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2017

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

The Use of Treaties in the Achaemenid Empire

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy  
in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures

by

Daniel Beckman

2017

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## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Use of Treaties in the Achaemenid Empire

by

Daniel Beckman

Doctor of Philosophy in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures

University of California, Los Angeles, 2017

Professor M. Rahim Shayegan, Chair

Starting in the mid-fifth century BCE, the Achaemenid Persian empire entered into a series of treaties with various Greek city-states. While treaties had often been used across the Ancient Near East prior to the Persian conquests, they did not play a role in the Achaemenids' imperial strategy; indeed, the Achaemenids did not sign any treaties with any non-Greek state. By examining Greco-Persian treaties, that is, by investigating what the Persians of old might have hoped to gain from treaties with Athens, Sparta, or any other Greek state, the present dissertation seeks to gain unique insight into the Achaemenid imperial strategy.

I demonstrate that the Achaemenid conception of imperial rule may have been partially inherited from their Elamite and Neo-Assyrian forebears. I establish the continuities between Achaemenid rule and that of their Near Eastern predecessors, as well as what constitutes uniquely Achaemenid innovations. I give special attention to the Achaemenid endeavor to exert control over various subjects in their empire by dialoguing with, and even reproducing,

indigenous manifestations of law and governance. However, scholarly models describing the use of local practices by the Achaemenids have been hitherto restricted to regions under direct Achaemenid rule. I argue, however, that the Greco-Persian treaties were most likely resulting from the Achaemenid desire to extend a proven strategy of governance, which aimed at engaging local traditions and practices, beyond their imperial borders. The exploitation of traditional Greek treaty customs allowed the Achaemenids to achieve the stability necessary for the achievement of imperial goals in the region, and befitted their overall political strategy.

The dissertation of Daniel Beckman is approved.

Sarah Morris

David Phillips

William Schniedewind

M. Rahim Shayegan, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2017

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## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to sincerely thank the Roshan Cultural Heritage Institute, who awarded me the Roshan Fellowship in 2015-16. This grant allowed me to focus on completing this dissertation.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my committee for working with me over the past few years, both on this dissertation and in the classroom. Their advice on this work has made it immeasurably better, and the defects that remain are my own.

Finally, I thank my parents and sister for their constant support and love. To my wife, I owe a lifetime of gratitude for everything that she has given me, not least her tolerance. To all my friends, you have my thanks for your unfailing encouragement.



# Abbreviations

ABC	Grayson, Albert. 1975. <i>Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles</i> . Texts from Cuneiform Sources 5. Locust Valley, N.Y., 1975.
ATL	<i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> . Meritt, B.D, Wade-Gery, H.T., and McGregor, M.F. 1939-53. 4 vols. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
Av.	Avestan
BIWA	Borger, Rykle. 1996. <i>Beiträge zum Inschriftenwerk Assurbanipals: die Prismenklassen A, B, C = K, D, E, F, G, H, J und T sowie andere Inschriften</i> . Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
CT	Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets, etc., in the British Museum
CTH	Laroche, Emmanuel. 1971. <i>Catalogue des textes hittites</i> . Paris: Klincksieck.
Ctes.	Ctesias' <i>Persika</i> . Lenfant, Dominique. 2004. <i>Ctésias de Cnide: La Perse, L'Inde, autres fragments</i> . Paris: Belles lettres.
DB	Old Persian inscription of Darius the Great at Bisotun
Diod.	Diodorus of Sicily's <i>Historical Library</i> . Dindorf, Ludwig August, Immanuel Bekker, Friedrich Vogel, and Curt Theodor Fischer. 1888-1906 (reprint 1964-69). <i>Diodori Bibliotheca Historica</i> , 5 vols. Stuttgart: Teubner.
DNa	Old Persian inscription of Darius the Great at Naqš-e Rostam, section a
DPe	Old Persian inscription of Darius the Great at Persepolis, section e
DSe	Old Persian inscription of Darius the Great at Susa, section e
El.	Elamite
FGrH	Jacoby, Felix. 1923-1958. <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Leiden: Brill
Hdt.	Herodotus' <i>Histories</i> . Hude, Karl. 1927. <i>Herodoti historiae</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
HDT	Beckman, Gary, and Harry A Hoffner. 1999. <i>Hittite Diplomatic Texts</i> . Atlanta: Scholars Press.
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
KBo	Hrozny, Friedrich. 1921. <i>Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi: fünftes und sechstes Heft</i> . Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung.
LSJ	Liddell, Henry George, Henry Stuart Jones, and Robert Scott. 2006. <i>A Greek-English lexicon</i> . 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
ML	Meiggs, Russell, and David M. Lewis. 1988. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Oxford; New York: Clarendon; Oxford University Press.
MP	Middle Persian
NL	Saggs, H. W. F. 2001. <i>The Nimrud letters, 1952</i> . London: British School of Archaeology in Iraq.
OP	Old Persian
PIE	Proto-Indo-European
Plut. Alc.	Plutarch's <i>Life of Alcibiades</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 1.2, Leipzig: Teubner, 1959::226-279.
Plut. Arist.	Plutarch's <i>Life of Aristeides</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 1.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1969::249-287.
Plut. Art.	Plutarch's <i>Life of Artaxerxes</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 3.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1971:318-351.
Plut. Cim.	Plutarch's <i>Life of Cimon</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 1.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1969:332-359.
Plut. Dion	Plutarch's <i>Life of Dion</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 2.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1964:93-135.
Plut. Solon	Plutarch's <i>Life of Solon</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 1.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1969:82-123.
Plut. Them.	Plutarch's <i>Life of Themistocles</i> . K. Ziegler, <i>Plutarchi vitae parallelae</i> , vol. 1.1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1969:157-197.
RIMA	Grayson, Albert. 1992-6. <i>Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian Periods</i> , 3 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
RINAP	The Royal Inscriptions of the Neo-Assyrian Period, 4 vols. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
RO	Rhodes, P. J, and Robin Osborne. 2003. <i>Greek historical inscriptions: 404-323 BC</i> . Oxford,

- England; New York: Oxford University Press.
- SAA State Archives of Assyria, 19 vols. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
- SAAS State Archives of Assyria Studies, 21 vols. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
- SI Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 1967. *The Aramaic Inscriptions of Sefire*. 1st ed. Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute.
- TAD *Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt*. Edited by B. Porten. Jerusalem, 1986–99
- TEPE Porten, Bezalel. 1996. *The Elephantine Papyri in English: Three Millennia of Cross-Cultural Continuity and Change*. Leiden, New York : E.J. Brill.
- Thuc. Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Jones, Henry Stuart, and J. Enoch Powell. 1942. *Thucydides Historiae*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- TLC Kitchen, K. A., and Paul Lawrence. 2012. *Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Tod Tod, Marcus Niebuhr. 2nd edn. 1946. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Xen. *Cyr.* Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Marchant, E. C. 1910. *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*. Vol. IV. Institutio Cyri. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Xen. *Hell.* Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Marchant, E.C. and Underhill, G.E. 1906. *Xenophon: Hellenica*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## Vita

Daniel Beckman received his BA in History from The College of New Jersey in 2008.

# 1. Introduction, History of the Scholarship, and Methodology

During the years between the Persian Wars and the signing of the King's Peace (490–387),<sup>1</sup> the Achaemenid Empire frequently engaged in diplomatic exchanges with Athens, Sparta, and other Greek states. Part of this activity included treaties that established territorial borders, declared an end to violence, or promised military and economic assistance. Since we have no record of the Persians entering into such agreements with any other states, we must ask why they deemed it fitting to do so in these cases.

The nature of this dissertation requires the bringing together of many separate sub-topics. For this reason there are very few modern works that deal with our subject as a whole. However, there are a small number of works that ought to be recognized here, as they provided the background and inspiration for my contribution. To my knowledge, the first modern scholar to address Greco-Persian interaction from a Persian perspective, and to conceptualize it from the standpoint of a potential long-term imperial strategy, was A.T. Olmstead. His 1939 "Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem" describes the stepwise process by which each new development in their contact with the various Greek states taught the Persian administration new lessons in regional diplomacy: the exploitation of divisions within and between the *poleis*; respect for Greek military capabilities; reliance on local governments, both democratic and tyrannical. Olmstead recognizes the slow, steady advance of Persian power into the Greek world over many decades, and avoids the ancient Greek tendency to over-emphasize their momentary triumphs at Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis.

In his *History of the Persian Empire* (1948), Olmstead continues in the same vein. He recognizes the role played by Persian diplomacy during the fifth century, insofar as Persian

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<sup>1</sup> All historical dates in this dissertation are BCE unless otherwise noted.

officials were able to play the Spartans and Athenians off one another, although he attributes this more to Artaxerxes' "lack of interest" in the Greek wars than any intentional strategy.<sup>2</sup> For all of Olmstead's achievements with this work, his ideas about the Persian court are taken almost verbatim from the Classical historians, and thus he accepts the Orientalist image of the decadent king distracted by his harem and mastered by his wives and mother. And while he does acknowledge that the Greco-Persian conflict, from the imperial perspective, was a series of minor border clashes,<sup>3</sup> nevertheless he describes the Persian war-chest as funded by the reckless impoverishment of Asia for the purpose of bribing Greek politicians.<sup>4</sup> Although his book encompasses the entirety of the Achaemenid period, and so extends beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should also be noted that Olmstead subscribes to the theory of Persian 'decadence' in the fourth century.

Throughout the text, Olmstead surveys the events of the empire, relying on the various primary sources available. The book's chronological arrangement forces him to jump between the Aegean, Babylon, Egypt, Judah, and Persia. Each region is treated as essentially separate, and there is little attempt to synthesize events or to understand the imperial policies that may have been at work. Because Olmstead believed that Zoroastrianism was a recent and ardently monotheist faith in the Persian empire, he understood the empire's toleration of polytheism as in conflict with the tenets of the official faith, a necessary evil forced upon the pious Achaemenids by the "temples and their too powerful priesthoods."<sup>5</sup>

Jack Balcer's 1989 "The Persian Wars Against Greece: A Reassessment" does a better job of contextualizing the Greek campaigns within an expansionist policy: "It had not been the

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2 Olmstead 1948:353.

3 Olmstead 1948:310.

4 Olmstead 1948:358.

5 Olmstead 1948:195.

reckless Athenian attack upon Sardis in 498 B.C., that spurred the Persians into Greece, but rather the new imperial policies of the Great King after 520 B.C., to expand into Egypt and Nubia, into western India, and into European Thrace, Macedonia, then Greece and ultimately Athens.<sup>6</sup>" This imperial policy, as Balcer explains in a later work, is one of constant expansion, very much in the Assyrian tradition, whereby it was the king's "imperial duty, a role fundamental to his cosmic kingship...to exceed his royal predecessors in the gradual and natural expansion of his Achaemenid Empire and to sustain the viable royal purpose to lead his nobles as their hero-king."<sup>7</sup>" This policy played out in Europe first during Darius' Scythian campaign of 513, in which Darius sought both to subdue the dangerous nomads beyond his Western borders, and also to secure significant economic benefits. Thrace was a region rich in minerals and lumber, which could be exploited by Persian subjects in Ionia, Cyprus, and Phoenicia.<sup>8</sup> Yet there is no evidence that the conquest of Greece was planned from the outset. Instead, it became necessary only after Athens refused to take in Hippias as tyrant. Darius was faced with the moral and legal obligation to punish this crime, and war was the only solution.<sup>9</sup> For his part, Herodotus states that the Athenians resolved to "be hostile" (πολεμίους εἶναι) to Persia and were thus already "at variance with the Persians" (διαβεβλημένοισι ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας) when the Ionian Revolt began. Considering that neither Darius himself, nor any of his satraps in Thrace or Asia Minor, made any attempt to punish Athens before they aided the Ionians, I do not believe, as Balcer does, that Cleisthenes' democratic reforms were actually interpreted as grounds for war. Balcer also argues that the Spartan threats to Cyrus back in 545 had put that city on a hit-list, about which the Persians

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6 Balcer 1989:128.

7 Balcer 1995:147.

8 Balcer 1995:156. The Scythian campaign with will explored in greater detail below, p. 175f.

9 Balcer 1995:159: "When Athens established a democratic government in 507 B.C., Persia branded it rebellious and illegal, and remained her official enemy. For that breach of the vassalage treaty, the Persians would punish and subdue Athens."

apparently forgot for the next half-century or so.<sup>10</sup> It seems to me that Balcer is implying that there was, in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, a "state of war," in which no hostile action whatsoever took place during the course of regime changes and revolutions, yet still remained in effect as some sort of international legal abstraction. While we would do well to recognize the regular hostility and instability in the Aegean region, it is certainly more accurate to define as a state of war only those periods where war is undertaken, or at least attempted.

I have labored on about this point because Balcer seems to hold conflicting ideas about Persian imperial law. He states that, following the Persian defeat at the Eurymedon in c. 465, Xerxes refused to negotiate with Athens, but simply decreed that peace now existed.<sup>11</sup> Balcer is clear that the Persian King is the arbiter of peace and war: a war begins because Cyrus was threatened or insulted (even though he took no military action); a war ends because Xerxes no longer desires it (even though Athens continued to attack Persian territory). How, then, do we wind up with the Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia in 449/8?<sup>12</sup> Even though Balcer understands—as I do—that the Peace followed a Persian defeat off Cyprus, which forced Artaxerxes to the negotiating table,<sup>13</sup> he cannot explain why Artaxerxes would agree to sign a treaty, when Xerxes was able simply to make peace by fiat. Why would the Great King of Persia abase himself so shamefully by negotiating with Greeks?

Balcer is more helpful in explaining the treatment of local customs within the empire. Like others before him, he recognizes that the Persian "accommodation" of local religions and

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10 Balcer 1995:81. This is based on Hdt. 1.152-3: "[Cyrus] said to the Spartan herald, 'I never yet feared men who set apart a place in the middle of their city where they perjure themselves and deceive each other. They, if I keep my health, shall talk of their own misfortunes, not those of the Ionians.'" This is a vague threat, not a declaration of war.

11 Balcer 1995:315.

12 The details of the Peace of Callias, as well as the controversy surrounding its date and very existence, will be addressed below, p.236ff.

13 Balcer 1995:323-5.

political customs was not a policy "set by lofty idealistic bureaucrats or even an enlightened king, but generated by necessity as the better means by which to rule a vast heterogeneous empire."<sup>14</sup> This policy is most obvious when observing the relations between the Persian rulers and the non-Persian local nobilities throughout the empire, and the promotion and manipulation of local traditions, which were an essential part of the long-term success of the empire. However, according to Balcer, this policy arose even before the foreign conquests began. Balcer emphasizes that Cyrus was "an Achaemenian," a term which, for him, indicates the political union of the Elamites, the Persians, and the Medes. "This mixture of ethnic, linguistic, religious, military, and political groups constructed for Cyrus and his imperial framework the many fundamental principles of Achaemenid cooperation based upon the accommodation with and the utilization of the multiplicity of units within the empire."<sup>15</sup> Achaemenid kingship was defined by accommodation from the outset, and we should thus not expect anything but accommodation of local traditions after the conquests had taken place.

If this was the origin of the policy of accommodation, what was the manifestation of that policy? There are several models that describe Persia's governance of her subjects. One, formulated by Frei and Koch in 1984, argues that local norms were collected, approved, and then projected back upon the subject people with the status of imperial law, in that particular locality. This is the "imperial authorization" model. M.A. Dandamaev later proposed his "local autonomy" model, arguing that the Achaemenids allowed a great deal of autonomy, only interfering when it was absolutely necessary to do so; any restriction of local customs was not only disadvantageous and inefficient, but antithetical to Achaemenid royal ideology.<sup>16</sup> In

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14 Balcer 1995:52.

15 Balcer 1995:53.

16 Dandamaev 1999.



contrast, Lisbeth Fried's "hypothesis of foreign or central control," formulated in 2004, argues that in fact the Persian state apparatus would have tried to limit any autonomy at the local level: "all power was in the hands of the king and his representatives."<sup>17</sup> Finally, in 2013, Elspeth Dusinberre proposed yet another model, the "Authority-Autonomy" model. Whereas Fried envisions constant competition for control at the local level between local elites and the central power, Dusinberre suggests a more flexible model: the center uses its might to exercise authority over issues and arenas that it considered most important (such as military power), and allowed for autonomy elsewhere (such as religious practices). Since 'authority' is defined as "power with a claim to legitimacy, the justification and right to exercise that power,"<sup>18</sup> then the manifestations of central control must be dictated by local notions of legitimacy. So whenever the Achaemenids exerted their authority, they would, as much as possible, work through local institutions or customs to achieve their particular goal.

These models have been applied mainly to Egypt, Judea, Babylonia, and Asia Minor. This dissertation will not argue for, or against, any one model; instead, by investigating each of these regions, along with Persis, the Achaemenid homeland, we will demonstrate that the mentality underpinning the use of local practices—to the extent it played a role in Achaemenid practice—may have also informed Persia's governance of the Greek world. This solves Balcer's problem: Artaxerxes' decision to negotiate with Athens was not an embarrassing admission of defeat, but instead a typical manifestation of Persian power. By manipulating a Greek legal tradition, Artaxerxes was expressing Persian control over Greek affairs.

But before we attempt to answer this question in full, we first must understand the Persian conception of binding agreements. After a review of our main sources in chapter 2, in

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17 Fried 2004:6.

18 Dusinberre 2013:4.

chapter 3, we will explore Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian practices concerning binding agreements and examine whether they might provide insights on Achaemenid procedures and conventions, for which they could have served as models or precedents. We will see, however, that there is reason to believe that the Achaemenids inherited some of the legal and treaty practices of the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian kings in Mesopotamia. While the long history of the use of treaties in the Ancient Near East may have left an impact on first-millennium practices, evidence of a more direct influence specifically on the Greco-Persian treaties either cannot be found, or remains too vague to be noteworthy. Since no other states besides the Neo-Assyrians and Neo-Babylonians (besides Elam) had as much direct and extended interaction with southwestern Iran, our study will not extend beyond these.

Chapter 4 will treat the issue of the transmission of Assyrian and Babylonian practices to the Persian empire. We will argue that there are two likely processes of transmission: Median inheritance and Elamite acculturation. The importance of the Medes in the early Achaemenid state was undoubtedly high, but their specific role and identity is unclear. Some form of Median state or coalition played a very important part in the Near East since the mid-eighth century, but there is no agreed-upon understanding of their political structure. Unlike the Medes, who feature so prominently in the Classical literature, an appreciation for the importance of the Elamites in Persian history is still growing. Recent studies have emphasized frequent contact between Elam, Assyria, and Babylonia in the first millennium.<sup>19</sup> Scholars have also suggested that the "Persian ethnogenesis" may have taken place in this period, specifically the century between the sack of Susa by Assurbanipal in 646, and the rise of the Persian empire, c. 550.<sup>20</sup> As a result of these two

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19 Álvarez-Mon 2013, 2006; Henkelman 2003; Radner 2013; Waters 2013.

20 Álvarez-Mon 2006; de Miroschedji 1985; Liverani 2003; Potts 1999. Stojanowski 1971:92 defines "ethnogenesis" as "the establishment of group distinctiveness." See p.62ff. below for a more detailed discussion of ethnogenesis.

historical processes—Elamite acculturation and exposure to Mesopotamia—the rulers of Persia would have been very much aware of the political realities of the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian states.

As the Persian empire spread across the Near East, they absorbed a variety of cultures, each with their own unique political traditions. Nevertheless, these cultures had a shared history going back several millennia, meaning that there were important similarities between them. In the last years of the sixth century, events in the Aegean world presented a new problem for the Persian empire. The Persian military was unable to subdue a great majority of the region, but Greek interference in Persian affairs (notably, in Asia Minor and Egypt) meant that the Persians could not disengage from the region. However, over the course of the fifth and early fourth centuries, the Greco-Persian treaties allowed the Persian authorities to enforce a greater degree of stability and exert greater control over the region. In order to provide a foundation for understanding these treaties, we will provide an overview of native Greek treaty traditions in chapter 5. We will see that the Greco-Persian treaties—as reported by the Greek sources—were modeled on traditional Greek treaties, not just in form but in conception. Next, in chapter 6, we will demonstrate that, while concluding treaties with the Greek world may appear to be, at first glance, a departure from typical patterns of Persian imperialism, in fact the Greco-Persian treaties were a manifestation of the very same imperial mentality that characterized Persia's interactions with all of her subject peoples.

## 2. Primary Sources

The historical information that we will use to make the argument outlined above—namely, that the Greco-Persian treaties were a result of Persians adopting Greek treaty customs—is based mainly on three categories of primary sources. To the first category belong the writers of the Greek historical tradition, mainly Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch. These authors, between the fifth century BCE and second century CE, provide narrative histories pertaining to the period we are investigating. Each exhibits its shortcomings, but altogether they provide us with the single largest body of source material. When citing these works, I have used abbreviations, all of which are listed on the Abbreviations page. There, I have also listed the Greek editions of these texts which I have relied on. All English translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

The second category consists of Near Eastern texts. One group consists of treaties, which in their majority relate to the Neo-Assyrian era, and may for the most part be consulted in Kitchen and Lawrence 2012, and Parpola and Watanabe 1988. The Hittite treaties have been catalogued and translated in Beckman 1996, henceforth HDT. Other Hittite texts, namely correspondence and inscriptions, can be found in Laroche 1971, henceforth CTH. Neo-Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, and Achaemenid royal inscriptions will also be examined in order to assess how the use of treaties might fit into royal ideology. The Neo-Assyrian texts have been collected and translated as part of the RIMA and RINAP series, as explained on the Abbreviations page. All translations of Achaemenid inscriptions in Old Persian are my own, based on the transliterations and transcriptions provided in Schmitt 2009; Achaemenid royal inscriptions in Elamite or Babylonian have been translated by others, cited accordingly. Moreover, texts will be

included in order to illustrate potential patterns of Achaemenid rule in different satrapies. The majority of the most important records concerning Achaemenid imperial rule in Egypt, Judaea, and Asia Minor have been collected in English by in Kuhrt 2007. All Biblical passages are taken from the New Revised Standard Version Bible, 1995, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Citations from the Cyrus Cylinder are taken from Finkel 2013. Citations from the Elephantine Papyri are taken from Porten 1996.

The final category of primary sources consists of ancient Greek binding agreements. As will be described in greater detail in chapter 6, our information on such agreements come from inscriptions, or later reports of the agreements, as recorded in the histories named above. The inscriptions have been collected in *Inscriptiones Graecae* (henceforth *IG*) and *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (*FGrH*); many have been reproduced in Piccirili 1973, Bengston 1962, Meiggs and Lewis 1988 (ML), and Rhodes and Osborne 2003 (RO), with translations and commentary. This category also includes speeches preserved in the corpora of Demosthenes and Isocrates.

### 3. Near Eastern Binding Agreements

Mesopotamian rulers began concluding treaties in the mid-third millennium, using a variety of forms, aimed at a variety of purposes. This section will begin with an overview of the use of treaties in the Neo-Assyrian period (c. 911–612) and continues with a look at their potential use in the Neo-Babylonian empire. Lastly, we will demonstrate that we are justified in assuming that the Achaemenid Persians could have been aware of, and made use of, aspects of Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian treaty practice.

#### 3a. *The Neo-Assyrian Evidence*

In the Neo-Assyrian period, the kings of Assyria would conclude treaties to secure various benefits for their empire. Our knowledge of these treaties come from two different types of sources:

- Type A: the treaties themselves, recorded on clay tablets, found at Aššur, Nineveh, or Nimrud;
- Type B: references to treaties, found in the royal inscriptions or letters exchanged between members of the state.

As always with the ancient world, many of these texts are heavily damaged or incomplete, so their precise wording and context is not always known. But based on the best reconstructions of the texts we possess, scholars have created the following characterization of treaties in the Neo-Assyrian empire.

Neo-Assyrian treaty texts refer to themselves as *ade*. This word seems to have come from Aramaic into Akkadian, and has a broad range of meaning. Usually it is simply translated into

English as "treaty," but "pact," "covenant," and "loyalty oath" are more appropriate in certain contexts.<sup>21</sup> The Neo-Assyrians would enter into different types of treaties, depending on the relative status of the parties and the presence or absence of hostilities. Although the treaties have been classified in various ways,<sup>22</sup> the most important for our purposes is whether the treaty was (1) bilateral, in which the Assyrians made concessions;<sup>23</sup> or (2) unilateral, whereby no concessions were made.

We should not assume that unilateral treaties were always forced upon vassals or provided no benefits for them; indeed, many vassals sought and received military assistance from Assyrian kings, which invariably entailed entering into Assyrian vassalage.<sup>24</sup> Even treaties concluded with hostile adversaries were designed more to provide concrete benefits to the Assyrian state, rather than to punish the enemy. A defeated state subjected to brutal reprisals was less productive than a well-managed and obedient state; and second, the function of the treaty

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21 "All extant Neo-Assyrian treaties (both domestic and international) are defined as *ade* in the texts themselves...clearly, the word *ade* covers a much broader semantic field than just 'loyalty oath' and is best taken as a general term for any solemn, binding agreement. 'Covenant' would probably be the closest equivalent in English, but 'treaty,' 'pact,' and even 'loyalty oath' are equally acceptable, depending on the context." (Parpola 1987:180–2)

22 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xvi-xxiv also put the known Neo-Assyrian treaties into the following eight categories:

1. Non-aggression pacts
2. Peace and friendship treaty
3. Mutual assistance pact
4. Alliance treaty
5. Treaties with exiled foreign royalty
6. Treaties with Assyrianized foreign royalty
7. Treaties with submissive adversaries
8. Loyalty pact

23 Such treaties were usually made with Babylon, which held a unique position in the Assyrian empire. The only bilateral 'peace treaty' of the Neo-Assyrian period concluded with a state other than Babylon was that of Esarhaddon and King Urtak of Elam (Parpola and Watanabe 1988: xvii), known only from references in correspondence. On this treaty, see p.19 below.

24 2 Kings 16:7–9 records such a pact between Ahaz of Judah and Tiglath-Pileser III: "Ahaz sent messengers to King Tiglath-pileser of Assyria, saying, 'I am your servant and your son. Come up, and rescue me from the hand of the king of Aram and from the hand of the king of Israel, who are attacking me.' Ahaz also took the silver and gold found in the house of the Lord and in the treasures of the king's house, and sent a present to the king of Assyria. The king of Assyria listened to him; the king of Assyria marched up against Damascus, and took it, carrying its people captive to Kir; then he killed Rezin."

was only to enforce the stipulations. Punishment, carried out by curses, could be unleashed in the event the treaties were broken. Nevertheless, a treaty with Assyria meant the loss of political independence for the new vassal state.<sup>25</sup>

In the treaty texts themselves, the Assyrian king is always portrayed as the victorious and superior party, who imposes his will on the defeated enemy or generously grants his favor to foreigners who have sufficiently displayed their fear and respect for his power. The oath to maintain the treaty was sworn only by the other party, never by the Assyrian king; hence, in the event that the treaty was broken, the other party would bear all of the repercussions of the invoked curses, while the king alone had the authority to punish the violators.<sup>26</sup>

Four detailed examples will suffice to show the different ways in which the Assyrians employed treaties: a treaty with a submissive party, a mutually desired peace treaty, a loyalty oath, and a treaty of military assistance, presented in chronological order.

First, a treaty between Aššur-nerari V (754-745) and Mati'-il of Arpad (modern Tell ar-Rif'at, north of Aleppo).<sup>27</sup> Of this six-column tablet, only the last three columns are largely intact. Fortunately, some of the stipulations have been preserved. Mati'-il swears that he will not harbor Assyria's enemies, and will bring his entire army, "together with his magnates, his forces, and his chariotry" on campaign at Aššur-nerari's bidding.<sup>28</sup> The rest of the surviving text mostly consists of curses and divine witnesses. No other texts enable us to put this treaty in an exact context, but later events do provide some assistance. Whatever the reasons for the treaty, Mati'-il apparently decided to break the treaty and join an anti-Assyrian coalition in 745. Because it took Tiglath-

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25 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xvi.

26 Parpola 2003:1057.

27 SAA 2 2 = *TLC* 90.

28 IV.1-3.



Pilaser III, Aššur-nerari's successor, three years to finally defeat Arpad, Parpola and Watanabe suggest that Mati'il had not been defeated by Aššur-nerari, but had instead agreed to submit in the face of an advancing Assyrian army.<sup>29</sup>

This treaty has an apparent connection to another famous set of texts, found at Sefire, also near Aleppo, in 1930.<sup>30</sup> The Sefire treaties provide clues about Assyrian policy in the region, including the context in which Aššur-nerari V and Mati'-il signed their treaty. Three stelae at Sefire record treaties made between the king of Arpad and another party; two (Sf 1 and 2) state that the parties were Mati'-il and Bir-Ga'yah of KTK (the parties are not preserved on the third). There is no agreement as to how the three texts relate to one another, or their exact dates.<sup>31</sup> The identity of Bir-Ga'yah and of KTK are also debated; Parpola and Watanabe argue that "Bir-Ga'yah" is most likely a pseudonym for Aššur-nerari, and "KTK" is a pseudonym for Assyria. In this hypothesis, the Sefire treaties are the Aramaic version of SAA 2 2, although it is important to note that they are not an exact translation, but rather a version more acceptable to Mati'-il's subjects.<sup>32</sup>

However, there are several reasons to doubt that this was a vassal treaty. Noth points out that since Mati'-il was obligated only to render military assistance (that is, he was not required to pay tribute, nor to pay homage to Bir-Ga'yah, and he did not owe his throne of Arpad to Bir-Ga'yah), he cannot rightly be called a vassal, at least in the context of diplomacy in the Ancient Near East.<sup>33</sup> Building on Noth's argument, Altman continues, that Sefire represented a defensive

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29 1988:xxvii.

30 Rozenvalle 1931.

31 Fitzmeyer 1967:1-4.

32 "It does not require much imagination to find a reason for the use of a pseudonym (or euphemism) for a hated overlord in a text like this. It may well have been 'part of the deal,' the only feasible way by which Mati'-il could accept the treaty without being ousted from his throne by the anti-Assyrian elements of his population." (Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxviii)

33 Noth 1961:138-145.

alliance, even if the two sides are unequal. Nowhere does Mati'-il agree to accompany Bir-Ga'yah on an offensive campaign. Finally, on Sf 1 C.1, the signatories state, "Thus have we spoken [and thus have we writ]ten." This implies mutual consent, with no one party dictating to the other.<sup>34</sup>

There is also the question of the identification of KTK, and therefore the tradition to which the Sefire treaties belong. Based on their equating KTK with Aššur-nerari, Parpola and Watanabe have placed the treaties into a Neo-Assyrian imperial context. Aššur-nerari was the only Assyrian king known to have conducted a treaty with Mati'-il, but from that it does not necessarily follow that the king of KTK must be an Assyrian. Parpola and Watanabe state that the "essential features in these treaties (the treaty gods, the structure and formulation of the texts, and the actual treaty terms) imply that the other contracting party was the king of Assyria,<sup>35</sup>" but this is far from established fact. There are phrases in the Sefire texts that are not found elsewhere in the Assyrian treaty tradition, nor in other Aramaic treaties. For example, the parties of the treaty are introduced with the same formula on both the obverse and reverse faces of stele 1, and the gods of both Arpad and KTK are not just enforcers, but parties to the treaty. Furthermore, the presentation of the treaty text on a public stele is otherwise unknown outside of the ancient Greek world.<sup>36</sup> The structure of the Sefire texts is also unlike known Neo-Assyrian treaties. The preserved stipulations in the Sefire treaties are regularly followed with the phrase, "If you do not [perform the agreed upon action], (then) you will have been unfaithful to (all the/the gods of) the/this treaty-oath (which is in this inscription).<sup>37</sup>" In contrast, Neo-Assyrian treaties lay out all of the stipulations, then follow with a long list of all the curses, rather than alternating between

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34 Altman 2008:30-40.

35 Parpola and Watanabe 1987:xxvii.

36 Altman 2008:39.

37 Morrow 2001:84 calls this the "repression formula."

the two, as in the Sefire treaties. According to Morrow, the treaty which most resembles this structure is that of Niqmepa of Ugarit and the Hittite Mursili II.<sup>38</sup> If we were assuming that the Sefire treaties were simply versions of an Assyrian treaty converted into a form more familiar to the local population, then these issues would not be important, and indeed might have been expected. However, since we can no longer state with confidence that there are significant similarities in structure and form between the Sefire treaties and the known Neo-Assyrian examples, the only remaining reason to link the Sefire treaties to the Neo-Assyrian tradition is the mere fact that Aššur-nerari eventually did sign a treaty with Mati'-il.

As Fales summarizes, there are other interpretations of KTK in the Sefire treaties, besides the equation of KTK with Assyria. The spelling *k-t-k* has been interpreted as a straightforward phonetic spelling of a place-name known from other sources. Kaška,<sup>39</sup> Kissik,<sup>40</sup> Kittika,<sup>41</sup> and Kiski<sup>42</sup> have all been suggested, but, as Fales notes, none of these theories accounts for the placement of the stela in Sefire. Malamat, followed by Lemaire and Durand, argued that KTK was not Assyria proper, but Til Barsip, the seat of Šamši-ilu, the Assyrian regional commander, who would then be identified as Bir-Ga'yah.<sup>43</sup> There is, of course, also the possibility that Bir-Ga'yah and KTK appear nowhere else, and will thus remain unidentified.<sup>44</sup>

Even though there are no clues as to the identity of Bir-Ga'yah, we may still hope to identify the kingdom which he ruled. Sf 1 B.8 requires that "not one of the words of thi[s] inscription be silent." B.9-10 then lists at least eight locations representing points within or

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38 2001:88.

39 Dupont-Sommer 1949:55-60.

40 Noth 1961:166-7.

41 Lipinski 2000:224.

42 von Soden 1985:136-7.

43 Lemaire and Durand 1984:37-58.

44 Fales 2010:343-4.

among which the treaty is to be known. Only four of these toponyms survive wholly intact (*lbnn*, *'rw*, *bq't* and *ktk*), and the others can only have suggested reconstructions. Nadav Na'aman has conjectured that the eight locations might represent locations roughly on the borders of the Kingdom of Aram-Damascus.<sup>45</sup> Sf 1 A.5 and B.4 suggest that Mati'-il swore not only for Arpad and his dynasty but for "all Aram;<sup>46</sup>" hence B.9-10 is establishing that the treaty will be heard and upheld throughout all of Mati'-il's territory. Since all of the other locations are organized as opposing pairs (e.g. in the phrase "from Lebanon to Yabrud," Mount Lebanon and Yabrud<sup>47</sup> represent the western and eastern corners of the southern border of Aram-Damascus), the last pair, Beqā' and KTK should also be opposing corners. Since the Beqā' Valley lies to the southwest, KTK should be on the northwest corner. This, according to Na'aman, puts KTK within the Kingdom of Hamath, known from the Assyrian inscriptions from 835.<sup>48</sup> Thus, the Sefire treaties bound KTK/Hamath and Arpad, most likely into a league of some sort, as was a common response to an outside threat; hence the demand for defensive military assistance mentioned already.<sup>49</sup> Considering the above discussion, we should not include the Sefire treaties within the Neo-Assyrian treaty corpus.

But the very content of the Sefire treaties, if we have correctly understood them, implies the existence of an Aramaean league that would be, by definition, to some degree anti-Assyrian in its orientation. Local rulers of this region had been forced into paying tribute to the Assyrians since at least Shalmaneser III's campaign in 858. Assyrian success, culminating in the sack of Damascus in 796, were undermined by internal instability in the following decades. Mati'-il in

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45 Na'aman 1978.

46 Na'aman 1978:223; Mazar 1962:116-7.

47 Mazar 1962:118.

48 RIMA 3 A.0.102.2 ii 86b-89a.

49 Na'aman 1978: 227-8.

Arpad was one of the main beneficiaries of Assyrian weakness, as was Sarduri II of Urartu.<sup>50</sup> The stipulations of the treaty between Mati'-il and Aššur-nerari V are almost totally destroyed, but "The Hatti-Land" and "The Urartian Land" are both mentioned,<sup>51</sup> suggesting that the Assyrian king attempted to divide and conquer the Aramaic-Neo-Hittite allies. Internal divisions in Assyria (in the form of a coup) allowed Arpad to remain free for another decade, but, after securing the throne, Tiglath-Pilaser III wasted no time marching into Northern Syria, and defeated both Urartu<sup>52</sup> and Arpad.<sup>53</sup>

Our only other source of information on the fate of Mati'-il is yet another inscription, one found at Incirli.<sup>54</sup> This hieroglyphic Luwian/Neo-Assyrian cuneiform/alphabetic Phoenician trilingual was raised by Awarikku, king of Que, in commemoration of a land-grant to him by Tiglath-Pilaser III. According to Awarikku, Mati'-il broke his treaty with Tiglath-Pilaser. The poor state of the inscription leaves us with few details, but as a result of Mati'-il's "blasphemy," Tiglath-Pilaser "judged Arpad like Assyria," treating the land as if it were his own territory.<sup>55</sup> Awarikku then narrates his own heroic deeds in the war that followed. As a reward for his assistance, Tiglath-Pilaser granted Awarikku some territories that had previously belonged to the kingdom of Kummuh. The final part of the text is a curse formula, which involves Nergal bringing down plague and fire; but it is too fragmentary to analyze further. Clearly, this version of the events leading to Mati'-il's downfall reflect the official Assyrian interpretation. In adopting

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50 Lipiński 2000:212-218.

51 *TLC* 90 §9.

52 SAAS 2 p59: "743: Tiglath-pileser (III), king of Assyria, in Arpad; defeat of Urartu made..." RINAP 1 text 9.9-16 describes Sarduri's defeat and flight from the battlefield.

53 SAAS 2 p59: "741: Bel-Harran-bel-usur palace herald, to Arpad, within three years taken." A restoration of RINAP 1 text 10.2 mentions Mati'-il, which the editors call "no more than a reasonable guess." RINAP 1 text 12.1-2 describes the wealth which Tiglath-Pilaser III received from Arpad in 738.

54 For text, translation, and commentary, see Kaufman 2007.

55 Left side, lines 4-23.

the justification for the war as his own, Awarikku continued to behave as a loyal vassal, both by reaffirming his commitment to Assyria and by showing the benefits of loyalty to others. There is no information as to whether Awarikku was bound to Tiglath-Pilaser by a treaty, or by some other means.

The fate of Arpad was infamous enough to become a warning to others. Thus, the Sefire treaties may provide some insight on the context within which Aššur-nerari V signed the treaty with Mati'-il. If Mati'-il had upheld his oath, he would have been driven apart from his allies; when he broke his oath, he provided the ideological justification for the Assyrian campaign that destroyed his kingdom.

Our second representative example is the treaty made by Esarhaddon with Elam and Gutti in c. 674. Unfortunately, the treaty itself has been lost, but one of Esarhaddon's royal inscriptions describes it thus:

The Elamites (and) Gutians, obstinate rulers, who used to answer the kings, my ancestors, with hostility, heard of what the might of the god Aššur, my lord, had done among all of (my) enemies, and fear and terror poured over them. So that there would be no trespassing on the borders of their countries they sent their messengers (with messages) of friendship and peace to Nineveh, before me, and they swore an oath by the great gods.<sup>56</sup>

That the Elamite king actively sought out an Assyrian alliance is confirmed by an inquiry sent by Esarhaddon to an oracle of Šamaš:

Šamaš, great lord, [give me a firm positive an]swer to what I am asking you! If Urtak, king of Elam has se[nt this proposal for making peace] to Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, [has he honestly sent] true, sincere words of re[conciliation to Esarhaddon, king of Assyria]? Be present in this ram, [place (in it) a firm positive answer, favorable designs], favorable, [propitious] omens [by the oracular command of your great divinity, and may I see (them)].<sup>57</sup>

Finally, a letter from the crown prince, either Assurbanipal or Šamaš-šumu-ukin, to one Šulmu-

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56 RINAP 4, text 1 col. V.26-33a; ABC 84 iv 17-18 and 126 i. 21-22 both confirm the return of gods of Akkad to Babylonia.

57 SAA 4 74.1-5; although Esarhaddon's inscription does not name the Elamite king, Urtak ruled from 675-c.664, so he is the only possible referent. See Waters 1997:68.

ahu, confirms that the treaty was concluded:

A message from the Crown Prince to Šulmu-ahu: The king of Elam and the king of Assyria, having repeatedly consulted with each other, have by the command of Marduk made peace with one another and become treaty partners.<sup>58</sup>

Why would these former enemies make peace at this time? Esarhaddon, of course, claims that fear of the might of Aššur drove the Elamites and Gutians to his side, but this is blatant self-aggrandizement. We have no information about the Gutian king, but it has been suggested that Urtak had seized the Elamite throne with Assyrian aid.<sup>59</sup> While this is plausible (but unprovable), there is also reason to believe that Esarhaddon was motivated to secure his borders with Elam. The previous Elamite king, Huban-haltaš II, attacked Sippar and defeated the Assyrian army there in 675. He also supported a rival claimant for control of Sealand, nominally held by an Assyrian client.<sup>60</sup> These western troubles were compounded by Assyrian defeat in Egypt.<sup>61</sup> An Assyrian inventory, which may date from 674, includes a list of treasures sent to Elam.<sup>62</sup> This would make sense in the context of on-going negotiations concerning a mutually-beneficial peace treaty. Without the treaty text itself, we can only guess at the terms, but since Esarhaddon specifically mentioned borders in his inscription above, we must assume that boundaries were agreed upon. A later letter also shows that the king of Elam (and presumably, the king of Gutians as well) promised not to aid Assyria's enemies:

Last year when the Palace Superintendent and the Magnates went down to Chaldea, the brothers of the king of Elam tried to incite their brother the king, saying: 'Let us gather an army, cross over to Chaldea and take it away from Assyria.' The king of Elam, however, did not sin, but refused to listen to them, saying: 'I shall not violate the treaty (*ade*).'<sup>63</sup>

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58 CT 54 580 obv.1-7; see Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xvii, Fales 2008:18.

59 Waters 1997:69n6.

60 Waters 1997:62-5.

61 ABC 1 iv 16-18.

62 Waters 1997:69; Frame 1992:99-100.

63 SAA 18 202.

So this treaty served not only to secure peace between Assyria and Elam, but also prevented Assyria's enemies from gaining allies. The alliance lasted through the end of Esarhaddon's reign, and only broke when Urtak attacked in 664. Ten years of peace between two long-standing enemies is no small achievement. This treaty, and that between Aššur-nerari and Mati-il of Arpad, might be reflections of the same policy.

Our third example of a Neo-Assyrian treaty comes from c. 673. Esarhaddon signed no fewer than ten treaties with various powers on the periphery of his empire.<sup>64</sup> Collectively known as Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty, the wording of the various manuscripts is almost exactly the same, the main difference being the names of the signatories. The tablets containing the text were found in Nimrud in 1955.<sup>65</sup> As revolutionary a discovery as these were, perhaps even more so was the discovery at Tell Tayinat (near Antioch) in 2011 of a tablet containing a similar treaty. This western example was far shorter, but made essentially the same demands.<sup>66</sup> Traditionally, these treaties were considered vassal treaties, because Esarhaddon makes unilateral demands on other parties, including that they accept the supremacy of Aššur.<sup>67</sup>

However, a more careful consideration shows that all of the terms of the treaty concern ensuring the succession of the crown prince Assurbanipal, and eliminating intrigue within the kingdom, especially within the court.<sup>68</sup> Notably absent is a discussion of military service, tribute,

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64 SAA 2 6 = *TLC* 94. Lauinger 2015:290-1 argues that at least one copy was produced for each Assyrian province and client king, meaning that there were, at minimum, 110 copies of this treaty.

65 Wiseman 1958; another copy was found at Aššur between 1939-41, but it is too fragmentary to tell how many copies it represents, and the names of the signatories are illegible. See Lauinger 2015:288.

66 Lauinger 2012.

67 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxx. See lines 393-6: "In the future and forever Aššur will be your god, and Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, will be your lord. May your sons and your grandsons fear him."

68 In his Rassam Cylinder inscription, Assurbanipal actually mentions a ceremony in which Esarhaddon made all



or Assyrian sovereignty over the foreign signatories, all of which we would expect in a vassal treaty. In the eastern versions of the treaty, the signatories, typically grouped together as "Medes," all make promises that, according to Mario Liverani, only make sense in the context of the heart of the empire, particularly at the royal court. Some examples:<sup>69</sup>

You shall keep absolute honesty with respect to Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate whom Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, has presented to you, and (with respect to) his brothers, sons by the same mother as Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, on behalf of whom Esarhaddon, king of Assyria has concluded (this) treaty with you; you shall always serve them in a true and fitting manner, speak with them with heartfelt truth, and protect them in country and in town.<sup>70</sup>

If you hear any evil, improper, ugly word which is not seemly nor good to Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, your lord, either from the mouth of his enemy or from the mouth of his ally, or from the mouth of his brothers or from the mouth of his uncles, his cousins, his family, members of his father's line, or from the mouth of your brothers, your sons, your daughters, or from the mouth of a prophet, an ecstatic, an inquirer of oracles, or from the mouth of any human being at all, you shall not conceal it but come and report it to Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria.<sup>71</sup>

You shall fall and die for Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, your lord, and seek to do for him what is good.<sup>72</sup>

If Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, passes away during the minority of his sons, and if either a bearded (courtier) or a eunuch puts Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, to death, and takes over the kingship of Assyria, you shall not make common cause with him and become his servant but shall break away and be hostile (to him), alienate all lands from him, instigate a rebellion against him, seize him and put him to death, and then help a son of Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate to take the throne of Assyria. You shall wait for a woman pregnant by Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, (or) for the wife of Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate (to give birth), and after (a son) is born, bring him up and set him on the throne of Assyria, seize and slay the perpetrators of rebellion, destroy their name and their seed from the land, and by shedding blood for blood, avenge Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate.<sup>73</sup>

You shall not give Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, your lord, a deadly drug to eat or to drink, nor anoint him with it, nor practice witchcraft against him, nor make gods and goddesses angry with him.<sup>74</sup>

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the people of his empire swear to accept him as their future king. See Zehender 2010:366.

69 Fales 2012:139-41 provides an outline of the entire text, including a list of all 36 separate commands.

70 92-100.

71 108-122.

72 229-236.

73 237-258.

74 259-265.

Many Neo-Assyrian treaties had specific injunctions against slander, rebellion, and rebellious talk, but no vassals specifically promise to not poison the crown prince, or to fall and die for him. Of course, the men who swore to uphold these terms could still have been vassals, but in this case were acting in a role not necessarily applicable or available to all other vassals. Such promises would only be needed from men in close physical proximity to Assurbanipal, so it is best to consider this treaty a loyalty oath given by Medes, who were employed as royal bodyguards.<sup>75</sup> There is no reason to believe that the Medes were the only ones employed as such. Other textual<sup>76</sup> and artistic<sup>77</sup> evidence shows that non-Iranian peoples served as royal soldiers and guards. Esarhaddon's treaties with the Medes are probably best understood as a specific instance of a general policy, in which foreigners were made to swear a formulaic oath to defend the king and/or the appointed successor.<sup>78</sup> Presumably, Esarhaddon would not allow members of an openly hostile community to serve as bodyguards in his palace, so we can assume at least some pre-existing diplomatic arrangement between the parties.

Lastly, the alliance between Gyges of Lydia and Assurbanipal. Concluded c. 664, this is an example of a request made to Assyria by a foreign power for military assistance.<sup>79</sup> Because we only know of this alliance through Assurbanipal's own inscriptions, we do not know the exact

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75 Liverani 1995:58-60.

76 Dalley 1985:31-39 cites texts nos. 99-108 of the so-called Nimrud Horse Lists, which, among other things, list the names of cavalry and chariot commanders of the *kišir šarrūti*, the "royal army." She identifies deportee officers from Samaria, and argues that deportees from Hamath and Carchemish may have also served as cavalry officers. Dezső 2012:37 lists "king's men" of the Ruqaḥu and Ḫallatu tribes serving as bodyguards for Sargon II.

77 Dezső 2012:117-8. There is not much non-textual evidence of foreign bodyguards, but a Til Barsip wall painting, dated to the reign of Sargon II, might show royal guards dressed in typically Judaeian garments.

78 Zehender 2009:359-68; Lanfranchi 1998:109.

79 In contrast to our first example, Aššur-nerari's treaty with Mati'-il, which was an Assyrian request (demand) for military assistance.

contents of the treaty. Still, Assurbanipal's description of the events gives us an idea of how the Assyrian kings conceived of their alliances. Gyges, his territory plundered by Cimmerian raiders, was inspired by a dream to "lay hold of the feet" of Assurbanipal in exchange for aid. Assurbanipal's prayer alone was sufficient to end the Cimmerian threat. However, after this victory, Gyges felt that he no longer needed Assyrian aid and instead sent his own troops to the pharaoh Psammetichus, who was in rebellion against Assyria. With this act, Gyges "threw off the yoke" of Assyrian sovereignty, and Assurbanipal prayed to Aššur and Ištar, that "his body be cast before his enemy, and [that] his foes carry off his limbs." Sure enough, the Cimmerians returned, this time acting as agents of divine retribution. Soon Gyges was dead, and his son acknowledged his father's violations and pledged to wear the yoke of Assyria.<sup>80</sup>

It is unclear whether or not Gyges was ever formally bound to Assurbanipal as a vassal; Spalinger points out that there is no mention of an alliance between the two, nor any claim of Assyrian domination over Lydia, as Assurbanipal never sent any aid beyond his prayers to Gyges.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Fuchs argues that Assurbanipal never had any intent to help Gyges, as the disruptions caused by the Cimmerians worked to his advantage,<sup>82</sup> so it is unlikely that he would have sworn an oath that he knew he would break. Parpola and Watanabe take the exact opposite view, arguing that even though a treaty is not specifically named, Assyrian aid would not have been offered without a written binding agreement, and that the existence of a treaty is clearly implied by the language.<sup>83</sup> In the end, this must be the best answer, as it is in line with Assyrian policy in the region. We know that when Tugdammû, the Cimmerian king, fell ill during a raid

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80 This account is found, with varying degrees of detail, in Assurbanipal's Prisms A, E, F, and the Harran Tablets. See Spalinger 1978:401–2; Cogan and Tadmor 1977.

81 Spalinger 1978:402.

82 Fuchs 2010:409-414.

83 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xix.

on Assyrian territory, Assurbanipal shrewdly took advantage: "I made him swear oath(s) by the great gods, [my lords, not to commit crime]s on the border of Assyria and I reinforced (it) with him. [I estab]lished the treaty.<sup>84</sup>" If Assyrian policy required an oath and a treaty to secure the border, surely the same requirements stood for a military alliance. Even though the details of the oath and treaty have been lost, we can be confident that Gyges' initial request for aid automatically bound him to the Assyrian king, and thus any act by Gyges that threatened Assyria activated the curses that served to punish oath-breakers.

Based on these four examples, we can see that the Assyrians used treaties as a way to exact certain promises from vassals and former enemies. The treaties with Mati'-il, Urtak, and Gyges all resulted in short-term peace, followed by a resumption of conflict and an eventual Assyrian conquest. Thus the treaties offered Assyria a win-win situation: either the vassal complied with the terms of the treaty, and offered Assyria what she wanted, or the Assyrians used a broken treaty as a justification for conquest. This is not to say that a broken treaty was the only justification for conquest; naturally, economic and strategic concerns may have played a more important role in determining military policy. However, such practical benefits of conquest were described as natural consequences of, rather than motivations for conquest.<sup>85</sup> Textual descriptions of the imposition of taxation or tribute are always given outside of the treaty text itself.<sup>86</sup>

As a brief summary, let us look at the case of the Arabian tribe of Qedar to see the Neo-Assyrian treaty at work, as described in one of Assurbanipal's inscriptions. Hazel, king of Qedar, had been an ally of Assyria in some way. His son, Yauta', upon taking the throne, appealed to

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84 BIWA Prism J Frag. 6.32-34.

85 Liverani 1979:312-314.

86 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxi-xxii.

Assurbanipal for the return of his god Atarsamain. Assurbanipal agreed, after making Yauta' "pronounce the oath of the great gods." Later, Yauta' rebelled and "threw off the yoke" of Assyrian dominion. In response, Assurbanipal sent his armies to conquer and enslave Arabia, while the gods brought down the curses of the oath upon the people in the form of famine. Assurbanipal replaced Yauta' with Abiate', who came to Nineveh to kiss Assurbanipal's feet. He then "made an oath-bound treaty" with Abiate, and imposed tribute on him in the form of "gold, beads, pappardillu stones, antimony, camels and stud-asses."<sup>87</sup>

Luckily, we also have the treaty between Abiate' and Assurbanipal, made in c. 652, mentioned in this inscription. The only surviving clauses require Abiate, his family, and his tribe to reject Yauta', and indeed to "make every effort to kill him."<sup>88</sup> As the next lines, the final lines that remain, begin the invocation of the gods of the oath, it is at least plausible that there were no further demands put on Abiate'. Since we do have examples of a Neo-Assyrian treaty with the format curses–stipulations–more curses–more stipulations,<sup>89</sup> we cannot rule out the possibility that the treaty with Abiate' originally went on to make more demands after an initial round of curses. As it stands, it appears that, in conformity with Neo-Assyrian imperial ideology, the imposition of tribute was a separate event from the making of a treaty.

As to the internal structure of a treaty, opinions differ on what the components of a Neo-Assyrian treaty are. Parpola and Watanabe identify ten components: preamble, seal impressions, divine witnesses, oath, historical introduction, stipulations, violation clause, curses, vow, and

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87 Piepkorn 1933:81-5, col. 7.93-8.38.

88 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:68-9.

89 Namely, Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty. Since this was made, as we have shown here, with royal bodyguards, and not a king, perhaps we should not expect it to conform to the same format.

colophon.<sup>90</sup> In contrast, Kitchen and Lawrence identify only four constituents of a treaty: title, divine witnesses, curses, and stipulations.<sup>91</sup> Of course, we must keep in mind that many of the tablets are broken, so it is hard to determine if an element, which may well have been present in a particular treaty, is no longer extant due to the fortunes of discovery and preservation, or whether it did not exist at all. No treaty has all of these elements, and many only have a few.

As a general rule, all ancient Near Eastern binding agreements, oral or written, involved divine participation. It seems that the collection of oaths and the conclusion of a treaty were accompanied by rituals. The phrase (as in *TLC* 96) "let the gods come for the treaty" suggests that "the treaty gods were, at least in theory, physically present at the oath-taking ceremony in the form of their statues or otherwise."<sup>92</sup> Other texts, like SAA 2 2 above, seem to describe an accompanying animal sacrifice which may have served to warn the vassal about the consequences of his acts if he were to violate his oath: "This head is not the head of a spring lamb, it is the head of Mati'-lu, it is the head of his sons, his nobles (and) the people of his land. If Mati'-lu should sin against this treaty, just as the head of this spring lamb is cut off, (and) its leg placed in its mouth, so may the head of Mati'-lu be cut off..."<sup>93</sup>

Jacob Lauinger has recently argued that some treaty tablets were regularly used in a ritual to reconfirm the oath that they represented. Based on his examination of the Tell Tayinat tablets discussed above, he concludes that there are two reasons to believe that these texts had a specific ritual function, in addition to a legal or political function. First, the texts had three unique seals: one from the Old Assyrian period, one from the reign of Tiglath-Pilaser III, and one from the reign of Sennacherib. While all important texts carried seals, these three were special because

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90 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxxv.

91 Kitchen and Lawrence 2012:218.

92 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxxviii.

93 I.21-28.

they transformed the tablet from ordinary clay into an object of religious power. An inscription from Sennacherib's seal on the Tell Tayinat tablet indicates that it is nothing less than the Seal of Destinies, which Marduk captured from the evil Qingu in the *Enūma eliš*.<sup>94</sup> Thus, by sealing the tablets in such a way, the texts were no longer a simple written record of an agreement, but had become an eternal statement of Aššur's decree, and therefore irrevocably set the destiny of all parties involved. An attempt to break the oath would therefore not only be doomed to failure, but would be punishable by the specified curses.

Second, the findspot of the tablets is indicative of their function. The Nimrud tablets were found in the Throne Room of the Ezida, where the *akitu* festival was performed at the new year. Another text, the "Covenant with Aššur," possibly in the context of Esarhaddon's coronation ceremony, states that an *ade* tablet was brought out on a cushion, accompanied by sacrifices and the burning of incense.<sup>95</sup> The Tell Tayinat tablets may not have had any connection to a coronation ceremony, but their location, far from an imperial capital, makes it likely that these tablets were brought out and read aloud when the signatories returned each year to deliver the tribute required of an Assyrian subject.<sup>96</sup> The ritual changed the delivery of tribute from a simple economic transaction to the reenactment of the subjects' destiny, one that was in accord with the will of the Assyrian king, and therefore of Aššur. This speculative reconstruction offers a reasonable explanation for how treaties were used and understood by the Assyrians, and how they reinforced Assyrian imperial ideology.

Treaties were an essential tool of the Assyrian empire, and they were the manifestation of

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94 IV. 119-122; see Lauinger 2013:108-10, Watanabe 1985:382, and George 1986:139.

95 SAA 9 3 ii 27-32.

96 Lauinger 2013:113-4.

the connection between Assyria and her subjects and allies. They served the practical purpose of extracting wealth and service from those territories who chose or were forced to submit to the power of Assyria. But treaties were also understood through Assyrian cosmology, wherein all terrestrial events, including interstate conflicts and diplomacy, were governed by the will of Aššur, the patron god of the Assyrian empire, king of the gods and the bringer of order to the cosmos. The king, as the "Priest, Governor [of Aššur], Prefect [of Enlil]," the weapon of Aššur on earth, was tasked with expanding the realm of Aššur by expanding the Assyrian empire. From at least the reign of Tikulti-Ninurta I in the Middle Assyrian period, the only order given to the king by the god was "extend your land!"<sup>97</sup> Their titles, "King of the Four Corners, King of the World" reflect this claim to universal legitimacy.

A comprehensive study of the role of religious ideology in the Assyrian empire would extend far beyond the main subject of this dissertation, and it is a topic addressed elsewhere by scholars far more learned than I.<sup>98</sup> What follows, then, is a brief summary of the role of religious ideology in the Assyrian notions of kingship and interstate relations, with special attention given to treaties.

### ***3b. Religion and Assyrian Kingship***

Aššur was the king of the gods and ruler of the universe. He was intimately aware of and involved in the activities of earthly kings and states, and his decree was their fate. The kings of Assyria were not gods, although at times they might be the recipients of sacrifice.<sup>99</sup> Still, they were far more than ordinary humans, acting as an intermediary between the gods and humanity,

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97 Tadmor 2011:88.

98 See especially Aster 2007:5-8, Holloway 2002, Oded 1992, Liverani 1979.

99 Holloway 2002:190-1.



and were the earthly manifestation of the divine will.<sup>100</sup> Since it was the duty of the Assyrian king to extend the land of Aššur, he must inevitably come in contact with foreign kings and their foreign gods. The Assyrian understanding of the divine will of Aššur governed these interactions.

Here, we must be sure of our terminology. The Assyrian empire was not a uniform state, but instead consisted of at least three distinct zones:

1. The border areas, such as Egypt or Elam, which were only rarely under temporary Assyrian control. They were subject to raids, but not regular taxation.
2. The "Yoke of Aššur." These were the vassal or client states. They owed regular tribute directly to the king, not the gods or temples, and maintained relative internal autonomy.
3. The "Land of Aššur." The provinces and heartland of Assyria proper. Provincial and city governors were responsible for sending tribute for the upkeep of Aššur, as were individual high officials.<sup>101</sup>

Only the Land of Aššur took part in the official Assyrian cult. Perhaps these were the regions in which the cult of Aššur carried sufficient importance to ensure continued loyalty to the king. The rest of the world, even those regions conquered by the Assyrian king, were prevented from membership in this cult, and therefore excluded from whatever benefits it had to offer. This message would only carry weight for subjects who were not more concerned with the worship of other more familiar local gods.

The kings of Assyria, according to their own inscriptions, did nothing that was against the will of Aššur. In going to war, they were acting "according to the word of the god" as received through oracles.<sup>102</sup> So, to pick two examples at random, Ashurnasirpal II is "the king who has always acted justly with the support of Assur and the god Ninurta the gods who help him and

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100 Oded 1992:18-19.

101 Holloway 2002:100-7; Postgate 1992:251-255; Cogan 1974:51.

102 Younger 1990:73.

subdued the fortified mountains and the kings hostile to him,<sup>103</sup>" and Adad-nārārī III is the "prince whom the gods Aššur, Šamaš, Adad, and Marduk assisted so that he extended his land.<sup>104</sup>" Because the gods, specifically Šamaš, are the source of justice, the king is a just ruler, who seeks to defend the weak and right wrongs.<sup>105</sup> By necessity, his enemies are evil. Esarhaddon calls Šamaš-ibni, leader of the Chaldean tribe of Bīt-Dakkūri, a 'rogue and an outlaw, who did not respect the oath of the lord of lords.<sup>106</sup>" Enemy lords plot murder and, most of all, rebellion, "and leave the Assyrian king no option but to resort to armed violence.<sup>107</sup>" These rebels have not just broken away from Assyria, but have "thrown off the yoke of Aššur.<sup>108</sup>"

Rebellion usually involved the breaking of an oath, which may have been recorded in a written treaty. Because of the power of the curse formula, treaties were considered to be effectively self-enforcing: a violation did not simply justify an attack against the guilty party, rather the retaliatory attack was itself a manifestation of the power of the curse. Royal inscriptions describe vassals who broke treaties and were then punished in horrible ways by the gods. For example, Assurbanipal tells of the following punishment of Urtak of Elam: "Because he had transgressed the oath by the great gods, Aššur, Sin, Šamaš, Bel and Nabu imposed upon him a heavy punishment and killed him with a weapon in Elam..."<sup>109</sup> There were no chronological limits to the treaties; vassalage was eternal and immutable, and any violation of the treaty was automatically an act of rebellion.<sup>110</sup>

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103 RIMA 2 A.0.101.26 35-39.

104 RIMA 3 A.0.104.1 16-18.

105 See for example RINAP 4, text 44 obv. 10-14.

106 RINAP 4, text 1 col. III.62-70.

107 Oded 1992:45.

108 RINAP 4, text 34 12'-14'.

109 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxiii.

110 Parpola and Watanabe 1988:xxiii.

While Aššur held the highest rank in the Assyrian pantheon, other traditional Mesopotamian deities still held positions of importance. As already seen, Marduk, Šamaš, Adad, Ištar, Enlil, Sin, Nabu, and others found a role in the royal inscriptions. Assyrian rule in Mesopotamia did not strip these gods of their status as patron deities of the great cities of the region. As Pongratz-Leisten has demonstrated, Ištar, Adad, Sin, Marduk, and Anu received royal support for their *akitu* festivals. At these festivals, the king himself or his royal garments attended the procession of the local god. They journeyed from the city, to an *akitu* temple, followed by a triumphant return back to the city, representing the restoration of cosmic order. The king's participation in this festival signified that the restored world was synonymous with the imperial order, which ultimately derived from the will of Aššur. We do not know the full scope of this particular form of *akitu* festival, but since they are attested at cities with garrisons, located on Assyria's borders with Elam, Anatolia, Urartu, and Mannea, they must have been intended to emphasize the connection between the cosmic order emanating from Aššur and the worldly order enforced by Assyrian arms on the chaos beyond the imperial frontiers.<sup>111</sup>

There is no doubt that, at least in their own words, if not in their own minds, the kings of Assyria were doing battle against evil men in service of their gods whenever they went to war. However, at no point did the Assyrian kings call foreign gods evil or seek to destroy them; in fact, they paid respect to all gods, and claimed to be more pious than the local population.

When encountering a foreign deity, the Assyrian kings almost never attempted to do them harm.<sup>112</sup> Instead, these deities were put to work in the Assyrian imperial project by bolstering the king's claim to legitimacy. According to the royal inscriptions, foreign deities are not defeated along with the kings who supported them. Rather, the fact of Assyrian victory is taken as proof

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111 Pongratz-Leisten 1997.

112 Holloway 2002:109–10. Holloway finds only five clear instances of the intentional destruction of a temple by the Neo-Assyrians.

that the deities have abandoned the enemy king. This belief in 'divine abandonment' may have been a response to Assyria's traditional respect for the city of Babylon and its god Marduk. Not wanting to anger so great and venerable a deity, the Assyrians simply claimed that Marduk had "granted [Aššur] from olden times, the gods of lowland and mountains, of the four corners of the world, that they, with no exceptions, might ever honor him."<sup>113</sup> If all deities could be shown to accept Aššur's suzerainty, this would not only avoid the impossible chore of attempting to stamp out false gods, but would also increase Aššur's power by adding other gods to his rule.

It was towards this end that the Neo-Assyrian kings proclaimed that their enemies were abandoned by their own gods. Sennacherib describes one Kirua, prefect of Illubru, leader of a rebellion in Cilicia, as forsaken by his own gods.<sup>114</sup> He goes on to list a number of cities on the border of Commagene which, although they had been "strong and proud, not knowing the fear of Assyrian rule...their gods deserted them and left them empty."<sup>115</sup> According to Assurbanipal, Haza'el, king of Arabia, so angered an unknown goddess (her name is damaged on the inscription) that she "handed him over to Sennacherib...and caused his defeat. She determined not to remain with the people of Arabia and set out for Assyria."<sup>116</sup>

2 Kings in the Hebrew Bible provides an outsider's version of this aspect of Assyrian policy in action. When Sennacherib was besieging Jerusalem, he sent three imperial officials to deliver a message to the population in "Yehudit," that is, the local language of the Judeans, rather than Aramaic or Akkadian. This was intended that his message should not be kept from the people. Sennacherib's *rab s aqū* a personal servant of the king,<sup>117</sup> delivered a message in three

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113 Thureau-Dangin 1912:49, lines 314-16; Cogan 1974.

114 Luckenbill 1924:61 62-5.

115 Luckenbill 1924:64 12-24.

116 K.3405 obv 1-4; Cogan 1974:16-17.

117 Levin 2015:327.

parts: first, that Hezekiah's reliance on Egyptian allies was foolish, as the Pharaoh was as weak as a broken reed; second, that if Hezekiah surrenders, he and his people will be relocated "to a land like your own land, a land of grain and wine, a land of bread and vineyards, a land of olive oil and honey." Otherwise, the siege will doom them "to eat their own dung and to drink their own urine." Thirdly, the *rab šaqu* attacked Hezekiah's status as Yahweh's anointed: "Has any of the gods of the nations ever delivered its land out of the hand of the king of Assyria? Where are the gods of Hamath and Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivvah? Have they delivered Samaria out of my hand? Who among all the gods of the countries have delivered their countries out of my hand, that the Lord should deliver Jerusalem out of my hand?" In fact, Yahweh wanted Assyria to triumph: "Moreover, is it without the Lord that I have come up against this place to destroy it? The Lord said to me, Go up against this land, and destroy it."<sup>118</sup>

Here we will not debate the historicity of the events of 2 Kings 18, beyond the claim that the account contains enough elements to trust that the scene has some basis in reality.<sup>119</sup> Even though Jerusalem was not actually conquered, this scene illustrates how Assyria's religious policy might be put into play. The intended victims of conquest are told that their god has not only abandoned them, but is in fact now working for the Assyrians. Yahweh, like all of the other local gods in the Near East, recognized the might of Aššur and now endeavored to carry out his will, in this case, through the Assyrian army.

The abandonment of a king or people by gods was made manifest by the removal of the divine statues from the local temples. Under normal circumstances, in the face of an approaching enemy army, a townsfolk would take their statues into a safe place in order that they might not be plundered. With Sargon II bearing down, Marduk-apla-iddinna, king of Kaldi, "gathered

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118 2 Kings 18:20-35.

119 Levin 2015:329-37; Cohen 1979.

together his inhabited towns and the gods dwelling in them and brought them in to the city of Dûr-Iakin and strengthened its defense.<sup>120</sup>" But it was to no avail, and "the people, small and great, who dwelt in (these) districts, and the gods their confidence I [Sargon] carried off as one, and left not one to escape.<sup>121</sup>" Holloway records fifty-five instances in the royal inscriptions of "godnapping" between Tiglath-Pilaser I and Assurbanipal, although the concept is a pre-Sargonic literary topos.<sup>122</sup> Excluding Babylon, "the majority of the cities or rulers to forfeit their gods were either urban centers without prior Assyrian 'commitments' or rebellious client rulers.<sup>123</sup>"

A captured god would be brought back to Assyrian territory, at which point it might have one of several possible fates. Early in the Neo-Assyrian period, it was common for the king to present the captured gods to Aššur. Aššur-dan II, having conquered the land of Kurruri, says "I brought forth their gods, booty, possessions, property, herds (and) flocks (and) [brought (them)] to my city [Aššur].<sup>124</sup>" His successor, Adad-narārī II, did the same to the gods of Qumānu.<sup>125</sup> Yet later kings frequently do not specify where the gods are taken, or state that they were brought to cities besides the Assyrian capitals. In a letter Šamaš-šumu-lešir, an imperial official, explains to Esarhaddon that Sennacherib had sent six gods (Marat-Sin of Eridu, Marat-Sin of Nemed-Lagudu, Marat-Eridu, Nergal, Amurru, and Lugalbanda) from Babylonian cities to Issete, with the intention of sending them, along with Bel, to Babylon itself. However, there seems to have been some confusion, as the gods were still waiting in the "province of the *rab šaqu*," a location unknown to us: "Now if the king, my lord, (so) commands, let a royal messenger go, and let

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120 Gadd 1954:186 6.27-30.

