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Title
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Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0b0159n4

Journal
Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology, 11(1)

ISSN
0191-3557

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Publication Date
1989-07-01

Peer reviewed

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Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology
Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 35-49 (1989).

Differential Leadership Patterns in Early Twentieth-Century Great Basin Indian Societies

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ABORIGINAL societies in the Great Basin were egalitarian. Most were band societies, but some may well have been organized at what Julian Steward (1938:257) called a "family level."[1] Steward (1938:247, 246, 251) summarized the nature of leadership in the Great Basin as follows:

> Ordinarily . . . a chief's authority was restricted to certain activities, such as hunts, dances, war, or ceremonies . . . [and] was . . . of uncertain scope and duration and depended largely upon his persuasiveness . . .
>
> No doubt periods of instability and change, like the wars with the white man, afforded strong personalities opportunities to achieve unusual authority. . . . A chief's main task was supervision of tribal movements when on hunting and trading expeditions. Establishing and enforcing a policy toward the white man augmented his power.

The aboriginal native leadership pattern, then, was headmanship, rather than chieftainship. In the central and western portions of the Great Basin, political issues less often involved matters of how to retain and protect strategic resources, than how to find them. Great Basin headmen who retained the position developed reputations for being knowledgeable and successful; competence was more critical than inheritance in determining leadership. This was so even in the band societies that existed in some regions, in which chiefs did exercise authority over some decisions, rather than guiding merely through suasion. Yet, in the bands the authority of chiefs and their counsels was noncoercive and was restricted to the periods during which the bands were convened. Families usually were free to leave bands or camps, moving on and attaching to a new camp following a collective fishing venture, a successful antelope drive, or "a pleasant round dance" (Jorgensen 1980:220; cf. Bunte and Franklin 1987:11). The southern and eastern Ute and eastern Shoshone groups had band-level political organization with single leaders, sometimes assisted by councils. Among the Northern Paiute, Southern Paiute, and Western Shoshone groups, leadership under a single headman developed only where resources permitted long-term residence over several generations and favored some collective ownership of resources (Jorgensen 1980:316-317, 488-489; Eggan 1980; Stewart 1980).

Lowie (1960:270-276) identified the existence and degree of leadership on the basis of coercive authority, and distinguished two kinds of "chiefs" in aboriginal America: titular chiefs, who were distinguished by the gift of oratory and the capacity to mediate and negotiate, as opposed to "strong chiefs" whose authority was unquestioned and enforceable. "Titular chiefs" were by far the more common, sometimes having exclusive authority and sometimes not, but in all cases being distinguished as peacemakers and "paragons of munificence" whose influence was exercised through persuading, coaxing, and "smoothing ruffled feathers."

THE EARLY CONTACT ERA

What changes in leadership patterns

occurred in the early contact era? Bunte and Franklin (1987:32-33) summarized what probably was one direction taken by aboriginal leadership in the early contact era:

> In historic times, from at least the 1870s to the present, most forms of collective action . . . were initiated through a . . . consensus group decision making which we call the "council" . . .
>
> The tribal leadership office we call the "chief elder" is the second major persistence political institution in historic and modern San Juan political life. . . . [2] The San Juan people . . . believe strongly that no single person can legitimately hold coercive authority over another . . .

What Bunte and Franklin (1987:33) called "tribal chief elders" had very specific leadership duties in aboriginal times (Steward 1938; Kelly 1964). Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did specific leaders emerge whose positions revolved primarily around relations with outside groups (Bunte and Franklin 1987:33, 181-182). These "outside" leaders most often were the ones perceived by U.S. Government representatives as "chiefs," and it was to this "outsider" relationship that the institution of chieftaincy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pertained.

However, in other Great Basin groups, contact with Euroamerican civilization engendered the development of some ranking, and this incipient ranking took leadership in a different direction. Usually this ranking was closely connected with acquisition of horses and development of customs relating to war. This ranking process resulted in the rise of what Lowie called "strong chiefs" and of some loosely-defined warriors' sodalities and women's auxiliaries (Lowie 1915: 813-816, 823; Opler 1940:167-170). Although Steward (1965) perceived a kind of class stratification among the Eastern Shoshone, Northern Shoshoni, and Bannock, these groups cannot be called "stratified" in the political and social sense in which Fried (1967:185-226) conceptualized "stratification," although they might be called ranked societies.

True chiefs, then, were a development of the contact era. They held power only to the extent that they were brokers between their own band or group and the U.S. Government, and their brokering power was limited by the extent to which a significant following found the brokering power of a particular chief beneficial and established a structure of trust based on it. The emergence of chiefs certainly was aided by Indian agents' avid search for spokesmen; the list of "chiefs" that could be compiled from agents' reports and letters over a period of 30 years—say from 1850 to 1880—would easily include several hundred names for all Great Basin groups.

