is that “there is a movement back and forth between these two levels of representation, between ‘pictures’ and ‘tales’” (Munro 184). Munro links pictures and tales to Michel de Certeau’s conceptual image of the panoramic city and city walkers spatial practices and argues that “Plague as theater operates on the level of the panoramic city, showing a fiction of unity and horrific purpose. Plague as circulation or narrative opposes these encompassing structures of urban significance” (Munro 183-4). Munro cites Dekker’s description of the plague as a “stalking Tamberlaine” as evidence of the plague’s duel representation as both abstract and particular. “We are caught between seeing the plague’s suburban slaughter as like that of the actual Tamburlaine in other cities,” Munro writes, “or seeing it as a making-real of a theatrical representation actually present in this specific location” (Munro 180). The plague becomes both past fact and abstract past made present, a nightmare that comes to haunt again.

In the tinker tale, both plague-picture and plague-tale coexist once the plagued-Londoner becomes a plagued-corpse. In Dekker’s description, the possibility of the plague sets off a predictable chain reaction that acts *as-if* the plague is already present. The tapster knows that if he does not find a solution, his bar will be burned down. The people know to board up all of their houses and to keep away from the body. The potential of the plague is confused with the

plague—a point that both Antonin Artaud cites in his work on the plague, and Munro affirms as a trope in early modern plague literature. The confusion between the potential of past plagues and the actuality of past plagues produces a "spectacle," in line with Munro's analysis of the oscillation between theatricality and narrative in plague literature.

The tinker arrives on the scene immune to the potential plague suddenly made spectacular. He also arrives with his own nomadic history, which is a history of potentials—not vestiges of events, but skills (both realistic and fantastical) that give credence to his survival: drinking, playing, and hypnotizing bees. Upon his arrival, the tinker asks for a draught, is told the story of the Londoner, and goes in to inspect the body.

> The excellent egregious Tinker calls for his draught (being a double Iugge) it was fild for him, but before it came to his nose, the lamentable tale of the Londoner was tolde, the Chamber-doore (where hee lay) being thrust open with a long pole, (because none durst touch it with their hands) and the Tinker bidden (if he had the heart) to goe and see if hee knew him. The Tinker being not to learne what virtue the medicine had which hee held at his lippes powred it downe his throate merily, and crying trilill, he feares no plagues.

The tinker is portrayed as careless, and though he is aware of the plague, he does not fear it. In fact, he sees it as an opportunity, much like Ben Jonson's characters in *The Alchemist*, to make a profit. Once he buries the body, he not only receives payment from the villagers, but also acquires seven pounds and some fancy clothes in the bargain. And as he leaves the town, crying, "Haue ye any more Londoners to bury," the citizens run away from him "as if he had beene the dead Citizens ghost." As a potential ghost, the tinker himself becomes the conductor of a spectacular history as if he is the dead Londoner come back to haunt the townspeople.

What is special about the tinker that he is able to act with a disregard for propriety and history as embodied by the tapster and the actions of the townspeople? What allows the tinker to continue circulation and to cut through the self-imposed segmentation and discipline initiated by the townspeople in response to the plague? The tinker does not get trapped in plague time because the tinker's relationship to history, which plague time disrupts, is already a relationship with the process of historicizing rather than history itself. The tinker does not attend to propriety or confuse the potential past with the actual past, because the tinker actualizes events as they emerge. He acts in relation to the past as a whole—the various skills he has and doesn't have—in order to negotiate his present situation. Like an actor, he anticipates action based on an evaluation of relationships rather than outcomes. The townspeople, on the other hand, act according to outcomes because they have a stake in and depend on the stability of history as well as the stability of their homes, town, state, and world.

The tinker's relationship with history as potential is correlated with his ability to continue circulating geographically, economically, narratively, and theatrically exterior to the state, or in this case, the town. He is able to move across boundaries because he does not move from one particular point to another, rather, his movement is a circulation through which he precipitates affects. He moves through the town, he uses the Londoner as a vehicle to riches, he drinks the beer that was poured for him and pokes at the dead body without fear. Undefined by any one location or identity, he adapts to each situation without ceasing or stifling the circulation of potential. Without a hierarchical relation to temporality, he has no clear line for plague time to disrupt. Thus, he is able to maintain a temporal continuity through a series of potential acts that are not singularly defined by any one past act or quality.

After the tinker strips and buries he Londoner's body, he emerges as-if an apparition for the townspeople. The townspeople define the temporality historically through the primacy of the future and finitude and see the tinker as a walking corpse because he has engaged with the plague-body. Much as the potential of the plague is confused with the actuality of the plague by the townspeople, the townspeople confuse the tinker with the corpse, assuming that the past of the Londoner must be repeated in the future of the tinker. He is able to act in a time out of joint because he, as a figure, is exterior to a properly historical time. For the townspeople, he is in a time out of joint, a ghost, someone that is misplaced and disoriented, but he continues on his way galvanizing Dekker's narrative.

Shakespeare's Tinker

Dekker's townspeople are inhibited by the history of past plagues and the spectacle of that history. They spring into action reactively and automatically, foreclosing all possibilities of action except for those that lead towards the death. They face the choice of either dying themselves or killing the tapster, thus supporting the Heideggerian and Baudrillardian theses that history tends towards death. The tinker, on the other hand, sees the potential within the arrival of the plague and the potential within the memory and history of the plague. He is able to exploit the stagnation of the townspeople's time and pivot the potential of the plague through the application of his own faculties.

There are at least three types of time at work: historical time, plague time, and tinker time. Historical time stops in the face of plague time and tinker time jumpstarts both: giving a historical trajectory back to the townspeople and infusing eventuality into plague time. The question that this tripartite relation of time raises is how does history continue once it has

stopped and all time has begun to tends towards a blackhole of death. This is the question that Virno takes up in his *Déjà vu and the End of History*.

Virno's project is an exploration of the conjunction of a theory of memory and a philosophy of history—navigating through individual mnestic processes and pure memory as form or potential. Any form of experience is always doubly and simultaneously sensed through the perception of the present and the remembering of the present. The first corresponds to the actual and the second to the virtual--what Virno alternately refers to as form, faculty, and potential. Launching from Bergson's work on the virtual, Virno distinguishes between the *form* and *content* of the past and argues for their contemporaneity.

For Bergson, an event becomes possible only when it is realized. The actual and virtual coexists in so far as the possible is merely the actual subtracted from the real (where real is both virtual and actual): "As reality is created, its image is reflected behind it into the indefinite past; thus it finds that it has from all time been possible, but it is at that moment that it begins to have been always possible" (ch. 1, sec. 3 Virno). Déjà vu, Virno argues, is the experience of the virtual and actual at the same time, even as the virtual past, or the past form is often confused for the past content of an actual past: one that has actually taken place. What is revealed by this confusion is that the virtual and the actual coexist. The coexistence of the virtual and actual, for Virno, is the condition of history. Put otherwise, history happens because every present is infused with all of the past-in-general, which carries potential into the present. The capacity to do and to create is never exhausted: there is always a new performance, a new speech-act, a new interpretation, a new assemblage that expands the possibility of the past as it contracts the present into the performance of the moment.

This is possible only because memory and perception are different in kind. Memory, in this case, is not merely a recording of perception, but is instead the faculty to perceive. Virno writes:

> The past-in-general accompanies every actuality like an aura—without, though, itself having ever been actual. It is, therefore, the pure form of actuality that is here at work. It is an a priori form, with the capacity to subordinate any experience whatsoever to itself: not just that which has already been, but also current experience and what is now to come. We ought to recognize that a representation can bear the mark of the past independently of what it represents. (ch. 1, sec. 4 Virno)

His argumentation moves along similar lines as the ones posed by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* in which Deleuze says that pure memory is the ground of the contraction of the present. That is, the present selects events, but the capacity for selection is always a simultaneous past as potential. We can also see lines of connection between Virno's mark of the past and Derrida's trace, which hints at a logic of rupture between the physical and metaphysical and highlights that origins are always deferred backwards and forwards across dualities.

Faculty exists in the past in general and "precisely because it exists as a past-in-general (one that has never been present), the faculty is not comparable, and still less reducible, to the concomitant performance" (ch. 1, sec. 6 Virno). Potential is never exhausted. Nevertheless, the experience of déjà vu is the experience of anachronism and can take the form of formal anachronism, or the potential memory of the present, and real anachronism, or the false recognition of content.

Usually, when we consider déjà vu, we think of the latter definition. First developed out of Freud's concept of the uncanny in the 19th century, this form of déjà vu is the feeling that

something presently occurring has already occurred at least once already, and the experience is being relived doubly from a reflexive past and a passing present: the spelling of an unfamiliar word suddenly seems strange, a room that one as never entered before seems profoundly familiar. This type of déjà vu is felt at the end of history, when everything seems as if it has already happened: the twenty-four-hour news cycle creates a feeling of dread in which every new story is a regurgitation of some past event, or a new plague feels like the repetition of every plague that came before it, or action seems pre-scripted. The repetition is not localizable to a specific event, but rather it is a feeling of repetition-in-general that is falsely assigned to a spectacular past that seems as if it already occurred.

In *The Taming of the Shrew*, the Lord orchestrates a spectacular history in order to trick the tinker Christopher Sly into experiencing this type of déjà vu and discipline his historicization. He attempts to convince Sly that he was always a Lord. The Lord effectively captures the nomadic qualities of theatricality and its transversal power in order to re-inscribe Sly into a hierarchy of family, profession, and state. In order to create the spectacle, he has to infuse his performance with enough potential through the manipulation of memory and history to generate a world in which Sly can forget himself.

The Lord draws on various vestiges of official culture from canine taming to proper music and mythology and attempts to make Sly a part of history by creating the appropriate conditions for Sly to historicize himself—to see himself as a part of history rather than as a character with a kind of history: a list of past experiences, an imagined lineage, a geography. The goal of the Lord is to ridicule Sly, but in doing so, to also civilize Sly and make him part of history, through a self-forgetting of his uncivil self. The Lord orchestrates two spectacular histories, one in order to transform Sly and the other for Sly to watch. These two spectacular

histories are related and resonate with one another: the first capturing Sly's memory and the second capturing his faculty to remember differently. Yet, Sly's transformation is aesthetic and incomplete; he retains some of his subjectivity and tinker-time—taking advantage of his new circumstances and basking in their pleasures.

Once the Lord happens upon Sly, the Lord identifies him as inhuman, as a swine without the capacity to reason or persist in civil society and the proper trajectory of history. For him, Sly's beastliness suggests an automatism without any recognizable faculty or potential. He confuses his exteriority to hierarchy and organization with an exteriority to the category of human itself, which, for the Lord, is necessarily institutional; beastly natures are to be tamed by the proper practice of music, gastronomy, hunting, mythology, visual art, fashion, and manners. Each art requires not only a binding of the self to well-timed action and a repetition of established principles, but also an engagement with cultural institutions that support these various arts: textile industries, enclosure laws, courtly codes, kennels, workshops, hierarchies of education and apprenticeship, methods of identification, and so on.

The Lord formulates a plan to get Sly to forget himself and, in the process, remember a new self through a re-membering, or reassembly of official practices. He asks:

> What think you, if he were conveyed to bed,
> Wrapped in sweet clothes, rings put upon his fingers,
> A most delicious banquet by his bed
> And brave attendants near him when he wakes,
> Would not the beggar forget himself? (Induction 1.36-40).

The First Huntsman responds to the Lord affirmatively, "Believe me, lord, I think he cannot choose," reinforcing the Lord's hypothesis that he can exert control over Sly's identity and

subjectivity (Induction 1.41). The Lord uses the type of spectacular past to take away his historicizing potential by replacing it with an imagined history in which Sly has limited agency to effect change. The Lord employs actors to convince Sly that he has always been a noble and that his waking life had been a dream. "These fifteen years you have been in a dream," the second servant says, "Or when you waked, so waked as if you slept" (Induction 2. 77-8). His past returns as purely spectacular and recognizably false. The real answer to the Lord's question, however, is that Sly does not fully forget himself. He defends his tinker-ness through memories of his material conditions and less obviously through his own capacity to perform.

Garret Sullivan argues that Sly's self-forgetting as a "winking adoption of a role he realizes will not last forever" performs a transformation from an unstable social position to a stable one defined in terms of "identity formation through emplacement into a social network and a world of opulent goods" (Sullivan 18). In Reynold's terms, he is placed into official territory through a self-forgetting. Yet, this type of self-forgetting, Sullivan continues, does not produce the usual staging of subjectivity found in other moments of mnestic crisis in Shakespeare's other works such as *Hamlet* or *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Instead, Sly trades in one identity for another and the subjectivity evinced is only elliptical. Along similar lines, Gail Kern Paster argues that the spectacle orchestrated by the Lord is meant to create a humoral taming through forgetting—a medical practice that was used by early moderns.[20] She points to the fact that the self-forgetting that the Lord is attempting to orchestrate is paradoxical since Sly has already drunken himself into forgetfulness. The second forgetting is meant to physically alter Sly's humoral composure, thus giving him a new internal subjectivity and external identity.

In both cases, forgetting occurs through a manipulation of external elements that directly affect Sly's physical rather than psychological or metaphysical condition. Whether proprietary or

[20] See *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage*, pp. 125-27.

humoral, the Lord's strategy is less to make Sly forget, and more to replace his faculties to remember and forget with spectacular content. Sly's forgetting depends on a kind of remembering that aims to make memory itself an object of discipline and hinge on a reinscription of Sly into official history. Sly, however, maintains his nomadic tinker-time and does not fully forget himself. It is, in fact, his capacity to see potential in spectacle that does not fully put him under the Lord's power.

Sly's confusion upon waking up from his stupor can be understood as a type of orchestrated déjà vu. He mistakes the spectacular past that has been created for him as his past in general that allows him to act creatively in the world through his various acquired trades and deceptions. He is encouraged to confuse his potential to be noble with an actual nobility, "Call home thy ancient thoughts from banishment" and his dreams with his waking life (Induction 2.29). The past literally becomes a spectacle put on by the Lord as a game, or a kind of history, and is filled in with the events of his life as events of his dream so that Sly can grab on to fragments of his lived memory to justify his current position. Sly is compelled to remember his imagined past, but it is renamed to be dream-like rather than lived and brimming with potential. He is ensnared in a spectacle of the past—a kind of déjà vu.

The orchestration of déjà vu depends upon a manipulation of time through language. When the potential "back then" or "once upon a time" becomes confused with a particular past, made accessible by an overabundance of memory, déjà vu becomes defined as a false recognition of a general past as a particular one. The Lord's main tool of deception is a lie about Sly's experience and perception of time. By making Sly's past seem like a dream, he eases Sly into his staged reality. Sly only begins to doubt his memory when he is told that he has been asleep for fifteen years, meaning that his previous pretensions to claiming the imagined

entourage of “Richard the Conquerer” as ancestors are real. The Lord takes up the unmoored and imagined history of Sly and attempts to make it seem real. He works to confuse Sly’s general past, or potential past, of nobility with an actual past of nobility, “Call home thy ancient thoughts from banishment,” and his dreams with his waking life (Induction 2.29).

For Sly, history is a set of dates that can be, however unsuccessfully, appropriated and remixed at will in order to speed up, slow down, or confuse time: to delay payment, accelerate respect, and garner prestige through confusion. The past is deployed spectacularly by Sly insofar as it is thought as concrete regardless of whether it corresponds to an event. At the same time, his own genealogy, given as defense to his noble predicament, is a genealogy of potentials—of things that he can do and places he has been. The combination of spectacular pasts and Sly’s relation to potential makes Sly a kind of figure of forgetting already. Yet, Sly’s forgetting is a creative one. He forgets history, but creates new histories, however ineffectively, from within his circumstances—drawing on the potential of history rather than on the facts of history.

Consistent with his role as a tinker, Sly remains keen on taking advantage of the situation and acting on the potential of the situation rather than in the actual situation. Upon seeing his “wife,” he orders her to bed and she must entreat him to think of his health. Similarly, he comfortably accepts the players to put on their play-within-a-play and “let the world slip”, and changes his speech from prose to verse (Induction 2. 139). He is also easily accepting of his new position as Lord, and contentedly falls asleep only to be woken up during the end of act one, scene one. Sly does not mind taking advantage of his newly found position, nor does he suddenly become lord-like. Sly’s complacency might give evidence to the success of the Lord’s trick, but it also gestures to Sly’s complicity in the performance, so far as he continues to perform, which suggests that the trick is not wholly successful. The past comes back to Sly as potential rather

than as fact and disrupts the Lord's plan for Sly's teleological transformation. For him, History is always "a kind of history" that does not blanche at destabilization and disorganization.

For Virno, historicizing occurs at the conjunction of the potential and the real. We can also think of historicizing as a type of becoming, that is a becoming-historical that reformulates the relations between the pure past and the present. The pure past, or the past-in-general, for Virno, however takes very specific forms: language and labor. He writes,

> And language is, in itself, the purely previous, and indeterminate other-then. The language faculty is the never present back then to which what I now utter can always look back. Language is the past-in-general of acts of speaking, the linguistic competence also goes—and to some extent—for whatever other faculty. The potential of the intellect, the simple disposition towards thought, is the passe indefini: within which all single intellectual faculties are inscribed. (ch. 1, sec 5. Virno)

Language, here, is an apt example because language does not "exist" in anyone or anywhere, nor does it cease to exist when no one is speaking, reading, or writing. Rather, language is pure potential, in an indefinite past, and every utterance reformulates the relation to that potential, shifting meaning, intensity, and possibility of everything that had been, has been, and will have been spoken. In the moment of déjà vu, when there is a reflexivity to the words one engages with—an unfamiliar feeling of a familiar word, an evaluation of an event as it occurs—the potential, or the capacity to make meaning (in the case of language) perceptibly coexists with meaning making and makes evident the becoming of history.

Sly's capacity to continue historicizing rests less on his linguistic capacity and more on his capacity to labor, even if unproductively. His assertion of his tinker-ness as evidence of elliptical subjectivities draws on his faculty to adapt and engage in becomings within any

situation without necessarily taking on any one identity, role, or subjectivity. Kate's maneuvering within her disciplinary environment also depends, to some degree on labor, as Julia Lupton asserts in her argument for Kate's somewhat hidden labor of hospitality.[21] Yet, Kate's capacity to continue to historicize and engage with her faculties rests much more significantly on her recognition of the potential of language rather than labor.

Like the Lord who attempts to "tame" Sly, Petruccio attempts to make time spectacular in order to "tame" Kate. Also, like the Lord, he first attempts to create spectacle. Unlike the Lord, he spectacularizes nomadic exteriority instead of creating a mobile memory of courtly opulence. The first spectacle that Petruccio puts on is his arrival at the wedding dressed in a mishmash of anachronistic and tattered clothes. Biondello announces Petruccio's arrival:

> Why, Petruccio is coming in a new hat and an old jerkin, a pair of old breeches thrice-turned; a pair of boots that have been candle-cases, one buckled, another laced with two broken points; an old rusty sword ta'en out of the town armoury with a broken hilt and chapeless; his horse hipped—with an old mothy saddle and stirrups of no kindred—besides, possessed with glanders and like to mose in the chine; troubled with the lampass, infected with the fashions, full of wingdalls, sped with spavins, rayed with the yellows, past cue of the fives, stark spoiled with the staggers, begnawn with the bots, weighed in the back and shoulder-sotten, near-legged before and with a half-cheeked bit and a headstall of sheep's leather which, being restrained to keep him from stumbling, hath been often burst and now repaired with knots; one girth six times pieced, and a woman's crupper of velour which hath two letters for her name fairly set down in studs, and here and there pieced with packthread. (3.2.42-61)

[21] See Lupton's "Animal Husbands in *The Taming of the Shrew*" in *Thinking with Shakespeare*.

Though Petruccio's spectacular appearance functions as a set up for the sartorial and sexual pun on "wearing"—evoking the wear of sexual relations, the wear of households, and the wear of time—Petruccio's spectacular appearance is also a tour-de-force of anachronistic spectacle.[22] He appears with garb in various states of disrepair from new to broken down—remixing styles and playing with class distinctions. His polytemporal appearance makes him appear both strange and untimed. He is not dressed in the fashion of any time and appears as a tinker might, brandishing a cobbled-together outfit. Similarly, his arrival is a temporal hodgepodge. He arrives late, causing anxiety and delay, but at the same time he is hasty and asks Tranio, "Were it better I should rush in thus?" (3.2.90). Though one is often unintentionally hasty when one is accidently late, Petruccio seems to be intentionally hasty and intentionally late, bridling the speed of the entire proceeding and putting it under his control. By remixing clothes in various stages of wear, he fashions time and creates an ahistorical, or perhaps polyhistorical, spectacle. The effect of his bridling and fashioning is that from the point of his arrival, he orchestrates the speed and the meaning of every event, managing to do what he should promptly slowly and do what he should do slowly, quickly. Though his regimen of torture for Kate is expansive, from the beginning, his main tool is the control and spectacularization of time through the fashioning of himself and staging of his wedding.

Once she arrives at his home, he disfigures Kate's temporality and her relationship to any form of organized time in order to inscribe her into a hierarchy in which he is dominant and controls the organization of her life. Petruccio tortures Kate through starvation, sleep deprivation, and denial of her possessions. Yet, Petruccio's litmus test for Kate's obedience is the adherence to his time:

[22] Amanda Bailey examines the history of sartorial habits, servant relations, and sexual relations, in "'Braving It' in *The Taming of the Shrew*." She offers a wide-ranging discussion of Petruccio's appearance and its implications, pp. 105-7.

Katherina: I dare assure you, sir, ‘tis almost two,

And ‘twill be suppertime ere you come there.

Petruccio: It shall be seven ere I go to horse.

Look what I speak, or do, or think to do,

You are still crossing it. Sirs, let’t alone.

I will not go today, and ere I do,

It shall be what o’clock I say it is. (4.3.190-94)

Hortensio affirms, “this gallant will command the sun” (4.3.195). Obedience, for Petruccio is a matter of timeliness. His goal is to coerce Kate into abiding by the temporality that he dictates. Petruccio attempts to control Kate and force her into a “proper” temporality by splitting representation from event, discussion of food from food, measuring clothes from clothes, lying in bed from sleep, and clock time from natural time. He makes Kate’s life spectacularly miserable rather than livable through attempting to eliminate all her temporal potential.

Kate resists, but eventually, after prompting from Hortensio, she concedes in an effort to return home:

Katherina: The moon? The sun; it is not moonlight now.

Petruccio: I say it is the moon that shines so bright.

Katherina: I know it is the sun that shines so bright.

Petruccio: Now by my mother’s son—and that’s myself—

It shall be moon or star or what I list

Or e’er I journey to your father’s house.

[*to Grumio*] Go on and fetch our horses back again.

--evermore crossed and crossed, nothing but crossed.

Hortensio: [*to Katherina*]

Say as he says, or we shall never go.

Katherina: Forward, I pray, since we have come so far,

And be it moon or sun or what you please,

And if you please to call it a rush-candle,

Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me. (4.5.3-15)

Kate's concession is not an admission of the accuracy of Petruccio's statement or even a complete acknowledgement of his power. She concedes because she understands the role she must perform in order to achieve her goals: to get home. She recognizes the disconnect between words and events that is required of her and performs it while elaborating on Petruccio's nonsense. This disconnect also sharpens the distinction between the actualization and the potential of an event. Kate learns to see the potential of an event rather than its actuality in order to orchestrate some semblance of agency, even if indirectly, within the binds of power she is confined by. I do not mean to argue that she is somehow liberated by her torture, but rather that the nomadic time employed by Petruccio to discipline Kate becomes an infectious means by which to effect her captivity subtly, if unproductively (so far as she remains captive). In other words, she is forced to relearn how to relate to time so as to continue circulating through it.

Sly and Kate accept the manipulation of their temporalities and imbrication into history differently in degree but not in kind. For both, time is made spectacular alongside the staging of their material conditions and both, however differently, are made to artificially re-member their place by forgetting themselves. Both, also, are able to eventually see through the staging of History and to continue to historicize; that is, to draw on the potential of the indefinite and disorganized past and act, however limited they are in their capacity to do so. It is worthwhile to

note, also, that the Lord and Petruccio also necessarily draw on a kind of tinker-time in order to perform their tricks. They are as complicit in tinkering with time as Sly and Kate are, though they do so in order to capture potential rather than to create it. Kate, becomes a kind of tinker—more reliant on the potential of historicizing than on the actuality of history and the "kind of history" that she performs begins to articulate the conditions of history in *The Taming of the Shrew*.