121 Gadd 1954:186 6.60-2.

122 Holloway 2002:145-6.

123 Holloway 2002:150.

124 RIMA 2 A.0.98.1:58.

125 RIMA 2 A.0.99.1:16-17.

them bring these gods (there) and have them sent on their way. Why should they dwell here?<sup>126</sup>" It is reasonable to assume that these were gods captured by Sennacherib, which Esarhaddon planned to have accompany Bel/Marduk during the *akitu* festival in Babylon. Of course, there is simply not enough information to be sure.<sup>127</sup> Assurbanipal took the gods of the Qedarite king Uaite' to Damascus.<sup>128</sup> Considering that nearly every mention of the capture of a god by the Assyrians is accompanied by a forced population transfer, the distribution of captured gods in various parts of the empire might be connected to this phenomenon.<sup>129</sup>

The capture of a foreign god served to demonstrate that the enemy was abandoned and no longer protected by his own gods, and to emphasize the might of Aššur, who was capable of forcing other gods to serve him. On a more practical level, a captured god became a 'hostage,' with which the Assyrians could cajole the new subjects into obedience. After a sufficient period of good behavior, the god might be returned. Holloway finds a total of thirty-six instances of the return of a divine statue to its point of origin. In three or perhaps four of these cases, the statues being returned had not been originally stolen by the Assyrians. In the remaining cases, statues stolen by the Assyrians were returned only to the Babylonians or Arabs. Unfortunately, neither the Babylonians nor Arabs can serve as a model for an empire-wide policy, as the represent unique arrangements (Babylon, because of its antiquity, and the Arabs, because they were a nomadic population).<sup>130</sup> When Esarhaddon returned statues of Bel, Beltiya, Belet-Babili, Ea, and Madanu to Babylon, he had them restored by skilled artisans and dressed with gold and precious stones. Their return to "the temple which Šamaš and Adad had selected through divination" was

126 SAA 13 no. 190.

127 See Holloway 2002:139n202.

128 Holloway 2002:145; BIWA, Prism A ix 2-8.

129 Holloway 2002:145-6.

130 Holloway 2002:286-8. See his Table 3, pp. 123-144 for all 55 instances of gods captured by the Assyrians, and Table 8, pp. 277-283 for all 21 instances of gods returned.

not just a repatriation but a birth into "the Esarra, the temple of their sire [Aššur].<sup>131</sup>" Clearly, no matter how much respect Esarhaddon might have had for Babylon, and however much he might have wished to atone for the sins of his father against the great city, his return of the divine statues was an unabashed attempt to subordinate these gods to Aššur, and thereby Babylon to himself.<sup>132</sup>

As we have seen, Assyrian ideology demanded that Aššur dominate all other gods, even if that necessitated capturing gods and holding them hostage. Considering this proud and overbearing worldview, and the degree to which the Assyrian kings boast of their battle-prowess, cruelty and bloodlust, one would be forgiven for assuming that the reality of Assyrian religious imperialism was oppressive. Certainly Assyrian rule frequently entailed violence, but once rule was secure, the Assyrians put no cultic impositions on their vassals, and almost never prevented the continued existence of local cults. Just as the Assyrian empire wanted its subjects to be healthy and productive, it would do Aššur no good and no honor if the gods made subservient to him were dead, their cults forgotten or forbidden. Foreign deities were made subservient to Aššur, not only in cultic practice but in the *ade* texts as well. The list of divine witnesses to a treaty could consist of the Assyrian and Mesopotamian gods honored by the Assyrians, as well as the local deities honored by the vassal (e.g., *TLC* 90 and 93). Presumably this increased the effectiveness of the oath, as a violation would call down the wrath of one's own god in his own home. It also served to make one's own god the executor of Aššur's mandate, which paralleled (and therefore reinforced) the vassalage of the local lord to the king of Assyria.

Based on this short summary, we see that on the ideological level, the Assyrian kings

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131 RINAP 4, text 48 rev. 79b, 87.

132 Holloway 2002:285.



were concerned with not only conquest but religious domination. Sworn oaths, sometimes recorded in treaties, were used not only to prevent a vassal from violating the terms of the agreement, but also to set in place curses which would allow for conquest or punishment in the future. Since Assyrian kings were divinely aided, their military campaigns could not fail, and conquest was their inevitable destiny. After the army demonstrated military superiority, it was essential that the local gods submit to Aššur. By capturing divine statues, the gods were shown to have forsaken the local king, and were prevented from lending him further support. They were forced to assist in the spread of Assyrian power, and acknowledged Aššur as their father. But on the practical level, local cults were not destroyed, and subjects outside of the Land of Aššur were not compelled to provide material support for Aššur. No one has ever accused the Assyrian empire of tolerance, but there was simply no reason for the Assyrians to interfere with local cult practice.

### ***3c. The Neo-Babylonian Evidence***

We have no clear evidence for the use of treaties in the Neo-Babylonian period. This absence of evidence can be used to suggest that the Neo-Babylonians ruled their provinces directly, with imperial officials.<sup>133</sup> It may also be the case that they ruled at least some of their territories through vassals, just as the Neo-Assyrians did, but only demanded a spoken oath; naturally, it is also possible that any written records of the oaths have been lost. Nebuchadnezzar mentions "kings on the other side of the river" and "kings in distant mountain regions and faraway islands in the Upper and Lower Sea" amongst the peoples who have been entrusted to

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133 Kitchen and Lawrence 2012:233.

him by Marduk.<sup>134</sup> Perhaps these are references to vassal kings.<sup>135</sup> Biblical evidence may shed some additional light on the issue.

Ezekiel 17:11–21 describes the making of a vassal treaty between Zedekiah and Nebuchadnezzar II.<sup>136</sup> When Zedekiah breaks the treaty, by seeking military aid from Egypt, the reaction of the God of the Hebrews to this is anger and the promise of destruction. What is important here is that Zedekiah has not just violated his oath to Nebuchadnezzar, but to God Himself.<sup>137</sup> While it has been argued that these verses refer to Israel's covenant with its Lord,<sup>138</sup> nevertheless these verses allow us to suggest that the Neo-Babylonians, at least in certain cases, bound their vassal states with oaths enforced by local gods; that is, when Zedekiah made his oath to Nebuchadnezzar, the Hebrew God would have been among those enforcing the oath. Hence God's anger at Zedekiah: by breaking the oath to Nebuchadnezzar, Zedekiah was also breaking his oath to the Hebrew God. Nebuchadnezzar, then, became the vehicle of God's retribution,<sup>139</sup> Although such use of vassal treaties in the Neo-Babylonian empire is not supported by other evidence, its usage in this one instance means that, at the very least, we cannot reject the possibility of a continuity between Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian treaty practice.

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134 Langdon 1905:149.

135 Jursa 2014:126; Vanderhooft 1999:35–40.

136 Tsevat 1959:201; Wong 2001:61.

137 Ezekiel 17:19–21: "Therefore thus says the Lord God: As I live, I will surely return upon his head my oath that he despised, and my covenant that he broke. I will spread my net over him, and he shall be caught in my snare; I will bring him to Babylon and enter into judgment with him there for the treason he has committed against me."

138 Greenberg 1983.

139 Peterson 2012:170.

## 4. From Assyria and Babylonia to Persia

In this section, we will investigate the state of southwestern Iran in the centuries immediately preceding the rise of the Persian empire, starting in the mid-eighth century. Our primary interest is in the nature of the Median and Elamite states and their role in contemporaneous Near Eastern history. This will allow us to discuss the conditions under which the Persian state was formed, and consider whether or not these conditions might have had an impact on the development of Persian imperial policies, with special emphasis on the treatment of local traditions of subject populations within the empire.

### 4a. The Medes

At the outset it is essential to remind the reader that nowhere in our earliest sources for Median history is there a definition of "Mede." It is clear that the Assyrians distinguished the Medes from other neighbors to the east, but as to whether this was based on linguistic, geographic, political, or other cultural factors, or whether the term Mede (Old Persian *Māda*-) was a self-designation, we simply cannot ascertain.<sup>140</sup> With that in mind, our first textual evidence on the Medes comes from the Assyrian annals of Šalmaneser III in 836/5. While carving a path of destruction across the Lower Zab river, Šalmaneser claimed tribute from "twenty-seven kings of Parsua" before moving on to the land of Media.<sup>141</sup> His son and successor, Šamši-Adad V carried out an undated campaign (Radner suggests 820/19) against one

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140 Radner 2013:63 points out that the names of various Median city-lords have been determined to be Indo-European, Kassite, Akkadian, or unknown. See Root 2002:1-5 and Dusinberre 2002:42-5 on recent attempts to define "Median art."

141 RIMA 3 A.0.102.27 120-121; Radner 2003:38-40.

Haniširuka, portrayed as the possessor of the "royal city Sagbita" and several thousand soldiers.<sup>142</sup> From 810 to 783, Adad-nerari III conducted at least 8 campaigns against the Medes, but there is little information about them. From these accounts, we can assume that the Medes played an important role on the Assyrian western frontier, possibly as a source of produce and/or horses for the east.<sup>143</sup> The Medes at this time lived in a large number settlements, some of which were at least semi-sedentary, and the region as a whole lacked political unity.<sup>144</sup> The Assyrian scribes tended to name the individual territorial units with the compound made from *bīt* or *mār* plus a personal name. Lanfranchi stresses that this was an attempt by the Assyrians to emphasize the institutional inferiority of the place, suggesting a "primitive" political structure based around tribes and familial bonds, as opposed to the "advanced" bureaucratic, territorial empire of the Assyrians. Thus, the terms used by the Assyrians to describe the polities in the Zagros region may be more strongly influenced by Assyrian ideology than by unbiased realities.<sup>145</sup>

We find increasing textual evidence starting in 744, when Tiglath-pilaser III established the first in a series of Assyrian provinces in Iran, run by Assyrian eunuchs; Sargon II established still more. The Neo-Assyrian strategy in the region was a dual system: local Median dynasts, called "city-lords," were maintained and strengthened alongside Assyrian administrative structures. The new provinces were created by combining several pre-existing territories controlled by local aristocrats. The position of city-lord was heritable,<sup>146</sup> but the Assyrian king on some occasions did remove a dynast and replace him with another member of the dynasty or an unrelated member of the local aristocracy. City-lords were required to offer a type of tribute

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142 RIMA 3 A.0.103.1 iii 27b-36; Radner 2003:40-2.

143 Radner 2003:42-3.

144 Tuplin 2004:232-3.

145 Lanfranchi 2003:87.

146 Waters 2011a:245.

called *mandattu*, a term specifying tribute paid by a client-ruler who still maintained independence.<sup>147</sup> The fact that Assyrian officials traveled to the city-lords to collect their loyalty oaths would have increased the prestige of these local leaders, thereby encouraging them to remain loyal.<sup>148</sup>

In the inscriptions of Tiglath-pilaser III and Sargon II, the Medes were named along with the epithet "mighty." This epithet (*dannūti*) is applied only to the Medes, and is related to *dannu*, a usual epithet of the Assyrian king. The term can have positive connotations of strength and legitimacy, or the negative connotations of savagery and danger. The implications of this, especially when compared with the fact that the Assyrians were able to travel as deep into Iranian lands as they were—perhaps as far as the Caspian Sea—and the apparent absence of resistance from the locals, leaves us with a very uncertain image of the Medes specifically and of western Iran in general.<sup>149</sup>

By the time of Esarhaddon (reigned 680-669), the ties between the Assyrian kings and Median city-lords were quite strong. Some Median city-lords came to Nineveh, offered submission to Esarhaddon, and brought horses, camels, and other tribute; since no Assyrian attack or conquest is mentioned in connection with this act, it can be assumed that these city-lords came under their own volition, if not exactly willingly, perhaps seeking Assyrian support to bolster their own power in their local fiefdoms.<sup>150</sup> This is how we should understand the famous treaties concluded between the Medes, along with other Zagros peoples, and Esarhaddon.<sup>151</sup> These treaties make no mention of tribute to be paid to Assyria, nor submission of territorial

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147 Lanfranchi 2003:108-111. *Mandattu* is in distinction from ordinary taxation owed by other Assyrian officials.

148 Radner 2013:443-449.

149 Lanfranchi 2003:90-2; Radner 2003:49-50.

150 Radner 2003:58-9.

151 On these treaties, see p.21ff above.

control to Assyria, and instead bind the signatories to defend the life of the crown prince Assurbanipal, and to report any plots circulating among the royal courtiers. These treaties should be understood not as "vassal treaties" but "loyalty oaths" agreed to by the body guard or personal army corps of Assurbanipal.<sup>152</sup>

The facts just mentioned suggest an almost symbiotic relationship between the Medes and Assyrians, but other Assyrian texts emphasize disunity of the Medes and the consequent variability in their relations with Assyria. A series of inquiries put to an oracle of Šamaš by Esarhaddon in 713 indicates his concern surrounding the difficulties faced by Assyrian agents sent to procure horses from "the territory of the Medes," an area apparently destabilized by the actions of the Manneans, Cimmerians, Scythians, and certain Median locals. Kaštaritu, city-lord of Kar-Kašši, alternately attacked the local Assyrian provincial capital and then proposed a treaty with Esarhaddon, a proposal which was apparently rejected. Other inquiries to oracles suggest that Esarhaddon was losing territory in the Zagros throughout his reign.<sup>153</sup> Assurbanipal claims to have made small reconquests by c. 656, but it is unclear whether the Zagros provinces actually remained a functional part of the empire during his reign.

The Medes drop out of contemporary records until 615, when they reappear in the Babylonian chronicles as an invading force, united under the rule of Cyaxares (Umakištar). The Medes were at this time allied with the rebel and eventual founder of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty Nabopolassar, and were able to capture the city of Ashur by themselves, before the Babylonians arrived on the scene. We have no evidence even suggesting how Cyaxares unified the Medes or the details of the structure of the Median state which he ruled. That the Medes stayed politically relevant through the Neo-Babylonian period until the time of Cyrus, and indeed

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152 Liverani 1995:58-9; Lanfranchi 1998:105-7; this is a fine example of the flexibility or ambiguity of the term *ade*.

153 Radner 2003:61.

Darius, suggests that Cyaxares' coalition did not simply melt away after the fall of Assyria. We shall now turn to the Median histories provided by the Greek sources in order to try and fill in the gap between 656 and 615.

Our main narrative source for the period of the formation of the Median empire is Herodotus' infamous *Medikos logos*, which is generally regarded as unreliable at best and completely ahistorical at worst.<sup>154</sup> But upon reflection, we must consider the possibility that there is some small historical kernel in Herodotus' Median *logos*. Herodotus embedded the story within the narrative of Cyrus' early life, since he tells us "that which certain Persians say, who do not wish to exalt the accomplishments of Cyrus, but to report the truth, this is what I will write, although I have learned three other accounts about Cyrus which I could tell."<sup>155</sup> His immediate sources were thus most likely Persians, although where they got their information is less certain. Herodotus' narrative of the rise of the Medes is a discussion on the nature and source of law, rather than a political history, but this, by itself, is no reason to reject the major events in Median history which he records. But let us briefly analyze the *Medikos logos*, and then decide how to use it.

To begin with, a Daikku, governor of Mannea, is mentioned in an Assyrian chronicle dating to 715. He has been put forward as a possible source for the name Deioces, Herodotus' founder of the Median kingdom. Likewise, a Kaštāritu, mentioned in oracles of Esarhaddon, has been equated with Herodotus' Phraortes, son of Deioces. However, neither instance can be used to argue for the historical reliability of Herodotus' *Medikos logos*. Daikku could not have

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154 For example, Waters 2011:243: "...Herodotus' account of the dynasty founded by Deioces (1.96-107), is a retrojection of Greek conceptions, often stereotypical, of the Achaemenid Persian Empire at its height. In other words, for Greeks writing in the fifth and fourth centuries, it was reconstruction of the past based on a (mis)understanding of the contemporary."

155 1.95: ὡς ὧν Περσέων μετεξέτεροι λέγουσι, οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι σεμνοῦν τὰ περὶ Κῦρον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἔοντα λέγειν λόγον, κατὰ ταῦτα γράψω, ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ τριφασίας ἄλλας λόγων ὁδοῦς φῆναι.

founded a Median kingdom: in 715, Sargon II was able to collect tribute from "22 Median chiefs" after forcing Daikku into exile; even if this Daikku had made some effort at unification, it failed or was immediately undone. Second, neither Daikku nor Kaštaritu are not identified as "Medes" in the Assyrian texts.<sup>156</sup> Lastly, neither one of these figures can be forced into the chronology of Median kings provided by Herodotus.<sup>157</sup>

It should be noted that the names Daikku/Deioces and Kaštaritu/Phraortes were still in use well into the Achaemenid Period. The name "Daikku" appears in the Persepolis Fortification tablets at least eight times, with the Elamite spelling *Da-a-hi-u-uk-ka* or *Da-a-ya-u(k)-ka*.<sup>158</sup> The Bisotun Inscription relates that one of the many Liar-Kings who revolted after Darius' accession was Fravartiš (Greek Phraortes). In Media, he claimed, "I am Xšaθrita [the Median form of the Assyrian spelling Kaštaritu], from the family of Uvaxšatara [Cyaxares]."<sup>159</sup> The presence of 'authentic' names in Herodotus' account should not be used to suggest that these names were preserved by a community, orally or written, as part of a political or mythical 'national' history. Instead, Herodotus may have simply picked an authentic name which he, rightly or not, associated with the Medes, and used it in a fictional account of his own creation.

Herodotus also includes a 28-year interregnum in Median history, during which the Scythians invaded and ruled all of Asia.<sup>160</sup> The leader of the Scythian invasion was Madyes, son of Protothyes. This later has been equated with Bartatua, a Scythian king who requested a royal daughter of Esarhaddon for a wife.<sup>161</sup> This episode is the concern of an oracle query dated post-

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156 Helm 1981:85-6.

157 Helm 1981:87.

158 Hallock 1969 PF 47, 241, 594, 1099, 1167, 1252, 1809, 1942. See also Wiesehöfer 2004:22.

159 DB §24.

160 1.104-6.

161 SAA 4.20.



676.<sup>162</sup> We do not possess any evidence as to whether the marriage was granted or not, nor any corroborating evidence for the existence of Madyes.<sup>163</sup> For chronological reasons, the notion of a Scythian 'conquest' must be rejected. According to Herodotus, the Scythians defeated Cyaxares in battle while he was himself invading Assyrian territory. Cyaxares later fought the Lydians to a draw in 585, datable by an eclipse.<sup>164</sup> Therefore, the 28-year Scythian interregnum took place before the fall of Nineveh in 612 (i.e., no later than c. 640) and if Cyaxares continued to rule until at least 585, his reign lasted for a minimum of 55 years (from 640 to 585). This is not impossible, but highly unlikely, as even Herodotus puts Cyaxares' reign at a mere 40 years.<sup>165</sup> Combined with the total absence of evidence of a major Scythian invasion in the Assyrian sources, we should reject the idea of a Scythian conquest of the Median empire, and certainly of "all of Asia."

Finally, there is little evidence outside of Herodotus of a "Median empire" of the size that Herodotus describes. If we assume that the Median war with Lydia did indeed take place in 585, this then implies Median expansion through those lands between their heartland and Lydia. However, what little evidence we do have indicates the continued independent existence of Urartu, as well as military activity of the Neo-Babylonians in this region after 612. The major centers of Assyrian administrative power continued to be inhabited, and were most likely absorbed into the Neo-Assyrian empire.<sup>166</sup> Neo-Babylonians armies marched through Anatolia as far as Cilicia; in the Chronicles recording these campaigns, there is no mention of the Medes,

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162 Grayson 1991:128-9.

163 Sulimirski 1991:564-7 puts great faith in Herodotus' account, but reads far too much into the Assyrian evidence.

164 Hdt. 1.73-4; Leloux 2016:36-9.

165 Steele 2003:6-7.

166 Kuhrt 1995:240-3.

who had so recently acted as allies in the final overthrow of the Assyrians.<sup>167</sup> If the Medes had claimed this region as their own, it is hard to image the Babylonians crisscrossing the land with apparent impunity without so much as a mention of Median consent or resistance.

A damaged section of the Nabonidus Chronicle records that Cyrus the Great "mustered his army and crossed the Tigris downstream from Arbēla."<sup>168</sup> From there, he marched against an unpreserved region, defeated the king, and set up a garrison. Traditionally, this has been assumed to be a reference to his Lydian campaign but, in recent decades, it has been demonstrated that the only possible reading of the defeated kingdom is Urartu.<sup>169</sup> We do not know what the structural and territorial reality of this Urartian "kingdom" was, so we cannot exclude the possibility that the Medes were able to establish a claim to some portion of Anatolia, alongside the Urartians and Babylonians. But if the Medes, despite their key role in the destruction of the Neo-Assyrians, made no claims to lasting control over former Assyrian territory, we can assume that Median "imperial" aims were tempered by the Neo-Babylonian presence in Mesopotamia, either because of an alliance or respect for Neo-Babylonian power.<sup>170</sup>

As far as the evidence indicates, then, the *Medikos logos* is not an accurate account of Median history. But before we throw it into the bin, we should first examine it in its place within Herodotus' work. Despite accusations that it is merely a Greek narrative imposed on Near Eastern characters, Christopher Tuplin argues that there is actually very little that is clearly Greek in the key elements of the story. For example, Deioces comes to power by virtue of his role as a lawgiver. While this could be a Greek motif at work—there are similarities between Herodotus' Deioces and Plutarch's Solon—Darius places great emphasis on his role as lawgiver

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<sup>167</sup> Rollinger 2008:53-5.

<sup>168</sup> ABC 7:2.16.

<sup>169</sup> Oelsner 1999-2000:373-80, quoted in Rollinger 2008:56.

<sup>170</sup> Reade 2003.

in his Bisotun inscription, suggesting that it was very much a part of the Iranian notion of legitimate kingship. Furthermore, Deioces places his own home in the center of the heptad of walls of Ecbatana in the fashion of Near Eastern palaces, not the Greek *polis*.<sup>171</sup> Nor was Herodotus simply retrojecting contemporary Persian practices onto the Medes. He credits Darius with the implementation of the satrapal and tributary systems of the Persian empire, both of which are absent in his account of the Median empire.<sup>172</sup>

What, then, is the *Medikos logos*? The undeniable fact of the Near Eastern names in the narrative means that it is not solely a Greek invention. This means that Herodotus got his information from someone else. Sancisi-Weerdenburg has challenged the conventional wisdom, that Herodotus was working from oral sources: his account lacks the narrative features typical of oral histories, and is, surprisingly, too accurate to not have at least some support from written sources, most likely Assyrian or Babylonian chronicles.<sup>173</sup> Naturally, Herodotus did not have access to these texts. But as Sancisi-Weerdenburg argues, the Persians clearly did have access to these texts, or at least the information contained therein. We can see from the narrative of Cyrus' youth—a much better example of an oral history—that the historical figure of Astyages (Ištumegu) was resurrected from the cuneiform texts in order to create a legitimate marriage connection between Cyrus and the Medes.<sup>174</sup> This provided the basis for the narrative; the form of the narrative took the form of the myth, which utilized the common motif of the Hero Exposed as a Child, because "myth" was the way in which ancient, pre-literate and therefore pre-historical

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171 Tuplin 2004:225-6. He continues, "But the important thing is not to determine that there is anything distinctively Median (rather than Mesopotamian, Elamite or Persian) involved—only that we do not have to regard (and dismiss) the story as purely the product of Greek imagination."

172 Tuplin 2004:227-8 points out that Herodotus specifically draws a distinction here between Median and Achaemenid practice, and that there is no reason to assume Herodotus' account is Greek in origin, counter to Waters' analysis in note 154 above.

173 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1994:46-51.

174 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1994:52-3.

people conceived of the past.<sup>175</sup> This does not mean that the *Medikos logos* was also created at the behest of the Achaemenids. Sancisi-Weerdenburg argues that Herodotus, perhaps wishing to describe the developments that led to the rise of the Persian empire, sought information concerning this period from sources familiar with it. Since the Achaemenid court had instigated a rediscovery of the post-Assyrian period for the creation of the story of Cyrus, this type of information was readily available, and "any Greek interested in Mesopotamian history, could obtain reliable data at the source."<sup>176</sup> Using this reliable data, Herodotus could then go craft his *Medikos logos*, according to the expectations of his audience.

This hypothesis provides a reasonable explanation for the presence of authentic information in Herodotus' otherwise inaccurate account. But it is not without its issues. First, it requires a situation where the early Achaemenids sought to win support amongst the Medes, and sifted through Assyrian and Babylonian texts until they dug up a Mede worthy to play the role of ancestor of Cyrus the Great. This implies that Asytages was not a well-known character at the time. What, then, was his significance to the Medes? It would not matter if the Babylonians had maintained records of his life and deeds, if he had been forgotten by the very people that were supposed to be influenced by his presence in a story. As pointed out above, the names Fravartiš/Phraortes and Uvaxšatara/Cyaxares were used by Median rebels because they were still meaningful. Cyrus was linked to Asytages for the same reason: he was a character, no matter how historically inaccurate, that carried an important meaning amongst the Medes. It is unnecessary to insert Mesopotamian archives as a mediator between Achaemenid propagandists and their Median recipients.

Second, while Sancisi-Weerdenburg is right in emphasizing the mutability of oral

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175 Meier 2004:33-46. On this see p.56 below.

176 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1994:52.

histories across time, it does not follow from this that any account containing accurate information, or which follows a chronological, fact-based structure, must be based on written texts. Oral narratives may develop according to a relatively reliable set of rules within any given culture, but there is no reason to suppose that a narrative must continue to obey the same rules when crossing into a new linguistic and cultural community, especially when the narrative has been taken over for the purpose of committing it to writing. Herodotus extracted what he needed and dropped the rest. While this still does not change the fact that Herodotus most likely learned the names for his *logos* from a Near Eastern source, it means that we must view that source material as primarily oral information, with all of the methodological issues implied therein. Herodotus' description of a Median "empire" should not be used to reconstruct Mesopotamian or Iranian history.

There is another narrative account of the Medes from the fall of Nineveh to the rise of Cyrus, that provided by Ctesias.<sup>177</sup> His account begins with a history of Assyria, whose thirtieth and last king is Sardanapallus. As a result of his extreme decadence and femininity, Arbaces the Mede and Belesys the Chaldaean hatched a plot to kill him. The two rebels spent a year gathering forces, then attacked Sardanapallus at Nineveh. Initially, the king was able to defeat the combined Median and Babylonian army, but when the Bactrians were convinced to join the rebellion, Sardanapallus was forced to retreat behind the city's walls. For three years he held out, until a great flood washed away part of the walls. When the rebel armies stormed in, Sardanapallus built a pyre of his treasure in the middle of his palace. He, his eunuchs and concubines, and the whole palace were consumed by the flames; thus 1300 years of Assyrian rule came to an end.<sup>178</sup>

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177 The primary edition of Ctesias' *Persika* is Lenfant 2004. I have also made use of the more recent editions of Stronk 2010 and Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010.

178 F1b = Diod 2.23-27. Note that Athenaeus 12.38 tells us that "most writers, including Duris, relate that he

In the aftermath, Arbaces became king of an independent Media. He and his successors wielded supreme power in Asia. Ctesias, or his transmitters, do not report the extent of the empire, although it is clear that the Cadusii, Parthians, and Sakae were independent, and the Persians were Median subjects. Babylon also appears to be under Median rule; Nanarus the Babylonian is called the "*hyparchos* of the king and most powerful man in Babylon."<sup>179</sup> Arbaces and his successors ruled Asia for 470 years, in comparison to the 128 given by Herodotus.<sup>180</sup>

As with Herodotus, some of the names used by Ctesias have been taken from Near Eastern sources. Sardanapallus is a Greek rendering of Assurbanipal—not the last Assyrian king, but the last to rule over a period of stability and power. The story of Sardanapallus' suicide on a pyre comes from a tradition concerning the death of Šamaš-šum-ukin, viceroy of Babylon and Assurbanipal's brother.<sup>181</sup> The name Parsondes, a Persian rebel leader in the reign of Artaeus, can be recognized in the attested forms Paršandāta, Parshandātha, and Paršanta.<sup>182</sup> Arbaces appears in an inscription of Sargon II as *Ar-ba-ku*, one of forty-five Medes who paid tribute in 713.<sup>183</sup> Since Arbaces and Belesys (Bēlšunu) were important imperial officials at the time of the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, it is also entirely possible that Ctesias simply took two contemporary names and dropped them into his narrative as needed.<sup>184</sup> Ctesias' Arbaces is described elsewhere as the

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[Sardanapallus] was stabbed to death by this Arbaces who was indignant that a man of this sort was their king."

179 F6 = Athanaeus 12.530 D.

180 Hdt. 1.130; note that in fact, adding the reign lengths provided by Herodotus actually gives 178 years (Llewellyn-Jones 2010:137n52).

181 MacGinnis 1988:39. The account is found in the Rassam Cylinder, as translated by Luckenbill 1927:303-4 no. 794: "Assur, Sin, Shamash, Adad, Bel, Nabu, Ishtar of Nineveh, the queen of Kidmuri, Ishtar of Arbela, Urta, Nergal (and) Nusku, who march before me, slaying my foes, cast Shamash-shum-ukin, my hostile brother, who became my enemy, into the burning flames of a conflagration and destroyed him."

182 Justi 1895:343-4; Diod. 2.33.1-6; Est. 9:7; Yašt 13.123.

183 Llewellyn-Jones 2010:137n52; Justi 1895:20-1.

184 Jaboby FGrH col. 2049.

commander of the Medes,<sup>185</sup> king of the Medes,<sup>186</sup> or a general of a group of Medes serving for a year at Nineveh,<sup>187</sup> which recalls Liverani's interpretation of Esarhaddon's Succession Treaties with the Median royal guards.<sup>188</sup>

Ctesias claimed to have made use of "royal records" (βασιλικαὶ διαφοραὶ or βασιλικαὶ ἀναγραφαὶ) as textual sources for his *Persika*.<sup>189</sup> While the existence of such texts has been doubted,<sup>190</sup> we should not reject the possibility of their existence outright.<sup>191</sup> Scholars have pointed to the similarities between the Assyrian stories surrounding Sargon the Great and Ctesias' account of Cyrus the Great's youth as possible evidence for the continuity of a literary tradition from at least the second millennium until the Persian period. The original version of Sargon's childhood was probably in existence by 2000, and was reused by Sargon II in the eighth century to legitimize his somewhat dubious claim to the throne.<sup>192</sup> Given the widespread presence of the motif of the Hero Abandoned as a Child across the Near Eastern and Greek worlds, we cannot prove that Cyrus was making an intentional reference to Sargon when he adopted the same motif for his own biography. Still, the Cyrus Cylinder shows that the Persian chancery was able to make full use of the Babylonian scribes' familiarity with the Mesopotamian literary legacy, and Cyrus' own offerings to a statue of Sargon suggests that he was well aware of

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185 Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 2: Ἀρβάκης ὁ Μήδων ὑπαρχος.

186 Suidae Lexicon s.v. Ἀρβάκης: βασιλεύς Μήδων ἐπὶ Σαρδαναπάλλου.

187 Diod. 2.24.1: Ἀρβάκης γὰρ τις, Μήδος μὲν τὸ γένος...ἐστρατήγει Μήδων τῶν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπεπομένων εἰς τὴν Νίνου.

188 See above, p.21ff.

189 Diod. 2.22.5, 2.32.4.

190 See, for one, Dorati 1995:33-6.

191 Stronk 2010:15-21 cites passages from the Hebrew Bible that mention a Persian "book of records," as well as archaeological evidence from Elephantine and Persepolis. While this is far from proof of the existence of Ctesias' 'royal records,' it does suggest that the Achaemenids may have written information about their own past, in a narrative form and/or as a chronicle of facts and events.

192 Kuhrt 2003:352.

the cultural value of that already ancient figure.<sup>193</sup> This is all to say that Ctesias was likely reporting a version of Cyrus' youth that he received from a Persian or Babylonian source; whether it was oral or written, we cannot say.<sup>194</sup> Ctesias certainly had opportunities to interact with potential sources of oral narratives, ranging from the many unnamed eunuchs, servants, and other administrative functionaries at court, to fellow Greek expatriates in Asia, to specific named sources, like Clearchus and Parysatis.<sup>195</sup> While we can make general statements about the reliability of oral narratives or their means of transmission, we cannot actually know the nature of oral literature at the Persian royal court during Ctesias' presence there. Furthermore, Ctesias (or any other writer) was under no obligation to preserve the form of the information he gathered from his sources, so while we may expect narratives from oral sources to fit certain patterns, the absence of those patterns in a written text does not rule out an originally oral source.

So there is good reason to believe that both Herodotus and Ctesias had access to Near Eastern sources, and that some of these sources may have informed their accounts of Median history. However, we cannot use the apparent authenticity of one particular narrative to certify the authenticity of any other narrative in the same author's work; it would only show that he had the capacity to obtain and make use of authentic accounts, if he wanted to do so. Furthermore, given the absence of corroborating evidence for a Median state with the level of political development or geographical range envisioned by the two Greek historians, it is best to set these accounts aside as we seek to understand the potential presence of Mesopotamian notions of

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193 Kuhrt 2003:356.

194 Drews 1974:391-2 concludes that the written tradition connecting the motif to Sargon would have been so strong as to prevent the motif from being applied to Cyrus in a written form; ergo, it was only applied to Cyrus in an oral narrative. However, there is nothing in the Mesopotamian literary tradition that suggests a motif could not be re-applied to various figures in written texts. If anything, Cyrus' clear reliance on preexisting traditions proves that the opposite is true.

195 Lenfant 2004:xxxiii-xxxv. Ctesias certainly claims to have heard some information directly from Parysatis, and Lenfant believes that her view has colored the section of the *Persika* which deals with the reign of Darius II to that of Artaxerxes II. Dorati 1995:40-1 doubts that Ctesias ever came into direct contact with Clearchus.



empire during the Achaemenid period.

This is, of course, not to say that there were no Median kings, or that the Medes had no part to play in Mesopotamian politics. The fact that Babylonian scribes felt that Cyrus' defeat of Asytagas was worthy of mention,<sup>196</sup> in addition to Darius' repeated description of his forces as 'the Persian and Median *kara*-' proves that the Medes were of at least local interest, and continued to play a significant role after the rise of the Achaemenids. How these simple facts were mutated into the notion of a Median *arche* over all of Asia is a question that continues to have no answer.

Let us clearly state the question raised by this section: can we justifiably suggest that the Medes were able to transmit Assyrian notions of empire to the Persians? This question requires a two-part answer, as it demands that we demonstrate first, that the Medes were familiar with the specifics of Assyrian ideology and imperial policies; and second, that the Medes passed this information on to the Persians in a recognizable way.

As has been discussed above, there was continuous and intensive contact between the Medes and the Assyrian state between the ninth and seventh centuries. Assyrian officials were present in Media, and Medes traveled to Assyrian capital cities to take oaths and deliver tribute. Specific information about these encounters is very rare, but a contemporary example from elsewhere in the Assyrian empire might be a useful analogy. Despite the differences between Israel and Media in this time period, their experiences with the Assyrian empire have much in common. Both were located on the borders of the empire. Defeat at the hands of the Assyrian military forced local leaders into vassalship, and resulted in the establishment of local Assyrian garrisons in both regions.

Biblical scholars have long noticed the similarities between the formulaic speech in

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<sup>196</sup> ABC 7 col. 2.1-4.

Assyrian royal texts, and the motifs used to describe the Assyrians in the Hebrew Bible. Likewise, Biblical authors display a familiarity with Assyrian tactics and policies, as reflected in otherwise unrelated Assyrian texts. Shawn Aster has examined the reflections of Assyrian propaganda in the book of Isaiah and argues for three channels of communication which carried official Assyrian 'claims to empire' to the author of Isaiah: media disseminated within the Assyrian heartland (e.g., the public reading of a 'letter to the god') and reported back to Israel by Israelites residing in a capital city; media disseminated in the territory of the Aramean kingdoms, which lay between Assyria and the land of Israel (e.g., meetings between Israelite emissaries and Assyrian royal officials, including the king); and media disseminated within the Land of Israel itself (e.g., inscribed stelae erected in Israel, or oral messages delivered during a siege).<sup>197</sup> Because many Israelites had come into prolonged contact with Assyrian officials and texts, the author of the book of Isaiah was able to draw upon a wealth of recent, accurate information when writing.

We can expect that Medes experienced a similar degree of contact with Assyrian claims to empire. Medes were present in the Assyrian heartland, as ambassadors and as body-guards.<sup>198</sup> Assyrians were present in the Median heartland, collecting oaths from city-lords and manning garrisons. Unlike the Israelites, the Medes did not produce their own texts, so we cannot know what messages they received from the Assyrians. But given how similar their experience was to that of the Israelites, we should expect that the Medes were at least generally familiar with the Assyrian claims to empire, as well as the broader strokes of Assyrian imperial policies.

Is there evidence that the Medes passed this knowledge on to the Persians? A separate but

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197 Aster 2007:9.

198 Liverani (1995:62n36; cf. Brown 1986) speculates that the rise of the Median 'empire' may have been facilitated by knowledge of Assyrian military and bureaucratic organization gained while residing in the Assyrian capitals, and then brought back to the Median homeland.

related question asks what the connection was between the Medes and Persians in the generations leading up to the rise of Cyrus the Great. Whatever methods the Medes practiced as a regional power, what opportunity was there for such practices to be passed on to the Persians? As Median power expanded outward from Ecbatana, they would have absorbed a great number of smaller entities, both Iranian and non-Iranian. This process may have been combined with the incorporation of local mythologies into a larger mytho-epic Median narrative, in which local heroes were transformed into the ancestral heroes of the contemporary Median kings. Hence, Daikku the Mannean and Kaštaritu of Kar-Kašši became the ancestors of Cyaxares and Astyages.<sup>199</sup> This explanation is appealing as it reconciles the names found in the Near Eastern records with those in Herodotus, but there is no reason that Daikku the Mannean can only be Deioces the Mede; it is entirely possible that Herodotus' Deioces has an entirely unrelated origin, one unfortunately lost to us.

Several sources indicate that there was a close link between Cyrus and the Medes. First, the Greek tradition went so far as to claim that Persia was subject to the Medes, and that Cyrus was actually the grandson of Astyages, the last Median king, and led a rebellion against him.<sup>200</sup> While it is not inconceivable that Cyrus was indeed of Median stock, the narrative of his birth, exposure, and final recognition as recorded by Herodotus is so obviously propaganda that Herodotus himself identifies it as such.<sup>201</sup> The story as it is fits neatly into the motif of the Hero Exposed as a Child. In this motif, someone attempts to destroy a child who is fated to bring about their downfall.<sup>202</sup> The responsible party is one abandoned by the gods, condemned to destruction.

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199 Helm 1981:87.

200 Hdt. 1.91; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.1; Strabo 15.3.8; Isocrates, *Evagoras* 9.38 and Ctesias F9 = Photius 36a9–37a25 claim that Cyrus actually killed Asytages; Ctesias also states that Cyrus was not, in fact, related to Astyages.

201 Hdt. 1.122 states that Cambyses and Mandane "spread the rumor that Cyrus, when he was abandoned, was suckled by a dog, so that their son's salvation would seem more providential to the Persians."

202 Lewis 1976:218-318. Some notable examples of the motif are the tales of Oedipus, Heracles, and the brothers

If it were true that Cambyses and Mandane had spread the story while Cyrus was still young, this would mean that Cambyses had been plotting against his father-in-law. There is no indication whatsoever that Cambyses had the ability or the ambition to rebel against the Medes; in fact, he was apparently selected for marriage with Mandane because of his low rank and "quiet disposition."<sup>203</sup> Thus, the story was crafted only after Cyrus rose to a position of power himself.

The discussion of Cyrus' lineage in the modern literature actually concerns two separate questions: Who were Cyrus' ancestors?; and what was Darius' relationship to Cyrus? The bibliography is long, and already presented by Rollinger 1998 and Jacobs 2011. We are here only interested in the first question. There is no need to try to reconcile the various family trees offered or suggested by the Cyrus Cylinder, Bisotun, or the Classical authors. We must recognize each of these as propaganda, created in a specific context and never meant to be compared to one another. Instead, it makes far more sense to see Cyrus as a King of Anshan who conquered the Medes, and then fed the Medes a traditional story to justify this conquest.<sup>204</sup> Since the story survived long enough to make it to Herodotus' ears, it is likely that it was still repeated at the royal court during the reign of Darius. Media was one of the areas plagued by rebellions after Darius' usurpation, and the Median Liar-Kings reached back to their heritage in their bid to reassert their independence by taking the throne-name Cyaxares. Perhaps Darius drew on this story to remind the Medes of Cyrus' totally legitimate rule over Media. Apparently some Medes were convinced, as "The Persian and Median *kara*-" clearly represented the core of Darius'

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Romulus and Remus. In other versions, known from Ion, Moses, and Sargon, the child is exposed as means to preserve them.

203 Hdt. 1.108 τρόπου ἡσυχίου.

204 Waters 2010b:65. Drews 1974 and Kuhrt 2003 both emphasize the connections between Cyrus' birth legend and that of Sargon, and suggest that Cyrus (or someone later) adopted the tale as a result of his interaction with the Babylonians, not the Medes. However, while the connections between Cyrus and Sargon should not be ignored, the motif of the Hero Exposed as a Child is so widespread that is not necessary to chose between either the Medes or the Babylonians. In fact, the tale may have been adopted because it was recognized by both communities.

power, and one of his generals was the Mede Taxmaspada.<sup>205</sup>

That Cyrus did rise to power by defeating the Medes is confirmed by the Nabonidus Chronicle 2.1-4, wherein we learn that Cyrus of Anshan defeated Astyages (Ištumegu) and captured Ecbatana, in c. 550/49. We are not informed of the relationship between Cyrus and Astyages, or the Persians and Medes. But whatever came into Cyrus' possession after his victory over Astyages, it would have been in his interest to maintain it. Even if the Median "empire" was nothing more than a series of local alliances or hierarchical dependencies, by appropriating the Medes' instruments of rule Cyrus would have been able to tap the military power of the various entities between Anatolia and Iran. The Medes remained an important group within the Achaemenid administration, and we can expect that they retained some memory of their experience of being vassals, allies and enemies of the Assyrians and Babylonians. The absence of any information about the administrative structure of the Median realm means that we cannot make any assumptions about the possibility that the Medes adopted and preserved Mesopotamian traditions of rule, and were thus able to pass these on to the Persians. The fact that Ctesias knows that the Medes were employed as soldiers or guards by the Assyrians might suggest that the Medes and Persians remembered specific characteristics of Assyrian rule, but it would be too speculative to expand this suggestion any further.

#### **4b. The Elamites**

The years from c.1000–750 in southwestern Iran are nearly a "dark age" of Neo-Elamite history.<sup>206</sup> At the same time that the Assyrians were forging connections with the Median city lords in the ninth and eighth centuries, there was increasing Assyrian encroachment into Elamite

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205 DB §33.

206 For a thorough reconstruction of the entire Neo-Elamite period, see Waters 1997.

territory. This led to a period of violence, characterized by Elamo-Babylonian cooperation against Assyria, interspersed with peaceful diplomatic activity. For example, Elamite troops fought under the Babylonian king Marduk-balassu-iqbi c. 813 against Šamšī-Adad V,<sup>207</sup> while the first Elamite diplomats came to Nimrud during the reign of Adad-nerari III (810–783). In 720, the Elamites were once again fighting the Assyrians in battle: this time, they were fighting for Merodach-Baladan II, a Chaldean claimant to the Babylonian throne. According to the Babylonian Chronicle, Merodach-Baladan never even made it to the battlefield, but the Elamites were still able to defeat Sargon II at Der on their own.<sup>208</sup> Elamite activity in Mesopotamia continued unabated until 693. At that time, Sennacherib, in the wake of a coup in Elam, marched into the Zagros. In his own words: "I besieged, I captured, I carried off their spoil, I destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire."<sup>209</sup> The following year, the Elamites and Babylonians gathered a coalition of allies from Parsuaš, Anšan, Pasiru, Ellipi, Chaldaeia, and Aramaeans. Our sources do not agree on the outcome of the ensuing Battle of Halule: the Babylonian Chronicle names Menanu, i.e. Elamite king Humban-nimena III, with a victory, while Sennacherib brags of smashing the allies and killing 150,000 enemies.<sup>210</sup> Certainly, Sennacherib remained strong enough to execute his infamous sack of Babylon in 689. In 674 Urtak of Elam made a treaty with Esarhaddon.<sup>211</sup>

Note that the toponyms Parsua and Anšan are listed among the allies of the Elamites. These tempt us to make assumptions about the early history of the Persians and their possible connections with the Elamites. First, there is the obvious similarity between "Parsua/Parsumaš"

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207 RIMA 3 A.0.103.1.37-45; Potts 1999:263.

208 Carter and Stolper 1984:45; Potts 1999:263-4.

209 Luckenbill 1924:88; Potts 1999:271.

210 Luckenbill 1924:45, 89; Potts 1999:273.

211 Waters 2013:478. See p.19f above.

in the Akkadian texts and the "Parsa" of the Old Persian texts. Second, in the Cyrus Cylinder, the oldest surviving inscription produced for a Persian king, Cyrus identifies himself as "King of Anšan." But we must exercise caution. The arrival of Iranian people into southwestern Iran cannot be precisely dated, but it is generally assumed to have occurred by 1000.<sup>212</sup> The first textual evidence of a Persian presence in Iran are ninth-century Assyrian annals, which mention the Parsua, Parsuaš, or Parsumaš.<sup>213</sup> However, it is not possible to equate these toponyms with the region known as Parsa/Fars, as the Assyrian records imply that Parsua/Parsumaš is located in the central Zagros, near modern Kirmanšah, and not in modern Fars.<sup>214</sup> It is unclear what exactly these terms referred to, in terms of geographic extent or political structure.

In 647, Assurbanipal destroyed Susa, but this was in no way the "end of Elam." Instead, this following period, down to c. 520, has been called a Neo-Elamite "renaissance."<sup>215</sup> Susa remained occupied without a break after 647, a wholly independent state during the entire time. The Acropolis texts, a set of over 300 tablets from an archive recording the distribution of goods by the palace, show that the Neo-Elamite state still maintained a degree of centralized control over the Susiana region, and that there was considerable material wealth flowing in and out of the palace. Since these texts date from the century before the Achaemenid period, they make clear the rich inheritance available to the Achaemenid state.<sup>216</sup> Based on archaeological evidence, it has been suggested that this period was characterized by a fusion or interaction between the various Elamite and Iranian groups, giving rise finally to a distinct Persian identity.<sup>217</sup> This

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212 Carter 2007:140.

213 Briant 2002:17–18; Waters 1999:100.

214 de Miroschedji 1985:59.

215 Álvarez-Mon 2013:472.

216 Henkelman 2008:5-8.

217 Álvarez-Mon 2006:267–8; Potts 1999:306-7.

theory of the Elamite acculturation of Persia is still controversial, and it is not our intention to investigate all of the intricacies involved. Instead, we will discuss the implications of this theory, and consider how an understanding of Elamite acculturation might impact our main concern, that is, the use of treaties by the Achaemenid imperial authorities.

It is now increasingly clear that in the sixth century, Iranians were included in the administrative bureaucracy centered around Susa, in a polity that constituted the precursor to the later Achaemenid empire, that is, "Persia before the Empire."<sup>218</sup> The Persians were connected to the larger history of Mesopotamia through the Elamites. In his Cylinder, Cyrus gives his titlature as "son of Cambyses, the great king, king of the city of Anšan, grandson of Cyrus, the great king, king of the city of Anshan, descendant of Teispes, the great king, king of the city of Anšan..." While this could mean that Cyrus had a royal Elamite lineage, it undoubtedly had an ideological justification as well. Cyrus was likely attaching himself to the prestigious Elamite monarchy.<sup>219</sup> Cyrus' Anšanite titles in his Cylinder in Babylon, the use of Elamite clothing and iconography in Achaemenid art and glyptic, and the fact that, in the Persepolis Fortification archive, the Elamites were not singled out as a group separate from the Persian population, all suggest that the Elamites "were not felt to be 'separate' or even 'foreign,' but primarily as inhabitants of the Persian homeland."<sup>220</sup>

In addition, the archaeological facts suggest that the city of Anšan (Tell-e Malyan), and Fars in general, was unurbanized during the period from roughly 1000–550.<sup>221</sup> Zournatzi hypothesizes that Cyrus claimed an Anšanite heritage in order to appeal to his new Mesopotamian subjects. Just as the kingship passed from city to city by divine will for millennia,

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218 Tavernier 2011:240–3.

219 Carter 2007:154–155; Shayegan 2011:284.

220 Henkelman 2003:79–81.

221 de Miroschedji 1990:53; Zournatzi (forthcoming):7–8.



as recorded by the Sumerian King List, so too it now passed to the city of Anšan, and therefore to Cyrus.<sup>222</sup>

A similar phenomenon may have inspired the Babylonian titles of Xerxes. From Cyrus to Darius, Achaemenid kings were given the title "king of Babylon, king of the lands" in Babylonian documents. Under Xerxes, it was expanded to "king of the land of Persis and the land of Media, king of Babylon, king of the lands."<sup>223</sup> Despite the emphasis on Xerxes' Persian heritage, there is no evidence that this new formula was inspired by any Persian precedent. It is possible to see the Elamite title "king of Anshan and Susa" as a model, which would suggest, once again, an attempt to tie the Achaemenid monarchy to old Elam.<sup>224</sup> However, it is also possible that this new formula was crafted by Babylonian scribes, consciously linking the Achaemenids to the Assyrians by using the Akkadian formula "king of the country of Sumer and Akkad" as a model. Note that while Cyrus does not use the formula "king of the land of Persis and the land of Media," he does take the title "king of Babylon, king of the country of Sumer and Akkad."<sup>225</sup>

The period of Elamite acculturation meant that the Achaemenids did not simply learn of Neo-Assyrian and -Babylonian policies when they came to power in the mid-sixth century; instead, these concepts were present in the Elamo-Iranian heartland during the very time of the genesis of the Persian ethnos. While there is no evidence to indicate what acculturated Persians made of Assyrian and Babylonian imperial practices, we should note there were some characteristics of Achaemenid imperialism already present in the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian empires, namely: (1) the incorporation of local elites in the administration of subject

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222 Zournatzi 2011:11–13.

223 Shayegan 2011:248–257.

224 Shayegan 2011:260–284.

225 Shayegan 2011:287–90.

territories; and (2) the co-option of local gods to further the interests of the empire. Furthermore, the very fact that acculturation was an essential element in the development of the Persians' ethnogenesis and political institutions, the possibility that that Persian ideological tenets allowed for the accommodation of external practices ought to be seriously considered. In the very heartland of the Persian empire, Iranian scribes continued the Elamite literary tradition,<sup>226</sup> and Elamite cults were supported by the Persian state,<sup>227</sup> accommodation of non-Persian culture was not just a strategy used for governing conquered subjects, but was typical of how the Persian state conducted its own internal affairs. In a sense, the Persians, on the strength of their own experience of acculturation, had come to perceive accommodation as a necessary condition for rule, and were thus prepared, possibly more than other polities of the Ancient Near East, to adapt to local traditions of their subjects.<sup>228</sup> This does not mean that the Persians' default posture was to adapt to any and all foreign cultures, or that the process of accommodation occurred without any consideration of the potential consequences. The Persians acculturated with only one other culture—the Elamites—and unique geographic, demographic, or other factors present in southwestern Iran must have played a role.

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226 Shayegan 2012:90.

227 Henkelman 2011:96–8.

228 "The fact that Elamite was chosen as one of the three languages of Achaemenid monumental epigraphy most likely indicates a direct linkage with Middle and Neo-Elamite royal ideology. At the same time, the inclusion of the long Elamite inscriptions at Bisotun, well beyond the traditional boundaries of Elam, paradigmatically marked the new role of the Elamite language in the Achaemenid period: it was no longer simply a language of a king and his people but a language in service of a new political ideology wherein the king ruled over multiple peoples envisioned as cooperating for the welfare of the state." (Basello 2011:80–1)

## 5. Greek Binding Agreements

Chapter 5 will attempt to describe the nature of binding agreements, specifically treaties, in the Greek world. We will begin with a general overview of terminology concerning Greek interstate binding agreements, and then describe the sources that provide us with evidence on these agreements. Next, we will consider the relationship between the Greek and Near Eastern worlds from c. 1400-700, and investigate the extent to which the treaty traditions in the former were influenced by the latter. Lastly, we will consider the tradition of treaties amongst the Greek states in the Archaic and Classical periods, and establish what notions the Greeks held about instituting and maintaining treaties.

### 5a. Terminology

First, in order to eliminate confusion and imprecision, I will present the terminology needed to discuss the range of Greek treaties. There is no single Greek word for 'treaty.' Instead, we have various words for different binding agreements and political alliances:

- εἰρήνη: peace. Can refer to a truce, as in a cessation of a battle;<sup>229</sup> also refers to a more general absence of war.<sup>230</sup>
- ἐκεχειρία: truce, armistice. Generally of shorter duration than σπονδαί.<sup>231</sup>

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229 Hdt. 1.74, where the Medes and Lydians put an end to a battle after seeing an eclipse: ...τῆς μάχης τε ἐπαύσαντο καὶ μᾶλλον τι ἔσπευσαν καὶ ἀμφοτέρω εἰρήνην ἐαυτοῖσι γενέσθαι. A more permanent peace is established later, when the sides agree to a royal marriage and an exchange of oaths: οὗτοί σφι καὶ τὸ ὄρκιον οἱ σπεύσαντες γενέσθαι ἦσαν καὶ γάμων ἐπαλλαγὴν ἐποίησαν.

230 Karavites 1982:27–8. See *Il.* 2.796–7, where Iris, disguised as Polites, says to Priam: ὦ γέρον αἰεὶ τοι μῦθοι φίλοι ἄκριτοί εἰσιν/ ὡς ποτ' ἐπ' εἰρήνης: πόλεμος δ' ἀλίστοσος ὄρωρεν. ('Old man, constant speech was always a friend to you/ as before, in peacetime; but incessant war has been set in motion.') Andocides *On the Peace* 11–12 wishes to define a peace as the settlement of a disagreement between equals, and σπονδαί as imposed by the victors on the vanquished after military defeat. However, this is directly contradicted by the evidence; see notes 234 and 235 below.

231 Karavites 1982:28.

- *ἐπιμαχία*: defensive alliance. As opposed to *symmarchy*, this type of alliance only committed the contracting parties to defend each other in case of attack by a third party.<sup>232</sup>
- *ὀμολογία*: agreement, truce, compact. Roughly synonymous with *συνθήκη*.<sup>233</sup>
- *ὄρκιον*, pl. *ὄρκια*; *ὄρκος*: oath. Typically, *ὄρκος* refers to an oath<sup>234</sup> while *ὄρκια* refers to the entirety of the terms of an agreement,<sup>235</sup> or the sacrificial victims employed in making the agreement.<sup>236</sup>
- *σπονδαί* (pl of *σπονδή*): truce, peace. Literally, 'libations,' referring to the rituals associated with truces and pacts. Frequently meaning 'treaty,'<sup>237</sup> but it need not refer to anything more than an unwritten, temporary cease-fire.<sup>238</sup>
- *σύμβολα* (pl. of *σύμβολον*): agreement regulating the interactions of private citizens of different *poleis*.<sup>239</sup>
- *συμμαχία*: offensive and defensive alliance, wherein both sides agree to have the same friends and enemies;<sup>240</sup> or a general term for 'alliance.' Could be between equal or unequal parties. Both *συμμαχία* and *ἐπιμαχία* left the internal autonomy of the parties untouched.<sup>241</sup> A *συμμαχία* did not imply any other

232 Adcock and Mosley 1975:121, 191. *Arist. Pol.* 1280b 25: ...ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον / "...as if they were in a defensive alliance, coming to one another's aid only against those doing wrong."

233 Voelke 1983:204-5.

234 e.g. *IG I<sup>2</sup> 14* = Bengston no. 145 line 37, a *psephisma* recording the oath of the Colophonians to Athens, c. 450.

235 Cohen 1980:46-58.

236 e.g. *Il.* 3.268-9: κήρυκες ἀγαυοὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ θεῶν σύναγον; in this line, the heralds bring two lambs forward to be ritually sacrificed.

237 As in *Thuc.* 5.18, which records the treaty between Athens and Sparta in 422: σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ κατὰ τάδε...

238 *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.1-20: Derkyllidas, Spartan commander in Asia, made a series of *σπονδαί* with the satraps Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. Each time they met on the field, the truce had to be renewed, and the appearance of the opposing forces, prepared for battle, was not taken as a breach of the previous truce. At 3.2.20, a *σπονδή* was used to keep the peace in Ionia while the Spartans and the Great King considered the terms of a more permanent peace agreement.

239 Adcock and Mosley 1975:189. See *Dem. Halonnesus* 12-13; *Arist. Const. Ath.* 59.6.

240 Thucydides illustrates the difference between *συμμαχία* and *ἐπιμαχία* at 1.44, when the Athenians decide to make an *ἐπιμαχία*, not a *συμμαχία*, with Corcyra:

...μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν (εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευον σφίσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύοντ' ἂν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί), ἐπιμαχίαν δ' ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἢ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους.

[The People] changed their mind, and decided not to make a *symmarchy* with the Corcyrians, so as to have the same enemies and friends (because if the Corcyrians urged them to sail against Corinth with them, it would undo their treaty with the Peloponnesians), but to make an *epimachy*, in which they would help each other, if someone should attack Corcyra or Athens or another of their allies.

241 Bederman 2001:163-4.

commitment beyond military assistance.<sup>242</sup>

- συνθήκη: article of a treaty; or the entirety of the agreement; or a private contract, when plural (συνθήκαι).<sup>243</sup>
- ῥήτρα (Doric φράτρα): verbal agreement; compact; treaty; law.<sup>244</sup>
- φιλία: friendship; presumably non-aggression; frequently paired with συμμαχία.<sup>245</sup>

As this short list shows, there was significant overlap in the terms, and each term has a variable semantic range according to each author. In cases where an author refers to a binding agreement which is otherwise not recorded, it is sometimes difficult to tell if the agreement was written or only spoken, and what its legal status would have been.

Since treaties were used by the Greeks in a wide variety of contexts, they could be structured very differently. However, there are some formulae that can be found in many examples. Most treaties contained a length of contract (either a set number of years, or specifically eternal), stipulations (responsibilities of each party), witnesses (divine and/or human), a sworn oath, and punishments (divine or legal) for violations.<sup>246</sup>

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242 Baltrusch 1994:3.

243 In the Politics, Aristotle draws a distinction between *symbola*, *symmachia*, and *syntheke*:

...εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ... μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολίται πόλεως ἦσαν: εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας.

And if [the state existed] not for the sake of life alone, but rather for the good life, nor on account of symmachy, so that they would be harmed by no one, nor for the sake of reciprocal commerce and trade—for the Etruscans and Carthaginians, and all who have *symbola* towards each other, would be like the citizens of one polis; at any rate between these there are *synthekai* concerning imports and *symbola* about not doing injustice and documents concerning symmachy.

If Aristotle is correct, it does not mean that *synthekai* always regulate trade, but rather than *synthekai* may regulate trade, or more general relations between states (as in Thuc. 1.78.4), whereas symmachy only refers to a military alliance. *Symbola*, in the context of interstate relations, concern legal or economic agreements and guarantees (as in Dem. *On the Halonnesus* 7.12, where the orator describes the history of mercantile exchange between Athens and Macedonia).

244 Wade-Gery 1944:7.

245 For a discussion of semantic range of *philia*, and the contradictions inherent in interpretations of this type of relationship, see Mitchell 1997.

246 For an in-depth discussion of the function and purpose of the Greek oath and curse, see Lonis 1980.

## 5b. Sources

The primary sources for Greek treaties are either historiographic or epigraphic. F.C.

Wooll divides our sources for Greek treaties into three categories:

- Type A: treaty in an inscription or exact verbatim quotation of a treaty in a literary source;
- Type B: detailed summary in a literary source, where we may not have the exact formulae, but we do know what the provisions were;
- Type C: vague summary or allusion to a treaty in a literary source.

Obviously type A is preferred, but frequently no longer exists, so we are reliant on types B and C. This forces us to consider the reliability of whichever writer is informing us on a given treaty, which leads to some complications. The ancients themselves sometimes disagree about when a treaty was signed, its exact terms, and sometimes even whether or not it existed. If we do not know when a treaty was signed and what its exact terms were, it is impossible to know how it was enforced and how long it stayed in effect. In one, admittedly unusual, example, we are able to compare what Thucydides reported about a treaty with the inscribed treaty text itself: in 420, a 100-year *symmachia* was struck between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis,<sup>247</sup> which Thucydides also recorded in 5.47. The inscription is fragmentary, and therefore Thucydides' text runs longer; but where the two can be compared, they are nearly identical, apart from minor variations.<sup>248</sup> Clearly, this applies to only one treaty and one author, and we must continue to search for corroborating evidence for each individual case.

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247 *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 86 = Bengston no. 193.

248 Cohen 1956.

## ***5c. Near Eastern Influence on Greek Treaty Traditions***

The earliest treaties in the historical record, as we will shortly see, come from the sixth century. This owes to the fortunes of textual survival, rather than the absence of earlier texts: in the post-archaic period, political changes encouraged the copying and publication of public documents with a greater frequency than previously.<sup>249</sup> Therefore, when investigating the historical development of diplomatic practices as recorded in Greek texts, we are largely bereft of the oldest examples, and what we do have are later copies, possibly corrupted by errors or intentional modifications. Therefore, the reader must keep in mind in the following section that the texts presented here may not actually represent the true development of diplomacy in the Greek world.

Assuming, however, that the picture painted by the surviving texts is a remotely accurate reflection of reality, long before formalized treaties entered interstate diplomatic practice, Greeks relied on binding agreements protected by curses, both in internal and external affairs, in private and public. When we compare the wording and function of curses in the Near East and Greece, the similarities are so strong as to discard any possibility other than either borrowing or shared heritage. What was the relationship between Greek and Near Eastern cursing, and how did that relate to the development of treaty practices? It is possible to argue that there was no significant difference between Greek and Near Eastern treaty practices, and that the Athenians would not have recognized Persian methods and motives as foreign, because the Greek treaty tradition, like that of the Persians, had a Near Eastern heritage, having arrived via contact with the Hittite Empire, the Levantine trade networks, or both.<sup>250</sup> This possibility is worthy of consideration

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249 Graham 1960:103.

250 Brown 1995:16-21 argues for a wide array of literary, cultic, and legal similarities between Greece and the Near East (focusing on Israel, but including the entire Levant and Mesopotamia when necessary) due to

because comparison of Greek myths, rituals, and linguistics demonstrates undeniable links between the Greek world, western Anatolia, and the Levant from c. 1400 onward.<sup>251</sup> Since the Hittites and certain Levantine states have known treaty traditions, we will now try to find evidence of similarities between these and those of Greece.

## **The Hittites**

The history of the Hittite empire is well investigated in scholarship,<sup>252</sup> so I will provide only what is necessary for the purposes of this study. The Old Hittite kingdom was founded c. 1750, by king Hattušili I. He was preceded by at least two other kings at his capital, Hattuša, but he unified central Anatolia, began the process of expansion westward and southward, and established the bureaucracy which created the archives, the source of the majority of this information.

As far as reconstructions allow, Hittite treaties are considered either vassal or parity treaties. They typically have six sections (though not all treaties have all six): preamble; historical background; provisions; deposition and storage of the treaty text itself; list of divine witness; and curses and blessings. For a vassal treaty, only the subordinate party swears a binding oath.<sup>253</sup> A late fifteenth-early fourteenth century treaty provides more details on the swearing of an oath:

If you do not fight, you yourself break the oath of the gods. Hattusas [the Hittite capital] will be

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contact. He addresses treaties specifically at pp. 253-283.

251 The period from c. 1400 to the beginning of the Classical Age was not without disruptions. The collapse of the interconnected Bronze Age world in c. 1200, whatever its causes, broke the links between the Greek world and the Near East, as well as the links between communities within the Greek world. The linguistic changes associated with the early-first millennium "Dorian Invasion" further complicate this scene. One's interpretation of the data will influence (and/or be influenced by) whether one sees evidence of a massive human migration (e.g. Adrados 2005) or of relatively localized social changes (e.g. Hall 1997).

252 For example, Klengel 2011; Collins 2007; Bryce 2005.

253 HDT:3; Korošec 1931:12-14.



free from the oath. Thereto we killed a sheep. We have as follows laid under oath. As long as we have not yet received a judgment from an oracle, His Majesty will not attack your land and you shall not attack His Majesty's land.<sup>254</sup>

There were at least four other treaties between the Hittites and Kizzuwatna. Scholars debate their chronological order, but as a group, they are sufficient to allow us a hypothetical reconstruction of their form and function.<sup>255</sup> We see that the treaties were primarily intended to prevent the Mittani from gaining control over Kizzuwatna. Each contains at least some reciprocal clauses, but only the treaty between a Hittite king (perhaps Hantili<sup>256</sup>) and Paddatissu of Kizzuwatna is clearly a parity treaty.<sup>257</sup> Telipinu had been campaigning in the vicinity of Kizzuwatna, and had secured cities that would later belong to Kizzuwatna. While the sequence of events is unknown, it is possible that, with this treaty, Telipinu was attempting to define the border between Kizzuwatna and the Hittite realm, and to reach an agreement concerning which monarch would rule which cities. This region was clearly a volatile one, made more so by the fact that it lay so close to Mittani territory.<sup>258</sup> Telipinu made a decision to avoid a violent confrontation, and to try to come to a peaceful settlement of the issue in order to bring stability to the region.

Again, we must be cautious about using so fragmentary a source to reconstruct an imperial policy, but treaties do appear to play a very different role in the Hittite imperial system than in the Assyrian. The treaty between an unknown Hittite king (possibly Tudhaliya II<sup>259</sup>) and Sunaššura of Kizzawanta illustrates this well. Rather than emphasizing his own power and glory,

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254 Otten 1967:56, II 13'-18'. English translation by Weeks 2004:66.

255 Translations of the other four Hittite-Kizzuwatna treaties are published as HDT 1, 2, Otten 1951:129, and Otten 1971:66-7.

256 Bryce 2005:113.

257 Beckman 1996:4.

258 Bryce 2005:104-6.

259 Beckman 1996:13.

the Hittite king instead insists that the current treaty represents a vast improvement in Sunaššura's fortune. Obligations are disguised as favors from the Hittite king, and overt imbalances in power are glossed over or ignored. Perhaps the Hittite king was unable to control Kizzuwatna directly, and decided to seduce Sunaššura into what was, effectively, a vassal treaty: many of the terms are reciprocal, but several clauses either place obligations merely on Sunaššura, or make it clear that the latter is of lower rank than the Hittite king.<sup>260</sup> The Hittite kings were not shy about putting their military to work,<sup>261</sup> but, based on the language used in their treaties, the ideological glue that held together their empire was the loyalty of their vassals, connected by personal ties of benefaction or marriage to the Hittite kings.<sup>262</sup>

There was a somewhat different relationship between the Hittites and some of their Anatolian neighbors, in regions less likely to see interference from rival empires. Most of these states, especially to the north and west, were less developed than the Hittites and other Near Eastern states, their leaders more properly called "chiefs" than "kings." As a result, the Hittite kings are much more demanding, and blatantly emphasize the immense height from which they tower over their vassals. So Suppiluliuma (reigned c. 1343-1323) reminds Huqqana of Hayasa, "I have now elevated you, Huqqana, a lowly dog, and have treated you well. In Hattusa I have distinguished you among the men of Hayasa and have given you my sister in marriage."<sup>263</sup> After the standard demands for obedience and loyalty, oaths and curses, Suppiluliuma warns Huqqana against partaking of the 'barbaric' custom of incest, or intercourse with other palace women, both capital crimes in Hatti but apparently still practiced in Hayasa. To drive home his point,

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260 Liverani 1994; Weeks 2004:63-4.

261 According to Beckman 2014:118, the Hittites were on campaign nearly every single summer, although mostly they were concerned with small operations in Anatolia.

262 Weeks 2004:80-4.

263 HDT 3, A i 1-5.

Suppiluliuma tells the following anecdote:

Who was Mariya, and for what reason did he die? Did not a lady's maid walk by and he look at her? But the father of My Majesty himself looked out the window and caught him in his offense, saying: "You - why did you look at her?" So he died for that reason. The man perished just for looking from afar. So you beware.<sup>264</sup>

During the course of his long reign (c. 1350–1322), Suppiluliuma reconstituted the Hittite empire's Anatolian territories and expanded into Syria. Perhaps his most significant achievement was the implosion of the Mittani empire and the subordination of its remnants. Suppiluliuma took advantage of internal strife amongst the Mittani nobility, and conquered all the major cities between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean, supposedly within a single year.<sup>265</sup> He faced six more years of combat, as well as diplomatic competition from Egypt, but in the end Tushratta, the Mittani king, was assassinated, his son was forced into a vassal treaty, and Suppiluliuma left his own son and heir as king of Aleppo.

This vassal treaty, between Suppiluliuma and Shattiwaza, son of Tushratta, is preserved in separate versions:<sup>266</sup> (1) one speaks in the voice of Suppiluliuma, and has the full complement of Hittite treaty sections: an extensive historical introduction (nearly sixty lines), provisions, deposition, separate lists of Hittite and Mittani divine witnesses, and curses and blessings; and (2) the second is written as if in the voice of Shattiwaza. It has only the historical introduction, deposition, Mittani divine witnesses, and a far more extensive curses and blessing section. Shattiwaza (or, more accurately, the Hittite scribe writing for him) describes in detail the sins of his ancestors, the virtues of Suppiluliuma, and his own poverty and weakness. Not only are the terms of the treaty protected by powerful curses, the treaty text is to be stored in a temple of the Storm God, and "read repeatedly, for ever and ever, before the king of the land of Mitanni and

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264 HDT 3, A iii 68-73; Collins 2007:121-2.