LEADERSHIP IN THE RESERVATION CONTEXT

What happened to these chiefs once reservations were established? Many of the chiefs, or "captains," as they often were called, had short-lived careers. For example, among Shoshone at Duck Valley, Paiute at Walker River and Pyramid Lake, and Eastern Shoshone at Wind River, the captains had virtually disappeared by 1915 as agents developed other bases for administering reservations (cf. Johnson 1975:27, 60, 74, 188; Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada 1974:63-77; McKinney 1983:73-80; Knack and Stewart 1984:52-54.)

At Wind River, Washakie's death in 1900 brought a period of political instability before a "council" emerged that was sanctioned with legitimacy by the local agent (Fowler 1982:104). When Tendoy of the Lemhi died in 1907, he was not succeeded. In light of these well-known cases, it is tempting to dismiss chieftaincy as a short-lived relic of the post-contact, pre-reservation era.

At some reservations, however, and among some nonreservation groups, the institution of chieftaincy not only persisted in the reservation era, but actually became entrenched. When an old chief died, a new one succeeded him, wielding some degree of power independent of brokering abilities. The groups that perpetuated and strengthened the institution of chieftaincy in the early reservation period are: the Western Shoshone of eastern Nevada, the Southern Ute and Mountain Ute of southern Colorado, and the Northern Paiute of Duck Valley.[3] The chiefs in question are: Old Temoke, Joe Temoke, Muchach Temoke, and Frank Temoke (Western Shoshone); Buckskin Charlie (Southern Ute); Ignacio and Jack House (Mountain Ute); Paddy Cap and Nat Paddy (Duck Valley Paiute).

Why did these chiefs survive and why did the institution of chieftaincy persist even after the wars were over? In order to answer these questions, we shall briefly outline the nature of chieftaincy among these groups in the early reservation period.

In nearly every case, the political coordinates of these chiefs' "chiefliness" lay somewhere between the virtual appointment of spokesmen by agents and the ethnographic reality noted generally by Fried (1967:133) for ranked societies that "leaders can lead, but followers may not follow." Contrary to Bunte and Franklin (1987:13), however, power is *not* reciprocal in all political systems. Although all societies must establish a "structure of trust" and provide socially defined meaning and solidarity (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:24-26), this structure, meaning, and solidarity are inseparable from the social division of labor. The degree to which the social division of labor is regulated by a collectivity or an elite determines the degree to which a leader—whether we call that leader "chief," "king," "president," or "chairman"—maintains a "structure of trust" based on leading followers or on a "balance of tensions" based on mediating a collectivity's regulation of an elite's power (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:32-39). The difference between power and control is very important (Adams 1975:20-21). An individual that has power only by virtue of the control over the social division of labor exercised by his or her immediate supervisor in a hierarchical system may actually have less power than an individual whose structure of trust is based on an actual following. Indian agents in the early reservation period had an almost imperial degree of control (cf. Crane 1925:114-116) over the social division of labor.

Power on Indian reservations was not reciprocal within the Indian agents' system of control. An Indian headman or chief had reciprocal power only with regard to his followers. If his power was based only in the control held by the Indian agent, he most likely had little reciprocal power based on trust because, although he might lead, the followers would not necessarily follow.

Southern Ute and Mountain Ute

By 1880, only three bands of Utes remained in Colorado: the Moache, Capota, and Weeminuche. Leadership of each group was vested in a headman who solicited advice from a council (Callaway et al. 1986: 354). While only one of these chiefs, Ignacio, represented any continuity with a self-sufficient lifestyle independent of Government control, chieftaincy was the single most authoritative post that could be held by a member of any of the bands. In 1895, pursuant to the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 and its various amendments, the Indian Office proposed to allot the Southern Ute Reservation in severalty and open it to homesteading. Construction was begun on an extensive system of irrigation ditches, and

Southern Utes were expected to become yeoman farmers.

Under the leadership of Ignacio, however, the Weeminuche band refused allotments, opposed the alienation of their lands, and retreated to the arid portion of the reservation west of the La Plata Mountains. This action was basically a defiance of the Indian Bureau's authority, and earned for Ignacio a reputation of intransigence and backwardness. An Indian agent painted this verbal portrait of Ignacio in 1894 (Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1894:128):

> Chief Ignacio is a potent foe to education, and he is not without influence, particularly with the Weeminuche tribe. He is stubborn, practically unsusceptible to reason, and an unyielding stickler for the habits, customs, and methods of his early days.