Synesthetic Friendship and the Value of the Present in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*

The central conflict in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* is often identified as Valentine's and Proteus's common struggle to negotiate friendship and desire within the confines of what is proper.[23] Valentine pursues his desire in proper time, or the time sanctioned, conducted, and trafficked by the state, while Proteus is always untimely in his desire. Less explored are the discourses on time that begin the action of the play and continue subtly pervading the main and secondary action. They inform and develop concepts of exchange, subjectivity, and affect at the intersection of the dominant themes of friendship and desire. Throughout the play, the characters, especially Proteus, mistime their actions and in turn their relationships suffer with varying degrees of severity. However, to mistime action or to use time improperly suggests that within the play there is a clear and distinct understanding of time frames (natural, social, personal, economic, political) that the characters share, articulate, and evaluate in the interest of abiding by and bolstering those frames of time. Time is at once a metric by which to measure which course of action should be taken, and it is a commodity that can be accumulated or wasted, determining the value of action. In *Two Gentlemen of Verona* Shakespeare offers a playful model of how time might become commodified and measured through the performed relationship between Lance and Crab. In their relationship we also find how the process of temporalization depends on the affective exchange of a plural subject in a confused present rather than a singular one already imbricated in laminated forms of time and official processes of temporalization.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of time in *Two Gentlemen of Verona* with special attention to the bond between Lance and Crab. Through their relationship, the

[23] See for instance, Harold F. Brook's, "Two clowns in a comedy (to say nothing of the dog): Speed, Lance (and Crab) in *The Two Gentlemen of* Verona," Maurice Hunt's "*The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and the Paradox of Salvation," John Timpane's "'I am a foole, looke you:' Lance and the social functions of humor," Jeffrey Masten's "*Two Gentlemen of Verona*," Erica Fudge's, "'The dog is himself': Humans, Animals, and Bladder Control in *The Two Genltemen of Verona*."

juxtaposition between the time of "now" and "proper time," or the imagined time of the state, comes to demonstrate the importance of temporality, and especially the value of the present, in *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. The relationship between Lance and Crab and their untimeliness throughout the play illuminate the contradictions imbedded in a proper time when viewed in terms of imaginary and non-imaginary dynamics of a social multiplicity. In this case, the comic duo and their human and non-human associates illustrate those dynamics. Lance's and Crab's scenes raise questions of how various temporalities are privileged, valued, and abstracted, as well as how temporality of the present is essential to the political problem of "more-than-one" that Henry Turner discusses in the context of *The Merchant of Venice*, and which is central to *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*.[24]

I argue that Lance and Crab's relationship operates as a model friendship within the play and depends on the deployment of the present to facilitate subjectivity at least partially outside of proper time. This allows Lance and Crab to exist uncivily within civility successfully. The larger implication of Lance's and Crab's relationship to each other and to time is that proper time can only be enforced if subjects are constantly and affirmatively future-motivated and past-

[24] Henry Turner discusses the problem of more-than-one in his "The Problem of More-Than-One: Friendship, Calculation, and Political Association in *The Merchant of Venice*." The problem of more-than-one, or how to act within a community, is a political problem and, for Turner, it introduces several questions: "How is the common good to be defined, and how is the common good of a community to be reconciled with the rights and claims of singular members? How is community itself is to be defined and how is the individual understood—that is,what classical philosophies of social life and subjectivity are implied in Aristotelian and Ciceronian approaches to the problem of justice and how does Shakespeare's play work these philosophies? What or who persists outside possible associations between the more-than-one ("partnership," "friendship"), forms of association that mediate entrance to the political community by providing the structuring principles and the system of value by which the political community constitutes itself and seeks to persist? Who is the noncitizen? What is owed to the noncitizen? And can this debt be calculated?" (417). Turner's series of questions are defined through spatial metaphors, which, are more appropriate for *The Merchant of Venice*. The problem of more than one also has a temporal dimension because more-than-one subject also implies more-than-one temporality. Multiple temporalities are negotiated through legitimate and illegitimate relationships. However, for the state to function, there needs to be a unifying time that is proper, whether that is a cultural, religious, scientific, or clock time. That time is formed through a unification of temporalities, much as the state is formed through a unification of spaces and the manipulation of boundaries within them. In *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, the problem of more-than-one is a temporal one. It is especially a problem when more than one subject shares the same time without recourse to a shared abstracted time to parameterize it.

disciplined. Thus, proper time becomes contingent upon subjective and social organization, which laminates over the affective, pre-subjective, and often contradictory aspects of the temporalization of plural subjects already found in Shakespeare's England.

In the beginning of the play, time well and poorly spent is juxtaposed.[25] The valuation of time by both Valentine and Proteus launches proper time within the play—what each of the characters should be doing within the confines of the imagined society. Valentine playfully admonishes Proteus for trying to convince him to stay and for remaining at home himself:

> I rather would entreat thy company
> To see the wonders of the world abroad
> Than, living dully sluggarized at home,
> Wear out thy youth with shapeless idleness.
> But since thou lov'st, love still, and thrive therein
> Even as I would, when I to love begin. (1.1.1-10)

Valentine cites the wonders of the world in order to convince Proteus that now is a time for exploring the multiple possibilities that the world has to offer. He frames Proteus's languishing at home as shapeless and devoid of action and possibility for the shaping of time. Youth, Valentine implies, is a time for carving out both a place and a trajectory in the world, but Proteus is wearing his youth out, making it dull, and disengaging himself from the fortune of the world. He is engaging in what Lorna Hutson calls "a bootless or unprofitable exchange" when he chooses love over travel (Hutson 114) Nevertheless, love appears to be a valid excuse for Proteus's idleness.

[25] Tina Skouen examines the value of time and its waste in the context of early modern print culture in *The Value of Time in Early Modern English Literature,* where she assesses the ways in which authors dealt with the acute awareness of print deadlines.

However, as the dialogue continues, it becomes apparent that Valentine is critical of Proteus's amorousness. Valentine retorts,

> And writers say 'As the most forward bud
> Is eaten by the canker ere it blow,
> Even so by love the young and tender wit
> Is turned to folly, blasting in the bud,
> Losing his verdure even in the prime,
> And all the fair effects of future hopes.'
> But wherefore waste I time to counsel thee
> That art a votary to fond desire? (1.1.45-52)

Love, which becomes conflated with desire, is presented as a pestilence, "an eating canker" powerful enough to siphon away Proteus's time and causes him to lose "all the fair effects of future hopes" (1.1.43,50). Love is also a pestilence that spreads. Though Valentine is not in love yet, Proteus's love causes him to waste his own time. He wonders, "But wherefore waste I time to counsel thee/ That art a votary to fond desire?" (1.1.51-2). Valentine finds himself entangled in Proteus's time and failing to convince him, bids him farewell. However, he does not fully disentangle himself. Throughout the duration of the play, love sickness pervades their relationship and informs their contention for a mutual future.

The two men share, as Jeffrey Masten says, a "*future* of nonseparated separation" ("Two Gentlemen of Verona," 269). When Proteus parts with Valentine, we see that even when they are apart, they share in everything. Proteus asks Valentine to think of him while he is traveling and offers to, however mockingly, hold him in his thoughts while he is gone:

> Wish me partaker in thy happiness

When thou dost meet good hap; and in thy danger,

If ever danger do environ thee,

Commend thy grievance to my holy prayers,

For I will be thy beadsman, Valentine. (1.1.14-18)

Masten notes that in the course of Proteus's speech, the "thy's" become "ours," arguing that "All things—including themselves, including self-possession—are in common between them" (Masten 269). The two men become one-another and in their shared self-possession also share time as well as everything in it: erotic desire, happiness, a place in the court of the Duke of Milan, and Silvia.[26] The way one spends or wastes his time affects the other.

Valentine's exasperation at Proteus's love sickness is not only caused by his thwarted desire to travel together but also by the effect of Proteus's love sickness on him. Following theories of early modern friendship posited by the likes of Cicero, Bacon, and Montaigne, Proteus is wasting his own and Valentine's time in the moment and he is wasting away both of their futures by spending time improperly.[27] Nevertheless, Proteus and Valentine's time is not allowed to be aberrant and remains disciplined by state power. Their own times allows them to simultaneously share a future and step in and out of their respective times without challenging the concept of proper time.

Proteus's soliloquy affirms Valentine's position that his love has reshaped him, following which he turns towards his own dispersed and dispersing desire. [28]

[26] Lorna Hutson frames this exchange as theft, emphasizing the combative rather than the friendly dynamics in the witty exchange between Valentine and Proteus. Though she still frames the two as exchanging selves of one's own and with each other. See *Circumstantial Shakespeare* pp. 110.

[27] For some examples of discourse on male friendship see for instance, Cicero's *On Friendship,* Michel de Montaigne's "Of Friendship," Francis Bacon's "Of Friendship." See also Alan Bray's *Homosexuality in Renaissance England*, Bruce Smith's *Shakespeare and Masculinity*.

[28] In *Time, Narrative, and Emotion in Early Modern England*, David Houston Wood notes that the "dilatory loss of time that accompanies emotion" was an experience confirmed by early modern medicine and warned against. Examples of Shakespeare's characters complaining about their loss of time can also be found in *Romeo and Juliet*,

Thou, Julia, thou has metamorphosed me,

Made me neglect my studies, lose my time,

War with good counsel, set the world at naught;

Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.

1.1.66-9

Proteus's love for Julia has changed him and caused him to lose his time as well as become tentatively unhinged from any sort of proper or social time. The concept of losing and wasting appears repeatedly throughout the play. The proper use of time seems to be one of the primary points of contention in the first scene and sets into motion the events that lead to Proteus's betrayals of both Valentine and Julia.

Antonio and Panthino, like Valentine, are concerned that Proteus is misusing his time. Antonio says, "Nor need'st thou much importune me to that/ Whereon this month I have been hammering. /I have considered well his loss of time" (1.3.17-18). Similarly, Panthino advises Antonio that Proteus should "spend his time no more at home, which would be great impeachement to his age in having known no travel in his youth" (1.3. 13-15). The time that is being lost and wasted here is proper time, or the time of official institutions such as family and government (in this case both represented by Antonio), which regulates when, by whom, how, and in what order actions should be taken.[29]

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when Romeo reflects on his loss of time pining for Rosalind, in *Love's Labour's Lost*, when Biron says that they have "neglected time." In each of these examples, the loss of time as well as the subjective experience of time is intersubjective and porous or infectious, whether the sensation of time is considered to be a subjective or intersubjective experience. In *The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English Renaissance*, Drew Daniel convincingly argues, relying on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's theory of assemblage, that melancholy, and the relationship to time that accompanies it, is both subjective and intersubjective. In other words, experiences of melancholy crystalize as subjective experiences but emerge out of contingent and dynamic intersubjective and inter-objective assemblages. Time loss and waste, as it is connected with desire and melancholy is transversal to individual and group subjects.

[29] In this case, the official institution is the time of the court and of the elder members in it such as Antonio. The proper time here is not equivalent to clock time, but is rather based on a metric generated by the lamination of

Proteus is losing time, or using time incorrectly according to the various actors that inform, restrict, and mobilize his subjective territory.[30] However, to lose, gain, have, spend, or waste time is a nonsensical statement that conceptualizes time as an object of exchange rather than as a form, affect, or personified figure. Notwithstanding the diverse theories and interpretations of time across different contexts in early modern England, only the momentary present and the eternity of heaven and hell had any existence in a strict ontological sense.[31] Individually negotiated conceptualizations of time as opposed to authoritative-social (liturgical, agricultural, festive) time were abstract and murky even as time-keeping devices and practices were becoming more pervasive and precise.[32]

Jacques Derrida's rehearsal of the impossible relationship between time and exchange sums up the problem that Proteus's loss presents. Derrida says,

> Therefore, as time does not belong to anyone as such, one can no more take it, itself, than give it. Time already appears as that which undoes the distinction between taking and giving, therefore also between receiving and giving, perhaps between receptivity and

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courtly practices and traditions, which establish the proper time to receive an education, to get married, to become a warrior, to become a ruler, etc.

[30] Drawing on the theories of Henri Lefebvre and Immanuel Kant, Bryan Reynolds defines "subjective territory": "Dual definitions of the operative term "subject" inform subjective territory: it is both a product of processes that *subject* an individual to their normalizing and authoritative modes of experience, and a condition of *subjectivity* and sentience forged from those processes. Composed of the conceptual, emotional, and physical range from which all individuals perceive and experience, this are can become part of an official territory when reinforced by state machinery and galvanized by state power. Subjective territory is constantly in flux, dynamically interacting with other subjective territories and reconfiguring accordingly" (*Transversal Subjects*, 285). The concept first appears in Reynolds's "The Devil's House, 'or worse': Transversal Power and Antitheatrical Discourse in Early Modern England" and is elaborated in *Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England* (2002), *Performing Transversally: Reimagining Shakespeare and the Critical Future* (2003), *Transversal Enterprises in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries: Fugitive Explorations* (2006), *Transversal Subjects: From Montaigne to Deleuze after Derrida* (2009), and *Intermedial Theater: Performance Philosophy, Transversal Poetics, and the Future of Affect* (2017), as well as throughout his articles and edited collections.

[31] See Daniel Woolf's "Afterward: Shadows of the Past in Early Modern England" pp.641.

[32] Michael Bristol in *Big-Time Shakespeare* articulates alongside Anne Higgins, Bernard Capp, and Leah Marcus, the dissemination of almanacs and calendars that helped facilitate farming and prognostication. Adam Max Cohen offers the most complete study of the dissemination of time-keeping devices in relation to Shakespeare in both *Technology and the Early Modern Self* and *Shakespeare and Technology*.

> activity, or even between the being-affected and the affecting of any affection. Apparently, and according to common logic or economics, one can only exchange, one can only take or give, by way of metonym, what is in time. (*Given Time,* 3)

The type of metonymy that Derrida refers to demands what Bryan Reynolds calls state-machinery, or the "amalgamated, dynamic interchange of sociopolitical conductors," which are the various "familial, religious, juridical, media, and educational structures—the replicators, transmitters, and orchestrators of thoughts, meanings, and desires—that interconnect a society's ideological and cultural framework" (*Transversal Subjects* 284). In other words, it necessitates a multitude of sociocultural actors and functions in order to maintain the upkeep of prescribed meanings and values that are assigned to the acceptable uses of time as well as the various signs and implements that facilitate access to those meanings and values.

The upkeep of those practices not only demands a tendency towards institutional cohesion (for instance, the institutional practice of sending one's children abroad to study, fight, or gain worldly experience), but also emotional discipline in so far as desire must be trained to facilitate the upkeep of redeemable temporal metonymies. That which is in time, including the measure of time, is only as stable as the maintenance of experiential stability defined as the metonym that is abstracted from it and maintained as a medium of conceptualizing both the value and sense of time.

Antonio is not concerned with his son losing time or with his son's melancholy, of which time-waste is a symptom, but rather, he is concerned with Proteus's undertaking activities that are inappropriate and which devalue proper time. Instead of developing his social capital, Proteus is sitting at home, losing himself, and dissolving into his melancholy. Here, social capital—adventuring, studying, discovering—are the metonyms that stand in for time. The

activities and experiences rather than the moments are precious. Time is merely a form within which things are created and destroyed, but the form of time is subject to the structuring and formations of individual experience and temporality. Antonio's concern is then much greater than concern for his son. It is a concern for the political body, which must be disciplined to follow proper time so that it can continue to be metonymically given, exchanged, and received within the framework of properly timed and socially acceptable relationships that follow similar standards of temporalization.

With the exception of Lance, whose relationship to time does not abide by proper temporalization within any space of the play, the characters of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* follow a temporal logic of consequence that prescribes well-rehearsed causes and effects, and which eventually, however problematically, guarantees the continuity of proper time through the coupling of the two gentlemen and their two ladies. Even as Valentine attempts to steal time with Sylvia and ends up in a fugitive-forest where time itself is fugitive, both Valentine and Proteus work in and sometimes against the constraints of the court—maneuvering adeptly with calculated risk.

Lance, a character of no consequences, does not abide (both intentionally and unintentionally) by the prescriptions given to him by Proteus as an extension of Antonio's commands. His relationship to the proper time of Proteus and Antonio is peripheral in so far as he is both inside and outside of it. Lance, however, through his relationship with Crab, provides a preliminary model for the ways in which proper time is temporalized and formed through aleatory group dynamics. Instead of temporality guiding his desire, affective and unsubjectified desire guides Lance's temporalization.

Lance enters the stage for the first time upset that he must leave his family behind to follow his master Proteus, who has spent his youth at home, lost his time, and is on his way to the emperor to unlearn his temporal prodigality. Proteus's time is of great consequence because it can be lost, but Lance, who is of no consequence and who stands only to lose his service rather than his time, threatens to hold up the voyage and imagines changing the laws of nature to fulfill his own desires. His time cannot be lost, in part because it does not follow the metonymic economy that Proteus and others must abide by and, in part, because he belongs to a fundamentally different temporal economy that is only adjacent to an official and courtly one. Despite both Proteus's and Lance's submission to the form of proper time set forth by Antonio, only Lance imagines a time of his own while Proteus resigns himself to his father's command.

The loss that Lance faces is more elaborated than the time that Proteus is presumably losing. Though Proteus is a character of consequence whose actions or inactions have determinate effects on the future of the state, he faces no articulated charges for his use or misuse of time. Lance, on the other hand, faces very clear penalties for his use of time, though he is a character of no consequence and the costs he is threatened with never materialize. Lance faces consequences because it is not his own time that he is wasting, but rather the time of his employer. Unlike the proper time that Valentine and Proteus share and waste together, Lance is not in a mutual and intersubjective relationship with Proteus. He can only borrow Proteus's time to effect Proteus's will.

Panthino, his fellow servant, tells him: "Tut, man, I mean thou'lt lose the flood, and in losing the flood, lose thy voyage, and in losing thy voyage, lose thy master, and in losing thy master, lose thy service, and in losing thy service—"(2.4.40-44). There is a logical progression to the consequences of Lance's delay that moves from the natural to the social. Despite Lance's

interruption of Panthino's inventory of consequences, we can imagine that in losing his service, Lance will lose his livelihood and perhaps his life. He is bound by natural and social rules—the rhythm of the tide, the schedule of the sailors, the commands of his employer-- that intertwine to regulate his time. Faced with a list of consequences leading to a determinedly subjunctive future, Lance turns them back on Panthino in the present by threatening him and then by reimagining the consequences that Panthino has enumerated:

> Panthino: Why dost thou stop my mouth?
>
> Lance: For fear thou shouldst lose thy tongue.
>
> Panthino: Where should I lose my tongue?
>
> Lance: In thy tale.
>
> Panthino: In thy tail!
>
> Lance: Lose the tide, and the voyage, and the master, and the service, and the tied? Why, man, if the river were dry, I am able to fill it with my tears. If they wind were down, I could drive the boat with my sighs. (2.3.45-53)

Lance imagines that his emotion can master the consequences and take back time—which in being taken back, perhaps, becomes his own. One way he asserts his own time is through his addition of a final consequence to the list: "the tied." Rather than the implied consequence of losing his livelihood, and possibly life, the final consequence that Lance imagines is losing Crab. The temporalizing of his own time depends at least in part on his relationship with his dog, which drives the majority of Lance's actions.

Together, Lance and Crab create a time that is improper because it is playful and performed playfully within the play world and on the stage. Their friendship thwarts state sanctioned relationships and the temporality that orients those relationships towards a future

disciplined by the past as well as more idealized relations of homoerotic friendship. Lance's motivation for reimagining the potential of his actions and the consequences of his resistance is his dog (which is possibly himself). He is playfully imaginative about how time and the world work. His playfulness allows him to take up time and to successfully maintain his own open time with Crab within the confines of Antonio's and, by extension, Proteus's proper time.

Play, for Heidegger, is the fourth dimension of time, which unifies the exchange between the past, present, and future.[33] The play takes place through a mutual giving between the past, present, and future, which gives being, read as becoming, to each time and acts as the condition of being and becoming. Matthew Wagner labels Heidegger's as well as Husserl's conceptualization of time as "thick time," which emphasizes the thickness of the present informed by a play of past and future in a theatrical moment, which in its thickness, becomes felt. Wagner focuses on Heidegger's emphasis on death as futurity, which for Wagner has a special relationship to theater in so far as "the theatre is not only an art form that is *like* life…it is, due to its temporal nature, a little life unto itself" because, differently from others forms such as film, literature, or painting, "theatre *is* in dying" (Wagner 30). Yet, the thickness of the present can also be understood through an intersubjective and confused relation to past, future, and present that makes the present possible alongside the horizon of possibility that Heidegger associates with death. The play of the past, present, and future amongst characters, audience members, props, subjects, and objects facilitates a present that is temporally "thick," because of the plurality of times and the plural desires to articulate them, which gives rise to temporality. That is, the different and mutual desires and conduits for desire give rise to metonymies that

[33] Heidegger writes: "Approaching, being not yet present, at the same time gives and brings about what is no longer present, the past, and conversely what has been offers future to itself. The reciprocal relation of both at the same time gives and brings about the present. We say "at the same time," and thus ascribe a time character to the mutual giving to one another of future, past and present, that is, to their own unity" (*On Time and Being* 13-14).

make up narrative as opposed to the death-horizon already framing narrative giving rise to the possibility of time. The future does not need to be rounded with an end for temporality to be thick.

Derrida explains that "This fourth dimension, as Heidegger makes clear, is not a figure, it is not a manner of speaking or of counting; it is said of the thing itself, on the basis of the thing itself (*aus de Sache)* and not only "so to speak." This thing itself of time implies the play of the four and the play of the gift" (*Given Time* 22).This play of the gift is the play of the given past, present, and future that for Derrida, exceeds the economy of metonymic time because the playfulness between real, imagined, subjunctive, past, and future takes place in the present which facilitates the forgetting of both past and future. Playing with time generates multiple, often incompossible, temporalities that multiply subjectivities and defer defined subjectification or valuation-- defying exchange because every play of pasts, futures, and presents creates a new present.

The "thing itself" of time, the impossible gift that is given and exchanged, takes the form of "now" for Lance and Crab, which is different than an Aristotelian or Augustinian "now" that Heidegger critiques. The "now" becomes the present that Lance presents to the audience before he imagines saving Crab with his tears and sighs, and it is what establishes his ability to repeatedly exist with Crab in an open time within the proper time of the play. Lance and Crab, through their friendship, create their own valuation of time and, in doing so, mangle civil rules of temporality and the metonymic exchanges of time.

Two Gentlemen and the Stuff of Now

The concept of "now" features most prominently in two of Shakespeare's plays: *The Winter's Tale* and *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*. In *The Winter's Tale*, "now" is used more as a

function of time, while in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, it is used much more as a function of temporality. The two—temporality and time—are not separate from one another, but focusing on one or the other offers a glimpse at the role of subjectivity in characterizing both.

Formally, the concept of "now" appeared in early modern English circulations of the work of Aristotle and Augustine. In *Physics,* Aristotle articulates the idea of time as a succession of "nows" that simultaneously contain both identity and difference: every "now" is both the same and a different much as every number belongs to the category "number" though it is different from the previous one. Time is formed of "nows," which constitute boundaries between what is and what is not such that a now is never fully present or absent.[34] Time is then a succession of abstract "nows." The "now" is defined as a paradox of continuous movement—bifurcated by the non-existent future and past—but it is objective and natural and thus quantifiable and measurable despite its metaphysical quandaries.

Augustine also conceptualizes time through the "now." However, Augustine's "now" is bifurcated by human perception. Rather than posing time as a relation between the succession of nows, he poses time as a relationship between the past, present, and future that are contained in the present "now" of perception.[35] Time, for Augustine, is interiorized by humans such that humans, at least in part, create it. The argument that Augustine presents is more of an argument of temporality than time. While both Aristotle and Augustine are concerned with human relations to time, only Augustine explicitly privileges human relations with time over all other relations to time. For Augustine the present is always human and qualitative first and measurable second. Augustine laminates his argument with Aristotelian time, which negates human experience, and in doing so implicitly attempts to address the temporality of multiplicity: or what to make of

[34] See Aristotle's *Physics*, Book IV, Part 3.
[35] See Saint Augustine's *Confessions*, Book Eleven, Part 13.

temporality when there are many individuals and thus many presents contained in one. He appeals to a transcendent solution to the problem—namely, God, who both is and organizes time. But Augustine struggles with such a simple solution because it does not offer any guide to evaluating time and instead replicates the abstract numerical time of Aristotle through a Christian lens.