265 HDT 6A, A obv. 38-47.

266 HDT 6A and 6B.

before the Hurrians.<sup>267</sup>"

By expanding into the former Mittani lands, the Hittites were brought into closer contact with the Assyrians and Egyptians. Mursili II (c. 1321–1295) soon faced rebellions in Syria, Assyrian occupation of Karchemish, and the chronic instability of North and West Anatolia. These were dealt with through the usual combination of warfare and treaties. His Syrian vassals were specifically warned against alliance with Egypt,<sup>268</sup> and in Anatolia, his vassals were told they must neither fight nor subordinate one another.<sup>269</sup> In so far as these treaties emphasized mutual defense and stability, they stand in contrast to the Neo-Assyrian treaties which were typically unilateral agreements forced on the subjects; but Mursili's treaties also differ from the most famous Hittite treaty, between Hattušili III and Pharaoh Ramses II in 1253.<sup>270</sup> This treaty, which resulted from the inconclusive Battle of Qadeš in 1275, is the closest thing we have to a perfectly symmetrical and reciprocal parity treaty. In all but one case—the guarantee of the royal succession—the terms are repeated word-for-word for both parties.<sup>271</sup> Such a treaty could only arise in the aftermath of a massive battle, which proved that neither could achieve any real advantages on the battlefield; for his part, Hattušili was further motivated to seek peace because the Pharaoh's recognition of his legitimacy would help subdue his own internal enemies, as well as secure his Syrian flank in the face of the ever-growing Assyrian threat.<sup>272</sup> Ramses had his own external security problems—the Libyans—and may have felt insecure on his throne due to a lack

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267 HDT 6B rev. 7-24.

268 e.g. HDT 8 B ii 4-9.

269 e.g. HDT 9 rev. 2-24.

270 HDT text 15; Langdon and Gardiner 1920.

271 Beckman 2014:120: "This is undoubtedly due to the particular situation in which each of the two monarchs found himself. Under the conditions governing communication and travel in the second millennium, it is doubtful that either ruler could actually have intervened directly and successfully in the affairs of his distant partner."

272 Bryce 2005:275-6.

of any major military victories. Even though his invasion of Syria failed at Qadeš, he was able to present the treaty to audiences at home as a humbling of the once-proud Hittites.<sup>273</sup>

This treaty is fascinating for many reasons: first, we have both the Hittite and Egyptian copies. "Two independent versions were composed, one in Hattuša, the other in Pi-Ramesse. Each version presented the terms of the treaty from the respective treaty-partner's viewpoint. The Hittite version was originally written in Akkadian, from a first Hittite draft, inscribed on a silver tablet, and then sent to Egypt, where it was translated into Egyptian. Copies of this version were inscribed on the walls of the temple of Amun at Karnak and the Ramesseum. Correspondingly, the Egyptian version of the treaty was first composed in Egyptian, and then translated into Akkadian on a silver tablet before being sent to the court of Hattušili.<sup>274</sup>" This, in turn, demonstrates that a lengthy diplomatic exchange must have preceded the composition of the treaty itself, and in fact we have some of the letters exchanged between Hatti and Egypt at this time.<sup>275</sup> This correspondence continued after the treaty was signed, as the two kings simultaneously quarreled about the treaty, and assured the other that they were sticking to its terms.<sup>276</sup>

The Hittite empire would only last until about 1190, at which point it disappears from the historical record. The collapse seems sudden, but there is no indication that the period was unusually violent, and Hattuša itself shows no evidence of conquest or destruction at this point.<sup>277</sup> Considering the frequent episodes of plague and famine, as well as the incessant internal

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273 Bryce 2006:3; Langdon and Gardiner 1920:185-6. In the "explanatory" introduction to the treaty, which is included only in the Egyptian version, Hattušili sends the treaty text to Ramses "in order to beg peace" from him.

274 Bryce 2005:277-8.

275 CTH 155; Bryce 2005:276.

276 CTH 156; Bryce 2005:280-1.

277 Klengel 2011: 43-4.

struggles amongst the ruling families, one senses not a cataclysmic final act, but a gradual decline resulting from several accumulated factors, including climatic and demographic changes.<sup>278</sup>

Hittite treaty policy was probably influenced by the political conditions in the Near East at the time. Between c. 1500 and c. 1200, the Hittites had as rivals and equals Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, the Middle Elamite kingdom, and the Mittani. Around and in between these empires were a large number of mini-kingdoms, variously fought-over and allied with one or another of the Great Powers. This is the era revealed in the Amarna Letters, an archive that shows the constant diplomatic communication between the Pharaoh and his peers. In this environment of near-equilibrium, the Hittites probably wanted to avoid major battles, and instead relied on diplomacy as much as possible. Even when the Hittite kings did resort to a military campaign, diplomacy was still part of their strategy.<sup>279</sup>

The Hittites' own ideological justification for the use of treaties was pragmatic. According to Gary Beckman (no relation to the author of this dissertation), the Hittites saw warfare as a divine trial, judged by the gods. Thus Hattušili challenges his royal brother, whose throne he would soon usurp: "You have acted with hostility toward me. You are a Great King, whereas I am king of the single fortress-town that you have left me. So come! Šaušga of Šamuḫa and the Storm-god of Nerik shall judge us."<sup>280</sup> Since this was recorded in an official Hittite text, after Hattušili's victory was finalized, it is unknown if such a challenge was actually issued, and one suspects that a Hittite king would rather forget such a bold statement if the venture ended in

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278 Schachner 2011:162-7.

279 Thus, during a massive invasion of Syria, Suppiluliuma wrote to Niqmaddu II of Ugarit, and offered him a treaty of alliance if Niqmaddu should attack Nuhashshi or Mukish, two neighboring kingdoms. As Niqmaddu did eventually fight for Suppiluliuma, the promised alliance was allowed. Granted, Niqmaddu did become a Hittite vassal, incurring all the obligations and inconveniences inherent therein, but in exchange Suppiluliuma did grant him great swaths of land wrested from the Nuhashshi and elsewhere. HDT 19; Bryce 2005:163-7.

280 CTH 81. Quoted in Beckman 2014:121.

defeat. In any case, the Hittites, being a large empire, were able to overpower most small states and force them into contracting vassal treaties. This subordination, achieved by persuasion or force, was always divinely sanctioned. Likewise, the parity treaty between Egypt and Hatti was a manifestation of divine will. If the gods had wanted one side to conquer, it would have been so.

Now we will consider the evidence of Hittite influence on the Greek world. Some time around 1400, the Hittite king Arnuwanda, son of Tudhaliya, wrote a letter<sup>281</sup> chastising his vassal Madduwatta for his conduct. Madduwatta fled from his territory in western Anatolia after one "Attarissiya, a Man of Ahhiya" attacked him with chariots. Later, he also led an attack on Cyprus. This was the first mention of Ahhiyawa—Ahhiya is the older form of this name—and there are almost no clues about its structure or location. Approximately eighty years later, Uhhaziti, king of Arzawa, broke his oath to the Hittite king Mursili II and fled to the King of Ahhiyawa. We are also told that the city of Millawanda went over to the king of Ahhiyawa. When Mursili advanced with his army, Uhhaziti refused to do battle and instead fled to the islands, presumably near the coast of Asia Minor, and sought refuge in Ahhiyawan land.<sup>282</sup> In response, Mursili attacked and burned Millawanda, a fact that seems to be reflected in the archaeology.<sup>283</sup>

Already in these two excerpts, we have learned much. Ahhiyawa controls some coastal areas of Asia Minor, as well as some islands. It has a king, and he is powerful enough to command chariots and ships, and to cause Hittite vassals to break their oaths. This may indicate that the power of Ahhiyawa was increasing, and that the king was attempting to gain a semi-permanent foothold in Asia, instead of just raiding the region. This is strengthened by another

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281 CTH 147.

282 Beckman et al. 2011:69-97; Bryce 1989:299-300.

283 Mee 1998:142.

text, this time a letter from Hattušili III<sup>284</sup> (c. 1265-1240), whom we encountered above, to an unknown king of Ahhiyawa, whom Hattušili addressed as "Great King" and "My Brother." These are significant titles: "Great King" means that the king of Ahhiyawa was himself an independent ruler, subject to no other king, while having other kings as his own subjects. This, in turn, implies that he has an army powerful enough to subject those other kings. For Hattušili to call him "My Brother" signifies that Hattušili acknowledges Ahhiyawa's status.<sup>285</sup> It is nevertheless apparent that Ahhiyawa was not, in any real sense, on the same level as Egypt or Assyria.<sup>286</sup> Note, too, that at the time of this letter, Millawanda was back in the hands of Ahhiyawa, and it was governed by Atpa, the son-in-law of Piyamaradu, a rebellious Hittite vassal. The letter was written after Hattušili went to Millawanda to bring several complaints to Atpa, including the fact that some 7000 Hittite subjects from the Lukka lands were living in Ahhiyawa, either fleeing Hittite rule or having been forcibly removed by Piyamaradu.<sup>287</sup> Another letter shows that Piyamaradu was capturing Hittite lands and transferring them to the control of Atpa.<sup>288</sup> The letter as a whole is very courteous in tone, as it in no way threatens a man who had, apparently, offered aid and comfort to a Hittite rebel. In fact, the use of the title 'Great King' might have been nothing more than strategic flattery in order to secure an alliance against a problematic enemy.<sup>289</sup> In the end, at the approach of Hattušili, Piyarmaradu, like Uhhaziti earlier,

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284 As the complete letter is not preserved, neither the sender nor the recipient is certain; Muwattalli or Mursili have also been put forth as the Hittite King in this letter. Beckman et al. 2011:101-119; Bryce 1989:300.

285 Kelder 2005:132-5.

286 According to Beckman et al. 2011:122, Hattušili's use of the epithet 'Great King' bestowed the Ahhiyawan king "a status that must have far exceeded his actual importance in the Near Eastern world in general, particularly when compared to the pharaoh of Egypt and the rulers of Mesopotamia, from whom there is not a single reference to a king or kingdom of Ahhiyawa."

287 Bryce 1999:259-60.

288 CTH 191, a letter from letter from Manapa-Tarhunda, king of the Seha River Land, to an unidentified Hittite king.

289 Bryce 2003:65-6; Morris 2011:160-1 cites a Hittite prayer text (CTH 590) in which "the queen prays to the Sea to [deliver] Piyamaradu to me so that he does not elude my grasp." This shows the threat that Piyamaradu



fled to the islands.

Ahhiyawan power in Anatolia seems to have waned by the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Tudhaliya IV, successor of Hattušili III, wrote a letter to an unnamed vassal of Millawanda (now spelled "Milawata"), demanding that he send the deposed vassal king of Wilusa to Hattuša, and reminding him of the boundaries of his own city. The addressee may be the son of Atpa, but even if he is not, it is clear that the Hittite King regards him as his subject, showing that the Ahhiyawan king has lost independent control of the city. This is mirrored in a treaty between Tudhaliya IV and Sausgamuwa, ruler of the vassal state of Amurru in Syria.<sup>290</sup> In the opening lines of the text, Tudhaliya lists the kings who are his equals: the king of Egypt, the king of Babylonia, the king of Assyria. Next comes the king of Ahhiyawa, but it is erased. It is unclear why this would happen—it could have been a meaningless scribal error—but it does suggest that the king of Ahhiyawa had lost his status as a Great King.<sup>291</sup> After this treaty, the name "Ahhiyawa" disappears from the historical record.

Nearly a century ago, it was realized that the name "Ahhiyawa" might be a Hittite form of "Achaiwa," which would itself be an archaic Greek form of "Achaea," that is, the Greeks who went to war with the Trojans.<sup>292</sup> Today, it is generally agreed that the Ahhiyawans were some sort of Greeks, but there is much less agreement as to exactly who they were, where they came from, and what sort of political structure they had.<sup>293</sup> Millawanda was also recognized as the city

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represented to the Hittite state.

290 CTH 105.

291 But again, it is likely that the Ahhiyawan ruler was never truly a 'Great King' to begin with, and so it is possible that nothing about his material circumstances changed. Indeed, it would have been self-deprecating for the Hittite king to list the king of Ahhiyawa as one of his peers in a treaty with a third-party.

292 Forrer 1924:9.

293 Ünal 1991 reviews the arguments against equating Ahhiyawa with Mycenae, or even Greeks more generally. While it is very important to keep in mind that the connections between Ahhiyawa and Mycenae are tenuous, and largely based on associating names in Hittite with names in Greek, I have yet to see a convincing alternative explanation.

Miletus, and Wilusa as Ilium, and Taruwisa as Troy.<sup>294</sup> Even better, Latacz has shown that Wilusa and Taruwisa were adjacent, and Wilusa was, during the Hittite empire, part of Taruwisa.<sup>295</sup>

Some scholars equate the Ahhiyawans with Greek people of the Late Bronze Age, possibly the Mycenaeans. The Mycenaeans were not a unified polity, but rather a series of palace-states that each controlled a fairly small territory and were largely independent. Even if the Ahhiyawan king did not earn the title of "Great King," he was powerful enough to be worth flattering with the title.<sup>296</sup> There is very little textual or archaeological evidence for a highly complex state in the Greek world during the Bronze Age, although Kelder argues that there is evidence for supra-regional, hierarchical organization centered at Mycenae, Thebes, and Orchomenos.<sup>297</sup> Mycenaean pottery and other wares are extremely rare in Asia Minor, significant finds being almost totally limited to Miletus, Ephesus, and Troy. At these sites, Mycenaean-style pottery is mostly locally-made, rather than imported from elsewhere, but there are no other signs of long-term Mycenaean colonization.<sup>298</sup> For this and other reasons, Mountjoy has argued that the Ahhiyawans were based among the interface of islands just off the coast as well as some mainland sites of Asia Minor, and were not colonists, but were native inhabitants "who had

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294 Bachvarova 2002:46-8.

295 Latacz 2004:73-100, contra Pantazis 2009.

296 Appian (*Hist. Rom.* 14.92) writes of the powerful fleets and fortresses of the first-century Aegean pirates, some of whom, "elated by their gains...likened themselves to kings, rulers, and great armies." This may not have any bearing on our understanding of the Ahhiyawans, but it does caution against using a claim to kingship as evidence of political status.

297 Kelder 2005 argues for the *wanax* as the Greek equivalent to the Near Eastern "Great King." However, see Morris 2003b, who shows that the authority of the *wanax* was limited to the world of rituals, and had no military or juridical powers. The *wanax*'s connection to the economic and military spheres was largely symbolic.

298 Kelder 2004/5:54-79. However, Bryce 1999 argues that even if there were few Mycenaeans in Anatolia, there is clear evidence of people moving the other direction. Linear B texts show that Anatolians were recruited or purchased to work in Mycenaean palaces as craftsmen and scribes. With their proximity to the political and religious elites, these emigrants were prime candidates for cultural transfers.

undergone Mycenaean acculturation to varying degrees.<sup>299</sup> There are no other Greek cultures that had reached a sufficient level of complexity known to have existed at the time when 'Ahhiyawa(ns)' are mentioned in the Hittite texts.

If we accept that the Ahhiyawans of the Hittite texts really were Mycenaean Greeks, despite being unable to find any clear understanding of their political status, we must now ask whether or not they could have been a conduit of diplomatic traditions between the Hittites and the later Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods. To begin, it is undeniable that certain Greek rituals and myths have clear Hittite origins. For example, Sarah Morris has shown that the image of Artemis of Ephesus wears an Anatolian *kurša*, a goat-skin hunting bag with connotations of royalty and plenty.<sup>300</sup> This same cult object could have been the model for the Golden Fleece, as well as other Greek scapegoating traditions.<sup>301</sup> The myth of Jason also preserves another Hittite myth: the monster guarding the fleece is a remnant of the Hittite myth of the dragon Illuyankas, a beast slain by the Storm-God.<sup>302</sup> For another, a passage of the *Iliad* book six probably reflects the typically Hittite custom of the ritual function of royal women.<sup>303</sup> Finally, there are texts and vase paintings from Anatolia that describe the bull-leaping ceremonies most commonly associated with the Minoan world.<sup>304</sup> Even if these regions inherited the tradition from a common predecessor, rather than passed it from one to the other, it would

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299 Mountjoy 1998:49-51.

300 Morris 2001:430-3.

301 Collins 2010.

302 Bremmer 2006.

303 In this scene (*Il.* 6.73-118) Helenus, son of Priam, instructs Hector to speak to his mother, the queen Hecabe. She is to gather the old women and lead them to the temple of Athena. There, she will lead a sacrifice of twelve cows to the goddess, "so that she would keep away from divine Ilios the son of Tydeus [Diomedes], that wild warrior, mighty planner of panic" (ὥς κεν Τυδέος υἱὸν ἀπόσχη Ἰλίου ἱρῆς / ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν κρατερὸν μῆστωρα φόβοιο). What is of interest is the prime importance of the queen and old women in the ritual. Greek women traditionally could serve as priestess, but this particular role of the queen as the leader of a ritual in the defense of her entire community is typical of Anatolian practice. See Morris 2013:151-3.

304 van Dijk 2013.

still emphasize the strong cultural ties between the two.<sup>305</sup>

Mary Bachvarova argues that Greeks/Ahhiyawans and Anatolians were "engaging in the right kind of contact" for the transmission of religious and literary traditions between the two cultures.<sup>306</sup> She does not claim that there is only one type of "right kind of contact," but it is clear that she has in mind a situation in which members of different cultural groups live in close contact, especially in mixed households, and in which religious exchanges take place. Regardless of how much contact resulted from individuals operating in the "free market," most craftsmen, scribes, bards, seers, and the like would have traveled from one court at the invitation of another. The knowledge and art of these individuals served were treated as exotic luxury goods, and therefore served to increase the prestige of the patron who was able to call wise and talented foreigners to his court.<sup>307</sup>

Physical evidence of such interaction would, of course, be extremely difficult to find and identify, and should not be used as the main criterion to establish the presence or absence of a group. Nevertheless we are confronted with a lack of evidence for long-term Mycenaean habitation in Anatolia. What little we can glean from the Hittite texts suggests that the Ahhiyawans were more interested in raiding and destabilizing Hittite territory than capturing and holding that land for long-term settlement. A few texts, however, might allow us to infer intimate contact between Greek and Anatolian elites.

The so-called Alaksandu Treaty, between Alaksandu, King of Wilusa, and Hittite king Muwatali II, c. 1300, established an alliance between the two kingdoms.<sup>308</sup> The historical prelude

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305 Bachvarova 2002:9-26 provides an overview of recent scholarship on the correspondences between Greek and Hittite myths, rituals, and language, giving far more examples than would be necessary here.

306 e.g. 2002:43-4.

307 Bachvarova 2016:199-211.

308 HDT 13.

of the treaty shows that there had been peace between the two for at least two generations already; the last time the two sides were enemies was so long in the past that the Hittite king can no longer remember under whose reign it occurred.<sup>309</sup> Scholars naturally have drawn a connection between Alaksandu of Wilusa and Alexander (Paris) of the *Iliad*. There is no reason to argue that Alexander of the epic is based on Alaksandu of the treaty, and we must maintain the distinction between Alexander the literary figure and Alaksandu the historical figure. Instead, it seems that this double name is an example of a Homeric "cultural memory" of a twice-named prince or king of Troy in an earlier age. This prince's historical exploits may or may not have contributed to the character of Alexander (Paris) of the *Iliad*.

Assuming that Homer had, in fact, captured a literary artifact from the Bronze Age, the existence of the twice-named prince in the Greek epic tradition suggests that the coast of Asia Minor may have been a region of interaction between Greeks and Anatolians. Many scholars, including Bachvarova, take Alaksandu as a Greek name.<sup>310</sup> If true, this would not necessarily mean that he himself spoke Greek, but perhaps that he was from a family that at some point did speak Greek, and maintained Greek names for reasons of prestige. Conversely, if he was not Greek, he might have wished to convey some sort of connection with Greek culture through his name. Another hint of Alaksandu's heritage is the fragmentary divine name '[...]appaliunas' amongst the gods of Wilusa. If this name is connected to Apollo, it would be an early association between the god and Troy, a relationship often mentioned by Homer and other ancient writers.<sup>311</sup> Just as important is Alexander's other name, Paris. This might be the Hellenized version of an

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309 HDT 13 B i 2-14.

310 Watkins 1986:49. This equation is encouraged by the similarity between Kukkunni, the father of Alaksandu, and Kuknos, a Trojan warrior (recorded in Pindar *Isthmean* 5.39).

311 For example: Apollo fights for the Trojans (*Il.* 1.43-52, 22.359-60); his role in the construction of the walls of Troy (*Il.* 21.444-9); his son Troilus, born of the Trojan queen Hecuba (Apollodorus, *Library* 3.12.5).

Anatolian name beginning in *pariya-*, for example, *Pariyamuwa*.<sup>312</sup> A person might take a double name if he were representing or interacting with two distinct groups, which in turn shows the profoundly close interaction of the two groups. The Greek and Anatolian groups need not both be present in Wilusa, but instead might represent the elites of Wilusa and another community, joined together in a marriage alliance.

Another aspect of Bachvarova's 'right kind of contact' is religious exchange, namely the exchange of gods and their associated rituals. She argues that 'state-sponsored religious festivals' would be just the sort of environment in which the cross-cultural contact of interest to her would take place. Such festivals were, in part, intended to establish and affirm the legitimacy of the rulers through the performance of the mytho-historical traditions not just of the contemporary local community, but of the greater Near Eastern world. For example, Bachvarova describes the Hurro-Hittite *šarrena* ritual, which involved the worship of royal and non-royal ancestors. The associated hymns invoked not only local gods and place names, but also the wise deified Akkadian kings Sargon and Naram-Sin, as well as the legendary Audaluma of Elam. Through this combination of history and myth, and the local and foreign, the Hittite kings were able to insert themselves into the "network of the brotherhood of Great Kings immortalized in Sargonic legend."<sup>313</sup>

Certain Greek epics, such as the *Iliad*, have strong thematic parallels with ritual texts performed in the Hittite realm. It is likely that these themes were transferred from the Hittite world to the Greek in an oral milieu, as the the Greek world was, for the most part, not capable of acquiring or preserving written materials. Just as Hittite elites would have been interested in

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312 Bachvarova 2002:47n41. Having analyzed the *Iliad*, de Jong 1987 argues that the name "Paris" is used when the character is in a Trojan setting (e.g. when he is in conversation with Trojans, or when the narrator wishes to emphasize his relationship with other Trojans), and "Alexander" is used when he is in a Greek or mixed setting.

313 Bachvarova 2016:182-191.

collecting and then displaying foreign narratives, so too would Greek elites invite foreign religious experts and bards to their courts as a sort of prestige object. The ability to command information from an almost unimaginably distant time and place was a marker of great wealth and power, and conveyed a mastery over esoteric knowledge.<sup>314</sup> The state-sponsored festival gave the elites an opportunity to call in foreign diplomats as well as performers. These performers would have spread narratives which were deemed valuable by dint of their foreignness, and thus worthy of preservation.<sup>315</sup>

Where the Assyrians captured foreign gods to force them to submit to Aššur's cosmic order, the Hittites "divided" gods—that is, they reproduced the cult in their own territory—as a way to seek outside help in dealing with plague, famine, and other natural problems. In one instance, Tudhaliya II<sup>316</sup> divided the Goddess of the Night from Kizzuwatna, and replicated her in Šamuha (possibly modern Sivas, Turkey). Then, under Muwattalli II, the royal prince divided her again and replicated her in Urikina.<sup>317</sup> This may be the framework in which to interpret Mursili II's question to an oracle as to how he should welcome the gods of Lazpa (Lesbos) and Ahhiyawa. This shows that the gods were unknown up to that point, and were therefore probably accompanied by priest who could instruct the king in the proper rituals.<sup>318</sup> While we do not possess any treaties or even formalized oaths exchanged between Ahhiyawa and the Hittites, we do know that letters were exchanged between the two courts. The Hittites must have tried hard

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314 Bachvarova 2016:206-212.

315 Bachvarova 2016:239-262 describes several festivals and rituals that may have served as occasions of exchange and interaction.

316 Reigned c.1430-1400; see p.70 above.

317 According to Beal 2002:197-208, to "divide" a god or goddess means, in this case, to build a new temple to the deity, and to place within that temple a new statue of the deity. Various rituals are then performed to coax the deity into the new temple, with the understanding that both temples would have an "equal share" of the deity at the same time. Thus, it became possible to create two simultaneous cult centers, without damaging or dishonoring either.

318 Bachvarova 2002:49-50.

both to create stable and peaceful relations with Ahhiyawa, and to gather as much intelligence about them as possible. Just as the later Phrygian and Lydian kings created *xenia*-networks<sup>319</sup> among the Greeks by making offerings to sanctuaries, Mursili II may have been attempting to cement diplomatic ties with Greek communities through a shared cult. In the absence of a surviving Ahhiyawan/Mycenaean treaty tradition, this may have been Mursili II's only option.

Bachvarova also argues that Wilusa is one of, if not the only, fountainhead of the Homeric poetic tradition. There is archaeological evidence that at least one Luwian scribe was active in the city at least until the twelfth century, that is, a century or so after the collapse of the Hittite empire.<sup>320</sup> Other evidence records a line of Luwian poetry, performed at Hattuša, which begins, "When they came from high/steep Wilusa." Watkins shows that this line was formulaic in Luwian poetry. Seeing that, in the *Iliad*, six times Troy is given the epithet 'steep' (αἰπεινή), the case for connecting Wilusa and Troy grows ever stronger. Watkins himself urges caution: we cannot even prove that Luwian '*wilusa*' is a city, nor that it refers to the same thing as Hittite '*Wilusa*,' nor that the city of Wilusa had a Luwian-speaking community.<sup>321</sup> Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence is building up.

Let us, for the sake of argument, push the evidence to its limit: Wilusa is Homer's Troy, the Luwian-speaking poets of the twelfth century laid the foundations for the *Iliad*, Alaksandu was one of the names of the King of Wilusa, given to him, or taken by him, because of his mixed Greek-Anatolian birth. It is a tempting step to take, and certainly an intriguing line to follow for future research. It does not, however, allow for the transmission of a diplomatic or treaty

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319 Frequently defined as "guest-friendship," *xenia*, in the context of interstate diplomacy, refers to friendly relations between individuals of different communities. A network of *xenoi* would provide an aristocrat with a set of reciprocal, non-competitive relationships with other aristocrats, thus providing him with security, power, and honor. See Scott 1982:6-17.

320 Hawkins and Easton 1996.

321 Watkins 1986:62.



tradition from the Hittites to the Greeks of the Classical period. There is no evidence that the Ahhiyawans participated in the treaty traditions of the Hittites in particular or the broader Near East of the Late Bronze Age. Even if Alaksandu was Greek, he was not an Ahhiyawan, and there are no suggestions of strong political ties between his city and the rest of the Greek world. His only treaty was with the Hittites, and it makes no mention of Ahhiyawa. However the Luwian bards transmitted their art to their Greek peers, there is no reason to believe that they also handed down treaty customs. They had no reason to do so. Recall that the Ahhiyawans had a reputation for raiding and piracy, not formal diplomacy. Perhaps more importantly, after the collapse of the Late Bronze Age civilizations, there were no societal institutions in the Greek world that would have had any reason to retain knowledge of Near Eastern treaty traditions. The concepts of the binding oath and the participation of the gods in oath are ones that can easily survive in a non-literate environment. But we must not allow the literary similarities between oath formulae of different ages to obscure the very different political contexts in which they were deployed.

Our only source which can inform us on the nature of interstate diplomacy in the Greek 'dark age' is epic literature. There are certainly oaths recorded in Greek epic works, but they bear little in common with the written treaties of later centuries. The distinction is not simply an issue of literacy. Let us consider a few examples. First, in the *Iliad*, we find two famous oaths. At 3.270ff, Agamemnon conducts the oath-ceremony, wherein he arranges for a duel between Menelaus and Paris. He begins by dividing the sacrifice:

Ἀτρεΐδης δὲ ἐρυσσάμενος χεῖρεςσι μάχαιραν,  
ἧ οἱ πᾶρ ξίφεος μέγα κουλεόν αἰὲν ἄωρτο,  
ἀρνῶν ἐκ κεφαλῶν τάμνε τρίχας· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα  
κήρυκες Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν νεῖμαν ἀρίστοις.  
With his hands the son of Atreus pulled out the dagger  
that hung suspended by the scabbard of his great sword,  
and from the heads of the lambs he cut wool; and then  
the heralds distributed it to the leaders of the Trojans and Achaeans.

As agreed upon earlier, Agamemnon swore that, if Paris wins, the Achaeans will recognize his marriage to Helen, and will leave the Trojan lands. If Menelaus wins, he will take Helen back with him, along with an indemnity payment. Furthermore, if, when Paris dies, his father and brothers refuse to give up the fight, Agamemnon will remain in Troy until he is victorious or dead. Agamemnon then slit two lambs' throats, and the other participants poured out wine. Then some unnamed Trojan or Achaean spoke out the curse which protected the oath: whichever party is first to break the oath, their brains and their childrens' brains shall be spilled out of their heads, and their wives shall be carried off.

The ritual performance undeniably belongs to the same traditions that are found across the Near East.<sup>322</sup> But in function, it is not truly comparable to Near Eastern or later Greek treaties. The function of the ritual, through the distribution of the wool cut from the lambs, was to bind the participants to the sacrificial victims, which were provided by both parties, thus connecting them to the victims, to the gods of the oath, and to the opposite party.<sup>323</sup> The function of the oath was to guarantee the end of the war, based on the result of the duel between Paris and Menelaus. Insofar as it established a relationship between the parties, its effects were strictly limited to the context of the duel and its immediate aftermath, and no further. The oath cannot be said to have been a reflection of a "state policy;" rather, it was the means of resolving a specific feud between two aristocrats.

Later in Book 19 of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon swears an oath to Achilles to bring him back into the battle. After, once more, cutting the hairs from a boar, he swears:<sup>324</sup>

ἴστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ὕπατος καὶ ἄριστος  
Γῆ τε καὶ Ἥλιος καὶ Ἐρινύες, αἵ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν  
ἀνθρώπους τίνονται, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὁμόσση,

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322 Faraone 1993:73-6.

323 Cohen 1980:55-6.

324 19.258-265.

μὴ μὲν ἐγὼ κούρη Βρισηΐδι χεῖρ' ἐπένεικα,  
 οὔτ' εὐνής πρόφασιν κεχρημένος οὔτε τευ ἄλλου.  
 ἀλλ' ἔμεν' ἀπροτίμαστος ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἐμῆσιν.  
 εἰ δέ τι τῶνδ' ἐπίορκον ἐμοὶ θεοὶ ἄλγεα δοῖεν  
 πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα διδοῦσιν ὅτις σφ' ἀλίτῃται ὁμόσσας.  
 Know, Zeus, leader and best of the gods,  
 and Earth and Sun and the Erinyes, who, under the earth,  
 punish men, those who swear falsely,  
 That I did not lay a hand on the girl Brises,  
 neither to take her to bed, nor any other way;  
 She remained untouched in my tent.  
 But if any of this is sworn falsely, may the gods give me  
 many great pains, as they give to those who transgress in swearing.

At this, he cut the boar's throat, and Talthybius flung the corpse into the sea.

This is another example of the oath as a tool to resolve aristocratic conflicts. It also only concerns events that have already transpired—or, more accurately, did not transpire. Once again, it makes no attempt to regulate affairs between parties in the future.

Since, as we will see, one of the more common functions of the treaty in Classical Greece is to establish a symmarchy, we should consider the construction of alliances in epic. Although the *Iliad* does not show the scene, Tyndareos, Helen's human father, forces her suitors to swear to support whoever will become her husband before they are allowed to compete for that honor.

The scene comes to us from Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*.<sup>325</sup>

καὶ νιν εἰσηλθεν τάδε:  
 ὄρκους συνάψαι δεξιάς τε συμβαλεῖν  
 μνηστήρας ἀλλήλοισι καὶ δι' ἐμπύρων  
 σπονδάς καθεῖναι κάπαράσασθαι τάδε:  
 ὅτου γυνὴ γένοιτο Τυνδαρίς κόρη,  
 τούτῳ ξυναμυνεῖν, εἴ τις ἐκ δόμων λαβῶν  
 οἴχοιτο τόν τ' ἔχοντ' ἀπωθοίη λέχους,  
 κάπιστρατεύσειν καὶ κατασκάψειν πόλιν  
 Ἕλλην' ὁμοίως βάρβαρόν θ' ὅπλων μέτα.  
 And then this came into [Tyndaris'] head:  
 The suitors will give an oath and shake hands  
 with each other, and, through burning offerings and  
 pouring libations, they will call down this curse:

325 57-65. Of course, Euripides was composing centuries after the Homeric epics, and so we cannot put much stock in the specific wording of these lines as a reflection of Archaic Greek treaties. However, as it takes place in the same society as does the *Iliad*, it is still a useful depiction of the social function of oaths at that time. For more on this oath, see Torrance 2014:49-53.

for whomever the daughter of Tyndaris should become the wife,  
I will fight in defense of that one, if someone, having seized her from his home  
should go, taking away his marriage-bed,  
Fully armed I will make war on him, Greek or barbarian, and destroy his city.

This is not a *συμμαχία* or *ἐπιμαχία* between states, but an agreement between individual aristocrats. As readers, we know that Helen will indeed be stolen away, but as far as diplomatic policy is concerned, this binding agreement concerns a single, hypothetical event which is not likely to occur very often. These three examples were not designed to be an exhaustive survey, but a representative sample. They show that, despite the clear evidence of Near Eastern influence on Mycenaean society, Greeks were not likely to have preserved treaty practices down to the Classical period. It is only with the rebirth of literacy and the birth of the *polis* that a treaty practice would even make sense. Religious traditions and notions of sworn oaths and curses certainly played a role in the development of Greek diplomatic traditions, but only in a general way.<sup>326</sup>

We should also consider that Hittite traditions might have been preserved in the Near East after 1200, and only later transferred to the Greek world. Even though the relative paucity of textual sources for the period between c. 1200 and c. 900 makes it seem like a "Dark Age," the collapse of imperial trade networks opened up opportunities for independent traders to cross the Mediterranean, exchanging fine crafts for raw materials, especially iron and precious metals. The rituals, myth, and artistic traditions of early Greece are so heavily indebted to the Levantine cultures that it would be inadequate to see them as separate but related traditions.<sup>327</sup> Furthermore, the elites of small city-states of Anatolia and Syria had spent several centuries dealing with Hittite diplomats, and were required to keep copies of their treaties. We do not see treaties come

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326 West 1997:19-23 gives a list of similarities between Greek and Near Eastern treaties, to show that "we are dealing with a single broad web of tradition."

327 Morris 1992, esp. 117-125.

back into use until the rise of the Neo-Assyrian empire, but it is not impossible that a form of institutional memory survived long after the end of the Bronze Age.

Some five centuries after the Ahhiyawans disappeared, Greeks once again enter into Near Eastern texts. In c. 730, an Assyrian official near Sidon wrote a letter to his king Tiglath-pilaser III to inform him that some Ionians had raided a coastal city, but were beaten back before they were able to take any loot. The phrasing of the text indicates that this was not new, and the Ionians were a known entity.<sup>328</sup> Sargon II, in 715, defended his allies at Tyre and Que from some pirates, written "KUR.ia-am-na-a-a."<sup>329</sup> This is usually translated as "Ionians," and bears an obvious connection with Hebrew *Imna*, Old Persian *Yauna*, and Greek *Ionia*.<sup>330</sup> Sargon, in his inscription at Khorsabad, adds the following information:

The seven kings of Ya', a district of Adnana which is situated in the midst of the Sea of the Setting Sun in a distance of seven days—so remote is their domicile that since eternal days, since my forefathers, the kings who came before me, took over the rule of Assyria, nobody had even heard the name of their country—far away in the midst of the sea, they heard of the deeds that I had done in Chaldea and Hatti and their hearts quivered and terror took hold of them.<sup>331</sup>

Ya' can only be Cyprus. It was the closest major island to the Assyrian territories in the Mediterranean. Sargon claimed to have extended the borders of Assyrian control "from the land of Yadnana in the midst of the sea of the setting sun to the borders of the land of Egypt and the land of Phrygia,<sup>332</sup>" and indeed the western-most Assyrian artifact is Sargon's stele, erected at Kition. This was set up after the King of Tyre, an Assyrian ally, requested and received Assyrian troops to reassert his control over his Cypriot vassals in 709-8. Afterwards, a Cypriot embassy came before Sargon in Babylon, and possibly began the negotiations that led the Cypriot kings to

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328 NL 69 = SAA 19 025. Bremmer 2008:9; Parker 2000.

329 *Khorsabad Annals*, 117-19; *Cylinder* 21; Lanfranchi 2000:14-22; Rollinger 2001:239-40.

330 Helm 1980:162; Tadmor 1958:80n217.

331 Lines 145-9. Fuchs 1994:232-2; Radner 2010:441.

332 Helm 1980:162-3.

become Assyrian allies themselves. Decades later, performing a task expected of an Assyrian vassal-ally, they would participate in the renovation of one of Esarhaddon's palaces, and served in the Assyrian invasion of Egypt under Assurbanipal. However, there is no evidence of regular tribute from Cyprus to Assyria, and in no sense should we conceive of an Assyrian "conquest" of the island. Rather, whatever power Assyria had over Cyprus can only be the product of an inheritance: after Esarhaddon's annexation of Sidon in 677, Assyria took over Cyprus' main port of trade with the Levant, giving Cyprus no other choice but an alliance.<sup>333</sup>

From Esarhaddon's inscriptions, it appears that at least five of the Cypriot kings were Greeks: Akestor of Idalon, Pylagoras of Chytoi, Eteandros of Paphos, and Admetos of Tamassos.<sup>334</sup> As with Sargon, for Esarhaddon, the "Land of the Cypriots" (<sup>KUR</sup>.*ia-da-na-na*) was part of the "Land of the Ionians" (<sup>KUR</sup>.*ia-man*):<sup>335</sup> "The kings who are in the midst of the sea, in their entirety, from Yadnana, the land of Yaman, as far as Tarsus, threw themselves at my feet."<sup>336</sup> So while there is general agreement that we are talking about Cypriot Greeks, whom the Assyrians called "Ionians," there is no clear connection between these Greeks and Classical Ionia some centuries later.<sup>337</sup> During the eighth century, it appears that most of the contact between Greeks and Assyrians was unofficial and took the form of unique events at the farthest reaches of the Assyrian realm. Just as "Assyria" was a distant and mostly unknown land for early Greek writers,<sup>338</sup> "Ionia" represented the very fringe of the world for the Assyrians.

By the mid seventh century, however, things had changed. Assyrian contracts from

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333 Radner 2010:433-40.

334 Helm 1980:164.

335 Rollinger 2001:243. Muhly 2009:26.

336 RINAP 4, 60.9b'-14a'.

337 Muhly 2009 and Jasnik and Marino 2009 argue for a Cilician origin of the Ionians.

338 Helm 1980:64-8.

Nineveh show that Greeks were present in the Assyrian capital, some serving as military officials at the palace, some selling slaves. Most likely, the Greeks at Nineveh were commanders of foreign auxiliary units for the Assyrian army, and/or commanding units of the royal guards.<sup>339</sup> According to Herodotus, around this same time tens of thousands of Greeks served in Egypt,<sup>340</sup> and ostraca from Arad document Cypriot (Greek?) mercenaries were serving in Judea towards the end of the seventh century.<sup>341</sup> Later Greek historians<sup>342</sup> recorded a battle between Sargon and the Ionians, but they received this tradition through Berossos, meaning that there is no trace of it in the Greek collective memory until the Hellenistic period. This means that at the very moment when we see the greatest potential for official Greco-Assyrian interaction, the Assyrian state was on the verge of collapse. Even at this period, Greek contact with the Near East was mainly in the form of trade and mercenary service in the Levant, and there is no evidence for regular, formal diplomatic activity.

The picture is largely the same for the Neo-Babylonian period. Texts show the presence of "Ionians" (*lu ia-man-na-a-a*) and goods from "Ionia" (<sup>KUR</sup> *ia-a-ma-nu*) in the Levant, but the meaning of these terms is unclear. Two of the named "Ionians" are Kunzumpiya and Aziyak, neither of which can be a Greek name.<sup>343</sup> This could be explained as an example of double-naming: two Greek merchants who used Semitic names when dealing with Phoenicians, Babylonians, and so on. Another possibility is that Phoenician or other Levantine merchants had brought goods from Ionia—wherever it was—and in such a way acquired the epithet "Ionian" for

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339 Brown 1984:301-2. Brown recognizes that we only know of three or four individuals who are identified as Greek ("Yamani"), and while they appear to be related to military affairs, there is no proof at all that they were mercenaries.

340 Hdt. 2.157.3ff; 2.163.

341 Aharoni 1968:13-15.

342 Alexander Polyhistor *FGrH* 680 F 7c (31); Abydenos *FGrH* 685 F 5 (6). Rollinger 2001:241; Lanfranchi 2000:33-4.

343 Kuhrt 2002:21 cites ration texts from Babylon, c. 592, published by Weidner 1935:923-35.

themselves. There is good evidence for Greek trading colonies in the Levant in the sixth century than earlier,<sup>344</sup> and the Greek poet Alkaios says that his brother served as a Babylonian mercenary,<sup>345</sup> but we are given no further context. Despite the increasing contact between Greece and the Levant, there is still no evidence for interaction between any Greek states and their Eastern counterparts, nor any formal diplomatic exchanges.

And yet, we are still faced with the inescapable fact of the similarities between Greek and Near Eastern curse formulae. A case in point: the many instances of sealing an oath with the use of sympathetic magic, or by cursing an enemy. Usually, a wax effigy was melted, burned, or otherwise destroyed; in other cases, one or more animals were sacrificed during the oath ritual. In both cases,<sup>345</sup> the destruction of a substitute served as a prefigurement of the destruction of the intended victim of the curse.

Our oldest Greek example is an inscription from Cyrene<sup>346</sup> (modern Shahhat, Libya). The inscription itself dates to the fourth century B.C.E., but records an oath sworn by the founders of the city, a group of colonists from Thera. Based on details from Herodotus,<sup>347</sup> the city was founded in c. 630, meaning there were some three centuries between the oath itself and its inscription. While the present version is likely not an exact copy of the original oath, it is a reasonably accurate rendition of a seventh-century oath.<sup>348</sup> The text is not a treaty, as it is a decree by the Cyrenaean *demos* that citizens of Thera, their mother-city, should be given Cyrenean citizenship. However, the oath section of the text can give us insight into the function of oaths and curses in Greek tradition, something that, as we have already seen, will play an

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344 Kuhrt 2002:22.

345 fr. 350; c.f. Strabo 13.2.3.

346 *SEG* ix 3.

347 Hdt. 4.149-159.

348 Graham 1960.



important role in interstate diplomacy.

The oath of the colonists is as follows:

Ἐπὶ τούτοις ὄρκια ἐποιήσαντο οἱ τε αὐτεῖ μένον[τ]ες καὶ οἱ πλείοντες οἰκίζοντες καὶ ἀρὰς ἐποιήσαντο τὸς ταῦτα παρβεῶντας καὶ μὴ ἐμμένοντας ἢ τῶν ἐλλιβύαι οἰκεόντων ἢ τῶν αὐτεῖ μενόντων. Κηρίνος πλάσαντες κολοσὸς κατέκαιον ἐπαρεῶμενοι πάντες συνενθόντες καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ παιδίσκαι· τὸμ μὴ ἐμμένοντα τούτοις τοῖς ὀρκίοις ἀλλὰ παρβεῶντα καταλείβεθαί νιν καὶ καταρρὲν ὥσπερ τὸς κολοσός, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γόνον καὶ χρήματα.

On these conditions they made an agreement, those who stayed here and those who sailed on the colonial expedition, and they put curses on those who should transgress these conditions and not abide by them, whether those living in Libya or those staying in Thera. They molded wax images and burnt them while they uttered the following imprecation, all of them, having come together, men and women, boys and girls: 'May he, who does not abide by this agreement but transgresses it, melt away and dissolve like the images, himself, his seed and his property.'<sup>349</sup>

Faraone 1993 lists many examples of this type of sympathetic magic in Near Eastern oaths. First, a Hittite military oath from c. 1450-1350 uses both animal fat and wax:<sup>350</sup>

Then he throws wax and mutton fat [on a pan] and says: "Just as this wax melts, and just as this mutton fat dissolves, whoever breaks these oaths, [shows disrespect to the king] of the Hatti [land], let him melt lik[e wax], let him dissolve like [mutton fat]." [The me]n declare "So be it!"

A second example, from the eighth-century Sefire Inscriptions:<sup>351</sup>

Just as this wax is burned by fire, so may Mati[el] be burned by fi[re]! Just as (this) bow and these arrows are broken, so may 'Inurta and Hadad break [the bow of Mati'el], and the bow of his nobles! And just as a man of wax is blinded, so may Mati[el] be blinded!

Next, from Esarhaddon's Succession Treaties, c. 672:<sup>352</sup>

Just as they burn an image of wax in the fire and (an image) of clay they dissolve in water, (so) may your figure be burnt in the fire and sunk in water.

Faraone's last examples are from the Akkadian *Malqu* ritual text, which contains incantations and rituals designed to counterattack human and supernatural enemies by burning and otherwise destroying figures. Lambert gives the following example, dated to sometime in the first

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349 Translation from Graham 1993:226.

350 *KBo* VI 34.40-rev. 5; see Pritchard 1969:353.

351 *Sf I A* 37-9. Translation in Fitzmeyer 1967:15.

352 *KL* 94 89.

millennium:<sup>353</sup>

#### The incantation:

Šamaš, these are my wizards [.] . [.] .these are they who have had me bewitched, The images of my sorcerer and sorceress, the images of my witch and of her who has had m[e] bewitched,

...  
Šamaš, these are they, these are their images. Since they are not present, I am burning Their images in the presence of your great divinity.

...  
Let their sorceries overwhelm [them] beneath you as though with a net, And let the sorceries catch them. Šamaš, let your fierce storm overtake [them]. Smash them like a pot, let their smoke, as from a furnace, cover [the heavens]. Let them melt, dissolve and run down, Let their [l]ife come to an [end] like water from a skin. Let them die, but let me live. Let them become weak, but let me become [strong].

#### The ritual for it:

Either in the ... or in the open country you must sweep the ground, sprinkle pure water, set up a table in the presence of Šamaš, put on it three food offerings consisting of twelve loaves each of wheat, set up a censer with pine incense, make a libation of first-beer, set up a brazier in the presence of Šamaš, and load it with slivers of willow(?). You must tie together four images of clay, four of clay from both banks of the river, four of fat, four of ... fat, four of sesame-hulls, four of dough, four of bitter-vetch dough, four of parched grain dough, four of tamarisk wood, four of cedar, four of pitch, four of wax. You must ignite a torch in burning sulphur, put it in the brazier and recite this incantation three times. When they (the images) have been baked, you must quench them in water, and recite the incantation, "You, Water" three times. Then you must burn them (the images) and throw them into a deserted place.

In the Greek world, evidence for the magical destruction of wax effigies is much harder to find, and largely limited to charms to encourage erotic love, or to ward off disease, although there is a Syracusan ritual wherein one swears while holding a torch or burning branch, inviting self-immolation if they should be false.<sup>354</sup> Instead, the Greeks tended to prefer to swear over ritually slaughtered and butchered animals. Near Eastern oaths using this same ritual make clear the meaning. Once again, from Esarhaddon's Succession Treaties:<sup>355</sup>

If you should sin against this treaty which Esarhaddon, King of Assyria, [your] lord, [has conclud]ed with you...just as [thi]s ewe has been cut open and the flesh of [her] young has been placed in her mouth, the flesh of your brothers, your sons and your daughters may you eat in your hunger.

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353 Lambert 1957.

354 Faraone 1993:64; Plut. *Dion* 56.3.

355 KL 94 58, 69.

The ritual context of such an oath is not recorded, but the actual presence of a slain animal is clearly implied.

In a Greek context, we find examples where the oath is immediately preceded or followed by an animal sacrifice, and the oath-taker(s) come into physical contact with the blood or entrails of the victim. Xenophon records a clear example of the practice, which occurred when Clearchus and his ten thousand mercenaries received help from Ariaeus, one of the Persian nobles who had sided with Cyrus the Younger:

...ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὸν πρῶτον σταθμὸν παρ' Ἀριαῖον καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου στρατιὰν ἀμφὶ μέσας νύκτας· καὶ ἐν τάξει θέμενοι τὰ ὄπλα συνῆλθον οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρ' Ἀριαῖον· καὶ ὄμοσαν οἱ τε Ἕλληνας καὶ ὁ Ἀριαῖος καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ οἱ κράτιστοι μήτε προδώσειν ἀλλήλους σύμμαχοι τε ἔσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι προσώμοσαν καὶ ἠγήσεσθαι ἀδόλως· ταῦτα δ' ὄμοσαν, σφάζαντες ταῦρον καὶ κάπρον καὶ κριὸν εἰς ἀσπίδα, οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνας βάπτοντες ξίφος, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι λόγχην.

Then, while they halted under arms in line of battle, the generals and captains had a meeting with Ariaeus; and the two parties—the Greek officers, and Ariaeus together with the highest in rank of his followers—made oath that they would not betray each other and that they would be allies, while the barbarians took an additional pledge to lead the way without treachery. These oaths they sealed by sacrificing a bull, a boar, and a ram over a shield, the Greeks dipping a sword in the blood and the barbarians a lance.<sup>356</sup>

Most appropriately for this dissertation, Thucydides shows us that such sacrifices could be part of Greek interstate treaty procedures.<sup>357</sup>

ὁμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπὲρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ζυμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ζύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὁμνύντων. ὁμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἕκαστοι τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω ὅδε: “ἐμμενῶ τῇ ζυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ζυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾶ.”

The Athenians shall swear to the articles both for themselves and for their allies, and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the allies of these shall swear to them, city by city. And they each shall swear the greatest local oath, over perfect victims, and the oath shall be this: 'I will remain with this league, according to the agreed-upon terms, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress by any art or machination whatsoever.'

This treaty text does not actually state the connection between the victims and the representatives

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356 *Anab.* 2.2.8-9.

357 *Thuc.* 5.47.8.

swearing the oath, but the previous examples should be sufficient to show what *κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων* implies. In Faraone's opinion, the known examples are limited to only the most doubtful oaths, where compliance was not otherwise expected.<sup>358</sup> He also notes that the clear similarities between this Greek procedure and the Near Eastern examples above suggests "some degree of informal standardization of the form of oath-ceremonies,<sup>359</sup>" even if the Greeks seem to have forgotten the original meaning of the sacrifices, but maintained them simply out of a sense of tradition. But even though there was a shared belief in the power of sympathetic magic, this type of magic did not play the same role in Greek politics as it did in the Near East. The shared kernel of belief, exposed to radically different political and social environments, manifested itself in correspondingly different ways.

In Greek practice, there was no connection between a curse and military action, even during the most aggressive phases of the Peloponnesian, Delian, or Corinthian Leagues. Even though these states, and others besides, carried out a variety of atrocities, there was no explicit connection between these acts and a treaty and curses. Take, for example, a Peloponnesian League debate in 432.<sup>360</sup> The immediate issues<sup>361</sup> were whether the outbreak of violence at Corcyra, Athenian aggression at Potidaea, the Megarian decree, and Athens' treatment of Aegina constituted a breach of the Thirty Years' Peace of 446, and what was to be done in response. Despite general agreement that Athens was indeed guilty of violating the treaty,<sup>362</sup> the Spartans

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358 Faraone 1993:78 gives examples literary (Aeschylus *Seven Against Thebes* 43-53; Euripides *Suppliants* 1195-1209; *Iliad* 3.297-300; Plato *Laws* 753d) and historical (Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 23.67-8; Pausanias 5.24.9-11).

359 Faraone 1993:76.

360 Thuc. 1.119-125.

361 Thucydides distinguishes between the "proximate cause" or "pretext" (1.118.1: *πρόφασις*; also *αἰτίαι*, at 1.23.5) and the "truest" (*ἀληθεστάτη*) cause, which was Spartan fear of Athens' expansion throughout the Greek world.

362 Thuc. 1.87.

nevertheless sent to Delphi to inquire if they should go to war. Apollo's enthusiasm for the war was such that he promised to assist the Spartans and lead them to victory, even if they did not invoke his name—and still the Spartans hesitated, and put the vote to the allied assembly. According to Thucydides, the only time that Sparta invoked a curse in their justification for war against Athens was Pericles' connection to the cursed Alcmaeonids through his mother's side, for which he deserved to be driven out from the city.<sup>363</sup> The Spartans, so says Thucydides, were motivated not so much by an urge to honor the gods, but the belief that they could weaken Pericles at home by reminding the Athenian demos about this curse.<sup>364</sup> If curses had been put in place to secure the Thirty Years' Peace, they do not seem to have played a part in Sparta's thinking about the war.

Throughout the ancient Near East and Mediterranean the curse had a prominent role in the basic structure of an oath or treaty.<sup>365</sup> For this reason, we see widespread use and references to the use of oaths bound by curses in various legal documents, as well as in literary contexts. But there is an important difference between an individual swearing an oath in court, or a local chieftain in the Zagros swearing to uphold an agreement forced upon him by the Assyrian king, on the one hand, and two roughly equal powers, such as Sparta and Athens, using curses to secure a treaty, on the other. An individual who swears a false oath in court will be recognized as

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363 The curse has its origins in seventh-century Athens, when an Athenian elite and former Olympic champion named Cylon captured the Acropolis during an attempt to establish a tyranny in the 630s. Megacles, son of Alcmaeon, was archon at the time. According to Hdt. 5.71 and Thuc. 1.26-7, Cylon and his supporters went to the statue of Athena as suppliants, but were nonetheless murdered, and the Alcmaeonids were blamed. The entire clan was deemed to be cursed by this sacrilege and driven out of the city. According to Plut. *Solon* 12, the exile did not occur until decades later, when Solon organized a trial of those accused of pollution, resulting in their being cast out, and the bones of their dead relatives being exhumed. At least a few Alcmaeonids were able to return to the city, as they were exiled yet again by the Pisistratids. These Alcmaeonids were among the exiles who bribed the Pythia to command the Spartans to free Athens from the Pisistratids. This Cleomenes did in c. 510, paving the way for Cleisthenes' reforms. When Isagoras led the conservative faction against these changes, he once again brought up the ancient curse on the Alcmaeonids. We see at Thuc. 1.127 that in Pericles' time, his family was still not free from this charge.

364 Thuc. 1.126-7.

365 West 1997:125-6 lists a few examples, beyond what we have already seen here.

a liar by his community. Depending on local norms, he may find himself a defendant in a lawsuit, or he may be shunned and driven out of town.<sup>366</sup> Likewise, an oath may also be effective when there is a significant imbalance in power. There were few powers in the Near East capable of resisting an Assyrian invasion. This did not stop some from attempting to break their covenants, but the Assyrian king would have felt little worry at carrying out an act of divine retribution.

In contrast, as events would show, Sparta faced a powerful enemy in Athens, and could have had no assurances in her own success. A curse could not be a tool of imperialism in the Greek world because there was no expectation that one state could conquer another, and therefore could not take on the role of the embodiment of that curse. Going back to our example from 432, Sparta did not reference the oaths and curses from 446 because only the Peloponnesian allies believed that Athens had violated those oaths; the Athenians could convince themselves that they were simply acting to defend themselves and their empire, and were thus not guilty; indeed, they claimed that the gods would side with them, if the Spartans were to break the Peace and invade Attica.<sup>367</sup> However, it was within Athens itself that the Alcmaeonids were accursed and deserved to be driven from the city, and that is why the Spartans mentioned only that curse.

We should also note that, while the treaty between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea,<sup>368</sup> does seem to prove the close relations between Greek and Near Eastern treaty practices, it also stands out as a unique example among surviving Greek treaties: I know of no other such sacrifice accompanying an oath in a Greek treaty, and that particular example is less than clear: the treaty is known from both an inscribed text and Thucydides, but the section referring to the "perfect

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366 Parker 2005:70; Gagarin 2008:61-3.

367 Thuc. 1.75-8.

368 *IG I<sup>2</sup> 86* = Bengston no. 193; see p. 67 above.

victims" is recorded only in Thucydides.<sup>369</sup> It is possible that Thucydides, Xenophon, and other historians, for whatever reason, decided to leave out mention of diplomatic oaths. It is also hard to believe that oaths played no role in diplomacy. Yet it is equally hard to avoid the conclusion that they were secondary to realpolitical considerations.

## 5d. Greek Treaties in the Archaic and Classical Periods

This section will trace the development of the use of binding agreements amongst the Greek states. In order to understand the historical context of the Greco-Persian treaties, we must examine the treaties which the Greeks signed amongst themselves during the Archaic and Classical periods.

It is unclear exactly when treaties were first used in the Greek world; Herodotus,<sup>370</sup> Aeschines,<sup>371</sup> Polyaeus,<sup>372</sup> and other writers mention agreements between cities in the archaic period, perhaps as far back as the early seventh century, but it is unclear if they were written down. There are no written treaties in Homer's works, though he provides many examples of spoken agreements.<sup>373</sup> Our first epigraphic evidence of a treaty comes from the mid-sixth century, but the widespread use of strictly oral agreements continued throughout the period of our investigation. The majority are reported by significantly later sources, so it is difficult to reach detailed conclusions about these treaties.

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369 This is the last recorded Greek treaty with an oath of any kind (Bolmarcich 2007:35); however, Xenophon reports that the Athenians were forced to accept a list of terms in exchange for the survival of their city (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). Xenophon says that "they made peace on these terms" (ἐποιοῦντο εἰρήνην ἐφ' ᾧ...), and it is hard to see how this would not involve some sort of oath. Unfortunately, there we know no details of this act of making peace: we are only told that the Athenians debated the offer, and eventually voted to accept it.

370 For example, 1.22.3–4; 1.69; 1.74.

371 *Against Ctesiphon* 3.109–112.

372 *Strategemata* 6.50.

The Greeks employed treaties in a variety of contexts toward a variety of aims. In general, we can state that a traditional Greek treaty formalized an alliance (συμμαχία or ἐπιμαχία) intended for the mutual security of both parties. A treaty could be used to enact an agreement between only two states, but on rare occasions, there were multiple parties involved in a single treaty.<sup>374</sup> As we shall see, the Athenians bound her Delian League allies to herself through treaties, while the Spartans preferred to control her Peloponnesian League allies through ties of *xenia* and *proxenia* with local, pro-Spartan oligarchs.<sup>375</sup> Furthermore, treaties could be concluded between any of the political systems present in the Greek world (monarchy, democracy, oligarchy), as well as with foreign states.

There are several treaties dated to the late sixth or early fifth century. Since there is no agreement on a definite chronology, I present the following three in the order found in Bengston, and the reader must understand that the dates are estimated.

Our first treaty,<sup>376</sup> between Elis and Eua, is short enough to present here in full:<sup>377</sup>

Ἀ φράτρα τοῖρ Φαλείοις καὶ τοῖς Ἐυφάοις: συμμαχία κ'ἕα ἑκατὸν φέτεα ἄρχοι δέ κα τοί αἱ δέ τι δέοι αἶτε φέπος αἶτε φάργον συνέαν κ'ἀλάλοισ τά τ'ἄλλα καὶ παρ' πολέμο αἱ δέ μὰ συνέαν τάλαντόν κ'ἀργύρο ἀποτίνοιαν τοῖ Δι Ὀλυμπίοι τοῖ καθαλέμενοι λατρεῖόμενον. Αἱ δέ τιρ τὰ γράφεα ταὶ καθαλέοιτο αἶτε φέτας αἶτε τελεστὰ αἶτε δᾶμος ἐν τ'ἐπιάροι κ'ἐνέχοιτο τοῖνταῦτ' ἐγραμένοι.

This is the agreement between the Eleans and the Euans: let there be an alliance of one hundred years, and this [year] should be the first. And if there is needed a word or action, let them attend to one another other, in other things but especially in wartime. And if one does not help the other, those who violate should pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus, for his services. If someone should damage this text, either a private citizen or a magistrate or the popular assembly, he shall be liable to the sacred penalty recorded here.

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373 See pp. 86f above.

374 For one example, Acarnania, Amphiloehia, and Ambracia concluded a 100-year *epimachia* and *spondai*. Thuc. 3.114.

375 Goldman 2011:30, 41; Cartledge 2002:127

376 Minon 2007:38-47 discusses an inscription which may be older or contemporary with this one. It gives some rules for a wrestling match, and bars men "of Elea and the alliance" from participation. Presumably the judges were Elean, and there was worry about unfair advantages.

377 *SEG* 11 1182 = Bengston no. 110 = Tod I<sup>2</sup> 5 = ML 17. On the toponym Eua, versus Heraia, see Minon 2007:75-80.



The historical context of this alliance is unknown, although Bengston suggests that it may be connected to a period of conflict between Elis and the neighboring city of Pisa (not the one in Italy).<sup>378</sup> Elis and Eua were situated on opposite sides of the Peloponnese. Given the possibility that Elis was already a member of the Peloponnesian League at the time of this treaty, it seems that the Peloponnese was crisscrossed by a web of alliances. The text, engraved on a bronze tablet found at Olympia, records a parity treaty. Violations result not in a curse, but a fine. A violation was deemed offensive to Zeus, and it was he who must be placated. This fine itself is interesting, as it implies that a violation did not necessarily break the agreement: as long as the fine is paid to Zeus, the alliance will continue. There is no explicit indication of an unequal relationship here, but this could be misleading, as Elis had control of Olympia during most of the sixth century. So even though a fine would be paid to the temple, the temple funds were administered by Elis.<sup>379</sup> The length of the treaty is set at one hundred years. Bengston says that this is basically the same thing as a perpetual treaty, but that is exactly what it is not. I am unaware of a Near Eastern treaty with a specific time limit. This lends evidence to the interpretation of this treaty as a parity treaty, as it is hardly imperial behavior to let one's vassals simply go free, even after one hundred years. Finally, note the injunction against "injuring" the inscription itself. Sarah Bolmarcich has shown that, by the Classical period, there was a clear connection between the treaty text and the terms written therein; to destroy an inscription was to destroy the relationship between the two parties. This held even for treaties that had expired or had been violated, and, in Athens, an inscription could only be removed with approval from the

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378 Bengston 1962:8; Pausanias 6.22.2-4. Jeffery 1961:216-20 dates the inscription to c. 500. ML accept this date, while noting that "the circumstances in which Elis made this alliance with Heraea of western Arcadia must remain unknown."

379 Koiv 2013:329-330, Minon 2007:81. However, if Olympia is invoked here because of its status as a pan-Hellenic shrine, it only obtained that status because of a generally accepted belief in its independence and fairness. The Sacred Wars show that blatant and consistent attempts to manipulate shrines were not taken lightly.

Assembly.<sup>380</sup>

Another example,<sup>381</sup> found at Olympia, records an alliance between the Metapioi and Anaitoi. Unfortunately, neither city has been located; Bengston suggests southern Italy; Bauslaugh suggests "northwestern Greece," but gives no specifics; Koiv argues for the vicinity of Olympia.<sup>382</sup> Minon equates the Metapioi with the toponym *me-ta-pa*, found in a Linear B text at Pylos, and suggests a location in the Peloponnese or Aetolia.<sup>383</sup> Estimated dates range from the mid-sixth century to the first quarter of the fifth.

Ἀ φράτρα τὸς Ἀναίτος καὶ τὸς Μεταπίος φιλίαν πεντάκοντα ῥέτεα. κ' ὁπόταροι μὲνπεδέοιαν ἀπο τῷ βομῷ ἀποφελείοιαν κα τοὶ πρόξενοι καὶ τοὶ μάντιερ. αἱ τὸν ὄρκον παρβαίνοιαν γνῶμαν τὸρ ἱερομάορτ' Ὀλυμπίαι.

This is an agreement between the Anaitoi and Metapioi: friendship for fifty years. And whichever does not uphold [the agreement], let the *proxenoi* and the *manteis* keep him from the altar. If they transgress the oath, the Olympian priests will give judgement.

Once again, we have an archaic treaty with a clear expiration date. Even if some will argue that "a century's alliance was regarded as practically unlimited,<sup>384</sup>" the same cannot be said of a fifty-year term. We must accept that Greeks had the option to choose between limited and unlimited agreements. Punishment of violators is entrusted to human representatives of the divine, rather than the gods themselves. Enforcement is thus placed in the hands of a third party, respected by both signatories but having no sovereign power over either; this point would be even more emphatic, if the location of the cities were proven to be Italy. Different from the Elis-Eua treaty, this one establishes only 'friendship' between the Anaitoi and Metapioi, not *symmarchy*. This term, as well as *φιλότης*, implies an absence of conflict. It is the state which

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380 Bolmarcich 2007.

381 Bengston no. 111; Bauslaugh 1991:58-9.

382 Koiv 2013:329.

383 Minon 2007:99-100.

384 ML p.32.

creates peace, and there is no requirement for either side to aide the other in war.<sup>385</sup>

Let us look at a final bronze inscription from Olympia, dated to the last half of the sixth century.<sup>386</sup>

ἀρμόχθεν οἱ Συβαρίται κ'οἱ σύμμαχοι κ'οἱ Σερδαῖοι ἐπὶ φιλότατι πιστᾷ κ'αδόλοι ἀείδιον πρόξενοι  
ὁ Ζεὺς κ' Ἄπολλον κ'ἄλλοι θεοὶ καὶ πόλις Ποσειδανία.

The Sybarites and their allies and the Serdaians have been joined together for endless, honest, and faithful friendship. Zeus and Apollo and the other gods, and the city of Poseidonia are the *proxenoi*.

Sybaris was an Achaean colony on the southern coast of Italy, while the Serdaioi have yet to be identified, although they may have not been Greek. This testifies not only to the widespread importance of Olympia, but also to the disconnect between the religious authorities nominally in charge of enforcing the treaty, and any political power capable of forcibly extracting compensation in the event of violation. Once again, if Elis were exerting an unnatural amount of influence over Olympia, the shrine would cease to have a legitimate place in interstate diplomacy. Here, too, we see the interesting reliance on human powers to enforce the treaty and punish violators: the *proxenoi*,<sup>387</sup> who are the guarantors of the oath, are on the one hand gods, and on the other, the city of Poseidonia.<sup>388</sup> Poseidonia was a Sybarite colony, also in southern Italy, and therefore not likely an unbiased party, but neither were they under the direct political control of Sybaris. The whole point of calling in a *proxenos* was to put the enforcement of the *philia*, and the punishment of violators, into the hands of a third party. It is their status as unaffiliated foreigners that give the *proxenoi* their legitimacy.

Other early treaties were made in the context of a regional hegemony. As the Spartans emerged from the twenty-year Second Messenian War, c. 665, they began a project of subduing

385 Alonso 2007:208-12; Bauslaugh 1991:56-64; Scott 1982:1-3.

386 Bengston no. 120; Fornara 1983:31-2.

387 For a discussion of *proxenia* in Greece, see below, p.224f.

388 Zelnick-Abromovitz 2004:94; Bolmarcich 2003:59-2.

the surrounding Peloponnesian *poleis*. This may be the context for the battle reported by Herodotus, where the Spartans carried chains into Tegea, confident that they would helotize this region as well, but only ended up defeated, with many of their own soldiers enslaved.<sup>389</sup> But, "in the time of Croesus," that is, in the early to mid-sixth century, Sparta succeeded in subduing Tegea by recovering the bones of Orestes. This has been interpreted as part of a Spartan propaganda campaign to co-opt non-Doric heroes behind the Spartan kings' attempt to legitimize their expansion,<sup>390</sup> but David Phillips convincingly argues that the seizure of the bones was just that: a violent theft of a local icon, by which the Spartans forcibly claimed the inheritance of Agamemnon's kingdom.<sup>391</sup>

By the end of the sixth century, Sparta controlled most of the Peloponnese, except Argos and Achaia. Her territory was divided into Lacedaemonia proper, centered on Sparta; the *kleroi*; and the lands of her allies. Sparta and her allies are now known as the Peloponnesian League, and in fact Blomart claims that the transfer of the bones of Orestes represented the formation of the Peloponnesian League. In Blomart's analysis,<sup>392</sup> the earlier defeat by the Tegeans, along with decades of internal problems, convinced the Spartans to adopt a policy of non-military expansion through alliances, treaties, and the creation of a pan-Peloponnesian identity. Orestes, as the king of Argos, Sparta, and Mycenae, was the ideal mythical predecessor of the Spartan kings.

As is expected, the constitution of the Peloponnesian League is uncertain. Since the mid-sixth century at the latest, the League was held together by oaths, but there is no evidence of a written constitution.<sup>393</sup> Each ally was connected to Sparta, but not to one another. Since c. 550,

389 Hdt. 1.66.

390 Leahy 1968:16-21 includes in this effort Stesichorus' revised story of the Atreidae and Helen, the building of a shrine to Odysseus, and the return of the bones of Tisamenus from Helike to Sparta.

391 Phillips 2003.

392 Blomart 2000.

393 Baltrusch 1994:20-22.

the Spartans occasionally made treaties with their allies. Plutarch reports that, when the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans were reconciled, after the return of the Bones of Orestes, they put up a stele which recorded the terms of their agreement (συνθήκη):<sup>394</sup>

‘τίνες οἱ παρ’ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις χρηστοί,’  
Λακεδαιμόνιοι Τεγεάταις διαλλαγέστες ἐποιήσαντο συνθήκας καὶ στήλην ἐπ’ Ἀλφειῷ κοινήν ἀνέστησαν, ἐν ἧ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων γέγραπται Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν. ἐξηγούμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτο φησι δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτινύναι βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν.

Who are the ‘χρηστοί’ among the Arcadians and the Spartans?

When the Spartans had come to terms with the Tegeans, they made a treaty and set up in common a stele by the Alpheius. On this, among other things, was inscribed: ‘The Messenians must be expelled from the country, and it shall not be lawful to make them χρηστοὺς.’ Aristotle, explaining this, says that it means that no one shall be put to death because of assistance given to the pro-Spartan party amongst the Tegeans.

Aristotle's interpretation is based on the euphemism οἱ χρηστοί, ‘the good people,’ for ‘the dead.’ But in the context of this treaty, this cannot be true. As Jacoby pointed out, the Spartans would not have insisted that the Tegeans expel the Messenians from their country, while also forbidding the Tegeans from killing the Messenians: "If [the Spartans] ever showed humanity it was certainly not in their relations with their Messenian slaves."<sup>395</sup> Instead, he points to Cretan usage, where ἄχρηστος means "useless," and in a political sense, "not a participating citizen."<sup>396</sup> So χρηστός must mean "useable," that is, a participating citizen, and so χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν must mean "to make someone a citizen."