Despite the obvious disapproval of the local agent, the Weeminuche were permitted to pursue their isolationist strategy of noncooperation. The successful pursuit of this isolationist strategy by Ignacio's band is in direct contrast to a similar attempt by a group of Northern Utes in 1906.[4] Leaving the Uintah-Ouray Reservation in protest against the allotment and alienation of their lands, the group roamed free for a few months in Wyoming and then was rounded up by cavalry and escorted to the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota. In 1909, they were returned, again by cavalry escort, to Uintah-Ouray, where they had no choice but to accept the allotment policy (Jorgensen 1972:55).

The Indian Bureau established a sub-agency at Towaoc, where Utes received rations, usually bi-weekly, until 1931 (Opler 1940:185). Between 1910 and 1915, the division between the "farming Southern Utes" and the "nomadic Mountain Utes" was informally recognized by the designation of the western, unallotted portion of the reservation as "Ute Mountain," even though the eastern and western portions continued to be officially designated the "Consolidated Ute Reservation" and the "Ute Mountain Tribe" did not formally come into existence until 1940.

Thus, band affiliation became subsumed under a Government-inspired dichotomy: those that farmed, on the eastern, allotted portion of the reservation, and those that did not farm, on the western portion. Ignacio seems to have abandoned leadership of his band after 1910 and settled on an allotment on the eastern portion near the town that bears his name, where he died at a ripe old age in 1913. At this point, one might expect chieftaincy to have disappeared as an institution among the Mountain Ute, but by 1928 a new chief, Jack House, clearly had emerged. At the same time, one might have expected chieftaincy to have disappeared among the allotted Utes as well. However, such is not the case.

By 1886, a fairly young, vigorous leader, Buckskin Charley, emerged as chief of the Capota band of Southern Utes.[5] He seems to have acquired the position by attempting to shape U.S. policy with regard to the Southern Utes. In 1886 he joined Ignacio and "Tapuche" in airing grievances and making specific requests to the Commission of Indian Affairs on a visit to Washington, D.C. By 1911, he clearly had emerged as chief of the "Ignacio Utes," and after 1913, when Ignacio died, his position seems to have been undisputed until his own death in 1935 (Colorado Graphic 1887; Denver Post 1911; cf. Lowie 1915:825). Thus, among both groups of Southern Ute, the institution of chieftaincy not only survived the "transition" period between aboriginal and reservation life, but also thrived as a viable position of leadership long after the reality of reservation life had become entrenched.

What were Jack House's and Buckskin

Charley's "keys to success"? First of all, it must be emphasized that, although both chiefs—Jack House among the Mountain Ute and Buckskin Charley among the Southern Ute—were acknowledged by Indian agents and Government officials, they were neither appointed by them nor under any particular influence from them. In fact, there is some evidence that both chiefs were able to maintain a degree of independence that may have been responsible for their continued grass-roots support. For example, although the Sun Dance met official disapproval from the Bureau of Indian Affairs between 1905 and 1933, and was officially banned after 1921 (Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1906:404; Philp 1977:56), both chiefs supported its growth and institutionalization, even though it was not traditionally Ute and had been "imported" from Shoshones via Northern Utes around 1900 (Jorgensen 1972:24). Although Jack House was ambivalent about Peyote, and at times expressed disapproval of it, Buckskin Charley's son, Antonio Buck, was among the first Ute peyotists, having gotten peyote from an Arapaho in 1900. A few years later, Emma Buck—Buckskin Charley's wife and Antonio's stepmother—also became a peyotist. Although he opposed peyotism at first, Buckskin Charley soon embraced it and became the first Road Chief of the Ignacio Utes (Aberle and Stewart 1957:16-17), even though peyote, like the Sun Dance, also met official disapproval from agents.

Marvin Opler (1940:185), who did fieldwork at Towaoc and Ignacio some time between 1930 and 1934, reported that, in raising crops "by the same methods . . . as the Whites," Ignacio Utes were following the example set by their chief, Buckskin Charley. Despite an attempt by agents to halt the practice of Hispanic share-cropping on Ute allotments, Buckskin Charley continued to support the adoption of particular Hispanic families and selected non-Hispanic individuals by Ute families, and supported the increasing liaisons and general cultural exchange among Utes and Hispanics. When Presbyterian and Baptist missionaries began attracting some Utes to their services, Buckskin Charley gave his tacit approval by also attending services. When a particular Ute woman had a child by an outsider, and was ordered by the Indian agent to marry him, Buckskin Charley responded by favoring the woman's husband with what amounted to actual adoption as a Southern Ute.

Under conditions, then, in which the local Indian agent maintained strict control over Utes' lives, and in which their best lands and irrigation ditches were usurped to an increasingly greater extent by ever larger numbers of non-Indian homesteaders, Buckskin Charley filled the role of magnanimous, unflappable leader. He maintained and supported cultural institutions that encouraged cooperation and cohesiveness among a geographically scattered population, and at the same time sanctioned diversity of choice and lifestyle within the Southern Ute community. After 45 years of being forced into a subordinate role in a situation of direct culture contact, Southern Utes in the 1930s still constituted a distinct, closed corporate community with 100% of the population proficient in the Ute language, despite the fact that genetically, there was a significant admixture from surrounding Navajo, Jicarilla, and Hispanic populations.