In *The Winter's Tale*, the character of Time subjects both characters and audience to its presentation of "now." The character Time appears on the stage and delivers a monologue that is both a treatise on the concept of "now" and a convenient device to mark the passage of fifteen or sixteen years. Time's "now" is every now. Scott Maisano, drawing on the work of Adam Cohen and Caroline Spurgeon, argues that Shakespeare has Time conceive itself as relative and proto-Einsteinian. Unlike Aristotelian time, which proceeds through a series of nows, or Augustian time which is bifurcated by the attention of a subject, Shakespeare's character of Time is outside of movement and experience. "Time," Maisano writes, "itself does not move or change—it neither turns the hourglass nor grows the swelling scene—but we produce these special effects of motion and change without actively doing a thing: we passively observe and that alone 'allows,' or makes possible, the impression of sense of time's passage and flow" (Maisano 378). Time persists eternally, which means that every now is occurring infinitely.

Each "now" that Time speaks is a moment that is occurring forever, and which frames the cycle of events as an infinite repetition. As Maisano suggests, this view of time approximates Augustine's view of divine time despite Augustine's focus on what should more properly be understood as temporality, or the human relationship to time. In this formulation, time is objective and the perception of time varies contingent on events and emotional states. Time unifies everything and everyone under its "nows." Yet, the perception of time also facilitates the

measurement of time, and an abstract time seems to subjugate temporality in ways that are beneficial for those who announce time's passage by means of abstract measure: whether that's Time itself or someone or something else.

The subjugation of temporality is much closer to the early modern idea that time is a product of motion rather than the more contemporary notion that motion is a function of spacetime and the relative position of something to it. The emphasis on the primacy of motion affects whether the value and sense of time is a dismissible illusion or an immanent and interactive component of embodied subjectivity. As the history of phenomenology shows, temporality and time are difficult to reconcile. They are particularly difficult to reconcile because the reconciliation requires a model to understand how temporality affects the times of others, which are not easily and practically encapsulated by a single unifying concept of time without disciplining the world to be subject to its construction.

The embodiment of time in *The Winter's Tale* temporalizes time, or makes objective time relational, and in doing so unifies it for everyone, thus making the instant of the final "now" eternal. Yet, such an eternity is valueless and doesn't account for the risks of past, present, and future. Without value and risk, the abundance of eternity in an instant makes all things subject to time but does not offer insight into how action occurs in time, or, otherwise, how everything can be in time together despite contradicting and sometimes impossible temporalities. Time might exist as an abstraction that can be temporalized, but the temporalization of time is directly linked to power in so far as one temporalization is regarded as more valuable than another, whether that be objective time or the time of a particular individual or group subject.

Theories of relativity or divinity do not account for the politics of time because in them, time remains an objective and actual fact that sometimes is and sometimes is not perceivable.

Yet, the objectivity and actuality of time is conventional. Individuals must abide by the correct local time, but they must abide by it only insofar as there are consequences for not doing so. Lateness and earliness have social consequences for those who do not set the time by which everyone sets their watches, just as lateness and earliness can end in physical and social death for humans, animals, plants, and non-organic substances. [36]

In Shakespeare's lifetime, the sense and urgency of time began to be more felt than it perhaps had been previously in England because timekeeping no longer belonged solely to the church or nobility. Timekeeping began to become democratized as timekeeping devices, which were by no means accurate or ubiquitous, moved out of church towers and into homes.[37] Watches and clocks often broke down or displayed inaccurate times. Neither were timekeeping devices conceptually coherent. They acted as symbols of power, tyranny, democracy, automation, death, and continuity to name a few central concepts associated with timekeeping devices.[38]

Adam Cohen and Scott Maisano both argue that the disjointedness of timekeeping and time-meaning facilitated a proto-relativistic approach to time. Shakespeare's various treatments of time as tied to emotion and perception certainly support their claims.[39] However, examples of time's relativity do not explain how time was organized and democratized. The democratization of time-keeping and time-meaning also meant that, at least abstractly, time would be the same for everyone despite its experience. Yet, the value of time, and hence its measure, were different

[36] See Robert Levine's *A Geography of Time*, Henri Lefebvre's *Rhythmanalysis*, Jeffrey Cohen's *Medieval Identity Machines*, and Michael Bristol's chapter "Social time in *Winter's Tale*," in *Big-Time Shakespeare* for contemporary sociological, medieval, and early modern examples of variations in "local time" and the ways in which it affects individual and group habits, movements, and social organization.
[37] See Adam Cohen's *Shakespeare and Technology* pp. 128 and 143-45.
[38] See Adam Cohen's *Shakespeare and Technology* as well as Otto Mayr's *Authority, Liberty, & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe*.
[39] David Houston Wood *Time, Narrative, and Emotion in Early Modern England* explores and elaborates upon the ways in which subjectivity, perception, and emotion can be read through a conjunction of temporality and humoral theory and doing so, he argues, allows for a historicizing of the early modern temporal self.

for different people. The experienced and conceptual incoherence of time gestures to an implicit question of how time was valued and whose time was more valuable. In other words, who or what maintained the meaning and value of "now" and how was the plurality of subjects and subjective experiences negotiated in that calculus?

In *Two Gentlemen of Verona* a discourse on "now" is given by Lance, a clown, rather than by Time. Unlike Time, who narrates the passage of everything through the present, Lance is only interested in presenting the present and taking up time, however inconsequentially. Lance also narrates events, but whereas Time fills in central elements of the plot without participating in the action, Lance narrates his departure from his family within the context of the play's action and in the thick of comic improvisation with both his dog and the audience. Lance's narration breeds confusion rather than clarity, and perhaps most significant is that much of the confusion comes from the polychronic muddling of moments, people, and objects. They do not all exist easily in time, forever, or in a moment.

The comedy and befuddlement of Lance's monologue gestures towards a problem of actualizing a distinct moment even as it may already exist in perpetuity.[40] Lance embodies time in performance as he details his departure, but in his confusion, he is unable to decide which thing or person (including himself) belongs to which moment. By actualizing time, however comically, Lance's performance suggests that temporality is both synesthetic and transversal amongst material subjects and objects such that the actual and the virtual are both real and affective. Without a system of standardization and differentiation, both time and the differentiation of things is forgotten.

[40] The actualization of time gestures to the idea that despite time being infinite, it can be entered into at any point, and entry at that point will dictate not only the qualitative experience of time but also the measure of objective time.

Lance enters to deliver his monologue after he is told that he must depart with Proteus for Milan:

> Nay, ‘twill be this hour ere I have done weeping. All the kind of the Lances have this very fault. I have received my proportion, like the prodigious son, and am going with Sir Proteus to the Imperial’s court. I think Crab, my dog, be the sourest natured dog that lives. My mother weeping, my father wailing, my sister crying, our maid howling, our cat wringing her hands, and all our house in a great perplexity, yet did not this cruel-hearted cur shed one tear. He is a stone, a very pebble-stone, and has no more pity in him than a dog. A Jew would have wept to have seen our parting. Why, my grandma, having no eyes, look you, wept herself blind at my parting. Nay, I’ll show you the manner of it. This shoe is my father. No, this left shoe is my father. No, no, this left shoe is my mother. Nay, that cannot be so, neither. Yes, it is so, it is so, it hath the worser sole. This shoe with the hole in it is my mother, and this my father. A vengeance on’t, there ‘tis. Now, sir, this staff is my sister, for, look you, she is as white as a lily and as small as a wand. This hat is Nan our maid. I am the dog. No, the dog is himself, and I am the dog. O, the dog is me, and I am myself. Ay, so, so. Now come I to my father. ‘Father, your blessing.’ Now should not the shoe speak a word for weeping. Now should I kiss my father. Well, he weeps on. Now Come I to my mother. O that she could speak now, like a moved woman. Well, I kiss her. Why, there ‘tis. Here’s my mother’s breath up and down. Now come I to my sister. Mark the moan she makes.—Now the dog all this while sheds not a tear nor speaks a word. But see how I lay the dust with my tears. (2.3.1-32)

His first word, “now,” is a present in which an action has already been finished—a past made present. “Nay, ‘twill be this hour ere I have done weeping” (2.3.1); what follows is a present

tense description of his entire family weeping--from mother to cat-- until he switches to past tense and mentions his dog Crab "yet did not this cruel-hearted cur shed, one tear"(2.3.8-9).[41] Once in past tense, he addresses the audience, "Now, I'll show you the manner of it," in order to present his story (2.3.13). The shift is strange because Lance is already telling the story, but, once he shifts to the present tense, he begins to present the story rather than tell it. He transitions from narrating events to suddenly living them out. His account of events turns into a continuation of the event that problematizes his ability to recount it in an easily distinguishable past. Etymologically, the tense and the description Lance offers provide an interesting quirk. He presents, or places before, literally placing the objects before the audience as he reminds them of the present. However, he must also present himself and does so by saying "now," though "now" is in fact unpresentable, since "now" erases his present once it becomes a reminder. He uses "now" as a tool to keep his story straight, but the "nows" won't stay in line. The presentations of the objects as "now" confuse the temporality of Lance himself, and there is immediate confusion of where or when he is in time or in relation with his family. Unlike Augustine, who is able to keep his presents in succession by an appeal to a transcendent and divine time, Lance has only himself, and he is undisciplined by any authoritative structure. His point of reference is his dog, which is already outside of any divine, civil, or on the stage, performance.

Here is the trickiness of the situation: Lance identifies a "now" by marking the limit or end of a previous action, he then describes the actions of his relatives in the present tense in participle form which makes the action existential and continuous. They are simultaneously descriptions of his family's actions and his family. Because their actions are now assigned to them, they become moveable objects that are subjunctive and unbound from a particular "now."

[41] Most notable is that Crab of course cannot shed a tear, and as Eric Fudge notes, his silence is important to the mechanic of the exchange (*How to do things with Shakespeare* 192).

In other words, they become presentable. However, they are still bound by an illusion of temporality because of the relationship between Crab and Lance, which crosses the past-becoming-present.

We know that Lance's relatives were weeping because Crab *did* not shed a tear and Lance's grandmother *wept* at his parting, placing the action unproblematically in the past. But, once he is done describing what happened he again uses the word "now:" "Nay, I'll show you the manner of it." What is this "now," this instant? Now, at first is an endpoint to his own weeping and then an endpoint to his story, which seems to never end. His relatives are forever and existentially weeping. In this case, the "now" is both a relation between past and present and a relation between characters and objects that are strewn haphazardly through time. The "now" becomes a node of polytemporal subjects and objects.

In the most direct sense, "now" is simply the preface to his next action just as it was the bookend to his previous one. The succession of "nows" follows an Aristotelian framework in which "now" acts as a boundary between one moment and the next. The "now" acts as more of a what than a when. However, the what of the now becomes confused so far as he is presenting a past that becomes embodied in the present objects around him, which come to represent his family because the objects share sensible traits—smell, sound, sight, touch-- with his family members. The consequence is that time is not in Lance or any one thing. His perception, confused as it is, does not make time. Instead, time is imposed onto Lance's story, and it is imposed on him by chance. Lance has a nomadic relation to time and each "now" presents an entryway into a story that has no common-sense chronology, once performed.[42]

[42] David Hoy: "Insofar as Deleuze affirms that time is not in us, but that temporality is an auto-affection, he is indirectly repeating and expanding on Heidegger's claim that it is not subjects that produce temporality, but that temporality produces itself and subjectivity follows. Once again, temporality is seen as the Ur-phenomenon that makes subjectivity possible. 217

Lance justifies each choice he makes through a correspondence of sensory attributes that become essential rather than incidental in his characterization: his mother is the left shoe because it has a hole in it and has the "worser sole," his father the right shoe that he curses, and his staff is his sister because she is "as white as a lily and as small as a wand." The objects at once have specificity in so far as they have existential qualities that correspond to the existential qualities of his relatives, while at the same time they are arbitrary in the present "now."

Lance makes his relatives timeless by presenting them through the objects that momentarily contain the "now" so far as they draw attention. They contain the present because they do not represent the relatives but act as the relatives that are both diachronically and synchronically in Lance's presentation. "Now" continues to act as a marker of the beginning and end of described actions, but it also confuses representation. Actions, people, and objects become interchangeable: the silence of the shoe and Lance's father, the smell of the other shoe and his mother's breath, the creak of the staff and the moan of his sister. In his own story, Lance becomes as interchangeable as the rest. Only as he presents does his arbitrary attention become necessary to a story that has no authoritative teller, time, or common sense.

The speech is meant to be funny and ridiculous, but it also offers an interesting lesson on time. When the "now" is presented, it becomes an actualization of an abstract time such that a presented object becomes potentially valuable specifically because it becomes confusable and interchangeable with other objects because the objects themselves begin to be abstract and relational. The abstract relationality of the objects means that they can be rearranged to have different values depending on how they are temporalized. A shoe can become more valuable than a father and a sister more valuable than a staff depending on when they are for Lance. Once

objects begin to be abstracted, their temporalization can become proper if there is a system to support their propriety. However, propriety depends, as we see, on the absurdity of abstraction.

Lance's speech is ridiculous, and in its nonsense, his speech performs one of the problems of time that Aristotle articulates. In Book IV of *Physics*, Aristotle writes:

> And it is clear that to be in time is not to be when time is, any more than to be in motion or in place is to be when motion or place is. For if that is to be in something, all things will be in anything, and the heavens in a millet seed. For at the time when the millet seed is, the heavens are also.

Lances relatives become present when they are rather than where they are, so they can be both shoes and parents at the same time. Presenting rather than representing allows for the heavens and the millet seed, the shoe and the mother, to be one and the same. The breakdown of differentiation is perhaps the point of an abstract and eternal time, but it creates a serious problem for accounting for change between things or moments.

Lance is not exempt from the temporal synesthesia (feeling-together) that temporalizes time into the presentable objects on stage. He loses himself and in an apotheosis of confusion says, "I am the dog: no, the dog is himself, and I am the dog—Oh! the dog is me, and I am myself; ay, so, so." He has trouble identifying who he and the dog are, and lands on the strange solution that "the dog is himself, and I am the dog—Oh! the dog is me, and I am myself." The dog represents him and Lance is presently himself just as the dog is presently himself and he represents the dog. The dog, after all, like Lance, is both in the past of this story and in the present. Lance can present his parents, sister, and maid by constantly bringing attention to the present "now," and thus fashioning himself as an a-temporal story teller, but his dog disrupts that move. Crab was there then and he is there now and by being there then and now while part of the

story at the same time, he disrupts the atemporal representation of his family as existential and continuous weepers. The disruption of temporality also signals the breakdown of representation, or at least meaningful and intentional representation that could be assigned to a unified subject that can be subjected to time.

The temporal dissonance in the joke suggests something important about the conception of the present and representation. The present, because it is unmoored from the specific temporality of past and future, makes subjects instrumental in the interest of representation and puts them into befuddled relations. Here, instrumentality is made absurd so far as Lance's family actually become objects, but it also highlights the difficulty of any sort of pure subjective temporality or exterior representation. The present moment effaces all of time, and its representation sets the locality of past and future flooding back in chaotically. Lance's play with "now," suggests that any recourse to a representable and hence measurable time is always subject to its own dissolution regardless of its proper or improper deployment.[43]

In other words, the representation or measurement of time is a spectacular and performative act that is only pure if its imaginative stability is maintained by institutions such as churches, courts, hierarchies, and so on. Time, whether natural or perspectival, requires maintenance regardless of whether that time is fictional or not. Otherwise, the present becomes both ecstatic and subjunctive such as in the case of Lance and Crab in which the "now" confuses intentionality and subjectivity, disrupts discipline, and proliferates chaotic accounts of time. Time becomes what it is imagined to be rather than what it is disciplined to be.

The imagination of time is both within the structure of the play and peripheral to it in so far as the audience is at least partially participant in the formation of the play world. Robert

[43] Derrida makes this point in his critique of Edmund Husserl's time consciousness in *Speech and Phenomenon and Other Essays on*. pp. 30-1

Weimann argues that the disruption of representation is contingent upon the actor-character's secure relationship to the real world of the audiences and within the social world of the play. Weimann writes,

> For Lance to become the clowning object and the laughing subject of his own mirth and that of the audience, reveals an astonishing stability in his relations to the social whole. These relations connect the character and the actor, illusion and reality, so that the imaginative flexibility of his relation to the play world has much to do with the social security of his relation to the real world. (Weimann 36)

The relationship between Lance and the audience is playful. It serves a complex function of unifying the socially heterogenous characters of the play as well as the socially heterogenous audience through a kind of mutual extension of awareness between audiences and actors. Weimman continues:

> Such awareness, one would suggest, reflects and interconnects both the social security of *actor's* relation to the real world and the imaginative and spatial flexibility of the *character's* relation to the play world, his implicit insight into and criticism of, the action of the play. (Weimann 37)

The security that the character-actor exhibits for Weimann, allows for the creation of a comic perspective both within and outside of the play.[44] The condition of Lance's stability, however, is his relationship with Crab—both as a relationship between characters and between actors. The dog, of course, is a non-actor that both grounds and confuses the present. Together they form a model of friendship that allows for a play of subjectivity and facilitates a sort of time within

[44] Weimann suggests Lance is the first of Shakespeare's many comic characters that perform such a role. Others include: *The Tempest*'s Trinculo, *Hamlet*'s gravediggers, *Macbeth*'s porter, and so on.

time, an uncivility within civility, an exchange of difference within an exchange of abstracted identity.

Synesthetic Friendship

Lance's confusion during his parting speech is both existential and temporal, which, at face value, replicates the *alter idem,* or second self, of Aristotelian friendship (popularized by way of Cicero) while demonstrating the problems of such a relationship when it is inserted into a material context. Masten makes the case that the friendship between Lance and Crab both lampoons the idea of an alter-ego and illustrates that the discourse of friendship is potentially dissentious because in breaking down differentiation between members of the same social milieu, it has the potential to break down differentiation across contexts and boundaries. He argues that Lance's relationship with Crab alters both male-female relations in the play and the idea of male friendship as a relationship with a second-self and troubles the idea of second-self. Masten writes,

> The comedy of the speech either suggests that persons really *are* differentiable, whatever Montaigne might say, and Lance should be able to distinguish himself from a cross-breed dog; or, more subversively (and possibly at the same time), it illustrates the way in which the discourse of friendship is potentially *mobile* in this culture, able to be transmitted, however accidentally, from master to servant and deployed in a new way that here mixes up species. (Masten 275)

If the discourse of friendship is mobile, then its mobility has implications for the transfer of both time and value between friends. A friend, as a second self, is supposed to offer vital continuity to one's life, taking on the responsibilities of the friend's household and relations. If a friend can be a servant or a dog, then the structures that uphold the transference of time and wealth begin to

become undone. More importantly, if a friend can be a dog, then one's second self can lack a "self" so far as dogs in early modern England, according to Erica Fudge, did not have identities.

The transference of the discourse of friendship across species as a subversive act, however, is dubious. Fudge points out that the condition of cross-species transference of discourses of friendship subverts humanity. She writes,

> The fact that Lance finds himself inseparable from his *dog* signals his failure as a human: because, as Thomas Aquinas wrote, "all friendship is founded on some community of life…and irrational creatures have no share in human life, which of its nature is rational, therefore no friendship is possible with them except metaphorically speaking" (Aquinas 1975: 89). Friendship, once again, is human and so a breach of friendship is also a breach of humanity—of civility, rationality, self-control. ("Humans, Animals, and Self-Control" 200-1)

Fudge's central claim is that Lance's friendship with Crab is a breach of humanity because it is a breach of community and the propriety of that community. Her argument is couched in a discussion of early modern discourses on pissing and the ways in which participation in a community depends on pissing, or doing anything, at the proper time and in the proper place. If Lance is inseparable from his dog, then like his dog, he is outside of proper time and outside of community.

When Crab pisses under the table, Lance takes responsibility for it and bemoans that "O 'tis a foul thing when a cur cannot keep himself in all companies!" (4.4.9-10). He is disciplined for Crab and the moment recalls his earlier chastisement by Pantino for his delay and his concern for Crab. Lance is indeed in a community of two with Crab (perhaps extending out to his family of objects) and he is disciplined for not being an obedient participant in the larger community,

but his failure to participate well in the larger community and his friendship with Crab do not seem to justify the argument that Lance fails as a human.

Indeed, he seems to fail more at being a servant than a human. Devoted and truly open to a multitemporal present, Lance presents a politics of an inclusion and an ideal of friendship founded on subjunctivity and transversality. In other words, Lance's friendship with Crab is both a breakdown of civility, insofar as civility is conceptualized as immobile, and an affirmation of the multiplicity of the present that propels becomings and positive differentiation as a kind of synesthetic civility. Rather than break down humanity and civility, Lance and Crab's relationship reevaluates it by reevaluating time. It is, perhaps, no longer the linear time of civility, but instead the polytemporal time of possibility through which a community is built—a community that is built on care instead of commodity in so far as in a polytemporal present moments and objects are only as valuable as the affects they generate in the moment.

In Book IX of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle outlines the synesthetic quality of primary friendship, or friendship founded in virtue rather than pleasure or utility, which both explains how and necessitates that a friend be an other-self, *alter idem*, or *heteros-autos*. He writes:

> And if someone who sees perceives that he sees, and one who hears that he hears, and one who walks that he walks, and in the case of other activities there is similarly something that perceives that one is engaged in them, so that, if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, we perceive that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (since we saw that to exist is to perceive or think); and if perceiving that we are alive is pleasant in itself (since life is by nature a good, and perceiving some good thing as present in us is pleasant); and if life is worthy of rational choice, and especially so for good people, because to them being is good and

> pleasant (since they are pleased when they perceive in themselves what is in itself good); and if the good person is related to his friend as he is related to himself (because his friend is another self); then, as his own being is worthy of choice for each person, so that of his friend is worth choosing in the same way, or almost the same way. (Aristotle 176)

For Aristotle, there is individual perception at the same time as there is another perceiver that perceives the perception. There is a community of perceivers. Most of his argument rests on perception, and it is only briefly that he mentions the role of reason in the choice of establishing a community of perceivers. Crab, according to Fudge, is excluded from reason because he is an animal. However, all of the claims about perception can be applied to Crab, who, through Lance's narrative, seems to be enjoying himself and his relationship with Lance. That he is without reason is only indicated by his lack of speech. Otherwise, he is still held accountable for misbehavior. Aristotle would claim the impossibility of friendship between humans and animals because of the lack of reason in animals indicated by their lack of speech, but in the case of Lance and Crab, more seems to rest on perception and its confusion then on reasoned speech.

Perception is shared between friends not in inter-subjective terms, Agamben clarifies in his discussion of the above quoted passage, but as a con-division of the self: the self-differing from the self. "The friend is not another I," Agamben writes, "but an otherness immanent in self-ness, a becoming other of the self" ("Friendship" 6). Such becoming is in time synchronically. The divided perception is an immediate division of a subject submitted to time and made plural by it. The con-divison of the self is the condition of the transversality of friendship and that initiates a "transversal movement" through which the borders of the self are exceeded by necessity. The transversal movement occurs together and at once, which opens up an ecstatic time scheme that is both different from proper time and relies on a plurality of selves that are

untimely. Lance is Crab and Crab is Lance so much so that the temporality of one cannot be understood without the other though neither is defined through or against the other.

At the end of his lecture on friendship, Agamben clarifies that this idea of friendship has a pollical dimension that excludes animals. He writes, "It is essential, in any case, that human community should here be defined, in contrast to that of animals" in so far as friendship is more than mere cohabitation. Here, Lance and Crab's relationship also departs from the nuance added by Agamben's analysis. Lance does indeed become Crab and Crab becomes Lance, forming their own political community, however small, and their own temporal valuation that is exchanged between them. Crab's time is dictated by Lance and Lance's by Crab.