Fifty years after Jacoby, Braun chided Jacoby for placing Plutarch's second reference to this treaty, at *Quaestiones Romanae* 52, into a footnote, just as I did above. So let us give it the attention Braun thinks it deserves:

διὰ τί τῆ καλουμένη Γενεΐτη Μάνη κύνα θύουσι καὶ κατεύχονται μηδένα χρηστὸν ἀποβῆναι τῶν οἰκογενῶν;’

...

ἢ διὰ τὸ χρηστοὺς κομψῶς λέγεσθαι τοὺς τελευτῶντας αἰνιττόμενοι, διὰ τῆς εὐχῆς αἰτοῦνται

394 *Quaestiones Graecae* 5, c.f. *Quaestiones Romanae* 52. See Baltrusch 1994:25; Bengston no. 112.

395 Jacoby 1944:15.

396 Jacoby refers to ML 2, a seventh-century legal inscription at Dreros.

μηδένα τῶν συνοίκων ἀποθανεῖν; οὐ δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάζειν: καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς Ἀρκάδων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συνθήκαις γεγράφθαι φησὶ μηδένα χρηστὸν ποιεῖν βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν, ὅπερ εἶναι μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι.

For what reason do they sacrifice a female dog to the so-called *Geneita Mana*, and pray that no one of their household become χρηστὸν?

...

Or, because the dead are euphemistically called "χρηστός," speaking in veiled terms with their prayer, are they begging that no one of their family die? This should not be a surprise. For indeed Aristotle says that it is written in the treaty of the Arcadians with the Lacedaemonians that no one is to be made χρηστὸν for helping the philolakonians amongst the Tegeans, which means that no one is to be killed.

Braun argues that Jacoby's analogy fails: even though ἄκρηστος and χρηστός look like they ought to be opposites, χρηστός is nowhere attested meaning "enfranchised," whereas its euphemistic function is common. Further, Jacoby's reconstructed treaty terms make no sense. Messenians living in Tegea would be no less of a threat to Sparta if they were not made citizens, nor is there any reasonable expectation that the Tegeans would be willing to make them citizens in the first place. Second, the demands made of Tegea are redundant. If Sparta expected Tegea to comply with the requirement to expel the Messenians on their land, why then also demand that the Tegeans not enfranchise the Messenians?<sup>397</sup> So we now understand two terms of the Spartan-Tegean treaty: first, the positioning of the stele suggests that a border agreement had been reached; second, Tegea was forced to agree to not kill members of the pro-Spartan party in their own lands. This may be related to Sparta's reliance on relations with friendly elites in other states, mentioned above.

The Spartans, however, do not seem to have had a general habit of making treaties with their League allies. It is frequently assumed that the League allies swore to have the same friends and enemies as Sparta, and to follow wherever she might lead. This, however, is only attested from the late fifth century.<sup>398</sup> In reality, Sparta was obliged to call a League congress to vote on

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397 Braun 1994.

398 Bolmarcich 2008:67-8.

war, which did not always go her way. There were also at least six occasions on which Sparta went to war on her own, without apparent allied assistance.<sup>399</sup>

Herodotus reports that Croesus, when he got wind of Cyrus' defeat of the Medes and his advance towards Lydia, consulted the oracle at Delphi. The infamous response, that his war would bring down a mighty empire, convinced him to make an alliance with the most powerful Greeks.<sup>400</sup> Sparta, currently standing tall amongst the Peloponnesians, was the obvious choice. To this end, Croesus sent ambassadors to make Sparta his friend and ally (φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος), without deceit or guile (ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης). We recognize similar language in the treaty between Sybaris and the Serdaioi. Due to the previous diplomatic relations between Sparta and Croesus (in the form of gift exchanges), the Spartans agreed to Croesus' offer. But Herodotus' word choice is interesting. Where Croesus asks for φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος, the Spartans make an oath of 'guest-friendship and alliance' (ὄρκια ξεινίας πέρι καὶ συμμαχίας). According to Bauslaugh, Herodotus only uses the phrase ξενία καὶ συμμαχία when referring to archaic-period treaties or alliances between individual rulers, usually tyrants. However, Herodotus uses ξενία καὶ συμμαχία to describe the relationship between Miletus and Croesus, which was clearly different from that between Sparta and Croesus.<sup>401</sup> Either Herodotus is less careful in his word

399 Goldman 2011:55–63 records the following instances, all found in Herodotus:

1. Spartans agreed to aid Croesus against Cyrus, but did not have the opportunity to render it (1.69; mid-sixth century);
2. Spartans alone fought the Argives at Thyrea (1.82; mid-sixth century);
3. At Samian exiles' request, Spartans unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Polycrates (3.47-8, 54-6; c. 525);
4. Twice, the Spartans sought to drive the Peisistratids out of Athens, and succeed the second time (5.63-5; c. 511). Note that Herodotus specifies that Cleomenes returned in 506 with "an army from the entire Peloponnese" to throw out Isagoras and his party (5.74);
5. Sparta fought the Argives at Sepeia (6.76-83; 494);
6. Spartans marched to join the Athenians at Marathon against the Persians, but arrived too late (6.106, 120; 490).

400 Hdt. 1.53.

401 Bauslaugh 1991:88-91. According to Bolmarcich, 2010:119-20, in Herodotus, *xenia* implies a relationship

choice than Bauslaugh would believe, or Herodotus was reporting a later Spartan tradition with little basis in historical fact. Assuming that the alliance was real, Sparta felt that they owed Croesus military assistance, but never actually fought for him. Failing to appreciate the speed of Cyrus' invasion, Croesus did not actually summon the Spartans and his other foreign allies until it was far too late, and even then, allotted them four months of travel time. The Spartans, distracted by war with Argos, received word that Croesus had already been captured while they were still getting their ships ready to sail.<sup>402</sup>

Athens was, at around this same time, beginning to collect allies of her own. In 519, Plataea was threatened by Thebes, and first turned to Sparta for help. They refused, claiming that they were too far away from Plataea to be of any service. Athens, however, being close by, would be a much better choice. This, according to Herodotus, was merely an excuse, as the Spartans' true goal was to sow conflict between Thebes and Athens. It worked. After Plataea joined Athens,<sup>403</sup> Thebes immediately sent an army to attack Plataea, and Athens duly came to defend them. Just before the battle broke out, Corinth came in to arbitrate. Thebes agreed to respect Plataea's borders, and to not try and force her to join the Boeotian confederacy. However, as the Athenians were marching away after the negotiations, the Thebans attacked. Athens managed to push them back, and in fact took the opportunity to extend Plataea's borders even further into formerly Theban territory.<sup>404</sup>

Thucydides picks up the story. During the Peloponnesian War, the issue of Plataea's status amongst the more powerful states in the region became a major issue. In the third year of

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with negative consequences, while *philia* will have a positive outcome.

402 Hdt. 1.82.

403 Hammond 1992:144: Herodotus, using *δίδομι* in various formulations, states that Plataea "gave themselves" to Athens.

404 Hdt. 6.108.



the war (429/8), Archidamus led the Spartans and their allies against Plataea. The Plataeans immediately sent envoys to remind him of what a previous Spartan king, Pausanias, had done after the Persian Wars. According to the envoys, in 479, after the battle of Plataea, Pausanias "proposed to the allies to concede to the Plataeans that they were to inhabit their land and city, possessing it as their own, in independence, that no one was ever to campaign against them with aggression or with subjugation in mind, and that, if any did not refrain from doing so, the allies were to defend [the Plataeans] with all their power.<sup>405</sup>" Plataea had suffered greatly at the hands of the Persians, and were forced to abandon their city for a year and spend a winter in the Peloponnesus.<sup>406</sup> One can interpret this as a gesture of defiance against Persia, or an acknowledgment of Plataean sacrifices by the rest of the allies, but it could just as easily have been an effort on Pausanias' behalf to ensure that Thebes and Athens would always have something to fight each other about.

Jumping back to 429/8, the Spartans rejected the Plataean claims to inviolability, insisting that they had forfeited whatever rights they may have had when, in 431, they treacherously slaughtered some Theban hostages. However, it took Sparta two years to actually capture Plataea, and so it was not until 427 that they put the remaining citizens on trial, and executed 200, in addition to 25 Athenian allies who happened to be in the city at the time.

These events show the political and ideological significance of alliances in the Greek world of the sixth and fifth centuries. We have no primary record of the initial conclusion of the Athens-Plataea alliance, but clearly it took on a great significance to later authors. For Herodotus, Plataea's honesty and loyalty served to highlight the machinations of Pausanias, and Sparta's conspicuous if excusable absence at Marathon. For Thucydides, the very same alliance

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405 Thuc. 2.71.2; translation based on Hammond 1992:144.

406 Diod. 11.14.5.

was a case-study of the conflict between the ideals of diplomacy and the utilitarian calculations of a *polis* at war. Even ninety-three years of a mutually-beneficial alliance were not enough to outweigh the immediate advantage that Athens sought from remaining behind their walls, rather than facing Sparta in open battle. Naturally, both historians' accounts were adjusted to fit their overarching viewpoint of recent Greek history,<sup>407</sup> and neither explains why Athens made an alliance with Plataea back in 519 in the first place. If Herodotus' account is true—one wonders how he could have known what Pausanias' strategy was—surely Athens knew that an alliance with Plataea would antagonize Thebes. Were they looking to provoke a fight, anticipating a victory? Did they want Plataea as a buffer zone against Theban aggression? Whatever the case was, the Athens-Plataea alliance shows how alliances could be recycled and reframed at later dates as ideological tools; this does not necessarily preclude their function as clearly-defined legal rulings as well, but it should be kept in mind as we analyze all treaties and alliances.

The treaties and alliances discussed above were mainly concluded between Greek *poleis*, although there were some between Greeks and non-Greeks. The scanty evidence, and the decentralized nature of archaic Greece, makes it difficult to define a "typical" treaty, or a set of diplomatic norms. But that in and of itself is significant. Unlike in the Near Eastern examples already seen, no one state could control diplomatic strategy or customs for the entire region, even though a small number of states had far more military and economic power than the others. There was a shared set of treaty customs (for example, establishment of an alliance, friendship, and boundaries; the participation of the gods; a specific lifespan for the agreement), but each state was free to manipulate these as they saw fit.

It is only in the years after the Persian Wars that we see a truly new development in the

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407 Cohen 1984 shows the thematic unity of Thucydides' presentation of the Mytilenian debate, the Plataean debate, and the description of the *stasis* at Corcyra.

use of treaties among Greek states. In the Archaic period, there were no Greek empires, and therefore no Greek state developed the means required to run an empire. The wars against the Persian empire began a process which resulted in military entities with higher degrees of centralization than were previously known in Greece. In 481, as Persian heralds traveled through Greece, collecting offerings of earth and water, those cities that were committed to resistance swore an oath amongst themselves. Herodotus and Lycurgus preserve different oaths, but both are concerned mainly with the dividing of spoils and offerings to the gods in the event of victory.<sup>408</sup> The alliance was not held together by any sort of constitution. Sparta was granted overall military command, but her authority extended no further than the battlefield.

In the aftermath of Xerxes' invasion, there was a drive to maintain a posture of readiness against future Persian aggression, but the final structure of this project was not immediately obvious. Since Sparta was unwilling to lead such a campaign, Athens took up a hegemonial role and set about gathering allies into her new league. According to Herodotus,<sup>409</sup> this league was born from the need to protect Ionia against future Persian threats. Thucydides,<sup>410</sup> however, states that Athens was allowed to assume hegemony only because Pausanias' tyrannical behavior made him unacceptable to the allies, who then refused to accept the authority of Dorcis, the Spartan sent to replace Pausanias. Thereafter, the Athenians led a campaign against Persian territory that had no other goal besides revenge against the Great King.

Regardless of the motivation for the Delian League, the Persian wars had demonstrated the strength of a centralized administrative and decision-making structure, even in the face of much greater forces. Thus it is not surprising that the Athenian leaders of the Delian League

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408 Hdt 7.131–2; Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 80–81.

409 9.106.

410 1.95–6.

sought to centralize power in the hands of a single state, and to insist on compliance with decisions made by that central power.<sup>411</sup>

We can be sure that the birth of the League was solemnized and concretized by the swearing of an oath by its members. Herodotus only reports that the Athenians bound the allies by their pledge and their oath to be faithful and not desert.<sup>412</sup> Plutarch adds that it was the Athenian general Aristeides who took the oath on behalf of Athens and concluded the ceremony by casting iron bars into the sea, uttering the imprecations that would arise from a violation.<sup>413</sup> Treaties concluded after 479, in general, contained an evolving set of clauses, all designed to eliminate weakness in previous treaties. Namely, the obligations of all parties were laid out with greater specificity, provisions were created to allow for amendments to the original agreement, and the oath taking and renewal procedures were made more elaborate. The purpose of all of these was to prevent the exploitation of 'loopholes' in the treaty, while simultaneously providing for a way to resolve future conflicts without dissolving the peaceful relationship between the parties.<sup>414</sup>

Furthermore, Athens, through the Delian League, bound her allies to herself (and herself alone) according to terms dictated by the Athenian ecclesia. These decrees (*psephismata*) cannot be called treaties, as they were edicts which the League members were forced to swear to uphold. *Psephismata* first appear in the Athenian textual record, amongst other inscribed texts of the ecclesia, around 458/7. These decrees, crafted unilaterally by the Athenians, do not represent "the creation of an international legal space," but rather "the extension of Athenian (domestic)

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411 Raaflaub 2009.

412 9.106.4: "...πίστι τε καταλαβόντες και ὀρκίοισι ἐμμενέειν τε και μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι."

413 Plut. *Arist.* 25.1: "ὁ δ' Ἀριστείδης ὄρκισε μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας και ὤμοσεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μύδρους ἐμβάλων ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀραῖς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν..."

414 Baltrusch 1994:83–88.

legal space to incorporate that of another polis."<sup>415</sup>

Among the surviving *psephismata*, we have one recording the procedures for dealing with legal disputes (called *ξυμβόλαια*) between Athenian and Phaselian citizens.<sup>416</sup> The decree states that,

ὅ τι ἄμ μὲν Ἀθήνησι ξυμβόλαιον γένηται πρὸς Φασηλιτῶν τινα, Ἀθήνησι τὰς δίκας γίνεσθαι παρὰ τῷ πολεμάρχῳ, καθάπερ Χίοις, καὶ ἄλλοι μὴδὲ ἄμδ· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀπὸ ξυμβολῶν κατὰ τὰς ὄσας ξυμβολὰς πρὸς Φασηλίτας τὰς δίκας ἔναι.

"Whatever legal dispute arises at Athens against a Phaselite, at Athens the suit shall be tried in the court of the Polemarch, just as with the Chians, and in no place else whatever. As to the other cases arising from legal disputes, the present mutual legal arrangements (*ξυμβολὰς*) with Phaselis will be applicable in litigation."<sup>417</sup>

Although it has been argued that the decree is a relatively benign arrangement for Phaselites to file claims against Athenians,<sup>418</sup> the phrase *πρὸς Φασηλιτῶν τινα* refers to arguments "in reply to" Phaselites—that is to say, any case that pits an Athenian against a Phaselite, regardless of which party is the defendant and which the plaintiff.<sup>419</sup> Furthermore, Greek legal custom at the time held that "One could only prosecute in courts where the civil authority had the coercive power to execute judgments in one's favor," meaning that we would expect an Athenian to seek redress from a Phaselite in a court at Phaselis. But *Ἀθήνησι* specifies that the trial must take place in Athens.<sup>420</sup> Ergo, Phaselites present themselves in Athenian courts

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415 Low 2007:88–9.

416 *IG I<sup>3</sup> 10 = ML 31*. The estimated dates of this inscription fall into a wide range, and typically from 469-50 or 428/7.

417 Lines 6-14. Translation from Fornara 1983 no.68.

418 Ste. Croix 1961:100-4 argued that the decree only applied when "something like 'legal dispute' or 'right of legal action' arises at Athens, involving a Phaselite." He then argued that it could not only refer to cases of Athenian claims against Phaselite defendants, as it is unlikely that the Athenians would have been willing and able to force Phaselites, on the other side of the Aegean, to come to Athens to sit before a (possibly) biased court. Further, as de St. Croix dated the decree to the 460s, Athens had not yet attempted to openly "rule" her allies and put such burdensome demands on them.

419 LSJ (s.v. *πρός*) characterizes *πρός τινα* as "less strong" than *κατά τινος*, "in accusation [against]," thus indicating that the genitive object is the defendant. See Ste. Croix 1961:105-7; Wade-Gery 1958:188 and Fornara 1979:50-1 argue that *πρὸς Φασηλιτῶν τινα* refers only to Phaselite defendants.

420 Fornara 1979:50-1.

when handling disputes against Athenians, and anyone who should violate this term would be fined ten thousand drachmae.<sup>421</sup> We also learn from this same excerpt that Athens had already applied this same rule to their Chian allies as well.

Another *psephisma*, recording an oath and terms of settlement between Athens and Chalcis, stands out for its nearly complete state of preservation.<sup>422</sup> It begins with the oaths to be exchanged. The Athenian boule and the dikasts swear:

οὐκ ἔχσελθ Χαλκιδέας ἐχ Χαλκίδος οὐδὲ τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον ποέσο οὐδὲ ἰδιότεν οὐδένα ἀτιμόσο οὐδὲ φυγῆι ζεμιόσο οὐδὲ χσυλλέφσομαι οὐδὲ ἀποκτενῶ οὐδὲ χρέματα ἀφαιρέσομαι ἀκρίτο οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀθηναίων, οὐδ ἐπιφσεφιῶ κατὰ ἀπροσκέτο οὔτε κατὰ τῶ κοινῶ οὔτε κατὰ ἰδιότο οὐδὲ ἐνόσ, καὶ πρεσβεῖαν ἐλθῶσαν προσάχσο πρὸς βολὲν καὶ δέμον δέκα ἔμερῶν ἥοταν πρυτανεῦο κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπμεδόσο Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθηναίων.

I shall not deport Chalcidians from Chalcis or devastate the city, or deprive any individual of his rights, or punish him with exile or imprison him or kill him or take property from anyone unheard in trial, without (the concurrence of) the People of the Athenians. I shall not have a vote taken, without summons to attend trial, against either the government or any private individual whatever. When an embassy has arrived, I shall introduce it to the Boule and People within ten days when I hold the prytany, to the best of my power. This I shall guarantee the Chalcidians if they obey the People of the Athenians.<sup>423</sup>

In return, the Chalcidians swear:

οὐκ ἀποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε τέχνει οὔτε μηχανεῖ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδ ἔπει οὐδὲ ἔργοι οὐδὲ τῶι ἀφισταμένοι πείσομαι, καὶ ἐὰν ἀφιστεῖ τις κατερῶ Ἀθηναίοισι, καὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελῶ Ἀθηναίοισιν, ἥδὸν ἂν πείθο Ἀθηναίος, καὶ χσύμμαχος ἔσομαι ἥοῖος ἂν δύνομαι ἄριστος καὶ δικαιοτάτος καὶ τῶι δέμοι Ἀθηναίων βοεθέσο καὶ ἀμυνῶ, ἐὰν τις ἀδικεῖ τὸν δέμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πείσομαι τῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθηναίων.

I shall not rebel against the People of the Athenians either by artifice or by device of any kind either by word or by deed. Nor shall I follow anyone in rebellion and if anyone does rebel, I shall denounce him to the Athenians. I shall pay the tribute to the Athenians which I persuade them (to assess), and as an ally I shall be the best and truest possible. And I shall assist the People of the Athenians and defend them if anyone does injury to the People of the Athenians, and I shall obey the People of the Athenians.<sup>424</sup>

After the procedures for the exchange of oaths is laid out, there is a vacant space on the stone, followed by a motion by one Antikles. This section contains two statements that are phrased as

421 Lines 20-2.

422 *IG I<sup>3</sup> 40* = Bengston no. 155 = ML 52 = Fornara 1983 103.

423 Translation Fornara 1983.

424 Translation Fornara 1983.

responses to questions previously asked.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἡομέρον ἀποκρίνασθαι Χαλκιδεῦσιν, ἡότι νῦμ μὲν Ἀθηναίοις δοκεῖ, εἴαν κατὰ τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα· ἡόταν δὲ δοκεῖ, βουλευσάμενοι ποέσοσι τὲν διαλλαγὲν, καθότι ἂν δοκεῖ ἐπιτέδειον ἔναι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Χαλκιδεῦσιν.

As to the hostages, reply shall be made to the Chalcidians that as of now the Athenians are resolved to leave the matter as voted. When it seems best, after consideration, they will make an agreement such as seems suitable for the Athenians and Chalcidians.<sup>425</sup>

τὸς δὲ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, ἡόσοι οἰκῶντες μὲ τελοσιν Ἀθέναζε, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται ἡυπὸ τῷ δέμο τῷ Ἀθηναίον ἀτέλεια, τὸς δὲ ἄλλος τελεν ἐς Χαλκίδα, καθάπερ ἡοι ἄλλοι Χαλκιδέες.

As to the aliens in Chalcis, [except] those who are resident [there] and who do not owe civic obligations to Athens, or who have been granted immunity from public burdens by the Athenian People, the other [aliens] shall pay to Chalcis like the other Chalcidians.<sup>426</sup>

In the first, the situation appears to be that hostages have already been taken, and the Chalcidians asked to have the arrangement altered, either with the hostages being returned, or exchanged for other hostages. The Athenian response is that things will stand as they are, but further negotiations may follow. This need not imply that all hostages will be returned.

The second has caused much greater disagreement: who are "the aliens in Chalcis?" It is sometimes argued that, in an Athenian decree, Athenians living abroad would be identified as Ἀθηναῖοι, not ξένοι.<sup>427</sup> However, since this statement is a response to a Chalcidian question (presumably, "What will be the civic obligations of the ξένοι living in here in Chalcis?"), a response to that question might well refer to these people from the perspective of those asking the question.<sup>428</sup> Of course, this need not limit the ξένοι to *only* Athenians.

After Antikles' motion, we find a final one, this by Archestratos:

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425 Lines 47-52. Translation Fornara 1983.

426 Lines 52-7. Each modern scholar seems to have a different translation, both because of the difficulty in rendering the Greek into English smoothly, and due to the differences in interpretation of specific words. Of particular note are χσένος (discussed below), and τελεῖν. τέλος is often translated as "taxes," thus leading to a debate over which specific tax is at issue here, especially in the context of the *phoros* collected by Athens. However, it can refer to the scope of civic obligations, including taxes, contributions in times of war (εἰσφορά), and liturgies. See Giovannini 2000:63-8, Ostwald 2002:140.

427 Whitehead 1976:254.

428 Fornara 1977:40.

τάς δὲ εὐθόνας Χαλκιδεῦσι κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔναι ἐν Χαλκίδι καθάπερ Ἀθῆνεσιν Ἀθηναίοις πλὴν φυγῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀτιμίας· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἔφεσιν ἔναι Ἀθηναῖζε ἐς τὴν ἑλιαίαν τὴν τῶν θεσμοθετῶν κατὰ τὸ ψέφισμα τὸ δέμο.

The legal processes of punishment shall be in the hands of the Chalcidians, as regards their own citizens in Chalcis, just as they are in Athens for the Athenians, except (when the penalty involved is) exile, death or loss of citizen-rights. In regard to these, appeal shall lie in Athens, in the law court of the Thesmothetes, in accordance with the decree of the People.<sup>429</sup>

Just as we saw with the Phaselis decree, here again the Athenians are exerting control over the internal politics of Chalcis through the justice system, rather than by enforcing a constitutional change. By claiming the sole right of the use of the most severe penalties, Athens has thus secured the ability to remove those Chalcidians who might interfere with her own ambitions, while also protecting Chalcidians who are willing to work in line with Athenian ambitions.<sup>430</sup>

There is some dispute about the date of this decree. The text states that the oaths to be exchanged are modeled on those demanded of the Eretrians.<sup>431</sup> Naturally, scholars have turned to the historical accounts of the fifth century to find an appropriate context. There is a minority position that puts the decree no earlier than the 420s. Philochorus mentions an expedition against Euboea in 424/3.<sup>432</sup> The Chalcis decree bears similar language<sup>433</sup> to that found in the truce between Athens and Sparta of 423,<sup>434</sup> the Athens-Bottiaea treaty of c. 422/1,<sup>435</sup> and the treaty between Athens and Perdiccas of Macedon of c. 422.<sup>436</sup> Also, in the text of the Chalcis decree we find the names Drakontides, Diognetos, Arcestratos, and Hierocles. We know from other

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429 Lines 71-6. Translation Fornara 1983.

430 ML 52 p.143.

431 Lines 40-3.

432 *FGrH* 328 F 119 = Scholion Aristophanes' *Wasps* 718. Translation Yardley, in Roisman 2011:279-80.

433 Mattingly 1961a:126-7.

434 Thuc. 4.118.11.

435 *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 76.30-3.

436 *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 89.40-1.



sources that men of these names held positions of authority in Athens in the 430s and 420s.<sup>437</sup>

The majority dates the Chalcis decree to the aftermath of the Euboean revolt (446), mentioned by Thucydides.<sup>438</sup> Very little is known about this revolt, but Thucydides states that Pericles subdued the entire island, with all cities but one accepting terms; the citizens of Histiaea were removed, with Athenians taking their place. We also know from Plutarch that, following the Euboean revolt, Pericles forcibly removed the "horse-pasturers" (that is, the wealthy cavalry class) from Chalcis.<sup>439</sup> This sort of dramatic upheaval is generally considered to fit in with the taking of hostages and the judicial interference.<sup>440</sup>

We now turn to two treaties, or rather, two texts recording the ratification of two treaties. As they are very similar on many levels, we treat them together. The first is an alliance between Athens and Rhegion, on the very southern tip of Italy;<sup>441</sup> the other is between Athens and Leontini, a city in Eastern Sicily.<sup>442</sup> Both texts are broken off at the bottom, and both are dated to 433/2.

Alliance with Rhegion:

[θεοί· πρέσβες ἐκ Ἰεργίου]οὶ τὲν  
χουμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο καὶ τὸν ἡόρκον  
Κλέανδρος Χσεν[.....19.....]τίνο,  
Σιλενὸς Φόκο,[.....14..... ἐπ' Ἀφ]σεύδος  
ἄρχοντος καὶ τῆς βολῆς ἡῆι Κριτιάδης  
πρῶτος ἐγραμμ[άτευεν ἐδοχσεν τῆι  
βο]λῆι καὶ τῶι δέμοι· Ἀ[καμαντῆς  
ἐπρυτάνευε, Χ]αρίας ἐγραμμάτευ[ε,  
Τιμόχσενος ἐπεστάτ]ε, Καλλί-vacat [ας  
εἶπε· χουμμαχίαν εἶναι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ  
Ἰεργίοις· τὸν δὲ ἡόρκον] ὁμοσάντων

Alliance with Leontini:

[θ]εοί· πρέσβες ἐγ Λεον[τ]ίνον]οὶ τῆν  
χουμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο καὶ τὸν ἡόρκον  
Τιμένωρ Ἀγαθοκλέος, Σῶσις Γλαυκίω, Γέλων  
Ἐχσεκέστο, γραμματεὺς Θεότιμος Ταυρίσκο  
ἐπ' Ἀφσεύδος ἄρχοντος καὶ τῆς βολῆς ἡῆι  
Κριτιάδες ἐγραμμάτευε, ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι  
καὶ τῶι δέμοι, Ἀκαμαντῆς ἐπρυτάνευε,  
Χαρίας ἐγραμμάτευε, Τιμόχσενος ἐπεστάτε,  
Καλλίας ἐν ἴπε· τὲμ μὲν χουμμαχίαν εἶναι  
Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λεοντίνιοις καὶ τὸν ὄ[ρ]κον  
δοῦναι καὶ δέχσασ[θαι] ὁμόσ[αι] δὲ Ἀθηναί[ος]

437 Mattingly 2002:379.

438 1.114.

439 *Per.* 23.2; *Hdt.* 5.77.

440 *ML* 52 p.144.

441 *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 53 = *ML* 63 = Fornara 1983 no. 124.

442 *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 54 = *ML* 64 = Fornara 1983 no. 125.

Αθηνα[ῖοι] ἵνα ἐι ἡπάντα πιστὰ καὶ  
 ἄδολα καὶ ἡ[απλᾶ] παρ' Ἀθηναίων ἐς  
 αἰδίων Ῥεγίνοις, κατὰ τὰδε ὀμνύντες·  
 χσύμ]μαχοὶ ἐσόμεθα πισ[τοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι  
 καὶ ἰσ]χυροὶ καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς [ἐς αἰδίων  
 Ῥεγίνοις καὶ] ὀφελέσομεν ἐ[άν τ][ο  
 δέονται —————]  
 Gods. The envoys from Rhegion who  
 concluded the alliance and took the oath:  
 Kleandros son of Xen...Silenos son of  
 Phokos...in Apseudos' archonship and in  
 the Boule of which Kritiades was the first  
 secretary. Resolved by the Boule and the  
 People: Akamantis held the prytany,  
 Charias was the secretary, Timoxenos  
 presided, Kallias proposed: there will be  
 an alliance between the Athenians and  
 Rhegians. The Athenians shall swear, so  
 that everything will be trustworthy and  
 without guile and straightforward by the  
 Athenians, forever, with the Rhegians.  
 They shall swear the following: "We shall  
 be trustworthy and just and strong allies to  
 the Rhegians, and not violate the terms,  
 and will render service if ... "

τὰδε· σύ]μμα[χοὶ ἐσόμ]εθα Λεοντ[ί]ν[οις]  
 αἰ]δίο[ι ἀδόλος καὶ [ἀβλα]βῆς· [Λεοντίνο]ς  
 ὀ[μῶς ὀ]μόσ[αι· σύμμαχοὶ ἐσόμ]εθα  
 [Ἀθηναίους αἰδίοι] ἀδό[λος καὶ ἀβλαβῆς·  
 περὶ  
 [5 fragmentary lines]  
 Gods. The envoys from Leontini who  
 concluded the alliance and took the oath:  
 Timenor son of Agathocles, Sosis son of  
 Glaukias, Gelon son of Exekestos.  
 Theotimos son of Tauriskos was the  
 secretary. In Apseudos' archonship and in the  
 Boule of which Kritiades was the secretary.  
 Resolved by the Boule and the People:  
 Akamantis held the prytany, Charias was the  
 secretary, Timoxenos presided, Kallias  
 proposed: there will be an alliance between  
 the Athenians and Leontinians, and the oath  
 will be given and taken. The Athenians will  
 swear as follows: "We shall be allies to the  
 Leontinians forever, without guile and  
 without breaking the terms." The  
 Leontinians will swear the same: "We shall  
 be allies to the Athenians forever, without  
 guile and without breaking the terms."  
 Concerning...

There are several important points to note at the outset. Both texts begin with a prescript, giving the names of the officials involved. On both texts, the prescript now visible replaced an earlier, erased version. The reason for these changes is not known.<sup>443</sup>

443 Based on the letter-forms, Meritt et al 1950:227 argue that the treaty should be dated to c.448-6. Since this conflicts with the date of Apseudos' archonship, 443/2, they suggest that the alliance was originally made in 448-6, but renewed in 433/2. At the time of the renewal, the original prescript was erased and replaced (see also Meritt 1946:90: "When these early treaties were reaffirmed with new preambles in 433/2 the treaties were themselves in no way disturbed: they still stood on their monuments of stone, unchanged, to be cherished and observed for ever."). But this is far from certain. The authors of the *ATL* argue that the Callias who proposed these treaties was none other than the ambassador who brokered a peace with Persia in c. 449. Seeing as that Callias, the son of Hipponicos, was old enough to fight at Marathon in 490, we would not expect him to be politically active in the 430s. And so Lewis 1961: "It seems unlikely that an Athenian decree-prescript can have a live archon, a live grammateus, a live epistates, living ambassadors, and a dead proposer (118n8)." Furthermore, there is no known comparable example, where a treaty is renewed by erasing a part of the original text. The normal procedure would be add a text of the renewal to the bottom of the stone (Smart 1972:144-5).

Also of note is the use of *αἰδῖος*, "everlasting, forever." Like the alliance between the Sybarites and the Serdaians, these are conceived of as everlasting political arrangements. This is in contrast to the alliances of the Elians and Euans, or the Anaitoi and Metapioi, which had specified expiration dates, or the Athenian alliances with Chalcis and Phaselis, which made no mention of chronological limits. On this point, Meritt directs us to the speech of Hermocrates of Syracuse in 424, urging his fellow Sicilians to enter into eternal alliances, or at least arrangements "for as long a term as possible."<sup>444</sup>

In the final years of the 430s, it may have been obvious to many in the Greek world that Athens and Sparta were edging ever closer to war. Thus Meiggs and Lewis suggest that Rhegion and Leontini may have sought a defensive alliance with Athens: they feared that Athens' preoccupation with Sparta would give Syracuse the freedom to expand her power in Sicily and southern Italy.<sup>445</sup> For her part, Athens needed to secure support in Sicily in order to prevent Syracuse and the other Dorian cities from sending aid to the Peloponnesians.

To study these treaties is particularly useful because Thucydides shows us how they eventually played out. In 427, at war with Syracuse, Leontini called on her Athenian allies:

ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμπαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ζύμμαχοι κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ζυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς: ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς εἵργοντο καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἶη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχέρινα γενέσθαι. καταστάντες οὖν ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ζυμμάχων.

Having sent an embassy to the Athenians, the allies of the Leontinians persuaded them to send ships to them, as it was in accordance with the ancient alliance and because they were Ionians; for they were being besieged by the Syracusans by land and sea. And the Athenians sent the ships, with their common descent as the excuse, but in fact they did not want wheat to be sent from there to the Peloponnesus, and wished to see if they had the power to control affairs in Sicily. So, after establishing themselves at Rhegion in Italy, they prosecuted the war with their allies.

The alliance was mutually beneficial, even though the parties were of radically different abilities.

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444 Meritt 1946:88; Thuc. 4.63.1. Meritt argues that this was spurred on by Athens' eternal alliances with Rhegion and Leontini.

445 ML 63 p.172-3.

Of course, we do not know what was contained in the missing section of the treaties, but we find no evidence of threats, punishments, or curses.<sup>446</sup> The oath in the Leontini text is exactly the same for both parties. Both in the text and in the course of events, the Rhegians and Leontinians were treated, if not as equals, at least as true allies.

This situation did not last. An Athenian reinforcement fleet, sent in 425, was delayed by events at Pylos. By the time it arrived, the Sicilians had made peace amongst themselves, and Athenians returned home.<sup>447</sup> In 422, the elites of Leontini called in the Syracusans to put down and expel the local demos. Eventually, the Athenians sent Phaeax, son of Erasistratus as an ambassador, to see if he might be able to restore the Leontine demos, but he was unsuccessful.<sup>448</sup> Syracuse's depopulation of Leontini was one of the Athenian justifications for the major invasion of the island in 415.<sup>449</sup> The Rhegians, however, refused to participate in the war.<sup>450</sup> As Thucydides records it, the Athenians did not refer to their alliance with the Rhegians, but instead called on them to help their Leontine kinsmen.<sup>451</sup>

Although the earliest examples are very fragmentary, in general these Athenian *psephismata* might record the oath in which they swore to not interfere with the citizens of the

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446 But see Bolmarcich 2010:116, who uses this treaty as an example to show that, "generally speaking, fifth-century Greek treaties take the approach of the Elis-Heraea treaty, depending on oaths and external penalties for their enforcement...The strength of the treaty depends on the strong, abstract (although not affective) language of the oath used by the Athenians and the Leontini." I would respond that, in fact, the two treaties are very different: the Elis-Heraea/Eua treaty is limited in time, has no invocation of the gods or oath, and is enforced by a fine; the Athens Rhegion/Leontini treaties begin with "θέοι," contain an oath, and have no other obvious enforcement or punishment.

447 Thuc. 3.115; 4.65.

448 Thuc. 5.4.

449 Thuc. 6.6.2.

450 Thuc. 6.44.3.

451 6.44.3: καὶ πρὸς [τε] τοὺς Ῥηγίνοις λόγους ἐποίησαντο, ἀξιοῦντες Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Χαλκιδεῦσιν οὕσι Λεοντίνους βοηθεῖν. (And to the Rhegians [the Athenians] said that, as they consider themselves Chalcidians, they should help the Leontines, who are Chalcidians.)

subject state. In exchange, the subject state pledged to never abandon, or revolt against, Athens, to pay the *phoros*, and to help the Athenian *demos* in times of need. Such decrees allowed Athens to claim a high degree of control over her subjects/allies. They were vague enough that Athens could justify intervention whenever necessary. The treaties between Athens and her allies became instruments of control, rather than a means to a mutually satisfactory end. Intervention in another state was hardly new to the Greek world: Sparta had a tradition of removing tyrants from other cities and replacing them with friendly oligarchs.

Whether or not this new use of binding agreements was a conscious decision by some party or individual within Athens, it seems clear that the change was necessary for the maintenance of the Delian League. The ability of the League to protect the Greeks from Persia was based on naval power. From the Athenian perspective, the easiest and most effective way to maintain this navy was through the regular extraction of *phoros* (instead of ships and crews) from the League members.<sup>452</sup> Based on the disastrous outcome of the Ionian Revolt, the Athenians must have realized that the navy could only be successfully employed if it was controlled by a single hegemon.<sup>453</sup> Both factors led Athens to adopt policies that had only been used in the Greek world by one previous power: the Achaemenid Persian empire.<sup>454</sup> Some of the traits mentioned above, which were "innovations" of the Athenians (collection of *phoros*, enacting legislation binding for the entire league), and additional measures, such as the destruction of cities and enslavement of populations, and the garrisoning of cities, all were

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452 Not all League members were equal. Chios, Lesbos, Thasos, and Samos (probably Naxos as well), at first, contributed manned ships. As time went on, Athens compelled Thasos, Naxos, and Samos to give up their ships after their unsuccessful attempts at rebellion. Chios maintained her fleet at least until 411. Mytilene, the main city on Lesbos, was forced to give up her fleet after a rebellion in 428/7, but Lesbos did contribute ships to the Sicilian campaign in 415. Other members were required to give *phoros*, although it is not evident that they were refused the option to contribute men and ships instead. See Aristotle, *Const. Ath.* 24.2, Plut. *Arist.* 24, Thuc. 1.96, 1.101.3; Gomme 1945:272n96.1, Meyer 1963:440-5, Robertson 1980:69-73.

453 Goldman 2011:162.

454 Raaflaub 2009.

characteristic of Achaemenid imperial practice.

Naturally, no Athenian would ever openly acknowledge that they were the successors of the Achaemenids.<sup>455</sup> It is impossible for a modern historian to determine whether or not the Athenians consciously adopted Persian methods, or if it is simply the case that both Athens and Persia made similar administrative decisions because they were faced with similar problems and needs. However, what can be said is that some Greeks were very aware of Persian practices and how effective they were. Herodotus, for example, gives a detailed description of the Persian tribute system.<sup>456</sup> Later, he describes how, in the aftermath of the Ionian Revolt, Artaphernes reached a settlement with the Ionian *poleis* that included a reassessment of tribute for those cities, which, Herodotus says, has remained unchanged "down to the present day."<sup>457</sup>

If we take Herodotus literally, we must believe that Artaphernes' reassessment provided the model for Aristides' assignment of *phoros* to the League member states.<sup>458</sup> This was likely motivated by the need to begin collecting *phoros* as soon as possible. There is no reason to believe that there was any significant changes to Ionian agricultural productivity in the two decades between Artaphernes and Aristides, so there was no need for a reassessment.<sup>459</sup> By adopting this efficient method of administration, Aristides was able to complete his work in

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455 However, Margaret Miller argues that the allies were required to deliver their *phoros* to Athens during the Great Dionysia so that Athens would have it in time for the campaign season. Since the Sanctuary of Dionysos was immediately to the east of the Odeion, she argues that, "in producing the Odeion [which supposedly resembled Xerxes' tent], the Athenians deliberately adopted a building type developed in Iran to convey a specific message of imperial majesty for the Persian kings; and they modified it slightly to make it buildable using Greek construction methods. Resonating against its Persian models, it is a proud statement of empire." (Miller 1997:241)

456 Hdt. 3.89-97; Herodotus' tribute list is, of course, Hellenocentric, but otherwise "must be considered reliable." (Briant 2002:392)

457 Hdt. 6.42.

458 Plut. *Arist.* 24.

459 Evans 1976:347-8. The clearest example of the similarity between the Delian League and the Achaemenid empire is the system of tribute (see for example Picard 1980:187-90; Wallinga 1989), but these similarities may be nothing more than the desire for speed and efficiency, as Evans shows.

under a year.<sup>460</sup>

Herodotus also reports that, in 492, the year after Artaphernes reached his settlement with the Ionians, the general Mardonius also went to Ionia and replaced the tyrants with democracies.<sup>461</sup> This was not because he or the Great King had any preference for democracy over tyranny, but because it was assumed that the citizens of these *poleis* would bear Persian ruler easier (and therefore deliver their tribute more willingly) if their internal constitutions were more to their liking. This is the same offer that Mardonius makes to the Athenians themselves, through the mediation of Alexander of Macedon, in 480.<sup>462</sup>

Since, as we shall see, the Achaemenids had established the long-standing precedent of 'tolerance' of local constitutional traditions in Ionia by the time of the formation of the Delian League, it is possible that the Ionian states had grown to expect similar treatment from any ruling power. If that was the case, then we can assume that the Ionians would have insisted that the Athenians show them 'tolerance' as well. According to Diodorus, Aristeides did not simply establish the constitution of the Delian League by fiat; rather, "through discussion (*κοινολογία*), he won over the *poleis*, and by his personal interaction with them, he brought them over to the Athenians."<sup>463</sup> Furthermore, after the initial foundation of the League, the Athenians "led the autonomous allies, who deliberated in a common council."<sup>464</sup> Since the Athenians were now,

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460 Aristotle *Const. Ath.* 23.5: διὸ καὶ τοὺς φόρους οὗτος ἦν ὁ τάξας ταῖς πόλεσιν τοὺς πρώτους, ἔτει τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν, ἐπὶ Τιμοσθένους ἄρχοντος; Meiggs 1972:58 shows that this would mean that Aristeides completed his task in approximately nine months.

461 Hdt. 6.43: τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπαύσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλιας.

462 Hdt. 8.140a.1-2; Likewise, despite the general assumption that the Delian League promoted democracy throughout the Greek world, positive evidence for which is largely fourth-century rhetoric, the Athenians of the fifth century generally tolerated foreign constitutions, intervening only when it was the right strategic move. (Brock 2009:149-166)

463 11.44.6.

464 Thuc 1.97.1.

consciously or otherwise, adopting some Persian methods of administration, the expectations of their subjects may have encouraged them to adopt a similar policy of accommodation of native practices.<sup>465</sup>

It is in this way that the Athenian *psephismata* were, in function, less like traditional Greek treaties, and more like Near Eastern examples. In form, while undergoing some evolution, Greek treaties never took on the religious imperial strategy used by the Neo-Assyrians; such a notion would have been inconceivable in the Greek world. The gods, when mentioned, generally feature only briefly; sometimes the single word "θεοί" is found at the top of the inscription, invoking those deities who protect treaties, without naming them or the penalties that will befall violators.<sup>466</sup> Curses are often not found in the inscriptions; while one could speculate that this may be due to the state of the inscriptions themselves, rather than a reflection of Greek practice at the time, some of the complete inscriptions<sup>467</sup> make no mention of a curse. Fines, loss of civic rights (ἀτιμία; ἄτιμος εἶναι<sup>468</sup>), execution, and other legal punishments for violations are quite

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465 We must not let ourselves take this reasoning too far. The Delian League/Athenian Empire was, in many ways, fundamentally different from the Achaemenid Empire. For example: the members of the Delian League were Athens' allies, coerced though they sometimes were. The Achaemenids made no such pretense. The Delian League members kept their original territories, and were not grouped into imperial districts. In contrast, the Achaemenid empire was divided into satrapies, based on pre-existing political entities.

466 e.g. Bengston no. 163, an alliance between Athens and Leontinoi, 433/2. This does not mean that the gods were not involved in the administration of the League. One sixtieth of the tribute was set aside for Athena (see Fornara 1983:83), and, by 425/4, all of the allies sent a cow and a panoply of armor to the Great Panathenaia, symbolically feeding and defending the city (Fornara 1983:136, Barron 1964:47). The importance of this forced contribution is shown in *IG I<sup>3</sup> 34 = ML 46* lines 41-3, which states that a failure to send the cow and panoply will be treated in the same way as if they had failed to send the *phoros* (Meiggs 1972:165-6).

467 *ML 17*, Bengston nos. 111, 120 above are short, but nevertheless complete, and make no mention of any curse.

468 Ἄτιμος can mean "dishonored," especially with respect to the dead (as at *Thuc. 3.58.5*, Sophocles *Electra* 1214). In a legal context, it originally meant "outlawry," in the sense that a person who was *atimos* was outside of the protections of the law, and could be killed with impunity (Phillips 2013:41-2, citing *Dem. 9.42-4* among several other examples). In the regulations recorded in inscriptions, it may refer to the loss of the rights of a citizen, including the right to enter the assembly, courts, or other political spaces, or to hold a magistracy. There was also the possibility of partial *atimia*, wherein certain crimes would result in the exclusion from only some aspects of civic life, but not all. Additionally, *atimos* still carries the force of "loss of honor" in such technical cases, and thus the reality of the punishment could be influenced by the social status (and the associated notions of honor) of the person being punished, as well as the specific crime. See van't Wout 2011, Wallace 1998:65-7, Allen 1997:128-9, Hansen 1976:60-1.



common. Let us revisit the reciprocal oaths between Athen and Chalcis:

κατὰ τάδε τὸν ἡόρκον ὁμόσαι Ἀθηναίων τὲν βολὲν καὶ τὸς δικαστάς· οὐκ ἔχσελθῶ Χαλκιδέας ἐχ  
Χαλκίδος οὐδὲ τὲν πόλιν ἀνάστατον ποέσο οὐδὲ ἰδιότεν οὐδένα ἀτιμόσο οὐδὲ φυγεὶ ζεμιόσο οὐδὲ  
χσυλλέφομαι οὐδὲ ἀποκτενῶ οὐδὲ χρέματα ἀφαιρέσομαι ἀκρίτο οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τῷ δέμο τῷ  
Ἀθηναίων, οὐδὲ ἐπιφεριῶ κατὰ ἀπροσκλέτοοῦτε κατὰ τῷ κοινῷ οὔτε κατὰ ἰδιότο οὐδὲ ἑνός, καὶ  
πρεσβειαν ἐλθῶσαν προσάχσο πρὸς βολὲν καὶ δέμον δέκα ἑμερῶν ὅταν πρυτανεῦο κατὰ τῷ  
δυνατόν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπ[ε]δόσο Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τῷ δέ[μ]οι τῷ Ἀθηναίων.

The oath shall be taken as follows by the Athenian Boule and the dikasts: 'I shall not deport Chalcidians from Chalcis or devastate the city or deprive any individual of his rights or punish him with exile or imprison him or kill him or take property from anyone unheard in trial without (the concurrence of) the People of the Athenians. I shall not have a vote taken, without summons to attend trial, against either the government or any private individual whatever. When an embassy has arrived, I shall introduce it to the Boule and People within ten days when I hold the prytany, to the best of my power. This I shall guarantee the Chalcidians if they obey the People of the Athenians.'<sup>469</sup>

κατὰ τάδε Χαλκιδέας ὁμόσαι· οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέσομαι ἀπὸ τῷ [δ]έμο τῷ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε τέ[χ]νει οὔτε  
μεχανῆι οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδὲ ἐπει οὐδὲ ἔργοι οὐδὲ τῷ ἀφισταμένοι πείσομαι, καὶ ἔαν ἀφιστεῖ τις κατερῶ  
Ἀθηναίοισι, καὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελῶ Ἀθηναίοισιν, ὃν ἂν πείθο Ἀθηναίος, καὶ χσύμμαχος ἔσομαι  
ὅιος ἂν δύνομαι ἄριστος καὶ δικαιοτάτος καὶ τῷ δέμοι Ἀθηναίων βοεθέσο καὶ ἀμυνῶ, ἔαν τις  
ἀδικεῖ τὸν δέμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πείσομαι τῷ δέμοι τῷ Ἀθηναίων.

The Chalcidians shall take the following oath: 'I shall not rebel against the People of the Athenians either by artifice or by device of any kind either by word or by deed. Nor shall I follow anyone in rebellion and if anyone does rebel, I shall denounce him to the Athenians. I shall pay the tribute to the Athenians which persuade them (to assess), and as an ally I shall be the best and truest possible. And I shall assist the People of the Athenians and defend them if anyone does injury to the People of the Athenians, and I shall obey the People of the Athenians.'<sup>470</sup>

There is no mention of the gods, nor of any divine retribution or curse. This inscription is in very good condition, so we are not missing significant sections of the text. The only obvious role of the gods in the enforcement of the agreement is that, if someone does not take the oath, his property is to be confiscated and a tenth is to be given to the temple of Olympian Zeus.

When curses have survived to today, they are rarely more than a few lines. This may have been sufficient to make potential oath-breakers think twice, but was hardly comparable to the pages of elaborate curses that could enforce Neo-Assyrian oaths. For example, the oath sworn by the people of Colophon to Athens in c. 450:

.....[fragmentary][Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλο καὶ τὲν Δέμετρα, καὶ εἰ μὲν ταῦτ[α] παραβ[α]ίνουμι]

469 *IG I<sup>3</sup> 40 3-16*; p.113 above.

470 *IG I<sup>3</sup> 40 21-32*.

ἐξόλες εἶεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ γ[έ]νος τὸ ἐμὸν [ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, εὐορκῶντι δὲ εἶε] μοι  
πολλὰ καὶ [ἀγαθὰ].  
...Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; and if I should violate this [oath], may I and my offspring be  
utterly destroyed for all time; but if I keep it well, may I have much that is good.<sup>471</sup>

We are driven to ask how "seriously" the Greeks took their own treaties. That is, whether or not they felt that it was important to obey the terms of a treaty, or if it was acceptable to violate the terms if circumstances changed, or simply if an opportunity presented itself. After all, there was no sovereign entity with acknowledged legitimacy that could enforce "international law" in the ancient world, and no higher power to appeal to in the event of a treaty violation, except the gods. The fact that treaties were so prevalent suggests that they were deemed useful. Given the life expectancy of even "eternal" treaties, however, one wonders what precisely that use was.

The events that lead to the outbreak of the first, "Archidamian" phase of the Peloponnesian War in 431 provide an excellent opportunity to examine the use of binding agreements amongst several Greek states, and for this reason we will in the following discuss this episode in some detail.

In c. 445, Athens made a thirty years' peace treaty with Sparta and her allies. Although we do not possess a single text that provides a complete and exact treatment of this agreement, based on speeches in Thucydides and an inscription reported by Pausanias, we can reconstruct the following five terms of the peace:<sup>472</sup>

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471 Bengtson no. 145, 52–55; see Lonis 1980. Note that this self-curse is almost exactly the same as that which enforces the oath of the Athenian Heliasts, as reported by Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates* 24.151:

ἐπομύναται Δία, Ποσειδῶ, Δήμητρα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶσθαι ἐξώλειαν ἑαυτῶ καὶ οἰκία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, εἴ τι τούτων παραβαίνοι, εὐορκῶντι δὲ πολλὰ κάγαθὰ εἶναι.

[The jurors] swear by Zeus, Poseidon, and Demeter, and call down curses upon themselves, that they and their houses shall be destroyed if they transgress this [oath] in some way, but if they swear truly, they will have many good things.

See also Konstantinidou 2014:38-9 on references to similar self-curses in Lycurgus, Andocides, and Aeschines.

472 Bengtson 1962:75–6.

1. Athens will give up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia (in the Peloponnesus and Megarid).<sup>473</sup>
2. Athens will respect the autonomy of all Greek *poleis*.<sup>474</sup>
3. Disputes between the parties are to be settled through arbitration (δίκας; also: λόγοις τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι).<sup>475</sup>
4. Any Hellenic state that is neutral shall be free to join whichever side it pleases.<sup>476</sup>
5. The terms of the peace are to be engraved and displayed.<sup>477</sup>

For six years, the truce held strong. Then, with a conflict between Corcyra and Corinth in 435-3, a series of regional disputes threatened to end the peace and drag Athens, Sparta, and all the allies into war. Corcyra and Corinth fought over control of their joint colony, Epidamnus. Corcyra sent ambassadors to Athens seeking aid, while Corinth sent ambassadors to Athens telling them to not get involved. The Corcyreans presented four arguments for Athenian intervention:

1. Since the Corcyreans are both a regional power and the victims of injustice, it is not only morally right that Athens should come to her aid, it is sound strategy, as Corcyra would "freely deliver themselves, without any danger or cost," to the Athenians out of gratitude.
2. It was inevitable that war would break out between Athens and Sparta very soon, so it was best to preemptively weaken Corinth, a Spartan ally.
3. Corcyra is situated so as to control the passage of reinforcements and supplies between Sicily, Italy, and the Peloponnesus.
4. If Corinth were to capture the Corcyraean navy, the second largest in the Greek world,

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473 Thuc. 1.115

474 At Thuc. 1.67, the Aeginetans complain that the Athenians were not respecting their autonomy as per the treaty (...λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς). It is unlikely that Sparta, in 445, would have specifically demanded that Athens respect the autonomy of Aegina and no other states. It is more likely that Sparta insisted on a clause ensuring the general autonomy of all Greek states. Megaran complaints over restricted access to Athenian ports probably also fell within the scope of this autonomy clause.

475 Thuc. 1.140.2.

476 Thuc. 1.35; Paus. 5.23.4.

477 Paus. 5.23.4.

Corinth would possess combined forces larger than the Athenian navy.<sup>478</sup>

They also added four points to counter any Athenian fears of violating interstate law:

1. Corcyra was forced to seek help from Athens, because Corinth has violated Corcyrean autonomy, and refused arbitration concerning Epidamnus.
2. An Athenian alliance with Corcyra would not violate the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace, as "it was stated in that very peace that any of the unaligned Hellenic *poleis* may go to whichever side it pleased her."
3. With Corinth drawing manpower from not just her own lands but from throughout Greece, it was unjust that Athens should allow her enemy to use men from Athenian territory against Corcyra.
4. If the Athenians wanted to make an alliance with Corcyra, but refused only because of the fear to break the truce, they ought to know that the alliance would make them strong enough to take on the enemy; their remaining weak, however, would not make their enemies back down from war.<sup>479</sup>

The Corinthian ambassadors countered with their own arguments:

1. Corcyra is only unaligned because her conduct is such that no one would want an alliance with her.
2. Corcyra, a Corinthian colony, has become too proud of her wealth and refuses to show the respect owed to a mother city.
3. Corcyra offered arbitration only after discovering that they could not easily control Epidamnus by force.
4. While it is true that unaligned cities may join whichever side they will, that article cannot be applied to a *polis* that is defecting from another party to the treaty; since Corcyra is hostile to Corinth, Athens cannot make an alliance with Corcyra without opening hostilities with Corinth; further, if Athens supports those who rebel from other states, surely Athens' subject states will seek aid to rebel from her.

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478 Thuc. 1.33; 1.36.3; Stadter 1983:131.

479 Thuc. 1.27.1; 1.34-36.5.

5. Corinth had respected Athens' right to punish her rebellious subjects Aegina and Samos.<sup>480</sup>

The Athenian assembly sided with Corcyra, but they only agreed to an *epimachia*, a defensive alliance. Thucydides (1.44) gives their reasons for doing so:

1. An *epimachia* was not a breach of the treaty, as it would not require Athens to join a Corcyrean offensive against Corinth;
2. Since a war with the Peloponnesian League was inevitable, Athens could not let Corinth capture Corcyra's fleet. It would be even better if Corinth and Corcyra weakened each other, ensuring that neither would be a threat;
3. Corcyra was indeed a convenient waypoint on the route to Sicily and Italy.<sup>481</sup>

Thucydides does not report that the Athenian assembly was interested in morality or fairness, but they were clearly torn between the desire to strengthen their empire and prepare for the coming war, and maintaining the terms of the treaty. They decided that an *epimachia* allowed them to thread the needle between two unfavorable outcomes.<sup>482</sup>

In 432, more fuel was thrown on the fire, this time as a result of conflicts over Potidaea. After Athens laid siege to Potidaea, with Corinthian troops inside, Corinth called the Peloponnesian allies to Sparta for a council. There, before the Spartan assembly, the League members debated whether the truce had been broken or not.

The Corinthian ambassador reminded the Spartans of Athens' actions at Corcyra and Potidaea, but most of all, they stressed that Athens' power and hubris was growing as a result of Spartan inaction. It was Sparta's duty to protect Potidaea. Even though this would technically break the treaty, "we will not be seen as acting unjustly by the gods of the oath, nor by the men

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480 Thuc. 1.35-41.

481 Thuc. 1.44.

482 Stadter 1983:134.

who acted as witnesses; for a truce is broken not by those who, having been abandoned, attach themselves to others, but by those who do not aid their confederates."<sup>483</sup>

Athenian representatives merely reminded the Spartans of Athens' contributions during the Persian wars, which therefore entitled her to an empire (ἀρχή). She has acted as any rational state would, and, in fact, better than the Spartans would. Lastly, the Athenians encouraged the Spartans not to risk war, but instead submit to arbitration, as per the truce.<sup>484</sup> In response, despite King Archidamus' moderation and caution, the Spartans decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and that it was necessary to go to war at once.<sup>485</sup> Thus the Thirty Years' Peace was broken, fourteen years after it was signed.

From this brief analysis, we can see that all parties took the maintenance of the Thirty-Years' Peace very seriously. They were apparently concerned with observing the terms to the agreement, or at least with appearing to be observing the terms. The continuation of the peace was so important that all wanted to behave as if the truce were in effect even after blood had been spilled. There was, however, evident disagreement over how to interpret the terms of the truce and what constituted a breach of the truce.

We must also be clear on what each side expected to achieve through this agreement. In both 451 and 445, after making peace with Sparta, Athens used the opportunity to expand her own power through force. Athens signed the Thirty Years' Peace only after King Pleistoanax's invasion of Attica forced Pericles to cut short his campaigns in Euboea.<sup>486</sup> The Peace was not intended to create peace; rather, it served Athens to ensure that war would not strike close to home. The Spartans, likewise, only invaded Attica in 445 because of recent Athenian gains

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483 Thuc. 1.71.

484 Thuc. 1.73-8.

485 Thuc. 1.87.

486 Thuc. 1.114-5.

nearby in the Megarid. In 432, the Athenian ambassadors attempted to dissuade Sparta from declaring war not through legal or moral arguments, but by warning of the unpredictable and potentially disastrous effects of war. Sparta did effectively nothing to slow the spread of Athenian power between 478 and 445. In fact, when Megabazus the Persian arrived in Sparta in 454 to bribe the Spartans into invading Attica, they refused.<sup>487</sup> The Peace broke down only when Sparta's allies, who were more directly harmed by Athenian aggression, forced her into action.

Thus, the Thirty Years' Peace serves as a representative example of the Greek treaty in action. *Poleis* almost always used treaties as a means for securing temporary peace, cooperation, or non-aggression. The gods were invoked to preserve an agreement, but only rarely were they called upon to destroy violators. Given the fluctuations inherent to the Greek political world, and the relative equality of most of the players, it is not surprising that treaties were not weaponized in a way that would have been familiar to a Neo-Assyrian diplomat. Even when Athens learned to use treaties to control the behavior of her subjects, she did so only within the League. With the states outside of her grasp, traditional, temporary, bilateral treaties remained the rule.

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487 Thuc. 1.109.

## 6. Peace Treaties and Achaemenid Imperial Strategy

Before turning our attention to the discussion of Achaemenid imperial strategy, we will briefly recapitulate our analysis of binding agreements and treaties in the Ancient Near Eastern and the Greek world.

1. The Neo-Assyrian kings used treaties to bind vassals to their empire. In these treaties, the vassal king—and his gods—were forced to acknowledge Aššur's superiority. A pantheon of Assyrian and foreign gods served as witnesses to the agreement, and as enforcers of the oath. The agreement was deemed to be eternal; as such, any deviation from the terms of the agreement at any time could be interpreted as a violation of the oath. Hence, an Assyrian military reaction was justified as a manifestation of divine punishment for the oath breaker. In this way, treaties served to: (a) incorporate subject states into the Assyrian cosmology in a submissive role; and (b) provide legitimacy for stripping vassals of all autonomy in the future.
2. The evidence from the Neo-Babylonian period is too sparse to make solid conclusions, but it is possible that the Neo-Babylonians bound their vassals with oaths similar to those of the Neo-Assyrians. We also argued that while Greek contact with the Hittites or Phoenicians resulted in the spread of some Near Eastern religious and legal concepts to the Greek world, there is no evidence that Greek treaty traditions were inspired by Near Eastern precedent.
3. Next, we argued that Achaemenid Persians, having been exposed over centuries to the Mesopotamian and Elamite milieu, ought to have been familiar with Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian imperial practices. Literary evidence shows that the Persians



claimed to be their heirs of the Neo-Assyrian empire, and as such adopted certain aspects of Neo-Assyrian ideology as their own.

4. Finally, we saw how in Greece, interstate binding agreements were likewise witnessed and upheld by the gods. Treaties served to establish an agreement or relationship between states, but the agreement was frequently set to expire after a number of years. Traditionally, even in agreements between states of unequal power, autonomy was not violated. However, during the fifth century, Athens introduced the practice of using decrees to control the internal and external relations of her so-called allies, reflecting Athens' hegemonic role in Greece, as well as possible Achaemenid influence.

How did these traditions factor into the Persian decision to make treaties with Athens and Sparta? We will investigate the Peace of Callias, the Peace of Epilycus, the treaties between Sparta and Cyrus the Younger of 412-11, and the King's Peace. To our knowledge, the Persians did not make use of formal treaties with other states.<sup>488</sup> If this is indeed the case, we must look elsewhere in the ancient world to determine how the Persians conceived of treaties.

## ***6a. Achaemenid Royal Ideology and Imperial Administration***

It has been suggested that the ideology of the Persian monarchy did not allow the Great King to enter into a treaty with another party.<sup>489</sup> After all, the Great King of Persia conquered his

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488 Diodorus reports an alliance between Xerxes and the Carthaginians, in which Xerxes would invade Greece at the same time that Carthage would invade Sicily and Italy (11.1.4; 11.20.1). However, along with most modern scholars, I reject the historicity of this alliance, as it is more intelligible as part of the broader program under the Sicilian tyrants Hieron and Gelon to synchronize their struggles for power with the 'pan-Hellenic' struggles against The Barbarian. See Gauthier 1966; Harrell 2006; Treves 1941; Zahmt 1993.

489 Badian 1987:27–8; Martin 1963:230–1. In reality, of course, it was necessary for the King to secure the loyalty of his most important subjects through rewards and gifts; in this sense, the king was tied to members of the elite by the obligation to provide estates and luxuries, as well as access to the King. But even in such cases, the

empire and ruled not through binding agreements, but through the greatness of Ahuramazdā, who had bestowed the kingship upon him, and placed the various countries into his hands.<sup>490</sup> Because the King ruled according to righteousness, the will of the King was the will of Ahuramazdā.<sup>491</sup> The polities conquered by the Persian emperors were completely absorbed into the imperial structure as satrapies or vassal kingdoms, and were in no way independent.<sup>492</sup> However, the form of Persian rule allowed for the adoption and continuation of local customs. This is demonstrated in documentary evidence from Egypt, Judah, Babylon, and Asia Minor, and is echoed by the Greek historical sources.

How far did this policy extend? What sorts of traditions did the Persians adopt? While the 'tolerance' of local traditions is a hallmark of the Achaemenid empire, its nature is still very controversial. We may recall that the use of treaties by the Assyrian empire was an extension of their religious policy, as a treaty served to bind a state to the Assyrians with an oath enforced by

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transaction was not staged as a reciprocal exchange between two equal and consenting parties. Certainly, no subject, no matter how close to the King, could demand a gift, complain about the value of gifts received (see the fate of the greedy Carian after the battle of Cunaxa: Plut. *Art.* 14.3–4), or expect to get anything that was contrary to the King's will (see the fate of Pythius, who asked Xerxes to excuse one of his sons from military service: Hdt 7.29–39). Ultimately, the King used his power to give superior gifts to his subjects, thus putting them into a debt that they could not hope to pay off. Inasmuch as the King was obliged to give gifts, he did so only on his own terms and for his own benefit, in transactions that served not to reward past loyalty, but to commit the recipient to obedience in the future. And of course, these exchanges were never legally ratified and written out as a treaty (Briant 2002:316–19).

According to Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 14 (40–2), Megabyzos, Artaxerxes I's son-in-law, went into rebellion after the reconquest of Egypt. With Artarios, satrap of Babylon, acting as a mediator, Megabyzos and the King agreed to make a treaty (σπείσασθαι) and be at peace. Considering the treatment of rebellious satraps and generals in other circumstances (namely, brutal execution), it is impossible to believe that Artaxerxes would let Megabyzos live, let alone forgive him and sign a peace treaty with him (Briant 2002:577–8). However, see Brosius 2012, who treats the story as historical.

490 DB §5-9: "King Darius says: by the greatness of Ahuramazdā I am king. Ahuramazdā bestowed rulership upon me. King Darius says: these are the lands which came to me; by the greatness of Ahuramazdā I am their king...By the greatness of Ahuramazdā they were my loyal subjects. They bore me tribute. That which I would say to them, that they would do, by day and night."

491 DB §63: "King Darius says: for this reason Ahuramazdā and the other gods who are bore me aid: because neither I nor my family are disloyal, nor liars, nor evil-doers. I abided by rectitude. I did evil neither to the weak nor to the mighty. The man who worked hard for my house, that man I rewarded well. He who did harm, him I punished thoroughly."

492 Note the iconography of the enthroned king, supported by tiers of subjects, as seen at Persepolis and Naqš-e Rostam.

the gods, sometimes the gods of both parties. A violation of the treaty terms initiated an Assyrian invasion, which served as a worldly manifestation of divine punishment. A successful Assyrian campaign ended with the local divinities abandoning their traditional worshippers, and coming of their own accord into the ordered realm of Aššur.

In this section, we will investigate the true nature of Persian religious and legal policy, and then ask whether it might be possible that this policy was in any way influenced by their Neo-Assyrian predecessors. To the extent that we can speak of a "religious" policy in isolation from other aspects of imperial rule,<sup>493</sup> we have seen that Neo-Assyrian beliefs about cosmology and the role of the king with respect to the gods played an important role in their ideological conception of the empire. This ideology was manifested in some techniques of rule, such as the rituals surrounding the signing of a treaty, or the capture and return of divine statues. Considering the similarities between Neo-Assyrian and Achaemenid religious policies, as well as evidence that the Achaemenids saw themselves as worthy successors of the Assyrians, and consciously appropriated various aspects of Assyrian imperial culture, we will argue that the Achaemenids' understanding of the role of treaties in their empire was modeled on the Assyrian precedent.

## ***6b. Regional Examples***

As we have already seen, the evidence suggests that the Achaemenid Persian state was born in a process of Persian-Elamite interaction. This may have laid the foundation for two

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<sup>493</sup> In the Achaemenid empire, as elsewhere in the ancient world, there was no distinction between the religious and the mundane. Thus all ideological statements were phrased using the vocabulary of the gods and man's relationship to those gods. All policies were in accord with the cosmological understanding of the ruling dynasty, and so, properly speaking, one cannot truly separate an Achaemenid "religious policy" from their "legal policy."

aspects of Persian imperial religious policy. First, the Persians, from their very origin, were forced to learn to interact with members of a different religious community and to incorporate them amicably within the state. Second, because the Elamites were so heavily influenced by Mesopotamian culture, this culture was passed on to the Persians. Whatever the reality of the Median 'state,' they too may have carried a knowledge of Mesopotamian practice to the Persians.

In what follows, we will examine four models that claim to describe the nature of the interaction between Achaemenid administration and local legal traditions. Since we are primarily concerned with Achaemenid interaction with mainland Greece, a region outside of the Achaemenid administration, Achaemenid use of local tradition within the empire may appear irrelevant. However, we must investigate Persian treatment of local legal traditions to try and discover the extent to which such traditions were accepted and even used by the Persians. This evidence could provide us with a precedent for Persia's diplomatic interaction with the Greeks outside of the empire, specifically their use of treaties.

The following four models of Achaemenid imperial administration cover a spectrum, ranging from near-total autonomy at the local level, to total control by the central powers. This is not intended to be a presentation of all such theories, but rather a brief display of some possible interpretations of the nature of the empire.

1. M.A. Dandamaev's 'local autonomy' model argues that "on the whole the Persian administration made no attempts to establish a total control over the population at all... The state did not interfere in their private life, daily affairs, and interrelations between the various members of the society, if only the laws in a given country were not violated."<sup>494</sup> Because the Persian kings made few changes to local administrative practices, the result was an empire that was characterized by a diversity of legal

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494 Dandamaev 1999:280.

practices, languages, religions, and monetary systems, among others.

2. Next, Elspeth Dusinberre's 'authority-autonomy' model offers a more flexible understanding of the Achaemenid empire.<sup>495</sup> By considering both the needs of the empire and those of the locals, we can find points of intersection that may represent collaboration or conflict. Hence Dusinberre's investigation is organized according to categories of activity, not geography. For example, when we look at local Anatolian burial customs, we find that, in general, there was little change during the Achaemenid period, indicating that the locals made a conscious effort to maintain local traditions.<sup>496</sup> In contrast, the military institutions throughout Anatolia were rigidly controlled by Persians, and were designed not only to defend the realm but also to ensure the loyalty of the forces to the Great King, and to him alone. The use of local seals, discovered at administrative sites throughout Anatolia, represents a middle ground: we see that many (but not all) local elites chose to use seals that made use of "Achaemenid koine" iconography. This is a case where locals chose to "cite" Achaemenid power, suggesting that these elites had been co-opted by their rulers. Even though the use of such iconography was not required, the fact that Anatolian elites were allotted a limited range of representative models of official iconography suggests that this issue was regulated by, and important to, the Achaemenids, but not so to the extent as to prohibit all expressions of autonomy.<sup>497</sup> In sum, according to Dusinberre, we should not be asking which places or peoples were autonomous, but

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495 Dusinberre's study is limited to Asia Minor, but for the purposes of this investigation we shall entertain the possibility that it could apply to the entire empire.