In 1934, when the Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act (IRA) was proposed to Southern Utes, Buckskin Charley approved the idea and, although he died before the first Southern Ute Council was formed, the IRA passed easily. His son, Antonio Buck, who inherited the chieftaincy, was elected its first chairman. Subsequently,

different council members were elected to the post, but until his death in 1961, Buck seems to have remained an important unifying figure, despite his lack of political power (cf. Stewart 1952). The Southern Ute chieftaincy officially died with Buck, but within three years of Buck's death, a collateral relative was elected first to the council and then, from within the council, to the chairmanship. When a constitutional amendment made the chairman and vice-chairman electable separately from the council, this man was elected to five successive terms. At the same time, another descendant of Buckskin Charley was elected to the council and has served as the chairman's spiritual advisor and medicine man. Both men were Sun Dance priests, and the chairman was an active participant in the Sweat Lodge, which has been revived by the medicine man. Many Utes pointed to this man's munificence and fairness in allocating tribal resources, in ability to get along with several factions, in success in negotiating with federal and state authorities, and in affirmation of traditional values and customs such as the Sun Dance. These features are closer to those associated with the early-reservation chief, Buckskin Charley, than with either the aboriginal "headman" or the "committee behaviour" (Bailey 1965:6-9) of council chairs. This point is discussed further below. In electing to office a man who had the qualities of the early-reservation chief, Southern Utes continued the leadership patterns of chieftaincy.

When the Indian Reorganization Act was proposed at Ute Mountain, Jack House favored neither the act nor the referendum to vote on it. His disapproval may be reflected in the ludicrously low voting statistics in the IRA referendum held at Ute Mountain in 1935. In contrast to Ignacio, where Buckskin Charley favored the Act and 74% of the eligible voters participated in the referendum, only 5% of Ute Mountain's eligible voters participated. The act was adopted by a vote of 9 to 3, but clearly such a lower voter turnout indicates that the act was not enthusiastically embraced (Indians at Work 1935:45; Haas 1947; cf. Jorgensen 1972:138). Another indication of the Mountain Utes' indifferent reaction toward the opportunities provided by the IRA is their reluctance to adopt the constitution or charter of business incorporation until 1940, despite the fact that these were "at the very heart" of the IRA's benefits (Kelly 1975:300).

The consternation of Indian agents at the Mountain Utes' intransigence is reflected in a letter written by agent Stacher to the Indian Office in Washington, D.C., in 1938:

> The Ute Mountain and the Allen Canyon Ute Indians in the past have been very difficult of approach and have shown only passive interest in their affairs, and have given but little response to the efforts of the Field [Service] to win them to a cooperate approach . . .
>
> Efforts are in the direction, through an educational campaign, to break down this barrier and to this end, a meeting was called at Towaoc on February 11th with the Southern Ute Council sitting in with the Allen Canyon and Ute Mountain bands . . .
>
> The need of organization was stressed and the benefits derived by other tribes already participating. Special emphasis was given the adoption of a constitution and the approval by the Indians through a referendum vote . . . [cf. Stacher 1940].

In 1940 the Indian Office got its vote. Jack House was persuaded to favor organization under the IRA's provisions, and by a vote of 91 to 12 (Fay 1971:96-101), Mountain Utes adopted an elective "tribal council" system of government. In the same year, Jack House also sanctioned the BIA's plan to concentrate the Ute Mountain population around the agency at Towaoc by moving from his isolated hogan into the agency town.

The elective IRA "tribal council" system of governance initially had a number of

features that would seem to make it hypothetically incompatible with traditional institutions of leadership. While traditional leaders gained and held their positions on the basis of task-specificity, knowledge, and competence, elective leaders gained their positions by majority vote. Once on the council, an individual had to rely, once again, on a majority vote to attain the chair (Johnson 1963:132). While traditional leaders used their persuasive powers to sanction activity or to bring about a consensus, in the council consensus could be blocked or replaced by a majority/minority split, potentially frustrating, legally and procedurally, a chair's intentions. While a traditional leader might smooth ruffled feathers and make peace among factions informally, conflict resolution in a council meeting proceeds in a mechanical fashion through formal resolutions and amendments. Council decisions depend upon a quorum being present, upon minutes being kept, and ultimately upon approval by the local BIA superintendent and the Secretary of the Interior. While this dependency was even more pronounced in the early reservation period, the relationship between an Indian leader and the BIA Superintendent was more adversarial or negotiative in that period than it was hierarchically supervisorial. But a council chair could potentially be placed in a devilishly triangulated position. He could be required to implement a decision made by majority vote with which he did not agree, and could be forced to take responsibility for both the decision and its lack of implementation if a higher, federal authority disapproved it. In general, then, a council chair's leadership relied heavily on managing what Bailey (1965:6-9) has called "committee behavior," in contrast to the behavior and qualities crucial for a traditional leader noted above.