Lance's speech parodies acts of devotion and friendship outlined by Aristotle and elaborated upon by Cicero, Montaigne, and Bacon amongst others.[45] The punchline is that though Lance is devoted to Crab, Crab is both unfeeling towards Lance and, more importantly, a dog that presumably cannot be a true friend. Nevertheless, Lance's inability to distinguish between himself and Crab gestures to the transversality of their relationship and within the synesthetic parameters of friendship, when Lance weeps so does Crab and vice versa. Lance is both himself and the dog, much as his mother and father are both themselves and the shoes made interchangeable by the aporia of the "now." The relationship between Lance and Crab, at least in temporal terms, is an ideal friendship even as in practice it is merely a comical one. Their uncivil friendship creates an alternative time scheme to the proper one imposed on both and allows for alternate presents that can neither be wasted nor spent to bubble forth.

Affect and Subjunctive Time

[45] On Lance's parody of friendship see Sam Hall's *Shakespeare's Folly: Philosophy, Humanism, Critical Theory*, pp. 10.

The ability to imagine a different and inconsequential time holds the potential to overturn a particular time and change it into a different one with a different valuation and hence a different measure. Lance, as a servant, is bound by Proteus's time. However, he deploys the confusion of representing the present as an imaginative resistance that both takes up time and effectively generates an alternative temporal rubric grounded in relations of emotion and sensation: "haptic time."

Matthew Wagner draws the term haptic time from Deleuze and Guattari's borrowed concept of hapticity, which they identify with smooth space, in which perspectives blend and intensify. Wagner uses the term "haptic time" to address the phenomenon of how painting or theater works as a whole to facilitate an encounter with it. The combination of present and absent objects and ideas creates a total sensation of time. He points out that in early modern England,

> This phenomenon is partly grounded in the fact that a strong, symbiotic relationship between the abstract and the material was one of the more prominent character notes of Elizabethan England; it was a culture which allowed, in a multitude of ways, for its participants to shuttle fluidly between an intangible idea and its material presence. (Wagner 42-3)

Wagner's point is that the relationship between the abstract and material is more than semiotic. The immaterial is bodied forth, much as time is bodied forth and made to be felt. Wagner's argument is that the theater is exceptional in blending affects in order to fluidly move between abstraction and materiality.

In this sense of moving between abstraction and materiality, Lance is exceptional as a theatrical exemplar in *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. Within the play, he bodies forth a different temporality through the expression of emotion—generating a mélange of speed and urgency—

filling the river with tears and driving it with sighs. Lance's haptic time is sensational rather than measurable, such that it becomes an alternative rubric of measure for the time of Proteus and the rest of the characters involved with the departure. His alternative time, facilitated by the transversality of his relationship with Crab and the temporal confusion of presentation and representation that follows, can otherwise be understood as "subjunctive time."

Subjunctive time is the "as if" or "what if" imagining of one or many different timelines that create a feedback loop with otherwise immeasurable abstract time and give it measure. Rather than using a numerical measure for time, emotion becomes the primary measure for subjunctive time. By imagining what happens if he should miss the ship, ""Why, man, if the river were dry, I am able to fill it with my tears; if the wind were down, I could drive the boat with my sighs," Lance reevaluates proper time such that his own subjective time becomes primary and agential, even if only imaginatively so (2.3.49-50). This type of measure is similar to the proto-relativism that scholars have pointed to in Shakespeare, but the key difference is that the "as-if" and "what-if" of subjunctive time imagines time based on the imagined emotional possibilities of being someone or something other than oneself.

The concept of subjunctive time draws on Reynolds's concepts of "subjunctive movement" and "subjunctive space." In practice, the two terms are similar in so far as they both blur the lines of fact and fiction in the constitution of agency. However, I emphasize subjunctive time over space in order to draw attention to the future-looking orientation of subjunctivity and the ways in which future-looking revalues the present. Unlike what Reynolds calls "subjunctive movement," which can work to disrupt or eliminate spatial and temporal boundaries, and "subjunctive space" which acts "as a hinge between subjugation and resistance, oppression and subversion, and self-reinforcement and self-redefinition," subjunctive time generates a

qualitatively different timeline that engenders a relative definition of time.[46] Subjunctive time works in conjunction with subjunctive space. It totters on the edge between states, but if subjunctive space generates a subjunctive mode/mood, subjunctive time sneaks subjunctivity in as a *real* and critical threat or hope—parameterizing the abstraction of time to be positioned affectively to generate other synesthetic temporalities.

Lance does not only imagine a fictional space in which he can manipulate circumstances differently. He imagines that his emotions can change the future: he can get to his destination regardless of conditions subject to time such as the tide or the winds. In doing so, he displaces himself from time while actively taking up the time of other characters and taking up time on the stage. Subjunctive time then creates relative measure by parameterizing abstraction through a strategic deployment of affect. His deployment of affect, however, is not his own but depends on his synesthetic friendship with Crab, which facilitates the abstraction of time that allows Lance to reevaluate time and make it his own. In this model, temporalization depends on affective relationships that are privileged over social ones. The result is that the process of temporalization becomes a production of friendship rather than a tracing of the proper and timely.

Affective Exchange: "If hearty sorrow be a sufficient ransom for offense"

I began this chapter with a dialogue between Proteus and Valentine and their implicit preoccupation with the proper use of time. In the discussion that followed, I illustrated the conditions and external pressures that allow for a conception of time as an exchangeable commodity, and I demonstrated the ways in which the conception of a proper and exchangeable time is belied by Lance and Crab's relationship with the present. Lance and Crab create their own time through an exchange of perceptions and affects that produce value rather than subscribing to an exchange of pre-evaluated time maintained by disciplinary institutions. As a

[46] For definitions of both "subjunctive movement" and "subjunctive space" see *Transversal Subjects* pp. 285.

close to the chapter, I want to return to Proteus and Valentine and examine the ways in which their problematic exchange over Sylvia is consistent with the idea of friendship within proper time as opposed to the perverse and caring relationship between Lance and Crab that affectively generates presents.

Stanley Wells calls Proteus's treachery against Valentine a "loss of moral coherence" and Proteus's transgression prompted Arthur Quiller Couch to say that "there are, by this time, *no* gentlemen in Verona" (Wells 63, Couch xiv). Yet, Proteus's treachery and attempted rape as well as Valentine's bizarre and immediate forgiveness of Proteus's acts functions within the logic of idealized friendship of shared metonymic time. René Girard goes so far as to say that "The entire comedy massively confirms the crucial role of Valentine in the genesis of Proteus's sudden passion for Silvia" (Girard 232). "Proteus desires Silvia," he argues, "not because their brief encounter made a decisive impression on him but because he is predisposed in favor of whatever Valentine desires" (Girard 232). He explains this phenomenon through what he calls "*mimetic* or *mediated* desire," which is an intense desire to share in everything. They are ideal friends who have a synesthetic relationship, sharing eachother's perceptions, desires, knowledge, and time. Advocating for Proteus's arrival to the court of Milan, Valentine says of Proteus, "I knew him as myself, for from our infancy/We have conversed and spent our hours together" (2.4.60-61). Their relationship suggests, according to the logic of ideal friendship, that they should share in everything, and desire is included in that communality alongside time—the hours they spend together, the time that Proteus wastes, and the time that Valentine spends appropriately.

In the context of their friendship, Proteus transgresses not when he desires Silvia, but when he asserts himself as separate from Valentine. As he seemingly agonizes over his desire for Silvia, he asserts his independent selfhood:

> I cannot leave to love, and yet I do;
> But there I leave to love where I should love.
> Julia I lose, and Valentine I lose;
> If I keep them, I needs must lose myself.
> If I lose them, thus find I by their loss,
> For Valentine, myself, for Julia, Silvia.
> I to myself am dearer than a friend…(2.6.17-24)

In this speech, he prioritizes his own desire and, as William Carroll footnotes, "violates one of the central tenets of friendship theory, placing his own desires before any consideration of his friend" (*Two Gentlemen of Verona* fn. 23 197). He couches his reasoning in a reversal of the logic of friendship, arguing that he will lose himself if he does not pursue Silvia and thus negating the purpose of friendship as a type of loss of self. Later Sylvia admonishes Proteus for choosing love over friendship admonishing him for being "counterfeit to thy true friend" and claiming that "All men but Proteus" respect friends even in love (5.4.52-54). His true transgression is to pursue his own desire beyond bonds that he has already established.

Once he breaks from Valentine and chooses to find himself, time suddenly becomes a vague abstraction for him. He claims twice—once to Valentine and once to the Duke—that time will restore order. First, he tells Valentine "Time is the nurse and breeder of all good" (3.1.241). In the next scene he eases the Duke's anxiety over Silvia's grief and says, "A little time, my lord, will kill that grief" (3.2.15). Time is no longer exchanged, wasted, spent, or given. Instead, it

becomes linear and progressive with a natural tendency towards good order. He evokes a temporal order for which he is not responsible and which does not need recourse to relationships with Valentine and Julia or the communities to which they belong. A singular restorative abstract time effectively erases all individual temporalities and allows Proteus to justify his desire. In asserting his individual desire he moves from a proper time to a transcendent time that washes away the texture of individual temporality but not individuality.

Proteus's logic mimics the logic of his father, who in the first act tells Pantino that "Experience is by industry achieved/ And perfected by the swift course of time" (1.3.23-4). The key difference, however, is that Antonio asserts the agency of the individual to act in time within the institutional bounds of industry, rather than trusting that time will restore order. In Antonio's logic, time is a tool that perfects rather than an abstraction that restores. Proteus is alone in his temporal logic except for the Duke who briefly takes comfort in Proteus's claim that time will eliminate Silvia's grief. When Proteus attempts to seduce Silvia, she uses the logic of temporal value to rebuff him, "I am so far from granting thy request/ That I despise thee for thy wrongful suit,/ And by and by intend to chide myself/ Even for this time I spend in talking to thee" (4.2.98-101). She remains resolutely attached to bonds, the institutions that uphold them, and the temporal economy that sustains them.

Unlike Lance and Crab, whose desire creates new temporalities out of the confused detachment that emerges from trying to assert presents outside of the institutions that sustain them, Proteus imagines a time that is detached from temporality and in which his individual desire is paramount. The effect is that actions and words become untimed for Proteus but time continues to move forward for him. He exists unproblematically in a stable present as an

individual and does not think about relations between the future and the past or the consequences of his actions. When his seduction of Silvia fails, he gives up on words and resorts to violence"

> Nay, if the gentle spirit of moving words
> Can no way change you to a milder form,
> I'll woo you like a soldier, at arms' end,
> And love you 'gainst the nature of love—force ye. (5.4.54-7)

Because he has taken himself out of a temporal economy, he has also taken himself out of a gift economy in which one's words are gifts that circulate through time and change or move others in the same temporal economy. He forces himself upon Silvia, "I'll force thee yield to my desire" and exists in an imagined present of his own while violently bringing Silvia into his desiring-present that erases her temporality—her past and her future (5.4.59). After he attacks her, she remains silent for the duration of the play, becoming an object of negotiation and exchange between Proteus and Valentine.[47]

Valentine unleashes a torrent of opprobrium against Proteus, whom he calls a "ruffian," "uncivil," a "treacherous man," and a "stranger." He affirms Proteus's separation from him and finalizes the end of their relationship: "Proteus/ I am sorry I must never trust thee more,/ But count the world a stranger for thy sake./ The private wound is deepest. O time most accurst,/ 'Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst" (5.4.69-72). Without the intersubjective temporality of their friendship, both Valentine and Proteus are left alone in a flattened singular time—Proteus by his own choosing and Valentine by circumstance. Valentine's cursed time contrasts Proteus's redemptive time, but both temporalities share a detached flatness outside of a temporal economy that percolates with multiple exchangeable times. Presents flow towards

[47] Hunt points out that only the Duke has the power to give Silvia away and that Valentine is demonstrating his friendship and love rather than actually giving away Silvia. Though Valentine might love both Silvia and Proteus, he nevertheless, chooses to share his desire for her with Proteus.

redemption or destruction abstracted from both individual temporalities and the institutions that make them commodifiable.

Proteus's apology is a recuperation between affect, time, and commodity. First, he acknowledges the intersubjective affects of shame and guilt, which eliminate his newfound self-hood, "My shame and guilt confounds me" (5.4.73). Then he asks for forgiveness, asking Valentine to reestablish a bond of friendship, and offers his sorrow as payment, re-commodifying and re-containing his emotion: "if hearty sorrow/ Be a sufficient ransom for offense,/ I tender't here" (5.4.74-6). His affects do not create time. They become commodities that enter back into the flow of affective and temporal exchange within the framework of ideal male friendship between Proteus and Valentine. Valentine accepts his affects as payment, "Then I am paid," and reestablishes the preexisting binds of friendship anew, "And once again I do receive thee honest" (5.4.77-8). The offering of a commodified affects as gifts of apology in the form of guilt and shame jumpstart the circulation of presents and reintegrate Proteus's redemptive time and Valentine's damned time back into institutional time. Valentine tells Proteus that "By penitence th'Eternal's wrath's appeased" (5.4.81). He invokes here a Christian ethic of repentance and forgiveness, but the effect of repentance is not a reintegration into some transcendent and godly time but a reintegration into the proper time of institutions.

In return, Valentine offers his own affects in order to complete the circulation of affective and temporal exchange. In the moment that Couch and Wells criticize, Valentine offers his love for Silvia to Proteus, "And that my love may appear plain and free, / All that was mine in Silvia I give thee" (5.4.82-3) Usually, Valentine's offer is understood as an offer of Silvia to Proteus as a commodity. Hunt, however, points out that "The words— 'All that was mine in Silvia'—do not refer to any rights of ownership, but to his love" (Hunt 19). I agree that he is offering his love for

Silvia to Valentine. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of whether Valentine is offering Silvia or his love for Silvia to Proteus can be made sense of in temporal terms. Proteus's attempted rape of Silvia contracts both her past and future into a violent present. Contracted as present, she becomes temporally exchangeable. That is, her temporality becomes limited and more easily exchanged. Similarly, Valentine's love for Sylvia also becomes commodifiable within a system of temporal exchange. Valentine is able to spend the present Proteus has made of Silvia. Proteus, of course, marries Julia in the end, and Silvia's temporal flattening is implicitly undone by the institutions of marriage and the protection of her own place in the Milan hierarchy. Proper time becomes restored through the circulation of affects and the temporalities they produce or destroy within a disciplinary institutional system.

Titus Andronicus: Futurity, Blackness, and a People To-Come

The future in Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus* appears foreclosed by an overly zealous adherence to past texts, whether they be Roman laws, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, or Titus's and Aaron's letters.[48] Yet, in a play in which action is motivated by an obsessive repetition of the past through textual exegesis, there is nevertheless the promise of an aberrant to-come that injects vitality into concepts of subjectivity reliant upon scripted predestination and immobility. That future belongs to Aaron's black baby, whose arrival is perhaps the only progenitor of futurity in the play. Nevertheless, both Aaron's child and ideas of the future have received little sustained critical attention, despite the child's infusion of futurity into an otherwise apocalyptic play and its unique status as one of two babies to appear on Shakespeare's stages.[49] One notable exception to this critical omission is Ian Smith's chapter "*Titus Andronicus:* A Time for Race and Revenge" in which he considers the birth of Aaron's baby as a metaphor for rebirth as well as the racial stakes of imagining the Renaissance as non-white.

Smith argues that Aaron's child serves as a racialized symbol of Renaissance rebirth. The baby also metonymically stands in as a racialized text, literally presented at the conjunction of text, clothing, and skin—evacuating the distinction between the aesthetic and rhetorical. As a racialized symbol and text, the baby acts as a reminder of the suppression of African histories and narratives in Petrarch's influential formulation of the Renaissance. Thus, the baby highlights the violence that is required to form any sort of "pure" rhetoric or discursive history. For Shakespeare, Smith goes on, the baby not only acts as a reminder of the violence that purity demands but also as a metatheatrical commentary on Shakespeare's theatre. He argues that the

[48] See, for instance: Chapter 3 of J.K Barret's *Untold Futures* and Danielle A. St. Hilaire's "Allusion and Sacrifice in Titus Andronicus."

[49] The other baby that appears in Shakespeare's plays is notably Queen Elizabeth I at the end of *Henry VII.* Andrew Sofer discusses the baby prop at length in his article "'Take up the Bodies': Shakespeare's Body Parts, Babies, and Corpses. Sofer, Andrew. "'Take up the Bodies': Shakespeare's Body Parts, Babies, and Corpses." *Theatre* Symposium. Vol. 18, 2010. pp.138.

black baby can be read in part as a response to anti-theatrical polemics on the theatre's contamination of society: "Read metatheatrically, the black child-as-text reveals how the theatre as a marginal institution is conceptually allied to Africa in Shakespeare's elucidation of discourse contamination" (Smith 296). The baby's survival and future thus offer a critique of an imagined racial purity, an emphasis on the violence necessary to imagine and sustain a past, and an assertion of the transversal power of theater to deliver messages across boundaries.

Smith's conception of Shakespeare as an opportunistic racial apologist is, in my opinion, overly generous. However, Aaron's baby does unmistakably recuperate a future, within and beyond *Titus Andronicus,* that is inextricably linked to blackness. The play performatively thinks through the processes of becomings-black and the social, political, and physical factors and emergent consequences that becoming-black precluded for early modern English audiences. Beginning with the silent arrival of Aaron and the opening question of inheritance and rule that is ultimately answered by the birth of Aaron's baby, *Titus Andronicus* asks its audience to consider who the people to-come are and how will or won't they be scripted by the people that came before them. In other words, it asks us to imagine how futures are created for peoples that do not yet exist as collectives, groups, or political stakeholders and how creative powers shape those futures.[50]

This chapter focuses on the baby's relationship to Aaron, his effects on Aaron's temporality, and the role he plays in creating a new world for which Aaron becomes both the

[50] The "people to come", in this case, are Aaron's baby and other black political subjects as well as the civil society that is produced through their own incorporation. These people-to-come are an imagined community rather than a "real" one. That is, Africans and other dark skinned people were a part of the English population from at least the 16th century, and made up a significant enough amount of the population in the 17th century that Elizabeth I issued edicts to counter the growth of a black populace. See for example, Onyeka's *Blackamoores: Africans in Tudor England, Their Presence and Origins*; Anthony Barthelemy's *Black Face, Maligned Race*, Matthieu Chapman's *The Anti-Black Racism in Early Modern English Drama: The Other Other*, Gustav Ungerer's "The Presence of Africans in Elizabethan England and the Performance of "Titus Andronicus" at Burley-on-the-Hill, 1595/96," Kim Hall's *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England*.

discursive field and ontological ground. The baby plunges Aaron into the event of its birth, and Aaron responds by fashioning the future of history in his own image through a recalibration of the narratives that are told and the ways in which they produce what Gilles Deleuze calls "sense," or the becoming of meaning. I argue that Aaron creates a future for his child through "fabulation,"—as conceived by Bergson, Deleuze, and Guattari-- and that he not only exposes an underlying history or writes over an existing one, but forges a creative sense of history in which material bodies, events, and immaterial concepts are reevaluated in a new world in which his child is already included. The consequence of such a positioning of Aaron is that Shakespeare deploys blackness as a concept and device that leads to both a destruction of the past and a creation of an open future.

Fabulous Exchanges

The life of Aaron's baby is granted by Lucius in exchange for Aaron's spectacular story of "wondrous things":

> Lucius, save the child,
> And bear it from me to the empress.
> If thou do this, I'll show thee wondrous things
> That highly may advantage thee to hear.
> If though wilt not, befall what may befall,
> I'll speak no more but 'Vengeance rot you all!' (5.1.53-8)

Aaron's story functions as a bargaining chip and as a rhetorical context within which the baby is wrapped. His words become the child's inherited and life-saving history.[51] Aaron's bargain has

[51] Smith gives considerable attention to the conjunction of rhetoric, vestments, and race in *Titus Andronicus*, arguing that Aaron's black baby works metonymically as a materialization of theatrical discourse that responds to anti-theatrical polemics with a spectacular critique of Plutarchian Renaissance defined through the expulsion of the discursive and physical African body. For Smith, Titus's weapons wrapped in text and the black baby swaddled in

two distinct parts. The first is a promise to show "wondrous things," and the second is a demand for a religious promise from Lucius: "Therefore I urge thy oath; for that I know/ An idiot holds his bauble for a god/ And keeps the oath which by that god he swears,/ To that I'll urge him: therefore shalt vow/ By that same god, what god soe'er it be" (5.1.78-82).[52] The double promise binds Aaron to Lucius and Lucius to Aaron's child and his social and ritualistic beliefs—partial catalysts for the violence of the play. The double promise also is bound by and depends on a pattern of violence that makes the promises and oaths made throughout the play indeterminate.[53] There is thus also a doubly indeterminate future: the future of the baby if the promise is upheld and the future of Rome if the first promise of its ruler is broken.

Aaron is wary of the indeterminacy of promises, so he reinforces them through a type of fabulative bargain in which the story he tells, however truthful, becomes the core of the history passed on to the Roman people for judgement at the end of the play. After recounting most of Aaron's story, Marcus asks the people of Rome, "Now judge what case had Titus to revenge/ These wrongs unspeakable, past patience,/ Or more than any living man could bear./ Now have you heard the truth: what say you Romans?" (5.3.124-27). Marcus expects the people to judge the Andronici favorably while demonizing Aaron. However, Aaron's story is ultimately the one recounted. His actions are up for judgment rather than the Andronici's. His narrative emerges as the origin-story of Lucius's Rome, and his wish that "Some devil whisper curses in my ear,/ and

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clothing form a nexus from which Aaron's baby emerges as a child-as-text, which serves the purpose of critiquing early modern England's inheritance of the concept of Renaissance. Smith's compelling reading serves to elucidate the metonymic power of Aaron's baby as a resistance to the "conformity to canonical texts [that] breeds hegemony while fostering a repressive hostility to other rival texts or traditions." Nonetheless, the function of Aaron's story must be considered on its own terms, both as a rhetorical, social, and political context into which the baby is born and a series of consequences that emerge from its survival within the framework of the play and its performance.

[52] Of course, this is the second time that Aaron saves his child, but in the first instance, Aaron uses his sword and his power over Tamora's sons to carve out a future for his child in the wilderness rather than in civil society in which his baby is set to be reared after his defense of it against Lucius and the Goths.

[53] See Thomas Anderson's "'What is Written Shall Be Executed': 'Nude Contracts' and 'Lively Warrants' in *Titus Andronicus*" for more on promises and their function in *Titus Andronicus*.

prompt me that my tongue may utter forth/ the venomous malice of my swelling heart" comes true as his words resonate through the Roman future (5.3.11-3).

The "fabulation function" that Aaron deploys is first introduced as a concept by Bergson in his *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, in which Bergson identifies the two sources of morality to be intelligence and intuition: the first facilitates the production of a static society, while the second facilitates the production of an open society; he associates the first with science, codification, and mechanism and the second with art, philosophy, and mysticism. According to Bergson, the fabulation function is a function of closed societies, which are delimited by habits and customs that, as Ronald Bogue puts it, "render social life automatic and somnambulistic" (Bogue 93). It creates myths in order to protect individuals and societies from despair and from ideas that might be detrimental to bonds and obligations that hold an individual or society together. In other words, the fabulation function forms protective illusions.

Understood through Bergson's explication of the fabulation function, Aaron's wondrous story of evil that he exchanges for his son's life operates as a fabulation, or myth, through which Lucius's Rome will be foreclosed. Aaron scapegoats himself for his son and his son's place in Lucius's new Rome. The story he promises to tell generates an obligation from Lucius and binds the baby to the new society, which must remain closed. It is both the first promise of Lucius's soon-to-be Rome and its cornerstone so far as obligations, for Bergson, are what bind individuals together into groups that extend out in concentric circles to form society. However, the promises Lucius grants threaten to destroy Rome to the extent that the baby, its possible claim to succession, and the future within which it is included already opens Rome to an untidy and permeable narrative through which the definition of "Roman" becomes fluid.