496 2013:203–6.

497 2013:65–72.

what types of behaviors were granted autonomy, and in what contexts.<sup>498</sup>

3. Peter Frei formulated a model of "imperial authorization," in which local norms were collected, approved, and then projected back upon the subject people with the status of imperial law, in that particular locality. The various elite groups within the empire were permitted to maintain whatever internal legal traditions they had before the conquest. These native legal traditions were approved and enforced by Persian authorities in each satrapy.<sup>499</sup> While this model could, in theory, be applied to the entire empire, any particular law was binding only for the community, from which it was originally generated.<sup>500</sup> This process could be top-down, that is, initiated by the King or the local satrap, or bottom-up, when a local elite would solicit the King or satrap for authorization.<sup>501</sup> In Frei's model, the local elite leaders were not a separate entity from the central Achaemenid authority: since they had been absorbed into the empire, they were a sub-unit of the empire. Therefore, it was important for the central authority to protect and maintain the legal systems that allowed the local authorities to administer the region, as the central authorities "were not in a position to build quickly a complex and efficient administration that could be managed by its own members."<sup>502</sup>
4. Lisbeth Fried's "foreign or central control" model represents the opposite of Dandamaev's: where Dandamaev argues that the Achaemenids allowed a great deal of

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498 2013:107–8.

499 Frei and Koch, 1984; Frei 2001; Schmid 2007.

500 Compare DNa §3.2-10: "By the greatness of Ahuramazdā these are the lands which I seized in addition to Persia...The law which is mine, that held them."

501 An example of the top-down process can be found in Darius' collection of Egyptian law (Frei 2001:9–10); an example of the bottom-up process would be the Trilingual Inscription from the Letoon (Frei 2001:19–20).

502 Frei 2001:6.

autonomy, Fried argues that local autonomy existed only in spite of Achaemenid efforts at total control.<sup>503</sup> Even if local elites were given positions of authority, these men owed their positions to the King and to no one else, and could be removed at his whim.<sup>504</sup> Despite the Persians' reputation for religious tolerance, evidence from Egypt and the Greek world shows that Achaemenid kings were just as willing to destroy or neglect local temples as to support them, depending on the specific context.<sup>505</sup>

As always, we cannot prove that there was one unified policy for the Achaemenid empire, nor can we accurately chart any possible chronological development. The best that can be offered is an overview of the source material available. This is scattered unevenly across the Achaemenid era and landscape, so we are forced to focus on five regions of the empire: Persis (the Persian heartland), Western Asia Minor, Babylon, Judaea, and Egypt. As this dissertation is concerned with Greco-Persian diplomacy from the Persian Wars to the King's Peace, as much as possible we will not base our analysis on evidence from elsewhere in the empire dating to later periods.

## **Persis**

Modern Fars, OP *Pārsa*, is the homeland of the Achaemenid dynasty.<sup>506</sup> This region has left us two textual sources for the Achaemenid era: the royal inscriptions; and the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury archives.

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503 Fried 2004:50.

504 Fried 2004:47, 107.

505 Fried 2004:155.

506 For an introduction to the region, with sources, see Henkelman 2012.

*Royal Inscriptions:*

Six Achaemenid kings made inscriptions which are available today: Darius the Great, Xerxes, Artaxerxes I, Darius II, Artaxerxes II, and Artaxerxes III. Most are trilingual (Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian), although there are monolingual Old Persian examples as well.<sup>507</sup> One of Darius' inscriptions at Suez (DZc) has a fourth version in Egyptian. Most of the inscriptions are located in Southwestern Iran (Bisotun, Elvend, Naqš-e Rostam, Persepolis, Susa), two are located outside of Iran (DZc and XVa, near Lake Van), and an abridged Aramaic version of Darius' inscription at Bisotun (DB) also circulated in Babylonia and Egypt. The subject matter of the inscriptions largely consists of ideological justifications for the kings' rule. Only DB contains a specific historical narrative.

The message of the royal inscriptions is consistent and clear: the Achaemenid monarchy is a collaboration between the king and the god Ahuramazdā. He alone is named in most of the inscriptions, although he is sometimes invoked alongside "the other gods who are." Everything the king does is according to the will of Ahuramazdā (literally "greatness of Ahuramazdā" (*vašnā A<sup>h</sup>uramadāha*): "King Darius says: This which I made, all this I did by the greatness of Ahuramazdā. Ahuramazdā bore me aid until I accomplished these deeds."<sup>508</sup> In exchange for his piety, the king, his dynasty, and his realm are protected by Ahuramazdā against the three greatest evils: enemy invasions, famine, and the Lie.<sup>509</sup> The faithful will also be rewarded with happiness in this world and the next.<sup>510</sup> The Achaemenid inscriptions provide us with idealized images of both the king and his kingdom. The inscription of Darius at Naqš-e Rostam (DNb), a "mirror for princes," is worth quoting in detail:

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507 Schmitt 2009:7-32 lists all the known inscriptions and fragments.

508 DNa §5.

509 e.g. DSz §14; DPd §3.

510 e.g. DB §73, repeated at §76; XPf §6.



5-11: θātiy dārayavauš xšāyaθiya vašnā auramazdāhā avākaram amiy taya rāstam dau[št]ā amiy miθa na[i]y dauštā amiy na[imā] kāma taya skauθiš tunuvatahāyā rādiy miθa kəriyaiš naimā ava kāma taya t[u]nuvā skauθaiš rādiy miθa kəriyaiš

King Darius says: by the greatness of Ahuramazdā I am of such a sort that I am a friend of the right, I am not a friend of the wrong. It is not my desire that the weak might be wronged on account of the strong, nor is it my desire that the strong might be wronged on account of the weak.

11-15: taya rāstam ava mām kāma martiyam draujanam naiy daušt[ā] amiy naiy manauviš am[iy ya]cimaiy [pər]tanayā bavatiy dəršam dārayāmiy manahā uvaipašiyahyā dərša[m] xšayamna a[m]iy

That which is right, this is my desire. I am not a friend of the lying man; nor am I wrathful. Whatever comes in my mind in a conflict, I hold myself strongly with my intellect. I am strongly in control of myself.

16-21: martiya haya hataxšataiy anudim [ha]karta hāyā avaθādim paribarāmiy haya [v]ināθayatiy anudim vinastaha[yā] ava]θā pārsāmiy naimā kāma taya martiya vināθayaiš naipatimā ava kāma yadiy vināθayaiš naiy fraθiyaiš

The man who works hard, I reward him according to his good deed. The man who does wrong, I punish him according to his wrongdoing. It is not my desire that a man should do wrong, nor is it my desire that if he should do wrong, he would not be punished.

21-24: martiya taya patiy martiyam θātiy ava mām naiy vānavataiy yātā ubānām hadugām āxšnauvaiy

The man who speaks against another man, I do not believe him, until I hear the testimony of both.

24-27: martiya taya kunautiy yadivā ābaratiy anuv taumanišaiy xšnuta [bav]āmiy utā mām vasiy kāma utā u[θand]uš amiy utā vasiy dadāmiy agiryānām martiyānām

The man who is productive according to his strength, I am pleased with this and it is very much my desire, and I am happy and I give greatly to loyal men.

27-32: avākaramcamaiy ušiy u[t]ā framānā yaθāmai y taya karta vaināhāy [y]adi-vā āxšnāvāhāy utā viθiyā utā spāyatiyayā aitamaiy aruvastam upariy manašcā [u]šicā

And my understanding and command are of such a sort that you may see and hear that which I have done, both in my household and at the army-camp. This is my capability, in addition to my reason and understanding.

32-40: imapatimaiy aruvastam tayamaiy tanūš tāvayat[i]y hamaranakara a[m]iy ušhamaranakara hakarammai y ušiyā gā[θa]vā hištantiy yaciy va[i]nāmiy hamičiyam yaciy naiy vaināmiy utā ušībiyā utā framānāyā adakaiy fratara maniyaiy afuvāyā yadiy vaināmiy hamičiyam yaθā yadiy naiy vaināmiy

This too is my ability, that my body is powerful. As a fighter, I am a good fighter. Once my understanding stands in place, when I see a rebel, when I do not, both with my understanding and my command, at that time I think myself superior to fear, when I see a rebel or when I do not see a rebel.

40-45: yāumainiš amiy utā dastaibiyā utā pādaiyiyā asabāra uvasabāra amiy θanuvaniya uθanuvaniya amiy utā pastiš utā asabāra əršt[i]ka amiy uvərštika utā pastiš utā asabāra

I am in control both with my hands and my feet. As a horseman I am a good horseman; as an archer I am a good archer, both on foot and horseback; as a spearman I am a good spearman, both on foot and horseback.

45-49: [i]mā uvnarā tayā auramazdā [upa]r[iy mā]m niyasaya utādiš atāvayam barta[nai]y vašnā auramazdāhā tayamaiy karta imaibiš uvnaraibiš akunavam tayā mām auramazdā upariy niyasaya These are the abilities which Ahuramazdā bestowed upon me, and I am able to bear them. By the greatness of Ahuramazdā this is what was done by me. I did it with these abilities, which Ahuramazdā bestowed upon me.

The Persian king, as defined in DNb, is wise and rational, in command of his mind and body, equally capable in the palace and the battlefield. His only interests are piety, justice, and

stability, both in his own behavior and that of his subjects. By serving as the intermediary between Ahuramazdā and mankind, the king is the source of all justice in the realm.<sup>511</sup> This relationship between the king and his realm is further defined in DNa:

1-8: *baga važarka auramazdā haya imām būmim adā haya avam asmānam adā haya martiyam adā haya šiyātim adā martiyahayā haya dārayavaum xšāyaθiyam akunauš aivam parūvnām xšāyaθiyam aivam parūvnām framātāram*

Ahuramazdā is a great god, who created this earth, who created that heaven, who made man, who made happiness for men, who made Darius king, one king over many, one commander of many.

8-15: *adam dārayavauš xšāyaθiya važarka xšāyaθiya xšāyaθiyānām xšāyaθiya dahayūnām vispazanānām xšāyaθiya ahayāyā būmiyā važarkāyā dūrai y apiy vištāspahayā puça haxāmanišiya pārsa pārsahayā puça ariya ariya čiça*

I am Darius, the Great King, king of kings, king of lands of many kinds, king of this great earth far away, the son of Vištāspa, an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan, of Aryan seed.

15-30: *θātiy dārayavauš xš[ā]yaθiya vašnā auramazdāha im[ā] dahayāva tayā adam agarbāya[m] apataram hacā pārsā adamšā[m] patiyaxšayaiy manā bājim aba[ra]ha tayašām hacām aθahaya ava [a]kunava dātām taya manā avadi[š] adāraiya māda ūvja parθava hara[i]va bāxtriš suguda uvāra[zm]iš zraka harauvatiš θataguš gadāra hiduš sakā haumavargā sakā tigraxaudā bābiru[š] aθurā arabāya mudrāya arm[ina] katpatuka sparda yauna sakā tayai[y] [pa]radraya skudra yaunā takabarā put[ā]yā kušiyā maciyā karkā*

King Darius says: by the greatness of Ahuramazdā, these are the lands that I seized in addition to Persia; I ruled over of them. They brought me tribute. Whatever was told to them by me, they did. My law held them: Media, Elam, Parthia, Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, Choresmia, Dragiana, Arachosia, Thattagydia, Gandara, India, The Amyrgian Saka, The Saka with pointed hats, Babylonia, Assyria, Arabia, Egypt, Armenia, Cappadocia, Sardis, Ionia, The Saka beyond the Sea, Thrace, The *petasus*-Wearing Ionians, Libyans, Nubians, Macranians, and Carians.

30-47: *θātiy dārayavauš xšāyaθiya auramazdā[ ya]θā avaina imām būmim yau[datim] pasāvadim manā frābara mām [xšā]yaθiyam akunauš adam xšā[yaθ]iya amiy vašnā auramazdāh[ā] adamšim gāθavā niyašādayam [taya]šām adam aθaham ava akunava ya[θā]mām kāma āha yadipatiy maniy[āhaiy ta]ya ciyakaram [āha a]vā dahayāva tayā dāraya[va]uš xšāya[θ]iya adāraya patikarā dīdiy tayai[y] gāθum baratiy adā xšnāsāhay adataiy azdā bavā[t]iy pārsahayā martiyahayā dūrai aršt[i]š parāgmata adataiy azdā bavātiy pārsa martiya dūray hacā pārsā parataram patiyajatā*

King Darius says: When Ahuramazdā saw this earth in turmoil, at that time he bestowed it upon me. He made me king. I am king. By the greatness of Ahuramazdā I placed it back in its place. That which I said to them, this they did, just as was my desire. If you should think: How many were the lands that Darius the king held, look at the figures that hold this throne. Then you will know, then it may occur to you: The spear of the Persian has gone far; then you may realize: the Persian man has fought battles far from Persia.

47-55: *θātiy dārayavauš xšāyaθiya aita ta[ya] kartam ava visam vašnā auramazdāh akunavam auramazdāiy upastām abara yātā kartam akuna[vam m]ām auramazdā pātuv hacā gastā utāmai y viθam utā imām dahayāum aita adam auramazdām jadiyāmiy aitamaiy auramazdā dadātuv*

King Darius says: This which I made, all this I did by the greatness of Ahuramazdā. Ahuramazdā bore me aid until I did these deeds. May Ahuramazdā protect me and my house and this land from evil. This I pray to Ahuramazdā; may Ahuramazdā grant it to me.

56-60: *martiyā hayā auramazdāhā framānā hauvtaiy gastā mā θadaya paθīm tayām rāstām mā ava[ar]da mā stabava*

O Man, the command of Ahuramazdā may not seem evil to you! Do not stray from the path of what is righteous! Do not rebel!

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511 Briant 2002:211-3.

Just as Ahuramazdā ensures stability on the cosmic level, so too does the Achaemenid king on this earth. The king lays claim to world rulership ("king of kings, king of lands of many kinds, king of this great earth far away"), but also specifically defines his realm by listing those lands he has conquered.<sup>512</sup> There are five other versions of this sort of list of nations, to be found in DB, DPe, DSe, DSaa, and XPh. No two versions are the same, and no single list names all the countries. Attempts to correlate the presence or absence of a given country on these lists with the historical fortunes of the empire have failed. Cameron has argued convincingly that the names in the lists are not satrapies or other administrative regions, but "names of peoples whom they deemed worthy of specific recognition."<sup>513</sup> For these reasons, plus the very fact that a delineated realm would seem to contradict the notion of world rulership, it must be that the country lists were not intended to represent the real and complete extent of the empire, but rather to highlight those peoples most recognizable to the reader, and to emphasize the king's ability to project his power over great distances (*pārsahayā martiyahayā dūraiṣ arštiš parāgmatā* "The spear of the Persian man went far"), without limiting the potential or actual scope of the Achaemenid king's rule.<sup>514</sup>

The reliefs accompanying these inscriptions at Naqš-e Rostam are equally significant. The king is depicted standing in front of a fire on an altar with his right hand raised towards a winged figure, presumably Ahuramazdā. He is supported on a platform by thirty figures on two levels. Although no country list has exactly thirty entries, these figures presumably represent the subjects of in the empire. There is a notion of cooperation and equality under Achaemenid rule.<sup>515</sup> This is also the message of the reliefs on the Apadana at Persepolis, depicting a

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512 Briant 2002:172-3 compares all six.

513 Cameron 1973:49-50.

514 Lincoln 2008:223-7; Briant 2002:177-8.

515 Briant 2002:211; Root 1979.

procession of subjects bearing gifts, as well as of the inscription DSf, which describes the exotic materials and foreign workers imported to build the palace. The emphasis is on the unity and order of the world through the rulership of the king.

The exact relationship between the Achaemenid kings and Ahuramazdā is difficult to pin down. The primacy of Ahuramazdā in the inscriptions is clear. No other gods are named until the reign of Artaxerxes II, who refers to Anahita and Mithra alongside Ahuramazdā.<sup>516</sup> While Berosus credited Artaxerxes II with institutionalizing the worship of Anahita in the empire,<sup>517</sup> Plutarch writes as if it had already been traditional.<sup>518</sup> Herodotus noted that the Persians had learned to worship Uranian Aphrodite from the Assyrians and Arabians,<sup>519</sup> and a seal found in the Persepolis Fortification Archive (PTS 91) shows a woman surrounded by a nimbus, typically associated with Anahita/Ištar.<sup>520</sup> If Artaxerxes did in fact feel the need to enforce the worship of a particular deity in the empire, this effort must have been limited to the Persians living throughout

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516 A<sup>2</sup>Sa, A<sup>2</sup>Sb, A<sup>2</sup>Sd, A<sup>2</sup>Ha.

517 *FGrH* 680 F11 = Clement of Alexandria *Protrepticus* 5.65.2):

ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπελήφασιν (scil. Πέρσαι καὶ Μῆδοι καὶ μάγοι) ... ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡς φιλόσοφοι. μετὰ πολλὰς μέντοι ὕστερον περιόδους ἐτῶν ἀνθρωποειδῆ ἀγάλματα σέβειν αὐτοὺς Βῆρωσσοσ ἐν τρίτῃ Χαλδαικῶν παρίστησι, τοῦτο Ἄρταξέρξου ἑτοῦ Δαρείου τοῦ Ὠχοῦ εἰσηγησαμένου, ὃς πρῶτος τῆς Ἀφροδίτης Ἀναίτιδος τὸ ἄγαλμα ἀναστήσας ἐν Βαβυλῶνι καὶ Σούσοις καὶ Ἐκβατάνοις <καὶ> Πέρσαις καὶ Βάκτροις καὶ Δαμασκῶι καὶ Σάρδεσιν ὑπέδειξε σέβειν.

(The Persians and Medians and Magoi) did not conceive of stone or wood statues of the gods...but fire and water like the philosophers. But, Berosus says in the third book of his *Chaldaikon*, after many years went by, they began to worship statues in human form, Artaxerxes son of Darius Ochus having introduced this practice. He was the first to set up a statue of Aphrodite Anahita in Babylon, and to introduce [this kind of] worship for the Susians, Ecbatanians, Persians, Bactrians, Damascenes, and Sardians.

518 *Plut. Art.* 3.1-2: ὀλίγω δ' ὕστερον ἢ τελευτῆσαι Δαρεῖον ἐξήλασεν εἰς Πασαργάδας ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὅπως τελεσθεῖν τὴν βασιλικὴν τελετὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Πέρσαις ἱερέων, ἔστι δὲ θεᾶς πολεμικῆς ἱερὸν, ἣν Ἀθηνᾶν ἂν τις εικάσειεν. εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν τελούμενον παρελθόντα τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν ἀποθέσθαι στολὴν, ἀναλαβεῖν δὲ ἣν Κύρος ὁ παλαιὸς ἐφόρει πρὶν ἢ βασιλεὺς γενέσθαι, καὶ σύκων παλάθης ἐμφαγόντα τερμίνθου κατατραγεῖν καὶ ποτήριον ἐκπιεῖν ὀξυγάλακτος.

A little while after the death of Darius [II], the king [Artaxerxes] marched into Pasargadae, so that he might be initiated in the royal rites by the Persian priests. There is a temple of a warlike goddess whom one might compare to Athena. It is necessary that the initiate pass into this temple, and take off his own robe, then put on that which Cyrus the Elder used to wear before he became king; and then he must eat a fig-cake, chew terebinth, and drink a cup of sour milk.

519 *Hdt.* 1.131; although he specifically denied that Persians made use of anthropomorphic idols.

520 Garrison and Root 1991:84.

the empire, not to all residents of the realm. It may have had something to do with Cyrus the Younger's challenge to his rule, and his subsequent desire to reinforce and reemphasize the divine support for his rule.<sup>521</sup> It has also been suggested that the increasing importance of Anahita and Mithra was the result of the rising influence of Mesopotamian custom on the Persians. By this theory, Anahita and Mithra had been syncretically equated with the Mesopotamian gods Ištar/Nanā and Šamaš, respectively.<sup>522</sup> Considering the importance of the gods in Mesopotamian ideology, it is obvious why the Achaemenid kings would associate themselves with them. However, what exactly motivated Artaxerxes to attempt to spread this worship to his subjects outside of Mesopotamia is unclear, and runs counter to what we think we know about Achaemenid religious policy in general.

Nowhere do the Achaemenid inscriptions deny other gods, nor do they call for a restriction on the worship of foreign gods. However, in two places it is made clear that within the empire, certain religious practices are not to be tolerated. First, in the fifth and final column of Darius' Bisotun inscription, two revolts, in Elam and Scythia, are reported. The main narrative of this inscription is concerned with the chaos caused by the rebellious "Liar-Kings" and Darius' divinely-inspired restoration of the empire. These final two rebels, however, are not charged with deceit but heresy:

θātiy xšayaṛšā xšāyaθiya avaiy ūjyā arīkā āha utāšām auramazdā naiy ayadiya auramazdām ayadaiy vašnā auramazdāha yaθā mām kāma avaθādiš akunavam θātiy xšayaṛšā xšāyaθiya haya auramazdām yadātaiy yānam avahayā ahati utā jīvahayā utā martaḥayā  
 King Darius says: Those Elamites were disloyal and they did not worship Ahuramazdā. I worshiped Ahuramazdā. By the greatness of Ahuramazdā, that which was my wish, thus I did to them. King Darius says: He who worships Ahuramazdā, there will be favor for him, both in life and in death.<sup>523</sup>

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521 Briant 2002:679-80. Arjomand 1998 argues that Artaxerxes' epithet 'Mnemon' is a Greek rendering of 'Vohu Manu,' one of the Amesha Spentas. This would add further evidence to Artaxerxes' Zoroastrianism.

522 Johandi 2012; Panaino 2000.

523 DB §72-3; repeated for the rebellious Saka at §75-6.

Darius' son, Xerxes, made a somewhat similar statement in an inscription at Persepolis, XPh:

28-35: θᾱtiy xšayaaršā xšāyaθiya yaθā taya adam xšāyaθiya abavam astiy atar aitā dahayāva tayaiy upariy nipištā ayauda pasāvama iy auramazdā upastām abara vašnā auramazdahā avam dahayāvam adam ajanam utašim gāθavā nīšādayam

King Xerxes says: when I became king, there was one amongst the lands who rose up in rebellion. Ahuramazdā bore me aid. By the greatness of Ahuramazdā that land I defeated and I set it back down in its place.

35-41: utā atar aitā dahayāva āha yadātaya paruvam daivā ayadiya pasāva vašnā auramazdahā adam avam daivadānam viyakanam utā patiyazbayam daivā mā yadiyaiša yadāyā paruvam daivā ayadiya avadā adam auramazdām ayadaiy ąrtācā barzmaniy utā aniyašca āha duškąrtam akariya ava adam naibam akunavam

And among the lands there was one where previously *daivas* were worshipped. At that time Ahuramazdā bore me aid. I destroyed the den of *daiva*(-worship) and I declared, "Do not worship the *daivas*!" The place where previously the *daivas* were worshipped, there I worshipped Ahuramazdā according to the order in the height.<sup>524</sup>

41-46: aita taya adam akunavam visam vašnā auramazdahā akunavam auramazdāma iy upastām abara yātā kąrtam akunavam

And other wicked deeds were done, which I made good. That which I did, I did by the greatness of Ahuramazdā. Ahuramazdā bore me aid until I accomplished it.

46-56: tuva kā haya apara yadimaniyāiy šiyāta ahaniy jīva utā martha ąrtāvā ahaniy avanā dātā parīdiy taya auramazdā niyaštāya auramazdām yadaiša ąrtācā barzmaniy martiya haya avanā dātā pariya ita taya auramazdā nīštāya utā auramazdām yadaiy ąrtācā barzmaniy hauv utā jīva šiyāta bavatiy utā martha ąrtāvā bavatiy

You who should think, 'May I be happy when alive, and blessed when dead,' uphold that law which Ahuramazdā established. Worship Ahuramazdā according to the order in the height. The man who upholds the law which Ahuramazdā established and worships Ahuramazdā according to the order in the height, he will be both happy in life and blessed when dead.

Let us analyze the passages one at a time. DB column 5 refers to the second and third years after Darius became king, i.e., 520-519. His campaign against the Saka may refer to the the Scythian campaign in Europe, found in Herodotus,<sup>525</sup> or to an otherwise unknown campaign against Scythians of Central Asia.<sup>526</sup> Either way, for Darius, there is a clear relationship between disloyalty and the non-worship of Ahuramazdā (*arīkā āha utāšām auramazdā naiy ayadiya*; "They were disloyal, and they did not worship Ahuramazdā.") and between worship of Ahuramazdā and success (*auramazdām ayadaiy vašnā auramazdāha yaθā mām kāma avaθādiš akunavam*; "I worshipped Ahuramazdā. By the greatness of Ahuramazdā, that which was my wish, thus I did to them.") and happiness in both worlds (*haya auramazdām yadātaiy yānam*

524 On this difficult phrase, see below, p.149f.

525 Hdt 4.1-143; Kellens 1987:677.

526 Briant 2002:127; Harmatta 1976.

*avahayā ahatiy utā jāvahayā utā martahayā*; "He who worships Ahuramazdā, there will be favor for him, both in life and in death."). For Kellens, Darius justified his (re)conquest of the breakaway provinces during his first year by emphasizing his dynastic legitimacy and denouncing evil. In order to justify expansion of the empire beyond the original provinces which he inherited, he proclaimed that his enemies had rejected a faith that legitimized his rule, and which must have been familiar to some part of his subjects. This appears to be a novel addition to Achaemenid ideology, as it was the first time unbelief or unorthodoxy was used to justify war.<sup>527</sup> However, since we have no royal inscriptions of previous kings for comparison, this can only be an assumption.<sup>528</sup> It can also only apply to the Saka, as the Elamite campaign cannot possibly be considered a new, foreign conquest. None of the other Liar-Kings are branded as unbelievers, even though some of them most certainly did not worship Ahuramazdā. Thus, such accusations are limited to the Iranian world, and were not applicable to the wider Near East.

To whatever extent Xerxes' Daiva Inscription was influenced by the fifth column of DB, it is certainly a stronger statement of what some have interpreted as "religious imperialism." As DB is treated as a historical narrative, traditionally scholars have looked to place the events described in XPh into a specific historical context as well. It has been argued that the rebellious provinces mentioned should be equated with Babylonia,<sup>529</sup> Greece,<sup>530</sup> Media,<sup>531</sup> Bactria, or Egypt.<sup>532</sup> But there are many good reasons why XPh should be read as a pure statement of

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527 Kellens 1987:681-2.

528 Although note Briant 2002:128: "This statement does not in any way imply that Darius completely altered the ideological strategy of his predecessors in the conquered countries."

529 Hartmann 1937:159.

530 Lévy 1939.

531 Ghirshman 1976:169-77; Herzfeld 1938:126-31.

532 Balcer 1995:312: "Xerxes proclaimed clearly he had retained command of his broadly spread empire, any disobedience to him would be punished, and the holy places in rebellious regions be destroyed. He clearly had in mind Egypt and Bactria."

ideology, without any reference to historical events.

First, as is clear from DB, the authors of the Achaemenid inscriptions were perfectly willing and able to provide precise dates for events, should they desire to do so. Although the passages from DB quoted above do not provide exact dates, it at least provides regnal years, and names the leaders of the Elamite and Saka rebellions. Xerxes gives us no such details, so one presumes this was intentional. Second, when we examine the vocabulary of XPh, it becomes clear that Xerxes has declared war on a very specific sort of enemy: the *daivas*. In the Avesta, the *daēuuas* are associated with improper worship and ritual.<sup>533</sup> That the message of these passages is to be interpreted in a strictly Zoroastrian context is accepted by most,<sup>534</sup> and is reinforced by Xerxes' statement that, having destroyed the "sanctuary of the daivas" (*daivadāna*), at that place he worshipped Ahuramazdā "according to *arta* in the height" (*artācā brazmaniya*). Since this is the case, it does not make much sense for Xerxes to declare that the Babylonians, for example, were worshipping Ahuramazdā improperly, as there can have been no expectation that they would worship Ahuramazdā at all.

There have been many interpretations of phrases such as *adam auramazdām ayadaiy artācā brazmaniya*, none of which has gained universal acceptance. The Elamite (*ir-da-ha-si bir-ra-is-man-nu-ia*) and Babylonian (*ar-ta-šá-' bi-ra-sa-am-man-ni-i*) versions of *artācā brazmaniya* show that the phrase was not translated into more familiar terms, but transcribed directly. This suggests that it was a fixed Iranian phrase. Additionally, the Elamite transcription shows the presence of the syllable *-ha-* in *artācā*, meaning that we must interpret the word as *\*artā/ā hacā*, where both the word divider and the *h* have been left out, as is common in the Old

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533 Briant 2002:551.

534 e.g. Bianchi 1977; Kent 1937:305: "It is perfectly clear, however, that Darius and Xerxes were adherents of the Zoroastrian religion, if additional evidence of this were needed."



Persian inscriptions.<sup>535</sup> Thus *artācā* is to be interpreted as "according to *arta-*," that is, "according to the divine order or harmony," and not as *arta-* with the enclitic *-cā*, "and *arta-*."<sup>536</sup> Other options have been suggested: according to Rüdiger Schmitt, *arta-* is a locative singular derived from Av. *ratu-*, OInd. *ṛtu-* "time."<sup>537</sup> Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin has suggested an original OP *\*artāñc-*, "facing Arta," which he suggests must be understood as facing north, in opposition to the Indian practice of facing south during rituals.<sup>538</sup> Still, *\*artā/ā hacā* is the preferred option because it also has a parallel in Av. *ašāt hacā*, "according to the Order." Since this must be a fixed inherited phrase, it can be explained as an "Avestan quotation."<sup>539</sup>

There are several competing hypotheses for the interpretation of the second word, *brazmaniya-*. It may refer to the *barəsmān* twigs held during Zoroastrian ritual, although it is unclear whether or not the Elamite transcription would allow *bar-* instead of *bra-*.<sup>540</sup> Based on a comparison with Sanskrit *brāhman*, "with solemn rites, due ceremonial behavior," and MP *brahm* "fashion," it has also been interpreted as an instrumental, indicating either the god to whom the sacrifice is being performed, or an object or ritual practice with or through which the sacrifice is being performed.<sup>541</sup> This view is supported by an Aramaic inscription from Aswan, Egypt. The damaged inscription tells us that the "commander of the garrison of Syene, built this *brzmdn'* in the month of Siwan, that is Mehir, in the seventh year of Artaxerxes the King, By the

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535 Schmitt 2009:149; Herrenschildt 1993:45-8.

536 This "inverse *-ca*" reading is, however, favored by Schmitt 1963:444-8, Mawet 1978:7, Ito 1981:323, Skalmowski 1990:83, and Lecoq 1997:160, among others.

537 Schmitt 1963:442.

538 Duchesne-Guillemin 1962:337.

539 Skjaervo 1999:41.

540 Kent 1945:228; Skjaervo 1999:42. Henning 1944:108-9 wonders whether "the stressing of such a minor detail of the cult as the *Barəsmān* twigs were would appear to be incommensurate with the tenor of the inscription."

541 Boyce 1982:175. Schmitt 2009:149 offers "zur rechten Zeit und mit rechtem Zeremoniell"; Herrenschildt 1993:48 does not offer a translation of *brazman*, but translates the whole phrase as "(avec) un *brazman* selon le bon agencement."

grace of God, welfare.<sup>542</sup> *brzmdn'* has been interpreted as the Iranian word *\*brazmadāna-*, "edifice in which rites take place."<sup>543</sup> Lastly, *brazmaniya-* has been taken as deriving from PIE *\*bherǵh-* "to be high", Av. *barəz-* "high," *barəzah-* "mountain."<sup>544</sup> In both the Avesta and the Vedas, adjectives derived from this root are commonly associated with gods or divine concepts, including, in Vedic, with *ṛtá*.<sup>545</sup> The adjective *\*brdnt-/brz-* is also very productive in Iranian onomastics, generating names such as Ir-da-pir-za-na (from *\*Rta-brzana-*).<sup>546</sup> So while we cannot exclude the interpretation which is based on *bráhman*, one based on *\*brdnt-/brz-* appears to be more likely, especially in this very Iranian context. While these issues have not been unequivocally sorted out, since we have already determined that *artācā* means "according to the Order," we conclude that *brazmaniya* must be taken as a locative singular, "in the height."<sup>547</sup> The entire sentence *Auramazdām ayadaiy atācā barzmaniya* will thus be "I worshipped Ahuramazda according to the Order in the height." This must refer to issues of proper ritual performance with respect to the cult of Ahuramazdā, and not proper religious belief more generally. XPh is a declamation against Iranians who are improperly carrying out the rituals of the royal Ahuramazdā cult.<sup>548</sup> To the extent that it is a statement of official ideology, it is aimed at the small group of Persian nobles who would have participated in this cult.

By comparing the OP text as a whole with its Elamite and Babylonian counterparts, instead of just focusing on individual phrases, yet more clarity arises. There is agreement that the

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542 Boyce 1982:184. The inscription was originally published, in Russian, by Bugoliubov 1966:40-6.

543 Schwartz 1990:204.

544 Skjaervo 1999:42; see Yašt 36.6 *barəzištəm barəzimanam* "highest of heights;" Kent 1945:223.

545 Mawet 1978:12.

546 Mawet 1978:13; Mayrhofer 1973:8.596. Irdapirzana is known from Persepolis Fortification texts 1463 and 2052. He may be the same man as Artabazanes, Darius' oldest son (Hdt. 7.2).

547 Skjaervo 1999:42.

548 Bianchi 1977:14.

Achaemenids practiced some form of Mazdaism. Hence the Avesta and Sanskrit texts are frequently used to find explanation of Achaemenid texts or acts. However, Elamite texts may offer a key to the puzzle of XPh. In the Elamite version lines 29-32 correspond to the OP 35-41, quoted above.

29-32: And among the lands there was (a place) where, formerly, (they) made/performed (for) the *daivā* their *šip* (sacrificial feast). Then, by the effort of Auramazdā, I devastated that place of *daivā* worship and I placed *kiten* upon them lest the *daivā* their *šip* be made/performed. Where formerly the *daivā* their *šip* had been made, there I made (for) Auramazdā his *šip*, at the proper time and in the proper style.<sup>549</sup>

Unlike *artācā brazmaniy*, the phrase "I placed *kiten* upon them," is not a translation or borrowing from the OP or Babylonian. In other Neo-Elamite texts, *kiten* can mean anything from "divine protection" to "'order,' a set of (legal) rules based upon the authority of the god and his agent, the king." It is strongly associated with Humban's protection and legitimation of the king.<sup>550</sup> It is essential that we appreciate the meaning of this word in its own, specifically Elamite, context, and not see it as an approximation of an Old Persian, Iranian, original form. Even though we may be tempted to see the OP text as primary or the "native language" of the Achaemenids, the Persepolis Archives prove that the Achaemenid scribes were very much a multi-lingual group, perfectly comfortable composing in Elamite. Analysis of other Achaemenid inscriptions has confirmed that the royal scribes were given sufficient liberty to compose texts in Old Persian, Babylonian, and Elamite, as opposed to simply translating from one original.<sup>551</sup> Considering the uniqueness of XPh, Xerxes must have taken great pains in crafting or approving the message of each of the three versions, meaning that the concept of *kiten* was as much a part of Achaemenid

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549 Original translation from Cameron 1959:473; version here from Henkelman 2011:103.

550 Henkelman 2008:364-8.

551 Shayegan 2012:88-9.

ideology as any concept from the Persian side.<sup>552</sup> Therefore, if, in the Elamite version, Xerxes places his *kiten* on the worshippers of the *daivā*, this must mean that he has imposed some sort of ban or restriction on a ritual: where the *šip* was formerly made for the *daivā*, this practice was stopped, and instead *šip* was made for Ahuramazdā. Once again, we see that Xerxes' intent was to ensure the success of the rituals which were part of the *royal* cult of Ahuramazdā, not necessarily connected with the idea of an "orthodox Zoroastrianism." Because the support of Ahuramazdā was essential to an Achaemenid king's power and legitimacy, any shortcomings in the rituals for Ahuramazdā were a direct threat to the king. By claiming sole authority to regulate and reform these rituals, Xerxes made himself the only human who could access legitimacy. Whether or not Xerxes carried out religious reform within his empire is uncertain, but it is now obvious that this particular passage was an ideological claim, generally applicable to all time, not a factual statement limited to past events.

*Persepolis Fortification and Treasury Archives:*

Based on our examination of the Achaemenid royal inscriptions, we concluded that the Achaemenid kings justified their rule by claiming to be doing the work of Ahuramazdā. The king was a just and able ruler who brought order to the earth. It was the will of Ahuramazdā that the Persian empire should have no acknowledged limits. Within these limits other gods were not denied, but the kings gave no attention to any non-Iranian gods, and there was intense effort to ensure that the requirements of Ahuramazdā-worship were carried out properly, with respect to the royal cult.

The Persepolis Fortification and Treasury archives show a very different picture. These two archives consist of tens of thousands of tablets and fragments which record the distribution

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552 Henkelman 2008:370.

of agricultural products among the nobility and officials in the region of Persepolis.<sup>553</sup> The Fortification texts cover the years 509-493, and the Treasury texts cover 492-458.<sup>554</sup> These two archives provide a massive amount of data on a variety of subjects (demography, onomastics, economics, bureaucratic hierarchy, etc.) but we are interested in these texts primarily for what they tell us about the religious policies of the Achaemenid state in their own heartland. The archives maintained at Persepolis were not the only ones in the empire, and only cover the region immediately surrounding Persepolis; even though they were based at an imperial capital, they were not an imperial archive in terms of their scope.

Goods were disbursed through the Persepolis system for a variety of purposes. Many tablets specify that the goods are to be given to a religious official<sup>555</sup> (they may or may not be specifically named), sometimes for the performance of a ritual. Eighty-one of those texts state that the goods are for the *lan* ritual, making it the most commonly named ritual in the archive.<sup>556</sup> Wouter Henkelman has proven at length that this ritual, of clear importance to the Achaemenid state, was not in any way reserved for Ahuramazdā, nor was it limited to Zoroastrian practice. Humban, the Mesopotamian and Elamite god connected with the divine protection and legitimacy of the ruler, was the most common recipient of *lan*. This is, of course, entirely different from the notions of legitimacy so readily seen in the Achaemenid inscriptions, where Ahuramazdā, occasionally accompanied by Mithra and Anahita, is the sole source of divine legitimation for the king, and where Humban, Adad, and the other gods present in the Persepolis

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553 Fisher and Stolper 2015 shows that there was almost certainly a similar archive at Old Kandahar, implying centralized control of the satrapy of Arachosia. However, its contents are almost entirely unknown.

554 For more background, including information about the discovery and study of the texts, see Henkelman 2008:65-75.

555 In Hallock's system, tablets PF 741-774.

556 Henkelman 2008:181. These 81 texts make up about one-third of the total which mention rituals or other religious practices.

Archives receive no mention whatsoever. But Henkelman has also stressed that the multiplicity of cults supported by the Persepolis administration cannot be used as evidence for a policy of religious 'tolerance' to be assumed for the entire empire. Even though some of the gods supported by Persepolis were not of Persian origin, they presumably entered the Persian pantheon after the centuries of acculturation with the Elamites. Thus all of the cults found in the Persepolis system would have been understood as "Persian," even if they began life outside of Iran millennia before.<sup>557</sup>

Thus the Persepolis Fortification texts are not to be used as a microcosm of imperial policy. With respect to an imperial religious policy, these texts only demonstrate the Achaemenids' attitude to their own religious life. However, what is of significance for our investigation is the treatment of the Elamite gods and cults. The Persepolis texts show a pattern of the integration of non-Persian elements into official practice. This may be a clue as to the source of the Achaemenids' "tolerant" attitude towards the practices of their subjects. If Henkelman is correct, that the Achaemenids did not recognize gods of Elamite heritage as distinct from those of Iranian heritage, this implies that, during the process of the Persian ethnogenesis, Iranian and non-Iranian elements were brought together under the umbrella of "Persian" identity. Although this process may have occurred long before the formation of the Persian empire, it nevertheless may have prepared the Persians to integrate non-Iranian elements into the administration of their empire.

## **Western Asia Minor**

At the time of Cyrus' defeat of Astyages, and his formation of the Persian empire, western

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<sup>557</sup> Henkelman 2008:334-6. Note also that, despite the presence of Babylonians, Greeks, Egyptian, and other foreign populations living and working in and around Persepolis, not one of their cults received state sponsorship.

Asia Minor was largely under the control of the Lydian kingdom. Croesus, the king, had his capital at Sardis. We lack precise information about Lydian rule in Asia Minor, so most of the following summary comes from Greek and Assyrian sources. A thousand years earlier, the Hittites had been one of the great powers contesting for control in the Near East. Their records mention describe the eventual Lydian heartland as part of the Arzawa Lands, a complex of vassal kingdoms in central western Anatolia. This was one of the many regions to descend into a 'dark age' between the twelfth and seventh centuries. A destruction level, accompanied by Mycenaean pottery, at Sardis has been dated to this period, and thereby associated with the arrival of the Heracleiad kings; more investigation of the site is required to confirm or reject this.<sup>558</sup> As early as Herodotus, the Lydians were taken to be the same as Homer's Maeonians, a people believed to originate north of Sardis.<sup>559</sup>

The Lydian kingdom, under the rule of the Heracleiad kings, never reached the same territorial size as the Hittites, but nevertheless was still an active player in the region. Some time in the early seventh century, Gyges, advisor to the last Heracleiad king, overthrew him and founded the new Mermnad dynasty.<sup>560</sup> Gyges and his successors periodically attacked the Greek cities of Ionia, but did not hold them permanently. Alyattes, Gyges' great-grandson and the penultimate king of the dynasty, began a tradition of using diplomatic agreements to settle disputes when military ventures had already failed. First, when besieging Miletus, Alyattes accidentally burnt down the temple of Athena at Assesos. Subsequently becoming very ill, he built two temples to Apollo, on the advice of an oracle, and recovered. He and Thrasybulos,

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558 Foss and Hanfmann 1975:28; Roosevelt 2015.

559 Beekes 2002:205-12.

560 Hdt. 1.8-14; alternate versions in Plato *Rep.* 2.359d-360c, and Nicholas of Damascus *FGrH* 90 F 47. According to Danzig 2008, it is most likely that Gyges was a simple usurper who killed Candaules, the previous king.

tyrant of Miletus, then made a truce to end the war.<sup>561</sup> This agreement was renewed by Croesus and, eventually, Cyrus.<sup>562</sup> Alyattes also secured an alliance with Melas, tyrant of Ephesus, by marrying the tyrant's daughter. Later, Croesus would go to war with Ephesus and force out the current tyrant, Pindarus.<sup>563</sup> When the Ephesians ran a rope around the entire city and connected it to the temple of Artemis, Croesus relented and made a new alliance with the city.<sup>564</sup> Both of these stories have the scent of folktale, but they do suggest a particularly close relationship between Croesus and Artemis, or her priests.

Herodotus gives us a general description of the scope of Lydian rule under Croesus:

Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδὸς μὲν γένος, παῖς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τύραννος δὲ ἐθνέων τῶν ἐντὸς Ἄλως ποταμοῦ, ὃς ῥέων ἀπὸ μεσαμβρίας μεταξὺ Συρίων τε καὶ Παφλαγόνων ἐξιεῖ πρὸς βορέην ἄνεμον ἐς τὸν Εὐξείνιον καλεόμενον πόντον.

Croesus was a Lydian by birth, son of Alyattes, and sovereign of the nations this side of the Halys river, which flows from the south between Syria and Paphlagonia and empties northward into the sea called Euxine.<sup>565</sup>

Herodotus says that Croesus was the first foreigner to subjugate and put tribute upon the Greeks, but gives no details. During the war between Lydia and Persia, Herodotus says that Croesus summoned Egyptian, Babylonian, and Lacedaemonian allies to Sardis, but makes no mention of Asian Greek levies or mercenaries; this could be an unintentional omission.<sup>566</sup> Considering the constant pressure on Lydia's Eastern borders from the Cimmerians and, later, the

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561 Hdt. 1.17-22.

562 Harris 1971:20: "Herodotus does not mention any renewal of this treaty with Miletus by Croesus, but since Cyrus later made a settlement with Miletus on the same terms that the Lydians had done (Hdt. 1.141), it may be concluded that the original treaty had continued in effect during Croesus' reign. Cyrus, therefore, presumably ratified rather than revived it."

563 Hdt. 1.92. Croesus' half-brother, Pantaleon, challenged him for the throne. Croesus was able to kill Pantaleon, but his son Pindarus inherited both the tyranny of Ephesus and his resistance to Croesus.

564 Aelian, *Varia historia* 3.26; Polyaeus *Strategems* 6.50.

565 Hdt. 1.6. At 1.28, Herodotus lists the countries which Croesus ruled.

566 Hdt. 1.77.



Medes, the Lydian kings could have made good use of Greek soldiers.<sup>567</sup> We do know that there was intensive contact and trade between the Lydians and Greeks, and that the Mermnad kings regularly, if not systematically, patronized Greek temples and shrines.

Sardis was also intimately connected with the Aegean world, both economically and diplomatically. Since the seventh century, a steadily increasing flow of pottery entered Asia Minor from several Greek regions. This was true for both Phrygia and Lydia, and continued unabated into the Persian period.<sup>568</sup> Greek imports also had an effect on the pottery produced in Lydia itself. At Sardis and in greater Ionia, Greek-style pottery shapes were dominant, while native shapes were rare. As this was not the case in Phrygian Daskyleion, this exchange may have been the result of some Lydian policy or attitude.<sup>569</sup>

Surely connected to this important trade was the tradition of Phrygian, and then Lydian, offerings made to Greek sanctuaries. According to Herodotus, Midas, a Phrygian king, was the first foreigner to send a gift to Delphi, in this case, a throne.<sup>570</sup> Gyges and Croesus continued the tradition, and in Herodotus' time, some of the most fantastic treasures at Delphi were those sent by the Lydian kings. Some of this information is attributed to the Delphic priests themselves,<sup>571</sup> while other details come from Herodotus' own observations. There can be no doubt that the *logoi* of Croesus and the Oracles have been shaped to give weight to Herodotus' main lesson, that of the inevitability of the rise and fall of empires and individuals. Whether Herodotus manipulated

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567 Harris 1971:18-19.

568 Yaldir 2011; Kerschner 2010.

569 Gürtekin-Demir 2002:112-5.

570 1.14; cf. 1.28, 1.72. It is interesting that Midas should send something to Delphi, on the Greek mainland, rather than to an Ionian sanctuary, much closer to his own realm. However, in the late eighth century, Delphi was a site of 'international' importance amongst the most powerful Greek *poleis*, something no Ionian site could claim. The overwhelming majority of pottery found at Phrygian sites is Corinthian or Euboean, and only a handful is East Greek, a fact which further emphasizes the relative importance of the two regions. See Kerschner 2005:116-124.

571 Hdt. 1.20.

genuine historical facts, or invented these *logoi* wholesale is unclear, although, given their formulaic presentation, I tend to lean towards the latter. Kindt shows that on three occasions, Croesus subverts the expected response to a Delphic oracle by assuming that the oracle is confirming what he already thinks he knows. It is he, not Apollo, who sees the future. So, for example, when the oracle tells him that his war with Persia will bring about the fall of a great empire, Croesus uses this as a confirmation of his expected success against the upstart Cyrus.<sup>572</sup> The obvious "true" meaning of the oracle, that it was in fact Croesus who would fall, is explicitly spelled out by Herodotus, through the Pythia herself.<sup>573</sup> In telling the *logos* from this particular point of view, Herodotus is able to give the reader an abundantly clear synopsis of his worldview, while simultaneously using Delphi to give that worldview divine authority.<sup>574</sup>

But just because we might doubt Herodotus' explanation for Croesus' motivation in sending gifts to Delphi and other Greek sanctuaries, there is no reason to doubt that some offerings were in fact made.<sup>575</sup> Herodotus says that he learned about these objects not by inscriptions on them or local written records, but through inquiry, presumably referring to priests at Delphi. The objects, which gave rise to the oral traditions about them, as captured by Herodotus, must have must have been well-known to everyone at the shrine and sufficiently imposing as not to be forgotten in some back corner of the treasury. Since the priests constituted a "closed community," no one individual would have been able to radically alter the

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572 Hdt. 1.53.

573 Hdt. 1.91.

574 Kindt 2006, especially 41-6. Of course, the irony is that Herodotus, in doing this, is himself claiming to interpret signs (in this case, historical data instead of oracles) which, in theory, could be used to predict the future.

575 Asheri et al. 2007:108-9 lists the "practical difficulties" that would have confronted a king in Sardis when consulting seven different oracles in a two-year span. Thonemann 2016 argues that an inscription (first published by Papazarkadas 2008) is the one which Herodotus himself saw at the sanctuary of Apollo Ismenios at Thebes, which he then used as evidence of Croesus' consultation of that oracle and subsequent dedication to the sanctuary (Hdt. 1.49, 52). However, Thonemann goes on to argue (161-5) that the 'Croesus' of the inscription was actually a Theban, not the king of Lydia.

story, as he would have been corrected by his peers.<sup>576</sup> Furthermore, there was at least one variant of the story of Croesus' demise. Bacchylides compared the piety of his patron, Hieron of Syracuse, to that of Croesus: because he, "of all mortals, sent the greatest gifts to holy Pytho," Zeus and Apollo saved Croesus from self-immolation.<sup>577</sup> This ode was written several decades before Herodotus, and shows that Croesus was synonymous with pious gift-giving.<sup>578</sup>

Lydian royal offerings at Greek shrines also made good sense. Friendly relations with the priests of important international Greek shrines would have offered the Lydian kings intelligence about Greek developments, opportunities for trade, and possible alliances. As noted, Greco-Lydian trade was clearly important, and it would have been in the interest of the Lydian kings to maintain good relations with the sources of the pottery. This would be parallel to the policy of supporting Greek cults in Ionia. For example, epigraphic evidence shows that Croesus supported the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus.<sup>579</sup> Lastly, his alliance with Sparta suggests a desire to exploit their soldiers for his own plans.<sup>580</sup> Given the traditional piety of Sparta, sacred offerings would probably have gone a long way to sealing the deal.<sup>581</sup>

By the end of Croesus' reign, then, Lydia had a well-established diplomatic and economic relationship with several Greek communities. This relationship manifested itself in Lydian patronage of Greek religious sites, as well as the creation of a hybrid Greco-Lydian pottery. Massive royal expenditures in Greek communities must have encouraged, if not forced, interaction between Greek and Lydian craftsmen and officials, even if this did not result in the

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576 Flower 1991:70.

577 Ode 3.61-2.

578 Flower 1991:74-5.

579 Mac Sweeney 2013:149; Kaplan 2006:133.

580 Hdt. 1.70.

581 Flower 1991:67.

creation of a hybrid artistic style.<sup>582</sup> What effect did the Persian conquest of Lydia have on this relationship?

To judge by Herodotus' account, the Persian conquest of Asia Minor was disruptive to the Lydians and Ionian Greeks alike. Immediately following the conquest, Cyrus appointed Pactyes, a Lydian, as treasurer and tax collector at Sardis, suggesting that he was willing to work with some of the local aristocracy. But this did not last. The Ionians had not revolted from Croesus,<sup>583</sup> but after the conquest, they insisted that Cyrus give them the same terms as Croesus had, when he conquered the Ionian cities.<sup>584</sup> In response, Cyrus sent Harpagus to conquer the Ionians city by city, all except Miletus, which had already surrendered.<sup>585</sup> At the same time, perhaps seeing that the Persians were distracted, Pactyes induced the Lydians to a short-lived revolt. As punishment, Cyrus forbid the Lydians to carry weapons, so that they might lose their skill in war and instead turn themselves to the arts and commerce.<sup>586</sup> This cannot be literally true, as the Lydians served in Xerxes' army during the invasion of Greece.<sup>587</sup> It may, however, reflect a subordination of the Lydian army, whereby Lydian troops still fought, but only under Persian commanders, and Persian troops were garrisoned in Sardis.<sup>588</sup>

Elsbeth Dusinberre has demonstrated the ways in which artifacts reflect the Lydian

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582 Ratté 1994:606.

583 Hdt. 1.76.

584 Hdt. 1.141.

585 This is frequently interpreted as a treaty, but Herodotus makes no such statement. He calls the Milesian-Persian agreement a "ὄρκιον," an oath. This could refer to the oaths that would accompany a treaty, but it could also mean that Miletus was forced to take the oaths of a vassal. Further, it is likely that Miletus did not, in fact, enjoy the exact same status under the Persians as under the Lydians: while there is no evidence that the Milesians were obligated to serve in Croesus' army, we know they did serve in several Persian campaigns. See p.164.

586 Hdt. 1.154.

587 Hdt. 7.74.

588 Hdt. 5.101. Ruffing 2009:329-30, and 2011:79 argues that the whole discussion between Croesus and Cyrus is a literary construct.

reaction to the Persian conquest. For example, in the period of Mermnad rule, elite Lydians usually drank from a clay vessel known as a *skyphos*. The Persian conquest introduced a distinctly Iranian vessel which Dusinger calls the "Achaemenid bowl." The archaeological record shows that, while *skyphoi* remained popular, the Achaemenid bowl was widely adopted by the Lydians, elite and non-elite, and was produced locally. In fact, so strong was the connection between the Lydians and the bowl that the Lydian delegation on the Persepolis Apadana stairway is depicted bringing tribute in the form of Achaemenid bowls. According to Dusinger, this means that the Persians saw the bowls not just as a commodity, but as a symbol of Lydian-Persian interaction within an imperial context.<sup>589</sup> However, the continued popularity of the bowl during the Hellenistic period shows that they were not imposed upon the Lydians by imperial decree.<sup>590</sup> Evidence for its use at Sardis reinforces the same sort of negotiation between Achaemenid iconography and local production and use.<sup>591</sup> Of course, it is extremely difficult to interpret artifacts in terms of imperial policies, and so we must examine the policies themselves.

At first, as mentioned above, Cyrus appointed a Persian governor and a Lydian tax collector to manage Persian affairs from Sardis. This system collapsed almost immediately, and Cyrus sent in two Persian generals to restore order. While we do not have a single, comprehensive list of the satraps of Sardis, the reconstruction shows that it was a post held only by Iranians. Noble Lydians did remain among the local aristocracy: Pythias, one of the richest men in Lydia and an unfortunate victim of Xerxes' generosity, was the son of Atys and grandson of Croesus.<sup>592</sup> But there is no indication that they served in offices of importance.

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589 Miller 2011 further describes this act of 'diacritical drinking,' wherein the individual adopts the Achaemenid bowl, as well as a typically Eastern three-fingered hold on the vessel, in order to differentiate himself from local practices, thereby associating himself with the source of imperial power.

590 Dusinger 1999.

591 Dusinger 1997.

592 Hdt. 7.27.

The exact administrative structure of Achaemenid Asia Minor is obscure. As usual, we are forced to piece it together mainly from references in Greek or Roman authors, who may or may not have appreciated the nuances of the names and titles they reported. The best reconstructions suggest that Lydia, Ionia, and Phrygia were initially all grouped into one satrapy, ruled from Sardis. The governor or satrap of Daskyleion, at least until the time of Darius I, was subordinate to the satrap at Sardis.<sup>593</sup> By the end of the fifth century, Lydia and Phrygia had been broken into two distinct satrapies, most likely to prevent a single satrap from becoming too powerful to be controlled by the King at Susa.

Croesus' most famous administrative legacy must surely be the "invention" of coinage. Even if he is incorrectly credited with this innovation,<sup>594</sup> the introduction of coinage made a lasting impact on both Greek and Persian minds. Accordingly, "Croesids," that is, gold and silver coins featuring a lion attacking a bull on the obverse, a design attributed to the reign of Croesus, were minted until the reign of Darius I. It is assumed that Darius relied on the experienced mint at Sardis to produce his famous gold and silver Archers, known "sigloi" and "darics," respectively.<sup>595</sup> It is not clear if the Archers were produced concurrently with the Croesids, or replaced them; nor is it clear if both coins were intended to serve the same economic purpose, that is, as a medium of exchange, with which we would be familiar today, as well as to circulate within the same commercial networks.<sup>596</sup> The Achaemenid central administration at Persepolis continued to make most disbursements in kind,<sup>597</sup> so the adoption of coinage by the Achaemenids

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593 Dusinberre 2013:36-7; Jacobs 1994:124-25. At Hdt. 3.120, Oroetes is in control of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia (εἶχε δὲ νομὸν τὸν τε Φρύγιον καὶ Λύδιον καὶ Ἴωνικόν). This man killed Mitrobanes, whose power was limited to Daskyleion (νομοῦ ἄρχοντα τοῦ ἐν Δασκυλείῳ), located in Phrygia.

594 According to Le Rider 2000, and Wallace 2016:175-8, Croesus' father, Alyattes, should get the credit.

595 Bodzek 2014:59-61.

596 See Nimchuck 2002 for discussion.

597 Hallock 1985:588 notes that while this is true for the Persepolis Fortification Archive, in the Treasury Archives silver is disbursed in lieu of a portion— never all—of the allotted rations.

was limited to Lydia, and must have been a response to the tradition of coinage in the region. Considering the connection of minting to legitimacy, it is fascinating that, rather than eliminating or subverting the tokens of the previous regime, the Persians continued minting Croesids for the first several decades and three reigns of Persian rule. This policy is a clear example of the Achaemenids' willingness to adopt and reproduce local traditions within the context of imperial administration.

The economic and cultural relationship between Greece and Lydia may have served as a foundation for the post-conquest treatment of the Greeks by the Persians. Cyrus demanded submission from the Ionians, an opportunity for a peaceful transfer not extended to Babylon or the Massagetae. The Milesians were shown even more favor. Cyrus, possibly in recognition of her fortifications, her network of colonies, and her control of Didyma, agreed to rule Miletus by the same terms as Croesus.<sup>598</sup> Herodotus uses the word ὄρκιον to describe this agreement, and he does not actually indicate that this, or, for that matter, the Milesian agreement with Croesus, was a written treaty, nor does he provide its exact terms. Nevertheless, it does suggest a negotiated and formalized agreement between the Persian administration and a conquered people, based on a pre-Achaemenid political arrangement. It is possible that this agreement established a precedent for future Greco-Persian diplomacy.

Persian rule over Ionia diverged from Lydian practice in two key respects: the demands for military levies, and the systemic interference with internal political developments. As mentioned above, there is little indication that the Lydians required much in the way of military service from the Ionians, and may have even offered much-appreciated employment for Greek mercenaries. Life under Persian rule would have been quite different. In the five decades after the Persian conquest, Ionians served in three major imperial campaigns. First, the general

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<sup>598</sup> Hdt. 1.141; Georges 2000:11-12.

Harpagus led a force of Ionians and Aeolians against the Carians, Caunians, and Lycians. Herodotus gives us little information about the campaign, but does name several instances where the locals put up stiff resistance, forcing Harpagus to lay waste to the region; service in the campaign would not have been easy.<sup>599</sup> Some twenty years later, the next generation of Ionians fought in Cambyses' invasion of Egypt.<sup>600</sup> Under Darius, the Ionians, Aeolians, and other Asian Greeks served in the Scythian campaign. Their main contribution was as sailors and shipbuilders, although individuals served as engineers<sup>601</sup> and advisors.<sup>602</sup> Finally, Otanes, "general of the people of the coast [of Asia]," used Lesbian ships to capture the islands Lemnos and Imbros, and appointed as governor (ὑπαρχος) Lycaretus, the brother of the tyrant of Samos.<sup>603</sup> After the Revolt, Ionians served in all three Achaemenid invasions of Greece, these being Mardonius' failed expedition (which was destroyed by a storm off Mt. Athos in 492), the Marathon campaign of Datis and Artaphernes (490), and Xerxes' invasion (480-79). Whether or not these obligations were more onerous than those put on other parts of the empire is unknown, but it may have seemed unusual to the Ionians themselves, because of what appears to have been relatively light service under the Lydians.<sup>604</sup> Conversely, steady pay in the form of reliable and familiar gold and silver coins may have been very attractive to Greek sailors and soldiers.

The Lydians, on at least one occasion, did force a "regime change" in an Ionian city, when Croesus forced the tyrant Pindarus to leave Ephesus and go into exile. This was not the

599 Hdt. 1.171-7.

600 Hdt. 2.1, 3.1.

601 Hdt. 4.87, Mandrocles of Samos built the bridge across the Bosphoros.

602 Hdt. 4.97-8, Coes of Mytilene gives Darius the idea to have the Ionian tyrants guard the bridge for sixty days.

603 Hdt. 5.25-7: στρατηγὸν...τῶν παραθαλασσιῶν ἀνδρῶν.

604 Harris 1971:110-14. It is possible that they were forced to serve in additional campaigns, or perform some services outside of official military campaigns. Based on what is known, serving approximately once every ten years does not seem overly draconian. Little is known about the services demanded of the Lydians, but the Asian Greeks were not Lydian subjects for more than around fifteen years (Hdt 1.28), and Croesus did not extend his empire far beyond the traditional Lydian realm.



result of a widespread policy against tyranny, but rather a battle between two contenders for the Lydian throne. The Lydians were apparently happy to work with Greek tyrants, but did not promote any particular constitution in their subject states.

In contrast, the Persians actively supported tyranny amongst the Greeks, apparently counter to the wishes of the locals. Tyranny, here defined as the concentration of power in the hands of a single man by extra-constitutional means,<sup>605</sup> came about as many *poleis* were going through a series of changes: increases in long-distance trade and transportation began to shift wealth away from the aristocratic landholders; at roughly the same time, the increasing reliance on hoplite warfare likewise decreased the importance of aristocratic cavalymen.<sup>606</sup> As the old aristocracies collapsed in a period of civil strife, individual strongmen stepped into the power vacuum, riding a wave of popular support and letting it wash away the previous regime. However, by insisting on holding on to sole power through force, tyrants might rapidly become just as hated as the aristocrats had been. Hence, tyrannies rarely lasted more than two generations, and many *poleis* transitioned from tyranny to an oligarchy or democracy.<sup>607</sup> Sarah Morris has emphasized the absence of a tradition of sole rule, passed from father to son, in the pre-Classical Greek world, meaning that tyranny was not a re-emergence of a long-held native

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605 The word has its origins in the Luwian title *tarwanis*, meaning "judge" or "the just." However, in practice, it was a title carried by a "non-aristocratic ruler, either subordinate or independent, connected by marriage with a member of the aristocratic royal house." This pattern of intermarriage between ruling houses is attested in the case of the Basilids of Ephesus and the Mermnads of Lydia; hence the association of Gyges with tyranny in Herodotus and Archilochus. Over time, the Greek experience of tyranny shifted from non-aristocratic rulers to anti-aristocratic usurpers, leading to a shift in the meaning of the word. See Uchitel 2007:14-28; Giusfredi 2009:140-5.

606 Fleck and Hanssen 2013:391-99 examined a sample of forty-six *poleis*. Of these, eleven were ruled by tyrants at some point during the Archaic period. Ten of the tyrant-ruled *poleis* were located on the coast, while the eleventh, Phleious, was located on a navigable river. Conversely, of the thirty-five with no record of tyranny, only five were located on the coast. The authors attribute this correlation to the re-establishment of trade with the Near East and the resulting disruptions of the local economic and social structures.

607 Raaflaub and Wallace 2007: 42; Harris 1971:27-40. The outcomes of this development were different for each *polis*, and neither democracy nor oligarchy was the single "natural" result.

tradition of monarchy, but rather an emergency response to a period of political chaos.<sup>608</sup>

There is, of course, no way to guess at the political evolution of Ionia in the absence of a Persian conquest.<sup>609</sup> However, based on the general trend away from tyranny towards more representative constitutions in most of the Greek world outside of Asia, and the Herodotean notion that the Ionian tyrants owed their positions to the Persian King, we can assume that the Persians actively sought to keep tyrants in power, in order to facilitate their own rule.<sup>610</sup> There is some evidence that the Persians installed tyrants against the will of the local population, but these examples may not be representative. Herodotus names many Greek tyrants throughout his work, but, unfortunately we only have information concerning their relations with the Persians for a few examples. These are sufficient to assume a policy of reliance on tyrants in Greek *poleis* in circumstances where the opportunity presented itself.

### *Samos*

From c. 540 to c. 522, Polycrates, son of Aeaces, ruled the island of Samos as a tyrant. He greatly increased the wealth and power of the island, and was able to threaten mainland Asia with raids. After his death at the hands of the satrap Oroetes, his brother Maeandrius ruled in his place. Maeandrius, at first, offered to give up most of his power and transition the island to an

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608 Morris 2003:1-9. Morris does not deny that figures called "kings" (*wanax* or *basileus*) existed, or that power could be transferred hereditarily. Instead, she argues that there is little secure evidence for the vesting of political power in the hands of a single individual—a monarch. Mycenaean texts indicate that, while the *wanax* was the most important individual, his power was manifested in his ritual activities, and does not appear to have a legislative, military, or judicial function. She also notes that in much of Greek mythology, kingship is based on matrilineal lines of inheritance, where kings marry into royal lines, and royal sons leave to seek a foreign bride (e.g. Menelaus at Sparta, Jason at Corinth, Odysseus at Phaeacia).

609 Histaeus, according to Herodotus 4.137, believed that Persia's support for local tyrants was the only thing preventing all of the cities from becoming democracies.

610 Turning again to Fleck and Hanssen, the correlation between coastal location and tyranny disappears in the Greek cities in Western Asia Minor under Persian rule (Fleck and Hanssen 2013:402-3, esp. 403n35).

isonomic<sup>611</sup> system, reserving only a small salary for himself and his family. However, the people angrily rejected this plan. A prominent citizen, Telesarchus (this name can mean ‘Bringing *arche* to an end’ or ‘Man of Authority and Power<sup>612</sup>’) accused Maeandrius of being so low-born as to not merit even the few privileges he wished to maintain. Maeandrius realized that someone else would simply seize power as soon as democracy was established. Becoming afraid, he arrested all his enemies, and had them executed. Herodotus takes this episode as evidence that the Samians did not want to be free.

At this same time, Polycrates' exiled brother Syloson was preparing to return home, with Darius' help. According to Herodotus, the two had met a few years earlier in Egypt, during Cambyses' invasion. There, Syloson had given a particularly beautiful cloak to Darius as a gift. After the fall of Polycrates, Syloson went to Susa and asked to be installed as tyrant of his island. In recognition of the Greek man's previous generosity, Darius agreed, and appointed Otanes to lead the invasion. Surely the Great King of Persia considered himself beholden to no man, certainly not a Greek, regardless of their past history, and it would be naive to think that Darius would have initiated such an elaborate enterprise, conducted by one of the highest nobleman in

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611 "Isonomia" first appears in a drinking song (collected by Athenasius, *Deipnosophists* 15.695a-b) that celebrated Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the tyrannicides who killed Hipparchus and thus began the events which eventually led to Cleisthenes' democratic reforms: ἐν μύρτου κλαδί τὸ ξίφος φορήσω / ὥσπερ Ἀρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων / ὅτε τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην / ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποιήσατήν. (In a myrtle bough I will wear the sword like Harmodius and Aristogeiton when they killed the tyrant and made Athens isonomic. [trans. Ostwald 1969:122].)

Alcmaeon, fragment 4 (Diels 1903:107), also uses the word in a medical text: τῆς μὲν ὑγιείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν. (Health is a equality of forces: the wet and the dry, the cold and the hot, the bitter and the sweet, and the rest; but a monarchy of one of these produces sickness.)

At Hdt. 3.80.6, during the so-called Persian "Constitutional Debate," Otanes defines "isonomia" ("equality under the law") as "the rule of the masses:" πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον πρῶτα μὲν οὖνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην... He thus defines "isonomia" in specific contrast to tyranny and oligarchy.

Vlastos (1950:339-361) and Ostwald (1969:96-160) both agree that isonomia refers to the concept of political equality. It was not a type of political constitution; but a constitution can be isonomic, if it guarantees impartial application of the law. For the distinction between "demokratia" and "isonomia," see Sealy 1973:274-90.

612 Pelling 2011:8.

the empire, simply to repay a foreign acquaintance for a cloak. However, the unequal gift-exchange at the core of the story may preserve an element of truth. The Great King frequently conducted unequal gift-exchanges with Persian and non-Persian elites, wherein the King would both demonstrate his wealth and power, and put the recipient into his debt, by giving a gift (a local tyranny, for example) of such great value that the recipient could not possibly hope to reciprocate.<sup>613</sup> In any case, Syloson was duly made tyrant after the invasion, and his successors continued to hold the island in the name of Persia until the Delian League took control of the whole Aegean after the Battle of Mycale.<sup>614</sup>

It is possible that the Persians would never have invaded Samos if Syloson had not been a willing participant. But with the memory of Polycrates still fresh in his mind, Darius would have leapt at any opportunity to secure Samos and its fleet. At the very least, then, Darius was willing to make use of puppet-rulers.