Despite the existence of a "tribal council," Jack House continued to exert considerable political influence in his role as chief. He never sought, nor was elected, to a seat on the tribal council. Nonetheless, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he gave direction to the council in distribution of claims monies, approval of oil and gas leases, construction of a recreation center, opening of a pottery factory, which is going into its nineteenth year of successful operation, and finally, just before his death in 1971, approving the development of Anasazi ruins in Mancos Canyon as a limited, "for-the-rugged-only" tourist attraction. Despite Utes' abhorrence of old buildings where there is the remotest possibility that ghosts might dwell, the Ute Mountain Tribe has stuck by the strategy laid out by Jack House, and has cautiously continued to develop the ruins as a tourist attraction.

Although no individual has emerged at Ute Mountain to take the position occupied by Jack House, it must be emphasized that, during 30 years of the operation of a "tribal council" system, the chieftaincy was neither supplanted nor diminished in strength. If anything, the influence of the chief increased, rather than decreased, during that period. The persistence of chieftaincy among the Colorado Utes, even after such an institution was supposed to have been replaced by an elective "tribal council" system, might be due in part to the success of Ignacio in leading the Weeminuche successfully away from the Southern Ute Agency in the 1880s, and to the undeniable success of Ouray in initially obtaining a large and bountiful reservation for Colorado Utes in the 1860s. The success of chieftaincy in the past certainly would have boded well for the success of chieftaincy in the future.

Western Shoshone

Quite a different situation has prevailed among the Western Shoshones of Nevada.

Whereas Colorado Utes fell neatly into two "tribes" in the twentieth century, Western Shoshones dwell in 17 distinct reservations and colonies, and in another three "unofficial" settlements. They are represented in nine different "tribal councils." To further complicate matters, Western Shoshones generally feel a kinship with one another that transcends "tribal" categories, and in the Indian Claims Commission proceedings, they have been represented as the "Western Shoshone Identifiable Group."

Chieftaincy never became strongly developed among Western Shoshones. Only four chiefs are mentioned with any consistency in reports of Indian agents during the mid-nineteenth century: Sho-kub, Buck, Te-Moke, and Tu-tu-wa. Sho-kub and his successor, Buck, appear to have been leaders of the White Knife Shoshone. They probably were a mounted band that originated along the Humboldt River in the 1860s and 1870s and combined a transhumant lifestyle with occasional alliances with more easterly groups variously known as "Weber Utes" or "Goshutes." Both in actuality merely were Shoshones who spoke a different dialect from those of Nevada Shoshones. The White Knives appear to have ended up in three different communities by about 1873—Carlin Farms, Battle Mountain, and Elko—and had abandoned band integrity by that time. The majority probably were relocated to Duck Valley between 1878 and 1879.

Both Tu-tu-wa and Te-Moke were involved in treaty negotiations with Indian agents in 1862 and 1863. However, when treaty commissioners seriously sought approval of the boilerplate 1863 treaty as it pertained to Western Shoshones, they sought out only Te-Moke and others whom Te-Moke apparently had contacted. Neither in the initial signing in 1863 nor in the reaffirmation in 1867 does Tu-tu-wa's name appear, and, although he apparently maintained influence and respect around Austin and Grass Valley, his position was not influential enough to inspire a successor.

Te-Moke seems to have been associated with Western Shoshones' resistance to being relocated to the Duck Valley Reservation, and he may have solidified his position of leadership by taking a stand in direct opposition to the Government's efforts at relocation. When it was proposed to move Shoshones from Carlin Farms, Battle Mountain, and Elko to Duck Valley in 1879, Te-Moke advised the Carlin Shoshones to move to Duck Valley, although he declared to the new agent in Elko that he was "too old" to move, and that he and his extended family of about 60 would remain in Ruby Valley and Cherry Creek, where he had a farm of about 175 acres. He also told the Duck Valley Shoshone that he would no longer be their chief, and that they would have to act on their own (How 1879a, 1879b). Thus, Te-Moke clearly separated himself from those who cooperated with the Government's relocation efforts.