From the outset, then, the story that saves Aaron's child and establishes Lucius's first bond is also the myth that threatens to break Lucius's new Rome apart because it casts the boy as the product of Aaron, who embodies evil, and Tamora, who both becomes beastly and gives the boy a claim to succession. The boy becomes shrouded in the myth of evil that forecloses Lucius's Rome. Simultaneously the first cornerstone obligation of Lucius's Rome and marked for expulsion by Aaron's fabulation, the boy unfolds into the embodiment of an indeterminate future as a scapegoat that remains within the state--a final revenge on Rome.[54]

Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of fabulation, however, facilitates a different interpretation. Deleuze and Guattari are attracted to the concept of fabulation, in part, because of its hallucinatory and creative elements.[55] Bergson separates creative emotion from fabulation because he characterizes creative emotion as a quasi-mystical unveiling and fabulation as a mechanical response that illustrates the deep-seated habits and customs of protection in a society. For Deleuze, as Bogue points out, "the 'leap forward' [of genuine creation] *is* the shock of the event, and fabulation is part of the genuinely creative process that makes of the event the occasion for the invention of a people to come" (Bogue 97). Fabulation becomes no longer an automatic response for Deleuze but an emergent force that, in part, creates the event itself in so far as making sense is always already a series of becomings-otherwise.[56]

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[54] Smith and Chapman similarly highlight Aaron's baby as an ultimate vengeance on Rome. They argue that this was a way for Shakespeare to play on English racial anxieties and titillate audiences for whom the inclusion of Aaron's baby as part of their history would be regarded as an abomination.

[55] For instance, Bergson offers an example from his correspondence with William James in which James describes his positive response to an earthquake through a recontextualization of the event through a joke between him and a friend. Bergson argues that James engages with the fabulation function in order to protect himself from the event. His argument is that the event catalyzes wonder and an attribution of personhood to the ineffable event as a *response* that makes sense of the event. For Deleuze, however, fabulation has a genuinely creative function that is tied up for Bergson with creative emotion and open societies. Ronald Bogue further develops this idea in his various discussions of fabulation.

[56] Here we must think the distinction between common sense and sense-making found in *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*.

In this light, Aaron's "wondrous things" is a creation of an event that is the fabulation for a people to-come embodied by his baby. It is also a catalyst for a Rome with a wholly new arrangement of subjectivity and desire. According to Bogue, the fabulative function for Deleuze can be thought in conjunction with two concepts introduced by Guattari: the social nature of desire and the group subject. The simple consequence of these two concepts is that desire is never individual nor independent, but is always produced, mediated by, and produces a social formation. Further, the individual is always a collective. That is, as Reynolds argues, subjectivity is always transversal to the subject. A subject is a series of changing subjectivities that pass, expand, contract, and escape. If the subject is plural and desire is social, the fabulative function works as a naming-function that rearranges the social through its auspice. It serves to create a new open territory rather than to reinforce an identificatory border.

In the case of Aaron, the fabulative function serves to reorganize social relations for his baby. Throughout *Titus Andronicus* social organization revolves around racialized histories that are both mobile and a kind of delirium crafted, in part, by Aaron's "wonderous things" that retroactively names the association between blackness and villainy. Such an organization is racial without necessarily being overdetermined in so far as Aaron's and the baby's social relations are always mediated by race and almost always by blackness-- intense without yet being fully representational because race and blackness remain somewhat fluid and fraught throughout *Titus Andronicus*. The concept of race that organizes much of the social order in *Titus* is challenged by the arrival of Aaron's baby, which temporarily illuminates the various contesting desires that precede the categorization of social organization: the desires that brought the baby about, the desires that assure its survival, and the desires that produce the society within which it survives and that survives it.

The baby's arrival poses a question to the established order in which race is already coded to skin color. Aaron asks the nurse, "Zounds, ye whore, is black so base a hue?" and in response to Demetrius and Chiron, Aaron praises the constancy of the "coal-black" hue of the baby (4.2.87,101). Though Aaron is associated with villainy, his questioning of the racial logic of the nurse and the other characters is neither villainous, conniving, nor illogical. It is, in fact, the first improvised response that he offers in the play and the first time he steps out of his character as villain. Similarly, in his final moments, Aaron does work to differentiate himself from his baby when he exclaims that he is not a baby: "I am no baby, I, that with base prayers/ I should repent the evils I have done" (5.3.184-85). Aaron both affirms his villainy and distances the association of villainy from his child who is a baby that will both rave and cry and will be offered redemption. The affirmation and distancing answer, in part, the question of whether black is so base a hue in the negative. Aaron, in his last lines, decouples his villainy from his baby, leaving potential for a reorganization of values in which aesthetic blackness is neither base nor evil and the baby can have an aleatory rather than a predetermined future.

The reorganization of values around the baby initiates a contestation of how the meaning and value of race is to be written on the child's body. In his first attempt to save his child, Aaron extols the virtues of blackness to Chiron and Demetrius by juxtaposing the deception of white skin with the constancy of black skin:

> What, what, ye sanguine, shallow-heated boys,
>
> Ye white-limed walls, ye alehouse painted signs!
>
> Coal-black is better than another hue
>
> In that it scorns to bear another hue;
>
> For all the water in the ocean

Can never turn the swan's black legs to white,

Although she lave them hourly in the flood. (4.2.99-105)

In her article "White-Limed Walls: Whiteness and Gothic Extremism in Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*," Francesca Royster remarks that Aaron's overturning of whiteness as natural works in two ways. On the one hand, "Aaron's reversal, insisting on the changeability of white skin, so easily reddened, in contrast to the steadfastness of black skin, helps to destabilize such beliefs" about the naturalness or superiority of white skin (Royster 443). The coupling of the references to reddening along with his portrayal of the two brothers as "white-limed walls" and "alehouse painted signs" characterizes white skin as changeable, cheap, and fugitive in so far as alehouses were, like theaters, associated with criminality and artifice.[57] Here we might also imagine a performative citation of the actor's cosmetic or textile black face worn by Aaron in contrast to the unadorned faces of the other actors. On the other hand, "What is gained in permanence, however, is lost to villainy—Aaron's main point is that the changelessness of black skin is an indispensable aid to the project of dissembling and of covering up wicked deeds" (Royster 443). The actor wearing black face can hide his face better than those not wearing blackface in the theatre, and such an interpretation seems to extend out from an imaginary Rome to a real early modern England. The discussion is complicated by Aaron's awareness of the danger that black skin poses to his boy's life because it marks him as Aaron's, "Nay, he is your brother by the surer side/ Although my seal be stamped in his face" (4.2.128-29). The constancy of blackness, in Aaron's eyes, is both a virtue and a danger for the very reason that it is unchangeable.

Yet, the child's blackness also does not guarantee that it is in danger. Aaron's plot to send the baby to be raised by Muly where he will be away from the threat of the court suggests that

[57] On a detailed history of alehouses and their functions, see Mark Hailwood's *Alehouses and Good Fellowship in Early Modern England*.

the association between blackness and villainy is not total. The immediate risk of the baby to Rome seems to be less that it is black and more that it is Aaron's. As Odom and Reynolds point out,

> Elizabethans feared the dissimulation of the Moor and the black man. If both the Devil and the Moor are potential dissimulators, then it is an easy step to conflate the two. As noted, however, dissimulation and deceit-conceit works best when least expected (the more improbable an event the greater effect it often has). This, in part, explains why all Elizabethan villains were not black or Moorish and why all Moors in dramatic literature were not villains. If dissimulation is a primary fear, and playwrights wish to capitalize on this fear, then no villainous markers should be conventional. (Odom and Reynolds 205-6)

The child's blackness does not make it inherently evil in the discourse of the play, and in fact, its constancy supports the idea that it does not necessarily sow confusion or villainy. Its blackness only makes it potentially evil: both changeable because it can become otherwise and exchangeable because it can successfully thrive in a different family.

The child's blackness is in question since the child is also defined as "tawny," by Aaron who says "'Peace, tawny slave, half me and half they dam!'", emphasizing the racial in-betweenness of the child while simultaneously affirming its potential blackness as "slave" (5.1.27). The child's tawniness, and more importantly, its capacity to survive in Lucius's future Rome, sets its social identity in flux, or as Odom and Reynolds put it, "in a constant process of becomings and comings-to-be" (Odom and Reynolds 219). In a world in which racial markers are not essentialized and the baby's race is not clear, it is strange that in order to save it Aaron should tell his story of villainy—thereby reinforcing associations between blackness and villainy-- in exchange for his son's life.

One response, provided by Odom and Reynolds, is that by affirming the child's blackness, Aaron saves the child because the child is then markedly defined as different and therefore does not have access to Roman power. Thus, there is no immediate possibility of his becoming an emperor and he is not seen as a contestant to the throne. He could have been emperor, Aaron says, "Had nature lent thee but thy mother's look" (5.1.29). Through affirming the child's blackness, he asserts his position as a non-threat. Along similar lines, Odom and Reynolds make the case that the child is also saved because it is the son of Tamora, who is an empress of Rome. The child is thus "in-between" as Odom and Reynolds put it: a powerful figure that is on the margins of political power. He is a figure of potential for the state and a figure whose body is contested.

In contradistinction to Odom and Reynolds, Chapman argues that the birth of Aaron's baby challenges the foundation of the symbolic order that rests upon a relationship between signifier and referent. The baby poses the ultimate challenge to Rome. Because Aaron's child is both a subject and a slave-- present and absent-- both signifier and referent become meaningless and redefinable. His argument rests on a definition of ontological blackness as absence understood through a definition of slavery dependent on Orlando Patterson's three constituent elements: natal alienation, general dishonor, and gratuitous violence.[58] Chapman contends that because Aaron's filial bonds to the child are recognized, the baby is both a subject and a slave. This contradiction leads to a questioning of subjectivity through race, and specifically blackness, which Chapman poses as "if the Slave can now be born a subject, then how does one know what is a subject?" (Chapman 173). He concludes that this collapse of meaning leads to the destruction of civil society that Lucius is left to build anew with no foundation to build it on because the foundations of institutional meaning of subjectivity have been shattered.

[58] See Orlando Patterson's *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*.

However, as a body that is as of yet undifferentiated—the babe as subject or slave—becomes a locus for a production of sense through racial contestation and ontological paradox. Chapman is correct in arguing that, "The final thought of the play, then, is not to offer a plan for rebuilding society, but rather to place the blame for collapse of civil structures onto the shoulders of Aaron's incorporation" (Chapman 173). However, this is only from the standpoint of Lucius who plans to "Then, afterwards, to order well the state,/ That like events may ne'er ruinate" (5.3.201-3). He does not know how to make sense of the incorporation of Aaron and his child, but Aaron puts his own plan that allows the incorporation of the child into motion through fabulation, which turns Aaron's baby into a generative event rather than only a political fugitive. Aaron's fabulation saves his baby and invents a people to-come—that is, his story plays across and through the body of his child and creates a future in which the child is a people.

His story is both a recounting of his deeds and a tale that turns him into a legend—perhaps a legend of villainy, but a legend nonetheless. Aaron tantalizes Lucius with his depravity:

> 'Twill vix thy soul to hear what I shall speak:
> For I must talk of murders, rapes and massacres,
> Acts of black night, abominable deeds,
> Complots of mischief, treasons, villainies,
> Ruthful to hear yet piteously performed;
> And this shall all be buried in my death
> Unless thou swear to me my child shall live. (5.1.61-8)

His introduction of the story and the story itself can be understood as the monologue of a vice character. At the end of his story, he engages in wishful thinking that his words could haunt Lucius forever:

> If there be devils, would I were a devil,
>
> To live and burn in everlasting fire,
>
> So I might have your company in hell
>
> But to torment you with my bitter tongue. (5.1.147-50)

Aaron is ultimately the character who is teller and witness to the history that unfolds, and despite his silencing and death-sentence, he writes the history into which his son is born. In telling the story, he is not purely villainous. He reveals the villainy of the Romans and the Goths, casting doubt on the constancy of relations.

Aaron's story, after all, is partially retold later by Lucius and Marcus who ask the Romans to judge the tale that has been presented to them. And while the Romans judge in favor of the Andronici, the question posed nevertheless unsettles the righteousness of the Andronici. Similarly, Aaron's body physically unsettles the soil in a kind of dishonorable autochthony. Lucius condemns him to be "fastened in the earth" (5.3.182). The condemnation, though horrendous, makes Aaron's body a part of the new Rome in which his son will grow. Much as his "wonder"-filled story saves his child and transforms the relationships between all of the players, so does his body unsettle the earth and the stage if we are to imagine him lowered down the trap door.

Aaron becomes an essential part of what Jonathan Bate says is his element: the pit.[59] Aaron, whose name is a pun on air and references the biblical Aaron's eloquence, becomes the

[59] In his introduction to the Arden Edition, Jonathan Bate writes, "Where the first act is dominated by the question of who controls the upper stage, symbolic of the Capital, of power over Rome, the second is dominated by the pit,

ground of the present past for his baby's future—"fastened in the earth" and thus made both permanent and constant.[60] Through his fabulation, he ends up carving out a space for his child by disarticulating and re-articulating both the value and sense of race and subjectivity. Aaron's baby, as a body across which race, history, and the future are contested, disarticulates Aaron. That is, alongside Chapman's point that Aaron and his baby's relationship are disruptive to the logic of Roman civil society, I suggest that another reason for that disruption is because the baby's arrival discombobulates temporality and meaning.

Minuted

Though Aaron spends his last energies creating a possible future for his child, he is nevertheless untimed by the arrival of his and Tamora's baby. His actions cease to be properly timed or part of a proper time, and he falls into a trap in which his opportunities are not carefully taken advantage of and planned. He admonishes the child for causing him trouble, "Come on, you thick-lipped slave, I'll bear you hence,/ For it is you that puts us to our shifts" (4.2.177-78). Jonathan Bate glosses "shifts" as to cause recourse to strategems or to cause trouble.[61] However, the word "shift," by 1560, had acquired the meanings of both "alteration" and "expedient."[62] The trouble that the baby causes is that it both changes Aaron and forces him to move, think, and act faster than opportunity provides for. Accosted by fortune and the overpowering desire to protect his child, he must depend more on chance than on strategic planning when he goes to the Goths, "as swift as swallow flies," without first ascertaining that Lucius had already gone to the Goths to raise an army against Rome (4.2.174).

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represented by the trap-door. Aaron is in his element here, hiding the gold, springing the trap, leading in the hapless Quintus and Martius. Attention shifts from the body politic to the human body. The forest is a place where desire can be acted out: Tamora comes to make love to Aaron, Chiron and Demetrius rape Lavinia" (Bate 7).

[60] Jonathan Bate "List of Roles," footnote 34.

[61] Jonathan Bate, footnote 178.

[62] For the etymology of "shift" see, https://www.etymonline.com/word/shift. By 1590, shift also mean garment, and the use of the word here further solidifies Ian Smith's assemblage of skin, cloth, and word while adding a distinctly temporal dimension to the tripartite concept that Smith articulates.

Aaron's hasty improvisation is antithetical to his relationship to temporality and pacing in the first acts of the play. Until the nurse delivers Aaron his child, all of his actions are timed precisely and allow him to govern the speed of events in order to guard himself from the untimely. Dori Coblentz notes in her examination of fencing rhetoric in *Titus Andronicus* that "Aaron demonstrates strategic skill at generating and seizing opportunity from his opening lines, where he resolves to "mount aloft" (1.1.512) with Tamora in her unexpected elevation, to his forest entrapment of Quintus and Martius" (Coblentz 66). The seizing of opportunity is kairic, and as Coblentz further explains, Aaron's entrapment of Quintus and Martius "shows his skill at exploiting the spatial as well as the temporal dimensions of Kairos by suggesting the woods" as a space for opportunity (Coblentz 66).

Aaron also self-identifies with time and timing by naming Saturn as the governor of his desires. He tells Tamora, "Madam, though Venus govern your desires,/ Saturn is dominator over mine" (2.2.30-1). The reference to Saturn is both to Saturn the revenger and Saturn the god of time (Kronos) who is grandfather to Kairos. Similarly, Saturn also represents the durational qualities of self-will and sullenness, as Bate points out in his gloss on Saturninus.[63] In sum, Aaron's actions and self-identification as Saturnalian make him a character that is governed by and obsessed with time and timeliness, Kronos and Kairos, until he is swept up into the imperceptible of the untimely—the Aion.

Despite Aaron's identification with Chronos and eventual tarrying with the untimeliness of Aion, Aaron's primarily operates though kairos—a political time that conceptually was important to Elizabethan English political theory, theology, and rhetoric, which articulated the edge between destiny and fortune, plan and action. It concerned knowing how to spot opportunity, when to act, the speed with which to act, and how to appropriately address a

[63] See Bates's footnote 1.

situation. Kairos thus has an epistemological dimension. But as Negri argues, and as Augustine's attention to temporality suggests, kairos also has an ontological dimension in so far as kairic experience changes eternity; seizing opportunity shifts the future permanently.

Negri makes his ontological argument for kairos by defining it as an event of knowing—bringing into being by naming: "Here, knowing (an episteme and a logic that are within the materialist field) is *Kairos*: the event of knowing, of naming, or rather knowing as singularity, interweaving of logical innovation and ontological creation" (Negri 146). In short, kairos is the occasion of naming what an event is within the common, with the common name, and from the edge of time. That is, it is an occasion of naming that is immanent to immediate temporal condition and that takes advantage—a risk or a leap—of naming the unknown in the nick of time so that one as a multitude or a multitude in-itself might participate agentially in creating an event.

Negri frames the problem of decision and creation within the postmodern moment but the problems of postmodernity that he identifies are ones that also appear in the world of *Titus Andronicus*: adherence to tradition, the end of history, over-reliance on past texts to make sense and create futures, and a disjunction between rhetoric and action. From the beginning of his first monologue until his child is delivered to him, Aaron is adept at acting on the edge of time and taking risks to participate in the creation of events. Nevertheless, his initial goal to transcend time, which offers a sensible motivation for his character beyond nonsensical villainy, is to create a dystopia that is evacuated of a fully determined future such that he becomes the master of proper timing and of creating a future through timely naming.

When Aaron first speaks after remaining silent on stage for the duration of the first act, Tamora has just become Saturninus's wife and pardoned Titus to exact her revenge for Alarbus's

murder a different day; Titus has also just invited the royal couple to join him on a hunt. Aaron's monologue, which I quote at length here, moves in four parts:

> Now climbeth Tamora Olympus' top
> Safe out of fortune's shot, and sits aloft
> Secure of thunder's crack or lightning flash,
> Advanced above pale envy's threatening reach.
> As when the gold sun salutes the morn
> And, having gilt the ocean with his beams,
> Gallops the zodiac in his glistering coach
> And overlooks the highest-peering hills,
> So Tamora.
> Upon her wit doth earthly honour wait,
> And virtue stoops and trembles at her frown.
> Then, Aaron, arm thy heart and fit thy thoughts
> To mount aloft with thy imperial mistress,
> And mount her pitch whom thou in triumph long
> Hast prisoner held, fettered in amorous chains
> And faster bound to Aaron's charming eyes
> Than is Prometheus tied to Caucasus.
> Away with slavish weeds and servile thoughts!
> I will be bright, and shine in pearl and gold
> To wait upon this new-made empress.
> To wait, said I?—to wanton with this queen,

This goddess, this Semiramis, this nymph,

This siren that will charm Rome's Saturnine

And see his shipwreck and his commonweal's.

Hallo, what storm is this? (1.1.500-24)

First, he compares Tamora to a goddess and claims that she is outside of diurnal time and "safe out of fortunes shot," literally above the affairs of the world, morality, and the common. Second, he identifies his own opportunity to rise to her heights with her and the perpetuity with which she has been bounded to him by desire that he intends to exploit. Third, he rejects ideas of servitude that bind him to her, "Away with slavish weeds and servile thoughts!" and pronounces that he will be bright and "shine in pearl and gold"—referencing both his garb and his metaphorical position. Finally, he names Tamora: "this goddess, this Semiramis, this nymph, this siren that will charm Rome's Saturnine."

Aaron's naming of Tamora as goddess differs drastically from Saturninus' naming of her as his queen. Saturninus's naming is contractual and binds her to himself as a desirable object who will remain secondary to him, "a handmaid be to his desires,/ a loving nurse, a mother to his youth" (1.1.336-7). Her desire and time become subject to Saturninus through his act of naming, which marks her as his. Aaron's naming, on the other hand, encapsulates her powers, desires, and potentials. It unbridles her from time understood as a cataclysmic series of events. It reimagines her as both eternal (beyond fortune) and creative (even if the creation is a destruction of Rome). In other words, his naming of her is kairic and timely—crafting her ascension as a temporal and manifold event through his almost miraculous capacity to exact actions out of words and vice versa.

Aaron's capacity to name Tamora as an event and facilitate her capacity as goddess and charmer of Saturnine is informed by his faculty to know and weave "logical innovation with ontological creation" throughout the play. As the most literate character of the play—commanding both writing and interpretation as tools to further his own goals—Aaron's words and his knowledge hold the most power for four acts. Meg F. Pearson even describes Aaron as the primary tutor of the play, teaching a methodology of vengeance based on writing, as opposed to speech, to the Andronici.

This type of knowledge is primarily spatial. Pearson notes that Aaron relies heavily on the word "plot"—a word that appears twelve times in *Titus Andronicus* and almost nowhere else in Shakespeare's cannon-- to describe his methodologies (Pearson 40). Plot simultaneously means a parcel of land, an outline, a scheme, and a story—all designators used by Aaron to break up, master, and control action. At the same time, his knowing depends on a properly timed naming so that action and plot correspond in an event. That is, his timeliness is a production of knowledge with material effects that are plotted. He is able to use language to create events, such as Tamora's rise, and then to rise above fortune to plot out—spatialize—time so that there can be no future and he can remain above time.

His ability to know and to name also scaffolds his facility to promise, which binds time to a plot. The distinction between a promise and a name rests primarily on the relation that both have to futurity. Naming creates a larval future without requiring the stability of that future. Promising assures a future and requires that future to be upheld intersubjectively and institutionally. Naming, in other words, creates a future as a condition for the promise that can both be upheld through exchanges and encapsulates the threat of violence that upholds those exchanges. The interaction between naming and promising undergirds what Reynolds calls the

"naming-function" which "reveals that proper naming need not operate simply in one direction, from sociopolitical conductors of state power to subjects, but also in reverse, differently, multi-directionally, and multi-dimensionally; interpellation does not just demarcate, it also liberates and mobilizes" (*Transversal Subjects* 280). The naming of Tamora by Aaron allows him to interpolate both Tamora and Rome as an outsider. At the same time, he is able to redefine Tamora and Rome on his own terms from outside the boundaries of the State.[64]

Aaron's first promise is to himself: that he will "be bright, and shine in pearl and gold," and his second promise is to Rome: that the queen he has named "will charm Rome's Saturnine/ And see his shipwreck and his commonweal's." The promise he makes is contingent on his ability to properly name and know Tamora's position and her relation to time, which much like morality, is beneath Tamora who is above Fortune. Aaron's accompaniment of Tamora to her position permits him to see and know time as clearly stretched out below him so that he can manipulate it to make his rhetoric turn into action through promissory language. That is, he is able to promise as an act of prophecy to actualize his knowledge and rhetoric through naming.

His second promise is exacted from Chiron and Demetrius, who interrupt his monologue with a squabble over their lust for Lavinia. Through a series of imperative commands to Chiron and Demetrius, Aaron obtains a promise from both to do violence against Lavinia through his "stratagem," which puts the action into motion.[65] Aaron's ability to make language perform action through imperatives and promises interweaves, as Negri puts it, "logical innovation and ontological creation" that build upon his initial act of naming Tamora outside of fortune and his promissory prediction that he will shine bright as Tamora who, with his help, will destroy Rome.

[64] Jeannette S. White similarly argues that Aaron is "constantly and consciously trying to subvert the established order as he perilously negotiates his space as subject and rejects his position as 'other'" (337). Matthieu Chapman also argues for Aaron's subjectivity, though as mentioned previously, for him the contradiction between his subjectivity and slave status is what ultimately subverts the established order both epistemologically and ontologically.