### *Miletus*

It is unclear when the tyranny was established at Miletus. Vanessa Gorman's (admittedly speculative) reconstruction is that in the mid-seventh century the Milesians called in the

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613 Briant 2002:316-7. There are several other examples of the Great King giving foreigners control of one or more cities, including: Athenaeus (*FGrH* 472 F6) records that Cyrus granted Pytharchus of Cyzicus control over seven cities; Theomestor was rewarded with the tyranny of Samos for his service in the Persian navy (Hdt. 8.85); Aryandates, Persian governor of Egypt, sent a force to install Pheretima at Barca (Hdt. 165-7; 200-5); Darius made Coes tyrant of Mytilene after the Scythian campaign (Hdt. 4.97, 5.11); Xerxes gave Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, and Gongylus of Eretria cities in the Troad, and their descendants continued to hold them down to at least 400 (Thuc. 1.128, Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6); Pharnabazus gave Alcibiades Grynium (Nepos *Alc.* 9); Thucydides 1.138.5 says that Themistocles governed (using the verb ἄρχω) the land (χώρα) of Magnesia, it being a gift of the king. There is an implied distinction between χώρα and the town or city itself. If there was a general policy at work, it may not extend further than the gift of cities as a reward for military service or allegiance to the Great King against the Greeks. There is also little indication that these men had real authority over these towns. It is more likely that they simply drew an income from them, a fact frequently remarked on by the ancient sources. See Austin 1990: 296-305; Briant 1985:58-9.

614 Hdt. 9.106.

Parians<sup>615</sup> to mediate between factions and to set their state in order.<sup>616</sup> The Parians set up an oligarchy, based on the men who had best managed their own lands.<sup>617</sup> However, in response to attempts by Alyattes of Lydia to conquer the Miletus, Thrasybulus was able to concentrate power into his own hands, via the office of the *pyrtany*.<sup>618</sup> During the period of Persian rule, Herodotus says that Histiaeus was the tyrant of Miletus, and, in a speech, Histiaeus makes it clear that he owes his position to Darius.<sup>619</sup> He does not say that he was made tyrant by Darius, or that he came to power after Darius took the throne. What occurred in between Thrasybulus and Histiaeus can only be guessed.<sup>620</sup>

Regardless of how Histiaeus came to power, once there, he was undoubtedly a puppet of Darius. Because of his loyal service in the Scythian campaign, Darius rewarded Histiaeus with control of Myrcinus, a Thracian site with access to silver mines and good timber. When Megabazus found out, he warned Darius about giving such a valuable property to such a clever and untrustworthy Greek. Thus Darius recalled Histiaeus to Susa, making the excuse that he wanted to invite his loyal friend to his personal dinner table.<sup>621</sup> There is no evidence that

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615 Herodotus never explains why the Milesians selected the Parians "out of all the Greeks" to act as arbitrators. Robertson 1987:369-77 suggests that the same cults were known in both communities, which would have provided the shared beliefs necessary for mutual trust.

616 Gorman 2001:112-9. This is contrary to the usual dating, which puts Thrasybulus' rule from c. 610-560, followed by the two generations of strife—perhaps 40 years?—mentioned in Herodotus, and then the Parian arbitration in c. 520. The main problem with this dating is that it assumes the Persians would allow the Parians to act as mediators for one of their most important cities, and that they would have let the *stasis* get so bad as to require outside intervention. Therefore, the Parian arbitration should be placed before the rise of Thrasybulus.

617 Hdt. 5.28-9.

618 Aristotle *Politics* 1305a 15-18. Thrasybulus was a *xenos* of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explain how Thrasybulus used the *pyrtany* to become a tyrant, beyond pointing out the holder of that office had control over many important affairs (πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις).

619 Hdt. 4.137.

620 Plut. *Quaestiones Graecae* 32.298c-d names the tyrants Thoas and Damasenor, but gives no clues as to when they were in power.

621 Hdt. 5.23-4.

Histiaeus was actually doing anything inappropriate, so it is likely that Megabazus did not want anyone to interfere with his own access to Thracian natural resources.<sup>622</sup> When Histiaeus left for Susa, his nephew and son-in-law, Aristagoras, held power in his place. This replacement must have been approved by Darius, and Aristagoras counted himself a personal friend (φίλος) of Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis,<sup>623</sup> a fact that may have made the Persian administration more comfortable with the switch. The Milesian tyranny served to secure Persian rule in Ionia. Even if Histiaeus and his family prospered as a result, his position in no way was based on negotiation with Persia.

If the Persian administration had such tight control over Ionia, why was the Ionian Revolt allowed to happen? Why was it that the Greek tyrants, the very men put in place to ensure the stability of Persian rule, were most responsible for the outbreak of the Revolt?

The causes of the Revolt are debated. It has been assumed that the Persian conquest had caused economic hardship for the Ionians, through increased taxation, altered trade networks, the destruction of important cities, or some combination. Georges takes the minority position that the net change in the Ionian economy due to Persian rule was nil and, if anything, the new trade links provided by the imperial network may have actually improved the overall economy.<sup>624</sup> Although there is no evidence that the Persians undertook a prejudicial policy to undermine the Ionian economy,<sup>625</sup> there must have been disruptions in individual sectors, cities, or families. Since

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622 Gorman 2001:133. Competition amongst imperial officials in Asia Minor was a recurring problem, so much so that one wonders if Histiaeus was sent to Thrace specifically to serve as a check on Megabazus.

623 Hdt. 5.29.

624 Georges 2000:1-10.

625 Lenschau 1913:175-83 argued that Darius favored the Phoenicians as way to weaken the Greeks, whom he saw as too powerful. To my knowledge, there is little literary or archaeological evidence to support this, and most subsequent scholars have rejected it. Furthermore, the solid support of the tyrants for Darius and the Persian regime can have only existed if the tyrants were benefiting materially from the system, which would not have been the case if the Persians were systematically bankrupting Ionia. See Briant 2002:150; Dunham 1915:88.

tyranny was both an unfamiliar and unloved institution and the acknowledged tool of the invaders, an anti-tyranny, anti-Persian revolt may have seemed like a good idea.

Herodotus' narrative leaves clues that the Revolt was largely ideologically motivated. Aristagoras generated support for his cause by "pretending to abdicate his own position in favor of isonomy, and then in the other Ionian *poleis* he did the very same thing..." Apparently, the anti-tyranny sentiment was so strong that, at Mytilene, the tyrant Coes was stoned to death. Aristagoras then ordered that *stratego*i be appointed in each city, in place of the tyrants.<sup>626</sup> By describing Aristagoras' act as a pretense (*λόγῳ*, literally 'in word [alone]') Herodotus makes it clear that Aristagoras did not really care if Ionia was ruled by tyrants or not. In fact, the whole reason he agreed to rebel against Persia was because he had failed to restore exiled aristocrats to Naxos, and feared that Artaphernes and Megabates would demand that he cover the cost of the expedition, and punish him for leading a Persian expedition to defeat.<sup>627</sup> But regardless of Aristagoras' personal political leanings, by wisdom or luck he correctly predicted that he could gain widespread support by promoting the end of tyranny in favor of isonomy. The spread of the Revolt was based not on the rejection of Persians as foreign overlords, but on the opportunity to secure the more representative systems which were gaining popularity before the conquest.

This explains the posture taken by the Persians in the resolution of the revolt in c. 492. After the systematic reduction of most of Ionia and the Hellespont, including the total destruction of Miletus and its population, Darius sent Artaphernes to update the Persian methods of calculating tribute, and Mardonius put an end to the tyrannies and established democratic institutions in all the cities.<sup>628</sup> This was immediately followed by his campaign to destroy Athens

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626 Hdt. 5.37-8.

627 Hdt. 5.35.

628 Hdt. 6.43.

and Eretria. It seems that the only measures necessary to ensure stability in the future were a respect for the locals' desire for isonomy, a more reasonable level of tribute, and a healthy dose of razing and burning. The outward manifestation of Persian rule changed (representative institutions instead of tyrants), but the underlying strategy did not: the Persians were still relying on familiar, local constitutions to maintain their rule. There was no fundamental change in the relationship between the Asian Greeks and the Persian empire.

Miletus comes back into our analysis in c. 391. Around that time, a land dispute arose between Miletus and Myus, a neighboring Ionian city. Both had been tribute-paying allies of the Delian League but, in the fourth century, neither Athens nor Sparta had a solid foothold in Asia. There are two, noncontiguous, fragments of an inscription describing the conflict and its resolution.<sup>629</sup> Based on the current reconstruction,<sup>630</sup> the two cities submitted their case to the King (Artaxerxes II), who then passed the matter down to the satrap, Streuthes. Δικασταὶ (jurors) from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomene, Lebedos, and Ephesos<sup>631</sup> were assembled to hear testimony and render a judgement. However, just as the case was concluding, Myus pulled out.<sup>632</sup> Reports were given to the cities which had judged the proceedings. Myus having abandoned the case, Streuthes decreed that the land belonged to Miletus.<sup>633</sup>

It is important to keep the immediate historical context in mind: Athenian and Spartan armies had been fighting over Ionia for years, Athens was still recovering from her defeat in 404, and Sparta was eliminated as a serious naval power at Cnidus in 395. Spartan efforts on land did

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629 Tod 113 = RO 16.

630 Piccirilli 1973:155-9.

631 Hiller 1908:202 no. 458 and Tod 113 both suggested that other Ionian states (viz. Phoea, Teos, Colophon, Samos, and Priene) were listed in the damaged section.

632 23-5: ἐπεὶ ἔμελλον οἱ δικασταὶ δικᾶν τὴν δίκην, ἔλιπον τὴν δίκην Μυήσιοι.

633 28-32: ἐπεὶ Μυήσιοι τὴν δίκην ἔλιπον, Στρούσης ἀκούσας τῶν Ἴωνων τῶν δικαστέων, ἐξαιτράτης ἐὼν Ἰωνίης, τέλος ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν εἶναι Μιλησίων. We do not know why Myus abandoned the proceedings, or how she responded to the outcome.



not fare much better, culminating with Thibron's death in battle in 392 at the hands of Streuthas.<sup>634</sup> Considering the chaos of recent years, and the fact that Persia was the only legitimate power left, it is not surprising that Ionian cities might turn to Persia to ratify and enforce a decision.

The debate over the meaning of this arbitration is determined by how one interprets Streuthas' actions. Shall we see him as dominating the process, handing down Persian justice to his Greek subjects? Or did he only confirm a decision made by a panel of Greek jurists? This case is surely connected to Artaxerxes' decision to force the Ionians to agree to submit to arbitration as a solution to intra-polis conflicts after the Ionian revolt.<sup>635</sup> Thus the entire process took place within a Persian legal institution. However, that institution seems to have been almost entirely comprised of local Greeks. The King did nothing besides pass the issue down to his local representative, who, in turn, did nothing more than settle the dispute when one of the parties refused to complete the process. Furthermore, if the reconstructions of the stele are correct, the composition of the panel of *dikastai* appears to have been based on the model of the twelve-city Ionian League.<sup>636</sup> This, then, would seem to be a premier example of "imperial authorization:" the Persians have taken a pre-conquest institution and folded it into their local administration, without depriving local elites of their roles and without disturbing their notions of justice.<sup>637</sup>

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634 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17-19.

635 This will be discussed in detail below, p.218.

636 Hdt. 1.142.

637 Frei 2001:18–19. According to Fried 2004, this text indicates that "the judicial procedure was Persian through and through; there was no validation of local norms" (119–121). Her argument is based largely around the verb "*χαρίζονται*" in line 3–4 (as in, the Greek *dikastai* were men 'accepted' by the King and the satrap), and Herodotus' tale of Deioeces the Mede (Hdt 1.96–100), using him as a model of arbitration "under the tyranny of the Persian monarchy." Gammie 1986 captures scholarly opinion when he describes Herodotus' Deioeces as "a caricature of the Oriental despot."

## *The Greek Mainland*

Before Darius' Scythian campaign of 513, the Greeks outside of Ionia had little to no official interaction with the Persian empire. But as a result of that campaign, Thessaly and Macedonia were integrated into the empire. While these regions were ruled by kings, they were not of the scale of the great Near Eastern kingdoms. It is thus important to examine how the Persians dealt with these regions, and see if they were treated differently from other conquered peoples.

The Persians' official entry into the Greek mainland occurred with Darius' Scythian campaign. The ancient authors give different explanations for why Darius took on this expedition. According to Herodotus, Darius wished to punish the Scythians for invading Media generations earlier. He was able to take on such a task because Asia was "in bloom" with men and wealth.<sup>638</sup> Ctesias reports that Darius initially sent Ariaramnes, satrap of Cappadocia, into Scythia. Ariaramnes captured Marsagetes, brother of the Scythian king. When the Scythian king, Scytharches,<sup>639</sup> wrote an angry letter to Darius, he responded with a letter of his own, and an invasion force of 800,000 men.<sup>640</sup> Justin gives a third version, wherein Darius invades with a mere 700,000 men, having been insulted when the Scythian king, Ianthyrus, refused to give Darius his daughter as a bride.<sup>641</sup> These two later versions may have been influenced by Herodotus, as he does report an angry exchange of messages between Darius and the Scythian king Idanthyrusos, but only after the invasion was long underway.<sup>642</sup> Most modern historians reject all of these hypotheses, regarding them as folk-explanations and assuming an economic

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638 Hdt. 4.1.

639 Literally, "ruler of the Scyths."

640 *FGrH* 688 F 13.20-1.

641 2.5.8-12.

642 Hdt. 4.126-7.

and/or strategic rationale instead.<sup>643</sup>

The Scythians themselves, the purported object of the campaign, were not conquered. After leading the Persian force deep into hostile territory, the Scythians sent Darius a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows. Darius interpreted this as the Scythian equivalent of earth and water; Gobryas, a Persian noble, declared that it was a warning. Regardless of the meaning of the gifts, the Persian force retreated back to Asia.<sup>644</sup> Darius left Megabazus and 80,000 men to subdue the Hellespont and Thrace along the coast.<sup>645</sup> Macedonia soon followed.<sup>646</sup>

It is unclear if Macedonia was organized into a satrapy; the local Argead kings were left as the (nominal) rulers, and there is no evidence that Megabazus or any other Persian commander took up a permanent residence in Macedonia. However, Macedonia, Thrace, and Scythia could have been organized into a greater "Balkan" satrapy, initially under Megabazus' control.<sup>647</sup> The Macedonians did contribute forces to Mardonius' failed campaign in 493,<sup>648</sup> and Alexander of Macedon acted as Xerxes' messenger to Athens in 479.<sup>649</sup> Herodotus says that, by 480, the entire land between Doriscus and Thessaly "had been forced into subjection and made tributary to the

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643 Balcer 1972:131-2, 1995:148 cites the rich natural resources of Thrace; Gardiner-Garden 1987:343-5 suggests that the Ionian tyrants proposed the campaign to Darius, in order to defend their commercial interests on the Black Sea coast from Scythian expansion; Kuhrt 2007:183 points out that "the fact that Darius made no use of his sizable fleet to support the land forces suggests that the expedition was limited to fixing the Danube as the effective northern boundary to Persian action in Thrace." These explanations are not mutually exclusive.

644 Hdt. 4.131-4.

645 Hdt. 4.143-4, 5.1-16. Herodotus calls him the *strategos* of Europe (4.143), *strategos* of the lands of the Hellespontines (4.144), and *strategos* of Thrace (5.14). Boteva 2011:747 argues that Darius bestowed these titles in sequence, as his conquests progressed.

646 Hdt. 5.17-18.

647 Modern historians who do believe that this was the case (such as Fol and Hammond 1988:246-9; Olmstead 1948:157-8; Dandamaev 1989:151; Harmatta 1990:128) typically assume that this satrapy was the "Skudra" of the Achaemenid inscriptions (DNa §3.21, DSe §4.11, XPh §3.21). Jacobs 2006 argues that Skudra was a "minor satrapy" that was situated in some way within the jurisdiction of the Lydian "major satrapy." Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 4.17, Cluad. Ptol. 3.13 both place a city called Scydra/Σκύδρα in Macedonia.

648 Hdt. 6.44.

649 Hdt. 8.136-144.

Persia by the conquests, first, of Megabazus and, later, of Mardonius.<sup>650</sup> Furthermore, we learn that Alexander's sister, Gygaea, had been married to Bubares, a Persian commander. They had a son, named Amyntas, to whom Xerxes had given the Phrygian city of Alabanda.<sup>651</sup> Presumably, had the Persians maintained hold of Macedonia for longer, and if the Argeads had shown signs of disloyalty, this Amyntas would have been installed on the throne.<sup>652</sup> If Macedonia was not a satrapy, the king of Macedonia was nevertheless a vassal of the Great King of Persia.

There is no evidence that Persia ever exerted influence over Macedonian legal or religious affairs. Megabazus and his successor, Otanes, limited their activities to subduing the region and transferring populations.<sup>653</sup> Despite this, there is still clear evidence of Persian influence on Macedonia and Thrace. Coins from this region have been found in Phoenicia, Syria and Egypt, their spread facilitated by the Achaemenid imperial order.<sup>654</sup> These coins first appeared during the sixth century, and were produced by a number of apparently independent tribes and cities. Independent mints were slowly shut down by the Macedonian kings until they had been almost entirely replaced by Macedonian royal mints by the accession of Phillip II in 359. Beginning under Alexander I in the early fifth century, the Macedonian kings extracted up to a talent of gold each day from their mines,<sup>655</sup> some of which went to mint coins of a variety of weights. An apparently short-run series of tetrobols displayed a horseman armed with a Persian-style *akinakes* short sword. The horseman may be Alexander I, and it has been argued that the coins were produced during Xerxes' march towards Athens. If this is accurate, the statement

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650 7.108.1. At 3.96.1, Herodotus says that "As time went on" (προϊόντος ... τοῦ χρόνου) the Achaemenid kings received tribute from Europe as far as Thessaly, but he gives no more information about the chronology.

651 Hdt. 5.21, 8.136.

652 Badian 1994:114-6; Fearn 2007:102.

653 Vasilev 2015:120-2.

654 Dahmen 2010:44-5.

655 Hdt. 5.17.

made by these coins is clear. Amyntas and Alexander had profited greatly from Persian rule, and had expanded their kingdom, and these coins were a Macedonian initiative designed to project the combined power of Persia and Macedonia.<sup>656</sup> Just as illuminating is the fact that the coins were produced for only a year, and do not appear to have circulated widely. With Xerxes' retreat, this once-potent political statement became a liability. Still, Alexander held onto whatever gains he had made as a result of the disruptions caused by Darius, Megabazus, and Otanes.<sup>657</sup>

Persia and Macedonia continued their interaction even after Macedonia regained her independence. During the reign of Artaxerxes III, the satrap of Phrygia, Artabazus, fled to Macedonia, as did Manapis, satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania.<sup>658</sup> Around this same period, Persian envoys came to the royal court of Phillip II at Pella, where they met the prince Alexander III.<sup>659</sup> Excavations in Macedonia have uncovered luxury goods that appear to have been inspired by Achaemenid court-style production. Many of these goods may have been imported from formerly Persian territories after Alexander's conquests, or perhaps they were made in Macedonia by craftsmen trained in the Persian empire. But if some of these goods were made and imported before the conquest, they would demonstrate that there existed among the Macedonian nobility an "informed environment" which recognized the Persian pedigree of these items, regardless of their place of manufacture. This would also imply that the Macedonian nobles were still receptive to Persian-style luxury goods, even long after they ceased to be Persian vassals.<sup>660</sup>

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656 Müller and Heinrichs 2008:292-5; Vasilev 2015:156-7. Justin 7.4.2 says that Xerxes conferred to Alexander rule over all the lands between Olympus and the Haemus range.

657 Mari 2011:86.

658 Artabazus: Diod. 16.52.1-4; Curt. 5.9.1, 6.5.1; Shayegan 2007:101-2. Manapis: Curt. 6.4.25; Arrian (who calls him 'Amminapes' 3.22.1.

659 Plut. *Alex.* 5.1. This is not to suggest that the envoys were sent to Pella because of Artabazus' presence there.

660 Paspalas 2000, especially pp. 550-5.

Thessaly offers a case akin to that of Macedonia. Thessaly was not a single kingdom, but a loose federation of cities, each ruled by an aristocratic clan. The Aleudai were the kings of Larissa, and were one of the most power dynasties in the region.<sup>661</sup> According to Herodotus, when Xerxes first took the throne, he was not interested in invading Greece, but the Aleudai, along with the Peisistratids, invited him to do so.<sup>662</sup> Herodotus goes on to specify that "the Thessalians" rejected this policy taken by their rulers, and sent an embassy to the allied conference at the Isthmus in 480 to encourage a communal defense of the passes near Mt. Olympus. Although 10,000 hoplites went north under Spartan command to join the Thessalian cavalry at Tempe, Alexander of Macedon encouraged them to abandon what was surely a suicide mission.<sup>663</sup> As a result, the Thessalians medized, but only as a result of military necessity. The Aleudai continued to serve Xerxes throughout the campaign, escorting the Great King out of Greece and ensuring that Mardonius had a safe camp for the winter of 480/79.<sup>664</sup>

Like the Macedonians, the Aleudai minted coins influenced by their contact with Persia. These Larissan coins bore Thessalian imagery, but were based on Persian weight standards. They are roughly dated to the decade prior to Xerxes' invasion. If true, this would lend further evidence to the Aleudai's warm embrace of the Persians.<sup>665</sup> The evidence for events of fifth-century Thessaly are sparse. As far as we know, there was no direct contact between the Thassalians and the Persians, but some interactions must have been maintained. At the end of the fifth century, the Thessalian-Persian *xenia* networks were up and running. Pausanias says that the

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661 Robertson 1976:102-7.

662 Hdt. 7.5-6.

663 Hdt. 7.172-3. Diodorus 11.3.2 gives a slightly different account. He says that large-scale defection to the Barbarians was already underway as the allies were gathering at Tempe, and only increased after the mission was aborted.

664 Hdt. 8.133, 9.1. Ctes. F13 §27 says that Thorax of Larissa joined Xerxes on the march to confront the allied forces at Thermopylae.

665 Herrmann 1922:36-7, 1925:1-8; Westlake 1936:12-15.

great Olympic champion, Poulydamos of Skotoussa, visited the court of Darius II at some time between 408 and 405.<sup>666</sup> Given Poulydamos' almost heroic status in Greece, he likely was not just a visitor to Susa. He may have acted as a representative for his city, although nothing is said about his acting as an ambassador.<sup>667</sup> Xenophon gives the interesting note that Aristippos of Larissa came to his ξένος Cyrus the Younger and asked for three months' pay for two thousand mercenaries so that he could defeat his local rivals. Cyrus in fact gave Aristippos six months' pay for four thousand troops, but in exchange asked that Aristippos not defeat his rivals before deliberating with Cyrus himself. This was part of Cyrus' plan to secretly build up and maintain forces that he could then call upon when the time was right to launch his campaign against his brother, the Great King Artaxerxes II.<sup>668</sup> And Cyrus did indeed make good use of his Thessalian ally. Aristippos sent 1000 hoplites and 500 peltasts to Cyrus under the command of Menon of Pharsalos,<sup>669</sup> who was himself a φίλος and ξένος of Ariaeus, a ὑπαρχος under Cyrus.<sup>670</sup> That Cyrus was able to draw on Thessalian nobles from Skoutossa, Larissa, and Pharsalos suggests that Persian *xenia*-networks may have extended across the region.<sup>671</sup> The case of Aristippos also shows how local elites made use of Persian assistance in their own power struggles. The Thessalians may have also recognized the Persians as more powerful and more constant allies than the contenders in the Peloponnesian war.<sup>672</sup>

Persia's treatment of Thessaly and Macedonia might serve as models for what could have

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666 Paus. 6.5.7; Hyland 2015:317-8.

667 Hyland 2015:318 cites Antiochus of Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33, 38) and Dionysodoros of Thebes (Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.2-4) as other athletes who participated in official embassies to Persia in fourth-century.

668 Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.10.

669 Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.6; Brown 1986:404.

670 Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.5, 2.1.5.

671 Aston 2012:265.

672 Hyland 2015:321-3.

happened to Athens, had the Persians been able to establish long-term rule over the latter. Interestingly, Hippias, during his exile from Athens (c. 510; see below), was offered a city by both the Macedonian and Thessalians.<sup>673</sup> Given Macedonia's status as a Persian vassal, Darius may have been the one to approve this offer—which Hippias rejected.<sup>674</sup> Although Athens was never integrated into the Persian empire, as will be argued in detail below,<sup>675</sup> after the treaty of c. 506, the Persians considered Athens to be imperial territory, under the control of the Lydian satrap Artaphernes, regardless of how the Athenians felt about the issue.

In c. 510, Hippias, one of the sons of Peisistratus, was the tyrant of Athens. Following the murder of his brother, his rule had become more despotic. So his rivals, the Alcmaeonidae, invited in a Spartan army, and Hippias and his family were forced into exile. In the immediate aftermath, Cleisthenes the Alcmaeonid<sup>676</sup> began to initiate a series of democratizing reforms to the Athenian constitution, in order to secure political power for himself and his allies. Yet another Spartan invasion arrived, this time invited by Isagoras, Cleisthenes' rival. Cleomenes, the Spartan king and general, was unable to force the abolition of the newly-established democracy, but it was clear that the Spartans would make another attempt, with a bigger army. It was at this point that the Athenians sent two ambassadors to Artaphernes at Sardis and asked for an alliance. As I will describe later, the Athenians never actually had need for Persian intervention on their behalf, but the Persians nevertheless deemed Athens a subject state.

Some thirty years later, Hippias was with the Persian force that landed at Marathon. If the

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673 Hdt. 5.94.

674 Xydopoulos 2012:21-9.

675 See p.219ff.

676 Hdt. 6.130-1: he was the son of Megacles, son of Alcmaeon (grandson of the Megacles who killed Cylon's supporters, bringing the *miasma* upon the family) who married Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon.



city was captured, or surrendered, he would be installed as tyrant once again.<sup>677</sup> The Athenian *demos* was, by definition, resistant to tyranny, and so a Persian policy intent on forcing an unpopular system of government on a conquered population might seem at odds with their traditional willingness to work through local systems rather than to create new ones. However, we must keep two facts in mind. First, the Pisistratids had been tyrants from c. 561 to c. 508, although at times they were forced into exile by rival elites. In contrast, by the time of Marathon, Cleisthenes' reforms had only been in place for less than twenty years, and could hardly be considered the "traditional" constitutional form of Athens. Second, and probably related to the first point, there were still factions in Athens that would have welcomed a return of tyranny in 490. We do not know how many men actively supported Hippias' return, but Pisistratus was remembered as a relatively benign, if illegal, ruler.<sup>678</sup>

That there was a medizing<sup>679</sup> faction in Athens at this time is clear, if from nothing more than Miltiades' warning that Athenian collaborators were waiting to act before the battle of Marathon,<sup>680</sup> and Herodotus' report that someone had raised a shield over the walls of Athens after the battle as a signal to the Persian fleet.<sup>681</sup> Herodotus rejects the accusation, that the

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677 One wonders exactly what the Persians expected to gain by installing Hippias. Assuming that he was an adult when he succeeded his father in c. 528, he would have been in his sixties by the time of the Marathon invasion. We know of no sons, although he had married his daughter to Aeantides, tyrant of Lampsacus, before being deposed (Thuc. 6.59).

678 Hdt. 1.56-60; Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 16

679 LSJ defines Μηδισμός (Medism) as "leading towards the Medes" and Μηδίζειν (to Medize) as "to side with the Medes." It implies treasonous political collaboration, and not cultural imitation. It applies to states and individuals who are not currently Persian subjects and collaborate for their own gain, not those who have been forced to submit to Persian rule (Tuplin 1997:155-62). As Graf 1984:15-20 explains, this is in analogy to other "imitative" verbs like Ἀττικίζω, Λακωνίζω, Λυδίζω, etc. Μηδισμός/ Μηδίζειν first appears in Herodotus (see Rung 2013:72n9 for a list of passages), who also uses the phrase "to take the side of the Medes" (8.34: τὰ Μήδων φρονεῖν). Interestingly, Περσίζεω implied adoption of Persian language and culture, but did not take on the connotations of treasonous political behavior (Graf 1984:20).

680 Hdt. 6.109.

681 Hdt. 6.115.

Alcmaeonidae were responsible for this attempted treachery.<sup>682</sup> Whether or not we believe Herodotus, the fact is that there is very little evidence to convict anyone in particular of medism.<sup>683</sup> Considering the harsh literary treatment dealt to Hippias, Demaratus, Pausanias, and Ephialtes, it is unlikely that other known medizers would be forgiven and leave no trace in the historical record. Medism was absolutely a real threat to Athens, and other Greek cities that wished to maintain the independence from Persia, and the Persians had plenty of experience turning a small number of well-placed individuals into a very effective "fifth column." We can be sure that the Persians would have made use of any factions willing to collaborate, and would have treated them much in the same way that they treated the Aleudai of Thessaly and the Argeads of Macedonia.

## Babylon

Unlike the textual material from Fars, there is evidence from Babylon which reveals some of the policies of the Achaemenid kings Cyrus the Great and his son Cambyses. Perhaps the most famous text from the entire Achaemenid period is the so-called Cyrus Cylinder, a Babylonian text written for his newest subjects. In this text we see that, from the early years of the Persian empire, the kings manipulated local religious traditions for their own benefit.

The language of the Cyrus Cylinder, a piece of propaganda targeting a Babylonian audience, was designed to paint a foreign conqueror in the best light possible, and thus introduced Cyrus as a prince following the call of Marduk to bring well-deserved peace to the

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682 Hdt. 6.121. See Gillis 1979:45-51 on this defense.

683 Samons 2011:157 argues that the first Athenians ostracized in the early fifth century were those who the *demos* believed to have medized; Schreiner 1970 argues that the ostracism law was created specifically to punish those who had collaborated with the Persians. As Holladay 1978:184 points out, if they had been demonstrably guilty, surely they would have simply been executed.

people of Babylon(ia):

My vast troops were marching peaceably in Babylon, and the whole of [Sumer] and Akkad had nothing to fear. I sought the safety of the city of Babylon and all its sanctuaries. As for the population of Babylon [..., w]ho as if without div[ine intention] had endured a yoke not decreed for them, I soothed their weariness; I freed them from their bonds(?) Marduk, the great lord, rejoiced at [my good] deeds...<sup>684</sup>

It is important to emphasize the literary context of the Cylinder. Everything about it was firmly rooted in a long Mesopotamian tradition, and there is nothing about it (besides the name of Cyrus) that can be used to group it with the Achaemenid royal inscriptions like those examined above.<sup>685</sup> Babylonian and Sumerian kings had long history of restoring temples and other structures in Babylon and preserving their account of this deed by placing an inscribed cylinder in the foundation of that structure. In fact, a fragment of the Cylinder states that Cyrus had found an inscribed cylinder from a previous restoration:

I strove to strengthen the defenses of the wall Imgur-Enlil, the great wall of Babylon, and [I completed] the quay of baked brick on the bank of the moat which an earlier king had bu[ilt but not com]pleted its work.  
[I ..... which did not surround the city] outside, which no earlier king had built, his workforce, the levee [from his land, in/int]o Shuanna.  
[.....with bitum]en and baked brick I built anew, and [completed] its [work].  
[.....] great [doors of cedar wood] with bronze cladding, [and I installed] all their doors, threshold slabs and door fittings with copper parts. [.....]. I saw within it an inscription of Assurbanipal, a king who preceded me; [.....] in its place. May Marduk, the great lord, present to me as a gift a long life and the fullness of age, [a secure throne and an enduring rei]gn, [and may I ..... in] your heart forever...<sup>686</sup>

With these lines, Cyrus draws on not just Mesopotamian but specifically Neo-Assyrian traditions. The writers of the edict skipped over the more recent Neo-Babylonian traditions and instead looked to the inscriptions of Assurbanipal as a model.<sup>687</sup> Even though the Achaemenid

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684 Lines 24-6. All Cyrus Cylinder excerpts here are from Finkel's 2013 translation.

685 Kuhrt 1983:88.

686 Lines 38-45.

687 Harmatta 1971:219. Stronach 2001 shows that Cyrus also relied on Neo-Assyrian models when adorning his new city, Pasargadae. However, the Assyrians themselves had adopted Neo-Babylonian traditions:

kings emphasize their specifically Persian identity in their own inscriptions, in other contexts they also seem to claim to be the legitimate successors of the previous Mesopotamian empires. When Cyrus claims to have been chosen and guided by Marduk, he is echoing the words of the Assyrian king Sargon II, as well as those of the Babylonian king Merodach-Baladan.<sup>688</sup> Indeed the very act of crafting and burying a cylinder is strongly reminiscent of a similar deed by Assurbanipal—whose own cylinder text Cyrus specifically mentions in line 43 ("an inscription with the name of Assurbanipal, a king who had preceded [me I sa]w..."), This is evidence of two very interesting phenomena: first, the Babylonian priesthood had access to and were familiar with the literature of Assurbanipal, and had been allowed sufficient autonomy by Cyrus to put forward Neo-Assyrian literary customs as a model for Persian proclamations;<sup>689</sup> and second, that Cyrus considered himself an heir to the Neo-Assyrian kings, and not the Neo-Babylonian kings. Now we must explain why the Babylonian priesthood, given a role in the composition of the Cylinder text, chose to use Assyrian rather than Babylonian models, and why this would have been acceptable to Cyrus.

The answer to the first question has been thoroughly obscured by the nature of our sources, namely, the Cylinder itself and another Babylonian text known as the Verse Account. From these texts, both composed after the Persian conquest, we learn that Nabonidus had been neglecting the rites due to Marduk, and instead favoring the moon god Sin, whose cult was

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Assurbanipal took the Babylonian title *šar māt Šumeri u Akkadi*, "king of the country of Sumer and Akkad," most likely as an attempt to demonstrate continuity with the Babylonian past. For the same reason, Cyrus adopted this exact same title in the Cylinder. See Shayegan 2011:287-8.

688 van der Spek 2013:29–30.

689 As discussed at length above (p. 57ff), it is clear that the Elamite acculturation played a significant role in the creation of the Persian identity; it is further known that the Neo-Elamite state had extensive contact with Mesopotamia. It is thus possible that Elamites within Cyrus' administration could have been aware of Neo-Assyrian and -Babylonian literary customs, and may have been the inspiration for his adoption of these customs. If this were to be demonstrated, it would have a powerful impact on our understanding of Cyrus' conquest of Babylon, and his interaction—or lack thereof—with local elites. However, given the Achaemenids' ability to adopt foreign traditions, in cases where one cannot reasonably argue for Elamite mediation (for example, in Egypt), we need not assume that it was present in this case.

centered at Harran. It was up to Cyrus to restore the cult of Marduk to the conditions of an unspecified previous golden age. This would explain the narrative of the Cylinder: the Marduk priests, having languished under Nabonidus, welcomed Cyrus and nostalgically equated his reign with that of Assurbanipal, who returned the statue of Marduk to Babylon.<sup>690</sup> But this, most likely, is to put too much faith in the sources. The Cyrus Cylinder and Verse Account are, first and foremost, propaganda designed to legitimize Cyrus to his Babylonian subjects. This was achieved by making Cyrus look very good, and Nabonidus very wicked. Thus, Nabonidus is criticized for patronizing the moon god Sin at Harran, even though this ignores the historical fact that Assurbanipal himself, among others, commissioned extensive building projects at Harran dedicated to Sin, so much so that the city was "one of the main urban administrative centers of the Assyrian polity" during his reign.<sup>691</sup> And to suggest that the Babylonian priests ignored Nabonidus while embracing Assurbanipal is to forget that that Nabonidus himself clearly modeled his own image on that of Assurbanipal.<sup>692</sup> Cyrus accused Nabonidus of neglecting the cult of Marduk, and took credit for restoring the proper sacrifices. But Nabonidus had made the same claims for himself: in his texts describing his restoration of several temples, he states that Nebuchadnezzar II—grandfather of the king eventually overthrown by Nabonidus—had tried to make a proper restoration. However, the gods had not shown him the original foundations of the temples, so he was forced to make false and therefore structurally unsound surrogates. Nabonidus, loved and aided by the gods, was able to find the foundations (usually laid by a famous predecessor, for example Hammurabi or Naram-Sin) and make a complete and lasting

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690 Cylinder lines 33-6; Harmatta 1971:225-9. As discussed above (p. 34ff) it was common for the Assyrians to capture, and then return statues of the gods, especially in Babylon. Even though Cyrus was not responsible for removing these statues from Babylon, the act of restoration was a traditional act of a pious Babylonian king.

691 Michalowski 2014:205-6.

692 Michalowski 2014:207-8; van der Spek 2014:254.

restoration. His intent was to show that he was intelligent, pious, and legitimate, whereas his predecessors, even the great Nebuchadnezzar, were of an unworthy dynasty, deserving to be overthrown.<sup>693</sup>

The crimes with which Nabonidus is charged, and the terms through which Cyrus is praised, are both more or less stock phrases found in accounts of Babylonian regime changes dating back to at least the time of Sargon II. We are dealing not with contemporary unbiased reporting, but "*post eventum* justifications for the defeat of a perfectly legitimate, regular Babylonian ruler."<sup>694</sup> The very fact that Cyrus must spend such energy vilifying Nabonidus is a clue that perhaps this view of him was not currently widespread. Nor did it take hold: two usurpers under Darius sought to establish their own legitimacy in Babylon by claiming (truthfully or not, it does not matter) to be the son of Nabonidus.<sup>695</sup>

This is not to suggest that Nabonidus was a great king, or that the Verse Account and Cyrus Cylinder are completely false; a piece of propaganda with no basis in reality will persuade no one. Instead, we should focus more on what Cyrus intended by crafting such a message. Regardless of whether it was true, he had no choice but to vilify Nabonidus. Starting from the

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693 Schaudig 2010:155-161.

694 Kuhrt 1990:143-4.

695 DB §16.10-12; §49.3-14; §52.16-21, 46-50; Schaudig 2001:68. Kratz 2002:151 put the creation of the Verse Account and the Chronicle of Nabonidus after the date of these revolts: "As evidenced by the names, the insurgents refer to Nebuchadnezzar II and Nabonidus, thus keeping the memories alive of the last Neo-Babylonian king and his political programme. The anti-Babylonian polemic turns the tables on these efforts to regain national sovereignty. It brings a national Babylonian standpoint into harmony with the Persian foreign reign, accusing meanwhile Nabonidus of estrangement from the Babylonian roots and turning to a foreign cult. Not Nabonidus, but rather Cyrus is the one chosen to complete the historical plan of the gods in succession to the Assyrian and Babylonian kings."

But as Waerzeggers 2015 reminds us, the Nabonidus Chronicle text is a copy, made at least 200 years after the events it describes, and possibly after the Achaemenid period was over. Moreover, its use of Cyrus' title "King of Parsu" is anachronistic for the mid-sixth century, as is the use of "Elam" to describe "Persia." These may be subtle hints that point to editorial changes made during the copying process, or indeed may indicate that the text is a late composition. Thus Waerzeggers argues that this text can only be properly seen as a historical text produced by the Hellenistic Babylonian scribal community, and not as a Neo-Babylonian chronicle text.

base of a well-known fact (Nabonidus' patronage of Sin at Harran), Cyrus then added on a fiction that played on Babylonian concerns (Nabonidus' neglect of Marduk<sup>696</sup>). In a rare acknowledgement of Neo-Babylonian tradition, he also emphasized his restoration of cults and made no mention of his military victories, even those over Nabonidus. The Neo-Babylonian kings had emphasized their building activity and their role as provider for the gods over all of the other traditional roles of the Mesopotamian king (e.g., shepherd of the people, or conqueror), and it is this role that Cyrus adopts as well. In this way, he could appeal to local predispositions and defeat Nabonidus by denying him those attributes which were most important to him.<sup>697</sup>

It is almost certain that Cyrus did in fact ensure that the proper rituals were carried out for Marduk, in order not only to appease the divinity—and his priests—but also to make up for whatever violence he had committed against the city. Although the Cylinder and Verse Account state that Cyrus protected the city and prevented his troops from looting, the accounts found in Xenophon,<sup>698</sup> Herodotus,<sup>699</sup> and in the Hebrew Bible,<sup>700</sup> all reveal a violent takeover of the walled city. The Greek accounts, while contradictory in many ways, tell of a resourceful commander taking a city closed against him by a stratagem. In contrast, the Babylonian cuneiform tradition works to absolve Cyrus of any guilt of having done violence against the great city. Alongside the

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696 Whether or not Nabonidus "neglected" Marduk is debatable. Archaeological evidence from Tayma/Teima (in northwest of modern Saudi Arabia) shows that Nabonidus spent approximately ten years there, long enough to justify building a permanent residence. This would have prevented him from participating in the *akitu* festival, as the Nabonidus Chronicle states. However, while in Tayma, Nabonidus did put up an inscribed stele, which describes, among other things, his offerings to various Babylonian gods, including Marduk (Eichmann et al. 2006:169-74). Additionally, the Nabonidus Chronicle states that, even though the *akitu* festival itself did not take place, offerings were nevertheless made to "the gods of Babylon and Borsippa, as in normal times (ABC 7 ii.7-8)." It is possible that some form of the *akitu* festival was able to continue in the absence of the king (Bidmead 2002:159-60). Furthermore, the festival was celebrated once Nabonidus returned to Babylon (ABC 7 iii.5-8; Kuhrt 1990:140). Thus the image of Nabonidus spending all his time at Tayma, and ignoring Marduk, may be more of an exaggeration than an outright fiction.

697 Waerzeggers 2011.

698 Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.7-17.

699 1.189-191.

700 Jer. 51:28-37.

Cyrus Cylinder narrative seen above, the Nabonidus Chronicle states that it is Ugbaru,<sup>701</sup> not Cyrus himself, who first entered Babylon. Ugbaru then died eight days later. If the capture of the city was believed to be a glorious thing, and Ugbaru wasn't around to assert his claim to the deed, why would Cyrus not have simply claimed it for himself? "The strategy of the chronicler seems to be to encourage the reader to conclude that Ugbaru was a scapegoat, noting his death almost immediately after Cyrus the liberator arrives in Babylon. The implication is that Ugbaru absorbed the divine judgment that otherwise might have been meted out to Cyrus."<sup>702</sup>

But why should there be any divine judgment at all? One possible explanation is that Herodotus and/or Xenophon were, at least, roughly correct in their report of the violent seizure of the city.<sup>703</sup> Another possibility, not necessarily in conflict with the first, is that the conquest was largely peaceful, but still resulted in damage to sensitive sites. A cuneiform text from a Babylonian archive records a payment for work done on the Gate of Enlil, one of the entrances to Babylon on the western side of the Euphrates. As the order was placed only three months after the Persian conquest, it is possible that Ugbaru forced his way into the city through this gate, while Cyrus squared off with Nabonidus and his forces near Sippar.<sup>704</sup> It is also just as possible that the work on the Gate of Enlil was routine maintenance, or was otherwise unrelated to the Persian conquest, and so we should not read too much into this text.

If Cyrus used force to seize Babylon, sound strategy though it may have been, he risked being equated with Sennacherib, who had wrought havoc when he took Babylon in 689 after a

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701 The Nabonidus Chronicle mentions an Ugbaru (ABC 7 iii.15). In the Nabonidus Chronicle, Ugbaru is called the 'governor of Gutium.' In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, 'Gobyras' is an Assyrian fortress commander for the king (4.6.1-2). Petit 1990:49-50 and Briant 2002:41-2 believe that Gobyras and Ugbaru are the same person; Grayson 1975:109 rejects this possibility, without explaining why.

702 Vanderhooft 2006:362.

703 Hdt. 1.188-91; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.7-15; Vanderhooft 2006:353-60.

704 Tolini 2005.



five-year rebellion and fifteen months of a siege.<sup>705</sup> Even the accusation of such a deed could have crippled Cyrus' efforts to ensure an orderly subjugation of Babylon, and he could have been plagued by the same chronic instability in southern Mesopotamia as were the Assyrians. Nabopolassar used Sennacherib's crime as a justification for his war against Assyria.<sup>706</sup> Later, Nabonidus describes Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon:

He [Sennacherib] planned evil; he thought out crimes against the country; he had no mercy for the people [of Babylon]. With evil intentions he advanced on Babylon, he turned its sanctuaries to waste; he made the ground plan unrecognizable; he desecrated the cultic rites. He led the lord Marduk away and brought him to the city Ashur. In accord with the anger of the god, he acted [thus] against the country. The anger of lord Marduk was not eased. For 21 years, he established his residence in the city Ashur. [When] the days were fulfilled [and] the time arrived, the anger of the king of the gods, the lord of lords, calmed and he remembered Esagil and Babylon, his lordly residence. The king of Subartu [Sennacherib], who in accord with Marduk's anger, had laid waste to the country, his very own son struck him down.<sup>707</sup>

This explains Cyrus' embrace of Assurbanipal. It would have been impossible for Cyrus to link himself to the Neo-Babylonians, nor would it have been particularly desirable. By 539, Cyrus had already proven himself to be a world conqueror, something the Neo-Babylonian kings could never claim. Only the Neo-Assyrians were a sufficient model. But Cyrus had to tread carefully. He already had to crush one rebellion in Lydia, and he had not yet had time to consolidate Persian rule. Assurbanipal was the perfect model, a king who had a reputation for both ferocity and piety, and who showed that he was willing to make concessions in order to stabilize Babylon.

Cyrus' message to Babylon is now, hopefully, clear. What of the reality of Persian rule?

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705 Luckenbill 1924:83-5; Brinkman 1973:93-5; Frame 1992:52-63.

706 Gerardi 1986 analyzes text BM 55467, dated to the early part of Nabopolassar's reign, in which the speaker first accuses Sennacherib of an array of crimes against Babylon and the gods, and then promises retribution: "...I shall avenge Babylon. [The property] of the Esagila and Babylon I shall bring down from the enemy land. An encampment [...]. The wall of Nineveh, which is made of strong stone, by the [command] of Marduk great lord, I shall pile up like a mound of sand. [The city] of Sennacherib, the son of Sargon, offspring of a house slave, the conqu[eror of Babylon, plunder]er of Akkad, its roots I shall pluck out and the foundations of the land I shall obliterate."

707 Langdon 1912: 271–273, col. 1, ll.1–41; English translation from Cogan 2009:167-8.

Broadly speaking, there was a great deal of continuity between pre- and post-conquest life in Babylon in terms of the administration of city. Many of the highest temple officials in Babylon and Sippar appointed by Nabonidus, all dependent on royal patronage to gain and hold their offices, continued on into the reign of Cyrus.<sup>708</sup> However, Cyrus exercised his prerogative to replace officials as well, and as time went on, Cyrus' successors made many changes and reforms in the administration of Babylonia. The tax system imposed on Babylonia was an extension of the Neo-Babylonian land-for-service system already in place, and continued to be based on goods and labor, rather than cash.<sup>709</sup> Massive amounts of wealth, material, and manpower were extracted for various wars and imperial projects elsewhere in the empire, and new mechanisms were developed to aid this process. The traditional office of *šakin māti* ('governor of the land') of Babylon was abolished three years after Cyrus' conquest, and its responsibilities were transferred to the new post of the "Governor of Babylonia and Across-the-River."<sup>710</sup> Likewise, the Babylonian title *rab kāsiri* ('treasurer') was replaced by the Persian *ganzabara-*, and the position was reserved for Iranians.<sup>711</sup> During the reign of Darius I, another title was introduced, that of *ustabaru*, OP *vaçabara-* ('garment-bearer'). This was not an office but rather a courtly title bestowed on subjects who had rendered a great service to the king. It was often given to Iranians of the highest non-royal families, but also frequently Babylonians and Egyptians. These men were then able to occupy a variety of influential posts.<sup>712</sup>

The most dramatic event in the first century of Persian rule in Babylon occurred in the second year of Xerxes' reign (484). Two Babylonian pretenders, Bel-šimanni and Šamaš-erība,

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708 Fried 2001:28; Jursa 2007; Waerzeggers 2012.

709 Jursa 2007:86-9; Jursa 2011.

710 Jursa 2007:80.

711 Jursa 2007:87n40.

712 Tavernier 2014.

both independently managed to have themselves declared king in Babylon, Sippar, and Borsippa; it is not clear if the revolts were simultaneous or overlapping, or what the relationship was between the two rebels. In any case, after only a few months Xerxes had restored his authority in Babylonia.<sup>713</sup> Traditionally, scholars had believed Herodotus, who tells the story that Xerxes destroyed Babylon and stole the golden statue of the god Bel.<sup>714</sup> It has also been suggested that, following the revolts, the phrase "king of Babylon" lost its importance in the Achaemenid royal titlature, and was supplanted by the "Iranian" element "king of the land of Persia and the land of Media."<sup>715</sup>

These two arguments have since been conclusively rejected, on the basis of a more accurate reading of Herodotus,<sup>716</sup> and on a reanalysis of Achaemenid royal titles.<sup>717</sup> Further, Caroline Waerzeggers has demonstrated that Xerxes' response to the rebellions was not a mass destruction of the city, but rather the elimination of only those temple elites located in the northern regions who supported the rebels. The archives of these elite families all came to an end at approximately the same time; what is more, they appear to have been sorted and stored for safekeeping, rather than lost or destroyed in some violent disaster.<sup>718</sup> The entrepreneurial elites, who lacked the long-standing power base enjoyed by the temple elites, remained loyal to the Persians and therefore suffered no reprisals. This helps to explain the lack of archaeological evidence of wide-scale destruction that should have accompanied an unrestrained Persian

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713 Waerzeggers 2003/4:154-5.

714 Hdt. 1.183; cf. Ctes. F13.26.

715 Cameron 1941:323-4; Dandamaev 1989:185.

716 Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987:71-2 emphasize that Herodotus accuses Xerxes of destroying a statue of a man (*ἀνδριάνς*), and the statue of Bel was still standing during Herodotus' day.

717 Already Dandamaev 1989 acknowledged that Xerxes and Artaxerxes I continued to use the title "king of Babylon." Shayegan 2011:260-90 shows that the "Iranian" element, "king of the land of Persia and the land of Media" has no known Old Persian pedigree. Instead, it is most likely an innovation made by the Babylonian priesthood; conversely it may have been inspired by Elamites within the Achaemenid administration.

718 Waerzeggers 2003/4:162; Baker 2008:109.

counterattack.<sup>719</sup> None of this is to deny that the Persians ruled Babylon with a heavy hand at times; Xerxes eliminated the rebels and replaced them with individuals expected to be more loyal.<sup>720</sup> The important realization is that Xerxes' policy towards Babylon was more or less in line with that of Cyrus, and did not reflect a more violent attitude.

## Judah

Persian interaction with the people of Judah began around 539. In the Hebrew Bible, Cyrus appears as the agent of another god, this time Yahweh. Cyrus is named as Yahweh's anointed one, who frees the Jews from captivity.<sup>721</sup> Interestingly, when the Biblical tradition describes the fall of Babylon, the deed is carried out by barbarian tribes, including the Medes, but Cyrus himself is not named.<sup>722</sup> This attitude may be the result of the adoration of the people of Judah for Cyrus, who not only freed them from Babylon but, according to several passages, gave them permission to rebuild their temple and the resources to do so:

2 Chron. 36:22-3:

In the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, in order to fulfill the word of the Lord spoken by Jeremiah, the Lord moved the heart of Cyrus king of Persia to make a proclamation throughout his realm and also to put it in writing:

"This is what Cyrus king of Persia says: "The Lord, the God of heaven, has given me all the kingdoms of the earth and he has appointed me to build a temple for him at Jerusalem in Judah.

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719 Waerzeggers 2003/4. Kessler 2004 shows how a similar phenomenon played out in Uruk. There, many important positions at the Eanna temple had been granted by previous Babylonian kings to families of Northern Babylonian origin. These families tended to orient their cultic practices towards the Babylonian gods Bel/Marduk, Nabu and Nergal. During the course of a very short period of time early in Xerxes' reign, these families were replaced by locals who preferred the local gods Anu, Ištar, Šamaš, or Nana. Kessler makes clear that this was a strategic royal initiative designed to shift economic power towards the Uruk elites, and it was not a matter of theological conflict.

720 Baker 2008:111-15 hypothesizes that some homes in the Merkes residential district of Babylon may have belonged to the same type of families who were punished by Xerxes. There is an obvious break in occupation in these homes c. 485/4, with some of the homes having been destroyed by fire, along with the temple of Ištar of Akkad. Baker emphasizes that this is highly speculative.

721 2 Chron 36:22-33; Ezra 1:1-8, Ezra 3:7; Ezra 4:3; Ezra 5:13-17, Ezra 6:3; Isaiah 44:28, Isaiah 45:1.

722 e.g. Jer 51:30-32. See Vanderhoof 2006.

Any of his people among you may go up, and may the Lord their God be with them."

Ezra 1:1-4:

"This is what Cyrus king of Persia says: "The Lord, the God of heaven, has given me all the kingdoms of the earth and he has appointed me to build a temple for him at Jerusalem in Judah. Any of his people among you may go up to Jerusalem in Judah and build the temple of the Lord, the God of Israel, the God who is in Jerusalem, and may their God be with them. And in any locality where survivors may now be living, the people are to provide them with silver and gold, with goods and livestock, and with freewill offerings for the temple of God in Jerusalem."

Ezra 6:3-5:

In the first year of Cyrus the king the same Cyrus the king made a decree concerning the house of God at Jerusalem, Let the house be built, the place where they offered sacrifices, and let the foundations thereof be strongly laid; the height thereof threescore cubits, and the breadth thereof threescore cubits; With three rows of great stones, and a row of new timber: and let the expenses be given out of the king's house: And also let the golden and silver vessels of the house of God, which Nebuchadnezzar took forth out of the temple which is at Jerusalem, and brought unto Babylon, be restored, and brought again unto the temple which is at Jerusalem, every one to his place, and place them in the house of God.

There is debate over whether these passage record authentic Persian edicts, in the sense that they might be copies of the original with only minor alterations; or if they are merely reliable depictions of Persian policy in action, even if they do not reflect an actual edict; or if they are pure fabrication, created to serve the interests of the compilers of the Hebrew canon. According to the scholarly consensus, the language used in these passages dates them to the post-Achaemenid period, and reflects a specifically Jewish worldview,<sup>723</sup> so, if they were based on authentic original texts, we cannot know exactly what those originals said. There is also very little archaeological evidence to support the notion of a large group moving into the region at any point during the Persian period, or the rebuilding or fortification of Jerusalem.<sup>724</sup> Finally, inconsistencies within the Biblical texts and challenges of interpretation make these sources even more difficult to use. But by comparing the case of Judah with other analogous examples from elsewhere in the empire, we will see that these passages most likely are an accurate reflection of a real edict. Cyrus' edict, as well as other aspects of Persian policy in Judah, was part of a

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723 Edelman 2005:181-200; Grabbe 2001, 2006; Janzen 2000.

724 Grabbe 2009:117; Na'aman 2009:27-9; Finkelstein 2008:510-14.

consistent imperial policy of the integration of local religious and legal traditions into the system of imperial rule.

Cyrus must have come into contact with the deported Jewish population living in Babylon fairly soon after the conquest. These people clearly had a strong desire to return to their home, and would not have waited very long before initiating that process. Ezra states that Cyrus freed them in his first year, which must mean his first year after conquering Babylon. It is not entirely clear why Cyrus would allow them to return and to rebuild their temple community, but since he evidently did allow them to return, he must have calculated that it was in the interest of his empire. Certainly, Cyrus would have wanted to control the Levantine trading ports, and prevent the Egyptians from filling the vacuum in the Levant following the collapse of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires. Returning residents would have also restored the productivity of farmland left untended after 587.<sup>725</sup>

How might the restoration of the temple fit into imperial policy? Despite the belief of some scholars, there is little evidence that the Persians had a general policy of restoring temples in their realm, or a unique interest in supporting various cults in their empire. Cyrus did in fact restore Babylonian temples,<sup>726</sup> but, as stated above, this was a calculated effort by Cyrus to ingratiate himself to the local elites, and to strengthen his legitimacy by acting out the traditional role of the Mesopotamian benevolent king. Darius claimed to have restored the rites or places of worship<sup>727</sup> eliminated by Gaumāta, but this is yet more propaganda, and cannot be taken as

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725 Lipschits 2006:25-32.

726 de Vaux 1972:58-9.

727 In DB §14, Darius says: *avaθā adam akunavam āyadanā tayā Gaumāta haya maguš viyaka*. OP *āyadana-* is frequently translated as "temple," "cult center," etc. (Schmitt 2009:45-6; Boyce 1982:88). Lecoq 1995:183-6 argues that it should be translated as "rite, cult." First, he aims to show that Sanskrit, Avestan, and other Old Persian words in *-ana-* are typically actions or agents, not places. Next, he cites Herodotus 1.131, who states that the Persians do not make use of statues or temples in their worship. Finally, Lecoq address the Babylonian and Elamite versions of this line. While the Babylonian version is clear that the object destroyed is a temple (É.meš šá DINGIR.meš, "the temples of the gods"), Lecoq argues that the Elamite <sup>AN</sup>*zi-ia-an* refers to the way in

historical. Even if it were historical, it should only apply to Persian temples, not those across the empire. And as we shall see, in Egypt and Greece, the Persians were just as willing to destroy a temple as preserve or rebuild one. So Cyrus must have allowed for the rebuilding of the temple at Jerusalem simply because the returning exiles were able to make the case that it was absolutely necessary for their society. Compared with the great temples of Babylon, this one additional temple was not enough to strain the imperial treasury. This does not imply official Persian interest or interference in cultic practice or religious belief in Judah.

Once they returned to their homeland, what role did the people of Judah play in the empire? Whose law governed them? It seems clear that Judah was integrated into the satrapal system as a part of the satrapy of Babylon and Ebar-nari ('Across-the-River').<sup>728</sup> According to Herodotus, the satrapal system was set up by Darius,<sup>729</sup> but this need not be taken to mean that Darius was the first to institute a system of satrapies in any form; in fact, it is hard to imagine that the empire could have been administered in an ad hoc fashion, especially considering that the Assyrians and Babylonians had a standardized system of provincial administration that could have served as a precursor for the Persian administration. Still, it is not clear what system was in place when Cyrus released the Jewish exiles. As the seat of the satrapy is unknown, we cannot gauge who was immediately responsible for governing Judah.

Even if the documents cited in Ezra are untrustworthy, they rely on the notions of Persian

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which humans view the gods, and thus "'rite, doctrine, coutume, usage', mais il n'est pas possible de préciser plus." He explains that the Babylonian versions uses "temples" because of the significance of the destruction of temples within the Babylonian literary tradition. He translates the entire line, "j'ai accompli les rites que Gaumāta le Mage avait supprimés (Lecoq 1997:192)." Henkelman 2008:469-73 rejects much of Lecoq's reasoning, but, more importantly, argues that no one version of DB is the primary, and all are to be understood equally as the King's words. "If this means that the King's message is polyvalent when it comes to concepts like *ziyan* and *āyadana-*, we will just have to live with that conclusion (2008:473)."

728 The territory of Babylonia and Ebar-nari "included not only Babylonia and coastal Syria and Palestine, but also the adjacent regions of upper Mesopotamia and inland north Syria." It appears that, initially, there was a satrap of the whole area, and a subordinate governor of just Ebar-nari. At some later point, the two units were split into independent and equal satrapies (Stolper 1989:288-92).

729 Hdt. 3.89-97.

control and of communication between Judah and the royal court. But how far did this control go? The problem, as we have seen, is two-layered: first we must determine which texts are authentic, or at least provide some reliable information about the question; and second, we must decide what those authentic or reliable texts tell us about the administration of Judah as a part of the empire. A full resolution to these problems is far beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it will suffice to determine whether or not the Persians were likely to allow laws governing Judah to have a basis in traditional Jewish customs and practices, in any significant way. Even if only a few laws for Judah had such a basis, they would be sufficient to establish a precedent. In contrast, if we find evidence that the Persian administration rejected or hindered local custom, we would have evidence that the Persians did not always concern themselves with maintaining local customs, although we would not be justified in assuming this was a manifestation of an imperial policy without having access to a wider range of information.

It is generally accepted that the books of the Pentateuch and Prophets were in their present state by the end of the Persian period.<sup>730</sup> However, the creation of new biblical texts had nearly come to an end by the middle of the Persian period; the Pentateuch had been composed by the pre-exilic period, with later generations only editing. Post-exilic Jerusalem, and Judah in general, was a poor and underpopulated region, not likely to be the scene of a literary explosion. Furthermore, the Pentateuch is a work of classical Hebrew, not Aramaic. Even if the tiny population of Jerusalem could support Hebrew scholars capable of composing in an archaic tongue, they would have required still older source material, on which to base their new composition.<sup>731</sup>

This was the textual material from which the people of Judah could have drawn a legal

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730 Grabbe 2001:112-3; Schmid 2006.

731 Schniedewind 2004:170-2.



system. Looking to one of the few texts certainly composed after the Persian period, we find that Ezra is supposed to have brought a law from Babylonia to Judah:

Ezra 7:25-6:

[from the edict of Artaxerxes:] 'And you, Ezra, according to the God-given wisdom you possess, appoint magistrates and judges who may judge all the people in the province Beyond the River who know the laws of your God; and you shall teach those who do not know them. All who will not obey the law of your God and the law of the king, let judgement be strictly executed on them, whether for death or for banishment or for confiscation of their goods or for imprisonment.'

Neh. 8:1-8

They told the scribe Ezra to bring the book of the law of Moses, which the Lord had given to Israel. Accordingly, the priest Ezra brought the law before the assembly, both men and women and all who could hear with understanding. This was on the first day of the seventh month. He read from it facing the square before the Water Gate from early morning until midday, in the presence of the men and the women and those who could understand; and the ears of all the people were attentive to the book of the law ... So they read from the book, from the law of God, with interpretation. They gave the sense, so that the people understood the reading.<sup>732</sup>

The importation of a written law code for Judah did not simply coincide with the period of Persian rule; it was a product of the Persian period. The spread of Aramaic gave Jewish scholars a tool for codifying their own traditions, which could then be brought back to the homeland and used to instruct the population, part of the process of restoring and purifying the community.<sup>733</sup> This in no way means that the Torah was written at the request or command of the Persian administration,<sup>734</sup> nor that Ezra was the one and only individual to introduce the written Torah to Judah. Based on comparative studies between the Torah and other Near Eastern law codes, as well as texts from Elephantine and Wadi Daliyeh, we ought to assume that the Torah was originally a legal ideal in the minds of the scribal elites, and not the legal reality of Judah.<sup>735</sup> However, the same may not be true for the Persian period. In the passage from Nehemiah above,

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732 Schniedewind 2004:180: "This text assumes that an audience in Jerusalem in the fifth century B.C.E. did not understand the Hebrew of the Torah. It had to be interpreted or translated, as the Hebrew word, *meforash*, in this text suggests (also see Ezr 4:18). In fact, the very Hebrew word employed, *meforash*, is a loanword from Aramaic, where it was a technical term used in the Persian chancellery. In other words, the use of this expression, with interpretation, indicates that the author had training by the Persian administration in Aramaic."

733 Schniedewind 2004:187.

734 As in the interpretation of Frei 2001.

735 Grabbe 2005:180-3; Jackson 2000:121-141; Patrick 1985:191-193.

Ezra not only presents the law to the people, but teaches them so that they might understand it, presumably so that it will be put into practice. Ezra gathered the heads of the families and the priests and Levites so that they might study the law further, and become experts.<sup>736</sup> Even if the Torah only functioned as a didactic or descriptive legal text, it still played a role in informing legal decisions.<sup>737</sup> There is also the possibility that the Torah was composed as a non-legal text, but its canonization in written form led it to become both decontextualized and authoritative as a legal text.<sup>738</sup>

But what was the relationship between this written law and the empire? If Ezra, or any other Jewish official working as part of the imperial or satrapal administration, introduced a law code to a province, he could not have done so without some sort of prior approval. The imperial administrators would have reported anything that challenged Persian authority. Why would the Persians allow the Jews to have so much autonomy? It is actually better to ask what reason the Persian authorities would have for rejecting the Torah as part of the legal system of the province of Judah. The Jewish people had a traditional law (whether or not it was originally intended to function as the basis of a functional legal system). Even though this tradition had originally glorified the kings of Judah as the only true divinely-guided monarchs on earth, and stated that an independent and powerful Jewish monarchy was divine will, the compilers of the Torah were evidently willing to incorporate the Persian kings into their system: the Jewish texts composed during and after the Persian period, in contrast with pre-exilic texts, portray the Davidic line as pious temple builders, rather than powerful and autonomous political leaders;<sup>739</sup> the legitimacy of

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736 Neh.8:13; Jackson 2000:141-2.

737 LeFebvre 2006; Jackson 1975:497 points out that the primary meaning of the word *torah* is 'instruction, teaching,' and not 'law,' as in Greek *nomos*.

738 Fitzpatrick-McKinley 1999:167-172.

739 Schniedewind 2004:165-173.

the Pentateuch as a law code comes both from the fact that it was handed down from Moses, but equally that it was brought back to Judah under the aegis of imperial writ, according to the imperial texts cited in Ezra and Nehemiah; the description of Solomon as the Ideal King in Chronicles is aided by the incorporation of Achaemenid royal iconography;<sup>740</sup> it is Cyrus, not a descendant of David, whom the Lord calls his "anointed" at Isaiah 45. Regardless of the historical truth of any of these statements, it is apparent that the compilers of the Hebrew bible understood the Persian state as a legitimate authority in Judah. What more could the Persians have asked for?

Evidence that Mosaic law was actually applied in Judah is thin, but examples can be taken from the accounts of Ezra and Nehemiah. First, Ezra mandated the Festival of Booths, as described at Lev. 23:39-43.<sup>741</sup> Later, he read out further cultic practices all found in the Pentateuch, although, as Grabbe points out, the requirement to bring wood for the altar (10:35) is not otherwise known to us.<sup>742</sup> He commanded the men to expel their foreign wives and the children by them (9-10). Beyond these laws, there are references to the narrative history of the Jewish people from the Torah, such as the creation, the story of Abraham, the Exodus, and the conquest of the Promised Land.

Nehemiah enforced Mosaic law as well. He restored tithes owed to the Levites:

Neh. 13:10-14:

I also found out that the portions of the Levites had not been given to them; so that the Levites and the singers, who had conducted the service, had gone back to their fields. So I remonstrated with the officials and said, 'Why is the house of God forsaken?' And I gathered them together and set them in their stations. Then all Judah brought the tithe of the grain, wine, and oil into the storehouses. And I appointed as treasurers over the storehouses the priest Shelemiah, the scribe Zadok, and Pedaiah of the Levites, and as their assistant Hanan son of Zaccur son of Mattaniah, for they were considered faithful; and their duty was to distribute to their associates. Remember me, O my God, concerning this, and do not wipe out my good deeds that I have done for the house of my God and for his service.

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740 Dixon 2009.

741 Neh.8:13-17.

742 Grabbe 2001:96.

This was a reference to Deut. 12:19 ("Be careful not to neglect the Levites as long as you live in your land.") or Num. 18:21 ("To the Levites I have given every tithe in Israel for a possession in return for the service that they perform.")

Next, he enforced the holiness of the Sabbath:

Neh.13:15-22:

In those days I saw in Judah people treading wine presses on the sabbath, and bringing in heaps of grain and loading them on donkeys; and also wine, grapes, figs, and all kinds of burdens, which they brought into Jerusalem on the sabbath day; and I warned them at that time against selling food. Tyrians also, who lived in the city, brought in fish and all kinds of merchandise and sold them on the sabbath to the people of Judah, and in Jerusalem. Then I remonstrated with the nobles of Judah and said to them, 'What is this evil thing that you are doing, profaning the sabbath day? Did not your ancestors act in this way, and did not our God bring all this disaster on us and on this city? Yet you bring more wrath on Israel by profaning the sabbath.'

When it began to be dark at the gates of Jerusalem before the sabbath, I commanded that the doors should be shut and gave orders that they should not be opened until after the sabbath. And I set some of my servants over the gates, to prevent any burden from being brought in on the sabbath day. Then the merchants and sellers of all kinds of merchandise spent the night outside Jerusalem once or twice. But I warned them and said to them, 'Why do you spend the night in front of the wall? If you do so again, I will lay hands on you.' From that time on they did not come on the sabbath. And I commanded the Levites that they should purify themselves and come and guard the gates, to keep the sabbath day holy. Remember this also in my favor, O my God, and spare me according to the greatness of your steadfast love.

This is a reference to the fourth commandment, as recorded at Ex. 20:8-11 ("Remember the sabbath day, and keep it holy. For six days you shall labor and do all your work. But the seventh day is a sabbath to the Lord your God; you shall not do any work—you, your son or your daughter, your male or female slave, your livestock, or the alien resident in your towns.") The law is repeated at Lev. 23:3 ("For six days shall work be done; but the seventh day is a sabbath of complete rest, a holy convocation; you shall do no work: it is a sabbath to the Lord throughout your settlements.")

Last, like Ezra, he expelled the foreign women taken as wives:

Neh.12:23-27:

In those days also I saw Jews who had married women of Ashdod, Ammon, and Moab; and half

of their children spoke the language of Ashdod, and they could not speak the language of Judah, but spoke the language of various peoples. And I contended with them and cursed them and beat some of them and pulled out their hair; and I made them take an oath in the name of God, saying, 'You shall not give your daughters to their sons, or take their daughters for your sons or for yourselves. Did not King Solomon of Israel sin on account of such women? Among the many nations there was no king like him, and he was beloved by his God, and God made him king over all Israel; nevertheless, foreign women made even him to sin. Shall we then listen to you and do all this great evil and act treacherously against our God by marrying foreign women?'

It was God's command that foreigners should not live in the Promised Land, and that His people should not interact with them except through violence:

Deut. 7:1-6:

When the Lord your God brings you into the land that you are about to enter and occupy, and he clears away many nations before you—the Hittites, the Girgashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations mightier and more numerous than you — and when the Lord your God gives them over to you and you defeat them, then you must utterly destroy them. Make no covenant with them and show them no mercy. Do not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their daughters for your sons, for that would turn away your children from following me, to serve other gods. Then the anger of the Lord would be kindled against you, and he would destroy you quickly. But this is how you must deal with them: break down their altars, smash their pillars, hew down their sacred poles, and burn their idols with fire. For you are a people holy to the Lord your God; the Lord your God has chosen you out of all the peoples on earth to be his people, his treasured possession.