Despite his origins as a relatively obscure "talker," Te-Moke successfully maintained his position as chief until his death in 1891. His position passed to two sons, Joe and Muchach, in succession, and finally to his grandson, Frank Temoke (cf. Steward 1938: 149-150; Clemmer 1972:463-489; Stewart 1980). Unlike the Ute chieftaincies, the Temoke chieftaincy has operated entirely outside the structure of tribal councils, and it could almost be said that the Temoke chiefs have been chiefs without chiefdoms. Although Old Te-Moke had a brief career as a military leader, he seems to have first emerged as a "talker" for a local group near Ruby Valley. Following the signing of the Treaty of Ruby Valley, he seems to have continued in this position as a liaison for a number of communities with Indian agents

and with army personnel, first at Fort Ruby and later possibly at Camp Halleck. His son, Joe, is also reported to have been a good "talker" and Muchach, Joe's brother, emerged in the 1920s as a spokesman for a group of Shoshones who advocated the official return of abandoned homesteads and unoccupied lands to Shoshone hegemony.

In the 1930s Muchach at first opposed the Indian Reorganization Act. As they did among the Colorado Utes, however, BIA personnel put forth their best effort to persuade Western Shoshones to "organize." Elmer Rusco (1982) has carefully documented the history of the proposal, revision, and subsequent rejection of this "pan-Western Shoshone Council." It is clear from his research that BIA officials were acting on considerable misinformation and misguidance, and at cross purposes in their efforts to impress upon Western Shoshones the benefits of organization.

The BIA attempted to locate educated Indians in reservation communities to assist in explaining the IRA. George La Vatta, a Shoshone from Fort Hall, and William Joaquin, Jr., a Shoshone from Battle Mountain, were appointed field agents by superintendent Alida Bowler. However, apparently before La Vatta could meet with most of the communities, Superintendent Bowler received a petition from Muchach Temoke and 80 other Western Shoshones opposing "self-government" and, instead, requesting land. Although Bowler wrote in her correspondence with the commissioner's office that she met with Muchach and, following the meeting, that Muchach had "a much clearer understanding of . . . the advantages in organization," Western Shoshones seem to have maintained a high degree of skepticism. La Vatta noted Western Shoshones' reluctance, and at one point remarked that "help or assistance cannot be given any group of people unless that help or assistance is desired by them" (Rusco 1982:184).

When the Indian Reorganization Act finally was presented to Western Shoshones, it was accompanied by a blueprint for a "Western Shoshone Tribal Council" which would have drawn elected representatives from all bands and communities that elected to join it, and would have been headed by a chief and a sub-chief. Since this blueprint was one of the few of which I am aware that actually provided for a position of "chief," rather than merely for a chairman elected from the body of the council, it is not unlikely that the position was meant for Muchach Temoke, Frank Temoke's father. Such a provision might have been intended to recognize the legitimacy of Muchach's considerable influence, and also to make use of Muchach's position of leadership in implementing various aspects of the "Indian New Deal."

Upon Muchach's death in 1960, Frank Temoke assumed the Temoke chieftaincy. At a number of pan-Western Shoshone meetings during the 1960s and 1970s, Frank Temoke asserted his role of "talker" and summarized the reasons for pressing for return of land, rather than accepting monetary compensation for the taking of that land, in terms of Western Shoshone tradition, myth, and religion. Frank Temoke seems to have renewed his leadership position yearly by hosting a "fandango" on his allotment in Ruby Valley. This "fandango" grew out of the aboriginal "pine-nut" festivals.

At one point in the 1970s, attorneys for Shoshones who favored return of land attempted to intervene in proceedings of the Indian Claims Commission under various Shoshone legal entities including that of "Frank Temoke, Chief of the Western Shoshone Nation of Indians."[6] Temoke's continual reaffirmation of a political policy

that flew in the face of programmatic offers from Washington surely was partially responsible for the Western Shoshone's rejection of the Government's 1979 offer of $26 million to relinquish title to their land. Although overturned by the Supreme Court in 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court in 1983 affirmed that the Western Shoshone did indeed still possess aboriginal title to 15 or 20 million acres of real estate in eastern and southern Nevada. The 1983 decision no doubt encouraged even more skepticism among Western Shoshones about merely "responding" to tribally targeted programs.

Paddy Cap Band of Northern Paiutes: Duck Valley

Along with Buffalo Horn and Egan, Paddy Cap was a major leader of the Northern Paiute and Bannock who participated in the "Bannock War" of 1878. Those that were captured, rather than killed, were incarcerated at the Yakima Reservation in the state of Washington. Initially, the Malheur Reservation had been set aside near Fort Harney, Oregon, for Paddy Cap's band and other Northern Paiutes. However, the Malheur Reservation was abolished in 1882 and when they were released from Yakima, the Northern Paiutes had nowhere to go. Although some went to Fort McDermitt, Paddy Cap finally went to Duck Valley and was informed that a 6- by 10-mile addition had been made to the reservation especially for him and his band. Between 1884 and 1887, a number of small groups of Paiutes and mixed Shoshone-Paiutes were collected from Northern Nevada, southeastern Oregon, and southern Idaho and persuaded to settle on the "Paddy Cap addition" to the Duck Valley Reservation. Apparently, Indian agents assumed that Paddy Cap would be "Chief" of all the Northern Paiutes at Duck Valley and treated him as such (McKinney 1983:58-70).