[65] Thomas P. Anderson

On the royal hunt, the directionality of the relationship between language and materiality is reversed, though the emphasis on naming and temporality remains. Aaron enters the stage alone to conceal a money bag in the forest as part of the second fork of his plot to obliterate the Andronici: the killing of the emperor's brother Bassianus. Aaron explains his plot to the audience as he hides the money bag: "Know that this gold must coin a stratagem/ Which, cunningly affected, will beget/ A very excellent piece of villainy" (2.2.5-7). The act of hiding begets the act of naming mediated by gold. Whereas in the case of his interaction with Chiron and Demetrius, Aaron uses the imperative in order to induce a promise from them, in this case Aaron uses the imperative and, anthropomorphizing the gold, engenders a naming-function from the gold. It must *coin*-- both mint and invent-- a stratagem. Aaron demonstrates his capacity for deploying knowledge in order to recruit things alongside people to name for him. That is, things and people become extensions of him and the spatiotemporal field that he skillfully maneuvers through at a distance.

When Tamora joins him in the forest, his plot becomes articulated more clearly along terms of desire and revenge. Tamora's entrance illustrates Aaron's careful attention to naming himself. Aaron's desires are governed by Saturn—by both mutability and timeliness. His mutability, however, is vigilantly controlled by him: continuing his project of controlling the extension of his rhetoric and naming. He makes sure that Tamora does not misread his signs and poses a rhetorical question: "What signifies my deadly-standing eye,/ My silence and my cloudy melancholy,/ My fleece of wooly hair that now uncurls/Even as the adder when she doth unroll/ To do some fatal execution" (2.2.32-6)? He denies that these are signs of desire, love, or doubt as they are in Romeo, Proteus, or Antonio's opening scenes.[66] Instead, he affirms that "these are no

[66] Romeo, Proteus, and Antonio all exhibit signs of melancholy that signify their love-sickness.

venereal signs;/ Vengeance is in my heart, death in my hand, Blood and revenge are hammering in my head" (2.2.37-9).

Aaron controls how he is interpreted by negating and correcting Tamora's interpretation of him. On the one hand, his interpretation affirms his vice-like traits to the audience. He is singular in his desire to do evil. On the other hand, it remains consistent with his ambition to rise above time. Unlike Tamora, who has transcended fortune by her position, which laminates her subjective territory as official territory, Aaron must maintain the coherence of his own subjective territory in order to continue operating as if time unfolds beneath him. If he is to cede control of his naming—of himself and others—he, his words, and his actions are to become untimed and subject to Fortune. Aaron does not have an external contract or space such as a marriage contract, a territory, or a filial relation that binds him or supports him and thus he must continue naming and creating promises in order to bind time to himself.

Aaron's need to control his subjective territory extends along racial lines that reverberate with his concerns about his son's blackness. In his rebuff to Tamora's advances, he authorizes the meaning of the uncurling of his "fleece of wooly hair" (2.2.34). Similarly, when Aaron explains his plot to take Titus's hand and his son's heads, he says "Let fools do good and fair men call for grace,/Aaron will have his soul black like his face" (3.1.205-6). The thread of affirming his own blackness extends to his child when he defends it by saying Coal-black is better than another hue "In that it scorns to bear another hue;/ For all the water in the ocean/ Can never turnt the swan's black legs to white,/Although she lave them hourly in the flood" (4.2.97-105). Aaron affirms blackness and its power in defense of the metastability of identity and fluctuation of subjectivity in part because it is his strategy for transcending fortune and remaining in control of the aleatory propensity of the to-come. In each of the examples I have

cited, Aaron names himself and later his child similarly to how he names Tamora, or he conscripts Chiron and Demetrius as well as the coins to be extensions of himself. Even as he extends himself, he attempts to prophetically remain ahead of the temporal consequences of such extension.

Untimed

Ironically, it is his son, the physical extension of himself, that untimes him, briefly unfastening his ability to control his own narrative and unite words and actions with kairic acumen. The arrival of children accompanied by untimely tragedy is found throughout Shakespeare's cannon. For instance, the births of Perdita in *The Winter's Tale* and Marina in *Pericles* catalyze disjunction in both plays. However, in the case of *Titus*, the baby's untiming of Aaron is closely entwined with his son's blackness. His blackness marks him as a bastard. The rejection of Aaron's son on the grounds of his blackness also highlights that Aaron's capacity to create events and unfold time is dependent on control of the naming of his blackness and of his subjective territory within the world of the play. In other words, Aaron's timely avatars only function when they are not black. Blackness, it seems, functions in a different temporal order in *Titus Andronicus*—both exterior and interior to the dialectic temporal logic of vengeance that structures the play.

The temporal difference of blackness in *Titus Andronicus* as well as its mobius-like relation to the temporal order of revenge signals the instability of the marker of blackness in the play—as Reynolds and Odom note—and the productive capacity of blackness—both linguistic and embodied-- deployed by Aaron, his interlocutors, and the events that he participates in. Its instability produces temporal disjunction that requires either the strict control of time (in the case of Aaron) or its unravelling (in the case of his child). Either way, within the world of *Titus*

Andronicus, blackness facilitates a temporal cut or caesura as an event that immediately precipitates a new future dominated by the future-oriented becomings-black of Aaron, his son, and Rome.

Aaron's untiming launches him into a temporal cut, or what Deleuze calls Aion, which transverses past and future through an empty present of becoming—simultaneously redefining both the past and future. Aion is coupled with Chronos for Deleuze: two categories central to his conception of the production of sense. For Deleuze, Chronos categorizes the physical changes of things, their interactions, and their mixtures. It is, in other words, embodied time that is perceptible via a phenomenological approach through which the present comes to encompass the past and future. It allows for the teleological trajectory that can be drawn from Aaron's coupling with Tamora to the birth of his son, which lends explanatory power to his predicament through a series of causal relations. Aion, on the contrary, as Daniela Voss succinctly summarizes, "is defined as 'virtual time' that slips away from the present by extending indefinitely into the past and future. Aion is the time of pure events" (Voss 15). Through the lens of Aion, the arrival of Aaron's child is an event that throws time out of joint and launches a series of imperceptible becomings. Chronos functions through what is visible and perceptible, while Aion functions through the imperceptible.

Kairos, in Negri's explanation of the term, is at the edge of Chronos and Aion. In the quotation cited earlier, he writes, "Kairos is the classical image of the act of releasing the arrow; here in postmodernity, it is the absolute singular ontological occasion of naming being in the face of the void, anticipating and constructing on the edge of time…and so making the name adequate to the event and constructing legitimation, not over or beyond, but within the common" (Negri 142). The idea of "making the name adequate to the event" resonates with Deleuze's Stoic-

inspired conception of the relation to events. “Nothing more can be said,” he writes, “ and no more has ever been said: to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth and to break with one’s carnal birth—to become the offspring of one’s events and not of one’s actions, for the action is itself produced by the offspring of the event” (*The Logic of Sense* 149). The becoming worthy of an event for Deleuze is a becoming-with the event that is similar to Negri’s Kairotic naming of events insofar as it creatively entangles event and actor but different insofar as it emphasizes the imperceptible and processual.

In Deleuze’s description of becoming worthy of the event, the emphasis on birth resonates with the actual birth of Aaron’s child, which is the event that Aaron becomes worthy of. That is, the birth of Aaron’s child catalyzes a rebirth of Aaron, unmooring him both from a plotted past and future. He no longer acts based on his actions but rather through the event of his child’s birth, which comes to define his role and eventually mark him as an imperceptible part of the event of his child for whom and because of whom he comes to redefine not only his own past and future but also the past and future of Rome itself. He becomes an actor that acts his role in events rather than a character who plays an already predetermined part.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze juxtaposes God and actor as representations of Chronos and Aion respectively. “God lives in the eternal present,” in contrast, “The actor belongs to the Aion: instead of the most profound, the most fully present, the present which spreads out and comprehends the future past, an unlimited past-future rises up here reflected in an empty present which has no more thickness than a mirror” (*The Logic of Sense* 150). The mirror’s surface and thickness are useful metaphors to understand the distinction that Deleuze makes. God is aware of all of the future and past extending out indefinitely like a reflection in the mirror that shows both

what is behind and ahead even if what is ahead reflects what is behind. That is, looking in the mirror allows for anticipation of what is to come by showing what is coming. The actor, instead, inhabits the space that is the thickness of a mirror as an empty present and which has no clear continuity.

The empty present for Deleuze belongs to the third synthesis of time articulated in *Difference and Repetition*; he defines it as a cut or a caesura in time that can be infinitely divided and is paradoxically uncontrollable. Similarly, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write the Aion is "the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already there that is at the same time not-yet-there" (*A Thousand Plateaus* 262). In order to act in the Aion, the actor must play a role "that is never that of a character; it is a theme (the complex theme or sense) constituted by the components of the event, that is, by the communicating singularities effectively liberated from the limits of individuals and persons" (*The Logic of Sense* 150). In other words, the actor no longer belongs to himself but rather to the event and its constituent combinatory elements, which initiate the actor in a becomings-imperceptible such that "the actor maintains himself in the instant in order to act out something perpetually anticipated and delayed, hoped for and recalled"(*The Logic of Sense* 150). There is no time for strategy in the infinite present of the Aion. There is only strategy in the eternal present of Chronos. In other words, the Aion is transversal to the past and the future, cutting across it, and the arrival of his baby triggers Aaron to cease playing a character and begin playing a role and work to make sense of the event of his baby's arrival as well as to make sense of the future.

Notwithstanding the way that Deleuze's articulation of these two frames of time find analogs in early modern religio-humanistic debates played out between religious predestination

and freewill, the tension between Chronos and Aion articulates the tension between being timed and untimed, and Kairos stands as a tentative resolution to that tension. Negri's Kairos can be framed as Deleuze's concept of "counter-actualization." Deleuze writes that "the actor redoubles this cosmic, or physical actualization, in his own way, which is singularly superficial—but because of it more distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events—a *counter-actualization*" (*The Logic of Sense* 150). Counter-actualization can be understood as a naming function, which reframes the becoming-imperceptible of an actor in an event into a proper name, a story, or a fabulation.

Aaron ascends to the heights of Chronos and remains there through kairic action—naming himself and the world around him. His child untimes him and as a response, to ensure the survival of his child, he must counter-actualize the event by both naming it and becoming-imperceptible within the world. By world, here, I mean a coherent spatial-temporal scheme in which events unfold along lines of proper time: lines of succession, cause-and-effect, ready-made history, and anticipated future. As Aaron's world and the world of Rome come to an end, Aaron is set upon a trajectory of becoming imperceptible: a future body and word that is to be the ground of the new world that his child is to inhabit. Importantly, his child is not a replicant of Aaron as Lucius's boy is of Lucius. Instead, he is a procreant. Where Lucius's boy is an extension of the past Rome just as he was the key to identifying the connection between Lavinia and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Aaron's boy is not an extension of Aaron. Aaron's child is a caesura that untimes Aaron and bodies-forth the future.

Aaron names his blackness as a strategy to remain a coherent subject that is in control and presumably outside of the fortuitous power of events. Once he is untimed by his child, he

becomes an actor within an aleatory field of events and transitions from becomings-black to becomings-imperceptible even as he kairically counter-actualizes the birth of his child and names him both black and royal. It is under the condition of Tamora's labor that the child is born, but it is under the condition of Aaron's labor that the child's future is generated and articula

ted as procreative instead of replicative—assuring that the child is not killed because it is perceived as a copy of Aaron and assuring that the new world in which Aaron is to be imperceptible is becomings-black.

Facing the Future

The becomings-black of the world is one of the conditions of futurity in *Titus Andronicus*, in which meaning heavily relies upon a rigidly applied majoritarian cultural memory in the form of law, tradition, and classical literature. That is, Aaron's becomings-black, or the blackening of the world, works to put those traditions, laws, and literatures into motion and reorganizes dominant cultural memory.[67] As Deleuze and Guattari write, "*Becoming is an antimemory"* so far as becoming works to deterritorialize, destabilize, and decode (*A Thousand Plateaus* 294). However, decoding is always coupled with a re-coding for Deleuze and Guattari. The decoding or break down of the world of *Titus Andronicus* has been scrutinized by scholars, often through an analysis of the violence done to hands (and their relationship to tongues) as symbols of agency, articulation, subjectivity. Orchestrated by Aaron, who is black and whose deeds are characterized as black, this type of destruction is a manifestation, if an anti-black one, of the becomings-black of the world, such that it becomes entangled in Aaron's machinations.

[67] Becomings-black here is taken to mean as a form of becomings-deviant or becomings minor. Blackness, deviates from the majoritarian idea of Rome within the play. So far as Aaron is the central deviant or criminal within the play, utilizing language, writing, and manipulation creatively in order to destroy Rome, becomings, within the play, tend to be organized along racial lines around becomings-black.

The result of an emphasis on hands and writing is a palimpsested approach to Rome. Aaron utilizes his knowledge in order to erase conventional meaning and rewrite it into and through the violent marking of Roman bodies. As Smith and Chapman argue, the outcome is that Aaron, and particularly Aaron's blackness, are utilized to rewrite history in the interest of playing on early modern racial anxieties over the idea of a "black" history or to use the violence against blackness as an analogy to explore the role of theatre. I agree that blackness is deployed in both ways within the play. However, both observations rely on an understanding of meaning that layers, overlaps, creates territories, and destroys them. That is, blackness bubbles up to the surface of the narrative as a tool of argument or fear. Neither perspective accounts for how Aaron produces new sense—the affirmative surface of nonsense and disjunction-- that ultimately creates a new future as event for his child through temporal and semiotic discord.

In his *Anti-Black Racism in Early Modern English Drama*, Chapman argues that the condition for Aaron's subjectivity, and by extension his becomings, is possible only because "Aaron's transformation to a human subject coincides with the destruction of Roman civil society" (157). The destruction of the Roman world in which *Titus* takes place depends on what Chapman refers to as "semiotic dissonance:" "when a subject expresses a signifier that relates to an unexpected or unknown referent," and as a result "all signifiers would lose the connection to their referent, challenging not only meanings, but also the concept of meanings" (Chapman 161). By exploiting concepts of honor, filial relations, and gratuitous violence, Aaron is able to unmoor the subjectivity of the Andronici through collapsing mechanisms of sense-making and to pose an existential threat to the civil society that makes up both Roman and Gothic worlds.

The process of unmooring subjectivity is expressly tied, for Chapman, to the loss of hands, which signify the destabilization of filial relations, general dishonor, and gratuitous

violence. Subjectivity is further destabilized with the birth and eventual recognition of Aaron's son. The effect of Aaron's narrative intervention is that the "English constructions of subjectivity and civil society are not divine but rather just that: constructions" (Chapman 179). Aaron, then, raises two anxieties. First, that the Roman, and by extension English, order is not divinely predestined. Second, "that the abject black, in this case Aaron, while viewed as a violent perpetrator in modernity maybe the precursor of a new world" (Chapman 179). I would like to add to Chapman's analysis and cast it in a temporal light in so far as Aaron may be a precursor of the new world, but his child is already in the new world. Aaron's apocalyptic blackness generates a future in a play that potentially has none—or even more strongly, he creates a future that is new where there is none. He runs a "line of flight" in an attempt to escape desubjectification towards a "black hole" of singular blackness, but, in the process, he creates a new world.

I agree with Chapman that Aaron destabilizes systems of signification and subjectivity within the world of the play through a literal wounding. Aaron motors the process of deterritorialization of Rome through a series of wounds. Notably, he creates a wound in the stage (the opening of the pit), the ground (within the forest) and the body of the sovereign (as royal family and land) when he orchestrates the murder of Bassianus. Upon finding Bassianus, Saturninus tells Tamora, "Now to the bottom dost thou search my wound:/ Poor Bassianus here lies murdered" (2.2.262-3). Through Aaron's machinations, the royal family is no longer safe from itself. He also facilitates the cutting of Lavinia and Titus's hands, which signify the destruction of both signification and subjectification—taking away the power to write and fight, to mean and to act.

However, I wish to examine how the conjunction of wounding and facialization supplements Chapman's reading and to suggest a mechanism by which Aaron reterritorializes meaning after deterritorializing it. The effect of that reterritorialization is a new system of signification and subjectification through which the future makes sense and which is catalyzed by the untiming of Aaron by his child.

The legibility of faces as signs of internal character or truth is a repeated concern within Shakespeare's as well as other early modern works. We only have to look at discourses on cosmetics, physiognomy, automatons, and courtly manners to notice the preponderance of discourse on the veracity of faces. Much of the problem of facial legibility and recognition that Shakespeare exploits throughout his plays is concerned with the changeability of faces and the question of whether there can be constancy within mutability.[68] Shakespeare regularly plays with the meanings and functions of faces. In *Titus Andronicus*, however, faces are especially pronounced in the production of sense and nonsense that actively blurs distinctions between interiority and exteriority, resemblance and dissemblance.

The power of the face is invoked in moments of emotional intensity when the action about to take place or that has already taken place balances precariously on the node of an identity. The faces invoked are roles that already preexist the characters and the characters either embrace or reject those roles. Lavinia pleads for Tamora's mercy by calling upon her woman's face, "O Tamora! thou bear'st a woman's face!", as Chiron and Demetrius drag her away to rape and mutilate her (2.2.136). Tamora announces Titus's staged betrayal by calling upon the image of a "man's face:" "Then all too late I bring this fatal writ,/ The complot of this timeless

[68] Examples abound: the perceptibility of nobility of Aviragus and Guiderius in *Cymbeline*, Perdita in *The Winter's Tale*, Miranda in *The Tempest*; the meanings of black and white skinned faces in *Titus Andronicus* and *Othello*; the significance of Hero's blush in *Much Ado About Nothing*; the seductive potential of faces in *Romeo and Juliet*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and *Antony and Cleopatra*; the unreadability of Coriolanus's face in *Coriolanus*; and the mock defense based on the veracity of faces in *Measure for Measure*.

tragedy;/ And wonder greatly that man's face can fold/ In pleasing smiles such murderous tyranny" (2.2.264-67). Marcus reads signs of shame in Lavinia's face—the turning of her head, the blushing of her cheeks-- after she has been raped and mutilated. Titus announces his grief through the image of "eternal springtime" on Quintus's crying face.

In each case, the reference to a face is a reference to a particular identity that belongs to a milieu of signification and a discipline of subjectivation. Lavinia's plea to Tamora, for instance, calls various meanings attached to womanhood and for Tamora to act in the moment through the lens of that womanhood: to save her from her impending rape, torture, and mutilation. Tamora, however, wears the faces of an empress and a vengeful mother, and those faces have no sight for Lavinia's supplications. Tamora's multiple faces and roles overlap to produce a kind of in-humanity such that her face becomes unrecognizable. Appealing to both Tamora's royalty and womanhood, Lavinia's final plea asks "No grace? No womanhood? Ah, beastly creature,/ The blot and enemy to our general name,/ Confusion fall—" (2.2.182-84). Lavinia fruitlessly searches for signs that she can successfully interpret and plumb Tamora's subjectivity. In the end, Tamora becomes a creature with which there is no civil communication—a literal black hole towards which Lavinia hurdles to her mutilation and eventual death.

Of the twelve mentions of "face" throughout the entire play, four relate to Aaron. Aaron announces his villainy by claiming that "Aaron will have his soul black like his face," confirming the analogous relationship between interior and exterior, which is reaffirmed by Lucius who wonders, "Say, wall-eyed slave, whither wouldst thou convey/ This growing image of thy fiend-like face?" (5.1.44-5). More importantly, Aaron's face is presumably the last image of the entire play—left "breast-deep in earth" standing beneath the trap-door of the stage. Aaron becomes the face of the stage (whether actually or imaginatively) and his face lives on into the

future via his son for whom Aaron's "seal be stamped in his face." Aaron's face becomes the face of the stage and the face of the future. As Aaron facializes the stage he also becomes a human face that bears responsibility for Rome and upon which justice is done, as opposed to Tamora whose face is devoured by beasts because her "life was beastly and devoid of pity" (5.3.197).

The uncertainty of faces and their effects as well as their racial coding in *Titus Andronicus* function according to the principles of what Deleuze and Guattari call "faciality." For them, the face is separate from the head. It is a deterritorialization of the head, or otherwise an abstraction from the body that occurs through the signifying and subjectifying processes of facialization. Signification and subjectification correspond to the white wall and black hole system that produces and ascribes signification and then evaluates the success of the production against a norm or standard of conformity. Signification is distributed across a white wall. The operative metaphor is that there is an overlay of signification on what is conceived of as a blank surface. In *Titus Andronicus,* all of Rome is over-coded by past law and past-writing. Titus murders Tamora's children, chooses the wrong emperor, and condemns his own children because of an adherence to the past. Simultaneously, Aaron is also overcoded, and successfully resists overcoding that attempts to turn him into a palimpsest.[69] Subjectification creates black holes, which are processes of selection and evaluation of signs that generate interiority and which segment significance—orchestrating signification towards some final disciplinary interpretation or demise. In other words, signification tends towards a process of subjectification because signification is organized through an interpretive frame, which produces the face for Deleuze and

[69] For instance, Kate Lowe in *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe* and Margaux Deroux in "The Blackness Within: Early Modern Color-Concept, Physiology, and Aaron the Moor in Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*" write how Africans came to be identified by their skin color rather than by any cultural, historical, or individual identifying features.

Guattari: the organization of a face, a landscape, a system of signification around ever-shifting black holes of interpretation.

The white wall-black hole system of facialization emerges, in part, out of Deleuze's analysis of sense in his *The Logic of Sense*. The production of sense depends on the disequilibrium between two series: one of excess and one of lack. Deleuze writes in his "Eight Series of Structure:"

> It is necessary to understand that the two series are marked, one by excess, the other by lack, and that the two determinations are interchanged without ever reaching equilibrium. What is in excess in the signifying series is literally an empty square and an always displaced place without an occupant. What is lacking in the signified series is a supernumerary and non-situated given—an unknown, an occupant without a place, or something always displaced. (*The Logic of Sense* 50)

The empty square which characterizes the excess is also the aleatory point, or the empty present, or the Aion that determines the question. Aaron's baby is both the excess for Aaron and for Rome, as well as the aleatory point, which injects chance back into Aaron's temporality. The unknown, or the lack, is the blackness which marks the child, but which is simultaneously constantly displaced and never fully present. The two series meet in the child as event or differentiator, and the child as black child bestows sense on both the signifying series, producing an excess of possible temporalities, and a signified series, contracting those temporalities within the staged Rome. It makes sense of the lack or displacement of blackness and of the excess or shifting place of Rome simultaneously.

As Deleuze notes, this framework is similar to Jacque Lacan's paradox: "two series being given, one signifying and the other signified, the first presents an excess and the latter a lack. By

means of this excess and this lack, the series refer to each other in eternal disequilibrium and in perpetual displacement" (*The Logic of Sense* 48). This is the same paradox that Chapman cites when he argues for the semiotic dissonance that Aaron and his child's incorporation begets: "If the symbolic order is based on notions of absence and presence as argued by Jacques Lacan, then an event combining these two notions into one would throw the entirety of the symbolic order into disarray; all signifiers would lose the connection to their referent, challenging not only meanings, but the concepts of meanings" (Chapman 161). Following Deleuze's logic, however, this paradox of presence and absence, excess and lack, has an articulatory function—articulating a series of excess to a series of lack, "both word and object at once: esoteric word and exoteric object," or, put in other terms, both word and object at once as intensive and extensive (*The Logic of Sense* 51). We can see the resonance between esoteric word and exoteric object and signifying and post-signifying regimes that make up the white wall-black hole system. Yet the face also imposes equilibrium between intensive words and extensive objects and attempts to distribute sense through a singular organizing principle, namely the face.

The child is both racially ambiguous and marked as black, both a product of Aaron's past deeds and a cornerstone of Rome's future. There is on the one hand a constant search to define the child as black, tawny, villainous, toad, slave, royal, and so on, which works as a passing of an empty place along an excess of markers. On the other hand, the event of the baby's arrival begins a series of unknowns. He is displaced in Rome and his placelessness plays out throughout the entirety of the fifth act. The two sides, the search for the baby's meaning and his constant displacement as well as his displacement of the future, move through one another—the contestation over its blackness making sense of the future of Rome and vice versa through the child.

This dynamic begins with the child's face and then extends out to the landscape of the theatre and of Rome. When the nurse delivers the child to Aaron, she tells him, "Here is the babe, as loathsome as a toad/ Amongst the fair-faced breeders of our clime./ The empress sends it thee, thy stamp, thy seal" and, later, the closing argument Aaron offers Chiron and Demetrius is, "Nay, he is your brother by the surer side,/ Although my seal be stamped in his face" (4.2.69-71, 128-29). The baby's face is over-coded by Aaron's stamp such that Aaron's face becomes a kind of despotic face around which all signification passes and which is literally inscribed onto the face of his child. Any sign of the baby that might escape Aaron's face requires a redefinition of the sign away from Aaron. At the same time, his seal marks the baby for death until he literally follows a line of flight by fleeing with his child and then fabulates a tale to assure his child's survival. Aaron's face, as the despotic signifier, is the supreme signifier to which his child, and later Rome, refer back.