Mary Douglas has argued that Ezra was simply in a "weak political position," and therefore willfully misinterpreted these passages, and ignored traditional Jewish thought. He took advantage of the instability in Jerusalem and expelled minorities in order to consolidate his own power.<sup>743</sup> This may well be so. It would not, however, change the fact that Ezra—and Nehemiah—were enforcing a law based on Jewish tradition, even if it was their own twisted version. They presented their reforms as Mosaic law, and they seem to have been received as such by the populace. Unless we are going to throw out the entirety of Ezra and Nehemiah as completely fictitious, we must accept that, at least on certain occasions, the laws being enforced in Judah were Mosaic laws. This argument does not require that the Torah represent the totality of Judah's legal system, nor does it contradict the reality of Persian law superseding Mosaic law, in the sense that it governed interactions between Judah and the imperial system. Just as Cyrus allowed

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743 Douglas 2002.

himself to be guided by Marduk in Babylon, guided by YHWH's hand he returned His exiles to Judah. The men who governed these regions were appointed by the Persian administration, but could be drawn from the local population.

The reliance on local legal tradition in Judah served Persian interests, but only insofar as such traditions, as an institution, were acceptable and familiar to the local population and therefore more likely to be obeyed and enforced; there is no evidence that individual Mosaic laws were crafted specifically in the interests of Persia. While one might expect that Ezra and Nehemiah, in their role as Persian agents, were acting solely in service to the empire, this is too narrow a view. The Judean and Israelite populations had been scattered throughout the Near East long before 539, and many of these relocated people opted to stay in their new homes rather than return to Persian Judah.<sup>744</sup> Those who did return were not colonists but an extension and a product of the exilic community in Babylon. It was this group, not the Persian administration, that was concerned with restoration of the temple and adherence to the laws of Moses. Take, for example, the expulsion of foreign wives. This is a law concerning citizenship in the community governed by those Mosaic laws. There is no reason why the Great King would have cared whom an individual Judean married.<sup>745</sup> As we have already seen, there are no instances of the Great King enforcing proper cultic practices outside of Iran. The expulsion of foreign women may have been carried out with the tacit acquiescence of the King, but it was not an imperial directive.

In sum, the textual evidence concerning Achaemenid Judah shows that the imperial administration governed Judah, at least in part, through traditional Judean laws. We do not know if this decision was prompted by a local request, or a top-down imperial command. Either way,

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744 Kessler 2006:107.

745 Eskenazi 2006:525.

the law code was (re)introduced to Judah by imperial agents drawn from the very community addressed by the code. Judah thus shows, once again, that the Achaemenid imperial administration made use of local legal traditions, which had been subsumed into imperial law, to ensure the stability of the empire.

## Egypt

Persian rule in Egypt seems to have been similar to that in Babylonia and Judah. The Persians were ruthless in their program of exploitation of the local population and extraction of resources, and yet made an effort to appeal to local sensitivities and rely on manipulation of local symbols. There are two text corpora that best exemplify the reality of Persian rule and the interaction between Persian administrators and the local elites. The one is the Demotic Chronicle, the other, the Aramaic papyri from Elephantine.

### *The Demotic Chronicle*.<sup>746</sup>

Neither the date of composition nor the author of this text is known, although paleography places it in the third century BCE, and it appears to have been written by at least three different hands. The recto is an oracular text, possibly a collection of oracles, concerning the era from the reign of Cambyses (525-520) to the Ptolemies. The verso has five separate texts, of which we will be concerned with only the final two. One is a statement about the rule of Darius I:

The matters that occurred following what was written in the Book of Decrees from Year 44 of the Pharaoh — life, prosperity, health — Amasis — life, prosperity, health — until Cambyses was in command of Egypt; he died ...(?) before regaining his country.

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<sup>746</sup> The translations of the Demotic Chronicle here are found in Kuhrt 2007:124-6 except where otherwise noted.

Darius made [the chiefs?] of the whole earth obey him because of his greatness of heart. He wrote (to) his satrap in Egypt in Year 3, saying: 'Have them bring to me the scholars [...] among the soldiers, priests and scribes of Egypt [...]. They are to write the law of Egypt from olden days until Year 44 of Pharaoh — life, prosperity, health — Amasis — life, prosperity, health!

The law [...] of the temples and the people, have them brought here ...(?) a papyrus until Year 19 [...] Egypt. They were [...] (in) Year 27. He wrote matters [...] in the manner(?) of the law of Egypt. They wrote a copy on papyrus in Assyrian writing and in documentary writing. It was completed before him. They wrote in his presence; nothing was left out.

It begins with the information that a 'book of decrees' was written, and that a certain section of it covered the period from the last year of Amasis' life to the period of Cambyses' reign. We then learn that it was Darius who had gathered the "scholars [...] among the soldiers, priests and scribes of Egypt" to record the laws of Egypt. This portion covered the laws made before Amasis' death. Darius drew a clear distinction between pre- and post-conquest legislation.

Diodorus tells us why:

A sixth man to concern himself with the laws of the Egyptians, it is said, was Darius the father of Xerxes; for, hating the transgressions committed by Cambyses, the previous king, against the temples in Egypt, he desired to live a fitting and pious life. Indeed, he conversed with the priests of Egypt themselves, and took part in their study of theology and of the events recorded in their sacred books; and after he discovered from them the greatness of spirit of the ancient kings and their goodwill towards those they ruled, he imitated their manner of life.<sup>747</sup>

The "transgressions" of Cambyses towards the temples is hard to identify. It has been clear for decades that Herodotus' portrayal of the murderous mad king Cambyses (the so-called "Cambyses madness logos") was largely fiction possibly created by the propaganda apparatus of Darius. Its chief accusations were that Cambyses, in the wake of the Egyptian conquest, killed the sacred bull Apis, and plundered Egyptian temples.<sup>748</sup> However, an inscription on a more recently discovered sarcophagus of the Apis Bull testifies that Cambyses had treated the god—which indeed had died—with the utmost respect.<sup>749</sup> The Demotic Chronicle seems to indicate

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747 1.95.4-5.

748 Hdt. 3.27-9.

749 Kuhrt 2007:124; Briant 2002:57; but see Depuydt 1995.



that Cambyses restricted the income of some goods to some temples, but it is also very explicit that income of other temples was to remain as before.<sup>750</sup> Perhaps this was sufficient to forever blacken Cambyses' name in the Egyptian mind, but it is unlikely. Agut-Labordère points out that the temples received from the Pharaoh a wide variety of commodities, the majority of which Cambyses' restrictions never even mention. The commodities that are restricted are raw materials easily produced in Egypt, and indeed the temples are instructed to produce these commodities for themselves.<sup>751</sup> Further, Cambyses names three temples which are to be exempted from some of the restrictions. This would have been little comfort to those priests now forced to raise their own livestock and grow their own timber, but Cambyses' priestly allies would have told a different story.

This very phenomenon is plain to see in the inscription of the most famous Egyptian collaborator, Udjahorresnet.<sup>752</sup> This scholar and naval commander described how foreigners (that is, the Persian conquerors) had installed themselves in the temple of Neith, possibly referring to looting or disrespectful soldiers in the Persian army. When Udjahorresnet asked Cambyses to have these men removed, Cambyses ordered them out, had the temple purified, and made offerings to "Neith, the great one, the mother of god, and to the great gods who are in Sais, as it was earlier."<sup>753</sup> It is no coincidence that Udjahorresnet was a prophet of Neith, and it is true that other temples lacking such an influential supporter appear to have been closed during the Persian period.<sup>754</sup> So we should read the hostile Egyptian accounts not as evidence of a blanket policy applied across all of Egypt, but rather the (possibly legitimate) complaints by local elites

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750 Agut-Labordere 2010.

751 Agut-Labordere 2005.

752 The main edition of this inscription is by Posener 1936:1-26.

753 Kuhrt 2007:118.

754 Fried 2004:71.

unwilling or unable to collaborate with the conquerors.

Even within Herodotus' text, there is evidence of divided opinions of Cambyses amongst Egyptians. Herodotus tells us that, according to the Persians, Cambyses invaded Egypt because he had requested that Amasis give him one of his daughters as a wife. When Amasis instead sent him a daughter of Apries, a previous pharaoh, Cambyses flew into a rage and went to war. However, the Egyptians claimed that Cambyses was actually an Egyptian himself, being the grandson of Apries.<sup>755</sup> The Egyptians had no affection for Cambyses, but they were willing to assimilate him into their own history.

Herodotus also tells conflicting tales about Cambyses outside of Egypt. In one scene, he is concerned with justice: after flaying a judge who had taken bribes and stretching the skin onto a chair, he appointed the victim's son to act as judge from that very chair.<sup>756</sup> Cruel to be sure, but within the realm of usual behavior for a Persian king in the mind of a Greek historian. But later, Herodotus reveals that Cambyses was guilty of as many crimes against Persians as against Egyptians, if not more: he killed his own sister, his brother Bardiya, and a score of noblemen. This points to a second source of misinformation on Cambyses: Darius. Assuming that Darius was a usurper, it would have been necessary for him to put Cambyses in the worst light possible.

Returning to the Demotic Chronicle, we should seek the purpose of this "Book of Laws" compiled under Darius. According to Frei, this was a clear example of Persian "authorization" of local laws.<sup>757</sup> However, according to Redford, the collecting and refining of laws had been going on for two centuries before the Persians arrived. There may have been nothing left for Darius to

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755 Yet another variant (Hdt. 3.1-3), whose source Herodotus does not mention, says that Cassandanae, Cyrus' wife, felt that she had been upstaged by one of his Egyptian wives. Cambyses invaded Egypt to avenge this insult to his mother. This version is echoed in Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F13a = Athenaeus 13.10.

756 Hdt. 5.25; Kuhrt 2007:133-4.

757 Frei 2001:9-10.

collect. Instead, he suggests that Darius' 'codification' was nothing more than translation into Demotic and Aramaic, to inform the Persian administrators about existing legal customs in Egypt.<sup>758</sup> Nowhere is it claimed that Darius ruled according to these and only these laws. But he clearly wanted to understand the expectations of his new subjects, and succeeded in pleasing at least some of them. Because Darius was a usurper, he was faced with widespread rebellions, including in Egypt.<sup>759</sup> However, he makes almost no mention of the rebellion in Egypt because he won no military glory there. Although we do not know the details of his reconquest, he may have made concessions to the elites in order to convince them to accept his rule.<sup>760</sup> As the Demotic Chronicle says, his new Book of Laws drew a distinction between the pre-conquest laws and those made under Cambyses. This *could* imply that Cambyses' restrictions on temple income, however moderate they may have been, were rescinded.<sup>761</sup>

After Darius died, Egypt went into a rebellion for three years, interrupting Xerxes' plan to invade Greece. Persian Egypt was troubled by rebellion far more often than other provinces of the empire, but this should not be used as testimony against the success of the administrators of the province. Historically, Egypt had never tolerated outside rulers, and indeed the long periods of stability in the Egyptian satrapy testify to the administrative superiority of the Persian empire as compared to their Assyrian predecessors. Nevertheless, it would always be difficult for a power based in Mesopotamia to rule Egypt, and the Persians were no exception to this rule.<sup>762</sup> Whereas Darius used concessions to settle the country, Xerxes punished Egypt by rescinding those very concessions, appointing Egyptians to only the lowest offices and ending subsidies to

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758 Redford 2001:150-158; Bresciani 1985:508

759 DB 2.5-8.

760 Bresciani 1998.

761 Bresciani 1985:508.

762 Ruzicka 2012:40.

the temples.<sup>763</sup> This crackdown did restore order, but evidently the forces of resistance were simply biding their time.

Artaxerxes I's policies in Egypt were complicated by Greek interference. Greek affairs were of only minor concern to the Persian emperors, considering the lack of wealth and population of Greece in comparison with Egypt, Babylon, or India. Still, a few motivated Greeks were able to wreak havoc in the empire's western provinces in the mid fifth century, due to the outsized importance of the Greek navy. The Battle of the Eurymedon, a significant defeat for the Persians, was soon followed by the death of King Xerxes in c. 464.<sup>764</sup> Taken separately, neither incident should have been more than a momentary setback for the empire; but their rapid succession and their impact on the Aegean region presented a golden opportunity for the Egyptians. By 462, Inarus, a Libyan claiming to be the son of Psammetichus, had pulled Lower Egypt into rebellion.<sup>765</sup> This was bad enough, but it nearly became a catastrophe when Inarus brought the Athenians over to his side by offering them joint rule.<sup>766</sup> Pursuant with the very purpose of the Delian League, Athens took the opportunity to send at least 200 ships up the Nile. The campaign was ultimately a failure, but managed to drag on for six years and must have caused innumerable headaches for the Persian central administration.

After the Peace of Callias, Athens was barred from interfering with Persian territory, and

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763 Ruzicka 2012:28.

764 See p. 248.

765 Thuc 1.104; Diod 11.71.3-4; Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F14.36.

766 Diod. 11.71.4: ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις περὶ συμμαχίας, ὑπισχνόμενος αὐτοῖς, εἴαν ἐλευθερώσωσι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, κοινὴν αὐτοῖς παρέξεισθαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ πολλαπλασίους τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀποδώσειν χάριτας.

And he [Inarus] sent ambassadors to the Athenians concerning an alliance, promising to give them, if they would free the Egyptians, common rule, and to pay them back in favors many times as many as the good deeds they will render.

According to Ruzicka 2012:30-1, this must have meant only that Inarus would grant Athens a degree of control over the Aegean, Mediterranean, and the Levant, but not within the kingdom of Egypt proper. It would have been in the mutual interests of Inarus and Athens to deprive the Great Kings of the use of Egypt, the Levant, and the nearby sea routes.

Egypt, cut off from her most valuable ally, remained calm. Predictably, when hostilities broke out between Athens and Persia after 415, Egypt once again grew restless. By 410, the situation there was sufficiently worrying that Pharnabazus had to divert a fleet of 300 ships from the Aegean down to Egypt. He had learned that the Pharaoh and the King of the Arabs were plotting to invade Phoenicia.<sup>767</sup> The timing cannot have been a coincidence, and we can assume that messengers had been sent to Athens to coordinate their schemes.<sup>768</sup> But Pharnabazus was only able to stem the tide for a few years, and by 405 Amyrtaeus of Sais was proclaiming himself first pharaoh of the 28th dynasty.

### *Elephantine Papyri*

This brings us to the most important text corpus from this period, a collection of Aramaic letters and archived texts belonging to a garrison of Jewish mercenaries at Elephantine, at the first cataract of the Nile. Fifty-two Aramaic texts have been found concerning Elephantine, spanning from the reign of Amasis to Amyrtaeus, and one final text from the reign of Nectanebo II (360-343). This fascinating archive allows us to see in some detail how the empire interacted with non-elite groups, and how administrators managed the friction caused between different and sometimes antagonistic groups living in very close proximity to one another. The garrison had been established at Elephantine since at least the seventh century, long before Cambyses, and carried over to Persian rule seamlessly.<sup>769</sup> The garrison, though they worshipped YHW,<sup>770</sup> were

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767 Diod.13.46.6. Since Darius II was still recognized as pharaoh throughout Egypt at this time, Diodorus must be referring to a native rebel, most likely Amyrtaeus.

768 Ruzicka 2012:36.

769 According to their own account, "When Cambyses came into Egypt he found this [Jewish] Temple built. They [the Persians] knocked down all the temples of the gods of Egypt, but no one did any damage to this Temple." The garrison also received an Aramaic copy of Darius' Bisotun inscription, suggesting that they did not participate in the revolts at the beginning of his reign. Porten 1968:20-1.

770 Porten 1968:105-6: none of the Elephantine texts ever use the tetragrammaton; instead we find 'YHH' or 'YHW.' Van der Toorn 2016 describes the evidence for the worship at Elephantine of Eshem-Bethel, Herem-

independent of the province of Judah, and were bound by the laws of Tshetres, the province of Upper Egypt, and not Ebar-Nerari.

The garrison was loyal to their new Persian paymasters, and stayed out of the many revolts of the fifth century. They continued to date their documents using Artaxerxes II's regnal years until 401. Freed of their Athenian problems after Aegospotami, Persian generals were ready to invade Egypt once again. But once again events conspired against them: Darius II died in 405, and Cyrus the Younger's rebellion immediately superseded all other issues. Even though he failed, the resources intended to be deployed against Egypt had been diverted, and the imperial army was incapable of a rapid about-face. The Elephantine archive switched to Amyrtaeus' regnal years in 401. It was sixty years before a Persian king was again recognized in texts produced in Egypt.

For the periods of Persian rule, we have some ideas about how the garrison was integrated into the province, satrapy, and empire. While imperial officials held most of the important positions, those positions themselves were based on the pre-conquest administrative divisions, which were left largely unchanged. From the capital at Memphis, the satrap ruled Egypt. Below him, a large bureaucracy handled military, fiscal, and military affairs. Each district was administered by a 'governor' (*frataraka*; always an Iranian<sup>771</sup>), and the garrisons within each district had a 'commander' (*rab halya*). Judicial matters were sometimes handled by the *frataraka* or *rab halya*, but there were also a large number of "judges," "royal judges," and "judges of the province," the precise function of which we do not know.<sup>772</sup> There was a satrapal

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Bethel, and Anat-Bethel alongside of YHW. He concludes that, while these four were treated as distinct, it is most accurate to describe Eshem-Bethel, Herem-Bethel, and Anat-Bethel as aspects or manifestations of YHW. Thus, in trying to define the Jews of Elephantine as either monotheists or polytheists, it is better to reject the notion of a strict dichotomy between the two poles.

771 Tuplin 1987:125-6.

772 Porten 1968:49.

treasury (called the "(store)house of the king") at Memphis, as well as local treasuries in each district, from which imperial officials were paid.<sup>773</sup> Officers of the lowest ranks of the administration at Elephantine could be Jewish or Aramaean, while Iranians held the higher ranks. Other Iranians worked as judges, heralds, and scribes.<sup>774</sup> In theory, the garrison answered directly to the king;<sup>775</sup> in reality, most tasks were delegated to the local governor, garrison commander, or satrap.<sup>776</sup>

Elephantine was a thoroughly diverse community. It and its vicinity were home to Jews, Arameans, Babylonians, Caspians, Khorazmians, Medes, Persians, and native Egyptians.<sup>777</sup> Not surprisingly, this eventually led to conflict. The YHW temple of the Jewish residents was immediately next to the temple precinct of the local god Khnum. In c. 410, the *frataraka* Vidranga approved an expansion of the temple of Khnum. During the construction process, priests of Khnum damaged and looted the YHW temple, until Vidranga ordered it destroyed.<sup>778</sup> Based on the texts which have survived, it appears that the Jews appealed first to Aršames, satrap of Egypt, reminding him of the loyalty to the empire throughout the revolts of the century.<sup>779</sup> This evidently failed to convince him to help, as they next wrote to Bagavahya, the Persian provincial governor of Judah. His reply has not been passed down to us, but a memorandum in the archive states that Bagavahya referred to Vidranga as "wicked," and recommended to

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773 Bresciani 1958:137-8

774 Fried 2004:94-5; Porten 1968:46-53.

775 This is according to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* 8.6.9; whether his observations apply to the entire empire or only Asia Minor (the limit of his own personal experience), is uncertain.

776 Porten 1968:43-4.

777 Porten 1968:29.

778 TEPE B18 and B19.

779 Cowley no. 27: "When the Egyptian detachments rebelled we did not leave our posts and no disloyalty was found in us."

Aršames that the temple be rebuilt.<sup>780</sup> Although Bagavahya had no legal authority in Egypt, Aršames apparently took his advice, and the YHW temple as rebuilt between 407 and 402.

How do we explain these events? There is no reason to believe that the priests of Khnum were particularly favored by the Persians; in 492-1, the current satrap Pharandates intervened in the election of a temple official; Pharandates claimed the right to approve the candidate in the name of Darius, but was ultimately unable to enforce his will. Briant infers from this episode that Persian rule was 'not onerous,' and that Pharandates was simply exercising the power of his Pharaoh, perfectly in accordance with tradition.<sup>781</sup> In contrast, Fried cites the incident as an example of the authoritarianism of the Persian administration, and a violation of traditional Egyptian practice.<sup>782</sup> Porten compares this incident to one during the reign of Rameses V (1149–1145), where the Khnum priests rejected the candidate put forward by the royal vizier.<sup>783</sup> So the practice was likely expected, if not "traditional," but no less resented by the priesthood.

The conflict between the two religious communities was probably caused both by competition for limited space and because the Jews' sacrifice of live goats offended the priests of Khnum. As far as can be observed, there was no conflict between the groups before the expansion of the Khnum temple, and there is substantial evidence of interaction and intermarriage between the Jews and the other groups living nearby.<sup>784</sup> In the documents referring to the rebuilding of the YHW temple, the leaders of the Jewish community commit themselves to offering only incense and barley, forgoing animal sacrifices.<sup>785</sup> One may read in this letter, as

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780 TEPE B21 = TAD A.4.9; Fried 2004:100-1.

781 Briant 2002:474.

782 Fried 2004:82-4.

783 Porten 1996:15.

784 Porten 1996:84-5.

785 TEPE B22 = TAD A4.10.



does Fried, a sign that Vidranga, in his capacity as a royal administrator, forced cultic reforms on one subject population for the benefit of another, favored subject population.<sup>786</sup> However, there are two strong reasons to reject this view.

First, Vidranga would gain very little from backing the Khnum priests. The Jewish community accuses the Khnum priests of bribing him,<sup>787</sup> so he may have had some financial motivation. The Khnum priests had a record of such activity in the pharaonic period as well.<sup>788</sup> However, the Jews at Elephantine belonged to a royal garrison, and for Vidranga to support the Khnum priests against the demands of his own troops would seem to run contrary to his own interests as a *frataraka*.

Second, Vidranga was only one part of the imperial system. The animal sacrifices at the YHW temple were halted not by Vidranga, but by the recommendation of Bagavahya and Delaiah, the governors of Judah and Samaria, respectively. In turn, the leaders of the Elephantine Jews agreed to limit themselves to sacrificing only barley and incense—as, apparently, was part of their custom<sup>789</sup>—and to give Aršames a bribe of their own, if Aršames would agree to allow the rebuilding of their temple.<sup>790</sup> Only a decade earlier, one Hananiah had come to Elephantine from Jewish authorities, either in Jerusalem or Babylon, and instituted a series of reforms concerning the celebration of Passover. Some have close parallels in the Pentateuch, others have none.<sup>791</sup> As discussed in the previous section, the final version of the Pentateuch was itself a product of the Persian period. It is therefore no surprise that Mosaic law was still undergoing a

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786 Fried 2004:103-5.

787 TEPE B20.5.

788 Porten 1996:17.

789 TEPE B21.9-11.

790 TEPE B22.8-14

791 Porten 1996:126n13. We are reminded of the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah.

process of standardization.<sup>792</sup> Will we believe that there was imperial policy of cultic reform specifically targeting the Jews, so significant that officers were willing to throw their own garrisons into disorder so as to achieve it? The simplest explanation is that this was a fight over land rights between the Khnum priests and the Jewish garrison. The Jewish leaders claimed the right to the land because the pharaohs and Cambyses had affirmed it.<sup>793</sup> Perhaps noticing the increasing chaos in Egypt in the last decade of the fifth century, the Khnum priests sensed an opportunity to strike a blow against a competitor previously backed by the full weight of the Great King himself.<sup>794</sup> While we should accept the broad outlines of the narrative as told by the Jewish victims, we must keep in mind that we have only their side of the story, written in such a way as to engender the greatest sympathy in the reader. As the dispute rose through the imperial hierarchy, eventually a settlement was reached, which does not appear to have favored one side too dramatically.

After considering evidence from across the empire, what general conclusions could we draw about the nature of Persian rule?

First, in Babylon, Egypt, and Judah—all societies in which local power had been traditionally centralized (to varying degrees) through a temple system—the Persian kings appointed temple officials by selecting members of the local elite. Iranians were also sent in to take up various administrative offices.<sup>795</sup> Since the King could not personally supervise all the satrapies at all times, his authority was channeled through his satraps. Even though the King himself was not the source of every Persian initiative, and his satraps, on occasion, would act

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792 Grabbe 2012.

793 TEPE B19.13-14.

794 Bresciani 1985:512.

795 Briant 1988:161–2.

without consulting him first, we are right in assuming that in general the King was well aware of developments throughout his empire, and his satraps were not permitted to create their own, independent policies.<sup>796</sup>

Second, even though Persian authority was absolute, the form of the expression of this power was dictated by local norms. So while the Persian Kings monopolized the right to appoint temple officials, those offices themselves and their functions stayed (largely) as they had been. The Achaemenid Kings usually adopted indigenous royal titles in a number of subjected polities (Babylonian; Egypt) for exclusive use within that region,<sup>797</sup> and the King, or his representatives, would on occasion participate in or pay for local religious ceremonies or festivals.

Lastly, when Iranian satraps settled disputes, the legal forms on which they relied existed in some form (not necessarily written) before the Persian conquest. We can see this in practice concerning the Jewish garrison in Egypt at Elephantine,<sup>798</sup> in the courts of Babylon,<sup>799</sup> and Ionia.<sup>800</sup> Granted, these cases have been interpreted in different ways: where one scholar might emphasize the role of the Persian satrap, and therefore the interference by the central authority, another might consider the use of local legal customs to be more significant.

The fact that we see similar tactics across a variety of places and times implies that such

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796 Waters 2010a.

797 Thus Cyrus was called "Cyrus, king of the universe, the great king, the powerful king, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters of the world," in the Cyrus Cylinder line 20; and Cambyses, while crown prince, took part in the *akitu* festival at the temple Esagila: *Nabonidus Chronicle* 7.iii.22–28. In Egypt, the 'collaborator' Udjahorresnet crafted the title "King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Mesuti-Re [Offspring of Re]" for Cambyses. Cambyses also participated in the sacred funeral rites for the Apis Bull (Briant 2002:57; Depuydt 1995). Moreover, between 519-503, Darius commissioned a codification of Egyptian law (Frei 2001:9–10). The case of Judah seems less clear. There can be little doubt, however, that whatever the legal nature of the documents which Ezra and Nehemiah brought to Judah, they were acting as imperial agents, authorized by the King to enforce local norms (Frei 2001:11–15); although we have no Achaemenid texts revealing the King's status in Judah, in Isaiah 45:1, Cyrus is referred to as 'YHWH's Anointed' (Fried 2004:177).

798 Kuhrt 2007:131.

799 Wells et al. 2010:24–26.

800 Briant 2002:495.

tactics were not ad hoc measures, but were all guided by the same (or a similar) strategy. While it does not at all prove that the same strategy was in place across the empire at all times, such a strategy is in line with what we know of Persian imperial ideology. The Persian king was the source of law on earth, and had the final say in any and all decisions. However, by necessity he delegated much of his power to his satraps and other officials. These, in turn, were expected to govern in such a way as to maximize the productivity and stability of their territory, so as to maximize the extraction of wealth and manpower. This uniform policy does not imply uniform laws: each province was ruled according to local tradition, except where it was necessary to operate by imperial laws. Thus we see variation over both time and geography: Judah, a relatively stable and insignificant province, operated according to Mosaic law, even if those who enforced the law were appointed by Persia. On the other hand, in Egypt and Lydia, both valuable and rebellious satrapies, centralized control was minimal after the initial conquest, but increased when Persian authority was reestablished.

Because the Persians did make use of the native legal traditions of their subjects, practically speaking, each satrapy had its own legal code. However, as a point of ideology, all law was the King's law, his *dāta-*, and thus he could claim absolute rule. Since this ideology is manifested throughout the empire, Achaemenid interaction with Athens, Sparta, and the rest of Greece could have been guided by the same principle.

However, the Greek world presented a particular difficulty. There was no single institution, sacred or secular, that ruled over all, or most, of the *poleis*, nor a single legal tradition that could have been codified and enforced by the Persians. The tradition of local autonomy was simply too deeply-rooted amongst the Greeks, and their political and legal systems remained localized and fragmented. So strong was the Persian impulse to rely on local traditions that it is

nonetheless clear that the Persians attempted to apply this system to the Greeks, and in limited cases, were successful in doing so.

One case was that of the Ionian states. Although each state was independent from all the others, twelve of the most powerful (Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Samos, Chios, and Erythrae) did have a tradition of holding common meetings at the Panionion. Although decisions made there were non-binding, joint military and political actions were agreed upon there.<sup>801</sup> These same states (except Miletus) approached Cyrus after his conquest of the Lydian empire, asking to be ruled under the same terms as under Croesus.<sup>802</sup>

Later, after the Ionian Revolt, Artaphernes sent for "representatives from [all the Ionian] states" (ἀγγέλους ἐκ τῶν πολιῶν). Rather than punish them, he forced them to swear to submit to arbitration (δωσίδικος εἶναι), and to refrain from robbing and plundering one another.<sup>803</sup> Herodotus does not say that Artaphernes accomplished this through the Panionion assembly. Still, he did take advantage of an existing tradition of a common assembly. There is also no suggestion that Artaphernes created new laws, but only that he insisted on the law, not violence, as the final resort.

After Darius' conquest of Thrace and Macedonia, the Persians did begin to administer these regions as part of the empire. In Macedonia, the Persians ruled through their vassals, the Argead kings. In Thrace, they established strategic *xenia* relationships with members of important families, who, in turn, provided the Persians with troops and safe passage on a few occasions. However, as a result of Greek military successes, these regions were never fully

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801 Goldman 2011:134–6.

802 Hdt 1.142; 6.7.

803 Hdt 6.42.

integrated into the satrapal system for a significant period of time. The Persians never extended their empire further south into Greece in any permanent way. Had they ever established long-term control of the region, some events from the Persian Wars suggest how they might have managed the region. On two separate occasions, Persian commanders attempted to force Athens to readmit their exiled former tyrant, Hippias, as sole ruler.<sup>804</sup> Later, Xerxes made an offer (through Mardonius and Alexander I of Macedon) to Athens: if they were to make an agreement with him, he would rebuild their temples, acknowledge their autonomy, and allow them to conquer as much land in Greece for themselves as they would want.<sup>805</sup> Although both of these attempts failed, they do indicate that the Persians had every intention of backing a single ruler (or single *polis*), through which they would exercise indirect control over the entire region.

### **6c. Greco-Persian Diplomacy**

Having examined the systematic treatment of local entities within the Achaemenid empire, it is still unclear if there was ideological room to accommodate the use of treaties between the king and his subjects. With that said, the Persians did accept a ritual offering of earth and water from foreign states to concretize their subjugation. Herodotus describes a famous example of this from c. 506, when the fledgling Athenian democracy sent two ambassadors to Artaphernes at Sardis, to request Persian defense against an imminent Spartan invasion. Artaphernes said that, if they would give earth and water to King Darius, then the alliance (*συνμαχία*) would be made. The ambassadors agreed; however, when they arrived back in

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804 Hdt 5.96 (immediately before the Ionian Revolt); 6.107 (Hippias accompanied the invasion at Marathon).

805 Hdt. 8.140a.

Athens, the assembly "greatly blamed" them. Shortly thereafter, the Spartan invasion fell apart, and so the Athenians never had recourse to call upon their new allies.<sup>806</sup>

This is a very important scene because it illustrates one method that the Persians might use to bring foreign states into their empire. We know of the demand for earth and water being made only to Greeks, so we cannot determine how widespread the practice was. There is no modern agreement concerning the meaning of this ritual.<sup>807</sup> Still, it is clear that this ritual was intended to make permanent a profoundly unequal relationship of voluntary total submission of the subject state to the Persian king—that is, submission without conquest.<sup>808</sup> As such, from the Persian perspective, it bound the Athenians to the Great King and implied that they accepted the obligation to perform the will of the King.<sup>809</sup>

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806 Hdt 5.73-5. Herodotus states that the invasion failed because the Corinthian allies abandoned the campaign after they decided that they were acting unjustly (Κορίνθιοι μὲν πρῶτοι σφίσι αὐτοῖσι δόντες λόγον ὡς οὐ ποίειεν δίκαια μετεβάλλοντό τε καὶ ἀπαλλάσσοντο), and because the two Spartan kings, Demaratus and Cleomenes, got into a disagreement and were thus unable to command effectively. It is entirely possible that the Athenian alliance with the Persians may have influenced the Corinthian decision, but there is no direct evidence of this, nor is it necessary to assume this.

807 For some recent attempts, see Rung 2015b, West 2011, Munn 2006:222–6, Kramer 2004:262–4, and Kuhrt 1988.

808 Raubitschek 1964 considers this ritual a 'treaty.' Therefore, he argues that Artaphernes' attempt to force Hippias upon Athens at Hdt 5.96 was a violation of the treaty. He adds that "it became quickly forgotten during the long Persian Wars which lasted almost a whole generation, that of Cimon." Considering the modifications made to Persian strategy between c. 506 and c. 448, this first meeting at Sardis was most definitely not forgotten. Kramer 2004 (echoed by West 2011) argues that the Athenian ambassadors did not actually give earth and water, but instead only promised to give earth and water after getting the approval of the popular assembly. Because the Assembly resoundingly condemned the ambassadors for doing so, it is clear that they had not gone to Sardis with plenipotentiary powers, and therefore could not have made a legally-binding submission. This is in direct opposition to Schachermeyr 1973:212-13, who argues that Athens' rejection of Hippias was undertaken in the full knowledge that this would be violation of their agreement of vassalage and therefore an act of war. However, to us, the only relevant point is that Artaphernes and the Athenians clearly had different interpretations of their first meeting at Sardis, and different expectations for the future of their relations.

809 But what of the Athenian perspective? As Herodotus has it, the Athenian demos did not ratify the agreement made between Artaphernes and the two ambassadors. We assume that the ambassadors would have been sent with at least basic instructions, and that the ambassadors would not make a decision contrary to these. Such an act could have only resulted in punishment and a collapse of any agreement. And yet, this is exactly what Herodotus reports; his narrative is at least internally consistent, and presents no *a priori* cause for rejection. Ruberto 2010:3-5 suggests that the Athenian elites, from which the two ambassadors were selected, had an understanding of what Artaphernes would demand and had prepared the ambassadors to do what was necessary to secure themselves against a Spartan attack. However, the wider demos, who had little to no knowledge of Persian practices, refused to ratify the decision.

What were these obligations? We can try to answer this question by assuming that the King would have put the same demands on Athens as he did on the Ionians.<sup>810</sup> From Herodotus, we know that Ionians (as well as the other peoples living in Asia Minor) were required to serve in the imperial army, when called on to do so.<sup>811</sup> We also know that the Ionians, along with other Greek communities of Asia Minor, jointly gave tribute (Herodotus calls it *phoros*), at least under Darius.<sup>812</sup> According to Darius' understanding, those who brought him tribute (*bāji-*) were his 'bound subjects' (*bandakā-*).<sup>813</sup>

This is entirely different from traditional Greek practices, in which treaties did not violate the autonomy of either party, and only dealt with a limited and specific set of obligations, frequently for a set number of years.<sup>814</sup> While it is unlikely that the Persian authorities at Sardis did not attempt to suggest the significance of this ritual to their Athenian guests,<sup>815</sup> it is almost certain that the two sides had entirely different set of expectations and assumptions about interstate agreements. Perhaps the Persians did not expect that the Athenians, just a decade after the conclusion of the agreement, would not only refuse to accept Hippias, a Persian collaborator, but even opt for open warfare against Persia, in support of the Ionian rebels. For their part, the Athenians' anger at the fact that Persian military assistance would only be rendered at the cost of

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810 Balcer 1995:75–9.

811 Hdt 1.171.1.

812 Hdt 3.90.1.

813 DB §7; DPe §2; DNa §3; DSe §3; Sancisi-Weerdenberg defines *bāji-* as 'the king's share,' that is, anything that the king is entitled to. It can take the form of taxes (a charge, usually money, imposed by the authority on persons or property for public purposes); or 'tribute' (payment by one entity to another as acknowledgement of submission, or for protection); or 'gifts' (offerings which have an intrinsic value not readily converted into money) (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1998).

814 There was, of course, a difference between the wording of a treaty text and the realities of Athenian imperial rule.

815 It is inconceivable that Cleisthenes did not know that an alliance with Persia would involve submission to the Great King. "It is much easier to believe that Herodotus' statement, that the envoys were responsible for the decision, is a distortion intended to spare the Alcmaeonids a further charge of Medism, particularly in view of his later enthusiastic defense of the family after Marathon" (Berthold 2002:260).



their own autonomy shows that they did not understand the nature of Persian imperial control.<sup>816</sup>

The seventh-century alliance of Gyges of Lydia and Assurbanipal<sup>817</sup> is analogous to the agreement between the Athenian embassy and Artaphernes at the end of the sixth century. If, as suggested above, the Achaemenids embraced Neo-Assyrian precedents, they may have been influenced by the Neo-Assyrian conception of treaties. Therefore, Assurbanipal's understanding of the terms of vassalage (as reflected in his inscriptions), may be drawn upon to explore how Achaemenids viewed their subjects. In the same way as Assurbanipal regarded Gyges as his vassal after the request for military aid (even though such aid was never rendered), Artaphernes and Darius may have also considered Athens a bound subject after their ambassadors pledged earth and water. Just as Gyges' aid to the rebellious Psammetichus invoked divine retribution by means of the Cimmerians, Athens' refusal to accept Hippias and participation in the Ionian Revolt were not just acts of war; they were violations of a binding agreement that demanded punishment.

Considering that this first diplomatic venture between Athens and Persia ended so poorly for both sides, we must wonder why either side would be willing to enter into another agreement. And yet they did. As we will demonstrate, in the context of the mid-fifth century, the first Greco-Persian peace treaty was not only beneficial to both sides, but also ideologically justifiable by both sides.

Let us begin with a brief discussion of the mechanics of Greco-Persian diplomacy, and how these treaties came into being. In the ancient world, as today, diplomacy was realized in the form of the exchange of representatives between power centers. Other scholarship has surveyed

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816 Buckley 1996:113. As discussed, it is not necessary to prove, or argue, that the Persians ruled Athens. Based on our study, we can assume that the Persian king would have treated the Athenians as subjects, regardless of how they felt about the matter.

817 See p. 23ff above.

the broader scope of ancient diplomacy, both in the Near East and Greece,<sup>818</sup> so we need not repeat the process here. Instead, I will focus on the individual personalities who acted as Greek and Persian diplomats, and attempt to connect their work with the strategic goals of the empire. As we shall see, individuals' ambitions were not always in line with the aims of the empire as an institution.

Greek has terms for ambassador (πρεσβεύς or πρεσβευτής), herald (κῆρυξ), and messenger (ἄγγελος), but the context in which these terms are used does not always distinguish between the powers and functions of the person in question. Regardless of the terminology, there were essentially two types of diplomats. One was of elite social status, hand-picked for a specific mission because he would be trusted and respected by both parties. There is no evidence that such men were usually bilingual, and so they must have been accompanied by translators when negotiating with non-Greek parties. Their missions tended to require negotiations, explanations, or transactions. This means that they were given a degree of freedom to maneuver and improvise, always in the knowledge that they would be held responsible for their decisions afterwards. As such, these men are most accurately called "ambassadors" or "diplomats."

The second kind was the professional herald. They accompanied all armies, and were found in all cities. Throughout Herodotus' *Histories*, heralds (κῆρυκες) are the medium of communication between all parties, Greek and barbarian, allies and enemies. These men, almost always unnamed, must have been professionals.<sup>819</sup> Herodotus makes it very clear that some of these heralds were bilingual, as they deliver spoken messages between Greeks, Persians, and

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818 Adcock and Mosley 1975; Watson 1992:24-69; Cohen 1996; Bolmarcich 2003; Kaufman and Wohlforth 2007; Lafront 2007; Little 2007.

819 At 6.60, Herodotus says that in Sparta, the position of herald is not just a profession, but a hereditary profession. This implies that elsewhere, anyone can train and learn to become a herald.

others.<sup>820</sup> They must have had a great deal of physical training as well, seeing as their job frequently required them to carry messages of immediate and vital importance over great distances; Philippides,<sup>821</sup> the man who ran from Athens to Sparta (roughly 150 miles) in under two days before the battle of Marathon, is described as "an Athenian, who also practiced the art of long-distance running."<sup>822</sup> This phrasing seems to suggest that there was something unique to his ability to cover such a distance so rapidly. However, at 9.12, the Argives sent to Athens an unnamed messenger, the best long-distance runner they knew, to warn Mardonius of Spartan troop movements.<sup>823</sup> This run, while not quite as impressive as Philippides', still covered some 70-80 miles, one way. By the fourth century, the long-distance runner (δρομοκῆρυξ or ἡμεροδρόμος) was a standard position in any military organization, including mercenary forces.<sup>824</sup> Heralds were tasked with delivering a message and receiving a response, but had no power to conduct negotiations.

Greek diplomats were always members of the elite. Inter-polis diplomacy was strongly connected to the institution of *proxenia*. A *proxenos* was a citizen of one *polis* who was recognized as a friend and benefactor by another *polis*. This was an institution built on personal relationships between elites. It was not a constitutional or regulated office, and so not all *proxenoi* behaved in the same way. In general, however, they might have two roles with respect to diplomacy. First, a *proxenos* would facilitate a diplomatic exchange between his native *polis* and the one which had bestowed the honor upon him, by doing such things as arranging meetings between an ambassador and the most important locals, and to help fight for the interests of the

820 e.g., Mardonius sent a herald to Pausanias right before the battle of Plataea, Hdt. 9.48.

821 Or "Pheidippides."

822 Hdt. 6.105: καὶ πρῶτα μὲν ἑόντες ἔτι ἐν τῷ ἄστει οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀποπέμπουσι ἐς Σπάρτην κήρυκα Φειδιππίδην Ἀθηναῖον μὲν ἄνδρα, ἄλλως δὲ ἡμεροδρόμην τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα.

823 Hdt. 9.12.

824 Christensen et al. 2009:156-161.

foreign *polis* during negotiations. Second, a *proxenos* might serve as an ambassador himself.<sup>825</sup> A *proxenos* was frequently granted the right of access (*πρόσοδος*) to the council or assembly of the *polis* which had honored him, as well as protected entry into the city during war.<sup>826</sup> However, there was an obvious tension between a citizen's loyalties to his native city and to the city which made him *proxenos*. This was exacerbated by the honor which a decree of *proxenia* bestowed upon a man, thus setting him above his elite peers. So while *proxenia* connected the Greek *poleis* together, it could also cause disorder within a *polis*.

Named Greek ambassadors to Persia, such as Callias, Epilycus, and Antalcidas, all came from similar status. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, was the grandson of Callias Laccoplutos, one of the richest men in Athens. Callias' sister, Hipparete, was married to Alcibiades.<sup>827</sup> His brother, Hermogenes, was one of a group of Athenian ambassadors who went to Tiribazus after the Peloponnesian war.<sup>828</sup> Much less is known about Epilycus, although diplomacy seems to have run in this family as well: his grandson, Andocides, went on missions to Thessaly, Macedonia, Molossia, Thesprotia, Italy, and Sicily.<sup>829</sup> Antalcidas, as a Spartan, was first a soldier and only second a statesman.

The *proxenia* system of Greek diplomacy worked well in the Greek world, but was incapable of accommodating the Persian imperial system. A *proxenia* network was made of men who were, more or less, equals. No Greek could hope to be an equal with the Great King, and missions to the empire became known as opportunities to gain serious wealth.<sup>830</sup> As elites

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825 Examples of *proxenoi* serving as ambassadors: Lichas (Thuc. 5.76); Kallias (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4); Clearchus son of Rhamphias (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35).

826 Mack 2015:66-8.

827 Plut. *Alc.* 8.2.

828 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13.

829 Andoc. *Against Alcibiades* 41.

830 Aelian *Varia Historia* 1.22; Plut. *Art.* 22.5-6; Diod. 14.81.4-6.

attempted to maintain their traditional monopolies on participation in embassies, democratic assemblies reacted by taking legal action against ambassadors who were believed to have worked against the interests of the demos. The taking of gifts in the context of law and diplomacy was not actually illegal or unusual in Greek custom, but only insofar as the gift reflected a traditional element of elite interaction, and as long as the political or legal action was deemed beneficial for the *polis*. However, as a result of their reasonable distrust for the Great King and his motives, Athenians quickly came to see any interaction with him as potentially detrimental, and thus any of his gifts as bribes.<sup>831</sup> This may explain the reactions against the ambassadors of 506, as well as the 50-talent fine levied on Callias.<sup>832</sup>

Unfortunately, we know much less about Persian diplomats. Greek sources usually describe their ambassadors arriving at Susa or Ecbatana, and negotiating directly with the satrap or even the Great King himself. As this sort of privileged access would be entirely out of character for what we know about Near Eastern diplomatic practice, it is more likely that our Greek sources fail to describe the layers of bureaucracy that stood between them and the actual seat of power. This also means that we do not know if the Persian diplomatic corps consisted of regular office-holders, or, as in the Greek examples, powerful individuals appointed to the role on an ad hoc basis. We will also see examples of Greeks serving as ambassadors on behalf of the Persians.

There are several instances of Persian diplomats on Greek soil. The first occurred in the aftermath of Darius' Scythian campaign. According to Herodotus, Megabazus sent seven of "the most honorable men in his army" to collect earth and water from Amyntas, king of the

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831 Taylor 2001:160-3.

832 Dem. *On the False Embassy* 273.

Macedonians.<sup>833</sup> What Herodotus means by "most honorable" is unclear. A general would be unwise to send his best commanders at a time when he was engaging in an aggressive policy in enemy territory, so these men were perhaps of high nobility but low practical importance. This was good foresight by Megabazus, as the crown prince Alexander organized the slaughter of the entire Persian delegation, and then covered up the crime by marrying his sister off to the Persian commander sent to discover the fate of the lost delegation.<sup>834</sup> While this has the characteristics of fiction, the Macedonians did give their submission to Persia, and there is no reason to doubt that it was obtained by a group of nobles detached from Megabazus' campaign.<sup>835</sup>

The next were the men sent to collect earth and water before the invasions of 490 and 481. Technically, these were hardly 'diplomats,' as there was no offer to negotiate. However, it is reasonable to assume that, in *poleis* divided between the choice to submit or fight, the Persians may have clarified the risks and rewards of each, and may have spent a few darics to tip the scales in the right direction. The Persians probably demanded earth and water as a way to avoid costly wars of conquest,<sup>836</sup> so it was in their interest to incentivize submission. Another possible tactic was to appeal to the emotions of the Greeks. Herodotus relates a tale told throughout Greece, that Xerxes sent a herald to Argos to convince them to support his invasion. This man succeeded by telling the Argives that they and the Persians were related, through their common ancestor Perseus.<sup>837</sup> Whether or not the Argives believed this, it may have served as a convenient

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833 Hdt. 5.17.

834 Hdt. 5.20-1.

835 Many scholars (e.g. Errington 1981:139-43, Erbse 1992:101-4, Badian 1994:107-10, Fearn 2007:101-2) argue that the tale has its origin in Macedonian propaganda, designed to cover up Amyntas' Medism. Scaife 1989, while not rejecting this view, offers a more tempered analysis of Alexander I in Herodotus.

836 Rung 2015.

837 Hdt. 1.150. Jones 1999:17-29 shows that, in Homer and Hesiod, the role of shared ancestry through a wandering hero was already a recognizable, if uncommon, motif in diplomatic discourse. Thus, even if Herodotus' story of Xerxes' claim to a shared ancestry with the Argives was fake, it probably reflects the type of exchanges that occurred between Greek cities. It may be worth noting that the Argead kings of Macedonia,

excuse for their Medism.

During the lead-up to the battle of Plataea, Mardonius attempted to split the Athenians away from the other Allies. First he sent Alexander, king of Macedon, to deliver his offers.<sup>838</sup> Alexander, says Herodotus, was selected for the mission because he was both connected to the Persians by marriage—this is the same man who supposedly killed the Persian ambassadors to Macedon, and married his sister to a Persian commander—and to the Athenians, as he was an Athenian *proxenos*. But when Alexander failed, Mardonius sent Murychides, a Hellespontine Greek, to repeat the same message. Murychides presented the offer to the Athenians, now on Salamis, as Mardonius had recaptured Athens. An Athenian named Lycidas spoke in favor of acceptance, and called for the proposal to be ratified by the demos. Herodotus suggests that Lycidas may have been a plant, bribed by Mardonius earlier for just this purpose.<sup>839</sup> The ruse, if true, failed, and Lycidas and his family were stoned to death, while Murychides was allowed to return home. Nothing else is known about Murychides, which is itself a clue that he was not of particular importance, especially in comparison to Alexander. This, along with the accusations of bribery against Lycidas, suggests that Mardonius was trying a slightly different tactic in this second attempt to pull the Athenians to his side. Perhaps he thought Alexander's failure was related to his status as a king, and so he selected someone from among the Asian Greeks, who had been living with isonomy for some two decades now. Mardonius expected him to work in concert with Lycidas to give his proposals a more 'democratic' air.

In the years following Xerxes' invasion, Persian ambassadors were sent to individual

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who also medized, claimed descent from Perdiccas I. He and his two brothers are said to have been Argive exiles who migrated up into Macedonia. This story is found in Herodotus (8.137-9), where it serves to emphasize the Hellenism of the Argeads (Borza 1982).

838 Hdt. 8.140a-b.

839 Hdt. 9.4-5. Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 71 calls the messenger 'Alexander,' apparently confusing him with the Macedonian king.

cities fairly often. After Pausanias, the Spartan king, had been removed from command of the allied Greek forces, he travelled to Byzantium and released some noble Persian prisoners back to Xerxes. Along with the prisoners, he sent a letter, offering to marry Xerxes' daughter and to bring all of Greece under Persian control. In response, Xerxes sent Artabazus, the new satrap of Daskyleion, with a letter from the King offering grand but unspecific financial and military aid. Thucydides even says that Artabazus was commanded to follow Pausanias' orders on any affairs that concerned this new imperial scheme.<sup>840</sup> It is hard to believe that Xerxes would elevate a Greek above one of his satraps—a man of royal blood, no less<sup>841</sup>—but as Pausanias was soon recalled by the Spartan Ephors, he was unable to put Xerxes' generosity, and Artabazus' loyalties, to the test. Xerxes' letter to Pausanias certainly does have an authentic flavor, echoing as it does the patterns of an Old Persian royal inscription.<sup>842</sup> Compare:

1. ὧδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Πασανία  
(Thus says King Xerxes to Pausanias)

and

XPh §3: *θᾶτιγ Χῶγααρῶ χῶγαθιγᾶ*  
(Thus says King Xerxes)

2. τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς μοι πέραν θαλάσσης ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἔσωσας κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραφτος  
(Because you saved these men from Byzantium across the sea for me, a bounty for you lies recorded always in our house)

and

DB §8: *martiya haya agriya āha avam ubartam abaram haya arīka āha avam ufrastam aparsam*  
(The man who was loyal, him I treated well; he who was disloyal, him I punished)

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840 Thuc. 1.129.

841 Artabazus was the son of Pharnaces, who was a brother of Hystaspes.

842 Hyland 2005:26-7; Schmitt 1996:98-100 also points out similar stock phrases in the Aramaic copy of DB, as well as Ezra 7:12.



thoroughly)

3. καί σε μήτε νύξ μήθ' ἡμέρα ἐπισχέτω ὥστε ἀνεῖναι πράσσειν τι ὧν ἐμοὶ ὑπισχνῆ  
(And let neither night nor day restrain you, that you cease in doing what you have  
promised me)

and

DB §7: *tayašām hacāma aθahaya xšapanā raucapativā ava akunavayatā*  
(That which I said to them, both day and night, that they did)

While the authenticity of the letter is still far from proven, the general outline of the narrative is in accord with the previous instances of Persian diplomacy.

It is likely that, around this same time, Arthmius of Zeleia was employed by the Persians to bring gold to Medizers in the Peloponnesus. Our fifth-century historians make no mention of this man, but later orators and historians say that he and his family were exiled from the entire Delian League for this treasonous act.<sup>843</sup> The exact context of his mission are unknown, but the *psephisma* sending him out of the League was proposed by Themistocles, who was himself forced into exile in the mid-460s. Thus there are a few plausible explanations for Arthmius' activities. He may have been supporting Argos during Xerxes' invasion; he may have been assisting Pausanias in the early years after the war, perhaps delivering the gold to his supporters back in Sparta.<sup>844</sup> There is also evidence that the *psephisma* was proposed by Cimon, not Themistocles. In this later context, we would imagine Arthmius bringing funds for anti-Athenian activity, possibly but not necessarily in Sparta.<sup>845</sup>

As the Athenian army was helping the Egyptian rebel Inarus in c. 460, Artaxerxes wished to force the Athenians out of Egypt to defend their home. He sent Megabazus to Sparta with 50

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843 Dem. *Phillipic* 3, 41-2, *On the False Embassy* 19.271; Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 3.257-9; Dinarchus *Against Aristogeiton* 2.24-5; Plut. *Them.* 6.2-3; Aelius Aristides *Panathenaicus* 1.310; Harpocration s.v. Ἄτιμος.

844 Cary 1935:179-80, Meiggs 1972:508-12.

845 Lewis 1989:230.

talents of gold to bribe the members of the Peloponnesian League to invade Attica.<sup>846</sup> This Megabazus may have been the son of Megabates, commander of Darius' fleet, and was himself a naval commander under Xerxes. He may also have been the grandson of the Megabazus sent to subdue the Macedonians by Darius.<sup>847</sup> Some men took the bribes, but Megabazus was unable to convince enough of the right men to succeed. Only after Artaxerxes saw that the bribes failed did he recall Megabazus, and gathered a large army to go restore Persian rule in Egypt. Some sixty years later, in 395, the satrap Tithraustes sent Timocrates of Rhodes with fifty talents of gold to go start a war, but this time the roles were reversed (Corinth, Thebes, and Argos were paid to attack Sparta), and it was successful.<sup>848</sup>

Probably the most famous instance of a Persian ambassador is the arrival of Pseudartabas before the Athenian Assembly in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, a comedy performed in 425. The hero, Dicaeopolis, has been listening to—and mocking—the Athenian ambassadors recently returned from Ecbatana (lines 61-90). Accompanying them was Pseudartabas, identified as "the King's Eye" (ὁ βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός). After Dicaeopolis compared Pseudartabas to a ship, the Persian delivered his message to the Assembly. There is not perfect agreement between the manuscripts,<sup>849</sup> but line 100 in *Acharnians* reads something like "ιαρταμανεξαρχανα-πισσονασατρα." Scholars have, for decades, tried to decipher this line, trying to discover if it has meaning, or if it is just babble.

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846 Thuc. 1.109.

847 Hdt. 5.33, 7.97; Briant 2002:353. See p.226 above.

848 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1.

849 Willi 2004:661-3.

Tolman,<sup>850</sup> Freidrich,<sup>851</sup> Dover,<sup>852</sup> and Willi<sup>853</sup> argue, through different means, that this line is the product of Aristophanes' attempt to reconstruct a specific Old Persian statement, but mangles it severely. West<sup>854</sup> and Long<sup>855</sup> argue that the text reflects OP speech patterns, but, since Aristophanes did not know Persian, the line is just his idea of what OP sounded like, without any underlying meaning. Starkie<sup>856</sup> argues that, as the name "Pseud-artabas" suggests, the character is supposed to be understood as an Athenian pretending to be a Persian, and is therefore just jabbering. Aveline<sup>857</sup> argues that the line is intentionally mangled Greek, reflecting the idea that, because Pseudartabas was a barbarian, his Greek would be very poor. However, as Chiasson points out, Aristophanes was perfectly capable of making a barbarian speak in poor but interpretable Greek, as he does in his *Thesmophoriazusae* 1001ff.<sup>858</sup>

The key to interpreting this line is not about translating the words, but understanding the function of Pseudartabas' speech. We have to understand the meaning of the scene in its context. This was a small part of a comic play, which concerns Dicaeopolis' growing frustration about the destruction wrought by the Peloponnesian War. The presence of a Persian ambassador serves to highlight two points: first, Athens' failure to secure Persian support (here, specifically in the form

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850 Tolman 1906.

851 Freidrich 1921.

852 Dover 1963.

853 Willi 2004.

854 West 1968.

855 Long 1986:133-4.

856 Starkie 1909:30-3 straddles the fence. He states that "there is no doubt that, on an English or French stage, an author would not take the trouble to make a Persian speak real Persian," and cites *All's Well that Ends Well* 4.1, where "foreign" soldiers—played by Englishmen before an English audience—speak nonsense. But he also reasons that Persian ought to have been as familiar to an Athenian as French would be to an Englishman, and so fake Persian would still have to be convincingly done. He cites Polyaeus' *Strategems* 3.9.59, where Iphicrates calms his restless troops by dressing up some men "acquainted with the Persian language" in Persian dress, and had them promise his troops that they were bringing money to cover their backpay.

857 Aveline 2000.

858 Chiasson 1984:132-3.

of gold); second, the respect paid by the Athenian assembly to the Persians, who, after all, are barbarians. The mere presence of a Persian does not seem to be of particular interest, which suggests that the arrival of a Persian ambassador in Athens is not surprising.

Everything else about the Ambassador, however, is funny. First, his name. Pseudartabas is clearly a combination of one Greek element (from *pseudo-*, false) and one Persian (*arta-bānuš*, "with the splendor of *Rta*<sup>859</sup>"), although the interpretation *pseudo-ἄρτάβη*, "false measure," has also been offered.<sup>860</sup> I am hesitant to look for a literal translation in any language. Considering what follows, I think this is the first clue that Pseudartabas is simply representing a stereotyped Persian, thus he requires a Persian-sounding name. The initial element is probably a joke about the untrustworthiness of the Persians. Next, his physical appearance and gestures are noted by Dicaeopolis, who compares him to a ship and to the King's Eye. Of course we do not have the stage notes, but Dicaeopolis' reaction suggests that through some combination of costume and gesture, Pseudartabas' most obvious features were his eyes—maybe his mask?—and his connection to the fleet. Again, this need not be taken too literally. If Pseudartabas is a "Persian," then two of the most salient features of the Persian empire, from an Athenian view, were the massive imperial navy and the infamous "King's Eye."

Although the Athenians could rightly boast that they were a fair match for the imperial fleet, there was no doubt that the King's rowers were still a force to be reckoned with. No Athenian campaign beyond the Aegean could disregard them as a threat, and the ability of the Persians to offer a fleet in support of either Athens or Sparta was an integral part of Pseudartabas' presence in Athens in the first place. Hence, it makes good sense to represent Persia's interference in Greek affairs, literally or figuratively, with a ship. Since the imperial ships were

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859 Mayrhofer 1963:8.576.

860 Starkie 1909:30n91.

painted with eyes on the bow, Pseudartabas' eyes stand in for the Great King himself.

This explains his title, ὁ βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός. Several Greek authors testify to the existence of the "King's Eyes" and sometimes his Ears,<sup>861</sup> but there is no consistent explanation of this title, nor is there any Near Eastern proof of the existence of such an institution or office. That the Great King required a corps of spies, both inside and outside of the empire, is certain, and his intelligence and communications network was legendary amongst Greeks. But there is no reason that a spy or imperial auditor would openly present himself before the Athenian Assembly. Instead, this is a manifestation of the same comic tactic as Pseudartabas' speech. Aristophanes wanted an exotic Persian, so he made him speak "like a Persian," and gave him the infamous title "the King's Eye," and made him look or act like a ship. These were simply clues to the audience that he represented Persia and the Great King. There was no reason for historical or linguistic accuracy, and thus no attempt was made to achieve either. As enjoyable as the scene is, it should not influence our understanding of the realities of Greco-Persian diplomacy. With this scene out of mind, there is no evidence that the King's Eye, if such an office existed, ever acted as an ambassador.

Just after the *Acharnians* hit the stage, a real Persian ambassador made his way to Greece. The Spartans had sent ambassadors to Persia, along with other non-Greek states,<sup>862</sup> and in 424/3 the King sent Artaphernes to Sparta. But the Athenians captured him along the way, and read his documents.<sup>863</sup> These revealed an on-going exchange of envoys between Sparta and Persia, the details of which we know very little. This diplomacy increased following Athens' support for the

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861 Eyes: Aesch. *Pers.* 978-81; Hdt. 1.144; Xen. *Anab.* 2.4.8; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.16.

862 Thuc. 2.7, 2.67.

863 Thuc. 4.50.2 says that the Athenians had the letters transcribed from "Assyrian characters" and then read them (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολάς μεταγραφάμενοι ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμμάτων ἀνέγνωσαν). His phrasing suggests that the act of translation was part of the transcription process.

rebel Amorges, and their defeat on Sicily. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus sent ambassadors to Sparta, and both satraps made use of Greeks as their representatives (although, according to Thucydides' text, it seems that Tissaphernes also sent a Persian representative).<sup>864</sup> While this a clear continuation of Persian practice in the Greek world, what is new is the apparently independent and competitive diplomacy of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

As these two Persians battled for supremacy in the Aegean and for the King's favor, as a pair they exerted more control over the Greek *poleis*. In 408, with Athens in a state of chaos and the Spartan fleet dissatisfied with Persian aid, Pharnabazus was playing both sides almost simultaneously, supporting the Spartans in battle one day and agreeing to pay the Athenians twenty talents the next.<sup>865</sup> He then assembled a caravan of Athenian, Spartan, and Argive ambassadors and led them as a group to meet the King. Their journey was cut short the next year, when they ran into a Spartan ambassador returning to the sea, bearing the news that the King had agreed to his requests, and that the King's will would now be enforced by Cyrus the Younger, *karanos* of the region.<sup>866</sup> Shortly thereafter, Cyrus felt himself powerful enough to send an envoy to Sparta to request that Lysander be reinstated as the fleet commander, even though Spartan law barred anyone from serving as admiral twice.<sup>867</sup> The culmination of this trend was the Peace of Antalcidas, described below. From that point on, Greek ambassadors from the major *poleis* were

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864 Thuc. 8.5-6.

865 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.4-8.

866 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13-1.4.7. Although this is the first instance of this title in our sources, Megabazus and Otanes both held the title "*strategos* of the men who dwell in the coastal countries," during the reign of Darius I, suggesting they had the same function, if under a different name (Briant 2002:340). There is also evidence this title may not have been limited to Asia Minor: Hyland 2013 shows that one Hystaspes/Vishtaspa held the title *karanos* in Bactria in the late 4th century, likely during the time of Alexander's conquest. Naveh and Shaked 2012 urge caution: this Vishtaspa could have been a member of the Karen family, well-attested during the Parthian period. Additionally, Vishtaspa the Karanos/Karen appears in only one note, a recording of the distribution of 40 sheep. Vishtaspa's role in the transaction is unclear, and lends no support in an argument for or against his office of "*karanos*." See Shayegan 2017:406-9.

867 Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.6-7.

forced to come before the King to negotiate a series of agreements that would ensure the continued weakness and instability of Greece as a whole.

Our next step is to consider the much-debated Peace of Callias. This refers to a treaty signed at some point in the mid-fifth century between Athens and Persia, negotiated by the Athenian statesman Callias. As noted earlier, there is more disagreement than consensus concerning this treaty. We certainly do not claim to be able to resolve the matter, but since it is a landmark event in the course of Greco-Persian diplomatic history, it cannot be ignored. We will proceed by first considering the arguments for and against the existence of a peace treaty between Athens and Persia. Then we will try to derive a more precise date. Finally, we will consider the likely terms of such a treaty.

The basic argument against the Peace of Callias is as follows: The historians closest to the purported event make no mention of it; those historians who do discuss it cannot seem to agree on when it occurred or what the terms of the settlement were. Furthermore, two ancient historians, Theopompus and Callisthenes, specifically state that the Peace was a forgery or falsehood. The reality, doubters claim, is that the conflict between Persia and Athens died off around 450, as both sides found more important issues to worry about. The tradition of the existence of a Peace of Callias was a propagandistic invention, a product of pro-Athenian voices in the first half of the fourth century who wished to drum up support for a resurgent Athens. In the context of Sparta's failed imperial ventures in Asia, culminating in the "shameful" Peace of Antalcidas, these Athenians emphasized Athens' heroic defense of Greece during the Persian wars, and turned a *de facto* state of peace into a diplomatic triumph secured by military might. Unfortunately, these propagandists were so good, and so lucky, that their narrative is the one that

has survived to become the majority view today.

There is no doubt that this is a strong case. But, when we address each point in turn, we see that none are convincing. To begin with, let us consider the “failure” of Thucydides and Herodotus to mention the Peace of Callias. It is certainly counter to our expectations that these historians, especially Thucydides, generally considered informed and reliable, should leave out something as momentous as an official end to the Persian wars: “the Peace is more relevant to the Excursus [in Thucydides] than any of the other omissions; and that its omission must therefore cast strong doubts on its existence.<sup>868</sup>” The absence is most glaring when the Persians appear to violate the Peace, as in 440, when, during Pericles' counter-offensive on Samos, he received a report that a Persian fleet had been sent against them.<sup>869</sup> Although no battle was fought, this was still a violation of Athens' maritime boundaries. Between 440 and 427, three times the satrap Pissunthes sent assistance to cities rebelling against Athens.<sup>870</sup> In 425, the royal messenger Artaphernes was caught bringing a message from the King to Sparta, offering to open up discussions of an alliance.<sup>871</sup> Thucydides never connects these events to a violation of any treaty,<sup>872</sup> which, in the eyes of one eminent scholar, “makes it almost certain that he knew nothing of such a Peace. And, if Thucydides knew nothing of it, it did not exist.<sup>873</sup>”

With Herodotus, the omission is just as startling, as he appears to come just to the point of discussing the Peace, but shrinks away. At 7.151, he reports an Argive embassy in Susa at the early part of Artaxerxes' reign, and that an Athenian embassy, led by Callias, was in Susa at the

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868 Stockton 1959:65.

869 Thuc. 1.116.

870 Eddy 1970:14.

871 Thuc. 4.50.

872 Mattingly 1961b:161-2.

873 Stockton 1959:67.



same time. We can assume that they would have arrived no later than 464: if the Argives were interested in confirming their *philia* relationship with the King, they would not have waited around for years after his accession.<sup>874</sup> This possibility cannot be ruled out, but we also might consider a slightly later date: Ephialtes' reforms took place in c. 462/1, so it is possible that the Athenians would not have been ready to countenance peace until after that date. Either way, the embassy was unsuccessful.<sup>875</sup>

Herodotus does not explain for what reason the Athenian embassy sought an audience with the King, unhelpfully saying only that the embassy was there "on other business." However, it is hard to imagine what business Callias might have had in mind other than peace, or at least the preliminary steps towards peace. Considering Herodotus' pro-Athenian slant, we might expect him to include the Peace of Callias, as he could describe it as a humiliating defeat of the Great King and a highpoint of the Athenian imperial project. For Thucydides, whose self-appointed task it was to chart "the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians,"<sup>876</sup> the Peace would seem to be an essential development of the Aegean political scene.<sup>877</sup>

While some have tried to do away with this problem by looking for evidence of the Peace

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874 Badian 1987:2-3.

875 Luraghi 1997:147: "At the end of the debate Herodotus adds that some Greeks held (λέγουσι) that two Athenian ambassadors at Artaxerxes' court in Susa had met an Argive embassy which aimed to renew the friendship with the Persians established at the time of Xerxes' expedition (7.151). At first glance we might think that Herodotus does not state explicitly whether or not it was the Athenian ambassadors who told this story because he does not want to put Argos' case too badly, but that is just half the truth at most. Any reader/listener would understand by implication that the story came from the ambassadors, otherwise Herodotus would not have mentioned them at all. The relevant point for him is not whether it was the two Athenians who had told it, but rather that some Greeks 'said' it in the sense that they were ready to believe that it had actually taken place—that is to say, they held it to be true. In a world of oral communication, the meaning of such an expression must have been obvious."

876 1.1.

877 Meister 1982:45-9.

of Callias in Herodotus or Thucydides,<sup>878</sup> we might simply acknowledge that these historians had their own motives and shortcomings,<sup>879</sup> and did not write according to our expectations. As Badian states, "It should be an accepted principle that the silence of an ancient author, whether Thucydides or (say) Diodorus, cannot be used as a negative argument, whatever the conventional degree of modern respect for that author."<sup>880</sup> It is not our sources that are wrong, but our interpretations of them.

It is easy to see the Peace of Callias as an unmitigated triumph, the ratification of Athenian victory over the Persian invaders, and Isocrates and Demosthenes certainly seem to adopt this triumphalist view. However, during the heyday of these two orators, Athens had changed dramatically since Herodotus published his *Histories*. The one-time hegemon had been exhausted by a century of continuous and ultimately unsuccessful wars, and had been forced by its reduced circumstances to accept the King's Peace. In this context, the Peace of Callias stood out in proud contrast to the King's Peace, and it was this contemporary contrast that Isocrates and Demosthenes exploited. However, in the time that Herodotus was finishing his work, Athens' allies had been resisting the hegemony for several decades, but Athens had not yet been humbled. As Herodotus was not just pro-Athenian, but a committed pan-Hellenist, he may have left the Peace out, hoping that his readers would remember Athens as the city that saved them from the evil Persians, rather than the city that made peace with the Barbarian in order to concentrate on enslaving fellow Greeks. This also explains his refusal to justify Athens' presence at Susa along with the Argive embassy. That story was told in order to emphasize Argive Medism, not Athenian diplomatic history. Herodotus chose to mention Callias' embassy, in order

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878 Gomme 1945:332-3, who sees Thuc. 8.56.4 as sufficient proof to declare, "The treaty is genuine."

879 Gomme 1945:365-70 lists sixteen "omissions" from Thucydides' description of the Pentecontaetia.

880 1987:18.

to indicate his source, but was forced to paper over Athens' attempt to bargain with Xerxes by weakly suggesting that Callias was there on "other business."