Paddy Cap's son, Nat Paddy, inherited the chieftaincy and was the acknowledged leader of the Paiute-Shoshone population on the Idaho side of the reservation. Inception of a "business council" at Duck Valley in the early 1930s did not supplant Nat Paddy's position of leadership, nor did Duck Valley's reorganization as the "Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation" in 1936 under the IRA. When Duck Valley was presented with a proposal drawn up by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for termination in 1948, Nat Paddy hired an attorney to prepare a formal legal statement rejecting the BIA's proposal. His statement further affirmed, on behalf of the "Paddy Cap Band," that the band was perfectly capable of deciding its own future and would do so at its own pace and according to its own motivations, rather than responding to proposals from the Bureau. Until his death in the 1950s, Nat Paddy continued to exercise political influence outside the parameters of the tribal council system, and was known as the leader of a "traditionalist" faction whose proponents were concentrated in the "Paddy Cap" addition to the Duck Valley Reservation.

CONCLUSIONS

This limited discussion certainly does not permit any grand conclusions to be made about general changes in leadership in the Great Basin. However, the growth and persistence of chiefs among at least four groups—Southern Utes, Mountain Utes, Paddy Cap Shoshone-Paiutes, and Western Shoshones—certainly does suggest that the development of chieftaincy resulted in the institution becoming entrenched, rather than disappearing, in the early reservation context. These groups had known only a system of headmanship prior to intensive contact with whites. One might also expect groups such as the Arapahoe to have maintained a "chief"

system in a similar context due to its importance in Arapahoe cultural tradition (cf. Fowler 1982:288-299), but such was not the case. One might ask just what factors are at work in the emergence of a particular individual as "chief" in a context that neither mandated chiefly succession on the basis of long-standing cultural tradition nor favored it as a response to demands for a "spokesman" from bureaucrats of the local Indian agency. One factor may well be that identified by Fred Voget (1984:134) in his account of Sun Dance leaders and innovators among the Wind River Shoshone and the Crow: "In their timely appearance, critical situations have a way of drawing together the strands of a career that appears to drift between dream and reality." Although there is no evidence that any of the chiefs under consideration here were subject to visionary revelations, certainly an individual's ability to draw together various charismatic components of his personality in a time of stress cannot be discounted. However, another factor, equally as important as the idiosyncratic nature of the individual chiefs themselves, was the political context of Indian-White relationships that existed among these groups.

Although all groups in the Great Basin were subjected to the vacillating policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Southern Ute and Western Shoshone were the only groups presented with clear-cut alternatives that, when pursued, actually resulted in some degree of success. Southern Utes were presented with two alternatives: farm, or don't farm. Two chiefs emerged who epitomized the strategies engendered from these alternatives: Buckskin Charley legitimized his leadership by demonstrating how to successfully accommodate innovations within Ute society and culture. Ignacio, and later, Jack House, legitimized their leadership by demonstrating how to successfully resist acculturation at first, and then how to cautiously pursue a strategy that maximized the benefits of new opportunities that were presented following the successful maintenance of a 30-year-long resistance strategy (cf. Opler 1940:190-201).

The Te-Moke chieftaincy among Western Shoshones also seems to have persisted on the basis of a clear-cut political platform. It was based on resistance to Government domination, maintenance of traditional residence areas, refusal to relocate to reservations, acquisition of reservations in traditional Western Shoshone areas, and insistence on recognition of treaty rights by the state and federal governments. Despite the desultory success of the strategy associated with this political platform during most of the twentieth century, the lack of any clear-cut defeat undoubtedly kept the possibility of success alive, and with it the legitimacy of a position of leadership based on advocating for its goals. Nat Paddy seems to have been able to unite initially disparate groups on the basis of an isolationist policy similar to that of the Te-Mokes and Jack House.

There is no correspondence between the political chiefs of the Great Basin groups reviewed above and the leaders of true "chiefdoms" which Service (1962:144) designated "redistributive societies with a permanent central agency of coordination." If anything, in the reservation era the central agency of redistribution and coordination was the local agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which dispensed rations, tools, clothing, jobs, and social policy. There is some aspect of the effort "to get something for the people" which Robert Bee (1979), on the basis of Lloyd Fallers' (1955, 1956) model of the Soga chief, saw in the activities of modern tribal council chairmen. However, their influence seems to have been based more on an ability to link their own personal

activities with a past perceived collectively by the group in question that was in turn linked with a destiny which assumed the persistence of the social collectivity based on that perception of the past. It could be said, in structural-functional fashion, that the chiefs in question filled vacuums and did so because of their charismatic abilities. But charisma can only "be imputed retrospectively," as Worsley (1968:xvi-xvii) put it, "or emerges AFTER the assumption of power, not before." If Great Basin chiefs in the twentieth century were in fact charismatic, their charisma probably resulted from their abilities to get things done as well as to symbolize the aspirations, memories, frustrations, and hopes of their followers who gave them their legitimacy.