Once Aaron is condemned to be buried up to the chest, he is presumably lowered down into the pit of the stage, or at the very least, he imaginatively becomes a face which marks the stage. His facialization, however, is not merely an emphasis on face. As a despotic signifier, his face is that which marks his baby and marks the new history of Rome. Every story and every signifier refer back to him. At the same time, he also becomes the black hole of subjectification through which all signs are interpreted. Lucius's last command is to "See justice done on Aaron, that damn'd Moor,/ By whom our heavy haps had their beginning:/ Then, afterwards, to order well the state, That like events may ne'er it ruinate" (5.3.201-205). Justice must be done to Aaron, but the implication is that Lucius intends to understand Aaron so that he can build a state that will be invulnerable to future Aarons such as Aaron's child, for instance. Thus, the foundations of Roman law evolve out of a probing of the various signs that Aaron produces to

understand him as a subject with interiority that can be learned from and understood. In the end, Aaron is not only a face, but the faciality machine of Rome that is made sense of by Aaron's baby who is the paradoxical excessive-lacking, sense-making mechanism.

That Aaron becomes the face of the future Rome is unique and contradictory. For Deleuze and Guattari, the standard face that codes all other faces is the face of Christ, or the White Man. It is the face by which all other faces are judged and converted or punished depending on their degree of deviance from it. This face is not the only face, but it is the dominant face and it is certainly the standard face of judgment on Shakespeare's stage. Aaron's face is also judged throughout as deviant and he is ultimately condemned to death for both it and his actions. However, he also becomes the landscape of the stage and of Rome—autochtonous to both. His face becomes the face by which all other faces are measured, even if negatively. Perhaps this is Shakespeare's tragic irony meant to play on anti-black anxieties that replaces the head of Titus who rejects becoming a head of state, "A better head her glorious body fits/ Than his that shakes for age and feebleness" with Aaron's face (1.1.190-91). Yet, though Aaron facializes the stage, he is left to die in the end and eventually become imperceptible. His baby produces the sense of his face and the sense of Lucius's Rome.

From the beginning of the play, when Titus refuses to become emperor, Rome is doomed by its own adherence to the past. Throughout most of the play, Aaron works to assure Rome's demise, following a plotted trajectory. However, his baby infuses chance back into his plotting and he is left bargaining for constructing a future for his child's life, who then produces the sense of Lucius's nascent Rome. What we are left with is that future in *Titus Andronicus* is imagined through race and that it is the arrival of a people to-come that catalyzes a reimagining of both

past and future—creating new systems of signification and subjectification and new organs of sense-making.

Virtual Virtue, Time-Binding, and Timelessness in *Pericles* and *The Tempest*

In "'Shaping Fantasies': Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture," Louis Montrose argues that Queen Elizabeth appropriated "the Tudor conception of the Ages of Woman," and that "By fashioning herself into a singular combination of Maiden, Matron, and Mother, the Queen transformed the domestic life-cycle of an Elizabethan female into what was at once a social paradox and a religious mystery" (Montrose 80). She collapsed the multiple times of womanhood into her motto, *semper eadem*, or always the same, which was coupled with her emblem of the phoenix. She figured herself in a timeless and perpetual rebirth. The juxtaposition of timelessness and rebirth constituted both her mystery and paradoxicality. She became the virtual motor and mater of her nation.

Twenty-five years before her ascension to the British throne Juan Luis Vives wrote *The Education of a Christian Woman* in 1523 for Queen Catherine of Aragon and her daughter Princess Mary. In it, he links chastity to knowledge and advocates for woman's agency while relegating that agency to a purely virtual sphere of virtue. The logical end of his argumentation is that a woman armed with education can deploy the seemingly infinite capacity of knowledge to defend herself from the onslaughts of the material world that might corrupt her virtue. With access to a proper education, a woman could become timeless and outside of the circulation of materiality while simultaneously bearing responsibility for her entire community, however large or small, and motor its vitality with the potential of her virtues. In this final chapter, I engage with this idea of timelessness as a cap to my previous forays into the past, present, and future. I argue that Marina in *Pericles* and Miranda in *The Tempest* are characterized by the idea of *semper eadem* as figures of virtual virtue that vitalize the play worlds they inhabit. Though

timeless, they remain polytemporal, and by transversing their temporal bounds, untime their worlds so that they can be timed anew.

After its original publication, Vives's treatise became one of the most popular conduct manuals for women in the sixteenth century and was praised by both Erasmus and Thomas More for its focus on morality and education. Extremely popular in English schools, it was used as a textbook in Tudor schools along with Lily's *Grammar* and before the end of the century, there were at least one hundred editions of the work in the original Latin and in translation (Fantazzi 34). Vives' treatise notably defies teachings that eschewed education for women and emplaced them as objects of exchange in an economy of procreation. Nevertheless, he maintains, sometimes radically, the traditional anti-feminist position that chastity was women's most essential virtue, writing, "In a woman, chastity is the equivalent of all virtues. They are idle and slothful guardians who cannot guard the one thing committed to their care and enjoined upon them with many words and exhortations, especially when no one will take it from them against their will or touch it without their consent" (Vives 85). Reflection upon this claim, he contends, will make a woman a more "attentive and cautious guardian of her chastity."

The emphasis on women's reflection suffuses the three books that comprise his treatise and resonates with his advocacy for women's education. Vives saw women as men's intellectual equals and potential superiors. He argued that the best way for a woman to preserve her chastity was through the accumulation and exercise of knowledge. He defined "virginity as integrity of the mind, which extends also to the body, an integrity free of all corruption and contamination" (Vives 80). The maintenance is a purely mental pursuit for him because the body is of no concern to God and is different in kind from his nature. Vives celebrates the power of knowledge so passionately that he contends that it can protect women from physical harm: "so much

admiration does virginity elicit that lions stand in awe of it. Of how much worth, therefore, is that quality which has so often freed and defended women from emperors, tyrants, and armies? (Vives 83). Citing a variety of examples from mythology and history, he pursues the idea that knowledge is a woman's ultimate safeguard.

The connection between knowledge and chastity that he draws out pivots his definition of a woman's role. If knowledge is the safeguard of chastity, then a woman's role becomes dependent on accumulating and safeguarding knowledge. She becomes the repository of knowledge as well as a vessel for the production of heirs. Vives argues that "Marriage was instituted not so much for the production of the offspring as for community of life and indissoluble companionship" (Vives 175). The role of women according to Vives is to remain virtuous in the protection of chastity through the accumulation and practice of knowledge that extends out to the creation of a more virtuous community and a more virtuous husband. At the same time, the accumulation of knowledge cannot be a mere simulation. He emphasizes that a young woman cannot only appear knowledgeable, but that "she should be in very fact what she appears to be externally. She must both appear and be humble, chaste, and upright" (Vives 115). The type of knowledge that Vives is writing about is a knowledge faculty that is itself virtual.

There is a paradox in Vives' conjunction between knowledge and chastity. On the one hand, knowledge itself is the protective armor of chastity and it has no relation to the body. On the other hand, a young woman must be a virtuous performer, enacting her chastity through practice. The disjunction between body and mind pervades Vives' treatise and slips out especially in his advice to young women venturing out into the public sphere. Knowledge and the mind become safeguards through martial metaphors:

> She should go out at times, if circumstances demand it or a parent orders it. But before she steps over the threshold, let her prepare her mind as if she were entering combat. Let her think about what she will see, what she will hear, and what she will say. Let her reflect within herself that she will be confronted on all sides by things that will perturb and upset her chastity and her good conscience. Against these shafts of the devil hurled from every side, let her take up the shield of the mind fortified with good precepts and examples, a firm commitment to chastity, and a mind intent and fixed on Christ. (Vives 176)

A young woman must simulate all possible interactions in her mind, carefully planning stratagems to parry and rebuff assaults upon her chastity. That is, she must constantly remain in a virtual reality so that she might know all in order to anticipate every possible danger. If she remains in a virtual reality, the logic goes, then she cannot be touched by reality. If she does not engage in speech or action with men or in the public sphere, then she can remain in her virtual reality visualizing and anticipating infinite scenarios.

Jessica Murphy points out that the economic and militaristic metaphors that Vives employs turn virtue into an object that is distinct from its host, which makes women's virtue an unattainable ideal. Vives deploys metaphor in order to move past this problem, but he ultimately fails and falls back into a different kind of absurdity. Murphy argues:

> In Vives' formulation, chastity is thus both weak and strong, both inviolable and vulnerable. Vives locates the harmony of these contradictions in his treatment of the "problem of rape," a problem with which any claim that chastity can keep a woman safe from harm must necessarily contend. The problem of rape is similar to the problem of evil in theology, in that chastity, like faith, carries with it the promise of complete safety

> but does not always deliver. Vives deals with this problem by locating the cause of rape in the woman herself. (Murphy 18)

By arguing that knowledge is the armor of women's chastity, he places women into a virtual realm of which she becomes sole defender. Failure to rebuff attacks on their chastity then makes women responsible not only for the attack but also for the consequences that follow for the family and community at large. Thus, Vives' progressive attitude towards women's education makes women ethically responsible for their communities even as it promises a path to limited subjectivity.

The problem of Vives' paradox rests, on the one hand, at the intersection of passion and reason. He chides the custom of allowing "girls of noble birth to be avid spectators at tournaments of arms and to pass judgment on the bravery of combatants" because "a young woman cannot easily be of chaste mind if her thoughts are occupied with the sword and sinewy muscles and virile strength" (Vives 73). "A woman that contemplates these things," he goes on, "drinks poison into her breast, of which such interest and such words are symptoms" (Vives 73). The body and contemplation of it are infectious in Vives' argumentation. Contemplation of virtue and good judgment allow women, in Vives' view, to temper their passions. This view is later supported by Alexandre de Pontaymeri, whose treatise on women's physiognomy contends that women's humoral inclination towards sadness, when paired with wisdom, makes them more prudent and apprehensive.

The problem of his paradox also rests at the intersection of providence and fortune. Speaking to married women, Vives recommends faithfulness to husbands who are unfaithful. He cites Paul, "An unfaithful husband is sanctified by a faithful woman," in order to argue that if she remains constant, a wife will be rewarded in heaven. He claims that to be unfaithful is to open up

a marriage to chance in so far as "those riches are certain and lasting that are guarded without being exposed to chance, whether from within, as rust in metals, moths in clothing, or from without, as thieves, robbers, a violent and unjust ruler, or a rapacious judge" (Vives 199). Though he is speaking to married women in this case, Vives' exhortation towards constancy follows a similar logic as his advice to unmarried women. They are to avoid the dangers of chance and fortune by turning to knowledge, particularly Christian knowledge.

The figure of a virtuous woman for Vives is a woman who is highly educated and through her knowledge is able to maintain her chastity. The protection of that chastity depends on avoiding the material world subject to fortune. If she is to venture out into the material world and something is to happen to her, the responsibility falls upon her shoulders because it proves that she was either not chaste enough or not knowledgeable enough. This type of failing is a blow to both a marriage and a community, which are both held up by a woman's virtue. In short, in Vives' view, women must carry all of the responsibility of knowledge without the agency of its physical and public practice. At the same time, her knowledge must constantly be practiced. For, following Vives' Aristotelian tendency, virtue is to be practiced, even if that practice is virtual and unproductive. That is, it must be performed, and is only noticed when it is performed improperly. Yet, the practice of virtue is impossibly bound by what Justin Mueller calls "horizontal time-binding" and "vertical time-binding" that emplaces a woman into a sociopolitical hierarchy and demands consent for that emplacement as an assurance that an ideal hierarchy will be maintained through virtual practices of virtue—through a practice of acceptable and unchangeable knowledge.

Mueller addresses the problem of temporality in political theories of obligation—namely, that political theories are often atemporal. Like Vives' manual, which explicitly avoids and

suggests avoidance of the problem of chance, political theories often assume a stable subject within a stable order, and debate the various priorities of that stable order. However, they shy away from interrogating the inevitable breakdown of consent when temporality and chance are introduced into the mix. Mueller identifies two kinds of time binding: "horizontal time-binding" and "vertical time-binding."

He writes, "Vertical time-binding specifies and enables the idealized representative images through which individuals and groups are to perceive, interpret, and live their social lives, and in relation to which they will be ordered, disciplined, and evaluated" (108). This is a type of time-binding that we can see in Vives' use of the image of the Virgin Mary as an ideal that should organize women's behavior. Their obligation stems from an adherence to a pre-established hierarchical order. For instance, a woman must remain constant to her father or to her husband, who in turn is loyal to a state, that in turn follows the ordering of a monarch who presumably retains a hierarchical connection to the church. Plato's *Republic* or Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* are good examples of vertical time-binding. In both, continuity and sameness are affirmed through a posited hierarchy that can be adhered to or deviated from.

Horizontal time-binding, instead, attempts to turn an individual self into an image to adhere to such that there is an attempt to "bind one's concrete self to and through their conventional self across time" (Mueller 88). Horizontal time-binding can be understood as a theory of consent. An individual becomes politically bound indefinitely once they offer consent. The moment of consent becomes crystalized as the moment that justifies continued political obligation. In Vives' book this concept plays out both in the assumption of consent if a woman is assaulted, which marks her forever as impure, or in a woman's consent to marry, which binds her to her husband despite circumstance.

Both horizontal and vertical time-binding work to guarantee political obligation by creating either an image of the state or an image of the individual. In the case of Vives' advice for a woman's education, he devises a formula for both a woman's role in an already extant image of a sociopolitical order and a method for a woman to create the image of an ideal woman through learning a prescribed course of study through which a woman tacitly gives consent to her political obligation. The reasoning is that if a woman receives a proper education, then she tacitly consents to practicing that education properly in the interest of maintaining a well-ordered family and community. If she is assaulted and her chastity is compromised, then she becomes deviant in the eyes of an established hierarchy and is responsible for breaking her consent.

The image of a state or an individual becomes a transcendent image separate from change. One must act in perpetuity according to the precepts of the image of the state or according to the consent already given. This idea of image shares a conceptual plane with Deleuze's idea of the "image of thought," which he develops in both *Difference and Repetition* and *What is Philosophy?*. The image of thought tends towards knowledge rather than learning. That is, it tends towards engaging with knowledge that already exists rather than the becoming of knowledge. In Vives' prescriptive approach, we can see that Vives is interested in women's learning only insofar as it is a learning of an image that can be both adhered to and used as a shield. If a woman presents an image of chastity that is directly representative of her self, then that image will protect her. This image is virtual insofar as it is not located anywhere and requires a constant practice as a repetition of the same knowledge. However, this type of virtuality is different from Deleuze's concept of the virtual, which identifies the faculties and potentials that undergird repetition—an engagement with the becoming of knowledge.

Of course, Vives' text, while popular, was not the only conduct manual for women and should be taken with a grain of salt when considering the lives of actual women. In *Shakepeare and Women,* Phyllis Rackin argues that descriptive writings illustrate the women were active in both public and political arenas. Wendy Wall similarly shows in *Staging Domesticity: Household Work and English Identity in Early Modern England* that women had agency in family economy and household business. Julia Lupton cites manuals such as those of Gervase Markham to discuss women's virtues and their ties to practical life. Natasha Korda asserts the agency of women in *Shakespeare's Domestic Economies*: *Gender and Property in Early Modern England*. Along similar veins, Amy Louise Erickson tracks women's relationship to property ownership in *Women and Property in Early Modern England*. That is to say, women had actual agency in the material world rather than only virtual agency in the realm of knowledge.

In Shakespeare's plays, also, Unhae Langis argues, "Instead of men who guard their sociopolitical, economical, and legal prerogatives in a constant defensive state, it is the women, having less to lose and more to gain in their subordinate position, who are thus motivated for expansive action" (Langis 22). As she points out, Shakespeare's works have a host of female characters such as Helena, Portia, Kate, Rosalind, and Cleopatra that "exceed their male counterparts in both the quantity and the quality of their virtue" and "promote excellence in both personal and civil spheres" (Langis 22). Thus, Langis argues, they forgo the constraints of social constructed images and roles of women to create subjectivities that challenge those constraints.

Yet, Shakespeare's female characters also function, at least partially, along lines of female virtue similar to those outlined by Vives. For instance, in *Pericles* Marina protects herself with her chastity in the brothel. In *The Tempest*, Miranda becomes the promise of Prospero's imagined political community when she is betrothed to Ferdinand. In both plays, Marina and

Miranda act out a virtual virtue that depends on their faculty of knowledge and their chastity. They are differently time-bound, and their practice of their political obligations allows for the happy resolutions of the two romances. The ground that I wish to stake out here is that Marina and Miranda's practice of female virtue as chastity positions them as characters of virtual potential and as temporal motors within the play. That is, their characters contribute to a dimension of possibility within the plays that functions along similar temporal lines as Vives' educated women upon whom communities rest. Their practice of virtue not only makes them exceptional, but also suffuses the worlds of the play with a timelessness *in potentia.* They become the *conditions* for the relations that are reconstituted at the end of the plays. Two threads of virtue thus are weaved through both Marina and Miranda: the image of virtue grounded in a stable and consumable knowledge, and the faculty of virtue that depends on agential practice.

Marina's Timeless Repetition in *Pericles*

Pericles narratively depends on a repetition of pasts, events, genres, and forms. Lauren Shohet argues that "reiterative identity" in *Pericles,* belonging to the genre of romance, is "productively polychronic," as Jonathan Gil Harris and Julian Yates use the term, and "does not collapse the present into the past, or endlessly repeat an inherited past in the present, but rather fully inhabits a variety of temporal levels" (Shohet 111). She juxtaposes Antiochus's daughter and Marina in order to illustrate the opposition between miscategorizing temporal orders and thus flattening them to a brute repetition and a maintenance of polychronisity and temporal difference that "preserves life and meaning in romance" (Shohet 112). Shohet says that "embracing the wrong generation," Antiochus sleeping with his daughter, "flattens temporal difference" (Shohet 112). The flattening of temporal difference, in *Pericles,* is a poison. The

repetition of the same leads to a collapse of time and a collapse of life. We can see this is in the effects of Antiochus's riddle on Pericles.

After Gower tells the audience about Antiochus's incest, Antiochus, Pericles, lords, and peers all enter to music in their richest ornaments. The song of Gower is given more texture by filling it out with spectacle, and the action begins on the rich terrain of a riddle that Gower has already answered, but which cannot be spoken once the riddle is exposed to the characters. Though it cannot be spoken, it is already answered by both Gower and the display of severed heads. The riddle is a meta-riddle of how Pericles and everyone else involved must act in order to survive. As a meta-riddle it functions as a riddle of faculties and performance, asking the question of how one is to perform in an impossible situation in which every answer is already anticipated and leads to death. It arrests action insofar as it is meant to leave the solver between silence and death.

If Pericles speaks the answer to the riddle that everyone already knows, then he dies. To speak the answer rather than to think it subjunctively is to give it extension and die for having turned knowledge into action. However, if Pericles does not answer the riddle or answers it incorrectly, then Pericles himself becomes spectacularly extended and he joins his fellow suitors to be part of the theatrical display as an image of silence to which future suitors will be similarly bound. In order to survive, he must defer the riddle or somehow both speak and not speak the riddle at the same time in a way that simultaneously anticipates and simulates all possible solutions, which together will hopefully shield him from both corruption and death. As long as the answer remains an unspeakable thought that is performed virtually by Gower outside of the play world, Pericles can continue to live.

This is exactly what Pericles does. He refuses to answer the riddle while maintaining that he knows the solution. He argues his refusal through the metaphor of books: "Who has a book of all that monarchs do,/ He's more secure to keep it shut than shown" (1.137-38). The metaphorical book becomes the answer to the riddle as a third term mediator. At the same time, it implicitly refers to Gower, who is reciting the story of the book. Here, there is also an implicit reference to the theatre itself, a kind of encyclopedia in which all the world is to be presented. Knowledge, in this metaphor, is to be kept outside the realm of action.

Pericles does act; he escapes, but his escape traces a series of courts in which he progressively has agency stripped from him until he is left speechless bobbing in his ship. The repetition of courts, disasters, and escapes leave him eventually silent and without faculty. In each court that Pericles travels to, he recreates the initial scene with a difference, but the repetition always leaves him without self-reflection and in a perpetual deferral to things: monuments, clothes, and books. In the court of Tarsus, he is monumentalized and made forever present without a past or future. Washed-up on shore after his shipwreck, he forgets himself and becomes propelled purely by desire, "What I have been, I have forgot to know,/ But what I am, want teaches me to think on" (2.1.69-70). In the court of Simonides, Pericles is fashioned anew through Simonides' bookish metaphor of marriage. In each case, Pericles's renewal is bound to an object that collapses him into a perpetual present without recourse to memory or faculty.

Shohet argues that Pericle's forgetting to know provides evidence for a clear separation between past and present that contrasts the temporal flattening of Antiochus's incest. She says,

> As a romance hero whose innate nobility of character subtends alteration in outward fortunes, Pericles separates past from present: he has in the present moment 'forgot to *know*'—to dwell consciously on what has been. This leaves both past and present intact

> and available for interrelation in future moments, where satire instead forgets or neurotically repeats. (Shohet 111)

In this passage she is also comparing *Pericles* as romance to *Troilus and Cressida* as satire. While there is a separation of past from present in that moment, as there is in each of Pericles's scenes, the past and present tend to collapse into the objects—metaphorical or otherwise—that allow him to persist. He is infected by Antiochus's flat temporality and indeed stuck in a neurotic repetition through which he is reinvented but does not reinvent himself. Instead, Marina is the character who leaves "past and present intact" and is able to successfully wed the two for the creation of a livable future.

Marina is born into a storm of repetition: another tempest, another tragedy, another instance of Pericles tossed about in a storm. Her first appearance on stage is in the arms of her nurse, Lychorida, who gives her over to Pericles and announces, "Take in your arms this piece/ Of your dead queen" (11.17-8). Marina is a piece of Thaisa, already born into an image of the woman. Moreover, she is a piece of Thaisa's virtue. Lysimachus tells us as much when upon speaking to a now teenage Marina, he gives her coins for her virtue and tells her, "Thou art a piece of virtue" (4.5.116). What are we to make of this phrase, "a piece of virtue," which Prospero also says to Miranda when talking about her mother, "Thy mother was a piece of virtue?" (1.2.56).

To be a piece of virtue suggests that there is a whole virtue that one becomes a part of. It is a type of Platonic virtue that depends on an image of virtue to be faithfully or unfaithfully copied. If one is a piece of virtue, then one is supposedly a part-as-copy of a greater virtue that exists beyond changes and eventualities. As a copy, or a piece, Marina becomes horizontally time-bound by her mother's consent to virtue and repeatedly enacts her mother's performance.

The idea of copied knowledge, or copied virtue, pervades Marina's narrative. Her survival depends on the performed repetition of her virtue, which supposedly protects her throughout her narrative.

For her to continue virtuously through the continued repetition of her tale she must never forget. Simon Palfrey, says that Marina's stormy birth,

> embodies both a recollection *and* a repetition of being born and made from such storm and loss. Indeed, every one of Marina's scenes replays the original one. It is always 'in her mind'—it is the thing she chooses to speak about to Leonine, it is the first thing she returns to when the pirates sell her to a brothel, it is the necessary password to reconciliation with her father. For Marina absolutely will not forget: she discovers story in the body and keeps it there. Her body and mind must *bear* the repetitions, and must do so despite rather than because of her choices. ("The Rape of Marina" 150)

Unlike Pericles, who forgets as he is propelled in his originary secret from one object-crowded scene to another, Marina never forgets. By never forgetting, she is *able* to bear repetition.