As for Thucydides, we must remind ourselves what the purpose of his work was. He wrote not just a history of the fifth century, but focused on those events that led to the Spartan-Athenian conflict. As such, he left out much of what he did not consider relevant to the evolution and progress of that conflict. Surely the Peace of Callias was a landmark event in the development of Greco-Persian diplomacy and Athenian imperialism, but upon examination, its impact on the immediate political situation was actually quite negligible. As our reconstruction of the terms will show, the Peace did not cause a radical change in the balance of power in the Aegean. The Ionians were to be taxed by the King as they had been for fifty years; the Athenians were to have control of the seas, as had been the *de facto* circumstance since the Eurymedon, fifteen years earlier; the Persians had not shown interest in mainland Greece since 479; and since 462, maintaining control of her allies and defending her empire against Sparta were increasingly more important to Athens than taking on additional conquests. Thus, even though the importance of the Peace for our particular investigation cannot be denied, for Thucydides, it was of minimal interest.<sup>881</sup>

We cannot easily sidestep Theopompus and Callisthenes, as they actively reject the Peace. Theopompus accuses the Athenians of telling lies:

*FGrH* 115 F 153 (Theon, *Progymnasmata* 2 (II 67, 22 Sp))  
παρὰ δὲ Θεοπόμπου ἐκ τῆς πέμπτης καὶ εἰκοστῆς τῶν Φιλιππικῶν, ὅτι <ὁ> Ἑλληνικὸς ὄρκος καταψεύδεται, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοί φασιν ὁμόσαι τοὺς Ἑλληνας πρὸ τῆς μάχης τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ αἱ πρὸς βασιλέα [Δαρεῖον] Ἀθηναίων [πρὸς Ἑλληνας] συνθῆκαι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην οὐχ οἷαν ἅπαντες ὑμνοῦσι γεγενημένην, «καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα» φησὶν «ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἀλαζονεύεται καὶ παρακρούεται τοὺς Ἑλληνας.»

And by Theopompus in the twenty-fifth book of the *Philippika*: The Greek oath is falsified which the Athenians say the Greeks swore before the battle of Plataea against the Barbarians, as is the treaty of the Athenians with King [Darius] [against the Greeks]. Moreover, he says, not even the battle of Marathon happened as everyone celebrates it, nor did "any of the other things that the city of the Athenians brags about and uses to deceive the Greeks."

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881 Fornara and Samons 1991:87-104.

*FGrH* 115 F 154 (Harpor. s. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν)  
Δημοσθένης κατὰ Νεαίρας ἀντί τοῦ παλαιοῦ: τὴν γὰρ τῶν κδ' στοιχείων γραμματικὴν ὁψέ ποτε παρὰ τοῖς Ἴωσιν εὐρεθῆναι. Θεόπομπος δ' ἐν τῇ κέ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν ἐσκευωρήσθαι λέγει τὰς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συνθήκας, ὡς τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασιν ἐστηλιτεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῶν Ἴόνων.  
Demosthenes, *Against Neaera*, for "in ancient [letters]": for the alphabetical order was invented after a long time by the Ionians. And Theopompus, in his *Philippika*, says that the treaty with the Barbarian was forged, since it was engraved not in Attic letters, but in Ionian.

Theopompus has two attacks on the existence of the Peace: it is just another propaganda tool of the Athenians; and the engraved text is an obvious forgery, as it uses anachronistic lettering. With Theopompus, we are dealing with fragments, and there are differing versions, so we cannot read his whole argument or see it in its intended context. Thus, it is unclear which treaty he is denying: Fragment 153 is usually amended αἱ πρὸς βασιλέα [Δαρεῖον] Ἰωνοῦ [πρὸς Ἑλληνας] συνθήκαι... Our interpretation of Theopompus' statement rides on what we do with the brackets. Krentz 2009 offers a brief summary of the key problems with this fragment, as well as recent attempts at interpretation. Scholars have either deleted or altered [Δαρεῖον] and/or [πρὸς Ἑλληνας], but preserving them makes the most sense, for three reasons. If we maintain [Δαρεῖον] as well as [πρὸς Ἑλληνας], we should translate "the treaty of the Athenians with King Darius against the Greeks." We know of a (purported) treaty with Darius II, from Andocides *On the Peace* 3.29.<sup>882</sup> Second, that peace would have been signed at a time when the Athenians were at war with a large part of the Greek world, so the hostile sense of πρὸς Ἑλληνας is appropriate. As Krentz points out, double πρὸς is not a common feature in Greek;<sup>883</sup> if Theon (or Theopompus) meant "with Darius and the Greeks," we would expect πρὸς Δαρεῖον καὶ Ἑλληνας. But the same fragment provides an analogous usage of πρὸς, in the phrase πρὸ τῆς μάχης τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους: "before the battle at Plataea against the

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882 On this treaty, see p.265ff. below.

883 Krentz 2009:232-3.

barbarians.<sup>884</sup> In sum, Theopompus was most likely rejecting the so-called Peace of Epilycus, reported by Andocides, and not the Peace of Callias. Furthermore, καταψεύδεται does mean "falsify," but with a sense of either "forge" or "misrepresent."<sup>885</sup> The next sentence implies that Theopompus intended this latter meaning: ἔτι δὲ καὶ is here serving to continue an argument by adding a further point. Thus for Theopompus, the Athenians were distorting the narrative about the battle of Marathon, in the same way that they were distorting the narrative concerning the Peace.<sup>886</sup> Since there is no hint at all that Theopompus rejected the very existence of the battle, his word choice indicates that the previous sentence should not be taken as a rejection of the existence of the Peace of Callias.

As for fragment 154, his second accusation, that the treaty with the Barbarians must be a forgery because it is inscribed in anachronistic characters, does no more to solve the problem. The entry begins with a reference to Demosthenes' *Against Neaera*.<sup>887</sup> The orator mentions a decree set up in the age of Theseus, and still standing, although the Attic letters (γράμμασιν Ἀττικοῖς) are only faintly visible. Theopompus is then invoked to emphasize the distinction between older and later inscriptions. Since this is Harpocration's entry under "Attic letters," we are surely dealing with an Athenian treaty. In yet another fragment, F 155, Theopompus states that the Athenians adopted the Ionian alphabet during the archonship of Euclides, i.e., 403/2. Thus we could be dealing with the Peace of Callias or the Peace of Epilycus. Once again, there is no way to determine to which he was referring. His accusation is unclear, as well. As with καταψεύδεται, σκευωρέομαι is usually translated as "forge," but it also has the sense of "tamper

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884 Connor 1968:80.

885 Walsh 1981:44-5.

886 Walsh 1981:45.

887 59.76.

with," suggesting that an authentic treaty text has been altered.<sup>888</sup> Whichever stele Theopompus had examined, surely he was able to distinguish between the two alphabets, and there is no reason to suspect that he is wrong about the date of the adoption of the Ionic alphabet in Athens. However, it is not as if the use of Ionic lettering was unknown before 403, as it was in use in Athens as early as the 440s.<sup>889</sup> To be sure, Ionic letters were generally limited to private inscriptions and pottery until the 420s, but even a few exceptions of public inscriptions with the Ionian forms demonstrate that Theopompus cannot be strictly correct in his denunciation of this particular inscription. Indeed, it is hard to believe that Theopompus would be clever enough to recognize a forgery by its letter forms, and be aware of the relevant law, but not know that Ionian letter forms were in use before that law. Perhaps it is more likely that Harpocration took Theopompus' statement of fact that, in 403, Athens decreed that all public inscriptions would henceforth be made in the Ionic letters, to mean that no inscriptions were made in the Ionian forms before 403. Once again, this "denunciation" of the Peace of Callias is shown to be vulnerable.

Callisthenes' rejection of the Peace runs along a different line. It seems evident from the Greek that he rejects the Peace because of the military activity taking place at the time period when the Peace was supposed to be in force. After describing Cimon's victory on the Eurymedon, Plutarch then describes how Cimon, having learned of the approach of a Phoenician

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888 Connor 1968:91-2.

889 According to Thraette 1980:31, *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 248, an Athenian imperial inventory, was inscribed in c. 450-440, and has a mixture of Attic and Ionic letters. D'Angour 1999:128 points out the choice of either the Old Attic or Ionic letter forms was a political statement. Ionic letters were connected to high literary culture, while the Old Attic forms were associated with dry public decrees. This led to a situation wherein "those of oligarchic sympathies" favored the Ionic forms, whereas radical democrats favored the Old Attic. Furthermore, the legal adoption of the Ionic script must be understood in the context of the times, namely, Athens' defeat by Sparta and the loss of her empire. No longer a military hegemon, Athens may have sought cultural hegemony, and communication via a panhellenic, rather than a local, script was simultaneously "a gesture of solidarity with the Samian demos, a subtle riposte to victorious Sparta, and a precursor to the overt appeals for Panhellenic unity voiced in the early fourth-century by Athenians such as Isocrates."

fleet. Cimon set his own ships out to intercept it, which they duly did. He adds:

τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον οὕτως ἐταπείνωσε τὴν γνώμην τοῦ βασιλέως, ὥστε συνθέσθαι τὴν περιβόητον εἰρήνην ἐκείνην, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἀεὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπέχειν θαλάσσης, ἔνδον δὲ Κυανέων καὶ Χελιδονίων μακρᾶ νηὶ καὶ χαλκεμβόλῳ μὴ πλέειν.

This deed thus humbled the will of the king, so that he concluded the famous peace, [namely] to forever stay away from the Hellenic sea the distance which a horse travels, and to not sail beyond the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian islands with warships.<sup>890</sup>

However, there was a controversy over the treaty:

καίτοι Καλλισθένης οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργῳ δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἤττης ἐκείνης, καὶ μακρὰν οὕτως ἀποστήναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε πενήκοντα ναυσὶ Περικλέα καὶ τριάκοντα μόναις Ἐφιάλτην ἐπέκεινα πλεῦσαι Χελιδονίων καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ναυτικὸν ἀπαντῆσαι παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν, ἃ συνήγαγε Κρατερός, ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων κατατέτακται. φασὶ δὲ καὶ βωμὸν εἰρήνης διὰ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ιδρύσασθαι, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν πρεσβεύσαντα τιμῆσι διαφερόντως.

Indeed Callisthenes denies that the Barbarian concluded these terms, but acted out of fear due to that battle, and so kept away from Greek affairs, with the result that Pericles, with 50 ships and Ephialtes, alone with 30 ships, sailed beyond the Chelidonian islands and no ships from the Barbarians met them. But in the decrees, which Craterus gathered, there is arranged in order a copy of the treaty as if it existed. They say also that the Athenians, because of it, set up an Altar of Peace and paid high honors to Callias, who had been ambassador.<sup>891</sup>

Plutarch's wording is precise and clear: οὐ φησι ταῦτα συνθέσθαι is to be translated "denies that he made *this* treaty," and not "denies any treaty at all." Callisthenes' argument, as Plutarch understood it, was that a treaty between Athens and Persia did not bar the King from sailing his fleet within a certain region. Instead, it was fear that compelled the King to allow Pericles and Ephialtes to sail along the Asian coast, without any interference from the imperial fleet. We could interpret this as a claim that no treaty was signed; we are equally free to interpret as a claim that, even though a treaty was signed, it was not respect for the sworn oath, but fear, that actually compelled Artaxerxes to uphold the treaty. Without having Callisthenes' original work before us, it is risky to assess his argument, but one should note that, at least as Plutarch presents it, Callisthenes has no direct evidence to support his claim.

In contrast, Craterus had assembled textual evidence that argued for the Peace. It must be

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890 Plut. *Cim.* 13.4.

891 Plut. *Cim.* 13.6. Jacoby lists Callisthenes' denial as *FGrH* 124 F16, and the reference to Craterus' collection as *FGrH* 342 F13.

admitted that ὡς γενομένων ("as if it existed") is not a ringing endorsement for the historicity of the Peace of Callias.<sup>892</sup> However, there is reason to believe that Plutarch, in general thought highly of Craterus. In his *Life of Aristides*, Plutarch once again cites Craterus:

τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν ἔγγραφον ὁ Κρατερός τεκμήριον παρέσχηκεν, οὔτε δίκην οὔτε ψήφισμα, καίπερ εἰθῶς ἐπιεικῶς γράφειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ παρατίθεσθαι τοὺς ἱστοροῦντας.  
But Craterus furnishes no documentary proof of this—no judgment of the court, no degree of indictment—although he is wont to record such things with all due fullness, and to adduce his authorities.<sup>893</sup>

On the one hand, Callisthenes claims that it was fear of the Athenian military, and not a treaty, that forced Artaxerxes to cede territory to the Athenians. On the other hand, Craterus, who Plutarch elsewhere describes as reliable, has documentary evidence of the existence of the treaty. In addition, Plutarch has heard that the Athenians honored Callias' achievement in making the Peace.<sup>894</sup> Plutarch avoids endorsing either side. But, even recognizing the inherent risk of speculation about the motivations of an author whose works are now lost, we need not be as timid as Plutarch. Callisthenes' work was, undoubtedly, a work of propaganda intended to glorify Alexander the Great. Alexander had made it clear that his campaign in Persia was motivated by a desire to punish the Persians for the invasion of Greece in 480,<sup>895</sup> and sent Persian armor back to Athena on her acropolis after the battle of the Granicus.<sup>896</sup> If Athens had already "defeated" the Persians back in 449/8 by forcing them into an embarrassing treaty, then the war was already over. But if Callisthenes could show that, in fact, someone still needed to avenge Greece, then

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892 That is, as if Craterus wanted to demonstrate that it existed. Higbie 1999:47 translates this phrase as "as though it was enacted," suggesting not just that the treaty had been made, but that it brought about the intended state of affairs.

893 Plut. *Arist.* 26.1-2. Translation Walsh 1981.

894 Plutarch *Cimon* 13.6: "They say also that the Athenians, because of it, set up an Altar of Peace and paid high honors to Callias, who had been ambassador." This claim is supported by Pausanias *Geography* 8.2: "Here stands a bronze figure ... of Callias, who, as most of the Athenians say, brought about the peace between the Greeks and Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes."

895 Arrian *Anab.* 2.14.4.

896 Arrian *Anab.* 1.16.7.



Alexander's deeds would be that much more heroic. As Bosworth shows, Callisthenes left out other facts, too. He claimed that Sardis had only been conquered three times: first by the Cimmerians, then by the Treres and Lycians, and lastly by Cyrus the Great. Absent are the Ionians, who burned part of the city in 498.<sup>897</sup> That episode, according to Herodotus, gave the Persians their justification for the first invasion of Greece.<sup>898</sup> But since Alexander could not allow Persia to be anything but the aggressor, Callisthenes had to drop the Ionian attack from his record, and instead emphasized Alexander's peaceful occupation of Sardis.<sup>899</sup> This not to say that Craterus was pure and unbiased, but since we are confronted with one claim, apparently backed by textual evidence, and a counterclaim, made by a historian with motive to distort the facts in this particular instance, and presenting no evidence, at the very least we must recognize that Callisthenes' claim is insufficient to make us doubt the existence of the Peace of Callias.

Seeing that the direct attacks on the Peace of Callias by Theopompus and Callisthenes are unconvincing, it is now time to consider the positive evidence for the Peace. Our main evidence for the Peace comes from the fourth century orators Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Lysurgus. Plutarch and Diodorus, writing centuries later, also provide more evidence.

Isocrates *Panegyricus*, (c. 380), 4.120:

μάλιστα δ' ἂν τις συνίδοι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς μεταβολῆς, εἰ παραναγοίῃ τὰς συνθήκας τὰς τ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν γενομένας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἀναγεγραμμένας. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς φανησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν βασιλέως ὀρίζοντες καὶ τῶν φόρων ἐνίους τάπτοντες καὶ κωλύοντες αὐτὸν τῇ θαλάττῃ χρῆσθαι: νῦν δ' ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ προστάτων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἐκάστου, καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς.

Someone might best see the greatness of the change [in Athenian power] if he should compare the treaty which was made under us [i.e. Athenian hegemony] and the one set up publicly just now. Back then, we will see that we put boundaries on the the realm of the King and established *phoros* for some, and prevented him from making use of the sea; but now he is the manager of the affairs of the Greeks, and establishes what each must do, and all but places governors in their cities.

Isocrates' description of the treaties is clearly exaggerated for emotional effect, and sadly lacking

897 Strabo, 13.4.8 = *FGrH* 124 F 29.

898 Hdt. 5.102.1.

899 Arrian *Anab.* 1.17.1-2; Bosworth 1990:8.

in details, yet it yields an important fact: by encouraging his listeners to compare the two treaties, it is evident that (a) both treaties were commonly recognized as fact at the time; and (b) at least one, if not both of the treaties were actually texts available to be read.<sup>900</sup>

Demosthenes 15.29 echoed this sentiment in c. 343:

καὶ παράδειγμα λέγειν ἔχω τούτου πᾶσιν ὑμῖν γνώριμον. εἰσὶ συνθήκαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι διτταὶ πρὸς βασιλέα, ἃς ἐποίησαθ' ἢ πόλις ἢ ἡμετέρα, ἃς ἅπαντες ἐγκωμιάζουσι, καὶ μετὰ ταῦθ' ὕστερον Λακεδαιμόνιοι ταύτας ὧν δὴ κατηγοροῦσι.

I can cite an instance that is familiar to you all. The Greeks have two treaties with the King, one made by our city and commended by all; and the later one made by the Lacedaemonians, which is of course condemned by all.

What these two speeches show is that there was general knowledge of two treaties between the Athenians and the Persians, one made in relatively recent memory, and one during the height of Athens' power. Meister argues that Isocrates invented the Peace of Callias by claiming that the *de facto* state of affairs in the mid-fifth century was actually the result of a treaty enforced on the Great King by Athens.<sup>901</sup> However, this would have been self-defeating. If his audience doubted the existence of the earlier treaty, these speeches would have no rhetorical effect.<sup>902</sup> One forged inscription is possible, but it is unlikely that Plutarch's altar, Pausanias' statue, and Demosthenes' and Isocrates' arguments could all be based on the same lie.<sup>903</sup> In contrast to Thucydides, the Peace was of great interest to our fourth-century orators, but only as a rhetorical tool. At that time, it gained significance but only insofar as it could function as a comparandum against the ignominious King's Peace of 387. Unfortunately, the orators were interested in neither accuracy nor precision, and made frequent use of emotionally-charged language to describe the Peace of Callias; it is possible that these were the very speeches that Theopompus was attacking, for these

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900 Thompson 1981:165.

901 Meister 72-5.

902 Cawkwell 1997:120.

903 Eddy 1970:9. In his commentary to *FGH* 328 F151, Jacoby argues that Philochorus refers to this very altar but ascribes it to a commemoration of the Common Peace of 375/4.

very reasons. So, while this may have resulted in some unresolvable conflicts over the date and terms of the Peace, it should not serve as evidence against its existence.

It is best to begin with a look at the chronology of the Pentecontaetia.<sup>904</sup> This is itself contested and confused. However, there are a few key events which can be dated to within a limited span of time, all of which contribute to our understanding of Greek and Persian politics at this time.

It is impossible that Athens and Persia could have signed a treaty in the first years after Plataea and Mycale. Persia, although defeated in Greece, had no reason to cede territory to Athens. Even if a future attack on Greek lands was ruled out as a matter of policy, they had no reason to make such a promise with any Greek state. And as far as Athens was concerned, the war against Persia had only just begun; thus they were intent on aggressively attacking Persian interests in Asia.<sup>905</sup> A peace can have been made only if the Persians felt that a peace might be less damaging than war (i.e., they would have to be unwilling to risk war with Athens), *and* if the Athenians no longer prioritized aggression against Persia. The earliest date that such a state of affairs might have existed is in the aftermath of the Battle of the Eurymedon.<sup>906</sup>

The Battle of the Eurymedon and the death of the Great King Xerxes took place in the mid 460s. Based on Babylonian documentation, we know that Xerxes died in August 465. It is not clear if the Eurymedon happened during his lifetime; Thucydides tells us only that it

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904 The "Pentecontaetia" ("fifty years") is the name given to the period of time between the end of Xerxes' invasion of Greece and the traditional start date of the Peloponnesian war (that is, 479-431). The notion of examining these years as a discreet unit arises from Thucydides' belief that this period contained the true cause of the Peloponnesian war, namely, Sparta's fear of Athens as the Delian League was transformed into the Athenian Empire (see especially Thuc. 1.97 and 1.118). Thucydides' narrative of this period is abbreviated and highly selective, and thus should not be taken as a comprehensive history of the period. However, seeing as Thucydides is one of the main sources for the following discussion, I have chosen to use "Pentecontaetia" as it is a widely-recognized term.

905 Thuc. 1.96.

906 Fornara and Samons 1991:171-5.

happened after the revolt of Naxos, which itself cannot be dated precisely.<sup>907</sup> However, we do know that the exiled Themistocles was nearly captured by the Athenian fleet off Naxos, and that soon thereafter Artaxerxes took the throne (νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα; Thuc. 1.137); that is, Themistocles arrived in Asia from Naxos in mid to late 465. Where exactly the Battle of the Eurymedon fits among the events encompassing the death of Xerxes, the revolt of Naxos, and the contested succession of Artaxerxes cannot be determined.<sup>908</sup>

At some date, shortly after the Eurymedon, Thasos, another Athenian ally, rebelled. While the Athenians spent the next three years putting down the rebels, Sparta, unbeknownst to the Athenians, agreed to a Thasian request for aid. This is significant because it marks the first blatantly hostile move of Sparta against Athens. One might miss the significance, because a great earthquake in Lacedaemon spurred a Helot revolt, forcing the Spartans to abandon Thasos, never having actually aided them, and to spend ten years fighting in their own territory.<sup>909</sup>

Even though Athens was not immediately aware of Sparta's plan to interfere in the Thasian rebellion, their hostility was soon manifest. Cimon, the leader of the more conservative and pro-Sparta faction within Athens, led an Athenian force southward, in response to Sparta's request for assistance. But when they arrived, the Spartans sent them back north, fearing that these radical democrats might attempt some political changes within the Peloponnesian League. The Athenians, deeply offended, realized that it was no longer profitable to maintain an alliance with Sparta, and "the instant they returned home they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Medes, and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos."<sup>910</sup>

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907 1.100; ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρὸς Μήδους...

908 Our sources disagree on who was king when Themistocles arrived at Sardis, either Xerxes or Artaxerxes. See Compernelle 1987.

909 Thuc. 1.101-3.

910 Thuc. 1.102; trans. Crawley. In Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, 1138-46, performed in 411, the title character

This affair not only drove a wedge between Athens and Sparta, but also radicalized Athenian politics. In one stroke Cimon had made the Athenian army look foolish and demonstrated that his 'philo-laconian' attitude was no longer relevant and indeed a threat to the Athenian *arche*. His ostracism followed shortly after his return from Sparta, leaving the door open for the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles starting in c. 462/1. As a result, the importance of the Athenian navy in securing the empire and collecting taxes, the power of the *demos* in the imperial judicial system, and the introduction of paid jury service meant that sovereignty resided in the *demos*, and that the continued prosperity of the *demos* was contingent upon the continued exploitation of the allies. The implication was that, while continued warfare against the Medes might be desirable, the security of the Delian League was essential, and therefore took precedence.<sup>911</sup> These were precisely the conditions that would have prompted the Athenian side to sue for peace with the empire, and so we may look for the Peace of Callias in the mid- to late-460s.

Many of our ancient sources would agree. Plutarch is clear that the Peace came as a consequence of Eurymedon.<sup>912</sup> Herodotus reports Callias' embassy to Susa shortly after the accession of Artaxerxes. Demosthenes tells us that Callias was prosecuted after returning from his embassy to Persia; although he escaped the death penalty, he was fined fifty talents.<sup>913</sup> Callisthenes, cited in Plutarch, attempted to argue against the Peace by showing how Pericles and

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reminds a Spartan delegation of Athens' charitable response to Spartan pleas for aid:

εἶτ' ὃ Λάκωνες, πρὸς γὰρ ὑμᾶς τρέψομαι, / οὐκ ἴσθ' ὅτ' ἐλθὼν δεῦρο Περικλείδας ποτὲ / ὁ Λάκων Ἀθηναίων  
 ἰκέτης καθέζετο / ἐπὶ τοῖσι βωμοῖς ὠχρὸς ἐν φοινικίδι / στρατιὰν προσαιτῶν; ἢ δὲ Μεσσήνη τότε / ὑμῖν  
 ἐπέκειτο χῶ θεὸς σείων ἅμα. / ἐλθὼν δὲ σὺν ὀπλίταισι τετρακισχιλίῳις / Κίμων ὄλην ἔσωσε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.  
 Next, Laconians, I'll turn to you: Don't you know that Perikleidas the Laconian came here as a supplicant and sat himself before these altars, pale in his red cloak, begging for an army? Messene, at that time pressed down on you, while the god shook the ground. Coming with four thousand hoplites, Cimon rescued all Lacedaemonia.

911 Fornara and Samons 1991:61-74.

912 *Cim.* 12-13.

913 *On the Peace* 19.273-4.

Ephialtes were able to sail along the King's territories; as Ephialtes died in the late 460s, Callisthenes apparently associated the controversy surrounding the Peace with the aftermath of the Eurymedon.<sup>914</sup> Demosthenes does not tell us when this trial took place, but Plutarch mentions an instance when Callias called on Aristides to testify on his behalf.<sup>915</sup> If Plutarch and Demosthenes are referring to the same trial—and there is no proof of this at all—it would mean that Callias' embassy took place before c. 464, the year of Aristides' death.<sup>916</sup> The *Menexenos* lists the Peace before the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta, the latter of which was fought in c. 457.<sup>917</sup> Diodorus does explicitly put the Peace in the archonship of Pedieus and the consulate of Marcus Valerius Lactuca and Spurius Verginius Tricostus, thus 449/8, but his account is likely corrupted. As Meister shows, Diodorus' description of the battles of the Eurymedon and Cypriot Salamis use very similar phrasing.<sup>918</sup> This does not prove that his dating of the Peace is incorrect, but it does not inspire confidence.

So far, then, the ancient testimonies speak against a date in the 440s. However, the idea of a Peace in 449/8 fits in well with what we know about the mid-fifth century. It is highly unlikely that the Peace was made immediately after the Eurymedon, around 465. Herodotus'

914 See p.244f above.

915 *Arist.* 25.3-6.

916 Meister 1982:16.

917 241d-242b lists a series of events, mainly battles, that "cleared out and completely swept the Barbarian from the sea:" the Eurymedon, the Cypriot campaign, the failed Egyptian campaign. Then, when peace was secured, the Greeks began to fight amongst themselves out of jealousy and envy. The first manifestations of these, "after the war began," (μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο γενομένου πολέμου) were the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta. If we interpret this series as unfolding in strict chronological order, then we must reject it, as it places these final two battles, which occurred in c. 457, after the Cypriot campaign of c.450. However, we should understand it as describing parallel series, the first of which describes the anti-Persian battles, and the second of which describes the increasing hostilities between Athens and Sparta. The two times are strongly connected, but not identical, and can thus slightly overlap. Thus, it need not follow that Plato's chronology is impossible, or that the Peace came after Tanagra and Oinophyta.

918 Meister 1982:28-30. Sordi 1971:34-42 attributes this to Diodorus' confusion with his main source, Ephorus. Ephorus wrote κατὰ γένος, "by episode," implying that he continued a narrative or historical sequence to a natural conclusion. In contrast, Diodorus described all the events of each year before moving on to the next year. Diodorus' confusion is evident at 11.62, where he quotes an epigram dedicated by the Athenians for the victory at Cyprus, after he has just described the Eurymedon.

account of Callias' embassy to Artaxerxes, as brief as it is, at no point even suggests that Callias succeeded in securing any sort of agreement. If the Athenians had, at that time, promised to refrain from hostile behavior towards the King's land, and then promptly invaded Egypt for six years, surely there would never be another Athenian-Persian treaty. Remember that this was the first attempt at peace since the Persian Wars. With the betrayal of the submission of 507/6 in mind, a second flagrant violation would not have been ignored.

However, three years after the failure of Athens in Egypt, Athens and Sparta signed a five-year truce.<sup>919</sup> This was followed immediately by Cimon's last campaign, this time in Cyprus. Off Salamis the Athenians won a great naval victory, but lost Cimon to disease.<sup>920</sup> According to Diodorus 12.4, the Battle of Cypriot Salamis was fought in 449/8, and that due to the great Athenian triumph, Artaxerxes decided that it was best to seek peace with the Athenians, and "dispatched to the generals in Cyprus and to the satraps the written terms on which they were permitted to come to a settlement with the Greeks." If Artaxerxes had been unwilling to consider a treaty with Athens after the Eurymedon, Salamis, coupled with the six-year revolt in Egypt, convinced him that continued warfare was no longer acceptable. This decision was not the result of fear, nor because he had been crippled by losses of men, ships, or wealth. Instead, Athenian interference in the Eastern Mediterranean region had simply become so disruptive that it was more beneficial to bite the bullet and make peace, rather than to risk the uncertainties of war. It is

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919 Thuc. 1.112.

920 Plut. *Cim.* 18-19. Parker 1976:36-8, Walsh 1981:39, and Meister 1982:27 all argue that Diodorus 12.2-3 states that the Athenians were besieging the Cypriot cities, but actually failed to accomplish any of their aims in the war. 12.3 does indeed suggest that the Athenians had perhaps bitten off more than they could chew: "The Athenians began the siege of Salamis and were making daily assaults, but the soldiers in the city, supplied as they were with missiles and matériel, were with ease warding off the besiegers from the walls." However, 12.2 makes it clear that they were ultimately victorious: "For Cimon reasoned that this would be the easiest way for him not only to become master of all Cyprus but also to confound the Persians, since their being unable to come to the aid of the Salaminians, because the Athenians were masters of the sea, and their having left their allies in the lurch would cause them to be despised, and that, in a word, the entire war would be decided if all Cyprus were reduced by arms. And that is what actually happened (ὅπερ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι)."

likely that Callias, given his previous experience as an ambassador to Persia, and his later success in securing the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, was selected to head this embassy as well.<sup>921</sup>

If the Peace of Callias was signed around this time, we would say that it inaugurated three decades of relative peace and stability in Athenian-Persian relations. This would help explain why the Persians thought their later treaties with Greek states might be successful. We cannot rule out a date in the 460s for the Peace, but an argument for such a date would require one to explain why the Persians would have considered entering into the Peace of Epilycus, and why the Athenians would feel safe enough to turn their attention away from Persia and towards Sparta.

With Cimon's death, Pericles was free to focus on Sparta. In doing so, he courted the League allies by granting a year without tribute, and, perhaps, issued the "Congress Decree," calling them to Athens in order to discuss a realignment of League policy, now that the war was over. This decree is almost as controversial as the Peace of Callias itself, and is known only from Plutarch. Pericles wished to discuss the restoration of temples destroyed by the Persians, the sacrifices owed to the gods for their assistance during the Persian Wars, and how to ensure the Greeks' safe access to the seas. However, Sparta refused to attend, and the congress never convened. From Pericles' perspective, this may have been just as well: he had forced Sparta to either legitimize Athenian hegemony, or reject the unity and joint security of the Greek world. The absence of a definitive plan for the use of League funds also allowed the Athenians to appropriate the treasury at Delos for projects, such as the work on the acropolis, that served to glorify Athens over all other Greek states.<sup>922</sup>

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921 Cawkwell 1997:116–7.

922 Meritt et al. 1950:279-80.



A mid-century date for the Peace of Callias also agrees with the archaeology. In the course of modern excavations at Persepolis, a statue of Penelope, Odysseus' long-suffering wife, was found in the Treasury room. It was soon identified as an exact copy of another statue, this one found in Rome. Both were carved in Greek style typical of the mid-fifth century. Greek craftsmen were employed at Persepolis, the existence of the Roman copy makes it extremely unlikely that this particular statue was made in Iran. Since the Persepolis complex was destroyed by Alexander's army in 331, and the Roman version was not likely produced before the second century, the two versions must be based on a single Greek original. Given the dating of the sculpture, the Persepolis version had not been looted during Xerxes' invasion, but was instead sent from somewhere in Greece as a gift for the Great King. The grieving Penelope was certainly known outside of Athens during the fifth century,<sup>923</sup> so there is no way to guarantee that this statue was not made in another *polis*.<sup>924</sup> But Tonio Hölscher argues that Athens is the most likely point of origin. The image of the grieving Penelope was popular in Athens during the early years of the Delian League, representing the grieving wives who had lost husbands in the heroic campaigns against the Persian barbarians. Democratization meant that the entire population bore the burden of war, and by the 450s, tens of thousands of Athenians must have died on campaign. Now that one version, the original, remained in Athens, and its exact copy resided in Persepolis, a symbolic link was forged between the two cities. It is unlikely that, in the mid-fifth century, any *polis* other than Athens would take such a risk as to link themselves to Persia.<sup>925</sup>

If this statue was a diplomatic gift, it would seem to necessitate a major change in attitude

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923 Neer 2010:166 cites a relief from Chiusi and a red-figure skiphos from Melos with the same motif, both dating from the mid-fifth century. Hölscher 2012:47 cites a Melian relief.

924 Palagia 2008:227-32 argues that, as it appears to be made from Thasian marble, the statue was produced in or near Thasos. The Thasians had a record of anti-Athenian behavior, namely by seeking Spartan aid (Thuc. 1.101.1). It may have been given to the Persians as a gift to Artaxerxes I on his accession, in an otherwise unknown effort to secure an alliance against Athens.

925 Hölscher 2012:54-7.

towards the Persians. The Athenians presumed, as do we, that the Persian wives and mothers suffered no less than they from the loss of their sons and husbands in the five decades of war. As must have been conveyed by the Athenian embassy when the statue was delivered, Penelope represented both the shared grief over the dead and the joy over the return of the living. In the mid-fifth century, the conclusion of a peace would have been a fitting occasion for the giving of such a sculpture.<sup>926</sup>

Furthermore, based on the Athenian Tribute Lists, scholars argue that no tribute was collected in 449/8, which can have only been true if Athens had not attempted to collect tribute that year. This would have been a concession by Pericles to the increasingly restless allies.<sup>927</sup> A Parthenon accounting stele from 434/3 states that it had been inscribed in the 16th year of construction, meaning that work began in 447/6.<sup>928</sup> If the Peace of Callias could be construed (by an Athenian politician to an Athenian audience) as a victory, then the construction of a victory monument would be an appropriate commemoration. Jenifer Neils argues that the Temple of Nike frieze reliefs commemorate the whole series of Athenian victories over the Persians: Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Mycale, Eurymedon, and Cypriot Salamis.<sup>929</sup> *IG I<sup>3</sup> 52* indicates that the whole project was predicted to cost 3,000 talents. According to David Lewis, "The only conclusion which can be drawn is that the Athenians were confident before starting work on the Parthenon that the Persian War was over, by mutual consent."<sup>930</sup> He adds: "Beside this conclusion, the details are relatively unimportant."

Another powerful argument against the Peace asks why, if the Peace were real, and the

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926 Hölscher 2015; see also Razmjou 2015 for information on the archaeological context; Hölscher 2012:50-3 for a more detailed discussion of duplicate statues in Greece.

927 Meritt et al. 1950:278. Sealy 1955:325-8 puts the year of no tribute to 447/6.

928 Kallet 2005:53.

929 Neils 2005:205-6.

930 Lewis 1992:126.

text was inscribed on stone in Athens, is there so much confusion about the details of the Peace amongst our sources? Let us consider the terms of the Peace:

Demosthenes *De Falsa Legatione* 273:

ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν, ὡς ἅπαντες εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἀκηκόατε, Καλλίαν τὸν Ἴππονίκου ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουμένην εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντα, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῆ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων καὶ Κυανέων πλοίῳ μακρῷ μὴ πλεῖν, ὅτι δῶρα λαβεῖν ἔδοξε πρεσβεύσας, μικροῦ μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς εὐθύναις πεντήκοντ' ἐπράξαντο τάλαντα.

I am sure you all have heard the story, Callias son of Hipponikos having served as an ambassador for that peace famous to all, [by which] the king was not to come down within a day's ride from the sea, nor to sail warships between the Chelidonian islands and the Cyanean rocks, they [the Athenians] nearly put him to death because they judged him to have taken bribes while an ambassador, and fined him fifty talents as a punishment.

Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 12.59-61:<sup>931</sup>

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας δυναστείας οὐκ ἔξην αὐτοῖς οὔτ' ἐντὸς Ἄλυος πεζῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταβαίνειν οὔτε μακροῖς πλοίοις ἐπὶ τὰδε πλεῖν Φασήλιδος...

In the time of our supremacy, it was not possible for them [the barbarians] to come down beyond the Halys with a land army, nor to sail in warships to this side of Phaselis...

Diodorus 12.4.5:

διόπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ Μεγάβυζον ἔπεμψαν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς διαλεξομένους περὶ συλλύσεως. ὑπακουσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεμψάντων πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορας, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Καλλίας ὁ Ἴππονίκου, ἐγένοντο συνθήκαι περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας, ὧν ἐστί τὰ κεφάλαια ταῦτα: αὐτονόμους εἶναι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀπάσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπας μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ θάλατταν κατωτέρω τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, μηδὲ ναῦν μακρὰν πλεῖν ἐντὸς Φασήλιδος καὶ Κυανέων: ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιτελούντων, μὴ στρατεύειν Ἀθηναίους εἰς τὴν χώραν, ἧς βασιλεὺς ἄρχει.

Consequently the officers of Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens for the purpose of discussing a settlement. When the Athenians responded and dispatched ambassadors plenipotentiary, the leader of whom was Callias, the son of Hipponicus, a peace treaty was made by the Athenians and their allies with the Persians, of which the main points are these: all of the Greek cities throughout Asia are to be autonomous, and the Persian satraps are not to come down within a three-day's journey from the sea, nor sail warships beyond Phaselis and the Cyanean Rocks. And if these terms are fulfilled by the king and his satraps, the Athenians are not to invade those lands of which the king is ruler.

Lycurgus *Against Leocrates*, 73:

ὄρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πῆξαντες τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τούτους κωλύσαντες ὑπερβαίνειν, συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο, μακρῷ μὲν πλοίῳ μὴ πλεῖν ἐντὸς Κυανέων καὶ Φασήλιδος, τοὺς δ' Ἑλλήνας αὐτονόμους εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας.

[The Athenians] having established limits for the Barbarians for the purpose of the freedom of the Greeks, and prevented them from transgressing, made a treaty: while they [the Persians] were not to sail with warships beyond the Cyanean Rocks and Phaselis, the Greeks were to be autonomous, not only those in Europe but also those who settled in Asia.<sup>932</sup>

931 Isocrates' description of the Peace became increasingly specific from c.380 (*Panegyricus* 118, 120) to c.357 (*Areopagiticus* 80) and finally c.340 (*Panathenaicus* 59-61); see Murison 1971:18, Sealey 1955:329.

932 The *Suda* s.v. Κίμων gives the same terms.

Plutarch *Cimon* 13.4

τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον οὕτως ἐταπείνωσε τὴν γνώμην τοῦ βασιλέως, ὥστε συνθέσθαι τὴν περιβόητον εἰρήνην ἐκείνην, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἀεὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπέχειν θαλάσσης, ἔνδον δὲ Κυανέων καὶ Χελιδονίων μακρᾶ νηῖ καὶ χαλκεμβόλῳ μὴ πλέειν.

This deed thus humbled the mind of the King with the result that he made the terms of that famous peace: to forever keep one horse-ride away from the Greek sea, and to not sail within the Cyanean and Chelidonian isles with armored warships.

Based on these descriptions, we can immediately assume the first clause:

*1. The King and his armies are not to enter a given part of Western Asia Minor.*

This might be hard to believe. Why would the Great King of Persia allow a small Greek city to tell him where he could send his own forces within his own empire? After all, the recent Athenian victories at the Eurymedon and Cypriot Salamis were annoying, but far from catastrophic. By way of comparison, Darius III, if Arrian is to be believed, did not begin to negotiate with Alexander until all of Asia Minor and most of the Levant were well and truly conquered.<sup>933</sup>

The description of the terms of the Peace of Callias in our Greek sources are not exact copies of the original treaty text. Therefore, it is possible that both sides, Athenians and Achaemenids, resolved to keep their forces out of a "demilitarized zone,"<sup>934</sup> and the original text restricted the movements of both the Athenians and Persians. Wade-Gery suggests that the King agreed to keep his 'Palatine' army, the *kāra Pārsa utā Māda* of the Achaemenid inscriptions, out of Ionia. This would not have precluded the conscription or hiring of local Greeks, Lydians, or others to serve the King and his satraps as the need might arise. Presumably, since the treaty never asserted the independence of Ionia, or Athenian suzerainty in Ionia, the restriction on the Persian military was designated only to ensure the autonomy of the Asian Greeks (see term 2 below), and bar Persian military support for tyrannies like those that ruled Ionia before the Ionian

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933 *Anabasis* 2.14.

934 Wade-Gery 1985:214-20.

Revolt. This term was not intended to strip the King of his ability to defend his realm.

All of our sources, except Lycurgus, describe a specific land border, but none agree. Wade-Gery pointed out that Herodotus put the distance from Sardis to Ephesus at a three-day journey on foot;<sup>935</sup> perhaps one day on horse was intended to be equivalent. The Persian military presence was supposed to not extend beyond Sardis, the satrapal capital. Meiggs accounted for the different units of measure by describing them as "arbitrary and superficial striving after originality."<sup>936</sup>

All of our sources agree that a limit was placed on the Persian navy. The King agreed to keep his ships on the east of a line that ran through Phaselis, on the southern coast of Asia Minor. The location of the Cyanean rocks is debated: either near Phaselis, or in the Bosphorus. The second interpretation would mean that the King would be unable to patrol the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and Phaselis. If this is true, it would be a reflection of Athens' reliance on her navy as the most important tool in maintaining her empire. The Persians, in contrast, used the Phoenician fleet almost exclusively when fighting the Greeks, and so the absence of the Phoenician ships along Ionia would not hamper Persian administration of the region.

Isocrates' 'Halys Line' is more problematic. Would the Great King would agree to keep his troops out of such a great portion of his own territory? For the Persians to keep East of the river would mean that they gave up Sardis and Daskyleion, both satrapal capitals.<sup>937</sup> This may be the result of Isocrates' imperfect knowledge of geography, or it could be an intentional exaggeration for rhetorical effect. We should remember that Herodotus defined the Halys as the

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935 Hdt 5.54.2.

936 Quoted in Sealey 1955:331.

937 Thompson 1981:171: "'Halys' is, of course, a wild exaggeration, but typical of Isocrates."

border between the Lydian and Median empires.<sup>938</sup> Perhaps Isocrates used the Halys in order to suggest that the Persians had been pushed back to their native land, where they belonged, and Ionia had been freed at long last. If Wade-Gery is correct about the demilitarized zone, then the profusion of place names makes sense, as we should expect a broad swath of territory, not a single line. The Greeks were not to pass east of Sardis, and the Persians were not to pass west of the Halys.<sup>939</sup>

Another possible explanation, not mutually exclusive with the first, is that our problem with Artaxerxes' surrender of control within his own empire stems from our own anachronistic understanding of imperial borders. Some modern observers might see any Greek *polis* operating with autonomy within Asia Minor as a violation of the Achaemenid empire's territorial integrity, and therefore an attack on the legitimacy of the Achaemenid king. Since no government would willingly erode their own legitimacy, any treaty clause acknowledging the autonomy of a foreign entity could not be acceptable.

However, the ancient notions of empire and borders were not the same as those of the modern nation-state. Ancient empires, for the most part, did not have "firm homogenous control within a territory bounded by impervious borders," but instead exerted varying degrees of control within and between "islands" based around cities or strategic centers.<sup>940</sup> The Ionian region was always a problem for the Achaemenids: the Ionian cities refused to abandon Croesus and join Cyrus, revolted against Darius, did great damage to Xerxes' army and navy, and supported the Delian League. So even though the Ionian Greeks were within the imperial realm, subject to

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938 1.6, 1.72. Leloux 2016 shows that Herodotus' understanding of the Halys and its place in Anatolian geography was rudimentary, in that he seems to view the Halys as nearly cutting Anatolia off entirely from the rest of Asia, when in reality the river is significantly shorter.

939 Wade-Gery 1958:215.

940 Parker 2012; Parker applied his model, called the "Continuum of Imperial Control," to the Neo-Assyrian empire, but its basic tenets apply to the Achaemenid empire as well.

military service, and were listed amongst the territories ruled by the Great Kings,<sup>941</sup> this need not have been a constant state of affairs. In reality, the decades of war that led up to the Peace of Callias proved that the Great Kings were unable (at that time) to exert total and permanent control over Ionia, so to grant autonomy to the Ionian *poleis* was simply to acknowledge the reality of the situation. This was a defeat for Artaxerxes, and the Greeks would never let him live it down. But, as we shall see, it was a lost battle, not a war.

The first term was a precondition for the second:

2. *The Greek poleis of Asia shall be governed internally by their own laws.*

This term did not free the Asian Greeks from Persian rule. It only established that they would not be prevented from structuring the legal codes of their cities according to Greek legal customs. This clause implies that the Greeks of Asia will be taxed according to the system established by Artaphernes forty years earlier;<sup>942</sup> remember that Herodotus stated that Artaphernes' reckoning of taxes due from each Ionian city was still used in his own day.<sup>943</sup> They still owed the King tribute, and presumably would still supply military levies if called upon to do so. The actual treaty text may have clarified this point. Typically, scholars both ancient and modern refer to the 'autonomy' of the Asian *poleis*, but this term is problematic. As Gomme saw, this term was vague enough that it was defined at one's convenience: "Persia could use it, meaning by it freedom for the cities from domination by Athens (they were to be free allies); Athens used it as the liberator of Greece."<sup>944</sup> Thus, here, I am speaking specifically of the legal codes used to govern the internal affairs of the *poleis*. This does not imply that the Great King

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941 The inscription on the tomb of Artaxerxes II, A<sup>2</sup>Pa, identifies thirty figures as "representatives" bringing tribute from around the empire. Among them are the Ionian (OP *Yaunā*) and the Lydian (*Sparidiya*).

942 Meritt et al. 1952:275.

943 6.42.

944 Gomme 1930:105.

gave up his claims to tribute from these cities, nor does it imply that they are no longer in his territory.

The third term is the Athenian concession:

*3. The Athenians and their allies will not attack the King's lands.*

It is unclear if specific limits were placed on Athenian movements. The King's priorities lay in protecting Egypt against further Greek interference. Since he was able to secure this concession from the Athenians, his own concessions in Asia Minor were worthwhile.

At first glance, it may seem odd that Artaxerxes would accept any sort of agreement with Athens. After all, as stated, the King did not enter into treaties with anyone, let alone former rebels. An examination of the terms of the Peace of Callias will help us understand. First, we see that the treaty was beneficial to Persian interests, without requiring great expense. The Persians already allowed the Ionian cities to be governed under their own laws (under the reorganization conducted by Artaphernes, following the Ionian Revolt). By these terms, the Ionians were still Persian subjects, as they had been. In exchange for limiting the movement of Persian troops in one region of the realm, Artaxerxes secured a promise from the Athenians to stay out of his entire realm. Considering the damage wrought at the Eurymedon, Salamis, and Egypt, this was a significant diplomatic score.

Second, when we consider how the Peace of Callias fit into Persian royal ideology, we see that it did no harm to the King's prestige, and in fact may have bolstered it. Recall that, from the Persian perspective, the Athenians and Persians were only hostile to each other because of the Athenians' violation of their oath and subsequent violent rebellion against the king. During Xerxes' invasion of Greece, Athens was burned—twice—in punishment. Therefore, by the time



of the Peace of Callias, Artaxerxes could tell himself and his nobles that Persian honor had been restored.

But here is the more significant point: when we examine the terms of the Peace, it is clear that it is a typical Greek treaty. As opposed to an eternal treaty of submission, perhaps more akin to the earth-and-water agreement seen before, or the Neo-Assyrian vassal treaties, the Peace of Callias merely established the territorial boundaries between two states, and made specific acknowledgement of the traditional autonomy of Greek *poleis*. The best explanation for this is that the Persians became aware of Greek treaty practices and were using these practices in an attempt to regulate Athenian activity. As demonstrated at length above, the Persians typically governed their various subject peoples through legal customs native to each region. With the Peace of Callias, Artaxerxes was treating the Greeks as though they were actually his subjects. Further, since the Peace of Callias was based on Greek norms, Artaxerxes, as a party to that treaty, could not simply dictate terms to Athens; that was not a Greek treaty custom. While we cannot know who suggested or wrote any particular term, we can be sure that the final text was the product of a negotiation, in which both sides made concessions. However, this does not suggest that Artaxerxes had been defeated, or suffered a loss of prestige. According to Greek custom, and unlike the custom reflected in the offering of earth and water, the Peace of Callias did not imply Athenian superiority, nor establish an unchangeable relationship between the two.

Furthermore, it appears that the Persian authorities took full advantage of the flexible interpretation of binding agreements in the Greek world. If the Persians were by this time well familiar with Greek interstate diplomatic practice, they would have been aware that the Peace of Callias was a potentially unstable agreement, but nevertheless one that would push Athens closer to war with Sparta and away from invading Persian territory. Just as the Athenians and

Peloponnesians worked hard in the 430s to maintain the Thirty Years' Peace, even when accusing the other side of violations, so too would the Athenians and Persians pay nominal heed to the Peace of Callias, even when its terms were violated.

For example, in 440, during Pericles' counter-offensive on Samos, he received a report that a Persian fleet had been sent against them.<sup>945</sup> Although no battle was fought, this was still a violation of Athens' maritime boundaries. Between 440 and 427, on three occasions the satrap Pissunthes sent assistance to cities rebelling against Athens.<sup>946</sup> In 425, the royal messenger Artaphernes was caught bringing a message from the King to Sparta, offering to open up discussions of an alliance.<sup>947</sup> Even though these aggressions are cited as proof that the Peace did not exist,<sup>948</sup> this simply does not follow. We know that the Athenians were willing to violate the terms of their agreements, and there is no reason to assume that the Great King and all his agents were somehow too virtuous to do the same. Instead, I prefer to see the violations as a testimony to the value of the Peace. The treaty was an acknowledgement by both sides of the benefits of peace to both sides, and this gave them the assurance that minor conflicts would not erupt into all-out war. Thus Athens and Persia remained at peace until about 420, when Athens assisted Amorges, a Persian rebel.<sup>949</sup>

Consider also that, as stated, the Achaemenids tried to rule various groups in their empire through the agency of indigenous monarchies and/or the temple system, which, traditionally, did not exist throughout Greece. So even if Artaxerxes had been willing to sign a treaty with Athens immediately after the Eurymedon, he would have been unable to execute his policy. However,

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945 Thuc. 1.116.

946 Eddy 1970:14.

947 Thuc. 4.50.

948 Meister 1982:36-8.

949 Andocides, *On the Peace* 3.29.

by the time of the Peace of Callias, Athens had transformed herself into a state sufficiently 'tyrannical' to fit into the scheme of Persian imperialism. This is not the place to debate whether or not Athens was truly a δῆμος τύραννος or πόλις τύραννος.<sup>950</sup> However, Athens, through her navy, controlled enough of the Greek world for Persia to consider cooperation with her as a means of stabilizing the Aegean region.

Finally, from a more utilitarian standpoint, it is also clear that Artaxerxes did not have a better option. His main goal was to defend the realm. The Persian Wars had demonstrated that, while Greeks could be defeated on land with overwhelming military force, to do so would require massive expenditures of time, money, and manpower, in order to control a politically fragmented people, notoriously defensive of their local autonomy. As mentioned above, Artaxerxes had already turned to diplomacy (in the form of a 'proxy war') to force Athens' departure from Egypt.<sup>951</sup> Although partially successful, Artaxerxes was still afflicted by Athenian harassment, so he was forced to deal with Athens directly.

We find further confirmation of Persian willingness to make use of Greek diplomatic traditions in Xerxes' *philia* relationship with Argos. It is unclear exactly when this relationship was initiated, but as Matthew Waters recently argued, it was most likely initiated after 480, as all Greco-Persian relationships prior to that date seemed to have required the submission of earth and water by the Greek party.<sup>952</sup> Once again, the Persians turned away from their initial method of rule and towards one that was more coherent to the local party. We can also assume further that neither Athens nor Sparta could accept *philia* with the Great King, as their statuses in Greece rested largely on their claim to be the 'liberators of Greece' from that very King. Treaties, on the

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950 Kallet 2003.

951 See p. 254.

952 2014:333–4.

other hand, served to establish a beneficial state of affairs without suggesting any friendly relationship with the enemy.

Following the Peace of Callias, the Athenians were free to pursue their imperial agenda within the Greek world. As mentioned, neither Athens nor Persia adhered rigidly to the terms of the Peace, but in general the two sides managed to avoid conflict. It is even possible that the treaty was renewed in the 420s.

In 391, Andocides gave a speech describing the benefits of peace. This speech is notorious for its historical inaccuracies,<sup>953</sup> and is therefore difficult to take seriously. However, at least one section of this speech is relevant here, and can be supported with outside evidence. At 3.28-9, Andocides presents a choice to the Athenians: an alliance with Argos against Sparta, or a common peace with the Boeotians and Spartans. In order to convince his audience of the wisdom of siding with the more powerful Sparta, Andocides reminds them of a historical precedent: his own uncle, Epilycus, had helped secure a peace and eternal friendship with the Great King, but then the Athenians gave assistance to Amorges. In response, the Great King supported Sparta, leading to the demise of Athens in 404.

As with the Peace of Callias, no ancient historian seems to know of this so-called Peace of Epilycus, but we still have reason to accept it. First, like Demosthenes and Isocrates, Andocides was attempting to convince his audience through historical analogy. This technique was less likely to work if he was relying on a treaty that was completely unknown. Even more importantly, the epigraphic record lends credence to Andocides' claim. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 227 mentions a grant of honors to Herakleides of Klazomenae in return for his kind treatment of Athenian ambassadors in his city. The decree also speaks of ambassadors from the King, and a treaty with

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953 For a quick summary of these errors, see Stockton 1959:72-3.

him.<sup>954</sup> The fragmentary nature of the inscription has led to some disputes over its translation and context, but as Wade-Gery has shown, there is good reason to believe that it belongs to the year 424/3.<sup>955</sup> Since Darius II took the throne at some point between December 424 and February 423,<sup>956</sup> it is likely that he is the King mentioned in the inscription. We can also assume that Epilycus could have been a member of the Athenian embassy, as he lived until 414.<sup>957</sup>

No source gives a description of this treaty, but there are clues that suggest the terms and the reasoning behind its enactment. The Peace of Callias, as noted, had basically held strong up to this point, but there were signs of weakness: the Athenians had intercepted a Persian agent coming from Sparta in 425/4. The documents in his possession revealed that Artaxerxes was unclear on Spartan demands, and was thus unwilling to make any promises.<sup>958</sup> But the mere fact of contact between Artaxerxes and Sparta was enough to spur the Athenians into sending a mission of their own to Susa. Artaxerxes' death soon thereafter brought an immediate end to that particular attempt at negotiations, but the Athenians must have been motivated to ensure that the new King would maintain peaceful relations with them. Just as the Argives sent an embassy to Artaxerxes soon after his succession in the 460s, so too did the Athenians send another embassy to Darius as soon as he came to power.

Previously, Athens had extended an olive branch to Persia after the battles of the

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954 "οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως ἦγοντες ἀγγέλλουσι Ἡρακλείδην συμπράττεν ἑαυτοῖς προθύμως ἐς τε τὰ σπονδάς τὰς πρὸς βασιλέα..." Harris 1999 goes to great lengths in proving that the "οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως ἦγοντες" of line 16 are a royal embassy sent from the King, and not a Greek embassy going to him. While there should be no disagreement with his point, Harris then goes on to argue that, since there is no mention of an Athenian embassy, this inscription "cannot be used to confirm the information found in the *De Pace* about the so called Peace of Epilykos." (128) However, he seems to have overlooked "τὰς Ἀθηναίων πρεσβείας" just four lines above. If anything, his analysis emphasizes that we are dealing with two embassies, one sent by the Athenians, and one by the King. My thanks to David Philips for pointing this out to me.

955 1958:208-9; Blamire 1975 argues for a date of 422/1 but otherwise accepts Wade-Gery's overall analysis.

956 Briant 2002:588-9.

957 Wade-Gery 1958:207.

958 Thuc. 4.50.

Eurymedon and Cypriot Salamis, that is, relatively major victories for the Athenians. No such battle is known in the mid-420s. This suggests that the Athenians would not have been able to pressure Darius into making further concessions. Instead, the Peace of Epilycus was likely just a confirmation of the terms of the Peace of Callias.

Athens' violation of the Peace in 420 did not bring another Persian invasion of Greece. Instead, Darius II simply backed the Spartan efforts against Athens. In the late fifth century, the satraps of Sardis and Daskyleion were Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, respectively. According to Thucydides, these two men competed to win the King's favor by collecting more tribute from Ionia and securing an alliance with Sparta.<sup>959</sup> The result of this was three treaties, between 412–11, the final version of which contained the following terms:<sup>960</sup>

1. The King shall have unfettered authority over Asia;
2. The Spartans and their allies shall not invade the King's territories, nor shall the King invade those of the Spartans and their allies;
3. The Spartans and the King pledge mutual defense of the other's territory;
4. Tissaphernes shall bear the cost of the maintenance of the Spartan fleet, until a royal fleet can be brought up as replacement; if the Spartans should wish that Tissaphernes continue to maintain their fleet after this point, they shall agree to repay any further costs to Tissaphernes at the end of the war;
5. The two fleets will jointly campaign against Athens.

As with the Peace of Callias, this treaty is very much in the Greek mold, and very similar to the treaties that bound Sparta to her Greek allies.

This treaty helped secure victory for Sparta, although the competition between the two satraps threatened Spartan ambitions. In 408, the Athenian commanders in Chalcedon made an agreement with Pharnabazus, in which he pledged to make peace with Athens and contribute 20

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959 8.5–6. Athens intercepted Peloponnesian ambassadors headed to Susa in c. 430, and a letter from Artaxerxes to Sparta in c425, but there is no evidence of a formalized relationship between the two sides before 412. See Rung 2008:35.

960 Thuc. 8.58.

talents for their fleet.<sup>961</sup> Shortly thereafter, the arrival of Cyrus the Younger in Asia Minor, acting as *karanos*, added further complications. Cyrus had been ordered by the King "to be ruler of all the peoples on the coast and to support the Lacedaemonians in the war."<sup>962</sup> In theory, this made both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes his subordinates.<sup>963</sup> In reality, Tissaphernes continually challenged Cyrus' authority, and would be the leader of the opposition against Cyrus during his failed rebellion in 401.

The Spartans assumed hegemony after 404 and decided to press their advantage in Asia, despite having lost their ally Cyrus. Responding to an Ionian request for assistance, a succession of Spartan commanders were sent to Asia, nominally to secure autonomy for the Ionians.<sup>964</sup> However, none of the Spartan commanders seem to have a plan beyond raiding, and so achieved no progress for the Ionians. On the Persian side, neither Pharnabazus nor Tissaphernes was willing to take on the Spartans in a land campaign, so instead each simply convinced the Spartans to raid the other's territory while protecting their own. Unfortunately for Tissaphernes, in 395, the Spartan king Agesilaus raided as far inland as the outskirts of Sardis. For his failure to protect the realm, Tissaphernes was executed and replaced by Tithraustes.<sup>965</sup>

By 395, there existed in Greece sufficient enmity towards Spartan hegemony that Tithraustes was able to take advantage of it. He sent a certain Timocrates of Rhodes with 50 talents to start a war against Sparta in Greece. Eventually, Corinth, Thebes, Argos, and Athens

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961 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.8–12.

962 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3.

963 Briant 2002:600.

964 Seager and Tuplin 1980 argue that the notion of the "freedom" or "autonomy" of the Ionians, or all Asian Greeks, first appears in Lysias' *Epitaphios*, Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, and Xenophon's *Hellenika*: "...the Greeks of Asia as a unit of thought and the freedom of the Greeks of Asia as a diplomatic slogan are both so apt to the situation that pertained in Asia Minor in the years after 400 as to justify the conjecture that it was during these years that men first came habitually to think and speak of the Greeks of Asia as a single community and to exploit the theme of their freedom for their own political ends. (145)"

965 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.21–25.

joined up, along with many smaller states.<sup>966</sup> The resulting Corinthian War ended in a stalemate, with little to show for seven years of fighting. It was, however, a perfect success for Persia. While the Asia Minor satraps had had no success in preventing the Spartans from raiding their territory, this war forced the Spartan ephors to recall Agesilaus from Asia to defend their homeland.<sup>967</sup> Just as Persian ships had given victory to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, now the Athenian admiral Conon sailed alongside Pharnabazus. In 394 they scored a joint victory over the Spartans at Cnidus.<sup>968</sup> Then, promising to ensure their autonomy, Pharnabazus secured the friendship of the Ionian *poleis*.<sup>969</sup>

The collapse of Spartan fortunes led to a peace conference in 392–1, led by the Spartan soldier and statesman Antalcidas. He reached a tentative common peace agreement with the current satrap of Sardis, Tiribazus, in exchange for acknowledging the King's rule over the Greeks of Asia Minor, the King would acknowledge the autonomy of the islands and the remaining Greek *poleis*. The Athenians, Argives, and Thebans rejected the offer, because an official recognition of the autonomy of the Greek *poleis* would result in their losing control over their allies.<sup>970</sup>

However, by 387, all parties were exhausted by the war. Antalcidas, after a minor naval victory at Abydos, convened another round of negotiations (likely at Sardis). This time, he succeeded, and the following peace was agreed to:

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενᾶς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων

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966 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–7.

967 Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.41–4.2.4.

968 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10–12; Diod. 14.83.4–7.

969 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–2.

970 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14–15.



καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties (ὁπότεροι) does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.<sup>971</sup>

There is no doubt that this is a 'peace' (εἰρήνη), but it is not a treaty between the King and any Greek state. As the language makes clear, this is a royal edict sent down from the King, and read out by Tiribazos.<sup>972</sup> The only parties bound by the agreement, and threatened by sanctions, are Athens and Sparta; ὁπότεροι cannot logically refer to any other states.<sup>973</sup> However, it is clear from what follows that it was accepted as binding throughout Greece. Xenophon reports that "each of the ambassadors returned to their own cities ... and all the cities swore that they would observe the articles of the peace, except the Thebans."<sup>974</sup> Shortly thereafter, Agesilaus forced Thebes into swearing.

There was no shortage of literary outrage directed at this, the so-called King's Peace.<sup>975</sup> Even though this peace secured autonomy for the Greek states, it forced the Greeks to acknowledge that the Greeks of Asia would not be liberated from Persian rule, and that the will of the Persian King would determine the nature of intra-Greek relations. Just as with the Peace of Callias, the King's Peace was both a treaty firmly rooted in Greek traditions of autonomy and diplomacy and, simultaneously, an instrument of control by the King over Greek interstate relations. The King's Peace was not the final Greco-Persian treaty, nor did it actually bring Peace

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971 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31.

972 "Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον..."

973 Badian 1991:39.

974 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32.

975 For example, Demosthenes *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* 15.29: "The Greeks have two treaties with the King, one made by our city and commended by all; and the later one made by the Lacedaemonians, which is of course condemned by all."

to the Greek world. Instead, its significance lies in the fact that it encouraged Greek *poleis* to fight each other in Greece, instead of invading the King's land. It served as a model for all future Greco-Persian treaties, and greatly increased the King's ability to control outbreaks of violence in the Aegean region.

Despite the Greeks' outrage over the King's Peace, nevertheless all parties continually emphasized that their actions were strictly in line with the provisions of that agreement, regardless of the legal reality of the situation. The first clear example comes from the inscription defining the alliance between Athens and Chios of 384/3. According to this text, the alliance preserves "the peace and the friendship and the oaths and the existing agreement, which the King swore and the Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks," and announces "good things for the People of Athens and the whole of Greece and the King."<sup>976</sup> This treaty became the model for Athens' new network of alliances, which became the Second Athenian League, formalized in 378/7. It set out a framework for resistance against the Spartans, while always ensuring the autonomy of all Greeks in accordance with the King's Peace:

ὅπως ἂν Λακεδ[αιμό]νιοι ἐῶσι τὸς Ἑλληνας ἐλευθέ[ρ]ος [καὶ] αὐτονόμος ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν τῆ[ν] χώραν] ἔχοντας ἐμ βεβαίωι τῆ[ν] ἐαυτῶν πᾶσαν, καὶ ὅπως κυρία ἦι καὶ διαμένηι ἢ τε εἰρήνη καὶ ἡ φιλία ἦν ὤμοσαν οἱ Ἑλληνες καὶ Βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δήμωι: ἐάν τις βόλ[η]ται τῶν Ἑλ[λ]ήνων ἢ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν ἐν [ἡπείρωι ἐν]οικόντων ἢ τῶν νησιωτῶν, ὅσ[οι] μὴ βασιλ[ε]ως εἰσίν, Ἀθηναίων σύμμαχ[ος] εἶναι καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, ἐξεῖναι αὐ[τ]ῶ[ι] ἐλευθέ[ρ]ωι ὄντι καὶ αὐτονόμωι, πολιτ[ε]υομένωι πολιτείαν ἦν ἂν βόλ[η]ται μῆτε [φρορ]ᾶν εἰσδεχομένωι μῆτε ἄρχοντα ὑπο[δεχ]ομένωι μῆτε φόρον φέροντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τ[οῖς] αὐτοῖς ἐφ' οἷσπερ Χίοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι κα[ὶ] οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι.

So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous and to live at peace, possessing securely all their own (territory), [[and so that [the peace and the friendship which the Greeks] and the King [swore] shall be in force [and endure] in accordance with the agreements]], the People shall resolve: if any of the Greeks or of the barbarians living in [Europe] or of the islanders who are not the King's, wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and the allies, it shall be permitted to him, being free and autonomous, living under the constitution which he wishes, neither receiving a garrison or a governor nor paying tribute, on the same terms as the Chians and Thebans and the other allies.<sup>977</sup>

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976 *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 34 9-15. Translations RO 85.

977 *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 43 9-25. Translation RO 93.

This text does not provide a constitution for the League; instead, it names some things that the Athenians will not do (for example, Athenians will not be allowed to own property in allied territories), thus assuring potential allies, the Spartans, and the King, that they will behave as they ought to.

## 7. Conclusions

At the beginning, we set out to explain why the Achaemenid Kings of Persia decided to use treaties in their relations with Athens, Sparta, and other Greek states. We began by investigating Neo-Assyrian traditions. Neo-Assyrian treaties were used to bind other states to the empire in a vassal relationship. These agreements were eternal, and witnessed and enforced by the gods. They were one aspect of an imperial religious ideology that sought to incorporate external foes into the ordered realm of Aššur. The Neo-Babylonians may have bound their vassals with similar oaths. The Persians were influenced by the role of treaties in these two previous empires because of their exposure to the Mesopotamian culture either directly, or by dint of Persian and Elamite acculturation.

Next, we investigated the traditions of binding agreements in the Greek world, where we found a very different system. These treaties were usually limited in time and scope, and never violated the internal autonomy of either party. Although it may appear that Greek states did not take their interstate binding agreements very seriously, historical evidence shows the great lengths Greek states were willing to go, by adopting a "flexible" view of the terms of a treaty, in order not to nullify their binding treaties; indeed, acts that technically violated the terms of a treaty did not automatically lead to violent retaliations.

The first binding agreement between Athens and Persia, the offering of earth and water in c. 506, was akin to a Neo-Assyrian vassal treaty: it was unspecific and eternal, and a violation of its terms led directly to an overwhelming military response. The decades of war, which followed, were a product of misaligned expectations on the two sides, each assuming different notions about interstate binding agreements. Just as the Persians familiarized themselves with and made

use of local practices elsewhere in their empire, they came to a better understanding of the Greek world and the use of treaties therein. By the mid-fifth century, they were able to conclude a mutually-beneficial peace with Athens, known today as the Peace of Callias. The subsequent treaties with Sparta in 412/11 were likewise very typical of Greek practice.

Decades of war drained Athens and Sparta of their will to fight on. In 387, the Spartan Antalcidas led the convention which produced the King's Peace, a royal edict declaring the autonomy of the Greek states. By embracing the traditional Greek notion of autonomy, the Great King was able to enforce his will upon the Greek world, effectively treating them like his subjects. Hence, the development of Greco-Persian diplomacy was an evolution of Persian understanding of Greek practices and the conscious manipulation of that understanding to secure the imperial realm.

The King's Peace was successful not because it brought peace to the Greek world, but because it greatly reduced the rate and severity of violent disruptions inflicted upon the Persian empire by Greeks.<sup>978</sup> The Greeks themselves would, on the whole, enforce the Peace amongst themselves, a process that pitted Athens, Sparta, and Thebes against one another. Despite the continual chaos of the first half of the fourth century, the Greeks steadfastly bound themselves to Artaxerxes' design; in 371, the Athenians led a drive that ended in the renewal of the King's Peace.<sup>979</sup> The King's victory was not military, but ideological: while he could not control the relations of any one *polis* with another, he succeeded by setting the terms of all inter-*polis* relations.

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978 In 366/5, the Athenian *strategos* Timotheos exploited the Great Satraps' Revolt to place Samos, Sestus, Potidaea, and other *poleis* into Athenian hands (Isoc. *Antidosis* 15.111-3). Considering the magnitude of the Revolt, this was only minor interference, and did not threaten any of the King's major concerns. According to Demosthenes (*On the Liberty of the Rhodians* 15.9), the Athenians explicitly ordered Timotheos not to violate the treaty with the king (μη λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα). See Buckler 2003:351-7.

979 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.

Artaxerxes III's strategy in Greece was, in essence, a mirror of the Achaemenid strategy within the empire. As we saw in Babylonia, Egypt, Judah, and Asia Minor, the empire incorporated local legal customs into the structure of the empire. As local legal customs were enforced as imperial law, imperial law was deemed familiar and palatable. This strategy was not perfect, but overall it allowed the numerically insignificant Medo-Persian dominant ethno-class to retain control over a massive population and enforce order within the largest empire yet seen. In Greece, the local legal custom of treaty-making was used to manipulate non-subject peoples in order to deflect violence and disorder away from the Achaemenid realm. With this strategy, Artaxerxes was able, in effect, to extend his reach beyond the geographic limits of his empire. While he did not wield total control over the Greek world, Artaxerxes had sufficient influence there as to lay the groundwork for more important issues; namely, restoring order to Asia Minor after the "Great Satraps' Revolt," and the reconquest of the ever-rebellious Egypt.

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