Generally, the transition, where it was made, from "respected tribal elder" or "talker" or "task leader" or "peacemaker" to "chief," and subsequent entrenchment of that institution, was marked by several features. A specific and temporary functionary, whose authority originally was tied to a certain task, became a permanent, generalized functionary. A good orator became a consensus-maker and persuasive sanctioner of certain traditional customs, or certain social and cultural changes, or both. A former leader of resource procurement activity assumed the responsibility of sanctioning Government proposals for resource allocation such as allotment of lands or distribution of ditch water. A persuasive peacemaker established and enforced policies toward nongroup members that sanctioned definition or redefinition of the group on the one hand, and permitted the peacemaker to assume a certain status on the other. Nonmembers, or outsiders, took such ascendancy to power to be symbolic and significant of the wishes, attitudes, and identity of the entire group, whether that relationship of significance actually existed or not. In all cases summarized above, the chiefs acquired and maintained followers by structuring trust so that they could use the chiefly position assumed or created by the Indian Agent to broker the collective power of the Indians against the hierarchy of control that agents tried to establish. Some chiefs successfully maintained this power brokerage well beyond the watershed years of the Indian New Deal (1932-1945). It was during this time the Indian Agents' control was drastically curtailed and power brokering became much more of a procedural matter within a bureaucratic hierarchy regulated by built-in safeguards and checkpoints.

The period between 1890 and 1935 is a dark period ethnographically; salvage ethnography during this era carefully recorded the "memory culture" of many groups in the Great Basin. But the social and political aspects of tribal life in the Great Basin during these decades have largely eluded us. Until much more research is done, any attempt to explain why chieftaincy as an institution persisted at some reservations while disappearing at others, or to account for the legitimization of some chiefs over and above others who might have claimed the office, must remain tentative and hypothetical. Certainly the U.S. Government's implementation of a uniform policy on all reservations beginning in the 1880s did not cover over the diversity among Great Basin groups with anything but the thinnest patina. Political processes may have been set into motion at each separate reservation so rapidly that the diversity of their character and the uniformities of their evolution may have escaped ethnographers and Indian agents alike, who erroneously assumed that they were dealing with the fading cultural shadows of anachronistic lifeways. Perhaps the existence of political chiefs among a number of groups is one of many indicators of the creativity of cultural innovators who knew better.[7]

NOTES

1. The empirical validity of this level of social organization is a matter of ethnological debate which cannot be pursued here (see Service 1962:94-99; D. Fowler 1964; Damas 1969:187-199).

2. Whether or not the unit within which leadership was exercised was indeed a "tribe" is a separate issue which I prefer not to tackle here.

3. It is not unlikely that the institution of chieftaincy survived at other reservations as well. A short obituary note appeared in an issue of *Indians At Work* in 1939 to the effect that "Elk Black, Chief of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe" (Fort Hall) had died, that he had been "leader" since 1935, and that no successor had been named. I have no data with which to either verify the existence of an "Elk Black" or to investigate the nature of his chieftliness.

4. The dissenters consisted of 365 White Rivers under Appah. However, an article in *Indians At Work* (July 15, 1935), mentions resistance to the Allotment Act at Northern Ute by "Sapenies Cuch," who "withdrew with 600 people . . . refusing to participate in a scheme that seemed to him ruinous." Although there may have been two incidents of this sort, it is likely that this incident is the same recounted by Jorgensen. Discrepancies may be attributable to a combination of the well-documented Ute penchant for using multiple names for the same individual and the somewhat unreliable reporting of a zealous, but ill-informed, employee of the Indian Bureau in the 1930s.

5. Jorgensen labeled Charley as Muwach rather than Capota. It is likely that he was both, but he is regarded by most Utes as having been "Chief of the Capota."

6. A corporate entity called "The Western Shoshone National Council" has been established subsequently, with Jerry Millett, a much younger man, occupying the office of chief.

7. Revised version of a paper presented at the Nineteenth Great Basin Anthropological Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1984. Research reflected in this paper was conducted at various times between 1970 and 1983, with funding from several sources, among them the National Institute of Mental Health, the Research Foundation of the City University of New York, and the Philips Fund of the American Philosophical Society.

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