The capacity to do through recollection is highlighted by Bergson and his adherents such as Deleuze, Virno, Negri, and Agamben, as we saw in previous chapters. Soren Kierkegaard similarly locates potential in repetition and differentiates it from recollection, synonymous with spectacular memory, which, he believes, like Nietzsche, bogs down action. Kierkegaard writes,

> Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards. Repetition, if it is possible, thus makes a person happy, while recollection, makes him unhappy, assuming, of course, that he actually gives himself time to live and does not, immediately upon the hour of his birth hit upon an

excuse, such as that he has forgotten something, to sneak back out of life again. (Kierkegaard 3)

Marina, by constantly speaking about her past, rehearses her unhappiness and elicits sympathy from her interlocutors. Simultaneously, by repeating the past again, she also moves forward and is able to make herself happier. She repeats backwards in order to repeat forwards in a type of eternal return which allows both her and others to overcome their own apparent, or actual desire.

One of Palfrey's main points is that because Marina is repeatedly threatened with loss, the deferral of finality erases the terror and sympathy that the audience would otherwise feel for her perpetual abuse at the cusp of violence and violation at the hands of Leonine, the pirates, and the various characters seen and not seen in the brothel.[70] She elicits sympathy through the repetition of her story within the world of the play but not within the world of the audience. This point is significant because she is then able to be the virtual character that can infuse the other characters, especially Pericles, with vitality through the deployment of her virtues. As Palfrey puts it, "The layered models of character—type, allegory, mutating individuality—together bear and bear witness to the self-constituting reality of the repetitions she experiences" ("The Rape of Marina" 150). That is, the repetition of her story in the brothel, to Leonine, and eventually to Pericles, continues to open up new possibilities of action rather than repeat the same story in a perpetual deferral to third terms.

Marina's virtue and her virtuosic performance of it asks us to reassess what "a piece of virtue" might mean. As Lorrain Helms shows, Marina challenges the traditional hagiographic character of what Helms calls a "Prostitute Priestess."[71] Marina is not miraculously protected by God, as in hagiographies, but she is protected through her rhetoric. Her rhetoric also becomes her

[70] See Palfrey's "The Rape of Marina," pp.140-42
[71] See Helms "The Saint in the Brothel: Or Eloquence Rewarded."

weapon and shield. Writing about the scene of three whores in *Pericles*, Helms says, "The 'continual action' in which the three whores engage is like military action; in the brothels of Mytilene, sexuality has become a war of attrition" (Helms 327). Like Vives' educated woman, Marina is able to protect her chastity through the use of her knowledge to practice virtue. In doing so, she creates possibility for herself and reshapes the community she inhabits.

During her admonition to Lysimachus, Marina uses martial and economic metaphors in order to convince him to not rape her:

> If put upon you, make the judgement good
> That thought you worthy of it. What reason's in
> Your justice, who hath power over all,
> To undo any? If you take from me
> Mine honor, you're like him that makes a gap
> Into forbidden ground, whom after
> Too many enter, and of all their evils
> Yourself are guilty. My life is yet unspotted;
> My chastity unstainèd ev'n in thought.
> Then if your violence deface this building,
> The workmanship of heav'n, you do kill your honor,
> Abuse your justice, and impoverish me. (19.102-12)

She argues that the governor has power over an entire territory that includes her. Marina asks him to use his own virtue of good judgment and ties his good judgment to the good judgment of the people he has power over. That is, she points to the hypocritical disconnect between judgment and practice if he goes through with assaulting her.

If he uses his power to rape her, then he penetrates his own territory and in penetrating her territory makes his own susceptible to invasion to others who might follow his immoral suit and after whom, "Too many enter, and all of their evils" for which he would be responsible. In doing so, he not only weakens his own territory, but defaces "the workmanship of heav'n" and thus, by mistaking virtual faculties endowed with life by God for the actual exchangeable goods, he annihilates his own authority while impoverishing Marina and, by extension, himself. Her argument then functions on moral, economic, and military grounds. Nevertheless, she does not have dealings with economies or violence. Rather, she maintains her position shrouded in rhetoric and with a capacity to extend it to materiality without participating in it herself.

Similarly, in her second defense against sexual assault from Bolt, she commodifies her virtues in order to maintain her ultimate virtue of chastity. Angrily leaving the brothel and moving past Bolt, Lysimachus tells him, "Your house but for this virgin that doth prop it,/ Would sink and overwhelm you" (19.145-6). Bolt, however misses Lysimachus's point that Marina is offering vitality to the brothel filled with disease and dying prostitutes. She is, indeed, a restorative for the brothel. Yet, for Bolt, chastity is not commodifiable the way the body is. It cannot be split up into parts as Bawd suggests when upon Marina's arrival she tells Bolt, "Bolt, take you the marks of her, the color of her hair, complexion, height, her age…", therefore, his goal is to find a different way to turn her body into an object by separating the virtue from her body (4.2.51-2). Bolt tells Marina, "I must have your maidenhead taken off, or the common hangman shall execute it" (4.5.132-33). She is either to lose her virginity or to lose her head.[72] In this threat, we can see a parallel to Antiochus's threat to Pericles when he displays the severed heads of previous suitors. Marina is placed in an impossible position in which she must become

[72] Angus Easson writes on the conjunction between chastity and death in "Marina's Maidenhead."

commodifiable and spectacular such that her she is to become temporally flattened and reduced to a thing with neither a past nor future—to become hyper-present.

Unlike Pericles, Marina attacks Bolt and appeals to his virtue and to his future. She calls him an object, parsing out his body parts as the Bawd would have done to her, and says he is subject to use by everyone who walks into the brothel:

> Thou art the damned doorkeeper to every
> Coistrel that comes enquiring for his Tib.
> To the choleric fisting of every rogue
> Thy ear is liable. They food is such
> As hath been belched on by infected lungs. (4.5.159-72)

Bolt retorts along similar lines, suggesting other ways in which his body might be segmented, "What would you have me do? Go to wars, would you, where a man may serve years for the loss of a leg, and have not money enough in the end to buy him a wooden one?"(4.5.173-75) He is also caught up in the economy of exchange in which he is to choose between relinquishing virtue and dismembering his body.

Yet, Marina insists that the use of his faculties is a way to reclaim his humanity from the commodification of his and women's bodies. She says, "Do anything but this thou dost. Empty/ Old receptacles, or common shores, of filth,/ Serve by indenture to the common hangman" (4.5.177-79). To seal the deal, she gives Bolt gold and moves beyond rhetoric into the realm of the material. The gold nevertheless remains the product of her rhetoric. She received it from Lysimachus for her rhetoric and then passes it on to Bolt. She does not so much pay Bolt as she becomes a momentary circuit in its circulation.

Though Marina's possession and dispersal of money emplaces her in a material economy, she does not hold on to or gain from the gold. She leverages it as a way to engage Bolt's attention on his terms in order to make her plea to advertise her virtues. She tells him, "Proclaim that I can sing, weave, sew, and dance,/ With other virtues which I'll keep from boast,/ And I will undertake all these to teach" (4.5.186-87). Her ploy works and she is able to keep her chastity, protect it with her knowledge, and give vitality to the brothel through the use of her virtues. We later hear from Gower and Lysimachus that she is able to escape the brothel, set up a make-shift school by the sea and excel as a teacher, singer, dancer, and embroiderer.[73] There, she creates a community that virtuously props her own existence, the existence of her students, and the brothel to which her gains go. Marina creates what Lupton calls a "messianic house of hope" for her various students and for the communities that she supports.

Marina's survival and success depends on a dual repetition: the repetition of her story as well as the repetition of her rhetorical prowess. Through that repetition, she is able to maintain and use her faculties without engaging in the sexual exchange and the material world or in public affairs of governance, war, and economy. She enters into scenes messianically but she does not participate in messianic time. That is, she offers to those she encounters the potential of an imagined timeless equilibrium through the use of her faculties. She remains eternally present as a fount of vitality. In doing so, she infuses her networks and communities with vitality. She also bears the polychronic potential of repetition and infuses Pericles's spectacular repetition with the repetition of difference that virtual virtues, or performances of her faculties, offer. She remains

[73] Elizabeth Archibald points out that most of Gower's lines are dedicated to Marina's domestic virtues as opposed to her intellectual ones. Archibald also compares Wilkin's novel version to the play and finds that much of the description of Marina's education found in the novel is left out in the play. This, she argues, citing Lisa Jardine, points to an ambivalence in the play towards Marina's status as an educated woman. At the same time, her education serves the purpose that manuals on women's education such as Vives's suggest it should: it protects her chastity.

horizontally time-bound by her mother's virtue as well as by the impossible choices presented to her in the brothel, but she is able to assert some agency over that bind in so far as she remains outside actual circulations in a virtual in-between community.

In the end, she enters a marriage economy after resuscitating her father from his stupor. The assumption is that she continues both virtually—never forgetting and always anticipating, maintaining past and future—and virtuously. In his epilogue, Gower summarizes,

> In Pericles, his queen and daughter seen
> Although assailed with Fortune fierce and keen
> Virtue preserved from fell destructions blast,
> Led on by heaven and crowned with joy at last. (12.3-6)

Pericles and Thaisa are included in virtue's preservation from fortune, but it is only Marina whom we see successfully parry aleatory travails. Pericles is "A man whom both the waters and the wind/ In that vast tennis court hath made the ball," bouncing from one spectacular and hypomnetic device to another and one court to another (2.1.58-9). Thaisa is preserved by her virtue, but Marina, whose narrative we follow throughout, demonstrates virtue and brings together the multiple virtual and actual temporalities when she is reunited with her family. She embodies the potentials of narrative and community without fully participating in the dealings of the actual and without losing control to fortune. Through her knowledge, she defends herself, her communities, and the narrative from the assails of Fortune.

Miranda's Virtual Chess in *The Tempest*

In *The Tempest*, Miranda plays a similar role to Marina as the node through which multiple temporalities come together. Lupton, citing the differences between Marina and Miranda in their association to shipwreck, says that "In her habits of habitation, Marina the un-

Miranda" in so far as Miranda is a spectator of shipwreck while Marina is always adjacent to it. "Unlike Miranda's cave," she says, "the soft and airy structure of Marina's coastal treehouse places her in the closest proximity to the ocean in its insurgencies" ("Shakespeare's Dwelling" 76). The difference in "habits of habitation" is also a difference in relations to community and temporality. Miranda, as her name suggests, admires the shipwreck, while Marina, as her name suggests, is of the sea and by the sea. The sea, in Shakespeare, functions as a representation of chance and fortune. It is where actual fortunes are lost and gained as in the case of Antonio in *The Merchant of Venice*, where characters are thrown into new environs as in *Twelfth Night, The Tempest*, and *Othello*, and where characters are imagined to be lost as in *Pericles, Cymbeline*, and *The Winter's Tale*. Marina braves fortune while rising above it through the repetition of her faculties and consent to her own image of virtue. Miranda, on the other hand, is always already distant from chance in so far as she is vertically time-bound by her father and works to maintain a certain hierarchy even as she seemingly deviates from it through her infatuation with Ferdinand.

The Tempest has been subject to numerous studies on both the role of time and Miranda, but less attention has been given to the ways in which Miranda, like Marina, functions as the virtual nexus of temporalities within the play. From the beginning of the play, Prospero's art is his ability to control time through the manipulation of his coerced subjects: Ariel, Caliban, and Miranda. With the help of Ariel, he creates spectacles that amaze but function outside of proper time, eluding the tragedies of chance that can often engender events. His first independent act of art within the play is to wind up time as he condenses an entire history into the span of a few sleepy minutes. Once Miranda is asleep, he also contracts Ariel's time and reminds him of his past torment. James Robinson argues that the contraction of Ariel's time and Prospero's time is

the contraction of natural time and human time—synchronic and diachronic time—into a single flat time in which magic and reality unite. Robinson says,

> The moment of the play, then, is present as a moment of the swift passage of time wherein rides the transient and mutable course of mortal lives and the mysterious course of elemental nature. In so far as the time of *The Tempest* embodies the history of Naples and Milan, it is real. In so far as it is the time of Prospero's providential aegis attended by Ariel, it is magical. The power of the latter will be sued to control the former so that time and spirit of fantasy will become one with the substance of reality. (Robinson 258)

The crux of Robinson's argument is that for action to occur, Prospero needs to wind time like a spring so that its contraction of past and presents belonging to the magical world of Ariel and to his own can motor his action and facilitate the reconstitution of time on his terms and within the time of one day.[74] Prospero contracts all of that time in Miranda, who becomes the embodied potential of Prospero's future.

After Prospero finishes consoling Miranda by telling her that no harm was done to the ship or the people on it, he asks her to take off his "magic garment" and lie down on it. With the ground of his art under her, he envelops her in their shared past. His art of memory is meant to assuage her response to "The direful spectacle of the wreck which touched/ the very virtue of compassion in thee" (1.2.26-7). This moment of consolation, which turns into the story of their shared past, acts as a temporal binding device within the play. Miranda's virtue is contextualized within Prospero's story and Prospero frames her and her virtue as his art—a part of him and his craft.

Unlike Marina, Miranda does not remember. However, her virtue is not contingent upon her memory or repetition. Instead, it depends on Prospero, his occluded wife, and the hierarchy

[74] On the unity of time see both Robinson and Tom Driver.

on and beyond the island. He orchestrates Miranda's experience, and we see his power at the end of his long tale to Miranda, to whom he says "Thou art inclined to sleep; 'tis a good dullness,/ And give it way. I know thou canst not choose" (1.2.185-6). He controls her experience and, by extension, her morality, if we follow Sullivan in his identification of early modern conjunctions between metaphors of sleep and morality.[75] Nevertheless, she, like Marina, is educated and acts as a teacher. However, Miranda is a teacher of Prospero's colonial values rather than virtues. Her teaching revolves around imparting her and Prospero's language to Caliban. She acts as an extension of Prospero, and we learn from Prospero and Miranda that Prospero punished Caliban when he attempted to rape Miranda. Miranda's virtue is protected by her father and her virtues are employed in his service.

Miranda, however, is not without agency. Barbara Sebek and Jessica Slights, for instance, argue that Miranda asserts her agency throughout the play in her refusal of Caliban, her infatuation with Ferdinand, and her self-supposed defiance of Prospero in pursuing Ferdinand. When she first meets Ferdinand the two mistake each other for wonders. Miranda says, "I might call him/ A thing divine, for nothing natural/ I ever saw so noble" (1.2.419-20). She observes his wonder from a distance like the spectacle of the shipwreck and in her amazement she is wonder-struck. Ferdinand, in response, calls her a wonder and asks her "If you be maid or no?" (1.2.428). He asks her whether she is a woman but at the same time he asks whether she is a virgin.

If she is not a woman then she is a goddess, above the worldly plane, and if she is a woman then her maidenhood becomes an important question for Ferdinand who is wondering whether he is wonderstruck by a married woman or an unchaste woman. Miranda affirms that she is "No wonder, sir, but certainly a maid" (1.2.429). Kristin Keating and Bryan Reynolds show that "No Wonder" acts as a pivot into alternative possibilities. It un-pauses the time of

[75] For these connections, see Sullivan's *Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama*.

wonder and launches series of questions that proceed along figuring out what someone or something is if not a wonder.

Miranda provides an answer, "certainly a maid" that prompts more wonder (1.2.429). Who is this virgin who speaks Ferdinand's language and how is she related to the man beside her who speaks of Naples? The multiplication of wonder in this moment incites desire between Miranda and Ferdinand, who are trying to puzzle each other out in their infatuation. It also marks the beginning of Miranda's supposed disobedience against Prospero. Nevertheless, her future with Ferdinand pivots on her maidenhood, which is guarded and used by Prospero and his political hierarchy. Ferdinand exclaims, "O, if a virgin, And your affection not gone forth, I'll make you the Queen of Naples" (1.2.449). If she is not a maid then the multiplication of wonder between the two dissipates as does the future Prospero orchestrates.

Miranda's first explicit defiance of Prospero is when she tells Ferdinand her name, "Miranda—O my father, I have broke your hest to say so!" Though a clear defiance of her father, it is a negligible one. She doesn't help him accomplish his task and she doesn't recruit Caliban to help him either. In her defiance, like Marina, she remains apart from labor. That is, her defiance is rhetorical. In Ferdinand's estimation, Miranda's rhetorical prowess is unmatched. Compared to the many other women whose "tongues hath into bondage/Brought my too diligent ear" none are like Miranda who "So perfect and so peerless, are created/ of every creature's best" (3.1.41-2,47-8). Though Shakespeare does not give Miranda the same kind of rhetorical fireworks as he gives Marina, we can imagine through Ferdinand's love-sick ears that she is as skilled. Her greatest virtue that she offers him, by her own admission, is her modesty, or chastity, which she claims is, "(The jewel in my dower)" (3.1.54). Her potential as a partner and her faculty as an orator is bound up with her chastity, which remains unimpeachable, but her chastity is not protected by

her oratory. It is the art of Prospero who calls Miranda's mother "a piece of virtue," but claims ownership of Miranda, "She said thou wast my daughter" (1.2.56-7). Her defiance is made more negligible by the way her chastity is bound up with Prospero and even more so by his manipulative voyeurism.

Prospero, still, needs her defiance in order for his plan to take shape. He utilizes it as a way to stir both Ferdinand's and Miranda's desire. In her speech that proclaims the compact of their marriage Miranda asserts her desire:

> At mine unworthiness that dare not offer
> What I desire to give, and much less take
> What shall die to want. But this is trifling,
> And all the more it seeks to hide itself,
> The bigger bulk it shows. Hence, bashful cunning,
> And prompt me, plain and holy innocence!
> I am your wife, if you will marry me;
> If not, I'll die your maid. To be your fellow
> You may deny me, but I'll be your servant
> Whether you will or no. (3.1.77-86)

Miranda's desire exceeds all bounds except for chastity. Her desire exceeds the bounds of what she believes Prospero finds acceptable; it exceeds the bounds of her own spectatorship, making her an agential participant in the action; and it exceeds her own capacity to give herself away in marriage. Nevertheless, Miranda promises Ferdinand her chastity whether he accepts her or not. If he accepts her, then the polytemporality of her and Prospero's shared history as well as her and Ferdinand's shared future is put into action. If he denies her, then she is to remain outside of any

actual economy and in the magical space of the island. It is not that we cannot imagine a future for Miranda without Ferdinand, it is that Shakespeare does not allot her the same capacity to do and to perform as he gives Marina. She functions as a node through which all of the timelines of the play pass and upon whom the resolution of the play hinges.

Miranda remains bound to Prospero's hierarchy and his protection but her desire also needs to exceeds those bounds so that there can be any change to the extant hierarchy. Vertically-time bound structures do not change. There can only be deviance from them. The price of disobedience from an established hierarchy is illustrated by Caliban, who is ostracized and scapegoated once he attempts to assert his own will as well as his own plural temporality that emerges from his relationship with the island. His assailing of Miranda threatens her, but it also threatens the permanence of Prospero's hierarchy and the potential that fuels that hierarchy: Miranda's chastity, which contains the possibility of Prospero and Miranda's past and future.

In order to maintain control of the situation while allowing Miranda the agency to multiply the resonance of desire between her and Ferdinand, he takes the role of spectator and praises her imagined transgression: "Fair encounter Of two most rare affections! Heavens rain grace/ On that which breeds between 'em" (3.1.74-5). He is able to encourage their desire while still making sure that Miranda's deviance remains within acceptable bounds. By doing so, he captures her desire and uses it to his own purposes. His control of her desire should not be mistaken for a subversion-containment model. He does not contain her desire. He assures that it remains within the temporality of his making and follows his schedule.

Miranda does not need to repeat performance of her virtue because her virtue is authorized by Prospero. The one instance in which she performs her virtue is in her discovery scene with Ferdinand when Prospero finds the two playing chess. Miranda accuses Ferdinand of

cheating at chess, “Sweet Lord, you play me false” (5.1.171). Once he denies that he is cheating, she dismisses his rebuttal and claims that she does not mind his cheating, “Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle, /And I would call it fair play” (5.1.173-4). She demonstrates her education in her ability to spot Ferdinand’s cheating. She also implies, as per Vives advice, that if there is sexual cheating involved then that is acceptable. She will call it fair. There is some ambiguity here about whether she means that she will call it fair play if he cheats with other women or if he cheats and enters the marriage bed before an official marriage.[76]

In both scenarios, she remains passive. Her passivity is made all the more interesting by the fact that this game of chess is the first instance of martial metaphor in which Miranda is a participant. Her position, however, is not one of defense, but one of acceptance. She does not protect her chastity or her virtue from Ferdinand, who is to be her husband. She passes from one vertical time-binding to another, from Prospero’s hierarchy to Ferdinand’s and, in doing so, she maintains her constancy through which the multiple temporalities of the island pass. Alonso asks, “Is she the goddess that hath severed us/ And brought us together?” (5.1.187-88). She is seen as the conduit and cause of all of the action who remains above it. Her constancy and potential, however, is maintained, in part by her, but ultimately by the structures created by Prospero and inherited by Ferdinand. She remains Prospero’s art even as she retains agency and desire that is used to motor Prospero’s contraction of a troubled past and idealized future into a magical world.

Marina and Miranda are differently time-bound. Marina is horizontally-time bound to the image of her repeated story. Miranda is vertically-time bound to Prospero’s hierarchy. Both characters, however, virtually transverse their bounds. Marina transverses her horizontal time-bind through the repetition of her story and through the repetition of her capacity to perform

[76] For more on the meaning of the chess game, see William Poole’s “False Play: Shakespeare and Chess.”

virtuously. Miranda transverses her vertical time-bind through her defiance of Prospero. In both cases, the characters' transversals remain virtual in so far as even as they transverse their binds, they do so without entering into material circulation and maintain their virtue. Their virtues carry the polytemporal potentials that infuse the resolutions of both plays with vitality. That is, they motor the becomings of the play-worlds without becoming-otherwise themselves and while remaining virtually timeless. As virtual actors they bear the past, present, and future fully without being horizontally or vertically flattened. Through the virtual practice of knowing, they use their virtue to unbind time and motor worlds in which vitality prevails.

Final Thoughts for a Beginning

In this study I have attempted to show how Shakespeare's characters create and circulate temporalities through tarrying with pasts, presents, futures, and eternities to generate rich play worlds within which appearances of subjectivities can emerge. I have tried to show the ways in which specific constructions and intersections of race, gender, and class carry temporalities into Shakespeare's play worlds and the ways in which those temporalities are timed and untimed in immanent systems that perform. Throughout the study, I have returned to the dynamic between the virtual and actual in the plays of Shakespeare and his collaborators that I have analyzed. By analyzing the processes through which the virtual becomes actual in temporal frameworks, I have shown some of the ways in which the plays can be understood as becoming. In doing so, I have tried engage in a conversation about the mechanics of becomings in the plays, which I hope, has opened a door to future study on the ways in which those becomings materialize in performances and adaptations within differing sociopolitical and historical contexts. My main goal was to demonstrate that approaching characters as temporal units can lend insight into the ways in which identities structure characters, characters structure temporalities, and temporalities, in turn, structure identities. I think that this immanent mechanics can have applications in studies of early modern time, subjectivity, and identity.

The specificity of characters and plays that I have analyzed prevent me from drawing sweeping conclusions about time and temporality in Shakespeare's plays except that the production of complex temporal worlds depends on a play between timing and untiming of and between characters with specific discursive identities, whether those characters are humans, animals, or objects. These timings and untimings are not universal or purely formal, but rather are bound to emergent identities that shaped the way temporalities were thought and crafted by

the way those temporalities were represented. Tinkers infuse history with potential, the friendship between a servant and a dog creates alternate presents, a black baby motors a future in an apocalyptic world, and two young women maintain their polytemporal worlds through the transgressive and skilled deployment of their virtual virtue. Further study would more closely explore the temporalities of specific identities across a broader range of works and begin to construct temporal diagrams of those identities that could then be deployed with more nuance in understanding the construction and performance of play worlds.

As this project continued to develop, I found that I persistently returned to a few key themes: spectacle and history, types and uses of memory, and the gap between capacity for action and action. I believe that more engagement with these themes through temporal frameworks could lend further insight into the construction of early modern identities and the ways in which the early modern theatre was utilized to circulate and shape those identities as ideas, measures, and paradoxes of time became more important subject-formations. I also believe that further study into the confluence of these themes could open a path towards thinking of the ways in which characters exceed their representation to be active and vital without psychologizing or moralizing characters, treating them as if they are human. The folding of these various themes generates interiority and intensity without necessarily producing a there-there in characters. Characters shape time and motor Shakespeare's worlds that motor ours in turn.

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